### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 323 -CV
City of Granite Shoal s, P at Cr ochet, John Gault, David Dittm ar, Bessie Jac kson ,

Shi rley K

ing, an d Merilyn Nations , Appellan ts

v. Ted Win der, Jam ie P arker, Be aver Island Pr operty Owners Association,

Denis Sn yder, and Ted O . Kost ich , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B URNET COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 3264 9 , HO NORAB LE GUILF ORD L. JO NES III , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Ap p el l ants City

of Gra nite Shoals, Pat Crochet, J ohn Gault, David Dittmar, Be ssie J ackson, Shirley King , and Mer ily n Nations (collec tively , the “City ”) br ing this interlocutor y appea l of the trial co u rt ’s o rd er d en y i n g t h ei r p l ea t o t h e j u ri s d i cti on. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a )(8) (West 2008). Appellee s (collec tively , the “prope rty owner s”) sue d the C ity for declar atory relief , challeng ing the City ’s conve rsion to a homerule municipality

under a rticle XI , section 5 of the Texas Constitution and its subseque nt annexation of the subdivisions in w hich the individual a ppellees own proper

ty
. We w ill af

fi rm the trial court’ s order

.I n their brief s, the parties r efe renc e an e x tensive history of anne x ations and disannexations 1 inv olv ingthe se pr op e rt ie s pri or to the 20 04 ann e xati on ; ho we ve r, we wi ll c on fi ne our d isc us sio n to the e ve nts that di re c tly

le d to thi s a

pp e a l. Or din anc e No . 4 27 state s th a t a c omm itt e e wi ll b e a

pp oin te d to dr a ft

the City ’s ho me -r

ule 2 c ha rt e r, that th e c ha

rt e r “ wi ll b e pr e se nte d to the Co un cil as so on a s th e City re a c he s 5 ,0 00 in population,” and that the char ter will then be put bef

ore the citizens of the City for a vote. Afte r the c ha rt e r wa s dr a ft e d, the Counc il a do pte d O rd ina nc e No . 4 41 , o rd e ri ngthat a sp e c ia l e le c tio n b e he ld f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e C i t y a s a

h o m e - r u l e m u n i c i p a l i t y. 2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND The individual appe llees ar e prope rty owner s from the subdivisions of B eave r I sland and Web I sle, whi ch s i t adjac ent to the City on L ake L BJ in Burnet County , Texas. I n 2004, the City , th e n a

g e ne ra l- law m

un ic ipa lity , an ne xed B e a ve r I sla nd and Web I sle purs ua

nt t o it s a uth or ity under se ction 43.033 of the loca l gover n m ent code

. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. 1 § 43.033(a) (1)- (7) ( W es t 2 0 0 8) (pr oviding c onditions under which g ener al-lawmunicipality may
ann e x ad ja c e nt t e rr ito ry

wi tho ut c on se nt of pr op e rt y ow ne rs ). Th e fo llo wi ng y e ar, the City Counc il

a do pte d o rd ina

nc e s a llo wi ng it to draf

t a ho me -r ule c ha rt e r a nd to c a ll a n e le c tio n f

or the City to i n c o r p o r a t e a s a

h o m e - r u l e c i t y. See id. §§ 9.001-.003 (West 2008)

. Under the home-rule provision

2 in article XI , section 5 of t he Tex as C ons ti tuti o n , c it ie s “ h a v in g mo r e than five thousand ( 5,000) inhabitants may , by a majority

vote of the qua lified voters of sa id city , at an elec tion held for that purpose , adopt or amend their c harte rs.” See Tex. Cons t. art. XI , § 5. The ele c ti o nto o k

p la c e N o v e mb e r

8 , 2 0 0 5
. A ma

jo r it y o f th e v o te r s a

p p r o v e d th e c h arte r , th e r e by
c o n v e rt i n g t h e C i t y f

r o m a T yp e A g e n e r a l

- l aw m u n i c i p a l i t y t o a h o m e - r u l e m u n i c i p a l i t y. On Dec ember

22, 2005, more than a y ear afte r the City annexed B eave r I sland and Web I sle pursuant to its authority as a g ener al-lawmunicipality , a majority of the prope rty

owner sAm on g the pr op e rt y ow ne rs ’ c omp la int s is th eir a sse rt ion that th e City

int e nti on a lly 3 delay ed in ac t i n g o n t heir pe titions for disanne x ation, there by wrong fully

subjecting them to the City ’s taxes for the 2006 tax y ear beca use their pr operties we re lis t ed o n the City ’s tax rolls on J anuar y 1, 2006. 3 in th o s e co m m u n i ties submitt ed petitions for disanne x ation. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 4 3. 03 3( b) (p ro vid ingtha t ma jor ity of land ow ne rs in are a

may pe tit ion g e ne ra l- law mun ic ipa lity for disanne x ation afte r one y ear but b efor e thre e y ear s from passa g e of a nnexation ordinance)

. There fore , the C ity was required to disannex Be aver I sland and Web I sle, see id. (providing that “the municipality

shall immediately

disannex the area ” upon landowne rs’ submi ssion of petition for disannexation), which it did on J anuar y 17, 2006. 3 I n Apr il 200 6, the City , n owa c tin g a s a ho me -r ule mun ic ipa lity , a g a in p ro po se d to

ann e x Be a ve r I sla

nd and Web I sle , iss uin g no tic e to the pr op e rt y ow ne rs of its int e nt to ann e x the se
and se ve ra l ot

he r s ub div isi on s in

the are a . T he loc a l g ov e rnme nt c ode pro vi des that a ho me -r ule municipality

may “extend the boundar ies of the municipality an d an n ex are a adja cent to the municipality .” Id. § 4 3. 02 1( 2) . T he statut e do e s n ot c on ta in a pr ov isi on a llo wi ngre sid e nts to petition home-rule municipalities for disannexation; t here fore , once the City annexed B eave r I sland

and Web I sle purs ua

nt to i ts a uth or ity a s a ho me -r ule mun ic ipa lity , a

ma jor ity of the re sid e nts c ou ld not petition to force the City to disannex their territories a s they had pre viously

when the City

was
a g e n e r a l

- l aw m u n i c i p a l i t y.

Af te r h ol di ng tw o p ub lic he ari ng s o n th e pr op os e d a nn e xati on s, the City

Counc il

a do pte d O rd ina

nc e No s. 46 2 ( B e a ve r I sl and ) an d 4 66 (We b I sle ), de sc ri bin g and ann e xing bo th territorie s. There afte r, the prope rty owner s filed suit for decla ratory judgme nt, seeking decla rations4

that cer tain specifie d actions by the City Council—(1) City Council Ordinance No. 441, which ha d called f or the home- rule e lection; (2) the home -ru l e el ection itself, held Nove mber 8, 2005; and (3) the a nnexations of Bea

ver I sland and Web I sle—wer e all “null and void” bec ause “ the City of Gr anit e Sho a ls doe s not have mor e tha n 5,0 00 inh a

bit ants and

is n ot e lig ibl e to b e c ome ho me ru le under the Constit ution and laws of Texas.” The proper ty owner s sought f

urther de clar ations that the disannexations of Be aver I sland and Web I sle beca me eff ective Dec ember 22, 2005; that th ey are
e n t i t l e d t o a r e f u n d f o r t h e 2 0 0 6 p r o p e rt y t a x e s p a i d t o t h e C i t y; an d t h a t t h e C i t y “ a c t e d w i l l f u l l y, fra udulently , in bad fa ith, and/or abused the ir discre tion as public officia ls in determin i ng the population of Gra

nite Shoals during 2005.” The City answe red a

nd filed a ple a to the jurisdi c ti o n a n d s p e c ia l e x ceptions, asse rting that the trial cour

t lacked subje ct-matter

jurisdiction over the suit. Specifica lly , the City argued that (1) the pr operty

owner s’ claim that they

are entitled to a tax refund wa s not y et ri p e b ec au se they pr e ma tur e ly

fi le d su it in vio la tio n of se c tio n 43 .1 48 of the loc a l g ov e rnme nt c od e ; ( 2) the pr op e rt y
owner s lacke d standing to bring their proc edura l ch al l en ges to the 2006 anne x ation beca use they should have be en broug ht either in an elec tion contest or by the S tate in a quo wa rra nto action; and (3) th e p r o p e rty o w n e r s la c k e d s ta n d in g to c h a ll e n g e th e Ci ty ’ s h o me - r u le c o n v e r s io n b e c ause, a s
non-re sidents of the City , they had fa iled to establish a “spe cial int er es t o r i njury ” re sulting fr om the conve rsion.

After a hea ring on the City ’s plea, but before the trial cour t ruled on it, the parties filed cr oss-motions for partial summary judgme nt, reurg ing the ir arguments reg arding the questions
o f subject-matter

jurisdiction and standing . Much of the e vidence attache d to their motions5

a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e C i t y h a d a c t e d f r a u d u l e n t l y o r i n b a d f

a i t h i n d e t e rm ini ng its population, thereby

permitting th e p l ai n t i ffs to cha lleng e the City ’s home-r ule conve rsion on the basis that it was void ab i n i t i o , rather than mer ely voidable. F ollowing a hear ing on the cross-motions for summar y judgme nt, the trial court iss ued an or der de ny ing the City ’s plea to the jur isd ic tio n a

nd makin g the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s o f f a c t:
1. The Plaintiffs wer e re sidents of the City of Gra nite Shoals at the time of the ho me ru le e le c tio n, a nd

the re for e, hav e sta

nd ingto c on te st t

he ho me ru le c on ve rs ion

of the City of Gr anit e Sho a ls; 2. Th e Pla int if

fs have sta

nd ingto c on te st the ho me ru le c on ve rs ion of the City of Gra nite Shoals by

virtue of the r e-a

nnexation of Bea

ver I slan d and W eb I sle on May 26, 2006, and the fac t that said re- annexations are pr edicated on t h e C i t y o f

G r an i t e S h o a l s b e i n g a

v a l i d h o m e r u l e m u n i c i p a l i t y; 3. The Summary

J udg ment evidenc e presented by Plaintiffs indicates that a f act finder c ould find that the require d 5,001 inhabitants determination wa s made in bad fa ith or by constructive fraud in which event the hom e rule conver sion woul d be vo id, and

pr ivate c iti zen s w ou ld h a ve sta nd ingto c on te st this conver sion; and 4. Pla int if

fs ’ c ha lle ng e to t

he City of Gr anit e Sho a ls’ c on ve rs ion to h ome ru le is n ot t he ty pe of a c tio n th a t mu st b e br ou g ht as a n “ e le c tio n c on te st” proce eding as conte mplated by Section 221.003 of t he Tex as Elec tion Code. The City

now appe als the denia l of its plea to t he jurisdiction. See Tex. Ci v. Prac.& Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a )(8)

. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We r ev i ew t h e d enial of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Texas De p’t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). I n decidinga plea to the6

jurisdiction, we may n o t we igh the merits of the plaintiff’ s claims, but must consider only the plaintiff’s plea dings, c onstrued in the plaintiff’ s favor , as we ll as ev i d en ce pe rtinent to the jurisdictional inquiry

. Cou nty of C am e ro n v . B ro wn , 8 0 S. W.3 d 5 49 , 5 55 (T e x. 20 02 ). Th e su pr e me court has rec og nized that in some case s disputed evidenc e of jurisdictional fac ts also impli cate s the merits of the ca s e; s u ch d i s puted fa cts may require resolution by

the finder

of fa ct. See M

iranda , 13 3 S. W.3 d at 22 6. On ly

if the ple a din g s and

jur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e a ff ir ma tiv e ly and c on c lus ive ly neg ate the e x istence of

jurisdiction should a plea to the jurisdiction be g rante d. Id. at 227. When a plea to the jur isdi ct i o n ch all eng es the plea dings, w e first de termine if the pleade r has a lleg ed fa cts that aff i rm at ively

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hea r the c ause. Id. at 226 (c i t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex as Air Contr ol Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). We construe the pleading s liberally in favor of

the plaintiff and look to the plea der’ s intent. Id. If the pleading s d o n o t c o nta in sufficient fa cts to aff irmatively

demonstrate the trial court’ s jurisdiction, but do not affirmatively

demonstrate inc urable defe cts in jurisdiction, the i s s ue is one of ple ading sufficie ncy

and the plaintiff should be aff orded the opportunity

to amend. Id. at 226-27 (c iting Br own , 80 S.W .3d at 555). I f t he pleadings a ffirmatively neg ate the e x istence of

jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may

be g rant ed wi t h o u t allowing the plaintiff an oppor tunity to amend. Id. at 227. I f a ple a to the jurisdiction challeng es the e x istence of juri s d i ct ional fac ts, the trial court c onsiders re levant evide nce submitted by t h e p arties when nec essar y to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. I f t he evidence cre ates a fac t question reg ardingthe jurisdictional issue, the trial cour

t cannot g rant the ple a to the jurisdiction, and the fa ct issue will be re solved by7

the fa ct finder

. Id. at 227-28. I f, howe ver, the rele vant evidenc e is undisputed or fa ils to raise a fa ct question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rule s on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. at 228. T h i s s t andar d g ener ally mirrors that of a

traditional summary

judgme nt under Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 166a( c). Id. Th e re fo re , w he n re vie wi ng a ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n in which the plea ding r equire ment has been me t and evidenc e has be en submitted to support the plea that als o impl ic a te s the me ri ts of the c a se , w e take a s tr ue a ll e vid e nc e fa

vo ra ble to t he no nmo va

nt, and we indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor

. Id.
DI SCU SSIO N The City bring s two issues on appea l. In its fi rs t i s sue, the City argues that the tr ia l c ourt la c ke d sub

je c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t he pr op e rt

y ow ne rs ’ c ha lle ng e to t

he ho me -r

ule char ter e lection bec ause the y

did not file their l awsuit as an elec tion contest under chapte r 221 of the
e le c tio n c od e . In it s se c on d is su e , th e City a sse rt s th a t a

c ha lle ng e to a ci ty ’s c on ve rs ion to h ome ru le must be broug ht by

the State throug h a quo wa rra nto proce eding except in case s of fra ud or bad f

aith. Th e City argue s th a t it s p le a

to t he jur isd ic tio n s ho uld

have be e n g ra

nt ed becau se th e pr op e rt y
owner s’ jurisdictional evidenc e fa iled to raise a fac t question regar ding w hether the City acte d fra udulently or in bad fa ith in determining that its num ber of inhabitants exceede d five thousand.
Ele c tio n Con te

st Ac c or din g to the City , the pr op e rt y ow ne rs ’ ch a lle ng e to t

he c a lli ngof

the ho me -r

ule
e le c tio n a nd su bs e qu e nt c on ve rs ion

to h ome ru le wa s r e qu ir e d to be br ou g ht as an ele c tio n c on te st. I n so a r g u i n g , t h e C i t y

r e l i e s o nt h e F o rtW o rt h C o u rto f A p p e a l s ’ d e c i s i o nin8

Sta te e xre l. K im mo ns v . Ci ty

of A zle , 588 S.W .2d 666 (Tex. App.— Fo rt W o rt h 1979, writ ref ’d
n. r. e .)

. Th e re , the State a tta c ke d th e c ity ’s “ c or po ra te e xiste nc e , in c lud ingits e xiste nc e a s a ho me rule c ity ” on the ba sis that the city did not have at least 5,000 inhabitants at t he time of the e lection, rende ring the hom e-r

ule conversion void. Id. at 667. The tria l court aw arde d summary judgme nt in f a vo r o f t he City of Azl e up on

its con clu si ve sh owing that it ha d b e e n d

uly inc or po rate d in
acc ordanc e with the g overningstatutes. See id. Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls a g re e d that th e City of Azl e had met its summary -judg ment burden, noting that the r ecor d contained “ sever al validation Acts by the L eg islature,” w hich “va li d a te d A zl e ’ s incorpora

tion and annexations” and by which the State wa s bound. Id. at 669.

Reg ardingthe State’s conte ntion that the c ity ’s deter mination of its population was made in bad f

aith, the cour

t of appe als held in City

of A zle :
I n th e c a se be fo re us the su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e of

Azl e su ff

ic e s to e sta

bli sh regularity of the elec tion on April 3, 1971. I n other words its e vidence es t ab lishes its compliance with the re quisite (if to be dee med as required) that it have the su ff ic ie nt q ua lif ic a tio n b y

po pu la tio n f

or a va lid e le c tio n o n th e ho me ru le a me ndme nt.
Id. at 670. The c ourt went on to state that “ if there be conte sts of validity and re g ularity

in instances of e le c tio ns to a do pt the ho me ru le a me ndme nt, ” su c h qu e sti on s mus t be lit ig a te d a s e le c tio n c on te sts under article 9.30 of the Te x as Revised Civil St atutes. Id. I t is this lang uag e that the Ci ty here relies on in asserting that t h e p ro perty owner s were require d to bringtheir cha lleng e to the City ’s ho me -r ule c on ve rs ion

a s an e le c tio n c on te st.9 As the C ity

acknow ledg es, the c ourt’s interpr etation of a rticle 9.30 in City of A zlewas subseque n t l y cr i t i cized by the Eastland Court of A ppeals in Sta te e

xre l. City

of W e ath e rfo rd v. Town of Hudson Oaks , 610 S.W .2d 550 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1980, wr it re f’d n.r.e.). Hudson Oaks involved a cha lleng e to the town’s municipal incorporation. The trial court re jected the plaintiffs’ c laims on the g round that their c halleng e wa s not fi led within the thirty day s of the elec tion, a proce dural re quirement for bring ing an elec tion contest under a rticle 9.30. Id. at 550. The court of a

ppeals re verse d, holding that a suit to determine whethe r a mu n i ci p al i t y had prope r authority to seek incor

poration “is not an e lection contest” beca use such a

deter mination “i s not within the scope of an el ec t i o n co n t est ” under the statute. Id. at 551. I n so holding, the Hu ds on Oa k

s c ourt state d that it “ wa s n ot p e rs ua de d b y the dic ta

e xpre sse d in Sta te e xre l. K im mo ns v . Ci ty

of A zle ” sug g esting otherwise. Id. at 551 (c itations omi tted). B oth of the se de c isi on s w e re pr e dic a te d o n f or me r a rt ic le 9 .3 0 of th e re vis e d c ivi l statutes, which gover

ned “Other contested elec tions.” See Act of May 28, 1951, 52d L eg ., R.S., ch. 49 2, 19 51 Te x. Ge n. L aws 10 97 , 1 15 1- 60 . T ha t st a tut e pr ov ide d:
I f the c ontest be for

the validity

of an e lection held for

any other p u rp o s e than the elec tion of an o ff

i ce r or off

icer s in any

county or par t of a c ounty

or pre cinct of a c o u n t y, o r i nan y i n c o r

p o r a t e d c i t y, t o w n , o r

v i l l a g e , an y r e s i d e n to f

s u c h c o u n t y, prec inct, city , town, or villag e, or a ny nu m b er of such re sidents, may contest such e le c tio n in

the dis tr ic t c ourt

of su c h c ounty

in t he same mann e r an d und e r t he same rules, as f

ar a s applicable , as ar e pre scribed i n t his chapter (ar ts. 9.01-9.38) for contesting the validity

of an e lection for a

county office

. Id. ; s e e H

u d s on Oaks , 6 1 0 S.W .2d at 550 n.2. The disag ree ment betwee n the City of Azle and Hu ds on Oa k

s c ourt s con c e rn e d whe the r a c ha lle ng e to a

c ity ’s mun ic ipa l in c or

po ratio n is a

c on te st10

to the “validity ” of a

n elec tion. This is a question we need not decide be cause , in this case, the statute in e ffe ct at the time the proper ty owner s’ claims arose is substantially differ ent. The c urre nt statute narr owly

define s an “e lection contest” as an inquiry conce rning
whether the outcome of the contested elec tion, as shown by the final c anvass, is not the true outcome beca

use: (1) illeg al votes we re c ounted; or (2) an ele ction office r or oth e r p e rs on

of fi c ia lly inv olved i n th e a dmi nis tr a tio n o f t he e le c tio n: (A) pr evente d elig ible voters fr om voti n g; (B ) fa iled to count leg al votes; or (C) eng ag ed in other f

raud or illega l conduct or ma de a mistake

. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 221.003 (West 2003). There fore , a challeng e that does not conce rn whe ther t h e o u t co m e o f the e lection was inc orre ct for one of the four rea sons list ed in the statute is, by definition, not an elec tion contest.

Te xas c ourt s h a ve lon g re c og nize d th a t an e le c tio n c on te st i s n ot a n o rd ina ry laws uit , but is inst ead “ a spec ial leg islative proce eding .” Rossano v. Townsend , 9 S. W. 3 d 3 5 7 , 3 6 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 99 , no p e t.) ; se e Du nc an v . W ill is , 302 S.W .2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1957); De Shazo v . W

ebb , 113 S.W .2d 519, 523 (Tex. 1938 );

. I n an ele ction contest, a district c ourt’s authority to act is limit ed to the subjec ts or g rounds ex pressly or i mpliedly authorized by

the elec tion code. See Te x. Elec. Co de Ann. § 2 21 .0 03 ; Rossano , 9 S.W .3d at 361; Coh e n v . Cl e ar Lak e City W ater Auth. , 687 S.W .2d 406, 407 (Tex

. Ap p . — Ho u ston [ 14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). The deter mination of whether a city has t he authority to hold an elec tion at all “is not within t he scope of an ele ction contest.” City of K ing sv ill e v . I nt’ l A ss’n o

f F ire fig hte rs , 5 6 8 S. W. 2 d

3 9 7 , 3 9 9 ( T e x. Ci v. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 78 , n o w ri t) ; se e Mc Cal l v . Le wis , 2 6 3 S. W. 3 2 5 , 3 2 7 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1924, no writ). Rather , the alleg ation that a city has no statutory

authority to hold anI t is well established that private pa rties have standing in case s involvi n g at tacks on 4 municipal incorporations and annexations only when the a ction complained of is void, ra ther than mere ly voidable, bec ause the municipality exceeded its authority

. See, e .g. , Alexande r Oil Co. v . Ci ty of S e gu in , 8 25 S.W. 2d

43 4, 43 8 ( Te x. 19 91 ); City of W est L ake Hi ll

s v. St atee

xre l. City of A us tin , 4 66 S.W. 2d 72 2, 72 7 ( Te x. 19 71 ); Go nz ale s v . Co nc e rn e d Ci tiz e ns of W e bb e rv ill e , 173 S.W .3d 112, 115-16 (Tex . App.—Austin 2005, no pet.); City of Nor thlake v. E ast Justin Joint V e ntu re , 87 3 S.W.2 d 4 13 , 4 17 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1 99 4, wr it d e nie d) ; City of W ill ow P ar k v. Bryant , 7 63 S.W. 2d

50 6, 50 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 19 88 , n o w ri t) ; Du rh am v . Cr utc hfi e ld , 578 S.W .2d 438, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1979, wr it ref’ d n.r.e.)

. 11 e le c ti o n “ f

a ll s w it h in th e a mb it o f th e d e c la r ato r y ju d g me n ts a c t.” C o mm i s s ioners’ Court v. Ra y bu rn , 2 64 S.W. 2d

55 2, 55 5 ( Te x. Civ . App .—B e a umo nt 1 95 4, no wr it) ; see also City o f Sherman v. Hudman , 996 S.W .2d 904, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pe t. gr anted, judg m’t vacated w.r.m.).

Be cause the prope rty

owner s’ suit for declar atory judgme nt does not raise a ny of the iss ue s th a t mu st b e re so lve d in an el e c tio n co nte st, we ho ld that the y we re no t r e qu ir e d to br ingthe ir challeng e as a

n elec tion contest under se ction 221.003. We overrule the City ’s first issue. Quo Wa rra nto I n it s se c on d is su e , th e City argue s that the pr op e rt y ow ne rs la c ke d s tand ingto c on te st the City ’s conve rsion to home rule be cause , unless the conve rsion was void ab initio, such a ch al l en ge ha d t o b e br o u gh t b y t h e S t at e in a qu o wa rr an t o p ro ce ed i n g. I n s o a rguin g , th e City 4

asser ts that its own determination that its number of inhabitants exceede d 5,00 0 s h o uld be g iven

a lmo st t ota l defer e nc e a nd that, c on tr ary

to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing , th e pr op e rt y ow ne rs ’ jur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e fa ile d to c re a te a fa c t qu e sti on

c on c e rn i ngwh e the r t

he City a c te d f ra ud ule ntl y or in bad fa ith in making that dete rmination.We held in Ha rri so n v . B un ne ll that the mun ic ipa lity ’s de te rm inatio n may be a tta c ke d o nly 5 on the g rounds of fr aud or bad faith and not on mere alleg ations that the municipality ’s ac tions were arbitra ry , capr icious, or unre asonable

. See 420 S.W .2d 777, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1 9 67, no writ). In the pre sent ca se, the City err oneously argues that, “[j] ust like the unsucce ssful plaintiffs in Harrison , Plaintiffs in this c ase a lleg ed that the c ity council’s de termination reg ardingthe number of the City ’s inhabitants was made fra udulently , in ba d faith, and was an abuse of discretion.” On the cont ra ry , t h e plaintiffs in Harrison alleg ed only that the def

endants’ c onduct was “ar bitrary , capr icious and unrea sonable” —not that the y had ac ted fra udulently or in bad fa ith. Id ; c f. B utev . Ci ty

of L e ague City , 390 S.W .2d 811, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1st D i s t
. ] 1965, no writ) (“Appellants in the instant ca se have not alleg ed that L eague City or its gove rning body

wer e ac tuated by

fra ud, bad fa ith, or abuse of discretion, and he nce the population determination wa s lodge d with the g overningbody of the City

. . . .”). 12 A m un ic ipa lity ’s fa ct- fi nd ingpo we rs are no t a bs olute , h ow e ve r, no r a re its deter minations e ntitled to conclusive de fer ence , a point the City itself acknow ledg es. In deciding that a city

“is proper ly

empower ed” to de termine its eli gi bility to adopt a home- rule c harte r, the Texas Supreme Court has re cog nized that when the g overningbody once asce rtained the fac t that [ the city ] had a population of more t h an 5 0 00 at the time of the a doption of its Home-Rule Charter , such asce rtainm en t is presumed to have been va lidly exercised in the a

bsence of alleg ations and of pr oof of fraud, bad fait h or abuse of discretion

. Sta te e xre l. R os e v . Ci ty

of L a P or te , 3 8 6 S
. W
. 2 d 7 8 2 , 7 8 5 (T ex . 1 9 6 5 ) ( ci t i n g Town of F re e po rt
v . S e lle rs , 1 90 S.W. 2d 81 3 (Tex . 1 94 5) ; W illiams v. Cast leman , 247 S.W . 263 (Tex. 1922)) (empha sis added). Thus, w hile a municip al i ty ’s administrative dete rmination of a pr edicate fa ct question prior to the orde ring of an e lection “is intended to be final,” that deter mination may

be set aside “on the g round of fra ud or bad fa ith.” Ha rri

so n v . B un ne ll , 420 S.W .2d 777, 779 (Tex. Civ. Ap p . — Au s t i n1 9 6 7 , n o wr i t ) ( qu o t i n g Sc ho ol B oa rd v . S tat e , 343 S.W .2d 247, 248 (Tex. 1961)). 513 Ex trapolating from these decisions, the proper ty owner s assert that the e x istence of fra ud or bad f

aith rende rs a municipality ’s incorporation wholly void, r ather than mere ly

voidable, there by confe rringstanding on privat e p arties to collaterally attack the decision outside of a quo
war ranto proc eedin g. See, e .g. , Lum v . Ci ty of B owi e , 18 S.W . 142, 144 (Tex. 1891) (“T he proce eding s by

means of w hich it was att em p t ed to annex the land of a ppellants wer e, we think, void, and not mere irregularities, an d t he rule is familiar that void ac ts may be questioned collate rally .”); City of Galena Park v. City of Houston , 133 S
. W
. 2 d 1 6 2 , 164-65 (T e x. Civ . App .— Ga lve sto n 1 93 9, wr it r e f’ d) (w he n atte mpt e d in c or po ratio n w a s c oll a te ra lly attacke d as “w holly

invalid and void,” conte stant could p ro ce ed “w ithout the joinder of the S t at e u n d er

a w ri to f q u o wa rr an t o ”) (c i t i n g City of P or t Art hur v . G as k in , 107 S.W .2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.—Bea

umont 1937, no writ) (holding t hat S tate is nece ssary party only when a ction “is mere ly

voidable”) , and Hunt v. Atkinson , 12 S.W .2d 142 (Tex. Comm ’n App. 1929, judgm’ t adopted) (dec lining to adopt quo wa rra nto require ment in case involving municipal anne x ation that
was c ompletely

void)). We ag ree with the proper ty owner s that void acts may b e co l latera lly attacke d
o u ts id e o f a qu o w ar

r an to p r o c e e d ing

. S

ee City of Irving v. Callaway , 363 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) , and case s cited there in. The que stion presented he re is whether the City ’s alleg edly fra udulent or bad-faith determination that it had the re quisite number of inhabitants and ther efor e wa s elig ible to call a home- rule e lecti o n wo u l d , if true, r ender the elec tion itself and the City ’s subsequent c onversion to home-r ule wholly

void or mere ly

voidable. As this Court has recog nized,14

De fe c ts i n th e inc or

po ratio n pr oc e ss wh ic h re nd e r the inc or po ratio n a bs olute ly vo id are limit ed to alleg ations: (1) t hat the ac t of incorpor ation itself was e ither prohibited or unauthorized by

law; (2) that the purported i n co rp oration wa s pursuant to an unconstitutional statute; or (3) that the attempt to comply with the provisions of the law authoriz ing the cre ation of such municipality was so utterly

lackingor def

ective as to rende r the attempt to create such c orporation void.
Go nz ale s v . Co nc e rn e d Ci tiz e ns of W e bb e rv ill e , 173 S.W .3d 112, 115-16 (Te x . App.—Austin 2005,

n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Du rh am v . Cr utc hfi e ld , 5 78 S.W. 2d 43 8, 44 1 (T e x. Civ . App .— Te xar ka na 19 79 , w ri t ref ’d n.r.e .)). Put differ ently , “[i] f a g overnmen tal entity was wholly

without authority

to call an elec tion, the election held pur suant to such an or der is void.” Hudman , 9 96 S.W. 2d a t 91 1; see Derrick v. County Bd. of Educ. , 374 S.W .2d 259, 264 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1963, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“ I n case s wher e the body essay ing to exercise the power of org anization or annexation does
so wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n, its a c tio n is vo id, and may be col lat e ra lly a tta c ke d .

. . .” ). Th e pr op e rt y
owner s urg e that the City ’s inhabitancy deter mination was tainted wi t h fra ud or bad f

aith and there fore the ca lling of the election was either c onstitut ionally impermissible or its attempt at compliance with the law author izi ng the incorpor ation was so def ective a s to render

the ac t void. De sp ite the de art

h o f a uth or ity e xplic itl y s t a t ingthat f ra ud or ba d f a ithin t he pr e dic a te fac t- f in d in g w il l r e n d e r

the municipality ’s incorpor ation wholly void, both parties have char acte rized
su c h alleg a tio ns a s “ e xce pti on s” to t he qu o w arr anto re qu ir e me nt. A c a se su pp or tin g that vi e w i s Bu te v . Ci ty

of L e ague City , 390 S.W .2d 811, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] 196 5 , no writ). In Bu te , the plaintiffs alleg ed two g rounds for de clar ing the city ’s incorpor ation ordinanc e
vo id, the re by pe rm itt ing the m to br ing su it in the ir ind ivi du a l ca pa c iti e s: (1 ) that L e a g ue City “ did not have more than 5,000 inhabitants as re q u i re d b y the Constitut ion,” and ( 2) that the c ity had15

attempted to incorpor ate non- adjac ent lands in vio l at i o n of the g overningstatutes permitting incorpora tion. Id. at 813. The court of c ivil appeals stated, “ We would ag ree with appellants if on the hea ring of the plea

in abateme nt the trial court ha d not impli edly found ag ainst them with respec t to both of such alleg ed grounds for declaring the ordinance void.” Id. B ut b e c a us e the e vid e nc e did not support the plaintiffs’ alleg ations and they had not alleg ed that the city “or its g overningbody
wer e actuated by fra

ud, bad faith or abuse of discretion,” the court aff irmed the trial court’s dismissal of their a ction. Id. at 814. I n so doing, the court re iterate d that the plaintiffs’ a ssertions of fr aud and bad fa ith, “if established, would rende r the ordinanc e void. Had the trial court found in the ir favor with respec t to such g rounds, they could have prosec uted their suit in their individual capa cities.” Id. at 81 5
. A s th e c o u rt o f c iv il a p p e a ls r e a s o n e d , a

qu o w ar r an to a c ti o nw o u ld

n o t h a v e been
ne c e ssa ry be c a us e the “ Sta

te wo uld no t ha ve be e n in

any be tte r p os iti on

to atta c k the or din anc e in
su c h e ve nt t

ha n w e re a

pp e lla nts and he nc e the re wo uld

be no reas on

fo r q uo wa rr a nto proce eding s.” Id.

We c on c lud e that a

c ha lle ng e to an inh a

bit anc y fi nd ing ba se d on f ra ud or ba d f a ith implicates voidness rathe r than voidability

. T h e d i s t i nction betwee n the two depe nds on whether the mun ic ipa l a c t is “ un a uth or ize d b y

law o r c olo r o f l aw” or , o n th e oth e r h and , is “a me re irr eg ular e x erc ise of p o we r. ” City of San Antonio v. Hardee , 70 S.W .3d 207, 210 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n An ton io 2 00 1, no pe t.) ; se e City of Ba lc h Spr ing s v. G e or ge F. Luc as Ir

re v oc ab le Fa mi ly Tru st , 101 S.W .3d 116, 119-20 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2002, no pet.). I n the pre s en t case, appellees d o n o t complain of a mere irregularity , but instead cha lleng e the City ’s fundamental authority to call a home- rule election and thereaf ter convert to home-rule —issues that bear on the16

City ’s ex istence as a home-rule municipality from its inception. See H udman , 996 S.W .2d at 911; Durham , 5 7 8 S
. W
. 2 d a t 44 1; De r r i ck, 37 4 S. W.2 d at 26 4; Callaw ay , 363 S.W .2d at 835. Specifica lly , they

asser t that the City

violated the Te x as Constitut ion by calling the elec tion when it had few e r

th anth e r e qu is it e 5 , 0 0 0 inh a b it an ts , th a t i ts d e te r

mi n a ti o nto th e c o n tr ar

y w a s made fra udulently o r i n b ad fa i th, and that bec ause the City lacke d the authority

to adopt the ordinanc e calling the elec tion, “the elec tion held pur s uant to such an or der is void.” See H udman , 99 6 S. W.2 d at 91 1; se e als o Todd v. Helton , 495 S.W .2d 213, 216 (Tex. 1973) (“an order ca lling an el ec t i o nt o o rga n i z e aco u n t y m ay b e a n n u l l edu

p o nd i s co v e r y o f f

r au d ”) (c i t i n g Oden v . Barbee , 129 S.W . 602, 603 (Tex. 1910)).

Our de ci sion on this questi on is consistent with the public policy behind the quo
wa rr anto re qu ir e me nt a

nd the ru le pr oh ibi tin g c oll a te ra l a tta c k u po n e xi s t i n g m u n i c i p a l c or

po ratio ns , a s th a t po lic y

ha s b e e n e xami ne d b y

the Te xas S up re me Court :
Th e ru le its e lf

[fo rb idd ingc oll a ter al atta c k o n e xistin g c or po ra tio ns ] is w e ll rec og nized an d rests upon the soundest public policy . But a n examination of the numerous ca ses supporting it will show that it applies only in those instances whe re the cor poration attac ked is at least a de facto corpor ation by virtue of a

n attempted or g anizatio n un de r “ c olo r of law”
. . . . B e fo re an atte mpt e d o rg anizatio n c an b e sa id to b e un de r “ c olo r o f law” , the re mus t have be e n a g oo d f a itha tte mpt

to o rg anize in the method pre scribed by exis ting law, and at least a colora ble compliance with that law.
Hunt , 1 2 S. W.2 d at 14 5 ( int e rnal c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he su pr e me c ourt

ha s h e ld t

hat th e ru le
re qu ir ingqu o w arr anto is n ot a bs olute , b ut i s f

ound e d in “ c on ve nie nc e , mer e ly , an d is no t to be so applied as to de feat the asser tion of just lega l rig hts by parties in the c ourts.” Pa rk s v . W est , 111 S.W
. 726, 729 (Tex. 1908). Parks involved a challeng e to the cor porate exis tence of a sc hool district17

by a group of proper

ty owner s within it s boundaries. Id. at 728-29. The court, while r ecog nizi ng that the district had bee n formed in substantial compliance with the law a nd had bee n actingas a de fac to corporation, neverthe less permitted taxpay ers to bringsuit outsi de of a quo war ranto a ction, noting that
the a tta c k of the pla int if

fs is not me re ly up on the c or po ra te e xiste nc e of

the dis tr ic t, bu t is dir e c te d a g a ins t th e po we r o f t he de fe nd ants to l ay

burd e ns on

the ir pr op e rt y and su bje c t th e m to the pa

y me nt o f t a xes. S urel y the y have a ri g ht t o d o th a t, althoug h the re ason they

assig n for the la ck of pow er ma y also g o to the right of the district to ex ist under the Constituti on. . . . Useful a nd convenie nt as is the doctrine inv ok e d, we c an n ot n ow g ive our a sse nt t o a n a pp lic a tio n o f i t w hic h w ou ld d e ny to the pla int if

fs the pr ote c tio n s ou g ht o f t he ir pr op e rt y ri g hts

. Id. a t 72 9; see also W

alling v. North Cent. Tex. Mun. W ater Auth. , 348 S.W .2d 532, 533 (Tex. 1961) (ap p ro v i n g Parks and affirming taxpay ers’ rig ht to maintain suit ag ainst water authority for r ecove ry of taxes on gr ound that statute cre ating authority was unc onstitut ional). Havingdecide d that the prope rty owner s’ pleading s assert c laims t h at could be broug ht outside of a quo wa rra nto proce eding by

the St at e, we m ust now consider w hether the jurisdictional evidence in this record c onclusivel y n egates those fac ts that would produce the exis tence of juris d i cti on. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227. I n other wor ds, if the evidenc e conclusive ly established that the City did no t act with fr aud and ba d fa i t h , then the City ’s d et er m i n at i o no f i t s n u mb er o f i n h ab i t an t s i s p re s u mp t i v el y v al i d an d t h e p ro p er t y

o wn er s ’ c h al l en ge to the validity

of t he election would fail. Be cause the questi on of whether the property owner s, as individuals, h av e standing to bring suit ag ainst the City depends on w hether

the City acte d fr au d u l en t l y o r i nb adfa i t h i nca l l i n g t h e e l ec t i o n , t h i s i s a cas e in wh i ch t h e j u ri s d i ct i o n al ch al l en geI no r d e r f o r th is p r o c e d

u r e tr u ly to mi r r o r tr a d it io n a l s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t p r o c e d

u r e , the 6 state’s initial burden must be to support its plea not merely with some evidenc e that the tria l court lacks jurisdi ction, but with conclusiveevidenc e on the jurisdictional issue. See Maan v. First ATM, Inc. , No. 03-06-00698- CV, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 9279, at *12 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (me m. op). 18 square ly implicates the merits of the plaintiffs’ cause of ac tion. I n these c ircumstance s, “af ter the state ass e rts an d s u

p p o rts w it

h e v id e n c e th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt la c k s s u b je c t matt e r ju

r is d ic ti o n , we simply require the plaintiffs, whe n the fa cts underly ing the merits and subj ect matter jurisdiction are intertwined, to show that ther e is a disputed mater ial fac t reg ardingthe j u ri s d ictional issue.” 6 Miranda , 1 33 S.W. 3d

a t 22 8. Th is p ro te c ts p la int if fs fr om h a vin g to p ut o n th e ir c a se si mply

to establish jurisdiction. Id. Unless the evide nce c onclusively shows an abse nce of

jurisdiction, the dis pu te d e vid e nc e re g ard ingthe jur isd ic tio na l f a c ts that im

pli c a te s th e me ri ts o f t

he c a se wi ll u su a lly require resolution by

the trier of fac t, there by g iving the tr ial court the discr etion to defe r re solution of the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 226. I n this case , the t rial court made an e x press findingthat “a f act finder c ould find that the requir ed 5,001 inhabitants d et ermination was made in bad f aith or by constructive f

raud in whic h event the home rul e conversion would be void, and private citizens would have sta

nding to c ontest this conver sion.” There fore , under Miranda , th e tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y
a c te d w ith in i ts d isc re tio n b y de fe rr ingre so lut ion of

the ult imate jur isd ic tio na l f a c ts unle ss t

he City conclusively

established that it did not act fra udulently or in bad fa ith in determining that it had more tha n 5 ,0 00 inh a

bit ants
. Fr om our revie w of the jurisdictional e vidence , we conclude that the proper ty owner s raised mor e than a

scintilla of evidenc e that the City acte d with bad fa ith in determining that it met the inhabitancy

require ment for c alling a home-rule elec tion. The courts have not def ined “ba dThis approa ch is consistent with the conce pt of bad fa ith in other are as of law

. 7 See, e .g. , Ci tize ns Br idge Co. v . G ue rra , 258 S.W .2d 64, 69-70 (Te x . 1953) (e quating “bad f aith” to a c ti o n s b a s e d

o nim p r o p e r mo ti v e s o r

w il f u l d is r e g ar d

o f f a c ts in c o mm e r c ia l p a

p e r c o n te x t); Ford v. Ae tna Ins. Co. , 394 S.W .2d 693, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus C hristi 1965, writ ref’ d n.r.e.) (h old ingthat im

pr op e r m oti ve is e le me nt o f bad fa ith ); se e als o I n r e Ba rr , 13 S.W .3d 525, 534 (T e x. Re v. Tr ib. 19 98 , p e t. d e nie d) (n oti ngthat of fi c ia l’ s in te nt t o u se of

fi c e to a c c omp lis h p ur

po se that was be y ond exercise of leg islative g rant of authority “may in and of itself c onstitut e bad f aith”). 19 faith” in this specific context, but in pa ssing on the validity of municipal ordinanc es have inquired int o th e “ g oo d f

a ith ” mot ive s o f th os e enact ingthe m and the e xten t to wh ic h th e ir a c tio ns are in further ance of the policies of this S tate. See City of San Antonio v. W allace , 338 S.W .2d 153, 156-57 (T e x. 19 60 ) ( ho ldi ngtha

t a c tio n o f c ity

le g isl a tiv e body

may be jud ic ia lly

e xami ne d in

lig ht o f i ts surrounding circ umstances, prior and subsequent ac tions of such leg islative body , and public policy in order to de termine g ood faith of que stioned action). 7

I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e pr op e rt y ow ne rs pr od

uc e d e vid e nc e fr om w hic h a re a so na ble jur or c ou ld c on c lud e that ( 1) the me tho d tha t the City us e d in makin g that de te rm inatio n w a s w ilf ull y manipulated in or der to pr oduce the desired fig ure, or (2) the deter mination was rea ched de spite—or in conscious disreg ard of —evidenc e that the City ’s ac tual i n h ab i t ancy fig ure w as fa

r below 5,000. Acc ording ly , as fur ther discussed be low, there is more than a scintilla of evidenc e that the City failed to make a g ood-fa ith e ffor t to comply with the inhabitancy require ment imposed by the
c on sti tut ion , a

nd in f a c t so ug ht t o c on tr a ve ne that r e qu ir e me nt. Reg arding the methods that the City employ ed in order to de termine its inhabitancy fig ure, the n-may or Pat Croche t testified that she p er s o n all y counted the numbe r of r esidential structure s within the Cit y and multiplied that number by three , which sh e es t i m at ed to be a
re a so na ble pe rs on s- pe r- ho us e ho ld m ult ipl ie r. Th is m e tho d in dic a te d a tot a l of o nly20

4, 65 6 inha

bit ants . Wh e n a sk e d w he th er the c ity c ounc il c on sid e re d a

ny oth e r t y pe of me tho d to de te rm ine its numbe r of

inh a bit ants , c ounc il m e mbe r M e ri ly n N a tio ns te sti fi e d th a t sh e pe rs on a lly inv e sti g a te d th e numbe r o f h ou se ho lds in t he City . N a tio ns te sti fi e d: Q. And what did y ou deter mine, as fa

r as house holds go? A. Confident. Ifelt conf ident that we were qualified in pursuing the Home Rule. Q. Di d y ou

make a de te rm inatio n a s to the numbe r o f h ou se ho lds ? A. No, not exact number. Ultimately , h o we v er, the City ’s deter mination that it had the requisite number of inh a bit ants a pp e ars to have be e n th e re su lt o f c a lc ulatio ns ba se d o n it s to ta l numbe r o f i n- c ity uti lity
c on ne c tio ns . Cr oc he t te sti fi e d th a t sh e c on ta c te d th e Te xas Munic ipa l L e a g ue and c on su lte d th e ir publication entitled Te

x as Ho meRu le Cha rte rs , wh ic h re c omm e nd s a numbe r o f w ay s f

or a c ity to deter mine its inhabitanc y fig ure. Among these is the sug g estion to “use utility connec tions with a mul tip lie r. ” A re pr e se ntativ e fr om the L e a g ue e xpla ine d thi s me tho d in the fo llo wi ngwa

y : “ [T]hi s means the c ity

would find out the number of utilit y connec tions withi n the city and then multiply

that number by

the ave rag e number

of individuals per house r ece iving utility s ervic es.” Croc het purp or te dly a do pte d th is a

pp roac h, c ounti ngthe numbe r o f “ wate r t a ps ” (1 ,6 75 ) a

nd a g a in mul tip ly in g t hat numbe r b y a mul tip lie r o f t

hr e e , w hic h p ro vid e d a

tot a l of 5, 02 5 inha

bit a nts
. Th e r e f o r e , th e Ci ty d e te r

mi n e d th a t it w a s e li g ib le to c a ll th e h o me - r u le e le c ti o n o n th e b a sis that it h a d 5 ,0 25 inh a

bit ants
.Cr oc he t te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s: 8 Q. Di d y ou

make a ny dis c ount fo r wh e the r the me te rs fe ll wi thi n a c e rt a in r a te code—r ate c ode? A. No, sir. Q. Ok ay . So it d idn ’t ma tte r w he the r t

he y we re re si den tial, c omm e rc ia l, g overnmental or whate ver, if the y wer e inside the c ity

limit s, y ou counted the m? A. Ye s. Q. An d w hy

wa s th a t? A
. B e c a

u s e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e T e x a s m u n i c i p a l l aw an d p r o c e d u r e s b o o k , i ts ays that y ou take the utilit y connec tions. I t doe sn’t have any thing in ther e about leavingout something and picking up something e lse. I t just m akes the flat state me nt t

hat y ou us e the uti lity

c on ne c tio ns . 21 Crochet a dmitted, however , that in perfor ming he r “w ater

tap” c alculation she did not distinguish betw een residential and c ommercia l utili ty connec tions, but i nstead c ounted all of the ta ps wi thi n th e c ity

lim its

. Simi larly , Nations testified t hat t he water tap figur e of 1,675 r epre sented

8 all of the water taps within the city limit s. Nations furt h er stated that, in order “to come up w ith this number” of 1,675 water taps, Crochet would have had to discount “other things,” such as the me ters of c ustomers outside the city limit s, but Nations did not inqui re “ as to whethe r or not the number of taps that serve people that do no t li ve [in the City ] pe rm ane ntl y sh ou ld b e e xclu de d. ” On thi s p oin t, N a tio ns te sti fi e d:
A. I t’s my

understandingthat t h ere wer e other things that they

—that she discounted to come up w ith this number . . . . I didn’t ask what they

wer e. Al l I cared a

bo ut w a s th e numbe r a nd ho w i t w a s a c qu ir e d f or my c omm itt e e ’s purp os e s.22

Q. You—y ou wer e mainly interested in that it was in e x cess of 5,000? A. Ye s. When asked why

she dec ided to use 3.00 as the pe rsons-per -hou s eh old multi plier, Crochet a nswere d that she had simply ask ed o t h er municipalities what multipl ier they used and selec ted one “ in the middle.” Crochet d i d not rec all how many municipalities she contac ted, or wh ic h o the rs sh e sp ok e to a pa rt fr om t he c ity of Ma rb le F a lls

. Using the City ’s sam e utilit y information, the prope rty owner s produce d contra ry evidenc e that the City ’s inhabitancy fig ure w as i n fa ct m uch lower than 5,025. Acc ording to the proper ty owner s, the C ity had only 946 residential water taps within the city limit s, which yielded an inhabitanc y

fig ure of 2,838, even usingthe City ’s per sons-per- household multipl ier of thr ee. T he pr op e rt y ow ne rs ’ evid e nc e a lso inc lud e d a numbe r o f o ff

ic ia l a c kn ow le dg me nts ma de by the City that its po pu la tio n wa s fa

r le ss tha n 5, 00 0. F or e xamp le , the pr op e rt y ow ne rs po int

ou t th a t th e City “re prese nted to the U.S. Depa rtment of Just ice by

letter dated J anuar

y 1 3 , 2 0 0 5 ” that it had a population prior to the anne x ations of B eave r I sland and Web I sle of 3,870.

I n a dd iti on , th e pr op e rt

y ow ne rs c ite d U .S. Ce ns us inf or ma tio n a nd oth e r d a ta projec tions indi catingthat Gra nite Shoals’s population in 2005 was or would be well below 5,000. Ac c or din g to t

he 20 00 U. S. Ce ns us , th e City ’s po pu la tio n w a s o nly 2, 04 0, and

the Ce ns us data projec tions estimated Granite Shoals’s populati o n t o be 2,336 in the y ear 2005. Fur

thermore , the Census data indicated that the City ’s ave rag e household size was only 2.47. As the prope rty

owner s point out, when 2.47 is used as t h e persons-pe r-house hold multi plier, rather than 3.00 a s used by Crochet, the City ’s inhabitancy fig ures a re e ven fur

ther be low 5,000. Cons i s t en t with the Census23

f igu r e s , th e O f

f ic e o f th e St a te D e mo g r a

p h e r e s ti mate d th a t th e Ci ty ’ s p o p u lati o n w a s 2,302 as of J uly 1, 2005, and that the f

igur e g rewto 2,346 by

J anuar y 1, 2006
. L i k ewise, the Capital Area Council of Gover

nments data proje cted the City ’s 2006 population to be 2,346, and the Texas Water Deve lopment Boa

rd pre dicted that the City ’s population will not ex cee d 5,000 until the y ear 2050. We conclude that the proper ty owner s’ evidenc e, which we must take a s true and view in their fa

vor, see M

iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 228, raises a fac t question reg ardingtheir alleg ation t h a t t h e C i t y d i d n o t a c ti ng o o d f a i t h i nd e t e r

m i n i n g t h a ti tw a s e l i g i b l e t o c o n v e rtt o h o m e - r u l e . In pa rt ic ul ar , N a t i o n s ’ s s t a t e m e n t t h a t s h e w a s o n l y i n t e r e s t e d i n w h e t h e r th e f i n a l n u mb e r

wo uld exceed 5,000 c ould support an infer ence that the City was wi lling to ac cept data of dubious reliability , ignor e contr ary evidenc e, or ma

nipulate the data to rea ch a desired result. Such evidenc e, coupled with the f

act that only

o n e o f t he thre e methods that the City ’s witnesses said they considere d actua lly

y ielded an inha

bitancy fig ure a bove 5,000, could indicate to a rea sonable juror that the City

did not ex erc ise g ood faith in arr iving at its final inhabitancy deter mination. Be cause the City failed to conclusively neg ate the claims of fraud and bad fa ith, it has
no t sh ow n th a t th e pr op e rt y ow ne rs la c ke d s tand ingto b ri ngthe ir c la ims ou tsi de of a

qu o w arr a nto proce eding . We theref

ore hold that the t ri al co u rt did not err in deny ing the City ’s plea to the jurisdiction, and we ove rrule the City ’s sec ond issue.
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled the City ’s i ssues, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the plea to the jurisdiction.24 J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Mar ch 19, 2009