NO. COA13-747

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 July 2014

GRANT A. LOOSVELT,

Plaintiff/Father,

v. Mecklenburg County

No. 11-CVD-21739(DH)

STACY LEIGH BROWN,

Defendant/Mother.

Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 1 April 2013 by 

Judge Donnie Hoover in District Court, Mecklenburg County. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2013.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and 

Tobias S. Hampson, for plaintiff-appellant.

James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Preston O. Odom, III, by 

defendant-appellee.

STROUD, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals order regarding permanent child custody 

and child support. For the following reasons, we affirm in part 

and reverse and remand in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, California, filed a 

complaint in North Carolina against defendant, a resident of 

Charlotte, North Carolina. Plaintiff sought to establish the 
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paternity of a child born out of wedlock, to determine custody, 

and an order addressing the parties’ support obligations. On 7 

December 2011, defendant filed an answer and counterclaims 

seeking child custody, child support, and attorney fees. On or 

about 10 April 2012, defendant filed a request “to upwardly 

deviate from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines[.]” On 

7 May 2012, plaintiff replied to defendant’s counterclaims

admitting “it is in the best interest of the minor child that 

his primary custody be awarded to” defendant, stating that 

“child support should be awarded in accordance with North 

Carolina law[,]” and denying allegations related to defendant’s 

request for attorney fees.

On 24 May and 20 June 2012, both nunc pro tunc to 16 April 

2012, the trial court entered temporary child support orders. 

The trial court ordered that plaintiff make monthly child 

support payments in the amount of $2,317.00. Defendant’s claim 

for retroactive child support was to be heard at a later date 

along with her claim for attorney fees.

On 1 April 2013, nunc pro tunc to 4 January 2013, the 

trial court entered a corrected order regarding permanent child 

custody and child support finding that because the aggregate of 

the parties’ adjusted gross incomes exceeded $25,000.00 per 
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month, the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines were not 

controlling for this case. The order established paternity and 

custody of the minor child, set plaintiff’s retroactive and 

prospective child support obligations as well as arrearages, and 

awarded attorney fees to defendant. As to the child support 

obligations and attorney fees, the trial court ordered:

4. Effective November 1, 2012, and 

continuing on the first (1st) day of each 

month thereafter until modified by this 

Court. Plaintiff/Father shall pay child 

support to Defendant/Mother in the amount of 

$7,342.84 per month. All payments shall be 

made directly to Defendant/Mother on or 

before the first (1st) day of each month.

5. Plaintiff/Father shall be 

responsible for ninety percent (90%) and 

Defendant/Mother shall be responsible for 10 

percent (10%) of all uninsured medical, 

dental, optical, orthodontic, therapy, 

counseling, prescription drug expenses, and 

any other expenses incurred by the minor 

child in connection with his healthcare that 

is not covered by the major medical 

insurance provider(s). In the event 

Defendant/Mother is required to advance any 

of the foregoing expenses to be paid by 

Plaintiff/Father as set forth above, 

Plaintiff/Father shall reimburse 

Defendant/Mother within thirty (30) days of 

the receipt of written verification of said 

expenses.

6. Plaintiff/Father’s child support 

arrearage in the amount of $15,077.52 shall 

be paid in full on or before March 5, 2013.

7. Plaintiff/Father’s retroactive 
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child support obligation in the amount of 

$39,655.27 shall be paid in full on or 

before March 5, 2013.

8. Defendant/Father shall pay to 

Plaintiff/Mother’s counsel the sum of 

$24,942.21 to partially defray 

Plaintiff/Mother’s legal fees. 

Defendant/Father shall make this payment 

directly to Claire J. Samuel, James, McElroy 

& Diehl, P.A., 600 South College Street, 

Charlotte, NC 28202 on or before March 15, 

2013.

Plaintiff appeals.

II. Retroactive Child Support

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in 

awarding retroactive child support because the trial court 

“[f]ailed to [m]ake [f]indings of [f]act to [s]upport its 

[a]ward[,]” lacked evidence to support its award, and failed to 

apportion the expenses incurred between both parties. Our Court 

has stated:

an order for child support must be based 

upon the interplay of the trial court’s 

conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of 

support necessary to meet the reasonable 

needs of the child and (2) the relative 

ability of the parties to provide that 

amount. These conclusions must be based upon 

factual findings sufficiently specific to 

indicate that the trial court took due 

regard of the factors enumerated in the 

statute, namely, the estates, earnings, 

conditions, accustomed standard of living of 

the child and the parties, the child care 

and homemaker contributions of each party, 
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and other facts of the particular case.

These findings must, of course, be 

based upon competent evidence, and it is not 

enough that there may be evidence in the 

record sufficient to support findings which 

could have been made. The trial court must 

itself determine what pertinent facts are 

actually established by the evidence before 

it. In short, the evidence must support the 

findings, the findings must support the 

conclusions, and the conclusions must 

support the judgment; otherwise, effective 

appellate review becomes impossible.

Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 234, 328 S.E.2d 47, 49 

(1985) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). 

Furthermore, 

[c]hild support orders entered by a trial 

court are accorded substantial deference by 

appellate courts and our review is limited 

to a determination of whether there was a 

clear abuse of discretion. Under this 

standard of review, the trial court’s ruling 

will be upset only upon a showing that it 

was so arbitrary that it could not have been 

the result of a reasoned decision. In a case 

for child support, the trial court must make

specific findings and conclusions. The 

purpose of this requirement is to allow a 

reviewing court to determine from the record 

whether a judgment, and the legal 

conclusions which underlie it, represent a 

correct application of the law.

Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 441-42, 567 S.E.2d 834, 837 

(2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“The ultimate objective in setting awards for child support 

is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the children 
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and the ability of the obligor to meet the needs.” Robinson v. 

Robinson, 210 N.C. App. 319, 333, 707 S.E.2d 785, 795 (2011)

(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Retroactive 

child support encompasses “[c]hild support awarded prior to the 

time a party files a complaint[.]” Carson v. Carson, 199 N.C. 

App. 101, 105, 680 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “However, retroactive child support 

payments are only recoverable for amounts actually expended on 

the child’s behalf during the relevant period. Therefore, a

party seeking retroactive child support must present sufficient 

evidence of past expenditures made on behalf of the child, and 

evidence that such expenditures were reasonably necessary.” 

Robinson, 210 N.C. App. at 333, 707 S.E.2d at 795 (citation, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

A. Findings of Fact as to Retroactive Child Support Expenses

The trial court awarded defendant retroactive child support 

from October 2010, the date of the child’s birth, through 

November 2011, the month following the filing of plaintiff’s 

complaint. The retroactive child support award of $39,655.271 was 

reimbursement for the following:

 

1 We note that these expenses actually add up to $40,025.27, 

although neither party has challenged the accuracy of the 

numbers in the trial court order.
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 “$5,160 in nursery expenses prior to [the child’s] birth”

 “806.13 in maternity clothes prior to [the child’s] birth”

 “$460.00 in additional daycare cost for [the child] from 

October 28, 2011 through March 20, 2012”

 “$1,313.54 in nursery expenses after [the child’s] birth”

 “$6,485.67 in expenses related to the minor child’s basic 

needs (i.e. baby food, diapers, formula, and clothing) 

after the minor child’s birth”

 “$11,520.00 to provide work-related child care” in 2011

 “$8,800.00 to provide work-related child care” in 2010

 “5,479.93 in expenses related to the minor child’s birth”

Because these expenses raise different evidentiary and legal 

issues, we will separately address them.

1. Nursery Expenses and Maternity Clothes Prior to Birth

The award for expenses incurred prior to the child’s birth

appears to raise a novel legal issue. We have found no 

authority, either in North Carolina or in any other state that

addresses recovery of expenses incurred prior to the child’s 

birth for nursery expenses or maternity clothes as retroactive 

child support. Apparently, defendant did not find any law to 

support this proposition either, as her argument is that “the 

fact that a ‘father’s duty to support his child arises when the 

child is born[,]’ Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 116, 225 
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S.E.2d 816, 827 (1976), does not preclude awarding retroactive 

child support covering expenditures incurred before a child’s 

birth.” Defendant seeks to analogize these expenses to medical 

expenses under North Carolina General Statute § 49-15. But we 

find that because (1) the child support obligation does not 

arise until birth and (2) North Carolina has a statute which 

limits recovery of pre-birth expenses to medical expenses, there 

is no legal basis for an award of any other types of expenses 

incurred prior to birth. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-15 (2011); 

Freeman v. Freeman, 103 N.C. App. 801, 803, 407 S.E.2d 262, 263 

(1991).

“A parent’s obligation to support his child arises when the 

child is born, not when the courts order a specific amount to be 

paid.” Freeman v. Freeman, 103 N.C. App. 801, 803, 407 S.E.2d 

262, 263 (1991) (emphasis added). As the legal obligation 

arises when the child is born, expenses incurred prior to the 

child’s birth cannot be considered as retroactive child support;

see Robinson, 210 N.C. App. at 333, 707 S.E.2d at 795; Freeman, 

103 N.C. App. at 803, 407 S.E.2d at 263, the only exception to 

this rule is North Carolina General Statute § 49-152 which allows

 

2 North Carolina General Statute § 49-15 provides that “[u]pon

and after the establishment of paternity of an illegitimate 

child pursuant to G.S. 49-14, the rights, duties, and 
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for “medical expenses incident to the pregnancy and birth of the 

child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-15. While many mothers reasonably 

incur expenses of many types in preparation for the birth of a 

baby, our General Assembly has provided for recovery of only one 

type of pre-birth expense, medical expenses, pursuant to North 

Carolina General Statute § 49-15. See id. Medical expenses 

related to the pregnancy are necessarily incurred before birth 

of the child, but there is no evidence or argument that these

nursery expenses and maternity clothes could qualify as “medical 

expenses” under even the most generous definition. Id. 

Accordingly, we must reverse the award for nursery expenses and 

maternity clothes incurred prior to the child’s birth.

2. Nursery Expenses and Basic Needs After Birth

For the nursery expenses incurred after the child’s birth 

and the expenses incurred for the child’s basic needs, we 

conclude there was not sufficient evidence to support an award 

of these expenses as retroactive child support because defendant 

did not present evidence that these expenses were actually 

 

obligations of the mother and the father so established, with 

regard to support and custody of the child, shall be the same, 

and may be determined and enforced in the same manner, as if the 

child were the legitimate child of such father and mother. When 

paternity has been established, the father becomes responsible 

for medical expenses incident to the pregnancy and the birth of 

the child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-15.
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incurred prior to the filing of the complaint. Defendant 

herself concedes that her evidence required the trial court “to 

draw the reasonable inference” regarding the dates of the 

expenses. Defendant’s exhibit listing the expenses showed only 

the merchant from which the purchase was made and the amount of 

the expense; defendant does not direct our attention to any 

evidence before the trial court, including her testimony, 

providing any dates for when the expenses were incurred. As 

retroactive child support may only be awarded for expenses 

incurred “prior to the time a party files a complaint[,]” 

Carson, 199 N.C. App. 105, 680 S.E.2d at 888, the trial court 

needed actual evidence upon which to determine when such 

expenses were incurred. Defendant’s evidence did not provide 

sufficient detail as to the dates that these expenses were 

incurred such that the trial court could reasonably find that 

they were incurred prior to the filing of the complaint. We 

reverse the award of nursery expenses and basic needs expenses 

incurred after the child’s birth.

3. Daycare, Child Care, and Birth Expenses

For the expenses regarding daycare, child care, and the 

child’s birth, plaintiff does not challenge the timing of these 

expenses or the evidence supporting the amounts awarded. Thus, 
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the trial court’s findings as to these expenses are binding on 

this court. See Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 640, 676 

S.E.2d 89, 91 (“Where [a party] fails to challenge any of the 

trial court’s findings of fact on appeal, they are binding on 

the appellate court[.]”), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 583, 681 

S.E.2d 784. As to these expenses, plaintiff challenges only the 

trial court’s findings as to his ability to pay the award of 

retroactive child support, arguing that the trial court was 

required to make findings of fact regarding plaintiff’s “ability 

to pay such amounts ‘during the time for which reimbursement is 

sought[,]’” and “the trial court was required to exercise some 

amount of discretion to determine what portion of the expenses . 

. . [defendant] purportedly incurred . . . represent[ing] her 

share of support.” As plaintiff’s ability to pay child support 

is actually a broader issue implicating more than just daycare, 

child care, and birth expenses, we separately address it below.

B. Ability to Pay Retroactive Child Support

Plaintiff contends that the trial court was required to 

make findings regarding his ability to pay child support “during 

the period in which [the expenses] were purportedly incurred.” 

In Hicks v. Hicks, this Court stated that the trial court must 
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make findings as to the obligor’s ability to pay during the time 

period of the retroactive support sought:

What the defendant should have paid is not 

the measure of his liability to plaintiff. 

The measure of defendant’s liability to 

plaintiff is the amount actually expended by 

plaintiff which represented the defendant’s 

share of support. In determining this amount 

the court must take into consideration the 

needs of the children and the ability of the 

defendant to pay during the time for which 

reimbursement is sought. The plaintiff is 

not entitled to be compensated for support 

for the children provided by others, nor is 

she entitled to be reimbursed for sums 

expended by her for the support of the 

children which represent her share of 

support as determined by the trial judge, 

considering “the relative ability of the 

parties to provide support[.]” 

34 N.C. App. 128, 130, 237 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977) (emphasis 

added) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). 

“[T]he time for which reimbursement is sought[,]” id., is not 

the time when this case was heard, as defendant contends -- that 

would be the time at which reimbursement is sought -- but is 

instead the time period during which the expenses were incurred. 

See Savani v. Savani, 102 N.C. App. 496, 502, 403 S.E.2d 900, 

903 (1991) (“An award of retroactive child support must also 

take into account the defendant’s ability to pay during the 

period in the past for which reimbursement is sought.” (emphasis 

added)).
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Here, the trial court specifically found that 

“Plaintiff/Father has the ability to pay the child support 

ordered herein” and “Plaintiff/Father’s income is more than 

sufficient to cover the awards contained herein based on his 

monthly expenditures and income.” Yet the trial court failed 

to make findings of fact as to plaintiff’s ability to pay for 

the time period for which reimbursement was sought, 

specifically, from the pre-birth medical expenses incurred until 

the filing of the complaint, the relevant time period for 

retroactive child support. See Carson, 199 N.C. App. at 105, 

680 S.E.2d at 888, see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-15. Therefore, 

we reverse and remand the order for the trial court to make 

findings of fact as to plaintiff’s ability to pay during that 

time period for which reimbursement was sought.

C. Allotment of Retroactive Child Support Expenses

In addition, plaintiff raises a related issue of the trial 

court’s apportionment of retroactive support. Plaintiff contends 

“the trial court was required to exercise some amount of 

discretion to determine what portion of the expenses . . . 

[defendant] purportedly incurred related to . . . [defendant’s] 

share of support.” We agree that “[t]he measure of 

[plaintiff]’s liability to [defendant] is the amount actually 
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expended by [defendant] which represented the [plaintiff’s]

share of support.” Hicks, 34 N.C. App. at 130, 237 S.E.2d at

309 (emphasis added). Here, the trial court awarded defendant 

100% of each of the expenses listed pursuant to its award of 

retroactive child support; this indicates that the trial court 

failed to allot any portion of the retroactive child support 

expenses as defendant’s responsibility. In contrast, we note 

that the trial court allocated to defendant 10% of the child’s 

prospective “uninsured medical, dental, optical, orthodontic, 

therapy, counseling, prescription drug expenses, and any other 

expenses incurred by the minor child in connection with his 

healthcare that is not covered by the major medical insurance 

provider(s)[;]” we cannot discern from the findings in the order

why defendant has responsibility for 10% of these prospective 

expenses but has no responsibility for the retroactive expenses.

D. Summary as to Retroactive Child Support

In summary, as to the award of retroactive child support, 

we reverse the award for nursery expenses and maternity clothes 

prior to the child’s birth because there is no legal basis for 

making such an award. We reverse the award for nursery expenses 

and basic needs after the birth because there was not sufficient 

evidence that such expenses were incurred prior to the filing of 
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plaintiff’s complaint. We reverse and remand the order as to 

the expenses for daycare, child care, and birth for the trial 

court to consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay during the time 

for which reimbursement is sought, how these expenses should be 

apportioned between plaintiff and defendant, and to make any 

other findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to 

support the award of retroactive child support.

III. Prospective Child Support

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in 

awarding prospective child support (“child support”) because it 

failed “to [m]ake [s]pecific [f]indings of [f]act [c]oncerning

[plaintiff’s] [i]ncome and [a]bility to [p]ay [c]hild 

[s]upport[,]” based its award on plaintiff’s income without 

considering the needs of the child, and abused its discretion in 

setting defendant’s child support obligation and failing to 

“offset” plaintiff’s child support obligation by such amount. 

Again, we note that we review the child support award to 

consider if the evidence supports the findings of fact, the 

findings support the conclusions of law, and the conclusions 

support the judgment. See Atwell, 74 N.C. App. at 234, 328 

S.E.2d at 49. 
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North Carolina General Statute § 50-13.4(c) requires the 

trial court to consider several factors when establishing a 

child support obligation:

Payments ordered for the support of a minor 

child shall be in such amount as to meet the 

reasonable needs of the child for health, 

education, and maintenance, having due 

regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, 

accustomed standard of living of the child 

and the parties, the child care and 

homemaker contributions of each party, and 

other facts of the particular case.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 (2011). Plaintiff raises arguments

regarding several of these factors and we will address each 

separately.

A. Plaintiff’s Income and Ability to Pay

As to plaintiff’s income and ability to pay, the trial 

court made the following findings of fact:

12. On October 16, 2012, 

Plaintiff/Father filed an Amended Financial 

Affidavit listing his average gross monthly 

income as being $24,409.66.

. . . . 

16. The child support award set forth 

herein is necessary to meet the reasonable 

needs of the minor child related to his 

health, education and maintenance, having 

due regard to the estates, earning, 

conditions, accustomed standard of living of 

the child and of the parties.

. . . .
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18. Plaintiff/Father is an able-bodied 

man who is gainfully employed and fully 

capable of paying to Defendant/Mother, for 

the benefit of the minor child, child 

support in the amount set forth herein.

19. Plaintiff/Father is a cosmetic 

dentist in Beverly Hills and Los Angeles, 

California. Plaintiff/Father has served on 

the faculty at UCLA’s School of Dentistry 

and is a member at Century City Hospital. 

Plaintiff/Father has also appeared on the 

ABC shows Extreme Makeover and Average Joe.

20. Plaintiff/Father has the ability 

to pay the child support ordered herein.

21. Plaintiff/Father is a man with 

substantial income.

22. Plaintiff/Father’s spending is 

inconsistent with the income reported on his 

Amended Financial Affidavit.

23. Plaintiff/Father’s average monthly 

spending according to his testimony and his 

checking account statements for his Chase 

Checking Accounts ending #8427 and #8435 

reflect that he spends an average of 

$88,617.80 per month.

24. At the time of trial, 

Plaintiff/Father had no credit card debt.

25. Plaintiff/Father owns and pays for 

two (2) luxury residences in Los Ang[e]les, 

California at a cost of approximately 

$12,000.00 per month.

26. In nine and a half (9 1⁄2) months, 

Plaintiff/Father spent $31,322.85 on 

vacations or an average of $3,297.14 per 

month.
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27. In two (2) months, 

Plaintiff/Father spent $51,000.00 on 

jewelry, or an average of $25,500.00 per 

month.

28. Plaintiff/Father . . . spent 

$1,466.78 for alcohol in three (3) days.

. . . .

34. Plaintiff/Father has monthly 

shared family expenses of $15,446.54 and 

monthly individual expenses of $6,937.00, as 

reflected on his Amended Financial 

Affidavit.

. . . .

36. Plaintiff/Father should have a 

child support obligation of $7,342.84 per 

month ($5,148.84 (1/3 of Plaintiff/Father’s 

shared family expenses) +$2,194.00 ([the 

child’s] individual expenses) = $7,342.84).

. . . . 

38. Plaintiff/Father’s child support 

obligation should be made effective to 

November 1, 2012.

39. Plaintiff/Father currently has a 

child support arrearage of $15,077.52 

through January 2013 ($7,342.84 x 3 months = 

$22,028.52 less $6,951.00 paid = 

$15,077.52).

. . . . 

44. Plaintiff/Father should pay ninety 

percent (90%) of the minor child’s uninsured 

medical expenses.

. . . .
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46. The provisions of this Order

regarding support of the minor child are 

fair and reasonable under the existing 

circumstances.

Only two of these findings address plaintiff’s income: finding 

of fact number 12 which finds that his financial affidavit 

listed his average gross monthly income as $24,409.66,3 and 

finding of fact number 21 which finds that plaintiff “is a man 

with substantial income.” 

When a trial court is considering child support outside of 

the North Carolina child support guidelines, the trial court

must make sufficient findings as to the parties’ incomes and 

ability to pay to permit appellate review:

Payments ordered for the 

support of a minor child shall be 

in such amount as to meet the 

reasonable needs of the child for 

health, education and maintenance, 

having due regard to the estates, 

earnings, conditions, accustomed 

standard of living of the child 

and the parties, and other facts 

of the particular case. [N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 50-13.4(c)].

. . . .

Where, as here, the trial court sits 

without a jury, the judge is required to 

find the facts specially and state 

 

3 This “finding of fact” is actually a recitation of evidence and 

not a finding by the trial court; this is apparent from the fact 

that the trial court ultimately determined that plaintiff has 

more income than what he listed on his affidavit. 
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separately its conclusions of law thereon 

and direct the entry of the appropriate 

judgment. The purpose of the requirement 

that the court make findings of those 

specific facts which support its ultimate 

disposition of the case is to allow a 

reviewing court to determine from the record 

whether the judgment -- and the legal 

conclusions which underlie it -- represent a 

correct application of the law. The 

requirement for appropriately detailed 

findings is thus not a mere formality or a 

rule of empty ritual; it is designed instead 

to dispose of the issues raised by the 

pleadings and to allow the appellate courts 

to perform their proper function in the 

judicial system.

Under G.S. 50-13.4(c), quoted supra, an 

order for child support must be based upon 

the interplay of the trial court’s 

conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of 

support necessary to meet the reasonable 

needs of the child and (2) the relative 

ability of the parties to provide that 

amount. These conclusions must themselves be 

based upon factual findings specific enough 

to indicate to the appellate court that the 

judge below took due regard of the 

particular estates, earnings, conditions, 

[and] accustomed standard of living of both 

the child and the parents. It is a question 

of fairness and justice to all concerned. 

In the absence of such findings, this Court 

has no means of determining whether the 

order is adequately supported by competent 

evidence. It is not enough that there may be 

evidence in the record sufficient to support 

findings which could have been made. The 

trial court must itself determine what 

pertinent facts are actually established by 

the evidence before it, and it is not for an 

appellate court to determine de novo the 

weight and credibility to be given to 

evidence disclosed by the record on appeal. 
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Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 711-13, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189

(1980) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Atwell, 

74 N.C. App. at 234, 328 S.E.2d at 49.

In Coble, the trial court had found that the “plaintiff is 

in need of financial assistance for the support of the minor 

children and that defendant is capable of providing such 

assistance.” Id. at 713, 268 S.E.2d at 189. Our Supreme Court 

noted that “[t]his finding is more properly denominated a 

conclusion of law, since it states the legal basis upon which 

defendant’s liability may be predicated under the applicable 

statutes, G.S. 50-13.4(b) and (c). As a conclusion of law, it 

must itself be based upon supporting factual findings.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted). The Court then determined that the 

findings of fact failed to support the conclusion, since the 

only relevant finding of fact was that the:

[d]efendant’s monthly net income is 

approximately $483.32, plus an 

indeterminable amount earned from overtime 

work, and yet her monthly expenses are 

approximately $510.00. To the degree that 

this finding indicates that defendant’s 

living expenses tend to exceed her average 

income, it would seem to negate, rather than 

support, the conclusion that she is capable 

of providing support payments. Moreover, the 

next part of finding No. 12 shows that 

although the monthly financial needs of the 

children average approximately $432.00, 
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plaintiff's net monthly income is 

approximately $825.00. Far from supporting 

the conclusion that plaintiff is in need of 

partial assistance in meeting his support 

obligation, this part of the finding 

suggests instead that he is capable of 

sufficiently providing for his children on 

his own. On the face of the order alone, 

therefore, finding No. 12 does not support 

the trial court’s conclusions as to either 

plaintiff’s financial need for support 

assistance or defendant’s financial ability 

to provide it. In the absence of other 

findings which support these conclusions, 

then, the order awarding plaintiff partial 

child support cannot be sustained.

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

In the case before us, the trial court’s findings of fact 

are of similar import. Compare id. Again, only two of the trial 

court’s findings address plaintiff’s income: finding of fact 

number 12 which finds that his financial affidavit listed his 

average gross monthly income as $24,409.66, and finding of fact 

number 21 which finds that plaintiff “is a man with substantial 

income.” There is no finding of fact as to plaintiff’s actual 

income, only that it is “substantial[.]” We can infer that 

“substantial” here means more than $24,409.66 but we cannot,

determine what the trial court found plaintiff’s income to be. 

Furthermore, the trial court found that although plaintiff 

claims to earn $24,409.66 on average per month, he actually 

spends an average of $88,617.80 per month. Here, the trial 
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court clearly assumed that the plaintiff’s income is quite 

significantly more than $25,000 per month, but we have no way of 

knowing what number the trial court had in mind.4

Normally, findings as to the incomes of the parties are 

stated in monetary amounts of dollars per month or year. 

Although these numbers might even be averages or approximations, 

particularly when a parent does not receive a set monthly 

paycheck, a finding of an actual monetary amount of income will 

permit this Court to review the findings based upon the 

 

4 Plaintiff also implies that the trial court imputed income to 

him due to what it may have found to be extravagant 

expenditures. We do not believe this is so, but if the trial 

court was actually imputing income to plaintiff, this would be 

error, as there were no findings of fact that that defendant was 

suppressing his income intentionally or spending excessively to 

avoid his child support obligation. See generally Respess v. 

Respess, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 754 S.E.2d 691, 703-04 (2014) 

(addressing defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in 

the amount of income it imputed to him: “Generally, a party's 

ability to pay child support is determined by that party’s 

actual income at the time the award is made. A party’s capacity 

to earn may, however, be the basis for an award where the party 

deliberately acted in disregard of his obligation to provide 

support. Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of an 

award, there must be a showing that the actions reducing the 

party’s income were taken in bad faith to avoid family 

responsibilities[.] This showing may be met by a sufficient 

degree of indifference to the needs of a parent’s children.” 

(citation, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted)). 

While certainly the trial court may find plaintiff’s evidence 

not to be credible, the trial court must still make an actual 

finding as to plaintiff’s income.
-24-

evidence.

5 While the trial court did give some regard “to the 

estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of 

the” parties, it failed to make a finding of fact as to 

plaintiff’s income which is definite enough for this Court to 

review. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c). Furthermore, while the 

trial court specifically found plaintiff was able to pay the 

child support ordered, the income the trial court was basing 

this finding on is unclear, and thus leaves this Court also 

unable to review the finding of plaintiff’s ability to pay.

In addition, even though the trial court’s order contained 

some findings as to “the estates[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-

13.4(c), of the parties, particularly plaintiff, it did not make 

any findings which would permit consideration of plaintiff’s

estate as supporting his ability to pay child support; rather, 

the findings of fact addressed only the expenses plaintiff has 

incurred. For example, the trial court found that 

 

5 We also note that without an actual monetary number for the 

income it could be difficult for either party to prove the need 

for a modification of child support in the future based upon a 

change in circumstances, as the trial court would have to 

determine what the plaintiff’s “substantial” income actually was 

in 2012 and whether any alleged change in the plaintiff’s income 

would be sufficient to support modification. See generally N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a) (2011) (“Except as otherwise provided in 

G.S. 50-13.7A, an order of a court of this State for support of 

a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon 

motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by 

either party[.]”)
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“Plaintiff/Father owns and pays for two (2) luxury residences in 

Los Ang[e]les, California at a cost of approximately $12,000.00 

per month.” Having a large house payment does not necessarily 

equate to having a substantial estate; it can mean just the 

opposite. The trial court did not find the value of these 

“luxury residences[,]” whether plaintiff’s indebtedness on these 

residences equals or exceeds their values, or any other facts 

regarding the net value of plaintiff’s estate. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the award of prospective 

child support for the trial court to make findings as to the 

monetary value of plaintiff’s income and any other findings of 

fact or conclusions of law necessary to set an appropriate child 

support amount. We note that plaintiff also makes arguments as 

to the specific evidence the trial court should rely upon on

remand in making its determination as to what his income is, but

we will not address this, since arguments about which evidence 

should weigh more heavily are properly directed to the trial 

court, which has the discretion to determine the credibility and 

the weight of the evidence. See Coble, 300 N.C. at 712-13, 268 

S.E.2d at 189.

B. Reasonable Needs of the Child

While we are reversing and remanding the child support 
-26-

award for the reasons noted above, plaintiff also has argued 

that the trial court failed to consider the child’s actual needs

in setting the amount of child support. The child support 

ordered in the amount of $7,342.84 per month far exceeds the 

actual needs of the child based upon the child’s historical 

individual expenditures as found by the trial court, which were 

$2,194.00 per month. Although the trial court has the 

discretion to award child support in excess of actual historical 

expenses based upon plaintiff’s financial position, the findings

of fact as to how this amount was established must be detailed 

enough to permit review:

Whatever may have been the rule at 

common law, a father’s duty of support today 

does not end with the furnishing of mere 

necessities if he is able to afford more. In 

addition to the actual needs of the child, a 

father has a legal duty to give his children 

those advantages which are reasonable 

considering his financial condition and his 

position in society.

In Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. 276, 

283, 150 A.2d 139, 143, Woodside, J., 

observed:

Children of wealthy parents are 

entitled to the educational 

advantages of travel, private 

lessons in music, drama, swimming, 

horseback riding, and other 

activities in which they show 

interest and ability. It is 

possible that a child with nothing 

more than a house to shelter him, 

a coat to keep him warm and 
-27-

sufficient food to keep him 

healthy will be happier and more 

successful than a child who has 

all the advantages, but most 

parents strive and sacrifice to 

give their children advantages 

which cost money. Much of the 

special education and training 

which will be of value to people 

throughout life must be given them 

when they are young, or be forever 

lost to them.

What amount is reasonable for a child’s 

support is to be determined with reference 

to the special circumstances of the 

particular parties. Things which might 

properly be deemed necessaries by the family 

of a man of large income would not be so 

regarded in the family of a man whose 

earnings were small and who had not been 

able to accumulate any savings. In 

determining that amount which is reasonable, 

the trial judge has a wide discretion with 

which this court will not interfere in the 

absence of a manifest abuse. 

It is never the purpose of a support 

order to divide the father’s wealth or to 

distribute his estate. Furthermore, even 

though the father be a man of great wealth, 

an excessive award which would encourage 

extravagant expenditures either by the child 

or in his behalf would not be in his best 

interest.

Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 57-58, 134 S.E.2d 227, 234

(1964) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted); 

Atwell, 74 N.C. App. at 234, 328 S.E.2d at 49.

The trial court’s order seems to “divide the father’s 

wealth” by basing child support upon a number calculated by 
-28-

adding one-third of plaintiff’s “shared family expenses” to the 

child’s historical individual expenses. Id. at 58, 134 S.E.2d 

at 234. The order also finds that plaintiff resides in Los 

Angeles, California, but fails to make any findings of fact as 

to how plaintiff’s expenses incurred in California, which 

apparently do not include any child-related expenditures, relate 

to the expenses of raising a child, even the child of a wealthy 

parent, in Charlotte, North Carolina.

A child support award can be made by using estimates of 

needs based upon the higher standard of living made possible by 

plaintiff’s means, but the trial court must make findings of 

fact which assign a monetary value to these needs. See Payne 

v. Payne, 91 N.C. App. 71, 75, 370 S.E.2d 428, 431 (1988) 

(“Although an equation for child support does not lend itself to 

an exact mathematical calculation, it is difficult, if not 

impossible, to know whether a trial judge has made a complete 

and reasonable assessment of the child’s needs and the parties’

abilities to pay when the needs-variable has no monetary 

value.”). As such, upon remand we also instruct the trial court 

to make findings of fact, specifically with monetary values, as 

to the child’s reasonable needs in light of the abilities of the 

parents to provide support.
-29-

C. Defendant’s Child Support Obligation

The trial court found defendant’s portion of responsibility 

for support of the minor child to be $100.00 per month, which 

plaintiff argues is too low, but at the very least should offset 

his own obligation by $100.00. But the order does not state 

that the total child support obligation of both parents is 

$7,342.84 per month, but rather that “Plaintiff/Father should 

have a child support obligation of $7,342.84 per month[,]” and 

thus we see no merit in his argument that his child support 

obligation should be reduced by defendant’s child support 

obligation. But, as discussed above, we are reversing and 

remanding the child support award for several reasons, and on 

remand the trial court should take into account, in a manner 

this Court can review, “the estates, earnings, conditions, 

accustomed standard of living” of both parties in calculating 

the child support obligation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c); see 

Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. at 712, 268 S.E.2d at 189. The trial 

court found unchallenged that defendant did have an income, and 

the trial court must consider the relative abilities and 

financial circumstances of both parties; though plaintiff’s 

earnings and estate may be far greater than defendant’s, 

defendant’s circumstances must also be taken into account. See 
-30-

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c); Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. at 712, 

268 S.E.2d at 189.

But despite the need for findings with monetary amounts for 

incomes and expenses, we acknowledge that not all of the factors 

under North Carolina General Statute § 50-13.4(c) can be 

quantified. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c). The trial court 

is directed to take into account “the child care and homemaker 

contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular 

case[,]” in setting child support; id., these factors are less 

susceptible to descriptions in monetary terms. Particularly, in 

a case such as this, where plaintiff lives thousands of miles 

away and has no role at all in the child’s daily care and life, 

it is appropriate for the trial court to consider the fact that 

defendant bears 100% of the daily responsibilities of child care 

and making a home for the child. See id. Only defendant will

make the daily physical and emotional sacrifices required to 

raise a child. All the law requires of plaintiff is to make a 

monthly payment. If the trial court does consider defendant’s

non-monetary, but truly priceless, contributions, it should make 

findings of fact regarding those contributions so that its use 

of this factor may be reviewed on appeal. See Atwell, 74 N.C. 

App. at 234, 328 S.E.2d at 49.
-31-

D. Summary of Prospective Child Support

In summary, we reverse the trial court’s award for child 

support and remand for the trial court to make specific findings 

of fact, including plaintiff’s income stated in a monetary 

value, plaintiff’s ability to pay, the child’s reasonable needs

stated in a monetary value, and to make any further findings of 

fact or conclusions of law that would be necessary to set 

support obligations for both parties in a manner that would be 

reviewable by this Court.

IV. Attorney Fees

Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in 

awarding attorney fees to defendant. Plaintiff challenges the 

finding of facts supporting the award. 

A. Finding Regarding Refusal to Provide Support

In an action or proceeding for the 

custody or support, or both, of a minor 

child . . . the court may in its discretion 

order payment of reasonable attorney’s fees 

to an interested party acting in good faith 

who has insufficient means to defray the 

expense of the suit. Before ordering payment 

of a fee in a support action, the court must 

find as a fact that the party ordered to 

furnish support has refused to provide 

support which is adequate under the 

circumstances existing at the time of the 

institution of the action or proceeding[.]
-32-

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 (2011). “Whether these statutory 

requirements have been met is a question of law, reviewable on 

appeal. Only when these requirements have been met does the 

standard of review change to abuse of discretion for an 

examination of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded.” Simpson 

v. Simpson, 209 N.C. App. 320, 323, 703 S.E.2d 890, 892 (2011)

(citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff contends, 

[t]he trial court made no finding [he] 

“refused to provide support which is 

adequate under the circumstances existing at 

the time of the institution of the action or 

proceeding.” It is well established that in 

a child support, action, this finding is a 

necessary prerequisite to an award of 

attorneys’ fees. Hudson, 299 N.C. at 472-

73, 263 S.E.2d at 723-24.

Indeed, 

[b]efore a court may award fees in an action 

solely for child support, the court must 

make the required finding under the second 

sentence of the statute: that the party 

required to furnish adequate support failed 

to do so when the action was initiated. On 

the other hand, when the proceeding or 

action is for both custody and support, the 

court is not required to make that finding.

Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 296, 607 S.E.2d 678, 687 

(2005) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Plaintiff thus 

contends that his action was only an action for support. 
-33-

Plaintiff, citing Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 

S.E.2d 199 (1984), argues that “the mere fact a lawsuit includes 

claims for support and custody does not convert a proceeding 

into one for both custody and support where custody is not 

contested.” Plaintiff then directs our attention to the fact 

that both parties agreed from the outset of this case that 

defendant would have sole legal and physical custody of the 

child. However, Gibson states, 

the issue of custody had been settled in 

Hudson by a consent order entered twenty 

months prior to the order concerning the 

child support while here the issue of 

custody, though uncontested, was settled by 

the judgment of the court some five months 

prior to the entry of the child support 

judgment. What appears to be important, 

however, is not how the custody issue was 

settled or when but that it was settled and 

was not at issue when the judgment 

concerning support was entered.

Gibson, 68 N.C. App. at 574, 316 S.E.2d at 105 (emphasis added).

Here, the order being appealed from is entitled “ORDER (RE: 

PERMANENT CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT)[.]” Furthermore, 

unlike in Hudson and Gibson, see id., the order on appeal is the 

first and only order that grants legal and physical custody of 

the child to defendant. Although plaintiff and defendant may 

have believed and acted as though they had resolved the custody 

claims before entry of the order, custody was still at issue 
-34-

when the case was called for hearing and was not addressed by 

the trial court until its final order which also addresses child 

support. Custody was therefore “at issue when the judgment

concerning support was entered[;]” id., so this was an action 

for custody and support, and the trial court was not required to 

find that plaintiff had refused to provide prior support to the 

child. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6; Spicer, 168 N.C. App. at

296, 607 S.E.2d at 687.

B. Other Findings of Fact 

Lastly, plaintiff contends that “[t]he trial court’s 

findings of fact do not support the amount of its award of 

attorneys’ fees” because “the trial court made no findings as to 

the actual hours spent or what any of the three lawyers 

representing . . . [defendant] did or the time they spent on the 

case, or the reasonableness of the work or time spent” or 

defendant’s attorneys’ “skill or experience.” Plaintiff again 

also notes that the failure of the trial court to find his 

income meant it could not rightfully find he had the ability to 

pay the attorney fees. We disagree.

The trial court reviewed the attorney fee affidavits and 

found the fees to be “necessary and reasonable[;]” the trial 

court also made several findings of fact regarding defendant’s 
-35-

attorney fees including, the necessity and reasonableness of the 

fees, the attorney’s rate, that the rate is reasonable as 

compared to others with like experience and skill, the 

“reasonable rates” of others in the firm who assisted on the 

case, and the total amounts charged. We conclude that the trial 

court made sufficient findings of fact to support the award of 

attorney fees. 

Regarding plaintiff’s ability to pay the award of attorney 

fees, plaintiff has cited no authority requiring the trial court

to find he is able to pay defendant’s attorney fees. North 

Carolina General Statute § 50-13.6 provides in relevant part 

simply that

[i]n an action or proceeding for the 

custody or support, or both, of a minor 

child, including a motion in the cause for 

the modification or revocation of an 

existing order for custody or support, or 

both, of a minor child . . . the court may 

in its discretion order payment of 

reasonable attorney’s fees to an interested 

party acting in good faith who has 

insufficient means to defray the expense of 

the suit[;]

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6, the statute has no requirement that 

the trial court also find that the party being ordered to pay 

these fees have the ability to pay, and although some cases have 

mentioned an obligor’s ability to pay, we have found no 
-36-

requirement that a trial court make this finding of fact. North 

Carolina General Statute § 50-13.6 places this matter in the 

trial court’s discretion, see id., and plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate an abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s

attorney fee award.

C. Summary of Attorney Fees

In summary, we affirm the trial court’s award for attorney 

fees.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, for the award of retroactive child support, 

we reverse the award for nursery expenses and maternity clothes 

prior to the child’s birth because there is no legal basis for 

making such an award; we reverse the award for nursery expenses 

and basic needs after the birth because there was not sufficient 

evidence that such expenses were incurred prior to the filing of 

plaintiff’s complaint; and we reverse and remand the order as to 

the expenses for daycare, child care, and birth for the trial 

court to consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay during the time

for which reimbursement is sought and how these expenses should 

be apportioned between plaintiff and defendant. As to the 

award of prospective child support, we reverse the trial court’s 

award for child support and remand for the trial court to make 
-37-

specific findings of fact, including plaintiff’s income stated 

in a monetary value, plaintiff’s ability to pay, the child’s 

reasonable needs stated in a monetary value, and to make any 

further findings of fact or conclusions of law that would be 

necessary to set support obligations for both parties in a 

manner that would be reviewable by this Court. As to the award 

of attorney fees, we affirm.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

Judges MCGEE and BRYANT concur.