Draft 

REVIEW OF SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT ISSUES 

FOR THE HANFORD SITE FOR THE PERIOD 

JULY 1, 1972, TO DECEMBER 31, 1990

Volume II – Appendices 

Contract No. 200-2009-28555 

Prepared by 

Arjun Makhijani 

Bob Barton 

Joyce Lipsztein

S. Cohen & Associates 

1608 Spring Hill Road, Suite 400 

Vienna, VA 22182 

Saliant, Inc. 

5579 Catholic Church Road 

Jefferson, Maryland 21755 

September 2011 

Disclaimer

This document is made available in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) to maintain all possible openness in its deliberations. However, 

the ABRWH and its contractor, SC&A, caution the reader that at the time of its release, this report is predecisional and has not been reviewed by the Board for factual accuracy or applicability within the 

requirements of 42 CFR 82. This implies that once reviewed by the ABRWH, the Board’s position may 

differ from the report’s conclusions. Thus, the reader should be cautioned that this report is for 

information only and that premature interpretations regarding its conclusions are unwarranted.
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LIST OF APPENDICES 

Appendix A: Internal Dose Data Completeness Review................................................................3 

Appendix B: November 2009 Updated Hanford SEC Issues Matrix ...........................................95 

Appendix C: Petitioner/Worker Interview Summary for the Hanford Site ................................106 

Appendix D: Summary of Interviews Relating to Building 324 Incidents.................................151 
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Appendix A 3 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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APPENDIX A: INTERNAL DOSE DATA COMPLETENESS REVIEW 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

A.1 Objective..............................................................................................................................7 

A.2 Description of REX Database..............................................................................................7 

A.3 Methodology and Approach ................................................................................................7 

A.4 Structure of Individual Radionuclide Sections ....................................................................8 

A.5 Summary of Findings...........................................................................................................9 

A.6 Individual Radionuclide Analysis Results.........................................................................12 

A.6.1 Americium .............................................................................................................12 

A.6.2 Cesium ...................................................................................................................22 

A.6.3 Miscellaneous Fission Products.............................................................................30 

A.6.4 Plutonium...............................................................................................................39 

A.6.5 Uranium .................................................................................................................48 

A.7 Discussion of Additional Radionuclides............................................................................58 

A.8 References..........................................................................................................................62 

Attachment 1: Description of Job-Specific Analysis....................................................................66 

Attachment 2: Description of Area-Specific Analysis..................................................................72 

Attachment 3: Magnitude of Bioassay Results by Year for All Worker Types Identified...........75 
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Appendix A 5 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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LIST OF TABLES 

Table A-1. Description of REX Database Files Used in Completeness Study..........................7 

Table A-2. Summary of Data Completeness Study by Analysis Category (as described 

in Section A-4).......................................................................................................11 

Table A-3. Americium In-Vitro Overview ..............................................................................13 

Table A-4. Americium In-Vivo Overview...............................................................................14 

Table A-5. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for 

Americium by Year (1972–1981)..........................................................................15 

Table A-6. Overview of Americium In-Vivo Results (nCi) for the Job Titles Most 

Likely to be Monitored During Employment ........................................................17 

Table A-7. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Americium Exposure .................18 

Table A-8. Combined Americium Monitoring Location Data.................................................20 

Table A-9. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Americium 

Exposure ................................................................................................................21 

Table A-10. Cesium-137 In-Vivo Overview..............................................................................22 

Table A-11. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for 

Cesium by Year (1972–1981)................................................................................24 

Table A-12. Overview of Cesium In-Vivo Results (nCi) for the Job Titles Most Likely to 

be Monitored During Employment........................................................................26 

Table A-13. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Cesium Exposure .......................27 

Table A-14. Cesium-137 In-Vivo Location Data.......................................................................28 

Table A-15. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Cesium 

Exposure ................................................................................................................29 

Table A-16. Miscellaneous Fission Product In-Vitro Overview................................................31 

Table A-17. Miscellaneous Fission Product In-Vivo Overview................................................32 

Table A-18. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for 

Fission Products by Year (1972–1981) .................................................................33 

Table A-19. Overview of Strontium-90 In-Vitro Results (μCi/l) for the Job Titles Most 

Likely to be Monitored During Employment ........................................................35 

Table A-20. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Fission Product Exposure ..........36 

Table A-21. Miscellaneous Fission Product Location Data.......................................................37 

Table A-22. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Fission 

Product Exposure...................................................................................................38 

Table A-23. Plutonium In-Vitro Overview................................................................................40 
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NOTICE:

Table A-24. Plutonium In-Vivo Overview ................................................................................41 

Table A-25. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for 

Plutonium by Year (1972–1981) ...........................................................................42 

Table A-26. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Plutonium Exposure...................44 

Table A-27. Plutonium-Monitoring Location Data....................................................................46 

Table A-28. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with 

Potential Plutonium Exposure................................................................................47 

Table A-29. Uranium In-Vivo Overview...................................................................................49 

Table A-30. Uranium In-Vitro Overview ..................................................................................50 

Table A-31. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for 

Uranium by Year (1972–1981)..............................................................................51 

Table A-32. Overview of Uranium In Vivo (nCi) for the Job Titles Most Likely to be 

Monitored During Employment.............................................................................53 

Table A-33. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Uranium Exposure .....................54 

Table A-34. Uranium Monitoring Location Data ......................................................................56 

Table A-35. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Uranium 

Exposure ................................................................................................................57 

Table A-36. Overview of Radionuclides with Infrequent Monitoring Records ........................61 
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Appendix A 7 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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A.1 OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this report is to examine the internal monitoring records contained in the 

Radiological Exposure Database (REX) for adequacy and suitability in constructing the 

coworker model presented in Appendix C of the Hanford site internal dose TBD. Specifically, 

this report will seek to identify monitoring practices, exposure potential, and potential gaps as 

they pertain to worker job categories, as well as periods of production and exposure potential 

during the SEC period. Radionuclides that are considered ‘exotic’ or ‘special,’ in that they were 

only used during specific campaign periods, and/or site locations will also be discussed, though 

in less depth than the more common contaminants. 

A.2 DESCRIPTION OF REX DATABASE 

The REX Database is made up of a series of smaller database files that contain a wide variety of 

information, including employment history, external/internal monitoring, lists of Hanford 

contractors/subcontractors, general worker information (addresses, passport information, etc.), 

and lists of incidents occurring at the site. For the purposes of this study, five of the REX 

database files will need to be analyzed and are described in Table A-1. 

Table A-1. Description of REX Database Files Used in Completeness Study 

Database Name Description 

REX_WORK_HIST 

Identifies workers by a ‘REX ID,’ which allows for the tracking of 

individual workers across the different database files. Also contains 

employment start and end dates. 

INV_RESULT 

Lists in-vivo counting samples by REX ID and date, and assigns a tracking 

number to each in-vivo sample, which can be used to obtain the results of 

the count in ‘INV_ISO_RESULT’ described in the next row. 

INV_ISO_RESULT Uses the tracking number from ‘INV_RESULT’ and provides the 

radionuclides and results of the in-vivo sample. 

EXC_RESULT Contains the urinalysis data for workers listed by REX ID. 

DOS_SUM_RESULTS 

Contains external monitoring results, which are not part of this analysis; 

however, the database also contains job title information that can be linked 

to the internal database files by REX ID. 

A.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 

The REX Database files were broken down to track the monitoring practices as they relate to 

overall coverage of the workforce, monitoring by job title, exposure potential by job title, and 

area of work. Specific radionuclides were selected for analysis based on the amount of data 

available in the database (i.e., exotic radionuclides and other contaminants with relatively few 

samples were not included in the main analysis, but are discussed in Section A-7). 

Radionuclides selected for analysis include americium, cesium, miscellaneous fission products 

(mainly Sr-90), iodine, plutonium, thorium, and uranium. 

One of the goals of this analysis is to gain information as to what groups of workers may have 

been monitored more consistently than others, whether that pertains to their job title or their 
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specific area of work. The exposure potential of different job titles was also analyzed based on 

the magnitude of results for specific jobs. Unfortunately, a worker’s specific job title and work 

location are not universally known for every worker and time period contained in the database. 

For example, a worker may have several different employment periods specified in 

‘REX_WORK_HIST;’ however, only one of those employment periods contains a job title 

designation. Similarly, a worker may have several different bioassay samples during their 

employment, but only a handful ever specified the area of work when the sample was taken. 

Because taking this information at face value (i.e., only considering worker employment periods 

with a job title specified or only bioassay samples that specify a work area) would severely limit 

the amount of data available for analysis, an approximate approach was developed, so that as 

much data as possible could be included. To this end, it has been assumed that if a worker is 

identified with a specific job title, they held that job title throughout their SEC employment. 

Similarly, if a worker is identified with a specific area of work, it is assumed they spent their 

entire employment at that location. These assumptions will result in some degree of “double 

counting,” in which the monitoring records of a worker who held multiple job titles, or that is 

identified with multiple work areas, would count towards the totals of both categories (whether 

job title, work location, or both). For further discussion on the possible implications of this 

approach, as well as additional information on how the data were analyzed, please refer to 

Attachments 1 and 2 (for job title and work location, respectively). 

A.4 STRUCTURE OF INDIVIDUAL RADIONUCLIDE SECTIONS 

Each individual radionuclide section (found in Sections A-6.1–A-6.6) that presents the results of 

the completeness study can be separated into four categories of tables: 

(1) Overall monitoring coverage by year for the entire worker population (for both in-vivo 

and in-vitro monitoring as available). 

(2) Monitoring coverage by year for the 20 job categories most likely to have been monitored 

during their SEC employment. 

(3) Identification of areas and time periods of potential internal exposure to the given 

radionuclide (based on information describing particular campaigns and area-specific 

projects), as well as the actual monitoring coverage by year and by area for the site (areas 

selected were the 100, 200, 300, 400, and 700 Areas, as well as the 100-N Reactor area 

and 200 Area Tank Farms). 

(4) Identification of the most common job title among monitored workers for the areas and 

time periods identified as having internal exposure potential (as described above under 

category 3). 

Category 1 tables will consist of one or two tables (depending on whether both in-vitro and invivo data exist for the given nuclide) that show the percentage of the overall workforce that was 

monitored for the given radionuclide by year, as well as the median and/or average bioassay 
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Appendix A 9 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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result for that year.1

 The workforce for each year was identified by their employment periods 

listed in ‘REX_WORK_HIST.’ Category 1 tables also include the number of samples per 

worker employed in a given year, in addition to the number of samples per worker monitored in 

that year. Note that this analysis does not distinguish between routine samples and those 

associated with incidents. NIOSH has taken this into account to some extent in its coworker 

analysis (see main report). 

Category 2 consists of two tables. One table lists, in order, the job categories most likely to be 

monitored for the specific radionuclide during their employment, but does not necessarily 

indicate they are the worker category with the highest percentage of workers monitored in any 

specific year. Nor does this category indicate what the most common job title is among 

monitored workers. As an example, the analysis may indicate that ‘Job A’ consists of 100 

workers of which 70% were monitored during their career, while ‘Job B’ consists of 1,000 

workers of which 30% were monitored during their career. While ‘Job A’ is the category of 

worker most likely to be monitored, it is not the most common job title among monitored 

workers (70 monitored workers for ‘Job A’ versus 300 monitored workers for ‘Job B’). The 

second table compares the employment monitoring practices shown in the first table against the 

median, average, and maximum bioassay result for that job category during the SEC period. 

Specific characterizing of the magnitude of bioassay results by year for all job categories 

identified is presented in Attachment 3. 

Category 3 consists of two tables. The first table presents information on site operations in the 

context of the areas/buildings (including the period of operation) where internal exposure was 

possible. The second table shows the percentage of workers monitored for each site area and 

year, and highlights the areas and years where internal exposure potential has been identified. 

Category 4 consists of a single table that lists the most common job category among monitored 

workers (i.e., ‘Job B’ described previously) for each year and area of interest for internal 

exposure potential. 

A.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 

Table A-2 contains a summary of the completeness analysis for each of the major radionuclide 

groups. Table A-2 is structured into the analysis categories described in Section A-4. It is 

important to note that the values given under category 1 (% of workers monitored per year and # 

of samples per monitored worker per year) represent average values over the entire SEC period, 

and that these values will vary from year to year, as shown in Section A-6. 

Some general findings of the completeness analysis presented in Section A-6 are as follows: 

Finding A-1: For the main radionuclides analyzed (Am, Cs, MFP, Pu, and U), workers 

associated with the 200 Tank Farms were the most likely to be monitored 

during their employment. 

1

 Because of the large variation in material and solubility types handled in different areas of the site and by 

different job types, we chose not to do the comparative analysis of the in-vitro samples for uranium and plutonium. 
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Appendix A 10 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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NOTICE:

Finding A-2: ‘Radiation monitors,’ ‘electricians,’ ‘operators,’ ‘pipefitters,’ and ‘science 

technicians’ were consistently among the five job titles most likely to be 

monitored during their SEC employment. 

Finding A-3: In general, the most commonly monitored job title by area and year are 

‘managers and administrators’ (100, 100-N, 200, and 300 Areas), ‘operators’ 

(200, 200 Tank Farms, and 300 Area), and ‘scientists’ (300 Area). 

Finding A-4: In-vivo records analysis for americium, cesium, mixed fission products, and 

uranium monitoring showed a significant decrease in worker sampling in 

1975 (generally less than 1% of the worker population was monitored). 

Other significant decreases in worker monitoring include 1974 (iodine), 

1976–1977 (mixed fission products), and 1985 (cesium). Thorium-232 was 

sparsely monitored throughout the period, and there are very few data points 

overall. No significant decreases in worker monitoring were identified for 

plutonium. 

Finding A-5: Section A-7 presents radionuclides not included in the main analysis because 

of the sparse available records; these include thorium, iodine, polonium, 

neptunium, radium, curium, californium/berkelium, and ‘total actinides.’ 

Polonium, curium, and ‘total actinides’ were mostly periodic sampling, while 

radium and neptunium were likely incident related.2

Observation A-1: Based on a review of the radionuclide-specific records in the Site Research 

Database (SRDB), SC&A found that contamination incidents generally 

tended to be followed up by urinalysis and/or in-vivo counting of the 

individuals involved, even if the initial nasal smears indicated no intake 

potential. However, it should be borne in mind that SC&A did not attempt to 

correlate these hardcopy incident records with individual personnel files. 

See also the discussion of Matrix Items 21 and 22 regarding missing or 

destroyed records in the main section of this report.

2

 It is assumed that samples designated as ‘special’ via their respective ‘reason codes’ were incident-related. 
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Table A-2. Summary of Data Completeness Study by Analysis Category (as described in Sec

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 

Radionuclide Monitoring 

Type 

Average 

% of 

Workers 

Monitored 

by Year 

Average # of 

Samples per 

Monitored 

Worker per 

Year 

Job Types Most 

Likely to be 

Monitored During 

Employment 

Areas and Years of Potential 

Exposure 

% of Work

Monitore

During 

Employm

for Area 

Concern 

In Vitro 0.21% 3.58 200 Area (1972–1990) 38.65% 

Americium 200 Tank Farms (1972–1990) 55.49% 

In Vivo 7.62% 1.10 

Rad. Monitors, 

Electricians, 

Operators, 

Pipefitters, Science 

Techs 300 Area (1972–1988) 42.40% 

200 Area (1972–1990) 91.71% 

200 Tank Farms (1972–1990) 99.41% 

Cesium In Vivo 24.76% 1.11 

Electricians, Rad. 

Monitors, 

Firefighters, 

Operators, Pipefitters 300 Area (1972–1988) 84.98% 

In Vitro 3.57% 1.43 100-N Area (1972-1987) 26.42% 

200 Area (1972–1990) 37.30% 

200 Tank Farms (1972–1990) 81.60% 

Miscellaneous 

Fission 

Products In Vivo 2.07% 1.80 

Rad. Monitors, 

Operators, Science 

Techs, Pipefitters, 

Electricians 300 Area (1972–1990) 22.16% 

In Vitro 10.82% 1.75 200 Area (1972–1990) 47.83% 

200 Tank Farms (1972–1990) 69.14% 

300 Area (1972–1990) 39.66% 

Plutonium In Vivo 0.05% 2.53 

Rad. Monitors, 

Operators, Handler/ 

Laborer, Pipefitters, 

Electricians 400 Area (1980–1990) 54.06% 

In Vitro 1.36% 1.89 100 Area (1972–1977) 23.30% 

100-N Area (1972–1987) 22.93% 

200 Area (1972–1990) 39.01% 300 Area (1972–1990) 42.92% 

Uranium In Vivo 7.28% 1.08 

Rad. Monitors, 

Electricians, 

Operators, 

Pipefitters, Science 

Techs. 

400 Area (1980–1990) 54.64% 

Appendix A 11 

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Appendix A 12 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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A.6 INDIVIDUAL RADIONUCLIDE ANALYSIS RESULTS 

This section presents the results for each of the radionuclides that were considered for 

completeness analysis (americium, cesium, other miscellaneous fission products, plutonium, and 

uranium). As described in Section A-4, the analysis aims to gain insight into the monitoring 

coverage and practices for the worker population as a whole by occupation and by site area 

(particularly areas with identified internal exposure potential). 

Note that all in-vitro results below MDA are set to zero for convenience and clarity [since there 

were conflicts between some of the MDAs in the REX database and the TBD (see main report)]. 

The median and average values of in-vitro results include all below MDA values counted as zero 

and all above MDA values. For in-vivo results, the REX database already lists the value as half 

the MDA. Hence, these values that are already in the REX database were used in computations 

for in-vivo average and media values. 

A.6.1 Americium 

Tables A-3 and A-4 summarize the site-wide practice of americium monitoring for in-vitro 

sampling (Table A-3) and in-vivo sampling (Table A-4). Each table shows the percentage of 

workers monitored by the given method, the average number of samples per worker employed at 

the site in each year, the average number of samples per monitored worker per year, and the 

median/average sample result. As seen in Table A-3, the practice of in-vitro monitoring for 

americium was for only a very small percentage of the worker population; however, the workers 

who were monitored via this method were often sampled more than once in a year. In 1976, 

monitored workers averaged over 15 samples per year; however, this appears to be the result of a 

major incident involving the explosion of an ion exchange column in Building 242-Z, which 

resulted in significant americium contamination. This is reflected in the sample results for that 

year as the magnitude of in-vitro sampling was several orders of magnitude higher than other 

years. 

Table A-4 shows that the practice of in-vivo monitoring covered a larger portion of the worker 

population, but was still generally less than 10%. In general, workers that were monitored via in 

vivo for americium were only counted once per year. The sample results by year indicate higher 

exposures earlier in the SEC period and generally decreased over time. However, this is also 

coupled with an increase in the percentage of the workforce that was monitored, so it is likely the 

observed decrease in exposures is the result of the monitoring coverage expanding to workers 

with lower exposure potential. 

Table A-5 shows the percentage of workers monitored for americium (either in vitro or in vivo) 

by year and by job category, as identified in the REX database.3

 The job categories presented in 

Table A-5 are ranked by the percentage of the workers in a given category that were monitored 

at some point during their SEC employment. For example, the second job category presented 

(Ranked 2nd) is ‘Radiation Monitors/Technicians,’ which covers 417 workers, of which 78.2% 

3

 Refer to Attachment 1 for more information on how job title information was derived and interpreted 

from the REX database. 
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Appendix A 13 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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were monitored for americium during their SEC employment. It is important to note that the 

ranking is not indicative of what percentage of workers was monitored in any given year, but 

rather over their entire SEC employment. As an example, 19.5% of ‘Radiation Monitors/ 

Technicians’ (Ranked 2nd overall) were monitored in 1974; however, in this particular year, the 

job category with the highest percentage of workers monitored was ‘Technicians’ (Ranked 17th

overall) at 38.3%. Table A-6 compares the career-monitoring percentage against the magnitude 

of observed in-vivo results by job category. As seen in the table, job categories such as operators 

and science technicians had a high percentage of workers monitored in their career, and also had 

above average in-vivo results. These job categories also had the highest observed results in the 

database. The only job title that had above average results and was not contained in the top 20 

job categories was security guards; only ~12% of the security guards were monitored for 

americium during their employment. 

Also observed in the table is that very few of the top 20 job categories had median results above 

the ‘all worker’ median. This is not of particular concern, however, as the majority of in-vivo 

results were less than the individual samples’ MDA. This would explain the relatively small 

variability between the median results shown (generally between .06 and .09 nCi). 

Table A-3. Americium In-Vitro Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored 

In Vitro for Americium 

Year 

Am Am-241 

Combined 

In-Vitro 

Samples 

Average # 

Samples per 

Worker per 

Year 

Average # 

Samples Per 

Monitored 

Worker per 

Year 

Median 

Am-241 Sample 

Result (μCi/l) 

Urinalysis 

Median 

Am-241 Sample 

Result, Fecal 

(μCi/g) 

1972 – 0.11% 0.11% 0.002 2.11 0.00E+00 1.67E-07 

1973 – 0.20% 0.20% 0.011 5.61 0.00E+00 4.34E-09 

1974 – 0.16% 0.16% 0.007 4.41 2.13E-07 0.00E+00 

1975 – 0.13% 0.13% 0.004 2.93 NA NA 

1976 – 0.41% 0.41% 0.063 15.32 9.29E-01 6.39E-05 

1977 0.16% 0.15% 0.28% 0.018 6.43 NA NA 

1978 – 0.14% 0.14% 0.007 1.19 5.45E-03 NA 

1979 – 0.13% 0.13% 0.007 1.67 NA NA 

1980 – 0.17% 0.17% 0.015 7.85 1.52E-06 6.32E-08 

1981 0.01% 0.10% 0.11% 0.004 2.00 0.00E+00 5.53E-07 

1982 0.04% 0.12% 0.14% 0.009 5.71 2.03E-06 5.09E-07 

1983 0.06% 0.10% 0.16% 0.003 1.56 0.00E+00 1.49E-06 

1984 – 0.38% 0.38% 0.006 1.45 0.00E+00 1.70E-08 

1985 – 0.36% 0.36% 0.008 2.08 1.55E-08 4.42E-08 

1986 – 0.53% 0.53% 0.009 1.66 0.00E+00 6.60E-08 

1987 – 0.34% 0.34% 0.005 1.56 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 

1988 – 0.15% 0.15% 0.002 1.54 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 

1989 – 0.06% 0.06% 0.001 1.70 1.20E-08 NA 

1990 – 0.09% 0.09% 0.001 1.33 0.00E+00 NA 

Dashes (-) indicate 0.00% in percentage of workers monitored 

NA indicates data could not be analyzed for magnitude 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 14 of 175 

Appendix A 14 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

Table A-4. Americium In-Vivo Overview 

Percentage of Workers 

Monitored In-Vivo for 

Americium Year 

Am-241 Am-242 

Combined 

In-Vivo 

Samples 

Average # 

Samples per 

Worker per 

Year 

Average # 

Samples Per 

Monitored 

Worker per 

Year 

Average Am-241 

In-Vivo Result 

(nCi) 

Median Am-241 

In-Vivo Result 

(nCi) 

1972 2.53% – 2.53% 0.027 1.05 4.65E-01 2.95E-01 

1973 4.95% – 4.95% 0.057 1.15 5.58E-01 2.65E-01 

1974 5.75% – 5.75% 0.066 1.14 8.18E-01 3.20E-01 

1975 0.16% – 0.16% 0.002 1.00 7.48E+00† 1.40E-01 

1976 5.90% – 5.90% 0.063 1.07 4.10E-01 1.30E-01 

1977 5.70% – 5.70% 0.060 1.05 1.76E-01 1.30E-01 

1978 7.63% – 7.63% 0.085 1.11 1.61E-01 1.25E-01 

1979 8.41% – 8.41% 0.094 1.12 1.55E-01 1.25E-01 

1980 9.16% – 9.16% 0.100 1.09 1.99E-01 1.30E-01 

1981 9.50% – 9.50% 0.104 1.10 1.57E-01 1.25E-01 

1982 9.09% – 9.09% 0.099 1.09 1.56E-01 1.30E-01 

1983 8.05% – 8.05% 0.085 1.06 1.56E-01 1.25E-01 

1984 8.17% – 8.17% 0.092 1.12 1.25E-01 8.00E-02 

1985 8.29% – 8.29% 0.093 1.12 4.26E-01 8.00E-02 

1986 8.68% 0.01% 8.68% 0.104 1.20 2.67E-01 8.30E-02 

1987 8.28% – 8.28% 0.092 1.11 1.55E-01 8.45E-02 

1988 9.42% – 9.42% 0.103 1.10 1.41E-01 8.60E-02 

1989 11.38% – 11.38% 0.123 1.08 1.71E-01 7.50E-02 

1990 13.78% – 13.78% 0.160 1.16 1.01E-01 6.65E-02 

† This value is driven by an unusually high result (1.3E+02 nCi in January of 1975); the sample result was blank, 

but listed an extremely high MDA (2.6E+02 nCi). The worker was a Westinghouse employee with an unknown 

job title. The sample is labeled as a termination sample. If this value is excluded, the average drops to 2.7E-01 

nCi in 1975.

Dashes (-) indicate 0.00% 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 15 of 17

Table A-5. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Americium by Y

Rank Job Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1

1 Misc Precision/Production [redacted] – – – – – – – 2 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 3.2% 28.1% 19.5% 4.4% 26.9% 25.4% 53.2% 503 Electricians 374 2.0% 16.7% 8.8% 0.0% 12.6% 14.7% 15.8% 194 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 6.7% 6.1% 11.0% 2.0% 6.5% 7.8% 15.0% 165 Pipefitters 364 5.0% 8.5% 4.7% 0.0% 7.2% 12.6% 17.3% 126 Science Technicians 394 0.0% 13.0% 16.7% 0.0% 21.6% 15.9% 18.2% 287 Sheet Metal Workers 80 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 11.1% 298 Painters 88 0.0% 13.6% 0.0% 0.0% 7.4% 6.1% 3.0% 59 Equipment Operator 128 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4

10 Misc Repair/Construction 476 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.4% 211 Carpenters 101 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0% 012 Welders and Solderers 47 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 7.1% 10.5% 2613 Health Physicists 59 0.0% 20.0% 14.3% 0.0% 15.4% 7.1% 13.3% 3314 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 6.9% 5.0% 615 Miners/Drillers [redacted] – – – – – – – 16 Misc Technicians 653 5.3% 5.3% 4.0% 0.0% 10.1% 8.6% 13.6% 1317 Technicians 446 14.7% 22.5% 38.3% 0.0% 36.9% 31.0% 38.6% 3218 Machinists 98 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 14.3% 11.6% 16.0% 1119 Truck Drivers 200 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 2.3% 320 Mechanics/Repairers 324 3.5% 7.9% 3.9% 0.0% 11.5% 8.7% 14.4% 10

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and yearAppendix A 15 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 16 of 17

Appendix A 16 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A-5. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Americium by Yea

(continued) 

Rank Job Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1

1 Misc Precision/Production [redacted] – – – – – – – 2 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 58.6% 40.0% 31.2% 33.6% 33.2% 35.2% 43.1% 663 Electricians 374 22.0% 18.6% 13.5% 16.7% 19.4% 20.9% 31.7% 534 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 14.4% 18.1% 22.8% 30.5% 39.2% 38.0% 38.2% 405 Pipefitters 364 19.7% 18.6% 17.2% 18.2% 18.1% 18.1% 25.1% 506 Science Technicians 394 18.0% 34.3% 35.8% 38.3% 33.2% 36.9% 35.5% 387 Sheet Metal Workers 80 11.8% 8.9% 13.7% 15.4% 28.3% 7.9% 31.3% 368 Painters 88 13.0% 6.2% 6.0% 6.7% 7.5% 7.9% 19.7% 289 Equipment Operator 128 7.1% 2.9% 3.0% 4.0% 8.6% 7.5% 10.0% 27

10 Misc Repair/Construction 476 1.1% 1.4% 2.3% 3.0% 2.6% 2.8% 23.1% 3011 Carpenters 101 4.6% 5.4% 4.8% 4.1% 7.8% 5.6% 21.1% 2612 Welders and Solderers 47 11.9% 14.3% 11.1% 13.0% 13.0% 10.9% 13.0% 1613 Health Physicists 59 27.3% 11.5% 9.1% 11.4% 4.6% 4.7% 10.4% 2514 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 12.3% 10.4% 9.5% 10.6% 6.3% 7.4% 22.8% 1615 Miners/Drillers [redacted] 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6616 Misc Technicians 653 22.5% 18.0% 17.2% 14.8% 15.8% 15.8% 17.6% 2017 Technicians 446 35.3% 29.7% 27.0% 28.5% 23.2% 20.2% 14.1% 1818 Machinists 98 14.3% 12.4% 9.0% 11.0% 9.7% 12.5% 13.7% 1019 Truck Drivers 200 8.2% 6.3% 5.6% 7.1% 5.3% 6.5% 5.3% 120 Mechanics/Repairers 324 17.1% 15.4% 15.2% 13.1% 17.6% 14.2% 14.7% 19

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and year 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 17 of 175 

Appendix A 17 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-6. Overview of Americium In-Vivo Results (nCi) for the Job Titles Most Likely 

to be Monitored During Employment 

Am-241 In Vitro Average Median Max 

Greater 

Than All 

Worker 

Average 

Greater 

than All 

Worker 

Median 

Percent 

Monitored 

During 

Career 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

Misc Precision/Production 6.05E-02 6.05E-02 6.45E-02 100.00% [redacted]

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 1.04E-01 9.00E-02 4.90E+00 78.20% 417 

Electricians 9.82E-02 8.70E-02 7.10E-01 70.90% 374 

Operators Plant/ System/Utility 4.73E-01 8.40E-02 1.26E+02 Y 65.60% 1003 

Pipefitters 1.04E-01 8.85E-02 4.66E-01 65.40% 364 

Science Technicians 4.74E-01 8.75E-02 1.30E+01 Y 63.70% 394 

Sheet Metal Workers 8.88E-02 8.50E-02 1.85E-01 58.80% 80 

Painters 9.30E-02 8.20E-02 3.20E-01 52.30% 88 

Equipment Operator 8.19E-02 7.68E-02 1.90E-01 48.40% 128 

Misc Repair/Construction 8.41E-02 7.85E-02 6.80E-01 48.10% 476 

Carpenters 8.31E-02 7.93E-02 1.80E-01 46.50% 101 

Welders and Solderers 1.08E-01 9.50E-02 2.78E-01 44.70% 47 

Health Physicists 1.13E-01 1.10E-01 1.95E-01 Y 44.10% 59 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 9.57E-02 9.15E-02 1.85E-01 40.00% 200 

Miners/Drillers 7.29E-02 6.13E-02 1.18E-01 40.00% [redacted]

Misc Technicians 1.02E-01 9.20E-02 7.35E-01 37.40% 653 

Technicians 1.33E-01 1.00E-01 1.50E+00 35.90% 446 

Machinists 1.17E-01 1.05E-01 9.50E-01 Y 34.70% 98 

Truck Drivers 9.37E-02 8.50E-02 2.05E-01 34.00% 200 

Mechanics/Repairers 1.13E-01 9.40E-02 2.20E+00 33.60% 324 

All Workers 2.01E-01 1.00E-01

Table A-7 shows the specific areas/buildings and periods of operation at the site, where the 

potential for internal americium exposure existed. As shown, the internal exposure potential was 

confined to the 200 Area, 200 Area Tank Farms, and 300 Area. 

Table A-8 breaks down the monitoring coverage by area and year for the major areas of interest 

for the site.4

 As shown in Table A-8, the percentage of workers in the 200 Area, 200 Tank 

Farms, and 300 Area were higher than the percentage monitored in the 100 Area, 100 N Reactor 

Area, 700 Area and the worker population as a whole. However, from 1979–1985, the 400 Area 

had the highest percentage of workers monitored for americium, although no known campaigns 

or activities have been identified that would warrant the increase in monitoring. 

Table A-9 further parses the data to identify workers in which information exists to identify both 

the location and job title in order to find the most common job title among monitored workers for 

a given location and year. As an example, the first entry in Table A-9 shows that 24 workers 

have been identified by job title in the 200 Area for 1972,5 and the most common job title 

 4

 Please refer to Attachment 2 for more information on how work location information was derived and 

interpreted from the REX database. 5

 As noted in Attachments 1 and 2, it was not plausible to determine whether the worker was in a specific 

area with a given job title on a year-by-year basis. Instead, it was assumed that if the worker held a specific job title 

and was identified as working in a given area at some point during their SEC employment that this job title and 

location applies to their entire employment. Please refer to Attachments 1 and 2 for further discussion of the 

implications of this approach. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 18 of 175 

Appendix A 18 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

monitored was a tie between ‘operators’ and ‘mngr. and admin,’ which represented 50% of the 

identified workers monitored ([redacted] workers for each category). As shown in the table, the 

most commonly monitored job category for the 200 Area was generally ‘operators’ and ‘mngr. 

and admin’ for almost all years. These two job categories were also commonly monitored in the 

300 Area; however, the title of ‘Scientist’ was also common from the beginning of the SEC until 

about 1983. It is worth noting that operators and scientists were also workers with some of the 

highest exposure potential, as was shown in Table A-6 previously. 

Table A-7. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Americium Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

T Plant (221T) 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

T Plant was mainly involved in 

decontamination activities during the 

SEC period; however, the internal dose 

TBD indicates americium recovery in 

the T Plant, but does not indicate a date. 

PUREX (S 

Plant A Plant, 

202A) 

1983–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Mainly 

associated with 

contamination 

incidents 

- Internal TBD indicates that there was 

americium recovery performed in the 

S Plant, but no dates were provided. 

- 2 contamination incidents identified 

(April 1982, February 1986). 

UO3 (224U, 

224UA) 

1984–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Due to large 

quantities of uranium 

processed 

17 reactor startups in SEC period 

(generally last 8 days – specific dates 

not currently known). 

225B Waste 

Encapsulation 

Facility 

1974–End of 

SEC 

Limited – Facility 

was remotely 

operated. 

232-Z 1972–1973 

Yes – Inhalation, 

Absorption and 

Injection Potential 

- TBD states exposure potential mainly 

limited to contamination incidents. 

- Ref 55191 shows 2 inhalation incidents 

and calculated intakes from Jan 1974. 

2345Z RMA 1972–1984 

Yes – Mainly due to 

contamination 

incidents 

Mainly limited to contamination 

incidents per TBD. 

2345Z RMC 1972–1989 

Yes – Mainly due to 

contamination 

incidents 

Mainly limited to contamination 

incidents per TBD. 

2345Z Storage 

Vault 

1972–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Mainly due to 

contamination 

incidents 

Mainly limited to contamination 

incidents per TBD. 

236-Z 1972–1976 

Yes – Mainly due to 

contamination 

incidents 

Ref 4892 noted a puncture incident in 

1985 that deposited 1.5 MPBB of 

americium. 

200 

242-Z 1972–1977 

Yes – Mainly from 

contamination 

incidents 

- ER states the facility was specifically 

for americium recovery. 

- Ref 55191 shows intake from injury 

incident in 1973. Ref 4892, 35872 and 

8707 document an explosion involving 

americium in 1976 resulting in 

significant contamination and internal 

deposition. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 19 of 175 

Appendix A 19 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-7. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Americium Exposure 

NOTICE:

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

200 

Tank 

Farms 

Waste Tanks 1972–End of 

SEC 

Limited – 

Respiratory 

protection used 

Unplanned release incidents from 1972–

1985 are described in Ref 60801 pp. 73–

79. 

333 1972–1988 Yes 

303 (A-G, J, K, 

M) 

1972–1983 

(A-G, J, K) 

1984–1987 

(M) 

Yes 

306 1972–1984 Yes 

325 

1973–1976, 

Possibly 

1982–1984 

Not Yet Established 

Ref 66625 indicates the 325-A and B 

cells were considered for use to separate 

Am and Pm; the document presents cost 

estimates for 1982–1984 (it is not clear 

whether this campaign was ever 

undertaken); site description TBD 

mentions americium purification being 

undertaken from 1973–1976. 

3708 Early 1970s Not Yet Established 

Site description TBD mentions that the 

north end of this building was used for 

canning experiments of americium and 

curium; Ref 13724 indicates these 

pressed powder targets were clad in 

aluminum and irradiated in other 

production reactors to produce special 

isotopes for medical and science 

applications. 

300 

324 Possibly 

1982–1984 Not Yet Established 

Ref 66625 indicates that the A cell of 

the 324 Building was under 

consideration for Pm-Am separation and 

purification for the years 1982–1984; it 

is not clear if this activity ever was 

undertaken. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

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Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 20 of 175 

Appendix A 20 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-8. Combined Americium Monitoring Location Data 

Percentage of Workers Monitored for Americium (In Vitro + In Vivo) 

Year All 

Workers 100 Area 100N Area 200 Area 200 Tank Farms 300 Area 400 Area 700 Area 

1972 2.57% 2.13% 2.00% 5.76% 13.16% 7.12% 4.00% 0.37% 

1973 4.97% 4.71% 4.38% 9.75% 6.82% 17.29% 9.25% 0.96% 

1974 5.75% 5.95% 5.56% 8.13% 7.41% 19.28% 5.06% 0.53% 

1975 0.27% 0.23% 0.26% 0.78% 1.39% 0.60% 0.34% 0.24% 

1976 6.00% 4.08% 3.82% 6.92% 3.13% 19.50% 5.41% 1.67% 

1977 5.85% 5.17% 5.22% 7.04% 3.20% 17.76% 9.47% 1.24% 

1978 7.62% 5.80% 5.62% 11.03% 12.32% 21.14% 18.20% 2.44% 

1979 8.41% 6.40% 5.85% 12.68% 11.98% 19.22% 29.55% 1.09% 

1980 9.16% 5.14% 4.65% 12.66% 13.95% 23.00% 28.23% 2.61% 

1981 9.50% 6.05% 5.39% 12.96% 12.00% 23.97% 30.95% 1.88% 

1982 9.07% 3.72% 3.00% 10.55% 13.60% 25.35% 39.92% 1.33% 

1983 8.08% 3.01% 2.09% 11.00% 17.28% 20.98% 28.60% 1.38% 

1984 8.25% 3.77% 3.00% 11.51% 17.18% 20.36% 26.86% 0.91% 

1985 8.24% 4.55% 3.63% 12.38% 21.12% 20.02% 22.85% 1.30% 

1986 8.69% 6.36% 5.57% 14.51% 28.06% 19.29% 18.85% 0.95% 

1987 8.28% 5.06% 4.27% 14.72% 25.87% 18.08% 19.22% 0.96% 

1988 9.45% 10.70% 10.20% 18.36% 24.84% 16.96% 18.80% 1.86% 

1989 11.36% 15.03% 14.61% 22.58% 23.96% 18.44% 17.18% 1.95% 

1990 13.82% 23.12% 23.08% 29.60% 32.09% 19.77% 16.75% 1.93% 

All Years: 15.18% 22.80% 22.36% 38.65% 55.49% 42.40% 54.70% 6.29% 

Bold and italicized values indicate internal exposure potential, dashes (-) indicate 0.00% 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 21 of 17

Table A-9. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Americium Ex

200 Area 200 Area Tank Farms 300 

Year # Monitored Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most C

Moni

T

1972 24 TIE: Mngr. and Admin., Operators 50.0% Combined [redacted] Operators 60.0% 48 Tech1973 70 Mngr. and Admin. 18.6% [redacted] Mngr. and Admin. 33.3% 139 Sci1974 56 Mngr. and Admin. 23.2% [redacted] Mngr. and Admin. 50.0% 184 Sci1975 [redacted] Operators 60.0% [redacted] Operators 100.0% [redacted] Misc Pr1976 84 Mngr. and Admin. 21.4% [redacted] Operators 66.7% 262 Sci1977 107 Mngr. and Admin. 22.4% [redacted] Operators 75.0% 271 Sci1978 219 Mngr. and Admin. 23.3% 17 Operators 52.9% 379 Sci1979 287 Mngr. and Admin. 20.6% 20 Operators 55.0% 391 Sci1980 325 Mngr. and Admin. 20.9% 24 Operators 54.2% 498 Sci1981 379 Mngr. and Admin. 21.4% 23 Operators 47.8% 555 Sci1982 345 Mngr. and Admin. 16.5% 30 Operators 63.3% 591 Mngr. a1983 448 Operators 22.1% 47 Operators 68.1% 570 Sci1984 528 Operators 24.1% 50 Operators 70.0% 590 Mngr. a1985 631 Operators 27.3% 64 Operators 65.6% 635 

TIE: 

and 

Op

1986 782 Operators 30.1% 87 Operators 64.4% 653 Op1987 830 Operators 29.4% 82 Operators 67.1% 661 Op1988 1044 Operators 23.6% 78 Operators 57.7% 627 Op1989 1278 Operators 21.0% 75 Operators 54.7% 1990 1767 Operators 19.4% 103 Technicians 21.4% 

No exposure p

Appendix A 21 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 22 of 175 

Appendix A 22 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

A.6.2 Cesium 

Table A-10 displays the overview of cesium in-vivo monitoring,6

 including the percentage of 

workers monitored, the number of samples per worker per year, the number of samples per 

monitored worker, and the average in-vivo result. The percentage of workers monitored by year 

generally varied between 10%–50%, with low points in 1975 (0.02%), 1984 (2.61%), and 1985 

(0.29%). It is not clear why these 3 years had such a significant decrease in monitoring. The 

sample results taken during these years do not show a significant difference with surrounding 

years, though the data that could be analyzed by result was limited to just two samples for 1975. 

Monitored workers were generally counted once per year. 

Table A-10. Cesium-137 In-Vivo Overview 

Year 

Percentage of 

Workers 

Monitored In Vivo 

for Cesium-137 

Average # 

Samples per 

Worker per Year 

Average # 

Samples Per 

Monitored 

Worker per Year 

Average 

Cs-137 In-Vivo 

Result (nCi) 

1972 11.80% 0.122 1.03 4.49E+00 

1973 20.80% 0.229 1.10 4.42E+00 

1974 19.44% 0.219 1.13 1.97E+00 

1975 0.02% 0.000 1.00 3.30E-01 

1976 15.88% 0.171 1.08 1.71E+00 

1977 18.82% 0.201 1.07 1.93E+00 

1978 21.75% 0.239 1.10 1.87E+00 

1979 26.15% 0.294 1.13 1.49E+00 

1980 28.24% 0.306 1.08 1.87E+00 

1981 33.15% 0.365 1.10 9.47E-01 

1982 35.67% 0.405 1.13 8.04E-01 

1983 33.10% 0.374 1.13 6.38E-01 

1984 2.61% 0.032 1.22 1.63E+00 

1985 0.29% 0.004 1.27 1.88E+00 

1986 19.63% 0.213 1.08 1.33E+00 

1987 39.20% 0.440 1.12 1.56E+00 

1988 39.77% 0.435 1.11 1.52E+00 

1989 50.78% 0.562 1.09 1.52E+00 

1990 53.26% 0.631 1.13 1.53E+00 

Table A-11 shows the monitoring coverage by job category for workers who can be identified by 

job title in the REX database.7

 Among the major job categories (i.e., categories with more than 

50 identified workers), the job titles most likely to have been monitored for cesium during their 

career were electricians, radiation monitors, firefighters, plant operators, pipefitters, and security 

guards. 

 6

 There was also a very small amount of Cs in-vitro data; because it appears to be non-routine and likely 

incident-specific, it was included under ‘miscellaneous fission products’ in Section 6.3. 7

 Refer to Attachment 1 for more information on how job title information was derived and interpreted 

from the REX database. 
Effective Date: 

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Page No. 

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Appendix A 23 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

Table A-12 displays an overview of the magnitude of in-vivo results for the top 20 job types 

listed in Table A-10. As shown, many of the job types that were identified as having a higher 

percentage of workers monitored during employment also had median and average values above 

the ‘all worker’ values.
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Table A-11. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Cesium by Ye

Rank Job Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1

1 Misc Precision/Production [redacted] – – – – – – – 2 Miscellaneous Transport 28 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.3 Sales [redacted] – – – – – – – 4 Electricians 374 6.12% 20.83% 28.07% 0.00% 27.59% 53.92% 41.73% 515 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 32.26% 50.00% 34.15% 0.00% 38.46% 55.93% 72.15% 696 Firefighters 104 0.00% 0.00% 6.67% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 23.68% 767 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 19.10% 24.49% 26.27% 0.00% 14.67% 51.08% 50.56% 578 Pipefitters 364 23.33% 35.59% 30.59% 0.00% 27.84% 39.86% 53.09% 599 Security Guards 531 14.29% 15.87% 16.67% 0.00% 13.40% 8.77% 7.48% 13

10 Welders and Solderers 47 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 41.67% 21.43% 42.11% 5211 Painters 88 12.50% 22.73% 15.38% 0.00% 22.22% 30.30% 39.39% 4112 Truck Drivers 200 0.00% 9.52% 10.00% 0.00% 4.44% 17.14% 15.12% 3713 Carpenters 101 0.00% 22.22% 0.00% 0.00% 19.05% 19.23% 24.32% 5514 Equipment Operator 128 11.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 33.33% 30.00% 4615 Sheet Metal Workers 80 11.11% 12.50% 35.29% 0.00% 23.53% 36.36% 22.22% 5016 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 20.69% 15.00% 3417 Misc Repair/Construction 476 7.89% 13.95% 10.17% 0.00% 19.72% 36.27% 31.43% 4718 Health Physicists 59 0.00% 20.00% 28.57% 0.00% 23.08% 28.57% 33.33% 3819 Masons 21 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 5020 Janitors 204 14.29% 55.56% 38.46% 0.00% 21.74% 15.15% 19.23% 15

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and yearAppendix A 24 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

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Page No. 

Page 25 of 17

Appendix A 25 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A-11. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Cesium by Year (1

Rank Job Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 

1 Misc Precision/Production [redacted] – – – – – – – – 2 Miscellaneous Transport 28 25.00% 52.38% 0.00% 0.00% 65.38% 92.59% 96.15% 92.00% 3 Sales [redacted] 0.00% – 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% – 100.00% 4 Electricians 374 69.78% 50.00% 1.74% 0.33% 25.57% 69.85% 84.62% 93.08% 5 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 86.21% 76.67% 5.37% 0.00% 37.40% 83.22% 86.15% 94.50% 6 Firefighters 104 25.42% 7.94% 0.00% 0.00% 3.85% 27.06% 44.32% 88.76% 7 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 76.35% 73.20% 4.48% 1.18% 38.60% 85.13% 81.69% 88.93% 8 Pipefitters 364 72.34% 68.37% 12.45% 1.78% 32.29% 73.72% 85.37% 93.53% 9 Security Guards 531 15.31% 23.14% 0.73% 0.00% 5.71% 20.44% 47.62% 82.05% 

10 Welders and Solderers 47 76.19% 66.67% 8.89% 2.17% 19.57% 76.09% 73.91% 80.95% 11 Painters 88 50.00% 53.85% 4.48% 0.00% 27.50% 67.11% 89.47% 84.93% 12 Truck Drivers 200 40.98% 35.92% 3.11% 0.00% 27.06% 56.52% 62.63% 76.27% 13 Carpenters 101 56.82% 46.43% 3.17% 0.00% 27.27% 65.56% 72.63% 82.28% 14 Equipment Operator 128 67.86% 51.47% 1.49% 0.00% 34.57% 56.07% 71.00% 83.67% 15 Sheet Metal Workers 80 47.06% 60.00% 3.92% 0.00% 47.17% 61.90% 89.06% 78.85% 16 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 47.37% 42.86% 4.05% 2.13% 32.14% 62.22% 77.93% 77.18% 17 Misc Repair/Construction 476 47.46% 44.76% 10.19% 1.14% 25.74% 58.82% 77.69% 84.79% 18 Health Physicists 59 40.91% 34.62% 0.00% 0.00% 34.09% 74.42% 75.00% 76.74% 19 Masons 21 100.00% 33.33% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 30.00% 60.00% 60.00% 20 Janitors 204 38.71% 35.19% 1.61% 0.00% 23.03% 36.65% 36.81% 66.23% 

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and year
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Page No. 

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Appendix A 26 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-12. Overview of Cesium In-Vivo Results (nCi) for the Job Titles Most Likely to 

be Monitored During Employment 

Cs-137 In Vivo Average Median Max 

Greater 

Than All 

Worker 

Average 

Greater 

than All 

Worker 

Median 

Percent 

Monitored 

During Career 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

Misc Precision/Production 7.10E+00 7.10E+00 9.40E+00 Y Y 100.00% [redacted] 

Miscellaneous Transport 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 100.00% 28 

Sales 3.53E+00 3.53E+00 3.70E+00 Y Y 100.00% [redacted] 

Electricians 1.18E+00 1.50E+00 1.40E+01 98.66% 374 

Radiation 

Monitors/Technicians 1.23E+00 1.50E+00 6.80E+00 98.32% 417 

Firefighters 5.55E+00 5.40E+00 6.90E+00 Y Y 98.08% 104 

Operators Plant/ 

System/Utility 1.22E+00 1.50E+00 2.30E+01 97.91% 1003 

Pipefitters 2.10E+00 1.50E+00 9.90E+01 Y 96.70% 364 

Security Guards 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 96.23% 531 

Welders and Solderers 2.20E+01 1.30E+01 2.60E+02 Y Y 95.74% 47 

Painters 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 95.45% 88 

Truck Drivers 3.83E+00 3.80E+00 4.70E+00 Y Y 95.00% 200 

Carpenters 2.47E+00 2.50E+00 2.60E+00 Y Y 94.06% 101 

Equipment Operator 2.69E+00 2.30E+00 2.70E+01 Y Y 93.75% 128 

Sheet Metal Workers 1.78E+00 1.70E+00 2.20E+00 Y Y 93.75% 80 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 2.73E+00 2.70E+00 2.90E+00 Y Y 93.00% 200 

Misc Repair/Construction 1.27E+00 1.50E+00 2.60E+00 92.86% 476 

Health Physicists 8.43E+00 8.30E+00 1.10E+01 Y Y 89.83% 59 

Masons 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 85.71% 21 

Janitors 3.06E+00 3.10E+00 3.30E+00 Y Y 85.29% 204 

All Workers 1.52E+00 1.50E+00 

Table A-13 shows the locations in which exposure to cesium would have occurred during the 

SEC period. As shown in the table, the majority of cesium-related operations occurred in the 

200 Area, 300 Area, and 200 Tank Farms. B Plant (in the 200 Area) was specifically involved in 

separating Cs-137 from high-level wastes generated at the PUREX plant, though documentation 

indicates the facility was remotely operated, so internal exposure would likely be limited to 

contamination incidents and maintenance activities. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Page No. 

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Appendix A 27 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

Table A-13. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Cesium Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

T Plant (221T) 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

T Plant was mainly involved in 

decontamination activities during the 

SEC period. 

PUREX (A 

Plant, 202A) 

1983–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Mainly 

associated with 

contamination 

incidents 

UO3 (224U, 

224UA) 

1984–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Due to large 

quantities of uranium 

processed 

17 reactor startups in SEC period 

(generally last 8 days – specific dates not 

currently known). 

225B Waste 

Encapsulation 

Facility 

1974–End of 

SEC 

Limited – Facility was 

remotely operated. 

222S 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

209E, 222T 1972–1986 Not Yet Established

222B 1972–1975 Not Yet Established

242 Evaporator 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established

Z-9 Trench 1972–1978 Not Yet Established

241-Z 1972–1973 Not Yet Established

200 

B Plant (221B) 1972–1983 

(per TBD) 

Limited – Remotely 

Operated 

Large-scale separation campaigns 

described in PUREX History document, 

but only to 1978, not 1983 per the TBD 

(Ref 14586, pg. 14). 

200 

Tank 

Farms 

Waste Tanks 1972–End of 

SEC 

Limited – Respiratory 

protection used 

Unplanned release incidents from 1972–

1985 are described in Ref 60801, pp. 

73–79. 

308, 320, 324, 

325, 326, 329, 

331 

1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established

Incident involving inhalation by a 

technician in 1978 (Ref 67891, pg. 120) 

and during a cleanup operation (Ref 

67891, pg. 335). 

318 1983-End of 

SEC Not Yet Established

321 1972–1988 Not Yet Established

327 1972–1987 Not Yet Established

3730 1972–1981 Not Yet Established

3745 1972–1983 Not Yet Established

300 

340 Waste 

Complex 

1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established
Effective Date: 

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Appendix A 28 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-14 breaks down the monitoring coverage by area for workers who could be identified 

with a specific site location in the REX database. As shown, the Tank Farms generally had the 

largest portion of its workforce monitored starting in 1977; prior to that, the 300 Area had the 

highest percentage monitored. Aside from the Tank Farms, monitoring coverage was usually 

highest in the 100 Area, though there has not been a significant internal exposure potential 

identified for this area. 

Table A-14. Cesium-137 In-Vivo Location Data 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In Vivo for Cesium-137 

Year All 

Workers 100 Area 100N Area 200 Area 200 Tank Farms 300 Area 400 Area 700 Area 

1972 11.69% 16.13% 16.80% 11.52% 15.79% 21.46% 10.67% 5.15% 

1973 20.76% 33.77% 33.76% 17.82% 13.64% 37.12% 17.92% 10.54% 

1974 19.37% 33.47% 34.50% 16.70% 14.81% 36.67% 18.14% 8.73% 

1975 0.02% 0.12% 0.13% – – 0.07% – – 

1976 15.83% 31.94% 32.52% 14.11% 6.25% 32.36% 12.11% 8.54% 

1977 18.72% 35.75% 35.96% 30.71% 59.20% 33.25% 16.87% 5.86% 

1978 21.66% 37.34% 37.88% 31.94% 54.35% 36.58% 27.22% 9.28% 

1979 26.00% 46.83% 46.90% 40.23% 62.28% 38.00% 40.15% 7.87% 

1980 28.10% 48.38% 48.29% 42.70% 72.67% 47.80% 45.15% 11.17% 

1981 32.99% 51.30% 51.81% 49.15% 76.00% 51.27% 56.28% 12.34% 

1982 35.49% 64.40% 65.26% 56.97% 82.02% 55.91% 62.35% 18.23% 

1983 33.06% 58.65% 59.13% 51.20% 72.06% 49.96% 55.19% 18.91% 

1984 2.60% 10.43% 10.93% 2.77% 4.81% 3.00% 2.30% 1.75% 

1985 0.29% 0.71% 0.74% 0.48% 1.32% 0.24% – 0.08% 

1986 19.57% 38.08% 38.92% 27.85% 37.10% 26.09% 27.56% 18.10% 

1987 38.81% 75.21% 75.86% 57.67% 89.27% 53.93% 55.94% 22.71% 

1988 39.07% 76.07% 76.99% 59.46% 89.17% 56.42% 59.44% 18.73% 

1989 49.79% 80.47% 81.00% 80.60% 95.53% 66.54% 73.43% 29.38% 

1990 50.08% 80.79% 81.38% 82.87% 96.26% 66.21% 73.91% 27.53% 

All Years: 48.67% 90.91% 91.30% 91.71% 99.41% 84.98% 91.11% 56.95% 

Bold and italicized values indicate internal exposure potential, dashes (-) indicate 0.00% 

Table A-15 displays the most common job title among monitored workers for the areas of interest 

for cesium. Managers and administrators dominated the 200 Area for most years and the 300 Area 

for the later years (scientists were the most commonly monitored job title in the early years of the 

300 Area). ‘Operators’ were the most common job title for the 200 Tank Farms.
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Table A-15. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Cesium Expo

200 Area 200 Area Tank Farms 300 

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most C

Monito

T

1972 72 Mngr. and Admin. 23.6% [redacted] Operators 50.0% 151 Tech1973 143 Engineers 22.4% [redacted] Mngr. and Admin. 40.0% 308 Scie1974 151 Mngr. and Admin. 27.8% [redacted] Mngr. and Admin. 50.0% 367 Scie1975 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A [redacted] Misc1976 192 Mngr. and Admin. 25.5% [redacted] Operators 50.0% 442 Scie1977 514 Mngr. and Admin. 22.0% 69 Operators 47.8% 533 Scie1978 659 Mngr. and Admin. 24.3% 73 Operators 53.4% 677 Scie1979 942 Mngr. and Admin. 21.3% 97 Operators 46.4% 775 Scie1980 1122 Mngr. and Admin. 23.6% 118 Operators 48.3% 1032 Scie1981 1473 Mngr. and Admin. 22.5% 144 Operators 48.6% 1213 Mngr. an1982 1786 Mngr. and Admin. 24.6% 180 Operators 46.1% 1320 Mngr. an1983 1989 Mngr. and Admin. 24.3% 192 Operators 51.0% 1339 Mngr. an1984 131 Mngr. and Admin. 36.6% 14 Mngr. and Admin. 64.3% 88 Mngr. an1985 21 Mngr. and Admin. 42.9% [redacted] Electricians 25.0% [redacted] Mngr. an1986 1465 Mngr. and Admin. 23.2% 113 Operators 47.8% 838 Mngr. an1987 3188 Mngr. and Admin. 20.8% 280 Operators 45.4% 1835 Mngr. an1988 3380 Mngr. and Admin. 20.4% 280 Operators 45.4% 1948 Mngr. an1989 4564 Mngr. and Admin. 23.3% 299 Operators 42.1% 2242 Mngr. an1990 4947 Mngr. and Admin. 22.2% 309 Operators 40.5% 2293 Mngr. an

Appendix A 29 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Page No. 

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Appendix A 30 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

A.6.3 Miscellaneous Fission Products 

Tables A-16 and A-17 display the in-vitro and in-vivo monitoring coverage for the most 

commonly sampled fission products present in the REX database. As the tables show, 

monitoring for specific fission products was not a routine occurrence and is likely related to 

specific campaigns or incidents. The only fission product that has data for each year of the SEC 

(aside from cesium-137 in-vivo monitoring covered in the previous section) was in-vitro 

monitoring for strontium, which generally ranged from a fraction of a percent (1972–1977) to 

well under 10% of the worker population. In-vivo monitoring for fission products shows a gap 

from 1975–1976. 

Documentation indicates that five internal exposures due to Eu-154 occurred in 1973, which 

explains why in-vivo monitoring is unusually high for this radionuclide in that year (Ref 59156). 

There was also an incident in 1974 (Ref 68214) involving Ce-144 contamination in Building 

325, which contaminated at least six workers (five of six workers submitted urinalysis samples 

the following day). A suspected Ru-106 intake occurred in Building 325 in 1974; no monitoring 

was found in response to this incident (Ref 68262). A potential Pm-147 internal exposure 

occurred in 1975 in the 325 Building when a worker encountered contamination from a faulty 

valve system (Ref 68236); Pm was separated in the 325 Building of the 300 Area from 1972–

1978 (Ref 66625). A technician in the 325 Building in 1978 was involved in an inhalation 

incident of Sr-90; this year coincides with a general increase in in-vitro strontium monitoring for 

the general worker population and also one of the highest average in-vitro results of the years 

shown (Ref 67891, pg. 120). 
Effective Date: 

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Table A-16. Miscellaneous Fission Product In-Vitro Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In Vitro for Miscellaneous Fission Products 

Year Sr Cs Pm Co Eu Ce Nb Ru MFP† Combined In-Vitro 

Samples 

Average # 

Samples per 

Worker per Year 

Aver

Samp

Mon

Worker 

1972 0.69% 0.01% 0.01% – 0.01% 0.01% – – – 0.73% 0.012 11973 0.82% 0.02% – – 0.09% 0.01% – – – 0.92% 0.026 21974 0.80% – 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.06% 0.01% 0.01% – 0.86% 0.013 11975 0.90% 0.18% 0.04% – 0.01% – – – – 0.91% 0.013 11976 0.25% 0.01% 0.09% – – – – – – 0.26% 0.005 11977 0.66% – 0.09% – – – – – – 0.68% 0.008 11978 2.53% 0.01% 0.11% – 0.01% – – – – 2.58% 0.034 11979 4.08% 0.08% 0.08% – – 0.01% – – 0.01% 4.10% 0.057 11980 4.04% 0.04% 0.02% – – – – – 0.01% 4.05% 0.059 11981 4.46% 0.11% 0.01% 0.13% 0.05% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% – 4.49% 0.074 11982 3.22% 0.08% – 0.07% – 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.20% 3.24% 0.051 11983 2.65% 0.04% – 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% – 2.70% 0.035 11984 4.37% 0.04% – 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% – 0.01% – 4.37% 0.054 11985 4.48% 0.01% 0.02% – – 0.01% – – – 4.49% 0.052 11986 4.80% 0.03% – 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% – 4.80% 0.056 11987 5.22% – – – – – – – – 5.22% 0.058 11988 7.40% 0.01% – – – – – – – 7.40% 0.083 11989 8.12% – – – – – – – – 8.12% 0.094 11990 7.90% – – – – – – – – 7.90% 0.084 1

† Designated as Mixed Fission Products Dashes indicate no data could be identified for that year and sampling type NA indicates data could be not analyzed for result magnitudeAppendix A 31 

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Table A-17. Miscellaneous Fission Product In-Vivo Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In Vivo for Miscellaneous Fission Products 

Year FP* Sr Eu Sb Ru Fe Zr Ce Nb Combined In-Vivo 

Samples 

Average # 

Samples per 

Worker per Yea

1972 0.14% 0.05% 0.01% 0.09% 0.14% 0.02% 0.19% – – 0.62% 0.007 1973 0.21% 14.08% 0.15% 0.21% 0.25% 0.14% 0.92% 0.07% 0.01% 14.92% 0.177 1974 – 18.23% – – – – – – – 18.23% 0.201 1975 – – – – – – – – – – – 1976 – – – – – – – – – – – 1977 0.01% – 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% – 0.05% – – 0.09% 0.001 1978 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% – 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% – 0.02% 0.07% 0.001 1979 – 0.01% 0.01% – 0.07% – 0.08% – 0.08% 0.10% 0.003 1980 – – 0.01% – – 0.01% 0.06% – 0.06% 0.09% 0.002 1981 – 0.02% 0.04% – – – – – – 0.06% 0.001 1982 – 0.01% 0.01% – – 0.01% – – – 0.03% 0.000 1983 – 0.02% 0.02% – – 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% – 0.06% 0.001 1984 – – 0.02% 0.01% – – – – – 0.03% 0.001 1985 – – 0.08% – 0.02% – – 0.04% – 0.12% 0.002 1986 – – 0.12% 0.02% – 0.01% – 0.21% – 0.29% 0.005 1987 – 0.01% 0.19% 0.02% – – – 0.08% – 0.25% 0.006 1988 – – 0.06% – 0.02% – – 0.02% – 0.10% 0.003 1989 – – 0.02% – – – – – – 0.02% 0.001 1990 – – 0.05% 0.02% – – 0.01% 0.01% – 0.07% 0.001 

* Designated as “Fission Products” Dashes indicate no data could be identified for that year and sampling type 

Appendix A 32 

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Table A-18. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Fission Products b

Rank Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 197

1 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 3.23% 40.63% 31.71% 4.35% 5.77% 5.08% 16.46% 32.292 Operators Plant/System/Utility 1003 8.99% 23.47% 26.27% 6.67% 0.00% 5.63% 18.35% 33.443 Science Technicians 394 5.88% 18.52% 26.67% 5.97% 1.35% 3.66% 27.27% 33.664 Pipefitters 364 5.00% 33.90% 29.41% 3.77% 0.00% 0.70% 9.88% 12.355 Electricians 374 0.00% 20.83% 28.07% 1.23% 1.15% 3.92% 8.66% 10.266 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 2.047 Welders and Solderers 47 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.26% 4.358 Misc Repair/Construction 476 0.00% 6.98% 10.17% 0.00% 0.00% 1.96% 2.14% 2.449 Painters 88 0.00% 18.18% 15.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.03% 5.88

10 Sheet Metal Workers 80 0.00% 12.50% 35.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.0011 Carpenters 101 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.0012 Health Physicists 59 0.00% 20.00% 14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.33% 22.2213 Miners/Drillers [redacted] – – – – – – – – 14 Equipment Operator 128 0.00% 5.26% 0.00% 5.26% 0.00% 0.00% 13.33% 9.7615 Misc Technicians 653 1.75% 13.33% 16.16% 1.80% 0.00% 1.23% 10.19% 10.0416 Mechanics/Repairers 324 3.45% 18.42% 19.23% 3.28% 0.00% 0.00% 5.04% 6.2517 Machinists 98 0.00% 9.52% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.8518 Truck Drivers 200 0.00% 4.76% 6.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.16% 2.9419 Technicians 446 2.67% 31.25% 59.57% 7.84% 7.21% 6.20% 6.21% 6.4920 Scientists 1535 0.00% 26.81% 33.14% 1.08% 1.18% 1.62% 3.19% 4.13

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and yearAppendix A 33 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 34 of 17

Appendix A 34 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A-18. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Fission Products by 

(continued)

Rank Job Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 198

1 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 20.69% 16.11% 23.90% 27.43% 33.97% 30.20% 37.54% 46.12 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 25.65% 17.81% 26.29% 32.19% 32.36% 34.29% 32.29% 37.83 Science Technicians 394 16.41% 17.47% 27.37% 29.03% 26.00% 35.04% 29.43% 27.04 Pipefitters 364 10.64% 9.77% 12.02% 11.03% 12.50% 15.36% 25.67% 31.05 Electricians 374 5.49% 7.02% 9.03% 11.71% 10.03% 13.23% 21.60% 33.226 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 0.00% 2.60% 1.35% 1.06% 1.79% 1.48% 30.34% 26.857 Welders and Solderers 47 4.76% 2.38% 4.44% 8.70% 10.87% 10.87% 17.39% 14.298 Misc Repair/Construction 476 3.39% 5.71% 8.80% 6.06% 8.25% 7.84% 31.23% 37.89 Painters 88 3.70% 1.54% 1.49% 0.00% 3.75% 1.32% 26.32% 20.55

10 Sheet Metal Workers 80 5.88% 4.44% 3.92% 7.69% 9.43% 0.00% 26.56% 21.1511 Carpenters 101 2.27% 0.00% 1.59% 0.00% 1.30% 1.11% 22.11% 27.8512 Health Physicists 59 9.09% 11.54% 9.09% 14.29% 15.91% 18.60% 25.00% 27.913 Miners/Drillers [redacted] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.00% 33.314 Equipment Operator 128 7.14% 10.29% 11.94% 17.33% 14.81% 19.63% 25.00% 30.615 Misc Technicians 653 4.23% 3.78% 7.69% 6.64% 7.05% 7.81% 13.42% 14.7716 Mechanics/Repairers 324 6.31% 3.86% 7.77% 5.86% 9.15% 5.79% 9.87% 8.6517 Machinists 98 1.30% 3.37% 3.37% 0.00% 1.08% 2.08% 0.00% 1.1518 Truck Drivers 200 0.00% 2.11% 1.24% 1.78% 2.94% 6.52% 6.32% 7.3419 Technicians 446 0.58% 2.01% 2.21% 2.34% 2.26% 1.83% 1.44% 2.5920 Scientists 1535 1.06% 1.19% 2.20% 1.40% 2.14% 2.37% 2.62% 3.98
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 35 of 175 

Appendix A 35 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-18 shows the monitoring coverage by job category for the fission products presented in 

Tables A-16 and A-17.8

 Similar to other radionuclides analyzed, the job titles most likely to be 

monitored during their career were ‘radiation monitors,’ ‘operators,’ ‘pipefitters,’ ‘electricians,’ 

and ‘handlers/laborers.’ 

Table A-19 shows an overview of bioassay results for the top 20 job titles most likely to have 

been monitored for fission products during employment. As the table shows, the top two job 

titles (radiation monitors and operators) had the highest maximum values observed among the 

top 20 job titles. 

Table A-20 shows the areas and periods of concern for fission products, which include the 200 

and 300 Areas, as well as the 200 Area Tank Farms, as the primary locations for exposure 

potential. In addition, the 100 N Reactor Area is also a location of concern for fission products 

due to the reactor operations. 

Table A-19. Overview of Strontium-90 In-Vitro Results (μCi/l) for the Job Titles Most 

Likely to be Monitored During Employment 

Sr-90 In Vivo Average Median Max 

Greater 

Than All 

Worker 

Average

Greater 

than All 

Worker 

Median

Percent 

Monitored 

During 

Career 

Number of 

Workers 

Identified 

Radiation Monitors/ 

Technicians 7.71E-07 0.00E+00 2.56E-04 70.98% 417 

Operators Plant/ 

System/Utility 3.41E-06 0.00E+00 5.23E-03 63.31% 1003 

Science Technicians 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 57.11% 394 

Pipefitters 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 56.59% 364 

Electricians 3.63E-07 0.00E+00 2.25E-05 55.35% 374 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 55.00% 200 

Welders and Solderers 3.34E-05 2.11E-05 2.90E-04 Y Y 51.06% 47 

Misc Repair/Construction 5.71E-07 0.00E+00 6.06E-05 50.21% 476 

Painters 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 47.73% 88 

Sheet Metal Workers 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 47.50% 80 

Carpenters 1.18E-07 0.00E+00 2.85E-06 44.55% 101 

Health Physicists 2.36E-05 0.00E+00 2.62E-04 Y 42.37% 59 

Miners/Drillers 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 40.00% [redacted] 

Equipment Operator 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 39.84% 128 

Misc Technicians 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 24.50% 653 

Mechanics/Repairers 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 24.38% 324 

Machinists 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 22.45% 98 

Truck Drivers 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 20.50% 200 

Technicians 4.28E-07 0.00E+00 1.28E-05 19.96% 446 

Scientists 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 18.37% 1535 

All Workers 1.29E-05 0.00E+00

 8

 Refer to Attachment 1 for more information on how job title information was derived and interpreted 

from the REX database. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 36 of 175 

Appendix A 36 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-20. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Fission Product Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

100 N N Reactor 1972–1987 

Not Yet Established – 

See incident 

description 

Accidental release of irradiated fuel 

elements in 1977 during a maintenance 

activity (Ref 26722). 

T Plant (221T) 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

T Plant was mainly involved in 

decontamination activities during the 

SEC period. 

PUREX (A 

Plant, 202A) 

1983–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Mainly 

associated with 

contamination 

incidents 

UO3 (224U, 

224UA) 

1984–End of 

SEC 

Yes – Due to large 

quantities of uranium 

processed 

17 reactor startups in SEC period 

(generally last 8 days – specific dates not 

currently known). 

225B Waste 

Encapsulation 

Facility 

1974–End of 

SEC 

Limited – Facility was 

remotely operated 

222S 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

209E, 222T 1972–1986 Not Yet Established 

222B 1972–1975 Not Yet Established 

242 Evaporator 1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

Z-9 Trench 1972–1978 Not Yet Established 

241-Z 1972–1973 Not Yet Established 

2009

B Plant (221B) 1972–1983 

(per TBD) 

Limited – Remotely 

Operated 

- B Plant was involved in strontium 

extraction. 

- Contamination incident was identified 

in 1974 when beta/gamma was 

discovered at numerous locations where 

an individual worked, including 221B 

(Ref 73668). 

- In the early 1980s, a concentrator tube 

failed, releasing MFP to the atmosphere 

(Ref 60801). 

200 

Tank 

Farms 

Waste Tanks 1972–End of 

SEC 

Limited – Respiratory 

protection used for 

most operations (see 

additional comments) 

Contamination incident was identified in 

1974 when beta/gamma was discovered 

at numerous locations where an 

individual worked, including the Tank 

Farms – no respiratory protection used 

(Ref 73668). 

Unplanned release incidents from 1972–

1985 are described in Ref 60801, pp. 

73–79.

 9

 A list and brief description of unplanned releases of fission products is provided in Ref 60801, pp. 302–

376. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 37 of 175 

Appendix A 37 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-20. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Fission Product Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

308, 320, 324, 

325, 326, 329, 

331 

1972–End of 

SEC Incidents Identified 

Strontium intake incident in 1978 (Ref 

67891, pg. 120) and again during a 

cleanup operation (Ref 67891, pg. 335). 

Spread of beta-gamma emitters in Bldg. 

324 during load out operation in 1979; 

exposure levels were at 450 rad/hr (Ref 

67867, pg. 105) 

318 1983–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

321 1972–1988 Not Yet Established 

327 1972–1987 Not Yet Established 

3730 1972–1981 Not Yet Established 

3745 1972–1983 Not Yet Established 

300 

340 Waste 

Complex 

1972–End of 

SEC Not Yet Established 

Table A-21 shows the monitoring coverage by area for workers who could be identified with a 

specific location in the REX database. As shown, monitoring was concentrated on the 200 Area 

and specifically the 200 Area Tank Farms. Much of the fission product monitoring (in terms of 

the percentage of the workforce monitored) occurred in 1973 and 1974 before dropping off 

significantly for the 3 years following. The exception to this trend is the Tank Farms, which 

showed increased monitoring starting in 1978, compared to the prior period. 

Table A-21. Miscellaneous Fission Product Location Data 

Percentage of Workers Monitored for Fission Products 

(In Vitro + In Vivo) Year All 

Workers 100 Area 100N Area 200 Area 200 Tank Farms 300 Area 400 Area 700 Area 

1972 1.30% 3.55% 3.80% 3.49% 13.16% 0.71% 1.33% – 

1973 15.50% 24.19% 23.91% 15.72% 18.18% 26.48% 12.72% 7.03% 

1974 18.70% 31.48% 32.75% 17.74% 24.07% 35.92% 16.88% 7.67% 

1975 0.91% 0.70% 0.51% 2.99% 6.94% 1.68% 0.34% 0.24% 

1976 0.26% 0.21% 0.23% 0.06% – 1.28% – 0.21% 

1977 0.77% 0.75% 0.73% 2.57% 3.20% 1.26% 0.62% – 

1978 2.62% 1.89% 1.92% 11.41% 25.36% 2.04% 1.24% 0.76% 

1979 4.10% 4.08% 3.79% 17.01% 51.50% 2.02% 1.52% 0.54% 

1980 4.10% 5.20% 4.65% 15.79% 49.42% 1.68% 0.75% 0.50% 

1981 4.51% 5.53% 5.22% 16.02% 46.50% 1.78% 1.23% 0.35% 

1982 3.23% 3.05% 2.90% 10.19% 32.02% 1.11% 1.19% 0.11% 

1983 2.73% 1.70% 1.32% 8.43% 30.15% 1.06% 1.09% 0.18% 

1984 4.39% 2.38% 1.78% 13.40% 31.62% 1.59% 1.94% 0.42% 

1985 4.59% 4.06% 3.32% 13.08% 36.96% 1.44% 1.98% 0.31% 

1986 4.99% 7.29% 6.74% 12.78% 36.45% 2.30% 2.37% 0.51% 

1987 5.41% 6.50% 5.86% 14.49% 38.49% 1.91% 2.48% 0.37% 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 38 of 175 

Appendix A 38 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-21. Miscellaneous Fission Product Location Data 

Percentage of Workers Monitored for Fission Products 

(In Vitro + In Vivo) Year All 

Workers 100 Area 100N Area 200 Area 200 Tank Farms 300 Area 400 Area 700 Area 

1988 7.46% 12.58% 12.44% 18.50% 39.81% 5.98% 5.33% 2.25% 

1989 8.14% 14.15% 14.13% 19.84% 43.77% 5.73% 4.61% 3.18% 

1990 7.92% 13.66% 13.52% 19.99% 38.32% 5.02% 5.64% 2.39% 

All Years: 13.57% 26.65% 26.42% 37.30% 81.60% 22.16% 14.50% 8.03% 

 Bold and italicized values indicate internal exposure potential, dashes (-) indicate 0.00% 

Table A-22 shows the most common job title among monitored workers in the areas and periods 

of interest. Beginning in 1978, the monitored workers in the 200 Area and 200 Area Tank farms 

were most commonly ‘operators.’ As with other radionuclide classes analyzed, ‘managers and 

administrators’ was often the most common job title among monitored workers. The job 

category ‘technicians’ was also prominent during the early part of the SEC period for the 300 

Area. 

Table A-22. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Fission 

Product Exposure 

200 Area 200 Area Tank Farms 

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

1972 22 Mngr. and Admin 31.8% [redacted] Mngr. and Admin 40.0% 

1973 120 TIE: Engineers, 

Mngr. and Admin 40.0% [redacted] Operators 42.9% 

1974 155 Mngr. and Admin 31.0% 13 Mngr. and Admin 53.8% 

1975 30 Mngr. and Admin 36.7% [redacted] Mngr. and Admin 60.0% 

1976 [redacted] Mngr. and Admin 100.0% 0 N/A N/A 

1977 43 Operators 30.2% [redacted] Electricians 25.0% 

1978 218 Operators 22.0% 32 Operators 53.1% 

1979 373 Operators 27.6% 79 Operators 55.7% 

1980 390 Operators 29.0% 79 Operators 53.2% 

1981 454 Operators 29.1% 86 Operators 55.8% 

1982 314 Operators 38.5% 69 Operators 60.9% 

1983 329 Operators 34.0% 79 Operators 64.6% 

1984 577 Operators 30.7% 89 Operators 55.1% 

1985 649 Operators 31.6% 110 Operators 60.0% 

1986 678 Operators 30.2% 110 Operators 56.4% 

1987 805 Operators 29.1% 119 Operators 55.5% 

1988 1051 Operators 21.6% 125 Operators 49.6% 

1989 1123 Operators 21.7% 137 Operators 48.9% 

1990 1193 Operators 21.6% 123 Operators 41.5% 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 39 of 175 

Appendix A 39 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-22. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Fission 

Product Exposure 

100-N Area 300 Area 

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

1972 [redacted] Operators 50.0% [redacted] Technicians 66.7% 

1973 74 Engineers 24.3% 230 Scientists 19.6% 

1974 115 Mngr. and Admin 30.4% 359 Scientists 18.1% 

1975 [redacted] Mngr. and Admin 100.0% 21 Technicians 33.3% 

1976 [redacted] Mngr. and Admin 100.0% 20 Technicians 35.0% 

1977 [redacted] Electricians 33.3% 21 Technicians 33.3% 

1978 19 Mngr. and Admin 15.8% 40 Technicians 22.5% 

1979 39 Mngr. and Admin 25.6% 47 Technicians 19.1% 

1980 53 Mngr. and Admin 24.5% 39 Mngr. and Admin 15.4% 

1981 68 Mngr. and Admin 32.4% 45 Mngr. and Admin 15.6% 

1982 32 Mngr. and Admin 31.3% 23 Rad Monitors 21.7% 

1983 25 Mngr. and Admin 28.0% 31 Mngr. and Admin 25.8% 

1984 40 TIE: Mngr. and 

Admin, Operators 17.5% 49 Rad Monitors 20.4% 

1985 92 Operators 44.6% 48 Mngr. and Admin 25.0% 

1986 187 Operators 34.8% 77 Rad Monitors 16.9% 

1987 167 Operators 38.3% 70 Mngr. and Admin 14.3% 

1988 221 Misc. Repair 

Construction 17.2% 

1989 205 Misc. Repair 

Construction 23.4% 

1990 

No Exposure Potential Identified 

185 Misc. Repair 

Construction 13.0% 

A.6.4 Plutonium 

Tables A-23 and A-24 present the plutonium in-vitro and in-vivo monitoring coverage by year. 

As seen in the two tables, plutonium monitoring was mainly by in-vitro methods for Pu-239, 

with a handful of years where this was replaced by a ‘Pu Alpha’ analysis (1981–1983). The 

percentage of the worker population monitored for plutonium varied from 7% to as high as 16%; 

however, it generally averaged around 10%. Monitored workers usually only submitted a 

sample once per year up until 1984, when the average samples per year jumped to just over two 

samples per year. As a reminder, this analysis of number of samples per worker does not 

distinguish between routine samples and those related to incidents. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 40 of 175 

Appendix A 40 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-23. Plutonium In-Vitro Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In Vitro for 

Plutonium 

Year Pu 

Alpha Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-241

Combined 

In-Vitro 

Samples 

Average # 

Samples 

per 

Worker 

per Year 

Average # 

Samples Per 

Monitored 

Worker per 

Year 

1972 8.18% 0.01% 2.92% – 10.85% 0.15 1.35 

1973 – 0.01% 16.34% – 16.34% 0.27 1.63 

1974 – 0.02% 14.94% – 14.94% 0.22 1.45 

1975 – 0.03% 14.95% – 14.96% 0.19 1.29 

1976 – – 14.41% 0.01% 14.41% 0.17 1.20 

1977 – 0.01% 11.97% – 11.98% 0.14 1.16 

1978 – 0.02% 9.24% – 9.26% 0.11 1.21 

1979 – 0.01% 7.10% – 7.11% 0.09 1.25 

1980 0.06% 0.07% 9.59% – 9.59% 0.13 1.32 

1981 7.54% 0.02% 1.99% – 9.25% 0.11 1.17 

1982 8.43% – 0.01% – 8.43% 0.11 1.27 

1983 6.27% 2.30% 2.55% – 8.48% 0.12 1.41 

1984 – 8.47% 8.47% 0.01% 8.47% 0.23 2.68 

1985 – 8.98% 8.99% 0.01% 8.99% 0.22 2.42 

1986 – 8.26% 8.27% 0.01% 8.27% 0.20 2.42 

1987 – 8.62% 8.62% – 8.62% 0.20 2.32 

1988 – 11.40% 11.40% – 11.40% 0.30 2.64 

1989 – 12.36% 12.36% 0.01% 12.36% 0.33 2.67 

1990 – 11.89% 11.89% – 11.89% 0.28 2.34 

Dashes (-) indicate that no data are available for that sampling type and year 

NA indicates data could not be analyzed for magnitude 

As seen in Table A-24, in-vivo monitoring for plutonium was only for a very small portion of the 

worker population. For most years, workers monitored for plutonium by in-vivo methods were 

only counted once or twice per year, with the exception of 1982, in which there was a single 

worker who was counted 59 times for Pu-238 during a 5-month period following an intake 

incident. 

Table A-25 presents monitoring coverage by job category for those workers who could be 

identified by work category in the REX Database.10 ‘Radiation monitors,’ ‘operators,’ and 

‘handlers/laborers/helpers’ were the job categories most likely to be monitored for plutonium 

while employed during the SEC period. 

 10 Refer to Attachment 1 for more information on how job title information was derived and interpreted 

from the REX database. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 41 of 175 

Appendix A 41 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

Table A-24. Plutonium In-Vivo Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In Vivo 

for Plutonium Year 

Pu-238 Pu-239 Combined 

In-Vivo Samples 

Average # Samples 

per Worker per 

Year 

Average # Samples Per 

Monitored Worker per 

Year 

1972 – 0.13% 0.13% 0.003 2.09 

1973 0.01% 0.08% 0.09% 0.001 1.25 

1974 – 0.07% 0.07% 0.001 1.43 

1975 – 0.03% 0.03% 0.000 1.00 

1976 – 0.01% 0.01% 0.000 1.00 

1977 – 0.02% 0.02% 0.000 1.00 

1978 0.01% 0.04% 0.05% 0.000 1.00 

1979 0.01% 0.06% 0.06% 0.001 1.40 

1980 – 0.04% 0.04% 0.000 1.14 

1981 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.001 2.75 

1982 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.004 20.33 

1983 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.001 2.25 

1984 – 0.09% 0.09% 0.002 2.40 

1985 0.01% 0.05% 0.05% 0.001 1.33 

1986 0.01% 0.14% 0.14% 0.003 1.92 

1987 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.000 1.25 

1988 – 0.01% 0.01% 0.000 1.00 

1989 – 0.01% 0.01% 0.000 1.00 

1990 – – – 0.000 – 

Dashes (-) indicate that no data are available for that sampling type and year 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 42 of 17

Table A-25. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Plutonium by Y

Rank Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 19

1 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 48.39% 78.13% 70.73% 58.70% 59.62% 61.02% 58.23% 43.72 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 23.60% 33.67% 27.12% 32.67% 22.83% 27.27% 18.35% 21.33 Handlers/Laborers/ Helpers 200 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 14.29% 10.34% 12.50% 2.04 Pipefitters 364 18.33% 23.73% 16.47% 18.87% 29.90% 21.68% 22.84% 11.15 Electricians 374 10.20% 37.50% 31.58% 30.86% 28.74% 17.65% 21.26% 8.36 Science Technicians 394 33.33% 66.67% 75.00% 64.18% 60.81% 65.85% 32.95% 31.67 Sheet Metal Workers 80 16.67% 25.00% 23.53% 16.67% 11.76% 9.09% 18.52% 8.38 Carpenters 101 0.00% 33.33% 14.29% 14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 5.41% 0.09 Welders and Solderers 47 33.33% 0.00% 50.00% 54.55% 33.33% 50.00% 10.53% 13.0

10 Painters 88 6.25% 18.18% 15.38% 16.00% 11.11% 6.06% 3.03% 5.811 Health Physicists 59 60.00% 40.00% 28.57% 30.00% 38.46% 14.29% 13.33% 27.712 Misc Repair/Construction 476 2.63% 16.28% 8.47% 3.08% 11.27% 5.88% 4.29% 2.413 Equipment Operator 128 5.88% 21.05% 5.00% 10.53% 9.52% 11.11% 3.33% 7.314 Miners/Drillers [redacted] – – – – – – – – 15 Machinists 98 13.64% 14.29% 10.00% 15.63% 8.57% 11.63% 4.00% 3.816 Misc Technicians 653 19.30% 28.00% 19.19% 18.92% 19.42% 17.79% 14.56% 7.217 Mechanics/Repairers 324 13.79% 23.68% 25.00% 22.95% 28.74% 18.26% 15.83% 6.218 Truck Drivers 200 0.00% 9.52% 30.00% 15.38% 22.22% 20.00% 6.98% 0.019 Engineering Technicians 622 33.78% 49.37% 38.89% 42.37% 36.57% 36.77% 32.14% 25.920 Technicians 446 33.33% 43.75% 41.49% 42.16% 35.14% 31.01% 28.28% 22.0

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and year Appendix A 42 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 43 of 17

Appendix A 43 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A-25. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Plutonium by Year 

(continued) 

Rank Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 198

1 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 35.17% 33.33% 33.17% 43.81% 34.35% 40.27% 49.85% 64.532 Operators Plant/ System/Utility 1003 18.04% 22.60% 28.11% 29.04% 30.96% 34.17% 41.08% 42.013 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 10.53% 10.39% 5.41% 5.32% 7.14% 7.41% 37.93% 26.174 Pipefitters 364 18.09% 19.53% 16.74% 18.15% 21.18% 18.77% 33.13% 46.985 Electricians 374 19.78% 22.31% 15.28% 21.40% 22.65% 19.38% 31.66% 44.986 Science Technicians 394 28.91% 36.14% 37.37% 36.41% 37.60% 41.24% 38.46% 37.547 Sheet Metal Workers 80 14.71% 11.11% 9.80% 15.38% 13.21% 7.94% 37.50% 30.778 Carpenters 101 6.82% 5.36% 1.59% 4.11% 7.79% 5.56% 37.89% 41.779 Welders and Solderers 47 11.90% 14.29% 8.89% 17.39% 15.22% 17.39% 19.57% 26.19

10 Painters 88 12.96% 7.69% 7.46% 6.67% 6.25% 7.89% 35.53% 34.2511 Health Physicists 59 9.09% 19.23% 18.18% 20.00% 11.36% 13.95% 18.75% 30.2312 Misc Repair/Construction 476 1.13% 0.95% 1.85% 4.55% 3.63% 7.00% 31.76% 39.8113 Equipment Operator 128 3.57% 8.82% 10.45% 13.33% 13.58% 15.89% 23.00% 26.5314 Miners/Drillers [redacted] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.00% 66.6715 Machinists 98 0.00% 1.12% 14.61% 18.68% 19.35% 15.63% 18.95% 14.9416 Misc Technicians 653 21.82% 20.06% 18.30% 18.14% 14.94% 15.43% 20.60% 19.9617 Mechanics/Repairers 324 14.86% 16.60% 14.84% 15.86% 17.29% 12.54% 17.20% 19.0318 Truck Drivers 200 7.38% 7.04% 7.45% 8.88% 7.06% 10.87% 10.53% 9.6019 Engineering Technicians 622 31.68% 30.53% 23.75% 24.63% 19.34% 18.90% 19.67% 16.6320 Technicians 446 23.12% 24.62% 20.35% 17.19% 15.81% 13.46% 10.63% 14.08

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and year 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 44 of 175 

Appendix A 44 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-26 shows the site areas and time periods that have the potential for internal plutonium 

exposure. These locations of interest include the 200 Area, 200 Tank Farms, 300 Area, and 400 

Area. 

Table A-27 shows the plutonium-monitoring coverage by area and by year for workers who 

could be identified with a specific area. In general, the areas and years with potential plutonium 

exposure had a larger percentage of the workforce monitored than those areas with lesser 

potential. One notable exception to this is the 400 Area in 1978, which had the highest 

percentage of the workforce monitored in that year (22.86%), though no known plutonium 

exposure potential has yet been identified with that area and year. 

Table A-26. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Plutonium Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

231-Z 1972–197911

Yes – Mainly 

associated with 

contamination 

incidents 

- Part of the plutonium isolation facility. 

- Documentation indicates a contamination 

incident in 1972 (Ref 67761), 5 in 1974 (Refs 

67777, 68241, 68244, 68247 and 68134), 1 in 

1975 (Ref 68132), 1976 (Ref 68251), 2 in 

1977 (Ref 67848, pg. 8), 1978 (Ref 67867, 

p.95), 1979 (Ref 67867, pg. 208). 

232-Z 1972–1973 

2345-Z (RMA, 

RMC, Storage 

Vault) 

1972–1984 

(RMA) 

1972–1989 

(RMC) 

1972–End of SEC 

(Storage) 

236-Z, 242-Z 1972–1977, 

1986,13 1989 

Yes – Mainly 

associated with 

contamination 

incidents 

- Part of the plutonium finishing facilities. 

- Documents indicate the following number 

of employees sampled internally by year due 

to incidence [# identified # evaluated]: 

1972 (50), 1973 (3618), 1974 (41), 

1975 (52), 197612 (10). 

- Chelation therapy documents indicate 2 

intakes in 1986 (Ref 73182 and Ref 73185), 

and another in 1989 (Ref 73199). 

T Plant (221T) 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

T Plant was mainly involved in 

decontamination activities during the SEC 

period. 

 200 

PUREX (A 

Plant, 202A) 1983–End of SEC

Yes – Mainly 

associated with 

contamination 

incidents 

Ref 59165 lists contamination and other 

incidents for PUREX/UO3 plant from 1972–

1981. 

Contamination incidents are described in Ref 

4967, p. 48, for 1984, 1985, 1987, and 1988. 

Other incidents documented through 

chelation therapy records are identified in 

1986 (Ref 73188). 

 11 Though the Hanford TBD indicates the 231-Z facility was closed down in 1977, incident reports were 

found indicating plutonium contamination incidents in 1978 and 1979. 12 Only the first quarter radiation control report is available for 1976. 

13 Though the Hanford TBD indicates the 242-Z facility was closed in 1977, documentation indicates intake 

incidents in 1986 and 1989. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 45 of 175 

Appendix A 45 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-26. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Plutonium Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

UO3 (224U, 

224UA) 1984–End of SEC

Yes – Due to large 

quantities of uranium 

processed 

17 reactor startups in SEC period (generally 

last 8 days – specific dates not currently 

known). 

225B Waste 

Encapsulation 

Facility 

1974–End of SEC

Limited – Facility 

was remotely 

operated. 

222S 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

209E, 222T 1972–1986 Not Yet Established 

Abnormal Pu airborne concentrations 

reported in reactor room of 209E in 1978 

(Ref 67891, pg. 149). 

222B 1972–1975 Not Yet Established 

242 Evaporator 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

Z-9 Trench 1972–1978 Not Yet Established 

241-Z 1972–1973 Not Yet Established 

B Plant (221B) 1972–1983 

(per TBD) 

Limited – Remotely 

Operated 

Large-scale separations campaigns described 

in PUREX History document, but only to 

1978, not 1983 per the TBD (Ref 14586, 

pg. 14). 

200 

Tank 

Farms 

Waste Tanks 1972–End of SEC Limited – Respiratory 

protection used 

Unplanned release incidents from 1972–1985 

are described in Ref 60801, pp. 73–79. 

333 1972-1988 Yes 

303 (A-G, J, K, 

M) 

1972–1983 (A–G, 

J, K) 1984–1987 

(M) 

Yes 

Incident in 1979, when a plutonium oxide 

storage container ruptured during a transfer at 

the 303-C storage facility. 

306 1972–1984 Yes 

308, 320, 324, 

325, 326, 329, 

331 

1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

Incident in Bldg. 325 (1982) when a 

[redacted] dislodged significant 

contamination with a putty knife and spread it 

around with brush. Additional contamination 

incidents in 1974 (Ref 68239), 1975 (Refs 

68128, 68157, 68220), 1979 (Ref 67867, pp. 

91 and 227). 

Three incidents in Bldg. 331 in 1974 (Refs 

68135, 68137, and 68142), 1 in 1975 (Refs 

68129/68160), 1976 (Ref 67773), 1977 (Ref 

67848, pg. 187). Other incidents included a 

contaminated tool shed – internal potential 

not known (Ref 68223). 

318 1983–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

321 1972–1988 Not Yet Established 

327 1972–1987 Not Yet Established 

3730 1972–1981 Not Yet Established 

3745 1972–1983 Not Yet Established 

340 Waste 

Complex 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

HTR 1972 Not Yet Established 

TTR 1972–1978 Not Yet Established 

300 

PRCF 1972–1976 Not Yet Established 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 46 of 175 

Appendix A 46 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-26. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Plutonium Exposure 

Area Building Period of 

Operation 

Internal Exposure 

Potential Additional Comments 

400 FFTF 1980–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

Table A-27. Plutonium-Monitoring Location Data 

Percentage of Workers Monitored for Plutonium (In Vitro + In Vivo) 

Year All 

Workers 100 Area 100N Area 200 Area 200 Tank Farms 

300 

Area 

400 

Area 700 Area 

1972 11.36% 7.45% 7.60% 29.84% 36.84% 20.75% 10.67% 4.78% 

1973 16.73% 11.69% 10.95% 42.41% 47.73% 30.21% 21.97% 6.39% 

1974 15.32% 11.11% 10.53% 39.84% 38.89% 27.33% 18.57% 5.03% 

1975 15.39% 9.85% 9.18% 36.91% 38.89% 28.49% 16.21% 5.25% 

1976 15.34% 10.89% 10.30% 35.47% 46.88% 25.09% 14.43% 4.79% 

1977 12.17% 7.67% 7.14% 30.71% 35.20% 21.73% 15.23% 3.37% 

1978 9.25% 8.53% 8.16% 17.76% 13.77% 21.10% 22.86% 2.13% 

1979 6.97% 5.34% 4.89% 18.36% 23.35% 13.35% 10.23% 2.17% 

1980 9.77% 8.03% 7.49% 16.38% 21.51% 21.21% 28.99% 3.10% 

1981 8.93% 5.74% 5.33% 16.26% 24.50% 19.75% 29.72% 2.94% 

1982 8.72% 3.27% 2.81% 12.82% 18.86% 19.62% 32.11% 1.44% 

1983 9.44% 2.02% 1.51% 14.58% 25.00% 18.88% 27.05% 1.75% 

1984 8.93% 2.89% 1.89% 16.94% 26.12% 14.30% 20.14% 1.41% 

1985 10.16% 2.86% 1.71% 17.84% 28.38% 15.38% 22.42% 1.69% 

1986 9.71% 2.99% 1.86% 16.92% 29.03% 14.17% 18.60% 0.81% 

1987 10.39% 3.14% 2.04% 18.67% 26.50% 12.89% 19.64% 1.18% 

1988 12.57% 14.28% 13.98% 23.90% 27.39% 15.85% 19.90% 2.80% 

1989 13.25% 16.44% 16.13% 25.76% 24.92% 17.11% 17.94% 3.91% 

1990 12.10% 18.41% 18.34% 25.05% 19.31% 14.45% 15.54% 3.32% 

All Years: 22.65% 24.88% 24.38% 47.83% 69.14% 39.66% 54.06% 11.83% 

Bold and italicized values indicate internal exposure potential

Table A-28 shows the most common job title among monitored workers who could be identified 

by position for each area and year of interest. ‘Operators’ were the most common job title 

monitored at the Tank Farms for each year of the SEC, while the remaining areas generally 

showed that ‘managers’ and ‘administrators’ were the most common job title of those monitored. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 47 of 175 

Appendix A 47 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-28. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with 

Potential Plutonium Exposure 

200 Area 200 Area Tank Farms 

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

1972 185 Mngr. and Admin 30.3% 14 Operators 50.0% 

1973 315 Mngr. and Admin 29.2% 20 Operators 35.0% 

1974 360 Mngr. and Admin 25.8% 20 Operators 45.0% 

1975 376 Mngr. and Admin 26.3% 27 Operators 74.1% 

1976 440 Mngr. and Admin 25.7% 42 Operators 42.9% 

1977 493 Mngr. and Admin 27.6% 40 Operators 47.5% 

1978 324 Mngr. and Admin 21.9% 18 Operators 38.9% 

1979 392 Mngr. and Admin 27.0% 37 Operators 43.2% 

1980 411 Mngr. and Admin 26.0% 36 Operators 44.4% 

1981 467 Mngr. and Admin 24.4% 47 Operators 53.2% 

1982 404 Mngr. and Admin 22.5% 42 Operators 50.0% 

1983 588 Mngr. and Admin 22.1% 67 Operators 56.7% 

1984 744 Operators 23.8% 75 Operators 61.3% 

1985 887 Mngr. and Admin 22.4% 85 Operators 61.2% 

1986 906 Operators 23.5% 90 Operators 61.1% 

1987 1052 Operators 23.9% 84 Operators 65.5% 

1988 1359 Operators 19.8% 86 Operators 54.7% 

1989 1459 Operators 18.8% 78 Operators 48.7% 

1990 1495 Operators 18.5% 62 Operators 27.4% 

300 Area 400 Area 

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Highest 

Job Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Highest Job 

Title 

1972 153 Scientists 22.9% 

1973 248 Scientists 16.9% 

1974 280 Mngr. and Admin 15.7% 

1975 334 Scientists 18.3% 

1976 338 Mngr. and Admin 18.0% 

1977 338 Mngr. and Admin 17.8% 

1978 382 Mngr. and Admin 15.2% 

1979 265 Mngr. and Admin 16.2% 

No Exposure Potential Identified 

1980 451 Mngr. and Admin 15.3% 208 Mngr. and Admin 30.3% 

1981 440 Mngr. and Admin 17.3% 226 Mngr. and Admin 30.1% 

1982 460 Mngr. and Admin 14.8% 246 Mngr. and Admin 22.8% 

1983 527 Mngr. and Admin 12.9% 239 Mngr. and Admin 19.2% 

1984 428 Mngr. and Admin 11.9% 195 Mngr. and Admin 21.5% 

1985 499 Mngr. and Admin 13.0% 235 Mngr. and Admin 24.7% 

1986 499 Mngr. and Admin 12.6% 208 Mngr. and Admin 20.7% 

1987 472 Mngr. and Admin 14.4% 232 Mngr. and Admin 21.1% 

1988 586 Mngr. and Admin 9.7% 235 Mngr. and Admin 17.0% 

1989 615 Rad. Monitor 10.4% 214 Mngr. and Admin 15.0% 

1990 534 Rad. Monitor 9.9% 193 Mngr. and Admin 16.1% 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 48 of 175 

Appendix A 48 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

 

A.6.5 Uranium 

Tables A-29 and A-30 show the monitoring coverage for uranium (in-vivo and in-vitro, 

respectively) by year for the entire worker population. In-vivo monitoring was almost 

exclusively uranium-235, with workers getting counted once per year. In general, uranium invivo results decreased from 1974 to the end of the SEC period; no data could be analyzed for 

results in 1972 and 1973, due to blank results or the lack of a listed MDA. 

The in-vitro monitoring in Table A-29 is generally sparse and covered between 1%–2% of the 

worker population. Workers who were sampled in vitro for uranium generally submitted 1 

sample per year until 1984, when they averaged 2–3 samples per year. 

Table A-31 shows the monitoring coverage by job category for workers who could be identified 

by position in the REX database.14 Similar to plutonium, ‘radiation monitors,’ ‘operators,’ 

‘electricians,’ ‘pipefitters,’ and ‘science technicians’ were the job categories most likely to be 

monitored for uranium while employed during the SEC period. 

Table A-32 presents an overview of the in-vivo uranium results for the top 20 job categories 

shown in Table A-31. As seen in Table A-32, there was not a lot of correlation between the 

likelihood of being monitored and the magnitude of results, though it is important to note that 

there was not a lot of variability between average and median values for the various job titles 

(i.e., they are all very close in magnitude). 

 

Table A-33 shows the site areas and periods of interest for potential internal uranium exposure, 

which include the 100, 100N, 200, 300, and 400 Areas. There are several incidents identified in 

the 1970s, though none could be found in the 1980s. 

14 Refer to Attachment 1 for more information on how job title information was derived and interpreted 

from the REX database. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

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Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 49 of 175 

Appendix A 49 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

Table A-29. Uranium In-Vivo Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In 

Vivo for Uranium 

Year 

U-234 U-235 U-238 

Combined 

In-Vivo 

Samples 

Average # 

Samples per 

Worker per 

Year 

Average # 

Samples Per 

Monitored 

Worker per Year 

Average 

U-235 In-Vivo 

Result (nCi) 

1972 – 0.49% – 0.49% 0.0051 1.03 NA 

1973 – 0.84% – 0.84% 0.0086 1.03 NA 

1974 – 5.74% – 5.74% 0.0655 1.14 2.10E-01 

1975 – 0.04% – 0.04% 0.0004 1.00 6.50E-02 

1976 – 5.90% – 5.90% 0.0633 1.07 6.61E-02 

1977 0.01% 5.65% – 5.66% 0.0593 1.05 6.51E-02 

1978 – 7.61% – 7.61% 0.0842 1.11 6.26E-02 

1979 – 8.40% 0.01% 8.40% 0.0936 1.11 6.24E-02 

1980 – 9.15% – 9.15% 0.0994 1.09 6.23E-02 

1981 – 9.48% 0.01% 9.48% 0.1033 1.09 6.29E-02 

1982 – 9.09% 0.01% 9.09% 0.0988 1.09 6.30E-02 

1983 – 8.05% 0.01% 8.05% 0.0850 1.06 6.31E-02 

1984 – 8.15% – 8.15% 0.0887 1.09 5.42E-02 

1985 – 8.29% – 8.29% 0.0884 1.07 5.35E-02 

1986 – 8.63% – 8.63% 0.0931 1.08 5.74E-02 

1987 – 8.25% – 8.25% 0.0875 1.06 5.73E-02 

1988 – 9.41% – 9.41% 0.0999 1.06 5.80E-02 

1989 – 11.36% – 11.36% 0.1211 1.07 5.02E-02 

1990 – 13.78% – 13.78% 0.1578 1.15 4.03E-02 

Dashes (-) indicate that no data are available for that sampling type and year 

NA indicates data could not be analyzed for magnitude
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

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Table A-30. Uranium In-Vitro Overview 

Percentage of Workers Monitored In Vitro for Uranium 

Year U-233 U-234 U-235 U-238 Elemental U U Nat† Combined In-Vitro Samples 

Average # Samples 

per Worker 

per Year 

1972 – – – – 0.58% 0.15% 0.72% 0.009 1973 – – – – – 0.69% 0.69% 0.007 1974 – – – – – 1.43% 1.43% 0.020 1975 – – – – 0.18% 1.20% 1.20% 0.023 1976 – – – – 0.62% – 0.62% 0.010 1977 – – – – 0.96% 0.01% 0.96% 0.011 1978 – – – – 1.67% – 1.67% 0.020 1979 – – 0.01% – 1.29% – 1.29% 0.016 1980 – – – – 1.41% – 1.41% 0.016 1981 – – – – 1.48% – 1.48% 0.020 1982 – – 0.01% – 1.33% – 1.33% 0.020 1983 – – – – 1.09% – 1.09% 0.011 1984 – – – – 2.04% – 2.04% 0.056 1985 0.02% – 0.02% 0.02% 2.06% – 2.09% 0.053 1986 0.05% 0.01% 0.05% 0.05% 1.47% – 1.51% 0.045 1987 0.01% – 0.01% 0.01% 1.73% – 1.74% 0.047 1988 0.02% – 0.02% 0.02% 1.37% – 1.38% 0.040 1989 0.02% – 0.02% 0.02% 1.48% – 1.50% 0.046 1990 – 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 1.35% – 1.77% 0.054 

 † This urinalysis type is likely also an elemental uranium analysis as spectrometric uranium analyses were not introduced to the Han

 Dashes (-) indicate that no data are available for that sampling type and year

Appendix A 50 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

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Page No. 

Page 51 of 17

Table A-31. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Uranium by Y

Rank Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1

1 Misc Precision/Production [redacted] – – – – – – – 2 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 0.00% 0.00% 19.51% 4.35% 26.92% 25.42% 53.16% 513 Electricians 374 0.00% 4.17% 8.77% 0.00% 12.64% 14.71% 15.75% 194 Operators Plant/System/Utility 1003 13.48% 4.08% 11.86% 2.67% 5.43% 7.36% 14.98% 165 Pipefitters 364 0.00% 0.00% 4.71% 0.94% 7.22% 12.59% 17.28% 126 Science Technicians 394 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 20.27% 15.85% 18.18% 277 Sheet Metal Workers 80 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 7.41% 298 Painters 88 0.00% 4.55% 0.00% 0.00% 7.41% 6.06% 3.03% 5.9 Health Physicists 59 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 0.00% 15.38% 7.14% 13.33% 33

10 Equipment Operator 128 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.11 Misc Repair/Construction 476 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.82% 0.98% 1.43% 2.12 Carpenters 101 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.85% 0.00% 0.13 Welders And Solderers 47 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 7.14% 10.53% 2614 Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 200 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.14% 6.90% 5.00% 6.15 Miners/Drillers [redacted] – – – – – – – 16 Technicians 446 2.67% 6.25% 39.36% 13.73% 37.84% 31.01% 39.31% 3317 Masons 21 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18 Misc Technicians 653 1.75% 0.00% 4.04% 0.90% 10.07% 8.59% 13.59% 1319 Machinists 98 0.00% 4.76% 3.33% 21.88% 22.86% 13.95% 16.00% 1120 Truck Drivers 200 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.71% 2.33% 3.

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and yearAppendix A 51 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
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Appendix A 52 

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Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A-31. Percentage of Workers Identified by Job Title Who Were Monitored for Uranium by Year (

(continued) 

Rank Description 

Total 

Number of 

Workers 

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 

1 Misc Precision/ Production [redacted] – – – – – – – – 2 Radiation Monitors/ Technicians 417 58.62% 40.00% 31.22% 34.96% 38.55% 38.93% 45.54% 67.28% 3 Electricians 374 21.98% 18.18% 15.28% 18.06% 19.74% 20.62% 31.66% 53.98% 4 Operators Plant/System/Utility 1003 14.63% 17.96% 27.27% 33.11% 39.75% 38.73% 39.04% 41.13% 5 Pipefitters 364 19.68% 18.60% 18.88% 19.22% 18.06% 18.43% 25.67% 50.86% 6 Science Technicians 394 17.97% 34.34% 35.26% 38.25% 34.80% 38.32% 35.79% 39.69% 7 Sheet Metal Workers 80 11.76% 8.89% 11.76% 15.38% 24.53% 7.94% 31.25% 36.54% 8 Painters 88 12.96% 6.15% 5.97% 9.33% 7.50% 7.89% 19.74% 28.77% 9 Health Physicists 59 27.27% 11.54% 9.09% 14.29% 9.09% 4.65% 10.42% 25.58% 

10 Equipment Operator 128 7.14% 2.94% 2.99% 4.00% 8.64% 7.48% 10.00% 27.55% 11 Misc Repair/Construction 476 2.26% 1.43% 2.78% 3.03% 3.30% 2.80% 23.10% 30.74% 12 Carpenters 101 4.55% 5.36% 4.76% 4.11% 7.79% 5.56% 21.05% 26.58% 13 Welders and Solderers 47 11.90% 14.29% 11.11% 13.04% 13.04% 10.87% 13.04% 16.67% 14 Handlers/Laborers/ Helpers 200 12.28% 10.39% 10.81% 10.64% 6.25% 7.41% 22.76% 16.78% 15 Miners/Drillers [redacted] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 66.67% 16 Technicians 446 35.26% 30.15% 26.11% 29.69% 24.84% 22.32% 16.09% 19.25% 17 Masons 21 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 18 Misc Technicians 653 22.48% 18.31% 18.57% 15.49% 16.39% 15.81% 17.77% 20.36% 19 Machinists 98 14.29% 12.36% 8.99% 10.99% 12.90% 12.50% 13.68% 12.64% 20 Truck Drivers 200 8.20% 6.34% 5.59% 7.10% 5.29% 6.52% 5.79% 11.30% 

Dashes (-) indicate that no workers could be identified with that specific job category and year 
Effective Date: 

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Table A-32. Overview of Uranium In Vivo (nCi) for the Job Titles Most Likely to be Monitored Dur

U-235 In Vivo Average Median Max 

Greater 

Than All 

Worker 

Average 

Greater 

than All 

Worker 

Median 

Percent 

Monitored 

During 

Career 

Numbe

Work

Identi

Misc Precision/Production 3.28E-02 3.28E-02 3.58E-02 100.00% [redac

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 5.50E-02 5.50E-02 6.80E-01 79.14% 417 

Electricians 5.61E-02 5.50E-02 4.37E-01 70.59% 374 

Operators Plant/ System/Utility 5.32E-02 5.20E-02 2.80E-01 66.10% 100

Pipefitters 5.66E-02 5.50E-02 2.80E-01 65.11% 364 

Science Technicians 5.13E-02 5.00E-02 2.30E-01 64.47% 394 

Sheet Metal Workers 5.51E-02 5.50E-02 1.35E-01 58.75% 80 

Painters 5.18E-02 5.15E-02 1.02E-01 52.27% 88 

Health Physicists 5.81E-02 5.50E-02 9.00E-02 Y 49.15% 59 

Equipment Operator 4.99E-02 4.63E-02 1.40E-01 48.44% 128 

Misc Repair/Construction 5.11E-02 4.69E-02 4.05E-01 48.32% 476 

Carpenters 5.09E-02 4.92E-02 8.51E-02 46.53% 101 

Welders and Solderers 6.21E-02 5.50E-02 2.88E-01 Y 44.68% 47 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 5.43E-02 5.50E-02 1.23E-01 40.00% 200 

Miners/Drillers 6.51E-02 3.60E-02 1.63E-01 Y 40.00% [redac

Technicians 5.62E-02 5.50E-02 3.40E-01 38.34% 446 

Masons 5.26E-02 5.50E-02 6.85E-02 38.10% 21 

Misc Technicians 5.73E-02 5.50E-02 4.45E-01 Y 37.67% 653 

Machinists 6.44E-02 6.00E-02 5.50E-01 Y Y 35.71% 98 

Truck Drivers 5.44E-02 5.50E-02 1.07E-01 34.00% 200 

All Data 5.72E-02 5.50E-02 

Appendix A 53 

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Table A-33. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Uranium Exposure 

Area Building Period of Operation Internal Exposure Potential Additional Comm

100 108-F 1972–1977 Not Yet Established 

100 N N Reactor 1972–1987 Not Yet Established Accidental release of irradiated fuel elem

maintenance activity (Ref 26722). 

242-B 1978 See incident comments Radiation occurrence involved spread of 

pg. 167). 

231-Z 1976–1977 See additional comments for contamination incidents Contamination resulting from a faulty gl

68261). 

232-Z 1972–1973 

2345-Z (RMA, 

RMC, Storage Vault) 

1972–1984 (RMA) 

1972–1989 (RMC) 

1972–End of SEC 

(Storage) 

236-Z, 242-Z 1972–1976 

Yes – Mainly associated with 

contamination incidents Part of the plutonium finishing facilities

PUREX 1983–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

T Plant (221T) 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established T Plant was mainly involved in decontam

the SEC period. 

PUREX (A Plant, 

202A) 1983–End of SEC Yes – Mainly associated with contamination incidents Ref 59165 lists contamination and other 

PUREX/UO3 plant from 1972–1981. 

UO3 (224U, 224UA) 1984–End of SEC Yes – Due to large quantities of uranium processed 17 reactor startups in SEC period (gener

dates not currently known). 

225B Waste 

Encapsulation 

Facility 

1974–End of SEC Limited – Facility was remotely operated 

222S 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

209E, 222T 1972–1986 Not Yet Established 

200 

222B 1972–1975 Not Yet Established 

Appendix A 54 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
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Appendix A 55 

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Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-33. Locations and Operational Periods of Potential Uranium Exposure 

NOTICE

wever, th

Area Building Period of Operation Internal Exposure Potential Additional Comm

314 1979 Incidents identified Spread of uranium during unmonitored m

Building in 1979 (Ref 67867, pg. 105). 

3720 1974 Incidents identified 

Documented incident in October 1974 infrom unprotected workers handling cont

67775). 

333 1972–1988 Yes 

303 (A-G, J, K, M) 1972–1983 (A-G, J, K) 1984–1987 (M) Yes 

306 1972-1984 Yes 

Intake incidents in 1975 (Ref 68217); decontamination incident [smears showed depleted uranium fires in 1976 (Refs 682puncture wound in 1979 (Ref 67867, pg

308, 320, 324, 325, 

326, 329, 331 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

Alpha contamination incident in 1975 [nMDA (Ref 68220)]; inhalation incident 67891, pg. 167). 

318 1983–End of SEC Not Yet Established 321 1972–1988 Not Yet Established 327 1972–1987 Not Yet Established 

3730 1972–1981 Not Yet Established 3745 1972–1983 Not Yet Established 

340 Waste Complex 1972–End of SEC Not Yet Established 

HTR 1972 Not Yet Established 

TTR 1972–1978 Not Yet Established 

300 

PRCF 1972–1976 Not Yet Established 

400 FFTF 1980–End of SEC Not Yet Established 
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Appendix A 56 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-34 shows the monitoring coverage by site area and year for workers who could be 

identified by their work location in the REX Database. The 300 Area was the location with the 

highest percentage of workers monitored up until 1980; the 400 Area had the highest percentage 

of monitored workers from 1980–1986, when the Tank Farm took over as the area with the 

highest percentage. The 100 and 100 N Reactor Area had relatively low numbers of workers 

monitored when compared to the other areas of potential exposure. 

Table A-34. Uranium Monitoring Location Data 

Percentage of Workers Monitored for Uranium (In Vitro + In Vivo) 

Year All 

Workers 100 Area 100N Area 200 Area 200 Tank Farms 300 Area 400 Area 700 Area 

1972 0.66% 0.71% 0.80% 1.79% 13.16% 1.93% 0.67% – 

1973 0.89% 1.30% 1.09% 0.53% – 4.46% – 0.32% 

1974 6.13% 6.35% 5.99% 8.13% 7.41% 19.88% 5.49% 1.06% 

1975 1.32% 1.16% 1.28% 1.11% 1.39% 4.29% – 0.48% 

1976 6.14% 4.40% 4.17% 6.75% 3.13% 20.14% 5.67% 1.88% 

1977 5.95% 5.08% 5.12% 6.99% 3.20% 17.76% 9.47% 1.24% 

1978 7.83% 5.66% 5.47% 10.96% 12.32% 21.40% 18.04% 2.28% 

1979 8.72% 6.59% 5.99% 12.68% 11.98% 19.37% 29.67% 0.95% 

1980 9.66% 5.08% 4.58% 12.69% 13.95% 22.97% 28.23% 2.61% 

1981 9.40% 6.10% 5.44% 13.01% 12.00% 23.90% 30.95% 2.00% 

1982 9.44% 4.08% 3.39% 10.63% 14.04% 25.51% 40.02% 1.33% 

1983 8.55% 3.22% 2.32% 10.98% 17.28% 20.98% 28.60% 1.38% 

1984 9.60% 4.82% 4.08% 12.33% 17.87% 21.74% 27.21% 1.16% 

1985 9.79% 5.46% 4.59% 13.23% 21.78% 21.37% 22.94% 1.61% 

1986 10.15% 6.56% 5.76% 15.06% 27.74% 19.74% 18.85% 0.95% 

1987 10.20% 5.15% 4.37% 15.05% 25.87% 18.76% 19.14% 1.11% 

1988 10.63% 10.94% 10.46% 18.75% 24.84% 17.80% 18.97% 1.94% 

1989 12.61% 15.35% 14.87% 22.85% 23.96% 18.94% 17.27% 1.95% 

1990 15.69% 23.67% 23.62% 30.12% 32.09% 20.72% 16.91% 2.26% 

All Years: 16.83% 23.30% 22.93% 39.01% 55.79% 42.92% 54.64% 6.87% 

Bold and italicized values indicate internal exposure potential, dashes (-) indicate 0.00% 

Table A-35 shows the most common job title among monitored workers for the areas of interest. 

The most common job title showed some significant variation by site area and year; however, 

‘managers and administrators,’ ‘scientists,’ ‘engineers’ (in the early years), and ‘operators’ (in 

the later years) were often the most common.
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Table A-35. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with Potential Uranium Exp

100 Area 100 N Area 2

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Mos

Mo

1972 [redacted] 

TIE: Mngr. and 

Admin, Misc 

Technicians 

100.0% [redacted] 

TIE: Mngr. and 

Admin, Misc 

Technicians 

100.0% 10 O

1973 [redacted] TIE: Engineers, Mngr. and Admin 66.7% [redacted] TIE: Admin/Clerk, Engineer, Electrician, Mngr. and Admin 100.0% [redacted] E1974 26 Engineers 30.8% 23 Engineers 34.8% 56 Mng1975 [redacted] Engineers 50.0% [redacted] Engineers 50.0% 13 E1976 28 Engineers 14.3% 25 Engineers 16.0% 83 Mng1977 47 Engineers, Mngr. and Admin 38.2% 42 Mngr. and Admin 21.4% 106 Mng1978 51 Mngr. and Admin 25.5% 217 Mng1979 63 Mngr. and Admin 30.2% 286 Mng1980 55 Mngr. and Admin 29.1% 324 Mng1981 74 Mngr. and Admin 29.7% 381 Mng1982 53 Mngr. and Admin 17.0% 347 Mng1983 48 Mngr. and Admin 14.6% 448 O1984 98 Operators 41.8% 564 O1985 129 Operators 44.2% 676 O1986 167 Operators 41.9% 811 O1987 129 Operators 46.5% 850 O1988 1066 O1989 1293 O1990 

No Exposure Potential Identified 

No Exposure Potential Identified 

1798 O

Appendix A 57 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

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Appendix A 58 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A-35. Most Commonly Monitored Job Title for Areas with 

Potential Plutonium Exposure 

(continued) 

300 Area 400 Area 

Year 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

# Monitored 

Workers 

Identified by 

Job Title 

Most Commonly 

Monitored Job 

Title 

% Identified 

with Most 

Common Job 

Title 

1972 [redacted] TIE: Operators, 

Technicians 50.0% 

1973 30 Scientists 20.0% 

1974 191 Scientists 19.4% 

1975 47 Technicians 23.4% 

1976 272 Scientists 17.3% 

1977 271 Scientists 14.8% 

1978 382 Scientists 13.9% 

1979 393 Scientists 17.0% 

No Exposure Potential Identified 

1980 499 Scientists 15.0% 196 Mngr. and Admin 24.0% 

1981 554 Scientists 13.7% 238 Mngr. and Admin 26.1% 

1982 595 Mngr. and Admin 12.9% 301 Mngr. and Admin 24.3% 

1983 570 Scientists 12.1% 236 Mngr. and Admin 19.9% 

1984 626 Mngr. and Admin 11.8% 251 Mngr. and Admin 21.1% 

1985 679 Operators 12.5% 231 Mngr. and Admin 24.7% 

1986 669 Operators 13.6% 209 Mngr. and Admin 21.1% 

1987 686 Operators 12.4% 225 Mngr. and Admin 23.1% 

1988 658 Operators 11.2% 224 Mngr. and Admin 17.0% 

1989 680 Rad Monitors 9.7% 206 Electricians 16.5% 

1990 766 Electricians 9.0% 210 Electricians 13.8% 

A.7 DISCUSSION OF ADDITIONAL RADIONUCLIDES 

As mentioned in Section A-3, radionuclides were selected for the main analysis based on the 

amount of data available in the database. However, it is still important to examine the 

radionuclides with few records to determine why the samples were taken and what implications 

the samples have on exposure potential to the workforce as a whole. This section will examine 

the monitoring records for berkelium, californium, curium, iodine, neptunium, polonium, 

radium, thorium, and samples of ‘total actinides.’ Table A-36 presents an overview of the 

available monitoring records for these radionuclides. 

As seen in Table A-36, berkelium and californium only had four records each for the same four 

individuals in March of 1974. Three of the four monitored workers had the same analysis result, 

although no units are provided. The fourth individual had results that were approximately three 

times higher than the other three workers. All four samples for each radionuclide were labeled 

as ‘baseline samples.’ 

Curium had the highest number of samples among the group of radionuclides analyzed in this 

section (359 in-vitro samples, 1 in-vivo sample). Samples covered most years of the SEC period, 

with gaps from 1972–1973 and 1979–1980. On average, workers who were monitored for 
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Appendix A 59 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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curium were sampled 4 times during their employment, though the majority of samples (~57%) 

were zero, negative, or less than the reported MDA. Eighty-eight percent (88%) of the samples 

taken were labeled as either a baseline or a periodic sample. Only about 8% of the samples were 

likely incident-driven (labeled as ‘special’), and 4% of the samples were taken for other reasons 

(either a test sample, sample requested by a contractor, or a re-analysis of a previous sample). 

The Internal TBD notes that small amounts of curium were processed in the 308 Building at least 

through 1973. Documentation notes that there was a loss of containment resulting in potential 

Cm-244 inhalation on two separate occasions in 1978 [one in Building 231-Z and the other 

location was not reported (Ref 67891, pg. 120)]. This document also notes, a “series of 

inhalations of Curium-244 has begun at [Bldg.] 331 and is expected to continue for several 

weeks” (Ref 67891, pg. 336). 

In-vivo counting constituted the majority of iodine sampling, and workers were generally 

counted multiple times during their career. The reasons specified for monitoring varied with less 

than 20% labeled as ‘special’ (likely incident samples). Sampling was performed throughout the 

SEC period, with the exception of 1974–1975. Less than half of the samples taken showed 

positive results, while the rest were below the limit of detection. 

Only 21 samples were found for neptunium, the majority of which appear to be incident-related 

(62% were labeled as ‘special’ with only 10% of the samples labeled as ‘periodic’). Eight (8) of 

13 workers monitored for neptunium were only sampled once, though over 85% of the samples 

reported a positive result. Records indicate that the PUREX plant was involved in production 

and dispatching of neptunium in December of 1972 (Ref 68669), though the only samples from 

this time are from September of that year and are baseline samples. The PUREX plant was shut 

down at the start of 1973 until sometime in 1983. 

Records identified for polonium consisted of 113 samples for 27 individuals (approximately 4.3 

samples per monitored worker), with 77% of the samples taken as either a baseline or periodic 

sample. Almost 95% of the samples reported a positive result for polonium. Monitoring records 

for polonium stop in 1983. 

Monitoring for radium was very scarce (only 23 samples), but appears to be almost entirely 

incident-driven, with no samples labeled as a baseline; only 17% of samples were periodic, while 

70% of the samples were ‘special.’ All 15 bioassay samples reported positive results, while none 

of the in-vivo records have a positive result recorded. The majority of samples were taken from 

1972–1973 (87%). Records indicate a contamination incident involving two workers in August 

of 1972 (Ref 67760); this incident is reflected in the monitoring records, with both in-vitro and 

in-vivo samples taken within a few days of suspected intake. 

Similar to radium, there were very few monitoring results for thorium isotopes other than 

Th-234. Only 35 monitoring results were identified for Th-228 and Th-232, most of which were 

in-vivo samples. Approximately one-third of the samples yielded positive results and generally 

workers were only sampled once during their employment. Thorium monitoring does not appear 

to be incident related (only 3% were designated as ‘special’ samples), and nearly 40% were 

labeled as ‘periodic’ or ‘baseline’ samples. Many of the remaining samples were labeled as 
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Appendix A 60 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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NOTICE:

‘contractor requested,’ which may reflect limited-scale thorium operations that may have 

occurred. 

 

Finally, records labeled as ‘total actinides’ comprised 205 records, of which over 97% reported a 

positive value. Sampling for ‘total actinides’ is mostly periodic and baseline sampling, with only 

3% being reported as a ‘special sampling.’ Almost 90% of the sampling occurred between 1980 

and 1983.
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Table A-36. Overview of Radionuclides with Infrequent Monitoring Records 

Analysis Category Berkelium Californium Curium Iodine Neptunium Polonium Radium 

Overview of Monitoring Records 

# of In Vitro 

Records 4 4 359 21 16 113 15 

# of In Vivo 

Records 0 0 1 263 5 0 8 

Total Records 4 4 360 284 21 113 23 

Years with 

Monitoring Data 1974 1974 

1974–1978, 

1981, 1983–

1990 

1972–1973, 

1976–1990 

1972, 1981, 1983–1984, 1986–1987, 

1989 

1972, 1974–

1980, 1983 

1972–1974

1982 

Monitoring Frequency and Sampling Results 

Unique Individuals 

Monitored [redacted] [redacted] 90 134 13 27 12 

Average Samples 

per Monitored 

Worker 

1 1 4.0 

2.12 

1.8 4.3 2.1 

Number of Positive 

Results 4 4 157 139 18 107 15 

Number of 

Negative, Zero, or 

<MDA Results 

0 0 203 

145 

3 6 8 

Rationale for Sampling (% of Total Records) 

Baseline Sampling 100% 100% 12% 30% 19% 12% 0% Periodic Sampling 0% 0% 76% 11% 10% 65% 17% 

Special Sampling 0% 0% 8% 18% 62% 20% 70% 

Other Reasons 0% 0% 4% 8% 0% 2% 13% 

No Reason 

Specified 0% 0% 1% 33% 10% 2% 0% 

Appendix A 61 

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Appendix A 62 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

A.8 REFERENCES 

Berry, J.R. 1976a. Potential Inhalation of Depleted Uranium. Radiation Protection Records – 

Radiation Occurrence Report. April 26, 1976. SRDB Ref ID: 68254. 

Berry, J.R. 1976b. Potential Inhalation of Depleted Uranium. Radiation Protection Records – 

Radiation Occurrence Report. April 26, 1976. SRDB Ref ID: 68255. 

Berry, J.R. 1975a. Depleted Uranium Contamination. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. October 8, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68217. 

Berry, J.R. 1975b. Potential Intake of Uranyl Nitrate. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. October 7, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68221. 

Berry, J.R. 1974a. Potential Inhalation of Uranium. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. December 4, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 67775. 

Berry, J.R. 1974b. Skin Contamination to Both Hands. Radiation Protection Records – 

Radiation Occurrence Report. September 14, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 68239. 

Bixler, R.B., R.D. Anderson, W.C. Armstrong, G.T. Dukelow, and B.J. Saueressig, 1974. 

Investigation Report Personnel Contamination and Spread of Radioactive Contamination Tank 

Farm Surveillance Section. ARH-CD-215. October 31, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 73668. 

Chelation Record 1986. Chelation Therapy Record for Ca and Zn-DTPA: Investigational New 

Drugs, Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education Medical Sciences Division, 1986. SRDB 

Ref ID: 73185. 

Cummings, F.M. 1975a. Shoes Contaminated to 1000 d/m a. Radiation Protection Records – 

Radiation Occurrence Report. December 19, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68128. 

Cummings, F.M. 1975b. 3000 cpm Spot in Hair, 1000 cpm Spot on Moustache . Radiation 

Protection Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. October 6, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68220. 

DOE 1991. Hanford Process Review. U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Administration 

and Human Resources Management. DOE/AD-0015. U.S. Department of Energy. SRBD Ref 

ID: 4892. 

Gerber 1992. Past Practices Technical Characterization Study – 300 Area – Hanford Site, 

WHC-MR-0388, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington, December 1992, 

SRDB 13724. 

Hanford Dosimetry Records, Multiple Years. Deposition Cases, Strontium, Promethium, 

Americium, Curium, Iodine. Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Battelle. SRDB Ref ID: 55191. 
Effective Date: 

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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Hanford Dosimetry Records, Multiple Years. Chelation DTPA Data for DOE Employees – 

REAC_TS_DTPA_219.0089_Daryl Delong. SRDB Ref ID: 73182. 

Hanford Dosimetry Records, Multiple Years. Chelation DTPA Data for DOE Employees – 

REAC_TS_DTPA_216.0096_Robert Massie. SRDB Ref ID: 73199. 

Hanford Dosimetry Records, Multiple Years. Chelation DTPA Data for DOE Employees – 

REAC_TS_DTPA_216.0092_John David. SRDB Ref ID: 73188. 

Hanford Records, 1993. Brief History of the Purex and UO3 Facilities. Purex MR-0437, WHCMR-0437. September 1993. SRDB Ref ID: 14586. 

Hanford Records, 1978. Accidental Irradiated Fuel Discharge from N Reactor Hanford 

Reservation Richland, Washington, December 16, 1977. January 1978. SRDB Ref ID: 26722. 

Hanford Records, 1977. Radiological Control Correspondence 1977. Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories, Battelle. 1977. SRDB Ref ID: 67848. 

Hanford Records, 1976. Explosion of Cation Exchange Column in Americium Recovery Service 

– Hanford Plant. August 30, 1976. SRDB Ref ID: 8707. 

Hanford Records, 1972. Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Monthly Report – December 

1972. Hanford Category C-65, ARH-2312. December 1972. SRDB Ref ID: 68669. 

Heid et al., 1979. The 1976 Hanford Americium Accident. Heid, K.R., Breitenstein, B.D., 

Palmer, H.E., McMurray, B.J., Wald, N. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Battelle. January 1979. 

SRDB Ref ID: 35872. 

Hodges, W.R. 1989. Radiological History of the PUREX Facility 1955-1989. Westinghouse 

Hanford Company. August 1989. SRDB Ref ID: 4967. 

Jech, J., 1979. Radiological Control Correspondence for John Jech, 1979. Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories. Battelle. SRDB Ref ID: 67867. 

Jech, J., 1978. Radiological Control Correspondence for John Jech, 1978. Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories. Battelle. SRDB Ref ID: 67891. 

Marshall, R.P. 1981. Response to R.K. Heusser’s Request for Informal FY-1982 Work Plan for 

the Recovery of Am, Pm, Rh, and Pd. Pacific Northwest Laboratories. Battelle. August 10, 

1981. SRDB Ref ID: 66625. 

McFall, E. 1977. Potential Intake of Plutonium from Puncture Wound. Radiation Protection 

Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. February 10, 1977. SRDB Ref 

ID: 68251. 
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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

McFall, E. 1976a. Violation of Radiation Work procedure - Potential Inhalation of Plutonium. 

Radiation Protection Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. June 23, 

1976. SRDB Ref ID: 67773. 

McFall, E. 1976b. Potential Inhalation of Plutonium – Spread of Plutonium Contamination in 

Immediate Work Area. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. BattelleNorthwest. May 25, 1976. SRDB Ref ID: 68261. 

McFall, E. 1975a. Potential Inhalation of Plutonium. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. November 19, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68129. 

McFall, E. 1975b. Skin and Personnel Clothing Contamination – Spread of Alpha 

Contamination from Broken Waste Bottle. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation Occurrence 

Report. Battelle-Northwest. August, 15, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68223. 

McFall, E. 1975c. Potential Inhalation of Plutonium. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. February 5, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68132. 

McFall, E. 1975d. Potential Inhalation of Plutonium. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. January 27, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68135. 

McFall, E. 1975e. Personal Clothing Contamination. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. January 6, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68137. 

McFall, E. 1975f. Violation of Radiation Work Procedure and Life Sciences Building Radiation 

Control Procedure. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. BattelleNorthwest. January 6, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68142. 

McFall, E. 1974a. Puncture Wound – Potential Intake of Plutonium. Radiation Protection 

Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. September 17, 1974. SRDB Ref 

ID: 68241. 

McFall, E. 1974b. Potential Intake of Plutonium from Minor Injury (Weapons Grade Pu). 

Radiation Protection Records – Radiation Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. September 

16, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 68244. 

McFall, E. 1974c. Potential Inhalation of PuO2. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. February 6, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 67777. 

McFall, E. 1974d. Potential Inhalation of PuO2. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. February 5, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 68247. 

McFall, E. 1974e. Potential Inhalation of Plutonium. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. January 27, 1974. SRDB Ref ID: 68134. 
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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

McFall, F.D. 1972a. Potential Inhalation of PuO2. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. December 19, 1972. SRDB Ref ID: 67761. 

McFall, E. 1972b. Potential Inhalation of 226Ra. Radiation Protection Records – Radiation 

Occurrence Report. Battelle-Northwest. August 22, 1972. SRDB Ref ID: 67760. 

McMurray, B.J. 1977. Radiological Control Correspondence 1977. Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories. Battelle. SRDB Ref ID: 67848. 

Merrill, D.L., 1975. “Potential Inhalation of 147Pm,” Battelle-Northwest, January 29, 1975. 

SRDB Ref ID: 68236. 

Rockwell Hanford Operations 1986. Historical Timeline of Hanford Operations. Prepared by 

Environmental Compliance Group – Radiological and Environmental Safety Department. 

Augustr 28, 1986. SRDB Ref ID: 60801. 

Rockwell Hanford Operations 1981. Radiation Control Report Purex/UO3 CY 1981. Doc. SDHS-TI-003. January 1, 1981. SRDB Ref ID: 59165. 

Unruh, C.M. 1975a. Release of Radioactive Material during Waste Disposal. Report No. 75-

BNW-16. Battelle-Northwest. November 13, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68157. 

Unruh, C.M. 1975b. Potential Release to Room Atmosphere of Alpha Contamination. Report 

No. 75-BNW-16. Battelle-Northwest. October 28, 1975. SRDB Ref ID: 68160. 
Effective Date: 

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Appendix A 66 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

 

NOTICE:

ATTACHMENT 1: DESCRIPTION OF JOB-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS 

Job title designations are available in two of the main database tables in the Hanford REX 

Database; these tables are entitled ‘REX_WORK_HIST’ and “DOS_SUM_RESULTS,’ 

respectively, the most useful of which was the table ‘REX_WORK_HIST,’ which also provides 

the employment period information for workers in the REX database and occasionally provided 

job title information via an ‘occupation code.’ NIOSH provides a companion document to the 

REX Database entitled, ‘REX Data Dictionary Final.doc,’ which provides a key to convert the 

occupation codes to actual job titles. Forty-four (44) distinct job titles and associated codes are 

identified in the NIOSH document; however, over 3,000 additional occupation codes were found 

in the database, that were not able to be decoded. 

A summary of the 44 distinct job titles that could be decoded is shown in Table A1-1, which 

includes the number of workers identified for each job title15 and year. As shown in the table, 

the practice of entering a worker’s job title into the database increased in the later years of the 

SEC period. In many cases, a worker would have multiple employment period entries in the 

database, but not every employment period had the occupation code entered (in general, the later 

employment period was more likely to have the occupation designated than the earlier 

employment period). The totals presented in Table A1-1 reflect the assumption that if a worker 

had a job type specified at any point during their SEC employment, that job title applies to all 

SEC employment periods. 

The other REX database table that had the occupation code designated, entitled 

‘DOS_SUM_RESULTS,’ contains external monitoring data for the Hanford workers. The 

occupation code was identified for only a small fraction of the database entries, and was 

significantly skewed towards the later years of the SEC period. Of the 984,722 entries in the 

database, approximately half (471,415) applied to the SEC period (July 1, 1972–December 31, 

1990). Of the entries that applied to the SEC period, only 18,143 (or ~4%) had the job title 

designated and 99.95% of these job title designations were in 1989 or after. The practice of 

entering the occupation code in this database also appears to coincide with the practice of 

designating the employee’s work location (work location data are further described in 

Attachment 2). 

15 Table 1 only contains 39 job titles as 5 of the 44 job titles were not found in the ‘REX_WORK_HIST’ 

database – these job titles include: Food Service Employees, Forest Workers, Groundskeepers, Misc Agriculture, 

and Pilots 
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Table A1-1. Summary of the Number of Workers Identified by Job Title and Year 

Job Title Description All Years 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 

Managers and 

Administrators 4965 808 926 1124 1267 1474 1764 2094 2326 2584 2781 2893 3293 3548 3848 4018 

Admin Support and 

Clerical 3517 276 326 418 480 564 681 852 957 1072 1155 1210 1380 1524 1802 2038 

Engineers 2343 322 367 464 517 630 759 882 972 1058 1117 1138 1298 1423 1619 1743 

Scientists 1535 257 276 341 371 424 495 564 629 705 743 752 840 910 1002 1121 

Misc Professionals 1205 252 281 328 354 402 459 510 549 596 636 653 743 804 874 967 

Operators Plant/ 

System/Utility 1003 89 98 118 150 184 231 267 323 349 428 499 668 715 761 785 

Miscellaneous 953 38 43 46 46 56 64 77 72 73 84 92 97 111 125 149 

Misc Technicians 653 57 75 99 111 139 163 206 249 273 296 307 344 377 452 482 

Engineering Technicians 622 74 79 108 118 134 155 168 177 192 198 202 226 240 268 305 

Security Guards 531 56 63 72 84 97 114 147 165 181 200 196 242 274 356 403 

Misc Repair/ Construction 476 38 43 59 65 71 102 140 164 152 160 177 210 216 264 303 

Technicians 446 75 80 94 102 111 129 145 154 170 169 173 199 226 256 310 

Radiation Monitors/ 

Technicians 417 31 32 41 46 52 59 79 96 120 134 145 180 205 226 262 

Science Technicians 394 51 54 60 67 74 82 88 101 106 121 128 166 190 217 250 

Electricians 374 49 48 57 81 87 102 127 156 165 170 182 242 288 299 309 

Pipefitters 364 60 59 85 106 97 143 162 170 172 187 188 215 233 281 288 

Mechanics/Repairers 324 29 38 52 61 87 115 139 192 210 220 222 259 283 290 295 

Janitors 204 [*] [*] 13 15 23 33 52 60 70 86 93 108 124 136 152 

Handlers/Laborers/ 

Helpers 200 10 12 10 15 14 29 40 49 52 58 57 77 74 94 112 

Truck Drivers 200 16 21 30 39 45 70 86 102 106 113 122 142 161 169 170 

Misc Service 199 36 39 42 49 60 72 84 102 115 122 128 145 156 163 170 

Equipment Operator 128 17 19 20 19 21 27 30 41 41 47 56 68 67 75 81 

Firefighters 104 11 13 15 21 30 36 38 39 44 58 59 63 69 71 78 

Carpenters 101 [*] [*] 14 14 21 26 37 38 39 42 44 56 63 73 77 

Machinists 98 22 21 30 32 35 43 50 52 58 66 77 89 89 91 93 

Appendix A 67 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

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Appendix A 68 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A1-1. Summary of the Number of Workers Identified by Job Title and Year 

Job Title Description All Years 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 

Painters 88 16 22 26 25 27 33 33 34 41 53 54 65 67 75 80 

Sheet Metal Workers 80 18 16 17 18 17 22 27 24 23 31 34 45 51 52 53 

Bus Drivers 78 [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] 13 16 20 29 33 38 48 53 58 64 

Health Physicists 59 [*] [*] [*] 10 13 14 15 18 20 20 22 26 33 35 44 

Doctors and Nurses 56 [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] 10 13 16 16 21 23 26 32 38 

Welders and Solderers 47 [*] [*] [*] 11 12 14 19 23 30 36 42 42 45 46 46 

Machine Setup/Operators 32 10 11 13 14 15 18 20 20 17 19 22 26 26 27 28 

Miscellaneous Transport 28 [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] 12 21 24 25 26 

Masons 21 [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] 10 

Health Technicians 11 0 0 0 0 0 [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] 

Miners/Drillers [*] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] 

Misc Precision/ 

Production [*] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Military [*] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Sales [*] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [*] [*] 0 [*] [*] [*] 

[*] = Redacted information
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Appendix A 69 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

As stated previously, the job title analysis is predicated on the assumption that when a worker 

was identified with a particular job title, they held that job title throughout their employment at 

Hanford during the SEC period. Certainly, there are situations where this assumption does not 

accurately reflect the reality of that worker’s employment. Two main examples of this are: 

(1) A worker only held the identified job title for a fraction of their employment; however, 

since other employment periods did not have a job title designated, the identified job title 

was erroneously applied to the entire employment. 

(2) A worker was identified with multiple job titles, so their internal monitoring records are 

being applied and analyzed for multiple occupations. 

The effect of the first case is hard to quantify. Clearly, the effect of extending any identified job 

title designations to all of a given worker’s employment periods will increase the pool of workers 

available for analysis in each year and job category. One way to analyze the effects of this 

assumption is to look at the increase in ‘worker-years’ in each job category, compared to if the 

assumption was not made; the results of this are shown in Table A1-2. For example, if we 

uphold the assumption that an individual worker held their same job title for all years of 

employment during the SEC period, the number of ‘worker-years’ available for analysis for the 

‘sales’ job category increases 600%. One possible explanation is that the ‘sales’ job category 

was not routinely entered into the database until the later years of the SEC period. 

 

Table A1-2. Percent Increase in Worker-Years from Expansion of the Dataset 

Summed over All Years by Job Category 

Job Category % Increase in 

Worker-Years Job Category % Increase in Worker-Years 

Sales 600.00% Masons 140.54% 

Machine Setup/Operators 285.44% Machinists 138.61% 

Misc Repair/Construction 208.50% Engineering Technicians 137.22% 

Welders and Solderers 208.43% Health Physicists 135.68% 

Painters 207.17% Carpenters 123.13% 

Miscellaneous Transport 205.95% Radiation 

Monitors/Technicians 108.49% 

Pipefitters 200.17% Science Technicians 98.15% 

Engineers 199.60% Janitors 95.89% 

Firefighters 195.56% Mechanics/Repairers 88.56% 

Truck Drivers 189.71% Miners/Drillers 86.67% 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 185.43% Admin Support And Clerical 74.21% 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 184.97% Miscellaneous 73.13% 

Equipment Operator 184.11% Health Technicians 62.22% 

Misc Service 179.46% Misc Professionals 55.81% 

Security Guards 172.78% Technicians 34.67% 

Sheet Metal Workers 163.85% Scientists 33.44% 

Misc Technicians 162.36% Doctors and Nurses 6.52% 

Electricians 159.30% Military 0.00% 

Bus Drivers 150.18% 

Mngr. and Admin. 145.67% Misc Precision/Production 0.00% 
Effective Date: 

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Appendix A 70 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A1-3 presents similar data; however, here the analysis looks to see the effect in the number 

of workers by year for all occupations analyzed. For example, by making the assumption that 

workers held the same job title throughout their employment resulted in a 404.58% increase in 

the number of workers available for analysis in 1972. As expected, this effect becomes less 

pronounced in the later years of the SEC period, as the entering of job title information into the 

REX database became more commonplace. By 1990, the stated assumption only results in a 

6.53% increase in workers available for analysis. 

Table A1-3. Percent Increase in Worker-Years from Expansion of the Dataset 

Summed over All Job Categories by Year 

Year % Increase in 

Worker-Years 

1972 404.58% 

1973 383.18% 

1974 398.17% 

1975 363.34% 

1976 379.26% 

1977 401.73% 

1978 411.92% 

1979 405.87% 

1980 393.56% 

1981 397.77% 

1982 381.87% 

1983 392.77% 

1984 371.19% 

1985 358.21% 

1986 325.48% 

1987 11.94% 

1988 6.87% 

1989 5.72% 

1990 6.53% 

Clearly, the effect of expanding the dataset to all employment periods has a significant impact on 

the majority of job categories, and had a particularly large impact in the earlier years. Therefore, 

if employment periods for a worker with no job designation do not reflect that worker’s 

occupation in later employment periods, the results of the analysis could have significant bias. 

However, the reverse could also be true; a worker might have had that same job category their 

entire career, but parts of that employment would have been ignored if it was not entered as such 

into the REX Database. 

The second instance of concern, where a worker has multiple job titles designated in the REX 

database, would seemingly bias the results towards those workers who held more than one 

occupation and had it entered as such in the database. These workers would be accounted for 

multiple times, and their internal monitoring would be reflected for each job category that they 

held. To assess the possible impact of this, the worker population was examined to determine 

how many workers had multiple job titles entered into the database. It was found that the 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

maximum number of job titles that any one worker had specified in the REX database was four. 

Table A1-4 shows the breakdown of the worker population by number of job titles. 

Table A1-4. Breakdown of Worker Population by Employees with 

Multiple Job Titles Specified 

Number of Job Titles Designated for 

an Individual Worker 

Percentage of Worker Population 

(Total Worker Population of 20,546) 

4 0.01% 

3 0.25% 

2 5.90% 

1 93.84% 

As Table A1-4 shows, almost 94% of the worker population had only one job title specified in 

the REX Database, and only about 0.26% of the workers had 3 or more job titles. Therefore, it 

does not appear as though the workers holding multiple job titles will have an overly significant 

impact on the results based on the given assumptions. 
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Appendix A 72 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

ATTACHMENT 2: DESCRIPTION OF AREA-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS 

Location data for Hanford workers can be obtained from the six files in the REX database; 

characteristics and descriptions of these six files are contained in Table A2-1. The two sources 

in each file for location data were columns labeled as ‘Building (BLDG)’ and ‘AREA.’ The use 

of the area codes was much less prevalent than the building codes in the REX database, and in 

almost all cases, the use of an area code was accompanied by a subsequent building code. 

Therefore, the main task in determining worker location was to identify which building codes 

were associated with specific areas. 

From inspection of the 6 data files described in Table A2-1, over 4,500 different building codes 

were identified. However, this total includes many codes that are very similar to one another; for 

instance the codes ‘TANKFARM’, ‘TANK FARM’, and ‘TNKFRM’ all count separately to this 

total. Several sources were consulted to interpret and convert these building codes to the areas of 

interest. These sources include two reference data files in the REX databasEREX_BLDG_FAC_XREF and REX_HAN_FACILITY, as well as the site description portion of 

the Hanford Technical Basis Document. The six data files themselves could also be used to 

develop a key when both the building and area were specified in a given entry. In the absence of 

a specific reference for a building code, reasonable assumptions were made to determine the area 

where possible. For instance, a building designated as ‘109N’ was assumed to be located in the 

100 Area and associated with the N Reactor. Despite these efforts, there are still close to 700 

building codes that could not currently be identified with a specific area of the site. 

As noted here and elsewhere in the report, an important limitation of the location-specific data is 

that it is not time period-specific; it is only known that a given worker had evidence of working 

in a specific location at some point during the SEC period. As an example, if a worker had 

evidence of working in Area 100, he/she would be included in the ‘Area 100’ subset of workers 

for each year he/she was employed at Hanford during the SEC period, whether or not he/she was 

actually working the entire time in Area 100. Table A2-2 shows how many workers fall into 

each of the location-specific categories by year, as well as how many total workers were on site 

in any given year. 

The number of workers present at Hanford in any given year was derived from the REX 

Database file ‘REX_WORKER_HIST.SAS.’ In-vitro data was obtained from the file 

‘EXC_RESULT.SAS.’ An effort was made to remove irrelevant in-vitro data entries from the 

database prior to the analysis; for example, entries in which there were no results because the 

sample was lost. Entries were removed if they were labeled with as ‘Employee did not sample,’ 

‘Employee Lost Kit/Can,’ ‘Insufficient Volume,’ ‘Lost in Lab/Lost,’ ‘Cancelled, or other similar 

labels, which indicated that the entry did not indicate a valid monitoring result. However, 

database entries were not removed simply if the results were blank; they were only removed if 

there was an associated label, such as those described previously. In-vivo data were obtained 

from the two interrelated files ‘INV_RESULT.SAS’ and ‘INV_ISO_RESULT.SAS,’ 

respectively.
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Table A2-1. Description of REX Database Files Containing Location Data 

REX Database 

File Name 

# of Total 

Entries 

# of SEC Entries 

Specifying 

Location 

Description and Comments 

DOSE_SUM_ 

RESULT 984,722 16,440 

Contains external dose data, including shallow, deep, neutron, eye, ring, and x-also specifies the worker’s occupation, building, site area and facility type. Fageneral activities of the worker’s building (i.e., weapon production, fuel fabric

building and area inputs were used to determine work locations; however, only which specified location in the SEC period were prior to 1989. 

DOSE_ MASTER 68,088 0 Contains similar information as DOSE_SUM_RESULT; however, the earliest 

in 1999. 

INCIDENT 2,530 643 

Contains an incident number, worker identifier, incident type code, date, buildiany comments. The incident type code and dose received are blank in all entriprovided for 47 of the 2,530 entries. The distribution of incident dates with the even throughout the SEC period. 

INV_RESULT 282,852 86,248 

Contains in-vivo data for workers and includes the following information: worheight/weight, portion of body measured, detector system, count duration, reas

data, in-vivo type, worker building/area, and any comments. Entries with loca1982 and are evenly distributed through the end of the SEC period. 

INT_MASTER 3,289 22 

Contains internal radionuclide intake data that include, but are not limited to, wevaluation and intake, radionuclides considered, and worker’s building/area, as 

to the reason for the evaluation and any medical dose reduction that was under

intake are not provided. The dates of the 22 entries which specify location are 1980s, as shown in Figure 5. 

ALT_LOC 7,057 2,225 

This table is used to identify subcontractor and ‘Hanford enterprise company’ egeneral information such as a worker identifier, home address, as well as the buUnfortunately, this data file does not contain any specific dates so it is impossibuilding/area designation with the SEC period. Therefore, this database file is completeness study. 

Appendix A 73 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 74 of 175 

Appendix A 74 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A2-2. Number of Workers Identified by REX ID in the SEC Period 

Number of Workers Identified for Each Site Location 

Year All 

Workers 100 

Area 

100N 

Area 

200 

Area 

200 

Tank 

Farms 

300 

Area 

400 

Area 

700 

Area 

1972 8494 564 500 1059 38 983 150 272 

1973 9051 616 548 1139 44 1099 173 313 

1974 10740 756 684 1353 54 1328 237 378 

1975 11374 863 784 1536 72 1492 290 419 

1976 12164 955 864 1793 96 1718 388 480 

1977 14751 1200 1093 2260 125 1988 486 563 

1978 16063 1430 1299 2674 138 2299 643 657 

1979 16626 1593 1452 3045 167 2524 792 737 

1980 16281 1693 1549 3389 172 2730 928 806 

1981 16161 1918 1764 3813 200 2916 979 851 

1982 15220 2233 2067 4141 228 3069 1012 905 

1983 16657 2825 2584 4945 272 3389 1098 1084 

1984 16949 2944 2698 5335 291 3532 1132 1203 

1985 17826 3498 3223 5774 303 3687 1164 1304 

1986 18200 3445 3176 5922 310 3825 1183 1365 

1987 18318 3340 3090 6020 317 3816 1212 1356 

1988 16542 2934 2725 5686 314 3697 1181 1287 

1989 16016 2488 2300 5664 313 3595 1193 1382 

1990 16920 2379 2197 5972 321 3702 1242 1504 

All Years: 48549 4983 4610 8287 337 5186 1552 1893 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 75 of 175 

Appendix A 75 SC&A – July 28, 2011 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

ATTACHMENT 3: MAGNITUDE OF BIOASSAY RESULTS BY YEAR 

FOR ALL WORKER TYPES IDENTIFIED 

Attachment 3 displays the full results of the magnitude analysis, which characterizes the 

magnitude of bioassay results for the various types of monitoring by year and job titles analyzed 

in this report. For most radionuclides analyzed, the median value is given, because this value 

will be less influenced by outliers and be a more accurate indicator of a given job title’s exposure 

potential. However, in some situations, such as where the majority of samples are designated as 

below a given MDA, the median is not appropriate, because it shows little variation between the 

different job categories. In situations where the median shows little to no variability, the average 

value will be used. 

It is important to remember that while all types of bioassay samples can be used in determining 

the frequency of monitoring, only bioassay samples that can be matched by specific analyte and 

analysis type can be used when determining the magnitude of bioassay samples. For example, 

uranium bioassay can be found in a number of forms, both in vivo and in vitro (for example, the 

in-vitro records contain entries for U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236, U-238, UNAT, Depleted U, 

Isotopic U, and U Mix). In most cases when this was encountered, a dominant sampling type 

(sampling type with the most results) was identified and used in this analysis. In cases where the 

dominant sample type was less clear, multiple sampling types may be presented to give a clearer 

picture of the exposure potential of different job types. The sample types that were analyzed in 

this effort are shown in Table A3-1. Table A3-1 also indicates which tables in this attachment 

contain the desired data. 

Table A3-1. Listing of Sample Types Analyzed and Location of Results 

Radionuclide Monitoring Type Sample 

Designation Result Type Table # 

Americium In Vitro – Urinalysis Am-241 Median A3-2 

Americium In Vitro – Fecal Am-241 Median A3-3 

Cesium In Vivo Cs-137 Average A3-4 

Sodium In Vivo Na-24 Average A3-5 

Zinc In Vivo Zn-65 Average A3-6 

Uranium In Vivo U-235 Average A3-7 

Strontium In Vitro – Urinalysis Sr-90 Median A3-8 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 76 of 17

Table A3-2. Median Americium In-Vitro Results by Year (Am-241 by Urinalysis in units o

Job Type 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical – – – – 0.00E+00 – – – 

Doctors and Nurses – – – – 0.00E+00 – – – 

Electricians – – – – – – – – 

Engineering Technicians – – – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Engineers – – – – 0.00E+00 – – – 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – – – – – – – – 

Health Physicists – – – – 0.00E+00 – – – 

Janitors – – 6.67E-08 – – – – – 

Managers and Administrators – – 9.55E-08 – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 

Mechanics/Repairers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 

Misc Repair/Construction – – – – – – – – 

Misc Technicians – – – – – – – – 

Miscellaneous – – – – 0.00E+00 – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.11E-07 – 3.93E-07 – 0.00E+00 – 

Painters – – – – – – – – 

Pipefitters – – – – – – – – 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians – – – – 1.87E-06 – – – 

Science Technicians – – – – 5.66E-06 – – – 

Scientists – 0.00E+00 3.71E-07 – 1.41E-05 – 0.00E+00 – 

Security Guards – – - – 1.98E-05 – - – 

Technicians – 0.00E+00 4.30E-07 – 3.98E-05 – 0.00E+00 – 

Unknown 3.00E-05 0.00E+00 1.20E-06 – 1.92E+00 – 6.76E-03 – 

Appendix A 76 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 77 of 17

Table A3-2. Median Americium In-Vitro Results by Year (Am-241 by Urinalysis in units o

(continued) 

Job Type 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Admin Support and Clerical – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 

Engineers – – – – – – – 

Janitors – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – – 

Managers and Administrators – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 

Mechanics/Repairers – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals – 0.00E+00 – – – – – 

Misc Repair/Construction – – – – – – – 

Misc Technicians – – – 0.00E+00 – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 

Painters – – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 

Pipefitters 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians – – – – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 

Science Technicians – – – – 0.00E+00 – – 

Scientists – – – – 0.00E+00 – – 

Security Guards 0.00E+00 1.29E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 

Sheet Metal Workers – – – – – – 8.50E-09 

Technicians – – – 3.49E-05 0.00E+00 – – 

Unknown 0.00E+00 1.62E-08 0.00E+00 5.39E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.13E-08 

Admin Support and Clerical 5.32E-07 – 0.00E+00 7.78E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.66E-08 

Engineers – 2.55E-08 0.00E+00 2.59E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 

Janitors 7.74E-06 – – – – 1.24E-08 – 

Managers And Administrators – – 0.00E+00 2.87E-03 4.29E-08 3.76E-08 3.12E-08 

Mechanics/Repairers 3.62E-05 8.01E-07 0.00E+00 3.44E-02 8.33E-05 6.28E-06 – 

Appendix A 77 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 78 of 17

Table A3-3. Median Americium In-Vitro Results by Year (Am-241 by Fecal Analysis in units 

Job Type 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical – 1.19E-10 – – – – – – 

Engineers – 1.44E-10 – – – – – – 

Janitors – – 0.00E+00 – – – – – 

Managers and Administrators – – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – – – 0

Mechanics/Repairers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals – – – – – – – – 7

Misc Repair/Construction – – – – – – – – 

Misc Technicians – – – – – – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility – 2.09E-10 – – 1.19E-07 – – – 2

Painters – 2.76E-10 – – – – – – 

Pipefitters – – – – – – – – 

Radiation 

Monitors/Technicians – – – – – – – – 5

Science Technicians – – – – 1.02E-06 – – – 

Scientists – 5.66E-10 – – – – – – 

Security Guards – – 0.00E+00 – 1.11E-05 – – – 

Sheet Metal Workers – – – – – – – – 

Technicians – – 0.00E+00 – – – – – 

Unknown 1.67E-07 2.09E-07 5.63E-09 – 9.71E-05 – – – 

Appendix A 78 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 79 of 17

Appendix A 79 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A3–3. Median Americium In–Vitro Results by Year (Am–241 by Fecal Analysis in units 

(continued) 

Job Type 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Admin Support and Clerical – – – – – – – 

Engineers – – 3.71E-09 – – – – 

Janitors – – – – – – – 

Managers and Administrators – – 1.57E-08 – 0.00E+00 – – 

Mechanics/Repairers – – – – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 

Misc Professionals 0.00E+00 – – – – – – 

Misc Repair/Construction – – – 2.31E-09 0.00E+00 – – 

Misc Technicians – – – – 1.47E-09 – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 0.00E+00 1.49E-06 8.77E-08 4.26E-08 4.07E-09 – 0.00E+00 

Painters – – – – – – – 

Pipefitters – – – 8.22E-08 4.65E-08 – – 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 0.00E+00 – – – – – – 

Science Technicians 6.50E-08 – – – – – – 

Scientists – – – – – – – 

Security Guards 3.73E-07 – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Sheet Metal Workers – – – 2.53E-07 – – – 

Technicians – – – 4.75E-07 1.45E-07 – – 

Unknown 8.39E-06 – 1.03E-06 1.04E-06 4.94E-07 – – 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 80 of 17

Table A3–4. Average Cesium In–Vivo Results by Year (Cs–137 in units of nCi)

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical 1.7E+00 1.9E+00 1.2E+00 – 1.7E+00 1.4E+00 1.4E+00 1.2E+00 

Bus Drivers 3.5E+00 2.4E+01 1.9E+00 – 1.1E+00 – 1.8E-01 9.1E-01 

Carpenters – 1.5E+00 – – 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.9E-01 1.7E+00 

Doctors and Nurses – 2.2E+00 – – 3.7E+00 – 1.4E+00 – 

Electricians 2.7E+00 2.5E+00 1.7E+00 – 1.4E+00 2.8E+00 1.1E+00 1.3E+00 

Engineering Technicians 3.5E+00 2.2E+00 1.3E+00 – 1.4E+00 1.7E+00 1.2E+00 1.3E+00 

Engineers 4.3E+01 7.5E+00 1.6E+00 – 1.3E+00 1.3E+00 1.2E+00 1.3E+00 

Equipment Operator 3.7E+00 – – – – 1.9E+00 1.5E+00 1.2E+00 

Firefighters – – 2.3E+00 – – 2.1E+00 7.7E-01 1.7E+00 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – 1.2E+00 – – 1.8E+00 7.5E-01 8.5E-01 1.2E+00 

Health Physicists – – 2.3E+00 – 1.3E+00 1.1E+00 1.2E+00 1.6E+00 

Health Technicians – – – – – – 3.3E-01 – 

Janitors – 2.1E+00 5.3E-01 – 1.5E+00 1.1E+00 7.4E-01 8.9E-01 

Machine Setup/Operators 2.1E+00 1.7E+00 3.3E-01 – – 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 – 

Machinists 2.8E+00 2.0E+00 1.5E+00 – 1.7E+00 1.4E+00 1.2E+00 1.3E+00 

Managers and Administrators 2.9E+00 2.5E+00 1.8E+00 – 2.1E+00 2.0E+00 1.5E+00 1.3E+00 

Masons – – – – – 3.7E+00 3.3E-01 1.1E+00 

Mechanics/Repairers 3.8E+00 2.4E+00 1.8E+00 – 1.2E+00 2.1E+00 1.0E+00 1.2E+00 

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Precision/Production – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 3.3E+00 2.3E+00 1.5E+00 3.3E-01 1.6E+00 1.4E+00 9.3E-01 1.2E+00 

Misc Repair/Construction 5.3E+00 2.4E+00 1.5E+00 – 2.0E+00 3.2E+00 2.4E+00 1.5E+00 

Misc Service 1.7E+00 1.4E+00 1.4E+00 – 6.2E-01 1.4E+00 1.9E+00 1.4E+00 

Misc Technicians 2.8E+00 2.1E+00 1.4E+00 – 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1.2E+00 1.0E+00 

Miscellaneous 4.4E+00 2.4E+00 1.6E+00 – 1.7E+00 1.8E+00 3.6E+00 1.4E+00 

Miscellaneous Transport – – – – 1.8E+00 – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 2.7E+00 2.2E+00 3.6E+00 – 2.0E+00 3.1E+00 1.4E+00 2.6E+00 

Painters 3.3E+00 2.3E+00 1.4E+00 – 1.1E+00 2.7E+00 1.5E+00 1.9E+00 

Pipefitters 4.8E+00 4.5E+00 2.7E+00 – 1.3E+00 2.0E+00 9.9E-01 1.3E+00 

Appendix A 80 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 81 of 17

Table A3–4. Average Cesium In–Vivo Results by Year (Cs–137 in units of nCi)

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 1.5E+01 1.3E+01 1.4E+00 – 1.1E+00 1.7E+00 1.2E+00 9.9E-01 

Sales – – – – – – – – 

Science Technicians 2.3E+00 2.3E+00 2.6E+00 – 7.9E-01 1.7E+00 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 

Scientists 2.5E+00 2.9E+01 1.5E+00 – 1.5E+00 1.9E+00 1.2E+00 1.4E+00 

Security Guards 4.3E+00 1.9E+00 1.1E+00 – 1.4E+00 1.9E+00 1.1E+00 1.5E+00 

Sheet Metal Workers 3.5E+00 2.7E+00 1.6E+00 – 1.9E+00 1.5E+00 7.4E-01 1.0E+00 

Technicians 2.2E+00 2.4E+00 1.3E+00 – 1.6E+00 1.4E+00 1.2E+00 1.4E+00 

Truck Drivers – 3.0E+00 1.1E+00 – 1.5E+00 1.4E+00 1.1E+00 1.4E+00 

Unknown 4.6E+00 2.7E+00 2.1E+00 3.3E-01 1.8E+00 1.9E+00 2.3E+00 1.5E+00 

Welders and Solderers – – 1.6E+00 – 1.4E+00 2.4E+00 1.2E+00 1.1E+00 

Table A3–4. Average Cesium In–Vivo Results by Year (Cs–137 in units of nCi) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Admin Support and Clerical 5.4E-01 5.7E-01 3.9E-01 4.6E+00 1.1E+00 1.6E+00 1.5E+00 1

Bus Drivers 3.3E-01 3.8E-01 – – 1.0E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Carpenters 1.7E+00 8.9E-01 2.7E+00 – 1.3E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Doctors and Nurses 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 – – – 1.5E+00 1.6E+00 1

Electricians 7.8E-01 6.8E-01 1.8E+00 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Engineering Technicians 6.1E-01 6.3E-01 1.7E+00 8.1E+00 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Engineers 7.3E-01 5.9E-01 2.2E+00 – 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Equipment Operator 7.3E-01 6.3E-01 3.3E-01 – 1.3E+00 1.5E+00 1.7E+00 1

Firefighters 7.5E-01 6.4E-01 – – 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 4.9E-01 6.4E-01 3.3E-01 – 1.1E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Health Physicists 8.1E-01 7.0E-01 – – 1.1E+00 1.7E+00 1.5E+00 1

Health Technicians 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 – – – 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Janitors 4.9E-01 5.9E-01 3.3E-01 – 1.1E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Appendix A 81 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 82 of 17

Appendix A 82 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A3–4. Average Cesium In–Vivo Results by Year (Cs–137 in units of nCi) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Machine Setup/Operators 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 9.2E-01 – 5.8E-01 1.5E+00 – 1

Machinists 8.6E-01 6.2E-01 4.5E+00 – 1.4E+00 1.6E+00 1.5E+00 1

Managers and Administrators 6.7E-01 6.0E-01 1.5E+00 1.6E+00 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Masons 7.2E-01 5.4E-01 – – 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Mechanics/Repairers 7.2E-01 6.8E-01 5.6E-01 5.7E-01 1.6E+00 1.6E+00 1.5E+00 1

Miners/Drillers 3.3E-01 – – – – 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Misc Precision/Production – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 6.7E-01 5.7E-01 2.1E+00 1.1E+00 1.3E+00 1.7E+00 1.5E+00 1

Misc Repair/Construction 6.7E-01 5.3E-01 1.1E+00 6.2E-01 1.2E+00 1.6E+00 1.6E+00 1

Misc Service 5.3E-01 4.6E-01 – – 1.4E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Misc Technicians 6.3E-01 5.7E-01 5.2E-01 3.3E-01 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Miscellaneous 5.6E-01 4.7E-01 – – 1.1E+00 1.5E+00 1.6E+00 1

Miscellaneous Transport 2.0E+00 6.8E-01 – – 1.4E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Operators Plant/System/Utility 1.2E+00 6.4E-01 8.0E-01 3.6E+00 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Painters 6.1E-01 5.0E-01 3.3E-01 – 9.4E-01 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Pipefitters 7.6E-01 7.7E-01 3.7E+00 3.3E-01 1.1E+00 1.6E+00 1.5E+00 1

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 9.5E-01 1.6E+00 1.1E+00 – 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Sales – – – – – – – 1

Science Technicians 6.9E-01 5.5E-01 2.4E+00 4.2E-01 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.6E+00 1

Scientists 7.4E-01 5.5E-01 3.4E+00 7.7E-01 1.3E+00 1.9E+00 1.5E+00 1

Security Guards 6.3E-01 5.4E-01 3.9E+00 – 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Sheet Metal Workers 4.4E-01 8.8E-01 6.7E-01 – 8.4E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 4

Technicians 7.6E-01 8.6E-01 3.2E+00 3.3E-01 1.4E+00 1.8E+00 1.6E+00 1

Truck Drivers 7.2E-01 5.7E-01 3.3E-01 – 1.1E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Unknown 8.9E-01 6.2E-01 1.0E+00 2.2E+00 1.4E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1

Welders And Solderers 6.7E-01 4.6E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 1.2E+00 1.5E+00 1.5E+00 1
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 83 of 17

Table A3–5. Average Sodium In–Vivo Results by Year (Na–24 in units of nCi) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical 3.9E-01 3.6E-01 2.0E-01 1.9E-01 2.9E-01 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 

Bus Drivers 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – 1.6E-01 – 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 

Carpenters – 1.6E-01 – 1.6E-01 2.9E-01 1.6E-01 1.7E-01 1.6E-01 

Doctors and Nurses – 5.4E-01 – – 1.6E-01 – 1.6E-01 – 

Electricians 1.6E-01 3.1E-01 1.9E-01 2.5E-01 2.0E-01 2.6E-01 2.2E-01 2.1E-01 

Engineering Technicians 4.0E-01 3.4E-01 1.9E-01 1.7E-01 2.1E-01 2.6E-01 2.3E-01 2.3E-01 

Engineers 3.0E-01 8.8E+00 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 3.0E-01 2.4E-01 2.3E-01 2.3E-01 

Equipment Operator 2.4E-01 – – – – 1.8E-01 2.6E-01 1.8E-01 

Firefighters – – 1.6E-01 – – 1.6E-01 2.4E-01 2.3E-01 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – 4.8E-01 – 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 2.1E-01 2.7E-01 

Health Physicists – – 5.6E-01 4.5E-01 3.9E-01 6.0E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 

Health Technicians – – – – – – 1.6E-01 – 

Janitors – 2.5E-01 1.6E-01 3.7E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 2.1E-01 1.6E-01 

Machine Setup/Operators 5.7E-01 2.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – 2.6E-01 1.6E-01 – 

Machinists 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 2.1E-01 2.0E-01 2.1E-01 1.9E-01 1.6E-01 

Managers and Administrators 3.2E-01 3.1E-01 2.2E-01 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 2.5E-01 2.0E-01 2.1E-01 

Masons – – – – – 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 4.8E-01 

Mechanics/Repairers 4.5E-01 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 1.9E-01 2.0E-01 2.7E-01 2.1E-01 2.2E-01 

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 2.9E-01 3.1E-01 1.8E-01 2.0E-01 2.1E-01 2.8E-01 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 

Misc Repair/Construction 2.2E-01 4.4E-01 1.9E+02 3.6E-01 1.6E-01 2.3E-01 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 

Misc Service 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 3.4E-01 2.7E-01 2.3E-01 2.5E-01 1.7E-01 2.5E-01 

Misc Technicians 2.4E-01 3.2E-01 2.0E-01 1.9E-01 1.7E-01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.1E-01 

Miscellaneous 7.1E-01 3.3E-01 1.9E-01 2.8E-01 2.3E-01 1.6E-01 1.9E-01 2.4E-01 

Miscellaneous Transport – – – – 1.6E-01 – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 2.8E-01 3.2E-01 2.3E-01 1.9E-01 2.2E-01 2.3E-01 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 

Painters 1.6E-01 4.1E-01 2.2E-01 1.6E-01 2.3E-01 1.6E-01 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 

Pipefitters 4.7E-01 3.0E+01 2.3E-01 1.8E-01 2.3E-01 2.7E+00 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 3.1E-01 2.9E-01 2.6E-01 2.2E-01 2.8E-01 2.5E-01 1.9E-01 2.0E-01 

Appendix A 83 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 84 of 17

Table A3–5. Average Sodium In–Vivo Results by Year (Na–24 in units of nCi) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Science Technicians 2.7E-01 4.1E-01 1.7E-01 1.7E-01 2.8E-01 2.2E-01 1.6E-01 2.0E-01 

Scientists 3.4E-01 2.6E-01 2.2E-01 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 2.5E-01 2.2E-01 2.1E-01 

Security Guards 2.1E-01 4.1E-01 2.3E-01 2.1E-01 3.1E-01 2.9E-01 2.3E-01 2.1E-01 

Sheet Metal Workers 6.9E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 2.0E-01 1.6E-01 2.6E-01 

Technicians 2.8E-01 3.2E-01 2.7E-01 1.9E-01 2.1E-01 2.5E-01 2.1E-01 3.2E-01 

Truck Drivers – 1.1E+00 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 5.7E-01 3.5E-01 2.5E-01 2.3E-01 

Unknown 1.7E+00 9.0E-01 2.3E-01 1.9E-01 2.2E-01 2.5E-01 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 

Welders and Solderers – – 1.6E-01 2.5E-01 1.9E-01 2.2E-01 1.9E-01 2.6E-01 

Table A3–5. Average Sodium In–Vivo Results by Year (Na–24 in units of nCi) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Admin Support and Clerical 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 2.8E-01 – 1.6E-01 – – 

Bus Drivers 1.6E-01 2.6E-01 – – – – – 

Carpenters 2.3E-01 2.3E-01 3.6E-01 – – – – 

Doctors and Nurses 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – – – – 

Electricians 2.1E-01 2.0E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Engineering Technicians 2.0E-01 2.3E-01 4.7E-01 – 1.6E-01 – – 

Engineers 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 2.7E-01 – 2.2E-01 – – 

Equipment Operator 1.8E-01 2.0E-01 1.6E-01 – – – – 

Firefighters 2.3E-01 2.0E-01 – – – – – 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 1.8E-01 2.1E-01 1.6E-01 – – – – 

Health Physicists 1.6E-01 2.0E-01 – – – – – 

Health Technicians 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – – – – 

Janitors 2.2E-01 2.3E-01 1.6E-01 – – – – 

Machine Setup/Operators 2.3E-01 1.6E-01 2.6E-01 – – – – 

Machinists 2.0E-01 2.1E-01 2.9E-01 – – – – 

Appendix A 84 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 85 of 17

Appendix A 85 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A3–5. Average Sodium In–Vivo Results by Year (Na–24 in units of nCi) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Managers and Administrators 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 2.5E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Masons 2.3E-01 3.4E-01 – – – – – 

Mechanics/Repairers 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 2.4E-01 2.9E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Miners/Drillers 1.6E-01 – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 1.9E-01 2.0E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Misc Repair/Construction 1.8E-01 2.1E-01 1.9E-01 3.3E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Misc Service 2.0E-01 1.8E-01 – – – – – 

Misc Technicians 2.1E-01 2.3E-01 1.6E-01 4.8E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Miscellaneous 2.0E-01 2.8E-01 – – – – – 

Miscellaneous Transport 3.8E-01 2.1E-01 – – – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 2.1E-01 2.2E-01 2.6E-01 3.8E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Painters 2.5E-01 2.1E-01 1.6E-01 – 1.6E-01 – – 

Pipefitters 2.0E-01 1.9E-01 2.5E-01 2.6E-01 – – – 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 2.1E-01 2.2E-01 3.3E-01 – 1.6E-01 – – 

Science Technicians 2.0E-01 2.2E-01 5.1E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Scientists 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 1.7E-01 2.9E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Security Guards 2.3E-01 2.0E-01 2.4E-01 – 1.6E-01 – – 

Sheet Metal Workers 2.4E-01 2.2E-01 1.6E-01 – – – – 

Technicians 2.1E-01 1.9E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – – 

Truck Drivers 1.9E-01 1.9E-01 4.1E-01 – – – – 

Unknown 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 2.4E-01 3.4E-01 1.6E-01 – – 

Welders and Solderers 2.1E-01 1.9E-01 3.7E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 – – 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 86 of 17

Table A3-6. Average Zinc In–Vivo Results by Year (Zn–65 in units of nCi) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical 1.3E+00 1.4E+00 7.3E-01 3.8E-01 1.8E+00 1.5E+00 4.5E-01 5.3E-01 

Bus Drivers 2.7E+00 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – 3.8E-01 – 3.8E-01 8.5E-01 

Carpenters – 1.7E+00 – – 8.4E-01 8.2E-01 5.4E-01 5.9E-01 

Doctors and Nurses – 3.2E+00 – – 3.1E+00 – 3.8E-01 – 

Electricians 1.7E+00 9.4E-01 7.8E-01 5.8E-01 1.2E+00 6.2E+00 6.6E-01 7.5E-01 

Engineering Technicians 2.7E+00 2.1E+00 7.8E-01 1.3E+00 1.1E+00 2.6E+00 4.8E-01 5.3E-01 

Engineers 1.9E+00 8.2E+00 9.9E-01 8.3E-01 1.2E+00 1.7E+00 6.3E-01 6.8E-01 

Equipment Operator 1.8E+00 – – – – 8.2E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 

Firefighters – – 3.8E-01 – – 2.3E+00 3.8E-01 6.3E-01 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – 2.1E+00 – 3.8E-01 2.4E+00 6.8E-01 9.8E-01 1.1E+00 

Health Physicists – – 1.0E+00 – 6.2E-01 7.4E-01 3.8E-01 1.2E+00 

Health Technicians – – – – – – 3.8E-01 – 

Janitors – 7.6E-01 7.0E-01 – 3.8E-01 6.6E-01 5.2E-01 3.8E-01 

Machine Setup/Operators 1.7E+00 1.6E+00 8.6E-01 – – 7.4E-01 3.8E-01 – 

Machinists 2.2E+00 1.7E+00 6.7E-01 1.3E+00 1.5E+00 9.1E-01 4.6E-01 3.8E-01 

Managers And Administrators 2.4E+00 1.4E+00 8.8E-01 5.6E-01 3.2E+01 1.7E+00 7.9E-01 7.0E-01 

Masons – – – – – 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 1.3E+00 

Mechanics/Repairers 3.5E+00 7.3E-01 1.6E+00 3.8E-01 1.5E+00 1.3E+00 6.4E-01 7.6E-01 

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 2.8E+00 1.2E+00 6.5E-01 6.7E-01 1.3E+00 9.7E-01 4.4E-01 5.4E-01 

Misc Repair/Construction 1.7E+00 9.2E-01 2.4E+00 – 6.7E-01 2.1E+00 1.4E+00 1.0E+00 

Misc Service 2.4E+00 1.6E+00 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 2.3E+00 8.7E-01 6.0E-01 6.4E-01 

Misc Technicians 1.1E+00 1.5E+00 6.9E-01 7.5E-01 1.2E+00 9.2E-01 5.0E-01 5.4E-01 

Miscellaneous 3.8E-01 1.5E+00 1.9E+00 3.8E-01 1.4E+00 1.1E+00 3.8E-01 7.2E-01 

Miscellaneous Transport – – – – 3.8E+00 – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 1.2E+00 1.3E+00 1.3E+00 9.4E-01 4.1E+00 1.9E+00 6.4E-01 6.6E-01 

Painters 1.6E+00 1.3E+00 5.1E-01 1.0E+00 8.7E-01 1.8E+00 1.4E+00 1.2E+00 

Pipefitters 2.5E+00 3.0E+00 1.1E+00 5.8E-01 2.5E+00 1.4E+00 7.2E-01 8.4E-01 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 1.7E+00 1.4E+00 9.5E-01 5.7E-01 1.1E+00 1.2E+00 5.0E-01 4.7E-01 

Appendix A 86 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 87 of 17

Table A3-6. Average Zinc In–Vivo Results by Year (Zn–65 in units of nCi) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Science Technicians 2.1E+00 1.1E+00 5.1E-01 3.8E-01 7.8E-01 8.6E-01 7.2E-01 6.7E-01 

Scientists 1.6E+00 3.4E+01 7.0E-01 6.7E-01 1.1E+00 1.2E+00 4.7E-01 6.0E-01 

Security Guards 2.5E+00 9.5E-01 1.1E+00 8.9E-01 1.1E+00 1.1E+00 9.2E-01 1.1E+00 

Sheet Metal Workers 2.1E+00 1.1E+00 1.0E+00 – 6.8E-01 2.0E+00 1.6E+00 6.4E-01 

Technicians 2.0E+00 1.9E+00 8.2E-01 9.8E-01 1.2E+00 9.7E-01 4.5E-01 6.6E-01 

Truck Drivers – 1.2E+00 9.2E-01 2.4E+00 1.7E+00 1.2E+00 5.9E-01 8.0E-01 

Unknown 2.3E+00 1.9E+00 1.1E+00 7.0E-01 1.5E+01 1.7E+00 8.0E-01 7.6E-01 

Welders and Solderers – – 6.3E+00 3.8E-01 6.1E-01 8.5E-01 9.3E-01 4.6E-01 

Table A3-6. Average Zinc In–Vivo Results by Year (Zn–65 in units of nCi) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1

Admin Support and Clerical 4.2E-01 5.0E-01 6.3E-01 – 1.4E+00 – – 

Bus Drivers 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Carpenters 4.6E-01 4.2E-01 7.2E-01 – – – – 

Doctors and Nurses 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Electricians 4.9E-01 4.7E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – 

Engineering Technicians 5.3E-01 4.6E-01 3.8E-01 – 3.8E-01 – – 

Engineers 4.9E-01 4.6E-01 7.1E-01 – 3.8E-01 – – 

Equipment Operator 5.2E-01 4.3E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – 

Firefighters 4.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 6.1E-01 4.7E-01 1.2E+00 – – – – 

Health Physicists 5.3E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Health Technicians 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Janitors 4.5E-01 6.0E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – 

Machine Setup/Operators 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 9.9E-01 – – – – 

Machinists 5.1E-01 5.3E-01 5.2E-01 – – – – 

Appendix A 87 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 88 of 17

Appendix A 88 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table A3-6. Average Zinc In–Vivo Results by Year (Zn–65 in units of nCi) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1

Managers And Administrators 5.3E-01 4.9E-01 5.8E-01 4.6E-01 4.8E-01 8.7E+00 – 

Masons 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Mechanics/Repairers 5.0E-01 5.9E-01 5.0E-01 3.8E-01 6.4E-01 7.4E+00 – 

Miners/Drillers 3.8E-01 – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals 4.7E-01 4.7E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 3.9E+00 – 

Misc Repair/Construction 6.3E-01 4.9E-01 3.9E-01 3.8E-01 1.9E+00 – – 

Misc Service 4.3E-01 4.1E-01 – – – – – 

Misc Technicians 5.1E-01 4.4E-01 4.0E+00 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – 

Miscellaneous 5.3E-01 4.5E-01 – – – – – 

Miscellaneous Transport 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 5.2E-01 4.8E-01 6.7E-01 4.8E-01 9.2E-01 – – 

Painters 3.9E-01 5.4E-01 3.8E-01 – 3.8E-01 – – 

Pipefitters 6.7E-01 4.7E-01 6.9E-01 3.8E-01 – – – 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 5.2E-01 4.6E-01 5.0E-01 – 1.5E+00 1.1E+01 – 

Science Technicians 5.4E-01 4.7E-01 3.8E-01 1.7E+00 3.8E-01 – – 

Scientists 4.9E-01 4.4E-01 4.8E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – 

Security Guards 4.7E-01 4.7E-01 9.3E-01 – 3.8E-01 – – 

Sheet Metal Workers 5.8E-01 5.3E-01 1.2E+00 – – – – 

Technicians 4.7E-01 5.2E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – – 

Truck Drivers 4.9E-01 4.7E-01 3.8E-01 – – – – 

Unknown 5.1E-01 5.0E-01 5.1E-01 5.9E-01 1.1E+01 2.0E+01 – 

Welders and Solderers 5.0E-01 5.2E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 3.8E-01 – – 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 89 of 17

Table A3–7. Average Uranium In–Vivo Results by Year (U–235 in units of nCi) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical – – – – 9.1E-02 6.8E-02 6.6E-02 6.2E-02 

Bus Drivers – – – – 8.0E-02 8.8E-02 7.5E-02 7.5E-02 

Carpenters – – – – – 7.0E-02 – – 

Doctors and Nurses – – – – 4.0E-02 – 6.0E-02 – 

Electricians – – – – 6.8E-02 6.0E-02 6.7E-02 6.6E-02 

Engineering Technicians – – – – 6.1E-02 6.5E-02 6.5E-02 6.3E-02 

Engineers – – – – 6.7E-02 6.7E-02 6.2E-02 6.3E-02 

Equipment Operator – – – – – – – 8.5E-02 

Firefighters – – – – – – 5.5E-02 7.4E-02 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – – – – 5.5E-02 6.0E-02 4.5E-02 5.0E-02 

Health Physicists – – – – 5.5E-02 – 6.3E-02 6.6E-02 

Health Technicians – – – – – – 5.0E-02 – 

Janitors – – – – 7.0E-02 5.8E-02 7.4E-02 7.0E-02 

Machine Setup/Operators – – – – – – 7.0E-02 – 

Machinists – – – – 7.1E-02 6.8E-02 6.7E-02 9.1E-02 

Managers and Administrators – – 2.9E-01 – 6.2E-02 6.3E-02 6.4E-02 6.4E-02 

Masons – – – – – – – – 

Mechanics/Repairers – – – – 6.9E-02 7.6E-02 7.4E-02 6.4E-02 

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Precision/Production – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals – – – – 6.8E-02 6.2E-02 6.1E-02 6.0E-02 

Misc Repair/Construction – – – – – 5.5E-02 6.5E-02 6.5E-02 

Misc Service – – – – 6.0E-02 6.5E-02 5.6E-02 6.2E-02 

Misc Technicians – – – – 6.2E-02 5.7E-02 6.7E-02 5.8E-02 

Miscellaneous – – – – 6.2E-02 5.0E-02 5.9E-02 5.5E-02 

Miscellaneous Transport – – – – – – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility – – 1.6E-01 – 7.9E-02 6.1E-02 6.4E-02 6.3E-02 

Painters – – – – 5.8E-02 6.5E-02 6.5E-02 7.5E-02 

Pipefitters – – – – 6.4E-02 7.8E-02 6.7E-02 6.3E-02 

Appendix A 89 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 90 of 17

Table A3–7. Average Uranium In–Vivo Results by Year (U–235 in units of nCi) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians – – – 7.0E-02 7.2E-02 6.6E-02 6.4E-02 6.5E-02 

Science Technicians – – 2.2E-01 – 6.1E-02 5.8E-02 5.7E-02 6.1E-02 

Scientists – – 2.5E-01 – 6.4E-02 6.1E-02 6.1E-02 6.2E-02 

Security Guards – – 1.1E-01 – 6.9E-02 5.6E-02 7.7E-02 6.3E-02 

Sheet Metal Workers – – – – – 6.5E-02 7.3E-02 5.9E-02 

Technicians – – 1.4E-01 – 7.0E-02 6.3E-02 6.4E-02 5.9E-02 

Truck Drivers – – – – – 6.4E-02 6.8E-02 6.3E-02 

Unknown – – 2.0E-01 6.0E-02 6.6E-02 6.7E-02 6.2E-02 6.2E-02 

Welders and Solderers 2.0E-01 – – – 6.3E-02 7.5E-02 6.5E-02 6.9E-02 

Table A3–7. Average Uranium In–Vivo Results by Year (U–235 in units of nCi) 

(continued) 

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Admin Support and Clerical 6.2E-02 4.8E-02 4.7E-02 5.4E-02 4.8E-02 5.9E-02 4.5E-02 4

Bus Drivers 8.0E-02 6.0E-02 – – – – – 4

Carpenters 6.5E-02 5.7E-02 6.0E-02 5.5E-02 5.4E-02 6.2E-02 5.3E-02 4

Doctors and Nurses 6.5E-02 5.0E-02 – – – – – 

Electricians 6.6E-02 5.8E-02 5.4E-02 5.8E-02 5.9E-02 6.1E-02 5.7E-02 4

Engineering Technicians 6.2E-02 5.4E-02 5.3E-02 5.7E-02 5.8E-02 5.7E-02 4.8E-02 4

Engineers 6.2E-02 5.3E-02 5.4E-02 5.7E-02 5.6E-02 5.8E-02 5.0E-02 3

Equipment Operator 5.5E-02 5.5E-02 6.0E-02 6.3E-02 6.0E-02 6.4E-02 5.4E-02 4

Firefighters – – – 6.0E-02 5.8E-02 5.1E-02 – 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers 6.8E-02 5.4E-02 5.6E-02 6.0E-02 6.2E-02 6.0E-02 6.1E-02 4

Health Physicists – 7.3E-02 5.3E-02 – – 5.7E-02 5.4E-02 3

Health Technicians – 2.5E-02 – – – – – 

Janitors 5.8E-02 4.9E-02 5.1E-02 5.6E-02 5.5E-02 5.2E-02 4.2E-02 2

Machine Setup/Operators – – – – – – – 

Appendix A 90 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 91 of 17

Appendix A 91 

: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

Ho is report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A3–7. Average Uranium In–Vivo Results by Year (U–235 in units of nCi) 

(continued) 

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Machinists 7.4E-02 5.9E-02 4.2E-02 5.8E-02 5.1E-02 6.1E-02 5.6E-02 8

Managers and Administrators 6.5E-02 5.6E-02 5.5E-02 5.6E-02 5.8E-02 5.6E-02 4.9E-02 4

Masons – – – – – 6.2E-02 5.2E-02 3

Mechanics/Repairers 6.5E-02 5.4E-02 5.4E-02 5.8E-02 5.9E-02 6.0E-02 5.4E-02 4

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – 1.0E-01 2

Misc Precision/Production – – – – – – – 3

Misc Professionals 6.1E-02 5.2E-02 5.2E-02 1.2E-01 5.6E-02 5.8E-02 4.4E-02 4

Misc Repair/Construction 6.5E-02 5.8E-02 7.0E-02 5.8E-02 5.6E-02 6.4E-02 5.2E-02 4

Misc Service 6.2E-02 5.5E-02 5.1E-02 5.2E-02 5.1E-02 5.2E-02 4.5E-02 3

Misc Technicians 6.4E-02 5.7E-02 5.4E-02 5.7E-02 6.0E-02 6.0E-02 5.8E-02 3

Miscellaneous 6.2E-02 4.8E-02 4.9E-02 5.1E-02 3.7E-02 5.1E-02 4.0E-02 3

Miscellaneous Transport 7.1E-02 – – – – 6.3E-02 – 3

Operators Plant/System/Utility 6.1E-02 5.4E-02 5.3E-02 5.5E-02 5.8E-02 5.7E-02 4.7E-02 3

Painters 6.9E-02 6.4E-02 5.5E-02 5.8E-02 6.0E-02 5.7E-02 5.0E-02 4

Pipefitters 6.4E-02 5.9E-02 6.4E-02 5.6E-02 6.3E-02 6.0E-02 5.2E-02 4

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 6.4E-02 5.4E-02 5.4E-02 5.6E-02 5.9E-02 5.8E-02 5.2E-02 3

Science Technicians 5.8E-02 5.3E-02 4.9E-02 5.0E-02 5.4E-02 5.4E-02 4.7E-02 3

Scientists 6.3E-02 5.5E-02 5.3E-02 5.4E-02 5.7E-02 5.6E-02 4.8E-02 3

Security Guards 8.8E-02 6.7E-02 5.8E-02 5.4E-02 5.1E-02 5.9E-02 4.8E-02 4

Sheet Metal Workers 6.8E-02 5.6E-02 5.2E-02 6.6E-02 5.6E-02 6.2E-02 5.5E-02 4

Technicians 6.9E-02 5.1E-02 5.0E-02 5.2E-02 5.6E-02 5.3E-02 4.4E-02 3

Truck Drivers 6.8E-02 5.7E-02 6.3E-02 6.1E-02 6.2E-02 6.3E-02 5.3E-02 4

Unknown 6.2E-02 5.3E-02 5.3E-02 5.3E-02 5.6E-02 5.6E-02 4.3E-02 3

Welders and Solderers 6.5E-02 6.3E-02 6.1E-02 5.6E-02 6.4E-02 6.4E-02 7.3E-02 4
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 92 of 17

Table A3–8. Median Strontium In–Vitro Results by Year (Sr–90 in units of μCi/l) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Admin Support and Clerical 3.00E-06 9.50E-07 – – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 

Bus Drivers – – – – – – 9.38E-05 – 

Carpenters – – – – – – – – 

Electricians – 0.00E+00 – – 0.00E+00 – 6.01E-08 – 

Engineering Technicians 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – – – 7.09E-05 – 

Engineers 6.55E-06 2.32E-07 – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Equipment Operator – 0.00E+00 – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Firefighters – – – – – – – – 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – – – – – – – – 

Health Physicists – – – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Health Technicians – – – – – – – – 

Janitors – – – – – – – – 

Machine Setup/Operators – – – – – – – – 

Machinists – – – – – – – – 

Managers and Administrators 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.76E-07 – 0.00E+00 – 1.14E-06 – 

Masons – – – – – – – – 

Mechanics/Repairers – – – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – – – 

Misc Professionals – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 8.56E-07 – 6.38E-07 – 

Misc Repair/Construction – – – – – – 3.02E-04 – 

Misc Service – – – – – – 2.30E-06 – 

Misc Technicians 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Miscellaneous – 9.50E-07 – – – – – – 

Miscellaneous Transport – – – – – – – – 

Operators Plant/System/Utility 5.25E-07 2.26E-07 1.51E-06 – – – 7.05E-06 – 

Painters – – – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Pipefitters 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – – – 2.33E-07 – 

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 8.90E-03 7.74E-06 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 2.88E-07 – 

Science Technicians 0.00E+00 1.43E-06 2.88E-07 – 0.00E+00 – 1.23E-07 – 

Appendix A 92 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

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Page No. 

Page 93 of 17

Table A3–8. Median Strontium In–Vitro Results by Year (Sr–90 in units of μCi/l) 

Job Title 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 

Scientists – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – 9.07E-08 – 

Security Guards – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Sheet Metal Workers – – – – – – – – 

Technicians – 5.97E-07 2.13E-06 – 8.28E-07 – 0.00E+00 – 

Truck Drivers – – – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Unknown 1.37E-07 3.13E-07 5.91E-07 – 7.44E-07 – 1.09E-04 – 

Welders and Solderers – – – – – – 0.00E+00 – 

Table A3–8. Median Strontium In–Vitro Results by Year (Sr–90 in units of μCi/l) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Admin Support and Clerical 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0

Bus Drivers – – – – – – – 

Carpenters 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – – – 6.20E-08 0

Electricians 2.10E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.82E-08 3.72E-07 2.10E-07 1.35E-07 0

Engineering Technicians 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.23E-07 1.72E-07 0

Engineers 2.78E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 7.15E-08 3.77E-08 2.74E-07 4.66E-08 0

Equipment Operator 9.16E-07 2.23E-06 9.85E-08 4.16E-07 0.00E+00 1.02E-07 1.16E-06 0

Firefighters – 0.00E+00 – – – – 0.00E+00 

Handlers/Laborers/Helpers – 0.00E+00 – – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.16E-08 0

Health Physicists 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.62E-07 0

Health Technicians – 0.00E+00 3.28E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0

Janitors – – 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 – – 0

Machine Setup/Operators – – 0.00E+00 – – – – 

Machinists 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 

Managers and Administrators 1.11E-07 2.83E-07 1.61E-07 1.22E-07 7.56E-08 1.66E-07 2.13E-07 0

Masons – – – – – – – 0

Appendix A 93 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

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Page No. 

Page 94 of 17

Appendix A 94 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE

wever, th

Table A3–8. Median Strontium In–Vitro Results by Year (Sr–90 in units of μCi/l) 

(continued)

Job Title 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

Mechanics/Repairers 7.70E-08 3.17E-06 0.00E+00 3.71E-08 1.91E-06 1.18E-07 1.80E-07 2

Miners/Drillers – – – – – – 0.00E+00 0

Misc Professionals 0.00E+00 – – – 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.13E-07 0

Misc Repair/Construction 0.00E+00 1.64E-04 5.42E-06 1.11E-06 0.00E+00 4.01E-07 3.38E-06 1

Misc Service 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0

Misc Technicians 0.00E+00 2.76E-07 0.00E+00 3.44E-08 1.40E-07 7.96E-08 2.34E-07 0

Miscellaneous – – – – 2.79E-06 – – 0

Miscellaneous Transport – – – – – – – 0

Operators Plant/System/Utility 2.99E-04 6.61E-08 4.37E-08 6.16E-06 1.95E-05 2.80E-07 2.33E-07 2

Painters 0.00E+00 2.70E-06 0.00E+00 – 2.76E-07 0.00E+00 7.48E-08 0

Pipefitters 0.00E+00 1.46E-05 7.49E-07 6.34E-08 6.36E-07 6.48E-07 1.15E-07 0

Radiation Monitors/Technicians 9.98E-08 1.01E-04 1.01E-07 7.42E-07 6.56E-08 2.61E-07 1.95E-07 9

Science Technicians 0.00E+00 6.83E-08 8.28E-08 3.54E-08 2.56E-08 1.49E-07 2.07E-07 0

Scientists 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 9.53E-08 2.10E-07 0

Security Guards 0.00E+00 3.77E-05 1.59E-06 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 7.40E-08 3

Sheet Metal Workers 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 – 1.65E-07 5

Technicians 0.00E+00 3.33E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.03E-07 0.00E+00 0

Truck Drivers – 0.00E+00 1.99E-06 5.75E-07 0.00E+00 3.24E-07 4.92E-07 0

Unknown 1.86E-05 4.76E-07 2.02E-07 2.74E-07 1.41E-06 1.35E-07 0.00E+00 

Welders and Solderers 0.00E+00 1.83E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.53E-08 0
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 95 of 175 

 95 

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APPENDIX B: NOVEMBER 2009 UPDATED HANFORD 

SEC ISSUES MATRIX 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Page No. 

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 96 

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REMAINING HANFORD SEC ISSUES 

FOR SEC PETITION SEC-00057-2 and PETITION SEC-00152 

Draft Issues Matrix Update 

Prepared by SC&A 

November 2, 2009 

This is an update of the Hanford Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) issues matrix made following 

the Advisory Board’s decision to accept NIOSH’s recommendation that all eligible Hanford 

workers employed until June 30, 1972, be included in the SEC provided they meet the health 

endangerment requirement of 250 days or more of qualified employment. The NIOSH 

recommendation was contained in an evaluation report of Petition SEC-00152, which is a new 

SEC petition. NIOSH has also been evaluating Petition SEC-00057-2, which has the same 

starting date (October 1, 1943) as SEC-00152. 

SC&A was not asked to evaluate SEC-00152. This is an 83.14 petition initiated by NIOSH, 

because it determined that it did not have sufficient data to estimate certain aspects of Hanford 

dose to June 30, 1972. During its October 2009 meeting, the Board accepted NIOSH’s 

recommendation regarding expansion of the SEC class to June 30, 1972. The follow-on task for 

SC&A was to update the SEC issues matrix to indicate which issues relevant to Petition SEC00057-2 had been fully or partially resolved by the Board’s decision regarding SEC-00152, and 

which issues still remain to be investigated in the context of SEC-00057-2. 

The matrix below indicates SC&A’s understanding of (1) the issues relating to SEC-00057-2 that 

were resolved by the Board’s decision regarding SEC-00152 and (2) the issues that still remain 

to be resolved for the July 1, 1972, to December 31, 1990, period. 

Disclaimer 

This document is made available in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Advisory Board 

on Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) to maintain all possible openness in its 

deliberations. However, the ABRWH and its contractor, SC&A, caution the reader that at the 

time of its release, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Board for 

factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. This implies that once 

reviewed by the ABRWH, the Board’s position may differ from the report’s conclusions. Thus, 

the reader should be cautioned that this report is for information only and that premature 

interpretations regarding its conclusions are unwarranted. 
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: 

Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

Page 97 of 17

Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

Start of potential SEC Issues 

(Preliminary list) 

1. Thorium-232 internal exposure from Sept. 1, 1946, up to December 31, 1959 

SEC proposed for Buildings 313, 306, 3722, 3706 

Buildings and locations other than the ones listed in the NIOSH ER appear to be involved, for instance, and 303-K, 305 Test Pile, 314, 321, 3307 A and B (change houses with thorium contamination), and Sites 300-33 and 300-26, sites with thorium contaminated soil. The 100 Area was also involved in thorium work; for instance, 105-D and 105-H reactors (there was a slug failure in the latter in 1954). The use of the REDOX facility (202-S) for U233 separation from irradiated Th-232 slugs was evaluated in 1955. Workers moved within an area without a record being maintained on a day-to-day basis. Many workers were roving workers and/or construction workers. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved. 

2. Americium-241 internal exposure, January 1, 1949 to December 31, 1968 

SEC proposed for Buildings 231-Z, 242-Z and 234-5Z 

Buildings and locations other than the ones listed in the NIOSH ER appear to have been involved. 303-C was used for americium storage. There was Am-241 separation in Building 325. The 216 series cribs and ditches were used for discharge of wastes from the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Workers moved within an area without a record being maintained on a day-to-day basis. Many workers were roving workers and/or construction workers. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved. 

Draft Hanford SEC Issues Matrix Page 97 of 175 

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Effective Date: 

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Draft Hanford SEC Issues Matrix Page 98 of 175 

Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

3. Thorium-232 internal exposure from January 1, 1960, onward. 

The ER assumes that sufficient Th in-vivo data exist, and that dose reconstruction can be done. OTIB-0039 proposes to estimate Th intakes based on uranium intakes. NIOSH investigating further. 

The REX database summary in the ER contains no Th data points until 1969, very few scattered data points from 1970 to 1981, and none after that. Data adequacy not established. Validity of using U intakes for Th intake estimation not established. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis item is resolved to June 301972. Data adequacy from 197onward remains to be investigated. 

4. HEU – uranium 

intake estimation 

ER does not discuss potential for HEU exposure. 

HEU was used at Hanford at various times. Only fluorometric urine data for uranium are available until 1983, preventing an estimation of U isotopic composition. HEU was used in early tritium and U-233 production (1949–1954), for reactor power enhancement (to June 1958), and possibly in the mid-1960s for U-233 production (N reactor). Some R&D uses continued into the 1980s. J and C slugs containing HEU were canned at Hanford. Fluorometric data are generally not adequate to estimate exposure to HEU in a context where most exposure to most workers was to low enriched or natural uranium. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateIssue is resolved to June 30, 1972. Data adequacy remains tbe addressed after that date to 1983, the date up to which uranium fluorometry was the urinalysis method. 

5. Uranium intake estimation prior to 1948 

ER considers Hanford U data prior to 1948 unreliable and back-extrapolation of later data to be scientifically inappropriate due to changes in equipment and methods. The ER proposes to use AWE data for this period. 

Equivalence of the use of AWE uranium data for the experimental and early production processes has not been demonstrated to be bounding or suitable for Hanford circumstances in an SEC context. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved. 

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Page No. 

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Draft Hanford SEC Issues Matrix Page 99 of 175 

Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

6. Uranium intake estimation to 1990 for unmonitored workers 

The ER proposes using coworker data. 

Adequacy of coworker model (Table 6-3 in OTIB-0039) remains to be established in the SEC context. 

Post 1972 SEC SC&A updateOnly the July 1, 1972, to 1990 part of the SEC review remains to be completed for OTIB-0039the corresponding review of OTIB-0054 for the same period also remains to be completed. 

7. U-233 intakes 

The ER proposes using the highest U-233 intake estimate. 

Adequacy of U-233 internal monitoring data and data for associated contaminants to determine bounding dose (or a dose estimated with greater accuracy) needs to be examined as a potential SEC issue. The history of U-233 production and separation also needs evaluation in the SEC context. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved until June 30, 1972. The last reprocessing campaign for U-233 was in 1971, according to vol. 2 of the TBD (Rev. 1, pg. 12). This remains to be confirmed. Handling and further processing of U-233 after June 30, 1972, remains to be investigated, notably for data adequacy, if there was such handling or processing. Exact final date of potential U-233 exposure also remains to be researched.

NOTICE: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

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Page No. 

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Draft Hanford SEC Issues Matrix Page 100 of 175 

Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

8. Recycled uranium intake estimation. 

The ER does not discuss intakes of contaminants in RU. The TBD has some data, with the earliest dating from 1988. 

Exposure to the trace contaminants in RU may be a potential SEC issue starting in 1952, when RU was recovered at Hanford from the highlevel waste tanks. The potential ending time would need further study. Adequacy of the RU contaminant table in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 (Vol. 5, Rev. 01, Table 5.32.5-2, p. 24)) needs to be examined in light of 42 CFR 83 requirements, and historical data at Hanford indicating higher contaminant levels. Some data indicate higher levels of trace contaminants in the early period than are shown in the TBD table. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved to June 1972. SC&A has raised the issue of use of 1988 and 1993 data for earlier periods, which now remains for the 1972–1987 period.

9. Neptunium-237 intakes, 1958 to 1972 

The ER states that, “Plutonium[-238] bioassay was considered sufficient to monitor for neptunium intakes” (p. 41). 

The validity of the suggested approach has not been established, especially in the context that Hanford handled separated Np. Only four Np bioassay samples exist for 1972 (REX database summary) and none before that. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved up to Jun30, 1972. Residual contamination and any processing for the July 1, 1972 to December 31, 1972, remains to be investigated.

10. Tritium intake estimation from 1949 onwards 

The ER states that data are available from 1949 onward and that they are sufficient for coworker dose determination. 

The REX database shows no tritium samples until 1982. SC&A awaits the results of NIOSH’s data capture efforts on this issue. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved until June 30, 1972. Data from July 1, 1972 to 1982 recovered by NIOSH (if any) needs to be reviewed for adequacy. Externdose records, which reportedly include tritium exposure (TBD Vol. 5), also need to be reviewed.

NOTICE: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Page No. 

Page 101 of 17

Draft Hanford SEC Issues Matrix Page 101 of 175 

Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

11. Promethium147 

The ER contains a discussion of processes involving promethium, but has no discussion of dose reconstruction methods. 

The REX database has promethium bioassay data from 1966 onward. Promethium processing may have started in 1962, and possibly earlier. Feasibility of dose reconstruction remains to be established, at least to 1966. Adequacy of data needs to be investigated from 1966 onwards. The coworker model does not address pre-1966 exposures or roving worker exposures (for workers not based in Buildings 308 or 325). 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved until June 30, 1972. A check on the last date of Pm-147 processing is needed. 

12. Sr-90, Cs- 137, MFP intake estimation 

Prior to 1965, the approach suggested is use of mixed fission product and Cs-137 data. The ER states mixed fission product urinalysis started in 1947; “erratic until 1948” (p. 39) 

 Dose reconstruction feasibility before 1948 

is a potential issue. 

 The REX database summary shows no 

fission product data prior to 1974. Use of the REX database for the early years needs to be assessed for possible changes in processes and validity of back extrapolation, and for its use in coworker dose estimation. 

 Sr-90 bioassay data available from 1965 

onwards. 

 Cs-137 whole-body count data available 

from 1960 onward (according to the ER), but no data points in REX until 1972. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved until June 30, 1972. Dose reconstruction method for July 1, 1972, to the end of 1973 needs to be evaluated. Data adequacy from 1974 needs to be checked for adequacy.

13. Tank Farm alpha contamination 

The ER does not explicitly discuss this issue. 

Site expert interviews indicate that tank farm exposures, including alpha-emitting radionuclide intakes (such as those from resuspension), may have been missed. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue would remain as part of the data adequacy check from July 1, 1972, onwards. 

NOTICE: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

Revision No. 

1 – Draft 

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Draft – Hanford SEC Issues Review – Vol. II 

Page No. 

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Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

14. Plutonium intake estimation 

The ER has an extensive discussion of data and dose reconstruction approach. 

May not be an SEC issue. Frequency of Pu urinalysis fell sharply in the late 1950s. Minimum detection limits were variable (higher in earlier years). Coworker models need to be evaluated from an SEC standpoint (e.g., adequacy of the REX database for coworker models). 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue remains only as part of data adequacy and validity (for lung and whole-body counts) from July 1, 1972, onwards. 

15. Hot particle ingestion 

The ER does not discuss this issue 

Ingestion of hot particles could be an issue for 1947 and 1948 T and B plant emissions and for 1952–1955 REDOX plant emissions (TBD Vol. 4 Rev. 2, p. 27). 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved.

16. Cm-244 

The ER states, “However, extraction of curium-244 from high-level waste occurred at the 325 Building sometime in the 1970s. Since the curium and americium procedures were the same, the results would have been reported as curium only, if so requested through the bioassay request system....” 

Significant amounts of Cm-244 (65 grams—more than 5,000 curies) appear to have been processed in the 1960s in Building 325 (Gerber, M.S. 1993. Multiple Missions: The 300 Area in Hanford Site History, WHC-MR0440, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington. September 1993, p. 23). Earliest Cm-244 data in the REX database summary in the ER are from 1968 (6 data points), after which there are 8 more in 1974. NIOSH has not presented a DR method for estimating Cm-244 intakes during the campaign that purified 65 grams in the 1960s. 

SC&A update June 15, 2009: This issue is resolved until June 30, 1972. Data check is needed for July 1, 1972 to 1974.

NOTICE: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
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September 30, 2011 

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Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading)

Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

SC&A Statement 

17. Neutron doses to December 31, 1971 (after which TLDs were introduced) 

ER proposes to use: 

 n/p ratios until 1958.  Adjusted NTA film data, 

to end of 1971 

NIOSH is engaged in an extensive neutron-related data capture effort. 

Issues: 

 Validity of n/p ratios for specific time and 

work location 

 Adjustment factor accuracy and/or 

bounding value 

 Area coverage of neutron monitoring  Construction worker neutron monitoring, 

since there is a claim in the petition that some construction workers were not monitored for neutrons (OTIB-0052 for construction workers did not address neutron doses) 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved. 

18. External exposure geometry 

The ER does not explicitly discuss this issue. 

Site expert evidence indicates significant geometry issues in some circumstances that may prevent film badge or TLD from registering relevant organ dose. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis is a site profile issue. 

19. Lack of adequate monitoring: Petitioner issue 

The ER discusses this in Section 7.4 and bases dose reconstruction feasibility on coworker models 

Coworker model adequacy from the SEC point of view needs to be evaluated in general and specifically in light of petitioner affidavits. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateAn external and internal dose completeness check remains to be done from July 1, 1972, onwards. 

20. Skin contamination 

The ER and TBD describe skin dose and extremity dose monitoring and assignment. 

Site expert interviews indicate unusual potential for skin exposure in some maintenance work. This needs to be evaluated against available data. TBD discusses hot particle skin dose. Validity of skin dose coefficients in the Hanford external dose TBD (Rev. 3) needs to be investigated. Hot particle skin doses need to be evaluated for 1947–1948 and 1952–1954. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateIncident reports should be evaluated from July 1, 1972, onwards as part of the SEC investigation. This should be joined with item 22 below. 

NOTICE: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
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September 30, 2011 

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Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

21. Missing records –routine (Petitioner issue) 

The ER refers to the coworker model OTIB-0052 for construction workers and general guidance to fill in doses corresponding to missing records. 

SEC-specific analysis for Hanford is needed to verify that the approaches specified are bounding doses (or more accurate than bounding doses) for all members of the proposed class. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateSC&A has received a list of destroyed documents. This issuneeds to be joined with issue 22 below. 

22. Missing incident records 

The ER does not explicitly address this issue. 

DOE files of claimants who have affidavits in the Petition need to be examined. Data completeness for incidents needs to be checked. This also links to potential destruction of records and existence of duplicate records. Specific incidents need to be evaluated, including a criticality in the 1950s. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateMissing and destroyed records and incident reports remain as a potential SEC issue. SC&A hareceived a list of destroyed records from DOE and some of these documents appear to have included personnel data. Existence of duplicate records from July 1, 1972, onwards for incident documents indicated adestroyed on the list remains to be established. 

23. REX database adequacy and representativeness for coworker models 

The ER acknowledges that the REX database is not complete for early-year data, but that other reports provide the data in question. 

Coworker models are based on the REX database. The representativeness of the REX database for estimating coworker doses needs to be examined in the SEC context. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateCertain data adequacy and completeness issues remain to binvestigated from July 1, 1972, onwards. See various internal dose items above. This is linketo the coworker model issue. 

24. Polonium-210 

Bismuth was irradiated at Hanford starting in 1945, but separation and processing did not begin till 1968, from which date bioassay data are available. 

Verification of no processing of irradiated bismuth target rods before 1968 is needed. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved. 

NOTICE: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.
Effective Date: 

September 30, 2011 

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Page No. 

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: This November 2, 2009, update has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for dis

wever, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Work

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Issue Number and 

Description 

NIOSH ER Position 

(SC&A Reading) SC&A Statement Update by SC&A November 

2009, for the Work Group 

NOTICE

Ho

25. Miscellaneous radionuclides (e.g., Cr-51, Ru-106, Ce144, Co-60) 

The ER relies on the internal dose TBD. 

Adequacy of the TBD approach for bounding doses needs to be assessed. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThis issue is resolved up to July 1, 1972. Whole-body and lung-counting data need to be evaluated for adequacy for those radionuclidestill relevant from July 1, 1972, onwards. Mixed fission producdata should be reviewed in this context. 

26. Data completeness 

The ER cites individual dose records and other sources of data. Principal reliance is on individual dose records for the most part. 

Completeness of individual dose records may need investigation. 

Post-1972 SEC SC&A updateThe completeness check has been kept pending due to NIOSH’s continued work. A plan from July 1, 1972, onwardthat includes data quality and adequacy checks needs to be developed. SC&A has started work on developing such a plan
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

APPENDIX C: PETITIONER/WORKER INTERVIEW SUMMARY 

FOR THE HANFORD SITE
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Document Description: 

White Paper: Petitioner/Worker 

Interview Summary – Hanford 

Effective Date: 

Draft – September 8, 2010 

S. Cohen & Associates:

Technical Support for the Advisory Board on 

Radiation & Worker Health Review of 

NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Program 

Revision No. 0 (Draft) 

PETITIONER/WORKER INTERVIEW 

SUMMARY FOR THE HANFORD SITE 

Page 2 of 45 

Task Manager: ___________________ Date: 

 Arjun Makhijani, PhD 

Project Manager: _________________ Date: 

 John Mauro, PhD, CHP 

Supersedes: 

N/A 

Record of Revisions 

Revision 

Number 

Effective 

Date Description of Revision 

0 (Draft) 09/08/2010 Initial issue 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

PETITIONER/WORKER INTERVIEW SUMMARY 

FOR THE HANFORD SITE 

Interviews were conducted with the petitioners and 38 former and current Hanford workers. 

Years represented by those interviewed range from 1943 to the present. Interviews for the 

Hanford Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) began October 15, 2007, and will continue on an asneeded basis throughout the petition review process. Two sets of face-to-face interviews were 

conducted on October 29–November 1, 2007, and December 17–18, 2008, in Richland, 

Washington, by Arjun Makhijani and Kathryn Robertson-DeMers of SC&A. Additional 

interviews were conducted over the telephone or answers provided via e-mail. The purpose of 

these interviews was to receive clarification on the Hanford petition basis and the petition 

process, accounts of past radiological control and personnel monitoring practices, and a better 

understanding of how operations were conducted through time. Interviewees were identified 

through the petitioners, public meeting transcripts, Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council 

(HAMTC), and interviewees. 

Those interviewed included the petitioners and former and current Hanford workers. Two 

members of the Advisory Board, Wanda Munn (former worker) and Josie Beach (current 

worker), were included in the list of those individuals interviewed. Those providing affidavits or 

comments at the Hanford outreach meetings were interviewed if clarification of the affidavits or 

comments was needed. Workers represented operations in the 100, 200, 300, 400, 600 and 1100 

Areas of Hanford, including major facilities such as the Plutonium Finishing Plant (234-5Z, 

231 Z), the reactors (100B, 100C, 100D, 100DR, 100F, 100H, 100K (East and West), 100N, Fast 

Flux Test Facility (FFTF), Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor, the separations plants (202-S, 

202 A, 221-B, 221-T, 221-U, 222-S, 224-B, 233-S, 242-A, 242-S, 242-T, 224-B, Hot Semiworks), the Tank Farms, the fuel manufacturing facilities (305, 306, 308, 313, 314, 333), and 

decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) areas, including the dig sites and construction. 

Some individuals interviewed were designated as Rovers, giving them access to all areas of the 

site. The categories that were represented by interviewees include the following: 

 Chemical Process Operations 

 Chemical Technician 

 Engineering Development 

 Laborer 

 Maintenance 

 Maintenance and Surveillance 

 Material Control 

 Nuclear Chemical Operations 

 Nuclear Engineering 

 Planner/Scheduler 

 Production Operations 

 Radiation Monitor (RM)/Radiation Control Technician (RCT)/Health Physics Technician 

(HPT) 

 Radiation Time Keeper 

 Reactor Operations 
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 Shipping and Handling 

 Special Material Processing 

 Subcontractors Support Personnel 

 Utility Operations 

 Waste Management 

SC&A’s review of the Hanford SEC Petition and NIOSH’s Evaluation Report of that petition is 

being conducted as part of its technical support to the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health (Advisory Board). SC&A explained that the interviews were being conducted as part of 

this review. Participants were told the interviews were unclassified and not to disclose classified 

information. Summaries from each interview set were prepared and provided to the interviewees 

for review. It was explained that interview notes with names (if authorized by the interviewee) 

are made available to the Advisory Board. A consolidated version of all interviews may be 

redacted for Privacy Act reasons by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for 

the publicly released report. 

The information the Hanford workers provided to SC&A has been invaluable in providing us 

with a better understanding of the Hanford SEC petition and its basis. This is not a verbatim 

discussion, but a summary of information from multiple interviews with many individuals. The 

information provided by the interviewees was based entirely on their personal experience at the 

Hanford Site. It is recognized that site expert and former Hanford workers’ recollections and 

statements may need to be further substantiated; however, they stand as critical operational 

feedback and reality reference checks. These interview summaries are provided in that context. 

With the preceding qualifications in mind, this summary has contributed to issues raised in the 

SEC petition evaluation report. 

General Information 

Workers mentioned that certain contractors were easier to work for than others. According to 

workers, UNC, DuPont, and General Electric were good companies to work for. There was an 

enormous difference in culture in the 400 area and with the Chemistry Section, simply because 

these were new-technology individuals who were futuristic in their concepts. They were not at 

all secretive in what they were doing. They saw this as the future of the world in a beneficial 

way, and did not have an “arms race” mentality. They were eager to share information (within 

the limits, of course). The rest of the site had been operating for close to 30 years, and the old 

timers were well entrenched in the 1940s mentality (i.e., a secretive, closed-system concept). It’s 

always difficult for a culture that has been established for that long to change to something new. 

There were mixed opinions among workers concerning the effectiveness and openness of the 

Hanford radiation safety program. Many of the interviewees indicated their management 

strongly recommended that employees work safely. The site was safety-minded, but there was 

so much development going on, it was impossible to keep ahead of the changes. One worker 

quoted from Legend and Legacy: Fifty Years of Defense Production at the Hanford Site, 

Revision 2 (Gerber 1995), related to the protection against the unseen danger: 
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The job of the HI Section was especially difficult because strict MED regulations 

precluded revealing to most employees even the existence of radioactivity. 

Additionally, onsite Army Commander Colonel Franklin T. Matthias worried that 

if the workers became concerned about radioactivity, ‘this might be disastrous to 

the project as it might cause a large number of people to leave.’ 

Health Physics was considered pretty qualified by many, and thus workers had no reason to 

question the monitoring process. Workers from some areas found out about hazards after the 

fact, and felt they were not provided with information about the hazards of particular jobs. 

Subcontractor personnel indicated when they found something that was a problem, it was 

implied they should "do something else if you want this job." They would reassign such workers 

around the Hanford site or they would be laid off. 

It was not uncommon for early Hanford workers to have an 8th grade or lower education. 

Training was primarily accomplished by learning on the job. With the push to get the first 

reactors up and operating, employees worked 60 hours per week, 10 hours per day. In earlier 

years, there were no female Chemical Operators at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). There 

were a few female RMs. 

To enter the site areas, employees had to show their badge at the gate so they could enter the 

area. In some parts of the 300 Area, individuals had to punch in on a time clock when they went 

into the area. This was not a universal requirement. Once the worker passed the guard house 

and entered the fenced area of the 300 Area, they had access to other buildings, even if they did 

not work in those buildings. Security didn’t control access at the building level. It was 

surprising how free the access was once you got past the gate. Workers talked about having area 

permits (200 Area permit, 300 Area permit, etc.), which allowed them into particular areas of 

Hanford. Individuals who were Q-cleared were constantly being rotated between different areas. 

For 234-5Z, you had to have a special clearance. 

There have been several strikes by organized labor at Hanford. J.A. Jones workers went on 

strike in 1957. In the early 1970s, the Hanford Site contract was split between just two major 

contractors. J.A. Jones held the construction for the new projects. Construction trades were 

hired out of local unions. The General Electric (GE) workers went on strike in 1966 over 

radiation exposure. GE decided that they would increase the weekly exposure limit, so the 

workers went on strike. J.A. Jones was the construction contractor at Hanford and they 

supported the strike. The union was on strike for 31⁄2 months. During this time, management 

fixed what needed to be fixed at the 100N reactor and took the brunt of the exposure during 

repairs. A third strike at Hanford occurred in 1976. J.A. Jones likely did the same at this time, 

because they would not cross the picket line. 

Fuel Handling and Fabrication 

Uranium metal was first shipped to Hanford in January 1944 for fabrication into fuel. The initial 

fabrication of fuel for the reactors involved trial and error, until they manufactured a fuel that 

could stand up in the reactor. Finally, they determined that uranium metal in an aluminum 
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cladding would withstand irradiation in a reactor. Uranium was handled in the form of metal and 

uranium oxide. Fine chips were formed during machining operations. 

In Building 313, the fuel for the single pass reactors (SPRs) was cladded with aluminum, and an 

end cap was added. The end cap was welded onto the rod. Prior to canning, operators had to 

prepare the furnace. They used lead to get a better heat sink. The furnace (or crucible) was 

charged with several inches of Pb. This was brought up to a temperature hot enough that molten 

aluminum could be added on top of the lead. There had to be more than 8 in of aluminum, 

because the fuel rods were 8 in long. The aluminum and Pb were not compatible and did not 

mix. With a special pair of tongs, the slugs were lowered through the aluminum into the lead. 

The lead was heavier, so it would heat up faster, shortening the required heating time. There was 

a set time it had to be in the lead to come up to temperature. Then the fuel unit was withdrawn 

into the aluminum portion to wash the lead off. A container was submerged filled up with 

aluminum. The slug was inserted into the can. At that time, they added a pre-heated aluminum 

cap on the end of the fuel. They took the fuel and machined it to a certain length. Then they 

welded the area between the cap and the can to get a good seal. A salt bath was not used with 

the SPR aluminum clad fuels. 

Conditions in Building 313 were hazardous. Employees worked around molten metal pots. The 

molten aluminum would squirt back and hit the workers, burning them. If a little water was 

mixed with the molten metal, it would blow out the furnace and material would go right up the 

stack. These blow ups did not happen too often. During chip recovery, employees wore white 

coveralls. While canning, workers wore an asbestos apron, gloves, and spats on the feet. In 

general, workers handled fuel with gloves, but it was difficult to wear gloves when machining 

with coolant spraying on the material. A worker had to keep the uranium covered or it would 

catch fire. None of the injuries were monitored for uranium contamination. The workers were 

patched up and put back to work. 

All the early fuels that were put into the reactor were tested in an autoclave to determine if they 

would hold up to reactor pressure. If the fuel failed, it would oxidize and form a sludge. This 

material would settle in a settling basin under the autoclave. With failed fuel, the autoclave had 

to be washed out with water prior to the next test. When the sludge in the settling basin built up 

to a predetermined level, operators would enter this area and scoop out the sludge (consistency of 

mud). They wore coveralls, caps, gloves, and shoes to perform this task. Workers involved do 

not remember whether the job required respiratory protection. Eventually, the autoclave testing 

was discontinued and rods were tested with induction coils. 

Uranium scrap metal (i.e., croppings) was initially fed into 30-gallon drums for shipment off site, 

but this practice was halted after a fire in Idaho occurred during transportation. The 30-gallon 

drums were loaded into a boxcar for shipment. As the boxcar passed over the mountains in 

Idaho, a fire spontaneously started. The boxcar was burned up and uranium contamination was 

spread throughout the immediate area. Hanford workers had to travel to the location to clean up 

the uranium. After this incident, the railroad would not ship any more uranium oxide scrap. 

Uranium turnings and fine pieces of scrap would spontaneously combust when it was oxidized. 

It became quite a storage problem, so they tried to develop a scrap recovery process. The scraps 
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and pieces that could be collected were converted into oxide at the oxide burner from about 

1946–1948. After a couple of years, it was discovered that putting uranium pieces under oil 

would prevent the uranium oxide from catching fire. As a result, there were only a couple of 

fires per year after the implementation of oil. 

In Building 314, there was also an operation to convert scrap uranium metal to oxide. The 

uranium metal in the form of scrap was heated to about 1,400° F in a furnace for several hours. 

While it was in the furnace, the uranium would oxidize. After the metal was brought up to 

temperature, it was fed immediately through an extrusion press. An 8-in rod was reduced to only 

a few inches (e.g., 2.25 in). On occasion, the material would stall or get stuck in the press. 

Operators used a hack saw to get it out of the press. 

 

When the uranium would oxidize, it would go airborne. The workers were eating and breathing 

the uranium. There was so much dust in the area that it would dim the lights. They did not wear 

respiratory protection at first. After a while, dust masks were provided to the workers. The area 

was so dusty that oxide would settle on the beams supporting the building. This material would 

form pyramids on these beams as high as they were wide. In 1971, experimental extrusions of 

zirconium were conducted in the converted old maintenance building right next to Building 314. 

Workers were told that the exhaust systems were enough to protect them from any harm. 

 

Uranium billets were extruded into rods, annealed after they were extruded, straightened, 

machined into fuel pieces, canned, and the leftover chips from machining were taken care of. 

N-reactor fuel was manufactured in Building 333. The fuel had an inner and outer element (i.e., 

fuel within fuel). N-reactor fuel used a protective zirconium copper-silicon sheathing, which 

enclosed the zirconium uranium billets. The billet was lubricated with water-based graphite and 

oil sprays, then the fuel with surrounding container was pre-heated at temperatures ranging from 

1,180°–1,350° F in a furnace. The uranium was then ready for extrusion. The material was 

removed from the furnace and placed on a loading arm. The uranium billet was extruded into a 

rod and it was cut to length. Acid was used to extract the copper silicon layer from the rod. 

Acid was also used to etch the uranium out on the end, so they could add an end cap. Some 

uranium would etch faster than others. The unit was braised with braise ring to fill the etching 

voids. The end caps were then welded and checked. The unit was then heat-treated, so the fuel 

would relax. Salt baths were used in the fabrication of N-reactor fuel. These baths would make 

the metal relax. If there was warping that could not be straightened, the fuel was discarded. 

Staff did some experimentation on the removal of warps in the fuel, and was eventually able to 

mitigate the warping problem. 

The 300 Area processed natural and low-enrichment uranium for reactor fuels. As a result, there 

was not as much concern about radiation exposure as at other areas of the Hanford site. All 

kinds of uranium (enriched, recycled, and natural) were handled in the same manner. Hands-on 

workers would not have known the difference when processing the uranium. 

The Special Materials Processing group was involved in thorium compaction, which started in 

1972 and continued for about 8 months. Thorium powder was vibrated down into a container 

until the container was full. A cap was then added. They had a hydrogen furnace where thorium 
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was compacted and cintered, so it would not crumble. The thorium compaction was done in the 

metal preparation buildings. There were four metal preparation buildings that were used for 

different purposes. In processing thoria, high levels of radioactive material deposited on the steel 

beams. 

There were some small reactors located in the 300 Area. Building 305 housed a 5-watt reactor, 

which was used for fuel testing and research and development [R&D]. The entire first load of 

aluminum-clad fuel manufactured was tested in this reactor to determine how it would tolerate 

reactor conditions. Subsequently, only some of the fuel was tested. Building 336 had a fullscale sodium reactor mock-up located in the high bay. The operators were trained to use a 

Closed Loop X-Vessel Machine to refuel the reactor. 

Hanford ran special irradiations of samples of all kinds in the early years (e.g., ~1947 to 1950). 

These were taken back to 3706 Building, where they would conduct analyses of the samples. 

Research and Development (R&D) activities were active in Buildings 324, 325, 326, and 327 

that involved multiple radionuclides. Plutonium targets were made in Building 306. Hanford 

made Np-237 and sent it down to the Savannah River Site (SRS) for irradiation and recovery. 

Researchers handled and/or separated all kinds of radionuclides (e.g., fission products). Some 

were brought from offsite and others were used to make up standards. Yttrium was handled and 

purified in the 300 area. 

In the 1970s, workers observed deep orange plumes coming from the stacks of Building 333. 

This was where the low extrusion press was located. 

Single Pass Reactors (SPRs) 

 

There were a total of eight SPRs at Hanford. These included 105-B, 105-C, 105-D, 105-DR, 

105-F, 105-H, 105-KW, and 105-KE. 105-B was the first reactor at Hanford to go critical. 

The Reactor Gas System feeds the helium into the reactor when the reactor is operating to 

redistribute the heat in various sections. Reactor gases are to be distinguished from “noble 

gases,” which are produced in the fission process. After shutdown, oxygen gets into the reactors. 

Nitrogen is used to purge the oxygen from the reactor at start-up. Helium is used to purge the 

nitrogen in the system. The gas building housed the system used to circulate gas through the 

reactor and dry the moisture from the reactor. Reactors were built with a gas atmosphere to get 

the heat out of the graphite. There were silica gel towers in Building 115 that were monitored, 

because they became saturated. These huge tanks were probably about 10-ft high and 8-ft to 

12-ft wide. An operator would take the tower off line and put in the drying material, if there was 

an indication of a plug in the tower. There were three towers on 100B reactor. When a tower 

became saturated, it would be taken out of service and the gel would be replaced. As the reactor 

gases circulated through the reactor, they became activated. 

When there were pipe leaks in the 107 Retention Basin, this would send out steam from highly 

irradiated water, causing a release of noble gases into the basin. Gas releases also occurred on 

the X levels (Experimental Levels) of the reactor. An air sample was taken to determine whether 

the gas was noble gas or reactor gas. Noble gas deposited on the filter, while reactor gas would 
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pass right through the filter. If the air filter indicated a positive count and the decay time was 

about 35 minutes, this would indicate the presence of noble gas. The reactor gas would pass 

right through the filter and no count would be detected. 

Reactor and noble gases were monitored by taking open and closed window measurements with 

a Cutie Pie (CP). With an open window (OW) CP, beta and gamma could be measured. A 

closed window (CW) CP measured only gamma radiation. These measurements were used to 

establish requirements for respiratory protection. If the difference between the OW CP 

measurement and the CW CP measurement was five or more, and the CP needle was wavering 

back and forth, this indicated there was noble or reactor gas present. A surface correction factor 

of 4.5 (rounded to 5) was multiplied by the difference between the OW and CW measurements. 

For example, if the OW was 30 mR/hr and the CW was 25 mR/hour, the exposure attributed to 

noble gas is (30 - 25) * 5 or 25 mR/hour. The storage basin or front face area was put on mask 

when the corrected OW reading reached 25 mR. A canvas curtain was rolled down between the 

reactor and the work area to reduce the gases escaping into the work area. 

Shortly after the 100-B reactor started up (~1946–1947), scientists discovered the graphite was 

growing. 100-B reactor was shut down while 100D reactor experimented with different gases. 

The far side of the graphite moved over so much at the top that there was a heavy neutron beam 

coming out of the reactor. They had to close off that passageway. C-clamps were used to hold it 

and weld it until operations developed a different atmosphere. The gas changed from helium to 

CO2 and helium. The combination of CO2 and helium controlled the growth of the graphite. 

The 100-B reactor was started up again. GE was responsible for changing the gas system in the 

reactors. At one point, the graphite in 105-D was thought to be so bad, they built the 105-DR 

(105-D Replacement) reactor. There were also graphite cracks at 105-F, and there were neutron 

beams penetrating the cracks at 105-D and 105-F. 

In the SPRs, vertical safety rods containing boron were inserted into the reactor from the top. 

Horizontal Control Rods, also containing boron, provided additional control of the reactor flux. 

A third safety system was used at the 105-B, 105-D, and 105-F reactors. There were four tanks 

containing liquid boron adjacent to the reactor. If the other safety systems failed, the liquid was 

released into thimbles to shut down the reactor. During an inspection in the early 1950s, the 

thimbles were found to be corroding. Failure of these thimbles would allow liquid to seep into 

the graphite, so the liquid boron safety system was replaced with the Ball 3X system. The boron 

ball system served as a backup for the control rod system in the reactors. The boron metal balls 

were stored in hoppers and could be released into the reactor if necessary. B, D, and F-reactors 

had 29 ball hoppers (2 inches long by 1.5 inches in diameter). 

Aluminum splines (1/2 in x 1/8 in) were used to adjust the flux in particular hot spots of the 

reactor. The splines had to be pulled out of the front face of the reactor and were dropped into 

the basin when no longer needed. The splines were attached to the spline puller on the elevator. 

A barricade was established to limit access to the area. Operators and support staff would get 

behind the shielding and the splines would be pulled out. Once the splines were removed, they 

would drop down into the C-elevator pit at the front face of the reactor. Occasionally, work had 

to be done to repair control rods. During these jobs, there was a potential for neutron and gamma 

exposure, because individuals were working at the front face of the reactor. 
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Operations would exercise the ball hoppers periodically. They used a vacuum to suck the balls 

out of the reactor. Occasionally, they removed a very radioactive ball (reading up to 

1,000 mR/hour). At this point, they would have to back away and rope off the area. Balls would 

have to be transferred to a cask and removed from the area. Balls that became stuck would 

sometimes be pulled out with the rod. The RM would use a Totem Pole or Teletechtor (Tele) to 

locate the ball; the operators would retrieve the ball with a rod and duct tape, and drop it into a 

lead shield. 

A couple of times a year, starting in the 1950s, individuals would have to enter the area under the 

reactor (i.e., the Ball Room) and shovel up the 1⁄4-in poison balls during outages. They suited up 

in coveralls, leather gloves, a half-face respirator, and shoe covers. Their task was to enter the 

room, shovel material into a bucket, and exit the area. Because of the radiation field present in 

the area, each worker would only be able to shovel 4–5 scoops before they burned out. The 

balls, along with graphite and boron ball dust, would plug the hoses in this area. Workers would 

have to bang the hoses on the floor in an attempt to unplug the hose. The Control Room 

monitored this area remotely, but at one point requested a verification of the readings in this area. 

The dose rate at 3 feet from the hoses containing the balls read 6,000 R/hour with a Teletechtor. 

For this operation, they would borrow individuals from the 300 Area, because there were short 

time limits on entry into this area. These individuals brought their dosimetry with them. Some 

workers remember wearing a job-specific film badge, as well as their routine film badge, for this 

task. This was probably the most radioactive part of the reactor. 

There was an instrument room on the far side of the reactor next to the X-1 area. If leaks or 

ruptures were suspected, this instrumentation would indicate this. It was a qualitative indicator 

of a tube rupture. The system measured the gases from different parts of the reactor. Once a 

leak was identified, the location had to be pinpointed. Rupture recovery involved the recovery of 

affected fuel from the reactor and the aluminum tube. As a result of fuel ruptures, contamination 

was spread to the effluent system and the work area. The fuel swelled up in the aluminum tube 

so much it could not be pushed out. It had to be pulled out of the reactor from the front face or 

the graphite would be damaged. It was messy. This involved short-term work by lots of people. 

Another method to detect possible fuel ruptures was to analyze water samples taken from the A, 

B, and C levels for high radioactivity levels. 

The North and South transfer pits in the basin area were used to facilitate transporting fuel to the 

200 Area. The fuel was moved under water by a monorail system and put into a cask. The cask 

was raised out of the water, surveyed, and loaded into a well car. The well car was able to enter 

the building for loading. 

There were occasions when reactors were modified. Sometime in the 1940s, a crew was asked to 

jack-hammer a big hole through a reactor (not sure which reactor). They dragged some type of 

rod (20-ft long) out into the courtyard and put it in some form of leaded container. This was 

covered with a mound of dirt. Millwrights removed hoppers off the top when the carbon broke 

and put new carbon blocks in at the reactors. 

An effort was made to clean up K-basins in the 1970s. This was a tremendous job involving 

100/300 Area workers for about 3 years. The clean-up was done because the basins were 
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leaking. They circulated the water, removed the filters, washed down the walls, and did other 

general clean-up. The basins were cleaned up to the point where the PPE (personal protective 

equipment) could be downgraded. Around 1983 or 1984, they went to K-West Area and refitted 

it. DOE decided to remove fuel from 100-N basin and store it at the 100-KW basin. 

K-East/K-West Area was clean prior to this. 

In 1975 in the 100-D area, a crew of subcontractors went in and sampled the biological shield 

around the reactor. This required drilling in through the wall. 

When operators were positioning the fuel in the reactor, they used aluminum spacers to position 

the fuel in the graphite center. Those spacers become very hot. If they were recoverable, they 

were taken to the wash pad and cleaned with Turco oxalic acid or nitric acid and used again. If 

they couldn’t be recovered, they were packaged. These packages were put into burial carts and 

moved to the “hot garbage dump” for burial. 

In 1608 Building as a part of a D&D project, workers were asked to remove some old pumps. 

The work had to shut down in the late fall for the winter and resumed in the spring. The fixed 

contamination levels detected in the spring in the pits were about half what they were in the late 

fall when they quit. The 115-D Building was in the process of being torn down in the fall. The 

contractor attached a hose to a fire hydrant to wet the area and keep the dust down. When they 

were finished, they did not get the flange tightened enough and the hydrant leaked. There was an 

underground tunnel that ran from the rear face to the stack area. The water leaked down into the 

tunnel and pulled tritium out of the walls of the concrete. A water sample was collected and 

analyzed. The water contained high concentrations of tritium. There was also a second building 

at 100-D where the rain water had leaked in. This area was also contaminated with tritium. This 

presence of tritium at 100-D was not discovered until the late 1980s/early 1990s. 

Experimental tests were conducted with various fuel elements (which were sometimes called 

metal) in the reactors. Metals tested included U-235, U-238, and tritium (also referred to as “coproduct” or B-metal). These fuel elements would sometimes affect the response of the reactor 

power levels, and adjustments had to be made to start up the reactor. There were three X levels 

in the SPRs. Each level had horizontal holes to test the radiation effect on different materials. 

There was some instrumentation kept here. They used bees wax traps to monitor the effects of 

neutrons. After irradiation, the test fuel elements were removed from the reactor and taken to the 

testing area of the storage basin. The fuel element was cut open. When this was done, bubbles 

of radioactive gas would come up through the water and become airborne. Bubbles were also 

produced when a fuel element developed a pinhole leak in the aluminum can around the uranium 

or tritium. When bubbles were observed, the storage basis was put on mask until the gas cleared 

through the exhaust system. 

One RM recalls working on the X-Level of the reactor on his first day. The Irradiation Test 

Group was pulling a very radioactive sample from the reactor. The sample had to be quickly 

removed and Pb stacked around it to reduce the exposure. Radiation levels were measured in the 

room directly below the floor where they worked. There were some experimental irradiations at 

D-reactor in the late 1940s and early 1950s to support the RaLa project. 
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Building 231 had an area where packaged tritium was stored, awaiting transport by a courier. 

The P-10 facility was highly contaminated with tritium. In the late 1980s/early 1990s, tritium 

became an issue in the 100-B Area when they started to dismantle the 108-B building. As they 

were tearing down where the tritium was being processed, the bioassay samples of the D&D 

workers reached high levels. The RMs could not detect tritium with their portable instruments, 

because tritium had such a low energy that it could not penetrate the windows of the Geiger 

Mueller (GM) probes they were using. DOE stopped work on that building for several months, 

until they got some portable tritium monitoring equipment from Germany. 

The 108-F Building was used for animal experiments on fish, dogs, and pigs. There was a fish 

lab where they diverted process water to expose fish. There was also an outside area used for 

vegetation experiments. There was also a glass blowing shop, where they made the pipettes for 

the various labs. 

The primary concern in the 100 Areas was external exposure. The real hot areas of the reactor 

were the wash pad area, the rear face discharge area of the reactor, and the top of the unit in the 

later years when workers had to vacuum the balls out the reactor. At the power house, the 

hazards were mainly nitric acid and other chemicals. Reactor Operators and support personnel 

worked in different areas of the reactor (e.g., top of reactor, face of reactor, storage basin areas). 

Radiation chambers with alarms were situated throughout the reactor buildings. The alarms 

would sound if the radiation levels were elevated. 

The SPRs were not completely shut down, but were maintained at a subcritical level. The inner 

rod room had higher neutron dose rates than gamma dose rates during reactor operations. For 

example, RMs would get neutron readings three to four times higher than the CP readings. 

Elsewhere in the routinely occupied areas of the reactor, the photon exposure was dominant. 

Although there was typically no entry into this room while the reactor was up and operating, 

there were occasions where it did occur. Access was allowed to the outer rod room when the 

reactor was up. 

Neutron surveys were conducted on a monthly basis and when neutron shielding material was 

disturbed at the reactors. In general, no one was allowed on the top of the unit when the reactor 

was at full power. Survey dose rates were a combination of photon and neutron dose rates, 

unless otherwise noted. 

Neutrons were detected at the front face of the reactor during operations. Neutron dose rates 

extended 30 to 40 feet from the elevator on the front face of the reactor into the work area for the 

SPRs. Depending on the reactor, dose rates ranged 5–10 mR/hour (gamma + neutron) in the 

front face work area. The Operations group prepared fuels for charging in this area a week prior 

to charging the reactor (while the reactor was still operating). They were sent to this area with 

neutron pencils and neutron badges (neutron film badges were not known to be very accurate in 

detecting neutrons in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s). 

The older reactors were notorious for neutron beams through stairwells. Individuals knew where 

to duck to avoid these beams. This was a particular problem at the 100-F Area. These were 

identified with BF3 detectors by RMs. Documentation available indicates that they were looking 
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for neutron leaks in the reactors as early as 1947. Neutron leaks from the reactors were located 

using 14 in x 17 in film. The neutron beams identified were actually crescent-shaped coming out 

of the reactor. 

Several groups may have been interested in neutron energies at the reactors, including the 300 

Area Calibration group, the Health Physics group, and the Irradiation Testing group. They may 

or may not have conducted some studies of neutron energies in the work areas at the reactors. 

Alpha contamination was not of concern and was not routinely checked for at the SPRs, although 

it was possibly present. Skin contamination incidents in the reactor areas were quite common 

during the operation of the SPRs and N-reactor. One activity which led to several personnel 

contamination incidents was the charging of the reactor. While charging and discharging the 

reactor, primary coolant water flowed from the reactor on top of the employees. The water came 

into the front face. When an operator went into the charge-discharge, they had to channel the 

water into the relief riser. If they were not careful, the relief riser would overflow and water 

would fall down on them instead of going into the effluent line. This happened quite often, 

especially with new people. There were times when primary coolant water splashed in the 

worker’s face or made its way inside protective clothing. 

Some Reactor Operators had measurable Na-24 in their in-vivo counts. When asked what the 

source of Na-24 was, a former RM thought the source of Na-24 in reactor workers was due to 

activation of elements in the blood. 

100-N Reactor 

100-N was a cogeneration plant which produced plutonium for weapons and steam for 

electricity. The N-reactor fuel cycle varied with targets being irradiated. During the Reagan 

administration, the N-reactor was shut down for refueling for a period of 7–10 days every 

28 days. There was a time when the reactor was run for 83 days straight, because there was a 

large need for electrical power. This took precedence over the need for plutonium. Twentyeight full-power days made for optimum weapons-grade plutonium production. The 100-N Area 

storage basin was different from other reactor storage basins, because it could store fuel cans 

stacked three high in the basin. When the reactor was shut down, the N-reactor fuel was 

transferred to the 100-K Area. 

Reactor Operators were responsible for the valving of the reactor, charging and discharging of 

fuel, and maintaining the storage basin. Maintenance, laborers (including subcontractors), RMs, 

and other support staff were also involved in charging and discharging fuel. Contractors such as 

J.A. Jones and Kaiser supported fueling and maintenance of the reactors. 

To charge the reactor, the operator had to enter the Valve -11 and Valve -12 pipe space. They 

would turn down the flow to Valve -11, go to the opposite side of the reactor, and turn down the 

flow to Valve -12. In order to access the pipe space, the operator would have to go in through 

the bottom and come out through the top. Both of these areas were high radiation areas, so they 

would run out of allotted dose. Entry into this area did not typically require respiratory 

protection. The caps on the front and rear face of the reactor were loosened. A tip-off was 
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added to the rear face of the reactor. The old fuel was pushed out, while the new fuel was 

pushed in. The caps were replaced after the reactor was charged. 

At 100-N, the protective equipment for charging the reactor included a face shield, British 

leggings (i.e., rubber boots), a poncho, and rubber gauntlets (i.e., elbow-length gloves). The 

gauntlets were taped to the raincoat. While charging and discharging the reactor, primary 

coolant water flowed from the reactor on top of the operators. There were times when primary 

coolant water splashed in their face or made its way into their sleeves. In the mid-1980s, a 

requirement for use of full plastic hoods (similar to the MSA hoods used at K-basins now) was 

implemented for skin contamination control. This reduced the number of skin contaminations at 

100-N. 

When the cooling water left the N-reactor or its basin, it was sent to a crib or trench. The soil 

was supposed to keep radionuclides from going to the ground water. The reactor leakage rate 

was approximately 125 gallons of water per minute. The older of the two cribs became 

saturated, requiring a new crib to be opened. 

When a skin contamination occurred, the workers typically decontaminated themselves. The 

RM had the workers go to the decontamination shower or sink (e.g., at the zero foot at 100-N) to 

do this. At times, it would take multiple washings. 

According to RadCon procedures, the area was washed three times with soap and water as a first 

attempt at removal. If this did not work, potassium permanganate and sodium bisulfate were 

tried. In some cases when this didn’t work, the area was covered with a glove or plastic and the 

contamination was allowed to decay, or the individual was allowed to sweat the contamination 

off. This approach required approval from the Radiation Monitoring Supervisor or the Analyst. 

The D Machining room (off the D-elevator) was where maintenance and decontamination of 

valves and other reactor parts was done. Operators would decontaminate these items to reduce 

the exposure others received. These shops were considered hot. The Ball Drier Room (100-N) 

was an area in the reactor where the Samarium balls were washed and dried. The Gas Drier 

Room (100-N) contained driers that dried the helium prior to circulating it through the graphite. 

The N-reactor was used to produce isotopes for hospitals. Scientists at Battelle would send 

samples to N-reactor to be irradiated in a special tube. These were irradiated for minutes to days, 

removed from the reactor, and placed in a pig for transport. Lithium targets were used to 

produce tritium at the N-reactor. The inner rod had to be separated from the outer rod and sent 

back to Oak Ridge for tritium recovery. By the time it reached Oak Ridge, much of the tritium 

had dissipated. Tritium was also produced as a byproduct of water passing through the reactor. 

There was a tritium monitor in place from 1978–1987 at N-reactor, which could detect tritium in 

the air at the pick-up chutes. This was the only place where an airborne tritium monitor was 

used. 

The graphite at the top of the 100-N reactor was expanding. As a result, a portion of the graphite 

was removed from the reactor in approximately 1983. This expanding affected the fuel canals in 

this area of the reactor, so only the smaller fuel rods could be used. 
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If a fuel rupture was detected, the reactor was shut down and cooled down to about 100 degrees 

and operators would go into Zone 1 to make preparations to discharge the ruptured fuel, 

normally between 8 to 12 hours after shutdown. This time period was shorter than during 

normal refueling entry of 3 to 4 days and did not allow the ambient temperatures to cool down. 

These conditions caused the face shields to fog up, so the tendency of operators was to raise the 

shield or tip their head so they could see. 

As with the SPRs, the primary radiological concern at 100-N reactor was external exposure. 

Activation products were one source of exposure. Originally, samarium oxide balls were used in 

the N-reactor. The activation of these balls was producing a lot of radioactive europium, so they 

were replaced with boron carbide balls to fix this problem. To harden the seats on some of the 

valves, stellite was added. This became activated, producing a Co-60 source term. Other nontraditional sources of exposure at 100-N included a Cf252 source used for conducting irradiation 

experiments, and painting the Golf Ball (i.e., tank). This held contaminated water, which gave 

off considerable radiation. The Painters who periodically had to repaint the tank picked up 

significant dose from this work. 

A number of workers expressed concern about receiving higher doses at N-reactor. Larger doses 

were received during certain reactor activities over short periods of time (e.g., charging and 

discharging, entry into the Ball Room). For example, one contractor employee received 

800 mrem for 3 days. There was a Ball Washer Room where the samarium balls were washed 

with solution. The radiation exposure was so high that the workers were limited to less than 

5 minutes in the area, so they would not exceed their 300 millirem for the week. There were 

people lined up outside the room to run in and out to complete jobs in this area because of the 

limited time an individual could be in the area. There was also a potential for internal exposure. 

One interviewee who worked with the construction contractor reported that he pulled the air 

breathing equipment off and the contamination got all over him while working at 100-N. If an 

individual was at a lower exposure level prior to very hot jobs, they were used on these hot jobs. 

Supervisors did “catch up” on the other guys, because they needed to tap everybody, so that no 

one would be over the exposure limits. 

Alpha contamination was not initially a concern at 100-N; however, this changed when alpha 

contamination was discovered in a sample of mud at the horse trough area (10–20K dpm). The 

RMs waited for 3 days for the area to be cleaned up; then when nothing was being done, the 

DOE Radiation Protection Manager was informed. The following day, J.A. Jones was sent out 

to cover the area with clean soil. When they performed surveys (around 1986 and 1987) in the 

transfer area of the storage basin at 100-N, it was common to check contamination with both 

beta/gamma and alpha survey instruments. If alpha contamination was discovered, entry into the 

area required respiratory protection. Collection of smears in this area was difficult, as there was 

a lot of moisture around and RMs were told to take dry smears to prevent alpha shielding. This 

was in contrast to FFTF, where RMs were told to take wet smears to better pick up Cs-137 

contamination. 
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Fast Flux Test Facility Production and Radionuclides 

Westinghouse Hanford came to Hanford in 1970, primarily to design and operate FFTF. The 

reactor was under construction by the mid-1970s. It had been designed as a larger facility. 

Political wrangling had reduced the budget and had pushed the design to a smaller physical 

facility; some aspects of construction had to be scaled down, though the reactor was still the 

same size. FFTF started up in 1982 and shut down in 1992. It operated for 10 very productive 

cycles. Westinghouse Hanford remained until they lost the contract in 1996. 

The reactor had specific experimental programs designed for testing parameters (e.g., thermal 

decay tests, reactor safety systems). The mission was to test the fuels, materials, and 

components to make an inherently safe breeder reactor. FFTF was not a breeder reactor itself. 

As a result, the fuel change frequency for the reactor varied (both short and long time periods) 

based on the test. FFTF would run at full power and then turn off the reactor to test the decay 

constants of the reactor and safety systems. The reactor had reflectors (composed of primarily a 

nickel alloy) to prevent the neutrons from leaving the reactor. This created a harsh neutron 

environment in the core. There was some activation of the nickel components in the reactor. 

FFTF did not use blanket assemblies. 

FFTF was designed such that the flux could be shaped any way they wanted it. This meant they 

were capable of creating unusual radionuclides that could not be produced in water-cooled 

reactors or in accelerators. FFTF did not produce large quantities of isotopes, though they tried 

towards the end of the project to convince the DOE that they could be an income-producing 

aspect of the department’s program. Politics indicated that this was not to be the case. The U.S. 

is [now] lacking in fast neutron facilities, requiring us to get medical isotopes created from fast 

flux internationally. At one juncture, staff was able to show that there are 22 isotopes that 

required a fast neutron flux, such as that at FFTF, for production. DOE did not accept this as an 

adequate justification for keeping FFTF operating. It was shown that with contracts with other 

countries and U.S. sale of isotopes, FFTF could meet 75% of the operating budget. DOE 

indicated that the facility had to be fully self-sustaining, though this requirement has not been 

imposed on any other facility in the DOE during its history. 

FFTF supplied several isotopes, especially alpha emitters that were used for a couple of 

brachytherapy experiments. The push was to identify specified energy alpha emitters that had 

short half-lives and could deliver a great deal of energy to a very limited area of tissue. 

Copper-67 was being used in human breast cancer trials. The breast cancer tests were showing a 

great deal of promise, but this method of treatment had to be shut down, because there was no 

reliable source of the radionuclide. FFTF produced very small quantities of gadolinium (pCi), 

which were shipped to a children’s hospital. They had a premature infant [preemie] that had a 

severe malformation. They used the gadolinium to identify the placement of internal organs for 

this preemie. FFTF had a small office that specialized in making sure that short-lived isotopes 

could be transported fast enough to still have enough activity to be of use. 

There was some experimental separations work associated with the Materials Test Assembly. 

FFTF took the precursor materials and shaped the isotope that was wanted. This is not what you 

think of normally. The foil or sample would be removed remotely and sent to the 300 Area for 
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separation in Buildings 324 or 325. FFTF held three international contracts that were voided 

because of the shutdown order. The tests were extensive radiation tests for a potential fusion 

facility for the Japanese. There was some production of lithium targets and some interest in 

producing tritium. 

FFTF did not have the kinds of distinctions that organized labor forces on people. There was a 

dedicated maintenance crew at FFTF. Maintenance and construction workers were unionized, 

but operators were not. At FFTF, the maintenance, crafts, and clean-up crews were a part of 

what FFTF did. There was no major division between job types. The employees at FFTF were 

pretty much a seamless team. Engineers relied on the maintenance people without question, 

because they knew the equipment. Maintenance relied on their engineers when something 

needed to be changed. 

Separations and Tank Farms 

The separations facilities were designed to separate plutonium and uranium. The facilities also 

separated a lot of fission products. Somewhere in the 1960s, Hanford started up fission product 

processing. B-Plant was revamped and new equipment for solvent extraction was put in. 

Strontium (Sr) and Cs heated material in the tanks, causing some waste tanks to boil. They 

wanted to remove the Sr and Cs from the underground storage tanks to make them safer. 

Strontium and Cs capsules were produced and are currently stored in Building 225-B. 

There were a lot of other radionuclides in the waste (e.g., promethium, neptunium, cesium, 

strontium, uranium). During the Cold War, there was an effort to recycle uranium from the 

tanks. This was due to a shortage in uranium supplies. Somewhere it dawned on someone that 

there were thousands of tons of uranium in the underground storage tanks. After all, practically 

all of the uranium used for producing plutonium was discarded as byproducts to underground 

storage in million-gallon tanks. After several years, the uranium solution from early plutonium 

production settled out and deposited a layer of uranium and assorted fission products on the 

bottom of the tanks. The process at 241-UR was to remove the liquid above the sludge (solids) 

and slurry them via high-pressure water streams into a process tank, where acid (nitric) was 

added to the slurry (a mixture where solids are suspended in a liquid). Once the slurry was 

acidified, it was transferred to 221-U as a nitrate, where it was purified. This solution was then 

transferred to 224-U, where it was converted to powder. 

All reactors were beginning to run at higher power levels and produced higher neutrons per gram 

per second of plutonium and higher levels of mixed fission products (MFPs). The high Pu-240 

content from fuel-grade plutonium from N-reactor was responsible for the neutron dose rates 

observed at PUREX. This was especially the case at the mixer dumper and calciner in N-Cell at 

PUREX. There was also Zr and Nb present in N-Cell in 1985. This may have been because of 

the fuel being processed or less than adequate removal of fission products in the process. There 

was about a 200–500 gram hold-up in this area. The plutonium solution known as feed for the 

calciner was analyzed prior to being shipped to PFP. 

Hot Semi-Works was located close to A Tank Farm and down the road from B Plant; it served as 

the test facility for the PUREX process. There were several hot cells in this building. The 
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PUREX maintenance group supported this facility. There were pipefitters, a millwright, a 

supervisor, an RM, and a welder. Instrument and electrical personnel were rotated into this area 

as needed from PUREX. 

The Q-cell at PUREX was used for the production of Np-237. The loadout was monitored with 

alpha instruments for smearable contamination. Cutie Pies were used to determine gamma 

readings next to the bottles of Np-237. The N-cell, Q-cell, White Room, L-cell, M-cell (the 

decontamination cell), and some laboratory areas’ alpha contamination were present. Analysis 

for U-233 took place at the PUREX lab in the late 1960s. 

There were several jobs that resulted in external exposure to separations facility operators. The 

operators working in the processing buildings received the most exposure while sampling in the 

canyons. This was a routine assignment where operators followed strict written procedures and 

used specialized equipment designed to offer maximum shielding to the sampling personnel. 

The operator taking the sample would go to the sample room where the risers were marked at the 

various sampling points. For this operation, individuals dressed out and wore a mask. Most 

samples were taken with a Bayonet. The cap was taken off the process pipe and the sampler 

pushed in to make a seal with the Bayonet. First, you would clear the cup at the bottom of the 

sampler. The pipette had a riser in it and the sample got sucked up into it. Some samples were 

put into pigs (heavy shielded containers). Other samples were put into a stainless steel container. 

When the sampler was full, it was taken to the lab for analysis. 

The primary function of 233-S was the final purification and concentration of plutonium. After 

the REDOX processing, plutonium nitrate was sent to 233-S. The operation was mainly to 

concentrate the plutonium nitrate down to 8 gallons. There were special runs in the 233-S 

Building, which occurred maybe once a year. Workers did not know what they were 

concentrating. The radionuclides used in these runs were referred to by code names, rather than 

their isotopic names. One special run was made to support the Airline Reactor Program (i.e., 

nuclear powered bomber on the drawing boards that could fly for months without refueling). 

This program was eventually scrapped. Neptunium (Np) was also concentrated and sent to the 

SRS. The Np had been separated from the regular process streams. The product was put into 

product cans for shipment. At one point, they were running out of product cans, so management 

directed the operators to overfill the cans. As a result, there were spills of radioactive material, 

which is one source of the hot floor drains. Taking thief samples for laboratory analysis from 

these cans caused additional spills and required the operator to come in closer proximity to the 

product. 

All the process equipment was in the highly contaminated greenhouse. Nobody went into the 

greenhouse normally. One of the ways they controlled the spread of contamination was with the 

air flow. The air flow went from the cleanest areas toward the hottest areas. Neutrons would be 

expected in Building 233-S, where the plutonium solution was concentrated. After 

concentration, the plutonium was shipped to Building 234-5Z. 

One of the upgrades to 233-S was the installation of an Anion Exchange Column during 1961–

1962. This process worked using the same principles as the common household water softener. 

When the solution passed through the column loaded with resins, ion exchange grabbed and held 
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impurities in a solution. This improved the process. An interviewee was assigned to operate the 

Anion Exchange one night. When he relieved the swing shift operator, he noticed that the 

monitoring instrument on the waste stream indicated a malfunction that was trending near the 

limit that required shutting down the process. He went to discuss this with his supervisor. 

Shortly after this, there was what sounded like an explosion that shook the building and blew 

open the instrument doors on the control panel. A fire occurred in 233-S in 1963 destroying the 

anion exchange column. The process was shut down and the Fire Department was called in. 

The next day, the interviewee was the first person sent back into the building to retrieve charts 

from the recording instruments. Note that there is no special shielding in 233-S other than 

Plexiglas, and no leaded glass. It was difficult, because there were no lights. For several 

months, crews worked on cleaning up the mess from the explosion. There was a lot of 

contamination and dust (i.e., 2 or 3 inches deep on the floor). As a result of the fire, the 

plutonium nitrate was converted to plutonium oxide. 

One method used during the clean-up was to fix the contamination in place by painting. 

This became a problem during D&D of the facility, because the paint was flaking off and it was 

a horrible mess to try to clean up. The steam line in 233-S was supposed to be a clean line; 

however, 17 million disintegrations per minute were detected with an Eberline E600 meter with 

smart probes. There were areas where smearable alpha contamination was so high it could not 

be quantified with the alpha meter. 

The 222-S Building is the principal laboratory for the Hanford site. Chemical Technicians 

perform a variety of analyses (e.g., gamma energy analysis, alpha energy analysis, 

thermogravimetric analysis, Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectroscopy, Emission 

Spectrometry, plasma coupling) using various instrumentation. They handled radioactive 

material (e.g., plutonium, americium, mixed fission products, thorium, neptunium, uranium) in 

all forms (i.e., gas, solids, liquids). Laboratory workers handled thorium as a liquid. They 

handled Sr and Cs as powders and liquids in Hot Cells. Several dilutions were made from 

samples and analyzed in open-faced hoods. A majority of the material handled at the 222-S 

Laboratory was MFPs. The lab was involved in analyses on mice, crows, snakes, and other 

animals. They were also responsible for the evaluation of environmental samples. Laboratory 

personnel also make standards. There were a multitude of standards that were stored in the 

Standards Lab (Room 1G Section), including plutonium, thorium, strontium, uranium, and 

cesium standards. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) standards were prepared in this room. 

In 1979, 222-S Laboratory analyzed some thorium nitrate for the purpose of disposal. There 

were some outside underground tanks of thorium nitrate at the east end of U Plant. Thorium in 

these tanks was left over from the thoria runs conducted in the late 1960s. Samples were 

collected from the tanks and brought to the 222-S Laboratory. Aliquots of the samples were 

taken, and destructive analysis was run on the aliquots. The 222-S Laboratory also did Pm-147 

analysis in the 1960s and worked on several different types of fission products. There was a 

shed on the east side of 222-S that was contaminated by Pm-147. There may have been a spill. 

The primary contaminated areas at 222-S were in the hoods and the hot cells. Other areas of the 

lab were generally clean. In the 1940s, the contractor was worried about what the lab workers 

would be exposed to in the 222-T and 222-B labs. As a result, they would put mice above the 
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heads of the workers, but they did not tell the workers why the mice were there. They recalled 

mice changed out from time to time. Interviewees indicated that documents on this are likely 

buried. 

Some operations at the laboratory took place on a bench top, such as cleaning sample containers. 

The liquid would be vacuumed by the use of a steam jet out in a hood. If the reading was less 

than 5 mR/hour, they were manually deconned with solvents like acetone, etc., in the open air 

and not in a fume hood. 

Other facilities mentioned by interviewees included the 242-S Evaporator Facility, which started 

up in 1972, and the 242-A Evaporator Facility, which started up in 1976. At 242-T Evaporator, 

they started bringing plutonium in to mix with the material being evaporated. The waste may 

have come from 234-5Z. This was not done for long, because facility management was told it 

was not a good idea. After they abandoned the evaporator idea, the waste was sent to the tanks. 

Tank Farms 

A tank crew consisted of 12–15 individuals, including an RM, two riggers, a crane operator, 3–4 

operators, an electrician, and a pipefitter. This crew was responsible for changing jumpers on 

diversion boxes, as well as cleanup and installation of equipment. The diversion box had several 

pipes coming off of it, which could direct flow to particular tanks. Jumpers were nozzles with 

heads that were used to control the flow direction of waste to the tanks. In order to change a 

jumper, a crane was used to move the heavy blocks off the tank. The old jumpers were removed 

and the new jumpers put in place. Some of the diversion boxes were on top of the tanks and 

some were located off by themselves. These nozzles had to be replaced whenever they failed. 

Operators sometimes took samples from the Tank Farm liquids using a 4-ounce bottle tied to 

string with a rock fastened to the bottle for weight, and a mark was made on the string to indicate 

the depth of the sample. The workers suited up in PPE and a respirator. The bottle was lowered 

into the tank to the marked area on the string. Once they reached this point, they pulled the 

bottle out and put it into a plastic bag. Samples were sent to the analytical lab. Both 200W and 

200E had their own laboratory. The people working in the labs got a lot of radiation exposure. 

Scavenging was the earliest process done on the tanks. Chemicals were added to the tanks and 

they were sparged. This caused the sludge to precipitate out. Operators pumped the supernatant 

out and into an open ditch across the street 4-ft deep and 60–100 ft long. On graveyard shift in 

the 200 East Area, workers were doing a scavenging job. They had installed a pump that had a 

floating suction on it, so it floated in the liquid above the level of the sludge. They pumped the 

supernatant. The dose rate on the sludge caused the CP against the line to go off scale. The 

pump was immediately shut down. The content of the pipe was uncertain. The whole system 

was back-flushed into the tank. 

The Saltwell systems were used to pump all the liquid out of the tanks, except for a small part at 

the bottom. The liquid seeped into the tank and was pumped out slowly. That left a cake in the 

tank. The site is now sluicing all the cake out. A lot of the tank content is like peanut butter 

consistency, sometimes making it difficult to get the stuff out. 
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One of the tasks at the Tank Farms was to load out ball-shaped casks for shipment. Workers 

would hook up polyethylene tubing to the cask and the tank. The waste was jetted out of the 

tanks, filtered, and put into the cask. At 50 feet, the CP would go off scale. They used a crane to 

load the cask onto a railcar. One could always tell when they had a train shipping this material. 

It was so hot that in the winter, all the snow would melt around it for 100 feet. Some of this 

material was sent to New Mexico and some back east. It was always top secret. Workers did not 

know exactly what was going on. Although they had to fill the casks, they had no idea what 

material it contained. Someone was separating whatever they were looking for out of this waste. 

It was a challenge to remove the polyethylene tubing. It had to be cut after it was flushed out. 

When they handled the tubing, they used tongs and stayed at least 3 feet away, because of the 

dose rate. Workers put the tubing in plastic bags and put it in the burial ground. The tubing was 

disposed of and new tubing used each time. This cask loading was done several times a year. 

Tank Farms workers were aware of potential exposure from alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. 

They were not concerned about the alpha exposure, because the beta and gamma exposures were 

so much higher. There were various locations at the Tank Farms where the dose rates were very 

high. For example, when pumps on the tank were damaged, an entry was made into the area to 

replace the pump. This had to be done somewhat remotely, because the dose rate was too high 

adjacent to the pump area. To avoid overexposure, workers were not allowed to work very long 

in these areas. The operators that worked in the Tank Farms and those that ran the cranes and the 

pumps, lifting material up and putting it into plastic bags, got a lot of radiation—more than those 

who took the samples. Work on diversion boxes at the Tank Farms resulted in as much radiation 

as any place. Employees papered the areas around the boxes, and then took the blocks off. 

Since the area was very radioactive, staff used mirrors to guide the work while maintaining some 

distance from the source. 

Timekeeping was used in the Tank Farm areas where dose rates where particularly high. The 

RM measured the dose rate (R/hour) and provided this to the timekeeper. The timekeeper had a 

clipboard with the names of the people on the job. The timekeeper calculated how long the 

person could be in the area and receive only the allotted daily dose or weekly dose. If they 

reached the dose limit, they could not go in for the rest of the week. The timekeeper told 

individuals the number of minutes they were allowed in the areas and notified them when they 

were to come out. Respiratory protection was required when the diversion boxes were opened. 

There was a great deal of public concern about the Tank Farms. Many people have heard, 

wrongly, that Hanford is the most contaminated place on earth. When the Single Shell Tanks 

were built, designers did not expect them to remain reliable for 25–30 years. Some of the tanks 

developed leaks over time; however, the contents of the Single Shell Tanks were moved to 

Double Shell Tanks. An effort was made to flag fugitive waste areas. There were quite a 

number of these areas at the Tank Farms. 

 

In 1975 at the 241-T Farm in 200-W, a crew helped a contractor drilling test wells to see if some 

of those tanks were proven leakers. Near 109 Tank, they got down to 92 feet. An acute 

exposure was received by one worker from sitting on the ‘clam-shell’ casing trying to break the 

sample free from it. He was told some minutes later into this activity that the CP (located about 

10–15 feet from the worker) was reading the maximum dose for that instrument at the highest 
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scale. Since his instrument was already reading at the maximum dose at this distance, the RM 

could not survey the sample itself. The RM advised the workers to get the entire sample and 

‘drill’ clam-shell into the 55-gallon lead-lined drum they had about 30 feet from the tent they 

were working in. The workers were told the sampling was complete after this. After that, they 

stopped all drilling at the tank farm. 

 

The Tri-City Herald reported that absolutely no tanks had leaked contents into the ground at 

Hanford, which many interviewees believed to be a complete fabrication. Last summer (2007), 

the local newspaper shared the fact that the Tank Farm was being covered over with an 

impermeable layer to keep the site’s most serious tank leak from migrating further into the 

ground, which seemed to support the interviewees’ position on this issue. Reflecting on the 

fabrication that leaks had not occurred at Hanford Tank Farms, it is easy to recognize the danger 

that fraudulent practices have placed upon the health of workers. The workers involved 

questioned whether Hanford was being truthful to the workers, since they were not truthful to the 

public. 

Apparently during the well drilling activities with Hatch Drilling, who was subcontracting under 

J.A. Jones during the 1970s, workers were not made aware of the potential for finding 

contamination [due to leaking tanks]. Radiation Monitors did not provide continuous coverage 

during the sampling, and there was no follow-up in terms of bioassay or additional monitoring to 

the workers’ recollection in this situation. The site did not think these workers were at high 

enough risk to warrant extra monitoring. 

When asked what types of materials were buried at the burial grounds, one interviewee replied, 

“Why not ask me what wasn’t buried out there?” Burial goes back all the way. In 1943, the site 

buried the stuff from the mess halls and construction. At that time, there was an uncontaminated 

burial ground a mile long and half a mile wide. The original settlers had the burial grounds. 

Hanford workers buried oil, chemicals, tons and tons of aluminum spacers, and a lot of lead. 

Contaminated trucks and tractors involved in rupture recovery became impossible to clean up 

and were buried. Plenty of contaminated clothing was buried. We have radiation boxes that 

were put in trucks to be thrown into the burial ground. The radiation boxes were cardboard 

boxes with a radiation sign on the side. 

Plutonium Finishing Plant 

234-5Z goes by several names, including Z-Plant, Plutonium Finishing Plant, PFP, Dash 6 or the 

Silver Place. Plutonium came into 234-5Z from 231-Z as a liquid. On the Rubber Glove (RG) 

line, and later the Remote Mechanical Control (RMC) line, it was siphoned into platinum boats. 

The material was about the consistency of mud. The material was then put into a furnace to dry 

the material to powder. Operators periodically checked the material during the drying process. 

The dried powder was pink in color. This powder was placed into a bomb, along with a sodiumcontaining compound, and the bomb was bolted shut. The bomb was put into a furnace and the 

powder was reduced to a metal button. As the process continued, the product was passed down 

the line from one hood to the next. These operations ended somewhere around 1988 to 1990. 
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While Hanford was processing weapons cores, they had an inspection protocol, which required 

an individual to view the item under a microscope. The dose to the eye could have been high 

and was dependent on whether the piece was coated or not. This practice began in July 1949 and 

was continued into the 1950s. They changed the final inspection process in the early 1950s and 

eventually built a final inspection wing. The new process was less hands-on. 

No enriched uranium was handled at PFP. Depleted uranium in the form of powder was 

analyzed in Room 156, Analytical Lab, from ~1985 to early 1990s. The manager of fabrication 

would not let uranium in his production areas in PFP. The people who worked with enriched 

uranium would be those at 231-Z. One interviewee thought he may have worked with thorium in 

a special room at 234-5Z. There were operations in the PFP complex that involved handling of 

high-fired plutonium oxide. 

The RG line was not well shielded and lead aprons were not worn during the 1950s at 234-5Z. 

The gloves in this line were not originally lead lined, but were made of rubber. The RG line is so 

named because rubber gloves were used in this line. Lead-lined gloves were added to some of 

the hoods later. Workers received exposure up to their shoulders when working in a glovebox. 

Shielding on the hoods was limited to the structural material of the hood (i.e., stainless steel). 

With the implementation of the RM line, there was improved shielding. Lead-lined gloves were 

introduced at the time. The thickness of the gloves varied over time. 

Hood #8 of the RG line was the worst of the hoods to work with along the line. This is where 

the liquid material was reduced to a powder. The radiation levels around this hood were high, 

including neutron dose rates. The dose rates at each of the hoods, including neutron 

measurements, were made periodically (i.e., more than once per year) by RMs. Hood #9 was 

also specifically mentioned as a particularly hazardous hood. 

Radiation Monitors were responsible for obtaining dose rate readings for the timekeeping cards. 

Dose rates were generally taken at the same location each time on the hood face. When 

timekeeping was used, there was typically an RM there to cover the job. There were only a 

couple of steps where the neutrons were bad. Early in the oxidation process, there were neutron 

issues (i.e., Room 228). 

Personnel tried to be as safe as possible in those days. Initially, individuals were supposed to 

rotate through the various stations in the process. The company found it more productive to use 

the same individual at a particular station. As Operators became experienced with the work, they 

would cut corners at times. 

In the 1940s, Building 231-Z concentrated and processed the plutonium nitrate from the 

separations facilities. There was an operation where plutonium nitrate cans were emptied back 

into the system at PFP and cleaned. Workers took scraps of plutonium and burned them back 

into powder. The Plutonium Recover Facility (PRF) was responsible for pulling the plutonium 

out of the waste until 1987. Other activities at the PFP complex included washing contaminated 

clothing [laundry], area decontamination, maintenance, an analytical lab, and other general 

support. 
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The HPT office was located in the old Recuplex area after it had been cleaned up. The company 

had put up a false ceiling. Contamination existed above this false ceiling, which fell on someone 

and contaminated them. Things were done differently when the facility was in operation than 

after it was shut down. Today, they are more prone to post an airborne area and put it on mask 

than historically. 

Decontamination and Decommissioning 

The Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of 233-S began in about 1999 or 2000. To 

work in this facility, workers received a full day’s facility-specific training. The primary 

radiological hazards in Building 233-S were Pu-239, with some Am-241 in some areas. During 

removal of the pipe trench, there were some discussions about Cm-244 and Np-237. There were 

no discussions concerning the presence of tritium or thorium. Thorium would be secondary to 

the plutonium and would not be a concern. The radioactive material in this facility was flighty 

during D&D, and went all over the place. The Radiological Engineer had some particle size 

studies completed. The radiological conditions at 233-S were like the side of PFP where they 

made buttons, and there was oxidized stuff. 

Construction laborers in the 300 Area were responsible for digging trenches, tearing out building 

structures (i.e., floor tiles, ceiling tiles, stucco walls) and equipment, and modifying or adding to 

existing contaminated equipment. This included laboratory facilities. Sometimes there was 

residual stuff and salt stains on walls. Much of what they were doing was new work. In about 

the mid-1970s, they were digging a 31⁄2-ft deep hole. They were told if you find a 10-in long and 

2-in round object, contact the HPT immediately. Apparently Hanford use to throw fuel slugs in 

the surrounding area. The workers appreciated being made aware of this potential hazard, which 

was not always the case at Hanford. Those involved did not follow up or ask questions, because 

people that did that ended up in the unemployment lines. 

The Hanford structure for decommissioning and excessing material was not the easiest thing to 

control. Rockwell had the responsibility for excessing and salvaging material. UNC had 

responsibility for safety during their tenure. This made ensuring safety difficult. 

Radiological Control 

The RMs in earlier years served as Safety Engineers, which meant they had responsibilities other 

than taking radiation measurements. The RMs had the authority to shut down jobs for safety 

reasons, although they were not always successful. In the early years, particularly in the 300 

Area, interviewees didn’t recall a routine presence by RMs in the area, or routine air sampling. 

The number of RMs at Hanford increased over time, providing better coverage. For example, at 

FFTF, it was not uncommon to have step-off pads staffed by at least two RMs in almost any 

contaminated area that was marked. Most of the RMs operated in specific areas of the site, so 

they became familiar with the specific equipment in the buildings. 

Not all Hanford contractors implemented the same rigor in the radiation safety program. For 

example, operations at PFP appeared tightly controlled to some workers, whereas Bechtel 

Hanford, Inc., seemed more lax in the implementation of their RadCon program. Personnel with 
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experience from the Nuclear Navy were brought in starting in the late 1970s. There were a lot of 

changes made in the RadCon program (e.g., initiation of sign-in sheets for Special Work 

Permits). 

The workers were sometimes cavalier in terms of exposure to others. There was one instance in 

about 1983 or 1984 where some workers from the 200 Area made a bad decision not to obey the 

postings. Individuals at the Tank Farm near one of the processing buildings decided not to 

follow the posting. The area was posted as a contamination area, which was not unusual for 

Hanford. For some reason, the workers took down the posting for a short period of time. This 

did not pose an immediate threat. An occurrence report was written related to this. For the most 

part, the work force was aware that they needed protection. 

Compared to dosimetry in the 1950s, by 1990, the site was eons ahead. By the mid-1970s and 

1980s, worker monitoring and protection were good. RadCon documented everything in later 

years, and people wore their dosimetry. The Lead Health Physics Technician was assigned to 

the desk to maintain logbooks of daily activities. Whenever there was a suspected intake, 

individuals were sent for a chest count. Individuals were asked to submit urine and/or fecal 

samples. Radiation monitoring in general improved as time went on. There were better 

radiation detection instruments, finger rings, etc. 

The Neut was the first neutron detection instrument used at Hanford, starting in approximately 

1949. A few months later, the BF3 neutron detector was introduced. That detector was used bare 

or with paraffin moderators. It could distinguish slow, intermediate, and fast neutrons. The 

portion of slow, intermediate, and fast neutrons varied depending on the location in the reactor. 

Health Physics implemented the Snoopy detectors (originally known as the Depanger 

instrument) in the early 1960s. This unit measured the total neutron dose rates, rather than 

discriminating by energy. 

In the 1950s–1970s, alpha monitoring for smearable contamination was detected by cart Poppies. 

These units had no visual readout, so the measurements were determined by listening to the 

frequency of pops the unit made. There were portable sources attached to the cart Poppy on a 

rotating device, which had various activities (500 dpm, 1,000 dpm, 5,000 dpm, etc.). The RM 

would memorize how many pops were associated with the different source activities. The Poppy 

had a minimum detectable activity of about 500 dpm. At this level, the sound was barely 

detectable. As the activity increased, the number of pops increased. The dial of the cart Poppy 

would go somewhere between half and full scale with each pop. At an activity of 40,000 dpm, 

the Poppy would be continuously popping. Radiation monitoring also had portable Poppy 

meters, where measurements were determined by the number of pops. A source of known 

activity was placed underneath the probe of the alpha instrument to determine the number of 

pops for that activity. The number of pops measured in the field was compared to the number of 

pops obtained from the source to determine the alpha activity. In the mid-1970s, the site 

obtained portable alpha meters with a visible readout. 

Instruments were well maintained throughout the site. If calibrations were done properly, the 

measurements could be trusted. Many were taken back to the shop and/or to Battelle for 

calibration, including the Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs). An automatic recall system was put 
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in place over the years that indicated which instruments were due for calibration. The calibration 

was done right in the shop every 1–12 months, depending on the instrument. The frequency was 

based on the unit’s history. Technicians at Battelle claimed the Eberline Alpha CAMs were 

greater than 10% efficient. Instrument Technicians indicated they were borderline and weren’t 

really that good of an instrument; they measured only gross contamination. In later years, they 

had all kinds of problems with the alarms from the instruments that were monitoring the air. If 

an alarm went off, Radiation Monitoring would survey individuals with a GM counter and would 

find nothing. The beta gamma units were pretty reliable. 

There were originally alpha stack monitors on process farms and in process buildings as a part of 

the Air Quality Unit. The monitors were put on top of the tank or in a small housing in later 

years. 

Engineering controls of various types, including fume hoods, gloveboxes, and ventilation, were 

used to control radioactivity. There were all kinds of restrictions for preventing plutonium from 

getting into your body. Mouth pipetting was not allowed in laboratories. Administrative 

controls, such as limiting time in high radiation areas, were employed to reduce exposure. In 

order to clearly identify contaminated tools, they were sprayed with purple and orange paint. 

These were left in the radiation zone. 

Different protective clothing was required in different areas. In the separations areas, there were 

very strict requirements as to how workers dressed. Some jobs only required a lab coat and shoe 

covers as protective clothing. Some jobs required coveralls and assault masks. Some jobs 

required air masks or a Self Contained Breathing Apparatus. At the Hot Semi-Works building, 

workers made hot cell entries. In order to make these entries, they put on plastic suits that 

looked like space suits. They had air attached to them and a source of cooling. Respiratory 

protection was worn at 234-5Z when a room became contaminated or when components of the 

hood (e.g., gloves) were changed. When entries were made into the greenhouse area of 233-S, 

employees wore a bubble suit with supplied air. 

In the 1960s and 1970s in the 200 Area, the smearable contamination criteria on jobs being 

performed in certain locations were not as clear as they could have been. These levels were used 

to determine when respiratory protection was required (when the area went on mask). This could 

be at the discretion of the RM. For example, one RM would require an assault mask at 

5,000 dpm/100 cm2

 alpha and another RM would require them at 3,000 dpm/100 cm2. The 

smearable limits were different, depending on the building worked in and the RM on the job. 

For beta/gamma smearable contamination, the RM would put a work location on mask when the 

removable beta contamination was 3,000 dpm/100 cm2

 at PUREX, but at B-Plant, the RM did 

not require a mask until the smearable beta/gamma contamination reached 10,000 dpm/100 cm2

. 

Smearable contamination limits at each building were defined by the local area monitor or 

supervisor. These could also be different, depending on which RM was monitoring the job. 

Currently, any detectable alpha smearable contamination would require an area be put on mask 

and would not have to reach a predetermined level. 

The original criteria at the reactor for requiring assault masks for airborne contamination (based 

on Sr-90) was 1.0E-9 μCi/cc, based on an 8-hour work day. Since the radiation level on the rear 
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face of the reactors would only allow a person to work for 1 or 2 hours, a radiation analyst tried 

to increase the efficiency of the worker by not having them work in a mask. There was a legal 

sentence in the regulations that would allow a person to work a short time in a higher airborne 

concentration level without a mask, as long as it was for an hour or two. This resulted in several 

(at least 4–6) people receiving a small amount of nasal contamination (200–300 c/m above 

background). The RMs started to perform nasal irrigation on the maintenance personnel 

themselves, rather than send them to the nurse (which was a customary practice). As the number 

of nasal contaminations increased, it became necessary for the RMs to send them to the nurse, 

due to lack of RM manpower. This overwhelmed the nurse with personnel from B reactor, as 

they only had one nurse. Eventually, the workers went back to the normal procedure of wearing 

assault masks when the air sample indicated 1.0E-9 μCi/cc. 

When a positive nasal smear was obtained from a worker, the nose was rinsed to flush out the 

contamination. Nasal irrigation in the 200 Areas was typically done by the RMs. In the case of 

the reactor areas, nasal smears were collected if contamination was identified around the nose. 

Facial contamination would occur when individuals were splashed with coolant water. For 

situations where there was contamination around the mouth or a positive nasal smear, special 

bioassay sampling was done. This could be urine and/or fecal sampling. 

Alpha contamination spreads at PFP usually involved bag ruptures, pinhole leaks in some of the 

rubber gloves, or other leaks in the hoods. There were 200 or 300 fixed air head samplers and 

CAMs at the PFP facility. About 50% of these samplers were CAMs. They were changed out 

weekly by one person who did the job full time. There were air samples collected and analyzed 

in other 200 Area facilities for beta/gamma and alpha contamination. 

In the 1950s, hand and foot counters were introduced in some areas in the 300 Area. If the 

instrument indicated workers had picked up contamination, they simply went to wash the 

contamination off. They were not required to call in an RM when their skin became 

contaminated. There was little concern about skin contamination in the 300 Area where they 

worked with uranium. When individuals with skin contamination did contact the RM, the RM 

tried to decontaminate the individual in the field. 

Radiation Monitors were required to check hands and feet prior to letting workers exit from 

radiological areas at the Tank Farms. Tank leaks were sometimes found as a result of these 

contamination surveys. There were times when contamination was found on PPE. Workers 

would change into clean PPE and re-enter the area to locate the source of the contamination. 

In the 300 Area where they handled uranium, workers did not initially know what a glovebox 

was. After several years (post-DuPont), gloveboxes and hand and foot monitors were installed. 

Workers were told what they were doing was safe and did not question the management when 

they said this. The company provided work shoes, which were changed before workers went 

home. Some interviewees indicated they took a shower and changed coveralls prior to eating 

lunch and leaving for the day. Showering and changing shoes prior to lunch was not the norm. 

Workers were merely told to wash their hands before eating lunch or taking breaks. Many 

workers wore their coveralls into the lunch rooms. Interviewees indicated it was very possible 

uranium was tracked into the lunch rooms, because of the contamination in the area and the 
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practices of many workers. At the 100-KW reactor, operators had a break room located just off 

the rear face of the reactor. 

Radiation Monitoring was responsible for monitoring protective clothing from the laundry. 

Their detection equipment at the laundry was not state-of-the-art. They would check clothing 

and return contaminated clothing to the hampers. The clothes had some defined acceptable level 

of contamination. In some cases, there was even contamination on the inside of the clothing. 

Later, the site switched to plastic disposable Anti-C’s. 

There is a program involved with non-destructive analysis (NDA) of several different kinds of 

sources. This NDA method involves taking a Sodium Iodide (NaI) or Liquid Nitrogen-cooled 

Germanium detector to the field and making predetermined measurements of items. This NDA 

method is a non-invasive procedure that does not require opening up systems or containers. It 

does not involve the use of radiation-generating devices. They measure radionuclide content 

(i.e., U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Np-237, Cm-244, or anything with a 

gamma) of filters, gloveboxes, waste packages, and unknown containers based on customer 

requests. NDA is used a lot to look for transuranics in waste packages prior to shipment of waste 

to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Fixed Germanium detectors are required to meet the 

WIPP and transportation requirements (i.e., 20 nCi/gram). It is a part of the material 

accountability program. Sodium iodide (NaI) detectors are only used for measurement of Pu 

above 0.5 grams. NDA was used after an accident in 1991 or 1992 at 222-S, when they removed 

a glovebox. An analysis of the storage cabinet detected about 0.5 grams of SNM (no particular 

isotope). Although you can assay for thorium with this method, no customers have requested 

analysis for thorium. 

All incoming and outgoing radioactive shipments passed through the 1100 Area. They were 

brought to the transportation lot, where they were surveyed. Radiation exposure in this area was 

limited, but occurred with the receipt and departures of all radioactive material, which included 

alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron shipments. 

Newly hired Separations Operators received a 3-day orientation. They were told not to get 

plutonium on their skin, or inhale or ingest it. Some individuals trained in the Hot Semi-Works 

building when they began separations assignments. 

External Monitoring 

The film badge was described as a piece of dental film with part of it shielded to measure 

gamma. There was also a portion that measured the beta dose. Interviewees actively handling 

radioactive material indicated badges were changed on a monthly basis. A change was made to 

thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), because dosimetry felt these badges were more accurate 

than the film badges. 

There have been several radiation exposure limits implemented at Hanford over time. Workers 

had to keep track of the daily exposures to ensure they did not exceed established limits. The 

weekly limit was set at 300 millirem. Supervisors were allowed to take greater than 

300 millirem/week up to 5.0 rem per year. Any amount over the 300 millirem/week had to be 
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specially approved. Workers at PUREX became concerned and filed a grievance when there was 

talk of increasing the weekly gamma exposure limit from 300 mR/week to 600 mR/week at 

PUREX. There was a contaminated tunnel that operations wanted decontaminated. As a result 

of the grievance, the weekly limit remained at 300 mR/week. 

In 1966, the union went on strike for about 6 weeks. Douglas United Nuclear (the contractor at 

the time) wanted to increase the weekly exposure limit from 300 mR/week to 400–

500 mR/week. The reason was that if they raised the exposure limit, they would not have to hire 

people to keep them under the dose limit. A letter was written to Katherine May [congressional 

representative] informing her of the situation. Ms. May read the letter into the congressional 

record. A response was provided to the sender from Katherine May and the Atomic Energy 

Commission (AEC). 

Hanford workers were allowed to receive 3.0 rem per year (administrative limit), while 

construction workers were allowed to receive 5.0 rem per year, based on the legal limit. The 

original lifetime limit was calculated as (N - 18) * 5, where N is the individual’s age. The 

lifetime dose limit was changed to 1*N in about 1992 or 1993. When the change occurred, at 

least one worker was told he had exceeded his lifetime limit (i.e., he was 61 years of age and had 

received 66 Rem lifetime exposure). As a result, the worker was put on restriction, limiting him 

to work in areas with low or no dose rates. He was not allowed to enter any zones that required 

respiratory protection. 

Film badges were not initially provided to the fuel fabrication personnel until the 1950s. 

Workers generally wore their whole-body dosimeters. There were occurrences where workers 

would take off their badge or wear it inappropriately. People were going to take short cuts and 

they weren’t going to be stopped. There were a number of occasions on the production side of 

things when workers needed to get the job done, so people would put their badge in their back 

pockets. This was either with the consent of management and/or on the workers’ own initiative. 

Some workers may not have worn their dosimetry because they were not allowed to work 

overtime once they reached their radiation exposure limit (i.e., 300 mR/week or 3 Rem/year). 

External dose monitoring was pervasive and fairly rigid at FFTF. There were extensive 

personnel monitoring procedures. Those working with fuel assemblies in the 300 Area had a full 

complement dosimeter. In the 308 and 306 Buildings, they made Mixed Oxide (MOX) powder. 

The individuals having access to those facilities were given full-range dosimeters, including 

Personal Nuclear Accident Dosimeters (PNADs, aka “the death chip”). Most of the individuals 

working at FFTF were monitored for neutrons. 

Personnel monitoring for neutron exposure began in the 1950s, using NTA film badges and 

neutron pencils. Monitoring primarily focused on those individuals who worked in the 

105 Buildings in the 100 Area. The neutron pencils could be distinguished from the gamma 

pencils (black) by their green color. When the workers checked out a green pencil, they also 

checked out a neutron film badge. The neutron film badge and green pencils seldom showed any 

neutron exposure. To track real-time dose, individuals had to sign in and out of the area. 

Personnel neutron monitoring was not accurate until the implementation of the TLDs in the early 
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1970s. There was indication from workers at 234-5Z that neutron exposures were 

underestimated prior to implementation of the TLDs. 

Since the film badges had to be sent off to be read, pencil dosimeters and timekeeping were used 

to supplement film badges or TLDs, providing real-time monitoring. Workers were sent into 

radiological areas with one pencil, or when entering a high radiation area, a pair of pencils. 

There were times when pencil dosimeters were used without the film badge or TLD. The 

reactors and the separations areas used self-reading pencil dosimeters (SRPD) after they were 

implemented in about 1965. The SRPD results for the cycle were used until the monthly badge 

reading became available. At that point, the exposure was based on the film badge. At the 

beginning of a new cycle, the SRPD was used to monitor dose until the next film badge reading 

became available. Electronic dosimeters with alarms were introduced in some areas. 

In the 1980s, when individuals working at the reactors were sent into areas of known neutron 

exposure, the RMs assigned a total dose (neutron + gamma) by multiplying the gamma pencil 

value by 3. This number was based on field photon and neutron measurements. This was done 

to track real-time total dose. 

Timekeeping cards were used by workers to track their exposures. The RM was sent into the 

area to set the dose rate for the job. Some RMs were less thorough than others in setting the dose 

rate. The workers were responsible for filling out these cards, including the in and out time. 

When there was indication that an individual received a high exposure, he would be moved to a 

station with a lower dose rate. Interviewees did not have occasion to compare their estimated 

doses to their actual doses. No one picked up a monitoring instrument without the RM present. 

J.A. Jones, the minor construction contractor, had a Radiation Time Keeper (RTK) (also known 

as Field Assistant) assigned to support them. In the reactor and separations areas, the minor 

construction contractor RTK was responsible for timekeeping records for all construction 

contractors. Sign-in sheets were used to record workers’ names, payroll numbers, and the times 

when they entered and exited the radiological areas. In the SPR reactor rear-face areas, timekeeping machines were used. When an employee reached the daily limit, the individual had to 

leave the area and the timekeeping machine was re-zeroed. If the dollar amount for a job 

exceeded a certain level, a minor construction contractor was brought in to complete the job, 

rather than operations doing it. Being an RTK employee for J.A. Jones required that one 

traveled to areas throughout the 100, 200, and 300 Areas. This included Building 234-5Z, which 

handled plutonium and americium. 

Dosimeter placement has a big role to play in calculating dose. Ideally, the badge was worn in 

the middle of the chest, but until the end of the 1960s, people clipped their badges to their collar 

or around the waist. There were many situations where a higher exposure was received to 

portions of the body that would not be reflected on the badge. As a result, workers question the 

accuracy of the whole-body dosimeter to quantify the highest exposure received to a particular 

location of the body. For example, during the 100K basin clean-up, the lower extremities were 

being exposed to a greater extent than the whole-body. They were not wearing dosimeters on 

their lower extremities, so an attempt was made to calculate the amount of exposure workers 

received. There are no official measurements of the dose workers received to their feet and legs. 
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There were workers involved from the 100 and 300 Areas. It would be difficult to calculate dose 

if the orientation of the individual in the field is unknown. Another example of higher exposure 

to the lower part of the body is when workers conducted jobs on the underground diversion 

boxes. 

The open-faced hoods were lined up along a wall in one room of the laboratories, and the room 

on the other side of the wall had other open-faced hoods in the same arrangement. It could turn 

out that someone was working on the other side of a wall where highly radioactive material was 

handled without their badge. It was not uncommon for people to have high dose items right 

behind them. In the T Plant and B Plant, the trenches inside the canyon ran right at your feet. 

Workers here would have gotten a lot of lower body exposure, particularly when samples were 

being taken on the Canyon floor. 

Dose to the lens of the eye was of concern during some jobs. For example, the PUREX 

operators had safety glasses on while collecting the sample in a sampling cup. A lot of the time 

the operators could not see, so they would look over the top. Their whole-body badge would not 

be in the exposure pathway, whereas their eyes were. It should be noted the REDOX operators 

took samples in a remotely similar fashion; however, due to building design problems that 

caused the air in the sample galleries to have higher than allowed concentrations of radiation, the 

operators wore assault masks, providing the eyes and face with a higher level of shielding from 

beta radiation. 

Much of the work required employees to use their hands, which brought them into closer 

proximity to the source term. The people who were judged to be at risk of exposure were 

provided extremity monitoring. For example, individuals handling unusual materials in 

gloveboxes, working on valves in reactors (particularly 100N), or working in certain areas of the 

Tank Farms were assigned extremity dosimeters. Extremity monitoring was assigned during 

special jobs, but was not used routinely until recently. At times in the early years, reactor 

workers were assigned finger films. Individuals at the Tank Farms could receive about 15 times 

as much exposure to their hands as to their body. 

[Note: SC&A was shown a number of pictures where geometry would affect dose reconstruction. 

For example, a photograph of someone wearing a finger badge facing outward while handling a 

source was shown. This individual should be wearing the finger ring on the inside of the hand. 

A photograph was also shown of three workers wearing their badges on their lapels.] 

Back in the 1970s, employees conducted work in high radiation areas, which was 5 R per hour 

(e.g., inside hot cells). Engineering barriers were required at something more than 5 R/hour to 

limit worker exposure rate. There were situations where workers’ badges were highly exposed 

or overexposed. When the badge numbers came up high, they asked the worker why. 

A number of the couriers responsible for safe and secure transport of nuclear materials had 

overexposed film. Dosimetry would interview personnel when black badges occurred. One 

courier indicated the dose was assigned based on what his coworker received. This happened 

quite often in the 1950s. There were a set of couriers assigned to Hanford, Los Alamos, and Oak 

Ridge. The couriers were AEC workers. 
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In-Vivo Counting 

Whole-body counts were conducted routinely for workers when they worked around radioactive 

material. These were conducted annually or by special request. Some received only whole-body 

counts, while others received both whole-body and chest counts. Several examples are provided 

below. 

Chemical Technician 222-S Annual Chest and Whole Body 

Chemical Technician 234-5Z Annual Chest and Whole Body 

Construction Laborer Rover Annual Whole Body 

Nuclear Engineer FFTF Annual Whole Body 

Reactor Operator 100N/100K Annual Whole Body with Chest Count added later 

It is unclear whether the construction trades received routine body counts or if they were only 

done when an incident occurred. If the whole-body count was positive, individuals would be 

asked to submit bioassay samples. 

The instrumentation used for whole-body counting became more sensitive over time and was 

able to detect smaller uptakes. For example, there is a manager who worked for PFP for 

20 years. His chest count has recently begun to show a positive value for americium. His 

exposure is attributed to chronic exposure, rather than a discrete incident. In more recent years, 

routine annual whole-body counts have been discontinued as a cost savings measure for some 

workers, or as processes shut down. 

In-Vitro Counting 

Hanford has relied on the whole-body/chest counter to identify potential uptakes at many 

facilities. If the count was positive, a urine sample was collected. If there was an incident or 

accident, a bioassay sample was collected. A routine urine sampling program was not in place 

for all workers and has varied over time and by location. Some individuals were aware of what 

the urine samples were analyzed for, while others were not. One interviewee recalled that their 

bioassay samples were analyzed for gross alpha (FFTF). Plutonium bioassay was typical for the 

200 Area. Interviewees did not recall submitting routine urine or fecal samples specifically for 

promethium, thorium, americium, or neptunium. 

Urine sample bottles or ice cream cartons (for fecal sampling) were left at the workers’ 

residences periodically. Interviewees indicated they always remember receiving their sampling 

kits at their residence. Collection of bioassay samples in the 300 Area started very early. Up 

until 1988, PFP workers were asked to submit routine bioassay, including submittal of fecal 

samples. Interviewees mentioned they were typically on a strontium and plutonium (at PFP) 

bioassay program, if they were routinely being monitored. During the K-basin clean-up, no 

bioassay samples were submitted. Interviewees recalled submitting samples as frequently as 

monthly. For facilities in the 200 Area, such as REDOX, routine samples were submitted quite 

frequently. The frequency of sample submittals was reduced over the years. 
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There were individuals submitting routine urine samples in the 1970s/1980s in some areas that 

were really on the fringes of those considered at risk. 

Medical 

The workers interviewed indicated they received annual physical exams, including a complete 

blood work up and collection of urine samples. 

Incidents/Accidents 

Incidents or unusual occurrences are documented in a variety of places. Reports of incidents and 

accidents involving personnel contamination may be found in the individual health physics file. 

Other places where incidents of personnel contamination are documented include the following: 

(1) The survey report of the RM, including contamination levels and/or dose rates 

(2) Progress letters or weekly reports sent to managers summarizing weekly activities 

(3) Monthly reports (i.e., summary of weekly reports) 

The degree of incidents has ranged from incidental skin contaminations to extensive uptakes of 

radioactive material. Hanford also had two criticality accidents. Other incidents or unexpected 

occurrences have included fuel failures, metal fires, open wounds, burns, and explosions. 

Many of the incidents that occurred at Hanford were related to Industrial Safety. For instance, 

individuals would enter underground tanks (i.e., confined spaces) and were overcome by fumes. 

Another example was a steam valve explosion during a valve replacement that resulted in 

personnel injuries [no date provided]. 

Criticality Accidents 

Hanford had two criticality accidents. The first was on November 16, 1951, when the poison 

control rod was pulled out of a solution too fast. The second accident occurred on April 7, 1962, 

at RECUPLEX (plutonium and uranium recovery area), when a non-critically safe tank, K-9, 

collected too much plutonium nitrate from the floor of the glovebox. K-9 had a tygon hose 

attached to it to suction up plutonium nitrate that had leaked from other process vessels. The 

operators were supposed to turn off the vacuum to the K-9 tank and keep the open end of the 

tygon hose off the floor. At some point, the vacuum was not turned off and the open end fell to 

the glovebox floor into a kind of “cup” (this “cup” is like a rounded depression on the floor). 

This cup caused a collection of plutonium nitrate, which went into the K-9 tank. The plutonium 

nitrate was from a leaking or overflowing receiver tank. This incident directly involved 

individuals who received high radiation exposures. A former PFP worker recalls that area was 

restricted to the 200-W Area for about 1 week; there were no entries into the 234-5Z Building. 

One of the workers involved in the accident reported that he saw the blue flash and was afraid he 

would die. There was also a significant incident in one of the tanks at PUREX, which was 

initially investigated as a potential criticality. 
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Plutonium Finishing Plant 

There was a massive glovebox explosion involving two Hanford workers at PFP in 1976. The 

columns in the americium process were on a preventive maintenance program, but the materials 

were not changed out in the way they were supposed to be, or as frequently as required. The 

incident was so significant that it made the national papers. The east coast newspapers called out 

to Hanford and wanted to know how big the crater was. 

On April 14, 1954, a [Operator 1] and [Operator 2] were working to clean the filter boats. In 

the process of making plutonium oxalate, it was captured in these filter boats. Liquid would go 

through and oxalate would stay. The plutonium had to be recovered from the boat. Oxide was 

scraped out of the boats, bagged, and shipped to 231-Z. The boat was put into a glovebox (only 

one in the room), immersed in a stainless steel can with chemicals, and brought to near boiling 

temperature of the solution (much higher than the boiling temperature of water). 

The [Operator 1] had been cleaning the boats while the [Operator 2] was intermittently 

supervising and talking to personnel down the hall in a clean area. This was about 20 feet down 

the hall from the lab where the work was taking place. After about an hour and a half, the 

[Operator 1] pulled his hands out of the glovebox gloves and found that he was contaminated. 

The [Operator 2] surveyed the area and found the area very contaminated. They called for 

assistance from the RMs, who entered the room wearing masks and in double anti-contamination 

clothing. The operators involved in the incident had been working in coveralls, street shoes, and 

latex gloves without a respirator. The [Operator 1] picked up his mask from the Poppy cart and 

put it on. It was later determined that the mask had alpha contamination of 105

 dpm. The 

[Operator 2] was also contaminated. The source of the contamination was a hole in one of the 

gloves. Contamination was spread down the hallway, since the [Operator 2] had been up and 

down the hallway during the job. The activity at the radiation chain (boundary) was 20,000 – 

105 dpm. 

The [Operator 1] was escorted back to the Health Physics Instrumentation room, which was 

also the decontamination area. His coveralls were removed and they scrubbed his face and hair 

down with some solution. The nasal smear taken by the RMs was positive. Nasal irrigation was 

done until the activity in [Operator 1]’s nose was less than detectable. He was given his street 

clothes and asked to hang around in the lunch room for the rest of the day. The [Operator 1] 

reported that he submitted daily bioassay samples for the next 2 to 3 weeks, including both urine 

and fecal samples. About the time they stopped delivering the sample containers, the HP 

indicated that the bioassay results had dropped down to background levels. The incident was 

formally documented. When the [Operator 1] reviewed the records submitted to NIOSH, there 

was only one bioassay sample in the record associated with the incident. 

While machining, metal turnings were produced and would catch fire at times. The use of 

carbon tetrafluoride precipitated these fires. The metal would smolder inside the gloveboxes. 

Operators extinguished the fire by smothering it with a piece of metal. These occurrences did 

not happen all the time, but they were not uncommon. 
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When they tried to change the filters in PFP, it was a contamination risk. This task resulted in a 

few incidents, including some significant uptakes. In one case, workers were changing a hood 

filter [date not given]. This filter was designed to remove suspended particulate from the hoods. 

The filter housing was opened, the old filter removed, and the new filter put in place. This 

operation was done in a greenhouse (containment tent). Respirators were usually worn for this 

job, but the workers had removed their respiratory protection that day. When the housing was 

opened, radioactive material was inhaled. Urine and fecal samples were submitted as a result of 

the incident. One individual involved indicated he received 18% of the limit for plutonium 

[presumably the Maximum Permissible Body Burden]. This worker is currently a member of the 

transuranic registry maintained by Washington State University (WSU). 

Another interviewee recalled an incident that occurred at 234-5Z, while he was changing a filter. 

He stayed over on swing shift to change the High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters in a 

particular area. They had set up a tent around the area. The job also required they wear 

protective clothing and a mask. The filter wouldn’t come loose, so the Millwright kicked the 

filter. It fell down at the workers’ feet and the stuff just disintegrated. The fine particles went 

right through the mask. Radiation Monitoring was called in to assist. Nasal irrigation was 

required for at least one of the workers involved. Quite a few urine samples were collected after 

the incident. As a result, the interviewee received an uptake. At one point, he was part of the 

transuranic registry, but is no longer involved. 

A more recent incident occurred in 1993, when operators were tapping on a vacuum gauge in 

Plutonium Recovery Facility (PRF). [Redacted] of the [redacted] workers had positive nasal 

smears. Several individuals received uptakes. More recent incidents such as this are well 

documented. 

Skin contamination incidents were a concern at PFP. Over time, Health Physics Technicians 

maintained an unofficial set of logbooks at PFP. The contamination control was loose 

historically and contamination was very common. An interviewee indicated there was entry after 

entry of skin and facial contamination in the logbooks. According to the log books, there were 

days when people were exposed to more than 40,000 dpm (i.e., facial nasal smears more than 

40,000 dpm). It was a daily occurrence when running campaigns. The Poppy used at the time 

only had a range from 500–40,000 dpm. Also in the logbooks was information on the criticality 

incident that occurred. Several examples were provided by interviewees. 

 One interviewee was involved in an incident where he punctured the glove in the hood 

while using a lathe. He indicated that his finger was contaminated, but his skin was not 

broken. Nasal smears and skin monitoring were performed after this incident. 

 There was an incident where a hole developed in one of the lead-lined gloves in the hood 

space. Contamination was present on the outside of the gloves, which in turn 

contaminated [redacted]. The contamination was on the coveralls, but did not reach the 

skin. Since there was a single monitoring point, [redacted] did not realize that 

[redacted] was contaminated until [redacted] went to the Poppy survey station. No 

nasal smears were taken following the incident. 
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 An employee was crawling on [redacted] knees on one of the upper floors of PFP. 

There was some loose contamination (>20 dpm/100cm2) in this area, which caused 

[redacted] to get crapped up [contaminated]. [Redacted] lost [redacted] coveralls as a 

result. Although there was smearable contamination all over this area, no respiratory 

protection was required. 

In addition to the incidents mentioned above, PFP had metal fires. 

[Note: SC&A has tried to locate the technician logbooks, but has not been successful.] 

Fuel Manufacturing and Reactors 

There were several fuel ruptures that occurred in the reactor areas (5%–10% during operation of 

the reactors). Fuel ruptures occurred at N-reactor, but this was not a real common occurrence. 

For a period of time, there were several ruptures because of weld failures on the fuel end caps. 

This exposed uranium to water, which caused it to oxidize. The fission products entered the 

primary coolant system, which was routinely monitored. The monitors indicated if a rupture 

occurred in the reactor. The reactor was shut down and the operations then attempted to identify 

the tube where the rupture occurred. After the reactor was cooled down, an RM could survey the 

rear face of the reactor and identify a general location of the ruptured fuel elements. Operations 

then removed the fuel and started the reactor back up. As soon as the 300 Area fixed the welding 

process on the fuel end caps, many such ruptures were eliminated. 

When they first started up one of the reactors in the 100-K Area, one of the fuel tubes melted 

because the cooling water to that area was shut off. The aluminum process tube failed, due to a 

rag plugging the flow to the process tube. This resulted in cladding of the fuel elements. It took 

workers quite a while to clean up the tube. This was a source of a lot of radiation. There were 

approximately 4,300 fuel tubes in each reactor (i.e., 105KW and 105KE), with only one failure. 

There were two incidents in the early 1980s, where fuel was pushed out onto the D-elevator and 

also into the C-elevator pit. The operators and RM involved received very high exposures. As a 

result of the incident, there were some medical tests conducted on these individuals to make sure 

they were all right. The fuel was left behind on the elevator so a recovery plan could be 

developed to collect the fuel on the elevator and in the C-elevator pit. There would be an 

occurrence report on this incident. 

The rigor for monitoring potentially contaminated wounds has not been consistent for all areas 

and times. There were situations where individuals received substantial wounds and were 

merely patched up and sent back into the area. For example, one interviewee was changing the 

die in the extrusion press in the 300 Area one day, when the crane hook straightened and hit him 

in the forehead. The hook was unapproved for the task and picked up the whole unit, rather than 

just the die. It straightened, causing the unit to drop and the hook to swing. He had a [redacted] 

in his forehead and was sent to [redacted]. After being [redacted], they sent him back to work, 

since the job he was doing was time sensitive. There was no RM around at the time, and the 

interviewee does not recall special bioassay sampling or monitoring of his wound after this 

incident. 
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There used to be spontaneous combustion fires within the exhaust ducts, and the fine particulates 

in the dust at the cut of the saws caught fire. This occurred almost monthly. 

There was a situation where the roof was lifted off a building in the 300 Area. This was the 

building used for training personnel on the RECUPLEX process, which occurred in the 200-E 

Area. The building is no longer there. 

After completion of the 100-N Area job, several Millwrights from Kaiser Hill went down to the 

300 Area to work at the mock-up reactor. They had a mock-up reactor made of carbon block 4 ft 

by 4 ft by 4 ft, and the Millwrights were assigned to pick up the blocks and haul them off. The 

workers could not pick them up, so they tried to crow bar them. The carbon block crow bar 

broke apart, and the uranium slugs came flying out. They shut down the whole place. There 

were 50 people from Kaiser Hill and from DOE involved. There was no record of the uranium 

slugs being installed in the mock-up reactor. 

There were areas with contamination in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas. Occasionally, there were 

small incidents at FFTF, but they were identified and reported promptly. FFTF never had a 

prolonged period of external contamination concerns. The fuel was handled in hot cells. 

Incidents were not unique to the operating period. There have been several incidents during 

D&D operations. For example, at the beginning of the decontamination effort at 105-C, 

someone entered an airborne area and inhaled radioactive material. This was BHI’s second 

strike for sending an individual into a posted area without respiratory protection. The first 

incident had occurred in 224-B. A third incident occurred at 233-S, resulting in an uptake of 

plutonium. 

Separations Area/Tank Farms 

At the REDOX facility, there was an explosion where the sample riser caps blew off. Liquid for 

the sample riser containing radioactive material spilled. This spill took a long time to clean up. 

The next time it blew, it blew the jumpers off, but the risers stayed in place because of an 

improvement made. 

There was a slurry line that busted at 242-S and it read 100 rad/hr. It was feed time for the 

evaporators. Workers were getting ready to put it into 102-S. The riser was used to pump makeup feed into 102-S, but it was plugged and the riser cap had not been bolted down. The liquid 

flowed out the top and left a lake of a solution that spilled out onto the soil. Dump trucks and a 

leaded cab were used to remove the soil. The area was completely cleaned up, and there is now 

matting and gravel over this area. 

An incident occurred at the 233-S Building where a line ruptured. The operators in the control 

room heard the Poppy (Alpha detector) making rapid popping sounds (indicated > 40,000 dpm). 

Since the instruments were prone to instrument surges, they thought the instrument was 

malfunctioning. One of the operators went to turn off the instrument. As a result, he received a 

lifetime dose of plutonium contamination. 
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There was at least one individual incident (September 1993) where americium exposure existed 

at the 204 REDOX liquid waste storage tanks. At the liquid railcar unloading near the 204 liquid 

storage tanks, on the RM’s way to a job, he noted that his GM went off scale as he passed the 

load-out facility. He conducted radiation and contamination measurements of the area and 

detected alpha and beta/gamma. The technical smears he collected were sent for analysis, and 

Am-241 was identified. The liquid waste car from the 300 Area overflowed when the liquid 

waste was transferred from the liquid waste car to the storage tank at 204. No one notified the 

shift supervisor of the spill. 

An RM assigned to PUREX Plant submitted a bioassay sample at Hanford. After a 6-week 

break in employment at Hanford, with no potential exposure to radiation during the break, the 

employee returned to Hanford to find out the bioassay sample previously submitted was positive 

for plutonium. This resulted in assignment of an internal dose of 5 rem. The individual did not 

believe the results and provided two potential explanations. First, the bioassay bottles were 

routinely decontaminated and reused; the individual might have received a bottle for sample 

submittal that had some residual plutonium as a result of inadequate decontamination. The 

second possibility was that the instrumentation used for counting became more sensitive about 

this time and could detect internal contamination in the body. 

Personnel at the Tank Farms were frequently contaminated during the transfer of waste from the 

tanks to casks or during similar jobs. These incidents could range from a small amount of 

contamination on the finger to significant contamination requiring a whole-body count. One 

occurrence involved a more serious contamination incident when the individual had a flange that 

was leaking on the top of the tank, and the easiest way to get to it was to remove the lid and get 

down from the top. The RM set up the job during the night. Operations turned on the system 

and liquid was released to the top of the tank. This sprayed liquid on the top of the tank. To 

remove the lid from the cell, the individual had to kneel on the tank, and the contamination was 

still there. Workers entering this area were grossly contaminated. In those days, you had to be 

clean before they sent you to town for whole-body counting. It took several showers to 

decontaminate the individual who knelt on the tank. At the whole-body counter, they put 

workers on a conveyor, and the counter would move all over to count the minerals or whatever 

was in the body. Sometimes they put employees on a chair. It was standard procedure to take 

urine samples after incidents like this. They had a bucket right outside on your doorstep so you 

could collect it. 

Criticality Safety Program 

FFTF had an extensive Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) prepared by the Reactor 

Safety group. This was a part of the Facility Safety Analysis Report, which was 14 volumes in 

length. To supplement this, there were technical safety requirements. Criticality Safety 

Requirement postings were used in specific areas of the facility. There was a training program 

new employees had to go through. They were assigned to this training for a half or full day per 

week for the first month they were assigned to the facility. This training strongly emphasized the 

importance of criticality safety. FFTF used geometry, spacing of fuel assembly (e.g., use of bird 
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cages), and special handling of aqueous solutions, even though no one had any reason to be 

dealing with solutions. 

The Nuclear Safety group was responsible for real-time inventory of fissile materials. These 

individuals operated out of the 308 Building. The inventories of fissile material were 

computerized for the whole site. 

Environmental Monitoring 

Starting in the early 1970s, there was a considerable effort to upgrade the atmospheric 

monitoring system, and much of the original (1940s) instrumentation was replaced. Based on the 

recollection of one interviewee, there was never a period since the 1940s when environmental 

monitoring was not a key part of the monitoring. There were several monitoring stations on site, 

in and around the City of Richland, and across the Columbia River in the agricultural area. This 

was originally part of the Hanford Reservation. Except for the portion that is part of the Hanford 

Reach, it is now private again. 

There was an animal problem, because the animals were getting into radiation areas. There were 

tumbleweeds that grew over the burial sites. They had root systems 18-ft to 20-ft deep that 

absorbed the radioactivity, causing it to spread. One crew was responsible for keeping the burial 

sites weed free. At one point, the crew even baled tumbleweeds and burned them, creating a 

radioactive plume.

Records 

Some workers have been successful in obtaining their radiation exposure records, while others 

have not. Several individuals interviewed had the opportunity to review their dosimetry records. 

Comments were made indicating that many of the dosimetry records provided were illegible or 

very difficult to read. In some cases, individuals indicated their records appeared to be complete, 

while in other situations, the records appeared to be incomplete. Interviewees were not aware of 

any destruction of health and safety records. 

In one case, an individual left Hanford and returned several years later. The first year-end annual 

exposure report the worker received showed a lower accumulated dose than what he previously 

had when he left the facility several years earlier. The individual questioned the report and 

forwarded all the radiation exposure reports he had received through the years to Battelle. 

Battelle re-evaluated and updated his exposure as a result of the information provided. 

Dosimetry sent workers their records every quarter at FFTF. Workers also got badge results. 

When an individual went for a whole-body scan, they were shown their results. 

Petition Information 

[SC&A explained that one of the issues raised in the petition was that people worked in buildings 

they were not assigned to. The interviewees provided the following information.] 
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SC&A: One of the things petitioners are worried about is people who were 

working in buildings they were not assigned to. 

Interviewee 1: Whenever I was assigned to work in another area or building, I 

reported to the shop in that area. I was sent from 200W to 200E. 

Interviewee 2: We were assigned to other buildings. 

SC&A: Would it show on your work record? 

Interviewee 1: I was in lots of different areas that I am sure are not recorded 

there. 

Interviewee 2: We were in the 300 Area, but when they had high exposure time in 

the 100 Area, they would loan us to the 100 Area putting pigtails on process tubes 

when they were recharged. They recharged lots of them, ~1,000. 

SC&A: Was there a process of checking into the building? 

Interviewee 2: You reported to the supervisor. 

And, 

SC&A: Is there any way for them [NIOSH] to know where you worked? 

Interviewee 1: I don’t believe that they can. I can’t even remember the numbers 

of the buildings where I worked. Even for a time card, it would have to show a 

special number. 

Interviewee 2: I had to sign an RWP only when I got to N Area. Everyone knew 

who belonged and who did not. 

And, 

SC&A: If you moved within the 300 Area from one building to another, would 

there be a record of it? 

Interviewee 2: No, there would be no record. 

Interviewee 3: If there were a record, there might be a calibration slip on a piece 

of equipment or a QC [Quality Control] tag. 

Interviewees 1, 2, and 3: Our security badge was all we needed. 
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The Hanford petition under current consideration was submitted on November 6, 2006. 

Petitioners would like NIOSH to define “discrete incidents,” and explain why the 

180-day requirement is not being met. 

The primary concerns in the petition center around falsification and completeness of 

records (i.e., data integrity). Petitioners raised the following concerns with respect to the 

evaluation report. 

 The evaluation report is confusing, unorganized, and does not address lost or 

destroyed records or affidavits supporting SEC 00057, 57-1, and 57-2. 

 The petitioners are uncertain how Rovers and construction workers fit into the 

SEC definition. 

 Access to Hanford records was limited during the development of the petition. 

Petitioners had to rely on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which 

were often not provided in a timely manner and incomplete. They have no access 

to records that may be classified. 

 Petitioners were not made aware of the documentation available on the 

Declassified Document Retrieval System (DDRS). 

 The petitioners are at a technical disadvantage and cannot effectively respond to 

the evaluation report. They do not understand the evaluation and would 

appreciate some type of support from someone knowledgeable of the radiation 

protection. 

 There is a significant concern over the use of surrogate data [e.g., coworker data] 

and the sample size on which these data are based (i.e., 7 individuals). 

 NIOSH and the petitioners interpret the information provided by former workers 

differently. Petitioners feel NIOSH is not responding to the information provided. 

NIOSH has not made any reference to the petition affidavits in their evaluation 

report. 

 The petitioners’ comparison of data in worker files and in REX indicates that the 

REX database is not complete. 

The petitioners raised concerns regarding the unresolved findings in the review report. 

Without resolving all of the findings, they believe there cannot be a defensible, claimantfavorable evaluation of any petition. The petitioners dispute the fact that NIOSH claims 

in SEC Petitions 00057-1 and -2 that external dose reconstruction is feasible. 

At the Worker Outreach meetings, former employees stated that not everyone wore 

monitoring devices. They also told how they would pick up monitoring devices at the 

buildings, and at the end of the shift, they would throw them all in a bucket. There was 
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no monitoring during transportation through the area; buses drove through noxious 

vapors and yellow clouds. Former workers stated they wore monitoring devices under 

various layers of clothing and protective gear, and that the monitoring devices were not 

on areas of the body that were exposed. One of the RadTechs at the Worker Outreach 

meeting said records of his personnel exposure incidents were not accurate. 

There is a lot of credibility given to interviewed experts, and they are referenced 

repeatedly. Nowhere in this evaluation report does it deal with the affidavits of 

falsification of records. There are affidavits stating monitoring records were falsified, 

and that supervisors coerced employees to change records or be sent home without pay. 

NIOSH is channeled in only one direction, and that is using only the existing records. 

One interviewee indicated that the record of his Kr-85 exposure was a false record and 

the exposure was considerably higher. He was working with a Kr-85 source, which was 

a 200 to 250 R source, for an hour to an hour and a half. The RM came by and saw that 

the work procedure was wrong and stopped the job. After that, a simulated test was 

performed to determine this individual’s exposure, since the dosimetry was not capable 

of reading that high a dose. He was not present to observe this simulated test, and the 

report shows a much lower dose than he would have received. 

During an interview with an individual submitting an affidavit, the individual indicated 

he worked with the gentleman whose diary is referenced in the SEC petition. The 

individual [redacted] performed operations in Hood #8 of the RG line. This individual 

could have received about 10 times the dose, as compared to coworkers. Eventually, he 

developed [redacted] and had to quit his employment with Hanford due to illness. 

The petitioners raised concerns regarding the participation of key Hanford dosimetry 

personnel in the preparation of the Hanford site profile. One individual was the Project 

Manager/Principal Investigator for the Hanford External Dosimetry Program (HEDP) 

from 1979 to 1995. This individual currently works with Dade Moeller and Associates, 

Inc., an ORAUT subcontractor. 

Evaluation Report and NIOSH Worker Meetings 

The following clarifications were provided by workers related to descriptions in the NIOSH 

evaluation report, particularly the 200 Area facility descriptions (Section 5.2.3, “Chemical 

Separations”). 

 The ER stated: According to site health physics documentation, reactor work areas were 

categorized into danger zones (i.e., red, yellow, and blue), which were subject to worker 

access limitations (pg. 23). The 200 Area did not use radiation zones, but just had 

Radiation Work Permit areas. 

 The ER stated: Two Separations Plants, called the T Plant and the B Plant were 

operational as of September 1946. Each Plant included a separations building (221 

Building) and a reduction building (224 Building). These plants were large, rectangular 
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reinforced concrete structures that consisted of a gallery area (pg. 23). There were 

actually three gallery areas in these buildings. The Operating Galley was on the top floor 

of the building. Under it was the Pipe Gallery (middle floor). On the bottom floor was 

the Electrical Gallery. The Electrical Gallery was even with the cells where all the 

equipment was. Iron ore was used for shielding instead of aggregate in the 10-ft thick 

concrete walls. 

 The ER stated: Next this batch was transferred to Building 224 (Bulk Reduction), where 

330 gallons were concentrated to approximately 8 gallons of plutonium nitrate paste and 

further precipitations with hydrogen fluoride and lanthanum salts were performed to 

remove additional impurities (pg. 23). The plutonium was a liquid when it was 

transported. The very first plutonium that was produced was a paste that was hand 

carried to Los Alamos. But for the period that the statement is referring to, it was a liquid 

that was transported to Z-plant. 

 The ER stated: Both purified strontium-90 and cesium-137 were transferred to the 225-B 

Building Waste Encapsulation Storage Facility, where they were converted to solids and 

encapsulated (pg. 24). The encapsulated sources still remain stored there under 20 feet of 

water. This was intended to be for long-term storage. 

 There is no discussion of the 233-S Building, which is separate from the REDOX 

building. 

 Concerns were raised about assigning the same dose to all employees in the 300 Area. 

Some workers were asked to perform special support operations and were actively 

involved in making improvements to existing processes. This meant they were 

introduced to non-routine radiation exposure situations that other workers were not. 

The operations at Hanford were secret and people didn’t always know what they were working 

with (e.g., thorium, americium, etc.). The SEC should be restricted to people who handle 

radioactive materials and not specific radionuclides. 

There are several situations that occurred at Hanford that would make dose reconstruction 

difficult. These issues should be addressed in the evaluation report. 

 There was an on again/off again practice of finger ring usage. The first finger rings were 

used in the 1944 or 1945 timeframe. Use of finger rings depended on whether the worker 

or RM requested them. If an individual was dealing with a hot job with exposure on the 

order of tens of R/hour, then the RMs would request finger rings. In later years, when 

they were sending Tank Farm samples to the laboratory, technicians worked directly with 

these samples. There were times when employees at the lab went to get samples without 

wearing finger rings. In some cases, they were not issued finger rings. After evaluation 

of badge readings in about 1978, it was felt laboratory workers should wear finger rings. 
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 The biggest gaps would be the indiscretions of the workers. For example, a worker was 

conducting work with neptunium. This Np was so hot that the RM left the area. The 

individual then took off his badge and did the work he felt needed to be done. 

 Another thing operators did was to take a sample of plutonium nitrate from product cans 

(this is known as a “thief” sample). This was performed in an open room using a wet 

towel for contamination control. According to procedures, this was to be performed in a 

load-out hood. The only time it became an issue is when something went wrong, such as 

a spill. This practice was known and condoned. 

NIOSH conducted three Worker Outreach meetings in 2007 (one in March and two in June). A 

Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council (HAMTC) representative was present for all three 

meetings. The notes from these meetings were not provided to HAMTC representatives union or 

the petitioners for review, but were posted recently on the NIOSH website. 

The overall feeling of some workers attending the meeting was that whenever a worker made a 

comment, there was an individual in the audience who stood up and disputed the comment. The 

perspective of some workers is that there is a lack of interest in the statements made by workers. 

Miscellaneous 

In addition to radioactive material, workers mentioned they were exposed to a number of 

chemicals. There was suspected exposure to ferrocyanide in the early 1990s during installation 

of thermocouple trees at the C Farm. There were times at C farm when off-gassing occurred and 

the odors would make it difficult to breath. In this situation, workers reported that no respiratory 

protection was used. A larger concern than the radiological exposure at FFTF was the potential 

reactivity of the sodium used to cool the reactor. Beryllium alloy was used in some fuel end 

caps. 

There was a lot of asbestos everywhere. One interviewee and his crew developed the moisture 

method of cleaning up asbestos, where they sprayed the material and kept it moist to keep the 

particulate down. This method was not used until about 1983 or 1984. 

During the operation of adding the copper-back plate, which used water-based graphite and oil 

sprays in the fuel fabrication process, the workers would be engulfed in off gases. There would 

be flames 4-ft high to get the surface smooth, so it could be extruded. Operators of the extrusion 

press were exposed to oil dag in the extrusion press area of Buildings 313 and 333. This is the 

graphite sheen on the liner to the extrusion press. One worker was directed to remove the 

carcinogenic label from the chemical. The label notified the workers not to get the chemical on 

their skin. Workers in the area were soaked in the stuff for 10 months of the year. During the 

extrusion of material, they handled the material with asbestos gloves. Workers had to scrape the 

transite troughs after each extrusion at the end of the day, so the extruded material did not have 

any galling on it. 

An early Shipping Clerk indicated he issued about a million tanks of welding gases. When 

Camp Hanford closed, he shipped out the excess materials to the various government holding 
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NOTICE:

stations around the country, which amounted to about 3,000 car loads and truck loads of 

material. 

United Nuclear Special Material Controller was responsible for maintaining the inventories for 

equipment and materials needed to operate the 100-N reactor. This included all kinds of 

different metals (e.g., Be brazing rings) and chemicals (e.g., silica sand for the water filter 

basins, bulk coal for the 200 Area power houses, oil, helium). The helium was supplied to 100-

N Area from Oklahoma and Texas. Hydrazine was used for 4–5 years for rod cooling systems 

before the operations personnel were notified that hydrazine was identified as a carcinogen. 

Dichromate was also used by the operators. 

Reactor Operators were required to perform checks in Building 109 where the steam generators 

were located at 100-N. There were a total of six cells with two steam generators in each cell. 

This area had a lot of asbestos. 

Hanford was involved with the processing and analysis of Zero Power Plutonium Reactor 

(ZPPR) fuel at one point. 

Additional Comments from Interviewers 

One interviewee brought a copy of his employment records. He allowed SC&A team members 

to review them. The employment records included job titles, pay records, performance 

appraisals, security paperwork, and miscellaneous other forms. It is possible to place this 

individual in a general area at a specific time. For example, there are performance appraisals 

placing him in a building on the date of the appraisal. There is also some information on site 

transfers. Within this set of records, there is no record on a day-by-day basis of where this 

individual worked. This provides some additional evidence that day-to-day assignment of 

workers to various buildings and areas may not be in the employment records. 

In addition to discussing the petition with the petitioners, SC&A reviewed records the petitioners 

had collected to support the petition. The records were primarily Hanford radiological and 

personnel records for individuals providing supporting affidavits. Many of the records were 

either provided or referenced in the petition. 

References 

Gerber, M.S., 1995. Legend and Legacy: Fifty Years of Defense Production at the Hanford Site, 

WHC-MR-0293, Revision 2, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington, June 

1995.
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS RELATING TO 

BUILDING 324 INCIDENTS 
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INTRODUCTION 

As a technical support contractor to the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 

(Advisory Board), SC&A has been tasked with investigating concerns raised to the Advisory 

Board and the potential impact of these concerns for active Hanford Special Exposure Cohort 

(SEC) reviews. The concerns raised to the Advisory Board involve recently reported findings of 

high radiation readings in the soil under Hanford Building 324. 

One component of SC&A’s review is a series of interviews with current and former workers 

with experience related to Building 324. John Stiver and Lynn Ayers of SC&A conducted onsite 

interviews between March 28 and March 30, 2011. A written response and two phone 

interviews were provided by individuals who were unable to participate in the site visit. A total 

of 13 individuals were interviewed, with employment dates ranging from 1948 to the present. 

The workers were employed by various contractors and the Department of Energy (DOE). Their 

experience includes research and development (R&D), process operations, engineering, 

radiological control, maintenance, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D), and project 

oversight. Some interviewees worked primarily in other buildings, particularly 325 and 327, 

where related programs were conducted. Their experiences, particularly in regard to radiological 

controls, were considered relevant, as they performed similar work in similar facilities for the 

same contractors. 

A classification officer was present for all onsite interviews and a telephone interview. 

Participants were told that the interviews were unclassified, and that they should not disclose any 

classified information. All interview notes were submitted for classification review and were 

released to SC&A. A written summary of each interview was prepared, submitted for 

classification review, and provided to the interviewee for review. Responses have been received 

from 12 of the 13 interviewees. This summary only includes materials from those responses. 

Information provided by the interviewees is based on their personal experience; individuals’ 

statements may need to be further substantiated. This interview summary is provided in that 

context. 

Soil Contamination and SEC Concerns 

A former worker was aware that process/glovebox waste drains and piping going to waste tanks 

had to be double-walled (pipe within a pipe). If the waste in Building 324 had corroded through 

two layers of pipe, so that the contamination escaped into the soil, it would be difficult to know 

where the pipe(s) were breached and who was exposed while it was leaking. The concerned 

individual initially thought the soil contamination was found during post-demolition excavation. 

If the building was gone, it would not be possible to determine the source of the leak or evaluate 

the potential for past worker exposures. [After learning that the contamination had been 

discovered by placing detectors beneath the intact structure, the interviewee expressed an 

additional concern]: “This means they are only getting partial information and using estimates 

on the real amount of contamination.” 
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The soil contamination found under Building 324 is not the only instance of remediation crews 

finding unexpected contamination. When they find a “surprise,” how do they know where it 

came from, how/when it got there, and how many people were exposed to it along the way? 

How is this cradle-to-grave history taken into account in the SEC review? A number of old 

burial sites are being excavated at Hanford, as well as decontamination and demolition of many 

former process buildings. What processes are in place to provide information from DOE to 

NIOSH about contamination finds and assuring that NIOSH accounts for them in SEC 

considerations? 

Building 324 Facilities and Operations 

Building 324 is located in the 300 Area of the Hanford site. [For many years,] Buildings 324, 

325, and 327 were shared by Westinghouse and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), 

which is operated by Battelle. Westinghouse was the facility owner/landlord during the 1980s. 

Battelle operated specific facilities within the buildings. PNNL took over the full operation of 

324 and other buildings in the mid-1980s. PNNL transferred Building 324 to Babcock & Wilcox 

(B&W), a D&D contractor, around 1997. B&W assumed responsibility for Building 324 and 

Building 327 from 1996–1997 as a subcontractor under Fluor. They were absorbed directly into 

Fluor after 1 or 2 years. D&D activities at this time were focused on decontaminating hot cells; 

stabilizing and removing contaminated material from the cells. 

Workers in Building 324 handled a broad range of fission products, including radioactive waste 

and commercial spent fuel. The work might vary from laboratory work with tracer amounts to 

work inside hot cells with gross activity. The recipe of nuclides has not changed much since the 

1980s. 

PNNL/Battelle ran the work in the Radiochemical Engineering Complex (REC) – cells A, B, C, 

and D. PNNL handled all sorts of radioactive materials in very high quantities in the REC, often 

in liquid form. Other facilities in Building 324 included the Shielded Materials Facility (SMF), 

Radiometallurgy Cells, Safeguards Vault [Fissile Materials Storage Vault], waste tank vaults, 

and Engineering Development Labs (EDL). There were shielded gloveboxes in some areas of 

324. Hot cells in the EDL were more like large, shielded gloveboxes, compared to the very 

large, heavily shielded hot cells in the REC. There were lunchrooms, a reception area, and office 

areas in the building. 

A central Airlock, a Truck Lock, and a Cask Handling Area were shared between the contractors. 

The central Airlock was like another big cell, but a lot cleaner than the RECs. Dose rates in this 

area might vary from a few hundred mR to several R, depending on the job. They sometimes 

worked on equipment in this area also. The Cask Handling Area was where they staged casks 

going in and out of the hot cells. 

In the mid-1990s, [highly radioactive heat sources produced in B-Cell] were stored in A-Cell. 

Cleanout was in progress in B-Cell. D-Cell was being cleaned out for other missions. The 

[fissile materials] vault was still full when the building was transferred to B&W. 
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An operations worker handled Pu, U, and some Th, primarily in SMF. They pulled apart fuel 

assemblies and reloaded them for FFTF [Fast Flux Test Facility] support. Workers investigated 

breached or ruptured elements. [The elements were] encapsulated and sent to 327, where they 

cut up and analyzed the metal. The workers handled a bunch of exotic materials that were 

irradiated. Most of these were encapsulated. They would package and ship them out to the 

investigators or send them to 327 for analysis. 

An interviewee said there were no research or production campaigns in Building 324 [in the mid1990s]. Y-90 medical isotope processing occurred in Building 325 [~1995]. 

There was a significant contrast in conditions between SMF and RECs. The Westinghouse side 

was supporting FFTF at the time [early 1980s]. They were working on test assemblies, and there 

were very high requirements for cleanliness. After a campaign for FFTF, workers could make 

manned entries into the hot cells with mops and buckets. The Battelle side was known as “the 

dark side.” The cells were too hot to enter, so they became dark and dirty. The windows became 

brown from exposure. Paint deteriorated on the walls, and the concrete absorbed more of the 

available light. Dust was pulled in through the air plugs. 

INFORMATION SPECIFIC TO B-CELL HISTORY AND SOIL CONTAMINATION 

INCIDENT 

B-Cell Operations

The soil contamination reported in November 2010 is located under the REC B-Cell. B-Cell was 

the highest activity hot cell on [the Hanford] site. The hot cell was under negative pressure, 

because ventilation throughout the building was designed to draw air from non-radioactive areas 

towards more highly contaminated areas. Cells in 324 Building were used for radiochemical 

processing—the work is somewhat “sloppy” by nature. A stainless steel liner covers the floor on 

top of the concrete, and goes partway up the sides of the cell. Work in B-Cell was done remotely 

from the first floor gallery. Two circular windows were put in on the second level for a 

vitrification project in the late 1970s. 

[The main focus of R&D activities in B-Cell] was waste treatment technology for high-level 

nuclear waste. The work they did in the 1960s was laying the groundwork for selecting waste 

processing technologies. The emphasis was on commercial fuel separations and processing. The 

first project used waste from the PUREX Plant to simulate commercial waste. Special runs were 

done without sulfate to give them the full spectrum of fission products. They added Ce-144 and 

Pr-144 from B Plant to heat it up. They handled about 50 million curies, but the half-lives are 

about 1 year. 

[In the 1970s,] a joint project between 324 and 325 Buildings was to vitrify actual commercial 

waste. This project was called the Nuclear Waste Vitrification Project (NWVP). They used 

actual spent fuel for NWVP; they wanted to have all potential waste components present to 

verify that the vitrification process was feasible. They worked with spent fuel assemblies from 

the Point Beach power reactor. Fuel assemblies for NWVP were stored in B-Cell. They 
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chopped and dissolved the assemblies in B-Cell, and they sent the material by underground pipe 

to Building 325. The group in 325 extracted the uranium and plutonium, and the high-level 

waste was returned to 324 Building for vitrification. Interviewees are not aware of any problems 

with the inter-building transfer line. It was only used for the NWVP between 1977 and 1979. 

They worked with Three Mile Island (TMI) waste in the 1980s, demonstrating the joule heated 

melter that is now used at modern vitrification plants. Three canisters of wastes from TMI were 

received to demonstrate the feasibility of waste vitrification. The waste was in the form of ion 

exchange resin (zeolite). 

In the early 1980s, workers were involved in a project to create canisters of high-level waste for 

the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This project brought cesium and strontium solutions 

into B-Cell. The Cs/Sr source material for the German canister project came from an onsite 

reactor. It may have been from B Plant. Tens of thousands of Curies of cesium, or more, were 

brought into B-Cell for the first vitrified log. The material was doped (not actual reactor waste) 

to demonstrate the vitrification process. 

Equipment built up in B-Cell over time. Some equipment in the cell was used for multiple 

projects, thus there was no need to remove it. There were always cuts in the budget, time, and 

resources. There was never money in the budget to take out old material, except for the TMI 

project. TMI was the only time when DOE took the equipment out afterwards and disposed of it 

in 200 Area. There was a huge cost involved with housekeeping that was hard to justify to 

management. It was often kicked down the road, but [some supervisors] argued it’s cheaper now 

than it will be later. [In addition to budget issues, a worker also thinks cleanup] wasn’t a priority 

for scientists. They tended to move on and get into the next research project when one project 

was over. You had to write it into the contract to have them clean up after a project. 

[Some interviewees discussed the presence of standing water in B-Cell; there was some 

disagreement in regard to the time period when water was present.] An interviewee recalled that 

there was water on the floor of the cell from the late 1970s to early 1980s. They had fuel 

elements in the racks; water covered them. They had to jet it to waste tanks. The interviewee 

doesn’t recall any standing water in the cell after 1983, when they were getting ready for the heat 

source project. Another interviewee recalls that the floor of B-Cell was covered with standing 

water in 1987. The interviewee doesn’t know why. There was standing water in B-Cell in the 

late 1980s—this was intentional. The water had been there all along, maybe before the 1986 

spill, at least intermittently. When they dropped equipment or tools, they used the ripples on the 

water surface to indicate where it had fallen and try to get it. 

Major Spills in B-Cell

There was one major spill in about 1968, involving mostly Ce/Pr. They normally prepped the 

waste on Thursday and Friday for the following week’s work. The waste batches were about 

500–1,000 liters. On this occasion, when they went in on Monday, Tank 112 was empty. The 

seals on the bottom outlet pump had failed, and the material had leaked out over the weekend. It 

went to the floor, drained to the sump, and was pumped to the waste vault, as the cell was 

designed to work. Some other very small leaks (drips) occurred in the load-out stall. Because of 
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the short half-lives and the amount of time, contamination from Ce/Pr spills that occurred in the 

1960s would not produce the high dose rates currently reported under B-Cell. 

Most of the contamination in B-Cell came from the FRG program. The biggest spill occurred in 

1986, when 500 L of liquid cesium nitrate was spilled in B-Cell. This spill is considered the 

most likely source of the soil contamination. Liquid cesium nitrate was being transferred from 

one vessel to another. It was a vacuum transfer, so there was no way to measure the liquid 

volumes during the transfer. After the transfer, workers observed that the volume was lower 

than it should have been. They found out there was a crack in a weld on a jumper. About 

200,000 Ci of cesium had spilled on the floor of the hot cell. This was very well characterized 

material. 

People who ran the processes in these cells documented things quite well, both the processes and 

the significant contamination incidents that occurred. Any significant spills or leaks that they 

knew about were documented in the record. There have always been records management 

requirements in place, at least since [the 1970s]. The researchers complied with those 

requirements. Individuals who were involved with specific incidents [during the R&D era] do 

not have these records and do not know where they are now. 

The records associated with Buildings 324/325 remained with the facility and were transferred to 

the new contractor when Battelle turned over the building. The records should have been passed 

along to each new contractor and/or stored with DOE. If the soil contamination was considered 

a surprise, how did the contractor perform their due diligence for characterizing the site before 

beginning the job? In addition to historical records of facility operations and incidents, several 

workers who did radiochemical processes in these buildings are still available with their 

institutional knowledge—some of them are still working for the contractors. To what extent did 

the contractor review historical documentation and talk to workers who have historical 

knowledge of the facilities? 

B-Cell Remediation 

Battelle started cleanout of seven hot cells (Buildings 324 & 325) in the late 1980s–early 1990s 

under a Surplus Facilities Management program. The emphasis of this effort was on recovering 

equipment and facilities for other uses. The Battelle program encouraged innovation. They 

made a lot of progress in 18 months, and they did the work safely and cost-effectively. They 

developed innovative techniques to reduce costs and personnel exposures. The buildings were 

later transferred to Babcock & Wilcox and other contractors after them. 

PNNL began cutting up material and equipment in B-Cell during the 1990s. Nothing was done 

to the building. They were cutting out equipment and racks, size reducing. There was some dirt 

on the floor, but mostly debris. Debris in B-Cell really started accumulating during cleanout. 

There was slag and metal from resizing efforts. [There was equipment such as] saws and 

torches. 

Several cutting methods were used in cell cleanout. Lasers did not work very well. A 

hydroknife used [high pressure] water with granite powder. The granite clogged up the nozzle. 
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When cutting with plasma torches, they used an electronic precipitator to plate out the smoke 

particles before they got to the filter. There is a report available on the web that shows a photo 

of a plasma torch cutting a metal plate. The picture is from B-Cell. You can see lead blankets in 

the photo [that were used for shielding]. 

The B-Cell cleanout [in the mid-1990s] involved a lot of size reduction and waste removal. 

They used plasma arc cutters to cut large equipment, racks, and other items down to a size that 

could fit into a cask for removal and disposal (about 6’ x 5’). They used a lot of grout to 

stabilize the waste material in the SEG casks. Some grout spilled on the cell floor during these 

operations. They packed about 2 casks per week and passed them out of the cell through the 

airlock to the Cask Handling Area. 

By the 1990s, the floor of B-Cell was covered in dirt and debris. There were a couple of 

problems with the cell design. One problem was that the manipulator arm was mounted 18 feet 

above the floor, but it only had a reach of 10 feet. Anything dropped on the floor stayed on the 

floor or had to be retrieved by the overhead crane. Each research project over the years had 

added to the accumulation of contaminated equipment and debris. The engineers had designed 

the floor to have a slight grade, so liquid spills would drain to the sump; there was a sensor in the 

sump to alarm when liquid was present, so it could be transferred to the HLV [High Level Vault] 

tanks. However, they didn’t account for the dust accumulation from operating the cell at 

negative pressure over many years. There was a layer of dust 3 to 5 inches deep on the floor of 

the hot cell. When the cesium spill occurred in 1986, the liquid had soaked into a layer of dust, 

rather than draining to the sump. When dried, it became a dispersible. This hazard was reported 

in a Safety Analysis Report in 1993. 

From the early 1990s to early 2000s, DOE was involved with RCRA cleanup of the HLV and 

REC in Building 324. They were dealing with mixed waste in A-, B-, and D-Cells. [Once the 

materials and equipment in the cells were designated as waste,] DOE was in violation of RCRA 

[Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] for having RCRA mixed waste in non-permitted 

areas. The State was not happy; they thought people had deliberately made the mess in B-Cell. 

As part of DOE’s effort to produce a Closure Plan for removal of dispersible waste from 

Building 324, a worker with 20 years of experience in Building 324 reviewed historical 

logbooks. They discovered an incident report from the mid-1980s (before the Point Beach fuel 

reprocessing). Workers had gone into the crawlspace under the airlock to install a line between 

B-Cell and the High Level Vault. Workers in the crawlspace noticed cracks in the concrete 

above them. They discovered that contamination had seeped to the soil in the crawlspace. They 

removed the contaminated soil and investigated the source. This contamination did not come 

from B-Cell, but from A-, C-, or D-Cell. The floor of B-Cell is a slab on grade, with no 

crawlspace or basement beneath it. 

The discovery of this information made DOE aware that they might not know about all past 

incidents, and that it was possible for lined hot cells to have leaks. They realized that they might 

encounter unexpected contamination during D&D of Building 324. DOE proposed to write into 

the Closure Plan a process for responding to new discoveries. The process included notifying 

state regulators and providing an investigation report of the finding within 90 days. 
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DOE’s proposal was accepted by the state regulators and incorporated into the Closure Plan. 

They had monthly meetings with the State to monitor progress towards the milestones (M-89-02 

Progress Monitoring Plan). They met the milestones for removing the dispersible material, using 

videos to demonstrate compliance. 

Dispersible contamination within the cell was handled remotely. Equipment racks were washed 

down with water before they were size-reduced and removed from containment. During 

cleanout, they dragged a 5-ton block across the cell to push the waste/debris. Sometimes the 

block could not break through the crust; it was like concrete. Then they built clam shells to 

scoop up the debris. 

Most of the debris and waste removed from 324, such as the FRG canisters and the grout 

containers, was TRU [transuranic waste], > Class C (RCRA). There is no end point storage 

available for it. They moved some waste to the PUREX tunnel. The rest went into shielded 

containers on a pad in 200 E. 

Discovery of Soil Contamination Under B-Cell 

The geoprobe measurements [that detected the soil contamination] were done as a proactive 

response to discovering a breach in the cell liner. The crack in the liner was noted from photos 

that WCH [Washington Closure Hanford] took of the cell interior to help with determination of 

cell inventory. 

While removing contaminated grout from B-Cell floor and sump, WCH identified a hole in the 

stainless steel liner at the floor of the sump. After the contaminated grout was removed, a 6-in 

layer of clean grout was poured over the whole floor, sealing the hole. 

 

They have bounded the horizontal footprint of the contaminated area. It appears to have gotten 

under the liner and seeped out along the concrete expansion joint along the perimeter of the cell 

floor. They now have a probe that will go into the cobble layer to verify the vertical bounds of 

the contamination. They are also planning to pull very small samples of soil (~ 5 cc) for 

analysis. 

General Information Regarding Building 324 and Related Facilities

Construction and Maintenance 

JA Jones was the primary construction contractor. They had a lot of highly trained and 

competent workers on site. JA Jones had very experienced skilled laborers. Facility people 

escorted them. Workers were paid extra on jobs with special conditions, such as respirator 

requirements. 

There wasn’t a big construction workforce in Building 324. Most installations for the hot cell 

were fabricated outside and passed in. JA Jones would do the fabrication offsite; Battelle 

technicians did installations in the hot cell. 
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There was quite a bit of construction in the late 1970s and the 1980s. They built an addition onto 

the front of Building 324. There were contracts with construction workers, primarily JA Jones 

and Kaiser, to do decontamination and maintenance in the cells. Millwrights worked on 

mechanical parts. 

Repairs in hot zones were common in the REC and SMF. Hot cell technicians could do complex 

work with manipulators. For example, a computer-operated CNC [Computer Numerically 

Controlled] lathe in a hot cell in Building 327 had an electrical failure in the late 1980s. It would 

cost $1.2 million to pull out, decontaminate, and replace the equipment. A hot cell technician 

worked with an electrician to figure out how to re-wire the equipment inside the cell. They 

rebuilt it with manipulators. SMF had cranes and remote detectors. Tools were put in with incell design criteria. Most equipment in the SMF was designed so that parts could be replaced 

remotely. 

Ventilation and balance workers check hood flows, air flow, HEPA filters, HEPA vacs, etc. 

Aerosol tests and smoke tests are used to indicate when filters need to be changed out. 

General Safety Culture 

 

Workers based in Buildings 324 and 325 reported that Battelle had an excellent safety program 

with very competent and experienced people. They took safety very seriously, sometimes 

bordering on overkill. Procedures were approved by four levels of disciplines, and they were 

followed precisely. If there was an error in the procedure, it was sent back for review and 

revision. 

It was a good building to work in—good people who worked well together. They did whatever it 

took to get the job done. In the 1980s, they were still in full production mode. It was very safe; 

they knew what was right. The safety attitude was very good. They took calculated risks to do 

the work that needed to be done, but it was well planned and controlled. Everyone had the same 

mentality. There was lots of planning and open discussions among workers. Most had a good 

working knowledge of how to do the job safely. The [informal] training program was effective; 

trainees were paired with experienced workers on the job. You really got to know your 

buildings. In later years, with more formal procedures and regulations, it became difficult to get 

things done efficiently. 

Workers participated in emergency/contingency planning. For example, a project in the SMF 

prepared cesium capsules for medical use. The “worst case scenario” they addressed was having 

a cask full of capsules get dumped on the floor [of the Cask Handling Area]. How would they 

pick them up in conditions up to 1 million R? 

Programs got more formal in the 1970s, and then became less precise as the mission moved from 

operations and research to construction/D&D. During operational years, precision and 

communication were very important—shutting off a fan in one area could impact work in other 

parts of the building. Under D&D, the need for high-level scrutiny was not as great, so the 

mindset changed. 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Some guys doing hot cell work were focused on getting the job done and thought the RadCon 

program was someone else’s job. They weren’t careless—they knew what things were definitely 

not in their interest and avoided those things—but they made considered choices in other matters 

where safety issues were secondary to getting work done. 

[In the mid-1990s], they had competent staff and good operational protection. 10 CFR 835 was 

new, so people were adapting to new processes and procedures. A RadCon worker thought it 

was noteworthy that the RadCon Manager said he would buy lunch for the first RCT 

[Radiological Control Technician] who called a “stop work,” and he did. 

In describing the cooperation and “mutual dedication to safety” demonstrated by Battelle and 

Westinghouse, a worker offered an example from Building 325 that he characterized as a “near 

miss.” A highly radioactive solution had soaked through the HEPA filters, so that it was exposed 

to a high flow of air that had no additional filtration. It was important to remove the radioactive 

material before it dried and became airborne. Battelle was responsible for causing the spill, but 

Westinghouse was responsible for the HEPA filters and downstream ductwork, including 

monitoring the exhaust air. Battelle workers contacted Westinghouse and they jointly decided 

that Battelle was in the best position to remove the radioactive material with Westinghouse 

observers. The work went quickly and smoothly, and no increase was noted in exhaust air. Both 

companies really do practice safety first. 

Chemical safety was lacking in comparison to rad safety. Industrial Hygiene was still in its 

infancy [in the 1980s]. With PNNL, rad safety was very good—formal programs, well 

controlled. Chemical safety on the cold side was not well controlled. 

Access Controls 

Access controls changed over time. A worker who started in the late 1970s does not remember 

having to go through “super security” in the beginning. Maybe the fence and enhanced security 

came a couple of years later. In the 1970s, you could come up to the building outside, but you 

needed a Q Clearance to enter the building. 

In the 1980s, security was very tight, with the exclusionary fence in place. There was a fence 

and a badge house restricting access to the inner 300 Area. There was a fence around 308, 324, 

325, and 328 (not 327) with a badge house. [Entry to the fenced area] was monitored by 

Hanford Patrol. A guard/patrolman in the badge house checked workers’ badges as they entered. 

You had to be on an approved list to enter. Access was controlled by area; workers within the 

fence could go between buildings. Building 308 did fuel processing and had guards inside the 

building. 

Later, the fence was torn down, they stopped using the guard house, and building access was 

controlled with prox cards and escorts. The guard house was taken down around 2004. 

The fence was removed and clearance requirements went away in the early 1990s. By [the mid1990s], there were no fences or building zones. You could go wherever you wanted within the 

300 Area. A prox card was needed to get in the building; this was controlled by DOE. Now, 
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there is just a CERCLA [Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 

Act] construction fence (chain link). You could get inside the building; high rad keys still 

control the cells. 

When SNM [Special Nuclear Material] was present, access and egress to the SNM was 

controlled. Egress from the area around the SNM was maintained for compliance with Life 

Safety Code. By about 2003, the spent fuel was gone. 

Within Building 324, there was no free-flowing traffic to the hot gallery areas. You went there 

for a specific reason. It was well marked, designated as a radiological control area, with egress 

monitors. People were trained not to enter posted radiation areas. 

One interviewee stated there was a card index that controlled access to the operating galleries of 

the hot cells. To get an access card, you had to have a need for access and rad worker training. 

The access card to the facility was separate from the ID/dosimetry badge. Another interviewee 

said Omni-locks were used on doors, basically a key-code lock when areas were not in use. 

Non-rad workers were not supposed to enter radiological work areas. They could be escorted to 

certain radiological areas. There was no physical barrier preventing someone from going into 

radiological areas. Sometimes someone might get into the wrong area, such as a janitor getting 

lost in the building. Janitors and managers sometimes wandered where they should not be. They 

were escorted out and frisked. 

Guards coming through on night maneuvers (post-9/11) were not restricted from zones. In case 

of emergency, they were expected to go in, take care of the emergency, and address 

radiation/contamination issues after stabilizing the situation. 

Radiological Controls 

[In the 1980s,] Battelle had its own RadCon group that covered the workers doing the processes. 

As building owners, Westinghouse [RadCon] people covered maintenance activities, such as 

filter change-outs. [Westinghouse personnel] covered work in the Radiometallurgy Cells and 

EDLs. Workers made entries in the East and South cells all the time. The construction crews 

might bring in their own RadCon or use Westinghouse RadCon. They usually had their own 

timekeepers for tasks. There was collaborative planning between construction and facility staff 

to plan staff around the work conditions and the job. 

Battelle first assigned Rad Engineers to buildings in 1995. Before that, Battelle had various 

radiological support roles, but not building-specific field Rad Engineers. 

RWPs [Radiation Work Permits] were very general in the 1980s. They weren’t tailored to the 

specific job like they are today. They had some limits, no individual basis; more like a sign. 

They were required, but they were generally ignored. They were almost all the same, essentially; 

“Do what the RCT tells you.” Workers relied on individual training, knowledge, and 

professional judgment to respond to conditions and situations encountered in the field. 
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[In the 1990s], there were routine and job-specific RWPs. Procedures are in the Hanford 

RadCon Manual (1994), which mirrored the DOE RadCon Manual. The RWPs covered 

engineering/administrative controls, dosimetry, limiting conditions, etc. They were rigorous and 

were followed. RadCon Supervisors and Rad Engineers reviewed and approved RWPs. In some 

cases, RWP requirements were integrated into work documents for low-risk, routine work. The 

goal was to consolidate all requirements into one document. 

Timekeeping was used to limit personnel exposures for specific jobs, such as decontaminating 

hot cells in Building 325 or a new crane installation. Timekeeping was used for hot jobs; not so 

much for routine work. If dose rates were fairly high, they sometimes used timekeeping, either 

alone or in combination with self-reading dosimetry, to control exposure. They preferred to use 

self-reading dosimetry and used that when it was available. It usually was. 

In the 1980s, timekeeping was used, but not documented. It was not recorded on RWPs. There 

might be a note on the survey report saying what time restriction was necessary for the 

conditions. Survey reports have 75-year retention; they should be available. 

RadCon would do a pre-job survey and brief the workers. Even when monitoring real-time 

exposures, the RCT did not tell the workers what to do in response to a high field. The RCT 

advised them of conditions as they were noted, but only the Ops Supervisor had the authority to 

direct the workers. Too many people giving directions would cause confusion, hesitation, and 

increased time and dose. 

Preliminary surveys and exposure estimates were made for specific jobs. Real-time dosimetry 

was not 100% accurate. A supervisor was involved in estimating exposures and planning for hot 

jobs. They used remote survey equipment to assess conditions for the job. They evaluated the 

job to be performed considering the work activities and estimating the length of time needed to 

complete the task. This information was used to make job assignments and determine time limits 

for the job. They had pretty good confidence in these estimates. The goal was for estimates to 

be accurate within 5%–10% of the actual exposure for the job, and they met that most of the 

time. There were 20–40 people making entries, and the workers watched it [accuracy of 

estimates]. RadCon investigated when the actual values were not consistent with the preliminary 

estimates. 

Room 15 was a filter room. A lot of building prints did not have it listed. It was a very hot 

area—there was a 3-minute time limit for working in there. That is where they kept A-Frame 

HEPA filters. There was a lot of grease—it was nasty down there. A worker was involved when 

the last A-Frame filter was pulled [in Building 324]. It may have been from D-Cell. The job 

was completed without incident. A carpenter was budgeted about 700 mrem to replenish the 

grease seal, and they stayed well below that (~300–400 mrem). 

They self-monitored at the work location and when exiting radiation areas. At the work location, 

they monitored with PAM [Portable Alpha Monitor] and GM [Geiger Muller]. When leaving the 

area, they used whatever monitoring was available. In early years, this was a counter to measure 

both alpha and beta/gamma on hands, and portable instruments for feet. With time, this 

improved to include hand and foot counters, and finally one to also monitor the whole body. 
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Hand and foot monitors were hard to set up for alpha. Radon interfered. The first portal 

monitors [whole-body detector] came years later. An interviewee recalled getting portal 

monitors—PCMs [Personnel Contamination Monitors]—in the 1990s. 

If anything, one interviewee said the hand and foot monitors may have been too sensitive. There 

was a high rate of false alarms—maybe 90% of alarms were false positives. Static electricity 

caused false alarms. Once, a lady on a tour with high heeled shoes poked a hole in the mylar. 

If the monitor was down, someone was stationed there with equipment to frisk people out. 

Positive results were reported to Radiation Protection, and workers followed their direction in 

recovering. They also evaluated the work site to see if improvements needed to be made. 

When exiting the airlock [in the 1990s], workers went through three stages of monitoring. They 

did an initial scan within the contamination zone, went through a PCM to exit the contamination 

area, and a hand and foot monitor to exit the Radiation Buffer Area. 

Rad [release] standards for laundry were less stringent than for egress. They got many false 

positives from frisking that were from laundered clothing and not contamination picked up 

during the job. 

Survey equipment [in the 1980s and 1990s] included SNOOPY (NRC AN/PDR-70 BF3 

proportional) for neutrons, PAM for alpha, and GM with various probes for beta/gamma. Cutie 

Pies and area monitors were used. Other instruments with higher detection ranges were used as 

well. They used ‘teletectors’ with 12-ft remote extensions to monitor waste as it was brought to 

the airlock threshold. RO-7 was another remote detector for process monitoring in cells. It had a 

long cable that could be put into the cell through a port and positioned with a manipulator. Now, 

they use a 100 cm2

 detector (DC alpha/beta instrument – Ludlum 2360 with 4390 probe). [Other 

current instruments include] GMs with pancakes and shielded probes, extendable teletectors, 

RO-20 dose rate monitor, and rem balls for neutrons. 

There was very little alpha monitoring in the hot cells during Westinghouse days. The thought 

was “there is no alpha” due to the materials used. 

Functional test sources were used for daily checks; PNNL Site Services performed calibrations. 

Documents, reports, and calibration records all had to be maintained. They have lifetime 

retention and would be PNNL records. 

There wasn’t much change to the facility over time. The hot cells were designed with negative 

pressure, and HEPA filters were in place before 1980. Some technology shortfalls were 

identified from the 1980s: 

 From the early days, they wanted to get detectors down to a small size. Very small 

detectors had geometry problems—they were not seeing the whole field. 

 Many correction factors were used. For example, the CP [Cutie Pie] instrument had 

correction factors for neutrons as well as alpha readings. It’s safe to say that most all 
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readings needed a correction factor. An error in using the right correction factor meant a 

large difference between the true dose and the worker’s reading. 

 Air samplers were fixed, based on known/anticipated sources of high airborne 

concentrations, and their placement was not based on air flow patterns. A later smoketesting study showed that some were in bad locations, and they had to be moved. 

 Early computers using metal tape for programs calculated data incorrectly. The 

calculations were sent to Seattle to evaluate if the error made a difference. 

A worker could not think of any [technology] shortfalls from the 1990s. The Operations groups 

were very responsive and proactive. The prevailing attitude was “Let’s try this.” 

Engineering controls were usually confinement of the radioactive material and airflow from 

areas of low contamination to areas of high contamination. Administrative controls were 

working from areas of lowest dose rate, minimizing the time of exposure, and using protective 

equipment specified for the task. Controls were already established by 1994. The Operations 

group had their own ALARA [As Low As Reasonably Achievable] person, who had RadCon 

experience. 

In the gallery, they would wear shoe covers, gloves, and a lab coat. They had area radiation 

monitoring alarms, so action could be taken if unexpected levels of radiation were present. 

Galleries were usually clean. They only designated them as CAs [Contamination Areas] when it 

became a DOE occurrence to find a speck of contamination on your shoe. It became very costly 

(about $40K) in lost time for evaluations. It became more cost-effective to have everyone dress 

out for a CA than to stop, report, and evaluate every situation. 

Contamination in the gallery mostly came from manipulator change-outs. Also, water leaked out 

of plugs during [hot cell] wash-down with the split plug design. Plugs had a split design, so 

electrical lines could be run through them. Contamination could get out around the plugs 

[capillary action] and leach out through the plugs [diffusion]. They routinely checked the plugs 

for contamination. Plugs were sometimes removed; this was a routine, everyday practice. You 

pulled the plug, put it in a bag, did the job, replaced the plug, and cleaned up the area. An 

example of good contamination control and monitoring processes was the establishment of a 

radiological buffer area when pulling the split plugs. The plug design changed later. After the 

racks came out, shield plugs went over the penetrations. 

RadCon got directly involved with cask handling operations, because the exposure potential and 

the need for worker protection became significant at that point [as material came out of the hot 

cell]. 

They used a pressure washer to decontaminate the airlock. When workers made airlock entries, 

they wore two pairs of coveralls and gloves. Depending on the job, they might have boots and 

air lines. If liquid or gross airborne contamination might be involved, there was an outer layer of 

plastic over the coveralls. 
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PPE [personnel protective equipment] changed over time. They used full face masks with 

canisters in the 1980s; air lines were used more starting in the 1990s. They always wore masks 

when making entries. Properly fitted respirators prevented inhalation exposures. Plastic air suits 

were used, depending on the level of activity of the particular job. [In the mid-1990s,] they used 

full bubble suits with air lines for airlock entries. “Cut men” helped the workers by cutting them 

out of disposable protective suits when the job was completed. Workers were always evaluated 

for contamination by RadCon. 

There were weaknesses in the inventory system—mass balance did not always account for 

everything. What you shipped out wasn’t everything that came in. There was dust, residual, or 

material lost up the stack. 

Stacks were monitored continuously. There were fixed air samplers in the galleries. The filter 

diameter was about 1 1⁄2 inches. [In the 1980s,] the fixed head air samplers were not based on 

smoke tests and were not in the best locations. Some CAMs [Continuous Air Monitors] 

remained in a particular area; additional CAMs would be brought in near the work area when 

they anticipated a higher potential for airborne contamination. Portable pumps were used when 

[they wanted readings] closer to the work than the stationary filters. They took high-volume 

grab samples. The location and type of air sampling were determined by Radiation Protection. 

RadCon managed the air sampling; instrument technicians serviced the equipment. One 

interviewee recalled there was not a lot of airborne contamination in 324. It was very rare to get 

CAM alarms. 

[In the 1990s,] they had fixed CAMs in specific locations, such as the galleries. Smoke checks 

were used to identify appropriate locations for air samplers. There was an initial assessment and 

probably annual checks afterwards. Fixed heads were checked routinely, about once a week. 

They would also be checked after jobs. 

Grab air samplers, such as the SAIC H-810 high-volume sampler, were used on jobs. For highrisk jobs, they put a grab sampler as close to the breathing zone as possible, between the source 

and the worker. For example, when people were working on a manipulator port high up on the 

wall, they strung the grab air sampler up within about 1 foot of the worker. The sampler was 

close enough to the workers that the noise was bothering them. 

Most interviewees do not recall lapel samplers being used. Lapel and breathing zone monitoring 

did not come into use until after 2005. One interviewee said they sometimes wore breathing 

zone samplers when going into the airlock. Now the workers are packing 20 pounds of 

monitoring equipment. 

Removing a manipulator for repair was handled very carefully to avoid exposure and control 

contamination. If the boot was intact, the internal structures [of the manipulator] were not 

exposed to the cell environment, and they stayed clean. If the boot ruptured, the manipulator 

would be contaminated. They would pull the manipulator as soon as possible after a boot 

rupture in order to minimize the contamination. They attempted to decontaminate the 

manipulator within the cell, then pulled it out through a sleeve and completed the 

decontamination as needed. 
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They shut down the gallery while pulling out the manipulator. When they changed out 

manipulators, there was plastic all over. They put tubular plastic over the opening from the cold 

side and covered the manipulator as it came out. There was a decon station in the EDL lab. 

Workers had continual RCT coverage, and there was a CAM in the vicinity. Contaminations did 

occur, especially if the manipulator boot was breached. Pipe sleeves on transfer tanks could also 

cause contamination, but this was rare. 

In-cell work was not hands-on, because the materials were too hot. Multiple layers of gloves 

were worn for most all hands-on work. They typically wore several layers of disposable gloves 

when work was done in the airlocks. They wore two pairs of surgeon’s gloves and one pair of 

work gloves. Some work was done with bare hands, because gloves interfered with very fine 

technical work. This was fairly common in the “little cells” in 327, where they handled very fine 

wires. It didn’t happen much in 324. 

 

Hot cell cleanup occurred in 325 Building as they finished one job and prepared for the next. 

Usually, they removed as much radioactive material as possible, removed any large equipment 

that did not require excessive shielding, and cut up any other equipment to be discarded into 

small enough pieces to fit in a solid waste cask. If personnel entry were to be made into the hot 

cells, they used extensive flushing to reduce background radiation levels. They used remote 

sensors to measure residual radiation levels. When levels were low enough, they developed 

plans to provide whatever additional cleaning was needed. Protective equipment requirements 

were defined in the work permit prepared for the job by Radiation Protection. Some areas of 

Building 324 could accommodate worker entries into hot cells, but the B-Cell could not be 

entered because of excessive dose rates. 

Eating, drinking, smoking, and chewing were not allowed in the work area. This was tightly 

controlled; they only ate in the lunchroom. According to one interviewee, it may have been OK 

to eat in the control room, but food was not allowed in hot work areas or even in the EDL. 

Another interviewee recalled that there were drinking fountains in contaminated areas. Some 

people chewed tobacco or gum, but they weren’t supposed to do so. Sometimes candy wrappers 

or cigarette butts were seen, but it was not common. It was against the rules and they would not 

want to get caught. In later years, they set up areas and surveyed them to create smoking areas. 

PNNL does most of the environmental monitoring for the site. The contractor companies did 

some monitoring, as well. RadCon workers assigned to Building 324 [in the mid-1990s] 

performed routine surface surveys of the yard around the building. Field characterization for 

Building 324 was already established by this time. Official reports have a 75-year retention 

requirement. They are in Seattle, mostly under PNNL records. 

External Monitoring 

External gamma was a significant consideration in Building 324 during operational years. Most 

of the external dose for the whole Hanford site came from 324. An interviewee once tried to list 

the times he encountered dose rates of 100 R/hr or more; he came up with at least a dozen 

occasions from memory. Another interviewee commented that a worker could get 20mR/day in 

Building 327 just doing the typical work [without any incidents]. 
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The external dose of record was monitored by TLD. PNNL Site Services handled this. They 

still do. PNNL read TLDs and finger rings—the dose of record. Monthly exchange was typical 

for routine jobs. They would exchange and read dosimeters immediately after hot jobs. 

Supplemental dosimetry, such as pencils and electronic dosimeters, was managed by the RadCon 

group. Pocket dosimeters and electronic dosimeters were read by facility RadCon personnel for 

the individual companies. Supplemental dosimeters were job-specific, not full time. RadCon 

reviewed PNNL dose reports against their supplemental dosimetry records and evaluated 

discrepancies. 

Neutron dosimetry provided a dose of record only; there were no supplemental neutron 

dosimeters until about 2006. RCTs used Snoopys and rem balls to monitor dose rates, which 

were considered in job planning. They might make changes, such as more frequent checking of 

the TLD, if warranted. Neutrons were not a significant component of work in 324 at that time. 

Anyone who had to enter a radiological zone had a Hanford TLD. The majority of construction 

workers were Rad workers, because most of the work was radiological. They were badged. JA 

Jones [construction contractor] had their own monitoring and timekeeping personnel. 

An interviewee stated that everyone he knew was monitored. Everyone was monitored; non-rad 

workers just had longer exchange intervals. [Dosimeter exchange frequency was related to work 

activities.] An individual who worked mostly in the control room and gallery had an annual 

exchange cycle. A worker who performed operations for the NWVP was on weekly exchange 

for a while. An interviewee went to monthly exchange, because he was only out in the gallery 

once or twice a day. Other workers reported monthly and quarterly exchange frequencies. [In 

the 1980s,] most everyone working in the cells had monthly exchanges. Exempt people were on 

annual or quarterly exchange. 

The majority of people who worked routinely in and around Building 324 were badged, but there 

were unmonitored people who visited the building (e.g., administrative workers, mail delivery, 

document copy workers). It would be possible, though not likely or common, for an 

unmonitored person to get to areas where they might be exposed. In other areas of Hanford in 

the 1980s, unmonitored people could and did get into areas where they could be exposed. 

A manager received reports of dosimetry results for his department from PNNL. He does not 

recall how often he received these reports. Individuals received annual exposure summaries by 

mail. 

Workers kept their dosimeters with them; it was part of the facility ID badge on a “necklace” that 

they wore. People kept their badges—took them home. This practice was never changed; it is 

still done that way. The TLD could be exposed to heat (e.g., put on the dash in a car). Workers 

were advised not to take their Hanford badge when visiting another site. They were not 

supposed to be worn in public. 

[Interviewees had different experiences in regard to dosimetry compliance.] Some interviewees 

said they were not aware of any deliberate non-use of badges. Another interviewee recalled that 

TLDs were sometimes left in lockers, both intentionally and unintentionally. People also put 
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TLDs in plastic, ostensibly to prevent contamination. A few layers of plastic could knock down 

the beta dose read by the TLD. [Intentional manipulation of TLD readings] was more common 

in some areas and buildings than in others. Regulations and enforcement got stronger in the 

early- to mid-1990s. 

Pencils were used in the hot cell area. The operators used pencils and their film badges during 

airlock entries. Multiple badges and finger rings were issued for specific jobs. Glovebox 

workers got finger rings if their extremity dose was expected to be about 5 times higher than 

whole-body dose. Glovebox workers who met the “5 times extremity rule” had routine finger 

rings; the TLD chips were read monthly. People who did a lot of neutron work got supplemental 

neutron badges around the 1990s or early 2000s. 

Electronic dosimeters and telemetry were used for supplemental monitoring for hot jobs; they 

were not accurate to measure the dose of record. One interviewee said telemetry would read 

about ±10% from the TLD. N-chips for neutrons were used when spent fuel was present (not 

continuous). 

They were quick to use innovative technology. For example, Battelle adopted a telemetry 

system in 1994. The system (SAIC PDX-4) used remote communication to display real-time 

dose rates from multiple detectors on the body. This system included extremity monitoring. 

Someone at the monitor could direct the worker to move away from a higher field based on input 

from dosimeters on his arm or leg. Another worker indicated [the PDX-4] was not rugged 

enough for their environment [in another work area]. They used PD-4, a gamma detector with 

remote RF readout, to track dose rates in real time for an area of the body that was of most 

concern for a specific job. 

An interviewee was not aware whether neutron:photon ratios or neutron spectral analysis was 

done for Building 324. They knew to monitor packages and workers for neutrons. In 324, there 

were neutrons from FFTF fuel, foreign fuel, etc. “Rem balls” (Bonner Spheres) were attempted. 

A “SNOOPY” [an NP-2 proportional counter filled with boron trifluoride, BF3] was used. There 

was a great disparity between SNOOPY and TLD values. TLDs had to be in contact with the 

skin to get close agreement (albedo effect), so they would tape the TLD to the worker’s chest. 

TLDs were not accurate in the 1980s, especially for neutron doses. People would be working in 

a field of 1 rem/hr neutrons, but the badge would only read a fraction of that. In some situations, 

exposure estimates were hand-calculated and entered into the dose record. For example, actinide 

pins had extremely high neutron dose rates. There was greater than 50% (factor of 2) difference 

between the RadCon readings and the TLD reading. They hand-calculated neutron exposures 

based on the dose rates for a group of foreign visitors on this project. 

[In the Safeguards Vault and Laboratory Area,] there was a glovebox and an open face hood for 

repackaging or mixing. A procedure limited the number of cans that could be out at a time, but it 

was not followed. The guys performing inventories and assays of the cans would take out more 

than allowed, which caused a high dose rate in the area. An operations worker went down [to the 

Fissile Materials Storage Vault] during a tour with the Tiger Team, and the tour leader left. An 

auditor noted that an item was not positioned where the inventory indicated, and the worker in 
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charge of the vault reached down and moved it to a different shelf. When those present 

expressed alarm at the move, he moved it back; he did not follow correct procedure for moving 

the material. There were 5 critiques in 5 days over that event. Another interviewee noted that on 

one occasion, a worker changed the configuration of material without checking why the material 

was out of place and if it was safe to move it. [SC&A does not know if the interviewees were 

referring to the same event or different events.] 

The union had an administrative limit of 300 mrem/week for electricians, millwrights, and hot 

cell workers. The DOE limit was 2 rem/year before that. Electricians, millwrights, and hot cell 

techs were likely to get 1,100–1,200 mrem/year. For years, they just sent in exception requests 

for some of these people at the beginning of the year [because they were likely to approach or 

exceed administrative limits]. 

They tried to stay within an administrative limit of 1,500 mrem/yr in the 1980s. They tried to 

keep individual exposures below 300 mrem/week. Typical doses were on the order of 100–

200 mrem/week, based on pencil dosimeters. The dose of record from the TLD was not that 

high. 

[When unusual dosimetry results occurred,] they would increase the frequency of dosimetry 

exchange (i.e., pull the issued dosimeter early to evaluate). The RadCon group had a dosimetry 

person who would investigate the cause of the unusual result. Findings were documented in an 

Investigative Operational Dosimetry Report (IODR). 

RadCon investigated anomalies between pencil and TLD results. Sometimes they found causes 

not related to work, such as workers on annual exchanges who put their dosimeter next to a 

radium dial watch at night, medical injections, etc. Investigating a high pencil reading [from a 

neutron area] that did not match the TLD, they concluded that bad dosimetry placement affected 

the TLD result. It was not in contact with the skin. 

A worker typically held a survey instrument in his left hand, near the left hip, using his right 

hand to adjust controls and settings. He wore his TLD on his right hip. He was essentially 

standing sideways to the source with the TLD on the far side of his body. 

Partial body exposure was not a significant issue with hot cell work. Split plugs and swing ports 

were areas of localized non-uniform external exposure potential; they used ring dosimeters and 

had good RadCon processes in place. Collimated beams were associated with transfer ports or 

shielding voids from the hot cells. In the 1980s, the material for the vitrification project was 

very hot. During manipulator or window change-outs, they could get 50 R/hr beams out of the 

cell through the shielding. Beam intensity was highly variable over a short distance, depending 

on position relative to the portal. [RadCon personnel] from Battelle and Westinghouse helped to 

monitor, due to the large dose rates through the building. 

Internal Monitoring 

Several interviewees reported routine bioassays not triggered by incidents, but they did not recall 

the frequency of bioassays. Bioassay needs were determined by Radiation Protection. They 
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varied from one-time samples to integrated samples for a full week. At one time, some workers 

in Building 325 were on a weekly schedule that lasted for a few years. The interviewee doesn’t 

recall the details, but thinks it involved collecting all urine passed from 1 hour before retiring to 

1 hour after awakening. Most people were on routine bioassay. An interviewee submitted 

samples at least annually, depending on the isotopes. An operations worker had routine annual 

bioassays. Special bioassay was also pulled in response to an event. They would assay for 

specific radionuclides based on the job, such as Cs, Sr, Pu, H3. Workers were usually on a 

bioassay program. Sometimes they would change the radionuclide [being handled] and not get 

changed to the proper bioassay for a while. 

A worker who handled “a bunch of exotic materials that were irradiated” indicated no unique 

bioassay [1980s]. Most of the materials were encapsulated. 

Some interviewees reported routine chest or whole-body counts. Head counts were done for Sr. 

Chest/head or whole-body counts (e.g., for fission products) were done by PNNL. Whole-body 

counts were done once a year until a few years ago. The historical contractor was PNNL; the 

current contractor is AdvanceMed Hanford. 

One interviewee had physicals once a year, whole-body counts a few times, and bioassay 

samples about three times in his career. The bioassays were 24-hour urine collections. 

Internal monitoring results were not explained in detail. It was just “below levels.” An 

interviewee doesn’t recall much discussion of results—more like passing in the hall and saying, 

“you’re OK.” 

[In the 1990s,] workers in Building 324 had annual whole-body counts (WBCs) at a minimum. 

Additional counts were done as needed, when there was airborne contamination or a suspected 

potential for uptake. WBCs were done near the Federal Building. Bioassay was required for 

workers who entered contamination areas. They delivered urine collection jugs to the worker’s 

door (at home) and picked them up. It is still done that way now. 

Incidents and Unusual Occurrences 

If they were working and got any alarm, they would get the RCT. If there were multiple alarms, 

they would stop work and re-evaluate. 

Defining an incident as something not going as planned and requiring an alternative approach, 

they were pushing the envelope much of the time, and they had a lot of incidents. Usually there 

was no radiation exposure above allowable limits and no extensive decontamination. Some 

interviewees did not recall releases or major containment failures. They had other events that 

could have led to unexpected exposure to employees, and these should have been documented in 

DOE reports by PNNL Lab Safety. Lab Safety maintained a database of incident reports. 

Levels of reporting problems, in increasing order of severity, are off-normal occurrences, 

incidents, and accidents. An off-normal occurrence could be anything—a personnel 

contamination event or a new piece of equipment that didn’t meet specifications to pass the QA 
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inspection. Records of off-normal events should be in the DOE database. Lost work time (e.g., 

if an injured employee visits a clinic) results in a public report to the state Department of Labor 

and Industries. DOE contractors are required to submit monthly reports of lost work time to 

DOE. 

[Interviewees had varying perspectives on the frequency and severity of contamination 

incidents.] One worker got clothing contaminated off and on—nothing serious. There were 

written protocols for handling skin contamination events. Another interviewee recalled hand and 

foot monitor alarms, but the contamination came off with duct tape. The interviewee did not 

recall any skin contamination events that required washing, scrubbing, etc. Another worker said 

skin contaminations were fairly frequent. 

Another interviewee said containment failures, contamination spreads, and skin contaminations 

were very common in the 1980s. Skin contamination up to 10,000 dpm beta/gamma was not 

documented if it could be washed off. Wool wax was sometimes used to remove contamination. 

They packed wool and wax on the affected area, covered it with a glove, and sent the worker 

home. Skin peels with potassium permanganate were very common. They might do up to three 

peels. 

Another interviewee recalled exposures and skin contamination were fairly common, especially 

in Building 327. People got contaminated on the face, nose, and areas they touched with a 

contaminated glove. Usually it was easily removed. Some people had to do skin peels and nasal 

irrigations. Before portal monitors were in use, a worker once went home with contamination in 

the worker’s hair. When the worker checked his coveralls the next day to reuse them, they were 

contaminated. They checked the worker’s home to make sure the worker had not spread 

contamination there. 

A RadCon worker heard about an incident that occurred before his time. People referred to it as 

“Black Friday,” when 4 or 5 people got contaminated in 1 day. Processes had been changed as a 

result of this event. 

Containment failure was fairly common, but relatively few in consideration of the amount of 

work performed. An interviewee does not recall any ventilation failures. One RadCon worker 

did not remember that there were many skin contaminations during [the late-1990s and early 

2000s] in Building 324. They had low-level clothing contaminations, but nothing noteworthy. If 

skin contaminations were common in earlier years (as reported to SC&A in an earlier interview), 

changes in processes and PPE may have rectified the problem. They did not use rain gear any 

more; they had bubble suits filled with air. The hood of the bubble suit was taped to the body of 

the suit, and the whole thing inflated from the incoming air. This kept the workers cooler and 

tended to push contamination out in the event of a puncture (due to positive pressure inside the 

suit). After the job, the worker was cut out of the suit in a controlled manner to minimize the 

potential for skin contamination. 

The primary solvent for decontaminating equipment was isopropyl alcohol. They went through 

gallons of it. If workers did not wear latex gloves, the isopropyl alcohol could carry 

contamination deeper into the skin. 
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You can review DOE occurrence reports to assess the frequency of skin contaminations. One 

worker recalled about 20 occurrence reports per year; about 6–8 of these were for skin 

contaminations. About half of the contamination occurrences came from clean laundry release 

levels being higher than operational detection levels. They would find that someone was hot 

before leaving the changing room. The other half were found while exiting the airlock. They 

filmed and did smoke tests, but often couldn’t identify the source. 

RadCon did follow-up reviews on contamination events. They assigned DAC [Derived Air 

Concentration]-hours for incidents. A RadCon worker vaguely remembered a DAC-hour 

tracking form. DAC-hour tracking is traceable to individuals for specific jobs. PNNL would 

have had the data. 

RadCon also participated in pre-job and post-job assessment meetings. When workers got an 

uptake, they got bioassays and WBCs. Managers also participated in a review/investigation if 

someone had a positive uptake. They got reports from PNNL, did evaluations and Lessons 

Learned. On one occasion, there were four minor skin contaminations in 1 day. That was a 

notable event. They were minor contaminations, but there were 4 in 1 day. They shut down 

operations to evaluate why they got contaminated and how to correct it. 

They did not see beta burns related to Hanford in the 1980s and 1990s. An older worker (now 

deceased) told an interviewee about the old days (1940s and 1950s) when they used a skin 

redness chart to estimate exposure. An older worker told an interviewee about an incident where 

they dumped the payload of a bowling ball cask in the Cask Handling Area. They measured a 

dose rate of 1 R/hr in the lunchroom. Workers went in without their dosimetry to clean up the 

spill. 

An interviewee was present for a 1986 incident involving Cs-137 in the truck lock. There were 

at least 4 HEPA filters on an A-Frame filter bank for B-Cell. The spot where they took readings 

to monitor the filter was about 6 feet away from the filters. The normal trigger to change the 

filter was when the reading at that location got up to 500 mR/hr. On this occasion, the survey 

reading was several R/hr at the 6-ft location. An RCT using a teletector on a pole measured 

>120 R/hr, about a foot from the filters, during removal of the filter bank. A crane cable caught 

and tipped over the filter bank during the removal procedure. The CAM in the gallery alarmed, 

and they could read smears on a Cutie Pie. An RCT crawled through high dose areas in the truck 

lock (behind a shield block) to hook the cable back on the filter bank so it could be righted. 

An interviewee recalled an incident when [two workers] got an internal uptake of Cs. When they 

washed down a cell, water would run into Room 18 in the basement. On this occasion, a plastic 

bag taped to the wall in Room 18 appeared to contain water. It turned out not to have water; 

what they saw was a dried water mark, so they inhaled dust from the bag. That room also had a 

poor exhaust design; the exhauster was above their heads. Nasal smears and a WBC were done 

and intakes were assigned. 

Some millwrights got contaminated in Room 147 once. The cause was not identified 

conclusively. A high exhauster may have pulled airborne activity past them. A manager had 

them move the exhaust down low and moved the work table. 
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One incident occurred in Building 325 in the mid-1980s; they got lines crossed and shot water 

into the vacuum system. A puddle of water on the floor had high alpha readings; it was 

measurable on the second scale for alpha above the water surface. A worker vacuumed it up 

with a ShopVac, but an RCT kicked it over to spill the water back out to avoid potential 

criticality. 

In July 1989, a B-Cell furnace plug leaked during decontamination by water flushing. Spots 

outside the cell in Room 18 read up to 500 R/h. The high reported intensities may not have been 

widespread; they could have been localized readings from hot particles, which did not extend 

beyond a very small area. 

In October 1990, cesium chloride spread through SMF gallery when a contaminated sleeve was 

withdrawn from south cell. 

A maintenance worker was working on shielded pipes in a high radiation area with chain link 

fence. The worker had to pull the lead shielding and stick a pitot tube in [a pipe] to check the air 

flow. An RCT took a swipe and left the worker to do the job. He surveyed before the job; the 

worker doesn’t remember him surveying the dose rate during the job. The job was supposed to 

take 2–3 days. The worker maxed out his dose for the month on his supplemental dosimeter 

after 1 or 2 days, and he was pulled from the job. [This incident occurred within the last 

10 years.] 

Waste Management 

There were several different liquid waste systems. 

 Process water sewers carried non-contaminated waste water. 

 There was a retention system with diverters and holding tanks. This system was for 

chemical waste with only low levels of radioactivity. Retention basins were at 

Building 340; they checked the incoming waste there. 

 The Radioactive Liquid Waste System [RLWS] took chemical and radioactive waste 

from the hot sinks, etc., from many buildings in the 300 Area to Building 340. 

The RLWS was considered to be a controlled location and not part of the environment. For 

many years, there were no limits on what went there. There were guides for what materials 

could be dumped, but it included pretty much everything. 

Solvents used to decontaminate manipulators and equipment included xylene, TCE, and ethyl 

and isopropyl alcohol. They became more sensitive to waste issues over time. In the late 1980s 

and 1990s, they had to use “approved” solvents and lubricants. 

Building 340 occasionally had stuff show up that should not have been in that system. If they 

could not determine the origin, they would call around to the buildings to figure out where it 

came from. It was fairly common to get calls. An interviewee felt that 324 got blamed or 
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impacted (e.g., fewer receipts allowed) for transfers and surprises that were not their fault. 

Eventually, the hot sinks were locked down, and they had to be unlocked to send waste out. 

A worker recalls that the RLWS got plugged up. They came in and blocked the drains off—the 

worker does not remember when. After that, they began using wet rags [to clean surfaces]—

wipe it down and get a new one. He doesn’t recall if this was a temporary practice or permanent 

change. 

Waste transfers from 324 [to the RLWS] were infrequent (when tanks were emptied). Waste 

was sampled and transfers were approved in advance. Any problems were discussed and 

resolved. They pumped low-level waste and condensate every 90 days. They did not have any 

organics in their effluents from 324. Building 327 dumped some acids from the fume hood 

sinks. They were diluted in retention tanks. 

The new [RLWS] system is stainless steel. With the old RLWS, waste often ate through the 

pipes. Workers (typically from JA Jones) repaired it by welding in a patch of stainless steel. 

High-level waste went out in bowling ball casks. This was well managed and controlled. [An 

interviewee described the use of bowling ball casks to remove waste from Building 325.] Waste 

was accumulated in each of the hot cells. When they had enough to ship, they would transfer it 

by vacuum through a jumper station to the cask. They tracked the volume added to the cask and 

also had a conductivity probe to let them know when the cask was full. When a cask was full, 

the lines connecting it to the hot cell were disconnected and the fittings were cleaned, if 

necessary. Fittings were plugged for transfer, the cask was surveyed by smears to verify it met 

appropriate standards, and it was moved to the truck lock for shipment to the 200 Areas. 

GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING OTHER AREAS OF THE HANFORD SITE 

Safety Culture 

Some interviewees experienced different safety cultures in other areas of the Hanford site. Every 

HPT (Health Physics Technician) is different. Some are very thorough; others are not. They 

were less engaged, more lax, at the tank farms than at other areas. About 50% were slackers. 

[An interviewee who worked for multiple contractors in multiple locations] indicated safety 

cultures were good, except Bechtel. The manager read the safety documents given to him, but 

once in the field, it was get the job done however you can, even if unsafe. There were gross 

violations and negligence. People were rewarded for getting things done, and the ends justified 

the means. It was an ad hoc process—make it up as you go. [This was in the mid- to late1990s.] One individual was a particular problem. There were hearings about the worker’s 

violations. The Nuclear Chemical Operators had trouble with this worker, too. 

 One job involved pumping hexavalent chromium out from the ground near the river; they 

were pumping into holding tanks to process it through an ion exchange resin. A line (3–

4 miles) was drained out on the ground. 

 On another occasion, drums of rad waste were [intentionally] tipped over. 
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NOTICE:

 While doing groundwater checks in HR-3 (H Area), rad techs detected something 

unusual (it may have been tritium) while checking for a different isotope. The discovery 

was not reported or investigated, because they were not looking for that. 

 A worker was reassigned to the waste pad as punishment for reporting problems to 

management. Some of the drums were sucked in or bloated out. The worker does not 

know what was in the drums; they contained solids and liquids. 

Internal Monitoring 

A worker once got a call about [a positive bioassay]; the worker had an elevated Pu level. They 

asked if the worker had ever worked at PUREX and the tank farms. The worker had worked in 

those areas. They collected three samples with higher Pu levels. Retesting was inconclusive. 

A claimant learned about a positive chest count when NIOSH pulled his DOE files. There [had 

been] no communication telling him about or explaining exposures. [The exposure may have 

occurred at tank farms.] They changed the limits and told him he was OK. 

EEOICPA Concerns and Questions 

Some individuals believe the site uses “national security” and “proprietary” to cover up 

information. For example, the list of hazardous chemicals at Hanford was initially pretty limited 

under these rationales until people went and found information publically available on OSTI. 

How secret can it be if they can find it on the Web? Workers and advocates put pressure on 

DOE to provide a more complete list. 

Claims examiners sometimes obstruct claims—sit on them for months—presuming to make 

medical judgments they are not authorized or trained to make. These claims should be going 

through to the medical specialist for assessment. They even get into “dueling doctors” 

situations—contradicting physician’s findings with DOE doctors—conflicting medical opinions. 

Patients’ doctors are reluctant to get sucked into that position, so they avoid getting involved 

with claims in the first place. 

How are cancer clusters accounted for under EEOICPA? An individual who works with many 

claimants sees a lot of the same kinds of cancers, such as pancreatic cancer or glioblastoma. It 

seems that worker migration would complicate detection of clusters (e.g., a worker who was 

exposed at Hanford and moves to another site is no longer local when he gets the cancer). 

Among the people an interviewee worked with at the same facilities, seven have had cancers and 

six of them (all except the interviewee) have died.