This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 30,714 9 JESUS CASTILLO, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY 12 Lisa C. Schultz, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Liane E. Kerr 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellant 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 20 KENNEDY, Judge. 21 Defendant appeals his convictions for armed robbery, conspiracy to commit 22 armed robbery, aggravated battery, and aggrav ated assault. In this Court’s notice of 232 proposed summary disposition, we proposed to affirm. Defendant has responded with 1 a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered. As we are not 2 persuaded by Defendant’s arguments, we affirm. 3 Voluntariness of Defendant’s Statements to the Police 4 Defendant contends that the districtcourt erred in denying his motion to 5 suppress evidence of certain statements he made to the police that he claims were 6 involuntary. [ See DS unnumbered page 2; RP 154-55; MIO 3-6] In this Court’s 7 notice of proposed summary disposition, weproposed to affirm. Defendant responds 8 by asserting that when he toldthe police that he would talk to them if his statements 9 were “off the record,” he meant that his statements would remain confidential—just 10 between him and the police. He bases his arguments on citations to Wikipedia.org 11 regarding “off the record” statements made to reporters. [MIO 5] 12 We find Defendant’s argumen t to be unconvincing. First, it is clear that a 13 potential source who gives a reporter inform ation on the condition that it be “off the 14 record” might reasonably expect that the reporter would keep the information to 15 herself. It is quite different, however, when a person has been taken into custody by 16 the police in relation to a number of crimes for which he is being investigated, and is 17 given warnings specifically to inform him th at anything he says will be used against 18 him in court. [RP 154 (indicating that Defendant received Mirandawarnings and 193 signed a “Mirandawarning statement” prior to speaking with the police)] 1 Furthermore, as we stated in our notice of proposed summary disposition, even if the 2 police engaged in deception when they agreed with Defendant that his statements 3 would be off the record, De fendant has provided no persua sive rationale or legal 4 authority to support his assertion that this deception constituted coercion that rose to 5 such a level that Defendant’s will wa s overborne and his capacity for self6 determination was critically impaired. See State v. Evans , 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 46, 146 7 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216 (stating that police deception is not per se coercive). 8 Therefore, we conclude that the distri ct court did not err in denying Defendant’s 9 motion. 10 Admission of Evidence for Impeachment Purposes 11 Defendant contends that the district c ourt erred in admitting the entire twenty12 six page transcript of a witness’s prio r inconsistent statement for impeachment 13 purposes. [DS unnumbered page5] In our notice of proposed summary disposition, 14 we proposed to find no reversible error, in part because Defendant had failed to 15 provide this Court with any specifics about the evidence or any explanation of how 16 he was prejudiced by its admission. We also noted that to the degree that we were 17 able to evaluate Defendant’s argument on its merits it appeared that the district court 18 had not abused its discretion in admitting th e statement, based on our Supreme Court’s 194 opinion in State v. Varela , 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 36, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280, 1 which states that when a prior inconsistent statement is admitted at trial, the entire 2 statement may be admitted and that the State need not show an inconsistency as to 3 each and every statement. 4 In response, Defendant has purported to provide this Court with the information 5 necessary to evaluate his claim by citing to a transcript in the record of an interview 6 of Lorenzo Castillo. [MIO 7-10; RP 127-38] It is not clear why Defendant believes 7 that this information will further his clai m, since the transcript on which Defendant’s 8 claim of error is based is of an interview w ith a different witness, Javier Orozco. [RP 9 unnumbered pages 4, 5; MIO 7] Accordi ngly, because Defendant has not met his 10 burden of demonstrating on appeal that any of the statements contained in Javier 11 Orozco’s interview were prejudi cial to him, he has failed to establish reversible error 12 on this basis. See Varela , 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 37 (declini ng to reverse based on the 13 erroneous admission of a prior statement thatwas not actually inconsistent with the 14 witness’s trial testimony where the ev idence was cumulative and the defendant 15 therefore could not demonstrate that the error made a difference at his trial). 16 Furthermore, as we stated in our no tice of proposed summary disposition, our 17 Supreme Court has stated that when a prior inconsistent statement is admitted at trial, 18 the entire statement may be admitted and the State need not show an inconsistency as 195 to each and every part of the statement. See Varela , 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 36. 1 Defendant does not provide any authority to suggest that Varela ’s discussion of this 2 issue is incorrect, no longer good law, or neednot be followed by this Court for some 3 reason. Instead Defendant points to State v. Barr , 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 36, 146 N.M. 4 301, 210 P.3d 198, which explains that, pur suant to the rule of completeness as 5 codified in Rule 11-106 NMRA, when a party introduces a portion of a statement and 6 the opposing party seeks to introduce the remainder of the statement in order to 7 correct misleading impression created by the se lection of the decontextualized excerpt, 8 only that portion of the remainder of the st atement that is rele vant and necessary to 9 serve the purpose of such correction should be introduced. Here, however, it is clear 10 that the evidence was not introduced pursuant to Rule 11-106. Here, the entire 11 statement was introduced by th e State to impeach Javier Orozco’s in-court statement. 12 No party sought to introduce only a portion of the statement that might be 13 misconstrued unless completed. Accordingly, Barr and the other cases cited by 14 Defendant that rely upon Rule 11-106 do not apply to this case. To the degree that 15 Defendant believes that some of the principles discussed in Barr should apply equally 16 to the circumstances of when a prior in consistent statement has been introduced 17 pursuant to Rule 11-613 NMRA, he has not e xpressly made this argument or provided 18 any authority to support it. Therefore, even if we were to evaluate the merits of 196 Defendant’s claim, we would apply Varela

. See 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 36. 1 Admission of Observer’s Stateme nt Regarding Defendant’s Approach 2 Defendant contends that the district court erred in admitting a witness’s 3 testimony that an unknown person called out “Chuy’s coming. Chuy’s coming,” after 4 the witness heard gunshots and saw that Defendant was approaching him. [DS 5 unnumbered pages 3, 5] In this Court’s notice of proposed notice of summary 6 disposition, we proposed to find no abuse of discretion in admitting this statement 7 based on the district court’ s rationale that the statement came within the excited 8 utterance exception to the rule against hear say or, in the alternative, that it was 9 admissible as within the ex ception for present sense impressions. Defendant responds 10 by arguing that hearsay cannot be admitted when the identity of the declarant is 11 unknown. [MIO 16-18] He cites no authority to support this proposition, and our 12 case law is to the contrary. See State v. Chavez , 2008-NMCA-125, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 849, 13 192 P.3d 1226 (stating that in ruling on th e admissibility of a statement under the 14 present sense exception to the rule against hear say: “It is immaterialthat the declarant 15 is unavailable to testify; it is immateri al that the declarant is unknown.”). We 16 therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 17 Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in our notice of proposed 18 summary disposition, we affirm. 197 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

___________________________________ 2 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 3 WE CONCUR : 4

_________________________________ 5 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 6

_________________________________ 7 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 8