FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAINT JOHN’S ORGANIC FARM; 

PETER DILL, individually,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO

ABATEMENT DISTRICT, a political

subunit of the State of Idaho; GEM

COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO, a No. 07-35797

political unit of the State of Idaho, D.C. No.

Defendants-Appellees,  CV-04-00087-BLW

IDAHO FARM BUREAU FEDERATION; OPINION

POTATO & ONION GROWERS OF

WASHINGTON; POTATO GROWERS OF

IDAHO, INC.; WASHINGTON

ASSOCIATION OF AERIAL

APPLICATORS; WASHINGTON STATE

FARM BUREAU; WASHINGTON STATE

HORTICULTURAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-intervenors-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 10, 2009—Seattle, Washington

Filed July 16, 2009

Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould and

Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

9127
Opinion by Judge William A. Fletcher;

Concurrence by Judge Tallman

9128 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
COUNSEL

William M. Eddie; FIELD JERGER, LLP, Portland, Oregon,

Charles M. Tebbutt, WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

CENTER, Eugene, Oregon, for the appellants.

Susan E. Buxton, MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE,

Boise, Idaho, Mark L. Pollott, Boise, Idaho, Murray D. Feldman, HOLLAND & HART, LLP, Boise, Idaho, Michael John

Kane, Boise, Idaho, for the appellee.

Russell C. Brooks, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, Bellevue, Washington, for the intervenor-appellees.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Saint John’s Organic Farm and Peter Dill (collectively, “Dill”) filed suit under the citizen-suit provisions of the

Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365, against the

Gem County Mosquito Abatement District and Gem County

(collectively, “GCMAD”). Dill alleged that GCMAD’s discharges of pesticides directly into the waters of the United

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9131
States without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (“NPDES”) permit violated the CWA. Dill and

GCMAD settled the suit.

The Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) limited

GCMAD’s pesticide spraying in several ways and provided

that an application for “costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)” under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(d) could be made to the district court. (For ease of reference, we will refer simply to “attorney’s fees.”) The district

court denied Dill’s attorney’s fees application, holding under

§ 1365(d) that Dill was not a “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” and, in the alternative, that it was not “appropriate” to grant fees to Dill.

We reverse. We hold that Dill was a prevailing party under

§ 1365(d). We remand to the district court to consider

whether fees are appropriate under the standard articulated in

this opinion.

I. Background

This case arises out of GCMAD’s longstanding use of pesticides to control mosquitoes in Gem County, Idaho. Among

other measures, GCMAD has applied adulticides — pesticides used to kill adult mosquitoes — by spraying from airplanes and “fogging” from trucks. Dill sent GCMAD a notice

of intent to sue pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), alleging that

GCMAD was required to obtain an NPDES permit from the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for its discharge

of pesticides (not limited to adulticides) into the waters of the

United States. GCMAD then applied to the EPA for an

NPDES permit. The EPA responded that an NPDES permit

was unnecessary (and therefore unavailable) under an EPA

interim interpretive guidance.

After the EPA refused to grant a permit to GCMAD, the

parties engaged in preliminary settlement talks. Before a set9132 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
tlement was reached, however, GCMAD brought suit against

the EPA and Dill in federal district court for the District of

Columbia. GCMAD sought a declaratory judgment that either

it was not required to obtain a permit or that the EPA was

required to issue it a permit. However, GCMAD consistently

contended in that court that a permit was not required. Dill

responded by filing suit in federal district court in Idaho. As

he had alleged in his intent-to-sue letter, Dill again alleged

that GCMAD was violating the CWA by discharging pesticides (not limited to adulticides) into the waters of the United

States without an NPDES permit. The district court in Idaho

stayed proceedings pending resolution of the suit in D.C. district court.

The D.C. district court dismissed GCMAD’s suit in January

2003. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 398 F.

Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2005). It held that there was no case or

controversy between GCMAD and the EPA because both parties took the position that no permit was required. Id. at 6-8.

It further held that venue in D.C. was improper for GCMAD’s

claim against Dill. Id. at 12-13. GCMAD appealed this decision to the D.C. Circuit, but then dismissed its own appeal.

Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 2005 WL

3789086 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2005). 

The Idaho district court lifted its stay in March 2005. In

July 2006, the parties filed a Settlement Agreement

(“Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”) with the district

court. The Agreement requires GCMAD: (1) to make a concerted effort to substantially reduce over five years its use of

adulticides by attempting to meet yearly targets for reduced

use; (2) not to engage in aerial spraying of adulticides except

in the event of a declared health emergency; (3) not to engage

in truck fogging of adulticides within 300 feet of the Payette

River; on the Payette River Wildlife Management area or

within 300 feet of a section of that area; or on or within 150

feet of any irrigation canal in the county; (4) to conduct surveillance monitoring and upgrade surveillance activities for

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9133
mosquitoes and apply mosquito threshold standards before

fogging; (5) to contribute funds annually to the Gem County

Soil and Water Conservation District to help improve drainage in order to facilitate reduction of mosquito habitat; (6) to

participate in a state planning committee on the West Nile

Virus; (7) to work with landowners to eliminate mosquito

habitat; and (8) to apply reasonable standards, take reasonable

steps, and consider all relevant factors when complying with

requests from property owners that their property not be

sprayed.

The Agreement requires Dill: (1) to release all claims

against GCMAD under the CWA and dismiss his suit with

prejudice; (2) to work with GCMAD to notify Dill’s neighbors about the Agreement and the mosquito control methods

to be used around his land; (3) to introduce additional mosquito predators on his property; and (4) to agree not to sue

under the CWA as long as GCMAD complies with the Agreement.

The Agreement provides that the district court should retain

jurisdiction to enforce its terms. Finally, the Agreement provides, “The parties have not agreed on the issues of attorney

fees and costs. The parties agree that the Court will retain

jurisdiction to decide any applications for attorney fees and

costs pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) submitted by any

party.”

Dill applied to the district court for attorney’s fees. The district court denied Dill’s application under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(d), holding that Dill was not a “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” and, in the alternative, that an award

was not “appropriate.” Dill timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s award or denial of attorney’s

fees for abuse of discretion. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214

9134 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, we

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and

review de novo its legal analysis. Id.

III. Discussion

[1] Section 505(d) of the CWA provides:

The court, in issuing any final order in any action

brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of

litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert

witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such

award is appropriate.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). In order to award attorney’s fees under

§ 1365(d), a district court must make two findings. First, it

must find that the fee applicant is a “prevailing or substantially prevailing party.” Second, it must find that an award of

attorney’s fees is “appropriate.” We address each in turn.

A. “Prevailing or Substantially Prevailing Party”

Dill contends that he is a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1365(d). He makes two arguments. First, he argues

that he received “actual relief on the merits of his claim” that

“materially alter[ed]” the legal relationship between him and

GCMAD by “modifying [GCMAD’s] behavior in a way that

directly benefits” Dill. Richard S. v. Dep’t of Dev. Servs. of

Cal., 317 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Second, in the alternative, he argues that he

is entitled to recover fees on the “catalyst theory.” For the reasons that follow, we agree with Dill’s first argument. We do

not reach his second argument. 

[2] A litigant qualifies as a prevailing party if it has

obtained a “court-ordered ‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship

between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.’ ” Buckhannon Bd.

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9135
& Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,

532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (alterations in original) (citation

omitted). “[T]he plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution

of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between

itself and the defendant.” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989). Following

Buckhannon and Texas State Teachers, we have held that parties must have obtained judicially enforceable “actual relief

on the merits of [their] claim that materially alter[ed] the legal

relationship between the parties.” Richard S., 317 F.3d at

1087 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We divide our application of Richard S. to the Settlement

Agreement into three parts: (1) judicial enforcement; (2)

material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties; and (3) actual relief on the merits of Dill’s claim.

[3] First, we conclude that the terms of the Agreement are

judicially enforceable. The Agreement specifically provided

that its terms would be enforceable by the district court. Pursuant to the Agreement, the district court’s order dismissing

Dill’s complaint provided, “The Court expressly retains jurisdiction over the matter for the purposes of (i) enforcing the

Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties and

the terms of the Settlement Agreement are incorporated herein

by reference, and (ii) deciding any applications for attorney

fees and costs pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).” Binding settlement agreements over which the district court retains jurisdiction to enforce are judicially enforceable. Richard S., 317

F.3d at 1088.

[4] Second, we conclude that the Agreement effected a

material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. Dill and GCMAD did not agree in the district court on

whether, or how much, GCMAD’s behavior was changed as

a result of the Agreement. Dill contended that the Agreement

required GCMAD to change the manner in which it had been

9136 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
applying, and would apply, adulticides. However, GCMAD

contended that the Agreement required it to do only what it

was already doing and would continue to do. The district

court declined to resolve this dispute. But the court noted that

even if the Agreement required GCMAD to do only what it

was already doing, it was undisputed that GCMAD’s behavior

became legally required rather than voluntary as a result of

the Agreement. 

Third, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that Dill

achieved actual relief on the merits of his claim. To achieve

such relief, a plaintiff must receive some actual relief that

serves the goals of the claim in his or her complaint. As

explained below, the relief achieved need not be of precisely

the same character as the relief sought in the complaint, but

it must require defendants to do something they otherwise

would not have been required to do.

[5] The threshold for sufficient relief to confer prevailing

party status is not high. “If the plaintiff has succeeded on any

significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing suit, the plaintiff has

crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind.” Tex. State

Teachers, 489 U.S. at 791-92 (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103

(1992), the Supreme Court made clear how little actual relief

is necessary. Plaintiffs had received only nominal damages at

trial, even though in the complaint they had sought substantial

actual damages. The Court nonetheless held that the plaintiffs

were eligible for attorney’s fees as prevailing parties, explaining that “a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing

party” because a “judgment for damages in any amount,

whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant’s

behavior for the plaintiff ’s benefit by forcing the defendant

to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay.” Id.

at 112-13. Thus, while the nature and quality of relief may

affect the amount of the fees awarded, an extremely small

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9137
amount of relief is sufficient to confer prevailing party status.

See id. at 114.

In Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1115, we applied Farrar to hold not

only that the amount of relief obtained may be much smaller

than the amount sought, but also that it need not be identical

in form. The plaintiff in Fischer had sought injunctive relief

under the Americans with Disabilities Act against an inn that

had refused to allow him to enter with his service dog. Id. at

1117. The parties entered into a settlement under which the

inn agreed to print a four-paragraph statement explaining its

policy of nondiscrimination against people with disabilities.

Id. The district court denied a grant of attorney’s fees, but we

reversed, holding that “[b]ecause Fischer has an enforceable

settlement that requires the Inn to do something it otherwise

would not be required to do, Fischer is a ‘prevailing party.’ ”

Id. at 1118. We stated, “According to Fischer’s complaint, the

goal of his ADA claim was to obtain an injunction that would

force the Inn to change its alleged policy and practice of

denying access to people who use service dogs. In the end that

is exactly what he achieved.” Id. at 1120. 

In this case, Dill sought to require GCMAD to cease discharging pesticides into the waters of the United States unless

it could obtain a NPDES permit. Specifically, the complaint

asked the district court, inter alia, to “grant the following

relief:” ”Enjoin Defendants from applying pollutants in the

Payette River, its tributaries, and all other surface waters in

such a manner as will result in further violations of the Act.

In particular, Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining Defendants

from discharging pollutants without a NPDES permit.”

The EPA refused to issue a permit to GCMAD on the

ground that under its interim interpretive guidance no permit

was necessary for GCMAD to engage in discharge of pesticides for purposes of mosquito control. This guidance was

incorporated into a formal regulation providing that mosquito

abatement programs that comply with the Federal Insecticide,

9138 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) do not result in

the discharge of pollutants under the CWA and therefore do

not require a NPDES permit. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(h); 71 Fed.

Reg. 68483 (Nov. 27, 2006). The regulation was eventually

held invalid in National Cotton Council of America v. EPA,

553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009), a multidistrict litigation decision that is binding in this circuit. Under National Cotton

Council, GCMAD is now required to obtain a NPDES permit

for its pesticide aerial spraying and truck fogging that results

in “pesticide residue and excess pesticide” being discharged

into the waters of the United States. Id. at 940.

[6] Dill did not succeed in obtaining the precise legal ruling

and relief that he sought in his complaint. Perhaps if he had

had enough money, he could have continued his suit and

joined in the multidistrict litigation that culminated in the

Sixth Circuit’s decision in National Cotton Council. But he

settled instead. In practical terms, the remedy Dill achieved in

the Settlement Agreement was an important part of what he

sought in his suit under the CWA. In his complaint, Dill asked

for an injunction against unpermitted discharges of all pesticides (not limited to adulticides) into specified waters of the

United States. In his judicially enforceable Agreement, Dill

got the equivalent of an injunction against discharges of adulticides into those waters. That is, GCMAD entered into a judicially enforceable Agreement not to engage in any aerial

spraying of adulticides except in a declared health emergency,

and not to engage in any truck fogging within either 300 or

150 yards of specifically described waterways, including the

Payette River.

[7] The relief achieved by Dill in the Agreement clearly

promoted the goals of the CWA. “The purpose of an award

of costs and fees is . . . to encourage the achievement of statutory goals.” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 706

(1983); see also Tex. State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 793 (holding

that a prevailing party alters the legal relationship between the

parties “in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9139
fee statute”). The goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain

the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s

waters” by eliminating pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The

CWA achieves this goal by forbidding or minimizing pollution through the NPDES permitting process. Dill achieved

this goal by forbidding or minimizing adulticide pollution

directly through the Settlement Agreement.

Based on the EPA’s construction of the CWA in its theninterim guidance under which GCMAD was not required to

obtain a NPDES permit, the district court concluded that

Dill’s relief did not promote the goals of the CWA. However,

the interim guidance (later, the formal regulation) on which

EPA relied has now been held invalid in National Cotton

Council as inconsistent with the CWA, in a decision rendered

after the district court ruled on Dill’s application for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in that case vindicates

Dill’s litigation position that GCMAD’s actions violated the

CWA, and shows that the terms of the Agreement reducing

discharges of pesticides into the waters of the United States

serve the goal of the CWA.

[8] We therefore hold that the Agreement meets the three

conditions necessary to make Dill a prevailing party.

B. “Appropriate”

[9] Section 1365(d) provides that the district court may

award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party “whenever the

court determines such award is appropriate.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(d). The district court held that even if Dill were a prevailing party, an award of attorney’s fees was not “appropriate” in the circumstances of this case. We have not previously

articulated the standard under which a court may determine if

a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff under the CWA is “appropriate,” and the district court necessarily was left on its own

to determine the proper standard. We take the opportunity

9140 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
today to articulate that standard, and we remand to the district

court for application of the standard in the first instance.

Our sister circuits have not agreed on a uniform standard

for determining appropriateness for a prevailing plaintiff

under § 1365(d). The First Circuit has stated that district

courts have “wide discretion” to determine the appropriateness of fees under the CWA, but it has not articulated a standard to guide the exercise of this discretion. United States v.

Comunidades Unidas Contra la Contaminacion, 204 F.3d

275, 283 (1st Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit has effectively

read “appropriate” out of the statute, holding that the CWA

“places no restriction on the award other than that the party

entitled to the award be ‘prevailing or substantially prevailing.’ ” Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch.

Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 1998). The Fourth and Fifth

Circuits have held that fees are appropriate whenever a prevailing party’s suit has served the public interest or advanced

the goals of the statute. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 885 F.2d

1276, 1279 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that an award is usually

“appropriate” when a party has advanced the goals of the statute invoked in the litigation); Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg’l

Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding

that plaintiffs were entitled to fees because they have “served

the public interest”). The Eleventh Circuit has held that “good

cause” is needed to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.

Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d

1128, 1142-43 (11th Cir. 1990). 

[10] For the reasons that follow, we do not adopt any of

these standards, and instead hold that the “special circumstances” standard first elaborated in Newman v. Piggie Park

Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), is the proper standard

for determining whether an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff is “appropriate” under § 1365(d).

[11] In Piggie Park, the Supreme Court considered a

request for attorney’s fees under Title II of the Civil Rights

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9141
Act of 1964. It held that “one who succeeds in obtaining an

injunction under [Title II] should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust.” Id. at 402 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned:

When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he

cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction,

he does so not for himself alone but also as a “private attorney general,” vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful

plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own

attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a

position to advance the public interest by invoking

the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress

therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees —

not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately

advance arguments they know to be untenable but,

more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by

racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under

Title II.

Id. at 402. We have interpreted the “special circumstances”

standard of Piggie Park quite strictly, such that fee awards

“should be the rule rather than the exception.” Ackerley

Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Salem, 752 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th

Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[12] We have applied the Piggie Park “special circumstances” standard in a variety of statutes. We have necessarily

applied it to all successful civil rights plaintiffs under 42

U.S.C. § 1988. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177

F.3d 839, 878 (9th Cir. 1999). And we have applied it, as has

the Supreme Court, to other statutes in which a successful

plaintiff has served the public interest. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978) (Title

VII); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)

(Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1617); Smith v.

9142 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984)

(ERISA); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d

1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980) (20 U.S.C. § 3205, relating to

school desegregation cases); Hannon v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 537

F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1976) (Truth in Lending Act).

In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for

Clean Air (“Delaware Valley”), 478 U.S. 546 (1986), the

Supreme Court interpreted § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act

(“CAA”), which authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to a

successful party. The Court interpreted § 304(d) in the same

manner as § 1988, writing, “Given the common purpose of

both § 304(d) and § 1988 to promote citizen enforcement of

important federal policies, we find no reason not to interpret

both provisions governing attorney’s fees in the same manner.” 478 U.S. at 560. The language of § 304(d) of the CAA

is essentially the same as § 1365(d), the attorney’s fees provision of the CWA before us today. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (providing that district court “may award costs of litigation

(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any

party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate”). The only difference is the absence of any “prevailing

party” language in § 304(d), but the Supreme Court has read

“prevailing party” into § 304(d) and other attorney’s fees provisions in environmental statutes. See Pennsylvania v. Del.

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (“Delaware Valley

II”), 483 U.S. 711, 713 (1987); Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682

n.1.

In Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.

1999), we applied Delaware Valley to the attorney’s fees provision of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Citing Delaware Valley, we wrote that “attorney’s fees provisions in

environmental statutes with similar language and purpose as

the attorney’s fees provision in the Civil Rights Acts should

be interpreted in the same way.” Id. at 1095; see also Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 691 (“[S]imilar attorney’s fee provisions

should be interpreted pari passu.”). We concluded, “Given

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9143
the similarity in language and purpose between the attorney’s

fees provisions of the Civil Rights Act and the ESA, Delaware Valley mandates that we apply to the ESA the civil

rights standard for awarding fees to prevailing [parties].”

Marbled Murrelet, 182 F.3d at 1095. Like § 304(d) of the

CAA, the attorney’s fees provision of the ESA is essentially

the same as § 1365(d) of the CWA. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)

(providing that district court “may award costs of litigation

(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any

party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate”); Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682 n.1; Marbled Murrelet,

182 F.3d at 1095. 

[13] The CAA (at issue in Delaware Valley), the ESA (at

issue in Marbled Murrelet), and the CWA (at issue in this

case) are all broad public interest statutes that authorize citizen suits to enforce their substantive provisions. Moreover,

the language in the attorney’s fees provisions in each of the

three statutes is in all relevant ways identical. We interpret

§ 1365(d) the same way the Supreme Court interpreted

§ 304(d) of the CAA in Delaware Valley and the same way

we interpreted § 1365(d) of the ESA in Marbled Murrelet.

We therefore conclude, following Piggie Park and its progeny, that the word “appropriate” in § 1365(d) means the same

thing it does in § 1988 and the other civil rights statutes with

respect to an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff.

We note that our conclusion accords with the highly persuasive analysis of a district court in our circuit that, more than

twenty-five years ago, applied the Piggie Park standard to a

request for attorney’s fees by a prevailing plaintiff under the

CWA. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 589

F. Supp. 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Weigel, J.). 

[14] We hold that the district court may deny attorney’s

fees to a prevailing plaintiff under § 1365(d) only where there

are “special circumstances.”

1

 Under this standard, “the court’s

1Our holding today is limited to the standard under which attorney’s

fees should be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff under the CWA. In Mar9144 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
discretion to deny a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff is narrow,” N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68

(1980), and a denial of fees on the basis of “special circumstances” is “extremely rare.” Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d

1384, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A defendant’s good faith belief that it was following the law does not qualify as a “special circumstance.”

Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (9th Cir.

1981). 

[15] The district court has not had the opportunity to apply

this standard to this litigation. We therefore remand to that

court for a determination, under this standard, whether an

award of attorney’s fees is “appropriate” within the meaning

of § 1365(d).

IV. D.C. District Court Suit

Because the district court did not award attorney’s fees to

Dill, it did not decide whether attorney’s fees should have

been awarded not only for the work done in connection with

the suit in the Idaho district court, but also for the work done

in connection with the suit in the D.C. district court. Therefore, we remand to the district court to allow it to address that

question in the first instance.

Conclusion

We hold that Dill is a prevailing party under § 1365(d). We

remand to the district court to allow it to determine whether

bled Murrelet, we held that a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees under

the ESA only if the plaintiff ’s lawsuit is frivolous under the standard

established in Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).

Marbled Murrelet, 182 F.2d at 1095-96. The question of when it is “appropriate” to award fees under the CWA to a prevailing defendant is not

before us today, but we see no reason why the standard from Christianburg, applied to the ESA in Marbled Murrelet, would not apply equally

to the CWA as well. 

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9145
an award to Dill, as a prevailing party, is appropriate under

§ 1365(d). We also remand to the district court to allow it to

determine whether attorney’s fees are recoverable for work

done in connection with the suit in the D.C. district court.

REVERSED and REMANDED. Costs on appeal to Dill.

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I write separately for two reasons. First, we do not today

determine whether the facts of this case constitute the requisite “special circumstances.” This question remains in the discretion of the district judge on remand. As we have explained,

we employ “a two-pronged test to determine whether special

circumstances exist to justify denying attorney’s fees.” Am.

Broad. Co. v. Miller, 550 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam). This test requires a showing whether (1) “awarding

the attorney’s fees would further the purposes” of the statute,

and (2) “the balance of equities favors or disfavors the denial

of fees.” Id. (citing Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540

F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008); Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d

775, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2001); Gilbrook v. City of Westminster,

177 F.3d 839, 878 (9th Cir. 1999)). It is important that the district judge make findings of fact and conclusions of law showing what special circumstances exist in the case, and I

emphasize that the standard of review for an award under this

doctrine remains the traditional abuse of discretion standard.

See id.; Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.

2008).

Second, the policy implications of today’s holding concern

me. Courts should not be interpreting attorney’s fee requirements in such a way as to discourage settlement. If today’s

holding is read too literally, I believe there is a disincentive

for parties in environmental litigation to negotiate a settlement. 

9146 SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO
Gem County was following the EPA’s policy that no

NPDES permit was required to apply pesticides in a manner

consistent with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y. Gem County’s

abatement procedures complied with FIFRA, allowing it to

spray for mosquitos potentially carrying the West Nile Virus

and other diseases. Yet, Gem County still attempted to

address Dill’s concerns regarding the effects on St. John’s

Organic Farm from these abatement methods. As the district

court noted, this is not a case where the defendant was

required to possess a permit and blatantly failed to comply.

Instead, Gem County was caught in a fight between the agency’s policy and Dill’s concerns while combating a public

health risk. It made the prudent decision to terminate litigation

by entering into a settlement agreement to cease its defense of

the EPA policy. Continuing in court would have drained the

limited resources of both parties, and it was still necessary for

Gem County to continue its abatement efforts to reduce mosquito populations.

If our opinion leads ineluctably to the conclusion that no

special circumstances can be established under this set of

facts, I am not sure why a defendant would not “roll the dice”

before a potentially sympathetic jury. This unfortunate result

would deter otherwise desirable settlements to avoid costly

and uncertain trials. Only time will tell whether the guidance

we articulate in this opinion will truly further the congressional aims behind the Clean Water Act’s citizen attorney general provision. Congress is, of course, always free to clarify

when attorney’s fees may appropriately be assessed in these

types of cases. 

SAINT JOHN’S v. GEM COUNTY MOSQUITO 9147