[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11884

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KEANO DONALD ALTIERI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cr-60182-RS-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11884

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Keano Donald Altieri appeals his conviction for possessing a 

postal service key, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1704, and possessing

stolen mail, in violation of U.S.C. § 1708. Mr. Altieri argues that 

the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the postal 

key and stolen mail evidence seized after police arrested him for 

prowling, in violation of Florida Statute § 856.021 (“the prowling 

statute”).1

1 The statute reads as follows: “(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or 

prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, 

under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. (2) Among 

the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such 

alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight 

upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or 

herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object. 

Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a law 

enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, 

afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern 

which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify 

himself or herself and explain his or her presence and conduct. No person shall 

be convicted of an offense under this section if the law enforcement officer did 

not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation 

given by the person is true and, if believed by the officer at the time, would 

have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern. (3) Any person violating the 

provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.”

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23-11884 Opinion of the Court 3

I

On March 28, 2022, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Officer 

Shannon noticed a car parked on Nova Drive, alongside a college, 

in Davie, Florida. Two males exited the vehicle dressed in all black 

and wearing black masks. Mr. Altieri—one of the two men—carried a plastic garbage bag and at least one of the two wore latex 

gloves. The two began to run across Nova Drive—toward a row 

of warehouses—but before they could complete the crossing, Officer Shannon intercepted them in his marked vehicle. 

Officer Shannon exited his car, identified himself as police, 

drew his gun, and commanded the men to the ground. The two 

men stopped and complied. Officer Shannon handcuffed both and 

took them into custody. While searching the men, Officer Shannon found unopened mail in the garbage bag that Mr. Altieri was 

carrying and a postal service key on his person. 

In August of 2022, a grand jury returned an indictment 

charging Mr. Altieri with possession of a postal service key, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1704, and with possession of stolen mail, in 

violation of U.S.C. § 1708. 

Mr. Altieri moved to suppress evidence of the postal service 

key and the stolen mail seized after his arrest. In his motion, Mr. 

Altieri argued that Officer Shannon lacked probable cause to arrest 

him for violating the prowling statute. Mr. Altieri asserted that because he had not fled, refused to identify himself, or attempted to 

conceal himself, the government could not satisfy the statute’s 

prima facie elements. Mr. Altieri also maintained that Florida 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11884

courts had found probable cause lacking in “much more suspicious” circumstances and that his act of running across a street at 

1:25 a.m. should not have alarmed Officer Shannon because Nova 

Drive was a busy intersection with 24-hour businesses and bus 

stops. See D.E. 12 at 6.

In response, the government argued that probable cause 

was not lacking. As support, the government pointed out that both 

men wore gloves and hooded shirts; both men pulled masks over 

their faces before crossing Nova Drive; both men refused to answer 

when asked to explain their conduct; and the car that had driven 

Mr. Altieri and the other suspect to the scene fled when the police 

officer approached. The government argued that Officer Shannon 

thus had probable cause to arrest Mr. Altieri for prowling because 

the two men were engaged in suspicious conduct and had failed to 

quell Officer Shannon’s concerns when given the opportunity. 

The magistrate judge to whom the case was referred found 

that Officer Shannon had probable cause to arrest Mr. Altieri because the circumstances leading up to the arrest, when “viewed 

from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,” 

supported the conclusion that he was “loitering or prowling in a 

place and at a time and manner not usual for law-abiding citizens.” 

D.E. 19. at 6. The magistrate judge also concluded that the cases 

cited by Mr. Altieri were “factually distinguishable” from the circumstances in the case at hand. See id. at 6. Accordingly, the magistrate judge concluded that Officer Shannon “had reasonable 

alarm or immediate concern for the persons and property in the 

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23-11884 Opinion of the Court 5

area” and that after Mr. Altieri failed to dispel this concern, the officer had probable cause to arrest him. Id.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation and denied Mr. Altieri’s suppression motion. Mr. 

Altieri pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a conditional plea 

agreement and timely appealed to this Court.

II

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s factual 

findings for clear error and the application of the law to those facts 

de novo. See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 

2006). The district court’s factual findings are construed in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party. See id.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence generally cannot be used against a defendant in a criminal trial where that evidence was obtained via an 

encounter with police that violated the Fourth Amendment. See 

United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). But, “a 

warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 

543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “Whether probable cause exists depends 

upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known 

to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id.

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We have interpreted Florida Statute § 856.021 as having two 

elements: “(1) the accused must be loitering or prowling at a place, 

at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens; and (2) 

the loitering or prowling must be under circumstances that warrant a reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in the 

vicinity.” United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 2000). 

These are some elements set out by the Florida courts. See, e.g., 

P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 

The statute lists several factors that may create the reasonable fear necessary for arrest, stating that reasonable fear is warranted if “the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 856.021(2). The statute further provides that “a law enforcement 

officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, 

afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate 

concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the 

person to identify himself or herself and explain his or her presence 

and conduct.” Id.

Probable cause requires “only a probability or substantial 

chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” 

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here the district court did not 

err by denying the motion to suppress the postal service key and 

stolen mail evidence.

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The facts, known to Officer Shannon at the time of the arrest, based on his personal observations, see P.R., 97 So. 3d at 

982−93, establish that there was probable cause to believe that a 

criminal offense had been or was being committed. See Devenpeck, 

543 U.S. at 152. The facts establish that (1) Mr. Altieri and another 

male existed a vehicle at 1:25 a.m.; (2) that both men were wearing 

black clothing and masks; (3) that Mr. Altieri was carrying a plastic 

garbage bag; (4) that at least one of the two men was wearing 

gloves; (5) that the car which drove the two men to the scene fled 

when Officer Shannon confronted Mr. Altieri; and (6) that Mr. Altieri refused to communicate with Officer Shannon when asked to 

explain his conduct. 

III

In sum, probable cause existed for Officer Shannon to conclude that Mr. Altieri was “loitering or prowling at a place, at a 

time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens,” and that 

there was “reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in 

the vicinity.” See Fla. Stat. § 856.021(2). The district court correctly 

denied Mr. Altieri’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

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