In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas 

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-23-00375-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2023-005682-1 

Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

ELISHA HOLLOWAY, Appellant

V. 

REVELSTOKE VENTURE, LLC, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellee Revelstoke Venture, LLC prevailed on its forcible detainer action 

against Appellant Elisha Holloway in the justice court. The judgment awarded 

Revelstoke possession of the premises, $4,958 in back rent, and costs. The judgment 

further ordered Holloway to pay $2,670 in rent into the court’s registry each month 

during the pendency of any appeal.

Holloway appealed to the county court. The justice court sent her a notice 

acknowledging receipt of the notice of appeal and reminding her that she needed to 

deposit the monthly rental amount into the court’s registry within five days and that 

her failure to make that payment “MAY RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A 

WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT HEARING.”

The next month, Revelstoke filed a motion requesting issuance of a writ of 

possession on the basis that Holloway had failed to make the monthly rent payments

into the court’s registry. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.9(c)(5)(B)(iv). A month later, the 

county court signed an “Order Authorizing Immediate Issuance of Writ of 

Possession.” In the order, the county court found that Holloway had not paid rent 

into the court’s registry, that Revelstoke had given Holloway proper notice of the 

failure, and that Revelstoke was entitled to issuance of a writ of possession. The order 

did not mention Revelstoke’s claim for back rent. Nevertheless, the order stated that 

it was a final judgment disposing of all clams of all parties. The next day, the county 

clerk issued the writ.
3

Holloway appealed to this court. Because the clerk’s record shows that the writ 

of possession had been executed, this court became concerned that the appeal was 

moot. Consequently, we notified Holloway that we would dismiss the appeal unless 

she or another party wishing to continue the appeal filed with this court a response 

showing grounds for the appeal’s continuance.

Holloway filed a response, but it does not show grounds on which we may 

continue the appeal. First, she cites Texas Property Code Section 92.0561 and asserts 

that “[w]e assert our right under this code to address necessary repairs when the 

landlord neglects maintenance requests.” See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.0561. Next, 

she asserts that her appeal “defends the fundamental right of tenants to reside in 

habitable dwellings, demanding swift resolution of maintenance issues.” She then 

claims that Revelstoke’s “continuous disregard for maintenance requests potentially 

breaches the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment” and that her “meticulously 

documented email communication serves as indispensable evidence, exposing [her]

sincere attempts and the landlord’s failure to address valid concerns.” Finally, she 

asserts that her appeal “is fueled by the violation of civil rights, including but not 

limited to discrimination and harassment,” and she “insist[s] that our counterclaim1 be 

duly considered in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations governing such 

claims.”

1

The clerk’s record does not show that Holloway filed any counterclaims.
4

Regardless of whether Holloway would have had recourse against Revelstoke 

for failing to perform its obligations under the lease, and regardless of whether

Holloway may have any other claims against Revelstoke, her response has not raised 

any meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property. As the 

Supreme Court of Texas has explained, “[j]udgment of possession in a forcible 

detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is 

wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate possession.” Marshall 

v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). “The only issue in

a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises.” Id. at 

785 (emphasis added). Thus, a forcible detainer action may resolve only a claim for 

possession and related claims for unpaid rent and attorney’s fees. See Tex. Prop. Code 

Ann. §§ 24.0051, .006; Brigandi v. Am. Mortgage Inv. Partners Fund I Tr., No. 02-16-

00444-CV, 2017 WL 1428726, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet. 

dism’d) (mem. op.).

Here, the county court’s judgment awards possession but does not award 

damages or attorney’s fees, and so the only issue on appeal is possession. But

Holloway no longer has possession of the premises, her response did not raise any 

meritorious claim of right to possession, and nothing in the record before us shows 

that she has a potentially meritorious claim to possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at

787; Ratliff v. Homes by Ashley, Inc., No. 02-20-00014-CV, 2020 WL 1057320, at 

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that a forcible-
5

detainer appeal becomes moot upon an appellant’s eviction from the property unless 

the appellant holds and asserts a meritorious claim of right to current, actual 

possession of the property or unless damages or attorney’s fees remain at issue).

Accordingly, regardless of whether Holloway has other claims that she could 

bring in a separate suit, she has not shown grounds for continuing this appeal. 

Because she no longer has possession of the property, her appeal is moot, and we 

have no jurisdiction over her appeal. We therefore vacate the county court’s judgment

and dismiss the appeal. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 790.

Per Curiam

Delivered: January 18, 2024