Draft White Paper 

UPDATE ON THE USE OF SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES 

AT GENERAL STEEL INDUSTRIES

Contract Number 200-2009-28555 

Prepared by 

Robert Anigstein 

S. Cohen & Associates 

1608 Spring Hill Road, Suite 400 

Vienna, Virginia 22182 

October 2011 

Disclaimer 

This document is made available in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Advisory Board 

on Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) to maintain all possible openness in its 

deliberations. However, the ABRWH and its contractor, SC&A, caution the reader that at the 

time of its release, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Board for 

factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. This implies that once 

reviewed by the ABRWH, the Board’s position may differ from the report’s conclusions. Thus, 

the reader should be cautioned that this report is for information only and that premature 

interpretations regarding its conclusions are unwarranted.
Effective Date: 

10/20/2011 

Revision No. 

0 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: Update on the 

Use of Sealed Radioactive Sources at GSI 

Page No. 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

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Document Description: 

Update on the Use of Sealed 

Radioactive Sources at General 

Steel Industries 

Effective Date: 

Draft –October 20, 2011 

S. Cohen & Associates:

Technical Support for the Advisory Board on 

Radiation & Worker Health Review of 

NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Program 

Revision No. 0 (Draft) 

UPDATE ON THE USE OF SEALED 

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AT GENERAL STEEL 

INDUSTRIES 

Page 2 of 25 

Task Manager: ___________________ Date: 

 Robert Anigstein, PhD 

Supersedes: 

N/A 

Project Manager: _________________ Date: 

 John Mauro, PhD, CHP 

Reviewer: 

 John Mauro, PhD 

Record of Revisions 

Revision 

Number 

Effective 

Date Description of Revision 

0 (Draft) 10/20/2011 Initial issue 

10/31/2011 Privacy Act cleared version provided. Personal identifiers have been redacted as well 

as Attachment 1. Minor formatting errors were also addressed. 
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Use of Sealed Radioactive Sources at GSI 

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Update on the Use of Sealed Radioactive Sources at General Steel Industries

During its meeting on September 20, 2011, the ABRWH Work Group on TBD-6000 assigned 

several action items to SC&A, including follow-up interviews with [redacted] site experts: 

[redacted], a former General Steel Industries (GSI) [redacted], and [redacted], a former 

administrator of St. Louis Testing Laboratories (SLTL). We were also asked to obtain 

descriptions and/or illustrations of the radiographic cameras (containing sealed sources) 

identified in GSI’s AEC byproduct material license applications. We were later directed by Ted 

Katz, Designated Federal Official to the ABRWH, to interview [redacted], a former [redacted] 

at GSI, as well as [redacted], former [redacted] of Nuclear Consultants Corporation (NCC). 

The purpose of conducting these interviews and collecting other information was to determine 

the degree of administrative control that was exercised over the use of portable radiation sources 

at GSI. The information which we acquired casts a new light on this subject. The present report 

comprises the following parts: 

 the main body of the report, which presents a summary of the information that was 

collected and discusses the implications and conclusions regarding the radiation safety 

practices with respect to sealed sources used for radiography; 

 Appendix A, which contains detailed reports of interviews with four site experts; 

 Appendix B, which presents the details of the calculations of exposure and dose rates 

from the use of 226Ra sources in the radiographic facility in No. 6 Building; 

 Attachment 1, which contains part of the radiation exposure record of [redacted], a 

former GSI worker; and 

 Attachment 2, which contains a brochure describing the Radionics radiographic cameras, 

one of which was procured by GSI in 1968. 

1 Film Badge Dosimetry 

A question had been raised about the use of film badge dosimeters at GSI prior to November 

1963, when dosimetry records obtained from Landauer indicated that film badges had been 

furnished to the facility. During the recent interview, [redacted] stated that he always used a 

film badge when he worked as a radiographer (section A.1).1 He recalled starting work at GSI in 

1953, later going [redacted], and returning to GSI [redacted] in 1956. His “Occupational 

External Radiation Exposure History” (Attachment 1) indicates a period of exposure at GSI of 18 

quarters up to [redacted], 1962. He stated that he started to work as a [redacted] at GSI only 

after he returned from [redacted]. This work was done on weekends—it was in addition to 

[redacted] Monday–Friday [redacted] in the laboratory, which involved no radiation exposure. 

If we assume that his period of radiation exposure spanned 18 contiguous quarters ending in the 

last quarter prior to the date of the report, then his exposures would have started during the 

quarter that began on July 1, 1957. Thus, we can conclude that film badge dosimeters were in 

use at GSI by that time. 

 1

 All sections starting with “A” are found in Appendix A. 
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In addition, Figure 1 shows a photograph of a General Steel Castings (former name of General 

Steel Industries, Inc.) worker wearing what appears to be a film badge on his belt. Since he 

appears to be wearing a T-shirt which most likely did not have a pocket, it is quite plausible that 

he would have worn the film badge on his belt. This photo appeared in a 1953 General Steel 

magazine (House 1953) and is assumed to have been taken at that time. The outline of the film 

badge and the open window resembles the Tracerlab film badge illustrated in Figure 2, which 

was used in the late 1940s and 1950s. Together, this evidence indicates that film badge 

dosimeters were used at GSI as early as 1953, which is the first year of the covered period. This 

lends credence to the following statement made by GSI in its application to the AEC for the 

renewal of its byproduct material license submitted February 14, 1963: 

Up to this time February 1, 1963 no formal written tests have been given. . . . 

During this period the exposure limits published by the A.E.C. at the applicable 

time were followed. They were never exceeded and averaged under 25%. (NRC 

2009a, p. 26) 

In our earlier report (Anigstein 2011), we questioned this statement, since, without a film-badge 

dosimetry program, GSI would have had no basis for such an assertion. Given that such a 

program had been in place and that the records were presumably available for inspection by 

AEC, this claim appears to be credible. 

Figure 1. William Greer at the Control Board 

in the Betatron Building (House 1953)

Figure 2. Tracerlab Film Badge (late 

1940s, 1950s) (ORAU 2009)

According to [redacted], NCC furnished film badges that it procured from Landauer to monitor 

GSI workers during the time he was a radiation safety consultant to GSI in 1962–63. He no 

longer has those film badge dosimetry records. [redacted] could not recall any instance of a GSI 

worker being “overdosed” during the time he was involved with that facility. 
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It was common practice for Landauer, especially in its early years, to provide film badge services 

to consultants who then furnished the badges to their clients. In such cases, the accounts and 

records would be maintained under the name of the consultant.2

Landauer has furnished NIOSH an index of clients to whom they provided film badges during 

their early years. Inspection of these records does not show any entries for “Nuclear 

Consultants,” “Konneker,” or Mallinckrodt,3

 or any plausible variant of these names, during the 

years in question, nor for GSI prior to November 1963. The possible explanations are that 

[redacted] might have been mistaken about his use of Landauer film badges, or he might have 

obtained the film badges through a middleman who had an account with Landauer. However, 

we could not identify any plausible source of Landauer film badges among the Landauer 

customers in the St. Louis area (where NCC was located) during the years in question. 

2 Use of Radium Sources 

2.1 Information From Worker Interviews 

[Redacted] stated that 226Ra sources were stored and used inside the special radiographic facility 

in No. 6 Building. In an earlier interview, he noted that they were kept in No. 6 Building “99% 

if not more.”4 In a follow-up interview, he said they were used outside that facility “once in a 

blue moon” (section A.1.2). He clearly remembered that the radiographic facility was there 

when he returned from [redacted] in 1956, and may have been there when he started in 1953. 

Mr. [redacted]’s background is summarized in GSI’s original application for an AEC byproduct 

material license as follows: 

Mr. [redacted] has had over 2 years experience in radiography at General Steel 

Industries doing standard x-rays, 24 MEV betatron and 500 mg sources of Ra 

226, some informal training and courses as listed above (NRC 2009b, p. 18). 

Furthermore, Mr. [redacted] stated that he was a “[redacted]”4 We conclude that Mr. 

[redacted] is a knowledgeable source of information and appears to have a clear recollection of 

his work at GSI. 

A somewhat different account was provided by [redacted], who said the source was taken 

“anywhere they needed it.” It may be instructive to compare Mr. [redacted]’s and Mr. 

[redacted]’s activities at GSI. We note the following description of Mr. [redacted]’s position 

and duties that appears in AEC Form 313, dated February 1, 1963, part of the GSI application for 

renewal of its byproduct material license (NRC 2009a, p. 17): 

We further request the addition of Mr. [redacted] to our license as an approved 

Radiographer. Mr. [redacted] has attended the lecture course mentioned above 

 2

 Joe Zlotnicki, SC&A Associate and former vice-president of Landauer, private communication with 

Robert Anigstein, SC&A, Inc., October 2011. 

3

 NCC became a division of Mallinckrodt in 1966. 

4

 [Redacted], private communication with Robert Anigstein, SC&A, Inc., October 9, 2010. 
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and has been judged by Messrs. [redacted] as competent in the operation of all 

our radiographic and monitoring devices. He is a [redacted], assisting Mr. 

[redacted] in supervision of the Chemical & Testing Laboratory, and as a 

[redacted] should have access to and knowledge of our procedure. Although 

fully capable of being a “radiographer”, he will not do any actual work as a 

radiographer. He has had several months experience with the Betatron and 

radium prior to our purchase of the Budd Co. Unitrons and Co-60. 

During his first interview, Mr. [redacted] could not recall when he started work at GSI. During 

a follow-up telephone call on October 11, 2011, that I placed to elicit his comments and 

corrections to the draft interview report which I had sent to him, he placed the start of his 

employment at about 1955. He also remembered that the radiographic facility was there when he 

started. 

We note that Mr. [redacted] was one of only [redacted] individuals authorized to act as 

radiographers under the original AEC license, while the request to add Mr. [redacted] was 

submitted later. Furthermore, Mr. [redacted] appeared to have a detailed recollection of the 

radiographic procedures, and was quite firm in his statements. Thus, while Mr. [redacted] was 

actively engaged in radiography, albeit only on weekends, Mr. [redacted]’s [redacted] appears 

to have been in the “Chemical & Testing Laboratory.” 

It would be illogical for GSI to have constructed a special radiographic facility and not used it. 

Performing radiography inside that structure would also appear to have been more efficient— the 

radiographer could set up the shot and go into the “office” inside the radiographic facility, or 

leave the building and lock the door behind him. There would be no need to perform a new 

radiation survey for each shot and to put up ropes and warning signs. It seems most likely that 

castings that could be lifted by a crane and would fit inside the radiography room (which was 

18 ft wide and about 56 ft long) would be radiographed inside that facility, while the occasional 

oversize casting would be radiographed in another location. Mr. [redacted] described the 

cordoning off of a “safe” area while the sources were used outside the radiography room, which 

indicated an awareness of radiation safety. However, he was critical of the fact that, under such 

circumstances, the exposed source was not continually monitored: the radiographer would 

occasionally leave the area. 

The preponderance of the evidence indicates that radiography using 226Ra sources was primarily 

performed inside the radiographic structure in No. 6 Building. On the infrequent occasions that 

it was necessary to use the sources outside this facility, the radiographer cordoned off an area 

and kept other personnel outside the 2 mR/h isoexposure perimeter. Some incursions into the 

higher exposure area may have occurred when the source was left unattended. In our previous 

report (Anigstein 2011, section 1.6), we derived the exposure of a person intruding into a ropedoff area surrounding a radioactive source. Applying the same method to the 500-mCi 226Ra 

source, we derived an exposure of 0.07 mR for a single intrusion. This represents a trivial 

contribution to a worker’s annual exposure. 
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2.2 Radiological Assessment of Radium Radiography 

In our previous report (Anigstein 2011), we derived a bounding exposure of a radiographer 

transporting 226Ra sources by means of the fishpole technique of 9.39 R/y. At that time, we did 

not have sufficient information to estimate [redacted] exposure while the radiography was in 

progress. We have learned from Mr. [redacted]’s most recent interviews that [redacted] spent 

much of the time that the exposure was in progress inside the radiographer’s office—a small 

room inside the radiographic facility. We therefore performed an analysis of the exposure within 

that facility, using the MCNP radiation transport code. The external exposure and personal dose 

equivalent, Hp(10), rates were calculated in two locations: the center of the office and 1 m 

outside the entrance to the facility. According to Mr. [redacted], it was possible to radiograph 

two castings simultaneously by placing sufficient shielding between the two sources to avoid 

exposure of the film from the adjacent source. We therefore modeled the source as 1 Ci of 226Ra 

(two 500-mCi sources). A detailed description of the MCNP model is presented in Appendix B. 

The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1. The annual work-hours are based on the 

consensus estimate of former GSI workers (“Dr. Robert Anigstein . . . “ 2007). The exposure 

duration (i.e., the fraction of the time the 226Ra sources were outside their shielded containers) 

was based on the initial AEC license application, which states that “[a] maximum of 30% of each 

shift is used for actual exposure” (NRC 2009b, p. 12). In the interest of a bounding assessment, 

the radiographer was assumed to remain in the office while the exposure was in progress; thus, 

the occupancy factor was assumed to be 100%.5 

 Table 1. Assessment of Exposure to 226Ra in Radiographic Facility in No. 6 Building 

Exposure rate Dose rate—Hp(10) Location Annual 

work-hours 

Exposure 

durationa Occupancy 

mR/hb mR/y mrem/hb mrem/y 

Office 100% 0.303 296 0.333 324

Outside door 3,250 30% 25%c 8.56 2,087 8.94 2,179

a

 Based on initial AEC materials license application (NRC 2009b, p. 12)

b

 Results of MCNP analysis

c

 “Partial occupancy factor” assumed in NRC 2009c, p. 6

Thus, a bounding annual exposure of a radiographer to 226Ra sources, based on our exposure 

model, is estimated to be 9.69 R/y (9.39 + 0.296  9.69), while the exposure of nonradiographers to 226Ra is estimated to be  2.09 R/y. 

Another approach to estimating the doses to radiographers from 226Ra sources is based on Mr. 

[redacted]’s “Occupational External Radiation Exposure History” (Attachment 1). We note that 

[redacted] a whole-body dose of [redacted] rem over 18 calendar quarters, or an average annual 

dose of [redacted] rem. We also note that Mr. [redacted] performed radiography only on 

weekends—during the week [redacted] in the testing laboratory, where [redacted] not 

 5

 In reality, the radiographer sometimes left the facility to develop the film from a previous exposure, or 

for other reasons. 
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knowingly exposed to radiation and would therefore not have been wearing [redacted] film 

badge. We used the furnished information to estimate the doses to a hypothetical full-time 

radiographer. We assumed that a part-time radiographer received an average annual dose of 

2.02 rem. To derive a high-end dose to a full-time radiographer, we assumed that a part-time 

radiographer worked one shift per weekend, 80% of the time. Thus, he would have worked 40 

shifts per year. Based on this assumption, a full-time radiographer working 406 shifts per year 

would have received an annual dose of 20.5 rem (2.02 rem  406 shifts/y ÷ 40 shifts/y = 

20.5 rem). A low-end estimate is based on the assumption that a part-time radiographer worked 

two shifts each weekend, working such weekends 90% of the time. He would have thus worked 

90 shifts per year, and the prorated dose to a full-time radiographer would be 9.1 rem/y, which is 

close to the dose derived from the exposure model described above. 

Finally, we can base a bounding dose on the statement in the AEC license application, cited in 

section 1 of the present report: “During this period the exposure limits published by the A.E.C. 

at the applicable time were followed. They were never exceeded and averaged under 25%.” 

(NRC 2009a, p. 26) Although the actual limits were not stated, we assume that the standard was 

15 rem/y prior to 1954. In 1954, the 5  (n − 18) rem rule was adopted (lifetime dose of 5 rem 

for every year after the age of 18), with a quarterly maximum of 3 rem. An employee well past 

the age of 18 with no known prior exposure history could receive as much as 12 rem/y in the 

years following 1954. Therefore, a plausible dose limit would be 15 rem/y for 1953–1954, and 

12 rem/y for 1955–1962. We observe that the three methods of estimating plausible upper 

bounds of exposures to 226Ra yield values within the range of 9–20 rem/y. 

2.3 Use of 60Co Sources 

Mr. [redacted] said that the 60Co sources were used either in the radiographic facility in No. 6 

Building or in one of the betatron buildings. They were rarely used in open areas. This is 

consistent with the account of [redacted], who was interviewed on the telephone by Paul L. 

Ziemer, then Chairman of the ABRWH, on December 7, 2009 (see Anigstein 2011, Attachment 

1). Mr. [redacted], who was [redacted], stated that the small 60Co source was only used to 

radiograph items in a separate “small” building, whose number he could not recall. His 

description fits that of the radiographic facility in No. 6 Building. It is also consistent with his 

earlier statement, that the 1⁄4-Ci 60Co source was used in the No. 6 Building.6

 On the other hand, 

Mr. [redacted] said that the radiographic cameras containing the 60Co sources were lifted out of 

the radiographic facility by the overhead crane and taken to other locations, such as the No. 10 

Building, as needed. 

As stated earlier, Mr. [redacted] [redacted] original radiographers listed on the AEC license 

application. [Redacted] first 18 workers who were issued film badges under the Landauer 

program, which started about [redacted], 1963. Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted] were both 

issued their first film badges under the Landauer program the week of [redacted], 1964—in fact, 

they had successive film badge numbers. This date is consistent with Mr. [redacted]’s account 

that he started work in 1963, since new workers were typically assigned to Magnaflux testing for 

approximately six months before being qualified as radiographers. Although Mr. [redacted] was 

 6

 [Redacted], private communication with Robert Anigstein, SC&A, Inc., January 21, 2008. 
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employed by GSI much earlier, he was apparently not involved in radiography during the first 

three months of the Landauer program. 

We thus have statements from [redacted] workers actively engaged in radiography that, with 

rare exceptions, GSI complied with the terms of its AEC license and confined the use of the 60Co 

sources to the designated facilities. 

As was the case for the radium sources, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that 

radiography using the small 60Co sources was primarily performed inside the radiographic 

structure in No. 6 Building. Allen (2011, section 6.2.1), derived doses to various workers inside 

and outside this radiography room. We agree with his bounding calculations of exposures of 

radiographers and of workers just outside the walls of 1.17 R/y that were based on reports of 

radiation surveys included in the application for an AEC byproduct material license. 

2.4 Other Radioactive Sources 

2.4.1 192Ir 

Mr. [redacted] stated that the only 192Ir sources at GSI were those brought onto the site by St. 

Louis Testing Labs. GSI workers did not perform radiography using those sources, but only 

showed the SLTL radiographers which shots were needed. Since 192Ir is not mentioned in the 

GSI AEC license correspondence, we conclude that GSI did not own such sources. 

2.4.2 “Large” 60Co Source 

According to the AEC license correspondence, GSI acquired an 80-Ci 60Co in 1968, which is 

after the covered period. However, J[redacted], a former [redacted] operator, stated during the 

course of a TBD-6000/6001 work group meeting on October 14, 2009: “I assisted an operator in 

a large curie cobalt source in the new Betatron one time. They brought a large cobalt source in 

to x-ray nuclear channel heads . . . . This was done . . . [b]y a fellow named [redacted]. 

[Redacted], who was an isotope man.” (Neal R. Gross 2009, p. 194 et seq.) Since Mr. 

[redacted] left GSI in 1966 (his last film badge dosimetry report was for the week 

[redacted]/66–[redacted]/66), this would imply that GSI had an unlicensed source, perhaps 

during the covered period. 

Before we received the AEC licensing records, I had asked Mr. [redacted] when GSI had 

acquired the 80-Ci source in order to estimate its activity during the period in question—he did 

not recall when the source was acquired (see footnote 6, p. 8). I also asked Mr. [redacted] about 

his recollections of a large source. He recalled an incident in which a 60Co source could not be 

retracted and someone had to be called in to fix it—he thought it might have been a large source 

(section A.1.3). I likewise asked Mr. [redacted] if he knew if GSI owned an 80-Ci 60Co source. 

He responded: “No, I wasn’t familiar with the 80 Ci. The mCi source I was, because it became 

disconnected one time and I retrieved it. I didn’t know they had an 80 Ci.” (section A.2.1) This 

would appear to be the incident which Mr. [redacted] cited; we thus conclude that one of the 

small (nominally 260- or 280-mCi) 60Co sources was involved. Furthermore, the late [redacted] 

stated in an interview that he knew of no 80-Ci 60Co source at GSI while he was there. Although 

he left the nondestructive testing (NDT) department to become [redacted] in Cleaning and 
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Finishing at the end of 1964, he said he kept in touch with the NDT department and would have 

known if GSI had such a source. (Anigstein 2010) 

During the May 12, 2010 meeting of the Work Group on TBD-600, [redacted], GSI 

copetitioner, said that some former workers suggested that the GSI Granite City foundry might 

have obtained a high-activity 60Co source from the GSI foundry at Eddystone, Pennsylvania, 

when the latter facility was shut down in 1963 (Neal R. Gross 2010, p. 270 et seq.) I therefore 

filed a FOIA request with NRC requesting any records on the Eddystone facility to determine if 

they had any 60Co sources and, if so, how were they disposed of. NRC responded that the 

records, under the earlier name of General Steel Castings Company (GSCC), had been turned 

over to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). NARA responded that they 

did have records for GSCC in Pennsylvania, but only for the Avonmore facility, which they 

furnished at my request. 

By way of background information, Avonmore was the location of the National Roll and 

Foundry Company, which was acquired by GSCC in 1955. The records contained 

correspondence between AEC and GSCC during 1957–1959 regarding a license for a 10-Ci 60Co 

radiography source, which was issued on September 27, 1957, and was due to expire on 

September 30, 1959. In response to various deficiencies that were cited by AEC, GSCC stated 

that they had dispensed with the casting business that required radiography and that they 

intended to sell the radiographic camera containing the 60Co source to “one of our other 

facilities.” The final record in the file, dated October 12, 1959 (which is after the September 30, 

1959, expiration date) was a signed statement that the source had “been disposed of in 

compliance with 10 CFR 20”—no further details were given. 

It is not plausible that this source was transferred to the Granite City plant. The source was 

assayed at 9.6 Ci on September 12, 1957. On March 7, 1962, when the Granite City facility 

made an urgent request for an AEC license for two 300-mCi 60Co sources, the Avonmore source 

had an activity of 5.3 Ci. Why would they have made such a request if they had a much stronger 

60Co source on hand? How could the State of Illinois, which knew of and disapproved the use of 

the 226Ra sources with the fishpole technique, not know of the 60Co source? 

A plausible explanation for the report of a high-curie source is based on the size and appearance 

of the radiographic cameras. Although GSI requested a license for two 300-mCi sources and 

subsequently acquired 260- and 280-mCi 60Co sources, the radiographic cameras housing these 

sources were designed for sources of up to 10 Ci (NRC 2009d, p. 18). Although we were not 

able to find any information on the Budd Unitron radiographic cameras acquired by GSI, we did 

obtain a brochure on the Radionics cameras, one of which was acquired by GSI to house the 

80-Ci 60Co source licensed and procured in 1968 (see Attachment 2). It is quite likely that the 

Budd cameras had a similar design. The sketch of the Budd cameras shown in Figure 4 suggests 

that the units are mounted between two wheels, like the Radionics camera illustrated in the 

brochure. This is consistent with the description of the “large” 60Co source being on a two-wheel 

cart. According to the Radionics brochure, the head of a 10-Ci camera weighed 600 lb, while the 

camera had a shipping weight of 750 lb. Since the cameras were shipped in their carriages, this 

would have been the actual weight of the unit. Mr. [redacted], in his interview, stated that 

SLTL used a camera containing a 10-Ci source inside a 400-lb lead sphere. This would have 

been the weight of the head—the entire assembly would have weighed more. Thus, the Budd 
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camera, designed for a 10-Ci 60Co source, most likely weighed more than 400 lb and as much as 

750 lb. 

We note that Mr. [redacted] was a betatron operator not an “isotope” operator (i.e., he was not 

certified to handle radioactive sources under the AEC license). Therefore, in assisting the 

isotope operator, he would have helped set up the shot, but would not have performed the 

radiograph. The radiographer would have to know the strength of the source in order to calculate 

the time required for the exposure; his assistant would not necessarily need such knowledge. Mr. 

[redacted] may have made the reasonable assumption that the camera contained a high-activity 

source, judging from the size and weight of the housing. 

We conclude that GSI most likely did not have an unlicensed 60Co source during the period of 

AEC operations. 
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Appendix A 

REPORTS OF WORKER INTERVIEWS 

Prepared by 

Robert Anigstein 

S. Cohen & Associates 

A.1 Interview with [redacted], Former GSI [redacted] 

A.1.1 Initial Interview: September 26, 2011 

On September 26, 2011, at approximately 2 PM EDT, David Allen, NIOSH, [redacted], GSI 

copetitioner, and I joined a conference call arranged by NIOSH. Once we were connected, I 

called [redacted], a former GSI worker, and connected him to the call. The purpose of the call 

was to obtain additional information from Mr. [redacted] about radiography using radium 

sources, as requested by the ABRWH Work Group on TBD-6000 at its meeting on September 

20, 2011. This was a follow-up to the interview I had conducted with Mr. [redacted] on October 

10, 2010. Mr. [redacted] provided the information that is summarized below. 

Mr. [redacted] said he was employed at GSI and performed radiography using the radium 

sources, starting in 1956. I noted that he had furnished [redacted] a copy of his record of 

radiation exposure for 1962, as recorded on film badges, and asked if he recalled being issued 

film badges prior to 1962. He answered “yes.” He then clarified his position in that department 

by saying that [redacted] in the laboratory Monday through Friday, where he was not exposed to 

radiation. If there was any work on weekends, he performed radiography on Saturday and/or 

Sunday. He confirmed handling the radium source using a pole made of wood or other material 

that was about 6 ft long. He described the radium source as resembling a plumb bob. I 

described the illustration of a radium source capsule on the Web as resembling a brass plumb 

bob with an eyelet on each end—he agreed that was correct. 

I then asked about the location of the radium radiography. Mr. [redacted] replied that it was in 

No. 6 Building, near the foundry, on the west side of the building. There was a concrete block 

room that was isolated from people outside who could be working on grinding or chipping. He 

recollects the room being there ever since the 1950s. The source was kept in a metal cabinet. He 

recalls that while he was away [redacted], someone got in and took the radium source home. 

After he came back from [redacted] in 1956, there was a lock on the door. I mentioned that the 

building described in the AEC application was about 20 × 60 ft—Mr. [redacted] said that that 

sounded right. I mentioned that the AEC application described 10-ft-high walls with three 

strands of barbed wire on top of the walls—he could not confirm that. He added that when they 

started using sources other than radium, they added steel blocks, four by four and 8–10 in thick 

in front of the office. He confirmed that no one entered the room during an exposure besides the 

radiographer, and that no one would get any direct exposure to the radium source. When I 

mentioned the potential exposure of workers outside the room, he stated that he did not perform 

any radiation surveys outside the radiographic room. He thought it may have been checked out 

by supervision, but he doesn’t know if they did that or not. He did use a survey meter in the 

office to check if the source was in or out, so that they would not be out in the field working 

while the source was out. I asked if he left during long exposures to develop films, etc. He said 
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they did not have that many shots. He doesn’t recall the shots being very long, but they could 

have left the room, since it was kept locked. 

Mr. [redacted] then asked if we were in touch with [redacted], and mentioned he has found a 

piece of literature on a cobalt source that Mr. [redacted] might be interested in, and that he was 

welcome to copy. In response to my question, he said he thought that the film badges were 

always supplied by Landauer. He mentioned that in addition to the film badges, every so often 

the radiographers were sent to St. Elizabeth Hospital in Granite City for blood tests, but 

[redacted] never given the results. The blood tests were in addition to film badges and were 

performed on a quarterly or semiannual basis. 

A.1.2 Follow-Up Interview: September 27, 2011 

I called Mr. [redacted] again on September 27, 2011 to ask some follow-up questions. The 

following are his responses. 

During his weekend shifts as a [redacted], he did both radium and betatron radiography— 

perhaps 50–60% of the time using the betatron, the remainder using radium. He worked 80–90% 

of the weekends, one or two shifts per weekend. Sometimes there was one person per shift (in 

the beginning), later increased to two or three per shift, since it made the work go faster and they 

got more shots. Two radium sources could be used to make separate exposures, with lead blocks 

used to shield each film from the source used for the adjacent exposure. When not in use, the 

sources were kept in a lead-shielded cabinet in the middle of the radiography room—the cabinet 

stayed in one place and wasn’t moved. The castings were placed in the center of the room or 

towards the far end, away from the office, to reduce the radiation exposures of the radiographers. 

I said I heard from other workers that the sources were used in other buildings. He said he 

recalled one time that they had to radiograph a railroad undercarriage and the source was taken 

by wheelbarrow or a motor vehicle to the No. 9 or 10 Building. However, removing the source 

from the shooting room was not a common occurrence—it was something that happened “once 

in a blue moon.” 

A.1.3 Calls to Confirm Draft Interview Report: October 5 and 12, 2011 

Following these two telephone calls, I prepared the above text and enclosed a hard copy in a 

letter which I mailed to Mr. [redacted] on September 27. On October 5, 2011, I called Mr. 

[redacted] and asked if he had reviewed the report of the interviews. He said the reports were 

very accurate, and he had no corrections. In another call, on October 12, 2011, he confirmed that 

the 60Co sources were also used either in the radiographic facility in No. 6 Building or in one of 

the betatron buildings. They were rarely used in open areas. He was not sure if GSI possessed a 

large 60Co source while he was there. He recalled an incident in which a 60Co source could not 

be retracted and someone had to be called in to fix it—he thought it might have been a large 

source. 
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A.2 Interview with Paul [redacted], Former Administrator, St. Louis Testing Laboratories 

A.2.1 Initial Interview: September 28, 2011 

On September 28, 2011, at approximately 10 AM EDT, David Allen, [redacted], and I joined a 

conference call arranged by NIOSH. Once we were connected, I called [redacted], a former 

administrator of St. Louis Testing Laboratories, and connected him to the call. The purpose of 

the call was to obtain additional information from Mr. [redacted] about radiography using sealed 

sources of 60Co and 192Ir at the GSI site in Granite City, Illinois, as requested by the ABRWH 

Work Group on TBD-6000 at its meeting on September 20, 2011. This was a follow-up to the 

information which Mr. [redacted] furnished at a meeting with former GSI employees held on 

October 9, 2007, in Collinsville, Illinois. I asked Mr. [redacted] a series of questions, which are 

listed below, along with his responses. The account is not verbatim. 

I sent Mr. [redacted] a preliminary draft of this report by e-mail. On October 6, 2011, he 

responded by e-mail with some corrections, which are incorporated into the present draft. 

Q: You had described how the radiographers of your company came to the GSI site and brought 

either a 10-Ci 60Co source or a 50-Ci 192Ir source and set up a shot on a rail siding on the GSI 

property. They surveyed the area and set up a 2-mR/h boundary and kept GSI workers outside 

the boundary. 

A: Yes, but the 192Ir was used in different locations inside the plant, wherever there was a large 

casting and there might be just one or two repair shots. Only 60Co shots were performed on the 

rail spur. Everything was roped off with yellow/magenta ropes and radiation warning signs, 

whether in the plant or on the rail spur. 

Q: If you had one man there, did anyone watch the perimeter while he was on a break? 

A: While the source was exposed, the perimeter was under constant surveillance—there was 

always someone there. If there was only one man and he had to go on a break, he secured the 

source by retracting it back into the lead shield and locked it up. 

Q: The source was retracted? 

A: Yes. 

Q: This was a radiographic camera with a remote cable? 

A: The radiographic exposure device (camera) did not use a cable and crank device. Instead, the 

source was moved from the exposure device by means of a rigid vertical tube and a long nylon 

string which ran through the rigid tube and was attached to a weighted pencil-shaped source 

holder. To expose the source, the exposure device was unlocked and the source holder raised 

into position by pulling on the string. To retract the source, you simply slowly released the 

string and the weighted pencil-shaped source holder dropped back into the exposure device, 

where it could be locked in its shielded position. The 50-curie iridium device operated in a 

similar manner. We did have iridium exposure devices that were of the cable and crank type, but 

they only housed a maximum of 10 curies. The iridium exposures in the plant used a collimator, 
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so the radiation was directional, since we were exposing only one film at a time. The cobalt 

exposures were panoramic (i.e. 360 degrees) so no collimator was used. However, the source 

was inside the 5-in thick cup-shaped casting, which shielded it somewhat. The cobalt was 

shielded in a 400-lb lead sphere and the iridium in a 50-lb lead sphere. 

Q: Did any GSI workers assist or participate in this? 

A: Not inside the ropes. 

Q: During what years did this take place? 

A: I think mid-60s, maybe early 60s. I think it started when we were working on the [St. Louis] 

Arch,7

 in the mid-60s, and I am not too sure how long—60s, 70s. 

Q: At the meeting in 2007, you said there were ten 60Co shots, and they spanned a 6-month 

period. Maybe that was just one campaign? 

A: I do remember the exposure time—that was the longest exposure we ever made. The iridium 

was before and after. 

Q: You had said some shots were made in the repair area. Was that in the finishing buildings? 

A: I am not sure which building it was, but it was where they repaired—where they ground out 

defects—it was indoors—it was easier to go in and take the one shot than for them to move the 

casting back to where they x-rayed it. Any time the source was out, the GSI people had to be 

outside the rope area. 

Q: Did the cable extend to the roped area? 

A: Yes, you could be 40 ft. The iridium was directional shooting, so the radiation was fairly 

well contained in one direction, towards the casting. The cobalt was a different story: that was a 

large area roped off. There, the radiographer was probably inside the rope. 

Q: You also said St. Louis Testing calibrated the survey meters used in the betatron building. 

Was that during the same time? Earlier, based on the AEC records, Nuclear Consulting 

Corporation was doing the calibration. Did your company take over from them? 

A: I kind of suspect they did. We took over when [redacted] was still there.8 

Q: Do you remember dealing with [redacted]? 

A: Yes. 

 7

 According to the U.S. National Park Service, Construction of the Arch began in 1963, and was completed 

on October 28, 1965 (NPS 2011). 

8

 According to the late [redacted], [redacted] took over as manager after [redacted] was promoted and 

transferred to another department. Mr. [redacted]’s last recorded film badge was for the week of [redacted], 1964. 

Thus, it was most likely that St. Louis Testing first came on site in late 1964, since [redacted] became manager of 

NDT at the end of 1964. 
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Q: Were you involved with radiation safety at GSI, besides your own radiography on site? Did 

you consult with them about their own safety? 

A: No, other than [redacted] or [redacted] might have asked me about that. 

Q: According to the records, we know that in 1962 GSI bought 260- and 280-mCi 60Co sources, 

and in 1968 they bought an 80-Ci 60Co source. Do you know if they had any other large sources 

in between these times? 

A: No, I wasn’t familiar with the 80 Ci. The mCi source I was, because it became disconnected 

one time and I retrieved it. I didn’t know they had an 80 Ci. 

Q: It may have been after you were no longer involved with them. 

A: That could be. 

David Allen then asked a question. 

Q: Do you remember how often the iridium source was used for the repair shots? 

A: It might be several times in a week, and then not for a while. We used it whenever they had 

a repair shot. We did the ground-out areas to see if they got it all. After they welded it up, at 

first they x-rayed it a couple of times, but our method with the iridium showed more than the 

betatron, so after that, they used the betatron on the final shots. 

Mr. [redacted] and I then had a brief discussion in which he explained that GSI had to furnish 

the films of the final repair shots to its customers. The films had to show a certain minimum 

sensitivity, which could be achieved by the betatron, while the 192Ir was too sensitive and showed 

more defects. 

A.3 Interview with Leroy Dell, Former GSI Supervisor 

A.3.1 Initial Interview: October 6, 2011 

On October 6, 2011, at approximately 12:30 PM EDT, David Allen, [redacted], and I joined a 

conference call arranged by NIOSH. Once we were connected, I called [redacted], a former 

GSI [redacted], and connected him to the call. The purpose of the call was to obtain additional 

information from Mr. [redacted] about radiography performed at GSI. 

In response to my questions, Mr. [redacted] said he did not recall when he started work at GSI. 

He did recall that the concrete block building used for radiography with sealed sources, located 

inside the No. 6 Building, was there when he started. He mentioned having some differences 

with Mr. [redacted] [a GSI official] and that he worked for only a short time as a [redacted] 

operator. He objected to the fact that GSI did not police the sources when they were used to 

radiograph steel castings. He was a [redacted], but did not actually perform any radiography. 

The first time he went to the 6 Building, there was a casting that needed to be x-rayed. At that 

time, the source was inside a lead container and was removed using a 10-ft pole and set in a little 

cup wherever it was needed. The area was roped off or taped off, and posted with signs that 
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said: “Caution, radiation danger.” But, after [redacted] roped it off, he went to the betatron to 

get more film, etc., and Mr. [redacted] went back to the lab. Thus, they did not police the 

source. The source was taken “anywhere they needed it”—it was not just used inside the 

concrete block building. The 60Co cameras, which were heavy, were lifted by a crane and were 

taken to the 10 Building if needed. 

In response to my question, Mr. [redacted] confirmed that the area was roped off and people 

were kept back. He confirmed that the radiographer was inside the roped area while setting up 

the shot. The control cable was 10–15 ft long, while the cable to which the source was attached 

protruded about 10 ft. Altogether the source was about 30 ft from the crank that controlled its 

position. Once the shot was set up, the radiographer would go outside the roped area. 

I then asked about sources other than the 260- and 280-mCi 60Co sources acquired in 1962. Mr. 

[redacted] responded that there was an 192Ir source, but it was not used by GSI men—it was 

brought in by an outside source—he thought it was St. Louis Testing Labs. [redacted] or 

another GSI worker went around with the St. Louis Testing radiographer to show him the 

castings and what they wanted shot, but the GSI workers did not perform the radiography. When 

I asked about a very large 60Co source, Mr. [redacted] stated that they said they had a 60Co 80-Ci 

source, but he does not remember it. When I mentioned the AEC records that showed that the 

80-Ci 60Co source was acquired in 1968, he confirmed that he was there in 1968. 

Mr. [redacted] then recounted the incident involving [redacted], who reported having lost his 

film badge. According to Mr. [redacted], the film badge was left inside the concrete 

radiographic facility inside the No. 6 Building for 16 hours, until [redacted] came back for his 

next shift. They found the film badge just inside—the source may not have been properly 

secured. 

I then asked about the radium source that someone had removed. I asked Mr. [redacted] if he 

was working at GSI at that time. He thought it was when he first started. He recounted that the 

worker had it in the back of his car, but when he found out how dangerous it was, he took it out 

on the railroad track and threw it out. They took Geiger counters and found it. In response to a 

further question, Mr. [redacted] wasn’t sure if the incident happened before he started working 

at GSI or just after. 

A.3.2 Call to Confirm Draft Interview Report: October 11, 2011 

Following the interview, I sent Mr. [redacted] a copy of the above draft report by e-mail. On 

October 11, 2011, at about 2:30 PM, I called him to ask if he had any comments on this draft. 

He responded that, although he did work as a [redacted], he occasionally performed 

radiography, both with the betaron and with 60Co sources. He did not handle the 226Ra sources 

with the fishpole, but did participate in setting up shots (e.g., placing the film in position). He 

also developed a clearer recollection of when he began work at GSI. He said he was hired to 

replace [redacted] when [redacted] went [redacted], which was ca. 1954, so Mr. [redacted]’s 

best guess is that he started in 1955. 
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A.4 Interview with [redacted], Former [redacted] of Nuclear Consultants Corporation, 

October 12, 2011 

On October 12, 2011, at approximately 11 AM EDT, I called [redacted], former [redacted] of 

Nuclear Consultants Corporation (NCC), to ask him about his recollection of his activities in 

connection with the radiation safety program for the GSI foundry in Granite City, Illinois, in the 

early 1960s. [Redacted] said that the radiation safety work was a sideline to his main business, 

which was supplying radioisotopes for medicine. He said that he obtained his film badges from 

Landauer, and confirmed my observation that he served as a middleman in these transactions. I 

asked about any radioactive sources that GSI might have had during that time, other than the two 

licensed 60Co sources and radium, he responded that they were not using radium during his time 

and mentioned no other sources. He could not furnish any information on their radiographic 

practices. When I asked about any incidents, he replied that he does not recall any instances in 

which anyone was overdosed. He could not tell me who supplied film badges to GSI prior to his 

involvement, but guessed it might have been Landauer, because they were a major supplier. 

Given the sparse information I obtained from [redacted], I did not send him this report for his 

confirmation. 
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Appendix B 

 MCNP SIMULATIONS OF EXPOSURES FROM 226RA IN NO. 6 BUILDING 

Prepared by 

Robert Anigstein and Richard Olsher 

S. Cohen & Associates 

We simulated the exposures and dose rates from 226Ra in the radiographic facility in No. 6 

Building at GSI using the MCNP5 radiation transport code. The model of the radiographic room 

was based on a sketch in the GSI application for an AEC byproduct material license (NRC 

2009e, p. 31), which is replicated in Figure 4. The walls are described as being 10 ft high (NRC 

2009b , p. 8). There is some ambiguity about the thickness and the material of which they are 

constructed. NRC (2009b, p. 8) refers to them being constructed of “16 inches of solid concrete 

block.” However, the report of the radiation survey by the Nuclear Consultants Corp. (NCC) 

(NRC 2009c, p.4 ) states that the walls are “24 inches thick (minimum),” the accompanying 

sketch (Figure 4) indicates that only three of the outside walls, as well as one inner wall of the 

small room used as an office for the radiographers, are 24 inches thick, while the other walls are 

16 inches. Furthermore, a drawing in NRC 2009f, p. 10, states that the walls are made of sandfilled concrete block. Since the drawings appear to give more detailed dimensions, we adopted 

the wall thickness shown in Figure 4. However, given the ambiguity in the description of the 

construction of the walls, and the range of densities of concrete used in building blocks, we 

modeled the walls as consisting of sand with a density of 1.586 g/cm3

, which is the bulk density 

of sand (Smico 2002). The doors to the office and to the outside are assumed to be hollow and 

made from -in steel sheet. They are modeled as a single sheet 1⁄8-in thick. A cross-sectional 

diagram of the MCNP model is shown in Figure 3. 

16

1

Figure 3. MCNP Model of Radiographic Facility 

The source was assumed to be 1 Ci of 226Ra, in full secular equilibrium with its entire progeny.9 

The exposure and personal dose equivalent, Hp(10), rates were calculated at two locations: the 

center of the office (see Figure 3) and 1 m outside the door shown at the left side of Figure 3. 

9

 We assume that both 500-mCi sources were exposed simultaneously to radiograph two separate castings. 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. Fi

gure 4. Sketch of Radio

gra

phic Facilit

y in No. 6 Buildin

g at GSI (NRC 2009, 

p. 31)
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References

Allen, D. (NIOSH/DCAS). 2011. “Battelle-TBD-6000 Appendix BB General Steel Industries: 

Dose Estimates for Portable Radiography Sources.” 

Anigstein, R. (SC&A). 2010. “Reports of Interviews with Three Former GSI Employees.” 

(November 29, 2010). 

Anigstein, R. (SC&A). 2011. “Review of NIOSH Report on Portable Radiography Sources at 

GSI—August 2011.” (September 15, 2011). 

“Dr. Robert Anigstein of Sanford Cohen & Associates (SC&A) Interviewing Former Employees 

of General Steel Industries (GSI).” 2007. 

House, J. D. (Ed). 1953. “Snapped at Commonwealth.” General Steel Broad-Castings, X(8), 21 

(December). Granite City, IL: General Steel Castings Corporation. 

[redacted] 2009. [redacted]_GSI-Landauer_Mar09.pdf. Attachment to <[redacted]> “Re: 

(GSI) Film Badge Reports, reply” March 9, 2009, personal e-mail to Robert Anigstein, SC&A, 

Inc., with copies to members of the ABRWH Work Group on TBD 6000/6001, Appendix BB, to 

NIOSH staff, and others. 

National Park Service (U.S.) (NPS). 2011. “Jefferson National Expansion Memorial - History 

& Culture.” http://www.nps.gov/jeff/historyculture/index.htm

Neal R. Gross, Court Reporters and Transcribers. 2009. “Advisory Board on Radiation and 

Worker Health TBD-6000/6001 Work Group, Wednesday, October 14, 2009.” 

Neal R. Gross, Court Reporters and Transcribers. 2010. “Advisory Board on Radiation and 

Worker Health Work Group on TBD-6000, Wednesday, May 12, 2010.” 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). 2009a. “General Steel Industries Byproduct 

Materials License for Cobalt-60 Sealed Source (Budd Company Model 41706) not to exceed 1 

curie, w/handwritten notes.” ADAMS acquisition number ML093451452. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). 2009b. “General Steel Industries Byproduct 

Materials License for Cobalt-60 Sealed Source not to exceed 1 curie.” ADAMS acquisition 

number ML093431334. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). 2009c. “Letter to James Mason from L. A. 

Kieber regarding an area radiation survey that was made of the Radiographic Exposure Facility 

in Granite City, Illinois.” ADAMS acquisition number ML093431294. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). 2009d. “Application for Renewal from General 

Steel Industries, AEC License 12-8271-1.” ADAMS acquisition number ML093431335. 
Effective Date: 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). 2009e. “Application for Byproduct Materials 

License Use in the Metallurgy Department from General Steel Industries for metallic source of 

Cobalt-60 in a sealed source, w/handwritten notes.”ADAMS acquisition number ML093480296. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). 2009f. “Letter to Nathan Bassin from Robert 

Ripley regarding their AEC License for the period through July 1977.” ADAMS acquisition 

number ML093451651. 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU). 2009. “Tracerlab Film Badge (late 1940s, 

1950s).” http://www.orau.org/ptp/collection/dosimeters/tracerlabfilm.htm 

Smico Manufacturing Company, LLC. 2002.”Material Bulk Density Reference Chart.” 

Oklahoma City, OK: Author. 

http://www.smico.com/pdf/SMICO%20MATERIAL%20BULK%20DENSITY%20REFERENC

E%20CHART.pdf
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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Attachment 1 

 Attachment 1 has been redacted in its entirety. 

 
Effective Date: 

10/20/2011 

Revision No. 

0 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: Update on the 

Use of Sealed Radioactive Sources at GSI 

Page No. 

Page 24 of 25 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Attachment 2 
Effective Date: 

10/20/2011 

Revision No. 

0 – Draft 

Document Description: White Paper: Update on the 

Use of Sealed Radioactive Sources at GSI 

Page No. 

Page 25 of 25 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Attachment 2 (continued)

NOTICE: