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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39618

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AMY FAYE GRECO,

Defendant-Respondent.

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2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 376

Filed: February 27, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Canyon County. Hon. Renae J. Hoff, District Judge. 

Order granting motion to suppress, reversed; case remanded for further 

proceedings.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Diane M. Walker argued.

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PERRY, Judge Pro Tem

The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Amy Faye Greco’s motion to 

suppress evidence obtained through the execution of a search warrant. We reverse.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Greco was charged with possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-

2732(c)(1), and injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(1). Prior to Greco’s arrest, police officers 

obtained information from one of Greco’s relatives regarding drug-related activities occurring in 

Greco’s residence. Officers also obtained information from Greco’s eleven-year-old son 

regarding his own drug activities inside the residence. Police officers went to Greco’s residence 

and asked Greco if they could search her son’s bedroom. Greco consented. Officers then asked 

if they could search the entire house. Greco told the officers that she needed to ask her 

grandmother for consent to search the house. Greco turned and walked inside the house and the 
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officers followed her. Once inside the house, Greco walked into her bedroom and closed the 

door. Officers then heard the sound of clanging glass and suspected that Greco was destroying 

evidence. The officers asked Greco to exit her bedroom, and she eventually complied. The 

officers then entered the bedroom and saw a security video camera monitor displaying the 

outside of the house.

The officers applied for a search warrant for the house. The magistrate issued a search 

warrant and the residence was searched. Officers found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug 

paraphernalia. 

Prior to trial, Greco moved the district court to suppress the evidence found during the 

execution of the search warrant, contending that there had been an unlawful, warrantless entry 

prior to obtaining the warrant. The district court granted the motion and suppressed the 

evidence. The State appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

The State claims that police officers were allowed to enter the residence because Greco 

consented to the search of her son’s bedroom. Further, the State argues that even if the evidence 

found as a result of the entrance were to be excluded from the search warrant application, the 

remaining evidence was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The standard of 

review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is 

challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, 

but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. 

Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, 

the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and 

draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 

897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 

1999). 

There were three searches in this case: (1) the initial entry into the residence; (2) the 

search of Greco’s bedroom pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 

requirement; and (3) the search of the entire residence pursuant to the search warrant. The State

contends that all three searches were lawful. The district court disagreed and found that the 

initial entry into the residence was unlawful because there was no consent to enter, that the 
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search of Greco’s bedroom was unlawful because the officers relied on a police-created 

exigency, and that the search of the entire residence was unlawful because the search warrant 

lacked probable cause. For the following reasons, we conclude that all three searches were 

lawful.

A. Entry into the Residence

The State argues that Greco’s consent to search her son’s bedroom allowed officers to 

enter the house because “[a] typical, reasonable person would have understood that this would 

involve entry into the house.” The district court found that because “neither [Greco] nor her 

grandmother consented to the search of the entire home,” the entry was unlawful. Although a 

warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal and violative of the Fourth 

Amendment, such an entry or search may be rendered reasonable by an individual’s consent. 

State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 

704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998). In such instances, the State has the burden of 

demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 

947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997). The State must show that consent was not the result of 

duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 

(1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App. 1993). The 

voluntariness of an individual’s consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Whiteley, 

124 Idaho at 264, 858 P.2d at 803. Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or 

conduct. State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Ct. App. 1991). Whether 

consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a question of fact to be 

determined by all the surrounding circumstances. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 

1052, 1057 (2003). 

In this case, the district court found that Greco gave officers consent to search her son’s 

bedroom. Greco did not revoke or limit the consent to search her son’s bedroom. Nonetheless, 

Greco asserts that the scope of consent did not allow officers to enter the residence when she 

retreated back into the home. The district court found that when Greco retreated, “she neither 

verbally nor by gesture invited the officer to accompany her.” The question before us, then, is 

whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider consent to search a bedroom to also include

consent to enter the house. We determine that it is reasonable. 
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The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 

objective reasonableness, “what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the 

exchange between the officer and the suspect.” State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696, 978 P.2d 

881, 884 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). The record 

demonstrates that the son’s room was located within the house. Therefore, in order to search his

room, the officers would necessarily have to enter the house. It would be unreasonable for the 

officers to receive consent to search the bedroom, and then be required to receive separate 

consent to enter the house in order to carry out the search. There is no requirement for the 

officers to receive an “invitation” to enter after consent to search a part of the house is attained. 

Therefore, we determine that a reasonable person would have understood the consent to search 

the bedroom to also include consent to enter the house.

Greco asserts that the lack of consent to search the entire house precluded the officers 

from entering regardless of the previously granted consent to search the bedroom. Greco argues 

that our decision in Abeyta is persuasive on this point. In that case, police officers went to

Abeyta’s residence and spoke with him from the doorstep. During the course of the 

conversation, Abeyta left the doorstep and went inside. Once Abeyta turned his back and walked 

away from the door, the officers entered his home uninvited. We held that the initial entry into 

the house was without consent and was therefore an illegal entry. Abeyta, 131 Idaho at 707, 963 

P.3d at 390. However, Abeyta is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In this case, the 

officers “unequivocally” received consent to search the son’s bedroom. In Abeyta, the officers 

never received consent to search any portion of the house prior to their entry into the house. 

Since the issue in this case turns on the scope of consent rather than the lack of consent, we 

determine that Abeyta is not apposite.

B. Exigent Circumstances

Once inside the residence, the State claims that exigent circumstances provided grounds 

for the officers to exceed the scope of the consent and make a limited entry into Greco’s 

bedroom. The district court, having found the initial entry illegal, held that the officers “created 

the exigency by their uninvited entry” into the house, and therefore the exigent circumstances 

exception did not apply. “One well-recognized exception [to the warrant requirement] applies 

when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a 

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King,
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____ U.S. ____, _____, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).1 “The need to prevent the imminent 

destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless 

search.” Id.; Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 

In this case, we determine that it was reasonable for the officers to enter Greco’s bedroom 

to ensure that evidence was not being destroyed. First, we have already concluded that the 

officers entered the home lawfully. Once inside, Greco displayed acts consistent with the acts of 

someone endeavoring to destroy evidence. First, Greco immediately went inside her bedroom 

and closed the door instead of approaching her grandmother to ask if the officers could search 

the entire house. Then, officers heard the sounds of clanging glass. Finally, Greco initially did 

not comply with the officers’ requests to come out of her bedroom. It was objectively 

reasonable, based on Greco’s acts, for the officers to conclude that evidence was being destroyed 

inside the bedroom. Further, the officers’ response was appropriately tailored to the scope of the 

exigency. Therefore, the officers were justified in removing Greco from the bedroom and 

entering the room pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception.

C. Validity of Search Warrant

The State claims that even if the evidence of the security video camera monitor was 

excluded from the search warrant application, the application still “shows ample evidence to 

establish probable cause.” When probable cause to issue a search warrant is challenged on 

appeal, the reviewing court’s function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 

concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); State v. 

Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1993); State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 

672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). In this evaluation, great deference is paid to the magistrate’s 

determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 215, 938 P.2d 1251, 1253 

(Ct. App. 1997). The test for reviewing the magistrate’s action is whether he or she abused his 

or her discretion in finding that probable cause existed. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 387, 

 

1 In King, the United States Supreme Court placed limitations on the police-created 

exigency doctrine. The police-created exigency doctrine is an exception to exigent 

circumstances. “Under this doctrine, police may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of 

evidence when that exigency was ‘created’ or ‘manufactured’ by the conduct of the police.” 

Kentucky v. King, ____ U.S. _____, _____, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011). In King, the Court 

held that “the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises 

by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at _____, 131 S.Ct. 

at 1862.
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707 P.2d 493, 498 (Ct. App. 1985). When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the 

burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the search was invalid. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 

268, 275, 678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct. App. 1984). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.

 

Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth 

Amendment, except that “oath or affirmation” is termed “affidavit.” In order for a search 

warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits of a 

crime may be found in a particular place. Josephson, 123 Idaho at 792-93, 852 P.2d at 1389-90. 

When determining whether probable cause exists: 

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense 

decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay 

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place. 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also Wilson, 130 Idaho at 215, 938 P.2d at 1253. 

In this case, the officers applied for a search warrant following the entry into Greco’s 

house and bedroom. The application was based on information obtained from Greco’s relative, 

Greco’s son, and through the officers’ observations, including the observation that Greco had a 

security video camera monitor inside her bedroom. The district court found that:

The remaining evidence is uncorroborated hearsay statements of [Greco’s 

relative] and the defendant’s son, neither were police informants so neither bear 

an indicia of reliability. The evidence obtained by law enforcement after the 

illegal entry should not have been considered by [the magistrate]. Therefore, the 

evidence discovered by law enforcement pursuant to the search warrant is hereby 

suppressed.

We disagree with the district court. We have held that:

Unlike an anonymous tip, which alone and absent sufficient indicia of 

knowledge and veracity is insufficient to justify a stop, State v. Etherington, 129 

Idaho 463, 465, 926 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Ct. App. 1996), an identified victimwitness’ or concerned citizen’s report to the police may be presumed reliable, 

such that the police are not required to establish either the credibility of the 
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informant or the reliability of his information. See State v. O’Bryan, 96 Idaho 

548, 552, 531 P.2d 1193, 1197 (1975). Where the information comes from a 

known citizen informant rather than an anonymous tipster, the citizen’s disclosure 

of her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the allegations turn out 

to be fabricated, is generally deemed adequate to show veracity and reliability.

State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000).

Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 136 Idaho 270, 274, 32 P.3d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 2001).

Here, police officers received information from Greco’s relative, a known citizen. This 

relative identified himself to the officers by name, described that he was related to Greco, 

reported that he lived in Middleton, and explained that he and his wife were eyewitnesses to the 

activity in Greco’s home. As a known citizen informant, this relative’s information could be 

presumed to be reliable. Further, officers also received information from Greco’s son. The son

made statements against his own interest--that he committed a crime and that he had evidence of 

the crime in his bedroom. Further, the officers knew his name, his relationship to Greco, his 

address, and knew that he was an eyewitness. Therefore, the information from the son could also 

be presumed to be reliable. The application for the search warrant contained information from 

these reliable sources, specifically that: (1) Greco was likely stealing her grandmother’s 

medication; (2) Greco had four to five friends enter her bedroom each night for around five 

minutes; (3) Greco installed a security camera monitoring system outside her house; and 

(4) Greco’s son smoked marijuana and had drug paraphernalia in his bedroom. Additionally, 

police officers corroborated this information by observing different vehicles frequenting the 

house over the course of a week, receiving a report from the son’s school principal indicating 

that the son was smoking marijuana, and receiving a report from another child that the son was 

threatening kids if they refused to smoke marijuana. This evidence created a fair probability that 

evidence of criminal activity was present in Greco’s residence, both in her bedroom and in her 

son’s bedroom. Therefore, it was appropriate for the magistrate to grant the application for the 

search warrant, even if the evidence discovered by the officers’ presence inside the house prior to 

the application were to be stricken. Thus, the district court erred by suppressing the evidence 

obtained through the execution of the search warrant. 
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III.

CONCLUSION

The officers’ initial entry into Greco’s residence was lawful because Greco consented to 

the search of her son’s bedroom. Also, the officers’ search of Greco’s bedroom was lawful 

pursuant to the exigency circumstances exception. Additionally, the magistrate had a substantial 

basis for finding probable cause to believe that there was a fair probability that drugs or evidence 

of that activity would be found at Greco’s residence. Based on these conclusions, we reverse the 

district court’s order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings.

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.