******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
SYLVESTER TRAYLOR v. TERRY GERRATANA ET AL.

(AC 35242)

Gruendel, Lavine and Sheldon, Js.

Argued December 5, 2013—officially released March 11, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Robaina, J. [motion to cite additional party];

Schuman, J. [judgment].)

Sylvester Traylor, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees (defendant Terry Gerratana et

al.).

Cristin E. Sheehan, with whom, on the brief, was

Gina Hall, for the appellee (defendant Connecticut

Medical Insurance Company).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this case, the plaintiff, Sylvester

Traylor, commenced the present action against eighteen defendants, on divers legal theories, to obtain

money damages, injunctive relief and a declaratory

judgment that General Statutes § 52-190a1is unconstitutional insofar as it requires indigent plaintiffs seeking

to bring medical malpractice actions against their health

care providers to obtain opinion letters supporting their

claims from similar health care providers before commencing suit. The defendants are seventeen state defendants, including twelve state legislators,2 one Superior

Courtjudge, one appellate clerk,3

the New London Superior Court,4

the ‘‘Connecticut Court of Appeals,’’5 and

the State of Connecticut (state defendants), and one

private defendant, the Connecticut Medical Insurance

Company (insurance company).

In proceedings before the trial court, the state defendants and the insurance company filed and prosecuted

separate motions to dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims

against them. The trial court granted both motions to

dismiss in their entirety and rendered judgment dismissing the action. This appeal followed. The plaintiff claims

that the trial court erroneously dismissed all of the

plaintiff’s claims, except those against this court and

the New London Superior Court, which the plaintiff has

not pursued on appeal.6 For the following reasons, we

conclude that each of the trial court’s challenged rulings

were proper and that the judgment must be affirmed.

I

CLAIMS AGAINST LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS AND

THE STATE

The plaintiff seeks money damages, injunctive relief

and a declaratory judgment that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, arguing that the legislative defendants acted

unethically, in violation of state and federal law, when

voting on proposed amendments to § 52-190a. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the legislative defendants

attempted to ‘‘derail,’’ for their own personal gain and

enrichment, House Bill No. 6487, 2011 Sess., a proposed

amendment to § 52-190a that would have expanded the

types of health care providers who could provide the

opinion letter required under that statute, eliminated

the requirement that the letter provide a detailed basis

for the formation of the opinion, and permitted the

dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint only if

the plaintiff failed to file the opinion letter with the

complaint and also failed to correct that defect within

sixty days when ordered by the court to do so. The

plaintiff does not allege precisely how the legislative

defendants attempted to ‘‘derail’’ the bill, however, he

claims that when several of the legislative defendants

either objected to or raised questions about the bill,

they were ‘‘promoting an unconstitutional law’’ in viola-
tion of the conflicts of interest rule under General Statutes § 1-85 because each of the legislative defendants

has a relative or business that benefits from § 52-190a.

In response, the legislative defendants argue that: (1)

sovereign immunity and absolute legislative immunity

bar the plaintiff’s state law claims against them in their

official capacities; and (2) qualified immunity and lack

of personal jurisdiction bar the plaintiff’s federal law

claims against them in their individual capacities. For

the following reasons, we agree with the legislative

defendants.

A

The Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

We turn first to the plaintiff’s claims against the legislative defendants in their official capacities for alleged

violations of state law. The legislative defendants argue

that sovereign immunity and absolute legislative immunity bar the plaintiff’s claims against them. We agree.

‘‘Sovereign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a

question of law over which we exercise de novo

review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d

675 (2007). ‘‘The principle that the state cannot be sued

without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well

established under our case law. . . . [T]he practical

and logical basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity]

is today recognized to rest . . . on the hazard that the

subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference

with the performance of their functions and with their

control over their respective instrumentalities, funds,

and property. . . . Not only have we recognized the

state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its

officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the

state is, in effect, against the state. . . . Exceptions to

this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our

jurisprudence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).

Our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions

to sovereign immunity: ‘‘(1) when the legislature, either

expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity . . . (2)

when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief

on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one

of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory

or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose

in excess of the officer’s statutory authority.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia
Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn.

342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

The plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief against the legislative defendants, and against the

state, are barred by sovereign immunity because they

do not satisfy any of these exceptions. The only exceptions to sovereign immunity that would apply to claims

alleging constitutional violations and conduct in excess

of statutory authority are the second and third, which

require that the plaintiff’s claim be ‘‘ ‘substantial.’ ’’ Id.

‘‘For a claim made pursuant to the second exception,

complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that

[t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual

underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected

interests. . . . For a claim under the third exception,

the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts

that reasonably support those allegations. . . . In the

absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to

support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss . . . is proper.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350.

The plaintiff’s amended complaint makes only conclusory allegations that § 52-190a violated his constitutional rights to equal access to court, separation of

powers, equal protection, due process, and to trial by

jury. None of the claims raised by the plaintiff allege

a ‘‘substantial’’ claim that ‘‘clearly demonstrate[s] an

incursion upon [his] constitutionally protected interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 354.

The legislative defendants argue, and we agree, that

the plaintiff’s claims against them also are barred by

absolute legislative immunity, provided by the speech

or debate clause of the Connecticut constitution,7 which

bars all relief against legislators who are carrying out

legislative functions. ‘‘[O]nce it is determined that

[m]embers [of the legislature] are acting within the legitimate legislative sphere the . . . [speech or debate

c]lause is an absolute bar to interference.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Office of Governor v. Select

Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 563, 858 A.2d

709 (2004). The plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the state legislative defendants ‘‘attempted

to derail House Bill HB-6487,’’ either by voting against

it or speaking about it on the Senate floor. Participating

in such legislative debate and voting on proposed legislation undoubtedly constitutes ‘‘ ‘acting within the legitimate legislative sphere.’ ’’ Id. Thus, the plaintiff’s state

law claims against the legislative defendants in their

official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity

and absolute legislative immunity.

B
The Plaintiff’s Federal Law Claims

The plaintiff also seeks money damages against the

legislative defendants in their individual capacities for

alleged violations of federal law. The legislative defendants argue that in addition to absolute legislative

immunity, qualified immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction bar the plaintiff’s claims against them. We agree.

‘‘Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials

from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts

showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149

(2011). ‘‘[I]f it was objectively reasonable for him at the

time of the challenged action to believe his acts were

lawful’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Amore v.

Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 2010); then qualified

immunity applies. Qualified immunity bars the plaintiff’s claims because he failed to establish that the legislative defendants violated a statutory or constitutional

right or that their actions were not objectively reasonable.

The plaintiff also failed to serve process on the legislative defendants in their individual capacities at their

usual places of abode, as required under General Statutes § 52-57 (a). Rather, the plaintiff served the legislative defendants only in their official capacities at the

office of the attorney general. In the absence of proper

service, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over

the legislative defendants in their individual capacities.

See Edelman v. Page, 123 Conn. App. 233, 243–44, 1

A.3d 1188, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908, 10 A.3d 525

(2010). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s federal law claims

against the legislative defendants in their individual

capacities are barred by qualified immunity and lack

of personal jurisdiction.

II

CLAIMS AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS

The plaintiff makes several claims against the judicial

defendants in both their official and individual capacities, under state and federal law, arising out of the

court’s failure to declare § 52-190a unconstitutional.

The judicial defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claims

are barred by absolute judicial immunity, qualified

immunity, and lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree.

Absolute judicial immunity bars the plaintiff’s state

law claims against the judicial defendants in their official capacities. ‘‘It is a long-standing doctrine that a

judge may not be civilly sued for judicial acts he undertakes in his capacity as a judge.’’ Lombard v. Edward

J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 630, 749 A.2d 630

(2000). The improper actions alleged by the plaintiff
against Judge Parker of issuing incorrect legal rulings

and orders in the plaintiff’s malpractice and mandamus

actions, applying unconstitutional laws, intimidating

the plaintiff during hearings, engaging in ex parte communications, and requiring the plaintiff to obtain legal

counsel for the claims of his wife’s estate, undeniably

were actions taken in Judge Parker’s official judicial

capacity. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims against him are

barred by absolute judicial immunity.

We arrive at the same conclusion with regard to the

plaintiff’s claim against appellate clerk Gannuscio,

alleging that he wilfully refused to grant the plaintiff’s

motion for extension of time. ‘‘Clerks, like judges, are

immune from damage suits for performance of tasks

that are an integral part of the judicial process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chance v. Superior

Court, United States District Court, Docket No.

3:04CV155 (MR)(D. Conn. December 13, 2004). Because

the determination of whether to grant or deny the plaintiff’s motion for extension of time falls within the judicial function of a clerk under Practice Book § 66-1, the

plaintiff’s claim against Gannuscio is barred by absolute

judicial immunity.

For the reasons set forth in part I B of this opinion,

qualified immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction bar

the plaintiff’s claims for money damages against the

judicial defendants in their individual capacities. The

plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to conclude

that the judicial defendants’ conduct was outside the

scope of their employment as judicial branch employees, or that such conduct rose to the level of being

wanton, reckless or malicious. He also has failed to

establish that the judicial defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right or that their actions were

not objectively reasonable. Further, the plaintiff failed

to serve process on the judicial defendants in their

individual capacities at their usual places of abode, and

thus, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims against the judicial

defendants in both their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of state and federal law are

barred by absolute judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and lack of personal jurisdiction.

III

CLAIMS AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY

The plaintiff also appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss filed by the insurance company. The insurance company argues that this

court should decline review of the court’s judgment

dismissing the counts against it, which sought, inter

alia, a writ of mandamus, because the plaintiff has failed

to adequately brief this issue on appeal.

‘‘An appellant who fails to brief a claim abandons it.’’

State v. Zarick, 227 Conn. 207, 221, 630 A.2d 565 (1993).
‘‘Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis

of their claims, we do not review such claims.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Knapp v. Knapp, 270 Conn.

815, 823 n.8, 856 A.2d 358 (2004); see DeLucia v. Burns,

11 Conn. App. 439, 444 n.7, 527 A.2d 1234 (bare assertions, without citations to legal authority evade meaningful appellate review), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 803,

531 A.2d 935 (1987). The plaintiff’s initial brief is silent

as to why the court’s dismissal of the counts against

the insurance company was improper, and we decline

to review any arguments advanced for the first time

in his reply brief. See Mangiafico v. State Board of

Education, 138 Conn. App. 677, 680–81 n.4, 53 A.3d

1066 (2012). Because the plaintiff has not adequately

briefed his claim that dismissal of the counts against

the insurance company was improper, we decline to

review it.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part as follows: ‘‘The

complaint . . . shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the

action . . . that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief

that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant . . . . To

show the existence of such good faith, the claimant . . . shall obtain a

written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider . . . that there

appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis

for the formation of such opinion. . . . The claimant . . . shall retain the

original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion,

with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged,

to such certificate. . . .’’

2 Senator Terry Gerratana, Senator Robert Kane, Senator Tony Guglielmo,

Senator Len Fasano, Senator Toni Boucher, Senator Jason Welch, Senator

Toni Harp, Senator Kevin Witkos, Senator Michael McLachlan, Senator

Anthony Musto, Senator Len Suzio, and Representative Prasad Srinivasan

(legislative defendants).

3 The Honorable Thomas F. Parker and appellate clerk Alan Gannuscio

(judicial defendants).

4 There are no specific allegations made by the plaintiff against the New

London Superior Court and neither the plaintiff nor counsel for the state

defendants have addressed in their briefs any claims asserted specifically

against that court.

5 The plaintiff stated in his oral argument on this appeal that he previously

has withdrawn this court as a party to the underlying action. Additionally,

neither the plaintiff nor counsel for the state defendants have addressed in

their briefs any claims asserted specifically against this court.

6 See footnotes 4 and 5 of this opinion.

7 The constitution of Connecticut, article third, § 15, provides: ‘‘The senators and representatives shall, in all cases of civil process, be privileged

from arrest, during any session of the general assembly, and for four days

before the commencement and after the termination of any session thereof.

And for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned

in any other place.’’