IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1567

Filed October 28, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATTHEW PAUL SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, James D. Birkenholz,

District Associate Judge. 

Matthew Paul Smith appeals his convictions following guilty pleas to 

operating while intoxicated, second offense, and child endangerment. 

AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Linda J. Hines, 

Assistant Attorneys General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Maurice 

Curry, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

In June 2014 the State charged Matthew Paul Smith with operating while 

intoxicated (OWI), third offense and child endangerment. In August the court 

ordered Smith to undergo a substance abuse evaluation. The court ordered the 

evaluator to release its written findings only to the court and to Smith’s attorney. 

Prior to his September trial, Smith filed written guilty pleas to the lesser-included 

offense of OWI, second offense and to child endangerment. See Iowa Code

§§ 321J.2, 726.6 (2013). Smith sought immediate sentencing and waived (1) his 

right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, (2) preparation of a presentence 

investigation report, and (3) reporting of the sentencing hearing. The plea 

agreements provided “both sentences to run concurrent & sentenced to up to 2 

years of prison.” The district court was not bound by the plea agreement. 

On September 12, 2014, the district court accepted Smith’s guilty pleas

and proceeded to sentencing. Each sentencing order contained several boxes 

for the court to show the most important reasons for the sentence imposed. On 

both forms, the court checked one box only, “the plea agreement.” The court 

sentenced Smith in accordance with the plea agreement to an indeterminate twoyear prison term on each conviction and ordered the sentences to run 

concurrently. The court imposed the minimum fine on each conviction, 

suspended the fine on the child endangerment conviction, and ordered Smith to 

complete substance abuse treatment while in prison. Smith now appeals, 

seeking resentencing. “Our scope of review of a district court’s decision 
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regarding sentencing is for an abuse of discretion or for defects in the sentencing 

procedure.” State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995).

Smith claims the sentencing court abused its discretion under our rules 

requiring the sentencing court to “state on the record its reason for selecting the 

particular sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d); see State v. Thompson, 856 

N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014) (stating a sentencing court must include in the 

sentencing order “the reason for the sentence when the defendant waives the 

reporting of the sentencing hearing”); State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304-05 

(Iowa 2001) (ruling boilerplate language insufficient). Specifically, Smith first 

claims we should find that even when the sentences imposed embody the plea 

agreement, the court checking one box provides an insufficient explanation,

particularly when, as here, the court is not bound by the plea agreement. Smith 

asks us to overrule Cason, 532 N.W.2d at 757. In Cason, our supreme court 

rejected a sentencing challenge similar to Smith’s, stating:

In State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983), this 

court held that where the State and the defendant have approved a 

plea agreement and the sentencing court incorporates the plea 

agreement in the sentence, “the sentence was not the product of 

the exercise of the trial court’s discretion but of the process of 

giving effect to the parties’ agreement.” We went on to hold that 

under those circumstances, stating reasons for imposition of 

sentence would serve no useful purpose, and any failure to abide 

by the [rules] was harmless. Id.

532 N.W.2d at 757. The Cason court concluded: “[T]he sentencing court was 

merely giving effect to the parties’ agreement. Under these circumstances, we 

do not believe the district court abused its discretion in failing to state reasons for 

the sentence imposed.” Id.
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It is not within the province of this court to overrule our supreme court’s 

directives. See State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014) (“Generally, 

it is the role of the supreme court to decide if case precedent should no longer be 

followed.”); State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957) (“If our previous 

holdings are to be overruled, we should ordinarily prefer to do it ourselves.”). 

Instead, we apply “existing legal principles.” See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1101(3). We 

decline Smith’s invitation to overrule existing case law and conclude the 

sentencing court’s failure to fully explain its decision to impose sentences that 

followed the parties’ plea agreement was harmless. 

Second, Smith points out the plea agreement did not mention fines, 

claiming the court therefore had to exercise discretion as to fines, and it failed to 

sufficiently state its reasons for imposing the fines. We find no abuse of 

discretion; the sentencing court imposed the mandatory minimum fines provided 

by statute. Applicable to Smith’s child endangerment conviction, Iowa Code

section 903.1(2) provides “there shall be a fine of at least” $625. The court 

imposed this fine and suspended it. The court thus exercised its discretion by 

imposing the most favorable fine for which Smith was eligible. A court’s failure to 

set forth reasons in such circumstances is deemed harmless. See State v. 

Matlock, 304 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 1981) (finding no abuse of discretion where 

the court lacked the power to enter a less severe sentence so the court’s error “in 

failing to state its reason did not harm defendant”). As in Matlock, a “remand for 

resentencing could not change the” fine “required under the relevant statutes.” 

See id. Similarly, Iowa Code section 321J.2(4)(b) provides for the “[a]ssessment 
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of a minimum fine of” $1875 upon conviction for OWI, second offense. The 

district court imposed this minimum fine on Smith and was without discretion to 

impose a lower fine. We conclude any failure to provide sufficient reasons for the 

fines imposed was not an abuse of discretion. See id. 

Finally, Smith challenges the portion of the sentencing order stating: 

“Defendant is ordered to complete substance abuse treatment while in prison,”1

again claiming the court failed to state sufficient reasons for its order. 

Smith’s substance abuse evaluation report is not in the record as the court 

ordered the report released only to defense counsel and the court. We note, 

however, our code requires a court imposing sentence on an OWI conviction to 

enter an order following the report’s recommendations. For example, Iowa Code 

section 321J.2(7)(a) provides, in the context of a person convicted of an OWI 

offense: “The court shall order the person to follow the recommendations 

proposed in the substance abuse evaluation as provided in section 321J.3.” 

(Emphasis added.) Similarly, Iowa Code section 321J.3(1)(a) provides, “the 

court shall order any defendant convicted under section 321J.2 [encompassing 

OWI, second offense] to follow the recommendations proposed in the substance 

abuse evaluation for appropriate substance abuse treatment for the defendant.” 

(Emphasis added.) These statutes thus require the sentencing court to enter an 

order in line with the recommendations of the substance abuse evaluation. See

Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (stating the word “shall” in a statute imposes a duty 

 

1 We note the court ordered the treatment requirement in the child endangerment 

sentencing order. We conclude this location is a scrivener’s error and the court intended 

the treatment requirement to be included in the sentencing order for OWI, second. 
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unless otherwise specially provided by the legislature). We can logically deduce 

the sentencing court ordered Smith to complete substance abuse treatment in 

prison because such treatment was recommended in his substance abuse 

evaluation and the court was required to enter an order following the evaluation. 

Smith, who received the completed report, does not claim otherwise. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Smith to 

complete substance abuse treatment. 

AFFIRMED.