UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, FEBBO, and SCHASBERGER 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Sergeant First Class QUANTRELL L. ANDERSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20170158 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence 

Richard J. Henry, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Leslie A. Rowley, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Captain Heather M. Martin, JA; William E. Cassara, Esquire (on 

brief and reply brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, 

JA; Major Hannah E. Kaufman, JA; Captain Allison L. Rowley, JA (on brief). 

21 February 2019 

--------------------------------- 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

--------------------------------- 

SCHASBERGER, Judge: 

 Maltreatment of subordinates is a criminal offense specific to the military. 

Military leaders hold unique and far-reaching authority over junior enlisted soldiers. 

This authority comes with obligations. One such obligation is the requirement to 

treat subordinate soldiers with a basic level of dignity and respect. Maltreatment is 

an offense against such dignity and respect, and thus an offense against the bedrock 

of military order and discipline. For this reason, conduct that would not be criminal 

in any civilian context may constitute the offense of maltreatment if directed toward 

subordinate soldiers by military superiors. Such is the case here. 

 

A panel with enlisted members sitting as a general court-martial convicted 

appellant, contrary to his pleas, of three specifications of maltreatment and one 

specification of abusive sexual contact in violation of Articles 93 and 120, Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 893 and 920. The panel sentenced 

appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, thirty months of confinement, forfeiture of all 

pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

2 

approved the adjudged sentence and credited appellant with four days against his 

sentence to confinement. Appellant’s case is now before us under Article 66, 

UCMJ.1

BACKGROUND 

Appellant was an Army air traffic controller (ATC) and served as the facility 

chief-in-charge of one of the control towers at Fort Rucker. The tower command 

structure was, in descending order, the ATC Chief, facility chief, training 

supervisor, shift leaders, ATCs, and ATC trainees. In November 2015, Specialist 

(SPC)2

 BK was assigned as an ATC trainee with duty in appellant’s tower. 

Over the course of the next few months, appellant and SPC BK exchanged 

hundreds of text messages. While some of the messages were related to work, others 

were sexually suggestive, and some others were sexually explicit. Appellant 

repeatedly asked for pictures of SPC BK in a sports bra and other workout attire. In 

the messages, appellant offered the flimsy rationale that he wanted the pictures to 

evaluate SPC BK’s progress in physical fitness. For this purported reason, he 

directed SPC BK to provide him images showing “every nook and cranny” of her 

body. Appellant also suggested he might implement “strip training.” Appellant 

explained that in “strip training,” he would quiz SPC BK on professional topics and, 

if she answered incorrectly, she would have to strip for appellant or, in the 

alternative, allow him to perform oral sex on her. Specialist BK’s responses to these 

messages varied: some she ignored; some she responded to in-kind; and to some she 

responded by changing the subject. 

In the very early morning of 1 January 2016, appellant called SPC BK and 

asked to come over and hang out with her at the barracks. He made up a story of 

being locked out of his own residence. Specialist BK agreed and said she was 

hanging out with friends. Appellant texted, “I’m trying to see all u sexy girls.” 

Specialist BK texted back, “it’s me, [SL], [S], and [PC].” Appellant’s response was, 

 

1

 In matters raised under United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), 

appellant argues the military judge erred in allowing improper sentencing evidence. 

We find no prejudicial error. We are also satisfied appellant’s conviction of abusive 

sexual contact is legally and factually sufficient. We limit our further discussion to 

appellant’s arguments regarding his convictions of maltreatment. 

2

 When she first arrived at appellant’s tower, SPC BK had the rank of Private First 

Class (PFC). At some later date, she achieved the rank of SPC. For consistency, we 

use her rank of SPC throughout this opinion. At all relevant times, SPC BK was a 

PFC or SPC and therefore considered a junior enlisted soldier. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

3 

“[s]o long as it’s females I’m good lol is that cool.”3 Of the three other soldiers, SL 

and PC were women and S was a man. Ultimately, SPC BK told appellant to let her 

know when he arrived and she and a friend would come out to meet him. Appellant 

asked what friend would accompany SPC BK, to which she responded, “[her] friend 

from Bravo Company.” 

When appellant arrived at the barracks, SPC BK and PFC PC came out to 

meet him. At that time, PFC PC did not know appellant’s rank. Specialist S joined 

them shortly thereafter and the four soldiers went to SPC BK’s barracks room. 

In SPC BK’s barracks room, SPC BK and PFC PC sat on the bed and appellant 

sat between them. Over the course of the next few hours, appellant repeatedly 

placed his arm around PFC PC, which PFC PC resisted by moving his arm off of her. 

Appellant and PFC PC also exchanged text messages while sitting next to each 

other. During this time, PFC PC learned that appellant was a senior NCO in SPC 

BK’s tower. Appellant showed PFC PC his identification card. 

At one point, PFC PC asked appellant to remove his hand from her stomach. 

Appellant responded by shoving his hand down PFC PC’s pants and touching her 

vulva. Private First Class PC grabbed appellant’s arm, removed his hand from her 

pants, and got up. Eventually, SPC BK and PFC PC got appellant to leave, in spite 

of his protests that he had nowhere to go. 

Some of the texts appellant sent to PFC PC during this time included: “Come 

on so I can feel u up in privacy;” “I am wanting to taste you I have never done that 

b4 with a white female lol;” “Ok sorry for harassing you . . . Why you so mad;” and 

“Why won’t u let me try. . . answer damn it lol.” 

 In February 2016, after the Super Bowl, another junior air traffic controller in 

the unit, SPC SL, engaged in a text conversation with appellant regarding the 

outcome of the game. After a few messages were exchanged on this topic, appellant 

asked her if she wanted “to know a real secret.” Upon her response of “ok,” 

appellant sent the message: “When you arrived I wanted to do u.”4

 Specialist SL 

reported the incident the next day and told SPC BK and PFC PC that she was 

reporting it. This led both SPC BK and PFC PC to report appellant’s misconduct 

toward them as well. 

 

3

 Because the text messages at issue are replete with acronyms and misspellings, we 

omit the use of “[sic]” when presenting the content of the texts. 

4

 Appellant concluded this message with an “emoji” depicting a monkey covering its 

mouth with its hands. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

4 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

 Appellant argues that his convictions of maltreating SPC BK and PFC PC are 

legally and factually insufficient. 

We review legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v. 

Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002). “The test for legal sufficiency of 

the evidence is ‘whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential elements 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83, 94 (C.A.A.F. 

2002) (quoting United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987)). The test for 

factual sufficiency “is whether, after weighing the evidence in the record of trial and 

making allowances for not having personally observed the witnesses,” the court is 

“convinced of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Turner, 25 M.J. at 

325. 

 The Manual for Courts-Martial sets out two elements in Article 93: (1) the 

victim was subject to the orders of the appellant; and (2) the appellant was cruel 

toward, oppressed, or maltreated the victim. Manual for Courts-Martial, United 

States (2012 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 17.b. Our superior court has clarified that to 

affirm a conviction of maltreatment the evidence must prove: “(a) the accused knew

that the alleged victim was subject to his . . . orders; (b) the accused knew that he . . 

. was making statements or engaging in certain conduct in respect to that 

subordinate; and (c) when viewed objectively under all the circumstances, those 

statements or actions were unwarranted, unjustified, and unnecessary for any lawful 

purpose and caused, or reasonably could have caused, physical or mental harm or 

suffering.” United States v. Caldwell, 75 M.J. 276, 281 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (emphasis 

original). 

The discussion in the MCM explains maltreatment must be measured by an 

objective standard. It further states: “[S]exual harassment may constitute this 

offense. Sexual harassment includes influencing, offering to influence, or 

threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual favors, 

and deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature.” 

MCM, Part IV, ¶ 17.c.(2). 

The flipside of giving military superiors extraordinary power over their 

subordinates is that they may be held accountable for abusing that power. As 

discussed below, we conclude appellant abused his power as an NCO by maltreating 

junior enlisted soldiers. Appellant’s abuse of power lacked any lawful purpose and 

harmed soldiers subject to his orders. By abusing his power in this way, appellant 

committed the offense of maltreatment. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

5 

A. Maltreatment of SPC BK 

 Appellant argued at trial and on appeal that he cannot be guilty of maltreating 

SPC BK because she was an active and willing participant in the messages that 

constitute the basis of the specification. 

 Appellant’s argument centers on the defense of consent. To address this 

argument, we examine three related issues. First, we define consent. Next, we 

establish how consent relates to the elements of maltreatment. Finally, we discuss 

whether it is a defense to maltreatment that an accused held a mistake of fact as to 

consent. 

 First, we note neither the text of the statute, nor the relevant Rule for CourtsMartial (R.C.M.), list consent as a defense to a charge of maltreatment. See 

generally, UCMJ art. 93; R.C.M. 916. In fact, the word “consent” does not even 

appear in the statute or discussions of Article 93. Consent is defined in the UCMJ, 

albeit in a different punitive article, as “a freely given agreement to the conduct at 

issue by a competent person.” UCMJ art. 120(g)(8). 

 Next, we conclude consent is relevant to, but not dispositive of, allegations of 

maltreatment. Approaching the issue from an elemental analysis, we see that 

consent plays no role in the first two elements of maltreatment identified by our 

superior court—i.e. whether the accused knew that the alleged victim was subject to 

his orders, or whether the accused knew he was making statements or engaging in 

certain conduct toward that subordinate. Whether consent is relevant to the third 

element—that when viewed objectively, appellant’s conduct was unwarranted, 

unjustified, and unnecessary for any lawful purpose and reasonably could have 

caused, physical or mental harm or suffering—is more complicated. On one hand, 

Caldwell tells us that the statements or actions are to be viewed objectively, which 

would lead to the conclusion that a victim’s perspective is not relevant. See 75 M.J. 

at 280. On the other hand, the statements or actions need to be unwarranted, 

unjustified, and unnecessary for any lawful purpose and must have caused, or 

reasonably could have caused, physical or mental harm or suffering. 

 Can consent transform actions that would otherwise meet the third element of 

Article 93 into actions that do not? We think so. In some circumstances, consent 

may alter something with no lawful purpose into something that is lawful.5 

Similarly, consent can alter whether it is reasonable to believe an action will cause 

harm. Indeed, our superior court has held that consensual sexual relations between 

 

5

 For example, consent may transform otherwise assaultive behavior in recreational 

striking and grappling sports into lawful activity. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

6 

an NCO and a junior enlisted soldier do not necessarily constitute maltreatment. 

United States v. Fuller, 54 M.J. 107, 111-12, (C.A.A.F. 2000) (overruled on other 

grounds by United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 389 (C.A.A.F. 2009). In Fuller, 

our superior court found a maltreatment conviction was legally insufficient when 

there was “no evidence” rank disparity played any role in the junior soldier’s 

consent and there was no evidence the junior soldier felt otherwise offended or 

harassed by the encounter. Id.

 Understanding that consent can affect whether there was maltreatment, we 

turn to the question of whether any alleged consent did affect whether appellant 

committed maltreatment in this case. Again, assuming that SPC BK consented to the 

text messages, we ask whether such consent imbued appellant’s conduct with a 

lawful purpose or made it objectively reasonable to believe SPC BK would suffer no 

physical or mental harm as a result. We conclude the answer is, “no.” 

 Consent does not cure all wrongs. This is especially true in situations where 

consent is obtained through exertion of authority, or where overriding policy 

interests weigh against allowing leaders to harm their subordinates even with their 

subordinates’ consent. In this case, the sexual text messages from a senior NCO 

facility chief to a junior soldier ATC trainee were unjustified and harmful despite 

any alleged consent by SPC BK. No amount of consent makes the text messages 

necessary or justified. Further, unlike in Fuller, appellant plainly used his rank as 

leverage to subject SPC BK to conduct that could reasonably cause her harm and 

suffering notwithstanding consent. For example, appellant’s “strip training” plan 

was patently demeaning to SPC BK and flowed directly from appellant’s rank and 

supervisory position. Similarly, appellant’s attempts to convince SPC BK that he 

could be her “boss” and a “FWB”6

 would, at a minimum, likely erode SPC BK’s 

confidence in the safety and professionalism of her workplace. Thus, unlike in 

Fuller, appellant repeatedly invoked his rank and authority when communicating 

harassing and offensive messages to SPC BK. 

 While we conclude appellant’s claim would fail even if there was actual 

consent, we do not find SPC BK consented to all the communications at issue. 

Rather, SPC BK’s testimony is replete with evidence that her participation was not 

always “freely given.” Appellant is correct that there is evidence of SPC BK’s 

willing participation in some of the sexual text discussions. The evidence of SPC 

 

6

 Specialist BK interpreted “FWB” to be a “friend with benefits.” The “benefit” 

being sex with appellant. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

7 

BK’s participation, however, does not introduce reasonable doubt as to the 

harmfulness or the unjustified nature of appellant’s communications as a whole.7

 Finally, appellant’s claim that he had a reasonable mistake of fact as to SPC 

BK’s consent fails for at least two reasons. First, as discussed above, even if SPC 

BK did consent to the communications in question, consent would not have rendered 

appellant’s actions harmless or justified. Second, “if an accused’s knowledge or 

intent is immaterial as to an element, the ignorance or mistake is not a defense.” 

R.C.M. 916(j)(1). As discussed above, the element of maltreatment that the conduct 

at issue must be “unwarranted, unjustified, and unnecessary for any lawful purpose 

and caused, or reasonably could have caused, physical or mental harm or suffering” 

is an objective test. Caldwell, 75 M.J. at 281. Appellant’s alleged mistake of fact 

is, therefore, immaterial to the element at issue. 

With the foregoing legal issues settled, and after weighing the evidence in the 

record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed the 

witnesses, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt appellant is guilty of the 

offense of maltreating SPC BK. See Turner, 25 M.J. at 325. 

B. Was PFC PC Subject to Appellant’s Orders? 

 Appellant argues that his conviction of maltreatment of PFC PC is legally and 

factually insufficient. Appellant’s argument is not that PFC PC consented to the text 

messages appellant sent her, but instead that there was no evidence that PFC PC was 

subject to his orders or had a duty to obey him. 

 For the purpose of our analysis, we find as fact: First, appellant was, at the 

time of the incident, a Sergeant First Class and senior ATC with duty as facility 

chief for one of Fort Rucker’s control towers. Second, appellant knew PFC PC was 

a junior soldier, in the same battalion as he, and was in the same company as other 

junior soldiers who worked in his facility. Third, appellant first met PFC PC in the 

early morning of New Year’s Day, in the parking lot of the barracks where PFC PC 

and SPC BK lived. Finally, PFC PC knew that appellant was an NCO and worked in 

the tower where SPC BK worked. 

 

7

 When a junior enlisted soldier is communicating with an officer or NCO, it is not 

appropriate to interpret mere silence by the subordinate as affirmative consent to 

offensive behavior by his or her military superior. The inherently coercive nature of 

military authority may overcome a junior soldier’s willingness to contradict or 

object to even clearly objectionable conduct by his or her superiors. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

8 

At trial, appellant argued that the government had not met its burden of 

showing that PFC PC knew appellant was an NCO and whether she knew that she 

had to follow his orders. As stated above, however, the knowledge requirement is 

not that PFC PC knew she had a duty to follow appellant’s orders; the knowledge 

requirement is that “the accused knew that the alleged victim was subject to his . . . 

orders.” Caldwell, 75 M.J. at 281 (emphasis on “accused” added). 

On appeal, appellant’s argument is that appellant did not know PFC PC was 

subject to his orders; specifically that there was no evidence that appellant knew 

PFC PC was a junior enlisted soldier. We find that SPC BK’s text message to 

appellant stating that her friend was in Bravo Company clearly established PFC PC 

was a soldier, and in the same battalion as appellant. The totality of the 

circumstances, including PFC PC’s age, friendship with other junior soldiers, and 

the location of the meeting in barracks for junior enlisted soldiers combine to 

establish that appellant knew PFC PC was a junior enlisted soldier. 

 To establish a violation of Article 93, the government must show not only that 

appellant knew PFC PC was subordinate in rank to him, but also that PFC PC was 

actually subject to appellant’s orders and that appellant knew it. The question then 

becomes whether PFC PC’s status as a junior enlisted soldier in appellant’s battalion 

necessarily makes her subject to appellant’s orders. We conclude it does. 

 While a direct supervisory relationship between appellant and PFC PC would 

make this an easy case to resolve, the lack of such direct supervision is not 

dispositive. The MCM explains the term “subject to his orders” includes “all 

persons, subject to the code or not, who by reason of some duty are required to obey 

the lawful orders of the accused, regardless whether the accused is in the direct 

chain of command over the person.” MCM, Part IV, ¶17.c(1) (emphasis added). 

 We recognize that the question of who is “subject to the orders of” whom has 

been addressed before, most recently in our court by United States v. Keller, 2018 

CCA LEXIS 463, *9-14 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 26 Sept. 2018). In Keller, we 

acknowledged that there is no definitive answer in case law or statute to the question 

of when a junior enlisted soldier is subject to the orders of a superior enlisted 

soldier. Id. at *11. We observed there is a difference between charges of 

disobeying a commissioned officer under Article 90 and charges of disobeying an 

NCO under Article 91. Id. at *10-11. As a result, we concluded that, in cases 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

9 

alleging maltreatment by an NCO, it is not enough to merely show that the accused 

is of higher enlisted rank than the person he or she allegedly maltreated.8 Id. at *12. 

Though not directly on point, we find the analysis in Keller instructive.9

 To 

answer whether SPC MR, the victim in Keller, was subject to Keller’s orders we 

asked: “if SFC Keller had ordered SPC MR to take a position on the perimeter, or to 

direct weapons fire onto a certain target, or had stopped her on the base and told her 

to make a uniform correction, could SPC MR have disobeyed those orders without 

fear of being court-martialed?” Id. at *13. Having concluded that the answer was, 

“[c]ertainly not,” we found SPC MR was subject to Keller’s orders for the purposes 

of Article 93.10

 Similarly, in this case, we must ask whether PFC PC had a duty to obey 

lawful orders from appellant. We conclude she did. 

 Private First Class PC was a junior soldier in appellant’s battalion. She 

testified that being an ATC trainee was her first duty assignment and, at the time of 

the offense, she had only been at Fort Rucker a few months. Based on customs of 

the service in the Army, we are convinced that if appellant ordered her to correct a 

 

8

 For offenses under Article 90, it is enough to show that the officer is of higher rank 

than the accused, whereas under Article 91 the accused must be have a duty to obey 

the order of the NCO. By extension, we infer enlisted soldiers generally have a duty 

to obey all lawful orders from officers but not necessarily every lawful order from 

NCOs. 

9

 We acknowledge that two of our sister courts have reached a narrower reading of 

the term “subject to the orders.” See United States v. Sullivan, 2016 CCA LEXIS 

404 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 13 Jul. 2016); United States v. Curry, 1991 CMR LEXIS 

1144 (N.C.M.R. 31 Jul. 1991). We find it important, however, to acknowledge the 

customs of the services may differ as to the expectations of junior enlisted members 

to obey the orders of NCOs. For example, the nature of combat for the Navy and 

Coast Guard is very different than combat in the Army. The fluidity of groundbased combat may have led us in the Army to slightly different customs and 

expectations than our maritime-focused brethren. We do not presume to speak to the 

customs of our sister services. Also, we find both cases from our sister courts 

factually distinguishable from the situation in both this case and Keller. 

10 The offenses in Keller arose on a deployment in Kosovo. The victim was not in 

the same unit as Keller and their actual interaction was at night in a non-official 

setting. We found the deployed environment was one of the important factors in 

analyzing whether SPC MR was subject to Keller’s orders. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

10 

uniform deficiency, pick up trash, come to the position of parade rest and stop 

talking, or take a message to her First Sergeant, PFC PC would have been obliged to 

obey. 

The Soldier’s Guide teaches junior enlisted soldiers to: 

• Obey the lawful orders of NCOs and officers. 

• Treat others with dignity and respect. 

• Complete each task to the very best degree possible and 

not just to standard. 

• Maintain a military appearance. 

• Maintain individual physical fitness standards and 

readiness. 

• Maintain individual equipment and clothing to standard. 

Dep’t of Army Training Circular 7-21.13, Soldier’s Guide [Soldier’s Guide], para. 

4-9 (30 Nov. 2015).11 

The Soldier’s Guide elaborates on general military authority—as opposed to 

direct command authority—as follows: 

[General military authority] originates in oaths of office 

and enlistment, law, rank structure, traditions, and 

regulations. This broad-based authority allows leaders to 

take appropriate corrective actions whenever a member of 

the armed services commits an act involving a breach of 

good order and discipline. Army Regulation 600-20, [sic] 

specifically gives this authority to commissioned, warrant, 

and noncommissioned officers. 

Soldier’s Guide, para. 4-11.a(2). In other words, in the Army, junior enlisted 

soldiers are trained to comply with lawful orders from officers and NCOs without 

inquiring into the basis for such orders. See also Army Reg. 600-20, Army 

Command Policy, para. 4-2 (6 Nov. 2014) (“All persons in the military Service are 

required to strictly obey and promptly execute the legal orders of their lawful 

seniors.”). 

 

11 Training Circular 7-21.13 became effective shortly before the events at issue in 

this case. The Training Circular replaced Dep’t of Army Field Manual 7-21-3, The 

Soldier’s Guide (2 Feb. 2004) [FM 7-21-3]. The Field Manual version of the 

Soldier’s Guide included almost identical language. FM 7-21-3 at para. 3-21. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

11 

 As set out in the Soldier’s Guide, we find it is a custom of the service in the 

Army that junior enlisted soldiers—meaning the ranks of Private E1 through 

Specialist—generally have at least some duty to obey lawful orders of NCOs.12 We 

acknowledge that this is potentially a broad conclusion, but we believe it accurately 

reflects the actual custom of service in the Army. In basic training, we do not 

instruct our soldiers which NCOs they must obey and which they can ignore. In the 

modern Army, different units often serve together in a single task force, or are 

otherwise comingled. In a deployed setting, there might be half a dozen or more 

units on a base, all sharing responsibility for accomplishing a mission. 

 There is an inherent tension when we require a soldier to obey the lawful 

orders of higher ranking persons not in their chain of command. For both NCOs and 

officers, the Army resolves this tension by expecting obedience from junior enlisted 

soldiers, and expecting officers and NCOs to respect the chain of command and to 

exercise discretion when interacting outside their chain of command. See Army 

Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership, para. 2 (Aug. 2012). 

We do not think the conclusion that junior enlisted soldiers have a duty to 

obey the lawful orders of NCOs—at least for the purposes of Article 93—is an 

overbroad reading of the law. For the purposes of the offense of maltreatment, the 

language of the UCMJ does not require the subordinate have a duty to obey all

lawful orders of the superior in order to be “subject to the orders of” that superior. 

The MCM explains that the subordinate need merely have “some duty” to obey. 

MCM, Part IV, ¶17.c(1).13 

 

12 By “generally,” we mean that the custom of the service we acknowledge in this 

opinion is only the custom in the usual case. Under extraordinary facts and 

circumstances, a particular junior soldier might have no duty whatsoever to obey a 

particular NCO. Such extraordinary facts and circumstances are simply not present 

in appellant’s case. Further, nothing in this opinion should be construed as 

lessening the government’s burden to prove every element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The custom of the service in the Army is a supporting factor in 

the government’s case, but it is not wholly dispositive of the element in question. 

13 The duty to obey in the offense of maltreatment under Article 93 and the duty to 

obey in the offense of disobeying an NCO under Article 91 are not quite the same. 

The issue in Article 91 turns on a superior NCO giving a lawful order and the 

subordinate having a duty to obey that specific order. In the context of 

maltreatment, however, the question is whether the subordinate has some duty to 

obey the lawful orders of the accused in the abstract. Soldiers never have a duty to 

obey unlawful orders. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20170158 

12 

Further, even if all junior enlisted soldiers in the Army did not have some 

duty to obey all NCOs in the Army, there is no question that PFC PC had a duty to 

obey appellant. This is not a case with soldiers from different installations who met 

off post, or even soldiers close in rank. In this case, appellant was an NCO of the 

grade E-7 and PFC PC was a junior enlisted soldier of the grade E-3. Appellant and 

PFC PC met at the barracks, and appellant was the supervisor of PFC PC’s friend 

SPC BK. Appellant was an NCO in the same battalion as PFC PC. Under any 

reasonable reading of the facts, PFC PC was subject to appellant’s lawful orders and 

appellant knew it. 

CONCLUSION 

Appellant used his rank of Sergeant First Class to subject junior enlisted 

soldiers to his patently offensive sexual overtures. Leveraging his rank, appellant 

counted on the silence, if not the consent, of the soldiers he maltreated. Ultimately, 

he obtained neither. We find appellant’s resulting convictions and sentence are 

correct in law and fact, and should be approved. 

The findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge MULLIGAN and Judge FEBBO concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: