THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


VOL. II 


DAY TWO 


ABRWH BOARD MEETING
 

The verbatim transcript of the 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at the Four Points by Sheraton, 


Denver, Colorado, on April 26, 2006. 

 

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C O N T E N T S
 

April 26, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 


PACIFIC PROVING GROUND (PPG) SEC 12 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH 13 


PRESENTATION BY PETITIONERS 47 


BOARD DISCUSSION 55 


NEVADA TEST SITE (NTS) SEC 82 


PRESENTATION BY PETITIONERS 82 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH 89 


BOARD DISCUSSION 100 


CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCUSSION 136 


DR. LEWIS WADE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 


DOL’S PROCESS FOR DETERMINING CLAIM ELIGIBILITY 


FOR AN SEC CLASS, MR. PETE TURCIC, DOL 171 


Y-12 SEC 194 


PRESENTATION BY SC&A 197 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH 216 


WORK GROUP REPORT, MR. MARK GRIFFON, CHAIR 263 


BOARD DISCUSSION 280 


CONFLICT OF INTEREST 292 


OVERVIEW OF BOARD ACTIVITIES/PUBLIC COMMENT 307 


DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 436 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- / signifies speaker failure, usually failure to 


use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


DeHART, Roy Lynch, M.D., M.P.H. 


Director 


The Vanderbilt Center for Occupational and Environmental 


Medicine 


Professor of Medicine 


Nashville, Tennessee 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 

 

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GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


LOCKEY, James, M.D., Ph.D. 


Professor, Dept. of Environmental Health 


College of Medicine 


University of Cincinnati 


MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


STAFF
 

LASHAWN SHIELDS, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 

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SIGNED-IN AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS
 

ADKINS, LEONILA 


ALBERG, JEANETTE 


BARKER, KAY, GRASS ROOTS ORG. 


BARRIE, TERRIE, ANWAG 


BASSETT, DAVID 


BEACH, M. JOSIE, NCO 


BEATTY, SR., EVERETT “RAY” 


BEHLING, HANS, SC&A 


BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A 


BICE, MARIA R., NIOSH 


BOLLOR, CAROLYN, CONG. MARK UDALL 


BRENTLING, PAULA, USDOL 


BRITTON, LESSIE 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC 


BROWN, GLENN 


BURKE, MARY 


CHANG, CHIA-CHIA, HHS 


CLARK, DEBBIE 


DAER, GARY R., ORAU 


DAUGHERTY, NANCY M., ORAU 


DEHART, JULIA 


DEMONET, JAN 


DIMICK, CHRIS 


DUKE, LAURA, CONG. BOB BEAUPREZ 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 


FRASER, JOHN 


HAGUE, HAROLD 


HARTMAN, ALAN 


HILLER, DAVID, SEN. KEN SALAZAR 


HINNEFELD, STU, NIOSH 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


HUEBNER, ELIZABETH 


IMSE, ANN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 


JENSEN, DIANE, ROCKY FLATS 


JOSEPH, TIMOTHY, ORAU 


KENOYER, JUDSON 


KIEDING, SYLVIA, USW 


KIMBROUGH, MICHAEL 


KIMPAN, KATE, ORAU 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 

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LAWSON, DIANE, ROCKY FLATS 


LEMING, MICHAEL 


LEWIS, MARK 


LIPSZTEIN, JOYCE, SC&A 


LUCERO, GENEVIEVE 


LUOMA, VERN 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MCALLISTER, ROBERT J., ROCKY FLATS 


MCFEE, MATTHEW, ORAUT 


MCGOLERICK, ROBERT, HHS 


MERCER, LORENA, ROCKY FLATS 


MILLER, HYMAN 


MILLER, RICHARD, GAP 


MINKS, ERIN, SEN. KEN SALAZAR 


MONISEN, ROGER A. 


MORMAN, KAREN, DOL 


MORRIS, ROBERT, CHEW AND ASSOC. 


NETON, JIM, NIOSH 


OSTROM, RICHARD 


PADILLA, JUDY, RFP 


PIERSON, JUDY 


POSEY, ROBERT V., ROCKY FLATS 


RINGEN, KNUT, CPWR 


RODRIGUEZ, MICHALENE, ORAU 


ROMAN, DENNIS R. 


ROSALYN, PAUL, RFP 


ROSE, WILMA 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


SABEC, DONALD 


SCHLUPP, RICHARD 


SCHULTZ, JEFF 


SCHULTZ, LAURA 


SCOTT, THEORTHIA 


SHEPPARD, BOBBIE, ROCKY FLATS 


STACK, VICTORIA 


THIELEN, VALERIE, STEEL WORKER 


TRUJILLO, GERARD A. 


TUCK, KIM 


TURCIC, PETE, DOL 


TURNER, JAMES, BERYLLIUM SUPPORT GROUP 


ULSH, BRANT, NIOSH 


WEBBER, DONNA J. 

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WILSON, GENE R., STEEL WORKER 


WINN, CHARLES L. 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(8:45 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR
 

DR. ZIEMER: Good morning, everyone. I'd like to 


call the meeting to order. I'll start with the 


usual reminder to register in the entryway -- 


if you're a visitor or Board member or staff 


member. Please make sure we have a record of 


your attendance here with us today. 


Also I'd like to remind members of the public 


that there is a public comment session 


scheduled for this evening. It will begin at 


7:00 p.m. If you wish to make public comment, 


please so indicate in the sign-up sheet, which 


is also in the entryway. That public comment 


period is listed on the agenda as being 7:00 to 


8:30. We will obviously try to accommodate 


everyone that wishes to speak, even if it does 


go a few minutes past 8:30 -- a few hours past 


8:30, whatever it may... 


But in any event, please let us know if you 


would wish to make public comment. 


I want to check -- we have Mr. Presley, who 

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will be with us at least part of the time by 


phone, and Robert, are you on the line? 


 (No response) 


Okay. I thought I heard something a moment 


ago, but --


 DR. WADE: Dr. Lockey possibly is. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Lockey, are you on the line? 


 (No response) 


Okay, neither one so far, but they may be 


joining us. 


 DR. WADE: Is anyone on the line? 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Dr. Ziemer, this is Liz 


Homoki-Titus with Health and Human Services. 


There are a number of people on the line. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, hang on just a second. We 


need to turn your phone volume up here so we 


can hear you. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm still here, Liz. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I couldn't hear them. For some 


reason you can't hear Paul. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, how's that? Robert, 


welcome. We're just getting underway here. 


Dr. Lockey, are you on the line, as well? 

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 (No response) 


Okay. Apparently just Mr. Presley so far. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Paul, can they turn the gain 


up on your volume on the phone? I can barely 


hear you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, how is this right now? Is 

this --

 MR. PRESLEY: It's better. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Is that okay? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, that's better. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. Dr. 

Wade has a few remarks as we get underway this 


morning, as well. 


 DR. WADE: Just a couple of sort of 


housekeeping items. Relative to the agenda, 


yesterday we did not have time for the 


presentations by SC&A on petitions related to 


Y-12 and Rocky Flats. What we'll do is we'll 


begin each of those sessions -- Y-12 this 


afternoon and Rocky Flats this morning -- hear­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: No, not -- tomorrow. Rocky is 


tomorrow morning. 


 DR. WADE: Rocky is tomorrow morning, I'm 


sorry. I'm sorry. Y-12 this afternoon, Rocky 

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tomorrow morning, hearing about -- hearing from 


SC&A on those -- their reports, and then we'll 


move into the regularly scheduled agenda item. 


This will give us a little bit of -- of 


coincidence in terms of the discussion. 


 Also tonight's public comment session is not 


only reserved for people who want to make 


comments on Rocky Flats, but anyone who wants 


to make comment. And you know, it could well 


take us well past the -- the time, but I know 


Dr. Ziemer's always been most gracious in 


hearing from everyone who wants to be heard and 


we'll certainly pursue that this evening. 


 MS. KARO: (Via telephone) Dr. Ziemer, I would 


like to introduce myself. I am Daniella Karo. 


I'm the petitioner for the Pacific Proving 


Ground. 


PACIFIC PROVING GROUND (PPG) SEC


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. Welcome, Danielle. 


We're just ready to get underway in fact with 


the Pacific Proving Ground SEC, so we welcome 


you aboard --


 MS. KARO: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and we'll be calling on you in 


a few minutes to make comments, in fact. So 

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we'll begin our discussion of the Pacific 


Proving Ground SEC with a presentation by 


NIOSH, and that will be given by Dr. Neton. 


Then following that, we'll -- and a chance for 


some discussion, we'll have a presentation by 


Danielle, representing the petitioners. So Dr. 


Neton. 


(Pause) 


Stand by, we're having some mike problems here. 


(Pause) 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH
 

DR. NETON: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. It's my 


pleasure to present to you today an update on 


the status of the Pacific Proving Ground SEC 


petition that we discussed at the January 


meeting of the Advisory Board in Oak Ridge. 


At that meeting the Advisory Board asked NIOSH 


to follow up on a few issues related to the 


petition. Specifically, those were to follow 


up with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to 


determine the status of their closure of items 


related to the National Research Council review 


of their program from several years ago. 


 Secondly, the Board wished to provide -- obtain 


some further information on the exposure 

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characteristics of the covered population of 


the Pacific Proving Ground. It was not obvious 


from our presentation the type of work 


activities that were involved with the -- this 


-- this class of workers, as well as the -- as 


the duration of employment. That is, you know, 


how many of these petitioner or how many of 


these class of workers would -- would actually 


meet the 250-day criteria that we proposed in 


our -- in our evaluation report. 


And third, to investigate a little bit the 


issue related to if it were 250 days, how is 


that relevant to a workforce who was 


essentially there 24/7 during the operations. 


I think we discussed that issue a little bit 


yesterday, but we'll certainly be willing to 


engage in further discussions on that if the 


Board desires. 


I would like to point out, as we discussed last 


-- at the last meeting, that the -- the Defense 


Threat Reduction Agency program that we're 


going to talk about is -- is somewhat different 


-- structured somewhat differently than -- than 


the -- than our program, the Energy Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program, and 

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that is that the military personnel stationed 


at the Pacific Proving Ground are -- their 


cancers are considered presumptive, so there's 


a presumptive class of workers there, and the 


dose reconstructions that the Defense Threat 


Reduction Agency does is for the non-


presumptive classes. So they're essentially 


already covered under -- under -- under the 


provisions of their Act, and in fact there is 


no cash award of this $150,000 like there is in 


our program. They're essentially evaluated for 


disability issues under the Veterans 


Administration. I just want to make sure that 


people were clear on that distinction. 


Before I get started in detail I thought I'd 


just take a few seconds to briefly go over some 


of the ground we covered last week (sic) to 


refresh people's memories as to -- as to what 


we're talking about with Pacific Proving 


Grounds. There was a nuclear test site in the 


Marshall Islands, of course, that consisted of 


four separate areas -- Enewetak Atoll, Bikini 


Atoll, Johnston Island and Christmas Island -- 


and there were 105 total detonations that 


occurred at Pacific Proving Grounds starting 

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with Operation CROSSROADS in 1946 and ending in 


1962 with Operation DOMINIC. And as you can 


see from the far right-hand column of the 


slide, there were various types of detonations, 


whether they were airbursts, from a tower, 


surface bursts -- some of them were underwater. 


So a wide variety of different activities were 


conducted with nuclear weapons during this 


period. 


This is the class of employees that we 


proposed, which was all DOE, DOE contractors 


who worked during the duration of the Pacific 


Proving Ground test shots -- that is from 1946 


to 1962 -- and the stipulation that those who 


worked there who were monitored or should have 


been monitored for exposure to radiation as a 


result of nuclear weapons testing. 


I'd like to clarify a little bit about what we 


mean by should have been monitored. We mean 


this in the context of current thinking of 


monitoring status, not monitoring status at the 


time of the shots. If, for example, one looks 


at the current Department of Energy regulation 


for monitoring status, everyone who has the 


potential to receive 100 millirem of exposure 

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in one year would be considered a person who 


should be monitored. And that's -- when we say 


that, that's what we're -- that's the context 


in which we're speaking. 


We looked at a number of resources, if you 


recall from the January meeting, and we could 


find no evidence that we could do dose 


reconstructions for internal exposures in these 


folks. There were reports that limited 


bioassay existed -- well, first let me go back 


and say that we found evidence that there were 


sources of internal exposure -- obviously, 


there were nuclear weapons that were detonated 


in the area. These -- the cohort class that 


we're speaking of were positioned about the 


criticality event, but not in har-- not very up 


close and personal that you would receive a 


dose equivalent to something as a result of a 


criticality incident that was an unplanned 


activity. In fact, almost all of these workers 


were monitored, so we have very good evidence, 


we believe, of what their external exposures 


were. But we lack sufficient bioassay data. 


We cannot reconstruct their internal exposures 


to any extent. 

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 There were reports from the DTRA program and 


elsewhere that bioassay samples were 


sporadically taken. The ones that we -- we 


heard of were measured on board a ship, sort of 


in a makeshift fashion, and even those results 


we couldn't find evidence of -- of the 


documentation for those results. 


There were some air monitoring samples taken, 


but they were by and large taken to track the 


plume of -- of the -- of the detonation and not 


really for purposes of reconstructing exposures 


to the -- to the workers at the facility. 


So we determined it's not feasible to estimate 


the internal doses with sufficient accuracy. 


And when NIOSH makes a determination it's not 


plausible to put an upper bound on the -- an 


exposure pathway for a class of workers, we 


make the determination that the health of the 


employees may have been endangered. 


As I mentioned, the evidence reviewed indicates 


that some had -- workers had accu-- accumulated 


internal exposures through episodic intakes of 


radionuclides. So what we're really saying 


here is not exposure from a criticality event, 


but really the indirect exposure as a result of 

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the fallout of the radioactive materials, 


direct breathing of that fallout while it was 


occurring, and -- and breathing of the fallout 


from resuspension due to activities after -- 


after the material was deposited on -- on the 


surface. 


This has a lot of -- a significant bearing for 


the cohort that we're talking about because, as 


you'll see later in our presentation, many of 


these workers were positioned there for -- for 


numbers of years. These were not short-term, 


go in with an instrument package, come out. 


Some did do that, but a large percentage of 


this cohort spent years there working on these 


islands. So from that determination, we -- we 


qualified this -- recommend this class based on 


the 250-day default scenario for SEC 


eligibility. 


 And the proposed class ended up being -- well, 


exactly what I just said, workers from 1946 


through '62 who were monitored or should have 


been monitored. 


 Now this slide just summarizes what I said in 


the beginning. We are following up with 


Defense Threat Reduction Agency to develop -- 

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see where they are with rele-- relative to 


their issues with the National Research 


Council, and we did some evaluations of the 


work and work patterns of the workers, and we 


attempted to address the monitoring status of 


the workers and the appropriateness of 250 


days. 


DTRA -- at the last meeting, if you recall, Dr. 


Paul Blake provided a presentation where he 


outlined their strategy to closure of the items 


of the National Research Council, and he 


indicated that he would send NIOSH an update on 


the documents under development and -- as well 


as an estimated completion time of their 


status. I have listed here the -- there's 


seven documents that are currently being worked 


on by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and 


all seven of these documents are related to the 


issues raised in the National Research Council 


report. The first one, screening doses for 


induction of cancers calculated with the 


Interactive RadioEpidemiologic Program, that 


one was -- as indicated by Dr. Blake in his 


communication to us -- had a proposed 


publication date of May 6th of this year. 

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The second document is particularly relevant. 


It's a bounding analysis for the effects of 


fractionation of radionuclides in fallout on 


estimation of doses to atomic veterans. In our 


minds this was one of the critical issues that 


was raised by the National Research Council. 


The Defense Threat Reduction Agency program 


assumes a uniform plane or deposition of 


fallout from the detonations. And in that way, 


if you know -- all you really need to know is 


what the external exposure was, and then one 


can sort of estimate what -- possibly what the 


internal exposure was. The NRC report actually 


suggested, though, that things don't happen 


that way. There are fractionations of the 


radionuclides in the mixture away from the 


fallout pattern, and they -- they suggested 


that DTRA should investigate this. And I think 


this is the -- the second document is what 


that's trying to accomplish. 


The revision of FIIDOS is -- is a revision of 


the -- I forget what the acronym stands for, 


but it's the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's 


program -- computerized program for analyzing 


internal -- the doses received from fallout. 

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It essentially takes a -- if you recall -- a 


film badge result and attempts to estimate what 


the internal dose would be based on external 


exposure. 


There's seven total publications here. Those 


are the first three, and those were the ones 


that had the closest-in publication dates. The 


fourth one is evaluation of inhalation doses in 


high-resuspension scenarios. This also has 


relevance to our ability to reconstruct doses 


for PPG -- and NTS workers, for that matter -- 


and that is when a detonation would go off it 


would also tend to bring with it fallout 


contamination from previous shots resuspended 


into the atmosphere, which created an 


additional exposure pathway that had heretofore 


been unrecognized I think, or not sufficiently 


accounted for in the Defense Threat Reduction 


Agency's documentation. 


And there's a special study that is underway 


for exposures to old fallout fields for DESERT 


ROCK trainees at NTS. This is related to an 


issue raised by the NRC about an evaluation of 


reliability for this model. It was not a -- 


necessarily a finding on their part. It was a 

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suggestion by the NRC that the reliability of 


this method -- that is, taking the film badge 


and interpreting or interpreting that as to 


what internal dose could be -- is really 


scientifically possible but not been 


empirically demonstrated. So the NRC 


suggested that they go and obtain some fallout 


samples, even contemporaneous samples, and try 


to go backwards and model this and see how well 


it works. I think this study may shed some 


light on that issue, although in communications 


with DTRA they have no detailed plans in the 


near term to -- to complete a full-blown 


evaluation of the reliability of the model at 


this point. There are a number of issues 


preventing them from doing that. Most notably, 


I believe there are classification issues that 


are standing in the way. 


And the final document that is -- or not the 


final, but another document intended to be 


completed is the -- how to estimate skin doses 


from, you know, dermal contamination. That is 


the settling of fallout on the skin of the 


workers and what the doses are from that 


pathway. 

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And the final one that's projected to be 


completed in November '06 is consideration of 


estimates of upper bounds of neutron doses for 


these -- for these veterans. 


So you can see that there -- there are seven 


documents that DTRA has underway in various 


stages of completion ranging from May through 


November of this year. 


Just before the Board meeting we wanted to make 


sure where they are with these documents to get 


a better snapshot as to what we could expect to 


see from them in the near term, and we sent a 


letter over to them and particularly were 


inquiring about the first three since they were 


the closest-in for publication. We thought we 


might be able to obtain draft copies of these 


documents, review them, see -- review them for 


applicability to our -- our situation. 


The documents have been drafted. They are 


currently under various stages of internal 


review within either DTRA or SENES Oak Ridge, 


which is their contractor for a number of these 


documents. They are not ready for public 


release. 


In fact, it's DTRA's policy that they don't 

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release pre-decisional documents to the public. 


We received a letter just Friday from Dr. Blake 


and I'd just like to read -- this -- this 


should be available to the Board, this letter 


from DTRA dated April 21st, 2006, and I believe 


there are also copies on the table for the 


members of the public. 


I'd just like -- the one paragraph, after we -- 


we -- we requested, you know, a status update. 


Dr. Blake responded that, I quote, "After 


internal technical review of these documents, 


NTPR plans to solicit peer review from the 


Veterans' Advisory Board on Dose Reconstruction 


prior to additional external review and/or 


final publication. It is not the policy of my 


agency to release pre-decisional documents so I 


must regretfully decline your request for draft 


copies." -- close quote. 


What that indicates to me is that even though 


these publication dates are -- are valid, I 


mean they do -- they have published -- draft 


documents, NIOSH will not be able to obtain 


documents for some time into the future. It is 


our understanding that their advisory board is 


not planning on meeting until July, so that 

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would be the earliest that the advisory board 


could provide input and comments on these 


documents, and we can't speculate as to how 


long external peer review would take after 


that, but it would certainly take some time, 


possibly months, after that. So we're looking 


at quite an extended time period for NIOSH to 


obtain additional documentation on how to -- 


how these may be applicable to our program. 


Okay, a little bit about the work histories and 


what happened to folks at the Pacific Proving 


Grounds -- and this was actually somewhat 


surprising to me when I -- when we started 


digging into these issues. We went and looked 


at every single case we have in our files for 


Pacific Proving Ground claimants. And at the 


time we did this analysis, I believe this was 


in February sometime, we had 600 -- 69 


claimants -- cases forwarded to us by the 


Department of Labor. I think at the time we 


presented this in January there were 64, so 


you'll see a slight disconnect in the numbers. 


 Interestingly, the average length of employment 


at the Pacific Proving Ground -- that is 


stationed on the islands -- was 393 days for 

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those claimants. I'll have to caveat that 


slightly. In looking through, there were a 


couple claimants who had stayed durations in 


excess of 25 years. I questioned the validity 


of that and I didn't use those in the analysis. 


I have to go back. I suspect what happened is 


there was some NTS -- Nevada Test Site -- 


exposures included in there. Although I did go 


through and look at a large majority of these 


cases, and the 393-day average -- I did confirm 


that that did constitute Pacific Proving Ground 


employment. I was concerned that it may be 


that a person had worked at NTS or Lawrence 


Livermore, was deployed to PPG, and that was 


all being aggregated into one number. It did 


not appear to be the case from the number of 


cases I looked at. 


The range of employment duration was from one 


day to greater than 2,500 days, and 


approximately -- almost half of the cases that 


we have in our possession have a covered 


exposure duration of greater than 250 -- equal 


to or greater than 250 days. 


In addition to this, which is somewhat 


interesting in light of what we're going to be 

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talking about in the next hour, is some of 


these cases have additional exposures at Nevada 


Test Site. There's a certain cadre of workers 


that go around doing these things, and if 


you're not investigating weapon detonations for 


the Proving Ground, you may be working at the 


Nevada Test Site. 


For those of you who are more graphically 


inclined, I put together a -- I love cumulative 


probability distributions, and -- of course, as 


everything in occupational exposure 


environments fits a lognormal cumulative 


probability distribution, no surprise there. 


And I just highlight it here on the graph, a 


little arrow pointing to the 250 days exposure 


duration, which is right around the median 


value of the population, which is -- which is 


somewhat surprising to me, to be honest with 


you, when I -- when I figured this out. And, 


again, lognormally distributed, half -- more 


than half 250 days, almost more than half. 


We also took a look and went through every 


Computer Assisted Telephone Interview that we 


had 'cause all of these workers, of course, 


either survivors or the workers themselves, 

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were interviewed. I think there were a couple 


that declined interviews, but almost all had 


interviews in their case file. And the variety 


of responses of employment -- by all accounts, 


and I went through and read some of these 


myself, and we have a very nice summary sheet 


that were prepared -- I didn't distribute it 


because I was concerned about Privacy Act 


information in here, but I -- I've summarized a 


few job categories just to give you a flavor 


for the range of -- of occupations that were 


present on these islands. 


They range from heavy equipment operator, which 


you'd expect, there's a lot of trench 


operations, there's buildings going up, 


buildings being torn down to support these 


detonations; divers to pull undersea cables. 


Surprisingly there was a dentist. He spent 


several years there. He was the only dentist 


on the island and --


 MS. MUNN: That makes sense to me. 


DR. NETON: -- I guess given the number of 


people that were there over the duration that 


they were there, they needed some medical care. 


There were first aid folks at that site, those 

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type medical people. Instrument technicians 


that you'd expect, laborers, physicist, 


cafeteria worker, so a wide variety of ranges 


of employment on these islands. And many of 


these reported combinations of work and 


recreation activities in their CATI. If you 


looked at what they were doing, of course they 


worked and worked long days, but they were also 


swimming in lagoons, eating the local 


vegetation. You know, they were inhabitants of 


the island, essentially. 


 Ninety percent of these cases were -- had 


external dosimetry results in their case files, 


so it is our belief, and I -- that almost all 


these workers had external dosimetry 


monitoring. The question is, given the 


scenarios of the work environment, were these 


workers actually wearing these dosimeters 24/7 


for greater than 393 days -- two years, five 


years? I suspect they weren't. I mean you 


don't wear your TLD to bed and that sort of 


thing. And if you're going to go out 


snorkeling, that -- so even though we have 


external dosimetry on these which we believe 


can put a bound on their -- their exposures, it 

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brings into question, in my mind at least, the 


applicability of the DTRA program where, if you 


recall, you really need to know the external 


dose to the workers to come up with any sort of 


reasonable assumption for the internal 


exposure. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


DR. NETON: Lacking a good external result 


number from a badge, one would have to know a 


detailed time motion study. Because again, 


with DTRA, if you knew where a person was 


positioned in time and space over four, five, 


six years, you could theoretically use that 


approach as well. And unlike the military, 


these people are not tracked with detailed logs 


of -- of where they were -- where they were 


positioned over these time periods. So you 


know, I don't think that -- that pathway -- 


that's a viable option for us to attempt to 


reconstruct these doses. 


I just sort of looked at these job categories 


and tried to collapse them into four major 


grou-- they sort of fell into four major 


groups, in my mind. I'm sure I could do a more 


fine structure, but I really wanted to get a 

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sense for what were the categories of work that 


people were doing, and interestingly enough, 


they fell into essentially three categories. 


If you combine administrative and unknown on 


the far right-hand side there, it's about a 


third apiece. A third of workers that were 


doing building trades activities or what I 


would call maintenance, so folks supporting the 


infrastructure of the island and the building 


and demolition activities. And then there was 


about a third of the workers were engaged in 


what I would call the scientific/technical 


aspects of the operation. That is preparing 


for the shots, monitoring the shots, that sort 


of thing. And then about a third of the folks 


were either in the administrative category -- 


project coordinators, managers, those type of 


functions -- or we just have no knowledge -- 13 


percent we have no knowledge of what their job 


category was. 


I think that -- that concludes what we were 


able to discern between January and now. I'd 


be happy to answer any questions. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Jim. We'll open 


the floor for questions. Let me begin by 

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asking you to clarify on the -- I think you 


characterized some of the early inhalations as 


episodic, in a sense, and what -- what 


implication does that have for these folks that 


are on the less-than-250-day category as far as 


internal dose is concerned? 


DR. NETON: If a class were added as proposed, 


anyone with less than 250 days exposure at the 


Pacific Proving Grounds would have to be -- 


have their dose reconstructed by NIOSH. If we 


couldn't reconstruct the internal dose, which 


we're saying we can't, we would reconstruct as 


much dose as we could, which would be any 


external dose, medical dose -- you know, the 


remaining pieces that we could -- we could do 


to figure out what their exposures were. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, let me ask it in a somewhat 


different way, as well. Is there any 


indication of what kind of an internal dose 


someone might get, even in a sort of a 


theoretical episodic event? I don't have a 


good feel for what kind of an intake one could 


have, and this would presumably be early on 


with the -- the fallout with a lot of the 


short-lived stuff and so on... 

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DR. NETON: It really depends, and this is one 


of the issues, on the weather pattern, what 


happened, the type of shots -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, but --


DR. NETON: -- but the doses are not in the -- 


the extremely high range, I guess, if that's 


what you're asking. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, that's really what I'm 


asking. 


DR. NETON: Not acute doses. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The episodic inhalations -- 


DR. NETON: Episodic, right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- result in doses that were --


DR. NETON: Sufficient -- sufficient to 


endanger their health, but not in the scenario 


where you're in the hundreds of rem range. 


 MS. MUNN: 


DR. NETON: Lower ranges of rem highest. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, just following up on that in 


two ways, I guess, though, there were -- given 


the number of tests that were done, it's 


certainly possible for someone to have multiple 


episodic exposures, which makes this more -- I 


guess more complicated to -- to -- to address 

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and so forth. What are the criteria that -- 


for the presumptive cancers in terms of any 


time limit, whatever, that would be applied by 


-- under the DTRA program? 


DR. NETON: I don't know the answer to that. 


What, if there is a -- a presence time DTRA? 


 DR. MELIUS: Presence, yeah. 


DR. NETON: Larry Elliott, my boss, says 


presence, and I think that's right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. DeHart? 


 DR. DEHART: Do we have a feel for how well the 


environmental doses have been monitored and 


documented in those sites over time? 


DR. NETON: There certainly have been a number 


of environmental assessment of the islands in 


more recent history, but if you remember -- if 


you recall, a lot of these were short-lived 


radionuclides, you know, would not be present 


in the environment -- temporary -- temporary 


period, but I know a lot of work has been done 


there, but I'm not familiar with the extent of 


it. SC&A I know has a lot of knowledge of the 


environmental operations at the -- at the 


islands, but I don't have first-hand knowledge. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Jim --

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 DR. DEHART: Would one estimate dose, comparing 


it to where we are, Denver, where we have a 


higher radiation exposure at 5,000 feet, on 


those islands -- any -- any feel at all as to 


isotope contamination and radiation levels and 


living in it, it's 24 hours a day. 


DR. NETON: During the time frame that we're 


talking about, we have no evidence of those 


values. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But certainly the islands that got 


direct fallout, such as the -- was it Ene-- no, 


it was Rongelap, I think, they ex-- excavated 


the island -- they evacuated the -- all the 


inhabitants. 


I think Dr. Melius was next, and then Dr. 


Roessler. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I'd like to actually follow 


up with Roy's point. The last -- at the last 


meeting when we discussed this, we talked about 


possibility of adjusting the 250 days to take 


into account the residence and now -- that 


actually their work days were -- were much 


longer. Has that issue been explored? I mean 


you seem to be indicating that 250 days of work 


was required, and I thought that's the -- the 

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way that you went through the -- the employment 


histories was 250 days, assuming an 8-hour day, 


I mean for --


DR. NETON: Yeah, that's correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- calculation purposes. 


DR. NETON: We thought about that and I believe 


we discussed this a little bit yesterday, and 


it's more in the policy area and I'd like to 


refer that question to Larry on that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, this was the issue discussed 


yesterday a little bit. It's the -- it's the 


idea of -- are you talking about 250 8-hour 


days and do you do a weighted -- 


DR. NETON: Right. Yeah, I think I understand. 


For example, if one were to -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: So if you were there --


DR. NETON: -- assume 24/7 --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- 24 hours a day, then you've got 


DR. NETON: -- you might end up with 80 days or 


something like that. 


 DR. WADE: We're not prepared to speak to it 


from a policy point of view. I don't have my 


hands on the data and, you know, Dr. Melius's 


question is going to what the data would show. 

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We'd have to look into that, but you know, in 


discussion with the Secretary and his advisors 


and the legal team, the rule itself talks about 


250 work days. It does not define work days. 


The Secretary would certainly be willing to 


accept a recommendation -- to consider a 


recommendation from the Board that attempted to 


deal with this issue of work days being eight 


hours versus a situation where people were 


resident there. And if the Board wanted to 


make a recommendation based upon that logic, 


that science, the Secretary would be more than 


willing to receive that recommendation and 


consider it. So there's nothing that precludes 


the Board from taking that into consideration 


as it would like and making its recommendation 


to the Secretary. 


Similarly, if you look at the other provision 


for health endangerment, it goes to -- and I'll 


read -- for classes of employees that may have 


been exposed to radiation during discrete 


incidents likely to have involved exceptionally 


high-level exposures such as nuclear 


criticality events, or other events involving 


similarly high levels of exposure. 

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So again, I think there is room for the Board 


to consider this issue of a recommendation 


different than the NIOSH recommendation as it 


relates to the health endangerment 


consideration. My only caution to you is if 


you do that, make sure that your recommendation 


to the Secretary is clear and based upon 


foundation, and -- and I think it's open for 


the Board's consideration. 


DR. NETON: Aside from the policy issue, I mean 


I have this cumulative frequency draft which, 


if you look at, if one were to make some 


assumption that 24 hours a day were going to be 


considered a work day and that might put their 


days of covered exposure down somewhere around 


80, if one extrapolates off this graph it looks 


to me like it might double the size of the 


covered population -- or move it down to around 


20 -- 80 percent of the workers would meet that 


-- 80 percent of the cases would meet that 


requirements. That's just a rough -- you know, 


off a graph, but certainly increase the -- 


expand the size of the covered -- covered 


class. 


 DR. WADE: I do think -- if I could have one 

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more comment. I do think that -- at -- at the 


last discussion Robert Presley, who was -- who 


has lived through some of these things, made 


some comments, and I would like to be sure that 


Robert's on the line and -- and if he has 


comments to make that we could hear his 


comments. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, I would. Can you hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, go ahead, Robert. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can you hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, go ahead. Can he hear us? 


Can you hear us? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, now I can. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Go ahead. Go ahead. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I would like to comment on the -- 


on the 80 days. Those people -- I was not 


there, but I've seen and read documents about 


the way they lived in the early days. A lot of 


the people when they were on islands lived in 


tents. They were exposed. It was very, very 


hot. They didn't have any rules about wearing 


shirts. A lot of them wore shirts -- or wore 


shorts and no shirts. With the amount of sand 


and small particles blowing around and living 


in tents, you would be exposed to the elements 

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24 day -- or 24 hours, 7 days a week. And I'll 


stop right there. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim -- of course if 


we're talking about internal dose, regardless 


of that parameter, internal's always 24/7 


anyway, so you wouldn't weight that, but is the 


external a driver here on these or not? I 


think you were saying the internal would be a 


driver on most of these. 


DR. NETON: Internal is why -- what we're 


proposing -- the reason --


 DR. ZIEMER: If the internal's the driver, then 


it's not any different from someone working in 


a lab, regardless of --


DR. NETON: No, no, I think -- there's an 


inhalation of 24 hours a day. The source term 


doesn't go away for them. If you work in a 


laboratory, you go home and -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah -- yeah -- 


DR. NETON: -- exposure, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: These people lived a short 


distance from -- from some of this stuff, and 


they were right on it, 24/7. 


DR. NETON: We're talking about the inhalation, 

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fallout and resuspension. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, the -- the other question I 


have then, then I'll let Gen get her question 


in, but is really related and that's the 


question of the class definition of monitored 


or should have been monitored or -- you talked 


about it a little bit, Jim, but -- but I'm just 


wondering how -- how is it going to be possible 


to make that separation here? I mean I --


sounded to me like most people were monitored. 


There may be some people, by nature of their 


employment, that -- that weren't -- weren't 


employed there -- I -- I guess -- I think we 


just need to be careful about how we define 


that so that we -- I -- I'm not sure that's -- 


we need to make -- make sure there's an 


understanding of what that means in this 


particular instance 'cause it would seem to me 


that most people that were, quote, living there 


and support personnel, you know, should have 


been monitored, I guess is the -- so -- 


DR. NETON: That's true. I don't want to 


speak for the Department of Labor and how they 


qualify the cases based on the class 


definition, but I think the intent is that 

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people who actually physically worked on the 


island --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- were present on the island doing 


activities versus someone who may be -- 


couriers that may be -- depends on what you 


mean by working the Pacific Proving Grounds. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: There could be someone a thousand 


miles away had worked on a Pacific Proving 


Grounds project, never set foot on the island ­

-


 DR. MELIUS: Right, and so that employment 


classifications that might normally not -- we 


would not consider to be "should be monitored" 


at a fixed facility whatev-- whatever, you have 


courier or whatever that -- that -- in this 


case, people that were working on the island, 


so maybe the -- the definition would be better 


if we made it physical presence rather than 


monitored/not monitored. And I know Pete's 


going to give a presentation later on that -- 


some of these definitions, and maybe we will 


save that question for him, also, but I'm just 


trying to get a sense of -- of the -- the 

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nature of the information on the group. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Gen Roessler. 


DR. ROESSLER: I was going to -- oops, this is 


kind of bad. Can you hear me okay? 


I was going to point out the 24/7 exposure to 


internal and external which has just come up, 


and I think based on what Bob Presley has said 


and the answer you got to your question from 


Jim, I think that's something we need to look 


at. And then I was going to ask about the 


number of people who would be included if there 


were some adjustment to what I would call a 20 


-- 250-day equivalent, which maybe is 


considered about 80 days, and I think the 


answer -- and I would just like to have Jim say 


it again -- the difference would go from 46 


percent of the population to did you say 80? 


DR. NETON: Yes. 


DR. ROESSLER: That would include 80 percent -- 


DR. NETON: a rough number I'm just reading 


off this graph in front of you, but if you read 


over --


 DR. ZIEMER: Read down to 80 days. 


DR. NETON: -- you read down to 80 and up -- 


and over to the Y axis, it looks to me around 

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20 percent in that way. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, that --


DR. NETON: Or 20 percent --


DR. ROESSLER: I just wanted to verify all of 


that. 


DR. NETON: More than the -- yeah, more than -- 


80 -- 80 percent or more had more than 80 days. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Any other questions or comments? 

 DR. MELIUS: Would just add --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- another comment, I -- and 

that's addressing the issue of the DTRA 


documents and so forth. I think at our -- our 


last meeting we had raised concerns -- we 


wanted more information about those documents 


and the schedule for those -- those documents, 


and I appreciate the efforts that -- that NIOSH 


made to obtain that information. And my 


reading of it in -- from Jim's presentation is 


that it -- number one is that those documents 


that would be relevant to our consideration of 


the Special Exposure Cohort are -- are many 


month or, you know, at least over a year away 


from us being able to evaluate them. Number 

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two, that it is doubtful that certain -- that 


certain key areas of evaluation are not being 


undertaken, for various reasons, within DTRA, 


so even if we waited a year or more it's not 


clear that we would have an adequate amount of 


information to make it -- assessment on the 


adequacy of any internal dose reconstruction. 


Just wanted to confirm -- you, Jim, if that's a 


-- appropriate conclusion based on what you 


presented to us, I --


DR. NETON: I would agree with you, many 


months. I don't know if I -- a year, I -- it 


would be speculative to say it could be more -- 


a year or more, but it would be certainly many 


months down the line. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Larry Elliott has a comment on 


that. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I've had a number of 


conversations with Dr. Blake since our last -- 


your last Board meeting and pursuing whether we 


could get our hands on the draft information, 


as you see in the letters that were provided to 


you this morning. And I apologize for that; 


they were to be copied yesterday but Kinko's 


somehow didn't get those produced in time. At 

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any rate, I think your conclusion is 


appropriate, Dr. Melius. If we were to go from 


the starting point with the data that they're 


using, we would have to do everything they're 


doing ourselves. We'd have to evaluate it. 


We'd have to get it peer reviewed. If we were 


to wait for them to finish their efforts, we 


would still not pick that up until it was 


completed in a peer review process. We want 


the information to be added to the body of 


science, to the literature base, before we 


would examine it and its content. So yeah, 


it's months to perhaps a year away. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Further comments or 

questions? 

 (No responses) 

PRESENTATION BY PETITIONERS
 

If not, we now have the opportunity to hear 


from the petitioner. Danielle Karo is on the 


line. I think Danielle is actually in 


California at this moment. Danielle, if you're 


still there, welcome. 


 MS. KARO: Yes, I'm still here --


 DR. ZIEMER: We're pleased to hear your 


comments now. 

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 MS. KARO: Thank you. I have a question 


regarding the 250 days. Is it an option or is 


it a standard? And the reason why I'm asking 


that is that it is my impression, and please 


correct me if I'm wrong, that the Amchitka 


people who already is part of the Special 


Exposure Cohort, that there there was no 


requirement for them for these 250 days 


aggregating over these 250 work days, so please 


kind of give me an idea of what the -- you 


know, clear this for me. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Danielle, I'm not sure we 


heard all of that question. We're having some 


difficulty with the sound here. 


 MS. KARO: Oh --


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to have to ask you to 


repeat it. 


 MS. KARO: Definitely. 


 DR. ZIEMER: You may have to actually talk a 


little louder, as well, if you would, please. 


 MS. KARO: Yes, I'm trying to. Can you hear me 


now? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, go ahead. 


 MS. KARO: Yes, my question is regarding the 


work days aggregating at least 250 work days. 

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Is -- is it an option or is it a standard? The 


reason I'm asking is there was some 


inconsistency, simply because I have become 


aware -- and please correct me if I'm wrong -- 


that the Special Exposure Cohort regarding the 


Amchitka place in Alaska has no requirement for 


the 250 days. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I believe that is a correct 


statement on the Alaska facility. 


 MS. KARO: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: NIOSH, can you add to that -- Jim 


Neton? 


DR. NETON: For Amchitka Island (inaudible) 


legislatively created by Congress, and we -- 


we're working on this analysis under our rule 


42 CFR Part 83, which has a default of 250 


days' duration; or presence, if we can 


determine that a very large accident occurred 


where a person would be irradiated at the level 


of a criticality incident, and our analysis of 


this cohort found no evidence of that. 


 MS. KARO: The only question that I have then ­

- is there a good scientific reason to arrive 


to this number of 250 days? Is there any 


science substantiating the need for that? And 

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I'm asking this because obviously the National 


Academy found recently that even lower 


radiation poses risk. In other words, even the 


smallest dose of low-level ionizing radiation 


has a potential to cause an increase in health 


risk to humans, so how do we reconcile this? 


You're talking about criticality and high 


doses, and yet we're -- you know, the National 


Academy of Sciences is saying even very small 


amounts, you know, pose risk. 


DR. NETON: All I can say is that the health 


endangerment criteria established in our rule 


was -- was vetted through the -- through the 


regular channels. It was published for public 


comment. We took public comment on this. The 


250 days is consistent with the legislatively-


added cohorts. But I cannot exactly point to a 


number of dose -- you know, the dose number 


that would equate to 250 days for health 


endangerment. It was adopted in our regulation 


and is consistent with the Congressionally-


mandated cohorts. 


 MS. KARO: I see. And -- and so it is written 


in stone? Could it be modified? Because it 


sounds to me -- from what I hear is that really 

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there isn't any good scientific reason -- or at 


least that's my -- kind of my -- my 


determination here, that it was legislated and 


it was a determination, but is it -- was it 


done at random, was it done for -- with good 


scientific -- for good scientific reason? I 


don't hear that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let the Chair attempt to answer 


that in part. There is a certain arbitrariness 


to the number. I don't think we can speculate 


exactly how it was determined in the 


Congressional language to begin with. There 


probably is a practical aspect to it, though. 


The National Academy report that you're 


referring to is one that talks about linear 


known threshold hypothesis for radiation 


effects that at least hypothesizes, and it's 


never been demonstrated in health effects, that 


the lowest dose may produce an effect. And in 


a practical sense, doses that bring the effects 


that we're talking about are more than trivial 


doses in terms of these probabilities. 


 MS. KARO: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Even if we were to calculate the 


probability of a millirem on here, it would 

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have no impact on the final decision. So those 


theoretical issues may be there, but in a 


practical sense, for a person to get enough 


dose to reach the probabilities that we're 


talking about based on the risk coefficients -- 


which also assume that same kind of linearity ­

- you have to have a reasonable amount of 


exposure. And in the absence of monitoring 


data in many of these facilities, based on 


practical experience, we know that a person 


who's only been there -- unless it's an 


episodic event -- only been there a brief time 


is not likely to have reached these sort of 


thresholds for -- for reaching the right 


probability. So there's a kind of practical 


aspect to it, but it nonetheless has a degree 


of arbitrariness, as well. 


 MS. KARO: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But be that as it may, Danielle, 


do you have some additional comments on the 


petition itself? 


 MS. KARO: Well, the only comments I have was 


that obviously the lengthiness of the process, 


and I'm not talking specific to the -- to this, 


you know, issue of the establishing the PPG as 

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a Special Exposure Cohort, but obviously I -- I 


have a husband who passed away a number of 


years ago and -- and I applied for compensation 


for in July of 2001 and here I am five years 


later and I'm not closer to a resolution at 


all. So I guess there is an element of 


timeliness. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, thank you. And actually that 


element of timeliness is one of the concerns 


that has been raised here today in terms of any 


delay that might be represented by awaiting the 


outcome of the DTRA studies, so that's an issue 


for the Board, as well, to consider. 


 MS. KARO: And the other question, if you don't 


mind and then I will shut up, is the fact that 


if indeed the person involved does not meet 


this requirement or this arbitrariness of 250 


days equivalence, then they will have to have a 


dose reconstructed, and it sounds to me like 


we're falling back onto the situation where 


inhalation and internal dosages would be 


difficult to establish. So even if a person is 


not going to be included in -- in the Special 


Exposure Cohort because they have not served 


for 250 days equivalence, how are they going to 

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-- if the dose needs to be reconstructed, what 


kind of formulas and what kind of calculations 


will be used when in fact it's been established 


that it's very difficult to figure out the 


inhalation doses. 


DR. NETON: That's a very good question. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Neton. 


DR. NETON: The answer is that if we make the 


determination that inhalation doses cannot be 


reconstructed, the remaining cases that were 


forwarded to us for dose reconstruction would 


be partial reconstructions. That is, we would 


only reconstruct the doses we could -- we could 


do with sufficient accuracy, and that would end 


up being the external dosimetry component and 


any medical exposures that may have occurred. 


The inhalation doses would not be considered in 


those dose reconstructions because, by 


definition, we couldn't reconstruct them. 


 MS. KARO: And then how are you going to be 


able to make a decision based on a partial 


reconstruction? 


DR. NETON: The decision would be based solely 


on the -- the outcome of the partial dose 


reconstruction. 

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 MS. KARO: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Danielle, do you have any further 


questions or comments? 


 MS. KARO: No. No, thank you for -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much for being with 


us today. 


 MS. KARO: Thank you for allowing me to -- to – 


BOARD DISCUSSION


 DR. ZIEMER: Now again, Board, is there further 


discussion on this particular issue? 


 Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I would -- it's not a motion 


yet, this is for discussion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay? I would propose that we go 


forward, we -- I would be in favor of approving 


this Special Exposure Cohort petition, the -- 


that there be some adjustment for the fact that 


people lived on the site so I think we need to 


explicitly address that -- that issue. I am 


disturbed, though, about the -- the sort of the 


inconsistency between this -- our approach and 


what we're allowing and the DTRA program, and ­

- in terms of the people with what may turn out 


to be less than 80 days of -- of a dose, and I 

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would suggest that -- and this is going to come 


up in Nevada Test Site, too, so it's -- it's 


something I think we should try to address. 


And I would think that -- I would like to ask 


NIOSH to do some further work to describe tho-- 


those people and better describe the population 


in terms of those with short-term exposure. 


And -- and I think we need to, you know, try to 


determine, you know, what's the appropriate 


approach for dealing with this episodic 


exposure such as here and at the Nevada Test 


Site. It may be that -- I guess I'm disturbed 


that we're ignoring the -- one of the -- you 


know, major sources that are dose (sic). We 


can deal with external if we just do a straight 


dose reconstruction, but not with the internal. 


It may be that some of the information from the 


reports that DTRA is working on might help us 


better understand the endangerment issue, 


though still might not be sufficient for full 


dose reconstruction the way we have approached 


it. 


I also think we have to keep in mind that the 


Congressional intent, when this law was passed, 


did make a separation between Amchitka and the 

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other Congressionally-mandated Special Exposure 


Cohorts, and presence at Amchitka was 


considered sufficient and 250 days was required 


-- required for -- for the others. And I think 


that was some recognition of having -- making 


Amchitka consistent with the program with the 


veterans, also was, you know, recognition that 


that was a different situation and that -- that 


if we -- if we were following sort of our 


logic, at least part of the rationale for when 


we did the 250 days in the health endangerment 


portion of our regulation for Special Exposure 


Cohorts, then that was based on well, we were 


paralleling the -- the -- what Congress had 


done. Well, if we were following that, then -- 


if we were paralleling Congress on a site where 


atomic weapons were exploded, like Amchitka, 


then Pacific Proving Ground and Nevada Test 


Site, one might have a different criteria for ­

- for health endangerment. I don't think we 


have enough information to -- to make a 


judgment on that, but I do think that we need 


to do further work and we should re-- should 


re-- explicitly reserve that issue in our 


recommendation. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Roy DeHart. 


 DR. DEHART: Basically your last sentence is 


what I was going to speak to. We have in the 


past identified members of a cohort as to 


different time elements, and certainly we could 


do that in this situation if it were the 


Board's intent to separate, so that we do have 


time to look at the issues of less than 250 


days. And I would recommend that we give 


thought to approving the 250-day, with a second 


criteria to continue to research and determine 


what to do with those individuals who have not 


reached that number of days. 


 DR. MELIUS: So -- so you -- I guess where we 


differ is I would be willing at this point to 


include some adjustment for people living on 


the island, so I'd cut 250 by three to make 


that -- and I think that a -- there may be 


theoretically a way of doing that adjustment 


better, but I'm not sure that there's adequate 


information to be able to -- to do that. I 


think we just have to be careful that when we 


define the cohort that those that would meet 


the -- the 83-day criteria, or whatever it is, 


would be able to -- would actually be present 

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at -- on -- in an area where there was 


endangerment, I guess is putting it 


theoretically, and do that as not someone that 


was, you know, shipped in and out or -- or 


whatever, that we do make sure it's 


appropriate. I'm not sure that it's going to 


be possible to do a -- a better adjustment that 


-- you know, depending on where they -- their 


activities or exactly where they worked and 


lived and so forth, based on the available 


information. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Actually -- and let me interject 


here and get a kind of procedural question -- 


if, for example, the Board were to approve or 


recommend approval of this petition, either in 


its present form or with a weighted 250-day or 


something like that, and if later -- say a year 


from now -- we learn something from the DTRA 


studies and other information that would impact 


on the issue of the episodic events, is -- is 


the -- is the door closed to considering that 


part of the population again separately as... 


See, the analogy made with Amchitka, I -- was 


that an underground test? 


 DR. MELIUS: That's underground. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: That was underground. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It was an underground test. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And there are a lot of differences 


there between that and these tests in terms of 


the nature of the exposures to the people, so 


I'm not sure that's a good analogy. I'm not 


saying it isn't a good analogy, but the fact 


that it was a weapons test per se I don't 


think, to me, makes the argument that they are 


necessarily the same. 


 DR. MELIUS: I think it was an -- I read it as 


sort of as a -- the dealing with an episodic 


exposure in terms of the facility -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: I understand what you're saying. 


 DR. MELIUS: And it's a little more complicated 


'cause I think another factor, frankly, was 


that people lived on that island, you know -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- didn't have any place -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- else to go, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Yeah, there's always 


differences and --


 MR. ELLIOTT: It was an episodic event. It was 


an underground test. And you know, I certainly 

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don't know the intent of Congress and how they 


wrote that, but what we do know from our 


understanding of the experience, that they sent 


people back down into those -- into the shaft 


to collect information, and certainly there was 


exposure in that experience. 


Now back to your question, Dr. Ziemer, I can't 


recall anything in the rule that says a class 


could not be revisited, that it stands, you 


know, in concrete at a given point in time. 


would think that we would be able to revisit a 


class, particularly with this type of context 


where new information may come to light that 


would change an understanding about health 


endangerment. Certainly if that were to be the 


case, we would have to work with DOL and review 


all of those cases that had been -- that DOL 


had adjudicated under the, you know, previous 


class definition. 


I would only -- I would offer this in -- as a 


further comment. We present to you a 


recommendation that is bounded by our -- the 


words in our rule, 250 days or presence. DTRA 


uses presence. They -- they know where their 


veterans were, which shots they participated in 


I 
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and what their roles were, and they have very 


clear evidence of that. They understand, you 


know -- you know, whether it was a Navy SEABEE 


or whether it was a -- Navy personnel on a ship 


that was stationed and adjacent to the shot, 


whether it was somebody they marched in after 


the aerial shot at Nevada Test Site. They have 


that kind of information. We have a much more 


difficult time in creating a work history for ­

- for the claimants in this program, and 


especially those claimants who have -- have 


left us and passed on and the survivors may 


have never been told what -- what those folks 


really did in a given event. 


MS. SCHUBERT: (Via telephone) Excuse me, is 


this --


 MR. ELLIOTT: You know, I -- you know, I can't 


-- I can't advise the Board on -- on this any 


more than just to say, you know, the way we 


brought it to you was 250 days. If the Board 


says presence is the way it should go, I'm sure 


the Secretary would consider that in his -- his 


deliberation. 


 MS. SCHUBERT: Is it possible for a member of 


the public to ask a question about this? 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on just a minute. We need to 


turn your volume up here. Could you repeat 


that? 


MS. SCHUBERT: Is it possible to ask a question 


of clarification --


 DR. ZIEMER: You certainly can. You certainly 


can. 


MS. SCHUBERT: My name is Sandra Schubert. I 


work for Senator Reid, and I have a question 


about sort of what's being discussed because of 


possible Presidential/residential* impact on 


the discussion about the Nevada Test Site. I 


have talked to a couple of people, including 


within NIOSH, about this very issue about if a 


decision is made on an SEC as it's being 


proposed here and in NIOSH that in our mind I 


would say does not include episodic events such 


as nuclear explosions, and we're hard-pressed 


to find out -- to understand what would be a 


critical event if not a nuclear bomb exploding. 


But the way it was explained to us that that 


would not preclude expanding the class at a 


later date. There was no ex-- no statement in 


my conversations that additional information 


would have to be brought forward, but rather 

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than since it wasn't proposed here, there was 


nothing that precludes it, even based on the 


current information and further discussion of 


it, from being considered at a later date. It 


sounds like the gentleman who just spoke, and I 


don't know who it is, is saying something 


significantly different, that it can only be 


addressed if there's additional information, 


and that is explicitly different than what I 


have been told. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That was Larry Elliott, and let 


him clarify that for you. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah. Yes, ma'am, I was 


answering Dr. Ziemer's question as to whether 


or not if -- if the DTRA information led us to 


a different understanding for PPG and specific 


to that petition. Your question I believe was 


raised with regard to the Nevada Test Site and 


whether or not -- if that class is awarded, can 


another petition come forward to expand that 


class or to --


MS. SCHUBERT: That's not --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- redefine that class, and 


certainly a person -- anybody can -- can 


provide a petition and the basis that they 

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submit with that petition would be evaluated 


and --


MS. SCHUBERT: That actually is not the 


question. The question is whether, based on 


the information in the particular petition 


before the Board, if they consider -- can they 


go forward with an SEC recommendation without 


closing off any other possible interpretations 


of what that cohort may be. For instance, can 


they determine today that they're going to 


grant an SEC based on 250 days or 80 days, 


depending on what you're talking about, and 


then revisit that very same petition perhaps in 


a few weeks to discuss the issue of less than 


the 250-day or the 80-day limit. I have been 


told in conversations just in the last couple 


of days that that can be done. It sounds as 


though what you're saying is no, you would 


interpret that this petition is closed and 


another SEC petition would have to be received. 


Those are two very distinct things, and I think 


it's important to clarify. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, I -- I understand the 


importance to clarify this. The petition that 


we would -- that would be closed based upon the 

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Board's recommendation to the Secretary and the 


Secretary making a designation, that petition ­

- I would need to talk to legal counsel about 


that, but the petitioner can appeal the health 


endangerment designation. We've had one 


instance of that already. There's a panel that 


would -- an appeal panel that would take that 


up. 


MS. SCHUBERT: So you're saying, though, that 


the Board itself cannot make a recommendation 


and keep further discussion open. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: No, they can. 


 DR. MELIUS: And actually --


 MR. ELLIOTT: They can. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I speak? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, and for the Court Reporter, 


I think -- Ray, I don't know if you got the 


individual's name here. This is not Danielle 


Karo who's speaking. 


MS. SCHUBERT: No, I'm just trying to 


understand --


 DR. ZIEMER: This is I think maybe Sandi 


Schubert from Senator Reid's office. Is that 


correct? 


MS. SCHUBERT: Yes, it is. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Sandi, thank you. Jim 


Melius wants to speak to that point, as well. 


 DR. MELIUS: I think in the past we've 


essentially split petitions, and we've made 


determinations on part of a petition or -- 


determination and then we've reserved and kept 


working on another aspect of it -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, we have. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- so we -- so we wouldn't be in a 


situation for someone have to re-- appeal or 


re-petition, and I'd propose that we just keep 


open the question -- you know, explicitly say 


in our letter to the Secretary that we're 


keeping open this issue of the episodic 


exposure and -- and, you know, awaiting further 


information on -- on that, and I think that's 


consistent with what we've done before and 


would allow us to -- to move forward on this 


without, you know, requiring a new petition or 


an appeal or anything. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, certainly you can do that, 


and we have precedent to that effect. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And perhaps --


 MR. ELLIOTT: That's not the question as I 


understood it --

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 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, it -- no. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- from Ms. Schubert. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I assume Sandi's question may 


pertain more specifically to the Nevada Test 


Site. I'm not aware that it would close any 


doors for expanding an SEC, either in terms of 


time, if -- or location or whatever. 


MS. SCHUBERT: I appreciate that very much. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I believe you're right, Dr. 


Ziemer. That is correct. 


 DR. WADE: When we talk about Nevada Test Site 


-- this is Lew Wade -- we need to get this very 


clearly on the record because, again, it is 


import-- an important issue -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- but let's continue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Pete Turcic 


from the Department of Labor has a comment. 


Pete. 


 MR. TURCIC: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. I just 


want to point out that in practice the way we 


apply the 250 days in a situation to be 


consistent with what we do with all the SECs, 


to be consistent, it would in fact be the 83 


days or whatever if someone was there around 

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the clock. 


The caution I want to make is that if -- if the 


petition is approved with something other than 


the 250 days -- and again, in practice it would 


be the 83 days in applying it -- then we may 


have a real legal issue and our hands may be 


tied until the NIOSH reg is revised to allow 


something different. So you know, the point 


that -- the point that I'm making that in 


practice if someone lived at the site, then 


just as we address, you know, issues of 


overtime, we pro rate that so that if they were 


there 24 hours a day it would be the 250 


divided by three in practice. If the petition 


-- and I don't know -- would become a legal 


issue, if a petition is -- a class is 


established with less than the 250 days, we may 


be in a bind to proceed with that until the 


NIOSH reg was changed in order to allow that to 


happen. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Pete, that I think is a 


new piece of information that is important for 


us to hear. I'm not sure any of us realized 


that that in practice was how this was carried 


out. So you are already doing what has been 

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suggested here and weighting the times 


accordingly. Has that actually show up in 


other petitions to be -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Quite a bit. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, it has? Okay. So in practice 


what we're going to see if we approve a 250 is 


in practice the 83 days for these people. 


 DR. MELIUS: But -- can I just ask Pete a quick 


-- but there would be no prob-- problem if we 


explicitly pointed the -- out the need to take 


that into account. 


 MR. TURCIC: No, no problem. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Or that it's our understanding 

that this is how it would be done. 


 DR. MELIUS: Well, yeah, something to that 


effect, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Roy DeHart and then Michael 


Gibson. 


 DR. DEHART: And then we would still include a 


separation for those who would be less than the 


250 days -- or the 83, as the case may be -- so 


that we can continue to pursue that, leave that 


open. Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Michael. 

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 MR. GIBSON: Just a question for Department of 


Labor. If this has been the practice or -- in 


the past that you've pro-rated the time based 


on overtime, et cetera, have you run into legal 


issues and have those had to be delayed until 


legal made a determination and/or NIOSH changed 


the regulations in the past? 


 MR. TURCIC: No. It's not an issue because it 


is 250 days, and then when -- the way we -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: We can’t hear. 


 MR. TURCIC: -- 250 days... 


 MS. MUNN: You need a mike. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Just go ahead and repeat that, 


Pete, so that those on the phone can hear you. 


 MR. TURCIC: No, we have not run into any 

problems --

 MR. ELLIOTT: You have to turn it on. 

 MR. TURCIC: We have not run into -- We 

haven't run into any problems because it is the 


250 days, and then when we apply the 250 days 


we consider each day a normal working shift. 


So you know, if someone was working ten-hour 


days, we'd take that into account in the 


calculation of the 250 days. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. Okay. Thank you, Pete. 

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Other comments or questions? 


 DR. WADE: I'd like to -- this is Lew Wade. 


I'd like to explore, just for clarification 


because these issues are so important. Let's 


assume that the Board votes the motion as we're 


hearing it, and that is, you know, for people 


with the 250 working days, add them to the 


class. For people with less than that, they 


wish the issue to be kept open pending an 


understanding of what DTRA might bring to the 


table from a science point of view. 


I see two pathways open. One is we would 


attempt to do partial dose reconstructions for 


the people who were less than the X days. 


Those claims might be denied, based upon a 


partial dose reconstruction. They could be 


reopened if new information was to come 


forward. Or you could pend the claims. Is --


is there a sense as to which direction you 


would go down? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I don't know that we -- we 


haven't -- we haven't had any discussions or 


thoughts about this in -- in specific, and I'm 


thinking of the -- I think it would really go 


to the type of cancer, perhaps, and what dose 

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we can reconstruct in a partial dose 


reconstruction. And certainly our practice and 


our policy has been, when we can reconstruct 


dose to move a claimant toward a decision, we 


do so. If there's some circumstances or 


outlying information that would lead to a more 


accurate dose reconstruction for decision, such 


as what we're dealing with in construction 


workers right now -- we're trying to put 


together a Technical Basis Document that will 


put them in a better position in their dose 


reconstructions -- we pend those claims. So it 


would just depend upon the circumstances of the 


claim as we would see it based upon our 


practice right now. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, I just want to get that 


on the record. I think that's fine. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, can -- can I just -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- yeah, just add -- I would just 

clarify -- I don't think it's just a question 


of -- of the DTRA information. I think there's 


some other information that we may be -- NIOSH 


may be able to pull together on -- on this 


issue regarding different job classifications, 

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what information's available, what are the 


external doses that -- that people experienced 


there and so forth. I would suggest that we 


develop a -- maybe a workgroup to work with 


NIOSH on -- on evaluating this issue and see 


where we can go with it. I think there's some 


-- some of the detailed information that Jim 


had that I think 'cause of privacy concerns 


can't share in an open meeting, we may be able 


to -- might -- might be helpful, also -- do 


that, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. I'm just taking that right 


now as an idea. 


 DR. MELIUS: Exactly, right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: All right. 

 DR. MELIUS: Can I have another idea? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, another idea. You -- this 

limits -- you've used your quota of ideas -- 


 DR. MELIUS: A long time ago, some would say. 


I would be willing, since I actually started it 


at the last meeting, to draft up one of our 


usual letter motions and get that prepared so 


that we can -- soon as we can get it copied and 


have further discussion, may be -- I -- 


practically speaking, it'll probably be after 

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lunch, but right after lunch we could discuss 


it or whenever there's time if that's -- 


 DR. WADE: We have Board working group tomorrow 


afternoon. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, we --


 DR. WADE: Certainly then, possibly -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Whenever you -- whenever. 


 DR. ZIEMER: If I understand what you're 


saying, you are going -- you are prepared to 


propose a motion to recommend approval of this 


SEC petition. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that correct? 


 DR. MELIUS: Correct. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The exact wording you're not yet 


prepared to present --


 DR. MELIUS: No. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and therefore would defer 


actually making such a motion till later in the 


meeting. 


 DR. MELIUS: Correct. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. So that's just 


our kind of pending thought that we could 


expect a motion to approve to come forth a 


little later in the meeting. Brad Clawson, 

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comment. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I just have a question for the 


Department of Labor, though. You said that 


you've done it in the past, that you've -- 


you've adjusted the 250 days and what -- what 


I'm wondering, especially in this Pacific 


Proving Grounds, how are the petitioners going 


to know how this was performed? Are you 


notifying them of -- of this or -- or how are ­

- how are we -- you know, do we need to propose 


it in a way that we make sure this is done, 


because I think on the Pacific Proving Grounds 


this is very crucial because the people living 


there in this 24/7. 


 MR. TURCIC: What we would do is that for 


individuals who lived there, their decision 


would say that they met the 250-day requirement 


by -- and it would spell out and refer to the 


policy, you know, that -- that says that we 


address and -- and -- you know, how we count 


the days. And so the -- the decision would 


specifically say that. 


Now if there was some -- if there was an 


individual who maybe they lived on-ship 


somewhere, you know, and -- and did their -- 

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did a normal shift, then that would not apply. 


So the decision would be very specific, that 


here's how they met the 250-day -- it would 


refer to the policy on counting the 250 days 


and come up with -- you know, if it come out to 


be 83 days, then they would meet the -- meet 


the requirements and be put into the class. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is there any further discussion on 


the Pacific Proving Grounds? If -- okay, Larry 


Elliott. Thank you. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I think it's important to follow 


up on that a little bit more. I'm going to put 


Pete on the spot here again. For partial dose 


reconstructions, how would the decision read? 


I mean you -- a person who was only there for 


78 days and we do a partial dose 


reconstruction, so how would -- how would you 


advise the claimant in that regard? 


 MR. TURCIC: Their decision would spell out 


that they are not a member of the class and 


explain why they were not a member of the 


class. And then it would refer to the dose 


reconstruction and, depending on what that was, 

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whether it was a denial or an approval. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And if they were, would you 


advise them on a condition (inaudible) cancer 


in the future? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Repeat -- repeat the -- Larry's 


question, if you would, Pete. 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, Larry asked if -- if they -- 


if it was a living employee, would we inform 


them about, you know, if they got an additional 


cancer that they could come back in -- yeah, 


all that's explained in -- in our decisions and 


explained in what their appeal rights are. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. So in essence these 


individuals would learn that they had not met 


the 250-day criteria, just as the ones who do 


meet it are informed, and -- and you would go 


from there. 

 MR. TURCIC: Yes, exactly. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, any other discussion or 

comments? 

 (No responses) 

Then we will have an opportunity later in the 


meeting to address specific motions dealing 


with this -- this proposed Special Exposure 


Cohort. 

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 Lew. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, just to follow up on that, 


Paul. For the petitioners' benefit, the way 


the schedule currently is constructed, we would 


likely take up that motion at 2:30 p.m. 


Mountain time tomorrow, so you know, you could 


adjust your schedule accordingly. That's the 


time we have scheduled for the Board working 


time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, and Danielle, just -- again, 


this is Dr. Ziemer, just to follow up on that, 


based on what Dr. Melius has stated, we are 


expecting a motion to approve the petition. 


 MS. KARO: Uh-huh, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: There may be some caveats in there 


dealing with this weighted 250-day calculation, 


but nonetheless that's what we anticipate. And 


then there would be a Board vote on that at 


that time. 


 MS. KARO: And this Board vote will take place 


tomorrow at 2:30 --


 DR. ZIEMER: Approximately at that time period, 


that's correct. 


 MS. KARO: Oh. 


 DR. WADE: 2:30 Denver time. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Denver time. 


 MS. KARO: Yes, Mountain time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Now Dr. Melius, with his wisdom, 


also asked me if there would be a quorum. I 


answered yes. If any Board members are 


intending not to be here during that time, I 


need to know. 


DR. ROESSLER: I hate to say this sitting next 


to Wanda, but I probably should leave about 


2:15, if that could be moved up a little bit. 


Either that, or if I could leave my vote with 


someone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Actually it would be possible for 


us to put some working session and just trade 


it with the program updates and go at 1:00 


o'clock. 


DR. ROESSLER: That would be great. I'll be 


here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that agreeable? 


 DR. WADE: So with -- without Gen we would 


still have a quorum, but for full participation 


DR. ROESSLER: I'd like to --


 DR. WADE: -- we'll make an adjustment to the 

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agenda and Ms. Petitioner, we would be 


intending to take up this issue at 1:00 p.m. 


Denver time tomorrow. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Danielle, thank you for 


being with us. We're going to recess now for ­

-


 MS. KARO: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- for 15 minutes. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:05 a.m. 


to 10:35 a.m.) 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Liz, you got to holler at 


them. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Okay, I'll try again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The phone lines have been rewired 


here during the break so we want to check the 


phone lines out. Bob Presley, are you still 


there? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Sandi Schubert, are you still 


there? 


 (No response) 


 Okay, perhaps Sandi will be on shortly. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Liz is on, too, or she was. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Liz, are you on? 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Dr. Ziemer, I am on. Is Lew 

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there? 


 DR. WADE: Yes, I'm here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Lew is here. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Lew, Emily is coming back to 


discuss an issue with you and I just wanted to 


give you a heads-up before you guys get started 


that you need to talk to her for at least two 


minutes. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Thanks. 


(Pause) 


NEVADA TEST SITE (NTS) SEC


 DR. ZIEMER: We want to hear from Sandi 


Schubert regarding the Nevada Test Site 


petition, and we need to wait just a moment to 


make sure she gets on the line. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Are you guys waiting for me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Sandi, are you there now? 


MS. SCHUBERT: Hi -- yeah, I accidentally got ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, welcome back. We're just 


ready to reconvene and we want to give you the 


floor first here. You have some remarks from 


Senator Reid's office, I believe. 


PRESENTATION BY PETITIONERS
 
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MS. SCHUBERT: I'll just take a couple of 


minutes. As you guys all know, Senator Reid 


has long supported compensating workers who 


suffer from cancer and other illnesses as a 


result of their work during the Cold War. He 


actually was involved in the passage of the 


EEOICPA when it first passed and is familiar 


with the legislative history and the intent is 


to compensate all those who are deserving. 


He is happy to see that -- that NIOSH is moving 


forward and has initiated the recommendation 


for an SEC for some workers at the Nevada Test 


Site, and if I understand this -- the 


limitations of the definition correctly, that's 


only those employed for 250 days during the 


years of the above-ground tests. He does not 


believe that this definition goes far enough, 


both for the workers there during those years ­

- he also believes that below-ground test 


workers should be covered. And I want to -- I 


sat in, as my of you know, on the Pacific 


Proving Ground conversation and I'd like to 


make a couple of comments that -- some of which 


came up as a result of that, but which we feel 


-- Senator Reid feels strongly about. 

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There's a difference between the recommendation 


for the definition of a cohort between NTS and 


Pacific Proving Ground that I don't understand. 


In the Pacific Proving Ground you recommend 


coverage for people who were or should have 


been monitored. In the NTS site recommendation 


that -- that language is not included and we 


would see that as a huge omission. It is 


documented, the significant problems with 


monitoring at the site, the actual amount of 


monitoring and hiding badges for a variety of 


reasons because people did not want to get over 


certain amounts which would move them into less 


hazardous and less well-paid areas. That's 


documented in the site assessment -- the audit 


of the site assessment and numerous documents 


about the Test Site, so that's one issue that's 


of concern and --


 DR. ZIEMER: Sandi, if I could interrupt you 


just a moment because I'm looking at the -- the 


petition evaluation report from -- 


MS. SCHUBERT: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- from NIOSH, and the proposed 


class definition in fact does include the words 


"who were monitored or should have been 

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monitored." 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Were those the words you were 


asking about? 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay, that is helpful. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, the -- it -- do you -- have 


-- have you been --


MS. SCHUBERT: I actually do have the copy of 


it. I -- I'm -- the copy of it. I will pull 


it up again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I was going to ask if you had 


received the --


MS. SCHUBERT: I don't have a copy of the 


petition itself. I wasn't able --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


MS. SCHUBERT: -- to get. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I was going to ask if you had a 


copy of the petition evaluation report from 


NIOSH, because the -- they do have that class 


definition and have used -- 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- basically identical words 


there, so I want to assure you that that is in 


what we're looking at, at least, as a Board. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay. Okay. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, go ahead then, proceed. 


MS. SCHUBERT: And then the other issue is the 


less than 250 days, and this leads to some 


questions that can wait until after your 


presentations, but we -- there's a concern that 


NIOSH did not recommend that those present 


during the above-ground tests be included in 


the SEC. The rationale for that is not at this 


present clear for us. There's a couple things 


that come to mind. Episodic events are covered 


under the SEC process. It is hard to 


understand what could be defined as an episodic 


event if the explosion of a nuclear bomb is not 


considered an episodic event, so he would 


recommend including all people who worked at 


the site during these explosions of the 


atmospheric tests, and I'm just limiting our 


comments to the time periods you guys are 


looking at. 


In addition, RECA, which covers Nevada Test 


Site workers, is framed in the same way. You 


have to be present at the time of the blast. 


It does not have a 250-day requirement and so 


that's a precedent for this site and those two 


provisions overlap. 

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I would, as a side measure, like to comment on 


that if we're looking at Amchitka as a -- going 


forward and develop SECs, I would think that 


would argue for the Nevada Test Site's below-


ground workers to also be a portion of an SEC, 


people there present and went back during 


drill-backs and re-entry. As you are aware, 88 


percent of all nuclear tests were done at the 


Nevada Test Site and we at this point do not 


have an SEC going forward and many of our 


workers have waited more than 50 years to get 


some sort of compensation. So despite the 


comments, we do not want any of these comments 


to be taken as a reason for not going forward 


today as far as we can go forward. We're 


hoping that the Board will expand the 


definition to include people present during a 


test -- an atmospheric test, and then I may 


have questions as you guys go forward. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Sandi, and 


we'll proceed on that basis. And if you do 


have questions as we proceed, please feel free 


to ask. Dr. Wade has a comment -- 


 DR. WADE: Sandi, I would like -- this is Lew 


Wade and we've spoken recently. I'd like to 

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just -- this morning when we talked about 


Pacific Proving Grounds you talked about some 


discussions you had had with NIOSH and -- 


MS. SCHUBERT: Uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: -- and wanting clarification. I 


think it's terribly important that all those 


issues be on the record here, and that you 


understand the record as it's established here. 


The Department of Labor is here, NIOSH is here, 


and we can have a clear understanding of the 


appropriate issues, and that's really the way 


this Board has done its business and I think 


it's well that we address any issues you might 


have as we proceed in these discussions in an 


open forum. 


MS. SCHUBERT: And one of the issues -- I had 


talked to Dr. Wade about this -- is can you 


partition off a portion of the SEC for future 


discussion without requiring -- and this may 


not have been explicit in the conversations I 


had, but it was our intention -- without 


requiring the submission of another petition. 


Because, as I said just previously, Senator 


Reid does feel it's -- is critical to move 


forward as expeditiously as possible to get 

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compensation for as many people as possible. 


But he also does believe that the definition of 


the cohort needs to be expanded to include 


people on-site during the tests. 


 DR. WADE: And I think the answer to that 


question, as with many questions, are complex 


and it's best answered in light of the Board's 


actions as it takes them, and we can have those 


discussions as appropriate. 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. Let's 


proceed then first with the presentation by 


NIOSH, which is basically the petition 


evaluation report, and Dr. Neton will present 


that. And Board members, you also I think have 


in your folder some copies of the presentation. 


DR. NETON: Good morning again. It's actually 


a good fit to be presenting the Nevada Test 


Site evaluation report right after the Pacific 


Proving Ground discussion because a lot of the 


issues are going to be very similar in nature. 


I am here to talk about the Nevada Test Site 


SEC evaluation report, which is SEC petition 


00055. This is a slightly different petition 


in the sense that it is filed under paragraph 

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83.14 of our SEC regulations, and that is it's 


a petition essentially self-initiated by NIOSH 


in the sense that we could not do a dose 


reconstruction for a claimant. Well, we didn't 


initiate the petition. We determined that we 


could not do a dose reconstruction for a 


claimant; informed the claimant, who was a 


laboratory assistant who worked at the Nevada 


Test Site between 1961 and '64, of that fact; 


and in fact provided him a copy of the 


appropriate forms to file a petition on behalf 


of that class. We did receive a petition from 


the claimant, again under paragraph 83.14, and 


that petition was qualified on February 28th of 


2006. 


In keeping with the requirements of the 


regulation, a Federal Register notice was 


issued on March 17th of this year, with an 


additional class definition of all employees of 


Nevada Test Site for the period from January 


27th, '51 to December 31st of 1962. That may 


be where the confusion arises. That was the 


initial class definition from the petitioner. 


NIOSH modified that class definition to what 


you see on the screen here, which is a slightly 

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91 

expanded version of that to include a lot of 


the standard language that you should now start 


to recognize in some of our class definitions, 


which is DOE or DOE contractors who were 


monitored or should have been monitored at 


Nevada Test Site. And there's always, as 


usual, a proviso in there that -- of a number 


of days aggregating at least 250 work days 


through the period, which can be used in 


combination with other -- other class 


definition -- sites. So that if a person 


worked at another site for a period of time, it 


could be added to the NTS period. One could 


surmise from this definition that we reached 


the point where the default 250-day requirement 


was in order rather than presence, and we'll 


talk about that in a little bit. 


Let's go back and talk a little bit about the 


Nevada Test Site. As all of you I'm sure know, 


it was the primary location in the United 


States for testing nuclear explosives. It 


began in 1951. Above-ground testing was 


conducted from January 27th, 1951 with -- I 


believe it was ABLE was the shot, through July 


17th, 1962, ending with Operation SUNBEAM. All 

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of these activities were conducted about 65 


miles northwest of the city of Las Vegas, 


Nevada on a fairly large reservation 


encompassing I think about 1,400 square miles. 


It's a very large site, a lot of testing done I 


think in that time period. There were I think 


almost exactly 100 shots either above-ground 


atmospheric tests were conducted during that 


time period. 


But in addition to atmospheric detonations, 


there were other safety tests that were 


conducted such as looking at dispersion of 


plutonium and uranium being exploded with 


conventional explosives, that sort of thing, 


some experimental reactor testing. There was 


also work done with development of nuclear 


aircraft engine, that kind of information, so 


there were other activities in addition to the 


above-ground atmospheric testing in the period. 


As -- as you've seen in our presentations 


before, this is two-pronged process established 


under EEOICPA for adding a class, and that is, 


is it feasible to estimate the level of 


radiation number of members of the class with 


sufficient accuracy. And if the answer to that 

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is no, then is there a reasonable likelihood 


that radiation may have endangered -- may have 


endangered the health of members of the class, 


and those are the two guiding principles we -- 


we followed in coming to our determination. 


We took a long look in trying to do the dose 


reconstruction for the case where we realized 


we couldn't, and looked at the potential for 


exposure t the facility. And the extent and 


the distribution of contamination from these 


atmospheric testing tests vary quite widely. 


It depended a lot on the nature of the test. 


These -- these weapons were detonated at 


various heights above the ground -- surface 


shots, shots from towers at 30 to 200 meters 


above ground. There were -- there was one 


where there was a helium balloon attached to it 


and it went up to I think about 450 or 60 


meters above ground. And so in addition to the 


type of shots and the yield of the shot and the 


location above ground, also the exposure to 


these workers would be somewhat dependent upon 


the local weather conditions at the time, which 


direction the wind blew, where the workers were 


in relation to the shot, that sort of thing. 

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Based on the above-ground testing in this 1,300 


acre -- square mile site, most participants 


have the potential for radiation exposure to 


certainly beta and gamma activity as -- as the 


fallout descended on the local region and 


irradiated both their skin and -- as well as 


their internal exposure due to breathing of the 


fallout, and subsequent inhalation -- just like 


Pacific Proving Grounds -- due to the 


resuspension of contamination on the ground. 


Since there were many shots that contaminated 


the surface soil, subsequent shots would again 


pull up into the atmosphere the contamination 


that had been deposited previously and make 


that available for inhalation to the -- to the 


workers on the site. 


 Most personnel at the Nevada Test Site were 


positioned out of the forward areas. That is, 


they did not have people right there, civilians 


in particular. There were some military folks 


positioned nearby. And our --


MS. SCHUBERT: Excuse me, can you speak up a 


little bit? You're starting to fade away. 


DR. NETON: Okay, I'll try. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Thanks. 

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DR. NETON: Most personnel were positioned out 


of the forward area, the civilians in 


particular. And the information we have 


available indicates that personnel in the 


forward area did wear dosimeters, so we 


believe, as with Pacific Proving Grounds, we 


have good indications of what the external 


exposures to these workers were that were in 


the area during testing operations. There is 


no indication that any of those workers 


received external exposures that were anywhere 


near what one would experience from what we've 


defined in the rule as a criticality incident. 


That is an unplanned criticality accident that 


occurred, which would be somewhat similar to 


what was observed at the Y-12 facility -- Oak 


Ridge Y-12 facility in 1958 where people 


received on the order of 200, 300 rem of 


exposure almost instantaneously. We see no 


evidence of that in this cohort. 


 The exposure characteristics of the fallout 


that's coming down are fairly complicated. 


This site, again, was a weapon -- a nuclear 


weapon that was detonated above ground and 


generated over 200 different radionuclides that 

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would have to be reconstructed. There's 


approximately 36 elements, so you have a real 


mixture of radionuclides and we'd have to 


follow that pathway of each radionuclide 


through the body and into the organs, and -- 


and many of them had short half-life so one 


would have to know when the exposure occurred 


in relation to the weapon burst, those type of 


things, extremely complicated exposure 


scenario. 


Again, some of these safety tests dispersed 


mixtures of uranium and plutonium using 


conventional explosives, which are separate and 


apart from the weapons testing activities, but 


certainly did provide an additional exposure 


pathway for workers at the Test Site. 


So what do we have available to reconstruct 


doses for the workers during this time frame. 


As I mentioned, we have a significant number of 


monitoring results for external dosimetry data. 


Over 90 percent of the cases that we have yet 


to complete had external monitoring data. 


That's a slightly confusing statistic. We have 


about 600 cases yet to complete in our -- in 


our files. There's a total of 1,200 cases 

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we've received from Department of Labor for 


Nevada Test Site, so we're about halfway 


finished with the case load. Of those 600 


remaining, 90 percent have external data. 


There are only, though -- I think our best 


estimate right now is about 350 cases that fall 


into this class definition period, so keep that 


in mind. There's about 350 cases that 


potentially would be affected by this decision. 


Air monitoring data was available at some 


locations, but we have very -- almost no 


information on the relation of the workers to 


these air monitoring samples. And in fact, 


very much like Pacific Proving Ground, these 


air samples were taken more to follow the 


direction of the plume rather than to help 


quantify the exposures to the workers on-site 


during the testing period. 


There was no formal bioassay program at this 


facility prior to 1958, and in fact there was 


no routine program until 1961. We have almost 


-- very, very limited bioassay data, and given 


the nature of the variability of these shots, 


the 100 different shots with different 


potential exposure characteristics, we believe 

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that the limited data we do have are 


insufficient to do any type of internal dose 


reconstruction with sufficient accuracy for -- 


for the cohort. 


There was after 1961 -- I believe after the 


atmospheric testing period ended, and starting 


later -- in later years, there are sufficient 


bioassay taken that we believe we can attempt 


to reconstruct doses in the underground testing 


period. 


As with Pacific Proving Grounds, the current 


DTRA approach, in our opinion, is not useful 


for dose reconstructions under EEOICPA for -- 


for principally the same reasons we talked 


about earlier under Pacific Proving Grounds. 


That is, there are issues raised with the 


techniques applied by DTRA to evaluate internal 


exposures from the external badge reading. 


Those responses to the National Research 


Council are underway, but we don't expect the 


results for some time. So at this point we're 


not convinced that these approaches would 


provide any meaningful internal dose results, 


and in particular in light of the requirements 


for sufficient accuracy under EEOICPA. 

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So based on this brief discussion of what's 


contained in the SEC evaluation report, we have 


come to the conclusion that we lack sufficient 


-- lack monitoring, process or source 


information that are sufficient to reconstruct 


internal doses at the Nevada Test Site during 


the evaluation period specified, but we do 


believe we have sufficient information to 


estimate the external and medical exposures for 


this period. As I mentioned we have a copious 


-- not copious -- we have good amount of 


external monitoring data available for 


personnel for this time frame. 


As far as health endangerment goes, we've 


determined it's not sufficient for us to 


estimate these doses with sufficient accuracy, 


in accordance with our requirements of our 


regulation. If we can't put a plausible upper 


limit on the exposure, then we have made a 


determination that the health of the covered 


employees may have been endangered. The 


evidence indicates that the workers in the 


class have accumulated internal exposures due 


to the inhalation of radioactive particulates 


as a result of these episodic shots that 

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occurred, and recurring exposures from 


resuspension of material deposited on the 


ground. And that is the basis for the 


definition of the 250-day exposure requirement 


for this class. 


So the last slide just summarizes pretty much 


what I just said. The period of January 27th, 


'51 through December 31st, '62 we are 


recommending that this class be add-- this 


class of employees be added to the -- for the 


Nevada Test Site workers based on the inability 


to reconstruct doses and the presence of health 


endangerment for the class. Any questions? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dr. Neton. Let's open 


the floor to questions. I think one comment 


before that. Dr. Wade. 


BOARD DISCUSSION


 DR. WADE: Yeah, just a -- for the record, Mark 


Griffon has self-identified that he's 


conflicted on Nevada Test Site. I did not say 


that at the start of the discussion. Mark has 


stepped away from the table, as is appropriate, 


and it's a good example of Board members 


policing their own activities and I thank Mark 


for the reminder. 

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101

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Questions now or 


comments? Wanda Munn and then Dr. Melius, then 

DeHart. 

 MS. MUNN: The workgroup which was looking at 

NTS has had several discussions about this 


particular case. We've not had the occasions 


to have a face-to-face meeting, but I think 


there's general consensus on the working group 


what our recommendation would be. I believe 


that Mr. Presley is on the line and, once the 


Board's comments have been heard, is prepared 


to make a motion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I'm not privy to what the 


workgroup has done and so, Wanda, you may want 


to -- or whoever -- somebody may want to jump 


in here, but -- but Jim Neton, my question is ­

- first question is you really -- you mentioned 


something in your -- sort of in passing during 


your presentation about the ability to 


reconstruct doses I think after 1962 for the 


below-ground testing, but we're not being asked 


to evaluate that. That's not part of the 


evaluation that's presented here. It may be 


something that, directly or indirectly, the 

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workgroup is evaluating in looking at the site 


profile, but -- but just for our understanding, 


we're not reaching any conclusion on that. 


We're only addressing the years prior to 1962. 


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


DR. NETON: We're only evaluating January 27th, 


'51 through --


 DR. ZIEMER: Actually through '62, not -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Right --


DR. NETON: Yeah --


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


DR. NETON: I only offered that as an example 


of why the class distinction is drawn at this 


point. We're making no judgment right now -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, okay. 


DR. NETON: -- as to what happens after that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Roy DeHart. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Paul, this is Bob Presley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, hang on, Bob, just a minute. 


We'll catch you here, just a second. Roy 


DeHart, a comment. 


 DR. DEHART: Jim, during those ten years there 

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103 

were quite a number of shots, as you've alluded 


to. How does the exposure -- what is the -- 


the constituency of the exposures of the people 


who are working there? Are these people who 


would have been working there during the 


interim of the shots, or could people have 


worked there and not been there in that 250 


days when there were no shots? Kind of give me 


a feel for what we're talking about. 


DR. NETON: That's a good question. I mean 


this was an official site. I mean there were 


people who worked there routinely. This was 


not -- not similar to Pacific Proving Grounds 


in the sense a lot of the technical staff flew 


out for the shot, although I think that 


probably did happen with folks from other 


facilities. But I did take a look at what the 


job categories were and -- just to get a feel 


of what we're talking about, and it's what one 


would expect. It's a combination of laborers, 


carpenters, mechanical designers, pipefitters, 


scientists -- so you -- you have the same sort 


of mix that you would see at any DOE facility, 


to some extent -- support personnel as well as 


scientific/technical personnel. 

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104 

As far as -- I did not do an analysis of the -- 


of the exposure periods for these workers like 


I did for Pacific Proving Ground, but I think 


that the -- the thinking is that this was a 


permanent, fixed facility where there were a 


lot of folks who just worked there and happened 


to be present during these shots and were 


exposed, either directly through working, you 


know, in the area of the shot or indirectly as 


a result of being in the plume. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Paul, can I comment? This is Bob 


Presley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Go ahead, Bob Presley on 


line. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Jim's exactly right. We had 


quite a large what we called a permanent party 


that stayed full time. They were -- they were 


employed 24/7 at the Test Site. A lot of them 


lived there at Mercury. In the later years 


some of them lived up on the mesa at what we 


called the forward -- forward operation area. 


But those people would go back and forth on 


their daily jobs through the areas where the 


above-ground tests had been made -- or where 

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105 

they'd been dropped. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Robert. And can 


-- Bob, can you or any of the NIOSH staff 


answer the question as to the relative 


exposures at -- at the Mercury site, which is 


where many of these folks spent their time when 


off duty, versus the duty sites around NTS? Is 


it a lower background area in general, or about 


the same? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Generally yes, it would be a 


lower background area. Some of the problems 


that we had when I was even going out there is 


if you went out in some of the older air drop 


sites and you drove through those sites, you 


would bring particles back on your tires on the 


car. And that was one of the areas they -- 


they waited all the way back till you got to 


Mercury where they had a wash drop where they 


would wash the cars, and at that time, you 


know, you were bringing stuff into Mercury. 


And then out there, the way the wind blows and 


things like that, even though Mercury is about 


-- oh, 25 to 35 miles from the -- some of the 


early drop sites -- maybe not 25 miles -- the 


wind blows out there seriously at times of the 

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106 

year and it could have blown some of the 


particles back over to that area. So there is 


a -- there is a possibility of contamination. 


DR. NETON: I would also add to that that we 


have very poor information about the location 


of the workers relative to space to where these 


shots occurred. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Speak up, Jim, I can't hear you. 


DR. NETON: We have very poor information about 


the relative location of these workers at the 


facility, as well. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Is this being taken into account 


in any way in ascertaining what a work day 


would be? 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's actually what I was leading 


to because -- and Bob Presley's already alluded 


to the fact that simply traversing the site on 


the way to a duty station might expose one to 


elevated areas. Do we know, for example, on 


the personnel monitoring -- at what point do 


they wear their personnel monitoring? Do they 


take it back to the Mercury site or do they 


leave it somewhere? 


DR. NETON: I believe -- I believe that the 

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badges were issued at the entrance to the 


facility. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


MS. SCHUBERT: I can't hear that. I'm sorry, 


the badges were issued where? 


DR. NETON: I believe that the badges were 


issued at the entrance to the -- to the site 


itself. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So once you're on-site, you had 


your badge 24 hours. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct, you got -- you 


got your badge when you entered at Mercury and 


you wore your badge -- or you're supposed to 


have it with you 24/7. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, so --


MS. SCHUBERT: Can I -- I have -- I have a 


question about the wearing the badges 24/7. 


There is significant literature, including the 


person who was the lead health physicist at the 


site for most of the time, indicating that that 


in fact is not what occurred. And in our 


discussions with Site workers, wearing badges 


24/7 was the exception as versus the rule. Why 


didn't you guys look at some of the materials, 


when you were analyzing this situation, that 

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indicate that these badges weren't being worn, 


including I believe that there's a book by the 


former head health physicist that details a lot 


of this. 


DR. NETON: Well, I think -- the answer to that 


is we had sufficient evidence that we can't do 


dose reconstructions with sufficient accuracy 


based on the internal dosimetry exposure alone, 


and because of that the class would be added, 


we -- I mean the class should be added, and 


that we would use the external dose results 


that were available as measured on the badge 


and do partial dose reconstructions to the 


extent possible. 


MS. SCHUBERT: And I -- I mean I -- I'm not 


sure that actually answers my question because 


the problem is these badges. I mean you guys 


say you have badges for 90 percent of the 


claims, and I'm not sure what years that 


includes, but there's significant evidence and 


your own audit report indicates that that 


actually is not the fact that went on at the 


site. 


Can I ask a question about partial dose 


reconstruction? So when you do a partial dose 

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reconstruction and look at just the external 


dose, how do you account for the portion of 


internal dose that you cannot estimate? 


DR. NETON: Well, we don't. Since we -- since 


we have determined that we can't estimate it, 


there would be no internal dose assessed. 


MS. SCHUBERT: So what you guys are saying is 


that although -- for instance, I think 


everybody would agree that anybody on the site 


under 250 days who was present during a bomb 


probably got an internal dose, but because you 


can't estimate it, you're not going to 


calculate it as part of a dose reconstruction? 


DR. NETON: Well, yes. I mean if you can't 


estimate it, you can't estimate it. 


MS. SCHUBERT: If you can't accurately estimate 


dose, doesn't that put people into an SEC as 


versus putting them into a situation where you 


ignore the dose you can't estimate? 


DR. NETON: Well, we are putting them into the 


SEC. The issue I think you're getting to is 


whether the duration of employment should be 


250 days or less. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Well, you're not putting anybody 


under 250 days into the SEC based on this 

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particular recommendation -- 


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


MS. SCHUBERT: -- yet the acknowledgement is 


still out there that internal dose 


reconstruction cannot be done for these people. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. This is not unique to the 


Nevada Test Site. This situation has arisen at 


almost all the other SECs that we've evaluated. 


I mean there's a -- there's a issue here. If 


you -- you know, if you add a class because you 


cannot reconstruct some component, then it's 


very difficult for us to turn around and say 


well, we'll just go and reconstruct it. I mean 


that's sort of an inconsistent logic, we 


believe. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Brad Clawson has a question 


or comment. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I guess I was just looking in the 


250 days, you know, we're talking that they 


were away from Mercury, which is basically 25 


miles away from it. Some of the information 


that I've looked into it, we've had -- we've 


had plumes from some of these explosions that 


has gone as far as Utah and Idaho, and that's 


quite a bit more than what Mercury was at. 

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It's getting back to the 250 days. I -- I 


personally feel that we need to look at this 


somewhat like the Proving Grounds where those 


people were living there. It's -- it's just a 


question that these -- these people were there 


all the time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, to follow up that -- two 


things. First on Sandi's question about the 


partial dose reconstructions. In some 


discussions yesterday the Board had asked for 


some further information on how those are done 


and what NIOSH's approach is, and so we will be 


discussing that issue in -- in more detail as 


it pertains really to this site and all the 


other SEC sites. And so -- so I think we'll -- 


we'll be able to evaluate that. 


In terms of follow-up to -- to Brad's question, 


I guess my question here is I think it's a bit 


more complicated than the Pacific Proving 


Ground 'cause you -- you -- was no place else 


to live and to -- or to go, essentially. Here 


it's a much more complicated site in terms of 


the type of facilities and so forth, and 


determining whether someone -- you know, how 

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many hours -- hours they spent there or 


whatever I think is going to be more 


complicated. 


And I guess I also have some questions on the ­

- the implementation of the -- the class 


definition here, given the number of -- of 


different sites. Are we essentially including 


everybody -- I mean how will we implement this 


definition, particularly the, you know, "should 


have been monitored" portion of it. And also I 


think the question of implementing the question 


that Brad raised about people living out at 


that site. 


DR. NETON: Okay. The "should have been 


monitored" I think -- it's our opinion that 


people were badged at the entrance to the 


facility, so I think that would -- that would 


cover pretty much everyone that's in the class, 


you know, is my opinion. 


I'm sorry, was there a second part to that? 


 DR. MELIUS: The second -- the second part is ­

- is -- is there going to be a way to identify 


people that live -- that lived out at the site? 


I mean how are we going to -- 


DR. NETON: Okay. 

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 DR. MELIUS: As opposed to Pacific Proving 


Ground where I think you would -- so -- some 


ways there's an assumption based -- you know, 


there's no place to go. Here there are places 


to go, it's a lot farther, but -- 


DR. NETON: I'd have to --


 DR. MELIUS: -- it's a long drive to... 


DR. NETON: I'd have to refer that question to 


maybe the Department of Labor or -- if they'd 


be willing to opine an opinion here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So the question has to do with to 


what extent do we know individually whether 


people stayed there 24/7 versus living off-site 


and going home at night? Is that --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I think the -- that's the 


question. Are we going to be -- if we're going 


to take into account people's living at the 


site and making some assumptions about their 


exposures based on that, then are we going to 


be able to identify them. 


 MR. TURCIC: We would have to have probative 


evidence that an individual did in fact live 


there, you know, so -- I mean because there 


were a number of people who traveled, who 


commuted daily. 

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 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: So we would need evidence, and it 


would be just like any other factual 


information, we could -- you know, either 


through records or affidavits, a number of 


ways, but we would need some evidence that an 


individual was there, you know, and did -- did 


in fact live there. And then we would, you 


know, again, apply the process where we would, 


you know, count 24 hours a day for that -- that 


individual. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Could I follow that up a moment, 


Pete? Does -- do the folks at Labor then 


automatically, in this case, consider if the 


person is on the site 24/7 then that gets the 


appropriate weighting, even though they're not 


in the work area, they're there at the Mercury 


site. 

 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, because --

 DR. ZIEMER: 

 MR. TURCIC: Because the Mercury site is on the 

site. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, it's -- it's in the gates. 

 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, that's exactly how we would 

apply that. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 DR. MELIUS: So procedur-- procedurally, we 


approve this class, all those 250 days or more 


would be approved. Those less than 250 days, 


would Department of Labor communicate with them 


saying that, you know, we need additional 


information. If they could provide 


information, for example, they worked for a 


contractor who, you know, for 90 days was at, 


you know, during certain time period was out on 


the site, they lived on the site, then that 


would be the type of information you'd be 


looking for? 


 MR. TURCIC: Exactly. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, okay. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Is -- is that information 


readily available for over 50 years ago? 


'Cause in our discussions that information is 


almost impossible for these guys to get ahold 


of. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley again. Can 


y'all hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Robert, can you answer that? 


 MR. PRESLEY: They had what they called a 


housing authority on site. I do not know the 

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date that it started, but the housing 


authority, when I was out there, kept up with 


everybody and where they stayed. They gave you 


a telephone number. They delivered your linen 


-- linens and things like that, and it -- when 


I was out there during the below-ground tests, 


the housing authority was in full work. There 


ought to be some records still out there on 


that. 


MS. SCHUBERT: But I mean you -- you said you 


were there during below-ground, not above-


ground. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


MS. SCHUBERT: So does anybody know if those 


records exist for the atmospheric tests? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I don't know. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I guess we don't know the answer 


to that at the moment, and I think what Pete 


Turcic is saying is that Labor would in fact 


have to ascertain that information. In the 


absence of information, what happens? What's 


the default? If they cannot verify, how do you 


-- do you, for example, say well, we'll assume 


worst case, that they were on-site, or do you ­

-

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 MR. TURCIC: It would depend -- like I'm sure 


that there were probably certain occupations -- 


it's my understanding there were certain 


occupations that would work, you know, a -- 


four days, then they would travel. And so if 


they fell into those kind of occupations which 


we have information, then, you know, we would 


assume that. But other than -- other than 


that, we would need some kind of information 


that, you know, verified that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. 


MS. SCHUBERT: So if I understand correct, if 


there are no records that exist for this, which 


happened more than 50 years ago, the default 


would be to assume they did not live there. 


 MR. TURCIC: We wouldn't necessarily just need 


records. I mean we could use affidavits and, 


you know, other -- other sources of 


information. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In other words, if the individual 


provided an affidavit that that's what they 


did, you would --


MS. SCHUBERT: What about the individual's 


survivor -- family member? 


 MR. TURCIC: As with any affidavit we look at, 

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you know, it's -- you have to look at the 


source and you have to weigh it and see how 


much probative value, you know, that affidavit 


has. 


MS. SCHUBERT: I mean in general if it's like a 


-- generally it's a child or a surviving 


spouse. Those are the survivors. How is that 


generally weighted? I mean if somebody sends 


something in saying my father talked to me all 


his life about living on the site. 


 MR. TURCIC: We could use, you know, 


information, you know, such as that to say that 


they lived at the site. It -- again, it would 


all depend on, you know, the case-specific 


information. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And the weight of that affidavit 


versus --


 MR. TURCIC: Exactly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, okay. Thank you. Dr. 


Melius, do you have another comment? 


 DR. MELIUS: No. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Brad Clawson? 


 MR. CLAWSON: I have a question for the 


Department of Labor there. We keep hearing 


about this 250 days, and I know as many 

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petitioners have voiced before and stuff like 


that, is there any way for them to know that we 


are looking at adjusting this time period, 


looking at them living on there? Because a lot 


of people may say well, geez, I was -- I was 


only out there for three months or something 


like that and so I'm not going to apply because 


I'm not under -- I'm not under that 250 days. 


Is there something, an avenue of which we can 


help educate the petitioners on this? 


 MR. TURCIC: Well, first of all, since -- since 


it's currently not an SEC, it wouldn't matter 


how many days. You know, if -- if people had 


the illness, we tried to get to them and, you 


know, encourage them to file a claim. There --


you know, that is a good point, and now that 


this is an issue, we will look at, you know, 


the best way to get that information out. It 


is on our web site in our procedure manual, but 


we'll look at ways to -- you know, to better 


explain that to the claimant population. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Further questions or comments? 


MS. SCHUBERT: This is Sandi Schubert --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Sandi. 

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MS. SCHUBERT: -- and I do have one further 


question --


 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. 


MS. SCHUBERT: -- and it goes to the less than 


250 days and the conflicts with RECA, and you 


guys have talked about legislative intent 


previously. It seems pretty clear that 


Congress in RECA made it clear that they 


intended people who were present during above-


ground tests to be covered. I did not look up 


the legislative history for this particular 


conversation. I actually did not know that 


this was going to be the decision till a couple 


of days ago. It seems as though there is -- 


that you guys talk about sort of consistency. 


You're creating a double standard here for 


certain employees. Why in some circumstances 


would your rationale be that in above-ground 


tests it's deserving of compensation in one 


circumstance and not in another, and how do you 


guys know the amount of exposure somebody would 


have gotten from the above-ground tests when 


you've admitted that you cannot reconstruct 


dose? 'Cause I'm hear-- I've heard different 


numbers, 300 to 400 like at Y-12, anything over 

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100, I'm not sure where this all comes down. 


Senator Reid is concerned that this -- that 


people there during -- present during these 


tests be covered and compensated. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I don't know if -- Jim, if you're 


prepared to answer that. In part, of course, 


one of the reasons you have the Special 


Exposure Cohort is because you can't 


reconstruct the dose. I think both the Agency 


and at this time the Board, we are operating 


under our current rules, which spell out a 250­

day -- I think any chan-- it would appear to 


the Chair that any change that this Board may 


wish to recommend, and this is aside from the 


weighting issue, becomes more of a generic 


problem, not just a site-specific problem, and 


would have to perhaps be handled separately as 


a -- as a -- an issue down the road. That 


doesn't preclude, if that occurred, revisiting 


that part of the group that didn't meet the 


250-day requirement at this time. 


Dr. Melius, you have additional comment? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I would suggest, and sort of 


parallel to our discussion on Pacific Proving 


Ground, that we also follow up on the Nevada 

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Test Site in a similar way. And I think we --


as you suggested, Paul, I think we need to, you 


know, re-evaluate this issue and then determine 


what's appropriate for going forward. Is there 


something that can be done within the current 


regulation, does -- do we need to recommend 


that the regulation be changed, do we -- or is 


there something that would have to be done -- 


done through the law, a change in the law. So 


I mean I think -- again, I would propose that 


we go forward and sort of evaluate that issue 


for -- for this site, also. We need to look at 


it. That should be part of our recommendation 


and that we keep this petition open in the way 


we talked about for the -- same way we talked 


about for the Pacific Proving Ground. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And at the moment the Chair simply 


identifies that as a possible issue. That's 


not an action item at the moment, but simply an 


issue that we must keep in mind as we move 


forward from this point. 


 Brad Clawson, another comment. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I just -- I'm needing a point of 


clarification because in reading parts of the 


site profile and so forth like this, you have 

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stated that there was universal badging that -- 


at Mercury and at the work site, but if I 


remember correctly, in -- universal badging 


didn't -- didn't start till what, '57, 


somewhere in there? 


MS. SCHUBERT: '58. 


 MR. CLAWSON: '58. So -- so, to me, it -- it 


brings up an issue there that there wasn't that 


much badging --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 MR. CLAWSON: -- before that time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Clarify that, Jim? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I -- that -- I think -- 


you're true -- it's true the badging probably 


didn't start until that time frame. But again, 


we've gone through and we have external 


dosimetry results for 90 percent of the cases 


that have been forwarded to us that need to be 


reconstructed. We have confidence that we know 


what the external exposures were. 


 DR. ZIEMER: For those actual cases who have 


made claims. 


DR. NETON: For those cases that have made 


claims. And with that -- with that type of -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Does that suggest these are people 

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from the tail end of the -- later than -- 


DR. NETON: That's a good question. I don't 


know the answer to that. But I'm -- I'm 


somewhat confused. If we're -- we're proposing 


to add this class based on internal exposure 


criteria, and if we were to add and say that 


now that we -- we can't do external dose 


reconstructions alone, that would leave us no 


recourse for external dose reconstructions, as 


well. We think -- we think the badges that -- 


data that we have are valid and we would use 


them to the extent possible to reconstruct 


those exposures. 


Now if you're speaking to the issue that people 


were not wearing badges that were exposed to 


criticality events close up and personal, I -- 


I'm -- we find no evidence that that occurred. 


 MR. CLAWSON: No, I'm just -- I'm just -- it 


kind of bothers me a little bit that we're 


saying that we've got 90 percent of the badges 


and so forth for these people, but the badging 


didn't even start till basically '58, so we've 


got a time frame from '51 up to then that I -- 


I just question. 


 DR. ZIEMER: LaVon, you --

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, I have clarification to 


that. Actually badging did begin earlier than 


that (inaudible) actually did badging. --


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on just a minute -- hang on 


just a minute, the mike is not -- is that mike 


on? It -- yeah, identify for the record for 


our court reporter by name here, too, Lavon. 


(Pause) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Try it again. No. 


 DR. WADE: Why don't you come up here and... 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay. Yeah, this is LaVon 


Rutherford with NIOSH. Actually badging began 


actually in the early years. LANL was doing 


the badging in the early years. REECo took it 


over in 1958, so we do -- that explains why 90 


percent of the badging was -- occurred -- based 


on the claims we had. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So in fact there was badging done 


in the early years is what -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: (inaudible) 


 MR. CLAWSON: What -- what -- was it universal 


badging or was it --


DR. NETON: No, he's saying it's not universal. 


There were -- there were monitoring programs in 


place and there were badges, but it wasn't 

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universal, issued at the gate, as we'd 


indicated previously for the entire facility. 


It apparently started in '58. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Further 

questions or comments? 

MS. SCHUBERT: This is Sandi. I have one --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Sandi. 

MS. SCHUBERT: -- last question. I'm sorry, 


could somebody explain to me how an episodic 


event is being defined such that explosion of a 


nuclear bomb doesn't qualify? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, let the Chair take an 


initial stab and then Jim Neton will help me 


out. It's quite true that the detonations 


themselves, in everybody's mind, is an episodic 


event. I think we're talking about episodic 


exposures, where the exposure itself is a very 


high value in a very short period of time, and 


you certainly get that in criticality accidents 


such as the Y-12 criticality that Dr. Neton 


referred to earlier. 


In the case of individuals who are at -- not at 


forward sites or are either shielded or back 


when the detonation occurs, they do not get 

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this high dose, even though the event has 


occurred, simply because they are protected by 


distance or shielding. They do get a small 


amount of dose from that 'cause it's not always 


100 percent shielding, but not an episodic 


amount. I think -- there's probably not a 


critical number, but it's not hundreds of rems 


like you get in a -- or rads that you would get 


in a criticality accident. Certainly they get 


exposure during that brief time period, but 


it's not up in that sort of episodic range. 


Jim, if you would add to that and -- 


DR. NETON: I think you've done the question 


far better justice than I probably could have. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I don't know if that answers the 


question, Sandi, but to understand the 


difference, we're talking about really the 


doses received by the persons. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Does the reg talk about episodic 


exposures or episodic events? I thought the 


language was event. 


DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton, and I'm trying 


to recall, and I don't believe it talks about 


episodic. I believe it talks about discrete 


events --

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MS. SCHUBERT: Uh-huh. 


DR. NETON: -- such as a criticality. I'm 


using recall, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll get the wording here -- 


DR. NETON: -- Dr. Wade is looking it up. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- on this. 


 DR. WADE: Might I read -- and I'm reading from 


the -- the SEC rule -- I can give you the 


citation, it's 83.13 -- these things are so 


hard to find --


MS. SCHUBERT: the rule. 


 DR. WADE: -- 83.13(iii), for cases of 


employees that may have been exposed to 


radiation during discrete incidents likely to 


have involved exceptionally high level 


exposures, such as nuclear criticality 


incidents or other events involving similarly 


high levels of exposures resulting from the 


failure of radiation protection controls. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. So we've been using the 


word "episodic events" here kind of in a 


generic way. It's not the language of -- of 


the regulation, but nonetheless, it has to do 


with the total dose received very -- in a very 


short period of time in these so-called 

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discrete events. 


 Okay, further questions or comments? 


MS. SCHUBERT: I thought the second half of the 


question was how do you determine the dose 


received from the atmospheric tests so that you 


know it's not a large amount? 


DR. NETON: Well, if we're speaking of the 


internal exposures, we know that that was 


delivered via particulate that was injected 


into the atmosphere and filtered down over 


time, and we have a sense -- from knowing 


information about fallout -- that it was not of 


the level of the dose received from a, as Dr. 


Wade read, a criticality accident. 


In general, internal exposures are -- are not 


delivered at the levels of external exposures 


like a criticality event. One inhales these 


materials and one can only breathe about 20 


liters per minute, so you -- it'd be difficult 


to inhale enough material in such a short 


duration of time to reach the levels -- to 


reach the thresholds that are indicated in the 


regulation. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Further questions or 


comments? 

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130

 (No responses) 


Okay, I'm looking to see where we are in the 


scheme of things here. We -- we at a point 


where we can consider motions on this 


recommendation? 


 MS. MUNN: I think Bob's prepared to do a 


motion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Robert, yes, you've been 


waiting on the side there. I forgot, since I'm 


not seeing your -- your tent here. So please, 


Robert Presley. 


 MR. PRESLEY: As Chairman of the working group, 


I'd like to make a motion that we accept this 


SEC petition as-is, and also that we go back 


and look at this 250-day things change. Can we 


put that in somehow? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. The Chair is going to rule 


that there are two motions there, one of which 


is to accept or to recommend approval of the 


petition, and I would understand that to be 


somewhat similar to the previous case since 


there's a weighting -- already a weighting 


issue and we'll let Jim speak to this. 


DR. NETON: I just have a minor point of 


clarification. You should probably accept the 

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evaluation report as written rather than the 


petition, because they are different 


definitions. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct, the evaluation 


report, I'm sorry. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So the motion is to accept the 


evaluation report. I'm not sure what that 


means in this context then. 


DR. NETON: The definition of a proposed class 


as contained in the evaluation report. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Is that -- is that correct, 


what you're saying, Bob? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I suggest that we sort of 


transform that into one of our usual letters -- 


as a friendly amendment to Bob's motion and 


that we, you know -- do that. And I think it's 


going to very much parallel the Pacific Proving 


Ground letter, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, well --


 DR. MELIUS: -- I'd be glad to write something 


up and give it to --


 DR. ZIEMER: I guess the Chair is really asking 


the following. The motion that Bob has 

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presented, in essence, is a much narrower 


motion. It's a motion to accept the definition 


of the class. It doesn't -- it does not itself 


recommend that -- I guess it doesn't recommend 


that we recommend that to the Secretary. Is 


that right, Bob? You're just recommending the 


acceptance of that definition? Or are you 


recommending the acceptance of... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, since Jim had brought that 


up, I -- I really think we ought to go ahead 


and accept the petition, 00055. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, that clarifies it then. I 


think in that case, if it's agreeable to you as 


the mover, we will put that motion on the floor 


and have it seconded. And if it's agreeable, 


defer action so that we can get it worded in 


the more technical wording approach that we use 


with all of these petitions, and I think Dr. 


Melius is offering to so word that, if it's 


agreeable. 


 MS. MUNN: I second. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It's agreeable. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's agreeable with the mover, and 


it actually doesn't re-- the motion didn't 


require a second since it comes from the 

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workgroup, but -- so if it's agreeable, we will 


defer an actual vote on this motion that -- the 


motion is the -- the intent is to recommend 


approval of the petition. We want to get the 


motion in the appropriate words so that we can 


act on it formally and we can actually take 


that action tomorrow afternoon, as well, I 


believe. 


 DR. WADE: Starting at 1:-- probably at 1:30. 


 DR. ZIEMER: After the action on the other SEC 

petition. 

 DR. MELIUS: And in --

MS. SCHUBERT: Can I ask for clarification? Is 


there going to be an -- is this just to accept 


it as written or to accept it as written and 


deal with the 250 days? 


 DR. ZIEMER: The motion is -- as it will come 


before us tomorrow will be to accept -- or to 


recommend approval as written. It will also 


include the idea that the 250 days will be 


weighted, as we talked about for the previous 


motion on the other -- on the Pacific Proving 


Ground site. 


We will have to separately deal with the issue 


of what had been called discrete events and 

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days less than 250 as a separate generic issue 


that covers more than either of these sites. 


So the Chair's interpretation of what action 


has been called for is approval of this 


recommendation. Our approval would go to the ­

- or our recommendation for approval of this 


class would go to the Secretary for his 


appropriate action. 


Sandi, did --


MS. SCHUBERT: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- did that clarify it or make it 


worse? 


MS. SCHUBERT: It actually clarified it. I 


greatly appreciate that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: And Bob, I'll e-mail you the 


letters tonight. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, thank you, Jim. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So without objection, we will what 


amounts to table action on this. I'm not going 


to formally call it tabling. We'll just defer 


voting till we get the motion worded in the 


standard fashion that includes all the caveats 


as to when the motion -- or when the letter has 


to go to the Secretary and any additional words 

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that we may need to help us clarify that 250­

day weighted day issue. 


 DR. WADE: If I might ask for a clarification. 


I also take it from the discussion that the 


Board will take up tomorrow how it wants to 


deal with the issue of -- of criticality events 


or exposures and the result-- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Discrete events. 


 DR. WADE: -- discrete events and -- and the 


result of that will be to keep that issue open 


and alive as we proceed forward. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I believe that -- that's certainly 


my understanding of it, and that -- I think 


that allows us to proceed with these two 


petitions without -- and allows the opportunity 


for later changes, if needed, without halting 


their progress by another issue coming into 


play. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I just -- it -- it -- we can 


discuss the details of this tomorrow, but I -- 


if I recall right, our past practice has been 


to -- in our letter to the Secretary is to 


document that we are, you know, only dealing 


with part of an SEC petition or, you know, 


we're not ruling fully and that we're keeping 

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it open and -- and that's what we had talked 


about with Pacific Proving Ground. I think we 


would do the same with the Nevada Test Site. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I would expect wording to be quite 


parallel in both of these cases. 


Thank you very much. Thank you, Sandi, for 


being with us. You're welcome to stay on the 


line, but we are going to move ahead here for 


the moment. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Thank you all very much. 


 DR. WADE: And Sandi, we -- this is Lew Wade. 


We will be taking up this issue again tomorrow, 


starting at 1:00 the broad discussion. We'll 


do Pacific Proving Grounds first and then 


Nevada second, so if you're looking for a more 


precise estimate, 1:30, quarter to 2:00. But 


if you were back with us at 1:00, that would be 


good. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay. Thank you very much. 


(Pause) 


CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCUSSION
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. The next item on our agenda 


is the conflict of interest discussion. 
I 


don't know if we'll be able to finish this 


before lunch, but we'll perhaps get started on 

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it. Dr. Wade will kick this off and then we'll 


see where we are, time-wise, at -- at -- when 


we get to the noon hour. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Paul. I'm going to be 


referring in my discussions to information that 


should be available to you in terms of a draft 


conflict of interest policy. Attached to that 


is also this wonderful chart -- flow chart that 


sort of describes how decisions will be taken. 


I'll be referring to the text, not to the flow 


chart, in my comments. 


Let me just make some introductory comments and 


then get into my explanation of the materials 


in front of you. 


There has been a great deal of discussion -- 


and there will continue to be, believe me -- in 


our life of conflict of interest. Early on 


when NIOSH had issues raised to it -- and 


again, it's been handed out to you again, some 


material submitted by a friend of the program, 


Richard Miller, raising conflict of interest 


concerns, and we've put that before you again 


just to remind you of some of those early 


concerns. 


Early on there was an attempt to try and put 

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band-aids on conflict of interest policies and 


deal with issues as they came up. The NIOSH 


Director, several meetings ago, decided that 


the only way to effectively deal with this was 


to really take it back to whole cloth and to 


look at putting forward a policy that -- that 


was consistent into itself and represented 


NIOSH's overall issue on -- and overall policy 


on conflict of interest, with the understanding 


that once this policy was vetted and agreed 


upon it would form the basis of many of the 


specific policies that would have to be in 


place for other entities that are covered and 


involved in the program. So this is an attempt 


to try and develop that over-arching policy 


that is consistent into itself and would form 


as the ba-- would form the basis of other 


policies that would be developed. 


What we're doing today is bringing you the 


latest draft of that policy. We would be very 


interested in hearing Board comments on it, and 


possibly the Board could take this issue up 


tomorrow and offer a general opinion of the 


Board. Short of that, we would welcome 


individual Board members' comments on the 

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policy as it's been presented to you. We'll be 


collecting up those individual comments, and 


I'm sure that at the next Board meeting you 


will see the next draft of this policy for the 


Board to consider and -- and react upon. 


I will tell you that as NIOSH moves forward 


with this general policy we are trying to live 


true to it as we move forward. We understand 


that it'll be a document that's continuing to 


evolve, and we will attempt to live forward -- 


to live consistent with the draft that we have 


in front of us. We think it is important that 


we not wait for this process to be over to try 


and engender some of the principles contained 


in the policy. We understand that there will 


be further review and further drafts and -- and 


we'll remain current with those drafts as we 


move forward. 


So let me try and walk you through the policy 


as -- as quickly as I can. And it all begins ­

- and I'm referring, again, to the document 


that you have in your books as a draft. It 


really begins with a statement of purpose, and 


I'll refer you to the third paragraph of the 


statement of purpose. This is where NIOSH sort 

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of lays out its concerns in the area. And it 


says (reading) This statement of policy 


balances two competing values. First, NIOSH 


wants to ensure that it obtains all available 


factual information about radiation doses 


received by workers having potential benefits 


under the EEOICPA program, from all relevant 


sources including those individuals having any 


past or current employment-related financial, 


professional or organizational relationship 


with the Department of Energy, an Atomic 


Weapons Employer, contract operators of DOE 


facilities, or with other parties having a 


stake in the general or particular outcome or 


outputs of the Program. Second, NIOSH wants to 


ensure that all scientific judgments contained 


in key Program function documents that are made 


by NIOSH employees or its contractor's 


employees about dose reconstructions are free 


from potential or actual conflicts of interest. 


So again, that paragraph tries to define these 


two competing values. We want to make 


judgments that are free from conflict of 


interest, and yet we want to make those 


judgments in the full light of information 

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available. And this sort of establishes the 


tension that exists as one approaches a 


conflict of interest policy. 


 Secondly, I'll address the issue of covered 


entities, and that's really quite well-stated 


in section 2.0 of the document, and the 


shorthand code is that covered entities are 


really anyone involved in the Program. We go 


through a litany there that -- that talks about 


DOE, NIOSH, other Feds, contractors and 


subcontractors. We really intend this policy 


to -- to cover all entities involved in the 


Program. 


 The third piece I'll speak to are actions that 


are required by the policy, and there I refer 


you to section 3.0, and in the heading you see 


the two action paths that result from the 


policy. One is disclosure and one is 


exclusion. Okay? If you read through the 


words and terms of disclosure, we think that 


everyone associated with the Program needs to 


disclose information that is consistent with 


the answering of the questions concerned in 


section 3.0. I'll talk more about those 


questions, but everyone needs to disclose. 

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The second path is exclusion. Based upon the 


answers to the question in 3.0, the judgment 


could be made that people have a conflict of 


interest; and if so, they are excluded from 


certain actions. So again, remember, two -- 


two pathways. Everyone discloses. If it's 


determined that you have a conflict, then you 


are excluded from certain actions. 


 Now what those actions are are listed in 


section 4.0, and they're defined as key Program 


functions. So again remember, if you are 


determined to have a conflict, you are then 


excluded from certain actions, and those 


actions are listed as key Program functions. 


can go through them very quickly. Obviously 


those key Program functions include dose 


reconstructions. They also include site 


profile document owners, people who are 


responsible for site profile documents. Let me 


read you that section because I think it shows 


the breadth of what we're trying to accomplish 


here. 


(Reading) A site profile document owner is 


responsible for coordinating and drafting all 


site profile documents, ensuring all relevant 


I 
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information is captured in the document, 


evaluating the information, and establishing or 


setting forth findings or conclusions. The 


site profile document owner is the primary 


writer/editor of the site profile document. 


The site profile document owner has an 


affirmative duty to seek out all relevant data 


and to objectively evaluate all relevant input, 


with no special consideration given to the 


source (site expert or subject expert). 


All narrative or quantitative input to the site 


profile documents must be clearly attributed to 


each source, whether it appears or is relied 


upon within a site profile document -- whenever 


it appears or is relied upon within a site 


profile document. In addition, both site and 


subject experts shall be clearly identified on 


the approval page of every site profile 


document to which they contributed. 


And lastly, a site profile document owner is 


responsible for any and all revisions to a site 


profile document. 


I read that because it sort of defined the 


breadth of what we're trying to do there, and 


what a document owner is responsible for and 

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what their duties are. And it also brings in 


the fact that we're not only talking about the 


original issuance, but we're talking about all 


revisions. 


It goes on in 4.3 to talk about Special 


Exposure Cohort petition evaluation document 


owners. We well know what they are, and I 


won't read you those words. 


In 4.4, Technical Information Bulletin owner, 


and again we know what Technical Information 


Bulletins are. They could refer to a site or a 


number of sites. And again, you can read the 


specific words of 4.4. 


4.5 takes us to a slightly different area, and 


now we're looking at reviewers of key Program 


function documents. This is where you, the 


Board, appears for the first time. Again, we 


are very cognizant of the fact that we need to 


guard against conflicts of interest where 


people with conflicts performing the review of 


key Program function documents. 


And finally, in 4.6, we're concerned again that 


these conflicts not be present in people who 


approve -- have approval authority on the 


documents listed above. So it's not only the 

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authoring and the owning of the documents, but 


the reviewing of them and the final approval 


authority. All of these things are considered 


under this policy to be key Program functions. 


And again, people with conflicts would be 


excluded from performing those functions. 


Let me go on. In section 5.0 we list, for 


completeness, non-key Program functions. These 


are again functions that could well be 


performed by people with conflicts. And again, 


I won't read that to you except to refer you to 


section 5.3, which is the first time that the 


Board is specifically called out in terms of 


exclusions and remedies. What 5.3 tries to say 


is that there are certain issues that the Board 


takes on that Board members can take on even if 


they have conflicts, but there are other 


activities that the Board takes on where those 


conflicts would cause exclusions. And I think 


you all know what they are. For completeness 


purpose, I'll very quickly go through them. 


If you are conflicted on a particular site, 


then you cannot be the individual responsible 


for overseeing the review of that dose 


reconstruction, the dose reconstruction for 

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that site. 


If you are conflicted at a site and there is a 


site profile discussion, you can be at the 


table. You can participate in that discussion, 


but you can't make a motion or vote on that 


site profile. 


And if you are conflicted at a site where there 


is an SEC petition, then you have to absent 


yourself from the table. You can't participate 


in the discussion at all, save as a member of 


the general public during the public comment 


period. Obviously you can't move or you can't 


vote. 


So then we come to the most difficult of the 


questions here, and that is who is determined 


to be conflicted. Again, section 3.0 goes into 


that. What I would like to do is to very 


quickly give you a snapshot of six groups that 


are conflicted based upon the policy as it's 


currently written. 


I'll remind you that for the documents we're 


talking about, it will normally be a site 


associated or multiple sites associated. There 


will also be a time frame associated with it. 


If we're looking at a Special Exposure Cohort, 

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it covers a particular time frame. So I will 


be referring to specific sites and particular 


time frames as I go through my comments. 


So now to a brief explanation, and hopefully a 


simple one, of the six pathways that could lead 


to a determination of a conflict. 


The first is really quite -- quite 


straightforward. If you currently work for 


DOE, then the judgment is that you are 


conflicted. 


Second, if you ever worked at the site in 


question, then you are judged to be conflicted 


at that site. 


Okay, those two are fairly straightforward. By 


work -- we define work in the document. It 


needs to be defined in this case, and I'll read 


you that brief definition of work. The term 


"work" means employment related to managerial, 


scientific or occupational safety and health 


matters for that operator and for that 


operator's subcontractors related to atomic 


weapons activities at the site. So that's what 


we mean by work. So if you worked at the site, 


then you are judged to be conflicted. 


Now the third of the six paths I'm going to 

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define to you starts to become a bit more 


complex. You would be conflicted if you 


currently work for the present or past operator 


of the site. So again, if you current-- if you 


currently work for the present or past operator 


of the site, then you are judged to be 


conflicted. Okay? 


Number four -- and again, these get increasing­

- increasingly more complex. You are judged to 


be conflicted if you worked for the operator in 


the past and during the time that the operator 


operated the facility, and during the time 


frame of the key Program document. Okay? So 


there are three things there. You worked for 


the operator in the past; you worked for them 


during the time that the operator operated that 


site; and you worked for them at -- during the 


time that covers the time frame of the document 


under consideration. And lastly, your work had 


impact on that site. 


Now remember, if you ever worked at the site, 


you're excluded, so now we're dealing with 


situations where you might have worked for that 


operator, not at that site but at some other 


site, and these are the tests that would be 

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used to determine if you were indeed 


conflicted. 


 The fifth test is you worked for DOE in the 


past. Remember, if you work for DOE now, 


you're conflicted. You worked for DOE in the 


past and your work for DOE included substantial 


involvement with the site in question during 


the time frame in question. And we have a 


number of people who worked for DOE. The test 


that they -- that worked for DOE in the past. 


The tests that they were taking were did you 


have a substantial involvement with the site in 


question during the time frame in question. 


That would be the test used to determine if you 


had a conflict, given the fact that you were a 


past DOE employer. 


And lastly comes to what I think is the most 


difficult -- and in fact, in my considered 


opinion, the most ill-defined of the tests -- 


and that refers to section 3.11, and I refer 


you exactly to that. This was an attempt by 


the authors of the document -- and these people 


worked extremely hard -- to deal with a wide 


range of issues, and I'll read, (reading) do 


you or did you have any financial, supervisory 

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or subordinate relationship with DOE, the 


operator, any former DOE or operator employee, 


employee survivor or attorney representing any 


of these parties. 


What that's trying to get at -- if, for 


example, you did expert witness work, be it for 


DOE or be it for employees or plaintiffs, then 


you would be found to be conflicted under this. 


If you had a financial relationship, or even if 


you gave testimony and did not -- were not 


funded for it, were not paid for it, if you did 


that under the supervision, quote/unquote, of 


an attorney who was working that issue on 


either side of the bar, then you would be 


considered to be conflicted. 


This also goes to issues of subcontractors and 


their relationships. In fact. 3.11 will be the 


place you would go to start to understand 


whether Salient, the subcontractor associated 


with SC&A, would be found to be conflicted, 


given the information we talked about in terms 


of SC&A's involvement with the Nevada Test 


Site. This 3.11 captures a great deal of 


information and needs to be thought through, 


and we certainly welcome Board or individual 

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comments on 3.11 -- 3.11 is really sort of an 


"all others" kind of a category. There are 


many situations you could imagine, and we 


wanted to be sure that we covered all of them. 


I offer you that as a construct. I welcome 


your comment. 


The last part of it, and then I'll stop this 


long monologue, deals with compliance, and you 


can read compliance in section 6.0. I won't 


paraphrase it for you. But again, we -- we 


think the entities involved, the corporate 


entities, the -- the government entities, are 


responsible for monitoring compliance. We also 


think individuals are. But we think overall 


NIOSH has a responsibility for determining 


verification with the policy, as practiced by 


everyone involved. 


So this is a -- I'm sorry for the long-winded 


discussion, but I wanted to try and give you a 


context of the document in front of you. I 


find it a meaningful document. I didn't write 


it myself. I think it's an attempt to try and 


deal with this issue on a -- on a broad basis. 


I appreciate the fact that it will raise issues 


that need clarification. We wanted to put this 

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draft before the Board. We welcome comments 


from the Board collectively, and we certainly 


welcome comments from the Board individually. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Lew. So at 


this time, this is a draft. It's -- at least 


in part is in effect, though, already. There 


are certainly many pieces of this that you've 


described that are already in effect. 


You -- NIOSH is seeking individual comment or 


Board comment on this? 


 DR. WADE: Both. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Both? 


 DR. WADE: And based upon whatever we receive 


from this meeting and subsequent to this 


meeting, we'll bring another draft to the Board 


at its June meeting. Possibly then the Board 


might want to spend more time deliberating. I 

leave that to the -- to the desire of the 

Board. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. What we can do at the 

moment is take a few comments or questions. We 

may want to return to this tomorrow at some 

time, if -- if the Board has particular issues 


that they think need to be addressed -- 


addressed collectively. Some of you may have 

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individual issues as -- in terms of how this is 


interpreted. I certainly will myself because I 


see a new paragraph in here which will greatly 


impact me, but -- I may not be qualified to be 


on any of these. 


Okay, Jim --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- Jim Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: I -- I way -- I -- I actually 

think we need to sort of digest this a little 


bit in order to have full comments. I think 


your comments were helpful and I understand 


some of the intent of things that I didn't 


understand before, and I still think there's 


some rewording and I have some questions on how 


extensive some of these are as they would apply 


to certain types of -- of individuals. 


My question is -- is where are we actually in 


the -- with the implementation of this? I 


think Kate Kimpan at our last meeting, or maybe 


the meeting before, had talked about that -- 


that they were -- ORAU was in the process of 


implementing their new policy. Then we had 


another policy that -- that came out. Now we 


have a sort of a third policy that -- that's in 

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place and we also have the question of -- of 


retrospectively dealing with a large number of 


-- of documents and -- and , some of which are 


actively under consideration by the Board where 


-- where this policy is -- current policy 


you're proposing is -- has been -- been 


violated, and how do we address those and has 


there been any thought to that and -- and I 


guess -- so I -- my question is, one, what is 


the current implementation; and secondly is 


what are we going to do about going back in 


time. 


 DR. WADE: Well -- and I'll answer the question 


and then certainly Kate or any of the other 


contractors is welcome to come forward. We're 


in fairly consistent communication with the 


contractors on this policy as it evolves, and 


we are asking the contractors to review not 


only their current work and their current 


staffing, but also conduct a retrospective 


review of work that they've done and report to 


us on conflicts that they find existed relative 


to the policy as we're pursuing it and remedies 


they intend to follow. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Kate, did you want to 

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comment? No. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Never pass up an opportunity to 

comment. 

 MS. KIMPAN: Lew characterized it exactly 

right. As you know, it's quite unusual in any 


world to take a new reformed policy or -- not 


on? 


(Pause) 


 MS. MUNN: That microphone is apparently 


worthless. 


(Pause) 


 MS. KIMPAN: I think Lew captured -- Lew 


captured it very well. I'd like to -- this is 


all on the record -- but just state clearly, 


there was a COI policy in force with which we, 


the ORAU team, believe we were in compliance 


throughout the beginning of this project, so I 


don't want any of this to create the impression 


there was no policy. There was a policy in 


force. The policy's currently changing. 


Although it hasn't been finalized, what Lew 


said is accurate. We are looking both to 


assure our compliance with this policy, the 


draft that you're looking at -- there've been 

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some changes between the prior draft Dr. Melius 


referred to and this one -- but the 


identification of who can do what role on these 


very important tasks is quite consistent 


between this and the immediately prior 


iteration. 


So we're doing two things as the ORAU team. 


For all going forward documents that we're 


involved in, in all aspects of our project, 


we're assuring compliance with this version of 


the policy -- meaning when someone via this 


draft is identified as a conflicted individual, 


there are certain restrictions upon the role 


that they can take in a going-forward way. 


There are some challenges to that 


operationally, but it gives us no heartburn at 


all. When the policy is finalized we'll come 


forward with what we believe is our analysis of 


what we've done and what we've done to assure 


the good quality of our work. 


Although it is quite unusual, we're also going 


to take this policy and view things done under 


a prior policy through the lens of this policy. 


We want to do that for a number of reasons, and 


Lew stated them. We want to make sure that 

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folks are satisfied with the good quality of 


our work, and also our forthrightness about 


declaring who had what roles and positions. We 


believe that all of our prior work and all of 


our current work is very good quality. It goes 


to a bunch of different authors, different 


quality assurance methods applied; many, many 


hands and eyes are on these proj-- products. 


One of the things that we're going to do for 


any document created under the prior policy is 


to review, under this policy, whether any of 


the folks in key positions would have had 


problems under the current policy. If we find 


that to be the case on a document that's 


already been completed, we will conduct a full, 


independent review of the findings in that 


document. Let me say I expect our findings to 


stand, but we will provide an independent 


review for someone who's not conflicted or not 


perceived to be conflicted to assure that every 


finding, every item in that document that can 


affect what is going to be done on a worker, on 


a document, is considered. 


For the going forward documents that are either 


under routine revision or not yet completed, 

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when we found folks to be not in compliance 


with the current policy, we've endeavored to 


change them out immediately and put a document 


owner in place that, as Lew read, has very 


rigorous responsibilities upon them to assure 


that the conclusions in that paper are 


accurate. We're doing that going forward. 


 For all documents -- present, future and past ­

- we will go through, as a separate exercise 


from this, and do full annotation and 


attribution. As Lew said, even if somebody is 


totally fine in the position they're in on a 


document, it's very important that the Board, 


that NIOSH, that the public know who suggested 


what things in a document, where the findings 


are from, what the scientific basis of any 


conclusions or direction or tabular information 


we have is. 


So for all documents going back, whether there 


was a conflict or not, we will go through every 


one of our documents and we'll provide -- we 


will provide both attribution and -- and as 


full a sunshine as we can get on how those 


documents were developed, what the process were 


-- was, and who the contributors were. 

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In some rare instances where we've found that 


the current policy would not have been in 


effect prior, we will also conduct an 


independent review of those findings. But even 


if there's no problem at all, if everyone on 


the document was totally appropriate under the 


old policy and the new one, we'll still go 


through and do full annotation and attribution. 


We want to make sure that these documents are 


viewed as credible by the folks that they're 


affecting, the folks that are using them, by 


this Board and others. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Kate. Mark has 


a comment. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, you might want to stay up 


there. Just to -- I just want to clarify. Is 


-- under this current proposed policy, if a 


document owner -- a site profile document owner 


or a Special Exposure Cohort petition 


evaluation report document owner -- can they be 


a site expert or subject matter expert? I'm a 


little confused if they're exclusive or if they 


can overlap. Can a person be an owner and also 


identified as a site or subject matter expert 


for the particular report? 

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 DR. WADE: Well --


 MS. KIMPAN: This policy -- I'm sorry, go 


ahead. 


 DR. WADE: Well, I mean -- I think -- I think 


the answer is that they cannot be a site 


expert. They cannot be conflicted and be a 


document owner, but they could be a subject 


expert. 


 MS. KIMPAN: And an individual could be --


 Mark, an individual could be in both 


categories, a site and subject expert, and that 


would have different constraints depending on 


what project they were working on. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. KIMPAN: I could be both a subject expert 


because I know a whole lot about a thing, but I 


might have gotten that knowledge at a 


particular site --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. KIMPAN: -- so my subject expertise could 


be used, although clearly identified and 


declared. As the site expert, I would not be 


in a position to own that document. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Brad Clawson. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Maybe -- maybe I didn't hear you 

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quite right when you was bringing this out. 


You were saying that you were going back and 


looking at some of the past documents that 


you've already done. Now is this going to be 


independent from your group or is it you doing 


it yourself? 


 MS. KIMPAN: The review of what the -- the -- a 


lot will be done on all documents that went in 


the past, Brad. Our group will -- my group, 


the folks that work for me, will go through and 


do the annotation and attribution. The folks 


that developed the documents and were part of 


very large teams are going to need to provide 


information to someone I've assigned to oversee 


that part of the project. So we'll go through 


each document and assure that we're saying 


where we got our conclusions, what our 


scientific findings were based upon. That'll 


go on for every document. 


If there's a document that we have already 


produced who -- which was produced under the 


prior policy, in compliance with the prior COI 


policy, but under this new policy with 


different aspects and restrictions the person 


would not be an eligible document owner, if we 

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have a situation where a component or an entire 


document was owned by someone under the current 


-- the not-yet-implemented policy would be seen 


to have a conflict, that document will go into 


a special category where not only will the 


attribution and annotation occur on that 


document, additionally we will conduct an 


independent scientific review of the findings 


in that document. Will it be somebody that 


works for me? It'll be somebody I hired to do 


that, so yes, it will be a member of the ORAU 


team for purposes of doing this. It will not 


be, for what it's worth, likely the same -- it 


-- it won't be the same individuals about whom 


there are questions, certainly. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I -- I guess -- I guess the point 


I'm looking at is this Board and everything 


else in it and its transparencies and stuff 


like that that we've tried to -- to bring 


forth, I want -- it -- to me, it kind of sounds 


like you're looking at yourself again. And if 


you've already got a conflict of interest, 


you've got another one there. Myself, I'm 


wondering if there's an outside group that 


could basically, you know, over-check your 

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conflict of interest. I know we have legal 


counsel that checks into us quite -- quite 


frequently and they're independent from us, and 


I was just kind of getting the feeling that 


you're looking over your own -- your own self. 


 MS. KIMPAN: We -- we will have -- for what 


it's worth, we will use both resources at NIOSH 


and our own. When you're talking about a legal 


determination, are we trying to figure out if 


Kate Kimpan is conflicted at a certain place, 


if need be we'll rely upon legal help -- 


NIOSH's legal help for that. 


 For the discussion that I'm doing about the 


review of documents, we see that as a 


scientific process. And after the annotation 


and attribution are completed, we believe that 


we can field a proper review team. I -- I hope 


that answers. I -- I think I understand what ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, he's asking really whether 


it should be an external, independent review 


team --


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- versus an ORAU team. 


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but then it will come to NIOSH. NIOSH will 


review it, then it will come to the Board. The 


Board will review it. It's quite possible the 


Board will ask its contractor to review it. 


So Kate is just talking about the internal ORAU 


step that goes first. Then it will come to 


NIOSH for independent review and eventually to 


this Board. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, that's --


 MS. KIMPAN: We expect a lot of sunshine, 


Brad. We -- we want our findings, our 


documents to truly be beyond refute, so 


hopefully everyone with an interest will review 


these documents as -- as we refine them and fix 


anything under this new policy that might have 


differently under the prior. 


This -- is this also a time where I should 


declare yet another --


 DR. ZIEMER: No --


 DR. WADE: No. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- no, not really now. Jim 


Melius, you had another comment or question? 


 DR. MELIUS: No, I -- thank you for that 


clarification. I think it's very helpful and ­

- but I would just ask the -- two things. One 

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is that we try to -- on the documents and the 


sites we're currently actively looking at, some 


of the SEC sites and so forth, that -- that we 


try to get the -- on -- if necessary, the 


appropriate document owner in place and -- and 


up to speed on this because I think we need to 


-- needs to be clear that -- that there's that 


kind of review and ownership going on. 


And secondly, to the extent that we can -- that 


it's feasible to get this new annotation done, 


I -- that's going to be -- I realize a large 


task and I hope we could prioritize it in a way 


so that we start with documents that we're 


currently looking at 'cause I -- that type of 


transparency I think would be very helpful to 


the -- to the process where we'd know where 


things came from -- you know, what the sources 


were and so forth. And I think it's very 


helpful for all of us in looking at these 


documents. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Thank you, Dr. Melius, very 


helpful comments. I also offered at the last 


Board meeting, in this same vein, that as we 


develop information -- of course the policy is 


yet unfinalized, but as we develop our 

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information and our analysis, we expect to 


provide to OCAS to bring to you all or provide 


directly to you all what we believe we've found 


so that you can review our findings under this 


upcoming new policy and assure that our 


conclusions about who was and who wasn't 


conflicted in past documents are the same 


thinking that you all would have. So as -- as 


soon as the policy's finalized, we'll have an 


analysis close behind. 


We're looking at that very carefully right now. 


We're not not working on this, but until the 


policy is finalized it would certainly be 


premature to analyze a final answer on who 


might have had a conflict in the past. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- but I think the annotation will 

be very helpful to sort of redressing some of 


these past issues, just again, the 


transparency. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Will be very helpful, regardless 


of the policy, yeah. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Any -- any guidance the Board -- 


we of course -- as Lew said, we're working very 

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closely with NIOSH as we prioritize how we're 


going to do the past review. We'd certainly 


welcome any -- any direction and instruction on 


how y'all would like to see that occur, as 


well. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. John Mauro, a brief 

comment. 

DR. MAURO: Very brief. I noticed a lot of -- 

I listened carefully, Dr. Wade, on -- a lot of 


the language and discussion we just heard had 


to do with an individual and ownership as a 


expert resource. However, I guess I didn't 


hear too much about what I would call 


organizational conflict, which goes to -- 


toward a corporation that has a contract and 


not -- not so much the individual now, but more 


which contracts that they may hold as an 


organization might in fact create a conflict 


situation. I think that's perhaps even more 


important or an even larger scale type of 


question, and I did not -- I have to admit, I 


did not hear too much about organizational 


conflicts. I may have missed it, but I 


certainly will look very carefully at that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Does that need to be addressed in 

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a separate --


 DR. WADE: Right -- why, yes. See, what we're 


trying to do is to put together the 


intellectual piece that's the foundation for 


everything. That would then be taken and used 


to develop the specific policies that would 


deal with our contractors and subcontractors. 


And in that situation, the tenets of this 


policy would be embodied in terms of any 


corporate limitations or responsibilities. We 


also do try to deal with it in terms of the 


financial independence in section 3.11. But 


I'm aware of the point you raise, John, and we 


would like this to be the document that would 


be used to develop those particular conflict of 


interest policies that would relate to our 


corporate entities. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Richard 


Miller is approaching the mike -- 


 DR. WADE: Richard has standing. 


 MR. MILLER: Process question, which is -- Dr. 


Ziemer, I understand that on the agenda there's 


a public comment period this evening, but I 


would presume that that should be largely 


reserved for folks from Rocky Flats. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we announced earlier that 


actually will be open to others, as well, but ­

-


 MR. MILLER: Well, let me just get to the 


point, which is that this particular issue 


revolving around this conflict of interest 


policy may have been well-vetted between 


contractor ORAU and NIOSH, but I have to say 


that this could probably merit from some public 


input, as well --


 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. 


 MR. MILLER: -- and if there was a way on the 


agenda that that could be either provided for 


now or at a future date, depending on when this 


is going to be finalized, I'd appreciate it 


'cause I have a long list of questions that 


grow out of the complaint we filed on Paducah 


back over a year ago that seems to be driving 


some of this policy. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, understood. Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: I think, Richard, it'll be our 


intent when we meet in Washington, which is an 


appropriate place, to have the comment -- 


public comment period address specifically to 


this issue. 

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 MR. MILLER: And so therefore the -- this 


conflict of interest policy won't be put into 


effect until that point in time. Is that 


correct? 


 DR. WADE: It certainly won't be finalized. As 


I mentioned, we are trying to work within the 


tenets of it as we move forward. We don't want 


to wait until the policy is finally approved. 


We are trying to live consistent with it as we 


deal with our different contractors and 


subcontractors. 


 MR. MILLER: Well, at least in one material 


respect, and I don't want to turn this into 


that comment period, but at least in one 


material respect, unless one can clarify this ­

- maybe it's my misreading of this document, 


but this policy is in fact far less protective 


of -- of conflicts of interest than the one 


that is currently in effect that Dr. Howard I 


think sort of patched up, which was the 


original ORAU policy, to deal with the Paducah 


conflict issue that arose and he took some, you 


know, interim steps. My understanding as I 


read this is is that site experts as well as 


subject experts, neither of these fall into the 

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category of what one would call a key project 


function, and so if they're not key project 


functions, if a site expert and a subject 


expert are not key project functions, then 


exactly how their COI applies here I guess 


could benefit from some clarification because 


right now that restriction's in place and 


that's why I ask. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And we're not actually 


going to get into that discussion right now, 


but keep that on the back burner. We'll have 


opportunity to revisit this issue even tomorrow 


if --


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- needed and have further 


discussion, and then I think I heard that it 


could be on the agenda for the June meeting as 


a specific item. 


We need to recess for lunch, and let's do that; 


return in an hour and we'll pick up from there. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:15 p.m. 


to 1:35 p.m.) 


DOL’S PROCESS FOR DETERMINING CLAIM ELIGIBILITY
 

FOR AN SEC CLASS, MR. PETE TURCIC, DOL
 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we're ready to reconvene the 


afternoon session. The first item on the 

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agenda this afternoon is a presentation by Pete 


Turcic from Department of Labor. This deals 


with the DOL's process for determining claim 


eligibility for an SEC class. So Pete, welcome 


back. 


 DR. WADE: Possibly as Pete's getting his notes 


arranged, we do have two Board members on the 


telephone. Is that correct? We have Dr. 


Lockey and Mr. Presley on the phone? 


 DR. LOCKEY: Yes, that's correct. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley; I'm on the 


phone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Good, just wanted to make that 


clear. 


 MR. TURCIC: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. I just 


want to thank you for giving me the opportunity 


to give a presentation to the Board to try to 


better explain, you know, what we do and how we 


do it in order to put a -- an individual 


claimant into a SEC class. And to do that, let 


me just real briefly explain some of the normal 


claims processing. 


And basically what happens is, you know, we -- 


we have to make a determination of whether 

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there was covered employment, and that -- that 


may sound simple, but oftentimes that's not as 


simple as it may appear because you have many 


subcontractors and we've developed a lot of 


methods of trying to get information where 


there is very little or no records at all 


available. And then we also have to make a 


determination of a covered condition. 


Now once the District Office -- once our 


District Office receives the claim, then we set 


up a case -- we create a case in our case 


management system, and it's assigned to a 


claims examiner. And the first two things that 


the claims examiner has to do is employment 


verification, and normally that is more of a 


just a general employment verification, wa-- 


you know, was the individual at work at a 


particular site. 


Now in the SECs, the newer ones, sometimes we 


have to go into a little bit more, you know, in 


depth to try to put them in a specific location 


in a -- in a certain site. And -- but the same 


techniques and the same kind of issues, you 


know, arise there. 


So the claims examiner then proceeds with 

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employment verification, and the way that's 


done, it's -- we take what the claimant is 


claiming, the employment, and we send that to 


either DOE -- the law basically requires DOE to 


verify employment for us, so it'll go to DOE 


and -- or there were a number of what we call 


corporate verifiers and these corporate 


verifiers are corporate -- corporations, 


usually involved the AWEs but sometimes at a 


DOE facility, where we'll go directly to the 


corporation and they'll provide employment, you 


know, information. 


A lot of times that, you know, is not 


sufficient, and we may go to Social Security 


Administration, and then we also have a 


contract with the Center to Protect Workers 


Rights, and they have access to a lot of -- 


specially for contractors. They have access to 


a lot of information such as pension records, 


other information, dispatch records for unions, 


and they'll search those records and oftentime 


can find and verify employment that, you know, 


we were unsuccessful. Those are really our, 


you know, toughest of the -- of the cases. 


And then we also use things like affidavits 

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that -- from coworkers. And again, when it 


comes to affidavits and things like that, the ­

- you have to weigh the totality of the 


evidence. And depending on who the affidavit 


is from and different situations, there may be 


-- it may get different weight. 


Now once we ha-- make a determination of 


employment, then you know, we have to also 


determine whether -- the medical condition, and 


the same types of things happen in -- in making 


those determinations. 


Now the way that happens is once the claims 


examiner gets -- you know, what the claimant 


filed, submitted, then the claimant'll get back 


-- it's -- it's a back-and-forth with the 


claims examiner and the claimant. And I need 


to stress here that unlike most workers comp 


systems, this is a non-adversarial process. 


And by that I mean there's not, you know, one 


side trying to refute what, you know, a 


claimant is claiming. And so basically the 


claims examiner is working with the claimant 


trying to perfect that claim as much as they 


can, and then looking at the totality of the 


evidence, make -- make their decision. 

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And I think a good point is that, you know, 


claims -- claims processing is really all about 


drawing lines. I mean that's -- you know, the 


claims examiners have to draw lines and look at 


the -- the total case and then make a judgment 


and, you know, each case is, you know, very 


different. 


Now one of the things that we need to do, and 


we do, is we have to give the claims examiner 


guidance. And we do that on each of these SECs 


because, you know, without that there just 


would be no uniformity. So you know, when you 


have nearly 400 claims examiners doing this 


work, we spend a lot of time developing our 


policy guidance and our bulletins. 


Now as for the details of actually making a 


determination at a SEC, first let me -- I'll 


talk about just briefly the statutory SECs. At 


Amchitka, for example, what was required was 


presence. But then it went further and said 


the individual had to have been exposed to 


ionizing radiation. Well, in that case there 


was very few records that would indicate any 


kind of exposure. So in our policy development 


there, we looked at it and did some research 

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and found that after the first shot there was 


breakage to the surface and therefore we made a 


policy determination that presence equated -- 


after the first shot equated exposure to 


ionizing radiation. 


At the -- at the gaseous diffusion plants the ­

- what is required is that they worked at the 


gaseous diffusion plant for an aggregate of 250 


days, and I did -- you know, explained that we 


do modify that in determination of the 250 


days. But it also went on to say they had to 


have been monitored or in an occupation that 


had similar exposure to those that were 


monitored. And so there again we had to make 


policy determinations. And where we came out 


on those was that after the -- after 


radioactive material started showing up at 


those facilities, then we assumed -- because 


under current practices everyone working there 


would have been monitored, we assumed that 


everyone should have been monitored and that's 


how we apply that. 


Now there's a lot of other issues that go along 


with that, though. Some other issues are 


because subcontractors are included and so are 

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people providing services, and those kind of 


issues raise -- you know, are difficult to 


adjudicate and -- but we had to adjudicate 


them. And to give you some examples, you know, 


we had a lot of claims from the railroad 


workers, people who worked on the railroads, 


and in combination with some legal opinions we 


came out that the mere delivery of goods does 


not constitute providing a service. So with 


the railroad workers what we need to do is if 


they merely brought materials to the site, such 


as coal, and loaded and unloaded it, they are 


not covered. If they did maintenance or 


construction, then that made them eligible. 


And the reasons we've got to do these things, 


if you didn't have -- if we didn't apply these 


-- I mean if you stop and think about it, I 


mean you have everything from people who come 


in and fill the vending machines -- I mean that 


is a subcontractor. 


And another example that we ran into, we had 


people from Metropolis that would go to Paducah 


-- chemists -- that would go collect samples, 


take samples, and then take them back to be 


analyzed. There again we had to develop policy 

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and came down that that is a covered function 


and those -- those folks were covered. 


We ran into another problem with -- there were 


quite a few government -- employees of other 


government agencies, and what we had to 


adjudicate there was if they -- if they were 


doing the function that their agency was 


mandated, because of that mandate then they are 


not covered. An example there would be a Post 


Office. You know, DOE did not pay the Postal 


Service to have a Post Office at the Nevada 


Test Site, so they would not be covered. On 


the other hand, there were a lot of government 


agencies that were in fact a subcontractor of 


DOE, so if there was that relationship -- and 


to get into that, you know, we have to go back 


and look at Memorandum of Understandings and, 


you know, things like that and make a 


determination in each case. 


And then, again, I discussed a little bit 


earlier about how we count the 250 days. 


One of the guiding principles that we use, 


especially in these new SECs, is that, you 


know, we need to follow what the designation 


is. And that's why if you remember at the St. 

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Louis meeting I think Shelby made a point that 


it's -- it's very important for the Board, in 


your recommendations, to be as precise as you 


can in both the definition of the class, but 


then also as to the rationale for the class 


because then that starts playing, you know, 


very important role in what is done. 


 But Mallinckrodt, for example, the earlier -- 


the earlier years, because the designation -- 


and again, Mallinckrodt designation is on 


space. And from our point of view, your -- 


it's a lot better to have a designation, you 


know, defined as some space as opposed to some 


function. Functions become extremely difficult 


as -- as I'll get into in a minute. So at 


Mallinckrodt it was a matter of the 250 days 


and -- but then the issue on the -- the reason 


for the early years of Mallinckrodt was the 


lack of data. So in -- in that case, since it 


was a lack -- a total lack of data, there were 


no -- for the non-specified cancers, there was 


no option for any dose reconstruction, so what 


we had to do there -- and again, we would only 


look at the cases -- the non-specified cancer 


cases that only had time in the early years and 

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didn't go into the later years because, you 


know, then they would fall into -- into that 


category. And -- but those, and I think there 


were a total of three cases that ended up that 


were denied because they were non-specified 


cancers and there was no ability to do any dose 


reconstruction. 


 Then Mallinckrodt the later years, again -- it 


was identical, the 250 days at that location, 


and -- with the difference being that those, 


the non-specified cancers, those cases remained 


with -- with NIOSH for the partial dose 


reconstructions. 


At Iowa, and we did have a -- again, that was 


designated by space, but we did have a problem 


there, and the problem -- we were able to 


resolve it. The problem was the evaluation and 


everything was done, and the reason -- the 


exposures that could not be dose reconstructed 


was Line 1 plus all those number of other areas 


that was in parentheses. Well, that didn't get 


into the designation, and that became pretty 


difficult to -- to deal with. Now the way we 


were able to resolve that was that in looking 


at everything there we were able to say that 

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182 

those other areas -- the yard, the firing pits 


and all that -- really had become synonymous 


with Line 1, so therefore we were able to 


include those areas, you know, without, you 


know, having to go back and have another SE-- 


another SEC established for them. 


Linde, again, is just the 250 days. And then 


the earlier -- the Y-12, the uranium enrichment 


activities and other radiological activities, 


we're still working and trying to resolve all 


the policy issues in that bulletin, and this 


one is very difficult because the designation 


is based on functions. So what we're 


struggling with and the way we're handling that 


is that -- we're looking at occupations kind of 


in three different groups. I mean we -- we 


have to, because it is a function and not a 


location. And you know, the first group are 


those occupations that we have identified that 


are just assumed to be, you know, in that class 


based on the occupation -- things like the 


Calutron operators, chemical operators, 


recyclers, Calutron cleaners, things -- you 


know, occupations like that. So -- so those 


are pretty easy. 

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Where it gets more -- more difficult is then 


there's a group of occupations where it's most 


likely they were not involved and not included 


in the class. And those would be things like 


clerical, accountants, cement finishers -- 


these are actual cases that we have that we're 


-- we're dealing with now -- cafeteria workers, 


couriers, machinists. And the instructions and 


the way we handle those, we would develop it 


with the claimant. We would go to the 


claimant, give them the opportunity to, you 


know, provide information that they were in 


fact involved in radiological -- uranium 


enrichment or other radiological activities. 


And the instructions to our CEs for that type 


of job is that in those we're going to need, 


you know, some kind of specific evidence that 


they were involved in the uranium enrichment or 


other radiological activities. 


And then the middle group are occupations that, 


you know, could be -- could have been involved, 


but, you know, they -- they could be -- been 


working in other areas of -- of Y-12. Those 


are the things like the maintenance workers, 


you know, mechanics, instrument technicians 

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and, you know, security guards. And in those 


kind of cases what we do is the CEs would 


develop it, but then what they would be looking 


for would be, in the absence of evidence to the 


contrary and -- you know, that they would 


include them in the class. But you know, if 


the CATI or if, you know, our occupational 


history interview or, you know, some other 


document, our DAR reports that we get from DOE, 


if that put them somewhere outside of that 


area, then you know, we would not assume that 


and we -- they would have the opportunity to 


show that that was incorrect, but then that's 


how that would proceed. 


And that's kind of just the basic overview and, 


you know, I know people may have some specific 


questions about some of the more recent ones 


and I'd be glad to try to answer any questions. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Pete. That's very 


helpful. Let's see if there are indeed 


questions from the Board. Yes, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: You used the term place or space, 


and I guess -- I guess the reason why I kind of 


look at this is -- is if you were to take a 


look, say at my position at the INEL, it'd show 

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me as a fuel handler and it'd show me at one 


facility, 666. But I'm also responsible for 


603, 749, 10, the north end, 30 -- you know, 


and -- and I guess this is my question of -- 


some of the -- I guess that's maybe kind of why 


I've seen them push more towards, you know, 


like Y-12, not a certain position. I'm just 


wondering how do we -- I guess I'm thinking 


about the maintenance workers because I think 


of them in the same position as myself. I mean 


they go numerous places and it's a concern to 


me that they're covered. 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, they -- in those cases, like 


I'm saying, with -- with a maintenance worker, 


which -- if -- you would expect that 


maintenance workers could be sent, you know, 


anywhere and they could have been in the 


uranium enrichment activities. So in -- like I 


was -- in those kind of cases, we would make 


the assumption that they were included unless 


there was something in the file to the 


contrary. If there was something to the 


contrary, then we wouldn't ignore that. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I -- I guess what I'm -- I heard 


from the public meeting in Oak Ridge was one of 

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the individuals was discussing about being a 


machinist --


 MR. TURCIC: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CLAWSON: -- and because he was a machinist 


they were figuring he was in this one place, 


but according to them, he -- he was all over. 


And if we do -- if we do do it this way, do 


they have an opportunity to be able to -- 


 MR. TURCIC: Absolutely. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Absolutely to --


 MR. TURCIC: See, that's -- that's where the 


development would come in. You know, we would 


send a development letter saying, you know, 


you're a machinist, you know, did you work in 


these areas -- areas and then maybe we would 


also go back to DOE, you know, look at other 


exposure records. You know, there's a lot of 


places that we would start looking for that. 


 MR. CLAWSON: That'd be fine if it was -- if 


you still had the individual still living, but 


you know, as we found out in many security 


issues and so forth, if you were to ask my wife 


what I did, she'd -- really wouldn't be able to 


even tell you to this day. She knows of 


certain areas that I do work, but -- you know, 

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and this was even magnified so much more in the 


early days. 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Thank you, Pete. I think 


it's helpful to get clarification on this 


issue. Couple of points. One is that I think 


that we need to obviously be careful when we're 


doing the class definition. I think it's going 


to develop out of the -- our evaluation of the 


monitoring data and the exposures at the site 


and basically determination of who cannot have 


their dose reconstructed. And then I think we 


need to take the step of trying to figure out 


how -- once we've got that -- figure out how do 


we define that group in a way that it becomes 


operational and can be verified based on -- on 


records and so forth. We'll -- because of the 


time periods involved and so forth we'll never 


be perfect and there may be people with odd 


work patterns or something that -- 


 MR. TURCIC: Exactly. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- just may have to be dealt with 


on an individual basis. But to the extent that 


we can, we can do that. In some cases it may 

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very well be by defining buildings. 


 MR. TURCIC: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MELIUS: In some cases, when it's a larger 


part of a site or something, it may just be 


people on the site or monitored or should have 


been monitored kind -- kind of designation, and 


I think it's just important that we -- we think 


through it -- through that -- that step and so 


forth and it's a little hard -- difficult for 


us because we don't always see the -- the 


records and --


 MR. TURCIC: Right. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- so forth. And plus even for -- 


I mean NIOSH and the deliberations here, we're 


often changing, you know, the -- the 


recommendations as we -- we go -- go through 


these and refining them in some way and so 


forth, but -- but I think if we can just keep 


in mind how to define it in a way that it'll be 


operational for you without having to put a 


large burden on the -- the claimants to have to 


then prove addition or provide additional 


information, to the extent that that's possible 


now. 


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going through and develop our policy to our 


claims examiners. For example, it's not an 


SEC, but a very similar thing happened at 


Blockston (sic) Chemical. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: When we looked at it, we were 


unable to put people into building 55. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: And so then we had to make a 


policy determination, and where we came out on 


that policy determination was that since we -- 


we weren't able to do that, we then just said 


employment verification with Blockston equated 


to working in building 55. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: The exact same thing was done at 


Bethlehem Steel. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 MR. TURCIC: I mean we probably -- we've 


probably paid more -- did more approvals than 


there could have been working on that one mill. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: And because there was just no way 


that -- were we able to, you know, narrow it 


down to that one mill, so again we made a 

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policy determination that, rather than, you 


know, just leaving it open to affidavits for 


everybody, we're better off and it was better 


public policy --


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: -- to make the determination that 


employment verification at Bethlehem Steel 


equated to --


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: -- working at the -- the mill that 


was in question. 


 DR. MELIUS: I mean I would just hope that as 


we're evaluating these and reviewing these that 


we could get input from you and your staff as 


to --


 MR. TURCIC: We'd be glad to, yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- to make sure that we're -- you 


know, that what's getting sent over to you 


eventually is something that's -- that's useful 


'cause it -- I don't think it helps again to -- 


 MR. TURCIC: It doesn't. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- take six months or whatever to 


figure out how to then --


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, exactly. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- validate these claims. 

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191

 DR. ZIEMER: Thanks. Mike Gibson. 


 MR. GIBSON: This information is helpful, Pete. 


But also I'd just like to remind you that some 


sites -- and in particular, like at Mound, 


there was a lot of buildings that had more than 


one process going on in the building, and -- 


for instance, even with a Q clearance, there 


may be one area of the la-- of a building that 


these technicians were putting together this 


widget and maintenance people would have to 


come in and maintain the equipment, and even 


with a Q clearance, without the need to know, 


we didn't what isotope was in that lab. 


 MR. TURCIC: Right. 


 MR. GIBSON: And so, you know, it's unknown to 


the employee what they may have been exposed to 


'cause there may have been several different 


isotopes in one building. 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. And I think that's the 


point, though, that Dr. Melius was getting to, 


that the -- the first determination is what 


exposures cannot be dose reconstructed. And 


then it's almost a different function in a 


sense, a different analysis, to then look at 


what information is available to then 

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structure, you know, the definition so that 


that -- those splits can be made. 


 MR. GIBSON: Are there people on your staff 


that are Q cleared that have the right to go 


into DOE --


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. 


 MR. GIBSON: -- and get these classified 


discussions on certain isotopes? 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Mark Griffon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Pete, can you -- I -- I'm trying 


to figure out -- I'm looking at a letter here 


from Linde, I -- or actually it was from you to 


NIOSH regarding Linde. 


 MR. TURCIC: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And at the end you ask for the 


work -- the employees at the Linde plant in 


buildings 30, 31, 37, 38 who would be either 


listed cancers or non-listed cancers. It -- I 


-- I mean you're -- are you making the 


determination on who meets the class definition 


or -- this seems like a request back to NIOSH. 


I'm not clear on this. 


 DR. ZIEMER: DOL -- who's making the 


determination is the question as to whether -- 

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 MR. TURCIC: Oh, of who --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- they were in the class -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Who were members of the class, 


right. 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, we do. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So you -- you determine -- 


 MR. TURCIC: I mean if you're saying whether 


someone is eligible, we take the class 


definition. Okay? And then based on that 


definition, in adjudicating the claim we need 


to make a determination whether someone meets 


the profile that is established. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so maybe I misread -- I 


mean this letter seems to be asking -- 


 MR. TURCIC: I -- I think there's a --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- NIOSH to provide this list of 

who was --

 MR. TURCIC: No, no, what we --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- at certain buildings. It's 

not --

 MR. TURCIC: -- do there, Mark. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- it's not the case? 

 MR. TURCIC: What we do there is, because these 

cases are, you know -- we have records and 


NIOSH has records, and there could have been 

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changes in the meantime, additional cancers 


might have come in, things like that, the first 


thing that we always do is come up with -- 


NIOSH comes up with their list that -- and we 


would come up with our list and we kind of 


cross-match them so that we make sure -- you 


know, we're trying not to miss something that 


maybe was just coded wrong or maybe the 


situation on the claim had changed. So that's 


the first step that we do. And then, depending 


on whether they're going to be -- depending on 


what's going to happen to the non-specified 


cancers in a particular case, then they either 


-- what we try to do is to only have the cases 


that involve a specified cancer come back to us 


if there's going to be, you know, further dose 


reconstructions for the non-specified cancers. 


So that's -- that's what that back and forth 


is. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Further comments or questions? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Thank you very much, Pete, for that 


discussion. 


Y-12 SEC
 
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We're going to move here momentarily into the 


discussion of the Y-12 SEC. I -- for Mr. 


Presley's benefit, I think he probably recluses 


(sic) himself on this. Is that correct? But 


is he -- he is allowed to listen -- 


 DR. WADE: Right, he can stay on the -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- but not enter into the 


discussion. 


 DR. WADE: Correct. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I will be reclusing (sic) 


myself. 


 DR. WADE: Right, this -- let me identify the 


conflicts on Y-12, and there are three -- Mr. 


Presley, Drs. DeHart and Ziemer. Under the 


procedures of the Board, they would leave the 


table. They could participate as members of 


the public, but not as members of the Board in 


this particular segment of the Board's 


deliberations. So I will ask them to take 


prominent seats in the audience. 


 Based upon consultation with counsel, I will 


act as Chair in an administrative capacity. 


will not be voting, but will try and take what 


I've learned from -- from Dr. Ziemer and apply 


it. 


I 
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Just a note that, given the situation that has 


taken place in terms of three members needing 


to recuse themself (sic), we now have seven 


Board members involved in the discussion with 


the ability to vote. The seventh is Dr. 


Lockey, who is on the call -- Dr. Lockey, are 


you still with us? 


 DR. LOCKEY: Yes, I am. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. A quorum of the Board is six, 


so that we have more than a quorum of the Board 


present and we can continue with our business. 


I would also point out that, based upon 


discussion with counsel, Dr. Ziemer will be 


allowed to undertake certain administrative 


tasks associated with this activity, such as 


preparing a letter to the Secretary, should 


there be -- should he be so directed by the 


Board who's present. We don't want to let him 


get away from the work, and I don't think it's 


appropriate that I would prepare a letter or 


sign a letter to the Secretary. So Paul, 


you're not off the hook completely. We will 


still work you, but you just can't join us at 


this prestigious table. 


So with that, we'll move into the agenda and if 

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you'll look at the agenda for this afternoon we 


will start with a presentation by SC&A giving 


their review of the Y-12 SEC evaluation report. 


That was really scheduled for yesterday 


afternoon but we ran out of time, and we'll 


start the deliberations with a presentation I 


believe by Arjun, and then move into a 


presentation from NIOSH on the evaluation 


report. We'll hear from petitioners if they're 


present. And then the workgroup, ably chaired 


by Mark Griffon, will make a report and then 


there'll be time for Board discussion and 


decision. 


So Arjun, if you would start the process for 


us. 


PRESENTATION BY SC&A


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, Dr. -- is this on? 


Am I live? 


 DR. WADE: I'll leave that judgment to others, 


Arjun. It's a matter of whether we can hear 


you or not. 


(Pause) 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, Dr. Wade. As you 


know, this report was prepared rather rapidly, 


in two versions, one on April 19th, after which 

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we had a call on April 20th. Of course we've 


been reviewing some of the issues for quite 


some time through the site profile review 


process, but there were many new things, 


including the class definition, in the 


evaluation report so a lot of the work had to 


be done starting with the receipt of the 


evaluation report. And so the point of these 


remarks is we know -- we know NIOSH has only 


received our latest report on April 24th and 


everybody had very short time to react, so we 


are open to discussion on many of these issues 


and we tried to research the issues and -- and 


bring them to the table as best we could in the 


time available. 


I just want to correct two typos from 


yesterday. I will send around a new Ames 


presentation. There were two elements in one 


of the tables that were in the wrong column, so 


I just want to put that on the record. 


Okay. Our -- our biggest finding I guess is 


that we -- we agree with the NIOSH 


determination that the data are not adequate to 


reconstruct doses for workers who were 


monitored or should have been monitored for 

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exposure to thorium in the period covered by 


the SEC petition, '48 to '57. So that was the 


NIOSH finding, and our basic finding also. We 


didn't find a lot of data there and -- and so 


we agree with NIOSH on that. 


We looked at the buildings that NIOSH had and 


areas that NIOSH had defined on -- on... On 


April 20th NIOSH did say that they had 


researched these very carefully. We had not 


gone through the underlying documentation at 


that time. NIOSH did supply us, and the e-mail 


is reproduced in the April 24th report, with a 


set of references. We did look at these 


references, admittedly not as thoroughly as we 


would like. There were just a couple of days 


really to prepare the response to the April 20 


conference call. So these -- these comments on 


the area and the buildings are offered in the ­

- in that spirit, that -- we're not saying that 


there are new areas of building that should be 


added to what NIOSH has done. We've just tried 


to identify areas that we think need some 


further investigation than what was indicated 


in the evaluation report. 


And the scale of thorium discards at Oak Ridge 

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-- and I'm not saying now Y-12 specifically, 


but at Oak Ridge -- in the SEC petition period 


was -- was quite large. As I added it up, the 


total discards through 1957 inclusive were 


almost 800 kilogram, most of them were to the 


burial grounds and/or the S-3 pond, it's not 


differentiated. There were also quite a lot of 


discards to the sewers and -- the sanitary 


sewers. 800 kilograms of discard, if you 


assume a typical few percent discards at most, 


indicates a very much larger scale of 


processing at Oak Ridge than -- that at least I 


-- I -- I thought we were talking about. It's 


not clear how much of this was at X-10 or at Y12. Most of the discards were at the burial 


ground associated with X-10, which is in a 


footnote in one of the reports. But it doesn't 


identify where the thorium came from. It seems 


reasonably clear that there were classified 


activities going on in the period and -- and it 


-- we think that a classified investigation may 


be necessary. 


There was a sort of a mismatch, and we're not 


sure about the period of the mismatch, but 


there are two buildings defined in the -- in 

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the site profile as being described as 


associated with thorium-230, which is a 


different isotope. We've been talking about 


thorium-232 so far. Those are 9215 and 9720-5. 


One of them is a storage area. And we don't 


know whether that applies to the SEC period, 


it's not clear. I have not gone through all 


the background documentation and we -- since 


they are not in the list that NIOSH has 


included, maybe the dates on those could be 


investigated to see whether they belong or not. 


Okay. Much of our discussion on the -- during 


the workgroup meeting has revolved around the 


verification of what has come to be called the 


CER database and what NIOSH has identified as 


the database that DOE regards as the database 


of record. And they have an internal/external 


component. NIOSH did quite a bit of data 


validation and verification of that database 


for internal data. There was a maximum dose 


match-up for 1950. There were health physics 


reports -- quarterly reports matching for 1952, 


and there were also validation activities for 


1953. And while there were years that were not 


matched up, we didn't find any particular 

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discrepancy or problem that we thought would 


invalidate the use of the data for dose 


reconstruction. It was limited, but there were 


no problems that came up in the verification. 


The picture's a little bit different for 


external dose. The external dose record for 


1951 in the CER database contains essentially 


all zeroes for '50 and '51. We matched up -- 


there's another database called the delta view 


database which consists of raw data, and that 


has some records from '51, perhaps they are 


mixed up X-10 and Y-12 records. We didn't 


investigate that, but there are discrepancies 


because all of the -- all of the entries for 


'50 and '51 are zeroes. This -- this doesn't 


appear to be correct, especially against the 


assertion that the people who were monitored 


had the highest exposure potential, and so 


NIOSH sent us a communication saying that -- 


that they agreed that this data could not be 


used for dose reconstruction. Then during the 


conference call of April 20th, it was stated 


that the person who said that -- in the -- in 


the communication it was stated that the 


discrepancies or the zeroes may be due to a 

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software problem. Then during the conference 


call of April 20th, that statement seemed to be 


withdrawn, so we're not quite clear as to what 


the status of that communication is and what is 


the source of these discrepancies. It doesn't 


appear likely that they're all correct zeroes. 


They're not going to be used for dose 


reconstruction, we understand, but -- but still 


the problem with entries that appear to be 


incorrect in the database will -- raises 


questions about the integrity of the database, 


quite apart from whether they're going to use 


for dose reconstruction or not. 


There are internal inconsistencies in the CER 


database in a part of the CER database through 


1955. The five columns showing external dose ­

- there's -- there's an illustration in the 


report -- I don't remember the page, but 


there's a table in the report that shows four 


of those five columns -- beta, gamma, shallow 


millirem and penetrating millirem, and there's 


also a column for neutron dose. And the 


penetrating millirem is supposed to be the sum 


of the gamma and the neutron, but through 1955 


every non-zero entry in the penetrating -- in ­
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- in the gamma or neutron does not add up to 


the penetrating millirem. Penetrating millirem 


is always less than the sum of the other two 


when they are non-zero. And it -- while that 


column is stated to be not scheduled for use in 


dose reconstruction, again, we have the same 


problem, as the other database of record that 


has a large number of entries that appear to be 


incorrect. 


Then there's a problem of systematically -- 


systematic discrepancy and one doesn't know 


then whether there might be other errors in 


other parts of the database that hasn't been 


identified yet. 


There was a NIOSH validation for 1953 that came 


up okay, but because of the problems in the 


other areas we felt that there should be 


verification for '52, '54 and '55 to some 


extent. There were no internal inconsistencies 


that we discovered for '56 and '57, but there's 


no external database matching with other 


records like raw data records or health physics 


reports or anything like that for -- for those 


years or for any of the years from which the 


coworker database has been filled. So there 

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are a considerable number of issues that we've 


raised with the external part of the CER 


database. 


 The specific issues associated with a group of 


workers called the salvage and recycling 


workers -- there's a typo on -- on page 18 of 


your report. The first building is missing the 


last digit. It says 920, it should say 9206. 


It's correct on the slide there. These three 


buildings are identified in the site profile as 


having salvage and recycling operations that 


ended in '51. And we've discussed the issue of 


how best to characterize and construct coworker 


doses for -- for these workers. Internal dose, 


the Technical Information Bulletin for these 


identify internal data available for these 


years is very -- being very limited and rather 


on the low side. The -- NIOSH proposes to use 


-- now this is from -- I forgot to give you one 


caveat is we don't have of course the 


transcript from April 20th and John Mauro took 


notes. And to the extent that those notes are 


not verified against a transcript, and we were 


obliged to use what notes we had in order to 


represent the conversation on -- on April 20th 

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in order to be able to respond -- we understood 


from John Mauro's notes that NIOSH had proposed 


to use the 95 percentile of the early '50s data 


and that this may be a reasonable approach. 


But --


DR. NETON: That's incorrect, Arjun. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's incorrect. I -- we had 


an internal debate about that. I didn't 


remember it that way. It was in John's notes. 


So I'm glad that we have a real-time 


correction. So I -- I'll just say for the 


record then that that piece of it should be 


disregarded. The -- the --


 MS. MUNN: I don't know which piece should be 


disregarded. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Some -- some approach needs to 


be found that applies to this particular set of 


workers to show that the coworker model that is 


being used from the early '50s will be bounding 


for the types of jobs that they were doing for 


internal dose. 


I think -- I think that we have some of the 


same issues for external dose. In addition, 


while there were no problems identified with 


the internal dose database of the type I 

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discussed for external dose, in the case for 


ext-- of external dose we have the additional 


problem of database of record suffering from 


systematic discrepancies. And so how these 


doses are to be reconstructed, especially for 


salvage and recycling workers for this period, 


at least seems like an open question to us. 


 There have been a lot of -- monitoring was not 


universal at Y-12 until 1961 when everybody was 


badged. The number of badged workers increased 


fairly steadily through the 1950s, and we do 


agree with the overall idea that the 


supervisors -- the idea -- the policy was to 


try to badge the workers with the highest 


exposed -- potential. We have discovered that 


this was sometimes successful and sometimes 


not. If you take the 1961 to 1965 period as 


indicating who really had the highest exposure 


potential there were two broad bins that were 


fairly successful: some buildings and workers 


who had low exposure potential and some who had 


high. But among the second group there was 


some -- some difficulty in actually 


successfully identifying all of those workers, 


so we had some questions about the coworker 

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model that NIOSH had constructed on the 


assumption that all of the badged workers were 


workers with the highest exposure potential. 


I'm trying to quote a paper accurately. 
I 


believe that that's an accurate representation 


of it. 


Also as I noted earlier, there's been no data 


validation for the period of this coworker 


model, and in view of the problems in the 


external dose CER database, we think that at 


least some is -- should -- should be done. 


These are the slides we talked about. Dr. 


Glarinski*, who's a statistician on our team, 


did a correlation of the mean doses in -- among 


the -- among the buildings with relatively high 


exposure potential, the mean from the '55 -- 


'56 to '60 compared to the mean dose from '61 


to '65. As you can see from the scatter plot, 


the correlation is rather low. 


We also did -- sorry. We also did a 


correlation between the percentage of workers 


who were monitored in the various departments 


versus the mean dose in the same department in 


the '61 to '65 period when everybody was 


monitored, and presumably you have a better 

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idea of which departments had the highest 


exposure potential from the latter period. And 


again the correlation, as you can see from the 


scatter plot was -- there was some correlation, 


but it's pretty weak. 


On the other hand, there seems to be some 


success within the period. If you say which 


were the departments in which the highest 


number of workers were monitored compared to 


the department that had the highest average 


dose, you see that within the period there was 


some success. This R squared from this 


correlation was .49, if I remember correctly, 


so within the '56 to '60 period there was some 


success, but then again it's clear that there 


were departments in -- in -- which were not so 


successful in identifying those workers with 


highest exposure potential. 


All right, we discussed this quite a bit 


yesterday about a quantitative task for 


determining, you know, how much confidence you 


have in data validation so I'll skip over it. 


The -- in the interest of time. 


In regard to uranium workers, NIOSH has stated 


that it can reconstruct doses for uranium 

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workers, but we didn't find a clear definition 


of uranium worker. From the description in one 


of the buildings where thorium was processed, 


it was clear that some areas in that building 


were thorium areas that had mixtures of uranium 


and thorium dust, and other areas were regarded 


as uranium dust areas only. The question arose 


as to what happens if trace quantities of 


thorium dust were present for workers who were 


defined as uranium workers, and this problem 


arises for uranium workers -- not so much, for 


instance, if you have plutonium and thorium 


mixed up -- because the dose conversion factors 


for certain organs for thorium are orders of 


magnitude bigger than for uranium. We looked 


at the mass -- so when I brought this up on the 


conference call on April 20th, Mel Chew said 


that you require a much, much bigger mass of 


thorium-232 because it has a much larger half-


life compared to uranium. I did check into 


this. I did -- I did state for the record that 


I didn't think that was entirely right. I did 


-- I did check into this. For natural uranium 


versus thorium-232 in equilibrium without their 


non-apparent decay products -- that is non­
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thorium decay products and non-uranium decay 


products -- the ratio's about three to one, not 


100 to one as Mel Chew stated. And if you do 


depleted uranium to thorium-232, which is 


always in equilibrium pretty much with thorium228, then you get a ratio of about 1.8 to one. 


So the mass -- the mass question is not a very 


relevant question. Radium-224 builds up very 


rapidly in thorium, also, within weeks. And so 


I don't think that that particular issue is 


important. And trace thorium. 


In the first report you got we hadn't covered 


recycled uranium. We do have a section on 


recycled uranium. In the main we think it is 


not a Special Exposure Cohort issue. 


We have some discussion about what ratios might 


be appropriate. We have a review -- a broader, 


sort of generic review of this issue in 


preparation. Dr. Thorne is -- on our team is 


doing that, but we used some of that 


information and -- and we did prepare a section 


for this particular report. 


The items that we do think -- where we have 


some concerns and reservations that need to be 


worked on some more just to demonstrate how the 

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question of sludges and waste streams are going 


to be handled. But mainly we don't think that 


this is -- apart from that, we don't think this 


is an SEC issue. It's covered in -- in the 


site profile and can be resolved mostly in that 


context. 


As you know, there were lots of radionuclides 


that were handled at Y-12 in the 


Calutron/Cyclotron area. Polonium-208 was one 


of them, a relatively short half-life material. 


And NIOSH has stated that it has sufficient 


data for dose reconstruction -- incident data 


are present. They com-- NIOSH has compiled 


data from this -- from the delta view database 


into a spreadsheet. I did look at that. The ­

- that database for the SEC period only 


contains a few internal bioass-- few -- few 


entries for bioassay data, almost all of which 


seem to be related to one incident in 1953, and 


all of which are from 1953. 


There was a sample DR, and again another 


caveat. There are lots of sample dose 


reconstructions that were done. We've only 


skimmed them. We -- we've not really given 


them the due credit of actually studying every 

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file in -- in them and -- and so we -- so some 


of these comments should be taken in that 


spirit. We didn't have the chance to look at 


any 1952 data. They're not in that delta view 


database. They might be in an incident report 


that we haven't had a chance to look at or in 


individual data that we don't have at the 


present time. So there has been an assertion 


by NIOSH. We -- we think that these data exist 


there may not be an issue but -- but we haven't 


had a chance to address and -- and resolve 


these issues so -- so we don't know for -- for 


-- from that point of view, for us, this 


remains an open issue for the SEC and until 


that -- that database is explained or published 


and made available. 


Plutonium -- by contrast to polonium, there's 


quite a lot of bioassay data for '52 to '56. 


We haven't done any verification, but just on ­

- on the basis of what's available, it seems 


that individual and coworker doses should not 


be a problem for those years. We didn't see 


any data for 1957 for plutonium, bioassay data. 


The coworker model, so far as I know, hasn't 


been developed as yet -- or at least I didn't 

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see it. The -- there was an allusion to 


plutonium in 1951 or earlier, and I don't -- I 


don't know if that actually is the case or how 


that would be handled, and some data are 


classified. So plutonium for the years for 


which data are available is largely not an 


issue, but -- but there are some sort of 


questions that we couldn't address with 


information not available. 


The rest of the radionuclides we've given the 


term "exotic radionuclides." There's a whole 


variety of them. Appendix 2 of the evaluation 


report contains a spreadsheet that details 


production of these radionuclides. We did find 


that that spreadsheet is not -- doesn't contain 


the full account of production and so at least 


some of these radionuclides we were able to 


verify that -- various sources -- as is 


described in the report. Again, here NIOSH has 


stated two workers were involved in that 


incident and external monitoring data would be 


available to reconstruct dose, and -- and we 


think if that is the case that there may not be 


an issue then, but we haven't been able to 


examine them. 

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There was a gallium dose reconstruction example 


given, but it was from an accident in 1968 and 


doesn't fall in the SEC period. We don't know 


what -- we can't determine what the relevance 


is to the exotic radionuclides for the SEC 


period, so we consider this still to be an open 


issue. 


Last slide is just to give you an idea -- it 


just -- I coordinated this and brought -- there 


were a lot of people involved in its 


production. Sorry, Bob Anigstein has a Ph.D. 


I forgot to put that in after his name. Other 


than myself, Kathy DeMers, Hans Behling, Mike 


Thorne, Harry Chemylinski and Bob Anigstein 


helped prepare the report and Dr. Mauro and Ron 


Buchanan reviewed it. 


I'd be happy to take your questions. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Arjun. We have an 


opportunity for questions from Board members 


for Arjun. Any questions? Dr. Lockey, any 


questions? 


 DR. LOCKEY: No, not at this time. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Arjun, thank you. Stay 


close. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm easily off the hook here. 

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 DR. WADE: Don't go far away, though. 


 MS. MUNN: Probably not. Don't be overconfident. 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH


 DR. WADE: And now we'll move into the formal 


part of the agenda that was set for Y-12 SEC, 


and that is the presentation of the petition 


evaluation report by NIOSH, and that will be 


done by Dr. James Neton. 


DR. NETON: Thank you, Dr. Wade. I'm not quite 


sure where to begin here after that rousing 


presentation by Arjun on our work. I'm glad 


that he did represent this as somewhat hastily 


prepared and did come about at the last minute. 


We've had a couple of looks at their report and 


my formal presentation here is not set up to 


respond to this because as of -- I received the 


last draft half an hour before I was headed for 


the airport on Monday, so one can imagine that 


we've not had time to -- to review all of this 


in its entirety. However, I would -- I would 


just like to state for the record that we do 


find that there are -- are several 


misunderstandings and misinterpretations in the 


report as portrayed, and we certainly would 

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welcome the opportunity to discuss them with -- 


with the SC&A folks -- in several major areas, 


I might add. I'm not going to go into them at 


this point, but I'd just like to state that for 


the record. 


I'm here to address our normal presentation for 


the evaluation of a petition, which in this 


case is SEC petition number 28, and that is for 


the Y-12 Plant. 


 The petition was submitted under Part 83.13 of 


our SEC regulations. It was submitted to NIOSH 


on behalf of a class of employees with the 


initial definition of all steamfitters, pipe 


fitters and plumbers who worked at Y-12 from 


October of 1944 through December of 1957. 


NIOSH -- in doing these evaluations we like to 


take a bigger bite of the apple if we can and 


take the opportunity to look on a broader 


scale, as long as we're going into the weeds on 


a lot of these issues, so we expand our 


evaluation to include a class bigger than that, 


which would be all workers who worked at the 


facility between 1948 and '57. The discrepancy 


in the first four years is because of course 


the Y-12 SEC has already been granted for the 

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years up through the end of 1947 under previous 


deliberations. 


A little bit about the Y-12 operations in this 


SEC evaluation period. For the most part, Y-12 


was heavily involved in machining, production 


and forming of uranium, and that is by far and 


away the largest potential source of exposures, 


but there were other ancillary activities that 


occurred on the site as alluded to by Arjun's 


presentation. There was an 86-inch Cyclotron 


that was there that they did produce these 


exotic -- so-called exotic radionuclides. The 


Calutrons were there, which we have discussed 


in previous SEC petition evaluations. And even 


though the Calutrons were formally shut down 


for production of uranium at the end of the 


previous SEC period, their use in fact 


continued for various other miscellaneous 


purposes up through the end of this evaluation 


period, and I'll talk a little bit about that 


later. 


In addition to that -- the Cyclotron/Calutron 


activities -- there were thorium activities 


ongoing at the site, and we have very good 


evidence that thorium was present at the site 

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from 19-- all the way from 1948 through 1957 in 


increasing quantities throughout the exposure 


period. However, just to comment a little bit 


on Arjun's emphasis on the quantity, the bulk 


of the quantities of the thorium that were 


disposed of in the waste pits did not happen 


until I think it was 19-- 1957 period. And we 


have very good evidence of where -- we believe 


-- the health physics reports are aware those 


processes were ongoing and in fact those are 


included -- those buildings are included in our 


evaluation. 


Another side comment -- I can't resist to 


comment slightly -- is the X-10 facility where 


the burial grounds were, to my knowledge, are 


not on the Y-12 facility property so therefore 


could not formally be considered as part of 


this SEC petition. 


In addition to thorium activities there were 


critical experiments facilities. There was a 


remote area of Y-12 that was set up to do 


criticality experiments. You can imagine it 


should be in a remote area that was somewhat 


isolated. They did critical and subcritical 


experimentations. 

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Okay, a little bit of the nuts and bolts of how 


this process goes. The Board should be fairly 


familiar with this so I've summarized what used 


to be three or four slides down into one. 


We've met -- the petition met the criteria 


outlined in our regulation on April 29th. The 


petitioner was notified and a notice was 


published in the Federal Register on June 6th, 


and the report -- evaluation report was 


prepared and sent to petitioners and the Board 


on April 7th and posted on our web site. And 


there was a Federal Register notice published 


that this petition evaluation report would be 


discussed at this meeting on April 19th. 


Again the slide that should be all familiar to 


you now, the two-part process. Can we estimate 


doses of radiation with sufficient accuracy; 


and if we cannot, was there health endangerment 


involving this class. 


Okay. There were a number of ongoing 


activities to evaluate this petition, and 


several are new. We -- this is the first time 


we have worked with -- very closely with the 


Advisory Board working group and SC&A to review 


originally the site profile, but in the later 

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months, towards the February time frame, we've 


been very heavily involved in reviewing the 


site profile in the context of how it played 


out for SEC petition. 


As usual, though, we are -- we went about our 


business and identified and reviewed data 


resources that we could use to determine 


availability of the information and feasibility 


of dose reconstruction. And in that way we 


looked at personnel monitoring, area 


monitoring, testing processes, radiation 


sources -- the usual types of information that 


we would look for to see that we could 


establish some type of a plausible upper bound 


on doses for this -- received by this class. 


Again, we're not trying to -- to reconstruct 


dose reconstruction down to the nth degree; 


we're trying to determine do we have sufficient 


information to plausibly bound exposures for 


members of this class. 


We reviewed the data for credibility and 


reliability. We have been doing that to some 


extent, but now it is more formally documented 


because of the new Board operating procedures, 


and we certainly are attempting to conform to 

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that in every way possible. And again we 


prepared example dose reconstructions for some 


specific scenarios that were somewhat mutually 


agreed upon between all of us working on this ­

- that is the Advisory Board working group, 


SC&A and NIOSH. I'd like to discuss a little 


bit about each of those in turn here. 


The site profile and SEC review discussions I 


might say were tremendously informative and a 


very interesting scientific exchange. I mean 


we -- they become somewhat frustrating and 


wearying at times because we had a lot of -- a 


lot of discussions. The working group was 


established in October of 2005. By my count of 


our -- our web site, we had five working group 


meetings, but I think that the SC&A report 


indicates there were more than that. I 


certainly would buy that. It was a -- there 


were many, many hours and there will be 


hundreds of pages of transcripts prepared as a 


result of our deliberations, and I think the 


science is much better -- better off for it. 


think it was a good process. 


As I mentioned, the focus shifted, though, in 


February from the profile review to very 


I 
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specifically fine-tuned, as Mark talked about, 


matrix that was relevant only to SEC issues and 


I think to a large extent we -- we pared down 


that matrix to -- down to a few items, at 


which point the matrix was labeled NIOSH is 


going to provide their final analysis in their 


evaluation report, which I believe we did. 


Again, the SC&A draft review came out April 


19th and we received the final -- I don't know 


if it's the final yet, but we received another 


version as of Monday. 


The resources available -- this was touched on 


somewhat in Arjun's presentation, but we do 


always look at the NIOSH case file database, 


so-called the NOCTS system, the NIOSH/OCAS 


Claims Tracking System. There we have a pretty 


rich amount of information from the claimants' 


submittals, the Computer Assisted Telephone 


Interview, anything that's in there that can 


help inform us as to what occurred at the site 


and what type of potential exposures were 


there. We also delved very deeply into the 


NIOSH and ORAU research databases. I think the 


Board is very well aware of our ongoing site 


research activities and we relied heavily on 

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the information in them for reconstructing or 


for -- looking for information that could help 


us reconstruct doses. 


We also developed a large number of technical 


documents from those primary resources, and 


I'll talk a little bit about those in turn, as 


well. This is probably the most well-


documented site that NIOSH has written about, 


to the point where I -- I think we're 


approaching 1,000 pages of writing. That could 


be a slight exaggeration, but certainly well 


into the upper hundreds of pages of site 


profiles, technical reports and such. And all 


of us on the working group and NIOSH and SC&A 


have -- have read almost all of it more than 


once. 


The ORAU Center for Epidemiological Research 


database is a valuable resource for us. This 


is a database that ORAU has available to them. 


It is an electronic copy of the electronic 


database at Y-12. In other words, it's not a 


database that was -- was created for purposes 


of epidemiologic study. It was the database 


that the DOE maintained and this is an -- to 


the best of our knowledge, a duplicate copy of 

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that database. 


We also did interviews with site personnel 


where it was relevant to certain issues that we 


needed to have answered. And of course we 


always look at the documentation or affidavits 


provided by the petitioners. 


A little bit about what's in NOCTS, we have 


1,303 cases that meet the class definition in 


the system right now, or potentially meet that 


definition. Of those, 309 have internal 


monitoring records, 106 have external 


monitoring records. We don't have a full -- a 


full complement of external and internal 


monitoring records for Y-12; there are some 


gaps, but we have developed coworker models 


that we could talk about later to fill in those 


gaps. 


As far as the research database resources 


available, there are almost 500 Y-12-specific 


documents out there. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I ask you a quick question? 


I'm a little confused by the numbers there. 


Which class definition are you referring to? 


DR. NETON: This is the proposed class 


definition. 

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 DR. MELIUS: So those would be --


DR. NETON: They're all -- all employees 


between the two dates, 1948 to '57. 


 DR. MELIUS: Oh, okay, so the petition, not 


your proposed --


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Okay, I didn't -- 


DR. NETON: Well, this -- not -- not the -- not 


the petition's classification but the proposed 


class definition by NIOSH, which is all workers 


between 1948 and 1957. 


 DR. WADE: clear, Jim? You make no mention of 


thorium in your comment. 


DR. NETON: Pardon? 


 DR. WADE: You made no mention of thorium in 


your definition. 


DR. NETON: I'm sorry, I'll be getting there, 


but it will --


 MR. GRIFFON: But this doesn't -- this doesn't 


DR. NETON: No, this is the evaluation of the 


peti-- the class under evaluation is all 


workers --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, exactly. I think that's -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah, we -- we don't know a priori 

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who would have worked with thorium, and that 


may be something we want to talk about a little 


later. We know which buildings the thorium -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: This would be all workers. So the 


database had almost 500 Y-12-specific documents 


and in that database was a fairly rich 


collection of health physics reports that were 


by quarter. Or actually they were sometimes by 


month, but eventually they became semi-annual, 


and these reports persisted -- persist 


throughout the SEC period, although I will have 


to admit that several reports in the interim 


periods, in the middle 1950s, we do not have on 


the database. We have reviewed them and looked 


through them, but they have yet to -- they're 


not classified necessarily, but they have not 


gone under classification review. We have no 


expectation that most of we will need is not 


classified, but I can't speak to that. But we 


have had people with clearances go in there and 


look through these -- these documents. There's 


also air sample data in there, bioassay 


samples, description -- process description, et 


cetera. 

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I mentioned about the volume of original 


writing that NIOSH, with ORAU's assistance, has 


put together, and these just list the Technical 


Basis Documents, the six chapters that make up 


the site profile for Y-12 and the dates that 


they were created. It's -- it represents 


several hundred pages of written documentation. 


And then in addition to that, as I mentioned, 


this -- this site probably has more written on 


it about the history of the monitoring programs 


and how we would interpret those pieces of 


information than any of the other sites. There 


are Technical Information Bulletins related to 


how we would adjust individual doses for -- 


from the external perspective. I think the 


first three up there are all related to this. 


There's a lot of effort put into backwards 


extrapolation into the pre-1956 period when we 


had a paucity of monitoring data. These are 


very well-defined documents and I -- I do 


believe this is one area, a big area, where 


there is a misunderstanding between us and SC&A 


as to exactly what we've done and what the 


relevance of some of their statistical analysis 


might be. I firmly believe that they have -- 

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we -- we should talk more about the 


interpretations on those data. 


There's also documentation on what was 


available for the electronic personnel data and 


the historical validation of the film badge 


dosimetry program. A lot of work went into 


looking at the quality of the measurements and 


what usefulness they might be. For example, we 


are not proposing to use any data before 1956 


in any dose reconstructions from the external 


dosimetry perspective. Contrary to the fact 


that there may be some issues, we have 


developed a backward extrapolation model that 


relies on a sampling of 147 workers who were 


heavily monitored in those periods and -- and a 


backwards linear extrapolation procedure that 


is part of these Bayesian analyses. 


And there's several more here. Again, these 


are related to the external radiation program. 


There are a few out there that are draft I 


haven't included here related to neutron 


monitoring and other. 


Let's talk a little bit about the Center for 


Epidemiologic Research database. This is a 


database that has literally hundreds of 

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thousands of records. Of course I can only 


speak, for this presentation, for the records 


in the SEC period -- or I should speak to 


those, starting in 1948, and I've included a 


little bit of overlap into the non-SEC period 


because of the fact we did rely on some of 


those results for our coworker models going 


back into the 19-- you know, before 1956. 


As with most sites, you see an increasing 


number of records as you become closer in time 


to the current period. The number of 


individuals monitored was fairly low in 1950 


through -- well, the first four years there, 


'51, 2, 3, 4, and you see a lot more records 


starting to come into play. We have a fairly 


well-defined coworker model for internal dose 


based on those monitoring records, and in fact 


the '48 and '49 where we have no records, we 


actually have used the data from the 1952 


period where we had -- I can't read it from 


here very well, but -- 13,000 records and 


assumed that all the exposures in those people 


of 1952 were related to their work practices in 


1948 and '49, an extremely generous assumption 


on our part. 

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The only question that remained, and our 


discussion with SC&A on this, was did in fact 


Y-12 fire everybody in 1949 and we couldn't use 


those 1952 records. In fact, were the 1952 


workers relevant to the exposures that occurred 


in 1948 and '49, and I thought our conclusion 


was on the phone that it was an unlikely 


scenario, but maybe we should go back and 


document that a little bit. That was my 


understanding of our discussion, somewhat 


different than what was portrayed on SC&A's. 


External monitoring data, again, very few 


numbers of people monitored through 1956, 


increasing numbers as you come later. And 


again, we're not using any of those values 


prior to 1956 for dose reconstruction. Based 


on our analyses of -- of those datasets, they 


do not really fit any distribution well at all, 


which is why we went to the backwards 


extrapolation approach from the data after 


1956. 


Just a little bit about the delta view 


monitoring set. This is a database of in 


excess of 400,000 pages of information that Y12 has maintained. It's not a database in the 

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sense that it's -- it's number values like in 


an Excel spreadsheet or something. It is 


actually image pages. So there are in excess 


of 400,000 image pages that contain a lot of 


information, including incident investigation 


reports, bioassay records, that sort of thing. 


In the time we had available while we were 


working with SC&A on this issue, we managed to 


pull out some records relevant to plutonium 


exposures that you see on the screen there in 


1952 through 1956. We propose to use those as 


part of our coworker model. And in fact, we 


provided a sample dose reconstruction using a 


coworker approach to SC&A. I'm not sure 


they've read it, but we have provided a model. 


A proposed model is out there. 


 Not much thorium monitoring, as you can see in 


that bottom line, until '58 where believe that 


the major production activities were initiated. 


As indicated, we did some data reliability 


checks on the electronic database. We did have 


an indication from -- we heard -- we heard 


reports from interviewees and such and others 


that had worked at the site that the database ­

- the electronic database was considered to be 

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the dose of record for the workers, and we did 


manage to go get a secondary reference that -- 


that -- it did indicate that. 


There was -- I should point out, there was no 


assertion as to reliability of the data made in 


the petition. This was not one of the 


arguments made in the petition. But of course 


we do recognize that it's prudent for us to go 


back and look at the data, take a -- take a 


check and see if it does pass the 


reasonableness test. So where possible we did 


compare results to the separate data sources, 


and this is a very difficult issue. I mean for 


50-year-old records, to go back and -- and to 


find original records is extremely difficult. 


I was very happy that we found the record we 


could, particularly in the internal area. So 


we went back and looked at the health physics 


reports, the delta view database, and we did 


find some electronic -- you know, the old IBM 


80-column keypunch cards that had data written 


on top that we could read and -- and helped 


also to validate our -- the reliability of the 


database. 


 In the bioassay area we did look at individual 

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results in 1953 health physics reports which 


pointed to workers. We heard about this 


yesterday. They compared very well. We did 


some percentile comparisons with a 1952 health 


physics report where they provided indications 


of the 70th percent-- 75th percentile, 90th, 


95th percentile, those type of numbers, and we 


went into the database in '52 for that period 


and in fact the percentiles compared favorably 


with what we had in the CER database. 


We looked at samples that exceeded the maximum 


permissible limit and -- it's not 19,552, but 


1952 -- and those compare somewhat favorably. 


There was a maximum value reported in a 1950 


health physics report. We went back to CER 


database and the maximum value in the database 


for that year was indeed a match. 


I will point out, though, that there was a 


discrepancy in the total number of urinalyses 


reported in the HP reports versus electronic 


database. We did some investigation. We 


interviewed people at the site who would have 


been -- we thought were knowledgeable in 


helping to elucidate why this would be the 


case. It turns out that the HP reports tended 

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to include a lot of additional samples that 


were not necessarily worker samples. There 


were duplicates made, there were quality 


control runs. There's some indication that 


when they split a sample and ran it for -- the 


fluorometric technique for mass versus the 


alpha isotopic analysis, that those would be 


double-reported. So there were a lot of 


indications to explain or at least to help -- 


well, to help explain why there would be more 


numbers -- total values of numbers in the HP 


reports versus the database. 


 The external dosimetry comparison, as -- as 


Arjun mentioned, was somewhat more difficult. 


We could not find original records to any large 


extent. And in fact, the 1953 delta view 


report was there area where we could -- only 


area where we could do a direct comparison, and 


even that was a -- not completely direct 


because these were summary data versus 


individual. But in looking through those 1953 


records we believe, and I think SC&A agreed, 


that the records would compare favorably, given 


the caveats we -- we had to put on them. 


 There were these discrepancies noted in 1950 

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and 1951. They certainly deserve to be 


investigated. However, I don't think that the 


data are invalid, as indicated in SC&A's report 


that we received. I think there are some 


pathways we need to go down. For example, in 


looking at the example in the SC&A report it 


appears to us that it -- we confirmed actually 


yesterday that -- that those are act-- almost 


all those except one -- all of those except one 


are X-10 workers. Delta view database has some 


carry-over from X-10 to Y-12, so we need to be 


careful in interpreting the data that's 


contained in the delta view. 


 Cyclotron activities, polonium-208 production 


did start in 1951, ended August of '53, so it 


was of fairly short duration in the -- process 


in the history of the Y-12 site. And there 


were chronic exposures. There were airborne 


activities produced as a result of irradiation 


of a bare target. As we'll discuss later, all 


the -- almost all the other activities used 


clad targets, but to the maximum output of the 


polonium from the proton interaction, they had 


to rely on bare target materials. But we do 


have air sampling results in some of the health 

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physics reports that document the airborne 


alpha concentrations in various rooms 


associated with the Cyclotron, which we believe 


we can use to help reconstruct those doses. 


 The other radioisotope production followed. 


These are typically short half-life research-


type activity nuclides -- gallium-67, 


promethium-147, those type of isotopes. The 


targets were -- were clad, so when they were 


irradiated in the Cyclotron they were 


essentially in a sealed cladding, and when they 


were pulled out of the Cyclotron they were 


actually processed at the X-10 facility intact. 


Now that's not to say there weren't exposures. 


We know that there were incidents, and we did 


provide one incident that we could find in the 


time frame available -- outside the SEC period, 


but we have numerous indications that when 


incidents occurred that were as a result of 


off-normal circumstances at the Cyclotrons, 


they were evaluated and bioassay samples were 


taken. In fact, these internal exposures 


really only, we believe, occurred when the 


target would rupture. There are a number of 


site documents we believe we can use to capture 

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what happened in these incidents -- I think 


I've got this on the next slide. 


 And these would include these five types of 


documents: NIOSH case files -- in fact, I 


think the gallium-67 accident, the bioassay 


records were in the case file itself. I mean 


we were looking through the files and -- and 


there it was. And those records come directly 


out of this delta view database, so we're very 


comfortable with the fact that when we apply to 


DOE or ask DOE to provide monitoring records, 


they search the delta view database -- we know 


this -- and provide us any -- they can do 


searchable fields and find names of people 


involved with incidents and provide them to us. 


 We've gone back and looked at the delta view 


database that they searched under code word 


"incidents". Right now we have indications 


there are about 70 incident reports out there 


in the SEC period in the delta view database 


that we're trying to obtain. We've had folks 


go over there with clearances and look through 


these, but again, these -- these need to be 


reviewed for classified material before they're 


released. 

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In addition to delta view reports we have 


internal memos, as well as production-related 


documents. 


Speak a little bit about the thorium 


activities. There were quantities of thorium 


present throughout the evaluation period, as I 


had indicated, and these were in three distinct 


types of operations. There were -- there were 


memos in the files that indicated that enriched 


uranium was cleaned up out of the Calutron 


using thorium as a co-precipitating agent. 


That's kind of an interesting process to use a 


radioactive material to obtain radioactive 


material, but that's in fact what the memo 


states, so there were -- there were thorium 


exposures from that avenue of -- of operations. 


There were isotopic separations, and this is 


where the thorium-230 exposures come in. 


Thorium-230 was -- was selectively isolated -- 


(Interruption due to inadvertent activation of 


voice mail on the telephone connection. 


Throughout the remainder of Dr. Neton's 


presentation the operator occasionally spoke to 


a telephonic participant, often concurrent with 


Dr. Neton's statements. Where indicated, it 

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rendered transcription of Dr. Neton's comments 


impossible.) 


 Isotopic separations occurred in the Calutron 


for a very specified period of time. We know 


when they occurred. We know where they 


occurred, so we believe we can -- we -- we know 


which buildings this oper-- activity occurred. 


 And then there was what we call the pilot scale 


research and development operations where they 


were gearing up to do mass quantities of 


thorium production in the late 1950s starting, 


we believe, no earlier than 1958. 


 From those three operations we -- and we looked 


through a number of these health physics 


reports, and the health physics reports tend to 


confirm that the operations occurred in the 


following buildings, which we are proposing to 


add to the class, and that's building 9202, 


9204-1, 9204-3, 9206 and building 9212. 


 For these operations we have very limited air 


monitoring data. I think we have some air 


monitoring data for the Calutron operations and 


we have no bioassay data for thorium for any 


operations that occurred in this. 


And we did provide nine example dose 

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reconstructions that are available on the back 


table, and I hope in the Board packets, for 


selected -- selected types of cases where we 


believe, collectively among our group, that 


they would shed some light on how NIOSH would 


go about doing these dose reconstructions. I 


won't read them all to you. They're there and 


I'd certainly be happy to go over any of them 


if the Board so desires. 


So given -- given the data that we had 


available to look at, we ended up with a 


revised class definition that included all 


employees of the DOE or DOE contractors or 


subcontractors who were monitored or should 


have been monitored for thorium in the 


buildings that I just mentioned -- 9202, 9204­

1, 9204-3, 9206 and 9212 -- and there's the 


usual proviso that it could be for the number 


of work days aggregating 250 days through the 


period, and that period is from January 1948 


through December 1957. 


So we did find evidence that there were sources 


of internal exposures as a result of thorium 


activities in those buildings listed, and we 


lack sufficient bioassay or area monitoring 

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data to estimate these doses with the exposure 


-- estimate the doses associated with exposures 


in these buildings. 


Since we couldn't put a plausible upper bound 


on the thorium exposures, we made a 


determination that health was endangered and -- 


in the buildings where thorium was handled in 


those years, and that some workers in the class 


may have accumulated internal exposure through 


the episodic intake of thorium as a result of 


processing activities. That is, we did not 


find any evidence that there were discrete, 


high level exposures of thorium such as one 


might see in a criticality accident. 


And this is a summary slide that shows the 


various categories of doses that we believe we 


can or cannot reconstruct. You can see the box 


checked for internal exposure of thorium. We 


do believe we can do internal exposure to 


uranium. I don't think we said that we could 


reconstruct doses to uranium workers. I think 


we said that we could just reconstruct uranium 


exposures, is what our concept was. But we 


also believe that we can reconstruct exposures 


to these other what I would call ancillary 

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operations, including the exotic radionuclides, 


polonium-208, and we can reconstruct external 


exposures to beta, gamma, neutron and 


occupational medical exposures. 


(Unintelligible due to operator interference) 


140-page report, that was a walk-through. I 


can certainly answer any questions at this 


point. 


 DR. WADE: Do we have questions for Jim from 


the Board? Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I have a short statement and 


a question. The statement is just -- back to 


the beginning of your presentation, I would 


just like to indicate I think that the Board 


does appreciate all the hard work and fast-


approaching deadlines that both you and SC&A, 


everybody really, and the workgroup involved 


here undergoes. And we always know, no matter 


what we do whenever we have a meeting, at the 


last minute I'm going to be assured that we 


will receive some document in our e-mail, you 


know, ahead of time and -- and I think that, 


you know, that's part of the process and I 


think we -- we understand that there's not time 


to reconcile a lot of these -- these issues yet 

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and I -- I think we sort of understand also 


that timeliness is important. It's helpful to 


have information and that somebody's going to 


be last to get it to us before any meeting and 


so forth, so I think that's -- that's 


understood. 


My question goes back to something you 


mentioned, which is the thorium definition -- 


or thorium worker definition. And given what 


Mr. Turcic said earlier and so forth and some 


of our other discussions, I think that we need 


to think a little bit about how we are going to 


define that or make that operational, should we 


approve that part of the . Whether to do it by 


building or some other way, I don't know, but ­

- so my question is have you given any thought 


to -- to that. One point you referred to it as 


-- as by building in your slide -- 


DR. NETON: Well, what I --


 DR. MELIUS: -- and at another point we talk 


about it as thorium workers, you know. 


DR. NETON: Yes. What I -- what I meant to 


portray here is that we believe that people who 


were engaged in thorium activities in those 


buildings, and by that we would say people who 

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were monitored or should have been monitored 


for thorium exposure in those buildings. It 


doesn't mean they couldn't have been uranium 


workers. For example, SC&A has done a nice 


analysis demonstrating that you could receive, 


for lack of a better term, side-stream exposure 


to thorium while working on a uranium process 


in those buildings. If that were true, then 


those workers should have been monitored for 


thorium and, in my opinion, would be covered 


under the provisions of this class. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, but --


DR. NETON: The Department of Labor, though, 


ultimately will -- will decide the way in which 


they determine eligibility. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Jim, I -- I think that there's a 


question even in that definition 'cause earlier 


today you mentioned using the monitored or 


should have been monitored as we do in the 


current sense, and if we do that as in the 


current sense, it isn't radionuclide-specific 


but rather it's -- it's based on your -- your 


potential to receive --


DR. NETON: Well --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- 100 millirem. 

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DR. NETON: -- let me -- let me -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. That needs a clarification 


there. 


DR. NETON: -- clarify. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And is it going to be consistent 


with your previous... 


DR. NETON: Yes, it's consistent with my 


previous statement. I didn't mean to take it 


to the full degree, which is 100 millirem 


potential from all radionuclides present at the 


facility. I would say that if it was 100 


millirem potential exposure to thorium, in this 


instance, that's what I would consider should 


have been monitored. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That -- that's inconsistent with 


the current regulations -- as I interpret them, 


anyway. 


DR. NETON: I understand that. What I meant to 


say was 100 millirem threshold, and I didn't 


mean to imply that it was from all potential 


sources. It wouldn't make sense in this 


context --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, no, that's --


DR. NETON: -- for me to say all -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that's why I'm asking. 

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I 

DR. NETON: Okay, and I appreciate that 


clarification. That's not what I intended. 


meant the 100 millirem monitoring threshold in 


this case would apply to the radionuclide which 


-- that we can't reconstruct. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, but then that -- still back 


to my original question. How -- can you 


identify those -- those people? Can you go 


through that 1,300 people or whatever that have 


-- were part of the -- you know, sort of the 


potential people that could have been included 


in the petition based on years of work at that 


facility and identify those that were -- would 


fit your definition? 


DR. NETON: We certainly would be willing to 


stand by Department of Labor and assist them in 


making that determination. We do have access 


to department -- departments associated with 


claims and workers. Much of that information 


is included in their files. But again, we 


don't make the determination. We do know that 


these buildings were there, and this is not 


very different than what Pete Turcic was 


talking about at Blockson Chemical they're 


required to determine who worked in building 55 

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where you heard the ultimate outcome of where 


they ended up there. I'm not suggesting that 


would be the outcome at Y-12, but it's up to 


Department of Labor to determine can you put 


these people in those buildings, and if not, 


what's your recourse? And I can't speak to how 


they would do that. 


 DR. WADE: For the record, Pete is not in the 


room at the moment. I think someone went to 


try and get him, but... 


 Other questions for Jim? 


DR. NETON: Now I would -- I would say that we 


did vet this definition with the Department of 


Labor and -- and they did not have, at least in 


the conversation in which I was involved, an 


issue with this definition in itself. 


 DR. WADE: Any other questions from the Board 


for Jim? Dr. Lockey, are you still with us? 


 DR. LOCKEY: I am with you. It's difficult to 


hear the presentation. I -- I could pick up 


bits and pieces of it, but it -- it's tough to 


hear. 


 DR. WADE: Sorry. Do you have any questions, 


based upon what you did hear? 


 DR. LOCKEY: No, not at this time. 

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 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I should say, before I -- 


'cause I guess I'm next, but I should say, Jim, 


that on the workgroup calls, and I was going to 


bring this up anyway, that we had a fair amount 


of discussion about the -- the potential and 


the thorium workers, and I -- I guess from my 


perspective it was more of a question of did we 


-- did -- does -- is NIOSH giving DOL enough 


information to determ-- to adequat-- to 


adequately identify people who fit the class. 


And if -- if they -- certainly they can 


probably figure out buildings -- maybe they can 


figure out if they were in those buildings, but 


then how do you determine if they were, you 


know, potentially -- now I -- I still have some 


issues with this monitored or unmonitored with 


regard to exposure to thorium 'cause I think 


that that's a harder question, 100 millirems to 


thorium versus today's standard, but that's -- 


that's -- aside from that, how do you determine 


if someone was exposed to thorium in that 


building or was just in that building working 


on uranium operations, you know? 


DR. NETON: Well, I can't speak for the 

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Department of Labor --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I know. 


DR. NETON: -- but you've heard examples -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: But I'm saying --


DR. NETON: -- that they apply and I can speak 


to those, that --


 MR. GRIFFON: I understand, but I guess the 


discussions we're having on the workgroup is -- 


is -- you know, does -- I think -- you know, 


DOL needs enough information to make this thing 


-- you know, to be able to implement it, and if 


NIOSH doesn't give enough information, then -- 


then there -- you know, I -- I guess -- 


DR. NETON: I think you've heard ample 


evidence, though, from the Department of Labor 


that where the information can't be determined, 


they -- they seem to make very conservative 


decisions. 


 DR. WADE: We need to --


DR. NETON: But I --


 DR. WADE: We need to get Pete in the room, and 


what I'm going to do, we'll take a couple more 


questions, then we'll take a break with the 


attempt to be to try and reconvene with Pete 


with us and then he can provide direct 

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testimony as to the -- the issues. 


Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: Not a question so much as a 


statement. We have a great deal of concern 


expressed from a number of areas about numerous 


different nuclides, and certainly a lot of talk 


about thorium. But the real question that 


probably should be kept in everyone's mind is 


not whether it was there, it whether the 


quantities were adequate to be significant in 


dose reconstructions and in terms of effect to 


the petitioners. That's -- that's something 


that I don't think, given what I believe the 


data is right now, probably can be defined very 


clearly. But the question, again, is not 


necessarily was it there. We know it's there. 


The question is was the quantity -- was the 


potential exposure significant. 


DR. NETON: I think we do believe that the 


exposure potential was significant. It -- it 


takes a -- more uranium -- more thorium than 


uranium to get -- to get a dose, but it's on 


the order of milligrams. We're not talking 


about mass quantities. And given what we know 


about source term quantities here, it's our 

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opinion that it was definitely possible to get 


enough thorium airborne to -- to endanger the 


health of the workers in those buildings. 


 MS. MUNN: And you know the form it was in. 


DR. NETON: Pardon? 


 MS. MUNN: And you know the form. 


DR. NETON: To a large extent, yes -- 


 MS. MUNN: To a large extent. 


DR. NETON: -- we know what they were doing. 


 DR. WADE: Jim? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, and I think that's precisely 


why it's important that we really understand 


how that definition of a class becomes 


operational because we want to make sure that 


what we're approving -- what we're recommending 


to the Secretary is -- you know, fits both the 


definition of endangerment and cannot -- not 


feasible to reconstruct their dose. So I -- I 


think we have to understand -- make sure we 


understand who we are including in the cohort 


and how that's going to be implemented, and 


that's why I think we need to -- this 


discussion. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. So with your permission, 


particularly, Mark, I would suggest we break 

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for let's say 10 minutes, and during that time 


the Chair will try and find Pete Turcic and see 


that he's in the room, and then we'll come back 


and begin with the report from the working 


group that will lead into Board discussion. 


Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:15 p.m. 


to 3:30 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: Dr. Lockey, are you with us? 


 DR. LOCKEY: Yes, I am. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we have our seven back and -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm here, also, Dr. Wade. 


 DR. WADE: And that is? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Bob Presley. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, you're -- and we appreciate 


your being here as a member of the public. 


Thank you. 


One of the things I neglected to do on the 


agenda was to leave time for petitioners to 


comment. I'd like to inquire whether the 


petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Hall, are on the line 


and would like to make a comment. Is there 


anyone representing the petitioners present? 


 (No responses) 


Is there anyone in the audience who has comment 

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to make that they might think relevant to the 


petition? Richard. 


 MR. MILLER: Hello? Does this work okay? 


 DR. WADE: No. 


 MR. MILLER: No, not at all. 


 DR. WADE: No. 


 MR. MILLER: My name's Richard Miller. I was 


contacted by the Atomic Trades and Labor 


Council, who has an interest in the Special 


Exposure Cohort petition, obviously because 


they represent people at the Y-12 and X-10 


facility. Ken Cook, who is the president of 


the Atomic Trades and Labor Council, had wanted 


to send one of his former members to this 


meeting, an elderly gentleman named Joe 


Wallace, W-a-l-l-a-c-e, who's an insulator and 


-- but on such short notice he couldn't arrange 


to be here. 


 Nonetheless, the issue that they wanted raised, 


and I think what Mr. Wallace would have raised 


based on my telephone conversation with him, 


was as follows, and it is very brief. But it 


speaks to the question of class definition and 


some of the issues that have been raised 


regarding whether one should have an element or 

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isotope-specific class definition. 


 (Unintelligible interruption by a telephone 


participant.) 


 MR. MILLER: Mr. Wallace worked at Y-12 from 


1955 to 1987 and he was an insulator. He said 


that he worked in the entire area, and he said 


there was not a crack or crevice that he did 


not get into in the course of his work. 


I asked him about the class definition, and I 


said did you know, in your years of work there, 


if you or the plant were involved with 


processing of thorium, and he said no, I never 


heard the word pronounced. We nev-- he nev-- 


he said he never knew whether he would have had 


to have been monitored for thorium or not. All 


he said is that the terms he knew were we were 


either exposed to radiation or we had to be 


concerned about beta or gamma and that sort of 


thing, but he had never heard of the word 


thorium being used in the context of his work 


there from 1955 forward. 


He also said with respect to his radiation 


dosimetry history -- and I want to point out 


here that Mr. Wallace has already been 


compensated under this program, so he is not 

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someone who would necessarily benefit from this 


petition. He said that he did not get a dose 


badge when he first went to work there as an 


insulator, and he -- when he started in the 


'50s. He said that tended to pick up more in 


the '60s. And I asked him about his 


participation in the bioassay program, and he 


said that in terms of seeking bioassays, he 


really thought his urinalysis began when the 


lithium enrichment process began, which would 


have been for mercury, and that that was when 


he thought he began actually in the '60s in 


bioassay. 


He also spoke about the question of building-


specific, would you be in a position that if 


you went from building to building doing your 


job, would you have had to create any record 


that you worked in say building 9206 or another 


building. And he said that once you went 


through the perimeter security, you went into 


the buildings where, as he said here, where he 


needed to go, without signing or getting any 


special clearance. So for -- there was no pass 


card. There was no record he went in and out 


of the buildings. Given that, it's going to 

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have real difficulty in establishing, if he -- 


if he were a class representative, how he could 


have been exposed to thorium in a particular 


building and be able to identify his work 


history as having been in that building. 


He also pointed out that one badge served as a 


security pass for everything on the site -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hello? 


 MR. MILLER: -- when he worked there, and he 


had what's called a --


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, John? 


 MR. MILLER: -- badge, and he said not until 


the early '60s --


 MR. PRESLEY: Can you hear? 

 MR. MILLER: -- they had one special -- 

 DR. LOCKEY: I can't hear anything. 

 MR. MILLER: -- they called the --

 DR. LOCKEY: Lockey. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Jim? 

 DR. LOCKEY: Yeah. 

 MS. MUNN: They can't hear. 


 MR. PRESLEY: See if I can get somebody -- I 


don't know what's going on. 


 DR. LOCKEY: I can't hear a thing. 


 MS. MUNN: Hold on, it's probably the mike. 

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We're trying. 


 MR. MILLER: I'll try to speak up here. He 


said that not until the early '60s did he have 


to show a badge at what was called Beta 4 


building. So I guess -- 


 DR. LOCKEY: It sounds like they dropped off 


the face of the earth. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, finish your comment, Richard. 


We'll have to --


 MR. MILLER: So having said that, I think that 


was all he was going to add, but that the 


question arises as to whether to have a 


process-specific class -- this would be my -- 


sort of my comment on it would be that -- or 


whether to have a building-specific class is 


one of the questions before you. And it just 


would seem from Mr. Wallace's experience that a 


building-specific one would be better than an 


element-specific one, but that even he would 


have great difficulty in this class ever 


establishing which building he was in or not in 


as an insulator. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, thank you. Pete Turcic is 


with us now. I don't know if the Board has any 


questions for Pete. When we concluded, Pete, 

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they were starting to form questions for you, 


and I don't know if we want to question Pete 


now or hear the working group's report. 


Okay. So questions for Pete -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Lew? 


 DR. WADE: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can y'all turn the mike up or 


something? We can't hear a thing. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, I'll ask -- is that any 


better? 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's a whole lot better. Thank 


you. 


 DR. WADE: I'd ask all of us to speak very 


close to the mike. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, the questions revolved 


around the issue of the potential class 


definition for this Y-12 SEC, and the questions 


-- is would we be better with a definition now 


as sort of thorium -- monitored for thorium or 


should have been monitored for thorium versus 


something else that would -- might be based on 


building or some other type of designation? 


 MR. TURCIC: What -- in practice, as I was, you 


know, explaining earlier, the way it's written 


now it would in fact become a building-specific 

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class. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: The issue -- you know, as opposed 


to a function class, so you know, from that 


standpoint I'm not sure what the word -- you 


know, by adding or including thorium in the 


definition adds, you know, to the process. I 


mean that is the reason for the -- for the 


class and in our -- you know, the rationale, 


and so then by identifying the buildings where 


the thorium was present, that's how we would 


then operationalize that. And then relative to 


the issue on monitoring, all we would be able 


to do is apply -- you know, occupations under 


the current -- what would have internal 


monitoring. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: And based on that, then basically 


what that would do is if someone was there for, 


you know, a short period of time, that may 


exclude them. But if someone was in that 


building, our interpretation -- you know, and 


assigned to that buil-- routinely assigned to 


that building, our interpretation would be that 


they should have been monitored, and so with 

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that interpretation, for all practical 


purposes, really becomes a building-specific 


class definition. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Pete. That's most 


informative. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Any other questions for the good Mr. 


Turcic? 


 (No responses) 


Dr. Lockey, any questions for Pete? 


 DR. LOCKEY: My question is, what Pete just 


said is that the petition is a building-


specific petition in relationship to thorium? 


 DR. WADE: Pete? Would you repeat your 


question, Dr. Lockey? 


 DR. LOCKEY: I didn't quite hear what he said 


when he said this petition in effect would be 


treated as a -- a building-specific petition? 


 MR. TURCIC: Yes, we would -- we would apply 


the class by the buildings where the thorium 


was used, so in that sense, and as I said 


earlier, that is much preferable than a 


functional definition. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so this distinction of 

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monitored or should have been monitored for 


exposures to ra-- to thorium, you -- you're 


really dropping that "for exposures to thorium" 


part of the -- in your practical application of 


this --


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you would just be saying we're 


looking at these buildings and determining 


whether they mon-- were monitored -- 


 MR. TURCIC: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- or should have been monitored 


under the current standards. 


 MR. TURCIC: Exactly. Exactly. 


 DR. WADE: You'd be looking for people who 


worked in those buildings. 


 MR. TURCIC: That's correct, uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. That's -- that's most 


informative. Thank you. 


 DR. LOCKEY: I have one other question. 


 DR. WADE: Surely. 


 DR. LOCKEY: If -- if in fact then -- if you 


were assigned to work in that building, that's 


understandable. What happens if in fact your 


assignment was at another building but you had 


access to the building? 

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263

 MR. TURCIC: That would be treated in -- in the 


same manner. We would -- we would have to come 


up with -- you know, for occupations where that 


was common, we would then, you know, unless 


there was evidence to the contrary, assume that 


they have access to the building, you know, 


such as maintenance people and so forth. 


 DR. LOCKEY: And so they would be included? 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, they -- so they would be 


included in the class, correct. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Anything else, Dr. Lockey? 


 DR. LOCKEY: No. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Anything else, Board 


members here? 


 (No responses) 


 Thank you, Pete. Please, if you could stay 


with us just in case we -- we come up with 


another question for you. I think your 


presence here has been most appreciated by -- 


by the Board. 


 MS. MUNN: Indeed. 


WORK GROUP REPORT, MR. MARK GRIFFON, CHAIR


 DR. WADE: We'll turn now to the chair of the 


working group -- that's one Mark Griffon -- who 


has a petition -- who has a report to bring to 

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the Board. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I just have a -- a 


brief report on our workgroup activities to 


date, and I'll try to not be repetitive from 


what we've heard from Arjun and from Jim, but I 


think -- mainly I want to kind of update on -- 


on some items that -- that came up during the 


workgroup in certain major categories that we ­

- some of which we've discussed already. And 


then at the end of this I want to kind of say, 


from the workgroup's standpoint, what we see 


remaining and -- and sort of discuss a path 


forward on this. 


So basic-- the one thing I want to emphasize on 


the front end, as I saw Arjun and Jim present, 


I do want to -- and I think others have 


recognized this -- the time line, and that the 


evaluation report that -- that was -- we -- we 


received that on April 7th. We had been 


working on the site profile for a while, but 


really April 7th everybody was crunched, and 


then we -- we had a workgroup meeting on April 


11th, received new materials on April 14th, 


17th, had another meeting on the 20th, and then 


we're doing two drafts over the weekend in 

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preparation for this meeting. So you know, I 


think that -- that we're -- we're close on a 


number of issues, but I think in -- in some -- 


some statements had to be qualified 'cause 


there was a sort of a rushed review on 


everybody's part, so -- but I think the 


workgroup made -- made great progress so far in 


this. 


First issue I wanted to discuss was -- was the 


thorium question. Some of the -- some of these 


things may have been already addressed by your 


statements, the Department of Labor, but during 


the discussion a couple of things were 


mentioned during the workgroup meetings. One 


was the question of these buildings, whether 


these four in fact were the only four, and I 


think we might have a little more work to 


verify that. And -- but -- but I think we're 


close. And again, the timing of this prevented 


us maybe from coming to complete closure on 


this. Jim did provide documents, but they were 


-- they were posted on the O drive, you know, 


maybe a week ago -- I'm not sure of the date on 


that, but you know, it was recent. So SC&A 


reviewed it, but we still I think need to 

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completely close that out. 


 Another discussion revolved around sort of the 


where or how -- the quantity, and Arjun's 


mentioned some things on that. I think we need 


further investigation on that, further 


clarification. Some of the waste -- I don't 


think he was proposing that the burial grounds 


at X-10 be included, it was just pointing out 


that somehow that volume was generated and 


where it came from was unclear. And if it in 


fact was generated from Y-12 processes, then 


the -- the magnitude of the quantities we're 


discussing might be a little higher. So again, 


that was -- I think that was the spirit with 


which that was brought forward by SC&A. 


We did during the workgroup calls have a -- a 


good discussion about some data that exists. 


There's -- there's finally some ledger data -- 


ledger records that have tracked the quanti-- 


quantities of -- of all these isotopes that -- 


that were received by the site. And Mel Chew 


on the workgroup discussions went further than 


that and said that actually for thorium he 


believed that records existed that could show 


the -- the allocation of the thorium into 

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various buildings. So that's another piece of 


information we kind of recently heard. 


Now he did also say that these records probably 


existed -- at least within classified records; 


I'm not sure if they were classified themselves 


or within a -- within a volume of classified 


records, but it might take some -- you know, 


some time to retrieve, but they -- he -- he 


believed fully that they existed. 


 Another point for consideration is that -- that 


was brought out was that there was some limited 


sampling -- I think Jim mentioned this. There 


was some limited air sampling during the period 


and my -- I think I'm correct on that, air 


sampling -- and then post this period there was 


some fecal monitoring for some workers for 


thorium. I believe it was fecal, not -- not 


urinalysis. So just another, you know, limited 


-- certainly limited data with regard to doing 


individual dose reconstructions, but there was 


some pieces there. Nothing during the time 


period in question, I don't believe, except 


maybe some -- some limited air -- air sampling. 


And then finally I think the fourth point we 


discussed on the thorium was just the point 

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that -- that Pete addressed for us, which was 


the concern about defining this -- this -- this 


class definition. I won't go into that 


anymore. I think we've discussed that quite a 


bit. 


The second big topic -- I think I got kind of 


four big topics that -- that we discussed. 


Data validation certainly, and it was -- Arjun 


went -- had quite a few slides on this topic. 


I -- I think it is worthwhile and -- and I -- I 


started to list out all the pieces of 


information that -- that NIOSH has gathered to 


-- and we've been calling it check reliability 


of the database for use, and again I'll say if 


-- if -- for people who weren't here yesterday, 


you know, it -- it becomes even more important 


probably at Y-12 because probably 80 percent of 


the workers do require coworker data to 


reconstruct doses, so if in fact it -- it's 


deemed unreliable, then we've got some 


problems. So a reliability check was -- was, I 


think, certainly worthwhile. 


 For external dose records, as was mentioned 


earlier, and the -- the '51 raw data didn't 


match. I think Jim now has -- has probably got 

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our answer for that, but as -- as -- at the 


time of these reports over the weekend, we 


didn't have that last bit of information, so 


there might -- that might be resolved. They 


did do some individual matches for 1953, and 


they matched very well with the database. They 


tracked several individuals and I -- I believe 


they summed the weekly -- weekly badge data 


together and -- and came up with the -- and it 


-- and it matched pretty well with the report-- 


the reported amount in the CER database in 


1953. 


The last part was this question of internal 


inconsistencies in the database, and even 


though it's -- you know, it -- it's -- well, 


there's two things there. One is, you know, 


the -- the penetrating millirem field wasn't 


adding up correctly with gamma plus neutron, as 


Arjun said, for '52 to '55. It -- it raises 


some -- some doubts of why that would have 


happened. The -- the -- I guess the other 


thing to -- to -- to point out is that the 


model -- the coworker model relies on data 


after that point. Right? So -- so it doesn't 


necessarily affect the coworker model, but it 

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just -- just -- it just sort of raises some 


questions of why that would happen and, you 


know, could something else have happened or -- 


or, you know, are there other problems in this 


database that we're just not able to take to 


ground. That's -- that's kind of the question. 


Now I -- I sort of listed these out 'cause I 


think it's useful to see, you know, as Wanda's 


raised yesterday and at previous times, you 


know, just this question of how much is enough, 


and I think we need to consider all these 


things. And just 'cause one thing -- we still 


have some questions on it, doesn't mean 


necessarily -- says the database is invalid, 


but you know, raises -- I think we need to take 


it in aggregate and consider it. 


On the internal side, I think -- and it -- I -- 


I think that the data to -- to this point is -- 


and this is my opinion. It seems like they 


have a stronger argument for -- that it -- it 


is a -- is a reliable set of data. And a 


number of things that were -- number of 


individual data points from some of the early 


health physics reports that NIOSH was able to 


cross-walk, maximum values, the -- the percent 

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that were greater than the maximum permissible 


limit. Say they said five percent of values 


were found greater than 70, and they looked in 


the database and they actually matched that 


number fairly closely, so some of those things 


were matched up nicely. 


I think the most convincing point for me was 


the graphs of the percentiles of data in the 


health physics report. They showed the 50th, 


75th and 90th percentiles by -- by week over a 


half a year, and I know that NIOSH reported on 


one year and I think I -- I've actually -- I 


haven't written this out, but I did some backof-the-envelope sort of checks on these other 


years that were in the reports and they seem 


very -- very close to the values. And that's 


reassuring in the overall sense 'cause -- 


'cause really what you're doing with this data 


is you're relying on a distribution anyway -- 


in the coworker model -- so if the 90th 


percentile matches up, you might have some -- 


some small problems with certain data points, 


but -- but your distribution's -- basically 


looks the same, so that was reassuring. 


The -- another point that was brought out was 

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the -- I don't know if Jim mentioned this, but 


the CER database actually is the Y-12 database. 


It was just transferred directly, so it's not 


as if this was a database made specifically for 


epidemiological research. It was taken in its 


entirety, so there wasn't any manipulation in 


between for -- for epi study purposes. And --


and further than that, they've produced a memo 


that seems to indicate that DOE had basically 


accepted the database data as the official 


record. And with that, the assumption is that 


that would have required DOE to check the 


quality of this thing before they allowed Y-12 


to use this database as the database of record. 


They weren't able to track this primary source. 


They believe it exists somewhere, but -- some 


communication directly with DOE, but they did 


identify within a -- I believe it was a health 


physics report that cited that this 


communication had occurred with DOE and that 


they had approved it or something to that 


effect. I'm -- I actually haven't read the 


memo, so -- but it is a Hap West health physics 


report. 


On the raw -- comparison of the raw data from 

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the urinalysis standpoint, they weren't as 


successful. But notwithstanding this, this 


good information. They have health physics 


reports and good corroboration. They did find 


some urine -- urinalysis punch cards, but they 


were really outside the period of concern. 


They were more in the 1970s, I believe. They 


were able to match them -- I guess reasonable 


matches were found. Part of the reason they 


didn't have -- they -- they couldn't do a 


direct comparison was because the card data did 


not include background values or -- or 


efficiencies, I guess, so they -- they had to 


assume certain nominal values and do a 


calculation and -- and got reasonable matches 


with the data they checked, and checked a 


limited number of cards on that. But again, 


the -- the other question there is it was sort 


of outside the period of interest. 


Finally, at one point on the workgroup process 


it was indicated that the urinalysis log books 


were available, and then I guess further 


inspection -- they -- they just never turned 


these up, so we never were able to actually 


cross-walk anything with urinalysis log books. 

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So that's -- that's the overview of the 


internal sort of data elements they looked 


through. And I go through that list only 


because I think if we're -- if we're really 


considering, you know, how much is enough, I 


think you got to get a sense of all the 


elements that they looked at and -- and 


consider it that way. 


You know, a summary for the external -- I think 


I've done the summary actually for both of 


these, and the internal, again, you know, the ­

- it seems that the HP reports with their 


percentile data, in my opinion, gives the 


strongest evidence. Should be noted, though, 


that these reports were mostly, I think, from 


the '51 through '53 time frame. 


Now Jim just mentioned something that I wasn't 


aware of, that the mid-'50s reports are 


probably out there but they're still under 


classification review, so that -- that might 


provide even further corroboration on -- on 


that part of the database. 


With regard to external dose reconstruction, I 


-- I think -- Jim mentioned, Arjun mentioned 


this and Jim both discussed this. I think 

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really where we're at with that is we need to 


finalize the review of the coworker models and 


-- both the gamma and beta coworker models and 


-- you know, notwithstanding the previous 


discussion about data validation -- assuming 


that the database is okay, I think at least 


we're -- we're -- from what I've surmised from 


the -- from the process is that we're likely 


going to end up with something that is not an 


SEC issue here. There might be some -- I -- I 


think in some -- in some respects, and probably 


because of the timing on this, there's a little 


bit of talking past each other on some of the 


statistical analysis of these coworker models, 


but I think that -- you know, in the end of the 


day it's likely not to be an SEC issue because 


it's -- it's just a matter of how to model it, 


not whether it can be modeled and not whether a 


maximum plausible can be established. 


Then on internal dose reconstruction I think 


where -- where we stand -- there -- there 


remains this question of the uranium in the '48 


to '51 time period, and I -- you know, I -- I 


heard -- it's interesting with -- we're -- 


we're pulling the other -- all perspectives 

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now, but I heard Arjun's interpretation and I 


heard Jim's -- Jim's sort of action on this, 


and again we're all in real time on this. 
I 


thought I -- I indicated the follow-up for that 


period was not just to determine if they had -- 


you know, for some odd reason all these guys 


had been fired the day before these samples 


were to be taken and they weren't in the 


database in '52. I -- I guess what we wanted 


was just evidence that what appears to be, the 


way Jim presents it, a very conservative 


approach, back-calculating from '52, assuming a 


chronic exposure during the whole time period. 


We just want evidence that that bounds these 


salvage workers who had a very -- it's a 


different type of job, different type of work 


and -- and I've at least seen some health 


physics reports that indicate a lot of times 


these salvage workers -- I saw one health 


physics report, I can't remember exactly when 


it was, but a high percentage of these -- these 


people were over the MPL and -- and out of -- 


out of four other workgroups there were -- 


there were one or two and there were like 13 of 


these people, so it raises the question in my 

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mind and I think in SC&A's mind that -- well, 


let's just make sure that we're bounding the 


dose. And we -- we talked about possibilities 


of, you know, was there any air sampling that 


could sort of -- they could look at during that 


period and say, you know, we're not going to 


rely on this for dose reconstruction, but it 


does show that our method is conservative, 


something like that. Or for example they could 


say we identified some salvage workers from 


that early time period and in fact we have at 


least this many and -- and -- that were still 


working in '52 and on the urinalysis program. 


I think that's the other factor. If they did 


salvage work from '48 to '51 and then shifted 


over somewhere where they weren't on the 


priority urine list -- they might not have been 


fired, but they might have been another -- you 


know, another job. So I thought there -- there 


was just -- and I don't -- I don't think it's ­

- I -- I think it's close to closed, but I 


think it needs just a final piece to -- to 


demonstrate that the approach you -- that NIOSH 


proposed is going to be bounding, that's all. 


Then we have -- from the internal side, I think 

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the other sort of action that I see out there 


is -- is on the exotics, and I think -- this -- 


this came -- as of our last conference call, I 


think Jim described a five-pronged approach, 


and I guess when I had the matrix I was looking 


for a -- you know, a methodology and I didn't 


even -- I didn't know it was going to be a TIB 


or what it was going to be, and Jim e-mailed me 


sort of a fi-- you know, five steps that would 


be taken to do these DRs. And it's not that it 


doesn't look reasonable, but I think we really 


haven't had time to digest that approach. And 


we did ask for at least maybe some sampling of 


what these incident data reports look like, and 


I know Jim said he -- you know, they can be 


pulled and they're wor-- they're probably 


working on that, working toward that. But I 


think that that's -- you know, that we just 


want to see a little bit -- maybe have a little 


further discussion on that approach and 


everybody can sort of sign off on this five-


pronged approach. I think it's -- it's almost 


there, but again it was -- it was the day after 


the last meeting, probably the -- April 21st 


that we sort of got something in writing on 

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this and... 


 And then lastly, the DR examples. I think 


Arjun mentioned this. The -- these have come 


to us late and they're -- SC&A is currently 


trying to go through these, but I think these 


are important and that -- as a Board we've 


always said that this is where we want to see 


sort of proof of principle, and I think we just 


need to -- to allow ourselves time to -- and 


SC&A time to adequately review those and come 


back to us and say okay -- you know -- and I 


think we -- we got quick presentations on 


those, but you know, just the timing I think on 


those is the issue, not so much the content 


yet, but the timing and time to review them. 


And I guess to conclude, I think we're pretty 


close, but you know, I -- I know -- I was -- 


you know, there -- there's some -- there's many 


little things, but I think we're pretty close 


overall and -- but I don't think as a workgroup 


that we're prepared at this meeting to make a 


motion on the class, and I -- I think I -- at 


least as the workgroup we would recommend that 


we continue our workgroup process and be 


prepared at the next Board meeting to bring a 

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recommendation to the Board. And like I said, 


I -- I don't think -- and I would hope that 


we're not down to -- you know, I hope we don't 


have seven workgroup meetings in between this 


and the next Board meeting. You know, I think 


we're closer than that and it can be achieved 


by that, and we'll have had time to step back 


and assess these -- these sort of lingering 


elements adequately. And that's -– 


BOARD DISCUSSION


 DR. WADE: I heard at the end of your workgroup 


report a recommendation. I believe that the 


procedure would be to have that recommendation 


seconded and then voted upon, accepted by the 


Board as the Board's recommendation. 


 Before that, though, I'd like to give an 


opportunity to other members of the working 


group to offer any opinions that they might 


like. The working group consisted of Wanda, 


Mike and Robert Presley. Robert Presley did 


not participate in the working group's 


deliberations as it related to the Y-12 SEC 


petition, but at this point I think it would be 


appropriate to hear if there are any comments 


from other workgroup members that want to be 

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put on the record. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, this has been an extremely 


difficult but ultimately, I think, fruitful 


working group. It has covered a much larger 


number of issues than this member ever 


anticipated when we undertook it. But I hope 


that it will serve to establish a method of 


approach for other similar complex sites that 


will make it easier in the future. 


I agree with Mark. We're not quite ready to 


say yes -- I would like to be able to say 


enough -- this is enough, we've done it. But 


there are one or two, as Mark pointed out, 


three or four now very well-defined issues that 


need to perhaps have a ribbon tied around them. 


And I would hope we could have one working 


group that would not require an enormous amount 


of effort on either the agency or the 


subcontractor. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Mike, any comment you'd 


like to add? 


 MR. GIBSON: I'd just like to say that I agree 


with my working group colleagues that this has 


turned into a lot bigger issue than what we 


anticipated. There's been tons of documents 

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back and forth by a lot of hard work by NIOSH 


and SC&A and it does take a lot of time to 


review them. And each time you review them, it 


-- it pars down the issues, but it brings out 


more specific points that you just need to run 


to ground. And you know, I think we've come 


from many issues down to just the few that Mark 


mentioned, and I, too, believe that another -- 


another call or two, hopefully at the most, 


maybe we can be done with this and get the 


matrix all settled out and be ready to present 


something to the Board at the next meeting. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Mark, could I ask you to 


restate your recommendation? After that I'd be 


looking for a motion that would embody that 


recommendation. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


 MS. MUNN: (inaudible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: What's that? 


 MS. MUNN: One face-to-face. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I recommend that -- 


that our current workgroup proceed our 


deliberation process with NIOSH and SC&A to 


revolve -- resolve the final outstanding items 


within the Y-12 -- or with-- identified in the 

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Y-12 SEC evaluation report review. 


 DR. WADE: Is there an expectation that it 


would come to the Board for its next meeting? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, with the expectation -- 


thank you, Lew. With the expectation that 


we'll come to the next Board meeting with a 


recommendation on the evaluation report. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. I would entertain a motion to 


that effect. 


 MS. MUNN: So moved. 


 DR. WADE: Second? 


 MR. GIBSON: Second. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we have a motion and a second. 


Is -- it's open for discussion. 


 DR. MELIUS: First of all -- I mean I -- as 


complex as this has been, I don't think it's 


certainly out of the ordinary that it would -- 


given that the SEC evaluation report was only 


received a few weeks ago, that it's going to 


take some time to eval-- you know, review that 


and -- and make recommendations on that. So 


doing that at the -- the June meeting I think 


is -- is appropriate. 


My question to you is the -- is -- are we 


resolving the site profile review or are we 

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trying to resolve issues related to the SEC 


review? I don't want to wish more meetings on 


you, but I'm a little confused by where we 


stand 'cause we started out as a site profile 


process and then we've sort of morphed it into 


a SEC process and I'm not quite sure where we 


are with --


 MR. GRIFFON: We're closing only on the -- I'm 


talking about closing on the -- the motion 


described was for the evaluation report, not on 


the site profile. 


 DR. MELIUS: So there'll still be issues 


related to the site profile -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: There's still -- yes -- 


 DR. MELIUS: -- since it covers --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- beyond cl--


 DR. MELIUS: -- other years -- additional years 


and --


 MR. GRIFFON: Correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- so forth. Okay. I just was 


trying to understand that and... 


 MS. MUNN: Not many, though. 


 DR. WADE: Other discussion? 


 DR. MELIUS: I guess I would like some 


discussion of how we sort of present this to 

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the Board, but I think we need to vote on the 


motion first. 


 DR. WADE: Other discussion? 


 (No responses) 


Dr. Lockey, do you have any discussion to 


offer? 


 DR. LOCKEY: No. 


 DR. WADE: Other discussion? 


 (No responses) 


So we have a motion and a second. I guess 


because Dr. Lockey is on the phone I'll just go 


around the table and ask you to designate 


whether you are in favor of the motion or not. 


Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: In favor. 


 DR. WADE: Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Jim? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Mike? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Brad? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yes. 

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 DR. WADE: Dr. Lockey? 


 DR. LOCKEY: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. So the motion is approved. 


What's your pleasure in terms of other issues 


related to the Y-12 SEC petition? 


 DR. MELIUS: My issue or request was at the 


time we get this present-- the next 


presentation of the Board -- first of all, I 


don't think that Jim Neton or someone from 


NIOSH needs to repeat the whole presentation we 


-- we've done before. We've heard this before. 


But there -- there may be some key issues that 


need to be presented and one of -- would be, I 


think, helpful to start out maybe with Mark 


sort of -- or someone from the workgroup 


presenting sort of what the workgroup has done 


and sort of just briefly going through issues 


that have been resolved and here's what's left. 


And then give NIOSH an opportunity to -- to 


maybe speak more to -- to those issues, as well 


as SC&A, as appropriate. And then we can come 


to some resolution -- resolution on -- on that 


and a -- and a, you know, final recommendation 


and a vote and so forth. 


 MS. MUNN: The matrix returns. 

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 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I would just -- just a 


comment on that. I just think it'd be helpful 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- matrix. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- for those of us not -- not been 


involved in -- or outside this workgroup to 


sort of understand the context -- I mean 'cause 


we tend to narrow down the issues and forget 


all the things that have been taken care of 


already, which -- which is sizeable, yet those 


are in some ways just as important to making a 


decision on the SEC --


 MR. GRIFFON: That's right. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- evaluation. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I would remind, if you need 


some reading material on the flight home, you 


know, there's -- there are like four matrices I 


think developed for the Y-12 review that are 


dated April 22nd, March 27th, February 27th -- 


actually it might be the -- those three, and 


they sort of track the progress so you can see 


items either being completed or -- some items 


completed and new items added, you know, so you 


can see sort of the evolution of it if you 


really want to look at those details. But I'll 

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also offer that I'll -- I'll give a summary of 


where we've -- what we've done, what we've 


closed out and where we -- what remains, that 


kind of thing. 


 DR. MELIUS: If I put everything into my carryon, I think I'd have to throw out my clothes to 


-- all the Y-12 information -- over the limit. 


 DR. WADE: Any other discussion on this issue 


before I turn it back to Dr. Ziemer? 


 (No responses) 


I'd like to end with one comment, as a 


Designated Federal Official. I think the Board 


does need to continue to address the issue of 


how much is enough. I mean it's -- it's a 


difficult issue. I applaud the work of 


everyone in terms of digging in this, but -- 


but I do think that the question of how much is 


enough is a valid question and it needs to be ­

- to be looked at. 


Also I would remind you that timeliness is a 


virtue we've all espoused, and I think we want 


to live true to that virtue as we approach 


making a decision on this -- on this very 


difficult issue. 


And my last act as Chair would be to formally 

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thank Pete Turcic for coming. I think your 


presence here added a great deal. I would 


suggest that the Board exercise the prerogative 


of inviting Pete back regularly to -- to 


participate in these discussions. 


 DR. MELIUS: I'd like a trip to Washington. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, so this issue's closed and Dr. 


Ziemer can come back. 


 MR. GIBSON: Lew, --


 DR. WADE: Oh, I'm sorry. 


 MR. GIBSON: -- just one comment is that 


throughout this process, hopefully when 


everyone on the Board sees the iterations of 


the matrix and everything else, it may help 


pare down future working group actions that, 


you know, may not be as -- as long-winded and 


tedious and kill as many trees. 


 DR. WADE: We -- we will certainly hold that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Lessons learned, yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, but -- I'd just express a 


contrary opinion. I think -- I don't think we 


-- you remember this started as a site profile 


review, and so by the very nature of that 


there's going to be a lot of -- a lot of 


issues. It's a complex site with a lot of data 

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and I don't think we need to worry too much 


about the fact that it takes a long time and 


takes a lot of effort. And yeah, hopefully we 


learned from what we've done so far, but at the 


same time I don't think you need to apologize 


by the fact that you -- you made the effort. 


 MR. GIBSON: Well, I -- I really wasn't -- I 


guess what I was saying -- 


 DR. MELIUS: I know what you were saying. 


 MR. GIBSON: -- some of the lessons we've 


learned is -- you know, I think the group 


members would agree with me that I think we've 


learned conference calls -- eight or nine-hour 


conference calls on these issues are as 


productive as face-to-face meetings. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. A 


couple of housekeeping things before we move 


forward. Board members, you should have 


received on your -- at your table place the 


minutes for the January 24th through 26th 


meeting, and we will act on those tomorrow. 


want to make sure you're aware that you have 


some bedside reading tonight. 


Also we have an early draft -- at least I do; 


do the other members have this? 


I 
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 DR. MELIUS: All the members do, and then I -- 


I think, after getting a little bit of input 


from the members, we can revise and make it 


available tomorrow in time for -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, we're not going to -- 

 DR. MELIUS: -- our full --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- act on this, but I -- I want 

the members to note that you have a preliminary 


version of the proposed motion dealing with the 


Pacific Proving Ground SEC petition that Dr. 


Melius has prepared for us, and this will be an 


opportunity for you to see it in advance before 


it comes to the table tomorrow. And I guess, 


Jim, if there's specific questions -- I don't 


think we want to discuss the motion now, but 


people can have a chance to digest it and even 


make suggestions to you off-line, if necessary. 


 DR. MELIUS: Correct. There's some new wording 


in there relative to some issues that we 


haven't considered before, and I think since we 


have two motions to deal with, it's helpful to 


get some input on both -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, and the motion for the 


other site will be somewhat parallel to this. 


I think the -- the new material is the second 

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to last paragraph, specifically, that deals 


with the issue of those discrete events. 


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Jim, will you send me a copy on 


e-mail, please? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, we need to e-mail a copy to 


Mr. Presley and to Dr. Lockey, as well. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, as I get to -- when I get to 


my room tonight I'll do that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: You'll do that. Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: That's what my card was up for. 


wanted to make sure that the Chairman of the 


NTS group had a copy of this and that Dr. 


Lockey did, as well. 


CONFLICT OF INTEREST


 DR. ZIEMER: The other issue now that we 


carried forward, in a sense, from this morning 


-- we had the initial discussion on conflict of 


interest. I indicated this morning that we 


might have further time to discuss that. It 


could also be carried forward to tomorrow. But 


we do have a little time yet this afternoon, so 


we could reopen that discussion on conflict of 


interest, having had, first of all, the 


materials from NIO-- or from -- yes, from 


I 
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NIOSH, the draft of their proposed policy, some 


additional input from -- from Mr. Miller and 


some others. 


So let us reopen the floor for discussions on 


conflict of interest and at least talk about 


issues of concern. We don't have to 


necessarily come to closure on these now, but I 


think we need to get on the floor either ideas 


or concerns that individuals may have relative 


to the policy or its implications. 


 Dr. Melius, you were waving your tent there. 


Is that --


 DR. MELIUS: Give me a second here -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- or is that just a --


 DR. MELIUS: If somebody else is ahead of me, I 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- it's just a habit. 


 DR. MELIUS: Little bit of a habit. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Okay, Wanda Munn is going 


to kick it off. 


 MS. MUNN: Although we -- I don't know about 


the rest of the Board. Having not had an 


opportunity to really absorb this and think 


about it very deeply, it nevertheless gives one 


pause. The concern is primarily what drives 

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the need for these extensive permutations with 


respect to conflict of interest; the fear that 


this is being driven by perceptions rather than 


by realities. There is no way that changing 


our approach will, I believe, change 


perceptions with respect to conflicts of 


interest. Anything that we do can always be 


improved. But there is a real reason to try to 


be very clear about what specific parts of our 


activities that we undergo here are being 


perceived as being questionable, and why those 


perceptions exist. One constantly hears that 


perception is reality, and I personally refuse 


to accept that. Perfection is not --


perception is not reality. Reality is reality. 


And it behooves us, as we look at things like 


conflict of interest proposals, to identify 


what better situation would this change put us 


in. In the same breath, what additional 


problems does this bring to us. One can't help 


but be concerned over the enormous amount of 


time, effort and consequently financial 


expenditure that's being, from my perspective, 


proposed as a result of this new document. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Yes, Dr. Wade. 

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 DR. WADE: I'll try and address that, Wanda, 


although, you know, there are many answers to 


your question. But I'll give you the agency 


perspective in terms of what drives us. 


 Again, we're doing the people's business and -- 


and in that business we are passing judgment on 


individuals' claims by -- by a dose 


reconstruction. We're passing judgment on 


peoples' claims with regard to the SEC process. 


So we are involved in that -- my agency is 


involved in that. This Board is involved in 


making recommendations to that effect. 


We therefore need to be sure that the people 


who we are rendering judgments about can have 


confidence in the impartiality of the 


deliberations and the process. And I think one 


of the things we worry about is, if you look 


back in history at a particular site, and if 


you were to find the people who built and owned 


and administered the -- the radiation health 


protection programs at that site now coming 


forward to pass judgment on the adequacy of 


what they've done by virtue of their work in 


terms of dose reconstruction or SEC petition 


evaluation, that raises a concern for my 

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agency. And that's part of what drives us down 


this path. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Dr. Melius? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Yeah, I would certainly 


concur with what Lew said, and I think it's 


also critical to the credibility of this 


program that we have a defined approach to 


that, that we've not done that in the past as 


well as we should and I think now's the time to 


make sure that we correct those -- those 


problems. You know, recognizing that it does 


require time and effort, but I think it's 


critical if people are going to trust this 


program and trust the decisions that are made 


within the program. 


My -- my question is -- and I don't have the 


former policy in front of me so I'm going from 


memory, but if I understand this correctly, we 


-- in this new policy we've now made some 


changes that make this -- the new policy less 


stringent than the old. And it's particularly 


in terms of how people, the site experts and 


the subject experts -- particularly site 


experts -- are handled. If I -- my 


recollection from the old document was that 

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site experts was considered a key program 


function. Now this current -- in the current 


one they're listed as -- in it are non-key 


program function, but then we have documents 


that are key program function documents, and 


it's extremely, at least to me, very -- very 


confusing trying to und-- understand that -- 


that change and what's meant by that. But I --


I think that gi-- given some of the issues that 


have been raised about -- at some of the sites 


so far, I think that the site experts have been 


the ones that -- where there has been the most 


que-- question raised about their roles and so 


forth. And I want to be clear that I 


understand what you mean by this new doc-- new 


document relative to those people. 


 DR. WADE: And I appreciate that, and I 


apologize for the -- for confusion. It -- we 


would try to eliminate it, but it's impossible 


as you deal with issues of this type. 


As I mentioned this morning, if someone worked 


at a site -- at a site in question, that person 


would be found to be conflicted, and therefore 


that person could not perform a key program 


function. It doesn't mean that person could 

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not be a site expert. And as a site expert 


could provide input to these processes, could 


even speak at a meeting to these processes, but 


they would not be the principal author of the 


document, the reviewer of the document or the 


approver of the document. So I don't think in 


that sense it's intended to be any less 


stringent than it was before. 


But I've had several people mention that to me 


and I think we really need to explore that in 


more detail. It was certainly not the 


intention of the authors of the document to 


relax on that issue, but -- but to make it 


clear who -- who was contributing and to do the 


attribution as appropriate, but not to allow 


someone who was -- who had worked at that site 


the ability to perform a key program function. 


 DR. MELIUS: It's -- it's certainly not how I 


recall our discussion of the last conflict of 


interest policy. And as I said, I don't have a 


copy with me and it's -- I'd certainly raise 


some issues about them representing the program 


and speaking for the program. I think that's a 


fundamental source of a lot of the -- the 


issues we -- we have now. A person who's a 

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site expert goes and holds a meeting with the 


representatives of the workers at the facility 


to get input about that facility. Well, it's 


input about the program that that per-- that 


site expert had developed and people I think 


are going to naturally have some issues about 


whether that site expert is going to take that 


information back and, you know, treat it -- 


treat it fairly and -- and so forth. I mean --


 DR. WADE: That is a valid point. 


 DR. MELIUS: Similarly, I -- I think that we 


also have the document own reporting -- a lot 


of responsibility on them, and certainly we -- 


we haven't seen evidence that and -- some of 


the recent workgroup discussions and so forth 


the reported document owners have not really 


been significant participants, so -- we've 


instead heard from site experts and subject 


experts, and I think that raises some problem-- 


problems, also, particularly when they -- 


again, if someone's called on to address 


something it's one thing. It's -- it's another 


thing when they're the ones essentially leading 


the discussions. 


 DR. WADE: Understood. I -- those are issues I 

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have been aware of and I've been on all of the 


workgroup calls. I think we have been trying 


to work that issue, and in my monitoring we've 


done a better job of seeing that all people 


with conflicts are identified and that those 


people with conflicts are not leading the 


discussion but are only there to ask -- answer 


specific questions when asked. Again, we need 


to continue to monitor that, but that's the -- 


the goal that we have in mind with regard to 


the interactions, the workgroup calls, and I 


think we're doing a better job on that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And it may be that one has to look 


at the other side of this at the same time and 


not only assure that the owner has no 


conflicts, but that the owner is in fact in a 


position to actually make the judgments on the 


validity of the site expert's testimony and the 


other materials that come so that -- so that 


there's a level of confidence that the site 


(sic) owner himself or herself is truly a 


competent individual and can -- that we have 


confidence in the owner so that if there is an 


issue with -- or some possibility that there's 


a perceived bias, that the owner can deal with 

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that in a clear and effective way. 


 DR. WADE: And that's the conundrum in what 


we're trying to do. You want someone who is 


competent and able to make that judgment, and 


yet you want a person who is not conflicted. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Not the expert. Dr. DeHart? 


 DR. DEHART: In your presentation this morning 


and in my brief opportunity to review this, I 


see -- I think for the first time -- a true 


balance. In other words, in the past we have 


taken great care to ensure that anyone who has 


worked in behalf of the government is watched 


over very carefully. Now we're seeing that if 


there has been a litigation and -- both sides 


now are expected to be -- be watched, as it 


were, for -- for bias and other issues. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. And just to give some 


credit, the model that was used for the 


document in front of you really was the SC&A 


conflict of interest policy, and it contained 


that balance and we found it important and 


tried to incorporate it into this document. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Jim. 
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 DR. MELIUS: Just if, again, my recollection is 


correct, we made a deliberate distinction 


between the SC&A -- what we -- the policy for 


our contractor, SC&A, and the policy we've had 


in place for -- for other participants in this 


program and so forth, and there were reasons 


for that and the -- the balance that Roy 


applauds, I have some concerns about. We had 


gone through this once before in the Board and 


reached a decision. This is a ma-- major 


change in that decision and I think there are 


some potential problems with it. 


 DR. WADE: It does represent -- you're correct 


in your reading. We are not distinguishing 


between anyone within the family as it relates 


to a conflict of interest policy, so the Board 


needs to be clear on that and individual Board 


members need to be clear on that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I did -- just a -- I mean just to 


maybe reflect on workgroup experience as -- as 


Lew for -- was -- was talking about, and -- I 


mean one observation of mine, and you know, I 


think it -- it needs to come out, you know, 


directly, is that -- you know, it says for 

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document owner -- for Rocky Flats the document 


owner is Karin Jessen and the last -- the first 


workgroup call on evaluation report that we 


had, it strikes me that Karin Jessen wasn't on 


the record except to introduce herself. So if 


she's -- has all these responsibilities 


relevant to this evaluation, independent of the 


site -- site experts and subject matter 


experts, seems to me that -- that she didn't 


play a very big role in the deliberations. And 


I guess one would be concerned that the subject 


matter experts and site expert are really 


driving the thing and a -- another name is 


going on at the end. That -- that's a concern, 


so --


 DR. WADE: It's a concern for us, as well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Lew, give us some idea 


-- you did already -- of what you see as the 


timetable for the agency. Are we in a position 


where we'll have time to formulate formal 


recommendations or what -- what are we looking 


at in terms of progression here? 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, I mean I -- it -- it's risky 


to -- to imagine, but I would think that -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or is there a target closure date? 

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Let's start there. 


 DR. WADE: Well, no, there isn't one, and I 


would think two Board meetings forward would 


be, I think, a realistic closure date, knowing 


how this process works. And again, we don't 


want to rush to finality, although again, as I 


said, we are interested in being guided by the 


principles that we espouse, but I would think 


that at the next meeting we will have heard 


your comments, both individually and -- and 


possibly collectively. We would offer you 


another draft. I would see another iteration 


before I would hope to -- to bring the curtain 


down. 


 DR. ZIEMER: More comments or suggestions at 


this point, or issues that you at least want to 


raise? Again, we'll have the opportunity then 


to formalize recommendations at a somewhat 


later date. As was suggested, we haven't had 


full time to digest this, but you might -- 


having looked at it and heard the presentation, 


you might have some initial reactions or -- or 


concerns, some of which have been raised 


already. An additional comment? 


 DR. MELIUS: Just one additional question. Who 

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-- who is the document owner? 


 DR. WADE: This document owner? 


 DR. MELIUS: And who are -- who are the site 


experts that -- that participated -- 


 DR. WADE: I'll define -- I'll define the 


document owner as John Howard is the document 


owner. I am simply the person -- 


 DR. MELIUS: How come he's not speaking here? 


 DR. WADE: Well, because he's the boss and I'm 


not. You see, that's how it tends to work. 


am the target, he is the document owner. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Actually we -- we left that one 


out, the target. Put that in -- a new role. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Lew? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Bob Presley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Bob, go ahead. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can you see that John and I both 


get a copy of this 'cause we're running blind 


on it. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we will certainly attempt to 


e-mail something to you. 


 DR. MELIUS: It was already e-mailed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, and --


 DR. WADE: It has been e-mailed before, but we 


I 
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will do it again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Robert, this is -- the document 


will be entitled "NIOSH statement of policy, 


conflict of interest, draft of 14th February, 


2006." 


 DR. WADE: I think it was sent to you probably 


two weeks ago, or cl-- well, about ten days 


ago, but we'll send it again. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, sir. 


 DR. WADE: You're most welcome. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: If -- if there's no further 


discussion on this topic this afternoon, I 


think we will go ahead and come to closure for 


the day, realizing that you'll have a chance to 


get some dinner and return for the public 


comment session at 7:00. 


I suspect many members of the public who wish 


to comment will be coming at that time and 


signing up. If any are here now and haven't 


signed up to make public comment but wish to do 


so, please avail yourselves of that. 


We will not restrict the comments to the Rocky 


Flats issue, so there will be opportunities for 


others to comment, as well. 


 Any additional housekeeping items to come 

307 

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before us? 


 DR. WADE: No, that's it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It appears not, so we will recess 


until 7:00 o'clock. Thank you very much. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 4:35 p.m. 


to 7:00 p.m.) 


OVERVIEW OF BOARD ACTIVITIES/PUBLIC COMMENT
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR


 DR. ZIEMER: Good evening, everyone. I'd like 


to call the meeting to order. This is a public 


comment period for the Advisory Board on 


Radiation and Worker Health. My name is Paul 


Ziemer. I serve as Chairman of this Advisory 


Board. I want to take just a couple of minutes 


to tell you a little bit about what the Board 


does, and maybe a little bit about what it 


doesn't do, and acquaint you with that. It's 


not always clear to people who these folks are 


sitting up here; what do they have to do with 


anything. 


Well, I want to tell you that the Advisory 


Board is independent of the federal agencies 


that are operating the compensation program. 


The compensation program is basically operated 


by several agencies -- Department of Labor, 


Department of Health and Human Services and 

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NIOSH, and Department of Energy. This Advisory 


Board has been appointed independently of those 


groups. These individuals are appointed by the 


President. They represent independent people, 


as it were. We are all individuals, as I say, 


not connected with the agencies involved. 


I myself am a retired professor from Purdue 


University -- any Boilermakers here? I'm the 


only one, huh? Okay. We're Boilermakers. 


There may be some other union boilermakers, but 


we're the Boilermakers at Purdue. Anyway, I'm 


a retired professor who spent most of my -- I 


spent most of my career teaching in the area of 


radiation safety, or health physics, so that 


technical connection is perhaps the reason that 


I'm involved here. But we have individuals on 


this Board with many different backgrounds. 


I'm going to ask each of the members of the 


Board to introduce themselves by name, tell you 


where they work -- or where they did work; some 


are retired like me -- and also tell you what 


their area of specialty is. We'll begin here 


with Dr. DeHart. Roy, use the mike, please. 


 DR. DEHART: Good evening. I'm Dr. Roy DeHart. 


I'm a physician, an occupational medicine, 

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aerospace medicine, Board-certified physician 


in that area. I've had the opportunity to work 


in Oak Ridge at X-10 and Y-12. I'm currently a 


professor in medicine at the University of 


Vanderbilt in Nashville, Tennessee. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Bradley Clawson. 


 MR. CLAWSON: My name's Brad Clawson. I'm a 


senior operator in the nuclear fuel handling 


division at the Idaho site, the INEL out there, 


and I'm still working out there, unlike some of 


my other ones. I work in the field -- my 


specialty's the -- mainly deal with handling 


uranium products and the remnants of a lot of 


the Cold War. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And this is Mike Gibson -- maybe 


stand, everyone, so everybody can see you. 


It's hard to see you sitting, maybe. 


 MR. GIBSON: My name is Mike Gibson. I'm a --


DR. ROESSLER: His mike is better than yours, 


Paul. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


DR. ROESSLER: His microphone is better than 


the one you're using. 


 MS. MUNN: Is it? I didn't think so. 


DR. ROESSLER: Oh, really? Okay. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Hold it up there, Mike. 


 MR. GIBSON: My name is Mike Gibson. I'm --


I've left Mound facility three years ago as 


they were closing it down. I'm a former union 


president, electrician by trade. I'm a former 


vice president of the Atomic Workers Council 


that represented some of the former OCAW sites 


who are now United Steel Workers. I was 


appointed to this Board in August of 2002. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Hi, I'm Mark Griffon. I'm a 


consultant. I do radiation-related research. 


I'm a health physicist by training and I'm out 


of Salem, New Hampshire. 


 DR. WADE: And my name is Lewis Wade. I'm not 


a member of the Board. I represent the 


Secretary of Health and Human Services on the 


Board as a Designated Federal Official, and I'm 


proudly an employee of NIOSH and the federal 


government. 


 DR. MELIUS: And I'm Jim Melius. I'm an 


occupational physician. I work for the 


laborer's union. 


 MS. MUNN: I'm Wanda Munn. I'm a nuclear 


engineer, retired from Westinghouse Hanford 


Company. I live in Richland, Washington. 

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DR. ROESSLER: I'm Genevieve Roessler. I'm 


retired from the University of Florida. There 


I was a professor of health physics. I moved 


to Minnesota so I could be closer to some of my 


seven children and 16 grandchildren. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The fellow here who some of you 


think is gasping for oxygen is actually our 


court reporter, who is basically one of the top 


recorders in the world, actually -- probably 


the top one in the U.S., but he gets every word 


that we say. 


 This Advisory Board meets on a regular basis, 


and our function is to help, as it were -- and 


sometimes it's not always interpreted as help ­

- but to help the agencies involved in making 


sure the compensation program operates the way 


Congress intended it to. In that sense we have 


what you might call oversight responsibilities. 


We review -- we actually do audits of some of 


the dose reconstructions that are done by 


NIOSH. We get involved in the petitions for 


Special Exposure Cohorts, including the Rocky 


Flats petition that is under way right now, and 


this Board has the responsibility of making a 


recommendation to the Secretary of Health and 

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Human Services on those kinds of petitions. 


And then the Board also has responsibilities on 


reviewing some of the other work that's done in 


connection with the dose reconstructions. 


We do not handle the individual dose 


reconstructions. Those are handled through 


Labor and the reconstructions through NIOSH. 


Likewise the individual claims, anything that 


has to do with the claims, the only real need 


for us to learn about your case is because it 


helps us understand how the program is working, 


or in some cases you might feel is not working. 


So we're pleased to hear your experiences or 


experiences of one you are representing. We 


try to take that input seriously and understand 


what we can do, what our input can be to the 


program to help correct areas where there are 


concerns or problems. So keep that in mind as 


you talk to us tonight. If you have a 


particular issue with your case, we can 


certainly make note of it, but your individual 


case does not get handled by this Board -- nor 


are we an appeals board. If your compensation 


is turned down, we do not get involved in 


appeals, either. So I just want to make that 

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clear. So we are more of an oversight group 


trying to help make the program work better. 


And as I say, how well we do that is not always 


clear. We're trying to do that well. These 


are independent people, as you say. 


Lew Wade is here representing NIOSH because 


under the Federal Advisory Act laws, each board 


of this type has to have a Designated Federal 


Official who serves as kind of an executive 


secretary, makes sure that our meetings are 


scheduled and our agendas are set and so on. 


But he is not a voting member of this Board. 


We're also aware that there is a Rocky Flats 


petition for Special Exposure Cohort in 


progress. In the morning more of that petition 


will be presented to this Board and at some 


point this Board will be in a position to 


actually make a recommendation to the Secretary 


on that petition. So that gives you a little 


bit of a background about what we're about. 


I'm going to have our Designated Federal 


Official in a moment make a few remarks. I do 


want to see if there are any Congressional 


delegates here -- anyone representing either 


the Senators or the Congressmen -- yes, and 

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let's recognize each of them. If you would 


each approach the mike and maybe -- and if you 


have any preliminary remarks at this time, we'd 


be pleased to have you make them, as well. 
I 


think we have several here. Just go -- you can 


figure out who's going to go first. 


 MS. ALBERG: Thank you. My name is Jeanette 


Alberg. I'm with U.S. Senator Wayne Allard's 


office. We are here today obviously to take 


part in this public comment session. The 


Senator today also actually drafted and sent a 


letter to Secretary Leavitt encouraging to use 


fair consideration on the steelworkers' SEC 


petition, so depending on where that goes, he 


has actually sent a letter to the Secretary 


asking for fair consideration. I do have 


copies of the press release which includes that 


here in the back, or you can also visit with 


me, as well. So thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Either of 


the other individuals -- at least introduce 


yourself right now, and if you wish to defer 


comment, that would be fine as well. 


 MS. MINKS: Sure, I'm Erin Minks with Senator 


Salazar's office, and I'm here with my 

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coworker, David Hiller, who has a statement 


from the Senator to share with you tonight. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And David, we'd be 


pleased to have that statement now, if you 


wish. 


 MR. HILLER: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. This is a 


letter that was signed by Congressman Mark 


Udall, as well as Senator Ken Salazar, 


addressed to the Advisory Board. 


 (Reading) Dear Dr. Ziemer and members of the 


Advisory Board. We have recently learned of a 


request from one of the petitioners on the 


Rocky Flats United Steelworkers of America 


petition to delay the Advisory Board's decision 


to determine Special Exposure Cohort status. 


As you know, that petition is on the agenda for 


consideration during the Board's working 


meeting in Denver from April 25 to 27. We ask 


that you grant this request, which we think is 


appropriate because of ongoing concern on the 


part of independent petition reviewer S. Cohen 


& Associates about the quality and reliability 


of data, a problem that affects their ability 


to provide a meaningful report to the Board in 


time for this meeting. 

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When the Rocky Flats United Steelworkers of 


America Local 8031 filed their Special Exposure 


Cohort petition in February 2005 they hoped for 


prompt and fair consideration of their request 


to be included in the Special Exposure Cohort. 


But it is more important that the consideration 


be fair than that it be prompt, especially now, 


more than 14 months later. The essential 


component to this fair consideration is to 


allow S. Cohen & Associates the time necessary 


to perform a careful and complete review of the 


petition. 


As you may know, our offices have participated 


in tel-- by telephone in several recent 


meetings of the Board's subcommittee for dose 


reconstruction and site profile reviews, and of 


the working group of Board members, NIOSH 


representatives and S. Cohen & Associates 


representatives. The S. Cohen & Associates 


December 2005 detailed report on the Rocky 


Flats site profile addresses many of the 


problems that the Steelworkers have identified 


in the history of Rocky Flats' radiation 


monitoring record-keeping. 


We have been advised, however, that S. Cohen & 

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Associates has only recently begun an in-depth 


review of the Steelworkers' petition itself. 


This independent review is important and it is 


unfortunate that it has commenced so late in 


the process. We do not see how this review can 


be completed before the Board's meeting 


scheduled for April 25 to 27 in Denver, 


Colorado. 


Therefore we respectfully request that the 


Board defer action on the petition until S. 


Cohen & Associates has completed its review of 


the petition and until the working group and 


the subcommittee have provided their 


recommendations to the Board. 


Thank you in advance for your prompt attention 


to this request. Sincerely, Mark Udall and Ken 


Salazar. 


And we delivered this letter to you yesterday. 


Thank you very much, Dr. Ziemer and members of 


the Board. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Mr. Hiller, and indeed 


this request will be before the Board tomorrow 


as we deliberate on this very subject, so we 


appreciate the input. 


 MR. HILLER: Thank you, sir. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: One other comment --


MS. MINKS: Excuse -- yeah, sorry. It was 


actually suggested that I read the letter in 


that Senator Allard --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


MS. MINKS: -- wrote, so I'll just read that 


quickly. Again, it's from Senator Allard to 


Secretary Leavitt. It says (reading) Dear 


Secretary Leavitt, in March 2005 and in 


November 2005 I, along with my colleagues 


Senator Ken Salazar, Congressman Bob Beauprez 


and Congressman Mark Udall, contacted you 


concerning the Rocky Flats Special Exposure 


Cohort SEC petition that was filed by the Rocky 


Flats Steelworkers on February 15th, 2005. We 


encouraged your office to do all in its power 


to ensure an expeditious and fair consideration 


of the Rocky Flats SEC petition. 


The intent of Congress when passing the Energy 


Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 


Program Act in 2000 was included -- which 


included SEC petitions, was to ensure that the 


men and women who put themselves in harm's way 


by working at Rocky Flats and other nuclear 


production sites had a clear and just process 

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for applying for appropriate financial and 


medical compensation provided under the law. 


The Rocky Flats SEC petition is an application 


for such compensation under this Act. 


I support the efforts of NIOSH and OCAS to 


fairly and scientifically evaluate the Rocky 


Flats SEC petition. I was pleased to learn 


from my staff that many of the concerns 


regarding the Rocky Flats SEC petition and the 


site profile have been resolved in the past few 


months. However, at the same time it also 


appears that the ultimate progress of the Rocky 


Flats SEC petition has stagnated significantly. 


My office was advised -- initially advised that 


the Rocky Flats SEC petition would be placed 


before the Advisory Board at the January 2006 


Board meeting. Then in December of last year 


my office was advised that the Board would not 


make a decision on the Rocky Flats SEC petition 


until the April 2006 Board meeting because of a 


number of outstanding concerns related to the 


petition and the Rocky Flats site profile. My 


office has now been advised the petition may 


not be taken up until the April Board meeting 


due to some outstanding concerns related to the 

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quality of data available. 


I understand and appreciate the care, 


consideration and detail that must be taken 


into account when reviewing SEC petitions and 


site profiles. I also understand and believe 


that the only way to fairly evaluate SEC 


petitions is by using the best scientific 


knowledge and data available. This was a key 


component of the Act, and one which I fully 


support. If our best science is thwarted by 


incomplete data or data quality concerns, the 


intent of the Act is clear, the site SEC 


petition must be approved. Should the Advisory 


Board decide to table the Rocky Flats SEC 


petition until the June -- or until the next 


Board meeting, the review of the Rocky Flats 


SEC petition will be at least six months past 


what my office and the petitioners were 


advised. To the men and woman who have filed 


that petition and to the thousands more who 


knowingly or unknowingly risked their lives at 


Rocky Flats, the delay is unjustifiable, but 


understandable given the -- given the new ac-- 


new data that's looked at. 


I encourage you to do everything in your power 

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to see that the Rocky Flats SEC petition is 


reviewed fairly and that a decision is made as 


expeditiously as possible. I believe your 


leadership is critical to this process. The 


men and women of Rocky Flats deserve and 


appreciate your support as this petition moves 


forward. If my office can be of any assistance 


to you or the Advisory Board as you review the 


petition, please do not hesitate to contact me. 


Thank you in advance for your assistance. 


Sincerely, Wayne Allard, United States Senator. 


And just to echo the concerns that Congressman 


Udall and Senator Salazar's office raise, our 


office too was contacted and we understand the 


request of the petitioners to delay the 


application, as well. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. I now 


will move to the sign-up sheet of individuals 


who've requested the opportunity to speak. 


I'll simply take them in the order that people 


have signed up. The first individual is Knut 


Ringen, and he is apparently prepared with 


PowerPointe slides. Knut. 


 MR. RINGEN: Yes, I don't want to waste any of 


your time -- or too much of your time. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Anyway, Knut is here from the 


Center for -- to Protect Worker Rights and -- 


here in Denver -- well, it's not in Denver. 


He's here in Denver. Okay, there we go. 


 MR. RINGEN: Well, thank you very much for 


letting me meeting with -- meet with you again. 


I've talked to you once before about our 


concerns, and I appreciate your holding these 


evening sessions, which we suggested that's a 


very useful thing for all of us. 


Today I'm here representing the Center to 


Protect Workers' Rights -- that worked a little 


too well -- and I have a handout packet that I 


left in front of you that consists of four 


attachments that you can see here. I will also 


(sic) copies of this handout packet and the 


slides at the table behind -- in the back there 


if anybody wants them. I'm using the slides to 


try to organize myself as well as I can. 


The Center to Protect Workers' Rights is the 


research arm of the Building and Construction 


Trades Department of AFL-CIO, and we represent 


the 15 international unions that cover the 


construction trades in the U.S. We are here as 


representatives of the claimants, and I want to 

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make clear that we have many, many interests 


with NIOSH and in this program. 


First of all, together with NIOSH we operate, 


and have for 16 years, a very large 


construction research center in safety and 


health. We conduct work for DOL under a 


contract on the EEOICPA program. We manage 


Department of Energy-funded medical screening 


programs at this point in time at 15 different 


DOE sites, including -- we're just starting 


here at Rocky Flats. We have had a contract 


and we proposed more work with OCAS on issues 


related to dose construction -- dose 


reconstruction methods for construction 


workers. 


We're not -- we're only here to speak for 


construction workers and their -- for the -- 


who are claimants, as well as their survivors. 


We can't claim to speak for any of the other 


kinds of workers, but probably many of the 


things that apply. We want to make clear our 


comments are about construction workers. 


We also want to make clear that we support 


individual dose reconstruction where it can be 


done validly, fairly and timely -- and I'm 

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going to speak a fair amount about all three of 


those issues today. And we will help in any 


way we can to make the dose reconstruction 


program work. 


Our concerns are the following: NIOSH agrees 


it doesn't have a valid dose reconstruction 


model for the vast majority of construction 


worker claimants. Nevertheless, it's managed 


to process what we think is somewhere between 


700 and 1,500 construction worker dose 


reconstructions. As far as we know, these have 


not been audited for validity, and we don't 


think Sandy Cohen & Associates has the 


necessary expertise to adequately audit a dose 


reconstruction for construction workers. 


NIOSH is sitting on about four or five -- 4,500 


to 5,300 construction worker claims, and it's 


been sitting on many of them for more than four 


years, and we hear from those claimants 


regularly. The reason that they're sitting on 


them is that they don't have a valid method, as 


I mentioned before. And the reason that they 


don't have a valid method, in our opinion, is 


that this isn't a big priority to NIOSH. And 


although construction worker claimants are 30 

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percent of all of the current claimants, and at 


least 50 percent of potentially all claimants, 


this Board doesn't seem to give it a very high 


priority, either. 


In December 2003 I first asked -- talked to you 


about this issue, and I want to give you a 


quick update on the major issues that we 


presented to you and where they're at at this 


time. 


We asked for expedition of construction worker 


dose reconstructions. That's not happened. We 


asked NIOSH to provide us with data on the 


status of all those claimants who are 


specifically construction workers that are in 


their files. That has not happened. We asked 


NIOSH to develop replicable protocols for all 


of its work, including its site profiles. That 


has not happened. We asked NIOSH to develop a 


valid dose reconstruction method for 


construction workers, and that still has not 


happened. We asked NIOSH to produce 


construction-specific site profiles. That has 


not happened. And we asked NIOSH to fix the 


conflict of interest problem in its contractor, 


and only now it seems that it's getting ready 

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to do something about that, although I don't 


think nearly enough. So after two and a half 


years, we don't have a whole lot to show for 


the issues that we asked this Board and NIOSH 


to deal with at that time, and we think these 


are very critical issues for a large number of 


claimants. 


There is no question that OCAS has a 


significant credibility problem among many of 


the claimants, which may or may not be valid, 


but we -- certainly in large part it's self-


inflicted. I've included a letter -- we get 


them all the time from claimants. I included 


one that we just got last week in attachment 


four, which says (reading) NIOSH could have 


consulted the Psychic Friends Network or the 


Magic and the Ball -- I've never seen these 


programs, by the way -- for approval of claims 


with the same credibility as they did with 


their dose reconstruction. 


Now that may be an unfair comment, but that's a 


very com-- fair com-- common type of comment 


that we get, and I think it arises out of 


problems that NIOSH has in three basic areas. 


One is the governance and organization of the 

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program. The second is the administration of 


the program. And the third is the science. 


I'm going to go through those things quickly. 


 When NIOSH first established the program -- or 


within two years after it was -- came into 


being, it established a rule on dose 


reconstruction which we at that time felt was 


way too vague. One thing that we raised 


concern about from the start was that it didn't 


and refused to set a time limit of how long it 


was going to take to do a dose reconstruction. 


We said there has to be a period of time in 


which a claimant here can get its claim handled 


by you, and NIOSH would not set that date. And 


that's a big problem that we face right now. 


There are many other problems with the rule, 


and a lot of the problems I talk about go back 


to that rule. 


The second thing that NIOSH did was to select a 


contractor that is rife with appearance and 


actual conflict of interest. There's no other 


way to put it. There's no reason to be polite 


about it, there's tons of conflict of interest 


in this program. And that became already clear 


after the first site profile was issued for 

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Savannah River, which I talked about in 


December of 2003. And I said there's clear 


conflict of interest, at least on part of one 


author of that document. We were shocked by 


that. But that conflict of interest is 


relatively minor compared to the documents that 


came afterwards at places like Hanford, where 


five or six of the main authors had very 


extensive conflict of interest. 


Now I wouldn't come here and talk about this 


for the -- right now if we hadn't made these 


points previously. We made it with Larry 


Elliott and to NIOSH when this program was 


first established. We made the same comments 


when the rule was issued, first rule was 


issued. We made the same comments when NIOSH 


proposed to hire a single contractor to do its 


work. We said there was going to be problems 


with that. And we made it in presentations to 


this Board before. So we don't come at this 


new. 


But there was one problem we'd never 


anticipated after this program was established, 


and that was the adversarial relationship that 


developed between OCAS and this Board, 

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particularly the first three or four years. 


That we hadn't expected, and I think has been 


problematic in the development of the program. 


Finally, you are now addressing the conflict of 


interest issue. That was only really as more 


and more pressure was placed on NIOSH to deal 


with it, and really only in the last month when 


a lot of this broke out in the news. And Larry 


Elliott at that time said it's a very 


difficult, complex dilemma that we face, 


according to at least several of the news 


reports that quoted. He said because the pool 


of available health physicists is so small. 


Now we don't agree with that. It's not -- the 


problem here is not the small number of health 


physicists. We think the problem is the 


contractual route that NIOSH chose in operating 


the program. 


There are also problems of administration. 


NIOSH says it's been unable to deal with 


construction worker claims because of a lack of 


resources. Now I would challenge anyone to 


find any program in the history of occupational 


safety and health that has had more resources 


than this program. According to the 

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President's budget, OCAS receives a budget of 


$50 million per year. That doesn't include the 


budget for this Board, by the way. So far it's 


cost roughly $14,000 per dose reconstruction to 


complete one if you divide its budget with the 


dose reconstructions that's done. So far, at 


least in this year in January and February, 


NIOSH has done about one dose reconstruction 


per FTE in the program, or between its 


contractors per month. And for every dose 


reconstruction that results in a claim of 


$150,000 being paid to a claimant, NIOSH spends 


about $50,000 in all on dose reconstructions 


because only one in four claims results in an 


award. So there isn't a shortage of money or 


resources here. As near as we can tell, if we 


compare this to the medical screening programs 


that we conduct -- which also include doing 


site profiles, outreach to recruit people in, 


medical exams which Dr. DeHart among others 


have done many of, X-rays, lung function tests, 


lab tests, work history interviews, follow-up 


both in terms of medical care and in terms of 


claims -- we do all this for about $1,000 per 


participant. It would seem that NIOSH ought to 

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be able to manage with the money it has if it 


can spend $14,000 per dose reconstruction. 


So we see it not as an issue of resources, but 


it's really priorities and management that have 


left out the construction workers so far in 


NIOSH's program. 


 We've also identified a number of problems in 


science. First of all, we think that there is 


a general ingrained bias in health physics that 


consists of two basically held views. Anyone 


who's not been monitored could not have been 


exposed is something we hear commonly. And 


secondly, anyone working in an area not 


designated as a radiation area could not have 


been exposed and therefore doesn't need to be 


monitored. Both of these biases or views -- 


prevailing views, if you apply them, I think 


when they get applied to construction workers 


it leads people, both in this program and in 


the general health physics community, to 


conclude that construction workers -- they're 


really at low risk and therefore they shouldn't 


be much of a priority in this program, and 


that's why they've been left behind. 


And I'm going to talk more about one specific 

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area that we've worked with NIOSH, and NIOSH 


agrees with, and that is -- and I want to make 


you aware of -- and the fundamental problem 


with construction workers is the enormous 


statistical variance that we have in exposure 


measures, something that you don't see in any 


other occupational groups. And it's absolutely 


critical to everything that's being done in 


this program when it involves these workers. 


And by construction workers I mean workers who 


do all kinds of stuff. Many people think 


construction workers only build new things, but 


at DOE most of them spend most of their time on 


maintenance, repair, renovation, cleanup and 


demolition work within the facilities 


themselves. 


In 2005 CPWR agreed to assist NIOSH to develop 


a valid model to address construction worker 


dose reconstructions, and we pulled together 


this working group, which you can't see but 


it's very highly-qualified and I think many of 


you know a number of these industrial 


hygienists. There are industrial hygienists 


that have worked on the problem of trying to 


develop predictable models for construction 

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worker exposures to a variety of toxic 


substances, not necessarily radiation, however. 


The key issues that we agreed to work with 


NIOSH on was to look at are the NIOSH models to 


estimate radiation exposure valid where 


exposure data are missing or lacking, and are 


they appropriate for construction workers. 


Second thing, is the variance in exposure dose 


measurements for construction workers greater 


than the variance incorporated into those 


models that NIOSH currently uses in its dose 


reconstruction program. And the third, should 


the NIOSH prog-- models be amended in any way 


for construction workers, in light of what we 


know in terms of variance. 


NIOSH asked us to focus on the Technical 


Information Bulletin 18 that had just come out, 


which deals with trying to develop a model to 


estimate internal dose, obviously a critical 


issue in terms of doing dose reconstruction, 


from external environmental dose -- try to 


extrapolate that. And within the NIOSH model, 


these are the sort of criteria that are used to 


-- to estimate internal dose for -- from -- 


from environmental measurements. 

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The concerns about NIOSH model that our 


industrial hygienists have had is particularly 


these three things. Is the breathing rate, how 


much workers breathe, valid in the NIOSH model. 


Is the maximum allowable concentration or 


annual limit intake rate valid that NIOSH uses 


since construction workers seem to have more 


episodic and more high peak, short term 


exposures. And finally, is the dose 


uncertainty distribution valid, given that 


construction workers experience such extreme 


variability. 


Now I'm just going to show you a couple of 


examples. These are various places where some 


of these industrial hygiene professors have 


done measurements of construction workers. 


These are workers doing identical tasks under 


different circumstanc-- under similar 


circumstances, and yet you can see for each of 


these -- the boilermakers, which were doing 


welding, the manganese welding, hot work, which 


also involves weld-- welding, abrasive blasting 


and so on -- sand blasting and so on. You can 


see how wide the range of variation is in the 


exposure, or how -- what -- wide the exposure 

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range is, for tasks that are seemingly similar 


and should yield identical results every time ­

- or pretty identical. This is the kind of 


range that we're talking about, which is not 


unusual, but which you don't see anywhere else 


in occupational safety and health. And Steve 


Rappaport has looked at this extensively, 


concluded that when we look at construction 


workers at least we should use -- be using a 


geometric standard deviation of 4.34 to 


estimate the 95 percent confidence interval of 


the -- the -- of the range of exposure -- of 


the variance for the exposure. These are just 


some more of that. 


Bob Herrick at Harvard did a study for us on 


asphalt fumes trying to figure out how you 


could create an ideal model to estimate -- to 


predict how -- how much of the conc-- exposures 


to asphalt fumes were actually there. And he 


found that the best they could do with a model 


was 40 percent -- estimate 40 percent of actual 


variance. 


And John Dement at Duke University has done the 


same sort of thing based on screening per the 


data and radiation monitoring data from the DOE 

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sites, and has found pretty much the same kind 


of thing. 


I'm going to skip through this stuff. It just 


shows that the -- the environmental dose for 


construction workers at Savannah River's -- 


tracks fairly closely production workers, but 


if you could see the site, when you look at 


between various construction trades and over 


time, there is enormous variability and spikes 


among the construction trades. 


So out of this meeting and out of this working 


group, we thought we got a draft agreement with 


NIOSH, and we looked at first of all the 


question of whether it's valid. We think that 


the NIOSH model in general for dose 


reconstruction is in reasonable concordance 


with the model that it uses for other workers, 


although it's inappropriate to exclude 


respiratory cancers, and they need to make 


amendments to -- to three things, the breathing 


deposition, the MAC values and so on. 


We agreed that the variance should be higher 


than what NIOSH uses in general. We agreed 


that with these modifications that are listed 


here, we felt NIOSH could go forward and 

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estimate internal dose for a large number of 


the construction workers it has in its files 


and move forward and close out some of these 


4,500 cases that were sitting there. Although 


before all of this could be done, they would 


have to do some more validation research with 


regard to individual DOE sites and facilities. 


But we thought we had an agreement that that 


was where we're going to move forward; that 


they would apply this model with the 


modification that we have said, and where they 


weren't -- where they couldn't apply it, then 


the claimants would have to self-select into 


the Special Exposure Cohort field. That's the 


only way we thought we could get -- get these 


cases moved. 


Now when I met yes-- I saw Larry Elliott here 


and Jim Neton yesterday, and they said they 


were reconsidering this because, first of all, 


OCAS has identified new sources of internal -- 


they've identified new sources of -- where 


there's lots of internal dose monitoring 


records for DOE construction workers across the 


DOE complex, apparently. 


 Now just because they have more internal dose 

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records doesn't mean that they can still use 


the same model that they have for others. They 


still have to amend it -- they haven't done 


that yet -- for the variance that we have among 


construction workers because there's going to 


be gaps in that -- in that monitoring records 


in very many cases, no matter what -- and 


they're going to have to extrapolate in one 


form or another from somewhere to fill in those 


gaps. And they have to take into account the 


variance that exists when they do that. 


 But Larry Elliott said something more -- else 


that I thought was very interested (sic). He 


said that OCAS intends to apply a zero false 


negative standard to its dose reconstructions, 


and it's the first time I've ever heard that. 


And the way he expressed it he said is that 


we're going to make sure that no claimant is 


denied a claim because the dose reconstruction 


was done in such a way that it gave a deficient 


result. So that's what I conclude is a zero 


false negative standard. 


To run a program, I will just say in 


parentheses, in any health field that has zero 


negative or zero false negatives I think is 

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just about impossible, so I admire OCAS for 


undertaking this. But I'm very curious how 


this is going to happen. And I'm also very 


curious where this standard comes from because 


I've never seen any reference to it, and I 


don't see it existing in, again, the rule that 


NIOSH operates under. 


But certainly if OCAS is going to apply this 


standard, this is the following that has to be 


done. There has to be an amendment to the rule 


somehow for this that we'll have a chance to 


look at, and it also has to do -- it also means 


that OCAS will have to operate with a level of 


specificity -- statistical specificity that's 


100 percent and a negative predictive value 


that's equal to 100 percent, and the only way 


that it can do that, in my opinion, is to 


approve all dose reconstructions. Furthermore, 


if this is going to be the standard that's 


applied, then we will insist that this Board 


and SC-- SCA-- SCA -- Sandy Cohen needs to 


develop an evaluation model for predictive 


value like you talked about yesterday. We want 


to see specificity. We want to see 


sensitivity. We want to see positive 

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predictive value and negative predictive value 


in the whole program. We want to see that by 


DOE site and by type of claimant. Otherwise, 


you can't uphold this standard. It's nice to 


talk about it, but you got to -- if this is 


going to be the standard, then you've got to 


prove that you're living up to it. 


 More importantly, NIOSH had -- has had now five 


years to figure out the construction worker 


problem. This Board has had four years -- 


you've been in existence for four years -- to 


help figure out this construction problem, and 


we've not had anything figured out yet. 


Meanwhile, these claimants wait, either old, 


sick people with cancer or their survivors, 


they wait. And that is not right. That is not 


timely. That is not fair and it's not valid. 


In conclusion, there are four thous-- I said 


there are 4,500 workers here -- sitting here. 


We don't have a model. NIOSH has performed 


dose reconstructions, as near as we can tell, 


on some construction workers without a valid 


model, and we think we should know what's 


happened with those. And to do that, we think 


Sandy Cohen needs better expertise on 

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construction worker science, exposure science 


in particular. And we urge this Board to make 


this a priority as it reviews the work of 


NIOSH. Thank you very much. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Mr. Ringen. The next 

person on the list is George Berry. George, 

you can approach either the mike up here or the 


one in the back, whatever you're most 


comfortable with. Is George -- okay. 


MR. BERRY: Hi, I'm George. Hello? 


(Pause) 


 Good evening, members of the Board. My name's 


George Berry. I was a journeyman machinist at 


Rocky Flats Plant from '82 to '89, and I am a 


positive Part E claimant. Prior to that I was 


a D -- Part D under DOE. And I been waiting 


many, many years. This is getting ridiculous. 


I'm here to talk to you about a couple of 


things. There's so many things I want to touch 


base on, but it's just too lengthy. 


I got to talk about altered documents and 


improper procedures that I saw. Some of it was 


lack of my knowledge, I agree, but a lot of it 


was pretty ambiguous readings. And I saw 


things anywhere from plus or minus 75 percent 

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to who knows what on my readings -- if that was 


plus or minus 75 percent, what good is my 


paperwork even reading, you know. That's like 


-- what? Things like that. 


I distinctly remember two incidents. One was ­

- very possibly could have affected my health. 


I -- I'm -- very good chance I wouldn't have 


been here today if I wouldn't have been on the 


ball that day. I was in Building 777 doing a 


component I can't even discuss, and a -- 


following top secret documentation, and I 


followed it to the T. It was at a down-draft 


table. This component should not have been in 


a down-draft table; it should have been a inglovebox situation. As soon as that component 


came to the end procedure of that machining 


process, it leaked, alarms, donned -- I donned 


my respirator immediately as soon as I could, 


in between time trying to tape up this 


component so it wouldn't leak any further. And 


at that time, then everybody came running to 


me. 


I had no idea what was going on. I was just a 


young buck. It was 1983, I was like maybe 25, 


30 years old. And I remember the radiation 

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monitor coming to me and I remember the 


radiation monitor's name. I don't know why, 


what, 20, 30 years ago, but I could tell you 


that man's name right now. I know there was a 


nasal smear taken, because you don't forget 


something being shoved up your nose and pulled 


back out. You know? Come on. 


I tried to get copies of that through Jim, who 


is the president of the Local 8031 AFL-CIO 


Steelworkers, and was -- was -- wasn't -- was 


unable to get anything from him, and then he 


passed away on us and that's when Tony took 


over. And then I went to DOE, and no luck 


there. Not even the Cong-- Congressman could 


even get any kind of movement on that. 


So you know, if I got cancer, how would NIOSH 


reconstruct a dose that -- that they don't even 


know how much I received and what the units 


were at the time of the dose? Are they going ­

- are they going to ignore this incident 


completely, or just stick it underneath the 


carpet just like, you know. This was a very 


controlled component, and you can't tell me 


that they didn't know what was going on. Like 


I'm going to give them at least that much -- 

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you know, procedure that they would follow that 


they would know, just like -- I hope. 


Anyway, you know, they don't even know what 


types -- type isotopes I was machining on that 


component. They don't know what area of the 


complex I -- I was in. They have no -- no 


documentation of -- of the incident that 


happened. How -- how -- how could you guys 


believe Joe Blow, you know. You -- you -- 


you're scientists and you're -- and -- and who 


knows what else in -- in very detailed, 


specific formats you have to follow. I don't 


blame you a bit. We got to come up with this 


stuff. 


This is ridiculous. This is not -- not 


acceptable. And I just can't believe that we 


would fight for our country in this way and be 


scoffed at and played games with and everything 


else, and it just keeps going on and on and on 


and -- oh, then, by the way -- gee, we're going 


to go from DOE to DOL. But in between time you 


guys get to wait and die. It's a bunch of 


crap. I'm sorry, it's a bunch of crap. You --


you would not believe how many things are wrong 


with me, and I just keep on plugging and keep 

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on plugging 'cause I'm not going to let the 


bastards get me. And I'm not saying you're 


bastards. I'm just saying I'm not going to let 


the bastards get me, you know? I'm going to 


keep on plugging. It's -- it's made me really 


strong, but it's also doppelganging (sic) on 


me. It's snowballing on me, and sooner or 


later the Lord's not going to keep me alive any 


longer. And I don't know if I want to stay 


alive any longer. It's ridiculous. 


I had an incident happen to me in Building 776 


and I gave this lady here the documentation, 


and I believe there was a -- probably a -- oh, 


a begruntled (sic) worker that was jealous of 


me or who knows what, but I was in the -- in 


the -- 776 doing a job and the pendant came 


around. I took my part out of the pendant, and 


underneath that part was a jagged piece of 


metal. If I wouldn't have been on the ball 


that day, concentrating 100 percent, I would 


have been dead right now. How could they allow 


something like that to even get in an area like 


that. That is flat out murder, let alone 


sabotage to Uncle Sam. I don't understand. 


I was a young kid then, and sure, we have our 

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times, but I never horse-played and I never put 


anybody else's life in danger, and I had to 


deal with this. 


Well, at that -- by that time I said heck with 


this, I'm not believing nobody and I'm not 


trusting anybody. So I went and I got on that 


phone and I called a DOE representative. I 


says you get your butt down here right now, I 


got something to show you. Half hour down the 


road, boom, he was down. He was right down 


there and I says come here with me, took him 


over to the glovebox and showed him this 


pendant that holds onto -- that -- that goes 


around in a conveyor line that you take your 


parts out of, and it was a stainless steel 


container with a jagged piece of metal sticking 


out of it whilst having a piece of Pu sticking 


in there that I was supposed to grab out. And 


gee, by chance we don't have any documentation 


for that. I don't think so. I don't think so. 


It's there. They're not that stupid. 


I'm glad I didn't see it or read it because I 


probably would have killed the person that did 


it to me, you know, and there's a good chance 


that maybe that's why they did that. Which I'm 

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kind of glad, but it's like I hope that person 


is still alive and still thinking about what he 


tried to do to me, and God help him -- 


literally, God help him, 'cause that's the only 


person in this whole universe that's going to 


help that man -- or woman. 


 Notice on this documentation that I give that 


girl, there's the documentation down there 


stating my bioassay reports on termination 


paperwork that - and -- there's a yellow line 


crossed across there and it shows an erasure of 


I believe -- I'm not sure if it was from the 


hand or forearm or what, but it shows an 


erasure and a -- and a rewrite, and it showed 


U-235. Well, that's D-38, okay. Who's to say 


that that wasn't U-233, which is very, very 


hot. It's almost so hot it should be in a 


glovebox. I machined it. I know. That stuff 


was so screaming hot you could stare at it and 


it would spark at you, and it was not even in 


the glovebox in a -- in another building, so I 


-- I know there was things going on up there 


that we didn't even know about. And I was too 


stupid and too naive to understand. That's not 


a quote. I'm telling you what I saw. I'm 

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saying oh, my God. 


I was told to put my badge inside my pocket on 


certain jobs that I ran because oh, they were 


afraid I might get the badge contaminated or 


dirty. God forbid that. To heck with my body 


or my bioassay or my nasal smear. Put your 


badge in there. It'll be safe. 


Can NIO-- can NIOSH reconstruct dose for these 


things? I don't think so. If I got cancer now 


I wouldn't trust the dose that was recommend-- 


that was reconstructed right. How would they 


know what I was exposed to, what building I was 


in, what machine tool I was operating, what 


radionuclide and elements slash -- brain fart, 


sorry -- elements and --


UNIDENTIFIED: Isotopes. 


MR. BERRY: -- isotopes, thank you, were 


combined in these parts? You have to have 


certain specifics to come up with a certain 


answer. It doesn't take a rocket scientist. 


I worked in all -- all the stuff I did over 


there was in special orders. I don't even know 


all what -- what it was. It was elements that 


I've never heard of, and never will ever hear 


of, you know. So just remember, the facility 

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was so contaminated that the FBI came up there 


and raided it and -- boom -- five, six years, 


it's gone. Why? Shut down and dismantled, 


boom -- 5,000, 6,000-person complex, 200­

some,000 acres and all of a sudden this place 


disappears? I'm sorry, I wasn't born 


yesterday. 


 What other nuclear weapons facilities has this 


happened to? Gee, I don't know, Lawrence 


Livermore? No, it's still cruising. 


Tennessee? Kentucky? All those, they're still 


cruising, doing great. Ain't nothing been torn 


down, pulled away from there. They're not 


hiding nothing. So it looks to me -- I'm just 


a country bumpkin right now, but it looks to me 


like they were hiding something and they didn't 


want someone to find out. 


I guess that's it. I'm sorry to have been so 


blunt to you, and sometimes I was real 


arrogant, but I'm dying. You guys got to get 


this crap straightened out, man. This ain't 


going to work much longer. I'm on my last 


legs. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We appreciate your comments, 


George. Thank you. 

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MR. BERRY: Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now we have Kay Barker. Is Kay 


here? Yes, please. 


 MS. BARKER: Good evening, Dr. Ziemer and 


members of the Board. I'm Kay Barker, and I'd 


like to talk to you about the accuracy of dose 


reconstruction. 


My late husband, Lawrence Barker, worked at 


Rocky Flats from December 1, 1958 to February 


28, 1986. He died September 2nd, 1994 after 


two years of hell from colon cancer. 


I requested the worksheets from NIOSH, and Mr. 


Sundin was kind enough to send me a copy of all 


the worksheets NIOSH used to reconstruct dose. 


I know I'm not the most educated woman, but I 


can certainly read dates. I was able to pick 


out dosage assigned for dates that Lawrence 


never worked at Rocky Flats. To remind you, he 


worked from December 1, 1958 to February 28, 


1986. 


In the booklet before you, you will notice that 


Lawrence has values assigned for years 1956 and 


1957, when he did not begin work till December 


1, 1958. He was dying due to his colon cancer 


in 1993. How can NIOSH say their dose 

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reconstruction for Rocky Flats claimants is 


accurate when they can't get the dates of 


employment correct? You call this data 


reliability? 


Mine is not the only case. I have a dose 


reconstruction from another claimant, which is 


also 'cluded in the booklet. He worked at 


Rocky Flats from May 4th, 1981 to March 31st, 


1990. You will notice that the year 1980 is 


listed on page 3 of his information, and that 


is towards the back of the booklet. Granted, 


no dose is assigned for 1980, but you will also 


notice no dose was assigned for 1981, either. 


But the mere fact that 1980 is listed, in my 


mind, shows that NIOSH is not accurately 


reconstructing dose. 


 Additionally, even the NDRP project included 


values for neutron dose for 1956 in my 


husband's reconstruction. That was a full two 


years before he started working at Rocky Flats. 


From what I have heard listening to the 


meetings, the NDRP is given a lot of weight in 


reconstructing dose for the early years. It 


doesn't seem to me that it is accurate, either. 


I don't accept any data that Rocky Flats has 

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for the workers. In my booklet I have the 


health scientist data system urinalis (sic) 


detail, with no values whatsoever for any 


radionuclide. I find it impossible to believe 


that a UA was not reported or taken for the 


years 1968 through 1971, but were available 


from 1975 through 1985. And this is not an 


isolated case. 


I have an e-mail in my booklet from Jack 


Wedding, a supervisor of my late husband, that 


states (reading) I notice that the dates of 


1964 through 1969 were omitted. Those missing 


records contained four different times I had to 


have my body counted. Also the cleansing I had 


after the 1965 fire while in the hospital. In 


fact, all records containing information about 


my contamination on that date are not 


available. 


 Jack couldn't make it to this meeting due to 


his frail health. 


I also find it hard to believe that my deceased 


husband's first urinalis (sic) value was not 


until 1975. He worked in hot areas for at 


least three years. I would think that 


considering the lack of safety protocol, the 

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early years, that he would have had some kind 


of reading for his UA. All I have is zeroes, 


especially his early years when he was a 


clerk/packer. 


From day one of my claim I've always said that 


Lawrence was hot during his first three years 


at Rocky Flats while working as a clerk/packer. 


Lawrence even reminded me of this on his 


deathbed. He wouldn't go into any details 


about it, only to say that the records were 


accidentally on purpose destroyed at the 


Federal Center here in Denver, Colorado. The 


only incident report that NIOSH has is the 


health physics report of involvement dated 


September 26, 1962. That's also in your 


booklet. The report states that Lawrence 


received a cut on the anterior surface, medial 


area, of his second finger, left hand, on a 


piece of glass in Building 901. But there is 


no Building 901 in the site profile. Building 


910 is listed, but wasn't built until 1977. 


Building 991, however, is another story. It is 


a hot building, and was built in 1952. Did 


NIOSH use 910 or 991 in their calculation? 


NIOSH claims this is data reliability? 

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You should also be made aware that Lawrence and 


Wally Gulden were instructed by management to 


leave their badges in the rack or desk drawer 


while doing their time studies and audits in 


hot areas. How's that for data reliability? 


From what I've learned from other coworkers 


doing the time studies and audits, you were not 


issued protective clothing while doing work in 


hot areas. I have an excerpt from Jackie 


Beavers*' letter that Terrie Barrie will be 


presenting that she has in her handout, who is 


unable to attend this meeting due to health 


problems. Film badges were stored on a 


dosimeter storage rack. Dosimetry became 


suspicious of high doses received by production 


workers. These production workers were accused 


of purposely over-exposing their badges by 


placing them in gloveboxes. If the badge 


exceeded the authorized limit for the period, 


production employees would be disciplined. In 


addition, they would not be eligible for 


overtime. As a result, some of the operators 


didn't wear their dosimeters all the time, or 


they'd put the dosimeter in the back pocket of 


their coveralls in order to avoid disciplinary 

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actions. 


There were periods of time when individuals 


wore dosimeters, but the quarterly dosimeters 


indicated no current data available, NCDA. It 


is uncertain if the dose received during the 


period of time represented by NCDA was recorded 


in the dosimetry record. Contaminated 


dosimeters were often replaced with new 


dosimeters. 


 Two chemical operators with many years 


experience in Building 771 process area left 


their positions to work in the dosimetry 


department. The dosimetry person training them 


told them if badges returned readings higher 


than a certain number they were instructed to 


give the operator zero counts, or no current 


data available counts. Is this data 


reliability? 


Also the counts were returned on a long dot 


matrix sheet and operators were often required 


to initial the counts as a sign of acceptance 


of the counts in order to receive their 


paychecks. All zero readings and no current 


data available readings had to be accepted by 


the operators, even when they knew better, and 

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initialed in order to receive a paycheck. One 


woman resigned her position from Rocky Flats 


after many years in an extremely hot process, 


such as molten salts and et cetera. She kept 


her badge with her at home and requested 


dosimetry personnel come to her home to pick up 


the badge. It took many months of dosimetry 


personnel to come to her home to pick up the 


badge, yet she received counts for the very 


same badge that was still in her possession at 


home. You call this data reliability? 


I would also like to bring to your attention 


the fact that Lawrence was a machinist during 


the 1970 strike. No dose was assigned for that 


period. Where is the data reliability here? 


NIOSH shows that Lawrence had 316 incidences of 


exposure, with 15 incidents taking place in 


years before he was employed at Rocky Flats. 


Now is that data reliability? 


I know you can't think of these claimants as 


humans but only as cases, but I had to include 


in Dr. Ziemer's booklet, at the very end, two 


photos of my late husband, Lawrence Barker. 


The first photo is of a healthy Lawrence 


Barker. The second photo is of Lawrence in the 

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final stages of his fight against colon cancer. 


I wanted you to be able to put a face of a 


dying employee in your mind while making your 


decision on the SEC petition. 


I would like to say that Terrie Barrie informed 


me and SC&A, as well as Mr. Sundin, about all 


the dosage given to Lawrence during his years 


he didn't work at Rocky Flats. Mr. Sundin 


informed Terrie that the claimant should 


contact NIOSH and explain in detail what that 


person had. Terrie did contact me, and I 


informed her that I would not call NIOSH to 


discuss this as I do not trust them. When I 


can find all these dates with dosages that 


Lawrence didn't work at Rocky Flats, how can I 


believe that NIOSH can reconstruct any dose 


accurately? If I can find problems of false 


data, how do we know that other claimants don't 


have the same problem? My claim has even gone 


through NIOSH twice, as it was -- as it just 


finished a rework in October of 2005. If they 


can't find this problem the first time through, 


you certainly would have thought it would have 


been noticed the second time. But no, it 


wasn't. What else has NIOSH done wrong on this 

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claim? I hate to think of how many other 


claims are out there with inaccurate dates and 


dosages, and to think NIOSH says they have data 


reliability. 


In all the meetings I've been listening to I've 


never heard Karin Jessen say a word, but 


instead Roger Falk is always addressed. Why? 


In conclusion, I question the validity of 


anything in my late husband's dose 


reconstruction. I respectfully request that 


you consider this information that I have 


documented for you as an example of why you 


must grant the Rocky Flats SEC petition. I 


think all of (sic) the people who are dying 


daily, just waiting for your decision. 


 Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Kay, for 


sharing that with us. And we also now have 


Terrie Barrie. 


 MS. BARRIE: Good evening, Dr. Ziemer and 


members of the Board. My name is Terrie Barrie 


and I'm a founding member of the Alliance of 


Nuclear Worker Advocacy Groups and advocate for 


some of the Rocky Flats claimants. I am here 


tonight to voice my disagreement with NIOSH's 

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opinion that they can reconstruct dose of the 


Rocky Flats claims. 


First I must state that I feel that NIOSH could 


not have handled this SEC petition in a more 


deplorable manner. They found every way to 


circumvent Congressional intent and have the 


evaluation report delivered to you, the Board, 


within the 180 days. The report was issued 


only 20 days before this meeting, and it placed 


additional pressure on the Board and its 


contractor, Sanford Cohen & Associates. 


 Data integrity is the key issue. Yes, NIOSH 


may possess the scientific expertise to 


reconstruct dose, but that's assuming that all 


of the monitoring data was correct and 


available to reconstruct the events as they 


occurred. But if they began with faulty data, 


the end result will be in error. The maxim 


garbage in/garbage out applies to Rocky Flats. 


The information you'll hear tonight from the 


audience I hope will convince you to ignore 


NIOSH's assertions and grant SEC status to the 


Rocky Flats facility. 


I believe that the site profile for Rocky Flats 


is flawed. There's a serious conflict of 

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interest with the internal dose Technical 


Bulletin Document. On December 3rd, 2003 I 


notified Mr. Larry Elliott of this conflict. 


Roger Falk, a member of the Oak Ridge 


Associated Universities, was -- which is 


charged with developing the site profile, was 


listed at that time the author of the TBD. Mr. 


Falk was the Rocky Flats internal dosimetry 


program administrator. He was also an expert 


witness for Rockwell International in my 


husband's workers compensation claim. It was 


not only upsetting that Mr. Falk testified 


against the claim, but what he testified to. 


do not believe that the TBD is accurately or a 


trustworthy account of the internal dose that 


the Rocky Flats workers received. 


I understand now that Mr. Falk is cited as a 


site expert, but -- and -- and also for both 


the TBD and the evaluation report, but he is 


the O-- right -- excuse me, I'm sorry about 


that. He -- he's cited as the site expert, but 


Karin Jensen (sic) is listed as the author. 


However, in all the meetings that I've been 


listening in to, the teleconferences, it's 


Roger Falk that is answering the questions, not 


I 
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this Ms. Jensen. Is there a face behind this 


name? Who actually did the writing for the 


evaluation report and the SE-- and the site 


profile? 


 I've received no response from Mr. Elliott. 


would have happily given him -- when I advised 


him of this conflict. I would have happily 


given him the workers compensation claim number 


to NIO-- so NIOSH could request a copy of the 


transcript and verify my assertions. Because 


Mr. Elliott did not contact me, I never felt 


comfortable offering NIOSH additional 


information concerning the site. 


It appears the same philosophy of ignoring 


offered information is still prevalent with the 


SEC process for the Rocky Flats petitioners. 


Over 20 people submitted affidavits to Local 


8031 to support the petition. Three additional 


claimants submitted testimony on behalf of the 


non-production workers. Not one of them has 


been interviewed by NIOSH. Yet according to 


the Y-12 evaluation, NIOSH conducted several 


interviews with numerous Y-12 employees. 


The site profile's also inaccurate when it 


comes to Building 886. This was a criticality 


I 
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lab. The site profile states simply, and I 


quote, short-lived fission products were 


produced and none were indicated as having been 


released to the work or outdoor environment, 


end quote. Maybe the short-lived products 


didn't enter the environments, but uranium and 


plutonium did. I have a handout over there, 


too, and in that is a -- an example from the e-


book called "History of a Criticality 


Laboratory" written by Bob Roth*, senior 


experimenter, and he asserts that there was 39 


anomalous events in over 30 years at that lab, 


two of which involved worker contamination. 


Because of this, I question the accuracy of the 


site profile for the other buildings. 


I also question NIOSH's consistency in 


evaluating SEC petitions. This arose in my 


mind when I listened in on the April 12th Board 


working group teleconference. I remember 


hearing the question raised about thorium being 


present at Rocky Flats. Since a transcript of 


that teleconference has not been posted yet to 


the web site, my recollection may be faulty, so 


please feel free to correct me. I remember 


that NIOSH stated that they could not 

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reconstruct dose for Y-12 for thorium because 


they did not have enough data. I am not even ­

- but they could reconstruct dose for Rocky 


Flats workers because they can utilize the 


gross alpha bioassay measurements. 


I am not even close to being a scientist, but 


if NIOSH cannot reconstruct dose for employees 


who were exposed to thorium at Y-12, how could 


they possibly determine they can for Rocky 


Flats? 


NIOSH stated on page 21 of their report that 


zero results were treated as zeroes because no 


better information was available. It is 


incomprehensible to me that a worker would have 


zero exposure while working at the Flats. In 


fact, page 14 of the evaluation report states 


that after the May 1969 fire that Building 771, 


776 and 777 were grossly contaminated with 


plutonium. Kay Barker has stated that her 


husband's and his boss's records show a gap for 


that year. I have another claimant whose 


records also show a gap for 1969. How is that 


possible that there is no recorded dose? Were 


these records destroyed, as some have alleged? 


This program is supposed to be claimant 

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friendly. NIOSH should have concluded that 


since there is no better information to explain 


the zeroes that they cannot reconstruct dose, 


instead of assuming that there was no dose 


received by the workers. 


A few claimants could not tonight -- could not 


attend tonight's session and asked if I would 


read their letters into the record. Time will 


not allow me to read them in their entirety, 


but I would like to read some excerpts. The 


first is from Jackie Brever*, who holds a 


master's degree in environmental science, and 


Ron Avery. They testified under oath to these 


facts, either before the Rocky Flats grand jury 


or the recent Cook Landowner lawsuit, and I 


quote, (reading) there was a campaign where 


americium-241 was purified and sold. Operators 


who were very good at this operation were 


rarely rotated from the process and received 


zero counts from their dosimetry badges, and 


were told by the dosimetry personnel that high 


counts were impossible for buildings on the hot 


side. Therefore operators started each new 


year with zero counts from the dosimetry 


department. Background was raised on a 

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constant basis in all sampling and counting 


areas until the numbers came back right. There 


were several times when the Rocky Flats 


personnel had to go to a person's home to 


decontaminate the home, the belongings in the 


home and his or her family. End quote. 


I have an e-mail in the handout dated July 


25th, 2005 from a woman who was helping her 


husband with his late father's claim. She 


substantiates the last quote from Ms. Brever, 


and that e-mail states (reading) they came to 


the home in protective suits and Geiger 


counters. My husband says they went through 


every room, the cars, the garage, and also used 


Geiger counters on not only his dad, but his 


mom, his little brother and himself. How does 


NIOSH plan to reconstruct dose in these 


instances? 


Finally I would like to raise an issue that 


does not have a direct bearing on the SEC 


petition, but does affect every claimant. 


Section 7.5.1.7 of the evaluation report states 


that DOL has considered -- DOL also considers 


the exposure of a worker to the combination of 


toxic chemicals and radiation under Part E of 

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EEOICPA, end quote. DOL has in fact set the 


probability of causation for the radiogenic 


cancers at the same standard as NIOSH; that is, 


greater than 50 percent. Mr. Peter Turcic in 


his April 11th letter states, and I quote, 


NIOSH developed and maintains computerized set 


of cancer risk models used by DOL to calculate 


the statistical probability that the covered 


employee's cancer was at least as likely as not 


caused by exposure to ionizing radiation. At 


least as likely as not. But the law for Part E 


claims sets a different and, in (inaudible)'s 


opinion, lower standard for Part B claims. The 


law sets the probability of causation for E 


claims, and I quote, it is least at likely as 


not (sic) that the exposure to a toxic 


substance at the Department of Energy facility 


was a significant factor in aggravating, 


contributing to or causing the illness. 


 Mr. Turcic's letter continues, and I quote, HHS 


regulations also provide for NIOSH to add, 


modify or replace cancer risk models as 


necessary on the basis of new evidence and/or 


improved scientific understanding. DOL 


encourages claimants to contact NIOSH regarding 

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its cancer risk models and the rule-making 


process that guides the POC determinations. 


End quote. 


So what I see here are the two principal 


agencies telling the claimants that the other 


is responsible for setting the standard for 


cancer claims under E. It would be very 


helpful if the Board tomorrow would ask NIOSH 


and DOL to clarify this during their program 


update session. 


I want to thank you for your time, hard work 


and consideration. I also want to express my 


gratitude to Tony DeMaiori and all those who 


helped submit the petition to the Board. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Next I have 


Diane Jensen -- I believe it's Jensen. Is it 


Diane Jensen? Thank you. 


 MS. JENSEN: Good evening. I'll begin by 


apologizing 'cause I had not planned on 


speaking this evening. When I came in to talk 


to a representative today about my case, I 


heard that NIOSH is recommending against 


special cohort status for Rocky Flats 


employees, the logic being -- or their lack of 

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support is based on their ability to perform 


dose reconstructions for former Rocky Flats 


workers. My concern is that the records used 


for the dose reconstruction are inaccurate, 


incomplete and blatantly fraudulent. 


Readings in past history for myself came back 


with dose reports of zeroes in times when I 


worked in high rad areas such as inside a vault 


for an entire two-week periods during 


inventories. In reality, my actual reports 


have come back to me saying no data available, 


but were as zeroes on my dose reconstruction. 


At the time I questioned this, this was 


explained to me that the badges were sometimes 


too dark to read due to high doses. They still 


settled with looking at them as zeroes. And I 


was supposed to feel better that they used a 


39, because 40 was the cutoff for too low to 


read, so I should be happy they credited me 


with 39. At other times dosimeters were worn 


beneath our lead aprons so they did not capture 


our body dose. 


 Additionally, working in plutonium production 


area meant 360-degree exposure, not front 


torsal (sic) with the badge located on my 

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lapel. I was surrounded by plutonium 


production processing lines. 


I'd also like to address the issue of 


incomplete. I received radiation dose for more 


than 20 years. The first eight years were as a 


production floor, the remaining years were as 


technical support. As technical support I was 


considered admin or office personnel. Badges 


were pulled from the office personnel, even 


though our offices were in the production 


buildings. My office wall was adjacent to an 


abandoned americium line. When the security 


station was installed in Building 771, metal 


shielding had to be set up to prevent the Pu 


detector alarms from going off in the 


surrounding area. My desk was located against 


that wall. 


 Area monitoring records for the year 2000 list 


the adjusted dose as 826 millirem per year -- 


note that this is adjusted -- for 2,000 work 


hours per year. For those of us who were 


salaried and working 45-plus hours per week, 


this figure is far too low. And though the 


figure is more than 800 percent higher than the 


dose assigned to an office worker, office 

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workers were still assumed to have a dose of 


less than 100 millirem, and they felt safe 


pulling our dosimeter badges. 


 I feel they're also fraudulent. In addition to 


being incomplete, inaccurate, the numbers were 


manipulated to meet the corporate bonus 


structure. Bonuses were realized by reducing 


the number of people in the dosimetry program, 


even though the maintenance shops and offices 


were known to have doses as high as 2,844 


millirem per year -- and that's the electric 


shop in 371 -- dosimeters were still pulled 


from office personnel who worked in those 


areas. 


 Additionally, rooms such as the men's and 


women's restrooms were known to have doses 


nearing 300 millirem adjusted dose per year. 


These numbers were again adjusted to reflect 


one-sixteenth of a work day, because people 


only spend ten minutes twice a day in a 


restroom. 


My office was adjacent to the locker room for 


several years. High level drum storage was 


immediately below my office. And when it 


became known that the area had a high dose, 

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dosimetry badges were to be placed in my office 


to -- to avoid getting high readings from these 


badges, the badges were placed midway in the 


reporting period, and moved midway in the next 


reporting period. Those records reflect only 


one-half of the actual dose received per pay 


period. 


Due to the bonus structure of rewarding reduced 


doses, multiple tactics such as reporting half-


period doses as the actual period dose, 


adjusting doses to reflect minimum time period 


of occupancy, and disregarding high doses as 


false or unreportable were methods used to 


obtain bonuses. The reward structure destroyed 


the accuracy of the dose reporting system. And 


I do want to note that people talk about the 


old records being inaccurate. I'm talking 


about things that happened in 2000 and after. 


NIOSH's position that they can accurately 


reconstruct employee doses with this faulty 


information cannot be logically supported. 


This position is unfair to employees who 


received substantial doses many times higher 


than the recorded dose. 


And I'd like to thank you for hearing us this 

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evening. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Dennis -- is 

it Rowan? 

 MR. ROMERO: Romero. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Romero, okay. Hard to read. 

Thank you. 

 MR. ROMERO: My name's Dennis Romero. I worked 

at Rocky Flats for 18 years. I started out as 


a production loader in 444 doing BE, uranium, 


titanium, silver, gold on the parts. Times 


we'd be back in the area -- in the old days 


they used to eat back there in beryllium 


process area. They'd smoke back there, do 


anything you did on the outdoors in the back 


area, and then in time they changed the rule. 


There was days that we'd have air reversals in 


the building -- just the fans would go in 


reverse, and you'd have an alarm for everybody 


to evacuate the back area, and you'd have dust 


settling out of the building -- BE? Who knows. 


Maybe take you a half-hour, 45 minutes to get 


past the step-off pad, and meantime you're 


breathing this air to get past the step-off pad 


to get out to the cold area. That went on 


constantly out there for beryllium. 

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Then I got moved to Building 779, became an 


RCT, did that for 12 years. We started doing 


D&D work in 779. Everything was procedurally 


driven during production days and then we went 


D&D. It was procedurally driven in the 


beginning to follow certain guidelines on how 


we dismantle boxes, how we dismantle piping, 


and if it wasn't right we'd shut the job down 


and we'd elevate the job to better PPE, better 


respiratory protection, and the job would go 


on. And based off DAC levels, divide their 


concentrations of plutonium in the air, that 


would determine what protections we would have 


as far as respirators. An (inaudible) 


respirator, which is 50 DAC, was our protection 


factor, or 1,000 for supplied air or PAPRs. 


When we exceeded those numbers, the jobs would 


stop. We would evaluate -- do we need to 


upgrade our protection factors to a higher 


protection factor respirator or supplied 


breathing air. 


As things turned out, because we couldn't keep 


the DAC levels down we would do supplied 


breathing air in tents -- which was, to me, the 


best way to -- D&D ability. You got outside 

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air, supplying air to a man to do work in a 


high DAC atmosphere. But it takes a long time 


to get a person in and out of supplied 


breathing air. It's time-consuming. It's hard 


on the worker. They deemed that PAPRs, which 


is a Powered Air Purifying Respirator with a 


motor that pushes air through the canister, 


gives you 1,000 protection factor, which they 


felt we could do the job in that and still be 


safe. If it hit 1,000, we would stop work and 


try to evaluate how we can keep the DAC levels 


down. 


But in time, because you couldn't keep the DAC 


levels down, they started tak-- changing the 


protection factors. Staying being 1,000, and 


our limit was 1,000 on-site for PAPRs 


protection factors, they felt that at 1,000 DAC 


we was protected. But then they started 


exceeding and go to 10,000 DAC, 100,000 DAC, 


even up to a million DAC. How much of that's 


getting through the respirator? Who knows. 


There's times the workers would wear that 


respirator for eight hours. He'd come out 


sweaty, canisters sweaty, saturated with sweat. 


Everybody knows the efficiency of the canister 

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-- or the respirator drops because it's wet. 


What's the efficiency of the respirator now and 


is he breathing in? Management wouldn't do 


nothing about it. 


We used to do PIF, protection -- well, 


potential intake factor limits where if we 


exceeded the protection factor they would do 


nasal/mouths on people. They would do 


bioassay. They would do fecal. If it got high 


enough, they would do body counts to see what 


this person was getting into it. It takes 


time. It takes money. You've got to shut a 


job down. Got to the point -- they weren't 


doing PIF, potential intake factor, worksheets. 


They weren't doing those because they didn't 


want to know what the levels were. 


 The DAC levels were exceeded. They knew it; 


they didn't care. They didn't make people do 


bioassay or fecal. What's these people's -- 


breathing in? The dosimeter's not going to 


show you that information. And that went on 


constantly. 


Towards the end I got into doing final survey 


on 771, which you know is the most contaminated 


building on site. They would deem -- the rad 

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engineers would deem certain areas to be cold. 


Like this room, they'd say this room is -- 


certain areas are for -- are cold. As an RCT 


we had to go do final survey on it, which is 


the direct frisk of the building so we could 


release the building so they could tear it 


down. Your black line there, we'll say that's 


a rad area. Workers are in there working in 


respirators. Rad engineer deemed us out here 


'cause we wasn't affected by that job, we 


didn't need no dosimeters. We didn't need 


respirators. But those men in that area had 


cams, they had air samplers, respirators, PPE. 


Cams would go off -- evacuate the area. We're 


over here working. Of course we'd have to 


evacuate, but what was we exposed to? We 


didn't have respirators on. We didn't have 


dosimeters. And the areas they was working on 


at that time was the infinity room. If you 


know anything about the infinity room, that was 


a very highly contaminated room. They were 


cutting up the concrete floor from the infinity 


room, which was an area -- million dpm. But 


because we wasn't part of that job, we wasn't 


required to have any of this protection. 

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Where's your information? It does not exist. 


The plant is closed. It's gone. They say it's 


cold. The place is not safe. There's still 


highly contaminated areas out there. The 


public is at risk now, besides the workers that 


were there. But now the public's going to be 


at risk because that place is going to reach up 


and bite somebody in the butt down the future 


because it's still very highly contaminated, 


and something needs to be done about it and the 


public needs to know. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dennis. Then Richard 


Ostrom. Richard. 


 MR. OSTROM: I didn't come prepared with any 


paper to read from, so I'm just going to give 


you a few of exper-- experiences that I had. 


was an assembler in Building 707 and 776, 777 


between 1982 and 1992. The experiences I want 


to relate, it won't take very long to do so, 


but it verifies what has already been 


discussed. 


When I first started there the dosimeter badge 


was supposed to be worn on the top of -- of 


your chest, right about in here (indicating). 


And then when we wore our lead vest, then we 


I 
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were supposed to be putting that dosimeter 


badge behind the vest in order to protect it 


from picking up more count. Later on down the 


road we wound up -- we had to put a vest in 


front and a vest behind because we're getting 


blasted so much from the radiation. 


That idea went away because somebody came up 


with the idea that now we have that radiation 


bouncing between two lead vests and we're going 


to keep it right in here (indicating). 


In summation to all this, I after a while just 


got to feeling like a lab rat, and that's 


pretty much all I can say about it. Thank you 


very much. I appreciate you -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. I'd like to 


call on Michelle -- I think it's -- I'm having 


trouble reading the last name -- R-o-b -- 


 MS. DOBROVOLNY: It's Dobrovolny. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MS. DOBROVOLNY: Michelle. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Michelle. Thank you. 


 MS. DOBROVOLNY: My name is Michelle Dobrovolny 


and I appreciate you sticking me in here. 
I 


actually am here against doctor's orders. 
I 


have pneumonia for the third time. But I am a 

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Rocky Flats employee and I am sick. And I did 


have a speech written and I've decided just to 


go from the hip because I've heard a lot of 


people speak here today and I think they've 


spoken very well, and they've spoken for the 


people and the claimants. 


I have fought for six times to get my claim 


through. I'm on my seventh currently. Just 


because I haven't been diagnosed with cancer, 


even though I have the condition, I am not 


entitled. But yet Rocky Flats deemed me 


disabled. I'm not entitled to Department of 


Lab-- workmen's compensation. I live on $1,400 


a month and raise three teenaged sons. That's 


not how I looked for my life at the age of 41 


years, and it is a very difficult thing to 


fight against a corporation and a company who 


continually (inaudible) you down. 


I've watched five family members die from Rocky 


Flats of cancer. I have one right now, a 


cousin, who is in bed dying, expected not to 


make it to the end of the week. I had a 


father-in-law that I nursed to death, lung 


cancer. And their families are still fighting 


for the compensation package. It's not right. 

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You guys hold a lot of power in your hands for 


our lives, and I hope that you take into 


consideration that our lives are valuable and 


they're important. And they -- we deserve to 


live each and every day to the best of our 


ability with what assistance we can. I was 


exposed out there. I was in administration. 


was in hot areas. I know what this young lady 


was speaking about -- dosimetry, but my 


readings come back zero. I worked -- I was 


salaried, worked sometimes 60 hours a week, in 


and out of the hot areas. But because I was 


considered administration, I wasn't given the 


same dosimetry rights as the other workers who 


worked with the plutonium. But I'm sick. 


I don't -- my life expectancy is maybe nine to 


ten years, and I'm 41 years of age. What were 


you guys doing at the age of 41? Were you 


looking towards your death? Think about it. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Michelle. We thank you 


for coming under very difficult circumstances 


indeed. 


 Judy Padaya -- Padeyea -- 


 MS. PADILLA: Padilla. 


I 
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 DR. ZIEMER: -- Padilla. 


 MS. PADILLA: Good evening. My name is Judy 


Padilla. I'm nervous, sorry. I just have one 


question, and it regards the February 18th, 


2006 article that was in the Rocky Mountain 


News, and it says (reading) Program for sick 


nuclear workers targeted for cut. 


It says (reading) The Bush administration has 


proposed cutting $686 million from the program 


to aid Rocky Flats and other nuclear weapons 


plant workers who were sickened on the job by 


radiation and toxic chemicals. That proposal 


has U.S. Representative Mark Udall and Senator 


Ken Salazar of Colorado worried that thousands 


of people who put their lives on the line to 


build nuclear weapons will be left out in the 


cold for lack of funds. This amount represents 


44 percent of the total budget. 


And I would just like to know from the Board 


your comment, please. 


 DR. ZIEMER: To my knowledge, that proposal has 


not gone anywhere in Congress, but I -- I'm -- 


I can't say beyond that. I don't know where it 


is exactly. I've heard the same thing. We 


have no -- I don't think we have any direct 

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information on it more -- I've seen the news 


articles. I'm not aware that it's going 


anywhere. Can anyone comment? I don't believe 


it has occurred and -- it certainly hasn't 


occurred. Maybe some of the Congressional 


people can explain where that is. 


 MR. HILLER: The reference in the article is to 


a discussion between the Office of Management 


and Budget and the Department of Labor, and we 


are watching that closely. There are many 


members of Congress from both parties, both in 


the House and the Senate, who are very upset by 


that proposal. I -- I -- we haven't seen an 


effort yet to implement that -- that proposal, 


but we're watching closely. There -- there's 


been one hearing that has been conducted in the 


House of Representatives. There has been I 


think a suggestion that there may be another 


hearing. All I can tell you is that there are 


a lot of people watching who are strongly 


opposed to that and you'll hear a lot more if ­

- if there is any effort to move that forward. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I suspect we'll all be relying on 


our Congressional people to -- to handle that 


issue. 

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 MS. PADILLA: The article continues, (reading) 


Two Colorado members of Congress say they fear 


the administration intends to implement the 


proposed budget cut by denying a petition by 


Rocky Flats workers seeking to grandfather into 


the program everyone with certain cancers. 


That is applicable to our proposal that we get 


the cohort status. 


 It further says (reading) The compensation law 


allows for such petitions to be approved when 


radiation records at a particular site are so 


sketchy that workers can't possibly prove a 


connection to their illness. 


I think that is so appropriate to this meeting. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. A.W. I'm not going to 


try to pronounce the last name; I'm having a 


hard time reading it. I figure A.W. will work. 


Right? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Absolutely. Good evening, Dr. 


Ziemer and members of the Board. My name's 


Anthony William DeMaiori. Everybody knows me 


as Tony DeMaiori. I'm the petitioner on behalf 


of the United Steelworkers. I'm the ex-


president of Local 8031, represented the 

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nuclear weapons workers at the former Rocky 


Flats site. 


 I'm here tonight not to give a speech, that's ­

- or even a presentation, so I'm going to let 


everybody down. The United Steelworkers have 


been invited to make their presentation in 


front of the Board tomorrow morning from -- 


anywhere from 8:30 till noon, I believe, if 


that's correct. That's -- and so I'd like to 


invite everybody here to please come back 


tomorrow and to be present for our 


presentation. We put a lot of time and effort 


into it and I will spend a minute or so 


thanking all the people that have helped us put 


this petition together. 


Everybody needs to know that everything we put 


in that petition was volunteered to us. Dr. 


Bob Biceline* gave us 38 years of experience at 


Rocky Flats; Dr. Goldsmith, who did 


epidemiology for the Department of Energy in 


Washington, D.C.; Steve Baker, internal 


dosimetry, 28 years; Jennifer Thompson put the 


petition together for us, she did all the 


technical writing that was absolutely donated 


for free. That's everything that we put 

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together we -- we collected from site experts, 


and I'm going to miss a few, so I -- I have to 


tell you that I'd like to thank all those 


people. I'd like to thank Terrie Barrie of 


ANWAG for working very hard on behalf of the 


sick nuclear weapons workers. And there's just 


so many people in the room -- we have Richard 


Miller, who's always been an advocate of the 


workers; Senator Salazar's office for all their 


support; Senator Allard's office for -- for 


their support; Congressman Mark Udall, 


Congressman Bob Beauprez -- we've had a 


tremendous amount of support for this petition. 


That's -- I'm around -- or I'm going to end 


this saying that, you know, everybody came 


together for the sick nuclear weapons worker. 


Tomorrow we will give our presentation and 


please come back. That's -- we feel that it's 


worth everybody, you know, listening to. The 


public is invited, so thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Tony. Indeed 


our meetings are fully open, so everyone is 


indeed welcome to -- to attend the meeting 


tomorrow morning. Larry -- let me give you the 


time. 

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 DR. WADE: It begins at 8:30. 


 DR. ZIEMER: 8:30. 8:30, and be right here. 


 Larry Rands? 


MR. RANDS: Hi, my name is Larry Rands. 
I 


spent 19 years working at Rocky Flats, mostly 


in what we referred to as the hot areas. And I 


was laid off in 2001, voluntary lay-off. Two 


years later I was diagnosed with lung cancer, 


and a month after that I had my right lung 


removed, along with a rib, and followed by 


chemotherapy, which has affected my balance, my 


-- numb -- I have numbness in my hands and 


feet. And so my point of contention of being 


here tonight is not only for myself but to give 


you an idea of some of the things that 


claimants have to go through. 


I had filed a claim beginning in 2004. I am 


still appealing denials, and I have been 


requested to provide information -- names, 


dates, places, types of exposures, duration of 


exposures, et cetera, et cetera. And I'm sure 


that you realize what a joke that is. 


I have filed for information regarding 


dosimetry logs, radiation control logs and on 


and on and on. I can provide -- I have a 

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limited number of copies, but I can provide 


that for you. And the burden of proof has 


always come back to me. 


In one case I received a letter and the -- the 


gentleman said that I needed to obtain a 


written medical report from my attending 


physicians showing a causal -- this is, you 


know, verbiage -- the causal relationship 


between my claim for pancreatic cancer and the 


cause of death indicated on my death 


certificate. Well, I'm here to tell you that 


I'm still alive. At least I think I am. 


And my -- the people that spoke before me told 


you about the ludicrous stuff that's going on, 


and -- and this is -- I can vouch for that. 


have filed a letter of petition, I guess, if 


you will, for -- under the Freedom of 


Information Act to get records regarding 


exposures to carcinogenic chemicals that were 


used at the Flats. Most of the focus is on 


radiation exposure, but any of us that have 


been involved with decontamination work or any 


glovebox work -- maintenance men, construction 


workers, it goes on and on -- we were exposed 


to more than just radiation, which could 


I 
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produce cancers. 


The NIOSH dose reconstruction report that I 


received said that I had received 47 rem to the 


lung, but the causal percentage was 37 percent. 


And the guidelines that NIOSH uses say that 


anything under 50 percent is denied. So my 


point being that dose reconstruction does not 


always consider the dose received by an 


individual working in a high dose rate job. 


They take averages, I believe, for the areas or 


the buildings. They take an average number of 


hours that may or may not have been worked by 


an individual. And that's pretty much where 


they get their dose reconstruction numbers 


from. 


I know for a fact that, as Diane pointed out, 


you know, as material was stored in Building 


371 in the later years, prior to being shipped 


out, background radiation in Building 371 and 


374 increased. Was not taken into 


consideration. Many of the workers there were 


office workers. At one -- it finally got to 


the point that -- that the workers had to -- 


even the administrative workers had to wear 


their dosimetry badges in the area working in 

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their offices. Their desks had to be moved 


away from the walls because of increased 


radiation. Now what about -- until that 


occurred, what about the dose received then? 


 The record-keeping is virtually non-existent, 


and records which might aid a worker claim 


cannot be found or do not exist, and this is 


from my personal experience. I've requested 


this information. I've been told it does not 


exist or it's not reproducible. If I want to 


pursue it, it will cost me $40 an hour to have 


someone dig through the boxes that they have 


located at the Federal Center. It will cost 


ten cents a page, plus a percentage on top of 


that to have that information reproduced and 


sent to me. Now that information I just got 


over the phone in the last couple of days, so 


I'm expecting a letter to document that by the 


end of the week. 


So the burden of proof lies with the worker who 


worked in an atmosphere of a need to know, and 


wasn't always aware of the chronic effects from 


the chemical exposure and the radiation 


exposure that we had. 


 Routine exposures were not recorded and people 

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were not sent to medical for contamination or 


chemical exposure unless necessary. And I'm 


sure that this is just reiteration of what you 


may or may not have heard already, but a lot of 


that occurred. 


Workers were exposed to unrecorded radiation 


exposure as the stored radioactive waste 


accumulated and aged. The amount of dosage 


went up. Unusual results, which has already 


been mentioned, were disregarded and averages 


were used for a matter of record. Well, it's a 


little unusual this time, but in the past that 


person only had a certain amount of -- so we'll 


just use that and erase or change the figure, 


so... 


If you need a copy, I can do that. Thank you 


for your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Before you sit down, sir, Mike 


Gibson on the Advisory Board has a question, I 


believe, for you -- for Larry -- or no -- yes, 


for Larry. 


 MR. GIBSON: I have a question and a comment. 


Dr. Ziemer, I believe if the records and the 


transcripts will reflect, I -- I read into the 


record a redacted letter to a claimant from a 

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391 

Mound facility in Miamisburg basically asking 


the same information that this gentleman was 


asked, and I was assured by one of the 


governmental agencies that sent this letter to 


the claimants that these letters would no 


longer go out and this practice would be 


stopped. And if -- if the gentleman would care 


to share with us, I would like to know when you 


received that letter. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And incidentally, this -- this was 


a letter -- was this to DOL or -- A letter from 


DOL. 


 MR. GIBSON: The question was, this same letter 


was sent to a claimant and I read it -- a 


redacted copy of that letter into the record, I 


believe back in St. Louis, several months ago. 


And the agency in charge assured me that this 


letter would no longer be sent out to 


claimants. So I'm just wondering, if you'd 


care to share with us, did you receive this 


letter recently or did you receive it several 


months ago? 


 DR. ZIEMER: This says I think June 10th of 


2005. Is that the letter that you're referring 


to? 

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MR. RANDS: Which letter do you mean? I've 


got a stack --


 MR. GIBSON: Okay --


MR. RANDS: -- of correspondence this high in 


my --


 MR. GIBSON: I'm --


MR. RANDS: -- different people from the 


Department of Energy, from the Department of 


Labor and NIOSH records. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. I'm sorry, sir, I'm 


referring to the letter that you referred to 


asking for a physician to sign a letter saying 


about the causation of your illness. 


MR. RANDS: Right. Okay, that --


 MR. GIBSON: What -- what was the date of that 


letter if you don't mind sharing? 


MR. RANDS: I don't. Okay, that was about 


January 15th of 2006. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, that was very recent then. 


 MR. GIBSON: So that was after -- that was 


after -- that we were assured by -- the Board 


was assured that that letter would no longer go 


out to claimants. 


MR. RANDS: Okay. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. I just want that on the 

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record. 


MR. RANDS: This is from the EEOIC (sic), the ­

- what's the thing here -- Energy Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation group, and 


that was about the 15th -- I think it was dated 


maybe the 13th. I could reproduce that. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, January 15th, I just -- I 


just seen it. 


MR. RANDS: Okay. 


 MR. GIBSON: January 15th of 2006, so -- 


MR. RANDS: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. That's the 


information you were looking for. I think --


 MR. GIBSON: I'd like to --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- there's a concern here which 


we'll have to follow up on. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes, thank --


MR. RANDS: Thank you. 


 MR. GIBSON: Thank you, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, then James Turner is next. 


Is James Turner here? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, maybe he stepped out momentarily. Mark 


Denhower -- Danhower -- Denhower*? Is that 


Mark? No? 

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MR. DANHOWER: My name is Mark Danhower. I'm 


an insulator. I worked out of Rocky Flats for 


four years and I have large B-cell diffuse nonHodgkin's lymphoma. I got that at 37 years 


old. I'm only 40 right now. 


I was only -- I hear a lot of stories about a 


lot of people who worked in the gloveboxes and 


production days and everything else. I was 


only involved in the last four years, but I got 


sick. And I've been in remission for two and a 


half years, but I have to live with that every 


day, that I can come out of remission at any 


time, and it scares the hell out of me. And I 


know there's other people here that are sick 


that are older -- may be a little bit easier 


for them to handle, but I'm only 40 years old 


and I have a family. 


Luckily I was able to get -- I got married and 


got some health insurance before I got sick, so 


that way my wife can be taken care of. But in 


the meantime, the monetary, the health, the 


psychological, the physical effects of chemo, 


like you just heard from this gentleman. I got 


one of the most intense treatments of chemo 


that you can get, five days a week, 24 hours a 

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day, six treatments, and that will -- ended me 


up in the hospital for two weeks after every 


treatment. 


I can go on and on about, you know, the 


financial, emotional, the -- the disabilities 


that I have now at 40 years old that I 


shouldn't have -- back problems, leg problems, 


tingling in my hands and the feet. I got the 


same thing you got. You know, and I still have 


another 20, 25 years to work, and I don't 


qualify for disability because I'm not disabled 


enough. So I have to live on pain medication 


and shots that hopefully when I'm able to go 


back to work they will hire me, being on all 


this medication. And they're taking a big risk 


giving me a job. 


You know, the -- the emotional distress that it 


-- that it does to you, knowing that you have 


cancer at such a young age. I know a lot of 


kids have cancer. I dealt with kids with 


cancer when I was around 21. I worked in 


Children's Hospital, dealt with Ronald McDonald 


House, all that stuff, and it just -- kind of 


ironic I ended up in that same position, but I 


can't imagine how a kid would feel being sick. 

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You know, I know I was scared to death 'cause I 


was stage three when they found it, and the 


only reason they found it in time was because 


of my wife. She demanded a CAT scan. And that 


was through my private insurance. 


So you know, I've torn down the area where they 


had the fire in '69, where they put up false 


ceiling. I tore that down. I torn down G-mod 


in 707, the beryllium room. I've torn down 


ductwork 30 foot high that had dust on it where 


you wouldn't believe from incidences that these 


people talk about that happened 30 years ago 


that 30 feet up in the air that nobody could 


get to because of all the conduit and all the ­

- the ductwork and everything else that we 


couldn't get to until we took everything up 


from the bottom up. And by the time we got up 


there, you know, nobody knew until I brought 


that piece all the way back down to the floor 


and had the RCT swipe it to find out that stuff 


was screaming, you know, and we were in that 


area the day before -- you know, you got people 


in one room with jack hammers on the walls and 


you got people over here making a whole bunch 


of noise and shaking dust and everything and 

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397 

we're walking around in that area and it's not 


posted. And the next day it's screaming hot 


once I take a piece of ductwork down. 


And I was told by my doctor that radiation 


exposure can cause non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. And 


I've -- I think they did my reconstruction and 


they put me at .03 percent, which means I don't 


have a chance in hell of getting a penny, or 


life insurance, or health insurance that I 


desperately need because if my -- my wife works 


through the State, and if she loses her job, I 


lose my health insurance. And if I get sick 


again, I'm dead in the water. I mean I went 


bankrupt with health insurance, but losing 


almost $90,000 in payroll from working out -- 


'cause I couldn't work at the Flats when I got 


sick. I didn't qualify for disability 'cause 


you have to be disabled for at least a year, so 


I didn't get a penny from them. I'd just 


bought a new house. 


I mean I can give you a sob story all night 


long. I know these other people have other 


stuff they want to say that's probably more 


important, but I also want to put a face to the 


disease that's out there. There's guys out 

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there that were 18, 19 years old that hopefully 


won't get sick. But who knows what they were 


exposed to because -- you know, they're going 


to be in the same position I'm in now 20 years 


from now, and hopefully they're not standing in 


front of a Board begging you for money. But 


not to go on vacation or anything else, but 


just to compensate for the loss that you've had 


to go through through the price of the 


insurance, the deductibles -- I still have to 


pay out of pocket money for my chemo -- not my 


chemo but my -- the pain I have from my chemo. 


I still have out of pocket expenses. It nev--


it's a never-ending deal. 


 It never stops and, to me, that would be the 


biggest thing is long-term health insurance. 


Because I know a lot of people that are 


uninsured and can't afford it, and I know I was 


truly lucky enough to get on my wife's 


insurance before I went out to Rocky Flats, so 


I'm one of the lucky ones I think when it comes 


to insurance because I know there's a lot of 


people that are uninsured or can't -- can't 


afford it. But if she loses her job, I can 


definitely -- will never be able to afford it. 

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399 

And like I said, my doctor tells me more and 


more -- the more I'm in remission, the less 


chance I have of getting certain -- you know, 


my cancer coming back. But I was also told 


that the chemo that I received can also cause 


other cancers. I could end up with leukemia. 


I could end up with anything. 


And if I -- if I get sick again, I have to have 


a bone marrow transplant. And because my 


brothers are half-brothers, I have to depend on 


a anonymous donor to save my life. I hope to 


God nobody ever has to have that in the back of 


their mind, that they have to go on a computer 


to find a stranger to save your life. I have 


to live with that every day. 


So I appreciate your time. I wish all of you 


the best. I wish everything works out for 


everybody. I just hope that you have an impact 


on this cohort status because that is the only 


way any of us is going to ever see a penny. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


MR. DANHOWER: That's the way I feel. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Leslie Britton? 


 MR. BRITTON: Good evening. 

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400

 DR. ZIEMER: Or is it -- Lessie -- Lessie? 


 MR. BRITTON: Lessie. There you go, you get a 


dime for that. Lot of folks -- most folks at 


Rocky Flats call me Les, and I'm a newcomer 


like this young man, was out there six years, 


and I got BE exposed. 


Now let me just -- now the folks that worked 


there, we did make history. I think it was 


projected to where we were supposed to lose two 


and a half people during the process of taking 


down Rocky Flats. All right. We didn't do it. 


That's the -- that's the good side. But the 


down side is, look at all the exposure and the 


sickness that came after that. 


Only thing I'm asking is this here. Being that 


I was out there just six years and my BE 


sensitivity did not -- okay? -- and for some 


strange reason he can't find the paperwork of 


that. Now that's bad. And I don't understand 


this because it's only been six years, I've 


only been gone for two years. But now like the 


folks that's been out there that's been there 


some 25 and 30 years, you know, and like here 


they are, they're dying from cancer -- or have 


died from cancer, and this young man here is 40 

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years old, he doesn't know what's going to 


happen to him. But what I don't understand is 


how does the government and people in power 


just throw away the citizens that helped save 


this country. How do you just throw them away? 


Why is it that you don't care anything about 


the people that helped save this country? 


And then you do all the other like idiotic mess 


of stuff we won't discuss about going on now -- 


folks can't get any help it seems because the 


system is clogged up -- by what? Just use your 


own imagination. All right? 


I don't have nothing against nobody human being 


-- okay? -- because my family's Heinz 57. 


Okay? But the (inaudible) was just here, I 


don't appreciate no one coming to this country 


without paying their dues that a lot of us have 


paid to live in this country. You come here, 


you get a free ride. All right? And then here 


we are, you got -- believe me, I mean I'm proud 


of the fact that I was part of Rocky Flats 


taking down, see, because we did it most safe-- 


safest way possible. But the after-effect -- 


think about the aftereffect, and who cares 


about that? The folks that don't care and just 

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402 

holding power, the right policy and things, 


there's nothing wrong with them. But now you 


have one doctor that's going to raise a bunch 


of ruck-- and you know him, Dr. MacInerney*. 


We worked in G module where this man -- young 


man tore down. I got exposed to BE there. He 


brought us -- a team of physicians in, which is 


him and 11 others. They was exposed. They had 


no PAPRs, no Tyveks, nothing. Then two weeks 


after they came in G module, then they post the 


room. I've never in my life heard a doctor 


talk this bad about anybody. The man might 


have got -- I don't blame him for getting upset 


for the simple reason he got exposed and didn't 


have to be exposed. 


I understand what makes this world go round, 


and it's not the people. It's the money. 


Folks care more about bonuses than bones that 


make people. We'll sit here and we can talk 


all day long about what you're going to do, but 


then that -- you've spent $95 million on 30 


people. All right. And when this program come 


about, I mean what -- and they said the $95 


million was paperwork. You care nothing -- you 


care more about paper than people. Why is 

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403 

that? You got -- you sit and you listen to me, 


you sit -- all these folks here, but here -- 


look at us, look at us. Folks is dying. It's 


the one's that's not dead. People are hurting. 


Credit, triple A-1 down to zero, bankruptcy. 


Like the young man said, begging for pennies 


when millions have been spent foolishly simply 


because we have jackasses in office. I'm real 


serious about that. And we have jackasses in 


here in high position that don't want to do 


anything, you know. 


I'm not hurting, you know. I don't have to do 


this here. I don't have to take no -- I take 


more drugs than anybody in here to keep from 


the pain that I have, just to function. Not to 


get high, just to come in here. Every day, to 


get up. It hurts. My wife have to deal with 


that. My children. But the name of the tune 


is that I'm going to be all right, until I die. 


But then we're all going to die from something, 


and we agree to that. But if you all have any 


kind of power to get these fools off they 


behinds and take care of the people that 


dedicated their lives to saving this country, 


holding this country together, then maybe it'd 

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be a better country -- when you've spent all 


your time on other stuff that really don't even 


matter simply because they haven't paid they 


dues. Everybody in here has paid their dues to 


live in America. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, well said, Lessie. And Jan 


Dennemest -- Dennemest? 


MS. DEMOREST: Yes, Demorest. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that close? 


MS. DEMOREST: Hi, I'd just like to say that I, 


too, received the Part E letter that you were 


asking for in approximately January. I'd also 


received a telephone call from Hanford's 


Resource Center asking for an interview. I had 


that deferred because I am now facing another 


possible cancer and was unable to do anything 


other than meet with a physician and asking him 


to write another letter identifying all of 


these issues. So I'm glad if in fact that has 


been canceled as far as -- as what is necessary 


for a claimant to provide for the Part E, if 


that's in fact what you were referring to. 
I 


would be glad to supply a copy of that letter 


if you -- if you would so desire. 


 MR. GIBSON: The Board was as-- the Board was 

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405 

assured it would be taken care of, but 


evidently it has not yet. 


MS. DEMOREST: Committee members, 


representatives from our Colorado senators and 


congressmen, fellow Steelworkers, fellow Rocky 


Flats claimants and concerned citizens, thank 


you for the opportunity to speak to issues 


regarding my experience at Rocky Flats -- 


 MS. MUNN: Ma'am --


MS. DEMOREST: -- and I request that you 


support the Rocky Flats SEC petition -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We need to have you --


MS. DEMOREST: -- for all claimants -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- get a little closer --


 MS. MUNN: Could you please --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- to the mike, if you -- 


 MS. MUNN: -- get closer to the mike? We can't 


hear you. 


MS. DEMOREST: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, that's better. 


MS. DEMOREST: I'm just thanking you for -- can 


you hear me now? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, that's better. 


MS. DEMOREST: There's a saying to that, I 


think. I request that you support the Rocky 

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406 

Flats SEC petition for all claimants, 


production and non-production workers alike. 


My name is Janet Demorest and I am a claimant 


under the EEOICPA as I contracted breast 


cancer, multi-focal ductal carcinoma in situ 


requiring a modified radical mastectomy in 


1994. Two and a half years later, after 


multiple tumor aspirations and excision 


biopsies to verify the presence or absence of 


cancerous cells in one and a half centimeter 


tumors growing at a rate of every three weeks 


to three months, 11 in all, and when one of the 


biopsies indicated precancerous hyperplasia on 


the ductal cells and when I underwent a 


prophylactic modified radical mastectomy of the 


other breast in order to reduce the chances of 


full-blown carcinoma or metastatic breast 


cancer. 


I was an employee. I was a non-production 


worker at Rocky Flats environmental technology 


site at the time I contracted cancer. From 


1991 to 2000 were the ten years that I spent 


there. Note that all production of pits had 


ceased at this time. However, the incidence of 


cancer did not, for a production worker or non­
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407 

production worker, as we have heard in many 


instances tonight. 


Although -- although the NIOSH reconstructed a 


radiation dose for my claim as I had not been 


issued a dosimeter at Rocky Flats per their 


management policy, and I challenge you to ask 


why such a policy existed, I did not believe, 


nor do I now, that my exposures were accurately 


estimated and cannot be estimated for 


sufficient accuracy. I therefore requested a 


re-evaluation of my claim, which was appealed 


August 19th of 2005, and a hearing took place 


in October. The hearing was, in my estimation, 


a farce, a complete waste of time and money, as 


was the three and a half years waiting to be 


heard. 


I'll just briefly explain why. For instance, 


during the hearing, the person who was 


overseeing the hearing greeted me cheerfully, 


stating that she remembered me as she was the 


one who had taken my claim input more than 


three years previously. I thought how strange 


that the same person who took my input was now 


the hearing official. Is this a conflict of 


interest? 

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408 

It was an emotional hour, but it was longer 


than the five minutes the older gentleman 


before me in line had his hearing, a man who 


was obviously crippled, and he was only allowed 


five minutes for his hearing because the 


recorder personnel was late. So in order to 


keep on time, they did not reschedule his 


hearing. I found this strange, and I question 


how fair. 


I had heard -- I had told the hearing personnel 


that I needed to make sure that the hearing was 


for Part B and not Part E, because none of my 


letters ever indicated that the claim hearing 


was for which part. As I left my hearing, the 


official stated, "If you get any more cancer of 


any kind, please let me know." I was 


stupefied. I had no response to such an 


inappropriate comment. What a horrible way to 


exit a cancer patient, fighting for my life. 


My claim was in fact denied, with no 


reconsideration of any of the facts which had 


been submitted in writing, verbalized multiple 


times in many phone interviews, nor per the 


hearing. A dose reconstruction of .65 millirem 


placed me at .25 percent risk. This totally 

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409 

ignored all of the facts that I had submitted. 


What was ignored? All of it. For instance, 


the fact that my office -- that is my desk -- 


was in a cold building. The documentation in 


the DOE records did not indicate that as the 


maintenance implementation program manager that 


I did not manage anyone. It was simply a title 


given to me because there was a new DOE order 


for maintenance programs for DOE facilities 


which required assessment of maintenance 


operations at DOE nuclear and non-nuclear 


facilities and implementation of SHAOW* 


statements for the DOE. That is the 


construction worker program, which we have 


heard of tonight. 


The fact that my job required that I accompany 


those construction crews, the maintenance 


workers, who also were my escorts since I had 


no dosimeter and had not been tasked for 


radiation worker training, per the management. 


I ask you again, why? These crews which I 


accompanied were electricians, welders, 


painters, carpenters, pipefitters, metrology 


technicians to check calibration of 


instruments, among others. We went into all 

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410 

the buildings, more than 400 at the time, on a 


routine basis up to the time of my diagnosis in 


January of 1994. The buildings which I worked 


in included cold -- that is assumed cold -- 


such as Buildings as 060, 111 and 112, 115, 


130, 131, 331, 334, 460, the trailers, medical, 


metrology buildings, et cetera -- and hot 


buildings, such as 371, 441, 443, 554, 771 -- 


which we've heard a lot about tonight -- 776, 


881, 707, et cetera. The fact that many cold 


areas within a hot building for non-production 


staff, which we have also heard instance 


proclaimed tonight, who were therefore not 


required to wear dosimetry -- these buildings 


had ventilation systems which were not always 


separated and were not HEPA ventilated from the 


hot areas. Therefore the air circulated 


throughout such buildings from the production 


side to the non-production office areas. So 


even a visit to a cold building could result in 


undetected contamination. 


Could I or other non-production workers 


therefore have received some rad, if present, 


from sitting at my desk? Or attending a 


meeting in a cold side of the building? More 

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411 

likely than not is what most workers would tell 


you. 


Fact: Painters reported to me of instances, 


though I was not in the area at the time, in 


which they were preparing a wall in a cold 


area, only to find the marker for radiation -- 


purple paint -- beneath layers of normal paint 


in areas where workers had their desks and 


conducted paperwork, believing -- and for all 


indications, they were right -- that they were 


in a non-rad area. The purple paint, however, 


indicated that the radiation of some type had 


warranted the warning, which had mistakenly 


been painted over at some point in time. Hence 


any worker, production or non-production 


worker, would have been exposed to some type of 


radiation, and most likely not be wary -- be 


wearing a TLD when in that designated office 


uncontrolled area. 


Fact: I might need to attend a meeting 


carrying paperwork back from an office in 


another building, often held in Building 771, 


the most dangerous building in the world, per 


former Secretary of Energy, Mr. Pena. Meetings 


were generally held in the cafeteria, or a cold 

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412 

office area -- also which are referred to other 


accountants tonight. 


It was not until after my cancer identification 


when I demanded that I be issued a dosimeter 


that I received a recorded dose, 0.11 rem. 


Where have I been? Building 771 in a meeting 


in the cafeteria? Yes. It was not until years 


later that I found out that the liquid 


plutonium processing tanks -- which were now 


leaking badly, post the infamous FBI raid, and 


had to be drained -- were on the other side of 


the cafeteria wall. Did my manager or 


supervisor ever go into these areas? All I 


know is I never saw a one of them in any of the 


buildings. They sent me instead, including 


going to meetings at other sites, such as 


Savannah River, Y-12, Pantex. 


While at Pantex there was a tritium release, 


and Pantex had made sure to issue me a 


dosimeter. However, the NIOSH report did not 


include the Pantex dosimetry report. 


Oak Ridge, Y-12, I was there many times. The 


later -- during a latter tour it included a 


tour of the side of Y-12 in which I noted that 


a pad was filled with everything from tires to 

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413 

desks in the open, uncovered. When I asked 


what was that, the reply -- it's contaminated 


stuff, and it had been filmed in a documentary 


by a major television program the week before 


as being a concern to the safety of workers and 


visitors -- and the public. Possible 


contamination exposure sans dosimetry, even 


when I was visiting other DOE facilities as 


part of my job, both pre- and post-cancer 


diagnosis. 


Y-12, incidentally, has now been given SEC 


status. 


Fact: Sources were present in many of the 


buildings, some of which I was aware of, such 


as low-level sources for the metrologists in 


calibration of instruments. Others, which were 


much larger, higher rad sources which at the 


time I had no knowledge of the close proximity 


to which I was working, as I had no need to 


know. 


 For example, there was apparently an extremely 


large source, the size of a room -- which room 


I do not know -- which leers (sic) 


[years/layers] later during D&D activities had 


to be excised from the hot building by cutting 

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414 

out the floor and having a crane lowered into a 


vender truck, the source occupying the entire 


back end of the truck. These activities were 


reported to me because then I was oversight for 


transportation activities, hence my need to 


know at the time of post-cancer that the source 


was originally greater than 20,000 curies of 


cesium, 20,000 curies. How many times have I 


and others walked into that area and the escort 


would warn me to -- don't touch anything, 


hurry. Was there sufficient protection? 


Doubtful, though I hope so for all the workers' 


sake. But I do know that the workers whom I 


accompanied were concerned. 


Fact: I was sitting at my desk in the 


maintenance building, Building 334, cold 


building -- I don't recall the date, but I 


include it as it typifies, unfortunately, the 


hazards of daily work at Rocky Flats -- when an 


announcement was made regarding an incident 


that had finally been reported, something like 


six days past the incident, in which liquid 


plutonium tanks had been successfully drained ­

- a major feat. The first one had gone so well 


that, despite the fact that the work order was 

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415 

to drain only one tank, a second had been 


drained as well, without taking time to assay 


the contents of the second tank. This allowed 


close proximity of two different concentrations 


of Pu, a potential criticality situation, which 


was identified nor reported until after the 


assay was completed. An investigation was 


conducted, an occurrence report filed, and two 


high-level supervisors lost their jobs as a 


consequence. 


Where had I been during that week, during the 


time frame of the tank drain to the time of 


notification? In that same building. 


Exposure? Highly likely, but not measured, no 


dosimetry. 


Fact: Regarding Building 771 again, I had to 


ensure maintenance crew operation support in 


the building. When not escorted, I could enter 


the area but not the building per se, so I 


would stand outside and observe the work 


outside. If maintenance crews didn't show on 


time, or there was a problem, I might make a 


phone call from a tunnel adjacent to the dock 


area. It wasn't until after I had rad worker 


training years later in 1998 that I found out 

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416 

that the tunnel was part of the transfer of 


drums of liquid plutonium, and other stuff, and 


was an area I definitely should not have been 


in. Dosimetry? No. PPE? No. 


I was also not aware at the time that due to 


the fire that was in Building 771, and others, 


that temperatures had caused plutonium to 


become oxidized into high-fired oxides, also 


known as Super Class Y materials. Due to this 


unique form of plutonium, and since this is the 


building where I later, post-cancer diagnosis, 


was in when I had a dosimeter and received a 


dose -- I'd only been in the cafeteria, 


remember -- it would -- could well have been 


due to Pu exposure, as well as to Super Y 


particles of high-fired oxide plutonium, which 


cannot be detected at the same levels of normal 


Pu due to their extremely small size. 


Note: It is my understanding that even Super Y 


particles are not detectible by TLDs. Since I 


was in various buildings on a daily, weekly 


basis for over three and a half years prior to 


my cancer diagnosis, or after, overall I could 


well have had the potential for chronic, low-


dose exposure to ionizing radiation, including 

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417 

Super Y particles. 


Fact: That I continuously walked by filled 


drums while swipes were being taken and loaded 


onto docks for transportation to other areas. 


Fact: I would sometimes be caught in rad 


building during a shut-down due to a crit alarm 


and confined to an area sometimes for several 


hours. Exposure? Most likely. 


Fact: The grounds themselves were 


contaminated. Driving past the gates from the 


east gate, one had to drive past rad-posted 


fenced-in open soil areas with sprinkler heads 


and hoses visible. As a new employee when I 


asked why they were trying to keep the 


sagebrush and the tumbleweeds green, I was 


informed that that wasn't the purpose. But 


after the fires in Building 771 and 707, the 


water had to be put someplace for the fires, 


and it over -- because it had overflown the 


berms, and so one of the ways was -- to get rid 


of the hot water was to spray it on the soil 


using a common sprinkler system, which of 


course contaminated the soil and could blow 


around when fierce winds hit, further spreading 


contaminants. 

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418

 Fact: Another method was one that was then 


developed to contain the contaminated water by 


building solar ponds, which were areas 


employees continually walked by. I was told 


not to deter any animals I saw drinking from 


these ponds so that we wouldn't be in violation 


of EPA laws. RCTs were baffled to find hot 


areas at the base of electric wire poles, which 


electricians had to maintain, until one day 


they found a coyote relieving himself onto the 


base of the pole. The animals were drinking 


from the solar ponds. I didn't drink from the 


solar pond, but I drove or walked by them 


routinely as I went from one area to another, 


as did every employee at the site, whether a 


production worker or a non-production worker. 


We all had potential to receive ionizing 


radiation. 


It is difficult to describe in retrospect the 


laissez faire attitude we as workers came to 


accept about our working conditions. We would 


go about our work, and most of the workers 


pooh-poohed the idea of any real danger to any 


of it. After all, they couldn't see it. They 


were used to it, and nothing had happened to 

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them so far. However, I believe it was also 


because they really didn't know how truly 


dangerous it was. Nor, in fairness to the 


discoverers of the entire nuclear bomb process, 


neither did they. Would I work there if I had 


known the level of contamination and not 


believed in what I was told, not to worry? 


Absolutely not. 


Post-cancer, my activities and locations were 


changed, mostly at my request, so that I would 


not be exposed to ionizing radiation. I was 


terrified of getting cancer again. I was 


issued a dosimeter and was limited by the Rocky 


Flats medical officer to 100 millirem per year. 


Likewise, I reduced my visits to other 


buildings. Yet one visit alone to 771 and 


that's where I received my one and only 


recorded dose. 


I never went back to 771 after that, yet NIOSH 


included this post-cancer single reading as a 


primary basis to calculate my pre-cancer dose 


as part of the dose reconstruction, and ignored 


all the incidents I have just related. Why? 


Because I did not provide dates of the 


incidents. 

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I often wonder if the clothes in my closets, 


the papers I carried back from meetings and 


others contained contamination back to me, to 


my family, to my peers. Is it still there? 


Where, and when did I get the uranium and 


plutonium found in my exit, and only, 


urinalysis in June of 2000, none of which were 


above decision levels. 


In light of the BEIR VII report of June 29th, 


2005, which was just four days after I received 


my NIOSH report, and others, surely any 


exposure this one measured should not be 


considered to be a causative agent to cancer. 


The BEIR VII report details that any ionizing 


radiation can cause cancer. I -- yet this is 


not included in the NIOSH model for 


determination of any of the cancers. 


As low as reasonably acceptable, or LARA, 


levels were constantly being changed at Rocky 


Flats as D&D activities and contamination 


exposure increased. Yet a respirator fit was 


denied me, and a dosimetry was once again 


denied, and my TLD badge was taken away during 


my last few months at Rocky Flats. I again ask 


you, why? I will be glad to give you my 

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opinion, which I can base upon fact. It was 


called money. 


So again, there was no way to know if I had 


been exposed or not, even when I might go to 


the warehouse, the cold Building 130 only to 


discover unreported incident: filled drums of 


low-level waste had come across the vender 


truck now loaded with the once upon time 20,000 


curie, there was my -- my wonderful source, but 


it had really been reduced down to less than 


10,000 curies so it could be transported across 


Colorado highways to Canada. 


This is a gigantic source that I was only three 


feet away from and I did not know. It was in 


the cold area. Did I receive contamination? 


Did others? Yes, without a doubt. Was it 


measured? No, no dosimetry. Just because it 


wasn't measured doesn't mean in fact that it 


wasn't present. 


Might I once again get cancer? I cannot allow 


myself to think that, but it is unfortunately a 


real possibility. 


 Please consider that other office workers, non-


production workers, even managers -- though I 


was only a program implementation manager -- 

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have been exposed to ionizing radiation, 


including the extremely dangerous Super Y 


particles that may have been the cause, at 


least as likely as not, to have been a 


contributing factor to potential terminal 


illnesses such as cancers. 


My testimony is an accurate representation to 


the best of my recollection. The dates, the 


times, the records of incidents -- no, I didn't 


keep records of these events because they were 


routine operations. I didn't have any idea 


that I might well have been exposed to 


radiation, let alone to any number of solvents, 


asbestos, beryllium, during my sojourns around 


the site. I had no reason to believe that I 


would need to keep records, for date, for any 


reason. I was keeping track of ordinary events 


on a daily calendar in a memo correspondence, 


none of which I have record of. 


 Again, NIOSH totally ignored all these 


incidents which I have just summarized. My own 


physician's report to NIOSH stating his belief 


that my cancer was caused by ionizing radiation 


received as an employee at Rocky Flats was also 


ignored. How can this be? 

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I close by sharing an image I shall always 


recall of one maintenance worker who lost his 


leg and aged before his years before his -- he 


died of cancer, who continually came out to the 


site to visit his friends, to visit the place 


he considered his home away from home before 


cancer won, a cancer caused without a doubt due 


to radiation exposure at Rocky Flats. His 


family needs compensation. His coworkers need 


compensation. We must believe in the workers, 


production or non-production worker. We all 


worked hard, side by side. We believed in what 


we were doing with all our hearts, and some 


have died. Others of us may die sooner than 


others our age because we were dedicated as 


Cold War warriors, and were unknowingly exposed 


to deadly radiation and other toxic substances. 


It is impossible to reconstruct any dosage 


received at Rocky Flats, the most contaminated 


site within the nuclear complex, as indicated 


by reports by the DOE themselves. 


Please support the SEC for Rocky Flats 


claimants, production and non-production 


workers alike. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Jan. I'm 

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going to check back to see if James Turner has 


come into the assembly. 


 (No responses) 


 Apparently not. That then concludes our public 


comment period. I'm sorry that we did go over 


a bit, but I think it was important that 


everybody got a chance to be heard. Thank you 


very much -- we have a question here. Hang on 


just a second. Mr. Gibson on the Board wants 


to ask a point here. 


 MR. GIBSON: I have a question to ask. It 


seems that several of the claimants have 


received their illnesses and stuff within say 


the last decade, 15 years. Just for 


informational purposes, could -- could someone 


tell me who the DOE officials on-site were at 


that time? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 MR. GIBSON: Was it -- well, the top offici-- 


was it Bob Card* and Jesse Roberson? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 MR. GIBSON: And did they -- who was the 


contractor at the site, C.H. Hill? 

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 UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 MR. GIBSON: Hill? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. And then just -- just for 


the record, it seems to me that shortly 


thereafter Bob Card and Jesse Roberson went to 


Washington, D.C. under DOE to take over 


environmental management, and that's when they 


established the accelerated clean-up of Rocky 


Flats, Mound and Fernald. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 MR. GIBSON: And when they talked about it -- 


eventually -- you know, before they took over, 


we were talking 20 years worth of clean-up, and 


all of a sudden when they took over -- now all 


of a sudden, within five years, all three of 


the sites are cleaned -- supposedly cleaned up, 


so I just want that information to be on the 


record. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. There was 


another question here. Sir? You'll have to 


use the mike. And again, identify yourself for 


the court reporter. 


UNIDENTIFIED: There's been a lot of Rocky 


Flats workers come and go, and there's going to 

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426 

be a lot more that are going to come down sick. 


Their quality of life is going to change. 


They're going to have to give up something. My 


question is to you, if you had to change 


positions with them, how much quality of life 


would you be willing to give up? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. That's a good question 


for us to think about. Another question here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: You'll have to use the mike or -- 


yeah. Okay. Yeah, that one is portable. Just 


-- the one in the -- just pull it -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: I can speak louder --


 DR. ZIEMER: No, we mainly need it for the 


court reporter here. 


 MS. MUNN: For the record. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, need to get it on his tape. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I would like to say one thing. 


Look, guys, I would like to thank my family, my 


friends for being here. We're going to be sick 


and we're going to get sicker. And you cannot 


give us any assurances that you're going to 


take care of us. We proudly -- proudly served 


our country. We're just as much soldiers as if 


they went to any war. I would like to say 

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thank you to all my friends here. These are my 


family. When you stand side by side somebody ­

- with somebody from the management all the way 


down to the janitor, we're all part of a body 


that worked together as a team. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I want to tell my husband 


publicly that I'm sorry that I was -- allowed 


myself to push so hard that I will not be with 


him for the rest of his life. When his demise 


comes, and I know that it will, you won't be 


there. 


I would also like to tell you guys that I'm 


happy for the first time in my life because 


I've let you guys go. I don't care what you do 


any more. You can't get my goat. Okay? It's 


not for sale. 


I, Laura Donna Kay Schultz, here swear that 


from hence on I'm going to live my life as if 


it's a new life. I'm terribly troubled and 


grieved of the loss of my family here. These 


are my family, as if they were my mothers, my 


sisters, my brothers, my fathers, whatever you 


might say. It disturbs me that this process is 


so cumbersome that you cannot pass the SEC 

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Special Exposure Cohort bill that would also 


cover from every human being, every soldier 


that worked at Rocky Flats, no matter who they 


are. I guess that's all I have to say. I've 


said my piece. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Thank you. One more 


question here -- or... 


 MS. HEAVNER: I was an R-- I was an RCT, I'm -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Identify yourself --


 MS. HEAVNER: -- Elizabeth Heavner. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Identify yourself for the court -- 


 MS. HEAVNER: Elizabeth Heavner. I was an RCT 


on the step-off pad for a while in 774, and 


they had done away with doing any kind of 


bioassay in high radi-- high -- highly 


contaminated areas. The kids would come -- 


their -- their respirators were so hot that 


they were infinity, and I said well, don't you 


need your nasal/mouth smears and your bioassay, 


and they said they took it out of our package. 


Now they don't require anything. And this man 


wore this mask that was so hot it had to be 


shipped in high-level waste, and yet no 


bioassay was -- they had done away with 


bioassay and they had done away with safety 

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because years ago we were told you couldn't 


wear your mask over two hours because the seal 


breaks. Once you start sweating, your 


respirator seal breaks. 


And also I worked a lot of years in G module, 


never had a respirator. Every other month I 


had to be cycled out because I had more than 


100 millirem in a month. And yet -- so I'd be 


out a month, go back a month. And we never had 


respirators. We sanded on BE with no downdrafts, no kind of thing to catch the dust. 


And we would talk about that, and they'd say 


it's not necessary. 


But the rules went out, and there's other kinds 


of illnesses that come from radiation and this 


contamination besides cancer. And I, too -- 


they put me on permanent disability and I won't 


be able to work, but mine's not necessarily a 


diagnosed cancer and I -- I breathed a lot of 


BE in, but they won't agree to do a lavage to 


do a check. And you know, we're denied all the 


stuff and Dr. MacInerney at the end wasn't even 


allowed to talk to workers. I called for weeks 


trying to get him to help me out, and they said 


well, he's not allowed to because he hasn't 

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seen you recently. 


So you know, there's other things that happened 


to people that should be taken into 


consideration because, like me, I can't get a 


job. I live on morphine and all these pills. 


And you know, I'm not -- I'm still in my 


fifties and I think that should be considered 


in the bill also. 


My husband has BE. They can't do lavages 


'cause they can't get the stuff out. He had 


high dose dosimetry areas and they would just 


up their limit and keep working, and they would 


lose their dosimeter for that month. In 


another area he worked on he had to wear ten 


dosimeters. Now none of that stuff showed up 


in the records. And records clear back to the 


'80s -- I kept mine because I -- I'm a pack rat 


on paperwork and stuff, but there was a lot of 


injustice done to people out there and I think 


everything should be considered, not just 


cancer. 


Judy here, she has a BE in her lungs and she's 


been denied over and over. And she's had 


cancer, also. 


 Do you want to say something? 

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431

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MS. PIERSON: I have berylliosis and the 


question I've -- my case has been turned over 


to five different caseworkers, and the la-- the 


last two wanted to know well, what years and 


which mines did I work coal in. Now just look 


at me. Have I been in a coal mine? Have --


have I done stuff like that? When I tell them 


that I worked in Building 44 for eight years, 


this doesn't mean anything to them and it 


doesn't mean anything to anybody. Just -- you 


-- you're sick, so let's just move on. It --


it isn't fair to any of us. It isn't fair to 


any of us. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MS. MUNN: We didn't get her name. 


 MS. PIERSON: My name is Judy Pierson. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, thank you. Obviously many 


frustrations. Thank you for sharing that. 


We do need to come to closure -- I have another 


comment, sir. Go ahead. 


 MR. WYNN: My name is Chuck Wynn. I live in 


Boulder. I worked at Rocky Flats from '58 to 


'61. I worked in Building 71. I think they 


refer it now to 771. At that time it was 71. 

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I 

I was injured working in a glass -- in a 


glovebox with glass, puncture wound, which was 


contaminated with plutonium. I quit in '61. 


didn't have any problems till '84. All of a 


sudden I started getting sores in my mouth and 


running a high fever. I went to the doctor and 


the guy says well, you've got herpes. So oh, 


okay, send me back home. 


The next day I was so sick my wife took me back 


to the same doctor practice but a different 


doctor and he says I'm going to take a blood 


test. 


He took a blood test and he come right back and 


he grabbed me by the arm and he says Chuck, you 


have no immune system. It's totally gone. 


So he took me right over to the hospital, laid 


me on the bed and did a bone marrow test, with 


no -- no shot or anything, laid me down there. 


My wife was on one arm and two nurses on the 


other one and he did a bone marrow test, and 


I'll tell you what. I picked those nurses and 


my wife right up off the bed it hurt so damned 


bad. 


But anyway, the story is ever since then I'm on 


this peaks and valleys all the time. Sunday ­
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433 

- I have a dog that's bad and I was -- I've got 


a ramp made and I was putting in the -- in my 


car and I got a sliver. And whenever I get a 


sliver, I want to show you. This little sliver 


was so small I just picked it out, but I get an 


infection. Look at my infection -- my hand how 


swole (sic) it is. I've been to the doctor and 


had it operated on five different times 'cause 


my hand will swell up like this. The only way 


I can get by is if I take -- they put me on 


high doses of predisone (sic). Well, predisone 


causes me to have high sugar and high blood 


pressure. That's the only thing that keeps me 


going, so I'm always on these peaks and valleys 


and we could sure use you guys' help if you can 


help us settle a lot of these situations here 


because it was -- and at that time -- I was 


there when they had the fire and I worked in 


the pressure suits and everything, and it was ­

- it wasn't a pretty thing, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. WYNN: -- thanks. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. Yes, sir. 


MR. POSEY: Yes, sir, I'm Robert Posey. 
I 


would just like to say I've been denied my 

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claim twice, and those records -- I found out 


in August 2003 that those records was destroyed 


many years ago by Dow -- by a chemical company 


up -- that -- over in their -- I have proved to 


them that those records are not available, and 


they have denied me. But they've got the first 


time to mention anything concerning those lost 


records. But they find some way to nit-pick 


something out of there so they can deny it 


without mentioning that these records is lost, 


is shredded by the company up there many years 


ago. All records that was kept over six years 


or older, they destroyed those records. And 


they -- the government and the claim handlers 


have yet to mention, in either one of those 


denials, that those records are lost and still 


saying we have no evidence. I can't get no 


evidence if they done destroyed the records. 


I've proved this to them over and over and 


over, and they still says we don't -- now some 


other little company they wrote here in town, 


they said that we have no record on him. 
I 


don't know where it was the union, CPWO or 


whatever it was, and they used that. Says CPWO 


said they don't have no record on you. Well, 

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who is CPWO? I don't even know. I said now 


the government got 30-something,000 workers up 


there and they can't find the record. How 


could you expect these four or five people over 


here in some garage to find those records? I 


just don't believe it can happen. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Again, thank all of 


you for coming tonight. Again, we invite you 


to return tomorrow. We'll have the formal 


discussion of the Rocky Flats petition before 


the Board beginning at 8:30 tomorrow morning. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 9:50 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

436 

1 

2 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of April 26, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


26th day of May, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102