Present: All the Justices 

AMANDA LELIA WAGONER, A MINOR, BY 

HER NEXT FRIEND, STACY WAGONER, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 972621 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 September 18, 1998 

TERESA SCOTT BENSON, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 

David V. Williams, Judge 

Amanda Lelia Wagoner, by her next friend, filed a motion 

for judgment against the Henry County School Board (the School 

Board) and Theresa Scott Benson, a school bus driver for the 

School Board, for injuries sustained when she was hit by an 

automobile while crossing a road to board a school bus driven 

by Benson. The trial court dismissed the motion for judgment, 

holding that the defendants were entitled to sovereign 

immunity under Code § 22.1-194. We will reverse the judgment 

of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings 

because we conclude that the accident arose out of the 

"loading" of the school bus as defined by the School Board's 

liability insurance policy and, therefore, the defendants were 

not entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to Code § 22.1-

194. 

Just before seven o'clock in the morning on December 5, 

1995, Stacy Wagoner drove her daughter Amanda to the school 

bus stop. She parked the car north of the westbound lane of 

State Route 57. A school bus driven by Benson approached the 
bus stop in the eastbound lane of Route 57 with its headlights 

on. When the bus was approximately 700 feet from the bus 

stop, Benson turned on the flashing red safety lights and, 

approximately thirty feet from the stop, she extended a 

mechanical stop sign. When the bus reached the stop, Wagoner 

got out of her mother's car and began crossing the westbound 

lane of Route 57 toward the front of the bus. When Wagoner 

was approximately half-way across the westbound lane, she was 

struck by a car driven by Mildred V. Brown and sustained 

serious injuries. 

Wagoner subsequently instituted this litigation.1 The 

School Board and Benson filed a plea of sovereign immunity.2 

The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed the motion 

for judgment, concluding that sovereign immunity was not 

waived pursuant to Code § 22.1-194 because the School Board's 

liability insurance policy did not provide valid, collectible 

insurance for Wagoner's injuries. We awarded Wagoner an 

appeal. 

 A public school board is entitled to sovereign immunity 

from liability for injuries resulting from the school board's 

simple negligence unless that immunity is abrogated by 

 1

 Wagoner also named Brown as a defendant, but dismissed 

that claim following a settlement agreement. 

2
statute. Kellam v. School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 

252, 255, 117 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1960). Code § 22.1-194 abrogates 

a school board's sovereign immunity to a limited degree. If 

the school board is an insured under a policy covering a 

vehicle involved in an accident, the school board is "subject 

to action up to, but not beyond, the limits of valid and 

collectible insurance in force to cover the injury complained 

of . . . and the defense of governmental immunity shall not be 

a bar to action or recovery." Code § 22.1-194. 

In this case, the School Board was an insured under a 

motor vehicle liability policy covering the school bus 

involved in the accident. Whether the School Board is 

entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity depends upon 

whether its policy was "valid and collectible insurance in 

force to cover the injury complained of." 

The relevant portion of the policy states that the 

insurer 

will pay all sums anyone we protect legally must pay 

as damages caused by an accident covered by this 

policy. The accident must arise out of the 

ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of 

an auto we insure.

Wagoner argues that the accident in which she was injured 

arose out of the "loading" of the school bus, and, therefore, 

 2

 For purposes of this appeal, we need not distinguish 

between the availability of the sovereign immunity defense for 

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the School Board and Benson were not entitled to sovereign 

immunity because valid and collectible insurance was 

available. We agree. 

 "Loading" is not defined in the liability insurance 

policy. While the word "load" can be used as either a noun or 

a verb, it is used as a verb in this insurance policy. 

Webster's defines the verb "load" as putting "a load in or on" 

or "to place in or on a means of conveyance." Webster's Third 

International Dictionary 1325 (1993). Neither the dictionary 

definition nor common usage limits "loading" to a single point 

in time or single action. "Loading" is a process which moves 

a "load" from one place to another. 

In this case, loading the school bus was a function 

performed by the bus driver. The loading process, that is 

moving the students from the road onto the bus, involved a 

number of steps. Those steps, viewed from the perspective of 

the driver performing the process, include turning on flashing 

warning lights and extending the mechanical stop sign and the 

metal safety gate, all of which remain engaged until all 

students are inside or have been "loaded onto" the school bus. 

Under the facts of this case, the accident clearly arose 

during the "loading" of the school bus. 

 

Benson and the School Board. 

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Contrary to the argument of the School Board and Benson, 

our decision in Stern v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 252 Va. 307, 477 

S.E.2d 517 (1996), does not require a different result. The 

similarity between Stern and this case is limited to the fact 

that both cases involve students who were injured while 

approaching a school bus with the intent of entering the bus. 

The legal issues involved in the two cases are not similar. 

First, Stern was not concerned with whether valid and 

collectible liability insurance was available to cover the 

injuries sustained by the student pursuant to Code § 22.1-194. 

Rather, the issue in Stern involved uninsured motorist 

coverage, specifically whether the injured student qualified 

as an insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of a 

school board's liability policy or was entitled to coverage 

under the provisions of the uninsured motorist statute, Code 

§ 38.2-2206. Stern, 252 Va. at 310, 477 S.E.2d at 519. 

Consequently, the focus of the inquiry in Stern was the 

student's use of the insured vehicle, not the use of the 

insured vehicle by the school bus driver, as it is in this 

case. Furthermore, Stern addressed the interpretation of the 

words "using" and "occupying" in the context of uninsured 

motorist coverage, not the meaning of the word "loading" in 

the context of an automobile liability policy. Id. Thus, the 

holding in Stern simply is not applicable to this case. 

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In summary, we conclude that Wagoner's injuries were 

sustained in an accident arising out of the loading of a 

school bus insured by a motor vehicle liability policy in 

which the School Board was an insured. Because valid and 

collectible insurance was available to cover Wagoner's 

injuries, the defense of sovereign immunity does not bar an 

action against the School Board and Benson for recovery of 

damages in an amount up to the limits of the insurance policy. 

Code § 22.1-194. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court 

and remand the case for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.

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