Th i s c a s e w a s s u b m i t t e d t o a p a n e l t h a t i n c l u d e d J u d g e Be t t y B. 1 Flet cher, who rec e n t l y pa ss ed away. Fo l l o wi ng Jud ge Flet cher’ s d eat h, Jud ge C h riste n was drawn b y l o t t o repl ace Jud ge Flet cher. Judge C hr i s t en has r ead t he bri ef s , rev i ewed t he r ecor d, an d l i s t ene d t o t he oral
a rg u m e n t. F OR

P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
E THAN F AR I D J I NI AN , A KAF ari d Khoujinian, Defendant- Appellant

. No. 11-10593

D.C. No. 3:09-cr- 01103- J SW -1

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON
Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia J eff rey S. W hite, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted Oc tob e r 1 8, 20 12 —Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed Ma rch 26, 2013 Amended July

23, 2013

Be fore : Dorothy

W. Nelson, Mary

H. Murguia, and Mo rg an Chri ste n, Cir c uit Judg e s. 1

Orde r; Op ini on by Judg e MurguiaU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Crim inal L aw The pa nel amende d its opini on filed Mar ch 26, 2013, and deleted Judge Christen’s concur renc e, in a ca se in which the panel a ffirme d a def

endant’ s conviction and sentence on thirteen c ounts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 stemming fr om a sche m e t o defr aud his employ er, B ricsnet F M A me ri c a , Inc ., by

div e rt ing pa

rt of the c omp any ’s pr of

its to a shell company

through which the de fenda nt and other employ ees distributed the dive rted profits in the form of
sa lari e s, div ide nd s, and

bo nu se s.
The defenda

nt asser ted that routine wire communications betwee n two California ba nks and the F eder al R eser ve B ank in D allas occur

red afte r the defe ndant deposited the m o nies i n t o h is Mechanic s Ba

nk acc ount and, as a

result, wer e neither initiated for

the purpose of

defr audingBr i cs n et nor related t o his scheme to defra ud. In the amende d opinion, the panel disagree d beca

use t he defenda

nt conducte d an ong oing scheme to defra

ud Br icsnet, and even if e ach c heck the defe ndant deposited is viewe d as a d iscrete fra udulent scheme , the interstate w ire c ommunications were neces s ary to complete the f

raud. The panel e x plained that the wir e transfe r wa s n ec es sary

to complete and c oncea l the fra ud beca use un t il the chec ks clea

red, the defe ndant could not be
cer tain it would be Br icsnet that would be swindled.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 3
Th e pa ne l r e je c te d th e de fe nd ant’ s argume nts that his conviction should be over turned be cause there was ins uf fic ie nt e vid e nc e to p ro ve that hi s u se of an inte rs tate wi re c omm

un ic atio n wa s re a so na

bly fo re se e a

ble and be c a us e the jury should have be en i n s t ructed to find the same. The panel wrote t hat no mens rea require ment exis ts with reg ard to the jurisdictional, interstate nexus of the def en d an t ’s actions under

§ 1343, which requires only that the def

endant used – or cause d the use of – interstate wires in f urthera nce of his sc he me to d e fr a

ud B ri c sn e t. The pa nel held that § 1343 is a v al i d ex tension of cong ressional power under the Commerce Clause, and that since Cong ress e nacte d the statut e base d upon a
c on sti tut ion a lly

e nume rate d p ow e r, ana ly sis of the statut e under the Nec essar

y and P roper Clause i s inappropriate. The panel a lso held that beca use § 1343 is a v al i d ex erc ise of power s deleg ated to Cong ress by the Commerce Clause, the de fe nd ant’ s T e nth

Am e nd me nt ch a lle ng e to t

he statut e fa ils

. The panel denied a petition f or panel rehe aring and the court de nied a pe tition for rehe aringen banc

.

CO UN SEL

Be njamin L . Coleman, Coleman & Ba logh L L P, San Dieg o, Ca lif or nia; and Etha n A . B a logh, Col e man & B a logh L L P, San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd ant–

Ap pe lla nt.
Suz anne Miles, Assistant United States Attorney , San Fr ancisc o, California, for Plaintiff–Appellee.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 4
OR DE R The Opinion filed Ma

rch 26, 2013, a

ppear ing at 712 F.3d 12 55 , is ame nd e d a s f

oll ow s: 1. On pag e 7 of the slip opini o n , fi rs t para g raph that beg ins on the previous pag e (712 F .3d at 1259), re place in the penultimate s entenc e “instruction’s” wit h “instructions’”. As
ame nd e d, the ne w s e nte nc e is:

I f the district court’s instructions fairly and adequatel y cover ed the e lements of the of fe ns e , th e n w e re vie w the in str uc tio ns ’ “‘pr ecise formulation’ for an abuse of discretion.” Id. 2. On pag e 13 of the slip opini o n , first full para g raph (712 F .3d at 1263), re place the third and fo u rth sentenc es wi th
Simi larly , “the e x ecution of the s cheme as
conce ived” by

J inian depende d up on eac h chec k succe ssfully

clea ringth ro ug h the fede ral re serve beca

use, if either bank ha d been le ft holding the dish onored c heck, J inian’s s cheme would have be en discove red. Id. at 715.

As ame nd e d, the pa

ra g ra phis:
We conclude that J inian’s conduc t is more akin to the fra

ud perpe trated in Schmuc k than in Kann . The sche me in Schmuc k r e ma ined incomplete until the m ailing a ctivity , there byU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 5
rende ringthe mailing an “essential step in the
succe ssful passag e of title,” oc cur red. Id. at 71 4. Simi larl y , “th e e xec uti on of the sc he me as conc eived” by

J inian depende d upon eac h chec k succe ssfully

clea ring t hroug h the fede ral re serve beca

use, if either bank ha d been le ft holding the d ishonored che ck, J inian’s s cheme would have be en discove red. Id. a t 71 5. As lon g a s B ri c sn e t w a s th e vic tim of his crime, Jinian c o u l dcover his tracks by g iving f alse a ssuranc es to Br own.
3. Be g inning on pa g e 15 of the slip opinion (712 F .3d at 1264), sec ond full para g raph, delete the second sentence and
rema inder of the para g raph. A dd a new second se ntence :
Th e wi re tr ans fe r w a s n e c e ssa ry to c omp le te the f r a u d b e c a u s e , un ti l t

h e c h e c k s c le are d, J inia nc o u ld n o t b e c e rta in

it w o u ld be Br icsnet that would be swindled. On pag e 16 of the slip opini on, fi rst full para g raph, r eplac e from the first sentenc e “T he g overnme nt also” with “The g ov e rnme nt” and

me rg e the re ma ind e r o f the pa ra g ra phwi th the pr e c e din g pa

ra g ra ph . T he ne w s e nte nc e is:
The g overnme nt introduc ed evidenc e that J inian direc ted B rown to i ssue multiple, smaller-de nomination checks, r athe r t han a larg e , lump- sum pa

y me nt. 6

As amende d, the second full para g raph beg inning on pag e 16 of the sli p o pin ion

is:U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 6

He re , th e me re c le ari ngof a c he ck is enoug h beca

use t he int erstate communication
was ne ces s ary

to complete and c oncea l J inian’s fra

ud. The wire transfe r wa s ne c e ssa ry to co mpl e te the fr a

ud be c a us e , unti l the c he c ks c le are d, Jinia

n c ou ld n ot b e c e rt a in it woul d b e Br icsnet that would be swindled. The g overnme nt introd u ced e vidence that J inian direc ted B rown to issue multip le, smaller-de nomination checks, r ath er than a larg e, lump-sum p ay

ment. Such conduct 6 g ive s r ise to i nf

e re nc e s th at Jinia

n inte nd e d to
conce al hi s t ransactions entirely from detec tion by

Br icsnet or struc ture the transac tions in a manner that gav e them the
a pp e ara nc e of re gular or ne c e ssa ry bu sin e ss exp enditures. Jini an’s c onduct furthe r sug g ests that depositing multipl e, smallerdenomination chec ks insulated his conduct from suspicion by

or scr utiny from Mec hanics Ba nk about larg e-sum deposits. Thus, a rational jury

could have conclude d that J inian utili z ed the interstate wire s to structure, perpe tuate, and c onceal his fraudule nt scheme

. 4. On pag es 26–29 of the slip opini on (712 F .3d at 1269–71), dele te J udg e Christen’s c oncurr ence

. Wit h these amendments, the pane l has voted to deny Ap p el l an t ’s p et i t i o nfo r re h ea ri n g. J u d ge M urgu i a a n d J u d ge C h ri s t env o t e t o d en y

th e p et i t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g an d J u d ge Ne lso n s o r e c omm e nd s.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 7
The full cour

t has bee n advised of the petit i o n for rehe aringen banc and no judg e has req u es t ed a vote on whether to rehe ar the matter e n banc. F ed. R. App. P. 35.

IT IS ORD ERED denying the petition for pane l rehe aringand the pe ti tion for re hear ing e n banc ( Doc. 40)

. “ No fu rt he r p e tit ion s f

or re he ari ng or re he ari ng e n b anc wi ll be ente rtained in this case .”

OP IN ION

MURGUIA, Circuit J udg e:
Ethan F arid Jini an wa s char g ed with fourte en counts of wir e f r a u d in v io lati o n o f 1 8 U

. S. C. § 1 3 4 3 s te mm ing from his scheme to def

raud his employ er. J inian contends that the distr ic t c o urt e r

r e d in d e n yin g h is mo ti o n s f o r ju d g me n t of
a c qu itt a l, a

new tr ial , a

nd fo r a n a rr e st o f j ud g me nt. Specifica lly , he ar g ues t hat (1) r outine transmissions
occ ur r in g d ur in g th e inte r

b an k c o ll e c ti o np r o c e s s ar e n ot
ma de fo r the purp os e of e xec uti ng a sc he me to de fr a ud or in further ance there of, (2) the jury should have be en instructed that it was nec essar

y t o fi nd that the interstate na ture of the wire c ommunications was re asonably likely or for esee able, (3) ther e wa s insufficient evidence to e stablish that an int e rs tate wi re c omm

un ic ati on wa s r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble be tw e e n tw o Ca lif

or nia ba nk s, and (4 ) t he wi re fr a

ud statut e is unc on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d to him . We re

je c t th e se arguments and af

firm J inian’s conviction and se ntence

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 8

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

Fr om 2004 until 2008, J inian serve d as the c hief e x ecutive
o f f ic e r ( “ CE O ” ) o f

B r ic s n e t F M A me r ic a , In c

. ( “ B r ic s n et”) , a compa ny that develope d and sold softwar e. As CEO, J inian
wa s a uth oriz ed to spe nd

B ri c sn e t mo nie s to fu rt he r i ts business operations and make e x ecutive and financ ial decisions. He w as also re sponsible for re viewingthe company ’s daily

expenditures. Br iscnet’s boa rd of dire ctors and a ma jo r it y o f it s inv e s to r s w e r e lo c a te d in E ur ope, enablingJ inian to control Br i s cn et’s operations from the
c omp any ’s San Fr anc isc o, Ca lif or nia of fi c e wi th l imi te d d a ily
ov e rs ig ht.

In 2006, J inian informed L eon Brown, B ricsnet’ s finance manag er, that the company ’s cha irman of the boa rd of dir e c tor s aut

ho ri zed Jinia

n to re c e ive c omp e ns a tio n in e xce ss of his annual sa lary

and to dra

w adva n ce s on that compensation. Unbeknownst to Br own, J in ia n n e v e r r e ceive d any such authorization. Neve rtheless, B rown, in re liance upon J inian’s re prese ntations, be g an issuing to Jinian chec ks from Br ic sn e t’ s a c c ount a t Sil ic on Va lle y B ank in S anta Cla ra , Ca lif or nia . Jini an d e po sit ed th e se c he c ks int o h is
acc ount at Mecha

nics Ba nk in Herc ules, California.
Jinia n in str uc te d B ro wn

to iss ue mul tip le , s ma llde no min a tio n c he c ks ins te a d o f a sin g le , lump -s um p ay

me nt. Bet we en November 2006 a nd September 2008, Jinian ob ta ine d f ro m Br ow n ne arl y 10 0 c he c ks , r ang ingin m on thl y amounts from $25, 0 00 to over $60,000. The chec ks were iss ue d r e g ula

rl y , s ome wi thi n d ay s o f e a c h o ther. In to ta l, Jinia n im pr op e rl y ob ta ine d o ve r $ 1. 5 mi lli on fr om B ri c sn e t.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 9

J inian was indicted on f ourtee n counts of wire fra u d, which cor

responde d to fourtee n Br icsnet che cks Ji nian deposited into his Mech an i cs Ba nk acc ount. At trial, the g o v ernment presente d evidenc e showingthat Mecha nics Ba nk utiliz ed the F eder al R es erve Ba nk as an inter

mediary betwee n it a

nd Sili con Valley Ba

nk to proce ss the chec ks for pay m en t

. Howar d Ng , an interna l auditor for the Fe dera l Reserve Ba

nk, testified about the pr ocess t h roug h which chec k s wer e cle are d. Ngexplained that, when Ji nian dep os ite d a

c he c k into h is M e c ha nic s B ank

a c c ount, Me c ha nic s B ank sent

an e le c tr on ic ima g e of

the c he c k v ia wire c ommunication to the Fede ral Rese rve B an k, which utiliz ed an imag e ser

ver loc ated in Dallas, Te x as to sort and pr oc e ss t he c he c k. On c e the c he c k w a s p ro c e sse d in Da lla s, Ngtestified, the F eder al Reser ve Bank wired an imag e of the chec k to Sil icon Valley Ba nk to be neg otiated and pa id. Ng testified that these w ire c ommunications f acilitated the c heck
c le ari ngpr oc e ss b y

e ns ur ingtha

t th e a pp ro pr iate a c c ounts
wer e debited a

nd cre dited.

At the c los e of

the g ov e rnme nt’ s ca se and the c los e of

a ll evidenc e, Ji nian moved, pursua nt to Fede ral Rule of Criminal Procedur e 29, for

a judg ment o f ac quittal, arguing that the g overnme nt failed to prove eac h element of wire f raud beyond a re asonable doubt. The district court denied Jini an’s motio n , an d the jury

returne d a guilty

verdic t on thirteen of fo ur te e n c ounts c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. Followinghis conviction, J inian rene wed his motion for judgme nt of ac quittal. J inian also moved for a new trial and for a n arr est of judg ment pursuant to Fe dera l Rules of Criminal Procedure 33 and 34, re spectively , arguing, a mong other thing s, that there was insufficie nt evidence that he kn e w— or kn e w i t w a s r e a so na

bly li ke ly

—th a t in te rs tateU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 10
wires wo u ld

b e u s e d to f urth e r th e f r a u d u le n t s c h e me

. T he district court ag ain denied Jinian’s motions and affirme d the jury ’s convictions. It then sen t en ced J inian to six ty -four months imprisonment, three y ear s of supervised r elea se, and order ed him to pay

restitution of $1,587,860.04.

Jinia n ti me ly a pp e a le d. We have jur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
We reviewde novo a district court’s interpr etation of a criminal statute, United States v. Dahl , 314 F. 3 d 976, 977 (9th Cir. 2002), a n d denial of a motion for judgme nt of acquittal, Un ite d Sta te

s v . A na y a- Ac os ta , 629 F.3d 1091, 10 93 (9 th C ir . 2 01 1) . Su ffici ent e vid e nc e to s up po rt a conviction exist s i f, “after view ing the evidenc e in the lig ht
m o st favora

ble to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the cr ime beyond a reasonable doubt.” J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We also revie w de novo whether the district court’s jury instructions a dequate ly

prese nted the def

endant’ s theory of the c ase a

nd whether

th e dis trict court pr esente d the jury with ever y element of

the cr ime. United St a t es v. Knapp , 120 F.3d 928, 930 ( 9th C i r. 1997). I f the district cour t’s instructions fairly

and ade quately cover ed the eleme nts of the of fe ns e , th e n w e re vie w the in str uc tio ns ’ “ ‘p re c ise formulation’ for an abuse of discre tion.” Id. Finally , we revie w de novo questions reg ardingthe constitutionality of a fede ral st at u t e. United States v. Zakharov , 468 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 11

Kann inv o lve d a lleg e d v io la tio n s o f the m a il fra u d sta tute . S inc e m a il 2

an d wi r e f

r au d ar e bot h def

i n ed as “ an y s ch eme or ar t i f i ce t o de f

r au d, or f o r o b t aining m o ne y o r p ro p erty b y m ea ns o f f alse o r f rau d ulen t p reten ses, represent at i o ns, or p rom i ses , ” 1 8 U

. S.C

. §§ 13 4 1 , 13 4 3 , “ t he wi re f raud
s t at ut e i s r ead i n l i gh t of t he cas e l aw on mai l f raud, ” Uni t ed St at es v. M a n a rite , 4 4 F .3 d 1 4 0 7 , 1 4 1 1 n.5 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 5 ); a cc o rd Car pent er v. Uni t ed St at es , 4 8 4 U .S . 1 9 , 2 5 n .6 (1 9 8 7 ) (a p p lying the sa m e a n a lysis to

m ai l and wi re f

raud). III . D ISC USS ION
The wire fra

ud statute criminalizes conduct by any person who, “having de vised or i n t ending to devise a ny scheme or artifice to d ef

ra u d , . . . transmits or cause s to be transmitted b y m ea n s o f wi re

. . . co m mun i ca t i o n i n i n t er s t at e o r f o re i gn commerc e, any

writi n g s, signs, sig nals, pictures, or sounds for the pur

pose of e x ecutingsuch sche me or a rtifice . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006). Section 1343, howeve r, “doe s not purp or t to re a c h all fr a

ud s, but only tho se lim ite d in sta nc e s” wher ein use of a

wire “ is a part of

the execution of the fr aud, le avin g a ll o the r c a se s to be de a lt w ithby app ro pr iate state law.” Kann v. United States , 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944). 2

The e lements of wire fraud are : (1) the e x istence of a sc he me to d e fr a

ud ; (2) the us e of

wi re , r a dio , o r t e le vis ion

to further the sche me; and (3) a spec if i c i n t ent t o defr aud. United States v. Pe lisamen , 641 F.3d 3 9 9 , 409 (9th Cir. 2011). “The specific intent require ment is an as p ec t of the ‘sche me to defr aud’ r equire ment; i.e., there is n o fra udulent scheme without specific intent.” Uni ted States v. Bohonus , 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 ( 9th Cir. 1980). “One ‘ca uses’ use of . . . wire c ommunications where such u s e can r easona bly be fore seen, e ven thoug h not specifica lly inte n ded.” United States v. Cusino , 694 F.2d 185, 188 (9th Cir. 1982). A wire
c omm un ic a tio n is “in fu

rt he ra nc e ” of a fr a ud ule nt s c he me ifU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 12
it is “incident to the ex ecution of the scheme,” United States
v . Lo , 2 31 F .3 d 4 71 , 4 78 (9thCir . 2 00 0) , me anin g that it “nee d not be an e ssential element of the s cheme , just a ‘step in the plot,’” United States v. Garlick, 240 F .3 d 789 , 795 (9 th C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Schmuc k v. United States , 489 U.S. 705, 71 1 ( 19 89 )) ; ac c or

d United States v. Garne r , 6 6 3 F

. 2d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1981) (e x plaining that the wire tr ansfe r “ne ed only be made for the pur

pose of e x ecutingthe sche me”)

. For purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, a wire c ommunication
ca n n o tb e “ p arto f a naf

t er -t h e- fa cttra n s ac t i o n th at , al th o u gh for e s e e a b le , w a s n o t i nf

urth e r an c e o f

th e d e f e n d a n t’s fr au d u l ent s cheme .” Lo , 231 F.3d at 478. Ultimately , “the issue is not one p u re l y o f time sequenc e.” Id. As the Supreme Court re cog nized in United States v. Sampson , “subseque nt mailings can in some circ umstances provide the basis for a

n indictment under the ma il fraud statutes.” 37 1 U .S. 75 , 8 0 ( 19 62 ). Thus , th e “ re le va nt q ue sti on a t a ll times” is whether

a wire “is part of

t h e ex ecution of the scheme as conc eived by t h e perpetrator at the time,” Schmuc k, 4 89 U. S. at 715 , not wh e the r t he de fe nd ant, pr ior

to the wiring , “had obtained all the money [he] expected to g et,” Sampson , 371 U.S. at 79.

A.

J inian’s principle a

rgument i s that the Supreme Court’s dec i s ion in Kann is l e g a lly ind ist inguis ha

ble fr om t

his c a se and, as suc h, compels a r ever sal of his conviction and e ntry of judg ment of ac q u i t tal. Kann, tog ether with six other employ ees, de vised a scheme to defra ud their employ er by divertingpart of the compa n y ’s profits to a shell compa ny thr ou g h w hic h th e de fe nd ants dis tr ibute d th e div e rt e d p ro fi ts in the form of salaries, dividends, a nd bonuses. Kann ,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 13

T h e s ec on d c ou n t a l l eg ed t h at t h e def en dan t s , who d ef

r au ded a 3

co nt ract o r hi red t o buil d a fact o ry for thei r shel l co m p any, end o rs ed and
ca s h ed i n M ar y l an d t h e con t r ac t or ’ s c h ec k i n t h e amou n t o f $12, 000, whi ch t he M ary l and b ank t hen “dep o si t ed i n t he m ai l t o be de l i vered t o t he bank i n W i l mi ng t on, D el awar e, o n whi ch i t was dra wn. ” Kann , 323 U

. S. at 92

. T he t hi rd co unt al l eged t hat one de f end ant de p o si t ed a check i n t he
am o unt of $ 5 , 0 0 0 at a D el aware b ank, whi ch t hen m ai l ed t he check t o t he d ra w e e b a n k lo c a te d in M a ryla n d

. I d. a t 92.

T h e Su pr eme Cour t , h owe v er , r ej ec t ed K an n ’ s con t en t i on t hat he 4 l ack ed t he r equi s i t e i nt ent under t he mai l f r aud st at ut e b as ed upon t he f act t hat he had no reasona b l e b el i ef t hat t he checks wo u ld go t hrough t he

m ai l s, exp l ai ni ng: “ [W ]e t hi nk i t a f ai r i nf erence t hat t ho se d ef

end ant s who dr ew , or t h os e wh o c as h ed, t h e c h ec k s bel i ev ed t h at t h e ban k s w h i ch t ook t hem wo ul d m ai l t hem t o t he b anks on whi c h th e y w e re drawn, and
a ssu m ing [K a n n ] p a rtic ip a te d i n the sc h e m e , t h e ir k n o w le d g e w a s h is kn owl edge. ” Kann , 323 U

. S. a t 93. 323 U.S

. at 89–90. T h e defenda nts were indicted on three counts—based upon three banking transac tions—of using the mail in ex ecution of a scheme to defra

ud, t houg h the g ov e rnme nt ab and on e d th e fi rs t c ount at tr ia l. Id. at 89–91. 3 Kann was convicted on the re maining two c ounts. Id. at 89;
su pra note 3. Challengi n g his conviction, Kann a rgued that the mailing of

the che cks by

the banks “ could no t b e for the purp os e of

e xec uti ngthe sc he me sin c e the defe nd ants to whom those che cks we re de livered ha d rec eived the mone y repr esente d by

the che cks and e ach tr ansac tion, afte r such
rec eipt, was irr ev ocable as re spects the dr awe r.” Kann , 323 U.S. at 93.
The S upreme Court ag ree d with Kann, ex plaining that the defe ndants rec eived the mone y “irre vocably” once the two chec ks were cashe d or deposited, which constituted the point at which “the scheme in eac h case had re ache d fruition.” Id. 4
a t 94 ; ac c or

d id. at 95 (de termining t h at “the sc heme wa sU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 14 completely

execut ed as respec ts the transac tions in question when the defe ndants rec eived the mone y intended to be obtaine d b y th e ir f

r a u d ” )

. T h e b an k s b e c ame th e o w n e r s of the che cks once they

wer e ca s hed or de posited and, “be ing hold e r s in d

u e c o ur s e , w e r e e n ti tl e d to c o ll e c t f r o m the draw ee ba

nk

. . . and the dr awe r had no de fense to pay ment.” Id. a t 9 4

. Re a s o n in g th at i t w a s “ immate r ia l” to the defe ndants “or to any consummation of the sche me[] how the bank which pa id or cre dited the che ck would collec t from the draw ee ba nk,” id. , the Kann Court concluded that, based upon the fa cts befor e it, the “subse q u ent bankingtransac tions betw e e nth e b an k s c o n c e r n e d w e r e me r e ly

in c id e n ta l and collater al to the sche me and not a pa rt of it.” Id. at 95. Be cause the mailings at issue were not for the pur pose of executing the fra

ud , the Supreme Court re verse d Kann’ s conviction. Id.

J inian asser

ts that the wire communications betwe en the tw o Ca lif or nia ba nk s and the F e de ra l Re se rv e B ank in D a lla s, like the mailings in Kann , occur red a ft er he deposited the
mon ie s into h is M e c ha

nic s B ank

a c c ount a

nd , as a re su lt,
wer e neither initiated f

or the purpose of defr audingBr icsnet
nor re lated to his scheme to de fra u d

. W e dis ag ree for two
re a so ns . F ir st, Jinia

n c on du cte d a

n o ng oin g sc he me to defr aud B ricsnet. Sec ond, even if we view eac h chec k J inian deposited as a

discrete fra

udulent scheme , the interstate w ire communications wer e nec essar y to complete and c oncea l
eac h fra ud.

Kann inv olv e d tw o d isc re te , in de pe nd e nt t ra ns a cti on s. There was no indication that the transa ctions were sequential
o r t h atth e s u cc es s o f o n e d ep en d edu p o n th e o th er

. Al th o u gh the g overnme nt argued in Kann that the two transac tions were pa rt of a larg e r s c he me de vis e d b y the de fe nd ants to c omm itU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 15
future f rauds a g ainst t h ei r employ er, the Kann Court construed the scheme narr owly , focusi n g upon the “tra nsactions i n question” and explaining t hat t he sche me was “complete ly

executed” once the de fenda nts “rec eived the money intended to be obtaine d by their fr aud.” Id. at 95. Deter mining that the f

unds were irrevoc ably i n the defe ndants’ possession at the moment the c hecks w ere deposited or cashed, id. at 94, the Kann Court concluded that the s ubsequent interba

nk mailings we re se parate and distinct from the de fenda

nts’ fra udulent scheme

. Id. at 95.

J inian’s conduc t, in contra st to the circumstanc es at issue in Kann , s ug gest s th at he e xec ute d a n o ng oin g sc he me to de fr a ud B ri c sn e t. Th e g ov e rnme nt, wh ic h ch arg e d J ina n w ith fourtee n counts of wire fra ud, introduced ev i d ence showing th at J inian deposited nea

rly 100 chec ks over the c ourse of a tw o- y e ar p e ri od . T hu s, Jinia n’ s a bil ity to p e rp e tuate his scheme without interruption for two y ea rs was de pendent up on the su c c e ssf

ul c omp le tio n o f the c he c k c le ari ngpr oc e ss for e ach B riscnet c heck Jinian deposite dinto his Mechanics Ba nk acc ount. See Schmuc k, 489 U.S. at 711–12.
Whil e Kann certainly repr esents an “ important limit ation[] on the g overnmen t ’s use of the ma il fraud statute,” United S tates v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 407 ( 7th Cir. 1997), we must consider it in li gh t o f the Supreme Court’s
more re cent pr onounceme nts in Schmuc k

. See United States v. Ashman , 979 F.2d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 1992) (a cknowledg ing that Schmuc k

did not overrule Kann ). Th e fr a ud ule nt s c he me in Schmuc k was devised by a used-a utomobil e d istributor who rolled ba ck odometer s and sold the vehicles to de aler s at artificia lly

inflated pric es. 489 U.S. at 707. The dealer s then resold the automobiles to customers. Id. In o rd e r t o c omp le te the re sale of e ach a

utomobile to it s customers, the de aler s hadU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 16
to obtain titl e to ea ch v eh i cl e. Id. To that end, the de aler s ma ile d ti tle a

pp lic atio n f

or ms to th e state on

be ha lf of the ir customers. Id. Schmuck was indicte d on—and convicted of—twelve counts of mai l fr aud, id. , a nd c ha lle ng e d h is conviction on the basis that t h e mailings we re r outine,
oc c ur re d a ft e r t he fr a ud c ame to f

ru iti on , a nd we re “ me re ly tang entially

related to the fra

ud,” id. at 711. The Supreme Court disag ree d with Schm u ck ’s
c h ar a c te r iz a ti o n o f th e ma il ings. Id. Foc using upon the “scope ” of the fra

udu lent scheme , the Schmuc k Court ob se rv e d th a t Sc hmu c k d id n ot e ng a g e in a “ ‘on e-s ho t’ operation in which he sold a single car to an isolated dea ler” but rathe r m aintained “ an ong oing f raudule nt venture.” Id. at 7 1 1

. T h e s c h e me , the Schmuc k Court rea soned, “did not
r e a c h f r u it io n un ti l th e r e ta il d e a le r s r e s o ld th e car s and eff ecte d transfe rs of title” and would have “ come to an a brupt halt” if the de aler s were unable to r es el l the ca rs they purcha sed fr om Schmuck. Id. at 712. T h u s , i t conclude d that, “althoug h the re g istration-form ma i l ings ma y not have contributed dire ctly

to the duping of

either the reta i l deale rs or the customers, they wer e nece ssary to the passag e of title, which in turn was essential to the perpe tuation of Schmuck’s scheme .” Id. The re g istration-form mailing s were there fore distinguishable f

rom the intraba

nking ma ilings in Kann beca use the former we re “ essential step[s] in the succe ssful passag e o f t i tle to the reta il purchase rs,” while the latter “involved little more than post -fr aud ac counting amongthe potential vi cti ms of the var ious schemes, a nd the long -term
succe ss o f t h e fra

ud did not turn on which of the potential victims bore the ultimate loss.” Id. at 714. On t his basis, the Schmuc k Court he ld that a rational jury could have found that the title-reg istr ati on mailings we re pa rt of the e x ecution of Schmuck’s fr audulent sche me. Id. at 712.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 17

We c o n c lu d e th at Ji n ia

n ’ s c o n d u c t i s mo r e ak in

to the fra ud perpe trated in S

ch mu ck than in Kann . T he sc he me in Schmuc k r e m a i n e d i n c o mp l e t e un t i l th e m a i l i n g a c t i v i ty, there by rende ringthe m ai l ing a n “esse ntial step in the
succe ssful passag e of title,” oc curr ed. Id. a t7 1 4

. S i m i l ar l y, “the e x ecution of the scheme as conc eived” by J inian depende d upon eac h chec k succe ssfully clea ringthroug h the fede ral res erve beca

use, if either

bank had be en lef

t holding the dishonored c h ec k , J inian’s sche me would have been discovere d. Id. at 715. As long as B ricsnet wa s the victim of his c ri me , Jinian c ou ld c ov e r h is tra c ks by g ivi ngfa lse
assura nces to B rown. Our rulingtoday i s co n sistent with the manner in which
we , as we ll as our sister cour ts, have interpr eted Ka nn and Schmuc k . For

example, in United States v. S h i p sey , a c a se i n v o l v i n g th e d i v er s i o no f c o n s tru ct i o n l o an p ro ce ed s th ro u gh wire pay ment transfe rs, we disting uished Kann by observing that the fra

udulent scheme “did not ‘ rea ch fruition’” when the wire dr aw reque sts we re submitt ed and c oncluded, unde r the logic of Schmuc k, that the wire s were incident to an esse ntial part of the fra

udulent scheme . 363 F.3d 9 6 2 , 965–66, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). The Seve nth Circuit, in Lack, distinguished the ma ili ng s a t iss ue in that c a se —o pe nin g a ba nk a c c ount t o launder money and providinga maili n g addre ss to which monthly statements wer e mailed—f rom t h o s e in Kann by explaining that they , like the m ai l i n g s in Schmuc k, helped
conce al and we re in fur

thera nce of the fra udulent scheme

. 1 2 9 F

. 3 d at4 0 8

– 0 9

. T h e T h i rdC i rc u i t , af fi rm i n g a conviction for ma il fraud wher e t h e def endant “ devised a

nd executed a sc heme to o b t ain additi onal bonuses” f rom her employ er by fa l s ifying r eports, distinguished Kann by explainin g that the fra ud was “ ong oing,” rathe r than inv olv inga

sin g le fa lse re po rt , a

nd wa s th e re fo re sim ila

r t oU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 18

T he M ill

s C o u rt a lso re c o g n iz e d tha t t h e d e fen d a n t’s co n d u c t f e ll 5 wi t hi n an excep t i o n set f o rt h i n Kann , di s cu s s ed i n f ra , na mel y t hat i t was co n c e i v a b l e i n s o m e s e t t i n g s t h a t t h e m e r e c l e a r i n g o f a c h e c k wou l d be
e n o u g h to c o n fer fed e ra l ju risd ic tio n un d e r th e w ire fra u d sta tute

. M ill s , 199 F. 3d a t 189. the sche me in Schmuc k

. United St ates v. Tiller , 302 F.3d 98, 10 0, 10 2 ( 3d Cir . 2 00 2) . F ur the rm or e , th e F if

th C ir c uit , in Unite d S tates v . M

ill s , relied pr incipally

upon Schmuc k

to conclude that the defe ndant, who wr ong fully obtained funds from his company ’s bank a ccount in Colora do and deposited them into his persona l ba

nk acc ounts in Texas, e ng ag ed in an “ong oing ve nture a

nd not a ‘one -shot’ oper ation” that involved numerous che cks over the course of at least thirteen
months

. 1 9 9 F

. 3 d 1 8 4 , 1 8 7 , 1 8 9

– 9 0 ( 5 thC i r

. 1 9 9 9 )

. F i n a l l y,

5 the S eventh Circuit has a lso disti ng uished Kann by virtue of the fac t that the decision predated the Uniform C o m merc ial Cod e , “ wh ic h ma [de ] i t e a sy fo r a c us tom e r’ s b ank

to r e ve rs e the cr edit if the instrument ca nnot be collected.” United States v. Franks , 309 F.3d 977, 978 ( 7th Cir. 2002).
Even if we construe e ach c h eck Jinian deposited as an individual, discrete sc heme, Kann rema ins distinguishable. Th e Sup re me Court

re c og nize d e xce pti on s t o th e ru le it
announce d in Kann : in s ta n c e s in w h ic h th e ma il s—or, as here , interstate wires—ar e used as “a means of c oncea lment so that further

fra uds which ar e par

t of the sche me may

be perpe tuated.” 323 U.S. at 94. The Kann Court ob se rv e d th a t, in such ca ses, “the ma iling has ordinarily had a muc h closer
r e lati o nto f

urth e r f r a u d u le n t c o n d

u c t t h anh a s th e me re clea ring o f a ch ec k. . . .” Id. at 95. I t also descr ibed as

“ c on c e iva ble ” that the me re c le ari ngof a c he c k, “ a lon e , in some set tings, would be enoug h” to support a f raud conviction. Id.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 19

Fo r examp l e, Ji ni an, on M arch 3 , 2 0 0 8 , d ep o si t ed t wo separat e checks 6 i n t h e amou n t s of

$17, 500 an d $15, 500, ra t h er t h an on e ch ec k f or $33, 000. O n Apr i l 4, 2008, Ji n i an depos i t ed t wo s epa r at e ch ec k s i n t h e amou n t s of $14, 000 a n d $9, 000, r at h er t h an on e ch ec k f or $23, 000. Her e, the mere clearing of a chec k is enoug h beca use the interstate c ommunication was nec essar y to complete and
c on c e a l Jinia

n’ s f ra ud . T he wire tr ansfe r w a s n e c e ssa ry to compl ete the f

raud be cause , until the checks c lear ed, Ji nian could not be ce rtain it wou l d b e Br icsnet that would be swindled. The g overnme nt introduced e vidence that J inian direc ted B rown to i s sue multiple, smaller-denomination
c h e c k s , r a th e r

th ana l ar g e , l u mp
- s u mp ay

me nt. Such

6
c on du c t gives rise to i nf e re nc e s th at Jinia

n inte nd e d to
conce al his transac tions entirel y from dete ction by

Br icsnet or structure the transa ctio n s i n a manner that g ave the m the
a pp e ara nc e of re g ula r o r n e c e ssar

y bu sin e ss e xpe nd iture s. J i n i an’s conduct furthe r sug g ests that depositing multiple, smaller-de no m i n ation chec ks insulated his conduct fr om suspicion by

or scr utiny from Mec h anics Bank a

bout larg esum deposits. Thus, a rational jury could have conclude d that J inian utiliz ed the i nterstate w ires to structure , perpe tuate, and
conce al his fra

udulent scheme

. In s ho rt , h avin g c on sid e re d th e pr inc ipl e s se t f ort h in Kann and Schmuc k, we sustain Ji nian’s wire fra ud conviction.

B.
Next, J inian, interpre ting 18 U.S.C. § 1343 to require that the g ov e rnme nt p ro ve be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t a defe ndant intended to use a n inte rst ate wire c ommunication as par t of a sche me to defr aud, conte nds that the district court
e rr e d b y fa ili ngto i ns tr

uc t th e jur

y that th e in ter stateU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 20 component of a wire must be rea sonably likely or for esee able. The district co u rt instructed the jury , in releva nt part, as fo llo ws :
With r e g ar d t o e a c h o f th e s e 1 4 c o un t s , in order for the defe ndant to be found g uilty . . . , the g overnme nt must prov e eac h of the fo llo wi nge le me nts be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t: First, t h e defenda

nt knowingly

devised a scheme or plan to de fra

ud or a sche me or plan for obtainingmon ey

by means of f

alse or fra udulent prete nses, re prese ntations, or promises[.]

. . . . Third, the def

endant a cted with the intent to defra ud; t h at is, the intent to deceive or cheat[ .] And fourth, the defe ndan t used or
c a us e d to be us e d a

wi re c omm

un ic a tion i n int e rs tate c omm e rc e to c arr y out or a tte mpt to
car ry out an essential pa

rt of the sc heme.

. . . . A wi re fr a

ud inv olv e s th e us e of

wi re in interstate c ommerc e. An interstate w ire communication includes a wire transmission so long a s it goe s acr oss a state line.

A wi ri ng is c a

us e d w he n o ne kn ow s th a t a wire w ill be used in the ordinar y course ofU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 21
business or w hen one c an re asonably fore see such use. I t doe s not matter whet h ert he information wired was itself false or dece ptive so long a s th e wire was used a s part of the
s ch eme, nor does it matter whe ther the
s ch em e or plan was succ essful or that a ny money was obtaine d.

An intent to defr aud is a

n intent to deceive
or c he a t. These jur y instructions fairly an d adequately cover ed the elements of w ire fr aud. See Pelisamen , 641 F.3d at 409; Knapp , 120 F.3d at 930.
Whil e ther e is a presumption in f avor of findingan intent require ment in eac h statutory ele ment that criminalizes otherwise innoc ent conduc t, United St a t es v. X-Citement Video, Inc

. , 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994), the Supreme Court has d istinguished betwe en prosc ribed c onduct g ener ally and conduct that f

alls within the sco pe of c ong ressional
re g ulatio n. Spe c if

ic a lly , it e xpla ine d th at a

“ re qu ir e me nt i s sufficie nt to confer jurisdiction on the fede ral courts for wha t otherwise a

re state crimes pr ecisel y beca use it impli cate s fac tors that are an appr opriate subjec t for fe dera l conce rn”: The signi fi canc e of la beling a statutory require ment as “jurisdictional” is not that the require ment is viewed a s outside the scope of the evil Con gress int ended to f orestall, but
mere ly that the exist ence of the fa ct that
c on fe rs fe de ra l juri sd ic tio n n e e d not be on e in the m ind of t he ac tor at the time he pe rpetrates th e ac t made cr iminal by the fe dera l statute.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 22
The question, then, is not whether t he
re qu ir e me nt i s juri sd ic tio na l, b ut whe the r i t is j ur i s d i c t i o n a l o n l y.
Un ite d S tates v . F e ola , 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975). He re, the “fa ct that confe rs fede ra l jurisdiction,” id. , in 18 U. S.C. § 1 34 3 is the int e rs tate ne xus: u se of an inte rs tate communication “is included in the statute mere ly as a ground for f eder al jurisdiction . . . . I f t h e wire employ ed is an interstate wir e the r equire ments for fe dera l jurisdiction are satisfied.” United States v. Blassingame , 427 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1970). The int erstate nexus is nece ssary , of cour se, “bec ause Cong r e s s ’ s p o w e r over intra state ac tiviti es is limit ed by the Co m m erc e Clause.” United States v. Lindemann , 85 F.3d 1232, 1241 ( 7th Cir. 1996). We theref ore hold that the interstate r equire ment in 18 U.S.C. § 1343 is jurisdictional and not a substantive e lement of a wire f raud of fense

.

“ Juri sd ic tio na l la

ngua g e ne e d n ot c ontai n the same culpability

require ment as other e lemen t s of the off ense.” United States v. Y

ermian , 468 U.S. 63, 68 (1984). In light of our holding , the g overnme nt is not r equire d to prove unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1343 that the inte rs t ate nature of the wire w as r e a s o n a b ly li k e ly o r f o r e s eea ble, see Lindemann , 85 F.3d at 1 241, beca

use the statute “ does not condition g uilt upon knowledg e that interstate communication is used” and “ use of int e rs tate c omm

un ic atio n is log ic a lly

no pa rt of the c ri me itself,” Blassingame , 4 27 F .2 d at 33 0; se e als o United States
v . R os e lli , 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970) (explaining that the purpose of

statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1343 “a rgues ag ainst a construc tion making a specific ‘anti-f eder al’ intent
a n ele m e n to f

th e o f f e n s e ” )

. A s th e S e v e n thC i r c uit
rec og nized,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 23 it has consistently

been he ld that for statutes in whic h Co ng re ss i nc lud e d a n “ int erstate
ne xus” fo r the purp os e of e sta bli sh inga ba sis for its authority , the g overnme nt must prove that the d e fe nd ant k

ne w h e wa s invo lve d in the wr on g fu l c on du c t, b ut need not prove that the defendant k

new the “interstate nexus” of his actions

. Lindemann , 85 F.3d at 1241 (empha sis added). It is therefor e “wholly irrele vant to any

purpo s e of the statute that the pe rp e tr a tor

of the fr a ud kn ow s a bo ut t he us e of in te rs tate
co mmunication.” Blasingame , 4 27 F .2 d at 33 0; a c c or d United States v. Bry ant , 766 F.2d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1985) (e xpla ini ngthat 18 U. S.C. § 1 34 3, “ read lit e ra lly , r e qu ir e [s]
o n ly th a t t h e w ir e c o mm

un ic ation be interstate, not that de fe nd ants knowthat it is t o be interstate ”).

A s p e c i f i c i n t e n tt o d e f

r a u d i s th e o n l y mens rea require ment under the wire fra ud statute. See United States v. Gre en , 745 F.2d 1205, 1207 ( 9th Cir. 1984) (construingthe
ma il fr a ud statut e ); ac c or

d United States v. W

alker , 191 F.3d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (c onstruing the mail f raud statute and
e xpla ini ngthat “ [ p] roo f of fr a ud ule nt i nte nt, or

the sp e c if

ic intent to harm or def

raud the vict i m s o f t he sche me, is an essential component of the ‘sche me to de fra ud ’ e lement”)

. The Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Uni t ed States , which esta

blishes that a def

endant “ cause s” an inter state wire if he a c ts “ wi th k

no wl e dg e that the us e of the [wir e ] wil l fo llo w i n the or din ary c ours e of bu sin e ss, or wh e re su c h u se c an r e a so na

bly be fo re se e n, e ve n th ou g h no t a c tua lly int e n d e d , ” 3 4 7 U

. S. 1 , 8

– 9 ( 1 9 5 4 ) , d o e s n o t h o ld to the
c o n tr ar y.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 24

T he gove r nment , however , need not s how t hat t he def endan t i nt ended 7 t o prev ent a c om muni cat i on f r om r eac hi ng a l aw e nf orce ment of

f i cer who m t he d ef

end an t knew t o b e a f e de r a l of

f i c e r be c a u s e 18 U. S. C. § 15 12 ( g) ( 2) pr ovi des t hat “ no s t at e of mi nd nee d be pr oved” wi t h r es pect to the vic tim ’s statu s a s a fed e ra l o ff ic e r. F ow l er , 131 S. Ct

. a t 2049. J inian’s reliance upon Fowler v. United States , 1 31 S. Ct

. 2045 (2011), whic h he conte nds supports his position that the g overnme nt must prove he re asonably fore saw that a

n inte rst atewire c ommunicat i o n—rathe r than a wire communication in g ener al—wou l d occur , is mispl ace d. At issue in Fowler

was the f

eder al witness tamper ing sta tute, which make s it a crime to k i l l

— o r attempt to kill—another person “with intent to

. . . preve nt the communication by any person to a la

w enf orce ment o fficer . . . of the United States of inf or matio n r e latin g to th e co mmi ssi on or po ssi ble
c omm iss ion

of a F e de ral of

fe ns e

. . . . ” 18 U. S.C. § 1512(a) (1)( C) (20 06). F ocusingupon instances whe re a de fe nd ant k ill e d a pe rs on wi th an int e nt t o p re ve nt t he vic tim fr om c omm

un ic atin g wi th law en fo rc e me nt of fi c e rs g e ne ra lly but did not have fede ral law enfor ceme nt office rs in mind, the Sup re me Court

a dd re sse d h owthe g ov e rnme nt n e e de d to prove a fede ral nex us under the statute in order “to show that the def enda n t more pa

rticularly intended to pre vent communication with federal office rs as well.” Fowler , 131 S. Ct. a t 20 48

. Sin c e it c ou ld no t c on strue th e wi tne ss tamperingstatute “a s intending to e x cuse the Governme nt f r o m p ro v i n g something a b o u t th e hy pothetical communication with fed era l office rs,” id. at 2051, the Sup re me Cou

rt he ld t hat th e gover

nme nt w a s r e qu ir e d to show there was a

rea sonable likelih o o dthat a re levant communication would ha ve bee n made to a f eder al offic er, 7 id. a t 2048

. In othe r wo rd s, kil lin g a vic timwi th a

n inte nt t o preve nt communication with law enf orce ment office rsU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 25

T he “ r eas o na b l e l i kel i hood ” s t andar d t he F ow l er Co ur t adop t ed 8

re flec te d the sh o rtc o m ing s o f a “m e r e p o ssib ili ty” sta n d a rd tha t, it
re a so n ed , wo ul d enab l e t he go vernm ent “ t o s ho w l i t t l e m o re t han t he p o ssib le c o m m issio n o f a fe d e ra l o ff e n se .” 1 3 1 S

. C t. a t 2 0 5 1 (e m p h a sis ad d ed ). g e ne ra lly inc lud e s “ an inte nt t o p re ve nt c omm un ic a tio ns wi th fe de ra l law e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs on ly if it is re a so na

bly lik e ly under the circ umstances that . . . at least one of the rele vant communications would have be en made to a fe dera l office r.” 8 Id. at 2052.
The F o wler Court adopted a f

orese eability

standard beca use t he witness tampering statute addre sses hy pothetical communications. See131 S. Ct. at 2049 (“Witness tampering
may pr ov e mor e se ri ou s ( and

mor e e ff e c tiv e ) whe n th e c ri me takes plac e befo re t h e victim has eng ag ed in any
c omm un ic a tio n at a ll w ithlaw e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs —at a t i m e when the pr ecise communication and nature of the office r who may

rec eive it ar e not y et known.”) . The wire fra ud statute, by

contr as t , require s an ac tual wire communication. Moreove r, the F owler Court’s enunciation of a “re asonable likelihood” standard w as direc ted towar d the “broa d ind ef

i n i te intent,” id. at 20 50 , s e t f or th i n 1 8 U .S. C. §1512(a) (1)( C) that require s the likelihood of c o mmunica tion to a fe dera l office r to be “ more than r emot e, o u tlandish, or simply hy pothetical,” id. at 20 52

. No su c h b ro a d, ind e fi nit e intent exi sts in the wire fra ud statute, which require s an intent to defraud , see Bohonus , 6 28 F.2 d at 11 72 , n ot t he int e nt t o utiliz e an inter state wire co m munication, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Fowler , there fore , is wholly inapposite. We rejec t J inian’s ar g uments tha t h is c onviction should be
ov erturne d on the basis that there was insuffic ient evidenc eU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 26 to prove his use of a

n interstate wir e com m u n i cation wa s rea sonably

fore seea ble and the ju ry

should have be en instructed to f

ind the same. No mens rea re qu ir e me nt e xists with reg ard to the jurisdictional, interstate nexu s o f J inian’s
ac ti o n s un d e r

1 8 U

. S. C. § 1 3 4 3 , w h ic hr e qu ir e s o n ly that Jinia n u se d— or

c a us e d the u se of

—inte rs tate wi re s in further ance of his s cheme to defra ud Br icsnet. The g overnme nt proved e ach e lement of wire f raud by introducing sufficie nt evidence for a rea sonable jury to c onclude that ( 1) J inian devi s ed a scheme w ith the specific intent to def raud Br icsnet, (2) it was rea sonably fore seea ble to J inian that wire communications bet

w e e n M e c h a n ic s B a nk and Silicon Valley Ba nk would be made in fu rt hera nce of his scheme, a

nd (3) int e rs tate wir e c omm

un ic atio ns a c tua lly

oc c ur re d in further ance of Ji nian’s sche me. Acc ording ly , the district
c ourt pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d th e ju ry

and did no t a bu se its discretion by

ref using to g ive J inia n’s proposed jur y instruction.

C.

Fin al l y , J inian argues that the district cour t erre d by denying his motion for judgme nt of acquittal beca use the wire fra ud statute, as a p p l ied to his case, c onstitut es an imprope r exercise of

cong ressional authority

under the Nec essar

y and Proper Clause a

nd violates the Tenth Amendment. We rejec t the se c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e s.
The Ne cessa

ry and P roper Clause “gr ants Congr ess broa d authority to enac t fede ral le gi s lation.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). When dete rmining whether the Necessar

y and P roper Clause g rants Cong ress the leg islative authority to e nact a fede ral statute, c ourts examine wh e the r “ the statut e c on sti tut e s a me ans that is ra

tio na llyU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 27

re late d to the imp le me ntatio n o f a c on sti tutiona lly
enumer ated powe r.” Id.
The wire fra

ud statute falls “within the extensive reac h of the Commerce Clause,” United States v. Hook , 195 F.3d 299, 31 0 (7 th Cir . 1 99 9) , und e r whic h Co ng re ss m ay (1 ) “ re g ulate the us e of the c ha

nn e ls of int e rs tate c omm e rc e ,” (2 ) “ re g ulate and prote ct the instrumentalities of interstate commerc e, or persons or thing s in interst ate c ommerce , even though the threat may

come only

from int ra state ac tiviti es,” a nd (3)

“ re g ulate tho se a c tiv iti e s h avin g a su bs tanti a l r e latio n to interstate c ommerce , i.e. , th os e a c tiv iti e s th a t su bs tanti a lly aff ect inter state commer ce,” United States v. Lopez , 5 14 U. S. 54 9, 55 8– 59 (1 99 5) (c itatio n o mitte d) ; ac c or d Gonzales v. R a ich , 5 4 5 U

. S. 1 , 2 2 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( r e c o g n iz in g th a t it is “of no
mom e nt” that Co ng re ss’ s v ali d re g ulatio n o f i nte rs tate activity “ensna res some pur ely

intrastate a ctivity ”). Wires a re channe ls or instrumentalities of interst ate c ommerce

. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v . United States , 3 7 9 U.S . 241, 271 (1964) (“The fac iliti es and instrumenta lities used to carr y on

. . . c omm e rc e , s uc h a s ra ilr oa ds , tr uc k li ne s, sh ips , r ive rs , and eve n hi g hway s are also subject to cong ressional
re g ulatio n .

. . .” ); United States v. Carnes , 309 F.3d 950, 954 (6thCi r

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( r e c o g n iz in g th at t e le c o mm un ic ati o n s are c ha nn e ls a nd ins tr ume ntaliti e s o f i nte rs tate c omm e rc e ); see als o United States v. W

right , 625 F.3d 583, 59 4 (9th Cir. 2010) (“ [O] ur pre cede nt indicates that cr iminal statutes punis hin g the tr ans mis sio n o f t he r e le va nt m a te ri a l ‘ in int e rs tate or

fo re ig n c omm e rc e ’ re qu ir e the mate ri a l it se lf to
c ro ss s tate lin e s. ” ). Ac c or din g ly , 1 8 U.S. C. § 1343 “ is a va lid extension of cong ressional powe r” unde r t h e C ommerce Clause. Hook, 195 F.3d at 310.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J I NI AN 28 Since Cong ress e nacted 18 U.S.C. § 1343 based upon a
c on s t i tu t i o n a l l y

e nu m e r at e d

p o w e r , an a l y s i s o f

th e s t atute under the Nec essar y

and Proper

Clause is inappropriate. Gonzales , 545 U.S. at 39 (explaining that the N ece ssary and Pr op e r C la

us e “em po we rs Con g re ss t o e na c t la ws in
e ff e c tuatio n o f i ts e nu me ra te d p owe rs t ha t ar e no t wit

hin its authority to enact in isol ation ” (e mphasis added) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421–22 (1 81 9) )) . F urt her

mor e , b e c a

us e 18 U. S.C. § 1 34 3 is a va lid exercise of p o we rs deleg ated to Cong ress by the Commerce Clause, J inian’s Tenth Ame ndmen t challeng e fa ils. United States v. Jone

s , 231 F.3d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 2000) (“ We have held that if Cong ress a cts under one of its enumerated power s, there c an be no violation of the Tenth Amendme nt.”).

IV . C ON CL USI ON

We c on c lud e that Jinia

n’ s f ra ud ule nt s c he me c los e ly
rese mbles the fra

ud perpe trated in Schmuc k , ra t her tha n the conduct at issue in Kann , a nd ho ld t hat th e int e rs ta

te
re qu ir e me nt i n 1 8 U .S. C. § 13 43 is juri sd ict ion a l and no t a substantive element of

the wire fra

u d o ff en se. We furthe r conclude that J inian’s const i t u tional challeng es to the wire frau d s tatute ar e w it

h o u t m e r it

. A c c o r d in g ly , w e a f f irm J inian’s conviction and se ntence

. AF F IRM ED

.