Be cause their intere sts align, e x cept whe re r ecitingfac ts, we re fe r t o Ni teclubs and 1 Drone barg er c ollectively

as “N iteclubs.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 259 -CV
Appellan t, Terr Agora Investm ents, L.P . // Cross-Appellants, Niteclubs En ter prises, Inc. and Warren Dronebarge r

v. Ap p el l ee , Ni te cl u b s E n te rp ri s es , I n c. / / Cr o s s -A p p el l ee T er rA g o ra I n v es tme n ts , L . P.

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 284, 238 , HO NORAB LE J. DAVID P HI LLIP S , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n this landlord-tenant dispute, all par ties—Terr

Ag ora I n v estments, L .P., Niteclubs Enter

prises, Inc., and War

ren D roneba

rg er—sue d eac h other on multiple c a u ses of a ction. 1 Th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d p art ial summ ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f e a c h p art

y on c e rt a in i ssu e s, and followinga jury

trial, the cour

t entere d judgme nt that Terr Ag ora re co v er $ 2 00 in actual damag es and that Niteclubs rec over $40,000 in a ctual damag es. Both sides a ppeal. We af

firm the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.2

Bac kgr ound Terr

Ag ora a nd Arra kis Production, I nc. sig ned a c ommercia l lease agr eement on J une 28, 1995. In November 1 9 96, Arra kis subleased the pr emises to Warren D roneba rg er a nd Ni te c lub s. Th e le a se a g re e me nt a pp lie d to the fi rs t fl oo r of a bu ild ingloc a te d at 21 3 We st F ourt h Street in Austin. From Nove mber 1996 throug h Sep t em ber 2, 2004, D roneba rg er a nd Niteclubs
su ble a se d th e pr e mis es to a thi rd pa rt y . A ft e r N ite c lub s’ s su

ble sse e va c a te d th e pr e mis e s in September 2004, N iteclubs made pr epar ations to open and ope rate a bar to be ca lled Boy

z C ove. I n a letter dated Nove mber 2, 2004, Te rrAg ora notified N iteclubs of seve ral matter s to be addr essed unde r t he lea se ag ree ment, including a dditional insurance c overa g e, proof of
reme diation of city code violations, proof of liquor license, and cer tificate of occupa

ncy . I n addition, the letter notified N iteclubs that Ter rAg ora disappr oved of a s i gn i n t h e window of the pre mises and re quired that it be re moved.

These issues w ere not addre ssed to Ter rA go ra ’s satisfac tion, and, on Dec ember 7, 20 04 , T e rr

Ag or a de liv e re d a

no tic e of

te rm inatio n to Ni tec lu bs . Ac c or din g to T e rr Ag or a , it was ter minating the le ase be cause of Nitec lub s ’s failure to cure all lease defa ults set out in t he November 2 letter within thirty day s, as re quired by

the lease ag ree ment. Terr Ag ora a lso notified Niteclubs that Ter

rAg ora ha d “ente red upon and take[n] possession of t he premises, and alter ed the locks in order

to secure the contents, a

nd to protect its interests.” On Janu ar

y 6 , 2 0 0 5 , N i t e c l u

b s f i l e d a p e t i t i o nf

o r w r i to f r e e n t r y p u r s u an tto section 93.003 of the pr operty code. SeeTex. P rop. Code Ann. § 93.003 (West 2007) . Niteclubs’s petition was denied by

the justice cour

t, and on Februa

ry 15, 2005, Niteclubs appealed the decision3

to th e c o u n ty c o u rt. T h e c o u n ty c o u rt di s mi s s e d N it e c lu b s ’ s a p p e a l on M ar c h 1 0 , 2 0 0 5
. T h e n e xt day , Niteclubs filed suit in county court, c laiming br eac h of the lea se ag ree ment and wrong ful exclusion. Nit eclubs a lso asked the c ourt for a decla ratory judgme nt authorizing it to take possession of the pre mises and for a

temporar y injun ct i o n t o p re vent Ter rAg ora f rom selling or

disposing of its prope rty located on the premises. The trial court g rante d Niteclubs’s reque st f o r t emporary inj un c tio n. Te rr

Ag or a ans we re d an d fil e d a cou nte rc la im ag a ins t Nite c lub s and a thi rd -p art y c la im
a g a ins t D ro ne ba

rg e r, a lle g ingbr e a c h o f t

he le a se a g re e me nt. All parties filed motions for partial summary judgme nt. The trial cour

t gr anted e ach mot ion in p art . T he tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th e fo llo wi nga s a

matte r o f l aw o n s umm ary jud g me nt: (1) The L ease did not require that a bar be continually operated on t h e l ea sed pr e mis e s; ( 2 ) Te r

r A g o r a ( L an d l o r d ) g a v e n o t i c e o f n o n c o mp l i an c e t o N i t e c l u b s ( Te na nt) in its November 2, 2005 letter but de mand for c ompliance within 5 day s was not authorized by

the lease ; however , the lease re quires no dema nd, and demand is spec ifically

waived in the L ease ; once the L andlord g ives notice o f noncompliance , the Tena nt has the oblig ation to come into compliance within 30 or (or 90) [ sic] day s, or t he L andlord c an ac t without further notice ; and (3) there is a fac t issue as to whether insurance , an oblig ation of the Te nant, by its natur e c ann ot b e c ur e d w ith in 3 0 d ay s.
The remaini n g is s u e s w e r e tr ie d to a ju r y in N o v e mb e r

2 0 0 5
. A ll p arti e s f

iled motions t o disreg ard c erta in jury finding s and for judgme nt notwithst andingthe ver dict. Ba sed on the jury finding s, the court e ntere d final judgme nt a war ding Terr

Ag ora $200 in a ctual dama g es andAlthough the jury answe red questions about t he amount of attorney s’ fe es that would be 2 rea sonable and nece ssary as to e ach party , none of the que stions subm itted asked the jury to awar d a tto rn e y s’ fe e s. 4 Niteclubs $40,000 in ac tual damag es and g rantingNi t ec l u b s ’s re quest to enjoin Terr Ag ora f rom

“ c on du c tin g any sa le to dis po se of [Nit e c lub s’ s] pr op e rt y .” Th e c ourt did

no t awa rd a tto rn e y s’ fe e s. 2
Discussion Terr

Ag ora Investments argues that the trial c ourt had no jurisdi ction to hear the ca se,
m i s c o n s t r u e d c e rt a i np r o v i s i o n s o f

t h e l e a s e , e r

r o n e o u s l y s u

b m i t t e d c e rt a i ni s s u e s t o t h e j u r y,
err oneously

ad m i t t edex p er tt es t i m o n y , an d fa i l edt o d i s re gar d

ce rt ai nj u ry

an s we rs t h at were contra

ry to conclusively established fac ts. Niteclubs challeng es the trial c ourt’s judg ment, arguing that the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in no t di sr e g ard ingthe jur y fi nd ingtha

t T e rr Ag or a did no t br e a c h th e le a se
a g re e me nt a

nd in n ot a wa rd inga tto rn e y s’ fe e s to Ni te c lub s. TerrAgora’s appeal I n its second issue, TerrA g ora c halleng es the trial c ourt’s par tial summary

judgme nt in f a vo r o f N ite c lub s. Te rr

Ag or a argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt mis c on str

ue d th e pr ov isi on

of the le a se ag ree ment that, acc ording to Terr Ag ora, r equire s Niteclubs to operate continuously as a r estaura

nt and bar . Since Ter

rAg ora f ailed to oper ate a s a re staurant a nd bar dur ing the entire te rm of its lease, Terr Ag ora c ontends, Niteclubs bre ache d the lease ag ree ment as a matter of law
.

We r e v ie w th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s s u mm ar y ju d g me n t d e n o v o . V

a l ence Operating Co.

v . D or se tt , 1 64 S.W. 3d

65 6, 66 1 ( Te x. 20 05 ); Pr ov ide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Summary judgme nt is proper when there a re no disputed issues5

of mater ial fac t and the movant is e ntitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P . 166a(c ). When r eviewing a summary judgme nt, w e take as true all evidenc e fa vorable to the non-movant, and we indulge every rea sonable inferenc e and resolve any doubts in the non-movant’s favor
. Valence Operating Co. , 1 64 S.W. 3d a t 66 1; Kno tt , 128 S.W .3d at 215. Terr Ag ora spe cifica lly

challeng es the tri al court’s construction of the f ollowing provision in the lease:
5.01 USE A

N D O PE RA T I O N O F le a s e d p r e mi s e s . T e n an t s h a ll u s e th e le ased premises for

the purpose of operating a re staurant a nd bar a nd shall not use the lease d premises for

any other purpose without t h e express written conse nt of L andlord. Te na nt s ha ll at a ll t ime s o pe rate thi s r e sta ur ant a nd ba r i n f ull a c cord ance w ith appl ic a b le la w s an d r e g u lati o n s . T e n an t s h a ll o p e r a te in a ma n n e r th a t does not dis tur b, wi th n ois e , o do rs , w a ste s, or a c c e ss, the oth e r t e na

nts in t he bu ild ingin t

he ir rea sonable e njoy

ment of their lea sed spac es for g ener al offic e use.
Acc ording to the trial court’ s summar y j u d gm ent, “[ t] he L ease did not require that a bar be continually

operated in the lease d premises.” We ag ree with the trial court’ s construction. Where, a s here , a wr itten contrac t is worded so that it can b e gi v en a cer tain or definite mea

ning or interpre tation, it is una

mbiguous and the court construes it a s a matter of law. See A merican M

frs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefe r , 1 24 S.W. 3d 15 4, 15 7 ( Te x. 20 03 ); Columbia Gas Transmissi on Corp. v

. New U lm Ga s , L t d. , 940 S.W .2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996) (ambiguity does not exi st merely

beca use t h e parties forc efully asser t diametrica lly

opposed interpr etations). A p ro v i s i o n d i re ct i n g t h at a t en an ts h al l o n l y u s e ap ro p er t y

fo r t h e l i m i t edp u rp o s e o f o p er at i n g a restaur ant an d bar doe s not sugg est that such re staurant a nd bar must be in continuous oper ation. Rather, the pr ovision m er el y re quires that the tena nt “shall not use the lea sed pre mises for any6

other purpose without the express or written conse nt of the L andlord.” To interpre t such a provision oth e rw ise wo uld

c re a te a sit uatio n in whi ch, a s h e re , a te na nt w ou ld b e in v iol a tio n o f t he le a se during the per iod in which he wa s prepa ring his restaur ant/bar for opening. A tenant would also be in violation of the lease, for example, dur ing periods in which the busine ss was closed f or nee ded repa irs and/or maintena

nce, c losed to transition from one re stau rant/bar business to another, or closed pe nding tr ansition betwee n lessees. The rele vant provision of the lea se simply does not provide for

the spec ific use of

the pre mises to be continuous. I f the landlord not only wanted a specific use, but also to have that use be c ontinuous, the l ea s e woul d need to pr ovide for suc h as
a re quirement. The lease here does not. As a matter of law, N iteclubs was not re quired, unde r the lease at issue, to ope rate a re staurant a nd bar on the premises in a c ontinuous, unint err upted manner
. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule T err Ag ora’ s second point of e rror . I n its first issue, TerrA g ora a rgues that the trial c ourt err ed in exercising jurisdiction over the issue of possession a nd conver sion, a s these matters lie within the exclusi ve jurisdiction of the justice cour

t pursuant to proper

ty code se ctions 93.002 and 93.003. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 93 .0 02 -.0 03 (We st 2 00 7) . A c c or din g to T e rr Ag or a , th e ri g ht t o p os se ssi on ha d b e e n f

ina lly deter mined by the justice cour

t when it denied Niteclubs’s petition for reentry
. By submitt ing the iss ue of c on ve rs ion

to t he jur y in t he tr ial court

—a n is su e c omp le te ly

de pe nd e nt o n th e ri g ht t o possession—and then fa iling to disreg ard the jury ’s finding , Terr Ag ora c ontends, the trial cour t
a llo we d th e pa

rt ie s to re lit ig a te an issu e that had a lr e a dy be e n fin a lly de te rm ine d b y the jus tic e c ourt
. Quest i o n s of jurisdiction are questions of law, whic h we r eview de novo. Sta te v. Holland , 221 S.W .3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2006). Section 9 3
. 0 0 3 o f t h e prope rty code a pplies when7

“a la ndlord has locke d a tenant out of l ease d premises in violation of S ection 93.002.” Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 93.002(a ). As Te rrAg ora note s, suits t o rec over posse ssion under this s ec t i o n are require d to be filed in the justice c ourt in the prec inct in which the re ntal premises are located. Id. § 93.002(b). T er rAgora

argues that a de termination by the justice cour

t under sec tion 93.002 deter mines the rig ht to possession un d er the lease and that any additional litigation to deter mine po sse ssi on

is b arr e d b y

re s ju dic a ta

and c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l. I n support of its rig ht to take possession of Niteclubs’s pe rsonal prope rty as we ll as the pr e mis e s in

the e ve nt o f defaul t, T e rr Ag or a c ite s to the fo llo wi ngpr ov isi on of the le a se
a g re e me nt: Upon occ urre nce of

an eve nt of

defa ult by Tena nt, L andlord may , in addition to any other re medies provided he rein or by law, ente r upon th e l ea s ed premises a nd take possession o f an y and all goods, wa res, e quipment, fix tures, fur niture, and othe r persona l proper

ty situated on the premises without liabili ty for tre spass or conve rsion and se ll the same up on fi ve da y ’s [sic ] wr itt e n n oti c e to T e na nt at pu bli c or pr ivate sale . . . .
I n its order, the justice c ourt deter mi n ed o n l y

that Niteclubs had “ not shown what needs to be shown for o btaining a writ of re entry , or dama g es,” not whe ther Nitec lubs defaulted under the terms of the le ase a g ree ment. Any number of situations could allow Terr Ag ora the rig ht to possession under t h e t erms of the ag ree ment, absent a ny defa ult by Niteclubs. Ter

rAg ora w as only authorized to ta

ke possession of the premises and to sell Niteclubs’s per sonal proper ty in the event of Niteclubs’s de fault. De fault wa s not determined by the just i ce co urt, and the tria l court
a c te d w it h in it s ju r is d ic ti o n in c o n s id e r in g an d d e te r mi n in g N it e c lu

b s ’ s c la im

f o r c o n v e r s io n . We
overr ule Ter rAg ora’ s first point of err or.8 Te rr Ag or a ’s thi rd

po int of e rr or a lso a dd

re sse s N ite c lub s’ s con ve rs ion c la im. Terr Ag ora a rgues that, under

the terms of the lease ag ree ment, the trial cour t erre d in submit ting the conve rsion is s u e to the jury , as the lea se prohibited liability for c onversion in the eve nt that the tenant b re ached the ag ree ment. Acc ording to Terr Ag ora, “Nite Club was found to have brea ched the lease .”

Te rr Ag or a ’s a sse rt ion

that “[t]he jur

y fo un d, and the County

Cou rt a g re e d th a t N ite Clu b b re a c he d th e L e a se ” is n ot s up po rt e d b y the re c or d. Th e jur y fo un d that Ter

rA g or a did

no t “ fa il to comply with the lease b y t erminatingit on Dece mber 7, 2004.” Howeve r, the jury did not find that Niteclubs bre ache d the lease . Even the a ccompa nying instruc tion allows no such infere nce:
Te rr Ag or a ha d th e ri g ht t o te rm inate the le a se and it wo uld no t be a fa ilure to c omp ly b y T e rr ago ra[ s i c] i f N i t ec l u b s fa i l edt o p ro cu re co m m er ci al p ro p er t y d am age insurance in the amount require d by the l ease within 30 day s after written notice; or, if the proc ureme nt of such i nsuranc e is something which, by its very nature , cannot be done in 30 day s, Niteclubs did not proce ed with a ll due diligenc e to proc ure suc h insurance
. The jury question is couched sole ly in terms of Ter

rAg ora’ s compliance with the lease . There was no jury question submitt ed inquiring as t o whether Niteclubs bre ache d the lease , and the jury made no finding on the issue. Thus, the trial c ourt did n o t er r i n submitt ing the conver sion issue to the jury . We overrule Terr

Ag ora’ s third issue. Terr Ag ora’ s fourth issu e c h al l en ges t h e t ri al co u rt ’s aw ar d o f d am age s for c onversion. Acc ording to Terr

Ag ora, the t rial cour

t errone ously

submitt ed an instruc tion that included loss of business value a s a par

t of the mea sure of

damag es for

conver sion.9 A cour t is re quired to submit to the jury questions, instructions, and definitions that
are raised by

the written plea di n gs an d ev i d ence. Tex. R. C iv. P. 278. To determine whe ther the trial court should have submitt ed Nitec lubs’s issues to the jury , we e x amine the re cord to de termine if the plea dings a

nd leg ally sufficie nt evidenc e support them. Elba or v . S mi th , 845 S.W .2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992). We review

a trial c ourt’s dec ision to submit or ref use a particula

r instruction under a

n abuse of discretion standa rd of r eview. In reV. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d 338, 341 (Tex. 2000). A trial cour t abuses its discre tion by

actingarbitra

ri l y , u n re asonably , or without consideration of g uiding principles. Merc edes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne , 925 S.W .2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996).

Niteclubs’s plea dings inc luded the followingrelating t o i ts cause of action for
conver sion:
28. Niteclubs owne d or possessed the persona l pr operty located in the pr emises and Te rr Ag or a wr on g fu lly

e xer c ise d d omi nio n o r c on tr ol o ve r i t. The followingquestion was submitted to the jury reg ardingconver sion:
Di d T e rr Ag or a c on ve rt the pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y and e qu ipm e nt o f N ite c lub s? The jury answe red “ y es,” a

nd was, ther efor e, instructed to a nswer the following question:
Wha t su m o f

m o n e y , i f

p a i d n o w i nc a s h , w o u l d

f a i r l y an d r e a s o n a b l y c o mp e n sa te Niteclubs for

damag es proximately

cause d by

the conve rsion by

Terr Ag ora?
Acc ompanying instruc tions ex plained:10

Consi der only

the loss, if any , of the va lue of Nitec lubs’ business. Do not add interest on any

amount of damag es y ou find. The loss of value of a business is the dif fe re nc e be tw e e n its mar

ke t val ue imm e diate ly be fo re it wa s d e str oy e d, if it w a s, and its mark e t val ue imm e diate ly a ft e r it wa s des tr oy e d, if it wa s. “ Ma rk e t va lue ” is the price a business would bring i f i t were off ere d for sa le by

a willing se ller who de sir e s to sell , but is und e r no ne c e ssi ty of se lli ng , to a willi ng buy e r wh o d e sir e s to b u y, b u ti s n o tr e qu i r e d

t o b u y.
Th e jur y awa rd e d $ 40 ,0 00 in d ama g e s. Te rr Ag or a argue s th a t N ite c lub s f a ile d to inc lude bu sin e ss v a lue in i ts c la im for c onversion. I n addition, the questi on submitt ed to t he jury on liability

for c onversion included nothing a bout conver sion of business value. The ref ore, Te rrAg ora c ontends, the trial cour t erre d b y in s tr u c ti n g th e ju

r y to c o n s id e r lo s s o f b u s in e s s v a lu e in it s in s tr u c ti o n s to th e jury . We ag ree . Submis sion of the ins t ru ct i o n that included loss of business value a s a mea sure of damag es for
conver sion was supported by neither the pleading s nor by the evidenc e. SeeTex. R. C i v . P. 278; Elbaor , 845 S.W .2d at 243.

To dete rm i n e whe ther this err or in the jury char g e is reve rsible, we c onsider the par ties’ pleading s, the evidenc e pre s en t ed at t ri al, and the jur y char g e in its entirety
. Ro se ll , 89 S.W .3d at 653. We will reverse if we f ind that an er

ror in the jury

char g e ca

used an imprope r jud g me nt t o b e re nd e re d. Te x. R. A pp . P. 44 .1 (a )( 1) ; S

h u p e v . Li n gafelter , 192 S.W .3d 577, 579 (T e x. 20 06 ); W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Johnson , 106 S.W .3d 718, 723 (Tex. 2003). Although the jury

was instructe d to consider loss of business value in determining
conver sion damag es, the jury c h a r g e o n c o nv e r s io n liability

asked only

whether Terr Ag ora c onverte d th e p er s o n al proper

ty and equipment of

Niteclubs. Having f

ound that Terr

Ag ora w as liable for11

conver s ion of Niteclubs’s pe rsonal prope rty and equipment, the jur

y awa rded da mag es in the amount of $40,000.

The re cord inc ludes evidenc e of N iteclubs’s value as a g oing conce rn and evidenc e of the value of

Ni t ec l u b s ’s p er s o n al p ro p er t y

an d eq u i p m en t
. Ac co rd i n g t o Dr o n eb ar ger , wh o p re s ented expert testimony

of Nitec lubs’s busines s value, the va lue of the business on De cembe r 7, 2004,
was a bout $500,000. After T err Ag ora ha d taken possession of t he premises, howeve r, Drone barg er opined that t he busi ness was worth only about $20,000 to $25,000, which, ac cordingto Droneba rg er,
r e p r e s e n ts h a lf th e v a lu e o f th e e qu ip me n t an d p e r s o n a l p r o p e rty
. I n a d d it io n , a s tate me nt of expenses at B oy

z C ove fr om Aug ust through D ece mber of 2004, inc ludes an itemized list of the value of all of the equipment. Acc ording to the repor t, the total e quipment va lue was $39,155. The jury ’s damag e aw ard of

$40,000 is consistent both with Dronebar g er’ s testimony that half the va lue of his e qu i p m e n t w a s $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 t o $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 an d w i t h t h e r e p o rt t h a t c a l c u l a t e d t h e v a l u e of a ll equipment to be $39,155. B ased on the pleading s, the evidenc e, and the jury char g e, it appea

rs that the jury awa rded da mag es base d on the value of t he equipment and personal prope rty , despite having been instruc ted as to the va lue of the business. As sufficient evidence suppor ts the damag e aw ard, the er roneous jury

instruction did not c ause the rendition of an imprope r judg ment. SeeTex. R. App. P. 4 4. 1( a )( 1) ; Shupe , 19 2 S.W. 3d a t 57 9; W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 106 S.W. 3d a t 72 3. We o ve rr

ule Terr Ag ora’ s fourth issue.

I n its fifth issue, TerrA g ora a rgues that the trial c ourt err ed in adm itting expert opinion testim ony

of Warre n Drone barg er on the issue of damag es. We r eview a trial c ourt’s d ec i sion to admit ex pert testimony under a n abuse of

discretion standa

rd. See E. I. du PontTerr Ag ora doe s not challeng e Dr onebar g er’ s testimony as it re l at es t o the value of 3 Ni te c lub s’ s e qu ipm e nt. 12 de Nemours &Co. v. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995). For the i mproper admission of expert testimony

to be reve rsible, the err oneous admission must have “proba bly cause d the re ndition of an im pr op e r j udg me nt” or

“ pr ob a bly pr e ve nte d th e a

pp e lla nt f ro m pr op e rl y

pr e se nti ngthe c a se to the court of a

ppeals.” SeeTex. R. App. P . 44.1. Terr Ag ora obje cts to Droneba

rg er’ s business value testimony . As w e h a v e d is c u s s e d, the damag e aw ard w as supported by sufficie nt evidence of t he value of t he personal property located on the pre mises. Ba sed on the plea dings, the evidenc e, and the j ury char g e, it appea rs t hat the jury returne d a ver dict consistent with the evidenc e as to the value of the equipment, and not c onsistent
w i t h D r o n e b ar g e r ’ s b u s i n e s s - v a l u e t e s t i m o n y. T h u s , a dm i s s i o no f D r o n e b ar g e r ’ s e x p e rtt e s t i m o n y, even if err oneous, wa s harmless. Ac cording ly , we ove rrule T err Ag ora’ s fifth issue. 3 I n its six th issue, Terr

Ag ora a rgues that the trial c ourt err ed i n faili ng to disreg ard
c e rt a in j ur

y ans we rs that “ we re c on tr ary to the c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli sh e d a nd un dis pute d f

a c ts establishing [Ter

rAg ora’ s] damage s.” Terr Ag ora’ s argument on this point is based on its contention that the “[l] ease expressly entitled L andlord to ‘the a mount of all loss and damag e which the landlord
may su ff e r b y re a so n of su c h te rm inatio n. ’” Ac c or din g to T e rr Ag or a , it s d a ma g e s w e re c on c lus ive ly
e sta bl i s h e d b y c e rt a i n e xh i b i t s an d t e s t i m o n y an d t h a t “ [t ]h e r e w a s n o c r o s s e xam i n a t i o nof thi s evidenc e af

ter it was pr esente d.” The lea se provisi o n ci t ed by Terr Ag ora is a r emedy

provision for the “ occur

renc e of any such eve nts of defa

ult.” As we ha

ve discussed, t h e j ury

made no f

inding that Nitec lubsAs noted above, althoug h the jury answe red questions about the amount of attorney s’ fe es 4 that would be rea sonable and nece ssary as to e ach party , none of the jury ’s finding s actua lly awa rded any a tto rn e y s’ fe e s. 13 de fa ult e d und e r t

he te rm s o f t

he le a se a g re e me nt. Th e jur y ’s fi nd ingwa s c ou c he d s ole ly in t e rm s of Te rr Ag or a ’s c omp lia

nc e wi th t

he le a se . In th e a

bs e nc e of a fi nd ingof

de fa ult by Ni te c lub s,
e ve n if the jur y de te rm ine d that Te rr

Ag or a did no t “ fa il to c omp ly wi th t he le a se by

te rm inatin g it
on De c e mbe r 7, 200 4, ” and e ve n if Te rr Ag or a “ c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli sh e d” so me me a sure of dama g e s, Terr Ag ora is no t en t i t led to damag es ava ilable as a result of de fault. We overr ule Ter rAg ora’ s six th issue. Terr

Ag ora’ s seventh issue is also base d on the pre mise that Niteclubs def aulted under the lease ag ree ment. Acc ording to T err Ag ora, beca

use “the judgme nt upholds the jury finding that Nite Club breac hed the L ease ,” the tria l court wa s require d to aw ar d att orney s’ fe es in the
a m o u n td e t e r

m i n e d b y t h e j u r y. As the j ury made no such finding, however, the trial court’ s ref usal 4 to awar d attorney s’ fe es wa s consistent with the jury ’s deter mination. I n its e ig hth iss ue , Te rr

Ag or a c ha lle ng e s the tr ia l c ourt ’s su bmi ssi on of ce rta in instructions, definitions, and questions. Sp ec i fi cally , Terr Ag ora c halleng es the c onversion instruction in light of Nitec lubs’s brea ch of the l ea s e, t h e los s of business value a s an ele ment of dama g es for

conver sion, the issue of waive r as it relates to conver sion, and the mea sure of
conver sion damag es. As we have alre ady addre ssed and overr uled eac h of these issues, we , likewise,
overr ule Ter rAg ora’ s eig hth issue.14

Niteclubs’s appeal I n its first issue, Nitec lubs c halleng es the trial court’s ref usal to disre g ard the jury ’s finding tha t T e r

r A g o r a d id n o t b r e a c h th e le a s e a g r e e me n t. A c c o r d in g to N it e c lu b s , a n in e ty -day
cure period ra

ther t h an a thirty -day

cure period a

pplied to Niteclubs’s proc ureme nt of additional insurance cover ag e under the t erms of the l ease . Niteclubs conte nds that beca use Ter rAg ora de nied Niteclubs the ni n et y -day cure period a llowed under the lease ag ree ment, Terr Ag ora br eac hed the ag ree ment as a matter of law . I n the alter native, Nitec l u b s argue s that the jury ’s finding that Terr Ag ora did not bre ach the lease ag ree ment was ag ainst the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the
e vid e nc e and

sh ou ld h ave be e n d isr e g ard e d b y the tr ia l c ourt
. W hether a contr act is ambiguous is a question of law f or the c ourt. Heritage Re s., Inc. v . NationsBank , 9 39 S.W. 2d 11 8, 12 1 ( Te x. 19 96 ). A c on tr a c t is un amb iguou s w he n it s meaningis susceptible to only one re asonable interpre tation. Id. Ac c or din g to t

he le a se a g re e me nt:
17.01 TENANT DEFA ULT AND REMEDI ES. The following events shall be de e me d to be e ve nts of

de fa ult by Te na nt:

. . . . B
. Te na

nt s ha ll f a il t o c omp ly

wi th a ny ter m, pr ov isi on , o r c ov e na nt o f t his L e a se , o the r t

ha n th e pa y me nt o f r e nt, and

sh a ll n ot c ur e su c h f

a ilure wi thi n thi rt y da y s a ft e r wri tte n n oti c e the re of to T e na nt, or if su c h f a ilure by its nature cannot be cure d within thi rt y d ay s, Tenant sha ll not have proc eede d wi th a ll d ue dil ig e nc e to c ur e su c h f a ilure in a

ma nn e r t hat s uch fa ilure is c ur e d in any

e ve nt w ith in n ine ty

da y s a ft e r wri tte n n oti c e the re of to T e na nt.15 Th e pr ov isi on

of the c on tr act

at is su e c an b e g ive n o nly on e re a so na

ble int e rp re tatio n—

that a fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th t he le a se mus t be c ur e d b y

the te na nt w ith in t hir ty da y s, or, if the f

ailure c annot be c ured wi t h i n t h i rty day s, the tenant must proce ed with “due diligenc e” and accomplish the cure no later tha n within ninety

day s. The contr act is unambiguous. See id. In addition, Niteclubs cha lleng es only the tri al co u rt ’s ref

usal to disreg ard the jury ’s finding , not the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt t

hat “ the re is a fa c t iss ue a s to wh e the r i ns ur anc e , a n o bli g a tio n o f t

he Te na nt, by its nature cannot be cure d within 30 day s.” I n revie wing the t rial court’s ref usal to disreg ard the jury ’s finding , we c onsider and w eig h all the evidenc e in the re cord a nd will rever se the judg ment only if it is so contrary

to the g reat w eig ht a

nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrong and unjust. Se e Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). Niteclubs’s a

rgument specific ally addresses the application of the thirty -day cure pe ri od rathe r t ha n th e nin e ty -d ay

c ur e pe ri od . H ow e ve r, the jur y wa s n ot i ns tr

uc te d to —a

nd did
n o t

— m a k e s u c h a

f i n d i n g . R a t h e r , t h e c o u rts u b m i t t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r

u c t i o nt o t h e j u r

y:
Te rr Ag or a ha d th e ri g ht t o te rm inate the le a se and it wo uld no t be a fa ilure to c omp ly b y T erra go ra[ s i c] i f N i t ec l u b s f a i l e d t o p ro cu re co m m er ci al p ro p er t y d am age insurance in the amount require d by the lease within 30 day s after written notice; or, if the proc ureme nt of such insuranc e is something which, by its ve ry nature , cannot be done in 30 day s, Niteclubs did not proce ed with all due dilige nce to pr ocure such ins ur anc e . “ Du e dil ig e nc e ” me ans su c h dili g e nc e a s wou ld b e us e d b y a re a so na bly pr ud e nt p e rs on

un de r t he same or

sim ila r c ir c ums tanc e s.
B a s e d o nt h e c o n t r a c tan d

t h e j u r y’ s i n s t r u c t i o n , e v e n a c c e p t i n g N i t e c l u b s ’ s a s s e rt i o n t h a tt h e n i n e t yday cure period should apply to the proc u re m en t o f i nsuranc e, Nitec lubs was re quired to proc eedAs discussed above , the jury made no finding that Niteclubs def aulted under

the terms of 5 t h e agr eement. Rather, the jury found that Ter

rAg ora “ did not fail to comply with the lease ” by terminating it based on Nitec lubs’s failure to procure additional insurance by Dec ember

7, 2004. 16 with due dilige nce to pr ocure the additional insuranc e. The rec ord suppor t s the jury ’s conc lusion that N ite c lub s d id n ot. 5

Niteclubs cites to Dr onebar g er’ s testimony that on November

3, 2004, the day

afte r he re ceive d Terr

Ag ora’ s letter listing items of noncompliance, he called C& S, his i nsuranc e ca rrier , to reque st an incre ase in cover ag e. I n addition, Niteclubs points to Dronebar g er’ s telephone r ecor ds that s h o w th a t a thr e e - mi nu te c a ll w a s p la c e d to C& S o n N o v e mb e r 3
. D e s p it e th e p h o n e rec ord, ho wev er, TerrA gora di sp ut es D ron ebar ger’s t est im on y , ci ti ng th e te st im on y of em pl oy ees o f C &S
w h o d e n i e d

h av i n g e v e r

r e c e i v e d t h e c a l l b a s e d , i np art , o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y h a d n o r e c o r d o f i t
. In light of this conf

licting testimo n y , i t wa s within the province of the jury to believe the te stimony of the C&S employ ees over the testimony of Drone barg er. See City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).

I n addition, Niteclubs admits that Droneba rg er’ s single phone call to C&S wa s the sole eff ort it made to procur e additional insuranc e cove rag e, explaining that Dr onebar g er “had no
rea son to think his insura nce ag ent had not c omplied w ith his reque st,” that “[i] n his ex perie nce, a
c a ll r e qu e sti ngthe c ov e ra g e wa s a ll that w a s r e qu ir e d, ” and that “ [h]e tho ug ht t

he land lor d w ou ld have the courte sy

to call him if there wer e a pr oblem.” B elievingthe matter to have bee n taken c are of, Drone barg er did not follow up with e ither Terr Ag ora or with the insurance company to verify and to document that his insurance cover ag e had be en incr ease d as re quested.17 Ha ving w eig hed the e vidence , the jury could have deter

mined that the ac tions taken by Niteclubs to procur e and ve rify the exist ence of addition al i n s u ranc e cove rag e did not
a mou nt t o d ue dil ig e nc e . T he e vid e nce su pp or ts a fi nd ingby

the jur y tha t N ite c lub s f

a ile d to exercise due diligenc e in proc uring the additional insuranc e cove rag e re quired unde r the ter ms of the lease ag ree ment. See D ow Chem. Co. , 46 S.W .3d at 242. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule N iteclubs’s first issue. I n its second issue, Niteclubs arg ues t hat i t was entitl ed to an awar d of attorne y s’ fe es beca use, as a matter of law, attorne y s’ fe es ar e re cover able in ca ses of c onversion ar ising fr om brea ch of c ontrac t. To support i t s p o s i t i o n, Niteclubs cites se vera l case s in which attorney s’ fe es
wer e aw arde d wher e the tort theor y was “intrinsically founded in the interpre tation of a contr act.” See G ill Sav. Ass’n v. Chair King, Inc. , 7 97 S.W. 2d 31 (T e x. 19 90 ); Sc hin dle r v . A us twe ll F ar me rs Co -op , 829 S.W .2d 283 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992), a ff ’d a s m o dif

ie d o n o th e r grounds , 841 S. W.2 d 8 53 (T e x. 19 92 ); High Plains W ire Line Servs., Inc . v. Hy sell Sire Line Serv., Inc

. , 80 2 S. W.2 d 40 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mari llo 19 91 , n o w ri t) ; W ilson v. Ferguson , 747 S.W .2d 499 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1988, wr it denied). In eac h of t he cited case s, howeve r, attorne y s’ fe es we re not only based on the interpre tation of a contra ct but wer e also a war ded to the par

ty that had pre vailed on, and re ceive d damag es for , its brea ch o f contract claim. He re, while the jury found in favor of Nite c lub s o n it s c on ve rs ion c la im, the jur

y e xpre ssl y

fo un d th a t T e rr

Ag or a did no t “ fa il t o comply wi t h the lease by

terminating it” when it did. As this result did not depend on whethe r or not Terr Ag ora had brea ched the contra ct and, in fac t, there w as no findingof bre ach, the conver sion
c ann ot be sa id to have “ ari se [n] out of a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t.” Gi ve n th a t N ite c lub s d id n ot p re va il18

on its corre sponding br eac h of contra ct claim, i t is not entitl ed to an a war d of attorne y s’ fe es for
c on ve rs ion

ari sin g out of

br e a c h o f c on tr a c t.
Conclusion Havingoverr uled all issues raised by

the par ties, we a ffirm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 27, 2009