### F OR P UBLICATION



## UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

N A R U T O 

### , a Crested Macaque, by and throug h his Nex t F riends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, I nc., Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

D A V I D 

### J O H N 

### S L A T E R 

### ; B L

U R B 

### , I N C 

### ., a Delaware corporation; W I L D L I F E 

### P E R S O N A L I T I E S 

### , L T D 

### ., a United King dom private limited company
,

Defendants-Appellees. N o. 16-15469

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324- W HO

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California W illiam Horsley

Orrick, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J uly 12, 2017 San F rancisco, California

F iled April 23, 2018

B efore: Carlos T. B ea and N. Randy Smith, Circuit J udg es,

a nd Eduardo C. Robreno, * 

### District J udg e.

* T h e Ho n o rab le Ed u ard o C

. R o b r e n o , Un i ted States District J u d g e f or th e Eastern District o f

P en n sy l v an ia, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

### N A R U T O V



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### 2

Opinion by J udg e B ea; Concurrence by

J udg e N.R. Smith

SUMMARY * *



### Copyright / Standing

Affirming the district court’s dismissal of claims broug ht by a monkey
, the panel held that the animal h ad constitutional standing but lacked statutory standing to clai m copy rig ht infring ement of photog raphs k nown as the “Monkey Selfies.”

The panel held that the complaint included facts sufficient
to establish Article I I I stan ding because it alleg ed that the monkey was the author and owner o f the photog raphs and h ad suffered concrete and particulariz ed economic harms. The panel concluded that the monkey ’s Article I I I standing was not dependent on the sufficiency of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, I nc., as a g uardian or “nex t f r i e n d

. ”

The panel h eld that the monkey lacked statutory standing because the Copy

r ig ht Act does n ot ex pressl y authoriz e animals to file copy

rig ht infring ement suits.

The panel g r anted a

ppellees’ request for a

n a ward o f attorney s’ fees on appeal.

Concurring in part, J udg e N

. R. Smith wrote that the appeal should be dismissed a nd the d istrict court’s judg ment

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.

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### 3

on the merits should be vacated because the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the ca s e

. Disag reeing with the

m a j o r i t y ’ s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t n e x t -f ri e n d s t a n d i n g i s nonjurisdictional, J udg e Smi t h w rote that PETA’s failure to

mee t t he requirements for n e x t-friend standing removed jurisdiction of the court.

COUNSEL

David A

. Schwarz (arg ued), I r e l l & Manella L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andrew J

. Dhuey (arg ued), B erkeley
, California, for Defendants-Appellees D avid J o h n Slater and W ildlife Personalities, L td.

Ang ela D unning (arg

ued), J acqueline B

. Kort, Ky le C. W ong , J essica V alenz uela Santamaria, Cooley L L P, Palo Alto, California, for Defendant-Appellee B lurb, I nc.

J ustin Marcea

u , D enver, Colorado; Corey Pag e, San F rancisco, California; for Amicus Curiae Ag ustin F uentes.

### N A R U T O V



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OP INION

B EA, Circuit J udg e:

W e must determine whether a monkey may sue h umans, corporatio n s , and companies for damag es and injunctive relief arising from claims o f c opy rig ht infring ement. Our court’s preceden t r equires us to conclude that the monkey ’s claim has standing under Art i c l e I I I of the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n

. N o n e t h e l e s s , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h i s monkey —and all animals, since they are not hu m a n

— lacks
stat utory standing under the Copy rig ht Act. 1 

### W e therefore affirm the judg ment of the district court.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK G ROUND

Naruto was a seven-y ear-old crest e d macaque that lived—and may still live—in a reserve on the island o f Sulawesi, I ndonesia. I n 2 0 11, a wildlife photog rapher, David Slater, left his camera u nattended in t h e reserve. Naruto alleg edly took several p hotog raphs of himself (the “Monkey Selfies”) with Slater’s camera.

Slater a nd W ildlife Personalities, L td., (“W il d l ife”) published the Monkey Selfies in a b o o k that Slater created throug h B lurb, I nc.’s ( “B lurb”) website in De cember 2014. The boo k identifies Slater and W ildlife as the copy rig ht

owners o f the Monkey Selfies. However, Slater admits throug hout the b ook that Naruto took t h e photog raphs at issue. F or ex amp l e , the book describes one of the Monkey Selfies as f

ollows: “Sulawe si crested black macaque smiles
at itself w hile pressing the shutter button o n a ca mera.”

1 1 7 U.S.C. § 1 0 1 et seq

.

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Another ex c erpt f

rom the book describes Naruto as “[ p] osing
to take its own photog raph, unworried by its own r eflection, smiling . Surely

a sig n of self-awareness? ”

I n 2015 People for the Ethical T reatment of Animals (“PETA”) and Dr. Antje Eng elhardt filed a complaint for
copy rig ht infring ement ag ainst Slater, Wildlife, and B lurb, a s Nex t F riends on behalf of Naruto. The complaint alleg es that Dr. Eng elhardt has studied the crested macaques in Sulawesi, I ndonesia f

or over a decade a n d has known, monitored, a nd studied Naruto since his birth. The complaint does not a lleg e any history o r relationship between PETA and N aruto. 2 

### I nstead, the complain t alleg es that PETA is “the larg e st animal rig ht s o r g aniz ation in the w orld” and “has championed establishing the rig h ts a nd leg al protectio n s a v ailable to animals bey ond their utility to human being s . . . .”

Slater, W ildlife, and B lurb filed motions to dismiss under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the g rounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to establish s t a n d ing under Article I I I or statutory stand i n g under the Copy rig ht Act. The district court g r anted the motions to dismiss. I n its order the district c o urt s t a t ed the following with respect to Article I I I standing :

The Ninth Circuit has stated that A rticle I I I “does not compel the c onclusion that a

2 A t oral arg u m en t A

pp ellan t’ s co u

n s el su g g ested th at, u

po n rem an d
, th e co m p l ain t co u ld b e am en d ed to s tate a sig n i f ican t relatio n sh ip b etw een P ET A an d Naru to

. H o w ev er, P ET A an d En g elh ard t ag reed n o t to seek

am en d m en t o f th e co m

p lain t, n o d o u

bt to p ro cu re o u r earlier h earin g th eir
ap p eal. Hav in g p ro cu red th e b en ef it o f th e barg ain , w e w ill h o l d th em to th eir co n tract.

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statutorily authoriz ed suit in t h e n a me of an animal is not a ‘case or controversy .’” Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush
, 386 F .3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004). I need not d i s cu s s Article I I I standing further, because r eg ardless o f whether Naruto fulfills the r e q uirements o f Article I I I
, he must demonstrate standing

un d er the Copy

rig ht Act for his claim to survive under Rule 12(b)(6).

W e are, of course, bound by th e p r ecedent set in Cetacean Community u ntil and unless overruled by an e n banc panel o r the Supreme C o urt. M

iller v. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

The d istrict court c o ncluded that Naruto failed to establish statutory standing u nder the Copy r i gh t Act. PETA and Dr. Eng elhardt timely appealed on Naruto’ s behalf. However, after the appeal was filed, and w ith the permis s i on o f Appellees, Dr. Eng elhardt withdrew from the litig ation. Therefore, on a

ppeal, only PETA remains to represent Naruto as his “nex t friend.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo dismissals under F ed. R. Civ. P. 1 2(b)(1) and F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc.
, 504 F .3d 1151, 115 6 (9th Cir. 2007). “ All alleg ations o f material fact are taken as true and construed in the lig ht most favorable to the n onmoving party .” Sprewell v

. Golden State W

arriors , 266 F

. 3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

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D ISCUSSION

I. Next F riend Standing

W e g r avely doubt that PETA can validly assert “ nex t friend” status to repr esent c laims made for the monkey both (1) because PETA h as failed to alleg e a ny facts t o e s tablish the required sig nificant relationship between a nex t f riend a nd

a real party in interest and (2) beca u se an animal cannot be represented, under our laws, by a “nex t friend.”

F irst, “[ i] n order to establish n e x t-friend standing
, the putative nex t friend must show: (1) that the p e t i t i o n er is unable to litig ate his o wn cause due to mental incapacity
, lack of access to court, or o ther similar disability ; and (2) the nex t friend has some sig nificant relationship with, a nd i s t r uly dedicated to the best interests of, the petitioner.” Coalition of Clergy v. Bush
, 310 F .3d 1153, 1159–60 ( 9 t h Cir. 2 002) ( q uoting Massie ex rel. Kroll v. W oodf o r d
, 2 4 4 F .3d 1192, 1 1 9 4 ( 9 th Cir. 2001)). Here, we a re concerned with the second requirement. PETA does n ot clai m to have a relationship with Naruto that is any more sig nificant than its relationship with any other animal. Thus, PETA fails to meet the “sig nificant relationship” r equirement a nd cannot sue a s Naruto’s nex t friend. 3

3 W e f eel co m p elled to n o te th a t P E T A ’ s d ef icien cies in th is reg ard
g o f ar bey o n d its f

ailu re t o p l ead a sig n if

ican t r elatio n s h ip w ith Naru to

. In d eed
, if an

y su ch relatio n s h ip ex i sts, PET A ap p ears to h av e f ailed to liv e

u p to th e title o f “ f

rien d .” A f

ter seein g th e p ro v erb ial w ritin g o n th e w all
at o ral arg u m en t , P ET A an d A p p ellees f iled a m o tio n ask in g th is co u rt to d ism iss Naru to ’ s ap p eal an d to v acate t h e d istrict co u rt’ s ad v erse j u d g m en t , rep resen tin g th at P ET A ’ s claim s ag ain st Slater h ad been settled

. It rem ain s u n clear w

h at claim s P ET A p u rp o rted to b e “ settlin g ,” sin ce th e

co u rt w as u n d er th e im

p ressio n th i s law su it w a s ab ou t Naru to ’ s claim s,

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### 8

B u t, e ven if PETA had alleg ed a sig nifica n t r e lationship with Naruto, it still could n ot sue as Naruto’s nex t friend. I n W hitmore v. Arkansas
, 4 95 U.S. 149 (1990), the Supreme Court discussed “nex t friend” standing in a habeas cas e i n

w hich a third-party litig ant soug ht to challeng e the d e a t h
sentence of a capital d efendant, Simmons, who had forsworn his rig h t to appeal. I n considering whether the t h i r d-party
, W h itmore, had standing to sue on behalf o f S immons, the Court emphasiz ed the limited nature of “nex t friend” standing and ex plaine d t h e rationale behind its limitations. F o r

ex a mple, requirin g a s howing of incompetency and a “sig nificant relationship ” e n sures that “the litig ant asserting

an d per P ET A ’ s m o tio n , Naru to w as “ n o t a p arty to t h e settlem e n t , ” n or

w ere Naru to ’ s claim s settled th erein

. Nev erth eless, P ET A ap paren tly

o b tain ed so m eth in g f

ro m th e settlem en t w ith Slater, alth o u g h n o t an y th in g th at w o u ld n ecessarily g o to N aru to : A s “ p art of th e arran g em en t ,” Slater
ag reed t o p ay a q u arter o f h is earn in g s f ro m th e m o n k ey self

ie b o o k “ to ch arities th at p ro tect th e h ab itat o f Naru to an d o th er crested m acaq u es in I n d o n esia.” See S

ettlemen t Rea ch ed : ‘Mo n key S elfie’ Ca se Bro ke N

e w Gro u nd Fo r A n i m a l Rig h t

s , P ET A
, h ttp s://w

w w .p eta.o rg /b lo g /settlem en tr e a c h e d -m o nk ey

- self

ie- case- b ro k e- n ew

- g ro u

n d -a ni m a l -r i gh t s / ( l a s t

v isited A p r. 5
, 2 0 1 8 ). B u t n ow , in th e w ak e o f P ET A ’ s p ro po s ed d ism issal, Naru to is l ef

t w ith o u t an ad v o cate, h i s s u p p o s ed “ f rien d ” h av in g ab an d o n ed Naru to ’ s su

b stan tiv e claim s i n w

h at ap p ears to b e an ef

f o rt to p rev e n t th e p u

b licatio n o f a d ecisio n ad v erse to P ET A ’ s in stitu tio n al in terests. W ere h e cap ab le o f r eco g n izin g th is ab an d o n m en t, w e w o n der

w h eth er Naru to m ig h t in i tiate an act i o n f o r b reach o f co n f

id en tial relatio n sh ip ag ain st h is (f orm er) n ex t f

rien d
, P ET A
, f

o r its f ailu re to p u rsu e h is in terests bef

o re its o w n

. P u zzlin g ly
, w

h ile rep resen tin g t o th e

w o r l d t h at “ an im als are n o t o u rs to eat, w ear, ex p erim en t o n , u se fo r

en tertain m en t, or ab u se in an y o th er w ay ,” see P ET A
, h ttp s://p eta.o rg (last

v isited A p r. 5
, 2 0 1 8 ), P ET A seem s to em p lo y Naru to a s a n u n w ittin g p aw n in its id eo lo g ical g o als. Yet th i s is p recisely w h at i s to b e av oid ed b y req u irin g n ex t f

rien d s to h av e a sig n if

ican t rel a t i o n sh ip w ith
, rath er th an an i n stitu

t io n al in terest in
, th e i n co m p eten t p arty

—a p o in t m ad e b y Ch ief J u stice R eh n q u ist in Len h a rd v. W o lff
, 4 4 3 U.S. 1 3 0 6, 1 31 2 (1 9 7 9 ). S ee in fra pag e 9 f

o r ex act lan g u ag e.

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only a g eneraliz ed interest in constitutional g overnance” does
not “circumvent the jurisdictional limits of Article I I I simply by assuming the mantle of ‘nex t friend.’” Id. at 164. I n short, requirements of a sig n ificant interest in the subject party protect ag ainst abuses o f the third-party standing rule. As the Court noted in a prior case, “however worthy and hig h minded the motives of ‘nex t friends’ may be, they inevitably

run the risk of making t he actual [ party ] a pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard lar ge r than his own case.” Lenhard v. W

olff
, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312 (1979). B ased on the dang ers inherent in any third-party standing do ctrine, the Court declined to ex pand “nex t friend” standing bey ond what

was authoriz ed b y Con gr e ss in the habeas corpus statute. W hitmore , 495 U.S. at 164–165.

Here, we follow the Supreme Court’s lead in holding that “the scope of any federal doctrine o f ‘nex t friend’ standing is

n o b roader than what is permitted by the

. . . statute.” Id. Althoug h Cong ress has authoriz e d “nex t friend” lawsuits on behalf of habeas petitioners, see 28 U

. S

. C. § 2242, and on behalf of a “ minor or incompetent pe r s o n , ” see F ed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), there is no such authoriz a t i o n for “nex t friend” lawsuits b roug ht on behalf of a n imals. Our precedent on statutory interpretation should apply to court rules as well a s statutes: if animals are to be a c co rded rig hts to sue, the provisions involved therefore should state such rig hts

ex p ressly

. See Cetacean Cmty.
, 386 F .3d at 1179. B ecause we believe the Supreme Court’s reasoning in W hitmore counsels
ag ainst court-initiated ex pansion o f “nex t friend” standi n g,

we d e cline to r ecog niz e the rig ht of nex t friends to bring suit

on behalf of animals, absent ex press authoriz at i o n from Cong r ess.

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Even so, we must p r oceed to the merits because Naruto’s lack of a nex t f

riend does not d e s t r o y his standing to sue, a s having a “case or c o n troversy ” u n der Article I I I o f the C onstitution. F e deral Rule of Civil Procedure 17, w h i c h

a uthoriz es “nex t f

riend” lawsuits, oblig ates the cour t “ t o consider whether [ incompetent parties] are a d equately protected,” even where they have no “nex t friend” o r “g uardian.” U.S. v. 30.64 Acres of Land , 795 F .2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986). W ithin this oblig ation, the court has “ broad discretion a

nd need not appoint a guardian ad litem [ or nex t friend] if it determines the person is o r c an b e o t herwise adequately protected.” Id

. (citing Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. , 2556 F .2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (“Rule 17(c) does
not make the appointment of a g ua r d ian ad litem mandatory .”)). See also Harris v. M a n g um , 8 6 3 F .3d 1133, 1139 n.2 ( 9th Cir. 2017) (n oting circumstances in which “appointing a g uardian ad litem

. . . could hinder the purpose of Rule 17(c),” and thus was not required). F or ex ample, “the
court may find that the incompetent person’s interests would be adequately protected by the appointment o f a lawy er.” Krain v

. Smallwood
, 880 F .2d 1 119, 1121 (9th Cir. 19 89) (citing W estcott v. United States Fi d e lity & Guaranty Co.
, 158 F .2d 20, 2 2 (4th Cir. 1946). I ndeed, courts have done just this, and the f

act that those courts did not then dismiss the

case p r oves that the lack of a nex t friend does not destroy an incompetent party ’ s standing

. See, e.g., W estcott , 158 F .2d at 22 (aff i r m ing judg ment ag ainst minor who was represented by an attorney

but not a g uardian ad litem). 4

4 Here, w e f

in d t h at th is case w as b rief ed an d arg u ed b y co m

p eten t

co u n sel w h o rep resen ted th e leg al in terests o f th e in co m p eten t p arty , b u t

n o t a p erso n , N aru to

. T h u s, h i s in terests u p to su b m issio n o f t h e c a se f o llo w in g o ral arg u m en t w ere ad eq u ately p ro tected
, n o tw ith stan d in g an y d ef icien cies in

P ET A ’ s “ n ex t f

rien d ” relatio n sh ip

.

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Concluding otherwise w ould conflict with our precedent. I n Cetacean C o mm u n ity
, 3 86 F .3d at 1 171, we h eld that a g roup of cetaceans c ould demonstrate Article I I I standi n g

. There, the cetaceans had n o purported “nex t friend.” T h u s,

were we to v a c a t e t h e case we have before us now a nd remand with instructions to dismiss b ecause of PETA’s failure to establish “nex t friend” standing , our jurisprudence would permit a case broug ht “ d irectly ” by animals without
any alleg ation that the suit was broug ht by a “ n e x t friend”—as was the case in Cetacean —but would not p ermit

a case broug ht by

an org aniz ation as the “nex t friend” of the animal at issue if the org aniz ation failed to meet the relational requirements. That cannot be th e law. W e thus hold that Naruto’s Article I I I standing under Cetacean is not dependent

on PETA’s sufficiency as a g uardian or “ nex t friend,” and we proceed to our Article I I I standing analy sis. 5

5 T h is is w

h ere w e d ep art f

ro m th e co n cu rrin g o p in i o n . First, J u dg e N.R. Sm ith seem s to p o sit th at w e m u st restrict o u r in q u i ry in to A rticle III
stan d in g an d its ef

f ect o n j u risd ictio n to an ex am in atio n o f th e v alid ity of th e claim ed Nex t Fr i e n d statu s , becau se th at is h o w th e co m p lain t is stated

. S ee in f ra , n o te 8 ( Sm ith
, J
., co n cu rrin g i n p art). In oth er w o rd s, sin ce Naru to ’ s o n ly stated b asis f o r j u risd ictio n i s Nex t Frien d statu s, w e

can d eterm in e w

h eth er w e h av e j u

risd ictio n by ex am in i n g o n ly th e v alid ity

o f th e Nex t Frien d claim

. B u t su ch a restrictio n is co n t rary to o u r lo n g h eld

an d o f ten restated d u ty to ex am in e su a sp o n t e w h eth er j u risd ictio n ex ists,
reg ard less h o w th e p arties h av e f ram ed th eir claim s. S

ee, e.g

. Go nza lez v. Th a ler
, 5 65 U .S. 1 3 4
, 1 4 1 (2 0 1 2) (“ W h en a req u irem en t g o es t o su b j ectm atter j u risd i ctio n , co u

rts are o b lig ated to co n sid er su a sp o n te th e issu es th at th e p ar t i e s h a v e d isclaim ed o r h av e n ot p resen ted

. Su b j ect m atter j u risd ictio n can n ev er b e w aiv ed o r f o rf eited .”) (in tern al citat i o n s o m i t ted ). W e th eref o re resp ectf

u lly rej ect th i s su g g ested lim itatio n

.

Nex t, alth o u g h Ju dg e N.R. Sm ith ag rees t h at an an im al can n o t su e b y

n e x t f rien d
, h e n ev erth eless lim its h is an aly sis to cases in v olv in g ne x t f rien d su its u n d er statu tes w h ich co n tain p articu l ar n ex t f rien d p ro v isio n s. Un der W h itmo re an d C

o a litio n , h e arg u es, w e m u st d ism iss b ased on

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II. Article III Standing

The Cetacean court held that all of the world’s whales, dolphins, and porpoises (the “Cetaceans”), throug h their selfappointed lawy er, alleg ed f acts sufficient to establish standing under Article I I I

. 386 F .3d at 1175. The Cetaceans alleg ed concrete phy sical injuries c aused by the Navy ’ s sonar sy stems i n a suit broug ht by the “self-appointed attorney for

P ET A ’ s in su f

f icien cy as a “ n ex t f

rien d .” B u t i f w e all ag ree th at su its b y

an im als ca n n o t be b ro u g h t u n d er F RCP 1 7, b ecau se th e ru le ref ers o n l y to

“ perso n s,” n o t “ an im als,” w h y w o u ld w e w an t to f

o llo w an d be b o u n d b y h ab eas cases f

o r h u m an s f

or w h ich t h e statu te (§ 2 2 4 2 ) ex p ressly p ro vid es

n ex t f rien d stan d i n g ? T h e co n cu rren ce d o es n o t ex p lain th is p o in t

.

In o u r v iew
, th e q u es t i o n o f s tan din g w as ex p licitly d ecid ed in Ceta cea n

. A lth o u g h
, as w e ex p lain later, w e b eliev e Ceta cea n w as

w r o n g ly decid ed
, w e are b ou n d by it. Sh o rt of an i n terv en i n g d ecisio n f ro m th e Su

p rem e Co u rt o r f

ro m an en b an c p an el o f th is co u rt, see Miller

v. Ga mmie
, 3 3 5 F.3 d 8 8 9
, 89 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ), w e can n o t escap e th e p ro p ositio n th at an im als h av e A rticle III stan d in g to su e. W i th th is as a startin g p rem ise, h o w co u ld it b e t h at P ET A ’ s d ef

icien cy as Naru to ’ s rep resen tativ e co u ld d estro y Naru to ’ s o th erw ise v alid A rticle III stan d in g ? A g ain , th e co n cu rren ce f

ails to ex plain

.

J u d g e N .R. Sm ith in sig h tf u l ly id en tif

ies a series o f issu es raised b y th e p ro sp ect o f allo w in g an i m als to su e. Fo r ex am p le, if an im als m ay su e,

w h o m ay rep resen t th eir in terests? If an im als h av e p ro p erty rig h ts, d o th ey also h av e co rresp o n din g d u ties? Ho w d o w e p rev en t p eo p le (o r

o rg an i zatio n s, lik e P ET A ) f ro m u s i n g an im als to ad v an ce th eir h u m an ag en d as? In ref

lectin g o n th ese q u estio n s, J u d g e Sm ith rea c h e s th e

reaso n ab le co n clu sio n t h at an im als sh o u ld n o t b e p erm itted to su e in h u m an co u

rts. A s a p u

re po licy m atter, w e ag ree. B u t w e are n o t a leg i slatu re, an d th is co u rt’ s d ecisio n in Ceta cea n lim its o u r o ptio n s. W h at

w e ca n d o is u rg e th is co u rt to ree x am i n e Ceta cea n

. See in fra n o te 6

. W h at w e ca n no t d o is p reten d Ceta cea n d o es n o t ex ist, o r t h at it s t a t e s

so m eth in g o th er, o r m ild er, or m o re am big u o u s o n w

h eth er cetacean s h av e A rticle III stan din g

.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 13

all of the world’s whales, p orpoises, and d olphins.” Id. at 1171. The Ninth Circuit made c lear that the “sole plaintiff in this case” is the Cetaceans and did not discuss “nex t friend”

or third-party standin g

. I d. Althoug h the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal because the Cetaceans lacked statutory standing under the environmental statutes at issue in that case, the c ourt stated that “Article I I I does not compel the conclusion that a statutorily a uthoriz ed suit in the

name of an animal is not a ‘ case or controversy .’” 6 

### I d

. at 1175.

Here, the complaint alleg es that Naruto is the author a nd

owner of the Monkey Selfies. The complaint fu rther alleg e s

6 T h e u se o f th e d o u

b le n eg ativ e h ere is p ro b lem atic in th at it creates

u n n ecessary a m

b i g u i t y i n th e co u rt’ s h o l d in g

. Better, w e th in k
, to say a p etitio n is “ tim ely ” th an th at it is “ n o t u n tim ely ,” f o r ex am p le. B etter h ere to h av e said th e an im al h as A rticle III stan d i n g

. “ T h is ty p e o f lito tes (th e

n eg atio n o f an o p p o site) o f t en m ak es l an g u ag e co n v o l u t ed

. Geo rg e Orw ell rid icu led it w ith th is ex am p l e: ‘ A n ot u n

b la c k do g w as ch asin g a

n o t u n sm all rab b it acro ss a n o t u n g reen f i eld .’ ” B RYA

N G A RNE R , G AR N E R ’ S M ODE RN A M E RI CA N U S A G E 5 4 5 (2 0 03 ) (citin g “ P o litics a n d th e En g l ish L an g u ag e” (1 9 4 6 ), in 4 C o llected Essa

ys, Jo urn a li s m a n d Letters o f Geo rg e Orwell 1 2 7, 1 38 n .1 (1 9 6 8)). B u t th is lan g u ag e d o es n o t ch an g e o u r u ltim ate co n clu s io n

. If n o th in g ab o u t A rticle III co mp els th e

co n clu sio n th at an im als lack stan d in g , th en it can n o t al s o b e t ru e th at

an im als lack stan d in g si m p l y b y v irtu e o f th eir b ein g an im als. In o th er

w o rd s , Ceta cea n at th e v ery least h o l d s th at it is po ssib le f o r an im als, lik e h u m an s , to d em o n strate th e k i n d of case o r co n tro v ersy req u ired to estab lish A rticle III stan d in g

. A lth o u g h th e claim s in Ceta cea n so u n ded in p h y sical h arm to p lain t if f s, an d t h e claim s in Na ru to so u n d in eco n o m ic h arm t o Naru to , t

h at d if f eren ce is n o t a p o in t o f d istin ctio n f o r A rticle III
p u rp o s es. “C a se s o r Co n tro v ersies” h av e d escrib ed claim s in v o lv in g p ro p erty in terests, as w ell as claim s in v o lv in g p erso n al in j u ries, sin ce th e Fo u n din g , an d bef

o re, at co m

m o n law

. T h u s, th e so rt o f b lan k et ex clu sio n

o f an im als f

ro m A rticle III j u risd ictio n w h ich Ju d g e N.R. Sm ith ad v o cates is, alas, f u n d am en tally

in co n sisten t w ith C

eta cea n ’ s h o ld in g

.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 14

t h a t N a ruto has suffered c oncrete and particulariz e d econo m i c harms as a result of the infring ing conduct by the Appellees, harms that can be redressed by a judg ment declaring Naruto

as t h e a uthor and owner of the Monkey Selfies. Under Cetacean
, the complaint includes f acts sufficient to establish Article I I I standing

. Therefore, we must determine whether Naruto has statutory standi n g 7 

### to sue for

7 Min d f u l t h at th e term “ stan d in g ” carries w ith it j u risd ictio n al

co n n o tatio n s, w e clarif

y th at o u r u se o f th e term “ statu to ry s tan din g ” ref ers to Naru to ’ s ab ility to su e u n d er th e Co p y r i g h t A ct, n o t h is ab ility to su e g en erally

. T h u s, as w e h av e o bserv ed in p rev io u s cases, “ [t]h o u g h lack of
sta tu to ry s tan d i n g req u ires d ism issal f o r f ailu re t o s t a te a claim
, lack of A rticle III s tan d in g req u i res d ism issal f o r lack o f su

b j e ct m atter j u risd ictio n u n d er Fed eral Ru le o f C iv il P ro ced u re 12 (b )(1 ).” Ma ya v. Cen tex C o rp

. , 6 5 8 F.3 d 1 0 6 0
, 1 0 6 7 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 1 1 ). T h e f

o rm er is a d eterm in atio n

o n th e m erits, w

h ile th e latter is p u

rely j u risd ictio n al.

W h i le w e b eliev e Ceta cea n w as in co rre c t l y d ecid ed
, it is b in d in g circu it p reced en t th at n on

- h u m an an im als en j o y co n stitu

tio n al stan d i n g to p u rs u e claim s in f

ed eral co u rt. See C

eta cea n , 3 8 6 F.3 d at 1 1 7 5

– 76 ; see

a lso Ctr. fo r Au to S

a fety v. Ch rysler G rp ., LLC
, 8 0 9 F.3 d 1 0 9 2
, 1 1 0 6 (9 th Cir.), cert. d en ied su

b n o m

. FCA U.S

. LLC v. C tr. fo r Au to S

a f ety , 1 3 7 S. Ct

. 3 8
, 1 9 6 L

. Ed

. 2 d 2 6 (2 0 1 6) (“ W h i le w e h av e th e au th o rity to d istin g u ish

p reced en t o n a p rin cip led b asis, w e are n o t f ree to ig n o re th e literal m ean in g o f o u r ru lin g s, ev en w h en th e p an el b eliev es th e p reced en t is ‘ u n w ise or in c o r r e c t

. ’ ”) (q u o t in g Ha rt v. Ma s sa n a ri
, 2 6 6 F.3 d 1 1 5 5
, 1 1 7 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 )). A lth o u g h w e m u st f a i t h f u lly ap p ly p reced en t , w e

are n o t restrain ed f

ro m p o in tin g o u t, w

h en w e co n clu d e after reaso n ed

co n sid eratio n , th at a p rio r d ecisio n o f th e co u rt n eed s reex am in atio n

. T h is is su ch a case.

A n im als h av e n eith er co n stitu tio n al n or statu to ry stan d i n g

. A rticle III
stan d in g “ o f

ten tu rn s o n th e n atu re an d so u rce o f th e c laim asserted .” W a rth v. S eld in
, 4 2 2 U.S. 4 9 0
, 5 0 0 (1 9 75 ). Oth er th an Ceta cea n , n o case h as h eld th at an im als h av e co n stitu t i o n a l stan din g t o p u

rsu e claim s in f ed eral co u

rt. See e.g ., Tiliku m ex rel. Peo ple f o r th e Eth ica l Trea tmen t

o f An ima ls, In c. v. S

ea W orld Pa rks & En tm’t, In c. , 8 4 2 F. Su p p

. 2 d 1 2 5 9 (S.D. Cal. 2 0 1 2 ) (T h irteen th A m en d m en t p ro h ib itio n o n slav ery an d

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 15

copy rig ht infring ement.

III. Statutory Standing under the Copyright Act

I n Cetacean
, this court s t a t e d the following with respect to statutory

standing for animals:

W e ag ree with the district court in Citizens to E n d Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc.
, that “[ i] f Cong ress and the President intended
to take the e x traordinary step of authoriz ing animals a s well as people and leg al entities to
sue, they c ould, and should
, have said so plainly .” In the absence of any such statement in the ESA, the MMP A
, o r NEPA, or the APA, we c o n c l ude that the Cetaceans do not have statutory

standing to sue.

in v o lu n tary serv itu d e ap p lied o n l y to h u m an s, an d t

h u s w h ales lack ed A rticle III stan d in g to b rin g actio n ag ain st o p erato r o f t h em e p ark u n der T h irteen th A m en d m en t ). P rio r to Ceta cea n , n o co u rt ev er in tim ated th at

an im als p o ssess in terests th at can f o rm th e basis o f a case o r co n tro v ersy

. A s to statu to ry stan d in g , C o n g ress h as n ev er p ro v id ed th at an im als m ay

su e in th eir o w

n n am es in f ed eral co u

rt, an d th ere is n o asp ect of f ed eral law (o th er th an Ceta cea n ) th at h as ev er reco g n ized th at an im als h av e th e rig h t to su e in th eir o w

n n am e as a l i t i g a n t

. T o th at p o in t, Ru le 1 7 (a)
req u ires th at th e su it b e b ro u g h t i n t h e n am e o f th e “ p arty in in terest”; an d th at n ex t f

rien d o r g u ard ian rep resen tatio n o b tain s o n ly f o r a p erso n

. S

ee Fed

. R. Civ

. P. 1 7 (c). B ecau se an im als d o n o t p ossess co g n izab le in terests, it stan ds to reaso n th at th ey can n o t b rin g su it in f ed eral co u rt in th eir o w n n am es to p ro t e c t s u c h in t erests u n less Co n g ress d eterm in es

o th erw i se.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 16

Id. at 1179 (emphasis added). 8 

### The court in Cetacean did not rely on the fact that the statut e s a t i ssue in that case referred to “persons” or “individuals.” Id. I nstead, the court crafted a simple rule of statutory

interpretation: if an Act of Cong ress plainly states that anim als have statutory standing
, then animals have statutory standing

. I f the statute does not so plainly state, then animals d o not have statutory standing

. The Copy rig ht Act does not ex pressly a uthoriz e animals to file
copy rig ht infring ement suits under the statute. 9 

### Therefore,

8 In Citizen s to En d An ima l S u f f e r i n g & Exp lo ita tio n , In c. v. New En g la n d Aq u a r iu m , 8 3 6 F. Su

p p . 4 5 , 4 9 (D. Mass. 1 9 93 ), a d o lp h in an d

sev eral an im al- rig h ts o rg an izatio n s f iled su it ag ain st th e Un ited States Dep artm en t o f t h e N a v y an d t h e Dep artm en t of Co m

m erce u n d er th e Marin e Mam

m al P ro tectio n A ct (MMP A ). T h e p lain tif f s alleg ed th at th e d o lp h in ’ s tran sf

er f ro m th e New En g lan d A q u ariu m to th e Dep artm en t of th e Nav y v io l ated i ts rig h t s u n d er th e MMP A

. W ith o u t d isti n g u ish in g b etw een “ s tatu to ry stan d in g ” a n d A rticle III s tan d in g , t h e d i strict co u rt g ran ted th e d ef

en d an ts’ m o tio n f

o r su m m ary j u d g m en t b ecau se th e d o lp h in lack ed stan d in g t o s u e u n d er th e MMP A

. Id

. (“ T h i s co u rt w ill n o t im p u te to Co n g ress o r th e P resid en t th e in ten tio n to p ro v id e stan d in g t o a

m arin e m am

m al w ith o u t a clear s tatem en t in th e statu te.”). T h e plain tif f s d id n o t f ile an ap peal. Id

.

9 P ET A also arg u es th at th e C o p y rig h t A ct co n tem

p lates statu to ry stan d in g f o r an im als b ecau se it p erm its statu to ry s tan d in g f o r co rp o ratio n s

an d u n in co rp o rated asso ciatio n s w ith o u t ex p ress au t h o riz a t i o n f

o r th ose

n o n

- h u m an en tities. T h at arg u m en t d o es n o t ref u te th e req u irem en t, estab lish ed in Ceta cea n , th at Co n g ress p lain ly state an y g ran t o f statu to ry stan d in g t o an im als. A lso
, th e Su p rem e Co u rt h as h eld co rp oratio n s t o b e

“ perso n s” f

or stan d in g , b o th f

o r co n stitu

tio n al an d statu to ry p u rp o ses. S ee, e.g

. , Citizen s Un ited v

. F ed

. Electio n Co mm’n
, 5 5 8 U.S. 3 1 0
, 3 4 1

– 4 2 (2 0 1 0) (co n clu d in g th at co rp o ratio n s—asso ciatio n s o f pe r so n s —h av e sp eech rig h ts u

n der th e First A m en d m en t); Bu rwell v. Ho b b y L o bb y S to res, In c. , 1 3 4 S. Ct. 2 7 5 1
, 2 76 8 (2 0 1 4 ) (co n clu d i n g t h a t th e p lain tif f

co rp o ratio n w as a “ p erso n ” u n d er th e Relig i o u s F reed o m Resto ratio n A ct

o f 1 99 3 ). Mo reo v er, co r p o ratio n s an d u n in co rp o rated asso ciatio n s are f o rm ed an d o w

n ed b y h u m an s; t

h ey are n o t f

orm ed o r o w

n ed b y an im als.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 17

based o n this court’ s p r e cedent in Cetacean
, Naruto lacks statutory standing to sue under the Copy rig ht Act. 1 0



### Several provisions of the Copy rig h t Act also persuade us ag ainst the c onclusion that animals have statutory standing to

s ue under the Copy

rig ht Act. See D avis v. Mich. Dep’t of Tre a s u r y , 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) ( “I t is a fundamental

canon of statuto ry construction that the words of a statute must b e read in their c ontex t and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”). F or ex a mple, the “children” of an “author,” “ w hether leg itimate or not,” can inherit certain r ig h ts under the Copy r ig ht Act. See 17 U.S.C. § § 101, 201, 203, 30 4

. Also, a

n a u thor’s “widow or widower owns the a uthor’s entire terminat i on interest unless there a re any surviving children or g randchildren of the author, in w h i c h

case the widow or widower o w n s o ne-half of the author’s interest.” Id. § 203(a)(2)(A). The terms “children,” “g randchildren,” “leg itimate,” “ widow
, ” and “widower” all imply h umanity and n ecessarily ex clude a nimals that do not marry and do not have heirs entitled to pr o perty by law. B ased o n this court’s decision in Cetacean and the tex t of the

S ee Ba n k o f th e U .S

. v. Devea u x , 9 U.S. 6 1
, 9 2 (1 8 0 6 ) (lo o k i ng t o “ th e ch aracter o f th e i n d iv id u als w h o co m p o s e th e co rp o ratio n ” in reco g n izin g f o r th e f irst tim e th e cap acity

o f co rp o ratio n s to su e in f

ed eral co u rt).

1 0 P ET A also arg u es th at Ceta cea n is d istin g u ish ab le b ecau se th e

s t a t u t es at issu e in Ceta cea n rep resen ted a w aiv er o f th e Un ited States ’

so v ereig n im

m u n ity
, an d s u ch w aiv ers, u n lik e th e Co p y rig h t Act, are

n arro w ly co n stru ed

. S

ee Un ited S t

a tes v. No rd ic Vill., In c. , 5 0 3 U.S. 3 0
, 3 4 (1 9 9 2 ) (“ [T ]h e Go v ern m en t’ s co n sen t to b e su ed ‘m u st b e co n stru ed strictly in f

av o r o f th e so v ereig n ’

. . . .”) (citatio n o m itted ). Ho w ev er th is

co u rt n ev er m en tio n ed so v ereig n im m u n ity in Ceta cea n , n o r d id i t im p ly
t h a t i t n arro w ly co n stru ed th e statu to ry l an g u ag e o f th e f o u r statu tes at issu e u n d er t h e can o n o f c o n stru ctio n d escrib ed b y P ET A t o reach its d ecisio n

.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 18

Copy rig ht Act as a w hole, the distric t court did not err in concluding t h a t Naruto—and, more broadly
, animals other than humans—lack statutory standing to sue u nder the Copy rig ht Act.

IV. Attorneys’ F ees

Counsel for Slater and W ildlife requests t h a t the court g rant him a

pp e l l ate-stag e a ttorney s’ f ees and remand to the district c ourt for the determination of the amount of those fees. 1 1 

### Counsel for Slater a n d W ildlife is entitled to attorney s’ fees and costs for t h i s a p p eal. See Fogerty v

. Fantasy, Inc

. , 5 10 U .S. 517, 5 34 n.19 (1994). Thus, the request in t h e a n s w ering brief by Slater and W ildlife for an award of attorney s’ fees on appeal is g ranted. 1 2 

### The determination of an appropriate amount of fees o n a ppeal is transferred to the district court pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.8.

AF F IRMED.

11 S ee 1 7 U.S.C. § 5 0 5 (“ In an y civ il actio n u n d er th is title, th e co u rt i n i t s d iscretio n m ay allo w th e reco v ery o f f u ll co sts b y o r ag ain st a n y p arty o th er th an th e Un ited States o r a n o f f icer th ereo f

. Ex cep t as

o th erw i se p ro v id ed b y th is tit l e , th e co u rt m ay also aw ard a reaso n ab le
atto rn ey ’ s f

ee to th e p rev ailin g p arty as p art o f th e co sts.”). B y stip u latio n , th e p arties h av e def

erred th e determ i n atio n o f trial- stag e atto rn ey s’ f ees

u n til th e reso lu tio n

o f th is ap p eal.

12 W e d o n o t sp ecu late o n th e ef f ect th at an y settlem en t ag reem en t,

su ch as th at m en tio n ed i n th e j o in t m o tio n t o d ism iss an d v acate, m ay h av e

o n A p p ellees’ ab ility t o realize an y su ch aw ard

. W e n o te th at th e j o i n t

m o tio n recited t

h a t A p p ellan t Naru t o w as n o t a p arty to th e settlem en t ag reem en t.

### N A R U T O V



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### 19

N.R. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e , concurring in part:

I concur that this case must be dismissed. F ederal courts do not have j u r i sdiction to hear this case at all. B ecause the
courts lack jurisdiction, the appeal should be dismissed a n d the d istrict court’s judg ment on the merits should b e vacated. Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & P rofessors v. Bush
, 310 F .3d 1153, 1 1 6 2–65 (9th Cir. 2002) ( “B e cause we conclude that th e C o a lition lacks [nex t-friend or third-party ] standing
, we decline to reach the remainin g q u e s tions addressed by the d i s t r i c t court

. . . . W e therefore vacate those portions of th e district court’s opinion which reached those questions.”). I ndeed, where there is no standing , any f urther ruling “is, by
very definition, for a court t o ac t ultra vires.” Id. at 1165 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t
, 5 2 3 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998)). The Majority misses this p o int. I write to

ex p ress my disag reement with the Majority ’s conclusion that

nex t-friend standing 1 

### is nonjurisdictional. 2

1 P eo p le f o r t h e Eth ical T reatm en t o f A n im als, In c. (P ET A ) g ro u n ded th e j u risd ictio n f

o r th is su it in t

h e n ex t

- f rien d stan d i n g d o ctrin e. A s p lead ed : “ [P ET A ] b rin g s th is actio n o n b eh alf o f
, an d as n ex t f

rien d [] to , Naru to , p u rsu an t to Ru le 1 7 (b ) o f t h e F ed eral Ru les o f Civ il P ro ced u re, b ecau se Naru to ’ s rig h ts can n o t b e ef f ectiv ely v in d icated e x cep t t h ro u g h

an ap p ro p riate rep resen tativ e.” Co m plain t at 3
, Na ru to v. S la ter , No

. 15

- cv

- 0 4 32 4 (N.D. Cal. Sep t. 2 1 , 2 0 1 5 ).

Nex t- f rien d stan d in g is an “ altern ativ e b asis f o r stan d in g ” w

h ere th e litig an t p u rsu es th e actio n o n b eh alf o f th e “ real p arty i n in terest.” W h itmo re v. Arka n sa s , 4 9 5 U.S. 1 4 9
, 1 6 1

– 6 3 (1 9 9 0 ). N ex t

- f rien d s t a n d i n g req u ires ( 1 ) “an ad eq u ate ex p lan atio n —su ch as in accessib i lity
, m en t al in co m p eten ce, o r o th er d isab ility

— w h y t h e r e a l p arty in in terest can n o t ap p ear o n h is ow

n b eh alf to p ro secu te t

h e actio n ”; an d (2 ) “ th e ‘n e x t f rien d ’ m u st b e tru ly d ed i cated to th e best in t erests o f th e p erso n on w h ose b eh alf h e seek s to litig ate, an d it h as been f u rth er su g g e s t e d t h at a ‘ n ex t

### N A R U T O V



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### 20

As the Majority opinion hig hlig hts in its treatment of the merits, PETA broug ht a frivolous lawsuit here. The arg ument that animals have statutory standing to maintain a Copy rig ht Act claim—or any property rig ht claims—is an easy question. Under the h olding in Cetacean Community v. Bush
, 386 F .3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004), t h e C o p y rig ht Act, and basic property law, animals have no such rig hts.

However, to reach i t s c onclusion on the Copy rig ht A ct question, t h e Majority ig nores its own conclusion reg arding standing
, instead determining that: (1) nex t-friend standing is nonjurisdictional; and (2) even if the elements of n ex t-friend standing a

re n ot met, any third-par t y m a y still bring suit on behalf o f an y o n e or a

ny thing —without the real party in interest’s permission—as long as (A) the real party in interest h as an Article I I I injury ; and (B ) the real party in interest i s “adequately p rotected” by the purported nex t friend’s (or selfappointed lawy er’s) representation. Maj. O p

. at 9–11. That determination fails to follow United States Supreme Court o r Ninth Circuit precedent. L et me ex plain.

f rien d ’ m u st h av e so m e sig n if

ican t relatio n s h ip w ith th e real p arty in in terest.” Id

. at 1 6 3

– 6 4 (in tern al citatio n s o m itted ).

2 T h e Maj o rity states t

h at “ Naru to ’ s A rticle III stan d in g u n der Ceta cea n is n o t

d ep en d en t o n

P ET A ’ s su f

f icien cy as a g u ard ian

o r ‘ n ex t f rien d .’ ” Maj

. Op

. at 1 1

. P u t an o th er w ay , t h e Maj o rity sim p ly say s th at lack of n ex t

- f

rien d stan d in g is n o n

j u risd ictio n al, an d (reg ard l ess of

“ PET A ’ s s u f

f icien cy ” to ad v an ce Naru t o ’s claim ) it m ay n on eth eless

reso l v e th is case.

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The Supreme Court was ex plicit:

The bur d en is on the “nex t f riend” clearly to establish the pro p r iety of his status a nd thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court

.

These l i mitations o n the “nex t friend” d o c trine are driven by the recog nition that

“ [i] t was not intended that the writ o f habea s corpus sho u l d b e availed o f, as matter o f

c o u rse, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, sty ling th e m selves nex t f riends.” I ndeed, if
t h e re were no restriction on “nex t f riend ” standing in f

ederal courts, the litigant asserti n g only a generalized interest in constitu t ional governance could circumvent the jurisdictional l i m i t

s of Art. III simply by assuming the mantle of “next friend.”

W hitmore
, 495 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added & internal citations omitted) (quoting United S t a t es ex rel. Bryant v

. Houston
, 273 F

. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921)). W e have a lso been

ex p licit: failing to meet t h e standing requirements for nex tfriend standing rem o ves jurisdiction of the court. Coalition
, 310 F .3d at 1 162– 6 5 ( dismissing c ase and vacating lower ruling w hich reached the merits, after finding there was no

nex t-friend standing ); see a l so Massie e

x rel. Kroll v

. W oodford
, 244 F .3d 1192, 1198

– 9 9 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (dismissing emerg e ncy motion for a stay o f

ex e c ution because purported n e x t friend failed to meet the standing requirements).

To buttress these conclusions, I (1) outline the basics o f Article I I I standing and the nex t friend ex ception to Article

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I I I standing ; (2) summariz e the Majority ’ s r e a soning a nd decision; and (3) demonstrate the leg al errors in the Majority opinion.

I. The basics of Article III s t a nding and next-f riend standing.

Articl e I I I of the United States Constitution limits the F ederal J udiciary ’s power to “cases” a nd “controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. I I I
, § 2, cl. 1. The “doctrine o f s t a nding ” is

one of the “landmarks” that “ s e t[ s] apart the ‘Cases’ a nd ‘Controversies’ that are o f the justiciable sort referred to in Article I I I

— ‘serving to identify t h o s e disputes which a re appropriatel y r esolved throug h the judicial process.’” Lujan

v. D efe n d e r

s of W ildlife
, 504 U .S. 555, 560 (1992) (orig inal alterations omitted) (quoting W hitmore
, 495 U.S. a t 155); see also W arth v. Seldin
, 422 U.S. 4 9 0
, 4 9 8 (1975) (“I n its constitutional dimension, standing impor t s justiciability : whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘c a se or controversy ’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning o f A rt. I I I .”); Coalition
, 310 F .3d at 1157 (“At its constitutional c ore, standing is a manifestation of the Article I I I case-orcontroversy requirement; it is the determination of w hether a specific person is the p r o per party to invoke the power o f a federal court .” (emphasis added)). “[ T] he core component o f standing is a n e s s ential and u nchang ing part o f the case-orcontroversy requir e m e n t of Article I I I

. ” Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 560. According ly
, the Supreme Court h a s “deduce d a set o f

r equirements that tog ether make up the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing .’” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Componen t s , I nc. , 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560).

### N A R U T O V



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Part of the Article I I I case-or-controversy requirement is the obvious d e rivative premise that “ the plaintiff g enerally
must a ssert his o wn leg a l rig hts and interests.” W arth
, 422 U.S. at 499 (citing Tile ston v. Ullman
, 318 U.S. 44, 46 ( 1943); United States v. Raines
, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (196 0 ) ; Barrows v. Jackson
, 346 U.S. 249
, 2 5 5 (1953)); see also Sessions v

. Morales-Santan a , 1 3 7 S. Ct. 1678, 1 6 89 (2017) (“Ordinarily
, a party must assert his o w n leg al ri gh t s a nd
cannot rest his claim to r elief on th e l e ga l rig hts o f third parties.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. U nited States
, 491 U

. S

. 6 1 7, 623 n.3 (1989) (identify ing that “whether the litig ant suffered some injury -in-fact, adequate to satisfy Article I I I ’s case-or-controversy requirement” is the first o f
two questions the Court asks “[ w] hen a person or entity seeks standing to advance the constitutional righ t s o f o thers”).

“ T h i s Court, as is the case w ith a ll federal courts, ‘has n o jurisdicti o n t o pronounce a ny statute, either of a state or o f the United States, void, because irreco n c i l able with the

c onstitution, ex cept as it is called upon to adjudg e t h e l e ga l rig hts of litig a

nts in a ctual c ontroversies .” Raines
, 362 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).

W ith only a s i n g le, n arrow ex ception, a person filing a claim must a ssert a pers o n al injury in f act 3 

### to establish

3 Ev en in th i rd

- p arty stan d in g (w h ere a p arty h as an A rticle III in j u ry , b u t sh e m

u st ad v an ce so meo n e else’s rig h t s to ach iev e red ress), th e p lain tif f m u st h av e su f

f ered a n in

j u ry

. See, e.g

. , Ko wa lski v. Tesmer
, 5 4 3 U.S. 1 2 5
, 1 29 n .2 (2 0 0 4) (assu m i n g w ith o u t d ecid in g th at p l a i n t i f f s alleg ed a n ad eq u ate in d iv id u al in j u ry to satisf

y th e “ co n stitu

tio n al

m in im u m o f stan d in g ” bef

ore co n tin

u in g t o a d d ress th e s tan d ard s f or p erm i ttin g a th i r d p a r t y “ to assert th e rig h ts o f an o th er”); Lexma rk In t’l, In c. , 1 3 4 S. Ct. at 1 38 7 n .3 (n o tin g cases arti c u l a t i n g t h at th e A rticle III b asis f o r th ird

- p arty stan d in g i s “ clo sely related to th e q u estio n w h eth er a

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standing

. Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 560–61. This ex ception is nex tf r iend standing
, where a third-party —without alleg i n g i t s o w

n injury —is allowed to bring suit on behalf of the named-party
, who is either (1) an incompe t e n t o r minor; or ( 2) unable to

access the courts because of imprisonment. W ith n ex t-friend standing
, the party in interest has a n Article I I I injur y , b ut because of the disabling aspect (minority
, incompetence, o r impris o nment), the real p arty c annot advance the action,

ex c e pt where a n o t h e r person ( the nex t friend) stands in a nd advances the cause o n the actual party ’s behalf. W h itmore
, 495 U.S. at 161–66.

A. The basics of

next-f riend standing.

The Supreme Court cons iders nex t-friend standing an “alternative basis” f

or standing in federal c o u r t s

. I d. at 161. Specifically
, it has “long been an a ccepted basis for jurisdiction in certain circumstances

. ” Id. at 162. These “certain circumstances” are d eeply root e d in history a nd narrowly limited to: ( 1) habeas corp u s a c tions; a nd (2) “infants, other minors, and a dult mental incompetents.” Id. at 163, 163 n.4.

Nex t-friend s t anding allows a third-party to sing ularly advance a cause o f action on another’s behalf. “A ‘nex t friend’ does not himself become a party to the

. . . action in which h e p articipates, but simply pursues the cause o n behalf

p erso n in t

h e litig an t’ s po sitio n w ill h av e a rig h t o f actio n o n th e claim .”) (q u o tin g Dep ’t o

f La b o r v

. Tr ip lett
, 4 9 4 U.S. 7 15
, 7 2 1 n .* * (1 99 0 ))). In th is case, P ET A d o es n o t (n o r co u ld it) alleg e eith er i n d iv i d ua l o r t h i rd

p arty stan din g

. It d o es n o t h av e an y co g n izab le A rticle III in j u ry f o r th e alleg ed Co p y

rig h t A ct v io latio n s ag ain st Naru to . Hen ce, I d o n ot f u rth er ad d ress eith er o f

th ese b ases f

or stan d in g

.

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### 25

of the

. . . real party in interest.” I d. at 16 3

. T o invoke nex tf r iend standing
, the purported nex t f riend must establis h : (1) “an adequate e x planation—such a s inaccessibility
, mental incompetence, or other disability —why the real party in interest cannot appear o n h is own behalf to prosecute the action”; and (2) “the ‘nex t friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on w hose behal f he seeks to litig ate, and it has been further sug g e sted that a ‘nex t friend’
must h ave some sig nificant relationship w ith the real party in interest.” Id. at 16 3

– 6 4 ( internal c itations omitted). I ag r ee with the Majori t y that there is no question PETA d id not alleg e—in a

ny way —sufficient facts to establish it could be Naruto’s nex t friend.

B. Next-f

riend standing cannot apply to anim als.

I a lso ag r ee with the Majority that a n i m a l s cannot be represented by a nex t friend; I write to e x p a nd on the reasoningprovided in the Majority opinion.

1. Next-f

r i en d standing f

o r anim als is barred by Suprem e Court precedent.

The Supreme Court has clearl y delineated the limits o f

nex t-friend standing : “[ T] he scope of any federal d octrine o f ‘nex t friend’ standing is no broader than what is permitted by

. . . the historical practice .” Id. at 164–65; cf. Town of Greece

v. Galloway
, 134 S. Ct. 1 811, 1818–19 (2014) (r e co gn iz ing leg islative pray er a s a “historical” e x c eption to the Establishment Clause); District of Columbia v

. Heller
, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 6 2 7 n.26, 6 26 (2008) (“[ N] ot h i n g in

our opinion should b e taken to cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions o n the p o ssession of f ir e a r ms by felons and the mentally ill[ .] ” (emphasis a dded)). The Supreme Court noted

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the two illustrat i o n s allowed by such “historical p ractice”: imprisoned individuals using habeas corpus and mental incompetents or minors. W hitmore
, 495 U.S. at 161–63, 163 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 4 2 (codify ing n ex t-friend standing f or habeas c orpus actions; F ed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) ( 2 ) (permit t i ng nex t-friend standing for a “minor or an i n c o m petent person who does not have a duly appointe d representative” (emphasis added)). However
, there is no historical evidence that a nimals have ever been gr anted authority to sue by nex t f r i e n d and, absent an act o f Co n gr e s s, 4 

### it would be improper to ex pand this narrow

ex c e ption to the actual injury requirement of Article I I I

.

2. There is no textual support in either t he habeas corpus statute o r Rule 17 f or anim al n e x t f riends.

Neither of t h e two e x isting g rounds for n ex t-friend standing a llow animal nex t-friend standing

. F irst, a writ for habeas corpus “shall b e in writing sig ned and verified by the
person f or whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf .” 28 U.S. C. § 2242 (emphasis added). Therefore,
tex tually
, only a natural p e r s o n can have a petition filed on her behalf. F urther, any arg ument t h a t a n imals are akin to “artificial perso n s” such as corporations, which are allowed
to sue, see e.g. , Cetacean
, 386 F .3d at 1176 (concluding that animals a re no different from various “artificial persons” such

as ships or cor

p orations), makes n o sense in the contex t o f

4 Ev en if su ch a statu te w ere e n a c ted
, su ch a statu to ry g ran t of

s t a nd in g w ou ld still n eed m eet th e A rticle III stan d in g “ cas e o r

co n tro v ersy ” req u irem en t

. B ecau se it w o u ld lack th e p re- co n sti t u tio n al h isto rical u se lik e h ab e a s actio n s or actio n s o n b eh alf o f m in o rs or in co m p eten t p erso n s , I h av e g rav e d o u b ts th is w o u ld su cceed

.

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28 U.S.C. § 2242. Corporations cannot be i m p ri soned and, thus, there is no g rounds to concl ude “person” in 28 U .S.C. § 2242 could include any thing other than natural persons.

Second, the F ederal Rules o nly authoriz e nex t friend suits

on behalf of “a minor or an incompetent p erson

. ” F ed. R. Civ. P 17(c) (emphasis added). Per the tex t, this can only apply to h u m an persons, not any “minor” or “incompetent”
corpo rations or animals. I mportantly
, the historical backg round of Rule 17(c) limits the use of nex t f r iends to only human persons. Rule 17(c) incorporated Rule 70 of the F ederal Equity Rules into the F ederal R ules of Civil Procedure. F ed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), Note to Subdivision (c). Rule 70 specifically provided, “All infants and o ther persons

so inca p ab le may sue b y their g uardians, if any , or by their prochei ami [ nex t friend]

. ” F ed. Equity R. 70. F inally
, the provisions for corporate capacity ar e articulated in Rule 17(b). F ed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). This separate enumeration o f rules for non-human entities, Rule 17(b), is a c l e a r t ex tual indication that the use of the term “person” in Rule 1 7(c) does

n ot include non-human entities, such as corporations o r animals.

3. Allow ing next-f

riend standing f

or anim als

w o uld violate the public po licy behind nextf riend standing.

I n addition to its historical limits, n ex t-friend standing is narrowly tail o r e d in lig ht of the public policy concerns associated with ex panding the doctrine. N ex t-friend standing “is by no means g ranted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an a ction on behalf o f an o ther.” W hitmore
, 495 U.S.
at 163. “I ndeed, if there were no r estriction on ‘nex t f riend’

s tanding in federal courts, the litig ant asserting on l y a

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g eneral i z e d interest in c onstitutional g overnance could

c ircumvent the jurisdictional limits of Art. I I I simply b y assuming the mantle of ‘nex t friend.’” I d. at 164. The specific requirements to become a n e x t friend are intended to keep “intruders o r uninvited m e d d lers, sty ling themselves nex t friends” out of the courts. Id. at 1 6 4 (quoting H ouston , 273 F

. at 916). Moreover, as Chief J ustice Rehnquist (writing as the sole justice for the Supreme Court on a stay of ex ecution) simil a rly noted: “ however worthy and hig h minded the motives of ‘nex t friends’ may b e, they inevitably run the risk of making the actual defendant a pawn to be manipulated on

a chessboard larg e r than his own case.” Lenhard v

. W olff
, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312 (1979).

Animal-nex t-friend standing is particularly susceptible to abuse. Allowing nex t-friend standin g o n behalf of animals allows lawy ers (as in Cetacean ) and v arious inte rest g roups ( a s h e re) to bring suit on b ehalf of those animals or o bjects with no means or manner to e nsure the a n imals’ interests are t r u l y being e xpressed or advanced

. Such a chang e would fundamentally alter the litig ation l andscape. I nstitutional
actors c ould simply c laim some form of relationship to the animal o r o bject to obtain standing and use it to advance their

own institutional g o als with n o means to curtail those a ctions. W e h ave n o idea whether animals or objects wish to o wn copy rig hts or open b ank accounts to hold their roy alties from sales of pictures. To some e x tent, a s h umans, we have a g eneral understanding of the sim i l a r interests of other humans. 5 

### I n the habeas corpus contex t, we pres u m e other

5 I in ten tio n ally d o n o t ref er to th e h u

m an

- co n tro l led en t ities su ch as

co rp o ratio n s o r sh ip s , b ecau se t h o s e en tities n ev er h av e n ex t- f r i en d
stan d in g

. T h ey h av e co rp o rate o f f i cers o r o w

n ers to ad v an ce th eir claim s. In d eed
, a sh areh o ld er, w h o w o u ld lik ely m eet t h e n ex t

- f rien d stan d in g

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### 29

humans desire libert y

. Similarly
, in actions on behalf o f infants, for ex ample, w e presume the infant would want to retain ownership o f t h e property she inherited. B ut the interests of animals? W e a re really asking what another species desires. Do a

nim a ls want to own property , such a s copy rig hts? A re animals w i l l ing to assume the duties associated w ith the rig hts PETA seems to be advancing on their behalf? 6 

### Animal-nex t-friend standing is ma t e rially different from a competent per s o n representing an incompet en t p erson. W e have millennia of ex perience understanding the interests and desire of humankind. This is
not necessarily true f

o r animals. B ecause the “real party in interest” can actually never credibly articulate its interests or goals
, nex t-friend standing for animals is left at the mercy o f the institutional actor to advance it s own interests, which it im p u tes to the animal or object w ith no accountability

. This l i terally c reates an avenue for what Chief J u stice Rehnqu i s t feared: making the actual party in in t er e st a “pawn to be

req u ir e m en t s, g en erally can n o t ev en brin g a su it o n b eh alf o f th e

co rp o ratio n

. S

ee e.g

. , Fra n ch ise Ta x Bd

. o f C a l. v. Alca n Alu m in i u m Ltd

. , 4 9 3 U.S. 3 3 1
, 3 36 (1 9 9 0 ) (h o ld in g t h at “ g e n e rally

. . . sh areh o ld ers [are
p ro h ib ited ] f

ro m in itiatin g a c t i on s to en f o rce th e rig h ts o f th e

co rp o ratio n ”).

6 P articip atio n in so ciety b rin g s rig h ts an d co rresp o n din g d u t i es. T h e rig h t t o o w

n p ro perty is n o t f

ree fr om d u ties. On e m

u st p ay tax es on p ro f i ts f ro m a ro y alty ag reem en t f o r u se o f a co p y

rig h ted im ag e

. A re

an im als cap ab le o f s h o u l d erin g t h e b u rd en of p ay in g tax es? Sim ilarly
, all
p eo p le h a v e a d u ty to o b ey t h e law an d
, f

o r ex am p l e, n o t co m

m i t in ten tio n al to rts. Sh o u ld an im als l iab le f o r i n ten t i o n al to rts as w ell? T h e

co n cep t of ex pan d in g actu al p ro p erty rig h ts—an d rig h ts b ro ad ly

— to

an im als n ecessitates reso lv i n g w h at d u ties also co m e w ith t

h o s e r i g h ts

an d
, b ecau se an i m als can n o t co m m u n icate in o u r lan g u ag e, w h o stan d s in th eir sh o es?

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manipulated on a chessboard l a r g er than his own case.” Lenhard
, 443 U.S. at 1312.

II. The Majority opinion.

Althoug h the Majority opinion recog niz e s the s e principles, it i gn o r es them. The Majority opinion states that animals c annot have nex t-friend standing
, but it nevertheless determines that, because Naruto has an A rticle I I I injury a nd he is “adequately protected,” t h e M ajority may proceed to determine the merits o f Naruto ’ s statutory standing claim under the Copy

rig ht Act. Maj. Op. at 9–15. I n o r d e r t o g et there, the Majority concludes that nex t-frien d standing is nonjurisdictional: “[ W ]e must proceed to the merits because Naruto’s lack of a nex t friend does not destroy his standing to
sue, as having a ‘case or controversy ’ under A rticle I I I of the Constitution,” and concludes tha t “Naruto’s Article I I I standing under Cetacea n i s n ot dependent on PETA’s sufficiency as a g uardian or ‘nex t friend.’” Maj. Op. at 10, 11. I admit that the basis for the Majority ’s concl u s i o n i s primarily g rounded in its reading of Cetacean
, in which a “self-appointed attorney ” broug ht a suit o n behalf of the world’s cetaceans. 386 F

. 3d at 1171–72. Cetacean concluded that animals may have an Article I I I injury —but, notably
, did
not ex amine whether nex t-friend standing was present. Given this analy sis, the Maj o r i ty concludes that, because the Cetacea n p anel allowed the case to g o forward, it implicitly held that nex t-friend standing is nonjurisdictional. M a j. Op. at 11.

The Majority ’s conclusion on the first point—animals can

never have nex t-friend standing

— is correct 7 

### and should end

7 A s su ch , I co n cu r in th e Maj o rity ’ s o p in io n to th at ex ten t.

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our inquiry

. See infra. On the other hand, the second conclusion (that nex t-friend s tanding is nonjurisdictional) is
not supportable. This conclusion is incorrect and the
consequences associate d with the Majority ’s holding a re avoidable, if we follow precedent.

III. The Majority’s c o n clusion that next-f riend

s t a n d i n g i s n o n j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s l e g a l l y unsupportable.

A. The Majority’s second conclusi o n v iolates Suprem e Court and Ninth Circuit P recedent.

B o th the U n i ted States Supreme Court and our Circuit have held nex t-friend standing is jurisdictional. I n W h itmore
, the petitioner broug ht suit on behalf of a nother death-row prisoner, Ronald Simmons. 495 U.S. at 152–54. W hitmore asserted both third-party standing and nex t-friend standing to justify the suit. Id. at 153–54. The Supreme Court held that W h itmore failed both standing tests and, ultimately h e ld that “J onas W hitmore lacks standing to proceed in this Court, a nd the writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of jurisdiction

. ” Id.
at 166 ( e m p h asis added). The Supreme Court also clearly held that any purported nex t friend bears the burden “clearly
to establish the propriety

of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court .” Id. at 164 (emphasis added) (citing Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n ex rel. S mith v. Armontrout
, 812 F .2d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1987); G rouseclose ex rel. Harries v

. Dutton , 594 F . Supp. 949, 952 (M.D. Tenn. 1984)); see also Demosthenes v. Baal
, 495 U.S. 731, 737 (1990) ( holding that “federal courts mus t m ake certain that an adequate basis

ex ists f or the e x e rcise of federal power” a n d d i s missing the suit for failure to demonstrate nex t-friend standing ).

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W e h ave also held tha t nex t-friend standing is jurisdictional. I n Coalition
, a coalition of clerg y , lawy ers, a nd professors broug ht suit on b ehalf of the prisoners detained in Guantanamo, Cuba. 3 10 F .3d at 1156. The district court h eld that the Coalition d id not have standing a nd, even if they did,

no f ederal d istrict court—including itself— c o u ld have jurisdiction over such a suit. Id. On appeal, we ag reed that the Coalition c ould not establish nex t-friend s t a nding

. Id. However, we n o t e d t h a t “[ t] he question before us is not the
scope of the rig hts and privileg es of the d etainees themselves under either our Constituti o n or other international laws o r ag re ements.” I

d. at 1164. Rather, we “ consider[ ed] only the rig hts of the mem b ers of the Coalition to assert standing on behalf of the detainees and to seek habeas r ev i e w o f their detention

. ” Id. at 1165 (emphasis added). W e then dismissed the suit and vacated the d istrict court’s other holding that no court, or itself, m ay entertain a h abeas action on behalf of a detainee held in Guantanamo, Cuba. Id

. Additional Circuit precedent stands for the same proposition. See M assie
, 244 F .3d at 1199 (affirming the distric t c o u r t’s conclusion that a litig ant seeking a stay of ex ecution on behalf of another
person “ lacked standing ” as a nex t friend under W hitmore ). 8

8 T h e Maj o rity arg u es th at I err b y u sin g n ex t- f rien d cases to co n clu d e th at w e lack j u ri s d i c t i o n in th is case. Maj

. Op

. at 1 1

– 1 2 n .5

. B u t, n ex tf rien d stan din g is th e o n ly b asis f o r j u risd ictio n P ET A h as alleg ed

. Co m p l.
at 3 (statin g P ET A “ b [ro u g h t] th is actio n o n b eh alf o f
, an d as n ex t f

rien d []
to , Naru to ”). B o th th e Maj o rity an d I ag ree t h at P ET A d o es n ot h av e n ex tf rien d stan d in g an d th at an im als can n ev er h av e n ex t- f rien d stan d in g

. T h is sh o u ld en d o u r in qu i ry

. Fu rth er, as a g en eral ru le, th e p ro p o n en t o f a case

m u st ad v an ce its ow

n in j u ry

. W a rth
, 4 2 2 U.S. at 49 9

. Nex t- f rien d stan d in g is an ex cep tio n to th is ru l e. W h itmo re , 4 9 5 U.S. at 1 6 1

– 6 3

. Naru to d id n o t b rin g h is o w

n claim
, P ET A d o es n o t a ss e r t i t s ow n in j u ry , an d b o th th e Maj o rity an d I ag ree P ET A can n o t b e Naru to ’ s n ex t f rien d

. T h ere are n o

o th er j u risd ictio n al b a ses o n w

h ich to rest o u r au th o rity to reso lv e th is

case.

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### 33

B. Standing m ust be juri s d ictional because of its preclusive ef

f ect.

J u d g m ents are preclusive. S ee, e.g. , Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. , 244 F .3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litig ation in a subsequent action o f any claims that were r aised or could have b e e n raised in the p rior action.” (citations omitted)). I f the putative nex t friend is not the appropriate entity
, bu t t he

case is allowed to g o forward, an improper representative can create preclusive precedent that, forever, bars the real party in i n t e rest. T his preclusive e ffect alone requires that the question of nex t-friend standing be d ecided before the merits question and, if there is no nex t-friend standing
, the c ase must be dismissed so the proper party may bring the case if she so chooses.

C. Ceta cean did not im pliedly overrule Coalition or Whitm ore . 9



### The Majority ’s conc l u s i o n t h a t C etacean somehow makes

nex t-friend standing nonjurisdictional tortures the case a nd leg al reasoning to reach such a conclusion. F irst, both W hitmore and C oalition were decided before Cetacean

.

9 T h e Maj o rity accu ses m e o f “ p reten d [in g ] Ceta cea n d o es n ot ex ist,

o r th at it states so m eth in g o t h er, o r m ild er, o r m o re am b ig u o u s o n w

h eth er cetacean s h av e A rticle III stan d in g ” an d arg u in g f o r a “ b lan k et ex clu sio n

o f an i m als f

ro m A rticle III j u risd ictio n .” Maj

. Op

. at 1 1

– 1 2 n .5
, 1 3 n .6

. My co n clu s io n d o es n o t “ preten d Ceta cea n d o es n o t e x ist”; it s im p ly
req u ires C e t a cea n b e ap p l ied w i th i n t h e l eg al f ram ew ork th at g o v ern s

cases w h ere a p lain tif

f ’ s claim s are b ro u g ht b

y so meo n e else

. Su ch claim s

m ay on ly b e ad v an ced b y a n ex t f rien d an d
, if o n e is n o t av ailab le or leg ally p o ssib le, th o s e claim s can n ot b e red ressed

. A s I d em o n strate in th is sectio n , Ceta cea n d o es n ot h o ld to th e co n trary

.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 34

According ly
, those binding cases, which directly answer the question of whether nex t-friend st a n ding is jurisdictional, were binding on the Cetacean panel as well.

Second, Cetacean is silent on nex t-friend sta n d ing

. I ndeed, even the briefing did not raise the issue. Rathe r , t h e Cetacean court seemed to conclude tha t a n i m a ls may have Article I I I standing
, 1 0 

### an d t h en ex a mined the statutory standing questions before it. 3 86 F .3d at 1174–79. The Cetacean court did n ot (thoug h it most certainly should have)

ex a mine whether i t w as appropriate for a “self-appointed attorney ” to b ring a case on behalf of t h e “C e tacean Community ” and articulate “their” interests. Id. at 1171–72. There can be no reasonable arg ument that the lawy er in Cetacean spoke to, and received instructions from h is c lient, the “Cetacean Community .” Rather, he functioned a s a purported n ex t friend, arg uing th a t certain Navy sonar technolog y injured the m e m b ers of the “Cetacean Community

. ” I

d.

Third, it is simply incorrect to conclud e t h at an implied holdin g f

r om a case that did not even address the question—in any form—somehow overrule s e x plicit prior U n i t e d States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit preceden t

. “[ U] nstated a ssum p t i ons on non-litig a ted issues are not precedential holding s binding f uture decisions.” Sakamoto v

. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd.
, 7 6 4 F. 2 d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); see a lso Morales-Garcia v. Holder
, 567 F

. 3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that panels are bound b y “prior decision[ s] ,” but “the term ‘ decision,’ h owever, encompasses only those issues that are raised or discussed” (citations

10 A lth o u g h b in d in g preced en t, I ag ree w i th th e Maj o rity th at g ran tin g A rticle III stan din g to an i m als w as an in co rrect co n clu s io n

.

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### . S L

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### 35

omitted)). I ndeed, Cetacean itself no ted: “‘[ W ] here a panel confronts an issue g e rmane to the eventual resolution of the
case, a nd resolve s i t after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of the circuit,
reg ardless of whether doing so is necessary in some s t r i ct log ical sense.’” Cetacean
, 3 86 F .3d a t 1173 (emphasis a dded) (quoting U

nited States v. J

ohnson
, 256 F .3d 895, 9 1 4 (9th Cir. 2001) (Koz inski, J
., concurring )); see also B r e ch t v

. Abrah a mson , 507 U.S. 619, 630–31 (1993) (refusing to follow p rior cases where the i s s u e had not been “squarely addressed”). Rather, the a ppro p r iate reading of Cetacean
, because a three-judg e panel cannot o v errule a prior panel, see Miller v. G a m m i e , 3 3 5 F .3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), is that the Cetacean panel (1) oug ht not have reached the question it did; and (2) the f act that it seemed to conclude that an animal may have Article I I I standing does n ot remove the appropriate standing question that determines if the nex t friend may bring the action at all. I t is simply unsupportable
to conclude that a panel that did not address a n i s sue somehow overrules prior binding decisions that did address the issue

.

F ourth, the simple fact that Cetacean found that animals could h a ve an Article I I I injury does not, au t o matically
, create some form o f r i g ht f or third-parties to advance those claims (or, make nex t-friend standing nonjurisdictional and,

as the Majority holds, simply inapplicable)! There are a multitude of Article I I I injuries that occur reg ular l y , which people choose not to pursue. B ecause the individual w ith the injury o pts not to pursue the claim does not some how make the injury “public domain,” s o a n y random entity may bring
t he claim. Nex t-friend standing serves as a bar to s u c h meddling
, and Cetacean d i d n o t impliedly eviscerate that conclusion.

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 36

Not o nly did Cetacean n o t address animal n ex t-friend standing
, but no court has ever done so. See Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan
, 954 F .2d 1441, 1448 n.13 ( 9th Cir. 1992) ( “No party has m e n t i o ned and, notwithstanding our normal rules, we do not consider, the standing of the f ir s tnamed party [ Mount Graham Red Squirrel] to bring this action.”); Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res.
, 852 F .2d 1106, 1107 (9th C i r

. 1988) (“As an endang ered species

. . . , the bird

. . . a l s o h as leg al status and wing s its
way into fed e r a l c o u rt as a plaintiff in its own right

. ” (emphasis added)), abrogated in part by
, Cetacean
, 386 F .3d
at 1 173 (9th Cir. 2 0 04) (“ Palila I V ’ s statements [ reg arding standing ] are nonbinding d icta.” ) ; Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Explo i t ation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium
, 836 F

. Supp. 45, 49–50 ( D. Mass. 1 993) (finding named dolphin, Kama, lacked standing because “[ t] h e MMPA does
not authoriz e suits broug ht by animals,” and add r e s s ing the fact that Rule 17(b) would hold that animals lack “capacity ”
t o b e sued because they a r e property of their owners, concluding that “ the MMPA and the operation of F .R.Civ.P. 17(b) i n d i c a t e that Kama the dolphin lacks standing to maintain this action as a matter o f law,” and allowing “the

r e m oval of Kama’s name from the caption of [ the] ca s e ”) ; Hawaiian Crow ( ‘Alala) v. Lujan , 906 F .Supp. 549, 551–52 (D. Haw. 1991) (finding that in Northern Spotted Owl
, P a lila
, and Mount Graham Red Squirrel
, no party had challeng e d the named standing of the animal it s e lf a nd the case had other parties in the litig ation a nd ultimately concluding t h a t “the cited c ases do not directly support plaintiffs’ position here” and concluding that “the p lain lang uag e of Rule 1 7 ( c ) and section 1540(g ) [ did] not authoriz e the ‘Alala to sue” because it was “clearly neithe r a ‘person’ as defined in section 1532(13), nor an infant o r incompetent person under Rule 17(c)”); Northern Spotted Ow l v

. Lujan
, 758 F

. Supp. 621

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 37

(W .D. W a sh. 1991) (failing to address sta n ding for named first-party ); Northern Spotted O wl v. Hodel
, 716 F

. Supp 479 (W .D. W a sh. 1988) (failing to address standing f o r named first-party ).

D. The Majority’s reliance on both Rule 17 and cases discussing “adequate protection” in t he context of Rule 17 are sim ply inapplicable.

There is a crucial distinctio n b e t ween the c ases cited b y the Majority for the proposition that the only requirement for

nex t friend suits is to ensure the “ [ incom p e t en t parties] a re adequately p rotected,” Maj. Op. a t 10 (quotation marks omitted and alterations in orig inal), a nd the facts of this case and nex t-friend standi n g b r oadly

. Each c ase cited is an

ex a mple o f an incompetent person br ing ing suit o n his o wn behalf or such a person b e ing sued b y another p arty

. I list the cases cited by the Majority to emphasiz e :

• Krain v. Smallwood
, 8 80 F .2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (“L awrence K rain appeals the dismissa l w ith prejudice o f eig ht lawsuits he f

i l e d

, in pro se , in the district court.” (emphasis added)).

• United States v. 30.64 Ac r e s of Land
, 795 F .2d 7 96, 79 7 ( 9 t h Cir. 1986) ( “The United States filed a complaint against Starr

. . . to e s tablish just compensation for 30.64 a cres of Starr’s land taken by the
g overnment . . . .” (emphasis added)).

• Harris v. Mangum
, 863 F .3d 1133, 1 1 3 6 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 7 ) (“Plaintiff-Appellant J ason

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 38

Harris, an Ariz o na state prisoner, filed pro

se a lawsuit in st ate court that was subsequently removed

. . . . ” (emphasis added)).

• Roberts v. Ohio Cas. I ns. Co.
, 256 F .2d 35, 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (finding where “O h i o Casualty I nsurance Company

. . . filed suit to set aside a ruling

. . . against th e c laimants —the children and their
g randmoth er,” and children had n ot been
represe n t ed by a g uardian a d litem, the lower judg ment g ranting relief to the plaintiff must be reversed and remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r oceeding s ( emphasis added)).

• W estcott v. U.S. Fid. Guar. Co.
, 158 F .2d 20, 21 ( 4th Cir. 1946) (“The United States F idelity & G uaranty Company

. . . brought a civi l a c t ion

. . . seeking a declaratory judg men t t o the effect that it

w as not liable o n a public liability pol i c y

. . . . The defendants in the c ivil action

. . . were the insured,

. . . Georg e Mann, a minor.” (emphasis added)).

Quite simply
, there is n o Article I I I jurisd i c t ion question in
any o f these cases. Of course, t he court would ensure such incompetent perso n s were adequately represented. The parties soug ht either redr e s s i n court as plaintiffs (but were not competent, and thus needed to be protected), or were pulled into court as defendants ( and, thus, the cou rt was required to ensure they

were protected).

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 39

These circumstances do not ex ist here. Our question is whether a third-party (PETA) has nex t-friend standing —such
t hat it can invoke the authority of this court—to stand i n Naruto’s shoes and advance his claims. I t is not a question o f whether Naruto was prope rl y p r o tected or was b r o ug ht into this litig ation as a defendant. Unlike the cases cited, N ar u t o (1) did n ot file t h i s c a s e himself; and (2) is n ot a defendant. PETA and Dr. Eng elhardt initiated this sui t o n Naruto’s behalf. As su c h
, the cases cited b y the Majority are simply inapplicable.

IV. Conclusion

The question of PETA’s nex t-friend standing was squarely before our panel. I t was briefed and arg ued. B y both concluding that nex t-friend standing is nonjurisdictional and reaching the merits o f the Copy ri g ht Act question, the Majority a llows PETA (with no injury or relat i o n s h ip to the

r e al party in interest) to sue on Naruto’s behalf, b ec a u s e i t obtained leg al counsel to alleg edly represent Naruto. I cannot support this conclusion. 1 1

11 In d eed
, th is case is a p rim e ex am p l e o f th e ab u se th e Maj o rity

o p in io n w o u l d n ow allo w

. In 2 0 1 1
, S later (a p h o to g rap h er) w en t to th e T an g k o k o R eserv e in In d o n esia an d setu p a cam era. N aru to , a crested

m acaq u e , p u sh ed th e sh u t ter. S later an d W ild lif e P erso n alities

su b seq u en t ly in clu d ed th e ph o to g rap h s in a b o o k p u b lish ed b y B lu rb

. In 2 0 1 5
, P ET A

—w ith n o ev id en ce it h as an y relatio n s h i p w h atso e v er to Naru to —b ro u g h t th e in stan t su it claim in g th at Slater, W ild lif e P erso n alities, an d B lu rb h ad v io lated Naru to ’ s rig h ts u n d er th e Co p y rig h t A ct. P ET A a l l eg ed th at it “ h a[d ] a g en u in e co n cern f o r Naru to ’ s w ellb ein g an d [w as] d ed icated to p u rsin g h is b est in terests in th is litig at i on ”

an d th at i t “h a [d ] th e f in an cial an d o p eratio n al reso u rces an d th e p ro f essio n al ex p ertise to ad m i n ister an d p ro tect Naru to ’ s co p y rig h t in th e Mo n k ey Self

ies.” Co m

p l. at 4

. P ET A so u g h t, in ter a lia
, a co u rt o rd er

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 40

“ [p ]erm ittin g [P ET A ] to ad m in ister an d p ro t ect Naru to ’ s au th o rsh ip o f a n d

co p y rig h t in th e Mo n k ey

Self ies.” Id

. at 1 0

.

P ET A lo s t at th e d istrict co u rt an d ap pealed

. W h en D r

. E n g elh ard t

m o v ed t o b e d ism issed f

ro m th e case, P ET A

tw ice af f irm ativ ely stated i t

w o u ld “ f u lf ill th e d u ties o f a n e x t f

rien d .” No tice o

f W ith d r a w a l o f Next Frien d An tje En g elh a r

d t (May 4
, 2 0 1 6 ); see a lso Mo tio n to Co rrect Ca p t io n (May 10
, 2 0 1 6) (“ P ET A sh all rem ain resp o n sib le f o r m ain tain in g t h i s l i t ig atio n an d f

u lf illin g th e d

u ties o f a [n ]ex t [f

]rien d p u rsu an t t o Fed eral Ru l e o f

Civ il P ro ced u

re 1 7(c).” (em p h asis ad d ed )).

Ho w ev er, P ET A q u ick ly ch a n g e d its tu n e af ter o ral arg u m en t. On Sep tem b er 1 1
, 2 0 1 7
, P ET A an d Def en d an ts m o v ed to d ism iss th e ap p eal

an d v a c ate th e lo w er co u rt’ s j u d g m en t

. Jo in t Mo tio n to Dismiss Ap pea l

a n d V a c a te th e Ju d

g men t (Sep t. 1 1
, 2 01 7). B u t, u n lik e a n o rm al settle m e n t , th e p u rp o rted p lain tif f
, N aru to , wa s n o t a p a rty

. “ Dism issal

w ith v acatu r is j u st an d p ro p er w h ere, as h ere, th e P lain tif

f [Naru to ] is no t

a pa rty to th e settlemen t .” Id

. at 1 (em p h asis ad d ed ). Rath er, h is p u rp orted

n ex t f rien d
, P ET A
, settled its o wn cla ims : “ th e s e t t lem en t reso lv es all d isp u tes arisin g o u t o f th is litig atio n a s b etween PETA a n d Defen d a n ts .” Id

. (em p h asis ad d ed ). It rem ain s a m y s tery t o m e w

h at “ claim s” P ET A (a

n o n

- p arty ) co u ld settle. Nev erth eless, ev en th ou g h P ET A o n ly settled its

o wn claim s, i t m ain t ain ed th at “ th e settlem en t also ren ders m o o t th e ap p eal f iled o n b eh alf o f th e P lain tif f Naru to .” Id

. In d eed
, P ET A w en t so f ar as to claim “ [t]h ere is th u s n o l o n g er an y liv e ca s e o r c o n t ro v ersy b ef o re th i s Co u rt.” Id

. at 3

.

T h o u g h it h ad prev io u sly attes ted it w o u ld “ f u lf ill[] th e d u ties o f a

n ex t f rien d ,” P ET A f

o rg o t i ts self

- ap p o in ted ro le. “ A ‘ n ex t f rien d ’ d oes

n o t [ itself] beco me a p a rty to th e

. . . a ctio n in w h ich [it] p articip ates, b u t simp ly p u r

su es th e ca u se o n b eh a lf o f [ th e p a rty in in terest] .” W

h itmo re , 4 9 5 U.S. at 1 6 3 (em

p h asis ad d ed ). W h atev er P ET A d id o r d id n ot d o f or Naru to (it o n ly m ad e r e p r e se n t atio n s t o th is co u rt reg ard in g w h at i t

o b tain ed ), P ET A m ad e su re to p ro tect itself an d w i t h t h e Jo in t Mo tio n

so u g h t to m an ip u late th is co u rt to av o id f u rth er n eg ativ e p reced en t

co n trary to its in stitu

tio n al o b j ectiv es. P ET A clev erly arg u es th at, b ecau s e Naru to is n o t a party to t h e s ettlem en t an d Def

en d an ts h av e m a in tain ed th at P ET A d oes n o t h av e n ex t- f rien d stan d i n g , N aru to sh o u ld n o t b e b o u n d b y j u d g m en ts en tered b ecau se o f P ET A ’ s actio n s. B u t, clev er arg u m en ts

### N A R U T O V



### . S L

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### 41

h ard ly co n ceal w

h at is really o ccu rr i n g a n d th e f lip b y P ET A is q u i te

su rp risin g

. On e d ay , P ET A m ai n tain s i t w ill ad v an ce Naru t o’ s in t erests, th e n ex t it m ain tain s th at Naru to can n ot be bo u n d b y P E T A’s actio n s. It is clear: P ET A ’ s real m otiv atio n i n t h is case w as to ad v an ce its o w n in terests, n o t Naru to ’ s. P ET A b eg an th is case p u rp o rted ly seek in g n ot o n ly

an i n j u n ctio n , b u t also a j u d g m en t “ [d ]eclarin g Naru to t o b e th e au th o r an d

co p y rig h t o w n er o f th e Mo n k ey Self

ies w it h a l l atten d an t rig h ts an d
p r i v i leg es u n d er law ” an d d isg o rg em en t. Co m p l. at 9

– 1 0

. A f

ter o ra l
arg u m en t, n on e o f th o se ob j ecti v es are, ap p aren tly
, w o rth p u rsu in g

. R a t h e r , w

h en it cam e d o w

n to a po ssib l e n eg ativ e, p reced en tial ru li ng f ro m th e p an el, P ET A q u ick ly s o u g h t t o p ro tect th e in stitu tio n , n o t th e claim ed real p arty in in terest. P ET A u sed Naru to as a “p aw n t o b e

m an ip u lated o n a ch essb o ard larg er th an h is o w n case.” Len h a r

d
, 4 4 3 U .S. at 1 3 1 2 (Reh n q u ist, J ., w ritin g f o r th e f u ll Su p rem e Co u rt).

Un f o rtu n ately
, P ET A ’ s actio n s c o uld b e th e n ew n o rm al u n der
to d ay ’ s h o ld in g

.