Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2176 | May 29, 2020 Page 1 of 22

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Michael L. Carmin

Daniel M. Cyr

CarminParker, P.C.

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Sean M. Clapp

Sean T. White

Clapp Ferrucci

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael O. Cain and

Linda A. Raymond,

Appellants-Plaintiffs,

v.

William J. Huff, II, Revocable 

Trust Declaration, Dated June 

28, 2011, and Nicole E. Huff 

Revocable Trust Declaration, 

Dated June 28, 2011,

Appellees-Defendants

May 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PL-2176

Appeal from the Monroe Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Holly M. Harvey, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

53C06-1804-PL-755

Baker, Judge.
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[1] This case has been here before. Michael Cain and Linda Raymond 

(collectively, Cain) are homeowners in The Shores subdivision in Monroe 

County. William and Nicole Huff (the Huffs) own over 200 acres adjacent to 

The Shores. The Huffs have an easement to use a roadway in The Shores to 

access their real estate. Cain sought to enjoin the Huffs from their use of the 

easement to conduct logging activities on their real estate. The trial court 

granted a preliminary injunction, which this Court vacated as overbroad. On 

remand, Cain renewed his prior motion and filed a new one addressing a

different portion of the Huffs’ real estate. This time, the trial court denied the 

requests for preliminary injunction. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In March 1990, Kenton Robinson granted an easement (the Grant of Easement) 

to Terre Haute Real Estate Corporation (THR), the then-owner of property 

adjacent to Robinson’s property. Subsequently, Robinson conveyed his real 

estate, which became The Shores, a residential subdivision. Cain is the current 

owner of Lot 9 in The Shores. The Huffs are the current owners of the real 

estate adjacent to the Shores (the Huff Real Estate), including the former 

property owned by THR (the THR Property), and are the successors in interest 

to the Grant of Easement.

[3] The Grant of Easement contains multiple easements. Relevant here are 

easements allowing the Huffs to use Shady Side Drive, the principal road 

serving The Shores, and a fifty-foot wide section over Lot 1 and part of the 
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Common Nature Preserve in The Shores, which connected The Shores to a part 

of the Huff Real Estate. The Huffs’ use of the easements was limited to 

construction, development, and use of single-family residences that would be 

built on the Huff Real Estate.

[4] The Huff Real Estate totals over 200 acres, including the THR Property and

approximately 44 acres that they acquired from Chumley, LLC (the Chumley 

Parcel). The only way to access the THR Property is via the easements in The 

Shores. The only way to access the Chumley Parcel (by land) is via the THR 

Property. 

[5] The subsequent events, as described by this Court in the first appeal involving 

this litigation, are as follows:

The Huff Real Estate is heavily wooded and hilly land, and 

access by land to the Huff Real Estate is via the three access 

easements. After the Huffs acquired their land, they . . .

developed a Stewardship Plan specifically for the Huff Real 

Estate, which was finalized in July of 2017. . . . The Stewardship 

Plan included certain well-delineated goals for the Huff Real 

Estate, including to improve the stand of trees, improve the 

wildlife habitat, control exotic and invasive species, provide an 

enjoyable place to recreate, selectively harvest trees throughout 

the woods in the future, develop four home sites, provide better 

access throughout the property, and develop fire trails.

***

In December 2017, the Huffs entered into a contract with TriState Timber (“Tri-State”) to cut and remove trees from the Huff 

Real Estate. The Huffs were to receive a percentage of the 
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proceeds from the sale of the removed trees. . . . Around April 

10, 2018, Tri-State began harvesting the timber on the Huff Real 

Estate, and Tri-State expected the work to be finished in 

approximately ten weeks, weather permitting. As part of its 

logging activities, Tri-State drove large commercial logging 

trucks and equipment over Easement No. 1, Shady Side Drive, 

which is a hilly and curvy two-lane road with no sidewalks or 

shoulders.

On April 18, 2018, Cain filed his complaint for declaratory 

judgment and injunctive relief. In the complaint, Cain requested 

declaratory judgment to determine the rights granted to the Huffs 

by the Grant of Easement and for a declaration that the 

easements do not authorize ingress and egress for commercial 

logging activity on the Huff Real Estate. Cain also requested a 

permanent injunction against the Huffs, enjoining use of the 

easements for commercial logging activities or any purpose other 

than specifically authorized by the general conditions in the 

Grant of Easement. . . .

On May 3, 2018, a hearing was held on the issue of a preliminary 

injunction. At the hearing, Cain presented evidence that he is a 

member of The Shores Homeowners’ Association and owned 

property in The Shores. Cain testified that he objected to the 

Huffs’ use of the easements to remove logs from the Huff Real 

Estate for commercial sale even if for the development of singlefamily homes. Cain further testified, “I feel like these logging 

trucks and this machinery are trespassing across the easements 

because they don't have permission to be there.” Cain also 

presented evidence that the use of logging trucks on the 

easements is an annoyance and inconvenience to him, although 

he only lives in his home in The Shores approximately four 

months out of the year. Cain testified that he had safety concerns 

regarding the logging trucks using the easements and introduced 

a picture of a neighbor standing behind a mailbox as a logging 

truck passed, but Cain did not have any knowledge of any 
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accidents occurring on Shade [sic] Side Drive in the years since 

he has owned his property.

***

At the hearing, William J. Huff (“William”) testified that, 

although he was clearing trees from the Huff Real Estate, he was 

not in the process of building homes on the land; instead, he was 

“preparing for the future use of [the] land.” The evidence 

presented at the hearing included William’s statement that the 

logging activity on the Huff Real Estate at the time the complaint 

was filed was to remove trees in accordance with the Stewardship 

Plan. In discussing what is necessary for future development, the 

Huffs presented testimony from a civil engineer that the 

“standard first step in a development project is clearing” the 

land. After reviewing the relevant portions of the Grant of 

Easement, the civil engineer testified that the development and 

use of the Huff Real Estate would include “clearing and grading, 

establishment of building sites for these buildings,” the extension 

of utility lines, and building of homes and garages. The engineer 

further testified that, as part of this process, any valuable timber 

that is removed during the clearing could be sold to help offset 

costs.

William testified that he understood that the process of 

harvesting the timber would only continue for a period of about 

eight weeks, depending on weather, and that harvesting would 

not need to be done again for approximately ten years. Evidence 

was presented that, once the timber was harvested, a ten to 

fifteen-year rotation was expected before harvesting needed to 

occur again but was dependent on the growth rate of the timber 

and the presence of diseases or other outside forces.

The Huffs presented evidence that their contract for selective 

harvesting with Tri-State was worth approximately $500,000, but 
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they did not show what percentage of that value they were to 

receive from Tri-State. The Huffs also maintained that they 

would incur penalties and fees associated with the cessation of 

work under their contract with Tri-State and that timber worth 

$20,000 had already been cut on their land and would spoil if not 

removed.

On May 8, 2018, the trial court entered its order granting Cain 

relief and prohibiting the Huffs from using the easements for 

anything other than the construction, development, and use of 

single-family structures. The trial court specifically ordered that 

the Huffs were enjoined from “using the [easements] through 

The Shores . . . for access to [the Huff Real Estate] except for the 

construction, development and use by [the Huffs] of single-family 

residential structures, which may include guest and caretaker 

quarters and other buildings attendant thereto.” The trial court 

further enjoined the Huffs from “use of the [easements] described 

in the Grant of Easement, which encumber [the Huff Real 

Estate,] for commercial logging or for hauling logs or trees, or 

forestry activity.”

William J. Huff, II Revocable Tr. Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011 v. Cain [Huff I], 

120 N.E.3d 1029, 1031-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations 

omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied. This Court noted that while the language in 

the first paragraph of the trial court’s order closely mirrored the language of the 

original Grant of Easement, the language in the second paragraph, which 

enjoined the Huffs from using the easements for commercial logging, hauling 

logs or trees, or any forestry activity, impermissibly encroached on the Huffs’ 

“ability to exercise their rights on their property.” Id. at 1037. Specifically, this 

Court found and ordered as follows:
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Under the language in the Grant of Easement, the Huffs’ use of 

the easements was limited to the construction, development, and 

use by the Huffs and their grantees and assigns of six singlefamily residential structures. The evidence presented established 

that the Huff Real Estate is comprised of approximately 240 acres 

adjacent to The Shores, which consists of heavily wooded and 

hilly land with the only access by land being the three access 

easements granted in the Grant of Easement. In order for 

reasonable development or use of the Huff Real Estate, it is clear 

that some prudent logging and removal of trees will be necessary 

and that the hauling and removal of trees would be essential in 

developing the Huff Real Estate as contemplated in the Grant of 

Easement. We, therefore, conclude that the preliminary 

injunction ordered by the trial court was overbroad as it enjoined 

the Huffs from activities on the Huff Real Estate that would be 

necessary to develop the property and effectively prohibits them 

from accomplishing what is explicitly granted in the Grant of 

Easement. Based on this, we vacate the trial court’s order 

granting the preliminary injunction.

. . . Prudent logging of the Huff Real Estate is essential for the 

reasonable use and development of the property, and as the Huff 

Real Estate is landlocked, the easements will need to be used to 

facilitate this prudent logging. Some sort of middle ground 

should be sought between the parties to accomplish this end, and 

this court urges the trial court to consider on remand whether the 

covenants on which a middle ground cannot be found are 

contrary to law and should be vacated.

Id. at 1037-38. Sometime in March 2019, the Huffs began logging activities on 

the Chumley Parcel, using the easements to access that real estate. 

[6] On May 3, 2019, Cain filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction (the 

Chumley Motion). In that motion, Cain stated that subsequent to the earlier 
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proceedings in the litigation, the Huffs “have extended their activities and are 

now engaged in commercial logging and other activities on real estate adjacent 

to the real estate owned by [the Huffs], but real estate which is not described in 

and is not benefited by the Grant of Easements.”1 Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 

94. On May 13, 2019, this Court denied Cain’s petition for rehearing.

[7] On May 21, 2019, Cain filed a motion to issue preliminary injunction (Motion 

to Reissue), asking that the trial court reissue its original preliminary injunction 

order subject to the limitations described in this Court’s opinion. In other 

words, Cain sought a narrowed preliminary injunction that excluded the 

overbroad language of the second paragraph of the original order but included 

the first paragraph as well as the trial court’s findings. Cain also included the 

allegation he raised in the May 3, 2019, motion that the Huffs had extended 

their logging activities to the Chumley Parcel, which is not benefited by the 

Grant of Easement.

[8] On June 11, 2019, Cain filed a petition to transfer to our Supreme Court. On 

June 12, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Cain’s two pending motions. At 

the outset of the hearing, the Huffs moved to dismiss because they argued that 

the real estate referenced in Cain’s new motions—the Chumley Parcel—was 

not included in the original complaint. The Huffs did not argue that the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction based on the pending petition to transfer or the fact 

1 Although not explicitly named in Cain’s motion, the real estate at issue is the Chumley Parcel.
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that this Court’s opinion was not yet certified. The trial court took the motion 

under advisement and held the hearing as planned.

[9] On August 19, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying both of Cain’s 

motions. In pertinent part, it found and concluded as follows:

1. [Procedural] Posture

***

There is no separate treatment of the two paragraphs of the trial 

court’s Order as [Cain] suggest[s]. The Court of Appeals vacated 

the entire order granting the preliminary injunction.

***

2. Law of the Case

[Cain] request[s] this Court to rely upon the findings of fact 

determined by the trial court in the May 7, 2018 Order, arguing 

that the appellate court did not specifically reverse or find 

erroneous any of the trial court’s findings. Arguably, the 

Opinion does not explicitly find error in certain findings . . . . 

However, as noted above, the Court of Appeals vacated the 

judgment entirely. . . . Therefore, this Court is not bound by the 

findings of the trial court in the May 7, 2018 order, and the 

parties are returned to the legal positions they occupied prior to 

the May 7, 2018 Order.

In the original Complaint, again [Cain] assert[s] that 

“commercial logging activities” by [the Huffs] on the [] Huff Real 

Estate breached the conditions set out in the Grant of Easement 

and cause[d] damage to the easement area. . . . In the second 
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Motion for Preliminary Injunction, [Cain] do[es] not assert new 

facts or new harm. . . . The primary difference in the two 

hearings related to the work conducted on the Chumley Parcels[

2

]

between March 11, 2019 and the June 12, 2019 hearing, which is 

substantially similar to the activity at issue in the first hearing on 

the first motion for injunctive relief.

Under the law of the case doctrine, the appellate court’s 

determination of a legal issue is binding upon the trial court on 

remand and on the appellate court on a subsequent appeal, given 

the case with substantially the same facts. . . . The Court of 

Appeals has already determined that such a restriction on logging 

activities as requested by [Cain] is contrary to law and that 

reasonable “development” of the land owned by [the Huffs]

includes prudent logging and hauling of timber. For this reason, 

the Court denies [Cain’s] second Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction.

3. Chumley Property, Motions to Dismiss and Instructions 

on Remand

The Court finds additional basis for denying [Cain’s] Motion. 

The evidence presented at the hearing on June 12, 2019 focused 

both on the prior evidence, as well as evidence concerning the 

activities which followed the issuance of the Court of Appeals 

opinion, during which there was no effective preliminary 

injunction, on the “Chumley Parcels”. As the Court has 

determined, and as the documents filed in support of [Cain’s] 

Complaint show, [the Complaint does not] include[] the 

Chumley Parcels as subject of the claims against the [Huffs].

2 The “Chumley Parcels” referred to by the trial court is the same real estate referred to by this Court in the 

singular.
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***

This Court recognizes that the Court of Appeals . . . generally 

describes the Huff Real Estate as including the Chumley Parcels. 

This Court finds that this general inclusion of the Chumley 

Parcels is not a re-writing or interpretation of the specific Grant 

of Easement as it is legally defined. Rather, it is a statement of 

the current circumstances and a conclusion that the [Huffs’] 

ability to develop their real estate as “contemplated by the Grant 

of Easement” requires consideration of the Chumley Parcels as 

well as the [THR] parcels specifically included in the Grant of 

Easement.

4. General trespass as basis for injunction

. . . [Cain’s] argument at the hearing . . . focuses . . . on the 

[Huffs’] use of the Access Easements to access the Chumley 

[Parcels] in general. As the Court has found above, [Cain has] 

not identified the Chumley [Parcels] in the Complaint, and the 

Complaint has not been amended. [Cain] seem[s] to argue . . . 

that the basis for the injunction is not the Grant of Easement at 

all, but a simple entry on The Shores property by [the Huffs] to 

get to the Chumley property. Because [Cain has] not amended 

[his] Complaint to include the Chumley property as a basis for a 

claim for trespass, the Court denies the Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction on that basis.

5. Instructions on Remand

The Court of Appeals . . . strongly recommended that this Court 

order the parties to mediation to attempt resolution. The Court 

finds that the recommendation is consistent with this Court’s 

practice of encouraging litigants to resolve disputes without 

protracted litigation. In addition, because it is clear that the 

addition of the Chumley Parcels complicates the application of 
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the conditions of the Access Easements, the Court finds that the 

parties should attempt reformation of the easements. In the 

event that mediation is unsuccessful, both parties may proceed 

with presenting their claims to the trial court for resolution.

Appealed Order p. 1-6. This Court’s opinion was certified on August 27, 2019. 

Cain now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] We summarize and restate Cain’s arguments on appeal as follows: (1) the trial 

court should have issued a modified version of the first preliminary injunction 

based on the law of the case doctrine and this Court’s first opinion; and (2) the 

trial court should have issued a new preliminary injunction related to the 

Chumley Parcel.3

I. Law of the Case

[11] The parties each address the law of the case doctrine. Cain argues that law of 

the case means that the trial court was bound by the portions of its first 

preliminary injunction order that this Court did not find problematic—

essentially, everything except for the second paragraph of the order that this 

Court found overbroad. The Huffs, in turn, argue that law of the case requires 

3 The Huffs argue that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider any of these arguments because this 

Court’s opinion was not yet certified when the trial court considered the motions and issued its order. We 

decline to consider this argument because the Huffs did not raise it to the trial court. See Georgetown Bd. of 

Zoning Appeals v. Keele, 743 N.E.2d 301, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a “party waives the issue of 

jurisdiction over a specific case by not raising that issue in a timely manner”).
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the same outcome for the Chumley Parcel as this Court implemented for the 

other portions of the Huff Real Estate.

[12] Under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court’s determination of a legal 

issue is binding on the trial court on remand and the appellate court on a 

subsequent appeal, given the same case with substantially the same facts. Ind. 

Farm Gas Prod. Co. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 662 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1996). All issues decided directly or implicitly in a prior decision are binding 

on all subsequent portions of the case. Id.

[13] There was one issue that was squarely decided by this Court in its first opinion. 

Specifically, we found that the portion of the trial court’s order that enjoined the 

Huffs from using the easements for commercial logging, hauling logs or trees, 

or any forestry activity impermissibly encroached on the Huffs’ “ability to 

exercise their rights on their property.” Huff I, 120 N.E.3d at 1037. That 

holding was clearly binding on the trial court on remand and is also binding on

this Court on appeal.

[14] The Huff I Court did not reach an explicit conclusion with respect to the rest of 

the first preliminary injunction order. It did, however, state that “[p]rudent 

logging of the Huff Real Estate[4] is essential for the reasonable use and 

development of the property, and as the Huff Real Estate is landlocked, the 

4

Significantly, the Huff I Court included the Chumley Parcel in its “Huff Real Estate” label. Id. at 1037

(noting that the Huff Real Estate is comprised of approximately 240 acres adjacent to The Shores).
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easements will need to be used to facilitate this prudent logging.” Id. at 1038. 

It then vacated the entire order and remanded to the trial court without 

instructions, aside from its finding that the second paragraph of the order was 

overbroad.

[15] When this Court vacated the entirety of the order and remanded, it returned the 

parties to the position that they occupied before the judgment was pronounced. 

Eden United, Inc. v. Short, 653 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Nothing in 

the analysis or holding of Huff I indicates that on remand, the trial court was 

bound by any part of its original order. Instead, the parties and the trial court 

were returned to the positions they held before the order was entered, with the 

proviso that the portion of the order found to be overbroad could not be 

included. Therefore, Cain is incorrect that the trial court was somehow 

required to make the same findings or reach the same result when considering it 

anew.

[16] With respect to the portion of the Huff Real Estate that does not include the 

Chumley Parcel, the trial court was bound by this Court’s determinations that 

“some prudent logging and removal of trees will be necessary” and that “the 

hauling and removal of trees” is “essential” to develop the Huff Real Estate as 

contemplated in the Grant of Easement. Huff I, 120 N.E.3d at 1037. Therefore, 

to the extent that Cain’s Motion to Reissue requests that logging and hauling 

and removal of trees from the Huff Real Estate be enjoined, the trial court was 

correct to deny it based on Huff I.
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[17] With respect to the Chumley Parcel, however, we do not believe that Huff I

mandates a resolution one way or another. While the Huff I Court included the 

Chumley Parcel in its definition of the Huff Real Estate, the Court did not 

squarely consider the Huffs’ use of the easements for the Chumley Parcel, 

which is not directly benefited by the Grant of Easement.5 Consequently, the 

law of the case doctrine did not offer guidance to the trial court as it considered 

Cain’s Chumley Motion.

6

II. The Chumley Motion

[18] Next, we must consider whether the trial court erred by denying the Chumley 

Motion. The parties spend a great deal of time arguing about whether the 

Chumley Parcel is sufficiently included in Cain’s complaint to be included in 

the litigation. We will assume for argument’s sake that it was, given our 

predilection for judicial efficiency and addressing issues on the merits when 

possible. We also note that Cain has since amended the complaint to clearly 

include the Chumley Parcel; therefore, going forward, it is clear to all parties 

that it is included.

5 The reason, of course, that the Huff I Court did not explicitly conduct this analysis is because the Huffs did 

not begin logging activities on the Chumley Parcel until after Huff I was decided.

6 Cain does not offer much in the way of argument regarding the Reissue Motion aside from the law of the 

case doctrine. Much of the analysis below regarding the Chumley Motion is equally applicable to the 

Reissue Motion. Consequently, for many of those same reasons, the trial court did not err by denying the 

Reissue Motion.
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[19] The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is within the trial court’s sound 

discretion. Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In 

conducting our review, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the judgment and will construe the findings together liberally in favor of the 

judgment. Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[20] The party seeking injunctive relief is required to show, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that the facts and circumstances entitle him to injunctive relief. 

Id. There are four factors to consider when weighing a preliminary injunction:

1) whether the plaintiff’s remedies at law are inadequate, thus 

causing irreparable harm pending the resolution of the 

substantive action if the injunction does not issue; 2) whether the 

plaintiff has demonstrated at least a reasonable likelihood of 

success at trial by establishing a prima facie case; 3) whether the 

threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm 

the grant of the injunction may inflict on the defendant; and 4) 

whether, by the grant of the preliminary injunction, the public 

interest would be disserved.

Id. Injunctive relief should only be granted in the rare instances in which the 

law and the facts are clearly within the moving party’s favor. Id.

A. Adequate Remedy at Law

[21] It is well established that a purely economic, calculable, or money damages 

harm is not irreparable. Barlow, 744 N.E.2d at 6. Cain admitted that any 

damage done to the road as a result of the Huffs’ activity could be fixed. The 

Huffs offered to issue a $50,000 bond for any damage done to the road. 
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Additionally, evidence was presented that at the time of the hearing, there had 

been very minimal cracking and ordinary wear and tear to the road, all of 

which is readily reparable. The Huffs have agreed on multiple occasions to fix 

any damage done to the road after the timber harvesting is completed. 

Consequently, it is clear that any potential damage is readily calculable and 

compensable.

[22] Cain essentially concedes that point and argues, instead, that when the action 

seeking to be enjoined is unlawful, the plaintiff need not make a showing of 

irreparable harm. Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos. Phase I, Inc., 751 

N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). He maintains that the Huffs’ use of the 

easement amounts to an illegal trespass and, as such, he need not show 

irreparable harm.

[23] Cain is incorrect, because under the facts of this case, the Huffs cannot have 

committed a trespass even if their use of the easement exceeds their authority 

thereunder. It has long been the case in Indiana “that an action for trespass to 

real estate cannot be maintained for an invasion of a right of way or easement.” 

Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Runge, 717 N.E.2d 216, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)

(internal quotation marks omitted). This rule “‘is based upon the principle that 

trespass actions are possessory actions and that the right interfered with is the 

plaintiff’s right to the exclusive possession of a chattel or land.’” Id. (emphasis 

added). In other words, because the Huffs have an easement and a 

concomitant right to use the roadway, they cannot have committed a trespass 
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even if their use of the roadway exceeded the terms of the easement.7 

Consequently, there is no evidence that they acted unlawfully, and Cain is 

required to show irreparable harm—which he has not done. Therefore, this 

factor weighs in favor of the Huffs.

B. Likelihood of Success at Trial

[24] To consider Cain’s likelihood of success at trial, which will turn on whether the 

Huffs have exceeded/are exceeding their authority under the easements, it is 

worthwhile to recap the history of the real estate at issue.

• In 1990, Kenton Robinson owned real estate in Monroe County. He 

granted easements to THR, which then owned the property adjacent to 

Robinson’s (the THR Property). Those easements are the ones at issue 

here.

• Robinson later conveyed his real estate to another entity, which 

ultimately transformed that real estate into The Shores subdivision.

• In February 2017, the Huffs acquired the THR Property from THR. The 

property they acquired included the 193 acres adjacent to The Shores, to 

which the easements attach.

• At some point not revealed by the record, the Huffs acquired from 

Chumley, LLC, approximately 44 acres that are adjacent to the THR 

Property. Those 44 acres are the Chumley Parcel.

7 Both cases cited by Cain—Washel v. Bryant, 770 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), and Paul v. I.S.I. Servs., 

Inc., 726 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)—are inapposite, as the first centers on a covenant not to compete

and the second centers on divorce and corporate embezzlement.
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• The only access to the THR Property is through The Shores, and the 

only access by land8to the Chumley Parcel is through the THR 

Property.

9

• The entirety of the Huff Real Estate at issue herein is a contiguous area 

of approximately 237 acres.

Cain insists that because the Huffs are using the easement on the roadway in 

The Shores to access the Chumley Parcel (via the THR Property), which is not 

directly benefited by the easement, they have exceeded their authority and he is 

likely to succeed at trial.

[25] This argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of property law in 

Indiana. Although we have used the labels herein for the sake of clarity, in 

reality, there is no longer a separate “THR Property” or “Chumley Parcel.” 

Instead, there is simply the Huff Real Estate, which includes all 237 acres. If 

we were to accept Cain’s argument, we would be holding that the Huffs are 

prohibited from accessing one part of their real estate from another part of their 

real estate. We cannot countenance that result.

[26] Once the Huffs use the easement to cross the servient property of The Shores, as 

the Grant of Easements give them the right to do for the purposes stated 

therein, they have all the property rights needed to access any portion of the 

Huff Real Estate for those same purposes. See Collins v. Metro Real Estate Servs. 

8 The Chumley Parcel may be accessed by water, but the only land-based access is via the THR Property.

9

In other words, if the Huffs were not permitted to access the Chumley Parcel from the THR Property (via 

The Shores), the Chumley Parcel would be wholly landlocked.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2176 | May 29, 2020 Page 20 of 22

LLC, 72 N.E.3d 1007, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“‘During the unity of title the 

owner may subject one of several tenements, or adjoining parcels of land, to 

such arrangements, incidents, or uses with respect to the other as may suit his 

taste or convenience, without creating an easement in favor of the one as 

against the other. This is so because the owner cannot have an easement in 

land of which he has the title.’”) (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 586, 2 N.E. 188, 190-91, (1885)). Cain argues that the 

Huffs are not allowed to give themselves an easement on their own property, 

but this misses the point—they do not need to give themselves an easement 

because they have unity of title across the entire acreage.

[27] This Court has already found that by engaging in the activities described herein, 

including prudent logging, the Huffs are not exceeding the rights provided by 

the easement. That they are now using the roadway in The Shores to access 

part of their real estate that was not included in the Grant of Easements does 

not require a different result. Therefore, we find that Cain has not established a 

likelihood of success on the merits, and this factor weighs in favor of the Huffs.

C. Harm to Cain v. Harm to Huffs

[28] As noted above, the threatened harm to Cain is primarily damage to the 

roadway. There is no evidence of substantial damage, and there is plenty of 

evidence that any damage will be easily repaired. There is likewise no evidence 

of harm to pedestrians or local traffic. Furthermore, the logging activities will 

last for only approximately eight to ten weeks once every ten to fifteen years.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2176 | May 29, 2020 Page 21 of 22

[29] On the flip side, if the injunction were granted, the Huffs would have to pay a 

hefty penalty to Tri-State and would forfeit between $500,000 and $2 million in 

lost revenue. They would also lose approximately $20,000 as a result of the 

spoliation of already-cut timber. Additionally, a prohibition on forestry would 

prevent the Huffs from caring for and enjoying their land, including removing 

diseased trees and generally cleaning up and maintaining the forest. We find 

that this factor weighs in favor of the Huffs.

D. Public Interest

[30] Finally, we must consider the public interest. Cain argues that the public 

interest would be served by an injunction because it would protect the public’s

right to contract for specific language in easements. As noted above, however, 

we do not believe that the evidence in the record shows that the Huffs have 

exceeded that which the Grant of Easements permits.

[31] The Huffs, in contrast, note that they are developing their land pursuant to a 

Stewardship Plan. The goals of that plan are to:

improve the stand of trees, improve the wildlife habitat, control 

exotic and invasive species, provide an enjoyable place to 

recreate, selectively harvest trees throughout the woods in the 

future, develop four home sites, provide better access throughout 

the property, and develop fire trails.

Huff I, 120 N.E.3d at 1033. Many of these goals confer a clear and direct public 

benefit. Additionally, the improved access throughout the Huff Real Estate for 

fire trails directly implicates the public interest, as it allows the authorities to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2176 | May 29, 2020 Page 22 of 22

better combat forest fires. We can only conclude that the public interest is more 

directly and significantly served by the denial of the preliminary injunction.

[32] In sum, we find that all four factors weigh in favor of the Huffs and against the 

preliminary injunction. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Cain’s 

motions.

[33] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for further 

proceedings.

Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.