An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-666

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County

No. 11 CRS 219377

VICTOR NNAMDI INYAMA

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 October 2012

by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 6 January 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Joseph E. Elder, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant 

Appellate Defender Hannah E. Hall, for defendant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Victor Nnamdi Inyama (“defendant”) appeals the denial of 

his motion to suppress following the entry of judgment based 

upon his guilty pleas to possession with intent to sell or 

deliver marijuana, possession of a firearm by a felon, and 

attaining the status of an habitual felon. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

I. Background
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On 17 August 2011, defendant was arrested on an outstanding 

warrant for failure to appear on charges of speeding and driving 

while license revoked at an apartment where marijuana and 

firearms were found. As a result of the marijuana and firearms, 

additional arrest warrants were served for possession with 

intent to sell or deliver marijuana and possession of a firearm 

by a felon.

On 28 November 2011, a Wake County Grand Jury returned 

separate bills of indictment indicting defendant on charges of 

possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana and 

possession of a firearm by a felon. The following day, a Wake 

County Grand Jury also indicted defendant for attaining the 

status of an habitual felon.

Prior to trial, on 4 October 2012, defendant filed a motion 

“to suppress any evidence obtained from [his] person, the 

[apartment] where [he] was arrested, and any statements made by 

[him] as a result of searches and seizures of his person and/or 

residence[.]” In the motion, defendant challenged the validity 

of three warrants issued on 17 August 2011, arguing the warrants 

were not based on sufficient or legally obtained evidence within 

the affidavits supporting their issuance. The motion came on to 
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be heard in Wake County Superior Court before the Honorable Paul 

C. Ridgeway on 15 October 2012.

Evidence presented during the suppression hearing tended to 

show that members of the Raleigh Police Department’s Gang 

Suppression Unit became interested in defendant on 16 August 

2011 when Dominique McLaughlin, with whom the police had dealt 

in the past, identified defendant by name as the owner of drugs 

and firearms found during the search of McLaughlin’s residence. 

The following day, Officer Eddie Camacho ran defendant’s name 

through the warrant database and discovered an outstanding 

warrant for defendant’s arrest for failure to appear on charges 

of speeding and driving while license revoked. Camacho also 

realized that he had previously encountered defendant during a 

traffic stop on 25 May 2011. At the time, defendant was driving 

a 1998 Cadillac DeVille, license plate number ACC-7005.

DMV records for the vehicle indicated it was registered to 

Natasha Montgomery of 2721 Milburnie Road. Although the vehicle 

was registered to Montgomery, Camacho recalled that during his 

prior encounter with defendant at the traffic stop, defendant 

acknowledged the car was registered in his girlfriend’s name but 

stressed that it was his vehicle because he paid for it.
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In search of defendant, Camacho and another officer went to 

the address to which the vehicle was registered on Milburnie 

Road. Montgomery’s stepfather, Phillip Becoat, answered the 

door and spoke with the officers. The officers informed Becoat 

that they were not searching for Montgomery, but for 

Montgomery’s boyfriend, naming defendant. Becoat responded that 

defendant and Montgomery “used to live there at 2721 Milburnie 

Road[,]” but “were [now] living together in an apartment complex 

off New Bern.”

With the information from Becoat, Camacho searched the City 

of Raleigh’s utility records to find the apartment. His search 

revealed that Montgomery lived at 217 Merrell Drive, Apartment 

101.

When the officers arrived at the apartment, they noticed 

the 1998 Cadillac DeVille and another vehicle registered to 

Montgomery in the parking lot near the apartment. Upon 

approaching the front door of the apartment, Camacho could hear 

male voices inside. Camacho, however, could not understand what 

the voices were saying or determine how many people were inside. 

Camacho then knocked on the door. He could hear people 

frantically moving around inside the apartment, but no one 

answered the door. Camacho continued to knock and announce 
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himself for five to ten minutes before calling his supervisor 

for assistance.

Camacho’s supervisor arrived shortly thereafter and knocked 

on the door. Again, no one responded. Camacho’s supervisor

then found Montgomery’s phone number in a police database and 

called Montgomery. Montgomery told the officers that she was at 

work, no one should be inside the apartment, she did not know 

who was in the apartment, and defendant was last in the 

apartment a few days earlier. The officers had received a key 

to the apartment from apartment management, but Montgomery would 

not consent for the officers to enter the apartment to search 

for defendant.

At that time, Camacho applied for and obtained a warrant to 

search the apartment for defendant (“warrant one”).

When Camacho returned with warrant one, a Selective 

Enforcement Unit (“SEU”) already on the scene executed the 

warrant as Camacho and other officers maintained a perimeter. 

The SEU was made aware that multiple people were inside and 

defendant had prior firearms violations. The SEU used the key 

obtained from management to enter the apartment. Upon entry, 

three men, including defendant, exited a back room of the 

apartment at the orders of the SEU and were detained outside. 
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The SEU then performed a protective sweep of the apartment, 

during which Officer C.R. Matthews noticed what he believed to 

be a partially smoked marijuana cigarette lying on the floor in 

one of the bedrooms in plain view. Officer Matthews informed 

Camacho of the marijuana cigarette and Camacho entered the 

apartment and, based on its appearance and smell, confirmed that 

the item on the bedroom floor was in fact a partially smoked 

marijuana cigarette.

Based on the marijuana cigarette, Camacho applied and 

obtained a warrant to search the apartment for “controlled 

substances, paraphernalia, documents indicating dominion or 

ownership of residence, packaging material, currency, firearms, 

ammunition, cellular telephones, and any and all evidence 

relating to the criminal [p]ossession of controlled 

substances[]” (“warrant two”). During the execution of warrant 

two, officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, materials for 

packaging drugs, firearms, and ammunition in the apartment.

A third warrant (“warrant three”) was later issued to 

search three vehicles in the parking lot, including the 1998 

Cadillac DeVille associated with defendant. Additional 

firearms, marijuana stems, a receipt with defendant’s name on 
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it, and a picture of defendant with a group of people were 

recovered from the 1998 Cadillac DeVille.

Upon consideration of the testimony, warrant applications,

and arguments, the trial court denied defendant’s motion in open 

court stating the following:

I've reviewed the evidence submitted in this 

case, the four corners of the search 

warrants as well as the case law handed up. 

And with respect to each of the three 

warrants, I find that, based on the four 

corners of the application of the search 

warrant, the magistrate had substantial 

basis for concluding that there was probable 

cause to believe that the defendant -- in 

the case of the first search warrant, the 

defendant would be found at the location 

described therein; and with respect to 

warrants two and three, that evidence of a 

crime would be found at those locations 

described therein.

After the trial court announced its decision, defendant 

preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress and pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or 

deliver marijuana, possession of a firearm by a felon, and 

attaining the status of an habitual felon. Judgment was entered 

based on defendant’s plea sentencing defendant as an habitual 

felon to a term of 77 to 102 months imprisonment. Defendant

appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.
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A written order denying defendant’s motion to suppress was 

later filed by the trial court on 27 November 2012.

II. Discussion

On appeal, defendant raises various issues with regard to 

the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial 

judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent 

evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on 

appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the 

judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 

132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “The trial court’s 

conclusions of law . . . are fully reviewable on appeal.” State 

v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).

Findings of Fact

In the first issue raised on appeal, defendant argues the 

trial court erred in issuing finding of fact number six because 

it is not supported by competent evidence. Finding of fact 

number six provides, “Officer Camacho and Officer Carpenter 

proceeded to 2721 Milburnie Road. At that address, they spoke 

with Natasha Montgomery’s stepfather, Phillip Becoat, who 
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informed the officers that Victor Inyama was Natasha 

Montgomery’s boyfriend.”

Specifically, defendant contends there is no evidence that 

Becoat informed officers that defendant was Montgomery’s 

boyfriend. In response, the State does not address defendant’s 

precise argument, but instead asserts there was sufficient 

evidence that defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend and, in the 

alternative, the finding is not critical to the trial court’s 

denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.

Although testimony at the suppression hearing indicated 

defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend, the testimony does not 

support the finding that Becoat informed the officers that 

defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend. During the suppression 

hearing, Camacho testified as follows:

I spoke to Ms. Montgomery's stepfather, 

Philip

Becoat. . . . He was very cooperative, very 

polite. He introduced himself as Philip 

Becoat. He allowed us to go inside and 

search for Ms. Montgomery. We informed him 

that we wasn't [sic] looking for her. We 

were looking for her boyfriend, Victor 

Inyama.

I spoke to -- actually, Officer Carpenter 

and I spoke to him. He stated that they 

used to live there at 2721 Milburnie Road 

but that he couldn't take their nonsense. I 

didn't ask him too much what he meant by 

nonsense. He stated they were living 
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together in an apartment complex off New 

Bern.

While this testimony implies defendant was Montgomery’s 

boyfriend, it is not evidence that Becoat explicitly informed 

officers that defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend.

However, we agree with the State that the finding was not 

necessary for a determination of the merits of defendant’s 

motion to suppress. In defendant’s motion to suppress, 

defendant did not seek to suppress evidence by challenging the 

truthfulness of the affidavits accompanying the warrant 

applications pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-978. Instead, 

defendant sought to suppress evidence on the ground that there 

was insufficient evidence in the affidavits to establish 

probable cause to search. “Simply stated, the sole question 

raised by the defendant's motion to suppress is whether the 

officer's affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of 

probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.” State v. 

Rutledge, 62 N.C. App. 124, 125, 302 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1983).

In this case, Camacho’s sworn statement in the application 

for warrant one provided, “Becoat advised that [defendant] is 

[Montgomery’s] boyfriend.” Because defendant did not challenge 

the truthfulness of the sworn statement below, we accept the 
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evidence in the affidavit as true for the sake of analyzing the 

remaining issues on appeal.

Moreover, we note that the statement in Camacho’s 

affidavit, that “Becoat advised [defendant] is Montgomery’s 

boyfriend[,]” is not irreconcilable with Camacho’s testimony at 

the suppression hearing. If defendant had challenged the 

truthfulness of Camacho’s affidavit in the motion to suppress, 

it is likely the State could have produced evidence to support 

the affidavit.

Conclusions of Law

In defendant’s second, third, and fourth issues on appeal, 

defendant challenges the trial court’s conclusions that the 

warrants were supported by probable cause. These are the issues 

raised in defendant’s motion to suppress below.

As this Court has explained,

A valid search warrant application must 

contain allegations of fact supporting the 

statement. The statements must be supported 

by one or more affidavits particularly 

setting forth the facts and circumstances 

establishing probable cause to believe that 

the items are in the places or in the 

possession of the individuals to be 

searched. Although the affidavit is not 

required to contain all evidentiary details, 

it should contain those facts material and 

essential to the case to support the finding 

of probable cause. . . . The clear purpose 

of these requirements for affidavits 
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supporting search warrants is to allow a 

magistrate or other judicial official to 

make an independent determination as to 

whether probable cause exists for the 

issuance of the warrant under N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A–245(b) (2001). N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 15A-245(a) requires that a judicial 

official may consider only information 

contained in the affidavit, unless such 

information appears in the record or upon 

the face of the warrant.

State v. McHone, 158 N.C. App. 117, 120, 580 S.E.2d 80, 83 

(2003) (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).

When addressing whether a search warrant is 

supported by probable cause, a reviewing 

court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. In applying the totality of 

the circumstances test, our Supreme Court 

has stated that an affidavit is sufficient 

if it establishes reasonable cause to 

believe that the proposed search . . . 

probably will reveal the presence upon the 

described premises of the items sought and 

that those items will aid in the 

apprehension or conviction of the offender. 

Probable cause does not mean actual and 

positive cause nor import absolute 

certainty. Thus, under the totality of the 

circumstances test, a reviewing court must 

determine whether the evidence as a whole 

provides a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause exists. In adhering to 

this standard of review, we are cognizant 

that great deference should be paid to a 

magistrate's determination of probable cause 

and that after-the-fact scrutiny should not 

take the form of a de novo review.

It is well settled that whether probable 

cause has been established is based on 

factual and practical considerations of 

everyday life on which reasonable and 
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prudent persons, not legal technicians, act. 

Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense 

standard. It does not demand any showing 

that such a belief be correct or more likely 

true than false. A practical, nontechnical 

probability is all that is required.

State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 334-35, 631 S.E.2d 203,

206-07 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted), 

appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 177, 640 S.E.2d 

59 (2006).

Defendant first challenges the trial court’s conclusion of 

law number one regarding the issuance of warrant one. 

Conclusion of law number one provides:

With respect to [warrant one], the court 

concludes that, based upon the four corners 

of the application for the search warrant, 

the magistrate had a substantial basis for 

concluding that there was probable cause to 

believe that the person named in the warrant 

would be found at the location described 

therein.

Defendant argues the trial court erred in issuing this 

conclusion because the affidavit accompanying the application 

for warrant one was insufficient to establish probable cause

that defendant would be found in the apartment.

Camacho’s affidavit in the application for warrant one 

provided the following statement of facts to establish probable 

cause:

On 8/17/2011, I have [sic] been diligently 
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searching for a wanted subject by the name 

of Victor NNamdi [sic] Inyama wanted for a 

speeding [f]ailure to appear warrant 

(09CR36003). Through our law enforcement 

data base [sic], I developed information 

that Mr. Inyama was cited on 5/25/2011 while 

operating a 1998 Cadillac Deville 

(ACC7075/NC). Officer Carpenter and I 

responded to the address assigned to the 

vehicle which was 2721 Milburnie Rd. The 

registered owner is Natasha Montgomery. 

Upon our arrival, [w]e spoke with Mr. 

Phillip Becoat who is M[s]. Montgomery's 

step-father [sic]. Mr. Phillip Becoat 

advised that Mr. Victor Inyama is [M]s. 

Natasha Montgomery's boyfriend. Through 

researching [C]ity of Raleigh utilities it 

was found that Ms. Natasha Montgomery 

resides at 217-101 Merrell Dr. Prior to 

conducting a knock and talk I heard items 

being moved by the front door and muffled 

speech. Officer Carpenter advised that the 

shades were open to the patio deck. I began 

to knock on the door and announcing [sic] 

myself when I heard subjects frantically 

moving about the residence. Officer 

Carpenter then advised that the shades on 

the patio deck were closed. Through 

multiple attempts of heavy knocking and 

announcing myself no one has came [sic] to 

the door thus far. Ms. Montgomery has two 

vehicles registered in her name. Both 

vehicles are on scene including the vehicle 

that Mr. Inyama was scene [sic] operating. 

At approximately 3:55 PM Sgt. Palczak spoke 

with Ms. Montgomery via telephone. She 

advised no one should be inside her 

residence located at 217 Merrell Dr. Apt. 

101. When I asked who is inside she advised 

she does not know. She advised suspect 

Inyama should not be inside the residence 

and he was last there “a few days ago[.]”[] 

Ms. Montgomery would not give verbal consent 

for the police to enter with a key they had 
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obtained from the apartment management.

Defendant contends this statement of the evidence does not 

contain a single statement supporting a reasonable belief that 

defendant was inside the apartment. In support of his argument, 

defendant distinguishes his case from State v. Oats, in which

this Court determined grounds for probable cause existed to 

search the residence of a third party where an informant 

provided information to police that a suspect would be staying 

at the residence and police were able to identify a person 

sitting on the porch of the residence as the suspect, _ N.C. 

App. _, 736 S.E.2d 228 (2012), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. 

denied, _ N.C. _, 740 S.E.2d 473 (2013), and compares his case 

to federal cases in which it was determined there was an 

insufficient basis for a finding of probable cause. See United 

States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 264 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[N]oise 

coming from inside of a house is not enough to give the police a 

reason to believe that a defendant is present.”); United States 

v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 420-24 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding there 

was insufficient evidence to form a reasonable belief that a 

subject would be found in an apartment matching a description 

given by a confidential informant who claimed to have purchased 

drugs from the subject in the past where the informant could not 
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identify the apartment by number, stated the subject would be 

staying in the apartment if he was staying in the area, and 

described a vehicle found near the apartment that defendant 

would likely be driving).

In response to defendant’s argument, the State argues that 

considering the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit 

included sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that 

defendant would be found in the apartment. In addition to 

evidence contained in Camacho’s affidavit, the State relies on 

portions of Camacho’s testimony during the suppression hearing 

that were not included in the affidavit relied on by the 

magistrate. This evidence included testimony that Camacho was 

familiar with the 1998 Cadillac DeVille that defendant had 

previously driven and testimony that Becoat informed officers 

that defendant lived with Montgomery.

Although we recognize that the State errs in relying on 

evidence that was not before the magistrate, upon review of 

Camacho’s affidavit, we agree with the State that there was 

sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

Despite no direct evidence that defendant was in the 

apartment, the affidavit considered by the magistrate indicated

that the 1998 Cadillac DeVille which defendant was driving on a 
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prior occasion when he was stopped by police was parked outside 

of his girlfriend’s apartment. A second vehicle registered to 

defendant’s girlfriend was also in the parking lot. Although 

defendant’s girlfriend informed police that no one should be 

inside the apartment and defendant was last in the apartment a 

few days earlier, the police could hear several male voices 

inside the apartment. Defendant’s girlfriend indicated she did 

not know who was inside.

Considering only the evidence within the “four corners” of 

the affidavit, we hold there was sufficient evidence from which 

the magistrate could find probable cause to believe defendant 

was inside the apartment. Therefore, the trial court did not 

err in concluding there was a substantial basis to support the 

magistrate’s issuance of warrant one.

On appeal, defendant also raises challenges to the trial 

court’s conclusion of law number two regarding the issuance of 

warrant two. Conclusion of Law number two provides:

With respect to [warrant two and warrant 

three], the Court concludes that, based upon 

the four corners of the applications for the 

search warrants, the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for concluding that there 

was probable cause to believe that evidence 

of a crime, as described in the warrants, 

would be found at the locations described 

therein.
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As our courts have long recognized, “affidavits must 

establish a nexus between the objects sought and the place to be 

searched. Usually this connection is made by showing that 

criminal activity actually occurred at the location to be 

searched or that the fruits of a crime that occurred elsewhere 

are observed at a certain place.” State v. McCoy, 100 N.C. App. 

574, 576, 397 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1990) (citation omitted).

In this case, the affidavit accompanying the application 

for warrant two described in detail the place to be searched. 

The following statement of facts was then listed as the basis to 

establish probable cause: “While executing a search warrant for 

a wanted person marijuana was in [sic] observed in plain view. 

Based on this discovery it is my reasonable belief that more 

narcotics will be located upon a further search.”

Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding there 

was probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found 

at the apartment because the affidavit accompanying the 

application for warrant two failed to implicate the premises 

searched. Specifically, defendant contends the affidavit does 

not connect the marijuana to the apartment to be searched and 

does not specify the location where the officers observed 

marijuana in plain view. Therefore, defendant claims the 
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affidavit is fatally defective. See State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 

125, 131, 191 S.E.2d 752, 756-57 (1972) (holding an affidavit 

that detailed no underlying facts and circumstances from which 

the issuing officer could find that probable cause existed to 

search the premises described was fatally defective).

Although the affidavit does not state that the search 

warrant for defendant was executed at the address identified to 

be searched, we hold that it is clear from a common sense 

reading of the affidavit that the place to be searched was the 

same place searched during the execution of the prior search 

warrant. Therefore, we hold the affidavit was not fatally 

defective.

In defendant’s final argument on appeal, defendant argues

the trial court erred in concluding there was probable cause to 

believe firearms and ammunition would be found at the apartment 

based on the discovery of the partially smoked marijuana 

cigarette.

In support of his argument, defendant cites cases that 

stand for the proposition that firearms are associated with drug 

dealers and drug trafficking. Defendant then contends that the 

partially smoked marijuana cigarette was insufficient, based on 

the amount of marijuana, to support a finding of probable cause 
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to believe firearms and ammunition would be found. We disagree. 

Where criminal activity has been discovered at the apartment, we 

find the trial court did not err in concluding there was a 

reasonable basis for the magistrate to believe firearms would be 

found.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we hold there was a 

substantial basis for the magistrate to determine there was 

probable cause to issue the warrants. Therefore, we affirm the 

denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.

Chief Judge MARTIN and JUDGE ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).