Paul Ziemer GSI letter

and 18

specifically raise this and ask other Board 19
Members the extent to which we can sort of move 20
it up in the queue, if there is a queue. 21

Page 271

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Comment? 4

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Before we leave GSI, 5

I'd like to get clarification. There are a 6
couple of -- there's some unfinished business 7
that SC&A has started that frankly for lack of 8
time, I got drafted ten days ago for work on 9
Linde, which I had not anticipated. 10

So, the air activation issue, we're 11

basically being asked to look at all portable -- 12
all other radiography sources, and the air 13
activation sort of came under that category. 14
And so, as I said, we did the analysis, but 15
haven't quite finished it to give you a result. 16

So, I would -- I mean I'm just 17

asking for direction. My plan had been to 18

submit a small White Paper on this with these -~ 19
with the conclusions and with the -- 20

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: On the air 21

activation? 22

Page 272

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. 1

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I'm 2

wondering if we shouldn't hold that until we see 3
what NIOSH does with it. Hold that in reserve 4
so that there's not at least a perception that 5
you're out in front on this. Not that you're 6
not out in front, but -- and I think Ted's 7
points are well made, but there is a perception 8
that we need to be cognizant of what -- let 9
NIOSH have a chance to see how they deal with 10
air activation. 11

Then you can easily say, "Yes, we 12

agree with this or we disagree based on our 13
analysis." 14

MCKEEL COMMENT: The take away point, however, is that SC&A was working on the
air activation issue BEFORE NIOSH had submitted any white paper on the same subject.
This fact reinforces my earlier comments that SC&A is playing an active “solver role” at
GSI that is inappropriate to its basic mission.

-({end of 10/12/11 TBD-6000 work group transcript excerpts]

si3%



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

from Stu Hinnefeld to Dan McKeel, subject -- 13
well, the subject is as it is on the email. It 14
says, “Hours Appendix BB versus new GSI White 15
Paper second request." It's dated September 16
18th. That was a reply that Stu Hinnefeld made 17
to Dan McKeel, concerning the revision process. 18

MCKEEL COMMENT: To be more specific, Mr. Hinnefeld stated to McKeel that NIOSH
was not planning to revise its evaluation report of SEC-00105 and that NIOSH would not
revise Appendix BB Rey. 0 2007 until the Board, SC&A and NIOSH resolyed all
outstanding issues. McKeel considered this answer to be both rigid and not client favorable
given the fact that David Allen’s October 2010 “path forward” white paper was the main
topic last October 12 that was discussed at the TBD-6000 work group meeting. Mr. Allen’s
path forward proposal outlined months or years of additional work that NIOSH must do.
Dr. Mauro of SC&A then changed the direction of the discussion and went on to another
topic (see pages 250 ff).

Page 250

DR. MAURO: I'd like to create -- 12

just put on the table another option. The way 13
we talked about these issues was that there was 14
a big basket filled with issues, all of which 15
are to be processed, and the process could be 16
somewhat protracted for some, maybe more 17
expeditious for others. 18

19
But I see it as really two baskets, 20
okay? There's that basket, where -- but there's 21

a basket of issues which are what I consider to 22

Page 251
be core issues that almost border on the kind of 1
thing -- like surrogate data. I think there's a 2

class of issues before this Work Group that 3
deals with the time period where there's no film 4
badge data. 5

There's non-destructive testing, 6

radiological examinations going on, where the 7
potential for off-normal conditions could've 8
existed without any documentation for the extent 9
to which they occurred. That's a very special 10
basket in my mind. It's a new basket, and it's 11
one that goes to the heart of the SEC issue. 12

In my opinion, that's the SEC issue. 13

All these other areas, over a very -- possibly 14
over a protracted period of time, we'll work it 15
out. We'll work it out. How long was the 16

person in the bathroom when the betatron was 17

52



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

workers at MSOE. It also highlights the obvious inadequacy of shielding to GSI workers that
was provided by the Betatron railroad track entry and exit doors and of the control room doors.
I believe the work group, SC&A and NIOSH have overlooked the inadequate shielding of the
GSI Betatron control rooms and the door between the New Betatron Building that was attached
by a causeway shielded by a thin ribbon steel door from Building 10. The facts were established
at the SC&A 10/09/07 outreach meeting. McKeel and a group of GSI workers and site experts
examined and photographed these doors in 2006 during a site visit and could find no evidence of
any lead shielding being present then or previously, The photos were shared with the Board,
Grossly inadequate shielding and protection from scattered x-rays and photons and electrons as
well as neutrons should have been weighted far more heavily as an important factor in NIOSH
and SC&A assessments of external dose to GSI Betatron operators. The computer modeling
using MCNP and ATILLA codes was based on arguably incorrect assumptions made at the input
end. Were the thin metal doors that guarded the railroad track exits and the control rooms of
both Betatron facilities factored into the analyses performed by SC&A and NIOSH, respectively?

It is time for the TBD-6000 work group to take definitive action and to vote on the GSI SEC-105
and make a firm recommendation to the full ABRWH for the Board to act on at its May meeting
in St. Louis. NIOSH should only be allowed time between now and the next TBD-6000 work
group meeting to complete their path forward white paper #2 (the actual work plan).

Talso request that GSI be addressed in Saint Louis at the May 2011 meeting so that the
petitioners, former workers, family, political staff, union officials and local media may be
present. This type of courtesy has been displayed in past Board Meetings (Los Alamos, Savanna
River, Fernald, etc.) I would hope that Board Members would also support this request. The

May full Board meeting was originally scheduled for Saint Louis because of Weldon Spring, not
GSL

I cannot express how worrisome it is that at this late date, five months after the October 2010
TBD-6000 work group meeting, that neither white paper promised by David Allen on the path
forward or the one Dr. Anigstein of SC&A said he was preparing (see transcript pages 271
through 272 on air activation has been released. I would hope the work group is not only
concerned about these delayed reports but will soon take action to address them. For example,
we believe that a letter from Dr. Ziemer to NIOSH and to SC&A urging prompt release of these
promised deliverables would be highly appropriate at this juncture.

Tam concemed that there is no scheduled future meeting of the TBD-6000 work group to address
GSI issues, Dr. Ziemer, chair of the TBD-6000 work group and former ABRWH Chair, assured
Dr. McKeel before the 2/16/11 work group met that such a meeting would take place. The
2/16/11 last TBD-6000 work group meeting was devoted to getting the more recently submitted
SEC at Bliss and Laughlin out the door and to the full Board. We protested the unfairness of this
handling of the respective SECs to GSI workers, whose SEC was filed earlier. We still feel a
tremendous injustice has been done to the GSI workers and is being perpetuated.

* The Allen "path forward" white paper of October 2010 asserts at the top that NIOSH is
revising their dose reconstruction plans for GSI. This is astounding considering that more than
94% of all GSI DR have already been completed using Appendix BB Rev 0 from June 2007!

Pa a


Paul Ziemer GSI letter

months before NIOSH obtained their FB dataset and subsequent discussions with the GSI
workers and their survivors that were involved in the building 6 exposed source incident,

See, to me, that's a class of problem 5

that's different than we've ever seen before. 6
And I don't know if you would agree 7

or not, but we've never been in the circumstance 8
where you're dealing with a fairly volatile 9
subject, namely radiography, where these things 10
happen.

MCKEEL COMMENT: I am amazed by this statement. Many other sites besides GSI had
NDT (radiographic nondestructive testing) activities including Betatrons and cobalt-60
isotope sources (Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats, many steel companies, West Allis,
WI/Allis-Chalmers, for example). All parties have avoided dealing with NDT related doses
even though these techniques were widely used at both EEOICPA AWE and DOE sites and
that OCAS-IG-003 demands that ALL sources MUST be factored in doses that NIOSH
calculates using IREP and IMBA. This clearly has not been done at many AWE and DOE
sites. Has LAMS-2064 been forgotten? and McKeel first identified this key
classified report that detailed the DOE NDT program for nuclear weapons at Rocky Flats,
Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge. Review of LAMS-2064 required Q-clearance review by the
Board, SC&A, IL Senator Obama’s staff, and NIOSH), These review reports and notes were
not supplied to the petitioners.

Things do happen, and they're a 11

continuum up to some serious things. 12

We have a ten-year period, where 13

people are doing some -- it's in the “50s, a 14
time period where a lot of things happened that 15
were unpredictable, and you don't have film 16
badge data. I think this is -- and if you go to 17
a two-prong process, well, sure. Let's keep 18
that basket moving. All of the betatron issues, 19
all of the post-~62 issues, and move that 20
forward as best you can. 21

But in parallel, perhaps, as quickly 22

Page 260

as possible, try to get through the pre-~62 1
issues. Bring that before the Work Group. 2

Bring that before the Board as quickly as 3
possible, and at a minimum, the outcome of that 4
would be one, I don't think we can't reconstruct 5
those doses. 6

MCKEEL COMMENT (typo identified): With respect to recommending that SEC-00105
be approved, lines 1-6 are yery important. We believe the word “can’t” underlined in line 5
is a typographical error. I completely changes the sense of this passage. We believe this

ate



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

Page 253

I think we got a handle on this. This is why. 1
Okay? Because if you can solve that, I know we 2
can solve this.

MCKEEL COMMENT: This overall statement is gratuitous and inappropriate on two
levels. The underlined statement is very disturbing. The implication is that “we” (SC&A
and NIOSH) can together “solve” the many issues for GSI 1964-66. It is NOT SC&A’s job
to “get a handle on” (if that equates with “solve”’) anything. It IS their job to review
NIOSH’s scientific approach. If NIOSH’s “solution” to reconstruct doses with sufficient
accuracy falls scientifically short, then it is inappropriate for SC&A to “rescue” them. In
fact, SC&A should then recommend to the Board/work group that NIOSH cannot do what
it must, that is to perform sufficiently accurate reconstruction of ALL SOURCE term
doses. This would add support to the work group and/or Board recommending that GSI
SEC-00105 should be approved.

The second part of the statement also adds greatly to my level of concern. There has
been growing alarm over the past two years within the advocate community that SC&A is
inappropriately performing work that solely belongs to NIOSH. Dr. Mauro states
unequivocally on line 2 above: “I know we can solve this” referring presumably to 1964-66
issues. The use of “we” is concerning. NIOSH must propose a solution to SC&A findings
that come to light when the Board technical contractor reviews NIOSH work. The
implication of this remark is that SC&A’s role is to assist NIOSH to bound GSI exposures
with sufficient accuracy, when that responsibility is NIOSH’s sole responsibility.

I'm not sure you can solve 3
that." 4

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You're talking 5
about the pre-film badge era? 6

MCKEEL COMMENT: We have supplied the work group with two 1962/1963
AEC/Nuclear Consulting Corp. (NCC) film badge reports from two GSI workers, NCC
was the company that did the GSI Building 6 radiography facility survey and was crucial
to GSI obtaining and maintaining its Cobalt-60 license as described in great detail in the
documents that Dr. McKeel obtained by NRC FOIA 2010-0012 for the Board and NIOSH.
There were two FB programs at GSI, not just one. NIOSH, SC&A and the TBD-6000 work
group have done nothing that has been put into the record to follow up on the “extra” pre-
Landauer NCC FB program. This seems to be scientifically inexcusable to me.

DR. MAURO: Pre-film badge. I'm 7

saying right now, the critical path on whether 8
this goes down as an SEC or not is going to be 9
how the pre-1962 time period is going to be 10
dealt with for the issues that I just described. 11

MCKEEL COMMENT: I understand that all parties may express their opinions, but this
is a very direct statement. The Board will hopefully determine “whether this goes down as

v7



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

an SEC issue,” rather than SC&A, which has only an advisory role to the Board.

If there's a way to come to grips 12

with that: either there is or there isn't. And 13
it's going to have to meet the test of 14
satisfaction of not only the Work Group, but the 15
full Board. To spend enormous resources, try to 16
polish the apple on ones that we know we're 17
going to be able to resolve. We're going to 18
resolve them, but it's going to take some time, 19
but we'll work it out. 20

And then after going through all 21

that, after another year or more, and then the 22

MCKEEL COMMENT: Dr. Mauro underscores again his prediction that resolving the
GSI issues that can be resolved is a one year “or more” proposition. There is simply no
possible defense for this scenario of allowing NIOSH and SC&A indefinite time to “work
things out” at GSI.

Page 254
showstopper becomes this basket, that seems to 1
be not an efficient way to go. Do we have -- in 2

other words, is it over because of the pre ~62 3
problems? If it's over, let's not even waste 4
our time with this. 5

MCKEEL COMMENT: Not only is the Board’s and SC&A’s and NIOSH’s “time being
wasted,” but GSI worker/claimants are meanwhile dying and some survivors are being denied
compensation they deserve to get under EEOICPA rules that apply to AWE sites.

6
Later, I'm going to go through a 7
scenario. Fine. If it turns out that's -- we 8

can't deal with this. I'm not sure if we can. 9
Okay, SEC is granted through ~62. Post-~62, 10
we're not sure whether you're going to have an 11
SEC there or not, but at least that's a little 12
bit more tractable.

MCKEEL COMMENT: In scientific terms, a statement such as “a little bit more
tractable” begs the central SEC question. Can or cannot NIOSH reconstruct doses with
sufficient accuracy for ALL GSI workers for ALL sources 1953-66? If not, the only moral,
ethical action to take that would be faithful to Congressional intent would be for the work
group and full Board to recommend overturning NIOSH’s recommendation to deny SEC-
00105. Mr. Allen’s October 2010 white paper on a path forward for GSI proves that
NIOSH cannot do sufficiently accurate dose reconstructions for the entire SEC Class
without spending at least one or more years doing additional work to develop methods, and
with no guarantee of their being success in the long run.

Si6«


Paul Ziemer GST letter

+ As the months and years tick by and GSI workers continue to die from their occupational
exposure, the petitioners and expert/worker team at GSI have continued to bring to the table to a
vast body of new knowledge of GSI source terms. Yet DOL refuses to ratify these data and
reconsider opening denied GSI claims until the Board and SCA and NIOSH completely resolve
all the outstanding issues. NIOSH should not be permitted to take unlimited to time to address
these new data. I firmly maintain as I have from the beginning that all the GSI workers deserve
an SEC for the full covered period of 1953-1966. They deserve this recommendation now, at the
May Board meeting in St. Louis.

1 fervently hope that the TBD-6000 work group will soon support the petitioner's position by

taking positive action on getting Appendix BB revised and by resolving all outstanding technical
meetings and by recommending approval of SEC-00105 to the full Board.

Respectfully submitted,

Daniel W. McKeel, Jr.

Daniel W. McKeel, Jr., M.D.

Contact information:

Daniel W. McKeel, Jr.

GSI SEC-105 co-petitioner

Phone: 573-323-8897

Fax: 573-323-8897

Mail: P.O. Box 15, Van Buren, MO 63965
E-mail: danmckeel2@aol.com

Enclosures as e-mail attachments (redacted versions from the DCAS website):

* Minutes of the October 9, 2007 SC&A outreach meeting with GSI workers

+ Transcript of the Oct. 9, 2009, SC&A review of the NIOSH evaluation report of SEC-00105
* Transcript of the October 12, 2010, TBD-6000 work group meeting on GSI issues

13



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

we're agreeing. 3

MCKEEL COMMENT: The DCAS Director wrote Dr. McKeel stating that NIOSH was
NOT Planning to revise its evaluation report. McKeel had asked NIOSH for a response
precisely because of Dr. Neton’s comment captured in line 22 of page 255 and in line 1 of
page 256 of the 10/12/10 work group transcript. Dr. Neton’s comment is both confusing and
disturbing. NIOSH needs to clarify more precisely for the record at this point exactly what
path forward they are working on, and if and when they plan to re vise APPENDIX BB and to
reissue the evaluation of SEC-00105.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No, this is 4

hypothetically. 5

Continued:

Page 258

DR. MAURO: And a plausible upper 16

bound can be assigned, but we disagree on some 17
of the assumptions.

MCKEEL COMMENT: We believe that Dr. Mauro is making a very premature judgment
that a plausible upper bound can be assigned for the last three years of the covered period.
In saying this, he begs two questions: (a) if that is possible, why has it not been done
already? (b) The petitioners assert that a plausible upper bound has NOT been assigned by
NIOSH, because large quantities of the source and monitoring data and FB questions (such
as sensitivity to 1 to 25 Mev photons) have been addressed very superficially or not at all,
or have been ignored altogether.

I'm more concerned about 18

the time period where they were working with 19
sources, and there is some uncertainty to what 20
sources those are, but sources, whether it's the 21
radium source, iridium source or even a cobalt 22
Page 259

source. 1

I'm more concerned about those ten 2

years where you're working with sources, and 3
I'll say it again, and you don't have film badge 4
data.

MCKEEL COMMENT: Dr. Mauro continues to ignore the facts that SC&A and NIOSH
computer dose modeling deviate substantially from each other and from the very limited
FB data for male radiographers only that represent at most only 3% of the GSI work
force. I am frankly very upset that NIOSH and the Board appear to ignore SC&A and
our data and worker affidavit data that indicate the GSI FB data is not representative and
is incomplete. Finding 1 of the SC&A review of the SEC-00105 evaluation report on page 7
of 50 underscores this point. I reject outright SC&A’s contention that the highest GSI FB
data are spurious based on conyersations that Dan McKeel had with RS Landauer 13

-8-



Miller, Diane M. (CDC/NIOSHIEID) =

From: DanMcKeel2@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 12:38 AM
To: pl.ziemer@comcast.net; Katz, Ted (CDC/NIOSH/OD); Kinman, Joshua L.

(CDC/NIOSH/DCAS), NIOSH Docket Office (CDC); Wade, Lewis (CDC/NIOSH/OD) (CTR);
Hinnefeld, Stuart L. (CDC/NIOSH/OD); jmauro@scainc.com

Ce: danmckeel2@aol.com;
Subject: GSI SEC-105 Co-petitioner McKee! Letter to ABRWH
Attachments: PLZ_GSIltr_3.11.11.pdf+.zip

Dear Dr. Ziemer and Colleagues,

| request that Ted Katz please distribute the 4 attached documents, that are related to General Steel Industries and SEC-
00105, to all members of the TBD-6000 work group and to all 16 current members of the Advisory Board on Radiation and
Worker Health (ABRWH). The letter to Dr, Ziemer and the Board [item 1] should also be distributed to NIOSH DOCKETS
140 (GSI) and 194 (Ten Year Review), ta the three NIOSH/DCAS addressees, to Dr. Wade, and to Dr. John Mauro of
SC&A

Tomorrow | will fax a hard copy of the letter to the Board to the Fax number (513-533-6826) provided on the DCAS
website. No mail address is listed for letters to the ABRWH.

The main letter has three technical document PDF enclosures/e-mail attachments. These documents [items 2, 3, 4]
should be distributed to everyone except the public Dockets as they are all posted on the DCAS website.

The PDF files are: [1] Cover letter <PLZ_GSlltr_3.11.11,pdf>
[2] + Attachment 1 <sca-gsimtg-2007_coll#2386F4.pdf>
[3] + Attachment 2 <GSIsec_sca-t5-5-r0.pdf>
[4] + Attachment 3 <TBD6K_wgtr101210.pdf>

Thank you,
Sincerely,

Daniel W. McKeel, Jr., MD
GSI SEC-00105 co-petitioner
Phone: 573-323-8897

Fax: 573-323-0043

E-mail: danmckeel2@aol.com
US Mail: P.O. Box 15, Van Buren, MO 63965-0015



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

continuum up to some serious things. 12

260

as possible, try to get through the pre-~62 1
issues. Bring that before the Work Group. 2

Bring that before the Board as quickly as 3
possible, and at a minimum, the outcome of that 4
would be one, I don't think we can't reconstruct 5
those doses. 6

Page 266

MEMBER BEACH: I'm in agreement with 7

looking at that -- Dave, looking at it, I'm 8
assuming you're going to get back to the Work 9
Group and let us know the time frame, but I 10
think it's a good approach to move forward with 11
the earlier years if possible. 12

MCKEEL COMMENT: Board member Beach’s assumption expressed here is logical, yet 5
a full five (5) months later Daye Allen and NIOSH have not gotten back to the work group
with a time frame for moving forward on GSL

Page 266

MEMBER MUNN: Well, the Board 21

certainly has adequate precedent for parsing, 22
Page 267

MEMBER MUNN:

especially SEC issues, when there is a clear 1
design in mind where technical improvements or 2
changes in process have occurred, any over a 3
given size. I see no reason why the 4
introduction of film badge data should not be 5
considered a major technical change in how this 6
facility was operated.

MCKEEL COMMENT: Ms, Munn’s statement can be stated more straightforwardly as
the advent of film badge data at GSI should be considered a major technical change.
However, the simple existence of FB data on a very limited number of 89 men in a single
job category does not constitute adequate representational monitoring data on which to
deny an SEC. [ am alarmed that this assertion was not challenged. How does Ms. Munn
reconcile the fact that NIOSH and SC&A computer models disagree quantitatively on
worker doses receiyed during 1964-66, and that limited FB readings are much lower?
Also, Appendix BB Rey. 0 (issued 6/25/07) does not utilize film badge data to calculate
external doses at GSI because that document was released before NIOSH obtained their
dataset in January 2008. This is important because 94.2% of dose reconstructions at GSI
haye been completed and all but 4 GSI DR relied on Appendix BB. The limited GSI FB data
is being endorsed as valid on flimsy scientific evidence and is largely unchallenged by other
work group members. The fact that very limited FB data at GSI cannot be construed as
being reflective of doses received by but one small group of GSI workers seems not to be
weighed by the Board, SC&A or NIOSH. In many other instances, sites with such limited



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

error needs to be brought to the attention of Dr. Mauro and then it needs to be corrected to
change the word “can’t” to “can.” The corrected passage needs to be brought to the
attention of the work group and full Board and read into the record,

Now, this would be a judgment the 7

Work Group or the Board makes. And if it ends 8
that way, at a minimum, there's at least some 9
resolution for the workers and the claimants to 10
get the SEC up to “62. 11

MCKEEL COMMENT: Again, the GSI petitioners strongly object to splitting the GSI
SEC-00105 into two parts. Dan McKeel’s co-petitioner position is that NIOSH has NOT
demonstrated it can reconstruct all external and internal doses for all GSI workers for
1964-66 as the many Findings in SC&A’s October 2009 review of SEC-00105 signify.

What happens after ~62? I don't 12

know. In other words, I'm trying to find a way 13
to deal with the heart of the problem. That's 14
the tough nut. I think the other half is 15
tractable, but I could be wrong. 16

Page 259

I'm more concerned about those ten 2

years where you're working with sources, and 3
I'll say it again, and you don't have film badge 4
data. See, to me, that's a class of problem 5
that's different than we've ever seen before. 6

MCKEEL COMMENT: This comment by John Mauro is subject to challenge. Two other
sites where no direct personal monitoring data existed are Dow Madison site (SEC-0079)
and Texas City Chemicals (SEC-00088). And as we cite above, LAMS-2064 details at least
three major DOE sites that had NDT radiography operations that utilized Betatrons and/or
cobalt-60 sources. I have been mystified why NIOSH, this work group, the full Board and
SC&A seem to systematically appear to ignore in their deliberations under EEOICPA the
entire field of NDT radiography in technical documents such as site profiles, SEC
evaluation reports, and program wide technical documents such as TBD-6000. Ms. Munn
addressed the NDT issue in this key document by saying the subject of industrial NDT
radiography is so complicated and diverse that it would be impossible to cover all its aspects
adequately in TBD-6000. Co-petitioner McKeel strongly disagrees that this is beyond the
expertise of a group of expert health physicists.

And I don't know if you would agree 7

or not, but we've never been in the circumstance 8
where you're dealing with a fairly volatile 9
subject, namely radiography, where these things 10
happen. Things do happen, and they're a 11

-10-



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

Because if we can't -- then 13

we could polish that apple, and say, “Okay, what 14
can we do about that?" 15

I'm not -~ I'm not saying that's a 16

done deal, but I feel a degree of confidence as 17
a health physicist that these are tractable 18
issues. They may or may not be in the judgment 19
of many people, but right now, my sensibility 20
about it is it can, 21

But I got to tell you, this other 22

255

basket of questions, I don't see it. I see some 1
serious challenges to trying to get over that 2
hump. 3

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I guess what 4

you're suggesting is you want to prioritize part 5
of this, and try to come to early closure, and 6
take the early years, and tell us how you will 7
treat them, then deal with the details on the 8
later years: the film badge records. 9

DR. MAURO: Yes. 10

DR. NETON: I don't disagree with 11

John. I mean, this is something he said many 12
times. I mean, if we're going to prioritize 13
anything, this ought to be the one because 14
clearly, he's voiced his concerns -- 15

MCKEEL COMMENT: Dr, Neton’s statement that he “doesn’t disagree” with John
Mauro (that is, to recommend approving a GSI SEC for the first 10 covered period years)
adds further emphasis that NIOSII’s original recommendation in its evaluation report to
deny SEC-00105 was flawed. Furthermore, Dr. Neton and the Allen path forward white
paper indicates that NIOSH has changed its mind as to feasibility of reconstructing GSI
doses during those first ten years. SC&A states pretty unequivocally it now doubts that
NIOSH can do sufficiently accurate DR in the first ten years of the GSI covered period.
The implication of this change for Board action on the SEC is rather obvious.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Suppose we did 16

that, and -- and agreed that you really are not 17
able to bound the early years. Then what -- 18
what, procedurally, would the petition get? How 19
would it -- 20

DR. NETON: Well, if we all agreed 21

technically, then it would be a matter of 22

Page 256

revising the Evaluation Report to say that, and 1
then we could re-present it. I'm not saying 2

27%



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

off? Was there anybody up here, or standing 18
outside the strip door? 19

See, these are things that 20

reasonable people could say, "Okay, I think this 21
is a good bounding approach. It's plausible. 22

Page 252
We can deal with it.
to take some time. 2

But that itself is going 1

MCKEEL COMMENT: I disagree with marginalizing and putting off dealing with these
other issues that I view as major. I challenge the implication that ALL issues related to the
rest of years 11-13 of the covered period at GSI are solvable. The work group has already
had years to solve these other issues that Dr. Mauro easily dismisses here and has failed to
do so. “Take some time” could take years based on the track record thus far of
NIOSH/SC&A solving “tractable” GSI issues.

While we're -- if it turns out we 3
wait until we resolve all that, and let's say we 4
do. It's a year from now, and we resolve all 5

MCKEEL COMMENT: Dr. Mauro here acknowledges the 1964-66 issues could take a full
year to resolve.

that. You know where we're going to be? With 6

that first basket. 7

The first basket is the showstopper. 8

If we can't -- if the Board -- the Work Group 9
and the Board struggles with the idea that we've 10
got 10 years of people working in radiographic 11
operations, no film badge data and no radiologic 12
protection, occupational records, programs where 13
we could track people who might've been injured, 14
might've received overexposure, if that's the 15
case. 16

MCKEEL COMMENT: This statement by Dr. Mauro reveals a bias that is disturbing.
SEC-00105 is not about just the 89 GSI radiographer cohort of 1964-66. NIOSH has film
badge dosimetry gamma photons and beta data, but no neutron data, on only this small
cohort. The Class NIOSH and original petitioner (this name should NOT
be redacted) proposed was all 3000+ workers at GSI, men and women, in all job categories.

So, to me, it's almost like we're 17

looking over here, but we should be looking over 18
here first because this may turn out in a 19
relatively short period of time. I guess this is 20
where I would be looking. I'll be looking to 21
Jim and the rest of the crew, saying, "Listen. 22

By te



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

2b. Four GSI radiation overexposure incidents were also mentioned in FINDING | and one in
FINDING 2 of the SC&A October 2009 review of the NIOSH evaluation report of SEC-00105.
Several other not cited GSI overexposure incidents are on the record. The text on page 7 of 50
follows:

[transcript FINDING #1] "Finding 1. Lack of Radiation Monitoring Data
for 1953-1963

The lack of radiation monitoring data for the 1l-year period
1953-1963 precludes a bounding assessment of external exposures
to direct penetrating radiation. There were four reported
incidents during this period: (1) a worker who was not a
radiographer mistakenly took home a 60Co source; (2) [REDACTED]
who was not a radiographer, remained inside an Army tank being
radiographed with the betatron; (3) [Worker A], a betatron
operator, reported he was involved in an incident with “Betatron
II” (presumably the new betatron) just prior to the beginning of
the Landauer film badge monitoring program; (4) an employee, of
St. Louis Testing, a GSI contractor, reported finding an
unsecured 60Co source that may have exposed GSI employees. These
incidents, especially the worker’s taking home a 60Co source,
indicate a serious breakdown of radiation controls."

MCKEEL COMMENT: Then the Finding is added that even the FB data for 1964-66 for
89 workers is limited. Note FB data from 108-89 = 19 GSI workers is for the period after
1966 (1967-73), which is part of the residual contamination period at that AWE facility:

[transcript FINDING #2 Pages 9 and 10 of 50]

Page 9. "Finding 2. Incomplete Monitoring of Workers:
1964-1966
The film badge dosimetry records for 1964-1966 list the names of
89 workers, who are believed to have been members of the
betatron teams or radiographers who used sealed sources. Former
workers have reported that the badges were stored in a rack just
outside the New Betatron Building, and that they were required
to take off their badges whenever they left the betatron
buildings. Consequently, the monitoring of even these workers
was incomplete, since it did not cover exposures they might have
received outside the betatron building. Areas in 10 Building,
including the restroom, were potentially exposed while the
betatron was in operation. Furthermore, some of these workers
may have worked as layout men who were in intimate contact with
castings immediately after betatron radiography. They would not
have been wearing their badges while performing such duties."

Page 10. "The monitored workers represent a small fraction
of the total GSI workforce. One incident that occurred during
this period involved a worker who was inside a casting while it
was radiographed with a betatron. He was not a radiographer and
was therefore not monitored."

2 {4



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

MCKEEL FOOTNOTE TO FINDING #2: FB data from 89 of 3,000+ [2.9%] (ignoring
turnover that would increase this number) is not remotely representative of the entire work
force during the covered period.

CONCLUDING CRITIQUE OF SECTIONS 2a,b. Dan McKeel’s overarching comment
to the foregoing October 12, 2010 TBD-6000 work group transcript excerpts is that he strongly
DISAGREES with the scientific validity of splitting SEC-00105 into two parts (1953-1962 and
1963/4-66). McKeel will strongly object to NIOSH post hoc forming two SEC Classes at GSI
given that all completed GSI dose reconstructions to date, except for the four cases that are
included in PER-24, have been processed under Appendix BB Rey, 0, Such a maneuver would
be highly unfair to the 1964-66 workers who, in the co-petitioner’s opinion, equally merit that an
SEC be approved as do 1953-63 GSI workers. It is far too late in the game to change the rules. It
needs to be highlighted here that at most NIOSH possesses standard dental (unfiltered) film
badge data from only 89 of 3,000 male workers in a single job category for 1964-66, three years
out of 13 years in the covered period, at GSI. These FB data are distinctly NOT representative of
the entire work force, all of whom should have been badged and monitored with both FB and
urine uranium bioassays regardless of whether AEC uranium work was ongoing at the plant.

It is important to note for the record that GSI co-petitioner McKeel obtained his summary
GSI film badge (FB) data directly from Landauer in January 2007 thirteen months prior to the
time that NIOSH obtained the full FB data for 1964-73 from Landauer. I have placed on the
record that Dan McKeel alerted NIOSH to the presence of GSI film badge data on at least 30
GSI workers at Landauer several times during 2006 and 2007, yet the agency did not obtain the
R.S. Landauer FB data from GSI workers until January 2008 according to David Allen’s
response to a McKeel question. | strongly believe and have offered voluminous new scientific
data and analysis over the ensuing 4+ years which shows that the film badge data (a) is not
representative of the work force at GSI over 13 years, (b) is incomplete in that radiographers
under company orders removed their badges upon exiting the Betatron facilities to work or
recreate in other areas of the GSI complex with substantial risk of radiation exposures (Building
10 overpass break area, Buildings 6 radiography facility and within Building 10, for example),
and (c) that the limited GSI FB data from 1964-66 is not remotely representative of the entire
workforce during 1964-66. Therefore, | conclude that the very limited FB data from 1964-66
cannot accurately bound even the 1964-66 portion of the covered time period.

3. Film badge sensitivity to greater than 1 to 25 Mev Betatron photons remains essentially
unaddressed by NIOSH, the work group or by SC&A. I believe it is unreasonable to only be
addressing this fundamental issue now, If the GSI FB were highly insensitive to 1 to 25 Mev
photons, as the co-petitioner believes is likely, then the FB data would be not only not be
representative, it would also be misleading as to doses received as both SC&A and NIOSH
computer models now indicate. The SC&A model showed highest doses in the control room.
There is abundant worker testimony in the 10/09/2007 SC&A worker meeting minutes of poor
shielding throughout the Betatron buildings at GSI. A thorough assessment of the hugely
important scientific issue of Red R.S. Landauer standard, unfiltered dental film badge sensitivity
must be done. Or, the TBD-6000 work group should recommend that SEC-00105 be approved
forthwith.



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

2. Dr. John Mauro of SC&A has during the past year repeatedly expressed his view (see excerpts
below) to the TBD-6000 work group and in SC&A (SEC-00105 ER review, October 2009)
technical reports that NIOSH cannot accurately reconstruct doses during the ten year AEC
contract period at GSI that spans 1953-1963. He has predicted unequivocally that the TBD-6000
work group will not be able to support NIOSH's recommendation to deny SEC-105 for at least
those first ten years when no source term or monitoring data is available. NIOSH lacks source
term data, purchase orders, and any individual or facility internal or external monitoring data
including film badge and urine bioassays and area or breathing zone radiation data, Yet despite
this very clear advice to the Board from its technical contractor, the TBD-6000 work group has
not had a single vote concerning the NIOSH recommendation to deny GSI SEC-105. When the
TBD-6000 work group will be in a position to bring a final GSI recommendation to the full
Board is uncertain at the present time. Making such a recommendation is clearly within the
mandate of the work group. Not making such a recommendation appears to be a major
abrogation of the work group's mission to make such a recommendation in a timely way using
procedures that are claimant favorable. In our view, this mandate has been breached.

[Note: _ furnished the following 10/12/2010 TBD-6000 work group meeting
excerpts from the redacted document posted on the DCAS website. That text is in Courier font
and some bolding has been added for emphasis. GSI SEC-00105 co-petitioner Dan McKeel
comments are in Times bold and blue at the relevant portions of the minutes and transcripts):

The transcript for the October 12, 2010, TBD-6000 work group meeting was generated by:
NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www-nealrgross.com

{transcript excerpts begin]

Page 8

Chairman Ziemer:

"McKeel Rebuttal of 5/16/10 NIOSH White Paper on GSI Isotopes."
So, 4

I want to make sure you have that document. 5

This was the petitioner's concerns about that 6

White Paper, although again some of that may 7

change with the new document. 8

MCKEEL COMMENT: The work group chose not to discuss the petitioner’s concerns
about the Allen October 2010 white paper at the 10/12/10 meeting and wonders why not.
All that was said still applies, except that 5 months have elapsed since the October 2010

work group mecting with no specific progress having been reported on a path forward by
NIOSH.

We have a June 6th letter from 9

petitioner McKeel, called, "New Source 10
Activation from both GSI 24-25 MeV Betatrons." 11
I did put on the document here, "Email letter 12

te


Paul Ziemer GSI letter

Daniel W. McKeel, Jr., M.D., Letter to the ABRWH and NIOSH Dockets 140 and 194
Concerning General Steel Industries (GSI): SC&A 10/09/07 Worker Outreach Meeting
Minutes; SC&A review of SEC-00105; Transcript of the TBD-6000 Work Group

10/12/10 Meeting
Letter ite: E-
istribut -mail
March 11, 2011 FAX: 513-533-6826

Dr. Paul Ziemer, Chair, TBD-6000 work group of the ABRWH

All members of the TBD-6000 work group and the full ABRWH

Ted Katz, DFO (please distribute this letter and 3 attachments to all ABRWH parties)
Josh Kinman, NIOSH SEC Counselor

NIOSH PUBLIC DOCKET 140 (General Steel Industries)

NIOSH PUBLIC DOCKET 194 (SEC and DR sections, Ten Year Review)

Dr. Lewis Wade, coordinator, NIOSH Ten Year Review

Stuart Hinnefeld, DCAS Director, Jim Neton and David Allen (NIOSH/DCAS)

Dr. John Mauro (SC&A)

Dear Dr. Ziemer,

1. It has been five months (October 2010) since the release of David Allen's white paper on
NIOSH's proposed path forward for GSI. This document had no detailed action plan from
NIOSH. Many unresolved technical issues remain outstanding between the Board/SC&A and
NIOSH.

* At the October 12, 2010, TBD-6000 work group session, the GSI SEC-105 co-petitioner, Dan
McKeel, expressed his most grave concern that Dave Allen's path forward plan would likely
involve months or even years of added work with no timeline specified for completion.
Testimony at the same work group session (see 2 below) confirmed that McKeel’s observation
was in fact likely.

* McKeel pointed out that the very admission by Mr. Allen that all technical phases of the
NIOSH Appendix BB and SEC-105 evaluation report needed to be reworked to accommodate
new GSI source information was proof of the magnitude of NIOSH’s task. Thus, NIOSH tacitly
admits it is unable to accurately reconstruct doses during the AEC covered period of 1953-1966.
The Board should act on this admission rather than allow unlimited time for NIOSH to pursue
such a schedule of new work, Whether additional work will make possible sufficiently accurate
dose reconstruction at GSI for the covered period in any reasonable time frame is debatable and
appears highly unlikely to Dan McKeel.

+ Dr. Ziemer expressed his concern during the most recent ABRWH meeting held in Augusta,
Georgia, on February 23-25, 2011, that NIOSH had not provided details on the path forward to
the TBD-6000 work group, The co-petitioner shares this concern.



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

external and no internal monitoring data as GSI has have been recommended for SECs by
the Board and granted SECs under EEOICPA. A different set of criteria is being unfairly
applied to GSI.

And therefore, it's a7
logical point on which to consider the 8
possibility of splitting up the SEC. 9

Page 267

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I think we 21

have consensus on taking that approach to the 22
Page 268

Path Forward, focused initially on the early 1
years in an effort to get more rapid process or 2
progress, particularly vis-a-vis the SEC issues. 3
We can put that to bed one way or the other in 4
perhaps a quicker fashion. 5

MCKEEL COMMENT: Dr. Ziemer does NOT speak for the signatories of
this letter or for the GSI SEC-00105 signatories that “parsing”
or splitting the SEC is the fair way to go. When Dr. Ziemer made
this assertion, he certainly did not elicit the petitioner's
view in mind.

So let us agree to proceed on that 6
basis,

MCKEEL COMMENT: The proper way to proceed would have been to make a
recommendation to approve SEC-00105 and record the votes of all 5 TBD-6000 work
group members as Dr, Mauro was urging throughout this meeting.

and ask if possible at our full Board 7

meeting that, if you can, to give us an estimate 8
of -- well, we still have to talk about the 9
prioritization, but maybe you will be in a 10
position to lay this out with other items for 11
the Board to consider, I suppose. 12

I'll raise the issue from our point 13

of view, but there will be other priorities. 14
So, I don't think we're asking you to commit to 15
this above everything else at the moment. 16
Simply be aware of our concerns, and make sure 17
that we have this on the agenda,

MCKEEL COMMENT: Substantial discussion of unresolved GSI issues was not on the
agenda of the just completed 2/16/11 TBD-6000 work group meeting or on the September
23-25, 2011, full Board meeting in Augusta. Thus, two opportunities were missed to move
SEC-00105 forward.

zit2s



Paul Ziemer GSI letter

4. FILM BADGE DATA REPRESENTATIVENESS. I have asserted as vociferously as
possible that film badge data from 1964-66 (3 of 13 years) on 89 male GSI Betatron and isotope
radiographers (but not Magnaflux operators), a single job class, out of a work force that
numbered more than 3,000 men and women is NOT a representative sampling of the entire GSI
work force. At peak hiring, more than 3,000 men and women worked at GSI in dozens of job
capacities. GSI advocates have proven these workers functioned in multiple other building areas
of GSI, other than the two Betatron buildings, where they were exposed to substantial levels of
radiation from all GSI radiation sources not only the Betatrons. NIOSH has NOT demonstrated it
can adequately bound external and internal doses from these other building sites or from the
other non-Betatron source terms at GSI even though OCAS-IG-003 mandates that it do so (see
#5).

5. David Allen and NIOSH have not demonstrated they can bound with sufficient accuracy
radiation doses from the two (not one) portable industrial GSI 250 Kvp x-ray machines. Note the
1973 GST auction documents supplied to the Board by McKeel lists three 250 Kvp x-ray units.
One was used for medical purposes. That unit has not been factored in as called for in OCAS-IG-
003. NIOSH has no documentary proof where these units were used, how frequently they were
used, exactly what purposes they were used for, where they were used in the GSI campus, or
what external doses were delivered to the operators or bystanders. / believe that sufficiently
accurate determination and bounding of the three (3) GSI portable x-ray unit doses IS NOT
POSSIBLE to do with sufficient scientific accuracy during the full 1953 to 1966 AEC contract
period. Too many necessary parameters are missing.

6. There remain substantial GSI technical issues that the TBD-6000 work group has not yet fully
addressed or addressed at all, much less resolved.

(a) One unaddressed issue is the insensitivity of (red) Landauer film badges containing
unfiltered "standard dental film" to greater than 1 Mev to 25 Mev very high energy photons
emanating from the two GSI Allis-Chalmers Betatrons. This basic fact was identified by our
expert, physicist former head of the Physics Department at the Milwaukee
School of Engineering (MSOE) that also operated a twenty-five Mev Betatron during the same
period as the ones at GSI. Dr. McKeel has brought this issue before the TBD-6000 work group.
The issue remains inadequately addressed.

(b) A second issue is the utterly ineffective design of the control room doors in the Old and
New Betatron buildings at GSI during the AEC uranium contract period. These were 1.5-2 inch
thick steel clad wood doors that would offer essentially no effective shielding to very high
energy Betatron photons, Dr. McKeel recently sent the TBD-6000 work group photos of both
GSI and MSOE doors that Mr. Ramspott had supplied to him. We believe the radiation dose to
workers in the control room would be substantially higher than the models used by SC&A and
NIOSH and limited 1964-66 film badge readings have shown. In stark contrast, the steel
shooting room door at MSOE's Betatron was 30 inches thick and weighed 70 tons due to its
construction with heavy steel plate and steel pellets. Obviously, the MSOE Betatron facility
design team, which also must have had input from Allis-Chalmers, believed the much greater
expense of the huge steel door was absolutely necessary to protect faculty, researchers, students
who attended classes on the other side of that door, as well as their Betatron operating crew. The
70 Ton door was donated by Allis-Chalmers in 1967. This confirms the A-C concern for the

216-