August 27, 2007 

Mr. David Staudt 

Center for Disease Control and Prevention 

Acquisition and Assistance Field Branch 

Post Office Box 18070 

626 Cochrans Mill Road – B-140 

Pittsburgh, PA 15236-0295 

Re: Contract No. 200-2004-03805, Task Order 1: Transmittal of Draft SCA-TR-TASK1-0018, 

Revision 1: Privacy Act-cleared version of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site 

Profile Review 

Dear Mr. Staudt: 

SC&A, Inc., is please to submit Revision 1 of a draft report titled, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory Site Profile Review, SCA-TR-TASK1-0018. Revision 0 of this report was forwarded 

to you on July 23, 2007, pending review for Privacy Act (PA) information. The document has 

now been revised in accordance with that review and has been cleared for distribution. Please 

note, however, that this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory 

Board for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 

Should you have any questions, please contact me at 732-530-0104. 

Sincerely, 

John Mauro, PhD, CHP 

1608 SPRING HILL ROAD, SUITE 400 • VIENNA, VIRGINIA • 22182 • 703.893.6600 • FAX 703.821.8236 

Project Manager 

cc: P. Ziemer, PhD, Board Chairperson A. Makhijani, PhD, SC&A 

Advisory Board Members H. Behling, PhD, MHP, SC&A 

L. Wade, PhD, NIOSH M. Thorne, SC&A 

L. Elliott, NIOSH H. Chmelynski, SC&A 

J. Neton, PhD, NIOSH J. Fitzgerald, Saliant 

S. Hinnefeld, NIOSH J. Lipsztein, SC&A 

L. Homoki-Titus, NIOSH K. Robertson-DeMers, CHP, Saliant 

A. Brand, NIOSH S. Ostrow, PhD, SC&A 

J. Broehm, NIOSH K. Behling, SC&A 

L. Shields, NIOSH T. Bell, Saliant 

Project File (ANIOS/001/18) 
Draft 

ADVISORY BOARD ON 

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site Profile Review 

Contract No. 200-2004-03805 

Task Order No. 1 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018, Revision 1
 

Prepared by 

S. Cohen & Associates 

1608 Spring Hill Road, Suite 400 

Vienna, Virginia 22182 

Saliant, Inc.
 

5579 Catholic Church Road 

Jefferson, Maryland 21755
 

August 2007 

Disclaimer 

This document is made available in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Advisory Board 

on Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) to maintain all possible openness in its 

deliberations. However, the ABRWH and its contractor, SC&A, caution the reader that at the 

time of its release, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Board for 

factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. This implies that once 

reviewed by the ABRWH, the Board’s position may differ from the report’s conclusions. Thus, 

the reader should be cautioned that this report is for information only and that premature 

interpretations regarding its conclusions are unwarranted. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

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S. Cohen & Associates: Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Technical Support for the Advisory Board on 

Radiation & Worker Health Review of 

Effective Date: 

Draft — August 27, 2007 

NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Program Revision No. 

1 – PA-Cleared Draft 

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL 

LABORATORY SITE PROFILE REVIEW 

Page 1 of 168 

Task Manager: 

________________________ Date: ___________ 

Joseph Fitzgerald 

Supersedes: 

0 

Project Manager: 

________________________ Date: ___________ 

John Mauro 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Acronyms and Abbreviations ..........................................................................................................5 

1.0 Executive Summary.............................................................................................................9 

1.1 Summary of Findings.............................................................................................14 

1.2 Opportunities for Improvement .............................................................................19 

2.0 Scope and Introduction ......................................................................................................22 

2.1 Review Scope.........................................................................................................22 

2.2 Review Approach...................................................................................................24 

2.3 Report Organization...............................................................................................25 

3.0 Assessment Criteria and Methods......................................................................................27 

3.1 Objectives ..............................................................................................................27 

3.1.1 Objective 1: Completeness of Data Sources.............................................27 

3.1.2 Objective 2: Technical Accuracy..............................................................27 

3.1.3 Objective 3: Adequacy of Data.................................................................28 

3.1.4 Objective 4: Consistency among Site Profiles..........................................28 

3.1.5 Objective 5: Regulatory Compliance........................................................28 

4.0 Site Profile Strengths .........................................................................................................32 

5.0 Vertical Issues....................................................................................................................33 

5.1 Dose Estimation for LLNL Personnel Assigned to Weapons Testing has not 

been Adequately Considered .................................................................................33 

5.2 Inadequate Consideration has been given in the Site Profile to Potential 

Exposure Received at Site 300 ..............................................................................37 

5.3 Completeness and Accuracy of the Data used in Dose Reconstruction is 

Lacking in the Internal Dose TBD.........................................................................40 

5.4 Inadequate Consideration has been given in the TBD to Potential Exposure 

and Missed Dose from Secondary Radionuclides .................................................43 

5.5 The TBD Provides No Guidance on Bioassay Data for Intakes of Tritium, 

Metal Tritides, or Organically Bound Tritium.......................................................44 

5.6 The TBD Does not Identify Possible Chemical Forms of Airborne 

Radonuclides to which Workers have been Exposed ............................................46 

5.7 The Internal Dose TBD has not Adequately Identified and Reviewed 

Applicable Bioassay Frequencies and Detection Levels .......................................48 

5.8 An Approach for Determining Internal Dose for Unmonitored or 

Inadequately Monitored Workers does not address Plutonium, Tritium, or 

Other Radionuclides...............................................................................................49 

5.9 Specific Guidance is Lacking for Intake and Dose Assessment............................52 

5.10 External Dose Records are Inadequately Characterized........................................53 

5.10.1 1952–Present..............................................................................................53 

5.10.2 1952–1957..................................................................................................54 

5.11 Inadequacies Exist in How Dose of Record is Compared with Worker’s 

Actual Dose; Insufficient Basis Provided for Neutron Dose Estimation...............55 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

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Effective Date: 

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5.11.1 Photon dose................................................................................................56 

5.11.2 Neutron dose ..............................................................................................56 

5.12 Lack of Valid External Dose Coworker Approach Hinders Adequate Dose 

Estimation for Early Unmonitored Workers..........................................................59 

5.13 Secondary Issues....................................................................................................60 

5.13.1 The Occupational Internal Dose TBD Lacks Information on 

Incidents that Could Cause Significant Intakes or External Dose .............60 

5.13.2 Occupational Medical X-rays Incompletely Characterized for Dose 

Estimation ..................................................................................................61 

5.13.3 Beam Quality, Filtration, and X-ray Tube Output are not Well 

Known........................................................................................................64 

5.13.4 Reliance on ICRP Publication 34 for Applicable DCFs May 

Underestimate Dose ...................................................................................66 

5.13.5 Lack of Maintenance, Collimation, and X-ray Protocol Data 

Increase Uncertainty ..................................................................................67 

5.13.6 Gaps Exist in the Occupational Environmental Dose TBD.......................69 

6.0 Overall Adequacy of the Site Profile as a Basis for Dose Reconstruction ........................77 

6.1 Satisfying the Five Objectives ...............................................................................77 

6.1.1 Objective 1: Completeness of Data Sources.............................................77 

6.1.2 Objective 2: Technical Accuracy..............................................................78 

6.1.3 Objective 3: Adequacy of Data.................................................................79 

6.1.4 Objective 4: Consistency among Site Profiles..........................................81 

6.1.5 Objective 5: Regulatory Compliance........................................................84 

6.2 Usability of Site Profile for Intended Purposes .....................................................84 

6.2.1 Ambiguous Dose Reconstruction Direction ..............................................85 

6.2.2 Inconsistencies and Editorial Errors in the Site Profiles............................85 

6.3 Unresolved Policy or Generic Technical Issues ....................................................86 

References......................................................................................................................................88 

Attachment 1: NIOSH Technical Documents Considered During the Review Process...............99 

Attachment 2: Site Expert Interview Summary..........................................................................102 

Attachment 3: Key Questions and Responses for NIOSH/ORAU Regarding Site Profile 

Documents .......................................................................................................................125 

Attachment 4: LLNL-Sponsored Atmospheric and Underwater Testing...................................152 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

Advisory Board Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 

AEC Atomic Energy Commission 

AERIN LLNL Dosimetry Model for Heavy Metals 

ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable 

Anti-Cs Anti-Contamination Clothing 

AP Anterior-Posterior 

AVLIS Atomic Vapor Laser Separation 

CAMs Continuous Air Monitors 

CDC Centers for Disease Control 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

Ci Curies 

CP Control Point 

CP1 Central Control Point 

CR-39 Canadian Resin Number 39, a polycarbonate material used for neutron 

dosimetry 

D-38 Depleted Uranium 

DAC Derived Air Concentration 

DCF Dose Conversion Factor 

D&D Decontamination and Decommissioning 

DOE Department of Energy 

DNA Defense Nuclear Agency 

DOD U.S. Department of Defense 

DR Dose Reconstruction or Dose Reconstructor 

DU Depleted Uranium 

dpm Disintegrations per Minute 

EEOICPA Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 

EDE Effective Dose Equivalent 

EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

ESE Entrance Skin Exposure 

DTPA Diethylenetriamine Pentaacetate 

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FDA Food and Drug Administration 

GM Geometric Mean 

GSD Geometric Standard Deviation 

GZ Ground Zero 

H&S Health and Safety 

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air Filters 

HP Health Physics 

HT Tritium Gas 

HTO Tritiated Water 

HVL Half Value Layer 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection 

IMBA Integrated Modules for Bioassay Analysis 

INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 

ISMS Integrated Safety Management 

IREP Interactive RadioEpidemiological Program 

keV Kilo electron Volt 

kVp Kilovolts-Peak 

kg Kilogram 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LAT Lateral 

LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 

LiDT Lithium Deuterium Tritide 

LiT Lithium Tritide 

LINAC Linear Accelerator 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

LPTR Livermore Pool-Type Reactor 

LRL Lawrence Radiation Laboratory 

mA Milliampere 

MAA Material Accountability Area 

MAPPER LLNL Dosimetry Database 

MCW Mallinckrodt Chemical Works 

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MDA Minimum Detectable Activity 

MDC Minimum Detectable Concentration 

MDL Minimum Detectable Dose 

MeV Million-Electron Volt 

MFP Mixed Fission Products 

mR Milliroentgen 

MT Metal Tritides 

MVA Material Vault Area 

MW Megawatt 

NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

n/p Neutron-to-Photon Ratio 

NPL National Priority List 

NTA Eastman Kodak Nuclear Track Film Type A 

NTED Nuclear Test Engineering Division 

NTEE Nuclear Test Electronics Engineering 

NTS Nevada Test Site 

NVOO Nevada Operations Office 

OBT Organically Bound Tritium 

OCAS Office of Compensation Analysis and Support 

OSPs Operational Safety Procedures 

ORAUT Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team 

OTIB ORAU Technical Information Bulletin 

PA Posterior-Anterior 

pCi Picocuries 

PFG Photofluorography 

POC Probability of Causation 

PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

PPG Pacific Proving Grounds 

PROC Procedure 

PSO Protective Service Officer 

R&D Research and Development 

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REECo Reynolds Engineering and Electrical Company 

RFP Rocky Flats Plant 

RTNS Rotating Target Neutron Source 

SAT Space Action Team 

SC&A S. Cohen and Associates 

SEC Special Exposure Cohort 

SID Source-to-Image-Distance 

SFCP Spent Fuel Climax Project 

SNL Sandia National Laboratory 

SNLL Sandia National Laboratory – Livermore 

SNM Special Nuclear Material 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

SRS Savannah River Site 

SSD Source-to-Skin-Distance 

STCs Special Tritium Compounds 

TBD Technical Basis Document 

TIB NIOSH Technical Information Bulletin 

TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter 

TPSS Two-Person Security System 

USC United States Code 

WB Whole Body 

WBC Whole-Body Count 

Y-12 Plant Y-12 National Security Complex 

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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This report provides the results of an independent audit conducted by S. Cohen and Associates 

(SC&A, Inc.) of the technical basis documents (TBDs) that make up the site profile for the 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) developed by the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). This audit was conducted during the period of 

October 5, 2006–June 30, 2007, in support of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health (Advisory Board) in the latter’s statutory responsibility under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA) to conduct such reviews 

and advise the Secretary of Health and Human Services on the “completeness and adequacy” of 

the EEOICPA program. 

The LLNL was established in 1952 to meet the scientific challenges behind advancing nuclear 

weapons design and development. It was sited at a former naval air station outside of Livermore, 

California, and has been managed ever since by the University of California (albeit, that 

responsibility will be shared with other contractors pursuant to a recently announced operating 

contract award). The original nuclear weapons development mission has expanded over the 

years to encompass a diverse set of scientific engineering research activities. These include the 

following (DOE 1992): 

• Research, development, and testing of the nuclear weapons life cycle and 

related tasks 

• Strategic defense research emphasizing kinetic- and directed-energy weapons 

• Arms control and treaty verification technology 

• Inertial confinement fusion for weapons physics research and for civilian 

energy applications 

• Atomic vapor laser isotope separation for defense and commercial 

applications 

• Magnetic fusion, including leadership of the U.S. effort on the International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 

• Other energy research in basic energy sciences, atmospheric sciences, fossil 

energy, and commercial nuclear waste 

• Biological, ecological, atmospheric, and geophysical sciences relevant to 

weapons, energy, health, and environmental issues, including assessment and 

guidance in the event of accidents and other emergencies 

• Charged-particle beam and free-electron laser research for defense and 

energy applications 

• Advanced laser and optical technology for military and civilian applications 

• Support of the U.S. intelligence community, the U.S. Department of Defense, 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other Federal agencies 

• Participation in the nationally directed initiative to understand the human 

genome at the molecular level (Maisler 2005b, pp. 7–8) 

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Site 300 at the LLNL is a 7,000-acre area established nearby in Tracy in 1955 to provide 

information essential to the physical and chemical characteristics of high explosives. These tests 

are commonly referred to as hydrodynamics tests. The radionuclides involved in hydrodynamics 

testing included depleted uranium (DU), thorium, tritium, and, at times, other radionuclides (e.g., 

Po-210, enriched uranium). Initially, hundreds of experiments were required for the 

development of a weapon; however, this decreased over time as scientists developed processes 

for this testing (Wagner and Diaconoff 1974). The Explosives Process Area was used to press, 

mill, machine, and assemble parts for testing. In addition, parts were evaluated for 

environmental effects by twisting, stretching, compressing, shaking, bumping, heating, chilling, 

corroding, and irradiating the parts and materials. The area housed a flash x-ray accelerator 

facility, several fixed and portable x-ray units, radiographic sources, and a Linear Accelerator 

(LINAC) to radiograph components (Batzel 1976a, Wagner and Diaconoff 1974, LLL no date). 

The Laboratory has also been actively involved in supporting nuclear testing activities at the 

Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG), and other test locations where 

LLNL sponsored atmospheric, underwater, and underground nuclear weapons testing of their 

weapons designs, supported other laboratories conducting tests, conducted safety shots, and 

performed subcritical experiments. These tests started in 1953 and continued until the end of 

weapons testing in 1992, involving a large number of LLNL staff members who were present at 

these test areas before, during, and following nuclear detonations. 

SC&A’s review focused on the six TBDs that make up the LLNL site profile and applicable 

technical information bulletins (TIBs). These address Introduction, Site Description, Internal 

Dose, External Dose, Occupational Medical Dose, and Occupational Environmental Dose, as 

they pertain to historic occupational radiation exposure of LLNL workers. These TBDs were 

originally issued in 2005, but five of the six are currently under revision. The Occupational 

External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) was updated in April 2007. As “living” 

documents, TBDs are constantly being revised as new information, experience, or issues arise. 

For the LLNL Site Profile in particular, interviews with NIOSH and the Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities Team (ORAUT) underscored their ongoing and extensive efforts to upgrade the 

existing TBDs. 

SC&A’s process included a review of the TBDs; a site visit to conduct limited site expert 

interviews, and identification and retrieval of documents (unclassified and classified); follow-up 

telephone and e-mail correspondence with site experts; and an exchange of questions and 

answers between SC&A and NIOSH. The TBDs were evaluated for their completeness, 

technical accuracy, adequacy of data, compliance with stated objectives, and consistency with 

other site profiles, as stipulated in the SC&A Standard Operating Procedure for Performing Site 

Profile Reviews (SC&A 2004). A complete list of the LLNL TBDs and other supporting 

documents that were reviewed by SC&A is provided in Attachment 1. 

SC&A found that the site profile does not address occupational radiation sources beyond the 

more established and well documented ones, which is problematic given the tremendous 

diversity and radiological significance of many of these “other” radionuclides, as well as the 

steadily evolving nature of radiological controls, dosimetry practices, and recordkeeping at the 

site from the late 1950s through the 1960s and into the 1970s that may have contributed to 

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information gaps critical to dose estimation. The two major oversights identified were (1) lack 

of dose estimation characterization and guidance for LLNL personnel involved in weapons 

testing, and (2) inadequate information relating to potential radiological sources and exposure at 

Site 300. The site profile TBDs provide no explanation for how dose reconstructions will be 

handled in cases where dose reconstruction cannot be done, as previously identified by NIOSH 

in other technical documents. Technical Information Bulletins (TIBs) and procedures (PROCs) 

have recently been developed, to provide additional dose reconstruction guidelines, particularly 

OTIB-0065 (ORAUT 2007e), which provides dosimetry coworker data dose reconstruction 

guidelines for unmonitored or inadequately monitored LLNL workers exposed to uranium. 

Future revisions to the LLNL TBDs should refer the dose reconstructors to these guidelines and 

discuss their site-specific application. 

Internal monitoring information (bioassay, air monitoring, and radiological contamination 

characterization data) available for dose reconstruction, especially for those involved in testing 

and special projects, is limited, inadequate, or, in some cases, not available. While NIOSH has 

developed general guidance that may help address these problems for some of the internal dose 

reconstruction [e.g., OTIB-0002 (ORAUT 2007d), OTIB-0014 (ORAUT 2004a), OTIB-0018 

(ORAUT 2005e), and OTIB-0033 (ORAUT 2005c)], no discussion is included in the TBDs 

regarding how these could be applied to LLNL. Again, this should be considered for inclusion in 

a future version. 

There are major issues with verifying the accuracy and usefulness of the data in the bioassay 

electronic database (MAPPER). Bioassay data is not available prior to 1956 for gross alpha and 

1957 for gross beta. There is limited bioassay data in the database for tritium, I-131, thorium, 

and other radionuclides handled at LLNL. The LLNL staff has indicated that some bioassays 

cannot be confidently associated with a specific person. The ambiguities in some analytes 

reported were that large negative results are included for later periods, and letters in the sample 

type column do not always indicate whether the sample was urine or fecal. Sample volume and 

mass must also be interpreted carefully. There are many inconsistencies noted in the way the 

MAPPER data are used to determine an individual worker’s dose. The use of this data for the 

internal dose coworker model is suspect and needs to be evaluated. The existence of bioassay 

results with what SC&A found to be classified datasets likewise leads to questions regarding the 

adequacy of information currently being provided in the claimant files. 

The Site Description (Maisler 2005b) and Internal Dosimetry TBDs (Berger and Szalinski 2005) 

do not give adequate guidance on assessment of all potentially important radionuclides 

encompassed by the recognized radiological source terms. The TBDs identify a large number of 

historically used radionuclides by building; however, they do not provide guidance on how to 

interpret bioassay data with results in gross alpha and gross beta activities that clearly encompass 

a wide range of the identified radionuclides. Radium, radon, and corresponding decay products 

are not covered in the internal dose guidance in any detail, although it is identified as a major 

component in the Tank Farm source term. Guidance on assessing intakes of Sr-90 and 

accelerator gaseous activation products, such as N-13 and O-15, is not provided, although there 

are indications that these make up significant sources at the site. There is no discussion on the 

contamination levels (air and surface contamination) that could have been involved with 

exposures at the site. Radiological controls such as source containment, air monitoring data, 

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respiratory protection usage, and surface contamination monitoring, and the changes in these as 

the site progressed, are not covered in the TBDs. 

There is a lack of site-specific guidance on determining parameters to be used in calculating 

internal doses, including guidance to assess internal doses from special forms of tritium [metal 

tritides (MTs) and organically bound tritium] and high-fired plutonium that may have been used 

at the site. SC&A acknowledges, however, that generic guidance has been issued for these two 

issues since the issuance of the LLNL TBDs (i.e., OTIB-0066 (ORAUT 2007g) for tritium 

compounds, and OTIB-0049 (ORAUT 2007b) for high-fired plutonium. These generic guidance 

documents discuss methods on adjusting dose; however, no discussion is provided in the TBDs 

on where and when to identify these forms, and when they may be involved in a claimant’s 

exposure. With no mention in the TBDs, it could be incorrectly construed that these source 

terms do not exist at the site. 

The Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) provided some general 

information concerning external doses, and an overall view of dosimetry at the LLNL during the 

years 1952–present; however, it is seriously lacking in detail and LLNL site-specific 

information. The TBD relies extensively on other generic documents applicable to the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE)-wide complex, and does not develop the data and issues 

specifically related to the conditions at the LLNL, Site 300, and other locations where LLNL 

workers were exposed. The TBD does not make sufficient use of the material and data 

developed by LLNL researchers; many of these noted authors have published numerous articles 

concerning radiation fields and dosimetry at LLNL. 

The TBD lacks details concerning badging policies that are needed to determine the adequacy of 

the recorded doses, for both beta/photon and neutron radiation. The methods used to select 

workers for badging affect both the validity of the recorded data for monitored workers and its 

use in coworker models for unmonitored workers. It does not contain any dose data analysis, 

such as dose readings by year, corrections to dosimetry readings, number of readings and range 

of doses per year, etc., that is necessary to assess the adequacy of the dose records. The TBD 

also does not provide sufficient dosimetry information and radiation field characterization to 

evaluate the accuracy of the recorded doses. Some details concerning the calibration, response 

functions, mixed-fields, and other pertinent dosimetry parameters during the history of LLNL are 

needed. 

Neutron dose information and data is especially lacking in the External Dose TBD. Because of 

the known shortcomings of Eastman Kodak Nuclear Track Film Type A (NTA) film for 

determination of neutron dose during the time period 1952–1969, the TBD recommends using 

the neutron-to-photon ratio (n/p) method to determine neutron doses. After a very brief 

discussion of the lack of neutron flux information at LLNL, it recommends using an n/p value of 

1.0 derived from a Savannah River Site (SRS) study (part of which was taken from a Hanford 

study). There are no comparative studies, or technical investigations, provided to support using 

one n/p value derived from another site to cover the time period 1952–1969 for all operations at 

LLNL. 

The in-depth development of important areas necessary to evaluate the adequacy of monitoring, 

dosimetry response, dose records, and other related issues is not available in the present TBD. 

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Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

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This lack of detail is inconsistent with other site profile external dose TBDs, and the present 

External Dose TBD would require extensive revision to meet the needs of dose reconstruction. 

The LLNL Occupational Medical TBD does not acknowledge and address the issue that little 

documentation exists to validate x-ray protocols and equipment maintenance and upkeep records 

prior to 1960, which can contribute greatly to the dose to the chest and other organs. There is no 

other information presented on such aspects as screens used, grids, film types, and changes in 

developing parameters. The dose conversion factors (DCFs) are derived from the International 

Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 34 (ICRP 1982) and are not 

comparable, therefore, in terms of beam quality, which would vary from unit to unit. Dose 

estimations derived from ICRP 1982 and the National Council on Radiation Protection and 

Measurements (NCRP) Report 102 (NCRP 1989) would not be reflective of actual equipment 

and protocols in use at LLNL during 1952–1960. The TBD does little to reasonably document 

the variety of medical occupational exposures and type of routine maintenance performed on the 

x-ray units up until 1960. 

With respect to potential use of photofluorography (PFG) units at LLNL, SC&A believes a 

random sampling of only seven individual medical records to be insufficient to rule out PFG use 

at LLNL. The TBD provides no substantive documentation that PFG units were not used at that 

site from 1952–1960. 

The LLNL Occupational Environmental TBD is incomplete, in that no method for assignment of 

internal dose from environmental sources for alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides is available 

prior to 1961, and for tritium prior to 1972. Both materials were handled prior to the periods 

above. The radionuclides of concern in the TBD do not encompass radionuclides handled, 

particularly at Site 300. In addition, potential exposure from resuspension of soil is not included 

in the TBD. 

Consideration of classified records should be included during subsequent revisions to the TBD. 

(Such consideration is not apparent in the current site profile). Information relevant to the site 

description, external monitoring, internal monitoring, and environmental data are contained in 

these records. General types of information include information on plutonium, tritium, and 

transuranium element handling. More detailed descriptions are available for the Atomic Vapor 

Laser Separation (AVLIS) program, Site 300 operations, and weapons testing. Also included in 

the records set is information on radiological incidents (LLNL 2006). 

Issues presented in this report are sorted into the following categories, in accordance with 

SC&A’s review procedures: 

(1) Completeness of Data Sources 

(2) Technical Accuracy 

(3) Adequacy of Data 

(4) Consistency among Site Profiles 

(5) Regulatory Compliance 

Following the introduction and a description of the criteria and methods employed to perform the 

review, the report discusses the strengths of the TBD, followed by a description of the major 

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issues identified during our review. The issues were carefully reviewed with respect to the five 

review criteria. Several of the issues were designated as primary findings, because they 

represent key deficiencies in the TBDs that need to be corrected, and which have the potential to 

substantially impact at least some dose reconstructions. Others have been designated “secondary 

findings” to connote their importance for the technical adequacy and completeness of the site 

profile, and also to indicate that they have been judged by SC&A to have relatively less 

influence on dose reconstruction or the ultimate significance of the worker doses estimated. 

1.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 

Finding 1: Dose estimation for LLNL personnel assigned to weapons testing has not been 

adequately considered. Exposure conditions related to LLNL personnel participation in 

weapons and safety testing, and subcritical or reactor experiments have not been considered in 

the LLNL site profile. This involves numerous LLNL-sponsored nuclear weapons tests, 

including atmospheric, underwater, and underground testing in the U.S. and at PPG. Hundreds 

of personnel were involved in weapons testing and the Plowshare program. The significance and 

potential dose contribution due to LLNL personnel participation in testing has not been 

considered in the site profile, which is of particular concern for those test sites without existing 

TBDs (e.g., Amchitka, Hattiesburg, PPG, etc.). NTS eventually became the repository for the 

PPG and NTS dosimetry results; however, dose records or evidence that they have been 

requested is not available for all claimants. There is no apparent explanation provided for the 

benefit of the dose reconstructor on when and how doses from testing should be considered. 

Scientists and support personnel were responsible for re-entries to collect diagnostic equipment, 

cloud sampling after atmospheric tests, and processing of core and air filter samples. They 

worked side by side with workers in Alaska, at the NTS during atmospheric testing, and at PPG 

during underwater and atmospheric testing. NIOSH has identified problems with dose 

reconstruction for both NTS and PPG. The TBD does not provide background information and 

guidance on how to assess potential missed dose for exposure during weapons tests, 

subcriticality test shots and experiments, and the Plowshare program at testing sites across the 

United States. There is no information on how dose reconstruction issues previously identified 

at the testing sites (e.g., from past respective site profile and Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) 

reviews) will be addressed. 

Finding 2: Inadequate consideration has been given in the site profile to potential exposure 

received at Site 300. The site profile is incomplete in its description of activities occurring at 

Site 300 and the potential radiological exposure conditions associated with these activities. 

Minimal dose reconstruction guidance is provided for internal and environmental occupational 

dose. The assumption of semi-annual bioassay monitoring is in conflict with information 

provided by former Site 300 employees and, in some cases, results available in dosimetry files 

and electronic dosimetry databases. The LLNL Site Profile indicates that the sources of 

radiation exposure at Site 300 include accelerators, DU, activation products from accelerators, 

tritium, and radiography sources when in use. Batzel (1976b) indicated that the guidelines 

allowed for experiments with natural uranium, DU, natural thorium, tritium, and beryllium. 

Sewell (1959) specifically authorized the thorium hydrodynamics program at Site 300 in 1959. 

No method for assessment of environmental dose from alpha emitters and tritium is available 

prior to 1961 and 1972, respectively. Potential extremity exposures may have occurred during 

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hand contact with thorium and thorium alloy. An evaluation of non-hydroshot activities at 

Site 300 is minimally covered in the TBD, although workers were potentially exposed as a part 

of these activities. Further evaluation of the implemented monitoring for this area and its 

adequacy for the radionuclides involved in tests is necessary. Varying levels of personal 

protective equipment (PPE) were worn and bioassay was not routine, according to employees 

interviewed. In some cases, no protective clothing and/or respirators were used, and it is 

important to establish when this occurred. The work activities at the site appear to have had the 

potential for internal exposure, with some doubt that any bioassays were taken for monitoring 

such exposure. 

Finding 3: Completeness, accuracy, and availability of data used in dose reconstruction, 

and as a basis for the internal coworker approach, not adequately addressed in the TBD. 

Information available for dose reconstruction, especially for those involved in testing and special 

projects, is limited, inadequate, and sometimes not available. There are major issues with 

verifying the accuracy and usefulness of the data in MAPPER used for the coworker internal 

dose assessment method. Regarding the MAPPER database, LLNL staff members have 

indicated that some bioassays cannot be confidently associated with a specific person, and there 

are ambiguities in some analytes reported. These LLNL staff members indicated that large 

negative results are included for later periods, letters in the sample type column do not always 

indicate whether the sample was urine or fecal, and overall, that sample volume and mass must 

be interpreted carefully. There is very little discussion in the TBD about the quality of the earlier 

data (1950s–1960s). With the inconsistencies inherent in MAPPER, the use of these data for the 

internal dose coworker model is suspect and needs to be evaluated. During SC&A’s review of 

classified documents, additional bioassay results were discovered that lead to questions regarding 

the adequacy of information currently being provided in the claimant files. These additional 

bioassay results found in classified records, not available for the dose reconstructor’s use, could 

have an important effect on dose reconstruction of the individual claimant’s dose. In light of 

these shortcomings, the verification process for determining the completeness and consistency of 

the internal dosimetry information provided in hard copy to dose reconstructors by the site needs 

to be addressed. 

Finding 4: The Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) has given 

inadequate consideration for the impact to worker dose from secondary radionuclides. 

Numerous radionuclides were handled at LLNL, ranging from microcurie to curie quantities. 

These have included radium, Th-228, Th-232, Am-241, U-233, Cm-244, C-252, Pu-238, C-14, 

Na-22, P-32, S-35, I-125, I-131, Sr-90, N-13, and O-15, along with other fission products and 

activation products. Much of the bioassay data in the database are identified as “gross alpha” 

and “gross beta” results, and NIOSH has not identified which, if any, of these secondary 

radionuclides may be associated with these data. NIOSH has commented that the next revision 

of the Internal Dose TBD will contain guidance on the interpretation of gross alpha, gross beta, 

and fission product bioassay results. NIOSH needs to determine if there are potential exposures 

to these radionuclides that cannot be reconstructed accurately, due to inadequacies with the 

available radionuclide-specific information. These may be similar to the inadequacies cited in 

NIOSH’s SEC evaluation report for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (NIOSH 2007). 

Radium is not identified (DOE 2004) as being used in any buildings or projects to a great extent; 

however, there is evidence that it may have been present at the site in some abundance. 

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Exposure to a number of these radionuclides was not given adequate or, in some cases, any 

consideration in the internal dosimetry TBD, although some are listed as facility-specific 

radionuclides handled in particular technical areas. 

Finding 5: There is limited guidance on the interpretation of bioassay data for intakes of 

tritium, metal tritides, or organically bound tritium. While OTIB-0066 (ORAUT 2007g) 

was issued while the SC&A review was underway, and provided generic guidance on the 

calculation of dose from intakes of special tritium compounds, it only partially addresses some of 

the issues discussed below. According to the Site Description TBD (ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2), 

Building 331 (Hydrogen/Tritium Research Facility) had the bulk of the tritium inventory in 

elemental form or metal hydrides. Metal hydrides of tritium are special chemical forms for 

tritium, and are also called metal tritides (MT). These MTs are somewhat insoluble forms of 

tritium compounds (Inkret et al. 1999, Cheng et al. 1997) that do not exhibit similar biokinetic 

behavior to the more common forms of tritium, such as tritiated water (HTO) or elemental 

tritium. Tritium from MTs does not enter the systemic compartment as quickly as HTO after 

inhalation and, therefore, the interpretation of tritium urine bioassay data cannot be treated with 

standard tritium excretion models (McConville and Woods 1995). Due to being relatively 

insoluble, inhaled MTs deliver the highest component of dose contribution to the lungs. Tritium 

from these particles also can convert to organically bound tritium forms (OBTs) from contact 

with lung tissue and further complicate the metabolic process (DOE 2004). OBTs were not 

discussed in the TBD. It has been determined that OBTs cause a significantly larger dose than 

tritium, more routinely found in the form of tritiated water (HTO) (DOE 2004). Not addressing 

MTs or OBTs could lead to underestimating doses. Bounding techniques proposed in OTIB0066 (ORAUT 2007g) cannot be effectively developed and applied without some basic 

understanding of the compounds handled and the extent to which individuals were exposed. 

Finding 6: The Internal Dose TBD does not identify the possible chemical forms of the 

airborne radionuclides to which workers are exposed. The TBD is lacking information that 

allows for the identification of the possible chemical forms of the airborne radionuclides to 

which workers could have been exposed. This is needed in order to give guidance on the 

solubility (absorption) class to use (F, M, or S) for inhalation and intake dose assessment. The 

Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) states, “Other variables such as 

particle sizes and clearance classes can be readily reconstructed from historical records.” No 

specific references are made to these historical records. There is no discussion on the potential 

for exposures to very insoluble and slowly absorbed high-fired plutonium. NIOSH has recently 

issued OTIB-0049 (ORAUT 2007b), which provides some assistance to the dose reconstructor 

with respect to high-fired plutonium; however, the LLNL TBDs do not identify the potential for 

this existing at the site. 

Finding 7: The Internal Dose TBD has not adequately identified and reviewed applicable 

bioassay frequencies and detection levels. In many cases, the information given for bioassay 

frequencies and detection levels is not useful, because of inaccuracy or lack of information. In 

the table showing bioassay frequencies, several in-vitro bioassays lack identification of 

radionuclides analyzed, and the frequency of whole-body counts (WBCs) for a period is missing. 

In addition, the table showing bioassay detection levels include values for in-vitro bioassay that 

disagree with historical site documents. Doses may not be calculated accurately without this 

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information, and may not be claimant favorable. While the collective origins of these apparent 

discrepancies are not clear, more complete and validated information should be made available 

to dose reconstructors. 

Finding 8: No approaches are provided for determining the internal doses to workers that 

were unmonitored or inadequately monitored for plutonium, tritium, or other 

radionuclides. The Internal Dosimetry Coworker Data for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, OTIB-0065 (ORAUT 2007e), provides an approach for determining internal dose 

only for uranium intakes by unmonitored or inadequately monitored workers, but does not 

address plutonium, tritium, or other radionuclides. This includes workers that were exposed to 

radionuclides prior to any bioassay monitoring (appears to be <1960) and those not monitored or 

inadequately monitored after applicable bioassay became available. If additional guidance is 

available from other sources, it is not referenced in the TBD. 

Finding 9: Criteria for Badging not sufficiently Defined in the External Dose TBD. LLNL 

is a large, complex site that has been in operation for over 50 years, with workers occupying 

several physical locations (LLNL proper, Site 300, PPG, and NTS). The Occupational External 

Dose TBD states that the personnel dosimetry records are generally available for all periods at 

LLNL for workers that had the potential for exposure to radiation (Thomas and Szalinski 2007, 

pg. 7). However, the TBD does not sufficiently define what workers were monitored, and what 

criteria were used to select those workers to allow determination of the adequacy of badging 

through the years. The use of the criterion that those with “significant potential for radiation 

exposure” were monitored could have left some workers unmonitored that, by later knowledge 

and standards, should have been monitored. For example, Nolan (1958) states that changes in 

the badging program of 1958 “...has brought to light exposures to personnel that were not being 

recorded and exposures of which we were unaware.” 

The LLNL badging criterion for beta/photon radiation during the period 1952–1957 was that 

those workers with significant potential for radiation exposure were badged. Then in 1958, it 

was decided to provide beta/photon badges to all workers entering the site, regardless of 

exposure potential, as discussed in the External Dose TBD. This total badging policy is 

somewhat different than the criterion that is listed in Table 6-5 on page 14 of the TBD, where for 

1952–present, it states that “All employees with significant measurable exposure potential 

were monitored continuously” [emphasis added]. This criterion would not necessarily include 

all workers entering the site. The latter statement is supported by gaps in monitoring, as noted 

on page 15 and annotation [7] of the TBD. 

The badging policy for neutron monitoring is even less defined than for beta/photons. It is not 

evident from the TBD that there were technically defined monitoring policies for neutrons, to 

ensure adequate external dose monitoring. Apparently, the badging policy for neutrons has been 

the same from 1952 to the present. This policy is that neutron badges are provided to workers 

where significant neutron exposures are possible, as noted on page 10 of the TBD. No definition 

of “significant” has been provided. Additionally, the TBD concludes that if a worker was not 

badged for neutrons, there is no potential for neutron exposure. In view of the fact that so little is 

known about neutron badging policies and details concerning neutron fields (especially during 

the early years), there is no technical justification for concluding that unmonitored workers could 

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not have been exposed to neutrons (Nolan 1958). This concern applies to both TLD neutron 

monitoring and when the dose reconstructor is to assign neutron dose using n/p values when 

NTA films were used. 

Finding 10: Insufficient Dose Data Analysis is Provided in the External Dose TBD. The 

External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) does not provide the dose data analysis that is 

necessary to evaluate the adequacy of the dose data for the workers. It is stated that 95% of the 

workers were badged during 1952–1957. However, it is not clear from the TBD if this includes 

subcontractor, temporary workers, and the like. Additionally, no breakdown of the number of 

badges and workers by year was provided. It does not state if 95% of the workers were badged 

for beta/photon and neutrons, or just beta/photon. There are also no analyses of the recorded 

doses, such as maximum/means/minimum, and the number of zeros/blanks that occurred on a 

yearly basis. 

This type of data analysis should be presented and discussed in the site-specific Occupational 

External Dose TBD, or a site-related OTIB to determine if the workers were adequately 

monitored, and if there were any weak points in the monitoring programs that could result in 

unmonitored doses. Additionally, this information is necessary to verify any coworker model 

and/or data tables developed to assign dose to unmonitored workers, or to fill in gaps in 

monitored workers’ dose records. 

Dose data analysis is especially important concerning neutron monitoring, because this type of 

information is necessary to (1) evaluate the adequacy of TLD neutron monitoring during 1970– 

present, and (2) to analyze the sufficiency of neutron badging during 1952–1969, because the 

dose reconstructor will use NTA badging as a guide to determine if the worker should be 

assigned neutron dose using the n/p method. Additionally, information concerning n/p data (or 

alternate methods) that will be used for assigning neutron doses during the period that NTA film 

was used needs to be provided. 

Finding 11: Lack of Dosimetry Characterization Information Provided in the External 

Dose TBD. Throughout the Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), the 

dose data records are presented as containing the correct dose received by the worker; however, a 

number of technical issues are not considered in this assumption. Lawrence Berkeley National 

Laboratory (LBNL) provided the dosimetry from 1952–1955; however, no details of calibration, 

response as a function of energy, geometry, mixed fields, or other pertinent parameters were 

provided. This was still an era when film dosimetry was being developed and some problems 

existed in dosimetry. Additionally, these response functions were not covered after 1955, when 

LLNL provided the dosimetry. These concerns apply to both beta/photon film and the derivation 

of applicable n/p values for assigning neutron dose instead of using NTA film results. Page 8 of 

the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) states that the dose reconstructor can compare earlier 

dosimetry systems to current systems to evaluate their performance. However, this is an area 

that should be addressed in detail in the TBD, and not a task relegated to the dose reconstructor. 

In addition to adjustment factors, dose uncertainties are not sufficiently addressed in the TBD. 

The recommendation on page 14 of the TBD that no adjustments be made to the beta/photon 

dose readings would indicate that the dosimetry system measured the correct external dose 

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within a few percent for all radiation fields at all locations for the entire time period of 1952 to 

the present. This is most likely not the case, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. 

The only adjustment to the neutron doses was the recommendation on page 14 of the TBD, 

which was to multiply the recorded dose by a factor of 1.91 to account for the ICRP 60 (ICRP 

1990) weighting factors. There are a number of areas concerning neutron dosimetry that are 

lacking in the present TBD and need to be addressed. These areas include neutron energy 

spectra, derivation/verification of n/p values; TLD and CR-39 response to different neutron 

energy spectra at LLNL; and calibration details. The very important task of deriving appropriate 

n/p values for LLNL was not provided in the TBD; instead, the results of a study done at the SRS 

(Scalsky 2005) were recommended. (The study at SRS was dependent on a study done at the 

Hanford site). The TBD recommends using the SRS n/p geometric mean (GM) value of 1.0, 

with geometric standard deviation (GSD) of 3.0, and an upper 95th percentile of 6.1. This value 

was stated without any documented analysis, supportive evidence, or determination of 

compatibility of neutron exposures between SRS and/or Hanford and LLNL. LLNL was one of 

the DOE centers for dosimetry development. From the available LLNL documents and 

publications (for example, Hankins 1975, Hankins 1976, and Slaughter and Reuppel 1977), it 

appears that much more pertinent information could be included in the TBD to assist in 

evaluating neutron fields and external doses to workers. 

Finding 12: Lack of an External Dose Coworker Model. The Occupational External Dose 

TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) does not provide any coworker data/model/tables for use by 

the dose reconstructor in assigning doses to unmonitored workers, except to refer the dose 

reconstructor to Table 6E-2 in the LANL TBD (Widner 2005). Also, no TIB has been issued to 

date that covers unmonitored LLNL workers’ external dose assignments using coworker data. 

This applies to beta, photon, and neutron radiation doses. Additionally, for an unmonitored 

worker (who has been deemed to have a low potential for exposure), it is recommended in the 

TBD that only the environmental dose be assigned. This would result in zero doses being 

assigned from any other radiation exposures, and could result in an underestimate of total dose. 

The TBD needs to be expanded to include, or reference made to a TIB that contains, detailed 

information that can assist the dose reconstructor in assigning technically sound external doses to 

undermonitored or unmonitored workers at LLNL. 

1.2 OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT 

(1)	 In the Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005, Section 5.3.2, 

pg. 19), there are conflicting statements on how sampling was done. The first paragraph 

states the following: 

The practice of offsite collection of samples, which takes place approximately 

24 to 48 hours after leaving the site, not only minimizes the possibility of 

sample cross-contamination, but also ensures sample collection after the 

transfer of the rapid clearance component. Some LLNL employees might have 

been asked to submit samples after 1 or 2 days off from work; there could be 

notation of that instruction on the analytical record. 

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The next paragraph states the following: 

LLNL typically collected urine samples in the workplace, usually on a 

Wednesday. Therefore, contamination of samples from worker’s hands or 

clothing cannot be ruled out as a contributor to any given result. 

The first paragraph may have been discussing radionuclides other than tritium and the 

second paragraph was possibly about tritium, but this, or any other distinction, is not 

specified. Therefore, the section is confusing, apparently contradictory, and needs to be 

clarified to help the internal dose reconstructor. 

(2)	 In Section 5.3.2 of the Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005), it 

states that, “Uncertainties associated with bioassay measurements were not stated in the 

records.” Table 5-6 in this section, Bioassay record codes, states that column numbers 

50–51 have the “Error,” which is “One standard deviation as a percentage of the result.” 

Therefore, it appears that the bioassay record could have the one standard deviation 

uncertainty expressed as a percent of the result value, which would allow the uncertainty 

to be calculated by multiplying the fractional value of the percent by the result. 

(3)	 In Section 5.3.2 (Berger and Szalinski 2005), it states that, “If a data set shows an 

unusually high urinalysis result for a given radionuclide, and if follow-up samples were 

not consistent with the high result, dose reconstructors can consider the high result an 

outlier and disregard it.” However, if the result is not obviously an outlier, it is claimantfavorable to assume the result is real. This guidance on identifying a high result as an 

“outlier” appears to be something that should have come from general guidance that is 

applicable to most, if not all, internal dose reconstructions done by NIOSH. It is very 

brief and not detailed enough guidance to ensure a dose reconstructor will perform 

consistent and claimant-favorable intake assessments. If there is more detailed guidance 

in a general bioassay interpretation procedure applicable to this data, then citing the 

reference (and possibly discussing it in more detail) is necessary. The above discussion 

is applicable to all parts of the TBD that address guidance from general procedures that 

are applicable to more than just LLNL or any other specific site. NIOSH should compare 

statements in the TBD to their recent generic guidance document for internal dose 

reconstruction, OTIB-0060 (ORAUT 2007c), and revise as necessary. 

(4)	 The TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) does not cite ICRP Publication 23, Reference Man 

(ICRP 1974), in the text, but it lists the document in the references. This publication has 

been updated and the TBD should list the replacement in the references (ICRP 2002). 

The update has larger volumes for daily urine excretion (1.6 liters/day for men, and 

1.2 liters/day for women), and this is needed when converting urine bioassay radionuclide 

concentrations (pCi/liter, μg/liter, etc.) accurately to 24-hour sample activity results. If 

NIOSH does not agree that these updated urine excretion volumes are applicable to this 

dose reconstruction, it should be discussed. 

(5)	 The current version of the LLNL Occupational Environmental Dose TBD, ORAUTTKBS-0035-4 (Thomas 2005), was published without air monitoring data prior to 1961 

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and tritium air monitoring data prior to 1972. The TBD (Thomas 2005, pg. 15) states 

that, “Efforts are currently in progress to develop estimated intakes for these missed 

periods and may be presented in a future revision of this TBD.” Methods for exposure 

assessment should be developed for the early years. 

(6)	 In the Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005), NIOSH may need to focus 

additional attention to finding other sources that might shed more light on aspects such as 

operating parameters, screens used, film types, filtration used, number of retakes to 

produce a quality image, maintenance regimens, type and amount of collimation, and 

development parameters to better determine if these factors may have resulted in a 

greater uncertainty than envisioned in the TBD and, therefore, may have resulted in a 

greater dose per x-ray than is assumed in NCRP 1989 tables. 

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2.0 SCOPE AND INTRODUCTION 

The review of the LLNL Site Profile was conducted during October 2006–June 2007 by a team 

of SC&A health physicists and technical personnel. Given the classified nature of some of the 

records for which access was needed, arrangements were made through the DOE for special 

clearances, as well as declassification reviews of notes taken and interviews conducted with site 

personnel and former workers. Two members of the SC&A team hold “Q” clearances that 

permitted unencumbered access for this review. 

Two team members also participated in the NTS site profile review conducted by SC&A in 

2005, from which relevant issues were derived that apply to LLNL personnel involved with 

nuclear testing activities at NTS and other such sites. Likewise, several members of the team 

conducted the site profile review of LANL in 2006; a number of dosimetry and records issues 

from that site have relevance to LLNL. 

SC&A understands that site profiles are living documents, which are revised, refined, and 

supplemented with TIBs as required to help dose reconstructors. Site profiles are not intended to 

be prescriptive or necessarily complete in terms of addressing every possible issue that may be 

relevant to a given dose reconstruction. It is recognized that NIOSH has data capture activities 

ongoing at LLNL while this review is underway. Likewise, additional guidance documents were 

being issued that while not reflected yet in the current LLNL site profile TBDs, would serve to 

mitigate some of the gaps and issues raised in this report (where appropriate, these recent 

issuances have been so noted). 

2.1 REVIEW SCOPE 

Under EEOICPA and federal regulations defined in Title 42, Part 82, Methods for Radiation 

Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program, of the Code of Federal Regulations (42 CFR Part 82), the Advisory Board is mandated 

to conduct an independent review of the methods and procedures used by NIOSH and its 

contractors for dose reconstruction. As a contractor to the Advisory Board, SC&A has been 

charged under Task 1 to support the Board in this effort by independently evaluating a select 

number of site profiles that correspond to specific facilities at which energy employees worked 

and were exposed to ionizing radiation. 

This report provides a review of the following six documents related to historical occupational 

exposures at LLNL: 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-1, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Introduction Rev. 00 PC-1, September 12, 2005 (Maisler 2005a) 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Site Description Rev. 00 PC-1, October 26, 2005 (Maisler 2005b) 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Occupational Medical Dose Rev. 01 PC-1, October 26, 2005 (Turner 2005) 

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ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Occupational Environmental Dose Rev. 00 PC-1, November 18, 2005 (Thomas 

2005) 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Occupational Internal Dose Rev. 00, October 10, 2005 (Berger and Szalinski 2005) 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Occupational External Dose Rev. 01, April 26, 2007 (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) 

These documents are supplemented by TIBs, which provide additional guidance to the dose 

reconstructor. A complete list of these documents is available in Attachment 1. 

Implementation guidance is also provided by “workbooks” developed by NIOSH for selected 

sites to provide more definitive direction to the dose reconstructors on how to interpret and apply 

TBDs, as well as other available information. The LLNL-specific workbooks have been 

evaluated by SC&A under a separate task (Task 3) and are included in evaluations being 

submitted under that task. 

SC&A, in support of the Advisory Board, has critically evaluated the LLNL Site TBDs for the 

following: 

•	 Determine the completeness of the information gathered by NIOSH in behalf of the site 

profile, with a view to assessing its adequacy and accuracy in supporting individual dose 

reconstructions 

•	 Assess the technical merits of the data/information 

•	 Assess NIOSH’s use of the data in dose reconstructions 

SC&A’s review of the six TBDs focuses on the quality and completeness of the data that 

characterized the facility and its operations, and the use of these data in dose reconstruction. The 

review was conducted in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure for Performing Site 

Profile Reviews (SC&A 2004), which was approved by the Advisory Board. 

The review is directed at sampling the site profile analyses and data for validation purposes. The 

review does not provide a rigorous quality control process, whereby actual analyses and 

calculations are duplicated or verified. The scope and depth of the review are focused on aspects 

or parameters of the site profile that would be particularly influential in deriving dose 

reconstructions, bridging uncertainties, or correcting technical inaccuracies. 

The six TBDs serve as site-specific guidance documents used in support of dose reconstructions. 

These site documents provide the health physicists conducting dose reconstructions on behalf of 

NIOSH with consistent general information and specifications to support their individual dose 

reconstructions. This report was prepared by SC&A to provide the Advisory Board with an 

evaluation of whether and how the TBDs can support dose reconstruction decisions. The criteria 

for evaluation include whether the TBDs provide a basis for scientifically supportable dose 

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reconstruction in a manner that is adequate, complete, efficient, and claimant favorable. 

Specifically, these criteria were viewed from the lens of whether dose reconstructions based on 

the TBDs would provide for robust compensation decisions. 

The basic principle of dose reconstruction is to characterize the radiation environments to which 

workers were exposed, and determine the level of exposure the worker received in that 

environment through time. The hierarchy of data used for developing dose reconstruction 

methodologies is dosimeter readings and bioassay data, coworker data and workplace monitoring 

data, and process description information or source term data. 

2.2 REVIEW APPROACH 

SC&A’s review of the TBDs and supporting documentation concentrated on determining the 

completeness of data collected by NIOSH, the adequacy of existing LLNL personnel and 

environmental monitoring data, and the evaluation of key dose reconstruction assumptions. Site 

expert interviews were conducted with current and former LLNL workers. 

All review comments apply to either Rev. 00 or Rev. 00 PC-1 versions of the LLNL TBDs, 

which are the most recent published versions, with the exception of the Occupational External 

Dose TBD, which is available as Rev. 01. SC&A is aware of ongoing information-gathering 

activities by NIOSH at LLNL to support a revision of the existing TBDs. 

Attachment 1 is a list of the LLNL TBDs and the supporting TIBs that were reviewed during the 

SC&A site profile review. 

Site expert interviews were conducted to help SC&A obtain a comprehensive understanding of 

the radiation protection program, site operations, and historic exposure experience. 

Attachment 2 provides summaries of the interviews conducted by SC&A during the course of 

this review. The interviewees included current and former staff from the LLNL Hazards Control 

division, and were conducted by Joseph Fitzgerald (SC&A/Saliant Inc.), Kathryn RobertsonDeMers (SC&A/Saliant Inc.), and William James (SC&A/Saliant Inc.) from April 14–19, 2007. 

On November 9, 2006, SC&A sent questions to NIOSH as part of its evaluation of the TBDs. 

These questions are reproduced in Attachment 3. NIOSH and ORAUT provided written 

responses to these questions on December 6, 2006, which are provided in Attachment 3, along 

with the NIOSH responses. Additional questions stemming from the review were submitted by 

SC&A to NIOSH on June 8, 2007, with a NIOSH/ORAUT response received on June 29, 2007. 

These additional questions and the corresponding responses are also provided in Attachment 3. 

Attachment 4 provides a listing of the LLNL-sponsored atmospheric weapons tests, underwater 

and underground weapons tests, and special LLNL projects related to these tests. 

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2.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION 

In accordance with directions provided by the Advisory Board, and with site profile review 

procedures prepared by SC&A and approved by the Advisory Board, this report is organized into 

the following sections: 

(1) Executive Summary 

(2) Scope and Introduction 

(3) Assessment Criteria and Method 

(4) Site Profile Strengths 

(5) Vertical Issues and Secondary Issues 

(6) Overall Adequacy of the LLNL Site Profile as a Basis for Dose Reconstruction. 

Based on the issues raised in each of these sections, SC&A prepared a list of findings, which are 

provided in the Executive Summary. Issues are designated as findings if SC&A believes that 

they represent deficiencies in the TBD that need to be corrected, and which have the potential to 

have a substantial impact on at least some dose reconstructions. Issues can also be designated as 

Secondary Issues if they simply raise questions, which, if addressed, would further improve the 

TBDs and may possibly reveal deficiencies that will need to be addressed in future revisions of 

the TBDs. 

Many of the issues that surfaced in the report correspond to more than one of the major 

objectives (i.e., strengths, completeness of data, technical accuracy, consistency among site 

profiles, and regulatory compliance.) Section 6.0 provides a summary of key issues and to which 

objective the particular issue applies. 

In many ways, the TBDs have done a successful job in addressing a series of technical 

challenges posed by LLNL’s dosimetric history. In other areas, the TBDs exhibit shortcomings 

that may influence some dose reconstructions in a substantial manner. Major issue areas include 

the following: 

•	 Dose estimates not developed for unmonitored LLNL personnel at the atmospheric and 

underground nuclear testing, particularly for potential internal intakes 

•	 Inadequate characterization of radiological hazards at Site 300 

•	 Lack of coverage of waste management, and Decontamination and Decommissioning 

(D&D) activities 

•	 Verification of the accuracy and usefulness of the data in the bioassay electronic database 

(MAPPER, not identified by this name in the TBD) 

•	 Lack information concerning sufficiency of data for early worker dose reconstructions 

•	 Inadequate consideration of missed dose to other radionuclides; this exposure was not as 

well characterized or monitored 

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•	 Exposure to tritium compounds was not fully addressed in the TBDs 

•	 Insufficient investigation and determination of alternate dose assignment methodology to 

replace NTA film dose-of-record results 

•	 Need to identify chemical forms of radionuclides, in order to provide guidance on which 

solubility (absorption) class to use (F, M, or S) for inhalation and intake dose assessment 

•	 Lack of information on incidents that could have caused significant intakes of
 

radionuclides 

•	 Need for specific guidance on parameter choice and assumptions for intake and dose 

assessments 

•	 Lack of data, particularly in the early years, of the type of x-ray equipment used, the 

beam quality, and the x-ray protocols that impact the DCFs 

•	 Lack of data to properly document the frequency of chest x-rays and other occupationally 

related x-rays. 

SC&A believes that these important issues need to be effectively dealt with in any upcoming 

revisions to the LLNL Site Profile TBDs, in order to ensure that the most scientifically valid and 

claimant-favorable dose reconstructions can be effectively conducted in areas where these data 

gaps exist. 

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3.0 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA AND METHODS 

SC&A is charged with evaluating the approach set forth in the site profiles that is used in the 

individual dose reconstruction process. These documents are reviewed for their completeness, 

technical accuracy, adequacy of data, consistency with other site profiles, and compliance with 

the stated objectives, as defined in SC&A Standard Operating Procedure for Performing Site 

Profile Reviews (SC&A 2004). This review is specific to the LLNL Site Profile, supporting 

TIBs, and dose reconstruction worksheets; however, items identified in this report may be 

applied to other facilities, especially facilities with similar source terms and exposure conditions. 

The review identifies a number of issues and discusses the degree to which the site profile fulfills 

the review objectives delineated in SC&A’s site profile review procedure. 

3.1 OBJECTIVES 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to the degree to which technically sound judgments 

or assumptions are employed. In addition, the review identifies assumptions by NIOSH that give 

the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 

3.1.1 Objective 1: Completeness of Data Sources 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to Objective 1, which requires SC&A to identify 

principal sources of data and information that are applicable to the development of the site 

profile. The two elements examined under this objective include (1) determining if the site 

profile made use of available data considered relevant and significant to the dose reconstruction, 

and (2) investigating whether other relevant/significant sources are available, but were not used 

in the development of the site profile. For example, if data are available in site technical reports 

or other available site documents for particular processes, and if the TBDs have not taken into 

consideration these data where it should have, this would constitute a completeness of data issue. 

The Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team (ORAUT) site profile document database, 

including the referenced sources in the TBDs, was evaluated to determine the relevance of the 

data collected by NIOSH to the development of the site profile. Additionally, SC&A evaluated 

records publicly available relating to the LLNL site and records provided by site experts. 

3.1.2 Objective 2: Technical Accuracy 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to Objective 2, which requires SC&A to perform a 

critical assessment of the methods used in the site profile to develop technically defensible 

guidance or instruction, including evaluating field characterization data, source term data, 

technical reports, standards and guidance documents, and literature related to processes that 

occurred at LLNL. The goal of this objective is to first analyze the data according to sound 

scientific principles, and then to evaluate this information in the context of compensation. If, for 

example, SC&A found that the technical approach used by NIOSH was not scientifically sound 

or claimant favorable, this would constitute a technical accuracy issue. 

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3.1.3 Objective 3: Adequacy of Data 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to Objective 3, which requires SC&A to determine 

whether the data and guidance presented in the site profile are sufficiently detailed and complete 

to conduct dose reconstruction, and whether a defensible approach has been developed in the 

absence of data. In addition, this objective requires SC&A to assess the credibility of the data 

used for dose reconstruction. The adequacy of the data identifies gaps in the facility data that 

may influence the outcome of the dose reconstruction process. For example, if a site did not 

monitor all workers exposed to neutrons who should have been monitored, this would be 

considered a gap and, thus, an inadequacy in the data. 

3.1.4 Objective 4: Consistency among Site Profiles 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to Objective 4, which requires SC&A to identify 

common elements within site profiles completed or reviewed to date, as appropriate. In order to 

accomplish this objective, the LLNL TBD was compared to several of the sites already reviewed 

by SC&A. The results of this comparison are provided in Section 6.1.4. 

3.1.5 Objective 5: Regulatory Compliance 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to Objective 5, which requires SC&A to evaluate 

the degree to which the site profile complies with stated policy and directives contained in 

42 CFR Part 82. In addition, SC&A evaluated the TBD for adherence to general quality 

assurance policies and procedures utilized for the performance of dose reconstructions. 

In order to place the above objectives into the proper context as they pertain to the site profile, it 

is important to briefly review key elements of the dose reconstruction process, as specified in 

42 CFR Part 82. Federal regulations specify that a dose reconstruction can be broadly placed 

into one of three discrete categories. These three categories differ greatly in terms of their 

dependence on and the completeness of available dose data, as well as on the 

accuracy/uncertainty of data. 

Category 1: Least challenged by any deficiencies in available dose/monitoring data are dose 

reconstructions for which even a partial assessment (or minimized dose(s)) corresponds to a 

probability of causation (POC) value in excess of 50%, and assures compensability to the 

claimant. Such partial/incomplete dose reconstructions with a POC greater than 50% may, in 

some cases, involve only a limited amount of external or internal data. In extreme cases, even a 

total absence of a positive measurement may suffice for an assigned organ dose that results in a 

POC greater than 50%. For this reason, dose reconstructions in behalf of this category may only 

be marginally affected by incomplete/missing data or uncertainty of the measurements. In fact, 

regulatory guidelines recommend the use of a partial/incomplete dose reconstruction, the 

minimization of dose, and the exclusion of uncertainty for reasons of process efficiency, as long 

as this limited effort produces a POC of greater than or equal to 50%. 

Category 2: A second category of dose reconstruction is defined by federal guidance, which 

recommends the use of “worst-case” assumptions. The purpose of worst-case assumptions in 

dose reconstruction is to derive maximal or highly improbable dose assignments. For example, a 

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worst-case assumption may place a worker at a given work location 24 hours per day and 

365 days per year. The use of such maximized (or upper-bound) values, however, is limited to 

those instances where the resultant maximized doses yield POC values below 50%, which are 

not compensated. For this second category, the dose reconstructor needs only to ensure that all 

potential internal and external exposure pathways have been considered. 

The obvious benefit of worst-case assumptions and the use of maximized doses in dose 

reconstruction is efficiency. Efficiency is achieved by the fact that maximized doses avoid the 

need for precise data and eliminates consideration for the uncertainty of the dose. Lastly, the use 

of bounding values in dose reconstruction minimizes any controversy regarding the decision to 

not compensate a claim. 

Although simplistic in design, to satisfy this type of a dose reconstruction, the TBD must, at a 

minimum, provide information and data that clearly identify (1) all potential radionuclides, 

(2) all potential modes of exposure, and (3) upper limits for each contaminant and mode of 

exposure. Thus, for external exposures, maximum dose rates must be identified in time and 

space that correspond to a worker’s employment period, work locations, and job assignment. 

Similarly, in order to maximize internal exposures, highest air concentrations and surface 

contaminations must be identified. 

Category 3: The most complex and challenging dose reconstructions consist of claims where 

the case cannot be dealt with through one of the two categories above. For instance, when a 

minimum dose estimate does not result in compensation, a next step is required to make a more 

complete estimate. Or when a worst-case dose estimate that has assumptions that may be 

physically implausible results in a POC greater than 50%, a more refined analysis is required. A 

more refined estimate may be required either to deny or to compensate. In such dose 

reconstructions, which may be represented as “reasonable,” NIOSH has committed to resolve 

uncertainties in favor of the claimant. According to 42 CFR Part 82, NIOSH interprets 

“reasonable estimates” of radiation dose to mean: 

. . . estimates calculated using a substantial basis of fact and the application of 

science-based, logical assumptions to supplement or interpret the factual basis. 

Claimants will in no case be harmed by any level of uncertainty involved in 

their claims, since assumptions applied by NIOSH will consistently give the 

benefit of the doubt to claimants. [Emphasis added.] 

In order to achieve the five objectives described above, SC&A reviewed each of the six TBDs, 

their supplemental attachments, and TIBs, giving due consideration to the three categories of 

dose reconstructions that the site profile is intended to support. The six LLNL TBDs provide 

well-organized and user-friendly information for the dose reconstructor when adequate data were 

available to do that comprehensively. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-1, Rev. 00, PC-1, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory – Introduction (Maisler 2005a), explains the purpose and the scope of the 

site profile. SC&A was attentive to this section because it explains the role of each TBD in 

support of the dose reconstruction process. During the course of its review, SC&A was 

cognizant of the fact that the site profile is not required by the EEOICPA or by 42 CFR Part 82, 

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which implements the statute. Site profiles were developed by NIOSH as a resource to the dose 

reconstructors for identifying site-specific practices, parameter values, and factors that are 

relevant to dose reconstruction. Based on information provided by NIOSH personnel, SC&A 

understands that site profiles are living documents, which are revised, refined, and supplemented 

with TIBs as required to help dose reconstructors. Site profiles are not intended to be 

prescriptive or necessarily complete in terms of addressing every possible issue that may be 

relevant to a given dose reconstruction. Hence, the introduction helps in framing the scope of the 

site profile. As will be discussed later in this report, NIOSH may want to include additional 

qualifying information in the introduction to this and other site profiles describing the dose 

reconstruction issues that are not explicitly addressed by a given site profile. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2, Rev. 00 PC-1, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory – Site Description, (Maisler 2005b), is an important document because it 

provides a description of the facilities, processes, and historical information that serve as the 

underpinning for subsequent LLNL TBDs. For a laboratory such as LLNL with its diverse and 

complex activities, the identification of radiologically significant operations assures that 

important source terms are accounted for and addressed in the site profile. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3, Rev. 01 PC-1, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational Medical Dose, (Turner 2005), provides 

an overview of the sources, types of exposure, and the frequency of exams that workers 

potentially received. SC&A reviewed this section for technical adequacy and consistency 

with other NIOSH procedures, and compared these with other site profiles. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4, Rev. 00 PC-1, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory – Occupational Environmental Dose, (Thomas 2005), provides background 

information and guidance to dose reconstructors for reconstructing the doses to unmonitored 

workers outside of the facilities at the site who may have been exposed to routine and episodic 

airborne emissions from these facilities. SC&A’s review also included particular attention to 

Site 300 releases, given the extensive history of outdoor hydroshot and other radiological design 

studies. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5, Rev. 00, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Occupational Internal Dose, (Berger and Szalinski 2005), presents background 

information and guidance to dose reconstructors for deriving occupational internal doses to 

workers. This section was reviewed with respect to background information and guidance 

regarding the types, mixes, and chemical forms of the radionuclides that may have been inhaled 

or ingested by the workers; the recommended assumptions for use in reconstructing internal 

doses based on the available types of bioassay data (in vivo and in vitro); the methods 

recommended for use in the reconstruction of missed internal dose; and the methods 

recommended for characterizing uncertainty in the reconstructed internal doses. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6, Rev. 01, Technical Basis Document for Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory – Occupational External Dose, (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), presents background 

information and guidance to dose reconstructors for deriving occupational external doses to 

workers. This section was reviewed with respect to background information and guidance 

regarding the different types of external radiation (i.e., gamma, beta, and neutron) and the energy 

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distribution of this radiation to which the workers may have been exposed. SC&A also reviewed 

the recommendations for converting external dosimetry data to organ-specific doses, the methods 

recommended for use in reconstruction of missed external doses, and the methods recommended 

for characterizing uncertainty in the reconstructed external doses. 

It is important to note that SC&A’s review of the LLNL site profile documents is not exhaustive. 

The findings are oriented to in-depth consideration of selected issues that SC&A has concluded 

have a potentially significant impact on either the scientific soundness of the dose reconstruction 

process or the claimant favorability of the results of the estimation procedure. In all its reviews, 

SC&A uses the same general criteria in evaluating adequacy of data or completeness of the data 

search by NIOSH. These are large, complex documents, and SC&A used its judgment in 

selecting those issues that we believe are important with respect to dose reconstruction. 

There are three levels of review for this report. First, SC&A team members reviewed the report 

internally. Second, SC&A senior management and editorial staff who had not participated in the 

preparation of this report conducted a review of this report. The report was then submitted to the 

NIOSH’s Office of General Counsel for Privacy Act review according to previously established 

procedures. Finally, the draft report is submitted to the Advisory Board, with copy to NIOSH, 

for review and comment by the Board and NIOSH. 

We anticipate that, in accordance with the procedures followed during previous site profile 

reviews, the report will then be published on the NIOSH Web site. This last step in the review 

cycle completes SC&A’s role in the review process, unless the Advisory Board requests SC&A 

to participate in additional discussions regarding the closeout of issues during an issue resolution 

process, or if NIOSH issues revisions to the TBDs or additional TIBs, and the Advisory Board 

requests SC&A to review these documents. 

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4.0 SITE PROFILE STRENGTHS 

In developing a TBD, the assumptions used must be fair, consistent, and scientifically robust, 

and uncertainties and inadequacies in source data must be explicitly addressed. The 

development of the TBD must also consider efficiency in the process of analyzing individual 

exposure histories, so claims can be processed in a timely manner. With this perspective in 

mind, we identified the following strengths in the LLNL site TBDs. 

•	 The LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005) has provided a good 

summary of the four types of x-ray machines used at LLNL in Table 3.1, and has 

expanded on what is known about these x-ray machines in Sections 3.4.2 through 3.4.4. 

•	 Dosimetry methods used for beta, photon, and neutron dose monitoring were described 

separately, and also as a function of time and technology changes. 

•	 The Internal Dosimetry Dose TBD has strengths in its discussions of in-vivo capability 

and inclusion of radionuclides in the source terms of buildings. NIOSH has done a 

thorough job of describing the development and capabilities of the in-vivo bioassay 

programs at LLNL, which includes the listing of the monitoring frequency, periods of 

usage, and minimum detectable activities (MDAs) for major radionuclides. 

•	 The implementation of ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction for Occupationally 

Related Diagnostic X-Ray Procedures, Rev. 2 (ORAUT 2003b), has provided a great 

deal of consistency between different site profile assumptions. Incorporation of Rev. 3 

PC-1 (ORAUT 2005d) of this document into dose reconstruction guidance for medical 

x-ray dose in the LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005) would provide 

further consistency among site profiles. 

•	 The TBDs’ use of personnel monitoring data and environmental monitoring data to 

determine dose is consistent with the requirements outlined in 42 CFR Part 82, in that 

(1) where in-vivo and in-vitro analyses are available, this information is provided for use 

in determination of internal dose, and (2) where routine beta/gamma and neutron 

dosimeters are available and adequate, this information is provided for use in 

determination of external exposure. Where environmental measurements are available, 

these data are used as the basis for environmental dose. 

•	 The TBD authors had arranged for discussions with key external and internal dosimetry 

personnel to support the preparation of their respective TBDs. 

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5.0 VERTICAL ISSUES 

SC&A has developed a list of key issues regarding the LLNL Site Profile. These issues relate to 

each of the five objectives defined in SC&A’s review procedures (SC&A 2004). Some issues 

are related to a particular objective, while others cover several objectives. Many of the issues 

raised below are applicable to other DOE and Atomic Weapons Employer sites, and should be 

considered in the preparation and revision of other site profiles. 

5.1	 DOSE ESTIMATION FOR LLNL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO WEAPONS 

TESTING HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED 

The significance and potential dose contributions from LLNL personnel participation in 

weapons, subcritical experiments, and safety shots are not considered in the site profile. LLNL 

sponsored atmospheric, underwater, and underground nuclear weapons testing of their weapons 

designs, supported other laboratories conducting tests, conducted safety shots, and performed 

subcritical experiments at NTS, PPG, and other test locations. These tests started in 1953 and 

continued until the end of weapons testing in 1992. Attachment 4 lists the LLNL-sponsored 

events. In 30 Years of Technical Excellence (LLNL 1983), the emphasis on weapons 

development and testing is evident: 

Nuclear weapons R & D has consistently remained LLNL’s largest program. Its 

direct and indirect staffing level in fiscal 1982 was 3,221 full-time positions – 

47% of the Lab’s operations staff. People working directly on technical aspects 

of weapons number about 1,400. 

The test group from the laboratory responsible for the design of the weapons [e.g., LLNL, 

LANL, or Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)] sent a contingent of personnel to the test sites for 

testing preparation, detonations, recovery of data and materials post-detonation, and support 

functions (including radiological safety). Operations performed by LLNL staff included device 

or weapons assembly, test preparation, detonation, retrieval of equipment and material after 

detonation, follow-up monitoring after detonation, monitoring during analysis of weapons debris, 

and decontamination of test sites. Rotating crews of laboratory personnel were sent to the site 

for tests, with a typical weapons test operation involving 100 or more personnel for a smaller test 

and from 400–500 for a larger test, such as a tunnel shot (see Attachment 2). During testing 

activities, both LANL and LLNL personnel were temporarily stationed at the NTS and PPG for 

extended periods of time. LLNL staff was typically sent out to PPG for periods of several weeks 

and were located on the island 24-hours per day. For events located in Area 12 (the tunnels) or 

Pahute Mesa, personnel often stayed at the Area 12 Camp at NTS, because of the rigorous 

schedules. There were approximately 100 individuals permanently assigned to NTS. In the 

cases where LANL or SNL sponsored the weapons test, a smaller complement of LLNL 

personnel was required to be present. Hundreds of personnel over the period of testing were 

involved and potentially exposed to radioactive material during these operations. 

Radiological personnel were frequently deployed to test areas to assist with radiological safety 

problems at test sites (see Attachment 2). Responsibilities of NTS and LLNL radiological 

control staff were delineated by NTS and LLNL in procedures and the Test Manager’s 

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Operational Plan. Reynolds Engineering and Electrical Company (REECo) served as a support 

contractor to the sponsoring laboratory, providing dosimetry and records services, and 

instrumentation. When individuals visited the NTS, they were asked to leave their LLNL 

dosimeter at home. During tests at NTS, PPG, and other test sites, dosimetry was provided by 

REECo (PPG and NTS) or Eberline (Tonapah, Cannikin (Amchitka), Gasbuggy (Colorado) (see 

Attachment 2). 

Dose information for LLNL employees was sent to LLNL and the external dose data has been 

added to the individual personal dosimetry files. In cases where bioassay was collected for 

shots, these data do not appear to be integrated into the MAPPER database or the LLNL personal 

dosimetry file. Based on conversations with Nevada staff, records are currently being retrieved 

by NIOSH from the Nevada repository. A few years ago, NIOSH provided a list of LLNL 

employees to NTS to determine if exposure records were available for these individuals. 

Although there appears to be documented external exposure for those involved in testing at the 

NTS and PPG, there is no discussion in the TBD of when this data is to be requested and how it 

is to be considered in dose reconstruction. The LLNL TBD does not provide guidance on when 

to assume exposure as a result of test involvement, nor does it refer the dose reconstructor to the 

NTS TBD for Nevada exposures. Absence of records from the time spent at the testing sites 

forms the basis for concerns raised by workers and their advocates. 

Site experts indicated that bioassay sampling was done at REECo under special conditions or in 

the case of incidents. If the results for REECo personnel were positive, the laboratory staff was 

asked to submit a bioassay sample. The data from bioassay monitoring conducted by REECo are 

available in records maintained by the Nevada Operations Office (NVOO). Routine bioassay 

sampling was not conducted for LLNL employees at the test sites, nor were workers required to 

submit bioassay samples in a timely manner upon return from the test site. This creates a 

significant potential for missed or unmonitored internal dose. 

It is understood that NIOSH, under EEOICPA protocols, verifies a claimant’s work location(s), 

including work at other Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or DOE sites, and requests 

dosimetry records for these locations to facilitate dose reconstruction. It is not clear from the 

LLNL site profile, however, how visiting LLNL employees on testing missions were monitored. 

It is also unclear who was monitored and, if monitored, how their doses were integrated with 

their personnel dose record at LLNL. It is also unclear what status was accorded REECo 

monitoring data in determining dose for LLNL employees. Since REECo and/or Eberline 

dosimeters were used in place of LLNL dosimeters, the external dose provided by REECo, 

NVOO, or Eberline is subject to the same shortcomings as those documented in the Review of 

the NIOSH Site Profile for the Nevada Test Site (SCA-TR-TASK1-0006) (SC&A 2005). In 

brief, these issues relate to lack of neutron dose data, potential neutron exposure during 

atmospheric testing, angular dependence of dosimeters, and uncertain status of bomb assembly 

workers. 

The TBD does not provide information on dose reconstructions during testing activities, nor does 

it refer the dose reconstructor to site profiles prepared for NTS. The Site Description TBD, 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2 (Maisler 2005b), provides limited information on LLNL’s participation 

in testing: 

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LLNL personnel supported a variety of nuclear weapons testing from 1952 

through the late 1980s. Specific information about these tests is not provided in 

the Site Profile. Individual exposure records should include information for 

personnel who traveled to the Nevada Test Site, Pacific Proving Ground, or other 

nuclear weapons testing locations (Alaska, Colorado, New Mexico, and 

Mississippi). These records should include external dosimetry results as well as 

bioassay that might have been performed. 

LLNL personnel worked side by side with Alaskan, REECo, and PPG workers during 

atmospheric, underground, and underwater testing. NIOSH has identified problems with dose 

reconstruction for PPG (SEC-00020, Harrison-Maples 2005) and NTS (SEC-00050, HarrisonMaples et al. 2006). The TBD does not provide background information and guidance on how to 

assess potential missed dose for exposure during weapons tests, subcriticality test shots and 

experiments, and the Plowshare program at testing sites across the U.S. There is no information 

on how dose reconstruction issues previously identified at the testing sites will be overcome. 

In their evaluation of the feasibility of completing dose reconstruction for all employees of DOE, 

DOE contractors, or subcontractors employed at PPG from 1946 through 1962, NIOSH clearly 

indicates that workers had the potential for internal exposure (Harrison-Maples 2005): 

The principal potential source of internal radiation doses for members of the 

class would have been inhalation or ingestion due to contamination caused by the 

fallout from the nuclear detonations. 

Furthermore, 

Fallout associated with some of the detonations, both on the land surface and in 

the water, was a potential source of internal exposure. The possibility existed for 

inhalation and ingestion of radiological particles during a fallout event as well as 

exposure to re-suspended fallout remnants at some later date. Radiological 

particles on the land surface could potentially have been disturbed and resuspended by wind, personnel traffic through contamination areas, construction 

activities disturbing contaminated soil, or by decontamination efforts, and been 

inhaled or ingested by personnel operating in contaminated areas (HarrisonMaples 2005). 

SEC-00020 indicates that due to lack of data, it was not feasible to perform reconstruction of 

internal dose from inhalation of radionuclides: 

NIOSH finds that the external monitoring records and operational histories 

available are sufficient to complete external dose reconstruction for these 

employees, with the exception of neutron exposure, which was not fully evaluated. 

Existing NIOSH procedures could be used to estimate possible occupational 

medical exposures. However, NIOSH lacks access to source term data, bioassay 

or internal monitoring data to estimate internal doses associated with potential 

inhalation of radionuclides. 

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The same potential for internal exposure also existed during the atmospheric tests at NTS. 

SEC-00055 (Harrison-Maples et al. 2006) further indicates that calculation of internal dose is not 

feasible: 

Consequently, based on the available data, NIOSH is unable to estimate with 

sufficient accuracy internal exposures and resulting doses for the class of 

employees covered by this evaluation. The initial class for which feasibility was 

considered by NIOSH in response to SEC Petition SEC-00055 comprised 

laboratory assistants who worked at the NTS from January 27, 1951 through 

December 31, 1962. The basis for the infeasibility of dose reconstruction for the 

petitioner’s specific claim was the inability of NIOSH to adequately address 

potential exposures associated with the changing and undefined source term 

during multiple atmospheric tests at the NTS. While it is very likely that 

individuals in the forward areas during atmospheric nuclear testing would have 

received exposure exceeding those of other groups of workers, NIOSH is unable 

to determine which workers were or were not potentially exposed to the changing 

radiological conditions during atmospheric nuclear testing. 

The current class definitions for PPG and NTS specify DOE or DOE contractors or 

subcontractors who were monitored, or should have been monitored, at PPG and NTS. Although 

LLNL scientists were actively involved in similar operations to those employed at PPG and 

NTS, it is unclear in the TBD how it is feasible to calculate internal dose for the period of 

atmospheric testing. Furthermore, later testing eras are still being evaluated as part of the NTS 

SEC petition review. Participation in these events could have led to significant internal 

exposures for some LLNL workers and should be thoroughly considered in the LLNL TBD. 

No site profiles currently exist for many of the Plowshare events (i.e., Amchitka, Alaska, 

Hattiesburg, Mississippi, Farmington, New Mexico, Central Nevada, Rifle, Colorado, or the 

PPG) to provide guidance on how to assess potential measured and missed dose during the 

course of these tests. This facet of exposure to LLNL employees requires treatment in the site 

profile or a TIB to inform the dose reconstruction process. 

In addition to weapons testing, LLNL participated in other programs at NTS. LLNL was 

involved in the development and operation of the Super-Kukla and Fran reactors at NTS. In the 

case of Super-Kukla, neutron activation of structural components occurred as a result of the 

prompt burst: 

Surveys and sampling were conducted at the Super-Kukla reactor to determine 

why post-burst gamma measurements were elevated. Studies indicated that there 

was neutron activation of the structural components in the containment building 

(Johnson 1965). 

LLNL participated in what was referred to as Project Pluto at Jackass Flats at the NTS beginning 

in 1957. The project objective was to study nuclear ramjet propulsion for the Air Force. Several 

experiments were conducted to explore the use of atomic energy to propel rockets. Two research 

reactors (Tory-IIA and Tory-IIC) were built and tested as a part of this program. Subcritical 

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shots were conducted at NTS, including shots during the test moratorium from 1959–1961. The 

test devices had all the elements of a full-scale nuclear test, but not enough fissile material to go 

critical. These tests were typically underground tests, although some subcritical shots were 

conducted above ground, such as the Vortex Project. A more complete analysis of LLNL 

activities at the test site is needed to investigate the potential internal and external exposures, 

particularly missed dose situations. 

In summary, the evaluation of dose from LLNL personnel participation in weapons testing, 

subcritical experiments, and safety shots are not adequately considered in the TBD. There is no 

information on how internal and neutron dose reconstruction issues, previously identified at the 

testing sites during atmospheric testing, will be overcome. No consideration was given to 

follow-up decontamination activities after the end of testing in the Pacific. LLNL’s participation 

in these events should be evaluated to determine if it was feasible to calculate dose while present 

at test sites. In addition, where dose reconstruction is feasible, a missed-dose methodology 

should be included for unmonitored or inadequately monitored workers who participated in 

activities at PPG, NTS, and other offsite areas. 

OTIB-0033 Rev.00, Application of Internal Doses Based on Claimant-favorable Assumptions for 

Processing Best Estimates (ORAUT 2005c), in Attachment A, “Exposure Potentials,” lists 

examples of work locations that NIOSH identifies as having high potential for airborne activity 

(alpha, beta/gamma, and/or uranium). This includes LLNL-sponsored weapons testing sites and 

weapons research and development (R&D) facilities. 

5.2	 INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN IN THE SITE PROFILE 

TO POTENTIAL EXPOSURE RECEIVED AT SITE 300 

The site profile is incomplete in its description of activities occurring at Site 300 and the 

potential radiological exposure conditions associated with this area of LLNL. The Site 

Description TBD, in Table 2-2, “Site Activities by Building and Associated Radionuclides,” 

indicates that the radioactive hazards associated with Site 300 include explosive testing, linear 

accelerators, DU, accelerator activation products (i.e., N-13, Ar-41, and O-15), and tritium 

(Maisler, 2005b, pg. 13). 

For Site 300, radionuclides of significance were selected according to the 

inventory of radioactive materials and the type of work performed at the site. 

Specifically, the presence of depleted uranium (DU) indicated the analysis of 

U-238 and U-235. For the purpose of this TBD, the dose reconstructor should 

assign the dose associated with U-235 and U-234 for depleted uranium. For the 

periods of 1961 through 1971, the gross alpha concentration for Site 300 should 

be used to calculate the presence of U-235 and a second calculation using U-234; 

the assigned dose should be selected from the higher of the two calculations. The 

gross beta concentration should be assumed to be thorium-234. (Thomas 2005, 

pg. 11) 

The TBD has little discussion on fabrication, pressing, and machine shops located in the area, 

and the waste management and D&D activities have been overlooked. 

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Site 300 was established in 1955 to support weapons R&D. Tests at Site 300 included weapons 

and explosives detonations, recovery of blast data, destructive and nondestructive materials 

testing, fabricating explosive components, developing high-energy explosives, radiography, 

particle beam studies, and waste disposal and treatment. Testing of weapons was done on firing 

tables on open concrete or gravel pads (Strauss 2004). Wagner and Diaconoff (1974) describe 

Site 300 activities below: 

Hydrodynamics experiments using high explosives are an integral and essential 

part of the development of nuclear explosive technology, as well as other areas of 

research at LLL. The bulk of this work at the Laboratory is done at the firing 

bunkers at Site 300. These bunkers were built and instrumented between 1957 

and 1967.... 

There are five major firing bunkers at Site 300. The types of experimental 

configurations range from simple explosive-drive plates for fundamental 

hydrodynamics research to complete nuclear device assemblies (without fissile 

material, of course). 

Hydrodynamic experiments were done on firing tables on open concrete or gravel pads (Strauss 

2004). Prior to the bunkers being developed, it is uncertain what protective measures were in 

place. The number of hydrodynamic experiments decreased over time, with the preponderance 

of the experiments conducted in the earlier years. 

The hydrodiagnostics techniques used at the bunkers include flash radiography, 

high speed streaking and framing cameras, fast optical and electrical pins and 

neutron detection equipment. The trend over the past several years has been 

toward increasing use of several of these types of diagnostics on each experiment, 

and toward more accurate and sophisticated measurements of each type. This 

has resulted in significant economies. For example, nearly two hundred hydro 

experiments were required for the development of the W-45 in the late 1950s, 

whereas the W-75, if completed, would have needed less than one-tenth that 

number. During the mid-1960s, most nuclear experiments required about ten 

hydro experiments during their design; now even radically new designs may 

require only two or three. (Wagner and Diaconoff 1974) 

Site 300 was added to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Priority List (NPL) 

on August 30, 1990, because of contaminants (both radiological and chemical) found in the 

LLNL groundwater and the total tonnage of material deposited in Site 300 landfills. Site 300 

historically operated dry wells, waste-water lagoons, and solid waste landfills. Solid waste 

landfills accepted waste from the LLNL main site, Site 300, and LBNL (EPA 1990). 

Radionuclide contaminants found in the soil and/or groundwater includes primarily tritium and 

DU. 

The Occupational Internal Dose TBD indicates that tritium and DU are the radionuclides of 

concern (Berger and Szalinski 2005, pp. 13–14). In Table 5-4 of the TBD, the frequency of 

uranium bioassay and in-vivo counts are listed as semiannually and annually, respectively, 

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starting in 1985 (Berger and Szalinski 2005, pp. 13–14, 16). The earliest uranium bioassays 

found in the MAPPER database are from 1958. It is uncertain for what areas the gross alpha 

bioassay was collected in the database. Site experts have indicated little or no bioassay was 

requested for workers involved in early hydrotests, and this seems to be supported by the lack of 

bioassay data in their files. The initial radionuclides involved in hydroshots were not limited to 

DU and tritium, as is indicated in a memorandum from R.E. Batzel to J.A. Perkins (Batzel 

1976a): 

LLL is proposing an extension of the Site 300 operation procedure to enable 

conducting experiments that do not increase hazards to the public, but are not 

technically within present guidelines. Since 1955 the Laboratory has used 

Site 300 for testing and diagnostics work with high explosives. Under the current 

guidelines the following radioactive and toxic materials are the only ones which 

may be released to the atmosphere during experiments: natural uranium, 

depleted uranium, natural thorium, tritium and beryllium. 

Sewell (1959) authorized the thorium hydrodynamics program at Site 300, provided that several 

safety requirements were met. Other radionuclides used in testing included Po-210 and U-235 

(Batzel 1976b). No thorium- or Po-210-specific bioassay data are available prior to 1968 and 

1971, respectively. The available bioassay data are limited and may not have included Site 300 

workers. It is not clear from the MAPPER database whether gross alpha bioassay were collected 

from these individuals, since personal identifiers are not available. Further evaluation of the 

implemented monitoring for this area and its adequacy for the radionuclides involved in tests is 

necessary. This analysis should include waste handling and D&D workers, as well as those 

present from the Main Site for hydroshots. 

Consideration should be given to the potential extremity exposures from hand contact with 

thorium and uranium: 

Hand contact with thorium or thorium alloy shall be limited to ten working hours 

per week (Sewell 1959). 

As previously mentioned, Site 300 at LLNL was placed on the NPL in 1990. Environmental 

contamination was characterized as chemical, radioactive, and mixed. Groundwater and soil 

were contaminated with a number of toxic chemicals, as well as tritium and U-238 (EPA 1990). 

It is uncertain whether thorium and its daughters and enriched uranium were evaluated, since this 

information related to thorium and enriched uranium was integrated with classified records. 

Environmental internal dose is assigned based on the following technique (Thomas 2005, 

pg. 14). 

For Site 300, radionuclides of significance were selected according to the 

inventory of radioactive materials and the type of work performed at that site. 

Specifically, the presence of depleted uranium (DU) indicated the analysis of 238U 

and 235U. For the purpose of this TBD, the dose reconstructor should assign the 

dose associated with 235U and 234U for depleted uranium. For periods of 1961 

through 1971, the gross alpha concentration for Site 300 should be used to 

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calculate the presence of 235U and a second calculation using 234U; the assigned 

dose should be selected from the higher of the two calculations. The gross beta 

concentration should be assumed to be thorium 234. 

The Environmental Dose TBD provides maximum annual median intakes for gross alpha and 

gross beta from 1961–1971. After 1971, maximum annual median intakes are provided for 

U-235, U-238, and Pu-239/240 (Thomas 2005, pg. 14). The TBD provides no method for the 

assignment of environmental dose for uranium and plutonium prior to 1961 and for tritium prior 

to 1972. In addition, no consideration was given to the contamination of soil and groundwater at 

the dry wells, waste water lagoons, and solid waste landfills. 

In summary, minimal dose reconstruction guidance for Site 300 is provided for internal and 

environmental occupational dose. Internal dosimetry models assume tritium and DU were the 

radionuclides of concern. Thorium and daughters, enriched uranium and daughters, and Po-210 

have not been treated in the TBD as potential internal exposure hazards. A method for the 

determination of missed dose from these radionuclides and other radionuclides encountered in 

waste areas at Site 300 is needed. In addition, a method for assignment of environmental dose 

for uranium and plutonium prior to 1961 and tritium prior to 1972 from waste handling and 

D&D is needed. 

5.3	 COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY OF THE DATA USED IN DOSE 

RECONSTRUCTION IS LACKING IN THE INTERNAL DOSE TBD 

Information available for dose reconstruction, especially for those involved in testing and special 

projects, is limited, inadequate, or in some cases, not available. NIOSH briefly discusses the 

quality of the bioassay data and notes that it is acceptable; however, there is no discussion in the 

Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) regarding what means of 

verification were used to establish the completeness and consistency of data provided to NIOSH. 

There are major issues with verifying the accuracy and usefulness of the data in MAPPER. 

LLNL staff members have indicated some bioassay cannot be confidently associated with a 

specific person; there are ambiguities in some analytes reported; large negative results are 

included for later periods; and letters in the sample type column do not always indicate whether 

the sample was urine or fecal and sample volume and mass must be interpreted carefully. There 

is very little discussion in the TBD about the quality of the early data (1950s–1960s). With the 

inconsistencies in MAPPER, the use of these data for a coworker model is suspect. The 

existence of bioassay results with classified datasets leads to questions regarding the adequacy of 

information being provided in the claimant files. 

There are major issues with verifying the accuracy and usefulness of the data in the bioassay 

database (i.e., “MAPPER,” although not identified by this name in the TBD). These data may 

need a review by radiochemists and internal dosimetrists prior to use to ensure validity. If this is 

the major database storing bioassay data for the site or is derived from the same source that is 

being used to generate information for claimants’ files, then there is a significant probability that 

information in the files may be inadequate. 

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Section 5.1 of the Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) states the 

following: 

A review of in-house procedures used to assess the concentration of radioactivity 

in urine indicates that quality control steps were an integral part of the process 

(LLNL 1979). For example, LLNL ran duplicates consistently, and comparisons 

of results to “known quantities” were a critical step. Therefore, in vitro results 

from in-house processing are generally reliable. However, interpretation of those 

results can be difficult, primarily because they might not have considered the 

contribution of environmental radioactivity (i.e., uranium, thorium)... 

There is very little discussion in the TBD about the quality of the earlier data (1950s–1960s), and 

it is possible that these data were reported without any uncertainty (error) value, which would 

provide information on the precision of the analysis and possibly actual detection levels. A 

review of the bioassay analysis procedures for all of the “eras” of analytical work should be 

considered to determine the level of confidence that can be placed in the results that will be used 

for dose and intake analysis. 

The statement that uranium and thorium could cause difficulty with interpretations is correct for 

analysis of gross alpha, gross beta, and naturally occurring uranium and thorium isotopes in 

bioassay samples. The statement in the TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) that “they might not 

have considered the contribution of environmental radioactivity...” is not an important issue with 

the analysis of the samples. This is a bioassay interpretation issue, because the laboratory only 

reports the total quantity or concentration of the radionuclides detected in a sample. 

The MAPPER database was also reviewed, and there are several gross alpha and gross beta 

bioassay results in the database up through 1996. This is into a period that isotopic radionuclide 

analysis was available and typically performed for plutonium, along with specific elemental 

analysis of uranium. There is no discussion of what radionuclides to assume for association with 

these gross alpha and gross beta results in the more recent years, or whether or not these are even 

useful for an employee who was being monitored using isotopic and/or elemental analysis. The 

database shows “MFP” for the radionuclide in several results from the 1960s to 1980s. It can be 

assumed that this means mixed fission products, as it does in the TBD. The TBD does not 

address which radionuclides should be assumed to be in any intake determined from MFP 

sample results (e.g., Cs-137, Sr-90, I-131, etc.). NIOSH has developed guidance for interpreting 

gross beta bioassay, OTIB-0054 (ORAUT 2007f); however, this TIB only applies to reactor 

operations, reactor fuel examination and dissolution, and high-level waste management, which 

are not representative of all the sources the bioassay was used to monitor (e.g., core sample 

processing). 

The MAPPER database was provided with a letter from the LLNL Radiation Safety Section 

(Mansfield 2006) warning about the accuracy problems with the database. Listed below is a 

summary of the problems that have been identified with the database: 

•	 There are some bioassay data that cannot be confidently associated with a specific 

person. 

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•	 The actual day of the month that a sample was taken was unknown for some bioassays. 

These were assigned to the first day of the month arbitrarily. 

•	 There was occasional ambiguity with the actual analytes reported in the results; for 

example, U28 and U38 were assumed to be U-238. 

•	 There was a period of large negative results (e.g., Pu-239 of –6.976 dpm) in late 1996 

that are called a “sort of artifact.” 

•	 There are some typographical errors left uncorrected in the unit’s column. 

•	 There are some letters other than the typical U (urine) or F (fecal) in the media column, 

such as B, R, and S. R and S are likely to be “Rush” or “Special” entries that were 

incorrectly put in this column rather than the Priority column. If the actual sample media 

was left out of the entry, then a claimant-favorable assumption will need to be made as to 

the sample being urine or fecal. Another sample result was determined to be a nose and 

throat swab result, instead of the urine sample indication it was given with a U. 

•	 Assumptions about sample volume or mass must be made carefully, especially for 

plutonium urine samples, which during the later years (starting in the 1980s), were split 

into two approximately equal volumes when analyzed for both plutonium and gross 

alpha. In these cases, the result for a full sample would require doubling the reported 

result. 

In summary, the letter warns NIOSH to use this database only in a critical manner, due to the 

problems discussed above. NIOSH should identify screening methods for dose reconstructors 

that will enable them to determine when data is usable. If NIOSH does not screen this data 

adequately, data interpretation could be done inaccurately and dose could be underestimated. 

Examples of inaccurate interpretation are as follows: 

•	 An inaccurate sample date assumption could lead to underestimating the dose if the date 

chosen is too close in time to the assumed or known intake date. 

•	 Not knowing that a sample was split into two equal volumes and analyzed for both 

plutonium and gross alpha could lead to underestimating the dose by as much as 50%. 

In its response to SC&A’s internal dose section question #1 (Attachment 3), NIOSH states that 

the database is used only for the coworker study and not for individual claims, which use hard 

copy records provided by the site. They are aware of the specific problems with the database, 

and have discussed interpretation of the data with site personnel. However, this 

acknowledgement and corresponding guidance to dose reconstructors needs to be included in the 

TBD. 

Finally, it is notable that during site expert interviews with former workers, concerns were raised 

to SC&A regarding the completeness and accuracy of historic LLNL radiation exposure records. 

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The hierarchy of data used in the dose reconstruction process begins with the use of individual 

monitoring data as a priority. This is fundamental to the performance of dose reconstruction. 

5.4	 INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN IN THE TBD TO 

POTENTIAL EXPOSURE AND MISSED DOSE FROM SECONDARY 

RADIONUCLIDES 

Numerous “secondary” radionuclides have been handled at LLNL in varying quantities. 

According to Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005), these have included 

radium, Th-228, Th-232, Am-241, U-233, Cm-244, C-252, Pu-238, C-14, Na-22, P-32, S-35, 

I-125, I-131, Sr-90, N-13, and O-15, along with other fission products and activation products. 

A lot of bioassay data in the database are identified as gross alpha and gross beta results, and 

NIOSH has not identified which, if any, of these secondary radionuclides may be associated with 

these data. NIOSH has developed guidance for interpreting gross beta bioassay, OTIB-0054 

(ORAUT 2007f); however, this only applies to reactor operations, reactor fuel examination and 

dissolution, and high-level waste management, which are not representative of all the sources for 

which the bioassay was used to monitor (e.g., core sample processing). NIOSH has commented 

that the next revision to the Occupational Internal Dose TBD will contain guidance on 

interpretation of gross alpha, gross beta, and fission product bioassay results. 

Radium is not identified as being used in any buildings or projects to a great extent; however, 

there is evidence that it must be at the site in some abundance. One of the few incidents that are 

mentioned in the TBD involved radium (Leahy 1975). In Attachment A of the Occupational 

Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005), Building 253 has Ra-226 at 0.015, Po-218 at 

0.33, Pb-214 at 0.33, and Bi-214 at 0.33 of the Activity Fraction for the building, which means 

that Ra-226 and the principal radon progeny add up to all of the radioactivity in the building. If 

these are not from natural radium and radon sources in the building materials, then an accounting 

of the dose from these radionuclides should be included in a worker’s dose. At the Building 514 

Tank Farm, Ra-226 is 1.55E-4 and Th-228 is 6.023E-3 of the activity in the total, which puts 

these two radionuclides in the top 20 of the 80 radionuclides listed for this building, which is a 

waste facility and likely received its radionuclides from buildings throughout the site. This is 

another indicator that there may have been some substantial exposure to radon and thoron at the 

site. During the site interviews, employees stated that Th-232 was handled heavily during the 

earlier years of weapons testing, and according to Table 5-5 “Bioassay Detection Levels,” there 

were no bioassays specific for thorium prior to 1970. Upon further questioning about the 

handling of internal doses from thorium exposure, NIOSH stated that further guidance will be 

given in the revision of the TBD, with the focus on use of gross-alpha urinalysis and WBC data 

for the post-1970 years. NIOSH also noted that an “83.14 SEC has been proposed for the early 

years at LLNL (through 1973).” (See Attachment 3 for these responses.) 

It is illustrative that Sr-90 use in projects is not discussed and this makes up 20.5 % of the 

activity in the Building 514 Tank Farm. This indicates a potentially large source of Sr-90 at the 

site that needs discussion in the bioassay interpretation guidance. There is no specific discussion 

about intakes that could have occurred at the accelerator buildings, which could have significant 

levels of activated gases (N-13, O-15, etc.), yet there is a reference (Ozaki 1980) in the reference 

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list that may be applicable. This infers that these could be significant and should be identified in 

the text of the TBD. 

In its response to SC&A’s internal dose section question #2 (see Attachment 3), NIOSH 

indicates that the list of “alpha emitters is small enough to limit the choices and determine a 

default” for gross alpha bioassay results. This may be a reasonable statement, but it will be 

important for NIOSH to give guidance that directs the dose reconstructor to use a claimantfavorable assumption for the alpha emitter(s) identified in intakes with gross alpha data. NIOSH 

does identify that “gross beta results are more problematic and a solution is still being 

discussed,” which indicates a very careful approach is needed to identify all applicable 

radionuclides that could have been detected with this bioassay, so that claimant-favorable 

assumptions are made. In its response to question #17 (Attachment 3) regarding possible 

significant sources of Ra-226 and Ra-228, NIOSH identifies that it has not yet addressed the 

determination whether there were any projects that could have used these and caused significant 

radon and/or thoron exposures, but they indicate it will be reviewed. 

5.5	 THE TBD PROVIDES NO GUIDANCE ON BIOASSAY DATA FOR INTAKES 

OF TRITIUM, METAL TRITIDES, OR ORGANICALLY BOUND TRITIUM 

Tritium in metal hydrides are special chemical forms for tritium, also called metal tritides (MTs). 

These MTs are somewhat insoluble forms of tritium compounds (Inkret et al. 1999, Cheng et al. 

1997) that do not exhibit similar biokinetic behavior to the more common forms of tritium, such 

as tritiated water (HTO) or elemental tritium. Tritium from MTs does not enter the systemic 

compartment as quickly as HTO after inhalation and, therefore, the interpretation of tritium urine 

bioassay data cannot be treated with standard tritium excretion models (McConville and Woods 

1995). Due to being relatively insoluble, inhaled MTs deliver the highest component of dose 

contribution to the lungs. Tritium from these particles also can convert to organically bound 

tritium forms (OBTs) from contact with lung tissue and further complicate the metabolic process 

(DOE 2004). 

Organically bound tritium forms (OBTs) were not discussed in the site profile TBD. There is 

limited guidance on the interpretation of bioassay data for intakes of tritium, MTs, or OTB. 

However, general guidance has recently been provided in OTIB-0066 (ORAUT 2007g), which 

was issued while this SC&A review was underway. OTIB-0066 addresses the calculation of 

dose from intakes of special tritium compounds, but only partially addresses some of the issues 

discussed below). 

Not specifically addressing MTs or OBTs in terms of historic applications at LLNL could lead to 

underestimating doses. According to the Site Description TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2 (Maisler 

2005b), Building 331 (Hydrogen/Tritium Research Facility) had the bulk of the tritium inventory 

in elemental form or metal hydrides. Tritium gas and salts were handled as a part of the weapons 

program and the fusion program. The exact forms of tritium encountered by facility are not 

available; however, over the course of operations, LLNL has handled tritides in the form of 

lithium tritide (LiT), lithium deuterium tritide (LiDT), titanium tritide, and uranium tritide. 

Organically bound tritium, such as tritiated pump oil, rust, pump oil droplets, tritiated methane, 

and tritiated solvents, were formed during operations with HTO and tritium gas (HT). A 

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majority of the tritium handled was in the form of HT. Tritiated water (HTO) was produced by 

exposure of HT and some special tritium compounds to air. Tritium-handling operations, R&D 

activities, and D&D activities have exposed workers to other forms of tritium. 

The dose consequences from special tritium compounds may be significantly larger than those 

from HTO; therefore, NIOSH needs to be familiar with the special tritium compounds handled, 

the quantities of material, the locations and time periods of potential exposure, and the physical 

behaviors of tritium compounds in the environment (e.g., conversion to HTO, formation of rust) 

to correctly characterize tritium exposure. Bounding techniques proposed in ORAUT-OTIB0066, Calculation of Dose from Special Tritium Compounds (ORAUT 2007g), cannot be 

effectively developed and applied without some basic understanding of the compounds handled 

and the extent to which individuals were exposed. In the recommendations from ORAUT-OTIB0066, it states that, “the selection of the appropriate tritium compound in an intake evaluation 

must usually be based on process knowledge of the source terms in the workplace.” It is 

important that the dose reconstructor chooses claimant-favorable forms of tritium for the dose 

estimation if there is a lack of process knowledge about the form that may have been involved 

with exposures. The dose to the lung from intakes of MTs can be underestimated by orders of 

magnitude if it is incorrectly assumed that the dose can be calculated with the methods used for 

HTO (ORAUT 2007g). 

The main types of OBTs found are tritiated solvents, tritiated oil, and solid particulates (e.g., 

organic dust, plastics, etc.). The dose from intakes of OBTs can be different than HTO intakes 

of the same activity and is dependent on the specific chemical compound in which the material is 

bound. The effective dose equivalent (EDE) per unit uptake has been estimated to be two times 

larger for OBT than HTO (DOE 2004). OBTs in the form of solid particulates reside in the 

lungs for a longer period of time, resulting in higher dose to the lungs. ORAUT-OTIB-0066, 

Calculation of Dose from Special Tritium Compounds (ORAUT 2007g), states that, “a Type 1 

calculation underestimates systemic dose approximately 30% for intakes of OBT because half of 

the intake is not uniformly distributed in the body-water space.” In the recommendations from 

ORAUT-OTIB-0066, it states that this method [from ORAUT-OTIB-0011 (ORAUT 2004b)] can 

be used without modification to calculate doses from intakes of OBTs to all organs and tissues, 

which appears to be non-favorable for claimants if it underestimates systemic dose by 

approximately 30%. More information on how prevalent OBTs are in the LLNL work 

environments should be gathered, and consideration given to the potential difference in resulting 

dose. 

Special tritium compounds are not explicitly discussed in the Occupational Internal Dose TBD. 

Dose reconstructors should be made aware of the characteristics of special tritium compounds 

(STCs) excretion in urine to enable them to distinguish between STCs and tritium oxide or HT. 

For example, McConville and Woods (1995) demonstrated, with individual excretion data 

following tritide uptakes, that tritium excretion curves for particulate tritides do not follow a 

simple exponential curve, as is the case with HTO. In the case of these individuals, tritides built 

up for a few days followed by a more traditional elimination curve. In 1976, a worker in the 

Tritium Facility at LLNL had a substantial tritium exposure and the urine samples collected over 

several days did not show the expected decrease in tritium concentration, indicating that there 

probably have been significant intakes of special tritium compounds (Dupzyk et al. 1978). 

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In order to develop a bounding exposure, NIOSH would need to make themselves familiar with 

the special tritium compounds handled, the quantities of material, and the locations and time 

periods of potential exposure. Some thought should be given to the chemical behavior of tritium, 

especially as it related to the D&D of aging tritium facilities and other facilities where tritium 

was a byproduct of operations. 

The Internal Dose TBD does not discuss how to differentiate between intakes of HTO, elemental 

forms, OBTs, or MTs, and does not discuss tritium dosimetry to any significant extent, even 

though this is one of the major radionuclides used at the site. 

In its response to SC&A’s internal dose section question #5 (see Attachment 3), NIOSH stated 

that, “It is not known if metal tritides were handled at LLNL...” As noted above, the Site 

Description TBD identifies that the main hydrogen/tritium research facility (Building 331) had 

the bulk of the tritium in metal hydrides or elemental forms. Tritium in metal hydride is also a 

metal tritide; therefore, it is known that these were handled, and as noted, probably in large 

fractions of the total source term for this building. In response to further questioning, NIOSH 

has stated that, “metal tritides and organically bound tritium were used at LLNL, but in very 

small quantities compared to tritium gas (HT).” If this is the case, then NIOSH needs to provide 

substantiation, as most of the stored tritium has been in the form of MTs and there was likelihood 

of various oils and solvents getting contaminated with tritium, creating OBTs. NIOSH should 

investigate further to determine if the probability of MTs and OBTs being involved in intake 

incidents may have been higher than the other typical forms (HT and HTO). 

NIOSH also responded that, “In general, tritium tritide contributes little dose unless there are 

large quantities of contamination found in the work place.” As noted above, an inhalation intake 

of MTs delivers the highest component of dose to the lungs, because it does not get uniformly 

distributed throughout the body quickly like HTO. Instead, it sits in the lungs absorbing into the 

blood system at rates that can be very slow, depending on the metal compound. Therefore, for a 

claimant with a lung cancer, assuming a metal tritide intake of low solubility (slow absorption 

rate) when there is no evidence to rule it out, is most likely claimant favorable. Another issue 

with this statement is that it appears NIOSH has not performed an investigation into the 

contamination levels found in the workplace, since this is not discussed in any of the TBDs, and 

therefore cannot make general assumptions that large quantities of contamination could not have 

existed. 

In summary, NIOSH has acknowledged that MTs and OBTs must be treated differently for 

tritium dose assessments in the development of their guidance document, OTIB-0066, (ORAUT 

2007g). However, due to the lack of description in the TBD regarding the exposure potential to 

these compounds, a concern remains about how NIOSH will identify when they are to be 

assumed in dose assessments. 

5.6	 THE TBD DOES NOT IDENTIFY POSSIBLE CHEMICAL FORMS OF 

AIRBORNE RADONUCLIDES TO WHICH WORKERS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED 

The Internal Dose TBD does not identify the possible chemical forms of the airborne 

radionuclides that workers could have been exposed to, which will give guidance on the 

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solubility (absorption) class to use (F, M, or S) for inhalation and intake dose assessment. The 

TBD states “Other variables such as particle sizes and clearance classes can be readily 

reconstructed from historical records.” No specific references are made to these historical 

records. There is no discussion on the potential for exposures to very insoluble and slowly 

absorbed high-fired plutonium. 

LLNL undoubtedly worked with many radionuclides that could have been in various chemical 

forms that may have exposed workers to intakes. The lack of identification of the chemical 

forms of the radionuclides leaves out guidance to the dose reconstructor on which solubility 

classes to assume when interpreting bioassay to determine the intake quantity (ICRP 1997). The 

correct solubility class is also needed when calculating the dose to specific organs from intakes 

(ICRP 1994). These relationships between chemical form/solubility class, intake determination 

from bioassay, and dose to organs per intake amount are dynamic. 

Inhalation and ingestion intakes of insoluble forms of radionuclides (e.g., PuO2, plutonium 

dioxide, which is class S) are typically not detected by urine bioassay with as much sensitivity as 

intakes of more soluble forms (e.g., PuNO3, plutonium nitrate, which is class M). This is due to 

the very low absorption of the insoluble forms into the systemic compartment. Therefore, 

insoluble form radionuclide intakes can be many times larger than soluble form radionuclide 

intakes when interpreting the same urine bioassay data. Highly soluble forms of radionuclides 

can move through the body and be excreted before detection if the sampling frequency is not 

high enough to detect significant intakes before these become undetectable. Inhalation intakes of 

insoluble forms of radionuclides are often detected by in-vivo counts with more sensitivity than 

soluble forms of the same particle size, because the insoluble forms will remain in the lungs for a 

much longer time, giving a stronger source for the in-vivo system to detect. Ingestion intakes of 

soluble forms of radionuclides are detected with more sensitivity in urine bioassay than insoluble 

forms of the radionuclides, because a larger fraction of the radionuclides in soluble forms are 

absorbed through the gut into the systemic compartment. For insoluble radionuclides, a larger 

fraction of the activity passes through the digestive tract and is excreted in the feces. Fecal 

bioassay is the most sensitive bioassay for detecting inhalation or ingestion of insoluble forms of 

radionuclides, and it is important to determine if fecal bioassay data are special bioassay taken 

after an incident or part of a routine bioassay monitoring program, in order to apply bioassay 

modeling appropriately. 

Inhaled insoluble forms of radionuclides give much higher doses per unit intake to regions of the 

lungs, due to the long clearance half-lives from this organ compared to more soluble forms. 

Inhaled and ingested soluble forms of radionuclides can give much higher doses to all organs 

(other than the lungs for inhalation exposures), due to the higher fraction of radionuclides being 

absorbed into the systemic compartment and distributed to organs at a higher rate. Therefore, the 

chemical form (which determines solubility) of radionuclides has a major impact on the eventual 

determination of intake quantities and internal doses to organs, and assumptions for these 

chemical forms should be claimant favorable when there are different possible forms involved 

with exposures. To illustrate, based on ICRP Publication 68 (ICRP 1994), the dose to the lungs 

from Pu-239 can more than double per amount inhaled when assuming an insoluble oxide 

(class S) form instead of more soluble forms, such as plutonium nitrate. In another example, the 

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dose to the lungs from uranium is approximately 100 times larger per amount inhaled when 

assuming a highly insoluble form instead of a highly soluble form, such as uranium hexafluoride. 

In its response to SC&A’s internal dose section question #8 (see Attachment 3), NIOSH 

indicated that the information on chemical forms of radionuclides and solubility classes is not 

available at this time. It also states that claimant-favorable assumptions would most likely be 

used for the majority of cases, even if there was building-specific information. This approach of 

not identifying chemical forms and/or solubility information appears to be a departure from the 

approach in writing internal dose TBDs, as provided (for example) in Argall 2004, Millard 2004, 

Bollenbacher et al. 2006, and Berger 2004, and specific references to the procedures that internal 

dose reconstructors should use to choose appropriate solubility classes is needed if this 

information is not going to be provided. 

5.7	 THE INTERNAL DOSE TBD HAS NOT ADEQUATELY IDENTIFIED AND 

REVIEWED APPLICABLE BIOASSAY FREQUENCIES AND DETECTION 

LEVELS 

In many cases, the information given for bioassay frequencies and detection levels are not useful, 

because of inaccuracy or lack of information. Doses may not be calculated accurately and may 

not be claimant-favorable without this information. Table 5-4, entitled “In-vivo and In-vitro 

Sampling Frequencies” (Berger and Szalinski 2005), reveals items of concern about the 

understanding that NIOSH has for bioassay history at the site. In Table 5-4, there are 15 in-vitro 

urine bioassay types (all for a period of an unknown beginning date through 1966) that list “Not 

Specified” in the Radionuclide identification column. In the period 2000–present, there is a 

whole-body (WB) in-vivo analysis listed with no radionuclides identified for the analysis (the 

entry in the Radionuclide column is blank). Therefore, there is no information provided on 

which radionuclides these bioassay frequencies apply to during these periods. There is no 

frequency or building shown for the in-vivo WB scans done from 1964–present for MFP 

radionuclides. This serves no purpose in assisting the dose reconstructor, other than to inform 

them that WB scans for MFPs were conducted at some time for some building(s) between now 

and 1964. Table 5-4 also shows little information on the bioassay frequencies for the earlier 

years (pre-1970s), which could be important for interpreting bioassay data to determine intakes. 

The frequencies for P-32 and C-14 are identified by “as applicable” and for I-131 “coordinated 

with work schedule” without any further explanation. Identifying the correct bioassay frequency 

can be important to the dose reconstructor for determining appropriate intake dates to assume 

and in the review of a bioassay history to help understand the claimant’s potential exposures. 

Table 5-5, entitled “Bioassay Detection Levels” (Berger and Szalinski 2005), has a few items 

that bring up concern about the ability of NIOSH to determine when bioassay results indicate 

intakes of radionculides (i.e., positive bioassay). First, it should be noted that a substantial 

amount of the detection levels listed are taken from references that were not developed at the site 

and may not be representative of the actual detection levels. The TBD states these were based on 

the LANL site experience and ICRP Publication 54 (ICRP 1989). There is no detection level for 

plutonium in urine (in-vitro bioassay) from 1988–1999. The minimum detectable activity 

(MDA) for Pu-239, 238 from 1967–1987, is stated as 0.03 pCi/24-h sample; however, it is 

identified as 0.051 dpm/sample (0.023 pCi/sample) in a 1979 document, Radiochemical 

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Procedures for Bioassay (Dupzyk 1979). In Table 5-5, the minimum detectable concentration 

(MDC), the quantity of radioactive material per volume, shown for uranium from 1978–1982 

was 1 microgram/liter, but the 1979 document (Dupzyk 1979) shows that it is 

0.1 microgram/liter. The 1979 document (Dupzyk 1979) also shows a radiochemical method for 

analyzing curium; however, Table 5-5 only identifies an MDA for samples analyzed starting in 

2000. The 1979 document shows a radiochemical analysis for gross alpha that applies to 

plutonium, thorium, americium, curium, actinium, and neptunium, but there is no gross alpha 

analysis listed in Table 5-5. This is of great importance because several alpha emitters other than 

plutonium, uranium, and americium were handled in the earlier years at the site (in particular 

thorium, curium, and neptunium), and Table 5-5 does not provide MDAs for these in the early 

years. This points out that more research needs to be done on understanding the applicability of 

gross alpha results to exposures from these radionuclides prior to applicable specific 

radiochemical isotopic analysis. 

It appears that the in-vitro analysis for HTO (tritium in urine) from 1952–1958 was done by GM 

counting. The entry in the next row of the table identifies HTO analysis for 1958–1968 by 

internal GM counting. This would infer that the 1952–1958 analysis was done using a GM 

counter with a window, since it was not stated to be “internal” GM counting. If the 1952–1958 

data was acquired using GM counters with windows, then this should be reviewed to make sure 

that this technique was valid, due to potential shielding of the weak beta emissions (18.6 keV 

maximum beta) by the windows along with potential self-shielding within the prepared sample 

which may cause non-detection. The in-vitro urine analysis MDA of “100 picocuries per liter” 

for gross beta from 1960–1999 is identified as being for the radionuclides I-125, I-131, and S-35. 

However, I-125 is not a beta-emitter and, therefore, it is questionable to interpret it with gross 

beta bioassay data. The first period entry for DU, Natural U by fluorophotometric shown in the 

table, needs to be edited, because it shows 1949–1976; however, the site began operation in 

1952. 

5.8	 AN APPROACH FOR DETERMINING INTERNAL DOSE FOR 

UNMONITORED OR INADEQUATELY MONITORED WORKERS DOES NOT 

ADDRESS PLUTONIUM, TRITIUM, OR OTHER RADIONUCLIDES 

Upon being questioned in the earlier phase of the review about the lack of guidance in the 

Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005), NIOSH stated that a coworker 

study was in development for the years in which bioassay was performed, and will determine 

bounding estimates for intakes of long-lived, long-retained nuclides for individuals that were 

subsequently monitored in later years. ORAUT-OTIB-0065, Internal Dosimetry Coworker Data 

for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (ORAUT 2007e), was issued and was evaluated to 

determine if unmonitored or inadequately monitored workers will be addressed appropriately. 

The document addressed potential internal doses from uranium exposures; however, no 

approaches are given for determining the internal doses to workers that were unmonitored or 

inadequately monitored for plutonium, tritium, or other radionuclides. This includes those 

workers that were exposed to radionuclides prior to any bioassay monitoring (appears to be 

<1960) and those not monitored or inadequately monitored after applicable bioassay became 

available. 

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The Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) states in Section 5.1 that this 

document provides the approach for assessing internal dose for employees with either missing or 

no monitoring information, and it also gives information on the start of internal exposure 

potential and bioassay programs: 

This document provides a uniform and consistent approach to assessing 

occupational internal dose at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL) for dose reconstructions for NIOSH in relation to the EEOICPA. It 

provides guidance to dose reconstructors on input parameters that are specific to 

LLNL employees, as well as the approach for employees with either missing or no 

monitoring information. 

LLNL workers handled a variety of radionuclides as part of their routine work. 

The key elements in the source term were plutonium and tritium, although others 

were used at various times and in various forms. For the purposes of dose 

reconstruction it can be assumed that internal source terms were introduced at 

LLNL’s inception on September 2, 1952. 

The Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) pointed out the following: 

Prior to the early 1960s, the only methodology that LLNL used to monitor 

employees for intakes of radionuclides at LLNL was urine bioassay, with the 

primary focus on excreted tritium. It is not clear when bioassay monitoring first 

began, but it continues to this day for plutonium, americium, uranium, mixed 

fission products, a variety of tracer radionuclides, iodine, and tritium ....” 

The TBD has a Section 5.3 titled “Assessment of Intake for Unmonitored Claimants.” This 

section states the following: 

The in-vivo bioassay sampling program at LLNL was extensive, and there was 

clear direction to supervisors on individual employee participation in the 

program. However, there is evidence that participation was not always enforced. 

Therefore, a means of assessing intake for unmonitored claimants is necessary. 

The Internal Dosimetry Coworker Data for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, OTIB0065 (ORAUT 2007e), gives direction on estimating doses from intakes of uranium, but 

provides limited guidance on assessing intakes for plutonium, tritium, and other radionuclides by 

unmonitored claimants [albeit, OTIB-0066 (ORAUT 2007g) does provide guidance on 

calculation of dose from intakes of special tritium compounds]. It should be noted again that the 

database used for this coworker procedure on uranium has been identified to have several 

quality-related concerns described in Finding 5.3 in detail (see discussion on MAPPER 

database). This may undermine the validity of the guidance provided in this document. 

If it is determined that coworker bioassay data is not useful in determining the doses for 

unmonitored or inadequately monitored claimants, several approaches can be evaluated for 

applicability. Air monitoring data (area and personal breathing zone) can be used to estimate 

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inhalation intakes of radionuclides and internal doses if it is available and applicable when 

bioassay is unavailable (CFR 2005). A statement in Section 5.1 of the Occupational Internal 

Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) identifies the performance of air sampling: 

Air monitoring in workplaces and in the breathing zones of employees has been a 

common surveillance method. However, LLNL apparently did not use the data 

acquired through that program, which are not readily associated with individual 

exposures, to prepare the dose of record for employees. 

In addition, Section 5.3 of the TBD states the following: 

Bioassays were supplemented with workplace and/or personal breathing zone 

airborne monitoring (Mansfield 1989, p. 10).... 

If air-monitoring data are used, then a determination of how representative the data are of the 

exposure the employee had is needed, due to the likelihood that certain types of air monitoring in 

an area may not accurately represent a given exposure (NRC 1993). Other assumptions need to 

be evaluated, such as the solubility class of the radionuclide(s) inhaled (to use the correct dose 

coefficient), breathing rate of the employee, and use of appropriate respirator protection factors, 

if respiratory protection is worn during exposure periods. Reasonable, claimant-favorable 

choices of breathing rates (light work, heavy work, resting) should be made. Adjustments to 

intakes for respiratory protection should not be taken unless the dose reconstructor has 

confidence that respiratory protection usage was adequately documented, including the type of 

respirator used, to identify protection factors and adequacy of the respiratory protection program 

and its implementation. 

Loose (removable) surface contamination data can be used to estimate air concentrations if 

reasonable claimant-favorable resuspension factors are applied to the data and the location of the 

survey data are applicable. If this approach is used, then the assumptions discussed above 

regarding solubility class, breathing rate, and respiratory protection will need to be addressed, 

since air concentration estimates would be used again for intake assessment. Surface 

contamination data can also be used to estimate ingestion intakes in areas that good personal 

contamination control practices may not have been followed. 

Another approach may be to assume that intakes that could be or have been assessed to workers 

that had similar exposures and were monitored by bioassay are representative of intakes that 

unmonitored or inadequately monitored claimants may have had. This approach would require a 

determination of the accuracy of assuming that the unmonitored claimants were working in 

similar areas and performing similar tasks under similar radiological contamination and control 

conditions. If this approach is taken, then a determination should be made whether the average 

or maximum intakes assigned to monitored workers are the most reasonable claimant-favorable 

assumption, or if a statistical analysis of intakes assessed by bioassay is needed to estimate the 

intakes for these claimants favorably. 

Several statements in the TBD point out that the supervisors were responsible for entering 

workers into available and appropriate bioassay programs, and one statement in the TBD 

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indicates that participation in appropriate bioassay programs may not have been enforced in all 

cases. The dose reconstructor should determine if a worker did or did not participate in the 

appropriate bioassay program, and if the worker’s supervisor(s) enforced the worker’s 

participation in the appropriate bioassay program. An approach should be developed to 

determine how to account for doses from potential intakes that these workers may have had that 

went undetected. The approach should be described in detail in either this TBD, a TIB, or 

procedure that is available for review. The capability to identify whether a claimant was in any 

group of unmonitored or inadequately monitored employees will also be needed, which involves 

some method to determine the timeframes that these employees entered work locations with 

internal exposure potential during their work at LLNL. 

In its response to SC&A’s internal dose section question #3 (see Attachment 3), NIOSH 

indicated that at the time this question was posed, a coworker study was in development for the 

years in which bioassay was performed, and will determine bounding estimates for intakes of 

long-lived, long-retained nuclides for individuals that were subsequently monitored in later 

years. It also states that an approach is in development for unmonitored workers in the early 

years with no later monitoring or with potential for exposure to short-lived nuclides. Due to the 

concerns with the problems in the bioassay data in the database that NIOSH is using to perform 

this coworker data approach (i.e., the MAPPER database), it is recommended that NIOSH 

review historical radiological control program information (if available), such as surface and air 

contamination monitoring data, to assist in estimating intakes to these individuals, in particular 

for the unmonitored workers in the early years or with potential for exposure to the short-lived 

nuclides. 

5.9 SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IS LACKING FOR INTAKE AND DOSE ASSESSMENT 

There is a lack of specific guidance for intake and dose assessments, such as assumption of 

uranium enrichment for bioassay mass concentration interpretation, aging of weapons grade 

plutonium, use of in-vivo data, and use of air sampling data or other radiological control 

information to support intake assessment. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0060, Internal Dose Reconstruction (ORAUT 2007c), provides guidance on 

many intake and parameter assumptions that should be made during dose assessments to 

maximize the dose that was potentially received by the claimant; however, the Occupational 

Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) still needs to provide some site-specific 

guidance to dose reconstructors. The assumption of uranium enrichment can change the dose by 

a fairly large factor when interpreting uranium mass concentration bioassay results, which are the 

results in which the bulk of uranium bioassay data is recorded. NIOSH responded to further 

questions that the assumed enrichment will be natural uranium in the next revision. The dose 

reconstructor needs to be aware of any possibility that highly enriched uranium intakes could 

have been monitored with bioassay uranium mass in the earlier days of lower sensitivity analysis 

(fluorophotometric), because the high specific activity from the U-234 component would give a 

rather large dose per unit detected and this would not be accounted for if natural uranium is the 

assumed enrichment. The TBD points out the different activity levels of the radionuclides in 

weapons grade plutonium over time for decay and ingrowth of Am-241; however, it does not 

give guidance on which age of plutonium to use or which is claimant favorable to use if more 

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than one is possible. The TBD does not give any significant guidance on performing internal 

dosimetry for any exposures that could have occurred during activity at weapons testing sites. 

The TBD does not give any guidance on the use of breathing zone air sampling, which it states 

was done routinely, or in-vivo bioassay, which has been performed since the early 1960s for the 

support and refinement of intake and dose assessments. 

In the response to question #7 of the internal dose section in Attachment 3, NIOSH states that, 

“A default value of 10 yr aged Pu is used in [dose reconstruction].” This guidance is not 

identified in the TBD, and if it is from another document, that document should be cited and 

referenced. 

5.10 EXTERNAL DOSE RECORDS ARE INADEQUATELY CHARACTERIZED 

LLNL is a large, complex site that has been in operation for over 50 years, with workers 

occupying several physical locations (LLNL proper, Site 300, PPG, and NTS). The 

Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) states on page 7 that the 

personnel dosimetry records are generally available for all periods at LLNL for workers that had 

the potential for exposure to radiation. However, there may be some situations where dose 

records may not be adequate for some workers. This is especially true for early workers, before 

all the radiation hazards were identified and all workers were badged. Additionally, dosimetry 

may not have matched the exposure conditions at all the different work sites. Lack of, or 

inadequate, monitoring can lead to incorrect dose records and less than claimant-favorable dose 

reconstructions. These areas of concern are examined in more detail in the following sections. 

5.10.1 1952–Present 

5.10.1.1 Badging policies 

Workers could have worked at different locations while employed at LLNL. These included the 

LLNL main area, Site 300, PPG, and NTS. It is not clear from the Occupational External Dose 

TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) whether the badging polices were uniform at these different 

work locations for LLNL workers. It states on page 7 of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) 

that workers could have worked at the NTS and other test areas, but does not provide any details 

on badging policies (i.e., did the LLNL workers take their badges with them to other sites, and if 

so, were the calibrations appropriate to the radiation fields present there?). If the workers 

obtained on-site badges when they worked at other test sites, were these doses recorded in the 

worker’s records at LLNL, or does the dose reconstructor have to be aware of this and request 

DOE files from that site also? Many workers or their survivors may not recall all the trips to 

different sites. Additionally, were the LLNL or on-site badges calibrated for the type of 

exposures to which the LLNL workers were exposed? 

5.10.1.2 Who was badged and when? 

On page 15 of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), it states that it was documented that all 

workers at Livermore were monitored for radiation beginning in 1954, but on page 9 it states that 

the policy of monitoring all workers began in May 1958. It is not clear from the TBD if the term 

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“all workers entering the site were monitored since May 1958” (page 9) covers all workers, 

including prime and subcontract workers, D&D workers, rovers, private contractors, etc. This 

total badging policy is somewhat different than the criterion that is listed in Table 6-3 on page 14 

of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), where for 1952–present, it is stated that “All 

employees with significant measurable exposure potential were monitored continuously” 

[emphasis added]. This criterion would not necessarily include all workers entering the site. 

The latter statement is supported by gaps in monitoring, as noted on page 15 and annotation [7] 

of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007). It appears even for 1958–present, not all workers 

were monitored at any time; i.e., employees with low exposure potential were sometimes not 

monitored, such as some workers in administrative-type work from May 1958 onward. 

5.10.1.3 Zero and blank entries 

On page 9 of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), it states that, “Doses below the detection 

limit were either recorded as zero or not recorded at all,” and Table 6-5 on page 14 of the TBD 

states that, “(no data) [and] blanks should be interpreted as individual was monitored with zero 

results.” If zeros are entered, it indicates that the worker was monitored for that period and the 

reading was between zero and MDL. However, a blank does not confirm that a worker was 

badged, or if a badge was read or recorded. A badge may not have been issued or it may have 

been lost or destroyed. This is especially important during 1952–1957, when not all workers 

were badged. Assigning a dose based on MDL for a blank entry does not insure that the 

potential dose received by a worker is correctly recorded. 

5.10.2 1952–1957 

5.10.2.1 Selection of workers for badging, 1952–1957 

The Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) uses the term “significant 

potential for exposure” to define who was badged during 1952–1957. However, this does not 

really provide sufficient information concerning who was badged during this period, i.e., what 

criteria established the technical basis for badging or not badging a worker. A more definite 

selection process is needed to ensure proper monitoring for dose reconstruction purposes. In 

addition, the validity of any coworker model derived from previously monitored workers’ 

recorded doses depends on how the monitored population was selected (i.e., maximum exposed, 

randomly selected, and cohort badging data available for specific job locations). 

5.10.2.2 Dose records, 1952–1957 

Table 6-5 of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007, pg. 14) states that more than 95% of the 

employees were monitored before 1958. However, it does not state if this covers all workers, 

including prime and subcontract workers, temporary workers, rovers, private contractors, etc. 

Additionally, it is not stated if this 95% figure also applies to neutron monitoring; nor does it 

provide the breakdown of the percent monitored by year. This area needs further investigation 

and discussion in the TBD. 

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5.10.2.3 Yearly badging results, 1952–1957 

To determine if adequate badging was performed during 1952–1957 (when not all workers were 

monitored) and the applicability of this data to a coworker model, it is recommended that a table 

or tables be constructed with a breakdown of the monitoring data for beta/photons and neutrons, 

to include the following: 

• Number of badge readings each year 

• Total number of workers each year 

• Percent of zeros each year 

• Percent of blank entries each year 

• Distribution of doses each year, including high, average/median, and low readings. 

• Any dosimetry problem or adjustments for each year 

Because of NIOSH’s recent recommendation to use the n/p method to assign neutron dose 

instead of using the original NTA film readings, NTA dose of record will not be used (Thomas 

and Szalinski 2007). However, it is still important to determine the neutron badging policy and 

to analyze the NTA neutron monitoring results because, in many cases, the dose reconstructor 

will check to see if the worker was badged for neutrons using NTA film to decide if neutron dose 

assignment is warranted using the n/p method. 

5.11	 INADEQUACIES EXIST IN HOW DOSE OF RECORD IS COMPARED WITH 

WORKER’S ACTUAL DOSE; INSUFFICIENT BASIS PROVIDED FOR 

NEUTRON DOSE ESTIMATION 

Throughout the Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), the dose data 

records are presented as containing the correct dose received by the worker. However, a number 

of technical issues are not considered in this assumption. Lawrence Berkeley National 

Laboratory (LBNL) provided the dosimetry during 1952–1955. However, no details of 

calibration, response as a function of energy, geometry, or mixed fields, etc., were provided. 

This was still an era when film dosimetry was being developed and some problems existed in 

dosimetry. Additionally, these response functions were not covered after 1955, when LLNL 

provided the dosimetry. Nolan (1958) indicated that there had been some problems with the 

former film badge program, and that the new program was much better, but still could use some 

adjustments. (Also see Graham and Homann 1977 concerning TLD photon measurement 

errors.) These concerns apply to both beta/photon and the deviation and application of n/p 

values. It is stated on page 8 of the TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) that the dose 

reconstructor can compare earlier dosimetry systems to current systems to evaluate their 

performance. However, this is an area that should be addressed in the TBD; it is arguable that 

the dose reconstructor should not be required to perform this task. Additionally, having each 

dose reconstructor perform this task could lead to inconsistency in dose reconstruction technique. 

The only adjustments to the photon doses mentioned in the TBD are an uncertainty factor of 1.3 

for film and 1.2 for TLDs on page 16, and the recommendation of the use of exposure-to-organ 

DCFs prior to 1966, and Hp(10)-to-organ DCFs thereafter in Table 6-6 on page 15. The only 

adjustment to the neutron doses was the recommendation to multiply the recorded dose by a 

factor of 1.91 to account for the ICRP-60 weighting factors. This appears to be an 

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oversimplification of dosimetry over a 50-year period. The areas that need to be addressed are 

presented in this section. 

5.11.1 Photon dose 

As dosimetry technology developed, response functions were refined and a better match was 

obtained between actual exposure and dose records. However, at most facilities, there were 

adjustments and uncertainties associated with dosimetry throughout the years. The Occupational 

External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007, pg. 14) makes the statement that no 

adjustments are recommended to the recorded photon doses. This would indicate that all photon 

dosimetry records at LLNL correctly represent the dose received by the workers during all 

periods and exposure conditions to all radiation sources within a small error, such as several 

percent. Most likely this was not the case, especially in the early years; for example, Kathren 

(1963) expressed concern about the measurement of doses from photons of <100 keV and of beta 

exposure. Uncertainty factors of 1.3 for film and 1.2 for TLDs, as recommended in the TBD 

(Thomas and Szalinski 2007), do not appear to be claimant favorable, in view of other DOE site 

TBDs, which use higher uncertainty factors. These other site TBDs list uncertainty factors of 1.3 

or more at SRS (Scalsky 2005) and at LLNL (Hankins 1978a), where it is indicated that TLD 

albedo-neutron dosimeters could be used with an expected accuracy of +25 to 33%. 

Additionally, it could not be found that the NIOSH’s OCAS-IG-001 (NIOSH 2002) document 

supports using an uncertainty value of 1.2 in view of page 16 of that document, which states 

laboratory uncertainty alone is never less than 20%: 

As noted by the National Research Council subcommittee, laboratory uncertainty 

was never less than 1.2. As long as a standard error estimate is greater than 

10%, the 95% Uncertainty Factor K(E)) is also never less than 1.2. 

According to this, laboratory uncertainties (calibration, chemical processing, reading, etc.) alone 

are usually considered to be around 20%. In addition, radiological (energy spectra, body PAAP-rotational positions, and other field variables) and environmental (moisture, light, 

temperature, chemical exposures, etc.) uncertainties must be considered. These combined 

uncertainties usually range around 30%–40% under actual working conditions, especially during 

the earlier years of film dosimetry, such as prior to 1971. 

5.11.2 Neutron dose 

In Rev. 01 of the Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), page 13, it is 

recommended that the dose reconstructor should use the n/p ratio method to determine neutron 

doses to workers with the potential for neutron exposure during the period 1952–1969. It is 

assumed from the first part of the paragraph that this includes 1969, although in the middle of the 

paragraph it states, “...prior to 1969.” The use of the n/p method eliminates a lot of uncertainties 

that have plagued the use of NTA neutron film throughout its history. However, at the same 

time, it puts an additional burden on the adequacy and accuracy of the measured/assigned photon 

dose. Using completely separate neutron (NTA) and photon (film) monitoring methods provided 

a checks-and-balances system, while at the same time, the accuracy of one measurement did not 

affect the accuracy of the other. Using only the photon dose to assign the total photon-plusNOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

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neutron dose requires more stringent control over the assigned photon dose, because an error or 

bias in the photon dose will not only be carried through in the final photon dose, but will be 

multiplied by the n/p factor and compounded by the dose to dose-equivalent conversion factors 

in assigning the final dose. Therefore, a number of details concerning neutron dose need to be 

addressed in order to use the n/p method. For the most part, this TBD did not sufficiently 

address the details and uncertainties of the n/p methodology. 

In addition to the lack of details concerning the n/p method, the TBD did not sufficiently 

investigate and address other periods of neutron dose measurements and dose assignments from 

1970 to the present, when TLD and CR-39 neutron monitors were used. 

Some of the major areas of concern in neutron dose assignments for 1952–present include the 

following: 

(1) The TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) makes the following statement on page 13: 

For neutron dose received prior to 1969, the dose should be adjusted by using 

a neutron to photon ratio. The ratio varied by operation and task. There was 

no comprehensive study of neutron flux at LLNL; the neutron to photon ratio 

cannot be established using existing data from LLNL. 

The fact that the n/p ratios cannot be established prior to 1969 using existing data from 

LLNL indicates that the dose reconstructor cannot adequately do a claimant-favorable 

neutron dose reconstruction for workers exposed to neutrons prior to 1969. The TBD 

then recommends using the SRS n/p GM value of 1.0, with a GSD of 3.0, and an upper 

95th percentile of 6.1. This value used from SRS (Scalsky 2005) is, in turn, dependent on 

a study done at the Hanford site. The value is selected without any documented analysis 

or support provided in the TBD. Some of the problems with this using the single n/p 

value from the SRS are as follows: 

a.	 No analysis was made of the similarities and differences between the three sites, 

which involved many diverse operations. 

b.	 A single n/p value for all operations through the time period of 1952–1969 is not 

appropriate, especially in view of the changes that took place in operations and 

radiation knowledge/controls during this dynamic period at DOE facilities. 

c.	 According to Table 5-14 of Rev. 04-E of the SRS TBD (Scalsky 2006, pg. 102), the 

HB line average n/p value was 1.29, with a range up to 3.1, and on page 104, it states 

that Brackenbush et al. (1987) reported the n/p value was 2 for F-areas. If LLNL Pu 

working conditions are shown to be similar to the ones at the SRS, then using a single 

n/p value of 1.0 does not appear appropriate. 

d.	 An n/p value for highly-moderated neutron sources would be claimant favorable in 

most cases. However, exposure potentials at LLNL consisted of higher energy 

neutrons from 14 MeV D-T reactions, high-energy accelerators, and reactor neutron 

ports. This could create neutron fields with n/p values of up to 10:1, an order of 

magnitude greater than the recommended 1:1 value. 

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e.	 A brief search of available LLNL documents indicates that there are some neutron 

spectra and dose measurement information available that may be applicable to better 

define n/p values, and to characterize neutron fields and exposures at LLNL. A few 

examples are Myers and Prevo 1969, Griffith et al. 1977, Harrar 1976, and Griffith 

et al. 1984, among others that are available. The ORAU server Site Research Query 

Interface lists 146 documents concerning neutron-related topics at LLNL. LLNL 

personnel were very active in neutron dosimetry and related research, and published 

articles in the Health Physics Society Journal (among other noted journals), such as 

Straume 1985 (setting neutron radiation safety standards), Hankins 1978b (neutron 

remmeters and thermal neutron response), and Griffith et al. 1979 (developments in 

neutron dosimeters), just to list a few. 

f.	 An abundance of publications by noted researchers at LLNL would indicate that there 

were some in-depth studies of neutron fields and doses at the LLNL that cover 

numerous years and various operations. A quick review of just the few articles 

mentioned above indicate that the researchers were involved in investigating a wide 

range of neutron energies, including thermal neutrons; sub-critical and criticalassembly neutrons; Cf and Pu spontaneous fission neutrons; (alpha,n) neutrons; D-T 

14 MeV neutrons; and accelerator produced neutrons. 

(2) Page 11 states that before 1963, the data were not adequately defined to directly report 

neutron doses, and that the dose reconstructor should use the guidance in OTIB-0023 

(ORAUT 2005b) and PROC-0006 (ORAUT 2006b). This is an important statement and 

needs to be explained in detail. For example, what would be the effects of switching 

from the NTA film results to the n/p method on deriving the shallow dose? 

(3) Information concerning the number of workers monitored for neutron exposure during 

the period from 1952–1969 needs to be provided. Although the dose reconstructor will 

not be using the NTA film results directly, this is an important item, because in many 

cases, the dose reconstructor will use this as a guide as to whether to assign neutron dose 

using the n/p method. 

(4) It is stated that neutron dosimeters were calibrated using PuBe sources prior to 1970 and 

Cf-252 thereafter. There were a wide range of neutron energies at LLNL (Thomas and 

Szalinski 2007, pg. 11). Details are needed concerning dosimetry response using these 

calibration sources, compared to actual neutron fields found at various work locations 

and any benchmark neutron dose, energy, and n/p values measurements made in work 

locations. 

(5) The effects of non-albedo neutron TLD dosimetry/calibration on recorded dose during 

1969–1975 need to be investigated and discussed. 

(6) Information concerning the number of workers monitored for neutron exposure after 

1970 is needed, because it is only stated that they were monitored as needed, but no 

additional information or data has been presented to determine if this monitoring was 

adequate for neutrons for all locations and time periods at the LLNL and its related sites. 

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(7) Information concerning n/p data or other methods that will be used for assigning neutron 

doses during gaps or to unmonitored workers for 1970–present and for use in a 

coworker’s model needs to be provided. 

(8) CR-39 neutron dosimetry has been used at LLNL since 1986. The TBD (Thomas and 

Szalinski 2007) needs to provide information concerning how this is integrated into the 

overall total neutron dose recorded for a worker at LLNL in conjunction with the TLD 

readings. It would also be helpful to provide information concerning what workers and 

their locations are monitored using CR-39 neutron elements and the advantages/ 

limitations of this technology in the neutron radiation fields at LLNL and its associated 

sites. 

SC&A has concluded that the present TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) does not provide 

sufficient details and quantitative data to support neutron dose reconstruction that is 

technically sound and ensures claimant favorability for all workers at the LLNL and its 

associated work locations for the period 1952–present. This is especially true for 1952–1969, 

when the use of the n/p method (using a single n/p = 1.0 from the SRS for all operations for all 

years) is recommended by NIOSH. The conclusion also applies to 1970–present, because the 

neutron badging policy has been very subjectively defined as those with “significant neutron 

exposure” were badged; it has not been shown that all workers exposed to neutrons were badged. 

Additionally, a valid neutron-dose coworker model for unmonitored workers has not been 

developed for 1970–present. There appear to be more documents and data available than have 

been presented and/or used in the current TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) to construct a 

technically sound and claimant-favorable neutron dose assignment and coworker model. 

5.12	 LACK OF VALID EXTERNAL DOSE COWORKER APPROACH HINDERS 

ADEQUATE DOSE ESTIMATION FOR EARLY UNMONITORED WORKERS 

Several times in the Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), the subject 

of using coworker data is mentioned: 

[Page 10] “If available, coworker data should be used.” 

[Page 17] “...to apply a dose based on coworker data.” 

However, the TBD does not provide any LLNL-specific photon, beta, or neutron coworker 

data/model/tables for use by the dose reconstructor in assigning dose to unmonitored workers; 

only a reference to LANL, Table 6E-2, is made on page 15. Also, to date, no TIB has been 

issued that covers unmonitored LLNL workers’ external dose assignments using coworker data. 

Therefore, detailed information is needed that can assist the dose reconstructor in assigning 

external doses to unmonitored workers at LLNL for photon, beta, and neutron doses. 

Information to be considered in using coworker data are as follows: 

(1) A table of recommended photon, beta, and neutron dose assignments for each year from 

1952–present (as a function of categories of worker’s location and/or job title, as is 

needed). 

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(2) Details concerning the population of workers from which the data were drawn should be 

provided. Some useful information for each type of radiation would be: 

• Number of badge readings included in each year’s data 

• Any filtering of data, i.e., “did not include readings less than MDL,” etc. 

• Work locations and job title categories of that are most prevalent in the coworker data 

• Distribution of doses each year, including high, average/median, and low readings 

(3) Information concerning the assignment of the appropriate percentile, such as 

50th percentile for unmonitored workers with low exposure potential and 95th percentile 

for routinely exposed unmonitored workers. 

SC&A concludes that the present TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) does not present 

sufficient analysis, data, and dose reconstruction guidance to provide a valid coworker 

model for 1952–present for photon, beta, and neutron radiation. The reliance on LANL 

coworker photon and/or beta data is not supported by quantitative comparative analysis over 

time and job types. Additionally, because the dose data for LANL (NIOSH 2007) for 1943– 

1975 are presently under SEC-00051 (which indicates that NIOSH cannot estimate doses for 

LANL workers with sufficient accuracy), this dose data should not be applied to LLNL workers. 

The present TBD does not provide information and dose reconstruction guidance, such as a 

coworker model with data tables, for unmonitored workers with potential for exposure during the 

period 1970–present. 

5.13 SECONDARY ISSUES 

5.13.1	 The Occupational Internal Dose TBD Lacks Information on Incidents that Could 

Cause Significant Intakes or External Dose 

The lack of information on incidents that could have caused significant intakes of radionuclides 

could hinder accurate interpretation of bioassay results and identification of intakes by 

unmonitored or inadequately monitored workers. 

The Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) states the following in 

Section 5.4, “Significant Incidents with Internal Dose Potential:” 

During operation at LLNL, a number of incidents increased the potential for 

intakes of radioactive materials. If a claimant recalls involvement in one or more 

of those incidents, dose reconstructors can use the information in Table 5-7 as 

input to an incident-specific assessment. This list is not all encompassing, many 

other incidents probably occurred; these are the incidents identified from review 

of the data capture records. Individual claimant records may provide 

documentation of involvement in other incidents. 

There are only three incidents in Table 5-7 (Berger and Szalinski 2005) for covering the site 

history. It is difficult to understand how the dose reconstructors can use the information from 

only these listed incidents to help reconstruct a claimant’s exposure from involvement in one of 

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the “number of incidents” that have occurred at the site. If a claimant recalls involvement in an 

incident, then every attempt should be made to find out as much about that specific incident as 

possible through claimant interviews and available LLNL records. Interpretation of bioassay 

data can be assisted by the use of incident records information. The use of medical interventions 

for any major intakes that would have undoubtedly been associated with incidents (e.g., chelation 

for plutonium intakes) that are not discussed in this TBD may be found in incident records, and 

bioassay interpretation can be assisted by this information. According to a health physicist 

interviewed, there have been several chelations in the last 15 years. NIOSH needs to determine 

if an incident records review of greater extent needs to be performed, and to justify why it does 

not need to do this if it believes it is not applicable to reconstructing doses accurately. During 

interviews with site employees, a location identified for incident records retention was the Fire 

Station. 

In a facility as large as LLNL, there most likely have been some incidents/accidents that need to 

be addressed in the TBD. This is especially true in the early days, before all the workers were 

badged and when there were many unknowns in experiments and in operations. The 

Occupational External Dose TBD (Szalinski 2005) does mention the following on page 13: 

Specific incident reports might address significant nonroutine worker doses, such 

as skin contamination events. The dose assessments in such reports, based on 

investigations conducted at the time of the incident, should be the best estimates 

of dose received. 

However, the recently revised Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) 

does not provide any information concerning the major incidents/accidents at LLNL and how 

they were handled, changes in policy resulting from these events, or what the resulting exposures 

were and if any unbadged workers were exposed. One example is the 1963 criticality accident in 

Building 110 (Montan 1963). 

In its response to SC&A’s internal dose section question #12 and question #7 of the site 

description section (see Attachment 3), NIOSH indicates that more research has been performed 

to better describe accidents and incidents in an ongoing revision of the LLNL TBD. This is an 

important effort that is needed for internal, external, and environmental dose assessment, which 

should be fully supported to quickly assist these dose assessments with appropriate claimantfavorable determinations. As discussed above, critical information for dose assessment accuracy 

can often be found in incident/accident investigation reports. 

5.13.2 Occupational Medical X-rays Incompletely Characterized for Dose Estimation 

The current guidelines, as presented in the reference OTIB-0006, Rev. 3 (ORAUT 2005d), go a 

long way in assuring that occupational medical exposures are included in determining the overall 

dose estimations for claimants. For instance, the LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD, 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 (Turner 2005), refers the dose reconstructor to the previous Rev. 2 of 

OTIB-0006 (ORAUT 2003b). Unfortunately, the interpretation to date by ORAU in the 

Occupational Medical Dose TBD utilizing OTIB-0006, Rev. 2 (ORAUT 2003b) is not as 

claimant favorable as the guidance provided in OTIB-0006, Rev. 3 (ORAUT-2005d). The 

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Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005) assumes an interpretation that also has been 

considered and applied at other sites, such as RFP and Hanford Plant. To this extent, the 

assumption that medical procedures are limited to only one pre-employment and other potential 

annual chest x-rays as part of routine physical exams may substantially underestimate worker 

medical exposure when evaluating the totality of occupational medical exposure. ORAUTPROC-0061 (ORAUT 2006d, Table A-1, pg. 15) does indicate that when using the “Maximizing 

Approach,” the dose reconstructor should assume a pre-employment and annual PA chest x-ray 

exposures. However, this claimant-favorable option is not applied in determining the “Best 

Estimate Approach” or the “Minimizing Approach” (ORAUT 2006d, pp. 8–10). 

In support documentation OTIB-0006, Rev. 3 (ORAUT 2005d), it is concluded that other 

examinations may be included, such as special job exams (e.g., respiratory protection, beryllium 

workers, asbestos workers, etc.) and termination exams. 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005) only mentions OTIB-0006, Rev. 2 (2003b). 

When revised, the TBD should lead the dose reconstructor to Rev. 3 of the OTIB-0006 (ORAUT 

2005d). The following quote from the TBD does note that it is not feasible to address the three 

general approaches specified in PROC-0061 (ORAUT 2004c), and emphasizes the importance of 

consulting the employee’s complete medical records to determine the worker’s occupational 

medical x-ray exposure: 

Chest films for beryllium and asbestos workers were apparently introduced in the 

1980s with a frequency dependent on the age and exposure of the individual 

(Noonan 2002). Available documents indicate that chest X-rays were 

administered on an individual basis in keeping with acceptable guidelines of 

occupational medicine. In the absence of a general policy for frequencies of 

regularly required chest X-rays, it is not feasible to address the three general 

dose reconstruction approaches (maximizing, best estimate, and minimizing) 

specified in Occupational X-Ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites [ORAUT 

2004b]. Dose reconstructors must consult an employee’s medical records to 

determine the extent of the worker’s required medical X-rays. (Turner 2005, 

pg. 6) 

ORAUT 2004b has been updated to PROC-0061, Rev. 01 (ORAUT 2006d), which was 

issued after the publication of the Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005). 

When the individual medical record is lacking in specific information, the TBD offers no other 

default means to develop a realistic medical x-ray history that might also include special chest 

radiography for respirator certification, beryllium and asbestos workers, and food handlers which 

might be a part of the annual physical. There is nothing in the TBD that documents past medical 

protocols. Such special chest radiography was often performed separately, at the request of the 

Medical Department, until the mid-1980s. 

The Occupational Medical TBD does point out the following: 

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Apart from the pre-employment baseline PA chest X-ray, it does not appear that 

LLNL mandated routine examinations on a regular basis for employees. 

(Turner 2005, pg. 6) 

However, unlike several other similar sites, the TBD provides no table that establishes the 

frequency of chest x-ray examinations. Table 3-1 in the LANL Occupational Medical Dose 

TBD (Johnson 2004, pg. 5) provides an example of this kind of table. 

The TBD refers to a March 1991 LLNL Health Services Department Radiography Program 

report that states the following: 

Requisition of X-ray studies for the purpose of diagnostic information should be 

based on clinical evaluation. Diagnostic X-ray examinations will be requested 

after an appropriate medical history and physical examination has been 

performed, in accordance with reasonable medical practice and occupational 

guidelines. Diagnostic objective, relevant medical history and X-ray procedure 

requested will be recorded on the radiographic request form. ... Based on the 

unique nature of the work performed at LLNL, a pre-employment baseline PA 

[posterior–anterior] chest X-ray examination is required. This film may be done 

at the time of pre-employment examination or a copy of a previous film or report 

may be requested and kept on file. Medical surveillance programs may mandate 

periodic chest X-rays. Periodic chest X-ray examinations unrelated to job 

exposure will not be done routinely but may be ordered by the examiner 

if clinically indicated. (LLNL 1991) 

Another factor not discussed in the TBD is the potential for and impact of x-ray procedures 

utilized by medical authorities to do special screenings, and to evaluate the result of injury and 

trauma. 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD, therefore, implies that only one pre-employment baseline 

PA (posterior-anterior) chest x-ray examination was all that was routinely done. There is no 

mention or documentation that some LLNL workers might not have received one chest 

examination of a PA and LAT per year, which was mentioned at other sites and was probably 

limited to a small fraction of high-risk workers. This was documented in Table 3.1 in the LANL 

Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Johnson 2004, pg. 5), especially after 1992. To the contrary, 

there is ample evidence that chest x-rays were provided on a voluntary basis to nearly all 

workers, as part of routine physical examinations. The majority of workers had chest x-rays as a 

routine at DOE sites until the mid-1980s, when federal guidelines warning against routine 

screening were first being enforced. 

After discussion with NIOSH personnel during a conference call regarding LANL, it was learned 

that NIOSH planned, at least for LANL personnel, to limit occupational medical exposure to 

those chest exams described above, and to assume all other exposure as part of worker 

background. SC&A believes such an interpretation is not claimant favorable to those most at 

risk. Our concern is that specified high-risk workers will likely receive compensation based 

upon a POC principally from exposure to radiation and beryllium. Second, all radiation provides 

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some risk, and arguably, is somewhat cumulative. These are not normal workers and warrant 

consideration of all forms of work-related x-ray exposure to be claimant favorable. SC&A 

believes NIOSH should review its interpretation of included exposure, and should adopt a 

broader interpretation of medical dose, as provided in the OTIB-0006, Rev. 3 (ORAUT 2005d). 

Thus, it is not considered claimant favorable to limit occupational medical exams to one 

pre-employment chest x-ray examination and not to account for some regularly administered 

annual chest x-rays, unless medical records and protocols clearly limit the use of radiography to 

a small fraction of workers, which was not the case until the mid-1980s. ORAUT-PROC-0061 

(ORAUT 2006d) also indicates that “Additional chest x-rays were apparently introduced in the 

1980s for beryllium and asbestos workers with a frequency dependent on the age and exposure 

of the individual.” 

5.13.3 Beam Quality, Filtration, and X-ray Tube Output are not Well Known 

The LLNL Occupational Medical TBD (Turner 2005, pg. 7) points out that the earliest an inhouse radiation survey of the Fisher X-ray machine was done by the LLNL Health Physics 

Group in 1975: 

The earliest document (Graham and Williams 1975) describes results of an inhouse radiation survey of the Fisher X-ray machine in the Medical Department by 

the LLNL Health Physics Group. Measurements gave an ESE of 19 mR [at a 

source-to-skin distance (SSD) of 157 cm], for a “typical” chest radiograph 

(100 kVp, 100 mA, 1/20 s). 

Beam collimation was deemed “satisfactory,” although the position of the light 

spot used for centering needed correction. The results of the survey indicated that 

the facility was operating properly and had adequate shielding. No other 

information was found about other aspects of the facility, such as screens, grids, 

film types, and development parameters. 

An issue of concern is that the DCFs are derived using a default half value layer (HVL) of 

2.5 mm Al for Type 1 units, in use from 1952–1980. Another issue is that the unit, in use from 

1980-present, had added filtration of 4.0 mm Al, which is significantly higher than the maximum 

3.5 mm Al taken from NCRP Report 102 (NCRP 1989, Table B.2). NIOSH believes that when 

no information is known about the energy spectrum, it is appropriate to use the Implementation 

Guide (NIOSH 2006) as a basis document. However, SC&A is not able to verify that 

information provided in LLNL 1991 is adequate to validate or support the assumption. 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 (Turner 2005), states the 

following regarding the application of ICRP Publication 34 (ICRP 1982) in developing DCFs 

appropriate for organ dose, and provides a default value for beam quality. 

The ICRP tables were developed under the assumption that the primary X-ray 

beam is collimated to the image receptor size. The application of these DCF 

tables to the early X-ray machines, particularly before about 1970, must therefore 

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be made in a way that compensates for the lack of collimation. Claimantfavorable allowance for this circumstance during different periods in the past, 

based on ICRP (1982), has been assessed in the generic document by ORAUT 

[2003b], which will be applied to estimate doses from the Fisher machine. In 

addition, when other data are not available, [ORAUT 2003b] recommends that 

the following values be used to express beam quality in terms of the half value 

layer of Al: 2.5 mm prior to 1980 and 4.0 mm for subsequent years. The ICRP 

(1982) values Document No. ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 Revision No. 00 Effective 

Date: 08/22/2005 Page 9 of 13 are used directly to obtain the organ doses for 

examinations with the Xonics and Bennett systems in Table 3-1. (Turner 2005, 

pg. 8) 

In calculating organ dose, the TBD provides the following guidance. 

Tables of DCFs are given in ICRP (1982) for seven organs in an adult 

anthropomorphic phantom for a number of common radiographic examinations 

with beams of different quality. For the PA chest projection, a source-to-image 

distance (SID) of 183 cm (72 in.) and an image receptor size of 35.6 × 43.2 cm 

(14 ×17 in.) are used. For an organ not included in ICRP (1982), but needed for 

the Interactive RadioEpidemiological Program (IREP), the DCF is taken to be 

that for the anatomically closest organ in the ICRP tables. (Turner 2005, pg. 8) 

Table 3-1 of the Occupational Medical Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0010-3 (Turner 2005), 

provides a very useful summary of the four types of x-ray equipment used at LLNL, and 

provides nominal operating parameters. These are documented by appropriate references for 

each type of machine. But as noted above, there is no other information on such aspects as 

screens used, grids, film types, and changes in developing parameters. It may be appropriate for 

NIOSH to search and add additional available references to help substantiate information 

depicted in Table 3.1. 

The ORAUT 2003b guidance recommends that the following values be used to express beam 

quality in terms of the HVL of Al: 2.5 mm prior to 1980, and 4.0 mm for subsequent years. The 

ICRP (1982) values are used directly to obtain the organ doses for examinations with the Xonics 

and Bennett systems in the LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005, Table 3-1, 

pg. 7). 

An issue of concern is that the DCFs are derived using a default HVL of 2.5 mm Al for Type 1 

units, in use from 1952–1980. Another issue is that the unit, in use from 1980-present, had 

added filtration of 4.0 mm Al, which is significantly higher than the maximum 3.5 mm Al taken 

from NCRP Report 102 (NCRP 1989, Table B.2). 

NIOSH believes that when no information is known about the energy spectrum, it is appropriate 

to use the Implementation Guide (NIOSH 2006) as a basis document. However, SC&A is not 

able to verify that information provided in LLNL 1991 is adequate to validate or support the 

assumption. It may be appropriate for NIOSH to search and add additional available references 

to help substantiate information depicted in Tables 3.1 of the Occupational Medical Dose TBD, 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 (Turner 2005). 

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5.13.4 Reliance on ICRP Publication 34 for Applicable DCFs May Underestimate Dose 

The TBD does consider the potential contribution to organ dose by using the DCFs for use by 

dose reconstructors for selected exams or specific organs in Table 3-4 on page 10 (Turner 2005). 

Organ dose equivalents for 14” x 17” PA chest radiography are provided for selected organs and 

for the different time periods for each type of x-ray machine used. This does not, however, take 

into account, the uncertainties in dose based on actual recorded measurements from the x-ray 

machine type, unless that information is available in the individual medical record. Unresolved 

is the concern that the DCFs are derived from ICRP Publication 34 (1982) and, therefore, are not 

comparable in terms of beam quality, which varies from unit to unit. These factors can 

contribute greatly to the dose to the chest and other organs for units in operation prior to 1960, 

where little documentation exists. 

For the Fisher Machine used at LLNL from 1952 until the end of 1980, the TBD (Turner 2005, 

pg. 9) states the following: 

In the absence of earlier documentation, the pre-1970 default values for organ 

doses given in Table 3-3 for the period 1952 through December 1969 are taken 

from Table 4.0-1 of ORAUT [2003b]. For January 1970 through December 1980, 

when the Fisher machine was probably retired, the doses in Table 3-3 are based 

on the default values from ORAUT [2003b] for this time period and scaled to be 

consistent with the 1975 measurements of Graham and Williams. Since the latter 

work showed the entrance kerma to be 0.020 rad and the default value is 0.10 rad 

for this time period, the doses given in column three of Table 3-3 are scaled to 

one-fifth their respective values in Table 4.0-1 of ORAUT [2003b]. 

The TBD is deficient in that little documentation exists to validate x-ray protocols, equipment 

maintenance, and upkeep records prior to 1960. It uses information derived from the OTIB0006, Rev. 2 (ORAUT 2003b) to estimate dose impacts. Further dose estimations are derived 

from Publication 34 (ICRP 1982) and NCRP Report 102 (NCRP 1989), and are not reflective of 

equipment and protocols used at LLNL during 1952–1960. 

The TBD provides the following information about the Xonics System that replaced the Fisher 

units around January 1981. 

No measurements were located that document the ESE for the Xonics chest exams 

at earlier times, from its beginning in January 1981 until the August 15, 1990, 

survey. In the absence of data to the contrary, the claimant-favorable assumption 

is made that the ESE was 0.045 R and the skin entrance kerma was 0.045 rad for 

the entire second period in Table 3-1. Thereafter, from November 1990 until its 

replacement after September 1992, the ESE is assumed to be 0.015 R and the 

entrance kerma, 0.015 rad. No records were found in which this level was 

exceeded. Table 3-3 lists the organ doses using these two values for the kerma 

and ICRP (1982). 

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For the Xonics System used after January 1981 and the Bennett System used after 1992, NIOSH 

and ORAU indicated (see Attachment 3, pg. 7) that adequate information was available after 

1980 to assess the skin-entrance kerma. The skin-entrance kerma assessed then allows for the 

appropriate use of DCFs that are provided in ICRP 1982. 

Uncertainty is defined in the TBD as being due to measurement error. This uncertainty includes 

variations in kilovoltage, tube current, timers, and the source-to-skin distance (SSD). This 

approach is quite similar to the uncertainty analyses documented in other DOE site profiles. The 

conclusion in this TBD, and others, is that an uncertainty factor of +30% should be used by dose 

reconstructors. 

SC&A agrees that the Occupational Medical Dose TBD conservatively estimates these essential 

aspects of an uncertainty review. Unresolved is the contribution to uncertainty in dose, due to 

other errors introduced by lack of quality controls in processing equipment and lack of adherence 

to established standard operating procedures (SOPs). A reasonable estimate of these 

contributions to uncertainty would be an evaluation of retake rates per examination type. As part 

of its revision of this TBD, NIOSH should revisit the potential for increased retake rates and 

evaluate its potential effect on dose. 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD does not show that LLNL applied dose minimization 

principles to reduce medical exposures prior to 1960. The document also does not assess or 

consider the likely exposure to workers who are referred to offsite medical facilities for 

followup. The TBD states that review of selected medical records and files did not reasonably 

show or match expected x-ray exam frequency, and type of exam. Little evidence exists to 

document the number of x-ray exams provided to the average worker, or for special exposure 

needs. 

5.13.5 Lack of Maintenance, Collimation, and X-ray Protocol Data Increase Uncertainty 

The Occupational Medical Dose, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 (Turner 2005), does not address the 

potential use of other forms of radiation exposure, other than x-ray units, that might have been 

used during medical injury diagnosis. This may involve use of isotopes, sealed sources, etc. The 

TBD is also deficient in that it does little to catalog the number, types of x-ray equipment, 

frequency of use, etc. The TBD also fails to document that available x-ray units were not 

operated at greater than 80–90 kVp during January 1981 while the Xonics x-ray machine was 

used, and for the Upgraded Sonics system used for chest x-rays from November 1990 to 

September 1992. Table 3-1 on page 7 does indicate that the Fisher x-ray machine was operative 

at 100 kVp during the period 1952 to December 1989, and that the Bennett x-ray machine was 

operated at 110 kVp from October 1992-present. 

The TBD does not address LLNL efforts to perform routine and preventative maintenance, 

which suggests that routine maintenance of x-ray units is not likely, unless performed by an 

outside contractor. The lack of discussion of any routine maintenance dose on x-ray equipment, 

especially in the early days prior to FDA x-ray inspections that started in August 1960, leaves 

some doubt about what was done to ensure optimal operations and dose reduction prior to 1960. 

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This is especially true for the Picker x-ray machine used for chest x-rays from 1952–1980. The 

TBD does mention that there is more information regarding the Xonics System used after 1980: 

However, reports from an FDA survey on August 15, 1990 (Van Pelt 1990), and 

from the follow-up by LLNL (Noonan 1991) provide considerable detailed 

information. The survey tested an array of items and resulted in a number of 

suggested action items. One concern was the finding that the ESE measured with 

a phantom for chest X-rays was 45 mR. Subsequent improvements upgraded the 

Xonics system in a number of ways, as noted in Table 3-1. The ESE was reduced 

to a reported range of 11 mR to 15 mR (Winstanley 1990a, b), which was verified 

by the FDA survey of the following year (Thomas 1991). 

Table 3.1 on LLNL x-ray equipment (Turner 2005, pg. 7) does indicate, however, that the unit 

had “...satisfactory collimation, measured ESE = 19 mr at SSD =157 cm...” This leaves in 

question the quality of the safety-related procedures in the period from 1952 to 1989. The TBD 

does provide the following statement regarding safety-related procedures: 

Detailed records were made for all X-ray examinations. The records include 

identification of the individual, the type of examination, data on operating 

parameters for the procedure, and other pertinent information. It appears that a 

single PA chest projection was standard practice. Radiographs are archived at 

LLNL and can be consulted. (Turner 2005, pg. 6) 

The lack of defined protocols and basis for approval of radiography procedures suggests that the 

use of radiography was not closely controlled. The Occupational Medical Dose TBD does not 

discuss the use of portable radiography to perform screenings and the potential for exposure of 

medical personnel or other workers without dosimetry devices being utilized. Interviews with 

past medical staff do suggest that portable x-ray units were not used. The TBD states the 

following in regards to the possible use of any PFG units at LLNL: 

There is no evidence that fluoroscopy was ever used at LLNL for required 

medical examinations. A random sample of X-ray portfolios was selected from 

the archives and examined for seven individuals employed at LLNL in the 1950s 

and 1960s. No small-format films were found. (Turner 2005, pg. 6) 

A random sampling of only seven individuals’ medical records seems to SC&A to be insufficient 

to rule out the possible use of PFG examinations at LLNL. The TBD provides no substantive 

documentation that PFG units were not used at that site from 1952 to 1960. Photofluorography 

units were not considered when organ dose calculations were documented in Publication 34 

(ICRP 1982) and NCRP Report 102 (NCRP 1989), which forms the basis for organ dose 

calculations presented in the TBD, when documented use of an x-ray unit is available. The 

recently revised version of OTIB-0006, Rev. 03 (ORAUT 2005d), suggests that 3.0 rem per PFG 

exam is more appropriate. If LLNL medical records do, in fact, show evidence of the use of 

PFG exams from 1952–1960, then the TBD should be updated to ensure that the claimant is 

given the claimant-favorable dose of 3.0 rem for each PFG examination received. 

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The TBD also fails to document that available x-ray units were not operated at greater than 80– 

90 kVp during January 1981, while the Xonics x-ray machine was used, and for the Upgraded 

Sonics system used for chest x-rays from November 1990 to September 1992. Table 3-1 on 

page 7 does indicate that the Fisher x-ray machine was operative at 100 kVp during the period 

1952 to December 1989, and that the Bennett x-ray machine was operated at 110 kVp from 

October 1992 to present. 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 (Turner 2005), does not consider 

dose impacts due to less than optimal use of technology, such as using screens, grids, or bucky 

systems. The TBD does not consider these elements as potential contributions to uncertainty. 

Also, the older version of the OTIB-0006, Rev. 2 (ORAUT 2003b), upon which the TBD relies, 

uses retake rates that average about 3%. The study referenced was based upon a large 

metropolitan hospital using highly trained technicians and well-maintained x-ray and processing 

units. A comparison review of federal facilities, such as by the Department of Defense (DOD) 

during the 1970s, using lesser-trained technicians (federal regulations did not require technician 

certification), showed that retakes sometimes ran up to 30% for abdominal exams, and often over 

15% for chest radiography. The TBD fails to provide any substantive documentation about what 

retake rate was needed with the specific x-ray machines used at LLNL. Although the PFG, by 

design, is less likely to require retakes, it is inherently much more dose-intensive. 

The conclusion is that the Occupational Medical Dose TBD does little to reasonably document 

the variety of medical occupational exposures and type of routine maintenance performed on the 

x-ray units up until 1960. Therefore, it is difficult to assure that a conservative and claimantfavorable estimation of dose is possible. This circumstance would suggest the need to reconsider 

a worst-case approach to establishing dose. 

5.13.6 Gaps Exist in the Occupational Environmental Dose TBD 

The LLNL Occupational Environmental TBD (Thomas 2005) provides internal and external 

dose information to be assigned to workers who were not monitored for external or internal 

exposure. The Technical Information Bulletin – Assignment of Environmental Internal Dose for 

Employees not Exposure to Airborne Radionuclides in the Workplace, ORAUT-OTIB-0014 

(ORAUT 2004a), provides additional information on when environmental dose should be 

assigned: 

If specific work locations on the site are unknown, dose reconstructors should 

always apply maximizing assumptions unless there is clear evidence (e.g., 

through the job description) that the maximum does not apply. As described in 

the previous section, however, an uncertain work location lessens the credibility 

of assigning environmental doses versus workplace internal doses. If work 

locations varied routinely (e.g., mail carrier, security guard), it might be 

appropriate to apply a site-wide average, if available, or use a weighted average 

based on the percentage of time in various locations. (ORAUT 2004a) 

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The LLNL Occupational Environmental TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4 (Thomas 2005), includes 

exposure from airborne releases, ambient external dose, and ingestion of tritium-contaminated 

water. 

The TBD describes the estimated annual intakes for inhalation exposure and 

estimated radiation dose as a result of ambient exposures at LLNL. 

Environmental measurements do not distinguish the source of emissions and, 

therefore, will reflect air concentrations from nearby as well as distant sources. 

The estimates of emissions were useful in filling in some gaps in measurement 

data and were critical to estimating exposure before the start of comprehensive 

and routine measurement data reports. (Thomas 2005) 

The TBD discusses the Main Laboratory area (hereafter referred to as the Livermore site) and 

Site 300 separately, which is appropriate, since Site 300 is 15 miles east of the Livermore site. 

Operations began at the Livermore site in 1952 and at Site 300 in 1955. Methodologies for 

assessment of internal dose are available from 1961 forward. External dose reconstruction data 

is available from 1976 forward, with assumed dose contributions made for previous years. 

Drinking water data is available for the Livermore site, but has not been located for Site 300. 

The Environmental Dose TBD has not included a methodology to calculate doses from 

environmental exposures in the early years when exposures may have been higher, but the TBD 

indicates that such an assessment of environmental dose was done. No consideration was given 

to increased effluent controls and improved equipment, and how this may affect the application 

of estimates from one year to another. The TBD did not consider data available regarding 

episodic releases, soil contamination, contributions to environmental dose from other DOE sites 

[e.g., Sandia National Laboratory - Livermore (SNLL), NTS, PPG], and internal exposure from 

radionuclides other than plutonium, uranium, and tritium. 

5.13.6.1 Environmental Dose in the Early Years 

The highest internal exposures likely occurred during the early years of operation, and decreased 

with time as increased controls and better equipment were implemented. The LLNL 

Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 2005) indicates that air samples were established as early as 

1961 for the Livermore site and 1962 for Site 300. Air samples were analyzed for gross alpha 

and gross beta initially. In 1971, isotopic analysis for plutonium, tritium, and uranium began. 

From 1961–1971, analysis was limited to gross alpha and gross beta. Tritium intake values prior 

to 1972 are not available, and gross alpha and beta are not available prior to 1961 in the TBD. 

The TBD is only appropriate for estimation of dose from 1961 forward for plutonium and 

uranium, and 1972 forward for tritium. In a number of cases, actual concentrations for isotopic 

values were not available, so the maximum result for a different year was assigned (Thomas 

2005). 

NIOSH previously indicated that efforts are in progress to develop values for uranium and 

plutonium prior to 1961, and tritium prior to 1972, and that this data may be presented in future 

revisions of the TBD. In response to SC&A’s question regarding the progress on development 

of a pre-1972 model, NIOSH stated the following (see Attachment 3): 

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NIOSH Response: Environmental air monitoring samples were not analyzed for 

tritium prior to 1972. Most of the tritium released was airborne with the 

dominant source being the Tritium Facility (Building 331, previously 

Building 172) which began operation in 1952. The TBD was revised to estimate 

inhalation of tritium by using dispersion models that were developed by LLNL to 

support a dose assessment after a release of tritium in 1970. Using the dispersion 

calculations that were performed in 1970, the estimated annual release of 

200 TBq/year and the same weather conditions that existed during the release, the 

concentration of tritium is estimated to range from 5.8 Bq/m3 to 2 x 106 Bq/m3 for 

any given year, from 1952 to 1971. It is unreasonable to assume that any one 

person stayed in the exact location (immediately downwind of the Building 331 

stack) for the entire exposure period of twenty (20) years, that the weather 

conditions did not remain stable and consequently, or that the maximum 

concentration represents the potential exposure. Revision 01-E (June 26, 2006) 

provided these data in Tables 4-3 through 4-7. Using the maximum airborne 

radionuclide concentration in a year (from either actual data or an estimated 

value), annual intakes for the radionuclides of concern were derived by using an 

assumed individual’s annual respiration rate of 2,400 m3

/yr. 

The revision discussed above is not included in the currently available LLNL Occupational 

Environmental Dose TBD. This leaves a substantial gap for determining environmental dose in 

the early years. No methodology has been proposed to mitigate this situation. 

Perimeter or onsite outdoor air sampling is used as the basis for determination of environmental 

internal dose in the TBD. Other sources of data exist that may be beneficial to the determination 

of internal environmental dose. In some cases, environmental data may be classified (e.g., 1965 

tritium release report, environmental data from testing). Sources of environmental monitoring 

data, such as stack release data, have not been considered in the evaluation of early doses. 

According to the Hazards Control Manual Part I, Procedure 802 (LLNL 1961), each area 

potentially emitting airborne material was required to maintain a continuous stack-monitoring 

program: 

Each area potentially capable of emitting enough airborne material to exceed the 

permissible off-site concentrations despite the dilution factor attributable to the 

distance from the stack to the site boundary fence shall maintain a continuous 

stack sampling program. Continuous monitoring equipment is currently required 

for the following areas: 

Building 110 – Criticality test cell exhaust 

Building 121 – Hot cell exhaust 

Building 171 – Enclosure and room exhaust 

Building 172 – Enclosure and room exhaust 

Building 190 – Cave exhaust systems 

Building 193 – Reactor room exhaust 

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The Hazards Control monitor assigned to the area will record the average daily 

reading of the stack monitors in a separate log book reserved for this data (LLNL 

1961). 

Furthermore, 

The stacks of other buildings where radioactive materials may escape in the 

effluent shall be surveyed at least once each month by swipe sampling of the stack 

interiors or with air sampling equipment. (LLNL 1961) 

During the 1965 tritium release, Building 331 (formerly 172) air exhausted through a stack that 

was monitored continuously by a Keithley Electrometer and recorded on a strip chart (Peterson 

et al. 2002). It appears that effluent monitoring capabilities were in place for the earlier years, 

although the technology may not have been as advanced. This data may be beneficial in 

bounding environmental doses prior to when air-sampling data became available. 

There is some question regarding the adequacy of the air monitoring data. In 1990, the Tiger 

Team raised concerns regarding the placement of environmental air samples: 

Some of the air samplers, Main Site perimeter and community, were located in 

areas obstructed by buildings, tress, and other obstacles which prevents them 

from getting a representative sample of ambient air (DOE 1990). 

This should be given some consideration in the TBD, particularly when determining uncertainty. 

Nolan (1958) indicated all LLNL employees wore some form of external radiation dosimetry 

starting in March 1958. The TBD indicates limited data were available for the determination of 

external environmental dose prior to 1976: 

From 1976 to the present, thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were used in 

determining ambient radiation levels, including natural background (terrestrial 

and cosmic) radiation. TLDs were deployed at Site 300 in July 1988. (Thomas 

2005) 

Implementation of CaF2:Dy chip dosimeters pre-dated 1976, and exposure information is 

available in the early 1970s. The evaluation of ambient external exposure did not make use of 

this data. Additional data that were not considered in the TBD analysis was ambient neutron 

exposure. Data are available for periods of time when neutron dosimeters were included in the 

environmental monitoring program. The primary source of potential neutron exposure was the 

14-MeV neutron generator (Building 212). 

During the years 1952–1958, LLNL was actively involved in weapons research and testing, as 

well as accelerator and reactor development. In 1958, the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests 

began and continued into 1961. This redirected LLNL’s operational mission. Without the 

availability of external monitoring data from 1952–1958, when personnel monitoring was not 

widely implemented, it is difficult to reconstruct potential external exposures during these years. 

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Assignment of dose from later years should be examined carefully, considering changes in 

mission and the improvement in technology and equipment over time. The reliance on radiation 

exposure at the perimeter is not necessarily representative of the exposure received by onsite 

workers. Representativeness of the monitoring sites in relation to the location of the source and 

the employee deserves some treatment in the TBD. 

5.13.6.2	 Internal Exposure from Radionuclides Other than Plutonium, Uranium, and 

Tritium 

Several radionuclides of concern are not included in the TBD, and no analysis has been done to 

determine whether these other radionuclides contribute to specific organ doses. The LLNL 

Environmental Dose TBD describes the types of radioactive material encountered at LLNL: 

Throughout its history, LLNL has processed and handled a variety of 

radionuclides, including uranium and transuranic elements, mixed fission 

products, and accelerator-produced radionuclides. (Thomas 2005) 

In Environmental Report for 1989 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Gallegos 1989), 

the potential radiological environmental pollutants at the Livermore site are listed as gross alpha, 

gross beta, gamma isotopes, plutonium, K-40, radium isotopes, thorium-232, tritium, and 

uranium isotopes. Isotopic analysis of soil samples concentrated on the evaluation of Pu-238, 

Pu-239, and Sr-90. Radioactive effluent data are available for Ar-41 from at least the early 

1970s forward (Griggs et al. 1985). The 1973 environmental report indicates a release of 1,300 

Ci of Ar-41 from the 3 MW pool-type reactor (Silver et al. 1974). Argon-41 has been identified 

as a key source of environmental exposure in other site profiles. Effluent data also exist for 

N-13/O-15 from at least the early 1970s forward. The source of these emissions is the electronpositron linear accelerator (Griggs et al. 1985). 

Gross alpha and gross beta air concentration data are available for the Livermore site and Site 

300 for the period 1961–1971. The TBD indicates that for the Livermore site, the gross alpha 

concentration is used to calculate the presence of Pu-239 and U-234. For Site 300, the gross 

alpha concentration is used to calculate the presence of U-235 and U-234. The assigned dose is 

selected from the higher of the two calculations. The gross beta concentration for the Livermore 

site and Site 300 is assumed to be Th-234. 

As previously mentioned, thorium was used in hydroshots at Site 300. Much of the buried waste 

was sent to Site 300 for disposal, along with waste from LBNL. The waste streams include 

radionuclides such as tritium, uranium (e.g., U-232, U-233, U-234, U-235, U-238), fission 

products, activation products, plutonium (e.g., Pu-238, Pu-239), thorium (e.g., Th-228, Th-230, 

Th-232, Th-234), accelerator-produced radionuclides, and transplutonium elements. 

Transplutonium elements have greater specific activities, shorter spontaneous fission half-lives, 

and more photons per disintegration (Denham 1969). Much smaller quantities of these elements 

produce the same exposure as Pu-239. No mention is made of the explosive burn pits at Site 300 

or if these operations involved radionuclides; at other DOE sites, there was often some level of 

uranium associated with this activity. 

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ORAUT-OTIB-0014 (ORAUT 2004a) indicates a diminimus value for environmental dose as a 

part of processing a claim: 

Calculated annual environmental internal doses that total less than 1 mrem for a 

specific radiation type and energy interval (for photons and electrons) are not 

required to be included in the Interactive RadioEpidemiological Program (IREP) 

input sheet. (ORAUT 2004a) 

This would infer that doses in excess of 1 mrem for a specific radiation type and energy interval 

should be included in the dose reconstruction. Some analysis of potential dose from 

radionuclides other than Pu, U, and tritium should be conducted to ensure that dose from other 

radionuclides meets the diminimus dose value. 

5.13.6.3 Environmental Exposure Sources Not Considered 

Episodic Releases 

Accidental releases have resulted in large amounts of radionuclides released to the environment. 

An accidental release of 350,000 curies of tritium gas occurred on January 20, 1965, from the 

Tritium Facility (Building 331, previously Building 172) (Peterson et al. 2002). In 1970, 

289,000 curies were released to the surrounding environment. On April 12, 1971, an accidental 

release of 240 Ci of tritium occurred from the Gaseous Chemistry Building. Extensive follow-up 

sampling was conducted post-event to evaluate the effects of this release on the environment 

(Gudiksen 1971). Another accidental release of 5,000 Ci of tritium occurred on June 8, 1984. 

The 1965 and 1971 tritium releases accounted for about 80% of the tritium released from LLNL, 

which is not included in the current analysis of tritium exposure in the TBD. On March 26, 

1963, a nuclear excursion took place at the critical experiments facility. Air, vegetation, and soil 

samples obtained within hours after the incident indicated a release of small amounts of shortlived, high-yield gaseous fission products and their daughters (Kathren et al. 1964). Other 

episodic releases included release of plutonium, americium, and curium to the soil. Episodic 

releases require some evaluation to ascertain if they have been captured by environmental 

monitoring available at the time, and what the relative impacts are on the total environmental 

dose. 

Soil Resuspension 

The LLNL Occupational Environmental TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4 (Thomas 2005) indicates 

that exposure may have been received from the resuspension of radionuclides in soils: 

Occupational environmental dose refers to exposure received by workers outside 

the facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) from 

elevated ambient radiation, from facility discharges to the environment, and from 

resuspension of radionuclides in soils. (Thomas 2005) 

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Furthermore, 

There was a potential for ingestion of radioactive materials from resuspension of 

radioactive materials (Section 4.3).... (Thomas 2005) 

Little discussion is offered on how dose from resuspension of radioactive material will be 

treated. In their response to SC&A’s question regarding ingestion and soil resuspension factors, 

NIOSH indicated the following: 

NIOSH Response: The potential for environmental dose was solely evaluated for 

the inhalation pathway; there was no assessment of the ingestion pathway. The 

current TBD addressed what was believed to be the major contributors to 

exposure, but as additional information becomes available and if it indicates 

modifications are warranted, information will be added to the TBD for use by 

dose reconstructors. 

Furthermore, 

NIOSH Response: There was no assessment of the ingestion pathway. No soil 

resuspension factors are available at this time. 

Based on NIOSH’s response, it is apparent that the potential for environmental dose was solely 

evaluated for the inhalation pathway, and there was no assessment of the ingestion pathway. The 

Occupation Environmental Dose TBD should be edited to reflect the actual pathway evaluated. 

An evaluation of exposure from resuspension of contaminated soil should be added to the TBD 

for completeness. Environmental monitoring reports indicate that soil characterization at LLNL 

was conducted in 1971 and 1972. Soil samples collected from Site 300 showed greater than 

background concentrations of U-238 in areas near the firing table (Griggs et al. 1985). Soil 

samples were also collected at the Livermore site, and are presented in annual environmental 

reports (Silver et al. 1974, Gudiksen 1971, Gudiksen et al. 1972). Data is available to conduct 

some level of analysis at both the Livermore site and Site 300. Some onsite soil contamination 

was identified in both locations. 

Environmental Dose Contributions from Onsite Sources 

There has been no consideration of potential releases from the Decontamination and Waste 

Treatment Facility or other waste treatment and storage facilities (e.g., Buildings 280, 693, 695). 

Site experts have indicated that there were sources of environmental exposure from the “taxi 

strip.” In the early years of the Laboratory’s operation, the taxi strip of the former naval air 

station was used for storage of liquid waste. The goal was to evaporate the liquid waste in open 

vats, and reduce it to a near solid form. Plastic- and concrete-lined trays for evaporation of lowlevel liquid waste leaked and penetrated several feet into the ground at the old taxi strip. This 

area was remediated (excavated) in the early 1980s to eliminate the contamination. Radium was 

identified during aerial surveys of the site in areas where the military buried radium dials when 

they had ownership of the site (see Attachment 2). 

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Environmental Dose Contributions from Other DOE Facilities 

The Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore (SNLL) is located immediately south of LLNL. 

SNLL is under contract with the DOE to provide R&D associated with nuclear weapons and 

security tasks. LLNL and SNLL are separate facilities and maintain independent monitoring 

programs (Gallagos 1989). The TBD does not discuss the contributions to environmental dose 

from releases at the adjacent SNLL. 

The TBD does not indicate whether there was opportunity for unmonitored workers to receive 

environmental exposures at the testing sites (e.g., PPG, NTS, Amchitka, etc.) The environmental 

source terms would differ from those encountered at the laboratory sites, including radionuclides, 

such as iodine and other fission products. 

Methodologies have not been proposed for how to assign environmental dose in the era when 

monitoring data are not available. The Environmental Dose TBD does not make use of available 

effluent and external radiation data, as a result of limiting the evaluation to publicly available 

documents. Environmental neutron dose were not considered, although monitoring was done in 

some years. The TBD does not consider data available regarding episodic releases, soil 

contamination, contributions to environmental dose from other DOE sites (e.g., SNLL, NTS, 

PPG), and internal exposure from radionuclides other than plutonium, uranium, and tritium. 

Although the TBD indicates that 90% of the environmental dose was received from plutonium, 

uranium, and tritium, there is no analysis to support this assumption. Radionuclides, such as 

noble gas, fission products, and N-13/O-15, are not evaluated for their potential contribution to 

environmental dose. The impacts of these issues on claimant exposure are minimal in 

comparison to occupational internal and external exposure; however, incorporation of additional 

information will make the TBD more accurate and complete. 

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6.0	 OVERALL ADEQUACY OF THE SITE PROFILE AS A BASIS FOR 

DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 

The SC&A procedures call for both a “vertical” assessment of a site profile for purposes of 

evaluation-specific issues of adequacy and completeness, as well as a “horizontal” assessment 

pertaining to how the profile satisfies its intended purpose and scope. This section addresses the 

latter objective in a summary manner by evaluation of (1) how, and to what extent, the site 

profile satisfies the five objectives defined by the Advisory Board for ascertaining adequacy; 

(2) the usability of the site profile for its intended purpose, i.e., to provide a generalized technical 

resource for the dose reconstructor when individual dose records are unavailable; and (3) generic 

technical or policy issues that transcend any single site profile that need to be addressed by the 

Advisory Board and NIOSH. 

6.1 SATISFYING THE FIVE OBJECTIVES 

The SC&A review procedures, as approved by the Advisory Board, require that each site profile 

be evaluated against five measures of adequacy: (1) completeness of data sources, (2) technical 

accuracy, (3) adequacy of data, (4) site profile consistency, and (5) regulatory compliance. The 

SC&A review found that the NIOSH site profile (and its constituent TBDs) for LLNL represents 

an adequate accounting of the primary internal issues related to plutonium, uranium, and HTO or 

gas exposures, as well as main external hazards from the reactor and accelerator facilities. The 

LLNL site profile falls short in fully characterizing a number of key underlying issues that are 

fundamental to guiding dose reconstruction. In some cases, these issues may impact other site 

profiles. Many of the issues involve lack of sufficient conservatism in key assumptions or 

estimation approaches or incomplete site data or incomplete analyses of these data. Section 6.0 

summarizes the key issues. Detailed evaluation of these issues is provided elsewhere in the 

report. 

6.1.1 Objective 1: Completeness of Data Sources 

The breadth of data sources used as a basis for the LLNL site profile is evident in the 144 

references in the TBDs and the 876 documents for LLNL in the OCAS Site Profile Research 

Database. The NIOSH/ORAU team consulted health physics personnel with long histories at 

LLNL who have extensive knowledge of key dosimetry historical processes and personnel 

monitoring data. For the LLNL site, these typically contain hardcopy internal and external 

monitoring results. The individual monitoring data provided to NIOSH, as cited by the site 

profile and applied in dose reconstruction, are pulled from these records at LLNL. 

Completeness and accuracy of the data used in dose reconstruction is likely lacking, particularly 

for internal exposure. The test group, from the laboratory responsible for the design of weapons, 

sent hundreds of personnel to the test sites for testing preparation, detonations, recovery of data 

and materials post-detonation, and support functions (including radiological safety). Although 

external monitoring was provided by REECo, Eberline, or DOE-Nevada, it is unclear how 

NIOSH identifies those with potential exposure at test sites when they request data from DOENevada, and how dose reconstructors are to interpret this data. 

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The site profile provides no explanation for how dose reconstructions will be handled in cases 

where dose reconstruction cannot be done, as previously identified by NIOSH in other technical 

documents, nor do they provide reference to other TBDs that may assist the dose reconstructor in 

interpreting data collected from the testing site. No reference is made to how internal and 

external dose reconstruction will be completed for test sites without TBDs. Source term 

descriptions do not appear to have considered information in classified documents. 

6.1.2 Objective 2: Technical Accuracy 

The site profile does not adequately address data insufficiency for impact and implications to 

early worker dose reconstruction. Information available for dose reconstruction in the early 

years is limited, inadequate, or in some cases, not available. The Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities Team (ORAUT) has recently produced several new ORAUT TIBs and PROCs that 

have application to LLNL (e.g., OTIB-0065, (ORAUT 2007e), an LLNL-specific document with 

coworker guidelines for internal dose. These TIBs and PROCs assist the dose reconstructor in 

developing more claimant-favorable doses. However, a similar TIB for LLNL external coworker 

dose has not been developed and is needed. Since there is a lack of bioassay data prior to 1958 

and serious difficulties identified for reconstruction of internal dose at testing sites, it will be 

important for the LLNL TBDs to be updated to highlight the importance of utilizing these OTIBs 

and PROCs during the claimant’s dose reconstruction. 

The Occupational Internal Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5 (Berger and Szalinski 2005), has 

a number of deficiencies related to inadequate consideration of exposure and missed dose. 

Radionuclides used at LLNL were not always monitored using bioassay, and this makes it 

difficult to find the data needed for claimant-favorable dose reconstruction. Exposure to a 

number of these radionuclides was not given adequate, or in some cases, any consideration in the 

internal dosimetry TBD, although some are listed as facility-specific radionuclides handled in 

particular technical areas. The completeness of results for uranium, tritium, and plutonium for 

the early years at the site is uncertain. 

Numerous “secondary” radionuclides have been handled at LLNL in varying quantities. These 

have included radium, Th-228, Th-232, Am-241, U-233, Cm-244, Cf-252, Pu-238, C-14, Na-22, 

P-32, S-35, I-125, I-131, Sr-90, N-13, O-15, fission products, activation products, and others. A 

lot of bioassay data in the database are identified as gross alpha and gross beta results, and 

NIOSH has not identified which, if any, of these secondary radionuclides may be associated with 

these data. These radionuclides may result in significant organ doses that are neglected. 

Reliance on partially validated bioassay data and claimant interviews to identify intakes from 

secondary radionuclides does not provide a sound basis for determining which individuals 

received dose from secondary radionuclides. Further research into the potential exposures from 

these radionuclides is needed to determine which workers may have been exposed, the quantities 

they were exposed to, and the potential internal doses from intakes. A proposed method, 

however, for identifying individuals potentially exposed to many of these radionuclides and 

assigning them a missed dose is absent from the TBD. Table 5.1 (Berger and Szalinski 2005, 

pp. 9–13) does provide source terms by building (activity fractions) for a large number of 

radionuclides. There is limited guidance, however, on how to apply these activity fractions. 

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The LLNL Internal Dose TBD, published in 2005, lacks the benefit of making reference to 

ORAUT-OTIB-0066 (ORAUT 2007g), which provides more recent guidance on calculation of 

dose from intakes of special tritium compounds; ORAUT-OTIB-0049 (ORAUT 2007b), which 

provides guidance on plutonium strongly retained in the lung (high-fire plutonium intakes); and 

ORAUT-0060 (ORAUT 2007c), which provides guidance for internal dose reconstruction. 

The current methodology outlined in ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6 (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) may 

result in an underestimate of neutron dose. The present method of using the single n/p value of 

1.0 for all locations for 1952–1969 is not supported by quantitative analysis, and may be 

claimant favorable in many cases. In some cases, however, this value of 1.0 would 

underestimate the actual neutron dose for some workers, i.e., those working around unmoderated 

neutron sources. From the information in the current Occupational External Dose TBD, 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6 (Thomas and Szalinski 2007), it is not obvious that the dose 

reconstructor has sufficient and accurate neutron dose reconstruction information and details 

available to correctly assign neutron doses for LLNL workers at all locations for the entire time 

period of 1952 to present. 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 TBD (Turner 2005), 

provides little documentation to support the assumed techniques and protocols applied to 

calculate the dose, which is mainly derived from Cardarelli et al. 2002. NIOSH believes 

that when no information is readily available about the energy spectrum, it is reasonable 

to use the assumptions for DCFs, which are presented in the Implementation Guide 

(NIOSH 2002) or in ICRP Publication 34 (ICRP 1982). 

The Occupational Medical Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 (Turner 2005), does consider the 

potential contribution to dose that may have resulted in less than optimal use of collimation. The 

generic DCFs have not been verified for use at LLNL. Unresolved is the concern that the DCFs 

are derived from ICRP (1982) and, therefore, are not comparable in terms of beam quality, which 

varies from unit to unit. These factors can contribute greatly to the dose to the chest and other 

organs for units in operation prior to 1985, where little documentation exists. 

The Occupational Environmental Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4 (Thomas 2005), as written, 

fails to test the adequacy of evaluating the cumulative (additive) effect of numerous source terms 

at differing locations. SC&A believes that the lack of air monitoring stations within particular 

areas of known higher releases of a specified isotope does not readily enable one to accurately 

estimate environmental dose using air-monitoring data from an adjacent air monitoring station. 

It will be difficult for the dose assessor to accurately estimate environmental dose, without 

accurate air-monitoring data derived from a station proximal to the release point. 

6.1.3 Objective 3: Adequacy of Data 

SC&A found that the site profile provided a focused evaluation of the more established and well 

documented radiation sources at LLNL. In some cases, however, source term definitions are not 

adequately defined. For example, there is no consideration of potential internal and 

environmental exposure from thorium and enriched uranium at Site 300. The laboratory was 

involved in a tremendous diversity of activities at Site 300, the Main laboratory, and at test sites. 

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Two major oversights were identified: (1) lack of dose estimation guidance for individuals 

involved in weapons testing, and (2) inadequate exposure characterization information relating to 

Site 300. The site profile provides no explanation for how dose reconstructions will be handled 

in cases where dose reconstruction cannot be done due to lack of exposure and monitoring 

information, as previously identified by NIOSH in other technical documents. 

The Site Description and Occupational Internal Dosimetry TBDs do not give adequate guidance 

on assessment of all potentially important radionuclides in the source terms. The TBDs identify 

a large number of radionuclides in the source terms of buildings; however, it does not give 

guidance on interpretation of bioassay data that have results in gross alpha and gross beta 

activities, which could be representative of a wide range of the identified radionuclides. Radium 

and the radon and decay products that would be produced from it are not covered in internal dose 

guidance in any detail, although it is identified as a major component in the Tank Farm source 

term and during cleanup of the old air strip. Guidance on assessing intakes of Sr-90 and 

accelerator gaseous activation products, such as N-13 and O-15, is not provided, although there 

are indications that these make up significant sources at the site. There is no discussion on the 

contamination levels (air and surface contamination) that could have been involved with 

exposures at the site. 

There are major issues with verifying the accuracy and usefulness of the data in MAPPER. 

Bioassay data are not available prior to 1956 for gross alpha and 1957 for gross beta. Tritium 

bioassay data is only available for 1968 through 1981, and are very limited. There are limited 

bioassay data in the database for tritium, I-131, thorium, and other radionuclides handled at 

LLNL, which typically covers only a fraction of the time these radionuclides were handled. 

Uranium-specific bioassay is not available until 1958. 

Sufficient dose data details are not presented in the Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas 

and Szalinski 2007) to determine if external radiation personnel monitoring was adequate to 

monitor beta, gamma, and neutrons before 1958, and neutrons after 1958. 

The LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005) is deficient, in that little 

documentation exists to validate x-ray protocols, equipment maintenance, and upkeep records 

prior to 1960, which can contribute greatly to the dose to the chest and other organs. There is no 

other information on such aspects as screens used, grids, film types, and changes in developing 

parameters. The DCFs are derived from ICRP (1982) and, therefore, are not comparable in 

terms of beam quality, which varies from unit to unit. 

NIOSH has not considered potential sources of data, which provide tritium effluent release data 

prior to 1972. This includes two significant tritium releases that occurred in 1965 and 1970. 

Environmental monitoring data for other radionuclides were absent prior to 1961 for the Main 

Laboratory and 1962 for Site 300, although the Hazards Control Group responsibilities included 

some environmental monitoring prior to this. The impacts of potential releases from nearby 

SNLL were not evaluated to determine if they impacted environmental exposures at LLNL. The 

TBD lacks a methodology to reconstruct environmental exposure prior to 1961. 

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6.1.4 Objective 4: Consistency among Site Profiles 

The default site profile assumptions and methodologies for LLNL were compared to those of 

other site profiles reviewed to date. LLNL was primarily involved in the development of the 

hydrogen bomb, but had numerous R&D activities similar in operations and mission to those at 

ORNL and LANL. These activities involved using a wide variety of radionuclides. Other site 

profiles used for comparison included the RFP, the SRS, Hanford, Idaho National Engineering 

and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), the NTS, the Mound Plant (Mound), and Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Portsmouth). These comparisons focus on the methodologies and 

assumptions associated with dose assessments and the derivation of values used to obtain a POC 

for individual claimants. 

Inconsistencies between Site Profiles 

The basic default values assigned for determining medical exposure are relatively consistent 

among site profiles. The site profiles do not apply the latest revision of ORAUT-OTIB-0006 

(ORAUT 2005d), which can be corrected in subsequent revisions of TBDs. Other deviations 

from the standard assumptions are based on site-specific information. 

The LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD indicates that pre-employment medical x-rays were 

taken. No routine frequencies for the best estimate, minimizing, and maximizing techniques 

were identified in the TBD. Dose reconstructors are told to consult the employee’s medical 

records to determine the extent of medical x-rays. The TBD only provides a best-estimate 

approach, and indicates that it is not feasible to address a maximizing approach. Other site 

profiles, such as SRS (Scalsky 2005), Portsmouth (Demopoulos 2006), and LANL (Johnson 

2004), provide a dose reconstruction approach to maximize the occupational medical exposure. 

Some site profiles, including Hanford (Shockley and Kathren 2005), SRS, Portsmouth, ORNL 

(Fleming 2006), and LANL (Johnson 2004), provide detailed technique assumptions, which 

seem to be limited in the LLNL Occupational Medical Dose TBD. LLNL does not make use of 

early stack release data to determine potential exposures prior to 1972 for tritium, whereas this 

was considered in the ORNL environmental site profile (Fleming 2006). 

Review of site profiles to date indicates that the NIOSH/ORAU team has not come to a 

consensus on what components should be considered in the environmental dose. Dose from the 

resuspension of contaminated soil has not been evaluated in the Occupational Environmental 

Dose TBD (Thomas 2005). This source of exposure was considered at RFP (McDowell-Boyer 

and Little 2007), SRS (Scalsky 2005), and NTS (Rollins 2006). Ambient external exposure from 

contaminated soil was also not considered in the LLNL Occupational Environmental Dose TBD. 

There is no mention of air immersion exposure from releases of noble gas, which was a part of 

numerous site profiles, including NTS (Rollins 2006), ORNL (Burns 2004), Hanford, (Napier 

2007), INEEL (Bump 2007), LANL (Chen and McDowell-Boyer 2004), and SRS (Scalsky 

2005). No attention was given to unique exposures that occurred to LLNL workers at NTS, such 

as radon exposure in the tunnels (Rollins 2006). In the Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 

2005), NIOSH has reviewed data from air monitoring stations, posted TLDs, and potential 

inhalation and drinking water intakes from measured concentrations. The TBD provides tables 

for site-wide annual intakes from inhalation and drinking water. NIOSH has developed 

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Table 4.7 on site averages for external gamma radiation by year at the LLNL main complex, and 

Table 4.8 on Site 300 external gamma radiation. In ORAUT-PROC-0060 (ORAUT 2006c), 

NIOSH has compared maximized ambient dose at various DOE facilities. For LLNL, this 

maximized estimate is 130 mrem/year, and is applied up to 1984. It then drops down to the 70– 

85 mrem/year level in subsequent years. These levels are consistent, if not slightly higher, than 

those at other DOE facilities. However, it is not clear that monitoring stations were positioned in 

areas of higher releases of specific isotopes proximal to the release point, thus resulting in an 

underestimation of environmental dose for these higher exposed workers. The analysis 

considered internal dose from onsite atmospheric radionuclide concentrations and ambient 

external exposure. 

The LLNL Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 2005) assigns the maximum average annual sitewide values to unmonitored workers based on work location (e.g., Site 300 and the Main 

Laboratory). When the worker location is unknown, LANL (Chen and McDowell-Boyer 2004), 

Hanford (Napier 2007), and SRS (Scalsky 2005) assign the site-wide maximum ambient 

radiation dose. This assignment of a site-wide maximum ambient dose is similar to the LLNL 

approach. The application of multiple receptor points would be consistent with the approach in 

the Hanford (Napier 2007), SRS (Scalsky 2005), and INEEL (Rohrig and Bump 2006) TBDs. 

Although LLNL environmental TBD segregates Site 300 and the Main Laboratory, it has not 

allowed for multiple receptor points at each of these two locations. The use of measured air 

concentration data is consistent with the approach applied in numerous other environmental 

TBDs. 

Unlike the LANL Environmental Dose TBD (Chen and McDowell-Boyer 2004), which applied a 

screening method to the source term to determine relative dose consequences for different 

radionuclides, the LLNL Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 2005) does not apply such a 

screening method. With the similarities in the breadth of radionuclides handled at LLNL, ORNL 

(Burns 2004), and LANL (Chen and McDowell-Boyer 2004), this screening method, or an 

equivalent, used at ORNL and LANL is considered prudent at LLNL as well. Overall, SC&A 

believes that further investigation into environmental source terms is needed. 

The basis for assignment of missed internal dose is not clearly defined in the LLNL Internal 

Dose TBD, nor does the TBD reference applicable TIBs. There have been several TIBs prepared 

for the assignment of internal dose; however, it is unclear which of them applies to LLNL, 

because they are not referenced in the TBD. The LLNL Internal Dose TBD has relied on 

minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs), expressed as the quantity of uranium per liter of 

urine (micrograms per liter), from LANL, with the assumption that the two laboratories used the 

same techniques, rather than obtaining these values from only LLNL documentation. The LLNL 

Internal Dosimetry TBD, like LANL (Argall 2004), SRS Scalsky 2005), Hanford (Bihl 2004), 

and ORNL (Bollenbacher et al. 2006), has failed to provide guidance for secondary radionuclide 

exposure. 

The LLNL Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) does not even mention MTs and, 

given its publication date, does not refer the dose reconstructor to a specific TIB, such as OTIB0066 (ORAUT 2007g) or OCAS-TIB-002 (OCAS 2003), which provides a general procedure on 

how to use IREP to calculate tritium dose from tritides and OBTs. There is no LLNL-specific 

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guidance or general direction on solubility, particle size, or other pertinent internal dose 

calculation factors. Both the LANL (Argall 2004) and ORNL (Bollenbacher et al. 2006) Internal 

Dose TBDs discuss solubility classes for their various radionuclide exposures. With the Mound 

Internal Dosimetry TBD (Millard 2004), there was a more detailed discussion regarding MTs, 

including appropriate lung clearance classes. The ORNL Internal Dose TBD refers the dose 

reconstructor to the specific guidance provided in OCAS-TIB-002 (OCAS 2003). The LANL 

Internal Dosimetry TBD (Argall 2004) also makes some mention of potential exposure to MTs, 

although it does not go into detail. Given that tritium processes and the special tritium 

compounds handled at these sites were the same or similar, a consistent methodology is 

appropriate. The LLNL Internal Dose TBD, published in 2005, lacks the benefit of making 

reference to the ORAUT-OTIB-0066 (ORAUT 2007g), which provides more recent guidance on 

calculation of dose from intakes of special tritium compounds. 

The LLNL External Dose TBD defaults to a neutron energy of 0.1–2.0 MeV for all facilities with 

no data supporting this assumption. The ICRP 60 quality factor is highest for this neutron 

energy group, which is claimant favorable, but inconsistent with other site profiles. The SRS 

TBD (Scalsky 2005) distinguishes neutron energies and n/p ratios for reactors, fuel fabrication, 

plutonium production, and radionuclide production and calibration. The INEEL TBD (Rohrig 

and Bump 2006) considers the reactors, the processing plant, waste handling operations, 

calibration sources, and uranium handling. Neutron energy spectra and n/p ratios for Pu-238 and 

Pu-239 operations are segregated at SRS (Scalsky 2005). The categories used in the LLNL TBD 

lack the detailed analyses seen in these other TBDs. Further evaluation of n/p ratios should 

include more specific categories, including neutron sources (RaBe, Cf, etc.); accelerators; early 

subcriticality experiments; and initiator development and neutron spectra from alternate fissile 

materials. The relative impact of further differentiation of n/p ratios will depend on the 

particular neutron source. 

The LLNL External Dose TBD indirectly addresses non-penetrating exposure to workers by 

referring them to the guidance in ORAUT-OTIB-0017 (ORAUT 2005a). Other site profiles are 

still in the process of including guidance on non-penetrating exposures. The Pantex (Fix et al. 

2006) and RFP (Langsted 2007) External Dose TBDs briefly mention extremity exposure and 

how to assign dose. The LLNL External Dose TBD does not mention potential extremity 

exposure, which was significant in core handling. This is also a shortcoming with many of the 

other site profiles. 

The Y-12 TBD (Kerr 2006), the SRS TBD (Scalsky 2005), and the Hanford TBD (Scalsky 2007) 

base their default exposure geometry on the compensability or non-compensability of the claim. 

The Mallinckrodt Chemical Worker (MCW) (Westbrook and Bloom 2007) and RFP (Langstead 

2007) TBDs based default exposure geometries on job titles. The LLNL TBD (Thomas and 

Szalinski 2007), the LANL TBD (Widner 2005), and the INEEL TBD (Bump 2007) choose to 

default to 100% Anterior-Posterior (AP) exposure. Further evaluation of exposure geometry for 

photon and neutron exposure should be evaluated for LLNL workers to determine if 100% AP 

geometry is appropriate for all LLNL workers. The NIOSH/ORAU team should consider 

development of a consistent default assumption for exposure geometry in all site profiles. 

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In general, the Integrated RadioEpidemiology Program (IREP) input criteria for Radiation Rate, 

Radiation Type, and Dose Distribution Type are the same for LLNL as for other site profiles. 

External dose assumptions were consistent with those used in other site profiles. The default 

energies for beta, photon, and neutron exposure were >15 keV, 30–250 keV, and 0.1–2.0 MeV, 

respectively. The missed external dose is calculated using the MDL/2 calculation times the 

number of monitoring periods, and is entered as a lognormal distribution with a GSD of 1.52. 

6.1.5 Objective 5: Regulatory Compliance 

SC&A reviewed the site profile with respect to Objective 5, which requires SC&A to evaluate 

the degree to which the site profile complies with stated policy and directives contained in 

42 CFR Part 82. In addition, SC&A evaluated the TBDs for adherence to general quality 

assurance policies and procedures utilized for the performance of dose reconstructions. The 

hierarchy of data used in the dose reconstruction process begins with the use of individual 

monitoring data as a priority. This is fundamental to the performance of dose reconstruction. 

NIOSH has complied with the hierarchy of data required under 42 CFR Part 82 and its 

implementation guides. As mentioned above, quality assurance with respect to claimant-specific 

information is lacking, such as the verification of electronic data, with hardcopy results or the 

completeness of data provided by the site for dose reconstruction. LLNL staff has raised 

concerns regarding the use of MAPPER for coworker modeling, stating various issues with the 

database. With DOE facilities concerned with classified projects, a review of classified 

documents is required to ensure that information relevant to dose reconstruction, including 

personnel or environmental monitoring data, are not being missed. 

6.2 USABILITY OF SITE PROFILE FOR INTENDED PURPOSES 

SC&A has identified seven criteria that reflect the intent of the EEOICPA and the regulatory 

requirements of 42 CFR Part 82 for dose reconstruction. Because the purpose of a site profile is 

to support the dose reconstruction process, it is critical that the site profile assumptions, analytic 

approaches, and procedural directions be clear, accurate, complete, and auditable (i.e., 

sufficiently documented). SC&A used the following seven objectives to guide its review of the 

LLNL Site Profile TBDs to determine whether it meets these criteria: 

Objective 1 − Determine the degree to which procedures support a process that is expeditious 

and timely for dose reconstruction. 

Objective 2 − Determine whether procedures provide adequate guidance to be efficient in select 

instances where a more detailed approach to dose reconstruction would not affect the outcome. 

Objective 3 − Assess the extent to which procedures account for all potential exposures, and 

ensure that resultant doses are complete and are based on adequate data. 

Objective 4 − Assess procedures for providing a consistent approach to dose reconstruction, 

regardless of claimants’ exposures by time and employment locations. 

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Objective 5 − Evaluate procedures with regard to fairness and the extent to which the claimant is 

given the benefit of the doubt when there are unknowns and uncertainties concerning radiation 

exposures. 

Objective 6 − Evaluate procedures for their approach to quantifying the uncertainty distribution 

of annual dose estimates that is consistent with and supports a DOL POC estimate at the upper 

99% confidence level. 

Objective 7 − Assess the scientific and technical quality of methods and guidance contained in 

procedures to ensure that they reflect the proper balance between current/consensus scientific 

methods and dose reconstruction efficiency. 

6.2.1 Ambiguous Dose Reconstruction Direction 

Our review has identified that clear and unambiguous direction on internal dose reconstruction 

has not been provided. Supportive background information/data and specific instructions should 

be presented in a logical manner that ensures understanding, process efficiency, and consistency 

among dose reconstructors. The Occupational Internal Dosimetry TBD (Berger and Szalinski 

2005) identifies a large number of radionuclides in the source terms of buildings and their 

activity fractions; however, it does not give guidance on interpretation of bioassay. The site 

profile provides no explanation for how dose reconstructions are completed in cases where dose 

reconstruction cannot be done, as previously identified by NIOSH in other technical documents 

for weapons testing sites. 

The LLNL Occupational External Dose TBD (Thomas and Szalinski 2007) is seriously lacking 

in details on external doses during the years 1952 to the present, and many LLNL site-specific 

documents are lacking. It relies extensively on other generic documents applicable to the DOEwide complex, and does not develop the data and issues specially related to the conditions at the 

LLNL, Site 300, and other locations where LLNL workers were exposed. The in-depth 

development of important areas necessary to evaluate the adequacy of monitoring, dosimetry 

response, dose records, and other related issues are not available in the present TBD; this is 

especially true for neutron radiation. This lack of detail is inconsistent with other site profile 

external dose TBDs. The present LLNL Occupational External Dose TBD would require 

extensive revision to meet the needs of dose reconstruction. 

6.2.2 Inconsistencies and Editorial Errors in the Site Profiles 

Table A-1 in Attachment A of the Occupational Internal Dose TBD (Berger and Szalinski 2005) 

has different radionuclides listed for Buildings 132 and 151 than those presented in Table 5-1 for 

these buildings. Table A-1 in Attachment A shows Building 151 with plutonium isotopes 

making up the majority of the activity in the building, while Table 5-1 in the text of the 

Occupational Internal Dose TBD shows only one plutonium isotope (Pu-236) in the building at a 

very low fraction of the total radionuclide activity. There does not appear to be a good reason to 

have both of these very similar tables, and it is close to being redundant with the risk of 

disagreement, as found in this review. It may be less confusing to just show one table in the 

TBD. 

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6.3 UNRESOLVED POLICY OR GENERIC TECHNICAL ISSUES 

A number of issues were identified that are common in the LLNL and other site profiles 

reviewed to date and, in some cases, represent potential generic policy issues that transcend any 

individual site profile. These issues may involve the interpretation of existing standards (e.g., 

oro-nasal breathing), how certain critical worker populations should be profiled for historic 

radiation exposure (e.g., construction workers and early workers), and how exposure itself 

should be analyzed (e.g., treatment of incidents and statistical treatment of dose distributions). 

NIOSH has developed several separate TIBs in order to address these more generic issues. The 

following represents those issues identified in the LLNL and previous site profile reviews that 

SC&A believes represent transcendent issues that need to be considered by NIOSH as 

unresolved policy or generic technical issues. 

(1) Direction on the applicability of other site TBDs and/or TIBs to individual dose 

reconstructions is absent. The TBDs need to be revised to reference new TIBs, and make 

certain that all guidance is cohesive and not conflicting. 

(2) Mobility of work force between different areas of the site should be addressed. Site 

expert testimony that many workers moved from one facility to the next within the same 

DOE facility is a complicating factor. Establishment of an accurate worker history is 

crucial in such cases. This will be especially difficult for family member claimants. 

NIOSH/ORAUT has developed ORAUT-OTIB-0052, Parameters to Consider When 

Processing Claims for Construction Workers (ORAUT 2007a), which specifically 

addresses construction workers. 

(3) Statistical techniques used in the application of the data to individual workers should be 

further considered and substantiated. 

(4) Dose from impurities and/or daughter products in radioactive material received and 

processed at sites should be assessed as a contributory exposure source when not taken 

into account using the standard internal and external dosimetry methods. 

(5) Analysis needs to be performed regarding how “frequent or routine incidents” should be 

addressed, given the possibility that such “spike” exposures often may be missed by 

routine monitoring as a function of how often and in what manner it was conducted. 

(6) Availability of monitoring records for “transient or outside workers,” e.g., subcontractors, 

construction workers, and visitors, who may have potential exposure while working on or 

visiting a facility, should be ascertained. 

(7) Dose to D&D workers should be assessed. Many facilities have large-scale D&D 

operations, which extend back many years. D&D operations often required working in 

unknown situations, which may provide unique exposure situations. 

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(8) Dose reconstruction for occupational medical exposures remains incomplete. NIOSH 

needs to reconsider the definition to include all forms of radiation medical exposure, to 

ensure its considerations are claimant favorable. 

(9) Dose reconstruction for workers involved in nuclear weapons testing, and radiological 

work at other DOE facilities as a LLNL employee, are often not possible due to lack of 

exposure data during these activities. 

(10) Quality Assurance on records provided by the site to the NIOSH/ORAU team is 

necessary to ascertain whether complete information is being provided. 

(11) Verification of the completeness and accuracy of databases used in coworker models 

should be evaluated prior to use. 

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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

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1 

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Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, May 1, 1979, ORAUT Data Capture Project Document 

Number 030001237, requested by Bill Thomas. 

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Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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1 

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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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Document No. 

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ATTACHMENT 1: NIOSH TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED 

DURING THE REVIEW PROCESS 

Technical Basis Documents 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-1, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory l – Introduction, Rev. 00 

PC-1 (Maisler 2005a) September 12, 2005. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Site Description, Rev. 00 

PC-1 (Maisler 2005b) October 26, 2005 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational Medical 

Dose, Rev. 00 PC-1 (Turner 2005) October 26, 2005. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational 

Environmental Dose, Rev. 00 PC-1 (Thomas 2005) November 18, 2005 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational Internal 

Dose, Rev 00 (Berger and Szalinski 2005) October 10, 2005 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational External 

Dose, Rev. 01 (Thomas and Szalinski 2005) April, 26, 2007 

Technical Support Documents 

OCAS-TIB-002, Rev. 00, 2003. Technical Information Bulletin, Tritium Calculation with 

IMBA, Office of Compensation Analysis and Support, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 22, 2003. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0002, Rev. 2, 2007d. Technical Information Bulletin, Maximum Internal Dose 

Estimates for Certain DOE Complex Claims, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, February 7, 2007. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Rev. 02, 2003b. Technical Information Bulletin: Dose Reconstruction 

from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-ray Procedures , Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee. December 29, 2003. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Rev. 03, 2005d. Technical Information Bulletin: Dose Reconstruction 

from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-ray Procedures , Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee. December 21, 2005. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0007, Rev. 00, 2003a. Technical Information Bulletin – Occupational Dose 

from Elevated Ambient Levels of External Radiation, Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team, 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee. November 12, 2003. (This OTIB was later cancelled and all relevant 

information provided in ORAUT-PROC-0060, Rev. 1, June 28, 2006). (ORAUT 2006c). 

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ORAUT-OTIB-0011, Rev. 00, 2004b. Technical Information Bulletin – Tritium Calculated and 

Missed Dose Estimates, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 29, 

2004. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0014, Rev. 00, 2004a. Technical Information Bulletin – Assignment of 

Environmental Internal Doses for Employees Not Exposed to Airborne Radionuclides in the 

Workplace, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 22, 2004. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0017, Rev 00, 2005a. Technical Information Bulletin – Interpretation of 

Dosimetry Data for Assignment of Shallow Dose, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee, January 19, 2005. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0018, Rev. 01, 2005e. Technical Information Bulletin – Internal Dose 

Overestimates for Facilities with Air Sampling Programs, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August 9, 2005. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0020, Rev. 01, 2005f. Technical Information Bulletin – Use of Coworker 

Dosimetry Data for External Dose Assignment, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge 

Tennessee, October 7, 2005. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0023, Rev. 00, 2005b. Technical Information Bulletin – Assignment of Missed 

Neutron Doses on Dosimeter Records, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, March 7, 2005. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0033, Rev. 00, 2005c. Technical Information Bulletin – Application of Internal 

Doses Based on Claimant-Favorable Assumptions for Processing as Best Estimates, Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, April 20, 2005. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0049, Rev. 00, 2007b. Technical Information Bulletin – Estimating Doses for 

Plutonium Strongly Retained in the Lung, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, February 6, 2007. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0052, Rev. 00 PC-1, 2007a. Parameters to Consider When Processing Claims 

for Construction Workers, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 

January 26, 2007. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0054, Rev. 00, 2007f. Technical Information Bulletin – Fission and Activation 

Product Assignment for Internal Dose-Related Gross Beta and Gross Gamma Analyses., Oak 

Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, May 11, 2007. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0055, Rev. 00, 2006a. Technical Information Bulletin – Technical Basis for 

Conversion from NCRP Report 38 Neutron Quality Factors to ICRP Publication 60 Radiation 

Weighting Factors for Respective IREP Input Neutron Energy Ranges, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 5, 2006. 

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ORAUT-OTIB-0060, Rev 01, 2007c. Technical Information Bulletin – Internal Dose 

Reconstruction, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, February 6, 2007. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0065, Rev. 00, 2007e. Technical Information Bulletin – Internal Dosimetry 

Coworker Data for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, February 16, 2007. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0066, Rev. 00, 2007g. Technical Information Bulletin – Calculation of Dose 

from Intakes of Special Tritium Compounds, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, April 26, 2007. 

ORAUT-PROC-0006, Rev. 01, 2006b. External Dose Reconstruction, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 5, 2006. 

ORAUT-PROC-0060, Rev. 01, 2006c. Occupational Onsite Ambient Dose Reconstruction for 

DOE Sites, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 28, 2006. 

ORAUT-PROC-0061, Rev. 01, 2006d. Occupational X-Ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, July 21, 2006. 

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ATTACHMENT 2: SITE EXPERT INTERVIEW SUMMARY 

Interviews were conducted with seven former Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 

personnel as an initial evaluation. The purpose of these interviews was to receive first-hand 

accounts of past radiological control and personnel monitoring practices at LLNL. Interviewees 

were selected in coordination with the EEOICPA site coordinator and Tri-Valley Cares (a public 

advocacy group), based on guidance provided by SC&A/Saliant. The interviews were conducted 

by Joseph Fitzgerald (Saliant), Kathryn Robertson-DeMers (Saliant), and William James 

(Saliant) from April 14–19, 2007. At the request of the LLNL EEOICPA coordinator, SC&A 

limited the onsite visit to classified and unclassified records review with the intention of 

following up with current worker interviews at a later date. Face-to-face interviews were 

conducted with retirees in Livermore, California. Further input was provided to written 

questions by various current maintenance, engineering, and security staff in June 2007. 

Questions were submitted to LLNL internal dosimetry staff; however, responses have not been 

received to date. Personnel represent experience at the site ranging from 1958 to the present. 

Workers were briefed on the purpose of the interviews, and background on the EEOICPA dose 

reconstruction program and site profiles, and asked to provide their names in case there were 

follow-up questions. Participants were reminded that participation was strictly voluntary and 

that all interviewer notes would be reviewed for classification following the interview. 

Former workers represented operations in Buildings 111, 123, 131, 231, 261, 271, 331, and 332. 

Other operations represented included Site 300 and weapons testing at the NTS, the PPG, 

Amchitka (Cannikan), and a number of Plowshare events. Also included were support personnel 

who worked throughout the site. The job categories or groups included the following: 

• Corporate Environmental Safety & Health Management 

• Dosimetry 

• Hazards Control Management/Team Leads 

• Health Physicist 

• Health and Safety Technicians 

• Machinist 

• Maintenance 

• Security 

• Staff Scientist 

• Technical Supervisor 

• Theoretical/Experimental Physicist 

• Tri-Valley Cares 

The information site experts provided to SC&A/Saliant has been invaluable in helping us 

understand the diverse activities conducted at LLNL. This is not a verbatim discussion, but is a 

summary of information from multiple interviews. The information provided by the 

interviewees was based entirely on their personal experience at LLNL and the testing sites. It is 

recognized that site expert and former LLNL workers’ recollections and statements may need to 

be further substantiated; however, they stand as critical operational feedback and reality 

reference checks. This interview summary is provided in that context. LLNL site expert input is 

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similarly reflected in our discussion. With the preceding qualifications in mind, this summary 

has contributed to issues raised in the site profile review. 

General LLNL Information 

Numerous divisions were involved in the development and testing of devices and weapons. One 

site expert described the distinction between a device and a weapon: 

A nuclear device is basically a “physics experiment.” It is intended to verify 

some type of physics principal [sic]. These experiments are usually “new” ideas 

and many are not successful. Nuclear devices are typically a one of a kind, often 

handcrafted types of nuclear assembly’s [sic]. On the other hand, a nuclear 

weapon is a successful device test [sic] that has been assigned a specific military 

purpose. This could be the warhead for a Polaris missile, an air force bomb or 

an army artillery shell. A weapon must fit within the constrained physical 

envelope of its specific delivery system. It must also meet the stringent “shake, 

bake, rattle and roll” storage, transport and delivery environment. It must be 

highly reliable over a long stockpile life. Most weapons systems incorporate 

sophisticated safety and security systems into their operational envelopes. 

Weapons also have to incorporate designs compatible with large numbers of 

production units. 

The Physics Division was responsible for conducting weapons modeling via computer and 

proposed new methods to be tested. B-Division was responsible for development of primary 

systems. A-Division concentrated on development of secondary systems. L-Division designed 

the diagnostics for tests. The Device Division provided the engineering technology for 

experimental and prototypical nuclear weapons systems. 

The LINAC was operated from Monday-Friday and shut down on Friday night for the weekend. 

This allowed targets to cool prior to handling. Monday was established as the maintenance day 

for the accelerator. Technicians were required to survey the length of the accelerator prior to 

entry, and they also provided job coverage. Bremstrahlung and activation products from the 

accelerator components were the primary source of exposure during shutdown status. The 

facility had an interlocked fence, as well as interlocked access to the drift tube area. The facility 

had a concrete roof. Most of the technicians’ dose came from the 100 MeV LINAC. 

LLNL operated reactors, subcritical assemblies, and critical assemblies at Livermore and NTS. 

The Subcritical Test Facility (Building 261) was used by N-division to conduct various tests. 

The Kukla Prompt Burst Reactor was built and tested at this facility. 

The primary reactor at the Livermore site was the Livermore Pool-Type Reactor (LPTR), which 

operated from 1958 to 1980. A central regulatory rod was mechanically operated through an 

attached gear. Four of the control rods were held by magnets, which could be easily dropped to 

scram the reactor. The reactor core was in a tank with 26 feet of water. Cooling water cycled 

through the reactor at a rate of approximately 1,000 gallons per minute. The reactor was 

operated from Monday through Friday and was shut down over the weekend. On Monday 

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morning, the 3-foot long fuel elements were rotated and unused fuel was stored in storage racks 

along the edge of the reactor vessel. Rotation was necessary to obtain an even burn on each of 

the fuel elements. The fuel was replaced when it no longer produced more neutrons than it 

absorbed. A 7,000 lb coffin was lowered into the reactor pool and the used fuel was loaded with 

a crane into the coffin under water. The shipping container was capped and removed. It was 

allowed to cool for 5–6 months prior to shipment offsite for storage. 

There were several beam ports at the reactor used to irradiate various types of targets. A 

pneumatic tube system was also available to shoot targets within containers (called rabbits) into 

the core for irradiation. Several irradiation positions were available in the reactor pool for 

irradiation of targets. These targets were sealed in an aluminum container and lowered into the 

reactor while it was shutdown. An aluminum wire was tied to the end of a string to help guide 

the targets into position. Irradiation time varied by experiment, but ranged from seconds to 

months. Most of the experiments conducted were physics experiments. Reactor operators were 

responsible for loading and unloading targets. Unloading of targets was done with long tools to 

increase the distance between the operator and the target. Hazards Control was present when 

targets were removed from the reactor. Targets were allowed to cool for at least 30 minutes prior 

to removal. Operators were also allowed to do radiation monitoring when a technician was not 

available. Prior to LPTR, there was a spherical tube of water with a graphite reflector. Uranium 

was put into the tank to conduct subcritical tests. It was shut down around 1959. 

The Research and Development (R&D) activities at LLNL were diverse and involved a number 

of facilities. Although much of the AVLIS-related work involved uranium, there was some 

research done at the Plutonium Facility (B-332) with plutonium. Project Sherwood was 

associated with fusion research conducted at the laboratory. The primary radiological hazard 

associated with this was the x-rays produced by the rectifiers. There were also nonexplosive 

tests conducted on nuclear components, such as the Swordfish Project (studying the effects of 

seawater on nuclear components). Environmental chambers were available to study the effects 

of environmental conditions (e.g., heat, humidity) on components at Site 300. Some plutonium 

was handled during these tests. 

Research and Development (R&D) was included in the activities that occurred in the 

Engineering Building (Building 131). A high bay was used for shot preparation (e.g., electrical 

tests). There was weapons-related vault storage in this building primarily containing depleted 

uranium. The main material storage vault was located in Building 231. Nuclear Chemistry shot 

diagnostic activities occurred in Buildings 151 and 251. Smaller quantities of thorium were 

handled in Buildings 151, 222, and 241. The old Radiochemistry Building (B-222) may have 

conducted limited R&D involving fluorination of small quantities fissile material. There were no 

measurable amounts of neutrons in this area. 

Chemists did not operate in the safest manner, even though there were safety procedures for the 

jobs they conducted. For example, on occasion, they stored radioactive materials in file cabinets. 

Radionuclides were carried back and forth between the laboratory and separations areas. 

One of many operations in the Plutonium Facility involved plutonium that was shipped from 

other DOE complex sites to LLNL for “clean-up” or purification. There were some glove bag 

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ruptures, window cracks, and cuts in gloves; however, there were not a lot of accidental intakes. 

Hazards Control did not put up with sloppy work practices, and plutonium was not often handled 

in liquid form. No plutonium buttons were produced at LLNL. Pits for testing came from RFP 

and other materials came from SRS and Hanford. 

The Heavy Elements Facility (Building 251) was involved in the evaluation of radionuclides to 

determine fission cross-sections. These elements were used for diagnostics testing. Challenging 

health physics issues arose in this and the core processing area, often with high dose rates 

involved. Much of the work was done in manipulator boxes, because of the high specific activity 

of the radionuclides. LLNL developed AERIN, which was an internal dosimetry model used for 

heavy elements. 

The Biomedical Sciences Group in the 360 area of the laboratory was involved in cancer 

research, where animals were injected with radioactive solutions. 

LLNL has been involved in the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of several older 

facilities over the last 10–15 years. A Space Action Team (SAT) was assigned to D&D 

operations to perform comprehensive assessments of past events in obsolete buildings (e.g., 222, 

170 series buildings) designated for demolition. Other facilities are in the decontamination phase 

and the inventory of radioactive material has been reduced (e.g. Building. 251, the heavy 

elements facility). In the early years of the laboratory’s operation, the taxi strip of the former 

naval air station was used for storage of liquid waste. The goal was to evaporate the liquid waste 

in open vats and reduce it to a near solid form. Plastic- and concrete-lined trays for evaporation 

of low-level liquid waste leaked and penetrated several feet into the ground at the old taxi strip. 

This area was remediated (excavated) in the early 1980s to eliminate the contamination. Radium 

was identified during aerial surveys of the site in areas where the military buried radium dials 

when they had ownership of the site. 

LLNL was working in collaboration with Mound on tritium cleanup efforts. These processes 

involved tritides. Much of the tritium research work was discontinued with the end of the cold 

war. Tritides were used in accelerator target material. They did not pose much of a hazard in 

this application. The targets were removed with the use of remote tools. The plates were 

disassembled and weighed. There was a significant need for shielding during this operation. 

LLNL was responsible for the Plowshare Program. Events from the Plowshare program 

included Sedan, Cabriolet, Buggy (5 simultaneous detonations), Gasbuggy, and Rulisen. L- and 

R-Divisions were responsible for the Treaty Verification activities. Studies were conducted to 

gain important information on how to identify production and testing of nuclear weapons by 

other countries. For example, the Plowshare shots conducted in Mississippi were done in a salt 

dome. Salt domes in Russian are used by Russians to conduct their weapons tests. Measurement 

studies above ground were completed to ensure that equipment used was sensitive enough to 

detect activity in a salt dome. 

LLNL was involved in a number of international activities, which involved potential exposure to 

radiation. LLNL employees wore their laboratory dosimeters and, in some cases, secondary 

dosimetry (e.g., pencil dosimeters). 

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Security 

The security services at LLNL were under the jurisdiction of the DOE site contractor, the 

University of California. Materials Management was responsible for verifying incoming and 

outgoing shipments of weapons, weapons components, and Special Nuclear Material (SNM). 

DOE couriers were responsible for transportation of shipments between DOE sites. Protective 

Service Officers (PSOs) were responsible for accompanying shipments to other areas of the 

Livermore site (onsite shipments). The percentage of time spent on these activities was 

dependent upon the particular job assignment. 

Materials were stored in both the production areas and in vaults across the site. Material Vault 

Areas (MVAs) and Material Accountability Areas (MAA) had Twp-Person Security Systems 

(TPSSs) in placed that were used during certain operations. The buddy system was used in the 

Category I facilities (i.e., B-231, B-239, B-261, B-332) for security and/or safety reasons (e.g., 

machining operations, explosive tests). This was particularly the case during SNM movement. 

PSOs were required to guard single or multiple SNM components when other protections were 

not available. The details of material types were not always disclosed to guards. Time spent on 

this duty ranged from rarely to several weeks in a row. Sometimes there was a wall between the 

guard and the SNM, while at other times, there was not (e.g., Site 300, transportation down the 

hall). 

Security occasionally provided escorts for offsite visitors and others, which involved entry into 

radiological areas. This was done in situations when uncleared individuals were allowed to enter 

sensitive facilities (e.g., B-332). LLNL guards were loaned to other DOE facilities after about 

1980. They also provided additional security support to offsite college campuses as necessary to 

control riots. 

In the early 1980s, a lot of facilities worked with SNM, whereas currently, it is more limited. 

There was a large inventory onsite handled in multiple places. In 1985, the SNM was 

consolidated in one location. After 1985, security became involved in training for security 

threats. Some of these exercises took place onsite (e.g., around the B-332 yard area), while 

others occurred at other DOE facilities (e.g., Hanford in 1984). Staff members interviewed were 

not involved in security work at nuclear testing sites. 

Security was the first on the scene at incidents and accidents. The responsibility of security 

during incident response was to control traffic and access to the area, and maintain the integrity 

of the area. Security reports were filed when incidents occurred. At one time, these records 

were stored at B-141, then at B-832E. The current location of these records is unknown. A few 

site experts indicated they were involved in a number of incidents over the course of their 

employment at LLNL. 

Entry and security logs were used at some locations. They were originally stored at the post or at 

B-271. Many of these logs were transferred to the records archive. There were areas with 

security or entry logs. At one time, all records were stored at B-141, then at B-832E. Muster 

logs were located in the B-231 and B-332 vaults. Security had some involvement in disposal of 

classified records at the Hammermill Facility. The records were collected and sent to 

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Hammermill for pulverization with a hammer. Although they were involved in the disposal, 

security did not know the contents of the records. 

Guards were routinely assigned dosimetry for measurement of external exposure. Several 

security site experts indicated that they did not receive any measured external exposure, but if an 

individual was involved in a mishap, they could receive some exposure. There were some duty 

stations that resulted in more radiation exposure than others (i.e., B-332). There was no 

particular subgroup of security staff who routinely received more exposure than others. Many of 

the security personnel interviewed do not recall having to submit bioassay samples (urine or 

fecal). A majority of them indicated they did not receive lung or WBCs. The PPE worn in areas 

such as B-332 were standardized for all workers. Some security staff indicated that there were 

situations at the laboratory where PPE was not the same for two workers in the same vicinity. 

PPE used in areas where SNM was stored included lab coats and shoe covers for B-332, and 

yellow booties at the firing tables at Site 300. 

Maintenance and Crafts 

Coordinators were responsible for different maintenance activities (e.g., lighting, air 

conditioning, heating, etc.). For a particular area of expertise, such as heating and air 

conditioning, an individual could be sent anywhere onsite where this service was needed. There 

were some individuals who were assigned to a particular building. 

Maintenance operations involving hands-on work with radioactive material or contamination 

included machining, casting, chemical analysis, waste handling (turning waste back into oxides), 

glovebox work, welding and welding setup, and electron beam cleaning. The machining, 

milling, and cutting of uranium for test shots were completed in the B-321 NC Shop (U-235) and 

B-332. Chip fires occurred on occasion in both of these areas. Beryllium was handled in the 

immediate vicinity of uranium and/or plutonium in both B-321 and B-332. Back at the peak 

production era, there were fairly constant operations and other metal processing in these areas. 

During these operations, High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA)-filtered local ventilation 

enclosures were used. There was also some thorium machining done in this area. Radiography 

and/or x-ray sources were used to verify the integrity of welds and in orientation of assemblies. 

Operations were associated with B-239. 

Site 300 

Site 300 is a remote area removed from the main LLNL site and populated areas. Offsite 

residential developments are currently expanding toward that location though. Preliminary 

weapons component testing was conducted, including explosive testing of small-scale devices 

and machining of explosives. The Device Division conducted hydrodynamic shots (hydroshots) 

at Site 300 and hydro or subcritical tests at NTS. The shots were used to test devices and 

associated diagnostics. There were as many as 15–20 hydroshots in preparation for a device or 

weapons test at NTS, the PPG, or other test sites. This number decreased over time as the lab 

became more efficient. These hydroshots were detonated on open air shot tables. During the 

actual detonation, workers were inside a concrete bunker 15–20 feet below ground. Large 

quantities of heavy metals were used in hydroshots. A single shot could contain hundreds of 

pounds. A large quantity of depleted uranium (DU, D-38) was used in the hydroshots. The 

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health physics hazards associated with this operation included exposure to radioactive material 

from open table shots, flash x-ray, and real-time radiography. The flash x-ray and radiography 

instruments were interlocked, shielded, and controlled for the workers’ protection. 

Diagnostics had to be carefully installed and manually set in place. This required staff to lie in 

the dirt to make sure placement was precise. The bunkers had port holes, where cameras are 

placed to film the test. Scientists could observe the test and track its progress. These tests were 

documented in reports that described the results. Minimal protective clothing was worn during 

preparation work at Site 300 in the early years of operation. 

Among other tests conducted at Site 300 were dynamic gas flow studies. Extensive 

documentation exists describing these experiments. These studies were conducted to certify 

theoretical calculations developed at the laboratory. 

Radioactive materials used in the shots included uranium, tritium (e.g., tritides), and thorium. 

Many of the shots used depleted uranium; however, thorium was used fairly consistently. The 

source of the thorium was Y-12 or LLNL itself. Post-shot re-entry occurred within 

approximately 30 minutes of the hydroshots to evaluate what material was left and to recover 

diagnostics. The device being tested was usually pulverized by the explosion. Sometimes PPE 

was used, while at other times it was not. These re-entries resulted in a potential for exposure. 

The W-Division also conducted non-nuclear explosive tests (e.g., skid tests). Thorium and 

uranium were handled by workers wearing latex or cotton gloves. Gloves were used primarily to 

prevent moisture from damaging parts. Booties were required to enter the gravel firing table area 

after shots. Once the gravel reached a specified level of uranium or beryllium activity, it was 

replaced. 

The nature of the hydroshots dispersed D-38 to the area around the firing table. Some D-38 

shrapnel was dispersed from the hydroshots. Environmental radiological contamination has been 

found around the shot tables. Beryllium contamination was also an issue. There are also waste 

burial and handling sites located here. It was used as a burial site in the 1960s and 1970s, where 

animal carcasses from the laboratory’s biomedical program were buried. Studies were 

conducted of contamination in this area. Site 300 is now considered a Superfund site. There is 

soil and groundwater contamination associated with this area. There was little historic concern 

with contamination until concern arose regarding offsite environmental releases. The 

surrounding community population is expanding out to the Tracy area where Site 300 is located. 

Weapons Testing Activities 

There were several organizations involved in testing at NTS, including the Defense Nuclear 

Agency (DNA), LLNL, LANL, SNL, REECo (the site contractor), and other supporting 

subcontractors. For LLNL, the device was constructed as a design model at LLNL. Component 

parts for nuclear tests were manufactured at the AEC integrated contractor facilities, including 

the RFP, Y-12, the Bendix Kansas City Plant, American Car and Foundry, Pantex, and in 

LLNL’s own shops on the main site and at Site 300. These components were shipped to NTS 

Building 10, where final assembly, component modifications, interface inspections, and portable 

radiographic checks were made. There was sanding and filing of parts conducted in the 

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Assembly Bay to make components fit better. The design of the diagnostics canister was done 

by LLNL and assembled at the site by contractors, such as Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier 

(EG&G) in Las Vegas. EG&G was responsible for fabricating the diagnostic equipment used in 

testing. Some of the final assembly work had to be coordinated with other laboratories. 

Equipment and components were placed in massive canisters and transported to NTS. 

Transportation of support personnel (e.g., engineers, scientists) to and from NTS was initially 

provided by a two-engine D-18. In 1963, as the work at NTS increased, a DC-3 (referred to as 

“Amy”) was added to the fleet. LLNL staff was responsible for evaluating the posted test data 

and technical aspects of the event. 

DNA conducted tests with weapons of known design. Tunnels were dug in the portions of 

Rainer Mesa facing Yucca Flats to support DNA operations. Yucca Flats was designed for 

lower-yield devices, and the backside of Rainier Mesa (northern portion) was designed for 

higher-yield devices. Rainer Mesa, Area 12, and Area 16 were used for DNA research (tunnel 

and transient radiation effects). Through contract with DNA, LLNL provided support in trying 

to understand tunnel events. This involved development of codes and conducting high-explosive 

gas shock and air jet experiments. They oversaw events conducted by DNA at NTS. 

Weapons tests at NTS, PPG, and other test sites involved approximately 100 personnel (e.g., 

assemblers, diagnostics, electronics, logistics, chemistry, engineers, scientists, and Hazards 

Control). Tunnel shots took longer to prepare for, and involved from 400–500 LLNL personnel. 

The Nuclear Test Engineering Division (NTED) was responsible for all mechanical, civil, 

structural, diagnostic, and containment aspects of underground nuclear tests. It was also 

responsible for the test site field operations, including the arming, detonation, gas systems, 

diagnostics, emplacement, and containment of nuclear tests. The Nuclear Test Electronics 

Engineering (NTEE) provided electronics support for the tests. These personnel were also 

involved in assembly and re-entry support post-testing. Laboratory personnel could be stationed 

at the test site for weeks, depending on their job responsibilities and the particular tests 

conducted. 

Full atmospheric tests of systems took place at NTS and PPG. A majority of these nuclear tests 

occurred at NTS at Frenchman Flats and Yucca Flats. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, 

over 100 atmospheric tests were done, for which there was no containment effort. Atmospheric 

tests focused on evaluating new weapon designs. 

LLNL Experimental Device assembly work was done in special secured facilities. During 

certain phases of the assembly process, dosimetry badges would be removed for explosive safety 

or as a damage precaution when handling certain materials. Nuclear devices contained exotic 

radioactive materials, high explosives, plastics and plasticizers, bonding agents, and solvents of 

all sorts. Weapons engineers were exposed to these materials. Employees were sometimes 

cavalier about handling chemicals and radiation. Once that phase of the assembly was 

completed, badges would be put back on. The assembled nuclear device or weapon was 

transported to the “forward area,” Frenchman or Yucca Flats, where it was placed on a tower or 

anchored to a balloon for detonation. 

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The shots were fired from the Control Point (CP), where test support staff was located. The CP 

overlooked the Yucca Flats, where pre-shot evaluations and the tests were done. Containment 

physicists would review the design of the containment with the site director. Early morning 

briefings occurred to discuss the stability of the weather and whether the shot could proceed. 

The shot was not performed during bad weather. The site manager would give the okay to 

detonate the device. Observations of the actual detonation were made from the Central Control 

Point (CP1). Most of the time, darkened glasses were provided, but on occasion, personnel were 

directed to “turn away.” 

Re-entry teams for special effects shots recovered items that had direct radiation exposure from 

weapons. Teams took turns doing portions of the recovery, with Hazards Control technicians 

accompanying them. Post-detonation, Hazards Control personnel would enter the area to 

determine whether radiation leakage had occurred. When the “all clear” was given, scientists 

went into the area to retrieve the diagnostic equipment and information recorded by the remote 

system in the trailer for atmospheric tests. No PPE was worn into the area for this operation after 

it had been cleared. Re-entries were conducted within hours after a detonation at NTS. Time 

restrictions were applied by Hazards Control. For tunnel shots, anti-contamination clothing and 

respirators were used. Re-entries resulted in the largest doses during the weapon tests. 

During atmospheric testing just prior to the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, there were a lot of “shots” 

in a relatively short period of time. Personnel worked long hours at the test sites. According to 

the site expert, the priority was to get the “shots” done on schedule, and sometimes “the rules” 

got compromised. During atmospheric testing, scientists from the Nuclear Chemistry Division 

flew through clouds immediately after the weapons detonation to collect gas samples. Upon 

entry into the “underground” era of testing, more standard operational procedures were 

developed. 

Underground tests required that a hole be drilled into the ground for insertion of the device. The 

weapon was placed down the main hole and the hole was backfilled to the surface. It is 

important to note that different tests may be performed in the same geographical areas. That 

meant holes for new tests could be drilled very close to ground zero (GZ) from previous tests. 

The area around GZ was vaporized and melted rock was found at farther distances away. For 

example, a 1-megaton shot vaporized rock up to 20 meters in radius, and melted rock as far away 

as 40 meters in radius. 

During the initial years of underground testing, many new and difficult challenges arose. 

Underground test holes and caverns, large and deep enough to contain the energy release by a 

nuclear explosion, proved difficult and costly. Containing the nuclear blast and its radioactive 

byproducts underground required new “containment” science and field technology. The capture 

and analysis of nuclear diagnostics systems data via “hardened” detection/electronics, and thence 

through miles of coaxial cables, was a daunting requirement. Shock mitigation of relatively 

delicate electronics was particularly challenging. New environmental “canisters” for the nuclear 

devices, diagnostics, containment, and cable systems were all new technology. New computer 

codes had to be developed for the test itself. The canister was installed by lowering it into the 

circular hole drilled into the ground. Different layers of backfill (different materials) were 

added. Attached to the canisters were the diagnostic cables used to record performance of the 

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device. These diagnostic cables came up through the ground and went to trailers an adequate 

distance from GZ. Recording was conducted without the presence of employees in the trailers. 

When the subsidence crater occurred, the cables could be pulled away from the trailers. The list 

of challenges went on and on. 

One site expert explained: 

Nuclear test technology evolved rapidly in the late 1960s. Shot yields got larger, 

diagnostics became very sophisticated, turnaround times became shorter and 

safety improved. 

After underground tests were completed, the LLNL Nevada Group arranged for core sampling. 

After the weapon was detonated, gases from the explosion cooled and the overburden collapsed, 

creating a crater. The ground had to be stable prior to re-entry, and the area had to be cleared for 

health purposes. REECo was responsible for drilling the holes and digging tunnels. Drillbacks 

occurred within 2–5 days of the underground tests. A sample was extracted from the detonation 

site. This sample was taken to a trailer or the “Blue Building” at NTS. With tongs, the sample 

was segregated to identify pieces with high-level activity (referred to as high-grading). The 

segregated portion was placed into a bag or a vial, then into a steel capsule (1–2 R/hr at the 

capsule). The steel capsule was put into a lead pig and flown to LLNL for analysis. The core 

sample was brought from the airport to Building 151 (Building 103 prior to its existence), where 

it was put into a glovebox and divided into sub-samples for the various analyses to be conducted. 

Air filters collected during atmospheric weapons testing were analyzed by wet chemistry and 

counted in Building 101. Air filter samples, regardless of the sponsor, were split between LLNL 

and LANL. Hazards Control provided coverage during the transportation and handling of core 

samples and air filters. 

When LLNL personnel worked at the NTS, they generally stayed onsite. If they worked 

“events” that were located on the Frenchman and Yucca Flats area, they usually went back to 

Camp Mercury. However, because the days were so long and the travel distances so far when 

they worked events located in Area 12 (the tunnels) and/or on Pahute Mesa, they stayed at the 

Area 12 Camp or on the Mesa itself. The Area 12 Camp was a scaled-down version of Camp 

Mercury. Very often, even events on the Yucca Flats had schedules that required personnel to 

stay nearby. There were many work trailers that been minimally outfitted with a few beds, a 

refrigerator, and a hotplate. Dosimetry badges were typically removed during recreation and at 

Area 12 or Camp Mercury, where personnel slept and ate. 

According to site experts, life on the tropical Christmas Island was much more “casual” than at 

the NTS. Hence, the people on the island had fewer security issues and more recreational time. 

This resulted in much more casual dress (usually shorts and sandals), and less concern about 

constant dosimetry badge-wearing. 

Events 

Operation Dominic was the largest U.S. nuclear test operation ever conducted. The device 

assembly work for tests in the Pacific was done at Barbers Point Naval Air Station in Hawaii. 

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They were flown to the drop areas by B-52 bombers. Thirty-six atmospheric tests were 

completed at the PPG between April and November 1962. About 500 people from LLNL were 

involved. Most of the tests were airbursts, with the devices dropped by B-52 bombers. The 

typical test in this series was a high-yield thermonuclear test that was observed from Christmas 

Island. Christmas Island atmospheric tests were evaluated by electronic detectors and physical 

particle samples. Both of these methods were conducted airborne and on the ground. As a result 

of weather anomalies or “off target” detonations, there was “fallout” from tests that ended up 

“dusting” the island. LLNL personnel also participated in Operation Nougat, which ran from 

September 1961 to June 1962. Operations Dominic and Nougat were the last atmospheric tests 

conducted prior to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 

LLNL was responsible for the Cannikin 5-megaton experiment conducted on November 6, 1971, 

in Amchitka, Alaska. The preparation took nearly 5 years. The weapon was placed in a 90-inch 

diameter hole that was drilled over 6,000 feet deep. At the bottom of this hole was a mined 

cavity over 50 feet in diameter. Four hundred tons of “hardware and electronics” cabling was 

lowered into the hole with the weapon. The “shock mounted” diagnostic recording trailers were 

located 2,000 feet from GZ. The blast generated a ground motion of 7.0 on the Richter scale. 

The corresponding peak ground displacement of over 15 feet was measured at the diagnostics 

trailer. All experimental data were recovered for this shot. 

Other Activities at NTS 

In addition to hydroshots at Site 300, LLNL conducted subcritical and high-explosive tests at 

NTS (Area 16). Mock-up devices and weapons with the primary were used in these tests. 

Subcritical shots at the NTS had all the elements of a full-scale nuclear test, but the nuclear 

materials were “diluted,” so they would not go critical. The majority of the diagnostics were 

electronic detectors. These tests were typically underground tests, where devices were placed 

about 150 feet below ground. Some of the subcritical shots were aboveground, such as the 

Vortex Project. During the test moratorium, all tests at NTS were subcritical tests. During the 

execution of “subcritical” tests, it was necessary to work “upside down” in relatively tight, 

underground quarters. All personal materials, including badges, had to be removed for assembly 

safety. High-explosives testing were conducted for R&D. 

Several one-point safety shots (e.g., test of only the primary) were conducted for almost every 

weapon at NTS. Project 56, which involved plutonium, started in Area 11 at NTS in 1955. Four 

safety shots were conducted, with the first three occurring without issue. The fourth shot did not 

go as planned. There were higher than expected external exposures. The Roller Coaster Event, 

conducted in the 1950s, also involved plutonium shots. 

LLNL ran the Tweezer Facility located at NTS. This facility was used to conduct tests on pits. 

For example, personnel were required to stay at a predetermined safe distance from hot dry runs 

and other runs. Other LLNL activities that occurred at NTS included the Pluto Project, the 

development and testing of the FRAN prompt burst reactor, and the development and testing of 

the Super Kukla reactor. The Pluto Project involved the development of a reactor core built at 

LLNL and tested at NTS. Beryllium was used as a reflector. This was related to a subatmospheric suborbital mission. N-Division was involved in all three of these projects. 

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Tunnels used for the Spent Fuel Climax Project (SFCP) were left over from the Piledriver 

experiment. During this project, they excavated a large area of tunnels in the granite rock. 

Tunnels that went back to the area where the explosives were set off were closed up. The 

elevator is located at the top of the surface where the excavated material was hauled out. They 

added a large room, which was used as an assembly area. The elevator was also used to carry 

materials down to this room. This room should not have been affected by the explosions. For 

the SFCP, gauges and other equipment had to be installed in the wall near the spent fuel sites. 

Spent fuel rods from a reactor were loaded into storage areas underground in the room. 

Diagnostics to analyze the effects on the granite were placed in the rock in the immediate area. 

Operations were done remotely. A report was issued on the setup of the SFCP. This work lasted 

approximately 5–10 years. 

General Radiological Control 

Radiation protection, industrial hygiene, industrial safety, criticality safety, and environmental 

monitoring were originally part of the Hazards Control Division. Technicians and supervisors 

worked for teams. Exempt staff was initially in a central organization. Most professionals were 

eventually moved out to the field to get them more involved in the resolution of team-specific 

issues. LLNL assigned the right people to the right areas, depending on their expertise. 

Individuals were not matrixed to operations, but always took their direction from the Hazards 

Control Division. 

Professionals, supervisors, and technicians were responsible for implementing all disciplines of 

safety. Health and safety technicians covered multiple safety disciplines. They were responsible 

for conducting health physics monitoring and planning, industrial hygiene monitoring and 

planning, and identification and control of industrial safety hazards. They were also assigned 

duties associated with critical safety and some environmental monitoring tasks. Technicians had 

a primary focus, but were required to support the other safety disciplines. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Radiation Safety Section of the Hazards Control Department 

consisted of approximately 22–27 staff members, including Operational Health Physics, 

Operational Health Physics (HP) Technicians, External Dosimetry Professionals, External 

Dosimetry Technicians, Internal Dosimetry Professionals, Internal Dosimetry Technicians, 

Counting Room Professionals, Counting Room Technicians, and Radiation Calibration and 

Repair Technicians. 

Operational HPs supported a particular Safety Team that was established to support various 

programmatic areas (e.g. the Plutonium Facility, Hazardous Waste Management, Biomedical 

Program, Physics (accelerators), Chemistry, etc.). In addition to those above, there were 20–30 

health and safety technicians who supported all safety disciplines (radiation safety, industrial 

hygiene, industrial safety, fire safety, and explosive safety). Much of the technical staff was 

hired from the Nuclear Navy program. These individuals were well trained, and knew how to 

write and follow procedures. They were also adept at contamination control. The members of 

the Hazards Control division had strong academic credentials and experience in their disciplines. 

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Hazards Control was involved in work planning from early on. When planning work, there were 

discussions on how to perform the task, including experimenters, operations, and safety. Those 

involved had to agree with the proposed process prior to proceeding. This process was similar to 

the current-day Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) program. Routine and special 

jobs were evaluated by a multidisciplinary team (e.g., workers performing the job, Hazards 

Control, and management). Field Hazards Control was responsible for identifying the hazards 

and establishing the controls. 

The facility safety procedures provided general instructions and requirements for the particular 

building. Operational Safety Procedures (OSPs) include requirements such as types of 

monitoring, air sampling, personal protective equipment (PPE), and other radiological controls 

for specific experiments or operations within the facility. Also included was a description of the 

work to be performed, identification of hazards, quantity of hazards where applicable, and 

controls required for the work. Essentially, they informed the program what they needed to do to 

control and monitor radiation exposure and to perform the work safely. The OSPs are similar to 

a current-day work package and were used for specific jobs. Discipline Action Plans provided 

day-to-day instructions for health and safety technicians. For example, it would explain required 

surveillances for health physics, industrial hygiene, and industrial safety. These documents were 

reviewed on an annual basis or more frequently, as needed. Technicians were rotated through 

the different facilities to give them a broad knowledge of hazards and hazards controls at LLNL. 

A Health Physicist was required to prepare a Health Physics Program document, which was 

updated annually. The Team Leader reviewed these for inconsistencies between plans. These 

included information on the location of the air samples, air sampling requirements, survey 

procedures, etc. Part I of the document provided general descriptions. Part II had detailed 

instructions for the H&S Technician. The overall Health Physics plans were generic in nature. 

The facility plans were adapted with specific information pertaining to the building. Industrial 

hygiene, industrial safety, environmental monitoring, and fire protection requirements were also 

developed in similar plans. 

There was also a Hazards Control Manual and an H&S Field Techniques Manual. The Hazards 

Control Manual goes back to the 1970s. It included procedures for calibrations and calibration 

checks, routine technical work, and formal training material. 

The AEC/DOE standards (e.g., AEC 0524 Manual, 5480.11, 10 CFR 835) have formed the basis 

of the radiation protection program at LLNL. The Radiation Safety Program has been somewhat 

challenging at LLNL, because R&D at the site is continuously changing. Monitoring worker 

doses and the work environment did not depend on only one system to determine whether 

exposures had occurred; it included personnel dosimetry (including extremity dosimetry), 

bioassay, WBC, air sampling, swipe surveys, hand and foot counters, area surveys, etc. 

Approximately 10% of the laboratory population handled or worked around radioactive material 

or radiation-generating devices. 

Site experts indicated that LLNL had a good As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) 

program. All aspects of exposure control (i.e., time, distance, and shielding) were considered 

when developing radiation controls. For example, in the plutonium areas, Pb aprons were not 

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routinely used while Pb gloves were used. The gloves caused reduced dexterity, resulting in a 

longer exposure time. Both the shielding protection and the increased exposure had to be 

considered. The Area HP was originally responsible for this function, but the programmatic 

individuals became involved at a later date, and Area HPs became peer reviewers. Tents were 

used where there was the potential for significant contamination, such as when first stage HEPA 

filters were changed. 

Former radiological control staff indicated there was no tolerance for performing routine work in 

contamination areas, which occurred at some of the other (production) facilities. Contamination 

was cleaned up as it was identified. Airborne contamination areas were the exception and not a 

routine condition. Eating, drinking, and smoking were not allowed in the plutonium facility or 

other radioactive materials handling areas. 

In general, areas of the laboratory where radioactive materials were handled or radiation 

generating machines were used were restricted to those individuals whose work assignments 

required their entry into the area. Former radiological control staff commented that it would be 

rare that any administrative staff or security personnel would enter into radiation areas, and 

essentially never into contamination areas. 

Air sampling was primarily used as an indicator or to verify the adequacy of workplace controls. 

There was infrequent personal (lapel) air sampling for the purposes of health physics. Personal 

(lapel) air sampling was used when individuals were entering a known contamination area to 

confirm adequacy of the respiratory protection. This type of air sampling was routinely done to 

measure industrial hygiene hazards. Early personal air samples were collected using a carbon 

vane pump, which was moved around on a cart. Tubing was strapped to the individual’s 

shoulder to reflect the breathing zone. Area air sampling was used much more frequently than 

lapel air sampling. Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) were installed in the plutonium facility at 

the exhaust points to the HEPA filter. At a later date, they were installed in the immediate work 

areas. LLNL has not used DAC-hour tracking as a means of tracking dose. Particulate air 

sampling was conducted in areas where metal tritides were handled. Filters were counted with a 

liquid scintillation counter. Air sampling was not used for internal dose assignments; the 

variables affecting air sampling were too extensive. 

Protective clothing for many areas was job-dependent. In some areas, workers wore lab coats 

and booties; in other areas, full Anti-Cs (i.e., coveralls, gloves, hoods, booties) were worn. 

During maintenance operations, full Anti-Cs were used. Respiratory protection (e.g., positive air 

purifying respirator, supplied air) was also used to some extent, based on the job hazards. In 

general, respirators at LLNL were worn for protection against chemical hazards rather than 

radiological hazards. There was a qualitative fit-test program using smoke and smoke tubes 

prior to the early 1990s. Starting in the early 1990s, a quantitative fit-test program was 

implemented using a PortaCount. Alpha friskers were mounted on each glovebox for routine 

hand monitoring. Hand and foot monitors were used for detecting personnel contamination 

when exiting the area. Site experts did not indicate they received chemical exposures in 

conjunction with radiation exposure. 

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Portable survey instruments used at LLNL varied over time. A few of the survey instruments 

used in the 1970s are listed below: 

Technical Associates Juno 

Early Victoreen Ion Chamber 

Blue Alpha Meter 

Rem-meter
 

The Juno is a high-range rugged instrument for monitoring dose rates. The ion chambers are 

used for measurement of low-energy x-rays. The Blue Alpha Meter was used in the plutonium 

area and continues to be used today. One unique characteristic of the probe is that the active area 

is exactly 100 cm2. Neutron instruments developed at LLNL included portable survey meters 

and spectroscopy units. 

Beginning in early 1980s, the Radiation Safety Division of the Hazards Control Department had 

an X-ray Safety Officer who monitored the non-medical x-ray machine safety program. This 

individual is responsible for inventorying all units, ensuring that periodic inspections and 

interlock checks are completed, verifying the presence of the x-ray safety boxes (where 

required), and making confirmatory survey measurements. The x-ray safety boxes were attached 

to the units to shut down the machine if short circuits or other potentially hazardous failures were 

detected. X-ray safety became much more rigorous following a significant overexposure to 

x-rays at the LBNL in the late 1970s. The X-ray Safety Officer maintains these surveys and the 

registrations for the equipment. 

Radiation Safety during Weapons Testing 

During tests at NTS, PPG, and other test sites, dosimetry was provided by REECo (PPG and 

NTS) or Eberline (Tonapah, Cannikin (Amchitka), Gasbuggy (Colorado). The LLNL dosimeter 

was not worn while at the test site. Dose information for LLNL employees was sent to LLNL. 

There was an effort to go back and review previous results for LLNL personnel involved in 

testing. This included re-evaluating film and incorporating NTS dose into dosimetry files. Some 

amount of internal dose reconstruction was also completed. The underground nuclear test shots 

themselves were monitored by an array of radiation area monitors (RAM) during underground 

testing to check for the possible escape of fission gasses. 

There were a variety of radiological hazards associated with weapons testing. During the 

atmospheric testing, there was prompt radiation. For underground and atmospheric testing, there 

was radioactive fallout. The fallout was disbursed by the wind. As a result of testing, the entire 

site was/is contaminated to some extent. With the 40–45 years that have passed since 

atmospheric testing, there has been radioactive decay of some radionuclides. Individuals 

working in the earlier years were exposed to more material than those there today. Some 

radionuclides are more prominent at NTS (e.g., Sr-90 and Cs-137). Some areas, such as 

Buckboard Mesa, are off limits due to contamination in the high lands. 

Once the device and diagnostic systems were moved out into the “forward” GZ test area, 

personnel had to go through numerous security check points. In general, the closer anyone got to 

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the GZ area, security and radiation safety became more rigorous. In addition to heightened 

security in the GZ area, there was always the appropriate number of Hazard Control personnel 

“monitoring things,” according to site experts, for both pre- and post-shot. Hazards Control 

personnel at NTS entered tunnels to recover air samples and conduct measurements. Required 

PPE included a full-face respirator and coveralls. Typical instruments used for measurements 

included a Juno detector, Radectors, and an E-120. In addition to re-entry operations, Hazards 

Control also provided monitoring coverage during assembly. Site experts indicated that on postshot re-entry or sample recoveries, it was assumed that the Hazards Control personnel directed 

and monitored individuals appropriately. There were situations where the recovery team 

members received overexposures. In general, Hazards Control staff observed that radiation 

safety recommendations were always followed. There were occasions where people overstayed 

their exposure time to “finish up” some operation. And there were times that radiation suits got 

torn or respirators leaked, but re-entry work, barring relatively common, unexpected situations, 

was reasonably planned and executed. With some exceptions, personnel wore their dosimetry 

badges in the “GZ operational” areas. 

Upon exit from the area, the PPE was stripped off, cursory personal monitoring was done, and 

skin was decontaminated as necessary. Urinalysis was taken after personnel contamination was 

detected. No thyroid counts were conducted at NTS for LLNL workers interviewed. There was 

no routine or confirmatory bioassay upon return from test sites. The exposure at these sites was 

primarily to short-lived radionuclides. 

External Monitoring 

Site experts indicated that senior management at LLNL apparently did not want to have to 

answer workers’ questions about potential exposures. It was believed that as a result, they 

implemented a policy to assign beta/gamma dosimeters to all LLNL workers. Site experts as far 

back as the late 1950s remember all laboratory staff being assigned dosimeters. Neutron 

dosimeters were assigned based on the workers’ potential exposure to neutrons. The local DOE 

office set a policy that personnel were not allowed to receive more than 20% of the legal limit. 

The dosimeter was, for a period of time, combined with the Security Badge. This combined 

system only measured beta/gamma exposure. It was either clipped under PPE or worn on a 

lanyard. In order to prevent the badge from getting caught in machines or contaminated, workers 

would sometimes throw their dosimeter to their back. Workers wore their dosimeters unless they 

accidentally forgot it when entering the area. There were some concerns raised by site experts 

that dosimetry was improperly loaded at times. 

Significant exposures were received during work at the test sites and during the analysis of test 

core samples. The exposure received by personnel for core samples was dependent on the 

quality (amount of radioactive material) of the sample collected. The major source of Sr-90 at 

the lab was from core samples brought back to the laboratory for analysis. However, the 

majority of the radioactivity in the shot samples was from short-lived fission products. Drill 

backs had to be analyzed quickly, because of the short-lived radionuclides. This resulted in 

intense work for short periods of time at high dose rates. Some early chemists received a 

majority of their external exposures from core-handling operations and post-test air monitoring 

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analysis. Routine extremity dosimetry was eventually implemented for Nuclear Chemistry. 

Prior to this, there was some indeterminate level of extremity monitoring. Some extremity 

dosimetry was worn by maintenance personnel. 

Reactor Operators were on a monthly dosimeter exchange cycle. Dose reports were provided so 

individuals could monitor their dose throughout the year. The primary source of external 

exposure was from irradiated targets. Standing at the top of the reactor did not result in much 

exposure. Fuel change out was done underwater, resulting in minimal exposure. There was a 

less-frequent dosimeter exchange period for maintenance personnel, since they were considered 

peripheral. Routine extremity monitoring was implemented for some periods of time for those at 

LPTR removing targets from the reactor. In 1971, LLNL undertook a project to refurbish the 

vessel and perform extensive maintenance at the LPTR 3 MW Research Reactor. There were a 

lot of personnel rotated through this project. The highest annual cumulative worker dose (100– 

150 person-rem) for the laboratory occurred as a result. No worker exceeded the annual 

exposure limit. 

In the late 1960s, concern was raised that the NTA film was not adequately measuring neutron 

exposure in the Critical Test Facility (Building 261) where critical array studies were being 

performed. As a result, a comparison of neutron doses recorded by NTA film and neutron rem 

meters was made. Neutron-to-photon dose rate ratios were evaluated in various assembly 

configurations. Based on the results of the study, the neutron-to-photon dose-rate ratios were 

used to determine the dose of record. In the early to mid-1970s, the site transitioned from NTA 

film to albedo dosimeters. Neutron spectral studies were conducted in the early 1970s. Neutronto-photon ratios were established in the plutonium area by glovebox. The use of chemical tracketch detectors for neutron dosimetry was implemented in the 1980s. 

The radiation profile of areas was evaluated on a regular basis. Night health and safety 

technicians would conduct periodic swipe characterizations of the radiological areas onsite in 

addition to the routine survey program. LLNL staff was heavily involved in testing new neutron 

measurement equipment and personnel dosimeters and determining neutron spectra for various 

areas of the site. In general, fission neutrons were typical in areas with Cf-252 sources, Cm-244, 

and plutonium. The Rotating Target Neutron Source (RTNS) II in Building 292 was used to 

produce 14 MeV neutrons from the Deuterium-Tritium reaction. Outside the RTNS II shielding 

vault, the neutron energies were about 1–2 MeV. This area inside the vault was not occupied 

during operation. Calibration of neutron instruments and dosimeters was done with a Cf-252 

source (i.e., a fission neutron spectrum). At the LINAC, neutron measurements were made at the 

entry above the accelerator while it was operating and in accessible areas. 

Roving workers would not be a concern after 1958, since all site individuals were monitored. 

Both maintenance and security personnel were badged, like those working in the glovebox area, 

if they were assigned to the Plutonium Facility or routinely entered this area. Personnel were 

required to show a security badge to get into the “forward” areas, so personnel generally wore 

their dosimetry badges. There were some exceptions. 

Administrative staff was not always provided a dosimeter. There were situations where these 

individuals served as escorts to dignitaries or where offices were located near radiological areas. 

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For example, one office area was located on the air station runway, which was later found to be 

contaminated. 

Secondary dosimetry was routinely used at the reactors, accelerators, and radiography areas 

(remote or permanent). Secondary dosimetry consisted of digital ion chambers, chirpers, and 

traditional pocket ionization chambers. Some hot jobs (e.g., work inside the hot cell) required 

time limits and chirpers. The approach was to limit the time and to have knowledge of the dose 

rate. The results of these dosimeters are found in the technician logbooks. The radiography 

group maintained their own log of secondary dosimetry results. Mapped surveys were posted at 

the entrance to an area to inform the workers. They were updated when there was a modification 

to operations or material being handled. 

In at least one case, a mechanical engineer asked health physics to re-evaluate the dose he 

received from working on parts from a prompt burst reactor at NTS (Super Kukla). There was a 

recorded gamma dose, but there was no beta exposure data in his record, so it had to be 

reconstructed. An extensive interview with the employee was conducted regarding the details of 

his job. Both skin and extremity doses were reconstructed and assigned to the employee’s 

dosimetry record. 

Internal Monitoring 

A wide variety of radionuclides were handled at LLNL, including plutonium, uranium, tritium, 

curium, americium, mixed-fission products, other transplutonium elements, and numerous 

activation products associated with the accelerator programs. Tritium was handled in 

Building 331, the Laser Fusion Program facilities, Site 300, and at the accelerators. Tritium 

handled at LLNL was primarily in the form of tritium gas and salts. For example, titanium 

tritide was tied to target material used in Buildings 212 and 292. Other tritides handled include 

uranium tritide and LiDT. LiDT was primarily used in testing. Uranium tritide was handled in 

Building 331. Tritium was handled too casually. Uranium was also considered to be harmless 

and was handled without gloveboxes. In fact, the workers performed hands-on operations with 

uranium metal. Tracers used in the nuclear test shots were various transuranics. There were 

only minor projects involving work with radium and radon. Careful measurements were made of 

naturally occurring radon concentrations in all of the buildings at the laboratory. Thorium 

compounds were handled in gloveboxes in Building 241. Smaller quantities of thorium were 

handled in Building 151 and Building 222. Chemists worked with small amounts of radium in 

experiments. There were also some situations where encapsulated radium sources leaked. The 

laboratory produced very pure Pu-238 and Pu-239 with very low concentrations of Am-241. 

Chemists also conducted isotopic separations to produce new transplutonium elements. There 

were opportunities for precutaneous, ingestion, and inhalation intakes when coming in contact 

with fallout and with entries into tunnel complexes at NTS. 

Chemical forms of plutonium handled at LLNL included plutonium hydrides, metal, oxides, and 

nitrates (smaller quantities). No high Pu-240 content material (i.e., <5%) was brought into the 

laboratory, because scientists didn’t want to contaminate the Pu-239 stream. Plutonium-238 was 

handled in pure form in gram quantities. This was used as a test diagnostic tool. There was no 

production of heat sources at LLNL. Depleted and enriched uranium were handled in the form 

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of metal, oxide, and a D-38 liquid. Some work was done with polonium oxide. Many of the 

radionuclides produced at LLNL for experiments (e.g., cross-section studies) were in R&D 

quantities. 

The internal monitoring program at LLNL was constantly improving. LLNL developed an 

underground in-vivo counter for counting individuals exposed to uranium and plutonium. Health 

Physicists quickly discovered that the physical size of an individual affected the efficiency of the 

in-vivo counter. In the 1970s, LLNL developed a realistic phantom to obtain calibrations, which 

were reflective of parameters such as lung thickness and purity of material. Calibrations were 

available for various lung thicknesses. The extent of WBC implementation was variable, 

depending on the time period. For example, scientists involved in intermittent work at Site 300 

do not recall receiving WBCs. There was some counting performed within 1 month upon return 

after the Amchitka event, but this was not the case immediately following all test events. 

Bioassay was incident-based, with some exceptions. Routine bioassay varied by area, and was 

based on types, quantities, and forms of the radionuclides handled and the types of work being 

done. Approximately 90% of the laboratory employees did not handle radioactive material and 

were not on a routine bioassay program. Routine plutonium and tritium bioassay occurred for 

those working in the plutonium and tritium facilities. Plutonium workers submitted bioassay 

samples monthly, semi-annually, or annually, and received an annual lung count. Plutonium-239 

was the predominant radionuclide, with minimal Pu-238 present. Site experts indicated that 

tritium was not taken as seriously as some of the radionuclides onsite, because it didn’t really 

pose a dose problem. Routine tritium bioassay for Building 331 workers was done weekly for 

individuals with high exposure potential, and monthly for those with peripheral involvement. 

Employees working around the firing tables at Site 300 were monitored for uranium uptakes; 

however, this may have varied over time. Individuals involved with Site 300 tests in earlier 

years (e.g., 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s) recall having film badges for measuring external dose, but 

do not remember submitting urine or fecal bioassay. Uranium bioassay programs were 

implemented for workers involved in machining and metallurgy at Building 321C shop and 

Building 231. Individuals handling core samples were monitored for mixed-fission products and 

transuranics as deemed necessary. Historically, uranium urinalysis was not effective enough by 

itself to allow for internal dose reconstruction. Various enrichments of uranium were handled, so 

there had to be some information on the type of material to which a worker was exposed. 

Monitoring requirements were documented in OSPs. 

Special bioassays were also taken when there was an unusual occurrence (e.g., elevated counts 

on air filters, glovebox failures, and unexpected releases). During the early days (the 1950s and 

1960s), special bioassay sampling was determined in consultation with the Medical Department. 

The Bioassay Program was moved entirely to the Hazards Control department in the early 1970s. 

Currently, there are flow sheets available in the LLNL internal dose TBD for determining when 

special bioassay sampling is required. When an incident occurred, the Health Physicist 

requested a sample of material from the area of potential exposure for isotopic analysis. Samples 

were counted prior to and after radiochemistry processing, and could include urine and/or fecal 

sampling. 

Nose smears were taken primarily as a field indicator for potential internal contamination. In the 

earlier years, the decision to take nose swipes depended primarily on the professional judgment 

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of the area Health Physicist. In about 1990, a more formal protocol for taking nose wipes and 

other follow-up bioassay samples was developed, based on airborne contamination levels, 

breaches in glovebox gloves, surface contamination levels, etc. In many cases, nasal smears are 

not indicative of actual intakes. There are individuals with positive nasal smears who have 

negative bioassays, and individuals with negative nasal smears who have positive bioassay. 

Regardless, anyone with a positive nasal smear was sent for bioassay, which was the basis for 

internal dose assessment. 

There were no chelation events at the site prior to about 1990; however, there have been about 

five or six chelation events since that time. This has largely been the result of incidents 

associated with the handling and processing of legacy waste. 

Environmental Monitoring and Waste Management 

Environmental monitoring was originally part of the Hazards Control Department. The 1969 fire 

at RFP precipitated an expansion in the Environmental Monitoring Program at LLNL. Early 

environmental monitoring included collecting air samples at the site perimeter, soil sampling, 

groundwater sampling, and measurement of external exposure by ionization chambers and later 

thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). Environmental monitoring has improved (kept up with 

the state of the art and increasing requirements) over time. In the mid-1980s, the Environmental 

Protection Division was formed, separating this function from the Hazards Control Department, 

and now consists of several hundred employees. There have been a number of issues at LLNL 

associated with environmental releases. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 

brought up concerns regarding tritium in the drinking water. 

Historically, waste separation was not as rigorous as required by regulations today, and, by 

current standards, it was poorly characterized. A few of the waste-handling facilities include 512 

(Old Liquid Waste Facility), the 612 Complex, and 514 (Current Liquid Waste Facility). Lowlevel waste was stored in Bennett buckets. Some of the early waste had to be repackaged by 

Waste Handlers. The drums were opened in a walk-in hood, and the contents were determined 

and repackaged into larger containers. With this work, there was an expected contamination 

hazard. As a result, coveralls and respiratory protection were used. The drums are then sealed 

and characterized prior to shipment to waste management. Aerial surveys of the site did identify 

some hot spots on the Livermore site. The military had buried radium dials onsite when they 

owned the site. 

Incidents 

The LLNL Fire Department is responsible for occurrence reporting and also maintains the 

incident archive at the Fire Station (Building 323). These reports are organized by incident 

number and year. When an incident occurred, the department involved was responsible for 

generating a report. Unusual events or identification of unexpected sources of exposure were 

supposed to be documented. Incidents mentioned by site experts include: 

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• Criticality Accident 

• 1965 Release (Tritium) 

• 1970 Release (Tritium) 

On March 26, 1963, a criticality accident occurred in Building 261 in a shielded vault designed 

for criticality experiments. At the time it occurred, no personnel were in the vault area. There 

was an explosion equivalent to 6–10 pounds of dynamite. The criticality was stopped when the 

explosion occurred, because there was no longer a favorable configuration. This facility was 

used to conduct fissile material array studies. Experiments were conducted in a shielded room 

with 5-foot thick concrete walls. 

The largest environmental releases at LLNL took place in 1965 and 1970, when tritium gas was 

released to the atmosphere. At the time, tritium stack monitoring was performed using an ion 

chamber with a strip chart recorder to help determine the magnitude of the release and sound 

alarms. In 1972, catalytic converters and molecular sieves were installed to supplement the ion 

chambers. The catalytic converters were installed to convert tritium gas to tritium oxide, which 

was easily collected on the molecular sieves. There was a known tritium release to the ground 

near the old reactor building onsite. Tritium could be measured in neighboring vegetation (e.g., 

Tritium Tree) until the area was remediated. An early incident at LBL resulted in an increased 

rigor in the x-ray safety program at LLNL. 

In 1967, a release of 32 mCi of plutonium-239 to the sewer system occurred. During review of 

sewer sampling data, a spike of plutonium was observed. The material made its way to the 

Livermore sewage treatment plant, where it got deposited with the sludge. This sludge was sold 

to the public for use as fertilizer and soil conditioner. Some of the sludge was sold prior to the 

cleanup and was used in Big Tree’s Park. Once the situation was discovered, the city was 

notified. Monitoring of the sludge indicated detectable quantities of plutonium on the order of a 

few pCi/g. The extremely low levels of plutonium in the sludge were considered a negligible 

risk, and no limitations were put on its use by the public. Around 1990, traces of plutonium were 

found in a public park close to the laboratory as part of LLNL’s Environmental Monitoring 

Program. LLNL did extensive sampling of the park to determine whether the sludge was 

contaminated and what potential exposures may be to the public. The maximum concentrations 

detected in a small area were on the order of 1 pCi/g. Due to the finding and concerns raised by 

a small group of citizens, extensive studies were completed on the extent of the contamination 

and the potential exposure pathways. Studies by the State of California, LLNL, and the Centers 

for Disease Control (CDC) concluded that the risk associated with the contamination was of no 

health concern. One of the changes that occurred as a result of the release was the installation of 

a real-time sewer monitoring system. A formal LLNL report was issued regarding this incident. 

In about 1960, a spill involving fission products at the LPTR occurred, resulting in the spread of 

fission product contamination. A uranium spill occurred in 1986 or 1987 to a trench outside 

Buildings 491 and 493. An incident analysis report was written on this release and would 

provide further detail. 

In addition to those incidents occurring at the main LLNL site or at Site 300, LLNL individuals 

were involved in incidents at testing sites. For example, the Baneberry underground test resulted 

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in a tremendous venting to the atmosphere. Curies of radioactive fission products associated 

with the detonation of the device were released. This test resulted in a stand-down and a 

reduction in testing once it was restarted. During Greeley, two workers were sent down the shaft 

in a special basket prior to the shot. The firing cables were damaged as a result of test 

preparation. Then men were sent down the shaft to repair the cables. 

Records 

Health Physicists and technicians kept logbooks of daily activities. Exposure information from 

the 1950s and 1960s were recorded in the technician’s, supervisor’s, or team leader’s logbook 

(e.g., Hazards Control logbooks). Logbooks were organized by individual or area, depending on 

the time period. These logbooks are rich with exposure information until about the late-1960s. 

There is a huge archive of memoranda, logs, and procedures about plutonium operations located 

at the plutonium facility. Logs from other buildings are stored elsewhere. Some health physics 

records were transferred to Site 300 for storage. No radiological records were ever intentionally 

destroyed. 

Hazards Control maintains a database of internal and external dosimetry results. In-vivo 

counting records are all available on computer media. The MAPPER database was developed in 

the early 1980s to organize, store, and make dosimetry information readily retrievable. It 

included internal and external dose information. Essentially all internal and external doses 

received at the site (and offsite), per radiological control staff, are included in this database. 

There was an effort to reconcile the individual dose values with the cumulative dose records. 

The personnel monitoring data included with classified records was separated from the classified 

information and declassified. 

TBD Comments 

SC&A asked for clarification on technical basis document comments related to destroyed, 

misplaced, or inaccurate records. The primary concern of Tri-Valley Cares is that records are 

incomplete with respect to exposures received at the test sites. They are having difficulty 

demonstrating that individuals were at NTS or other shots, and for how long. They have tried to 

retrieve airplane trip records to demonstrate that individuals actually went to the site; however, 

DOE has not been able to provide these. Other former workers have been told that records such 

as job assignments have been destroyed. The Oak Ridge Associated Universities team has 

visited Tri-Valley Cares to review their records collection. 

Miscellaneous 

LLNL had a presence at Pantex and RFP. While there, individuals were monitored by the 

respective sites. About 1 in 15 experiments conducted by LLNL involved Pantex. In the 1950s 

and 1960s, a few individuals who visited the RFP and Mound laboratories received 10s of rem 

from internal exposures. 

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Family members of scientists were invited in the past to visit NTS. They were shown the Sedan 

crater, which resulted from a 100-kiloton nuclear shot. They were only able to stand on the 

platform for a limited amount of time (~10 minutes), due to the dose rates in the area. 

Medical x-ray exposure was not routine. The worker physical did not require that an x-ray be 

taken. 

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ATTACHMENT 3: KEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR 

NIOSH/ORAU REGARDING SITE PROFILE DOCUMENTS 

SC&A submitted questions related to the LLNL Site Profile documents to NIOSH on 

November 9, 2006, with supplemental questions submitted on June 8, 2007. NIOSH/ORAUT 

provided written responses to these questions on December 6, 2006, and July 8, 2007, 

respectively. Both sets of questions and responses have been provided below. 

Responses to SC&A Questions for the LLNL Site Profile Document: 

Site Description TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2 

Occupational Medical Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3 

Occupational Environmental Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4 

Occupational Internal Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5 

Occupational External Dose TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6 

The current versions of these TBDs were published with acknowledged data gaps in information 

to allow processing of selected LLNL claims. Planned revisions of these documents will include 

additional information collected since the publication of this TBD and any applicable 

information that comes from NIOSH responses to SC&A questions. 

Key Questions for NIOSH/ORAU regarding 

the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Site Profile Technical Basis Documents 

[Submitted by the SC&A review team, November 9, 2006] 

General Questions 

(1) Is there a classified version of the Technical Basis Document? 

Response: There is not a classified version of the LLNL Technical Basis 

Document (TBD). Also at this time, no classified documents were reviewed prior 

to the development of the LLNL TBD. 

(2) In general, what subject areas could not be included in the TBD for national security 

reasons? How were these compensated for in the TBD? 

Response: The mass of fissile materials were not available for specific devices. 

The specific procedures and nature of the experiments were not available for 

review in unclassified documents. The measured neutron to photon dose ratio for 

specified nuclear devices and components were not available. Personnel 

exposure to ionizing radiation, both internal and external exposures, was 

documented using the technology and criteria approved for that period of time. 

There was sufficient information to establish radiation exposures for personnel 

working with classified materials. The current TBD addresses what are believed 

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to be the major contributors to exposure, but as additional information becomes 

available and if it indicates modifications are warranted, information will be 

added to the TBD for use by dose reconstructors. 

(3) What steps were taken to investigate whether individuals at LLNL also received doses at the 

Nevada Test Site, Trinity, and other test sites? Is dosimetry information from these other 

facilities available in the LANL radiation exposure file? 

Response: Personnel at LLNL did work at the Nevada Test site (NTS) as well as 

the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG). If it is determined that the individual was at 

one of the test sites, monitoring results are requested and received from the site. 

The claimant files will then contain the radiation monitoring results from NTS or 

PPG and are included in the records used by the dose reconstructors. 

Assumptions to reconstruct radiation dose are summarized in the TBD developed 

for NTS. 

(4) Was there movement of personnel and radiological activities between LLNL and Sandia 

National Laboratory? 

Response: It is possible that personnel at LLNL did work at the Sandia National 

Laboratory (SNL). SNL established the requirements for personnel monitoring, 

including for visitors in their facilities. The claimant files contain the radiation 

monitoring results from SNL, as available, and would be expected to be included 

in the records used by the dose reconstructors. Assumptions to reconstruct 

radiation dose, for any Sandia site exposure, are summarized in the TBD 

developed for SNL. 

(5) Is any of the work history, medical, or radiation exposure data for claimants classified? Are 

claimant files being redacted for national security reasons? 

Response: The ORAUT has never seen any indication that information in a 

dosimetry response was redacted because of security classification. 

(6) What types of claims have been evaluated to date? Without a complete dataset, how has 

NIOSH/ORAUT bridged gaps and assured estimated doses are bounded? 

Response: Because of the lack of internal monitoring data in claimant files, 

claims, which are particularly radiosensitive, can not generally be completed 

using overestimating efficiency methods. The exception to this is claims were 

environmental internal radiation estimates (as provided in the TBD) are 

appropriate. This same limitation exists for claims with multiple primary cancer 

sites. 

A bioassay coworker study is currently underway to assist in determining internal 

exposure for individuals with a potential for internal exposure but for whom 

internal monitoring was not performed. 

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Some claims are able to be evaluated using under- or overestimating techniques 

to account for the gaps in data. Others require more information and have not 

yet been completed. In the case of internal dose assessment, a number of claims 

have been put on hold while research continues into the interpretation of results 

and the identification of information to be used to fill the gaps in monitoring. 

(7) Which Technical Information Bulletins are applied to LLNL dose reconstructions (e.g., TIB0006, TIB-0002, TIB-0028)? 

Response: 

1.	 OTIB-0002, Maximum Internal Dose Estimates for Certain DOE Complex 

Claims, 2004. 

2.	 OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic 

X-Ray Procedures, 2005. 

3.	 OTIB-0007, Occupational Dose from Elevated Ambient Levels of External 

Radiation, 2003. (This OTIB has since been cancelled. All relevant 

information is in ORAUT-PROC-0060, Revision 1, Occupational Onsite 

Ambient Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites.) 

4.	 OTIB-0017, Interpretation of Dosimetry Data for Assignment of Shallow 

Dose, 2005. 

5.	 OTIB-0018, Internal Dose Overestimates for Facilities with Air Sampling 

Programs, 2005. 

6.	 OTIB-0020, Use of Coworker Dosimetry Data for External Dose 

Assignment, 2005. 

7.	 OTIB-0023, Assignment of Missed Neutron Doses Based on Dosimeter 

Records, 2005. 

8.	 OTIB-0055, Technical Basis for Conversion from NCRP 38 Neutron 

Correction Factors to ICRP Publication 60 Weighting Factors for 

Respective IREP Input Neutron Energy Ranges, 2006. 

(8) How has NIOSH/ORAU verified the completeness and accuracy of the data provided by 

LLNL? 

Response: The TBD was developed using documents that were developed by 

LLNL and reviewed by the DOE. When available, multiple documents were 

referenced to provide consistency. To the extent practical, the TBDs are complete 

and accurate. 

It was extremely common for LLNL workers to visit NTS. When there is evidence 

of a visit occurring (whether in the claimant supplied information, CATI, or 

dosimetry information), a request for dosimetry information is sent to NTS. 

(9) How have you integrated site expert input into the TBD? 

Response: Several individuals were interviewed to discuss specific elements of 

the radiation monitoring program at LLNL. Mr. Mel Chew (NIOSH/ORAUT) 

provided information about the radiation control program at Site 300 and the air 

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sampling efforts for tritium. [Name redacted] provided a summary of the 

radiochemistry procedures for bioassay samples and internal radiation exposure. 

In 2004, the HSE department managers described current radiation dose 

assessment procedures. This information was summarized in the TBD. 

Contributions on internal dosimetry, external dosimetry, and medical exposures 

were incorporated based on discussions with current staff. 

Site Description (ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2) 

(1) In Section 2.3.1 [“Building (Main Site)”], the TBD appears to be inconsistent in using the 

old and current building numbers to identify buildings. When cross-referencing buildings 

identified in this section with buildings in Table 2-1 and Attachment A, there is a lot of 

disagreement with building names. This gives the impression that the authors may have 

conflicting information. 

Response: The term “Building Name,” although used in the reference, should 

not be taken literally. In most cases, the name actually refers to “Building 

Function” or “Building Activity,” and a building may contain several functions 

or activities. The term will be changed in the next document revision, and a more 

complete description of the numbering system reflected in the TBD will be 

included. The building activities came from several sources and may refer to 

different functions. Some buildings did not have “old numbers.” Prior to issuing 

a revision all building numbers and descriptions will be verified. 

(2) Table 2-2 does not list Building 121which is a major building that is the first listed in 

Section 2.3.1. 

Response: Building 121 will be added to Table 2-2 in the next revision of the 

TBD. 

(3) Table 2-2 shows Building 292 as having residual contamination from a rotating target 

neutron source, but the only radionuclide identified is 3

H. Are there any other activation 

products there? 

Response: No long-lived activation products were identified in the references. 

(4) Table 2-2 shows Building 231 as containing “The-232” – can we assume this should be 

Th-232? 

Response: Yes, this should be Th-232. 

(5) Table 2-2 is not consistent in showing radionuclide contents in buildings. For example in 

several places (Buildings 513, 514, 612, 625) 90Y is not shown when there is 90Sr although 

the pair are shown in other buildings, these two are always present together in equal activity 

unless chemically separated. 

Response: This will be revised to be consistent. 

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(6) In Section 2.3.1, at the end of the sub-section for Building 231 there is a statement that, 

“Small amounts of DU have been used in Building 232.” Is this meant to start a new subsection on Building 232, or is this a typographical error and is it still discussing 

Building 231? Also, an example of what is meant by “small amounts” would be helpful 

(e.g., gram quantities?). 

Response: This question requires clarification. Building 232 is part of the 

Building 231 complex; however, this is not contained in the description. 

The following is an example of describing “small amounts” by using actual mass 

values: 

- in the case of DU, “small amounts” generally means less than 10 kg. 

(7) There is no section discussing Accidents and Incidents, such as in the LANL TBD. Does 

this infer that there were none of these? 

Response: Accidents and Incidents are described briefly in Section 5. This was 

also a Worker Outreach comment and further research has been performed to 

more fully describe Accidents and Incidents in a document revision of the LLNL 

TBD. 

Occupational Medical Dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3) 

(1) The Occupational Medical Dose TBD (Turner 2005, pg. 6) provided a quote from a 1991 

document which stated that “...relevant medical history and X-ray procedure requested will 

be recorded on the radiographic request form. ...” (LLNL 1991) Has NIOSH/ORAU 

routinely found from their claimant research this kind of relevant medical history and x-ray 

protocol routinely listed on the radiographic request form that is mentioned in the LLNL 

Health Sciences Department Radiography Program document cited in the TBD? 

Response: The x-ray records provided by LLNL include a list of the x-rays 

provided as part of the medical screening process. This record does not usually 

include the "relevant medical history" as mentioned in the document quoted 

above. 

(2) If an individual claimant’s medical file lacks proper documentation of his chest x-ray 

history, has NIOSH/ORAU developed a default schedule to account for routine chest x-rays 

and if so, what is that default schedule? 

Response: Procedure 61, Occupational X-ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE 

Sites, provides a default frequency for LLNL of a pre-employment PA chest and 

annual PA chests for cases that are reconstructed using an "overestimate" 

approach. The guidance in Procedure 61 also states that x-ray records should be 

requested from LLNL and the case must be reconstructed using a "best estimate" 

or "underestimate" approach (if the records were not initially provided). LLNL 

has been responsive to such requests. 

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(3) Has NIOSH/ORAU been able to verify that LLNL workers did receive routine chest x-ray 

examinations during medical examinations? Since the TBD states that these were not 

routinely done and were only documented in the individual’s medical record, what has been 

the experience in reviewing LLNL worker medical records on the frequency of these routine 

medical x-rays? 

Response: The TBD is clear about the requirement for a pre-employment PA 

chest x-ray. Page 6 of the TBD states "From 1952 until about 1993, baseline 

X-rays were required for all pre-employment evaluations." Also on page 6 is the 

quote from the LLNL Health Services Department Radiography Program, March 

1991 document which states "Based on the unique nature of the work performed 

at LLNL, a pre-employment baseline PA chest X-ray examination is required." 

As described in the answer to question #2 above, a default frequency of an annual 

PA chest in addition to the pre-employment PA chest for cases that are 

reconstructed using an "overestimate" approach is assigned, and the x-ray 

records can be requested from LLNL should they be needed in completing a case 

using the "best estimate" or "underestimate" approach. LLNL has been 

responsive to such requests. 

(4) Has NIOSH/ORAU found evidence of special chest radiography at LLNL and were LLNL 

workers given dose for special chest radiography for respirator certification, for beryllium 

and asbestos exposure and for food handlers? 

Response: According to (Noonan 2002), “Required chest films for beryllium and 

asbestos workers were introduced in the 1980s. The frequency of which varied 

based on the age and exposure of the individual [sic].” This is the only 

documentation found on this subject. No evidence was found for required chest 

radiography at LLNL for respirator certification or for food handlers. However, 

as described in the answer to question #2 above, a default frequency of an annual 

PA chest in addition to the pre-employment PA chest for cases that are 

reconstructed using an "overestimate" approach is assigned, and the x-ray 

records can be requested from LLNL should they be needed in completing a case 

using the "best estimate" or "underestimate" approach. LLNL has been 

responsive to such requests. 

(5) What evidence has been found to rule out the possible use of PFGs in the early period from 

1952 to 1960 other than the random sampling of seven LLNL worker’s individual medical 

records? 

Response: No records in any form were found to indicate that PFGs were ever 

performed at LLNL. Other efforts made to find evidence of possible PFG use all 

yielded negative results. The question of the possible use of PFGs was raised 

routinely with each LLNL staff member consulted during preparation of the TBD, 

without positive response. In addition, spot checks of individual records in the 

NOCTS files for LLNL were made and so far, have not turned up anything to 

indicate that PFG was used. Should a claim turn up with evidence of a PFG, the 

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dose reconstructor would assign organ dose for the PFG from ORAUT-OTIB 

0006. 

(6) Is there any documentation on the number of retakes that were often needed, especially in 

the early days, when using the Fisher x-ray machine? 

Response: The only document found for the Fisher machine is the survey report 

discussed in the next item (Graham and Williams 1975). It did not address 

retakes. There is documentation showing that retakes were monitored in later 

years. However, no quantitative information from the results of any retake 

studies was found. 

(7) What is known about the maintenance schedules, radiographic safety protocols and optimal 

operating parameters of the Fisher x-ray machine used at LLNL from 1952 to 1980? 

Response: The only document found for the Fisher machine is (Graham and 

Williams 1975). This is a useful and informative reference in the form of an 

interdepartmental memorandum from the two surveyors to [Name redacted]. It 

describes results obtained from a radiation survey of the X-ray facility. In 

summary, the memo concludes, “The results of the radiation survey indicate that 

the X-ray machine is operating properly and that the facility is adequately 

shielded.” Measurements were performed over a range of operating voltages 

(40 kVp to 100 kVp) at currents of 100 mA and 200 mA, with other parameters 

also being varied. To cite from the memo again, “The half-value layer 

measurements indicate that at 100 kVp and with the normal filtration (3 mm Al) 

the effective energy is 32 keV. This energy is appropriate for medical 

radiography.” Apparently, the Fisher machine was thoroughly checked out and 

operated in an optimal manner at this time. There is no discussion in the memo of 

maintenance schedules or radiographic safety protocols. However, a copy of the 

California Radiation Control Regulations was included as an attachment to the 

memo, additionally suggesting good safety management of the facility. 

(8) What is known about the potential for LLNL workers to receive x-rays for other forms of 

radiation exposure, other than routine chest x-rays such as isotopes, sealed sources, 

radiography etc.? What impact on providing claimant-favorable occupationally related 

medical dose does the lack of defined protocols and specific knowledge of the radiography 

procedures have when assessing dose occupationally related medical dose to LLNL 

workers? 

Response: If the first question refers to “X rays for other forms of radiation 

exposure” as being those occupationally encountered, for example, in 

crystallographic work or in the inspection of welds, then such X-ray doses do not 

constitute occupational medical doses. These exposures are part of an individual’s 

external radiation dose and would be addressed by Section 6 of the Site Profile. Per 

42 CFR 81 and 82, the only occupational medical dose eligible to be included in 

dose reconstruction under EEOICPA is dose from x-rays that were required of 

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employees, as part of medical screening and surveillance programs. The 

Occupational Medical TBD addresses organ dose from these procedures, and these 

procedures only, as prescribed by 42 CFR 81 and 82. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006 was developed to provide default values for entrance kerma 

and organ doses when specific X-ray machine data from a site was either not 

available or suspect. The default values in ORAUT-OTIB-0006 are favorable to 

claimants, and are to be used when site specific data is lacking. The DCFs from 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006 (modified from ICRP 1982) were used with LLNL entrance 

kerma values prior to 1980. As described in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, adequate 

information was available for times after 1980 for the Xonics and Bennett machines 

to assess the skin-entrance kerma and then appropriately use (ICRP 1982) DCFs. 

(9) What radiological safety procedures have been found to documents that LLNL applied dose 

minimization to reduce medical exposures prior to 1960? 

Response: The TBD team researchers focused their data collection efforts on 

obtaining information about the x-ray screening protocols, information about 

average technique factors used for screening examinations, and any physical 

measurement data made on the x-ray machines over time, so that site specific organ 

doses could be developed for the screening exams. While no specific documentation 

was found that pertained to efforts at LLNL to minimize medical X-ray exposures 

prior to 1960, this was not the primary focus of the researchers' data collection 

efforts. 

(10) Has any effort been made to validate the application of the DCF factors in the ICRP 1982 

DCF tables to the early x-ray machines at LLNL, particularly before about 1970, and what 

has been done to compensate for the lack of collimation in this early period? 

Response: ORAUT-OTIB-0006, 2003 and 2005, specifically addresses the 

assumption of poor collimation for x-rays made prior to 1970. Prior to 1970, the 

authors of ORAUT-OTIB-0006, 2003 and 2005, recommend that DCFs from 

(ICRP 1982) other than those for the PA and LAT chest x-rays be substituted for 

certain organs in order to account for poor collimation. The substitute dose 

conversion factors are chosen (and documented in ORAUT-OTIB-0006, 2003 and 

2005) to include more organs in the primary beam than would be the case for a 

properly collimated beam. For the pre-1970 dose to the thyroid, for example, 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006 recommends using the DCF for an AP cervical spine 

(appropriately correcting for difference in organ depth between the AP and PA 

projections), effectively placing the thyroid in the primary beam of a poorly 

collimated PA chest x-ray. DCF substitutions are also specified for the ovaries 

and analogues, testes, and uterus. Again, as related to LLNL, the claimantfavorable pre-1970 doses in Table 3-3 of the TBD are based directly on ORAUTOTIB-0006, 2003 and 2005, and assume a poorly collimated beam prior to 1970. 

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(11) How did NIOSH determine that when no information is known about the energy spectrum, 

that it is appropriate to rely on Implementation Guide (NIOSH 2002a) as a basis document? 

Response: The External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guide (NIOSH 

2002a) gives the following instructions (p. 19). “If no information is known about 

the energy spectrum, they should be conservatively (claimant friendly) assumed to 

be in the 30–250 keV photon range.” This is the middle of the three photon energy 

bands specified within the NIOSH-IREP probability of causation program, and 

the only appropriate energy spectrum range for the production of medical x-ray 

images. For LLNL, the operating potential differences (related to the maximum 

energy x-ray photon) and the entrance exposures for the x-ray machines were all 

documented. 

Occupational Environmental Dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4) 

(1) The LLNL Occupational Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 2005, pg. 7, Section 4.1, 

Introduction) states, “There was a potential for ingestion of radioactive materials from 

resuspension of radioactive materials” (Section 4.3). There currently is no section related to 

this topic. Does NIOSH/ORAU intend to include a discussion and associated tables 

estimating annual intakes via resuspension of radionuclides of concern? 

Response: The potential for environmental dose was solely evaluated for the 

inhalation pathway; there was no assessment of the ingestion pathway. The 

current TBD addressed what was believed to be the major contributors to 

exposure, but as additional information becomes available and if it indicates 

modifications are warranted, information will be added to the TBD for use by 

dose reconstructors. 

(2) In future revisions of the TBD, what soil resuspension factors will NIOSH/ORAUT use to 

develop concentration and intake data for the ingestion pathway? 

Response: There was no assessment of the ingestion pathway. No soil 

resuspension factors are available at this time. 

During dose reconstruction for DOE sites, any environmental intakes of material 

are assumed to be from the inhalation pathway. Ambient doses are assessed 

using air monitoring data from environmental stations across the site. 

(3) Has NIOSH/ORAUT identified locations where soil contamination exists in addition to the 

Pu-239 contamination in the Southeast quadrant of the Main Site? 

Response: No, the environmental monitoring chapter summarizes the results 

provided by the onsite air sampling network. 

(4) The LLNL Occupational Environmental Dose TBD does not provide information regarding 

episodic (acute) releases that may have resulted in unaccounted for intakes or external 

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radiation exposure to unmonitored workers. Does NIOSH/ORAUT have information to this 

effect and if so, how will this information be included in future revisions of the TBD for use 

by dose reconstructors? 

Response: Environmental doses are only used to estimate doses for unmonitored 

workers, who would not have required radiological monitoring. A spill or acute 

release required monitoring for the persons involved in the release or associated 

with the remedial work. Radiation dose associated with acute releases and/or 

episodic releases are defined in the individual claimant file. The current TBD 

addressed what we believed to be the major contributors to exposure, but as 

additional information becomes available and if it indicates modifications are 

warranted, information will be added to the TBD for use by dose reconstructors. 

(5) The LLNL Occupational Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 2005, pg. 15, Section 4.2.3.1, 

Potential Intakes Prior to 1961) states, “Prior to 1961, air monitoring data were not available 

for review... Efforts are currently in progress for developing intakes that occurred prior to 

1961 and may be presented in a future revision of this TBD.” What progress has 

NIOSH/ORAUT made to estimate worker intakes prior to 1961 (1952–1960 for LLNL and 

1955–1960 for Site 300)? 

Response: Revision 01-E (June 26, 2006) was revised to address the potential 

environmental dose prior to 1961. The environmental data from Argonne 

National Laboratory East (Site D) (ORAUT 2006) was used because no data were 

collected at LLNL until 1961. The assumed geometric standard deviation (GSD) 

was 5.0 because the results were not collected at LLNL. The maximum value was 

selected from the dataset, 1953 through 1960 and added as a surrogate for 1952 

at LLNL. 

(6) The LLNL Occupational Environmental Dose TBD (Thomas 2005, pg. 16, Section 4.2.3.2, 

Potential Intakes 1961 to 1971) states, “Tritium environmental air monitoring data were not 

available for review. Estimated worker intakes of tritium in this revision of the TBD are 

restricted to the years beginning with 1972. Efforts are currently in progress for developing 

tritium intakes that occurred prior to 1972 and may be presented in a future revision of this 

TBD.” What progress has NIOSH/ORAUT made to estimate worker tritium intakes prior to 

1972? 

Response: Environemtnal air-monitoring samples were not analyzed for tritium 

prior to 1972. Most of the tritium released was airborne with the dominant 

source being the Tritium Facility (Building 331, previously Building 172) which 

began operation in 1952. The TBD was revised to estimate inhalation of tritium 

by using dispersion models that were developed by LLNL to support a dose 

assessment after a release of tritium in 1970. Using the dispersion calculations 

that were performed in 1970, the estimated annual release of 200 TBq/year and 

the same weather conditions that existed during the release, the concentration of 

tritium is estimated to range from 5.8 Bq/m3

 to 2 x106 Bq/m3 for any given year, 

from 1952 to 1971. It is unreasonable to assume that any one person stayed in 

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the exact location (immediately downwind of the Building 331 stack) for the entire 

exposure period of twenty (20) years, that the weather conditions did not remain 

stable and consequently, or that the maximum concentration represents the 

potential exposure. Revision 01-E (June 26, 2006) provided these data in Tables 

4-3 through 4-7. Using the maximum airborne radionuclide concentration in a 

year (from either actual data or an estimated value), annual intakes for the 

radionuclides of concern were derived by using an assumed individual’s annual 

respiration rate of 2,400 m3

/yr. 

(7) The TBD identifies that effluent data collected in 1976 and later have an estimated 

uncertainty of ±20%. In future revisions of the TBD, will NIOSH/ORAU demonstrate that 

this value is conservative given the inaccuracies of early year data and data that still require 

reconstruction for intakes prior to 1961 and for tritium intakes prior to 1972? 

Response: The uncertainty associated with the monitoring data is related to the 

collection and analysis of the individual samples. There are no data available to 

establish the uncertainty associated with the potential for environmental exposure 

for unmonitored workers at LLNL. If additional information becomes available 

and if it indicates modifications are warranted, information will be added to the 

TBD for use by dose reconstructors. Because of known uncertainties associated 

with measurements and their application in extrapolating to dose, a lognormal 

distribution is used for assigning dose, with a default GSD of 3. As noted above, 

a GSD of 5 is assigned for the early years because data from a surrogate site has 

been applied. 

(8) Is there any information regarding source accountability (i.e., loss of control of radioactive 

sources) that may have contributed to exposures of unmonitored workers? 

Response: No, the environmental monitoring chapter summarizes the results 

provided by the onsite air sampling network. The assessment of the release of 

tritium from Building 331 was used only to estimate exposures prior to the startup 

of the air monitoring network 

Occupational Internal Dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5) 

(1) How will NIOSH review the bioassay database for accuracy (verification and validation)? 

LLNL had warned NIOSH in the letter that accompanied the database that it is known to 

contain errors. 

Response: The database is used only for the coworker study; individual claims 

use the hard copy records that are provided by the site. LLNL included a list of 

specific concerns regarding the electronic data and multiple conference calls 

were held to discuss interpretation of the data. All assumptions and exclusions 

will be documented in the coworker OTIB. 

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(2) How will NIOSH determine the quality and usefulness of the earlier bioassay data 

(laboratory quality control, knowledge of result units and sample sizes, radionuclides 

assumed to produce the gross alpha and beta results, etc?) 

Response: This is typically a generic issue across the complex. Records from the 

site are reviewed to the extent that they can be found and assumptions are made 

where necessary and possible. It’s unclear as to why there would be an issue 

associated with result units; those are typically included with results. The 

interpretation of gross alpha and beta results was discussed with site personnel 

during the calls to address the database – a former chemist from the site 

participated in the discussions. Based on knowledge of what could have been 

included in the sample and what would have been chemically removed, the list of 

alpha emitters is small enough to limit the choices and determine a default. The 

gross beta results are more problematic and a solution is still being discussed. 

(3) How will NIOSH reconstruct internal doses for groups that did not get adequate (or any) 

bioassay monitoring and were potentially exposed to airborne and/or transferable surface 

contamination (including the early years that did not have bioassay procedures)? Is there air 

sampling data or other contamination survey data available for this assessment? 

Response: A coworker study is in development for the years in which bioassay 

was performed. Bounding estimates can be placed on individuals with the 

potential for intakes of long-lived, long-retained nuclides who worked during the 

years preceding the implementation of a bioassay program and who were 

subsequently monitored in later years. An approach is still in development for 

unmonitored workers in the early years with no later monitoring or with the 

potential for exposure to short-lived nuclides, such as fission and activation 

products. 

(4) For bioassay of radionuclides that occur naturally (uranium, thorium, etc.), how will NIOSH 

handle the determination of the occupationally contributed component of the activity in the 

bioassay sample in a claimant-favorable manner? Should the average background for the 

population be used or an individual specific background (if available)? Is the average value 

the most appropriate to use or the – one standard deviation (σ) value for background 

subtraction? 

Response: When assessing intakes based on uranium urinalyses, our standard 

procedure has been to assume that the entire result is due to occupational 

exposure because of the large variability in the natural background and its 

dependence on personal habits (such as drinking water source) of the individual. 

In the case of Cs-137, we are using values from the NCRP as a guide and not 

assessing whole body count results below those values. However, we do not 

subtract the value when it is determined that an occupational intake occurred. 

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(5) NIOSH states that LLNL handled a lot of tritium compounds. Has NIOSH attempted to 

verify any usage of metal tritides or organically bound tritium compounds at LLNL? How 

will NIOSH direct dose reconstructors to perform internal dosimetry for these compounds if 

these were handled? 

Response: It is not known if metal tritides were handled at LLNL, and if they 

were, what quantities and what processes were involved. In general, tritium 

tritide contributes little dose unless there are large quantities of contamination 

found in the work place. The TBD shows that, with one exception, tritium dose is 

calculated and assigned from a bioassay measurement by assuming exposure to 

HTO. The exception is for workers in Building 331 that housed research and 

laboratory operations, where isotopic ratios for HTO, HT and elemental tritium 

are given (see Table 5-1). An OTIB addressing the assessment of metal tritides is 

scheduled for development. 

As far as OBT is concerned, there a couple of competing processes going on: 

1)	 The method we use to evaluate tritium urine bioassay data tends to 

overestimate the dose from HTO a bit and underestimate the dose from 

OBT a bit. 

2)	 OBT tends to be less common in the workplace and when it does occur it 

tends to be less volatile than HTO, which translates into less potential for 

exposure to OBT in production environments. 

3)	 OBT tends to occur with HTO rather than by itself, which on the average 

substantially reduces any potential underestimates of doses from OBT 

intakes. 

Based on these considerations, it is felt that OBTs in the workplace do not 

warrant special treatment or consideration. 

(6) Will NIOSH determine if there was potential for exposure to high-fired plutonium oxides 

and how will the internal dose assessment for these be handled if this occurred (will NIOSH 

modify any biokinetic models to assess this accurately)? 

Response: Assumption of absorption types is considered a generic dose 

reconstruction issue. The TBD identifies the radioactive materials and associated 

processes, so appropriate absorption types can be determined and applied by 

dose reconstructors. An OTIB addressing the assessment of very insoluble 

(“super S”) plutonium is currently at OCAS for review. 

(7) NIOSH lists several aging states of weapons grade plutonium that were handled at LLNL. 

How will NIOSH decide on which aging mixture of plutonium isotopes will be used for data 

interpretation and intake assessment? 

Response: The americium-plutonium (Am-Pu) ratio noted in in vivo bioassay 

results should be compared to the values listed in Table 5-2 of the TBD in order 

to assess the age of the mixture. For in vitro bioassay results, the ratio of 

plutonium isotopes (from alpha spectroscopy) is compared to the Table 5-2 

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values. A default value of 10 yr aged Pu is used in DR. This default value is used 

unless an actual value can be discerned from claimant specific data. 

(8) NIOSH states, “Other variables, such as particle sizes and clearance classes can be readily 

reconstructed from historical records.” No further discussion is found on the specific 

clearance classes that were involved with radionuclide intakes at the site. Is NIOSH going 

to publish a list of the clearance classes of radionuclide compounds used at the site and 

associate these with specific buildings or projects? Is NIOSH going to investigate if there is 

any site-specific airborne radionuclide particle size analysis data available (determination of 

actual activity median aerodynamic diameters)? Some sites have been known to perform 

particle size analysis with impactors or other analytical equipment. Some sites have also 

done solubility analysis of radionuclide compounds it handled to determine actual clearance 

classes and rates. 

Response: At this point in time, this information is not available to us. The 

claimant records typically lack enough detail to identify one specific work 

location for an individual, and the materials used in a location often change over 

time making it difficult to assign one particle size and one material type to an are, 

so default (for particle size) or claimant favorable (for material type) assumptions 

would most likely be used for the majority of cases even if there were buildingspecific information. 

(9) NIOSH does not identify any use of chelation treatments or any other radionuclide intake 

medical intervention in the TBD (as the LANL internal dose TBD identified). This infers 

that there were no major radionuclide intakes requiring medical intervention in the history of 

the site. Does NIOSH plan to investigate this further? How will NIOSH handle dose 

reconstruction for any workers that had medical intervention treatments for minimizing 

internal dose? 

Response: Because the administration of DTPA was required to be reported to a 

central authority, it is assumed that records were kept in the individual files. 

Dose assessments for chelated claimants will be handled by the dose 

reconstructors on a case-by-case basis. 

(10) As noted in the LANL internal dose TBD, intakes that occurred many years earlier that were 

not detectable with past bioassay methods can become detectable several years after the 

intake due to the improvement of the bioassay methods (lowered MDAs/MDCs). Two of 

the difficulties with estimating the intakes from new positive bioassay data that may be 

identifying an intake that was undetected for many years are assumptions for intake date(s) 

and intake radionuclide composition. Does NIOSH have an approach identified on how to 

reconstruct internal doses in these situations? 

Response: While there are standard practices for assessing individuals with no 

results exceeding the detection level, positive results are handled on a case-bycase basis. In general, the appearance of a positive result following a series of 

negative results would tend to indicate an acute intake and the starting 

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assumption would be to assume an intake occurred at the midpoint between the 

date of the positive result and the previous result. However, all data would be 

reviewed, including the change in MDAs over time, subsequent sample results, 

and results from other bioassay methods to ensure that they were consistent. 

(11) NIOSH states that, “Air Monitoring in workplaces and in the breathing zones of employees 

has been a common surveillance method” at LLNL. No specific air sampling data, use and 

evolution of applied air concentration limits/action levels, or use of respiratory protection 

are discussed which would give information on the radionuclide air concentrations that 

workers could have been exposed to (as opposed to the discussion in the LANL internal 

dose TBD). Has NIOSH reviewed any of this LLNL data and respiratory protection 

program information to determine if it has any usefulness in the internal dose reconstruction 

effort? 

Response: This information is currently not used when performing a dose 

reconstruction. This has not yet been addressed; it will be reviewed. If additional 

information becomes available and if it indicates modifications are warranted, 

information will be added to the TBD for use by dose reconstructors. 

(12) The incident table (Table 5-7) has very few incidents. Does NIOSH plan to do a thorough 

search of the incident information available for LLNL in order to identify as many incidents 

with internal dose significance as possible to assist the dose reconstructors? Incident reports 

often provide very useful information for accurate dose reconstruction. 

Response: Section 5.4 of the TBD acknowledges that many other incidents other 

than those listed in Table 5-7 may have occurred. As they are identified, they will 

be captured in future revisions of the TBD. 

(13) Has NIOSH reviewed any contamination monitoring that may have been done in areas 

around the perimeter of airborne and surface contamination areas to determine if workers in 

these perimeter areas may have had intakes? 

Response: This issue is addressed in LLNL-4. 

(14) Has NIOSH determined if there was any specific monitoring performed for LLNL personnel 

that were exposed during work at other sites such as Nevada Test Site, Pacific proving 

grounds, etc.? If these personnel were monitored by the bioassay program at the other site 

will NIOSH be able to retrieve that data for dose reconstruction? 

Response: Visitor data requests are made when there is evidence that an 

individual performed work at another site. Many LLNL claims contain visitor 

data from NTS (although it’s typically external rather than internal data). 

(15) How does NIOSH plan to handle the identification of radionuclides intakes associated with 

the bioassays identified in Table 5-4 that have “Not Specified” in the radionuclide 

identification column (i.e., radionuclide the bioassay was for is unknown)? 

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Response: The reference(s) used to prepare those entries indicated that 

bioassays had been performed during the time periods in question, but no 

specifics on what samples were analyzed for were given. It is presumed the dose 

reconstructors will use the isotope-specific analytical results that appear in the 

bioassay records of that vintage for the individuals in question for the dose 

assessments. 

Within the claimant specific records, it is common for the radionuclide to be 

unknown. This is the case for gross alpha, beta and MFP bioassays which were 

performed at LLNL and appear in the claimant records. When this occurs, the 

dose reconstruction for that individual would be performed as elsewhere 

described in the TBD (i.e., Section 5.3.3). 

(16) Some buildings at LLNL had “source terms” with dozens of radionuclides identified in 

Attachment A. Some of these radionuclides have activity fractions that are very small (e.g., 

229Th = 2.2E-12 in Building 132). Does NIOSH plan to assign an intake of all radionuclides 

listed in Attachment A shown for the applicable building that is involved in an intake 

assessment or is there going to be a threshold activity fraction below which radionuclides 

will not be included 

Response: The source term data is made available in order to assist the DR in 

the determination of exposure potential when specific data is not available. The 

data in these tables applies only to post 1993, and its use has been clarified in the 

revision to the TBD. 

(17) 226Ra and 228Ra are shown as radionuclides in several of the waste processing and storage 

buildings (513, 514, 612, and 625) in Table 2-2 of the Site Description TBD and at fairly 

significant fractions of the activity in the 514 Tank Farm (1.55E-4 for 226Ra). Has NIOSH 

determined if there were/are any projects that could have caused significant radon and/or 

thoron exposures? 

Response: This has not yet been addressed; it will be reviewed. 

Occupational External Dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6) 

(1) On Page 6 of the LLNL Occupational External Dose TBD (Szalinski 2005), it is stated that 

personnel dosimeter records are generally available for all periods, and they are of the 

highest quality. However, during a recent search in the DOE records, only the total dose for 

all the years in the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s was found for each of the radiation 

types (photon, electron, and neutron). No yearly (or quarterly) dose data records were found 

during a period when all workers were to be monitored (i.e., all years were after 1958) and 

data for each exchange period should have been available. Shouldn’t dose records for each 

exchange period be available to the dose reconstructor? 

Response: Dose records and periods of monitoring are provided in the NOCTS 

Claim Record documents. 

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During the conversion to electronic recordkeeping, only positive dosimeter values 

were populated. As a result, prior to 1980, there are only records of non-zero 

individual dosimeter results. 

(2) On page 6, Section 6.3 (Szalinski 2005), it is stated that dose reconstructors can compare 

earlier dosimetry systems to current systems to evaluate their performances. While this may 

be a possibility, considering the number of cases handled, this most likely would not occur 

during the dose reconstruction process. Could more specific examples be included in the 

TBD to expand on this concept and assist the dose reconstructor? 

Response: There are documented historical studies of dosimeter performance as 

noted in the following: 

1. AEC (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission), 1955, “Intercomparison of Film 

Badge Interpretations,” Isotopics, Volume 2, number 5, pp. 8–23. 

2.	 Brackenbush, L.W., G.W.R. Endres, J. M. Selby, and E.J. Vallario. 1980. 

Personnel Neutron Dosimetry at Department of Energy Facilities. 

PNL-3213. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA 99352. 

3.	 Brackenbush, L.W., K.L. Soldat, D. L. Haggard, L. G. Faust and P. L. 

Tomeraasen. 1987. Neutron Dose and Energy Spectra Measurements at 

Savannah River Plant. PNL-6301. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 

Richland, WA 99352. 

4.	 Brodsky, A., and R.L. Kathren, 1963, Accuracy and Sensitivity of Film 

Measurements of Gamma Radiation –Part I: Comparison of MultipleFilm and Single-Quarterly-Film Measurements of Gamma Dose at Several 

Environmental Conditions, Health Phys 9(4):453-461. 

5.	 Brodsky, A., and R.L. Kathren, 1963, Accuracy and Sensitivity of Film 

Measurements of Gamma Radiation –Part II: Limits of Sensitivity and 

Precision, Health Phys 9(5):463-471. 

6.	 Brodsky, A., A.A. Spritzer, F.E. Feagin, F.J. Bradley, G. Karches and H.I. 

Mandelberg, 1963, Accuracy and Sensitivity of Film Measurements of 

Gamma Radiation –Part IV: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Errors, Health Phys 

11(10):1071-1082. 

7.	 Gorson, R.O., N. Suntharalingam, and J.W. Thomas, 1963, Results of a 

Film-Badge Reliability Study, Presented at the 49th Annual Meeting of the 

Radiological Society of North America, Chicago, IL, Nov. 17–22, 1963. 

8.	 Morgan, K. Z., 1961, “Dosimetry Requirements for Protection from 

Ionizing Radiation,” Selected Topics in Radiation Dosimetry, Proceedings 

of the Symposium on Selected Topics in Radiation Dosimetry, Sponsored 

by and Held in Vienna 7–11 June 1960, International Atomic Energy 

Agency, Vienna, Austria, pp. 3–23. 

9.	 Parker, H. M, 1945, Comparison of Badge Film Readings at the 

Metallurgical Laboratories, Clinton Laboratories and the Hanford 

Engineering Works, 7-3090, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, 

Richland, Washington. (SRS used Clinton dosimetry services and then 

implemented systems similar to other laboratories) 

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10. Plato, P., 1978, Testing and Evaluating Personal Dosimetry Services in 

1976, Health Phys 34(3):219-223. 

11. Thierry-Chef, I., F. Pernicka, M. Marshall, E. Cardis and P. Andreo. 

2002. Study of a Selection of 10 Historical Types of Dosimeter: Variation 

of the Response to Hp(10) with Photon Energy and Geometry of Exposure. 

Radiat Prot Dos, 102(2): 101-113. (Includes SRS Panasonic 802 

dosimeter) 

12. Vallario, E. J, D.E. Hankins and C.M. Unruh. 1969. AEC Workshop on 

Personnel Neutron Dosimetry. BNWL-1340. Battelle, Pacific Northwest 

Laboratory, Richland, WA. 

13. Vallario, EJ, D.E. Hankins and C.M. Unruh. 1971. Second AEC 

Workshop on Personnel Neutron Dosimetry. BNWL-1616. Battelle, 

Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA. 

14. Wilson, R.H., J.J. Fix, W. V. Baumgartner, and L. L. Nichols. 1990. 

Description and Evaluation of the Hanford Personnel Dosimeter Program 

From 1944 Through 1989. PNL-7447. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 

Richland, WA (see section 5.3 on intercomparison programs). 

The circumstances of these dosimeter performance studies are compared to the 

LLNL workplace radiation fields to arrive at an estimated level of accuracy. 

Instructions are provided in ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6 section 6.4 on adjustments to 

recorded dose. These instructions are provided to ensure the dose reconstruction 

is claimant favorable and the limitations of the dosimetry and practices of the 

monitoring period are adjusted to the standards outlined in OCAS-IG-001, 

External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline. 

(3) On Page 7, Section 6.3 (Szalinski 2005), it is mentioned that the original dose data 

combined with detailed examinations of workplace radiation fields can be used to provide 

the best estimate of the worker’s dose. It does not appear that there is a lot of detailed 

information in this TBD, other than energy intervals, concerning the many different 

radiation fields (such as the percent of neutrons below the threshold of the NTA film, 

dosimetry response to different exposure geometries and different mixed radiation fields, 

etc.) for the dose reconstructor to refer to. Plus, most dose reconstructors do not have time 

to analyze each case to that level of detail, unless these adjustments are specifically spelled 

out in the TBDs. Could more radiation field details for various locations and time periods at 

LLNL be provided in the TBD in summary tables to assist the dose reconstructor to make 

more reliable dose assignments when concerned with different radiation fields? 

Response: Information about the individual worker’s unique exposure conditions 

would be obtained during the Computerized Assisted Telephone Interviews 

(CATIs). If the individual’s dosimetry records are determined by the DR to be 

inadequate for dose reconstruction, then additional information may be obtained 

from site records as described in OCAS-IG-001, External Dose Reconstruction 

Implementation Guideline, Sections 1.1.2 Not Monitored and 1.1.3 Monitored 

Inadequately. 

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(4) Table 6-1 on page 7 (Szalinski 2005) provides a list of MDL (in rem) for different types of 

dosimeters for different time periods. The MDLs for neutron dosimeters remain constant for 

a given type and time period regardless of the exchange frequency (i.e., 0.050 rem 

regardless of the exchange period). However, the MDL for a given photon/electron 

dosimeter, and given time period, changes with exchange frequency (i.e., 0.015 rem for 

weekly, 0.020 rem for Biweekly, and 0.030 rem for Monthly exchanges). The MDL is an 

inherit property of the dosimeter that should be independent of the use period (especially in 

this case because no background control dose was subtracted from the readings according to 

Page 15 of the TBD). Would you please explain the reason for the changes in the MDL as a 

function of exchange frequency? 

Response: The MDLs provided will provide claimant favorable results in that 

they overestimate the fade of the film badge exchange frequencies of biweekly and 

monthly. The MDLs are reported as they were obtained from LLNL records. The 

differences in MDL with measurement periods is presumed to be a function of 

fading of the radiation induced signal which becomes more significant with 

longer exchange periods. 

(5) Section 6.3.1 on Page 8 (and also Table 6-5 on page 12) (Szalinski 2005) states that LLNL 

has always had the policy of monitoring individuals with any significant potential for 

exposure and has monitored all workers entering the site since May 1958. This brings up 

several questions: 

a.	 What defined “significant potential” for badging prior to May 1958? 

b.	 How was it decided to monitor or not monitor workers for neutrons along with 

photon/betas before 1958 (i.e., any further details concerning significant potential for 

neutron exposures)? 

c.	 Were all workers who entered the site badged for neutrons as well as photon/beta after 

May 1958? 

d.	 Were all neutron and photon/beta monitoring badges read at all times AND recorded in 

the dose records? 

e.	 Has the same badging policies applied to Site 300, as they were for the LLNL main site? 

f.	 Does monitoring of all workers entering the site include subcontractor, D&D, 

construction workers, and rovers from May 1958 to present? Was neutron monitoring 

always included for these workers, or was it on an as needed basis? 

Response: 

(a) Prior to 1958, personnel monitoring procedures required all persons entering 

a radiation area to wear a film badge (Block 1954). Records dating back to 

February 1953 required personnel whose daily work “might” expose them to 

ionizing radiation of any kind to wear a film badge, and with few exceptions 

film badges were available for each employee at Livermore (Nolan 1953). 

This is further verified by available records showing that 125,000 film badges 

(for weekly badge changes) were ordered for 1956–1957 (Wilcox 1956). 

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(b) The criteria for neutron monitoring were not found. As described in 

Section 6.3.2.2 of the ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6, “no definition of ‘significant’ 

was provided. It is reasonable to consider significant to be some fraction of 

the applicable radiation safety standards. At this time there are no clear 

criteria for how neutron dosimeters were assigned. If available, coworker 

data should be used.” 

(c) See response to (b). 

(d) It is presumed that neutron and photon/beta badges worn by employees were 

read at all times. See section 6.3.2 of ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6. 

(e) Yes, documents reviewed showed that the same badging policies applied to 

site 300 (Lindeken 1956). 

(f) Yes, documentation shows that all contractors, and outside consultants were 

classified as visitors and were monitored by film badges (Block 1954, Block 

1954 b, Nolan 1956). To answer the question about neutron badging, in a 

discussion between Paul Szalinski and Ron Kathren (8/14/2006)1

, Mr. 

Kathren indicated that approximately 10% of the workers were issued NTA 

and that it is reasonable to assume people who were issued NTA film were the 

ones who were exposed. 

The following is a list of references used in the above responses for question 5: 

1.	 Block 1954, Personnel Monitoring Procedure for UCRL, Livermore, 

Memorandum from S. Block to All Department Heads, July 19. [SRDB 

Ref ID: 15708]. 

2.	 Block 1954b, Visitor’s Film Badges, Memorandum from Seymour Block to 

Robert Becker, November 19. [SRDB Ref ID: 15707]. 

3. Nolan 1953, Film Badge and Pocket Dosimeter Information, 

Memorandum from W. E. Nolan, to All Livermore Employees, February 5. 

[SRDB Ref ID: 15715]. 

4. Nolan 1956, Film Badge Coverage for P.T.I., Memorandum from W. E. 

Nolan, to C. L. Blue, December 19. [SRDB Ref ID: 15754]. 

5. Lindeken 1956, Film Badge Coverage at Site 300, Memorandum from C.L. 

Lindeken to G. E. Wilcox, March 11. [SRDB Ref ID: 15703]. 

6. Wilcox 1956, New Film -555 For 1956–1957, Memorandum from G. E. 

Wilcox, to W. E. Nolan and S. Block, March 19. [SRDB Ref ID: 15705].2 

(6) Table 6-5 on page 12 (Szalinski 2005) provides an interpretation of reported data. Several 

questions concerning this table are listed below: 

1

 Paul Szalinski and Ron Kathren are currently a part of the NIOSH/ORAU Team. 

2

 The six documents listed here by NIOSH are LLNL internal memoranda. All authors and recipients were 

LLNL employees. 

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a.	 In the “Interpretation of blanks (no data)” column, it states that, “No data or blanks 

should be interpreted as individual was monitored with zero results.” How can it be 

stated that a worker was monitored, and the results were zero when a blank could 

mean a worker was not monitored, badge was lost, not returned, or not read? 

b. In the “Monitored/unmonitored” column, it states that, “(more than 95% of 

employees were monitored before 1958).” Is there any details concerning the percent 

of workers monitored each year, percent monitored for neutrons, and monitored 

workers’ location information for each year for 1952–1957? 

Response: 

(a) Individual claim records for LLNL in the NOCTS data base showed that when 

a badge was lost or not returned the word “missing” was entered onto the 

dosimetry record. The assumption that the individual was monitored but the 

results were zero (as apposed to the individual was not monitored and away 

from the jobsite) is claimant favorable because the DR will assign a missed 

dose equivalent to 1⁄2 the MDL in accordance with OCAS-IG-001, External 

Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline. It was also noted in the 

NOCTS records that the “Request for Personnel Exposure Under the 

EEOICPA” was summarized and interpreted and signed by the LLNL 

dosimetrist and an interpretation of the blanks in the historical records would 

not be required by the DR. 

(b) The guidance documents note that all employees who might be exposed to 

ionizing radiation wear a film badge. See response to 5(a) above. In 

addition, visitors to the site were also monitored using film badges. There are 

no additional details identified at this time concerning the percent of workers 

monitored each year, percent monitored for neutrons, and monitored workers’ 

location information for each year for 1952–1957 

(7) Table 6-7, Page 14 (Szalinski 2005), list “Bias and uncertainty” for the dosimetry system. 

It lists a range of bias for different dosimetry systems. In the text on page 14 it recommends 

that the dose reconstructor use an uncertainty factor of 1.2. 

a.	 Is it intended that the dose reconstructor is not to use the values in Table 6-7, but 

always use the 1.2 value? 

b. OCAS-IG-001 (NIOSH 2002), Section 2.1.1.4 Page 16, indicates that the laboratory 

uncertainty was not less than 1.2. When factoring in environmental affects (heat, 

humidity, processing, etc.) and exposure uncertainties (different energies, geometry, 

etc.) the overall uncertainty would most likely be greater than 1.2. How can an 

uncertainty of 1.2 be considered claimant favorable for both film and TLDs when this 

is a minimum value for lab uncertainty only? 

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Response: 

(a) Yes, the text on page 14 describes that DRs should use an uncertainty factor 

of 1.2. 

(b) As described in OCAS-IG-001 (NIOSH 2002), Section 2.1.1.3 Page 13 

describes ...”for simplicity, the approach outlined by the National Research 

Council (1989) will be employed for dose reconstruction under EEOICPA. 

However, the additional uncertainty discussed for exposures below 200 mR 

will not be employed, since routine monitoring is generally more precise than 

large sampling events...” Figure 2.1 of OCAS-IG-001 shows that above 200 

mR the 95% uncertainty factor K(E) is approximately 1.2. Use of this factor 

to calculate the upper 95% confidence dose is claimant favorable. 

(8) Section 6.7, Page 14 (Szalinski 2005), recommends that the dose reconstructor use coworker 

data and population data to assign doses to unmonitored workers. Coworker and population 

data does not appear to be present in the current TBD. Also, CATI reports generally do not 

contain sufficient information to acquire this type of data, and it would be too time 

consuming to create a coworker dose model for each worker. Where/when will this 

coworker/population dose data be available for the dose reconstructor to use? 

Response: Coworker data is used when there is insufficient monitoring data for 

the claimant. As described in OCAS-IG-001, Section 3.1.1, and 3.2.1, a list of 

coworkers could be identified. One option may be to examine the records for 

other LLNL EE claims that contain doses for monitored workers. The basis to 

prepare a coworker database for LLNL is under examination. 

(9) Section 6.7, Page 14 (Szalinski 2005), states that, “For unmonitored workers whose 

exposure potential has been determined to be low, assign the environmental dose.” Is this 

decision left solely up to the individual dose reconstructor, or are there any guidelines 

(which consider work locations and time periods specific to the LLNL site) available to the 

dose reconstructor? 

Response: The decision is left up to the DR following guidance contained in 

OCAS-IG-001. However, it is noted that most individuals at the LLNL site, 

including visitors, were monitored with a film badge. The respective dose 

reconstructions are subject to internal ORAUT, OCAS and DOL review. 

The DR takes into account information contained in the individual claimant 

records (CATI, dosimetry records) as well as the TBD in making this 

determination. 

(10) Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 along with Table 6-3, Page 11 (Szalinski 2005), mentions neutron 

dosimetry and assigns an energy interval of 0.1–2.0 MeV 100% of the time. However, other 

information is lacking concerning details of neutron fields and dosimetry. Some areas of 

concern are: 

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a.	 At an energy interval of 0.1–2.0 MeV, NTA film (used 1952–1969) would miss most 

of the doses below about 700 keV. 

i.	 When was the inadequacy of NTA film for lower energy neutrons recognized at 

LLNL? 

ii.	 How was it addressed? 

iii.	 Were there areas at LLNL where a significant portion of the neutron dose 

consisted of neutrons less than 700 keV?
 

iv.	 Were the worker’s recorded neutron doses corrected, or do they presently need to 

be corrected, to assign the correct neutron dose? 

v.	 How is this going to be accounted for in the dose reconstruction? 

Response: Inadequacy of NTA film was recognized in the early 1950’s. The 

technical challenges were evident and the result of numerous studies and 

publications (Cheka 1954 and Kathren 1964). In addition the AEC held a series 

of Personnel Neutron Dosimetry Workshops to address problems experienced by 

its sites concerning accurate measurement of neutron dose. The first workshop 

was held in 1969 (Vallario1969) concluded that “... for intermediate energy 

(>0.4 ev to < 700 keV)... neutron sources, NTA personnel neutron dosimeters 

cannot be effectively used...” 

The DR is instructed to assess the potential missed neutron dose using a neutron 

to photon dose ratio as described in Section 2.2.1 of OCAS-IG-001. 

The following is a list of references used in the above responses for question 10a: 

1.	 Cheka 1954, Recent Developments in Film Monitoring of Fast Neutrons, 

Joseph S. Cheka, NUCLEONICS, Vol. 12, No. 6 June. 

2.	 Kathren, R.L., C.T. Prevo, and S. Block, 1964, Angular Dependence of 

Eastman Type A (NTA) Personnel Monitoring Film, UCRL-12199, 

Earnest O. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, 

Livermore, California. 

3.	 Vallario, E.J., D.E. Hankins, and C. M. Unruh, 1969, AEC Workshop on 

Personnel Neutron Dosimeter, BNWL-1340, Pacific Northwest 

Laboratory, Richland Washington. 

b.	 Section 6.3.3.2, Page 9 (Szalinski 2005), states that PuBe sources were used prior to 

1970 to calibrate neutron dosimeters. How is this sufficient to cover the large neutron 

energy range at LLNL to include low-energy neutron fields at critical assemblies and 

reactors to high-energy accelerators with widely varying neutron energies and 

shielding arrangements? 

Response: In the 1960s LLNL created a set of DO spheres to moderate 

the PuBe energy for calibration (8/14/2006 teleconference between R. 

Kathren and P. Szalinski). 

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c.	 Were different calibration factors used for different work areas (i.e., different neutron 

fields) when PuBe sources were used for calibration? 

Response: No documentation was found to indicate that different 

calibration factors were used for different work areas. 

(11) Table 6-7, Page 14 (Szalinski 2005), shows that TLDs were used to monitor neutron doses 

1969–present. During 1969–1986, how were the higher energy neutrons (such as around the 

numerous accelerator at LLNL) monitored? Was NTA film used in conjunction with TLDs? 

Response: The table and research indicates that only TLDs were used after 1969. 

(12) Could you please elaborate concerning where CR-39 dosimetry has been used since 1986 

and how this is integrated into the overall total neutron dose recorded for a worker at LLNL 

in conjunction with the TLD readings? 

Response: CR59 etch track dosimetry is used in facilities where employees work 

with neutron generators or linear accelerator cyclotrons. Neutron and photon 

dose are recorded separately and summed to obtain the Hp(10). 

(13) Section 6.3.3.2, Page 9 (Szalinski 2005), states that since 1970 unmoderated and moderated 

Cf-252 sources have been used to calibrate neutron dosimeters. Does this apply to all areas 

(reactors to accelerators) for all TLDs and CR-39 dosimeters? Is there differ calibration 

factors for different location (i.e., neutron energy fields) at LLNL? 

Response: No documentation was found to indicate that different calibration 

factors were used for different work areas. CR-39 has the advantage of a 

comparatively plat dose equivalent response with neutron energy. Follow-up 

discussions with LLNL employees may provide additional information. 

Final Questions on the Internal Dose TBD submitted to NIOSH on 

June 8, 2007 and received from NIOSH/ORAU on June 29, 2007 

 (Not Discussed during a Conference Call) 

(1) Has NIOSH determined how they are going to interpret gross alpha, gross beta, and MFP invitro bioassay results? Will any doses be assessed using these bioassay data and how will it 

be done? 

Answer: The current revision to the TBD, ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5, Rev. 01, 

contains guidance on the interpretation of gross alpha, gross beta, and fission 

product bioassay results. This interpretation of the results is how the dose 

reconstructors will use them for assessments. 

(2) Has NIOSH investigated further the potential for exposure to special tritium compounds 

(metal tritides and organically bound tritium) and what are the results of the investigation? 

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Answer: If indicated in an employee’s file, metal tritides and organically bound 

tritium are addressed through the use of ORAUT-OTIB-0066, “Calculation of 

Dose from Intakes of Special Tritium Compounds.” Metal tritides and organically 

bound tritium were used at LLNL, but in very small quantities compared to tritium 

gas (HT). 

This may be a partial response. We may find more on this in the review of the 

new documents. 

(3) Has NIOSH found any further information on the chemical forms of radionuclides handled 

to give further information for the dose reconstructors? 

Answer: Having the chemical forms of the radionuclides handled at LLNL is 

useful information, and we prefer to have it. However, it is not necessary to have 

the information because dose reconstructors assign the material type yielding the 

largest dose if it is unknown. 

(4) Has NIOSH found any significant sources of radon and thoron that need to be accounted for 

in the internal dose reconstruction and how will these be assessed? 

Answer: No mention of significant exposures to radon or thoron was found 

during site research. 

This may be a partial response. We may find more on this in the review of the 

new documents. 

(5) Has NIOSH found any new information on the MDAs and MDCs for bioassays and will the 

TBD be updated with this? 

Answer: The TBD contains a list of bioassay analyses and corresponding MDAs 

for most methods; however, this list is based on ICRP and ANSI documentation 

and is not LLNL-specific. As additional MDAs or MDCs are identified, the TBD 

will be updated. 

This may be a partial response, at least as far as whole body counting goes. We 

may find more on this in the review of the new documents. 

(6) Has NIOSH determined a default uranium type for the dose assessment from in-vitro 

bioassay mass concentration (μg/liter) data and what is it (depleted, natural, or enriched at 

some percent)? If NIOSH will not identify a default type how will internal dosimetrists 

choose the correct type? 

Answer: The TBD has identified the default type to be natural U. (This has 

recently been corrected in a revision/page change to ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5, 

Rev. 01.) 

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(7) From the site interviews it was determined that thorium was handled frequently especially in 

the earlier years, how will the dose from this be assessed? 

Answer: Guidance has been provided in the TBD revision on how to evaluate 

thorium from whole body count and gross alpha urinalysis data for the post-1970 

years. This guidance is discussed on page 13 of the TBD revision: 

"Another possible exception would involve thorium. LLNL performed some 

machining of thorium. Indications are that whole body counting was used to 

monitor for thorium intakes. If a worker was getting regular uranium analyses, 

then had a gross alpha bioassay analysis, this suggests that the worker had been 

working with the uncontained thorium, and the gross alpha result should be 

interpreted as thorium. The worker’s job description should be evaluated to 

determine if this is appropriate. If there is a whole body count, then the thorium 

intake calculated from the gross alpha urinalysis could be compared against the 

detection limit of the whole body count." 

Also, an 83.14 SEC has been proposed for the early years at LLNL (through 

1973). 

This may be a partial response. We may find more on this in the review of the 

new documents. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
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Revision No. 

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Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

151 of 168 

 

 

 

REFERENCES 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-1, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory l – Introduction, Rev. 00 

PC-1 (Maisler 2005) September 12, 2005. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-2, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Site Description, Rev. 00 

PC-1 (Maisler 2005) October 26, 2005 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-3, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational Medical 

Dose, Rev. 00 PC-1 (Turner 2005) October 26, 2005. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-4, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational 

Environmental Dose, Rev. 00 PC-1 (Thomas 2005) November 18, 2005 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-5, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational Internal 

Dose, Rev 00 (Berger and Szalinski 2005) October 10, 2005 

ORAUT-TKBS-0035-6, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – Occupational External 

Dose, Rev. 00 (Szalinski 2005) October 7, 2005 

NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health), 2002. External Dose 

Reconstruction Implementation Guideline, OCAS-IG-001, Office of Compensation Analysis and 

Support, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

152 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ATTACHMENT 4: LLNL-SPONSORED ATMOSPHERIC AND 

UNDERWATER TESTING 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Ruth Upshot-Knothole 03/31/1953 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Ray Upshot-Knothole 04/11/1953 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Simon Upshot-Knothole 04/25/1953 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Koon Castle 04/06/1954 Bikini Island Surface Weapons Related 

Tesla Teapot 03/01/1955 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Turk Teapot 03/07/1955 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Post Teapot 04/09/1955 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Zuni Redwing 05/27/1956 Bikini Island Surface Weapons Related 

Yuma Redwing 05/27/1956 Enewetak Tower Weapons Related 

Kickapoo Redwing 06/13/1956 Enewetak Tower Weapons Related 

Inca Redwing 06/25/1956 Enewetak Tower Weapons Related 

Mohawk Redwing 07/02/1956 Enewetak Tower Weapons Related 

Apache Redwing 07/08/1956 Enewetak Barge Weapons Related 

Tewa Redwing 07/20/1956 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Lassen Plumbbob 06/05/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Wilson Plumbbob 06/18/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Hood Plumbbob 07/05/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Diablo Plumbbob 07/15/1957 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Owens Plumbbob 07/25/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Saturn Plumbbob 08/10/1957 NTS Tunnel Safety Experiment 

Shasta Plumbbob 08/18/1957 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Smoky Plumbbob 08/31/1957 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Wheeler Plumbbob 09/06/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Rainier Plumbbob 09/19/1957 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Whitney Plumbbob 09/23/1957 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Charleston Plumbbob 09/28/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Morgan Plumbbob 10/07/1957 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Venus Project 58 A 02/22/1958 NTS Tunnel Safety Experiment 

Uranus Project 58 A 03/14/1958 NTS Tunnel Safety Experiment 

Fir Hardtack 1 05/11/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Nutmeg Hardtack 1 05/21/1958 Enewetak Barge Weapons Related 

Sycamore Hardtack 1 05/31/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Maple Hardtack 1 06/10/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Aspen Hardtack 1 06/14/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Redwood Hardtack 1 06/27/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Hickory Hardtack 1 06/29/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Cedar Hardtack 1 07/02/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Dogwood Hardtack 1 07/05/1958 Enewetak Barge Weapons Related 

Poplar Hardtack 1 07/12/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

153 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Juniper Hardtack 1 07/22/1958 Bikini Island Barge Weapons Related 

Olive Hardtack 1 07/22/1958 Enewetak Barge Weapons Related 

Pine Hardtack 1 07/26/1958 Enewetak Barge Weapons Related 

Quince Hardtack 1 08/06/1958 Enewetak Surface Weapons Related 

Fig Hardtack 1 08/18/1958 Enewetak Surface Weapons Related 

Mercury Hardtack II 09/23/1958 NTS Tunnel Safety Experiment 

Mars Hardtack II 09/28/1958 NTS Tunnel Safety Experiment 

Colfax Hardtack II 10/05/1958 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Tamalpais Hardtack II 10/08/1958 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Neptune Hardtack II 10/14/1958 NTS Tunnel Safety Experiment 

Hamilton Hardtack II 10/15/1958 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Logan Hardtack II 10/16/1958 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Vesta Hardtack II 10/17/1958 NTS Surface Safety Experiment 

Wrangell Hardtack II 10/22/1958 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Rushmore Hardtack II 10/22/1958 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Juno Hardtack II 10/24/1958 NTS Surface Safety Experiment 

Ceres Hardtack II 10/26/1958 NTS Tower Safety Experiment 

Sanford Hardtack II 10/26/1958 NTS Balloon Weapons Related 

Evans Hardtack II 10/29/1958 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Humboldt Hardtack II 10/29/1958 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Mazama Hardtack II 10/29/1958 NTS Tower Weapons Related 

Blanca Hardtack II 10/30/1958 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Ganymede Hardtack II 10/30/1958 NTS Surface Safety Experiment 

Titania Hardtack II 10/30/1958 NTS Tower Safety Experiment 

Antler Nougat 09/15/1961 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Chena Nougat 10/10/1961 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Gnome Nougat 12/10/1961 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Mad Nougat 12/13/1961 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Feather Nougat 12/22/1961 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Stillwater Nougat 02/08/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Codsaw Nougat 02/19/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cimarron Nougat 02/23/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Danny Boy Nougat 03/01/1962 NTS Crater Weapons Effects 

Brazos Nougat 03/15/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Hoosic Nougat 03/28/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Passaic Nougat 04/06/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Hudson Nougat 04/12/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Platte Nougat 04/14/1962 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Dead Nougat 04/21/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Black Nougat 04/27/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arkansas Nougat 05/02/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Frigate Bird Nougat 05/06/1962 Pacific Rocket Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

154 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Yukon Nougat 05/07/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Arikaree Nougat 05/10/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Muskegon Nougat 05/11/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Swanee Nougat 05/14/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Eel Nougat 05/19/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Chetco Nougat 05/19/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

White Nougat 05/25/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tanana Nougat 05/25/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Truckee Nougat 06/09/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Harlem Nougat 06/12/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Des Moines Nougat 06/13/1962 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Petit Nougat 06/19/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Bighorn Nougat 06/27/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Marshmallow Nougat 06/28/1962 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Bluestone Nougat 06/30/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Sacramento Nougat 06/30/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Sedan Storax 07/06/1962 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Pamlico Storax 07/11/1962 Christmas Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Johnnie Boy Storax 07/11/1962 NTS Crater Weapons Effects 

Merrimac Storax 07/13/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Wichita Storax 07/27/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

York Storax 08/24/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Raritan Storax 09/06/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Allegheny Storax 09/29/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Androscoggin Storax 10/02/1962 Johnston Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Mississippi Storax 10/05/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bumping Storax 10/06/1962 Johnston Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Roanoke Storax 10/12/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tioga Storax 10/18/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Santee Storax 10/27/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Calamity Storax 10/27/1962 Johnston Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

Housatonic Storax 10/30/1962 Johnston Island Area Airdrop Weapons Related 

St. Lawrence Storax 11/09/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Anacostia Storax 11/27/1962 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Taunton Storax 12/04/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Madison Storax 12/12/1962 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

155 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Manatee Storax 12/14/1962 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Casselman Storax 02/08/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hatchie Storax 02/08/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kaweah Storax 02/21/1963 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Carmel Storax 02/21/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Toyah Storax 03/15/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cumberland Storax 04/11/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kootanai Storax 04/24/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Paisano Storax 04/24/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pleasant Storax 05/29/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Yuba Storax 06/05/1963 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Apshapa Storax 06/06/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kennebec Storax 06/25/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Satsop Niblick 08/12/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kohocton Niblick 08/23/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Natches Niblick 08/23/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Ahtanum Niblick 09/13/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Narraguagus Niblick 09/27/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tomillo Niblick 10/11/1963 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Clearwater Niblick 10/16/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Mullet Niblick 10/17/1963 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Mustang Niblick 11/15/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Greys Niblick 11/22/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Eagle Niblick 12/12/1963 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fore Niblick 01/16/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Oconto Niblick 01/23/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Club Niblick 01/30/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bunker Niblick 02/13/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kickitat Niblick 02/20/1964 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Handicap Niblick 03/12/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hook Niblick 04/14/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bogey Niblick 04/17/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Turf Niblick 04/24/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Driver Niblick 05/07/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Backswing Niblick 05/14/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

156 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Ace Niblick 06/11/1964 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Duffer Niblick 06/18/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fade Niblick 06/25/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dub Niblick 06/30/1964 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Bye Whetstone 07/16/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Links Whetstone 07/23/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Alva Whetstone 08/19/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Player Whetstone 08/27/1964 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Spoon Whetstone 09/11/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Par Whetstone 10/09/1964 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Salmon Whetstone 10/22/1964 Hattiesburg, Mississippi Shaft Vela Uniform 

Garden Whetstone 10/23/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Forest Whetstone 10/31/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Handcar Whetstone 11/05/1964 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Crepe Whetstone 12/05/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Drill (Source-Lower) Whetstone 12/05/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Drill (Target-Upper) Whetstone 12/05/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Mudpack Whetstone 12/16/1964 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Sulky Whetstone 12/18/1964 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Wool Whetstone 01/14/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cashmere Whetstone 02/04/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Alpaca Whetstone 02/12/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Wishbone Whetstone 02/18/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Seersucker Whetstone 02/19/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Suede Whetstone 03/20/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cup Whetstone 03/20/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Palanquin Whetstone 04/14/1965 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Gum Drop Whetstone 04/21/1965 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Chenille Whetstone 04/22/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tee Whetstone 05/07/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Cambric Whetstone 05/14/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tweed Whetstone 05/21/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Organdy Whetstone 06/11/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Diluted Waters Whetstone 06/16/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Tiny Tot Whetstone 06/17/1965 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

157 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Izzer Flintlock 07/16/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pongee Flintlock 07/22/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Ticking Flintlock 08/21/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Centaur Flintlock 08/27/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Elkhart Flintlock 09/17/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kermet Flintlock 11/23/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Corduroy Flintlock 12/03/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Emerson Flintlock 12/16/1965 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Maxwell Flintlock 01/13/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Reo Flintlock 01/22/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Plaid II Flintlock 02/03/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Rex Flintlock 02/24/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Finfoot Flintlock 03/07/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Clymer Flintlock 03/12/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Templar Flintlock 03/24/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Stutz Flintlock 04/06/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Duryea Flintlock 04/14/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fenton Flintlock 04/23/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Traveler Flintlock 05/04/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tapestry Flintlock 05/12/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dumont Flintlock 05/19/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Double Play Flintlock 06/15/1966 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Kankakee Flintlock 06/15/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Vulcan Flintlock 06/25/1966 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Saxon Latchkey 07/28/1966 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Rovena Latchkey 08/10/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Newark Latchkey 09/29/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Simms Latchkey 11/05/1966 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Ajax Latchkey 11/11/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Vigil Latchkey 11/22/1966 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Sterling Latchkey 12/03/1966 Hattiesburg, Mississippi Shaft Vela Uniform 

New Point Latchkey 12/13/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Greeley Latchkey 12/20/1966 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Rivet I Latchkey 01/18/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Nash Latchkey 01/19/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

158 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Rivet II Latchkey 01/26/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Ward Latchkey 02/08/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Agile Latchkey 02/23/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Rivet III Latchkey 03/02/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Oakland Latchkey 04/04/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Heilman Latchkey 04/06/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Effendi Latchkey 04/27/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Commodore Latchkey 05/20/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Knickerbocker Latchkey 05/26/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Switch Latchkey 06/22/1967 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Midi Mist Latchkey 06/26/1967 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Vito Crosstie 07/14/1967 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Stanley Crosstie 07/27/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Washer Crosstie 08/10/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Lexington Crosstie 08/24/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Yard Crosstie 09/07/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Marvel Crosstie 09/21/1967 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Lanpher Crosstie 10/18/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Worth Crosstie 10/25/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Polka Crosstie 12/16/1967 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gasbuggy Crosstie 12/10/1967 Farmington, New Mexico Shaft Plowshare 

Hupmobile Crosstie 01/18/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Staccato Crosstie 01/19/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Faultless Crosstie 01/19/1968 Central Nevada Shaft Weapons Related 

Cabriolet Crosstie 01/26/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Knox Crosstie 02/21/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Buggy A Crosstie 03/12/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Buggy B Crosstie 03/12/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Buggy C Crosstie 03/12/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Buggy D Crosstie 03/12/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Buggy D Crosstie 03/12/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Milk Shake Crosstie 03/25/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Noor Crosstie 04/10/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Throw Crosstie 04/10/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Shuffle Crosstie 04/18/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

159 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Scroll Crosstie 04/23/1968 NTS Shaft Vela Uniform 

Boxcar Crosstie 04/26/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Crock Crosstie 05/08/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Clarksmobile Crosstie 05/17/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tub A Crosstie 06/06/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tub B Crosstie 06/06/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tub C Crosstie 06/06/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tub D Crosstie 06/06/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tub F Crosstie 06/06/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Chateaugay Crosstie 06/28/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tanya Bowline 07/30/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Imp Bowline 08/09/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Rack Bowline 08/15/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Diana Moon Bowline 08/27/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Noggin Bowline 09/06/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Stoddard Bowline 09/17/1968 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Hudson Seal Bowline 09/24/1968 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Vat Bowline 10/10/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hula Bowline 10/29/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Crew Bowline 11/04/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Crew 2nd Bowline 11/04/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Crew 3rd Bowline 11/04/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tinderbox Bowline 11/22/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Schooner Bowline 12/08/1968 NTS Crater Plowshare 

Tyg A Bowline 12/12/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tyg B Bowline 12/12/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tyg C Bowline 12/12/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tyg D Bowline 12/12/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tyg E Bowline 12/12/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tyg F Bowline 12/12/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Benham Bowline 12/19/1968 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Packard Bowline 01/15/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Wineskin Bowline 01/15/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Biggin Bowline 01/30/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cypress Bowline 02/12/1969 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

160 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Valise Bowline 03/18/1969 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Chatty Bowline 03/18/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Coffer Bowline 03/21/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gourd-Amber Bowline 04/24/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gourd-Brown Bowline 04/24/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Purse Bowline 05/07/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bowl 1 Bowline 06/26/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bowl 2 Bowline 06/26/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Ildrim Mandrel 07/16/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hutch Mandrel 07/16/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Spider A Mandrel 08/14/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Spider B Mandrel 08/14/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Minute Steak Mandrel 09/12/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Jorum Mandrel 09/16/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kyack A Mandrel 09/20/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kyack B Mandrel 09/20/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pipkin Mandrel 10/08/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cruet Mandrel 10/29/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pod A Mandrel 10/29/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pod B Mandrel 10/29/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pod C Mandrel 10/29/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pod D Mandrel 10/29/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Calabash Mandrel 10/29/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Scuttle Mandrel 11/13/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tun A Mandrel 12/10/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tun B Mandrel 12/10/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tun C Mandrel 12/10/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tun D Mandrel 12/10/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Terrine White Mandrel 12/18/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Terrine Yellow Mandrel 12/18/1969 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fob Green Mandrel 01/23/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fob Red Mandrel 01/23/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fob Blue Mandrel 01/23/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Yannigan Red Mandrel 02/26/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Yannigan Blue Mandrel 02/26/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

161 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Yannigan White Mandrel 02/26/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cyathus Mandrel 03/06/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arabis Red Mandrel 03/06/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arabis Green Mandrel 03/06/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arabis Blue Mandrel 03/06/1970 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Handley Mandrel 03/26/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Can Green Mandrel 04/21/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Can Red Mandrel 04/21/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hod A (Green) Mandrel 05/01/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hod B (Red) Mandrel 05/01/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hod C (Blue) Mandrel 05/01/1970 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Mint Leaf Mandrel 05/05/1970 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Cornice Yellow Mandrel 05/15/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cornice Green Mandrel 05/15/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hudson Moon Mandrel 05/26/1970 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Flask Green Mandrel 05/26/1970 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Flask Yellow Mandrel 05/26/1970 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Flask Red Mandrel 05/26/1970 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

Piton C Mandrel 05/28/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Piton A Mandrel 05/28/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Piton B Mandrel 05/28/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arnica Yellow Mandrel 06/26/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arnica Violet Mandrel 06/26/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Scree Acajou Emery 10/13/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Scree Alhambra Emery 10/13/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Scree Chamois Emery 10/13/1970 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Avens Andorre Emery 12/16/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Avens Alkermes Emery 12/16/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Avens Asamite Emery 12/16/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Avens Cream Emery 12/16/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Carpetbag Emery 12/17/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Baneberry Emery 12/18/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hareball Emery 06/24/1970 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Camphor Emery 06/29/1970 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Miniata Grommet 07/08/1971 NTS Shaft Plowshare 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

162 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Bracken Grommet 07/09/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Nama Amarylis Grommet 08/05/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Nama Mephisto Grommet 08/05/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Baltic Grommet 08/06/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Chantilly Grommet 09/29/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cathay Grommet 10/08/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Lagoon Grommet 10/14/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cannikin Grommet 11/06/1971 Amchitka, Alaska Shaft Weapons Related 

Diagonal Line Grommet 11/24/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Parnassia Grommet 11/30/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Chaenactis Grommet 12/14/1971 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dianthus Grommet 02/17/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Sappho Grommet 03/23/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Longchamps Grommet 04/19/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kara Grommet 05/11/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Zinnia Grommet 05/17/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Merida Grommet 06/07/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Haplopappus Grommet 06/28/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Diamond Sculls Toggle 07/20/1972 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Delphinium Toggle 09/26/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Akbar Toggle 11/09/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Arsenate Toggle 11/19/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Canna Umbrinus Toggle 11/17/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Canna Limoges Toggle 11/17/1972 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Solanum Toggle 12/14/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Flax Source Toggle 12/21/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Flax Test Toggle 12/21/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Flax Backup Toggle 12/21/1972 NTS Shaft Weapons Effects 

Alumroot Toggle 02/14/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gazook Toggle 03/23/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Natoma Toggle 04/05/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Starwort Toggle 04/26/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Rio Blanco 1 Toggle 05/17/1973 Rifle, Colorado Shaft Plowshare 

Rio Blanco 2 Toggle 05/17/1973 Rifle, Colorado Shaft Plowshare 

Rio Blanco 3 Toggle 05/17/1973 Rifle, Colorado Shaft Plowshare 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

163 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Kashan Toggle 05/24/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dido Queen Toggle 06/05/1973 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Portulaca Toggle 06/28/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Silene Toggle 06/28/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Polygonum Arbor 10/02/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Waller Arbor 10/02/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Seafoam Arbor 12/13/1973 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pinedrops Sloat Arbor 01/10/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pinedrops Tawny Arbor 01/10/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Pinedrops Bayou Arbor 01/10/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hulsea Arbor 03/14/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Potrero Arbor 04/23/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Grove Arbor 05/22/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fallon Arbor 05/23/1974 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Crestlake Tansan Bedrock 07/18/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Crestlake Briar Bedrock 07/18/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Portmanteau Bedrock 08/30/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Stanyan Bedrock 09/26/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Trumbull Bedrock 09/26/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hybla Fair Bedrock 10/28/1974 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Temescal Bedrock 11/02/1974 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Portola Bedrock 02/06/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Portola Larkin Bedrock 02/06/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Teleme Bedrock 02/06/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cabrillo Bedrock 03/07/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dining Car Bedrock 04/05/1975 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Edam Bedrock 04/24/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tybo Bedrock 05/14/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Stilton Bedrock 06/03/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Alviso Bedrock 06/11/1975 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Camembert Bedrock 06/26/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Husky Pup Anvil 10/24/1975 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Kasseri Anvil 10/28/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Leyden Anvil 11/26/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Chiberta Anvil 12/20/1975 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

164 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Muenster Anvil 01/03/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Esrom Anvil 02/04/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fontina Anvil 02/12/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cheshire Anvil 02/14/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Colby Anvil 03/14/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Mighty Epic Anvil 05/12/1976 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Rivoli Anvil 05/20/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Banon Anvil 08/26/1976 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Gouda Fulcrum 10/16/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Chevre Fulcrum 11/23/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Asiago Fulcrum 12/21/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Sutter Fulcrum 12/21/1976 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dofino Fulcrum 03/08/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dofino Lawton Fulcrum 03/08/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Marsilly Fulcrum 04/05/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Carnelian Fulcrum 07/28/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Flotost Fulcrum 08/16/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gruyere Fulcrum 08/16/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gruyere Gradino Fulcrum 08/16/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Coulommiers Fulcrum 09/27/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Farallones Cresset 12/14/1977 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Campos Cresset 02/13/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Reblochon Cresset 02/23/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Karab Cresset 03/16/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fondutta Cresset 04/11/1978 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Asco Cresset 04/25/1978 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Satz Cresset 07/07/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Panir Cresset 08/31/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Diablo Hawk Cresset 09/13/1978 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Cremino Cresset 09/27/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cremino Caerphilly Cresset 09/27/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Emmenthal Quicksilver 11/02/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Quargel Quicksilver 11/18/1978 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Farm Quicksilver 12/16/1978 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kloster Quicksilver 02/15/1979 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

165 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Pepato Quicksilver 06/11/1979 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Fajy Quicksilver 06/28/1979 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Burzet Quicksilver 08/03/1979 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Nessel Quicksilver 08/29/1979 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Pera Quicksilver 09/08/1979 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Azul Tinderbox 12/14/1979 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tarko Tinderbox 02/28/1980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Norbo Tinderbox 03/08/1980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Liptauer Tinderbox 04/03/01980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Colwick Tinderbox 04/26/1980 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Kash Tinderbox 06/12/1980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tafi Tinderbox 07/25/1980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Riola Tinderbox 09/25/1980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Dauphin Guardian 11/14/1980 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Serpa Guardian 12/17/1980 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Seco Guardian 02/25/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Vide Guardian 04/30/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Harzer Guardian 06/06/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Niza Guardian 07/10/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Havarti Guardian 08/05/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Islay Guardian 08/27/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Akavi Praetorian 12/03/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Caboc Praetorian 12/16/1981 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Molbo Praetorian 02/12/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gibne Praetorian 04/25/1982 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Kryddost Praetorian 05/16/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kesti Praetorian 06/16/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Monterey Praetorian 07/29/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Queso Praetorian 08/11/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Huron Landing Praetorian 09/23/1982 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Diamond Ace Praetorian 09/23/1982 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Frisco Praetorian 09/23/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Manteca Phalanx 12/10/1982 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cheedam Phalanx 02/17/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cabra Phalanx 03/26/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

166 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Armada Phalanx 04/22/1983 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Crowdie Phalanx 05/05/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Danablu Phalanx 06/09/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Laban Phalanx 08/03/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Jarlsberg Phalanx 08/27/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Tomme/Midnight Zephyr Phalanx 09/21/1983 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Branco Phalanx 09/21/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Branco Herkimer Phalanx 09/21/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Romano Fusileer 12/16/1983 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Gorbea Fusileer 01/31/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Agrini Fusileer 03/31/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Orkney Fusileer 05/02/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bellow Fusileer 05/16/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Normanna Fusileer 07/12/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kappeli Fusileer 07/25/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Wexford Fusileer 08/30/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Breton Fusileer 09/13/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Egmont Grenadier 12/09/1984 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Tierra Grenadier 12/15/1984 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cottage Grenadier 03/23/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Towanda Grenadier 05/02/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Salut Grenadier 06/12/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Ville Grenadier 06/12/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Maribo Grenadier 06/26/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Serena Grenadier 07/25/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Cebrero Grenadier 08/14/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Diamond Beech Charioteer 10/09/1985 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Roquefort Charioteer 10/16/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Goldstone Charioteer 12/28/1985 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Mighty Oak Charioteer 04/10/1986 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Jefferson Charioteer 04/22/1986 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Panamint Charioteer 05/21/1986 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Darwin Charioteer 06/25/1986 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Cornucopia Charioteer 07/24/1986 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Labquark Charioteer 09/30/1986 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

167 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Belmont Musketeer 10/16/1986 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bodie Musketeer 12/13/1986 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hazebrook Emerald Musketeer 02/03/1987 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hazebrook Checkerberry Musketeer 02/03/1987 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hazebrook Apricot Musketeer 02/03/1987 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Middle Note Musketeer 03/18/1987 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Delamar Musketeer 04/18/1987 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hardin Musketeer 04/30/1987 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Brie Musketeer 06/18/1987 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Borate Touchstone 10/23/1987 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Mission Cyber Touchstone 12/02/1987 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Kernville Touchstone 02/15/1988 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Schellbourne Touchstone 05/13/1988 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Comstock Touchstone 06/02/1988 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Rhyolite Touchstone 06/22/1988 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Nightingale Touchstone 06/22/1988 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Kearsarge Touchstone 08/17/1988 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bullfrog Touchstone 08/30/1988 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kawich A White Cornerstone 12/09/1988 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Kawich A Blue Cornerstone 12/09/1988 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Kawich A Red Cornerstone 02/24/1989 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Kawich A Black Cornerstone 02/24/1989 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Ingot Cornerstone 03/09/1989 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Palisade 1 Cornerstone 05/15/1989 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Palisade 2 Cornerstone 05/15/1989 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Palisade 3 Cornerstone 05/15/1989 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Contact Cornerstone 06/22/1989 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Disko Elm Cornerstone 09/14/1989 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

Hornitos Aqueduct 10/31/1989 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Barnwell Aqueduct 12/08/1989 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Metropolis Aqueduct 03/10/1990 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bullion Aqueduct 06/13/1990 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Randsburg Aqueduct 07/25/1990 NTS Tunnel Weapons Related 

Tenabo Sculpin 10/20/1990 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Coso Bronze Sculpin 03/08/1991 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82. 
Effective Date: 

August 27, 2007 

Revision No. 

1 

Document No. 

SCA-TR-TASK1-0018 

Page No. 

168 of 168 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A6-1: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Sponsored Atmospheric Weapons Tests, 

Underwater Weapons Tests, and Special Projects 

Source: DOE 2000 

Test Name Operation Date Location Type Purpose 

Coso Gray Sculpin 03/08/1991 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Coso Silver Sculpin 03/08/1991 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Montello Sculpin 04/16/1991 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Hoya Sculpin 09/14/1991 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Bristol Julin 11/26/1991 NTS Shaft Joint US-UK 

Galena Yellow Julin 06/23/1992 NTS Shaft Weapons Related 

Galena Orange Julin 06/23/1992 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Galena Green Julin 06/23/1992 NTS Shaft Safety Experiment 

Hunters Trophy Julin 09/18/1992 NTS Tunnel Weapons Effects 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.