## In the Court of Appeals S econd Appellate District of Te xas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 23

- 00375

- CV

___________________________

On Appea l from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023

- 005682 -1 Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J. Per Curiam Memorandum O pinion 

### E LISHA 

### H OLLOWAY 

### , Appellant
V 

### . R EVELSTOKE 

### V ENTURE 

### , LLC , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appel lee Revelstoke Venture, LLC preva iled on its forcible detainer a ction against Appellant Elisha H olloway in the justice court. The j udgment awarded Revelstoke possession of the premises , $4,958 in back rent, and costs. The judgment further or der ed H olloway to pay $2,670 in r ent into the court ’ s registry e ach month during the pendency of any appeal. Holloway appealed to the county court
. The justice court sent her a notice acknowl e dging rece ipt of the notice of appeal and r emi nding her that she needed to d eposit the m onthly rental amoun t into the court ’s registry within five days and that her failure to make that payment “ MAY RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT HEARING
. ” The next month, Revelstok e f iled a motion requesting issua nce of a writ of possession on the basis that Holloway had failed to make the mont hly rent payment s into th e court ’ s registry
. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.9(c)(5)(B)(iv). A month later, the county court signed an “ Order Au thorizing Immediate Issuance o f Writ of Possession. ” In the order, the count y court found that Holloway had not paid rent into the court ’ s registry, that Revelstoke had given Holloway proper notice of the failure, and that Revelstoke was entitl ed to issu ance of a writ of p osse ssion. The order did not mentio n Revel stoke ’ s claim for ba ck rent. Nevertheless, the order stated that it was a final judgment disposing of all clams of all parties
. The next day, the county clerk issued the writ.3 Hol loway appealed to this court. Because the clerk ’ s record show s that th e writ of possession had been executed , this court became concerned that the appeal was moot. Consequently, we notified Holloway that we would dismiss the appeal unless she o r a nother party wishing to contin ue the appeal filed with this c ourt a response sh owing grounds for the appeal ’ s continu ance . Holloway filed a response , but it does not show ground s on which we may continue the appeal
. First, she cite s Te xas Property Code Section 92.0 561 and asserts that “ [w ]e asse rt our right under this code to address necessary repairs when the landlord neglects maintenance requests. ” See Tex. Prop. Co de Ann. § 92.0 56 1. Next, she as serts that her appeal “ defends the f und amental right of tenants to re side in habitable dwellings, d e manding swift resolution of maintenance issues. ” She then claims that Revelstoke’s “ continuous disregard for maintenance requests potentially breach es the implied covenant of qu iet enjoyment ” and that h er “ meticulously do cumented email communication serve s as indispensable evidence, exposing [h er] sincere attempts and the landlord’s failure to address valid concerns
. ” Finally, she asserts that her appeal “ is fueled by t he violatio n o f civi l rights, including but not limited to discrimination a nd harassment , ” and she “ in sist[s] that our countercl aim 1 be duly considered in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations governing such claims. ”

1 The clerk ’ s record doe s n ot show that Holloway f iled an y counterclaims.4 Regardless of whether Holloway would ha ve had recourse against Revels toke for failing to perform its obligations under the lease , and regardless of whether Holloway may have any other claims against Revelstoke , her response has not raised any meritorious claim of right to current, actual pos ses sion of the prop erty . As the S upreme Court of Texas has expla ined , “ [ j] udgm ent of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to imm edi ate possession
. ” Marshall v. H ous. Auth. of City of San Anton io , 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006)
. “ T he only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises
. ” Id. at 785 (emphasis added). Thus, a forcible detainer ac tion ma y r esolve only a claim for posses sion and related claims for unp aid rent and attorney ’ s fees
. See Tex. Prop. Cod e Ann. § § 24.0051 , .0 06 ; Brigandi v. Am. Mortgage Inv. Partners Fund I Tr. , No. 02

- 16

- 00444

- CV, 2017 WL 1428726, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Apr . 2 0, 2017, pet. dism’d) (mem. op .). Here, t he county court ’ s ju dgm ent awards possession but does not award dama ges or attorney ’ s fees , and so the only issue on appeal is possession
. B ut Holloway no longer has possession of the pr emis es , her response did n ot raise any meritorious claim of right to possession , and n oth i ng in the record before us shows that she has a potentially meritorious claim to possession
. See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 787 ; Ratliff v. Homes by Ashley, Inc. , No. 02

- 20

- 00014

- CV, 2020 WL 1057 320 , at *1 (Tex. App
. — Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op .) (noting that a forcible

-5 detainer appeal becom es moot upon an appellant ’ s eviction from the property unless the appellant holds and asserts a meritorious claim of right to current, actual po sse ssion of the prop erty or unles s damages or attorney ’ s fees re main at issue). Accordingly, regardless of wheth er Holloway ha s other claims that she could bring in a separ ate suit, she has not shown grounds for continuing this appeal. Because she no long er has possession of the property , her appeal is moot , and we ha ve no jurisdiction over her appeal
. We therefore vacate the county court ’ s judgment and dismiss th e appeal
. See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 790.

Per Curiam Delivered: January 18, 2024