THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

convenes the 

TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING 

ADVISORY BOARD ON 

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 

DAY TWO 

The verbatim transcript of the Meeting of the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health held 

at the Adam’s Mark, St. Louis, Missouri, on February 

8, 2005. 
 

2 

C O N T E N T S 

February 8, 2005 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 13 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR

DR. LEW WADE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF DRAFT MINUTES, MEETING 27 14 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

SITE PROFILE REVIEW --

MALLINCKRODT, DESTREHAN STREET FACILITY 16 

SC&A 

SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT & BOARD DISCUSSION -- 62 

FIRST SET OF CASE REVIEWS 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

BOARD DISCUSSION/WORK SESSION 96 

INTRODUCTION 147 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

GENERAL PUBLIC COMMENT 154 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 275 
3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND 

The following transcript contains quoted material. 

Such material is reproduced as read or spoken. 

In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 

an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 

sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 

or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 

word(s) when reading written material. 

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 

of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 

reported. 

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 

the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 

available. 

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 

"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 

-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 

without reference available. 

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 

failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

In the following transcript (off microphone) 

refers to microphone malfunction or speaker's neglect 

to depress "on" button. 
 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 

(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 

BOARD MEMBERS 

CHAIR 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus 

School of Health Sciences 

Purdue University

Lafayette, Indiana 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D.

Senior Science Advisor 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Washington, DC 

MEMBERSHIP 

ANDERSON, Henry A., M.D.

Chief Medical Officer 

Occupational and Environmental Health

Wisconsin Division of Public Health 

Madison, Wisconsin 

DeHART, Roy Lynch, M.D., M.P.H.

Director 

The Vanderbilt Center for Occupational and Environmental

Medicine 

Professor of Medicine 

Nashville, Tennessee 

ESPINOSA, Richard Lee

Sheet Metal Workers Union Local #49 

Johnson Controls 

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Espanola, New Mexico 
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GIBSON, Michael H.

President 

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union

Local 5-4200 

Miamisburg, Ohio 

GRIFFON, Mark A.

President 

Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc.

Salem, New Hampshire 

MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D.

Director 

New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund

Albany, New York 

MUNN, Wanda I.

Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired)

Richland, Washington 

OWENS, Charles Leon

President 

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union

Local 5-550 

Paducah, Kentucky 

PRESLEY, Robert W.

Special Projects Engineer

BWXT Y12 National Security Complex

Clinton, Tennessee 

ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus 

University of Florida

Elysian, Minnesota 
 

 

6 

AGENDA SPEAKERS 

(in order of appearance) 

SC&A 

Dr. Paul Ziemer, Chair 

STAFF/VENDORS 

CORI HOMER, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH

STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS 

AHIRA, KEN

ALEXANDER, OLIVE M.

ALEXANDER, TERRY

ALLEN, GEORGE

AMANN, DEBORAH

AMENELL, ROBERTA, IAAP

ANBLE, JOHN, KTVI

ANDERSON, KATHLEEN, IAAP

ARRO, MICHAEL R.

BAFARO, MARILYN, NIOSH

BASCHERT, BETTY J.

BEATTY, EVERETT RAY, SR., FERNALD ATOMIC COUNCIL

BEHLING, HANS, SC&A

BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A

BELL, R. THOMAS, SC&A

BERRY, CHARLENE

BEST, CHARLINE

BEST, RAYMOND

BIEST, JOAN

BLANKENSHIP, CINDY

BLUE, GEORGE

BOELHAUF, LINDA

BOGNAN, JOHN

BOYD, JAMES

BLOSSER, FRED, NIOSH

BRALASKI, RITA

BRAND, ANSTICE, CDC

BRINGER, GLORIA

BROCK, DENISE, UNWW

BROWN, DENNIS

BROWN, THOMAS, BSCAG

BRYANT, DOROTHY

BULGER, HAROLD

CALLAWAY MOOCH, FERNALD ATOMIC COUNCIL

CAMPBELL, MARTHA JANE, IAAP

CAVALESKY, SHIRLEY

CHISHOLM, MILLIE

COFFELT, EVELYN

CONRAD, JAMES

COOK, FRANKLIN

COTTER, GARY 
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COTTER, WILLIAM D.

COVALESKY, SHIRLEY

CROCK, JAMIE

CURTISS, JOANN & RICK

DANIEL, GWEN

DAVIS, JANETTE

DAVIS, RICKY, KTVI

DEEP, HEIDI, NIOSH

DEICHMAN, MATT, WBII-TV

DETHERAGE, DEBBIE

DILLARD, HOMER & HALENE

DOCKENDORFF, ALVIN, IAAP

DOLAN, JACQUELINE E.

DOLAN, WILLIAM E.

DORNFELD, DEBBIE, JIM TALENT

DOWNING, MARILYN, IAAP

DOWNS, DEB

DREY, KAY

DUDLEY, MARTIN

DURSO, HARRY, FAMILY

EATON, CLARISSA, UNWW

ECHEMENDIA, AIDA

EHLMANN, PAT, UNWW

ELLISON, CHRIS, NIOSH

ERTZ, MARILYN, IAAP

ESPY, RICHARD

FAGAS, JANE

FANTER, DALE

FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A

FRAZIER, JOE

FRISCHMAN, BILL

FULKERSON, ROBERT

GARNER, DON

GENERI, MARY

GILLARD, LORRAINE A.

GRAER, RON

GRAHAM, MAYOR, CITY OF O’FALLON

GREEN, JAMES

GREUBLATT, B., UPI

HABBIG, JOHN K.

HAERER, BERNELL

HALLMARK, SHELBY, LABOR

HANNEKEN, BETTY, IAAP 
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HARDIN, JOYCE, IAAP

HARGIS, JOHN

HARRIS, WALTER

HARRISON, KATHY

HARRISON, LINDA L., IAAP

HARRISON, RUSSELL, IAAP

HART, ALISON, SENATOR HARKIN

HAWKINS, BRENDA

HEADRICK, WILLIAM

HEISTER, MELANIE, NCRP

HENNITS, DOROTHY

HERBERT, NICHOLE, NIOSH

HERTZ, DOROTHY

HILL, BRYAN L., IAAP

HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH

HOELSCHER, LAUREL, IAAP

HOELSCHER, RUTH, IAAP

HOLLAND, MARTIN

HOLTMEYER-MAUNE, JERRINE

HODGES, CARRIE

HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS

HORGAN, TOM, SEN. BOND

HUMPHREY, JOYCE

IRWIN, SUE

IVERSON, SI

JACKSON, BETTYE

JOHNSON, MARY L.

JOHNSON, PAT

JONES, VIRGINIA L.

JORDAN, LAJUANNA

KATZ, TED, NIOSH

KELLER, LILLIAN A.

KELLISON, JAMES

KELLY, PATRICK, SC&A

KENOYER, JUDSON, ORAU

KIEDING, SYLVIA

KIENLEN, BONNIE, IAAP

KIMPAN, KATE, DOE

KLOTZ, STEVE, KTRS

KOENEMAN, BARB, UNWW

KOENEMAN, RAYETTA

KOENEMAN, TANYA, UNWW

KORDING, GLENN 
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KORDING, SHARON

KOTSCH, JEFFREY L., DOL

KRAICHELY, MARY, UNWW

KUNTZ, LORI, IAAP

LACKEY, MELBA

LAMBKIN, DON, UNWW

LAVERY, KEVIN M., KWMU

LEA, JEFF, KMOV

LEACH, BOB

LEAHMANN, SHIRLEY

LED, PAUL

LITTLE, JAMES

LYNCH, CINDY

LYNCH, HELEN

MACK, HUY, POST DISPATCH

MANNING, JIM

MANSFIELD, LAURIE, DES MOINES REGISTER

MASSMANN, MERRELL

MASSMANN, VERNON

MAURO, JOHN, SC&A

MCINTYRE, JOAN

MCKEEL, DAN, MD, WASHINGTON UNIV.

MCKEEL, VIRGINIA, VILLAGE IMAGE NEWS

MCNUTT, ROBERT

MESSALA, DAVE & JAN

MIKLOVIC, DAN

MILLER, RELADA L., NIOSH

MILLER, RICHARD, GAP

MITAS, JIM, CONGRESSMAN AKIN

MOLENHOUR, ROBERT

MOUSER, TERRI, UNITED NUCLEAR

MURPHY, DAN P.

MUSCKE, EDWARD C.

NAES, NORVILLE

NESVET, JEFF, DOL

NETON, JIM, NIOSH

NOVAK, JUSTINE

NUGENT, MARY, US GAO

O’HARE, FRANK W.

OJEDA, THERESA, KMOV

PATTON, JACK

PHEGLEY, RAYMOND, AIRPORT

PIPER, WILLIAM 
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PORTER, DIANE, NIOSH

PRESLEY, LOUISE S.

PRIEST, CHRISTINE

RACH, CHARLES L.

RAMSPOTT, CHRISTINE

RAMSPOTT, JOHN

REECE, DOYLE, AIRPORT

REMPE, VIRGIL J.

RETKONSKI, RICHARD

REUSS, ANN

RIDENHOWER, DONALD D.

RIDENHOWER, LINDA

RINDALL, TINA, UNITED NUCLEAR

RINGEN, KNUT, CPWR/BCTD

ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY, SC&A

RODE, BETTY

ROSENTHAL, JAMES

ROTH, CHARLES L.

ROTHROCK, AMY

RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH

RYAN, FRAN

SACKS-LONG, DONNA J.

SALTER, JIM, AIRPORT

SCHESLER, ELAINE

SCHNEIDER, CLARENCE

SCHNEIDER, MARILYN, UNWW

SCHRUMM, RUTH

SCOGGINS, FRANCES

SCOTT, SYLVIA

SEMARADI, ANDREW

SHANEHEN, JUDY

SHAW, SHIRLEY

SHELTON, MR. AND MRS. JAMES L., IAAP

SMIDDY, BARBARA A.

SOMRATY, ANDY, AIRPORT

SOMRATY, CATHY, AIRPORT

SOVAR, RICH AND EVELYN

SPICKETT, DAVID

SPICKETT, EVELYN

STEFFEN, CAROLE

STEGER, RON

STEGER, RONI

STEINKAMP, JUDIE 
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STEMPFLEY, DAN, NIOSH

STEWART, LEONARD, IAAP

STRAUTHER, LEE

STRONG, JANE

STROPES, FLO

STROUSSNER, DONALD A.

STUCKENSCHNEIDER, DOLORES

STUDT, ARLENE

SUERMANN, ZELDA

SULLIVAN, MICHELLE, WBII-TV

SWABODA, JAY, ST. LOUIS LABOR TRIBUNE

TASCHLOR, JOHN

TAULBEE, TOM, NIOSH

TEAGUE, CARLOTTA, NCRP

TENFORDE, THOMAS S., NCRP

THORNHILL, CHARLENE

THORNHILL, GEORGE

TINDALL, FRANKLIN

TINDALL, TINA

TOOHEY, R.E., ORAU

TURCIC, PETE, DOL

UNDERWOOD, LEWIS, NIOSH

VACEK, PENNY, SENATOR GRASSLEY

VERHOFF, GWENDOLYN

VOGNER, JOHN

WALKER, ED AND JOYCE, BSCAG

WATSON, DAVID P., JR.

WHITE, WALTER, JR.

WIESEHAUS, JOHN J.

WILBURN-YOCHIEM, LYNDA ANN, IAAP

WILEY, EFFIE M.

WINDISCH, ANTHONY, IAAP

WING, JENNY, SENATOR HARKIN

WISE, GEORGE

WOLFF, TOM

WOOD, MYRLL, IAAP

WOODS, JANET

YAKOS, CHARLES

YERINGTON, LASCA

YOUNG, OBIE D., MCW

ZAK ROSEMARY 

ZIEMER, MARILYN

ZIMMERMAN, SUE, CONGRESSMAN JIM LEACH 
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P R O C E E D I N G S

 (8:20 a.m.) 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS

 DR. ZIEMER: Good morning, everyone. I'd like 

to call the meeting back to order. This is the 

second day of the meeting of the Advisory Board 

on Radiation and Worker Health. Again I would 

remind all participants if you would, please 

register your attendance at the registration 

table at the entrance, if you haven't already 

done so. 

Copies of the agenda and other materials are on 

the back table. If you have not already seen 

them, please avail yourselves of those. We 

will follow the agenda fairly closely. From 

time to time we may have to adjust it, 

according to the -- how -- how things progress. 

The record will show that all of the Board 

members are here with the exception of Dr. 

Andrade, who is ill with the flu. Henry 

Anderson is -- we hope will join us by phone 

from Alaska. Mr. Espinosa will be joining us 

shortly. 

What time is it in Alaska? 

 MS. MUNN: It's barely 6:30. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: We'll give Dr. Anderson his wakeup call, I think is what it will be. 

(Pause) 

 Good morning, Henry, are you there? Do we have 

Dr. Anderson on the line? 

 (No response) 

Well, we'll keep -- continue to try to hook Dr. 

Anderson in here. 

REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF DRAFT MINUTES,

 MEETING 27

 The first item on our agenda this morning is 

the review and approval of the minutes of our 

previous meeting. That was the meeting in 

Livermore, the December 2004 meeting in 

Livermore. Board members, you've had those 

draft minutes. I have reviewed them. There 

are a few typos and so on which I will pass 

along to Cori Homer. I'd particularly like you 

to make sure that, as you look at those 

sections where you have expressed ideas and so 

on, that you make sure that you are correctly 

reflected in those summary minutes. 

Are there any significant corrections or 

additions to the minutes, as you have them? 

These are in the sixth tab in your folder. 
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If there are no corrections or additions, let 

me entertain a motion to approve those minutes, 

with the understanding that minor editorial and 

grammatical corrections will be made. Is there 

such a motion? 

 MS. MUNN: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And seconded? 

 DR. DEHART: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Moved and seconded. All in favor 

of approving the minutes, say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 Any opposed? 

 (No responses) 

 Any abstentions? 

 (No responses) 

Thank you. The minutes stand approved. 

One reminder, Board members, this morning as we 

proceed, we have -- we learned that -- 

yesterday that some of the participants in the 

audience had difficulty hearing Board members 

during discussion on occasions where you moved 

your head away from the mike, that the sound 

loss was noticeable. So you do need to 

apparently get relatively close to the mike and 

-- and keep your mouth close there as you 
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speak. That will help -- this is a large room 

and a bit of an echo cavern. No fair yodeling, 

though. Just say what you have to and keep it 

close. Okay? 

SITE PROFILE REVIEW –-

MALLINCKRODT, DESTREHAN STREET FACILITY 

We're going to then move to the report on the 

site profile review which was done by the 

Board's contractor, SC&A. The lead person on 

that effort was Joe Fitzgerald. Joe is with us 

here this morning, and assisting Joe in that 

effort was Tom Bell. And I'm looking for Joe 

to make sure he's in there. I know he was 

around this morning. We're two or three 

minutes early, so Joe may not have anticipated 

that. But Joe is going to introduce the work 

of SC&A on the site profile review of the 

Mallinckrodt Destrehan Steel -- Street 

facility, rather, and then -- and then Tom 

Bell, who had the lead in that, will pick up 

from there. 

(Pause) 

Ladies and gentlemen, Joe Fitzgerald. Sorry, 

Joe, we jumped in a couple minutes early here, 

but we are prepared to proceed on the work, so 
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-- yeah, thank you, so... 

 MR. FITZGERALD: Good morning. I'm Joe 

Fitzgerald. I'm the task manager for task one 

on the site profiles. What we want to do this 

morning is just give you a briefing on the 

review of the site profile for Mallinckrodt 

that was accomplished over the last couple of 

months. 

Tom Bell is going to go through the specifics 

of the presentation. You do have a handout 

that provides the specific findings and 

observations. 

Let me just say that, you know, this -- this 

review was done over a four or five-month 

period, actually, starting with a series of 

interviews that we conducted with workers here 

in St. Louis back in the summer. We progressed 

through document review and also spent 

certainly a great deal of time interacting with 

NIOSH and looking at the documentation NIOSH 

has collected. 

I think -- this is the first one that benefited 

from a issue resolution process which we 

conducted with NIOSH, with the Advisory Board 

present, a few weeks ago, and I think this 
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turned out to be a very advantageous process. 

I'd like to report we converged on a number of 

issues where I think clarity helped us, and I 

think this is a good precedent that we can 

certainly build on, and I think it made the 

report a better report. 

We're going to hear a lot about Mallinckrodt 

today, but I just want to outline a few of the 

things that certainly we found very pertinent. 

Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, located here in 

St. Louis, of course, refined and processed 

uranium ore, one of the earlier sites as part 

of the Atomic Energy Commission. They used 

high purity uranium. Actually operated from 

1942 to '58. A lot of the operations were then 

transferred to Weldon Spring. 

We spent a lot of time certainly looking at the 

question of dust concentration, primarily 

'cause, again, bioassay data wasn't available, 

and a lot of the information we had to rely on 

really involved contamination studies and 

whatever air samples that had been conducted. 

The key issue I think that we focused on was 

film badge data was not available before 1945, 

so certainly there's a lot of issues in terms 
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of actual datapoints that could be relied upon. 

Certainly that'll be a key issue that'll be 

returned to again and again this morning. 

I don't think it's any mystery -- I don't think 

-- I think you're going to hear a lot of the 

history. This was a plant that had poor 

ventilation, minimal safety programs in the 

early years, and the monitoring which -- 

monitoring -- limited monitoring was done 

certainly demonstrated a high concentration 

levels of uranium dust, which persisted in the 

early years. 

Anyway, in terms of what we did process-wise, 

the initial working draft was developed. We 

did provide questions, as we have done in the 

past, to NIOSH. Did have an opportunity, by 

virtue of conference call, to go through those 

questions, trying to get certainly a response 

to some of the issues that we were looking at. 

And the purpose of this, again, was to elicit 

some clarity as far as how the profile was 

developed, some of the issues in terms of 

documentation that was used, and to understand 

better some of the analysis that was employed 

in the review. And certainly I thought that 
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was pretty productive and NIOSH agreed that a 

number of the issues -- and this is a key 

feature of this particular review, and we 

raised this with the Board last year 'cause we 

were aware that this was one site profile that 

was in the process of being I think 

dramatically revised, and the question at the 

time, as you recall, was what should we do, 

given the fact that it was on the list. I 

think the sense of the Board was to go ahead 

and proceed with Rev. 00, understanding of 

course that perhaps some of the issues that we 

were going to find for -- by virtue of 00, were 

being addressed in the ongoing revision of Rev. 

01. So I think that's the context by which we 

developed that particular evaluation. 

Again, as I indicated, we did spend time with 

NIOSH on the 18th. We had several Board 

members present -- Wanda, Mark Griffon, Mike 

Gibson I think, and Richard Espinosa. I think 

the four Board members of the subcommittee were 

present. It was a very helpful session. I 

think we did address a number of issues that 

made the report better, and this -- this 

report's the product certainly of that 
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exchange. And this report was submitted on the 

31st. 

With that -- where's Tom? I want to give Tom 

as much time as possible to go through the 

specifics of the -- of the findings. I think 

he's got a number of -- of points he wants to 

make and I want to (unintelligible). 

(Pause) 

 MR. BELL: Well, good morning, members of the 

Board, Chairman Ziemer and all the folks here, 

ladies and gentlemen, the workers at 

Mallinckrodt that have been able to join us. 

It's a privilege to be able to be here to 

present some of our findings. 

 Joe's covered for you some of the introductory 

slides, so you've got a feel for how we started 

this. What I'd like to go through with you are 

about five major areas that we developed 

findings in, and talk a little bit about each 

one and give you some background in those. 

The first is really the early period, which we 

thought had lots of problems, and I think the 

SEC petition indicates that that really is a 

problem, and we'll talk about some of the 

details of that. 
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Second are internal dosimetry questions, and a 

lot of our issues really arose in that area 

because the inhalation dose -- the internal 

dose turned out to be the significant route for 

a lot of the exposure, in addition to perhaps 

radium 226 later for external dose with film 

badging. 

And then we'd like to talk a little bit about 

some problems we see with some of the external 

dose issues. 

 Fourth, dealing with the coworker data and how 

it's interpreted and used. 

 And finally, some general information on timeweighted averages, which kind of is the crux of 

the dust study information and some problems we 

see in that. 

So with that, what I'd like to do is to start 

off here with a -- a review -- basically we 

were charged to do these objectives, and I just 

want to go over them quickly so that you know -

- in fact, I understand at the Los -- at the 

Livermore meeting there was a concern that we 

should try to address each of these major 

objectives more specifically in the report, and 

the report format was changed in order to do 
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that. And we actually do go into these subject 

in the report that you can read. But overall 

we're trying to assess the scientific validity 

of the site profile. But specifically we're 

really interested in is there -- is the data 

complete, is all the stuff there that you need 

to really do a good dose reconstruction. 

Secondly, we're trying to evaluate the site 

profile's technical accuracy; third, to 

evaluate if guidance and data are adequate to 

sufficiently -- are they sufficiently detailed 

and complete for dose reconstruction process; 

fourth, evaluate the consistency between the 

profiles, and we've had limited experience -- 

we've only done two or three so far, but we're 

going to give you a little background on that; 

and then evaluate conformance with applicable 

policies and procedures. 

And so with that -- let's see... I'm sorry, 

they didn't show me which button to push here. 

(Pause) 

We had certain constraints, and Joe touched 

upon those but I wanted to go over them again. 

We realized that NIOSH was working on Rev. 1 

and really had made a lot of progress on it. 
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In fact, we discussed some of this at our 

meeting in Cincinnati. But we didn't have the 

ability to see what was being done, and we 

asked at the meeting, you know, is it possible 

to maybe get a summary. And NIOSH was helpful 

in providing us that summary, but unfortunately 

it came at the very last minute as the report 

went out the door, so we didn't really have a 

chance to really incorporate it or to think a 

great deal about what the summary meant. But I 

do have a feeling that a lot of the issues 

we've raised that NIOSH is seriously 

considering them and that Rev. 1 may very well 

address a number of those issues. 

At the time we prepared to send out the report, 

the SEC petitions were not available and we 

didn't have those to look at. We have now been 

able to review those since we've come to the 

meeting, and will have a few comments on that. 

And the transcripts of our January 18th 

meeting, which as Joe mentioned was a very 

productive meeting; I think this issue 

resolution process really helped each of us to 

kind of sit down and think about the issues and 

where we certainly had differences and how we 
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could perhaps come together on issues, and I 

think that's a very, very valuable process. 

And finally there was no section eight, which 

dealt with environmental releases, and they 

acknowledged that and they're working on that, 

so we didn't have any ability to -- to deal 

with that section, even though there are a few 

tables in the TBD that --

 MS. MUNN: Point it at the -- point it at 

the... 

 MR. BELL: Oh, I keep forgetting to do that, 

right. 

Well, I somehow bypassed the strengths. Let me 

cover that, since it's not up there. 

We found the report in many ways to be an 

excellent report. I mean the development of 

the processes and the history behind things, 

very, very well put-together to help us 

understand. I think the workers hopefully 

would understand that this process helped in -- 

in going through it all. NIOSH made the 

decision that type S solubility for respiratory 

tract tissues is appropriate, and we agreed 

with that. They've used an assumption of type 

S for respiratory diseases and type M for organ 
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doses and other organs, and we felt that was 

sufficient and the right way to go. Type F was 

used for UNH, and that was correct. 

And the analysis of organ dose from urine is a 

complex process and we felt that, even though 

they tried to address that in a fairly 

(unintelligible) way, there's still some 

pitfalls in that process and NIOSH indicated 

they're going to work on that and address that. 

The TBD did some work for -- on urinalysis in 

the mid-1955's on some of the effects of the 

daughters of uranium 234, 235 and 238 and 

thorium 230, and provided a section 6.1 that 

dealt with that. And we'll talk a little bit 

about that. I think there needs to be little 

more done to characterize the dose from -- from 

particularly raffinates. 

And NIOSH then made a concerted effort to 

obtain a lot of documents. The reference list 

was extensive. The kinds of documents they -- 

they reviewed was -- was very helpful and we 

utilized those extensively. Their data history 

was clear and insightful, the nature of the 

plant operations, and it helped us a lot 

understanding what -- what was going on at the 
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plants. 

I sure did lose two slides there. Sorry about 

that. 

Okay. There was very limited data in the early 

period, particularly from 1942 to 1945. Film 

badge program did not start till late in 1945. 

Extensive dust studies, although Mallinckrodt 

started some in '47, really didn't begin until 

about 1948 when AEC New York Operations Office 

got involved and Mont Mason came to the plant 

and began to try to work on improving it. And 

at that point a lot changed in the Mallinckrodt 

process, and a lot of improvements were made 

within a year or two. Our feeling, our 

confidence in some of the data as we went out 

beyond that point became better and because you 

had experts that were working and using some of 

the state of the art techniques at that time. 

But -- but the data really, we feel, is kind of 

incomplete up until basically 1948, even though 

they were developing some and talking about 

that detail. 

 The assessment of internal dose is -- involves 

an area that we think is -- needs more 

development is the raffinate and trace 
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radionuclides. There's more that needs to be 

done, we believe, in characterizing that, 

particularly actinium 227, which if it's 

concentrated can represent sometimes a 

significant dose, and we don't think the TBD 

Rev. 0 has really addressed that as fully as it 

should, and we hope that Rev. 1 will come back 

and do that. 

In the early period the SEC has decided to work 

on a period from '46 to '48 and -- and they 

basically made a statement that they think that 

the data is limited during that period and that 

it's not feasible to estimate Mallinckrodt 

employees' doses with sufficient accuracy, and 

they referred that issue to the Board for 

consideration. 

If you look at their SEC petition, which we 

just got, you'll find this is backed up by the 

fact that in the first early years, 

particularly for dust concentrations, and you 

look at their table, the number of employees 

that they have information on versus the total 

employees, the percentage of information that 

they have for these folks -- about 18 percent 

in 1946, 12 percent in 1947 and only about ten 
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percent in 1948, which I found interesting 

because that was the year a lot of the 

extensive dose studies started to be done by 

the AEC. But our concern is that ten, 12, 18 

percent is a difficult base to work from to try 

to project doses to the other 80 percent or so 

of people, and that there are some potentials 

for higher doses that may not be caught in that 

process. 

And in our meeting in Cincinnati, NIOSH has 

indicated that -- that they're working on a way 

to try to demonstrate how they (unintelligible) 

the technique and how it might capture some of 

that, but we -- we had some concerns on that. 

The table 31 coworker doses need a better 

methodology, we think. The data's there, but 

the -- the methodologies that they used to 

develop that data and put it to use for 

individual use doesn't seem to be very well 

developed, and we had a little trouble seeing 

how they applied that. It may work quite well 

when they do the individual dose 

reconstructions, but we haven't been able to 

see that. So we'd like to know more about 

that, and I believe they're going to probably 
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try to address that in more detail in -- in 

Rev. 1. 

And we'll talk a little bit a little bit later 

on time-weighted averages. There's some 

uncertainties there and we think they need to 

firm up a little bit of that. 

And then at our meeting in Cincinnati, after 

talking a good deal about how to quantify 

uncertainties, NIOSH brought up the fact that 

they may be considering the use of the upper 

95th percentile bounds as a way to deal with 

the uncertainties associated with the timeweighted average air concentrations. And I 

think that's going to help a lot in resolving a 

lot of our concerns, which we didn't have 

available in the -- in the Rev. 0 -- 1 -- 

thing. 

Okay. The completeness of data, NIOSH has made 

a concerted effort to obtain a lot of records. 

We had pointed out fairly early that there was 

a source of documents down at the ORISE CER 

vault and, as I was going through some 

documents even last night, I saw that they also 

began to be aware of that and were -- were 

actually, about the same time, beginning to 
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pursue that, and we'll talk later, but I think 

they've got about six boxes of that data now, 

and I think that's going to be helpful. We 

hope that -- and maybe they can comment more, 

but we hope it has some of the raw data cards 

for the early period that could help in 

reconstructing individual doses. 

Still a little concern -- and Naomi -- Naomi 

Harley did a lot of the early work at the 

Nevada -- at the New York Operations Office for 

AEC on the data collection process. And in 

fact, NIOSH provided in one of the rebuttals 

back on Bethlehem Steel some very good 

information on Naomi Harley's process of 

dealing with these. And she's very wellrespected and I'm sure that they were using 

some of the better techniques they could at the 

time, but -- but as we'll talk a little later, 

there -- there is a concern that they didn't 

under-- they don't know enough details about 

the location of the samplers, what the 

calibration of the samplers were and some other 

things which -- which make it kind of 

questionable whether they have all the data 

needed to really make accurate estimates, so -- 
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based on that. 

Now in terms of technical accuracy we think 

it's lacking for the early period. I think the 

SEC petition, the early -- the first one, 

indicates that they'd support that. 

In terms of internal dose and raffinate and 

trace radionuclides, we -- we think that really 

does, as I mentioned, need further application. 

(Pause) 

The fact that there might be some additional 

raw data to validate some of the tables that 

they've dev-- I think is -- is very important. 

We -- we looked particularly at table 21, which 

was the one that tried to use the '48 data that 

AEC had done in the late '48. There were two 

basic studies, one in April and one in 

February, and they -- they used that to project 

back doses that they thought people received 

from the '42 to '46 or '47 time frame at Plant 

4. And as we go into a little more detail, we 

think there's an awful lot of samples that we 

found in those dust studies that are -- are 

much higher than the kinds of average -- 

weighted averages that they received, and we 

think that there's -- at least there needs to 
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be a technique to explain how they did that and 

whether those are incorporated or not. NIOSH 

feels they are. We don't see the evidence of 

that and we think that the -- the values that 

were utilized to transpose back to the early 

period likely may have missed some high exposed 

folks that -- that would -- if they'd looked at 

more closely or we had raw data behind it or 

source term data or even extrapolations back 

from perhaps urine data later that -- that 

there'd be a way to evaluate that and perhaps 

adjust that somewhat. The 95 percentile thing 

is an issue, too, that could be very helpful in 

that. 

And as to say, we'll get into the efficiency 

calibrations a little more, and also the use of 

the CER vault data which -- which they are 

doing. 

 Now the technical accuracy areas internal dose 

factors that are missing, there are these 

unknowns and calibration efficiencies, location 

of samplers, where they were taken, whether 

they were multal (sic) samples or not, the 

duration of time the samples were taken -- all 

issues that, if not properly evaluated, could -
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- could perhaps lead to underestimates of dose. 

And I realize they're working with limited data 

and that's difficult to do, but if -- if there 

is further information that's available on 

that, it would be helpful, especially in the 

Rev. 1 discussion. 

We brought up the issue of heavy breathing, and 

that's come up in Bethlehem Steel. I don't 

want to belabor that. Some people are mouth 

breathers and that potential is greater then 

for perhaps a higher dose than would be 

'ticipated (sic) from the general averages and 

it's just something that needs to be looked at. 

Our worker -- site worker experts that some are 

here today have brought up the concern about 

ingest inhalation from skin and -- and glove 

contamination. We -- we don't find a lot of 

documentation on that in the records and -- and 

we think that is a potential -- perhaps not 

staggering amounts of dose, but could be 

significant if people are in areas where 

they're smoking and eating at the same time in 

lunchrooms or are touching surfaces uranium 

metals (unintelligible) and transposing it to 

their mouth or inhaling the dust from that. 
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 And finally we'll talk a little more detail on 

the raffinate waste. 

(Pause) 

 DR. WADE: Would you like me to just sit up 

there to --

 MR. BELL: Maybe, it just doesn't seem to want 

to respond for me. I -- it -- should pressing 

the arrow button. Correct? 

(Pause) 

Okay. Table 31 data basically was the coworker 

data, and this is discussion of the inhalation 

intakes that workers had, and they were 

provided by job categories that they broke out. 

I think that there may be other job categories 

that was reduced some to make it easier to put 

it in a table, but there may be job categories 

that weren't necessarily covered. And the 

explanation of how they take the inhalation 

dose and how they convert that to an individual 

dose, as I mentioned earlier, wasn't 

sufficiently explained and we think maybe Rev. 

1 will do a better job of that. 

 The application of 1948 data for coworkers in 

particular for dust inhalation study work back 

to the early days, from the site experts we've 
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talked about there was limited data collected 

in the early period, probably limited coworker 

data to use, and therefore it's difficult to 

imagine that there is good coworker data that 

can be correlated with an individual that 

they're actually doing a dose reconstruction 

on. And so we think that there's a weakness 

there that needs to be improved a little bit 

and explained better. 

Also, the GSDs in table 1 were in error, and 

NIOSH acknowledges that quite early and 

indicated they're correcting those and that 

will be done in TB-1 -- Rev. 1. 

In terms of time-weighted averages, 

measurements of -- -- in -- in -- in the case 

of the (unintelligible) for minimum dose may 

have been taken over just a day or two, not 

necessarily for the whole period, so there's a 

little concern about how accurate they are. 

There are no uncertainty analysis (sic) done on 

them, and as a result NIOSH, in the SEC 

petition, is acknowledging that perhaps a way 

to handle that would be the 95 percentile 

value. And the high exposure worker is not 

captured by some of the average dust study 
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samples, and so we have some data that we 

presented in the report about samples that 

really are quite high, and we just think that 

with those kinds of levels for some of the high 

dust concentration studies -- I mean work, that 

these should have been more adequately 

addressed some way to show how they were 

handled. 

As an example, in 1946 for a green salt TA-7 

packer, their highest dose was -- was 13,000 in 

the table. And yet if you look in the specific 

reports like in February '49, the TA-7 packer 

had an average of -- of 24,000 -- 27 -- 27,400, 

but as high as 40,500. And if you look at 

people that worked around the dust collectors, 

they had an average of -- of 823,000 and a high 

of 2,870,000 -- these are dpm per cubic meter. 

And also furnace cleaners, who we've all heard 

had -- had some -- some specific doses that 

probably were high -- case where 53,000 was the 

average dpm per cubic meter and the high was 

77,000 dpm per cubic meter. And in the table 

21 there -- there is no -- there's no 

information on that -- those particular 

categories, and there's no coworker data to 
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corroborate that, either. So we think that 

represents a problem in validating those kinds 

of doses. 

We've talked and Joe mentioned the poor 

ventilation. This was a real concern to the 

workers. As we talked to our site experts, so 

they -- they really didn't have much. They 

were told to wore -- wear just regular face 

mask kind of thing, which -- which they did 

when they wanted to do, but if they didn't want 

to, there was nobody there that, you know, 

basically said you should be doing that, so it 

was up to the individual to determine how much 

protection they received. And that wasn't 

until Mont Mason came in around '48, '49 they 

began to evaluate the need. He rebuilt some of 

the plants and devel-- developed better 

ventilation systems for those plants that this 

problem began to be rectified, and yet when you 

take the information at hand and look at the 

SEC petition, it's also agreed that even though 

they made all these changes, they still had 

trouble keeping these -- these values in the 

early -- in later years even down below where 

they would like them. It was much better in 
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the later years than it was earlier. And the 

air sampling may not have been sufficient to 

capture the areas where the significant dust 

really was occurring in some of these 

operations. 

Now Hanson Blatz and Merril Eisenbud did some 

estimates very early in the 1951 time frame on 

-- on lung burdens and some other organ doses, 

and very interestingly -- this is addressed in 

the TBD as just specifics, but it didn't go 

into the fact that -- of 17 people that they 

did the reconstruction, did some calculations, 

had doses as high as 1,000 rem to the lung. 

And so this wasn't mentioned specifically in 

the TBD. Perhaps maybe in TBD Rev. 1, but we 

think it's an important issue that needs to be 

looked at carefully when -- particularly for 

lung dose. 

Early monitoring data wasn't specifically 

geared towards the individual worker. It was 

more of an area monitoring to validate dose 

levels. The workers, we understand from our 

site experts, were often not made available. 

They were -- they didn't know the information. 

They didn't know what they were working in, so 
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there wasn't -- there wasn't incentive for them 

to be careful about what they were doing or 

wear their masks and so -- so we think that 

represents a problem. And as we mentioned, the 

95 percent confidence bounds may be a well -- a 

way to resolve this concern about the 

uncertainties in the process. 

In terms of the raffinates, the TBD Rev. 0 

mentions them in certain areas, predominantly 

in one of the tables on page 51 on their table 

there and it talks a little bit about -- in 

section 6.1 about what the dose reconstructor 

should do about that. But we're concerned that 

-- we know that from Mound, who verified that 

they got from Mallinckrodt waste that had both 

radium 226, protactinium 231 and actinium 227, 

that these -- these were specifically in the -- 

in the raffinate waste that was coming to them 

for processing. And Salusky* in 1956 mentioned 

the sperry cake consisted of .1 to .2 parts per 

million of protactinium, and we did some 

calculations on point -- actually .3 parts per 

million and found that that can represent a 

significant dose, particularly when these are 

concentrated, and this wasn't adequately 
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addressed in TBD 00 and hopefully will be in -- 

in the TB (sic) 01. 

I think it was brought out that this -- this 

point -- .3 parts per million, and we did some 

calculations, that it could have represented as 

high as 14 nanocuries per gram or 1.43 times 

ten to the ninth eighth (sic) curies per gram 

of protactinium 231. Also there are 530 

becquerels per gram sperry cake, and these are 

-- actually actinium is in equilibrium with U235 in the ore, and thorium 230 was addressed 

in the TBD for the periods from 1955 to '57 in 

Plant 7, but we think that there may be periods 

earlier than that where this should be looked 

at, and they may be of significant concern, 

even -- even a milligram per month over a few 

years of actinium 227 or protatim (sic) 231 can 

represent a significant internal dose, both to 

the bone surfaces and to the lungs. 

And page 20 of the TBD actually does mention 

the potential for resuspension of raffinate 

particles during dewatering, and -- and I think 

it needs to be a little more explanation of how 

they feel that -- that dewatering process, what 

might affect the raffinate release and -- and 
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inhalation, or -- or perhaps even 

aerosolization. 

Table 32 we think needs to be re-evaluated. 

It's a -- an attempt to -- to deal with 

thorium, but I think it's -- it needs to have 

more attention. 

And on page 23, 42 and 43 they do acknowledge 

the decay chain radionuclides, especially in 

the sense of scraping from filtered waste and -

- and that's an area that I think could -- 

could use some more development. 

 Outdoor pitchblende ore storage also 

represented a potential here and it was not 

carefully evaluated in any detail and I think 

could -- could benefit from that kind of 

additional consideration. 

Adequacy of external dose data, we're all quite 

aware of the -- the lack. There was no -- no 

film badging basically in the early period. 

When it started up in -- in 1945, late '45 and 

early '46, the records are pretty good on -- on 

the numbers of people that were exposed, and I 

think NIOSH presented in their SEC petition a 

very nice table summarizing what the film badge 

exposures were like. We had asked for that in 
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Cincinnati. I'm pleased to see that they've 

incorporated that in the SEC petition because I 

think the workers, as we talked to them, had a 

very hard -- had a hard time understanding 

basically what the range of doses might be and 

where they fit into this. 

 The appropriate organ electron dose factors for 

locating energies we think needs further 

development since there isn't a correction 

factor for that, and I think -- in an area that 

might have an impact on dose. 

The use of fixed-position gamma monitoring data 

is not yet incorporated. And if it is, 

Globerman* mentions a number of considerations 

about some of the problems or disadvantages of 

using that technique for evaluating it, and I 

think those need to be looked at a little more. 

And I can understand SEC and NIOSH in their SEC 

petition has quoted Globerman, so they're -- I 

think been reviewing that, too. 

Use of average weekly film badge doses for an 

individual recorded dose past 19-- in other 

words, if they don't any dose earlier, they're 

using later data, weekly doses and -- and 

accumulating that o-- and then dividing it by -
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- by the time the person -- weeks that they're 

exposed to come up with an estimate of their -- 

of their actual gamma exposure. That may be a 

problem for -- especially for people in the 

high exposure areas where it's not capturing -- 

the average is not capturing that kind of a 

potential. 

So in conclusion, a lack of uranium dust 

inhalation data in early periods and the 

concern for the average -- dose weighted 

averages, may have uncertainties that are not 

captured in Rev. 00, and it makes it probable 

that tables 21 through 24, and particularly 21 

and 22 -- 21 was for Plant 4, 22 for Plant 6 -- 

and the early -- the early values that were 

used in those table to go back to the early 

periods are the ones that we're specifically 

kind of looking at and wondering whether those 

couldn't be adjusted or improved, particularly 

with the 95 percentile dose -- the 90 (sic) 

percentile thing factored in. 

This makes it important in SCA's position that 

these issues be more thoroughly reviewed before 

moving beyond the use of the DWEs* for minimum 

dose calculations. The SEC says that there is 
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some concern doing that for -- certainly for 

the early period from '42 to '45, even in the 

'42 -- '46 through '48 time period there's 

still not -- not quite enough data to do that 

adequately. I think the SEC petition indicates 

that they feel more comfortable doing these 

dose calculations and reconstructions with the 

data from '49 on. 

 However, when we looked at the dust study data 

in the -- in the report we have -- mention a 

series of things that might have an impact on 

these time-weighted averages that certainly 

should be considered as they re-evaluate them 

in Rev. 1 and one is just the -- the 

measurement uncertainty that we -- we really 

can deal with if we use the 95 percentile. 

The measuring over just one or two days rather 

than the entire period, the variations in 

routines of workers, they may not always be 

doing the same thing, and those average tables 

don't really capture that movement around. 

The variations in the ventilation that 

occurred, some areas better and some places 

almost non-existent. 

 Off-normal practice that occurred. We've heard 
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number of testimonies of things that happened, 

explosions off a furnace and other things, 

which created high episodic releases that are 

not very well addressed and could -- could 

represent significant dose to individual. 

 And finally job categories are not necessarily 

always properly categorized and some are 

missing in some of the tables. 

So overall I think NIOSH has done a very 

extensive job of trying to evaluate what -- 

what kinds of things might have happened. The 

report covers a lot of these, but falls short 

in some areas. I think the -- I really 

appreciate what they have done in terms of 

response to our questions, and eventually to 

our resolution process, to try to resolve these 

things. I think they're working very earnestly 

to address those and I'm -- although we haven't 

seen Rev. 1, I have a lot of confidence that 

maybe a lot of these issues will be addressed, 

from what they've told us, and hopefully can 

provide more data that we can base our decision 

on. Thank you. 

 Any questions? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Tom. And 
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Tom, it appears to me that the slides you 

presented here today perhaps have been revised 

somewhat from what the Board has in its packet, 

and I'm wondering if -- if we might be able to 

get a -- an -- sort of up-to-date copy of what 

you presented here? I've noted --

 MR. BELL: They're -- they're revised from what 

I was planning to talk to, so I'm not quite 

sure where it got crossed. I've had some 

problems skipping around because of that. I 

don't know why the confusion on that. I mean 

we only sent one set to Cori and -- on the last 

day, January 31st, but definitely there is some 

problems, yes. 

DR. NETON: Dr. Ziemer, I might be able to 

elaborate a little bit on that. There was a --

at the -- there were two versions of the 

presentation that we received. The one that's 

in the handouts is the last version that we did 

receive. What you're seeing here is the first 

version, and somehow that second version didn't 

get incorporated onto the -- the computer, so -

-

 MR. BELL: Okay, well, that -- I -- explains. 

That's why I was bouncing around a little bit 
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here, was -- slides were coming up that weren't 

(unintelligible). 

 DR. WADE: I think you did very well at that. 

 MR. BELL: Okay. Well, thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Which -- which version should we 

consider the sort of official -- 

 MR. BELL: Well, I would think the ones you got 

latest would be the best ones to work from. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Best ones, okay. Thank you very 

much. 

 MR. BELL: I apologize for the... I mean I 

didn't try -- that's why I had to -- just have 

to kind of quit talk-- talking. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, you were equally surprised. 

 MR. BELL: Yes, and any further questions you 

might have. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, let's open the floor here 

for questions, Board members. 

 DR. WADE: Well, before any questions, I'd just 

like to, from NIOSH's point of view, thank SC&A 

for their -- their approach to this process. I 

think we are learning how to do this better and 

I think that the lessons we've learned reflect 

well in the presentation that you made, so 

thank you. 
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 MR. BELL: Thank you, sir. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda Munn. Jim. Okay. 

 MS. MUNN: No questions, just a comment. I 

think I can speak for the other members of the 

working group that the January 18th meeting 

was, in our view, extremely beneficial to all 

the parties involved, and was particularly 

useful in establishing a better concept for us 

of what process to undergo. If other members 

of the working group have comments on that, 

perhaps the full Board would be glad to hear 

that, but I was very impressed, personally. 

And I think the general feeling amongst us was 

this was probably one of the better 

interactions that we'd seen, both in terms of 

technical exchange and a much better, more 

effective way to resolve the issues that we as 

a Board had seen arising. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Again, I -- I guess my 

question is to -- both to NIOSH and I guess to 

-- to the Board here, is sort of where do we go 

from here with this? We -- we've got a -- 

again, I agree, I think a very good review and 

glad the process worked better this time, but 
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we also have a revised site profile that some 

of us got a chance to read on -- probably on 

the plane on the way out here or whatever. Not 

everybody has, and it's clearly not at that -- 

it's still in draft form, and I guess my 

question to be -- to NIOSH is where does that 

stand in terms of -- of -- of being completed, 

and I think that would then sort of set the 

stage for what do we do -- do from here in 

terms of -- you know, further comments from 

SCA, I mean there's lots -- lots of options, 

but I think some of it depends on timing, so -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Dr. Neton --

DR. NETON: Yeah, from NIOSH's perspective, we 

received the -- the second version or the 

revised version, I think it was January 31st 

that it was issued, so we -- we've not had it 

very long, either. We are -- we do agree that 

the meeting on the 18th was beneficial and some 

of the issues we discussed were incorporated or 

-- or revised in -- in the report, but we will 

prepare a presentation or a written response to 

the final report and what we believe to be the 

significant findings and areas where we -- we 

have -- we may still have some remaining 
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issues. 

 DR. WADE: Jim, I think the question, though, 

is when might we see Rev. 1? 

 DR. MELIUS: Rev. 1 to the site profile, yeah. 

DR. NETON: Oh, Rev. 1, I'm sorry. I thought 

you meant our response to the current version. 

 DR. MELIUS: And I guess my -- if you -- when 

you're answering this, I mean -- I don't think 

you necessarily need to do a response to this 

if you're -- I mean if Rev. 1 is close to being 

completed. I mean it -- I don't want to make 

sort of needless work and time spent addressing 

things you already are addressing. And maybe 

there's some other options we can think about 

in terms of further review and -- and so forth 

so --

DR. NETON: Yeah, I -- I think the fundamental 

issue here, though, is Rev. 1 is not likely to 

-- to address every single issue or finding 

that were -- that was raised here. As we've 

said all along, these are living documents. 

Rev. 1 -- there is a draft version. I believe 

the Board may have had an opportunity to look 

at that. It's substantially larger. I think 

it's double in size than Rev. 0. It's over 250 
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pages now. 

But there are still some outstanding issues, 

such as these cards that -- that Tom Bell 

referred to that we're receiving. There are 

six boxes of data that were retrieved from the 

ORAU vault. Those have not yet been digested 

and evaluated by ORAU. 

Nonetheless, we think that it's -- it's 

important to get the first -- the next Rev. out 

there so that we can use it to address cases 

where we can. That being said, I think Rev. 1 

is -- is fairly close. I'm reluctant to give 

an exact time frame without maybe discussing it 

with our ORAU counterparts here, but I -- I 

certainly think in a matter of -- of a month or 

so is probably a reasonable time frame to get 

the next -- the first revision out. But again, 

that's not likely to address every single issue 

that's raised by the SC&A report. 

 DR. WADE: And that's fine. I mean that's not 

necessary, but you think within a month's time 

it might be possible to put Rev. 1 in the hands 

of SC&A? 

DR. NETON: Approximately a month's time frame. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Mark Griffon? 
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 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I just had a -- I think 

Wanda was -- I just wanted to clarify with Jim, 

though, the document we received via e-mail I 

think Friday says Rev. 00-C, so this is not the 

Rev. 1 that -- that --

DR. NETON: No, that -- that would be -- that 

will eventually become Revision 1. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Wanda Munn, and then 

Jim Melius. 

 MS. MUNN: Especially in view of the concerns 

that we've heard expressed by former workers 

and survivors with regard to the reliability of 

the data, and even the availability of raw data 

on these early years, I'm wondering whether 

enough is known about the six boxes of new 

information that's turned up to even tell us 

what years that are covered. Can -- can you 

give us any information at all about -- 

 MR. BELL: That would --

 MS. MUNN: -- (unintelligible) boxes. 

 MR. BELL: -- be very helpful. I would 

appreciate it if Jim could help us a little bit 

on that. I -- we're -- we've got a lot of hope 

for those boxes. They may not have as much as 

we think they do. 
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 MS. MUNN: Anything. 

DR. NETON: I'm sorry, I'm just not prepared to 

address it -- that at all. I haven't seen the 

boxes myself. I don't know that ORAU's even 

gone through all six boxes yet to make that 

determination. 

 DR. ZIEMER: So there's no early indication of 

even what years are covered then. Is that 

correct? 

DR. NETON: I don't know. I don't know if 

anyone from ORAU is here that could shed light 

on that issue. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Apparently not. 

DR. NETON: Judson Kenoyer is at the meeting. 

I'll -- I'll get together with him -- he's not 

here at the present, but I'll ask him. If we 

can answer that question, we will. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: Then -- then given the information 

we've just received, I would agree, I think 

that NIOSH should prepare a response to the 

SC&A report, but they should do it in the 

context of this revision being underway, as 

well as what's being planned in terms of 

further revisions and -- and so forth, just to 
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avoid sort of needless work of trying to rel-- 

and that hopefully we could then have a -- 

maybe another meeting between NIOSH and SC&A to 

try to resolve some of the technical issues as 

they've done there that have come up during the 

NIOSH's review with -- and so forth and then 

see where that -- that takes us. 

(Unintelligible) have to revisit this a little 

bit after we discuss some of the SEC issues 

today, and there may be particular things we'd 

like to have the interchange between NIOSH and 

SCA focus on, but that may be more apparent 

this afternoon. But I think that would be a 

reasonable process for this -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Actually -- and what you're 

suggesting is a process quite parallel to what 

was done with the Bethlehem Steel, and that is 

to ask that the issues that have been raised be 

addressed and that the two groups get together 

on factual accuracy information and try to 

resolve some of these issues, hopefully with 

Board members present again so that we can 

observe the exchange and make -- make sure that 

we're satisfied with how that is being carried 

out. 
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If -- if the Board wishes to wait on -- in 

formalizing this action till you've heard other 

things in the meeting relating to this, we can 

delay that. Or if you feel like you're ready 

to take action now specifically on recommending 

the process for going forward, we can do that, 

as well. 

 MR. BELL: Mr. Chairman, I might say I think 

that's beyond our current tasking to do that, 

but if -- if it were handled as part of the 

issue resolution process -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right, and we --

 MR. BELL: -- I believe that's the way we'd 

have to do that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right, and we understand that in 

terms of adjustments that may need to be made 

to tasking for that purpose, as we did before, 

and Dr. Wade can work with John Mauro on those 

kinds of issues as -- as -- if -- if the Board 

so wishes. 

 Yes, Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: The -- yeah, I would recommend 

that we just go ahead and formalize this at 

this point. If we want to modify that this 

afternoon or make specific recommendations at a 
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later point, we can. So I would --

 DR. ZIEMER: That would be fine. Why don't you 

go ahead and make an appropriate motion and 

we'll get it on the floor. 

 DR. MELIUS: I move that the Board accept the 

SC&A review of the Mallinckrodt site profile 

and that NIOSH and SCA move ahead to -- first 

that NIOSH prepare a response to the SC&A 

comments; secondly, that NIOSH and SC&A then 

hold a meeting, with Board members present, to 

discuss and resolve any technical issues 

related to the -- SC&A's comments, as well as 

the NIOSH response. 

MR. ESPINOSA: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: You've -- you've heard the motion. 

It's been seconded. The Chair will not try to 

repeat it, but I -- I would suggest one I 

believe friendly word change. Rather than 

"accept" the report, to "receive" the report, 

the difference being that to many, under 

Robert's rules, the acceptance of a report 

implies endorsement of all its findings. We do 

not know yet whether we in fact accept all of 

the findings of the contractor. In fact, some 

of these perhaps remain to be developed as the 
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process that you've described continues. Would 

the mover agree to the word "receive" the 

report? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. And the seconder? 

MR. ESPINOSA: Seconder agrees. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 MR. BELL: Mr. Chairman, I forgot to push the 

last button, just acknowledge the folks that 

worked on this. I apologize for that. It's in 

your packet, but I did have people that worked 

with me on the preparation of the report and it 

was initially -- it was reviewed by Mike 

Thorne, who has done the initial review on 

Bethlehem Steel, as well, and reviewed by Dr. 

Mauro and -- and Joseph Fitzgerald, so -- Dr. -

-

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We do thank 

all the members of the team. And having seen 

the names, I think we still will go ahead with 

the motion. No, we do appreciate the work of 

the contractor on these on behalf of the Board. 

Other -- is there any discussion on the motion 

that's before us? 

 DR. WADE: Could I offer a --
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 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Lew, please. 

 DR. WADE: I think it would be most beneficial 

if that get-together was to happen once SC&A 

could have Rev. 1 in their hands, as well, so I 

just think that would be of benefit. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I agree. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Can we take that as the intent of 

the motion? 

 DR. MELIUS: That's the intent. I actually 

just think in terms of practical timing, I 

think. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Mark Griffon. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just a -- a process 

question on that. I -- as we have several of 

these things where we're talking about having 

NIOSH and SCA have these meetings to work out 

technical iss-- we -- as -- and I agree with 

Wanda. I was at that meeting and it worked 

very well. It's a good exchange. You can get 

down into the technical detail better with a 

smaller meeting and -- and that worked out very 

well. I'm just wondering if we shouldn't -- 

and we've talked about this before -- set up 

ahead of time several subcommittee meetings and 

have several of these issues at one 
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subcommittee meeting, if that makes any sense 

at all, in between Board meetings so that we 

could have SC&-- all the -- the parties will be 

similar. There may be different team members 

that have to come in and out, but you -- you -- 

you could do Bethlehem Steel follow-up, 

Mallinckrodt follow-up, the 20 dose reviews, 

you know, if that needs to be followed up on -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: We can certainly do it that way as 

opposed to a working group. The issue will be 

the ability to do that on short notice between 

SC&A and NIOSH will be difficult because of the 

advance need for -- if it's a full subcommittee 

meeting -- to have postings in the Federal 

Register and it becomes an open meeting. But 

we can certainly do that if the Board prefers 

that. It will -- it represents some practical 

difficulties in moving ahead rapidly on some of 

these things, but if --

 DR. WADE: But certainly if that's the wish of 

the Board, we can --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- if that's the wish of the 

Board, we can do it that way. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I think it's certainly a more 

open process to the pub-- I think we have to 
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have that balance of the openness and the 

efficiency --

 DR. ZIEMER: And that's -- and that's fine, 

yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: You're just commenting at this 

time, and if -- at some point if you want to 

formalize that, we can do that as a separate 

motion. It would be an implementation issue 

for this process. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are you ready to vote on the 

motion? It appears that we're ready to vote. 

All who favor the motion say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

Those opposed say no? 

 (No responses) 

 Any abstentions? 

 (No responses) 

 Motion carries, all voting in favor. Henry 

Anderson, are you on the line? 

DR. ANDERSON: (Via telephone) Yeah, I'm on the 

line and I'm voting yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Thank you 

very much, Tom. I -- are there other -- let me 
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ask if there are other questions for Tom or for 

Joe at this point. If not, we thank you very 

much and that will complete this portion of the 

agenda. 

SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT AND BOARD DISCUSSION -– 

FIRST SET OF CASE REVIEWS 

We're going to move to a subcommittee report 

and Board discussion on the first set of case 

reviews. 

 At the subcommittee meeting yesterday the 

subcommittee identified 22 new cases to present 

for audit, to ask our contractor to audit. I'm 

going to refer you to the list that's the 

randomly-drawn list of cases that were under 

the first tab of your booklet. That's the 

subcommittee tab. The first part of that tab 

had the minutes of the subcommittee and then 

the list of cases. 

The subcommittee is recommending to this Board 

that the following cases be included in the 

next set of dose construction -- dose 

reconstruction reviews. I will identify these 

by the number -- the last digits in the number 

in the left-hand column, and I'll also identify 

by site. Are you ready for the listing? And 
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others of the subcommittee who were present can 

help the Chair if I -- if I miss something on 

the list. 

Case 8, Paducah; case 11, Idaho National 

Engineering Lab; case 15, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory; case 18, Feed Materials Production 

Center; case 23, Dana Heavy Water Plant; case 

25, Hanford; case 27, Oak Ridge Gaseous 

Diffusion Plant, K-25 and Y-12; continuing on 

the second page of the listing, case 36, Nevada 

Test Site; case 39, Idaho National Engineering 

Laboratory; case 43, Y-12, Oak Ridge; case 52, 

Idaho National Engineering Lab and Nevada Test 

Site; case 53, Hanford; case 58, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory; case 62, Pacific 

Northwest National Lab and Hanford; case 65, 

Hanford; case 69, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 

Plant; case 70, Pantex Plant; and continuing on 

the third page --

MR. OWENS: Dr. Ziemer --

 DR. ZIEMER: Did I --

MR. OWENS: -- I'm sorry to interrupt, but 

according to my list, I think that we've had 

some omissions. If we could start on page 2 

again, after case number 36, Nevada Test Site, 
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we then had case number 39. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thirty-nine, did I -- I have that 

on my list. Did I omit that? 

MR. OWENS: Okay, and then case number 41. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry, you're correct, case 39 

-- let me correct the list. Thank you. Case 

39 is Idaho National Engineering Lab. Case 41, 

did I miss that one, too? 

MR. OWENS: Yes, sir. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. That was a Feed Materials 

Production Center; case 43 was next and then 52 

we had covered and 53 and 58 and 62 and 63 and 

65, Hanford, and 67, Savannah River Site; 69, 

Paducah; and 70, Pantex. Did we get all -- get 

those correctly? Okay. And then -- thank you 

very much. And then going on to the last page, 

there are two more. It's case 89, which is 

Rocky Flats, and case 99, which is Argonne 

East. Those, taken together, constitute 22 

additional cases that the Board is asking our 

contractor to help us audit. 

 This comes as a motion from the subcommittee. 

It's on the floor for discussion. Mark? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- being a member of the 

subcommittee and having voted for these cases, 
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I say this tentatively, but afterwards I found 

-- I -- I got new information, I guess, is -- 

is the way I want to put this, and I think that 

we should consider dropping a couple of cases 

and replacing them. One is the -- case number 

23, the Dana Heavy Water Plant, and I did talk 

to NIOSH staff and Stu Hinnefeld indicates that 

that was a non-radiological plant, so this 

would all have been medical dose. And you 

know, even though the POC looks relatively high 

and it might be interesting to see how they 

overestimated this, I also think we have to 

take into account that these 20 are going to be 

our advanced reviews, and I think it might be 

sort of a -- a misuse of resources to do an 

advanced review on a case that wasn't even a 

radiological site. So that's -- that's the one 

I propose dropping. 

The second one is case number 69, which is a 

Paducah colon cancer. The interesting aspect 

of this, which I must admit I missed in the 

first brush, is that colon cancer is a SECcovered cancer, so it escapes me why this would 

be included, unless the time period of the 

cancer was prior to the time frame for the SEC 
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coverage period. So this person may have been 

employed prior to them doing radiological work 

at the site, might have been in the 

construction phase when they were just putting 

the buildings in, so I don't think there was 

any radiological material there. So I don't 

know that that's worth -- again, worth an 

advanced review. 

And I would propose actually replacing them 

with number 5, which I know we skipped Savannah 

Rivers and, Paul, I -- this is a 40 percentile 

and the reason I think now this might be useful 

is because of the information we got after our 

selection process yesterday was a reminder to 

us by SCA that these -- in fact these last 20 

in their task were going to be the advanced 

reviews, and I -- I had forgotten that when we 

were doing the selection. We sort of skipped 

all the Savannahs and I was sort of skipping a 

lot of Hanfords 'cause we had done quite a few 

already. So I thought we could add that one 

on, number 5, and also number 74, which is 

again one around 40 percentile and it's a 

Hanford case. 

 DR. ZIEMER: So Mark, you are making a motion 
-- 

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to amend the recommendation of the subcommittee 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- and is there a second to the 

motion? 

 MR. GIBSON: I second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: There is a second. Before I ask 

people to speak to the motion, the Chair will 

exercise the prerogative on a motion like this, 

which is somewhat complex, in a sense. I'm 

going to split the motion into two pieces. The 

first part will be the dropping of two cases, 

and then we will act on that, and then we will 

act on adding because others may wish to add 

others, and a motion of this type is the 

prerogative of the Chair to split the motion, 

so I will interpret it as two motions and two 

seconds, and we will deal first with the first 

motion which is to drop the Dana and the 

Paducah case. 

DR. ROESSLER: Give numbers. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Cases number 23 and 29 -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Sixty-nine. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- 69, 23 and 69, so we're now 

addressing that. This is -- this is a motion 
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to amend by dropping those two. Do you wish to 

speak to the motion to amend? Yes, Wanda. 

 MS. MUNN: Yes. With respect to item 69, the 

Paducah case, do we have -- I'm sorry, I don't 

remember what the dates of the SEC are. Can we 

identify that? Do we know if it is in fact 

outside the SEC? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Do any of the NIOSH folks know the 

answer to that? Is that outside the covered 

period? I guess the question was why was that 

on the list. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Or -- or it could have been a 

case of short-term employment, less than 250 

days. 

DR. NETON: That's the best of our recollection 

is it's probably a 250-day minimum employment 

requirement. 

 MR. PRESLEY: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

year and a half, though. 

 MR. GRIFFON: So I guess the whole --

 DR. ZIEMER: It didn't meet the 250-day 

requirement. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right, I guess the whole time 

period's covered, but they might have not met 

the 250 days --
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 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- so... 

 MS. MUNN: So --

 MR. GRIFFON: A different consideration, I 

guess, yeah. 

 MS. MUNN: So the different consideration is 

this is a less than 250-day employee? 

 MR. GRIFFON: That doesn't seem to work with 

the one and a half years listed on the years 

worked. 

 MS. MUNN: Well, not only that, but doesn't 

that automatically exclude them from 

consideration under the Act? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Neton? 

DR. NETON: There may -- there -- occasionally 

when there's more than 250 days, we may 

reconstruct the dose. If the person was a 

contractor, for instance, and intermittent 

employment during that year and a half, we 

would over-reconstruct the dose, in that sense, 

and give the person 100 -- the one and a half 

years exposure, even though the aggregate was 

less than 250. I'm not sure, I'm -- I'm 

speculating --

 DR. ZIEMER: The work span might have been a 
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year and a half, but the time on -- on-site may 

have been less. 

DR. NETON: That's correct, it's -- it's 

possible. I'm not saying that is it, but 

that's one possible explanation. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Stu Hinnefeld, do... 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I wanted to offer an 

explanation for how that work time is 

calculated or how it's generated. The years 

worked is not a value that we store in the 

database. When we generate a report like this 

we have a routine that calculates what was the 

work, and we do that by start date/end date for 

each employment period. And so in this case, 

if we have a start and end date of employment 

that's a year and a half apart, even though it 

may have been intermittent and the whole 250 

days --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you know, he didn't make 250 

days --

 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- that may be how it arri-- we 

arrived at that. That same process also 

explains the question that came up yesterday, 
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how could someone start in the '70's and have 

58 years of covered employment. In that 

particular case the employee worked at all 

three Oak Ridge sites and had several pieces of 

intermittent employment, say, from 1980 to 1990 

and 1991 to 1997, and it's entered in the 

database as a line for each site. So we'll 

have three entries for each of those employment 

periods. So on that particular case, the best 

approximation of what their actual work time 

was is about a third of what's on the -- on the 

spreadsheet. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Further questions? 

 MS. MUNN: Thank you, I think. I --

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess the main point with my -- 

that -- with dropping that Paducah case was 

that it was -- we're not exactly certain here, 

obviously, but it seems like it was less than 

250 days employment or else they would have 

been compensated under SEC. 

 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 

 MR. GRIFFON: And so is it worth looking into 

that kind of -- do we want to reconsider that 

in light of the fact that these are going to be 

our advanced reviews? I -- I was thinking it 
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might be better served to do a -- a Savannah 

River and Hanford, you know, under our advanced 

review criteria, use our resources a little 

better. That's the only thing... 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Yes, further discussion? 

Okay. The motion is to drop case 23 and case 

69. Are you ready to vote on that? 

All in favor, yes? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 All opposed, no? 

 (No responses) 

Abstentions? One abstention, thank you. 

So that motion to amend carries. Now the --

the other part, the next motion to amend is to 

add case 5 and case 74, and that now is open 

for discussion, and you may have other cases 

you would rather look at, so that's the reason 

for splitting this. 

Case 5 is the Savannah River Site case, that is 

a bladder cancer. It's just over 40 percent 

probability of causation, which is one of those 

ranges that we had an interest in anyway. The 

Savannah River (sic) case 74, colon cancer, 

also over 40 -- 40.16 percent. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I believe that's -- that's 
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Hanford, isn't it, that second site? 

 DR. ZIEMER: That's Hanford, I'm sorry. Any 

discussion? Are you ready to vote on adding 

these two? I'm going to take it by the 

quietness that that means you're just raring to 

vote here. 

All in favor, aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 Any opposed, no? 

 (No responses) 

Abstentions? Henry, are you --

DR. ANDERSON: I vote aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Did we get your vote on the 

previous motion? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we heard you. Thank you. 

The ayes have it. 

Now what we have before us now is a motion to 

accept 22 cases. This is the amended main 

motion. The main motion, amended with the two 

deletions and the two additions. Are you ready 

to vote now on the full slate of 22 cases, as 

amended? 

All in favor, aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 
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DR. ANDERSON: Sure. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Was that you, Henry? 

DR. ANDERSON: Yes, that was an aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. All opposed, no? 

 (No responses) 

 Any abstentions? 

 (No responses) 

The motion carries. The Chair had a -- a 

question on the -- when we vote for the group, 

and this may have come up before because a 

number of people have facilities for which they 

have individually abstained, but which now 

appear in the group motion. The Chair is 

unclear whether all of those folks have to 

abstain. I think not, since we're voting on 

sort of the block here. 

 DR. WADE: That would be my assumption, as 

well, that individuals would not have to 

abstain when we're voting on the cases as a 

block, but would when we're voting on 

individual cases. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. The other thing that 

the subcommittee worked on yesterday was the 

methodology for characterizing the findings 

from the dose reconstruction reviews. We have 
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the report from the first 20 cases, which we 

dealt with at our last meeting, to some extent. 

And the subcommittee discussed a methodology 

for ranking the findings in that type of 

report. This was a way to organize and 

characterize the findings of our contractor. 

And meanwhile, knowing that we had been looking 

at that sort of thing, the contractor had also 

independently developed a sort of checklist 

that would also serve to characterize the 

findings. 

Now we have -- there were two documents then 

that surfaced and the first of these is a 

single-page document called methodology for 

characterizing and ranking dose reconstruction 

case review findings. This document was 

developed primarily by the workgroup that we 

had working with the contractor on -- on the 

review process. That would be Mark Griffon, 

Wanda Munn and Mike Gibson, and we have their 

document. And then also we have provided you, 

from the revised report from our contractor -- 

and not all of you got the revised report; it 

was distributed on the 31st. Some of you will 

find it back at -- on your e-mail when you get 
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back, a 300-page report. But there is in that 

a case review checklist and a copy of that 

checklist has been provided to the Board. I 

believe it's also on the table in the back for 

members of the public. It's called case review 

checklist and it categorizes how the contractor 

was considering categorizing these things. 

 DR. WADE: If you look at the overlap between 

the two documents -- on the case review 

checklist if your eye goes to the right side of 

the page, if no potential significance (sic), 

low, medium and high, then down to the footnote 

you see the explanation and that's where 

there's a commonality or a discussion between 

the two documents. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's their -- that's their 

ranking system, yeah, right. 

 DR. WADE: Right, it's their ranking system. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Both of these documents have a 

similar intent, and one of the issues will be 

how we sort of amalgamate these or use the 

concepts contained herein. It's not a matter 

of adopting one or the other, but perhaps of -- 

of finding the common ground here. 
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Let me ask first if after -- and I know, Board 

members, you've had this at least overnight. 

Do you have any questions on the checklist that 

was developed by our contractor, and John Mauro 

and his colleagues are here if we need to have 

questions answered. But any questions or 

comments on that? Jim. 

 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Wanda. 

 DR. MELIUS: No, Wanda has the mike -- no, I 

guess I have the mike. Yeah -- yeah, my 

comment was, I don't have any particular 

objections to the checklist, but I found that 

the -- that it was not a good way of 

summarizing individual dose reconstruction 

reviews that, for me, when I was reviewing the 

300-page document we got last week, that the 

checklist really didn't provide a good review 

mechanism for me. It was helpful information, 

but by itself it really didn't provide some way 

of really summarizing comments or me 

understanding what the basis was for -- for -- 

for the -- for those comments. 

Now I guess -- I think Mark did this, did -- 

this -- this other -- no? 
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 MR. GRIFFON: I never saw it, no. 

 DR. MELIUS: Someone's done this other -- other 

document called summary of findings and so 

forth, which sort of starts to combine the two, 

and I found that to be a more useful document, 

sort of -- not -- both understanding what the 

comments were, as well as -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, yes, I neglected to mention 

that, but Mark had taken the first 20 cases and 

had taken them I believe by finding number, so 

1.1 would be case one, finding one; 1.2 would 

be case one, finding two and so on. He 

summarized the findings, summarized NIOSH's 

response, tried to characterize the finding -- 

was it a technical finding, what were the other 

categories, Mark, I forget -- procedural and so 

on. And what it pertained to, such as internal 

dose, external dose. And then tried to score 

it in terms of its relative importance, based 

on -- somewhat on the scale described in the 

one-pager. So that document you should also 

have at hand. I neglected to mention that, but 

that was a sort of practical attempt to 

actually go through the series of findings and 

-- and try to evaluate them. 
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My understanding on the checklist from the 

contractor that their intent had been to do 

that for each case, and then to do a roll-up, 

and the roll-up would -- what would the roll-up 

look like? It would talk about the percentage 

of -- of the 20 cases? Hans perhaps is going 

to address --

 MR. GRIFFON: Let them resp--

 DR. ZIEMER: -- speak to that. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- describe it, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Tell us how that would look -- 

what it would look like in a roll-up. 

 DR. BEHLING: Let me also identify a major 

difference between what Mark did and what we 

tried to do. Now Mark's summary only confined 

itself to those issues that were being 

contested by NIOSH. In other words, the list 

that you see in front of you that identifies 

Mark's comments is a very partial list of 

issues that we identified in our report. In 

fact, it's probably no more than 25 percent of 

the findings. So our list -- checklist 

includes everything. Every single component of 

the dose reconstruction report is entered into 

our two-page checklist, which is considerably 
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more comprehensive than the very partial 

findings that Mark identified. As I said, and 

I'll summarize it again, those findings were 

only those where NIOSH disagreed with us. So 

those two are very different in terms of what 

they intended to do. 

Now our checklist is a very comprehensive one. 

Kathy, my wife, and I looked at each of the 

dose reconstruction reports and broke it down 

by every element that could possibly contribute 

to a dose reconstruction. As you will see in 

some of the individual dose reconstructions, 

starting with case number 6 and going on to 20, 

you will see in many instances a lots of NA's, 

meaning that that particular dose 

reconstruction report did not even address, for 

instance, missed photon dose or missed neutron 

dose or on-site ambient dose. And so we tried 

to basically look at the total number of -- of 

ways in which a dose reconstruction report 

would tally a dose, and then assess each one of 

those components in terms of whether or not 

they complied with the procedure. And in some 

instances, as you see, you will see a low or a 

medium or -- or a high evaluation. 
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Now the value of assessing the total then comes 

at the very bottom of the checklist, which is 

on page 2. For instances, a series of ones may 

each in individual instance not contribute 

anything significantly, but when they're 

tallied in total, a lots of little nits of -- 

of non-compliance would, in effect, in the very 

bottom line perhaps introduce a significant 

error. And we only had one case where there 

were a series of twos, where again, in each 

individual instance and -- and where we had a 

two, and I think I'm referring to case number 

6, the potential error may have contributed 

let's say five rem here and five rem there that 

was too low. But when you add them all 

together, they may in fact, in terms of an 

aggregate error, introduce enough of a 

difference that would cate-- drop the 

evaluation into category three, which is the 

most severe, where you not only affect the dose 

significantly, but it's significant enough to 

potentially shift the compensability of a given 

claim. And that was our intent is to -- 

perhaps the aggregate form that you see is not 

really what you should be looking at, but 
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perhaps for each individual case so as to give 

an overview. And it's also very valuable for 

the individual who's about to read a dose 

reconstruction report to get a glimpse as to 

where are we here, what are the contributions 

to the dose. When you see lots of NA's, that 

means you can focus on those issues where the 

dose reconstruction entered a significant dose 

that ultimately gave rise to a POC calculation. 

And so there were a lot of things that we tried 

to consider in our assessment, and it's really 

to be used in conjunction with the text of our 

dose reconstruction report. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Jim Melius, Wanda -- I 

didn't get the order on everyone -- Gen 

Roessler, Mark -- okay. Okay, Dr. Melius, 

proceed. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, what I -- I guess one final 

comment at this point -- come back, but I just 

think we need to avoid a scoring system. It 

bothers me that we're starting, on a basis of 

20 cases, to sort of keep score. And I think -

- at least at this point in time I think what 

we want is some way of summarizing what's 

important in the dose reconstruction review and 
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that -- not trying to get something that's 

going to allow us to score what NIOSH has done. 

And I worry a little bit about us, with this 

case review checklist, getting into a scoring 

sort of system. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, so noted. Wanda Munn. 

 MS. MUNN: For anyone who's been very deeply 

involved in QA, this form of Hans's gladdens 

our heart. This is precisely the type of 

scoring system or, if you don't like the term 

"scoring", Jim, evaluation of -- of magnitude 

that I had in mind two years ago when we were 

talking about this in the Board, is there some 

roll-up that we can see at the end of each 

review. 

It seems to me that we may not be able to meld 

what this is intended to do with what our -- 

our overview of specific cases is intended to 

do because this is something which would apply 

on a case-by-case basis. What we will be 

looking at in our cases is larger, overriding 

issues that may affect the entire process, not 

just the individual dose reconstruction. So it 

may be that we're trying to put too many things 

into one basket. We may have two baskets here, 
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no matter how we approach this. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Gen Roessler? 

DR. ROESSLER: I think everybody's pointing to 

the same thing, and I'll just expand a little 

bit on it. What the case review checklist is a 

-- on individual cases, but the methodology 

that was put together by the group was -- 

pointed to not only the individual case 

evaluation, but this is really a step toward 

would it likely affect other claims that were 

done for that site, or would it potentially 

have program-wide impact, and I think that's 

what we're really looking for. So I think, too 

-- I agree with Jim that this detailed 

numerical checklist really could be very 

misleading. We're really looking to see, you 

know, how it impacts the whole program. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Mark? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think I -- I agree 

with Wanda's overview on that, that -- I think 

these two -- and I've talked with Hans and 

Kathy after our last meeting in Virginia about 

how to sort of come -- how these -- these 

things overlap. I think they have some 

commonality, which is good, but I think that -- 
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you know, I think this -- this matrix or -- or 

a revised version thereof 'cause I think I'd 

have some comments to it, but anyway, this -- 

this matrix could be useful for tracking the 

individual findings for individual cases. I 

think this -- you know, this or a similar kind 

of roll-up report has a different function, the 

broader function that Gen was just referring 

to. I will point out that my intent was to 

summarize the entire -- all SCA's findings or 

observations within this matrix. I -- I worked 

mainly from the ones we discussed in Virginia 

because that's the document I had time enough 

to work with and I just received the other one 

on Friday, so I tried to capture in some 

others, but -- and that was difficult. But I 

think, you know, going forward the intent would 

be to -- to capture all findings or -- or if we 

want to categorize findings and observations 

and put them in a similar sort of matrix format 

as -- as -- you know, so mainly I brought this 

for the format and the discussion of do we 

agree with the format. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Yeah, I think Hans has 

an additional comment. Please. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I just wanted to be certain 

we're all on -- looking at the same thing. I'm 

not sure what the Board currently has to 

review, but if you only have the checklist, 

that checklist -- in the actual report that we 

have forwarded to you and you'll be receiving 

by mail -- is used twice. It is used in behalf 

of each individual's -- the 15 DOE cases, and 

if you look at the report up front as part of 

the executive summary, the scores that involve 

each individual case is then summarized in the 

same checklist. Where you currently see, for 

instance, in the checklist a -- an area where 

for each individual case there's simply a check 

mark that says there was a deficiency for this 

one, we entered, in behalf of the 15 cases, a 

number. In other words, you will see in case 

number 6 where there was a deficiency involving 

the failure to include uncertainty, and it's 

strictly in that category a simple checklist. 

But when we took the whole 15 cases and 

collated them and introduced that same 

checklist as a summary table, you will see the 

number three in there, meaning that three out 

of the 15 cases all failed to use uncertainty. 
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So what you may be looking at right here is 

only an empty checklist. But that checklist is 

usable for not only single individual cases, 

but then it is able to -- to summarize the 15 

cases by entering in each of those categories 

the number of times in which we failed to 

observe this -- this -- this issue or this noncompliance. And it can be used as a continuous 

means by which we not only collate the -- each 

set of cases, in which case -- this instance is 

15 cases, but for the next 20 cases we'll just 

have a running total that says we are in the 

position now to track certain things, seeing -- 

saying that we may, for instance, see trends 

where we see a deficiency in a given area of 

internal exp-- dose assessment or external dose 

assessment or specifically with regard to 

neutron. And so when we collate all of the 

individual cases into a single table that is 

basically the one you're looking at, we can 

actually assess trends and say we are 

constantly seeing a repea-- a repetition of 

deficiency that suggests that there's a problem 

here and perhaps identifies root cause. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Further 
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comments? Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: And I guess my concern in response 

to that is I -- and I realize not everybody has 

this, but that I found that in the report to 

the Board that not all of us have seen, the 

collation into a summary audit findings, as 

Hans was just referring to, was not helpful at 

all. I thought it was -- did not provide an 

adequate summary. It may -- the checklist on 

individual cases was helpful, but overall as a 

summary of -- of that -- and I have real 

concerns about starting this scoring system, as 

was just alluded to, as an approach to -- I 

just don't think we're ready for this yet and -

- some concerns. 

I would also think that -- I would also like to 

see a separation. I think Mark did propose it 

in one of the documents that we -- we look at 

the impact of the error on an individual dose 

reconstruction, and then I think as a separate 

issue is would that impact -- may be important 

for -- not for this particular case, but could 

be important for other cases. And those two 

should be separated out 'cause I think they're 

two different types of information. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And not -- not all the 

Board members have actually seen the checklist 

in use, and it may be that you'll need to take 

a look at that and look at those individual 

scoring sheets, as well as the -- the roll-up, 

and determine what you think is the utility of 

that approach. 

It also appears from some of the comments that 

-- that perhaps we may not necessarily want to 

roll these into one document, but that in fact 

we may want to have a different assessment 

tool, even though there is a kind of quality 

control roll-up that the contractor may 

provide. 

Another comment from the contractor, yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes, this is Kathy Behling. One 

of the issues that you're probably not aware of 

since you haven't had the opportunity to read 

the report is that we're also suggesting -- and 

we've already laid the plans to do this; in 

fact, it's incorporated into our task two -- we 

have developed a database to summarize all of 

the reports, and in that database we intended 

to incorporate these checklist items. And that 

will give us the opportunity when we have -- 
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when we've done the first 40 or 60 cases, to 

actually go in and sort that data by just about 

any means you'd like. We can look at just 

Hanford cases, we can look at just certain 

external dose issues, we can look at issues of 

data collection. We can separate out is the 

interview process consistent with what was used 

in the dose reconstruction process. 

And if -- if I may just address the issue of 

scoring, based on our understanding at the 

closed session, we -- we really were under the 

impression that you wanted some means of 

determining the significance or the impact of 

each of these items that we put on the 

checklist. We didn't mean to score, we're just 

trying to give you a sense of the impact of 

this particular item. And as Hans indicated, 

there may be, in a certain case, issues where a 

lot of little things possibly could add up to 

something a little bit more significant, and 

that's all we were trying to do with this low, 

medium and high. 

 DR. WADE: Thank you. I think -- thank you for 

your comment. 

 DR. ZIEMER: All right. So the score that you 
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are talking about is simply an incidence of 

particular findings rather than a significance 

per se that was what Mark was trying to 

incorporate. 

Other comments? Mark, did you have a comment 

you were --

 MR. GRIFFON: (Off microphone) I was waffling 

(unintelligible). 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- waffling, okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I -- I actually -- I 

still think they can probably work together. I 

-- I think there is use -- usefulness in 

tracking -- in setting up this tracking system. 

I think it would be beneficial and this is 

probably more detailed than can be worked out 

on the full Board level. I mean it might be 

something we can work out at the subcommittee 

level or something like that. There may be 

benefit to -- for instance, when I tried to 

develop this matrix, one difficulty I had was 

that there was a different format in this new 

report, and that's -- that's only because 

they're -- they're working with their format in 

their report, but if the finding number was 

somehow tied to their checkmarks on their 
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matrix, that might be useful. I think, for a 

summary report to the public, I -- I 

personally think it's more useful to have a 

descriptive finding and a -- some sort of 

judgment on its impact, individual and -- and 

broader -- and program-wide or broader impact. 

I think that's more useful probably -- maybe -- 

I think this -- this -- as a tracking tool, 

this matrix could be very beneficial. We would 

have that data there to maybe call upon and 

look for trends as -- as they've stated. So 

I'd -- I -- I'm not proposing, at least right 

now, to scrap one for the other. I think they 

work separately. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. I've just noticed an 

interesting thing in our agenda, that our break 

goes from 10:30 to 10:15, and the Chair's 

trying to figure out how to do that. I'm open 

to suggestions. 

I wanted to remind the Board of the -- the sixstep process that we put in motion last time 

for review of the dose reconstruction reports. 

This is what we asked be done after we received 

the report on the first 20. 

One, that NIOSH complete its technical and 
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factual review of the SC&A report. 

Parentheses, NIOSH had made a partial review 

but had not completed the technical and factual 

review of the SC&A report. 

Two, that SC&A and NIOSH resolve and clarify 

issues in the report where there appear to be 

factual disagreements on the facts of the cases 

or cases. 

 Three, that SC&A prepare a new report for the 

Board to address any issues raised by NIOSH, 

including corrections and changes that SC&A 

already may have made. Parentheses, SC&A 

already prepared a list of errata that they 

wanted to add to the report and we had not had 

a chance to review that. 

 Four, that SC&A prepare a better categorization 

of its findings. 

Five, that NIOSH communicate to the Board 

unresolved issues that arise from their 

collaboration with SC&A on the items talked 

about in item two of this motion -- item two 

being the issue resolution part. 

And then finally that SC&A provide the Board, 

at least one week before the next meeting, 

their revised report. 
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Now actually the -- the checklist that we're 

talking about, in part, meets or is the intent 

-- the intent by the contractor to meet part 

four, categorization of the findings, and 

that's what they have been responsive to. 

 One thing that has not really been completed on 

this six-part thing is item five, that NIOSH 

communicate to the Board unresolved issues that 

arise from their collaboration with SCA on the 

items talked about. I think that's because 

NIOSH just received the report itself and I 

could ask for a comment from Jim. I don't 

believe your group has had a chance really to 

review that report yet, have you, so that we -- 

we don't yet have the information on these 

unresolved issues. 

DR. NETON: That's correct. The report came in 

I think late Friday afternoon, and we have not 

had time to evaluate. All we have so far is 

just the verbal discussion that took place in 

McLean, Virginia. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. So there -- therefore 

it appears to me that there is a -- a part of 

this step that remains to be done yet, which is 

some information that this Board needs to try 
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to bring closure on those first 20 cases. Okay 

-- and so let me now stop and Mark comment. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I was just going to say, for the 

Board's information, I -- I did make an attempt 

to capture some of that in the NIOSH comment 

category of the matrix, so -- but there are 

several areas where you'll notice I had 

question marks or -- or -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right, ba--

 MR. GRIFFON: -- or underlined --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- based on the discussion, you -- 

you had some idea of NIOSH's response, but we -

- I don't think we officially have that 

response. And so it appears to the Chair that 

we need that additional piece of information to 

bring full closure to this process, and it may 

be that the Board will also wish to have the 

opportunity to look at the -- the checklist and 

give some more thought to that. And then --

and then finally to determine what to do with 

this -- the working group's methodology, and it 

cert-- I -- I believe that the subcommittee -- 

I may need some help in recollecting here, but 

I believe the subcommittee did take action to 

adopt this as a conceptual way to go forward 
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and I don't know if I have the exact wording on 

that. And maybe we can retrieve that during 

the break so that -- so that we have that to 

present to the Board because we need to -- we 

need to take formal action on that. Yes, 

Wanda. 

 MS. MUNN: I believe our wording was that we 

accepted it in principle and would move to try 

to -- to associate it with --

 DR. ZIEMER: I believe you are probably 

correct, Wanda, and just to make sure that -- I 

think we will try to retrieve those words so 

that we have the correct recommendation from 

the subcommittee and we'll then have a chance 

after the break to actually take an action on 

that conceptually. 

I'm going to then -- I figured out a way to 

take a break from 10:30 to 10:15, and that is 

we'll all leave the room backwards and -- 

anyway, we will take a break at this time and 

reconvene in -- about 10:30. Thank you. 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:10 a.m. 

to 10:35 a.m.) 

BOARD DISCUSSION/WORK SESSION

 DR. ZIEMER: During the break we were able to 
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retrieve the wording of the subcommittee's 

action on the methodology for categorizing and 

ranking dose reconstruction case review 

findings. That was the one-pager that was 

presented to us. The action of the 

subcommittee was as follows: That -- that the 

document be accepted as a concept, with details 

to be worked out at a later date. That's very 

close to what you just stated earlier, Wanda. 

So that is actually the motion that comes from 

the subcommittee, referring to the one-page 

methodology that Mark presented to us, that 

that methodology be accepted as a concept, with 

details to be worked out at a later date, as it 

would be fleshed out and some additional 

refinements made, perhaps. 

So that -- that becomes a motion for the full 

Board to act on. I'll open the floor for 

discussion on this. Yes, Leon. 

MR. OWENS: Dr. Ziemer, after -- after 

reviewing the document last night, I would like 

to offer a motion that -- to the Board that the 

document in its entirety be accepted. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Say again --

MR. OWENS: Rather -- rather than the document 
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being conceptual, with details to be worked out 

later, I'd like to offer a motion that the 

document be accepted in its entirety as it has 

been written -- yes, sir, the methodology for 

categorizing and ranking dose reconstruction 

case review findings. 

 DR. ZIEMER: The Board is -- or the Chair is 

uncertain as to whether that is a friendly 

amendment or a different amendment -- or -- or 

a motion, or an amendment to the motion. I --

I think I would interpret it as basically an 

amendment to the motion, which is rather than -

- it -- it still accepts the document, but it 

appears to me that it perhaps solidifies it as 

the methodology, as opposed to the idea that 

there are some refinements to take place. So I 

-- I'm going to ask -- the assembly always has 

the right to -- to instruct the Chair as to 

what it wishes to do. 

Do you consider that to be a different motion 

or the same motion? It has a somewhat 

different -- I think it's a -- I think it's an 

amendment or you wouldn't have raised it -- 

characterized it as the document in a somewhat 

different way. 
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Mark, could -- could you in a sense respond to 

that? Do you believe that this is ready to be 

used as it is, or --

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I -- I think it -- it 

probably is a different motion, that it's 

accepting it as a meth-- as the meth-- the 

Board's methodology, understanding that we 

always have the option to revise at later 

points, but it would be the methodology then. 

I mean I -- I -- I sort of understand what 

Leon's trying to get at -- I mean I, too, would 

like to maybe resolve this, and even if we had 

to edit this document here as our -- during our 

working session, rather than just say accept it 

in principle and at some future time work out 

the details, I think we've got to come to some 

point where let's work out the details, let's -

- let's stop pushing it down the road. 

There is one thing that I -- I think -- that 

I've heard yesterday and again this morning 

that I would offer as a refinement to this, 

which would be to maybe split out the ranking 

that I proposed, to have a case-specific 

ranking and a broad ranking that -- that might 

refine this methodology a little bit. So 
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that's one point that was made yesterday and 

again -- I think Jim Melius brought it up this 

morning, so -- but otherwise I -- you know, I 

think that is a slightly different motion in 

that it would be the methodology that we'd be 

voting on. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Leon, let me ask you to -- if 

you'll state your motion again, which I'll 

interpret as an amendment to the main -- to the 

motion. 

MR. OWENS: Okay, Dr. Ziemer, and I'll -- I'll 

note Mark's comments. I move that the Advisory 

Board accept the methodology for categorizing 

and ranking dose reconstruction case review 

findings in its entirety, the document that was 

discussed yesterday in subcommittee, and that 

in the second titled "Ranking the Findings" 

that there be an additional sentence possibly 

added that would incorporate case findings and 

overall ranking as two separate rankings. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Is there a second to the motion? 

 MR. GIBSON: I'll second that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Seconded, okay. Now this motion 

to amend is on the floor. Wanda Munn. 

 MS. MUNN: Although Mark touched on this, I'm 
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not sure that it was clear. With respect to 

accepting the entire document as is, we have 

not discussed and I'm not convinced that the 

categorization of findings which we discussed 

but never really and truly came to any 

agreement on -- remain unsure as to whether 

this is comprehensive enough or is too 

detailed. We haven't had any discussion at all 

on that. 

And in terms of relying on a specific document 

for guidance as to how we should proceed in -- 

in reviewing and reporting on each of these 

cases that comes before us, this may not be as 

polished as some of us would like it to be. 

Therefore, I -- I have some reservation -- not 

about accepting this; I agree that the intent 

here is precisely what we want to try to 

pursue. But I -- I would -- would caution that 

the understanding that it's going to be 

polished be inherent in the motion. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. It appears that you are 

speaking against the amendment and for the 

original, which was more conceptual. 

 Jim Melius, and then Roy -- or -- I saw you -- 

yes. 
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 DR. MELIUS: Okay. I missed the subcommittee 

meeting so I didn't hear the discussion today 

(sic) but would seem to me the way that we -- 

when we do need to go forward with this and 

that the way of evaluating this and for us to 

reach more certainty about it, more -- be 

comfortable, is actually applying it to a 

number of cases and then -- maybe the first 20 

and then see what -- if we -- it needs to be 

adjusted or modified, you know, based on that. 

Does it capture what we wanted to -- intend it 

to. And so I'm not sure I see a great deal of 

difference between the -- the original motion 

and the amendment in the sense of we would -- 

we'll just go forward and then, after applying 

it, I think we'd have a much better sense of -- 

of -- be able to address any changes that may 

be needed. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. An excellent point 

that, in a sense, both motions have the same 

intent. I think the -- the one was perhaps 

recognizing that maybe there's a degree of 

incompleteness and some unease in blessing the 

document if it wasn't fully complete. But your 

point is that we can proceed forward in any 
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event and then modify. Roy DeHart. 

 DR. DEHART: In our discussions yesterday I -- 

what I was hearing was a very soft outline of 

what we were reviewing at that time, which we 

have in front of us. And I don't know of 

anything that has changed on that, so I'm 

speaking against the -- the amendment. I have 

a 260-page document at home that I want to 

review before I try to combine or consider 

these two documents. And I would encourage us 

to keep the -- our procedures flexible until 

that time that we've had an opportunity to 

review the documents that are available to us. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Gen Roessler. 

DR. ROESSLER: Although I support the concept 

of the amendment, I want to speak against it, 

also, because I think in the document we have 

the word "findings" is not yet clear to us, and 

it's mostly not clear to us because we don't 

have the document from SC&A. And once --

obviously this morning we had some 

misunderstanding as to what is in that 

document. Once we get it, then I think we can 

better define what we mean by findings and 

better put this together. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Other comments for or 

against the proposed amendment? We've had 

several I think speak against it. Let me ask 

for --

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm -- I'm -- I'm generally --

I'm -- I'm generally still for the amendment, 

but you know, I -- I sort of see -- I mean Jim, 

I think, made the main point and you concurred, 

Paul, that --you know, we're going to get to 

the same place, I think. So if we apply this 

in concept first round and see how it works, 

then maybe we can finalize a methodology -- you 

know, after we've had more opportunity... 

 DR. ZIEMER: And actually -- again, I'll reemphasize -- I believe the intent of both 

motions is the same, and ultimately we would 

proceed, either way, to use this as a starting 

point. Jim, another comment? 

 DR. MELIUS: And I'm just trying to understand 

procedurally what --

DR. ANDERSON: This is Andy, people have to 

speak up, you're kind of breaking up. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I don't know if that was somebody 

on the phone or --

 DR. MELIUS: That's Henry. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, that was -- okay. We're 

breaking up, okay. 

DR. ANDERSON: Yeah, you're breaking up in more 

ways than one. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Andrew -- Andy. 

 DR. MELIUS: The -- I'm trying to understand 

procedurally what would be the difference in 

the two approaches at this point in time. I 

would hate to have to wait to the next 

committee meeting before we can finalize this 

document and before we can start applying it 

and sort of getting some of this information 

categorized. We've got another 20 or so cases 

at least that'll be going through the 

individual dose construction (sic) review 

process and -- and so I guess I would like to 

see this applied as -- as part of this process, 

and then maybe then if we then want to, at the 

next meeting, you know, make some modifications 

to it, let's do it in the context of having it 

applied. Now whether that's covered by your 

original proposal or whether it's only covered 

by the amendment, I'd like clarification. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. The original proposal from 

the subcommittee actually didn't speak to that 
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directly. It -- it said let's adopt this as a 

concept, and I think in part wanted to bring 

this forward to the Board with the opportunity 

to put additional legs on it, if you wish, 

which might be in the form of saying let's not 

only adopt it, but let's use it. Which in a 

sense I believe is what Leon's amendment was -- 

I believe, if I understand, Leon, was to do 

just that. And it's my sense that the Board in 

fact wishes to do that. They may be 

uncomfortable with stating that this is sort of 

the final form. That may be the real problem 

that a few are having with this. But I think 

we'll reach the same endpoint, either way. 

If the -- if the amended motion is defeated, 

you will need to turn around and make a motion, 

if we adopt the original, to then use it. So I 

think the final effect will be the same. We'll 

be quibbling here about Robert's rules, but we 

need -- we need to move forward, so let me ask 

for -- are you ready to vote on the amendment, 

which -- the Owens amendment, which was to 

basically adopt this as the document and to add 

some sentences to clarify that one part, 

without specifying what would be added at this 
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point, either. Right? 

 All who favor that, say aye. 

 (Affirmative responses) 

Let me see the hands, ayes -- one, two, three, 

four, five, six. 

And no’s? And I think the ayes have it, so 

it's -- it's now adopted as -- that is the 

amended motion. 

DR. ANDERSON: I'm an aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now finally, we have -- we 

have amended the motion. We now are going to 

vote on the amended motion. You have to vote 

again. 

All in favor of the motion, as amended, say 

aye. 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 Any opposed -- 

DR. ANDERSON: Aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now the amended motion's 

been adopted and this now is our document. 

Does the Board wish to give any instructions on 

the added sentences that -- that Leon referred 

to -- Leon or Mark, yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess as a -- a -- what would 

this be, a friendly amendment to this, I -- 
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 DR. ZIEMER: No, we've adopt--

 MR. GRIFFON: -- suppose, or just language? 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- we've adopted this. Now if you 

want to add to it --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think we should add 

a sentence at the bottom of the ranking the 

findings, something to the effect that the 

approach will include a case-specific ranking, 

as well as an overall ranking. The approach 

will include a case-specific ranking as well as 

an overall ranking. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I think Leon's sentence actually 

said that, did it not, Leon, the sentence you 

added? 

MR. OWENS: Correct. 

 DR. ZIEMER: In essence, that's already 

included. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: All right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: But make a note in your document 

in case you missed it. The approach will 

include a case-specific ranking, as well as a -

-

 MR. GRIFFON: Overall --
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 DR. ZIEMER: -- overall --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- broad ranking, I'm not sure 

what term we would use. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Overall ranking. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Now does the Board have any 

further instructions for -- for our contractor 

with respect -- we have the report. We'll have 

to read it. We'll -- we are -- we'll still be 

looking for responses from NIOSH on that, and 

then we'll have an opportunity next time then 

to come to full closure. 

Let me ask if there's any more issues on that 

that need to be addressed this morning. This 

is on the first 20 cases. Mark. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I guess -- again, just the -

- the process question of when or where or how 

are we going to handle that. And -- and -- I 

mean I -- I think, you know, to apply this 

methodology to the entire report is a good idea 

'cause as -- as Hans stated, I -- I probably 

captured mainly the ones that had issues that 

were discussed at the McLean, Virginia meeting. 

But I think -- to move this along, I think we 

have to determine when and -- and you know, 
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where we're going to -- where we're going to 

consider that. I don't think we want to wait 

two months for the next Board meeting to -- you 

know. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right. And related to that will 

be whether or not this is handled, as it was 

before, as a working group or a subcommittee 

meeting. If it can be done as a subcommittee 

meeting, although there are some practical 

issues with respect to announcing in the 

Federal Register and so on, in one sense that 

is desirable in terms of the openness of the 

process, where the interaction -- once we get 

the comments from -- from NIOSH, if in fact 

there needs to be any meeting involving NIOSH, 

the contractor and the Board, that would need 

to be handled either as a working group or 

subcommittee. And if it's going to be a 

subcommittee, we need to identify when that 

would be, in terms of announcements in the 

Federal Register. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know if -- if we have the 

answer to this, but did -- do we know the 

specifics of the timing, how long does it have 

to be posted ahead of time and... 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Is Cori here or --

 MS. MUNN: Thirty days. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- can Liz -- any of the NIOSH 

staff --

 MS. MUNN: It's the same as for --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- remind us of those lead times 

for announcing in the Federal Register? 

 DR. WADE: He's going to get Cori. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Cori will remind us of 

that, or maybe Larry is able to. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Generally, committee management 

office wants us to have a notice in the Federal 

Register 30 days before your meeting. We have 

deviated from that in the past, but with great 

duress. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. That's an 

important piece of information. There is that 

-- what has to appear in the Federal Register 

is place and time and some agenda information, 

and then it would be an open meeting for anyone 

-- members of the public and so on. 

 MS. MUNN: For that reason alone, the 

flexibility of a working group, especially in a 

situation where no one can provide an absolute 

date that documentation is going to be 
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available, is much more flexible, easier to 

work with. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, it's -- it's true that the 

working group approach is more flexible. 

However, it does often raise questions on the 

openness of the process, and so we need to be -

- have that in mind. We have started the 

practice of keeping minutes -- or a transcript 

of these meetings. But nonetheless, the 

openness issue -- maybe Dr. Wade would like to 

add to that. 

 DR. WADE: Well, I think -- I think the Chair 

raises the right considerations, but if we were 

to go with the working group we would again 

take minutes and a transcript of that meeting, 

so we do want to deal with the transparency 

issue. So I -- I think we can work through 

that and do a working group if that's the sense 

of the Board. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Jim Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: Could we adopt something to the 

effect of, if feasible, a subcommittee meeting 

to discuss these issues should be held, but 

recognizing that it may not be feasible, in 

which case the working group approach would be 
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-- with a written record, would be the backup 

to that. And I think it's really going to be a 

question of timing and scheduling, and our 

first choice would be subcommittee. Our backup 

would be working group. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I had a -- a similar comment or 

idea, just to -- you know, it strikes me that 

every time we come to these meetings we get 

documents on the Friday before, so if we set a 

subcommittee meeting, or a couple of them, up 

in advance, I -- it -- I think that all of us 

work under deadlines, and will probably have 

products available for those meetings. We will 

work I think with our contractor just to make 

sure are these doable dates, you know. But 

then if in fact we had one of those 

subcommittee meetings, I -- I would argue that 

the subcommittee meetings can be set up not 

just to address one item, but we've got several 

things on the plate. Let's lay them out, 

designate a subcommittee meeting, then if they 

-- for whatever reason, certain products aren't 

ready at that subcommittee, then we would have 

sort of an emergency workgroup session in 

between or whatever and that would be the 
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backup option, as Jim said. I think that 

works. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments, or does someone 

wish to make a motion for a specific action? 

What --I'm sorry --

 DR. MELIUS: Do we need --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- am I looking for a flag? 

 DR. MELIUS: No, I don't --

 DR. ZIEMER: No. 

 DR. MELIUS: Do we -- do we need a motion on 

this? I mean I'll make the motion if -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I -- I think we need to get 

the sense of the Board and that's most easily 

done by having a formal action. Before we do 

that, let me inquire of maybe Jim Neton or 

Larry. In terms of NIOSH's response to the 

revision of -- of the first 20 cases, what -- 

what would we be looking at there in terms of 

turnaround time? Is that -- is that premature, 

since you haven't seen the document yet? 

DR. NETON: Yeah, I think that's premature for 

us to comment because we really haven't had a 

chance to look at it and, you know, the 

magnitude of the issues that we might have to 

deal with. My sense is they're not going to be 
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great, but I -- we really haven't looked at it 

yet. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. And it may -- thank you. 

It may be that a motion such as was suggested 

by Dr. Melius, which is somewhat general and 

indicates the intent to try to have it as an 

open subcommittee meeting, and we may be 

dependent on -- at some point in learning when 

that review would be done so that we could 

schedule this interaction. But the Chair would 

certainly entertain a motion to that effect. 

 And while we're thinking about the motion, let 

me ask this question. Suppose we had a working 

group meeting. Is there any reason why it 

couldn't be publicly announced anyway and 

invite members of the public to attend? 

 DR. WADE: No, there's no --

 DR. ZIEMER: Now let me -- is that something 

that -- as long -- if we -- even if we end up 

with a working group, if we make known to those 

interested parties that might wish to be 

present? 

MS. HOMER: I'm not entirely certain that it -- 

and I'd have to check with committee management 

about this. I don't see a reason why not, but 
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it is separate from the FACA process because it 

is a workgroup. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, understood. But in essence -

- and we're not talking here about the reviews 

of individual dose reconstructions. We're 

talking about the -- the step where we have, in 

essence, the redacted information and we're 

dealing with this other process, so -- the 

extent to which we can be open on this, in any 

event, will be I think important. 

 Dr. Melius, did you start to make a motion or 

am I prodding you too much? 

 DR. MELIUS: No. No, I'm ready, I think. I --

I move that the committee -- that the Board, if 

feasible, hold a subcommittee meeting to 

discuss and resolve issues related to the first 

20 dose reconstruction reviews and other 

matters related to the site profile reviews. 

If it is not feasible to hold such a committee 

meeting due to timing or availability of 

adequate documents from either our 

subcontractor or from NIOSH, then we should use 

-- hold a working group meeting that -- that 

working group meeting should be transcribed -- 

recorded and transcribed and, if possible, 
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announced to the public. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. You've heard the 

motion. Is there a second? 

MR. OWENS: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Is there any discussion on this 

motion? No. 

Okay, all in favor, say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 Any opposed -- did I -- Henry, are you still on 

the line? 

DR. ANDERSON: I'm aye -- I'm ayeing. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, just want to make sure 

you're awake. 

 Any opposed? 

 (No responses) 

 And any abstentions? Then the motion carries. 

Thank you very much. 

If there's anyone in the assembly today that's 

having a difficult time seeing the Board, I 

have your glasses. Somebody has turned in a 

set of glasses. Let me pass them on down to 

Cori, but you -- you may claim these -- or if 

they fit pretty well and you need an extra 

pair, whatever. 

Leon has kindly reminded me that when we 
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selected our 22 cases earlier today the Chair 

failed to assign review teams. And so I now 

ask that we return to our set of cases -- 

 MR. PRESLEY: Paul --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes? 

 MR. PRESLEY: -- excuse me. Could we go ahead 

and say that we -- that meeting that we just 

set up, that we will have that in Cincinnati? 

I think it'll be easier on the staff if we say 

that we're going to have that meeting there -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, I'm sorry, the --

 MR. PRESLEY: -- in Cincinnati. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- the subcommittee meeting? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Right. Go ahead and set a place 

for that so that it'll -- it would be a whole 

lot easier on them. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Well, I suspect either 

Cincinnati or McLean, but let -- let's -- we'll 

ask Lew to work with those folks and find a 

suitable location. I don't know that we need a 

specific action, but that certainly would be 

the intent -- convenient location for -- for 

staff and -- and -- if that's agreeable, we'll 

let them work that out. Thank you for that 

reminder, though. 
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Now let's return to the list of cases, and last 

time we found that a simple way to do this was 

to go down the list and go in the order of -- 

of our teams. Also you may have particular 

sites that you need to recluse (sic) yourself 

from and that will affect the teams involved. 

 DR. DEHART: Paul, are we maintaining the same 

teams? 

 DR. ZIEMER: We don't need to, but it's easiest 

to do that, if it works out. Now I -- I need 

to have a reminder, though, if you remember 

whose team you're on. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Henry and I are on --

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let -- let's start out -- 

 MR. PRESLEY: Henry and Robert Presley are on 

one team. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Anderson --

DR. ANDERSON: Yeah, we have --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- and Presley. 

DR. ANDERSON: Yeah, that's good for me. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Is that one team? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, sir. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And Gen Roessler, who were you 

with? 

DR. ROESSLER: Roy DeHart. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, DeHart and Roessler. And 

Melius --

 DR. MELIUS: And Richard Espinosa. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Espinosa. 

 DR. MELIUS: The A team. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Griffon --

 MR. GRIFFON: And Tony. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Andrade. Let's see, Gibson and 

Ziemer. And Munn and Owens. I think that's 

it, six teams, right? Okay. 

Let's start down through the list now. Leon, 

you have to keep me on track here. 

Now we have 22 cases, so we need four -- four 

cases per team, in most -- most of the way. 

And Anderson and Presley, let's see how we do 

with the first few cases here. We've got 008, 

which is Paducah, we're okay on that I believe. 

Right? 

 MR. GRIFFON: What about 005? 

 MR. PRESLEY: 005 we added. 

 MR. GRIFFON: We just added that this morning. 

 DR. WADE: 005 was added. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I hadn't marked my copy here. 

That -- 005 is the one we added -- yes. 

Savannah River, 005, would be that team; 008, 
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11 and 15, and --

 MR. PRESLEY: Henry, have you got a problem -- 

DR. ANDERSON: No. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Henry, did you get those, 5, 8, 11 

and 15? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Henry? 

DR. ANDERSON: Yeah, what? 

 DR. ZIEMER: You -- he's okay. 

DR. ANDERSON: I'm okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

 MR. PRESLEY: You know where those are from? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Now --

DR. ANDERSON: I thought I heard it, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, 5 is Savannah River, 8 is 

Paducah, 11 is Idaho and 15 is Los Alamos. 

DR. ANDERSON: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Next for DeHart and 

Roessler, we have --

 MR. GIBSON: Excuse me, Paul --

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry? 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- isn't Andrade on the first 

four? 

 DR. ZIEMER: No, I have Andrade with Griffon. 

 MR. GIBSON: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. 

 DR. ZIEMER: No, right. These may not be the 
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same order the teams were before. I'm just 

taking them as -- DeHart and Roessler, let's 

see where we left off here. 

 MR. PRESLEY: 18. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Number 18, Feed Materials; number 

25 is Hanford --

 DR. DEHART: Skip 27. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- 27 is Oak Ridge, so we have to 

omit that one, conflict of interest on Oak 

Ridge, so we would skip down to 36, which is 

Nevada, and 39, which is Idaho. Okay? 

 Then Espinosa/Melius, go back and pick up 27, 

which is Oak Ridge; 41, which is Feed 

Materials, Paducah -- or no, Feed Materials 

Production Center; number 43, which is Y-12; 

and number 52, which is Idaho. Okay on that? 

Then the Griffon/Andrade team -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know Tony's conflicts, so 

-- might need some help here. 

 DR. ZIEMER: We have his list here, it's -- Los 

Alamos and Nevada are his main two. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Next four are fine. 

 DR. ZIEMER: 53 is Hanford, 57 is Y-12 -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: 57? 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry, 58, I read the wrong 
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line. I need those glasses, where are they? 

62 is Pacific Northwest and 63 is Rocky Flats. 

We're okay on that, Mark? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Gibson/Ziemer, we have 65 is 

Hanford, 69 is Paducah -- 

 DR. WADE: 69 was dropped. 

 DR. ZIEMER: That's the one that was dropped, 

sorry. We have 67, Savannah River then that 

was added. We have 70, Pantex -- actually, 

Mike, I'm thinking that we should only take 

three in order that Wanda and Leon both have 

three. Right? We don't want to short-change 

them. Right? Right. Is that agreeable? 

Let's see what we have -- final three here. We 

have -- no, we're going to have to do a switch 

because 74 is Hanford. Wanda, that's -- let's 

do a trade then. Let's put 74 back with 

Gibson/Ziemer. We would put 70 with 

Munn/Owens, that's Pantex. We'd put 89, which 

is Rocky Flats, and 99, Argonne East. Okay? 

Everybody okay on those? Any questions? So 

the 22 cases are assigned as just indicated. 

Thank you. 

(Pause) 
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 I'm looking to make sure that there aren't any 

loose ends on the -- the dose reconstruction 

roll-up process now. We've taken care of 

attempting to schedule that next step. Is --

do any of the Board members have any issues 

relating to the first 20 cases that we need to 

address yet today? Thank you. 

We have a few minutes left -- let me just 

consult the agenda here. We have some time 

left yet this morning in the work session. We 

can -- we can begin, if the Board pleases, to 

address issues related to the report on the 

site profile that we heard this morning. We 

still have Bethlehem Steel issues to deal with. 

I believe that Dr. Melius was prepared to 

perhaps make a motion relating to next steps on 

the Bethlehem Steel, and that would be the 

logical one to address next. Jim, are you 

waving a flag there or prepared to -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I have actually five 

motions, just for purposes of discussion. They 

aren't (unintelligible). 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are these motions that we should 

deal with one at a time, or do you want to 

spring them all on us and -- 
-- 

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 DR. MELIUS: I think it would be easier just to 

do them one at a time. I don't -- some of them 

are pretty straightforward, but -- and they 

address the overall issue of the NIOSH report, 

as well as the four specific questions that 

NIOSH asked the Board, so that's where the five 

 DR. ZIEMER: You're talking specifically about 

Bethlehem Steel now. 

 DR. MELIUS: Bethlehem Steel, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 DR. MELIUS: And the first motion is that the 

Board accepts the NIOSH response to the SCA 

report on the Bethlehem site profile, including 

NIOSH's plans to address several of SCA's 

comments and to produce a revised site profile 

or Technical Basis Document. The Board also 

requests that NIOSH and SC&A meet to discuss 

and resolve any remaining technical issues 

related to SCA's comments and NIOSH's response. 

Members of the Board should be present at that 

meeting. 

MR. ESPINOSA: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: That's the motion --

 DR. MELIUS: The motion. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: -- and I believe Richard has 

seconded the motion. It's now on the floor for 

discussion. 

 Wanda Munn. 

 MS. MUNN: Are we going to leave that 

outstanding issues sort of hanging in the air 

without defining what they are? 

 DR. MELIUS: No, I have four motions. 

 MS. MUNN: That's the next motion. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And there are some -- hopefully 

some follow-ups. Maybe you should 

characterize, if it will help the Board vote on 

this motion, to have some idea of what you're 

going to propose as follow-up. 

 DR. MELIUS: That's fair. The -- the four 

questions that NIOSH asked us for specific 

comments on, one is on page 6 and has to do 

with the use of the 95th percentile 

distribution to -- et cetera. The other one 

relates to the issue of -- of respiratory rate 

in heavy work. The next one concerns the 

aerosol size issue. And the last one concerns 

how NIOSH characterized external exposures, and 

those are the four specific questions that 

NIOSH asked the Board to address, and I've 
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prepared motions for all of those. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Does that answer the question you 

-- yes. Other questions or comments on this 

initial motion? Are you ready to vote then? 

All in favor of the motion, say aye? 

(Affirmative responses) 

 And those -- 

DR. ANDERSON: Aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Henry. Those opposed? 

 (No responses) 

 And abstentions? Thank you, motion carries. 

Proceed. 

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. I also move that the Board 

adopt this resolution. The Board concurs with 

the use of the 95th percentile of the 

distribution of air samples at Bethlehem Steel 

to characterize the upper limits of exposures 

at that facility. However, NI-- however, NIOSH 

should continue to evaluate other approaches to 

characterize exposures and work environments 

similar to Bethlehem Steel, including better 

ways to characterize exposures of workers in 

higher risk job categories and better methods 

to identify such workers. 

And if I can explain, I think -- 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Let me have a second to the 

motion. That'll get it on the floor and then -

-

 DR. DEHART: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- you can elaborate. It's been 

seconded. Now, proceed. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I think that -- I think 

they've made a convincing case for this 

particular site. However, I don't think we're 

ready to say that's something that should be 

generalized as an approach to all sites. It 

may be, may not be; that they should continue 

to evaluate that and I personally get concerned 

that, in essence, what we've done is sort of a 

mini SEC at Bethlehem Steel. We're really 

beyond the point of -- we don't -- not taking 

into account anything about a person's 

individual history, work history. We've done 

sort of a blanket approach that's applied to 

someone, whether they worked in the rolling 

mill area or whether they were a security guard 

or some other person at that facility. So I 

think that that may be appropriate for that 

facility. However, I think we need to look at 

other ways of -- of -- other approaches that 
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might be used in other facilities -- that. So 

that intent is to yes, we concur with the 

approach for Bethlehem; however, there till 

needs to be some work as to what would be the 

best way for other facilities. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Mark Griffon. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess the on-- the only concern 

I have here is -- is that you -- you know, I 

guess I agree with the NIOSH proposed method in 

concept. I'll use Wanda's way to -- to look at 

this. I -- I -- I'm a little hesitant to be 

definitive about it until I hear more back from 

SCA that -- that it in fact addressed all the 

concerns of the original finding, so -- but -- 

but I do agree with the approach in -- in -- 

conceptually, so I don't -- I don't know if 

that's against the motion or just -- I just 

wanted to throw that out there, that I -- I 

don't know that we have all the facts back. 

And we had the discussion yesterday with -- 

with our contractor, could we get a timely 

response, you know, and I think we're -- we're 

closing in on this thing. I think we have to 

come to closure on it, I agree. But I just 

want to make sure that we understand fully what 
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we're voting on with that, that this upper 95th 

percentile of what, of what dataset was it 

representative? You know, there's some whatifs in that power point presentation that are a 

little -- get a little more involved, I think. 

So... 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? Jim, 

would you read the motion again? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. The --

 DR. ZIEMER: Not too fast. I'm trying to 

absorb it. 

 DR. MELIUS: Oh, okay. The Board concurs with 

the use of the 95th percentile of the 

distribution of air samples at Bethlehem Steel 

to characterize the upper limits of exposure at 

that facility. However, NIOSH should continue 

to evaluate other approaches to characterize 

exposures in work environments similar to 

Bethlehem, including better ways to 

characterize exposures of workers in higher 

risk job categories and better methods to 

identify such workers. 

If I can explain --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, your first sentence, you're 

referring to NIOSH's use of -- or -- use of the 
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95th percentile --

 MR. GRIFFON: Of the Bethlehem Steel air 

samples, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- of the Bethlehem Steel air 

sample. 

 DR. MELIUS: Well, what they specifically 

proposed in --

 DR. ZIEMER: Are proposed --

 DR. MELIUS: -- in their comments. That's --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- in their response. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- directly from their... 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Yes, Jim? 

DR. NETON: Just a point of clarification. 

What we proposed was to use the Simonds Saw and 

Steel data for 1949 and '50 -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, under -- yes. 

DR. NETON: -- and Bethlehem Steel for '51 and 

'52 --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

DR. NETON: -- just so we're clear on that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I believe, Jim, you 

understood that, right, and -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, that was --

 DR. MELIUS: Even though that's not what's 
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stated there, but that's... 

 DR. ZIEMER: It's the 95th percentile on that 

Simonds Saw's data. 

 MR. GRIFFON: For one time period and Bethlehem 

Steel for the other time period. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I believe that's correct. Other 

comments? And are you ready to vote on this 

motion? Ready to vote. 

All in favor of this motion, say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

DR. ANDERSON: Aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Henry. 

 All opposed, no? One opposed. 

 MR. GRIFFON: No, I'll -- I'll abstain. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Abstaining? Mark is abstaining. 

DR. ROESSLER: Well, I'll abstain then, too. 

 DR. ZIEMER: You're abstaining, two 

abstentions, okay. 

That's fine, you're welcome to abstain. I 

think it -- for clarity, I don't believe these 

abstentions have to do with the facility. They 

may have to do more with the voters having some 

uncertainty about exactly what this motion is 

doing. 

Well, I -- I don't want to interpret what the 
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abstentions mean. I'm sorry, I don't want to 

characterize -- okay, thank you. Or do you 

wish to characterize? 

DR. ROESSLER: I can comment on what mine 

means. I'm not clear that our subcontractor 

agrees with this and I really haven't had 

enough of an explanation as to what this 95th 

percentile means. I can't picture in my mind 

what impact this has on the actual claimants. 

NIOSH said it would be more claimant friendly, 

but I haven't quantitized (sic) it yet to come 

to that conclusion. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I know -- yeah, mine's similar. 

Maybe it should have just been a no vote, but I 

-- I -- you know, I think Jim's trying to get 

to the same position. In his first motion 

anyway the idea was that where there's still 

differences, we would go ba-- I think NIOSH and 

SCA would work out -- you know, I think it was 

in your proposal there was some follow-up on 

these -- on -- on the comment resolution 

process. You know, my -- I guess my notion 

when we first discussed this second motion of 

Jim's was that maybe we should just phrase it 

to say that we agree in principle with the 
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approach taken, but -- and -- and -- and that's 

simply -- I -- it's the same concern that Wanda 

had of the earlier -- you know, I -- I don't 

know if I concur with this until I -- I 

understand it a little more deeply and hear 

SCA's response. Quite frankly, they put a lot 

of effort into researching this finding. I 

don't know how much data was in the Simonds 

Saw. I don't know how much data they're 

relying on for distribution. You know, I don't 

know how well they can -- you know, there's -- 

there's a lot of ifs in this, so I think -- 

that was my only reservation, so I -- I'd like 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. And that's helpful to have 

on the record. You recognize there's some 

reservations then that exist amongst the Board 

members on -- on that particular motion. 

 DR. MELIUS: And I would just add that there 

also will be a revised site profile or 

Technical Basis Document, and if we so choose 

to review that and can do so and look at the 

level of details --

 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- I think it's just hard to find, 
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you know, where -- how far to go and I think we 

do need to resolve some of these issues rather 

than just sort of continually leaving them out 

there. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And in fact at some later point if 

additional information comes to light, the 

Board could in fact say well, actually we have 

a different view now. So that -- that's always 

a possibility. 

 Please proceed. 

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. I'm trying to get to the 

right page here. 

Yeah, top of page 7. Okay and -- move that the 

Board request that NIOSH review the use of the 

ICRP default value for heavy work to determine 

if it's appropriate for heavy industrial work 

in hot environments. 

It seems to me this is just a -- a simple sort 

of factual issue, that there's a lot of studies 

-- I know there've been studies done of heat 

stress in steel mills, and I'm sure there's 

others in uranium mines and -- and so forth. 

And it seems to me that they could sort of 

resolve and -- you know, based on those studies 

and other information, what is the appropriate 
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way of characterizing the breathing rate for 

people in such environments and -- do that and 

it may very well be that the default value used 

in ICRP is fine, but we'll just evaluate that 

and move on from there. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. You've heard the motion. 

Second? 

 DR. DEHART: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Discussion? Wanda Munn. 

 MS. MUNN: May I hear that motion again, 

please? I --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 DR. MELIUS: I'll -- say it slow -- more 

slowly? 

 MS. MUNN: Yes. 

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

 MS. MUNN: Words of one syllable. 

 DR. MELIUS: The Board requests that NIOSH 

review the use of ICRP default value for heavy 

work to determine if it is appropriate for 

heavy industrial work in hot environments. 

 MS. MUNN: It was my understanding that NIOSH 

had done that, and that they were recommending 

the use of the ICRP default value. Is that 

correct or not, Jim? 
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DR. NETON: That's correct, we were 

recommending the use of heavy work breathing 

rate, which is 1.7 cubic meters per hour. I 

think the central issue was the use of mouth 

breathing as opposed to nasal breathing. 

 MS. MUNN: Yes. 

DR. NETON: That's an issue that's unresolved 

at this time. 

 MS. MUNN: And it is unlikely that any of us 

who have never been in that environment or 

doing that kind of work would be expert at 

making that decision. I suspect that most of 

the reviewers are in the same position. It 

seems unreasonable to me to always assume that 

every person in that environment would be 

breathing through their mouth rather than 

breathing through their nose, even under fairly 

heavy work conditions. To make that assumption 

on a -- on a broad scale seems unreasonable. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Of course NIOSH is I believe 

attempting to find default parameters that are 

both claimant favorable and -- and reasonable. 

And Jim, could you clarify in your -- your 

motion -- it's -- is it specifically to address 

this issue of the mouth? 
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 DR. MELIUS: It's both mouth breathing and -- 

and breathing rate that came up, and my 

recollection is when Jim Neton was presenting 

this this morning, I think he referred to 

uranium miners in some way, but it's just not 

clear to me that -- that we've actually looked 

into the derivation of that default value, and 

therefore it seems to me that with some other 

research you ought to be able to do it and 

determine what's appropriate for different 

kinds of work environments. And seems to me 

that would be -- I won't say easy to do, but it 

should be straightforward do to based on 

whether their information's available, what 

went into the derivation of the ICRP default 

value for heavy work. 

I have done some studies in steel mills and it 

at least would appear to me that steel worker -

- many of those people do more than an hour of 

heavy exercise -- equivalent of heavy exercise 

during -- during a day, so at least on the fact 

of it, the use of one and seven does not seem 

to be right, but I may not completely 

understand how they derived that and -- and 

what's appropriate. It may be that different 
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things are appropriate for different types of -

- of work environment and I think that's, you 

know, worthy of some further evaluation. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Where are we between NIOSH and 

SC&A on those values? Remind me of -- what did 

SC&A recommend be used, or were you simply 

questioning the -- the basis for NIOSH's 

selection? I don't recall the -- 

DR. MAURO: Yes, there are really two separate 

issues, and it's important to keep them 

separate. One is, as Dr. Melius pointed out, 

the breathing rate inherent -- the -- the 1.7 

cubic meters per hour breathing rate and the 

assumptions imbedded in that as applied to the 

work environment was one question, whereby 

exploring that a little further in terms of is 

-- in terms of the -- that work -- in that 

working environment is that a claimant 

favorable assumption. 

Completely separate, and I -- quite frankly, a 

much more difficult issue, has to do with 

something that ICRP I don't believe addresses, 

namely -- there is a fraction of the population 

of the United States that are mouth breathers. 

That is when they're sitting still they are 
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breathing through their mouth. And certainly 

when they're moving into a more aggressive -- 

they are breathing through their mouth. 

That changes some -- we in fact did some 

analysis to see the type of effect that might 

have on the dose calculation. If all of a 

sudden we were to say wait a minute, there is 

some -- some subdivision of the American 

public, of the American workers who are mouth 

breathers. Will that have an effect on the 

dose to the lungs. We did some calculations. 

They are contained, as it turns out, in our 

most recent report on Mallinckrodt where we 

found that it has about a factor of two effect 

on the lung dose. 

So -- but this is a different question. It's 

almost a -- a -- what I call a policy question. 

That is, do you -- how -- to what degree do you 

take into consideration a sub-population of -- 

that has certain behavioral patterns that may 

differ from reference man as adopted in ICRP. 

I would -- I -- I -- I could -- I could see 

arguing both sides, because 42 CFR 82 does 

adopt ICRP methodologies. And so on that 

respect you could say well, we're following 
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ICRP methodologies, which does not take into 

consideration that particular issue. Or -- I 

believe. 

 Or alternatively, and I guess this may -- this 

is why I would say perhaps it is a Board issue 

in terms of -- however, if it turns out there 

is a substantial portion of the American 

population that are mouth breathers, is it 

appropriate to take that into consideration, 

which -- which would deviate somewhat I guess 

from the explicit guidance. I don't think ICRP 

rules out your deviating -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 

DR. MAURO: -- but it's -- it's just there to 

be helpful. I hope that helps. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. That's helpful, John. 

And in essence SC&A has raised the issue and 

says it ought to be considered. And I believe 

your motion to the effect is to do just that. 

Is that not correct? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda. 

 MS. MUNN: In our report NIOSH says they will 

revise the site profile to assume that all 

workers were engaged in heavy work at all times 
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during the shift. So we're not talking about 

the default rate of one hour per shift. We're 

talking about -- NIOSH has said we'll go under 

the assumption that we are going to be using 

heavy work inhalation rates all eight-hour 

shifts. I don't see that we can ask more than 

that. If we begin to factor in how many people 

are mouth breathers and how many people are 

not, then we are getting into a realm I don't 

believe there's any reasonable way to reach a 

conclusion about. 

If the motion that's being made is to accept 

that NIOSH will use heavy breathing data for 

eight hours, then I can support it. If it does 

not, then I don't think we're helping NIOSH any 

by just saying go back -- I don't think we're 

helping either NIOSH or the other contractor by 

saying go back and look at it more. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Did you want to respond, Jim, on 

that? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --

 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just a point of 

clarification. I thought Jim was -- Jim Neton 

was going to make it, but heavy work is 

different than heavy exercise, so the one hour 
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and seven hour ratio is -- in ICRP-66 one hour 

is -- referred to heavy exercise and the other 

seven hours are -- are -- I forget, light? 

DR. NETON: Yeah, seven hours would be light 

exercise, of which the ICRP model assumes a 

normal person would breathe through their nose 

100 percent, where under -- under habitual 

mouth breathing, I think it's something like 50 

percent mouth breathing under light exercise 

conditions. All humans -- most humans breathe 

through their mouth 50 percent of the time 

under heavy exercise, so there's some subtle 

distinctions there. But it really does boil 

down, as John Mauro characterized, to do we 

address habitual mouth breathing as a default 

value in this program. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Jim? 

 DR. MELIUS: And what I think the intent of my 

motion was saying that I think you need to do 

further review and get further information on 

this overall issue, both breathing rate and the 

issue of mouth breathing, and present it back 

to the Board or however you want to, you know, 

follow up on it. We're not going to be able to 

completely resolve it, but we're saying let's 
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look -- there's other information available 

liter-- in the literature and so forth and 

let's look at it in more detail. 

 DR. ZIEMER: So it would be more along the 

lines of whatever final selection is made that 

there's a clear justification or basis -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- for that. Further discussion? 

Are you ready to vote on this motion? 

All in favor, aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

Opposed? 

DR. ANDERSON: Aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Opposed? 

 (Negative responses) 

Let me see the hands opposed. 

 (Negative responses) 

 And abstentions? Okay, then the motion does 

carry. Thank you. Proceed -- you have an 

additional motion? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, this one I -- short motion, 

but -- be Board discussion. 

The -- move that the Board concurs with NIOSH's 

characterization of aerosol size and density 

used in the Bethlehem site profile. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We've heard the -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Which is found on page 8. 

 DR. ZIEMER: We've heard the motion and -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- seconded. This had to do with 

the selection of the mass -- aerodynamic mass 

medium diameter, as characterized in the -- and 

I -- I believe we also heard that our 

contractor also concurred with that. Is there 

discussion? 

All in favor, say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

DR. ANDERSON: Aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Opposed, no? 

 (No responses) 

Abstentions? That motion carries. Thank you. 

 DR. MELIUS: And --

 DR. ZIEMER: Next one? 

 DR. MELIUS: -- next and final motion, move 

that the Board concurs with NIOSH's approach to 

characterizing external exposures. 

MR. ESPINOSA: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Seconded. The Board concurs with 

NIOSH's --

 DR. MELIUS: Approach to characterizing 
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external exposures. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Discussion? 

 DR. MELIUS: Page 10. And I believe in SC&A's 

comments on this was that issue of clarifying 

the basis for this. Again, my understanding 

was that that had been -- additional 

information had been provided and -- and I 

thought the justification that NIOSH made in 

their -- you know, it did provide an adequate 

justification. 

 DR. ZIEMER: For their -- for their -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Approach. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- decision -- or approach. 

Discussion on this item? Then are you ready to 

vote? 

Okay. All in favor, aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Any opposed? Henry, yes? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Henry's gone. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Henry? 

 DR. MELIUS: Henry's gone fishing. 

DR. ANDERSON: Aye. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, thank you. Opposed? 

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm opposed. 

 DR. ZIEMER: One opposed. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Same reason as before. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Same reason as before, thank you. 

And abstentions? 

Okay, the motion carries. Let's see, does that 

cover them? 

 DR. MELIUS: That's it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Now we're 

approaching the lunch hour. We're going to 

recess till 1:00 o'clock, and at that time 

we'll have a presentation of the SEC petition 

for Mallinckrodt and some opportunities for 

public comment. 

 Thank you, we're recessed till 1:00 o'clock. 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 11:45 a.m. 

to 1:05 p.m.) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Good afternoon. 

(Whereupon, discussion of the Mallinckrodt SEC 

Petition ensued until the dinner break. This 

is contained in a separate volume.) 

7:00 p.m. 

INTRODUCTION

 DR. ZIEMER: This is the -- the evening public 

session of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 

Worker Health. My name is Paul Ziemer and I'm 

serving as Chairman of this Board. I'd like to 
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take a few minutes here at the beginning to say 

a little bit more about this Board and its 

role. We've already had a couple of extensive 

public comment sessions, but usually -- in our 

evening sessions, particularly -- we do take 

the time to talk just briefly about what the 

role of the Board is, partially because there's 

often confusion about what it is that this 

Board actually does. 

And contrary to what the local newspapers or 

news media have indicated, this is not a 

hearing that we have here. This is one of our 

regular meetings, and at all of our meetings we 

have public input through the public comment 

session. This happens to be a kind of special 

meeting because it's the first of our meetings 

where we have had before this Board a petition 

dealing with Special Exposure Cohort, so in 

that sense this has been a special meeting for 

this Board. 

Let me tell you very briefly a little more 

about the Board. First of all is you're 

probably aware that the program that we're 

dealing with is a program that has been split 

up by Congress into sort of pieces. That is, 
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the responsibilities are shared by a number of 

agencies -- Department of Labor, Health and 

Human Services, Secretary of Energy and the 

Attorney General -- so you have different 

Federal agencies that, in a sense, are 

administering this program. That may be good 

news and it may be bad news. I'm never quite 

sure when you get a lot of Federal agencies in 

the pot, but in any event, that's the way 

Congress set the program up. 

In addition to these Federal agencies, the 

legislation called for the appointment of an 

Advisory Board, and that's what this group is. 

These are individuals who are not feds, but are 

serving, in a sense, independently. The 

legislation says that the Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health will consist of no 

more than 20 members appointed by the 

President, who also appoints the Chair, and 

also that the members shall represent the 

workers, the scientific community and the 

medical communities. 

And so that's what this group is here, that is 

the -- and -- and you probably notice right 

away that you don't see 20 people. And the 
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reason for that is that the President actually 

has only appointed 12 individuals to this Board 

thus far, and of those 12, ten are here. Dr. 

Andrade unfortunately is ill with the flu, and 

Dr. Anderson is in Alaska tonight, but the rest 

of the Board members are here. 

I have listed their names here and there are 

placards. I'm not going to introduce each one 

individually tonight, but I do want you to 

notice, if you look at the names and a little 

bit about their titles, you will see that they 

represent a kind of spectrum of technical, 

medical and worker groups or agencies or 

entities. So here's about half the Board on 

this slide and I'll list the rest of them here 

momentarily -- and the rest are listed here. 

So you see we have a mix of individuals, come 

from various parts of the country. We are --

this is not a full-time job for us and we do 

not work for NIOSH or these other agencies. We 

come from various walks of life and meet 

together regularly for the purpose of this 

legislation and to deal with this particular 

issue, the compensation program that you're all 

interested in. 
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This Board has been charged with some very 

specific duties. There are very specific 

things that we, under the law, are required to 

do, and there are other things that we simply 

are unable to do, much as we may like to do 

them. There are a lot of things that we wish 

we were able to do, particularly after we hear 

many of your stories. But to some extent we 

ourselves are limited by the law as to what we 

are able to do. 

I've listed here precisely what the 

responsibilities of this Board are. Some of 

these responsibilities have been largely 

completed. We are responsible to work with 

NIOSH in a sense to help develop the guidelines 

for the dose reconstruction program and for the 

probability of causation rule that is used. 

And we have been in the past directly involved 

in developing those guidelines. They are now 

in place. 

We also have an ongoing job of evaluating the 

scientific validity of the dose 

reconstructions. And for this purpose the 

Board has the assistance of an outside 

technical contractor that helps us evaluate the 
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dose reconstructions. And we do this on a --

essentially an audit basis. We randomly select 

cases that have been completed and review them 

in an audit type of function to determine 

whether or not, for example, NIOSH is following 

its own procedures properly, if the dose 

reconstructions have been carried out in 

accordance with the proper methods, and so on. 

So that process is ongoing and will be going on 

throughout the years ahead. 

 And finally, this Board has a role in the 

identification and determination of the socalled Special Exposure Cohort groups, so that 

any petitions involving Special Exposure 

Cohorts require that this Board review the 

petition, review the recommendations of NIOSH, 

and that we ourselves make a recommendation. 

Our recommendation goes to the Director of 

NIOSH, and that in turn feeds up to the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services. And 

incidentally, in case you weren't aware, issues 

involving the Special Exposure Cohort -- 

particularly if there's a determination made 

that a group should go forward as a Special 

Exposure Cohort -- eventually that goes back to 
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Congress. So there are steps beyond, for 

example, what has occurred here today, even 

with respect to the Mallinckrodt group. 

Our group does not do dose reconstructions. We 

do not handle individual cases. We're always 

glad to learn of your case and your experience, 

but if you have particular issues, they 

actually have to be handled by the staff people 

from NIOSH or, in some cases, Labor may be 

involved, depending on what the issue is. And 

if you have particular issues, this Board will 

not directly deal with your case, but we are 

glad to refer you to those folks from the 

agencies who actually handle the cases and 

process the dose reconstructions. 

We are interested in the process. We're 

interested in how well it's working or how well 

it isn't working, what your frustrations are. 

We're very much aware of the frustrations 

throughout the system. One of our jobs is to 

try to help smooth the way and try to overcome 

some of the barriers that have existed in the 

past that made it difficult for the process to 

be completed. 

As we proceed with the public comment period 
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then, I hope you'll keep that in mind that we -

- we're not necessarily here to answer specific 

questions you may have on a particular case. 

But if you do have such questions, we want to 

make sure that they are also heard by the staff 

members of the agencies who are here and who 

can also help. But the Board likes to hear of 

your situations in the context of the job we 

have to do with respect to evaluating quality 

of dose reconstructions and evaluating, for 

example, the Special Exposure Cohort situation. 

GENERAL PUBLIC COMMENT 

So with that as background -- let's see if we 

can -- with that as background, I'm going to 

proceed. I have a list of individuals, some of 

whom are leftover, as it were, from our 

previous session, and I'll start with those, 

and then -- and then continue on with other 

names that might come forward. 

I have Mary Johnson here on my list. Is Mary 

with us tonight? We're hopeful the snow didn't 

-- or the thought of snow didn't scare too many 

away. Mary, if you'd please approach the mike 

we'd be pleased to hear from you first. 

 MS. JOHNSON: My name is Mary Lou Johnson. I'm 
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the widow of David Johnson. Dave worked at 

Mallinckrodt at Weldon Spring from 1957 through 

1961. In December of 1997 he fell to the floor 

with a grand mal seizure and was diagnosed that 

day with a glioblastoma multiforme, which is a 

grade four brain tumor. This is Dave. His 

case number, 5045. I wanted NIOSH to put a 

face with a case file. 

These aren't just numbers, they're human 

beings. He was my husband, my best friend -- 

excuse me -- excuse me -- the father of my 

children and my business partner. He lived six 

months. I took care of him. I've run the 

family business by myself for the last seven 

years. I know I'm just one of many, many, but 

so much time's gone by, so many of them are 

dying, it's time for them to be workmen's 

compensated now. 

I know you get tired of hearing these cases. 

They're real. How would you feel today if you 

went home and found your spouse on the floor 

and told they had five months to live? Can you 

imagine the devastation that would put on your 

family? 

Thanks for letting me speak. Thank you. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you for sharing a very 

difficult story. Mary Jenerry has asked to 

speak. Mary, welcome back. 

 MS. JENERRY: Well, I did speak yesterday, but 

I failed to tell you about David Johnson. I 

worked with him, too, and I worked about four 

feet from him. And I had many times seen him 

take containers and he said he was taking them 

down to Destrehan, and there was some kind of 

radioactive material in the containers. Of 

course he died of the brain tumor, and I just 

wanted to speak for him 'cause he can't. 

That's about all I have to say. Thanks very 

much. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Mary. Tim Manser? Is 

it Tim? Appears to -- is -- M-a-n-s-e-r, 

perhaps? How about Donna Land? 

 MS. LAND: Yes. Dr. Ziemer and all the Board 

members, I am here as a claimant for my 

husband, Earl F. Socks, who worked at the 

Mallinckrodt plant at Weldon Springs. He 

worked there from June 1957 until December 

1961. And I want to emphasize to you people 

that these workers had no idea of the danger of 

what they were working with. I have a picture 
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here that I'd like to present just as an 

example. 

 The workers were not informed of the dangers of 

exposure to uranium processing. My husband was 

involved in a chemical explosion at a tank farm 

where acid was sprayed on him. It was 

hydrofluoric acid. He referred many times to 

the orange fumes coming off the pots where the 

uranium ore had been placed with chemicals to 

be boiled down to a pure uranium state. The 

orange dust had settled on pipes, lines, and 

anyplace it could settle, and it was left 

there. 

 My husband developed lymphoma. We sent the 

biopsy tissue from St. Luke's to Barnes 

Hospital for a second opinion, where it was 

also verified as lymphoma. This followed 33 

continuous days of irradiation, trips back and 

forth, burning layer after layer of his body, 

illness and inability to accept food. Because 

of my husband and others like him, I urge you 

to no longer delay the site profile of the 

Mallinckrodt Chemical Plant at Weldon Springs, 

Missouri. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We do have 
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with us again this evening Tom Horgan from 

Senator Bond's office, and Tom, I believe you 

would like to speak. Thank you. 

 MR. HORGAN: All righty. Thanks again for -- 

to the Advisory Board for sitting through these 

long days. They're -- we really appreciate and 

appreciate all the work you do. And now that 

it is the official public comment period, I did 

want to -- I was taking some notes and want to 

express some concerns on behalf of Senator Bond 

and -- and the Mallinckrodt claimants. Some of 

this is -- well, let me just go right to it. 

Do we know what the status of Dr. Anderson's 

participation in tomorrow's discussion of the 

site profile from '49 to '57 will be? I mean 

we are going to be -- you do plan on discussing 

'49 to '57. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, we do. 

 MR. HORGAN: And do you -- is he going to be 

here by phone? 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm -- I don't think I know for 

certain what his schedule is. I -- my 

understanding --

 MR. HORGAN: Can somebody answer that? 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- is that he will be flying part 
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of the day, so --

 MR. HORGAN: So is he going to participate in 

tomorrow's discussion and deliberation or not? 

 DR. ZIEMER: I do not know. 

 MR. HORGAN: Does anybody know at the Board? 

Dr. Wade, do you know? 

 DR. WADE: I think he's going to be in the air 

part of the time. I do not know if it'll be 

all the time. 

 MR. HORGAN: Okay. Well, then does the Board -

- if you're going to have deliberations on this 

key topic from '49 to '57, is there a schedule 

on the agenda, now that it appears to be pushed 

off today's agenda, to deliberate on '49 to 

'57? I just got the answer to that question. 

Are there going to be votes on recommendations 

tomorrow with -- or without -- it appears 

without Dr. Anderson's presence? 

 DR. ZIEMER: That will be entirely up to the 

Board as to whether the Board wishes to make 

motions. 

 MR. HORGAN: So there could be votes tomorrow. 

 DR. ZIEMER: There could be votes, yes, 

certainly. 

 MR. HORGAN: Okay. Now this next question is a 
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housekeeping question, and it's to you, 

Chairman Ziemer. We were all following the 

agenda today, and I guess I would like to know 

why there was a departure from today's agenda? 

In other words, we had NIOSH give their 

presentation on the site profile, and then we 

had Denise on behalf of the Mallinckrodt 

claimants, and then after that there was 

supposed to be an immediate Board discussion of 

the issues raised in those two petitions, and 

then we went straight into two hours of public 

comment. Now I am all for public comment, and 

it was even scheduled for tonight right now and 

that's why all these people are here, but it 

wasn't scheduled right after that crucial -- 

those two crucial presentations. And I guess 

I'd like to know why it was -- I mean why was 

there a departure? Why did we not proceed -- 

the Board proceed directly into this discussion 

when the two presentations were fresh in their 

minds? 

 DR. ZIEMER: The schedule -- and the Chair will 

take responsibility for this. The schedule 

called for petitioner comments and public 

comments from 1:30 to 3:00 o'clock, at which -- 
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and so we continued with the public comment. 

The petitioner comments ended at approximately 

2:30. The comment period continued, as per the 

agenda, and we had a number of individuals from 

Mallinckrodt who indicated, because the Chair 

asked them if they would be willing to speak 

this evening. A number of them indicated they 

would be unable to be here and requested that 

they be allowed to speak, and the Chair 

therefore allowed them to speak so that the 

Board could hear --

 MR. HORGAN: See, I guess I was following it 

and I saw the NIOSH presentation from 1:00 to 

1:30, the SEC presentation that Ms. Brock gave 

and her designates from 1:30 to 3:00, and then 

I thought they were going to have an hour 

discussion. I didn't know that included public 

comment when public comment was -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, the -- the agenda calls for 

public comment. The group that Ms. Brock 

designated -- according -- and I keep track of 

the time as we go -- finished at approximately 

2:30, at which time I started down the list of 

others and asked specifically which -- which 

individuals needed to speak because they could 
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not be here this evening. So that is the 

reason for it. I take the responsibility -- 

 MR. HORGAN: Okay, I have an -- an -- a 

schedule back here and I unfortunately left it 

at my chair, but that didn't -- that wasn't 

clear. It didn't seem that that was supposed 

to be the scheduled agenda and -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: All right. And in fact we -- we 

actually went into our break time. We ended up 

the discussion at 3:30 and then resumed at 

approximately 4:00. The schedule calls for the 

Board to have its discussion on that topic at 

about -- at 3:45, so we were not that far off. 

The Board discussion was scheduled for after 

the break, which is exactly what we did. We 

did run a little long on the public discussion, 

at the request of the members of the public. 

 MR. HORGAN: Well, I guess I didn't quite read 

it that way, but maybe I'm the only one. At 

any rate, my point that I was making is that 

the Board lost valuable deliberative and debate 

time when these reports were fresh in their 

minds. When the topic was hot, we went to two 

hours of public comment. And by the way, I'm 

not against public comment. I encourage it 
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strongly. It's just that I -- it seemed to me 

that it was out of order on this agenda. 

Now even when we did get to the Board 

discussion on the NIOSH and the claimants' 

presentations, when Mr. Elliott was called up 

to the microphone the first thing he said was 

"If you remember my presentation," and then he 

went into make his point. I guess I'm going to 

leave it at there, but you know, that cost us 

valuable time and now we're going to have to -- 

the Board's going to have to deal with this 

tomorrow when a Board member's probably not 

going to be here after specific arrangements 

were made for him to participate. And I'm 

going to leave it at that, but I want the Board 

and the Designated Federal Official to be aware 

of that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, and let me also comment that 

the Board did not a priori indicate that it was 

going to take any specific actions by the end 

of business today. This was only desig-- 

indicated as a Board discussion, period. 

 MR. HORGAN: Well, we -- but the agenda does 

indicate that this would -- the -- the -- it 

would be wrapped up today. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: No, I'm sorry, it does not. 

 MR. HORGAN: Okay, where -- oh, okay. I don't 

see it -- is it on tomorrow's agenda, too? 

 DR. ZIEMER: We have -- we have Board working 

sessions tomorrow morning and working sessions 

tomorrow afternoon, as well. 

 MR. HORGAN: Again, I think that's relatively 

unclear, but I'll -- I'll -- I'll accept the 

answer. 

Okay. And also I -- we're hearing about a new 

letter. I guess it -- I don't know if I got it 

right, I was in and out a lot, from a Mount 

(sic) Mason that I -- is that correct? -- that 

rebutes (sic) the early letter of I guess Mr. 

Mason showing the falsified data. You know, 

basically there's a rebuttal and that key piece 

of evidence that calls into question a lot of 

the data from '49 to '57, there is a -- we hear 

now, today -- at least I have, for the first 

time -- that there is a new letter that rebuts 

this. Is this letter here? Can we -- can we 

produce that? Does -- does -- NIOSH has a 

letter. Do we have a copy of that? 

 DR. ZIEMER: I don't know the answer to that. 

Let's see, someone from NIOSH -- 
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 MR. HORGAN: Can someone from NIOSH -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: The Board -- the Board has not 

seen the letter, let me tell you that. 

 MR. HORGAN: The Board hasn't seen it, okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: No. Jim Neton from NIOSH perhaps 

can answer your question, so -- 

DR. NETON: Jim Neton. Certainly we'll make a 

copy of the letter available to both the Board 

and the public. We do need to review the 

letter for Privacy Act issues, and as soon as 

we do that and redact, as appropriate under the 

provisions of the Privacy Act, we will make it 

available to the public. 

 MR. HORGAN: Well, my next question is, you 

know, what -- well, I guess, Jim, you might 

want to stay here. When was it discovered? 

Who all has seen it? And I put incorrection 

(sic) the Board and I just heard that the Board 

has not seen it. Has the petitioner seen it, 

since it was brought up as a rebuttal to a key 

piece of evidence in their presentation? 

DR. NETON: I'm -- I don't -- I can't answer at 

this meeting exactly when the letter was 

discovered, but it has been on our research 

database drive for -- for a while, is my 
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understanding. The petitioners have not seen 

it, but I do believe it was used as a part of 

the basis for the professional judgment 

evaluation that the Advisory Board has a copy 

of. But I -- I can certainly find out exactly 

in which data capture effort this -- this came 

to be on our database and -- and let you know 

when I find that information out. 

 MR. HORGAN: Okay. I guess my -- and my next 

question would be what -- I guess it was 

answered. Why was not the letter brought 

tonight to be shared with the Board and the 

petitioners? 

 (Off microphone) Why was the letter not brought 

tonight to be shared with the Board and the 

petitioners? 

DR. NETON: I'm not exactly certain how to 

answer that. We didn't bring everything with 

us that we obviously needed to -- to share with 

the petitioners. It was not possible to 

predict exactly which pieces of information -- 

clearly this was one, in retrospect, that 

should have been. 

 MR. HORGAN: Well, and I -- I have to agree 

with you, Jim. If you're going into court of 
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law and you draw attention to evidence, it 

helps to have it there to -- so that we can 

look -- everybody can look it over and -- and -

- and look at it, but at any rate, I'm not 

going to belabor that topic. 

Now I hear for the first time that we have six 

new boxes of information about -- I guess it's 

related to Mallinckrodt. This is the first 

I've heard about it. And we need to go through 

these documents. I guess I'd like to know when 

were they discovered and how long is it going 

to take to go -- sift through these documents? 

DR. NETON: Okay. As Judson Kenoyer indicated 

earlier in the afternoon, the existence of this 

information was known for a while. However, it 

was interleaved among classified information 

and it took some time to get that information 

released. To the best of my knowledge, these 

boxes were not released until as recently as 

several weeks ago, so it's been in the last 

couple of weeks that we've taken possession of 

the boxes and we have yet not gone through 

every single box to identify the type of 

information that's in there. 

 MR. HORGAN: Who released them, do you know? 
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DR. NETON: I can't answer that. Judson 

Kenoyer may -- Judson, do you know who released 

the boxes? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Was the question who released or -

-

 MR. HORGAN: Yeah, he said that -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: What was the question? 

DR. NETON: It must have -- well, I'll let 

Judson answer that question 'cause I'm really 

not that familiar with the process. 

 MR. KENOYER: This is Judson Kenoyer. These 

boxes I believe were released after review from 

the ORO vault in Oak Ridge and transported to 

the Cincinnati Operations Center, and I've -- I 

had -- I've had a couple HPs starting to review 

those, and at the same time, after they review 

it, we will upload it to our computer system so 

that we can disperse the information. 

DR. NETON: Was it Department of Energy? 

 MR. KENOYER: It was -- these were in the ORO 

classified records vault, and they were 

declassified by DOE. 

 MR. HORGAN: Okay. Well, I guess the -- the -- 

all I'm going to say is if we could -- if the 

Board or the petitioners could get an 
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unredacted copy of the -- of that letter, I 

know you have Privacy Act concerns, but -- but 

guarding those, I'm sure that you -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm certain we'll make everything 

available that we get. 

 MR. HORGAN: Uh-huh. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Everything the Board gets, you can 

have. 

 MR. HORGAN: Now I'm not going to stay up here 

too much longer, but there was a comment made 

today -- I think it was a really good comment -

- by one of the Board -- I think it was -- is 

it Mars-- I -- I can't remember your name at 

the end of the table. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda. 

 MR. HORGAN: Wanda. I'm sorry, Wanda. And it 

was the more information we uncover, the better 

chance that we can determine the feasibility of 

dose reconstruction. I think that's -- you 

know, fair to say. I mean new information may 

come out over time that may help us down the 

line. But while time may be the Board's best 

ally in determining the feasibility of dose 

reconstruction, it is and it already has been 

the claimant's worst enemy. Thirty people have 
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died while waiting for their frames (sic) to be 

processed. A large portion of these claims 

have been waiting for over four years to get 

dose reconstruction. 

Now I'm going to reiterate something that 

Senator Bond said the other day. How long must 

these people have to wait to see if they can 

have their dose reconstruction done? Will six 

years be enough? Eight years? This Act was 

supposed to provide compensation for these 

people in a timely manner. Again, how long do 

they have to wait? I thank you for your time 

and I appreciate all the effort and hard work 

you put through on this. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And Tom, we thank you and the 

Senator's office for your ongoing interest in 

the program, and for raising some important 

issues tonight for us. 

Now let me return here to my list. George 

Allen? Is Geor-- is it George? Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: Good evening. My name is Mortimer 

George Allen, III. My father was Mortimer G. 

Allen, Jr. My father was in World War II in 

France and Germany. When he got out, went to 

St. Louis U., he became an accountant. 
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I'm here to address -- we've heard earlier to 

see -- earlier today about -- from nuclear -- 

former nuclear workers, family of -- families 

of nuclear workers. I'm here to address 

another class of workers at Mallinckrodt, the 

people that worked in the front office. 

My father answered to a Mr. Bruner and Mr. 

Thayer. He was in -- the head of cost 

accounting department. His job was inventory. 

He inventoried the nuclear material. He told 

me about carrying containers two at a time. 

When they became clo-- got closer than three 

feet together, they got hot in his hands. 

Sounds like nuclear fission was going on, to 

me. 

When they built the Hematite facility I was 

there for opening hot dogs and soda. I 

remember what it looks like. My father did 

inventory there on a quarterly basis. Then on 

a monthly basis for several years. He worked 

for Mallinckrodt from 1955 until 1970. 

In 1969 my mother developed tumors on her legs. 

She washed my father's clothes. She slept in 

the same bed with him. And in 1973 she died. 

Cancer was unknown, it was just cancer; that's 
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all I know. Medical records are not available. 

In 1991, in like February, my father turned 

yellow, jaundiced. We thought he might have 

hepatitis of some form. And he went to the 

doctor, doctor said no, you don't have that. 

They opened him up. They took a look and 

closed him back up. He had cancer of the 

pancreas and the liver. They gave him eight to 

ten months with chemotherapy and radiation, and 

they gave him three to five months without. He 

took the without. He died in July of 1991. 

I hope that this Board certifies all people 

that worked at Mallinckrodt, whether they 

worked in the actual processing plant or worked 

in the front office. My -- our car was 

repainted because of the fumes from this 

process, the same as George Mallinckrodt's car 

was repainted. My father's secretary and other 

women that worked in the office, their nylons 

melted on their legs from the acid fumes that 

reached the front office. I was told about 

having to blow a considerable amount of dust 

off the desks in the offices in order to do 

their work at that time because of that dust 

came into the office buildings. 
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That's all I have. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, thank you, George. Barb --

perhaps it's Kolsman -- Kolsman? Are we close? 

MS. KOENEMAN: Thank you. My name is Barb 

Koeneman and I'm here on behalf of my father, 

Clifford (unintelligible) -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Barb, could you give us the 

spelling on that, just for the record here? 

MS. KOENEMAN: Yes, it's K-o-e-n-e-m-a-n. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

MS. KOENEMAN: My father worked for 

Mallinckrodt from 1936 to 1966. He was an 

electrical foreman. He died of lung -- lung 

cancer in 1984. My story is much like all the 

others you've heard here, and I'm sure you hear 

them all the time, just a slight variation. 

I can't remember a time where he didn't have 

difficulty in breathing. He had chronic COPD 

before he was diagnosed ultimately with the 

lung cancer. He had a hard time walking from 

point A to part -- point B without getting out 

of breath. He had a hard time cutting the 

lawn, just simple things. 

He also suffered from these horrendous 

nosebleeds. His nose would start bleeding and 
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they would just gush and he would have to be 

hospitalized for several days at a time. They 

would have to insert -- insert balloons and 

expand them to get the bleeding to stop. 

Like I said, there's just slight variations 

from I'm sure the same story you've heard over 

and over. There's a lot of people who need 

your help to expedite. And I want to thank 

Denise for all she's done, because before 

Denise nobody really gave a rip what happened 

to these workers, and I thank God for Denise. 

That's all. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Also I have Rayetta 

Koeneman. Sounds like -- a family member, 

perhaps? 

MS. KENNEMAN: Hello, everybody. I'm speaking 

on behalf of my father, Raymond Kenneman. My 

name is Rayetta Kenneman and this is my sister 

Joan. My father worked at the Mallinckrodt 

Destrehan site, uranium division. Dad worked 

from 1951 until 1956. He became very sick and 

was hospitalized. The doctors told him to quit 

Mallinckrodt, for he had extensive lung and 

pulmonary complications, so Dad had to quit at 

the age of 36. 
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Dad died of lung cancer in the year of 2001. I 

was born in 1954. I was conceived in the years 

Dad was working at Mallinckrodt Destrehan site. 

I was a sickly infant -- infant and child. I 

have severe Crohn's disease with one-third 

colon and small bowel left, along with many 

surgeries, and I have to have another one in 

the near future. 

I have also had benign grapefruit-size tumor 

removed along with my ovaries and fillipian 

(sic) tube. And my breast, I've had cysts in 

the milk duct tract. I have many more health 

complications. I am in constant deal of pain 

and I am speaking on the behalf of all workers 

and survivors who have worked and gave their 

lives to Mallinckrodt. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Next, Joe 

Frazier. 

 MR. FRAZIER: My name is Joe Frazier. I'm a 

retired pipe fitter, Local 562, 41-year member. 

I worked for Sterns-Rogers* at Weldon Springs, 

1968 and '69; United Nuclear at Hematite, and 

Mallinckrodt Chemical Destrehan Street in the 

'70's for General Installation Company, which 

has been out of business for ten years. 
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 While working at Weldon Springs plant as a pipe 

fitter for Sterns-Rogers, our job was to remove 

existing pipes and equipment from the buildings 

and install a new system to produce agent 

orange. Some of the pipes and frequent -- and 

equipment contained foreign residue. At that 

time I still smoked, and we would be checked at 

the smoking area to see if we were clean. 

Periodically the monitor would tell us to take 

a shower and get clean clothes. These 

buildings were not clean. You could find small 

particles of that yellow stuff lying around. 

Before we left, Stern-Rogers broke up one of 

the concrete floors, put down a membrane and 

poured a new floor over the membrane. At that 

time I was maintaining the temporary heat and 

one of the monitors told me the -- came over 

there checking was that the radiation was 

already coming up through the new concrete. 

I believe this contractor took on more than 

they had ever realized, as the site was unable 

to be decontaminated. As a result, all work 

stopped and we were laid off. Before we left 

we were told ten foot of contaminated soil was 

to be removed from the site. The plant stood 
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vacant for a number of years while it was, I 

guess, reviewed and the plant could be cleaned 

up right. I would presume instead of removing 

the ten foot of contaminated soil, 75-foot 

mound was put over on top of it. 

 Construction workers are laid off when the job 

is completed, or in the case, terminated. The 

contractor takes his profits and goes home. 

The construction workers go on to other 

projects, wherever that may take them. 

I feel that I was one of the workers that fell 

through the cracks with the problem, as I fell 

in the time frame that no one was concerned for 

illness resulting from radiation exposure from 

1968 to 1974. I strongly feel this should -- 

and must be re-evaluated to include these 

missing years. My dilemma is it is not -- it -

- not strange that the Weldon Spring site was 

contaminated before I worked there, after I 

worked there, but not while I worked there. 

I have had 13 nose surgeries, 12 for basal cell 

cancer, one for squamous cell cancer. My 

father and his brother, which was my uncle, 

were also pipe fitters. They had no problems 

with skin cancers. They had similar 
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complexions and did not work around nuclear 

radiation. My -- my main concern is that one 

of these -- if I don't stay on top of this and 

get my checkup every six months that one of 

these skin cancer-- if I miss one of these 

things, this possibly could lead to something 

else, and I want to give my thanks to Denise 

Brock for her driving effort to win 

compensation for radiation-exposed workers. 

Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Joe. Next, Jim 

Manning. Jim? 

 MR. MANNING: I also am a retired pipe fitter 

and I first met Joe Frazier on that job at 

Weldon Spring many years ago. And I would like 

to tell you about some of my experiences out 

there. 

Now our job was to, in essence, demolish this 

plant. We took down pipe and took pumps apart 

and everything, and we were assured before we 

started there that all of these pipes had been 

flushed and there was nothing in them at all. 

And a lot of this duct work was supposed to 

have been cleaned out, and it's been my 

experience that -- one day I was on a ladder in 
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one of the buildings -- and these buildings had 

floors made of what is called stainless steel 

checker-plate. And what it is is a piece of 

stainless steel about four by eight feet with a 

diamond pattern on it to make it less slick 

when you walked on it. 

So I was on top of this ladder disconnecting 

some pipe when this liquid came out -- where I 

had disconnected, it made -- it had broken the 

pipe -- and it spilled on the floor below me. 

So I thought I had better get a bucket or 

something to catch the stuff in, whatever it 

was. So I went and found a steel five-gallon 

bucket, put it under (sic) the floor under this 

leak, climbed back up on the ladder, looked 

down at the steel bucket, and the bottom of it 

had been eaten out and the stuff was spreading 

across the floor. And I got a few drops of it 

on my thumb and about a day later I lost some 

skin where that had gotten on my thumb. It --

little further damage. 

And then also we took out a duct and capped it 

off with duct tape and plastic film, and this 

was loaded onto a car -- a railroad car on the 

old MKNT railroad* which is now the KT trail*, 
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of course. And this was put on open freight 

cars -- I guess you would call them a coal car, 

not these dump-bottom cars you see today, but 

an open freight car with a wall around it about 

four feet high. And it was sent off to -- we 

were told Oak Ridge, Tennessee for further 

disposal. 

Now in handling these materials, we used a 

crane to load them into this freight car, and 

occasionally the plastic film that we'd put on 

them with the duct tape would come off and out 

would come a yellow powder, which has -- I 

think has been identified as something called 

yellowcake. And it was not unusual for spills 

to happen. 

 And actually that's all I have to say. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Jim. Next, Clarence 

Snyder, Weldon Springs. Clarence? 

 MR. SNYDER: Clarence Snyder, electrician, 

employee number 10167. I've worked at -- from 

1957 to 1965 at the Mallinckrodt Chemical 

Company, Weldon Springs uranium division. I've 

graduated (unintelligible) Trade School in 

1948. Mallinckrodt Chemical Company was 
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contracted by AEC at Weldon Springs to process 

uranium ore. Early in 1940 the Destrehan 

Street plant, St. Louis, Missouri, processed 

regular uranium, later moved to Weldon Springs 

where enriched uranium was processed. So the 

company had a long history of (sic) our 

production methods were improved. The Weldon 

Springs plant had the latest technology, but 

lacked protection for their plant workers. It 

should have operated as a state of art facility 

with a clean and safe environment. Instead, 

Mallinckrodt was negligent and was operating a 

hazardous and dangerous radioactive plant. 

 Numerous blowouts and explosions occurred which 

electricians were expected to repair. High 

levels of radiation were monitored by the 

badges we wore warning the dosage amount, but 

did nothing to prevent airborne dust and 

chemicals. 

Electrical equipment failures were common from 

chemical fallout. The quality of the air was 

affected by the pot-room product, orangecake, 

where liquid was boiled down to orangecake. In 

another hazardous process open salt baths in 

the pilot plant were used to heat uranium metal 
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for spin casting. 

 Improved methods increased production, some of 

which turned out to be even more dangerous. 

can recall numerous incidents where electric 

furnaces were burned out when defective slag 

liners caused blowouts. A new method then was 

used known as vacuum induction electric 

furnaces. By the way, the old furnaces were 

also electric, but they were the standard 

electric furnaces. It, too, failed and six 

operators were injured in the explosion. 

No doubt Mallinckrodt managers received many 

awards for their work and accomplishments 

during World War II through the Cold War. The 

employees, however, received nothing -- no 

retirement, not even a thank you for our 

service nor our commitment to our country. 

I'm here to -- I'm here today to comment. As a 

former known employee of Mallinckrodt Chemical 

uranium division, Weldon Springs, Missouri, 

from start-up to close, and in my position as 

electrician witnessed most all day-to-day 

hazardous operations -- danger, blowouts and 

explosions. As electrician -- electricians 

health and safety rep, these gave grave 
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concerns were (sic) re-- were repeatedly 

reported, but safety procedures still lagged 

and caution remained lax and unenforced. 

Today, nearly 50 years later, we affected 

employees and approximately 70 percent 

survivors are still making a joint effort to 

fight for a substantial monetary compensation 

for the negligence and injustice this company 

allowed to exist, causing injuries, illnesses, 

suffering and early deaths to their employees -

- to their employees. Now we are requesting 

from this date on for compensation, while our 

diligent investigator, Denise, and our 

legislators can realize their (unintelligible) 

and the results in a most timely manner. 

Too much time and delay now has already passed 

and stagnating our claim and immediate po-- 

positive results should hereto be finalized. 

 I'm also speaking representing the 26 

electricians that I've worked with at 

Mallinckrodt. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Next we'll hear from 

Jean Sack -- Jean Sack. 

 MS. SACK: Good evening. Can you hear me? 

'Cause some of them I couldn't hear. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: You're doing well. 

 MS. SACK: Okay. My husband's name was Earl 

Sack and he hired in when he returned from the 

Korean Conflict -- they called it conflict then 

instead of war -- and he was at the Destrehan 

plant when he started and was there just a very 

short time and he was moved to the Mal-- Weldon 

Spring plant, and he was a welder. 

Now I didn't -- he didn't talk a lot about how 

bad things were to me, and -- but of course 

some of these men that -- electricians and that 

have talked about things. The only thing he 

ever said to me was that they had some problems 

at the plant and he would have to crawl around 

in there where this uranium stuff had been 

running all day. Now they had to shower every 

evening, but of course all day long, if you've 

got this stuff on you, you know, what good does 

it do? 

He died when he was 60 years old of pancreas 

cancer. And still at that time we didn't know 

that it was, you know, given to -- whether it 

was really because of he worked at Weldon 

Spring, because they kept saying every-- noth-- 

you know, everything was fine, there was no 
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danger. He died, my two -- I had three 

children, but my two daughters were expecting 

babies when he died. He never saw his two 

grandchildren. 

If it wouldn't have been -- the first -- the 

first time that I got upset about the slowness 

of things going on was when I read in the paper 

one day that they had -- the people -- that 

they were having a meet-- that they'd had a 

meeting for uranium workers in St. -- in the 

St. Louis area and that there was poor 

representation there. And I thought -- what 

meeting? I wasn't notified of any meeting. So 

I wrote a letter to the person in charge and 

says I hope you're going to run things a little 

better next time because I wasn't notified. 

Naturally there's probably no -- lots of other 

people that weren't notified. 

So I have to thank Denise because she notified 

all of us when she got these meetings together. 

My claim was done in -- let's see, when was it 

-- I guess when she had her first -- first or 

second meeting, whenever they had come out and 

said that the government had finally decided 

that the people that worked in the uranium 
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places should be compensated because of the 

dangerous situation, so that's when I fir-- so 

I went to the meetings and I filed a claim. 

My claim has been in for three years now. Dose 

reconstruction is pending. What a joke, as far 

as I'm concerned. If they would have saved all 

that money they've spent all this time and just 

paid the people that died with cancer or had 

cancer, the things that they said were -- were 

causes from being in ur-- around uranium, it'd 

be cheaper than what -- what we're going 

through right now. 

I just -- the other -- the other thing that I -

- the other time I got upset was I couldn't -- 

when I was filling out my claim, I couldn't 

remember the date that my husband started at 

Mallinckrodt. I knew the year, but I didn't 

know the day. So I wrote to the personnel 

office at Mallinckrodt and asked them what -- 

that I needed to know the date that my husband 

was hired at Mallinckrodt, that he worked at 

Weldon Spring and so on and so forth. Well, I 

received a letter back that said Mallinckrodt 

had no record that my husband worked there. 

Now, you know, he died, but you know, he didn't 
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work there. So that told me that I was in -- I 

was in for, you know, a lot of trouble. I was 

very re-- I was -- I was looking forward to 

receiving some compensation because of some 

problems and -- financial problems with three 

children and -- and -- and I still haven't 

received a compensation. Thank God I was able 

to work myself. 

 Thanks to Denise for getting us started, and I 

hope I receive some compensation before I die. 

Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, thank you, Jean, for sharing 

with us there. Gloria Bringer. Gloria? 

 MS. BRINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, my name is 

Gloria Bringer and I am standing here on behalf 

of my father, Frank Bogner*, Jr. He worked for 

Mallinckrodt for 41 years, from 1946 to 1987. 

He started at the Destrehan plant. When they 

started up Weldon Spring, he started up the 

plant. When they closed it down, he closed it 

down. Then he went back downtown. 

Not only did he work at those two plants, while 

at Weldon Spring he was also in charge of 

equipment for Lattie* Avenue, for the equipment 

at the airport site, and he was also sent to 
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Fernald, Ohio to set up the plant there. So we 

have five different places that he worked for 

Mallinckrodt. 

We just received a letter from NIOSH that 

stated the letter that received last year that 

said that Dad was in dose reconstruction was a 

mistake. They didn't exactly tell us why. 

There are four different reasons and it's one 

of those four reasons, or a com-- or a combined 

reason, but is it because he worked at five 

different sites and site profiles have not been 

completed for those five sites? Only Fernald 

and Destrehan have been completed. 

Well, at the rate things are going, it'll be 

the year 3000 by all -- time all five site 

profiles are done. My mom can't wait that 

long, and I'm standing here for her. 

Dad -- before he passed away in March of 2002, 

he made a listing. He's -- he applied in 

September 14th, 2001 for his -- his benefits 

from this program. And he made a listing and 

we went through his work history. He listed 

every single building he worked at at 

Destrehan, every single building he worked at 

at Weldon Spring. He could tell me which area 
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he was in each building and which elements he 

was exposed to. He was exposed to beryllium, 

green salt, pitchblende, uranium ore, orange -- 

orange oxide, brown oxide, radium, thorium, 

black oxide, barium sulphate and uranium 

residue. In working with uranium residue he 

did suffer an eye injury. However, the medical 

records from '46 to '66 are missing, so we 

cannot verify that -- at least Mallinckrodt 

can't. 

But see, Dad saved everything. He's got every 

single W-2. He's got every single pay slip. 

He's got every single note that was ever 

written to him and any piece of correspondence. 

So we've got signatures from people all over 

Mallinckrodt. And he also saved the Wise Owl 

plaque that he received from having his eye 

injury, and it has a date on it, so we have 

some verification there. 

Where are those records, that's my question. 

We've got the ones from '80 -- from '66 to '87, 

but we don't have anything before that. 

He suffered from heart attacks, seven bypasses, prostate cancer, two knee replacements, 

diabetes, Parkinson disease, blood clots in his 
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lungs, several strokes and finally respiratory 

failure. 

As I said, he died March 1st, 2002. On January 

9th of 2002 my mother was diagnosed with 

moderate dementia. The doctor said it was 

because of the severe stress that she had been 

under in caring for my dad. She never left him 

side -- his side for more than a half an hour 

or 45 minutes. She would make several trips to 

the grocery store because she didn't want to 

leave him. If -- on those frequent or 

infrequent times that she did leave him over 

that, she bought a cell phone. Mom is not a 

20th century person. She bought a cell phone 

and had it on the whole time, in case something 

happened to Dad and so she could get back to 

him right away. He always said the best $2 he 

ever spent was for their marriage license. 

 She also suffered quite a bit. I was born in 

'47, my brother in '50. Between '50 and '56 

she suffered two miscarriages. My sister was 

born in '56. She cannot have children. She 

almost died trying to have children. Mom had a 

heart attack. She had a stroke. She had 

triple by-pass. Right now she's in a dementia 
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facility. 

 We applied for these benefits. After Dad died 

we had to apply for survivor benefits. And in 

2002 we went to a meeting that Denise held, and 

it was the second big meeting, I suppose, 

'cause we had a whole lot of people there in 

St. Charles, and I talked to both the Secretary 

of Energy and the Secretary of Labor, and they 

both assured me that our benefits would be paid 

to us and our claims met within six to 18 

months. 

Well, ladies and gentlemen, that was October 

2002 and it's now January (sic) of 2005. 

Obviously, you know, people don't know what 

they're talking about 'cause they don't know 

what they're doing. I am tired -- physically, 

mentally, emotionally -- of being lied to, 

deceived, given the runaround by Mallinckrodt, 

by NIOSH, by the various Departments of 

government. This has affected our whole 

family. My brother lives in Seattle, my sister 

in Chicago, so I'm the only one here to fight 

for Dad and to take care of Mom. 

As one of the other people said, the government 

would have come out way ahead if they had just 
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paid everybody who worked at Mallinckrodt, 

because anybody who walked into those plants, 

especially Destrehan and Weldon Springs, 

deserved to get that money, because just 

walking in those places you were exposed to 

what was there. 

 I know several times Dad would come home and 

say we were up to our armpits in plutonium 

today. And I'd say really? And he'd say 

literally up to our armpits. You have to 

consider that Dad was a foreman. He was a 

supervisor. He had to go into all of those 

places and work with all those people to make 

sure that all that equipment was working 

properly. If something was wrong, they called 

him. He had his beeper. He worked night 

shifts. He worked day shifts. There's a lot 

of times that we don't remember my dad because 

he wasn't there. He was a company man. And if 

this is the way the company treats him, then 

you know, I don't care if Mallinckrodt goes 

down the drain in bankruptcy, quite frankly. 

No one in this whole world can be found who had 

the same job as my dad, because he was at so 

many places doing so many things. And so 
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therefore they can't do a dose reconstruction 

because there is no one who had similar 

exposure. So therefore I please ask you, in 

your recommendation, that Mallinckrodt be 

declared a Special Exposure Cohort and that we 

finalize this and we can get back to our own 

lives and go on living. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Next we have Joyce Humphrey. 

Joyce? 

MS. HUMPHREY: Thank you very much. I stand 

here on behalf of my father, Lloyd Humphrey, 

who passed away August 6th, 2004. He worked at 

Weldon Springs plant from 1957 to 1965. His 

first six months there he was in the -- what 

they called the pot room in the refinery, and 

then he worked in the warehouse where he 

unloaded rail-- railroad cars and delivered the 

ore in that to different places in the complex. 

On the list of cancers, I believe there are 22 

of them, my dad had four primary cancers. In 

June of 2000 he had his bladder removed because 

of bladder cancer. He suffered numerous 

urinary tract infections, which is common when 

you have your bladder removed. That eventually 

led to his death, along with colon cancer, 
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which he was diagnosed with in December of 2002 

and operated on. He had a recurrence of colon 

cancer in 2003 and had another surgery. He had 

skin cancers, one of which was over 35 years 

ago, so I cannot get the medical records for 

that, but he's had -- had two more since then. 

None of these cancers were cancers that spread 

to any other part. They were all primary 

cancers. 

We filed the original claim for my father in 

August of 2001. After he died in August of 

2004 I filed a claim as a survivor. To my 

knowledge we are in reconstruction right now 

for dosage reconstruction. I don't know how 

they can possibly do that accurately, but 

that's what they're trying to do. 

My dad said he would never live to see any 

resolution on this, and he was right, he 

didn't. I'm just wondering if I will. 

My dad was assigned a tracking number -- 1142 

is his number -- and I would like for the Board 

to know that my dad was more than a number. My 

dad was a World War II veteran who won five 

Bronze Stars -- he was awarded five Bronze 

Stars. He was a family man, a Christian man, a 
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good friend to many people. He was more than 

that tracking number. 

And I guess I would like to finally say, you 

know, please -- they were not told -- according 

to my father, they were not told how dangerous 

it was to work in what they were working 

around. And that wasn't right. Please, make 

it right now and give these men and women the 

compensation that they deserve. And I would 

like to thank you for listening to me and thank 

you, Denise, for everything you've done. Thank 

you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And thank you, Joyce. If I read 

this correctly, I think it's Donna Locker Long. 

Am I reading that correctly? Is there -- is it 

Donna Long? D. Long? 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) I think I -- I 

think I'm being called twice. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh --

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 

(Unintelligible) yesterday and then it -- said 

that I would wait until today (unintelligible). 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, possibly your name has 

reappeared. Okay, thank you. Yes, you were on 

this. 
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Jennifer Hunter Hernan -- Herner? 

 MS. HORNER: Horner. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Horner, thank you. 

 MS. HORNER: My name is Jennifer Horner, maiden 

name Hunter. I'm here with my mother, Freida 

Hunter. My father first filed his claim July 

of 2001 and in August he wrote a personal 

statement because he, like a lot of people, did 

not believe that he would live to see anything 

happen with his claim. So I'd like to read his 

statement since he is no longer with us to 

represent himself. 

(Reading) In the early months of 1957 I went to 

work for the Mallinckrodt Chemical Company at 

Weldon Springs, Missouri as a maintenance 

electrician. I worked for this company until 

March of 1963 as an electrician. During this 

time frame I worked on all phases of electrical 

work used in the process of converting uranium 

ore into uranium metal. This process was very 

complex, as it took various acids in the 

processing of this uranium ore. 

One of the most dangerous buildings as far as 

radiation was called the metals building where 

they put the ore in big ovens and baked it at 
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high temperature for several hours. 

And within the context, in the body of this, he 

goes into dimensions of the ovens and the 

equipment, the machinery, a lot of detail, down 

to inches, of what everything looked like. And 

then further down it says (reading) If there 

were any cracks or openings in the slag liner, 

the magnesium would burn through the shell 

outer lining in a split second, causing a 

blowout in the furnace or oven, usually 

damaging the oven elements and interior. The 

ore would run down into the pit where it would 

have to cool down from several hundred degrees. 

The controlled relays were near the back of the 

furnace on a rack, with electrical conduit 

buried in concrete alongside of the pits, the 

control cabinet near the front of the oven. 

The heat during one of these blowouts would be 

so intense in the pit that they would melt the 

control wiring in the conduit buried in 

concrete alongside the pit. 

 When these ovens would have a blowout they 

would be out of operation for a period of time 

and production would be down, so they would 

expect the craftsmen to get the ovens back in 
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operation as soon as possible. I've worked on 

these ovens on the interior while the uranium 

ore in the pit would still be glowing red from 

the heat. I have no doubt that while working 

on these ovens I was exposed to quite a lot of 

radiation. The building contained several of 

these ovens or furnaces. 

There was other equipment located in this 

building. There were some big (unintelligible) 

vertical lathes that were used to mill these 

blocks of uranium metal down to a certain size. 

And while the milling process was in progress, 

the sparks would fly from the milling machine 

cutting head. They had a liquid coolant 

flowing over the cutting head to contain the 

sparks. I know that there was a lot of 

radiation around these machines, and we had to 

do maintenance work on these machines. There 

was blocks of uranium metal sitting at open 

storage areas in one corner of the building. 

In a left rear corner of the building there was 

a large machine called an extrusion press. 

This machine had a large induction furnace and 

handling system to heat these large blocks of 

uranium metal to a very high temperature. They 
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would come out of this furnace glowing bright 

red. I'm sure that the men who worked in the 

buildings -- metal buildings and the other 

various production buildings were exposed to 

various amounts of radiation that would cause 

cancer and other diseases and problems of 

health. 

 I've been diagnosed with colon type cancer 

approximately seven years ago. The treatment 

pain that I have suffered has had a significant 

impact on mine and my family's lifestyle during 

this time frame. And it's signed Ralph O. 

Hunter. 

We had it notarized and it was sent off August 

of 2001. He did his phone interview, even 

though he was barely able to sit there he was 

in so much pain. He did that in April, 2002, 

and died a couple of months later, June of 

2002. 

I just find that it's amazing that he was able 

to recall all these details, even though he was 

not feeling very well, even down to 

measurements -- specific measurements of 

machinery and equipment, even down to the brand 

names of the machinery. And then recalling how 
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everything was still burning bright red in the 

pits. And it's obvious that he received enough 

radiation exposure to cause his cancer, and yet 

prior to the site profile NIOSH has sent a 

letter stating insufficient exposure. 

Our family believes, as well as I'm sure a lot 

of people, that these claims are being delayed, 

I guess waiting for the workers to die, and 

hoping that families and surviving spouses 

won't have the nerve or the knowledge to 

continue with the claim. I guess you're just 

hoping that they'll go away. These people are 

not going away. My mother is not going to go 

away. 

And I do have some concern about residual 

effects. I have a seven-year-old at home. My 

father's only grandson was born paralyzed and 

missing major organs. There's got to be 

something there. 

 You know, today's workers are protected by 

government agencies and by OSHA and protective 

equipment and conscientious employers who are 

held liable for anything that they do -- any of 

their actions. It's just a shame that 

yesterday's workers are not given the same 
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consideration and protection. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Jennifer. Ron Steiger 

-- Steiger, Steger? 

 MR. STEIGER: My name is Ron Steiger. My wife 

worked at Mallinckrodt from '52 to '56, '57. 

She went there right out of high school. There 

was a shortage of lab technicians because of 

the draft -- a lot of drafting going on into 

the Korean Conflict -- so they had to hire up 

some people. So she -- she was one of the 

chosen few. She worked there for six years. 

She left there because she was pregnant with 

our first daughter. 

In the meantime, I went in the Marine Corps, 

and I finally found out that she had a more 

dangerous -- she had a more dangerous job than 

I did. I could shoot at the person that was my 

enemy, which she couldn't. 

At the first doctor's visit for our last -- our 

last child was a boy. And at her first checkup 

at the pediatrician -- or obstetrician, they 

found a little lump in her throat, which was 

diagnosed as Hodgkin's. This was six years 

after she left Mallinckrodt. She fought it for 

ten years. That wonderful doctor at Wash. U. 
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did a fantastic job, and she was determined to 

live until her son -- who was born then -- got 

into grade school. So she made that. 

But I think there was about 16 hospitalizations 

over those ten years, different kind of 

radiation, different kind of -- there wasn't a 

lot of -- it was a new process and they didn't 

quite know what the drugs would do to you. She 

lost her bladder because of -- of the -- the 

effects of some. So it's just been a long 

struggle. 

And I just think we've been lied to too much. 

It's just been one big coverup after another, 

and as you get these letters, I've been -- I 

started this about four years ago, and -- and 

just about the time you think you're going 

somewheres, another letter'll show up and say 

well, you know, you're -- you're still here or 

you're still there. And then when they come up 

here and said well, we went from a D to a C or 

a A to a B or whatever this is, I mean that was 

another -- I thought what -- what is this, you 

know, this is stupid. 

 So gentlemen, I thank you for your effort, but 

you got to do better. And Denise has been a 
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fantastic help. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Ron. Andy Semradi --

Samradi? 

 MR. SAMRADI: I guess you're getting tired of 

hearing from me, but I'm here as a 

representative of the airport people. Now this 

man here, he said he was a contract worker out 

there. You're lumping everybody in on this 

Destrehan site, and these people deserve 

everything they get. But if I look around this 

room here, I don't know these people from 

Mallinckrodt, but it looks to me like you went 

from '42 to '47 -- none of these people are 

them. These are all people that started after 

'40-something, so what are they going to get? 

You know, they were out at Weldon Springs and 

this -- they should get it. 

But the airport people -- I'm telling you, I've 

got a fact right here. The alpha and beta is 

over the limits, and this was done in 2000. 

Now why are we fighting NIOSH? NIOSH should be 

working for us. I've had investigations out 

there and they come out and do nothing. They 

can't get into the spots and all -- well, 

there's a few TWA people here -- and we made 
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them run some tests years ago, and we can't get 

the answer. We can't get the answer from DNR 

about this water pollution. And I get the laws 

and authorities and everything here that tells 

you the Clean Water Act. Cradle to grave is 

what my company told me. I had the haz-whopper 

training. And when I go out and I pick 

something up and I release it into the air or 

into the stream, I'm guilty. But my company 

could do it and they could -- they could cover 

up all the facts and everything we've got. 

Now you've got this CF 29 1910-20, access to 

employees exposure records. I've asked for 

these. I can't get them. I contact NIOSH, I 

contact OSHA, nobody will do a thing. They 

won't make the company -- they say they have -- 

they don't have my records. Now this was in 

2000. Now these people here are trying to get 

records from '42. How are they supposed to get 

records when we -- and I can't get them now. 

And what is the penalty if they don't have 

records? It says you have to keep the records 

of anybody's employment for 30 years after you 

leave employment. Now where are my records? 

Now what's going to happen -- the airport has 
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got pollution out there. I'll guarantee you 

you've got pollution. I could show you. All I 

got to do is get somebody out there. It's all 

government, and that's what NIOSH inspector 

told me. He says this is all political. 

You're not going to get the records. 

Well, I was in on that new tire construction. I 

was in on that new east terminal construction, 

ate my arm up. I got breathing problems and I 

finally got a doctor at Barnes that told me you 

want to die or do you want to live? If you 

want to live, get out of this airport. Well, 

he had me on workmen's comp. My company fought 

me for -- 2000 I went on workmen's comp, 

supposedly. They been -- I still have not got 

a dime from workmen's comp. I have no sick 

leave. I was out over two years with no pay at 

all coming in. Me and my wife survived and 

that's what I'll do, I'll survive the rest of 

my life. I don't need them. But I could see 

the -- what you're doing to these people here. 

Now not you people, I mean. But NIOSH, to me, 

is fighting us. Why are they fighting us? 

They should be out there running 

investigations. And I'll tell you, there's a 
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couple of TWA people here that -- I've got a 

list here in my -- well, not here, but in my 

briefcase there, I know of at least 75 people 

at the airport that has got cancer, have died 

of cancer, and one of them here has got cancer 

now. And they're dying all the time on us out 

there. 

Now sure, this is Mallinckrodt people, but 

we've been the residual things that they dumped 

out there. I could prove truckload after 

truckload used to come out there. It went into 

Coldwater Creek, went into the Mississippi 

River. Everybody along Coldwater Creek has 

been affected by this. Now it's time -- you 

know -- oh, sure, you voted or are going to 

vote on the '42 to '47, that -- that's 

ridiculous 'cause those people are dead. There 

might be one or two of them here. These people 

here from '47 on, even to -- there's a few here 

that were working there in -- in the '90's. 

It's still there. 

Now if the airport has still got residual 

radiation, where's that? I've got samples that 

have got DDT in it that's been banned since '77 

that's at the airport. Now if anyb-- why can't 
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we get somebody to come and run tests and 

investigations to help the people? There's a 

thousand employees at the airport that should 

be involved in this. All those construction 

workers. The electricians, when they built 

that new control tower out there, they refused 

to go in it because the water would splash on 

them and they would put welts on them, burn 

you. 

 The airport police complained about the mold in 

their office. It wasn't the mold. It was the 

stuff right underneath the ground underneath 

them they were breathing. And we've got a lot 

of the samples and things, but we can't get any 

attorney -- I've been to the biggest attorneys 

around this area. Nobody will touch it. DNR 

won't touch it. Bill Renner* went to Jefferson 

City, talked to DNR, OSHA. I've been to 

everybody I can, and we can't get anybody to do 

-- and it's like a prison out there. You can't 

get on the property there. 

Now some of the employees could get there, but 

they threaten to fire them. I had a television 

station working with me to get samples. They 

threatened to sue the television station, TWA 
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and the City of St. Louis. And -- well, I lose 

my thought. I got brain damage and -- but I 

mean I'm going to survive. 

I've got my arm back. I -- and I -- but I'm 

not working there. I don't -- don't have any 

money from them. I've got my Teamster pension 

now. But the company fired me one day before I 

could self-pay and get $700 a month more on my 

teamster pension, so you tell me that they 

didn't set me up. And they fired me for 

absenteeism, and I was -- had a perfect 

attendance the year before and they give me a 

letter of commendation, and -- but they -- they 

didn't want me after 43 years, and I had the 

best job out there and everybody -- you could 

talk to anybody and they'll tell you that. 

But I mean should we get this -- like you got 

access to your records. Should all of us 

younger people get these records now, before we 

have to go through this same process of dose 

reconstruction a couple of years from now 

whenever our families want to -- we've -- we 

turn up with cancer and die? I can't get them 

now. How are we going to dose reconstruct what 

I got if I can't get them now? And these 
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people from NIOSH are going to come in here ten 

years from now and say oh, we're going to work 

on it and they're going to postpone it, 

postpone it and postpone it like they're doing 

for these people. 

Now I realize Weldon Springs is not included in 

your thing. The airport's not included. Hey, 

this is all Mallinckrodt stuff we're exposed 

to. And I could show you -- and if anybody 

wants to -- I'll put up my own money. If you 

want to -- if you want to come out there and 

give me a construction crew, I'll -- I'm not a 

betting man. I don't go to the boats and 

stuff, but I'll bet you every dime I got, I'll 

take a construction crew out there, I'll drill 

test wells, and if I don't find this radiation 

and these DDTs and these pesticides and stuff, 

I'll pay for it, but you pay for it if I find 

it. I'll guaran-- hey, that's as close as I 

come to a guarantee on it. But it's about time 

to pay these people here. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Next I have Frances -- I believe 

it's Scoeggins. 

MS. SCOGGINS: Scoggins. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Scoggins, Frances Scoggins. Thank 
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you. 

MS. SCOGGINS: My husband worked for Dow 

Chemical Company in Madison, and he died of 

cancer in '91. He found out in August -- in 

April of -- 20th, so on his 64th birthday -- 

that he had lymphoma, and he suffered agonizing 

death for -- from then until he died in July 

6th of '91. And I had -- we had six children. 

This is one of them. And I had two 

miscarriages and I think that was because of 

what he was working with at Dow Chemical 

Company. But he didn't tell us anything about 

his work 'cause we didn't know anything about 

his work. But he was -- he started at Dow 

Chemical Company in 1953 and we had our second 

baby in '54, and he was working there then and 

he's -- he was just a wonderful man and he was 

good to the girls. And he -- I said during 

that time I had two miscarriages, but that's 

all I've got to say. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Yes? 

 MS. BEST: I'm also a survivor of Ray Scoggins. 

I'm his daughter. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And tell us your name, also, 

please? 
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 MS. BEST: My name is Pamela Best. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Pamela? Uh-huh. 

 MS. BEST: And in 1996 I was diagnosed with RA, 

and then in 2002 I was diagnosed with OA. I 

have had a heart attack. I've had two heart 

surgeries, and I was born in 1958. And that 

was between the time -- 1958 until 1964 is 

whenever Mom had her two miscarriages. One was 

a set of twin boys and the other was a single 

boy, but she still lost them. And when she got 

pregnant with my youngest sister, she was born 

in 1962, and she found out she was fine then. 

But that was after everything. 

I don't understand why nobody told these 

workers how much damage this could do, not only 

to them but to their families. I mean this 

stuff can be handed down, generation to 

generation, and there's no sense in not telling 

anybody about it. That's all I needed to say. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Next I have listed 

Harry Durse -- or Durkso family -- family? 

Maybe several folks. Is it Durkso? 

UNIDENTIFIED #1: (Off microphone) Durso, D-ur-s-o. 

 DR. ZIEMER: D-u-r-s-o, Durso. Thank you. 
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UNIDENTIFIED #1: Good evening. We are the 

daughters of Harry Durso. He worked at 

Mallinckrodt from 1941 to 1972. He spent 21 

years at the -- is it called Destrehan plant, 

the one off of North Broadway, and ten years at 

Weldon Springs. He was a chemical operator, 

that was his title. We have a Mallinckrodt 

newspaper that has five photos of him in here, 

and it looks like the only -- he's stirring up 

-- I guess whatever, chemicals or something, 

and -- did you want to see it? And it looks 

like the only protection that they had at that 

time were some kind of glasses that they could 

wear over their own glasses or -- or whatever. 

And my father was diagnosed with cancer in -- 

let me find it now, where did I put it? 

UNIDENTIFIED #2: In '77. 

UNIDENTIFIED #1: '77? 

UNIDENTIFIED #2: Uh-huh. 

UNIDENTIFIED #1: Oh, in August of '77, and he 

died in August of '81. On his actual death 

certificate it was listed as a heart attack. 

He was in intensive care. He had several 

surgeries for cancer. And when he died he had 

cancer from his brain all the way to his toes, 
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probably. He couldn't walk without assistance. 

My mother used to have to rub his legs. His 

legs hurt so bad 'cause he had cancer in both 

his legs and that. That was bad enough. The 

doctors came out and told us he had ten minutes 

to live unless they would put him on life 

support. My father did not want that. I think 

that's the hardest decision our mother had to 

make is saying no life support. 

A few years later our mother died in November 

of '90 from cancer, and she also suffered a 

terrible death like he did. She had numerous 

tumors. She had had radiation implants put in 

her to try to kill the -- the tumors and 

everything and she also died a terrible, long 

death. 

Right now we haven't been diagnosed with 

anything, thankfully, and we hope that 

continues. But we thank you for your time and 

effort. And thank you, Denise. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Robert Mollinhauer? 

 MR. MOLLINHAUER: My name is Robert 

Mollinhauer. I'm here on behalf of my dad, 

Richard. I don't know the exact date he 

started, but he had 37 years. He was at the 
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Destrehan plant, shifted to Weldon Spring, and 

then back. And they made him retire after 37 

years 'cause he -- he had cancer. He was 

walking sideways. He had something called 

hydrocephalus. I've got all the records, 

filled everything out, and like everybody else, 

why are we waiting? I'm going on four years. 

Here, here it is here, the same thing, comes 

all the time. My question is why. And I know 

Denise is helping us, but why can't we just get 

paid. That's all I have to say. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Virginia Jones -- 

Virginia? 

MS. JONES: Hello. I will make this short. My 

husband worked for 32 years for Dow Chemical. 

It was Spectralyte* when he passed away. He --

he died in 1986 and he had cancer in the lungs, 

in the shoulder, the brain, various parts of 

his body. And he worked in a lot of different 

departments. He had one more year but he was 

going to retire, and that's all I have to say. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Richard 

Ralgens -- again, I'm having a little trouble -

- R-a-l-g-e-n-s? I may be reading that wrong. 

Richard -- maybe it's R-o-c-l-g -- Rocler, 
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maybe, Rocler? Anything close? I'm sorry, I'm 

having trouble reading this. Richard A. --

also from Spectralyte Corp. 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 

(Unintelligible) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) Thank you, 

though. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Linda 

Ridenauer? Linda Ridenauer not here? Okay, 

let's -- and also Donald Ridenauer, perhaps 

have left then. Paul Led, L-e-d. 

 MR. LEO: (Off microphone) Leo? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Leo, Paul Leo, is it, L-e-o? 

 MR. LEO: (Off microphone) Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, that's it. 

 MR. LEO: My name's Paul Leo. I've worked at 

the St. Louis airport site in the late '90's, 

early 2000, and since then I've developed 

respiratory problems and that's really all I 

have to say. There -- there was people getting 

sick on the job site, and I've learned that 

they did an air -- air quality study. They 

told the workers that there was nothing wrong, 

and it's come out that they lied, so thank you. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Betty Rode. 

 MS. RODE: I'm here to speak on behalf of my 

deceased husband, Ray Rode. He was from the 

Hematite United Nuclear plant and also he 

worked for Combustion Engineering, and it had 

formerly been -- in the beginning it was a 

Mallinckrodt plant, and they sold out to United 

Nuclear. They sold out five or six times 

during the time he worked there, from '67 to 

'88 that he worked there. 

He was a security guard. He was required to go 

throughout all the plant, throughout the 

radiation areas, the hot rooms, everything, and 

all the grounds on his rounds that he would 

have to make every hour. He was not given any 

proper uniform to wear -- I mean only a shop 

coat was all he was required to wear. No mask, 

no gloves, no -- nothing. And he went through 

all kind of contaminated areas. 

And upon retirement he contacted (sic) a 

chronic cough and when he finally went to the 

doctor because he couldn't clear this cough up, 

he was told that he had scarring in his lungs, 

and there was nothing they could do for him. 

They said there was no treatment for it, other 
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than a lung transplant, and they figured by the 

time that he received a lung -- received a lung 

transplant that something else would get him 

first. So they said that there was no 

beryllium at that plant, but I have reason to 

believe there was because a lot of the workers 

that worked there said there was beryllium 

there, and I think that he had that CBD or 

whatever it was, beryllium disease. 

 And once while he was working there he was -- 

the plant was secured over a weekend. He was 

the only guard on duty, and he discovered that 

the hydrous ammonia tank was leaking, and he 

went to report it to the guy that was over him, 

Arlen Nowak*, and he told him to go find the 

shutoff valve and shut the tank off because it 

was leaking so bad. He didn't want to get out 

in the cold to come and take care of it, so he 

asked him to do it, which wasn't his job, so he 

didn't know where the shutoff valve was and he 

said it took him three tries to go back and 

find where to shut the valve off at because it 

kept taking his breath. And he came home that 

morning and told me that he had almost got 

overcome by the ammonia, it was so strong, and 
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he said that he burned all the way down through 

his -- his chest, and he wanted to know if I 

had cough medicine or something he could take 

to relieve that. 

Well, after so long, the -- the burning quit, 

and then he had developed this cough, a chronic 

cough. He just hack, hack, hacked all the time 

and he didn't seem to have a cold or anything. 

So that's what sent him to the doctor 'cause he 

couldn't get rid of his cough. And the doctor 

said that he had striping all through his 

lungs. He didn't know what it was. 

We had to change doctors because of insurance. 

We changed insurance and so he was required to 

take another physical, and when he took the 

other physical later on, they told him man, 

what have you been into? You have got into 

something that you have inhaled and has burned 

your lungs. He said they have scarred them up 

something terrible. 

And so as years progressed, it got worse. His 

breathing got worse. His oxygen level would 

drop and he finally had to go on oxygen, and he 

was on oxygen full 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week. And it got to the point that later on he 
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couldn't even walk across the floor, he -- he -

- without assistance. He went from a healthy 

man of about 209 pounds down to less than 120 

pounds when he passed away, and he's been gone 

for two years now. 

And I have put in claims since 2001, and I have 

got rejections from Department of Energy, 

Department of Labor. I have done -- they give 

me the runaround -- get in touch with Paducah, 

Kentucky. I'd call them. They'd say go --

write to Colorado. I'd write out there. 

They'd say write to Seattle, Washington. I'd 

write out there. I've wrote -- and I get a 

stack of denials that big, they said because -- 

we're not paying because it's not cancer. 

 Well, it's just as bad as cancer. It scarred 

his lungs and it took his life. And I've got 

his lung X-rays there. And when he passed away 

I had an autopsy done, which cost me $2,000, 

and I didn't have to have the autopsy done but 

I wanted to know myself just exactly what was 

his problem. And I have a 15-page autopsy and 

it states in there that he was a perfectly 

healthy man. All of his problems was located 

right in his lung area, and it was due to some 
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toxic substances or gases that he had inhaled 

at some time or another that scarred his lungs 

up so bad. And yet I can't get any 

compensation because they say he didn't have 

cancer. Well, to me, this was just as bad 

'cause it took his life. 

And a lot of other people's got respiratory 

problems, and they can't get any compensation, 

either, because it's not cancer. Cancer is the 

main word. If you don't have cancer, you don't 

have any chance to get any compensation. 

That's baloney. There's a lot of respiratory 

problems and lung problems that's just as bad 

as if you had cancer. I'm not saying cancer's 

not bad, 'cause I know that's bad and I feel 

sorry for people that have it. But I also feel 

sorry for the people that are turned down 

because they don't have cancer. 

And he was a faithful worker down there. He 

worked 21 years down there, and they should 

have given him protection. These men that were 

working inside of these dangerous areas, they 

had proper clothing and they had masks and they 

had gloves, and they had boot things over their 

shoes. Ray went through all these. He -- he 
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turned doorknobs. He went through these areas 

and with no protection, not even a mask, just a 

shop coat like a doctor wears, a shop coat, as 

though that was going to protect him. 

And then he comes home with these same uniforms 

on, these same shoes that he tramped all over 

that plant with in areas, and I had to wash his 

clothes. And he told me, don't handle my 

clothes. Take something to pick them up and 

throw them in the washing machine 'cause they 

could have a lot of that contaminated dust and 

stuff on them. And -- well, I ended up with 

breast cancer, but I mean that was my problem. 

I didn't figure it was -- I mean I don't know 

what caused it, but anyway, could have been 

from some -- handling a lot of his clothes, who 

knows. 

But anyway, I think it's a doggoned shame that 

they're letting a lot of these workers go 

without any compensation. And they're -- 

they're just as sick as people that's got 

cancer, but yet they're not recognized by the 

health -- Energy or Labor because it wasn't 

lung cancer. 

My -- the man that did -- or pathologist that 
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did the report of his autopsy, he saved his 

lungs for a lung study, and he -- he sent it 

not only to him, but he sent it out to three or 

four other pathologists to get their idea on 

it, and they all came back with the same 

report, a toxic substance caused his scarring, 

burned his lungs up, from something that he 

inhaled. 

So I've been waiting now five years for 

compensation and they keep saying oh, you'll -- 

you'll probably get it, you'll probably get it. 

Well, I'll probably be dead. I'm 75 years old, 

and I can't wait forever on it. So I just hope 

you can do something that somebody else can't. 

Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: You've reflected -- you've 

reflected some frustrations that actually 

probably would ultimately need to be addressed 

by legislators since, for example, this program 

is -- as you say -- is very specific in terms 

of the disease that it addresses. The remedies 

that are often needed are legal remedies, and 

hopefully some of the Congressional people who 

may be here tonight will hear that. So your 

point is well made. Thank you. 
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Don -- I'm not sure if the last name is Foy or 

if I'm just seeing part of the last name. It's 

either Don or Dan, I believe. Is there a Don 

or Dan Foy or Roy, anything close? I'm -- I'm 

not able to read the middle part of this. It's 

either a middle name or the first part of a 

last name that I cannot decipher. Are there 

any Dons here that think they signed the list? 

If not, I'm sorry, I'm unable to read it. 

Okay, let me skip ahead. Maynard Wise? Okay. 

Donna Earlman? 

 MS. EHLMAN: (Off microphone) Ehlman. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, E-h-l, okay. I'm trying to 

read these writings. They're all different. 

Thank you. 

 MS. EHLMAN: My name is Donna Ehlman and I'm 

here speaking on my father's behalf and my 

mother's behalf. She's up here. I've heard 

these stories before. I know a lot of the 

people that have been talking. I was down here 

last year speaking on my dad's behalf. I'm 

very thankful that he's still living. 

He worked at the Destrehan plant from '52 to 

1958, and then from '58 to '63 at the Atomic 

Energy plant at Weldon Spring. He also, just 
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as this lady's father, wrote a letter because 

he really didn't think he would be here. He's 

been living the last five years, probably 

should have only lived two and a half years but 

he's defied medicine. He's had a lot of good 

care from my mother. But his lungs shut down 

on him five years ago and he was on a 

ventilator for a long time. And he wrote this. 

(Reading) I worked in the breakdown area 

picking up shells with a hoist. We would take 

the cap off with the shell laying in a cradle. 

Then we would cut the lime-lined shells out of 

the shell with a jackhammer as far down to the 

derby as we could. Then we would up-end the 

shell with a hoist and hammer on the sides and 

bottom of the shell until the derby or the 

ingot of uranium fell out. 

 The next operation was to break the lime off 

with hammers until you had a fairly clean 

derby, about seven or eight inches in diameter, 

five inches high, weighing about 95 pounds. 

Some derbies had a black oxide form on the 

bottom, and when we would slide them on a metal 

roller conveyor they would catch fire. If you 

didn't clean it off, it would burn all day. 
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Most of the shells were not being cleaned good 

enough, and I submitted a suggestion for a 

better cleaning solution and got $25. It was a 

pretty good one. 

I don't recall how long I was on that job, but 

following that I was put over in the refinery 

operating the metal dissolver. It was a very 

dangerous job working with scrap uranium from 

the blowouts, which was a fine material, very 

dangerous because it dissolves very fast. The 

larger the chunks are, the more solid and 

slower they dissolve. Fork truck drivers would 

bring predetermined loads to me on wood skids. 

I'd load them on stainless steel baskets into a 

tank of about 10,000 gallons. I would close 

the lid and start the acid spray over it. 

Too much fine material would cause a reaction. 

The lid would raise up and the fire would puff 

out. If that ever happened I was supposed to 

open the flood valve with water and it would 

sound an alarm to evacuate the refinery. 

 One Saturday morning material was set up for 

me, and it looked like too much fine stuff at 

one time. My lead man said run it. When the 

lid raised up four inches, it started belching 
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out fire, and I was scared to death. I turned 

off the acid, went down the ladder and flooded 

it. My lead man came out and said what the 

hell are you doing? I said I'm just doing what 

I'm supposed to do. Turned out my boss was off 

and the wrong material had been set out. No 

one communicated that to me. 

I had been trying to get into the machine shop 

so I wasn't on that job much longer. I ended 

up running a taper lathe, various other jobs in 

the machine shop. I worked the 4:00 to 12:00 

shift most of the time, and got a lot of 

experience working in the field with some good 

buddies -- Roger Aubachon*, Hank Padulsky*, Joe 

Mintier*, Frank Bogner* -- and his daughter's 

here -- Les White and Charlie Sheeley. 

We all worked together tearing down blown 

furnaces, which were very hot. Sometimes we 

would only stay in there for 15 minutes, 

sometimes a half-hour. Other times we would 

work on dust collectors, cleaning the bags and 

putting in new ones. I can't say that anyone 

ever checked them out before we worked on them, 

but I believe they were very hot. We would 

often spend a couple of hours in the dust 
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collectors. 

I remember when they drilled holes throughout 

the plant at Destrehan and told everyone they 

were checking for termites. I believe now, as 

I did then, that it was to check radiation 

levels because it was no longer safe. 

There was a gentleman here who talked about the 

radiation levels in the floor and how when they 

poured the new concrete into the floor that the 

radiation was penetrating that, as well. 

(Reading) I believe that's why they built the 

Weldon Springs plant. I didn't go out there 

voluntarily 'cause I didn't want to drive the 

75-mile round trip every day, but eventually I 

was forced to go or lose my seniority, so I had 

to go back into the manufacturing division 

because there were already enough people in the 

machine shop. 

This time I went to work in the green salt 

plant. I had to operate the fluid beds on the 

very top floor. There were two vessels there 

where they forced hydrogen to react with orange 

oxide to turn it into brown oxide. The heat 

was terrible, 145 degrees. 

The brown oxide was mixed with hydrofluoric 
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acid -- hydrochloric acid into three different 

screws, each one about 25 to 30 feet long. If 

the acid was added too fast, it would bridge 

the screw. Sometimes it was so bad the 

hydraulic pressure couldn't turn the screw. 

There were other times when the ribbons in the 

screw would break and a whole bank of furnaces 

would be shut down and the screw would have to 

be pulled out. It was a costly job and a lot 

of work. A couple of good panel operators 

could control the green salt by speeding up or 

slowing down the screws, but the jobs were 

always hazardous. We wore gloves, hardhats and 

goggles. 

When I went back to the machine shop I was 

exposed to many other types of contaminations 

working on the bullard lathes. 

I think this lady over here talked about those. 

My dad said (reading) they would cut off -- cut 

a curl off a 4,000-pound ingot of uranium. The 

chips would fall into a basin around the chuck, 

which was continually being flushed with watersoluble oil, but it would still ignite and turn 

cherry red. 

I changed the dies in the extrusion presses. 
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They would be burned black with a hard crust on 

them. I would straighten the mandrels and they 

would be black. It seems to me that anything 

in contact with uranium a certain length of 

time would turn black, and I think that the 

black oxide that forms is very hot. 

We were always packing pumps, changing and 

repairing machinery in areas where we had to 

have rubber boots, gloves and goggles on. I 

remember going to take out the packing on a few 

pumps, which was only referred to as "a place 

across the street" -- this was down at 

Destrehan. When we went through we had to 

neutralize our tools that we had used and throw 

them in a barrel. After that they were put on 

a raffinate truck and hauled out to the airport 

dump. It must have been really potent stuff. 

I know that some of these observations and 

opinions may not be completely accurate, but I 

believe they should be told. I believe it's 

possible -- I believe it's probable that the 

airplanes flying over the raffinate dumps at 

the airport may have been picking up radiation, 

and that that is why they wanted to move 

operations to Illinois. That's probably a 
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little exaggerated, but I've thought about this 

for years. 

One thing I do want to bring up is my concern 

that for years they have hauled waste through 

St. Louis with no thought for public safety. 

They tore down the Destrehan plant and hauled 

it out Highway 70 to 94 and dumped it into the 

quarry. After that they cleaned up the Brown 

Road site and hauled it out. 

The next site was the pit or lake that had some 

good material on the bottom. Somebody wanted 

to reclaim it, and they wanted to pump the 

water into the Missouri River. People in St. 

Charles County got wise and wouldn't allow them 

to dump it into the river for fear of 

contamination, but I think it was done anyway. 

I think the Department of Energy knew that they 

were in trouble for dumping in the river. 

Finally they made a place on the Weldon Spring 

site for storing waste. They built a new road 

from the quarry to the storage site that 

eliminated the well-traveled Highway 94 route. 

I don't know what all is completed, but I think 

they finally monitored the water and pumped it 

into the river. 
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I believe the workers and the public have had 

the wool pulled over their eyes for years. Now 

after 50 years they want the workers, who are 

50 to 60 percent deceased, to go by their rules 

and regulations for compensation. 

I worked hard as an employee of Mallinckrodt 

Chemical Company, as did many other people. My 

illnesses began after I was laid off. I've had 

several heart attacks when I was 45 years 

young. I worked as a machinist after that for 

29 years, but have always had problems with my 

legs and feet from the day that I started. 

I've had quadruple bypass, a second bypass 

surgery, a cholecystectomy, colon cancer, 

prostate problems, and most recently suffered 

Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome and was 

diagnosed with pulmonary fibrosis, years after 

I had stopped smoking. I was on a ventilator 

for three and a half, four months, to breathe. 

He's had a long road to recovery, and he's 

still very debilitated or he would be here to 

speak for himself, I'm sure. He can't -- he 

says he can't prove that this was all caused by 

radiation exposure, but he has many -- he has a 

stack of medical records, out of this world, to 
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support his claims. He's had good care from 

his wife, doctors and nurses, and without God, 

I don't think he would still be here to write 

this so that I could tell you of his 

experiences. 

But I think that people are really getting 

tired of the wait. I understand it's not your 

problem, but look around the room. Just look 

around the room. These are not people who were 

working at the Destrehan plant in the '40's. 

These are people who have worked there after 

that, and out at the -- out at the plant. 

Take a -- has any -- has anybody here been out 

to look at the -- at the site at Weldon 

Springs? The money that was spent to bury what 

was left of that plant and the teardown is 

unbelievable. I've been out there and I've 

walked to the top. And I'm telling you, you 

don't make a grave for something like that 

unless it's dangerous. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Next the Hanak family -- Hanak? 

H-a-n-a-k, perhaps have left. Let me continue. 

Debra D-e-t-- I'm having trouble reading the 

rest. This is office -- oh, this is the 

Congressman's office. This would be Debra -- 
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Debra Dornfeld? 

MS. DORNFELD: I don't want to talk, that's 

okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Debra. 

MS. DORNFELD: I don't need to talk. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Bernel Hower -- Howrer, H-a-e-r-er. Thank you. 

 MR. HERRER: Bernel Herrer. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Herrer? 

 MR. HERRER: Yes, sir. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Herrer, thank you. 

 MR. HERRER: At the age of 21, just fresh out 

of the military, I was seeking un-- seeking 

employment. I was hired by -- at Weldon 

Springs in 1959. I was employed till 1966. 

During that period of time I worked in the 

metals plant, sampling plant and the refinery. 

In the metals plant there wasn't a job I guess 

that I wasn't trained on. Some of the folks 

that have spoken before me that repaired the 

furnaces, well, I cleaned up after some of the 

blowouts in the furnaces. I worked in the 

breakdown area. Some of my good friends are no 

longer with us. Charlie Bradensteiner and I, 

we used to work in the breakdown area, worked 
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in the slag plant, and naturally the dust 

problem was quite severe, even though we wore 

small -- we called them respirators, but they 

really didn't amount to too much. 

When the crucibles and the furnaces had a 

blowout -- what we called a blowout -- there 

would be dust floating around in the metals 

plant from the front to the rear of the 

building. And unless you were close to it, you 

didn't even wear a respirator, you just -- you 

weren't asked to, you weren't told to. 

Fortunately I'm still standing here and able to 

talk about it, even though I've had two tumors 

removed, one off of my jaw, one off my back. 

I've had three stints. I've had an abdominal 

aortic aneurysm which was five centimeters, and 

I have reoccurrences with bronchitis. 

 1970 I married my bride, and I informed her -- 

after we were married, I didn't tell her before 

-- that -- I said look, I've made a decision, 

we're not having any children. I don't want to 

take a chance, after hearing some of the horror 

stories and witnessing some of my friends that 

had children that were born with heart defects, 

blind in one eye, and similar things. 
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So these are some of the things that 

fortunately (sic) we trusted our employer to 

keep us safe. Fortunately (sic), maybe we 

shouldn't have trusted them that far. But I 

will trust you folks to do everything you can 

to get this handled and to the people that 

really need the help. Please work for them and 

try to get this resolved. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Kimberly Smith Asfari* 

or -- am I close on that one? I'm having a 

little trouble reading the writing. Kimberly -

- from Mallinckrodt downtown. No? Billy J. 

Smith? George Allen? 

MR. ALLEN: (Off microphone) I already spoke -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes --

MR. ALLEN: -- (unintelligible). 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) Would you start 

over, please? 

MR. ALLEN: Thank you. I didn't come prepared 

tonight to speak. I didn't believe I'd be 

called on so I didn't come prepared, but anyway 

 DR. ZIEMER: Somebody put your name down. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, I did --
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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: -- when I came here, but I didn't 

realize that I would get called. 

Anyway, you know, I've got a copy of my 

father's security termination agreement from 

Mallinckrodt dated October 28th, 1957 that 

shows that most likely he had to enter the -- 

the processing areas or other top secret areas 

of the Mallinckrodt plant. What I've got in my 

hand is his employment file. Getting this 

employment file was like pulling teeth. It 

didn't come easy. Finally a vice president of 

legal at Tyco gave it to me after I really 

raised a stink about it. 

Two years later my sister found out about this 

program and tried to get my father's employment 

file, and Mallinckrodt told her that he never 

worked there. Luckily I already had it. 

What was in this file, though, was interesting. 

There -- I asked -- I asked this vice president 

of legal at Mallinckrodt what about the 

dosimeter badge readings from working at 

Hematite, from working at Weldon Springs. And 

I was told that all this information had been 

scooped up by the Department of Energy and -- 
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on several years prior to that and that it was 

locked up somewhere, and I couldn't see it. 

All my father's medical records were destroyed. 

He died in 1991. This was in 2001. Ten years 

later, they're all gone, couldn't find them. 

My father's employment record, it shows pay 

increases. It shows some conferences he had, 

but not once in here does it show what he did 

for the company besides being assistant 

comptroller. It doesn't show anything about 

working at -- at Hematite, which the DOL has 

now certified him as working there. It doesn't 

show anything about Weldon Springs. It doesn't 

show anything. 

And when I filed this claim, it was a couple -- 

a year or two later after we filed it, we got a 

determination from NIOSH. The NIOSH 

determination was based upon background 

radiation at the Mallinckrodt plant. And the 

amount of radiation they said he received was 

below the threshold to cause the cancer that he 

died from when I had a signed affidavit in the 

package from the comptroller of Mallinckrodt 

that my father had done inventory at Hematite 

and had handled this material on a monthly 
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basis. And this wasn't even included. They --

they just based their determination on the 

background radiation, which was based upon the 

background radiation at a similar plant, not 

even on the actual Mallinckrodt plant. 

I was irate, to say the least, when I got this. 

I phoned NIOSH. I phoned the Department of 

Labor. And a couple of days later they called 

me back and he said oops, we have a flag in 

your file. We need to do another telephone 

interview. 

I did another telephone interview. Then they 

sent me a letter saying that they were going to 

-- starting the dosage reconstruction process 

over again. This'll be the second one. The 

first one took what, a year and a half, two 

years? You know, this -- I'm -- we're on the 

second dosage reconstruction now because they 

decided that he actually was a Hematite 

employee, as well as a Destrehan Street 

employee. And this is just taking forever. 

Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Dan Meklovich* -- 

Meklovich -- close? 

 MR. MEKLOVICH: My name's Dan Meklovich. I'm 
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here representing my sister, Patrice Solomon, 

and myself. My father was a 34-year employee 

of Mallinckrodt, despite the fact that they say 

he never worked there, and I have documents, 

you know, that mention his name in the 

Mallinckrodt magazine and everything. Like so 

many of the other stories here, it's clear -- 

I'll defy any of you on the Advisory Committee 

to reconstruct your caloric intake for February 

8th, the year 1994. How many calories did you 

ingest yourself ten years ago today? How --

you can't do that. Given the absence of these 

records, you're asking strangers to do dose 

reconstruction on people whose jobs they didn't 

do, they don't understand, and more 

importantly, the records have been either 

inadvertently, accidentally or purposely 

destroyed. 

I have a degree in electrical engineering with 

a minor in nuclear engineering from the 

University of Missouri at Columbia. I know 

that the exposure that people receive in 

roentgens and all the other measures are real, 

because in this magazine it says I also worked 

at Mallinckrodt as a co-op student in the 
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'70's. I saw what my father did. I saw what 

these other people did. I worked with Frank 

Bogner. I know what these people did. The 

injustice is not Mallinckrodt losing the 

records. The injustice is not going to be the 

fact that they were lied to, because back then 

we didn't know. When I was there in my 

twenties working at Mallinckrodt, and studying 

this at school, I didn't know, and I was a 

student of about the dangers of nuclear 

engineering. The crime will be if you don't 

grant them Special Exposure Cohort status 

because you're asking a dose reconstruction 

committee to do the impossible. That's the 

issue, is it can't be done. You can't do what 

you don't have records for. You can't ask 

people to reconstruct doses when they don't 

even know what these people did for a living. 

Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Larry Nolte? Then 

Terry Mauzer? 

 MS. MAUZER: Hi, my name's Terry Mauzer and I 

worked at the Hematite plant. The reason I'm 

here to -- for my comments to this committee is 

hope to expand the time frame from the opening 
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of the plant in 1956 to the closing of the 

Hematite plant in June of 2001, simply because 

I don't know where to start to bring the 

attention to the Hematite plant in Missouri. 

I was employed as a radiation worker from 

February of 1995 to the closing of the plant in 

June of 2001. I had several positions within 

the company. My first exposure to 

hexafluoride, UF-6, was in the production and 

assembly plant. In this process the UF-6 

cylinders were turned from a gas form to 

uranium-enriched powder to form what was known 

as green pellets, which were then used in 

enriched -- sorry -- used in the plant -- I'm 

sorry -- placed in the millennium boats on an 

incanel* tray. They were then placed on ramps 

to enter what was known as a dewaxer furnace. 

The plant -- pellets then went through three 

temperature zones. They would burn off any 

impurities, causing a poof of smoke on regular 

-- on a regular basis. The poof would emit 

fumes and radium -- radon particles into the 

air in which we as an operator were constantly 

exposed. 

Also the plant would -- planter end, which this 
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area would be so contaminated with residual 

contamination that we'd have to clean 

constantly just to keep the residual 

contamination that we would have to -- to keep 

your dac* readings down, I'm sorry. This was a 

very dirty and nasty job. Usually the only 

protective clothing we had on were very thin 

cotton liners and also rubber latex gloves we 

used every time to -- every time -- God, I'm 

sorry -- every time -- every type of protection 

to try to keep from being exposed to the radon 

particles, but it was basically a no-win 

situation, so imagine if you can the horrific 

experiences as operators we had to endure on a 

daily basis just to keep the production going. 

 The pellets then went to a centering furnace in 

which the same basic concept as the dewaxer 

except in the process the pellets would go 

through a chemical change to cause the pellets 

to ceramatize. From there the pellets went to 

another operator in which they would dump the 

pellets into the machine, which then shook the 

pellets, causing a cloud of powder to encircle 

the operator, causing them to get dangerously 

high readings. I find this to have been a very 
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dangerous step to the fact -- due to the fact 

that 90 percent of all of our equipment was so 

old and outdated. We took a chance, first of 

all, in safety. Also we were endangering our 

lives on a daily basis to get the production 

out the door. As one supervisor had said to us 

all -- it's all about the numbers, not taking 

in consideration for their workers. 

From this point the pellets were being ground 

to meet certain guidelines for NRC and customer 

standards. The pellets would then be placed 

back into another -- a millennium boat, then 

transferred into -- onto a cart. While in 

transit some of the residual contamination 

would fall onto the table, causing even more 

exposure to the radon dust particles. The 

pellets were once again dumped onto a work area 

known as the shaker table. This would cause 

the pellets to chip and display a very, very 

thick dust on the work area. The pellets, 

while being shook, were -- formed -- would form 

a very visible cloud in which the operator was 

exposed to airborne particles on -- in order to 

align the pellets on a pre-cleaned tray in 

order to prevent cross-contamination expos-- 
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and exposure to the dust particles. 

 From there the pellets would then be pushed 

from the tray for inspection of any of the 

defects or for the correct enrichment. In this 

process the operator would use a rolling table 

which would turn each roll of the pellets onethird circumference per rotation in order to 

get a complete and true inspection. The 

operator would slide the pellets back onto the 

tray. Keep in mind the contamination would 

still be at the work area, causing exposure to 

the dust particles once again from this point. 

 The operator would then transfer the trays onto 

carts to be sent to a cardex* machine. In this 

process the operator would load the pellets 

into a deep pan to then have the pellets go 

through a bulk dryer. In this process the 

pellets would be held in what was known as a 

bay. The bay would -- kept it at a certain 

temperature in order to be sent to the rod line 

assembly process. 

I can remember several times the bays would get 

jammed, and as an operator were once again told 

to solve the problem, so the operator, 

following instructions of management, would go 
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into the equipment, un-jam the bulk dryer, not 

even realizing dangerously high levels of 

alpha, beta and gamma radiation they had been 

exposed to in order to keep production flowing. 

Once the pellets went to the rod line they were 

then placed into the rods in which they would 

eventually go to an off-site reactor which was 

used in the process of making electricity. 

Also some of the operators were required to do 

what was known as a core sample. In this 

process the cans of pellet or pow-- powder 

would be placed into a hood on a calibrated 

scale in order to get approximately 25 grams of 

powder or pellets. An operator had to use a 

thieve (sic) to get a true homogenous sample 

and the powder and pellets would be placed into 

a plastic vial, securely closed. This 

procedure would cause a high radiological 

exposure, I'm sorry, and then the sample would 

be sent off to our lab technicians for analysis 

to find the true U content. 

I had then worked in the recycle recovery 

department. In this department I have been 

exposed to an oxidation reduction and pyro 

runs. In this process the pellets and material 
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would be changed from its original form using 

different types of chemicals such as ammonium 

hydroxide, caustic soda, potash and green salts 

to cause a chemical change in the components, 

causing the product to change its chemical form 

to make uranium isotopes of U-235 and U-238. 

In this particular department not only was I 

being exposed chemically, but I discovered I 

was being exposed to residual contamination 

from the Mallinckrodt, which was -- which as 19 

-- 97 percent uranium dioxide from the previous 

years of ownership. We were also required to -

- to bathe, drink and wash our hands in water 

that little did we know would be tainted with 

technetium. 

I have stated several ways I feel I have been 

ex-- I have been exposed to radiation. Pellets 

and dust were constantly lying on the floors, 

tables and in hoods. Around filter banks we 

were told to clean up the material several 

times per shift. We used cotton liners and 

latex gloves for personal protection. It was a 

joke. The contamination materials would go 

through the gloves into our skin. We also wore 

white coveralls to protect our bodies from 
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exposure, but this thin cotton garment as 

useless for any type of protection. We were 

also required to wear lapel monitors, dosimetry 

badges, which another ridiculous form of 

protection. Although we were required to wear 

a special breathing apparatus, 75 to 80 percent 

of the time the batteries were dead due to the 

improper protective gear. I know I was highly 

exposed to the radiation emitted from the 

pellets and the dust particles. 

When my lapel monitor was working I would come 

up with a high U count. This would happen 

many, many times. I'm certain at these times I 

was highly exposed. I have been exposed to 

fumes and such a gray -- a thick gray cloud of 

smoke while attempting to retrieve my full face 

respirator from health physics. Please -- what 

is wrong with this scenario. I have been -- I 

have even suggested that it would be a good 

idea to place the masks in our department so we 

wouldn't have to walk through the fumes and 

contamination to get the mask that is supposed 

to keep from receiving radiation exposure. 

From supervisor to upper management, no one 

would listen. 
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One day two of our coworkers were changing out 

a filter bank while their protective gear -- 

one of the employees was removing the filter 

when they discovered an abnormally huge amount 

of contaminated powder. This was considered a 

criticality because there was over 35 kgs of 

powder, which is an over-permissible exposure 

limits. We were all highly exposed to the 

radon molecules. I'm sure there are many more 

instances in which we were all exposed. 

I'm 25 -- I was 25, engaged to be married in 

1995. I had been diagnosed with cervical 

cancer. T his was a very devastating -- to me. 

I had thought I had a great job and a future, 

to only have my ability to have children taken 

away from me to have a complete hysterectomy. 

To me, the nature of -- nature -- natural end 

of childbearing years is -- in a woman is 

menopause, not hysterectomy. 

These cases I've cited are the ones I'm aware 

of. I'm convinced that there are many more 

that haven't come to light. There are many 

former employees who are of childbearing years, 

both men and women. To what extent with their 

repercussions of working at the plant represent 
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itself in offspring to come. We wonder why no 

one is even acknowledging the Hematite location 

when we have just as many illnesses and deaths. 

In all my research I have no -- found no 

information that anyone is doing anything to 

help the community and the employees who 

desperately need the help in getting the time 

frame changed in order to receive the 

compensation for all we've been through. Thank 

you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. There's just a couple 

more, folks. I know it's getting late, but 

Judy Shanahan? Is Judy still here? Judy. 

MS. SHANAHAN: Here's a picture of my family. 

I'm 52 years old and I'm one of five children. 

My mother, widowed for the last 46 years, is 

88. A few weeks ago my husband told me about a 

group that was meeting at the Columns. It was 

the survivors of -- it was for the survivors of 

cancer victims who had worked at Mallinckrodt 

Chemical Company. Little did I know I was in 

there for the shock of my life. 

Denise was great. I was glad to have here 

there with me. Until this time it was my 

understanding that my father had died of 
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natural causes, if that's what you call it -- 

call cancer of the colon, stomach and 

intestines. I had no reason or cause to 

believe otherwise. It's what we were told. 

We were ages five, six, eight, 11 and 12. Mom 

was 43, Daddy was 46. For over a year before 

he passed away he was home in bed sick. We 

were seldom allowed into his room. We had to 

be very quiet when he was sleeping. My 

brothers, sister and I were regularly sent to 

visit relatives and friends that year. The two 

older boys, Ken and Jim, stayed at home to help 

Mom. 

My brothers remember Mom having to help Daddy 

walk around the house at least once a day to 

prevent bedsores. He was in a tremendous 

amount of pain. Mom had to give him shots of 

morphine. Due to the pain and the morphine he 

changed from a gentle, loving, kind man into 

someone he himself loathed. He was frantic, 

knowing he was leaving his wife holding the 

responsibility of raising five children. He 

felt he was personally responsible for all that 

had gone wrong, and that he was a failure in 

his life, letting down those he loved. 
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 During this time Mom enrolled in night classes 

to renew her teaching certificate. She already 

had a master's degree in education. On top of 

taking care of a dying husband, five little 

children, she had to plan for our future. My 

mother did not want friends, his mom's parents, 

hers, siblings or any other relatives to know 

the seriousness of his illness. My mother 

agreed. They did not want the intrusion of 

others making suggestions on how they should 

deal with it, or their pity. He wanted to live 

out his life as best he could with his wife and 

children. Any good hours of the day he wanted 

to share with them. 

He felt a terrible guilt about leaving Mom with 

five dependent children. He believed that he 

had failed those he loved. It was all his 

fault that their lives were going to be 

terribly difficult. 

A week after Daddy died, Mom began her search 

for a teaching job. Several schools turned her 

down. Many told her a woman with five children 

couldn't possibly hold down a job. The 

superintendent of Ritner* school district 

thought differently. He thought a woman who 
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could look for a job a week after burying her 

husband was someone he could take a chance on. 

She was hired, and taught English for over 25 

years. 

Knowing she couldn't just get up and leave five 

children home alone to get off to school, she 

hired someone to come in each morning. Her 

name was Mrs. Crider. She came in, made us 

breakfast, packed our lunches and got us out 

the door. It was the responsibility of the 

oldest sibling to get the younger ones to 

school and back. 

A friend of Mrs. Crider's asked why Mrs. 

Shwiller* never got married. After all, she 

was pretty, well-educated and very smart. Mrs. 

Crider told her yes, she is very pretty and 

intelligent, too. However, only a crazy man 

would marry a woman with five children and Mrs. 

Shwiller wasn't going to marry a crazy man. 

My Grandpa Bud put all five children through 

college during the depression. Four of his 

children were girls. There's a story that 

Grandpa's friends would often criticize him for 

sending his girls to college. They said George 

Buck, why are you -- what are you, crazy? Why 
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would you work to send all those girls to 

college when they're just going to get married 

and have kids. Unwaveringly and sincerely, 

Grandpa would answer, "And I couldn't think of 

a better reason to have an education." 

Thank God for Grandpa's wisdom. Without Mom's 

education we could have never stayed together 

as a family. 

Daddy was a cost accountant for Mallinckrodt. 

He worked there from 1937 to 1958. Last week 

while looking through my mom's records, I found 

a manuscript he had prepared on the chemical 

industry for publication to the National 

Association of Cost Accounting. The 

instructions for 'paring (sic) this document 

included a guide stating, and I quote, In 

deciding on the type of manuscript which will 

have the greatest possibility as a publication 

and earn the greatest credit in the Stevenson* 

trophy competition, you should include actual 

case studies of how we do it, articles dealing 

with specific experiences relating to any phase 

of manufacturing. 

 Upon reviewing my father's manuscript one could 

see that performing his duties as a cost 
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accountant for Mallinckrodt he was clearly 

required to frequently visit the physical plant 

where the chemicals were being processed. Our 

brother can -- my brother can remember Daddy 

was sometimes so red and swollen -- no doubt 

from radiation exposure -- that some days he 

couldn't even get his pants on. His doctors 

told him it was 'cause he had a skin 

irritation. Put some lanolin on it. This was 

long before he was actually diagnosed with 

cancer. 

 You'll be happy to know, however, we -- I found 

another letter stating we have been 'vised 

(sic) by the national headquarters that your 

manuscript entire develop a material control 

program in the fine chemical industry has 

earned 80 points. Congratulations, you are now 

the second-highest in points in the St. Louis 

chapter. I guess I should be proud. 

My mother kept great files, many of which, 

until the last couple of weeks, I had never 

seen. Allow me to share a few clips from 

letters I have been reading. In a resolution 

passed by the board of directors from NECA, 

Kenneth Shwiller served on the board for eight 
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years as director of the meeting and a general 

member of the board for 14 years. He had 

countless friends throughout the United States 

because of his jovial personality, optimism and 

the spirit of cooperation. As a formal 

expression of our affection, love and esteem, 

we shall miss the able counsel and admirable 

personal qualities, but his memory shall abide. 

Quote from a church newsletter written by the 

choir director, Kenneth was the ideal choir 

member, perfect tenor voice, fine choir 

background, excellent attitude and an interest 

that went beyond Thursdays and Sundays. We 

will all remember his quiet wit and chuckles, 

his great kindness towards everyone. I 

particularly shall remember how he gazed 

heavenward when I would ramble on and waste 

time. My muddled mind fails to grasp the 

reason for taking a man at the height of his 

life from a wonderful family who needed him. 

A letter from a minister to Ada and his 

children -- her children. Death is like an 

ocean. It is too big to see across. No matter 

how we strain our eyes to look across the 

waves, we cannot see land. Even the greatest 
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scientists with the finest telescope gazing out 

across the water for days and days can't see 

the opposite shore, and might shake his head 

and say there isn't any. Daddy is gone but 

Mother is still with you. You are fortunate 

that God has given you such a brave, 

courageous, loving mother to guide you and help 

you through the days to come. 

The newspaper article carrying his obituary, it 

states, vice president of the National 

Association of Cost Accountants died at his 

home after one year's illness. Cost accounting 

department for Mallinckrodt Chemical Company. 

Survivors include wife Ada Buck and five 

children. 

Directly above his obituary was an article 

titled Examination for Cancer Can Stop Worries. 

It states waiting helps no one. Examination is 

the only answer. If all exams are negative, 

everyone is relieved of worry. If something is 

discovered, early treatment will mean a cure. 

I just wonder how my mom felt when she read 

that article placed directly above his 

obituary. 

Mom kept all the letters and cards and flowers 
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she -- and flowers she received. She kept a 

record of the thank you notes she had written. 

They totaled 118 cards. Can you imagine 

grieving for your husband, taking care of five 

children, looking for employment and finding 

time to write 118 cards? Unbelievable. 

 Mom never remarried. She told us she already 

had the best, even though it was just for a 

short time. She had five children to take care 

of, and didn't have time after Daddy died, so 

the -- oh. After Daddy died, so did the 

demonstrative side of my mother. Until 

recently none of us had ever heard her tell us 

she loved us, nor did we see warm hugs. 

However, we never questioned her love for us. 

We always knew she did. 

Daddy had two wishes when he died: Keep us all 

together as a family, and secondly, put us all 

through college -- tall orders for a widow with 

five children, but you (unintelligible) mother. 

Three of her children graduated from college. 

Ken has his PhD. at Buena Vista University and 

is the dean. Jim has his undergraduate and is 

the owner and publisher of a magazine called 

"50 or Better" in Kansas. Jane, like Mom, has 
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a master's in education and teaches students 

with special needs. My brother Paul is a 

mailman, and I went to Stanford* Brown Business 

College and hold a position of executive 

assistant to the president of Lynwood*. My 

mother fulfilled a dying man's wishes. 

After the meeting at the Columns I had to tell 

my siblings what I had learned. They all live 

in different states, so I had to do it by 

phone. Those were the hardest calls I've ever 

made. To learn and pass on that your father, 

whom you believed had died naturally, was in 

fact stolen from you is tragic. To have to 

pass this sadness on to my siblings was 

heartbreaking. 

Denise asked me to represent my family today. 

I asked my brothers and sisters to tell me what 

they wanted to share. Here are their comments. 

 Many soldiers were killed in combat. Others 

making a bomb. It's as though he was there. 

Ken told me -- Dad talked to me a lot about 

taking responsibility. He would get angry with 

me for not being responsible enough. During 

that time Mom told him they were in a 

partnership. Ken was the oldest and she needed 
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him to share the responsibility of taking care 

of the other children. When she had to go to 

the grocery store, she told him he was in 

charge. His reaction -- oh, my God, I'm in 

charge? 

Jane said hearing the news was like Dad had 

been taken away all over again, only this time 

he had been killed through negligence and 

ignorance. She had accepted it, but now must 

learn to accept it all over again, but in a 

different way. Like me, none of us can even 

think about it without hurting. This is not 

something you want to relive. 

Jim remembers how Mom -- how he could hear Mom 

crying and -- not sobbing, almost wailing late 

at night when she thought we were all sleeping. 

He didn't have any idea of what to do to 

comfort her. He also remembers going to talk 

to Dad and seeing Mom inject him with morphine, 

and then having to help walk him around the 

house, screaming in pain. 

My youngest brother, Paul, really doesn't 

remember him much because, like me, he was too 

young. He is devastated to learn that we 

didn't have to lose him. We could have had a 
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father all these years. His wish is for all of 

us to sit down and share what we know. That is 

something we've pretty much always avoided 

doing. It hurts. 

I remember very little. I would be better off 

telling you how it affected our lives. Daddy 

put himself through business college. He made 

a pretty good salary, and I'm sure our lives 

would have been much different in so many ways. 

Mom had to go to work full time to support us, 

and we lived very frugally. Mom was good at 

stretching the buck. 

My uncle worked for Pet Milk Company and 

supplied us with all the powdered milk you 

could ever want, and more. You wouldn't 

believe what you could make with powdered milk. 

I could do a testimonial. I could tell you 

what was under the Christmas tree every year of 

my life growing up. My older brothers jovially 

called every year the Fruit of the Loom 

Christmas. We went to the Muni Opera on summer 

nights and sat in the free seats. There were 

programs at the art museum that were free and 

Mom would take us there often. We were all 

scouting -- in scouting, youth sports, but 
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church was the most important part of our 

upbringing. All five of us have been 

confirmed. We attended Sunday School and 

church every Sunday except occasionally when my 

brothers skipped out and went down to the donut 

shop until the minister caught them. 

Mom loved us all, treated us all as 

individuals, but equally. She supported us and 

did all she could to make a good life for us. 

 When I graduated from high school my boyfriend 

asked me to marry him. As tradition would have 

it, he had to ask the parent. He did. Mom 

said no. She told us that Daddy's dying wish 

was for us all to go to college. How could I 

argue? I believe that was the one good thing 

caused by Daddy's death. I didn't marry my 

high school sweetheart. 

I met the most wonderful man in the world, and 

from what I know of my father, he mirrors him 

in many ways. For that, I'll be eternally 

grateful. 

When I was 29, newly married, living in 

Chicago, my husband and I decided to move back 

to St. Louis. I knew my relationship with my 

mom had to change if I returned, so I went and 
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saw a therapist. You see, at 29 I had never 

really put my dad into his grave. I carried 

him with me all the time. All I had to do was 

think about him, and it would bring tears. The 

therapist said let's do some role-playing. I'd 

drive back down to St. Louis, and I can 

remember one time sitting on the back porch 

with Mom and asking her, what traits of Daddy's 

do I have? Her response, none. I cried all 

the way back to Chicago. I knew that her 

response was not in any way intended to hurt 

me. It was truly the only response she could 

give. I left not angry, but terribly confused. 

I visited my Aunt Patty and upon return to 

Chicago we sat on the rocks looking out onto 

Lake Michigan. She relayed to me the traits 

that I possessed of my father's. My heart 

filled with warmth and I was at peace. She 

told me it was too difficult for my mom to 

express these types of feelings, or bare her 

soul in such a way. After this I was able to 

bury my father, knowing I carry him with me, 

and I began understanding my mother and 

appreciating her in a whole new way. Today we 

have a wonderful relationship. 
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We have been robbed. My father was taken from 

us, not by natural causes, but by a chemical 

that Mallinckrodt Chemical Company needed to 

produce for our country. And by the way, Daddy 

joined the Army after Pearl Harbor, but was 

released as unfit for service almost 

immediately because of something odd about his 

back. So he joined the Navy and was six weeks 

into basic training at Great Lakes when the 

Navy doctors discovered the secret. Isn't it 

ironic that in a way he did give his life for 

his country, but instead of perhaps dying an 

almost immediate death on a faraway battlefield 

or at the high seas, he had to suffer over 400 

pain-filled nights and days, knowing his health 

was gone and he, too, would die soon. 

Little of Daddy I really remember. Most of 

what I know is through the eyes of others. He 

was a kind man, a religious man who came home 

from work and hugged his wife and children. He 

made sure we said our prayers before dinner and 

at bedtime. In his final year bedtime always 

included a reminder of Christ's love for us. 

He had a beautiful voice and loved to sing. He 

was a fine athlete, winning many amateur tennis 
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tournaments. He was the catcher on the 

Mallinckrodt softball team. He was a gentle 

man who was loved by many. Having him die once 

was awful. To know that he was stolen from us 

after all these years is worse than I can ever 

begin to convey. 

 Mother lived frugally and saved as best she 

could. These days she suffers from dementia 

and can no longer live alone in the little 

house where we all grew up, the first and only 

home Mom and Dad ever bought, the same place my 

father died. Four weeks ago we moved her into 

a retirement home and her mental health took a 

dramatic downward spiral. We must now move her 

to an assisted living facility. She exists on 

Social Security and retirement funds from her 

teaching years, and has only a small cash 

reserve. 

Our mother is a proud, independent woman. The 

thought of possibly relying upon her children 

to pay for her care is devastating for her. 

The funds to which she is entitled would remove 

this enormous financial burden from my mother. 

She would be able to independently afford the 

type and quality of care she needs and truly 
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deserves. It would give her the financial 

stability she has never had due to her great 

loss. I certainly hope those in control of 

these funds will expedite the process for all 

the survivors. It would be an inconceivable 

tragedy for her to spend the rest of her life 

worried about her finances, when her relief is 

tied up in the red tape of government. 

Death is truly like an ocean. It is a 

bottomless sea of pain with waves of emotion. 

Only one can imagine what is on the other side 

of this vast emptiness. The other day Mom 

asked me where is Kenneth? Why did he leave 

us? Can anyone here please give me that 

answer, because I'd like to know. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Judy. Very wellstated. Frank Tyndale. Is Frank still here? 

 MR. TYNDALE: Howdy. My name's Jim Tyndale. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Jim? Okay, Frank --

 MR. TYNDALE: Jim. Yeah, Franklin's my 

official name. Jim's what everybody calls me 

by. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, gotcha. Thank you. 

 MR. TYNDALE: A little bit younger than most of 

the folks you've seen. I hired in at the 
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Hematite plant in '92, worked there until 2001. 

I'm going to kind of help out with a coup-- 

Mallinckrodt folks, hopefully. I remember one 

of the first jobs I had when I was there, they 

put me out in a pit about a quarter of the size 

of this room and they had it divided up into 

three-foot squares. And they said Jim, we want 

you to take an inch to three inches off of each 

square and we're going to test them and see 

what kind of radiation or anything we get out 

of them. 

Well, they had me dig several of the squares to 

about waist deep, then they come out and said 

well, we're going to dig core samples, and they 

went down 40 to 60 feet and still found stuff 

down there. They said well, you're not going 

to do it with a shovel, we'll just come back 

and do it again some other time. It's still 

like that out there now. It's never been 

cleaned off so that's still there. 

 There's pipes that they took out of oxide and 

before that was done with the submarine fuel, 

the real high enrichment, that those pipes are 

still buried out there. And I listened to a 

gentleman speak about what they did with them, 
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put them in plastic bags with duct tape, and 

that's exactly what they did with them, put 

them out there. And it's still out there and 

probably not going to last the whole lifetime, 

you know, of everything. I'm sure it's 

breaking down and that's what's in the water 

out there now is why they've plumbed water all 

the way to the -- the Hema-- Hematite 

facility's kind of out of the way of everyplace 

else. It's, you know, three to four, five 

miles from the closest town and they've plumbed 

water all the way out to there because of the 

stuff in the water from the plant. So -- and 

then -- that's just kind of a couple things 

there about hopefully it'll help the 

Mallinckrodt folks a little bit that they're -- 

you know, it's definitely there. You could go 

out now with a backhoe and dig it up. They 

haven't moved it. It's still there. 

About my job, like I said, I had the burial 

pits I dug up for them when I first started 

there, and then they put me on a job called the 

scanner in '93. And I don't think anything's 

ever been done as far as fully -- with the 

radiation, you know -- one of the jobs I had 
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doing that scanner was they had me change the 

source every 18 to 24 months. It's a 

californium source, we actually eraded (sic) 

the rod, the fuel pellets, up to whatever 

enrichment they were supposed to be. If it was 

-- we did -- we -- fortunately we dealt with 

much lower grade uranium than what the nuclear 

was. Ours was -- our max limit was five 

percent, and what we would do is actually with 

the scanner was enrich that radium up to 

whatever it was, and my job was to look at the 

reports and see -- make sure that if we had 3.5 

percent there was 3.5 percent and not five 

percent or anything like that there. And like 

I was saying 18 to 24 months, we'd change that 

source in the back of it, and it was just -- 

this is a huge casket about nine -- eight, nine 

feet tall, round, filled with cement and lead. 

And whenever we'd do that about every 18 to 24 

months, they would actually turn off the 

nuclear alarm and everybody'd have to get out 

of the building that I was in changing that. 

There'd usually be two or three of us in there 

changing this source. And they would say -- I 

asked them one time how come -- well, the first 
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time. I said how come you got a guy out turn 

off the -- well, we're afraid it's going to set 

off the nuclear alarm. You know, I guess 

you're young and stupid, you don't think about 

things like that at that age, but -- but at the 

age of 32 in '99 I was diagnosed with a real 

rare type of sarcoma cancer. And I don't know 

if you can prove anything from anyplace, but I 

drank the water out there. I was in -- pretty 

much an athlete. I didn't drink soda or 

anything like that there, I drank straight 

water 'cause I thought it was better for me, 

and I drank the water that come out of the 

plant out of the -- out there now, which 

they've said for all the surrounding homes and 

everything, don't drink it. You know, it's not 

safe. 

But just a couple of those things there I 

wanted to bring up and say, you know, that it's 

still -- we would like to extend the time up 

because that uranium and everything is still in 

the ground, even from back whenever they did 

the high enrichment stuff and buried it in the 

ground. It's still in the ground. It's 

leeching into the drinking water and they're 
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plumbing in water. They've plumbed it in for 

all the surrounding homes and everything out 

there, you know. It's in the ground. Thank 

you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Now I also 

have Dan McKeel on the list. Dr. McKeel has 

addressed the Board a couple of times in this 

meeting, but Dan, you -- you have the mike 

again. You are the last speaker, Dan. 

 DR. MCKEEL: This is going to be very brief and 

it's about a completely different subject. I 

want to put in the record just another 

forgotten group of people. There were two 

people here tonight from the Thompson-SternsRoger group, and I want to tell you about a 

third. And I'm looking forward to the day when 

this Special Exposure Cohort status will be 

sought for all the other people at 

Mallinckrodt, including those folks at Weldon 

Spring. 

But I wanted to tell you about 460 construction 

people, employees of Thompson-Sterns-Roger from 

approximately January 1968 to June 1969 when 

the Army Corps of Engineers from Kansas City 

and the Aberdeen Proving Ground Army crew 
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repurposed the Weldon Spring chemical plant for 

production of herbicide orange, popularly 

called Agent Orange, for use in Viet Nam. 

I obtained a report from the Aberdeen Army 

group, which is in my packet that I gave to Dr. 

Ziemer, and here's what the description of the 

contamination was at Weldon Spring. Now this 

is after the plant had shut down and it was 

being cleaned up to produce Agent Orange. 

So on page 39 of this report it says (reading) 

Contamination discovered in and under the 

concrete floor in the south end of building 103 

was of such a magnitude that it was necessary 

to excavate six inches of old floor and pour 

new concrete, thus effectively masking the 

contamination. 

Page 40, (reading) At the completion of the 

project, approximately two -- $2,800,000 had 

been expended for decontamination and 

dismantling of buildings 101, 103 and 105 to 

reduce the radiological contamination to 

acceptable levels. Even with these extensive 

efforts, none of the structures met the 

criteria for release to the general public when 

surveyed for alpha contamination in May '69. 
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Finally on page -- on that same page a little 

farther down, (reading) In building 103, the 

digestion and de-nitration plant, the 

contamination of the floor could not be brought 

down to acceptable limits, even after a partial 

removing -- removal and a coating of tar was 

applied to the entire area, and four to six 

inches of reinforced, high-density concrete was 

poured over the tar. The curbings around the 

floor remain visibly contaminated. The floor 

in the southwest corner of the north section 

could not be contaminated -- decontaminated, 

and a layer of tar was poured over the area as 

a temporary measure. 

The person who I'd like to represent to you 

tonight is named Charles Reed. He is one of 

those disenfranchised TSR construction workers 

who worked in building 103 at Weldon Spring 

during 1968 and dug up those brick floors. He 

describes visible yellowcake, the uranium oxide 

lying beneath the floor. He describes workers 

picking up the radioactively-contaminated 

bricks with their bare hands, and not being 

told what the nature of yellowcake was, nor of 

its dangers to his health. He was not given a 
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respirator to wear, despite an extreme 

potential for dust exposure and inhalation of 

alpha particles. His exposure was the same as 

or greater than some of the Atomic Energy 

Commission MCW uranium division workers before 

1966 when uranium production was still ongoing. 

 Charles suffered severe skin and nerve damage 

to both feet and ankles in the absence of any 

co-morbidities such as diabetes or peripheral 

vascular disease. True, these radiationinduced illnesses were not EEOICPA-approved 

cancers, but for him they were still were and 

still remain extremely disabling ailments. 

Charles and his fellow TSR workers deserve to 

be compensated just as much as workers who 

developed their berylliosis or the 22 cancers -

- any of those approved under the act under 

Titles B, D and E. 

By Charles' account, his chest film badge dose 

could not possibly have been accurate. He, 

like many MCW workers, recount having their 

badges pulled, some days while they worked, so 

that excess doses would not be recorded. Their 

boots were not always cleaned or changed, nor 

were stringent steps taken to ensure that their 
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contaminated clothing remained on site. 

There are many wrongs that EEOICPA could have 

partly addressed, but thus far has failed to do 

so. The original intent of Congress has not 

been adequately served. And I thank you again 

for coming and hearing my remarks and staying 

so late. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. This will conclude 

then our public session for this evening. I do 

remind you all that the Board will be 

reconvening tomorrow at 8:00 o'clock. There --

included in tomorrow's sessions there are 

public comment periods early afternoon and 

later in the afternoon. 

Thank you all for being here tonight. You've 

been very patient. I know it's been a long 

evening, but we thank you for being here. I 

wish you all a good evening. (10:00 p.m.) 

(Whereupon, an adjournment was taken to 

Wednesday, February 9, 2005 at 8:00 a.m.) 
275 

C E R T I F I C A T E OF COURT REPORTER
 

STATE OF GEORGIA
 

COUNTY OF FULTON
 

I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court
 

Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the
 

above and foregoing on the day of February 8,
 

2005; and it is a true and accurate transcript
 

of the testimony captioned herein.
 

I further certify that I am neither kin
 

nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor
 

have any interest in the cause named herein.
 

WITNESS my hand and official seal this the
 

2nd day of March, 2005.
 

STEVEN RAY GRE , CC,4 

CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 

CERTIFICATE NUMBER: *,21G2_''