2020 UT App 36

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JOHNNY BRICKMAN WALL,

Appellant.

Amended Opinion∗

No. 20151017-CA

Filed March 5, 2020

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable James T. Blanch

No. 131903972

Troy L. Booher, Freyja Johnson, and Beth Kennedy, 

Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Tera J. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.

HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 A jury convicted Johnny Brickman Wall of murdering his 

ex-wife, Uta von Schwedler.1 Wall appeals his conviction, 

 

∗ This Amended Opinion replaces the opinion issued December 

12, 2019, State v. Wall, 2019 UT App 205. 

1. “This court typically does not include the names of crime 

victims, witnesses, or other innocent parties in its decisions. We 

make an exception in this case due to the considerable notoriety 

this criminal episode has attracted. The [victim’s] identity is well 

known, and obscuring her identity in this decision would serve 

(continued...)
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arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, that 

the district court erred in admitting certain DNA evidence, and 

that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 

State’s closing argument involving the DNA evidence. We 

conclude that Wall has not carried his burden on appeal to show 

there was insufficient evidence to support his murder

conviction. Further, the district court did not exceed its 

discretion in admitting certain DNA evidence, and Wall’s trial

counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s characterization of that evidence in closing 

argument. Accordingly, we affirm Wall’s conviction.

BACKGROUND

Marriage and Divorce

¶2 In 1988, a mutual friend introduced Uta to Wall while 

they were each completing doctorate programs on the west 

coast. Wall and Uta married in 1990, and Wall graduated from 

medical school four years later. After medical school, Uta, Wall, 

and their newborn son moved to Utah for Wall’s residency 

program. Over the next few years, they had three more children 

together.

¶3 By 2005, the marriage had failed and Uta moved out of 

the family home, leaving the four children to live primarily with 

Wall. The couple divorced in 2006.

 

(...continued)

no purpose.” State v. Chavez-Reyes, 2015 UT App 202, ¶ 2 n.2, 357 

P.3d 1012. Additionally, although we generally refer to relevant 

parties by their last names, we will refer to the victim in this case 

as Uta because that is how all of the witnesses referred to her at 

trial.
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¶4 Wall and Uta responded differently to the divorce. 

According to their children, Wall was “very, very sad” and 

depressed after the divorce, but over time his mood changed 

from sadness to “anger, even hatred” toward Uta. Wall 

frequently complained to the children about Uta, saying that she 

was “a bad parent,” that she was “selfish,” and that she made his 

“life difficult.” The children said that Wall never treated Uta

“nicely or kindly” after the divorce. At one point, Wall 

“physically removed” Uta from his property when she “tried to 

come in the front yard” to pick up the children for her parent 

time.

¶5 Most people who knew Wall knew that he “despised” 

Uta. He asked his friends, “Would it be bad if Uta wasn’t here 

anymore?” and “How would my life be if she weren’t around?” 

He sent emails to Uta accusing her of immoral acts and 

threatening to “move away” with the children “or continue 

towards obtaining full custody.” He blamed Uta for his 

unhappiness and accused her of “hurt[ing] people that matter 

deeply” to him. When she reached out to him regarding requests 

from the children’s friends for weekend trips, he asked her to 

“please stop inserting [herself] in [his] parent time.”

¶6 It was clear that Wall did not want Uta in the children’s 

lives. The summer before her death, Wall took the children to 

California but refused to tell them when they were returning to 

Utah because he did not want them to tell Uta. If the children 

attempted to communicate with Uta while they were with Wall, 

“he would become very upset” and would sometimes take their 

phones away from them. He was uncooperative with Uta

regarding parent-time exchanges and adjustments to the custody

arrangement. Wall frequently ignored Uta’s messages, and she

had to organize parent-time schedules through her older

children.

¶7 Uta’s response to the divorce was quite different. Her 

friends, family, coworkers, and other acquaintances who 

testified at trial knew Uta to be “very outgoing, very friendly, 
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20151017-CA 4 2020 UT App 36

very cheerful,” and “full of life.” Those witnesses said her 

positive attitude continued after the divorce, and some people 

“certainly thought she was happier” after the divorce. She was 

welcoming to newcomers and frequently brought homemade 

treats to work or to social gatherings. She regularly engaged in 

physical activities such as swimming, running, hiking, skiing, 

and camping. Uta was in a “very happy” relationship with a 

man (the boyfriend) whom the children liked, and the two eldest 

children told family members that they “were so happy that Uta

had [the boyfriend]” because he was “a really, really good match 

for Uta.” No witness testified that Uta was unhappy or suicidal, 

except for Wall.

¶8 Uta was very involved in her children’s lives. Although 

she “had a great love and passion for science,” she arranged 

with her supervisor to work a “30-hour work week” because “it 

was important to her to be available for [her children] after 

[school] hours.” “Uta’s greatest pleasure in life was the love of 

her four children,” and she wanted to spend more time with 

them. She attended their sporting events and musical 

performances and created photo albums for each of them.

¶9 One of the few things that upset Uta was attempting to 

work with Wall regarding the children. A few years after the 

divorce, Uta hired an attorney to file a petition to modify the 

divorce decree regarding parent time, and the court ordered 

mediation. Although Wall and Uta reached an agreement during 

mediation, Wall later refused to sign the proposed order. Thus,

for years following the divorce, the custody arrangement was 

never sorted out and remained a “constant battle.”

¶10 Early in September 2011, after years of unsuccessfully 

attempting to work out a better custody arrangement outside of 

court, Uta reached out to her attorney to discuss filing a new

petition to modify the divorce decree and to consider moving to 

appoint a custody evaluator. Wall ignored Uta’s inquiries related 

to the children, including whether he would either agree to sign 

the custody evaluation request or agree to the proposed parent-
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 5 2020 UT App 36

time schedule for the upcoming school year. He also frequently 

ignored his own attorney’s communications related to these 

requests. The week before Uta’s death, in an apparent change of 

course, Wall agreed to sign the custody evaluation request the 

following week. But after he left the children in Uta’s care for the 

weekend, Wall “excited[ly]” told a new acquaintance that “he 

was getting his kids back.”

Uta’s Final Days

¶11 The week before her death, Uta had made a discovery in 

her research that could advance a new treatment for childhood 

leukemia. According to her supervisor, the “long-term 

implications of that discovery” were “very exciting on a 

professional level, on a career level, both for Uta and . . . the lab, 

because [it would] lead[] to new peer-reviewed publications, 

grants, [and] presentations.” This was a “milestone” in Uta’s

career that would have had “positive implications” for her.

¶12 On September 26, 2011, the day before her body was 

discovered, Uta had a meeting with her supervisor and another 

coworker related to this new discovery, and they were all “quite 

enthusiastic” because “[t]his was one of the biggest discoveries 

[they] had had thus far in the laboratory.” Later that evening,

Uta attended one of the children’s soccer games and was “in a 

great mood.” She spread out a blanket and shared treats with 

other parents. Uta told a fellow parent that she “had been 

camping that weekend with her kids and [her boyfriend]” and 

was looking forward to her upcoming trip to California with her 

two youngest children later that week while Wall took the two 

eldest children to visit universities back east.

¶13 After the soccer game, Wall arrived at Uta’s house to take 

the children back home. When he arrived, Uta tried to talk with 

him to finalize the details for the California trip, but Wall “rolled 

up his window and ignored her.” According to the children, 

Wall appeared annoyed on the drive home.
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 6 2020 UT App 36

¶14 With the children out of the house, Uta went about her 

usual Monday evening routine of “deep cleaning” the house. 

Uta called her boyfriend and made plans with him for the 

following night. At around 10:45 p.m., Uta spoke with a friend 

over the phone about potential plans for the next day. That was 

the last time anyone heard from Uta.

September 27, 2011

¶15 The following morning, on September 27, 2011, Uta’s 

neighbors did not see her at her kitchen table drinking coffee

and reading her newspaper, as she did all other mornings. 

Instead, the newspaper remained in the driveway, and the 

garbage cans Uta put out for collection the night before 

remained on the street.

¶16 That same morning, Uta’s eldest daughter awoke at 

around 6:00 a.m. and got ready for school. She searched the 

house for Wall, who usually drove her to the light rail station, 

but she could not find him anywhere. The eldest daughter 

testified that if Wall had to leave for the hospital in the middle of 

the night, he would “generally . . . text [her] or call [her]” to let 

her know, but he had not left her any messages that morning. 

After calling him twice with no answer, the eldest daughter 

walked to the station to go to school. Wall was spotted by the 

eldest daughter’s schoolmate and her mother at 7:05 a.m.,

driving some distance away from and in the opposite direction 

of his house, and Wall still had not returned home to get the

youngest children ready for school by the time the eldest son left 

for school around 7:30 a.m. But the two youngest children 

remembered speaking with Wall at some point before leaving

for school. Specifically, they remembered seeing an injury to 

Wall’s eye. Wall told them that he had slept outside on the porch 

and had been scratched by their dog, but the youngest daughter 

thought Wall was acting “weird, almost paranoid.” Just after 

8:00 a.m., a carwash facility photographed Wall dropping off his 

car. Wall took his car there to “detail the inside” and asked the 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 7 2020 UT App 36

carwash attendant to focus “extra heavy” in the trunk cargo area 

and on a spot on the driver’s side back seat.

¶17 After leaving his car to be detailed, Wall arrived late for 

appointments with patients. He “looked disheveled and 

anxious,” appeared not to have bathed, and wore the same 

clothes as the previous day. A medical assistant noticed that he 

had a scratch on the left side of his face and that his left eye was 

“reddened and bloodshot.” Although two people who worked 

in Wall’s office said that this scratch looked like it was caused by 

a fingernail, “Wall volunteered an explanation for the scratch, 

saying that his dog jumped on him and scratched his face while 

he was sleeping outside.” One of the assistants “thought [this] 

explanation was odd because [Wall] had his dog for a long time 

and she had never seen it scratch him before.” When Wall

noticed that his assistant was looking at additional scratches on 

his arms, he “quickly” rolled down his sleeves. After seeing one 

patient, Wall left to see an eye doctor and did not return to work.

¶18 When the eldest children returned home, they too noticed 

the scratch to Wall’s face and eye. Wall told them that he had 

been sleeping outside occasionally over the past few months and 

that their dog had scratched him the night before while he slept

outside on the porch. None of the children had ever seen Wall 

sleep outside on the porch, and none of them knew their dog to 

scratch anyone.

The Crime Scene

¶19 At around 7:45 p.m. on September 27, 2011, Uta’s 

boyfriend went to visit her as they had planned the night before.

Uta’s garbage cans were still on the street, and her newspaper 

was still in the driveway. The boyfriend walked into her house 

through her unlocked door, which Uta normally locked before

going to bed. He noticed that her bathroom door was slightly 

ajar and that the light was on. On his way to the bathroom, he 

walked past her bedroom and noticed that the blinds, which 

were always open, had been pulled shut. The boyfriend reached 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 8 2020 UT App 36

the bathroom, announced his presence, opened the door, and 

found Uta dead in her bathtub with the cold water running but 

not overflowing. She wore only her pajama shorts, and her 

bloodied tank top was folded at the edge of the bathtub. The 

boyfriend called the police, who quickly arrived on the scene.

¶20 Upon entering the house, the first responders noted that 

there were pills strewn across the bedroom floor, a lamp had 

toppled over on the bed, and a vase and books from the 

nightstand had been knocked onto the floor. The comforter on 

the bed had been balled up in a way that appeared to conceal 

several dried bloodstains. The fitted bed sheet contained one

large pool of blood and two smaller pools of blood that 

“show[ed] motion in three different directions,” indicating “a 

sign of a real struggle.” There was also a bloodstain on the 

pillowcase. In the bathroom, there was blood smeared on the 

sink and below the windowsill located above the bathtub, but 

there was no blood smeared on the walls between Uta’s 

bedroom and bathroom or on any of the light switches. There 

was a shampoo bottle standing upright in the middle of the 

bathroom floor, which was usually kept in the windowsill above 

the bathtub. Under Uta’s body, the first responders found a large 

kitchen knife. Also in the bathwater was a magazine, the sports 

section of the newspaper (which Uta never read), and the 

youngest daughter’s photo album. There were dried bloodstains 

that looked like shoeprints on the kitchen floor.

¶21 Some of the officers testified that the scene appeared 

“suspicious,” as if “there could have been a struggle,” and that it 

“did not appear consistent with an overdose or accidental 

death.” After leaving the scene, one of the officers contacted 

detectives to conduct an investigation.

Wall’s First Version of the Events of September 26 and 27

¶22 Later that night, the detectives arrived at Wall’s house to 

ask him “if he was willing to come down to [the] police station 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 9 2020 UT App 36

to talk.” The officers did not tell Wall what they wanted to talk 

about, and he did not ask them.

¶23 While Wall waited to be interviewed, the detectives first

interviewed the boyfriend. The boyfriend was “compliant” and 

“helpful.” He did not “have any trouble time-lining himself, 

explaining what he had been doing the weekend before, [or

what happened] the day before. He seemed to be honest in all of 

his answers.”

¶24 In contrast, Wall’s responses to the detectives’ questions 

were vague and he spoke in generalities rather than directly 

answering questions about what occurred the previous 

night. When the detectives asked where he went the night 

before after picking up the children from Uta’s house, Wall 

said, “I don’t know . . . I don’t rem . . . I mean, I don’t 

usually remember every . . . what I do, but . . . ah . . . usually 

what we do.” (Omissions in original.) He went on tangents 

about what usually happened when he retrieved the children 

from Uta’s house at the conclusion of her parent time. The 

officers kept redirecting Wall, stating, “So what happened last 

night, though, [Wall]? This was just last night.” But Wall 

continued to respond to inquiries about the previous night with 

things the family “usually” did on Monday evenings or what the 

children “sometimes” did when they got back to Wall’s house. 

Wall could not say if he had been home the entire night or if he 

had gone back to Uta’s house after picking up the children. 

Wall evaded direct answers about the last time he had seen Uta, 

and he could not remember if he had recently touched Uta or 

the last time he had been inside Uta’s house. When directly 

asked if he had been inside Uta’s house on September 26 or 27, 

Wall responded, “I don’t think so.” When asked if there 

was “any reason, whatsoever, that [his] DNA . . . would be 

under [Uta’s] fingernails,” Wall responded, “I don’t know.” 

When he was asked if he killed Uta, he said, “I don’t think I 

did it,” “I don’t think I was there,” and, “If I did it, I did make a 

mistake, and I am sorry. But I don’t think I did it.”
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 10 2020 UT App 36

¶25 Eventually, over the span of three hours, Wall gave an 

account of the things he did on September 27, 2011. He told the 

detectives that he went to a gas station near his house to 

purchase eggs between 6:45 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. He said he 

returned to the house and had breakfast with his two youngest 

children before taking them to school. Wall then went to a 

carwash facility because he had “extra time” that morning and 

there were “burritos spilled all over” the front passenger seat. 

He talked about going to his office, seeing the eye doctor 

regarding the scratch on his eye—which he again said his dog 

caused—and returning to the carwash to get his car before 

driving to his office at the hospital. At the hospital, Wall 

apparently parked his car and left his windows rolled down

with his cell phone still inside the vehicle. He claimed that his 

cell phone had been stolen by the time he returned.

¶26 Wall could not tell the officers what he had done between 

8:00 p.m. on September 26, 2011, and 6:45 a.m. the following day.

¶27 After interviewing Wall, the detectives had photographs 

taken of Wall’s injuries and had a technician take his 

fingerprints. Wall was not arrested, and a detective arranged a 

ride home for him. One of the detectives testified at trial that

Wall was “surprised” that he was being released and asked, 

“[S]o I’m not going to jail?” When the detective said he was not, 

Wall responded, “[B]ut I’m a monster.”

Wall’s Conduct Following Uta’s Death

¶28 When Wall returned home from his interview with the 

detectives at around 2:30 a.m., he bluntly told the children,

“Uta’s dead and they think I did it.” He told the youngest 

daughter “not to leave him alone because he was scared he 

would do something he would regret.” Wall curled up “in the 

fetal position” and cried. He started “babbling and rambling” 

and “saying things along the line of: ‘Am I a monster? Only a 

monster could have done this. How do I know what I do when 

I’m asleep? What if I did it and I don’t remember?’” The children 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 11 2020 UT App 36

and family friends testified that Wall repeatedly referred to 

himself as a monster in the days following Uta’s death. The 

eldest son explained that Wall’s ramblings made him “question[] 

[Wall’s] involvement in [his] mother’s death.”

¶29 One of the children called a family friend to help Wall.

Wall told this friend, “Uta is dead and they think I did it . . . .” 

When she asked him, “[D]id you do these things that—that the 

police said you did?” Wall responded, “If I did them, I don’t 

remember.” When this friend started looking for some of Wall’s 

medications, he told her that he had been “sleeping outside 

recently” and that “the dog scratched him on his face.” She 

asked him, “Why are you telling me this?” And then he showed 

her his eye. The friend noticed other scratches and “gouges” on

Wall’s body, which he quickly covered up. Because Wall was so 

“distraught,” the friend wanted to offer him a sedative and 

asked him if he was familiar with Xanax. Even though he was a 

medical doctor and had twice prescribed himself Xanax after his 

divorce from Uta, Wall claimed not to know what it was. After 

the friend explained Xanax’s purpose, Wall claimed to remember

recently prescribing his mother Xanax “because she’s afraid to 

fly.” Wall then started telling the friend that “[a]ll he wanted 

was for Uta to be happy . . . and that’s all he ever wanted,” 

which the friend found to be “unusual because [she] felt like he 

was very angry at Uta” and did not believe that Wall really 

wanted her to be happy.

¶30 That same morning, Wall checked himself into a 

psychiatric facility where he stayed for about a week. While he 

was receiving treatment, the eldest son and a family friend 

visited him and asked him questions about Uta’s death. During 

this conversation, Wall asked his son, “If the police found my 

phone there [at Uta’s house,] what could I say to refute that?”

¶31 After Wall’s release from psychiatric treatment, the 

children resumed living with him, but his behavior changed. 

Over time, Wall restricted the children’s communication with 

Uta’s family and the boyfriend. Wall told the children that the 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 12 2020 UT App 36

boyfriend should have “come to him and comforted him in his 

time of need,” and therefore the boyfriend should not be allowed 

to communicate with the children. (Emphasis added.) Wall also 

began telling his children that Uta committed suicide and told 

the youngest son, “[M]aybe it’s better that she’s dead.” He 

became more “confrontational,” “aggressive and intimidating” 

toward the children regarding Uta’s death. The eldest son 

moved out of Wall’s house the day after an “uncomfortable 

incident” in January 2012, in which Wall asked him “what [he] 

knew about [his] mom’s death” and “what attorneys [he] had 

contacted.” By May of that year, the three other children were 

also no longer living with Wall.

¶32 After Uta’s death, the eldest son went to Uta’s house to 

collect the children’s photo albums to send them to Uta’s family 

in Germany. He could not enter the house on his own because 

the spare key that was normally left outside for the children was 

missing and never found. After receiving help from the 

boyfriend to gain access to the house, the eldest son retrieved the

albums and sent them to Germany. The eldest son informed 

Wall that he had sent the photo albums to Germany and that 

Wall would receive copies of the albums. In November 2012, 

Wall sued the eldest son for conversion and demanded to have 

the photo albums returned to him. In response, the eldest son 

filed a counterclaim against Wall for Uta’s wrongful death.

Wall’s Second Version of the Events of September 26 and 27

¶33 At a hearing on the wrongful death claim, at which Wall 

was present, the lead detective testified that he was actively 

investigating Uta’s death as a homicide and that Wall was the 

primary suspect. He further testified that “DNA samples had 

been submitted to [a] lab for testing” and that those results were 

still pending.

¶34 After this hearing, Wall was deposed and asked about his 

whereabouts between September 26 and 27. During his 

deposition, Wall offered new details to account for how his or 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 13 2020 UT App 36

Uta’s DNA might have transferred to the areas tested by police. 

For instance, police took a swatch of fabric from the driver’s side 

back seat where Wall had pointed out a spot at the carwash. 

Wall volunteered that, when he picked up the children from 

Uta’s house the night before her death, Uta had opened the 

driver’s side rear passenger door to hug the youngest daughter.

Wall also claimed, for the first time, that he had caught Uta

walking out of his garage later that night. Wall said he pursued 

Uta and “[s]he turned around and hit [him] in the face” and 

might have scratched him. He claimed that Uta had broken into 

his basement “multiple times in the previous months,” but that 

he never reported it to the police.

¶35 Although the DNA results were still pending, counsel 

deposing Wall asked him, “Why is your DNA in Uta’s

bedroom?” He said he did not know if his DNA was there, but 

that Uta had invited him into her bedroom before “to seduce 

[him],” although he declined her advances. He could not 

remember when she last invited him into her bedroom but said 

that it could have been one or two months before her death.

¶36 Wall also testified in his deposition that Uta attempted 

suicide once on their honeymoon in 1991 and again while she 

was pregnant with their youngest son. But Wall said that he 

never reported either suicide attempt2 or helped Uta seek 

counseling or treatment.

¶37 Finally, Wall gave a different version of events regarding 

his whereabouts on September 27, 2011, than what he told the 

detectives. This time, Wall explained that after allegedly chasing 

Uta away and being hit by her in the face, he went back inside

his house to sleep. He woke up around 5:00 a.m. and decided to 

go to the hospital to work on his patients’ charts but realized that 

he forgot his identification and could not enter the hospital. Wall 

 

2. Wall claimed to have told Uta’s father, but Uta’s father had 

died before Uta and therefore could not corroborate this claim.
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 14 2020 UT App 36

said he decided to go for a hike up a nearby canyon before the 

sun rose and before going to the carwash facility and then to 

work. Unlike the story he told at his police interview, this 

version of events did not include Wall being at home that 

morning with the two youngest children and the newly 

purchased eggs before school, even though the youngest 

children testified to that effect.

The Investigation

¶38 While Wall was getting psychiatric treatment in 

September 2011, Uta’s body was sent to a medical examiner to 

perform an autopsy. Although some of the officers believed 

there could have been foul play and that her death appeared 

suspicious, an investigator’s report provided to the medical 

examiner said her death was “a probable suicide overdose.” The 

medical examiner later testified that, had the “case been 

presented . . . as a suspicious death or homicide,” he would have 

taken more photographs of the body and conducted a more 

thorough examination. The medical examiner noted “sharp force 

injuries on her left wrist . . . in three separate locations,” a bruise 

on her lip, an abrasion on her cheek, and a laceration to her 

lower leg. Uta also had internal hemorrhages in her neck, which 

could have been sustained by a “broad and/or soft blunt object 

being applied in that location,” and petechiae (burst capillaries)

in her right eye, each of which were consistent with 

strangulation. Uta had a near-lethal dose of Xanax in her system, 

but there were no pill remnants in her stomach. The medical 

examiner was “not looking specifically for an injection site 

anywhere,” because the case was brought to him as a probable 

suicide, but he testified that any of the injuries on Uta’s body 

“could potentially obscure an injection site” if that was how the 

Xanax got into her system. The medical examiner explained that 

the nature of Uta’s wounds was “not like anything [he] had ever 

seen in a suicide,” because they appeared to be defensive rather 

than self-inflicted, and that he had concerns that the police were

“dealing with a homicide.”
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 15 2020 UT App 36

¶39 After conducting the autopsy, the medical examiner 

concluded that Uta’s cause of death was drowning but could not 

determine the manner of death. Based on his concerns that the 

manner of death may have been homicide, the medical examiner 

asked the officers to meet with him to discuss his findings. 

Because he could not determine how the Xanax got into her 

system, he asked the officers if they were conducting further 

investigation. The sergeant in charge of the case at that time 

“basically [said] that we think this is a suicide, period.” The 

medical examiner told the officers that he was “not going to call 

this a suicide,” and that the manner of death was 

“undetermined” based on what he knew. The medical examiner 

explained that the scene of the crime was “suspicious,” that it 

appeared “more consistent with homicide than anything else,” 

and that “but for the Xanax” in Uta’s system, he “would have 

certified the death as a homicide.”

¶40 A few weeks after the medical examiner performed the 

autopsy, the investigation stalled. Between November 2011 and 

November 2012, the boyfriend, an ex-boyfriend, the eldest son, 

and some of Uta’s other family members kept pressing the police 

to investigate the case as a homicide. Finally, in November 2012,

the investigation resumed in earnest.

¶41 A crime scene reconstructionist reviewed the photographs 

taken by the investigators the night Uta’s body was found, 

visited Uta’s house after it had been cleaned, and reviewed the 

items collected from the scene. The reconstructionist determined

that Uta had been murdered and that the murderer had staged 

the scene to look like a suicide. The reconstructionist, who had 

special training and expertise in “blood pattern interpretation,” 

analyzed the blood patterns on Uta’s comforter and fitted sheet

and concluded that a “violent struggle” occurred and that Uta

struggled “under a restraint.” The reconstructionist also 

analyzed Uta’s bloodied tank top that had been folded and laid 

over the side of the bathtub. Although there was one saturated 

spot on the chest where it appeared Uta had held her bleeding 

wrist against her body, there was “no hand transfer” of blood 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 16 2020 UT App 36

onto the tank top where one would expect to see it if Uta had 

removed the tank top herself. The reconstructionist opined that 

the bloodstains in the bathroom under the windowsill and on 

the sink appeared to have occurred while Uta was being pushed 

into the bathroom. The bloodstains were not consistent with Uta

being “intoxicated and stumbling around her house on her own” 

because there were no apparent patterns on the walls of 

someone staggering or touching surfaces to get from the 

bedroom to the bathroom.

¶42 Forensic testing also revealed that there were bloody 

shoeprints in the bathroom and the bedroom and that there was 

a bloody spot above Uta’s headboard. These blood stains

initially went undetected because they had been cleaned up 

before the boyfriend discovered Uta’s body and first responders 

arrived at the scene. A crime scene technician discovered these 

bloodstains using a special chemical that changes color when it 

comes into contact with blood protein, which helped to make the 

“partially visible” or “faint” bloodstains in the bedroom and on 

the bathroom floor more visible.

¶43 Unlike the faint bloodstains that were overlooked by the 

first responders, dried-blood shoeprints had been immediately 

apparent in Uta’s kitchen. The crime scene reconstructionist 

explained that those stains would not have come from 

“rehydrated blood” because if the blood had dried and a person 

with a wet shoe stepped into the blood and started walking, that 

person “might get flakes . . . [or] portions” of blood, but it would 

not make a full bloody shoeprint. The reconstructionist 

concluded that the evidence showed another person had been 

present and attacked Uta and that “this scene was a homicide 

that was staged to look like a suicide.”

¶44 Investigators searched to find where the Xanax may have 

come from. Uta was never prescribed Xanax, she had never told 

anyone she had taken it, and no prescription bottle for it was 

found at her house. Even though Uta sometimes stored her 

medication in film canisters, those canisters were always labeled. 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 17 2020 UT App 36

Further, Uta kept a yearly “medicine calendar” in which she 

dutifully documented the medications she took, the amount she 

took, and her “level of wellness” related to those medications. 

Nowhere on these calendars did Uta document taking Xanax.

¶45 On the other hand, Wall had twice prescribed himself .5 

milligrams of Xanax following the divorce. And, just four 

months before Uta’s death, Wall wrote a prescription for the 

highest dosage of immediate release Xanax, which is 2 

milligrams, and filled that prescription at a pharmacy that he 

had never used before or since. Wall claimed that he filled this 

prescription for his mother who lived in California, but in their 

initial interviews with investigators, Wall’s parents could not 

confirm whether they ever received such a medication.

¶46 At the crime scene, the investigators collected, among 

other things, a pillowcase and scrapings from underneath Uta’s 

fingernails to be tested for DNA evidence. Using different 

techniques, investigators extracted DNA samples from each of 

these items. The forensic analysis revealed that Wall was a 

possible contributor to the DNA located on the pillowcase, but 

Wall could not be included or excluded as a possible contributor 

to the male DNA located under Uta’s fingernails. Uta’s exboyfriend, the boyfriend, and the first responders were all 

excluded as possible contributors to the DNA located under 

Uta’s fingernails.

¶47 More than two years after Uta’s death, the State charged 

Wall with murder. During the four-week jury trial, the State 

presented the evidence detailed above. The jury also heard, 

among other things, from two forensic pathologists who were 

given Uta’s autopsy report with photographs, police reports, 

crime scene photographs, crime laboratory reports, photographs 

of Wall’s face taken on September 27, 2011, the report from 

Wall’s eye doctor, the preliminary hearing testimony of the 

medical examiner, and Uta’s healthcare reports. Both agreed that 

Uta’s wounds to her wrists and leg were not self-inflicted and 

were instead defensive wounds. They both determined that, 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 18 2020 UT App 36

although there was a near-lethal dose of Xanax in her system, the 

low level of Xanax in Uta’s stomach was consistent with either 

the drug being injected into her body or swallowed as a slurry—

meaning that the pills had been crushed and mixed with a 

liquid. Both of the forensic pathologists concluded that Uta’s 

manner of death was homicide.

¶48 The jury convicted Wall of murder. Wall now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶49 Wall argues that the evidence of guilt was insufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict “because the inference that [Wall] 

killed [Uta] is less likely than the inference that [Uta] killed 

herself, whether accidentally or intentionally.” “In considering 

an insufficiency-of-evidence claim, we review the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 

favorable to the verdict.” State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 15, 345 P.3d 

1195 (cleaned up). “We will reverse only when the evidence, so 

viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was 

convicted.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶50 Wall next argues that the district court erroneously 

admitted certain DNA evidence through expert testimony. We 

review the district court’s decision to admit expert testimony 

under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and “we will not reverse 

a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony unless the 

decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Walker v. Hansen, 

2003 UT App 237, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d 635 (cleaned up).

¶51 Wall also argues that his trial counsel “was ineffective for 

failing to object when the State mischaracterized the DNA 

results” in closing argument. “An ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a

question of law. In such a situation, there is no lower court 

ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant was 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 19 2020 UT App 36

deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of 

law.” State v. Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136, ¶ 17, 449 P.3d 223

(cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶52 Wall argues that “the evidence is insufficient to exclude 

reasonable doubt.” Specifically, he argues that “the State’s 

construal of circumstantial evidence . . . that [Uta] was attacked, 

restrained, and injected with Xanax, all without leaving restraint 

marks on her body or any DNA evidence . . . was physically 

possible,” but “it [was] not the most reasonable explanation.” 

Instead, he claims that the most reasonable explanation is that 

Uta’s death was an accident or a suicide. 

¶53 To succeed on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the 

appellant “has the burden to marshal the evidence in support of 

the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v. 

Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 68, 345 P.3d 1195 (cleaned up). On appeal, 

we do not reweigh the evidence presented to the jury. “When 

the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves 

as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given particular evidence.” State v. Workman, 852 

P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). “Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 

not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must 

resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict.” Id.

We are thus restricted to “evaluat[ing] whether the evidence is 

so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not 

support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

¶54 Wall concedes throughout his brief that “suicide and 

homicide are at least equally probable.” He says that all of the 

evidence is “consistent with homicide” but that the same 

evidence is at least “equally consistent” with suicide and that 

some evidence is “more consistent” with suicide. In making this 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 20 2020 UT App 36

argument, Wall relies on language from State v. Cristobal, 2010 

UT App 228, 238 P.3d 1096. In that case, we suggested that

“[w]hen the evidence supports more than one possible 

conclusion, none more likely than the other, the choice of one 

possibility over another can be no more than speculation.” Id.

¶ 16. But as our supreme court has since clarified, “the fact that 

we can identify an ‘equally’ plausible alternative inference is not 

nearly enough to set [a] verdict aside.” State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 

5, ¶ 25, 349 P.3d 664. On appeal, “[t]he question presented is not 

whether some other (innocent) inference might have been 

reasonable,” but “simply whether the inference adopted by the 

jury was sustainable.” Id. ¶ 27.

¶55 Wall argues that the jury’s verdict was not based on 

reasonable inferences, but on speculation. He posits that the 

“distinction [between reasonable inferences and speculation] 

turns on whether there are equally likely interpretations of the 

evidence.” Here, because “the evidence and inferences did not 

preclude the reasonable alternative hypothesis presented by the 

defense,” he contends that the jury’s verdict was based on 

speculation, which does not constitute proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Quoting State v. Cardona-Gueton, 2012 UT 

App 336, ¶ 11, 291 P.3d 847 (cleaned up).) Despite the broad 

language used in some of our past opinions, “the law is well 

established that the existence of one or more alternate reasonable 

hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from 

concluding that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Cardona-Gueton, 2012 UT App 336, ¶ 11 (cleaned up). “It 

is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh the competing 

theories of the case, in light of the evidence presented and the 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to conclude which 

one they believe.” Id. (cleaned up). Therefore, “despite the 

existence of theoretically ‘reasonable’ hypotheses, it is within the 

province of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, 

assign weight to the evidence, and reject these alternate 

hypotheses.” State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694–95 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1995). Indeed, “a finding that a defendant is guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt is necessarily a finding that any alternative 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 21 2020 UT App 36

hypothesis of innocence presented at trial was not reasonable 

under the jury’s view of the evidence.” Cardona-Gueton, 2012 UT 

App 336, ¶ 12.

¶56 Consequently, it is not enough for Wall to show that the 

evidence would have permitted a reasonable juror to accept the 

defense’s theory that Uta’s death was an accident or suicide.

“These are fair arguments for counsel to present to the jury in 

closing.” Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 24. But once the jury has rejected 

the alternative explanation offered by the defense, “an appellate 

court will reverse such a finding only where no reasonable juror 

could have taken that view of the evidence.” Cardona-Gueton, 

2012 UT App 336, ¶ 12. “The question presented is not whether 

we can conceive of alternative (innocent) inferences to draw 

from individual pieces of evidence, or even whether we would 

have reached the verdict embraced by the jury.” Ashcraft, 2015 

UT 5, ¶ 24. Instead, it is “simply whether the jury’s verdict is 

reasonable in light of all of the evidence taken cumulatively, 

under a standard of review that yields deference to all 

reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s verdict.” Id.

¶57 The jury’s determination that Uta was murdered is well 

supported by the evidence admitted at trial. As to the crime 

scene, multiple witnesses testified that there was evidence of a 

“violent struggle.” Items throughout Uta’s bedroom were 

knocked over onto the floor and the bed, even though there was 

no blood pattern on the walls to suggest that Uta might have 

caused the disarray by stumbling around the room on her own.

The blood patterns on Uta’s comforter and sheet showed that 

Uta struggled “under a restraint.” The bloodstains under the 

bathroom windowsill and sink were consistent with Uta being 

pushed into the bathroom with blood on her hands. The lack of 

hand-transfer bloodstains on Uta’s tank top suggested that she 

had not removed it herself. And although the defense expert 

drew different conclusions from this same evidence, the weight 

to be given to such conflicting expert opinions is solely the 

province of the jury. See State v. Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 

1960).
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 22 2020 UT App 36

¶58 As to Uta’s injuries, she sustained defensive wounds on 

her arms and on the back of one of her legs, suggesting that she

tried to defend herself from an attacker. She had hemorrhaging 

in her neck and petechiae in her eye, each of which is consistent 

with strangulation. She also had male DNA under her 

fingernails, which is consistent with scratching an attacker.

¶59 Additional evidence supported the prosecution’s theory

that a second person left the home shortly after Uta had been 

subdued. The blinds in Uta’s bathroom and bedroom—which 

were normally open—had been shut, and bloody shoeprints in 

those rooms had been wiped clean, as well as a bloody spot 

above Uta’s headboard. In the kitchen, which had no blinds, no 

effort had been made to clean up dried-blood shoeprints. The 

prints did not match any of the first responders’ or the 

boyfriend’s shoes. In any event, the reconstructionist testified 

that Uta’s blood would have dried in the hours between her 

death and the discovery of her body and that the prints were 

inconsistent with the later transfer of rehydrated blood.

Evidence that someone had tracked fresh blood through the 

kitchen around the time of Uta’s death and had tried to clean up 

blood in those rooms where the activity could take place behind 

closed blinds was strong evidence supporting the jury’s 

conclusion that Uta was murdered.

¶60 Other evidence further undercut the defense’s theory that 

Uta’s death was a suicide or accidental overdose. Without 

exception, the witnesses who knew Uta testified that she was not 

suicidal. To the contrary, she was excited about a breakthrough 

at work, was looking forward to an upcoming trip with the 

younger children, and was making plans up until the night 

before her death. And although there was a near-lethal dose of

Xanax found in Uta’s system, there was no evidence that Uta

had ever been prescribed or taken Xanax, and no prescription 

bottles or labeled film canisters for the drug were found at Uta’s 

house. In addition, there were no pill remnants in her stomach 

that would account for the concentration of Xanax in her system, 

supporting the prosecution’s theory that Uta was either injected 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 23 2020 UT App 36

with or forced to swallow a slurry containing a high 

concentration of Xanax.

¶61 Two forensic pathologists reviewed all of the relevant 

reports from the police, medical practitioners, and the autopsy

and testified that the cause of death was homicide. Even the 

medical examiner, who had been told that Uta’s death was “a 

probable suicide overdose,” found the evidence to be “more 

consistent with homicide than anything else,” refused “to call 

this a suicide,” and “would have certified the death as a 

homicide” had it not been for the ambiguity created by the 

Xanax in Uta’s system. The medical examiner’s uncertainty was 

understandable because, as the crime scene reconstructionist

explained, “this scene was a homicide that was staged to look 

like a suicide.” Based on all of this evidence, a reasonable 

jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Uta was 

murdered.

¶62 There was also sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

determination that Wall was the murderer. Wall had a 

well-established motive to kill Uta. They were involved in an 

acrimonious ongoing custody dispute, and those familiar with 

him knew that Wall “despised” Uta. He often complained that 

she made his “life difficult” and blamed her for his unhappiness.

Mere days before Uta’s body was discovered, Wall informed a 

new acquaintance that he was “getting his kids back.” And after 

her death, Wall told their youngest son that “maybe it’s better 

that she’s dead.”

¶63 Wall also had the opportunity to commit the murder. He 

could not account for his whereabouts around the time of Uta’s 

death. In his first police interview, Wall told the detectives that 

he had gone to a gas station near his house to purchase eggs 

between 6:45 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. and then returned home to make 

breakfast. But his older children indicated that he was already 

gone when they awoke for school around 6:00 a.m. and had not 

returned by the time the eldest son left for school at 7:30 a.m. In 

a deposition more than a year later, he claimed that he woke up 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 24 2020 UT App 36

early and went to the hospital to work on charts, even though a 

hospital witness testified that doctors know that they cannot 

access the medical records office before 8:00 a.m. Wall claimed 

that he could not access the hospital because he had forgotten his 

identification and then decided to go on a pre-dawn hike, 

despite having left no word for his children, as had been his 

practice. No one could corroborate his whereabouts between the 

time the children went to bed the night before and 7:05 a.m. the 

next morning when he was spotted driving his car some distance 

from his house.3 He later appeared for work disheveled and 

wearing the same clothes as the day before as if he had not been 

home to sleep or get ready for work. Not only did Wall have the 

time and opportunity to commit the murder, the jury had ample 

reason to find his evolving story incredible.

¶64 The lack of forced entry at Uta’s home also supported the 

conclusion that the crime was not committed by a stranger. 

When Uta’s body was discovered, the door to her house was 

unlocked, even though Uta always locked it before bed. The 

eldest son testified that Uta kept a spare key hidden outside the 

house for the children and that the key was missing after Uta’s 

 

3. On appeal, Wall makes much of the fact that the autopsy 

report did not document any changes to Uta’s skin, known as 

“washerwoman syndrome,” from having been immersed in 

water for a long period of time. Wall argues that the absence of 

such evidence conclusively proves that Uta’s death occurred 

shortly before her body was found in the evening rather than 

during the early morning hours when Wall had no alibi. But the 

medical examiner testified that, although he did not note 

washerwoman changes in his report, he had not been looking for 

them because the death had not been presented as a possible 

homicide. And there was conflicting testimony from defense and 

State experts about whether washerwoman changes could be 

seen in the autopsy photographs. The jury could reasonably 

conclude that the apparent absence of washerwoman syndrome 

was entitled to less weight than the defense believed it deserved.
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 25 2020 UT App 36

death. The jury could reasonably infer that Wall knew of the 

spare key and used it to enter the house on the night of the 

murder.

¶65 Wall also had access to the drug used to subdue Uta. In 

fact, he had recently written a prescription for the highest dose 

of Xanax, purportedly for his mother who lived in California,

although she could not confirm receiving it. The jury could 

reasonably conclude that Wall filled the prescription at a 

pharmacy that he had not used before or since (and later feigned 

ignorance of the drug) to make it harder to link him to the drug 

he used in the course of killing Uta.

¶66 The jury could also reasonably conclude that Wall’s 

behavior and statements showed consciousness of guilt. When 

the police asked him if he killed Uta, he responded with

equivocal statements such as, “I don’t know, I don’t think I did 

it,” “I don’t think I was there,” and “If I did it, I made a mistake, 

and I am sorry. But I don’t think I did it.” When Wall was 

released after the police interview, he was surprised and said, 

“[B]ut I’m a monster.” When he returned home, Wall announced 

to the children, “Uta’s dead and they think I did it.” Rather than 

comfort the children, Wall acted “distraught,” curled into the 

fetal position and cried, and forced the children to take care of 

him because “he was scared he would do something he would 

regret.” He kept calling himself a monster and repeatedly asked 

the children, “What if I did it and I don’t remember?”

¶67 Furthermore, Wall volunteered implausible explanations 

for physical evidence that might connect him to the crime. Even 

before Uta’s body was discovered, Wall tried to explain the 

scratch on his eye by telling everyone that he had recently 

started sleeping on his porch and that his dog scratched him

while he slept. No one ever saw him sleep on the porch, and no 

one had ever seen the dog scratch anyone. And to those who 

testified, the scratch to Wall’s eye looked like it was caused by a 

fingernail. Wall also had scratches on his arms and legs that he

quickly covered up when people noticed. When interviewed by 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 26 2020 UT App 36

police, he was vague about the last time he had seen or touched 

Uta and whether he might have been in her house around the 

time of her death. He told the police that his cell phone was

stolen from his unsecured car that same day but later asked his 

eldest son, “If the police found my phone [at Uta’s house] what 

could I say to refute that?”

¶68 Significantly, Wall offered new explanations when he 

knew that DNA test results were pending. When he was 

deposed in the wrongful death lawsuit, Wall offered a new story

that would explain why his DNA might be found under Uta’s 

fingernails. For the first time, Wall claimed that he had not only 

seen Uta again after picking up the children on the night of her 

death, but that the two of them had gotten into an altercation 

and that she had struck him in the face. He also claimed that she 

had once tried to seduce him in her bedroom, which could 

explain why his DNA might be found at the crime scene. And 

Wall took care to mention that Uta had leaned into the back seat 

of his car the night before her death to give their daughter a hug, 

touching the part of the seat that the investigators collected to 

search for DNA evidence, although her DNA ultimately was not 

found in that sample. The jury could reasonably infer that Wall 

offered these explanations because he knew that the results of 

the DNA testing could link him to the crime.

¶69 While this summary is by no means an exhaustive review 

of all of the evidence supporting Wall’s guilt, it is more than 

sufficient to demonstrate that the jury’s verdict was supported 

by substantial evidence. This is not a case in which the evidence 

was so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not 

support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State 

presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion 

that Uta was murdered and that Wall was her murderer.

II. Admissibility of DNA Evidence

¶70 Wall next argues that the district court should have 

excluded the DNA evidence that was extracted from Uta’s
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 27 2020 UT App 36

pillowcase because “the State failed to make the threshold 

showing that [the forensic laboratory’s] methodology was 

reliable or reliably applied” under rule 702(b) of the Utah Rules 

of Evidence. Rule 702(b) provides that “[s]cientific, technical or 

other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert 

testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles 

or methods that are underlying the testimony” are “reliable,” 

“based upon sufficient facts or data,” and “have been reliably

applied to the facts.” Utah R. Evid. 702(b).

¶71 In applying rule 702(b), the district court “performs an 

important gatekeeping function, intended to ensure that only 

reliable expert testimony will be presented to the jury.” Gunn 

Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 

UT App 20, ¶ 31, 269 P.3d 980. But this function is “limited” to 

“ensuring a minimal ‘threshold’ of reliability for the knowledge 

that serves as the basis of an expert’s opinion” and must not 

“displace the province of the factfinder to weigh the evidence.”

State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1195 (cleaned up). 

Although “the line between assessing reliability and weighing 

evidence can be elusive,” appellate courts “must be mindful of 

this important distinction because the factfinder bears the 

ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability, 

and weight of the testimony.” Id. (cleaned up). “When 

performing their gatekeeping function, judges should approach 

expert testimony with rational skepticism. But the degree of 

scrutiny that should be applied to expert testimony by trial 

judges is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or 

other specialized principles or methods that are free of 

controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test 

reliability.” Gunn Hill Dairy Props., 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 32 

(cleaned up).

¶72 Before trial, Wall moved to exclude, among other things, 

the DNA results from the pillowcase, arguing that he “should be 

excluded as a possible contributor” because some alleles were 

missing from the sample and because the “statistical probability” 

calculated by the forensic laboratory was unreliable. The district 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 28 2020 UT App 36

court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 

evidence and expert testimony met the minimum threshold of 

reliability necessary for its admission.

¶73 At that hearing, the court heard testimony from two 

experts from the forensic laboratory that conducted the DNA 

tests and one expert for the defense. All of the experts testified to

DNA composition in general and forensic DNA testing. DNA is 

made up of twenty-three pairs of chromosomes and is found in 

most cells of the human body. Twenty-two of the chromosomal 

pairs control non-sex traits (autosomal) and the twenty-third 

chromosome is sex determining—either male or female. Except 

for identical twins, no person has the same DNA as another 

person. But only one percent of human DNA differs from person 

to person based on short tandem repeats (STRs), which are 

patterns of alleles at a certain locus within human DNA. “At 

each given locus, you would expect to see two alleles because 

you get one from your mother and one from your father.” But 

sometimes there is only one allele at a given locus, which occurs 

“when you get the same [allele] from both your mother and your 

father.” Forensic DNA analysts focus on these patterns to 

discover the identity of the source of the DNA.

¶74 When conducting an autosomal STR analysis, as was 

done in this case, the forensic analyst targets sixteen of the 

individualized STR locations along the twenty-two autosomal 

chromosomes. There are five steps to the test: extraction,

quantification (determining how much DNA was isolated at the 

targeted sixteen loci), amplification (creating copies of the DNA 

sample by splitting the DNA “ladder” down the middle and 

re-bonding the DNA to create a sufficient number of copies of 

the sample for testing), the actual testing (using florescent dye 

and an electrophoresis machine), and analysis.

¶75 The experts further explained that, during the testing 

stage, the analyst injects the DNA with fluorescent dye and runs

it through an electrophoresis machine, which measures the 

alleles’ fluorescence in “relative fluorescence units” (RFUs). 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 29 2020 UT App 36

Then, a software program creates a graph of this data and 

shows the “peaks” of each allele (i.e., the strength of the 

fluorescence) at the sixteen tested loci. The peaks will appear 

taller or shorter depending on how much DNA is present at that 

allele and a taller peak means it “has more DNA.” If an allele 

reaches a peak of fifty RFUs, then it has reached the “analytical 

threshold” and the analyst can rely on that as a match of alleles 

on that locus between the crime-scene sample and the possiblecontributor sample. If an allele’s peak is below fifty RFUs, it is 

unclear whether the allele represents DNA or “background 

noise.”

¶76 After providing this background, the analysts from the 

forensic laboratory (the State’s experts) then testified directly to 

the DNA samples and comparisons in this case. Relevant to the 

sample collected from the pillowcase using the M-Vac process,4

the State’s experts found that Wall’s entire autosomal STR 

profile was present in that sample, but that three of the alleles 

were detected below the analytical threshold. Because three 

alleles did not meet the analytical threshold, the State’s experts

followed the laboratory’s policy to conduct a second 

amplification test to see if the results were reproduced. The 

second test produced the same results,5 and the analysts 

determined that Wall could not be excluded as a possible 

contributor because a “repeat” event “gives more credence or 

 

4. According to expert testimony, “[a]n M-Vac is basically like a 

DNA wet vac[uum]” that has a “buffer” in it that will not 

degrade or harm the DNA sample. The M-Vac soaks the targeted 

area and then “sucks up the liquid.” The liquid is “run through a 

series of filters” to extract the DNA from the targeted area for 

forensic analysis.

5. One of the alleles that was above the analytical threshold in 

the first test was below the threshold in the second test. But the 

State’s experts explained in great detail why this could occur and 

why it did not undermine their confidence in that allele.
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 30 2020 UT App 36

reliability to that event.” The State’s experts explained that a 

finding that a person cannot be excluded as a possible 

contributor does not mean that the person is an “actual” 

contributor. The defense’s expert disagreed with the laboratory’s 

policy to retest the sample and concluded that any DNA sample 

with an allele that does not reach the analytical threshold should 

amount to an exclusion of the individual as a possible 

contributor to the sample.

¶77 Following the hearing, the court issued a detailed written 

order denying Wall’s motion to exclude the evidence. The court 

explained that although the director of the forensic laboratory 

determined that there was “questionable activity” with respect 

to alleles on three loci within the DNA sample, it is the 

laboratory’s policy “not to disregard it.” Instead, the director 

determined that these results showed that Wall could not be 

excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA sample because

the three loci where the alleles were recorded “below the 

analytic threshold at the points where [Wall’s] alleles should 

have been” showed that “it is possible these loci could contain” 

Wall’s alleles based on the results of the repeat amplification. 

The court found that many laboratories have similar policies and 

that this particular laboratory’s “policy has been subjected to 

third party assessment and has been approved by auditing

companies and at least one previous director of the lab.” The 

court explained that although there was conflicting expert 

testimony from the State and the defense regarding the 

reliability of the results of this DNA sample, it was “not the 

court’s role to decide which expert is correct,” and the court

determined that Wall’s “objection to this evidence is a matter of 

weight rather than reliability.” The court concluded that the 

State “made a threshold showing of reliability” and admitted the 

evidence.

¶78 On appeal, Wall asserts that the forensic laboratory’s 

“director . . . testified that the [laboratory’s] method of including 

[Wall] as a possible contributor was unreliable.” But as articulated 

above, the director testified that data below the analytical 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 31 2020 UT App 36

threshold is “not reliable” with respect to conclusively including 

or excluding an individual for statistical purposes, but that the 

laboratory is “not going to put blinders on and just completely 

ignore it.” This is because the presence of “some activity” or 

“amplification” at these loci shows that something is “detected.”

The director explained that ignoring the below-threshold 

information with respect to certain alleles and excluding an 

individual as a possible contributor can make “exclusion 

inaccurate.”

¶79 Wall also asserts that the “State did not demonstrate 

that . . . [the laboratory’s] methods were reliable and reliably 

applied to include [Wall] as a possible contributor.” But the

district court made specific findings that the laboratory’s policy

against excluding a person where a possible match is detected 

below analytical thresholds is consistent with the practice of

other laboratories and that recent audits and third-party 

assessments have approved this policy. The district court acted 

well within its discretion in relying on this evidence to conclude 

that the laboratory’s methods met the minimum threshold of 

reliability.

¶80 We therefore conclude that Wall has not shown that the 

district court exceeded its discretion when it admitted the DNA 

evidence and expert testimony under rule 702(b) of the Utah 

Rules of Evidence.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶81 Finally, Wall argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to object to the prosecutors’ statements in closing 

argument that he asserts misconstrued the DNA evidence.6 To 

 

6. In his opening brief, Wall argued that trial counsel was also 

ineffective for failing to object to certain statements elicited on 

direct examination of the State’s expert witnesses. But at oral 

argument, appellate counsel conceded that “the issue about the 

(continued...)
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 32 2020 UT App 36

prove that trial counsel was ineffective, Wall must show that 

trial “counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 

objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,” and 

“that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.” State v. 

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 19, 12 P.3d 92; see also Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). The “failure to establish 

either prong of the test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim.” State v. Torres, 2018 UT App 113, ¶ 14, 427 P.3d 

550 (cleaned up). Consequently, “there is no reason for a court 

deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both 

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 

showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Here, Wall has not 

shown that his counsel performed deficiently.

¶82 When we review a claim of deficient performance, we 

“presume[] that counsel has rendered adequate assistance,” and 

“if the challenged act or omission might be considered sound 

trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of 

counsel.” State v. Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, ¶ 8, 46 P.3d 761 

(cleaned up). “When we review an attorney’s failure to object to 

a prosecutor’s statements during closing argument, the question 

is not whether the prosecutor’s comments were proper, but 

whether they were so improper that counsel’s only defensible choice 

was to interrupt those comments with an objection.” State v. 

Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 76, 353 P.3d 55 (cleaned up). This is 

because “counsel for both sides have considerable latitude in 

their closing arguments. They have the right to fully discuss 

 

(...continued)

DNA is all about closing argument and closing argument only.” 

This court asked the clarifying question, “Your [ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim] is failure to object during closing 

arguments, not the failure to object during the expert 

testimony?” And appellate counsel responded, “That’s right.” 

We therefore do not address whether trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object during direct examination of the 

State’s expert witnesses.
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 33 2020 UT App 36

from their perspectives the evidence and all inferences and 

deductions it supports.” Id. (cleaned up). “Moreover, a 

prosecutor has the duty and right to argue the case based on the 

total picture shown by the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Through

this lens, we review the three points in the State’s closing 

arguments to which Wall claims any reasonably competent trial

counsel would have lodged an objection.

¶83 First, Wall challenges a statement made by the prosecutor 

in the first part of the State’s closing arguments. The prosecutor 

stated, “We have male DNA being found under [Uta’s] righthand fingernail clippings. I would submit to you it was as if 

[Uta] was standing in this courtroom and pointing to [Wall] as 

her killer.” Wall argues that this statement violated the court’s 

order related to DNA evidence, which informed the parties that 

they could not use the DNA evidence to show conclusively that 

he was the contributor to the DNA, and therefore trial counsel 

was deficient in failing to object to it. The prosecutor correctly 

noted that male DNA was found under Uta’s fingernail, not that 

Wall’s DNA was underneath her fingernail, but essentially told 

the jury that the reasonable inference was that Wall’s DNA was 

under Uta’s fingernail. Assuming without deciding that this 

statement was improper, trial counsel may have based his 

decision to forgo an objection on sound trial strategy, choosing 

instead to undermine the State’s characterization of the

fingernail-DNA evidence in his own closing argument. This is 

exactly what trial counsel did. Trial counsel argued that the 

DNA evidence was “just meaningless,” it “doesn’t prove 

anything” because Wall was excluded as a possible contributor 

to some of the DNA samples, the DNA test results were 

“unreliable,” and the DNA evidence “doesn’t put [Wall] in 

[Uta’s] house.” We therefore conclude counsel was not deficient 

in failing to object to the State’s characterization of the fingernailDNA evidence. See State v. King, 2012 UT App 203, ¶ 14, 283 P.3d 

980 (explaining that counsel performs deficiently only where 

there is no “conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions” 

(cleaned up)).
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 34 2020 UT App 36

¶84 Next, Wall argues that in the State’s rebuttal closing 

argument, the prosecutor improperly told the jury that it was in 

a better position to determine Uta’s cause of death because the 

medical examiner who wrote the report “didn’t know about all 

the DNA work” and that counsel should have objected to that 

statement. The challenged statement was a direct response to 

statements made by Wall’s trial counsel in his closing argument. 

Specifically, Wall’s counsel made the following argument:

Here’s the part you guys have been waiting for, the 

conclusion. There’s been a lot of evidence 

introduced here. And we’ve heard a lot of evidence 

about the relationship of two people, about their 

lives, their mental states, their problems. You’ve 

heard a lot of evidence about forensics, about shoe 

identification, blood stains and pathology. But the 

most critical testimony in this case, the most critical 

input came from the state medical examiner.

He went on to explain that the medical examiner’s testimony 

was key because it “indicated that [Uta’s death] was either a 

homicide or suicide” and that the medical examiner’s “opinions 

were affected by the presence of Xanax in [Uta’s] body.” The 

defense theory was that the medical examiner’s inability to 

conclude one way or the other “establishe[d] reasonable doubt.”

¶85 In rebuttal, the prosecutor opened with the following 

response:

I’d like to start first with the last thing that was 

said [in trial counsel’s closing argument], the 

critical piece of evidence was the medical 

examiner. And I want you to remember what the 

medical examiner said because you all have a 

better position than he did when he wrote that 

report. He said he didn’t have [Uta’s] medical and 

mental health records. He didn’t know about all 

the DNA work. He didn’t know about all the 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 35 2020 UT App 36

witnesses that [testified]. You, ladies and 

gentlemen, know more about this case than he did 

when he wrote his report . . . . You know 

everything. You know all the witnesses who said 

she was not suicidal, that she didn’t do this. And so 

you can confidently find this individual guilty.

¶86 The prosecutor’s statement that the medical examiner 

“didn’t know about all the DNA work” is an accurate 

characterization of the evidence. The medical examiner testified 

that he did not have all of Uta’s medical records, all of the police 

reports or witness statements, the crime scene reconstructionist’s 

report, the bloodstain expert reports, or “any of the DNA reports 

that had been done.” Moreover, the prosecutor’s statement did

not suggest, as Wall claims, that the DNA evidence alone 

conclusively established that Uta had been murdered. Instead, 

the prosecutor pointed to “everything” the jury heard during the 

trial that the medical examiner did not know, including not just 

the DNA evidence, but also information about Uta’s medical and 

mental health records and the testimony of numerous witnesses 

offered during the four-week trial. In context, the prosecutor’s 

argument neither misstated the evidence nor overemphasized 

the importance of the admittedly inconclusive DNA evidence. 

As a result, any objection made by trial counsel to this statement 

would have been futile and did not constitute deficient 

performance. See State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, ¶ 7, 131 

P.3d 864 (“It is well settled that counsel’s performance at trial is 

not deficient if counsel refrains from making futile objections, 

motions, or requests.”).

¶87 Wall also argues that trial counsel should have objected to 

the prosecutor’s statements about DNA found on Uta’s 

comforter. One of the forensic laboratory’s analysts testified that 

the laboratory collected DNA using different methods on five 

areas of Uta’s comforter and submitted them for testing. Four of 

the test results either excluded Wall or were inconclusive for 

male DNA. The fifth test included Wall as possible contributor. 

The analyst also conceded on cross-examination that, based on 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 36 2020 UT App 36

the results of the test, all four children’s alleles are accounted for 

[and Wall’s] alleles are accounted for” in that sample. Wall 

contends that the prosecutor erroneously “insisted the DNA 

must be from [Wall] rather than the Wall children” because the 

State mischaracterized how the DNA samples were collected 

from the comforter when it said that the DNA came from 

“pinpoint location[s].”

¶88 As an initial matter, we note that trial counsel moved to 

exclude all of the DNA evidence prior to trial based on 

“inaccurate statistical evidence for DNA mixtures” but later 

withdrew that motion with respect to the DNA collected from 

Uta’s comforter. Trial counsel chose instead to advance the 

theory at trial—through the defense’s own expert testimony and 

through cross-examination of the State’s experts—that there was 

a “possibility of all of the children being [contributors]” to some 

of the DNA samples, including the comforter, and therefore “it’s 

impossible to determine if [Wall’s] DNA is in that sample.” Trial 

counsel reiterated this point in closing argument:

Now [the State] is probably going to talk to you 

about if [Wall’s] and [Uta’s] allele charts are both 

present, if their genetic patterns are both there, 

then all the kids are going to be there too. Use your 

common sense. You have four kids living in the 

house and [Uta] living in the house . . . . Whose 

DNA is going to be on the comforter? The people 

living in the house.

. . . .

And if you remember the hypothetical that I gave 

to [the State’s expert] that if all the children used 

the towel when they’d been out hiking or sweating 

and had DNA placed in the towel . . . to a sufficient 

degree that it could be tested, that even if [Wall] 

was in Australia, . . . he would be found to be a 

possible contributor.
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 37 2020 UT App 36

¶89 In the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor

reminded the jury that the two eldest children testified they had 

“never been on [Uta’s] bed for a long time . . . [s]o their DNA 

won’t be there.” He also said that the DNA was not “all over the 

comforter” and was instead at “a very pinpoint location.” He 

further explained:

That’s where you are going to find [Wall’s] DNA. 

And it’s not going to be because the children were 

there, because you need to have all four children to 

be on that same spot. And you’re going to tell me 

that at these particular locations all four children 

went and equally touched that spot to make that 

combination? That’s ridiculous. The more likely 

and the real reasonable [explanation] is that one 

person touched it, and it’s [Wall].

¶90 It is unclear why trial counsel would be deficient for 

failing to object to the very argument that he forecasted for the 

jury in his own closing argument. Trial counsel had already 

presented a counterargument to the State’s theory by providing 

the jury an alternative explanation for why certain DNA samples 

could have included Wall’s DNA without Wall having ever 

touched the relevant items. And trial counsel reiterated at many 

points throughout trial and in closing argument that the DNA 

evidence was “meaningless” because Wall was excluded as a 

possible contributor to some of the DNA samples and that he 

should have been excluded as a possible contributor to other 

DNA samples because the laboratory’s methods were 

“unreliable.” Trial counsel’s strategy related to this DNA 

evidence was clear, and his strategic decision not to object to the 

State’s alternative characterization of this same evidence was not 

deficient.

¶91 Further, any objection to the prosecutor’s statement 

would have been futile. See Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, ¶ 7. Just 

as trial counsel was free to argue that it was more reasonable 

that the children’s DNA had combined on the comforter to 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 38 2020 UT App 36

create a sample that happened to be consistent with Wall’s DNA, 

the State was free to argue that it was more likely that a single 

person, Wall, was the contributor. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 76

(recognizing that “counsel for both sides have considerable 

latitude in their closing arguments,” that “they have the right to 

fully discuss from their perspectives the evidence and all 

inferences and deductions it supports,” and that the State has 

“the duty and right to argue the case based on the total picture 

shown by the evidence” (cleaned up)).

¶92 Relatedly, Wall has not persuaded us that trial counsel 

was deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor’s statement 

that the DNA was extracted at a “pinpoint location” and that all 

of the children would have had to touch that exact spot. The 

State’s expert testified that the DNA was collected via M-Vac 

only on the locations where there were bloodstains. Thus, the 

samples were not drawn from the entire comforter, as Wall 

suggests. And trial counsel could have reasonably determined 

that objecting would have been futile and would have drawn 

greater attention to that evidence. See Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 

71, ¶ 7; see also State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶ 39, 247 P.3d 344 (noting 

“that avoidance of drawing the jury’s attention to certain facts or 

over-emphasizing aspects of the facts is a well recognized trial 

strategy”).

¶93 “The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade 

counsel’s performance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

697 (1984). Instead, we “must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. at 689. In this case, Wall has not 

shown “that the challenged actions cannot be considered sound 

strategy under the circumstances.” See State v. Torres, 2018 UT 

App 113, ¶ 16, 427 P.3d 550 (cleaned up).

CONCLUSION

¶94 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support 

Wall’s murder conviction. We further conclude that the district 
State v. Wall

20151017-CA 39 2020 UT App 36

court did not exceed its discretion in admitting certain DNA 

evidence because the State made the threshold showing that the 

forensic laboratory’s methods and policies were reliable. Finally, 

Wall has not persuaded us that his trial counsel performed 

deficiently in failing to object to certain parts of the State’s 

closing arguments because the State did not mischaracterize the 

evidence and the arguments fairly responded to the theories 

argued by the defense.

¶95 Affirmed.