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September 19, 2006

Dr. Paul L. Ziemer

Chairman

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

c/o National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

4676 Columbia Parkway MS C-46

Cincinnati, OH 45226

RE: Chapman Valve. SDecial Exoosure Cohort Petition (SEC Petition ~ 0043}

Dear Dr. Ziemer:

We write to express our support for the Special Exposure Cohort Petition (file #:

012-05-3653) filed by fonner employees at Chapman Valve Manufacturing Company in

Springfield, Massachusetts and their survivors. Outlined below are issues that we ask the

Board to consider. A number of the issues involve highly technical matters and we

respectfully suggesthat the Board consider engaging its technical support contractor to

assist in its review.

Congress passed the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation

Program Act (EEOICP A) in 2000 to ensure that nuclear energy workers would be

compensated for illnesses caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic substances.

These unsung heroes of the Cold War helped to build our nation's arsenal. In many

cases, their work was perfonned in top-secret conditions, and the extremely dangerous

nature of their jobs was concealed from them. For the most part, exposure monitoring

was inadequate. It is often very difficult, if not impossible, to establish the level of

radiation exposure for each worker. EEOICP A addressed this problem by allowing

workers and their survivors to petition to become members of the Special Exposure

Cohort when it is not feasible to estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy.

Chapman Valve machined uranium for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in

1948 and 1949. Their employees were exposed to radioactive materials in the course of

this AEC-related work. Cleanup activities took place from 1991 to 1995 under the

Department of Energy's Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program.
Dr. Paul L. Ziemer

September 19, 2006

Page 2

The SEC Petition for these Chapman Valve workers was submitted on August 15,

2005, qualified on November 9, 2005, and the SEC Evaluation was due, under the tem1S

ofNIOSH's Interim Final Rule, on May 9,2006. We received the NIOSH SEC

Evaluation Report on August 31, 2006, more than three months after the 180-day

deadline established under EEOICP A The Evaluation Report concludes that it is

feasible to complete dose reconstructions with the data that has been recovered for this

site. We have serious questions about the basis for this conclusion.

NIOSH is relying upon the February 22, 2005 Site Profile (ORAU- TKBS-OO33)

for the Chapman Valve site as the basis for concluding that it is feasible to reconstruct the

dose for these workers. That Site Profile was issued only one day after a public meeting

with former workers in February 2005. At that meeting, NIOSH received numerous

pieces of evidence and testimony regarding the activities at the plant. Since the Site

Profile was issued the next day, it could not have incorporated evidence from that

meeting.

We have been advised by NIOSH that the agency intends to revise the Site

Profile. We applaud this decision. In light of this planned revision, however, we find it

curious that the Evaluation Report would be issued based in substantial part on analyses

from the existing Site Profile. While NIOSH states these changes to the Site Profile will

not make a difference in the SEC Evaluation Report, we have difficulty understanding

how this could be the case. At a minimum, the petitioners should be allowed to see the

revised Site Profile and to review it in conjunction with the Evaluation Report to make

appropriate comment.

We are also deeply concerned about the conclusions reached by the Evaluation

Report. Under EEOICP A, NIOSH has the burden of demonstrating that the data is

representative of the highest exposed individuals at a worksite, and the Board has adopted

evaluation criteria regarding these workers:

4. Consideration of Data and Data Subsets -

NIOSH must demonstrate that there are sufficient data (e.g., is the sample size

adequate) and that the data are representative of the highest exposed individuals

within the class. This may involve looking at subsets of larger exposure data sets.

Often these subsets are less comprehensive for a given time period (usually earlier

years). NIOSH should assess how "robust" these data or data subsets are for the

purposes of dose reconstruction. In answering this question NIOSH should

consider whether they can determine the representativeness of the data. Some

questions which should be considered in evaluating representativeness include: 1)

Are the data from the site in question, from a surrogate site(s), or both; 2) If from

a surrogate site, have these data been appropriately evaluated and have the

uncertainties due to extrapolation from another site been accounted for; 3) Do

they represent the highest exposed individuals? 4) Do they represent the entire

exposed cohort; 5) Do they represent all workers ever on the site; 6) Are the data

from "cohort" type sampling?; and 7) Can the data be interpreted in a way to

ensure that the maximum plausible dose can be determined? (emphasis added).
Dr. Paul L. Ziemer

September 19, 2006

Page 3

While NIOSH states that it "did identify employees at the facility during this time

period for which complete dose reconstruction would be feasible," (Evaluation Report,

page 37), we have serious concerns about this conclusion with respect to all members of

the class. Indeed, the Department of Labor has recently remanded a number of cases to

NIOSH for additional study based on inadequacy of the data.

Weare particularly concerned that data relied upon for the Evaluation Report is

not representative of the maximally exposed individuals in the class. This concern arises

from our review of raw data that we recently received from NIOSH regarding workers'

exposure at Chapman Valve. A few key issues arose from our review:

First, records indicate that routine monitoring for uranium intake took place on

only three occasions (July, September and October of 1948) and involved only 33

samples covering 32 workers. Chapman Valve used cohort sampling, covering a range of

job classifications, rather than sampling only the most exposed workers. (NIOSH

concedes in its SEC Evaluation report that the "exact selection criteria is unknown.")

Samples were taken from only six and five workers in September and October,

respectively, and none of the workers monitored in October were production workers,

who face the greatest risk. Instead, bioassays were concentrated in non-production

workers, such as the Associate Director for Research, Foremen, Personnel Managers,

Chief Electricians, Engineers, Inspectors and others who would have had far less

opportunity for internal radiation exposure at this facility. Such samples clearly would

not reflect the highest exposures at the plant.

Second, Chapman Valve also did not take bioassay samples from the individuals

with the four highest film badge readings, which reflect high levels of external exposure.

These readings were 650,555,500 and 500 mr per week. The routine bioassay samples

did not include these maximally exposed individuals.

In addition, there was only one incident monitored-a fire presumed to be in

early June 1948. Samples were taken from seven workers on June 11, 1948, five of whom

had elevated uranium in urine readings. Only two workers involved with fire and its

cleanup were re-sampled, both guards. Their bioassay readings were the same or higher a

month later. NIOSH assumes the fire occurred on June 10, but the date of the fire

remains unknown, despite extensive efforts by the Chapman Valve families to ascertain

the date through archival research. We believe this uncertainty should be reflected in the

estimations of the monitored workers, so there is no possibility of an underestimate of the

uranium intake of these workers. In addition, uranium machining facilities are known to

have frequent fires, yet workers were only sampled after one particular incident. NIOSH

therefore simply does not have data that reflects other potential exposures.

Finally, NIOSH has failed to explain how it accounted for the work history of those

individuals with bioassay samples, nor has it adequately indicated how it assessed the

duration of time between when the workers were exposed and when the bioassay samples

were taken. In light of these shortcomings, we fail to see how NIOSH can conclude that it

has representative data from which it can develop a plausible upper bound dose estimate.
Dr. Paul L. Ziemer

September 19, 2006

Page 4

In addition to these specific concerns regarding the analysis of worker monitoring

data relied upon in the Evaluation Report, we also have reservations about NIOSH's

treatment of other factors contributing to workers' exposure.

For example, Oak Ridge National Labs documented the presence of2.16%

enriched uranium at the Chapman Valve site. However, this is not explained in the Site

Profile or the SEC Evaluation Report. As part of a radiological survey tied to the

environmental cleanup program in the 1990s, the Labs performed an isotopic analysis on

two uranium samples. One of the two samples was positive for enriched uranium.

Despite this evidence, the NIOSH Site Profile assumes only natural uranium was

processed. NIOSH has failed to explain how it will account for enriched uranium in dose

reconstructions, given the lack of data on the amount of material and on the processes

used to handle it. Nor has it shown how it will avoid underestimating workers' potential

exposures to enriched uranium.

Also, the cracking furnace and uranium chip incinerator operations, which may

have been intermittent and had high exposure potential, appear not to be adequately

addressed in the Report. (They were also overlooked in the Site Profile.) Furthermore,

although the stipulated time period for operations was not long, documents indicate

potential for widespread exposures, such as through contamination spreading from the

production area into the lunchrooms. After the Chapman Valve site had ceased

production and the scrap and waste had been shipped away, the site had to be washed

down several times. Even with this washing, residual contamination remained embedded

in the building.

For the above reasons, we have serious questions about NIOSH's conclusion that

the handful of production worker bioassays is representative and from this that it is able

to develop a plausible upper bound dose estimate. In light of these concerns, we

respectfully urge the Board to carefully review this SEC Evaluation Report and the raw

data relied upon by NIOSH. Again, in reviewing the technical issues, we urge the Board

to assign a review of the Evaluation Report by audit contractors, as it did in the SEC

petitions at Iowa Ordnance Plant, Mallinckrodt Chemical, Rocky Flats, and Oak Ridge

Y-12.

'hn F. Kerry

cc: Dr. John Howard, Director, NIOSH

Larry Elliot, Director, Office of Compensation Analysis and Support, NIOSH