J. S70007/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

CHRISTOPHER FINNEFROCK, : No. 1245 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 6, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No. CP-15-CR-0004197-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 24, 2018

Christopher Finnefrock appeals from the April 6, 2018 judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County after he 

entered guilty pleas to two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse 

with a child, one count of unlawful contact with a minor, and one count of 

corruption of minors.1 The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate 

term of imprisonment of eight to sixteen years. Mark Conte, Esq., has filed 

an Anders brief,2 with an accompanying petition, alleging that the appeal is 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 6318(a)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 

434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
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frivolous, and including a request to withdraw. After careful review, we 

grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

The trial court set forth the following:

Appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of Rape 

of Child (18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 3121(c)), nine (9) counts 

of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse With a 

Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)), nine (9) counts of 

Unlawful Contact With a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6318(a)(1)), nine (9) counts of Incest of a Minor 

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302(b)(1)), one (1) count of 

Corruption of Minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. §6301(a)(1)(ii)), 

one (1) count of Endangering Welfare of Children

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)), nine (9) counts of 

Indecent Assault of Person Less Than 13 Years of 

Age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)), nine (9) counts of 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-Serious 

Bodily Injury (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(c)), and nine (9) 

counts of Contact/Communication With a 

Minor-Sexual Abuse (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(5)). 

The Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-Serious 

Bodily Injury and Contact/Communication With a 

Minor-Sexual Abuse counts were withdrawn at the 

lower court. The remaining 47 counts were bound 

over for trial.

Various pre-trial motions were filed by the parties. 

The Commonwealth filed a “Motion to Allow 

Testimony of Out of Court Statement”. A hearing 

was scheduled for May 25, 2017 but continued to 

permit new defense counsel to enter his appearance 

and prepare for the hearing. New defense counsel 

filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the

Commonwealth’s Motion on August 16, 2017. Upon 

consideration of the evidence presented and 

arguments made at the August 17, 2017 hearing, 

the Commonwealth’s motion was granted in part and 

denied in part. The Commonwealth filed additional 

motions on November 27, 2017: (1) a “Motion in 

Limine to Preclude References to Prior Sexual

Conduct”, and (2) a “Motion for Testimony by 

Contemporaneous Alternative Method”. A “Motion in 
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Limine to Admit Expert Testimony Regarding Lack of 

Injury to Victim” was also filed by the 

Commonwealth on February 16, 2018. After 

discussions held in chambers with both counsel, the 

court deferred its ruling on the Commonwealth’s 

motions until the time of trial.[Footnote 1]

[Appellant] filed a “Motion in Limine” on 

February 23, 2018 requesting that [appellant] be 

permitted to: (1) cross examine the child victim and 

child witness, and (2) present evidence of the child 

victim’s prior sexual conduct including prior sexual 

assaults. [Appellant’s] “Motion in Limine” was also 

deferred until the commencement of trial.

[Footnote 1] It was represented to the 

court by the Commonwealth, during the 

chambers conference, that the 

Commonwealth would be withdrawing its 

motion requesting an alternate method 

of testimony for the victim at trial. 

However, no withdrawal was formerly 

made by the Commonwealth subsequent 

to the chambers conference.

On April 6, 2018 a jury was selected for trial. Prior 

to the court’s rulings on the parties’ pending motions 

and the commencement of trial, the Commonwealth 

and [a]ppellant presented the court with a 

negotiated guilty plea. Appellant pleaded guilty to 

two (2) counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual 

Intercourse With a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)), 

one (1) count of Unlawful Contact With a Minor 

(18 Pa.C.S.A. §6318(a)(1)), and one (1) count of 

Corruption of Minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. §6301(a)(1)(ii)). 

Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 

8 to 16 years of incarceration on the two (2) counts

of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse With a 

Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. §3123(b)) and 10 years of 

probation on the remaining counts.

On April 24, 2018, through his appointed defense 

counsel Mark Conte, Esquire, [a]ppellant filed an

appeal to his April 6, 2018 judgment of sentence. 

On April 25, 2018, the court filed its Rule 1925(b) 
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Order. Subsequently, on May 14, 2018, Mr. Conte 

filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to File 1925(b) 

Statement and For Appointment of New Counsel”. 

On May 25, 2018, the court granted Mr. Conte’s 

request for an extension of time and scheduled a 

hearing for June 6, 2018 to address his request to 

withdraw as [a]ppellant’s counsel. Mr. Conte also 

filed a “Motion to Withdraw as Appellate Counsel”

with the Superior Court. (See Docket, 

Commonwealth v. Finnefrock, 1245 EDA 2018). 

The Superior Court issued an Order on June 1, 2018 

directing this court to enter a disposition on Mr. 

Conte’s request to withdraw as [a]ppellant’s counsel.

Prior to the hearing of June 6, 2018, [a]ppellant

submitted correspondence to the Chester County 

Clerk of Courts indicating his desire to participate in 

the June 6, 2018 hearing, and his desire to keep 

Mr. [Conte] as his appellate counsel “cuz he kno(ws) 

I’m not guilty”. (See Commonwealth v 

Finnefrock, CP-15-CR-4197-20176, Correspondence

Docketed 06/01/18, p. 1). We denied Mr. Conte’s 

request to withdraw as appellate counsel after 

considering the legal arguments made and 

[a]ppellant’s statements to the court. We found that 

[a]ppellant was not financially able to retain private 

appellate counsel, and that he was under significant 

time constraints to proceed with his appeal. 

Subsequently, [a]ppellant, through Mr. Conte, filed a 

“Motion for a New Hearing to Address Defense

Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw”. We denied his 

request on June 13, 2018.

On June 21, 2018, [a]ppellant filed his Concise 

Statement of Errors Claimed of on Appeal pursuant 

to our May 21, 2018 Order.

Trial court opinion, 7/19/18 at 1-4 (footnote 2 omitted).

To withdraw under Anders, court-appointed counsel must satisfy 

certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for 

leave to withdraw and state that after making a conscientious examination 
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of the record, he has determined that the appeal is frivolous.” 

Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 947 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Second, counsel must file an Anders

brief, in which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history 

and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to 

anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for concluding that the 

appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the 

relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or 

statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. With respect to the briefing requirements, 

“[n]either Anders nor McClendon requires that counsel’s brief provide an 

argument of any sort, let alone the type of argument that counsel develops 

in a merits brief. To repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are 

references to anything in the record that might arguably support the 

appeal.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Finally, counsel must furnish a 

copy of the Anders brief to his client and “advise[] him of his right to retain 

new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points that he deems 

worthy of the court’s attention, and attach[] to the Anders petition a copy 

of the letter sent to the client.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 

594 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). “[If] counsel has satisfied the 

above requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of 

the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to 
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whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. 

Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc) (quotation marks 

and quotation omitted).

Here, counsel’s Anders brief substantially complies with prevailing 

law. Attorney Conte has provided a procedural summary of the case, albeit 

without references to the record. (Anders brief at 6-8.) Attorney Conte 

does, however, attach copies of the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion; 

appellant’s April 6, 2018 written guilty plea colloquy; appellant’s 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement; the transcript of the April 6, 2018 hearing 

regarding the Commonwealth’s plea offer to appellant; and the transcript of 

appellant’s April 6, 2018 guilty plea proceedings as Exhibits A, B, C, D, and 

E, respectively, to his Anders brief. Attorney Conte cites to those exhibits 

throughout his brief, and the originals of those exhibits are included in the 

certified record. Attorney Conte also refers to portions of those exhibits that 

arguably support the appeal; specifically, potential issues regarding the 

voluntariness of the plea. Attorney Conte concludes that “[a]ppellant’s 

appeal is frivolous and without merit.” (Anders brief at 14.) Additionally, 

Attorney Conte’s correspondence to appellant provided appellant with a copy 

of the Anders brief; informed appellant that he “thoroughly reviewed the 

issue” that appellant asked him to raise; specifically, appellant’s “belief that 

the [trial court] threatened, forced, or otherwise coerced [appellant] into 

pleading guilty when it advised [appellant] of the applicable mandatory 
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minimum jail sentences that applied to the charges [appellant was] facing at 

trial,” and counsel’s conclusion that the claim is “frivolous and without legal 

merit.” (Attorney Conte’s correspondence to appellant, 9/10/18.) In that 

correspondence, Attorney Conte also advised appellant of his right to either 

retain new counsel or to proceed pro se on appeal to raise any additional 

points that he “believes are worthy of the court’s attention.”

3

 (Id.) As such, 

Attorney Conte has substantially complied with the procedural requirements 

of Anders. We, therefore, proceed to conduct an independent review to 

ascertain whether the appeal is indeed wholly frivolous.

Attorney Conte raises the following issue in the Anders brief: 

Did the Court err by advising [a]ppellant, 

Christopher Finnefrock, that he was facing 

eighteen (18) felony charges and that each count 

carried a ten (10) year minimum mandatory 

sentence and was the effect of this notification such 

that [a]ppellant was threatened, forced, or coerced 

into pleading guilty to [the crimes]?

Anders brief at 5.

At the outset, we note that the record reflects that prior to the entry of 

appellant’s guilty plea, a jury had been selected on Friday, April 6, 2018, and 

the parties were prepared to proceed to trial on Monday, April 9, 2018, when 

the Commonwealth extended the plea bargain offer to appellant. (Notes of 

testimony, 4/6/18 at 2.) The trial court then held a hearing wherein 

 

3 Appellant did not file a response to Attorney Conte’s correspondence to 

appellant dated September 10, 2018.
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appellant acknowledged that Attorney Conte advised him of the 

Commonwealth’s plea offer. (Id. at 2-3.) The trial court then informed 

appellant that if the jury convicted appellant of all charges, appellant’s 

mandatory minimum sentence would be up to 180 years of imprisonment. 

(Id.) The Commonwealth clarified the mandatory minimum sentence as 

being comprised of 18 counts with each carrying a 10-year mandatory 

minimum. (Id. at 3.) Appellant acknowledged that he discussed the plea 

offer with Attorney Conte, but that it was appellant’s choice to proceed to 

trial. (Id.) Thereafter, however, appellant accepted the Commonwealth’s 

offer and entered his guilty pleas. (Notes of testimony, guilty plea 

proceedings, 4/6/18 at 2-7.)

In considering the validity of a guilty plea colloquy, “[t]he 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open 

court and require the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain 

whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his 

plea.” Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014). Pursuant to 

Rule 590, the sentencing court should inquire whether the defendant 

understands, among other things, “the nature of the charges to which he or 

she is pleading guilty[,]” and “the permissible ranges of sentences and fines 

possible.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. “[N]othing in the rule precludes the 

supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read, 
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completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea 

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-1213 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 893 (Pa. 

2009).

Thereafter,

[t]he reviewing Court will evaluate the adequacy of 

the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the 

resulting plea by examining the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea. 

Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered 

a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and 

the defendant bears the burden of proving 

otherwise.

Prendes, 97 A.3d at 352 (citations omitted). Accordingly, even if there is 

an omission in the oral plea colloquy, “a plea of guilty will not be deemed 

invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that 

the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of 

his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.” 

Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(citation omitted).

Additionally, “a defendant is bound by the statements which he makes 

during his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 

1167 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted). As such, a defendant “may not assert 

grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he 

pled guilty,” and he cannot recant the representations he made in court 

when he entered his guilty plea. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the law 
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does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his 

decision to plead guilty. The law only requires that a defendant’s decision to 

plead guilty be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See 

Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 528-529 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Here, the record reflects that appellant read, completed, and signed an 

extensive nine-page written guilty plea colloquy form, which is part of the

certified record. (Written guilty plea colloquy, 4/6/18.) On that form, 

appellant affirmed, in writing, among other things, (i) that he understood 

the charges filed against him and the maximum sentences that could be 

imposed for those crimes; (ii) that he fully discussed the charges with his 

attorney and is satisfied with his attorney’s representation and advice; 

(iii) that his decision to plead guilty was his own decision; (iv) that no one

used any force or threats against him to induce him to plead guilty; (v) that 

no promises were made to induce his guilty pleas; (vi) that he committed 

the crimes to which he plead guilty; and (vii) that he read and understood 

the full meaning of the entire written colloquy and still wanted to plead 

guilty. (Id.) 

The record further reflects that the trial court conducted an oral guilty 

plea colloquy. (Notes of testimony, guilty plea proceedings, 4/8/18.) 

Appellant acknowledged that after he had additional discussions with 

Attorney Conte, he decided to plead guilty. (Id. at 3.) Appellant agreed 

with the factual basis of his guilty pleas and admitted to committing the 
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crimes. (Id.) Appellant affirmed that the signatures on the written guilty 

plea colloquy were his, and he acknowledged that he had gone over the 

entire written colloquy with Attorney Conte. (Id.) Appellant acknowledged 

his satisfaction with Attorney Conte’s professional services. (Id.) Appellant 

also acknowledged that no one promised him anything or threatened him to 

induce his guilty pleas. (Id. at 4.)

After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the totality of 

the circumstances surrounding appellant’s entry of his guilty pleas discloses 

that appellant fully understood the nature and consequences of his pleas and 

that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the pleas. Therefore, the 

record supports Attorney Conte’s assessment that because appellant entered 

his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily, this appeal is wholly frivolous.

Finally, our independent review of the entire record reveals no 

additional non-frivolous claims. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm appellant’s April 6, 2018 judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/24/18