[Cite as State v. Steele, 138 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013-Ohio-2470.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. STEELE,

APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Steele, 138 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013-Ohio-2470.] 

Criminal law—Offenses—Intimidation—R.C. 2921.03—Abduction—R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) 

and (A)—Police officer not exempt from prosecution for offense of intimidation 

for abusing power to interrogate or for knowingly filing a materially false 

complaint to intimidate or influence witness—Jury instruction defining 

“privilege” in context of police officer’s privilege to arrest and detain is not 

plain error when instruction is identical to definition of “privilege” in R.C. 

2901.01(A)(12).

(Nos. 2011-2075 and 2011-2178—Submitted March 12, 2013—Decided 

June 18, 2013.) 

APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 

No. C-100637, 2011-Ohio-5479. 

____________________ 

O’NEILL, J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal and cross-appeal, we are presented with two issues. 

First, we consider whether police officers are exempt from prosecution for the 

offense of intimidation when accused of abusing their power to interrogate. We 

hold that R.C. 2921.03 provides no such exemption. A police officer may be 

convicted of intimidation when the state presents evidence that the police officer 

knowingly filed a materially false complaint in order to influence or intimidate a 

witness. 

{¶ 2} Second, we consider what instructions a trial court must provide to 

a jury on the definition of the “privilege” exception to the offense of abduction 

when the defendant is a police officer accused of abusing his privilege to arrest 

and detain. We hold that when a trial court’s definition of “privilege” is identical 
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to the definition provided in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12), such an instruction does not 

constitute plain error. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 3} On May 26, 2009, police officer Julian Steele was indicted on ten 

counts, including abduction, intimidation, extortion, rape, and sexual battery. The 

charges stemmed from Steele’s investigation of a series of six robberies that 

occurred in the same neighborhood in Cincinnati, Ohio. Shortly after one of the 

robberies, a resident in the neighborhood saw a vehicle driving suspiciously. The 

resident provided the vehicle’s license-plate number to police, who linked the 

vehicle to A.M. 

{¶ 4} The state presented evidence at trial that once Steele became aware 

that A.M. had children, he went to their school, arrested three children, and had 

their lockers searched. One of those children was R.M. Steele took R.M. into 

custody by handcuffing him and placing him in the caged back seat of a police 

cruiser. Steele told the school employees not to tell A.M. that he had taken R.M. 

into custody. Steele also told school employees the next day that he knew that 

R.M. was innocent. Although R.M. did not fit the physical descriptions of the 

robbers, Steele took R.M. to the police station and interrogated him extensively, 

using threatening and coercive tactics, prior to any attempt to offer him his 

constitutionally guaranteed Miranda warning. Specifically, after R.M. flatly and 

strongly denied knowledge of or involvement in the robberies, Steele threatened 

R.M. by telling him that his mother would be jailed and his siblings would be 

taken away if R.M. did not confess to the robberies. R.M. succumbed to the 

coercion and made a false confession. Steele then Mirandized R.M. and taped his 

confession. 

{¶ 5} Using R.M.’s false statement, Steele was able to formally bring 

charges against R.M. for the six robberies and had R.M. imprisoned in juvenile 

detention. 
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{¶ 6} While R.M. was in detention, Steele repeatedly persuaded R.M.’s 

mother, A.M., to meet with him under the guise of talking about R.M.’s case and 

eventually convinced her to come to his apartment. Steele stated to A.M. that he 

would be able to get R.M. out of detention, but that it would involve quite a 

“process.” During one of A.M.’s visits to Steele’s apartment, Steele asked her to 

engage in sexual activity with him. A.M. testified that she complied with Steele’s 

requests because she believed that he had the power over R.M.’s release. 

{¶ 7} While R.M. was spending nine days in detention, Steele repeatedly 

told the assistant prosecutor that he knew that R.M. had nothing to do with the 

robberies, but that he had locked R.M. up in order to compel A.M. to cooperate 

with the investigation. The prosecutor mistakenly assumed that R.M. had been 

sent home on the day of his arrest. When, on the ninth day, she discovered that 

R.M. was still in lock-up, she immediately had R.M. released and dismissed his 

charges. The prosecutor’s office then had Steele questioned about his actions. 

The state submitted a recording of the questioning, during which Steele admitted 

that he had excluded R.M. as a suspect prior to locking him up. Steele admitted 

that he thought R.M. had given a false confession. Steele admitted that he had 

told A.M. that he did not think R.M. committed any of the robberies. Steele 

stated that he does not make arrests solely based on witness identification, but 

instead he utilizes the technique called “bullshitting,” which apparently refers to 

arresting people on less than probable cause in the hope that something promising 

will result. 

{¶ 8} Steele was charged with two counts of abduction, three counts of 

extortion, two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of 

intimidation, all with firearm specifications. A jury trial was held, and Steele did 

not testify. 

{¶ 9} At the close of the evidence, the parties and the court discussed 

alterations to the proposed jury instructions. The court provided the revised jury 
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instructions to the parties, and counsel for Steele stated that the instructions “look 

fine, and they incorporate all of the changes that we discussed yesterday.” 

Pursuant to the agreed-upon jury instructions, the trial court provided the jury 

with definitions for “privilege,” “arrest,” “probable cause,” and “reasonable 

grounds,” as they are used in R.C. 2905.02, 2901.01(A)(12), and 2935.03. 

{¶ 10} The trial court defined “privilege” as “an immunity, license, or 

right conferred by law or bestowed by express or implied grant or arising out of 

status, position, office, or relationship or growing out of necessity.” The trial 

court stated that when an arrest is made without probable cause, it is an illegal 

arrest. The trial court instructed that probable cause exists “when an officer has 

knowledge of existing facts and circumstances which would warrant a prudent 

police officer in believing that a crime was committed, and that the person to be 

arrested has committed the crime.” The trial court then explained that a police 

officer has the authority to arrest and detain a person if the police officer has 

reasonable grounds to believe that the person is guilty of committing a crime. 

Steele had no objections to the foregoing explanations. 

{¶ 11} The jury found Steele guilty of abduction of R.M. in violation of 

R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) and (A)(2) and intimidation of R.M. in violation of R.C. 

2921.03, each with an accompanying firearm specification. The jury acquitted 

Steele on the remaining charges. He received a prison sentence of five years and 

an additional five years of community control. 

{¶ 12} On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals rejected Steele’s 

arguments that his intimidation conviction was not supported by sufficient 

evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence and affirmed the 

conviction. The appellate court reversed Steele’s abduction convictions, however, 

holding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury on the offense of abduction 

were fatally deficient. The appellate court held that the trial court should have 

explained to the jury that a police officer loses the privilege to arrest and detain a 
January Term, 2013 

5

citizen only if he does not have a good-faith belief that there is probable cause for 

the arrest. “In essence,” the court held, “the jury was instructed that an officer 

loses the privilege to arrest when the arrest is made without probable cause.” Id. 

at ¶ 9. The appellate court concluded that because Steele’s conviction hinged on 

whether Steele’s actions were in good faith, the deficiency in the instructions rose 

to the level of plain error, requiring reversal despite Steele’s agreement to the 

instruction. 

{¶ 13} The appellate court dismissed Steele’s sufficiency and manifestweight arguments regarding the abduction convictions as moot. Finally, the 

appellate court reversed all of the gun specifications, as no evidence had been 

presented at trial that Steele had a firearm on or about his person when he 

committed the offenses. The appellate court thus partially reversed and remanded 

the case for a new trial on the charges of abduction. 

{¶ 14} Both the state and Steele sought this court’s discretionary review. 

In case No. 2011-2075, we accepted the state’s appeal regarding the appellate 

court’s reversal on the issue of jury instructions on the offense of abduction. 131 

Ohio St.3d 1472, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 803. In case No. 2011-2178, we 

accepted Steele’s delayed appeal regarding his intimidation conviction. 132 Ohio 

St.3d 1422, 2012-Ohio-2729, 969 N.E.2d 270. The two cases were consolidated, 

and the state’s appeal was designated a cross-appeal. Id. 

Analysis 

Intimidation and Police Officers 

{¶ 15} R.C. 2921.03(A) provides: 

No person, knowingly and by force, by unlawful threat of 

harm to any person or property, or by filing, recording, or 

otherwise using a materially false or fraudulent writing with 

malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, 
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shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public servant, 

party official, or witness in the discharge of the person’s duty. 

{¶ 16} Steele proposes that a police officer cannot be prosecuted for the 

offense of intimidation, in violation of R.C. 2921.03(A), based on actions taken 

by the police officer while conducting an interrogation. We disagree. 

{¶ 17} In our examination of R.C. 2921.03, we begin by noting that our 

“paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.” State v. S.R., 

63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 589 N.E.2d 1319 (1992). We must give effect to the 

plain meaning of the words used in a statute, and we must not modify an 

unambiguous statute by adding or deleting words. Id. at 595. 

{¶ 18} R.C. Chapter 2921 criminalizes offenses committed against justice 

and public administration. “Chapter 2921 deals with acts tending to subvert the 

processes of democratic government, including bribery, perjury, and related 

offenses, crimes which hamper law enforcement and the administration of justice, 

and peculation, conflict of interests, dereliction of duty, and other offenses of 

public officials.” Committee Comment to R.C. Chapter 2921, 1972 Am.Sub.H.B. 

No. 511. Thus, R.C. Chapter 2921 was separately enacted within Ohio’s criminal 

code to focus on the special societal ills created by improper interference in the 

administration of justice or the discharge of a public duty. 

{¶ 19} R.C. 2921.03 makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly take 

certain actions to influence, intimidate, or hinder a witness, a party official, or a 

public servant in the discharge of a duty. R.C. 2921.03(A). The ways in which it 

is illegal to exert such improper influence are by knowingly (1) using force, (2) 

unlawfully threatening harm against any person or property, or (3) using a 

materially false or fraudulent writing in any way with malice, bad faith, 

wantonness, or recklessness. Id. Thus, there are specified actions that are 

criminalized when committed against a specified set of people. However, there 
January Term, 2013 

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are no such limitations as to the identity or status of the person who might commit 

the offense of intimidation. 

{¶ 20} By contrast, the General Assembly has enacted various criminal 

statutes that provide exceptions for certain categories of people. For example, 

statutes prohibiting the possession or distribution of controlled substances provide 

a number of exceptions for certain authorized health professionals, police officers, 

and other parties. See, e.g., R.C. 2925.02(B) (corrupting another with drugs); 

2925.03(B) (trafficking offenses); 2925.11(B) (drug-possession offenses). The 

offense of coercion provides certain exceptions for prosecutors acting in good 

faith and in the interests of justice. R.C. 2905.12(B). Many weapons-possession 

statutes explicitly exclude authorized law-enforcement officers who are acting 

within the scope of their duties. See, e.g., R.C. 2923.12(C)(1)(a) (carrying 

concealed weapons); 2923.121(B)(1)(a) (possessing a firearm in liquor-permit 

premises); 2923.122(D)(1)(a) (possessing a deadly weapon in a school safety 

zone); 2923.17(C)(1) (possessing a dangerous ordnance). 

{¶ 21} We cannot add an exception to R.C. 2921.03 where there is none 

present. And by reading R.C. 2921.03 in light of the statutes in the preceding 

paragraph, we cannot presume that an exception to R.C. 2921.03 was intended 

when other statutes explicitly specify when police officers are exempted from 

certain offenses. See S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d at 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319; State v. 

Cunningham, 113 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245, 863 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 20; State 

v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 45. “It always 

has been deemed necessary to enact laws to compel performance of duty and to 

prevent corruption on the part of public officers. They are not attended by any 

special presumption that general language in disciplinary measures does not 

extend to them.” Donnelley v. United States, 276 U.S. 505, 516, 48 S.Ct. 400, 72 

L.Ed. 676 (1928). 
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{¶ 22} Further, it is true that police may draw from a wide variety of 

interrogation tactics and may even use certain kinds of deception to elicit a 

confession. See State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 81, 571 N.E.2d 97 (1991); 

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). 

However, there is no authority for the contention that police officers may use 

physical force, unlawful threats of harm, or a materially false or fraudulent 

writing with malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness as part of a legitimate 

interrogation of a suspect. Accordingly, we hold that a police officer may be 

prosecuted for the offense of intimidation when the police officer’s actions during 

an interrogation satisfy the elements provided in R.C. 2921.03. 

{¶ 23} The evidence submitted at Steele’s trial indicated that despite 

Steele’s repeatedly stated belief that R.M. was not involved in the robberies, 

Steele coerced R.M. into giving a false confession. Despite knowing that the 

confession was false, Steele filed a criminal complaint against R.M. using that 

false writing in an attempt to force R.M.’s mother to admit what he believed she 

knew about the robberies. Thus, Steele used a materially false writing in bad faith 

to influence and intimidate a witness within the meaning of R.C. 2921.03(A). 

We therefore affirm the First District’s conclusion that Steele’s intimidation 

conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

Abduction, Privilege, Police Officers, and Plain Error 

{¶ 24} The state proposes that in the context of the offense of abduction, 

when a trial court provides a jury instruction defining “privilege” exactly as it is 

defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12), the trial court’s failure to sua sponte provide 

additional, more specific instructions on “privilege” does not rise to the level of 

plain error. We agree. 

{¶ 25} R.C. 2905.02 provides: 
January Term, 2013 

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(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly 

do any of the following: 

(1) By force or threat, remove another from the place where 

the other person is found; 

(2) By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person 

under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the 

victim or place the other person in fear. 

{¶ 26} Thus, in order to convict a defendant for the offense of abduction, 

the finder of fact must determine that the defendant removed and/or restrained the 

victim by force or threat “without privilege to do so.” R.C. 2905.02(A). 

“Privilege” is defined as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, 

bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or 

relationship, or growing out of necessity.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(12). A police officer 

has a right conferred by law to execute a warrantless arrest of any person who the 

police officer has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of certain enumerated 

offenses, including theft offenses and offenses of violence. R.C. 2935.03(B)(1). 

A police officer has reasonable or probable cause to arrest when the events 

leading up to the arrest, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 

police officer, amount to” probable cause. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Probable cause exists when 

there are facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge that are 

sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect is committing or has 

committed an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 

142 (1964), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 

L.Ed. 543 (1925). If an arrest is made without probable cause, the arrest is 

constitutionally invalid. State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122, 127, 311 N.E.2d 16 

(1974). 
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{¶ 27} It is undisputed that the trial court provided accurate instructions 

on all of the above terms and that it followed the corresponding statutory 

language virtually verbatim. The appellate court concluded that the trial court 

erred by not providing additional instructions sua sponte. Specifically, the trial 

court explained when probable cause exists and when it does not. It explained 

that a privilege to arrest exists when there is probable cause, but it did not explain 

that the privilege is not lost merely because probable cause was lacking. It is this 

omission that the court of appeals found to be fatal. 

{¶ 28} Under normal circumstances, the consequence of an illegal arrest is 

that evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible at trial. State v. Henderson, 51 

Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 554 N.E.2d 104 (1990), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 

U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). However, a police officer is not 

automatically stripped of statutory privilege and exposed to criminal liability if a 

court finds in hindsight that the officer made an arrest on less than probable cause. 

When looking at a police officer’s liability in the civil context, privilege is lost 

when “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [a 

clearly established] right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 

3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). We find this principle to be applicable to the 

context of a police officer’s authority to arrest, pursuant to R.C. 2935.03, and 

correspondingly, the officer’s “privilege” as defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12). 

Accordingly, a police officer does not lose the privilege to arrest merely because 

probable cause is lacking. However, the police officer loses the privilege to arrest 

when a reasonable police officer would understand that probable cause is lacking. 

{¶ 29} It would have been ideal for the trial court to provide additional 

instructions regarding the loss of privilege in the specific context of a police 

officer’s authority to arrest. However, it must be remembered that we are not 

looking for the ideal in this case. We are merely looking for the absence of plain 

error. There was no objection to the jury instruction in issue. “On appeal, a party 
January Term, 2013 

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may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any instructions unless the 

party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the 

matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” Crim.R. 30(A). It is 

undisputed that Steele negotiated for and agreed to the revised jury instructions 

provided by the trial court, that he lodged no objections to the instructions related 

to the abduction charges, and that he has therefore forfeited all but plain error. 

{¶ 30} For a court to notice plain error, the error must be an obvious 

defect in a trial’s proceedings, it must have affected substantial rights, and it must 

have affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Eafford, 132 Ohio St.3d 159, 

2012-Ohio-2224, 970 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 11, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 

502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306; State v. Lynn, 129 Ohio St.3d 146, 2011-

Ohio-2722, 950 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 13. See also Crim.R. 52(B). Because there was no 

explicit case law or statutory guidance in Ohio on the standard of proving a police 

officer’s loss of privilege to arrest, it would be difficult to conclude that the trial 

court’s failure to invent such an instruction constitutes an obvious error. 

Regardless, even when the minimum requirements have been met, a reviewing 

court should still be conservative in its application of plain-error review, reserving 

notice of plain error for situations involving more than merely theoretical 

prejudice to substantial rights. See State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 94, 372 

N.E.2d 804 (1978). “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken 

with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a 

manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 31} Here, the appellate court concluded that the lack of an instruction 

on loss of privilege amounted to plain error because “[i]t relieved the state of its 

burden to prove all elements of abduction beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2011-

Ohio-5479 at ¶ 21, citing State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 

817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 97. In Adams, we did note that relieving the state of its burden 

of proving an element of the offense violates a defendant’s right to due process. 
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Id. However, we went on to hold in Adams that such an error in jury instructions 

is waived when there was no objection and when the outcome of the trial was not 

affected. Id. at ¶ 100 and 102. We have long held that improperly reducing the 

state’s burden of proving an element of a crime is not plain error unless the 

outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise. State v. Cooperrider, 4 

Ohio St.3d 226, 227-228, 448 N.E.2d 452 (1983); State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio 

St.3d 12, 14, 444 N.E.2d 1332 (1983); Long at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 32} Due to the trial court’s failure to sua sponte provide additional 

instructions on “privilege,” the appellate court determined that the jury was in 

essence instructed that a police officer could be criminally liable any time an 

arrest is made on less than probable cause. 2011-Ohio-5479 at ¶ 9. Certainly 

such an instruction would be erroneous. But the trial court did not provide any 

incorrect statements of the law in its instructions, and we cannot assume that the 

jury in fact made this improper inference. 

{¶ 33} By concluding that an erroneous instruction, by itself, constituted 

plain error, the appellate court did not complete its plain-error analysis. Instead, 

“an appellate court must review the instructions as a whole and the entire record 

to determine whether a manifest miscarriage of justice has occurred as a result of 

the error in the instructions.” State v. Wamsley, 117 Ohio St.3d 388, 2008-Ohio1195, 884 N.E.2d 45, ¶ 17. The totality of the instructions and of the record in 

this case does not support a finding of plain error, particularly when considering 

Steele’s intimidation and abduction charges together. 

{¶ 34} The facts underlying Steele’s charge for abduction were 

inextricably intertwined with those underlying the charges for intimidation. He 

took R.M. out of school in handcuffs, placed him in an interrogation room, and 

blatantly intimidated him with dire threats directed at his entire family, including 

his school-aged siblings. Steele admitted to school employees, R.M.’s mother, 

and the prosecutor that he knew that R.M. was not involved with the robberies. 
January Term, 2013 

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He coerced a confession from R.M., which he admittedly thought was false, and 

filed a criminal complaint against R.M. using that false confession. 

{¶ 35} In order to be convicted of knowingly filing a false writing in 

satisfaction of the elements of the offense of intimidation, Steele needed to 

believe that R.M.’s confession was false, i.e., that R.M. had not committed the 

crime. If Steele believed that R.M. had not committed a crime, then a reasonable 

police officer in Steele’s position would have understood that probable cause was 

clearly lacking. Thus, because Steele’s accusation against R.M. had to be 

knowingly false in order for the jury to find Steele guilty of intimidation, and 

because the jury did find Steele guilty of intimidation, there is nothing to indicate 

that the trial court’s failure to explain a higher standard of loss of privilege for 

police officers affected Steele’s convictions for abduction. Further, there is 

nothing in the record to support the proposition that Steele had anything even 

approaching probable cause to arrest when he took this youngster out of school in 

handcuffs. At the very best, there was the suspicion that the child’s mother’s car 

had been used in the crime. No reasonable police officer could possibly 

categorize that as reasonable suspicion sufficient to satisfy the United States 

Constitution. 

{¶ 36} Although we hold today that the trial court did not commit plain 

error in its failure to provide specific instructions for a police officer’s loss of 

privilege, we must stress that we are in no way attempting to tie the hands of 

police officers in their broad authority to arrest and detain suspects. Police 

officers must often act quickly and decisively, as a delay in response could have 

dire consequences or even constitute dereliction of duty. See Davis v. Scherer, 

468 U.S. 183, 196, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). Police officers 

performing their valuable and often dangerous duties cannot be made to fear 

criminal charges any time an arrest or detention is made with what turns out to be 

less than probable cause. Thus, our holding today would reach only the rare 
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circumstance of a police officer depriving a person of his or her liberty when a 

reasonable police officer would know that there is no probable cause supporting 

the detention, no matter how brief.

{¶ 37} Because the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction did not rise to 

the level of plain error, we reverse the First District’s decision to reverse and 

remand Steele’s abduction convictions. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 38} We hold that the First District Court of Appeals correctly upheld 

Steele’s intimidation conviction, but incorrectly held that the definition of 

“privilege” provided by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas constituted 

plain error. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the 

court of appeals and remand the cause to the First District Court of Appeals for 

consideration of the additional assignments of error that were mooted by its 

original holding. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 

concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

____________________ 

 Daniel J. Breyer, Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and crossappellee. 

Byron L. Potts & Co., L.P.A., and Gloria L. Smith, for appellee and crossappellant. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Francisco E. Lüttecke, 

Assistant Public Defender, in support of neither party on behalf of amicus curiae, 

Ohio Public Defender. 

________________________