United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 04-2241

IN RE BOSTON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,

Debtor.

____________________

BOSTON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

HANSON S. REYNOLDS, TRUSTEE, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

FIRST LUTHERAN CHURCH AND THE FIRST CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIENTIST,

Intervenors, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

[Hon. Carol J. Kenner, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge]

Before

 Boudin, Chief Judge,

Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.

Theodore E. Dinsmoor, with whom Burns & Levinson LLP was on

brief, for appellant First Church of Christ, Scientist.
Michael C. Gilleran and Pepe & Hazard, LLP on brief for

appellant First Lutheran Church.

Charles R. Bennett, Jr., with whom David C. Kravitz,

Christopher M. Morrison, and Hanify & King, P.C. were on brief, for

debtor-appellee.

Robert B. Foster and Rackemann, Sawyer & Brewster, P.C. on

brief for trustee-appellee.

June 14, 2005
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a mare's nest

of exotic legal problems. At the outset, it requires us to resolve

a novel question of bankruptcy jurisdiction. After deciding that

question, we must then determine whether, under Massachusetts law,

a nonprofit organization that has ceased operations may nonetheless

receive a charitable bequest. Because the charitable organization

was still functioning as such at the time its entitlement to the

bequest vested, we conclude that the bequest may be paid.

I. BACKGROUND

Elizabeth Krauss executed her last will and testament in

1975. That instrument bequeathed the residue of her estate in

equal shares to the New England Sanitarium and Hospital of

Stoneham, Massachusetts (New England Sanitarium), First Lutheran

Church of Boston (First Lutheran), and First Church of Christ,

Scientist (the Mother Church). It specified that the bequest to

the New England Sanitarium was "to be used to provide a bed for

indigent patients."

In 1988, a state probate court adjudged Ms. Krauss

incompetent and placed her under guardianship. Eight years later,

the court appointed successor guardians in the persons of Gary

Douglas Rose (Ms. Krauss's grand-nephew) and Hanson S. Reynolds (an

attorney). The new guardians found Ms. Krauss's financial affairs

in disarray. They concluded that it would be best to sell her

realty, thus making her estate more liquid and raising funds that
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could be used to settle her debts and defray the costs of her

nursing care.

To minimize potential tax liabilities, the guardians

proposed to transfer the real estate to certain inter vivos

charitable trusts as a precursor to any sale. These transfers

would render the testamentary bequests nugatory but, to effectuate

Ms. Krauss's original intent, the guardians drew the trust

indentures to provide that, upon Ms. Krauss's death, the remaining

corpus would be divided in equal portions among the three residuary

beneficiaries named in the will. By then, the New England

Sanitarium had changed its name to Boston Regional Medical Center

(BRMC), and the indentures of trust named BRMC, First Lutheran, and

the Mother Church as residuary beneficiaries. This stipulation did

not include the preexisting limitation on the gift to BRMC (that

the funds "be used to provide a bed for indigent patients").

According to Reynolds, the guardians deliberately eliminated the

restriction because they believed that it was ambiguous and, as

such, might cause a failure of the bequest.

On October 10, 1997, the probate court confirmed the

guardians' plan for transferring and then selling Ms. Krauss's

assets. The real estate was transferred and sold, and the trusts

were funded. The guardians were named as co-trustees.

On March 1, 1998, Ms. Krauss died at the age of 105. The

trustees neither initiated any contact with the named beneficiaries
1BRMC and L-BRMC are not distinct legal entities. Rather, LBRMC is the continuation of BRMC as reorganized. We distinguish

between them solely for purposes of clarity.

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at that time nor made any immediate distribution of the corpus.

The record does not indicate that BRMC even knew of Ms. Krauss's

death, let alone of the windfall that her demise betokened.

Approximately eleven months later, BRMC closed its doors,

halted hospital operations, and filed for bankruptcy protection

under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the time, it was still

not aware that it was a beneficiary of the Krauss trusts. Thus,

BRMC did not list any expected distribution from the trusts among

the assets of the bankruptcy estate.

On January 18, 2000, the bankruptcy court confirmed

BRMC's plan of reorganization (the Plan). The Plan was strictly a

liquidating plan. Under it, all of BRMC's assets were vested in a

reorganized BRMC, which we shall call liquidating BRMC or L-BRMC.1

L-BRMC's sole purpose is to liquidate the marshaled assets and

distribute the net proceeds to BRMC's creditors in accordance with

the provisions of the Plan.

In May of 2000, the nature and extent of Ms. Krauss's

philanthropy became known to her intended beneficiaries. Citing

BRMC's bankruptcy, First Lutheran and the Mother Church filed a

complaint against the trustees and L-BRMC in the probate court

seeking to prohibit any distribution from the trust corpus to the

bankrupt hospital. L-BRMC objected on several grounds, asserting
2The Plan provides in pertinent part:

[T]he confirmation of the Plan shall act to permanently

enjoin . . . all persons . . . (a) from commencing or

continuing in any manner any action or other proceeding

of any kind with respect to any such claim or interest

against the Debtor and/or reorganized BRMC; . . . (c)

from creating, perfecting or enforcing any encumbrance of

any kind against reorganized BRMC, or against the

property of the reorganized BRMC with respect to any such

claim or interest; . . . . (excess capitalization

omitted).

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in the first instance that the injunctive provisions of the Plan

barred the maintenance of the suit.2 The churches agreed to drop

L-BRMC from the state court proceeding and filed a motion in the

bankruptcy court for relief from the injunction so that the probate

court proceeding could go forward. The bankruptcy court denied

that motion on July 12, 2000.

Shortly thereafter, L-BRMC initiated an adversary

proceeding in the bankruptcy court to compel the trustees to turn

over the hospital's share of the trust assets. The churches

intervened and counterclaimed for reformation of the indentures of

trust, seeking to reimpose the "bed" limitation that had been

contained in Ms. Krauss's will. First Lutheran simultaneously

moved to dismiss the turnover complaint and the Mother Church filed

a motion entreating the bankruptcy court to abstain. The

bankruptcy court denied both of these motions. In re Boston Reg'l

Med. Ctr., 265 B.R. 645, 651-52 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (BRMC I).

Although it agreed that the adversary proceeding was not
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appropriately characterized as a turnover action (and, thus, was

not a core proceeding), the court nevertheless found "related to"

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000), id. at 651, and

determined that abstention would be inappropriate, id. at 652.

On February 7, 2003, the bankruptcy court held a hearing

on the merits. It thereafter concluded that because Ms. Krauss

died before BRMC ceased to function as a hospital and because BRMC

incurred its debts in furtherance of its charitable mission, there

was no obstacle to paying out a one-third share of the trust

residue. In re Boston Reg'l Med. Ctr., 298 B.R. 1, 27-30 (Bankr.

D. Mass. 2003) (BRMC II). The court further determined that the

churches' counterclaim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Id. at 18-23. Based on these findings and conclusions, the

bankruptcy court recommended that the district court enter an order

directing the trustees to pay the disputed funds to L-BRMC.

The churches filed objections to the bankruptcy court's

recommended decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2000); Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 9033(b). They also moved in the district court for (i)

dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction, (ii) abstention,

or (iii) certification of the state law questions to the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). The district court

denied the motions, conducted a de novo review of the record,

adopted the bankruptcy court's proposed findings and conclusions

with minor modifications, and entered judgment accordingly. In re
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Boston Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. Civ. A. 03-12215, 2004 WL 1778881, at

*6 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2004) (BRMC III). The churches now appeal.

II. JURISDICTION

We start with the jurisdictional question. The churches

strive to persuade us that there is no "related to" jurisdiction

because this litigation arose after the bankruptcy court confirmed

the Plan. We are not convinced.

Bankruptcy jurisdiction is governed principally by

statute. The general grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction is contained

in 28 U.S.C. § 1334. That provision vests original jurisdiction in

the district courts over "all civil proceedings arising under title

11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id. §

1334(b). In what is a typical arrangement, the District of

Massachusetts, by standing order, has delegated to the bankruptcy

court all cases in which jurisdiction is premised on section 1334,

see D. Mass. R. 201, subject to review by the district court (or,

alternatively, by the bankruptcy appellate panel) in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158.

The statutory grant of "related to" jurisdiction is quite

broad. Congress deliberately allowed the cession of wide-ranging

jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts to enable them to deal

efficiently and effectively with the entire universe of matters

connected with bankruptcy estates. See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743

F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, bankruptcy courts ordinarily
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may exercise related to jurisdiction as long as the outcome of the

litigation "potentially [could] have some effect on the bankruptcy

estate, such as altering debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or

freedom of action, or otherwise have an impact upon the handling

and administration of the bankrupt estate." In re G.S.F. Corp.,

938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Smith, 866 F.2d

576, 580 (3d Cir. 1989)).

In this instance, the bankruptcy court found the

adversary proceeding to be "related to [a] case[] under title 11,"

as that phrase is used in section 1334(b). At first blush, this

seems to be a garden-variety application of the general rule.

Whether or not BRMC prevails will directly affect the amount of the

liquidating dividend paid to creditors. There is, therefore, a

fairly close connection between the adversary proceeding and the

administration of the bankruptcy estate. That seemingly would

suffice to bring this case within the bankruptcy court's related to

jurisdiction. See In re Toledo, 170 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir.

1999) (finding related to jurisdiction when the outcome of the suit

would affect the amount of funds available to creditors).

The churches urge us not to apply the general rule here.

In their view, the distinguishing feature is that L-BRMC commenced

this proceeding after the bankruptcy court confirmed the Plan.

This argument presupposes that the scope of the bankruptcy court's

related to jurisdiction narrows dramatically once a plan of
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reorganization has been confirmed and that, thereafter, related to

jurisdiction only includes those matters that have a particularly

close nexus to the confirmed plan — a nexus that the churches

assert is absent in this case.

On its face, section 1334 does not distinguish between

pre-confirmation and post-confirmation jurisdiction. Nonetheless,

courts sometimes have found a need to curtail the reach of related

to jurisdiction in the post-confirmation context so that bankruptcy

court jurisdiction does not continue indefinitely. See, e.g., In

re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2005)

(suggesting that post-confirmation bankruptcy court jurisdiction is

necessarily more limited than pre-confirmation jurisdiction); In re

Resorts Int'l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 164-69 (3d Cir. 2004) (similar).

The rationale behind this line of decisions starts with

the premise that a reorganized debtor is emancipated by the

confirmation of a reorganization plan. It emerges from bankruptcy

and enters the marketplace in its reincarnated form. From that

point forward, it is just like any other corporation; "it must

protect its interests in the way provided by the applicable nonbankruptcy law," without any special swaddling. Pettibone Corp. v.

Easley, 935 F.2d 120, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1991). Given the broad

sweep of related to jurisdiction, applying the general rule without

qualification after the confirmation of a reorganization plan

easily could result in the bankruptcy court retaining jurisdiction
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of all cases affecting the reorganized debtor for many years

thereafter. This prospect not only would work an unwarranted

expansion of federal court jurisdiction but also would unfairly

advantage reorganized debtors by allowing such firms to funnel

virtually all litigation affecting them into a single federal

forum. See id. at 122.

The solution, however, is not to discard the baby with

the bath water. While courts have interpreted the term "related

to" more grudgingly in some post-confirmation settings, context is

important. Those narrowing interpretations have been invoked only

with respect to actions involving reorganized debtors that have

reentered the marketplace. No case has suggested that courts

should abandon the general rule in all post-confirmation cases.

Here, the Plan calls for the liquidation of BRMC, not its

continuation as a going concern. The most salient difference

between the usual Chapter 11 reorganization and a liquidating plan

is that, in the latter instance, the reorganized debtor's sole

purpose is to wind up its affairs, convert its assets to cash, and

pay creditors a pro rata dividend. By definition, it has no

authority to reenter the marketplace. That fact undercuts the

primary purposes for parsimoniously policing the perimeter of postconfirmation jurisdiction: the specter of endless bankruptcy

jurisdiction and a kindred concern about unfairly advantaging

reorganized debtors. Accordingly, there is much less reason to
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depart from the general rule for related to jurisdiction where a

claim involves a liquidating plan of reorganization.

There is another, perhaps more important, reason for

distinguishing between liquidating plans and true reorganization

plans. Courts that have limited the scope of post-confirmation

jurisdiction have based their holdings on the conclusion that, once

confirmation has occurred, fewer proceedings are actually related

to the underlying bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Resorts Int'l, 372

F.3d at 165-67; In re Craig's Stores of Tex., Inc., 266 F.3d 388,

390 (5th Cir. 2001). That makes good sense: as the corporation

moves on, the connection attenuates.

This justification is absent in the case of a liquidating

plan. Typically, a reorganized debtor is attempting to make a go

of its business. Thus, its actions (including any involvement in

litigation) redound primarily to that end and only affect the

underlying bankruptcy proceeding in a tangential or derivative way.

See Pettibone, 935 F.2d at 122-23. By contrast, a liquidating

debtor exists for the singular purpose of executing an order of the

bankruptcy court. Any litigation involving such a debtor thus

relates much more directly to a proceeding under title 11.

This case is a paradigmatic example: L-BRMC's success or

lack of success in securing a share of the trust corpus will

directly impact the amount of the liquidating dividend eventually
3Although there is authority for the proposition that the

prospect of increasing the funds available to creditors, without

more, is insufficient to establish related to jurisdiction in a

post-confirmation case, see, e.g., Craig's Stores, 266 F.3d at 391,

those cases concern operating corporations, not liquidating

corporations. They are, therefore, inapposite.

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paid to BRMC's creditors. That is a matter intimately connected

with the efficacy of the bankruptcy proceeding.3

We add, moreover, that in the case of a liquidating plan

of reorganization, there exists a substantial policy interest in

favor of adhering to the general rule governing related to

jurisdiction: the strong federal policy in favor of the

expeditious liquidation of debtor corporations and the prompt

distribution of available assets to creditors. See In re Holiday

Mart, Inc., 715 F.2d 430, 435 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Cartridge

Television, Inc., 535 F.2d 1388, 1390 (2d Cir. 1976). This policy

is furthered by concentrating in a single forum any litigation that

will impede or advance that goal.

The existence vel non of related to jurisdiction must be

determined case-by-case. See Pegasus Gold, 394 F.3d at 1194

(recognizing that post-confirmation related to jurisdiction should

be determined with "a certain flexibility"). The language of the

jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, is protean, and what is

"related to" a proceeding under title 11 in one context may be

unrelated in another. With this in mind, we feel confident that

there will be situations in which the fact that particular
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litigation arises after confirmation of a reorganization plan will

defeat an attempted exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See,

e.g., Resorts Int'l, 372 F.3d at 166-68. We are equally confident,

however, that there are other situations in which the fact that

particular litigation arises after confirmation of a reorganization

plan will not defeat an attempted exercise of bankruptcy

jurisdiction.

 Insofar as we can tell, no court has yet addressed the

scope of post-confirmation related to jurisdiction in a case

involving a liquidating plan of reorganization. For the reasons

alluded to above, we hold that when a debtor (or a trustee acting

to the debtor's behoof) commences litigation designed to marshal

the debtor's assets for the benefit of its creditors pursuant to a

liquidating plan of reorganization, the compass of related to

jurisdiction persists undiminished after plan confirmation. Based

on this holding, we affirm the bankruptcy court's exercise of

subject matter jurisdiction.

III. THE MERITS

We turn now to the merits. In this court, the churches

have abandoned their counterclaim for reformation of the trust

indentures. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.

1990) (explaining that legal points alluded to in a perfunctory

manner, but unaccompanied by developed argumentation, are deemed

abandoned). Instead, they focus on their thesis that L-BRMC is
4L-BRMC asserts rights both as a legatee under Ms. Krauss's

will and as a beneficiary under the inter vivos trusts established

on her behalf. Depending on which instrument is under

consideration, Ms. Krauss technically may be a testator or a

settlor and her largesse technically may be described either as a

bequest or as a distribution. Since the parties' rights are the

same in either event, we refer throughout to Ms. Krauss as the

testator and to the gift as a bequest.

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ineligible to receive a share of the trust residue. This thesis

runs as follows. Under Massachusetts law, an organization is only

eligible to receive a charitable bequest if it is capable of using

the bequest for the purpose for which it was intended4 — and an

entity that exists solely for the benefit of creditors (like LBRMC) is incapable of using such a bequest (like Ms. Krauss's) for

the intended purpose ("provid[ing] a bed for indigent patients").

Like the district court, we review de novo the bankruptcy

court's conclusions of law. In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning

Corp., 212 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 2000). We review its findings

of fact, as modified by the district court, for clear error. Id.

Inasmuch as the parties and the courts below have addressed this

case on the plausible assumption that Massachusetts law furnishes

the substantive rules of decision, we follow suit. See In re

Newport Plaza Assocs., 985 F.2d 640, 643-44 (1st Cir. 1993); see

also Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274, 283-84 (1st Cir. 2005).

Massachusetts law on certain issues central to this

appeal is fuliginous. We are therefore required to make an

informed prophecy as to how the SJC would rule if confronted with
5Here, the authorities are divided and are thus of little

help.

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the same questions. Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d

1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996). In making this prediction, we rely

first on settled Massachusetts law and build from there by

reference to case law in other jurisdictions5 and to the policies

enunciated in the Massachusetts cases. See Moores v. Greenburg,

834 F.2d 1105, 1107 (1st Cir. 1987); Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc.,

460 F.2d 661, 663 (1st Cir. 1972). We are entitled to assume that

the highest court of the state would apply the rule that would best

implement those policies. Kathios v. Gen. Motors Corp., 862 F.2d

944, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1988); Moores, 834 F.2d at 1107.

We begin with what can be gleaned from the Massachusetts

cases. In construing a will or other testamentary instrument, the

testator's intent governs. Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084, 1094

(Mass. 1985). Charitable gifts are impressed with a kind of quasitrust, which demands that they be applied to charitable purposes.

See Hillman v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fall River, 508 N.E.2d 118,

119 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) ("A gift with a general charitable

intent, of course, imposes a trust of a sort in the sense that the

grantee may not use the assets for private, personal purposes; the

assets must be used for charitable purposes consistent with those

of the designated charity."); see also Brigham v. Peter Brent

Brigham Hosp., 134 F. 513, 517 (1st Cir. 1904) (describing this
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phenomenon, under Massachusetts law, as "a quasi trust" not "a true

trust"); Smith v. Livermore, 10 N.E.2d 117, 125 (Mass. 1937)

(stating that gifts to charitable corporations in Massachusetts are

considered gifts upon trust for charitable purposes).

In Massachusetts, an organization that is the beneficiary

of a charitable bequest is not disqualified from receiving the

bequest merely because it has merged with another charity or has

ceased actively to provide charitable services. See Old Colony

Trust Co. v. Winchester Home for Aged Women, 85 N.E.2d 622, 623-24

(Mass. 1949); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Third Universalist Soc'y of

Cambridge, 188 N.E. 711, 711-12 (Mass. 1934); Boston Safe Deposit

& Trust Co. v. Stratton, 156 N.E. 885, 888-89 (Mass. 1927). In

each of these cases, however, the beneficiary, though no longer

itself providing charitable services, had the capacity to redirect

its funds to another organization that was actively engaged in

charitable endeavors. See, e.g., Winchester Home, 85 N.E.2d at 623

(noting that although the named beneficiary itself no longer

functioned as a home for elderly women, it continued to exist as a

corporation and to use its resources to support a comparable

facility in the same community).

This distinction seems to have driven the SJC's decision

in Sleeper v. Camp Menotomy, 223 N.E.2d 696 (Mass. 1967). There,

a testator left a bequest to the Arlington Girl Scouts (AGS). Id.

at 696. Before the testator's death, the corporation that
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previously had operated as AGS disaffiliated with the Girl Scouts

and went forward as the same corporate entity, albeit under the new

name Camp Menotomy. Id. at 697. As such, it ran a nonprofit

summer camp for girls. Id. The SJC held that the corporation was

ineligible to receive the bequest because it no longer had any

involvement in the scouting movement. Id. at 697-98.

Massachusetts law thus appears to require that a donee of

a charitable bequest be able and willing, at a bare minimum, to

direct the funds received to charitable purposes of the same

general type and kind that it historically had performed. Failing

that, the courts will appoint a trustee to effectuate the

testator's charitable intent. See Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum,

80 N.E. 490, 494 (Mass. 1907) (explaining that "[i]f the

corporation, at the time of the probate of the will, was incapable

of taking the property and carrying out the general charitable

intent of the testator, the court . . . would appoint a trustee to

act in its place"); Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc'y, 84 Mass. 334, 336-37

(1861) (similar).

We conclude, therefore, that the Massachusetts cases

point strongly to a rule that an organization cannot receive a

charitable bequest unless it is both capable of using that bequest

for the intended purpose and willing to do so. Against this

backdrop, we must decide whether the bequest to BRMC was intended
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for a charitable purpose and, if so, whether BRMC had the capacity

to carry out that purpose at the critical time.

Under Massachusetts law, a gift to a charitable

organization is ordinarily construed as a gift for a charitable

purpose. See Wellesley Coll. v. Att'y Gen., 49 N.E.2d 220, 223

(Mass. 1943); Osgood v. Rogers, 71 N.E. 306, 308 (Mass. 1904).

There is no dispute that both at the time Ms. Krauss executed her

will and at the time the probate court sanctioned the proposed

trusts, BRMC was a nonprofit corporation, duly qualified under

section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §

501(c)(3), and, thus, a charitable organization. Against this

backdrop, we readily conclude that Ms. Krauss intended the bequest

to be used for a charitable purpose. The will's explicit reference

to "a bed for indigent patients" makes this clear, as does the

trust article naming BRMC as a beneficiary (which states that the

residue of the trust shall be distributed "in equal shares to such

of the following charitable organizations" so long as each

organization then qualifies as a charity under the Internal Revenue

Code).

Viewed in this light, the question reduces to whether

BRMC, in its new incarnation as a corporation whose sole purpose is

to marshal its assets, liquidate them, and distribute the proceeds

to creditors, is eligible to receive a charitable bequest. On this

issue, the Massachusetts cases are silent and the authorities
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elsewhere are divided. Compare, e.g., In re Will of Kraetzer, 462

N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Sur. Ct. 1983) (holding that a bankrupt

hospital is not capable of implementing the purpose of a charitable

bequest and that the hospital is therefore ineligible to receive

the bequest), with, e.g., Montclair Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Seton

Hall Coll. of Med. & Dentistry, 233 A.2d 195, 200 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 1967) (concluding otherwise on the ground that the

payment of debts incurred in the furtherance of charitable purposes

is itself a charitable purpose).

We navigate through these uncharted waters by following

a pole star of Massachusetts law: the principle that, in

construing testamentary instruments, courts, whenever possible,

should give full effect to the testator's intent. See Clymer, 473

N.E.2d at 1094. The language that Ms. Krauss used in her will

offers a window into her intent: she was concerned about helping

sick persons who could not afford to pay for health care. That is

a fairly typical species of charitable intent; a charitable act

generally is thought to be an act of benevolence or generosity

toward others, in particular the needy. See W. Mass. Lifecare

Corp. v. Bd. of Assessors, 747 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Mass. 2001);

Saltonstall v. Sanders, 93 Mass. 446, 469 (1865).

Normally, a testator who leaves a charitable bequest acts

with a prospective intention. See Will of Kraetzer, 462 N.Y.S.2d

at 1013. She intends that the bequest will increase the charity's
6Of course, a testator might leave a bequest for the specific

purpose of enabling a charitable organization, whether or not

solvent, to pay its debts. That sort of bequest is beyond the

scope of this opinion.

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good works by helping it to continue furnishing services, to expand

service delivery, or the like. We find it difficult to imagine

that, in the absence of special circumstances, a person with a

generic charitable intent would choose to subsidize a charitable

organization if she knew that the funds would be used only to pay

creditors and not to assist in providing any future or additional

charitable services.6

The bankruptcy court thought that since BRMC incurred its

debts in the furtherance of its charitable mission, the payment of

those debts could be deemed charitable in nature. BRMC II, 298

B.R. at 28-30. That reasoning has some superficial appeal: it

would have been impossible for BRMC to function effectively as a

hospital without credit and in that sense the provision of credit

was vital to its ability to discharge its charitable function. In

the usual case, however, the extension of credit is not itself an

act of charity, and in a real-world sense, the payment of debts

after a hospital ceases operations does not further the hospital's

ability to carry out its charitable mission. For that reason, we

think it would be inconsistent with Ms. Krauss's intent for a deadas-a-doornail hospital to receive a portion of the trust corpus
7Our emphasis on the testator's intent is buttressed by our

knowledge that, under Massachusetts law, a testator could expressly

include a provision in her will precluding a bankrupt charity from

taking thereunder. See Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.

Friele, 23 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Mass. 1939) (holding that a testator is

generally entitled to place such conditions and limitations on a

bequest as she sees fit).

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with the understanding that it would be spent solely to reimburse

creditors for debts previously incurred.

We are also unpersuaded that holding a bankrupt hospital

incapable of taking a charitable bequest will have the dire

consequences predicted by the appellees. While a rule that

charitable bequests could not be used to pay debts might have a

crippling effect on a charity's ability to obtain credit and,

hence, on its ability to function, our holding is not nearly so

broad. We decide only that, absent a contrary provision in the

will or indenture of trust, a charitable organization that has

ceased to perform any charitable work and that is incapable of

redirecting new funds for charitable purposes is ineligible to

receive a charitable bequest or gift. That rule will have the

effect, in a few cases, of blocking a charity's creditors from

access to a new source of funds — but that is a small price to pay

for honoring the testator's intent.7

This decision does not end our odyssey. We still must

consider the significance (if any) of the time lapse between the

testator's death and the ensuing bankruptcy. When Ms. Krauss died,

BRMC was running a fully functioning hospital and was actively
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engaged in performing its charitable mission. By any standard, it

was then able to receive the bequest. The question is whether that

datum makes a dispositive difference.

In the churches' view, this accident of timing is

irrelevant. The only thing that matters is that BRMC is bankrupt

now and no money it receives will be used for charitable purposes

on a going-forward basis. BRMC has a different viewpoint; it

asseverates that its rights to the bequest vested as of the date of

Ms. Krauss's demise; that it was then eligible to receive the

funds; and that subsequent events cannot defease that entitlement.

Neither of these positions is foolproof.

On the one hand, the churches' proposed rule that a

beneficiary's status at the time of distribution is the relevant

benchmark seems as shaky as a shack built upon shifting sands. The

Massachusetts cases offer no support for such a hard-and-fast rule;

what little authority we have found points in the opposite

direction. See, e.g., Hubbard, 80 N.E. at 494 (suggesting, in

dictum, that the capacity to receive a charitable bequest should be

judged at the time of probate of the will). Moreover, such a rule

would have the potential to work serious mischief. If those in

charge of the distribution of funds have the power, through action

or inaction, to affect the identity of those who receive the funds,

the risk of abuse might well be unacceptable. See Montclair, 233

A.2d at 199-200.
8In the case of charities, a named beneficiary may become

unable to carry out the charitable purpose of the bequest after the

death of the testator but before it is eligible to receive the

bequest under the will. In that scenario, the mere fact that the

bequest vested might not be enough to entitle the beneficiary to

payment. Cf. Stratton, 156 N.E. at 887-88 (discussing the

eligibility of a charitable legatee to take under a will when the

asserted disability accrued after the death of the testator, but

during an intervening life estate). Since the case at bar involves

an outright bequest, with no intervening life estate or other

built-in reason for a delay in payment, we need not decide how the

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The churches' suggested rule also raises the boggart of

unnecessary litigation aimed at influencing the timing of

distributions. We think that the Massachusetts cases, to the

extent they shed any light on this issue, exhibit a preference for

a rule that is not contingent on the whims of third parties. See

Sleeper, 223 N.E.2d at 697 (indicating that the eligibility of a

charitable organization to receive a bequest ought to be determined

at the time "the will became effective").

On the other hand, BRMC's position is also open to

question. While Massachusetts law is clear that the bequest vested

at Ms. Krauss's death, see Cook v. Hayward, 51 N.E. 1075, 1076

(Mass. 1898), vesting is a concept that has different shades of

meaning in different contexts. For example, although noncontingent bequests vest at the time of the testator's death, a

will may provide for a built-in delay in distribution (as in the

case of an intervening life estate). See, e.g., Brigham, 134 F. at

518-19. In such cases, many years may pass before the beneficiary

is entitled to a distribution.8 Id.
rule would operate in such a configuration.

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One thing is certain: vesting notwithstanding, the

bequest was not payable immediately upon Ms. Krauss's death. An

unbroken skein of Massachusetts cases, dating back to the early

nineteenth century, recognizes that time is needed for an estate to

gather the testator's assets and settle any debts. See, e.g.,

Andrews v. Hunneman, 23 Mass. 126, 129-130 (1828). This

consideration has particular force with respect to the payment of

residual legacies, as debts, expenses, taxes, and other bequests

all must be paid before the amount of the residue can be

determined, let alone distributed. See Blaney v. Blaney, 55 Mass.

107, 115 (1848).

As a result, unless a will specifies some later date —

and Ms. Krauss's will did not — Massachusetts courts hold that

bequests are deemed payable one year after the death of the

testator. See Porter v. Ketchum, 203 N.E.2d 84, 84 (Mass. 1964).

Not coincidentally, this interval corresponds to Massachusetts's

one-year period for filing claims against an estate. See Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 197, § 9. Although an executor, in his discretion,

may pay a bequest before this prescriptive period expires, a suit

to compel payment of a bequest will not lie until a year has

passed. See Brooks v. Lynde, 89 Mass. 64, 67 (1863); see also

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 197, § 20 (providing that interest does not
-26-

begin to accrue on legacies or bequests until after the limitations

period for claims against the estate has expired).

In sum, the bequest to BRMC vested upon Ms. Krauss's

death on March 1, 1998 (when BRMC was operating a hospital).

However, BRMC had no right to demand payment of the bequest until

March 1, 1999 (by which time it had entered bankruptcy and halted

hospital operations). The crucial question, then, is which of

these dates controls in determining BRMC's eligibility to receive

the bequest.

Although the question is close, we conclude that the SJC

would choose the date of vesting as the vantage point from which to

determine a charitable organization's eligibility to receive a

bequest. We reach this conclusion partially by analogy to the case

of natural persons. The SJC has held that when a will contains a

bequest that is contingent on the donee surviving the testator and

the donee does survive but dies before distribution of the bequest,

the donee's heirs (rather than the testator's heirs) are entitled

to receive the bequest. Childs v. Russell, 52 Mass. 16, 25 (1846).

This holding makes it transparently clear that, in the usual case,

the Massachusetts courts measure a donee's eligibility to receive

a bequest from the time of the testator's demise, notwithstanding

the absence of a right to immediate possession. Given that the

human mind cannot devise a rule that would apply perfectly in all

circumstances, we believe that the SJC would hew to this same line
9Of course, the "date of vesting" rule that we endorse today

is a default rule. Within wide limits, a testator retains the

ability to specify the terms on which a beneficiary is eligible to

receive a bequest and, thus, to modify the "date of vesting" rule

as he or she sees fit. See Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.

Friele, 23 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Mass. 1939).

-27-

of reasoning in a case involving a charitable bequest to a

charitable beneficiary.

We also give weight to the fact that a "date of vesting"

rule is an easier one to administer. Although BRMC had no absolute

right to receive its share of the trusts until a year after Ms.

Krauss's death, the trustees had the authority to make such a

distribution at an earlier date. Had they done so, we do not think

anyone would suggest with a straight face that BRMC should be

required to refund the bequest because it ceased operations before

a full year had passed. Thus, measuring the organization's

eligibility to receive the bequest as of the date when distribution

could be mandated would reintroduce the prospect of manipulation on

the part of the fiduciary and, thus, would wind up at cross

purposes with the Massachusetts policy favoring mechanical rules in

the distribution of estates.9

That ends this aspect of the matter. We conclude that the

SJC would find it preferable to measure eligibility from the time

of death. Thus, BRMC's right to the bequest was complete upon Ms.

Krauss's death. As BRMC was a fully functioning hospital at that

time, it was eligible to receive the bequest. The fact that its
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continued existence as a hospital was short-lived did not alter

that reality. Accordingly, as between these claimants, L-BRMC is

entitled to the disputed funds.

IV. RELIEF FROM THE INJUNCTION

One loose end remains. As a fallback position, the

churches contend that even if we find L-BRMC eligible to receive

the bequest — as we have — we nonetheless should reverse the lower

courts' refusal to grant relief from the Plan's injunctive

provisions, quoted supra note 2, so that the churches can initiate

a proceeding in the Massachusetts probate court to conform the

trusts to the will and reintroduce the "bed for indigent patients"

limitation. BRMC argues that this is a non-issue because the

earlier probate orders constitute a bar to further proceedings on

res judicata grounds.

We need not reach the res judicata issue (and,

consequently, do not attempt to resolve it). While the record does

not reveal the bankruptcy court's reasons for denying relief from

the injunction, the district court's opinion affords some guidance.

In upholding the bankruptcy court's refusal to relax the

injunction, that court cited the substantial delay in the

liquidation of BRMC that this litigation already had caused and

concluded that, in all events, any proceeding brought by the

churches in the probate court likely would be a waste of time.

BRMC III, 2004 WL 1778881, at *5-*6 & n.12.
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Although the matter is far from clear, we assume, for

argument's sake, that the probate court retains the authority, even

at this late date, to modify its decree confirming Ms. Krauss's

estate plan. Cf. O'Brien v. Dwight, 294 N.E.2d 363, 380-81 (Mass.

1973) (holding that probate courts have the continuing power to

revoke or modify their decrees, but suggesting that such action

would only be appropriate in limited circumstances). Even so, the

mere fact that relief which is not available to a litigant in the

bankruptcy court conceivably might be available in another forum is

not, in and of itself, sufficient to require the bankruptcy court

to lift an injunction or a stay. See, e.g., In re Federated Dep't

Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 829, 836-37 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that

the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in refusing to

relax an anti-suit injunction, even though the denial of relief

might cause hardship to the movant's ability to litigate a state

law claim). The bankruptcy court is entitled to consider not only

the nature of the remedies that might be available in a parallel

(non-bankruptcy) proceeding but also the substantiality of the

asserted claim and the effect of granting the exception on the

bankruptcy case as a whole. See In re Calore Express Co., 288 F.3d

22, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2002).

We review a bankruptcy court's decision not to exempt a

particular claim from the sweep of an injunction or stay

prohibiting the maintenance of non-bankruptcy litigation for abuse
-30-

of discretion. In re C & S Grain Co., 47 F.3d 233, 238 (7th Cir.

1995). Having reviewed the record with care, we discern no abuse

of discretion here. There are a series of obstacles standing in

the churches' way. First, we question whether the probate court

would entertain the churches' belated petition to modify the estate

plan. Second, even if the probate court would entertain the

petition, we view the chances of the churches winning reformation

as small. Third, even if the churches were to prevail in reforming

the indentures of trust, it is problematic whether that victory

would change the ultimate analysis vis-à-vis BRMC's entitlement to

the bequest. After all, at the time of Ms. Krauss's death, BRMC

was functioning as a hospital and, thus, was still capable of

applying the bequest to the care of indigent patients. And,

finally, even if the churches succeeded in stripping away BRMC's

entitlement to the bequest, it is not certain that they would

benefit. Cf., e.g., Town of Brookline v. Barnes, 87 N.E.2d 843,

845-47 (Mass. 1949) (holding that a charitable gift, which could

not be distributed because of the legatee's unwillingness to carry

out the testator's charitable intent, could inspire an application

of the doctrine of cy pres so that the court could order the

bequest paid to a different institution and, thus, effectuate the

testator's charitable intent).

The bottom line, then, is that the churches' anticipated

probate claim is tenuous at best. That fact, coupled with the
-31-

district court's accurate observation that the battle for the

bequest already has caused protracted delay in winding up the

bankruptcy case, convinces us that the refusal to lift the

injunction was comfortably within the encincture of the lower

courts' discretion.

V. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. In life, timing often is

important. So it is here: on the date of the testator's death,

BRMC was eligible to receive the charitable bequest because it was

then operating a nonprofit hospital. Our conclusion that the date

of death (and, hence, the date of vesting) controls may in some

sense seem arbitrary (after all, a few months either way would have

made a dispositive difference). But there are no perfect solutions

to imbricated problems of this sort. Thus, we base our conclusion

not on its inevitability, but, rather, on our belief that the SJC,

if squarely confronted with this conundrum, would hold that the

relevant date for determining the capacity of a beneficiary to take

a charitable bequest is the vesting date, regardless of whether the

distribution is made on that date or at some later time. In our

view, this result represents a reasonable accommodation of

competing centrifugal and centripetal forces, most particularly,

Massachusetts's policy favoring the preservation of charitable

gifts for charitable purposes and Massachusetts's expressed
-32-

preference for mechanical rules of descent and distribution in

matters of testamentary distribution.

Affirmed.