THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


FERNALD
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held in Cincinnati, Ohio on October 


24, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES 

NATIONALLY CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS 

404/733-6070 
2 

 6 

C O N T E N T S
 

October 24, 2007 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR 12 


SITE PROFILES, PER’S, SEC REVIEWS DISCUSSION 12 


MATRIX AND PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION 30 


MATRIX DISCUSSION: 


FINDING 4.1-1 41 


FINDING 4.1-2 170 


FINDING 4.1-3 230 


FINDING 4.1-4 258 


FINDING 4.1-5 258 


FINDING 4.1-6 264 


FINDING 4.2-1 265 


FINDING 4.2-2 315 


FINDING 4.2-3 316 


RECAP OF ACTION ITEMS 324 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 331 

3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- “^”/ (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies 


speaker failure, usually failure to use a microphone or 


speakers speaking over each other. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


SCHOFIELD, Phillip 


Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 


Los Alamos, New Mexico 

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IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

ABITZ, RICHARD J., FORMER SITE GEOCHEMIST 


ADAMS, WELDON J., FORMER ASST. PLANT MANAGER, FMPC 


BALDRIDGE, SANDRA, PETITIONER 


BALLART, TERESA 


BEHLING, HANS, SC&A 


BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A 


BRACKETT, LIZ, ORAU 


BURGOS, ZAIDA, NIOSH 


CHEW, MELTON, CAI 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


FAUST, LEO, ORAU 


HOFF, JENNIFER, ORAU 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


KENT, KAREN, ORAU 


KISPERT, BOB, FERNALD EMPLOYEE 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MAY, MARY P., CLAIMANT 


MORRIS, ROBERT, CAI 


POTTER, GENE, ORAU 


RICH, BRYCE L., CAI 


ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH 


SHARFI, MUTTY, ORAU 

 

 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (9:00 a.m.) 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO
 

DR. WADE: This is the work group conference 


room. We’re about to begin. If I could ask 


someone out there to acknowledge the fact that 


you can hear my voice. 


DR. MAURO (by Telephone): Hi, Lew, it’s 


John Mauro. I can hear you very clearly. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, thank you. 


And as we go through our introductions 


if there’s anyone out there who has difficulty 


hearing anyone around this table by virtue of 


how they make their introductions, please let 


us know, and we’ll try and adjust the 


equipment. 


As I said, this is Lew Wade, and I 


have the privilege of serving as the 


Designated Federal Official for the Advisory 


Board. And this is a meeting of a work group 


of the Advisory Board. This is the work group 


that looks at the Fernald site profile and SEC 


petition. 

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Ray, are you ready? 


COURT REPORTER: Yes, sir. 


 DR. WADE: Then that group is chaired by 


Brad Clawson, members Griffon, Ziemer, Presley 


and Schofield, and all of those individuals 


are present at the table. 


I would start by asking if there are 


any other Board members who are on the call by 


telephone? 


(no response) 


DR. WADE: Are there any other Board members 


on the call? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Okay, so we do not have a quorum 


of the Board which is appropriate for a 


meeting of the work group. What I would 


suggest we do is go around the table and 


introduce those of us around the table. And 


please, if you have a conflict with regard to 


Fernald, please identify that, particularly 


members of the SC&A team, members of the NIOSH 


and ORAU team identify. Then we’ll go out 


into telephone land and have introductions 


made also with conflicts identified. Then 


we’ll have a little bit of a talk about 

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telephone etiquette, and then we’ll begin the 


deliberations. 


So again, this is Lew Wade. I work 


for NIOSH and serve the Advisory Board. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I’m Brad Clawson. I’m the 


work group chairman, no conflict. 


DR. BEHLING: Hans Behling, S. Cohen and 


Associates, no conflict. 


MR. GRIFFON: Mark Griffon with the Advisory 


Board, no conflicts. 


MR. ROLFES: Mark Rolfes, NIOSH Health 


Physicist, I have no conflicts. 


MR. CHEW: Mel Chew with the O-R-A-U team, 


no conflict. 


DR. ZIEMER: Paul Ziemer with the Board, no 


conflicts. 


MR. SCHOFIELD: Phillip Schofield with the 


Board, no conflicts. 


MR. RICH: Bryce Rich with the O-R-A-U team, 


no conflict. 


MR. MORRIS: Robert Morris, O-R-A-U team, no 


conflict. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani, SC&A and 


CDC has said that I have a conflict. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Robert Presley, Board member, 

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I have no conflict. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Sandra Baldridge, 


petitioner. 


 MR. ADAMS: I’m Weldon Adams. I’m a former 


Assistant Plant Manager at Fernald. 


 MR. KISPERT: Robert Kispert, former long-


term employee at the Fernald site. 


 MR. ABITZ: Richard Abitz, former site 


geochemist at the Fernald site, no conflict. 


MS. HOFF: Jennifer Hoff, ORAU team, no 

conflicts. 

MS. KENT: Karen Kent, ORAU team, no 

conflict. 

 MR. SHARFI: Mutty Sharfi, ORAU team, no 


conflicts. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Larry Elliott, NIOSH, I have 


no conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


Let’s go out onto the telephone. I 


guess I would ask for other members of the 


NIOSH or ORAU team who are on the line to 


identify themselves. 


MR. FAUST (by Telephone): Leo Faust, ORAU 


team. 


 DR. WADE: Could you make a comment as to 

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conflict, please? 


MR. FAUST (by Telephone): No conflict. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 MR. POTTER: Gene Potter, ORAU team, no 


conflicts. 


MS. BURGOS (by Telephone): Zaida Burgos, 


NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Other members of NIOSH/ORAU team, 


please? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: How about members of the SC&A 


team? 


DR. MAURO (by Telephone): John Mauro, SC&A, 


no conflict. 


MS. BEHLING (by Telephone): Kathy Behling, 


SC&A, no conflict. 


 DR. WADE: Other members of the SC&A team? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Are there other federal employees 


who are on the call by virtue of their 


employment? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Any other federal employees with 


us? 


 (no response) 

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 DR. WADE: Do we have any other petitioners, 


representatives, workers who are on the call 


who would like to be identified? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Members of Congress or their 


staffs? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Is there anyone else 


participating who would like to be identified 


for the record? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: We have one new attendee. 


Could you identify yourself? 


MS. HOWELL: Emily Howell, HHS. 


 DR. WADE: Again by way of telephone 


etiquette, again, some simple rules will help 


us do our business. Please, if you’re 


speaking, speak into a handset and try to 


disdain the use of a speaker phone. If you’re 


not speaking, mute whatever you can that’s 


around you. 


And again, be mindful of background 


noises that might be second nature to you but 


could be very distracting to people that are 


on the call. I think we’re doing much better 

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with regard to our telephone etiquette, but 


please keep those simple rules in mind so that 


the Board can make its, the work group can 


make its deliberations open to those on the 


telephone. I think that goes well to the 


issues of transparency. 


So Brad, it’s all yours. 


INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, first of all I’d like to 


make sure if everybody’s got the new matrix 


that we’re going to be working to today. 


As you know, the last time we met we 


went through the preliminary responses from 


SC&A. Unfortunately, I don’t think that we 


really felt that we gave Hans enough time to 


be able to discuss some of those things. But 


as we’re coming into this, we’ll just start 


from the very first of it and continue on down 


through it. 


Hans, if you want to – 


SITE PROFILES, PER’S, SEC REVIEWS DISCUSSION
 

DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I hope by this time 


everyone has had a chance to review our review 


of the SEC petition. And one of the key 


features that I want to point out is that in 

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most of the statements and findings that I 


made, I used documents that reflect memoranda 


and other official documents that were part of 


the record including documents that were 


contained in the SEC petition itself. 


So to notice that most of the comments 


that are made in the form of findings reflect 


issues that reflect documents that are part of 


the official record. And I say that because I 


want to divorce myself from any kinds of bias 


in a sense where I’m not interpreting things. 


And for that reason this particular review may 


be somewhat different from previous reviews. 


It may be more lengthy than previous 


reviews because I incorporated a lot of 


exhibits, and exhibits that identify certain 


statements that I found to be an issue and 


stated as such. And for the convenience of 


the reader, most of the exhibits that I 


incorporated into our review, I underlined or 


highlighted key statements that reflect the 


particular finding. 


And I hope everyone’s had a chance to 


read them because some of the issues are quite 


complex, and they do, in fact, need to be 

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looked at in very careful terms. And part of 


that review should be the exhibits that are 


incorporated in the report itself. 


I also want to say the last time when 


we met we were somewhat surprised because the 


opening statement made by Mark was that we, 


NIOSH, was in the process of revising many of 


the things that are part of the TBD as well as 


the SEC. And having said that I was somewhat 


at a loss to figure out how to approach our 


discussion because of the changing in the 


dynamics by which this TBD and SEC was being 


reviewed. 


And so I guess today we’re looking at 


a new matrix that may have a lot of different 


responses that were not addressed in the first 


go around. In fact, I was almost thinking 


that I was going to get a new or revised site 


profile that would accompany some of these 


changes. 


And I guess that would be my first 


question to Mark as to whether or not there 


will be a revision to the TBD for Fernald. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, there’s certainly going to 


be a revision to the Fernald Technical Basis 

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Document. ^ a direct copy has been made 


available to the Advisory Board for the 


environmental intakes, and that incorporates 


information regarding the internal exposures 


from K-65 venting of radon as well as other 


things that have been discussed previously. 


That’s for the Advisory Board’s review. It is 


not a final copy for distribution and use in 


dose reconstructions at this time though. 


In addition, there’s going to be a 


revision of the internal dose TBD coming out 


relatively soon. I believe one of the key 


pieces of information that we are waiting on 


for finalization was the coworker modeling. 


And the coworker model is, I believe, in its 


final stages. So as soon as that is completed 


I believe it will be released in a revised 


internal dose TBD. 


Do we have any, is there an external 


TBD question at this time? 


MR. CHEW: Yes, there is a draft external 


TBD with some additional information in it. 


DR. BEHLING: And I have at this point 


reviewed many of the documents that have been 


put out on the O drive with the expectation 

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that those data will be used to perhaps revise 


some of the TBDs for environmental, internal, 


external. Am I correct? 


MR. ROLFES: We have prepared many white 


papers, and there are white papers that are 


available with the sample dose reconstructions 


that were provided back in February during the 


first meeting of the Advisory Board when the 


Fernald SEC evaluation was presented. Many of 


those white papers have, in fact, been working 


documents. They are going to be incorporated 


into the internal dose TBD as well. So when 


we have a methodology and a white paper, it 


gets incorporated into the final approved 


version of the TBD. 


DR. BEHLING: And the reason I ask this 


because we’re going back and forth. Now I 


understand the dynamics of the site profiles 


and all the other documents, the nature of 


revising them as we go along. But it does 


complicate matters in tracking the issues. I 


think we heard yesterday in the Congressional 


hearing the issue of what’s taking so long. 


But it’s always the question of how 


many times do we go back and forth before we 

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come to the final end product that says this 


is our best and final. SC&A go ahead and 


review this, and whatever criticism we can now 


talk about in terms of resolving these 


findings. And as we’re going along here, we 


find ourselves going back and forth, and we 


realize we’re never at the end because as 


we’re talking right now, we’re obviously 


informed that there’s going to be another 


revision to at least three of the TBDs for 


Fernald, and I’m not sure we’re going to be in 


a position to address them today. 


MR. ROLFES: This process is not a one-shot 


process. It’s a living document, and when we 


receive new information about exposures that 


we didn’t previously have, we want to make 


sure that we incorporate that information into 


the site profile so that we can give credit to 


the people for whom we’re doing dose 


reconstructions. 


We want to make sure that when we have 


to turn down a compensation claim, that we 


have given that person every shot that we can. 


So in order to do that we want to make sure 


that we have a living document that we can 

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revise at any time. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, could I ask a question 


about that? We’ve understood from the 


beginning that site profiles are living 


documents, and you prepare them as fast as 


possible, and you’re constantly reviewing them 


internally, and then you publish. I’ve not 


understood until now that evaluation reports 


are living documents. Is that part of the 


implication? 


MR. ROLFES: I don’t believe I said that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, because this is being 


addressed in the context of an evaluation 


report. I mean, understanding that it has 


implications for the site profile, but these 


revisions are being made in response to Hans’ 


review of the evaluation report. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure. Certainly, in many of 


the issues we’re discussing, really NIOSH’s 


opinion is that these are not SEC issues but 


issues that affect how we complete a dose 


reconstruction. 


MR. ELLIOTT: The program evaluation report 


is triggered by a change that we make in our 


dose reconstruction methodology that would 

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result in an increase, a potential increase in 


the dose estimate. And so when we arrive at 


that trigger point, that’s when we would set 


forward a program evaluation review and a 


report. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, Larry, I completely 


understand, and I’m in agreement. As you know 


we’ve worked this process for some years, and 


we’re in agreement that that’s a good process. 


That when you’re doing dose reconstructions, 


you should have the best, most recent, the 


widest scope of information to have a fair 


process. And then you have your PERs which I 


think are very responsive to that question. 


But the confusion in my mind arises 


because this is occurring in the context of an 


SEC. We had an ER, and we completed a full 


review of that ER. We had a site profile 


review. We completed a full, the site 


profile, we completed a full review of that. 


Many of those issues are overlapping. But it 


seems like --


I mean, I don’t know, Brad, we’re just 


seeking some clarity because John -- I mean, 


correct me if I’m wrong -- John and I had some 

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discussions about this, and I’ve also 


discussed this in the context of Hanford with 


Jim Melius. And I, myself, am not clear what 


the Board and the working groups are asking us 


to do because are we to wait in terms of the 


SEC process until NIOSH is done or are we to 


go on going back and forth as if this is a 


site profile review? 


I’m very confused. As SEC task 


manager trying to figure out how to approach 


this, it would be helpful to have some 


guidance from the Board. 


DR. MAURO (by Telephone): Arjun, I think 


you clearly articulated some of the 


discussions we’ve had. And I guess we’re 


looking to the working group and to the Board 


-- this is John Mauro -- as to are we engaged 


in a process now, and that’s fine, where as 


white papers are produced, SC&A is directed by 


the working group and the Board to review 


those white papers as living documents, 


participate in working group meetings, as 


we’re doing at this moment? Or would the 


working group and the Board prefer that we 


review the final product that comes out? 

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Let’s say it’s a site profile or I don’t know 


if there’s going to be any revisions to the 


evaluation report in light of the revised site 


profiles. 


Right now we are engaged in a living 


process where we’re continuing the, what I 


would call, an ongoing review of white papers 


and issues resolution that are relevant to 


both the evaluation report and the site 


profile. We’re operating on that basis as we 


speak now. That is, it’s going to be ongoing. 


I just wanted to seek a little 


guidance though. Are we interpreting that 


correctly because we are expending resources, 


and we believe we’re doing what the working 


group and the Board would want us to do. But 


quite frankly, we really haven’t been directly 


said, no, we want you to engage in this, 


operate in this manner. I guess that’s the 


clarification we’re seeking. 


 DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade. And let me 


speak to some issues of clarification. If 


there are judgments that the Board needs to 


make, then we need take those judgments to the 


Board obviously. But let’s just sort of step 

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back and look at the entire playing field. 


With regard to site profiles I think 


we all understand that those documents are 


constantly in flux and will constantly be 


changing. And if SC&A is asked to review a 


site profile, they can well expect that they 


are reviewing a document that is actively in 


the process of being rewritten. And I think 


we’ve dealt with that. I think we understand 


how to do that, and I think that’s fine. 


Again, it makes for lots of, a lot of 


work. Some people could say it makes for 


extra work. I guess we don’t feel that way. 


I think it’s appropriate. 


But when you get into the SEC arena it 


becomes a little bit more in need of clear 


definition. And there you need to focus on 


the NIOSH evaluation report. That report 


stands and should be the document that you’re 


reviewing. NIOSH can modify that report, and 


if it does, then that is an event in time that 


the working group or the Board needs to then 


ask you to review as a new entity, as a new 


document. 


Really what’s happening here is that 

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there are many technical issues that will be 


uncovered in the process that will affect the 


way NIOSH does dose reconstruction very 


specifically. But in NIOSH’s mind it well 


does not affect the judgment presented in the 


evaluation report that says we believe we can 


estimate or cap dose with reasonable accuracy. 


It’s only when that bar is passed that NIOSH 


will issue an addendum or a modification to an 


evaluation report. 


So when SC&A is tasked by a work group 


or the Board to look at an SEC review, you 


need to always keep in mind that there’s an 


evaluation report that’s out there. It 


stands. It’s the document under review. If 


that document is modified or changed, then you 


will be asked to review that document by the 


work group. 


DR. ZIEMER: In fact, I think we’ve had at 


least one case where in the process of the 


petition review, new information came to light 


that caused NIOSH, in fact, to pull an ER and 


develop a new one. So that certainly can 


occur. But until it occurs we’re, in a sense, 


locked into what’s on the street at the 

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moment. 


 DR. WADE: And if it does occur, then the 


work group needs to turn to its contractor and 


say we would like you to review that new 


document. 


DR. ZIEMER: And if we know it’s coming, and 


I think we’re in a position to say hold up on 


something until we get the new information or 


the new review. 


 DR. WADE: So a pertinent question to NIOSH 


would be is there a rework of the evaluation 


report underway? 


MR. ROLFES: No, not at this time. There’s 


nothing that we’ll be changing so the 


evaluation report that was released for 


Fernald will be unchanged at this time. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I’ve got a question. When we 


do this, one of the things that I’d like to 


intervene in here is that if we ask SC&A to go 


back and review something, that they only 


review the portion of the document that we 


revised. Going back and reviewing the whole 


document and coming back with another big old 


thick final review for the document that’s 


already been, the whole thing’s been gone 

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through once, I have a problem. 


 DR. WADE: We have data points on that. I 


mean, if you remember back to the time of 


Savannah River when SC&A reviewed the Savannah 


River report, it stood. Time passed; 


activities passed; a new Savannah River Site 


profile was issued. The Board then asked SC&A 


to take up the complete review of that new 


document. So that’s one path. 


The other path the Board might say to 


SC&A we’d like you to focus on this particular 


technical issue. Then SC&A will do that, and 


that’s what they’ve done. So I think there 


are two pathways to be followed. Now it is 


confusing, but I think we need to talk about 


it periodically. 


MR. ELLIOTT: I would like to add to what 


you said, Lew. It is confusing. 


And I might have misunderstood your 


question, Arjun. If you meant is an 


evaluation report for an SEC petition a living 


document? I hope you heard in Lew’s answer 


that it is. If there is something that comes 


to us late in the process that we need to 


change the document or pull it back, we would. 

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But it’s not a living document in the sense of 


our site profiles and technical basis 


documents. 


In an evaluation report for a 


petition, we’re putting forward our official 


position regarding that petition. In a site 


profile document, we’re putting forward our 


best capacity and ability to start working 


claims with the understanding that we’re going 


to improve upon that to the benefit of the 


rest of the claims and those that were 


previously done that didn’t find themselves to 


be compensable. 


That’s been our strategy, and I hope 


that’s coming clearer, but there is a 


difference. And I may have misspoke about a 


program evaluation review. I heard that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And I think it’s clear to 


me. The procedural part is still not clear, 


but I think the definitional part is clear. 


MR. ELLIOTT: We have muddied the waters in 


our eagerness in this working group in dealing 


with the site profile issues to share these 


draft documents, these draft environmental 


dose approaches, before they become finalized. 

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That’s the difference. 


That’s what you’re seeing here in our 


eagerness to show you that we’re addressing 


what we’re hearing, that we’re understanding 


what you’re offering as constructive 


criticism. That’s how we’re reacting, and I 


hope that hasn’t been to the disadvantage but 


to the benefit. 


 DR. WADE: But the title of this work group 


is to review the site profile and the SEC 


petition. It’s somewhat unique. And the 


Board is, I assume, very specific in how it 


charges and titles these groups. 


Mark? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think one thing, and 


Arjun alluded to it, one thing I thing we’re 


not, that hasn’t been mentioned yet is the 


procedural aspect of this. And I think when 


we task SC&A with an SEC review, we have Board 


procedures that we have defined how we review 


an SEC petition. 


And unfortunately, here’s one of the 


problems we’re having in Rocky Flats, as an 


example, and in all of these as we go forward 


is that the regulatory requirement for NIOSH 

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to meet their 180 days is slightly different 


than our procedural requirements. We’re 


asking for a higher bar, and there’s a lower 


bar set in the regulation which basically says 


that NIOSH has information sufficient to 


reconstruct doses for all members of the class 


da-da-da-da-da. 


In our procedures we’re asking that we 


specifically look at issues of data integrity, 


data completeness, and we ask for this last 


thing, which always has slowed us down into 


the point where we need that specific models 


and data, and that is that you can do the 


proof of principle. You can demonstrate that 


you can calculate a dose for a thorium worker. 


So then we have to, well, how can we 


evaluate that unless we have the model. So 


then we get into this position of, yes, NIOSH 


met the, in the evaluation report it might not 


even change, but we can’t really complete our 


procedural review until we have additional 


details. 


 DR. WADE: Right, and that’s just certainly 


attention and a confusion. But, see, the 


Board, what I’ve heard the Board say is that 

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we can’t pass our judgment as to whether or 


not NIOSH can, indeed, cap dose with 


sufficient accuracy until we see certain 


things. And that’s the Board’s right to ask. 


But then that takes us into a very gray area 


where now you’re looking at things that are 


constantly in flux. 


MR. GRIFFON: And that’s why it is 


necessarily iterative. I mean, some of this 


has to happen this way I think because we have 


to wait for some of these models to be 


completed. And therefore, that’s going to 


require a sort of a serial analysis. We’ll 


have to have SC&A look at certain models, 


maybe not all of them. Maybe some of them are 


obvious on their face that we as a work group 


can say, looks good. We don’t need to review 


this any further. But others we may say we 


need SC&A to look at this as a follow up to 


make sure for proof of principle reasons or 


for whatever. 


 DR. WADE: So that’s the tension. And 


there’ll always be a tension between 


timeliness and completeness. And certainly, 


the Board feels that. 

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MATRIX AND PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION
 

I have something else I need to talk 


about before you go back to your 


deliberations. And that is to the matrix and 


the fact that the matrix as the work group is 


talking about it now has not been cleared for 


Privacy Act information. In the opinion of 


counsel, it contains information that has 


Privacy Act implications. And therefore, we 


cannot give the matrix to the general public. 


I would also caution the work group 


members that as you have discussions, steer 


clear of any verbal statements that might go 


to anything that has Privacy Act implications. 


If you’re treading in that direction, Emily 


will certainly let you know. 


I think a bit of explanation is needed 


for our friends that are here. The Act that 


this Board and its work group meets under 


imagined that these work group meetings would 


be closed, that these deliberations would be 


closed to the public because the work group is 


talking about things that are in the process 


of change, and their work products that are 


not finalized and well might contain Privacy 

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Act information. 


This Board has decided to open up 


these work groups, and I think that’s a good 


thing so you can be here. You can listen to 


the entire discussion. The work group will be 


talking about certain documents that haven’t 


been scrubbed, and that’s by virtue of the 


fact that these documents have only been in 


existence for several days. 


We apologize to you for the fact that 


they might be talking about documents you 


can’t see. I think it is better that you’re 


here and able to hear the discussions than if 


we close these meetings, and so apologies to 


all. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I ask? The previous 


version of the matrix prior to NIOSH’s recent 


addition in the last column, that should have 


been reviewed and available, right? 


 DR. WADE: I don’t know that, but if it is, 


I’d be glad to give it out. 


Emily? 


MS. HOWELL: I would have to check my files. 


MR. GRIFFON: Because at least I could 


follow along with the discussion. I think 

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that would be helpful if we could make that 


available. 


 DR. WADE: Do you have a copy, does someone 


have a copy of that document that’s not --


DR. ZIEMER: Here’s one from last time, 


August 3rd . It doesn’t have the NIOSH 


responses. 


MR. GRIFFON: Does it have Board actions in 


it? 


DR. ZIEMER: Or it doesn’t have the Board 


actions in it. 


 DR. WADE: But does it have anything on the 


bottom that identifies it’s Privacy Act 


limited? 


DR. ZIEMER: It says it’s protected by the 


Privacy Act. 


 DR. WADE: Does it say disclosure to any 


third party --


DR. ZIEMER: Disclosure to third party is 


prohibited. So it’s not scrubbed then, I 

guess. 

 DR. WADE: We’ll look into that. 

MR. GRIFFON: From August 3rd I would think 


we would have --


DR. ZIEMER: But what would it be by now, 

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that’s the question. 


MS. HOWELL: The matrices are not sent to us 


for review. I mean, there’s some confusion 


about products that are supposed to be 


reviewed. We can discuss that certainly if 


there’s a need for this matrix or others, we 


can work on that, but I don’t have a copy that 


^ make available at this time. 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t know that we’re clear 


on those rules because I know the Rocky Flats 


matrix did go for reviews. 


DR. ZIEMER: Every time? 


MS. HOWELL: Right, but they were 


specifically --


MR. GRIFFON: At the end anyway. We might 


have not done that in the beginning. We 


didn’t do any of it in the beginning. 


 DR. WADE: When the matrix becomes part of 


an SC&A deliverable, for example, then it’s 


Privacy Act reviewed. But there are many 


working versions of it that go on that are 


not. Again, the Board when it meets in full 


session could decide it wants those documents 


reviewed, and then we’ll have to deal with the 


time implications of that in terms of the 

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process and how it proceeds. 


Again, working groups are really 


supposed to be able to work on things that are 


not complete and not finalized. And I applaud 


opening up the meetings, but it brings with it 


certain needs for explanations. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can you check that, Emily, 


though to see, because I would like to see if 


we can provide the folks in the room with the 


one that has the Board actions in it even from 


the last meeting. 


MS. HOWELL: I can, but I don’t have it with 


me. I can see if it’s been reviewed, I can 


verify if it’s been reviewed, but I cannot fax 


it. 


 DR. WADE: So we’ll work on that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


And again, with apologies, but please 


listen to our discussions. 


Okay, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I’ve listened to all this go 


back and forth, but Mr. Presley made a comment 


that kind of bothered me in somewhat of a 


fashion because he said when we ask SC&A to 

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review something that they can’t bring 


anything into anymore. And I beg to differ 


with that because if the findings that they 


find changes some of the other avenues, then 


they have to bring that forth. That would be 


like telling NIOSH once you get us this paper, 


you can’t ever change it. So this is an ever 


moving process, and I know it’s very 


difficult. But when we get done with this, we 


want to be able to have the best product that 


we can for the petitioners and so forth. So I 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think I agree with the 


spirit of Bob’s comments though that we don’t 


want to review the whole site profile --


 MR. CLAWSON: No, we don’t want to. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That’s what I meant. 


DR. ZIEMER: I think you’re not excluding 


the possibility that if it changes, something 


else --


 MR. CLAWSON: No, I just want to make sure 


we are on that because, you know, all of us 


are here for one thing and that’s to be able 


to get the best product that we can for the 


claimants and also to be able to get to the 

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bottom line underlying truths of everything. 


And I just wanted to make sure that we were on 


the same page. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I just would like some 


specific clarification because maybe Mr. 


Presley is talking about a document we 


recently delivered to him. We were asked --


so it would kind of clarify things for me a 


great deal, for all of us I think. I was 


responsible for that. A number of us 


contributed. 


It was the Nevada Test Site external 


dose document. It was a completely redone 


document partly at least in response to the 


TBD review. We were given to it to review. I 


don’t believe there was a specific instruction 


although it was within the context of 


discussing the matrix. 


The way we interpreted it was to focus 


on the matrix items so the main part of the 


review concerned the matrix items, but you do 


have to read the whole document. You can’t, 


because the document isn’t rewritten according 


to the matrix items. It’s a completely redone 


site profile for external dose. 

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In the course of reviewing it certain 


things just leap out at you, you know, there 


are certain things that appear to be not quite 


correct. So we made a laundry list of things 


that leaped out at us and kind of put it in a 


miscellaneous set of items that were not in 


the matrix, but also said that we have not 


performed a comprehensive review of this 


document. 


So I don’t know whether that’s in a 


gray area or how you want to do that or 


whether you strictly want us to remain within 


the matrix items and say nothing else even if 


something egregious leaps out at us; that I 


think would be important. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think in part it depends on 


the modifications that were made. If one 


small section was modified, based on a matrix 


item, then I would, I think then we would 


focus on that small section. But if an entire 


rewrite was done --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, this was an entire 


rewrite. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, so I don’t know 


that specific situation. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, the cover said it’s 


a complete rewrite so we read the whole thing. 


So, were you referring to anything 


that we did more than what you expected? 


 MR. PRESLEY: In that regard more in that 


regard than I expected when I got that thing. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So then we really need 


clarification because if a TBD is completely 


redone, and we are asked to review it, and we 


focus on the matrix items and made some other 


comments, I guess what Mr. Presley is saying 


that other comments are out of order. 


 MR. PRESLEY: No, I wouldn’t say they’re out 


of order. There was more there than I would 


think. I mean, that’s a total, we’ve got to 


go back and start from scratch now. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, we didn’t feel that we 


did a complete review of that write up. We 


made some additional comments as they came 


upon them. We did not do a complete review of 


that write up. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, of course, we can’t solve 


that one here, but it sounds like you 


identified things that appeared questionable 


as you went but did not review them in depth 

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and simply said here are some other items that 


maybe need to be looked at. 


And I think as long as it’s sort of at 


that point, then the Board can decide whether 


you need to go back in depth on those. It 


seems to me if they see something that looks a 


little questionable, why not raise it as long 


as you’re doing the rest of the review? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We want clarity on that. 


We’re not looking to raise it or not raise it, 


but I think it would be important for us to 


know --


MR. GRIFFON: We do have to spell our 


timeliness, but if it was an entire rewrite, I 


would say in that case I would expect at least 


a read through of the entire document, yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Well again, the Board when it’s 


in session needs to discuss this and --


DR. MAKHIJANI: That would be very helpful 


to us. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, I’ll turn it back to 

Hans. 

DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I guess the way I would 

hope or expect this to proceed is for me to 


just simply summarize each of the findings as 

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was stated in the reviews. And I have to tell 


you, I only got to the matrix yesterday and 


among all the other things, flying in here and 


so forth, I didn’t really have a chance to 


look at it in detail. So I’m probably going 


to be looking at the matrix as we’re 


discussing it and assess it for its ability to 


accommodate the issues that were raised in the 


first place. 


So let me just start out with Finding 


DR. ZIEMER: Excuse me, Hans. Before you 


start can you give us a, you said you had been 


citing the other documents. I’m not seeing 


that in terms of you said the references were 


underlined in the matrix. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, not in the matrix. 


MR. GRIFFON: In the report. 


DR. ZIEMER: Oh, you’re referring to the 


report. 


DR. BEHLING: In the report itself. And our 


matrix is just --


DR. ZIEMER: No, I was looking, I thought 


you were talking about the matrix. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can you tell us, Hans, though 

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in your report can you give me a title or a 


file name for that just so I can find it? I 


know I have it, and I’ve reviewed it, but I 


don’t. Is it Rev. 1? 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, June 2007. 


MR. GRIFFON: So this is the SC&A review 


document, number five, Task 5-0056, Rev. 1. 


Everybody’s looking at that. 


DR. BEHLING: And if anybody is trying to 


follow each of the findings as they were 


described in the original review, I’m going to 


give you the actual finding number and the 


page on which that finding was cited in our 


review. So if you’re following or tracking 


each of the findings as they’re being 


discussed, I will give you the page number on 


the report to make it easy. 


FINDING 4.1-1
 

And I guess we need to get started 


here. Let’s start out with Finding number 4.­

1, and that was on page 25 of my report. And 


the issue there was strictly one of 


identifying limitations associated with the 


use of fluorophotometric urinalysis data. And 


what is come down to is this. The initial 

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intent at Fernald was to assess worker 


exposure to uranium, not because it’s 


radioactive, but because it’s a chemical 


toxin. 


And so the measurements were 


essentially recorded in units of milligrams 


per liter of urine excreted. Now for toxicity 


purposes, that’s all you need to look at 


obviously in terms of how much uranium, and it 


really doesn’t matter because the atomic 


weight of U-235, -234, and -238 are close 


enough where a single unit of measurement in 


terms of milligrams per liter would suffice in 


assessing the potential exposure, and 


therefore, chemical toxicity that a worker may 


be exposed. 


And if I recall, also among some of 


the other documents, it was really intended to 


only supplement the air monitoring data which 


was supposed to be the first line of defense. 


So our question, or my concern was that in 


light of the fact that we’re dealing with the 


radiological impacts of uranium, we need to 


obviously have a more definitive understanding 


with regard to what was essentially taken in 

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by the body whether it’s through inhalation, 


ingestion, in terms of the isotopic mixture 


because that’s very critical. 


And we also do recognize that at 


Fernald we were dealing with uranium in the 


form of depleted uranium, natural uranium, 


slightly enriched and up to, I believe, up to 


20 percent of, I’ve seen numbers like three 


percent, seven percent and even ten percent. 


And of course, as we enrich, the specific 


activity per unit rate rises dramatically to 


the point where at some point it is U-234 that 


dominates almost exclusively the activity. 


And so understanding the milligram per 


liter of excreted urine is one parameter that 


now has to be defined in terms of its 


radiological impact. And up to this point in 


time we have had certain default values, and 


here I see again a default value of two 


percent which clearly would, in my mind, say 


that is fair for the average person. But the 


SEC has to address everyone, and that means 


people at the far end, and that is one of the 


concerns. 


What do we do when we don’t know and 

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all we have are data that is defined in terms 


of milligram per liter and we now have to 


convert that into a radiological unit that 


obviously makes more sense for our concern? 


And there were five people for periods of time 


at select locations who may have been exposed 


to much greater than the default value of two 


percent. And this is raised here. 


And I know we’ve had previous 


discussion about the ability to look at these 


blank data that is only defined in milligrams 


per liter and somehow or other make it 


claimant favorable by assuming certain, making 


certain assumptions that are claimant 


favorable, specifically with regard to the 


solubility that is now defined in terms of the 


tissue that is obviously of concern. And I 


understand all those things and I applaud the 


attempt to make all of these unknowns into a 


claimant favorable assumption. 


But there’s also the question in my 


mind, and I will repeat that probably several 


times today, is the issue of plausibility. 


And I think the last time we were talking 


somebody mentioned that these very difficult 

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cases will be handled by select people who 


have a very firm understanding of all the 


issues that we will be discussing here, and 


we’ll address these issues. And if that is 


the case, I would retract my concern. 


My concern is always dealing with 


someone out in the field who was not 


privileged to these discussions, who may not 


always understand the issue that he may have 


to address when he unfolds a document that 


contains all the DOE records. And he now has 


to make decisions about which assumptions. 


May this person have been exposed to highly 


enriched or moderately enriched? Was the 


solubility in question the right one I chose? 


And if there are people, and I think 


we have a gentleman over here who tells me 


that he is mostly involved, I will walk away 


saying I think it’s in good hands. And that’s 


my concern is that oftentimes, yes, 


plausibility is there, but a lot of things are 


plausible, but there’s always a question of 


will it actually be done as we have promised 


the worker that we will do. 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, that is true that Fernald 

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was concerned about workers’ health, 


nephrotoxicity was certainly one of the 


primary reasons that uranium was monitored for 


in urine. They wanted to make sure that 


personnel were not overexposed because of 


chemical effects. 


The information that we have from 


those urinalysis data does not prevent dose 


reconstruction with those data if you have 


information on the source terms to which the 


individual is exposed. And we do. We’ve 


focused quite a bit on conducting interviews 


with former employees, looked at various 


campaigns and enrichments, various processing 


areas at Fernald, as well as air monitoring 


data that have personal identifiers on them, 


and information regarding the source term. We 


feel that the default of two percent is 


supportable. 


There were some individuals in the 


later time period. Fernald never had any 


significant quantities of enrichments. There 


may have been some, up to 19.9 percent 


enriched uranium at Fernald; however, the 


quantities were very, very low in comparison 

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to the great majority of the production that 


was completed. And in the early time periods 


the primary source term was natural uranium. 


Prior to 1964, now if you take a look 


at the specific activity toward the U-235 


composition in natural uranium, that’s 0.71 


percent. What NIOSH is using for dose 


reconstructions in that early time period is 


actually one percent U-235 which results in a 


higher dose estimate for those claimants. 


After 1964, from 1965 forward, we are 


defaulting to a two percent enrichment which 


is even more claimant favorable. In reviewing 


the mobile in vivo radiation monitoring 


laboratory results which we have obtained for 


all employees at the site, we cannot support 


anything higher than two percent enrichment. 


There were some people that were 


identified on projects that were working with 


4.9 and 6.5 percent enriched uranium. And so 

what we did, we did a sample dose 

reconstruction for these individuals. And in 

looking at all sources of data, which we would 


use for dose reconstruction, we could not 


support that these individuals were exposed 

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solely to the higher enrichments. Based on 


the in vivo data, we feel that two percent is 


a bounding value for these individuals. 


DR. BEHLING: Let me ask you -- and excuse 


me for the interruption, but let’s assume that 


post-’68 when the mobile in vivo measurements 


were done, chest counting, and you have 


urinalysis, how do you deal with two sets of 


data that may or may not be necessarily 


compatible? 


MR. ROLFES: Two sets of data? 


DR. BEHLING: Such as urinalysis versus 


chest counting for uranium. 


MR. ROLFES: If you’ve taken a look at the 


Fernald records, nearly everyone at Fernald 


had a urine sample at some time in their 


history. What we are using as our first piece 


of information -- and most important pieces of 


information for a dose reconstruction do not 


exist in the site profile but rather in the 


person’s dosimetry records. 


That is the first and foremost piece 


of information for a specific individual’s 


dose reconstruction from which we start and 


use as a basis to complete an evaluation of 

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that claim. Information in the site profile 


allows us to interpret that information. So 


when we would complete a dose reconstruction, 


we would take a look at the DOE response files 


that we receive for every individual, and on 


an individual basis we would take the 


urinalysis results in that person’s DOE 


dosimetry response as our initial basis for 


the dose reconstruction. 


We would take a look to see what 


plants they worked in, what their job title 


was, and most importantly, their urinalysis 


and radiation exposure history. For assigning 


the internal dose, we would take those 


urinalysis results and take a look to see if 


they were in a position where they could 


potentially be exposed to higher enrichments 


above our default of one percent or two 


percent based on the time period. 


We would estimate an intake based on 


those urinalysis data, and then we would also 


take a look at the in vivo data that we have 


for that individual during the appropriate 


time period. And you can determine 


information regarding the enrichment to which 

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the individual is exposed. In many times in 


our reviews we find that individuals that were 


working with higher enrichments, were not 


solely exposed to those higher enrichments. 


And by higher enrichments I’m 


referring to something, for example, something 


such as 2.1 percent. Anything at Fernald that 


wasn’t natural uranium and had a U-235 content 


above 0.71 percent was referred to as enriched 


uranium. So I don’t want to mislead anyone by 


indicating that Fernald had highly enriched 


uranium as you alluded to. Fernald did not 


ever have highly enriched uranium at the site. 


It had a limit of 19.9 percent U-235 content 


in very limited quantities. Nothing at that 


level was produced as a long-term, routine 


product. These were very unusual campaigns 


when higher enriched uranium of short duration 


that occurred. 


So we must consider all sources of 


information. We want to make sure that if a 


person was, in fact, exposed to higher 


enriched uranium, we account for that. And so 


that’s why we spoke with former employees, 


reviewed former historical documents, excuse 

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me, and various other pieces of information to 


make sure that we are, in fact, defaulting to 


a claimant favorable assay for assigning 


internal dose. 


DR. BEHLING: So let me sum up. Your 


default values of one percent and two percent 


based on time period of employment? 


MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. The one percent and 


two percent defaults are based on information 


regarding the production at Fernald. And in 


the early time period, like I said, the great 


majority of the products that were being were 


produced on a routine basis and in the highest 


quantities were roughly natural uranium. 


After that, in 1965 forward, the 


greatest mass of uranium that was being 


produced was, I believe -- there were some 


smaller campaigns that were completed for 


Hanford reactors. There were some enrichments 


of 0.95 percent and 1.25 percent I believe off 


the top of my head. And during that time 


period, we’re actually defaulting to a two 


percent enrichment which is above those 


routine operations. 


DR. BEHLING: Does the mobile in vivo data 

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give you some clue? Because obviously we have 


the 185 keV photon from the U-235 that you can 


look at. 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly. 


DR. BEHLING: And then look at the total 


uranium. Have you come across anything that 


looks out of place in terms of the ratio based 


on the micrograms for U-235 versus milligrams 


for U-2 -- total uranium? You can clearly 


come to some understanding of what the ratios 


were. 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly, however, you need to 


be cautious in doing that because you need to 


consider only positive values for both total 


uranium and positive values for U-235 in order 


to make an assumption about the, so... For 


the higher exposure, the more clear-cut image 


you can get of the isotopic information to 


which the individual was exposed. 


DR. BEHLING: Also, one last thing, and I 


don’t want to belabor this. This, however, 


goes beyond the finding here. I did take a 


look at some of the data involving certain 


individuals that were exposed to fairly high 


levels as indicated by uranium excretion data 

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in the early period, ’52, ’53. 


And one of the things that struck me, 


and we’ll come back to that later when we talk 


about the issue of uranium toxicity, but I was 


surprised when you look at some of the 


incidents where your person was exposed to a 


single moment in time to a large dose. And it 


was recognized that there was a radiological 


incident, and that person was followed by 


successive urinalysis for periods of days or 


even weeks. 


And then you plot the uranium 


measurements taken for that individual. And 


in some cases -- I’m looking at one here, and 


again, it’s Privacy Act so I can’t share this 


with anybody here or at least not talk about 


it specifically, but I have an individual here 


who took on Day One time zero in a very, very 


high dose, quantity as indicated by a urine 


excretion number. 


And on that same day he was tested 


several more times, and the numbers are all 


over the place. And again, he was tested the 


next day and the following day, and the 


numbers just fly all over. If you didn’t know 

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that this was an issue here involving that 


individual, you’d never conclude that this was 


the same individual whose urine was being 


analyzed. And it clearly does not conform to 


any ICRP excretion model regardless of which 


solubility you select. 


And I was wondering, to what extent 


when people look at these data for a given 


individual that, in this case, involves a 


moment in time a radiological incident. How 


do you assess that data? Do you apply the 


highest number and apply the ICRP dose model 


as incorporated into IMBA? Or do you look at 


these data and say, well, these somehow don’t 


comply, and do we sidestep the IMBA model? 


MR. ROLFES: As you alluded to in your 


report, of the individuals that were exposed 


in the case study that you had selected from 


the Health Physics Journal, I noted that you 


had indicated that NIOSH would significantly 


underestimate potential exposures if we looked 


at only limited data. However, I do want to 


make sure that everyone is aware that we do 


not only select one or two urinalysis results. 


We will take every single urinalysis result in 

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that individual’s file to estimate his dose. 


And if you do, in fact, take one urinalysis 


data, that’s true. There’s going to be a 


highly uncertain dose estimate with that. We 


want to take all sources of information that 


we have for that individual to use for his 


dose reconstructions. 


DR. BEHLING: Like I said, this is somewhat, 


you know, and it was in context with that 


particular article that I looked at others to 


see, well, how does the ICRP model, and I 


think in one of the exhibits that I enclosed, 


there was the ICRP model for, I think in those 


days it may have even been still classified as 


Class D, W and Y, and for three different 


micron sizes. 


And you see, however, they’re 


superimpose-able. You just have to slide the 


Y axis up and down to make these basically 


superimpose. And they all start at the very 


high end and exponentially reduce in 


concentrations. And then when I look at some 


of these data on the same day, and I won’t 


give you the specific numbers again because I 


don’t want to be told to not identify them, 

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but on Day One, one of the urine samples 


measured excretions in the thousands of 


micrograms per liter on that very same day. 


And in a matter of hours I would think it went 


from thousands to less than ten. And so the 


question is what does that mean? 


DR. ZIEMER: But the nature of urinalysis, 


people don’t excrete in a nice smooth manner ­

-


DR. BEHLING: Oh, I agree with that. It 


could be 24 hours --


DR. ZIEMER: -- their liquid intake varies 


throughout the day, so any tiny thing like 


that can be very misleading. You have to 


smooth that over a long period of time --


MR. ROLFES: Total area under the curve. 


DR. BEHLING: You can go and drink ten 


glasses of water and --


DR. ZIEMER: I would be more suspicious of 


data where the outputs were the same 


throughout the day. That would look 


suspicious. The jumping all over is very 


common in urine analysis. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and I understand that, 


but the question remains. What do you do? Do 

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you take that first day, the highest, the big 


data, and say let’s put it into our IMBA and ­

-


MR. ROLFES: No. 


DR. BEHLING: -- let ICRP dictate? 


MR. ROLFES: No, we take the entire amount 


of uranium excreted from that incident, the 


total area under the curve, the total quantity 


of uranium excreted from the body is used to 


analyze the intake. Then once we have that 


data, we essentially, based on the scientific 


information that we have at hand, we consider 


multiple solubility classes for the type of 


uranium for which the person could have been 


exposed. 


And we take a look at excretion 


patterns also and make a claimant favorable 


assumption regarding the solubility. So that 


we are essentially assigning a worst-case dose 


to that individual’s organ where the cancer 


occurred for historical dose reconstruction. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a question about 


enrichment. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, I do, too, but go ahead 


with yours. It may be the same thing. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, last time we discussed 


the question of production information and the 


original site profile contained internally 


contradictory information plus -- Stu 


Hinnefeld was here, and he said that you had 


available to you the original ^. So far as I 


know, the amount of enriched uranium in the 


1950s were not small. They were in the 


hundreds or thousands of tons at least. And 


cumulatively they may have been quite 


considerable. 


So I don’t think, offhand, without 


looking at the corrected materials count, I’m 


not comfortable with the assertion -- at least 


from everything I know, whatever was 


classified as enriched uranium is probably 


about 20 percent of the total Fernald 


production. The total Fernald shipments are 


listed in the materials that comes from the 


1980s as being upwards of half a million tons. 


And the total enriched uranium shipments that 


I remember -- I don’t have the document with 


me -- are upwards of 100,000 metric tons. 


In the 1980s Fernald was processing 


primarily depleted uranium if memory serves me 

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right. And so the enriched uranium would have 


been focused in the ‘50s, ‘60s and ‘70s. 


‘Seventies production was quite low, so we’re 


talking primarily about the ‘50s and ‘60s. So 


I think settling this question of enriched 


uranium, and I think we can’t just toss a one 


percent number at it without actually looking 


at the materials and counting data that is 


available. 


I’m not at all confident, especially 


in face of the fact that the TBD numbers, some 


of them, are certainly wrong because they’re 


internally contradictory. They don’t add up. 


The recycled uranium number in the TBD is more 


than the total uranium, one of the total 


uranium numbers in the TBD. So something is 


definitely wrong. 


So I’m not comfortable with any 


resolution of this question until there are 


some clear data on enriched uranium. Because 


I happen to be quite familiar with these 


numbers, and I know that the numbers on the 


table are not right. 


Secondly, I think there would need to 


be some, some of the numbers are not right. 

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That’s certain. There would need to be some 


demonstration I would think that since upwards 


of five percent uranium was used since we’re 


not talking about an SEC, but you are covering 


the class with two percent. 


And I haven’t personally heard an 


argument, I would readily agree that a two 


percent assumption would be claimant favorable 


for, if you’re just saying as a population. I 


have no problem with that, and I think 


actually we said that in our site profile 


review. I don’t think that is an issue. I 


think that’s quite clear if you look at the 


overall production. 


However, in an SEC context and we had 


this discussion the last time, I think sort of 


hand waving we’re comfortable that it’s okay, 


and the individuals that we have looked at are 


not, you know, more than two percent is not 


justified. At least I’m not clear that it 


meets the charge that we have in our criteria 


for looking at evaluation reports. 


MR. ROLFES: For the enrichments in the 


early time period, Fernald referred to 


enriched uranium as anything which exceeded 

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the natural isotopic composition of uranium, 


anything above 0.71 percent. So as a matter 


of record Fernald had to refer to uranium 


which was 0.73 percent, only two one-


hundredths of a percent higher than U-235 


content, as enriched material. 


So they reported, so, yes, that is 


very possible that 0.71 percent or 0.72 


percent was the majority of the product there. 


However, if it exceeded 0.72 percent, it was 


reported as enriched material. Our one 


percent default will bound the enrichments for 


the greatest majority of the materials 


produced in that time period, and likewise for 


two percent. 


So, yes, we have reviewed many source 


documents. We’ve conducted interviews in this 


regard, and I believe we have provided some of 


those interviews but not a complete set. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Is there the production data 


that you reviewed on the O drive? I mean, I 


can’t, it’s impossible to look at the 


reference material on the O drive because it 


has no titles, only numbers to the documents. 


And one doesn’t know what to open in order to 

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prepare for this. 


MR. ROLFES: I was able to find them. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, of course we can find 


them if we open 70 documents and then you’ve 


got to keep track. You have to --


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe we can cross-reference 


on the matrix just to make it easier for the 


future. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, sure. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and just to, on page 32 


of our review, there is an exhibit, actually 


Attachment 4.1-4A. And if you go to page 32, 


I’ll just read you a statement for those who 


may not have access to the report. But it 


says projected and anticipated U-235 


enrichment process -- and this is an inhouse 


document. 


And it says, “Discussions with the CAO 


and NLO personnel have indicated that the ^ 


process, cold fuel from several reactor sites 


including Hallam, Bonus*, EGCR, Piqua and 


perhaps from Savannah River, significant 


portion of fuel will range from three percent 


to seven percent U-235 enrichment. In this 


regard a campaign is scheduled to begin 

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February ’69.” So they’re talking about 


significant quantities of fuel that will have 


enrichments of ^ percent. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, that’s very true. Under 


the commercial assay program during the 1970s, 


there were some high enrichments material that 


were brought into the site. And this is 


during the time period that the whole body 


counter was operating, in fact. So we have 


information regarding isotopic content for 


those who were exposed to this uranium. 


Furthermore, we do have documentation 


of individuals that were involved in the 


Hallam Reactor Project. And we have provided 


that information to the Advisory Board for 


their review as well as prepared a sample dose 


reconstruction for one of those individuals 


that were involved. 


And based on the information it does 


say that these individuals were, in fact, 


working on two enrichments with the Hallam 


Reactor elements. We know that they were 


working with 4.9 percent enrichment and 6.5 


percent enrichment. And when we looked at 


their urinalysis data, we estimated an intake 

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based on those two enrichments. I think we 


actually used the bounding enrichment of 6.5 


percent. 


However, when we looked at all the 


sources of data, when we considered their in 


vivo data, we could not confirm, because we 


could not confirm that these individuals were 


solely exposed to the 6.5 percent enrichment 


because their lung counts would have been 


very, very high. Our urinalysis data way 


over-predicted -- excuse me. Our intakes 


based on the urinalysis data way over-


predicted the observed mobile in vivo lung 


count data. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, I would expect that your 


lung count data would be more indicative of a 


recent exposure as opposed to urine which can 


be from years and years ago. It’s an 


integrated exposure that covers many years 


realizing that it may be released from bone 


tissue that was deposited many years ago as 


opposed to a lung even if it’s fairly 


insoluble. It may have a relatively shorter 


time period or life span in the lung as 


opposed to in the matrix of the bone tissue. 

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So my gut feeling is if you looked at 


the mobile in vivo lab data, you would 


probably have a better indication of exposure 


to a higher, a more enriched -- I won’t say 


high enriched -- more enriched uranium as 


opposed to urine data. So the two may not be 


compatible. 


MR. ROLFES: The two are compatible and are 


used as, you know, we have to consider all 


evidence. We can’t selectively choose one 


piece of information that contradicts another. 


We have to incorporate all information that we 


have for an individual. 


Go ahead, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: I just wanted to clarify your 


follow-up response in the matrix. It says, 


“Higher enrichments were handled as special 


projects and some people directly involved are 


identifiable from the dosimetry data, work 


locations and telephone interviews allowing 


bounding calculations to be done.” 


When I read that I thought, I mean, 


the question for me, some words jump out, work 


location, some. Some tells me not all 


probably. And then allows for bounding 

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calculations to be done told me that that was 


different than your two percent default. But 


now you’re saying -- I guess, are you saying 


that you’ve looked at these cases, this list 


of people, and determined that even, and this 


is the sample that you gave us that you 


provided? That sample DR demonstrates that 


even using the 6.5 for this particular 


individual, looking at all the other in vivo 


data available, couldn’t justify that they 


were only exposed to the 6.5 material? Is 


that --


MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- therefore, when you say a 


bounding calculation can be done, it should 


say -- well, I don’t know. Are you saying 


using the default enrichment values? 


MR. ROLFES: I’m not sure of the question. 


Could you clarify? I’m sorry. 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess I’m saying you’re 


saying that you picked out this one sample, 


and their in vivo couldn’t support using the 


high enrichment level. Certainly you didn’t 


go through this entire list and check that 


kind of thing. I wouldn’t --

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MR. ROLFES: Oh, no, no, no, we didn’t ^ for 


everyone onsite, no. 


MR. GRIFFON: But you’ve made this argument 


that we have one individual off this list that 


worked with this high enrichment material 


documented in this list. And we compared the 


situation, and we can’t support using a higher 


enrichment value for this case. And 


therefore, for any other case? Or is it 


individual specific or --


MR. SHARFI: You’d have to consider the 


specific scenario of the different claimant. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, this certainly has to be 


done on a case-by-case basis. We cannot, 


without looking at the data, I could not make 


MR. GRIFFON: So for each case you’d go and 


look at the in vivo, and if there’s any 


indication that there might have been enriched 


work based on ratios, but in a lot of cases 


you’re not going to have positive values so 


how are you going to --


MR. ROLFES: Well, if we don’t have a 


positive value --


MR. GRIFFON: You default to your two 

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percent? 


 MR. SHARFI: Just because you don’t have 


positive values doesn’t mean you --


MR. GRIFFON: I’m just trying to understand 


the decision process. 


 MR. SHARFI: So I mean, if you ^ six and a 


half percent off the urine, you may or may 


not, depending on the size of the urinalysis 


results, expect positive chest count. So it 


may fit or it may not fit --


MR. GRIFFON: So to follow up on the may or 


may not, if you don’t have the in vivo data, 


then how do you decide? 


MR. ROLFES: If we have an individual that 


we know, based on documentation ---


MR. GRIFFON: Whoa, whoa, whoa, based on 


documentation, what documentation? What does 


that mean? You know, job title, work 


location? What was the --


MR. ROLFES: Well, plant one was one of the 


locations that had the majority of the 


enrichment. There are some people that had 


been exposed to higher enrichments in plant 


one, and those individuals are identified by 


breathing zone samples. And we have 

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information regarding air concentration data. 


We have information regarding uranium mass 


data in the air. 


So from that -- and we also do have 


their swipe samples taken associated with 


those results. Now keep in mind that these 


are very short campaigns involving one or two 


people, so I want to make sure that we’re 


clarifying. We’re not discussing a very large 


population of people. These individuals are 


identified by breathing zone sample results 


and the enrichment. And I have observed some 


enrichments of about three percent, 3.5, 3.9 


percent on a very short campaign basis. 


However, these individuals were also 


monitored by the in vivo about two years later 


so we’d still be able to, if there were 


significant exposures, we’d still be able to 


make some inference based on the data about 


what isotopic content they were exposed to 


previously. 


But the great majority -- and these 


were the people that were working with 


enrichments that exceed our default of two 


percent in that time period. There were not a 

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significant amount of, there was not a 


significant amount of uranium which exceeded 


our defaults in the technical basis document. 


And for those people that did exceed it, we 


believe we have data that we can use to bound 


their doses. 


MR. GRIFFON: And you’re talking ones and 


twos, not tens and twenties of people. I 


don’t know enough about --


MR. ROLFES: Sure, based on the information, 


for example, there were a couple of short 


campaigns in plant one that I saw some 


receipts of materials. People had breathing 


zone samplers on, and there was information 


regarding the enrichment. And it was 


approximately a week for the one operation, 


and then another week later on in the year 


involving the same person. 


 MR. CLAWSON: What about the maintenance 


people and stuff that would have to go into 


those because some of the information that 


I’ve read on these plants, they had an awful 


lot of problems. In fact, they were even shut 


down numerous times. So now you’ve got a 


whole ‘nother revolving group that’s going to 

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be rotating through there. 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly, that is very true 


that people did go in and out of the plant; 


however, if you take a look, these individuals 


didn’t work just on this enrichment. These 


individuals would have been working in other 


plants that were handling other enrichments, 


mostly which would have been natural uranium 


or something below our default of two percent 


at the time. 


So these individuals would, in fact, 


be exposed to natural uranium for 50 weeks out 


of the year, and could have potentially been 


exposed to the three percent enrichment on a 


very limited basis for a week or possibly two 


weeks. So it is possible. We cannot say that 


with 100 percent certainty that an individual 


was not exposed to this higher enrichment. It 


is very possible, but it is very, very 


limited. 


So does that answer what you’re --


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, I just -- yeah, they may 


have been there, but you’re digging for this 


one person. You’ve got a lot of breathing 


zones and everything else, but you don’t have 

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it for these other people going in and out 


that are actually, actually going to be right 


up there, hands on and --


MR. ROLFES: Certainly, just like chemical 


operators were. These individuals we also, we 


do have mobile in vivo data for these 


individuals as well. So maintenance people 


were included in the schedule for receiving 


monitoring from the mobile in vivo unit. So 


if, once again, there were significant 


exposures to this very limited operation, if 


they had a significant exposure, it would be 


detectable in the mobile in vivo units. 


 MR. CLAWSON: You were talking about the 


enrichment and stuff, now were they able to 


actually enrich it up to the three percent at 


Fernald or were they blending other uraniums 


in? 


MR. ROLFES: In the later years, I believe 


in the ‘60s, they did begin receiving some 


uranium back, recycled uranium, from Hanford 


which typically had an isotopic content of 


around 0.8 percent. That material -- I guess 


I’ll probably ask Bryce to give us a little 


bit more detail about that. 

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Bryce, I wondered if you could explain 


a little bit about the receipt of, now the 


three percent material was not used in this 


early time period for blending. Typically, in 


the earlier time periods, I’d like to ask 


Bryce to comment on this because there was a 


limit to which assay of U-235 Fernald could 


use for blending, and that was typically about 


two percent enrichment I believe. And that 


came in as UF-6 from the gaseous diffusion 


plant. However, there was also material that 


came in from Hanford that was about 0.8 


percent enrichment, and that was used and 


blended I believe. 


Bryce, could you elaborate on the 


process a little bit about the blending of the 


use of one slightly higher assay such as 0.8 


percent or 1.25 percent enriched uranium to 


sweeten or enrich the isotopic content of 


natural uranium? Would you care to elaborate, 


please? 


MR. RICH: My understanding, and we have the 


experts in the room that actually did that, 


but there was an accounting restriction from a 


cost standpoint. Higher enrichments were 

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accounted for very rigorously and, in fact, 


were, had to be blended on a teaspoon basis as 


opposed to a reasonable blending on a poundper-pound basis to blend up to a certain 


level. 


So the blending was done with 


materials that matched more the, a slight 


blending up to the level that could be done 


more accurately in order to blend materials in 


a blending machine. If you blend a teaspoon 


with a ton, why you had to blend more 


carefully in order to get the entire lot 


blended to a certain amount. 


However, in addition to that the 


accountability rules prevented higher 


enrichment. Normally, they were sent back to 


the gaseous diffusion plants because they 


weren’t good blending material. So they were 


just temporarily, or some of the campaigns for 


the Hallam fuel, for example, was recovered in 


a special campaign but not used for blending 


immediately. There was an inventory that was 


stored at the plant temporarily and not used 


for blending because it was at the higher 


enrichments where they couldn’t afford the 

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price associated. 


And as a matter of fact, certain 


blends of certain enrichments had to have not 


only upper management approval at the site but 


had to have AEC approval in order to use that 


material. It cost a lot of money to blend it 


up to a very high enrichment, and so you just 


didn’t casually use that to blend up to the 


1.25 to two percent that was used in the 


routine reactor fuel. 


And I’m not sure if that answers 


specifically the issue associated with the 


blending and the use of higher enriched fuels 


or high enriched uranium or blending material. 


MR. GRIFFON: Was that all done in Building 


1, the blending operation would have been done 


there, too? 


MR. RICH: There was some blending in four. 


 MR. KISPERT: Right, and then refined in 


plant two and three where most of it was done. 


And plant four also did dry blending, powder 


to powder. Plant two and three did liquid 


blending as uranyl nitrate solution. 


MR. GRIFFON: So these different emissions 


were not just in one, right? 

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MR. CLAWSON: The reason I bring this up is 


because going through some of our data in 


Idaho, we sent some of our processed over to 


see if they could blend it. And I guarantee 


you that wasn’t two or three percent. Much, 


much higher. That’s why I’m having this 


issue. 


MR. RICH: The material from Idaho, however, 


most of it went to Y-12, and it was used 


primarily at Savannah River driver fuel. A 


little bit went to Rocky, and some others went 


to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. 


But I’m not aware that they sent any to 


Fernald. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, in going through some of 


our data, we gave, the earlier years they took 


some of the 601 process material to see if 


they could blend it, and my understanding of 


the records that we showed was that it didn’t 


work out so well because of, it was too highly 


enriched. 


MR. RICH: You can’t blend a teaspoon at a 


time. That’s just what it amounts to. You 


have to blend forever in order to get mixing. 


 MR. CLAWSON: That’s when they were trying, 

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my understanding was in the powder form where 


it was a little bit more, but it was too 


highly enriched to go. 


MR. RICH: Early on in the Idaho campaign 


they shipped as liquid, but then that stopped 


shortly or thereafter because of safety 


issues. They simply didn’t want to ship these 


uranyl nitrates because the nitrate had been 


sent as powder. But even as liquid the 


blending is still a problem. Precise 


measurements, for example, to get a precise 


total batch enrichment is a problem. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, and see, this is kind of 


one of my issues is, and I’ve said this 


before, all these sites are integrated in one 


way or another. And a lot of times this stuff 


isn’t really documented that much. This is 


why when you start getting into the enrichment 


and this and that, I can guarantee what came 


from Idaho was a lot more than that. 


And in reading it, and it might have 


been for just a short period of time there 


because my documentation that I ran into and 


stuff said that, just what he said. It was 


too highly enriched. They were looking at 

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some other fuels, but they only did the very, 


very high fuel amounts. And I believe it did 


go on to Oak Ridge and Savannah River to be 


able to be split up. 


MR. RICH: Yeah, they decided very early on 


and shortly after 1953 that Savannah River was 


coming up about the same time, and they were 


going to use highly enriched driver fuel. And 


in that case the highly enriched stuff in the 


75 percent plus range would serve well for 


that. And so most of it was used for that 


purpose, and it went to Y-12. 


MR. KISPERT: We did not normally receive 


from Idaho. They were not part of the Fernald 

circle. 

MR. RICH: I’m not aware that any Idaho fuel 

went to Fernald. 


MR. KISPERT: No doubt were shipments made 


from INEL that were experimental, but they 


would be non-routine, non-recurring. 


 MR. CLAWSON: But you did receive some? 


MR. KISPERT: I have no doubt that to my 


recollection, yes, we did from INEL. 


 MR. CLAWSON: And I read a little bit of the 


history, and basically, it was too far up 

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there to be able to bring it down. They were 


looking at being able to use this uranium to 


be able to help the process along, but it had 


already been cleaned up way too far to make 


it. I just, when they start to say out to me 


that we never had anything over three percent 


enrichment, then I start reading these 


documents. 


MR. ADAMS: We did not have anything above 


20 percent. That was our absolute limit, the 


material. And there was very little of that 


material. The material was in that five-tosix percent range. 


MR. KISPERT: The receipts that we got from 


Y-12 were all, most of them were blended. 


 MR. CLAWSON: We need to get you to 


introduce yourself. 


MR. KISPERT: Oh, Robert Kispert. 


DR. ZIEMER: Mark, could I have you clarify 


in the NIOSH statements where you say higher 


enrichments were not processed until the mid­

‘60s, you mean higher than two percent or 


higher than natural levels? 


MR. ROLFES: No, there were some that 


exceeded natural levels. 

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DR. ZIEMER: But not two percent? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, there may have been on a 


very limited, for example, in 1965 there were 


a limited number of people --


DR. ZIEMER: ^. 


MR. GRIFFON: Just ^ your phrase in your 


resolution. 


 MR. SHARFI: For one percent ^. 


DR. ZIEMER: I’m trying to get a feel for 


whether two percent is bounding in terms of 


the absolute records, or if it’s bounding in 


terms of, as I understand it, if you had an 


individual whose record showed that they 


worked at -- I don’t know, pick a number, four 


or five percent -- you could actually 


reconstruct on that basis for that period if 


you knew when it was. 


And I think what you’re saying is if 


you assumed it was two percent for their whole 


time, the final number you would come up with 


would be at least as great as if you took the 


0.7 percent and then the little period when 


they worked with higher, and then --


MR. ROLFES: I certainly am fully confident 

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DR. ZIEMER: Is that --


MR. ROLFES: I certainly feel that applying 


two percent would bound a person’s integrated 


exposure over their career. I’d certainly 


feel that --


DR. ZIEMER: But for those who had higher 


you could actually do the reconstruction for 


the period for which you knew --


MR. ROLFES: Oh, certainly, certainly, 


certainly can. However, we would --


DR. ZIEMER: And in the sample you’re just 


saying that you can show the two percent 


bounds even those for whom you have the data. 


MR. ROLFES: Exactly, the mobile in vivo 

data. 

DR. ZIEMER: Because if you’re going to 

reconstruct it exactly, you’d use the 0.7 and 


then whatever enrichments. 


MR. ROLFES: Exactly. 


DR. ZIEMER: And the two percent so far has 


bounded all of it. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, certainly. 


DR. ZIEMER: You’re not saying you tried 


everyone. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. Two percent 

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has defaulted. 


DR. ZIEMER: And in the absence of knowing 


that they worked with something or else, the 


two percent would seem to, you could make the 


case that that works. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s the case they’re making 


actually. 


DR. ZIEMER: And like any assumption you can 


always argue that there might, there could 


have been someone --


DR. BEHLING: A short-term employee who 


happened to get the six percent. 


MR. ROLFES: But that’s very unlikely. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, you still have urine data 


for those in any event, do you not? 


MR. ROLFES: I’m sorry? 


DR. ZIEMER: Are there people for whom you 


don’t have the urine data? 


MR. ROLFES: I believe approximately 93 


percent, off the top of my head, had 


urinalysis data. And for those that don’t, we 


do have a coworker model. 


MR. SCHOFIELD: How often was urinalysis 


done and in vivo counting done for these 


people? 

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MR. ROLFES: I think I can reiterate that 


some people were monitored, there’s some 


people that were monitored in the number of 


tens of times per day. Some people that were 


not working in radiological areas were only 


monitored on an annual basis. So for example, 


if there was an incident, for example, 1966 


there was a UF-6 release. There are people 


that were involved in this incident that were 


monitored. If you take a look, there are some 


people that were monitored more than ten times 


in that one day. So I think there’s --


DR. BEHLING: So I think the question 


centers more around routine monitoring as 


opposed to incident-related monitoring. 


MR. ROLFES: It would vary based upon 


previous exposures, what their actual urine 


data say, based on any incidents. For 


example, if the person felt that he had been 


exposed, he could go request a urine sample as 


well. So without, you know, I don’t want to 


make some broad statement. I’d have to take a 


look at what the person did. For example, a 


person that had the higher potential for 


exposure would certainly be monitored more 

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frequently. 


DR. BEHLING: And I looked at some of the 


procedures. We’ll get into that I think in 


the next Finding, but it changed over time. I 


mean, you look at procedures as they evolved 


over time, and you realize that the frequency 


increases. 


MR. RICH: And indicate that the sampling 


procedure was ^ elucidated in procedural form. 


DR. ZIEMER: Can I also ask for clarity on 


Arjun’s statement on the masses and your 


statements on, we have pretty good records on 


what came in as I understand it. And the 


large masses that you mentioned, is a lot of 


that accounted for stuff that was just over 


the 0.7? 


MR. ROLFES: That was exactly what it is, 


yes. 


DR. ZIEMER: Does that agree, I know you had 


a report that occurred in the ‘80s sometime, 


you and some colleagues did, did you have some 


inventory data there that somehow is different 


from what they’re saying on this? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Dr. Ziemer, last time when I 


raised this, I had referred, and also in our 

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site profile review in the production numbers, 


we referred to the original material accounts 


that Fernald filed with the AEC and the DOE. 


And in those accounts, at least the ones I’m 


familiar with, there were only three 


categories. It said depleted, normal and 


enriched. They don’t actually tell you the 


enrichment only subject to limitation for the 


site that it was under 20 percent. 


DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And we know that, so far as 


my memory serves me, that enriched uranium 


cumulative over the site’s history was very 


significant. It was not the majority, but it 


was over 100,000 metric tons, and it was being 


reported in the mid-‘80s. 


DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, but I’m sort of asking 


was 99.9 percent of that barely over or do we 


know? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: It might have been one 


percent. 


MR. RICH: Let me just comment there. In 


the original technical basis document there’s 


a section dealing with recycled uranium. And 


those numbers -- and that came directly from 

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AEC’s extensive, or DOE’s at that time, 


extensive mass balance report dealing 


specifically with recycled uranium. 


Those numbers were reported in the 


technical basis document, and they disagree 


with the total production at the site 


primarily because in the early days, they 


processed the African ^ ores. And then later 


on they processed U3OH straight out of the 


uranium mills in the U.S. production program. 


So they were processing a tremendous amount of 


uranium that will bring, so those will 


conflict with the recycled uranium. 


But it was reported in the technical 


basis document as a consequence of the fact 


that the recycled uranium was used and blended 


and transferred back and forth between sites. 


DOE recognized there was discrepancies in that 


mass balance report between sites. The 


secondary transfers, for example, exceeded 


that that came directly from the primary 


chemical processing site. And so they 


resolved, two years later the Department of 


Security issued another report which clarified 


the primary shipment. 

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So, indeed, yes, there are some 


discrepancies between reports. But again, I 


guess I think we are in the new technical 


basis document for clarifying some of that, 


but there still will be some discrepancies. 


That doesn’t deal directly with dose 


reconstruction, however, but it does give you 


an idea of what happened at the plants and I 


think that material is there and effective. 


MR. GRIFFON: One thing I wanted to ask was 


the follow up. Stu did mention in the first 


meeting we had of some documentation that 


would support, you know, clarify this maybe. 


MR. RICH: Yes, there are some documents. 


MR. GRIFFON: Is this, I mean in number two 


here, action item, you have this Bogar 1986 


report. Is that going to address -- so I 


think if I can add on just to move this 


discussion along, I was proposing that a 


follow-up action needs to be done on SC&A’s 


part. That SC&A needs to review the sample 


case that you alluded to in your number three 


here, response number three, along with the 


default approaches of one percent and two 


percent for pre-1964, post-1964. And SC&A 

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will also include review of the Bogar 1986 


document in this process. That answers kind 


of one, two and three at least here on our 


actions. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Just for clarification about 


that task. The Bogar series of documents, you 


know, there were five periodically, maybe even 


monthly. I don’t remember. They don’t 


contain any data on enrichment levels, so we 


won’t, we just have these three categories, 


enriched, normal and so we won’t be able to 


resolve the one percent, two percent, ten 


percent, five percent without -- and that’s 


the problem I’m having with this is being 


familiar with, there’s a mass of information 


that tells you enriched or not enriched. 


And we know that a lot of the enriched 


dealt with Hanford reactors, so it was likely 


to be low enriched, in the lower, less than 


two percent range. So that’s what I said. As 


a general matter, two percent if you say would 


apply comfortably to the vast majority of 


workers, this is good. I think that 


everything we know about Fernald says that 


this is good. The people who worked there 

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would maybe affirm that. 


What I’m concerned about is if you 


have a small batch of 15 percent or 19.9 


percent, the isotopic composition is so 


completely different here. Urine-specific 


activities that are 30 times, 25 times more 


than natural uranium and very much higher than 


two percent uranium that somebody who worked 


there for a couple of years who did that 


mostly could be, some burden remains. So I 


don’t know how we could carry out this task 


that you’ve just said without more data from 


NIOSH. 


MR. ROLFES: Fernald’s Health and Safety 


individuals did recognize that higher 


enrichments were brought into the site and 


focused on those exposures. If you take a 


look at one of the documents I provided, there 


were adjustments to the individuals who had 


worked on the Hallam fuel elements of higher 


enrichments. There were adjustments to their 


maximum permissible exposure, the maximum lung 


burden data with the specific activity of the 


materials that they processed. So they did, 


they were aware of who was, in fact, working 

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with these materials. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, my statement did not 


revolve around whether Fernald was being 


careful or not. It was just Mark Griffon 


assigned us a certain task, and I don’t know 


how to be responsive to that because we don’t 


have the documents. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I wasn’t sure what the 


Bogar 1986 document had in it. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: The Bogar 1986, I have that 


document. 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess the follow up is, you 


know, I think we need to, or NIOSH needs to 


provide whatever they used to make, and maybe 


it was the interviews that you said you still 


are working on transcribing, to support your 


statement that a lot of it was just barely 


above 0.7, you know. 


MR. RICH: And it’s extraordinarily 


expensive. Accounting was severe. When you 


get something worth more than gold, you don’t 


let flakes of that lie around. 


MR. GRIFFON: So I guess the back up 


document to support those default arguments 


and then this review of this case I think, 

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Arjun, to get at that question of -- because 


we can keep talking about it in this 


hypothetical realm, but I think maybe if you 


look at that case and say, okay, here’s how 


they did it. 


And I still have a little bit of a 


question, but I do want to look at that case, 


a little bit of a question of this was a 


person that had detectible in vivos. I’m 


still a little confused on how you’re going to 


deal with those that are undetectable, and now 


it’s Building one through four at least that 


had some enriched activities going on. 


But at least to look at that case and 


say, I think what they’re demonstrating in 


that case is that they looked at 6.5 enriched 


and converted the in vivo and the in vivo 


still bounded the case. So therefore, two 


percent even in this case would be because of 


all the other work that they were involved in 


or whatever, right? 


So I guess I thought maybe just to 


move this along, you need to at least look at 


that case and then respond more specifically. 


But I think SC&A also needs more specifics on 

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how you came to that conclusion that a lot of 


this material that was defined as enriched was 


just slightly over the 0.7 rather than up over 


two percent. 


MR. ROLFES: Weldon and Bob, I saw you 


motioning your hands. Was there something? 


MR. ADAMS: There was a recycle between us 


and Hanford. We sent material out that was 


either 0.95, actually 0.947 to be more 


accurate or 1.25 percent. Most of it was 


0.947 percent. If part of that material was 


consumed or part of that isotopic content was 


consumed at Hanford and it came back to us in 


the 0.8 to 0.9 range, then it was sweetened 


back up again to the 0.947 or 1.25 range and 


then sent back out. And that material’s 


processed, and then the material came back to 


us eventually. But first it came back to us 


through Paducah, and then later on in the 


early ‘80s, it came back to us directly. 


MR. GRIFFON: But when you received that 0.8 


percent, I guess what you’re saying is that it 


would have been assumed as enriched. 


(Whereupon, multiple speakers spoke 


simultaneously.) 

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MR. ADAMS: And there was a considerable 


amount of that material. I mean, it was 


thousands of tons in total. 


DR. ZIEMER: It sounds like, at least at 


this point, as Arjun suggested, it may account 


for 99 percent, but we don’t really know for 


sure. 


MR. ELLIOTT: What document --


MR. KISPERT: In the 1950s it’s my 


recollection enriched production began in the 


late ‘50s, like ’57. Let’s say ’58, give or 


take a year. The great majority, the great, 


great majority of uranium processed from start 


up through the 1950s was normal uranium in the 


form of E, either as uranium or concentrates 


from the domestic mill sites out in Utah, 


Colorado, or as pitchblende that came from 


Africa. 


The relative amounts, you know, it is 


computable. You could look at deliveries or 


annual production by plant and take plant two 


and three production. And I would not 


normally for a -- was that a nominal eight to 


ten thousand tons a year in the ‘50s up until 


about ’58. When the Mallinckrodt plant at 

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Weldon Springs came online in ’56 some of our 


production was then shipped to Mallinckrodt 


eventually leading to our refinery at plant 


two and three being shut down in ’61, ’62. 


At that point we got into residue 


management taking care of the huge 


accumulation of residues that had not been 


processed while we were high production 


through plant two and three. Nineteen sixty-


five our plant two and three was reactivated, 


and that’s where we got into short discrete 


runs of enriched, mostly in the less than two 


percent. We did have one campaign at two 


percent, but mostly they were to get the 


residues back into UNH, uranyl nitrate, form. 


The report that you mentioned, Bryce, 


was the Ohio Field Office Report of the late 


1980s. And I know I was on the team. And it 


was a very thorough look at obtaining a 


material balance amongst the user sites, 


Fernald, Savannah River, Portsmouth, Hanford 


that was principal, and Oak Ridge. 


MR. RICH: And it’s repeated again in 2000. 


MR. KISPERT: Yes, so I think the numbers 


are there that would take all, but that’s my 

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recollection. 


And one other thing on enriched. By 


definition DOE declared normal U was an 


administrative declaration to be exactly 0.71 


percent. It was done because costs were 


collected by depleted uranium, enriched 


uranium and normal uranium categories. 


MR. CHEW: I think that answers the 


question. 


MR. ELLIOTT: What documentation do we owe 


them, Mark? 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly our interview 


transcripts would fit the bill I believe as 


well as other source documents that we’ve made 


available, I think many of which we have 


provided on the O drive for their review. 


 DR. WADE: Well, I suggest for the record 


that Mark is sort of taking notes and 


generating minutes; the Chair of the work 


group will do the tasking on the timelines. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: My last question is, you’re 


saying that you relied on telephone interviews 


for some of this, and I, you know, in terms of 


individual dose reconstruction under one in 


the matrix? 

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MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And I was wondering how do 


you deal with survivor claimants? 


MR. ROLFES: These telephone interviews were 


related to employees that were involved at the 


site, so we could clarify that as well. 


MR. ELLIOTT: It says that. It says 


conducted interviews with former employees. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, that’s not what I’m 


really asking. Under item one, higher 


enrichment were by handling special projects, 


some people directly involved are identifiable 


by various means including telephone 


interviews. And if that is one of the means, 


it’s sort of an old concern. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, once again, we have to 


consider all sources of information so that’s 


certainly one source that we would take a look 


at to help us get a better picture of what the 


employee did, and what his potential exposures 


were. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Let me ask a different 


question. When there are survivor claimants’ 


interviews supplement that? 


MR. ELLIOTT: If necessary to complete a 

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best estimate dose reconstruction, we would. 


But typically it’s not necessary. 


MR. ROLFES: Exactly. The most important 


piece -- I don’t want to confuse anyone 


because the most important piece of 


information that we have for a specific claim 


relies on information that we received from 


the Department of Energy as reported to us in 


our response file. So for the great majority 


of claims that is normally sufficient with 


information to interpret potential doses using 


information in the site profile. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m still on Finding 1, but 


I’m down to action number four now. And the 


response from NIOSH is that a list of people ­

- this goes back to my who question. 


MR. ROLFES: Can we take a restroom break? 


MR. GRIFFON: Let’s take a break, yeah. I 


was hoping to get through one first, but you 


might not. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Let’s take a break. 


(Whereupon, the working group took a break 


from 10:55 a.m. until 11:08 a.m.) 


 DR. WADE: We’re back. For you on the phone 


we’re just about ready to take our seats and 

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to begin the work group’s deliberations. 


Brad? 


 MR. CLAWSON: I want to just kind of touch 


base. I think we kind of got lost last time. 


We’ve got an action item though for number 


one, correct, Mark? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes, for really one through 


three, and I was kind of jumping up on number 


four. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Hans, are there any that you 


need clarifications on on these here? 


DR. BEHLING: Well, during the break Arjun 


and I talked, and I think we’ve all come to 


the conclusion that on a time-integrated 


basis, even for one individual, especially a 


long-time worker who may have been there for 


periods of ten years or more, the likelihood 


of an occasional exposure to uranium that is 


enriched at greater than two percent may 


exist. 


But if it’s averaged out over the full 


duration of exposure time, then probably the 


one percent prior to ’64 and the two percent 


past ’64 would prove to be a reasonable and in 


all likelihood even a claimant favorable 

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approach. The exception to that would be, and 


then I’m assuming that maybe there will be 


instances where we will look at an individual 


case and say, well, that is the period where 


six percent was enriched, and this guy was 


there for only a year or two. 


Well, we might make an exception to 


that default assumption and look at it in 


context with that individual’s employment 


period and assess him accordingly. But if 


that is the likelihood for proceeding, then I 


think we will look at this item number one and 


say it’s resolved. 


MR. GRIFFON: Again, John, I mean, Hans, I 


don’t mean to cut you off. I think it’s worth 


looking at this example maybe, and instead of 


deciding on a break that this meets your needs 


maybe -- as a work group member I don’t care 


^. I would propose though that SC&A look at 


this as well --


DR. ZIEMER: To verify that calculation. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, to verify that those 


defaults make sense. And I think the more we 


hear about it and the fact that they were 


short campaigns, I’m being convinced here in 

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the room that they’ve provided us this 


example, I think we should all reflect on it 


and make sure that we’re in agreement with 


this. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I just want to clarify my 


end of the conversation. From my point of 


view, and maybe Hans misunderstood. From my 


point of view I was just reiterating what I 


said in the formal meeting on the record, 


which is I’ve no doubt that overall these 


assumptions are claimant favorable for the 


vast majority of workers. But I have some 


concerns in the SEC context which is more 


rigorous than doing claimant favorable dose 


reconstructions. I do think they need to be 


reviewed, so in my opinion which I said in the 


first part of the meeting. I think maybe Hans 


misunderstood what I had, what the intent of 


my statement was. 


MR. GRIFFON: If I can, I can read out what 


I had sort of as an action, and it covers, I 


didn’t really put it down for NIOSH’s Response 


1 or Response 2, but it sort of covers one, 


two and three in that first set of responses 


at least. And I suggested that SC&A sort of 

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review sample case along with default 


approaches, one percent and two percent. 


SC&A will also include a review of the 


Bogar 1986 document although, as Arjun said, 


it may not answer some of those questions. 


NIOSH to provide documentation to support the 


statement that most of the enriched material 


was very slightly enriched, slightly greater 


than 0.71 percent U-235. And that’s what I 


have just as follow-on actions here. 


DR. ZIEMER: Good, I’m just looking at the 


SC&A report, and they give the Bogar numbers 


for the categories, so I’m not sure what we 


would gain because you’ve already indicated 


that he doesn’t provide further detail than 


that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, Dr. Ziemer, what I was 


looking for in terms of just trying to respond 


to Mark’s tasking here is more detail as he 


has just stated --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ZIEMER: But I think the Bogar --


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- the Bogar is not 


relevant. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s probably not as relevant. 

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DR. ZIEMER: Well, I’m saying the Bogar 


numbers are in their report, and I don’t think 


it answers the question. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, the Bogar numbers are 


only relevant so far as the total amounts of 


the three categories and sorting out the TBD ­

-


MR. GRIFFON: So as far as the task, I’ll --


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- because there are some 


errors and sorting out the errors in the TBD 


the Bogar documents are very appropriate. 


MR. GRIFFON: So as far as the task I’ll 


drop that Bogar review from that task, 


otherwise I’ll leave it the same. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, let me just go back and 


then if the Bogar document is insufficient to 


look at the sample cases and how do you judge 


the validity of the two cases, one percent, 


two percent, in the absence of more definitive 


data? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think the example is 


for an individual that you knew worked on a 


certain campaign, so you have knowledge that 


they worked with enriched material. And 


they’re saying that even though he worked 

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during for a short campaign on this six 


percent -- whatever it was -- 6.5 percent 


enriched, it turns out looking over all at 


this cumulative dose, the in vivo more than 


bounds it and two percent probably would have 


been sufficient. 


So I guess that’s the context in which 


I would review it is to say, yes, they have, 


using the in vivo and the urinalysis do they 


have enough there to bound and is two percent 


bounding for all members of the class? I 


think we go back to that all members of the 


class statement. That’s what you want to 


answer. 


And part of that is, I think, it might 


get into this action item number four, but 


part of it is the, I think in my mind anyway, 


the size of these campaigns. Because before I 


came to this meeting, I wasn’t sure. And the 


way they’re being characterized, it seems that 


they’re much smaller than I was envisioning. 


And the other part is the who 


question. Can you identify either through 


dosimetry data or other pieces, do you have 


enough there to allow you to bound? Does that 

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make sense, Hans? 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I haven’t looked at 


those cases specifically. 


MR. GRIFFON: Neither have I. 

DR. BEHLING: So I don’t know what’s in 

there. 

MR. GRIFFON: I’m just going by what’s 

described here so I haven’t looked at that 


case either. 


DR. ZIEMER: Mark, as I understood it 


though, if you had a case such as Hans 


described, some individuals who only worked on 


campaigns with high enrichments for restricted 


times, you wouldn’t have to go to the overall 


bounding. You could bound that individual 


base on the actual percentages which would 


meet the other side of the SEC criteria. 


MR. GRIFFON: But if they were identified as 


working on the project. 


MR. ROLFES: Once again, for example, in 


1964 we have breathing zone samples for 


individuals that were working 3.5, 3.9 percent 


enrichment. That information would be used in 


their dose reconstruction if we didn’t have 


mobile in vivo data. 

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MR. GRIFFON: So you have some isotopic BZA 


analysis? 


MR. ROLFES: It’s not isotopic, but what was 


done was they would take an activity 


measurement as well as a mass measurement as 


well as some swipes to determine the specific 


activity of the materials. And it would 


indicate that higher assays were being 


processed or higher assay work was being 


completed. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Now this second case is a 


real worker with real data or --


MR. ROLFES: Oh, certainly. 


 MR. SHARFI: Modified a little bit to 


protect the individual’s ^. 


DR. ZIEMER: Does that one go on the O drive 


did you tell us or --


MR. ROLFES: Well, this is air monitoring 


data that I’m referring to. What Mutty I 


think was referring to was the actual mobile 


in vivo data that was used in the analysis of 


the 6.5 percent enriched internal exposure 


model. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mutty, which case number is 


it? Do you remember? 

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 MR. SHARFI: Actually, it’s not a claimant. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Sorry? 


 MR. SHARFI: This was not a claimant. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, but which example 


dose reconstruction --


MR. ROLFES: I believe it’s internal 14. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then, Brad, if I can go 


on, on number four I just had a question. 


Really this gets back to the who question, but 


just a question for Mark on what actually does 


his response mean. We have a list of people 


with thorium working locations and in vivo ^, 


and then his provided response a list of 


workers with Uranium-235 and ambient 


environmental dose^ of at least 100 micrograms 


^. Those aren’t separate lists, are they? 


Are they the same --


MR. ROLFES: They’re separate lists. Yes, 


they are. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, they are? Okay. So why 


was this first sentence included as an action 


for this Finding? I’m just a little confused. 


MR. ROLFES: We had asked about the 


assumptions to apply to the entire class. We 


basically, this was just a lump of our 

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information into this response. We had gone 


through --


MR. GRIFFON: Because I know we had asked 


about thorium workers, quote/unquote, thorium 


workers, but that comes up later, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Then there was also some 


question about who was potentially exposed to 


enriched uranium. So I provided both listings 


as an indicator of thorium exposures as well 


as potential enriched uranium workers based on 


in vivo data. 


MR. GRIFFON: But they’re not the same list, 


and they don’t necessarily overlap or anything 


like that. 


MR. ROLFES: There are some people that are 


both. 


MR. GRIFFON: And the list of U-235 in vivo 


count results of at least 100 micrograms more 


than one time’s provided. Was this list -- I 


haven’t looked at it, but was this list 


constructed by NIOSH or --


MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- was this something that was 


-- so you pulled this out of in vivo --


MR. ROLFES: Exactly. Let me qualify this a 

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little bit. For example, the thorium worker 


notation was written onto the mobile in vivo 


data sheet by individuals at the site who were 


apparently attempting to reconstruct 


individuals who were working on historical 


thorium processes. 


They knew that some of the people had 


not been previously monitored for thorium 


exposures in the earlier days. So they wanted 


to make sure that these individuals had not 


exceeded a maximum permissible lung burden in 


the earlier time periods when thorium was, in 


fact, processed. So there’s indications on 


the mobile in vivo datasheets to indicate that 


these individuals were either current or 


former thorium workers. 


And now this is, many of these 


individuals that were thorium workers were 


counted in the first month that the mobile in 


vivo unit came to Fernald indicating that they 


knew who the individuals were that were 


working on the thorium projects as well as 


selecting those individuals for the first 


round of counts. 


The enriched uranium list, I just used 

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a 100 microgram quantity because that’s a 


readily detectable quantity to identify a 


person that could have had a potential 


enriched uranium exposure. So that’s why 


we’re providing it. 


MR. GRIFFON: And that was derived from HIS20 or how was that --


MR. ROLFES: No, this was actually from the 


raw data sheets that NIOSH collected, the 


mobile in vivo data which are available on the 


O drive. We just went through by hand and 


looked for the results that exceeded 100 


micrograms. 


MR. GRIFFON: So back to my original 


question. I’m a little slow on the uptake on 


this, but I saw a thorium worker -- this goes 


back to this document you provided, there was 


a PDF called thorium worker I think, maybe I’m 


wrong. Is that true? 


MR. ROLFES: I can take a look through my 


notes here, and I believe there was a list of 


thorium workers, a list of potential enriched 


uranium workers, and then an Excel spreadsheet 


that had both listed just by the names of the 


employees. And the PDFs actually included all 

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of the employees’ in vivo data for both the 


potential enriched uranium exposures as well 


as the thorium. So anyway I do have a copy. 


I have the stack of mobile in vivo results for 


each of the categories I’ve just described so 


if you’d be interested in making a copy or 


something. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I mean, I probably have 


it, but I see lists of thorium and former 


thorium workers, but I don’t see the uranium 


one. 


MR. ROLFES: Thorium and former thorium 


workers at Fernald and then list of potential 


enriched uranium workers. 


MR. GRIFFON: I can sort this out. 


 MR. CLAWSON: We have a comment over here 


from that --


MS. BALDRIDGE: Is that list including 


workers pre-1966? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, enriched uranium --


MS. BALDRIDGE: No, reference to the 


thorium. 


MR. ROLFES: Reference to the thorium, it 


certainly is, yes. I’m not saying it’s 100 


percent complete because in the early time 

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period, mobile in vivo results were not 


available. And what was done, there were 


individuals at the site who had investigated 


former people that were working on the thorium 


projects and compiled a list of individuals 


who were involved. 


However, based on the information that 


we’re using for dose reconstruction, we’re 


going to be using air monitoring data for 


those early time periods when people did not 


have in vivo counts, so --


MS. BALDRIDGE: And how are you doing that 


for plant six when they didn’t even know it 


was there? Have you found air monitoring 


measurements? I mean, they weren’t available 


for the original site profile so did you find 


those? 


MR. ROLFES: We certainly did, yes. That’s 


a very good important point because NIOSH was 


not aware of those initially, and Fernald 


certainly was. Fernald documented the, they 


actually had prepared to, basically after the 


materials in plant nine in the early 1954, 


’55, ’56 time period were produced, a lot of 


the materials that were left over were put 

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into a storage building. They wanted to 


reduce the volume of those materials and 


convert them to a safer storage method. 


So they converted a furnace in plant 


six in the, in late 1959, they converted the 


plant six furnace to essentially roast and 


oxidize the thorium materials into a safer 


storage form. And that was done between, I 


believe, ’60, ’61 time period. I’d have to 


take a look at the exact notes that we do have 


and documents. But it certainly was 


documented; however, NIOSH did not initially 


have that documentation so in the early time 


period. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Another question, have you 


checked the workers’ records based on the 


exposures that were presented in the documents 


to see that your records agree with the 


National ^ of Ohio records that were provided 


in exposure? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, we have begun a comparison 


of urinalysis cards to information that we 


received from the Department of Energy and our 


dosimetry response file which is out of HIS20. So we’ve been asked by the Advisory Board 

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members to compare the data that’s in the HIS20 database to information on urinalysis 


cards. And so we are in process. We’ve 


completed the analysis of -- I don’t want to 


give a number. I don’t have the number off 


the top of my head. Gene Potter, I believe, 


is on the line. If he would care to address 


some of the data comparisons, that would be 


helpful for us. 


Gene, are you available? 


 MR. POTTER: Yes, let me get my mute button 


there. What we’ve looked at so far was large 


blocks of data that were available in the 


SRDB. And these are mostly plutonium results 


from the ‘80s, and those results are comparing 


very favorably. And we’ll have all that in 


some sort of final report. 


Still waiting to get more information 


from DOE. There are some smaller sets of data 


particularly for a given worker that are in 


the SRDB that can be compared also. But we’re 


looking to hopefully do some statistical 


comparisons from, say like a goodly number 


from each decade to compare to the data in 


HIS-20. 

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MR. ROLFES: Thank you, Gene. 


Is there anything else, Ms. Baldridge? 


MS. BALDRIDGE: That’s fine, thank you. 


MR. GRIFFON: So on number four I do find a 


spreadsheet called “Fernald In Vivo Review”, 


9/25/07. And this says former thorium 


workers. The PDF file actually it says list 


of former thorium workers, but it’s actually 


31 pages of there are in vivo counts for 31 


people or about 30, whatever it is, 29 people. 


And then in the next column, in Column B of 


this Excel spreadsheet, you say potential 


enriched uranium workers. And those in this 


list have about 74, and you’re saying these 


are the people that were greater than 100 


micrograms at any one time? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: So they’re not necessarily all 


potential enriched uranium workers for those 


with a significant reading anyway. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, sure, these are the 


individuals who would have had high ^ 


exposures. 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t know that there’s any 


further follow up on that. 

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Arjun, do you have something? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I’m a little confused. Are 


we on five? 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m on number four actually. 


I was just trying to clarify what documents 


existed to support that it wasn’t --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Four is still about 


enrichment, right? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. NIOSH’s response number 


four to the first Finding. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, response number four to 


the first finding. 


MR. GRIFFON: First finding, yeah, yeah, 


yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I’m in the fourth finding. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right, and there’s a 


response, part of that response, it talks 


about thorium again. I think we cover that in 


another finding, but air monitoring data for 


thorium tasks, ’66-’72 being made available by 


another division of NIOSH. It’s now being 


entered in a spreadsheet. So you have a 


follow up on that is to provide that 


spreadsheet? That hasn’t been provided yet, 


right? 

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MR. ROLFES: Entered into spreadsheet, let’s 


see. Air monitoring data for thorium. 


MR. GRIFFON: This really talks about 


thorium. I get a little confused. 


MR. ROLFES: We have provided the air 


monitoring data for thorium. It is available 


to the Advisory Board on the O drive. 


MR. GRIFFON: So I’ll work with you later, 


Mark, but we’ve got to cross-reference that on 


another action because this is kind of in the 


wrong place, I think, right? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a question about that 


spreadsheet, if I might. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: There are two or three 


spreadsheets actually. I’ve downloaded them 


all and there’s one spreadsheet that says 


“Fernald Thorium Data Air Samples Combined”. 


But only a few of these samples are actually 


labeled thorium. It seems like a lot of these 


are just uranium samples. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can we come back to that when 


we get to the thorium action? I’m with you, 


Arjun, but I want to get through the ^. I 


think we’re almost there because number five ­
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- I’m just going through these one by one to 


make sure we’re thorough here. 


Total production numbers and the 


differences. You say you’re still in progress 


on that, Mark. Is that correct? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, the comparison of HIS-20 


data, is that what we’re --


MR. GRIFFON: No, it’s number --


DR. ZIEMER: It’s the fifth action. 


MR. ROLFES: I apologize. We are certainly 


reviewing the total production numbers; 


however, these are not something that is going 


to directly impact dose reconstruction. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, and I would, I guess my 


druthers would be to do the best we can on 


that, but also understand that we don’t need ^ 


because it’s probably not going to impact on 


dose reconstruction. 


MR. ROLFES: Right, I agree with that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But production is really 


important only for two things that I can think 


of. Because one is when did these things 


start? When did RU start? When did enriched 


uranium? What were the levels of enrichment? 


I agree that we don’t need --

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MR. GRIFFON: Any precision here. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- precision in the actual 


production numbers. We need precision in the 


other things, you know, content of RU ^ dose 


related. 

MR. GRIFFON: So we just want to keep that 

in mind. 

 MR. CLAWSON: If I might, something else 

from the outside people looking in. You can 


go on the DOE site, and it shows this much, 


and you go to these actual TBD and you’re 


talking --


MR. GRIFFON: Absolutely, we have to at 


least be responsive to that. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Just so that people can see 


why there is such a broad difference there. 


That’s one of the things. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s very important, and we 


do occasionally get calls like that, and 


usually we’re able to resolve those calls, you 


know, when we speak to the claimants. So we 


do get questions like that that we’re able to 


resolve. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, for number six you have 


see number four. But I don’t know that that 

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sample one, you say the person’s not a 


claimant, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: Did you find any claimants 


that fit this category or were there --


MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: And so I don’t think you’ve 


answered that question. Can you provide claim 


numbers? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, we’ve provided a list of 


names so that was --


MR. GRIFFON: They’re in that list then. 


Okay, so they’re back in that spreadsheet. 


And number seven, and, Hans, I think 


you have a follow-up report on this, did you 


not? 


DR. BEHLING: Yes, I think it was e-mailed 


to all of the working group people, and I have 


some hard copies here as well. 


MR. GRIFFON: Do you have any comments on 

this one? 

DR. BEHLING: Well, I’m not sure we’re ready 

to discuss it, but the petitioner, Ms. 


Baldridge, had identified an issue at one of 


the full Board meetings and at the most recent 

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working group meetings that relates to the 


issue that -- and I’ll summarize it, what 


happens when you have a person who has had a 


significant exposure to uranium that 


potentially renders the kidney less than 100 


percent functional, and what does that do to 


invalidate subsequent bioassay data? 


In other words for people who had been 


exposed either chronically to high levels or 


perhaps as a result of a single incident that 


renders the kidney less than functional in a 


normal sense, to what extent will that 


exposure invalidate the bioassay data that you 


would essentially look at following such an 


incident, or on a chronic level and 


essentially render that data invalid? 


And as a result of that question, I 


looked into it, and there’s very little data 


out there. I had to look at one of the major 


documents, and that is the “Toxicological 


Profile for Uranium”. I brought with me only 


the draft form that was issued in 1998, and I 


do want to pass that on to Sandra, but I’ve 


also got the most recent version, final draft, 


which was issued in 1999. 

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And I reviewed the data which is 


segregated on the basis of exposure pathways 


that separates out from inhalation, ingestion, 


wounds, et cetera, and different types of 


compounds based on solubility. And you will 


see, when you go through that document, 


there’s an incredible wealth of information, 


but unfortunately, always it involves animals, 


different species, from rats, mice, rabbits, 


dogs, goats, et cetera, et cetera. 


There was all but one case study that 


involved a human. And I don’t say that that 


was the only human study, but it was the only 


human study where it was clinically determined 


that the person suffered from toxic effects of 


uranium and reduced kidney function. And that 


is a 1990 article by Zhao and Zhao and 


involved an individual who was exposed to 


significant quantities in two incidents to 


uranium tetrachloride. 


It was clearly shown that he had 


impaired renal function, and it was also shown 


that the excretion data for that individual as 


a function of time followed a track that could 


not be explained by the conventional ICRP 

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model. And in short, if you look at the 


document, you will see that this individual 


was monitored for the first 64 days following 


this incident. 


And you’ll see a steady increase in 


24-hour urine excretion for that individual 


rose from about 152 micrograms per liter to 


over 3,000, and then thereafter it declined 


exponentially by two functions. What it 


triggered in my mind is let’s assume this 


individual had been monitored up front, and 


the excretion was very modest at first. 


That would suggest, well, there’s no 


reason to even follow this guy up because 


based on the early excretion data of one 


hundred and some odd micrograms per 24 hour 


urine excretion, there’s no need to concern 


only to realize that subsequent time when he 


may not be monitored anymore that his 


excretion had risen twenty-fold to over 3,000 


micrograms. And it does, in fact, support the 


potential concept that when you have toxic 


levels of intake for uranium, that the 


bioassay data may reflect numbers that do not 


coincide with our expectation based on ICRP 

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excretion models. 


And I do want to ask the Board now if 


I can make a copy of that report available to 


Ms. Baldridge? Because it has not gone 


through the review cycle of the Privacy Act, 


but on the other hand, she was the petitioner, 


and it’s mostly her documents that were 


reviewed in context with this issue. So I 


will ask the Board at this time if I can offer 


or send her a copy of the report. 


DR. ZIEMER: I don’t think the Board can 


make that determination. It’s a legal 


question. 


 MR. CLAWSON: This is the report that you’re 


talking about, Hans? 


DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. CLAWSON: The one you gave us? I’ll get 


Mr. Wade to take a look at it. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Hans, I can wait until it’s 


cleared. There’s no urgency. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think we might have to 


wait --


DR. BEHLING: There’s nothing in there that 


she hasn’t seen before, obviously. 


 MR. CLAWSON: We’ll give this to Mr. Wade, 

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and he’ll get with legal counsel and make sure 


we vet it, and then we’ll get you a copy of --


MS. BALDRIDGE: And that leads to the next 


question concerning the [identifying 


information redacted]. When we went through 


the interview process on [identifying 


information redacted] claim, I was asked 


questions and asked if I had any additional 


information. And I was making references to 


[identifying information redacted] records. 


And the interviewer said where are you getting 


this? I said, well, I’m assuming it’s in his 


records. The records that were used for 


[identifying information redacted] dose 


reconstruction did not have any of the 


information concerning him having [identifying 


information redacted] which were contained in 


the National Lab of Ohio infirmary records 


when he was diagnosed by the doctors there, 


and evidently monitored to some degree for 


that damage. Now, I question, I had asked 


Mark, what records does NIOSH have from 


National Lab of Ohio because those records 


were turned over by the court to the employees 


and put in trust. So I don’t know if in the 

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‘90s a copy of that information was provided 


or not provided, but I know in [identifying 


information redacted] case those records were 


provided by me for his claim and that NIOSH 


did not have access to them. Or if they were 


in the databank, they haven’t been located. 


MR. ELLIOTT: You did provide them by claim? 


With your claim you provided them. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I provided them with the 


claim, but since the petition records that the 


class of workers which could be potentially 


600 people apart from the 900 or so who have 


applied for claims, their records would not 


have been provided that would indicate whether 


or not they had issued the [identifying 


information redacted]. 


DR. ZIEMER: From what you describe, Hans, 


it sounds as if the [identifying information 


redacted] increases the uranium turnover in 


the urine. And if I’m a dose reconstructor, I 


think I’m going to be estimating more uranium 


in the body than I would otherwise. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Actually, it causes a 


retention of salts. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it does not --

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DR. ZIEMER: Well, you’re talking about a 


fraction of the body burden being excreted --


DR. BEHLING: If you look at, for instance, 


the assessment of the initial intake for this 


individual who is the case study, and then you 


look at the ICRP excretion fraction which is 


now a number, you would expect ^ W which was 


cited in this case to be about three percent 


or four percent on day one. 


DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


DR. BEHLING: And obviously, that was not 


the case. The 156 micrograms was a small 


fraction, less than one percent; and 


therefore, it is clearly not in concert with 


what you would expect to based on the relative 


quantity that would be expected to be excreted 


if you looked at the ICRP model as a reference 


value. 


DR. ZIEMER: But you wouldn’t only use day 


one. 


MR. ROLFES: Exactly, exactly. That’s a 


very important point because right here we’ve 


indicated that NIOSH would significantly 


underestimate an intake or a body burden if 


such an assay were to be performed in the 

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first few days following an acute exposure. 


That’s a very important point because we would 


not rely only on a limited set of data. We 


would consider the total uranium excreted from 


the incident all the way out until the end of, 


until the urine sample dropped back down to 


below detectable levels. So we cannot --


MS. BALDRIDGE: The point is [identifying 


information redacted] is not something that 


just occurs for a few days while they might be 


excreting uranium levels from an incident. It 


causes an inflammation which affects the 


[identifying information redacted] ability to 


process and excrete the salts, particularly 


uranium hexafluoride or tetrachloride to the 


point that, as I’ve read, begins to excrete 


and causes it to be withdrawn and deposited in 


the [identifying information redacted] which, 


in fact, is not allowing the uranium to leave 


the body, leave the [identifying information 


redacted], but is actually extracting that 


portion from the water portion of the urine 


and depositing the salts, the uranium salts, 


in the [identifying information redacted]. 


DR. BEHLING: And let me make a comment 

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here. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: The long-term excretion 


ability for the [identifying information 


redacted] in people with [identifying 


information redacted]. 


DR. BEHLING: The data suggest that there is 


obviously a reduced excretion early on that 


perhaps reaches a high point, in this case if 


one can look at this case and assume it may 


represent other individuals, you reach the 


maximum excretion value around 62 days after 


the exposure. But what it means is that if 


you took the day after or a couple days after 


where you’re at the low end, you would clearly 


not assess this person’s exposure accurately. 


You would underestimate clearly. 


DR. ZIEMER: I think Sandra is saying that 


the integrated excretion will still be low 


regardless --


MS. BALDRIDGE: Right. 


DR. BEHLING: It probably would be. 


DR. ZIEMER: -- of what the ^. It seems 


like if there’s a retention here which, if 


that’s the case, the integrated will give you 


a different answer. 

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DR. BEHLING: If you had chronic 


[identifying information redacted] failure or 


a chronic reduced [identifying information 


redacted] function, and I’ve looked at some of 


the animal studies where basically the 


[identifying information redacted] seizes and 


stops. It shuts down, and you’ll have to, if 


you’re a human, you have to resort to 


dialysis. 


MR. ROLFES: Correct. It’s a very, very 


serious condition where the [identifying 


information redacted] do stop. You stop 


producing urine. You do not excrete urine or 


uranium. 


DR. BEHLING: I know that, but the truth is 


you can have partial [identifying information 


redacted] that doesn’t block the entire 


[identifying information redacted] function 


but is reduced [identifying information 


redacted] function. And under chronic 


exposure conditions where there’s a chronic 


reduction in [identifying information 


redacted] function, not 100 percent to the 


point where a person stops secreting, you’re 


altogether at a catastrophic end point. 

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But in the sense where you have 


partial reduction in urine excretion of 


certain metal salts, you would falsely assume 


that the exposure was less than what it truly 


is. This is what these data dictate to me. 


MR. ROLFES: I don’t see this as 


invalidating the data that we do have. This 


is a single data point, a single case 


scenario. And it’s a big leap of faith to use 


one case scenario to apply, you know, in an 


acute, very serious exposure condition like 


this which required medical intervention, it’s 


a very big leap of faith to try to apply that 


to a chronic routine exposure at a much, much 


lower level. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Mark, one of the documents 


that was submitted with the petition where 17 


men had exposure and 100 percent of them had ­

-


DR. BEHLING: It’s part of the exhibits in 


this report as you will see. I included that. 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, that is very true. There 


was an incident with uranium hexafluoride for 


17 individuals who received it. There were 


some immediate concerns about the individuals’ 

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health because this is an unusual occurrence 


and a significant incident. When you have an 


exposure to this material, to UF-6, it’s 


highly soluble. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I don’t think you can claim 


that it only occurred in individuals who were 


involved in an incident like the one 


documented. It shows a pattern that uranium 


hexafluoride causes damage, period. Now if 


you can identify everyone who was exposed to 


uranium hexafluoride, you will know which ones 


to begin checking for that. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, sure, uh-huh. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I mean, to say it was 


limited to an isolated incident or an isolated 


claim or case I think is a little narrowing. 


MR. ROLFES: No, certainly these are 


significant events. The individuals that were 


involved in this UF-6 release required medical 


intervention, and they were well monitored. 


In taking a look at -- I actually do have a 


list of individuals that were directly 


involved in the 1966 UF-6 release at Fernald, 


and these individuals gave immediate urine 


samples. Let me get to the results here. 

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There are 12 AEC employees listed on 


this sheet, and between these 12, there are 35 


urine samples taken. The one individual --


one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, 


eight, nine, ten, eleven, there are 11 urine 


samples for the one individual. It appears 


that five of which are in the first 24 hours. 


So these are acute scenarios that are unusual 


occurrences. 


Fernald routinely --


MR. GRIFFON: Mark, do we have that 


document? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, I do believe this has been 


made available to the Advisory Board as well. 


Let me take a look at my list here for a 


second. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I think the unusual 


occurrence may be that they were monitored or 


detected and not the fact that the exposure 


was a unique occurrence. 


MR. ROLFES: I’m sorry. Could you repeat 


that, please? 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I think the unique 


occurrence would have been that they were, 


that the exposure incident was reported and 

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these people were monitored and not that the 


occurrence of [identifying information 


redacted] was the unique occurrence. I’m sure 


during the course of the operation at Fernald 


more than 17 people were exposed to uranium 


hexafluoride. 


MR. ROLFES: Oh, yeah, I’m not by in any way 


limiting this to only these individuals that 


are listed on this particular incident report. 


However, Fernald did do additional research 


and development with individuals who had been 


exposed to uranium. We have indications --


well, let me start off with on an annual 


basis, personnel provided urine samples. 


In addition to urinalyses that were 


looking for uranium concentrations in urine, 


individuals on an annual routine basis 


provided urine samples that were analyzed for 


things that would determine whether 


[identifying information redacted] function 


was, in fact, being impaired or not. This, in 


fact, was the reason, Fernald was concerned 


about chemical toxicity, and so they monitored 


employees for any chemical toxicity effects. 


If you take a look at the information 

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that was collected from a urine sample during 


an annual physical, there were indicators to 


determine whether there was albumin being 


excreted in the urine. They were looking for 


proteins in the urine as well. They were 


looking for a condition known as proteinuria 


which would be an indicator of [identifying 


information redacted]. They were also looking 


for blood in the urine. They were looking for 


white blood cells in the urine. They were 


looking for various types of castes that are 


formed by cells in the [identifying 


information redacted]. 


These are all indicators of, in 


addition, they would look at the specific 


gravity and the color of the urine as well. 


You can infer a lot of things as a medical 


doctor from information collected. I am not 


aware of any indicators where an individual 


has a documented case of chronic [identifying 


information redacted] failure based on routine 


exposures at the site. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Next question goes back to 


do you have the records that show what the 


albumin was, what the proteins were that would 

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have all have been included in their infirmary 


records? If you do not have those records, 


then you have to rely on the documentation 


that was provided either in the petition 


stating that 17 people had damage or the 


documentation that was sent with the claimant 


showing what their excretion rates were. 


MR. ROLFES: We know based on the list of 


individuals that were provided in the petition 


that had [identifying information redacted]. 


These individuals had acute [identifying 


information redacted]. This is significantly 


different and caused by a large exposure to a 


highly soluble uranium hexafluoride gas. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: [identifying information 


redacted] is not one of those individuals. 


His damage was discovered during a routine 


urinalysis. There was no record that he has 


ever had an exposure other than the notation, 


it’s apparent that this man has been exposed 


because of what we’re seeing in his urinalysis 


records. 


MR. ROLFES: In a specific case like this 


what we would need to do is take a look at the 


urinalysis data. That would be the first 

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place to start. As a medical doctor could 


take a look, excuse me, at the medical 


records. A medical doctor would be able to 


infer information regarding the [identifying 


information redacted] function from these 


urinalyses results that you’re referring to. 


The problem with chronic [identifying 


information redacted] failure, not just 


uranium can cause [identifying information 


redacted]. Several other environmental 


factors, health factors such as diabetes, high 


blood pressure, can all contribute to chronic 


[identifying information redacted] failure. 


So we would have to make a case-by-case 


analysis. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Does NIOSH have the 


information? 


MR. ROLFES: What information? 


MR. GRIFFON: Do you have the medical 


records? 


MS. BALDRIDGE: To determine whether --


DR. ZIEMER: To determine if there’s a 


[identifying information redacted] problem for 


a given individual. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: -- there could be a 

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[identifying information redacted] problem 


which would affect the validity of the 


urinalysis records for anyone in the class? 


MR. ROLFES: Once again, we do not have a 


comprehensive, I don’t want to mislead anyone. 


We do not have a comprehensive documentation 


of everyone’s medical records on the site. We 


do, however, have everyone’s urinalysis data, 


and that would be the first place to start. 


If we observe something that was unusual with 


those urinalysis data, then it would trigger 


additional investigation into that claim. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: That urinalysis data, is 


that uranium urinalysis or complete 


urinalysis? 


MR. ROLFES: We would certainly know if 


there was something unusual because of the 


amount of data that is provided. We would 


take a look at the urinalysis data first. We 


would take a look at in vivo data, if the 


person was not excreting the uranium that 


would be residing within the body, it would 


readily detectible by the in vivo results. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, that came after ’68. I 


mean, there are a lot of loopholes here. 

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Let’s face the fact that if you have chronic 


[identifying information redacted], the 


urinalysis will not allow you to make that 


decision as to whether or not there’s 


something unusual. You’ll just see a reduced 


urine content of uranium. That’s all you’re 


going to see. You’re not going to be able to 


say whether that reduced uranium excretion 


value is legitimate or is the result of 


reduced [identifying information redacted] 


failure, and that’s the bottom line. 


MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


I’d like to point the Advisory Board 


members to some research that was, in fact, 


done by the Fernald site on this topic. There 


were, in fact, case studies of human exposures 


to uranium for individuals that were in fact 


employed at... There were four individuals 


that were directly exposed to uranium at 


Fernald. These individuals during their time 


period at Fernald did pass away from various 


causes. 


The Atomic Energy Commission was 


interested in learning additional pieces of 


information from individuals that had worked 

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at the site in order to determine whether 


this, in fact, was a concern. I’d like to 


point back to the conclusions that resulted 


from the autopsy data. 


There were organ-specific examinations 


of uranium content as well as a detailed 


investigation of the kidney tissues. The 


amount of uranium found in analyses of the 


kidneys is well below the level at which we 


would expect to find kidney damage. The 


microscopic sections indicate no kidney damage 


which could be attributed to uranium. It 


appears to us that the kidney may be the 


critical organ for these types of exposures we 


encountered. 


So it shows to me that they certainly 


were concerned about this, and it was 


investigated. We have no indicators other 


than a single case study that would invalidate 


our dose reconstruction model. 


DR. BEHLING: I’m having somebody from the 


ICRP who’s one of our consultants actually 


look at that data and try to make heads or 


tails with it because quite honestly it did 


strike me odd to look at that excretion value 

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for that individual and realize it was going 


up for probably 64 days and then precipitously 


dropped thereafter. 


And I’m having them look at it so to 


say is there an explanation that is reasonable 


and should be looked at in more detail in how 


it might apply to other claimants here at 


Fernald. 


MR. ROLFES: This individual did have acute 


renal failure so he stopped producing urine. 


I believe it’s documented in this report, but 


he was only producing about ten milliliters of 


urine in a day versus the normal excretion 


amount of roughly 1.5 liters. 


It’s very possible this individual had 


to receive medical intervention because of his 


huge exposure. It’s very possible this 


individual was given something such as like a 


bicarbonate to expedite, sort of like a 


chelating agent, to expedite the excretion of 


uranium that remained within his body. 


I don’t know if that was the specific, 


I don’t know if the treatment regimen, and I’m 


not a medical doctor so I’m not qualified to 


evaluate his medical history and the treatment 

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of this case. But I would have to take a look 


or have a medical doctor take a look at that 


information to make a judgment about this 


specific case. And once again, this is one 


single case where there was a large ^ 


exposures. 


DR. BEHLING: And I have stated up front 


that human data are very few. And I looked at 


other data that were, in fact, also published 


in 1990, an article by Ron Fischer and Ron 


Kathrin and others and also involving 


tetrachloride, and unfortunately in those 


instances the clinical data doesn’t support 


renal damage. The clearance rate was given 


there and so forth, but I was focusing on 


strictly dose human data where there was 


excretion values associated with clinically 


diagnosed renal failure. And that’s the only 


case that I was able to find. 


 MR. SHARFI: Were those reported in 24 


hours? 


DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes, actually, they were 


adjusted because I believe they didn’t always 


collect, and then they arbitrarily said let’s 


multiply everything so that the 24-hour urine 

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volume ends up being at 1.4 liters. 


MR. ROLFES: And that’s a good point but --


 MR. SHARFI: Because ^ concentration. I’m 


not sure, I wonder if the concentration 


changes because of the renal damage versus the 


total uranium output. 


DR. BEHLING: I can tell you just looking at 


the numbers because for the first 24 hours 


they cite as the 21st hour urine volume as 104, 


I think, micrograms per liter. And then if 


you look at the actual figure itself, it looks 


to be that if that was scaled up to 1.4 liters 


at 152 micrograms. So I believe that all of 


the data points you see are, in fact, 


normalized to a 24 hour urine excretion 


volume. 


DR. ZIEMER: Mark, could you clarify on some 


of the other markers like albumin and so on? 


Was that routinely done in connection with 


your uranium analysis or only on cases where, 


such as the one you cited, where there was a 


known high intake? 


MR. ROLFES: The annual physicals at Fernald 


collected urine samples separate from the 


regular uranium urinalyses to evaluate the 

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individual’s health. 


DR. ZIEMER: And then I think the question 


was do we have that as something that can be 


coupled with the uranium data so that if there 


are such indicators -- let’s just take a 


hypothetical case. Here’s Worker X who has 


elevated albumin, say, indicating something 


with the kidney. What do we do with that 


relative to the model? 


 DR. WADE: First, do you know? And then 


secondly, what do you do with it? 


DR. ZIEMER: Or do we even know of that? 


That’s what I’m asking you. Sort of, or is 


that data separate. Sandra suggested it may 


be somewhere else and is not available. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s the first question, 


you’re right. But hypothetically, even if you 


did have it in the --


DR. ZIEMER: Well, do we have it? 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t think you do have 


those references in the DR file, right? 


MR. ROLFES: No, we do not receive the 


complete medical history; however, we do 


receive, for example, medical X-rays, et 


cetera, out of those medical files. 

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DR. ZIEMER: And you do have it for special 


cases where we know there’s an extreme --


MR. GRIFFON: But then the question would be 


if you were to get it all from DOE, assuming 


you could, what would you do with it relative 


to the model is your second question. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, I’m not sure what we can 


do with it. Because you could raise the same 


question about any individual and their 


general health and say what do you do, you 


know, is there a separate model for a 


diabetic? Is there a separate model for you 


name it? The only time we correct for a sort 


of a lifestyle issue is for smoking. The 


uranium case is somewhat unique in that the 


agent itself that we’re interested in has the 


dual function of toxicity and ^. It’s not 


really dual. All the limits on the uranium 


are based on the chemical toxicity which in a 


sense if you’ve exceeded that -- well, you 


don’t worry about the radiological because the 


chemical shows up sooner in a sense as far as 


dose limits are concerned. But in any event, 


I’m wondering how we --


MR. RICH: Up to about two and a half 

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percent. 


 DR. WADE: So those are the questions I 


think NIOSH has to think about. Do you know? 


If you don’t know, can you find out? And then 


if you do have the information --


DR. ZIEMER: Well, even if you had it, what 


would you do with it? I think in an 


individual case, if we know there’s definitely 


a medical diagnosis of renal damage, it seems 


to me you could maybe say, okay, what will we 


do in this case and consider that. If you 


just have indicators like the albumin level is 


a little bit up or nowadays if the PSA value 


is up on somebody what do you do with that or 


whatever it is. 


MR. ROLFES: Another point that I think is 


worth mentioning that NIOSH selects the 


solubility type of the uranium to which the 


person is exposed based upon the urine data 


that is provided to us. So if we have 


indication that the uranium that the person 


was exposed to is not being excreted as 


rapidly as is expected, that would be 


indicative to us that the material is less 


soluble. 

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DR. BEHLING: How do you, you’re making 


statements that you can’t verify. How can you 


say when, if I go in and report to a location 


where I submit my 24-hour urine sample Monday 


morning, and it shows so many milligrams per 


liter of 24-hour volume, how do we know 


whether that’s to be expected? 


I mean, you can’t tell me that you can 


look at the urine data and say, oh, this is 


abnormal. There must be something wrong. 


Let’s do a kidney function test. That just 


doesn’t sound right. 


MR. ROLFES: Well, a urinalysis of a couple 


milligrams per liter would certainly be --


DR. BEHLING: It’s just the opposite. 


You’re likely to see less than what you would 


expect. 


MR. ROLFES: If we saw less, then what we 


would expect, that would be indicative of a 


less soluble material which resides in the 


body. 


DR. BEHLING: You’re missing the point here. 


You don’t know --


DR. ZIEMER: You just have a number. 


DR. BEHLING: -- you don’t know what to 

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expect. 


 DR. WADE: Sure, I think an issue has been 


identified at least to be looked at and it 


needs to be commented on. 


MR. ROLFES: Once again, we cannot just 


consider single pieces of information. For a 


specific case if you can provide a specific 


case scenario, we would have to take a look at 


that specific case, use the urinalysis data, 


compare the in vivo data, look at medical 


histories. You know, it would be a very 


comprehensive study that would need to be 


done. 


DR. ZIEMER: I would think a pretty serious 


renal damage, you would see some drastic 


changes in the volume of the urine which might 


be an indicator aside from the albumin issue. 


If somebody’s excreting a few milliliters a 


day, it’s indicating the system is shutting 


down. Then you might, the dose reconstructor 


might be looking at that, and I don’t know 


what they would do with it. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, but the thing is when 


you go give one of these urine samples, you 


give a urine sample for your medical to check 

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for ^ . Every so often they give you a urine 


check for uranium. We always got a line. 


We’ve got to fill to there. If it takes one 


day or two days that’s what you get. And see, 


this is where the big question is coming in 


at. 


DR. BEHLING: But the classical case is 


Sandra’s [identifying information redacted]. 


He was not a person who was suspect to be 


exposed to uranium, but on a routine medical 


examination, perhaps an annual, he was 


diagnosed to have the issue of [identifying 


information redacted] failure. And there was 


no relationship to urinalyses that were done 


on an employee uranium excretion. 


So what do you do if on your annual 


routine medical exam, you end up with a 


clinical data that says you may have been 


exposed to levels of uranium that rendered 


your [identifying information redacted] less 


than perfect? And now you go back and may not 


even have any urine data to look at to assess 


what exposures. And even if you did, what 


does that tell you? What does that data tell 


you? Is it legitimate or isn’t it legitimate? 

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MR. ROLFES: That’s an important point. One 


thing that an individual with chronic 


[identifying information redacted] disease, if 


untreated, can lead to end stage [identifying 


information redacted], excuse me, chronic 


[identifying information redacted] failure can 


lead to chronic, essentially end stage 


[identifying information redacted] disease in 


which a person’s [identifying information 


redacted] stop functioning entirely, and it 


requires a person to go onto dialysis. 


We would have to take -- like I said, 


other things can cause chronic [identifying 


information redacted] failure. 


DR. BEHLING: Heavy metals are a key issue. 


And for instance, when I looked at the Addel, 


Fischer, Ron Kathrin article that was also 


published in 1990, Health Physics Journal, 


they looked at autopsy data years later. And 


they say, well, there’s no persistent 


[identifying information redacted] damage 


that’s in evidence based on postmortem 


analysis, tissue analysis. And that may be 


true, but and obviously it’s like a severe 


sunburn. There comes a point when that skin 

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sloughs off, and you regenerate, and you look 


as healthy as you were. 


But a postmortem is not an indication 


that there wasn’t at least transient 


[identifying information redacted] damage to 


which time he was monitored for uranium 


excretion. So I look at that data and say, 


well, you can’t argue with the facts. The 


facts may not speak in total of the issues 


that we’re discussing here. That is, what 


does [identifying information redacted] damage 


do for periods of time during which you were 


monitored for uranium excretion? And to what 


extent does that [identifying information 


redacted] damage impact the validity of that 


uranium excretion in modeling internal 


exposure? 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m going to get an action 


item out of this before lunch. So, Arjun and 


-- I agree with Lew, but I think we’ve got to 


define it a little better. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think Sandra mentioned 


that although NIOSH did have the information 


about her [identifying information redacted] 


that there was actually no adjustment done. 

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This is kind of, I would suggest that this is 


a case study of NIOSH having information about 


chronic [identifying information redacted] 


damage, and there was no adjustment. So to 


date there appears to be no procedure or 


perhaps I’m mistaken. If there are procedures 


for dealing with such a case when they’re not 


on dialysis --


 MR. SHARFI: I have some clarification, and 


I think Sandra can correct me if I’m wrong. 


I believe they used OTIB-0002 on your 


claim? 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Right. 


 MR. SHARFI: So they didn’t actually assess 


bioassay. They used an overestimate to do her 


case. So I don’t want to say that they may or 


may not have done, looked at that information 


since they did what we consider an 


overestimate approach. They didn’t see the 


need to make adjustments. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: ^ an interesting case to 


address. 


 MR. MORRIS: I’d keep a couple of points in 


mind. One is that the threshold for permanent 


damage in a 70 kilogram standard person is 

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about 40 milligram intake according to 


Brotsky. That’s a big number. And then I’d 


also -- maybe you want to elaborate a little 


bit on this, Mutty, but the idea that our 


intake models have uncertainties built around 


them, geometric standard deviations on our 


input datasets. All are intended to 


accommodate the variability in the human 


condition compared to the standard model. Am 


I right? 


MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: And that’s in your response, 


this GSD accommodates, although I’m not sure 


about this three number. We’ve disputed this 


before. And Owen Hoffman has also supported 


my argument of for some nuclides it’s probably 


a little higher. But anyway, aside from that 


this GSD accommodates wide population 


variability in biokinetics. But that’s wide 


population variability, that’s not really 


referencing someone who has medical evidence 


of a [identifying information redacted] ^. 


MR. MORRIS: That is ^ that population, 


isn’t it? I mean, that person is sort of the 


three or four sigma out on the curve of 

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[identifying information redacted] function. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I would argue that this 


GSD sort of covers your variability of a 


normal population. I think that’s the way 


it’s always --


MR. MORRIS: Multiply your three. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, I know. But the 


question here, and I’m reading that first 


line. I think, “By law, NIOSH uses the 


latest,” I’m not sure it says biokinetic 


models in the law. It’s in the regulation 


actually. I think it should say by 


regulation. It doesn’t say ICRP. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It says consensus models. 


 (Multiple speakers) 


MR. GRIFFON: But ICRP does allow for 


adjustments. I’m not sure if allows for 


adjustments for, I don’t think it, I think 


it’s silent on the [identifying information 


redacted] failure or chronic. 


 DR. WADE: But this is an important issue. 


DR. BEHLING: No, I think if you look at 


excretion values from your ICRP, based on sub-


toxic levels of intakes. 


MR. GRIFFON: No, no, no, but I’m asking if 

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the ICRP document ^ allows for, they allow for 


effect modifiers for certain other things. I 


don’t know if it’s in that. So I guess the, 


what I’m trying to understand is what should 


the action be for NIOSH because, you know, Lew 


said NIOSH needs to follow up and just what 


are we asking them to do? Because right now 


they don’t have the medical records in the DR 


files, so they would have no way of finding 


out if someone had medical evidence of any 


problem. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, it seems to me we ought 


to ask it in a generic way and not link it, 


for example, to a particular case. The 


question is more along the lines of what, how 


do you conduct an internal dose reconstruction 


in cases where there is a medical condition 


that can impact the excretion? Or there’s 


damage to, in this case the [identifying 


information redacted], but you could ask the 


same thing from fecal excretion or maybe even 


on lung if the person has --


MR. GRIFFON: And the lung’s a good example 


actually because I’ve asked for this before. 


Because ICRP does allow for effect modifiers 

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for smokers. So we sort of in the epi model 


we sort of take away risk or attribute it to 


smoking and not to radiation, but we don’t add 


it in for the ICRP side. So it does allow for 


that. 


DR. ZIEMER: The reason we can do it for 


smokers is that we have pretty good risk data 


for smoking, but for other --


MR. GRIFFON: But we don’t do it for smoking 


by the way. You’re thinking of the risk side, 


not the dose side. 


DR. ZIEMER: It’s not the dose side. It’s 


in the final analysis that we --


 DR. WADE: This is a very broad question 


here about the ability to estimate dose for 


any member of the class. You’re going to have 


to get to the intellectual issue of if 


potential members of the class are in some way 


physically impaired, how do you deal with 


that? 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, I’m not sure you can ask 


it quite that way. It’s got to tie in with, 


for example in this case, I think the organ of 


interest that’s causing the excretion if it’s 


damaged somehow. Not simply that the person’s 

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impaired. 


 DR. WADE: Well, if you’re using certain 


bioassay information as the underpinning of 


your determination, then the issue really goes 


to any condition that could call in question 


the validity of that bioassay. 


MR. ELLIOTT: You don’t want to 


underestimate the dose, but you’ve got to, 


there’s a logical constraint that would retain 


dose in the body. You want to avoid 


underestimating that. But I’m clear on, we 


don’t have a current, I don’t believe a 


current --


DR. ZIEMER: And it may be that it’s not 


doable. 


MR. ELLIOTT: What would we use? I’d like 


to follow that. If the output all of a sudden 


decreases dramatically, we go from a liter and 


a half a day to less than ten, what does that 


trigger? How do you use that? How do you 


look at that and say, well, am I going to look 


at the internal bioassay data different now, 


urinalysis data different now? I don’t know. 


MS. BRACKETT (by Telephone): This is Liz 


Brackett. I’m the principal internal 

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dosimetrist for the project. 


MR. GRIFFON: Hi, Liz. 


MS. BRACKETT (by Telephone): Hi. 


 DR. WADE: Please speak up, Liz, okay? 


MS. BRACKETT (by Telephone): We haven’t 


looked at the [identifying information 


redacted] issue with uranium, but on occasion 


some unusual circumstances come up. And not 


that long ago there was a person had had 95 


percent of their pancreas removed, and I 


believe it was pancreatic cancer in that case. 


And we do have a medical doctor on staff, and 


when something like that comes up, we check 


with him to get his opinion --he’s also a 


Health Physicist -- to get his opinion on what 


kind of impact, if any, it would have on the 


case. We don’t have any specific procedures 


for this in place, but on particular 


occasions, we have checked with him. But I 


think something like this would be on a case-


by-case basis certainly, and we might have to 


check with additional experts to --


DR. ZIEMER: And that may be the answer 


itself. At least if you --


 DR. WADE: And that presupposes that you 

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have the information available to know. 


MS. BRACKETT (by Telephone): Yes. 


 DR. WADE: All this needs to be thought 


about and put together in a cogent 


presentation. 


MR. ROLFES: Once again it does get back to 


looking at all of the evidence that we have, 


all of the information for a particular 


claimant. And these things are, in fact, 


mentioned in telephone interviews and worker 


histories. 


 DR. WADE: Well, an excellent point has been 


raised. It needs to be addressed. Where is 


the work group on this? 


MR. GRIFFON: I know. I’ll work on this 


over lunch. I’ll work on an action item 


statement, and then when we come back we can 


summarize. And I’ll get with Mark and others 


on the side. 


MS. BRACKETT (by Telephone): Can I mention 


one more thing? This isn’t directly related. 


It’s related to something that Arjun said 


several minutes ago about the excretion curve 


for the individual who had [identifying 


information redacted] damage where the uranium 

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was very low at first and dropping and then it 


came back up again and --


MR. GRIFFON: I think that was Hans that 


said that. 


MS. BRACKETT (by Telephone): Right, well, 


that’s not a unique instance actually. We’re 


looking at this for Atomics International or 


it’s Santa Susana, whatever it’s called now, 


but there was a paper published. It was 


specifically exposure to uranium aluminide, 


but that was found to exhibit that pattern 


where it drops for awhile. It appears to be 


insoluble at first, and then it starts 


increasing after, I think, 30 or 40 days, and 


it continues to rise for quite some time 


before dropping off again. So it’s not 


unheard of to have a pattern like that, and 


maybe we’re looking at something like that 


here. 


DR. BEHLING: And, Liz, this is Hans. I 


think you’re correct. The issue here is one 


of uranium tetrachloride which most, I think 


NIOSH regards this as Type M or Class W. In 


looking at the toxicological profile, they 


view uranium tetrachloride as a very insoluble 

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form of uranium. 


MR. ROLFES: Moderately soluble. 


DR. BEHLING: More so than you would expect 


as a Class W or an M, somewhere in between M 


and S. 


MR. ROLFES: It’s a moderately soluble 


material. 


DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes, and it may --


MR. ROLFES: So it falls in between highly 


soluble --


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it may very well explain 


the slow dissolution in the lung fluids that 


transfer to the blood stream, and of course, 


the excretion subsequently. And I looked at, 


for instance, the ICRP model, and I think they 


basically assume everything goes in a 


solution. It’s a flaw in the data. And if 


you look at that curve that I enclosed as one 


of the exhibits, it’s always highest days 


first 24 hours, and it may not necessarily be 


the way the real data demonstrates excretion. 


MR. ROLFES: The highest data, you know, for 


a highly soluble compound such as uranium 


hexafluoride would likely be in the first day 


or two. 

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DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


MR. ROLFES: However, with less soluble 


compounds, you are certainly going to see an 


increase in excretion rates. And certainly 


with this individual if he received medical 


treatment, he was probably going to be 


eliminating. I don’t know if he was getting, 


like bicarbonate can be used as a chelating 


agent for uranium compounds. He could have 


been given bicarbonate, and bicarbonate 


intravenously in order to try to treat the 


symptoms. So I’d have to take a look. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, also, one final 


statement before we go to lunch, I assume. 


That is to correct the record. I think Mark 


made a comment that this individual suffered 


from an extreme case of oliguria, which is a 


reduction and complete loss of urine. That is 


not the case for this one. You were quoting 


case number [identifying information redacted] 


which I should have basically deleted. 


The case number [identifying 


information redacted] was a serious injury; 


whereas, the uranium was actually transferred 


through an open wound. He was burned over 70 

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percent of his body, and I’m looking here at 


the data. I didn’t remember anything that you 


mentioned, and I’m just now going through it. 


And it says here that the issue of ten 


milliliters for the 24-hour period on the day 


seven. That was not this particular case. So 


I just wanted for the record. 


MR. GRIFFON: This is included as 


attachments in your paper? 


DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


MR. ROLFES: I’m looking at page ten, Hans. 


Can you take a look at page ten? I do have, 


it does indicate that this individual 


underwent urinalysis, kidney and liver 


function tests and analysis of urine for 


protein. 


DR. BEHLING: Yes, and the tables, Table 1, 


that shows the times during which these tests 


were done and the duration during which this 


[identifying information redacted] failure or 


reduced [identifying information redacted] 


function persisted to 04.6 for his exposure. 


But the issue of oliguria that you’re 


referring to really is on page 12, and it’s 


defined on the second page. 

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MR. ROLFES: But oliguria is indicative of 


proteins in the urine. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, but you mentioned that 


this person would have been instantly flagged, 


based on the fact that his urinary output for 


24 hours was ten milliliters. This was not 


the case ^. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I think we all agree 


there’s going to be an action. I’ll work over 


lunch on the wording of the action, but that 


brings us through Finding number one. I think 


we’re finished. 


MS. BEHLING (by Telephone): Excuse me, this 


is Kathy Behling. Can I, before we leave this 


first finding, can I ask one more basic 


question, everybody there? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes, we’re here. 


MS. BEHLING (by Telephone): I didn’t know 


if you have shut me off by now. We talked a 


lot today already about looking at individual 


cases and things on a case-by-case basis and 


bounding doses based on individual records and 


so on. And I just want to be sure that we can 


feel confident that based on the data that 


that dose reconstructor is going to have in 

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the individual’s file, we will be able to 


identify this individual, let’s say, as a 


thorium worker or as a person that may have 


been involved in these campaigns where there 


were higher enrichments of uranium and so on. 


And the reason I say that is I heard 


Mark, I believe, indicate earlier that you 


have compiled some lists from logbooks of 


individuals in the early days that may not 


have had lung counts, and a lung count may not 


be in that individual’s record that indicates 


that he was a thorium worker, but instead you 


have a list from a logbook. In looking over a 


lot of the dose reconstruction records, I 


don’t always see those types of lists in an 


individual’s record, and do we have the 


confidence that the dose reconstructor is 


going to know this individual does fall into 


one of these categories where we have to look 


at him a little closer? 


MR. ROLFES: I’d like to make a 


clarification for the record that these are 


not logbooks that we reviewed. These are the 


mobile in vivo radiation monitoring laboratory 


results that we have associated with an 

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individual’s claim. 


MS. BEHLING (by Telephone): Although I 


thought you indicated that for the earlier 


years, people did not have the lung counting 


data, and that you were looking at air 


sampling data and logbooks for air sampling 


data to identify who these individuals were. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. For 1965 in 


plant one there are a couple of individuals 


that were working with some enriched material 


that exceeded our standard default in the 


technical basis document. Those individuals 


were, in fact, given lung counts at a later 


date, approximately two-to-three years after 


working on that campaign. These individuals 


are documented. In fact, we have the 


enrichment information associated with that. 


Without getting into other additional 


information that was not part of the routine 


dosimetry program at Fernald, there was an 


aspect of research and development to quantify 


historical exposures that was ongoing at 


Fernald for many years before the in vivo unit 


did come. If we can wait until after lunch, I 


guess, to have that discussion, we’ll be able 

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to give it the time it deserves and fully 


elaborate on what, in fact, took place prior 


to the mobile in counter being onsite. 


MS. BEHLING (by Telephone): Okay, thank 


you. 


 DR. WADE: For lunch, what time do you want 


to be back? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, looks like now about 


1:30. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we’re going to break for 


lunch. We’re going to break the phone line, 


and we’ll dial back in several minutes before 


1:30. 	Thank you. 


(Whereupon, the work group broke for lunch 


from 12:25 p.m. until 1:35 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: We’re back on. 


 MR. CLAWSON: First of all over lunch we 


were supposed to kind of word this. 


Mark, did we come up with something? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we got it. I was 


talking with Paul a little bit and Arjun about 


some language here. This would go under 


number seven I guess as a follow-up action. 


It says NIOSH will provide a response 


outlining their approach for evaluating 

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internal dose in cases where uranium exposure 


may have caused sufficient renal damage to 


affect biokinetic models. I’ll put it in the 


matrix written out, but I mean I guess we 


thought about this for awhile -- Paul, you can 


chime in -- but I guess rather than trying to 


be proscriptive, we said let’s keep it broader 


and ask NIOSH how are you going to handle this 


type of situation with fairly broad 


parameters. Although we did limit it to any 


cases where uranium exposure may have caused 


renal damage that could have affected the 


biokinetic model. 


DR. ZIEMER: And we understand the possible 


answer is we can’t do this. I don’t think we 


want to predetermine that we know the answer, 


and we’re looking to see whether you come up 


with it or not. 


 MR. CLAWSON: But also, too, on the same 


sense, what would trigger them to look at 


something like this, and that’s where --


DR. ZIEMER: I think that’s kind of a 


subsequent question. If they say here’s how 


we could address this, then we might say, 


well, how do you find out that the condition 

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exists even. It seems to us, I think we felt 


that that was like a follow up, or they may 


want to include it. But at this point until 


they say, yes, we have a way of addressing the 


issue, then we say, well, okay, how do you 


find out that it actually exists for a person. 


 DR. WADE: You’re asking about approach 


generally, Mark? Is that --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we started brainstorming 


like what triggers and things like that. And 


then we said wait a second. Let’s step back 


and just ask NIOSH. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, is there a way of 


handling this? 

MR. GRIFFON: I’ll say it again --

 MR. PRESLEY: Can you read it again? 

MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, NIOSH will provide a 

response outlining their approach for 


evaluating internal dose in cases where 


uranium exposure may have caused sufficient 


renal damage to affect the biokinetic model. 


DR. ZIEMER: If you say, well, we really 


can’t do that, then it doesn’t matter whether 


you can get the information or not. 


 DR. WADE: But if NIOSH can do it, then I 

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would assume they would interpret the word 


approach then to talk about the trigger 


mechanism. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: And the word uranium in there 


then ties it down to a rad worker. 


DR. ZIEMER: Rad worker and renal damage. 


We didn’t feel like we wanted to get into the 


issue of thinking about all possible chemicals 


that could cause renal damage in the workplace 


which really goes beyond the scope of this 


Board I think. 


 DR. WADE: I think that’s reasonable. 


MR. GRIFFON: That was our attempt to kind 


of keep it broad enough to let, because we 


didn’t want, well, it’s not our role to sort 


of weigh in on how we think the approach 


should be, rather just to ask the question. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Mark, do you see this as 


feasible or reasonable? 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, and sort of are we asking 


the right question? 


MR. ELLIOTT: Are we asking the right 


question and can we produce an answer? 


MR. ROLFES: But what I think would be 

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helpful for us is to take a look at the 


specifics of the case study that was evaluated 


by SC&A and see how we would reconstruct that 


individual’s dose and see if, know what our 


estimated intakes would be versus what his 


true exposure was. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, we didn’t want to tie it 


to --


MR. ELLIOTT: There are other ways we want 


to look at this, but that’s one way. 


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe look at that case and 


should say with our claimant favorable 


approaches, we would have done this; and 


therefore, we’re okay with these, just 


acknowledge, you know. I don’t want to 


suggest an answer. 


DR. ZIEMER: Unless Mark has some other 


thoughts in mind. 


MR. ROLFES: I think we can have some 


discussions with our medical doctor on the 


project and see what he would recommend that 


we do or potentially give us his input as a 


path forward for evaluating this. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I’d also like us to in 


this look at whether or not the uncertainty 

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that we assign under our geometric standard 


deviation covers this because we’re using a 


model that’s developed against a standard man 


that has an uncertainty associated with that. 


And does that uncertainty include this kind of 


example? I won’t say it’s a rare, but it --


MR. GRIFFON: That’s why we tried to keep it 


broad so that you have flexibility in how you 


want to respond to it. 


DR. ZIEMER: And it may be that Liz 


Brackett’s comments, maybe an approach like 


that is another possibility that might be 


included it seems later. 


MR. ROLFES: We’ll definitely pursue this 


issue and look into it further. We weren’t 


able to put anything too substantive together, 


you know, in immediate turnaround so certainly 


we want to make sure we give the time that it 


certainly deserves. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, I think that will take 


care of, was it number seven? 


DR. BEHLING: Well, number seven of Finding 

1. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, number seven of Finding 

1. 
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Now, earlier today we didn’t want to 


get sidetracked or anything, but we kind of 


sidestepped the thorium issue. And did we 


want to try to address that? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think it comes up in a 

later finding. 

FINDING 4.1-2

 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, so if we want to move 

on, Hans? 

DR. BEHLING: Yeah, Finding 2, again, I’ll 

summarize it. It’s described in our review 


report on page 26, and the title of the 


Finding is “The Questionable Integrity of 


Fluorophotometric Urinalysis Data”. And I 


referenced this whole thing with the statement 


that there’s reason to believe or concern 


about the integrity of reported results that 


reflect the perceived role. 


And the word I want to focus on is the 


perceived role of the urinalysis program by 


the Health and Safety personnel at Trent*. I 


think it’s very important to look at that. 


I’m not questioning the validity of the 


fluorophotometric method as a diagnostic tool 


or a bioassay tool for assessing internal 

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exposure. But some of the things that 


disturbed me when I read some of the documents 


which are enclosed herein as exhibits. 


And I will just read to you from one 


of the statements that was among all the 


people who would make that statement and was 


Director of Health and Safety himself who 


stated that we use urinary uranium excretion 


information along with air survey information 


to be sure that we’re controlling airborne 


exposures to the amounts that will not be 


harmful. And then he goes on to say we do not 


consider the urinary uranium excretion 


measurement as an accurate measurement of 


estimating either body burden or exposure. 


And, of course, that flies in conflict 


with the way NIOSH is currently using the 


data. We’re saying the uranium urinalysis 


bioassay data is our principal way of doing 


dose reconstruction, and air monitoring may be 


a supplementary way of looking at that data 


and saying is there a consistency here. And 


again, I don’t want to necessarily tend to 


discredit the concept of fluorophotometric 


measurements, but when I see or read a 

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statement of this nature, my question that I 


have to raise is to what extent that they 


really take this issue seriously. 


To what extent were procedures 


necessarily followed when the Director of 


Health and Safety makes such disparaging 


comments? And this was not the first and only 


time. There are multiple documents that I 


read through that says it’s basically almost a 


waste of time to even pursue urinalysis. 


MR. ROLFES: We addressed this at the last 


discussion. This is because the biokinetic 


models that we have today were not available 


at the time to do a detailed assessment. They 


collected the data, and the data is good and 


sound. And there’s nothing that prevents us 


from using those data with current biokinetic 


models to accurately assess an individual’s 


radiation exposure from those uranium 


urinalyses results. ^ previous discussions. 


DR. BEHLING: I know that. And as I said, I 


don’t want to discredit the concept of using 


the data, but I do have to raise some 


questions about how the Director viewed the 


data and to what extent that filtered down to 

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people who were running the laboratory. Did 


they really take it seriously; did they use 


the standards that they were supposed to? Did 


they calibrate the instruments? 


Did they do all those things if the 


perceptions were -- but we’re wasting our time 


because we have no use for the data. And 


you’re right. On the other hand I will even 


take exception to that because ICRP 2 came out 


in 1959, and some of these documents I’m 


looking at, this first one I’m quoting, was 


1963. So they could have had at least some 


reference point as to how to use the urine 


excretion data and using ICRP 2 models which 


they chose not to do. 


MR. ROLFES: Mutty, I heard you say 


something. Is there --


 MR. SHARFI: Well, ICRP 2 models are still 


very limited in their ^. At that point their 


workplace monitoring probably would have been 


a better indication because trying to go from 


urinary in a single compartment model that 


ICRP 2 uses, trying to go from urinary 


excretion all the way to intake is, there’s a 


lot more variability obviously because the 

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biokinetic models aren’t as accurate as they 


are, as we have today. 


So they probably would rely more on 


the field measurements because trying to use 


the current models that they had at the time 


wouldn’t be probably as reliable given the 


variability of this model. So I can 


understand their point of view that they 


didn’t, that he felt they put more reliance on 


their field measurements than they would on 


the bioassay model. 


With all of that said, I think also in 


the NIOSH response they quote that even in ’53 


when they did a QA analysis, the QA results 


were very consistent. So there’s no 


indication from QA, for the Quality Assurance 


Program that their process in analyzing the 


urinalysis results had any lack of enthusiasm 


to do a quality job. 


MR. ROLFES: There were also some concerns 


about the amount of uranium that was, in fact, 


in people’s bodies, being retained in people’s 


bodies. And it is discussed in documents. 


And there were mobile in vivo results that 


were brought on. So the mobile in vivo system 

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was brought on to ensure that previous 


exposures were not accumulating, you know, 


significant amounts of radioactive material 


were not accumulating in individuals’ bodies. 


Bryce. 


MR. RICH: And the point is I think that the 


fact that they were religious, and it was 


important to them from an industrial hygiene 


standpoint to collect samples, which they did. 


The samples were taken. They were analyzed in 


order to provide toxicological assurance that 


they weren’t exceeding the limits. So the 


samples were taken, and now we’re using the 


samples for a radiological standpoint which is 


legitimate. 


DR. BEHLING: But as I said, the quotation I 


gave you was in 1963. But if you go to page 


26, the bottom, and then continue on page 27, 


there are multiple other quotations that you 


can look at that reflect time periods of ’69, 


’73, ’79, ’84 and ’88. So it seemed to have 


gone far beyond the point where urinary data 


should have been used as a way of assessing 


body burdens and lung burdens when, in fact, 


they were not used. 

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And, of course, at that time ICRP 30 


had been issued and more refined models. And 


to me it’s somewhat mind boggling to think 


that they had this view that urinalysis data 


was nothing more than a way of confirming that 


air monitoring data was the best approach to 


safeguard worker exposures. 


And I’m not saying anything can be 


done at this point. Obviously, it would be at 


least it’s my opinion and the working group 


can make a different statement. But it’s my 


opinion that, yeah, urine data should be used. 


In fact, I have a very, very questionable 


attitude about air monitoring data that we’ll 


get on later. So at this point it’s the 


lesser of two evils to rely on urine data. So 


I’m afraid we’re left with this, and based on 


our finding under number one, let’s try to use 


that as best as we know how. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I have a question for Mark. 


In the records, the artifact records, that you 


went through, did you go through any artifact 


records? 


MR. ROLFES: Artifact? I’m not sure what 


you’re referring to. 

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MS. BALDRIDGE: Well, those would have been 


for, I assume they matched from the time the 


plant opened, the ‘50s and so forth, for the 


workers. Did you, checking back on those 


records, did you ever see any notations made 


on the records that they were, that they 


couldn’t be used or why they couldn’t be used? 


Because there’s a document in the 


petition where it states that they never used 


results for estimates to confirm exposures 


referring to the uranium urinalysis. And that 


if artifacts are discovered, a notation that 


the count results are unreliable is made in 


the worker’s record. Did you come across any 


of those? 


MR. ROLFES: I really would have to take a 


look at the context of what you’re referring 


to. I’m not sure that I’ve seen a notation. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: I think it was a response to 


a questionnaire that was submitted about the 


records at National Lab of Ohio. 


MR. ROLFES: There are some indications, for 


example, for the mobile in vivo unit. There 


were some reported indications that there were 


some bad runs that were conducted in the in 

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vivo unit. And I’ve certainly seen notations 


of those bad runs associated with anomalous 


results. And the individual was, in fact, recounted after that anomaly. 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess my concern on this 


finding is more of the question of the data 


integrity rather than, I mean, these memos, 


we’ve seen memos like this before, and I tend 


to, from what I’ve reviewed anyway at other 


sites, too, I tend to agree with what Mutty 


said, that that was sort of what they were 


suggesting in their memo. But I think in 


looking at our actions, one of the other sub-


pieces, and I’ve probably interjected this 


because it looks like something I might have 


done. 


But the question on the database and 


the actual urinalysis data, and again, I go 


back to our Board procedures, that we have to 


review the data integrity. So we’re looking 


at both the data integrity for individual 


claimants as well as in the database where it 


would be for the coworker model. And I guess 


in those two actions, number two and three, if 


you clearly provided HIS-20, I have that. 

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181 

I’ve at least looked at it a little bit. 


I don’t know how much of it you all 


have had a chance to, in number three I must 


admit, I’m sure you posted it in there, but 


can you just maybe outline for us, Mark, what 


you were able to find with regard to the 


urinalysis logs or documents? 


MR. ROLFES: Let me see if I --


MR. GRIFFON: And then I think the obvious 


next step is we’ve got to marry those two 


somehow. And I think we have to ask SC&A to 


look at that. 


MR. ROLFES: I believe that Gene Potter had 


a little bit to –- some of what had been done 


initially. We used the data that was existing 


on our Site Research database at the time. We 


have been in the process of making a request 


to go back and look for additional urinalysis 


records, urine cards, urine sample request 


cards. And as soon as we receive those back, 


we’ll be able to compare the data between the 


urine cards and HIS-20. 


Based on what we’ve done so far, for 


example, you know, for the other radionuclide 


issues that typically are identified by the 

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Advisory Board, I can say that the results 


that we have cross-checked between HIS-20 and 


the urine sample cards were very, very well 


correlated. 


So even for something that was not 


routine at the site, they did document things 


very well. So we’re still in process with 


this, and we’ll be pursuing additional 


urinalysis results in comparison so that we 


get a representative sample over the 


histories. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean, on your follow-up 


number three can I just ask that you, it 


doesn’t have to be now, but can you include 


when we edit this response, the reference ID? 


It says Ref. IDs for some urinalysis logs. 


Just make it easier for us to track so we have 


the document numbers. If you can 


parenthetically --


MR. ROLFES: Sure, sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- put the numbers in there, 


then we can keep track of that. 


MR. ROLFES: I have a partial list of some 


of the urine cards here. If you’d like me to 


read those into the record, I can. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, maybe you shouldn’t for 


Privacy Act, but if you can add them to the 


matrix we can go from there. 


And then the -- go ahead. 


DR. ZIEMER: Are you talking about these --


MR. GRIFFON: SRDB Reference IDs for some 


urinalysis logs. Yeah, those are okay. Those 


aren’t ^. 


DR. ZIEMER: In the HIS-20 database, which ­

-


MR. GRIFFON: I’m on NIOSH response number 


[identifying information redacted] under 


Finding 41-2. 


DR. ZIEMER: Oh, oh, the logs. Are those 


logs separate? Are they on the O drive? 


MR. ROLFES: There are urinalysis results 


that are separate from HIS-20 urinalysis 


results which we were asked to inter-compare. 


MR. GRIFFON: This is sort of the raw data 


comparing to the electronic database. And I 


just asked just for simplicity to put the 


reference numbers in there so we can find them 


easier. Make it a lot easier to --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, were you assigning us 


something or --

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MR. GRIFFON: That was my next question is I 


would think -- and this is a work group 


decision -- but I would think we can either 


wait for NIOSH to produce a report or we can 


have SC&A do an analysis of this in parallel. 


And I don’t know what, you know, I guess 


that’s for us to discuss and decide. But if 


we want to be timely about this, we might want 


to consider having SC&A, if there’s enough 


logbooks, I mean, I guess the question gets 


back to you’re still looking for urine cards 


so there could be this kind of, I don’t want 


to double work. 


Like if SC&A looks and says we only 


found urine cards covering these years, and 


NIOSH says, well, we told you we were coming 


back with more, you know, and here they are. 


I don’t want to make double work on this. So 


does it make sense to do this in parallel, or 


do we have to wait until NIOSH, I think we 


might have to wait at least until NIOSH posts 


all the logs they could find in their source ­

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MR. ROLFES: All the logs that we can find? 


MR. GRIFFON: No, no, all the logs that 

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you’re using to support, all the logs that 


you’re using for --


 MR. CLAWSON: To support this. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. ROLFES: Right, we just are going to be 


requesting a sampling of the logs just so that 


we have --


MR. GRIFFON: That’s what I said. 


MR. ROLFES: That would be quite an 


undertaking to get nearly half a million 


results. 

MR. GRIFFON: So what do people think on 

that? 

 MR. CLAWSON: I guess I’d ask the question 

of what does SC&A feel about this? 


DR. ZIEMER: What’s the magnitude of that, 


Mark? 


MR. ROLFES: We have formulated a request 


with the Department of Energy Legacy 


Management, and we are in the process of 


sorting out what would be helpful to address 


this issue. So I can’t speak for anyone 


outside of our agency. I really don’t know 


how far or how long this might take so I’m 


hesitant to give any kind of commitment. 

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MR. GRIFFON: I think what we should do just 


to, I think we can put an action in here for 


SC&A but also make it very clear that, I guess 


I don’t want to wait until we have another 


official meeting necessarily, but I also want 


to move things along. So if we said that once 


NIOSH, upon completion, SC&A will review or 


we’ll do an assessment of this as well, you 


know, upon NIOSH’s completion of the above 


action items, SC&A will conduct an assessment 


of the validity of the urine data within the 


HIS-20 database and within individual records, 


something like that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: One of the things just to 


ask Mark Rolfes, some of the raw data are 


already posted, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, yes, that is true. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So without, you know, again, 


since more data are going to be posted, 


obviously we can’t be conclusory in any sense, 


but it may be possible depending on how much 


is posted, and Mark Rolfes could just 


eliminate this a little bit, to do some 


preliminary verification and give you some 


preliminary idea. I don’t know what Hans 

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thinks, but I’m thinking that having gone 


through this before, if everything matches, 


then, you know --


DR. ZIEMER: Do we need to do 100 percent? 


MR. GRIFFON: No, we certainly don’t want to 


do 100 percent. 


MR. ROLFES: Like I said, what we’ve focused 


on right now, what we have readily available 


were primarily related to the plutonium 


specification for urine samples that were 


collected in the ‘80s. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, that’s highly 


selective. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. I think you have to at 


least wait until more information is up there. 


MR. ROLFES: As I mentioned, those matched 


up very well. 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess I’m hesitant to, 


thinking of our recent past where we had, you 


know, Rocky Flats started with the one 


Kittinger log, and everybody seemed like, oh, 


this matches up very well, but then we found 


many more logs that we had to go through. So 


I think it might be worthwhile at least 


getting more information posted that covered 

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the timeframes of interest, you know, a good 


sampling that covered the time period from 


some interest, operations of interest, and 


then you can do your sampling after that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, to go from experience 


at other sites, it seems that this electronic 


database has seemed to be more, they seem to 


have gaps in the early years because of the 


way they were compiled. The HIS-20 database, 


you know, started in the ‘70s with 


computerization, and then it was done for 


people who were employed at that time. And 


then so a lot of people fell into that net. 


And we did this in the TIB-0052 review 


when Steve Marschke and I, well, Steve 


Marschke really looked at it, looked at the 


data more than I did, but this came up. This 


is a kind of a little bit of a systemic 


problem but perhaps not at all sites. It may 


not apply to Fernald. I don’t know. But it 


seems that people who stopped working before 


the mid-‘70s may not be there in HIS-20. Is 


that true at Fernald? 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t know if that was 


unique to Rocky or, because they were pulled 

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out, right? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, it’s not unique to Rocky 


actually. I think that problem is more so if 


we’re going to identify issues, then I think 


it might be useful to have the logs that 


relate to the ‘50s and ‘60s. If those could 


be posted, then we could actually begin to ^. 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly. I haven’t done the 


analysis to determine whether the people that 


worked in the earlier time period were, in 


fact, entered into HIS-20. We’d have to do 


the analysis and certainly link that to 


earlier time periods there might be more data 


uncertainty. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think it’s simply my 


understanding, and I think it’s in our TIB0052 review, that it’s my understanding that 


typically when the records were computerized, 


they computerized them for the people who were 


working, for understandable reasons. 


MR. GRIFFON: If they retired before a 


certain point, they weren’t in there, yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: They weren’t in there. 


MR. GRIFFON: Unless, and in Rocky Flats we 


had it confounded by some people who were put 

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back in later when they came to the medical 


screening program. 


MR. ROLFES: An example you used, Arjun, 


when you reviewed OTIB-0052 was not from the 


HIS-20, but it was from the HPAREH from 


Savannah River. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, that’s right. I was 


remembering another database, but it was a 


similar database. It was called something 


else, but it was a similar electronic database 


that was compiled in the mid-‘70s. And then 


there happened to be another, the Fairweather 


database that had been compiled in the ‘50s 


that had a lot of the data that was missing in 


the HPAREH database. 


MR. ROLFES: But we have to work it through 


^. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, we did. 


MR. GRIFFON: So I guess I would suggest 


maybe we put an action item that SC&A doesn’t 


act until NIOSH completes the above action 


items. Does that make sense? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, if Mark and Hans and 


me need to know --


MR. GRIFFON: The only reason I want to do 

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that is because if in three weeks you have 


most of the logbooks posted, there’s no sense 


waiting until this work group meets again. 


And then we assign SC&A, and then we’re 


another --


MR. ROLFES: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: If we can try to keep this 


moving that would be good. So, okay, I’ll put 


a --


DR. ZIEMER: Well, does SC&A have in mind 


some sampling protocol so you don’t do the 


whole thing? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We’ve not in the past 


developed a sampling protocol for HIS-20, a 


more ad hoc --


DR. ZIEMER: It’s going to depend on --


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- what we did at Rocky 


Flats. 


DR. ZIEMER: -- this database is developed. 


I mean, it may be if it’s small you can do 100 


percent. But if it’s like --


MR. GRIFFON: No, it’s a big database. 


DR. ZIEMER: -- if it’s a big one, then 


you’re going to have to have some, we need to 


give some guidance on how much either percent 

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wise or a certain number not to exceed 


something or what are we talking about? 


MR. ROLFES: Five hundred thousand. 


MR. GRIFFON: Why don’t we ask, as an 


interim action we can ask SC&A to give us the 


methodology. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, I want to keep it down to 


at least 100,000. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think that’s fair. I think 


we ask --


DR. MAKHIJANI: We can do what we did at 


Rocky Flats when we examined individual cases. 


We really wanted to limit it, and we only did 


52 actually. And from the random it’s just 32 


cases. And then there were 20 sort of 


symmetric from the high exposure group. In 


that case what we did is we asked our 


statistician, Harry Chmelynski, to develop a 


protocol. And maybe as soon as the data are 


posted, the first thing we could do is to have 


Harry develop a sampling protocol. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we’ll do it in two 


steps. Have SC&A submit a protocol, and then 


after that we’ll discuss that --


DR. ZIEMER: Then maybe they can come to the 

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work group and say here’s what we propose. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And will that be done by e-


mail preferably or --


DR. ZIEMER: I would think so. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ZIEMER: What do you think? 


 MR. CLAWSON: That’s what I was going to 


ask. 


Mark, are you going to have any 


problems with that? I guess I’m looking at 


more timeliness and not so much data that --


MR. ROLFES: There’s quite a large amount of 


data, and it’s the Advisory Board’s, you know, 


it’s your, whatever you would like to do. 


We’re here to do what you ask us to do. If 


you feel that the data integrity issue is 


something that we should focus on, we’ll be 


happy to spend as much time as necessary, but 


keeping in mind that we’re trying to make a 


timely decision on this. 


DR. ZIEMER: It seems to me if the 


statistician comes back and says something 


like, well, if you look at 30 or 40 of these 


and you don’t see any discrepancies, that’s 


fine. But if they come back and say, you 

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know, you need to look at 586 samples, and we 


need to think twice about the time and 


resources. 


MR. MORRIS: Well, keep in mind that we’re 


doing that now as NIOSH’s work. So if you 


want to duplicate it, that’s a different topic 


than just checking that we’re doing it. 


DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, it’s actually kind of an 


independent, yeah, you have to do the same 


thing. It’s kind of the issue of --


 MR. CLAWSON: The independence. 


DR. ZIEMER: -- of independence and --


DR. MAKHIJANI: In this piece though the 


checking is not of the same type of the 


completeness investigation at Rocky Flats. 


It’s quite different. Actually also that one 


did not take a whole lot of time. We spent a 


lot of time discussing it, but it didn’t take 


a lot of time. 


MR. GRIFFON: The data completeness is 


another thing. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: In this case you’re trying 


to match individual samples, so doing a few 


hundred is not going to be --


MR. GRIFFON: You’re just looking at a raw 

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record versus a --


DR. MAKHIJANI: You’re not actually trying 


to compile everything for a claimant. 


DR. ZIEMER: You can do that very rapidly. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, I think even if we had 


to do a few hundred, I do not believe that 


matching up a few hundred individual bioassay 


points would, electronically with the 


logbooks, I think it could be done relatively 


rapidly. It also would be done by a more 


junior staff person also. 


 MR. CLAWSON: But we need to get the data 


from NIOSH, correct? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. CLAWSON: So I guess my question is, is 


as this comes available, could you make it 


available to SC&A so we can do this check and 


be able to take care of this? 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, the two reference IDs, I 


believe, have been put on the O drive, and as 


additional ones, I’ll make sure I notify 


everyone on the Advisory Board, everyone in 


the working group. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: My tentative thing would be 


to focus initially after the mid-‘70s and then 

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from the mid-‘70s on as an initial parsing of 


this. 


MR. GRIFFON: As we usually would. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That might be a more 


convenient way to do it and let the 


statistician handle the numbers. 


DR. ZIEMER: Actually, if the only thing 


we’re looking at is making sure the names 


match, I’m not sure why we even have to sample 


that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Excuse me? I don’t understand 


what you’re saying. 


DR. ZIEMER: If we’re not validating 


anything calculationally, if they come to us 


and say everything matched up, I don’t know --


MR. CHEW: I think you’re asking the 


question what are we really looking for, 


right? 


MR. GRIFFON: We’re looking for what we 


found at Rocky Flats because we had uranium 


urine logs which there were values that were 


not even in the HIS-20 database. And it ended 


up that probably the reason for that was that 


a lot of the early workers were removed. 


There were explanations. I’m not saying that, 

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you know, but at least it raised that question 


especially when you’re using the database for 


coworker models. That’s where it really comes 


into play is the coworker model stuff. So if 


you’re missing, I mean, worst case is you go 


through and you, I mean, I wouldn’t even do a 


random selection of values although it’s 


SC&A’s protocol. But I would go through and 


see raw records and highlight high values. If 


NIOSH is missing a lot of high values, then --


DR. ZIEMER: NIOSH will already have that 


information at that point, will they not? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, NIOSH doesn’t validate 


any of this stuff. That’s where we’re at. 


DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, but I thought they’re 


saying they’ll be doing that as they go. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, we’re internally doing 


that already. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s just another sampling of 


the independence. 


MR. CHEW: But I just want to make sure we 


say it clearly. We’re looking at individual 


records here to assure that those sample 


results are adequately put into HIS-20 


correctly. Is that the two matching? 

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MR. GRIFFON: That there’s a match between 


raw records and HIS-20 records. 


MR. CHEW: The raw records would be the 


individual urine sample results that were in 


the individual person’s records. Does that 


sound right? 


MR. GRIFFON: Or the raw records, well, 


you’ve got logbooks, too. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, logbooks. I mean, one 


would actually ideally look at both. 


MR. GRIFFON: Although because I know, Mel, 


sometimes, as you know, the individual records 


are printouts of the database so I hesitate 


there. That’s why we go to these raw. 


MR. CHEW: When you’re talking about 


logbooks, are you talking about the logbooks 


of the person who actually did the analysis 


and transcribed it? We got into this 


discussion before with Y-12; I want to make 


sure we know what we’re looking for. I want 


to make sure you’re looking, we’re looking for 


the same thing here. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But there are a number of 


issues. I mean, there’s the issue that Mark 


mentioned. From the mid-‘70s onward usually 

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the individual records are just a printout of 


the database that were computerized. 


MR. GRIFFON: So we know they’re going to 


match. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, so they will match. 


But sometimes there are also raw records, and 


I imagine the practices were different at 


different sites. So I don’t know enough to be 


able to generalize. I’ve looked at the data 


in detail only from a few ^. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, I’m calling them, I’ve 


been calling them urinalysis logbooks, but I 


don’t know if they had a logbook in the 


laboratory where they recorded down each 


reading or how they --


MR. CHEW: Remember back in the days we did 


Y-12, the actual card and making sure that 


that particular number got transcribed into 


the database. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, and some of the cards I 


think had ^ on them, too. And it could get 


complicated, but you only need, like I said, I 


think you look for, because remember what 


we’re trying to demonstrate for this purpose 


anyway, this is not the data completeness 

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evaluation to show that all the individual DRs 


you’re doing have a complete enough set of 


records that you can do a dose reconstruction. 


This is a question of if we have to 


rely on a coworker model, we know they’re all 


derived from the HIS-20. So we want to make 


sure that you have at least enough of the high 


values because you’re always going to use the 


95th or 50th, so you want to probably bias your 


sampling toward higher numbers in the 


logbooks. If most of them are there or all of 


them are there, then you’re fine. 


DR. ZIEMER: I want to ask my question in a 


slightly different way. NIOSH is doing a 


statistical verification of this very thing. 


Is that correct? 


MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


DR. ZIEMER: Are we asking that we verify 


NIOSH’s statistical sample, or do a separate 


statistical --


MR. GRIFFON: I’m asking for an independent, 


I would prefer independent. 


DR. ZIEMER: Okay, that wasn’t clear to me. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: The purpose of it is to 


ensure than in every period the coworker model 

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makes sense. 


MR. GRIFFON: Is going to be, is bounding. 


It makes sense, correct. It makes sense. 


MR. ROLFES: I think you clarified it, Mark. 


You want to assure that the high results are 


adequately portrayed in the HIS-20 because 


they will now bias the coworker study. I 


mean, that’s been the --


MR. GRIFFON: I think that’s kind of a 


bottom line issue because you’re saying, I 


mean, I don’t want to go too far ahead because 


I haven’t seen the coworker model. I mean you 


said it’s almost ready, but I’m assuming that 


generally you use the 95th for operational 


people. So if it ends up looking like that, I 


don’t want to, maybe I should, but I don’t 


want to assume on internal. 


 MR. SHARFI: The standard model would be the 


50th percentile with a distribution. We didn’t 


use the 95th at Rocky, but that was a special 


situation because of other issues. The 


internal we would assign the 50th with a 


lognormal distribution. 


MR. GRIFFON: So I guess still I don’t think 


it changes what you are going to look at 

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because I think you would tend to want to look 


at the higher values because that’s going to 


probably shift the annual average and --


MR. MORRIS: The NIOSH approach is going to 


be to use the middle standard sampling 


protocol. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, and I’ll leave it up to 


SC&A --


DR. ZIEMER: Give equal weight to 


everything. You’re not going to selectively 


look at high values. 


MR. MORRIS: No, we will not selectively 


look at high values. We’ll look at acceptance 


criteria like making widgets. If you get the 


first hundred widgets right, then you don’t 


sample the next hundred widgets with the same 


vigor. 


MR. CHEW: Does that answer Mark’s question 


though? I want to make sure that we --


MR. MORRIS: We’re not going to bias. We’re 


going to take a random sampling. 


DR. ZIEMER: A random sample. 


Do you know at this point how many 


samples you will be taking? 


MR. ROLFES: Gene, are you available? Gene, 

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are you there? 


MR. POTTER (by Telephone): Yes, sir. 


MR. ROLFES: Paul Ziemer asked how many 


samples we might be taking, and could you 


relay some of the Mill Speck (ph) Sampling 


Procedures that we’re using to define the 


acceptable quality level for the dataset? 


MR. POTTER (by Telephone): Yes, we’re just 


adopting the protocol that has been used by 


the ORAU team before in doing similar sorts of 


things when records have been transcribed into 


spreadsheets, for example. And this is 


generally the old, old data. And basically, 


you would define up front what an acceptable 


quality level is. 


In other words, for the Pu sampling 


data that we talked about, Mark and I 


discussed and decided that a one percent 


acceptable quality level would be a value to 


use. And that would say that 99 out of 100 


results were correctly transcribed. And then 


based on your batch size, and what these Pu 


sample results were, were data sheets that 


were transmitted to the site from offsite 


labs. And that’s why folks found them 

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convenient to capture the data in reference 


IDs when they went out to the site. 


So based on how many are in that 


batch, you have look-up tables -- actually, 


it’s on the web -- for that acceptable quality 


level. And then you, I won’t go into all the 


details, but there are different inspection 


levels that you can define depending on what 


you think the quality of your data is. 


In other words, after you’ve done 


several batches and the data appears to be of 


a high quality, then you can reduce your 


sample size. But this is all subject to very 


strict rules. Anyway, from your acceptable 


quality level, the batch size and you start 


out with a normal sampling procedure that 


tells you how big of a sample to draw. From 


using that number I drew a random sample and 


compared those results one by one to HIS-20. 


Was the person there? Was the result there? 


Was it correct? And if all that fell into 


line, that was called an acceptable sample. 


A couple of other observations since 


I’ve been listening here. You all are very 


correct that this is something that needs to 

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be checked because like most sites, HIS-20 is 


at least the third generation of databases 


that were used at Fernald. There’s always the 


possibility of things getting hosed up as data 


is transferred from database to database. A 


lot of the data was hand entered, the old 


stuff, so there’s a possibility of error 


there. So that’s another good thought to 


check on all this stuff. 


But I can tell you from what I’ve 


looked at so far, there are many, many people 


from the ‘50s that have urine results from the 


‘50s. And what I was suggesting that we go on 


a decade-by-decade basis maybe. And at this 


point we may not be able to pull all of the 


samples from, say, like the 1960s and then 


pick a random sample based on that batch size. 


So probably what we’re going to do is 


pull a box or something of urine request 


cards. This seems to be the record that’s 


identifiable in the site records as being 


something close to like a logbook. In other 


words, a lab person would enter the result on 


this card, and this would be the reduced data 


from, you know how photofluoric ramitry (ph) 

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usually works. They do three trials, and if 


they’re within a certain acceptable range of 


each other, then they record the result of the 


average of the three. 


So this is reduced data already, but 


there’s not a lot of stuff that I saw in the 


site records that identifies itself as a 


logbook. So urine request cards are a 


possibility. And what I suggest is a, you 


know, from each decade we pull a box or so, 


and then we pull a random sample from there. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: May I ask Gene a question 


since he’s looked at ‘50s’ data? 


Did you find that there were, that 


HIS-20 was complete in the ‘50s? Or did you 


find all matches or did you find that there 


were things in HIS-20 that didn’t match up 


with the cards? 


MR. POTTER (by Telephone): I only have some 


very preliminary results from the New York 


Operations office samples that were done for 


Fernald. And so I would like to see more of a 


sample before I draw any conclusions on the 


‘50s’ data. But a lot of it is there, 


definitely. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Gene, this protocol you 


described, you said it’s on the web? Or is it 


on our AB doc? 


MR. POTTER (by Telephone): I did not see a 


procedure; however, I’ve been involved in 


doing some of the sampling a couple of times 


in my previous career, and then once with the 


ORAU team. And so I wrote down a little 


procedure for myself which I certainly can 


provide to Mark for --


MR. GRIFFON: That would be great if you can 


provide that if that’s okay, Mark. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: And was this the same approach 


you used for Rocky Flats? I’m just trying to 


get a sense. 


MR. POTTER (by Telephone): No, for Rocky 


Flats we did not use a statistical method. 


There it was kind of an agreement as I 


understood it between yourself and Brant Ulsh 


as to how many we would look at. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I think that gives us a 


sense of where to go though. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, we’ve got a clear line 


of direction, clear as mud. I was going to 

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ask that technical term of hosed up. That 


sounds like something I’d say. But we’ve got 


a clear line on this right now. I’ll be right 


honest. I’m lost. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m going to ask if we can go 


back through the last, the four responses on 


the Finding because I think we have a clearer 


line for the database stuff. But I think it’s 


worth stepping back to number one. 


Number one, we asked for QA reports, 


and it looks like one from 1953 was 


identified. But we asked for QA reports from 


the early time period, ’54 through ’80. I 


notice that the one we found was from ’53. I 


don’t know. Now there’s interviews. I guess 


the statement here is a little concerning to 


me, interviews with former FEMP workers 


revealed an informal QC program exists. I’m 


not sure what exactly that means. 


MR. ROLFES: I can elaborate a little bit. 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess you’re also going to 


provide these interviews so we --


MR. ROLFES: Yes, certainly. Yeah, there 


were indications that prepared samples 


essentially, samples that were spiked urine 

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samples that were put through as blind samples 


to determine, you know, they would put a known 


quantity of uranium into the sample without 


giving any of the technicians who are involved 


in doing the analysis on that urine, fake 


urine sample, they would put that through as a 


blind sample in every manner identical to a 


regular urine sample to determine what the 


results were. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, we haven’t seen any --


MR. ROLFES: The interview transcripts will 


be made available. 


MR. GRIFFON: But did you find that in the, 


it’s not like you don’t have any lab data that 


you’ve seen? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, we did provide the data 


that we had record of, the formal record in 


1953. 


MR. GRIFFON: ‘Fifty-three is the one that 


was. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes. However, we are aware 


that this individual didn’t start until about 


I believe mid-to-late ‘50s. I could take a 


look back at the transcripts and see. I don’t 


believe it was documented. I know there were 

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certainly much more documentation of it in 


more recent years, but it does appear that it 


was done, in fact, in 1953. 


MR. GRIFFON: So in 1953 in the interviews 


they’re saying that it continued beyond that? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: And do you have any of the, we 


asked about procedures, too, laboratory 


procedures? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, those have been made 


available to the Advisory Board. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, they are available. 


DR. BEHLING: The ones that I’ve looked at, 


the one was 1984, and the other one was ’88. 


It’s obvious as time went by how things start 


to get into more controlled and certainly much 


more documented. But I guess as Mark was 


saying --


MR. GRIFFON: Well, we said from the earlier 


time period, too. 


DR. BEHLING: But my focus would be in the 


‘50s and early ‘60s to see --


MR. ROLFES: If I recall, I believe there 


were some from the ‘60s that we provided as 


well. I can take a look back. 

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MR. GRIFFON: I didn’t see that in your 


response, so I’m not sure. 


MR. ROLFES: Let me take a look through 


here. I mean, there is quite a large number 


of reports that were provided. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know. I’m just trying 


to make sure we don’t miss anything here as we 


go through the actions. 


I’ll move on to number four. And I 


was trying to refresh my memory on this 


myself. NIOSH to complete or to compare 


selective cases with lung count data and 


urinalysis data. And it says in progress. 


And I know that somewhere cases were 


identified with elevated lung counts. 


MR. MORRIS: Well, I think this was Paul’s 


suggestion that, and I volunteered that we do 


have the in vivo lung count data. And in 


there there are obvious cases of people who 


were sampled seven or 12 or 15 times during 


the year. We could potentially pull out a few 


of those people and compare their urinalysis 


data. I’m not sure what it gets us, but it’s 


^. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I was trying to remember 

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exactly why we wanted to do this, but it says 


it’s in progress, so I guess you’re doing it. 


MR. MORRIS: Yeah, it’s on my to-do list so 


it’s going to get done eventually unless you 


call us off. 


DR. BEHLING: But as you mentioned, the 


question is what does the --


MR. GRIFFON: This is the reality check. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, but does it really 


reveal anything? If you are exposed to UF-6, 


you’re going to see a lot of it in the urine. 


If you’re exposed to uranium oxide, you’re 


gong to see it in the lung. And the two may 


not have any relationship to each other. So 


I’m not sure I know what to advise you and 


what the point of that effort is. 


MR. MORRIS: Sure, that’s probably why it’s 


not complete. 


MR. CHEW: We agree with you. It was your 


Board action. 


DR. ZIEMER: I don’t actually recall what we 


were trying to do there other than the fact 


that you have some exceptions, but in fact, 


there should be correlation in general on 


these things. 

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MR. MORRIS: In fact, there should be some 


correlation. I agree with you. How to 


quantify that correlation is a hard question. 


And we can record it, but whether we draw 


conclusions from it is another question. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, for example, if you have 


fluorometry data, you infer what’s in the body 


if that’s all you have. If you have lung 


data, you also infer what’s in the body. So 


both are used for that purpose. Do they 


correlate? Well, maybe, maybe not. But, in 


fact, what would you do if you have, as a 


claimant, someone with both pieces of data? 


What do you do? 


MR. ROLFES: For example, in a dose 


reconstruction what we would start off with 


would be looking at the urinalysis data to 


estimate their intake. And then if we were 


doing, it certainly depends on the specifics 


of the case, whether we’re doing an 


underestimate or an overestimate or a best 


estimate. 


And, for example, if we had an 


overestimate case that we needed to complete, 


what we would do is assign intakes based on 

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the urinalysis data and look at the mobile in 


vivo data to determine whether the dose could 


have been any higher than what we’ve assigned. 


And if it is not, then that would be 


sufficient for the uranium intake estimation. 


On the other hand if we had urinalysis 


data and we were doing an underestimate for a 


claim, we would use those urinalysis data to 


assign an intake, and then we would also 


potentially look at the mobile in vivo data to 


confirm that we haven’t assigned too much 


uranium intakes. So we might use the mobile 


in vivo data to refine our intake estimate. 


For a best estimate, that would be the 


number of best estimate claims we have 


completed for Fernald is very low. I don’t 


have a specific number or percentage of these 


claims, but I would say it’s certainly less 


than five percent of the claims. But it’s 


those cases where every piece of data for that 


claim is considered very detailed, very 


thoroughly, and in those cases we still are 


claimant favorable in our assumptions for 


those best estimates. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, if you had case where the 

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urine data, say it’s a lung cancer case. The 


urine data gave you one value for lung dose 


and the whole body or lung counter data gave 


you a different value. I’m assuming you would 


use the highest values. 


MR. ROLFES: Well, if it’s an underestimate, 


we would actually use the lowest value and 


that would result in compensation. 


DR. ZIEMER: Whichever way you’re going. 


You would use the value that was necessary for 


you to make the correct --


MR. ROLFES: The one -- if it’s a noncompensable claim -- yes, exactly. 


DR. ZIEMER: I think this rose in the 


context of the finding. The finding had to do 


with whether or not you could depend on this 


type of urinalysis data, and --


MR. GRIFFON: So this was a kind of reality 


check. I think --


DR. ZIEMER: -- the question was --


MR. GRIFFON: -- we need to know enough in 


these selective cases because we need to know 


enough to understand what types of uranium --


DR. ZIEMER: Could you still make the right 


decision. I think it was in that context. 

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You weren’t way out in left field with the 


urine analysis that you wouldn’t end up with a 


completely different answer than if you had 


lung data. 


DR. BEHLING: I asked that question earlier 


in the day. What do you do when you have two 


sets of data, one urine, one lung count? And 


which one dominates the decision to use for 


settling a claim? 


 MR. SHARFI: The sample DR we did six and a 


half percent does look at a situation where 


you do have both urine and it might be once 


you look at that you can decide if you have 


additional questions and try to debate it 


right here. We have now provided an example 


where we did do an assessment of a scenario 


where we had both urine and chest count data 


and the case with a low ^. And you can look 


at, we do look at a best estimate scenario 


versus an overestimate scenario, just the 


urine versus --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we could probably start 

with that one. I mean, the idea of selective 

was that we --

DR. ZIEMER: But I think the point is if you 

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looked at a number though, and you found out 


that the urine analysis always gave you a 


different answer than the lung, that would be 


very troubling. Right? 


 MR. SHARFI: It depends on what you’re 


always assuming. If I’m always assuming Type 


S, then that might be the case. But it’s hard 


to say because every intake scenario you can, 


if you look at both sets of data, there are a 


lot of cases and ways that you can refine your 


adjustment scenario to actually fit both sets 


of data. 


DR. ZIEMER: But the context of the issue is 


can you use the urinalysis data to reach the 


correct decision? That’s the context. And 


insofar as you can independently, say I can 


still get the correct decision because I have 


these other cases where if I’d have made the 


decision based on the lung data, I’d have come 


out with the same decision. 


That’s why I’m saying if they were 


always in the opposite direction, that would 


be very troubling. You can think of some 


weird scenario where they might be, but in 


general, if you’re making the right decision 

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with the urine data, then, because it’s an 


issue of the reliability, the urine data 


that’s in question in the finding. 


DR. BEHLING: But let me pose a question to 


Mutty again here, and that is I keep hearing 


that the issue of claimant favorability 


usually involves taking something that is most 


claimant favorable in a dose reconstruction. 


But I think sometimes there’s a caveat thrown 


in there. And when we, for instance, as you 


mentioned earlier this morning, the issue of 


solubility class, the statement was we will 


always go to that solubility which favors the 


potential dose to that particular organ of 


interest. And is that something that will be 


used across the board, or is that something 


that again is only used in instances where you 


tend to overestimate and the claim you know up 


front? 


 MR. SHARFI: You’re always looking for the 


most claimant favorable scenario that fits the 


available data. So in case you only had 


urine, you might assume that a very insoluble 


material that if they had had lung counts 


would grossly overestimate them. But because 

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you don’t, you might then still, even as your 


best estimate, start to get a little more 


insoluble material. 


DR. BEHLING: And let me refocus the 


question. Is it influenced by whether or not 


the claimant’s going to be compensated or not? 


For instance, where you have different 


criteria for, let’s say in selecting a 


bioassay date and if it’s a routine bioassay, 


you don’t know when the intake is. 


There are many approaches that have 


been used in dose reconstruction that I’ve 


experienced in auditing them, and that some 


say, oh, well, that, even though it’s a 


routine bioassay, that exposure must have 


taken place a day or two before the bioassay. 


The other alternative is to use a mid-point 


between that day of assay and the previous one 


or extremely claimant favorable, use the day 


after the most recent one. The question of 


which one you use is always driven by whether 


or not you intend to compensate. 


And so again going back to the 


question of using always the most claimant 


favorable solubility class may very well be 

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driven by your decision or preconceived notion 


whether or not this is going to be a 


compensated case or not. And my question is, 


is the claimant favorability of selecting 


always the solubility class that’s most 


favorable to the tissue in question use 


independent of whether or not the claimant’s 


going to be compensated or not. That’s my 


question. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, the answer is yes. Of 


course, we use our efficiency process to the 


best of our ability to get an answer, a 


correct answer, for the claim. We do not, 


when we’re doing best estimates, we do not 


presuppose that a solubility class that gives 


us a non-compensable decision is the right 


over a solubility class that would give us a 


compensation decision. We would take the 


compensation decision and that solubility 


class. 


DR. BEHLING: Okay, because I’ve seen it in 


other instances where when you realize, okay, 


based on that assumption that’s claimant 


favorable, you’re going to reach a 50 percent 


or greater, then oftentimes the situation 

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changes. We go back and say, well, let’s go 


back and see where did this individual work. 


Well, he worked in a facility that had uranium 


tetrafluoride or uranium oxide. And the good 


will of assuming that the most claimant 


favorable solubility is withdrawn because 


empirical data would allow you to do that. 


And I’m asking that question. Is it a given 


that --


MR. ELLIOTT: We don’t have --


Help me out here, guys, if you will, 


but my understanding is if we don’t have data 


otherwise, we don’t have the information to 


say here’s the specific solubility class that 


should be used, we would look at each 


solubility class and pick the one that is most 


claimant favorable. 


DR. BEHLING: There is a back door, and 


that’s what I’m saying is that --


DR. ZIEMER: If you don’t have the 


information. 


DR. BEHLING: -- in a case of, let’s say I’m 


reviewing the Portsmouth. And there are 


individual locations in Portsmouth where all 


the radionuclides are listed, and there is a 

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segregation based on what the best estimate is 


regarding the solubility class. And you would 


not necessarily default to one that is most 


claimant favorable if the empirical data would 


suggest that there’s a solubility that is 


perhaps less favorable in those instances. 


And I guess I just want to separate so 


that when we see an audit that involves a real 


case, and the assumption, the default 


assumption, of the most claimant favorable 


solubility class does not exist I understand 


why. Because there’s empirical data to 


justify selecting another solubility that will 


reduce the dose. 


MR. ELLIOTT: And I would expect that to be 


articulated in the report. 


MR. GRIFFON: And that’s what Jim Neton 


would call sharpening the pencil. So we’ve 


seen that. 


MR. ROLFES: And this leads to considering 


all pieces of scientific data that are 


associated with the claim. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I’m leaving number four 


as in progress because I think we might want 


to see a couple of these in addition to the 

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one you’ve already provided, Mutty, if that’s 


okay. I think let’s just leave that in 


progress, get a couple more of those pieces. 


And I say selected cases because I want you to 


select cases where you know, because I agree, 


you’re not sure. If it’s an unknown 


solubility case, you want to pick the case 


that you know --


MR. MORRIS: So you want two more example 


dose reconstructions or two more just 


comparisons of datasets? 


MR. GRIFFON: Two more just comparisons of 


datasets I think, a couple more comparisons of 


datasets. 


 MR. SHARFI: Just for clarification. How do 


you want us to, when we take comparing data 


without doing a dose reconstruction, I don’t 


know how you compare the data. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, you do have to compare 


the internal dose. I’m not asking for a full 


DR. 


 MR. SHARFI: Oh, and you’re talking about 


just the assessment of the bioassay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Of the bioassay, right, 


bioassay and lung, selecting a case that you 

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have enough knowledge of what types of 


material they were working with I guess would 


be the way I’d narrow it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We talking about one case? 


How many cases are we talking about doing it 


to? 


DR. ZIEMER: Sounds like two or three, 


right? 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, a couple or three, 


yeah. 


MR. CHEW: We actually want the thought 


processes, the logic. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, that’s what you want, 


right, just to demonstrate that logic. 


DR. ZIEMER: And then we’re trying to 


demonstrate that the urine analysis is a valid 


piece of data to use or set of data to use. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, remember, it comes from 


the finding of a concern over the urinalysis 


data in general, so we’re trying to show these 


cases should demonstrate that --


DR. ZIEMER: In fact, you want a case where 


you know something about what its form was, 


not one that --


MR. GRIFFON: We don’t want an ambiguous one 

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because then we’ll get an ambiguous result. 


 MR. CLAWSON: And also in the same sense 


we’re evaluating the lung count, too, though, 


aren’t we? 


DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, but the point is do you 


get correct body burden or the correct organ 


burden by both methods. That would serve to 


validate the issue of the urine data being 


reliable. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, but I think Brad’s 


right. If you, at the other end of the 


spectrum if you have some things that are 


totally out of whack, then you say one or one 


or the other is wrong. 


DR. ZIEMER: But the point is you’re using 


urine analysis and showing it’s --


MR. ROLFES: I think we’ve already completed 


this request with our sample dose 


reconstruction 14, internal 14, because we 


did, in fact, compare urinalysis data. We 


estimated the intakes based on urinalysis data 


then compared the projected intakes to the 


actual measured mobile in vivo results. So I 


think that it’s already been completed. So I 


think it would be important for the Advisory 

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Board to review what we have --


DR. ZIEMER: Where is that? 


MR. ROLFES: That’s internal number 14 


that’s made available on the O drive. And 


this was also the same sample dose 


reconstruction that considered potential 


exposures and Hallam reactor elements. 


MR. GRIFFON: Then I think as an action we 


should have SC&A review that DR, internal 14. 


So in progress was not, we’ll delete in 


progress, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, I guess I would ask that 


you take a look at that first, and then if 


we’d like to do some more specific things, 


we’d be happy to. We don’t want to repeat 


something that we’ve already done. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Mark, what was the name of 


that again because I’m looking at that. 


MR. ROLFES: The sample dose reconstruction 


was internal number 14. 


DR. ZIEMER: That’s the name of the file? 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. It’s under the 


sample dose reconstruction folder. I believe 


the folder’s actually titled working drafts of 


Fernald sample --

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DR. ZIEMER: I got it. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Let’s take a short break real 


quick. 


(Whereupon, the working group took a break 


from 2:43 p.m. until 2:55 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: I just wanted to mention I’ve 


reviewed this case during the break which is 


the determination of POCs from the urine data 


and from the chest count data. This was done 


for colon, kidney, lung and prostate based on 


cancers in a real case, although they’ve 


modified a few things so we couldn’t identify 


the person. But the compensation decisions 


would have been the same for both methods in 


this case. The lung burden --


MR. GRIFFON: This is a dose reconstruction. 


DR. ZIEMER: A dose reconstruction, the 


example. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, it’s all right. It’s all 


right. I mean ultimately the question still 


is, okay, we can argue that whole Labor thing 


but it comes down to that. They calculated 


the doses to the lung. But the interesting 


thing is the lung values came out 92 percent 

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and 99 percent for the two methods. 


DR. BEHLING: Can you tell us which one’s 


higher? 


DR. ZIEMER: The urine data gave a slightly 


higher value. 


DR. BEHLING: To the lung? 


DR. ZIEMER: To the lung. Well, actually, 


for everything. The ones that were the 


furthest apart that didn’t affect the 


compensation decision was kidney. The urine 


data gave it at 44 percent. The lung data 


only at 21 percent, but any --


MR. RICH: Well, wouldn’t you expect that 


because of the configuration of the counter 


itself. It was intended to be a --


DR. ZIEMER: Intended to be a chest counter, 


but presumably from the body burden you can 


still in modeling you can estimate organ dose. 


MR. RICH: But only to have an estimate that 


ten to 20 percent ^. 


DR. ZIEMER: In any event I’m kind of 


satisfied that they’ve done what we’ve asked. 


I’m not sure what we’ll gain by doing a couple 


more cases. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think we’ve conceded that. 

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We said we’d look at this on first, right? 


MR. ROLFES: There are other examples 


internal dose reconstruction, like the default 


two percent enrichment that we’re using as 


well. So within a comparisons of the 


probability of causation for a selection of 


organs. So once again if you’d like to take a 


look at that, and if you have any additional 


questions or clarifications, then we can 


proceed. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Brad, I’d like to say 


something for the record here. I really 


applaud Mark’s efforts at trying to keep this 


working group informed of things that we have 


developed in response. I know that the 


working group Board members have had a lot on 


their plate in the last couple of weeks with 


the Board meeting and all of that. And I 


guess I just feel I need to say this because 


it’s somewhat apparent to me that you all 


haven’t had a chance to avail yourselves of 


the examples that we’ve given and some of the 


other answers and responses that we tried to 


put on the O drive for you. Is there 


something that we could do better in that 

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regard? I know you’re all busy. I know you 


all have got a lot of things going on 


especially with the Board meeting the week 


before last, but if you think of things that, 


you know, I know that Mark was very diligent 


in sending out his e-mails and reiterating 


what he’s already said before in previous, 


what he’d given up before he identified again, 


and what was new being added he identified for 


you. So if you think of things that we can do 


to improve in that just so that we can alert 


you that there is information for your benefit 


before you come to a meeting, if you can check 


it out that’s great. If not, you might --


DR. ZIEMER: No, I agree that Mark is very 


diligent, and I think one of the real 


limitations is the volume of stuff that comes 


to us and trying to digest it all. 


MR. GRIFFON: And it’s not only for Fernald 


obviously. 


DR. ZIEMER: No, I mean, it’s Fernald, and 


it’s Hanford, and --


MR. ROLFES: Multiple sites, there’s a lot 


on everyone’s plate here. 


 DR. WADE: And that’s why it’s so valuable 

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for the work group meetings because as Mark 


was telling you earlier to touch everything 


when you come here so you can know what’s out 


there and know if there are other things that 


you need. You just need to keep working. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, was there any review 


item in here for us other than 14 which you 


assigned earlier? 


MR. GRIFFON: Just to review DR number 


internal 14. We’re not going to do any 


additional ones unless we have some questions, 


unless that raises questions I guess, but that 


probably will satisfy our request. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So overall or not any radon 


breath things or --


MR. GRIFFON: We haven’t gotten to the radon 


breath. That’s another issue in Finding 3. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Still trying to get us ahead 

here. 

MR. GRIFFON: Call us back at ten p.m. 

tonight. 

 MR. CLAWSON: But if I would ask, Mark, when 

we get done with this today, there’s just a 


couple on this internal 14 that I want to go 


over with you. It’s just to try to help me 

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figure out --


MR. ROLFES: Sure, certainly. 


 MR. CLAWSON: -- and we’ll go from there. 


And I’ll just get with you after we go. I 


need to call you. It’s just some questions 


that I was trying to figure out what --


MR. ROLFES: Certainly, please, I’m always 


available. 


 MR. CLAWSON: My boss doesn’t seem to think 


I’m not very available. 


Anyway, let’s go back to the matrix. 


FINDING 4.1-3
 

DR. BEHLING: This one, I think, is one that 


we are likely to discuss in context with the 


cohort dose models. The finding that was 


identified as Finding 4.1-3, the failure to 


monitor all personnel with potential internal 


exposure to uranium, was triggered by a 


document that was part of the petition that 


Sandra submitted wherein you’ll see the actual 


exhibit or attachment on page 29 of my report 


that identified a total of four workers who 


had, in words of the document, had unexpected 


urinary excretion rates that were 


unexplainable especially for case number 

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[identifying information redacted]. That this 


individual had an excretion volume in excess 


of -- I won’t give you exact numbers -- in 


excess of five milligrams per liter. And the 


statement was --


MR. ROLFES: That’s inaccurate. I believe 


that should be maybe 500 micrograms or --


DR. BEHLING: I’m sorry, it’s 0.5, and 


that’s all. I’m going to give it just one 


number, 0.5 milligrams. I’m sorry if I said 


500, but that’s a significant number when you 


view it in context with 0.025 and 0.04 action 


lines. People would be followed up, in fact, 


as I’ve stated in my write up, you know, this 


unexpected value is 13 times higher the value 


of 0.04 milligrams per liter action level. 


And I guess if this was a chemical operator, I 


would say, well, okay, that speaks to have a 


high value, but what was surprising here is 


that this case was regarded as an exposure 


that wasn’t expected. 


And the question is why wasn’t it, and 


who were these four people who were monitored? 


And I think it’s part of the things that you 


submitted on the O drive. I did come across 

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something that may explain it. I don’t know. 


But I looked at a whole bunch of records where 


the document was termed breakdown of personnel 


by control group. 


Now I don’t know, and there’s a 


heading called control group. Now I’m looking 


at that and wondering if these people were 


selected as baseline values or what the term 


control group is in reference to. Were these 


people who were selected from worker 


population groups that weren’t expected to 


have any exposure? And were nevertheless 


monitored for whatever reasons? 


And I think we were asking you if you 


could identify these four individuals and 


somehow specify what was the justification for 


monitoring them. 


MR. ROLFES: We did look into HIS-20 data. 


We identified the four individuals. These 


high results are, in fact, in HIS-20. I 


believe these four high results are all the 


first results for each of these individuals in 


the record of HIS-20. So we’ve identified 


them. One of the four, in fact, had a follow-


up within the month, yet there’s three did not 

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have follow ups. So we’ve identified the 


individuals, and we have this investigation 


report that basically was asking us, you know, 


what potentially happened to these individuals 


for them to have a high urinalysis result. 


This is also during the time that it 


is very possible because of where urine sample 


bottles were stored in the earlier time 


periods, it’s very possible that these urine 


sample bottles could have been contaminated 


with processed material, uranium. So these 


would, the measured concentrations of uranium 


in urine based on cross-contamination would 


essentially result in a higher dose estimate 


for these individuals than what was actually 


received. 


MR. GRIFFON: Do you have, I know you 


provided a write up for this. Do you know 


what the document name is? 


MR. ROLFES: It’s an Excel spreadsheet. I 


believe it’s reference 29-13. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I’ve got it. 


DR. BEHLING: This is a question that I 


have, and I’m not sure you answered it just 


now. But why were these people monitored? 

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Was it standard protocol to take people who 


were not expected to have any exposure to 


uranium, nevertheless subjected to urinalysis 


that in this case surprisingly showed up with 


high values? 


MR. ROLFES: Everyone gave a urinalysis 


sample, and by everyone I say, you know, the 


great majority of individuals, more than 93 


percent of individuals at least gave one 


annual sample at Fernald. So this was not the 


only urine sample that these individuals 


provided. So if you take a look at their 


records within the analysis that NIOSH made 


available to the Advisory Board, it indicates 


that there are additional urine samples in the 


subsequent years after this. 


DR. BEHLING: And I think my concern in 


writing up this issue as a finding comes in 


concert with Arjun’s concern about fugitive 


missions that may have exposed people who were 


certainly not candidates for an internal 


exposure. And so that’s the reason why this 


issue was raised. But if you say that people 


were as a matter of fact monitored at least 


once a year, that would certainly perhaps 

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provide us with some insight as to people’s 


exposure that at least were monitored on some 


routine basis and not ignored so that you 


don’t have people for whom there’s no 


monitoring data. And then you’re sort of 


stuck with what do we do for these people if 


they’re claimants. 


MR. ROLFES: We spoke with an industrial 


hygienist regarding these fugitive emissions, 


and he indicated that if you expected that a 


person was not going to be exposed, if you 


looked at the entire dataset that the dataset 


would be indicative that these personnel were 


not exposed personnel. 


These are unusual occurrences, and 


because it was an unusual occurrence because 


this bioassay data was elevated, they did, in 


fact, investigate it as indicated by this 


report that was provided. So once again, 


those urinalysis data would be used in a dose 


reconstruction as is for estimating a person’s 


intake. 


DR. BEHLING: Now the issue of the coworker 


data model, can you elaborate as to who they 


may apply to? 

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MR. ROLFES: The coworker data model would 


be, well, I guess I’ll let Bob Morris speak to 


that a little bit more about the application 


of uranium intakes to unmonitored personnel. 


MR. MORRIS: I understand we’ve got on the 


order of ten dose reconstructions that are 


pending coworker study completion. So the 


great majority of dose reconstructions at 


Fernald do not depend on coworker models. 


We’ve got a few waiting for a signature on 


this report that’s coming out soon. 


 MR. SHARFI: Actually, internal I think 


there’s only about one or two. For the 


coworker in general if you include external, 


there’s about ten or fifteen. But the 


internal there are only I think one or two, 


and these are usually subcontractors who 


worked there like three months ^ and then 


that’s the limit of their exposure. They were 


very short periods of time, usually not prime. 


They fall into the construction trade worker 


category. 


MR. GRIFFON: Does it include D&D era? 


 MR. MORRIS: The coworker model? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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MR. MORRIS: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I mean, does your 


assessment of one person for internal include 


after the D&D era? 


 MR. MORRIS: All that’s outstanding. 


 MR. SHARFI: Active claimants. 


MR. GRIFFON: Because I know I’m just 


reflecting back on Rocky and in that case 


though the coworker model was truncated before 


the D&D period. So I think you have it all 


laid out, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Does that answer your question? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 

DR. BEHLING: Do you have anything? 

MR. GRIFFON: Only a follow up on this 

spreadsheet. I guess the question I have was 


if these were investigated. And I’m assuming 


that all the values are in there, but there’s 


one individual that the follow-up sample has 


been 13 months later? 


DR. ZIEMER: More than that. 


MR. ROLFES: Only one of the four gave a 


follow-up sample within the first month. 


DR. ZIEMER: I thought that was very 


strange. 

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MR. GRIFFON: And all of them are their 


first urine sample that they ever had. 


DR. BEHLING: And they exceeded the 0.04 


milligrams value which should have triggered 


something else --


MR. ROLFES: Which triggered --


DR. BEHLING: -- you’re coming down again. 


DR. ZIEMER: This one has a gap from 


February ’66 to December ’67 for the next 


follow up. And that seems awfully strange 


after an incident. I mean I don’t know if we 


can speak to that, but it just looks strange. 


MR. ROLFES: If we take a look at the code 


associated with the urinalysis result, that 


might give us a better indicator of why the 


sample was collected. If it was for an annual 


physical, if it was for an annual physical, if 


there wasn’t a follow up, there may be 


additional documentation which we haven’t 


located at this time. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, there’s three here that 


are part of the incident, then this lapse of 


18, actually 22 months before the annual 


physical which is -- anyway his annual samples 


are two years apart. 

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MR. GRIFFON: What did the investigation 


conclude? Did the investigation find 


anything, any problems? 


MR. ROLFES: The investigation --


MR. GRIFFON: The report? 


DR. BEHLING: I didn’t follow it through 


because I had not looked at what you ended up 


doing on behalf of these four individuals that 


are cited in this memo. So I am not sure I 


know what the outcome of the investigations, 


but as Paul just mentioned, there are some 


inconsistencies here. Because I quoted in my 


statement that 0.025 milligram and 0.04 


milligram are two action levels that should 


have triggered a subsequent urinalysis as a 


minimum for all four of them. 


I mean, one of them exceeded by a 


factor of 13. The other one exceeded by a 


factor of ten the higher action item. And you 


sort of say again going back to the issue, did 


the people take the urinalysis all that 


seriously? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, I see what you’re saying. 


In this case it does indicate that there was 


an investigation. You know, it’s clearly 

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documented that this individual was working in 


this area, and they discussed, it appears in 


this document, that they were discussing the 


individual’s work history. Where were they? 


What was being done? 


There may be other documents 


associated with this that we haven’t located 


to date. That’s very possible. But if as a 


result of this investigation they determined 


that these results were false positives for 


cross-contaminated samples, it may be that 


they didn’t request a follow-up bioassay 


because they had made the determination that 


the individual had not entered a 


radiologically controlled area. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, it seems like from the 


document -- I’m looking at the document in 


question here that’s identified as Attachment 


4.1-3 on page 29 of the report. And the 


statement is the investigation failed to show 


why these urinalysis samples were high in 


uranium, meaning that they had conducted the 


investigation and they never understood why. 


There was no reference here to a contamination 


of laboratory or anything else. It was just 

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an unanswered question. 


MR. MORRIS: I recall that we discussed this 


with an informed person during one of our 


interviews. And he said that they stored 


sample bottles at that time co-located with 


their laboratory which was in an operating 


facility. And that they were never surprised 


when they got elevated contamination on these 


cross-contaminations because of the way they 


were stored. 


His point was that for this group of 


people that were normally never exposed to the 


plant conditions but were in the 


administrative buildings that we needed to 


look at that in the context of that small 


coworker population of administrative workers. 


And he said you look at them as a group, and 


you’ll never see evidence that there was a 


large exposure in a building, in an 


administrative building. There was not a 


cloud wafting into the building from a 


processing facility. 


MR. GRIFFON: The investigation at the time 


it was inconclusive. 


MR. MORRIS: I can’t talk to the specifics 

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of that. All he said was we would never be 


surprised at a cross-contamination of a sample 


bottle. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think that would have been 


written down. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I would have expected 


them to at least suggest that as the 


explanation. 


MR. RICH: The wording on the memo would 


imply we couldn’t find the source or any 


reason why the individual, in other words, 


they had gone through the full process of 


defining where he was, and where he worked. 


And they couldn’t, the language -- at least I 


would interpret it saying we simply could not 


identify any source of contamination. 


DR. BEHLING: That’s not what it says. It 


says we don’t, the investigation failed to 


show why these urinary samples were high in 


uranium. 


MR. RICH: That’s exactly what I’m saying. 


DR. BEHLING: No, that doesn’t talk about 


source term. It talks about why. If, for 


instance, cross-contamination would have been 


one of the options, they should have maybe 

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made reference to that. 


MR. MORRIS: I doubt that we’re going to get 


any more data on this. This stands as the end 


of the track for this string as we’ve pulled 


it. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, if these individuals had 


a claim at this point, you would assume that 


that was a real exposure. Is that correct? 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly. 


DR. ZIEMER: So under the rules they would 


get assigned dose and so --


DR. BEHLING: But Paul that was not, the 


question, I mean other people were exposed but 


were never monitored. Was this --


DR. ZIEMER: The issue is failure to 


monitor. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, well, was this a 


serendipitous finding or were you looking for 


a baseline and you found fairly high excretion 


rates. And if that’s the case, how many other 


people who were not monitored might have also 


had high excretion rates; and therefore, their 


data are never part of the record? 


MR. MORRIS: I think that’s what this ^ 


exactly told us. He said to look at the whole 

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body of administrative workers. As a group 


you will find that they have a routine annual 


physical bioassay system imposed on them. And 


that in that group of people you’ll find 


diminishingly small numbers for their sample 


results as a whole. 


DR. BEHLING: But disturbing is what Paul 


just said that when followed up, some of these 


people weren’t monitored again for 22 months, 


and they should have been monitored within the 


next few days and weeks. 


 MR. SHARFI: But that only leads to a larger 


dose assigned when you have a follow up that’s 


so far out, you basically result and all that 


you can do is a very large one. 


DR. ZIEMER: So it gives a bigger dose. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s part of the quality of 


the program. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I understand. 


DR. BEHLING: I mean, in one of their 


statements, Paul, it says that when there’s 


levels of 0.04 micrograms per liter that you 


do a follow up. And here you have 13 times 


that volume with no follow up. And yet no 


explanation was given that says, well, this 

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was all an artifact; and therefore, there’s no 


need for a follow up. If that had been in the 


record, I’d say well, they looked at it, 


there’s a justification for no follow up, and 


no need to concern yourself. But that 


document does not give you that warm feeling. 


MR. ROLFES: I’d like to ask for a 


clarification. You said a follow up was 


conducted after 0.004 milligrams per liter? 


DR. BEHLING: That was the criteria for 


action. 


MR. ROLFES: That was 40 micrograms per 


liter. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, 40 micrograms is 0.04 


milligrams. 


MR. ROLFES: Zero point zero four, yes, 


correct. I thought you said 004. I 


apologize. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Hans mentioned it in 


passing, but I think this is a more than 


passing problem at Fernald. There are very 


clear documents that show the importance of 


fugitive emissions and unmeasured emissions to 


the atmosphere. They’re well documented in 


many cases and there are also documents that 

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show that the losses that were not measured 


were often bigger than the losses that were 


measured. 


And the thorium memo that’s cited in 


the site profile review that we gained that 


uranium conditions were the same, and I think 


that a possible explanation certainly -- I 


don’t know more than what these folks wrote, 


but I do know that at that time they weren’t 


looking very carefully at the contamination of 


the general air in the plant around the 


working building. And it’s quite possible 


that somebody might be perpetuated with going 


at lunchtime from one building to another to 


meet somebody. 


And they might get exposed to quite 


significant amounts of uranium that had 


nothing to do with stack emissions which is 


how environmental doses have been approached. 


I think at Fernald from whatever I’ve seen of 


the data, the stack emissions would be not the 


most important part of the onsite 


environmental dose. There would be fugitive 


emissions. I don’t have a very good handle on 


that. 

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 MR. CLAWSON: ^ bring up in that though 


where we had administrative people in there, 


and they were getting a tremendous amount just 


from the paperwork that was coming back from 


going across the road. 


MR. ROLFES: It would have been difficult to 


compare a plutonium facility --


DR. MAKHIJANI: ^ highly enriched uranium. 


MR. ROLFES: -- yes, and a highly enriched 


uranium as well. To address what this 


discussion, we had this discussion at the last 


Advisory Board working group meeting, and 


NIOSH consulted with a former industrial 


hygienist that had worked at Fernald. And we 


asked his opinion on what the conditions 


outside of the operating plants were. And he 


indicated that this was absolutely not routine 


at Fernald. He indicated that outside of the 


buildings was certainly much safer than 


inside. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, you know, I think it’s 


all well and good to consult people who worked 


there, and we all do it routinely and document 


it. But you do have to compare that to the 


documentation from the time. You have 

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documentation before you that thorium was 


being dried in open doorways and that was 


blowing liberally about. We supplied you that 


documentation. You have it. I believe it 


might even been in the petition. And that 


you’re dealing with air concentrations that 


are dozens or hundreds of times of MAC. I 


don’t remember the exact numbers, but I can 


dig them up for you. So I’m not bringing this 


up lightly. I think this is a point that has 


to be technically addressed by trying to 


estimate fugitive emission doses based on 


documentation that you already have about 


fugitive emissions that were measured at the 


time. I don’t see how fugitive emissions that 


were measured at the time and numbers were put 


down on paper can be ignored in favor of 


somebody saying that the outside air was 


pretty clean, trust me. I can’t see the logic 


of that response. 


MR. MORRIS: We have in one of the 


interviews that you’ll be soon getting an 


interview with a person who was in a position 


of authority and knowledge of this time. And 


Bryce was interviewing them. And he said a 

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secretary who never got into a production area 


who had a high result in an annual physical, 


that’s an indication to the lab that the lab 


was in a uranium production facility. Bottles 


were stored there prior to being sent to 


Medical. We fully expected occasional bottle 


contamination. I don’t think anyone ever 


assumed it was anything but a contaminated 


sample. Bryce says the conclusion being drawn 


by reviewers is that this indicated high 


fugitive dusts in the plant area, and a lot of 


people were routinely exposed and not 


routinely monitored. He says go to IH air 


monitoring reports, 1950s ending in 1968. 


There are many results listed for walkway, 


roads and offices in the production areas. 


You get a very good picture on if there were 


any of these spooky high air dust clouds 


floating and zapping some secretary. To get a 


secretary they would have gotten everyone in 


the area, and there was no plant where that 


occurred. The data for these areas is what 


you would expect. Nothing that would be 


considered high. 


MR. ROLFES: Thank you, Bob. 

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MR. SCHOFIELD: I don’t think you can rule 


out the fact that somebody tracked 


contamination into a building or into an 


office. It happens at every facility. 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly, of course it does, 


or not at all. But we are simply 


demonstrating that the airborne concentrations 


inside of the production facilities or 


associated with that production are much 


greater than the fugitive dust emissions that 


are, you know, the uncertainty is being cast 


on these fugitive emissions which are not a 


significant potential exposure source term for 


individuals at the site. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m back more to this narrow 


issue than the broad question. I mean, the 


issue to me that this raises here is there any 


more of this investigation that we can find? 


If not, it raises more questions in my mind 


about the quality of the program. 


I mean, here’s a case where you have 


an investigation report, and yet you can’t 


find follow ups that they say, you know, so 


the question, we had before about procedures 


from the ‘50s through ‘80s, which we still 

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don’t have any of in QA reports for that 


period, is heightened for me now, I guess. 


Because you’re looking at a case right here 


where you say these are baselines. 


If I had these people coming in to 


work here, and this is actually a, I don’t 


know if it’s a baseline because I don’t know 


when the hire date was. But if it was a 


baseline, I’d want to know where the heck they 


worked before or if they, you know, and if it 


was an annual, certainly I would have done a 


follow up sooner than 22 months based on these 


initial levels. 


So back to Hans’ point. What’s the, 


how well can we trust this urinalysis data, 


and what was the quality for that early time 


period? I guess that’s what it raises in my 


mind. 


MR. ROLFES: I apologize. I’m just looking 


through my notes, and I’m trying to recover --


MR. GRIFFON: Sandra has a comment. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: They really weren’t required 


to monitor ^ people on an annual basis. A lot 


depended on where they worked. And if the 


plant had determined in their mind that the 

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exposure potential was low. So those areas, 


they weren’t required to monitor. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I guess my point is 


here’s four people, they probably anticipated 


being low. And they had elevated samples. 


They investigated it, but they didn’t do 


follow up to see if it was a real or if it was 


a contaminated bottle. Or at least the data 


we have doesn’t indicate that they followed 


up. Maybe, the only other question is, this 


is from HIS-20, this data. Maybe specials 


were not included in HIS-20. Maybe there were 


follow ups that were done that aren’t even 


part of the dataset in HIS-20. I don’t know. 


But it certainly raises that question in my 


mind. 


MR. MORRIS: We do have a one-month follow 


up for one of the four. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that’s right, so one of 


them had, yeah. One of them was followed up. 


DR. BEHLING: Of the four, which one was it? 

MR. GRIFFON: But you can’t say the name. 

DR. BEHLING: No, I’m just saying they’re 

numbered one through four there, and the names 


have been deleted. 

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 MR. SHARFI: Number three. 


DR. BEHLING: Number three? 

MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

DR. BEHLING: That was also the highest one. 

MR. GRIFFON: And the follow up was 

elevated, so then that would make me, if they 


just did it because it was the highest I think 


if I saw an elevated sample, I’d say, oh, I 


better follow up on the other people, too. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: If the follow-up sample was 


elevated, that would discount the explanation 


that --


DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- this was a cross-


contamination. 


MR. ROLFES: Or if you take a look at the 


case history, it’s possible that this 


individual worked at another site prior to 


coming to Fernald as well. 


 MR. SHARFI: Also, on the report number 


three is the only person they say there’s a 


possible almost exposure potential. The rest 


of them they say it’s unlikely given their 


work scenario that they, that they would 


result in a dose or an intake that would 

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result in this bioassay. Number three they do 


say that there is a possibility, and you 


might, one of the reasons why --


MR. GRIFFON: Is this for a Fernald exposure 


or for previous --


 MR. SHARFI: They worked in the radio 


chemistry lab. So that might be the reason 


why that person actually did a follow up; 


whereas, the rest of them their job title and 


work location didn’t indicate a potential so 


they saw no need. And once again we’ve talked 


about the reliance on the bioassay from the 


sense of back then. They look at the bioassay 


more as because the modeling situation wasn’t 


as reliable. 


So they might have focused more on the 


field indicators saying that these three 


people, three of the people didn’t really have 


potential; whereas, the one person had 


potential. So let’s go ahead and get a follow 


up on that one person. 


MR. GRIFFON: So they might have bypassed 


their own protocols then? 


 MR. SHARFI: Well, I don’t know all the, 


didn’t get any of the details, but they might 

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have investigated it, but decided follow-up 


bioassay wasn’t necessary for that situation. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, let me read you what the 


requirements were, and I’m quoting directly 


from a document that the head of the Health 


and Safety was in charge of and said urine 


results. “Persistent results of 0.025 


milligram per liter indicates moderate 


exposure and results over 0.04 milligrams per 


liter are considered due to excessive exposure 


which require follow up.” 


 MR. SHARFI: When was that? 


DR. BEHLING: That was in April 19th, 1972. 


 MR. SHARFI: Yeah, that’s ’72. These 


samples were in ’55. So I mean, I’m not 


saying that that follow-up procedure was ^ was 


present during the time that these samples 


were resulted. So I hate to draw conclusions 


what they would mean in the ‘70s versus --


MR. GRIFFON: Right. I thought that was 


protocol at the time. I didn’t realize that. 


I mean, it goes back to the question of some 


procedures from the time. 


 MR. SHARFI: My understanding is that that 


was protocol since early days of that 0.40 

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micrograms is how it was. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think it was if I 


recall, too. That was an early requirement. 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t know that we’re going 


to come to any conclusion here, but I just, so 


I guess the only follow up I would have -- and 


it may be a dead end like you said, but if 


there’s any way to pull the string on this 


follow up to this memo, if there’s anymore 


investigation documents. 


MR. MORRIS: We’ll try and revisit it and 


see what we find. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then the only other thing 


I would maybe go back to is the previous 


finding where we had your response number one 


was the QA report in 1953. Your response was 


that we found one from 1953 but nothing else, 


but we have interviews. And I guess I’m 


asking again, I mean, I don’t know what this 


means, but I don’t know that I’d stop turning 


over rocks. If you can find any more QA 


reports or procedures from that time period. 


MR. MORRIS: In fact, this pointer that you 


pointed to, IH reports from that era, we 


haven’t found them yet. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Oh, you haven’t found those. 


MR. ROLFES: We do have some, but it’s 


probably not a high --


MR. GRIFFON: ^ the IH reports because they 


may include a QA section, a ^ section. 


MR. MORRIS: In fact, there’s some 


suggestion that they did. 


MR. ROLFES: We do have thousands of 


documents that are on the site research 


database. 


MR. GRIFFON: I just want to make sure that 


I wasn’t, by skipping that that I wasn’t 


saying that action was off the table. If you 


keep looking, that’s fine. 


MR. ROLFES: Every time we go back and look 


for something, we can find documents that we 


didn’t realize we had there. And so certainly 


we’ve been spending a lot of time to make sure 


that we are, in fact, providing everything of 


relevance to the Advisory Board for our 


discussions. They may be there, so I’d have 


to take a look through those. And also, if we 


realize that we don’t have them, we could also 


make a request, a supplemental request, to get 


those. 

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MR. GRIFFON: That’s fine. So for that I 


just said NIOSH will do additional follow up 


on the investigation report. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, moving on. 

FINDING 4.1-4 

DR. BEHLING: Finding 4.1-4 on page 30 of 

the report, the use of claimant unfavorable 


assumptions and default values regarding the 


level of uranium enrichment. I think we had 


discussed that sufficiently, so skip that one? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yep. 


DR. BEHLING: Everyone’s agreed. 


FINDING 4.1-5
 

I’m not sure if the next one isn’t 


yours, Arjun, recycled uranium? It’s Finding 


4.1-5, and the finding states there are 


several radionuclide contaminants in RU that 


are not adequately considered for internal 


dose estimates. Most relevant to this concern 


are impacts of these contaminants in RU 


raffinate waste streams. And I guess we’ll 


talk about raffinate waste streams. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I guess we’re awaiting your 


white paper on that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think the follow up is 

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you haven’t completed that yet. 


On the second action though, I just 


want to understand, when we’re moving into 


thorium stuff, you posted some thorium data, 


air sampling data, but I thought that was more 


in response to the other thorium processing 


rather than this. 


MR. ROLFES: The great majority of the data 


that we posted for the Advisory Board, at 


least two separate Excel spreadsheets that are 


available, the great majority of the 


information in the larger of the two is 


Thorium-232. Now there are some contributions 


also in there from raffinates as well, air 


samples. So we have separate research 


database documents that have raffinate air 


monitoring data, and those have not been 


reduced into an Excel spreadsheet at this 


time. We have provided the Thorium-232 data. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I add that in your 


response then for number two? Instead of 


saying done, can I add that, what you just 


said that you have additional site research 


documents with raffinate data that are being 


put into Excel spreadsheets at this point? 

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MR. ROLFES: Yeah, that is correct. I do 


believe we’re working on reducing that 


information into spreadsheets, or we will be 


doing so. 


MR. RICH: And also there’s a white paper on 


RU specifically. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Can I ask a question about 


this thorium data, Fernald thorium data air 


samples combined? Some of these samples where 


it talks about the location actually says at 


plant nine thorium. And then other stuff is 


just plant nine. Is that all relating to 


thorium? I mean, I don’t know how these 


samples have been identified as relating to 


thorium. 


MR. ROLFES: They’re identified as thorium 


gross alpha air samples. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: In the original datasheets? 


MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And are the original 


datasheets posted somewhere? 


MR. ROLFES: They’re certainly in the site 


research database. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And they’re in the site 


research database? 

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MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And is that toward the end 


of the site -- I’m just trying to make my life 


a little easier. 


MR. ROLFES: It’s in the middle, Arjun. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So that was my only 


question. 


MR. ROLFES: Bob, do you recall if when we 


entered all those air monitoring data if we 


cited the source, like reference ID number of 


the --


MR. MORRIS: We probably did because we were 


aware of needing some kind of QC on our 


transcription. But to be honest, the details 


of --


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, we did this quite a long 


time ago, and I do remember that there is 


actually, now that you mention it, a QC report 


that we put together based on --


MR. MORRIS: I think I wrote a QC report on 

that. 

MR. ROLFES: Yes. 

DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, there is a document 


number and a page number I see here. But 


these document numbers wouldn’t correspond, I 

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think, with the site research database number. 


They’re quite different. 


MR. ROLFES: Could you provide that --


DR. MAKHIJANI: For example, it says 15, 


001, 36, 001, 003, and then it gives a page 


number, 001 parentheses 85, a parenthetical 


number for the page number. 


MR. MORRIS: Yeah, I almost certainly have a 


decoder some place for that. 


 MR. CLAWSON: One of them little rings? 


Any more questions on that? 


MR. GRIFFON: No, I think we’re on to the 


next. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Is there anything you want 


done with this? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, we’re waiting on a white 


paper, and we’re waiting on data to be put up, 


right? So I don’t know if there’s any action 


right now. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I meant on the thorium 


air sampling data where it says done. 


MR. GRIFFON: No, I crossed out done. 


Because maybe I’m wrong, but --


DR. BEHLING: Well, they did ^ on the O 


drive. BZ sampling data and GA sampling data 

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and --


MR. GRIFFON: I guess I want to ask if any 


of that’s Thorium-230 related, or is it all 


Thorium-232 related? 


DR. BEHLING: Two thirty-two. 


MR. RICH: The one that’s done is thorium 


data. 


MR. GRIFFON: What? 


MR. RICH: The air sampling data, I think, 


Mark, that you list as done is thorium data. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. 


MR. RICH: And the one that we’re saying is 


yet to be done is the raffinate one. 


MR. GRIFFON: Or the Thorium-230, right. So 


I changed that from done to is in progress, 


being translated. 


So we’ll get to the other one coming 


up, Arjun. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But for the moment with the 


Thorium-232 data you don’t want anything done 


with it. 

MR. GRIFFON: As I said, we haven’t gotten 

to that. 

DR. BEHLING: We haven’t gotten to that. 

It’s part of another finding, Arjun. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, okay, sorry. 


FINDING 4.1-6
 

DR. BEHLING: I think the next finding is 


yours, too, Arjun, 4.1-6. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s the same I think, yeah, 

4.1-6, Arjun? 

DR. BEHLING: It’s on page 34 of the report. 

DR. MAKHIJANI: So that’s the same response 


that the white paper in preparation is. 


MR. GRIFFON: And the white paper is going 


to discuss that derivation of the assumptions 


on percentages, et cetera, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, and I did want to remind 


everyone that we do have urinalysis data 


available for individuals that were exposed to 


the plutonium specification materials. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: For the ‘80s? 


MR. ROLFES: Certainly, yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Not for the early ^. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, but it was during the ‘80s 


that the highest concentrations of plutonium 


came in the site. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, we don’t have 


measurements of the early years. 


MR. ROLFES: Oh, we know exactly how much 

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came into the site based on the recycled 


uranium research that was done by DOE. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Do we have partial ^ 


measurements for plutonium? 


MR. ROLFES: We sure do. It’s in the 


recycled uranium DOE data. 


FINDING 4.2-1
 

MR. GRIFFON: On to the next one. I think 


that’s the same resolution, same action. 


DR. BEHLING: Are we on 4.2-1? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. BEHLING: I don’t think you’re on that. 


We haven’t resolved that one. That’s the K-65 


default model. And I guess I have a whole 


series of questions here. The original TBD 


identified a methodology on page 27 of the 


TBD. 


The approach for assessing exposures 


and this is an internal exposure obviously to 


materials contained in the transfer of these 


13,000 drums from the drums received from 


among other places Mallinckrodt ^ silos one 


and two. And you have to be very, very 


studious to really go through and understand 


what was done to estimate the potential 

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internal exposure. 


And I took strong exceptions to the 


whole methodology because for the most part it 


says, well, we have a few air concentration 


data, sampling data, and then we now have to 


figure out, well, what was the duration of 


exposure. And there’s a whole series of 


assumptions that were made regarding external 


dosimetry of 23 people which the highest 11 


people were selected. 


And then there was this whole cascade 


of assumptions that says, well, if this was 


the average for the 11 highest people who were 


exposed at the K-65 silos, then how long could 


they have worked there in order not to exceed 


an administrative dose limit of four rem a 


year. And they ratcheted down to ten weeks. 


And then they finally ratcheted down to six 


weeks. And if you go through the methodology, 


you sort of say this is not science here. 


I mean, you’re basically trying to 


define the internal exposure, duration of 


internal exposure. You have a couple of air 


samples, and now you’re just going to say, 


well, based on inhalation rates, how much did 

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this individual take in. And to answer that 


question you have to know how long was that 


person exposed. 


In other words, to get a time 


integrated internal exposure, you have to know 


not only air concentration, but the exposure 


time. And apparently, in this particular 


exercise, they defaulted to external dosimetry 


data. And says, well, here are 23 people 


assigned to the K-65 silos. We’ll select the 


highest 11. That sounds claimant favorable. 


What you’re selecting is the highest 


exposed individual and then impose over that 


the issue of a four rem yearly dose limit. 


And saying, well, on that basis, how many 


weeks could they have worked on the assumption 


that these highest 11 individuals were exposed 


on a weekly basis. And the assumption was 


then, well, they couldn’t have worked more 


than ten weeks. 


And then in another statement -- and 


I’m not sure how to explain that -- they were 


ratcheted down to six weeks. Well, the truth 


is the administrative dosimeter program did 


not exist because during the ‘50s it was 15 

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rem a year. And there was also the assumption 


that there were a three-shift rotation, and 


the conclusion was that in any given year, six 


weeks was the bounding duration for any one 


individual to be exposed. 


Well, I kind of looked at that and 


said, well, this doesn’t make sense. It’s 


just based on assumptions that have no 


scientific merit. First of all, the dose 


limit of four rem is inappropriate. And the 


issue of 80 drums, I know there’s one document 


that says they transferred the contents of 80 


drums in one day. But that was one day, and 


how do you apply that to 13,000 drums is 


another issue. 


And the whole issue of modeling 


internal exposures based on external dosimetry 


data that were restricted to the highest 


levels, and then impose on that the issue of a 


four rem annual dose limit as an admin limit 


is something that I won’t accept as a 


legitimate approach to modeling this data. 


MR. ROLFES: What we’re doing to reconstruct 


people’s internal exposures for this operation 


is the radon breath data. 

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DR. BEHLING: That’s exactly what I was 


going to ask next. It’s clear to me from what 


I gather now in this dose reconstruction case 


that you provided me with, case internal dose 


reconstruction sample number two, and that was 


my exact question. Are we abandoning this 


model? Because I can’t possibly accept this 


model as legitimate. 


MR. ROLFES: I would have to take a look at 


what you’re referring to. That doesn’t ring a 


bell to me. It may have been something that 


we had just, you know, it might have been some 


descriptive information that, I mean, the 


people, there were a couple of people that 


exceeded administrative limits at the site of 


five rem in the very early time period. And 


they were associated with this operation 


working with the radium-bearing materials. 


That was just another piece of information 


that would allow us to identify who was 


potentially involved in this operation. I 


don’t in any way --


DR. BEHLING: During this time period -- and 


I have the documents here. These are the 


official documents, there is a continuous 

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reference to 300 millirem per week, and 


there’s another one that talks about 15 rem 


per year. And that has a date of 1959. 


That’s about the timeframe when we switched 


from 15 to five as a regulatory limit. 


So as I said, I cannot buy in on the 


four rem admin dose limit because there’s 


clearly no reference to that in the internal 


documents that such a dose standard was 


exercised. And as I said, the issue was taken 


where you had 21 workers, and then you took 13 


workers who had the highest dose and took the 


average of that and saying based on the four 


rem yearly limit, they couldn’t have worked 


for more than ten weeks without exceeding the 


limit. And then it was further ratcheted down 


to six weeks, and the whole issue that 


basically said no worker could be exposed to 


the K-65 material internally for more than six 


weeks. And then, as I said, I can’t buy into 


this --


MR. GRIFFON: This was mentioned on the site 


profile apparently. 


DR. BEHLING: That was in the site profile. 


MR. RICH: It’s in the technical basis 

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document for internal dosimetry. It was used 


as an example to define that the external dose 


would limit the workers to less than looking 


at a full year based on the external dosimetry 


records. And in that case then we defaulted 


for some number above that as a maximum 


exposure level short of a year. In other 


words, we did not default to a full year of 


exposure as a maximum air sampling data, air 


sampling concentration rate that had been 


determined from other sources. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, I’ll read you the exact 


statement that’s contained in the TBD: “From 


the information derived in the external dose 


data sheets and the air monitoring sampling 


sheets, it appears that the transfer could 


have been limited to a period of about six 


weeks per year with no individual working more 


than a period of six weeks in the year.” 


MR. RICH: And, Hans, we’re not using this 


approach any more. 


DR. BEHLING: I realize that. I just want 


to be sure that we can walk away from this. 


MR. RICH: We’re walking away from this. 


This won’t be in the next technical basis 

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document. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it wasn’t clear whether 


or not the radon breath data was a supplement 


or an alternative or a complete replacement 


with this being taken out. 


MR. RICH: It’s a replacement. 


DR. BEHLING: On that issue and having said 


what I just did, I do go want to go through 


the issue of the radon dose reconstruction 


protocol that you provided us in sample number 


two. And again here the issue is one of the 


plant one labor work 1952 through 1958 and was 


exposed to radon, et cetera. And let’s see 


here, oh, this is not the one. It’s the 


internal dose reconstruction number three. 


I’m sorry. I got the wrong one that involves 


the radon breath sample. 


And this case again the laborer worked 


from ’52 to ’58 and was part of the K-65 


raffinate handling. So he was one of the guys 


who was unloading the 13,000 drums from the 


material in the drums into the silos, too. In 


this case it was silo number two. And the 


statements at the bottom of that dose 


reconstruction sample is that radon breath 

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monitoring taken at the end of the six-week 


job loading pitchblende into the K-65 silo 


number two. 


Now again, I’m focusing on the six 


weeks because it happens to be coincidental 


value that was incorporated in the previous 


model. And, of course, if you’re looking at 


an assessment of radon breath data, you would 


like to do it at the end of an exposure time 


period because, obviously based on your TIB0025, you have to assume, in order to get an 


accurate body burden, you’d have to assume 


that this is not taken on the first day, the 


first week or midway in between. 


If there is a finite duration during 


which this person was exposed to this K-65 


material, you would like that analysis done 


sometime after he completes his tour of duty 


with the K-65 transfer. Now the question --


and I looked at the data, and you provided 


data for the years ’52, ’53 and ’54. 


And I assume that these people were 


more than just the K-65 workers because they 


clearly took weekly samples starting in 


January for each year through the end of the 

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year. Meaning that this whole issue of, oh, 


they worked around the clock, three shifts for 


six weeks, certainly won’t hold water in 


context with the actual radon breath data 


because I looked at the ’52 and ’53 and ’54, 


and they have weekly sampling from January 


through the end of the year which means that 


the transfer took place basically year round. 


And it would make no sense to assume 


that you assign people in the middle of the 


night from 11 to seven in the morning in 


darkness transferring stuff into the silos. 


I’d have a tough time understanding the 


urgency behind that effort. If you took from 


’52 to ’58, why would you confine it in any 


given year to six weeks? 


But anyway, the question now I have is 


regarding the radon breath samples. When were 


these samples taken, and to what extent can 


you conclude that the breath data that’s 


available on behalf of these individuals, and 


I have no question that these people were 


monitored, were, in fact, taken at the time 


when you can conclude that the breath analysis 


really reflects the body burden that should be 

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done at the end of that tour of exposure? 


MR. ROLFES: Well, we would have to take a 


look at the specifics of the case to make that 


determination. For example, we would take a 


look at the information for that specific 


person to see when he, in fact, started 


working at the site or when he, in fact, 


started working at the silos, slurrying the 


materials into the K-65 silos. 


We would then take a look to see when 


the bioassay result is to make sure that the 


bioassay result was, in fact, after the 


initial exposure could have started. We would 


have to take a look at a specific claim in 


order to make some sort of determination about 


DR. BEHLING: But certainly, one would have 


to be reasonably cautious about how these 


radon breath samples are used in order to 


assure that we’re not talking about a guy 


who’s on the job the first week then given a 


radon breath analysis. And according to this 


example that we were given, the statement was 


that this was at the end of a six-week 


engagement. I mean, one has to be sure that 

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we’re not making assumptions that are simply 


not supported by the facts. Or if you don’t 


know, what do we do about it? 


MR. ROLFES: That is an important point 


because if you take a radon breath sample, 


whether it’s still material of significant 


amounts within the lungs, the radon recorded 


in these breath samples would be a higher 


amount than if we took the sample down the 


road much further because the radium-


containing materials would have had the 


opportunity of passing the lungs, and --


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah, I’m familiar with 


it, but on the other hand, your total burden 


would be considerably less if on the first day 


versus at the end of a three month period. 


And your model according to OTIB-0025 says 


that we assume -- the model assumes -- that 33 


percent of the radium inhaled remains in the 


lungs, 39 percent in cortical bone, 14 percent 


in trabecular bone and 14 percent in other 


soft tissue. Those are the parameters of the 


OTIB-0025 model. And so you recognize, and of 


course, the emanation rate is 100 percent for 


lung, 100 percent for soft tissue, 33 percent 

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for cortical bone and 14 percent for 


trabecular bone. I think those are the 


numbers that I recall. 


And so it does take that into 


consideration. But I believe in all instances 


these models were based probably on animal 


data, and then I would assume they were 


probably beagles that they exposed to radium 


for long-term studies. And subsequent data 


involving obviously our friends, the ^ 


probably had different values because there 


the long-term residence they use probably is 


in the cortical bone and the trabecular bone 


meaning that the release fraction is 


considerably smaller which does affect the 


dose calculation, too. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, and they were taking it 


in by swallowing. 


DR. BEHLING: Yes, ingestion. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Basically, your caution here 


is, Hans, that we use radon breath data 


appropriately. That we don’t pick a data 


point that is very early in the campaign or 


the exposure experience. 


DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

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MR. ELLIOTT: That we look at the breath at 


the end of the exposure. I think we 


understand that. We accept that. 


DR. BEHLING: And because there’s, I mean, 


this is a very, very insensitive test. And 


according to OTIB-0025, the multiplier is one 


picocurie per liter in breath, exhaled breath, 


converts to 250,000 picocuries in the body 


using the model I just described. So you 


don’t have to be off by much, you know. If it 


goes from one picocurie to two, you multiply 


the source term in the body. So it’s a very 


insensitive protocol to begin with. 


And then you also realize that that’s 


just your starting point. Now you have to go 


back to the core sampling in silo one and two 


to extract the secondary data it says in 


addition to the Radium-226 that I’m measuring 


by means of a surrogate measurement in radon 


breath, you have to now assess for thorium and 


all the other decay products that are 


concurrent in silos one and two. So you 


realize there’s a tremendous amount of 


extrapolation, extrapolation. 


MR. ROLFES: I agree. It’s highly 

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uncertain, and the net result is that all 


those compounded uncertainties are to the 


benefit of the claimant. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a specific question 


about radon breath data. I took a look at the 


data, and there’s only data for ’52 to ’54, 


and ’52 and ’53 are very incomplete. All the 


years of ^ are lost data. There’s quite a bit 


of indication of mishandling of data because 


the flasks weren’t properly sealed. 


And so a considerable amount of data 


was not only lost, but there’s a question in 


my mind as to how much that was in the 


original flask was actually in the lab when 


the radon was analyzed. And then a number of 


questions in regard to the completeness of the 


data even for the years that are there. And I 


noted there’s nothing after 1954. And the K65 Mallinckrodt residues are really the ones 


that we’re talking about most that are at 


issue in terms of exposure and transfer and so 


on were brought there in 1955, at least 


according to the TBD. 


Now that date may change. I didn’t go 


back and check the original documents or 

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verify with Mallinckrodt. It was just a brief 


preparation for this meeting. So that really 


reinforces Hans’ question in a very specific 


way is that there are no data for the period 


in which you would assume there was the 


greatest exposure, at least none that have 


been posted. 


MR. ROLFES: I would have to take a look in 


our site research database. There may be 


additional documents. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, no, I’m just talking 


the current status. The current status, I 


looked at all the data. I looked at every 


single data sheet. That’s the only really 


careful thing I did in going through what’s 


new on the O drive because I was very curious 


about how much radon breath data there is. 


And for two out of three years the data are 


pretty skimpy. 


For ’52 there’s very little, lots of 


missing data, and the sample sheets are quite 


clear, and there are quite a few concerns 


about things. And the most important thing 


perhaps is that data, there are no data after 


1954, and you had continuing exposures along 

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these lines into the 1950s. I don’t know the 


last year that the high radium-content ores 


were done, but certainly Mallinckrodt was 


transferred in 1955. 


So is there ongoing research or do you 


have some data? 


MR. ROLFES: I’m thinking back to what we 


had. I recall seeing some memoranda regarding 


measuring beta activity in urine from radium 


during this period. Or, excuse me, they were 


trying to quantify, in addition, there was a 


memorandum, I don’t recall if I have it with 


me or not, but actually during February of 


1955, this memorandum indicated that they were 


looking into monitoring radium exposures via 


urinalysis in addition to the radon breath 


sampling. We have seen some employees in the 


early time period, roughly corresponding with 


this time period, who have beta activity 


results reported in their DOE dosimetry files. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Radium-226 or beta? 


MR. ROLFES: I’m sorry? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Beta activity? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, beta, beta activity, yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: How did that relate to 

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Radium-226? 


MR. ROLFES: I do not know if they were 


trying to quantify other radionuclides that 


they were potentially exposed to, but it was 


listed as something associated with the radon 


breath testing. So it’s, I agree, it’s 


something that we need to take a look into. 


We’ll certainly take another look at the data 


that are available and see if we can request 


additional records regarding radon breath 


testing. 


DR. ZIEMER: Do we know what happened after 


those dates in terms of bioassay even? Were 


they looking at radium body burdens by another 


method after that date? What was the final 


date that you mentioned? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well the date on the O drive 


was December 1954. And there are no data that 


I saw. They start in March 1952. There’s one 


sample seen from ’51, but I think that might 


be a --


MR. ROLFES: I’m going to ask Bryce or Bob 


to add a little bit to this discussion because 


we did ask the individuals who we spoke with, 


former employees from Fernald, about the 

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personnel who were potentially exposed to this 


operation as well as the types of materials 


that were coming in so that we made sure that 


we were aware of some of the types of source 


terms that were coming in, either the radium-


bearing materials that were brought in or the 


ore concentrates that did not have the radium 


associated with it. There are additional 


details in our transcripts of these interviews 


which we will make sure that we’re making 


available as soon as they’re reviewed by the 


interviewee. 


DR. ZIEMER: So the radium may no longer 


have been an important source term at that 


point? 


MR. ROLFES: That may be the case. I’d have 


to take a look. 


DR. ZIEMER: That’s a possibility? 


MR. MORRIS: I think the Belgian Congo ores 


are really some of focus. 


DR. ZIEMER: Pitchblende was --


MR. MORRIS: That’s right, and by then -- I 


can’t speak to the exact date off the top of 


my head right now, but in the middle-to-late 


‘50s the Belgian Congo ores were completely 

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finished. There was no more raffinates left 


that were moving through the system based on 


that input stream. So it could be that their 


perceived need ^ by that time. 


MR. RICH: There were two plant sites, the 


hot raffinate site which was a shielded 


facility, and it’s hot because it had a lot of 


radionuclides. It was radiologically high 


levels of external radiation. They also did 


the transfer of the Mallinckrodt waste and the 


Niagara waste that came to the site, some 


13,000 barrels of waste that were then 


transferred over a, about a -- I forgot now, 


three or four year period --


DR. BEHLING: I have here according to what 


I remember from the TBD, ’52 through ’58 was 


the transfer of those 13,000 drums. 


MR. RICH: And that was done in a slurry 


transfer station out near the silos. So it 


was not specifically in plant two and three. 


It was dumped, slurried and then pumped to the 


silo. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And the pitchblende was, 


according to the site profile, revision zero, 


pitchblende was, from ’53 to ’55 ^ pitchblende 

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ore so you have ’55 in there. And they said 


the ’53 data are pretty, less than, maybe less 


than 50 percent of the data are there, and 


there are none from ’55 onward. 


DR. ZIEMER: But it sounds like a process 


change. 


MR. RICH: It shifted then from processing 


high uranium-bearing ores to the U.S. supply 


that came directly from mill sites. They had 


already been, the daughter product had already 


been removed there. And so it then came into 


the sites and they used both the hot and the 


cold sites then for the processing in plant 


two and three. And those raffinates were much 


lower. 


DR. ZIEMER: I just wanted to make sure that 


the creation of the radium bioassays coincides 


with what, our continuing need for uranium 


bioassay. I think it was too early for them 


to have switched to whole body counting. 


DR. BEHLING: No, that didn’t occur until ^. 


MR. RICH: I don’t know very many ^ that did 


a lot of radon breath sampling ^ anyway. It 


was a somewhat empirical analytical technique 


that we do have a significant database at 

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Fernald because of the fact that they were 


handling so much of the higher raffinates or 


the high radium process stream material. That 


gives the, an insight into the level of intake 


or deposition during that highest potential 


exposure period. And as a consequence and 


they used that to develop a bounding intake. 


MR. ELLIOTT: How many workers are we 


talking about? How labor intensive was this? 


MR. RICH: The process plants two and three 


for the high process periods were upwards of 


100 people, and we’ve been told that that 


workforce was both from the head end to the 


back end and all of those areas. The average 


workforce was much lower than that. That 100 


is their estimate of the workforce at the 


highest process period where they were running 


all sections of the plant, but that’s 100 ^. 


And typically, they anticipate that the ^ and 


the raffinate would be in the 25 workforce 


level. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Did this go on 24 hours a day 


or is this --


MR. RICH: Yes, yes. 


DR. BEHLING: Why was there such an urgency 

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when it was expected to run for a few weeks in 


any given year? Why would you subject people 


to be in the middle of the night out in the 


cold? 


MR. RICH: Part of the problem there and one 


of the reasons why, you know, these drums 


setting around on the pad for long periods of 


time were reading, a general background was in 


the range of about 300 millirem per hour in 


those storage areas. 


And so when they were working the 


drums, you can’t burn out your people, burn 


them out by, you know, they approach their 


radiological, external radiological dose 


levels relatively fast. So they either did 


it, and we don’t know. We don’t know whether 


they did it in a short period of time or 


rotated people in and that, based on the 


analytical external dose data, it appears that 


there were a crew of -- I forget -- five to 


six people that did the drum transfer 


operation. 


And so a larger standpoint if they 


were operating, if they’re transferring at a 


certain rate over a period of time and doing, 

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you know, we played that game. And it all 


comes out the same anyway because but it’s 


probably external dose limited on small teams 


of people. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, I guess what I couldn’t 


grasp was if they worked a three-shift 


rotation year around, I’d say they were 


looking to expedite the removal of this 


material into the silos. On the other hand --


MR. RICH: They would have finished in much 


less of a time period. 


DR. BEHLING: Yes, of course, I mean, 80 


drums a day as was suggested in the TBD if you 


move it by times 250 days out of the year for 


working, it doesn’t take you six, seven years. 


MR. RICH: It was done in a year and a half. 


DR. BEHLING: And so the question I had all 


along was, was this something of an assumption 


that had no basis. In other words, I would 


understand three-shift rotation year round if 


the intent was to expedite this, but not a 


three-shift rotation and then do it six weeks 


and then stop. That doesn’t make sense. 


MR. RICH: It looked like from the data 


sheets that they had four shifts. I know four 

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groups of five people that they were working 


in. So that led us to the conclusion 


initially that they were operating on a, at 


least on a two or three shift --


DR. BEHLING: I remember looking at those 


data, and my feeling was that they may have 


been workers who were basically dealing with 


raffinate waste that was being produced around 


the clock rather than the transfer of 13,000 


drums. And my gut feeling was that the three-


shift rotation may involve personnel who were 


involved in transferring the liquid raffinates 


that were being produced as part of the 


process there. 


MR. RICH: It’s been a number of years since 


I looked at that data sheet, but I think as I 


recall, they were identified as the drum 


transfer operation. 


DR. BEHLING: I don’t remember getting that 


information from the data sheets. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I go back to the actions 


and ask, I think the follow up I have is NIOSH 


will further assess the current lack of radon 


breath data after 1954. Is ^ ’55 question? 


DR. BEHLING: Arjun, do you have breath data 

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for ’54? I only have ’52, ’53 and ’54. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: There are some data for ’54. 


DR. BEHLING: There are data for ’54? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And not, every year is 


incomplete. 


DR. BEHLING: I didn’t look at data for ’54. 


MR. ROLFES: I believe there’s three data 


sheets that have ’52, ’53 and ’54. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then I also had an SC&A 


action item here, possibly. Can SC&A provide 


a written review of the white paper? The 


white paper’s available. You made some 


comments on it. I think it might be useful to 


write that out. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: White paper? 


MR. GRIFFON: The white paper is referenced 


in this response and provided. I don’t know. 


Is the white paper the same as TIB-0025 or is 


it in addition to? 


 MR. SHARFI: I think it’s what we used for 


the sample DR. 


DR. BEHLING: Is there a white paper? I 


think --


MR. MORRIS: I think all we did, it’s been 


awhile since I wrote it. I think it just 

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summarizes the data that you got and puts the 


distribution around it. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I mean, Arjun made some, 


at least raised some questions about the 


completeness and stuff like that. I guess I 


want to formalize SC&A’s response to this. Is 


this complete enough for dose reconstruction? 


I think we need a formal response on the 


table. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. If the dose 


reconstruction relates to the years for which 


there are data, then obviously --


MR. GRIFFON: Well, one action is that NIOSH 


is going to look beyond ’54, but given the set 


you have now, I think you need to give us a 


written assessment of that as well. 


DR. ZIEMER: Is there a white paper or not a 


white paper? 


MR. GRIFFON: Apparently, there is. 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, there is. 

DR. ZIEMER: And it’s called? 

MR. ROLFES: It should be in, if you take a 

look at the internal dose reconstruction 


folders, what sample number? 


DR. BEHLING: That was sample number three, 

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I believe. 


MR. ROLFES: You take a look in number 


three. It should be located in with that. 


 MR. SHARFI: ^ post-’54 we have seen 


claimant files with radium urinalysis data 


post-’54, and we have done assessments for 


those claimants where they had actually 


urinalysis data like in ‘57 where it looked 


like they were working on that job. And they 


did have high external records in the same 


time, deep doses are in the same time period 


they had these radium urinalysis. So they may 


have switched over to a urinalysis program. 


MR. GRIFFON: That could be a follow up, 


yeah. If you find that out, that’s great. 


 MR. SHARFI: I can only speak for a few 


claims where we’ve actually seen this data in. 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, we’ve seen those results 


in a very limited number of cases, and we’ve 


been tracking this down. We’ve been asking 


about this for a long time. 


So I had asked an interviewee who came 


on right after these urine samples were 


collected during the time period that these 


urine samples were collected. He wasn’t able 

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to provide any additional information, but 


we’re certainly, you know, it’s certainly 


something that’s out there that we currently 


have no method to interpret right now. 


There’s data there, but we’re not sure exactly 


what it’s for. 


MR. GRIFFON: Also, for response number one 


I edited, and I’m keeping these in red line 


form, so I’ll circulate them, Mark, for your 


review and make sure that they’re accurate. 


But I changed “provided radon breath”, I think 


it said, “and thorium air monitoring data”. I 


said, “provided radon breath data. Raffinate 


air data is being assembled into a spreadsheet 


as we discussed in Finding 4.1-5.” So this 


again is the raffinate data. It’s not the 


Thorium-232 air data, right? 


 (no response) 


MR. GRIFFON: You see I’m looking at 


response number one, so I crossed out 


“provided thorium air monitoring data” because 


you really haven’t provided that related to 


the raffinate. That’s being assembled, right? 


And I want to distinguish between the two. 


MR. MORRIS: We’re pulling it together. 

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MR. GRIFFON: I want to distinguish those 


two sets of thorium data. 


MR. MORRIS: I think they are two separate 


bioassays. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then the final question I 


have is the last sentence in that, “NIOSH 


response says the ratios are unchanged.” How 


do you know that if you haven’t even assembled 


this data yet? 


MR. MORRIS: Because these will be gross air 


sample data. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, so they’re gross air. So 


they’re not going --


MR. MORRIS: We haven’t changed any of the 


underlying or pending assumptions about the 


three. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. ROLFES: -- that is the TIB that allows 


us to interpret the radon breath data. We may 


not have put the white paper in there because 


I know for the radon breath data -- I’m trying 


to recall if the white paper that we had 


initially put together was placed into the 


folder for the Advisory Board to review. 


I know that TIB-0025 was essentially 

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the same methodology, and so I don’t recall if 


we just decided that TIB-0025 essentially had 


all the data, and instead of citing the white 


paper, we already went to an approved 


document. So that may have been the case that 


we used an approved document rather than the 


white paper. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, can I ask a question 


about the Thorium-230? What matrix are you 


using for calculating the Thorium-230 exposure 


after the Belgian Congo ore stopped? Because 


at that point the radium became much less of a 


concern because the radium was already taken 


out at the mill. And then you’ve got 


basically the silo three material, the ^ metal 


oxide stuff. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s a good point. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mostly Thorium-230. What 


are we doing with that? 


MR. ROLFES: We spoke with individuals that 


had first-hand knowledge of what was going on 


at the site. And it was the same individuals 


that were working on both the radium-bearing 


materials on the hot side of the refinery and 


the same people would work on the cold side of 

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the refinery as well. So they were both 


potentially exposed to the same materials. 


If you take a look, the silo three 


material only has, well, not only, but silo 


three material does not contain the radium. 


However, if you take a look at the silo one 


and two concentrations of Thorium-230, those 


concentrations exceed the concentrations in 


silo three. So we feel that a radon breath 


bioassay data would be representative of all 


people exposed potentially to these raffinates 


because it was the same work population, same 


worker population. 


And we feel that the intakes based on 


the isotopic ratios from silos one and two 


would account for exposures to silo three 


material because the Thorium-230 


concentrations in silos one and two, in fact, 


exceed those in silo three. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Is that in your white paper? 


I’m wondering if it’s documented somewhere. 


MR. ROLFES: We weren’t able to locate the 


white paper so this may not be there, but it 


is documented in our drafts of our interviews 


that we conducted with old Fernald employees. 

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And as soon as those are finally approved, or 


approved in a final version by the 


interviewees, we’ll be sure to make those 


available. 


We discussed many of these issues with 


former Fernald employees. We felt that that 


was the best source of information that we had 


at our hands in addition to the records. And 


I believe we probably got probably 75 pages 


roughly of documentation from these 


individuals. So we’re working as fast as we 


can to get everything to make that available. 


MS. BALDRIDGE: Mark, ^ here. When I was 


preparing this petition that you’ve gone to 


one of the meetings for the former Fernald 


workers, I was told that I was wrong about the 


thorium in plant six, that I was going to make 


a fool of myself because the person who was 


talking to me had worked at six, and he knew 


thorium had never been there despite the fact 


of the documentation. So my point is many of 


the people who have worked there who have 


given you information may be 100 percent 


correct, but there are others who think they 


are more of an expert than they are. And 

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that’s my personal experience. 


MR. ROLFES: Sure, you also have to consider 


that the things that are being recalled are 


going back 50 years and some of the people 


that we’re speaking with vary in, you know, I 


mean, there’s certainly a distribution of ages 


in this room, and by no means do I mean that 


as an insult at all. 


So anyway, we have to consider 


information from all sources, and we do our 


best because we’re not always going to have a 


100 percent agreeing, not everything’s always 


going to agree. We just need to make the best 


available information, excuse me, the best 


sense of the available information from all 


sources. We don’t rely on solely one person’s 


input. 


We consider input from a variety of 


sources. We have very open public comments 


that we receive. We receive comments from 


professionals from other sites. We receive 


information from a variety of information 


sources including technical documents, 


including just a wide variety of sources that 


we consider. We’re not looking to, we want to 

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make sure that we consider any potential 


issues. 


MR. RICH: Mark, can I just add a note being 


one of the older ones here? We have recently 


retrieved a number of very good historical 


documents dealing with a number of different 


processes and plants. And in addition to 


that, and in concert with those histories and 


plant documented histories, we’ve interviewed 


a number of very experienced -- I won’t say 


old -- but experienced people that hearken 


back to the era when those documents were 


written. It fills in, those interviews give a 


feeling and an understanding, a better 


understanding, of the documents themselves. 


I’ll just leave it at that. 


MR. GRIFFON: These documents you’re talking 


about, have they been posted or --


MR. RICH: I think most of them are on the O 


drive. 


MR. ROLFES: They’re certainly on the site 


research database. There is --


MR. RICH: There may be some that are not; 


however, they’re recent additions. 


MR. ROLFES: I don’t want to, you know, when 

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we get up to the volume of records that we’re 


placing on the O drive, we’re essentially 


going to be providing a copy of the site 


research database. I mean, we’re dealing 


with, you know, these are not a small number 


of documents that we’re dealing with. As I 


mentioned before, we are referring to 


thousands of documents that we have in the 


database for Fernald. I mean --


MR. RICH: In fact, I was just reading a 


recent document that addressed plant six, and 


which is a recently recovered document that is 


a historical document in addition to plant 


nine and some of the others on the way on the 


plane. 


MR. GRIFFON: When I said the O drive, I 


meant the site research database. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, yes, they are on the site 


research database. So everything that we 


recover for a site is typically put on this. 


 MR. CLAWSON: We kept hitting around this 


white paper, and I’m, so where is this white 


paper at? 


DR. ZIEMER: It doesn’t exist. 


MR. ROLFES: I don’t believe it exists 

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because we determined --


MR. RICH: Which one? 


MR. ROLFES: The white paper that we’re 


referring to is for the interpretation of the 


radon breath data. 


 DR. WADE: It’s a virtual white paper. 


MR. ROLFES: I believe we had proceeded with 


putting a white paper together; however, I’d 


have to take a look back. This was done 


probably six months ago or more, and what I 


believe we ended up doing is just, rather than 


putting a white paper out for the 


interpretation of radon breath data, we used 


an approved document, OTIB-0025. 


MR. RICH: I might just say that the section 


in the technical basis document which is under 


much revision, there is a revised K-65 radium 


breath analysis in that section. Consider 


pulling that out as a white paper to make it; 


we have not done that yet. However, several 


other of the sections have been pulled out as 


white papers for interim use. 


MR. GRIFFON: So has SC&A reviewed TIB-0025? 


DR. BEHLING: I didn’t review it. I don’t 


know who within SC&A did. I probably would 

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have had a few questions about it, but we 


approved it, and I guess that’s final. 


DR. ZIEMER: Well, a comment here says an 


example dose reconstruction was provided, and 


I think we have that. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, that’s correct. 


DR. ZIEMER: This is internal three. 


MR. GRIFFON: Also, we can’t really review 


this TIB because it’s in a technical basis 


document, and it’s still not released. 


MR. RICH: It’s in a reasonably complete 


form at this time. It might be, we would need 


to talk about that whether we need to make a 


white paper out of that or not. 


 MR. CLAWSON: So what are we doing? 

MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, what’s --

 MR. CLAWSON: Which way are we going? 

MR. GRIFFON: Instead I think I’m going to 

rephrase that to say SC&A will review that 


example DR. 


DR. BEHLING: I’ve already done that. 


MR. GRIFFON: You’ve done that? Okay. 


DR. BEHLING: There’s not much to review. 


MR. GRIFFON: SC&A has reviewed --


DR. BEHLING: If you apply OTIB-0025 and you 

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applied the radiation ^ of your neutron mix of 


silo two, you come up with a value, and 


there’s not much --


MR. GRIFFON: So we don’t have anything to 


do except if we get the section from the 


technical basis --


DR. BEHLING: My concern here was strictly 


one of when was this radon breath analysis 


done relative to the completion of the work in 


transferring this material because that’s 


obviously the critical uncertainty parameter 


that has to be looked at in doing dose 


reconstruction. 


MR. ROLFES: And I think we’ll expand our 


discussion of that certainly within our white 


paper or in --


MR. RICH: The transfer of the 13,000 


barrels or drums and the process of the Congo 


ore was done simultaneously. And so even 


though they were different places, the radon 


breath sampling was done early in that period. 


MR. GRIFFON: So I’m just going to leave a 


NIOSH action at this point, further assessment 


of their lack of data after ’54. 


 MR. CLAWSON: In this white paper you were 

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talking about, Paul, could we put in a 


possible white paper? 


MR. ELLIOTT: I guess it depends on how 


close we are to producing an approved 


technical basis document. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. ELLIOTT: And if we’re real close to 


that it makes more sense to me to put that on 


the table for you to look at than it does a 


white paper. As we’re working on finalizing, 


then these things start passing in the night, 


and we don’t know where we’re at in our 


position. 


MR. RICH: The only justification for a 


white paper is that it takes less review, less 


time. It’s more readily available. However, 


the longer you go --


MR. ELLIOTT: A white paper gives the 


working group a sense of the direction that we 


think we’re going, and are we okay in that 


direction in their view. So I think we’re far 


enough down the way here on radon breath that 


we ought to be able to produce a technical 


basis document in an approved status I 


believe. 

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DR. BEHLING: Well, some issues you 


addressed regarding the absence of breath data 


for people who may have been there. And I’m 


looking through some of the data sheets, and 


that week’s sample comes back, and it’s lost 


and there’s no data. Whether or not those 


people were re-sampled is another question I 


haven’t figured out. 


But there may be obviously people who 


were never monitored or were not monitored 


throughout this period. What will be done on 


their behalf to assess their exposure when the 


data simply isn’t there, or you don’t trust 


the data? Will there be a coworker model or a 


50th percentile of all the data that you have 


available or something we said about what do 


you do when you don’t have the data for a 


worker who you know was assigned to the K-65 


operation? 


MR. RICH: As we’ve indicated, there’s some 


additional data also, general air sampling 


data, that’s becoming available that can be 


used to validate that sampling, and also to 


extend that radon breath analysis period into 


the succeeding years, the post years. And 

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functionally, that’s the way we’re going to 


need to go if the air sampling data is there 


primarily because the character of the 


raffinates also changed and the 


characterization, the isotopic 


characterization --


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I didn’t want to get 


into that, but obviously the first few drums 


that were transferred, the profile and from 


the core sampling we have average values for 


each of the nuclides that essentially covered 


the full duration and full ^ of the silos; 


however, that’s likely to change obviously. 


Early material that was transferred may have 


been different from latter periods --


MR. RICH: Except that even the Mallinckrodt 


raffinates were also pitchblende ores 


raffinates. So the character is consistent 


from Mallinckrodt to Fernald. And anything 


that went in the silos was from that source. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, silo one. 


MR. RICH: Silo one and two. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Two is a little bit 


different than one. 


MR. RICH: It’s a little different, but the 

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^. 


DR. BEHLING: Well, it may be a minor point 


that can’t be resolved. 


MR. ROLFES: Just one point, Mutty 


identified that we do have Radium-226 bioassay 


in some files for Fernald. 


MR. CHEW: Nineteen fifty-seven period, 


right, Mutty? 


 MR. SHARFI: This particular claimant had 


actually urinalysis data for Radium-226 in 


their claimant file. 


MR. GRIFFON: You can discuss that when you 


look beyond ’54 if you have bioassay ^. 


MR. RICH: As it turned out there’s a 


variety of sources of information that we try 


to put together in the ^ analysis, and do the 


best you can. 


MR. CHEW: I think the more difficult 


question is what Hans asked is what of the 


people that should have been monitored and 


wasn’t monitored for those early periods? 


MR. GRIFFON: Or how do you deal with how 


you monitored people were in that area? 


MR. CHEW: How do you monitor people that 


were at that area? 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: I mean Hans raised this 


briefly, but what concerns me was an earlier 


point I raised in terms of whether there’s 


anything to do which is the qualities of the 


overall, not the protocol of measuring radon 


breath, but the quality of the overall 


procedure that was actually carried out 


because a lot of samples were lost, and we 


don’t know, and there isn’t much data. So for 


some years, for two of the four years, there 


isn’t much data. Two of four years there are 


about 50 percent of the ^ data for people 


identified. And for the third year there’s 


much less than 50 percent. 


MR. MORRIS: In ’52 there were 84 valid 


samples, 140 samples were shipped. In ’53 


there were 238 samples shipped, and 183 of 


them came back with valid data. And in ’54 


231 samples shipped and 182 came back with 


valid data. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: When I say 50 percent and 


less than 50 percent, I’m just telling you the 


weeks for which there are reported data, even 


in any reported date in the data sheet. There 


are weeks that have no, they were doing this 

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weekly, and there are a lot of sample data 


sheets that are simply not there. And the 


notations and some letters that are there in 


the files that are on the O drive indicate 


that they were having some problems in the 


transfer of these flasks and closing them 


properly, and some indication they didn’t 


handle these things right to make sure that 


it’s done properly and so on. A few. 


MR. GRIFFON: This is why I was asking you 


to review the white paper, but I guess we’ve 


got to kind of wait and see if it comes out on 


a tech basis, and you know, more specifically. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, there is a question on 


the quality of the data as to whether what we 


read in the flask actually wound up in the 


lab. 


DR. BEHLING: And these were all one minute 


samples assuming that they basically monitored 


the equivalent of 20 liters worth of exhaled 


air? 


MR. RICH: This is an analytical procedure 


that’s not used much any more. They were 


trying it out at that time. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Ad nauseum comment. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Ready for the next one. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, let’s talk about 


something first. It’s 4:35 right now. We’ve 


made through seven pages of the 22 pages that 


are here. My question is, is if we have one 


that we really need to be working on or so 


forth, my issue is we’re not going to get 


through this paper today. I know that’s a, 


that was a pipe dream to be able to do, but it 


also brings up a question of when we can get 


back together again to be able to continue on 


through this, be able to get all the issues 


out on the table and start being able to work 


on them. And I wanted to, because I know 


there’s going to be a lot of discussion about 


it, is throw out a time that would best suit 


the people to be able to get together and be 


able to do this. I know Ray’s got some stuff 


coming up and so forth, but I think it’s very 


vital that we get, we’re able to return back 


to this and make this through this paper. 


 DR. WADE: Well, the Procedures work -- to 


give you food for thought -- the Procedures 


work group will meet in Cincinnati on the 11th
 

of December. There’s lots of overlap between 

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the two groups. That’s the next face-to-face 


meeting that I’m aware of of the work group, 


any element of the Board, I’m sorry. So it 


doesn’t mean you have to be given by that, but 


it gives you a --


MR. GRIFFON: When is that again? 


 DR. WADE: The 11th of December, the 


Procedures work group. Now you might want to 


meet before then, that’s fine. I’m just 


giving you a moment in time when, for example, 


Ziemer, Mark, who else at Procedures? 


 MR. CLAWSON: And I want to throw something 


else out, too. Possibly being able to 


schedule maybe two days for this. If we 


can’t, it’s not, because we’ve got a lot of 


issues in this, and we’re plugging along, and 


we’re doing really good, but we still have an 


awful lot to still be able to go over. If we 


can’t do it, then that’s the way it goes, but 


I’d like to be able to get through this matrix 


and be able to proceed forward. 


 DR. WADE: Can you wait ‘til the middle of 


December or do you want to go earlier? You 


have to leave time for things to be done by 


the people --

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MR. GRIFFON: Well, we haven’t even gotten 


through the --


DR. BEHLING: We’re not reviewing the stuff 


that we have action items. We’re just trying 


to get through what we have today. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, right. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, my question --


DR. BEHLING: We can do it anytime soon. It 


doesn’t matter. We’re not waiting for 


anything. 


 MR. CLAWSON: So November --


DR. BEHLING: Schedule the day before 


Thanksgiving. We’ll get it all done in one 


hour. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I’m afraid, you know, being 


out there with this rousing conversation, I 


can just picture when a lot of Health 


Physicists get together what they talk about 


because it was pretty good. 


MR. GRIFFON: How about November 1st? This 


is probably impossible for people to schedule 


this this soon. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we have a mini-call of the 


Procedures work group on November 1st . 


 MR. PRESLEY: I can’t be here. I’ve got 

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2:00 p.m. eastern standard time written down. 


 DR. WADE: And we have a Blockson call on 


the second. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well then, we’re into the next 


week I guess. 


 DR. WADE: So the next week is what, the 


fifth, sixth? 


MR. GRIFFON: Seventh, we have a work group 


call for Procedures. 


 DR. WADE: The sixth is Election Day. The 


eighth, do you want to try a phone call? 


 MR. CLAWSON: I think until about the first 


time we get through this matrix I really think 


face-to-face would be the best. 


 DR. WADE: Do you want to try the eighth? 


 MR. CLAWSON: What’s that? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I can’t be here on the eighth. 


 DR. WADE: Twelfth? 


 MR. PRESLEY: That whole week I’m free. 


 DR. WADE: How about the 13th? I heard you 


say you possibly could --


DR. MAKHIJANI: I possibly could be on the 


12th. 


MS. HOWELL: The 12th is a federal holiday. 


 DR. WADE: The 12th is a federal holiday. 

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The 13th? 


MR. GRIFFON: The 13th? 


 MR. CLAWSON: How about maybe the 13th and 


the 14th? Okay, let’s try the 13th then. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think the 13th . We can get 


through half a matrix in one day. 


 DR. WADE: So the 13th, do you want to start 


at nine? This hotel, if possible? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Good. 


 DR. WADE: It shall be so. 


MR. GRIFFON: So does that mean we’re 


adjourning for today? 


DR. BEHLING: We can at least clean up 4.2-2 


because that’s Arjun’s. I don’t want to end, 


to run away from this thing. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Which page are we on? 


DR. BEHLING: We’re on page 46 and on the 

matrix --

 MR. CLAWSON: Matrix it’s page 7, 4.2. 

We need to take a real short break. 


(Whereupon, the working group took a break 


from 4:45 p.m. until 4:52 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: We’re back in session. 


FINDING 4.2-2


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the matrix with 4.2-2. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think that’s an item where 


that’s the same as the earlier one where NIOSH 


provides the analysis, right? 


 MR. SHARFI: It relates back to 4.1-5. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, it’s in draft form. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think that was their 


response. White paper is in preparation. We 


didn’t ask earlier if the white paper’s 


prepared, do you want us to look at it or wait 


until the next meeting or --


MR. ELLIOTT: Again, it may not be a white 


paper. It may be a technical basis document. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, so we could put under 


the comments on that that whichever, white 


paper, technical data --


MR. ELLIOTT: This is a different one? 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s not the radon breath 


issue. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: RU. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s the RU. Does the same 


thing apply? Is it rolled into that tech 


basis or is this a separate, because we’ve got 


white paper here again. 


MR. RICH: The RU one is in preparation. It 

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should be finished shortly. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so that’s a white paper. 


So that’s different. 


MR. MORRIS: Our newest interview 


transcripts have a lot of data on this topic. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, and it says and 


interview information. 


MR. MORRIS: So we’re referring back to 4.1­

5. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean, we didn’t ask should 


we add in there when made available, SC&A 


should review. I mean I think we want that to 


happen, so I think we need to state it. I’ll 


put it under 4.1-5. 


FINDING 4.2-3
 

DR. MAKHIJANI: The next one is yours, Hans. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah, the next one involves 


radon, and radon emanating from silos one and 


two. And the original TBD made some reference 


to the RAC 1995 study that estimated on 


average somewhere around five to six thousand 


curies per year that was being released. And 


that was based on some information that 


involved emanation through the walls because 


by that time there had been a dome cap put on 

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silos. 


And I looked at the data, and I said, 


well, that’s kind of a questionable model for 


using diurnal variations in atmospheric 


pressure that would then force the radon out 


in the head space, et cetera, et cetera. So I 


simply looked at the actual data from the core 


sample in silos one and two and looked at just 


the disequilibrium between Radium-226 and 


Polonium-210 and Lead-210. 


And I realized, well, this is an 


obvious no brainer. If you have 477 


nanocuries per gram of Radium-226, but you 


only have 202 nanograms (sic) per gram of 


Lead-210, there’s obviously a discrepancy here 


that has to be accounted for by the loss of 


radon as the intermediate radionuclide. 


And on that basis I calculated that 


you would probably lose not five or six 


thousand but 60 or even up to 90 depending on 


which radionuclide you would select in terms 


of the disequilibrium. And so that was the 


basis for my original finding that was 


identified as Finding 4.2-3. 


In the meantime I guess you guys did 

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something else here. And this is a white 


paper I take it that was issued here. And I 


can conclude that your revised estimates, and 


it’s really defined mostly for environmental 


onsite ambient exposure to radon. But I 


wonder also to what extent it might just apply 


to the K-65 workers themselves. Are we in a 


position to even apply some of that data to 


them? 


I realize obviously it would come out 


from the top and perhaps not necessarily 


expose those workers who are in close 


proximity to the silos. That’s a question you 


may want to look at at some other time. But 


anyway, your white paper, I assume it’s white 


paper, a revised assessment, estimates, doses 


or quantities, radon releases for 1988 or ’89. 


You have obviously very, very substantial 


increase in number of curies that were, 


certainly increased the number of curies 


released from the original RAC 1995 data about 


the 6,000 per year. So I’ll let you respond 


to what was done here. 


MR. ROLFES: The radon model that we are 


using now was based on research completed by 

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Susan Penny of the University of Cincinnati. 


That took into consideration in addition to 


the K-65 silos other potential source terms of 


radon. And those included some of those 


specific bins outside of the refinery, I 


believe, in which the Q-11 ore was contained. 


And I’d have to take a look back. It’s been 


awhile since I’ve looked at it, and it is a 


large report. I believe much of this 


information --


Mel, am I correct in saying that? 


MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


MR. ROLFES: Much of this information was 


information that was used to revise the 


environmental technical basis document. 


MR. CHEW: Correct, uh-huh. 


MR. ROLFES: Could you give us, you know, we 


have updated our approach for environmental 


intakes and provided a draft copy to the 


Advisory Board for their review. This is not 


a final approved version, and we did want to 


provide this just to show that we have made 


progress in this area to basically demonstrate 


our progress on this issue. Once again, this 


hasn’t been finalized, and we will be 

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finalizing it. 


MR. CHEW: Based on what you just said about 


the, from your calculations the difference 


between the Radium-226 and the Lead-210, 


obviously looking at the emission data, we 


probably need to go back and look at that TBD 


and see if we can recalculate and address your 


question here. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah --


MR. CHEW: Because right now with the way we 


have it still in this draft form, was still 


the information from the RAC data. 


MR. MORRIS: Isn’t it from the Penny data 


that we’ve got in the ^? 


MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


MR. MORRIS: I think the report right now 


reflects the Penny data. 


DR. BEHLING: To me it would seem more 


logical to go to first principles that says 


what are we left with. What can we reasonably 


conclude? It may be conservative. Obviously, 


somebody had made a comment that you could 


potentially lose Radon-222 in the walls as 


it’s seeping through, but gas follows the path 


of least resistance. 

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And I would expect during the period 


of time when there was no dome cap, then the 


radon simply left through the top. And the 


discrepancy between the Radium-226 and its 


decayed daughter products would probably be a 


more rational approach to saying the 


difference is one of radon escaping into the 


environment. And that requires very little 


speculation and modeling or anything else. 


It’s a simple issue of defining the 


disequilibrium between the Radium-226 that you 


have empirical measurements for as well as 


empirical measurements for the Lead-210 and 


Polonium-210, and simply calculate it on the 


basis of disequilibrium and assess what the 


potential annual releases might have been. 


MR. RICH: There was a period of time when 


the cap was more secure than it was initially 


which would, the radon would be contained more 


and then the decay, then the Lead-210 in the 


raffinate or in the solid could be less 


because of the radon in Lead-210--


DR. BEHLING: It’s like radon in your house. 


People have always said if I could put a good 


coat of paint on my floor, I should be able to 

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99 percent of radon. No, that’s not the way 


it works. A few cracks and that’s all you’ve 


got left. 


MR. RICH: And I know we built an 


underground whole body counter in Livermore 


and surrounded it with about eight feet of 


asbestos, low background fill. And the radon 


in low pressure times went right through it, 


but it doesn’t take a lot to give you a lot of 


activity. 


DR. BEHLING: But what I’m saying is the cap 


does not have to be an hermetically sealed cap 


in order to preclude its escape. If it’s even 


moderately leaky, it’s going to go out one way 


or the other whether or not the cap is there 


or it isn’t. And so my gut feeling is --


MR. RICH: But there is a lot that decays in 


place when there’s a barrier of any kind so 


when you say that the deficiency in Lead-210 


is accounted for and everything escaping, 


there is some that decays in --


DR. BEHLING: Oh, there’s no doubt. And I’m 


saying give the benefit of the doubt here and 


use a conservative assumption that the 


discrepancy is due to the escape. I realize 

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that. I realize that. 


MR. RICH: But the principle’s true. I 


admit that you don’t expect to come within ten 


percent or so. 


DR. BEHLING: And so I would just like to 


see, mine was, you know, while I’m sitting at 


my desk doing the back-of-the-envelope 


calculations saying what’s disequilibrium, 


what should I expect to release on the basis 


of the two radionuclides and the difference 


between them. I think one was 60,000, and the 


other one was 90,000 curies on an annual basis 


as a rough estimate, you know, back-of-theenvelope calculation. 


MR. CHEW: There’s an upper theoretical 


bound. 


MR. GRIFFON: So is there an action item? 


MR. ELLIOTT: I think it’s food for thought 


as you develop the new draft here. 


MR. CHEW: Okay, we’ll take a look in 


consideration of what your theoretical 


calculation you’re showing. But we’re 


focusing on the Penny data, right, Bob? 


MR. MORRIS: That’s my understanding. 


DR. BEHLING: And that might be important 

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with regard to people who are onsite or near 


the boundary for environmental, obviously, her 


data, and I’m not going to dispute her, the 


credibility of her research. 


RECAP OF ACTION ITEMS


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, we went ten minutes 


over, but before we leave, Mark, if we could, 


we need to have a review of what action items 


we do have. 


MR. GRIFFON: Going back to the first 


finding, it comes under Finding 4.1-1. I have 


a follow-up action. Here it is right now. 


SC&A to review sample case along with default 


of p^ (paren) one percent prior to 1964 and 


two percent after ’64 (closed paren). NIOSH 


to provide documentation to support the 


statement that most of the enriched material 


was very slightly enriched (paren) slightly 


greater then 0.71 percent U-235 (closed 


paren). 


I think there’s more on that page. 


And one more follow-up action on that same 


finding. NIOSH will provide -- this is the 


one we discussed right after lunch. NIOSH 


will provide a response outlining their 

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approach for evaluating internal dose in cases 


where uranium exposure may have caused 


sufficient renal damage to affect the 


biokinetic model. 


And moving on to the next Finding 4.1­

2, SC&A to develop a protocol for validation 


of HIS-20 urine data (paren) against the raw 


records (closed paren). And we stopped at 


developing the protocol because a lot of the 


urine records aren’t up there yet. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And by raw records you would 


include the cards that we were talking about? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, these -- I forget the 


exact name, but the, what are they called? 


Not urine cards, there’s some other term. 


Anyway --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Bryce mentioned it. 


MR. RICH: No, I think Mark did. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, urine request cards I 


think they were called. 


Also, I think, I didn’t write this one 


down, but NIOSH will post additional urine 


request cards --


MR. ROLFES: As they become available. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- as available. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: ^. 


 MR. CLAWSON: What? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: ^ 50, 60 because that’s how 


we’re going to proceed with them. 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah, correct. 


MR. CHEW: Didn’t we discuss about putting 


an upper bound on the number to look at them, 


looking at part of the ^, a few hundred or 


something like that? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think we, as far as 


how many to sample, I mean, we said certainly 


not 100 percent, but as long as you have a 


representative number of logs. We’re leaving 


that up to you to define. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And I will talk to Harry to 


see if he can develop it in the abstract or 


whether he needs --


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


Then I have SC&A to review DR number 


internal 14. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Isn’t that the same as in 


item one? I think, Mark, that’s the same one. 


DR. BEHLING: This is the dual thorium and 


uranium bioassay. 


MR. GRIFFON: You know, the reason I put 

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that in there was because we decided instead 


of in progress, I’ll just reference back to 


4.1-1 because number four, NIOSH’s response 


said in progress, when actually we decided 


we’re not going to do any additional cases. 


We’re also going to review that one that’s 


already provided. I’m just going to put, see 


4.1-1. 


4.1-3, I have just NIOSH will do 


additional follow up on this investigation 


report that’s related to those cases. 


4.1-5, SC&A will review the white 


paper -- and I think it is a white paper in 


this case -- and supporting interview 


information when available. And the second 


part of that for 4.1-5, NIOSH has additional 


raffinate air sampling data that is being put 


into a spreadsheet format and will be provided 


to the work group when completed. Stop me if 


I did something incorrect there. 


4.2-1, I did some editing of the NIOSH 


responses, but I don’t have to go through 


those. Just that it wasn’t really a white 


paper but a section of the internal TKBS, et 


cetera. The only action for 4.2-1 is that 

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NIOSH will further assess the apparent lack of 


radon breath data after ’54. And I left that 


kind of open-ended. You can include the 


urinalysis data or whatever. 


4.2-3, the last --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, is there something on 


the question of the quality of the ’52-to-’54 


data that you want? Do you want to punt on 


that and address it later or not an issue? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I have this, since we 


don’t have the write up, I don’t have anything 


for you to review. I originally had it in 


there, but I took it out because we don’t have 


that white paper. It’s part of the overall 


tech basis document, right? It’s not a 


separate paper. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s what I’m understanding. 


MR. MORRIS: Don’t you mean a TIB? I don’t 


think it’s a --


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, I thought it was a site 


profile basis. 


 MR. SHARFI: It is a site profile. 


MR. GRIFFON: OTIB-0025, yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So that will be out sooner 

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than this. That will presumably address this 


issue? 


MR. GRIFFON: Hopefully, if I’m 


understanding Bryce correctly, you’re going to 


either release the entire site profile section 


or, if not, maybe pull that part out and 


provide it to us, right? 


MR. RICH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: You guys can --


MR. RICH: We need to talk about it. 


MR. GRIFFON: So right now, Arjun, you know. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We’ll hold off on that. 


MR. GRIFFON: 4.2-3, NIOSH will consider 


SC&A comments in updating the draft. That’s 


all I have for that, and that’s regarding the 


disequilibrium calculations. 


And that’s it. That’s all I have. 


Anybody have – 


MR. ROLFES: Thank you, everyone. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Mark. 


 MR. CLAWSON: We appreciate it. 


DR. ZIEMER: Move adjournment. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Move we adjourn, moved and 


seconded. Let’s go. 


(Whereupon, the work group meeting adjourned 

332 

1 at 5:15 p.m.) 

______________________________ 

333 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of October 24, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


3rd day of May, 2008. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR, CVR-CM, PNSC 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102