Draft White Paper 

SC&A REVIEW OF LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL 

LABORATORY SITE PROFILE MATRIX ISSUE #2 

Contract No. 200-2009-28555 

Prepared by 

Joseph Fitzgerald 

S. Cohen & Associates 

1608 Spring Hill Road, Suite 400 

Vienna, Virginia 22182 

Saliant, Inc. 

5579 Catholic Church Road 

Jefferson, Maryland 21755 

September 2012 

Disclaimer 

This document is made available in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) to maintain all possible openness in its deliberations. However, 

the ABRWH and its contractor, SC&A, caution the reader that at the time of its release, this report is predecisional and has not been reviewed by the Board for factual accuracy or applicability within the 

requirements of 42CFR82. This implies that once reviewed by the ABRWH, the Board’s position may 

differ from the report’s conclusions. Thus, the reader should be cautioned that this report is for 

information only and that premature interpretations regarding its conclusions are unwarranted.
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Document No.: White Paper – 

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Effective Date: 

 Draft – September 5, 2012 

S. COHEN & ASSOCIATES: 

Technical Support for the Advisory Board on 

Radiation & Worker Health Review of 

NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Program Revision No. 

0 – (Draft) 

SC&A REVIEW OF LAWRENCE BERKELEY 

NATIONAL LABORATORY SITE PROFILE 

MATRIX ISSUE #2 

Page 2 of 14 

Task Manager: 

__________________________ Date:____________ 

Joseph Fitzgerald 

Supersedes: 

N/A 

Project Manager: 

__________________________ Date:____________ 

John Stiver, CHP 

Reviewer(s): 

 John Stiver 

 

Record of Revisions 

Revision 

Number 

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Date Description of Revision 

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NOTICE:

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Abbreviations and Acronyms ..........................................................................................................4 

1.0 Background..........................................................................................................................5 

2.0 Issues for Work Group Consideration .................................................................................6 

2.1

....................................................................................................................6 

Exposure Potential for which Adequate Bioassay Coverage May Be 

Lacking

2.2 Programmatic Issues Affecting Adequacy of Bioassay...........................................9 

2.2.1 Compliance with LBNL Bioassay Submission Requirements ....................9 

2.2.2 Program Reliability: Selection of Personnel and Radionuclides..............10 

References......................................................................................................................................13 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

ABRWH Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 

AEC Atomic Energy Commission 

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

EH&S Environmental Health and Safety 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LBL Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 

LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

MAP Mixed Activation Product 

MDA Minimum Detectable Activity 

MeV million electron volts 

MPBB Maximum Permissible Body Burden 

mrem millirem 

MSD Medical Services Department 

NaI(T1) Sodium Iodide doped with Thalium 

NDA non-detectable activity 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

pCi picocurie 

SC&A S. Cohen and Associates (SC&A, Inc.) 

SEC Special Exposure Cohort 

SRDB Site Research Database 

TBD technical basis document 

WBC whole-body counting 
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1.0 BACKGROUND 

In its site profile review (SC&A 2010), SC&A questioned whether there is sufficient information 

on Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) bioassay monitoring, post-1961, particularly 

as it pertains to dose reconstruction based on gross alpha, beta, and gamma analyses. Workers 

were potentially exposed to a diversity of radionuclides at LBNL, and SC&A found the site 

profile (ORAUT 2007, now ORAUT 2010) to be incomplete in relation to the periods of time 

and quantities of radionuclides handled in the different areas. SC&A also questioned whether 

LBNL methods at the time for gross alpha, beta, and gamma analyses would be sufficient to 

detect certain radionuclides given low process recoveries and relatively high Minimum 

Detectable Activities (MDAs). 

At the February 2012 Work Group meeting, SC&A emphasized that the issue [now Matrix 

Issue #2 in SC&A’s Issues Matrix (SC&A 2012)] pertains to the adequacy and completeness of 

bioassay data, with MDA being a key question (ABRWH 2012). The National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) responded by noting that the period of 1961 and earlier 

is covered under an existing Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) for LBNL. It was further observed 

that either MDA information in Table 5-4 of Revision 2 of the LBNL Site Profile or specific 

MDA information provided in the worker’s dosimetry records has been sufficient to assess all 

current claims. NIOSH noted that use of gross monitoring results, though they may result in 

higher MDAs, still allows the dose reconstructor to provide a bounding/claimant-favorable 

exposure analysis. NIOSH also noted that additional information on radionuclide-specific 

MDAs can always be added to Table 5-4 of the technical basis document (TBD) (NIOSH 2012). 

At the Work Group’s request, SC&A agreed to review exposure potential from internal emitters 

at LBNL for the post-1961 period, and determine their significance and whether bioassay 

monitoring was complete and adequate for that time period. SC&A proposed to sample 

available dosimetry records for pertinent information regarding what exposure potential existed 

in which operations and buildings, and whether monitoring was available and adequate (and 

addressed in the current TBD). This information would then be made available to NIOSH, in 

advance, for its use in responding to Matrix Issue #1 (regarding historic documentation of 

operations and sources of radiological exposures). 

 

In terms of approach, SC&A reviewed post-1961 records available in the Site Research Database 

(SRDB), evaluated dosimetry program documentation and dose information, and compared its 

assessment with that provided in the TBD. Apparent gaps and differing assessments of bioassay 

program adequacy are highlighted in this review, with an emphasis on what programmatic or 

dosimetric shortcomings would have the most significant influence on dose reconstruction. 

 

In terms of SC&A’s review under site profile Matrix Issue #2, two central questions surface for 

Work Group consideration: (1) Exposure potential posed by radionuclide source terms for 

which adequate bioassay monitoring may be lacking (or which are not addressed by the TBD), 

making sufficiently accurate dose reconstruction problematic; and (2) inadequate management of 

the bioassay program at LBNL making bioassay results less reliable for use in dose 

reconstruction. 

 
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For the former, SC&A questions how LBNL could have adequately monitored for Mixed 

Activation Products (MAPs) using in vitro gross alpha and beta techniques, coupled with wholebody counting (WBC), when MDA detection thresholds and extended monitoring periods would 

have mitigated against detection. This limitation has been acknowledged during SEC 

proceedings by NIOSH for another University of California laboratory, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL), for which an SEC has already been established in 1975 (due to the lack of 

WBC capability for detecting MAPs, mixed fission products, and exotic radionuclides) and for 

which additional years are being considered, based on difficulty bounding short-lived gaseous 

emissions using limited WBC data. 

For the latter question, NIOSH has accepted the inauguration of the LBNL bioassay program in 

1961 as the threshold of a comprehensive and reliable database for internal dosimetry (and 

therefore the end of the SEC-covered period), while SC&A believes pertinent program 

documentation (e.g., DOE audits in the 1980s) clearly highlight persistent inadequacies in how 

the program was managed that bear directly on data reliability. 

Both of these questions are discussed below in more detail as issues for Work Group 

consideration. 

2.0 ISSUES FOR WORK GROUP CONSIDERATION 

2.1 Exposure Potential for which Adequate Bioassay Coverage May Be Lacking 

Table 1 identifies source terms present at LBNL with an identified exposure potential, based on a 

review of available site monitoring records, but not addressed specifically in the TBD for their 

ability to be monitored with sufficient accuracy. 

 

Table 1. Source Terms Not Adequately Addressed in TBD having Exposure Potential 

Radionuclides LBNL Building No. Reference Comment 

Mixed Activation Products 

(MAPs) 

(includes C-11, N-13, O-15, 

Ar-41, Be-7, and others) 

Bldgs. 6, 9, 10, 80, 

51, 55, 56, 70, 70A, 

71, 74, 88 

ORAUT-TKBS-0049 

(LBNL Site Profile) 

(ORAUT 2010) 

MAPs present for all high energy 

accelerators as potential exposure 

source term. Primarily short-lived 

beta emitters. 

Mo- 93 

Nb- 92,93 

Zr- 89, 93, 95 

Bldg 70A, rm 2217 Grill 1966 Source-terms not included in 

TBD. 

Br-82 Bldg 70, rm 133 Low-Beer 1962 NDA, but not clear on MDA; not 

included in TBD. 

Ho-160m, 161 

Nd-149 

Bldg 70, rm 143 Low-Beer 1962 NDA, but not clear on MDA; not 

included in TBD. 

Eu-152, 154 Bldg 70 Low-Beer 1962 NDA, but not clear on MDA; not 

included in TBD. 

Cm-244 LBL 1969 In vivo MDA for Cm-244 2-10x 

MPBB (1969)...missed dose? 

W-181 88” cyclotron LBL 1969 

LBL 1973b 

In vivo detection of exposure 

source w/ unknown energy 

signature (1969); thought to be 

W-181 (1973) 
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Table 1. Source Terms Not Adequately Addressed in TBD having Exposure Potential 

Radionuclides LBNL Building No. Reference Comment 

S-35 Low-Beer 1963 Only fecal sampling showed 

activity (1 positive) (1962) 

Rh-106 Bldg 70, rm 218 Thaxter 1960 Some Rh compounds gaseous – 

counting/collection efficiency 

unknown (1960) 

For internal dose assessments, LBNL relied upon in vitro (urinalyses) bioassays for selected 

employees identified by the Safety Services Department (later Environmental Health Sciences) 

based on input from onsite radiological monitors, which also identified the radionuclides to 

which individuals had the potential to be exposed. In the 1960s, there were about 100+ 

individuals providing routine urinalysis samples at the laboratory, increasing to 170 by 1988 

(DOE 1987). A smaller subset of workers was given routine WBCs [employing the Donner 

WBC using a NaI(Tl) crystal calibrated for a gamma spectrum of 0 to 2.0 MeV], e.g., 28 in 1961, 

39 in 1966–1967, and 38 in 1972–1973 (Low-Beer 1962; LBL 1968; LBL 1973a). Most results 

were non-detectable (NDA), although some longer-lived radionuclides were identified: Y-90, 

Zn-65, Cs-134, Tc-99m, and Cr-51. 

It was recognized early that in vitro bioassay provided for “greater sensitivity” when compared 

with in vivo WBC monitoring for actinide and beta-emitters. While low-level gross beta activity 

was typically found in most worker urine samples, the high rate of decay indicated that it was not 

attributable to Sr-90, a fallout constituent (LBL 1968). 

A special WBC survey of 85 accelerator workers (selected from the 184-inch cyclotron, 88-inch 

cyclotron, Bevatron, and Hilac), performed in 1967, had 7 positive determinations of 91 workers 

evaluated, with Zn-65, Co-56/57, W-185, and Am-241 identified (LBL 1968). However, for 

urinalyses taken for the same workers at the same time, 76 of 85 (89%) proved positive for gross 

beta, with activities ranging from 1–42 pCi/24 hour sample. This supports the LBNL 

observation (cited above) that relatively low-level dose from short-lived beta emitters not 

attributable to fallout was being missed in the bioassay program. However, at the same time, 

based on a gross alpha and beta survey by LBNL of residents of the San Francisco bay area, it 

was concluded by LBNL that “the continuing low levels of beta activity found in a high 

percentage of [LBNL] personnel included in the routine bioassay program” were also prevalent 

in the general population and, therefore, “should probably not be regarded as due to industrial 

[i.e., LBNL] exposure when found in the routine bioassay program” (LBL 1969). It is likely that 

short-lived MAPs contributed to this constant low-level beta component (particularly with the 

finding in LBL 1968 that was unlikely due to Sr-90), but lack of detection and discrimination 

due to WBC sensitivity and delay in monitoring made it unlikely that these would be picked up, 

and this survey “finding” apparently was the reason LBNL chose not to resolve this unknown 

exposure source term. 

Table 2 further illustrates this issue by comparing the half-life of radionuclides identified by 

routine WBC monitoring as compared with common MAPs generated by accelerator operations 

at LBNL. Other than an outlier radionuclide for each list (Be-7 for MAPs and Tc-99m for 

positive WBCs), it is clear that the shorter-lived MAPs were not detected by WBC at LBNL in 

the post-1961 years and made up an indeterminate amount of the “non-detectables” cited for 
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workers who were routinely counted. As was found at both LANL and Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL), while MAPs are relatively short-lived, their copious production in 

high-energy accelerators can provide a constant exposure source term during operations. This 

source term is difficult to monitor and estimate because of the nature of the gaseous emissions 

(neither vapor nor particulate) and the relatively short half-lives involved. Furthermore, the 

magnitude of this exposure will obviously be a function of accelerator type and energy, operating 

time scales (i.e., continuous or intermittent), worker occupancy, location and height of onsite 

emission points, and degree of building ventilation and filtration. For LANL, NIOSH has tried 

to bound MAP doses by quantifying ratios of released source terms (e.g., Ar-41, O-15, N-13) to 

Be-7, a longer-lived MAP released with the other gases. This has proven problematic, given the 

need to ascertain what constitutes a “representative” set of MAP emission values, because they 

were heavily influenced by factors such as holdup time and facility origin. 

Table 2. Comparison of MAPs Generated vs. WBC Monitored 

Radionuclide Type of Decay Half-Life 

Mixed Activation Products: 

C-11 

N-13 

O-15 

Ar-41 

Be-7 

Beta 

Beta 

Beta 

Beta 

Gamma 

20 minutes 

10 minutes 

123 seconds 

1.8 hours 

53 days 

LBNL positive WBC (19621973): 

Y-90 

Zn-65 

Cs-134 

Tc-99m 

Cr-51 

W-185 

Am-241 

Beta 

Beta 

Beta 

Gamma 

Gamma 

Beta 

Alpha 

64 hours 

245 days 

1.05 years 

6 hours 

27.5 days 

75 days 

458 years 

 Source: Low-Beer 1962; LBL 1968; LBL 1973a; ORAUT 2010. 

It should be clarified that this is not to say that the Argonne-type NaI(Tl) detector did not have 

the capability to discriminate and detect specific MAPs at some activity level. As with LANL 

and LLNL, however, no monitoring regime existed to do so on a routine basis, because they 

were not considered a significant enough routine exposure source for workers to warrant 

sufficiently frequent sampling (or modeling estimations) to be included in the personnel dose 

records. 

Adequacy of Gross Alpha Urinalysis Procedure 

A number of LBNL annual bioassay program summaries noted that individuals whose urine 

samples had been found to be negative were found to have positive fecal sample results (e.g., 

LBL 1968) and for positive urinalyses, often higher activity levels (LBL 1973b; LBL 1969). 

These individuals were also whole-body counted with negative results. LBNL concluded at the 

time (1968) that “in cases of exposure to very small amounts of alpha activity, analysis of a fecal 

sample is a necessary procedure for effectively ruling out the presence of alpha contamination” 

(LBL 1968). However, from review of bioassay monitoring records, it is clear that the 

laboratory continued to rely predominantly on gross alpha urinalyses to confirm exposures to 

alpha emitters despite this repeated finding. It is clear from these backup fecal results that many 
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of the negative gross alpha results may have been actually positive for alpha emitters leading to 

missed dose of an unknown amount. 

 

Preliminary Conclusion: 

While there are some MDA and source term-related discrepancies (as listed in Table 1), the key 

concern stemming from SC&A’s review is LBNL’s historic capability to monitor for MAPs 

given its reliance on gross in vivo and in vitro methods, coupled with a lengthy (monthly, yearly) 

sampling periodicity, that would have mitigated against routine detection of most short-lived 

MAPs. While the WBC had the capability to discriminate some activation products, its MDA 

for the weaker beta emitters was apparently too high to ascertain the chronic low-level gross beta 

uptakes that were being detected in worker urinalyses. In this case, this circumstance parallels 

that of LANL and LLNL, where concerns have been raised regarding dose reconstructing MAPs 

when routine WBCs were lacking or did not adequately characterize this source term. 

For alpha emitters, in general, SC&A had raised questions in its site profile review about how the 

TBD “does not discuss the fact that many radionuclides present at LBNL would not have been 

detected by gross measurements, or at least detected with low recoveries and resulting high 

MDCs [MDAs]... the potential missed dose associated with non-specific bioassay techniques 

should be further investigated to determine the impact on internal dose calculations” (SC&A 

2010). The LBNL references cited (LBL 1968) above substantiate this concern through actual 

observations at the time, where fecal analysis confirmed uptakes that urinalyses and WBCs 

missed. Given the laboratory’s sparing use of fecal analysis confirmation (typically only used 

following an incident), it can be concluded that substantial missed alpha dose may have existed 

at LBNL, for which NIOSH’s bounding method may not be adequate. As recommended in its 

2010 site profile review, SC&A believes the magnitude of this missed dose should be assessed in 

the context of actual monitoring results, such as those cited above, and the basis for the TBD 

revisited in this regard. 

2.2 Programmatic Issues Affecting Adequacy of Bioassay 

2.2.1 Compliance with LBNL Bioassay Submission Requirements 

LBNL has had a history of bioassay compliance problems dating back to the inception of the 

program. An audit by DOE (DOE 1987) found that while 170 employees working with 

radioisotopes in 1986 were required to participate in the bioassay program, 24% (or 41 workers) 

were non-compliant in the submittal of samples for analyses. It was noted in the audit that some 

of the non-compliant individuals continued to work with radioisotopes without action on the part 

of LBNL management. It also noted that 10 bioassayed individuals had positive bioassay results 

for CY1986, with the highest effective dose equivalent being 200 mrem. 

Submission of required bioassay samples was a recurring problem at LBNL. A 1962 Bioassay 

Program report (Low-Beer 1963) indicates that at the end of the year (1962), 24 persons were 

delinquent in submitting samples, and 7 had not submitted any samples prior to the end of the 

reporting year. This led to at least one management directive (Howe 1963) warning staff to 

submit their samples or face disciplinary action. A Bioassay Program report for 1968–1969 
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(LBL 1969) indicates a compliance rate of 84.2% for 139 employees enrolled in the program for 

that period (i.e., 22 or 16% of workers were not compliant). For 1971–1972, the bioassay 

compliance rate was reported as 48%, with less than half of the 139 employees enrolled in the 

program submitting samples as required. For 1972–1973, the compliance rate for bioassay 

sample submissions was reported (LBL 1973a) as 72% for 117 workers. It was also noted that 

laboratory management found it “impossible in a number of instances” to obtain a second 

confirmatory sample in those instances where a positive alpha determination had been made 

(LBL 1973b). 

Preliminary Conclusion: 

It is not clear from available records whether delinquent bioassay samples were eventually 

collected (based on SC&A’s site profile review, some were at least a year overdue) or not, but 

given the relatively high percentages of noncompliance and the apparent lack of management 

accountability to enforcing bioassay requirements (as late as 1986), NIOSH should review the 

adequacy and completeness of bioassay records from this perspective (per Matrix Issue #4) and 

determine the significance of missing bioassays. From the positive results cited in all of these 

program reports, a clear exposure potential exists for these non-compliant workers, and the 

question of historic non-compliance is not addressed in the TBD. 

 

2.2.2 Program Reliability: Selection of Personnel and Radionuclides 

For adequate bioassay results, it is critical that personnel are included in the bioassay program 

based on their work and are bioassayed for the radionuclides to which they are potentially 

exposed. The TBD concludes that after 1961: 

LBNL bioassay records show that the selection of personnel for bioassay and the 

radionuclides for analysis have been based on the work performed by the 

individual. Selection of employees to be included in the bioassay program was 

typically made by the Laboratory’s Safety Services Department through its staff of 

monitors. The monitors were directly aware of the radionuclides used throughout 

the Laboratory and were therefore best qualified to select employees at risk for 

potential internal exposure. (ORAUT 2010) 

However, LBNL reports and memoranda from the 1960s through the 1990s point to a 

management system and culture that would have mitigated against a comprehensive personnel 

selection process addressing what can be a constantly changing experimental work environment 

involving a myriad of different radionuclide sources with exposure potential. At LBNL, the 

bioassay program was administered by the Medical Services Department (MSD), while the 

personnel dosimetry (external) program was administered by the Environmental Health and 

Safety (EH&S) Department. Given this organizational split, it was critical for EH&S to work 

closely with MSD to ensure that the latter had a complete listing of employees who warranted 

bioassay screening due to their work-related exposure potential for certain radionuclides. 

Otherwise, MSD, having little operational perspective, would be unable to maintain an accurate 

listing of who should be bioassayed for what radionuclides. 
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Program reviews raised repeated concerns over this organizational dichotomy and its adequate 

implementation of the selection process. A 1985 review of the bioassay program by DOE (DOE 

1985a) found, in part: 

 ...no formal mechanism for the selection of employees that are required to be 

on the program.

 ...no written criteria stating which tests are to be performed of the different 

classes of employees on the program.

 That... the list of employees currently on the program had a number of 

inconsistencies and may not be up-to-date regarding which radionuclides are 

currently being used by the individual employees.

 That... there are LBL employees who work on Campus with unsealed 

radionuclides. It is not clear whether it has ever been determined if bioassay 

monitoring should be done on these individuals and if so, where their 

radiation records would be maintained.

 No formal mechanism currently exists for including supervisors in the loop for 

determining list of employees to be covered or in follow-up compliance 

procedure.

 Communications between EH&S and Bioassay [MSD] appears to rely 

primarily on informal contacts with no scheduled meetings between medical 

and EH&S re: Bioassay coverage.

For corrective actions, DOE recommended that LBNL require MSD to take a stronger 

management role in the bioassay program, and that EH&S verify the selection and follow-up 

process for those in the bioassay program.

An April 1985, Functional Appraisal of the radiation safety program by DOE (DOE 1985b) 

found many contamination incidents were only discovered after the internal exposure was 

detected through the routine bioassay program or by environmental sampling. While the focus 

of the review was the inadequacy of the ALARA program at LBNL, the appraisal noted that a 

20% staffing reduction had taken place for radiation monitors, which may have had a direct 

influence on the lack of response to contamination incidents. It may have also impacted the 

bioassay program by mitigating against updated personnel selection and follow-up. 

With respect to bioassay sample compliance, a 1987 DOE review (DOE 1987) found that, 

“Laboratory management is not enforcing the LBL policy to submit bioassay samples.” The 

report further found that “some of these individuals are still working with radionuclides without 

participating in the bioassay program.” 

This persistent lack of employee responsiveness and lack of accountable management systems to 

ensure a comprehensive bioassay program is not surprising, given the apparent laboratory 

management culture and thinking regarding its safety functions in the earlier years, including the 

1960s–1980s. As illustrated in a memorandum (Howe 1966), some laboratory managers 

believed a more ad hoc, decentralized system was more conducive to a research-oriented 
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institution than one that entailed more formal management direction and support, as advocated 

by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and later by DOE oversight findings. This internal 

memo also defends the lack of more formal communications between EH&S and MSD regarding 

the bioassay program and its selection process, and suggests that recommendations by the AEC 

were misguided and originated from its “rather bureaucratic thinking.” It does not appear that 

there was a commitment to respond to AEC recommendations in a meaningful way and 

strengthen institutional accountability for more effective bioassay program implementation. 

Preliminary Conclusion: 

The adequacy and completeness of LBNL’s bioassay data bear directly on whether potentially 

exposed employees were properly identified and enrolled for bioassay sampling, along with the 

identity of radionuclides to which they may have been exposed. Coupled with the historic lack 

of compliance by employees and lack of enforcement by management, and the lack of quality 

assurance performance checks, the degree of adequacy and completeness of bioassay data is 

uncertain, at least until the early to mid-1990s, when more formal management systems were put 

into place at LBNL. 
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REFERENCES 

ABRWH 2012. Transcripts of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) Work Group 

Meeting, February 3, 2012, available at 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/pdfs/abrwh/2012/wgtr020312.pdf. 

DOE 1985a. “Functional Appraisal of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, June 27–28, 1984,” 

U.S. Department of Energy, San Francisco Operations Office, California. November 28, 1984. 

SRDB #21456. 

DOE 1985b. “Functional Appraisal of the Radiation Safety Program, Lawrence Berkeley 

Laboratory, January–February 1985,” U.S. Department of Energy, San Francisco Operations 

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1987,” U.S. Department of Energy, San Francisco Operations Office, California. SRDB #21509. 

Grill 1966. Memorandum from R.P. Grill (LBL) to Dr. M. Powell (LBL) and Dr. L. Shaer 

(LBL), Subject: Termination Bio-Assay Whole Body Count. May 24, 1966. SRDB #20814. 

Howe 1963. Memorandum from P.W. Howe (LBL) to Health Chemistry Personnel (LBL), 

Subject: Bio-Assay Program Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. March 14, 1963. SRDB #20585. 

Howe 1966. Memorandum from P.W. Howe (LBL) to E.L. Kelly (LBL), Subject: Review of 

AEC Annual Radiation Safety Inspection of LRL-Berkeley. January 13, 1966. SRDB #20797. 

LBL 1968. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Report of the Bioassay Program, UCRL-18588, July 

1967 through June 1968, Anne dG. Low-Beer and Thorton W. Sargent, November 1968. SRDB 

#71905. 

LBL 1969. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Report of the Bioassay Program, UCRL-19354, July 

1968 through June 1969, Anne dG. Low-Beer, Thorton W. Sargent, Stephen R. Wright, and 

Barbara C. Buckley, August 1969. SRDB #71907. 

LBL 1973a. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Report of the Bioassay Program, July 1972 through 

June 1973, LBL-2248, November 1973. SRDB #71780. 

LBL 1973b. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Report of the Bioassay Laboratory, 1969–1972, 

UC-41, TID 4500, May 1973. SRDB #71773. 

Low-Beer 1962. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Memorandum from Anne dG. Low-Beer 

(LBL) to Dr. Howard G. Parker (LBL), Re: Report of Bioassay Program for 1961, January 10, 

1962. SRDB #21253. 
Effective Date: 

September 5, 2012 

Revision No. 

0 (Draft) 

Document No.: White Paper – 

SC&A Review of LBNL Issue #2 

Page No. 

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 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and 

Worker Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 

NOTICE:

Low-Beer 1963. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Memorandum from Anne dG. Low-Beer 

(LBL) to Dr. Howard G. Parker (LBL), Re: Report of Bioassay Program for 1962, January 23, 

1963. SRDB #21442. 

ORAUT 2007. Technical Basis Document for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,

ORAUT-TKBS-0049, Rev. 01, Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

April 2, 2007. 

ORAUT 2010. Technical Basis Document for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,

ORAUT-TKBS-0049, Rev. 02, Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

May 10, 2010. 

NIOSH 2012. “NIOSH Preliminary Responses to SC&A’s Issues Matrix for the Lawrence 

Berkeley National Laboratory Site Profile Technical Basis Document” (annotated responses 

added to SC&A 2012). National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

February 2012. 

SC&A 2010. Review of the NIOSH Site Profile for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,

ORAUT-TKBS-0049, Rev. 01, 2007. SCA-TR-TASK1-0002, January 22, 2010. 

SC&A 2012. “SC&A’s Issues Matrix for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Site 

Profile Technical Basis Document,” SC&A, Inc., Vienna, Virginia, and Saliant, Inc., Jefferson, 

Maryland. January 2012. 

Thaxter 1960. Memorandum from M.D. Thaxter (LBL) to P.W. Howe (LBL) and H.F. Soule 

(LBL), Re: Ru106-Rh106 Spill, Bldg. 70, Rm. 218 of September 12, 1960. September 13, 1960. 

SRDB #20475.