**UN PUBLISHED**  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 4753** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. BOBBIE JO BROWN , Defendant

- Appellant
.

**No. 13**  **- 4754** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. MITCHELL EDWARD GARVIN , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Abingdon
. James P. Jones , District Judge. ( 1:13

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- JPJ

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- 13 ; 1:13

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Submitted : July 29, 2014 Decided: August 7, 2014

Before GREGORY and FLOYD , Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge
.2 Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Casey Allen Sears, II , Johnson City, Tennessee ; Douglas L. Payne , LAW OFFICE OF DOUGLAS L. PAYNE , Green e ville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Timothy J. Heaphy, U nited S tates Attorney , Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee
. Unpublished opinions are not binding preceden t in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Bobbie Jo Brown and Mitchell Edward Garvin of multiple counts of passing false and fictitious checks with the intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) (2012), and conspiracy to pass false an d fictitious checks with the intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). On appeal, Brown and Garvin challenge their convictions, arguing that the Government did not meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they had the inten t to defraud. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal
. United States v. Strayhorn , 743 F.3d 917, 921 (4th Cir. ), cert. denied , 134 S. Ct. 2689 (2014)
. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, w e determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government. Id. “ Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ” United States v. Jaensch , 665 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)
. The test is whether “ any rational trier of f act could have found the essential elemen ts beyond a reasonable doubt. ” United States v.4 Madrigal

- Valadez , 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
. We consider “ the complete picture ” created by the evid ence, United States v. Burgos , 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), including both circumstantial and direct evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from such eviden ce in the Government’s favor. United States v. Harvey , 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). If the evidence supports different interpretations, the jury decides whi ch interpretation to believe, and we “may not overturn a substantially supported verdict merely because [we] find[] the verdict unpalatable or determine [] that another, reasonable verdict wou ld be preferable.” Burgos , 94 F.3d at 862. Rather , “[a] defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge must overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for insufficiency must be confined to cases where the pros ecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Engle , 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied , 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012). To sustain convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and § 514(a)(2), the g overnment must prove, among other elements, that the defendant had th e intent to defraud when cashing the false or fictitious instrument
. See 18 U.S.C. § 514(a) (“Whoever, with the intent to defraud . . . .”); Ingram v. United States , 3 60 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (“ Conspiracy to commit a5 particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.” (inter nal quotation marks omitted)). Like other facts, “[f]raudulent intent may be inferred fr om the totality of the circumstances and need not be prove n by direct evidence.” United States v. Ham , 998 F.2d 1247 , 1254 (4th Cir. 1993). Moreover, u nder th e doctrine of willful blindness, knowledge may be inferred where a defendant delibe rately avoids enlightenment. United States v. Campbell , 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992). Here, although there was no direct evidence that Appellants had the intent to defraud, we conclude that the circumstances surrounding the check

- cashing scheme were suspicious en ough to alert even the most unsophisticated individual to the fraudulent nature of the scheme. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Appellants took very few actions to ascertain the validity of the checks even when the transpiring events gave them reasons to suspect that the checks were not legitimate . Finally, Brown testified that she was generally wary of requests to cash monetary instruments but cashed the checks nevertheless, having only the bald assertion from someone she barely knew that they were l egitimate. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Appellants “subjectively believe[d] that there [was] a high probability that” the checks were not valid and that they took “deliberate actions to avoid learning” that6 they were in fact invalid. Global

- T ech Appliances, Inc. V. SEB
S.A. , 131 S. Ct. 2060 , 2070 (2011)
. Accordingly, we conclude that the Government met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants had the intent to defraud , and we affirm the district court’s judgments. We disp ense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. AFFIRMED