THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes 


MEETING 50 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


VOL. I 


DAY ONE 


The verbatim transcript of the 50th 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at the Holiday Inn Select, 


Naperville, Illinois, on Oct. 3, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES 

NATIONALLY CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS 

404/733-6070 
 

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C O N T E N T S 

Oct. 3, 2007 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL 

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NUMEC SEC PETITION 

MR. LAVON RUTHERFORD, NIOSH 

PETITIONERS 

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NIOSH PROGRAM UPDATE 

MR. LARRY ELLIOTT, NIOSH 

94 

SEC PETITION UPDATE 

MR. LAVON RUTHERFORD, NIOSH 

116 

DOE PROGRAM UPDATE 

DR. PATRICIA WORTHINGTON, DOE 

124 

DOL PROGRAM UPDATE 

MR. JEFFREY KOTSCH, DOL 

134 

PUBLIC COMMENT 143 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 169 
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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

BEACH, Josie 


Nuclear Chemical Operator 


Hanford Reservation 


Richland, Washington 


CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 

 

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LOCKEY, James, M.D. 


Professor, Department of Environmental Health 


College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati 


MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


POSTON, John W., Sr., B.S., M.S., Ph.D. 


Professor, Texas A&M University 


College Station, Texas 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


SCHOFIELD, Phillip 


Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 


Los Alamos, New Mexico 

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SIGNED-IN AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS
 

ALLEN, BRANDON 


AMENO, NEDRA K., C.A.S.E 


AMENO, PATRICIA, CO-PETITIONER 


ANTOFF, KEITH, DOW 


ANTOFF, KEVIN, DOW 


ANTOFF, MARY, DOW 


BALDRIDGE, SANDRA, FERNALD 


BERRY, TERRI, ROCKY FLATS 


BREYER, LAURIE, NIOSH 


BROCK, DENISE, NIOSH 


CAMPUS, ELEANOR J., BLOCKSON 


CANO, REGINA, DOE 


CHANG, C, NIOSH 


D’ATRI, A.R., RETIRED 


DETMER, DEB 


DUGKO, JOHN, BETATRON OPERATOR 


FITZGERALD, JOSEPH, SC&A 


FREW, SUSAN 


GATES, JOHN, RETIRED 


GATES, MARY LOU, BLOCKSON 


GURA, CYRIL, BLOCKSON 


HALEY, TOM, NUMEC 


HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


JANKOSKI, GERALYNN, BLOCKSON 


JOHNSON, KAREN, WELDON SPRINGS 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


LEWIS, MARK, ATL 


MAHALIK, ROBERT, RETIRED 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MANLEY, JAMES E., RETIRED 


MARCOSKI, BEV, BLOCKSON 


MARTIN, ELGAR 


MARTIN, GERTRUDE 


MCKEEL, DAN, WU-VI NEWS 


PARLER, RICH, NUMEC 


PETROVIC, ANTOINETTE, BLOCKSON 


RAMSPOTT, JOHN 


RIVERA, NANCY, BLOCKSON 

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RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


SCHAEFFER, D. MICHAEL, SAIC 


SCHNEIDER, MARILYN, WELDON SPRINGS 


SIEBERT, SCOTT R., MJW CORP 


THOMAS, IRENE, BLOCKSON 


WESTAN, RICHARD, CDC 


WORTHINGTON, PAT, DOE 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(1:15 p.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR
 

DR. ZIEMER: Good afternoon, everyone. I'd like to 


call the meeting to order. This is the 50th 


meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health. The agenda for this meeting, as 


well as related documents, are on the table in 


the back of the room. If you have not gotten 


copies, please avail yourself of those. 


Also my usual reminder, we would like you to 


register your attendance with us. The 


registration book is in the corridor. Also 


there is a book to sign up for addressing the 


assembly during the public meeting time, and if 


you wish to do that please make -- make 


yourself -- or make that known through the use 


of that particular book. 


The record will show that all of the Board 


members are here present with the exception of 


Dr. Melius and Dr. Lockey, who will be joining 


us tomorrow, but we do have a quorum. 


Since the -- the 50th meeting represents a kind 

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of milestone, if you would indulge the Chair 


for a moment I'd like to reminisce. 


 DR. WADE: Ah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: When you get to my age, you like 


to do that a lot. 


This Board first met in January of 2002. At 


that time the members -- there were ten 


members: Henry A. Anderson, Antonio Andrade, 


Roy L. DeHart, Richard L. Espinosa, Sally L. 


Gadola, James M. Melius, Wanda I. Munn, Robert 


W. Presley, Genevieve S. Roessler and Paul L. 


Ziemer. That was January, and Mark Griffon 


joined the group shortly thereafter, according 


to my records, in March of 2002. So of that 


original group of ten or 11 -- I guess 11 if we 


count you, Mark -- we still have six folks who 


have been here for the full period, which now 


has -- it's completing its sixth year of 


operation. So I salute those of my colleagues 


who have been faithful and persevered through 


many, many meetings. 


Later in 2002, in October, Michael Gibson and 


Charles Leon Owens joined the Board. And the 


Board operated with those members, the ones 


I've just named and the original group, through 

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2003, 2004, and early 2005. 


Our colleague Tony Andrade died in February of 


2005. Also in February of 2005 -- and I should 


mention that our original Designated Federal 


Official was Larry Elliott, but in February 


2005 Dr. Lewis Wade replaced Larry Elliott as 


the Designated Federal Official. 


In 2006 three new members joined us, Bradley P. 


Clawson, James E. Lockey and John Poston, all 


of whom were added in January of 2006, and then 


in January of 2007 Josie M. Beach and Phillip 


M. Schofield. 


Now of all the names that I've read, with the 


exception of two -- Sally Gadola had to resign 


early in 2002, shortly -- during the first year 


of the Board due to a conflict of interest. 


And I've already mentioned that -- that Antonio 


Andrade died in 2005. There were some others 


who left the Board in 2006 at the time that the 


new members came on. Those were Henry P. 


Anderson, Richard L. Espinosa, both of whom 


completed their terms of the Board in January 


2006, and then Roy L. DeHart, who completed his 


term with the Board in August of 2006. And 


finally Charles Leon Owens resigned from the 

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Board in September 2006. 


So I thought it was -- at least for the benefit 


of the Board members -- worth reminiscing about 


who's been with us and how long they've been 


with us. We're very pleased with all of the 


Board members who've participated over these 


past six years. All of them have been active, 


have had significant input on all issues and 


have made major contributions in -- in keeping 


us on track. So I thank all of the Board 


members, our Designated Federal Officials, and 


I should point out that the work of this Board 


could not be carried out without the strong 


support of the various staff members 


representing the federal agencies to which we 


are attempting to provide good sound advice. 


With that I will turn it over to our Designated 


Federal Official, Dr. Wade. 


 DR. WADE: Well, thank you, Dr. Ziemer. 


Welcome, and as I always start a meeting, thank 


you. Let me add briefly to Dr. Ziemer's 


comments. 


I had had the privilege in my career of serving 


a number of advisory boards and committees in 


very disparate areas of government, and I have 

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never seen a board more dedicated and 


productive and professional than this Board as 


it currently sits. To a person, everyone 


around this table makes tremendous sacrifice 


and contribution to the work of -- of this 


Board. I think we all understand the 


importance of those we serve that -- the atomic 


war heroes of this country, but I couldn't be 


more proud to be associated with the Board and, 


to a person, I thank you for your efforts. 


I'm joined at the table here today to my right 


and slightly behind me by Dr. Christine 


Branche. Dr. Branche is preparing to become 


the Designated Federal Official for the Board 


when I move on to other things at a date as yet 


undefined. But Christine will be participating 


and will be here and will learn the business 


and I'm sure come to -- to admire this Board as 


I have. 


So welcome, and again thank you for your 


efforts. They are appreciated. 


NUMEC SEC PETITION


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We are going 


to move immediately now to our written agenda. 


The first item on our agenda is a petition -- 

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SEC petition from NUMEC, which is located in -- 


I believe it's Apollo, Pennsylvania or -- or 


thereabouts. And LaVon Rutherford is going to 


present the petition evaluation from NIOSH, and 


then following that we will hear from the 


petitioners, Patty Amino, Rich -- I believe 


it's Rich Paver, I'll -- do I have your last 


name right? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I'll get them right, and 


perhaps some other individuals. So let's hear 


from LaVon and then we'll proceed and hear from 


the petitioners. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Can you hear me? 


 DR. WADE: Could I make one brief announcement 


before LaVon begins? As is typical, I would 


announce conflicts of interest. Dr. Melius, 


who's not with us today, has recently brought 


to my attention the fact that he has some 


involvement with re-- with the NUMEC site. Dr. 


Melius does not feel that that would constitute 


a conflict, but has raised it to my attention 


and while that issue is being investigated I've 


made the determination that Dr. Melius will 

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need to recuse himself from discussions on 


NUMEC. Now he's not here today and therefore 


it's somewhat of a moot point, but that is an 


issue under discussion, and for complete 


disclosure I thought I would make that known to 


all. Thank you. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Thank you. Thank you, Dr. 


Ziemer and the Board, for giving me this 


opportunity to speak on behalf of NIOSH and our 


evaluation of the NUMEC SEC petition. A little 


background --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Oh, you know, that helps -- 


and I was told that three times, to remove that 


paper. 


All right, a little background. We received 


this petition on December 13th, 2005 -- 


(unintelligible) -- at it was SEC 47. On May 


1st we issued a proposed finding that the 


petition did not qualify. On May 9th the 


petitioner requested an administrative review 


of that petition. We submitted that to the 


Administrative Review Panel and began the 


administrative review process. 

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In the meantime we performed an internal 


assessment of our own procedures for SEC. We 


identified a number of things that we could do 


better. And then Dr. Lockey's working group 


also performed an assessment and looked at 


petitions that did not qualify and they 


identified a number of -- a number of things 


that we could do better in communication with 


petitioners. 


On December 4, 2006 the petitioners submitted a 


second SEC petition, that would be SEC 80, and 


that was for a more broader (sic) class. After 


a lengthy process with the Admin Review Panel, 


they came back to the decision that they felt 


that NIOSH did not provide clear justification 


to the petitioner for not qualifying the 


petition, and recommended that we qualify that 


petition. 


On January 11th the first SEC petition was 


qualified, January 11, 2007. On March 28, 2007 


the second petition, which was a broader class, 


was qualified for evaluation. The two 


petitions were then, in a process that we 


define -- were merged together. SEC 80, which 


was the more broader class, became the primary 

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petition and SEC 47 was -- was fully 


encompassed within the class with SEC 80. 


On September 14th of this year we issued our 


evaluation. 


 Petitioner proposed classes. SEC 47, which was 


the first petition, identified administrative 


and clerical personnel at NUMEC from 1957 to 


1983. The second petition, SEC 80, was all -- 


petitioner identified all employees at NUMEC, 


both Apollo and Park, from 1957 to 1983. Our 


process requires that we limit our evaluations 


to a single facility. Apollo and Parks right 


now -- the Department of Energy on the facility 


databases has identified them as two separate 


facilities. Therefore, our evaluation focused 


on the Apollo site and our recommended class 


definition was all AWE employees who were 


monitored, or should have been monitored, for 


exposure to ionizing radiation while working at 


the NUMEC Plan in Apollo, Pennsylvania for a 


number of work days aggregating at least 250 


days from January 1, 1957 through December 


31st, 1983. 


A little background on NUMEC Apollo site. As 


Dr. Ziemer had mentioned, that the NUMEC Apollo 

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facility is located in the town of Apollo, 


approximately 33 miles from Pittsburgh. The 


plant was first licensed by the AEC in 1957. 


The AEC, the Atomic Energy Commission -- AEC 


radiological operations included, from 1958 


through the '60s, processing unirradiated 


enriched uranium scrap. Also, from 1961 to an 


unknown date, they produced plutonium-beryllium 


neutron sources under AEC license. 


NUMEC had a number of commercial operations, as 


well as they produced fuel for the Navy. 1957 


to 1970 -- through 1978, high enriched uranium 


production; 1957 to '84, low enriched uranium 


production; 1961 to an unknown date, they -- 


uranium oxide pellets; and 1961 to an unknown 


date, research and development of coatings for 


uranium microspheres. 


In addition, 1963 to an unknown date, we know 


they had thorium operations including thorium 


oxide pellet production. In 1963 they were 


licensed by -- through (unintelligible) to 


produce thorium oxide pellets. We know that 


they produced them in '64 and '65, and we also 


know that -- we have documentation that 


supports thorium production continuing possibly 

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into the 1970s. 


In 1959 to 1984, laundry operations -- which 


included laundering for Apollo, Parks, and 


other nuclear facilities, and this included 


burning extremely contaminated anti-


contamination clothing and washing control rod 


drive mechanisms. So they weren't exactly -- I 


mean it wasn't just laundry operations, is the 


point there. 


During our evaluation NIOSH reviewed a number 


of sources. Most of these sources are typical 


in our evaluation process. We looked at the 


Technical Information Bulletins we have. There 


was no site profile that -- as petitioners 


pointed out numerous times, there is no site 


profile for the NUMEC facility, and we were 


actually in the process of developing a site 


profile during the qualification process, so a 


number of these issues became apparent as they 


-- in the developing of that site profile, 


which is still not complete. 


We looked at -- we interviewed former NUMEC 


employees. We looked at case files in the 


NIOSH database. We also reviewed documents in 


the site research database, and our petitioners 

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were -- provided us numerous documents and 


affidavits that we also reviewed as well. 


The NUMEC employees received internal and 


external exposures from the operations I've 


previously identified. Also on-site personnel 


were exposed to uncontrolled stack releases 


from (unintelligible) filters, leaky filters 


and -- and the actual configuration geometry -- 


the geometry configuration actually supported 


heavy downwash to the on-site personnel. So we 


have reports that support this. 


Principal external exposures, they had beta 


exposures from uranium production operations; 


they had gamma exposures from thorium 


operations, uranium production and laundry 


operations. They also had neutron exposures 


from neutron source production, plutonium 


operations and work with high enriched uranium. 


 Principal internal exposures were uranium from 


uranium production operations; thorium from 


thorium operations, including thorium oxide 


pellet production; plutonium from the neutron 


source production, laundry operations, storage 


operations and analytical procedures; in 


addition, polonium from neutron source 

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production. 


Availability of data. From what we've reviewed 


of the -- of the monitoring data -- which the 


monitoring data is on the X drive, available to 


the Board members in an Excel spreadsheet. 


From what we've reviewed of that data, it 


appears that the personnel monitoring was 


limited to a small group of individuals who 


were thought to have -- who were thought to 


have -- receiving the highest exposure. Most 


of the other monitoring data is external area 


monitoring data. We have external area 


monitoring data from 1961 through 1983. 


One of the difficulties we've had with this 


site, and I'll address more later, is really -- 


monitoring data -- it's not clear from the 


monitoring data where -- where the activities 


or where the monitoring took place. Most of 


the documents that are listed identify Apollo 


on the heading of the document. However, the 


activities could -- could have been conducted 


at Parks or Apollo. But also they do not 


describe on most of the documentation the ex-- 


for the area monitoring data what they were 


supporting by doing the monitoring, so it's 

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very hard to determine where the exposure 


source was. 


 Internal monitoring data. The urine bioassay 


data for uranium from 1960 up through 1976 -- 


up to 1976; we have fecal bioassay data for 


uranium available from 1966 up to 1976; we have 


whole body counts for uranium available from 


1968 through '85; we have no bioassay data for 


thorium or other radionuclides. In addition, 


all plutonium bioassay appears to be for the 


Parks facility -- Parks employees. None of --


we -- we found no bioassay data for Apollo 


employees. 


Air sampling. We have breathing zone air data 


for uranium from 1961 through 1982, and we also 


have very limited thorium air samples. We have 


87 general area samples and 11 breathing zone 


samples in over -- that range from 1963 through 


1965 for the dates. We have no air sampling 


data for other radionuclides. 


As you all -- a lot of you are aware, we have a 


two-pronged test. One, we look at is it 


feasible to reconstruct dose with sufficient 


accuracy. If that's yes, then we don't have to 


answer number two. If that's no, we have to 

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answer number two, is there a reasonable 


likelihood that the health was endangered for 


members of the class. 


NIOSH found that the available monitoring 


records, process descriptions and source term 


data are insufficient to complete dose 


reconstructions for the proposed class of 


employees. NIOSH currently lacks access to 


sufficient monitoring, source term data and 


process information to estimate the complete 


internal and external dose. 


Now specific issues that we found with -- that 


limit our ability to reconstruct dose. We 


found we had no monitoring data from the 1957 


through '59 time period. We -- the former 


contractor, (unintelligible), was providing us 


monitoring data for individuals. However, none 


of that data -- there was no data for the 1957 


through '59 period. 


We looked at using a back-extrapolation 


approach where we would use later data from the 


'60s and work back. However, as we've seen in 


a number of facilities, if you do not have 


clear process description and clear details on 


what the activities that were conducted early 

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on, pilot operations and -- and typically we'll 


weed out those or identify high exposure 


sources and engineering controls could be 


implemented, so the later data may be much 


lower than exposures to the earlier data -- 


earlier period. 


NIOSH -- another issue, we found that the 


internal monitoring data, process description 


and source term information was insufficient to 


reconstruct occupational thorium dose. We know 


that -- we know the thorium off-site pellet 


production and the -- the thorium operations -- 


they're not well defined. The thorium off-site 


pellet production, we know that that occurred. 


We have no details of that process and we 


actually have no clear description of the 


facilities that were used in that process at 


Apollo. And we also have indications through 


documentation that supports that thorium 


operations may have continued into the '70s. 


One of the big issues -- as I mentioned, we 


were in the development of the site profile 


when -- as these processes -- or as these 


petitions came in. One of the issues that was 


identified during the site profile was that -- 

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that bioassay monitoring data analyzed by 


Controls for Environmental Pollution could not 


be used for dose reconstruction. There was a 


CEP-analyzed bioassay data at Sandia in the 


early '90s period. In 1994 there -- it was 


identified that there was potential 


falsification of bioassay data that was 


analyzed by CEP. We have reviewed the 


information -- documentation that's available 


for that, which is also available to the Board 


on the X drive, and we've concluded that we 


cannot use CEP monitoring data for dose 


reconstruction purposes. 


I think it's important to point out that -- 


that we recognized that we needed to evaluate 


the effect to other facilities that may have 


used CEP data. We immediately got with our 


contractor to review and determine other sites 


that may be affected. At this point we've 


identified NUMEC, Sandia and, at a limited 


scale, the Mound facility may have used CEP 


data. We've also reviewed that the -- looked 


into our existing coworker models, and none of 


our existing coworker models use CEP data. 


 Another issue, NIOSH lacks monitoring data for 

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activities with potential plutonium exposures. 


The documents indicate that there was a 


significant plutonium exposure potential at the 


laundry facility. However, we had no data. We 


have no air data, we have no bio-- bioassay 


data for -- for employees that worked there. 


We also know that NUMEC was licensed to produce 


plutonium/beryllium sources. They took over 


operations for the Mound facility in 1961. And 


we have no process descriptions, source term 


information at all for those activities. 


Another issue is NIOSH lacks stack monitoring 


data to calculate potential exposure to on-site 


personnel for year-- operational years at 


NUMEC. 


A NUMEC health physicist, Roger Caldwell, 


reported in 1967 problems associated with stack 


releases from the 124 stacks at the Apollo 


Plant. As I'd mentioned earlier, the 


configuration and geometry of the stacks caused 


significant downwash, as well as the fact that 


there was numerous indications of leaking 


filters and filters that have failed. 


NIOSH has some stack monitoring data, but it's 


very limited. 

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NIOSH lacks external monitoring data for 


laundry operations and neutron source 


productions, and the personal monitoring data 


is limited. As I mentioned, you know, if we 


had -- if the ex-- if the external monitoring 


data, personal monitoring data, clearly 


identified what the exposure source was that 


they were monitoring, it would help us in -- 


for our ability to reconstruct external dose. 


However, without that and without a process 


description and source term, it -- it -- our 


ability to reconstruct -- to be sure that we're 


doing sufficiently accurate external dose 


reconstruction is limited. 


 Again, NIOSH has determined it is not feasible 


to reconstruct -- to completely reconstruct 


dose with sufficient accuracy, and that the 


health of the employees may have been 


endangered. 


 The evidence reviewed indicates that workers 


received chronic exposures to internal and 


external exposures from production, 


remediation, research and development, and 


support activities at NUMEC Apollo. 


Our -- our sug-- our recommended class -- I 

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actually read this earlier; I won't read it 


again, but it is for the entire covered period, 


January 1, 1957 through December 31st, 1983. 


Our summary table, NIOSH feels that dose 


reconstruction is feasible for uranium after 


1959. The 1957 through '59 period, I've 


already identified the issues that we've had 


with that. Other radionuclides, we cannot 


reconstruct -- or cannot completely reconstruct 


the dose. External, beta-gamma exposures 


cannot be reconstructed; neutron cannot; and we 


can with occupational medical. 


It's important to note our -- our -- we feel 


that for partial dose reconstructions we will 


use the available monitoring data that we do 


have for each individual, with the exception to 


CEP data. So if the class is added, for non-


presumptive cancers we will use the available 


monitoring data we have to give them a partial 


reconstruction. 


The summary there, again, and also during the 


evaluation, as I mentioned earlier, some of the 


issues that we identified with Apollo was 


apparent that they -- they rolled right over to 


the Parks facility. The Parks -- the CEP data 

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-- CEP was analyzing bioassay data, both 


(unintelligible) one year and for -- for both 


Apollo and Parks. In addition to other 


operations -- other operational issues are 


affected at Parks. 


 Therefore, based on that, we have initiated an 


83.14 for the Parks facility and have 


identified a petitioner, and we're moving 


forward with that process. 


And that's it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, LaVon. LaVon, could 


you clarify the issue of external monitoring 


for the period of '57 through '61? Was Babcock 


and Wilcox the contractor -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- at that time? And they were 


approached for records. Is it my understanding 


that they had no records, or did you not -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: They had no record-- they had 


no -- they were approached for records for any 


claimant that we had from 1957 on, and we've 


actually uncovered no records -- they had no 


records for the '57 through '59 period. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I noticed that NUMEC actually had 


an AEC license beginning in '57. 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And that would tell me that they 


probably had to be doing personnel monitoring, 


at least external. And so the question is -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, we --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- do we know who did their 


badges? Was it a commercial firm like Landauer 


or was it --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We actually know Landauer did 


some of their badges, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And has Landauer been approached 


for archival information on this -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We actually have -- Stu 


Hinnefeld is looking at Landauer now for -- for 


data for not only -- but for Spencer Chemical 


and a few other facilities. However, the data 


that we have from -- that -- I think it's 


pretty clear that it -- that we're probably not 


going to get that data because Landauer 


services were actually after 1959, the way I 


understand it. And so the '57 through '59 


period, what we've got from BWXT is probably 


all we're going to get. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, Landauer did begin operation 


for '59, but --

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: I'm just saying the contract, 


I thought, was after -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I see. Okay. In any event, 


it's not an issue that they didn't necessarily 


do monitoring. We just don't have access to it 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We don't have it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Board members, further 


questions? Dr. Poston. 


 DR. POSTON: LaVon, I just want to make sure 


that we're being accurate. I don't think B and 


W or BWTX (sic) was the contractor at the time 


period you're talking about. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, I -- I -- I believe that ­

-


 DR. POSTON: And I thought it was just a 


company called NUMEC. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, it was NUMEC actually 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. POSTON: Well, in answer to Dr. Ziemer's 


question, you replied in the affirmative when 


he asked you, and I just want to make sure that 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. POSTON: -- that's made clear. 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Larry Elliott. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I think it's important to note 


that we worked really hard to get the data from 


BWXT that we've gotten. We had to actually 


work with DOL and threaten the use of a 


subpoena. And once we finally employed that 


scenario, we got in touch with a person at BWXT 


that seemed to be willing and interested in 


helping us out. So it's our belief that BWXT 


does not have the '57 base data. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I have a question, LaVon, about 


the -- the class definition. I -- I see the 


information on the stack -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- uncontrolled releases -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- couldn't really quantify them, 


and I'm wondering if the class definition 


shouldn't include all workers instead of just ­

-


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, in (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know, our normal language is 


in there, I understand. But in this case --

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: I think it's -- yeah, I -- I 


agree with you in the fact that all personnel 


on site had potential to receive exposure 


because of the stack releases. However, if you 


look at the definition, it's all peo-- 


personnel monitored, or should have been 


monitored. So if you take that into 


consideration that they probably should have 


been monitored, then they would be included. 


So it's the interpretation of the class at that 


point. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I'm just trying to make 


things cleaner for DOL. You know, if you 


define the class as all people on site, then 


there's no gray area where we don't -- where 


we're not sure how DOL's going to interpret 


your class definition that -- so -- I mean if 


you're saying you agree with me, why can't we 


just reword it to say all workers on the site 


and then there's no gray area for 


interpretation. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: It'll -- if it's okay with 


Department of Labor for administering the 


class, you know, I -- I think we'd have to ask 


the Department -- 'cause what we go through is 

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we always submit our class definition to 


Department of Labor to determine if they can 


administer the class as defined. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I guess my -- my -- I 


just don't want to let things fall through the 


cracks where they -- if they're looking at this 


like they normally would, they might say oh, 


you know, administrative personnel -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- unlikely to be exposed or -- 


or -- or should have -- monitored or should 


have been monitored, and they might rule them 


out of the class when actually in this case 


it's a little different scenario probably, 


so... You und-- you understand the issue, 


though. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let -- let me insert here, though, 


I think that DOL nonetheless has to make their 


interpretation in light of the surrounding 


facts. And even if we use the terminology 


"were monitored, or should have been," which is 


the typical term that we use, I think everybody 


understands in this case that it is all-


inclusive. And if they were doing it some 


other way, I think -- maybe Larry can help us, 

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but what -- what -- how would we -- that would 


become known pretty quickly, would it not, and 


we would have to powwow on that in some way. 


I'll put you on the spot here. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I don't know if Jeff Kotsch is in 


the room or not from DOL, but -- 


 MR. KOTSCH: I -- I'm --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Oh, yeah, Jeff is here. Sorry, 


Jeff. He's probably better served to speak to 


how they would administer this class. They did 


review the class definition. I believe Jeff 


understands the evaluation findings and the 


circumstances around the environmental dose 


that we can't reconstruct. I -- I can't say 


how they will act on this. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I -- I -- okay. You 


understand my point, if we just change the 


class definition, we -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have Jeff Kotsch from Labor -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- don't have to worry about it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- to comment on it here. 


 MR. KOTSCH: I think -- yeah, our knowledge of 


the class is that there are on-site 


considerations, too, so -- depending on how 


it's ultimately written, but we have that 

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understanding. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I'm -- I -- are we through 

with the class? I wanted to go back to another 

point. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I guess so. 


DR. NETON: Let me just -- can I inject -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Neton. 


DR. NETON: -- just one more thing? The -- the 


bar is pretty low for this, as you know. It's 


-- the criteria is anyone who had the potential 


to receive 100 millirem exposure -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, exactly. 


DR. NETON: -- and I think -- it's not 


inappropriate necessarily to put in the 


designation that some radiation exposure should 


have had to have occurred to be a member of the 


class. I think if you say all employees, then 


that's a certain fact that everyone is in there 


whether they were exposed to radiation or not. 


And it does appear in this case that most site 


employees were exposed, but at least in this 


case I think it provides some assurance that 


there was at least some radiation exposure to 

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the members. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I don't -- I -- I guess my 


point is NIOSH is the one better equipped to 


make that judgment. And if in your judgment, 


you know -- and -- and now you're asking -- 


you're turning it over to DOL -- 


DR. NETON: We don't -- we can't make that 


judgment. We know that there is -- there were 


effluents that permeated the entire site, but 


we can't predict what the Department of Labor's 


going to find when they start reviewing the 


individual cases as to where people actually 


worked, what they did -- you know, I don't 


know. It's just not predictable by us. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Brad Clawson and then Phil 


Schofield. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I understand what you're saying, 


but you know, I'm just reading through the 


little profile here and I understand about a 


fire and so forth like that that affected 


everybody throughout that whole plant. So my 


feeling is, you know, I've got to agree with 


Mark is all the people on this should have been 


covered by this because there's no -- you know, 

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the workforce is out there, too, but this fire 


created quite a bit of havoc there, too. And 


so I -- I don't think that you could really say 


that just one class, you know, would -- would 


cover that. I -- I've got to agree with Mark 


that everybody there... 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, I think if -- if -- I 


totally agree that -- that -- that on-site 


personnel are -- you know, are -- were exposed. 


But they should have been monitored. Then that 


means they're part of the class. I think the 


import-- or the thing is -- to look at is what 


if there was, you know -- you know, what if 


there's a person that worked for NUMEC that had 


to work -- and I'm just using this as an 


example --


 MR. SCHOFIELD: All right. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- okay? I have no clue that 


-- that worked six miles away in an 


administrative office and never, you know -- 


you know, that's the -- that leaves that 


opening that it wou-- could be evaluated that 


they weren't exposed. Okay? I think if the 


class is administered -- you know, if they read 


the report, all on-site personnel should be a 

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part of the class, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Phil? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Brad already addressed, you 


know, what I was going to say. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Any further questions? LaVon, 


thank you --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I want to point out another 


thing I don't think I answered very well, and 


that is even if we had the external -- if -- if 


the external monitoring data is available for 


'57 through '59, you know, it's not going to 


change the class definition for internal 


exposure. Plus, if we do uncover that data, 


we will use it for partial dose reconstruction. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Understood. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I mean as (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just one more... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: LaVon, just to follow up on the 


partial dose reconstruction, you -- in -- in 


one of your slides I think you said you had 


some data that would have been the highest 


exposed. 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: They believe to be -- they -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: They believe to be the highest 


exposed --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Their monitoring approach 


appears to be -- their external monitoring 


approach was to badge -- to badge people they 


thought would get the highest external 


exposure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so am -- am I -- if you're 


doing partial dose reconstruction, is it only 


going to be for data that you find for the 


individual, or would you use this -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: It's only going to -- data for 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- highest exposed to apply in 


any way, or no? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We would use only data we find 


for the individual. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Now we'll hear from 


the petitioners, and let me start -- Pat -- 


Patty, do you want to kick this off or who's -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


(Pause) 

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MS. AMENO: Good afternoon. I would first like 


to -- I'm waiting for my technical part to come 


back in. He had to take care of a matter in 


the restroom. I would like to bring up my 


technical and my co-petitioner, please, Rich 


Parler, and introduce to the distinguished 


Board. Richard filed the petition originally 


that was denied, and then he refiled and then 


merged in. 


Our technical experts on this, Mr. Tom Haley, 


some of which I'm sure that you'll be able to 


identify in his -- his bio, it's very 


outstanding. 


At this particular time I would like to start 


out with our technical witness, please. Thank 


you. 


(Pause) 


MR. HALEY: Hello, my name is Tom Haley, and I 


want to apologize first for scaring Patty so 


much, but we -- I left Pittsburgh very early 


this morning and I had peanuts for breakfast, 


and I'm not used to that so I had to quickly 


leave the buil-- the room and I'm glad to be 


back and I'm glad to be able to address this -- 


this panel. Dr. Ziemer, I, too, like to 

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reminisce at my age -- I'm 72 years old -- and 


I -- in this case, my reminiscence will be 


giving you some technical information regarding 


what happened at NUMEC as I lived it for 11 


years -- 11 and a half years. And so -- and 


it's a serious remensision (sic). I, like you, 


I think, have a good memory. And so what I'm 


going to do is support the report that was 


given by NIOSH, and I'm going to go past that 


and I'm going to talk -- I'm going to give you 


some information about what really happened 


there, as I lived it. 


Now I -- let me see what -- oh, I want to have 


you turn to -- behind the third blue marker 


here. And this seems to be out of order, but 


we found out this morning that LaVon was going 


to talk about -- give you technical details and 


talk about the report first. My comments are 


based on my review of the report, and my 


additional comments are based on my activities 


and observations as I lived them at NUMEC. 


The -- I have a -- just about myself. I have a 


BS in chemistry from Carnegie Tech and when I ­

- I (unintelligible) in nuclear processing, I 


worked at Portsmouth, Ohio for five years, the 

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gaseous diffusion plant. I worked at NUMEC for 


11 and a half years after that, a great 


training ground on -- on -- in nuclear 


technology and other technologies. I've had --


I've got two patents from NUMEC and I've got 


two other patents from Westinghouse. 


I left NUMEC in 1971 -- thank you for my 


glasses. I left in 1971 and I came -- and went 


to Westinghouse and I've been there -- I was 


there for 23 years. I retired from 


Westinghouse in 1994. I'm published. I said I 


have a couple of patents from NUMEC, a couple 


of patents from -- from Westinghouse, and I've 


got a total of 40-some years in this industry. 


Now -- now I have -- these comments are 


directly -- I have six comments directly 


attributable to LaVon's report. 


First, and in one section he -- they state that 


all the op-- all the operations conducted at 


the NUMEC Apollo site involving radioactive 


materials during the entire history of the 


plant's operation are considered relevant to 


the proposed class. The summary list that 


LaVon had in the report is good, it's generally 


complete, but it's not complete. I -- my job 

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at Westingh-- NUMEC, excuse me, entailed 


project management and -- and project 


engineering, all the processes that we had to 


develop -- that we developed there. We had 


three engineers who -- who did that, and I'll 


give you some detail in a second on that one, 


but the summary list, as I remember it -- and I 


haven't looked these up; these are from memory 


-- that -- that LaVon had is generally true. 


Those are correct. But there was a lot more 


things which the -- which the -- the report 


alluded to and that I have to point out to you, 


they're all activities that are directly 


related to exposure of the workers. I'm not 


going to go through them all. You can see them 


on the page, about production of uranium 


microspheres and -- and production and coating 


of uranium, development -- well, this one here, 


development and operations of uranium scrap 


recovery proc-- recovery processes. I'll touch 


on that in a minute. But the production and 


development of coated uranium materials using 


electron beams is one of the things I got a 


patent for, but those are things we did. We 


advanced the technology continuously. We did 

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the development of the processes. We developed 


new processes. We got a lot of information on 


-- on scrap recovery and -- and -- and that -- 


and the operations regarding recovery of 


uranium from -- from solutions and the 


extraction and so on of uranium. So there are 


many more development and small production 


processes that aren't listed there, all of 


which -- to some degree, high or low -- when 


put in production did contaminate personnel and 


expose the personnel to the radionuclides in 


question. 


So in -- next top-- my next comment is with 


regard to the smaller R&D operations of NUMEC 


and Apollo are not very well documented. 


Absolutely they aren't. Some are patented and 


documented, but the processes themselves aren't 


documented. And they're based on things that 


were developed other place (sic), but they were 


also developed by myself and a couple of other 


engineers. And they were -- after they were 


developed -- in the laboratory they only built 


the prototypes in these big laboratories. 


These aren't laboratories like you see 


stainless steel tables and all that kind of 

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stuff and -- with the (unintelligible) and the 


(unintelligible) flasks and all that kind of 


stuff. Yeah, we had those, but these were 


things -- these are laboratories where we 


actually did the development and did the -- did 


the solvent extraction, we did all the things 


necessary to develop the parameters that we 


could use (unintelligible) pilot plant, and as 


tho-- as those parameters were redefined, we 


then moved to the production facilities. 


That's the way it worked. 


So I want to point out that, you know, I -- 


scientists here will recognize (unintelligible) 


that through the course of those activities, as 


in any development occurrences, we had things 


like spills and we had overflows on floors or 


lab benches, hoods. Overheats -- you know, 


crusty hot-plates with uranium dried on it 


sitting on the lab benches, sitting on the 


hoods, all open in the -- in these big 


laboratories that were where we developed the 


processes. And -- and the personnel were 


constantly exposed therefore to ionizing 


radiation and internal and external 


contamination, constantly -- constantly. 
I 

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worked beside my technicians and we all wore 


lab coats. And as we got into the stages where 


it was slurried and we get ADU and other types 


of -- of slurries and -- that's a -- we were -- 


and it was on our lab coats. Uranium was on 


the lab coats, and we'd take them off before 


we'd leave the rooms, but in any case, that 


just occurred. That's the way it was. 


Then beginning in 19-- oh, by the way, the only 


protective gear we had were safety glasses, lab 


coats and gloves. We did not wear dosimeters. 


We were not iss-- issued dosimeters. I never 


had a dosimeter. You will never see the refer­

- anything for me showing that I wore a 


dosimeter. I just didn't. I don't know 


whether I had something on the back of my badge 


or not. I was never told what -- I just -- the 


job was to get it done, whether you had a 


dosimeter or not. 


Also, number four -- oh, I forgot three. 


Beginning in '61 the processes for scrap 


recovery we developed were for UO2-Zr. Uran--


you know, recovery of uranium from UO2-Zr., 


UO2-Alumina, UO2-BeO and more. There was some 


classified stuff, but this was -- this was 

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enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium which 


we developed the processes for in these big -- 


in our laboratories on the lab benches, in the 


open and under hoods, especially when the -- 


when the gases coming off the processes were 


very toxic; they went up the hood. All these 


processes exposed personnel to continuous 


radioactive contaminants. 


Now we talked about the data, the urine and 


fecal bioassay, it said that the -- it -- it 


should be -- well, I'm telling you, most of 


this data for urine and bioass-- bioassay and 


zone monitoring should all be considered 


suspect, even the results you have, and that's 


beside this CEP data that was -- was -- was 


referenced here in the report. 


 DR. WADE: May I just stop you for a minute? 


Could you position the microphone in a way -- 


you're cutting in and out very badly. 


MR. HALEY: How's that? 


 DR. WADE: Well, maybe -- you're going to have 


to say some things. 


MR. HALEY: Why don't I just hold it? How's 


that? 


 DR. WADE: If you hold it close. 

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MR. HALEY: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. WADE: This young man's going to help you. 


People on the phone are say-- are having 


difficulty hearing -- Board members, as well. 


So again, Board members, when you do make a 


comment, make it directly into the microphone. 


MR. HALEY: Okay. This is high technology for 


me, as old as I am. Okay, can everybody hear ­

- hear fine? How about on the telephones, you 


people out there? Thank you. 


 Anyhow, where was I? Oh, I'm talking about the 


fecal and -- I mean the urine and fecal 


bioassays and the zone monitoring. I said it 


should all be considered suspect. And besides 


the CEP data, if you know what the CEP data is 


and what the report says about that. The 


submitters -- the submittals for the fecal 


samples and the urine samples were all com-- I 


mean not all, but mostly compromised, 


especially when samples were taken home -- I 


mean actually containers for samples were taken 


home and the workers were told to get some 


samples of fecal matter and the urine samples 


overnight and then bring it back in the next 


day. Well, the workers who were exposed and 

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were getting this -- this -- (electronic 


feedback). 


Now I don't think I did that. How we doing 


back there -- how we doing back there sin-- 


okay, the mike's off or on? Okay. 


The thing is that it was common knowledge that 


family members contributed to those samples. 


And the reason they did that, if the samples 


came back and showed information that indicated 


that the worker had been exposed, he was sent 


home and not paid. So in order to be able to 


work, he made sure that the samples were 


doctored to the point -- it's common knowledge 


that that happened. We -- we knew it, but 


whatever -- for whatever reason, this happened, 


and my point is all that information is 


comprom-- I mean all the information is 


compromised. I don't -- I can't say it's all ­

- it's all in error, but I know it has been 


compromised. 


And then again, when bioassay samples were 


taken at the plant and they would -- people 


would give -- and the workers were given 


containers to take into the men's room, they 


got their friends to come in and they would 

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switch samples for somebody who hadn't been 


working in the radioactive ar-- I mean in a 


contaminated area. That happened. I saw it 


happen. It did happen. 


Now -- and -- and the air samples, I have to 


say those, too, were compromised. And they 


were -- in this way, in this way. The workers 


were working in glovebox, on the benches, every 


place else, they had -- they were taking air 


samples. Well, for the guy in a glovebox, he's 


stuck there and he's tired and he hates that 


annoying buzz. He hates it. So what happens 


is somebody comes along and takes it and 


unplugs it. It doesn't buzz anymore. It's 


also not taking samples anymore. Now at the 


end of the shift, somebody -- I mean when they 


get ready to leave, they plug it in so that 


they can show it was there. Well, the HP 


people don't know that that sample hadn't been 


taken for eight hours or six hours or whatever. 


They just don't know. So I'm saying that 


those, too, were compromised. Not all of them, 


but those were compromised as well. 


Now in section -- well, in the evaluation 


report -- I'm going to have to read this -- it 

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says that the NIOSH evaluation did not identify 


any evidence that would establish that the 


class was exposed to radiation during a 


discrete incident, or similar condition 


resulting from the failure of radioac-- 


radiation exposure controls, likely to have 


produced levels of exposure similarly high to 


those occurring during nuclear criticality 


incidents. NIOSH is not aware of any report of 


such an occurrence at the facility during this 


period. And I can understand that they 


wouldn't be aware because I don't think that 


there were reports written about those, but 


I'll give you some first-hand information on 


two things that I was directly involved in that 


did expose workers to extremely high radiation, 


and it should be documented if it isn't. And 


this is the -- and this is true, first-hand 


information. 


There were two occurrences that meet the 


criteria listed in the -- in the repor-- or in 


the -- in the NIOSH report. The first one is 


that -- and I participated in these directly -- 


is a fire in the nuclear materials unit. Now 


this is a special one. We've had -- they had 

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fires -- from 1957 till the time I left there 


were fires in little buckets with UO2 


spontaneously combusting and so -- especially 


during those first three years when they were 


trying to get up and running, and not -- and -- 


and trying to train people who were former 


steel workers and seemed to be treating the 


material -- the radioactive material the same 


as they would steel. That's what they were 


trained to do. They didn't understand the 


importance of how to handle these radionuclides 


and the radioactive material -- or whatever. 


So the first was a fire in the nuclear 


materials vault, and I'll tell you about that. 


This fire was discovered to be caused by 


containers of highly enriched uranium, uranium 


carbide, and it was -- it exploded. A bottle ­

- or you -- picture the vault against the wall. 


Here's these -- these square shelves, and in 


the mid-- and -- and criticality -- I mean cri­

- it's -- it's designed to prevent criticality 


when you place a bottle -- a plastic bottle of 


uranium carbide in the middle of that. Now 


it's stacked and there's -- and there's -- it's 


horizontal and vertical. Now what happens? 

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Okay, a bottle blew up. Now uranium carbide 


oxidizes with great -- great intensity, very 


hot. What happens, it blow-- it blasts smoke 


everywhere. The -- the stuff's melting through 


the metal platforms, the metal -- metal -- and 


coming down and exploding other ones and 


melting down. Now I've got a report in here on 


that. I mean I just wrote it up and stuck it 


in the back as an enclosure 'cause I don't 


think we have enough time to go into it, but I 


will tell you that this was a -- this was a 


very discrete, serious accident and it exposed 


the -- our class to a health endangerment 


involving levels of exposure similarly high to 


those occurring during a nuclear criticality. 


We had to keep it from going critical. We had 


to run in. We -- myself and another fella ran 


in after they drug the vault custodian out, and 


his report's in there, too. But they drug him 


out to get him out of there because of what was 


happening. Myself and another engineer -- this 


was on a weekend. There wasn't a lot of people 


in the plant. They ran in -- we ran in and 


shoveled, you know, metal X on top of it to try 


to smother it. There's -- there's something in 

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the back talks about that. I won't go into any 


more, so details on that accident are provided 


in enclosure one and two to this document. 


And enclosure three -- A and 3B are letters 


from the AEC to the NSA, who was investigating 


this because of the loss of uranium, regarding 


the amount of U-235 lost. They talked about 


how much -- three kgs of -- this was lost here 


and so on. They had to wash the walls and they 


got a kg and a half off those walls. They had 


to remove the roof; they got it off of that. 


They got it off the floor. They got it off of 


other stuff in the -- in the vault and the -- 


now they -- they check us out. They do nose 


swabs, they do ear swabs, they take us into a 


shower room and scrub us all down and spend a 


whole day scrubbing us so we can get to the 


point where we can go home with coveralls on. 


You know, that's exposure. They ended up 


removing the walls and -- and it was a -- if 


there's a kilogram and a half of U-235 on the 


walls they recovered, how much was breathed, 


how much was on the skin, how much was 


absorbed. And that's -- that's -- I don't 


think you have that information. I don't know. 

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The second accident, an 11-liter, 5-inch 


diameter plastic bottle full of highly enriched 


uranium, uranyl nitrate in this case, it was 


about 380 grams per liter. I know what the 


concentration was 'cause it was within a 


specification that we were trying to adjust the 


acidity and other things like that, and we had 


them in the carts in our lab, so -- and under 


the direction of an engineer, a person -- a 


technician took it out and dumped it into a 


tank. That's a lot of uranium. We don't know 


whether it was just one or a little bit more, 


but a criticality event could have occurred had 


that uranyl nitrate assumed a geometry that 


would have caused it to go critical. 


So what did we do? We sent people down to the 


-- to the town to get all the 20 Mule Team 


Borax they can to be able to -- to get it to -- 


I mean to prevent -- to poison it so it won't 


go critical. And then -- then there -- then 


there had to be some operations done to be able 


to try to recover some of that uranium. 
I 


wasn't -- I had to go -- I was sent home, as 


others -- after we got cleaned up, but we were 


-- the people working in that area received a 

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very high dose of -- of exposure. So there's 


more words on that back in the enclosure. 
I 


won't go into it, but --


And lastly, at least during my period with 


NUMEC, uranium -- enriched uranium appeared to 


be handled in basement labs in the Warren 


Avenue office building. That was right across 


the street, and Patty's going to show you a big 


board showing what the proximity of the plant 


was to the office building. But I know of 


instruments that were developed there and -- 


and -- and in the basement and observed what 


the -- what appeared to be uranyl nitrate 


compounds present. I never saw any dosimeters 


at all issued or worn by any personnel in that 


building. Yet during the preparation for 


demolition when they were recovering -- when 


they were closing things down, they -- they had 


very high radiation levels in sewer pipes, 


behind floor molding and wooden floors, and 


about three kgs were lost -- oop, that's 


something else. But they found all that 


information -- they found all that stuff when 


they -- was demolishing the building, 


indicating that something had gone on there, 

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something had been tracked through and perhaps 


something else had happened to -- to cause 


material to come from the vents or whatever 


over to that area 'cause it's so close. But 


there was some -- I have back in the back a -- 


in the enclosure 5, I believe, a -- a newspaper 


report quoting -- to the -- the president of 


the environmental compliance organization 


saying that findings in the building prove a 


danger to the workers. Certainly, but the 


workers over in that building never wore 


dosimeters. 


Now at the beginning I said -- well, my 


comments are intended to support the NIOSH 


proposed class recommendation, and I've also 


identified two discrete occurrences causing 


exceptional high levels of exposure to NUMEC 


personnel. If you continue to follow the 


current protocol that I believe you have, as I 


understand it, the exposure effects of these 


occurrences may well be the determining factor 


in the dose reconstructions for applicants who 


may have less than the 250 days or may have 


cancers other than those listed in the Act. 


And I want to make it clear that my comments to 

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the evaluation report, and with all due respect 


to -- to the -- to the NIOSH report itself, 


don't even come close to adequately describing 


the true deleterious working conditions leading 


to the exposures that the personnel 


experienced. I read that 'cause I don't want 


to be misquoted. 


Now given that, the NUMEC Apollo facility was a 


commercial endeavor. Deadlines had to be met 


and pressures to complete and ship final 


products were very strong in order for the 


company to -- to get paid and make payroll. 


Expedience was often the highest priority. 


This was not a GOCO, a government-owned 


contractor-operated, facility. It was a cost 


plus fixed -- fixed fee contracts. They had to 


make a profit, and to do that they had to -- 


they -- whatever they had to do. They had to 


make a profit to meet the payroll and get back 


on the invest-- of their invest-- get back 


something for their investors. So health and 


safety rules were in place, but often 


circumvented by the workers to meet priorities. 


While the management discouraged this, it 


nevertheless happened. It just happened. 

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That's the way it was back in the early '60s. 


And it was just -- well, as a result of this 


and other factors, exposure data is either 


incomplete, nonexistent, or at least suspect. 


Some documentation of incidents is missing or 


incomplete or ambiguous, at best, and makes 


radiological effects on pers-- on personnel 


almost impossible to determine. 


In addition, processes had to be developed and 


implemented on a large scale for the first 


time. And mistakes were made, as one might 


expect in these kind of operations. That just 


happens when you're doing development. And the 


mistakes, when you're working with uranium, can 


be disastrous. But mistakes were made. 


 For our purposes today I must say that the 


workers were subjected to continuous exposure 


to radiation that varied in intensity depending 


on the operations they were performing or the 


accidents in which they were involved. So when 


you think about a class, and you all were 


talking about looking at individual cases and 


so on, yes, that's true. But there were some ­

- I mean -- but still, it -- as I said, it 


depends on the operations they were performing 

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and the accidents to which they -- in which 


they were involved. 


And now while I concur with the NIOSH 


recommendations, and I hope that it moves 


forward with all expediency, based on -- well, 


at least my comments and Mrs. Ameno's -- Ms. 


Ameno's presentation later, I wish to make the 


following recommended -- recommendations for 


your consideration. 


One, the lack of exposure data from operations 


and accidents should not be cause to preclude 


those who have cancers or who have died from 


cancers not listed in the Act. Data needed to 


determine exposure levels does not exist. 


Those affected of em-- those affected employees 


should not be included (sic) from a class and 


lose the right of compensation, as Miss Ameno ­

- Ms. Ameno will also attest to in her 


presentation. 


Two, office employees in the Warren Ave. office 


building should continue to be included in the 


class under consideration. They were exposed. 


It's clear they were exposed, and they had no 


dosimeters. And they -- again, I ask they be 


included in the -- in the eval-- in the class 

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under consideration. 


Now I -- there's some stuff behind that that I 


alluded to in -- and whatever, but if you have 


any -- I want to make sure you understand one 


thing. I've been in this business my whole 


life. I've been to all the national 


laboratories, especially Hanford, the 


Engineering and Development Lab which was run 


by Westinghouse when I was there. And I've --


I've visited them on the various 


(unintelligible) and whatever, especially on 


waste management activities and -- and -- and 


while I worked as an employee for Westinghouse 


and as I worked for -- an employee for NUMEC, 


so I could go out and learn what's happening 


elsewhere. And I've never seen any operation 


ever, anyplace, since I left -- before I went 


to NUMEC or after I left NUMEC, that was -- 


that was -- let me say in a -- conducted in a 


way that continually exposed the workers to 


radiation and -- and continually to expo-- 


exposed them, no matter -- I mean on -- on a 


constant basis. The report says that they're 


recommending it because -- they should consider 


the class because it's -- there is a -- well, 

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62 

I'm saying the class should be considered an 


acute operation, not just one that causes a 


constant oper-- I mean a constant exposure, but 


there were acute exposures. There had to be, 


for the type of accidents that occurred. 


And with that, I -- I -- I close. If you have 

any questions... 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. I'd like to 

ask for a clarification, either you or perhaps 


LaVon Rutherford, on the Warren Avenue office. 


Is that part of the Apollo Plant that we're 


talking about or -- where is -- where is that 


in this? 


MR. HALEY: May I -- may I answer that? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


MR. HALEY: Ms. Ameno will have in her 


presentation -- we have -- we have a -- well, I 


can show it to you here -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


MR. HALEY: Well, I'll hold it back for a 


second, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: Basically I'm asking if that's 


included in our definition. I -- it was --


MR. HALEY: Yeah, it's within 30 feet -- 

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63

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh --


MR. HALEY: -- of the front of that building, 


and it -- it -- and it was exposed to effluents 


from the stacks. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's what I was really asking, 


so LaVon, is it your understanding that that 


building is covered in the recommendation from 


NIOSH? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: From -- and I -- I can't 


remember actually, but the -- and is that the 


administrative building that was -- yes. 


MR. HALEY: It was the administrative building 


on the corner --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, that's --


MR. HALEY: -- (unintelligible) by Warren 


Avenue, yes. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. I believe that was 


within the site boundary, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I just wanted to make sure 


the -- that we're on the same page on that. It 


wasn't clear from your recommendation that -- 


whether or not you were implying that that had 


been not included or whether that was, and 


apparently it has been included. 


And then just as a comment, I just want to make 

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sure that you're aware that the list of cancers 


that is used has been specified by Congress. 


MR. HALEY: Yes, I am aware that -- I am aware 


of that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Just so you -- you understand that 


the Board --


MR. HALEY: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- is not in a position to change 


the list. 


MR. HALEY: Right, and --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I just want to make sure 


you're aware of that. 


MR. HALEY: Yes, I am, and as I understand it ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


MR. HALEY: -- they -- they do -- they try to 


do a dose reconstruction for those types of 


cancers that aren't listed in the Act. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


MR. HALEY: And -- and if -- and what I'm 


asking for is that the accidents that occurred 


here and the exposures, the intense exposures 


during the accidents that occurred, should be 


considered during that dose construction. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay. Board members, 

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other questions for Tom? 


MS. BEACH: I have one. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Josie. 


MS. BEACH: I don't know if you're the right 


person to ask, but the laundry, was that done 


on-site or was it off-site? 


MR. HALEY: It was on-site, yes. It wasn't in 


the main building, but it was -- it was off to 


the side of the building at the end of the 


parking lot. Yes, it was included. 


MS. BEACH: Thank you. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I'm just looking at this, and 


what's the difference between Apollo and Parks? 


MR. HALEY: Oh, well, about what -- 11 miles, 

is it? 

MS. AMENO: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

MR. HALEY: About two and a half air miles, but 

let me -- yes, good point, but the -- the Parks 


site was -- their license initially was 


restricted to plutonium processing and it -- 


and it was done there. Ultimately -- whether 


it -- the license changed or whether it was 


initially passed for this, they did do uranium 


fuel. They did make uranium fuel for a -- for 


the Navy nuclear program up there, using a 

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process that I'm also in -- in -- have a patent 


for. But they moved -- after I left, they 


moved that up there. I don't -- so they had -- 


outside of the normal processing of plutonium 


facilities, they had another building making 


uranium fuel for the Navy nuclear program. 


 MR. CLAWSON: So La-- LaVon, on this -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Speak into the mike, Brad, so 


everybody can hear you. 


 MR. CLAWSON: On this, then, for this SEC -- 


it's just for Apollo. Right? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, because of the rule 


require-- since they are listed as two separate 


facilities, Apollo and Parks, that this is only 


for Apollo. But we have recognized the issues 


with Parks and are moving forward with the 


83.14 to -- to include Parks as well. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, 'cause I was wondering how 


are we -- I'm sure that there was people that 


went back and forth and -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Oh, yes, the issues that we've 


identified for Apollo -- a number of those 


issues affect Parks as well. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, thank you. 


MR. HALEY: Just as an example, sir, I worked ­
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- I -- I would go up to the plutonium facility 


to teach them how to use the process of coating 


plutonium, in this case, or -- or 


(unintelligible) materials using plutonium, 


with the electron beam process. We set that up 


there. And -- and workers moved back and forth 


some. Yes, they did, and -- so they were 


exposed in both places. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. 


MR. HALEY: Thank you, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Patty, back to you. 


(Pause) 


MS. AMENO: Testing -- can you hear me? 


Everybody can hear me? I just want to make 


sure that this doesn't fall all over the place 


here. 


(Pause) 


I would like to start with the dedication, if I 


may. In the spirit of love, this testimony is 


dedicated to all the NUMEC workers who have, 


are and will battle mankind's common enemy: 


cancer and other diseases. For your heroic 


work service, you are greatly appreciated. 
I 


will never forget, nor will I let others 


forget, the contributions and sacrifices you 

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have made for our country. 


My name is Patty Ameno, and I would like to 


thank this distinguished Advisory Board for 


hearing the NUMEC case today. In addition, I 


would like to acknowledge a very special thank 


you to NIOSH for their time-intensive 


investigation and recommendation of SEC status 


for the NUMEC Apollo site. Thank you very 


much. 


I am retired from the United States Navy and a 


former Department of Defense criminal 


investigator. But more so, I am the long-time 


environmental activist that has been involved 


for years with the NUMEC sites in Apollo and 


Parks Township, Pennsylvania. Eighteen years, 


to be exact. I will tell you that my training 


aided greatly as I combed through several 


million pages of documents over the years on 


these sites. 


Photo one is -- right there, Tom, you have it ­

- this is, or appropriately speaking, was the 


NUMEC site in Apollo. And I grew up directly 


across the street from the site, and that was 


my house. I never knew what kind of business 


it was, or what all the 55-gallon drums were 

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that streamed its fence line -- right over here 


-- and I guess I can -- the secret's out. 


Everybody knows I'm not a natural blonde now. 


Can you see the drums on this? 


I was literally the girl next door. My parents 


owned and operated an Italian Deli adjacent to 


our home that was a favorite lunch spot for the 


NUMEC workers. The vast majority of the 


workers lived either in Apollo or in a 


neighboring town. And for the most part, we 


all knew each other. 


Though the NUMEC plant and office buildings are 


now gone, one can continuously see the legacy 


that the plant, with great measure, bestowed to 


its workers, a legacy of cancers and diseases. 


 NUMEC, which was once hailed as the world's 


largest and privately-owned producer of 


plutonium, uranium and experimental fuel for 


the Naval Reactor's Program, was plagued with 


problems and compromise. The workers were not 


monitored at all from 1957 through and at least 


to 1960. Enclosure 1-A illustrates that in 


1958 absence of monitoring and sampling of 21 


workers that were exposed to, quote/unquote, 


radioactive dust and radiation, showing that no 

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samples were taken and medical referral was not 


given. 


 Enclosure 1-B is dated February 15th and 16th 


of 1962, which clearly shows 400 -- 400 workers 


that were exposed to uranium, plutonium and 


beryllium. However, on this occasion there was 


testing, if you want to call seven samples out 


of 400 workers exposed sampling. 


NIOSH identified NUMEC's main and initial 


AEC/NRC license as SNM-145. However, NUMEC had 


several other licenses at Apollo running 


simultaneously. Once such license was SNM-135, 


which on May 25th, 1969 was amended, quote, to 


authorize the discharge of radioactive material 


from any stack effluent of your Apollo Uranium 


Plant in concentrations up to 100 times the 


applicable limits. 


 That's an astonishing 10,000 percent increase, 


and it was allowed to run as such for at least 


one year. Considering that the Apollo plant 


had 124 stacks, workers didn't have to be 


inside to get dosed really good. The parking 


lot for the plant workers was within the plant 


boundaries, and during the decommissioning of 


the facility in the early 1990s the parking lot 

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was found to be highly contaminated. There was 


never any surveys done on the workers' vehicles 


that continually parked in that lot, nor were 


any of them ever washed off before leaving that 


plant facility. 


In addition, the office building was only an 


approximate 100 feet from the plant building, 


and in the summertime, with the absence of air 


conditioning, the windows on many of the 


offices were opened and are suspect to that 


10,000 percent increase. Furthermore, in 1972 


a release from the Apollo plant for a seven and 


a half hour duration was 102,866 times the 


limit. Photo enclosure number three shows the 


location of the plant in proximity to the 


office building, along with fallout collectors 


positioned directly in front of the office 


building and at other locations. And enclosure 


number three shows the NUMEC exhaust stack 


locations. Please note that the location of 


the majority of the stacks are concentrated to 


the plant's end that is in proximity to the 


office building. 


And directly in between the office building and 


the facility is a 35-foot road called Warren 

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Avenue, or otherwise known as Route 66. 


Approximately 12,000 vehicles go through there 


every day, and then we have to think about 


roadway resuspension as well. 


On November 29th, 1972 AEC compliance officials 


met with NUMEC management because, quote, 


compliance was concerned about the reoccurring 


(sic) nature and seriousness of NUMEC 


violations, end quote. The group later met 


with the AEC's J. P. O'Reilly, who started the 


meeting by stating, quote, NUMEC has been the 


worst offender of AEC regulations over the 


years, end quote. That designation was 


extremely telling of NUMEC's total and 


consistent disregard for regulations and worker 


safety over time. And photo number five is a 


testament to that continuous and blatant 


disregard. That would be this photo right 


here. In it is worker [Name Redacted] and 


[Name Redacted]. And both of these men are 


standing seven feet deep in what is known as 


burial trench number one at the Parks Township 


waste dump. This dump and its burial trenches 


are extremely dangerous, with buried contents 


of, but not limited to, uranium-235 and 

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plutonium, with unknown -- unknown amounts of 


high level material. That dump consists in 


totality of approximately six tons of nuclear 


and chemical waste. It may be a different 


site, which is only two and a half air miles 


down the same road from Apollo, but Apollo and 


Parks shared the same management and 


organizational personnel, and the workers were 


interchanged between the two sites on a 


frequent basis, and the trucking between the 


two sites occurred on the daily basis. 


From 1973 through 1974 at NUMEC at -- on the 


Apollo site the AEC noted 333 violations of the 


ventilation requirements, along with the 


company's failure to correct earlier problems. 


In addition, State inspectors observed 


emissions from the Apollo plant on numerous 


occasions because the company had shut off the 


scrubbers. 


 NUMEC's Apollo laundry area was a nightmare. 


Document enclosure number four, a company 


confidential document, clearly and in layman 


terms, without technical editing, outlines the 


continued seriousness of the problem and worker 


exposures in that are had to be phenomenal. 

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The document states, and I quote, health and 


safety problems are becoming critical. The 


exposure problem is serious. High plutonium 


levels in the laundry means someone is being 


exposed at the plutonium plant. There are high 


levels of plutonium and mixed fission products 


in the laundry. Evidence of our high discharge 


is easy to find. Imaginary dilution is not 


satisfactory. We will be found out and could 


subsequently lose our license. The delaying 


actions carried out for years are not going to 


pacify the State and federal authorities any 


longer. 


NUMEC employed thousands of people over the 


cradle to grave time period of 36 years. Many 


of these workers were on a revolving door 


layoff type of cycle, especially during 


inspection scrutiny. When demanding contract 


production was ongoing, the main workers that 


got cooked were laid off and new hires were 


brought in. NUMEC would have as high as, 


quote/unquote, 100 percent worker turnover 


every three months. When the new hires got 


cooked, the main workers were called back. 


This would effectuate NUMEC's goal for contract 

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deadlines without having to pay the worker that 


was cooked to be in another area. Enclosure 


number 5-A addresses this problem and the 


problem of NUMEC's policy of non-inclusion of 


skin dose testing for the workers. Enclosure 


number 5-B, a sworn statement from three NUMEC 


nurses, attest to the worker turnover and the 


horrific conditions that they themselves were 


exposed to. 


In 1977 an Oak Ridge National Laboratory team 


did an assessment that based their findings 


from information received from NUMEC. It 


stated that, quote, the Apollo facility may 


have a significant adverse effect upon the 


surrounding environment, end quote. That being 


the case, one can safely conclude as to the 


adverse effects to the NUMEC workers. Former 


NUMEC worker [Name Redacted] knew quite well of 


the adverse effects and the toll it took on him 


physically and professionally. He outlined, in 


his April 4, 1979 letter, the professional 


toll. Quote, our environmental reports are not 


justifiable by facts. By law, we are to 


maintain records on all radiation exposure of 


our employees and others, past and present. We 

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do not. By law, we are to submit exposure 


analysis to the NRC. We do this. However, it 


has no relative bearing to a person's total 


exposure, but it satisfies the NRC. By law, we 


are permitted to send -- we're not permitted to 


send out false reports to exposed victims or 


others. We do. By law, we are not permitted 


to place a person with an overexposure back 


into a known radiation field until that 


exposure is satisfied. However, we ignore 


this. 


 The violations of worker safety did not stop in 


1983. During the decommissioning of the NUMEC 


site in Apollo the workers were once again 


exposed in a huge way to contamination. 


Additionally, contracts -- contractors that 


were hired by NUMEC were not given the required 


40-hour OSHA site safety training or 


certification. They were not provided with 


monitoring, safety gear or exposure 


information, and were not informed of the level 


-- levels of radioactive and chemical 


contamination. Also during the decommission, 


in the office buil-- building, radiation 


contamination in a pipe was found at levels of 

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22,328 picocuries of enriched uranium per gram. 


The basement of that office building contained 


the lab where at least R&D, research and 


development, was being conducted. 


NUMEC was continuously defiant in adhering to 


laws, regulations and directives, professional 


standards and worker health and safety 


standards, and therefore habitually violated 


them. NUMEC was the poster child of sloppy 


housekeeping, the derelicts of health and 


safety, and a disgrace to the Code of 


Professional Standards. In any other place 


this would be descriptive of gross negligence. 


Nonetheless, NUMEC, which was an important 


source of our country's nuclear power plants 


such as TMI, of Naval fuel and weapons 


material, continued to be allowed to operate 


for over 40 years by having the needed and 


necessary licenses and permits continuously 


amended. NUMEC was wrongfully able to 


circumvent the law through this process. And 


while NUMEC fired the gun, the government drove 


the getaway car. 


There is an enclosure, and it is by -- it's a 


document by a former president of NUMEC, [Name 

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Redacted]. And in it he states compliance -- 


oh, I'm sorry -- he states, quote, we are 


guilty. If the memo -- if the information 


contained in these memos is accurate, we are 


guilty of gross irresponsibility. We are out 


of control. 


That is the president of NUMEC then speaking in 


that present day. The information that he had 


in front of him, that we may not have, and for 


that I have to ask then who are we. 


I would like to make it clear for the record 


that I am not an anti-nuclear activist. I 


would like to believe that many advances in 


medicine, science, space exploration and other 


peaceful fields are benefiting mankind. 


However, and as you well know, the first 


generation of these facilities were afflicted 


with many problems, but none with the totality 


of the problems that engulfed NUMEC, that which 


would make textbook instruction on how not to 


run a nuclear facility. 


And so I will say to you now it is with, 


through, and because of NUMEC's historical 


legacy; the totality of circumstances of 


continued violations of monumental proportions; 

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the unreliable, the conveniently unobtainable 


and the unbelievable lack of monitoring; the 


continued exceeded emissions and the 


dangerously sloppy housekeeping, all of which 


that may have intensified the chronic 


exposures, that I respectfully ask this 


distinguished Board to approve NIOSH's 


recommendation of SEC status to the Apollo site 


with expansion of the proposed class to include 


the named job descriptions of the 


administrative, clerical, and security guard 


workers; and that the Board add NUMEC, please, 


to the less than 250-day rule list that you are 


currently considering and evaluating other 


sites for. 


May I have my water, please? Thank you. 


(Pause) 


Forgive me. Finally, as the honored voice for 


the workers of NUMEC sites in Apollo and Parks 


Township, I can tell you that they have been 


totally abandoned by the companies that paid 


meager wages and left them void of insurance 


coverage, and abandoned by the very government 


which they were proud to serve during the Cold 


War. The NUMEC workers have always been the 

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true stakeholders, and have been equivalent to 


veteran soldiers in their own right. Veterans 


who committed themselves to the battle of the 


Cold War; veterans who have watched their 


coworkers, friends, family and loved ones 


perish from a silent and continuous friendly 


fire, a friendly fire that's resulted in 


tumors, cancers and other diseases; veterans 


that have been left, in an un-American way, on 


a battlefield without any reinforcements; 


veterans that will never have a parade in their 


honor, or be awarded a Purple Heart for the 


nuclear tour of duty service, even though in 


our hearts hundreds upon hundreds like [Name 


Redacted], [Name Redacted], [Name Redacted] and 


[Name Redacted] and so many more should 


posthumously be awarded a comparable to the 


Congressional Medal of Honor for the battles 


they fought, single-handedly, with courage, 


against cancer; veterans that for over four 


decades unknowingly hosted and embraced, at the 


bequest and reassurance of our regulatory 


agencies, the cold-hearted and uncaring 


companies that bombarded our land, causing us 


to have literally lost our ground. But they 

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are also veterans who will never, ever, give up 


the fight in trying to reclaim it. 


And so to this Board, this distinguished Board, 


you are charged with the responsibility 


regarding the very people who have helped pave 


the way for those in this field, and so I ask 


you now to rise to the occasion and let these 


veterans know today that the reinforcements are 


on their way. 


I thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Patty. 


MS. AMENO: Are there any questions? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I would like to ask for one word 


of clarification regarding the positions that 


were named. Again, are those covered, LaVon, 


as you understand it, in the NIOSH -- this -- 


they appear to be administrative pos-- 


administrative, clerical and security guard 


workers. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, those -- all of those 


people are covered. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Would be covered? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. I just wanted to make 


sure we were in the same boat there. Thank 

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you. 


Other questions? Yeah, Brad Clawson. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I've got a question for LaVon. 


Who did the -- was there only one laundry 


plant, or was there only one laundry? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: There was one laundry op-- one 


laundry facility that laundered for both Park, 


Apollo and actually they laundered for other 


nuclear facilities, actually brought in laundry 


from other nuclear facilities and laundered it 


there. 


 MR. CLAWSON: So -- so they -- they show their 


laundry back and forth and everything on that. 


Who did Apollo's and Parks' -- well, who did 


the bioassay? Who -- was that a -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: They -- they had -- bioassay 


was done by a number of different contractors, 


but from 1976 to 1993 it was done by CEP. 


There was actually three or four other 


contractors that -- that did bioassay analysis 


in the earlier years. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. When did Apollo -- well, 


when did NUMEC shut down? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: They -- operations that 


supported the AEC were in '83, were com-- 

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that's when they -- those operations were 


complete. However, they continued uranium 


production in '84 and other operations until I 


think the facility was closed and completely 


D&D'd in '93. 


MS. AMENO: December of '93. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: On the issue of outside laundry, 


do we have any idea of the possible 


introduction of other nuclides that -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, in fact --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- would have been used in other 


facilities but not part of the Apollo -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, in fact at one point -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- inventory? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We did leave out a -- the -- 


one of the reports that is in the sheet that 


Ms. Ameno has provided is actually a report I 


provided to the Board on the X drive, plutonium 


at the laundry. Our report was silent on the 


fact that there was mixed fission products 


clearly at the laundry, and I think if you -- 


and -- and that was not monitored for, and that 


was probably from washing the control rod drive 


mechanisms at the laundry, as well. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, thank you. Continue. Do you have --


you have an --


MS. AMENO: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: -- any additional --


MS. AMENO: -- (unintelligible) the Board has 


nothing further from me or for me or of me or 


(unintelligible) I could do for you. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. 


MS. AMENO: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And did Richard have some remarks, 


as well, or not? 


 MR. PARLER: Well, not much, after all of that. 

I do --

 DR. ZIEMER: Richard, we'll need to have you 

miked for the recorder. 


 MR. PARLER: As long as everybody can look at 


these pictures and realize how small and tiny 


this place was. It's not spread out. As a 


matter of fact, the back of that place is a 


steel mill which wasn't even used. The -- the 


NUMEC plant was right in the front there, that 

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little -- little small area. And the office 


that was across the way there, 35 feet, because 


of those uranium labs in the basement there, 


that administrative building, the -- the 


uranium labs were not in the administration 


building, office building. The office workers 


were in the uranium lab building. 


And with that, I want to thank the 


distinguished Board, of course, and the 


distinguished members of the audience. And 


this has been a long, long uphill fight for 


everybody and I want to comment on the 


professional actions and integrity of everybody 


with NIOSH who have gotten us to this part 


through their long dedication and service. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Phil, do you 


have a question or comment? Phil Schofield. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes, I do. I've got a 


question. You talk about them bringing the 


laundry from other facilities. Were any of 


these facilities there covered under an AWE so 


that maybe some of this plutonium mixed 


isotopes that were coming in were actually 


residual contamination from sites that would be 


covered? 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, I'm not sure about that, 


but the significant portion of the plutonium 


was definitely from the Parks facility. The 


Parks facility was doing plutonium production, 


and there's actually a few reports which I've 


made available to the Board on the X drive 


which talks about opening of highly 


contaminated anti-contamination clothing with 


heavy plutonium contamination from the Parks 


facility at the laundry. And then burning them 


in barrels, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Brad Clawson, an 


additional comment? 


 MR. CLAWSON: I've got a question because on 


the bottom of your statement it's -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Use the mike, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: It says is uranium dose 


reconstruction feasible for 1960 on due to 


available of bioassay data. But there's a 


question because there's a guilty plea that was 


issued. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, I --


 MR. CLAWSON: How -- how can we trust that? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We -- we won't. We will not 


use the CEP data. We were -- we will use -- 

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the CEP data from 1976 to 1983 we will not use. 


All other bioassay data that we've -- we've -- 


we -- we will use all other bioassay data. We 


have -- we have breathing zone data for 


uranium, we have the whole body counts for 


uranium, we have the bioassay data pre-'76 for 


uranium. We also have fecal data pre-'76 for 


uranium, so we will use that information. The 


only information we won't use is the CEP data. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. I think it 


would be appropriate if we took -- took our 


break now, and then following the break, Board, 


we can continue discussions on this petition 


and any motions that you may wish to make. 


We'll have a break for approximately 30 


minutes. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:00 p.m. 


to 3:30 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I'll call the meeting back 


to order. Thank you very much. 


 Board members, we'll continue our discussion of 


the SEC petition for the NUMEC Plant in Apollo, 


Pennsylvania. Are there any questions or 


comments before we ask for a specific action? 

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 (No responses) 


Apparently not. If not, it would be 


appropriate for us to have a motion. I'm going 


to call for a general motion to indicate the 


Board's intent on this particular petition. If 


the motion carries, we will have ready for you 


Friday the exact wording of the action as it 


will go to the Secretary of Health and Human 


Services. That wording includes not only what 


we recommend, but would include the usual 


instructions to the Chair on how soon that 


needs to go out and related information on why 


we are making the recommendation. 


So I will ask if anyone wishes to make a 


motion. The motion -- an appropriate motion 


would be for us to recommend the class as 


recommended by NIOSH. Anyone wish to make a 


motion? 


 MR. GIBSON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mike is making the motion. Let me 


repeat Mike's motion. Mike's motion is that 


all AWE employees who were monitored, or should 


have been monitored, for exposure to ionizing 


radiation while working at the NUMEC Plant in 


Apollo, Pennsylvania for a number of work days 

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aggregating at least 250 days from January 1st, 


1957 through December 31st, 1983, or in 


combination with work days within the 


parameters established for one or more other 


classes of employees in the SEC. 


That was your motion, Mike? He made it much 


more efficiently than I did, but that was his 


motion. Is there a second? 

 MR. CLAWSON: I second it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And a second. Is there any 

discussion on this motion? I -- let me add 

that, should the motion carry, the Chair will 


then entertain a separate motion that would 


recommend that the iss-- the 250-day issue that 


was raised by the petitioners be referred to 


the Melius workgroup that is addressing 250-day 


issues for all petitions, so -- was that the 


question you were going to ask? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) That was my 


question. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Okay, are you ready to vote? 


 Comment, Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Only one more. We -- we might 


have -- I just want to give Jeff a chance to -- 


maybe just this interpretation of the class 

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question that I had earlier. I think we've 


been around the block on it, but if I could 


just get DOL to maybe give a sense to the Board 


of how they're going to interpret this class, 


given what they know about the facility 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: Present wording uses "who were 


monitored, or should have been monitored" -- 


it's the Board's understanding that this 


includes all individuals on the Apollo site and 


I think --


 MR. KOTSCH: I think --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- Jeff, you've agreed -- 


 MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, we agree that -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- that that's what it means in 


this case. 


 MR. KOTSCH: I would agree with that 


interpretation. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Then let me call for a 


vote, and let me point out also that we're 


obligated under our rules to obtain the votes 


of those who are not present. That would be 


Dr. Lockey, and I -- right now we're assuming 

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that Dr. Melius is conflicted on this one. If 


it turns out he isn't, we would obtain his vote 


as well, if needed. 


All those who favor the motion, say aye -- 


let's do it by rais-- show of hands, raise your 


right hand. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


Okay, any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


 Any abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


It appears to the Chair that the motion carries 


 DR. WADE: By a vote of ten-zero. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- ten-zero. We will nonetheless 


obtain Dr. Lockey's vote for the record, and if 


necessary, Dr. Melius's vote. So the motion 


carries and there will be a formal 


recommendation to the Secretary that the Apollo 


petition be approved for -- as part of the 


class in the Special Exposure Cohort. 


Now I would entertain a motion to request that 


the 250-day issue raised by the Apollo 


petitioners be referred to the Melius workgroup 


for consideration in their deliberations. 

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 DR. WADE: Just for the record, that workgroup 


is called the SEC issues group, paren, 


including 250-day issue and preliminary review 


of 83.14 SEC petition, chaired by Melius, 


members Griffon, Roessler, Ziemer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. That's our -- that's the 


workgroup with the longest name. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'll make that motion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I'll second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's moved and seconded. Any 


discussion on this motion? 


 (No responses) 


All in favor of the motion, aye? 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed, no? 


 (No responses) 


The motion carries. Thank you very much. 


 DR. WADE: By a vote of ten-zero. We will not 


secure Lockey's on this 'cause this is not a 


recommendation --


 DR. ZIEMER: That's correct. Thank you very 


much. And for the --


 DR. WADE: We have a -- maybe one -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- Apollo folks, we thank you for 

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your participation today. If you have any 


additional comments, we'd be pleased to hear 


them. 


MS. AMENO: I would like to, on behalf of the 


NU-- NUMEC workers, the ones that are gone, the 


ones that are still here, for the families, for 


the people of our community who interact with 


them, for everybody, I want to thank each and 


every member of this Board today. Thank you so 


much. Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: A comment. I think if -- if thanks 


from those workers are due to anyone, they're 


due to you and the fine work that you people 


have done representing them. You should be 


very, very proud of what you have accomplished. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. Let's 


then proceed. We're a little behind schedule 


but we'll be able to make up some time. I'm 


going to take the presentations not completely 


in the order that they're listed in the agenda 


because there are some individuals that will 


need to leave us earlier and one or two that we 


might postpone till tomorrow. I think we're 


going to postpone Dr. Neton's presentation, 


probably, unless these others really go faster 

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than I expected. 


NIOSH PROGRAM UPDATE
 

But we'll begin with Dr. -- with Larry 


Elliott's update on the NIOSH program. I'd 


like to follow that by having LaVon Rutherford 


give us an SEC petition update. Then we'll 


hear from Pat Worthington, the DOE program 


update, and then Jeff Kotsch will give us the 


Department of Labor update. So Larry, you're 


first. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. 


Appreciate the opportunity again to be with the 


Board and present to the Board the program 


status update and (unintelligible) talked about 


in previous presentations. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on. 


 DR. WADE: He's not picking you up. 


(Pause) 


 MR. ELLIOTT: How about now? Not yet. Not 


yet? Not yet. One, two, three? Sometime 


soon? Now we're coming up, maybe. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm on now? 


UNIDENTIFIED: No. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: No? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 MR. ELLIOTT: How about that? 


 DR. WADE: Upside-down, Larry. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Upside-down? 


(Pause) 


 Is that -- am I working now? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay, we're working now. 


 The overall initial claim information that we 


present in the program updates are in this 


first slide. As of September 27th of this year 


there've been 25,325 cases which have been 


referred to NIOSH by the Department of Labor 


for dose reconstruction. Seventy-six percent 


of those have been returned to DOL, and if you 


break that number -- 19,265 -- down, you will 


see that there are 17,153 that have been 


returned to DOL with a dose reconstruction 


report. Another 642 have been returned to DOL 


as being pulled by the Department of Labor, for 


a variety of reasons, and so they're out of the 


dose reconstruction process. 


 There have been 1,470 claims that have been 

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returned to DOL with a determination of 


eligibility within a Special Exposure Cohort 


class that has been added. That means that 23 


percent of the cases remain at NIOSH for dose 


reconstruction, for a total of 5,797 as of 


September 27th of this year. 


One percent, or 263 cases, are currently 


administratively closed, and I'll remind the 


Board and the audience of what this means. 


That means that we have completed our work with 


the dose reconstruction, provided to the 


claimant, and the claimant has chosen not to 


provide us with an OCAS-1 form indicating that 


they have no further information to -- to 


offer. If they so choose, they want us to 


reopen the claim, all they have to do is let us 


know or provide additional information, provide 


the OCAS-1, and we'll reactive the claim. 


This pie chart shows a different graphic 


(unintelligible) of those 25,325 cases. In 


this you'll see the light blue or the Carolina 


blue, 67.7 percent showing as being completed. 


There's a different color there for the other 


categories of claims, and I'll let you sort 


through those as you wish. 

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Of the 17,153 dose reconstructions that we have 


returned to the Department of Labor for final 


adjudication, we note that 31 percent of them 


will result in a probability of causation 


greater than 50 percent, or around 5,242 


claims. That means 11,911 claims, or 69 


percent, that have had -- that will be found in 


the adjudication process to be non-compensable 


or have probability of causation of less than 


50 percent. 


This bar graph that we show in this slide shows 


in decade or decile groupings of zero to ten, 


11 to 20, 21 to 30 and 31 to 40, 41 to 49 


percent and greater than 50 percent, the 


distribution of claims as they break out in the 


probability of causation categories, as you 


see. 


Of the 5,797 claims remaining at NIOSH for dose 


reconstruction, I'll break those down for you 


in this slide, 1,838 cases are currently 


assigned to a health physicist for dose 


reconstruction; 956 initial draft dose 


reconstruction reports are (unintelligible) 


with the claimants, they're with the claimants 


and we're awaiting the return of the OCAS-1 

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form; and that leaves 3,003 cases that are not 


assigned to a dose reconstructor at this point 


in time -- as of September 27th. 


As we work very hard and continue our efforts 


on -- on monitoring the oldest cases, you'll 


see that 53 percent of these active cases, or 


3,056, are older than one year. 


We continue to maintain our attention on the 


first 5,000 claims, trying to complete these 


oldest claims that have been referred to NIOSH 


for dose reconstruction. And in this slide 


you'll see that we have returned to DOL, of the 


first 5,000, 2,996 claims. We've 


administratively closed 58 claims in this first 


5,000. And there've been 246 of those first 


5,000 claims pulled by Department of Labor 


without a dose reconstruction report. We have 


183 that have been removed from the first 5,000 


because they have some eligibility in an SEC 


class. And we have eight dose reconstructions 


with a claimant. The lines that you see here 


in red are those claims that we are working on 


in the first 5,000. The 445 claims are 


actually not initial dose reconstructions. 


They've already given up their initial dose 

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reconstruction report and something changed 


about that particular claim within those 445 


and we were asked to rework them. The 64 I 


think here is a critical number. These are 


claims that have not yet had an initial dose 


reconstruction, and of those 64, 20 are NUMEC 


claims, so that would leave 44 possible claims 


for us to reconstruct dose on if all 20 of 


those NUMEC claims find their way into the SEC 


class for NUMEC. 


 This slide presents the -- in three lines on 


this graph, the number -- the trend in receipt 


of cases from Department of Labor shown in the 


blue line. And you can see -- I'll point out 


that we've seen an increase of late in 


submittals to us for dose reconstructions from 


the Department of Labor. We've also seen in 


our drafts that go out, in the green line, and 


our final reports that go to DOL in the red 


line, a downward trend. And you'll note that 


this started back in really about the second 


quarter, some activity in the first quarter of 


this fiscal -- last fiscal year. But this is a 


result of our tailoring back in our 


prioritization of work given resource 

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constraints under a series of continuing 


resolutions during that fiscal year, in FY '07, 


as well as some other funding issues that we 


have noted for you in past presentations. 


This bar graph gives you a sense of our 


progress on working through the cases in 1,000 


increments all the way through to the 25-- 


25,000-whatever number we have represented 


here. The blue line part of the graph 


indicates those that have been completed. The 


red line indicates those that have been pulled 


for us for reasons DOL has, and the -- this 


greenish -- I don't know what color that really 


is -- pardon me? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Olive. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Olive is a very good descriptor 


of that color. That represents those cases 


that are active and we're working on. The 


sharper green, grass green, would represent 


those cases that are pended currently, and this 


may be because of technical issues or because 


of -- we're working through some issues with 


the deliberation process on moving these claims 


forward and we're waiting to see final action. 


So there's a variety of reasons as to why these 

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might be pended. The yellow would be SEC 


claims within those 1,000 increments that are 


being adjudicated by the Department of Labor, 


and then this purple bar are administratively 


closed in those 1,000 increments bars of the 


graph. 


This graphic -- bar graph shows you how many 


reworks we have received, and I'll note for you 


the trend that's shown out here on this end. 


These are primarily due to the program 


evaluation reviews of super S or highly 


insoluble plutonium material that are being 


done right now. 


We have -- as you know, we make requests to the 


Department of Energy for exposure information 


relative to the claims, and I always report to 


you how well we're doing in that regard. We 


follow up every 30 days on our requests and we 


document our progress and take special note of 


those that go beyond 60 days. Right now we 


have 815 outstanding requests, with 148 of 


those exceeding a 60-day mark. And if I were 


to anticipate Dr. Melius's question, since he's 


not here, the sites for the -- the operational 


-- the DOE operations offices that we are 

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looking at in those 148 claims are represented 


by the Oak Ridge operations office with 93 


claims. That cuts across the sites for K-25, 


Y-12, X-10, Paducah and the Paducah Gaseous -- 


or the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The 


next highest number in that 148 would be 


Albuquerque operations office with 28 claims 


greater than 60 days, and those represent 


claims from Lawrence Livermore National Lab and 


General Atomics cases. And then the next 


highest number would be 21 claims resident -- 


requests for information resident with the 


Chicago operations office for ANL East and ANL 


West and Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. 


We have -- bring special attention over the 


course of the last year and a half on the 


atomic weapons employer facilities. As you 


recall, there were more than 1,400 claims that 


we felt needed special attention. They 


represented around 200 sites. And so we asked 


Battelle to work up a set of documents for us 


on how to handle those particular atomic 


weapons employer sites. This presents to you 


that the Technical Basis Document-6000 for 


atomic weapons employers that work with uranium 

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and thorium metals and the status of those 


particular appendices that are associated with 


that Technical Basis Document and where they 


stand. Right now we have 15 of those 


appendices that have been completed and are in 


use. There are ten other appendices that are 


currently in review as of September 18th, last 


month. And there are 14 appendices that are 


currently in development, some stage of 


development, that are associated with TBD-6000. 


The next Technical Basis Document that is of 


interest and note for atomic weapons employers 


that speaks specifically to those that refined 


uranium and thorium, we have three completed 


appendices and are using those. There are no 


appendices in review and we have four that are 


currently in development. 


We'll move on to the Program Evaluation 


Reports. I know this is of special interest to 


the working group on procedures. They had a 


little discussion about this yesterday and I 


hope that the level of detail I'm about to 


present will be found satisfactory with that 


working group, as well as with the full Board. 


Nineteen Program Evaluation Reviews have been 

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issued at this point. You'll find them on our 


web site. There are also a couple of what we 


call Program Evaluation Plans included in that 


set. Those currently affect 13,008 claims. 


However, that number -- 13,008 -- does not 


reflect individual claims, as a claim may be 


counted more than once because it's affected by 


different types of Program Evaluation Reviews. 


So I'd just caution you on thinking about that 


number and its magnitude. It is a lot of work, 


but it -- as we work through these, we're -- 


we're taking a claim and rubbing it off against 


every possible modification and change that has 


been found and -- and recommended in a Program 


Evaluation Review. 


To date we have seen a -- of the ones that we 


have reviewed which -- in our efforts to look 


at whether a change constitutes a -- a change 


in the outcome of the claim decision, we have 


found 157 claims that have gone from noncompensable to compensable. If I break that 


down a little farther for you, 152 of those 


were based upon lymphoma, so if you write that 


down -- it's not on my slide, but I thought I 


might give you just a little more detail 

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(unintelligible) background. Three of those 


were from Bethlehem Steel -- which changed from 


non-compensable to compensable -- and two are 


reflective of the IREP lung model change that 


we made. So that gives you 157 switched from 


non-compensable to compensable. 


9,061 claims have been reviewed and no change 


in compensability decision has been found. 


That's a remarkable number for you to take away 


from this. A lot of people out there are 


being, I think, anticipating a big change in 


compensability decision and this number 


indicates to us, to me, that there's not a lot 


of change in compensability decision. We have 


3,790 claims still under evaluation across all 


of these PERs that I've -- that you'll find on 


our web site. If you need more detail or more 


information about PERs, I'd be happy to see if 


I can answer any questions you might have at 


this meeting. Or if you want more input than 


this for the future meetings, let me know. 


(Unintelligible) in our contract for technical 


support on dose reconstructions and processing 


SEC petition evaluations, the request for 


proposals was issued on May 4th, 2007 and those 

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proposals were due to be submitted by June 


15th, 2007. The proposals met that date -- 


submission date are now being processed in a 


procurement review. To avoid interruption of 


service, we have extended the ORAU contract 


until October 5th, and it will be further 


extended until the award of a new contact, so 


just to give you assurance that we're trying to 


maintain consistency in service and support. 


 LaVon's going to present a little bit more in 


(unintelligible) about the SEC class additions, 


but I wanted to just include in my comments 


that, from the very broad picture scale, 22 


classes have been added since May of 2005. 59 


percent of those -- or 13 -- have been 


accomplished through the 83.13 process which is 


a petitioner submitting a qualified petition 


and this Board evaluating our report on that 


and moving forward with a recommendation to the 


Secretary. 31 percent, or nine of those 22 


classes, have been processed through the 83.14 


rule process and I think that's very 


noteworthy. These represent classes of workers 


across 17 sites, these 22 classes, and also 


represents 1,470 cases as of to date. 

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Something I haven't included in past 


presentations, but given that we've just 


completed the seventh fiscal year of operation 


in this program for NIOSH -- and actually this 


is six and a half fiscal years, because our 


money didn't come to us in the FY '01 until 


pretty much into -- late into the second 


quarter of that fiscal year. But we have 


accounted for $280 million under administrative 


funds to conduct our work in this program 


across those six and a half fiscal years. If I 


were to break that down for you into finer 


detail, I would say to you that $220 million 


have been expended on all contractors; $180 


million of that went to ORAU. $14 million went 


to the Board, and that leaves $46 million for 


the operation of -- and conduct of federal 


staff in my office over those years. 


But more telling I think is that $869 million 


has been paid out in compensation by the 


Department of Labor based upon NIOSH work. 


That reflect -- that's reflected in 6,762 


payees in 4,810 cases at $719 million; and $150 


million for added SEC classes, which represents 


2,138 payees in 1,014 cases. 

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 And with that, I will see if I can answer any 


questions that you might bring forward. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Larry. We'll 


begin with Wanda, and then with Phil -- oh, no, 


it's Gen Roessler. Hello, Gen. 


DR. ROESSLER: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, you all look alike, right. 


DR. ROESSLER: Larry, on the ORAU money, did 


they get additional funds to continue till 


October or are they operating on the funds they 


had been granted already? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We extended (unintelligible) 


contract extension that also provided 


additional monies through October 5th. Next 


contract extension will also extend not only 


the contract period, but will provide 


additional funding (unintelligible) the work. 


The $188 million that I spoke of, that was 


through the end of FY '07, which was last week. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is this done on a proportional 


basis for the extended time -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: (Unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- fraction of a year? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- continuing resolution, and so 

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the continuing resolution requirements that we 


have to follow say that we operate on a similar 


budget level as last year -- or the year before 


when we had an actual appropriate set of funds. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Phil. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I've just got one quick 


question. During the early stages of the 


program, at the Espanola area office actually 


encouraged people to file as claimants in order 


to get their records. And now some of these 


people -- who at the time were not eligible, 


they did not have any health problems -- are 


now starting to crop up with health problems. 


They want to know how difficult it is for them 


to get their cases reopened. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm sorry, you lost me there. 


What --


 MR. SCHOFIELD: (Off microphone) Okay, what -- 


what was happening --


 DR. ZIEMER: Use the mike. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: The local office in Espanola 


was actually encouraging people in the early 


days of the program to file a claim under the 


Act so they could get their medical records, 


their exposure records. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: This is the Resource Center. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: The Resource Center, yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: A lot of these people who filed 


did not have any health problems of any type. 


Now some of them are showing up with cancers 


and some of these other health problems, and 


they're wanting to know how difficult will it 


be for them to go back and get their cases 


reopened. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, that's a question that is 


best posed to the Department of Labor. I can't 


answer that. It should not be difficult. All 


they have to do is -- and once they have a 


physician's report indicating that they have 


acquired a cancer that they didn't have before, 


or if it's a Title E, Subpart E claim, based 


upon toxic chemical exposure and they have some 


health effect that a physician has 


acknowledged, then they should approach the 


Department of Labor to reopen that claim. But 


I can't answer how long it would take or what 


efforts would be required upon a claimant to 


get that done. I'd just encourage them to go 


back to the Department of Labor and ask that it 

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be reopened. Did that help? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes, it did. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda, additional? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. Larry, thank you for the good 


information on the PERs, from -- excuse me, I 


always sound terrible. It's improving things. 


Right? Under the TBD-6000 information that you 


gave us, are the 19 appendices that you 


mentioned in your slide the complete set of 


what we anticipate for appendices to that 


particular TBD at this time? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: This is TBD-6000? 


 MS. MUNN: 6000, right. You said we had 15 


that were done, ten that were in review and 14 


that were in development. And I was wondering 


whether there were more behind the curtain 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Right now that is a comprehensive 


list, as we understand it. See, TBD-6000 


covers a lot of sites --


 MS. MUNN: I know. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- in and of itself. 


 MS. MUNN: I know. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: The appendices are designed to 

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speak to special exposure circumstances, like 


the appendices for General Steel Industries 


speaks to the Betatron exposures, which is not 


covered in TBD 6000. 


 MS. MUNN: I understand. Yeah, I've read some 


of them, but certainly not all of them -- just 


wanted to make sure --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: -- that there were not more -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Remember I said there were around 


-- around 200 sites --


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- that were covered by Technical 


Basis Documents. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: You only see I think -- the 


numbers I've shown here are not 200. 


 MS. MUNN: Thanks. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Poston? 


 DR. POSTON: Larry, I just want to clarify. 


Did you say $14 million to the Board? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, sir. 


 MS. MUNN: Over six years. 


 DR. POSTON: Does that include SC&A's contract? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, it does. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That's all the Board. 


 DR. WADE: You wondered where it was going, 


didn't you? 

 DR. POSTON: Yeah, I wondered where it was 

going. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Most of that's for the Chairman. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: That's all (unintelligible). 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, actually most of that is 

contractor cost. There's minimal cost for 


Board members, who hitchhike to the meetings, 


but --


 MR. ELLIOTT: What it does not include -- let 


me speak to that. What it does not include are 


our costs associated with our reacting to the 


Board. Okay? When -- when the Board -- a 


working group takes up an issue and we bring 


our staff or our technical support contractor's 


staff to bear on that issue, those costs are 


not included in that $14 million. They're 


included in the costs I reported out for the 


contractor or for OCAS. 


 DR. WADE: To give you a sense of proportion, a 


typical year -- $4.5 allocated to the Board, 


$3.5 million of that goes to the SC&A contract, 

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a million for everything else. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Every year I put forward a budget 


request that includes $4.5 million for the 


Board, unless otherwise instructed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Mark, do you 


have a comment? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, just a question on the -- 


the PER slide, and -- and I'm trying to 


understand that would -- compared to what we 


got yesterday with the procedures workgroup, 


and I -- I don't know if these are comparable 


in any way or if there's any way to cross-walk 


them, but that -- well, I guess that's the 


question. Is there any way to compare the 


number or 3790 look like they're remaining 


claims in your overhead, and then we have 24 


PERs with various numbers of cases. 


 DR. ZIEMER: There's some duplication. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: There's some duplication. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know, I --

 MR. ELLIOTT: I could have included a couple 

more slides, but I didn't do that 'cause I 


wasn't sure what level of granularity or detail 

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 MR. GRIFFON: But this --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- the Board was interested, but 


I have it with me. I have some information if 


you'd like a little bit more information about 


those that are in -- are being evaluated 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: May-- maybe a little -- I just 


wanted to understand does this 3790 account for 


all those that were listed on that slide that 


we looked at yesterday in the procedures 


workgroup, all these 24 PERs. 


 DR. WADE: Perhaps, Larry, you could -- offline we could look at that and then you could 


make those numbers available when we have the 


workgroup report. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I can do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's fair. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I can do that. I can tell you 


right now there's not all 24 involved, no. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Not all 19 PERs are involved 


here. It looks to me like there's maybe nine. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Additional questions or comments? 

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 MR. GRIFFON: So that number of claims under 


review could go up when -- when more of these 


PERs are --

 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- included? Okay. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Absolutely. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I wanted to --

 MR. ELLIOTT: That's just a snapshot in time. 

SEC PETITION UPDATE

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Thank you, 


Larry. Now let's move on to another part of 


the NIOSH report and that's an update on the 


SEC petitions, give us a look at what's coming 


down the line and so on. 


 DR. WADE: If I could ask you to experiment, if 


you could hold that microphone close to you, 


you’re supposed to wear it on the lapel and 


then push the button with your other hand, if 


you can --


 DR. ZIEMER: (Unintelligible) stand. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we can use the standing mike. 


This isn't work-- the lapel mike is not working 


well. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) high on the shirt 

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(unintelligible). 


 DR. WADE: Well, let's experiment so we're -- 


'cause it's not working well at all. 


(Pause) 


Try. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: How does that work? 


 DR. WADE: Count to 157. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: 151, 152, 153 --


 DR. WADE: That seems to be working pretty 


well. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I'm going to give the status 


of upcoming SEC petitions. We -- we provide 


this update at the Board meetings so the Board 


can prepare for upcoming working group sessions 


and future Board meetings. 


As of September 17th we had 97 petitions. We 


now have 99. We actually have two 83.14s that 


came in. We have nine petitions that are in 


the qualification process, 42 petitions that 


have qualified. We're in the evaluation 


process for five of those, and we have 


completed evaluations on 37. We have 41 


petitions that did not qualify. 


I want to go over some petitions that are 


currently with the -- with the Board for 

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recommendation, and kind of give you an 


overview of -- of the -- kind of chronology of 


events. 


 Chapman Valve evaluation report was approved 


and sent to the Board and the petitioners on 


August 31st, 2006. We presented our evaluation 


at -- at the September 2006 Advisory Board 


meeting. The Advisory Board established a 


workgroup to review the evaluation at its 


September meeting, and the workgroup presented 


its findings at the May 2007 Advisory Board 


meeting. 


A decision was made at that time to postpone a 


recommendation till the July meeting to allow 


the petitioners to review SC&A's report on the 


evaluation. 


 The Advisory Board voted on a six-to-six to not 


add the class in the July 2007 meeting. Based 


on this vote, the Advisory Board determined it 


would like to get a response from the 


Department of Labor and DOE concerning 


potential covered work at the Dean Street 


facility. 


 DOL provided response to the Advisory Board's 


questions, and the current status of th-- and I 

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think we're still waiting on DOE's response -- 


 DR. WADE: We are not. We now have DOE's 


response and --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: All right. 


 DR. WADE: -- it's been shared with the Board. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: This was as of September 17th, 


so I'm okay. 


The status is the Chapman Valve SEC is with the 


Advisory Board for recommendation. 


 Blockson Chemical, the evaluation report was 


initially approved and sent to the Advisory 


Board and the petitioners on September 5th, 


2006. NIOSH presented our evaluation report at 


the December 2006 Advisory Board meeting. We 


subsequently pulled that -- that evaluation 


report after it was determined that we did not 


address all covered exposures. The Advisory 


Board established a working group to review the 


evaluation report at the -- at its December 


2006 meeting. 


NIOSH issued a revised evaluation report in 


July 2007 and presented that evaluation report 


at the July Board meeting. The working group 


met in Cincinnati on August 28th, and a public 


meeting was conducted on September 12th with 

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claimant audience to explain changes made to 


the dose reconstruction technical approach. 


 And the status is the petition is still with 


the working group. 


Feed Materials Production Center, the 


evaluation report was approved and sent to the 


Advisory Board and petitioners on November the 


3rd, 2006. NIOSH presented the evaluation 


report at the February 2007 Advisory Board 


meeting, and the Advisory Board established a 


working group to review the evaluation report 


at that meeting. 


In May 2007 SC&A provided a draft review of the 


evaluation report to the working group, 


petitioners and Board. The working group met 


in Cincinnati on August 8th. 


 And the status is the working group review of 


the FMPC, Feed Materials Production Center, 


report is ongoing. 


Bethlehem Steel, the evaluation report was 


approved and sent the Advisory Board and 


petitioners on February 27th, 2007. NIOSH 


presented their evaluation report at the May 


2007 Advisory Board meeting. At the time, the 


Advisory Board determined that it needed 

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further information before making a 


recommendation on the SEC petition. The 


Advisory Board tabled the discussion on 


Bethlehem Steel evaluation report until the 


working group that is looking at the use of 


surrogate data comes back with a determination 


concerning the use of surrogate data at 


Bethlehem Steel. 


Status of the petition is with the Advisory 


Board for recommendation. 


Sandia National Lab Livermore, the evaluation 


report was approved and sent the Advisory Board 


and petitioners on March 29th, 2007. On April 


25th, just before the Board meeting, we 


received new information from the petitioner 


and NIOSH presented our evaluation report at 


the May 2007 Advisory Board meeting, and we 


discussed the new information that was provided 


by the petitioner. The Advisory Board asked 


NIOSH to provide an update that would address 


the new information. 


NIOSH has issued the addendum to their 


evaluation report and we plan to present that 


addendum at this -- this Board meeting. 


Y-12 statisticians, the evaluation was approved 

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and sent to the Advisory Board and petitioners 


on June 29th, 2007 and we are presenting that 


evaluation report this meeting. 


NUMEC, which we discussed earlier, the 


evaluation report was approved and sent the 


Advisory Board and petitioners on September 


14th, and I think we've taken action on that 


one. 


Hanford Part 2, which addresses all employees 


'47 to '90, the evaluation report was approved 


and sent to the Advisory Board and the 


petitioners on September 11th, and NIOSH is 


presenting that evaluation at this meeting. 


 NTS, NIOSH completed our evaluation in 


September, this month, and NIOSH plans to 


present that evaluation report at the January 


2008 meeting. 


We have a few petitions that are in the qual-- 


or in the evaluation process right now. We 


have an 83.14 for Lawrence Livermore National 


Lab. We expect to have that evaluation report 


completed this month. 


We're also working on an 83.13 from a 


petitioner for Texas City Chemical, and we 


anticipate having that complete at the end of 

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this month. 


We have a 83.13 from the Mound plant, and that 


is on schedule to be completed in November. 


In addition, the resource constraints that we 


were -- that limited our activities on the 


83.14 process have been resolved and we have a 


-- we are currently working a number of 83.14s 


and I -- you can expect that process to -- to 


increase considerably over the next six months. 


 That's it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, LaVon, for a good 


summary of what's coming down the pike. Let me 


see if anyone has questions for you. Josie? 


MS. BEACH: I just had a question on Parks. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


MS. BEACH: You mentioned that was going to be 


an SE-- or an 83.14. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, that was -- that one 


didn't make the -- didn't make (unintelligible) 


yet because we didn't actually have the 


petitioner as of September 17th when I -- see, 


they put tight restrictions on us on preparing 


these presentations now, so I couldn't up-- 


 DR. ZIEMER: But we know that one is also on 


the horizon, as well. Thank you. 

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 Other comments or questions? 


 (No responses) 


Thank you very much, LaVon, for that update. 


DOE PROGRAM UPDATE
 

Let's proceed -- is Dr. Worthington here or -- 


there she is. Okay. 


 Dr. Worthington, welcome. We're pleased to 


have you here. You'll give us an update on 


what's happening with the DOE -- at least some 


things that are happening with the DOE. 


 DR. WADE: Painful though it may be, Bomber, 


you have to give up the mike. 


 DR. WORTHINGTON: While he's getting the next 


set of -- of slides, can you hear me okay? 


Louder? This is good? 


(Pause) 


Good afternoon, Dr. Ziemer, Dr. Wade, members 


of the Board, representatives of Department of 


Labor and NIOSH and interested workers and 


citizens. I am very pleased and honored to 


appear before the Board today. This is my 


first opportunity to do that and I'm looking 


forward to it. 


I am the Director of the Office of Health and 


Safety within the Department of Energy. And 

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one of the primary responsibilities, one of my 


highest priorities, is to ensure that we're 


able to provide thorough and timely records to 


support this activity. The program continues 


to be a very high priority within the office of 


HSS, but also across the DOE complex, so I 


wanted to share with you today the status of 


our program and to make sure that people are 


aware that the health and safety of our 


workers, both past and current, is very 


important to us and it helps define who we are 


within the Department of Energy. 


Again, I want to talk a little bit about our 


role. Our role in the Department of Energy is 


a role of being a facilitator, supporting and 


assistance -- and assisting the other 


organizations to make sure that we can 


research, retrieve and provide the appropriate 


documentations for these activities. 


A little bit more about the role of Department 


of Energy in terms of what we're doing. We 


have responsibility in a number of areas. One 


is individual claims. I don't know if you can 


actually see that from where you are so I'll 


mention what the numbers are. We have been 

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very aggressive in that area. And for example, 


employment verifications, we typically -- we've 


done eight -- over 8,000 this year. In terms 


of dose documentation for NIOSH, you'll see 


that we've done over 4,000 in that area. In 


terms of document acquisition requests, we've 


been aggressive there; again, over 8,000. So 


again, a number of activities related to 


individual claims. 


We have some large-scale activities, and I 


think you've heard a little bit about that 


already. We try to provide support to NIOSH 


and to DOL and to the Board for various 


activities. We try to serve, again, as a 


facilitator, supporting and making sure that 


the sites are aware of the planned visits and 


that they're able to retrieve the documents for 


both site exposure matrix projects, things to 


support the Advisory Board in their research, 


and also to support the -- the SECs. One of 


the things that we do from our office, from 


HSS, we are constantly trying to provide 


information to the sites. We have all of the 


various activities from NIOSH and Department of 


Labor and the Board on the calendars that are 

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visible to Glenn Podonsky, and we're making 


sure that in his interaction with senior 


leadership in the Department that we make sure 


they're familiar and they're aware of these 


upcoming events and they're prepared to support 


the document retrieval activities. 


We also have responsibility for research and 


maintain the covered facilities database. 


I want to talk a little bit about slides in 


terms of the kinds of things that we're doing 


here. This particular slide relates to our 


activities of all the records requests that 


we've completed for both DOL and NIOSH. And 


you can see here that there continues to be an 


increase in terms of the requests coming to the 


Department of Energy for the various records. 


There've been some fluctuations in the 


requests, but certainly it's clearly an 


increase in the activities. 


I think the trick is to point towards the -- 


oops, do I need to go back? 


(Pause) 


I want to talk a little bit about the record 


research support activities that we do in 


support of NIOSH and its contractors. As you 

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can see, we have nearly 15 areas or sites that 


we're supporting in providing documentation 


for. In addition to the ones that you see 


here, from time to time we have to do 


additional researches at our National Archives 


and Federal Records Centers, and we're doing 


that, making sure that we're looking at all the 


places and finding the records 'cause in some 


cases the records are not -- no longer at the 


site, or there are incomplete activities and we 


look in other areas and other places to try to 


find these records. 


 I'm getting an echo here. Are you hearing me 


okay from where you are? Good? 


A little bit about our support to you, to the 


Board. There are some things that we're doing, 


we're trying to facilitate getting the records 


for your activities, as well. 


A little bit about where we are. I think 


you've heard a little bit from Larry in terms 


of activities and interface with Department of 


Energy in terms of getting records. Again, 


certainly we weren't able to accurately project 


the -- the records that would be required or 


sort of the complexity associated with the 

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records, or the -- the kinds of things we would 


have to do in all cases to do research and to 


make the information available to you. We've 


been trying to shoot very high in terms of 


getting things out within the 60-day period. 


think we had a target of 95 percent. We're 


falling below that. Over the last -- again, 


the last three or four months, I think there've 


been increased numbers in terms of the requests 


and we've done a number of things in the 


Department to try to compensate for that and to 


make sure that we're able to do a better job. 


At the sites, in some cases they had 


underestimated the personnel needed to -- to 


provide the records. They've made some 


adjustments; they've shifted some individuals 


around, and in some cases assigned new 


individuals to support those activities. 


They've also looked at processes and mechanisms 


to be more efficient and more effective in 


terms of delivering, and we're working on that. 


And we've established points of contact for the 


various activities to have individuals that are 


dedicated to that, that they understand it, and 


they're working on that on a regular basis. 


I 
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We've instituted and partnered with our -- with 


the organizations in terms of providing 


training. We've had some very good training 


sessions and I think that we're going to 


continue with those things. And we're looking 


to have sort of a joint all-hands meeting 


between DOL and NIOSH and the Department of 


Energy to kind of work through things in terms 


of how we can do them better. 


We've also, within the Department of Energy, 


(unintelligible) some additional resources. 


From time to time we go to the program offices, 


we ask them for help in terms of retrieving and 


researching records and understanding what 


might be needed so that NIOSH and DOL can do 


their jobs. 


 We've also recognized the -- sort of the 


uniqueness of what we call Legacy Management. 


They have a responsibility for maintaining 


records and various activities associated with 


what the Department describes as legacy 


management, things that we've cleaned up to a 


certain point but we still have a DOE 


responsibility in those areas. They have some 


unique skills and some unique capabilities. 

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They've been working with us and helping us to 


research and make those -- make certain things 


available. And so we think that you'll see in 


the upcoming months and next year even better 


processes within DOE because of the partnering 


that we're doing within the Department with the 


Legacy Management organization. 


A little bit about sort of our current 


research. You've heard -- these are the ones 


that are high on the list of -- of our office 


right now. Chapman Valve, we were able to 


complete the activities on that and the 


information is available for you right now. 


In terms of the Dow Chemical, we are still 


researching and trying to exhaust, you know, 


all reasonable efforts to provide some 


information to you in this area. We've reached 


out to the FBI to help us to look at some of 


the documents in terms of whether or not we can 


get some additional information on things that 


we couldn't actually see ourselves. But we're 


hoping to be able to reach closure on that in 


the very near future. 


The last three that you see here are things 


that are -- ones that are -- we're becoming 

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much more aggressive now that we're able to 


work through the two on the top, and should be 


providing some information to you shortly in 


that area. 


The last one, again, is just kind of a 


restatement of the -- the Office of Legacy 


Management and the kinds of things that we're 


doing with -- with that organization. And so, 


again, you'll hear more from them in the future 


because they'll be helping us to address some 


of your concerns. 


This is actually the last slide here, I 


believe, and I'm happy to answer any other 


questions or give more details regarding what 


we're doing at Department of Energy on any of 


these items. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much, Dr. 


Worthington. We appreciate the level of 


support we've seen from you and from Glenn 


Podonsky. It's been very helpful. 


 Board members, questions for Dr. Worthington? 


Or comments? Yes, Mark Griffon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just wanted to follow up on -- 


we had asked before about the Mound records 


that -- the issue that they may have been 

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buried or whatever and were -- and was there an 


attempt to recover them or -- and where -- 


where that kind of stands. I know you were 


looking into it or... 


 DR. WORTHINGTON: Yes, I want to give you a 


status in terms of where we are. We've had 


quite a bit of discussion in the Department, 


and we've been very thorough, we believe, in 


trying to come up with what would be an 


estimate in terms of being able to retrieve the 


documents. And we've looked at some of the 


challenges that we might have in being able to 


do this. Right now our position is that we 


were -- are waiting to hear about the SEC, if 


there are any decisions on that. And we would 


look to that decision, as well as some 


collaboration with NIOSH and Department of 


Labor, about next steps. And so we have 


gathered quite a bit of information. We're 


waiting for some additional pieces and then we 


would make a decision on -- on doing that. We 


have not yet closed the door. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other questions or 

comments? 

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If not, thank you again for that update -- 


 DR. WORTHINGTON: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and we look forward to 


continued interactions with the staff there. 


DOL PROGRAM UPDATE
 

Next we're going to have an update -- program 


update from Department of Labor. Jeff Kotsch 


is here and Jeff, I think we still have time on 


the agenda to hear from you. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Good afternoon. Is this audible 


back there or... 


I'll start. We've got the standard format for 


these presentations and we're trying to look at 


some other ways to present some of this data 


'cause it's kind of number-intensive. 


Part B, just as a summary, started back in -- 


or it became effective back in July 2001. Part 


B is the side of the program that deals with 


cancers, silicosis, beryllium-related diseases. 


As of September 19th -- the date varies a 


little bit through the presentation -- we've 


had 58,876 cases with 85,380 claims. Again, 


there's always more claims than cases because 


once -- if the employee passes away, there's -- 


could be more than one survivor. Of those, 

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38,321 are cancer cases, and I think this 


number -- we try to coordinate with Larry; I 


think this number is -- at least hopefully the 


same, 25,238 cases that we've referred to 


NIOSH. 


The Part E side we inherited from DOE, and that 


was enac-- that was enacted in October 2004, 


became effective for Labor in June of 2005. 


That's the side that deals with exposure to 


toxic materials at the -- at only DOE sites. 


Part B is effective for both AWEs and DOE 


sites; Part E only for DOE sites for the -- for 


the amendment to the Act. On that side we've 


had 48,518 cases from 66,879 claims. And we 


inherited 25,856 cases from Department of 


Energy. 


To date, Department of Labor has paid out $2.9 


billion in total compensation, Part B and E. 


$2.1 billion is Part B and $1.6 billion of that 


has been for cancer cases and $257 million for 


RECA, the Radiation Exposure Control Act, 


cases. $815 million are Part E cases and 


another $168 million in medical payments. 


As far as the payees under the program, there 


have been 33,620 total payees. Of those, 

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26,563 have been Part B payees. And then as 


that breaks down, 10,942 are cancer, 4,810 were 


at NIOSH and 5,168 were RECAs. And then the 


remaining 7,057 were Part E's. If you look at 


the pie chart, just as a correction, the two 


pies on the -- pie -- slices of pies on the 


right, the cancer one should actually be 39 and 


the RECA one 19, and then if you were adding 


up, you -- now it adds up to 100. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Say that again, Jeff. The case--


 MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, the cancer cases, it's 


showing 35, it should really be 39. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thirty-nine. 


 MR. KOTSCH: And the RECA's showing 15; it 


really should be 19. We just -- I didn't -- 

I'll take the blame. I didn't proof that after 

it was produced. 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 MR. KOTSCH: Excuse me? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(unintelligible) 


 MR. KOTSCH: Yes, that -- that arithmetic stuff 


baffles me sometimes. 


The Part B cancer case status, 38,321 cases 

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having -- with 58,638 claims. We've had 29,308 


cases with final decisions. That means they've 


gone all the way through the process and have 


gone -- final decisions to the claimants. 


2,316 have recommended decisions but no final 


decisions. That means they -- they are now 


currently with our Final Adjudication Branch, 


at which point the -- the claimant has the 


opportunity to basically contest the -- the 


recommended decision and ask -- request a 


hearing if they'd like, or whatever they want 


to submit as far as additional evidence or 


objections. 4,347 are at NIOSH currently, and 


we have 2,350 that are pending initial 


decision. Those would be at the District 


Office awaiting a determination of the 


recommended decision. So about 69 percent of 


them have final decisions. 


This is the standard graphic for the cancer 


case final decisions. On the left side of the 


bar is 11,114 final decisions approved; on the 


right side, the red bar, is 18,194 and then the 


breakdown to the right of that for the reasons 


that those cases are not -- those cases were 


denied. And the principal driver is 11,800 -- 

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sorry, sorry, 11,093 cases with POCs less than 


50, and then the other reasons are non-covered 


employment, insufficient medical evidence, non-


covered conditions or ineligible survivors. 


Now of the ones that we referred, the 25,238 


cases that we referred to NIOSH, 19,209 have 


been returned, 1,931 of those have withdrawn -- 


have been withdrawn, to give you 17,278 dose 


reconstructions. The primary reason for the 


withdrawals more recently are classes that are 


coming into the SEC and we withdraw them prior 


to them having a dose reconstruction. There 


are also other smaller drivers for withdrawing 


cases. The claimant may have died or the 


employee may have died. There may be no 


survivors, in which case the case basically 


just comes back to -- to cease adjudication. 


Or there may be other reasons of the case has 


dropped out. Maybe whatever cancer was 


initially considered is no longer verifiable or 


documented or something like that. 


Okay, 17,278 dose reconstructions. We've --


I'm sure this number is different, 1,752 


reworks sent back, and we still have 4,101 


initial referrals back at NIOSH. 

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So the -- again, the 17,457 cases that we have 


with dose reconstructions, 89 percent have 


final decisions. That's a little over 15 and a 


half thousand cases. We have 1,430 


recommended, but no finals. Again, they're at 


-- with our FAB. And we have 480 pending 


recommended decisions in our District Offices. 


Now the new SEC-related cases, we have 1,360 


that's we've withdrawn from NIOSH for SEC 


reviews. That has resulted in 1,022 final 


decisions, 853 of those are approvals, 69 are 


denials; 156 recommended but no finals again, 


they're with FAB; 81 are pending and I think 


last time when the presentation was given by 


Christie we didn't have this last number, the 


102 closures, and that'll give you the -- 


that'll allow you to sum up the numbers to give 


the -- get the total. Closures are just ones 


that are -- again, the case is closed for some 


reason. Again, it may be the employee's passed 


away, there are no survivors. For whatever 


reason, that case is administratively -- the 


processing of that case is administratively 


stopped. Again, 82 percent are final decisions 


or have had some final decision. 

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Related to NIOSH -- or compensation related to 


NIOSH cases, $869 million in compensation has 


been paid out. That's 8,900 payees in 5,824 


cases. Of that, $719 million were on dose-


reconstructed cases for 4,810 cases, and $150 


million on the added SEC classes. That's 1,014 


cases. 


And then as we do, we just have some summaries 


of information so far related to issues that 


are here at the Board -- or in front of the 


Board for this meeting. So you'll see NU-- we 


have both NUMEC and Parks listings for cases. 


In the -- in the case of Apollo it's 250 cases. 


They're only Part B again. 54 dose 


reconstructions, we've had 58 final decisions, 


27 Part B approvals and paid out $4 million in 


compensation. 


We list the NUMEC listing there for -- there've 


been five Part B approvals for $600,000. 


 The Hanford listing there for -- this would be 


both Part B and E, 7,866 cases, final decisions 


on 2,678, 830 Bs -- B approvals or 830 -- I'm 


sorry, 885 E approvals for -- total for Part -- 


Part B and Part B of $147 million. 


Sandia Livermore, we've seen about 221 Part B 

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and E cases, had 34 NIOSH dose reconstructions, 


54 final Part Bs, 15 B approvals, nine E 


approvals for $1 million in compensation. 


Y-12, 11,182 Part B and E cases. There've been 


2,100 NIOSH dose reconstructions, 3,834 B 


decisions, 2,408 B approvals, 1,853 E approvals 


for $443 million. The B approvals I think 


would be -- a lot of SECs there. 


 Blockson, 201 cases, 108 finals -- Part B 


decisions, 14 approvals for $2 million. 


 Fernald, a little under 3,000 cases, 776 NIOSH 


dose reconstructions, 957 Part B decisions, 353 


approvals for Part B, 302 for E, $69 million in 


compensation. 


Chapman Valve, 215 cases. We've had 111 Part B 


decisions, 34 approvals. That's $5 million. 


Dow Chemical is -- we've seen 313 cases, two 


NIOSH dose reconstructions. We've had 29 final 


decisions for Part B, two approvals, that's 


$300,000. 


 Bethlehem Steel, 1,354 Part B cases, 712 NIOSH 


dose reconstructions, 799 Part B final 


decisions, 326 approvals, that's $48 million. 


Rocky Flats, about 5,300 Part B and E cla-- ca­

- cases, 1,017 NIOSH dose reconstructions. 

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Labor's rendered 1,622 dec-- final decisions, 


713 B approvals, 726 E approvals, and that 


totals out at $105 million. 


 Again, just because those are -- those are the 


ones that are in front of the Board this week, 


just to give you a little background. I don't 

know why... 

 Anyway, questions? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Jeff. Comments 

or questions, Board members? As always, 


there's a slight difference in the NIOSH and 


the DOL numbers for dose reconstructions, but 


we understand the reasons for that. But 


anyway, thank-- we appreciate knowing that -- 


it's always of interest to -- you get a feel 


for what the com-- total compensations are for 


the various programs, and the scope of that. 


Often we hear comments that no one is getting 


compensated, and in reality, quite a few people 


are in fact. So I appreciate getting those 


numbers as well. 


 Other comments, Board members? 


 (No responses) 


 Thank you, Jeff. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Okay, thank you. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Now we're going to have time for a 


break before our public comment period, about 


15 or 20 minutes actually. Any housekeeping 


instructions for us, Dr. Wade? 


 DR. WADE: I think we're one presentation 


behind. We didn't want to rush Jim Neton's 


presentation 'cause it's a substantive one and 


 DR. ZIEMER: Not that the others weren't 


substantive, but it's even more so. 


 DR. WADE: Even more so, but we have time for ­

- we'll have time in the agenda for that 


tomorrow or Friday. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good, let's take a break till 5:00 


o'clock and we'll resume with our public 


comment period. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 4:40 p.m. 


to 5:05 p.m.) 


PUBLIC COMMENT


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We'll resume 


our session. We're -- we move now to the 


public comment session of our meeting. I've 


had a number of people sign the request to make 


public comment. I'll just take them in the 


order that they appear. At least one person is 

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on the phone, hopefully. Let me check first. 


John Ramspott, are you on the phone? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) (Inaudible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: He is, okay. Just stand by. Our 


first speaker then will be Dr. Dan McKeel. 


Dan, welcome. We'll hear from you first. 


 DR. MCKEEL: Good afternoon, Dr. Ziemer and the 


Board. Two days ago, on September the 30th, I 


received the long-awaited HH-- HHS letter dated 


August the 30th, 2007 related to extending the 


Dow SEC number 79 to cover the residual 


contamination period from 1961 to 1998. The 


letter was in response to a letter from Dr. 


Ziemer and the Board in late May. Dr. Ziemer's 


letter requested the Secretaries of Labor and 


Energy to assist their Departments to look into 


the Dow SEC extension to cover the residual 


contamination period. 


The HHS letter came to me in a roundabout 


fashion. That is, an HHS aide sent it, upon a 


request, to Robert Stephan of Senator Obama's 


staff -- to Mr. Stephan, who then forwarded a 


copy to me. The four months' delay in not 


being sent a copy by the Board directly in my 


role as Dow co-petitioner was both surprising 

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and very disappointing. Since the July 19th 


Board meeting I had asked Dr. Ziemer and Dr. 


Wade several times about the status of the HHS 


letter, with no clear response, and I wonder 


why I was not given this letter sooner. 


The content of the letter made it clear to me 


that Director Gerberding of CDC, who wrote the 


letter on behalf of HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt, 


was either unaware of or overlooked certain 


salient facts about the Dow SEC. These facts I 


would now like to place in the public record 


are as follows: 


One, NIOSH, which was not charged by the Board 


to do so, unilaterally undertook to query 


Department of Labor and DOE via a May 8, 2007 


e-mail about changing the coverage period and 


the facility description on the Dow Madison, 


Illinois site. This e-mail, which was directly 


and intimately related to the Board's two 


unanimously-passed motions on the Dow SEC by 


Dr. Jim Melius on May 4th, was withheld from me 


until after both DOL and DOE had responded, 


thereby eliminating me from having meaningful 


input. The e-mail ignored my testimony to the 


Board on 5/4/07, four days earlier, about the 

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Dow SEC petition and the validity of extending 


it to cover the residual period of 1961 to 


1998. The framing of the coverage facility 


issues was markedly different in that May 8th 


e-mail than the way I see them. I did not 


mention they were -- the reply, I'm sorry; the 


e-mail of -- of May 8th did not mention either 


the worker affidavits about truckload 


quantities of thorium alloy shipments going to 


Rocky Flats for AEC work, for example. 


Four, Dr. Gerberding is apparently unaware that 


I strongly rebutted Pat Worthington's DOE 


response letter dated 5/22 to Larry Elliott, or 


that I am still awaiting a final response 


and/or the interim response that was promised 


to reach me before the October Board meeting. 


I should add that today I was happy that I did 


receive this interim letter this afternoon at 


about 1:00 -- 1:15 today. 


Number five, Dr. Gerberding also does not 


acknowledge that DOE is reassessing its 


determination by performing forensic FBI 


character recognition on Mallinckrodt AEC and 


Dow Madison purchase order 316 that relates to 


the thorium plate alloys where the following 

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letters, 21A, which my group believes strongly 


points to these being a magnesium and thorium 


alloy, are clearly readable to me but are not 


eligible (sic), according to Peter Turcic, to 


DOL or to DOE. This point continues to truly 


amaze me. 


B, DOE is also searching for additional 


documents that relate to thorium alloy 


shipments to Rocky Flats and to the possible 


use of these materials in nuclear weapons. 


Six, and finally, the HHS August the 30th 


letter does also not mention that on October 


the 1st Senator Barack Obama of Illinois sent a 


letter to Peter Turcic of DOL asking him to 


state his view of the weight that should be 


afforded direct, eyewitness testimony and 


affidavits by knowledgeable Dow Madison 


workers, including some non-claimant 


supervisors, that the site shipped magnesium 


thorium alloy in quantity to three AEC 


facilities. My group, the Southern Illinois 


Nuclear Workers, asserts that some of this 


material either was used in or contributed to 


the production of nuclear weapons. I do not 


believe that Mr. Turcic has yet responded to 

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the Senator. 


I, as Dow SEC petitioner, thus feel that I have 


been treated very unfairly in -- in having both 


the NIOSH May 8th, '07 e-mail to DOL and DOE 


and Dr. Gerberding's HHS letter of August 30th 


withheld from me. Although I appreciate DOE's 


willingness to explore this issue further, it 


is disappointing that answers have not emerged 


in time to have the Board vote at this meeting. 


These two actions have seriously undermined our 


efforts to have the Dow SEC extended to cover 


1961 to 1998. 


For the record, it is now 13 months since I was 


first notified that Dow Madison would be 


recommended by NIOSH for an 83.14 SEC petition. 


My final comment relates to ongoing dose 


reconstructions at Dow Madison. The number of 


cases now in the SEC has decreased from 53 to 


47, reasons uncertain to me. Of the remaining 


Dow claims at NIOSH, only eight have been 


assigned a health physicist, while 81 have not. 


Why is this? How can they ever have a dose 


reconstruction done with no site profile and no 


TBD 6000 appendix? These claims have been at 


DOL for months. Two DR -- two dose 

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reconstructions have been completed. 


And finally, I would also note for the record 


that the transcripts of the 5/4/07 and the 


7/19/07 Board meetings where the Dow SEC 


extension was discussed have still not been 


delivered to me. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dan. I do want to add 


a comment, which I did pass on to Dan privately 


earlier. The letter from Director Gerberding 


which is referred to is dated August 30th. 


Board members, you would have gotten your copy 


by e-mail yesterday. That letter was held by 


the government for 30 days in the form of the 


U.S. Post Office, where my mail was being held 


for several weeks because I was on travel. I 


did not see the letter, either, August 30th, 


not till just before this meeting and I brought 


a copy with me. I -- it was not sent in the 


electronic form, so actually Dr. McKeel 


probably saw that letter before any of the 


Board members, before Dr. Wade, I know before 


Dr. (sic) Elliott. So although it appeared to 


be a delay, I think he was the first to know. 


I did bring the letter with me and -- and 


checked with Lew on it yesterday when I 

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arrived, and learned that no one had gotten a 


copy of that letter and it was immediately -- 


we obtained it in electronic form then and it 


was immediately sent to the Board members and 


to Dr. McKeel. However, he had already 


received it by the circuitous route that he 


described in his comments. But I do want to 


make it clear that there was no -- certainly no 


intent on my part to delay that letter. It 


simply -- I -- I simply did not get it myself, 


physically, till just before this meeting. 


Nonetheless, we understand the comments that 


were made and the concerns that Dr. McKeel has. 


Also, we're aware from Dr. Worthington's 


comments that DOE is doing some follow-up on -- 


on some of those issues, so that -- the book is 


still open, I think. 


Okay, let's proceed. I -- I next have John 


Ramspott on -- on the schedule, is -- and I 


think we heard that John was on the line. Last 


time John tried to speak to us and the phone 


connection was very bad and we had a great deal 


of trouble. But John, I'm hopeful that we can 


hear you this time. 


 (Extreme feedback) 

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We'll try again. Go ahead. 


 (Extreme feedback) 


(Pause) 


How are we doing? Is John still on the line? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) still on the line 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


(Pause) 


MR. RAMSPOTT: ... hear me. Hello? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. Ziemer, can you hear me now? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, proceed. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


MR. RAMSPOTT: This is John Ramspott in St. 


Louis, Missouri. I'm calling on behalf of 


workers and families from General Steel 


Industries in Granite City, Illinois. I would 


first like to begin by thanking the Board for 


allowing me the opportunity to make these 


public comments. I had hoped to be there with 


you, but due to some medical emergencies in the 


family I needed to stay home. 


I appreciate everyone's involvement with the 

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now-ongoing evaluation of the General Steel 


Industries Appendix BB by SC&A. This type of 


review or official review has been one of my 


primary goals from the very start of my 


involvement with the General Steel Industries 


site. It all started approximately two and a 


half years ago. 


I thank NIOSH for creating those documents so 


we had something to work with. I've been told 


that this is a living document and I hope to 


help make that a living document by all means 


possible. I fully realize that these types of 


documents are not easy to do or prepare in 


accurate manner under 50 years of working with 


many times incomplete information and that is 


why I have really dedicated some time to trying 


to help all parties with this information. 


I ask that the research regarding General Steel 


Industries, and in particular the two Allis 


Chalmers Betatrons plus numerous other nondestructive sources and procedures, now be 


given full consideration that General Steel 


Industries had been selected or given a kind of 


priority status authorized by the Board to do a 


full review. We cannot thank you enough for 

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that action. I listened in on the conference 


call a couple of weeks ago, heard essentially a 


unanimous vote of the people from the Board who 


were there to authorize SC&A to do what they 


needed to do to get the best information 


possible, and I, again, cannot thank you 


enough. 


That by itself is quite a task, considering the 


fact that the Betatrons have really never been 


explored, to my knowledge, at any of the sites 


to this depth or this detail which we hope will 


take place at General Steel. We find the fact 


that they were not explored at General Steel a 


little confusing considering they were the main 


reason for sending uranium to General Steel 


Industries beginning in 1953, which of course 


is confirmed -- that date, '53, is confirmed in 


-- in other document -- it was actually for 


Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. That document 


states the Betatron slices were sent as they 


were collected to General Steel Industries. So 


looking at the Mallinckrodt document as 100 


percent total credence that all this started in 


1953, so there should be no doubt because of 


the two related documents that back up this 

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fact. 


It was also mentioned in the government cleanup 


reports and why they were never considered is 


beyond me. Experts knew what they were. But 


that is, quite frankly, water under the bridge. 


This is now. And considering the fact that the 


Board has requested SC&A to do this review of 


Appendix BB and of course the McKeel-Ramspott 


critiques, I really am confident that we will 


get the job done this time. 


I would also ask that the replies to the 


McKeel-Ramspott critiques to the General Steel 


Industries Appendix BB which were noted in the 


last meeting in the state of Washington would 


be included in this total review process since 


they certainly are part of the basis for the 


Appendix, and it was stated by NIOSH that there 


was no need to change anything at this current 


time. We of course, for the record, have been 


advised by NIOSH to reply to their response 


where we feel necessary, and we certainly will 


be doing so. I wish to thank NIOSH for that 


offer. The door wasn't slammed. It's wide 


open and I certainly respect and thank people 


for that offer. 

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Because of some of the very technical topics, I 


felt it best and appropriate to do this reply 


in conjunction with, but totally separate from, 


the SC&A review. I was told that the Board was 


going to be made aware of these recent critique 


replies from NIOSH, as well. So as usual, and 


as always, I would certainly welcome any review 


by the very knowledgeable, professional Board 


members which I have met over the last two and 


a half years. I've always said that if I'm 


mistaken or do not fully understand something, 


I would certainly take constructive criticism 


or suggestions ver-- very sincerely and thank 


you for them. So I hope Board members'll be 


able to take a look at those replies we 


received from NIOSH as well. 


And I really believe the Betatron device at 


NDT* should have received much more I guess 


investigation long before now 'cause they were 


commonly used at many sites and we now have a 


more detailed Allis Chalmers site list which is 


available. This is an actual, or partial, 


published Allis Chalmers customer list thanks 


to various other (unintelligible) sources and 


individuals who have helped me with this 

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research project. Allis Chalmers, of course, 


is only one of the Betatron manufacturers -- 


GE, (unintelligible), Siemens, et cetera built 


the machines as well. These are not by any 


means your everyday chest X-ray devices that 


are commonly referred to as part of the various 


site evaluations. Any comparisons regarding 


exposures and doses would be totally 


inaccurate, in my opinion. If the X-rays are 


considered dangerous, as they apparently are, 


what do we think about 24 or 25 million volt 


Betatrons? That 100 percent addressing 


Betatrons and other forms of non-destructive 


testing that involve radiation and radioactive 


material at all sites appears to be in direct 


conflict with TIB 6000 and 6001 where they do 


say -- I'm going to paraphrase this -- all 


radiation sources must be addressed during the 


approved AEC contract periods. And I 


underlined "all radiation sources". Apparently 


they cannot be bundled or grouped. They seem 


to be, according to this document, individually 


addressed. 


This was confirmed during a past conference 


call about a year ago -- actually -- when the 

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appendix was released, probably nine months 


ago, ten months ago. There were ten 


participants or agencies on the line, one of 


which was NIOSH and I thank them for their time 


and consideration on setting the record clear. 


People have tried to make the rules very clear. 


It is the exact details and procedures that I 


hope we can all work together on to make GSI 


appendix a truly accurate document. 


Again, there's a vast amount of research 


material regarding this device. It's 


available, and has been for quite some time. 


just happen to be a curious individual and no 


physicist, but I have been requesting the 


assistance of professionals for this type of 


expertise. The Board in this latest action, 


and NIOSH, and now SC&A -- certain will make 


that happen. I appreciate the preliminary work 


done on behalf of NIOSH, SC&A and many others 


for starting the investigation. It has been 


too long overlooked for this well-known 


radiation source. 


Many of the GSI workers, their families, asked 


me to thank the Board for its willingness to 


open up this overdue investigation. This is 


I 
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much larger than General Steel Industries. 


Those people, too, deserve this full review. 


I have a collection of documents, what have 


you, that will show and prove that these 


machines were in many, many locations. 


Everything was done manually. There was really 


no automation with this device, so the 


exposures were definitely real. The internet 


and both public and university libraries are 


full of data. One in particular which I just 


sent to both NIOSH and SC&A is from the 


University of Illinois. That's where the 


Betatron was invented by Donald Kerst. The 


University archives people were very, very 


congenial and helpful. The title of that 


document is "Activities Induced by a 20-million 


Volt X-ray to Various Elements" -- it actually 


came from the original document at the U of I 


Library archives Dr. McKeel and I located on a 


recent visit to U of I. I returned a couple of 


weeks ago to the library to look for any 


additional material and I have now forwarded 


that to SC&A and NIOSH. I think you'll find it 


very interesting. I'm sure they'll share with 


you, or I'd be happy to e-mail it to you. 

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In closing I really, really appreciate what 


everyone's done. I look forward to working 


with you in the future. And as usual, if I'm 


wrong in anything, please let me know. I'm 


trying to get this accurate and respect 


everybody that's helped me with this project. 


Thank you very much. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Okay. Put us back on, 


please. Put us back on. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you -- thank you very much, 


John. And this time we could hear you very 


well and very clearly, so we appreciate your 


comments. 


Next we'll hear from Gertrude Martin. 


 MS. MARTIN: I, too, would like to thank you 


for this opportunity to speak with 


representatives from NIOSH and the Advisory 


Board. And I, too, appreciate the fact that 


this is continuing because it shows that there 


is some concern for the workers after all. 


Initially when we began this process we got to 


a certain point in the process and we were 


told, because of his -- both of his cancers, to 


continue with this because they could probably 


qualify -- he could possibly qualify as a 

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claimant, so -- which we did. But at one point 


we felt like we were just going through a 


process and that no one was really considering 


the individuals. And I mention that because 


all of us in this room -- none of us are 


clones. Am I correct? We're individuals, and 


we have different reactions to different 


exposures. I may be exposed to the same thing 


my husband was exposed to, and never come down 


in my lifetime with a disease. He, on the 


other hand, did come down with it. 


I came across something on the Internet whereby 


an independent study was done of dose 


reconstructions. And the words in that -- that 


report kind of underscored the fact that this 


was not an exact science. There are so many 


problems with the reconstructions. First of 


all, we all know that Blockson is no longer 


there. Building 55 was torn down years ago. 


There was no remediation of the site. There 


were no records kept. Everyone is scrambling 


to try to find some records that they can go 


by. In fact, at the last town hall meeting 


last month -- and some of you -- I see familiar 


faces there -- it was brought out that there 

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was some urinalysis done of a certain number of 


employees. As I stand here, we can say -- he 


worked in that place -- there were no 


urinalysis (sic) done for him. There was no 


badge monitoring done for him. There was no 


safety precautions based on what he was exposed 


to. In fact, let's begin with the fact that 


most of those people didn't have a choice that 


they could have had, had they known what they 


were working with. They had an opportunity to 


do a job for the company. And many of them 


were like he. He is known as a really good 


worker. He worked there at Blockson for 40 


years, and anybody knows him would tell you he 


almost lived there. He used to get mad at me 


because I didn't tell him when somebody called 


him to come to work. But what I'm saying is 


these workers were conscientious. They thought 


here's an opportunity to do a good job. They 


knew there was something different about it 


because they had to have clearance. But they 


still were not told that they could be exposed 


to harmful substances. Had they known that, 


they may not have made that choice. They may 


have said no, I don't want to take a chance on 

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it. And even as they were working there, if 


the government at that time had used known 


precautions in having these people work around 


this yellowcake, it might have afforded some 


protection for them, but they didn't do that. 


So I -- I want people to bear with me 'cause 


they've heard me say this before. We know 


those people worked there. We know they were 


exposed. We know there were -- there was no 


monitoring. We know -- we know there was no 


bioassays done. And in this report that I saw 


of an independent audit of a dose 


reconstruction that was performed by NIOSH, 


there were some words in here that I thought 


was worth noting. They talked about the worker 


likely experienced internal exposures. It is 


believed to have had routine X-rays. The 


worker was not provided with film badge or 


thermoluminescent dosimeters, nor were 


bioassays performed to estimate internal 


exposures. As a result, exposures were 


estimated. Now see, that's different from 


knowing something. You're talking about 


estimating, you can estimate a lot based on 


what you knew happened at another plant. But 

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with Blockson not being there, you cannot prove 


that that happened at -- at Blockson. 


They were trying to determine whether the 


exposures were derived in a scientifically 


valid manner and whether the doses were derived 


in a claimant-favorable manner. And as we -- I 


got over to one of the pages that said here we 


cannot verify that the external dose rates from 


drum handling reported in the TBD are 


scientifically correct and claimant-favorable. 


In fact, we ba-- we believe an error was made 


in NIOSH calculations which has resulted in 


underestimate of external doses, and I believe 


that is the reason why we're here today. Am I 


correct? 


 But there's something else I wanted to say. 


didn't say this in public before because I 


didn't want to be misconstrued. The government 


had a responsibility in this whole thing. Just 


like we have a responsibility to pay our taxes 


on time so that the government has money to 


work with, the government, I believe, has the 


responsibility to protect these workers, to 


provide them with the best safety that they 


can. This was not done. And we know that 


I 
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responsibility is one of those core values we 


try to teach our kids, take responsibility for 


what you do and so forth. Overall, I believe 


that that alone should be something that looms 


large in your consideration for these 


claimants. Some of these people were 


fortunate. Like my husband is still here with 


me today, for which I am very happy. But is 


that because of what happened to him at 


Blockson or was that because we followed up 


with his health care and were lucky enough to 


discover these things before they became 


manifest? 


For example, one of his cancers was bladder 


cancer. It just so happens I'm an old nurse -- 


I've been nursing for 30 years -- but I 


recognized that you should not see blood in 


your urine. He called me up and he said I see 


this, and I said well, go to your doctor right 


away, go to your urologist, the same one that 


treated him for the prostate cancer, and he had 


bladder cancer. But now look at the number of 


people that didn't have that available to them. 


So sometimes you look at it and you say well -- 


somebody made a remark that some of these 

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people are gone, and that is true. They're 


dead, their families are there trying to speak 


up in their behalf. I'm fortunate that he's 


still here. But at the same time, that does 


not absolve the fact -- and from the fact that 


he was not treated fairly when he was working 


for Blockson. 


And don't get me wrong. He did derive some 


benefit from working at Blockson, and it helped 


us to have a decent living. But that does not 


absolve them from what they did. 


And I thank you again for the opportunity and 


hopefully -- that at least be a voice. 


Now they -- they talk about what they did over 


and over and over at that plant, but I don't 


think that you'll ever get to the bottom of 


what they actually -- what actually happened 


there because it's all -- all gone. Thank you 


for the opportunity. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Gertrude. 


Let's see, according to my notes, Marilyn 


Schneider would wait till tomorrow to speak. 


Is --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 

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(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, we'll do you tomorrow then, 


Marilyn. 


 Actually that then completes my list for today, 


but let me give an opportunity -- is there 


anyone that wished to speak that did not have a 


chance to sign on the roster? 


 DR. WADE: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Apparently not. There will be 


opportunity tomorrow again. We have another 


public comment session so we're now going to 


recess and -- oh, quick--


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) I should have 


said something while I was standing 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: You're welcome -- we'll -- you're 


welcome -- you certainly don't want your wife 


to have the last... 


 MR. MARTIN: I'm Edgar Martin and I worked at 


Olin* Chemical Box and Works for 40 and a half 


years, and when I was -- I was contact to see 


if I wanted to work in Building 55. I was 


being investigated by the FBI, and after the 


investigation it was declared that I could go 


in Building 55 because of my record. I went in 

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Building 55 in 1954 and I stayed there until 


1957. The place was completely secure. All 


the windows and all the doors were locked. We 


had a -- a -- a deputy sheriff in -- in -- in 


the room to stop anyone coming in -- in and out 


for security. I worked there and I was a 


operator's assistant. But what I did, I 


treated the different (unintelligible) with -- 


with (unintelligible) and (unintelligible) and 


different other things, and then I assisted the 


operator. But during the time that we were 


working there we were not told that this was -- 


that this is uranium that you're working with. 


We did not know that until later on during the 


-- during the time we were working there that 


we were working with uranium. 


During the time of the processing we'd come in 


contact lots of times whereas we couldn't use 


gloves. We had to use our bare hands doing -- 


to get the work -- get it done right away. And 


the main reason for that was -- was time. Time 


was involved. When I worked -- working at the 


-- with Olin at this time they had no 


protection at all or nothing to keep the person 


from getting sick. The main thing that 

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Blockson wanted at that time was production. 


You get the production, you're a good guy. 


Okay? And I've got bladder cancer and I have 


prostate cancer, but I'm still alive. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. Thank you very much. We 


then will recess till tomorrow morning at -- 


 DR. WADE: 9:30. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- at 9:30, so look forward to 


seeing many of you then. Thank you very much. 


 (Whereupon, the session concluded at 5:45 p.m.)
 
______________________________ 

169 

1 

2 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of Oct. 3, 2007; 


and it is a true and accurate transcript of the 


testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


6th day of November, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102