UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERVIN RODDELL HUGHES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (2:02-cr-00012-BO-1)

Argued: September 23, 2010 Decided: October 6, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: James Edward Todd, Jr., OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. 

Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal 

Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States 

Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ervin Roddell Hughes appeals the twenty-four month sentence 

imposed on him for violation of his term of supervised release. 

Hughes argues that this sentence is plainly unreasonable. We 

affirm.

In 2003, Hughes pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a 

felon, and received a sentence of 92 months imprisonment to be 

followed by 36 months of supervised release. On June 30, 2009, 

Hughes completed his term of imprisonment. Two-and-a-half 

months later, on September 17, 2009, a probation officer 

petitioned the court for revocation of Hughes’ term of 

supervised release. The probation officer explained that in 

violation of the terms of release Hughes had: (1) tested

positive for marijuana on three occasions; (2) failed to report 

for random drug testing on two occasions; (3) engaged in 

criminal conduct, including reckless driving, resisting a public 

officer, and hit and run leaving the scene of property damage;

and (4) failed to work regularly at a lawful occupation. The 

probation officer completed a worksheet that weighed the 

violations according to the Sentencing Commission’s Policy 

Statements; this produced an advisory imprisonment range of 8-14 

months.

At the revocation hearing, Hughes admitted violations (1), 

(2), and (4), and did not contest violation (3). Hughes’ 
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attorney suggested that the police officer involved in that 

violation “summariz[e] the evidence” as to it. According to the 

uncontroverted statement of the officer, after he activated his 

blue lights and initiated a traffic stop of Hughes’ car at 

3:00 a.m. on August 29, 2009, Hughes accelerated away from and 

attempted to elude the officer, proceeding to swerve into a 

ditch. Hughes then jumped out of the car and ran into the 

woods. The police set up a perimeter and sent out a search team

and the officer found Hughes hiding in a creek bed.

Hughes told the court that he panicked because he had been 

robbed earlier that night and feared being found in violation of 

his conditions of supervised release. After considering Hughes’ 

explanation, the district court concluded that Hughes had 

violated his term of supervised release. The court then asked

defense counsel if there was “anything [he] wanted to say.” 

Defense counsel responded that Hughes had secured some part-time 

work, had paid off part of a ticket, and knew that he needed 

treatment for his drug problem. Neither Hughes nor his counsel 

requested a sentence within the guidelines range, sought a

sentence that departed from the guidelines range, or even 

mentioned the guidelines or the § 3553 factors.

After the Government counsel reminded the court that 

Hughes’ original offense also involved fleeing an abandoned 

vehicle, the district court sentenced Hughes to the statutory 
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maximum -- twenty-four months imprisonment. The court explained 

that Hughes’ violation involved a “highly dangerous situation” 

and created a “bad scene.” The record reflects no objection to 

that sentence or even comment on it from Hughes or his counsel.

“[R]evocation sentences should be reviewed to determine 

whether they are ‘plainly unreasonable’ with regard to those 

§ 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised release revocation 

sentences.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th 

Cir. 2006).

Moreover, although neither Hughes nor the Government

addressed the issue in their briefs, the record mandates that in 

determining whether the challenged sentence in this case is 

“plainly unreasonable,” we apply the rigorous plain error 

standard of review. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 

577-80 (4th Cir. 2010). Preservation of an objection to a 

sentence sufficient to evade plain error review requires a 

defendant to make an argument drawn from the § 3553 factors that 

“sufficiently alerts the district court of its responsibility to 

render an individualized explanation” of the sentence. Id. at 

578. Neither Hughes nor his counsel made such an argument here. 

The district court expressly gave Hughes and his counsel an 

opportunity to speak prior to imposition of the sentence. 

Indeed, after discerning the facts of Hughes’ violation, the 

court specifically asked defense counsel if there was “anything 
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you want to say.” In response, defense counsel did not request 

a guidelines (or lower) sentence or even mention the guidelines 

or § 3553. Thus, Hughes did not preserve his present argument 

that the sentence imposed is plainly unreasonable.

Given the rigorous plain error standard of review, see

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (setting forth 

plain error standard), we must affirm. Hughes has failed to 

demonstrate that the district court plainly erred by imposing a 

plainly unreasonable revocation sentence.

AFFIRMED