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Filed 12/19/22 In re Layla R. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re LAYLA R., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DIANA S. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

LAYLA R., a Minor, etc.,

 Appellant. 

 A164135

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. DEP-5732-01)

In re LAYLA R., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DIANA S.,

Defendant and Appellant;

DONNY R.,

 Intervener. 

 A164492

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. DEP-5732-01)

After a 24-month review hearing, the juvenile court found 

that five-year-old Layla R. was at substantial risk of emotional 
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detriment if returned to her mother’s custody and that the 

Sonoma County Human Services Department (the Department) 

failed to provide reasonable reunification services. The juvenile 

court ordered six more months of reunification services but also 

made a further order that no visitation could occur until Diana S. 

(Mother) and Layla began parent-child therapy. In these 

consolidated appeals, Layla, the Department, and Mother appeal 

from that order, challenging, among other things, the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings. We are 

unable to grant effective relief and dismiss the appeals as moot.

BACKGROUND

A.

In 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition, which 

alleged then two-year-old Layla came within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1),1 due to Mother’s 

substance abuse, neglect, and unsafe living conditions. It was 

further alleged that Layla was at substantial risk of being abused 

or neglected (§ 300, subd. (j)) because Mother failed to protect 

Layla’s older sibling from sexual abuse. The juvenile court 

sustained the petition, declared Layla a dependent of the juvenile 

court, and ordered her removed from Mother’s custody. 

During initial supervised visits, Mother and Layla were 

observed to be connected and affectionate. Mother maintained 

sobriety, found full-time employment, and engaged in her 

reunification services (including therapy). Layla was diagnosed 

with “educational autism,” as well as post-traumatic stress 

disorder and attachment issues. Their visits progressed to 

unsupervised. 

Then Layla began to struggle with transitions to and from 

her visits with Mother. In particular, she complained of injuries, 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
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nausea, and stomach pain that were not physically explained and 

were determined to be psychosomatic stress responses. When inperson visits resumed, after a period of virtual visits due to the 

emergence of COVID-19 in 2020, Layla began to resist visits with 

Mother and again experienced somatic stress responses. Layla 

was referred to an individual play therapist, Ibitz, but the 

Department made no attempt to start joint therapy for Mother 

and Layla. 

At an 18-month review hearing (that was repeatedly 

continued), the juvenile court found that Mother substantially 

met her case plan objectives, that returning Layla to Mother’s 

custody would be detrimental because of Layla’s severe somatic 

responses, and that the Department failed to offer reasonable 

services to address those responses. The juvenile court extended 

services for six months, ordered the Department to provide 

therapeutic visits for Mother and Layla, and temporarily 

suspended visitation until appropriate therapeutic supports were 

in place. 

On Mother’s prior appeal (Sonoma Cty. Human Servs. Dept. 

v. Diana S. (In re Layla R.) (March 7, 2022, A162649) [nonpub. 

opn.] (Layla R.)), this Division affirmed the 18-month review 

order, concluding that substantial evidence supported the 

juvenile court’s finding that returning Layla to Mother’s custody 

placed her at substantial risk of detriment. In reaching that 

conclusion, this Court determined that substantial evidence also 

supported an implicit finding that Layla’s anxiety was caused, at 

least in part, by early childhood neglect she suffered in Mother’s 

home. 

B.

In its status report for the 24-month review hearing, the 

Department recommended termination of reunification services. 

The social worker noted that a family therapist, Stender, began 

working with Mother and Layla (individually) within a few 
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months of the 18-month hearing. However, after five sessions 

with Layla, Stender concluded family therapy would be 

emotionally detrimental to Layla—who did not recognize Diana 

S. as her mother, did not want to visit her, and displayed 

concerning behaviors when the subject was explored. Layla 

continued to do well in her foster care placement and identified 

her foster parents as her mother and father. 

Mother’s therapist had also recently requested termination 

of Mother’s individual therapy due to her failure to progress or 

demonstrate insight. The therapist believed that Mother’s 

avoidance of any depth or trauma work indicated her failure to 

recognize Layla’s trauma. 

Shortly before the 24-month review hearing date, Layla’s 

counsel filed a section 388 petition, requesting termination of 

both visitation and family therapy. After a hearing on the 

petition, at which Stender testified that continued family therapy 

would be counterproductive, the court granted the petition in 

part and denied it in part. Specifically, the court temporarily 

withdrew its order for family therapy but declined to make a 

finding that either visitation or family therapy was detrimental. 

The court believed the detriment question was best left for 

resolution at the upcoming contested review hearing. 

C.

At the conclusion of a contested 24-month review hearing, 

the juvenile court ordered an additional six months of 

reunification services, specifically joint therapy. The court found 

that the Department failed to meet its burden to show it offered 

reasonable services; that the case had been significantly 

disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic; and that it was in Layla’s 

best interests to order additional services. The court declined the 

Department’s request to make a detriment finding on visitation, 

ordering “visitation to mother pursuant to parent/child therapy 

and if clinically indicated, additional visitation with mother is 
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authorized[.]” The court further ordered that the prior 

suspension of visitation would remain in place until parent-child 

therapy began. 

D.

While the instant appeals (A164135 and A164492) from the 

24-month review order were pending, the juvenile court found, at 

a subsequent review hearing, that Mother made substantial 

progress towards mitigating the causes necessitating removal; 

that return of Layla to Mother’s custody would nonetheless be 

detrimental; that reasonable reunification services had been 

provided; and that visitation would be detrimental to Layla’s 

emotional health. The juvenile court terminated reunification 

services and set a section 366.26 hearing for November 9, 2022. 

The Department informed the court of this development in 

its briefs, asked us to take judicial notice of this later order, and 

conceded that its appeal from the 24-month review order had 

become moot.2 

In Diana S. v. Superior Court (Oct. 12, 2022, A165684) 

[nonpub. opn.] (Diana S.), this court denied (on the merits) 

Mother’s petition for writ relief from the order terminating 

reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. In 

her petition, Mother did not challenge the juvenile court’s finding 

that visitation was detrimental to Layla. 

The Department then asked us to take judicial notice of 

the Diana S. opinion, and filed a motion (which Layla joined) to 

dismiss Mother’s instant (A164492) appeal as moot. Although 

2 The Department filed a request for judicial notice of this 

court’s Layla R., supra, A162649 opinion and the juvenile court’s 

subsequent order setting a section 366.26 hearing. Layla joined 

in the Department’s request. We originally deferred ruling on 

their unopposed request but now grant it. (See Evid. Code, §§ 

452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) 
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Mother and Father oppose the motion to dismiss, they make no 

objection to this court taking judicial notice of the Diana S. 

opinion. Accordingly, we take judicial notice of that opinion. (See 

Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

DISCUSSION

We agree that the consolidated appeals are moot because a 

reversal in any of the three appeals would be ineffective now that 

the subsequent order—terminating Mother’s reunification 

services, setting a section 366.26 hearing, and finding visitation 

between Mother and Layla detrimental—is final. 

A.

Appellate courts have a duty to decide only actual 

controversies via effective judgments and to abstain from giving 

opinions on moot questions. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 

53, 58-59.) Juvenile dependency appeals frequently raise 

mootness concerns because the parties have multiple 

opportunities to appeal while the proceedings in the juvenile 

court continue. (Id. at p. 59.) We will ordinarily dismiss 

dependency appeals if, assuming reversible error is found, we 

nonetheless cannot provide any effective relief. (Id. at pp. 58-60.) 

However, the question should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 

(In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 664.) 

B.

Both the Department and Layla concede that their appeals 

are moot. We agree that their appeals are moot because they 

have now received the very relief requested—termination of 

reunification services, the setting of a section 366.26 hearing, and 

a finding that visitation with Mother is detrimental. 

The Department and Layla nonetheless ask us to exercise 

our discretion to consider their moot appeals. (See In re Yvonne 

W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 [reviewing courts have 
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discretion to reach merits of moot appeal if it presents an issue of 

public importance that is likely to recur while evading appellate 

review].) 

Neither appeal presents an issue of broad public interest. 

Rather, all three of their arguments raise highly fact-specific 

questions: (1) whether the juvenile court’s finding that the 

Department had not provided reasonable services (in the six 

months preceding the 24-month review hearing) was supported 

by substantial evidence; (2) whether the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in extending reunification services beyond 24 months; 

and (3) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion, at the 

24-month review, in declining to find visitation with Mother 

detrimental. 

We are not persuaded that it is appropriate to address 

these moot issues. (See In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 

156, 159 [noting similar fact specific issues are frequently 

presented to appellate courts and are unlikely to evade review]; 

accord, In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 802 [declining to 

address sufficiency of the evidence issue because it was “not an 

issue of continuing public importance”].)

C.

In Mother’s opening brief, she challenges the juvenile 

court’s visitation order, arguing it was an unlawful delegation of 

judicial power. She seeks reinstatement of the order for 

therapeutic visitation, enforcement of that order, and more time 

for reunification. 

We agree with the Department that Mother’s appeal is also 

moot because, even if we assume (for the sake of argument) that 

she is right on the merits, there is no effective relief we could 

grant now that the subsequent order—terminating reunification 

services, setting a section 366.26 hearing, and finding any 

visitation between Mother and Layla detrimental—is final 
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(Diana S., supra, A165684). (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(1); In re 

Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 533.) 

Mother’s opposition brief does not persuade us it remains 

possible to grant effectual relief—by affording her “additional 

reunification services and enforcement of visits”—or that the 

challenged visitation order has continuing impact after the 

juvenile court’s finding that visitation is detrimental. (See In re 

Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [when reunification 

services have been terminated and section 366.26 hearing has 

been set, focus shifts from reunification to child’s interest in 

permanence and stability]; In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 

Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504 [“[e]ven after family reunification 

services are terminated, visitation must continue unless the court 

finds it would be detrimental to the child”], italics added.) 

We are similarly unconvinced, by Mother’s wholly 

conclusory argument, that this is an appropriate case in which to 

exercise our discretion to address her moot appeal. 

DISPOSITION 

The consolidated appeals are dismissed as moot.
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______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________

WISEMAN, J.*

A164135 / A164492

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.