#25635-a-SLZ 

2011 S.D. 16

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

NINE, INC. d/b/a 9 BAR 

AND NIGHTCLUB; and GDT, 

INC. d/b/a CUBBY’S SPORTS 

BAR & GRILL; and SKINNER’S, 

INC. d/b/a SKINNER’S PUB, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 

v. 

CITY OF BROOKINGS, Defendant and Appellant. 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

BROOKINGS COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HONORABLE DAVID R. GIENAPP 

Judge 

* * * * 

DONALD M. McCARTY of 

McCann, Ribstein & McCarty, P.C. Attorneys for plaintiffs 

Brookings, South Dakota and appellees. 

MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 

DOUGLAS M. DEIBERT of 

Cadwell, Sanford, Deibert & Garry LLP Attorneys for defendant 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellant. 

* * * * 

 CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 

ON MARCH 21, 2011 

 OPINION FILED 04/20/11 
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ZINTER, Justice 

[¶1.] Appellees brought this declaratory judgment action against the City of 

Brookings. They challenged the method by which Brookings set the fee for new onsale full-service restaurant alcoholic beverage operating agreements (more 

commonly referred to as liquor licenses). The circuit court declared the Brookings 

methodology invalid and enjoined its enforcement. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] Appellees own and operate private bar and/or restaurant businesses in 

Brookings. These businesses are authorized to sell alcoholic beverages under 

operating agreements with Brookings. Appellees sought a declaration that a 

Brookings ordinance and resolution establishing the fee for additional full-service 

restaurant on-sale liquor operating agreements/licenses violated SDCL 35-4-117 

because the fee was based on city population rather than the market value of 

existing operating agreements/licenses.

[¶3.] A brief history of the law authorizing municipal liquor licenses is 

necessary for context. Prior to 2008, municipalities were only permitted to 

authorize a limited number of businesses to sell or serve alcoholic beverages. In 

2008, the Legislature passed statutes authorizing municipalities to issue additional 

on-sale “licenses” to full-service restaurants. See SDCL 35-4-110 to -119.1 Under 

 (continued . . .) 

1. SDCL 35-4-111 (2008) provided: 

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 35-4-11 or 35-4-11.1 or the on-sale 

license fees established pursuant to subdivisions 35-4-2(4) and (6), the 

governing board of any incorporated municipality or the board of 

county commissioners of any county may, by ordinance, issue 
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________________________ 

(. . . continued) 

 (continued . . .) 

the new legislation, the fee for the new licenses was to be based on the current 

market value of existing licenses. SDCL 35-4-117 (2008) provided: 

Any municipality or county adopting the ordinance pursuant to 

§ 35-4-111 shall set the price of a new full-service restaurant onsale license, pursuant to § 35-4-116, at or above the current fair 

market value. However, such full-service restaurant on-sale 

license fee may not be less than the minimum on-sale license fee 

established pursuant to subdivision 35-4-2(4) or (6). For 

purposes of this section, the term, current fair market value, 

means the documented price of the on-sale license most recently 

sold between January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2008, through an 

arm’s-length transaction, less the value of any real or personal 

property included in the transaction. 

(Emphasis added.) The Legislature also provided for a minimum fee based on 

population. SDCL 35-4-116 (2008) provided in part: 

Any municipality or county adopting the ordinance pursuant to § 35-4-

111 may issue additional on-sale licenses to full-service restaurants. 

Any municipality adopting such ordinance shall charge at least one 

dollar for each person residing within the municipality as measured by 

the last preceding decennial federal census. 

[¶4.] In response to the 2008 legislation, Brookings decided to authorize 

additional on-sale liquor licenses. However, the appropriate fee to be charged for 

the new licenses was complicated by the fact that Brookings is a “local option 

community.” See SDCL 35-3-7.2 In local option communities there is only one 

additional on-sale licenses for full-service restaurants if the 

municipality or county charges at least the minimum fee required by § 

35-4-116. 

2. Local option communities are described in SDCL 35-3-7, which provides: 

Any municipality may, by vote of its electors, as provided in §§ 35-3-8 

to 35-3-23, inclusive, determine whether or not alcoholic beverages, 

except malt beverages, may be sold within the municipality by on-sale 
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ew licensing] provisions.” 

________________________ 

(. . . continued) 

liquor “license,” and that license is held by the city. Those cities then enter into 

“operating agreements” with private businesses authorizing the businesses to sell 

alcoholic beverages. See SDCL 35-4-19.3 Because there technically are no 

“licenses” or “license” sales to determine current fair market value in local option 

communities like Brookings, a question arose whether Brookings’s operating 

agreements should be considered the same as licenses for purposes of determining 

the fee under SDCL 35-4-117. The 2009 Legislature resolved the question by 

adopting SDCL 35-4-19.1. That statute provided that “[e]ach operating agreement 

holder is a license holder for the purposes of §§ 35-4-110 to 35-4-120, inclusive, and

when applying these [n

[¶5.] SDCL 35-4-19.1 was not, however, in effect at the time Brookings 

enacted its ordinance and resolution. Therefore, Brookings took the position that 

because there were no “license” sales upon which current market value could have 

dealers. The municipality may also in the same manner determine 

whether the municipality shall procure a license or licenses for the sale 

of alcoholic beverages, except malt beverages, at retail, or, if the 

municipality is engaged in such a business, whether the license or 

licenses shall be renewed. 

3. SDCL 35-4-19 provides in part: 

No retailer license under this chapter, except for licenses issued 

pursuant to subdivisions 35-4-2(12), (16), (17), and (17A), other than to 

the municipality, may be granted to operate in any municipality which 

has obtained a license under this chapter except that: 

. . . 

(2) If a municipality has been issued an on-sale and off-sale 

license, then the governing board may by resolution enter into 

an operating agreement with any person for the specific 

purpose of operating the on-sale establishment or the off-sale 

establishment, or both for the municipality. 
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been established under SDCL 35-4-117, the city was authorized to set the new 

license fee at the minimum amount based on population as provided for in SDCL 

35-4-116. Accordingly, Brookings adopted an ordinance and resolution setting the 

new fee at $18,504, the minimum amount based on population. Appellees 

subsequently commenced this action. 

[¶6.] The circuit court ruled that operating agreements were the same as 

licenses for purposes of determining the fee under the new statutes. The court 

declared the new Brookings ordinance and resolution invalid because they 

established the new license fee in an amount less than current fair market value as 

required by SDCL 35-4-117. The court did not determine whether SDCL 35-4-19.1 

applied retroactively because the issue was moot under the court’s interpretation of 

SDCL 35-4-117. 

[¶7.] Brookings raises two issues on appeal: 

1. Whether Brookings properly set the fee for new fullservice restaurant on-sale liquor licenses in accordance 

with SDCL 35-4-116 and SDCL 35-4-117. 

2. Whether SDCL 35-4-19.1 applies retroactively. 

Decision 

[¶8.] The first question is a matter of statutory construction. Statutory 

construction is a question of law that we review de novo. Perdue, Inc. v. Rounds, 

2010 S.D. 38, ¶ 7 n.2, 782 N.W.2d 375, 377 n.2. 

[¶9.] Brookings contends that operating agreements are more akin to 

leases, which are not “sold” like licenses. Relying on this distinction, Brookings 

argues that there were no “license” sales in Brookings upon which a market value 

fee could have been calculated under SDCL 35-4-117. Therefore, Brookings argues 
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that it properly adopted the minimum fee based on population in accordance with 

SDCL 35-4-116. Brookings’s argument fails to consider all relevant provisions of 

SDCL Title 35. 

[¶10.] SDCL 35-1-1.1 (2008) provided that “[f]or the purposes of [SDCL Title 

35], . . . an entity that has entered into an operating agreement with a municipality 

pursuant to § 35-4-19 shall be deemed to be a licensee.” Concededly, this language 

speaks more directly to the nature of the entity than the nature of the agreement 

between the city and the private business. Nevertheless, the language strongly 

suggests that the Legislature intended operating agreements to be treated as 

licenses for purposes of SDCL 35-4-116 and 35-4-117. 

[¶11.] This conclusion is supported by SDCL 35-4-19.1, the 2009 amendment 

specifically providing that for the purposes of applying the new licensing statutes, 

an operating agreement holder is a license holder. We may consider subsequent 

amendments “in gleaning the legislative intendment of the law.” In re Farmers 

State Bank of Viborg, 466 N.W.2d 158, 160 (S.D. 1991). “When considering a 

subsequent amendment, we must decide whether the purpose of the amendment 

was to clarify or alter the law. . . . In making this determination, we consider the 

time and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the amendment.” Id. at 160-

61. 

[¶12.] The Legislature’s 2009 enactment of SDCL 35-4-19.1 (the amendment) 

occurred in the year immediately following the 2008 authorization for new licenses. 

The amendment was introduced and approved shortly after this litigation was 
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started.4 Thus, it appears that the amendment was a clarifying response to the 

litigation and question involving application of the new license law in local option 

communities. See In re Farmers, 466 N.W.2d at 161 (finding an amendment 

clarifying because it was in response to litigation and because it spoke to the issue 

at hand with greater detail). We conclude that the 2009 enactment of SDCL 35-4-

19.1 was meant to clarify rather than alter the 2008 legislation. 

[¶13.] Because the 2009 “amendment was intended to clarify the law, we may 

look to it in order to determine rights under the original act.” See In re Farmers, 

466 N.W.2d at 160. See also Ellis v. City of Yankton, 526 N.W.2d 124, 126 (S.D. 

1995) (“Subsequent amendments to a law to clarify the existing law may offer 

guidance to the intent of the law as initially enacted[.]”). The 2008 legislation did 

not specifically address how the new law would apply to operating agreements in 

local option communities. The 2009 amendment clarified that “[e]ach operating 

agreement holder [was] a license holder for the purposes of . . . applying . . . [the 

new licensing statutes].” SDCL 35-4-19.1. Considering this clarifying amendment 

together with SDCL 35-1-1.1, we conclude the Legislature originally intended that 

operating agreements were to be considered the same as licenses for purposes of 

determining the fee under SDCL 35-4-116 and 117. 

[¶14.] We also observe that there had been a sale of an operating agreement 

in Brookings during the relevant period necessary to determine fair market value of 

operating agreements under SDCL 35-4-117. Therefore, when Brookings decided to 

4. The declaratory judgment action was filed on December 23, 2008. SDCL 35-

4-19.1 was approved on February 25, 2009. 2009 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 177, § 

11. 
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authorize new operating agreements under the new statutes, Brookings was 

required to adopt an ordinance and resolution using prior operating agreement 

sales to set the new market value fee in accordance with SDCL 35-4-117. The 

circuit court correctly determined that the Brookings ordinance and resolution were 

invalid for setting the fee based on population under SDCL 35-4-116 rather than 

market value under SDCL 35-4-117. In light of our holding, the issue involving the 

retroactivity of SDCL 35-4-19.1 is moot. 

[¶15.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, MEIERHENRY, 

and SEVERSON, Justices, concur.