An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-552

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 January 2014

I.B.S.A., INC., d/b/a INDEPENDENT 

BUILDERS SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Johnston County

No. 11 CVS 3878

BUILDER’S SUPPLY, INC., BRENDA B. 

SCHLIE, JOHN T. SCHLIE, DAVID M. 

BOLDON, DAVID BOLDON, INC., and 

CONTRACTOR’S LUMBER COMPANY,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendants from order entered 1 October 2012 by 

Judge James Ammons, Jr. in Johnston County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2013.

Daughtry, Woodard, Lawrence & Starling, by Luther D. 

Starling, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.

Terry F. Rose, for defendants-appellants.

HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.

Builder’s Supply, Inc., Brenda B. Schlie, John T. Schlie, 

David M. Boldon, David Boldon, Inc., and Contractor’s Lumber 

Company (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal from an order 
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denying their motion to transfer venue. Because we find the 

action to be predominantly transitory and not local, we affirm.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

I.B.S.A., Inc., d/b/a Independent Builders Supply 

Association, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) obtained a judgment against 

Defendant Builder’s Supply Inc. (“Builder’s Supply”) in Lincoln 

County Superior Court File No. 08-CVS-1819 on 4 December 2008 

for $325,709.77. At the time the judgment was entered, 

Defendants Brenda Schlie and David Boldon owned all of the stock 

of and were the only officers of Builder’s Supply.

Brenda and John Schlie owned five acres in Lincoln County

on which Builder’s Supply conducted its business (“Store 

Property”). From the complaint, it appears that Builder’s 

Supply owned real property in Maple Leaf Subdivision in Lincoln 

County (“Maple Leaf Property”). David Boldon was the sole owner 

and officer of Defendant David Boldon, Inc. David Boldon, Inc.

owed Builder’s Supply $100,000 on an account.

On 3 February 2009, the Clerk of Court in Lincoln County 

issued a writ of execution against Builder’s Supply in the 

amount of $334,869.71 plus interest from 30 September 2008. The 

writ of execution was returned unsatisfied on 6 July 2009.
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On 28 May 2009, during the time period that the writ of 

execution was outstanding, Brenda Schlie, individually and on 

behalf of Builder’s Supply, executed and filed a confession of 

judgment in favor of her husband, Defendant John Schlie, in the 

amount of $119,173.90.

On 19 July 2009, Builder’s Supply sent an open letter, 

written by Brenda Schlie, stating that Builder’s Supply would be 

going out of business and would not have sufficient funds to pay 

unsecured creditors. 

In August 2009, Plaintiff sent Builder’s Supply a request 

to verify its records and accounts. Neither Brenda Schlie nor 

Builder’s Supply responded to the request. On 24 September 

2009, the Clerk of Court in Lincoln County issued an order 

requiring Brenda Schlie to appear and testify regarding 

Builder’s Supply’s assets and enjoining the transfer of assets. 

Attempts to serve Brenda Schlie at her residence were 

unsuccessful. A similar order on 20 October 2009 was also 

unable to be served at Brenda Schlie’s residence.

On 11 December 2009, David Boldon filed Articles of 

Incorporation forming Defendant Contractor’s Lumber Company 

(“Contractor’s Lumber”). On 22 December 2009, Brenda and John 

Schlie transferred the Store Property to Contractor’s Lumber. 
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All inventory and remaining assets in the store were transferred 

to Contractor’s Lumber. Contractor’s Lumber never opened for 

business and the transfers were made either without 

consideration or without fair and adequate consideration.

On 27 August 2010, Contractor’s Lumber held an auction to 

sell the Store Property and the building supplies and equipment. 

Although the Store Property itself did not sell, the goods

yielded net proceeds of $42,837.45.

On 29 February 2010, David Boldon, Inc. obtained a judgment 

against Builder’s Supply, despite the fact that David Boldon, 

Inc. owed in excess of $100,000.00 to Builder’s Supply. As a 

result of that judgment, the Maple Leaf Property was placed in 

the name of David Boldon, Inc., on 21 October 2010.1

On 30 November 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the 

present action in Johnston County: 1) asking the court to pierce 

the corporate veil with regard to David Boldon and Brenda 

Schlie; 2) alleging fraudulent transfer of Builder’s Supply 

inventory and of the Maple Leaf Property; and 3) alleging that

the confession of judgment in favor of John Schlie was 

fraudulent.

 

1 For purposes of this opinion, we assume the Maple Leaf Property 

was subject to the judgment lien at the time of this transfer.
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On 28 December 2011, Builder’s Supply, David Boldon, David 

Boldon, Inc. and Contractor’s Lumber filed a “motion for 

removal” of the action to Lincoln County on the ground that the 

complaint sought to set aside the deed to property located in 

Lincoln County. On 19 March 2012, Builder’s Supply, Brenda 

Schlie, and John Schlie filed a similar motion for removal. On 

1 October 2012, the trial court denied the motion for removal. 

On 25 October 2012 and 29 October 2012, Defendants filed timely 

notice of appeal.

II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A–27(b)(3) (Supp. 2013). 

Although parties generally have “no right of immediate appeal 

from interlocutory orders and judgments[,]” Goldston v. Am. 

Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990), 

Defendants have an appeal of right under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A27(b)(3) because they appeal from an “interlocutory order or 

judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action 

or proceeding which . . . [a]ffects a substantial right.” As 

our Supreme Court has stated, “[a]lthough the initial question 

of venue is a procedural one, there can be no doubt that a right 

to venue established by statute is a substantial right. Its 
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grant or denial is immediately appealable.” Gardner v. Gardner, 

300 N.C. 715, 719, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980) (internal citation 

omitted).

“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, 

reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 

511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010). “‘Under a de novo review, the 

court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own 

judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams,

362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re 

Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 

(2003)). 

III. Analysis

On appeal, Defendants argue the trial court erred by 

denying their motions to remove the case to Lincoln County. We 

disagree and affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76 (2011), actions for 

“[r]ecovery of real property, or of an estate or interest 

therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or 

interest, and for injuries to real property must be tried in the 

county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, 

is situated[.]” On the other hand, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 

(2011) prescribes that “[i]n all other cases the action must be 
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tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, 

or any of them, reside at its commencement, or if none of the 

defendants reside in the State, then in the county in which the 

plaintiffs, or any of them, reside[.]”

To determine which statute applies to a given set of facts, 

our Supreme Court has stated:

If the judgment to which plaintiff would be 

entitled upon the allegations of the 

complaint will affect the title to land, the 

action is local and must be tried in the 

county where the land lies unless defendant 

waives the proper venue; otherwise, the 

action is transitory and must be tried in 

the county where one or more of the parties 

reside at the commencement of the action.

Thompson v. Horrell, 272 N.C. 503, 504–05, 158 S.E.2d 633, 634–

35 (1968).

Our Supreme Court has further explained:

an action is not necessarily local because 

it incidentally involves the title to land 

or a right or interest therein, or because 

the judgment that may be rendered may settle 

the rights of the parties by way of 

estoppel. It is the principal object

involved in the action which determines the 

question, and if title is principally 

involved or if the judgment or decree 

operates directly and primarily on the 

estate or title, and not alone in personam

against the parties, the action will be held 

local.
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Rose’s Stores, Inc. v. Tarrytown Center, Inc., 270 N.C. 201,

206, 154 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1967) (emphasis added) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Thus, in the present case, we look 

for the “principal object” of Plaintiff’s action. See

Kirkland’s Stores, Inc. v. Cleveland Gastonia, LLC, ___ N.C. 

App. ___, ___, 733 S.E.2d 885, 889 (2012).

Taken together, Plaintiff’s action seeks to collect money 

on an account and to enforce its judgment against the debtor and 

his allies, whose actions have been taken in an effort to 

defraud creditors. The complaint, in effect, is an effort to

aid in executing the Plaintiff’s prior judgment. Unlike cases 

in which determining the ownership of legal interests in land is

paramount, here the dispute is centered solely on a remedy which 

is monetary damages. Put differently, Plaintiff does not desire 

to adjudicate the title to the property per se but is only 

concerned with the amount of equity, if any, remaining at the 

time of the transfer, which could be used to pay the judgment. 

The only realty at issue in this case appears to be the Maple 

Leaf Property in which Plaintiff already has a superior lien. 

It is therefore obvious the Plaintiff’s requested relief of 

setting aside the transfer is surplusage and not the main object 
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of the suit. Under these facts, we hold the action is 

transitory in nature and not local.

Because the principal object of Plaintiff’s action is 

recovery of monetary damages, Plaintiff’s action is incidental 

to the principal object of recovering assets that were allegedly 

fraudulently transferred. Therefore, venue is transitory and 

the trial court did not err in denying Defendants’ motions for 

removal.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court 

is

AFFIRMED.

Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).