### FILED 

### March 1,2016 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt W A StateCourtofAppeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE In the Matter ofthe Welfare of ) ) No. 32975-5-III D.B., T.C., and K.F. ) (consol. with ) No. 32976-3-III, ) No. 32977-1-III) ) ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION SIDDOWAY, C.J.

- Thetrial courtterminated B.B.'sparental rights as to herthree children. B.B. appeals. She argues the trial courterredwhen it found 

### (1) thatthe Department ofSocial and Health Services (Department)providedherwith all necessary services underRCW 13.34.180(1)(d) becausethe Department did not provide herwith integrated treatment for her co-occurring mental health and substance abuse issues, and (2) thatitwas in herchildren's best interests to terminate herparental rights. Becausethe Department offeredB.B. several co-occurring treatment options, and because itis in the children'sbestinterests to terminate B.B.'sparental rights, we affirm. FACTS B.B. is the mother ofthree children: K.F., T.C., and D.B. TheDepartmentbecame involvedwiththe family in August 2011. Between August 2011 andMarch 2012, "the Department received eight separate referrals[. T]wo allegedphysical abuse, butthe majority were for neglect, such as the childrennotreceiving enoughto eat, theNo. 32975-5-III (consol. 

### wiNo. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-I-III) In re the Welfare of D.E.

cleanliness ofthe home, concerns about [RB.'s] behavior around the kids, and substance abuse." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 358-59. RB. confessed on one occasion that she had "smoked spice, methamphetamines and marijuana" at a party with her children. CP at 359. B.R participated in voluntary services, including family preservation services, urinalysis (VA) screening for drugs, and a screening at Spokane Mental Health. When the voluntary services agreement expired in May 2012, the Departmentclosed its case. In October 2012, the Departmentreceived anotherreferral for unsanitary conditions inthe home and concerns about B.B.'sbehavior with D.B. When social worker Anna Schultz viewedthe home she found piles ofdirty dishes in the sinkwith flies circling around them, and debris and food onthe floor. "Thebasementhad been flooded from [D.B.] pluggingthe toilet." CP at 360. "[B.R] was extremely agitated and yellingprofanities. She insisted her house was clean andthat she had been cleaning." Id. Ms. Schultz was worried about B.B.'s mental health, butRB. refused to attend counseling. Ms. Schultz filed a dependency petition on November 21,2012. A shelter care order was entered on November 27, 2012, under which the children

were allowed to remain in the home because B.B. agreed to intensive family preservation services, followed by family preservation services, VA and breath alcohol testing, a chemical dependency assessment iftherewas ever a positive VA, mental health treatment with Carla Paullin, and to take D.B. to counseling.

2No. 32975-5-III (consol. 

### wiNo. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-I-III) In re the Welfare of D.B.

That same day, intensive family preservation services began with therapist Shaylyn Gunnels. Ms. Gunnels tried to buildrapport with B.B., butB.B. was hostile and verbally combative, did not want Ms. Gunnels to be the therapist, and was unwilling to explore appropriate behaviormanagement techniques. B.B. made no progress in the four sessions with Ms. Gunnels, and on December 3,2012, Ms. Gunnels notified B.B. she would be unable to continueproviding services to her. Ms. Schultz obtained an orderto remove the children on December 5, 2012, and another shelter care hearing was held. Atthat hearing, the children were ordered to remain out ofthehome. "[B.B.] again agreed to [intensive family preservation services],

. VA testing, a chemical dependency assessment ifa VA was dirty or she failed to appear, mental health counseling with [Carla Paullin], and counseling for [D.B.]." CP at 365. The children were found dependent onJanuary 24, 2013. The Department filed a petition to terminate B.B.'sparental rights more than a year and a halfafter the children's removal from the home, on October 1, 2013. Betweenthe beginning ofthe dependency in January 2013 until the trial courtultimately terminated B.B

..'sparental rights, B.B. attended the provided services only sporadically, oftenrefused services, and made little progress on her mental health and substance abuse issues. More than another year hadpassed when, on November 17, 2014, the trial court 

# I found that all six requirements ofRCW 13.34.180(1) were satisfied by clear, cogent, and 

# I I 3No. 32975-5-III (conso!. wiNo. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-1-III) In re the Welfare of D.B. convincing evidence, and that terminating B.B.'sparental rights was in the best interests ofthe children. B.B. appeals. ANALYSIS "The fundamental liberty interest ofnatural parents in the care, custody, and management oftheir child does not evaporate simply because they have notbeen model parents or have lost temporary custody oftheir child to the State." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). Because ofthis fundamental liberty interest, the State may terminate parental rights'" only for the most powerful [of] reasons.'" In re SJ, 162 Wn. App. 873, 880, 256 P.3d 470 (2011) (alteration in original) (quotingIn re Welfare of AJR., 78 Wn.**App~** 222, 229, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995)). Washington uses a two-step process to determine whether to terminate parental rights. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908,911,232 P.3d 1104 (2010). "The first step focuses on the adequacy ofthe parents and mustbeprovedby clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." Id. (footnote omitted). The State must establish the six statutory elements listed in RCW 13.34.180(1) and make a finding that the parent is presently unfit. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i). Here, only one ofthe six elements under RCW 13.34.180(1) is challenged on appeal: (d) Thatthe services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered orprovided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable ofcorrecting the parental 4No. 32975-5-111 (conso!. 

### wiNo. 32976-3-111, No. 32977-1-111) 

### In re the Welfare of D.E.

deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). "Clear, cogent and convincing evidence exists when the evidence shows the ultimate fact at issue to be highly probable." 

### In re Dependencyof KSC., 137 Wn.2d 918,925,976P.2d 113 (1999). "The second step focuses on the child's best interests and need be proved by only

apreponderance ofthe evidence." 

### A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 911 (footnote omitted); RCW 13J4.190(1)(b). The courtmay not reach the second step unless the first step has been satisfied. 

### Id. at 911. STANDARD OF REVIEW This court reviews an order terminatingparental rights de novo. 

### In re Dependency ofKNJ., 171 Wn.2d 568,574,257 PJd 522 (2011). "Thecourt's factual findings must be upheld ifsupported by substantial evidence from which a rational trier offact could find the necessary facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." 

### KSC., 137 Wn.2d at 925. Evidence is substantial ifit is sufficientto persuade a fair-minded person ofthe truth ofthe fact at issue. 

### SJ., 162 Wn. App. at 88l. "Thetrialjudgehas the advantage ofhavingthe witnesses before him orher, and deference to the findings is ofparticular importance in deprivationproceedings." 

### KSC., 137 Wn.2d at 925. "Unchallenged findings offact are verities on appeal." 

### In re Welfare of A. W, 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 PJd 1186(2015).

5No. 32975-5-III (consol. 

### wi No. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-1-III) In re the Welfare ofD.B.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR The issues on appeal are whether the State provided B.B. with all necessary services under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), and whether it is in her children's best interests to terminate herparental rights. 

### 1. The State ProvidedAllNecessary Services B.B. argues that the State did notprovide her with all necessary services because it failed to provide her with integrated treatment for her co-occurring mental health and substance abuse issues. To terminate parental rights, the State must prove that it offered all necessary services capable ofcorrecting the specificparental deficiencies within the foreseeable future. RCW 13.34.l80(1)(d). "The services offered mustbe tailored to each individual's needs,"In reDependencyofT.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 161,29P.3d 1275 (2001), and they must be offered in a timely manner, SJ., 162 Wn. App. at 881-83. Itis well settled that the statutory requirement to offercorrective services does not contemplate an entirely one-way process, and "aparent's unwillingness or inability to make use ofthe servicesprovided excuses the State from offering extra services that might have beenhelpful." In re Dependency of Ramquist, 52 Wn. App. 854,861, 765 P.2d 30 (1988).

6No. 32975-5-III (consol. 

### wiNo. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-1-III) 

### In re the Welfare of D.B.

Even where the Department inexplicably fails to offer services to a parent, termination will still be deemed appropriate ifthe services would not have remediedthe parent's deficiencies in the foreseeable future. 

### In re Welfare ofMR.H, 145 Wn. App. 10,25, 188 P.3d 510 (2008). "Wherethe record establishes that the offer ofservices would be futile, the trial court can make a finding that the Department has offered all reasonable services." 

### Id. (citing

### In re Welfare of Ferguson, 32 Wn. App. 865, 869-70, 650 P.2d 1118 (1982), 

### rev'don othergrounds, 98 Wn.2d 589, 656 P.2d 503 (1983». While B.B. contends that the State did not offerher co-occurring treatment, the trial court's unchallenged findings offact show otherwise. The record demonstrates that Ms. Paullin, a therapist who was selected for her expertise in co-occurring disorders, attempted to work with B.B. on hermental health disorder through cognitive behavioral therapy, and also attempted to get RR to attend treatment for chemical dependency. B.B. resisted both. [B.R] was unwilling to acknowledge, or evenpretend, that she had to change her way ofthinking, to engage in counseling or other services. [B.B.'s] view was the Department wanted her kids[,] that it wasn't about parenting, that she had cleaned her dirty house, and there were no other reasons for concern. CP at 368. A chemical dependency counselortried three separate times to help RB. access 

# I 

# I ! health insurance so she could obtain co-occurringtreatment, butB.B. missed all three 

### I appointments. The counselortestified that, while co-occurringtreatment is limited in 7No. 32975-5-111 (consol. 

### wi No. 32976-3-111, No. 32977-1-111) In re the Welfare of D.B. Washington, hadB.B. securedmedical insurance, she would have had access to the treatment. Social worker Lori Blaketried to convince B.B. to goto inpatient treatment. In fact, three beds at inpatientprograms that apparently could have addressed B.B.'s cooccurring condition opened, butB.B. refused to participate in those programs at the times the beds were available. When B.B. finally agreed to go to inpatient treatment, the only open bedwas at Pioneer CenterEast (PCE), a chemical dependency treatment centerthat does notprovide co-occurring treatment. Even aftertreatment at PCE, B.B. received numerous referrals. She was again referred to Ms. Paullin for counseling. She was also referred to Youth, Family, Adult Connections (YFA) for their "co-occurring disorder intensive outpatient group," andto FrontierBehavioral Health for a mental health referral and self-help groups. CP at 374, 383. Shewas anhour late for her intake appointment at YFA, and only attended two other appointments (and at one ofthem she left early). She did not attendthe remaining nine appointments. B.B. also failed to re-engage in counselingwith Ms. Paullin. The record contains clear, cogent, and convincing evidence thatB.B. was offered cooccurringtreatment options on multiple occasions. Even ifthe Departmenthad failed to offer co-occurring treatment options, B.B.'s unwillingness to engagewith services orrecognize her mental health and substance abuse issues make itclear such treatment would have been futile. In addition to B.B.'s failure 8No. 32975-5-111 (conso!. 

### wi No. 32976-3-111, No. 32977-1-111) In re the Welfare of D.B.

to engage in the co-occurring servicesjustmentioned, B.B. failed to actively engage in any ofthe other services offered. During the approximately nine months B.B. was scheduled for UA testing, she missed 25 appointments. While she did attend six UA tests, two were positive for drugs, and one was invalid due to low creatinine. And though B.B. more consistently attendedher counseling sessions with Ms. Paullin (attending 13 of 21 sessions), she never actively engaged with counseling andrefused to accept she had a problem. Similarly, whenB.B. was referred to a counselor at B.B.'s attorney's request, B.B. missed her two and only appointments. While B.B. did attend seven ofeight appointments with clinicalpsychologistDr. Sean Smitham, as soon as he discussed her schizophrenia with her, she discontinued treatment. The overwhelming consensus ofher various health care providers and social workers was that she was unwilling to accept she had aproblem, and refused to actively engage in services to correctherparental deficiencies. Thus, the Department was not required to provide additional services. B.B.'s arguments based onIn re Dependency ofH.

# w., 92 Wn. App. 420, 961 P.2d 963, amendedon recons. bysub nom. In re Dependencyof H W. & 

### V.

# w., 969 P.2d 1082 (1998), and 

### SJ, 162 Wn. App. 873, are not persuasive. In

### H. W. the father was a convicted sex offender andthe motherwas developmentally disabled. 92 Wn. App. at 421. The Department assumed the mother could not protectthe children from sexual abuse because she was too attached tothe father to understand his sexual deviancy. Id at 

### 9No. 32975-5-III (consol. 

### wiNo. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-1-III) In re the Welfare of D.E.

423-24. Consequently, the Departmentneverreferred the mother to the Division of Developmental Disabilities for potentially applicable services. Id. at 426. However, the evidence showedthat the mother was able to learn new material, adjust her behavior, and

was eager for more services. Id. at 428. The courtultimately found that all necessary services were not offered. Id. at429-30. In 

### s.J., the mother had a bipolar disorder and substance abuse issues. 162 Wn. App. at 876. Despite knowing ofher mental health issues, the Department did notrefer her to mental health services until eight months after S.J. was removed from the home, during which time the mother unsuccessfully attempted to complete inpatient treatment for substance abuse three times. Id. at 876-77. However, soon after receiving mental health services-inwhich she actively participated and improved her ability to identify symptoms ofa bipolarepisode-the mother successfully completed inpatient treatment. Id. at 882. Thereafter, the mother remained sober, implemented the suggestedparenting skills, and established a safe, clean, drug-free home. Id. at 877, 883. The court found the mother's inability to complete inpatient treatment was linked to herbipolar disorder, and that ifthe Department had offered her co-occurring treatment sooner, she would have been able to recover in time to properly parenther child. The court found the Department had not offered all the necessary services. Id. at 882, 884. 

# I I 10

# I I j 

# i No. 32975-5-II1 (conso!. 

### wi No. 32976-3-III, No. 32977-I-III) In re the Welfare of D.E. 

# I H 

# I This case is distinguishable from 

### H. W for two reasons. First, while the mother in

. 

### H W was eager for services and tried to implementtechniques she learned, here B.B.**~** 

# I frequently refused orfailed to attend services, and would not acknowledge she had a ! problemthe services could help remedy. Second, while the mother in

### H. W was never 

# I offered disability services, B.B. was offered co-occurring treatment both before and after 

# I entering inpatienttreatment. 

## ! I 

### SJ is likewise distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, while the mother in 

### SJ received no mental health counseling until eight months afterher child was removed, here B.B. received multiple referrals to mental health, substance abuse, and cooccurringtreatmentprograms. Shereceived mental health counseling from Ms. Paullin the same month her children were removed and was encouragedto goto chemical dependency treatment within a month ofstartingthat counseling. B.B. was offered

access to insurance to obtain co-occurring treatment, but she missed three appointments to help herenroll. B.B. refused three beds at inpatienttreatment centers that apparently could have accommodated her co-occurring disorder. After inpatient chemical dependency treatment, B.B. was again offered counseling with Ms. Paullin, and cooccurring treatment at YFA, but she either sporadically attended or did not attend at all. Second, while the mother in 

### SJ actively engaged in mental health sessions and implemented suggestedparenting skills, B.B. consistently failed to engage inthe provided services, and showed little to no ability to acceptthat her problems with mental 11No. 32975-5-111 (consol. 

### wiNo. 32976-3-111, No. 32977-1-111) In re the Welfare of D.B.

illness and substance abuse were the reason her children were removed from her care. Therefore, neitherH W nor 8.J. require this court to find the Department failed to offer B.B. all necessary services. In fact, this case is most likeRamquist, 52 Wn. App. 854. In Ramquist, the mother suffered from schizophrenia. Id. at 856. She received regular counseling, was informed ofclasses nearherhome (one ofwhich she completed), and was prescribedmedication. Id. at 861. Despite these services, the mother's doctors and her caseworkertestified that herparental deficiencies were untreatable and would notbe remedied by further services. Id. at 861. There the court found the Department offered all necessary services. Id. Here, B.B. was offered a variety oftreatments, both sequential and co-occurring, and she failed to engage in orbenefit from any ofthem. And like in Ramquist, B.B.'s health care providers and caseworkers all testified thatB.B. was resistant to counseling, attended infrequently, and would not acknowledge herproblems. There is no service that

can make someone acknowledge a problem, and without acknowledging herproblems, B.B. is untreatable. Thus, the trial court properly found the Departmentprovided all necessary services. II. The Children ISBestInterests Here, B.B. assigns error to the trial court's finding that terminating herparental rights was in her children's best interests. Because she fails to make argument or cite to

12No. 32975-5-111 (consol. 

### wi No. 32976-3-111, No. 32977-1-111) 

### In re the Welfare of D.E.

any authority to support her assignment oferror, she has abandoned the challenge. 

### See In

re the Dependency ofCT., 59 Wn. App. 490, 500, 798 P.2d 1170 (1990). The outcome wouldbethe same had B.B. properly argued the issue. All ofthe children have significantneeds thatrequire a consistentparent who provides a safe stable home, andrecognizes their need for treatment and appropriate behavior management. Where B.B. is unable to recognize her parental deficiencies or acknowledge her own need for mental health and substance abuse treatment, she will be unable to provide the home the children need to be able to recover andthrive. Accordingly, it is in the children's best interests that B.B.'sparental rights be terminated. We affirm. A majority ofthe panel has determinedthis opinion will notbe printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public recordpursuantto RCW 2.06.040.

# ~~tU'~if- Siddoway, C.l. 

# 'i5

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, 

### J.

13