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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36119

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN GEORGE PLASTER, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 582

Filed: August 9, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia

County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge. 

Order granting motion in limine and judgments of conviction and sentences, 

affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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GRATTON, Judge

Jonathan George Plaster, Jr., appeals from his judgments of conviction entered upon 

conditional guilty pleas to seven counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen, 

Idaho Code § 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, 

I.C. § 18-1506. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2005, Plaster was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a child

under the age of sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years. 

The parties reached a plea agreement and the district court agreed to be bound by it, pursuant to 

Idaho Criminal Rule 11. Plaster entered a conditional Alford1plea of guilty to one count of lewd 

 

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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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conduct, reserving his right to appeal the denial of a suppression motion. The district court, after 

accepting Plaster’s plea, ordered a psychosexual evaluation. Although the plea agreement was 

binding, the agreement provided that both parties could present evidence in aggravation and 

mitigation at sentencing, in order to provide the Parole Commission with information to consider 

at such time as Plaster would become eligible for release on parole. 

As part of the psychosexual evaluation, Plaster was advised that he had the right to 

remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against him, that he had the right to 

have an attorney present during the assessment, and that he had the right to stop answering 

questions at any time. Plaster indicated that he understood each of these rights, agreed to waive 

the rights, and signed a form spelling out those rights. During the psychosexual evaluation, 

Plaster admitted to sex crimes against the three victims in addition to those acts charged in the 

original information. 

Prior to sentencing, Plaster filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district 

court granted. Thereafter, in January 2008, the State charged Plaster with eight counts of lewd 

conduct and two counts of sexual abuse in a separate case.2 These charges also involved the 

three victims alleged in the 2005 case which Plaster had discussed in the psychosexual 

evaluation. Prior to trial in the 2008 case, the State filed a notice of intent to offer evidence of 

confession at trial, and a motion in limine requesting that the district court rule on the 

admissibility of Plaster’s statements made during the psychosexual evaluation. The district court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing and entered a memorandum decision ruling that Plaster’s 

statements made during the psychosexual evaluation would be admissible at trial. The 2005 and 

2008 cases were consolidated for trial. Plaster entered an Alford plea of guilty to all of the 

counts set forth in the 2008 case, seven counts of lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse, 

and the State agreed to dismiss the 2005 case. Plaster reserved his right to appeal the district 

court’s decision regarding the motion in limine, but waived all other appellate claims. This 

appeal followed.

 

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The State later filed an amended information alleging seven counts of lewd conduct and 

one count of sexual abuse.
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II.

ANALYSIS

Plaster’s contention on appeal is as follows:

Mindful of the fact that Mr. Plaster’s participation in the psychosexual 

evaluation in the First Case was not required as part of the plea agreement with 

the State and would not factor into his sentence in any way, and mindful of the 

fact that Mr. Plaster moved to withdraw his plea and, thereby, knowingly 

withdrew from his plea agreement with the State, Mr. Plaster nevertheless 

contends that, because the admissions made during the psychosexual evaluation 

were made in reliance on the original plea agreement, it was fundamentally unfair 

for the district court to have ruled that the State could use those admissions 

against him even after the plea agreement had been vacated.

Plaster asserts only fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of the statements made during 

the psychosexual evaluation. Plaster cites no Idaho precedent regarding application of 

fundamental fairness principles to the decision to admit or deny evidence. Aside from the 

statement quoted above, Plaster makes no argument as to how the admission of the evidence 

would be fundamentally unfair or how the district court erred in its analysis of this issue. 

Instead, Plaster cites, as “cf.” two cases, United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 62-64 (1st 

Cir. 2003) and United States v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1992).

In Ventura-Cruel, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ventura-Cruel was required to provide 

complete and truthful information about his crime and involvement in a drug conspiracy. In 

order to receive a reduction in sentence, Ventura-Cruel had to accept responsibility and provide 

incriminating information. The court advised him at the change of plea hearing that he was

waiving his right against self-incrimination. Thereafter, Ventura-Cruel wrote a confession letter 

to his probation officer. Ventura-Cruel did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, but the district 

court later rejected his guilty plea. The district court allowed the letter into evidence. The 

appellate court determined that, based upon the facts, allowing the letter into evidence would be 

fundamentally unfair. Ventura-Cruel had reasonably relied on the existence of the plea 

agreement before making his admissions. In fact, he had been advised that he had waived his 

right against self-incrimination and had been, by the terms of the plea agreement, required to 

provide incriminating information. In addition, Ventura-Cruel had not asked to have the plea 

withdrawn or otherwise lose the benefits of the plea agreement. Thus, under the circumstances, 

admitting the letter would deprive him of the benefit of the agreement, yet place the government 
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in a better position. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d at 62-63. Similarly, in Escamilla, the defendant 

was required, by a plea agreement, to make incriminating statements regarding his role in a drug 

conspiracy and, after he made incriminating statements but failed a polygraph, the government 

withdrew from the agreement. Again, the court determined that using the admissions would 

deny him the benefit of the bargain and place the government in a superior position. Escamilla, 

975 F.2d at 571-72. 

By contrast, here, Plaster entered an Alford plea and was not required to and did not 

admit or accept responsibility for the underlying crimes charged. Plaster was advised of his 

rights before making the admissions. There were no provisions in the plea agreement which 

induced Plaster to make incriminating statements. Plaster, not the State, voluntarily withdrew 

from the plea agreement. Further, the district court determined that the statements were 

voluntarily made. Plaster has failed to demonstrate or provide relevant authority for his claim 

that admission of the evidence was erroneous on the ground that such admission would be 

fundamentally unfair. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Plaster has not demonstrated error in admitting into evidence the statements made in the 

psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, the district court’s order granting the State’s motion in 

limine, and Plaster’s judgments of conviction and sentences are affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON, CONCUR.