Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

MARK SMALL NATALIE A. FANTETTI

Indianapolis, Indiana Indiana Department of Child Services

Peru, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

DCS Central Administration

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF )

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP )

Of R.R. and T.R., Minor Children, )

)

R.R., Father, )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 52A02-1208-JT-665

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )

SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MIAMI SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Daniel C. Banina, Judge

Cause Nos. 52D02-1106-JT-8; 52D02-1106-JT-10

April 30, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

R.R. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to Ri.R. and 

T.R. (collectively, Children). He argues the Department of Child Services (DCS) did not 

present sufficient evidence there was a reasonable possibility the conditions that resulted in 

Children’s removal would not be remedied. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ri.R. was born to Father and B.R.1 on February 28, 2003. On September 29, 2009, he 

was removed from Father’s care because Father’s girlfriend, S.S., struck and injured Ri.R.. 

Ri.R. was placed in foster care, where he remained during the proceedings.

T.R. was born to Father and S.S. 2 on December 31, 2008. On February 18, 2010, she 

was removed from Father’s care because she “appeared lethargic and sickly, and her feces 

were like little white rocks. Neither [S.S.] nor Father seemed to see [T.R.’s] condition as 

alarming.” (App. at 37.) She was placed in the same foster care home as Ri.R., where she 

remained during the proceedings.

The Children were each adjudicated as Children in Need of Services (CHINS). Father 

was ordered to, among other things, participate in substance abuse services; participate in 

home-based services to “address issues of domestic violence, abuse/neglect, and parenting;” 

attend visitation with Children; address mental health issues; attend domestic violence group 

therapy sessions; and provide documentation of financial responsibility or full-time 

employment. (Id. at 53.) On July 14, the juvenile court found Father in indirect contempt,

 

1 B.R.’s parental rights were terminated prior to Father’s rights. 

2

S.S.’s parental rights were not terminated.
3

because he did not participate in some of the services ordered, and sentenced him to ninety 

days in jail. The sentence was suspended as long as Father complied with some requirements 

already ordered, specifically to continue supervised visitation and be on time for all visits; 

continue individual and couples counseling with S.S.; continue home-based services; 

participate in a psychiatric evaluation and receive medication for anxiety and ADHD; and 

“participate in a medical evaluation for his back problem and seek alternatives to the use of 

methadone for pain management if recommended by a licensed physician not affiliated with 

the methadone clinic.” (Id.) 

On July 1, 2011, DCS petitioned for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental 

rights. On April 30, 2012, and May 1, 2012, the juvenile court held evidentiary hearings 

regarding each child, and on July 17, 2012, it terminated Father’s rights.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S., and 

B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh evidence or judge 

credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the 

judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we 

will set aside a judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied 534 

U.S. 1161 (2002). 

When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, 
4

we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 

839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine first whether the evidence supports the 

findings and second whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly 

erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by 

inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and 

inferences support the juvenile court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 

208. 

However, Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings; rather he asserts

only that the findings are insufficient to support its judgment. Therefore, we need not look at 

the evidence presented, but only to the findings to determine whether they support the 

judgment. See Smith v. Miller Builders, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 

N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A juvenile court must subordinate the 

interests of the parents to those of the child, however, when evaluating the circumstances 

surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 837. The right to raise one’s own child 

should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, id., but 

parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her 

parental responsibilities. Id. at 836. 

To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, the State must allege and prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 
5

months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are 

not required, including a description of the court’s finding, the 

date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was 

made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under 

the supervision of a county office of family and children or

probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most 

recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child 

is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged 

to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a 

child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof of these 

allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. If the court 

finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. 

In deciding whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal will not be 

remedied, a juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time 

of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re 

J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. It must evaluate the parent’s 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future 
6

neglect or deprivation. Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of 

a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide 

support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 

The juvenile court also may consider, as evidence whether conditions will be 

remedied, the services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s response to those 

services. Id. A juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed by a deficient 

lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth are permanently impaired 

before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). 

Father argues the evidence was insufficient to terminate his rights to Children 

because: (1) the condition that resulted in Ri.R.’s removal, abuse at the hands of Father’s 

girlfriend, S.S., had been remedied because Father no longer lived with S.S.; and (2) the 

conditions that resulted in T.R.’s removal, failure to thrive, had been remedied because 

Father made an effort to learn more about T.R.’s medical problems and he participated in 

services. We disagree.

1. Remedy of Conditions Resulting in Ri.R.’s Removal

On September 29, 2009, DCS removed Ri.R. from Father’s home because Father’s 

girlfriend, S.S., struck Ri.R. As S.S., and not Father, struck Ri.R., and as Father and S.S. no 

longer live together, Father argues the conditions under which Ri.R. was removed from 

Father’s care are unlikely to recur. 
7

After Ri.R.’s termination hearing, the juvenile court made the following findings 

regarding Father’s participation in services:

19. In the CHINS case, Father was ordered in the dispositional order, in the 

order on the rule to show cause . . . to lower his use of methadone. However, 

Father never attempted to do so, saying he was not court ordered to reduce his 

methadone usage.

20. The first step to lowering Father’s methadone usages was to be Father 

having his back pain evaluated. Father could not afford to have his back pain 

evaluated at the Community Health Center; however, he was able to pay $80 -

$84 for his methadone weekly.

21. Father had not missed more than a few methadone clinic appointments in 

the past 5 or 6 years, but he missed approximately fourteen out of forty-one 

visitation opportunities with his Child between February, 2010 and April, 2011 

due to “emergencies.”

* * * * *

23. Father did not maintain employment as required in the rule to show cause 

and the outline; Father opined he worked at Swifty’s throughout most of 2011. 

However when asked if he was fired from Swifty’s in March, 2011, Father 

agreed that was correct.

* * * * *

25. Father claimed that he worked at his own business, R & J Tree Service, 

until he was forced to give it up while working on budgeting with the homebased provider. [S.S.] testified that Father had not worked at the tree service 

during the time she lived with him, from January, 2008 through January, 2012.

26. Father and [S.S.] never attended any type of Domestic Violence support 

groups . . .

27. There was ongoing domestic violence in the home from the time [S.S] 

became pregnant with [T.R.] until she left the final time in December, 2011. 

The physical violence occurred approximately thirty times during the course of 

the relationship.

* * * * *

29. Child witnessed Father physically and emotionally abuse [S.S.].

* * * * *

33. Father initially refused to cooperate with any services other than visitation.

* * * * *

44. Father struggled with engaging with Child during visitation in this DCS 

office. He frequently paced, complained that he had ADD and was not on 

medication, therefore he could not be confined in the visitation room at the 

office. When visits took place in the community, Father had to be reminded to

stay focused on the Child and keeping him safe. Father frequently arrived late 
8

and left early, which caused Child extreme anxiety.

45. Father never progressed to the point in visitation with Child that DCS 

recommended visits be unsupervised or even partially supervised.

* * * * *

55. Father and [S.S.] desired to have their children at home; however, they 

could not sustain the changes in their relationship necessary to get the children 

home.

* * * * *

58. Father is not likely to change, and it is very unlikely he will ever be able to 

effectively parent Child on his own.

59. Father attended a medication evaluation at Four County Counseling Center 

in December 2010; he was prescribed medication for his ADHD.

60. Father received samples, took the medication for a day or two and then 

stopped. The medication bottle was sitting in the kitchen as of the day [S.S.] 

left in December, 2011.

61. Father variously stated that he could not use the medication around heavy 

equipment, that the medication had side effects that he could not deal with, and 

that Four County Counseling Center wanted to charge for refills. Father never 

returned to Four County Counseling Center to be reevaluated.

* * * * *

66. Father has not changed his behavior since the inception of the CHINS 

case, and there is not a historical basis to say that Father is reasonably likely to 

change.

67. Throughout the underlying CHINS’ [sic] case, Father did not demonstrate 

that he was ready and able to parent the children. Father was resistant to 

services, was not forthcoming with information, failed to complete services, 

and failed to demonstrate an ability to benefit from services he had received; 

his services with Family Service Society and White’s Family Services were 

closed unsuccessfully, and Four County Counseling Center closed its referral 

because Father did not attend appointments.

68. During the time that Child had ongoing supervised visitation, his behavior 

deteriorated, especially after visits. Child would become more aggressive 

toward members of his foster family, especially the girls; he showed no respect 

for women/girls, hitting and bullying them, and saying that they “deserved” it. 

He became resistant to adult (female) supervision or redirection.

(App. at 56-61.) 

We consider a parent’s unresponsiveness, uncooperativeness, and unwillingness to 

complete assigned services, in addition to the statutory elements required, when determining 
9

sufficiency of evidence for termination of parent-child relationship. See In re L.S., 717 

N.E.2d at 210 (“pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate 

with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a 

finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change”). While it 

is true Father participated in some services, he did not complete them. Therefore, based on 

Father’s inability to complete services and lack of progress with the domestic violence issues 

in the household, the juvenile court did not err when it terminated Father’s parental rights to 

Ri.R. Father’s arguments to the contrary are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, and

we cannot. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or 

judge credibility of witnesses).

2. Remedy of Conditions Resulting in T.R.’s Removal

On February 18, 2010, DCS removed T.R. from Father’s care because she “appeared 

lethargic and sickly, and her feces were like little white rocks. Neither [S.S.] nor Father 

seemed to see [T.R.’s] condition as alarming.” (App. at 37.) Father argues since he has 

learned about T.R.’s medical conditions and how to treat them, the conditions under which 

T.R. was removed from Father’s care are unlikely to recur. We cannot agree.

The juvenile court incorporated many of the findings from the order terminating 

Father’s rights to Ri.R. and included additional findings regarding T.R.:

32. [T.R.] was diagnosed as Failure to Thrive with no known medical cause. 

Father and [S.S.] were given lists of appropriate foods for visits by the foster 

parents, but Father often failed to follow them, and denied even seeing such a 

list.

* * * * *
10

34. Father had a limited grasp of what [T.R.] could do based on her age and 

maturity level. Father received verbal instruction, hand-outs and a DVD 

program addressing child development and developmental milestones. Despite 

continuing instruction, Father showed limited, if any, progress in his 

understanding of these concepts.

* * * * *

36. Throughout much of the CHINS case, Father obsessed about [T.R.’s] 

health, and whether she was eating properly and getting enough rest at the 

foster home. Father would hover over [T.R.] during visits, micromanaging 

[T.R.] verbally, and overstimulating [T.R.].

(Id. at 43) (citations to testimony omitted). As noted in our discussion of the termination of 

Father’s rights to Ri.R., Father made some effort to complete some services, however, based 

on his unwillingness to complete other services and his lack of understanding regarding the 

proper way to care for T.R., we cannot say the juvenile court erred when it determined there 

was no reasonable probability that Father would remedy his inability to properly parent T.R. 

Father’s arguments to the contrary are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, which we 

may not do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or

judge credibility of witnesses).

CONCLUSION

DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove the conditions under which Ri.R. and T.R. 

were removed from Father’s care would not be remedied. Therefore, the juvenile court did 

not err when it terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children, and we affirm.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.