THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


MEETING 13 


SUBCOMMITTEE FOR DOSE RECONSTRUCTION AND 


SITE PROFILE REVIEWS 


The verbatim transcript of the 13th 


Meeting of the Subcommittee for Dose Reconstruction 


and Site Profile Reviews held in Erlanger, 


Kentucky on Nov. 16, 2006. 


C O N T E N T S
 

Nov. 16, 2006 

 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 6 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL 


FOURTH SET OF CASES 12 


MR. MARK GRIFFON, SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIR 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 294 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates an 


unintentional or purposeful interruption of a sentence. An 


ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech or an unfinished 


sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of word(s) when reading 


written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of the 


word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, without 


reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 


P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 

 

 

BOARD MEMBERS
 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

BEHLING, HANS, SC&A 


BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A 


FIX, JACK, ORAU 


HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


KATZ, TED, NIOSH 


MAHER, ED, ORAU 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


SAMPSON, BOB, GAO 


SHARFI, MUTTY, ORAU 


WINSLOW, SUSAN, ORAU 

P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(10:00 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade and again, as always, I have 


the privilege of serving as the Designated 


Federal Official for the Advisory Board. This is 


a meeting of the Subcommittee of the Advisory 


Board. It's not a working group meeting, it's a 


Subcommittee meeting. It's been duly noticed in 


the Federal Register and again, as always, 


transcripts and minutes will be available. It's 


open to the public. 


I am going to consider this a meeting of the old, 


quote/unquote, subcommittee. As you know, there 


was a subcommittee comprised of all Board members 


that looked at issues related to individual dose 


reconstructions and site profile reviews. The 


Board has commissioned a new subcommittee to 


replace that, that will be a subcommittee looking 


at individual dose reconstruction reviews. Since 


I don't have that approved charter in my hands, I 


think it's appropriate that I would convene this 


as the old subcommittee. It affects none of the 


business that will be done here. 


 The new subcommittee, for those that are 


interested, is going to be chaired by Mark 


Griffon, with members Gibson, Poston and Munn; 

alternates Clawson and Presley. The old 


subcommittee was made up of all members of the 


Board. I would ask -- even as we deal with this 


as an old subcommittee, I would ask Mark to chair 


the proceedings, if you will be so kind. 


 Again, I think we'll go around the table here and 


introduce, and then we'll hear from people out in 


the -- in telephone land, so again, this is Lew 


Wade with NIOSH and the Advisory Board. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Mark Griffon with the Advisory 


Board. 


 MS. MUNN: Wanda Munn, Advisory Board. 


 DR. BEHLING: Hans Behling, SC&A. 


DR. ROESSLER: Gen Roessler, Advisory Board, 


sitting in on this meeting. 


 MR. SHARFI: Mutty Sharfi, ORAU team. 


MR. MAHER: Ed Maher, Ed Maher, ORAU team Task V 


manager. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Stu Hinnefeld from NIOSH. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Brad Clawson, Advisory Board. 


 MS. HOWELL: Emily Howell, HHS. 


 DR. WADE: Now I would ask that other members of 


the NIOSH/ORAU team, OCAS/ORAU team that are out 


there identify themselves on the telephone, 


please. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: This is Liz Homoki-Titus with 


HHS. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Liz. 

MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Thank you. 


 MR. KATZ: This is Ted Katz with NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Always a pleasure to have you with us, 


Ted. Thank you. 


 MS. WINSLOW: This is Susan Winslow with the ORAU 


team, Task V. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome. 


THE COURT REPORTER: Who was that? 


 DR. WADE: Susan Winslow with the ORAU team, Task 


V. 


 Other members of the NIOSH/ORAU team? 


 MR. FIX: This is Jack Fix, principal external 


dosimetrist, ORAU team. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Jack. What about members of 


SC&A? 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro from SC&A. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, John. We -- we heard your 


testimony yesterday. You are now a star. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay, thank you. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, not "we"; some. 


 DR. WADE: Other members of the SC&A team? 


 MS. BEHLING: Kathy Behling from SC&A. 


 DR. WADE: Kathy, we miss you, but we're very 


glad that you're with us. 


 MS. BEHLING: Miss you, too. 


 DR. WADE: You add so much to our deliberations. 


Thank you. 


 MS. BEHLING: Thank you. 

 DR. WADE: Other members of the SC&A team? 


 (No responses) 


What about other federal employees who are on 


this call as part of their employment? 


 MR. SAMPSON: This is Bob Sampson with GAO in 


Washington, Lew. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Bob. Nice to have you with 


us. 


 Any other federal employees on the call by virtue 


of their employment? 


 (No responses) 


Is there anybody else on the call who would like 


to identify themselves? 


 MR. GIBSON: This is Mike Gibson. You got me on 


record. Right, Lew? 


 DR. WADE: I do, Mike. Thank you again for being 


with us. Mike is a member of the new 


subcommittee and, as all Board members, a member 


of the old subcommittee as well. 


Other Board members, anyone else who wishes to 


identify themselves? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Again, I won't go through a detailed 


conflict of interest discussion, but I will ask 


that if there are any members of the NIOSH or 


ORAU team who are conflicted at particular sites, 


I think it would be good for you to identify 


those conflicts, and then the same with SC&A, 

just so we can have that as background for 


discussion, depending upon cases we might 


discuss. So let's start here -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: This is Stu Hinnefeld with NIOSH. 


I'm conflicted at the Fernald site, also called 


Feed Materials Production Center, and I'm 


conflicted for a short period of time at Lake 


Ontario Ordnance Works. 


MR. MAHER: Ed Maher, I'm not conflicted at any 


DOE sites. 


 MR. SHARFI: Mutty Sharfi, I'm conflicted at the 


Mound site. 


DR. ROESSLER: Gen Roessler, I have no conflicts. 


 DR. BEHLING: Hans Behling, no conflicts. 


 MS. MUNN: Wanda Munn, conflicts at Hanford. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Mark Griffon, conflict at Nevada 


Test Site and Oak Ridge, Paducah, Portsmouth when 


steelworkers are the named petitioner. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Brad Clawson, conflicted with 


Idaho. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. On the phone we'll deal with 


ORAU/NIOSH team members. 


 MS. WINSLOW: Susan Winslow, conflicted with 


Hanford. 


 DR. WADE: Anyone else have conflicts they need 


to report? 


 MR. FIX: Jack Fix, conflicted with Hanford and 


Idaho. 

 DR. WADE: Thank you, Jack. 


 MR. GIBSON: Mike Gibson, conflicted with Mound. 


 DR. WADE: Anyone else on the line who needs to 


identify conflicts? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, John Mauro, conflicted with 


Savannah River. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, just as a background for us all 


to understand. And as I proudly say, Lew Wade, 


no knowledge, no conflicts. I'm uniquely 


qualified to do what I do. 


 Okay, Mark. 


FOURTH SET OF CASES


 MR. GRIFFON: And I can't follow up on that very 


well. Okay, we're -- the focus on this meeting I 


think is going to be the -- well, I know is going 


to be the fourth set of cases. The matrix that 


we have provided from NIOSH I think the end of 


last week -- does everyone have -- have the 


latest version of the matrix? 


 DR. WADE: We have an extra one here if they 


need... 


 MR. GRIFFON: For those on the phone, if you 


don't have one I think we can manage to get it by 


e-mail. Right? 


 DR. WADE: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: E-mail (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: This has -- this -- SC&A produced 

this from their initial report, which really I 


think we -- we need to know -- to remember 


there's a lot more than this short statement 


behind the findings, so the initial report 


provided -- I think in April or so, Hans, is that 


correct? 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the report was -- at least 


the date I have on my report in my recall, I 


think that's the correct date, was issued on 


April -- in April of 2006, so -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: April 2006 and then the matrix -- 


NIOSH included responses on this and we got that, 


like I said, the end of last week, I believe. So 


we're taking our -- our first stab at sort of 


looking at the finding and NIOSH's response and ­

- and resolving these issues. 


The -- just to -- to close out, I know at the 


last -- I think it was at the last Advisory Board 


meeting I talked about the second and third set 


of cases and a -- a draft letter that we voted on 


at the last meeting, and I did say that I was 


going to -- that there was some -- there were 


some discrepancies in the numbers of SC&A's 


report and -- and what we listed in the letter. 


I think we've resolved those, but I don't have 


final copies of those, but those'll certainly be 


ready to -- to bring back to the Board at the 


next full meeting, so -- so we want to get those 

letters out, but that'll close out the second and 


third set. 


Now we're on to the fourth set of -- of case 


reviews, and I guess the best thing -- the way 


we've always approached this is just to sort of 


start with a summary of the finding and then an 


understanding of NIOSH's response and discussion 


if we need it. So I'll start with -- although 


the only other thing I would ask for is -- for me 


it would be helpful to have a listing of the 


finding or -- or the case numbers as identified 


in this matrix versus the ID numbers. I don't 


want to say them -- I don't want to necessarily 


say the ID number on the record, but do we have a 


listing of that? That would make it a lot easier 


to -- to track through --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I have not generated that list. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It'd be a simple thing to 


generate, but I have not -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, it'd be fairly simple. I 


just -- I was trying to match them up this 


morning and sometimes -- 


 MS. BEHLING: I also have a list -- this is Kathy 


Behling -- I can e-mail that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You have a list right now that you 


can e-mail, Kathy? 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, I can do that during a break. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, that would be helpful. All 


right, so we'll start with -- 


 DR. WADE: Just -- now you'll send that to Mark 


and you'll send it to Stu? 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, I will. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, but no one else. Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, we don't want to float 


the IDs all over the place. 


 DR. WADE: Does anybody else want this? 


 MS. MUNN: No, I'll just read Mark's. 


 MS. BEHLING: I can include you, Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: I don't actually have a printer, but I 


can download it, yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. And Mike, I'll include you, 


also -- I'll include all the Board members. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. So the first 


finding is -- or first case is case 61, and maybe 


I'll turn it over to Hans and let him give us 


some background on these findings. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. The title of this finding is 


that we could not reproduce the modeled external 


photon dose numbers that relates to the exposure 


model that involved the uranium ingot, and we -- 


in our report that's obviously not available on 

your matrix -- provided our version of what we 


considered was the right value, and that does not 


coincide with what NIOSH had put in there. But 


in realizing NIOSH's response, they said that 


there was a revision to Table 3 in OTIB-4 and we 


accept that as the response. 


And -- but one of the things I do want to say is 


that the first five cases all involve AWEs, and 


you're going to see a repeat because this OTIB-4 


was used for dose reconstruction each of those 


five AWE claims, and so we're going to repeat 


ourselves on a number of times. And when we do, 


we'll try to make it very quick to say we've 


addressed this issue and let's just go on with 


that so as to get through the first five cases. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So in terms of the -- the 


finding -- now I'm just trying to understand so I 


can fill in my other columns in -- in the matrix 


here, for consistency purposes. This -- was this 


-- this sort of -- I mean the -- the values were 


higher, but it was a mistake in the -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Apparently. We can't reconstruct 


them, either. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So apparently it was. It was 


higher than what it should have been based on -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: It doesn't affect the outcome of -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the descriptions. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- the dose. Right, right, right. 


Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so there's agreement on the 


finding. Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Just for my edification -- so with the 


new table, then you're able to -- to -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: -- reproduce the numbers that NIOSH 


then produced using the new table. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: So are we going to rank these as we go 


along or are we just going to indicate 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: I was just going to try to fill in 


the resolution column. 


 MS. MUNN: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. But I mean I would think 


that... 


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling. Can I ask a 


question here? I believe that TIB-4 has changed 


rather significantly, and I'm not sure -- is this 


particular table included in the revision of Rev. 


-- Rev. 3 or 4 of TIB-4? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there is a -- there is an 


external dose number in there. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Because I wasn't sure if 


this Table 3 that has incorrect values in -- 

based on our finding 61.1 is actually reproduced 


in the most current version of TIB-4. I have to 


be honest, I didn't look -- look at that at this 


point because, as they've indicated, we just got 


these responses and I really didn't have time to 


go back to the most current version. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There are actually several Table 


3s. There's 3-1 through 3-7 in the new TIB-4, 


and the -- the external dose rates are on Table 


3-7 in the new version. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I just have to admit that I 


didn't personally go back and recalculate this 


value to ensure that it is correct in the current 


version. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: This is -- this is John Mauro. I 


believe conceptually what we have here is (break 


in transmission) uses a generic slab or chunk of 


uranium that a person is standing next to, I 


believe 2,000 hours per year, and he's being 


exposed, I believe at one foot is the -- is the 


conceptual nature of how the model approaches it. 


And we were -- and then of course when -- 


depending on the organ, the actual dose that -- 


will differ from person to person, but the 


setting, the generic setting I believe has 


remained fairly constant from revision to 


revision. Please cor-- you know, you can 

certainly correct me if I'm wrong. And when we 


check the calculations, the radiation field that 


the person would be exposed to, and then what the 


dose to your organ would be, we -- we are finding 


that the doses that we are getting are lower than 


the ones that are being reported -- and this is 


recurring -- for (break in transmission) and one 


reason, one doing -- one regarding how the 


external field itself is calculated at this one-


foot location from this generic slab of uranium, 


and second, how the conversion is going from the 


field to the organ dose or this -- this 


superficial -- let's say to the organ dose. So 


we're -- we're finding that in just about every 


case when we review an OTIB-4 dose reconstruction 


based on dose that -- that we're -- we -- we're 


always coming in lower by about a factor of two. 


And I guess to a certain degree we're not quite 


sure where -- you know, where that, you know, the 


underlying reason for that is. And Stu, it 


sounds like you folks are looking into that also? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I don't know that we have 


an active investigation on that, but I think -- 


have you guys -- are you guys reviewing the new 


version of TIB-4 in the procedure review task? 


DR. MAURO: We did look at -- well, the latest 


version is -- is -- it's called PC3? Is that --


is -- that -- I'm not sure if -- we did review 

TIB-4 in the last cycle of procedure reviews. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The most recent is Rev. 3 PC-1. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, we did not review that one. 


Rev. 3 PC-1, no. I don't know what date that is, 


but I don't -- you know, I -- I was involved in 


the reviews of the TIB-4 that -- that -- I do not 


believe we reviewed that version. Unfortunately 


we're losing a little track of them 'cause there 


are a number of versions. In any event, what I'm 


saying is that it sounds like that we do have 


agreement that the methodology by which the 


external dose from this generic slabs is being 


calculated apparently -- at least up to -- up to 


the versions that we looked at, and the cases, 


all of -- all of the -- and there are a lot of 


these -- that there seems to be a small 


difference of -- relatively small, you know, we ­

- we're coming up -- you're coming up with 


something on the order of four rem to -- and 


we're coming up with something closer to two rem 


per -- I think it's per -- per year from this 


generic slab, and we haven't quite yet nailed 


down the reason for those differences. Those 


differences may have been resolved in the latest 


version of TIB-4, I don't know. But I thought 


I'd add that. It might help out here. 


 DR. WADE: Just as a procedural issue, one of the 


things the Board will need to do in December is 

to complete the list of 30 procedures for SC&A to 


review this year, and I think there are still 16 


slots open for review, John, or a number like 


that. 


DR. MAURO: Exactly, correct -- that's the exact 


number. 


 DR. WADE: So we could consider adding Rev. 3 PC1 as a candidate and so I would make that note. 


And if you would like, I would see that that's 


brought up during the Board meeting. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I'm going to check to make sure 


that in fact we did not look at it, but certainly 


that would be appropriate if it has not been 


looked at. 


 DR. BEHLING: John, I think you're touching on 


two separate issues here, your own theoretical 


calculation and versus the instructions that are 


given in TIB-4, and the table that identifies the 


number that we can't match. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah --


 DR. BEHLING: Now those are two separate issues. 


DR. MAURO: (Unintelligible) questioned that. 


You're -- yes. I think there are multiple 


aspects to this. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and our calculation, if you 


don't have the dose reconstruction review report 


in hand, we calculated a dose of 4.1 rem versus ­

- no, they calculate a dose of 4.1 and we 

calculate a dose of 3.1, so we're off by about 25 


percent lower than theirs. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: Again, this issue will repeat 


itself in the next four, so that when we -- when 


we go to the next four cases we'll skip over that 


whole issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: But the magnitude of the differences 


that you're seeing is not that great. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, 25 percent. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, but --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: I might want to add -- this might be 


helpful, too. In the case of TIB-4 we're -- 


we're dealing with AWE facilities where usually 


the driver for risk is the inhalation dose of 


uranium --


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- (break in transmission) of course 


get to in this case, so in general the external 


dose portion -- I guess it would of course depend 


on the organ -- on the cancer, but in general I 


think the -- where the majority of the exposures 


are occurring is from the relatively high levels 


of airborne uranium that the individual is 


assumed to inhale as being the -- the major 

-- 

contributor to most of the -- the organ doses. 


In this particular case I believe it's a colon 


cancer so I'm not quite sure how impor-- if you 


look at the summary table you can find out how 


important the external dose is relative to the 


internal dose. It could be determined if this 


difference in about two rem per year -- you know, 


how important it is to this particular case. 


Bear in mind, I believe this person was 


compensated. Is that correct? I believe that's 

the case. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, just to answer your question, 

John --

DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- the external dose represents 


about 33 rem and the internal dose is about 30, 


so we're actually higher for the external than we 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I stand --


 DR. BEHLING: -- are for the internal. 


DR. MAURO: -- I stand corrected. Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Could I make just one --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) isn't surprising 


for a colon cancer, yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- one small observation, just to 


close on this? So as I understand it, SC&A did a 


review. Their review found that they were not 


able to reproduce our numbers based upon the use 

of Table 3 --


 MR. HINNEFELD: In Rev. 2. 


 DR. WADE: -- in Rev. 2. We've found that there 


was -- we weren't able to, either, so we've 


modified Table 3 --


 MR. HINNEFELD: We'd actually already modified 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. WADE: The only question that Kathy raises 


that I think someone needs to answer is is now 


the PC -- the Rev. 3 PC-1 Table 3.7, is it the 


right table --


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: -- and someone needs to say that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. WADE: And if NIOSH --


 MR. GRIFFON: And I'm not sure SC&A has reviewed 


those. 


 DR. WADE: Right, so that -- that issue needs to 


be --


 MR. GRIFFON: That might be on the table. 


 DR. WADE: -- closed. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Otherwise --


 DR. WADE: We're done. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we're in agreement on that -- on 


that finding. And -- and if -- if that most 


current version of that OTIB-4 hasn't been 


reviewed, I think we probably should add it 


because it -- it's going to be a pretty critical 

TIB, obviously. 


 DR. WADE: It would --


 MR. GRIFFON: For a lot --


 DR. WADE: -- be nice --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- for lots of sites. 


 DR. WADE: -- to see that the --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- that NIOSH verifies that the new 


Table 3 is the correct table. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That if -- okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: And to answer Wanda's question, 


what is the difference, well, it's driven by 


obviously duration of employment. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, let's go on to 61.2. My 


goal also in this meeting is to get through the 


whole matrix, so --


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, but it -- my -- the only 


reason I say that is 'cause there's some fairly 


technical ones coming up, so we may want to table 


where we have a chance to -- you know, we may not 


be able to do it at the full subcommittee 


meeting. We may say, you know, Hans, get 


together with Stu off-line, figure out where 


we're at, you know -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I can think of one --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- I think clearly we won't be 


able to resolve today. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It'll be very -- I think it'll be 


an extensive technical discussion on one issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, yeah. In fact I --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'm sure, there may be more than 


one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- at least -- maybe -- yeah, maybe 


more than one, but at least one -- one that 


appeared in a couple of different spots I think, 


so -- at any rate, I do want to try to get 


through all of them at least one time through, 


even if we have to kind of table a few of the 


more technical ones. 


All right, go ahead, Hans. Sorry. 


 DR. BEHLING: The second one involves the 


improperly converted model photon doses to organ 


of interest, and that's a very, very generic 


problem that we've encountered. It probably 


needs no further discussion. The intent was to 


substitute all AP geometry DCFs and -- and I 


think NIOSH has acknowledged that that should be 


the case. So again, we accept NIOSH's response 


on this in the -- strictly the issue of the 


geometry afforded for Appendix B of 


Implementation Guide, all the DCFs. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I think NIOSH is in agreement 

and -- and it -- and you state that all cases 


will be re-evaluated in this report. As far --


Wanda was mentioning earlier that case ranking 


and site ranking -- I'm kind of skipping those 


now, only because I'd like to go back to my other 


matrices and make sure I'm applying these 


consistently and then bring it back to this 


subcommittee because I know these -- this 


finding, for instance, has come up before and I 


think I want to make sure I'm being consistent in 


the way we're ranking them across matrices, so -- 


and I don't -- I don't want to guess at those on 


the fly. 


All right, 61.3? 


 DR. BEHLING: That's the issue that has also been 


discussed at length. I don't know to what extent 


we want to talk about it today again -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- and that's the applicability of 


TIB-4 for compensable cases. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We've tried to summarize this -- 


you know, what happened in this response, and so 


we -- we felt obliged to, you know, make 


progress. These cases have been around a long 


time. We've always felt like there would 


probably be some sites where we couldn't do 


anything better than a bounding dose. We felt 


like the TIB-4 technique provided us a -- a -- a 

valid bounding dose on the sites it's applicable 


to, and so we decided we would do that. You 


know, there's a part in the regulation that says 


you -- you -- when research is done, you go with 


what you've got. And so that's what our decision 


was. Research is done; we're going to go with 


what we've got. And for some of the cases we 


did, I think we were perfectly appropriate in 


doing that, but not for all of them. We applied 


it more broadly, through misunderstanding on 


NIOSH's part -- and I guess it is on my part. If 


you look at who at NIOSH misunderstood, it was 


me, because I directed ORAU to submit these cases 


and I directed our health physicist to approve 


these cases. So if it didn't -- if no one -- if 


everybody above me understood what we should have 


been done -- doing, I'm the one who 


misunderstood. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And particularly you're speaking to 


the --


 MR. HINNEFELD: TIB-4 -- any TIB-4 compensable 


cases. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) used for 


compensable cases. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: TIB-4 compensable cases. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And --


 MR. GRIFFON: But at this time --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- TIB-4 was applied -- you know, 


there are two types of misapplication that one -- 


that they were compensable, but it was -- it was 


applied to cases -- the reason there were 


misapplication -- two categories of 


misapplication, it was applied to cases where it 


-- where TIB-4 really wasn't applicable, and 


you've noted that in some of the findings. And 


it was applied to cases where really the research 


was pretty much done and there was no real need 


for a capping dose. And then TIB-4 itself 


prohibits its use in a compensable case. We 


expected that the revision will be forthwith. 


We'll start doing these things, revis-- 


(unintelligible) will be revised right away and 


it just never got revised because we recognized 


before that was done that this was -- that it was 


being misapplied and there weren't really that 


many cases we could correctly complete in this 


fashion, so the revision never got done. There 


was an exchange of paper -- what we call a change 


management form between us and ORAU where we 


documented this is what we want you to do. We 


told ORAU yes, this is what we want you to do. 


We do that on occasion. We don't necessar-- I 


don't document all my direction to ORAU on change 


management, but there are certain ones where 


there's maybe a good chance that there won't be 

common understanding among both sides of the team 


so we prepare a written understanding -- this is 


what we want to do -- and that was done. 


DR. MAURO: Stu, this is John Mauro. Just a 


question on -- this particular case is a 


Bridgeport -- Bridgeport Brass case. I notice 


that there is now a -- a site profile for 


Bridgeport Brass, and I think in our write-up on 


this case we make -- we point out that if you 


were to use the -- the -- the site profile, 


specifically Bridgeport Brass, as opposed to TIB4, there is a substantial change in the dose. Is 


this one of the cases where you're going back and 


revisiting this particular case and using 


Bridgeport Brass site profile? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We are not revis-- we are not 


revisiting any cases on our own. 


DR. MAURO: I -- I can go --


 MR. HINNEFELD: The Department of Labor is aware 


of these cases. 


DR. MAURO: I -- I see. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And if they return them to us, 


then we would do it with Bridgeport Brass site 


profile. 


DR. MAURO: I understand. 


 DR. WADE: But now this is a case that was 


compensated. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 

DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Just want to have that on the record. 


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling. Stu, do I 


understand correctly that the modification to 


TIB-4 is going to allow certain facilities, 


certain AWE facilities, to be compensated using 


TIB-4? Is that what I'm understanding? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I didn't -- I didn't intend to 


say that we would -- were doing that now. At the 


time we adopted this approach, we intended to do 


that, but we abandoned the approach before the 


revision ever got made. 


Now it still may happen that we may find cases 


that we want to -- there's no -- nothing we can 


do better than a bounding dose, and TIB-4 is a 


good bounding dose for that site. In that case, 


if there's some we want to do in the future, we 


would revise TIB-4 to allow that -- it to be used 


in that -- in that fashion. Or we would put out 


some other document that -- with a bounding dose 


as -- you know, when that -- you know, in that 


fashion, but we would not rely and reference TIB4 in its current -- in its current state if we 


did that. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay, because I -- I'm just 


wondering if it would be useful to maybe go and 


look at the list of AWEs where there are 


claimants and determine which facilities it may 

be applicable to use the OTIB-4. I wasn't sure 


if that's what you were insinuating or not, if 


potentially there would be a list of AWE 


facilities where you realize TIB-4 may be 


appropriate to be used, but it doesn't sound like 


that's what you're doing. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we're doing something like 


that. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Battelle, our second dose 


reconstruction contractor, has responsibility for 


most of the AWE sites, and they are -- they have 


compiled the available information and they are 


making those judgments about which ones does it 


look like we can -- we have enough, you know, 


data at that site where we can do dose 


reconstructions and here's a site profile, here's 


how you do it. Which ones do we not have enough 


information to even do a capping dose 


reconstruction. And so those'll have -- those 


will probably go 83.14 path. They don't know 


what else they would do. And then the final 


category would be those which -- a source term 


model like -- like TIB-4 would work. Now whether 


it -- we ultimately end up revising TIB-4 and -- 


and using TIB-4 or whether we publish another 


document that describes the capping source -- you 


know, source model -- exposure model dose for 

those, I don't know exactly how that'll proceed 


yet. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay, that makes sense and that 


seems to make the process a lot cleaner -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- so very good. 


 DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade. If I might just 


make an observation because this is one that 


obviously we've talked about a great deal within 


the agency, as well. I think NIOSH encountered a 


situation where it felt in order to do its job in 


a timely way it needed to make use of bounding 


assumptions, and I applaud that decision. There 


were technical errors made in that those reports 


said that TIB-4 was used when TIB-4 was a 


document that was not to be used, and therefore 


errors were made. The working group -- excuse 


me, the subcommittee and SC&A did their job in a 


wonderful way, as well, and pointed out these 


issues. And it's good to have this open 


discussion and now we're moving to a better way 


of all of us doing business. I think this points 


out the importance of a review process, as well, 


so I compliment all involved. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just the -- I gue-- I guess your -- 


answered part of my question which was who 


defines this universe of applicable sites for 


this procedure and -- and Battelle's -- this is 

kind of ongoing now, but how -- at the time you 


had TIB-4 for the cases that -- in this review, 


how was it -- how was it decided -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It was one --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- TIB-4 was going to be a bounding 


-- plausible upper bound for these sites? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, TIB-4 was prepared to be a 


plausible upper bound for sites that handled 


uranium. It was originally uranium. And so 


because it's based on the earliest -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: So the (unintelligible) say that, 


but it's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it's based on the earliest AEC 


facilities and the conditions that were found in 


the late '40s when HASL actually started looking 


at these places that had been producing uranium 


during the war. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So it was based on uranium 


facilities, and -- and then so the research that 


was done at the time was to look through some of 


the available information, not necessarily make a 


thorough research of it but to identify sites 


where it appears all they handled was uranium. 


And so those sites were in the appendix as the 


applicable sites. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And it doesn't necessarily 


distinguish between types of uranium work. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it's gone through -- it's 


gone through a number of evolutions, and so at 


one point I think it may have said uranium metal 


forming --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and then -- and then -- but 


those plants in the '40s did more than uranium 


metal forming. They did all the chemical process 


uranium and so the data that supported this 


supported more than just uranium metal work. So 


-- and it's gone -- it was originally just 


natural and I think it was maybe expanded to 


allow some low level enrichment, also. So I 


don't know exactly what -- but there -- it's 


going through --


 MR. GRIFFON: And the reason --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- a series of things as research 


supported it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm sorry. The reason for 


developing a Bridgeport Brass site profile and 


that was that you -- you subsequently found 


additional information on Bridgeport or -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, we did -- we did have -- 


well, I don't know that Bridgeport Brass was ever 


part of -- in the TIB-4 appendix. I don't know 


that it ever was. It's one of the -- one of the 


-- one of the errors we made was the 


misapplication of TIB-4 to sites beyond the way 

it was supposed to be. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So this was one of those sites that 


might have been beyond -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't -- I don't think -- I 


don't know if it was ever -- I don't know if it 


was ever in the appendix or not, and even if it 


were, there is additional information about 


Bridgeport Brass available beyond -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: There's -- there's two -- two 


things that I was looking at here was, one, that 


it was a compensable claim and, strictly 


speaking, the TIB said not to use it for that -- 


right? -- at the time, anyway. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And then the second thing was I was 


wondering before that I was -- asked was the site 


even listed in that -- in that TIB at the time 


this was done. I don't know if Hans knows that. 

(Pause) 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, it was. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, it was listed? So it was 


listed in the -- so it was really the compensable 


issue. That's what I was (unintelligible). Then 


-- then why -- why did -- was it -- was it 


additional information came (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, we did find additional 


information from Bridgeport Brass. We actually 


found the guy who had been the radiation safety 

officer and he pointed out where some records 


were stored about the information from those 


people, I think. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 61.4 is an issue that -- in 


your matrix it's defined as failure to account 


for all potential occupational medical doses, and 


this person was employed in the '50s to the early 


'60s. He was given -- given medical occupational 


exposure in behalf of conventional PA chest X-


rays, but there was no accounting for any 


potential photofluorography. And so that issue 


really addresses the need to perhaps account for 


medical exposures involving photofluorography. 


And as it turns out, in OTIB-4 Rev. 3 PC-1 there 


is a recommendation to use photofluorography for 


all years prior to 1961. So I'm not sure your 


response addresses that change in the guidance. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there's not -- you know, 


that TIB -- TIB-4 does include that, the latest 


revision does include that. There's not uniform 


agreement on everybody's side, on the ORAU and 


OCAS side, about whether that really is the 


correct approach to take because the -- the 


research that supports -- I believe it's TIB-6, 


which is the DOE -- you know, medical exposures. 


The research that led us to conclude that if you 


don't have other evidence at DOE facilities, you 


should use PFG up in -- through some year, was 

based on research that was done in DOE 


facilities. It was not research that was done at 


-- how were chest X-rays done in general, in the 


population. And so it's not entirely clear to us 


that you really -- you know, that a private firm, 


if they were giving X-rays, and some -- most AWEs 


we don't even have any indication that they were 


necessarily giving X-rays, but if they were, 


would they have done a PFG exam, which was 


usually a large-scale kind of screening thing. 


They could do a lot of them. So there's still 


some disagreement. The current version of TIB-4, 


as you say, exactly says use PFG up to '61, but 


there's still some open discussion on the side -- 


our side whether that's really the correct 


recommendation or not. If we want to go farther 


down that path, that would really I think require 


-- outside of this, you know, discussion outside 


this sub-- this subcommittee, at least in this 


particular task. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But at this point you're -- you're 


at least saying there was a -- you didn't adhere 


to the procedure. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the -- no, no, actually 


procedure two --


 DR. BEHLING: The original procedure didn't make 


reference to it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: The revised procedure does, and 


generically speaking, when we talk about pre1960, there was at least some generic use of 


photofluorography at -- at DOE sites. And so 


that was really brought up then, and of course 


would support our contention that the revised 


TIB-4 does in fact make reference to the 


photofluorography. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And there's still debate, yeah, 


but right now -- where we are today -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- where we are today, it would 


be included. 


MR. MAHER: This version of the OTIB 


(unintelligible) dose reconstructor follow 


(unintelligible) used to correct 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the version that he had at 


the time. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: But Hans's question has been raised, 


and the new OTIB deals with Hans' question, so 


this issue is behind us right now. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, that's done. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So it's accepted in the new OTIB, 


but you say there's still -- you're -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there's still some debate 


about it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- still some debate -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's still some debate about 


it, but where we are right now -- you know, 


unless some debate changes things, where we are 


right now is it's in TIB -- TIB-4 to include PFG 


in (unintelligible). 


 DR. WADE: Well, that's the infamous Rev. that 


we're going to --


 MR. GRIFFON: That we're going to review anyway, 


right. Okay, go ahead. 


 DR. BEHLING: The next one, 61.5, is already -- 


something we discussed and that is the 


appropriateness of using TIB-4 for 'pensable 


claims, so we can skip that. I think that takes 


care of claim 61. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 61's done, okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: 62 is another AWE facility. In 


this case it's NUMEC, and the first issue there 


was, again, the use of OTIB-4 as an appropriate 


method for calculating dose, which we've already 


discussed. And so you see in the matrix, see 


response 61.3. The only difference here, 


however, is that is NUMEC really an AWE that 


should be judged on basis of TIB-4. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And it should not. 


 DR. BEHLING: Should not. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It was not --


 MR. GRIFFON: Wasn't on the list. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- I can pretty much tell you. 


It wasn't on -- it was not part of TIB-4. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Agreement on that. This -- was 


this a compensable case or a... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Compensable? 


 DR. BEHLING: 62.2, again, goes back to the 


uranium ingots in Table 3, and I think Stu has 


already identified the fact that that table has 


been revised, so we can skip over that. 


 Again, 62.3, it's a repeat of the issue about a 


DCF using AP geometry which was already 


discussed, so we can skip that. 


Let me go to see if there's anything unique about 


62.5. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Case where the file included a 


few individual bioassay samples and some medical 


exposure information. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Does 62.4 fall into that earlier 


discussion of --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- the --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, yeah, yeah, because it was 


the -- it was about residual contamination, but 


it -- you know, it's from uranium in TIB-4 and 


this was other than uranium plant, so it's the 


same misapplication. 

 DR. BEHLING: So 62.5, it's an issue involving 


the failure to actually look at the DOE records 


that were provided, and your statement here is 


that the data was not received until after the 


dose reconstruction had been completed. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, this ca-- this is a case -- 


this is a site where we didn't -- DOE didn't have 


any exposure records for this site, so we -- and 


we didn't have a contact to get exposure records 


for the site so we didn't think we were going to 


get any. And so this case was done -- 


subsequently we've encountered and had contact 


with two companies that ran the site for some 


period, one of which provided us relatively 


quickly the information they had, but they were 


not the site that closed it so all they had was 


medical information that was generated during the 


time when they oper-- they were the -- they had 


the license for NUMEC. And included in that were 


some X-ray exposures and some bioassay. They had 


some bioassay and a medical record. So that's 


how come it showed that, and that came after the 


DR was done. 


 DR. BEHLING: And I can understand why this dose 


reconstruction was closed, in light of the fact 


it was compensated. The need to have additional 


information that -- was at this point no longer 


relevant to the -- to the decision. It was 

obviously a motivated capture. 


Again, 62.6 is the issue of TIB-4 and its 


applicability, so that needs no further 


discussion. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Does NUMEC have a -- a site profile 


by itself? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's being -- we're working on -- 


we're working on it. And in fact, the company 


that had the license when it clo-- when those 


plants closed we've been in contact with and 


they've just recently provided us a lot of 


individual exposure information for the claimants 


-- boxes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Good. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, sort of good. 


 MS. MUNN: Give or take a little. 


 DR. BEHLING: 62.7 goes basically back to the 


issue that was discussed in 62.5. The dose 


reconstruction was done at a time when certain 


amount of monitoring data had not been made 


available, that were only made subsequently 


available, but because the case was compensated I 


can only assume that issue of having to back-fit 


that was really not necessary. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This says inconsistency between 


CATI and data used by NIOSH. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the CATI report said he was 


monitored. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: The absence of records was 


obviously considered as perhaps an issue where 


these were lost and the dose reconstruction took 


place using a generic method. And since he was 


compensated, the decision was made not to make an 


issue out of it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And the only interest -- this 


person was compensated. The only curiosity I had 


on this was how in fact were -- 'cause I didn't 


look at this -- the details of this case. How 


was the --


 MS. MUNN: CATI (unintelligible)? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, how was external dose assigned? 


 MS. MUNN: Ah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Was it a --


 MR. HINNEFELD: TIB--


 MR. GRIFFON: -- coworker model? 


 DR. BEHLING: TIB-4 model. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- TIB-4 model. 


 MR. GRIFFON: TIB-4 model. TIB-4 covers both 


external and internal. I always focus on 


internal. Okay. Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: And the last one -- again, the last 


one, NIOSH did not address potential radiological 


incidents of -- in the CATI report the survivor 


of the claimant made reference to the fact that 


the individual had to frequently take showers 

prior to coming home from work and that his 


clothing were contaminated and his shoes were 


taken away from him. Again, these would suggest 


that there were issues involving personal 


contamination, but again, as previously cited, 


the person was compensated so the issue of 


minimizing the dose investigation or dose 


reconstruction is justified. 


MR. MAHER: This is the standard technique we use 


for minimization where we give them enough dose 


to make them compensable and it's over. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. Yes, so it's just a technical 


issue in making that -- it would have been all 


different -- those three different sit-- 


conditions would have been different in a noncompensable case. 


MR. MAHER: That's right. 


 DR. BEHLING: Case 63, this is West Valley. 


Again, we can probably expedite things, pretty 


much the same issues came up, but again, West 


Valley is probably not a facility that should be 


compensated by TIB-4, so that's the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: It wasn't on the original list of 

facilities. 

 DR. BEHLING: So the first three things we can 

just totally ignore; 63.4 -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is this a compensable or non-- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It's compensable. 


 DR. BEHLING: In fact this was somewhat of a 


hybrid. They did not use the full measure of 


TIB-4. Again, it was a partial application of 


TIB-4, but it was sufficient to compensate the 


person, so it was basically an abridged dose 


reconstruction using TIB-4 as a -- as a generic 


model. 


Now the only question I have, and this is more or 


less an academic question, is -- again, the issue 


that -- what brought this to light was that TIB-4 


states that it should not be used for certain 


types of claims, including lung cancer. In this 


particular case the cancer involved -- it's the 


thoracic region, and based on whether or not you 


define that as an integral part of the 


respiratory system that would be excluded under 


the way that TIB-4 read at the time and so this 


is -- that issue was really a technical issue 


that the TIB-4 really states it shall not be used 


for dose reconstruction involving the lung tissue 


and this cancer was a ET-2 cancer and so that was 


the reason I brought this issue up here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think it -- yeah, it's a 


worthwhile thing to debate, except that the 


latest revision of TIB-4 has removed that. You 


know, it no long excludes its use for lung. 


 DR. BEHLING: That was my real question. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So it no longer excludes its use 


for lung, so it wouldn't -- there's no need -- so 


we -- kind of it goes away. 


DR. MAURO: This is (break in transmission) Stu. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: When I was looking at this West 


Valley I (break in transmission) the application 


of TIB-4 to West Valley and in theory the line of 


argument went like this. (Break in transmission) 


uranium handled at West Valley, there -- and so ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: John --


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- are you on a speaker phone? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, should I pick up? 


 MR. GRIFFON: You're -- you're -- we're losing 


every word -- every third word. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, I'm sorry. Is that better? I'm 


now on my headset. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that's better, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. Yeah. I'm speaking loud into 


my headset. The only thing I was -- would like 


to ask is, you know, when we were talking NUMEC 


and talking Bridgeport Brass, it was clear that 


predominantly both facilities dealt with uranium. 


Bridgeport Brass certainly, NUMEC also, but there 


were other radionuclides. But now we're moving 


into West Valley where it would seem to me that 

we're dealing with a facility where uranium is 


not your principal concern. There are, you know, 


other radionuclides that probably are (break in 


transmission). And then in this case, by 


assuming the uranium as if it were a uranium 


facility and then applying the 100 MAC for the 


airborne dust-loading for inhalation seemed to be 


so far removed from the reality of the operation 


itself (break in transmission) Valley facility 


that it -- that it really went, you know, I would 


say to the point where it was too far removed. 


Are you folk-- I mean that's how I came out. Are 


you folks of the same mind or do you see it 


differently? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No. No, we're of the same mind. 


Yeah, that was one of the errors that was made in 


that use of TIB-4 for compensable claims was we 


didn't worry about the applicability of TIB-4 to 


the particular site. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So yeah, that was clearly -- 


you're right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, thanks. I just wanted to make 


sure I had it right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Then 63.5, Hans? 


 DR. BEHLING: 63.5, yes, the selection of 


solubility class for this case, the dose 


reconstructor elected to use type S, when in fact 

TIB-4 identifies solubility class type M. Now of 


course type S would be considered claimant-


favorable, so under the assumption that we wanted 


to maximize it, the selection of type S for a 


respiratory type cancer would have been claimant-


favorable. On the other hand, it did conflict 


with TIB-4's statement that solubility type M 


should be used generically. So you overestimated 


when you didn't have to. 


 MS. MUNN: Another one of those cases where the 


issue becomes do you go the claimant-favorable 


route at all times, even when it's not really 


appropriate scientifically, or do you follow the 


directive. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Some of this is moot because TIB-4 


is not even applicable. Right? I mean --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Realistically, TIB-4 shouldn't 


have been used at this site. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


 MS. MUNN: It's the same question coming up 


again. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And it probably gets caught up in 


at the time lung being excluded -- 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- for use of TIB-4. Everybody 


thought well, and for every other organ M's going 


to be more favorable so we're going to use M in 


TIB and in the ET, the extraterrestrial or -- 

extraterrestrial -- sometimes we feel that way. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: ET, right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The ET part, extrathoracic part 


of the respiratory tract would be -- that's going 


to look great in the transcript. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Little sense of humor. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, very little. 


 MS. MUNN: You had to be there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The -- I forget my point. 


Anyway, I think it was -- when we excluded the 


lung we just neglected to think about what about 


ET-2 and should we exclude that as well, and so 


we excluded the lungs there and I think that's 


why TIB-4 read the way it did. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But I don't think it reads that 


way anymore. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But I think, just to summarize -- I 


mean there was a -- a -- I don't think you 


strictly followed your initial procedure -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- at the time. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But the point was that you used S, 


which is more favorable in this case, so -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Are we on to 64, Hans? Is there 


anything else on this case? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think that sums it up --

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, West Valley, I'm sorry. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- concludes that one. Let's see 

here, the next one is Jessup Steel, and that 


claim was denied. Again, Jessup Steel was 


defined in behalf of -- dose reconstruction was 


done in behalf of TIB-4 and we've looked at Table 


3. That was the error that we identified 


earlier, so I can skip that first finding. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and the second one. 


 DR. BEHLING: The second one, again, AP geometry 


and DCF value, we can skip that. 65.3, let's see 


-- 64.3, now we are (unintelligible) -- 64.3 is 


inappropriate uncertainty assigned for modeled 


photon dose. Again, this is probably a 


formatting problem where parameter two had 


included some values that should not if you apply 


a dose that's defined as a constant. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, but IREP doesn't use 


parameter two. 


MR. MAHER: It ignores that parameter. 


 DR. BEHLING: It ignores it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So it shows up there, but it's not 


using it. 


 DR. BEHLING: Let me just take a quick look to 


see... Usually you can -- if there's a two value 

that's identified, then you realize that it's 


just a mechanical error, but -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Actual-- excuse me, this is Kathy 


Behling. Actually I think the template for the 


IREP includes a two in parameter two and if 


that's not taken out by the dose reconstructor 


it's erroneously left in there, but as NIOSH is 


indicating, it's -- it's not used because it was 


entered as a constant. 


 DR. BEHLING: But what I'm looking at, Kathy, is 


the actual Appendix A for those particular 


entries, and the two is -- does not appear there. 


It does seem to be a value that differs -- in 


fact it oscillates between 1.26 and 1.82, et 


cetera. And so it suggests that a generic 


uncertainty value was not used if you look at the 


Appendix A for this case. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, I'm looking at it. Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: And that's what made us question 

the --

 MR. GRIFFON: But doesn't --

 DR. BEHLING: If you look at the IREP input 

sheet, you will see for the particular entries 


listed, the uncertainty is not a value two. In 


fact it's -- it oscillates between 1.26, 1.82 -- 


goes back and forth. And so I'm not sure if this 


is just a typographical or some kind of error 


associated with the IREP because the numbers do 

change. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I don't know that we could 


possibly reproduce where those parameter two 


numbers came from. I mean we can speculate about 


a few things. Could be that the original dose 


reconstructor erroneously entered it, say as a 


lognormal distribution or something like that 


based on something, and the peer reviewer said 


you're using overestimating technique, this 


should be a constant, and they just changed all 


those param-- all the -- the distribution 


constant and then the dose comes out right. I 


mean I don't know that -- and certainly in our 


shop we would not review parameter two if we had 


a dose identified as a constant in the IREP 


sheet. So it could be -- it could have been a 


spreadsheet that was essentially reused and cut 


and pasted stuff into it that had values already 


in parameter two and we just didn't change them. 


So there's any number of ways you can speculate 


about how they got in there. 


MR. MAHER: But it is not used when you use a 


constant --


 MR. GRIFFON: Bottom line -- if there's agreement 


that it should be a constant, I think it 


(unintelligible) right. 


MR. MAHER: Just the first parameter. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, just the first parameters 

there. 


 DR. BEHLING: 64.4 -- yeah, here's an issue. 


There were dose assignments that go beyond the 


years of employment. We looked at the years of 


employment and apparently the IREP inputs 


contains surface contamination exposures that go 


beyond the period of employment. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That was a mistake. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's something I would quali-- 


qualify as like a quality control thing, you 


know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I guess it -- I suppose. 


mean I don't think that our reviewer would even ­

- would -- I think our reviewer would let it go ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- because if -- if -- this is a 


-- this is a non-compensable claim. The -- it's 


probably not very much dose, and -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, it's quality in the sense of 


the outside world sees this as they assigned me 


dose; I wasn't even there, you know, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, could be. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So then they wonder, you know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. But I mean there -- there 


are doses -- there will be internal doses in 


everybody --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


I 
 MR. HINNEFELD: -- beyond their employment right 


up to the date of diagnosis. 


 DR. BEHLING: And then the last and final one, 


failure to account for all potential occupational 


medical doses. And I think -- I think, John, you 


wrote this one in because you compared the OTIB-4 


values for occupational medical with the generic 


TIB-6 values and you concluded that the TIB-4 


gave much higher values, and the question is why. 


And I guess -- again, here in my write-up, 


apparently this inconsistency has been rectified 


in Revision 3 of TIB-4, which recommends the use 


of ORAU OTIB-6, so apparently you have taken away 


the earlier medical exposure doses that were 


considered. We would -- looked at them, said why 


are they so high and are they in -- why would 


there be a reason for them to be higher. I guess 


the review on the part of NIOSH says let's take 


them back out --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well --


 DR. BEHLING: -- and substitute generic TIB-6 


values. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Well, I think -- I'm 


getting confused now which way it went. When 


TIB-4 was revised to refer to the TIB-6 -- to use 


the TIB-6 values, those early years, that would 


actually move the doses up because the TIB-4 X-


ray doses were lower than the TIB-6 PFG doses. 

So this is part of that open question we had 


about what -- what is the correct -- you know, is 


it correct to apply the research at DOE 


facilities that says you should assume PFG exams. 


Is it correct to apply that research to the 


general public and non-- non-DOE sites when you 


don't even have any particular evidence that the 


X-rays were taken. So that's kind of part of an 


open question that we talked about earlier. 


 DR. BEHLING: And not included in the matrix was, 


again, the reference to the use of 


photofluorography prior to '61. The issue's 


raised why wasn't that considered. And again, 


we've discussed it, that's still under discussion 


with ORAU and NIOSH. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But the current revision includes 


it. Right? I mean where we're at as far as 


today goes. 


So 65 are we on to? 


 DR. BEHLING: 65, this is Chapman Valve, and 


again, the similar things that we've already 


discussed -- the use of TIB-4, and so that 


requires no further discussion. Account for all 


medical exposures -- again, we've discussed that 


issue. 65.4 -- let me see what 65.4 is making 


reference to. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Those two are the same. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah, these are all repeats. 

 MR. GRIFFON: On 65.4? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, 65.4 makes reference to model 


intake via ingestion during uranium operations 


may not be scientifically valid or claimant-


favorable. And John, I don't know if you want to 


take this one --


DR. MAURO: Yeah, this is a generic issue. It's 


recurring, but I think it's been resolved. It 


has to do with the -- the basic approach that 


NIOSH has adopted in the past for the ingestion 


pathway from -- from deposited radionuclides, and 


also for the resuspension path-- (break in 


transmission) --deposited uranium. We -- we --


and this goes all the way back to Bethlehem 


Steel. The fundamental approach had to do with 


one predicting what might be on surfaces on some 


generic assumptions regarding deposition 


velocities, and then certain generic assumptions 


once the stuff is on the surfaces, how would it 


go from the surface and then be inadvertently 


ingested. So the basic approach that's been used 


across the board on all of these, for the 


ingestion pathway and for the resuspension 


pathway, from the deposited residual activity has 


been that there would be a direct proportionality 


between what's airborne during an operation and ­

- and then place an upper bound on what might be 


ingested. And one of our concerns that we 

brought up -- and this will -- again, goes all 


the way back to Bethlehem Steel -- was well, you 


know, what might be on surfaces may not very well 


be directly proportional to what's in the air 


because the process by which surfaces become 


contaminated may be from other -- other mech-- 


(break in transmission) not only from the 


deposition of fine, 5-micron particles. So as a 


result, I think this issue has been resolved in 


principle. I believe that NIOSH has accepted 


that, has come up with a new methodology that 


they incorporated into the latest version of 


Bethlehem Steel, which we believe is -- meets -- 


satisfies the concerns we raised. But these 


cases that we're looking at now still use the old 


methods, but I believe there's agreement (break 


in transmission) really need to be revised and -- 


and are -- and have been revised, and the degree 


to which you may or may not need to revisit a 


particular case in light of that, you know, I -- 


I don't know, but -- but we're going to continue 


to see this deposited residual radioactivity 


issue emerge again and again because -- and 


historically that's the method that was used, but 


I believe that problem has been solved. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Where -- where does that model 


stand, Stu? Has that been completed and -- I 


know --

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's not clear to me --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- Bethlehem Steel. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's not clear to me that it's 


completed. There's work underway, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's on the overarching issues 


list, I believe. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, it's on our -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- will remain there, I guess, for 


this item --


 MR. HINNEFELD: For this item I think we should 


address overarching. 


 DR. WADE: And we would like -- we'll have an 


overarching presentation in December, and we 


would expect that this would be on the list. 


DR. MAURO: Say, Stu (break in transmission) so 


the latest version of Bethlehem Steel, you know, 


we have not looked at, we haven't been asked to 


look at it, that's now on the web, do you know 


whether or not that includes the new method that 


Jim desc-- if you recall, during the closeout 


process Jim and you folks described a new 


protocol for this scenario that we all agreed was 


reasonable and appropriate. I'm just assuming 


that that protocol was in fact adopted and 


incorporated into the Bethlehem Steel revised 


site profile. And that being the case, it sounds 

like that -- you know, that that was a done deal. 


But what I'm hearing is that you're still looking 


at that? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think -- now I've not 


been engaged in that particular issue, but my 


understanding is that the Bethlehem Steel -- a 


changed model is used in Bethlehem Steel. It now 


uses a changed model. But that there was some 


discussion that that might be a Bethlehem Steel-


specific sort of solution in that the ingestion 


remai-- in general remains a broa-- an 


overarching issue to -- to deal with. 


DR. MAURO: I agree. I think the way we -- in 


fact, this might be helpful. We -- we all came 


to the same place. There are times when the 


material that's deposited on surfaces only gets 


there because there's fine airborne particulates 


that are continually depositing on surfaces. And 


then the method that you guys have been using 


historically, you know, has merit. But if you 


have situations where surfaces are deposited like 


they are at Bethlehem Steel or other steel 


facilities, steel handling faci-- met-- uranium 


steel (break in transmission) for these where the 


particles might be large, flake off, or there 


might be spills that are not related necessarily 


to the airborne dust loading, then the new method 


is used. So I think that -- I think that's where 

we might be, and I gue-- perhaps the whole story 


has not yet been developed, but you have applied 


the new method on Bethlehem Steel. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: So I think that might just be where 


we are. 


 DR. WADE: And we'll hear about the generic issue 


in December. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: John, just in principle, when you 


speak if you could pick up the handset -- 


DR. MAURO: I apologize, I will do that in the 


future. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's better. 


 DR. WADE: -- as a matter of rule. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the last issue, 65.5, 


involves an issue regarding incidents as defined 


in the comments made in the CATI report. We 


reviewed the CATI report and the Energy employee 


did make some reference to accidents, and we do 


know that in June of 1948 there was a fire at the 


Chapman Valve facility, and there was no attempt 


to at least look at potential exposures 


associated with radiological incidents. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I mean the -- this was a -- 


this is still a TIB-4 case. Right? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, but it was denied. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: A TIB-4 case, I'm pretty sure 


that that TIB-4 intake applied over the course of 


employment exceeds the expected from that. We 


know about -- we know some information about the 


fire. We don't know perfect information about 


the fire but we have some information about the 


fire. We're very confident that even with that 


fire-related exposure -- and for that matter, 


episodic incidents in the uranium proc-- you 


know, the machining plant, are kind of predicated 


as that's a part of this TIB-4 intake. So we 


felt like the intake of TIB-4 sufficiently 


bounded this person's intake in light of the fact 


that they were probably exposed as they 


described, and so --


 MR. GRIFFON: What surprised me in your response 


here is that you didn't -- just what you said 


there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, we're better at that now 


than we were when we did this dose 


reconstruction, but yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: TIB-4, you know, we've looked at it 


-- TIB-4. We believe it will be bounding of any 


incident. That's kind of the -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We choose language like that. It 


doesn't say that exactly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I mean your response may 

(unintelligible) don't say that in the matrix 


here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Oh, okay, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: I may be able to add a little bit -- 


turns out I just finished completing my review of 


the Chapman Valve site profile and SEC petition, 


and what you've just described, Stu, I concur in. 


Namely, Chapman Valve has a -- the situation 


there was -- the generic approach was to assume 


47 MAC as being the continuous chronic exposure 


that all workers experienced, and then -- and 


then what Chapman Valve does is it superimposes 


upon that an additional acute from a fire. And I 


agree that if you were to assume 100 MAC, as TIB4 does across the board always, that would more 


than account for the exposures that might occur 


episodically. So I agree that -- that the TIB-4 


approach would in fact be bounding for Chapman 


Valve workers. 


 DR. WADE: But this response needs to be 


modified. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, I was just going to ask. 


MR. MAHER: And I'd also point out that when we 


have incident data and sometimes (unintelligible) 


there's, you know, (unintelligible) bioassay data 


we find, we of course apply that to the -- the 


(unintelligible) dosimetry and (unintelligible) 


on top of the old TIB-4. 

 DR. WADE: So on to 66 --


 MR. GRIFFON: This is another -- let me just ask 


one more thing on -- on 65. This was on the 


original list of TIB-4 sites, I believe. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: What was the company again? 


MULTIPLE SPEAKERS: Chapman Valve. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'm pretty sure it was, but -- 


I'm pretty sure it was. Yes, it is. 


 DR. WADE: Not to celebrate too long, we're a 


quarter of the way through. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the easy ones. The easy 


ones. 


 DR. WADE: We celebrate when we conclude. 


 DR. BEHLING: The last AWE is a case involving 


Heppenstall Company, and again, we can probably 


expedite things. The same issue that we've 


already discussed defines the first finding, use 


of TIB-4. Again, the second one, the same thing 


about AP geometry and DCF, so you can knock that 


off. The inappropriate uncertainty assigned, 


there I think I looked at the IREP sheet. It 


says constant but you have parameter for 


uncertainty defined as two, which instantly would 


signal that this is obviously an issue that 


involves (unintelligible). 66 -- failure to 


account for all potential occupational medical, 


let's see, let's --


 MR. GRIFFON: That's the one we discussed before, 

I believe. Right? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, again, this involves generic 


values in TIB-6 versus those in model TIB-4 and 


the photofluorography, so we've pretty much 


discussed all of the issues that involve this 


particular case previously, so we can -- we can 


go on from -- we can put this one behind us. 


Okay, is there any need to take a break or you 


want to go to lunch? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I was just thinking we're getting 


into the harder ones now, but -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, we're going to get into some 

--

 MR. GRIFFON: I think we should open this one up 

and take lunch at noontime. I mean we just -- 


you know. 


So this is case 67. 


 DR. BEHLING: This is case 67, yes. It involves 


a Savannah River Site claim. Notable about this 


claim that this represents a best estimate -- 


this is probably the first real, true-blue best 


estimate we've encountered in our dose 


reconstruction audits, and we identified a number 


of issues that I think are very technical and -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Hans --


 DR. BEHLING: -- they require some -- some 


discussion. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- since we have several Savannah 

-- 

River cases here, can you -- I don't want to 


identify the NOCTS ID -- I don't think we should 


identify that on the record, but can you just 


write down on a piece of paper which -- do you 


know the NOCTS ID for this one? I've looked at 


four of them. I've got notes -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Kathy, do you --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I've got it, I've got it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Here you go. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, go ahead. 


 DR. BEHLING: And again, I don't want to touch 


numbers that may identify the individual by 


citing the POC. It was -- other than to say it 


was very, very high. The claim was denied, of 


course. The person had colon cancer, I will say 


that. That's the kind of cancer. And so let's 


go and look at the findings. 


I'm going to have to spend a little bit of time 


reading 'cause some of these things are very, 


very complex and as much as you can read them and 


I only had since Friday, so I haven't had much 


time to really delve into some of the issues, but 


 MS. BEHLING: Maybe I can interject here -- this 


is Kathy Behling -- if you would like me to. 


 DR. BEHLING: Go ahead. 


 MS. BEHLING: Finding 67.1 and 67.2 -- this has 

to do with an error that we have identified in 


the workbook that was being used. This was a 


Savannah River Site. It's the EDCW version I 


think, zero (break in transmission) point one 


five workbook --


 DR. WADE: Kathy, are you on a speaker phone? 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, I am. 


 DR. WADE: Please pick up, if you don't mind. 


 MS. BEHLING: I'm sorry. 


 DR. WADE: It's obvious to us. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay, is that better? I'm sorry. 


Again, this was an issue where the -- we've 


identified an error in the workbook. This is a 


Savannah River-specific -- yeah, a Savannah River 


Site-specific workbook, the EDCW workbook, and it 


was an earlier version. I will state that it 


appears that this error has been corrected in a 


more current version of the workbook. But at 


this time what had happened is the workbook 


introduces a range of DCF values associated with 


the colon for not only the 30 to 250 exposure 


range, but it actually looks at the exposure 


range for the 30 to 250 for all the geometries, 


and it selects the minimum value from all 


geometries as opposed to just the AP geometry, 


and a maximum value from all geometries, which in 


this particular case I believe happens to be the 


AP geometry. And therefore when the Monte Carlo 

technique is used, the -- it is sampling from a 


range of DCF values that is incorrect, and that 


range starts at a lower value or a minimum value 


that is quite a bit lower than what it should be 


looking at. In other words, I think the AP 


geometry -- let me look -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Kathy, can I interrupt -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- because I have the numbers in 

front of me. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: I'd forgotten what this issue was 

about until I turned the page and you'd already 


taken the lead on this, but again, we had all 


concluded one thing is that the DCF values should 


be confined to AP geometry, and yet the workbook 


uses a sampling method that selects from the 


lowest and the highest, independent of what the 


DC-- what the geometry is. And in this case, for 


the 30 to 250-keV photon range -- energy range, 


for the colon the DCF at the lower end has 0.226 


and at the high end of 0.798. On the other hand, 


the minimum DCF is defined in behalf of the 


isotropic geometry which starts out at 0.056. So 


in essence, the way the workbook currently 


operates is to take the lowest DCF, which in most 


instances -- in this case, especially -- use the 


isotropic value as the starting lower end of the 

triangular distribution when in fact instead of 


using 0.226 as a starting point for sampling, the 


value of 0.056. So there's a fourfold lower 


value in the DCF, and that's a generic error that 


we identified in the workbook that was applied 


here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, and as part of the -- the 


whole issue of we didn't start out using a whole 


-- wholly 100 percent AP and so we have to 


identify these cases and go re-evaluate as part 


of that whole prog-- Program Evaluation Report. 


UNIDENTIFIED: We're doing that right now. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So the -- the -- to make a long 


story short on this item number one, 67.1, you 


re-evaluate any cases that use this -- that 


approach? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. Yeah, and I'm sorry it's 


not in the response. We'll add -- we'll add that 


to our response. 


We'll add it to our response. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the next findings are also -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: In this particular case -- I'm 


sorry to interrupt, but this one was a close -- a 


borderline case --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It was high, but not 50 percent, 


so yeah, it was pretty close. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But it will be re-evaluated, 


though. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 


 DR. BEHLING: The next three findings involve 


67.3, 4 and 5, and we sort of group them 


together. We identified that the records were 


inconsistent. I looked at the annual summary 


doses, and they did not match the quarterly 


assigned doses. And it turns out the annual 


doses were lower than the quarterly recorded 


doses. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Actually they do match. The --


in the quarterly doses that are provided with the 


case, the wrong person's doses -- the wrong 


person is underlined. It's a person who has the 


same surname as this Energy employee, but -- but 


is a different employee. This Energy employee 


fortunately is on the same page, several lines 


lower than the underlined, and so when you use 


this employee's correct quarterly dose for the 


third quarter, it lines up and it totals -- the 


annual totals do add up to what the total is on 


(unintelligible). Now since it -- you can't 


redact all that and show what it means, I don't 


have it with me now but I can produce it. And if 


you look on the -- in the AR in the response on 


those pages where the quarterly responses are 


provided, you can see that Savannah River, when 


they were identifying the person -- the related 


person, underlined the wrong person. The -- he 

has the same surname, but -- but different first 


and second initials, and the EE is about ten 


lines lower on the same page. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I think that's something you 


can double-check --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- outside of this meeting. Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: I guess when I looked at it I focus 


on the underlined --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Absolutely, absolutely, that's 


what I do, too. It took me the longest time to 


figure out what was going on. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Can I interrupt just for a 


second? Kathy, can -- while you -- while you're 


doing this, since you probably have -- you're in 


a better position, can you make the necessary 


notation behind each of these findings on the 


spreadsheet? 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, I'm doing that. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, because --


 MR. GRIFFON: Just to go back to 67.1 'cause I -- 


seemed like there -- I mean the DCF issue I've 


got, but in the -- earlier in your response you ­

- you're talking about -- let's see, it's in the 


-- it's -- it's a question of zero readings 


versus no monitoring that I was looking at. That 


seems to be a separate issue -- separate and 

apart from the DCF issue, isn't it? Is -- my 


question is were they -- were these zeroes -- 


were these blanks in the record, if they were 


blanks, how were they tre-- you know, how -- how 


did you treat blanks versus zeroes? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I don't know, Ed or Mutty, 


can you comment on that? 


 MR. SHARFI: Sure. I mean in the earlier years 


we did -- we did get a -- they do have a lot of 


blanks and it is in OCAS's TIB -- it's one of the 


early OCAS TIBs that cover -- that does -- they 


do have a TIB that covers Savannah River's 


reporting records, and blanks are considered 


zeroes. Savannah River in their records, if -- 


if no dose was recorded, they left the result in 


their manual recordings as a blank, so we do then 


enter a zero in as the -- to replace a blank in 


the record --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- for Savannah River. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So Savannah's site-specific policy 


was that blanks would mean -- or -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Are zeroes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But it wasn't that they weren't 


monitored. 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: I guess I --

 MR. GRIFFON: You would have treated it as less 


than detectable and not -- okay. Go ahead, Hans, 


I'm sorry. 


 DR. BEHLING: The secondary issues -- I'm reading 


here quickly -- involves when you have just a 


quarterly dose (electronic interference) person 


was monitored monthly, you have no way of 


recognizing whether or not that dose was spread 


evenly or was a single monthly dose with two 


zeroes. The question is were all potential 


missed doses accounted for given the incomplete 


data that we had to work with. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, I don't know, but I would 


guess --


 MR. SHARFI: Probably more of a claim-specific. 


I'd have to actually look at the data itself, but 


generally, even if you're given quarterly data -- 


I mean in the same case in other sites, like 


Rocky Flats, where we give summary data, there 


are ways to estimate -- based on exchange 


frequencies -- the expected number of, you know, 


blank records or -- or --


UNIDENTIFIED: TBD will have some of that 


information, too. 


 DR. BEHLING: But what do you do? I guess I'm 


still confused. Let's assume that in this case I 


have annual sum doses, I have quarterly sum 


doses, but not monthly doses. And the question 

is, do I assign for every -- a highly 


conservative approach would be to assign all 


quarterly doses to a single wear period and 


assume two zeroes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, but Savannah River -- just 


for the Savannah River record that has the 


quarterly dose, it also has some cycle results, 


meaning the cycle -- the third cycle, that's the 


monthly report of the third month of the quarter, 


so you'll have the third month of the quarter and 


you'll have the quarterly total. So if those two 


numbers are the same, then you clearly have two 


zeroes. If those two numbers aren't the same, 


then I think what we're using is we're figuring 


there's one zero, because we know that there are 


two readings that aren't zero, so we'll put one 


in as zero. I think that's what we're doing, but 


I won't swear to it. 


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling. Based on 


what I've seen in the most -- in the Savannah 


River Sites for -- associated with I guess the 


fifth set, that's exactly what they were doing. 


They're looking at the cycle data on the 


quarterly data. If they are the same, they use 


two zeroes and they are being fairly claimant-


favorable in that approach. 


 MS. MUNN: And Kathy, two zeroes would give -- in 


that instance that you just reported -- 

approximately how much additional dose? 


 MS. BEHLING: The zero would be assigned to the 


two months, and it would depend on the LOD value, 


so they would take an LOD divided by two and they 


-- but they would assume that there would be 


missed dose there as opposed to assuming that 


that quarterly dose was spread out over three 


months. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I understood that, but the -- 


the approximate -- I've never been very clear in 


my own mind how much real dose -- I shouldn't say 


real dose. How much assumed dose is actually 


recorded in a case like that? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, for a period where the LOD 


is 40, for instance, it would be 20 millirem 


(electronic interference) a month assigned as the 


mean of a normal distribu-- of a lognormal 


distribution. 


 MS. MUNN: And that's a fairly common -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: -- level of (unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: In radiolo-- in radioepidemiology 


assessment, that's a fairly common treatment for 


a zero reading. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. Right. 


MR. MAHER: The TBD gives you a different value 


over different time periods and I could put 


(unintelligible) --

 MS. MUNN: Correct, correct --


MR. MAHER: -- and we would use what's -- 


 MS. MUNN: -- but I'm trying to identify what 


that --


MR. MAHER: Oh, the --


 MS. MUNN: -- that baseline is --


MR. MAHER: -- the magnitude of -- 


 MS. MUNN: -- that -- that -- yeah, the 


magnitude. 


MR. MAHER: -- (unintelligible). 


 MS. MUNN: So that if we were saying that this 


kind of treatment was being applied over a whole 


year; i.e., you have readings, but you're 


assuming that two of the quarterly doses are zero 


doses so you're assigning additional dose to 


them, then in all probability over a period of a 


year, an individual would have accumulated say 


something on the order of 100 additional 


millirem. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: On that order. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, right. Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Between 100 and 200. 


MS. MUNN: Between 100 and 200. 


 MS. BEHLING: 160. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This can be a recurring theme, too, 


but the -- this question of when there's blanks 


and when there's zeroes, and when the blanks are 


really gaps in the individual's monitoring versus 

-- I'm not sure I completely -- I mean I'll -- 


I'll defer for -- I'm talking specifically to 


Savannah River. I'm not as familiar with the -- 


I looked briefly at this cycle data being 


quarterly data, and if -- I mean if -- I don't 


know if Savannah River -- for instance, if people 


were cycled out of -- not to use cycle, but if 


they were rotated out of a rad area, didn't 


require monitoring, would they just have a gap on 


these sheets? They wouldn't have an entry with a 


blank? Is that the distinction? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, Savannah River -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) have an entry with 


a blank that they -- that they're saying equals a 


zero, and I'm saying that they were monitored but 


they had a zero. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: At Savannah River, as I 


understand it, at least for certain years at 


Savannah River, if someone was monitored for a 


portion of the year and then for one month like 


cycled out and were not monitored, it would look 


like they were and they got a zero. That's the 


way -- that's the -- the record we get would look 


that way, at least for some individuals. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Then the question is if you 


have -- I mean, you know, how do you -- how do 


you treat that, and I think you -- kind of a 


triage approach, but if you have a large chunk of 

those missing, I think you'd probably go to 


coworker model type stuff. 


MR. MAHER: Right, if you find their job hadn't 


changed and they should have been monitored, then 


we'd go to something like that, that's right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, and if it's like one 


missing, you probably just say put a zero in -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: A zero. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, okay. I -- I think it 


becomes important in this case because of the -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know that we can go much 


further on that right now, but I would -- other 


than to look back more -- at least I understand 


now that the blanks, for the most part, were -- 


or that was a Savannah River policy in the 


database (unintelligible) put blank in for 


zeroes. 


Hans, do you have any follow-up on that -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- part for now? I think --


 DR. BEHLING: I'm trying to scan through -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: The main response I have for that 


first one is that the DCF -- that you're going to 


re-evaluate --


 MR. HINNEFELD: To re-evaluate --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- Use that old workbook or 


whatever, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: And I think several of the other 


findings all relate to the issue of not being 


able to match the quarterly doses to the yearly 


doses, because we were looking -- or the wrong 


name was underlined. I think we can 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: And Kathy's got that note just to ­

- you think we should take that, should check 


into that and make sure that you're in agreement. 


I think we will be, but... 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, I think we can go -- let me 


see if there's anything else here. There is, 


however, one thing that -- again, I'm trying to 


scan through more pages here that define each of 


these one-statement findings. I looked at the 


Technical Basis Document for Savannah River and 


also the location where this person worked at the 


773-A facility, and the recommendation there is 


to use a photon energy split that 50 percent 30 


to 250 and 50 percent 250 or greater, and -- and 


that would certainly -- again, not only was the 


issue of the triangular distribution using 


isotropic, the low end, misused, but using the 


energy distribution as defined in the TBD for 50 


percent between 30 and 250 and 50 percent greater 


than 250, you again raise the -- the energies for 


the photons, especially when you talk about 


greater than 250, because now the triangular 

distribution oscillates between a low of 0.798 to 


a high of 0.891, and certainly that would 


significantly raise the potential dose 


assignment. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and the -- as a general 


rule we believe that 30 to 250 -- assigning 100 


percent 30 to 250 is -- is claimant-favorable 


because the radiation effectiveness factor in 


that energy range is higher than it is for 


greater than 250. I think for this case what we 


should do is just demonstrate (unintelligible) 


with doing them both, do the doses with 100 


percent 30 to 250 with the correct DCF range so 


just the AP DCF range and so on, and also do it 


with a 50/50 split with the -- with each 50 


percent getting its correct DCF range and then -- 


then once you get a dose, that dose will be -- it 


will be higher with a 50/50 split, but you put 


those values into IREP and I believe the POC will 


be higher for the 100 percent 30 to 250 because 


of the effectiveness factors, but we -- I think 


we can just -- just lay that out and do it, 


that'd be straightforward. 


 DR. BEHLING: Certainly the -- certainly the dose 


will go up. Whether the POC will go up -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: One of the things that was 


identified in your write-up where you attempted 

to also redefine the POC using different DCF 


values, you make mention for the low energy 


photons -- initially in the dose reconstruction 


used for the less than 30 keV DCF -- a value of 


0.06, which is the central value for the colon -- 


yeah, as I recall here -- yeah, for photon 


energies of less than 30 keV, the DCF AP geometry 


is 0.06, and then in your write-up you define a 


value that is considerably less and you -- I'm 


not sure how you justified the -- it goes from 


0.06 to 0.0226, so a factor of two -- more than a 


factor of two lower. Initially in my write-up I 


agreed with what you did, but in your response 


here that I only had a chance to look at since 


Friday, you changed your mind about that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the --


 DR. BEHLING: You see where I am --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I know what -- I know which 


-- I know which one you're talking about. There 


is a -- we have a set of dose conversion factors 


that are plutonium-specific, and plutonium is 17 


keV. And the DCF energy ranges in the 


implementation guide, with the broad energy bands 


for less than 30, that encompasses a fairly broad 


band of potential DCFs, and so you have a fairly 


broad band of -- of -- of potential conversions, 


you know, to use. But if you have pretty good 


knowledge that -- or if you're -- you have a good 

set of knowledge that the low energy photon 


exposure was due to plutonium, then you have 


actually a mono-energetics* force and so you can 


have -- you can do a better job of a DCF 


determination for -- for a plutonium low energy 


photon exposure. So that's -- that's the -- 


that's the origin of the other set of DCFs. 


 DR. BEHLING: That does, however, bring up an 


issue, because it came up in another instance 


where in some cases where low energy photon 


spectra are compensated by virtue of the cadmium 


filter being somehow or other less than objective 


in defining the dose for low energy photons, 


including those at the low end of the 30 keV 


because of cadmium having a high (unintelligible) 


value, 48 --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- and this photoelectric 


interaction is driven by (unintelligible) to the 


third power, then you have a thousand milligram 


per centimeter squared filter, it will attenuate 


more if it's cadmium than a thousand milligram 


per centimeter squared filter of tissue 


equivalency at 6.7 (unintelligible) value. So 


the question is, in some cases -- I believe at 


Rocky Flats and elsewhere -- you actually raised 


the -- the -- or do a dose adjustment by ten 


percent or even up to 25 percent, and I wasn't 

sure whether this was another issue here that you 


attempted to correct the low energy photon 


component. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I'm not very knowledgeable 


about Rocky Flats. I believe the low energy 


photon was generated from the non-penetrating 


result than the -- on the -- on the dosimeter at 


Savannah River, wasn't it? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, for Savannah River I think 


they subtracted deep dose from the shallow dose, 


and then they applied the less than 30 keV -- 


initially it was defined by DCF of 0.06 and then 


they converted it to 0.0226 and then -- that's 


the issue here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: And I wouldn't concern myself, but 


this guy is very close -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think --


 DR. BEHLING: -- and every effort was made to 


sort of say how can we reduce this guy by what's 


-- and then justify it on a technical basis, and 


so I'm on the other side trying to say what was 


the justification. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think that the -- it 


certainly warrants more discussion than we can 


give it today, and it apparently warrants more 


internal NIOSH discussion than has been applied 


so far about the -- you know, the use of 

plutonium-specific DCFs in this case, or do we 


have a -- you know, do we have a firm policy on 


when it should -- when those should be used. So 


today I think it would be an open issue. I think 


this whole number -- this whole case number, 67, 


I think we could -- we could redo and -- and I 


think ultimately -- well, because we've still got 


other issues to get through as well that are 


relatively tough -- and have essentially a 


firmly-blessed one because, you know, we do dose 


reconstruction, dose reconstruction comes out, 


we're getting into some fairly -- very difficult 


technical questions here and we want to be sure 


we have the best person -- you know, Jim Neton 


doesn't look -- you know, the best person on our 


side is Jim Neton. Jim Neton doesn't look at 


every dose reconstruction. And so get him 


involved in making sure that the decisions we've 


made in terms of this -- this case are the 


correct ones and we're going to continue to 


proceed this way. And we're just -- you know, we 


haven't done that at this point. So I -- I will 


say that I think what we should do is rework it 


the way we think it needs to be reworked, all 


this -- you know, that NIOSH would have the best 


minds at NIOSH agreeing this is the way it should 


be reworked, and then -- and then we'll come back 


to the Board. And if it -- you know, if it 

changes the outcome, it changes the outcome. 


 MR. GRIFFON: To my knowledge, plutonium-specific 


DCF -- this will be in an area you wouldn't 


expect much americium in with this material or... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: To be honest, I don't even know. 


I know that's what that says -- I know that's 


what the response says -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- but I don't really know for 


sure. 


MR. MAHER: Depends on the age of the material. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, are we at 67.7? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think so. 


 DR. BEHLING: I guess -- well, we had identified 


the failure to assign on-site ambient dose for 


the year 1980, '81 and '82, and OTIB-7 should 


have been referenced -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah, we agree with that. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Which one are we on, Hans? Let me 

catch up. 

 DR. BEHLING: 67.7 -- okay, 67.8 -- now we're 

getting into internal. I wonder if this would be 


a good time to take a break because internal is 


going to take quite some time. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I guess we can break for 

lunch. 


 DR. WADE: What time back, an hour? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, let's take an hour, so be 


back a little before 1:00 o'clock. 


 DR. WADE: We're going to break here for lunch, 


ostensibly an hour. We'll connect back in like 


45 minutes, but we're going to break the contact 


now. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. Back by 1:00? 


 DR. WADE: We're going to -- we're going to 


connect at a quarter of. It'll probably be 1:00 


before we actually begin. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 MR. GIBSON: Thanks, bye. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 11:50 a.m. to 


12:55 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: Okay, this is the workgroup confer-- 


the -- excuse me, the subcommittee conference 


room, and we are about to go back into session. 


I would ask if there are any Board members on the 


line? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, Lew, this is Mike. I'm here. 


 DR. WADE: Hi, Mike, welcome back. Brad Clawson 


is not with us; he left mid-morning. Gen is 


here, Wanda and Mark, so we'll begin. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. Hans, I think we left 


off on case 67, and 67.8 seems to be internal 

dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: Right. Yeah, the first one -- and 


again, some of these are complex, and if there's 


a period of a few seconds, it's because I'm 


reading the statements that lead up to the actual 


finding and -- some of these are complex. 


I guess finding 67.8 we identified as NIOSH did 


not properly account for all internal doses from 


fission products, and for the -- for missed 


fission products internal doses, NIOSH was 


limited barium-140 and lanthanum-140, and we 


questioned whether or not that is really as 


claimant-favorable as it is stated to be. And I 


think we're going to get into that later on when 


we talk about some of the whole body count data 


as well as chest count data where there's a 


default approach to saying well, we'll use the 


most limiting radionuclide and apply MDA and use 


that as a way of saying we're claimant favorable 


and at the expense of obviously deleting other 


radionuclides that would clearly also be there in 


conjunction with barium or lanthanum-140 in this 


case. And in fact, in addition to those 


radionuclides that are gamma-emitters and are 


oftentimes found below MDA, one should also look 


at, for instance, certain beta-emitters such as 


strontium and yttrium-90, which would not even be 


there under any circumstances. So the question 

that we have here is the issue of limiting 


yourself to a single radionuclide -- even though 


that radionuclide, in a mixture, may be one that 


give you the highest single dose -- at the 


expense of ignoring all others. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And I can -- I think -- I would 


like to just speak briefly about this and 


recognize that a really complete discussion of 


Savannah River mixed fission product internal 


dosimetry approach really requires its own real 


discussion, with perhaps some different people in 


the room -- from the ORAU side and from the NIOSH 


side, at least. There is a basis for the mixed 


fission product approach in Savannah River. 


It'll be a fairly involved technical discussion 


to get to -- you know, to describe that. 


In general in a mixed fission product environment 


it is a calculation convenience to choose -- you 


know, if all the fission product activ-- where 


activity were of this particular radionuclide, 


that would provide the highest dose and so that 


would be the way to do that. 


Now in this situation, as you pointed out, the 


measurement was an -- was an in vivo non-detect, 


and so what we had was a measurement that was 


indicative of each specific radionuclide, not the 


totality of mixed fission products. So the basis 


of going from the thought process that in mixed 

fission products choose the most -- you know, the 


most claimant-favorable dose nuclide and assume 


all other mixed fission product to that to the 


cases where we have here where we don't have a 


total mixed fission product count is something I 


think requires a discussion of its own. That 


could occur in the Savannah River site profile 


review. It could occur in a future discussion of 


this group. And we -- like I said, we do need to 


get additional NIOSH and ORAU people in the 


discussion. Or -- you know, or whatever venue 


you want it to take. And since we're going to be 


-- I think we probably need to rework this case 


anyway, we could do it at that time. You know, 


come back with a reworked case 67 and engage in 


that discussion at that time as well. I mean the 


venue time isn't very important, but I think 


this'll be -- this will be a pretty difficult one 


to resolve and it'll take quite a bit of 


discussion. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think it's satisfied, but 


for those people who are not quite familiar what 


this issue is, I have to go back to the previous 


page here that precedes the finding. In this 


case we have whole body counting that suggests 


we're looking for a cerium-144, chromium-51, 


iodine-131, ruthenium-106, zirconium-95, zinc-65 


and cobalt-60, and -- and as I already mentioned, 

they've elected to use cerium-144 as the limiting 


radionuclide for this particular tissue and using 


the MDA value decided to say that that's 


claimant-favorable. And for that radionuclide it 


would be, but what it does ignore are the other 


radionuclides. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so I think Stu, maybe to -- 


to just sort of lead up to this discussion 


whether -- I actually think it would be best to 


put this issue in the site profile discussion. 


But I think to lead up to that, would NIOSH -- is 


NIOSH or do you have currently any description of 


-- of these -- you know, sort of a what-if -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The -- the -- what's the basis of 


it? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, what's the technical basis 


and -- you know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there's ----


 MR. GRIFFON: Looks like there's kind of a triage 


and --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- there's probably -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- there's probably some language 


in the site profile, but I don't know how 


descriptive it is. You know, our site profile 


language sometimes isn't the easiest to follow 


along the technical debate of it or the technical 


theme of it, so I think we would -- we would 

start there and see what's there already, and 


then kind of look at -- you know, and perhaps 


embellishing it for future discussions of this 


group or Savannah River site profile group or 


whatever --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- whatever venue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean 'cause all -- all I was 


thinking sort of an action out of this might be 


to -- if it --


 MR. HINNEFELD: For us to ensure that it 


happened, we can --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- yes, yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- have some basis ready so we 


don't --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- spin our wheels with the same 


discussion, you know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: And just to cap it off, I 


understand that at least the fundamental concept 


behind this approach is probably analogous to a 


urine data where you don't know what the mixture 


is but you assume that if they're all beta-


emitters will take the least -- the most -- the 


most limiting of most claimant-favorable one. In 


this case it doesn't work out. 

Okay, 67.8 -- no, 67.9 is the issue -- and I'm 


going back here in my notes, or at least in the 


audit. It states that -- in the dose 


reconstruction that the use of type M for a 


plutonium mix is claimant favorable and therefore 


type M was used. When -- when we were in -- in 


the -- and we substituted type S as opposed to 


type M for this particular organ, we end up with 


a considerably higher dose. If the intent was to 


be claimant-favorable, type S probably would have 


been your choice of solubility. If you can show 


-- convince me that type M was more likely the 


probable solubility, than that choice would have 


also been the case, but I think -- I took 


exception to the statement that we're being 


claimant favorable by assuming a more soluble 


form, when in fact when you start out with a 


urine sample and you work backwards and then feed 


that information back into IMBA, you end up with 


a higher organ dose for -- for -- for type S. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think it's a good point that we 


shouldn't refer to class M as claimant favorable. 


It wasn't selected because it was claimant 


favorable, it was selected because it fit the 


bioassay data. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and -- and as I said, if --


if -- if there is documentation that says the 


type M, based on -- on TBD information that would 

suggest it's type M, that that would certainly be 


acceptable. I just took exception to the 


statement that this - this assumption was 


necessary claimant favorable. 


 MR. SHARFI: Also this particular case, but 


that's -- if you're assuming just bioassay, that 


might be true, but you have to consider this 


person also had chest counts, and when you get 


into type S you're going to get the americium 


associated with the type S that probably will 


show much smaller intakes (unintelligible) the 


chest count where then the urinalysis assuming 


type M is more claimant favorable. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, you -- I understand your 


argument, but you would also have to have a chest 


count that is relatively coincidental in time 


with the urine so as to at least provide some 


measure of assurance that the two are somewhat in 


concert with each other. 


But anyway, if type M is the appropriate 


selection, then the argument goes away. 


 MS. MUNN: It sounds as if it is. 


 UNIDENTIFIED TELEPHONE PARTICIPANT: Hello? I'm 


sorry, the volume disappeared. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, are we back? Can't you hear us? 


 UNIDENTIFIED TELEPHONE PARTICIPANT: Well, very, 


very, very lowly, and at 84 my hearing is less 


than perfect, but that's all right, that's not -- 

that's my -- my hard luck, not yours. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll try to speak up. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, we're hearing you clearly. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, finding 67.10, this centers 


around a conversion value and I'm trying to read 


where -- what the finding really was -- (reading) 


SC&A cannot determine the basis for uranium 


urinalysis conversion factors. And the 


conversion factor that apparently came into the 


dose reconstruction methodology involves a one 


microgram per liter of uranium is equivalent to 


109 picocuries per liter, and I guess I was 


questioning how that -- it's obviously a sign of 


-- of uranium -- enriched uranium, but I'm at a 


loss to explain what that enrichment is. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's a specific mixture 


identified in the glossary of the site -- of the 


site profile, HEU, and so using that specific 


mixture that's defined in the glossary and the 


specific activity conversions, that's the 


composite conversion you get. 


 DR. BEHLING: The second issue in -- in that, and 


I'm not sure -- let me see if it's even 


identified -- no, it's not in the matrix. The 


second one is the issue of converting -- or 


making assumptions with regard to the intake 


regimes. I believe in this case we had two 


chronic intake regimes for -- for all of the 

bioassays involving uranium urinalysis data and 


eight acute intake regimes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Wait, are you on to 11? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, this is still part of 10 -- 


still part of 10. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead. 


 DR. BEHLING: And of course what happens here, 


when you look at the intake regimes, the acute 


intakes regimes apparently were assigned to the 


highest observed urine activity, and to what 


extent one can reasonably justify that on a 


scientific basis, because it tends to reduce the 


collective dose to the organ if you assume an 


acute intake as opposed to a chronic intake, and 


I realize when you guys put this data into IMBA 


you actually plot it out and then you have 


certain programs that would suggest what is the 


most logical interpretation of these periodic 


points in space for -- for measuring urine and 


dates and -- and I'm just not sure I always agree 


or understand how the selection process of an 


acute versus a chronic regime takes place. And I 


-- on -- on the next page I actually have the 


dates that -- that are defined here for the eight 


chronic -- for the eight acute intakes, and 


they're fairly high. There's a couple that 


involve -- in fact, the one that stands out, 


there's one urine sample that contained 180 dpm 

per 1.5 liter, and as it actually turns out, that 


should have been one of the high five selection 


groups and it was considered an acute intake. 


And then most important was the actual time for 


that intake, and I think this is where we're 


going to get into a discussion here because 


apparently the dose reconstructor assumed that 


for the eight acute intakes, the day of intake or 


-- was the day before the bioassay, in some 


instances two days before. And -- and when I 


look at the procedure, it says if the bioassay is 


labeled as routine -- in other words, it's your 


day to come in and have your urinalysis done, 


there's nothing that motivates that; for 


instance, failed respiratory device, an alarm 


going off, a nasal swipe positive -- to what 


extent can one justify an intake that says the 


day before you have your bioassay is when you 


took it in in order to do a dose assessment, when 


in fact the protocol suggests the midway point 


between that day and the previous one. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the -- the protocol 


assigning a mid-- a midway intake is when there's 


not other evidence of what the date occurred, and 


so when you have a long series of bioassay data, 


you can -- you can fit the intake -- you know, 


choose the intake date that fits the bioassay 


curve the best. And so that's generally what's 

done and that's how the intake date then is 


chosen on these selections. The reason why a 


series of, you know, all these various acute 


intakes were taken -- you know, on many occasions 


you'll see a bioassay pattern that moves around a 


little bit and will choose a chronic intake that 


essentially covers the whole lot, realizing that 


the excretion curve is well above some of those 


bioassay data points. Well, that's an 


overestimate of what the actual intake was 


because you've overestimated those various 


excretion points and so that's suitable and much 


easier in a case that you can get by with an 


overestimate. But we're not -- you know, we 


don't provide compensation cases -- 


overestimating compensation cases, so if we have 


a compensable case, we have to do our best 


estimate. That means fitting the bioassay data, 


even when there are a number of episodic acute 


exposures like this. That's what the bioassay 


would indicate. So that's why a lot of acute 


exposures were done, and the intake dates should 


have been selected to best fit the bioassay data. 


And like I've said before, since we've said we're 


going to redo this case, kind of make it a poster 


child for these various issues, I think we can 


probably walk through that in greater detail at 


the point when we do that. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and in fact -- again, for the 


people who don't have the actual table -- I 


looked at the assumed days of intake versus the 


midpoint, and in some instances we're talking 


about months, so clearly if one were more 


claimant favorable and follow the guidance as 


defined in ORAU PROC-3 that says intakes should 


be based on known incidents when information is 


available. When there is no information, default 


data for acute intake or start of a chronic 


intake is the midpoint between the date of the 


sample assumed to indicate the intake and the 


previous sample. So --


 MR. GRIFFON: I think, Hans, there's more -- I 


mean the most compelling point, too, is that 


these are all routine, you say? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: They were routine tests. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) specials drawn 


from an inci-- you know, if it was specials every 


time and you knew you had a known incident, then 


you could say well, it makes sense. You had --


you have paperwork that shows you got exposed the 


day before or two days before. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and --


 MR. GRIFFON: You know, it's kind of odd that you 


had eight acute intakes -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and especially -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- if it fits it best, you might 


even have to step back and say am I modeling it 


right here, you know. I mean that's what I would 


do, so --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think that -- yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- this raises a question. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that it's a -- it's a 


valid -- a number of valid things to look at when 


the case is re-evaluated and -- and how that's 


done. All I can say is that generally in this 


situation, if -- if it's on the edge, you know, 


we're not supposed to compensate with an 


overestimate, then we try to get the best fit to 


the bioassay data we can. And what's supposed to 


happen is that the -- the intakes are selected to 


best fit the bioassay excretion and -- I haven't 


personally gone back and verified the fits of 


these, so I -- you know, but we can -- we can do 


some more investigating of those when we bring 


the case back. 


I'm not going to last all day. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You need some (unintelligible). 


MR. MAHER: The dose reconstructor 


(unintelligible) provide some (unintelligible) on 


that and he felt that if he'd used your in-- your 


dates, that would have over-predicted much of the 


data. 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, I would not question that. But 

when you have 180 days between two successive 


one, to select the day before, that's kind of 


pushing it. You know... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the key element on internal 


dosimetry issue -- well, what was this cancer, 


was this colon? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, so then it was relevant. 


Normally on a bi-- if you're doing internal 


dosimetry calculation from urine data for a 


systemic organ, the inte-- if you get the 


integral -- the integral of the uranium excretion 


curve correct, you've got the dose correct. Now 


for colon it's actually a little different, not 


so clear cut because some portion of the intake 


doesn't end up systemic but still irradiates the 


colon to a certain extent, so just -- I think 


it's -- it's -- certainly speaks to the need to 


have a more thorough review of this particular 


case and these various issues, use kind of this 


case as the poster child for it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And that -- that was 67.11, I 


believe. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so -- I mean really you're 


going to re-examine this issue. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and -- and the whole case, as 

a matter of fact. 


 DR. BEHLING: That was one of the more difficult 


ones --


 MR. GRIFFON: Can I just go back to 67.10 for a 


second? I'm just -- just wanted to make a note 


or have Kathy make a note that I think SC&A needs 


to state agreement with that if you agree with 


the way that -- that -- I think it's a mixed AGU* 


factor that you calculated. Right? Based on 


different --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, they'll -- they'll need -- 


they'll need to check and see what they -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: They'll verify that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and if there's agreement, we can 


close it out, you know, but... 


Okay, go ahead, Hans. I'm sorry. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. So I think we're finished 


with case 67. Let's go to 68, which is another 


Savannah River Site one, and this is -- involved 


someone had actually two cancers, which I won't 


name. The POC was also very, very high, and 


there was a best estimate. This goes first 


finding, finding 68.1, two blanks shown in 


exhibit one were associated with code 67 entries 


-- let me see here what it said. Inappropriate 


method used to assessing missed photon dose. 


Oh, the -- it is really a workbook issue here. 

I'm reading here again, trying to refresh my 


memory. 


MR. MAHER: The LOD over 2 issue? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and I think this comes up 


elsewhere. The workbook really only identifies a 


missed dose when the dose entered actually 


represents zero. On the other hand, if it's a 


positive dose that is less than LOD over 2, it 


recognizes that as a real value, which means that 


the guy who has a positive dose that is less than 


LOD gets penalized over the guy who has a zero 


dose. 


MR. MAHER: Yeah, that's the way we used to -- we 


have since changed that way of doing business. 


think it was because of the last meeting we had 


on this. 


 MS. MUNN: Was this compensable? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, it was close to -- no, but it 


was close. 


 DR. BEHLING: This is -- you know, this is one of 


the best estimates. 


MR. MAHER: We've looked at a few of these cases. 


It doesn't make much difference. 


 DR. BEHLING: No, I realize that, but when -- 


when you're close to that pivotal point, you look 


at all of the information. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And that --


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling. I think one 


I 
of the other things -- and Hans, you're right, in 


the earlier versions of these workbooks they did 


not consider any of the doses that are less than 


the LOD over 2 as actually missed doses. But the 


other thing is is we have cases here that we're 


dealing with that go back into the '40s and '50s, 


and in the early years many of these people were 


monitored on a weekly basis. So as -- as we're 


indicating, for a case like this, that can at 


least add some additional dose. But I think in 


this particular finding we're also pointing out 


that, based on what we saw in the workbook, there 


were some blanks put in for some of the weekly 


doses that didn't seem to make sense because it 


looked like there were zeroes before it and after 


it and he was monitored before and after, but 


these blanks didn't seem to be considered as 


zeroes. So there were several issues here and I 


think we have an exhibit to that effect. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This is that code 67, which means 


they --


 MR. HINNEFELD: That must be --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- switched locations or something, 


is that what --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's a change in location, and 


it's an entry in the dosimetry record that 


indicates the person changed locations, not that 


a badge was read. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So -- and that's, I guess, in -- 


that's, I guess, probably in our TIB in 


interpreting the Savannah River -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Out of an area requiring 


monitoring, is that the -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, it's just a -- that they 


would --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- they kept track of not only -- 


they -- the person's assignment, they kept track 


of where the person was assigned in their 


dosimetry record, and when they would change 


assignments they would enter a line -- a code 67 


line --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- that doesn't have a result 


over there and the -- the month is there when it 


changed --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so it looks like it's a 


monthly result -- or not actually a month, it's 


the cycle, the year and the cycle, so it looks 


like a monthly report but it's really just 


information to the system to change this person's 


work location. It's recorded in the record that 


way, so it's not an actual badge reading. That's 


the -- that's the way that our TIB says to 

interpret that bioassay record, so that's the 


case on the 67 ones. 


Now the case on the LOD over 2 is still -- I mean 


that's a valid issue that will have to be part of 


the reconsideration. Normally it doesn't change 


much, but it still needs to be done correctly. 


 MS. BEHLING: And that has been corrected as you 


indicated in -- I guess based on a -- one of 


these memos that NIOSH put out, but based on 


ORAU, I believe that correction has only been 


implemented as of maybe September of this year. 


MR. MAHER: September 1st was the kickoff date 


for that, that's right. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. If I can also just remind 


everyone to speak into the microphone, I'm having 


some difficulty hearing some of the people that I 


-- Mark, it -- I'm not always hearing you, and 


the person that just spoke, I -- I don't always 


hear you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's because we're behind 


computer screens probably. Sorry. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay, thank you. 


MR. MAHER: There were somewhere close to 48 


templates we had to change to make this 


improvement, so it took a while to do that and to 


edit it all that, make sure -- 


 MS. BEHLING: And I understand, and it all sounds 


like it's a lot of insignificant doses, but as I 

-- 

believe Hans is mentioning here, we are dealing 


with a best estimate, we are dealing with a case 


that's very close to a 50 percent POC, and we are 


dealing with an individual who was monitored back 


in -- where -- there were numerous years where he 


was monitored on a weekly basis, and so it can 


add up. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's -- my follow-up question to 


that was are you going to reassess certain cases 


and is it going to be dependent on -- 


MR. MAHER: That's going to be --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- are you going to make a judgment 


MR. MAHER: -- (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- if it's close in certain -- 


yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and it'll be a judgment, 


you know. We'll probably have a fairly high cut 


point in terms of the POCs that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- that we'll look at -- 


'cause it's going to be -- you know, even if you 


have a lot of these changes, you're going from a 


constant -- or a -- well, a normally distributed 


value of say eight to a lognormally distributed 


value of 20 and -- and you know, a few times. 


It's just not a big change. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I know. 

-- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- instance, so --


 MR. GRIFFON: But you have some POC -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But we'll have some POC cut 


points. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So you might generate a PER report 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, something like that. 


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling again. This 


just prompted another thought, and I know we're 


going back to a previous case and a previous 


finding, but the issue of the error with the DCFs 


in at least the Savannah River Site cases and the 


Savannah River Site workbooks, did you say you 


are going to go back and look at all of the 


cases? Because for some cancers, such as like a 


breast cancer, this can be a significant dose 


that is -- the dose can be significant based on 


the fact that they used the improper range of DCF 


values. Is that something you will be going back 


and looking at all of the cases where they may be 


affected by this -- by this issue? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Okay, thank you. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I think we're on to 68.2, is that ­

-

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, and this goes, again, back to 

the workbook, because as part of this particular 


dose reconstruction review we obviously looked at 

-- for the first time closely at the workbook and 


what are the assumptions assigned in it, and one 


of the positive things was that it automatically 


finds the uncertainty associated with recorded 


doses, which was something that we always had 


talked about in earlier reviews where it was up 


to the dose reconstructor to actually assess for 


recorded doses what the uncertainty is. And 


based on the guidance given in the implementation 


guide, we realize no one could do it and 


understandably so, and so either they didn't 


bother or they defaulted to a 95th percentile by 


multiplying all doses by a factor of two. So 


here comes the workbook and it does it nicely for 


you. 


However, it does in fact limit the uncertainty 


strictly to laboratory uncertainty, and I pointed 


out under Task III when I reviewed the 


implementation guide what it does not include is 


obviously radiological uncertainty, which can 


contribute significantly. And so I brought it up 


here because it was part of our review of the 


workbook that was used and -- and the -- the 


workbook does not address anything other than 


laboratory uncertainty. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think the -- the 


resolution of this, if -- if it's okay, we can 


keep in the procedures review -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: It's been brought up before, as you 


said --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it's in there. I mean it's in 


the procedures review finding, and so I think if 


we bring -- you know, resolve it there -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Close -- yeah, I agree. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it might be most efficient. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Makes sense. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, this is 68.3, onsite ambient 


dose improperly converted to organ dose, and -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Can I interrupt here a minute? 


This is Kathy Behling. Before we go on to 68.3, 


there -- there is an issue that we discussed in 


this dose reconstruction report regarding neutron 


doses, and I'm just asking this because I would 


like to clarify some of these issues for myself 


for future cases, as well as this case. It's of­

- it's often very difficult for us, and in fact I 


believe I had asked Stu Hinnefeld for the list of 


what are called HP area codes that are part of 


the Savannah River Site dosimetry records, and 


now that we're more familiar with the workbooks 


we can see where the dose reconstructor placed 


that individual throughout all of the years, 


where his work location was, and then that 


dictates whether there were neutron doses 


considered. And a lot of times -- and I did get 


this list of these HP codes and also these 

department codes, but it's still not clear to me 


often where he worked. And we will see in these 


records that between -- let's say they'll assign 


him in one location between 1960 and 1965, and in 


1966 they'll put him in another location. But 


when I look at the dosimetry records, I don't see 


that HP area code changing, and sometimes I do 


question why they moved him into a different 


location which may indicate that he is not going 


to be supposedly exposed to neutron doses. And 


I'm just wondering if NIOSH has any other 


documentation or information that they can 


provide to SC&A that helps to better explain 


these dosimetry records, because obviously they 


seem to see something that we don't see always. 


And this'll be brought out I think in more detail 


in some of the more -- the cases under this -- 


this set. I don't know if you can shed any light 


on that or not, but the HP area codes that you 


had provided me, Stu, don't always seem to answer 


these questions and I wondered if there was any 


other data that NIOSH has that we don't. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'll mention something, and then 


maybe Mutty and Ed might have some additional 


things. For Savannah River at least, if a person 


has a bioassay record, the bioassay card includes 


that work location at each sample. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, and I do look at that, also. 

But also I will see in the dose reconstruction 


report that NIOSH indicates we assigned him at 


these various locations based on dosimetry 


records, and it's just not always clear to me 


based on these HP area codes and -- but I do 


usually compare the bioassay codes, also. But 


maybe we could get a less -- little bit more 


detail on that particular issue also when we go 


through this case again. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If not today, I think we can 


probably have some more insight. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, that's what I mean, when we 


reassess -- well, we might not be reassessing 


this case, but maybe when we reassess the 


previous case we can get more detail on that. 


MR. MAHER: It has to be very case-specific 


because the dose reconstructor will read the 


whole picture and the CATI interview and then, 


even though it may not appear he moved his 


location, there may be some information in the 


CATI or in other sources that says well, things 


have changed for that time frame, that his 


dosimetry had changed -- reactor was shut down or 


that type of thing where you would have normally 


given neutrons if it was operating, you know, 


that type of thing. So it's a -- it's a whole 


picture they look at, a sort of professional 


judgment issue. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Okay, very good. I just 


wanted to ask that question while I was thinking 


about it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That kind of thing should be 


documented in the case work-up -- no? 


MR. MAHER: Yeah, well, you might make the case ­

- yeah, it is, but these things are pretty long 


as they are and --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MAHER: -- sometimes they're probably not 


documented to the extent they probably should be 


for someone on the outside -- a clear picture. 


But if you have case numbers, we could go back 


and take a look and -- and find out why that dose 


reconstructor made that decision with that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we've got the case number 


on this one. For instance, we can do it on this 


case, number 68. 


MR. MAHER: Does it apply -- is it -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Is 68 one of them, Kathy? 


 MS. BEHLING: We made mention in this particular 


case that it was interesting how they defined 


these various work locations, and based on what 


we saw, I guess we felt that this was reasonable. 


Now I have two cases in the fifth set where I'm 


questioning whether that was appropriate, the 


assignment of the work locations. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, well --

 MS. BEHLING: So I will provide -- provide you 


with those case numbers. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MS. BEHLING: Thank you. 


 DR. BEHLING: Kathy, by the way, you don't have 


to identify your name. We recognize your voice. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: She's just being polite for Ray. 


 MS. MUNN: We know where you are. 


 MS. BEHLING: Anyway, 68.3, onsite ambient dose 


improperly converted to organ dose. We -- we 


couldn't match the numbers, even when we used the 


DCF iso*, but the second part of that is the 


issue again of DCFs that we question for anything 


other than AP geometry. It's probably very 


trivial, but it is something that should be 


raised. I understand the justification for 


isotropic when you talk about a surface 


contamination from effluent releases, but in the 


end, the fact that the DCFs are questionable for 


iso*, you have a dilemma here. What do you use? 


Obviously the geometry's correct, but the DCF is 


wrong. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, we'll include that as one 


of the items to re-evaluate. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the next one is 68.4 -- let 


me just go to that. Yeah, my comment here in the 


original version was just -- well, I guess it's ­
- at least the title of it was correctly 


transcribed. It says the internal dose 


calculations and assumptions for plutonium are 


excessively complex, time-consuming, without 


scientific basis and potentially not claimant 


favorable. That's the sum total. I'm going to 


go back and see what was done here. This was a 


very, very complex calculation. 


This person apparently had 17 chest counts, four 


had values that were above the MDA value for 


americium-241, and those four chest counts were 


regarded as representing acute intakes and 


therefore were modeled by IMBA by assuming that 


the acute intakes occurred midway between the 


date of the observed chest count and the previous 


-- so in this case they followed the prescribed 


methodology. All of the 17 chest counts were 


identified as routine chest counts, which again 


raises the question when do you draw the 


distinction between a -- an acute intake versus a 


chronic when they are defined in the original DOE 


documents as routine. 


What was done here, and it's very difficult to -- 


to really explain in the brief time we have, 


there were several intake regimes and -- and 


again, the question is was -- was the scientific 


basis for that justified. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: As you stated, it's a pretty long 

and complex --


 MR. GRIFFON: Another one --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- process. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- another one you said you're 


going to rework, or no? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, this --


 MR. GRIFFON: This is 68, you already said -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I said 67, I think we should do 


68 as well. They're both complex. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause I see in your response you 


say simplified runs for type S and M apparently 


had been done. This was post-- post-mortem, 


right? I mean post-(unintelligible) -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, yeah. Yeah. So you know, 


having done that, I think we ought to just put 


the whole thing together. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: In fact, for these -- for these 


complex ones with POCs close to the decision 


point --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- I think we ought to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause that's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- spend the time to have, you 


know, as much -- you know, wherever we need to 


have these discussions, but to go through these ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause we haven't seen these -- 

these simplified runs, have we? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, you have not. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, you have not. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But if they're going to be part of 


the --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It will be part of it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- entire rework, then I don't 


think we need to see it until you do the 


entire... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: And one of the most important 


things was that there were no data for a number 


of years, '67, 8, 1980, 1981, 1984 through 1993, 


and so there are a whole series of years for 


which there's no accounting of potential internal 


exposure, and then I believe, even though they 


may not have assessed this individual by 


bioassay, there are other competing monitoring 


that was done for this guy that would suggest 


that perhaps he was still continuing to be 


exposed. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the decision I guess would 


depend upon a coup-- either work location or 


knowledge of monitoring practices. For instance, 


if -- and I'm only making this up; I don't know 


if this happened at Savannah River. If a site 

said well, we've got this nifty in vivo counter 


now, it doesn't take much to count people, we're 


just going to run people through it every year, 


then that doesn't necessarily mean that the 


person who's getting counted is in a likely 


exposure job, or a job where they would typically 


be monitored. So there may be situations why 


there might be data generated in that 


circumstance that does not -- is not indicative 


of exposure. I guess we see it probably most 


often in terms of exit in vivo counts. It's 


fairly common to have an exit in vivo count on 


someone who hasn't had one before or hasn't had 


one certainly for a long time. And in that case 


you'd say well, that was a common practice, and 


it's clearly an exit -- I mean it's right before 


he leaves employment. So there are situations 


like that where a monitoring that you sometimes 


consider an indication of exposure really are not 


an indication of exposure, so it could be 


something like that. I just think we'll need to 


address it completely when we, you know, rework 


the case. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, the next -- the next one is 


very, very complex, too. Again, it involves the 


uranium and I can just sort of briefly talk about 


-- this was very much more complicated due to the 


fact that they converted units from mass per unit 

volume to dpm at various times, and -- and it 


makes it very difficult and then -- so there were 


also the -- the -- then there was the issue of -- 


there were -- there were multiple issues involved 


here that may go beyond the point of discussing 


this right here. 


 MR. SHARFI: Hans, are you on 68.5? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. The one that I guess I had -- 


I had the most difficult time with here -- let's 


see, is this the one -- yeah, the -- the person 


was clearly involved in areas where natural 


uranium and even modestly enriched uranium might 


have been his source for exposure. And when you 


talk about micrograms per liter, you run into a 


difficulty in converting micrograms per unit 


volume into activity. When it's defined in dpm 


it really doesn't matter, but in the case of 


micrograms per liter, you have to obviously now 


convert it, and you have to make assumptions -- 


are we talking about depleted uranium, natural 


uranium or modestly enriched uranium -- and in 


this case they elected to use depleted when there 


was evidence to suggest that, at a minimum, he 


was exposed to a natural and possibly somewhat 


enriched. And of course the difference between 


those three options are significant. It can be 


as high as a factor of three and a half and up to 

ten, depending on degree of enrichment. So the 


key finding on -- on this particular one was the 


unconservative or non-claimant-favorable 


assumption that assumed that all uranium 


exposures was necessary to depleted uranium. And 


-- and there were quite a few bioassays. I think 


this guy had a total of 239 urinalysis done that 


identify uranium and 18 identify enriched 


uranium. Now I think I heard comments about EU 


not necessarily being (unintelligible), but -- 


but again, what is the basis for making that 


assumption? 


 MR. SHARFI: I believe inside the Technical Basis 


Document they do cover that uranium samples that 


were analyzed for activity were identified in the 


records as EUs, even though they weren't 


necessarily for enriched uranium. It was just a 


recording practice to mark mass-based uranium 


samples as U and activity-based uranium samples 


as EU, so --


 MR. HINNEFELD: That -- that was an artifact of 


the sample that the type of analysis that was 


run, that's what dictated that entry rather than 


the material the person was exposed to. 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And there's al-- you know, 


there's also a situation where if you're -- when 


you're -- if you have bioassay results in mass 

units, like less than five dpm per unit of 


volume, and then after that you have -- I'm 


sorry, five micrograms, less than five micrograms 


per unit of volume, and then at a later date you 


have bioassay that is less than one dpm or 


something per unit of volume, that later bioassay 


can in fact impose a limit on how much -- how 


high that earlier intake could have been and how 


many dpm per liter could have been taken in 


associated with those five micrograms because -- 


you know, because the excretion wouldn't be 


completely gone yet, depending on how much later 


it is. So there may be some bounding factors 


that were used there. 


 Again, complicated issue -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, this -- this --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- discussed in more depth, I 


think. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and I think -- right now you 


didn't even have a reply -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I didn't even put it in there, 


no. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that, right. 


 DR. BEHLING: And also the assumption that it was 


necessary type F would certainly, again, minimize 


exposure in this case. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and that really should only 


have been selected if it was -- either fit it 

best or if the combination of the fit and the 


dose to the target organ -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- worked out to the highest, and 


so I don't know what the -- you know, sitting 


here today, I don't know what the situation was. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 68.6, Hans, is... 


 MS. MUNN: I hope the response that you put 


together does include that interesting 


information about EU notation. The --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, --


 MS. MUNN: -- casual observer would never know 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- specifically reference the TBD 


so we know where --


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to look. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, that would be helpful. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The practice of recording dpm 


versus micrograms, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 68.6, the statement here is 


that internal dose methodology for tritium 


excessively complex, time-consuming and not 


proceduralized. I understand now you do have a 


procedure TIB for tritium, but at that time I 


don't think it was there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Has SC&A reviewed TIB-11? I --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, I believe -- Kathy? 


 MS. BEHLING: I believe we do -- we do have that 


on our list to review TIB-11. I really have to 


verify that, though. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, it has not been done yet, 


though. Right? 


 MS. BEHLING: No, I don't -- no, it hasn't. 


 DR. BEHLING: I think it has, Kathy. 


 MS. BEHLING: Well --


 DR. BEHLING: I'm not sure, Ron Buchanan -- 


 MS. BEHLING: I'm not sure, let me mark it down 


and -- and check it. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. But anyway --


DR. MAURO: I distributed the TIB review to the 


latest set that we were authorized to various 


reviewers and that just began. I could check 


quickly to see if that was among them. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 MS. MUNN: That would help. 


 DR. BEHLING: Anyway, to get back to this 


particular case, this individual had 648 


individual tritium bioassays that were entered 


into the workbook, and I guess they were then 


modeled through some -- IMBA, I assume -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Hans, did you have an issue with 


the -- the technical -- I mean the -- 


 DR. BEHLING: It's not so much --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- conclusion or --

 DR. BEHLING: -- an issue, it's just that, again, 


I --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- overly complicated -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Overly complicated --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- very difficult, time-consuming, 


et cetera, and it tends to raise a question of 


efficiency and timeliness for doing dose 


reconstruction in assuming that -- a reasonable 


estimate or appropriate, and what I really would 


have recommended is to use certain values such as 


-- since many of them were positive, half of MDA 


would have been nice. And since you know that 


one microcurie per liter represents 71 millirem, 


you can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation and 


come within a few percentage points, and the 


difference between 648 individual dose entries 


versus a generic calculation would have been a 


couple of millirems. But again, it's -- it's -- 


it's obviously something that is not technically 


incorrect, but questionable in context with the 


need to do thing in an expeditious -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I could see the other -- 


 DR. BEHLING: -- manner. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean the dose -- the dose 


consequence here is not very -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No, it's not. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but I can see the other side of 

it where we could say this was very close, you 


should have looked at the specific data that you 


have for this person instead of using the backof-the-envelope approach, you know. 


MR. MAHER: Well, also we're required by contract 


(unintelligible) hierarchical use of data -- 


dosimetry data supposed to (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: If there's personal data, use it, 

yeah, right. 

 DR. BEHLING: But there are procedures, like TIB3, that can be used to -- to do tritium dose 


calculation using a more generic approach. 


MR. MAHER: But those --


 MS. BEHLING: I think the other --


MR. MAHER: -- (unintelligible) don't have 


dosimetry data. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, if you have the data, we -- I 


mean --


MR. MAHER: We have to use it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- supposed to use it, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: The data is the data. 


 MS. BEHLING: I think the other thing that we 


have determined since reviewing this case, it 


appears that there is a workbook that's being 


used -- it's a very user-friendly workbook -- and 


from my understanding in talking to ORAU, 


possibly a lot of this tritium bioassay data is 


entered up front when this -- this case is being 

put together, along with other dosimetry data. 


So if that's the case, that certainly does make 


this whole process a lot easier for the -- 


MR. MAHER: The DR's not --


 MS. BEHLING: -- dose reconstructor. 


MR. MAHER: -- punching this thing. We have a 


prep group that sets up all this data into the 


file, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. BEHLING: But at the time of us doing this 


dose reconstruction -- this dose reconstruction 


audit, we were not aware of that. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 68.7, internal dose from 


fission products -- that's a repeat of the one 


that we just talked about -- again, where whole 


body data -- it talks to cerium-144 as the 


limiting radionuclide and then ignores the other 


radionuclides that could have been potentially 


been considered as part of the dose 


reconstruction process and you said you're going 


to be looking into that. 


So 68.8, NIOSH failed to properly address 


radiological incident. Let's see here... I have 


something here that I can't in my mind -- maybe 


Kathy can help me. It says here NIOSH statement 


regarding biological monitoring in 1966 is in 


error since internal monitoring for the 


(unintelligible) for uranium did not start until 

-- 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay --

 DR. BEHLING: -- 1971. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- yeah. I believe what we're 

indicating here is perhaps NIOSH indicated that 


they felt they had -- they had addressed any 


potential radiological incident because there was 


bioassay monitoring. Howev-- however, we're 


stating that the CATI did identify a radiological 


incident and he wasn't -- this individual did not 


have monitoring throughout his entire employment, 


if I -- if I'm recalling correctly. Or am I 


wrong here? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, that's -- that's the case. 


 MS. BEHLING: His actual monitoring did not start 


for uranium until 1971, and I believe we're 


indicating that this incident could have been 


prior to 1971 and we're using this date here of 


1966. I'd actually have to go back to the entire 


dose reconstruction report again, but I believe 


we're indicating that there certainly could have 


been a radiological incident that was possibly 


not picked up through the monitoring. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes, you're correct, Kathy. I'm 


reading it now and that -- I'm reminded of that's 


what happened. He -- he was not monitored till 


'71 and the incident precedes that by five years. 


 MR. SHARFI: In his description now of the 

incident, his work location they describe is 


consistent with this time period that he worked, 


and he was monitored in the '70s, so it does -- 


it does look like maybe his recollection of the 


exact year may be off, and the bioassay is 


consistent with a possible incident occurring in 


the early '70s, and the work location described 


in the incident -- they align. So I -- I think ­

- I think what they're looking at is maybe -- 


maybe that the assessment did account for the 


incident, though his perfect recollection of 


exactly when that incident occurred may be 


questioned. And obviously when you're trying to 


remember an incident that happened 30 years -- 


30, 40 years ago, you know, he's -- remembering 


exactly what day or what exact year happened 


can't be -- always difficult for anybody. 


 MS. MUNN: It is hard. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We can provide whatever -- you 


know, whatever information we have that would 


lead us to believe that it didn't happen in 1966, 


you know, in more complete detail -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, we'd --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- or we may go back and say 


well, gee whiz, maybe it did occur in '66 -- you 


know, as part of the rework of the case. 


 DR. BEHLING: We make no judgment about the -- 


the validity of statements made in the CATI. 
I 
mean we have to accept it at face value. Whether 


or not the person's failing memory is at fault 


here or whether this was true is something we 


can't make a judgment call on. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If there's evidence to the 


contrary of their recollection, then we will do 


something different. As a general rule, we 


believe what their recollection is. And I'm just 


saying that in this case this will be part of the 


rework of the case and we'll -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I'm --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- have to go back and see if we 


really do have evidence to the contrary that's 


convincing. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I was surprised to see a 


different response than the other incident 


findings when you said there was -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, the other --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but you may not be taking the 


intake all the way back to those early years. 


Right? For uranium? It may depend on when you 


started --


 MR. HINNEFELD: There are a number of things -- 


there are a number of things associated with this 


issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- going on here, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There was -- there was -- this 


person had a nice -- in his -- in the records we 

got from Savannah River there were nice 


descriptions of incidents that he was involved in 


late --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and so it looks like we got a 


good, complete record. And they described 


incidents he was involved in late. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But now that begs the question, 


when did they start keeping records in that 


fashion and putting them in the bioassay record, 


you know. If they didn't start that till 1968, 


that's not evidence. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: See? So there are things like 


that that we put together originally, and I just 


felt like -- you know, we had a response that I 


didn't send over 'cause I felt like it needed 


work --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and we needed to make sure 


that we have -- you know, if we have evidence 


that it didn't occur in '66, we'd better be 


pretty comfortable with the evidence. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And so that's why we felt like we 


would have to come back later with this is the 


demonstration of where we're -- yes, we're 

convinced it didn't happen in '66, or come back 


and say mea culpa, we -- maybe it did happen in 


'66. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay --


 MS. MUNN: Until that's articulated and laid out, 


it's hard to evaluate, though. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: Impossible to evaluate. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 DR. BEHLING: Last finding for this person -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: I think we kind of just -- 

 DR. BEHLING: -- 68.9, and I think this goes back 

to an earlier one that involves his recollection 


that he may have been working with natural and 


enriched uranium, which again goes back to an 


earlier issue that we have identified. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I thought it was also the 


recollection of the incident, wasn't it? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think --


 MR. GRIFFON: Both, I guess. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: They're both caught up in the 


CATI. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think he did also describe in 


his CATI he was exposed to -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, he identified --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- to natural and enriched -- 

 DR. BEHLING: -- identified the radionu-- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, next case, tab 69, is the 


third Savannah River Site case. This person had 


-- well, I won't say the cancer. Again, in this 


case the POC was not as close to 50 as the other 


two, but still within the -- within the stretch 


of the -- the POC values where you have to be 


very careful about what may have been assigned 


versus what should have been assigned. And I'm 


looking at the doses for this particular type of 


cancer and it's apparently a cancer that has a 


very low natural incidence, which means that a 


relatively small dose can certainly raise the POC 


quite high. 


Let's go -- take a look -- the first finding, 


unable to match the dates of recorded doses with 


NIOSH-assigned doses. Let me try to --


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's right. It was a mistake 


on our part. We entered the wrong year -- 


started in the wrong year. And we started it a 


year early, so if there's any effect, it would be 


in the positive POC side -- on the side of POC. 


 MS. MUNN: So we're okay with that one. We know 


what happened. 


 DR. BEHLING: Second finding, 69.2, failure to 


account for recorded photon dose uncertainty. 
I 
guess they assumed a normal distribution but 


failed to give an uncertainty estimate for two 


entries. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, in this --


 DR. BEHLING: No, not two entries, 155 through 


166, so we're missing certain -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: This is a comment that's been 


made before in dose reconstruction reviews 


because the dose reconstruction use a DCF of one 


and times a constant dose number, used that as a 


constant, as opposed to propagating a normally 


distributed measured dose times the triangular 


DCF. We think that using one is claimant 


favorable. If you use a DCF of one in -- in -- 


when the triangular distribution is entirely 


below one, we think that's a claimant-favorable 


approach. We're putting together a paper that 


demonstrates that. It takes a while to do that 


'cause you have to do it cancer by cancer, so you 


(unintelligible) each of the cancer models, but 


we are -- we feel like we can demonstrate that 


that's a conservative approach. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, there's no doubt, and I will 


not identify the cancer in question, but the DCF 


-- obviously well below unity and so the choice 


of a default DCF of one would certainly be 


claimant favorable. And I guess it would be nice 


just to proceduralize it so that when you fail to 

give uncertainty and you give a generous DCF that 


one fully understands that you have accounted for 


any -- any potential exposures that might have 


been missed based on the absence of an 


uncertainty measurement. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and we've gone through a 


series of language that tried to illustrate -- 


you know, we have a section of what uncertainties 


were used in a dose reconstruction. It's in the 


dose reconstruction report. And our language has 


evolved over time where we try to say that since 


this such-and-such component is an overestimate, 


it was entered as a constant, or something like ­

- you know, something like that. 


 DR. BEHLING: The next one is -- parallels this 


one, finding 69.3, failure to include recorded 


neutron dose uncertainty. When you look at the 


TBD and you look for the uncertainty measurements 


using the TLND, they do give a standard deviation 


of 30 percent, and --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think it's the same issue. 


 DR. BEHLING: It's the same issue. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Same issue, right. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: On to the internal dose? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, 69.4, selection of solubility 

class not claimant favorable. Again, it's a 


question of whether to use type S versus M. 

-- 

 MR. GRIFFON: In this particular case I'm 


assuming that you're not going to redo this case 


necessarily. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We had not planned to. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you -- can you provide the IMBA 


analysis --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- showing that it would be a bound 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think we can provide the 


evidence. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You're basically saying your in 


vivo is sort of bounding the -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The intake, yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But we haven't seen that analysis ­

-


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- have we, so maybe they can 


provide that, Hans, and then you can -- we can 


follow up on that? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. Now I guess -- you know, this 

--

 MS. BEHLING: Mark, can you repeat that? I'm 

sorry, I didn't hear it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I -- I said -- I asked 


if NIOSH wasn't expecting to redo this entire 


case, but if they can provide the IMBA analysis 


described in their response to 69.4 -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- where they show that the -- or 


they're -- they're saying that the -- that the in 


vivo counts are -- are going to basically bound 


your intakes, considered alongside the 


urinalysis, I -- I -- approach -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- so -- and Stu said they would 


provide that to us and you can follow up on 


reviewing that. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay, very good. Thank you. 


 DR. BEHLING: I guess the only question I have in 


regard to that explanation, which certainly makes 


scientific sense, was this in fact considered at 


the time that the decision was made to use a 


different solubility class rather than saying 


okay, let's be sure that we were correct. There 


was no evidence from what I could see that the 


calculation you're referring to was in fact the 


basis for the selection. In other words, had 


this selection been made on that particular 


calculation and -- and made obvious, one could 


certainly say well, they did their homework, they 


made a decision that is justifiable and -- and 


there should be no questions about whether it's 


scientifically right or wrong. The question is 


was this calculation done after the fact to 


justify the intuitive decision, which may have 

been the correct one, but the question is was it 


done at a time when you didn't know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, sitting here today, I don't 


know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Or is this something that the -- 


yeah, I would hope that the dose reconstructor 


considered this in -- in the first analysis. 


That's sort of what you're saying. Right, Hans? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. You know --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- if I had the warm and cozy 


feeling that this -- this information was 


basically available to the dose reconstructor 


when he made the decision, I would say you're 


correct and you did your homework, you -- you 


went forward and said well, the americium count 


would have been greater than what was evident and 


therefore we can justify our selection. But it 


appears perhaps at this point it was done after 


the fact, and it may tru-- it may be the correct 


choice after all. But the question is was this 


done to back-fit your decision. 


 MR. SHARFI: It would be the general practice to 


look at all solubilities and look at what 


bounding -- obviously since this one is close, 


you wouldn't have -- you know, you might have -- 


if this case wasn't so close, you might have just 


used the type S and done an overestimate -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- on the urinalysis. But this one 


is close so I'd have to think that -- in standard 


practice, you would consider both the chest count 


and the urinalysis and that is the common 


practice to do, so --


 MR. GRIFFON: Was that evident in the files 


provided in the D--


 MR. SHARFI: Probably not, probably -- 


I mean you wouldn't show every possible scenario 


that you may have tried in that given scenario. 


Otherwise you'd be providing 300 files, possibly 


-- you know, to show every single scenario that's 


possible. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: So if we said that standard practice 


would dictate that the reconstructor would have 


considered this --


MR. MAHER: Well, we feel that -- yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: Yeah. Since I -- I had to clarify 


what -- how much I can say. Since I actually did 


the case, I can speak in general practice of what 


I've done and what I've reviewed. This is 


obviously a two-year-old case that we've done, 


but in general practice, yes, you would -- you 


would consider looking at both the urinalysis and 


the chest counts. It would be very common to 


look at it if you're going to do type S, what is 

more limiting, whatever the chest count to the 


urinalysis would be, which would provide a larger 


dose, whether it's the type M based on 


(unintelligible) or vice versa, you'd have to 


look at both scenarios. And you know, whether 


you're basing the chest counts as type M or S or 


-- and whatever bioassay would be more limiting 


in that case or whether or not you base the 


intake on the urinalysis and look at type M or S 


and without the chest count. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And is that actually in those -- I 


mean I reference these -- like at Rocky the last 


time, these ones, too, I don't know. It might 


have been -- the SRS dose reconstruction 


guidelines, do you have similar documents for 


Savannah River that you have for some of the 


other sites, dose reconstruction guidelines? 


 MR. SHARFI: Some -- some sites do, I wouldn't -- 


I mean Savannah River's one -- probably one of 


the first DOE sites we probably started tackling, 


so given the people that do Savannah River, been 


doing them for two years, whether or not I -- we 


-- we have guidelines -- the general thing -- 


because they've been -- they've been involved in 


it for so long, I'm not sure if we've -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: You don't know if they're written 


down, though? That's the question I think -- 


 MR. SHARFI: This particular site, I don't. 

 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause part of what we have to 


consider is consistency across different DR -- 


MR. MAHER: And it's hard to know two years ago 


because a lot of the information dose 


reconstructors get are in the weekly meetings. 


You know, we kind of get these unique cases or 


different cases and we kind of have a round table 


in these meetings saying when you have this 


situation, do this. So some of this 


information's not written down, but it's part of 


the ongoing -- you know, weekly meetings and 


information and training that the dose 


reconstructors get. I can tell you right now, 


though, we get into a situation with two forms of 


bioassay, they'd better support each other or 


we'll take the one which supports the higher 


dose. And OCAS won't let it go through unless we 


do something like that, I can guarantee you that. 


 MS. MUNN: So my question is, given that 


information, can we -- at least this -- this one 


single item here, can we say that's acceptable? 


It's acceptable because -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we've already said we'll 


provide the IMBA analysis that shows -- 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, and you're going to do the whole 


schmear --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I mean the -- your -- your 


statement probably will stand, you know, but all 

we want to see is the -- yeah. And they've done 


it. It's not like they're recreating anything. 


Right? I mean this has been done. 


MR. MAHER: And these reports, you know, have the 


final run, the one that we select that we feel is 


most claimant favorable, and all the other ones 


we run, we just don't -- they just don't show up. 


They may stay with the dose reconstructor -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, not necessarily the most 


claimant favorable. Here you might -- you know, 


the best fit --


 MR. HINNEFELD: We put in the one that supports 


the dose reconstruction. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's what's submitted is the 


run that supports the dose reconstruction. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MAHER: Right, but when you have two forms of 


bioassay and one's giving you a different result 


from the other one, then we will tend to the more 


claimant favorable one -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, from that standpoint, 


claimant favorable, yeah. 


All right. I only -- I have one other thing and 


that -- it -- I was wondering in this particular 


case, not that we know who did it, but was there 


any supporting documentation for -- for this 


conclusion that it's a false positive -- other 

-- 

than -- other than based on your fitting. You 


know, was there any --


 MR. SHARFI: Outside no intake scenario would fit 


to it? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, was there anything at the 


time of the -- of the measurement that they 


indicated on the in vivo count that this looked, 


you know --


 MR. SHARFI: I'm going to have to actually pull 


up the --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- suspicious or, you know, unusual 


and we want to do a follow-up or -- 


 MR. SHARFI: I can't guess --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- not necessarily, this was based 


on your --


 MR. SHARFI: Given that the next chest count I 


think is a couple of months away -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- and chest count results obviously 


come by really quickly, so -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- I -- it doesn't seem that there's 


something specific that they -- otherwise you 


would think they would have just -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- within a couple of days, recount 


 MR. GRIFFON: Raising alarms at the time for them 

necessarily. 


 MR. SHARFI: Yeah, so the only -- the only way 


you could rule it out is, given that they do have 


various other monitoring data -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Urinalysis right after that is how 


you did it. 


 MR. SHARFI: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MAHER: I think also you had information 


about the site. This location where he was 


working is not likely an americium area. 


 MR. SHARFI: A pure americium --


MR. MAHER: (Unintelligible) information together 


would sort of collaborate (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But not necessarily any -- any -- 


 MR. SHARFI: I don't remember anything on the 


individual chest count report that indicated this 


was a false positive by count. 


 DR. BEHLING: Finding 69.4 -- no, we've just done 


that, 69.5. And this is sort of a generic 


question I have. Here they used a triangular 


distribution which assumes zero MDA over two and 


MDA in -- in the samples. Now I've always looked 


at that and sort of say if you had -- for 


instance, in a case of a dosimeter and you had 20 


readings, none of them are above LOD, so you 


realize you're somewhere between zero and LOD but 

you don't know where you are and the reasonable 


assumption -- or perhaps even conservative 


assumption -- would be to assume that's on 


average somewhere midway. But for instance if I 


looked at a series of -- of dosimeter reading for 


-- 50 percent were well above and then some were 


below LOD, then you realize that zero is not 


likely to be an option as a lower limit. In 


fact, you would start to favor a value between 


LOD over two and LOD, and this is the issue that 


is raised here. 


 MR. SHARFI: You're talking about if you have 


positive --


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- results. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. SHARFI: In this --


 DR. BEHLING: In conjunction with -- with -- with 


that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It would not, yeah -- yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: In this case, this was assigned 


missed dose when all -- all the monitoring data 


was negative. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. The triangular 


distribution on these -- on the internal missed 


dose is only used when all the -- when all the 


bioassay is --


 MR. SHARFI: If you do have positive, then you 

would have -- you would have assessed that 


positive and assigned a lognormal distribution 


with a GSD of three. In this case, this is all 


missed dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: But he did have chest count that 


showed positive counts for americium-241, and I 


think that's what prompted this. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there --


 MR. SHARFI: Outside this positive one -- outside 


this one that was ruled as a false negative, I 


(unintelligible) this report (unintelligible) 


that there are -- there was one (unintelligible) 


positive net count. That doesn't make the result 


positive. If you look in some of the settings, I 


know it looks like you've just taken a ratio of 


the net counts to the chest -- the actual 


positive chest count and tried to infer that same 


ratio to the other chest counts, which is not 


something that you can do. In this case it talks 


about having like a thousand net counts is 


referred to as a .6 nanocurie chest burden. 


Actually if you look at that chest count, the 


site actually did calculate the chest burden for 


that partic-- for that particular chest count and 


it was .12 nanocuries, not .6, and there are a 


lot of factors that go in when you're converting 


net counts to (unintelligible) chest burdens, and 


in that case the MDA at the time was -- for that 

particular chest count was like .2, so that was a 


negative chest count even though it had positive 


net counts. So in that case -- I mean then if 


you go through all those chest counts, all those 


chest counts actually are reported and it's less 


than the MDA from a chest burden activity, so 


that's why only missed dose was assigned even 


though they do have positive net counts on the -- 


for the americium region. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: See, and that net count's -- 


positive net count's in a region of interest if ­

- depend-- I don't -- not exactly sure how they 


generated their net counts. If you're talking 


about, you know, your count in that region 


compared to an empty chamber background, if that 


is what your net count rate is, that will always 


be positive if you've got a body in the chamber 


because you will always have more net counts with 


a human in the chamber than you will with an 


empty chamber, so there -- they've estab-- you 


know, we -- they established a detection level 


where they would have, you know -- this is a 


detectable count, you know, because a few net 


counts doesn't matter. You have to get enough 


net counts to really be indicative of what the -- 


that there's something there, and so we've 


generally taken the approach then that if it's 


not a detectable, it's not a detectable -- 

 DR. BEHLING: And I just want to be sure -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- from zero. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- in understanding, but when you 


say you would always have a positive net count is 


due to scattering into that region that would be 


defined for the americium? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If -- if you're -- yeah, if 


you're in vivo counting and you take an empty 


chamber background and then you put a person in 


the chamber and count them, you will -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Person in the --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- always have more net counts 


because --


 DR. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) potassium-40 -- 


MR. MAHER: Scattering volume (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- potassium-40 scatters -- 


scatters through the whole thing -- potassium-40 


in particular, a few other things here and there, 


naturally occurring here and there, and you're 


going to have counts all down the continuum, you 


know, if you put somebody in the chamber. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, 'cause I looked at that and I 


always saw net positive counts for some of these 


maybe below MDA, but it certainly suggests that 


something is there and therefore the assumption 


of zero as a starting point for triangular 


distribution wouldn't hold. 


DR. MAURO: So -- so this is John -- so when you 

have a control, it's not from a person that 


you're counting that you know does not have the 


particular body burden. It's basically a count 


without a person there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the idea --


DR. MAURO: In other words --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I mean it would be something to 


investigate. I can tell you for sure that, 


depending upon how the software's set up -- you 


know, it's going to depend on how they set up the 


software --


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- what they consider -- what 


they subtract in order to get net. 


DR. MAURO: I understand. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And I don't -- sitting here 


today, I don't know. I would think that would be 


something we could find out. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that'd be -- 'cause I would -- 


your -- your argument is -- if in fact you -- you 


just take a count of the background noise without 


a person present, your -- I couldn't understand 


why -- the difference between -- you know, how 


you would come up with a positive net count for ­

- in this -- in the circumstance. So anyway, I 


think that's an interesting question and -- on 


how the calibration's done so that we could 


understand what that number really means when you 

say you have a positive net count, but it really 


is not above the lower limit of detection, that 


would help clarify things. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, we'll see what we can find 


out. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 69.6, dose entries for 


plutonium-241 with less -- no, with electrons 


with energy greater than 15 keV appears to have 


been ignored. I'm trying to remember what this 


is about. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Probably the internal dose 


assessment doesn't include any -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah, I think --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- any lines that show electron 


dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- we're missing that as one of the 


components. 


 MR. SHARFI: 69.9? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and --


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, 69.6. 


 DR. BEHLING: And -- and I think Kathy ran the 


calculation that says at MDA level we would end 


up with a dose of 4.7 rem. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the practice was to -- 


 MR. SHARFI: I'm sorry. I mean -- I mean the -- 


the plu-241* component was included into the 


total alpha component -- plu-241* is assigned as 


an alpha because it readily decays to americium 

and the majority of the dose component's going to 


be an alpha-emitter, not a -- not a -- not the 


plutonium beta-emitter but the actual alpha 


associated with its daughter, so it's actually 


assigned as an alpha. The -- the --


(unintelligible) looked at this. The actual 


electron that we're talking about that was 


assigned I believe is associated with the -- 


either the environmental or the fission product 


that was assigned, and I think there's just a 


misunderstanding of the interpretation of the -- 


you're talking about the triangular distribution 


assigned is electron greater than 15 keV. 


 DR. BEHLING: Uh-huh. 


 MR. SHARFI: Is that correct? That is actually 


the fission product dose that's assigned, not the 


plutonium-241. The plutonium-241 is compiled 


into the total alpha dose that's assigned. So if 


you were to sum your four components of your 


alpha -- your plu-238*, 239, americium-241 and 


plu-241*, that will equal the total americium 


assigned. Then the electron greater than 15 keV 


is the fission product that's assigned. 


 DR. BEHLING: That's certainly not something we 


came away with or understood when we looked at 


dose reconstruction. 


 MS. BEHLING: I think we need to go back and 


revisit this because now we have a better 

understanding of some of the workbooks that are 


being used and we can better sort out this -- 


this -- this particular finding. Right now I 


can't remember. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think that the key -- the 


key element is that a plu-241* intake is assigned 


as alpha. Most of the dose is alpha because it's 


from the americium-241 that grows in while it's 


resident, and the little bit of beta dose that 


comes from plu-241*, we throw it into the alpha 


pile, you know, and just total it all up as alpha 


dose. It actually works to the claimant's favor 


'cause the REF of alphas is higher than REFs of 


betas. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But it's a fairly small -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: The part I was missing was the 


fission product, how does that tie in -- 


MR. HINNEFELD: That's a completely separate 


analysis, it's just there are apparently -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I didn't understand why there was 


really a dose finding. 


 MR. SHARFI: It seemed -- it seemed to me -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's not --


 MR. SHARFI: Yeah -- that they assumed that the ­

- 'cause they're very -- to do -- actually to 


(unintelligible) the plutonium-241 and the 


cesium-140 -- or the cerium-144, the actual final 

doses are very similar, so I think there's a 


confusion that -- that the -- what we assigned as 


cerium dose was actually what was supposed to be 


assigned as plutonium dose. I think that -- I 


think that's -- that connection I got away from 


reading -- from what -- obviously I'm trying to 


interpret what someone else is interpreting, 


but... 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, this is as far as I got in my 


personal review so I'm reading this again because 


within the time we had available -- trying to 


figure out what each of the findings really 


represents based on the expanded explanation. 


69.7, again, this person is very similar to 


previous ones, had seven -- or had ten whole body 


counts, seven of which identified body burden of 


cesium that exceeded two standard deviations and 


were considered significant, and for seven other 


fission products including cerium-144 and we've 


already mentioned those ones, who body count 


measurement did not exceed the 95th percentile 


level but were nevertheless consistently 


identified in terms of net count that suggest 


their presence. On that basis, NIOSH confined 


itself again to cerium-144 and assumed an MDA 


value of 60 nanocuries and used MDA over two to 


come up with a dose for cerium. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: This is the -- this is the issue 

that we talked about on the two previous cases 


about mixed fission product intakes. If we can 


address it appropriately in the rework of the 


other two cases --


 MR. GRIFFON: Same, right, yeah, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it'll be the same solution 


here, so... 


 MR. GRIFFON: 69.8. 


 DR. BEHLING: 69.8, use of a triangular 


distribution is not claimant favorable for 


uncertainty. Again, it's the same argument that 


we just talked about here, that when you have 


below MDA value but there are strong indications 


that it's -- it's below MDA and it's real number, 


the use of a triangular distribution that starts 


out at zero may or may not be appropriate. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you're saying only use it when 


all the bioassay's negative. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, only use it when the 


bioassay's negative and we believe there is a 


reason why there are non-detectable consistently 


-- consistently positive net counts that are non-


detectable. We believe there's a reason why it 


comes out that way. It is not -- does not mean 


that those radionuclides are present. It has to 


do with how things are set up. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the only thing here is -- 


like the earlier one where you say okay, in an 

empty chamber you don't count any constant 


scattering that would contribute to the 60-- in 


this case you had cesium-137 as positive, which 


is a fission product and it's usually not 


necessary by itself, so the presence of three 


positive cesium-137 counts would suggest the 


probability that other fission products would 


have also been there, perhaps at lower 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: When were the counts taken? When 


did this guy work? The cesium-137 was dietary 


until --


DR. ROESSLER: I counted a lot of cesium-137. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, it's dietary and you 


counted it in everybody from bomb fallout until ­

- I don't know, you might still count it today, I 


don't know. 


MR. MAHER: Deer meat. 


 DR. BEHLING: Deer meat. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, that's -- that's a common ­

- I mean it lasted longer in people -- you count 


it longer in people who eat deer meat, but during 


certain time periods everybody had cesium-137. 


MR. MAHER: Wood ash (unintelligible) wood ash. 


 MS. MUNN: It's out there. 


DR. MAURO: With this pause, I -- this is John 


Mauro. You had asked the question before whether 

-- was it OTIB-11, whether or not -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- it was reviewed? Was it -- yeah, 


is -- is O-- is the OTIB-11 you're referring to 


dealing with tritium? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that was reviewed as part of 


the second set of 30 cases -- procedures that 


were reviewed, so yes, SC&A has reviewed and it's 


in one of our reports as -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


DR. MAURO: -- tritium calculated doses, OR-- 


OTIB-0011, so the answer to the question is yes, 


we have reviewed it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you, John. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Stu, can you -- that last line I'm 


reading -- in fact, OCAS consistently treats non-


detectable results as indistinguishable from 


zero. Can you explain that -- explain? I think 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The basis -- well, we do that 


clearly in the external dosimetry world. When we 


have a result that's less than LOD over two we 


consider that indistinguishable from zero, 


therefore we count it in the missed dose column 


as if some-- as if a person was monitored and 

nothing was detected. So we put it in the missed 


dose calculation rather than put those eight 


millirem in the recorded dose. So -- and 


similarly, in a bioassay setting, if the -- if a 


value is less than detectable, then we consider 


that -- it is not distinguishable from zero and 


so is a -- it's a non-detect, it's not 


distinguishable from zero, and so based on that 


thought process, the triangular distributions 


applied to these missed doses start at zero 


because there's a potential this person had no 


exposure. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right, I understand. 

Thank you. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the last one, 69.9, 

identifies environmental internal exposures to 


account for tritium, iodine and uranium is 


inappropriate. I'm trying to remember exactly 


what was the issue here, but... The records show 


or suggest that the EE worked in locations where 


tritium exposure and iodine exposure and uranium 


may have taken place in the workplace instead of 


as a result of environmental exposure. And I 


guess the question then is it claimant favorable 


to assign the presence of tritium, iodine and 


uranium to environmental as opposed to workplace 


exposure. 


Kathy, do you have anything to add because -- 

 MS. BEHLING: No, that's exactly the issue. 


You've just hit it. We -- based on what we saw 


on the IREP sheet, this looked like they did 


calculate dose for tritium, iodine-131 and 


uranium, but it was assigned based on 


calculations for environmental internal exposure 


as opposed to assuming that it was workplace, and 


that's exactly it. 


 MR. SHARFI: These were all radionuclides they 


were not monitored for. 


 DR. BEHLING: Right, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But there was a --


 MR. SHARFI: Well -- I mean tritium's -- in 


Savannah River tritium seems to be a very -- 


-- (unintelligible) in '86 we did assign -- we 


did have some tritium bioassay we assigned for, 


so we drew the environmen-- the other years, 


though, there's no indication that -- that he had 


likely -- I mean Savannah River's very -- they 


readily monitored people for tritium bioassay, so 


the -- the lack of tritium bioassay does not 


necessarily suggest that he had a true 


occupational exposure to it since they were so 


readily monitoring people on that program. So 


outside the years that he was actually monitored 


for tritium, we did not see -- see the -- 


something that would force us to use anything 


more than environmental dose. 

 MS. MUNN: But there's no evidence that -- that 


his workplace environment -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MS. MUNN: -- would create tritium and iodine. 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MS. MUNN: All right. 


 MR. SHARFI: I don't know how much you want to 


get --


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I mean that -- that -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the fact that we had a whole 


body count, that did suggest at least trace 


quantities of iodine-131. 


MR. MAHER: Exit or entrance body count -- I mean 


everyone gets one. 


 MR. SHARFI: Well -- well, as part of his routine 


-- I mean when they -- when they do a whole body 


count, they look for a slew of radionuclides that 


-- that -- I mean whether or not that truly means 


that he had a potential for iodine-specific just 


because they reported the values -- you know, 


obviously they're looking for the entire fission 


product gambit. 


MR. MAHER: He was not on a routine bioassay 


program. 


 MS. MUNN: Wasn't on the program apparently. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the fact that he was whole 


body-counted would suggest that there was reason 


for doing so (unintelligible) fission products -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: It wasn't regs that it was a -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Chances are --


MR. MAHER: (Unintelligible) is a part of routine 


bioassay (unintelligible) was it a entrance or 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know, I (unintelligible), 


too, I guess. 


 DR. BEHLING: Again --


MR. MAHER: (Unintelligible) all get counted 


once. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: What this whole thing is about is 


that the assignment of doses to these three 


radionuclides would have been considerably higher 


had the assumption been made that it was a 


workplace exposure as opposed to a -- a -- 


environmental exposure. 


MR. MAHER: Yeah, 'cause the way we would use 


some other source, occupational exposure, but -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Well, his work location didn't 


insinuate any uranium potential -- I don't think 


in any of his work locations, for the uranium 


particularly. The fission product will probably 


fall more into the fission product discussion 


where we assigned the highest -- the radionuclide 


that gave the most dose rather than this whole 


discussion of whether or not can you assign a 


slew -- so I mean I think that's a different 

-- 

issue, whereas we assign fission products based 


on the highest potential radionuclide, not every 


single one that he was monitored for. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, they -- you know, just 


sitting here, I would think that -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Iodine for this cancer's not going 


to --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we -- we assigned a -- an 


occupational mixed fission product intake -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- which should account for the 


iodine in any iodine occupational intake, and 


that the addition of the iodine in a -- 


environmental iodine, I would say, is probably a 


mistake on the high side, but it's pretty small, 


you know, so it's not that big a deal because 


since you assigned a mixed fission product intake 


based on his occupational exposure, you have 


accounted for the fission product intake. That's 


what I would think. Then if there's no evidence 


of uranium exposure, we would in-- you know, we 


would maybe assign a uranium environmental intake 


because he worked on the environs of the Savannah 


River Plant. And if I read this response 


correctly, the tritium intake was less than a 


millirem from environmental (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) work areas and job 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- as a matter of course we -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- suggested that he wouldn't have 


been --


MR. MAHER: So the DR --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- uranium building --


MR. MAHER: -- occupation exposed, that's the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MAHER: -- professional judgment of the DR. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: To -- to the -- to uranium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Was occupationally exposed to 


uranium. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the assignment was as 


follows: 55 millirems for collective exposure to 


tritium, zero for the iodine and zero for uranium 


alpha. So he was given 55 millirem collectively 


for the period 1970 through the year 2000, so 30 


years worth of environmental exposure netted him 


55 millirem. And I -- I guess I looked at it in 


context with the whole body counts and saying 


well, if he was whole body-counted for fission 


products, which is really what you're looking 


for, why wasn't any assumptions made that that 


exposure couldn't have been assigned to a 


workplace exposure. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, and we did assign a mixed 


fission product missed dose, which -- even though 


we didn't specify every radionuclide, you know, 

that's part of the discussion so that would fall 


into -- you know, that was -- 


 DR. BEHLING: That would essentially eliminate 


this --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- meant to encompass -- 


 DR. BEHLING: -- as an argument. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, that would -- it's intended 


to encompass all those fission products in that 


mixed fission product -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I guess unless something 


strikes us in the job history or work history -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- otherwise, I would say, you 


know, that -- that's --


MR. MAHER: That's a reasonable --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that's the basis, yeah. So I --


I put for that one that the iodine part is going 


to -- I sort of footnoted this fission product 


model discussion, and on the other two, unless 


you see something else in the job history you 


want to note, I think that's -- there's no 


further action on those. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the next case number, 70, is 


Hanford. I think the ones that follow these 


first Savannah River Sites are going to be much 


easier. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) strike me -- 


 MS. BEHLING: We're now getting into the min/max 

type cases as opposed to the more realistic 


cases. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just one thing as follow-up 


on that last one. It did strike me that 30 years 


of environmental exposure netted zero millirem 


for uranium. You -- you must round off if it's 


below a certain --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we generally round off -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- ten millirem of something 


(unintelligible) bother. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- below a millerem a year. We 


round to the nearest millerem and if it rounds to 


less than one millirem a year, we don't include 


it, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I would expect it to be low, 


but 30 years and zero millirem is -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- surprising. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, there are a lot of us that did 


that. Not necessarily at Savannah River. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And it may have been -- anyway, 


that doesn't -- left that aside. 


I think -- can I ask for a -- maybe a comfort 


break? Let's keep it to ten minutes. We're --


we're past the Savannah River ones. I think --


 DR. BEHLING: These are going --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we can still get through -- 


 DR. BEHLING: -- to go much quicker. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, it should go much quicker. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, we've been through the 


three hardest. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll give Hans a little chance for 


some (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No, in fact, I'm going to -- 


because I'm going in on virgin territory here for 


me because these were done by Kathy and I a long 


time ago and I did not go beyond the three 


Savannah River cases in preparation for today 


because I had very limited time to review the 


matrix since I only received them -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- over the weekend. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, we'll do the best we can. 

 DR. BEHLING: I have to kind of read as we're 

going along and I'm going to ask -- normally if 


Kathy were here, she reads while I talk; I read 


while she talks and we kind of oscillate between 


us, which makes things a little more fluid. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Let's take ten -- a ten-minute -- 


 MS. MUNN: This is bad 'cause you both 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- ten-minute comfort break and -- 


 DR. WADE: We'll be back in ten. We're not going 


to break the connection, though. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:30 p.m. to 


2:40 p.m.) 

 DR. WADE: Okay, we're going to start up in a 


minute. Mike, are you still with us? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. We're on the home 


stretch, he said naively. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Home stretch, the last ten, yeah. 


Okay, we're ready to start up again, everybody? 


 MS. MUNN: We're back. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Everybody, are we starting on case 


70, wasn't it, Hans, on the (unintelligible). 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. Okay, this case was I 


believe a maximized dose reconstruction; denied, 


of course, if it's maximized. The first finding, 


inappropriate DCF, and I guess somehow in here I 


see the thyroid DCF of 1.1 was used when it 


should have been slightly higher, 1.017. I'm not 


sure that that is -- I'm looking here at the 


NIOSH response that says the correct DCF of 1.017 


was used. 


 MS. BEHLING: I believe I can address this. I 


believe initially the dose reconstruction report 


actually indicated that a DCF of 1 was used, and 


when we went in and calculated our doses 


manually, we realized that a DCF of 1.01 was 


essentially used. And when we looked at the 


implementation guide, it indicated that it was 


1.017 and NIOSH is indicating here that 1.0-- 

yeah, 1.017 was actually used, and that's what's 


in the workbook. I believe at this time we 


weren't quite as familiar with the workbooks and 


our manual calculation -- it's so close -- it 


obviously really doesn't matter here, but I think 


initially we felt it was 1.01, the dose 


reconstruction report said 1, and it was just a 


rounding-off issue. I don't think we really have 


any additional comments on this and we agree with 


NIOSH's response. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 70.2, failure to assign 


recorded photon dose uncertainty -- let me see 


here. Let me go back and check to see which -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Oh, this is that reoccurring theme 


that for recorded photon dose -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- they're supposed to enter it, 


based on the procedures, as a normal distribution 


with a numerical standard deviation and that was 


not done in this case. 


 DR. BEHLING: I'm looking at it. These were 


extremely trivial doses for recorded dose that 


ranged from ten millirem to -- only to a maximum 


value of 61, so again, it's a technical issue, 


but it's a very marginal dose to begin with and 


the uncertainty around a marginal dose would 


certainly have limited impact. 


Finding 70.3 --

 MR. GRIFFON: So you're -- let me just --


 DR. BEHLING: It's a technical issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- NIOSH is kind of saying there's 


probably no reason to rerun this because -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) triangular 


distribution --


 MR. HINNEFELD: We don't think it's going to 


matter. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, not going to matter 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We may -- based on 70-- when I 


read 70.2 and 70.3 I said we can take another 


look at these, it won't take a lot of work to reevaluate some --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- potential things here and -- 


and show this is probably not likely going to 


change. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's a POC of 45, but still -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- this is probably not likely to 


be affected. Right? 


 DR. BEHLING: But -- but the -- it's not even the 


POC. You have to be careful. This was a --


based on an overestimation approach and there's 


so much buffer built into it where these minor, 


trivial doses have very little impact. And so, 

you know, when somebody says -- for instance, 


when we go back to our -- our initial matrix here 


of where we have to say okay, the case review 


checklist, what -- is this dose significant, yes 


or -- or is it low, medium, high. That's -- it's 


not so much the absolute value of that error, but 


-- and it has to be done in context -- was this a 


best estimate and how close are you to 50. So a 


one-rem miscalculation when you're at 49 percent 


POC on a best estimate could certainly make a 


monumental difference. A one-rem miscalculation 


for a best -- for a maximized where there's 12 


rem given for hypothetical internal has no 


meaning, so --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I'm agreeing, I 


(unintelligible) the case. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 70.3, potential failure to 


properly account for missed neutron dose. Our 


review of this claim looked at the location. He 


apparently worked in -- in two buildings -- or 


actually three locations, he worked in building 


1705, 105 in the 100 N reactor area, and the EE 


also identified the 1705 building that was 


located for the N reactor area. And he claims 


that there were no doors separating his facility 


from the reactor, et cetera. 


 MS. BEHLING: In addition, I guess the employee 


was also given a multi-purpose TLD that was 

capable of monitoring for neutrons between 1982 


and 1984, and generally we see that these types 


of dosimeters are issued when they are going to 


be monitored for neutron dose, although in this 


particular case I think the records just showed a 


blank. And so although we -- we still are 


questioning, based on the fact the work locations 


or the proximity to these work locations, whether 


there shouldn't have been neutron doses 


considered. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And I think that's just one -- 


that one and .2 I said we'll take a look at 


because --


 MR. GRIFFON: You're re-evaluating, I saw that -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- when I was -- when I looked at 


that, this person went from a non-multi-purpose 


dosimeter onto a multi-purpose dosimeter, so it 


wasn't like they were necessarily hanging them on 


everybody --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so we may want to take a look 


at it. But there is -- like you said, it's a 


hypothetical internal, so it's a pretty big 


overestimate to start. 


MR. MAHER: It’s a big overestimate. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 70.4, and that is 


inconsistency between CATI and data used to 

assign dose. Let me quickly scan through here. 


 MS. BEHLING: This is a reiteration of the 


finding 70.3 where, again, the individual seemed 


to indicate that there -- I believe that's what 


this is -- that there was a potential for neutron 


exposure that wasn't calculated in this -- in 


this dose reconstruction. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MS. BEHLING: So 70.3 and 70.4 are discussing the 


same issue of the neutron dose. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And do you want to get into the 


neutron discus-- or the radon discussion at all, 


you know, --


 DR. BEHLING: Was there a potential for a radon ­

-


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the CATI, they -- they alarmed 


the -- the PCMs at -- we don't have an 


occupational source of radon at this part of 


Hanford and so we would consider that to be 


natural background --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, that -- that was -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- as far as the dose 


reconstruction. And you can alarm a -- if you're 


-- if you're talking about a count PCM, you can 


alarm then on natural -- natural background. 


 DR. BEHLING: Now would the radon exposure be 


considered occupational? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Not in an instance where it was 

naturally background. It is considered 


occupational in a couple of circumstances. 


MR. MAHER: Some sites it is. 


 DR. BEHLING: For instance, in the case of the 


Gerties and --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- other locations, wouldn't -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There are --


 DR. BEHLING: -- obviously you would have a 


natural source of radon -- 


MR. MAHER: Certainly (unintelligible) involved. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- but it's also considered in the 


dose reconstruction. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There are -- there are two 


circumstances when radon's included. One is when 


you have the occupational source of radon; in 


other words, you have radium, but -- and the 


other is when you are working in a workplace 


that's sort of unique to the complex. You know, 


it's -- it's -- you wouldn't be working in that 


kind of environment unless it were a tunnel 


drill-back at NTS and you're working in a tunnel 


or you're working in a Gravel Gertie where 


nuclear weapons are assembled. So in those --


MR. MAHER: A unique -- unique feature of the 


work area. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Those are considered unique 


features of the AEC work and therefore we include 

radon in those. But just working in the basement 


of a building, we would not because a lot of 


people work in basements of buildings. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, that was an issue raised by 


the claimant. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I -- can I understand the -- 


the finding again? I'm looking at the little 


snapshot, but ingots I see between CATI and data 


used to assign neutron dose, and then we're 


talking about radon over here. Am I --


 DR. BEHLING: Well --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well --


 DR. BEHLING: -- it all comes under the CATI. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it comes -- it's all in the 


CAT, it's all in the CAT. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So it's two parts of -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Two parts things, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Can we go to 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Can we talk about the neutron part 


of that? I mean --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it's the same as 70.3. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, got it. 


 MS. BEHLING: Which NIOSH is -- NIOSH is going to 


reassess. 

 UNIDENTIFIED: Going to reassess, right. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 71 is also a Hanford case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Did this person -- I'm sorry to go 


back to 70.4. Did this person say that they had 


alpha alarms going off, is that what prompted 


this --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Apparently -- let me see here, this 


is -- let me see. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Because I think we can agree on 


there was no source of --


 DR. BEHLING: She said --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- radon exposure, but -- 

 DR. BEHLING: I shouldn't say even any -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- how do we know radon was causing 

the alarm? I mean --


 DR. BEHLING: Portal -- portal monitors were set 


off, and that suggested exposure to radon, radon 


daughters. One of the daughters is a 360 keV 


photon that oftentimes gets mistaken for iodine131 in a reactor facility, and so I guess perhaps 


one of the short-lived gamma-emitters was -- was 


triggering alarms, portal alarms. 


MR. MAHER: (Unintelligible) happens a lot in 


power plant (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. BEHLING: We had at Three Mile Island -- 


MR. MAHER: -- poly-- polyester suits, you know ­

-

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes --


MR. MAHER: -- stick to the --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, in the Redding Prong area we 


would have people come in first thing in the 


morning for a whole body count and they would set 


off or give a false positive for iodine and it 


would turn out to be radon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I -- I know theoretically this 


can and does happen, but how do we know -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: She attributes it to that on the 


CATI. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, she attributed it in the CATI ­

-


 MR. HINNEFELD: She said --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- okay --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the alarms were set off 


because of radon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, that's fine. 


MR. MAHER: That's probably what the technician 


around the (unintelligible) kind of told 


(unintelligible), you know, (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it's easy to -- it's easy 


to tell if you make them stand there for 30 


minutes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead on to 71 -- 71. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the next one is 71, it's 


another Hanford case. If you have the 


background, Kathy, is this a overestimate -- yes, 

it is. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, it is. I was going to say, 


let's, for the rest of these, indicate that -- 


whether they're overestimates or underestimates, 


and this was an overestimate. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, the POC was very, very low in 


spite of the overestimate, so we can look at 


these issues with -- with a questionable need to 


-- to address these more serious infractions, 


other than the fact that they were findings. 


 MS. BEHLING: And actually the first finding, 


again, although we're only dealing with a small 


dose here, we realize, but to be technically 


correct when we look through all of the DOE 


records there was a 30-millirem dose identified 


in 1980 that was not accounted for in the IREP 


input sheet. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We agree. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: And again, we're back to the same 

issue of also failed to account for recorded 


photon dose uncertainty. 


 DR. BEHLING: That's finding number 71.2, so 


again, we've discussed that before. 


 Finding 71.3, failure to account for all 


occupational medical exposures. There were three 

years of occupational medical exposures that were 


not included, and these doses were relatively 


minor. Now let's see, what does it say here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the DR said as part of its 


overestimating --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- approach, it assigned one 


every year. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and -- and --


 MR. HINNEFELD: And it actually didn't. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It left out three years. We've 


got the records and the person didn't get that. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it still assigned more -- 


it's consistent with -- with the statement "for 


all years," it's inconsistent -- 


MR. MAHER: With every year. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- with every year, so --


MR. MAHER: So it's still an overestimate, 


though. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- it's still an overestimate, so ­

-


 MR. HINNEFELD: It should have coincided -- you 


know, and it's an overestimating approach so the 


POC's not very high. The dose reconstruction 


should have coincided with the language in the 


dose reconstruction. 


 DR. BEHLING: Inappropriate --

 MR. GRIFFON: No further action on that? 

 DR. BEHLING: If the wording --

 MS. BEHLING: This particular case -- this is 

another one of those reoccurring themes where 


when they ran the OTIB-2 workbook, the 


hypothetical intake, they used the colon as the 


highest non-metabolic organ as opposed to the 


actual --


 DR. BEHLING: Cancer. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- the actual tissue of interest 


for this particular case. And again, this 


resulted in a fairly significant overestimate of 


the dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: And again, it's mostly for the 


optics, when a person reviews this and says we 


assessed it for colon, if the emphasis is stated 


that this colon dose is actually greater than 


your cancer dose, they might say well, maybe you 


got the wrong person. And -- and clearly the 


hypothetical does allow for the particular cancer 


in question to be run. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And the other -- and the other 


reason is important, we discussed many times, is 


if they come down with another cancer. I don't 


know if this person's -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- still alive. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: In this case was 12.377 the dose or 


was it 18.(unintelligible). 


 MS. BEHLING: 12.377 was the dose calculated 


based on the colon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: And it was --


 MR. GRIFFON: I read it, it was an overestimate 


of 12 or -- or -- okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: No, no. 


 MS. MUNN: Overestimated by that much. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, the -- the --


MR. MAHER: And that was -- that was typical of 


OTIB-5 at that point, you know, years ago. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah, we've found that 


before. Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: And again, as I said, it is the 


hypothetical intake that drives this whole dose 


reconstruction. 


 MS. BEHLING: I agree. 


 DR. BEHLING: Looking at the Table 1 here of the 


15 and a half rem assigned to the organ dose, 


fully 12 -- 12 of those 15 and a half was based 


on a hypothetical. So these errors that we 


identified are trivial when you compare it to the 


generous assignment of hypothetical intake and 


therefore they have limited significance. 

 MR. GRIFFON: And 72. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 72 is a -- another Hanford 


dose reconstruction case. This was a minimized 


dose reconstruction and therefore you attempt to 


minimize or underestimate dose or only partially 


reconstruct dose, and on the basis of a partial 


dose reconstruction the claim was obviously 


compensated and -- do we even have any findings 


here? 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. This has come up before, 


too, this derivation -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, it has, this is the 


inappropriate method used for deriving the 


recorded shallow dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, yeah, yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Go ahead. 

 DR. BEHLING: No, I'm actually -- I just got to 

the page, Kathy. If you have the answer, go 


ahead. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Well, I believe in this 


particular case it -- and I'm -- I'm also just 


getting there, but the Appendix B of the 


implementation guide indicates that when you do 


have a shallow dose, a -- a seven milligram dose, 


that you should just use that shallow dose for 


your skin dose as opposed to -- see what they 


used here, did they use a photon dose and apply a 

DCF? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think --


 DR. BEHLING: What they did was use the 1,000 


milligram deep dose and then applied a DCF, as 


opposed to just using the shallow dose and saying 


okay, this is the number; we don't have to have a 


DCF. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think what the -- I think what 


the DR did was identify the electron component of 


the shallow dose, which is a step that you say 


should really not --


 DR. BEHLING: It's minimizing the dose -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- but it's an unnecessary step 


when you're trying to be efficient. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, well, some people might 


argue no, because the Radiation Effectiveness 


Factors are different for electrons than they are 


for 30 to 250 keV electrons. 


 DR. BEHLING: But it's counter to a minimized 


dose where you're trying to say -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We should have just put it in 


there. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- hey, (unintelligible) efficient. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: He could have just put the 


shallow dose in it and made it -- you know, just 


called it all electrons, for instance. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, we've encountered this issue, 

however, in instance where it was not necessary 


an -- an overestimate where we sort of say just 


use -- and -- and Appendix B in the 


implementation guide clearly states if there is a 


shallow dose, assign that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, and -- and there may be a 


need to apportion it, though, in a best estimate, 


be-- especially if your components are 30 to 250 


elec-- photons because the Radiation 


Effectiveness Factor is different -- 


 DR. BEHLING: I know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- for that than it is for 


electrons, so there may -- you could use it as 


the number, that's the dose number. You still 


may need some way to apportion it between the 


photons and the electrons. It this case it was 


considered all -- it could have been done 


(unintelligible) just call it all electrons. 


 DR. BEHLING: There's a second one area -- yeah, 


72.2, again, the issue of uncertainty. 


 MS. BEHLING: And actually in this particular 


case we realized that for efficiency, you know, 


you could disregard the uncertainty. However, it 


was entered again as a constant and I believe 


that parameter two had a value of two, and again, 


which we've discussed earlier, is just part of a 


template that -- it just looked strange to us 


when we look at the IREP sheet. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: And in general, when you have a 


minimized dose, you ignore uncertainty to begin 


with. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


 DR. BEHLING: You say --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well --


 DR. BEHLING: -- we'll just go with the lower 


dose and forget uncertainty, so that's a standard 


protocol for -- for a minimized dose. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and -- and the DR did enter 


it as a constant. It is identified as a constant 


value, it's just that that (unintelligible) for 


those (unintelligible) twos in parameter two. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, case 73, a Y-12 case. This 


person had two cancers. 


 MS. BEHLING: It was an overestimate of the dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, an overestimate, and a POC 


that was very modest, a little more than half of 


the required dose to be compensated. 


 MS. BEHLING: The first two findings are these 


findings that we've discussed over and over 


again. That is very typical when the dose 


reconstructor is using either OTIB-8 or OTIB-10 


and their misinterpretation of that. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, this is what I think Stu is 


getting sick and tired of hearing us talk about 

it. We call it the poster boy (unintelligible). 


 MS. BEHLING: We also realize that OTIB-8 and 


OTIB-10 have been modified -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- and then it should correct this 


problem. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: You want to go into the -- to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: No. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- the actual problem on these two 


ca-- on these two findings? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't think we need to. 


UNIDENTIFIED: There's no action. 


 MR. GRIFFON: On -- on these case-- on these 


first two, do -- would you still use TIB-8 or 


would you use the Y-12 coworker models that you 


have? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, this is an ORNL case. 


 DR. BEHLING: This is an overestimate. 


 MS. MUNN: An overestimate. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's ORNL? 


 MS. BEHLING: No. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We -- we -- I -- we could still 


use --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, it says ORNL/Y-12 in my 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay, maybe it's both. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is it both or is it --

 MR. HINNEFELD: We -- we could use both. We 


could still use TIB-8. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We could, or we could use the 


coworker --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right? Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I mean if -- if it's going to be 


a relatively low POC with -- using TIB-8, we just 


might go ahead and --


 MR. GRIFFON: Where -- what is this -- what is 


this case from? Is it Y-12 or ORNL? 


 DR. BEHLING: It's Y-12. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's both. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Or both? It's both. 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, yeah, yeah, it is both. 


 MS. BEHLING: Both. 


 MS. MUNN: There's really no action here. 


 DR. BEHLING: No. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, we've addressed it else -- 


we've addressed it elsewhere. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's already been addressed, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: TIBs have been revised to be more 


clear. 


Are we on 73.2, Kathy? 


 MS. BEHLING: 73.3 now. 


 DR. BEHLING: 73.3, okay. 


 MS. BEHLING: Because the first two findings were 


both associated with -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- the calculation of the -- the 


missed dose and then the uncertainty associated 


with that, and they were both associated with 


misinterpreting TIB-8, so we're on to 73.3. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, here again it was a willful 


assumption to assign missed dose for 73.3 where 


data suggests that that was really excessive and 


unnecessary. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, they assumed that 12 badge 


exchanges --


 DR. BEHLING: Yes --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- when the records indicate 


four. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- quarterly. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: So again, it just -- you know, our 


feeling is if you have the real number, don't 


necessary inflate it beyond what's reasonable. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And this individual -- this 


individual wasn't in the production areas in 


these facilities, doesn't seem like it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, could have been. Looks 


like he was a maintenance craftsman, probably in 


and out. Indicates that (unintelligible) was in 


some of the production areas, but was -- I 


believe was monitored full time. And the -- the 


cancers are not -- they have relatively low risk 

values. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: 73.4 and 5 involves unmonitored 


neutron versus missed neutron assignments. 
I 


guess it's a question here -- Kathy, can you help 


me out here? What is --


 MS. BEHLING: I'm struggling with this, also. 


I'm just reading it as you are. 


 DR. BEHLING: I'm just trying to read here. 


Apparently the records show that when for 


external photons the -- the values was below MDA, 


they recorded it as a zero. But that was not 


done in behalf of neutrons. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, well, in our response we 


said --


 MR. GRIFFON: Based on work area? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- if we were doing this case 


today we wouldn't have put the neutrons in. You 


know, your -- your finding is right, this is an 


over-- unnecessary overestimate. 


 MS. BEHLING: Can you repeat that, Stu? I didn't 


hear you. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If we were doing the -- I'm not 


sure I can. 


 DR. BEHLING: I'm choking him. 


 MS. MUNN: He's about at the end of his rope 


here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If -- if we were doing the case 

today we would not have included the neutrons, as 


you suggest. We would have -- we would have said 


we have done it the way you suggest it should 


have been done, so this was an unnecessary 


overestimate done at that time. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you're saying if you would do 


it today, that would be -- the basis would be 


based on where they worked their job that you 


wouldn't --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- include neutron? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the nature of the records is 


that if it's -- if it was non-detectable, they 


recorded it as zero and if they were monitored it 


was a blank, which is essentially what they've -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: So they had a blank. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- what the finding is. There 


were blanks in this case that this dose 


reconstructor counted as zeroes -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Ah, okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- which we would not do today. 


 DR. BEHLING: I guess our finding says that 


perhaps the person should have been regarded as 


an unmonitored person as opposed to there was no 


reason to monitor and there was no exposure. So 


the second half of that finding -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- 73.5 seems to suggest that 


perhaps the approach for -- for assigning neutron 


dose should have been based on unmonitored 


neutron as opposed to missed neutron. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I was getting at, the 


second (unintelligible) where it says and does 


not appear to have any potential for exposure. 


think that's what you're also saying. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So... And SC&A -- Hans, do you 


(unintelligible) --


 MS. BEHLING: And actually --


 DR. BEHLING: Well, I guess --


 MS. BEHLING: -- I think we need to look at this 


a little closer because based on the building 


locations that he indicated he was working, that 


would indicate that he should have been 


monitored, that he -- he could have been exposed 


to neutrons. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think you also want to 


look at the era that he worked. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it's building 9212. 


 MS. BEHLING: 9212. 


 DR. BEHLING: And there was a photon -- neutron-


to-photon ratio of 25 to one, so the potential 


for relatively significant neutron exposures 


I 
would have existed in building 9212. 


 MS. MUNN: During the years he was there? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But again, look at -- look at the 


era that he worked -- the era he worked, which 


was essentially the '90s. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: He's got '80s. Is that at ORNL? 


No, he's in the '80s at Y-12. But still, that 


may be... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Wait a minute, I was looking at 


the one excerpt on page -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I show '81 through '89 -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, let me go back here -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- uranium --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- bioassay data. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, you're right. Well, like I 


said, the practice was that if there was -- the 


neutron badge was less than detectable, they 


recorded a zero. If he wasn't -- and if he 


wasn't monitored for neutrons, then it was a 


blank. And based on that, that's why we would 


decide that he wasn't monitored for neutrons, and 


probably appropriately. Just because there is a 


potential for it in some -- I mean 9212 is a -- 


that's a Y-12 building, right? 


 MR. GRIFFON: 9212 is a Y-12 building, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: What would be the source of the 

25 to one neutron-to-photon at Y-12? It'd be one 


location in a -- in the building, right? It 


wouldn't be the whole building. 


 MR. SHARFI: I think so. I'm not as familiar 


with Y-12. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The basis for the decision would 


be the --


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm trying to --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- there'd be blanks. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: They were blanks, not zeroes, and 


that's -- you know, in the record, and so that's 


why we say well, he wasn't monitored for 


neutrons. That's what we would say today. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But this job basis does make -- 


make us at least question it still, at least in 


my mind. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. I can get more 


explanation. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah, we'll get that to you. 


 MS. BEHLING: I'm sorry, I'm not hearing. What 


was the resolution to this finding, or have we 


come -- have we come to one? 


 MR. GRIFFON: We're fading out here, it's -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


MR. MAHER: We'll get the DR to give his or her 


thinking on this and why they considered the 


person not exposed to neutrons. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay, I believe I got that. 


 MS. MUNN: Did you get that, Kathy? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, Hans, are we -- yeah, I guess 

we -- yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and -- and I -- I assume 

you're going to look into this building issue of 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: 73.6, incorrect organ selected for 


estimating occupational medical exposures, and 


apparently -- I'm trying to quickly read here -- 


what they did using testes as a surrogate organ 


for the prostate and (unintelligible) organs for 


the surrogate of the brain, when they actually 


used -- X-ray dose recorded (unintelligible) 


organ other than skin. I'm not sure I --


 MR. HINNEFELD: They used the highest medical -- 


the highest dose -- X-ray dose in the table 


rather than the correct surrogate. I think this 


kind of falls into the category that we've 


actually asked them, you know -- we've sent ORAU 


-- hey, don't do these overestimates just to be 


overestimating --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and -- and so I think we've 


kind of addressed that in communications. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, excessive conservativism. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and -- and -- and in TIB-6 


you really have the option of choosing the 


specific organ dose of concern. Okay. So it was 


a question of potentially overestimating that, 


again, we would like to discourage. 


 Finding 73.7, whether the use of the hypothetical 


internal dose model is appropriate. Let me see. 


 MS. BEHLING: Here again, I believe we're -- 


we're indicating that there were quite a few 


bioassay records. I believe that we have here 57 


positive urinalysis records. However, the dose 


reconstructor I guess chose to use the 


hypothetical internal dose model, which I don't 


think is consistent with OTIB-2. I don't really 


believe that the OTIB-2 indicates that a dose 


reconstructor should have used the hypothetical 


internal when this person has had this many 


positive bioassays. And I believe I also went in 


and actually ran IMBA in this case, and although 


that hypothetical internal model gave a higher 


dose, it still was inappropriate to run it, just 


based on the number of positive bioassay samples. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and I think you agree with 


that in your response, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, as -- as a matter of 


practice -- you know, the nice thing about the 


hypothetical intake is the dose numbers are there 

and available to you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And if you can demonstrate that 


the hypothetical gives you a higher dose in an 


overestimate, that's been a matter of practice. 


And we -- we would prefer the use of bioassay 


data, but a bioassay fit takes a lot of time and 


a lot of work and so we have accepted cases that 


had hypothetical intakes, even when there's 


bioassay present when -- that's been -- 


MR. MAHER: For non-compensable cases. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: For non-compensable cases, yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, I do understand that. I 


guess, though, the wording in OTIB-2 would 


indicate that the dose reconstructor was not 


supposed to use that procedure, but I understand 


your rationale. 


 DR. BEHLING: Finding 73.8 --


 MS. BEHLING: Again, this is a situation where 


when they did run the hypothetical internal they 


used the highest non-metabolic organ as opposed 


to the actual --


 DR. BEHLING: Prostate and -- well, I won't say 

the tissues. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- The actual, you know, cancer of 

in-- or organ of interest. So again, this was an 


overestimation of the dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it was essentially then twice 

you used hypothetical when in fact you could have 


used real numbers, and then you used the 


hypothetical using the colon as opposed to the 


tissue of interest. So twice an overestimate, 


again, for efficiency or whatever, but again, 


there's -- the excessive use of -- of assigned 


dose is something that will bite you if the 


person gets another cancer. 


MR. MAHER: Except that we do caveat these 


reports by telling (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, I realize that, but I think 


most people don't view it quite that way. 


MR. MAHER: Well, I -- I agree, but if we have to 


go back to best estimates, it's going to take us 


a lot longer to do a case -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, I know. 


MR. MAHER: -- so I mean, which way do we want to 


go? And I think the right way is what we're 


doing. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, you know --


 MS. BEHLING: We're not even suggesting doing a 


best estimate. We're just suggesting -- you can 


keep your efficiency by selecting the correct 


organ of interest as opposed to the highest -- 


MR. MAHER: This is an old case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. MAHER: This is what we were told to do back 


then. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MAHER: That's not --


 MS. BEHLING: Right --


MR. MAHER: -- (unintelligible) do now. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- I understand. 


MR. MAHER: (Unintelligible) change -- 


 DR. BEHLING: However, I will point out -- I will 


point out I did listen yesterday to the hearings 


and this issue was brought up again. In fact, 


they gave an example of a case where someone had 


a 40 -- I believe 40-some percent POC with one 


cancer, developed a second cancer. The dose 


reconstruction was reworked and the POC went down 


to 30-something. So that was discussed again 


yesterday in -- in hearings. 


MR. MAHER: But the only way to get around that 


is to do best estimates. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, we're all on the same page 


here. 


 DR. WADE: This is a NIOSH policy issue. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We're all on the same page. If 


it's effici-- if it adds efficiency, it's 


allowed. But there's no reason to go over and 


above --


 DR. BEHLING: More than you have to. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- more than you have to for the 


efficiency. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can -- can -- Kathy, you seem to 

have these records in front of you. I don't see 


any X-10 information for this person. Is there 


any dosimetry information from X-10? You said it 


was an X-10/Y-12 case. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, there was no data for X-10. 


 MS. BEHLING: I don't have all those records in 


front of me, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay, I'm sorry. 


 MS. BEHLING: I believe Hans is correct that 


there was no X-10 data. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, if I recall this one, they 


only had Y-12 data for this person. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm assuming we confirmed -- you 


confirmed employment at both or... 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There are a lot of possible 


explanations, but I'd have to look at the case 


file to really know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The only reason I ask is just to -- 


to go back to those other issues of where this 


individual worked and whether he could have been 


in areas where he was not monitored and should 


have been monitored, you know, those kind of 


questions. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: This person was --


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm not saying it's likely to turn 


this case over, but --


 MR. HINNEFELD: If this person was a -- cons-- a 

subcontractor employee, Y-12 would have held his 


records, regardless of where he worked on the 


three sites down there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: 'Cause they held records -- all 


the records for construction subcontractors for 


certain periods of time -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- were kept at Y-12 even though 


they worked in all three of the Oak Ridge plants, 


so -- and that could be the case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That could be -- that could explain 

it, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay, case -- case 74, again, this 

individual was ORNL and Y-12. 


 MS. BEHLING: And this case was an overestimate 


of the dose, conducted as an overestimate. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This was also ORNL and Y-12? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes. Low POC, that's why the 


overestimate. First finding, 74.1, inappropriate 


assignment of missed dose uncertainty, and I 


think --


 MS. BEHLING: I think this, again, is a -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- misinterpretation of the OTIB-8 


which was previously discussed and has been 


corrected at this point. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yes, so we can skip that. The 

second one is the misuse of surrogate organ for 


calculating occupational medical dose. Again, 


that's the same thing as we've gone through 


before. In this case the lung was used instead 


of the colon, which was the cancer of interest. 


And then there's no excuse for looking up a table 


and then looking at the wrong tissue. 


 74.3, inappropriate selection of the hypothetical 


internal dose. We came to a conclusion that 


perhaps -- I don't know, maybe there's 


justification -- that the 28 radionuclide dose 


model's inappropriate for a place that doesn't 


have reactors. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, if they worked at ORNL -- I 


mean ORNL has reactors and fission products. If 


they were only at Y-12 -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Y-12, yeah, this is --


 MR. HINNEFELD: If they were only at Y-12 that'd 


be (unintelligible). If they worked both places, 


we would use the 28-nuclide -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Kathy, is this both or -- or just ­

-


 MS. BEHLING: This is both. This is both, so I 


guess it was appropriate to use the 28. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Kathy sent me that spreadsheet, 


that's why -- on her spreadsheet it just said 


both, so... 


 MS. MUNN: So we're not --

 MR. GRIFFON: Again, there's no X-10 records, 


though, I don't think. 


 DR. BEHLING: Let me see -- well, one of them had 


no -- no records for X-10. I don't know which 


one it was -- the previous one -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, neither one of these last two 


have. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, that we see here. Do you 


have the whole --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- submittal file? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: I don't know if it's this one. 


 DR. BEHLING: And unless I read the whole report, 


I'm not in a position to make a firm statement. 


Let me go --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think this person's 


work history was in the '80 -- late '80s to '90s, 


so -- and it was an overestimating approach, so I 


don't know that there's anything there. It just 


surprises me that there's both -- both times they 


list X-12 and Y-12 and I haven't seen any X-10 


records at all. I don't know, maybe that's 


common. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, yeah, I think it was fairly com­

- based on what I believe I've heard Bob Presley 

say, I think that was common, that people moved 


from one to the other but the records were kept 


by one --


 MR. GRIFFON: Stayed in one -- one area, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: You know, actually when I go back 


to the summary statement here -- 'cause I don't 


have --

 DR. BEHLING: 

 MS. BEHLING: 

Yeah --

-- all the records in front of me ­

-

 DR. BEHLING: 

 MS. BEHLING: 

-- I believe he was at both places. 

Yeah, I'm not sure that this 

individual also worked at X-10 or if this was 


just Y-12. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think this -- Kathy, I 


think this guy was confined to Y-12. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, I do, too. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's the -- that's the way the 


write-up reads. The tab reads both. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So the last case then was both, 


though. Right? 


 DR. BEHLING: I'm trying to even verify that. 


 MS. MUNN: That's what they said. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just want to be clear this -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, the last case -- I also -- 


I'm looking at whole different sources here, but 


I also have on the last case that that's just Y­
12. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I -- I have not found 


anything, Kathy --


 MR. GRIFFON: So maybe it's only 75 -- 


 DR. BEHLING: -- that would suggest that these -- 


either one of these cases worked at both. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, 75 is X-10. That's the next 


case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think that's the one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I thi-- okay, I think now I'm 


understanding your notation. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it's just --


 MR. GRIFFON: Kathy, you --


 DR. BEHLING: -- Y-12. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Kathy, you were writing ORNL, 


parentheses, Y-12. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And ORNL is always synonymous with 


X-10, and everybody -- down there that thinks 


about it, anyway, so -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, I -- that was -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I was --


 MS. BEHLING: -- inappropriate on my -- on what I 


just sent you. I apologize. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I understand now what... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. I see. 


 DR. BEHLING: So in essence, the 28-radionuclide 

model would have been inappropriate for Y-12. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Would have been, yeah, and it was 


-- you're right. It's one of those -- no need to 


overestimate more than you have to. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, are we done with this one? 


We can go to case 75? And I think this is the X10. I think this is where we have neutron 


records. 


 MS. BEHLING: No, it's not. This -- this case 


was compensated and I don't think there were any 


findings on this case. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Okay, I hadn't looked at it 


yet. Okay, yeah, this was a underestimation of 


dose and compensated. So there's a partial dose 


reconstruction that's based totally on external 


exposure that's recorded. So are there any 


findings at all on this, Kathy? 


 MS. BEHLING: No, there's no findings. 


 DR. BEHLING: No findings. That's an easy one. 


 MS. MUNN: You just wanted to get through. 


 MR. GRIFFON: If anybody's interested, there are 


X-10 records for this person, so -- 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, good. 


 MS. BEHLING: You know, I think we're referring 


to a case in the third set where there might have 


been an X-10 and Y-12 situation and there were no 


X-10 records. I may be wrong, but if my 

recollection serves me correctly, I believe that 


was during the third set of cases. I don't know. 


We'll continue on. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. So we're making progress. 


We're on case 76, and this is Fernald. Now this 


was an overestimation of dose, POC modestly high 


-- not modestly high, somewhere in the middle 


between zero and 50. Okay, first finding, failed 


to properly account for all missed photon doses. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, this is a bit complex. I'm 


reading through this also. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Since you guys just got this, you 


might just, you know, read the response and see 


later on --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- if you agree with it. It has 


to do with a change in LOD, not a change in 


monitoring frequency. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: Let's see --

 MS. BEHLING: I'm sorry, Stu, I couldn't hear 

you. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: No one else can either. 


 MS. MUNN: He said it has to do with a change in 


LOD. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah -- yeah, not change in 


monitoring frequency. That's the difference. 


 MS. BEHLING: Oh, okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So just read our write-up and see 


if you agree with it. I mean later on, don't -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, might -- might want to reevaluate that later, Kathy. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay, I will do that. I'll mark it 

on here. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay, 76.2, failure to assign 

unmonitored neutron for all years employed. 


Claim is that he should have been monitored -- or 


should have been assigned unmonitored neutron 


doses for all 33 years of employment. 


 MS. MUNN: It says OCAS is looking at that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We're re-evaluating. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Okay, so you want to leave 


that as an open issue? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we owe a response on that 


because I believe it's a correct comment that the 


-- there is insufficient evidence in the person's 


file to exclude the possibility of neutron 


exposure. Clearly there was neutron monitoring, 


and based on what we've written in the site 


profile, it looked to me like it -- neutron 


should have been in there. So it's -- I believe 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. BEHLING: Finding 76.3, I guess we're using 


again the statement that the methodology that 


involves TIB-2 may be inappropriate when in fact 


the person has extensive monitoring data that 

could have been used or should have been used, 


especially in the case -- for this individual, he 


was monitored for uranium no fewer than 157 


times, which 156 out of 157 had positive samples 


in terms of -- defined in terms of micrograms per 


liter, so -- and -- and I'm just reading quickly 


here through the bullets, the highest urine 


values occurred in '57 through '61 with maximum 


values of 60 micrograms per liter and an average 


value I calculate at 35 micrograms per liter. 


think what we concluded is that this person 


defaulted to a hypothetical intake because he was 


maybe not sure how to use IMBA, I don't know. 


 MS. MUNN: I think your -- your response from 


NIOSH may address your concerns there, Hans. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, let me -- let me -- 76.3 --


yeah. Yeah, I think what -- what concerned me 


here was a person just blindly said let's just do 


a hypothetical and -- and, you know, maybe was 


done --


MR. MAHER: I don't think that's a -- you can 


conclude that. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, you know, it's -- it's -- 


MR. MAHER: I would guess they compared the two 


and found the hypothetical more claimant 


favorable. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, usually we go behind the 


scenes and see what was done, and -- and if it 


I 
-- 

wasn't done, then -- you know, if -- usually 


there's a paper trail that you can find and say 


okay, what's -- what's the actual data used to 


assess it. And if so, what did it show and was 


the assumption of a hypothetical intake in fact 


higher and therefore defaulted to it. I don't 


think we found any evidence to suggest that the 


real data was ever used. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think -- I think we've 


actually done that subsequently. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Subsequently. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Subsequently, right, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think we have. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But if it was done prior, it should 


have just been provided. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: I mean and this is what's triggered 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: I mean if I would have seen some -- 


some evidence that this was done -- I'm not 


debating that the hypothetical still 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. BEHLING: The question is are people doing 


this more or less routinely, saying well, that 


takes an awful lot of work, why bother; we'll 

just go with a hypothetical -- on the blind 


assumption that it's going to yield a higher dose 


when that necessary doesn't have to be the case. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: This I believe is back when -- when 


-- we had taken OTIB-2 and, based on the uranium 


intakes, figured out what kind of bioassay 


results would be required to cause a dose greater 


than what OTIB-2 assigned. And if all the 


bioassay data was below that point, then we -- it 


was already determined previously that, you know, 


if you required at least a 200 microgram per 


liter result and all -- his highest at 60, at 


that point we still know OTIB-2, without even 


having to assess the bioassay because we've done 


some general assessments to see what kind of a -- 


what kind of doses would be associated with OTIB2 over a general bioassay level. 


 DR. BEHLING: I mean if there were screening 


methods that were available that says okay -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Well, that's what he was saying. 


MR. SHARFI: (Unintelligible) on this was is they 


didn't provide the --


 DR. BEHLING: There was no --


 MR. SHARFI: -- (unintelligible) assessment 


because they had already done the prescreening 


stuff to determine that these results are below a 


level that OTIB-2 would cause an overestimate. 

 DR. BEHLING: You know, it would be really nice 


for us if -- if a -- if the real data were run 


that showed that the doses would have resulted in 


something less than hypothetical, we'll default 


to hypothetical. And -- and like I said, I would 


have no doubt, but I -- my concern is that 


somebody might do this at the wrong time and 


place without --


MR. MAHER: Are you sure the DR doesn't say that, 


'cause they often do say things -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No, I don't think there was any 


evidence --


 MR. SHARFI: At this -- this point they'd done 


the prescreening, then they would have just 


looked at the value of the results, not assessed 


them, 'cause if you would have assessed them, 


then at that point you might as well just use -- 


you've assessed --


 MS. BEHLING: Uh-huh. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- we've already done the work. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But is this -- is this prescreening 


-- it's not necessarily proceduralized. It's 


probably in these meetings that you were talking 


about before -- right? -- that -- 


 MR. SHARFI: I would assume from an efficiency 


point of view that in trying to apply the OTIB in 


the most efficient method they looked at those 


intakes -- this is a while back, I don't know if 

they still use this process (unintelligible) a 


lot of the quick cases, but they -- they would 


have looked at the intakes that OTIB-2 assigns, 


and if the cancer was applicable, you would 


expect that OTIB-2 would result in -- the intakes 


from that would result in bioassays at a certain 


level. If all your bioassays were below that 


point, then OTIB-2 would have to assign -- 


MR. MAHER: I think Mark was asking is that 


document anywhere. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Exactly, that's what I -- 


MR. MAHER: -- and I don't know. 


 DR. BEHLING: I'm (unintelligible) what -- what ­

-


UNIDENTIFIED: -- documentation like that be -- 


there's an appendix to OTIB-18 that's similar, 


but I don't know if we ever came up with an 


attachment to OTIB-2 to show that. 


 DR. BEHLING: I didn't --

 MS. BEHLING: I've never seen any screening 

information. The other thing that's sort of 

interesting in this particular case -- I know in 


previous cases we've -- the previous case, we -- 


we made a finding for the fact that they used 28 


radionuclides as opposed to the 12. In this 


particular case they did only use the 12 


radionuclides, and I have to admit, I don't -- I 


didn't sit down and put all the bioassay data in 

for this particular case because it is somewhat 


time-consuming, so it did -- it did beg the 


question. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and I'll read you the words 


and in fact it's written in our dose 


reconstruction review that -- and I'll read what 


I've stated here. On the basis of numerous 


bioassay data which consistently showed high 


levels of uranium and contaminant radionuclides, 


the use of the hypothetical dose model is 


inappropriate and the blind assumption that the 


hypothetical internal dose, quote, greatly 


exceeds any potential intake is a statement 


without validation. And -- and if -- if in fact 


there is such a guidance document that are used, 


you should have mentioned it and that statement ­

- and -- and our finding -- 


MR. MAHER: It may not be in the guidance 


document. It may be a table that was given out 


at our meeting. 


 MR. SHARFI: That was given out, yeah, so I don't 


-- I don't think there was a blind assumption 


that the hypothetical intake is -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is this --


 MR. SHARFI: I think they've done the pre -- the 


prescreening and then they came up with tables 


based on certain scenarios saying that if you 


fall in this scenario, then this -- we know that 

this a -- an overestimate, and then you don't 


have to every time rerun -- 


MR. MAHER: I could guarantee this is not done 

blindly. 

DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I would suggest 

that that seems to be important as a procedure or 


an analysis that would prop up a lot of these 


decisions, you know, if that was a document that 


could be available for review. 


 MR. SHARFI: I don't think it's (unintelligible) 


documents. 


MR. MAHER: Well, but it may be in a memo or 


something and --


 MR. SHARFI: Sure. 


MR. MAHER: -- we'll talk to Liz and see if you 


can get it. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I mean I -- I would have 


liked to have seen -- for instance, the 


hypothetical dose model greatly exceeds any -- 


any measured intake as -- as defined by the 


records. I would have said -- think they must 


have looked at something here to come to that 


conclusion. But the way it says greatly exceeds 


any potential intake, were you looking at the 


real numbers or not, and -- 


MR. MAHER: Well, they have done that I guarantee 


you that. 


 MS. WINSLOW: This is Susan Winslow. 

MR. MAHER: Too dangerous. 


 MS. WINSLOW: That document that you're referring 


to was something that was put into a table form, 


but not in a formal procedure, and it was passed 


out in DR meetings back in 2004. 


 MR. SHARFI: So it never became a controlled 


document. 


 MS. WINSLOW: No, it never became a controlled 


document, correct. And we are not using that 


method any longer. We're -- we are instead 


analyzing the bioassay data in an overestimated 


fashion if we're going to compare -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: When you have the data. Right? 


 MS. WINSLOW: -- to TIB-2. 


MR. MAHER: Which is what we should be doing I 


think in all of the cases now. I think 


(unintelligible) change. 


 DR. WADE: So the finding is valid; the answer is 


valid. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can you provide that reference, or 


is that not -- can that be distributed to the 


Board? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The table? I don't know there's 


any reason we wouldn't distribute it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Got to just find it. 


 DR. BEHLING: It would -- it would help us, too ­

-

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- in -- in doing the audits -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: We can close it out, yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- if we can make these comments -- 


MR. MAHER: Can you scan it --


 MS. WINSLOW: Yes, I can get it --


MR. MAHER: -- Susan? 


 MS. WINSLOW: -- scanned and send --


MR. MAHER: And send it to me e-mail? 


 MS. WINSLOW: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean don't -- it doesn't have to 


be real time or anything, but -- 


MR. MAHER: Thank you. 


 MS. WINSLOW: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And would -- would that have been 


referenced in the DR guidelines that come up like 


-- like this is Fernald. Right? Fernald DR 


guidelines, would it -- 


 MR. SHARFI: In the TBD? 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- indicate that --


 MR. SHARFI: At this -- the time of this DR -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- how you may screen like this -- 


yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: At this time of this DR, I don't -- 


I think this was of when we were going complex-


wide, looking at efficiency methods for obvious 


comps and obvious non-comps, but I don't think we 


started full-blown into Fernald doing the -- the 

TBD till after this, so the more -- best estimate 


claims would have came after this when we had the 


TBD, where these were obvious comps or obvious 


non-comps that you could do either based on the 


available data --


 MR. GRIFFON: So this might have preceded any DR 


guidelines --


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that you would have had. Okay. 


All right. 


 DR. BEHLING: I think there's one more issue that 


wasn't raised in behalf of this -- this finding 


is that the EE worked plants 4, 5, 6 and 7, and 


those locations may have exposed him to recycled 


uranium, which may have contained plutonium, 


neptunium, technetium-99, and so the -- my 


question was if those particular radionuclides 


might have been included in addition to the 


uranium bioassay measurements, to what extent 


could that have potentially increased the real 


dose. 


 MR. SHARFI: The recycled component is actually 


small compared to the uranium dose. They're in 


parts -- I believe the default is 1,000 parts per 


million. The recycled component looked at the 


actual numbers. But I mean usually the uranium 


dose for any of the organs -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Dominates. 

-- 

 MR. SHARFI: -- this sizeable over the -- I mean 


we're looking at orders of magnitude over the 


recycled uranium component. I mean they do 


provide a -- a -- obviously a measurable amount 


of dose, but comparably to the uranium it's -- 


it's very small. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This might get into Fernald site 


profile stuff --


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but doesn't that vary by 


location -- work location? 


 MR. SHARFI: Definitely. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The assessment that was done, you 


know, afterwards where we actually got the IMBA 


run on this specific data included the recycled 


components in the dose number, and that dose 


number is less than the TIB -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can you provide that, as well, Stu 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you said you'd -- yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I'm going to provide -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Plus that reworked one you're 


referencing. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We're going to provide that and 


we're going to provide this TIB-2 screening. 


 MS. BEHLING: I didn't hear everything that Mark 

stated, however this, in my mind, brings up 


another issue, that as we're sitting here 


auditing these dose reconstructions -- and not 


just in this particular case or internal dose -- 


I have to assume that the dose reconstructors do 


have some guidance documents out there as I 


believe I heard Mark say something about DR 


guidance or some user's guides out there. And it 


would be something -- I realize some of these 


things are not published, but if they could be 


shared with us or somehow made part of some of 


these files at times, it certainly would answer a 


lot of questions for us and possibly reduce some 


of our findings if we had an understanding of 


what was going on behind the scenes at times. 


realize that's outside the -- the scope of this 


particular issue, but the fact that there was 


some screening method possibly used here that we 


were not aware of, it's these types of things and 


these types of documents or user's guides that 


might be out there --


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that --


 MS. BEHLING: -- that aren't published, if we 


could also have access to that information it 


would be very helpful for us. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- Kathy, I'd be -- I agree with 


you in general. I think I'll -- I'll work with 


Stu on that down -- as we go forward, but I think 


I 
in this particular case I don't know that they 


could have anticipated to include this screening 


table, you know, that -- that -- but the DR -- 


 MS. BEHLING: I understand. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- if there's sites that we're 


covering in the sets of cases that -- 


 MR. SHARFI: Those documents are in flux because 


we update them --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- I mean they're not controlled so 


we don't have historical documents at -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, you don't have --


 MR. SHARFI: -- at the time the DR -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- all revs of them or something? 


 MR. SHARFI: No, 'cause --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh --


 MR. SHARFI: -- they're flux documents. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah, yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: I mean you -- obviously you don't 


want to --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- a DR going to an old guidance 


document --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that'd make it difficult -- 


 MR. SHARFI: -- if the information has changed, 


so those are kept as flux documents, as up-todate as possible. 


MR. MAHER: And the other thing you missed, too, 

which I don't think would -- I mean would 


complete your inf-- the information we need to 


get there is that each of our DRs go through 


three to four days of training. We have updates 


training, refresher training and we have weekly 


meetings. And you're all missing that 


information and sometimes some -- some of this 


information that's exactly what we're talking 


about is passed out at that meeting, and Susan's 


-- was one --


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, I understand. Thank you. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, running -- getting things 


moving here again, case 77 had no finding, it was 


a compensated claim, so we can go directly to 


claim 78. Claim 78 is the Mound facility. 


 MS. BEHLING: And I believe, again, the first 


finding is -- associated with 78.1 is the 


reoccurring theme of the dose reconstructor 


misinterpreting OTIB-8. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, this, again, is a maximized 


dose, by the way, so we're looking at an inflated 


assignment of doses. 


Where's the next one -- finding 78.2, incorrect 


selection of organ for assessing occupational 


medical --


 MS. BEHLING: Once again, this is --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- the selection of a very 

claimant-favorable organ as opposed to the actual 


organ of interest. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: This is an overestimation of the 


dose. 


 DR. BEHLING: They -- the person had bladder 


cancer and they chose something that was 


obviously at a much higher risk for exposure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And no action? It's resolved --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's previously addressed, yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: And if we can move on finding 78.3, 


once again this reoccurring theme of selecting an 


inappropriate organ as opposed to the correct 


organ of interest for running a hypothetical 


internal dose model. 


 MS. MUNN: No action again. We've done that. 


Right? 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, been there, done that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This -- this person was in the '80s 


to '90s at -- at Mound? I'm just skimming 


through what -- no bioassay or any -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No, there's nothing --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- records? Is that the deal? 


 DR. BEHLING: -- nothing really to suggest any 


significant exposures. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro, I got a quick 


question. When -- in the work we're doing now 


on, you know, the newest cases, I assume when we 

-- 

-- 

do come across these same old-same olds we are to 


note them down just so that we're keeping track ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- right, okay. So I just wanted to 


 MR. GRIFFON: And we'll -- we'll -- we'll try to 


DR. MAURO: make sure of that -- that we put them 


down and --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- expeditiously go through them -- 


DR. MAURO: -- as just a way of keeping score, so 


to speak. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yep. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, we're not sure whether we 


should default to a new terminology that says an 


observation has been resolved as opposed to a 


finding that is still subject for -- for 


resolution. There's so many of these things that 


are repeat problems that have long ago been -- 


been taken care of. 


 MS. MUNN: It would certainly be helpful and, 


from my point of view, not in any way diminish 


the thoroughness of the review to do just exactly 


that, Hans, to identify we -- we understand what 


happened at the time. It really is not a finding 


now, it's an observation that has been cleared. 


If we could do that, I think it would really be 

helpful for everyone concerned. 


 DR. BEHLING: And chances are they would not be 


on the matrix anymore. As an observation that 


has been resolved in a previous assessment, I 


would assume that we don't want to necessary 


track this on a matrix, unless you have a 


different opinion on that, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I kind of want to -- I don't know, 


I have -- I want to think about that, but I agree 


that we shouldn't be having -- if we can indicate 


somehow so we don't have to have a discussion 


again about it, that certainly would be helpful. 


I think the other thing we can do is try to -- in 


our case selection try to avoid some of the cases 


that were done --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it's based on time -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- in time periods --

 DR. BEHLING: -- time periods --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- where some of these generic 

approaches -- you know, then we'll get out of 


doing those cases that -- 


 DR. BEHLING: I think --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- have the same findings. 


 MS. BEHLING: What I have done in this last set 


of cases for a situation like this, I have 


identified it as a finding. It has gone into the 


matrix, but in our dose reconstruction audit I've 


put an asterisk alongside of that finding, put a 

footnote indicating that this is an issue, 


although it's a finding and it was appropriate -- 


or it was associated with a certain time frame, 


it has been resolved. So it was my feeling that 


we might be able to go right into the matrix and 


fill out quite a bit of the matrix -- and it 


would still be captured, but we can do it any 


way. That was just another -- that's what I have 


-- I've done in this last set of cases, just so 


that we -- we still captured it in the matrix, 


but we could easily fill out that matrix because 


we've -- it's already been an issue that's -- 


that was resolved in previous cases. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think that's fine. 


 DR. WADE: I would make a point -- this is Lew 


Wade -- that, you know, when we meet in December, 


the subcommittee and then the Board, there will 


be a selection of the seventh round of cases. So 


you might want to start to give some thought to 


that process and then let Stu know what your 


thoughts are so he can have the right materials 


present. 


 DR. BEHLING: And -- and I guess the -- the 


selection process could focus on a time frame of 


adjudicating claims that exclude the issues that 


have already been resolved. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We could --


 MR. GRIFFON: Or at least consider that as part 

of our parameters, when was the DR completed, you 


know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We could provide the pool and 


include the date -- and I would recommend the 


date that the draft dose reconstruction was 


approved. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There are a number of dates that 


occur after that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that's good, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know if we would include 


the exact date, but we might group them as a -- 


because the exact date is like -- it's kind of 


identifying information. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So we could group them by 


approved between June and -- and December of '06, 


we could group them in three-month intervals and 


things like that, and we should -- at the end we 


should discuss what kind of selection pool -- I 


could -- or I could -- the Board's not here. 


could send, you know, a suggestion -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- to the Board about -- how 


about we do a selection pool like this to select 


the seventh group, 'cause we could do something 


like that that will allow the selection pool to 


choose newer cases and avoid some of the ones -- 


I 
-- 

you know, keeping sampling from the entire 


population. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 MS. MUNN: And it wouldn't seem that -- that one 


would even have to break down those time periods 


so carefully. It --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, maybe a six-month period. 


 MS. MUNN: -- seems to me that prior to the 


rewriting of TIB-8, you know, prior to redo of 


TIB-2, and that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Think about how tight it has to be 


or how wide --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and we'll -- we'll come up 


with some --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- know best on that --


 MS. MUNN: I'm sure they would. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- some corrective actions that 


have been done because of DR reviews and put 


those dates --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- available -- in there as well 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- to kind of inform the 


selection a little bit. 


 DR. WADE: Well, I would suggest there be some 

discussion between Mark as the chair of the 


subcommittee --


 MR. HINNEFELD: And me? 


 DR. WADE: -- and you, just to make sure that you 


have the right materials when the subcommittee 


and the Board meet. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'll call you when I can talk. 


 MS. BEHLING: I have started to put in, too -- 


the cases that I'm doing now, in our summary up 


front, I've included the date that the dose 


reconstruction was completed, just so that it 


gives us some understanding. That was a comment 


made by the Board -- one or two of the Board 


members during our conference calls, also. 


 DR. BEHLING: Are we ready to go to our second to 


last? Los Alamos National Laboratory -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I was just -- I was following up -- 


I don't know if someone answered me, but did this 


person -- the Mound person -- have bioassay 


records, no bioassay records? I saw a couple of 


uranium samples. 


 DR. BEHLING: Hold on. 


 MS. BEHLING: I'll have to look. 


(Pause) 


I believe there were bioassay records, but 


activities were less than levels of detection. 


I'm reading that in our section three of this 


case. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I'm -- I'm looking at this... 


 MR. GIBSON: Could we -- could I get a time 


period on this individual's employment, or would 


that be --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I can -- I can give you the 


years without the exact date. 


MR. MAHER: '81 to '92. 


 DR. BEHLING: '81 to '92, yeah. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay, '81 to '92, have we also 


looked into the Price Anderson findings that -- 


that fined Mound for basically doubling the 


background of their -- their lab on the -- the -- 


they got a background that they deduct from the 


bioassay sample, and it was built into the 


Canberra, and the lab manager went in and added 


that background in again so these records could 


be underestimated. 


 DR. BEHLING: In this I think --

 MR. GRIFFON: So far everything I'm seeing here ­

-

 MS. BEHLING: The bioassays. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- is zeroes. 

 MS. BEHLING: That -- that is not something that 

Hans and I would have looked into, but if we are 


looking at the Mound site profile, that's 


certainly something that should be looked into on 


-- in the Task I level. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and if we were aware of it, 

Mike, we would probably look at it. But there 


doesn't seem to be any indication that this 


person was even monitored, so that inflating the 


background level --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, they had a couple of uranium 


samples, that's found on -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, he was -- he was monitored. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, there was some monitoring, 

but --

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- very -- very minimal and like -- 

I agree with Kathy, all -- everything I saw so 


far is below -- you know, zeroes below detectable 


limits. 


 MR. GIBSON: Was what -- below what, Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Below detectable limits, and that's 


just scanning through here quickly, so -- 


 MR. GIBSON: Maybe that's something we should do 


in the site profile, but there were -- the site 


was shut down for inappropriate monitoring of 


workers by Price Anderson and DOE on at least 


two, maybe three, occasions during those years. 


 MS. BEHLING: Oh, it was during the years of this 


person's employment? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes. Yes. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. GIBSON: All radiological work was shut down. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Does anyone know the work history 

for this individual, what type of work? 


 DR. BEHLING: I'll go to the front -- REDACTED 


was the official title. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Mike, we can sort out what we 


know about that. I don't know today what we've 


done about this bioassay issue at Mound, but I 


can find out. We have a number of people on the 


project who pretty much know what's happened up 


there in the -- in the past, so I think we can 


sort it out. 


 MR. GIBSON: Well, I'm recused as a Board member, 


but I could certainly be an expert witness and I 


have -- I have the documentation that -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: You could certainly -- 


 MR. GIBSON: -- (unintelligible) a lot of things 


about that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: You can certainly share what you 


know, if it's conflicted or not. So we'll -- if 


we don't learn -- we'll get ahold of you -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Cert-- certainly there -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- or talk to you when we know 


what we have found out or what we know -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we'll talk to you and see if 


that matches. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It seems --


 DR. WADE: Just for the record, on the site 


profile issue a Board member who's conflicted can 

sit at the table and contribute to the 


discussion. They just can't make a motion or 


vote. So you're more than welcome to bring that 


information to the table, Mike, at -- when we 


discuss these things. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So --


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. From a practical 


matter in this particular case that we're talking 


about, what I hear is that if you look at his 


records you see bioassay readings that are less 


than the detectable level. Is the question on 


the table that they took a urine sample, they 


measured it and did not see anything above the 


detectable level? Or is the question that they 


took the urine sample, took a measurement, 


subtracted background from it and then reported 


in his record below the limits of detection? 


don't know if you see my question. In other 


words, so what -- what I'm hearing, from a 


practical matter, is can we believe the record 


that we're looking at actually means what we 


think it means? 


 MR. GIBSON: The answer -- my answer to that, in 


my opinion, is no. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. GIBSON: What I'm saying is, when they put 


the new system in, Canberra software programmed 


I 
in the background level for the Mound area, and 


then the bioassay manager fiddled around with the 


software and put the background level for the 


Mound area in again, so it in effect doubled -- 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GIBSON: -- the -- it doubled the MDA. 


DR. MAURO: I think -- I think we -- this is an 


important question because that would mean we -- 


we don't really understand the records and what 


they mean. We may be misunderstanding it, and -- 


and you're correct, Mike, if that's the case -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that's --


DR. MAURO: -- this person may have had above a 


detectable level but it's not being reported that 


way. 


 MR. GIBSON: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that's definitely a site 


profile question and follow-up here. I'm not 


sure --


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- it's going to affect this 


particular case. It looks like --


 MR. HINNEFELD: This was --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- a pretty conservative estimate ­

-


 MR. HINNEFELD: This was a TIB-2 case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but --


 MS. BEHLING: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- the question I had, though, was 


stepping back a little further than -- than the 


fact that he has two uranium analyses that I can 


find and they're --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- they're zeroes. The question I 


have was there's -- at Mound there's -- there has 


been issues or questions about not monitored but 


should have been monitored, so you know, 


depending on the job and workplace areas, if we 


can justify this 28-radionuclide approach, I 


think this is probably -- you know, we can close 


it out that way. But that's why I was asking 


about where -- you know, what this person did. 


It is in the '80s through '90s, REDACTED, that 


could put him in a lot of areas. I mean I don't 


know -- you know. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, you're right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So --


 MR. GIBSON: REDACTED were all -- were assigned 


to different projects and different radiological 


buildings, you're exactly right, Mark. But this 


is probably something that'd be better to -- to 


look into with the --


 MR. GRIFFON: And when you --


 MR. GIBSON: -- site profile. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know, I'm not necessarily sure 


-- depending on the organ, I think -- I don't 

know the organ in this case. I'm not necessarily 


sure the 28-radionuclide approach will be 


bounding for every case at Mound. You've got 


some pretty interesting isotopes at Mound. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's a bladder case. 


 DR. BEHLING: It's a bladder case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, bladder case? So -- yeah, 


probably is, right. 


Anyway, that was -- that was my question on that 


case and some of this may be deferred to site 


profile discussions, I think, but... 


Anything else to close out on that item before we 


let -- Hans is just about ready to wrap us up 


here. 

 DR. BEHLING: Well, we've got two more to go. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Two more to go, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: And we did something I never 

thought we would and that's complete this review. 


If we go to case 79, this is Los Alamos claim, 


and it's an overestimation -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Overestimate. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- overestimation and the POC value 


is just about midway between zero and 50. Let's 


just quickly go through the first finding, 79.-- 


 MS. BEHLING: 79.1 and 79.2 --


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- once again, these are associated 


with the OTIB-- either 8 or 10 error, and so I 

think we can move -- move on beyond those. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I'm not sure that it -- that 


was really the --


 MS. BEHLING: Oh, okay, I'm sorry. 


 DR. BEHLING: This one were -- was a case where 


instead of LOD over 2 they used LOD, and -- 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: -- that being the case, you're 


talking about the 95th percentile value, and 


there's no need to include uncertainty when you 


deal with LOD as the 95th percentile value for 


missed dose and so therefore the inclusion of 


uncertainty is unnecessary or inappropriate, so 


that's finding number one. 


The next three are -- no, 79.3 is inappropriate 


assignment of missed neutron dose uncertainty, I 


guess the same thing again here. For missed 


neutron dose they again used the 95th percentile 


value that does not require therefore the use of 


uncertainty. 


 And the following finding, 79.4, 5 and 6, they 


are all in concert with each other. One involves 


missed photon, the other one missed electron and 


the other one missed neutron dose. And what that 


involves -- I'll read it to you. The records 


provided by the DOE only include evidence that 


the EE was monitored in '69, '70 and '71. On the 


other hand, a companion report to the records 

entitled "LANL Bioassay Repository Report" warns 


that the available records may not be complete. 


And given the fact that the EE worked at that 


facility for more than 14 years, which included 


the early years of '49 through '55, the absence 


of additional external monitoring records may 


include the fact that they were records that were 


lost, the failure to monitor record when he 


should have been monitored, and -- and possibly 


the third option, which would then be correct, 


the EE's assignment to a non-radiological work 


location. In the absence of information as to 


which one of those three options may apply, we 


felt that only assignment of missed dose for 


three years might be inappropriate given the 


acknowledgement that records were not necessary 


complete. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: In this instance, the -- the 


warning that records may not be complete is in 


the bioassay data repository, and it relates 


really only to the bioassay data repository. 


That database has been built within the past two 


years by Los Alamos and we've essentially 


assisted them with -- you know, NIOSH and ORAU 


team have provided experts that -- you know, that 


we paid to assist with the computerization of 


those LANL old records. And so I'm not eminently 


familiar with the work, but for whatever reason 

they felt obliged to warn that they may not have 


captured all the bioassay ever taken at Los 


Alamos when they built this repository. But 


that's for bioassay data. 


Now that does not -- that admonition should not 


be interpreted to the external dosimetry data, 


which was kept separately all those years and 


didn't have to be built into a repository for our 


program. So to the extent that -- you know, so I 


don't think that admonition in that bioassay 


repository file should be extended to the 


external dosimetry 'cause it wasn't intended to 


be when it was generated. 


 DR. BEHLING: I guess --


 MR. GRIFFON: Your response here says now that 


this resposit-- now that this is available, or 


referring to the repository, it should not be 


considered evidence -- oh, it should not be 


considered evidence that the exter-- okay. 


You're consistent. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's getting late. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: Was there any reason to assume that 


he was not monitored because he didn't need to be 


monitored for the early years? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I can -- we can go back and 


look and see what -- have -- what information we 

have about his work location and -- and 


monitoring practice at Los Alamos, but our -- our 


un-- my understanding today is that the Los 


Alamos external monitoring, at least for certain 


periods of time, was relatively, you know, 


comprehensive; that people that -- in the 


technical areas and needed to be monitored were 


monitored externally and -- and the -- but not 


everyone at Los Alamos was monitored. And so 


there -- it could certainly be the case that a 


person moved from a monitored job to an 


unmonitored job. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, the reason I say it -- 


because I'm going back to summary background 


information on each one that identifies the time 


period in which the claimant claims to have 


served in the capacity of a detonator operator 


inspector and involves years prior to -- I won't 


go -- defining the years obviously here for 


privacy reasons, but it clearly would suggest 


that if the person was doing that job prior to 


'71 and monitored after that, one would have to 


assume that whatever exposures she might have -- 


and I'm using gender here -- the claimant was 


exposed to for a certain year where the records 


are there, that the -- the likelihood that that 


person was exposed prior to that is -- is not an 


unreasonable assumption. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I mean it'll be something 


we can pursue further. It might be something to 


address in the Los Alamos site profile in terms 


of completeness of the external monitoring 


records. I mean it'd be -- 


 DR. BEHLING: I -- I think -- again, this is what 


triggered me was the assignment or the job 


description that crosses over the unmonitored 


period into the monitored period and in certain 


years that person was monitored, but for the same 


job description for previous years was not. And 


then you sort of ask the question why not; was 


there a change in policy to monitor people or was 


there no need to or was it group badging -- what 


was the issue that explains the unmonitored 


periods of time. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. I'll see what evidence we 


have on that. 


 MS. MUNN: It would seem --


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess -- go ahead. 


 MS. MUNN: -- seem like a few sentences in the 


site profile would probably take care of that, 


wouldn't it? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, if there's evidence. 
I 


mean if you have sufficient -- if you have 


sufficient evidence, yeah, you can take care of 


it pretty easily. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Ought to be an interesting site 

profile. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, it would. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It strikes me -- I guess I 


shouldn't be surprised by this, but the data 


capture for this individual was one page from DOE 


records, and there's no -- I mean there's '69, 


'70 -- there's annual summary data. It does 


indicate on the annual summary that there is 


three monthly -- parentheses, October through 


December, three monthly badges, 1970 -- 


parentheses, January through December, 12 monthly 


badges. But you don't have that detail -- I'm 


sure you requested it, or did you request it and 


not get it? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We have told the DOE sites that 


we needed to know not only the total dose -- we ­

- we wanted every badge reading. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's what we wanted. Failing 


that, because that is very difficult for very 


many DOE sites. Failing that, we would manage 


with the total, as long as we knew what the ba-- 


what the readings -- the number of readings per 


year were. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And then what's generally done in 


these cases is you assign all that measured dose 


to one of those exchanges and you include all the 

other exchanges in the missed dose. That's 


generally what's done on these cases. So they 


were compliant with essentially our second level 


request -- our second tier of what we would 


prefer. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And they -- you -- all 


right, yeah, I guess like -- I -- I was also ask­

- wondering -- follow up on the missed versus 


unmonitored question, so if there's clarification 


on where he -- where the person worked and why 


they -- you know, would -- would you expect -- 


would you have expected them to be badged and 


monitored in the location job they had for that 


time period. 


Is this a short period of employment for this 


individual? 


 DR. BEHLING: No --


 MR. HINNEFELD: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's a lengthy... 


 DR. BEHLING: -- the person --


 DR. WADE: That's enough. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I don't want to go any 


further than that, but -- okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: Finding 79.7 involves occupational 

medical dose. I'm trying to look at what the 

response was. I -- I -- Kathy, do you have a 

comment here? 

 MS. BEHLING: No, it looks as if -- and -- and 

I'm trying to check this right now. NIOSH is 


indicating that the value that was pulled off of 


the Table 4 from OTIB-6 was the PFG value, and 


I'm trying to verify that. 


 DR. BEHLING: Well, the -- the statement in the 


dose reconstruction report states that NIOSH 


assumed the EE was given one annual diagnostic 


chest X-ray for the full duration of employment ­

- I think those are the words -- and the 


statement was -- and the entry -- that the dose 


assigned was based on OTIB-6, Rev. 2 -- and I 


guess the key here is for the full duration of 


employment, when in fact the early periods -- I 


won't, again, identify the years -- were not -- 


were not addressed. It was only assigned for the 


years during which the person received 


occupational external exposures as was monitored 


for that. So we're missing a significant number 


of years during which the potential exposure to 


occupational X-rays were not included. And I 


would assume that occupational medical exposure 


would have been prescribed without regard to 


whether or not there was any external exposure 


monitoring done on that individual. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's -- there's medical 


exposure assigned for every year of employment. 


 DR. BEHLING: There -- oh --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Lines --

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Lines 96 --


 MS. BEHLING: Yes, there --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- through 112 on your exhibit. 


 MS. BEHLING: 96 through 112, that's correct. 


What we were questioning was the dose, not the 


fact that it wasn't assigned. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I 


misread what I -- what I have here. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: The assigned dose was for the three 


years in question does comply with the Table 4 


data. What does not apply was for earlier years, 


and I guess your comment here that you used data 


for photofluorography does not seem to jive with 


the statement that it was a PA chest X-ray that 


was used. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, what the dose reconstructor 


said was they had received diagnostic chest X-


rays. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Now that didn't mean to imply 


that it was a (unintelligible) exam. PFG exam 


would be considered diagnostic chest X-ray. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Again, this is a maximized 


dose and not going to significantly affect the 


outcome here. 


Okay, now --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, and I'm actually looking at 


the OTIB-6 and NIOSH is correct here, because the 


PFG -- if you do use the PFG dose, their -- their 


values are correct. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay --

 MR. GRIFFON: Head on to 80? 

 DR. BEHLING: -- the last one. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, my gosh. 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, my God. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Incredible. 


 DR. BEHLING: Do we get a free dinner with this 


achievement or something? 


 MS. MUNN: We ought to. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, last case, number 80 was 


Pinellas. 


 MS. MUNN: We have to slap ourselves to stay 


awake. 


 DR. BEHLING: Is it that bad, Wanda? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Slap ourselves, we're getting 


tired. 


 MS. MUNN: That's right. 


 MS. BEHLING: You're hurting my feelings. 


 MS. MUNN: No, no, no, no, no. I'm trying to 


follow what is going on -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it's a --


 MS. MUNN: -- in three separate places at the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it's a --


 MS. MUNN: -- same time. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- riveting matrix. 


 MS. MUNN: It is a riveting matrix. 


 MS. BEHLING: I'm teasing. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay, the last one, as I said, is a 


case involving Pinellas, a maximized dose 


reconstruction, person was a machinist -- among 


other things. The POC -- what was the POC? Oh, 


it was below 40 percent and so with that, let's 


go and look at the findings. 


 MS. BEHLING: And the first finding has to do 


with missed dose uncertainty, and we're just 


indicating -- since they did maximize that missed 


dose -- it didn't need to be entered with a 


lognormal distribution and -- as a lognormal 


distribution with a GSD. There was no need for 


uncertainty in this particular case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and NIOSH agrees with that, 


I -- accept --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MS. BEHLING: Am I wrong there? 


 DR. BEHLING: No, you're right. 


 MS. MUNN: No action planned? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well -- and -- and I don't even 


dispute the uncertainty question in this, but the 


second part of your response, Stu, that -- it 


says is procedurally incorrect and that the 


unmonitored doses based on an upper bound should 


have been assigned as constants. How are these ­
- how are these unmonitored doses based on an 


upper bound derived? What's -- what's the upper 


bound? Where's that coming from? Is it a 


coworker model for Pinellas or -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There was a time when we did the 


highest recorded dose at anybo-- for anybody at 


Pinellas --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- as the dose you would -- as 


the upper bound for an unmonitored person. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's -- and I think that's 


probably what refers to. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's what this says? 


 MR. SHARFI: At other sites, too. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So it's a 95th of a distribution, 


it's actually the highest value -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The highest recorded that was 


monitored, that was used for a while. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you're saying that's not the 


practice going forward probably. 


MR. MAHER: The Pinellas TBD (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: (Unintelligible) Pinellas TBD 


now. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah, we have a lot of explaining 


to do with these sites we don't have TBDs. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And when you say the highest 


recorded dose at Pinellas, were there a fair 

-- 

amount of monitoring data? I remember seeing 


that -- a high percentage of people had zeroes or 


very low --


 MR. HINNEFELD: There were --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- there were a large number of 


people monitored that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Monitored that probably -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- doses tend to -- not to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- didn't need to be monitored and 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Doses tended not to be very high 


down there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah, that's right. Okay. All 


right. 


 MS. MUNN: That's why we can't go to Florida. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Should have had (unintelligible), 

yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Moving here to item 80.2, failure 

to assign missed neutron dose, we looked at the 


CATI and identified the fact that the EE had 


claimed to have worked in buildings 300 and 400, 


which according to the TBD were areas for testing 


neutron generators. The EE also identified being 


exposed to thorium, et cetera, and so the finding 


is that he should have potentially been assigned 


missed neutron dose. 


So you have -- what was the response? 

MR. MAHER: Basically it was so over-monitored 


that if you had any potential you were going to 


be monitored. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


(Pause) 


 DR. BEHLING: Mark, what do you --


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- well, if anything, I think 


this is deferred to a site profile. Are we doing 


that site profile? Is that on our list to 


review, Pinellas? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it just got added, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's on for this year I think. 


 DR. BEHLING: What kind of neutron generators, 


are we talking about sources or -- do you know 


what kind of neutron generators? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, different ones. 


 MR. SHARFI: I can't say. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: You have to be -- you have to be 


real careful about what you say about neutron 


generators. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. BEHLING: You didn't hear that. Okay, so 


we'll --


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I guess the only question is 


to validate the -- this -- this statement that 


you just made, that basically if anybody was at 


any risk, they were monitored. If we can show 

-- 

that through the site profile review, then I 


think this goes away completely. 


MR. MAHER: In that statement there was that 78 


percent of the annual whole body doses were less 


than 20 millirem, which indicates a site that 


over-monitors, I guess, although these days it 


makes sense to do over-monitoring. 


 MR. SHARFI: Whole body dose was neutron, photon 


MR. MAHER: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. SHARFI: -- so using the high histories all 


would have included. 


 DR. BEHLING: Finding 80.3 we came to conclude 


that the assignment of occupational medical dose 


this person (unintelligible) high value. I guess 


we came up with a value that's considerably less, 


but even when the TIB-6 values are used, they are 


high. And it may be due to the fact that the 


assumptions were that photofluorography was used 


instead of conventional X-rays. 


 MR. SHARFI: Exactly, because it does infer that 


these were (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Oh, yeah, I realize that. 
I 


realize that. And again, I'm not sure, I don't 


have the original dose reconstruction report, but 


at least according to -- to the statement here 


which suggests I tried to parallel the wording 

used that it was a PA chest X-ray, would 


potentially suggest that this was -- should have 


been restated in terms of photofluorography. 


Anyway, it's obviously a large assignment of 


medical X-ray doses, and since this is a 


maximized dose reconstruction, so be it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is there any follow-up on that, 


Hans? I don't -- it -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- doesn't sound like there's any. 

 DR. BEHLING: No, no. I mean if -- if estimates 

of skin dose were defined by -- by 


photofluorographic examination then it's 


obviously a position that is somewhat subjective 


and in a maximized dose reconstruction it's not 


an arguable issue. 


Last finding, 80 -- no, is it the last? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Not quite. 


 DR. BEHLING: Two more -- I must have skipped one 


-- oh, yeah, here we are, inappropriate 


assignment of hypothetical internal dose. Is 


this one of the old ones again, 12 radionuclides? 


Yeah, I guess the question is is it even 


appropriate to use the 12-radionuclide 


hypothetical. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it's certainly an 


overestimate --


 DR. BEHLING: True. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- given the materials that were 


there. We hadn't completed a lot of research 


down there. We were aware of the RTG plutonium 


sources. The claimant in her CATI said they 


worked with a variety of, you know, 


radionuclides. And absent a completed Pinellas 


research where we now feel like we have better 


understanding, and we had the TIB-2 approach 


available, so we gave them the TIB-2 -- I think 


probably the 28-nuclide, so it was an approach 


available that we took advantage of at the time. 


Now we wouldn't do that. We don't use TIB-2s at 


Pinellas anymore based upon our subsequent 


research about exposures down there. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I mean I think I took it in 


context with the statement that the only 


radionuclide that was considered to be internal 


exposure potential was tritium, and then of 


course the 12 -- identified 12 different ones, 


and that would be an inconsistent statement with 


the issue of tritium being the only potential 


source of internal exposure. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We -- well, we didn't have enough 


confidence at that time to really -- you know, 


that we wanted to stand on saying only tritium 


was the internal, and -- and since the TIB-2 


approach would work for the case, we went ahead 


and used TIB-2. 

 DR. BEHLING: Last --


 MR. GRIFFON: I want -- I wanted to ask about the 


end of that response of yours. I don't dispute 


what you just said, Stu, but the -- this 


statement, however, this cannot be completely 


proven, so it was not addressed in the dose 


reconstruction report. I think we've been -- we 


-- we've brought up this comment before, but I 


think it probably -- I mean you've revised your 


DR report, so I think this was an older one, and 


I think we've said that, you know, at least the 


DR report should address any comments that the 


claimant made in their -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- CATI interview, right, right. 


Even if it's to say that our approach is bounding 


anything that you brought up here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know, something like that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The second part of that is -- or 


maybe this is into the last one -- I -- I -- I 


was questioning on how you confirmed that these 


isotopes that the individual did bring up in 


their CATI interview, how you confirmed that they 


were not --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- present at Pinellas. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it's a site profile -- it's 


what the site profile -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- determined, and -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- as part of this, I didn't -- 


we didn't go --


 MR. GRIFFON: But you didn't --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- search out that evidence. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So it'd be part of the site 


profile --


 MR. GRIFFON: But you didn't contact the 


individual in any way or --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- follow up with the individual. 


It didn't seem like --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It would have been -- that would 


have shown up on the file, wouldn't it? Any 


follow-up --


 MR. HINNEFELD: If you've got his file, chances 


are there would be something -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Some communication back and forth 


or -- I don't know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think -- if it were done for 


site profile purposes rather than the purpose of 


his specific claim, it might not be in his claim 

file. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Then -- but I don't -- I don't -- 


I don't know that we contacted, but I'm not 


saying we probably did. I don't know for sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. BEHLING: The last --


 MR. GRIFFON: Hans, I think I kind of spilled 


into -- into the last one, but go ahead. 


 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, the last one is the issue of 


potential neutron exposure. You feel that these 


people were over-badged, if anything. In the 


absence of data which suggests there wasn't any 


documentation convinc-- shows convincing evidence 


that that was the case then this finding could be 


withdrawn. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So anything that would relate to 


this is really a Pinellas site profile type of 


question if we want to resolve any of this any 


further. Is that right? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. MAHER: And the neutron exposure at Pinellas 


for this device was in the testing of the device 


itself. That was done -- I mean I witnessed the 


facility. It's done in an area where people 


around are going to get exposed. But if it is, 


it's very incidental. 


 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 

 DR. WADE: You have 20 more to do? We might as 


well, we're on a roll. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We have plenty of time. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: (Unintelligible) done -- 


 DR. BEHLING: No, we've done, but --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we don't have --


 DR. BEHLING: -- Ready to do any of those. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. ROESSLER: For those of you on the workgroup 


tomorrow, we have our homework. Arjun just sent 


a report, so we have something to read tonight. 


 DR. BEHLING: That'll keep you out of trouble. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I think -- I -- we're just 


discussing this. I'll -- I'll try to update this 


matrix for the December meeting, and I think 


we're going to have a subcommittee meeting on 


that first day, at least -- at least a brief 


subcommittee meeting to maybe update on where we 


are with the matrix. I -- you know, I think 


we've -- there's some actions that are going to 


take a little longer than December 11th to -- to 


complete, but at least I want to get an update 


there. And -- and Lew and I were at least 


talking about the possibility of leaving some of 


the morning open for workgroup activity as well 


as for a subcommittee -- a dose reconstruction 


subcommittee meeting, so we might apportion it 


that way. 

 DR. WADE: Right, I mean my current plan is to 


hold 11:00 a.m. to noon for the subcommittee. 


There is the issue of the selection of this -- 


this seventh round. Then hold the morning 


completely open for workgroups as they might 


like. 


Now one potentially confounding factor is Senator 


Obama might want to speak to the Board, and it's 


possible he might want to speak on Monday 


morning, so -- you know, stay tuned. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. But other than that, I'll 


try to update this matrix with at least -- you 


know, in this -- in this resolution column, at 


least try to put a draft of what I think we 


resolved today, where we stand on these issues, 


circulate it prior to that meeting, anyway -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and then we can maybe just get 


an update at the December meeting -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I would think so. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and move on from there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I would think so. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And we -- we have the fifth set and 


sixth set. Can you just give us on update on 


where --


 DR. BEHLING: Kathy, can you give us an update on 

the status of the fifth and sixth sets? 


 MS. BEHLING: The fifth set is complete and we've 


completed the conference calls, that's in the 


process of being finalized and sent out. I'm 


just putting together an executive summary for 


that. And we are well on our way working on the 


sixth set also and I'm hoping to have that done 


somewhere close -- I'm hoping to have the con-- 


the next set of conference calls on the sixth set 


possibly after our December -- December Board 


meeting, sometime close to the end of December. 


 DR. WADE: Kathy or John, I mean I have queued up 


for December looking at the definition of the 


seventh set --


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: -- and we have a meeting in February 


where we could take on identifying the eighth 


set. Is that pace acceptable? 


DR. MAURO: That would be ideal. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 MS. BEHLING: Yes. That sounds fine. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I will work with -- I'll talk 


with you off-line, Stu, to -- about the 


parameters and I'm also wondering what kind of 


cases we have in the hop-- in the pool of cases 


available. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I want to keep the progress going, 

for sure, but I also want to make sure we have 


the kinds of cases we want to look at and not 


some of the same cases, you know, so -- 


MR. MAHER: You might see more and more best 


estimate cases now, more difficult. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's what we're -- that's 


what we're -- yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Arjun is swamped, too. 


MR. MAHER: (Unintelligible) more funner (sic), 


I'll tell you that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That is more fun. Okay --


 DR. WADE: I think we also would be -- 


 DR. BEHLING: Speak for yourself here. 


 DR. WADE: I think on the record we need to thank 


Stu for persevering. He obviously is on the last 


drop of petrol and you're welcome to sleep -- 


 MS. BEHLING: I was about to say that he'll just 


do anything not to have to speak. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Especially since Kathy kept making 


him repeat everything. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you all very much. This is a 


most productive day. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thanks a lot, yeah. All right, I 


think we're closing. 


 DR. WADE: We're closing, we're done. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Adjourned. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 4:27 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of Nov. 16, 2006; 


and it is a true and accurate transcript of the 


testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin nor 


counsel to any of the parties herein, nor have 


any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


18th day of January, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102