J-S21017-15

2015 PA Super 135

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY REID

Appellant No. 1968 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 16, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003040-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2015

Appellant Anthony Reid (“Appellant”) appeals from the January 16, 

2014 judgment of sentence in the Philadelphia County Court of Common 

Pleas following his guilty plea convictions for attempted murder,1assault of a 

law enforcement officer in the first degree,2and aggravated assault.3 

Appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders4 brief, together with a petition to 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 901.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.

4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967).
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withdraw as counsel. We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The trial court summarized the events underlying Appellant’s 

convictions as follows:

On the morning of September 4, 2009, Appellant and his codefendant, Brian Williams (“Williams”), ran out of the Sunoco 

gas station at 52nd and Spruce Streets in Philadelphia. Officer 

Julius Cesar observed that the men were armed and carrying a 

bag of money. Both men jumped into a get-away car and fled 

the scene. Officer Cesar engaged in a high-speed pursuit of the 

two defendants through the city. As Appellant was driving, 

Williams leaned out the passenger window and fired at Officer 

Cesar’s vehicle, which struck the car’s front grille – the officer 

was not injured. Both men continued to elude police until 

crashing into a parked car at 63rd and Grays Avenue. At that 

time, multiple officers converged on the scene. Appellant 

opened the driver’s door and opened fire at the officers. The 

police returned fire, and during the exchange of bullets, Officer 

Adrian Hospetale was struck in the mouth. Both Appellant and 

Williams were immediately apprehended. A search of the vehicle 

revealed two (2) loaded firearms and $100,000 in cash.

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed November 24, 2014 (“1925(a) 

Opinion”), p. 2.

On March 21, 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to the aforementioned 

charges. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, on January 16, 2014, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20 years’ incarceration on the 

attempted murder conviction,5 20 to 40 years’ incarceration on the assault 

____________________________________________

5 The trial court sentenced Appellant – who had five prior robbery 

convictions – pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714, which provides mandatory 

sentences for second and subsequent crimes of violence.
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of a law enforcement officer in the first degree conviction6concurrent to the 

attempted murder conviction, and 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for the 

aggravated assault conviction to be served consecutive to the attempted 

murder and assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree 

convictions, for an aggregate total of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration.7 On 

January 24, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se post-trial motion to reconsider 

sentence that was denied by operation of law on June 11, 2014. Appellant 

filed a notice of appeal on July 2, 2014.8 On August 18, 2014, Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

6 The trial court sentenced Appellant pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1, which 

requires a mandatory 20-year minimum sentence for convictions for assault 

of a law enforcement officer in the first degree.

7 The trial court imposed no further penalty for six other charges of 

aggravated assault to which Appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted. 

The court nolle prossed the remaining charges as part of the guilty plea 

agreement. 

8 Appellant was represented by counsel at the time he filed his pro se motion 

for reconsideration. Accordingly, his pro se motion for reconsideration was a 

nullity. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa.1993) 

(“[T]here is no constitutional right to hybrid representation either at trial or 

on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 

(Pa.Super.2007) (pro se post-sentence motion filed while represented was a 

nullity, having no legal effect). Therefore, Appellant’s counsel actually 

properly filed the notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf on February 11, 

2014, despite the pending pro se motion for reconsideration. Despite this, 

this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory on May 15, 2014. See 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 553 EDA 2014. Following the denial of the pro se

motion for reconsideration by operation of law on June 11, 2014, Appellant’s 

counsel once again filed a timely notice of appeal. We find this procedural 

posture, while flawed, presents no jurisdictional impediment to the instant 

appeal.
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appointed counsel filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). The trial court filed its 1925(a) Opinion 

on November 24, 2014.

As previously noted, Appellant’s counsel has filed an application 

seeking to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v. California

and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Commonwealth v. Santiago.

9

 Before 

addressing the merits of Appellant’s underlying issue presented, we must 

first pass on counsel’s petition to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 

928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super.2007) (en banc). 

Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders, 

counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established by our 

Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel must also provide the appellant with a 

copy of the Anders brief, together with a letter that advises the appellant of 

his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed 

pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of 

____________________________________________

9 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.2009).
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the court’s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the 

Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 

(Pa.Super.2007). Substantial compliance with these requirements is 

sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 

(Pa.Super.2007). “After establishing that the antecedent requirements have 

been met, this Court must then make an independent evaluation of the 

record to determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” 

Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super.2006).

Instantly, counsel contemporaneously filed a petition to withdraw as 

counsel with the Anders brief. The petition states that counsel determined, 

after communicating with Appellant about the appeal, independently and 

conscientiously reviewing the record, and conducting appropriate legal 

research into possible issues, that no non-frivolous issues exist to be raised 

on appeal. See Petition to Withdraw As Counsel, ¶¶ 8-9. The petition 

further explains that counsel drafted and filed an Anders brief that included 

all issues Appellant wished raised on appeal as well as any issues counsel 

felt were of arguable merit, all of which counsel ultimately concluded were 

wholly frivolous. Id. at ¶ 11. Additionally, the petition explains that counsel 

notified Appellant of the withdrawal request, furnished Appellant with a copy 

of the Anders brief, and sent Appellant a letter explaining his right to 

proceed pro se or with new, privately-retained counsel to raise any 
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additional points or arguments that Appellant believed had merit.10 See id.

at ¶¶ 12-13; see also Letter to Appellant, January 12, 2015. In the Anders

brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and procedural history of the 

case with citations to the record, refers to evidence of record that might 

arguably support the issues raised on appeal, provides citations to relevant 

case law, and states his conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous and his 

reasons therefor. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 7-33. Accordingly, counsel has 

substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.

As Appellant filed neither a pro se brief nor a counseled brief with new, 

privately-retained counsel, we review this appeal based on the issues of 

arguable merit raised in the Anders brief:

[1.] Was [Appellant’s] negotiated guilty plea knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary?

[2.] Was the negotiated sentence imposed upon [Appellant] by 

the lower court pursuant to the terms of the negotiated guilty 

plea manifestly excessive?

[3.] Was the sentence imposed upon [Appellant] illegal under 

Alleyne v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) insofar as it included 

mandatory minimum sentences imposed pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.[] §§ 9714 and 9719.1?

____________________________________________

10

 Appellant’s counsel originally filed his Anders brief and petition to 

withdraw on January 12, 2015. On January 28, 2015, this Court entered a 

per curiam order directing counsel to file, within 10 days, copies of the letter 

he sent to Appellant with the Anders brief, which counsel had neglected to 

attach to his petition to withdraw. See Order, January 28, 2015. Counsel 

timely complied with this Court’s directive on February 3, 2015.
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[4.] Is [Appellant] entitled to have his sentence vacated due to 

the fact that the District Attorney’s Office breached the terms of 

an agreement with [Appellant]?

[5.] Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel due 

to the fact that his privately retained plea counsel failed to file a 

pre- or post-sentence motion to withdraw [Appellant’s] 

negotiated guilty plea?

[6.] Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel due 

to the fact that his privately retained plea counsel advised him 

not to exercise his right of allocution at sentencing?

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6.

1. Appellant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.

Appellant’s first claim alleges that his plea of guilty was not knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 17-20. This claim lacks 

merit.

“A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the 

charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the 

presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s 

power to deviate from any recommended sentence.” Commonwealth v. 

Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa.Super.2005); Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, 

Comment. Additionally, a written plea colloquy that is read, completed and 

signed by the defendant and made part of the record may serve as the 

defendant’s plea colloquy when supplemented by an oral, on-the-record 

examination. Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108 (citing Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

590). “[A] plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances 

surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full 
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understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that he 

knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.” Commonwealth v. 

Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa.Super.1993). “Our law presumes that a 

defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He 

bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 

A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super.2003) (internal citation omitted). The entry of a 

negotiated plea is a “strong indicator” of the voluntariness of the plea. 

Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa.Super.1994). 

Moreover, “[t]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with 

the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is 

that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

made.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 

(Pa.Super.2010).

The record reveals Appellant understood the nature of the charges 

against him and the plea to which he was agreeing, and that he voluntarily 

and intelligently entered his guilty plea. At the outset of the guilty plea 

hearing, the trial court placed the terms of the agreement on the record.11 

____________________________________________

11 The trial court summarized the plea agreement as follows:

THE COURT: . . . It’s my understanding that on each of these 

transcripts in exchange for your pleas to Counts 1 and 2 of the 

first transcripts that I referred to which you’re charged with 

robbery and criminal conspiracy, and on the second transcript in 

exchange for your pleading guilty to Counts 2 and 3 on that 

transcript involving robbery and criminal conspiracy.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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See N.T. 3/21/2011, pp. 6-7. Appellant confirmed that he understood the 

terms of the negotiated agreement. Id. at 7. Thereafter, the trial court 

conducted a lengthy guilty plea colloquy in which Appellant fully participated. 

See id. at 8-35. During the guilty plea colloquy, the trial court explained to 

Appellant his right to a jury trial, his post-guilty plea appellate rights, and 

the elements and statutory maximum penalty possible for the charges. Id.

at 9-21. Appellant indicated he understood. Id. at 10, 13, 21. Additionally, 

the Commonwealth provided lengthy factual bases for the charges, after 

which Appellant admitted he was guilty of each crime. Id. at 21-29. 

Appellant is bound by his statements made during the colloquy. See 

Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa.Super.2001) 

(defendant is bound by statements he makes during plea colloquy, and may 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

In exchange for your pleas to Counts 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 

21 and 24 of the third transcript in which you’re charged with six 

separate counts of attempted aggravated assault, one count of 

attempted murder, one count of criminal conspiracy, and one 

count of aggravated assault, causing serious bodily injury to a 

police officer, in exchange for those pleas the Commonwealth 

has agreed to nolle pros all other counts under each of the 

respective transcripts. 

And they have agreed to recommend a sentence which is to be 

deferred for a total period of 25 to 50 years of incarceration 

which the sentence is to be served concurrent to and as yet a 

federal sentence is to be imposed in the near future together 

with fines and costs, plus restitution.

N.T. 3/21/2011, pp. 6-7. 
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not assert grounds for withdrawing plea that contradict statements made 

when he pleaded guilty).

Additionally, defense counsel and Appellant reviewed and completed a 

written guilty plea colloquy for each docket on which he pleaded guilty, 

which the trial court reviewed with Appellant and admitted into evidence 

during the oral colloquy. See N.T. 3/21/2011, pp. 29-31; see also Written 

Guilty Plea Colloquies. The written colloquies outlined the plea agreement 

and discussed the charges, the right to a jury trial, and the pre-trial rights 

relinquished by pleading guilty. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquies. The 

written colloquies further outlined the presumption of innocence and the trial 

court’s power to deviate from the recommended sentence. Id. Appellant 

further acknowledged in the written guilty plea colloquies that he had ample 

opportunity to consult with counsel, and that he was satisfied with counsel’s 

representation. See id. at 3. He is further bound by these written 

statements. See McCauley, supra.

Our review of the guilty plea hearing transcript and documents reveals 

that the lower court did not abuse its discretion. The record supports the 

trial court’s conclusion that Appellant entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently. 

2. Appellant waived his discretionary aspects of sentence claim. 

Appellant next claims the negotiated sentence imposed upon 

acceptance of his guilty plea was manifestly excessive. See Appellant’s 

Brief, pp. 29-33. This claim raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects 
J-S21017-15

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of Appellant’s negotiated sentence, and is unreviewable. The trial court 

imposed the sentence Appellant negotiated with the Commonwealth. 

Appellant may not now seek discretionary review of that negotiated 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 

(Pa.Super.2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence 

may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”). This claim fails.

3. The trial court did not impose an illegal sentence under Alleyne.

Appellant next claims his sentence is illegal based on the Supreme 

Court of the United States’ decision in Alleyne v. United States12 because 

it includes certain mandatory minimum sentences. See Appellant’s Brief, 

pp. 25-28. Appellant is incorrect.

First, Appellant challenges the application of the 10-year mandatory 

minimum sentence imposed on his attempted murder conviction. Regarding 

mandatory minimum sentences for second or subsequent convictions for 

crimes of violence, the Sentencing Code provides, in relevant part:

(a) Mandatory sentence.--

(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this 

Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time 

of the commission of the current offense the person had 

previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be 

sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of 

total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of 

this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon a second 

____________________________________________

12 __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
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conviction for a crime of violence, the court shall give the 

person oral and written notice of the penalties under this 

section for a third conviction for a crime of violence. 

Failure to provide such notice shall not render the offender 

ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).

42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a). 

In Alleyne, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 

Sixth Amendment requires that any fact – other than a prior conviction –

that increases a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense must be 

submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, 

Alleyne did not overturn prior precedent that prior convictions are 

sentencing factors and not elements of offenses. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 

1260 n.1; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 

243-44, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 1230-31 (1998).

Section 9714 increases mandatory minimum sentences based on prior 

convictions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1). Accordingly, this section is not 

unconstitutional under Alleyne. See Alleyne, supra; see also

Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 239 n.9 (Pa.Super.2014), appeal 

granted and order vacated on other grounds, No. 238 EAL 2014, 2015 WL 

920472 (Pa. Mar. 4, 2015). 

Here, at his guilty plea hearing, Appellant acknowledged that his cases 

involved “mandatory sentences [that would] be imposed by the [trial 

c]ourt[.]” N.T. 3/21/2011, p. 8. At sentencing, the court characterized the 
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instant matter as a “second strike case[,]” without objection from 

Appellant.13 See N.T. 1/16/2014, pp. 4-6. The trial court then imposed a 

section 9714 mandatory minimum sentence on the attempted murder 

conviction. This sentence was legal.

Appellant also challenges the application of the 20-year mandatory 

minimum sentence imposed on his conviction for assault of a law 

enforcement officer in the first degree. Regarding sentences for offenses 

committed against law enforcement officers, the Sentencing Code provides, 

in relevant part:

(a) Mandatory sentence.--A person convicted of the following 

offense shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment 

as follows:

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a) (relating to assault of law 

enforcement officer)[14]--not less than 20 years.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1. 

____________________________________________

13 Appellant concedes he had five prior convictions for robbery, a crime of 

violence. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 27 n.9; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g).

14 Section 2702.1 defines the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer in 

the first degree as follows:

Assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree.--A 

person commits a felony of the first degree who attempts to 

cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a law 

enforcement officer, while in the performance of duty and with 

knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer, by 

discharging a firearm.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a).
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This mandatory sentence provision does not implicate Alleyne. 

Section 9719.1 does not require proof of any additional elements beyond 

those already required to convict a defendant of assault of a law 

enforcement officer in the first degree under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a). Nor 

does section 9719.1 follow the statutory scheme that allowed a trial court to 

apply a mandatory minimum sentence if the Commonwealth established the 

triggering fact for the mandatory minimum by a preponderance of the 

evidence,15 which this Court found unconstitutional under Alleyne. See, 

i.e., 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(b) (relating to sentencing for drug crimes committed 

in school zones),16 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(b) (relating to sentencing for drug 

____________________________________________

15 Since Alleyne, this Court has ruled unconstitutional multiple statutes 

containing nearly identical “proof at sentencing” provisions. These 

provisions all included language essentially identical to the following:

Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall not be an 

element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall 

not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the 

Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section shall be 

provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability 

of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall 

consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the 

Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any 

necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(b).

16 Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Bizzel, 107 A.3d 102, 103 

(Pa.Super.2014).
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trafficking);17 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(b) (relating to sentences for offenses 

committed with firearms),18 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1(c) (relating to sentences 

for certain drug offenses committed with firearms),19 42 Pa.C.S. § 9713(c) 

(relating to sentences for offenses committed on public transportation),20

and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(c) (relating to sentences for offenses against infant 

persons).21 Instead, section 9719.1 simply describes the legislativelyrequired sentence for an offender convicted of assaulting a law enforcement 

officer pursuant to section 2702.1(a). Because it does not require proof of 

facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence, and does not follow the 

statutory construction that allowed trial courts to find such facts by a 

preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, section 9719.1 is not 

unconstitutional under Alleyne or its Pennsylvania progeny.

For these reasons, the trial court did not impose an illegal sentence.

____________________________________________

17 Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748 

(Pa.Super.2014).

18 Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 

(Pa.Super.2014).

19 Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 

(Pa.Super.2014).

20 Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 

(Pa.Super.2014).

21 Held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 

(Pa.Super.2014).
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4. No evidence exists of any agreement breached by the 

Commonwealth.

Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth induced him to plead 

guilty with the promise of an alleged, nebulous agreement between the 

Commonwealth and Appellant, which the Commonwealth subsequently 

breached. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 24-25. This claim lacks merit.22

Appellant appears to argue that he received no benefit for having 

testified for the Commonwealth in other cases.23 However, nowhere in his 

brief or filings does Appellant set forth when he made any agreement with 

the Commonwealth to testify in other cases or the terms of the alleged 

____________________________________________

22 Appellant’s claim challenges the validity of his plea and is therefore 

eligible for review on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 

A.3d 1268, 1275 (Pa.2014) (noting “upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant 

waives all claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction 

of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed the 

“legality” of the sentence imposed”). To the extent Appellant argues that his 

counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea with false promises, such a claim 

must await collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 

562, 576 (Pa.2013); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).

23 Appellant’s pro se post-sentence motion to modify contains the claim:

F. I feel that there was a breach of contract on behalf of the 

District attorney office – ADA ODonnelly – where as I Fullfilled

my part, after coming Forward and testifying, but no 

acknowledgement was acredited, Nor brought Forward to the 

commonwealth court. Now I are being left hung out to dry and 

Fend for my life. For the remainder days of my life through 

lengthy incarceration sentence.

Motion for Reconsideration/Modification of Sentence, filed January 24, 2014, 

p. 2 (verbatim).
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agreement(s). In fact, Appellant does not even allege the existence of an 

agreement in the first place. Instead, he simply explains that he testified 

and expresses his dissatisfaction that he did not receive some undefined 

benefit from the Commonwealth in return. See Motion for 

Reconsideration/Modification of Sentence, p. 2. Further, the record contains 

no evidence of such an agreement. The only agreement that appears in the 

record is the guilty plea agreement that the trial court summarized with 

Appellant’s approval, as discussed supra. Accordingly, this claim fails.

5. Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims must await 

collateral review.

Appellant’s final two claims allege trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by (1) failing to file pre- or post-sentence motions to 

withdraw Appellant’s guilty plea, and (2) advising Appellant not to exercise 

his right of allocution at sentencing. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 20-23. It is 

well-settled that, absent circumstances not present in the case at bar, 

“claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA 

review[.]” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa.2013). 

Accordingly, these claims are premature and we will not address them at 

this time.

For the aforementioned reasons, the claims raised in the Anders brief 

lack merit. Additionally, our independent review of the record has revealed 

no non-frivolous claims that Appellant could have raised, and we agree with 
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counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw is 

granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2015