THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


ROCKY FLATS
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held telephonically on April 


30, 2007. 

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C O N T E N T S
 

April 30, 2007 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


NEUTRON ISSUES, ’52 THROUGH ‘58 14 


NEUTRON ISSUES, ’59 THROUGH ‘70 50 


B PLANT 100 


TIB-38 111 

WOUND MODEL 117 


EXAMPLE CASES 130 


MATRIX 138 

PRESENTATION TO THE BOARD 141 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 153 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- “^”/(inaudible)/(unintelligible) signifies 


speaker failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

 

4

 P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 

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IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

ALBERG, JEANETTE, SEN. ALLARD 


BARKER, KAY, ANWAG 


BARRIE, TERRIE, ANWAG 


BEACH, JOSIE, ABRWH 


BOLLER, CAROLYN, CONG. UDALL 


BRACKETT, LIZ, ORAU 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC WASHINGTON 


BUCHANAN, RON, SC&A 


DOWNS, ALYCIA, NIOSH 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


ERNEST, HEATHER, ORAU 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 


FIX, JACK, ORAU 


FRANK, LAURA, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 


HILLER, DAVID, SEN. SALAZAR 


HOFF, JENNIFER, ORAU 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


JESSEN, KARIN, ORAUT 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


LOPEZ, TERESA, ORAU 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MINKS, ERIN, SEN. SALAZAR 


NETON, JIM, NIOSH 


SHARFI, MUTTY, ORAU 


SMITH, MATTHEW, ORAU 


ULSH, BRANT, NIOSH 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (12:00 p.m.) 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO


 DR. WADE: Mark, do you want to wait for Joe? 


Joe Fitzgerald, with us? 


 (No response) 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I -- I think we can probably 


go ahead. Joe said he'd get to a line as 


quickly as he could and join us. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Well, this is a meeting of 


the workgroup of the Advisory Board. It's a 


workgroup that looks at Rocky Flats site 


profile and SEC petition issues. My name is 


Lew Wade and I serve as the Designated Federal 


Official for the Advisory Board that has given 


rise to this workgroup. The workgroup on Rocky 


Flats site profile and SEC petition is chaired 


by Mark Griffon, with members Gibson, Presley 


and Munn. I've heard all of those fine people 


identify themselves as being on this call. 


Ray, are you with us and ready to go? 


THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, sir. 

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 DR. WADE: Good. Are there any other Board 


members on this call save for Griffon, Gibson, 


Presley and Munn? Any other Board members? 


 (No responses) 


What I'd like to do is our introductions, 


starting with the NIOSH/ORAU team. Members, 


please identify yourself and state your -- your 


conflicts. Then we'll move to the SC&A team. 


We'll then move to other federal employees. 


We'll look at workers, worker representatives, 


petitioners or their representatives, members 


of Congress or their staffs, and then anyone 


who wishes to be identified. 


So let's start with the NIOSH/ORAU team. 


 DR. ULSH: All right, this is Brant Ulsh in 


Cincinnati with the NIOSH team, no conflicts. 


DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton in Cincinnati; 


NIOSH, no conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Other members of the NIOSH/ORAU 


team? 


 MS. JESSEN: This is Karin Jessen of the ORAU 


team; no personal conflicts. 


 MS. HOFF: Jennifer Hoff with the ORAU team; no 


personal conflicts. 


 MR. SHARFI: Mutty Sharfi with the ORAU team; 

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no personal conflicts. 


MS. BRACKETT: Liz Brackett with the ORAU team; 


no conflicts. 


MR. SMITH: This is Matthew Smith with the ORAU 


team; no conflicts. 


 MR. FIX: Jack Fix, ORAU team; no conflicts. 


MS. LOPEZ: Teresa Lopez, ORAU team; no 


conflicts. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: This is Larry Elliott, 


NIOSH/OCAS; no conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Other members of the NIOSH/ORAU 

team? 

 (No responses) 

 Members of the SC&A team? 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro, SC&A; no 


conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Other members --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani, SC&A; no 


conflicts. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Ron Buchanan, SC&A; no 


conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Other SC&A team members? 


 (No responses) 


 Other federal employees who are working on this 


call? 

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 MS. HOWELL: This is Emily Howell with HHS; no 


conflicts. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Liz Homoki-Titus with HHS; 


no conflicts. 


 MR. BROEHM: Jason Broehm, CDC; no conflicts. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Jeff Kotsch, Department of Labor. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Jeff. 


 MS. ERNEST: Heather Ernest, NIOSH; no 


conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Other federal employees? 


MS. DOWNS: Alycia Downs, NIOSH; no conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Workers, worker reps, petitioners or 


their representatives, members of Congress or 


their staff? 


 MS. BOLLER: Carolyn Boller with Congressman 


Udall's office. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning. 


 MS. BOLLER: Good morning. 


 MS. ALBERG: Jeanette Alberg with Senator 


Allard's office. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning. 


 MS. ALBERG: Good morning. 

 MR. HILLER: David Hiller, Senator Salazar's 

office. 

 DR. WADE: Good morning, David. 

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 MS. BARRIE: Terrie Barrie with ANWAG, and Kay 


Barker will be on later today. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Terrie, as always. Other 


workers, worker reps, petitioners or their 


representatives, members of Congress or their 


staffs? 


 (No responses) 


Anyone else who would like to be identified on 


the record for this call? 


MS. FRANK: This is Laura Frank with The Rocky 


Mountain News. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome. 


MS. FRANK: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Anyone else who would like to be 


identified? 


MS. BEACH: Lew, this is Josie Beach. I think 


I missed the first roll call on Advisory Board 


members. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. All right. Thank you. Josie 


is not a member of this working group, but can 


listen to these discussions as a member of the 


public, in essence. 


Anyone else who wants to be identified? 


 (No responses) 


 Okay, Mark, it's all yours. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I think I e-mailed an 


agenda but everybody may not have it and 


actually when Lew was doing roll call I tried 


to pull it up myself. I'm going to do it from 


memory, though. 


 MS. MUNN: Overview. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Basically the first two items are 


neutron-related items and I broke it up into -- 


into time periods because that's kind of the 


way we've been looking at it on the technical 


phone calls that we've had in between the 


workgroup meeting. So the first one, the 


neutrons for the period 1952 through 1958, and 


I think really what we need to do on this call 


today is to update everyone -- there -- not 


everyone was on the technical phone call, 


obviously, so I think we need to kind of say 


where -- what came out of that technical phone 


call and any further information that we might 


have from either SC&A or NIOSH, they can share 


that. 


And then the -- the second period is 1959 


through '70 that -- that is the end of the NDRP 


time frame, and because of the tight time frame 


we never did have a technical call on that part 

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of the time frame and the issues there. And 


actually SC&A sent a report around but I -- it 


didn't get to most people until mid or late -- 


late on Friday, so this is like hot off the 


press, this issue, and we need to discuss the 


findings from that, have SC&A present them and 


-- and have more of a full discussion on that 


time frame. 


And then the remainder of the agenda covers 


sort of some -- some other issues, non-- not 


the neutron issues but the -- I'm trying to 


remember the order of these -- 


 MS. MUNN: You started on your agenda with the 


overview of the executive summary and the five 


primary points. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, that's the old agenda, Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, it is? 


 MR. GRIFFON: That was from the last meeting, 


yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, I might -- I might have 


it --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- let me try to pull it up. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And -- and yeah, the -- 


well, there -- there's a few other issues. One 

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is the -- the 881 -- Building -- the Plant B or 


881 workers and the -- the -- just further -- 


final discussion I guess on that as to whether 


the coworker model will bound those -- those 


doses for the early years 'cause we -- we did 


find several of those workers who did not have 


monitoring data, so I was just going to kind of 


close out on that question. 


The TIB-38 coworker model, which is the 


internal dose coworker model -- again, a final 


discussion of -- of -- of sort of how -- how 


that model was to be applied, I guess was the 


real question there. 


Then we also had sample cases, some of these 


proof of principle cases that we wanted to go 


over and NIOSH had provided those, and as of 


the last worker meeting SC&A didn't really have 


-- didn't have the time at that point to review 


those cases so we wanted to just finally touch 


base on those. I think some of those involved 


-- well, I know one is external coworker model, 


one is the internal coworker model and one is a 


super S case, so I think -- to the extent we 


don't discuss those in our other discussions -- 


we can look at those cases. 

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And then I guess the final sort of point on the 


agenda was to -- for the workgroup to discuss 


the -- the path forward with how we're going to 


present -- how we are going to present, as a 


workgroup, to the Board and -- and just maybe 


the -- the logistics of that in the next couple 


of days. 


So I think that was the main thing. If I 


missed anything, I'm -- I'm sure I'll find it 


when we start talking here. I'll look for the 


agenda. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, you're -- you're right. You 


went down it pretty well. I finally found the 


right one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Sorry. 


NEUTRON ISSUES, ’52 THROUGH ‘58


 MR. GRIFFON: But I -- first item on there -- 


and the first two items obviously are the most 


two sort of critical right now, and if I could 


ask I think either Arjun or Brant -- Arjun or 


Brant, I don't care really -- it doesn't matter 


who goes first, but gi-- maybe give us an 


update on the '52 through '58 time period from 


that technical call that we had, and from your 

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supplemental report -- I guess it makes sense 


to start, Arjun, with you. Then Brant can -- 


can add in after. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Well, we took at look at 


a number of different angles of the '52 to '58 


period, having -- some of them in the prior 


calls that we had, NIOSH and SC&A agreed. And 


the main big picture point on which there is 


agreement -- Brant, correct me if I'm wrong -- 


is that the '52 to '58 data are themselves not 


adequate to do the dose reconstruction. The 


data were mostly restricted to Building 91. 


The Building 71 data, there were some, but most 


of them are not available or could not be 


available for rereading. The -- and so 


essentially the evaluation and the dose 


reconstruction depend on the use of 1959 data 


for -- for calculating a neutron-to-photon 


ratio and evaluating or estimating the doses 


for '52 to '58 by building. And so I think -- 


I think on that much there is pretty much 


agreement. 


 And then there is the question of whether the 


back-extrapolation works and whether it has 


been shown to be claimant-favorable or a best 

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estimate or somewhere in that realm, or whether 


it is scientifically defensible or not. And on 


that piece there -- there has not been 


agreement, at least until the last call. 


What we did was we investigated whether there 


is some piece of '52 to '58 data, either for 


Building 71 or Building 91, which were the main 


buildings in that period although 76 and 77 


were added and there are some others -- whether 


there's some way in which this back-


extrapolation -- against which this back-


extrapolation can be -- can be checked. And 


there was the statements that are documented 


there, at least initially, that the workers who 


were badged in the '52 to '58 period were those 


who were thought to be at highest risk. And 


there's a little bit -- the record's a little 


bit murky on this, but if I go by what Roger 


Falk has said, it -- it is that there -- there 


were a special group of period -- people, at 


least initially in Building 91, who were 


handling a special neutron source who were 


thought to be at highest risk and therefore 


they were badged. And actually the data bear 


that out in that in -- in 1952 and 1953 the 

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neutron doses from Building 91 are -- are quite 


a bit higher than -- and then they tend to go 


down, all the way to 1999. And that was the 


table, unfortunately, that I revised and sent 


out yesterday 'cause it didn't -- it didn't 


change the numbers significantly, but the 


original numbers were a little bit off because 


of the gamma com-- small gamma component in 


there that shouldn't have been in there. And 


the -- the -- broadly, the -- the -- the 


neutron doses were declining in Building 91 and 


they were higher -- see, we try to compare them 


with -- with the notional doses, taking the 


NDRP statement of purpose at face value that 


they tried to make a best estimate dose. And 


if you -- if you look at Figure 1, I think, 


you'll see that most of the measured neutron 


doses are less than most of the notional doses 


in 1955. In 1953 it was the reverse -- the 


year of the high neutron doses in Building 91. 


All the measured doses were at the -- among the 


top ten doses. So we found a very mixed 


picture. We couldn't find any way to actually 


find a benchmark in that period to validate 


this back extrapolation. For Building 91 the 

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doses -- neutron doses were the lowest in 1959. 


Of course the NP ratios -- the ratio of neutron 


to photon -- and you'd -- so you'd need a full 


-- full-blown analysis, but mainly what is -- 


we looked then into what is the physical basis 


for the comparison. 


It turns out that there were a very large 


number of changes in what was done in these 


buildings, how it was done, the job types. In 


the '56 to '58 period there was an expansion of 


the operation. Two new buildings were built. 


Metal-working operations were transferred from 


71 to 76. Assembly operations were transferred 


from 91 to 77. It's not clear to me whether 


the neutron sources that were initially handled 


remained the same. This is something we didn't 


investigate, but the neutron doses in Building 


91 declined after 1953, raising a question 


about that. 


Then there was a new chem line -- chemistry 


line that was added in Building 71 to do the 


plutonium chemistry, and that changed the way 


in which the work was done. Initially it was 


done remotely and there was -- there were a lot 


of maintenance problems with that. There were 

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a lot of clogging of the lines that had to be 


then cleared manually. And so then 


subsequently, starting in '57 or '58, the work 


was done manually and then there was less 


maintenance. Roger Falk stated that the 


neutron doses from routine operations went up 


and maintenance operations went down, but on 


balance the neutron doses went up. There's 


been no real quantitative test of this balance 


because we have no data for Building 71 in -- 


in the relevant period with the old equipment 


and the old way of doing things. 


And we have the problem of job types, as well, 


because the balance between the job types 


changed. And while workers were following the 


batches of plutonium from beginning to end, the 


-- there are different dose groupings indicated 


when -- when you do look at the neutron doses 


that are available in -- in Building 71. So 


it's not that everybody was getting the same 


order of magnitude of doses so you can assume 


there was one type of job. 


So overall we found that while NIOSH has stated 


that the changes were claimant-favorable and 


that NDRP calculations are claimant-favorable, 

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we couldn't find any analysis that -- that 


could make this quantitatively demonstrable and 


-- and a very significant number of chan-- 


well, the pit design changed, too, to a hollow 


pit -- very significant number of changes means 


that you have to do a quantitative analysis to 


demonstrate that this back-extrapolation is 


claimant favorable. We -- we saw no -- no easy 


way nor -- in which it could be done. And in 


fact, we saw no way to assure that if you spent 


a lot of time that -- that you could actually 


arrive at a scientifically credible result. 


We did one more test, which was for the '59 to 


'70 period where we do have workers who have a 


lot of neutron monitoring data, more than six 


months to a full year of neutron monitoring, 


and we applied the NP method to those workers 


to see whether the result is claimant 


favorable. We took one worker from 71, one 


worker from 91 for each year from '59 to '70. 


Of course for -- for any one year it's not a 


statistically significant test, but overall we 


had 21 workers for whom we did this calculation 


and that calculation is presented in Table 4. 


And we -- we -- we found that in most cases the 

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notional dose was less than the measured dose 


in actually -- out -- out of 21 cases, it was 


less than the measured dose in 18 cases. And 


if you ignore the ones that were in the 90 


percent, there were -- one, two, three -- four 


of them. So in 14 out of 21 cases, you had -- 


you had the notional dose that was less than 90 


percent, and the lowest one was as low as -- as 


22 percent. There were -- there were three 


results that were in the 20 percent range. 


So that test also of the claimant favorability 


of the NP method didn't work. I mean we looked 


at the NDRP and -- and its origin, and the -- 


the rereading of the badges and the whole 


project was conceived in the context of an 


epidemiological study of grouping workers 


together. From that point of view for 


buildings you may use the reread badges for -- 


for that purpose, but at least we could not 


find it demonstrated that it's working for 


this. And certainly for the '52 to '58 period 


it -- it seems -- it seems, as things stand, 


that it did not demonstrate it to be claimant 


favorable and one doesn't know whether it could 


ever be because there's no benchmarking data. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Arjun, is --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I think that I've covered 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I've covered the main 


points. I mean you -- the first part of the 


report is -- does deal with '52 to '58 


primarily and -- and the data -- if you want 


the summary of, you know, visual -- visual 


results, you can -- you can look at Table 1, 


which is on page 15, where you have this 


comparison of which -- whether the notional 


dose workers were more exposed or monitored 


worker were more exposed, assuming that the 


notional dose is a best estimate, of course. 


So this is only an indicative comparison 


because we have questions about notional dose. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just to -- to check, I'm not -- I 


-- I should have done this at the outset of the 


call, but does everyone have this supplemental 


report? Has this been cleared by privacy 


review? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, it has been cleared. 
I 


mean one reason why I took a little bit long is 


we were technically proofing this and checking 

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the numbers at the same time as it was 


undergoing privacy review, and so we kind of 


did a final cleanup of the report as -- as Liz 


and Emily were reviewing this, and so we were 


able to get it out to everyone, with -- with 


technical corrections, on Friday. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. Okay, so -- so maybe 


Brant, this would be a good time to let you -- 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, as everybody knows, we're 


under the gun on this. We've really been 


getting down into the weeks on NDRP for the 


past few weeks. I did get the first part of 


SC&A's report that dealt with the '52 to '58, I 


believe -- or maybe '59 -- time period on 


Tuesday. I had a little bit of time to react 


to that. I never got the supplemental of the 


report that deals with post-'59. That is to 


say SC&A never sent that to me. However, I did 


get it through the NIOSH grapevine late in the 


day on Friday, so I can comment a little more 


confidently about '52 to '58. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Brant, the -- the '52 to '58 


part is also revised in the -- what you have 

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because we had a conference call after the 


Monday report and those are all back and forth 


and we have the minutes or -- from that call 


that are now part of this report, and some of 


that discussion is reflected in the new '52 to 


'58. 


 DR. ULSH: All right, thank you. There's a 


couple of things I think we need to talk about 


in the '52 to '58 time period, and the first 


thing is that the Neutron Dose Reconstruction 


Project went through detailed time lines for 


the people that were included in the project, 


by badge exchange cycle, and placed them in 


buildings. So we know, for instance, which 


people were in Building 71, which people were 


in Building 91, et cetera. And so I -- I think 


it's worthwhile noting that when you try to say 


something about '52 to '58 as a -- as a unit, 


that might be too broad a brush stroke, and 


I'll get into what I mean by that in -- in a 


few minutes. 


I do want to clarify this benchmarking issue 


because it has come up a number of times, and I 


also want to talk about who was monitored and 


who wasn't and I'll go through some relevant 

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time lines here. 


First of all, I think the situation is very 


different in Building 91 compared to Building 


71. Let's start with Building 91. It was 


constructed -- construction was completed in 


1952. It was, I believe, the first building on 


site completed. The main activities in that 


building were the shipping and receiving of 


plutonium -- you know, materials from off-site 


and also, as Arjun mentioned, the final 


assembly. So when things were getting ready to 


leave the Rocky Flats site, they left from 


Building 91. And also as Arjun mentioned, in 


1957 the final assembly operations were 


transferred to the newly-operational Building 


77. 


And over the course of 1952 to 1959, you see 


that about -- I mean we've talked about that 


there were 20 neutron dosimeters available for 


badge exchange. And gee, that sure doesn't 


sound like a lot. But when you look at the 


number of people who were gamma monitored in 


Building 91 by year and you look at the number 


of people who were neutron monitored in 91 by 


year, you see that it varies anywhere from 21 

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percent to 41 percent. 


Now I want to be clear what I'm talking about 


here. I'm talking about of the people who were 


monitored for gamma, approximately 21 that can 


be -- if you divide the number of people 


monitored by neutron over the number of people 


monitored for gamma, you get about 21 percent 


to 41 percent. So you know, that's not a 


majority, but it's certainly -- I want to make 


that clear what we're talking about here, what 


fraction of the monitored population was 


actually monitored for neutrons. 


One thing I also need to clarify is that when 


we say that people were not monitored, I -- I 


know that SC&A and -- and NIOSH and probably 


the working group know this, what we're talking 


about is neutron monitoring. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Correct. I mean it's stated 


explicitly in the report. 


 DR. ULSH: Exactly. Exactly, I just want to 


point that out. So I mean we are using 


individuals' own data to the extent that they 


have gamma monitoring, so it's really neutron 


monitoring that we're talking about. 


And as mentioned, as the years went by in 91, 

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the total neutron dose rate tended to drop, 


until you got to a point where both the gamma 


and the neutron doses that you were seeing were 


very near the limit of detection. And this is 


a critical point because the NDRP faced a 


choice when looking at Building 91. They could 


look at the -- the ratio that was observed in 


1959 in Building 91, or they could look at the 


ratio observed in Building 77 and apply that, 


because that's where the final assembly 


operations went. Because the ratio was higher 


in 91 in 1959, they chose to use that ratio. 


 And there's an interesting phenomenon in play 


here. The neutron doses did not have 


background subtracted from them. Now that's 


the numerator of your ratio. Then the dose, 


that's the denominator, did have background 


subtracted. And that's why, once you get down 


near the LOD, limit of detection, that's why 


you see a higher NP ratio in Building 91. And 


then we're taking that higher ratio and 


applying that back to the gamma doses that were 


observed in the early years. That is the 


reason that we're saying this is a very 


claimant-favorable thing to do. I would con-- 

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I would say that the estimates provided in the 


NDRP could be characterized as claimant 


favorable best estimates. 


The situation is a little bit different in 


Building 71. Building 71 was constructed in 


1952 and -- now here's an interesting thing 


that may not be obvious. If we are concerned 


from an SEC standpoint about neutron doses 


experienced by the workers from handling 


plutonium, and also the neutron 


(unintelligible) in 91, well, I don't think 


that we should be -- even talking about 1952 or 


indeed prior to May, 1953 in Building 71 


because the first batch of plutonium was 


introduced into the chem line in May of 1953 in 


Building 71. So if our concern is neutrons 


from plutonium, it doesn't make sense to me 


that we're talking about any time prior to May, 


1953. 


Now, as Arjun mentioned, in 1957 or thereabouts 


-- I think the funding for the expansion of 


Building 71 occurred in (broken transmission) 


and the actual expansions occurred in '56 into 


'57, I can't really recall. But they did add 


what was called the east chem line, and also in 

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Building 71 in 1957 you see some degree of 


neutron monitoring. I don't want to oversell 


that. It was not a lot. 


And then another important event happened in 


'57 -- this was an active year in terms of what 


you might expect in Building 71. As Arjun 


mentioned, the -- the machining operations were 


transferred over to Building 77, and that was 


precipitated by a large plenum fire that 


occurred in September of 1957, and that shut 


down operations until the latter part of 1958. 


So you're not going to see many -- you know, 


much neutron exposure between that plenum fire 


until the latter part of 1958. And then later 


in 1958 there was the resumption of plutonium 


chemistry operations and neutron monitoring's a 


bit more widespread in 71 in that year. 


So if you're concerned about the back-


extrapolation from 1959 to those earlier years, 


one thing that you've got to keep in mind in 


Building 71 was that the primary neutron 


exposure source was the plutonium chemistry and 


in particular the fluorination of the 


plutonium, and that did not change between -- 


well, over -- prior to 1959. There was one 

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exception, and that was -- to accommodate the 


changed pit design that Arjun mentioned -- the 


batch size increased from 200 grams to about on 


the order of 1,200 grams. There's no reason to 


think that that would have changed the ratio, 


the neutron-to-photon ratio. So as you go back 


in time, it is true that when you're trying to 


apply 1959 ratio to earlier years, it becomes ­

- I think speculative was the word that was 


used, the further back in time you go. But I 


would ask you to consider whether or not '58 


can be related to '59. I mean this was after 


all these changes that we contend would have 


increased the NP ratio. I know that that's not 


agreed-to by SC&A, but it begs the question of 


why the '59 ratios could not be applied in '58, 


maybe even in '57, although, you know, you did 


have some events there in '57. 


And getting back to this benchmarking issue, it 


is certainly true that there are no field 


survey type of data that were available for the 


NDRP. That is not a point that is in 


disagreement. However, there are limited 


neutron and photon monitoring for those people 


who were monitored. And as I said, that ranged 

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between 20 and 40 percent of 199-- I'm sorry, 


20 and 40 percent of 91 workers and less for 


Building 71. And in Building 71 you have 


neutron monitoring beginning in '57, then they 


had the fire that shut down operations, then 


they resumed. In 1958 you see more monitoring, 


still not a lot, then widespread monitoring I 


guess in 1959. 


And what we observed from the monitoring that 


was done, in Building 91 there were -- well, I 


don't really know how many plates exactly there 


were, but from the paired data that are 


available, we observe an NP ratio of -- and let 


me be clear; I'm talking about simply the sum 


of the gamma doses over the sum of the neutron 


doses -- and we observe a ratio of 2.23, and 


that -- and that's between 1952 and 1958. So 


all those years taken together, that's the 


period we're talking about extrapolating. And 


then what we observe in 1959 is the ratio of 


3.6, so to the extent that this data is 


informative -- and I agree that it is limited, 


so it should be weighed as only part of the 


evidence -- you know, part -- weight of the 


evidence, it looks like that is claimant 

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favorable. 


Building 71, we only had limited neutron 


monitoring from '57 and '58, and we observe a 


ratio of 1.31 compared with the 1959 ratio of 


1.4 -- again, claimant favorable. 


I'll let you draw your own conclusions about 


the strength of that. There are certainly some 


limits to how much confidence should be placed 


in this. But the data that does exist do 


suggest that the ratio to 1959 are claimant 


favorable for back-extrapolation. 


And I'm looking at my agenda here to see if 


there's anything else that I need to say about 


those. Oh, yes, let me see. 


Table 4, I think Arjun mentioned this table, 


but it might refer to the later time period and 


I think maybe we want to limit our conversation 


to '52 to '58 right now and then maybe talk 


about '59 forward later. Is that what I'm 


thinking, Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I guess so -- yeah, maybe 


we -- you know, we have enough to chew on there 


for that one period, so -- 


 DR. ULSH: All right, so I think that is pretty 


much all I want to say about '52 to '58. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, could I make one comment 


about what has just transpired? It is that the 


-- the -- I said this before but I wanted to 


reiterate it in this context is the nature of 


the work in Building 71 changed, and this -- 


this was discussed during the April 24th call 


and the current report is revised to reflect 


that discussion, which is that in the earlier 


period the pluton-- in Building 71 the 


plutonium chemistry was done differently than 


it was in the new chem line, which is that the 


operations were remote, but there were a lot of 


maintenance problems which were done manually. 


And then later on there were fewer maintenance 


problems, but the operations were done 


manually. We don't have any quantitative data 


to compare the balance of how the neutron to -- 


doses were between maintenance and routine 


operations, much -- much less to actually go on 


to -- to the neutron-to-photon ratios. And we 


also don't have a job type analysis because 


NDRP decided to do a building aggregation. And 


so this -- this is actually a -- a very 


significant problem. And the other thing is 


that new job types were introduced into 

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Building 71, which was the incinerator which 


was built in 1958 and we don't have any 


separate data for NP ratios or gamma and 


neutron doses by job type. They -- they -- 


they would exist in the individual claimant 


data and in the job cards and so on, but it's 


not integrated into the NDRP analysis in any 


way. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, in terms of the incinerator, 


Arjun, I -- I question whether that would have 


any appreciable impact at all because the dose 


rates are so low. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I'm not (unintelligible) ­

- all I'm pointing out is we -- we've not said 


that the NIOSH conclusion is wrong. All we've 


said is that we haven't found any quantitative 


analysis and the -- the changes were very, very 


significant. And in the earlier period for 


Building 71 the data do not appear to exist 


against which to confirm this. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I -- I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) is at the core 


of the argument. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I have just presented some 


data that -- well, that -- for Building 71, 

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that's from '57 and '58 so I don't want to try 


to extend that back. But yeah, we're pretty 


much arguing from first principle here because, 


as you said, at least in Building 71 -- now 


this is certainly not true in Building 91 -- 


but in Building 71 there was no neutron 


monitoring prior to 1957, so that is a point 


taken. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And the '57 data don't ap-- we 


found only data from late '58 for Building 71. 


 DR. ULSH: No, there is Buil-- there is '57 


data. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Okay, it's not -- this is Ron. 


It is not on the matched pair -- neutron -- 


beta/gamma and matched pair on the NDRP on the 


O drive. We did receive a little bit of data 


on the CD or something that was sent earlier, 


in January, that had a few workers results in 


'57. But if it's on the O drive under the 


NDRP, I have not found it yet if it's there. 


Now, the main body of the neutron/photon 


matched pair does not contain any '57 data for 


that building. 


 DR. ULSH: I don't know -- Mutty? 


 MR. SHARFI: That -- that's correct, the paired 

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data -- there is -- there is some '57 data that 


is not in the pair dataset. 


 MS. MUNN: Only in '57 data, right? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But we have no way to compare 


the NP ratios because we have no matched pair 


data. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, but we have some raw data from 


'57, and --


UNIDENTIFIED: Correct. 


 MS. MUNN: -- let me -- let me clarify one 


question -- one -- one thing I think I heard. 


Did I not hear that there was no SNM in 


Building 51 (sic) until sometime in 1953? 


 DR. ULSH: Wanda, that was me, I said that, 


that in -- in -- there was -- the first batch 


of plutonium -- that was received, I believe 


from Hanford -- was introduced into Building 


71, the east chem line, in May of 1953. So 


prior to that there was no plutonium in 


Building 71. 


 MS. MUNN: So why would there even be an issue 


about '52 with respect to 19-- Building 71? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, that was my question. 


 MS. MUNN: There wouldn't be. There was no 


material there. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: NIOSH has -- has -- and the 


NDRP has applied NP ratios to -- to Building 71 


going back to 1952, and we didn't actually 


investigate the detailed beginning of every 


particular operation (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) certainly 


something we can (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- (unintelligible) documents 


are classified and we just took the NDRP sort 


of period as the starting point for our 


analysis --


 MR. GRIFFON: That's something we certainly 


want to get right, too, if -- you know, if it 


came down to --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, right, obviously -- no -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) time frame, 


yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm using an unclassified document 


as my source for that, it's Putzier's Memoirs, 


which are on the O drive. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That -- that's fine, Brant. I 


mean we -- we can certainly -- 


 MS. MUNN: For our purposes --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah --


 MS. MUNN: -- yeah, for our purposes, 

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essentially --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- certainly consider the date 


(unintelligible). 


 MS. MUNN: -- 1953 is the date we're looking 


at. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I'm not sure that applies 


to -- to 91 as well? 


 DR. ULSH: No, it doesn't, Mark. 


 MS. MUNN: Huh-uh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 MS. MUNN: No, no, it (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: We do have measured neutron doses in 


91 in 1952. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I suspect, although I can't say this 


for certain, that it has to do with that 


neutron source --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- rather than the plutonium. 

 MS. MUNN: Probably. 

 DR. ULSH: In fact, Putzier's Memoirs attest to 

that. 

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clarification. You -- you mentioned the shift 


for some of the operations from Building 91 to 


Building 71. I think that was in 1957, as 


well? 


 DR. ULSH: It was Building 77, Mark, I believe. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 77, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: And I do think you're right. I 


think it was in 1957. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and when they switched 


assembly operations, was the assembly operation 


essentially the same operation, or was it a 


different design that they were assembling or 


wha... 


 DR. ULSH: Well, keep in mind, Mark, that this 


is right around the time, as -- as Arjun 


mentioned, that they -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- initiated the new pit design -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: -- and so that required I believe a 


bit more extensive activities in terms of the 


final assembly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: So that would -- would have been a 


little bit different. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: So wou-- again, that's a process 


change, in my mind, that -- that's simply the 


way I'm looking at this. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I agree. The -- the question 


in -- that -- that remains for me, however, is 


whether any concerns with regard to a change in 


design are covered by the assertion that the 


larger batch quantities would bound that 


question. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, let me speak to that just a 


little bit, Wanda. There's a couple of things 


to consider. First of all, I -- I don't want 


to get into too much detail about NP ratios 


from pits. I think we could get into trouble 


talking about that. 


 MS. MUNN: Probably. 


 DR. ULSH: However, it is less than one. And 


I'm reading from Putzier's Memoirs right now 


and it says that Building 991 -- for workers in 


Building 991 a piece of NTA film was added 


since some of the MDT* operations did involve 


some generation of neutrons. The intended use 


of the NTA film at that time related to the 


fact that people who were operating equipment 


which created neutrons from gamma neutron 

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reaction and not that they were handling 


plutonium, which gave off neutron radiation 


also. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, whoa, read that sentence one 


more time, please. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, let me see, I think I know the 


one you mean. The intended use of NTA film at 


the time related to the fact that people were 


operating equipment which created neutrons from 


a gamma neutron reaction and not that they were 


handling plutonium, which gave off neutron 


radiation also. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, okay. 


 DR. ULSH: So I interpret that to mean that the 


neutron-to-photon ratio that was observed in 


Building 91 had primarily to do with this 


equipment that they were operating that we 


can't go into great detail about. 


 MS. MUNN: Right, machinery, other than -- than 

--

 DR. ULSH: And so the transfer of the final 

assembly operations, which would have been the 


lower NP ratio type of operations, taking those 


out of Building 91 would increase the NP ratio 


-- and I'm arguing from first principles here ­
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-


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- and therefore when you're left 


with this neutron source, combined with the 


fact that the dose rates are now down around 


the LOD and the fact that the background is not 


subtracted from neutron but is from gamma, that 


becomes a much more important factor. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: So -- and SC&A's only --


 MR. GRIFFON: This whole -- this whole 


operation was moved, though, wasn't it? And --


and is this -- this other source, was it the 


same afterwards? 'Cause I know they went 


through -- this is hard to discuss on the con-- 


you know, open conference call -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I don't know the answer to 


that, Mark, that source. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I could probably find out the answer 


to that, but I don't know it right now. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: The --


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause it's not only the -- well, 


anyway, yeah. Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: One of the issues here -- you 

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know, Ro-- Roger brought this up on our calls 


more than once -- is that the initial 


monitoring of Building 91 people was oriented 


toward that special neutron source that I 


believe Brant has just talked about, and -- and 


-- and its NP ratio would be different than 


during the other operation. Now if -- if -- if 


the pit design was different and the -- the 


con-- the people who were badged were not the 


ones who were actually doing the assembly 


operations, as I understood, at least initially 


-- the badging was targeted towards people 


handling the neutron source 'cause they were 


concerned say about incidents in handling it 


and -- and so forth, and -- and because of 


that, we -- we don't -- I think even in 


Building 91 you would not have data for the 


early years unless there -- you get into the 


job cards, and we certainly haven't done that. 


Perhaps NIOSH has done that and sorted whether 


there are say in '52, '53, '54 there are 


workers who had assembly responsibilities who 


had monitoring with the old type of pit. 


 DR. ULSH: Arjun, I didn't come away with our ­

- from our conference call with that 

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distinction between the people handling the 


neutron source and the final assembly. I came 


away from it with the understanding that 


handling of that neutron source was part of the 


final assembly. Again, I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, my --


 DR. ULSH: -- would have to get --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- my -- my feeling about who 


was monitored were -- were people who were 


handling -- that the monitoring was targeted 


toward people who were handling that neutron 


source --


 DR. ULSH: I didn't get --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and that was the object of 


the monitoring. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I think --

 MS. MUNN: That were a part of the production 

process. 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, yes, so that once you 


separate that out -- what -- all what I'm 


saying is I'm not sure that you've got an 


appropriate comparison basis because of how the 


selection of the monitoring -- monitored 


population was done in Building 91. It doesn't 


seem to me that -- that we have that. 

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 DR. ULSH: Well, I think -- yeah, I think it's 


true -- I mean I just read Putzier's Memoirs 


where he says that the neutron potential was 


related to the handling of this equipment 


rather than the handling of the plutonium. And 


another thing to keep in mind here is that we 


looked at the 1959 ratio in Building 91 and 


it's 3.6, and compared to the earlier years, 


the limited data that we have, it's 2.23, so it 


suggests at least that -- I mean what you're 


saying is true that the monitoring was focused 


toward these people that handled the neutron 


source, but I think it's claimant favorable to 


do that because when you compare that to final 


assembly operations you're talking about 


plutonium metal, and for various reasons, you 


don't really want a lot of neutrons around the 


plutonium metal pit. Bad things tend to happen 


when you get a lot of neutrons there. 


 MS. MUNN: Especially if -- again, this is a 


refresher of what I think I -- I heard in 


earlier discussions here. The neutron-tophoton ratio -- the NP ratio in '59 was above 


3.6 something, and from '52 to '58 it was -- or 


was that '57/'58 it was 2.23 and then for the 

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longer period it was down to 1.8? 


 DR. ULSH: No, Wanda, let me clarify on that. 


 MS. MUNN: I -- I'm confused. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Let's talk about Building 91. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: Starting -- the time period between 


1952 and 1958, the observed NP ratio was 2.23, 


and that's based on limited data. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, right. 


 DR. ULSH: In 1959 the observed ratio in 


Building 91 was 3.6 --


 MS. MUNN: 3.6. 


 DR. ULSH: -- and that has mostly to do with 


(broken transmission) fact that both the 


neutron and the gamma measurements came down to 


right around the LOD. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: That fact about background 


subtraction becomes a much larger factor. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, got that. 


 DR. ULSH: That's not the same for Building 71. 


You want me to talk about that? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes --

 DR. ULSH: Okay. 

 MS. MUNN: -- would you please? Refresh me. 
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 DR. ULSH: Building 71 you've got plutonium 


coming in beginning in May of 1953. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ULSH: All right? 


 MS. MUNN: So essentially for 71, '52 is not an 


issue. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I'll leave that to the working 


group's discretion. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, in my mind (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: What was going on in 71 when -- 


when it started operations in '52? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, Arjun, it was built in 1952 


and it became operational for plutonium in May 


of 1953, so I'm -- you know, I can't really say 


exactly what was going on. All I can say is 


that the first plutonium came in -- 


 MS. MUNN: They were probably installing 


machinery. Anyway --


 DR. ULSH: Well, yeah -- I don't know exactly. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: Now Building 71, you've got starting 


in May of '53, first plutonium comes in. They 


-- the workers here are gamma monitored but not 


neutron monitored. 


Now as you go forward in time, you come up to 

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1956, you come up to 1957 and a lot of things 


happened in 1957. 


 MS. MUNN: Right, you went over those. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, and --


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) do that again. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Beginning in '57, you've got 


some neutron monitoring, not much. Then in '58 


when they resumed operations, you've got more 


neutron monitoring and then more again in '59. 


And what we observe here is that in those years 


where we do have data -- a limited number in 


'57, more in '58 -- the observed NP ratio is 


1.31; as you move into 1959, the observed ratio 


is 1.4, so it's --


 MS. MUNN: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: -- slightly claimant favorable. 


Quite (unintelligible) favorable 


(unintelligible) suggest. 


 MS. MUNN: All right, got it. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: That's better. Thanks. Sorry to 


get you off on that repeat item. 


 DR. ULSH: All right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I -- I mean I -- I think 


we have this all -- you know, we've gone 

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through this. I would urge everybody on the 


workgroup, we've got the minutes from the 


technical call, too, that we just had and we 


have the supplemental report from SC&A, and 


along with these -- these transcripts that 


Ray's going to turn around in a day -- Ray 


can't answer to my joke -- but -- but I think I 


-- I'd urge everyone to look at those 'cause 


some of this is written up. It's a lot easier 


to digest when you're looking at all of it in 


writing rather than sharing it on the phone. 


But is there anything else to clarify '52 to 


'58 before we move on? I -- I think we've got 


-- you know, the -- the way I'm looking at this 


is let's get all the facts on the table and 


then, you know, we can discuss them. May-- and 


I think the workgroup may have to caucus 


Wednesday night before the meeting with the 


Board on Thursday. I think --


 MS. MUNN: I think that's an excellent idea. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Mainly my purpose here is to get 


all the facts out on the table and then -- then 


sort of bring it back to the Board at that 


point. 


 MS. MUNN: I don't see how we can avoid that. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. Anything to add, 


Arjun or Brant, on that time period? And then 


we can maybe move on to -- 


 DR. ULSH: I have nothing further, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I -- I don't, either. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. And --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Joe -- I don't know if Joe's on 


the call as yet --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, I am, I'm --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Joe, are we --


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- (unintelligible) cover 


(unintelligible) background noise is -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- (unintelligible) the 


problem. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Joe, are we okay on -- on going 


ahead? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I -- I think, you know, 


between the documentation and what we've just 


discussed, I think we've covered this in some 


detail already. 


NEUTRON ISSUES, ’59 THROUGH ‘70


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. All right, then '59 


onward, Arjun, you --

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- touched on that earlier, but I 


think we should hit on it a little further. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, '59 on -- '59 onward, of 


course there is more data and there are data 


for -- for every building and there are neutron 


and photon data for every building, so the -- 


so the issues are a little bit different -- 


quite a bit different. The -- the 1959 to 1964 


period, there was more monitoring, but there 


were still a lot of people who had neutron 


exposure or at least in the NDRP who were not 


monitored. That is, whose records indicate 


that they have 100 percent notional doses. I 


just wanted to say what the notional dose -- 


what the NDRP dose consists of. 


It has four components, basically, two of them 


relate to this notional dose and two of them 


relate to the rereading of the badges. First ­

- so the badges were recovered, as Brant has 


pointed out -- it said at the NDRP about 87,000 


badges were reread and 76,000 were matched 


neutron gamma pairs -- in varying amounts for 


each year, increasing into 1964 and '65. So a 


lot of the badges were recovered and reread and 

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most of them were in pairs, but not all of them 


were recovered and so for various years you 


have varying numbers of workers, ranging from 


one to 1,700, whose badges were not reread for 


one reason or another -- not available, 


couldn't be matched to the worker and so on. 


So the NDRP added the reread dose, the cor-- 


assuming it's correct, for the moment -- to a 


dose that was generally felt to be in error and 


the rereading showed it to be in error, and the 


amounts of errors varied over the years greatly 


and by individual also greatly, and added -- 


added up was a -- a -- a dose that was known to 


be in error to a dose that was corrected and 


pres-- can be presumed, I think, to be in -- at 


least as a first -- first cut, to be correct. 


So you've got a problem of data integrity with 


the NDRP in that an erroneous dose was added to 


a correct dose. 


Now NIOSH dose reconstruction doesn't 


incorporate the part of the dose that couldn't 


be reread directly, but adds a correction and 


multiplies it by a correction factor, so we 


checked the correction factor. And for that -- 


that's an issue with the rereading part. 

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For the '59 to '64 what is more relevant is the 


notional dose, which is the dose calculated to 


fill the gaps in neutron monitoring. They 


could be small gaps, intra-year gaps, which 


were filled by nearby doses from the worker's 


own monitoring record, so if you had one-month 


gap and two or three months around that had 


monitoring data. Generally we -- we did not 


find that to be questionable and -- and the 


uncertainties around that are -- are limited, 


and I think there's -- there's -- there's more 


general agreement that that piece of the NDRP 


in -- in filling the gaps is okay. 


The piece of the NDRP that there has been a lot 


of question about in our analysis is the -- is 


the dose calculated from the NP ratio. We 


looked at '59 to '64, and if you look at the 


highest recalculated doses you find that in 


many or most cases the higher end doses are 


calculated doses rather than for monitored 


workers. Now this doesn't mean that the actual 


exposures were to workers that were not 


monitored, because -- obviously we have 


questions about -- about -- about the NP ratio. 


Now if you look at Table 4, you'll see that in 

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our test, at least, the claimant favorability 


of tests that we did -- admittedly not 


statistically significant for any one year, but 


overall we did look at 21 workers. We looked 


at them randomly. It was just going through 


and finding the first worker -- Ron, correct me 


if I'm wrong here, you -- you did the selection 


-- finding the first worker with more than six 


months of neutron and gamma monitoring data. 


And if you look at Table 4, the calculated dose 


on the NP method is generally smaller than in ­

- in most cases than the measured dose, and in 


some cases it's much smaller, less than 50 


percent of the measured dose. And so at least 


this test indicates that in many or most cases 


-- at least in many cases the NP ratio method 


of calculating dose is not claimant favorable 


and then not a best estimate. And for '59 to 


'64 you've got a lot of people with indicated 


high notional doses, which may not be claimant 


favorable, which are higher than the monitored 


population. Now -- so that's -- that's sort of 


a particular issue with -- with the NDRP. 


Now it's -- the problem is that -- of different 


magnitude in different years. That's why in 

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our report we just gave you the scatter plots 


of -- of percent notional dose and percent -- 


versus neutron dose for every year in that -- 


in that period, just so you could make your own 


judgment about how significant it was in any -- 


any -- any one of those years. 


Then there's a question of job types. You 


know, we looked at -- we looked at whether a 


building aggregation of NP ratio was 


appropriate for calculating individual dose as 


opposed to say the original -- the origin of 


the NDRP, which was for epidemiologic study 


calculations, and we have not done a complete 


cluster analysis as yet. There just was not 


time to do that. But to the extent that -- 


that we could see, there -- you know, there 


were some worker doses that -- that were around 


ten millirem per day in Building 71, for 


example, and there were others that were only 


around one to two millirem per day range, and 


this is the av-- their annual average dose rate 


in Building 71 for -- for different 


individuals. So this indicates that -- that 


aggregating -- aggregating workers and taking 


the average of the neutron dose and the average 

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of the photon dose may not be ap-- appropriate 


for calculating an individual's dose. And when 


you put that together with the results of Table 


4 or our analysis that I've just alluded to, it 


-- it raises a lot of questions about that. 


And in this period man-- many workers or most 


workers are indicated, you know, to be at high 


risk of neutron exposure who were not monitored 


at all or not monitored the vast majority of 


the time. 


So those I think are the -- the date-specific 


issues that -- that refer -- refer to that 


period are the main points to me. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Brant, you want to -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I'll say what I can, Mark. 


Mutty and I --


 MR. GRIFFON: Sure. 


 DR. ULSH: -- have been working pretty 


feverishly on this this morning, and I'm 


looking at Table 4 and I think we're certainly 


in agreement with SC&A that this is not 


statistically significant. I mean one worker 


per year, when I believe in '59 -- and I'm 


going to rely on Mutty to fill in the gaps here 


for me. I believe there were like 2,000 people 

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-- Mutty, do you recall? 


 MR. SHARFI: In tot-- total that were monitored 


in any given year and the number that had maybe 


six months worth of data was probably around 


100 in a given building year. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, so we're in agreement with 


SC&A that this is not statistically 


significant. 


I do have some other questions about this, and 


again, I -- I don't have the backup data that 


goes behind this table so I'm just going to try 


to speak off the top of my head here, but this 


table, Table 4, characterizes this as buildings 


-- well, for instance, Building 71, notional 


over measured. And so I'm assuming that SC&A 


calculated the notional dose just as the NDRP 


would. I'm looking at the paragraph ahead of 


the table and it says that these workers were 


selected with the restriction that the worker 


have at least six months of paired neutron 


gamma dose data. So as Arjun mentioned, there 


are two terms that go into the notional dose 


calculation, and it's weighted by what 


percentage of that time a worker is neutron 


monitored versus what percentage of the time 

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he's not. And the first term in the notional 


dose is the worker's own neutron dose rate -- 


daily dose rate, and if she was worker -- she 


was monitored as it says here in their 


paragraph, that they were monitored at least 


six months and at least half of the notional 


dose would have come from that method, versus 


the other term which is the part of the time 


the worker was not monitored, to which you 


would apply an NP ratio. So I'm assuming that 


when you have the notional -- what's 


characterized here as the notional doses in 


Table 4, SC&A calculated those with the 


appropriate weighting for the time the people 


were monitored and to which you would apply the 


daily dose rate. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, Brant, I think you are 


misunderstanding the purpose of this analysis. 


No, that's not what this table is and I -- I've 


obviously done a bad job of explaining it. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Excuse me, (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This table was to test the 


neutron to photon method of calculating 


notional doses and whether -- 


 DR. ULSH: Arjun, is that the -- what you've 

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calculated in this table is not the notional 


dose as it would be calculated by the NDRP 


becau--


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It is. 


 DR. ULSH: No, because what you've done is 


you've selected people who were -- had at least 


six months of paired neutron and gamma data. 


Now if you take into account the population of 


people who were neutron monitored, they were 


the people thought to be at highest risk of 


exposure. In other words, they would have most 


likely the highest NP ratios. And that is why 


the NDRP weighted the notional dose by the time 


that they were monitored. So when you say that 


these are notional doses as they would be 


applied to these people, it's not. The NDRP --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I guess --


 DR. ULSH: -- (unintelligible) that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I still did not get through. 


Mark, I -- I do not know whether the working 


group understood what I'm trying to say is the 


purpose of this analysis. It's simply to 


calculate a notional dose for workers who were 


monitored in order to test whether the method 


is effective for workers who were not. 

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MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, let -- let me add --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Maybe Ron can explain it better 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, let Ron -- put Ron on. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- (unintelligible) than I do. 


 DR. WADE: Can I just interrupt for a moment -- 


this is Lew. We're hearing noise -- dogs bark 


and children cry and it's starting to become 


distracting, so I -- I guess I'd ask you to 


consider your situation and if that noise is 


going on where you are, please take steps to -- 


to spare the rest of us. Thank you. Ron. 


 MS. MUNN: And before we go back to where we 


were, can someone please repeat what page 


number of the report this is on? I got lost in 


bioassays. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Wanda, we're on page 34 -- 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- of the report. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Ron, why don't you take a crack 


at explaining that. I follow it, but I was -- 


you know, I've looked at it pretty close so... 


MR. BUCHANAN: Okay. Yes, the purpose of the 

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exercise was to say what if a person wasn't 


monitored and we -- we didn't think he was 


monitored and so we're going to apply notional 


dose to his gamma dose, NP ratio to his gamma 


dose to get a notional dose, and yet in his 


back pocket he has a monitor so we could later 


on compare that neutron dose to what we 


calculate from his gamma dose. And so 


essentially went in and looked at his gamma 


dose and then looked at the NP ratio for that 


year for that building, applied it to that 


gamma dose and said oka-- he would have been 


assigned say 1,000 millirem -- okay, he did 


actually have a gamma mon-- a neutron monitor. 


How does that compare to how we would have 


assigned his dose, and that was the ratio. Say 


he -- his neutron badge read 2,000 millirem, 


then the ratio would come out 50 percent, and 


so our intent was to just go in and pick 


randomly the worker out of that year, that 


building, and that had enough data because you 


-- you're kind of caught here if you don't get 


enough data, then you say well, it's not 


statistically significant. If you get too much 


data, well, then you say well, he was monitored 

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anyway. So I looked at something that had at 


least six months to make it some reasonable 


data and just say what would we assign him on 


a, you know, NP ratio. Say he wasn't 


monitored, he should have been monitored, he 


wasn't; what would we assign him on his -- 


based on his gamma dose or the NP ratio that 


year and then say how does that compare to what 


he was -- actually received on his neutron 


badge. That was the purpose of that, to see if 


-- and -- and I would expect that some years it 


would have alternated. Some years some workers 


would have been covered completely, some of 


them wouldn't. But in our case, you know, most 


of them were -- were below what was actually 


measured. That was the point of the exercise. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, I understand a little -- I 


mean I understand what you were doing there, 


Ron. I contend, though, that you can't draw 


any conclusions about the notional dose as it 


would be applied in the NDRP because what -- 


what would have happened is, let's say you were 


monitored for an exchange period, then you were 


unmonitored, and then you were monitored again 


so you've got a gap. The way that the NDRP 

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would have assigned that dose, it would have 


been heavily weighted -- at least in the 


population that you've selected -- by the 


worker's own daily neutron dose, and that is 


not reflected in this table -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But Brant, but this analysis is 


not relevant for workers with -- who were 


monitored most of the time. This analysis is 


most relevant -- indicative for workers who 


were not monitored most or all of the time. 


MR. BUCHANAN: That's right, 'cause they would 


have received the largest portion of their 


notional dose from N over P ratio. Say we have 


a worker out there should have been monitored, 


he wasn't, what dose would we assigned him. We 


would assigned him all -- or based on the N 


over P ratio, or if he was just monitored for 


several weeks or a month, most of the notional 


dose would have been from N over P ratio. And 


what I was -- I was looking at was how does 


this measure up to if he'd actually had a badge 


on him, how would that assigned dose match 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, if -- if you go to Figure 


10 maybe on page -- it might help to know which 

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workers we're talking about. It's on page 37. 


It's -- it's the percent of notional dose 


versus the actual neutron -- versus the final 


neutron dose as calculated by NDRP. If you 


look at the bo-- what -- the bottom set of 


dots, which is zero percent of people who were 


monitored all the time and -- and the set of 


dots that's between say zero and 20 percent or 


zero and 30 percent, tho-- or zero and 40 


percent even, those are the people who were 


monitored most of the time, about whose final 


neutron dose in terms of filling the gaps we 


don't have a lot of questions. We think that 


that's okay unless, you know, a lot of badges 


that couldn't be found. But the -- the -- the 


workers that we're talking about that we have 


concerns about are the ones toward the top of 


the graph where it says 80 percent and 100 


percent, these -- these workers would be in -- 


according to that analysis, may have received 


assigned notional doses that are much less than 


say if they had been actually monitored. 


Now, you know, your -- you have to do it year 


by year 'cause conditions were changing, but 


overall the test of the method indicates not 

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adequate for -- for these people at the -- 


toward the top of the chart, but okay for 


people toward the bottom of the chart. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I don't know that we're going 


to get a lot further than this other than -- I 


mean my main -- I understand what you were 


trying to do with this table. My concern is 


that, by the nature of the selection that you 


performed, the people who had at least six 


months of paired neutron gamma data, those were 


the people who were monitored because they were 


thought to be at highest risk of neutron 


exposure. So you cannot draw conclusions from 


those people and compare it to the people who 


were unmonitored for neutrons who were at lower 


risk of neutron exposure, and -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But would the -- but they are 


the ones who -- whose doses would determine the 


NP ratio, so the NP ratio should obviously 


apply to them because they were the monitored 


ones. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Anyway, yeah, that's 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Well, like I said, there is 


one more thing that I want to bring up here -- 

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and Mutty, I'm going to rely on your for some 


help here -- and that is the issue of missed 


dose, because the data in Table 4 I believe -- 


an annual total. So for instance, five percent 


in Building 71, 1959 -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Which -- which page are you on? 


 DR. ULSH: -- I can't -- this was -- that this 


took any account of missed dose as it would be 


applied in NIOSH dose reconstruction. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Which -- which -- which table 


are you -- sorry. 


 DR. ULSH: Back on Table 4 still. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Page -- page 34? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Of the new report? 


 DR. ULSH: I think so. Mutty, do you want to 


talk --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Would you like to --


 DR. ULSH: -- about that a little bit? 


 MR. SHARFI: We're -- we're probably confusing 


two issues. There -- there -- there are later 


tables, I think it's Table 5 and other -- Table 


6, which used to be in the -- in the initial 


pre-'52 report --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I saw that comment from 

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you all. I realized that I wasn't explaining 


things right. I just dropped that table with 


the zeroes 'cause I realized it was just 


confusing the issue and it is no longer in this 


report. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, okay. The final piece is, when 


you're talking about people who were monitored 


at least six months out of the year for 


neutrons, I -- it's safe to say that we would 


be assigning 95 percent -- I mean these would 


be the people who would be at the 95 percent 


confidence limit, I mean, and the NDRP does 


provide 95 percent upper bound doses. So I 


don't know that the uncertainty was taken into 


account here. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, actually that was a piece 


that I did not mention in -- in -- in going 


through the list is there is a discussion in 


the report -- I don't remember the pages 


anymore -- about -- about the NDRP model 


itself, is that the NDRP -- the N over P model 


assumes a proportionality between the gamma 


dose and the neutron dose, and assumes that the 


neutron dose is zero when the gamma dose is 


zero because that -- that -- that's the nature 

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of the equation that's used. If you go to page 


32 of the report, this is just one of the 


graphs and most of the graphs that I did came 


out this way. I didn't present them all 


because it just clutters the report, but this 


is fairly typical. It -- it plots -- it plots 


the paired data, measured -- measured data, 


neutron and gamma dose, and -- and the pink 


dots are -- are -- are linear regression line ­

- you see that there is a -- a Y-axis intercept 


with a 100-odd millirem of -- for -- for that 


regression line. The correlation isn't very 


good, actually; it's quite poor. But to the 


extent that there's a correlation, the -- the ­

- there is an intercept. And in the -- in the 


model that has been adopted, the -- the N-- 


these are measured data, so in the model that 


was adopted for notional doses doesn't reflect 


the characteristics of the measured data 


because it does not have a Y-axis intercept. 


The difficulty with this Y-axis intercept is it 


really changes from one year to the next 


because the conditions of work were changing, 


the way the assembly line operated was changing 


and so on, the number of workers who were 

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badged was changing. And the -- the strict 


proportionality with -- with a dose going 


through the origin does not apply to the actual 


data, but it's the way the notional dose model 


was set up for the NP ratios. And in that kind 


of context, I think the selection of the model 


raises a question in our minds as to whether 


the -- the variance means anything at all 


because that model does not reflect the 


measured data. 


DR. NETON: Arjun, this is Jim. I -- I think ­

- I might have a misunderstanding here 'cause I 


have not looked at this as thoroughly as Brant, 


but I thought that the uncertainty in the model 


was determined empirically based on the 


observed difference between the predicted minus 


the actual measured data in the workers that -- 


the paired data. That is really the overall 


variance of the model. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: If the variance is calculated 


based on the paired data but the overall model 


is forced to go through the origin, in that the 


expected values of the errors -- if you do 


neutron dose equal to NP ratio multiplied by 


gamma dose plus an error, which would be 

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essentially the -- the Y-axis intercept, that 


error is forced to be zero. 


 MR. SHARFI: Actually it's not, because this 


doesn't account for missed dose. The missed 


dose then would be our error. As the gamma 


dose goes to zero, then we assign missed dose ­

-


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, no, we're not talking 


about -- we're not talking about how you do 


dose reconstruction and whether you assign 


missed dose or not. We're just talking about 


whether the -- whether the characteristics of 


the model reflect the characteristics of the 


data, so that the -- what the variance might or 


might not mean. 


 MR. SHARFI: Well, that's my point. By -- by 


shifting this to a forced zero, what you do is 


you increase the slope of this curve, the 


neutron linear curve, and that gives you a 


higher NP ratio --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, but you underestimate 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. SHARFI: -- which (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- lower for the -- when you 


have lower measurements -- you have different 

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effects at different dose ranges, so that in 


some dose ranges you have a claimant-favorable 


effect and in other dose ranges you have the 


reverse. You are not claimant favorable. 


DR. NETON: I -- I think it's probably a little 


too complicated to flesh out here in some 


detail, but I think Mutty's right in the sense 


that how we apply the model in dose 


reconstruction is -- really is germane. I mean 


the model, if it's forced to be zero, you apply 


that and then as you get down towards mi-- the 


lower doses, the missed doses apply. And I 


think at the end of the day the analysis will 


show that we are fairly claimant favorable. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But you never apply the 95 


percentile. 


DR. NETON: Well, it's in there. It is applied 


at the distribution about the val-- the central 


value. That is applied in -- in the best 


estimate cases, that's true. For -- for cases 


-- isn't that right? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: You never apply 95 percentile 


as a fixed value, so far as I understand. 


DR. NETON: Well, we do on the overestimates, I 


thought. 

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 MR. SHARFI: We apply the distribution, not as 


a fixed value. 


DR. NETON: We apply a central estimate plus 


the distribution of the values. 


 DR. ULSH: And then for an underestimate we 


take the 90-- I'm sorry, for an overestimating, 


we take the 95th. 


DR. NETON: The 95th percentile is for an 


overestimate, and then it's a distribution for 


a best estimate. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mutty, do you apply the 95 


percentile fixed values for an overestimate? 


 MR. SHARFI: There is a -- a -- I think we're 


referring to is the uncertainty factor that's 


applied -- (broken transmission) -- uncertainty 


factor that can be multiplied into these doses. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. The -- the effect of 


applying a normal distribution in a dose 


calculation with -- with a -- with the -- with 


the standard deviation is that the net effect 


is that you're really applying the 


(unintelligible). 


DR. NETON: Well, that depends on how large 


that -- that uncertainty is. We've been 


through this before many times, but the fact 

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that that exists means that we do know some 


upper bound estimate of the overall certainty 


model that could be applied. You know, I think 


it's a fairly good empirical determination of 


the overall uncertainty model. You take it and 


apply it to the measured data and what is the 


overall variance of the model. That's a 


standard statistical technique. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That -- that is a distinct point 


you're making, Jim, that the fact that that 


exists in the database is (unintelligible), 


even -- even if you're not using it, you may 


choose to go that route. Is that what you're 


saying? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, that's what I'm saying. I 


mean I'm not committing to that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


DR. NETON: -- but that -- those -- those data 


do exist and it really is the overall variance 


of the model itself. 


 MR. SHARFI: And I -- I think if you also run 


this Table 4 for some of the higher exposed 


workers (unintelligible) random selection of a 


small number, but you pick the higher numbers, 


we (unintelligible) that the NP ratios do 

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actually bound the (unintelligible) for '59 to 


'69 the NP ratios do actually bound the higher 


dose (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: If you pick the --


 MR. SHARFI: -- (unintelligible). 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- if you pick people who were 


monitored most of the time that you would be 


automatically getting the higher exposed 


workers. Is that -- is that not -- that -- I 


thought that's what Brant said. 


 MR. SHARFI: Well, I'm saying if you purposely 


go to the top end, the most -- the highest 


exposed workers, if you pick the top 20 people 


that were exposed, and you look at applying the 


NP ratio to them, and then looking what their 


notional -- what their measured (broken 


transmission) -- the notional (broken 


transmission) -- the notional dose, then 


looking at their measured (broken transmission) 


-- I mean we find that -- that that still 


(broken transmission) -- in -- in how you 


created your Table 4, but if you're looking at 


the top dose people, that the NP ratios do 


apply. It's hard -- it's hard when you start 


just randomly picking any -- any person within 

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the subset because there are a lot of people 


with zeroes, and (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, we picked people who 


were monitored most of the time. 


 MR. SHARFI: Well, but just because they're 


monitored doesn't mean they don't have (broken 


transmission) doses that (broken transmission) 


the LODs. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Well, no, I --


 MR. SHARFI: So you're getting into issues of ­

-


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Ron, do you -- you -- you -- I 


have -- we have -- we have the detailed data, 


and Ron, you know them well. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Right, I -- I -- I tried not to 


pick things that -- first of all, I looked to 


see if they had a reasonable amount of data, 


and then I tried to not -- not to pick any ones 


that had a lot of ones, where there were ones 


instead of zeroes, which means the gamma dose 


was -- was below the detectable limit and -- 


and have a high neutron dose 'cause that 


wouldn't be fair. I mean I wasn't -- I was 


trying to -- to not be biased on what I did 


pick, although it wasn't a great number -- 

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statistically valid number, I was trying to 


pick ones that would give us an answer that was 


-- was representative. And so I did -- I -- I 


tried not to pick ones that were very low gamma 


doses. If I picked on that looked like it was 


right amount of monitoring time but they had 


all ones in the gamma dose, I didn't use that 


one. I us-- now, again, I didn't go through 


all of them and -- and hand-pick them, but I 


did not -- I tried to eliminate extremes. 


 MR. SHARFI: Well, I have tried to 


(unintelligible) the largest (unintelligible), 


people with the largest neutron doses and then 


-- then look at their gamma doses, and if you 


look at their gamma to neutron ratios, they are 


well within the -- the NP bounds. 


(Unintelligible) to the middle and lower 


people, that -- and these -- these tables don't 


show, if there's underestimate, the -- the 


amount of dose that's underestimated, whether 


or not that would be captured with the missed 


dose, and that's adding -- maybe that's what 


Brant was talking about earlier is -- is if you 


start getting into the people with low doses, 


there is a missed dose component that has to be 

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considered. You have to -- have to look at 


only the people that have high recorded doses 


in this comparison in every cycle period, 


otherwise you're missing a component that would 


be assigned as part of the (unintelligible). 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, we're -- we're -- I think 


there is still a misunderstanding about what 


the purpose of Table 4 is, and -- and I guess 


Mark, you know it pretty well so maybe -- maybe 


you can take over from here -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, actually I was -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- (unintelligible) many 


iterations of trying to say what this table is 


designed to do. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I don't know if there's a 


misunderstanding, but what I was almost -- I 


think it's almost time to step back and say, 


you know, for this time period -- I -- I was 


going to try to summarize. For this time 


period I think I -- from my read on this, 


anyway, and this is just me individually, but 


my take is that we have -- we have less issues 


than in the first time period that we were just 


discussing, but we still have some significant 


questions on the table, you know, and I'll 

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summarize those. I mean in a very simple 


fashion. 


I'm not going to get into the detail that it 


was just discussed, but number one, the -- the 


highest exposed individuals were -- were not 


monitored for neutron exposures, at least up 


through '64. We still have that question of 


the highest exposed not -- not being measured 


dose but -- but 100 percent notional on several 


of those years. It goes aw-- it seems to go 


away, as Roger Falk had said, in 1964/'65 where 


you start to see almost all the higher total 


neutron doses are from measured dose -- from 


people that were measured. So that's one 


factor. 


Number two is -- is -- and I think this is 


still significant in this time period, that you 


have -- seems to me you have a -- a large 


variation, or at least a fair variation, 


between individuals as opposed to sort of the 


building level, doses and NP ratios. So you 


know, the question is, you know, the NDRP 


project was -- was -- did everything on a 


building level and I'm not -- I'm not saying 


that that was a mistake, you know. For their 

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purposes it certainly was -- was the right way 


to go. But for our purpose I think, you know, 


we have to question whether we can calculate 


doses for all workers in all areas. So then 


there's a question if there's a very large 


variation, are we missing someone. Now that's 


why I -- I sort of jumped in on Jim's point, 


that there is some information here about the 


95th percentile, and we can dispute how that 


was calculated and all -- all the details of 


that, but there may be -- there may be some way 


to -- to still sort of look at bounding that 


group, even if -- you know, assuming we don't ­

- you know, assuming it's determined that this 


current approach isn't -- isn't satisfactory. 


And then I guess the last point for this time 


period, at least in my read of this, was the 


question of the non-reread doses, and there's ­

- there's -- basically this is a -- a question 


of where -- where the person was monitored, 


but, for whatever reason, a certain film meter 


-- it couldn't be recovered or it was damaged 


or whatever, they couldn't reread that 


particular film for that cycle and so they left 


the non-reread dose in the NDRP and it's my 

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understanding that that was just added into the 


person's overall dose in-- instead of 


recalculating that cycle using a notional 


approach, they just added in that non-reread 


portion, which -- which may certainly -- it -- 


it -- it appears always to be lower than the -- 


the notional doses --


MR. BUCHANAN: Mark, I'd like --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- so there's a que-- go ahead. 

MR. BUCHANAN: A clarification here. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Clarify that for me, Ron. Thank 

you. 

MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, they do -- I do want to 

say on NIOSH's part, they do -- in dose 


reconstruction they do take that original non-


reread dose and multiply it by 2.5 or -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, 1.99 and 1.13. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. SHARFI: And the 2.5 does apply for pre-'63 


for (unintelligible) are applied to the 


original (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: The pre-'63, right, so that -- 


you have correction factors, I should -- I 


didn't get to that, but --


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in this report. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But that was -- that's not in the 


NDRP. Those correction factors are in NIOSH's 


approach. Right? 


 MR. SHARFI: Correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Beyond -- yes, yes, so -- so -- 


you know, so those -- those three factors still 


exist. I think also, if I remember correctly, 


and -- and Brant or others may refresh my 


memory on this, but I think in '59 through '64 


-- I mean the big push, you know, of -- of sort 


of benchmark data from the time period, I think 


you have more information sort of to validate 


these ratios during this time period, don't 


you, or -- or am I mistaken? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, Mark, if -- if you're talking 


about actual measured neutron doses, we've 


certainly got more in '59. If you're talking 


about field survey data, I don't really know 


the answer to that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I was talking about the -- 


the latter, actually. 


 DR. ULSH: Field survey data? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, sort of those independent 


benchmarks that we were talking about, and I 

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thought that it was mentioned. Am I wrong, 


Arjun? Was that --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, Roger did mention field 


survey data, but he said that they were not 


archived, if I remember -- Roger's not on this 


call, is he? 


 DR. ULSH: No, he -- I don't think so. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So anyway, I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It is -- it is in the minutes 


of the calls. I can check, but -- 


MR. BUCHANAN: That's what he said. He said 


that it was done, but he -- you know, no 


documentation that existed to verify that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So I guess my -- my 


biggest concern for this time period would be, 


you know, the fact that -- that we have a -- 


several -- a lengthy time period where you 


still have the highest final neutron doses 


basically being full notional doses. In other 


words, the -- the people had 100 percent 


notional dose and they were the highest total 


neutron doses in the database for that year, 


and the second being that that variation -- and 

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if you look at the individual doses or 


individual NP ratios, to the extent you can 


look at individual NP ratios, but you see a 


large -- a large variation in -- within each 


building, which was -- which makes you question 


whether you just use the straight sort of 


average to calculate everyone's dose or you 


(unintelligible) sort of upper -- upper, you 


know, 95th percentile or something like that. 


And I think that in this case, in this time 


period, actually there might be the data there 


to be able to do that kind of approach, so -- 


that -- that's my read on this and maybe I'm in 


a different place than everyone else, but 


that's -- I just wanted to try to step back and 


frame the issues that way. 


 MS. MUNN: The bottom line here is, regardless 


of the details which we have worked in 


enormous, finite context, the only question 


that exists for the working group is whether 


there is adequate data to do a decent job of 


dose reconstruction. We have lots of 


individual data. We have capability of doing 


bounding calculations -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: You're speaking to this time 

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period, right, Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I'm speaking to this time 


period --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- (unintelligible), I see no reason 


why we continue to work these details. We have 


the data we need to fulfill the charter of this 


group. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think -- you know, 


and I think, unless there's any more evidence 


to put forward, I think, you know, Wanda's -- I 


don't know how much more we can discuss these 


details. I think we might have enough to -- 


and it -- and it's a weight of the evidence 


question and I think, you know, that they -- 


this -- this time period, that's why we sort of 


-- that's why we've been discussing these in 


these sort of time frames that we have is 


because there -- there are or there were 


drastic differences and there were -- there's a 


lot more measured data, and especially as you 


get out to '64 and '65, there's -- it's very 


clear that what Roger Falk indicated is true, 


that the highest exposed are clearly monitored 


from then on, you know, so I think there is a 

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lot more data. I still think that -- that some 


of these -- some of these, you know, 


deficiencies do exist, but they might not be 


insurmountable in this time period. That's 


sort of my -- where I'm at with this and I'd 


just ask if Brant or Arjun could say any final 


sort of evidence or facts to make sure we go on 


the right route and then we can close this one 


out. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, Mar-- Mark, if you look 


at -- and Wanda, if you look at page 42, the 


figure there will show you -- you know, Roger 


Falk indicated it was sometime in the mid-'60s 


or -- you'll see that clearly mid-- '65 is very 


different from '64, and that really all of the 


highest measured doses are -- are -- are along 


the zero percent line -- I mean highest final 


doses are along the zero percent line. That is 


(unintelligible) measured and -- and the zero 


to 20 percent range is very heavily populated, 


so -- including for those people who have high 


final doses, so in-- for '65 and I think 


subsequent years, although I don't have the 


charts for all of them, the -- this would be 


true. I'm not sure about '69/'70 'cause there 

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you have the problem of what -- what films were 


archived, but this -- this is sort of more 


characteristic and so in this period certainly 


you have an indication that the most exposed 


peo-- people were monitored and more people 


were monitored and so on. 


DR. NETON: I -- I think --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And very little of the total 


final dose is notional dose. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Jim, was that you? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I was just going to make a 


comment or an observation that I'd remind 


everyone that when we use coworker data and 


assign the 95th percentile of the distribution 


to unmonitored workers, we assign more dose to 


those workers than 95 percent of the monitored 


workers. I'm not sure what the argument is 


that the notional dose provides more dose. I 


mean it -- it's the same -- same kind of logic, 


if --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, the -- the argument here, 


Jim, is that when we checked for whether 


notional dose was even the best estimate, we -- 


we did not check out to the extent that -- to 


that -- to the extent that our analysis went, 

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anyway. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's a limited sample and I think 


we've been over this ground enough. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, right. 


DR. NETON: I wasn't talking about the Table 4 


values. I was just saying that, you know, this 


-- this idea that 100 per-- you know, many -- 


that most of the workers -- many of the workers 


have 100 percent notional dose -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- is not inconsistent with the 


approach that we -- was adopted for coworker 


models --


 MR. GRIFFON: The only point there, Jim, was 


that we were pointing out that, you know, the ­

- the hi-- the normal sense would be that the 


highest exposed were monitored, and these -- 


these indicate that they -- they were kind of 


catching up with that, you know, as the years 


went on. These are estimated doses rather than 


measured doses for the -- still up through '64. 


 DR. ULSH: Mark, I -- I've only got one thing 


to say --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, okay. 


 DR. ULSH: -- and that is that when you say 

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that the highest exposed people were not 


monitored, that's based on the notional doses 


as calculated by NDRP, and I think there's a 


bit of circular reasoning here. In order to 


draw that conclusion you have to rely on the 


NDRP notional dose calculations, which SC&A at 


least has said that they're not convinced is 


valid, so there's a bit of circular reasoning 


there. And --


 MR. SHARFI: I'd like to com--


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah, and you could -- you 


-- yeah, you could --


 MR. SHARFI: People with the highest gamma 


exposure possibly (unintelligible) were not 


monitored for neutron. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I didn't catch that. 


 MR. SHARFI: I said in the earlier years all 


you can argue is the people with the high-- 


some of the highest gamma doses were not 


monitored for neutron. That doesn't mean they 


had the highest neutron potential. But by 


assigning them an NP ratio, that gives them the 


highest neutron dose. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So you're -- you're saying that 


these no-- these NP ratios -- I mean it -- 

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there could be circular reasoning on both sides 


of this, Brant. I -- we can go around in 


circles both ways 'cause -- are you saying that 


the -- I mean I -- I was under the 


understanding that the -- and -- and they 


stated in the report that these are the best 


estimates. They weren't -- these weren't 


overly conservative estimates that they were 


making when assigning notional doses. These 


were the best estimates. 


 DR. ULSH: We might be getting tripped up on 


semantics --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- (unintelligible) best estimates, 


however that best estimates includes -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Some conservatism in it or 


whatever. 


 DR. ULSH: Exactly, and I would agree that 


people -- some of the people who had the 


highest neutron doses were not monitored. But 


that's based on my confidence in the NDRP 


notional doses. If you don't have that 


confidence in the NDRP notional doses, you 


can't really draw any conclusion about whether 


the highest neutron-exposed people were 

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monitored or not. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, the -- actually that -- 


that -- that last piece is not quite right in 


the sense that's what the Table 4 analysis is 


all about and we can certainly do a few more, 


but -- or NIOSH can do a few more, but the 


Table 4 analysis was designed to compare 


whether the notional dose is a reasonable best 


estimate or claimant favorable estimate or 


upper limit estimate or really an 


underestimate, and in most cases it's indicated 


to be an underestimate. And so actually when 


you have high -- the highest values being 


notional doses, by that yardstick you would say 


that really the actual doses of the people who 


were not monitored would -- may even be higher 


than that, in many cases, because the notional 


dose is indicated to be not a best estimate or 


a good estimate in many cases. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Well, I don't want to go back 


to Table 4. We've already stated our objection 


to that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: Jim, do you have anything? 

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DR. NETON: No, I -- I don't. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think we have enough 


information on the table that we -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, Mark, I think the defense 


rests. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we can try to sort this 


out. I mean I -- I don't -- and I think it is 


-- I think everybody -- we can agree on one 


thing, that the -- I think the characteristics 


are different from '59 forward and that, you 


know, there -- there -- there's more data there 


so I think we have to consider that differently 


than the first period, for sure. 


Why don't we move off of neutrons and on to the 


next topic. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, did you want something on 


the non-reread badge portion for '69 and '70, 


which is the latest piece of the analysis that 


we have not discussed in any working group. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, might -- might as well 


quickly, Arjun, I guess we need to -- yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We -- we actually looked at the 


correction factors that are applied to the non-


reread doses by NIOSH since they did say, quite 


-- quite rightly, that they're not using the 

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non-reread portion, the badges that -- that 


were not reread. If you go to Table 7 on page 


49 you'll see this particularly affects some 


years. We analyzed '59, '65 and '69, and did a 


preliminary analysis of 1970. We found that 


NIOSH uses -- quite apart from the compensation 


for the fact that the energy neutrons are not 


being ful-- fully picked up, the full energy 


spectrum is not picked up by the NTA film for ­

- for which a compensating factor is used. The 


compensating factor or correction factors that 


apply strictly to this are about two -- or 


1.13, depending on the building, and we 


calculated -- for the individuals -- for all 


the individuals in 1959, for instance, which 


are the shortest tables so it's presented here, 


Table 8 on page 50, you'll see that, for 


individuals who had a portion of their dose 


that was not reread, that the reread portion 


you had errors of a factor of 1.56 to a factor 


of six-- more than 16. And for 1969 that 


result was -- and a ratio -- the correction 


factor was from .5 to 220, which is that the 


original dose was more than reread dose, an 


underestimate by a factor of 220. And so we 

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found actually the range of corrections that 


were being made to the original reading was 


very huge. And in 1969 and 1970 they were not 


correlated, the ratios were not correlated with 


either the corrected dose or the original dose. 


So it doesn't seem that there's any good way -- 


at least that was evident to us -- to pick a 


correction factor. And in all cases that we 


examined, NIOSH's correction factor was not 


claimant favorable. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So this is -- I don't know if 


Brant's had a chance to review this issue, but 


 DR. ULSH: No, I really haven't -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- Mutty, have you? 


 MR. SHARFI: Just -- just --


 MR. GRIFFON: This is a question of that 1.99 


factor -- correct? -- or... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. SHARFI: These -- these are -- I will say 


that we're still -- an analysis of summary 


data, not cycle data. Now I -- I really, you 


know, give people caution to use these summary 

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data, not some ratios, until you break these 


stuff down to cycle data because a lot of these 


total doses that you see are a lot of zeroes 


with only a single 20 millirem that then 20 


zeroes get compiled into a summary 20, and then 


when they recalculate 20 different cycles, you 


see a large -- you see a large reread dose and 


it makes it look like there's a very high 


ratio. When it regards to actually a very low 


ratio there is a lot of cycle data that is 


included in these, so there's not a very big 


different in individual cycles but in an 


overall dose 'cause you're looking at summary 


data. 


And when we've done these analysis and gone 


back to the cycle data, you do not see these 


factors of ten, 20, 100. You -- you -- you -- 


they're very close to what -- what we use in 


the -- in the actual --


 MR. GRIFFON: Mutty --


 MR. SHARFI: -- dose reconstruction process. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Mutty, do you have the backup -- 


you said you've done this analysis. Do you 


have that analysis that supports your selection 


of the 1.99 or whatever value that's stated -- 

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 MR. SHARFI: I think Brant --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- in the TIB? 


 MR. SHARFI: -- (unintelligible) when we had 


relooked at -- 'cause this is with a table -- 


this is actually the same table that has been 


sent to us, I thought before the supplement. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, it is not. It is new. 


 MR. SHARFI: It's the same process that was 


used in their Table 6, which is the exact table 


that was sent to us. It's just expanded to '69 


to '70. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I'm not asking about 


their tables. I'm asking if you have what 


you've done, your analysis, to support your 


selection of the 1.99 correction factor -- 


 MR. SHARFI: What I have is --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- from the (unintelligible). 


 MR. SHARFI: -- I have -- I don't want -- I 


have to look -- what Brant has already sent 


over. I mean -- but I believe that does go all 


the way to '69 is what we looked at. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean if that -- maybe if that 


could be provided, then we -- as a workgroup, I 


think -- at this point I think we're just going 


to have to compare that, look at the -- look at 

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SC&A's supplemental report, compare how NIOSH 


derives the 1.99 value and -- and -- you know, 


put that on the table. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, and Mark, I -- I sent over a 


report on Thursday, but I don't know if it 


contained that, so much has been going back and 


forth. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I'll look and see whether or not I 


have sent over what Mutty's talking about. 


 MR. SHARFI: Brant, we might have just sent to 


'66. We did the calculations all the way 


through, but sent the original -- Arjun might 


be right since the original table only went to 


'66, we might have only included a response -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: So that might be in your response 


document then, okay. 


 DR. ULSH: It might be, I don't know. I -- I 


can't remember. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, all right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I didn't see any 


calculations in the response document, but I 


didn't look at it very carefully. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, okay. Maybe I can just ask 


if -- and this is -- we're in the final throes 

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of this, but if -- if there is something else 


that you can add, just -- you know, that -- 


that would help us determine -- to compare that 


1.99 value versus what Arjun -- what the SC&A 


report says. 


 DR. ULSH: If we -- if we end before 4:00 


o'clock today, Mark, Mutty and I will put our 


heads together --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, we -- we will --


 DR. ULSH: -- and see. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- end before 4:00 o'clock 'cause 


my mouth's starting to throb, so -- 


MR. BUCHANAN: Okay, this is Ron. Let me just 


clarify that last --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- what you requested, Mark. 


That's pertaining to OTIB-27, Table 4.1 where 


it lists for 1951 to 1963 it lists the film 


rereading bias as 1.99 for Building 771, all 


other buildings 1.13, and then it lists the 


same value for 1964 to 1970. We would like to 


see --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- where the 1.99 and the 1.13 ­

- how those were derived -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: How they were derived. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- and what database they was 


taken from. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: All right, Matt and Mutty, make a 


note of that, and we're going to be moving off 


of the neutron issue here -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yep. 


 DR. ULSH: -- so perhaps you can start thinking 


about that, but don't go too far away. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Did someone just say 


something? 


All right, anything else on neutrons? I think 


we're -- I think we should move on. 


 DR. ULSH: Mark, would this be a good time for 


a brief bio break or comfort break? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah, that's a good idea. 


I'll find some Motrin in the meantime, too. 


Okay, we'll -- let's everyone on the call maybe 


take till 2:00 o'clock? 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we won't break the line. 


We'll just keep the line open and we'll be back 


at 2:00. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, all right. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 

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99

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 1:50 p.m. 


to 2:00 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: Any other Board members on the call? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, Mark, you can begin as you'd like. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. I think -- I think we 


completed the hardest task, the neutron 


discussions, and these other items I think are 


-- are mainly clarifications from the last 


call, just to see where -- you know, make sure 


they're closed or not or where -- where we 


stand with them, I guess, so we'll just go 


through those one by one. I don't think it 


should take too long. 


Before we get started, I -- I think, Erin, did 


you want to make a comment, 'cause I think it 


might take longer than 20 minutes. 


MS. MINKS: Yeah, I would just -- generally -- 


I'm Erin Minks from Senator Salazar's office. 


I understand I have other colleagues from the 


delegation on the line right now. We look 


forward to seeing the Board in Denver later 


this week and we should have some formal 


comments to offer then about the petition, so 


just thanks for letting me listen in and we'll 

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see you in a couple of days. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you for your time and 


attention. 


B PLANT


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so the question on the -- 


the B Plant, I -- I think the -- the -- where 


we stood with the -- this is a question again 


of -- it's uranium workers and it's a back-


extrapolation of penetrating and shallow doses 


from I believe 1960 -- '60 -- I don't think -- 


or at least there was a question about gaps in 


the data prior to '60 -- am I getting this 


right, Brant? 


 DR. ULSH: Mark, yes, the issue is that the 


workers in Building 881 were not monitored for 


external exposures prior to the fourth quarter 


of 1960. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. So --


 DR. ULSH: I'll have more to say about back-


extrapolation, but maybe I'll let you finish 


your summary first. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, well -- well, that -- that -- 


that was just about it. I think we --


 DR. ULSH: Oh --

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 MR. GRIFFON: -- we wanted to make sure that -- 


I guess the question on the table was, you 


know, was there a -- a -- suffic-- sufficient 


data to bound the doses for these workers in 


the earlier time period. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. All right, I'll speak to that 


then, Mark, if you're done. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: This is -- this is going to be hard. 


You've got to pretty much erase the memory 


banks from the discussion that we had before 


the break about neutron-to-photon ratios and 


back-extrapolation of those. This is a 


different situation. 


It is true that we do not have monitoring for ­

- external monitoring for these people up until 


the fourth quarter of 1960. And the -- the 


thinking at the time, as with other areas of 


the plant, was that people who were not 


expected to exceed ten percent of the exposure 


limit were not required to be monitored and so 


these people were not monitored for that 


reason. What we have looked at, once we do 


have monitoring -- and that is the fourth 


quarter of 1960 and then the full year of 1961 

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-- we have compared what we observe to the 


coworker doses that we would assign to 


unmonitored people in those years. And what we 


have found is that our coworker model -- 


coworker data exceed even the maximally exposed 


of the monitored workers in '61 and in the 


fourth quarter of '60 by large margins. Not 


unreasonable margins, I don't believe, but 


certainly large margins. And so what -- we're 


not proposing to back-extrapolate any data in 


1960 back into the '50s. What we are saying is 


that these people were judged to be at less 


than 10 percent of the monitoring limit, and 


indeed that was the case once they were 


monitored in '60 and '61. And what we are 


saying is that the coworker doses that we 


assign in those years do indeed bound their 


exposures, and we looked at the history of 


operations in that building, Building 81, into 


the earlier '50s and we also believe that our 


coworker doses that we assign in those years 


would be bounding. 


And we have a couple of reasons for thinking 


that. If you look at the coworker doses that ­

- well, maybe I should start with a little two­
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sentence or so history of this building. 


It came on line -- Building 81 came on line in 


1953. That was the beginning of the uranium 


operations there. In 1955, along with the 


expansion around the plant, there was the 


addition of a machining facility, and I think 


SC&A has expressed some concern about that 


perhaps. And then up to the fourth quarter of 


1960 there was no monitoring, that's when the 


monitoring started. And then finally in 1964 


the enriched uranium operations were phased out 


and transferred to Y-12. 


Now, even if -- well, I don't see how the 


addition of a machining operation in 1955 


would, number one, cause the maximum dose 


experienced by these workers to exceed even our 


coworker doses. If you look at certainly the 


operations later at Rocky Flats, and if you 


look at the operations -- uranium machining 


operations at other facilities, they don't even 


approach the doses that we are assigning for 


coworker, and those range between anywhere from 


-- oh, I'm looking three, four, five, six, 


seven rem of penetrating doses. And these 


coworker doses that we have calculated are 

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based on the people who were monitored, and 


those are -- you know, prior to 1960, those 


include the plutonium operations and they 


include the depleted uranium operations in 


Building 44, which tend to have high shallow 


doses. And the shallow doses that we are 


assigning between '52 and 1960 range anywhere 


from oh, three and a half or so rem up to oh, a 


maximum I guess of about over eight rem, and 


these are also very high compared to what you 


would expect from a -- type of operations in 


Building 81. So we --


 MR. GRIFFON: Brant -- Brant, just for our 


cross-reference, those values are in TIB-58. 


Is that correct? 


 DR. ULSH: That's exactly right, Mark, Table 


7.1; that's what I'm looking at right now. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) follow along, 


okay. Thank you. 


 DR. ULSH: So I think that's really all I've 


got to say right now. That's the reasons for 


our confidence in the coworker -- in the 


coworker doses, what would be assigned to these 


people since they were not monitored, at the 


95th percentile. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, and I -- I -- Arjun, I 


don't know -- or -- or Joe, if you had anything 


to add to -- you know, again, this is a -- I 


think we've seen written materials on this, 


too. I just wanted to summarize where we -- 


where we stood. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, Mark -- Mark, and from my 


point of view, you know, we've discussed this 


on the SC&A team and also with you that the 


reason this is there, at -- at some length is 


just to specify what -- what demonstration 


aspects were kind of not really fully on the 


table and -- and for you to decide -- you know, 


we're -- we're not making any claims, one way 


or another, about its SEC relevance. It's just 


that the -- there's criteria and we're just 


following those along for you to -- and be 


explicit in what we say to you for you to 


consider. That's it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Brant, the only question I have ­

- one question you answered already; one was 


the -- when was the EU operation phased out, 


and that was in 1964. You did a comparison 


with the -- and I did mischaracterize that 


back-extrapolation. I didn't mean that, but -- 

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but the one way you compared to the '60 -- the 


1960 fourth quarter data and the '61 data, did 


you -- I mean I'm surpr-- the EU was phased out 


in '64. Did -- did you look at '62 and 3 and 


would it have given you the same -- I mean are 


you confident it would give you the same sort 


of results? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, we didn't, Mark, for a couple 


of reasons. One, the 19-- fourth quarter of 


'60 and then the year 1961 were the closest in 


time to those earlier operations. And also we 


didn't think that it would necessarily be 


informative too much because the later years -- 


I mean '64 is when I believe the last of the 


operations went to Y-12, but there was 


certainly some ramp-down that you would expect. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: You know --


 MR. GRIFFON: That's fine, that's fine, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- prior to --


 MR. GRIFFON: And did -- did -- and -- and the 


last thing, the other operations pri-- the 


machining came on line in -- in '55 -- 


 DR. ULSH: Well, Mark, I'm -- I did -- that is 


what I said. I think, though, that -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Or somewhere thereabouts. 


 DR. ULSH: Right around there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. But -- but -- other 


activities in that building, what -- what else 


-- I mean they did -- they did do the chemical 


processing as well or what -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I'm looking at -- at Putzier's 


Memoirs, Mark, and here's how he describes it. 


Building 881 -- they did rather extensive 


chemistry, foundry and fabrication operations 


and that additionally it handled its own 


recycle of enriched uranium scrap, and then 


there was a supporting laboratory and 


radiography facility. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But there was a foundry in 881? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, there was. That's -- that's 


according to Putzier's Memoirs. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I thought the foundry was in 44. 


It must have been a different foundry, huh? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I think I know why you might 


have felt -- might think that, Mark. There was 


a concern in our earlier conversations back a 


few working group meetings ago about in 


Putzier's Memoirs it mentioned about high 

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contact dose rates in the foundry, and I think 


there was some confusion about where that was. 


That was in Building 44, the depleted uranium 


foundry, where you do see high shallow dose 


rates relative to what you would expect to see 


in enriched uranium operations. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah -- yeah, and you would not 


see that in highly enriched uranium, but you 


would see that in low -- you'd see the same 


thing in low enriched uranium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But probably no higher than the 


DU. 


 DR. ULSH: No, it would not -- the shallow 


doses would not be higher -- I mean they would 


be the highest in the DU. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, that's correct, but you'd 


see a similar phenomenon in low enriched 


uranium. In HEU you would-- you wouldn't 


because you -- well, depending on the 


enrichment, but you'd see it much less because 


you've got so little U-238 there. 


 DR. ULSH: That is correct. That's why we're 


confident that the coworker's shallow doses in 


the '50s are probably dominated by the DU 


workers, and we don't expect that people 

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working with enriched uranium would exceed 


those. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right, and I -- I 


think we have enough -- I mean the oth-- the 


other thing I think we might have as a point of 


reference, and I'm not sure how direct a 


reference we can make, but -- because I don't 


know how the -- the buildings would compare and 


I'm a little reluctant to make these kinds of 


comparisons, but you know, all this operation 


was shift-- switched to Y-12 and those -- the 


magnitude of those coworker doses you gave, I 


think you said three to seven rem penetrating 


per year, that was sort of the range in the 


early time period, I think -- is that right, 


Brant? I was trying to find TIB-58 while we 


were talking but I couldn't find it. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, Mark, it does range anywhere -- 


between the years 1952 and, I don't know, let's 


say 1960 -- well, '61 maybe -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- it ranges from 3.2 rem at the 


95th percentile up to -- I'm looking at maybe 


7.8 rem. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All of those are the 95th 

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percentiles. Right? 


 DR. ULSH: That's correct, and that's what we 


would apply to these unmonitored uranium 


workers. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, that's right, the -- okay, so 


you would apply the 95th and those are that 


high -- those -- those -- those, you know, seem 


high based on other com-- comparable operations 


is what you're saying also. Right? 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I am, with the appropriate 


caution that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- as you stated. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Okay. I -- I don't know 


that we -- Wanda, do you have any questions, or 


Bob or Mike? 


 MS. MUNN: I don't think so, I'm -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think we probably have enough 

information. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, this is Bob Presley. I'm 

all right. 

 MS. MUNN: And I've not -- it's been a while 


since I had any concerns that were not 


addressed there. I think this -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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 MS. MUNN: -- covers that material pretty well. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. All right. Then if 


there's no more questions there, I think we can 


-- you know, I think we have enough to make a 


decision on there and I think that those doses 


you mentioned from TIB-58 do seem, you know, on 


the high side of what you would normally see in 


these kind of operations, so I think we're -- I 


think that it looks like it's sufficient to 


bound for these workers, but I -- you know, 


that's my opinion. I'll let other workgroup 


members weigh in, but I think we can bring this 


back to the workgroup and caucus on this 


amongst ourselves. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, a lot of work's been done with 


this --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- and it -- it looks like it's in 


quite adequate condition to me. 


TIB-38


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Then if everyone's ready, 


we can move on to TIB-38, and I think TIB-38 is 


sort of in -- in Brant's hands or -- maybe you 


can give us a report on that, Brant? 


 DR. ULSH: Sure, Mark. We had some discussions 

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at the last working group meeting on April -- 


gosh, I think it was 19th maybe -- and we've 


had a lot of discussions prior to this. And 


the concern has been expressed -- primarily by 


Mark, I think -- that there are differences 


between the two databases that we have, CEDR 


and HIS-20, and those differences primarily are 


differences in the number of datapoints that 


are included over the years. And it -- it does 


appear, though, however, that the higher end 


measurements are in both databases. And so the 


concern is here that when we apply internal 


coworker do-- coworker data, what we typically 


do is we apply the 50th percentile intake 


value. And as I understand it, and I will -- 


with the distribution, sorry -- 50th percentile 


with the distribution. As I understand it, and 


-- and I'm sure that I can count on Mark to 


correct me if I misstate this, the concern of ­

- considering the known limitations of HIS-20 


and these observed differences, there was more 


concern about the comparability, I believe, at 


the 50th percentile than at the 95th 


percentile. And so I think that those concerns 


could be addressed by applying the 95th 

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percentile intakes. 


Now I want to be very clear here that we don't 


view this as setting a precedent that could be 


applied to any other site. We are considering 


this issue in other venues, but this issue 


relates to the Rocky Flats databases 


themselves. And so I think that, you know, in 


an effort to reach resolution on this issue, I 


think that we're prepared to agree to assign 


the 95th percentile intakes in situations where 


we are using internal coworker data at Rocky 


Flats. 


Mark, have I missed anything? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I -- I think that's -- yeah, 


that's -- that's -- I think that's a reasonable 


approach, given -- you know, like -- as you 


said, Brant, there's -- you know, NIOSH has -- 


in your -- in your own evaluation report you 


pointed out some of the shortcomings of the 


database, and I think through the workgroup 


process we've also pointed to some of those. 


Nonetheless, you know, when we -- when we 


looked at -- at -- and everyone on the call 


probably knows how extensively we looked at 


this, but we looked at logbooks and -- and as 

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much raw data as we could get our hands on, 


including urinalysis logs. And I think we were 


-- you know, what we saw -- and Joyce 


Lipsztein, I don't think she's on the phone 


call, but she also looked at this and, you 


know, what she saw was basically that the 


higher end data, you know, was there, the -- 


from the logbooks when we compared the high end 


-- high end entries back to the database, it 


was in the CER database, which is the one that 


-- that's being used for the internal coworker 


models. 


 Nonetheless, there was this question of, you 


know, why don't the number of people match in 


both databases, and it was -- you know, we 


discussed that at length and -- and there is 


some good reason why people were dropped. You 


know, they do understand why a bunch of people 


were dropped, but trying to sort out who got 


put back in and who didn't I think got a little 


overwhelming maybe, at least from my 


standpoint, of how -- trying to understand why 


these things didn't match up. So I think 


that's a good solution. We're pretty confident 


that these tails of -- of this database look 

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good, and if NIOSH commits to using, you know, 


the -- the 95th, which is the upper end of the 


datasets, then I think -- I think we could work 


-- you know, I think that seems reasonable for 


bounding, especially -- I think also we also 


have to remember that -- and Brant's pointed 


this out several times -- to me, as a matter of 


fact -- that we -- we have to remember that 


most -- most of the people have their own 


individual bioassay data, so we're only looking 


at a small number of people here. So I think 


that, given those factors, I think it -- it's a 


bounding approach. 


The only thing I would -- the only caveat I 


would say is that we might want to just follow 


through, you know, with how this -- it takes it 


off the SEC table, in my view, but I would 


still want to see the mechanics of how -- 


'cause depending on how I worked with this, you 


know, interpreting the 95th and how it's 


applied, I think we still might want to just 


take to ground, so to speak, but it's certainly 


not an SEC issue, if that's -- if -- I believe 


-- in my opinion, anyway, with this -- with 


this approach that NIOSH is laying on the table 

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now. I don't know if others have an opinion on 


that. 


 MS. MUNN: I guess I'd go even further than 


that. I don't see any reason for us to be 


required to go through the exercise of actually 


doing the math for this. The -- the data's 


there, and we've -- we've agreed that the 95th 


percentile would be bounding. That's 


instructional for the dose reconstructor and it 


fulfills our requirements. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Wanda, this is Bob. I agree with 


you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I would -- I at least 


agree it's off the SEC -- 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- table and I think the other 


can be taken up as part of the DR process, so 


it's not part of our function here. I think 


you're right. 


Anybody else -- any opinions on that? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. We always get the quick ones after our 


breaks. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, that's true. As the Motrin 


starts to wear off. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: I just found some Motrin during 


my break, too, so yeah, that's -- I waited too 


long to take it, I think. The pain started 


before I took them. 


 MS. MUNN: You're not supposed to do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I know, I know. Anyway, and now 


I'm missing my agenda. Can someone help me? 


What's next on our agenda? 


 DR. ULSH: Next on the agenda, Mark, is review 


of example cases. 


WOUND MODEL


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, the example ca-- before we 


get to the example cases, actually I forgot one 


thing, which is Jim Neton's favorite agenda 


item that we keep -- that I keep bringing up, 


the wound model. And I know, Brant, you sent a 


response and I think you indicated that Jim was 


probably going to give us a summary of that. 


just wanted to be able to close that out if -- 


you know, or -- or -- I think it's kind of 


still an open item. 


DR. NETON: Okay, yeah, Mark, if you'd like I 


can --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- I can give you a brief run -- I 


I 
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don't know -- if -- if -- I -- we sent out a -- 


I think it was last week, a very brief 


description of our analysis of this. This was 


something you brought up (unintelligible) 


working groups ago. The idea was I think that 


you ran preliminary calculations and 


demonstrated that you could theoretically get a 


higher dose applying a default wound model over 


the chronic exposure model that we've adopted 


for most situations when we have a lack of 


monitoring data -- (unintelligible) a lack of 


intake assumptions. We assume the intake 


occurred chronically as opposed to acutely. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just to clarify, I did -- 


I did -- I only used an injection model on this 


'cause I didn't have your wound TIB with me. 


DR. NETON: What -- what -- see, I didn't even 


remember what you used then, but -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- you'll see what we did is the -- 


the wound model is pretty simplistic. It's a 


two-component (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- with a 90 percent clearance with 


a one-day half-life --

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 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- and then the remainder clears 


with a 150-day half-life, I believe. Well, 


that -- that -- that puts the stuff pretty 


quickly into the systemic pool, and it -- it's 


-- actually we looked at it fairly closely. It 


-- it could be modeled somewhere between a type 


M and an F clearance from the lung if you want 


to compare it to an acute intake into the lung. 


But you know, because it's such a rapid 


clearance of such a large percentage, it is -- 


it is the case that if you -- if you had a 


wound, and I think the example we -- we sent 


out showed a -- a wound on the -- the worst-


case scenario, which would be the -- the next 


day after you left your sample or the first day 


of employment, and then if you took a -- a 


urine sample, say on an annual basis of 365 


days, you can come up with a fairly large 


missed intake --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- or uptake, I guess, for the 


wound scenario. But when we compared that to 


the chronic exposure model, and in particular I 


think we were talking about cases in the -- in 

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the -- in the early '50s, the wound counter I 


think came into being around 1958, somewhere 


thereabouts, what we did is we compared a 


chronic ten-year intake of plutonium with a one 


dpm excretion on an annual basis to a -- using 


a chronic model versus the acute wound model 


and it turns out that up -- up until about two 


years post-exposure, the wound model puts out a 


-- a higher dose, an annual dose, and -- and 


the case we modeled was one of the metabolic 


organs, the bone surfaces. But after that, and 


we used type F for the chronic inhalation 


model, the annual intake ramps up considerably 


to the -- to the extent that at five -- ten 


years post-intake, you get five times the 


assigned dose to the organ than you would with 


the -- the wound model. So it's a little bit 


of a mixed bag, but the other side of the story 


is that there is very little probability of 


causation, almost zero, assigned to acute 


intakes very near -- to cancers that occur very 


near the intake period, so it wouldn't really 


affect, on balance, the cases, we don't think. 


That's kind of --


 MR. GRIFFON: And you -- and you --

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DR. NETON: -- it in a nutshell. There's a lot 


of different ways one could compare this and -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- we wrestled back and forth as to 


how to show this and I can -- I can tell you 


there's two or three other comparisons that 


didn't make the -- didn't make it. But this 


was the simplest, I think, approach that we 


could -- we could take to try to demonstrate 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Now can you -- can you -- so you 


did a chronic ten-year versus what for your 


wound? 


DR. NETON: The wound was just a single wound 


on the first day of employment. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and a -- and monitored ten 


years later? 


DR. NETON: No, no, it would -- it would have 


been --


 MR. GRIFFON: One year later. 


DR. NETON: -- one year later it would have 


shown up with one dpm per day in the urine. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: So in other words, you know, you 


would -- you would have not detected the wound 

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until a year later based on a one-year sampling 


frequency and let's say it was just below one 


dpm, that would be your missed intake for the 


wound versus a chronic exposure scenario that 


would give you one dpm per day out for ten 


years. 


We also did look at a chronic exposure for one 


year and it's very similar to the graph that 


was presented except that it doesn't ramp -- it 


-- it crosses the -- right around the two-year 


period as well, but it doesn't, you know, ramp 


up quite as -- as large as the ten-year chronic 


because obviously the exposure stopped at one 


year. But it seems to be that two-year time 


period is the crossover point. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, and do you -- do you have ­

- I -- I think that answers the question. I --


I do recall looking at this. I -- I don't 


remem-- recall the cross-- and I saw the same 


crossover, but I thought it was later in my 


model, but do you re-- do you have IMBA runs 


for these that you could just post or... 


DR. NETON: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: None -- nothing? Okay. Well, we 


-- I can recreate just based on the parameters 

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you gave --


DR. NETON: Yeah, it's pretty -- it's pretty 


simple, just --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- one dpm per day (unintelligible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- and we didn't save the runs -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Didn't bother saving the runs, 


yeah. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: It was pretty straightforward. I 


can't imagine you'd have a whole bundle of 


those, anyway. 


DR. NETON: No, and -- and again, this is -- 


it's not surprising 'cause we've argued back 


and forth several times about the -- the 


appropriateness of a -- of a chronic versus 


acute intake, and you can only have an acute 


wound. You can't have a chronic -- well, you 


can have multiple wounds, but when you get a 


wound, it's an -- it's an acute intake. 


 MS. MUNN: It's acute. 


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-- we have the response then on that. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, and of course it's every -- 


you know, the -- the one day, the day of first 


employment is the worst-case scenario. As that 


wound moves closer and closer to the sampling 


date, the problem becomes smaller and smaller ­

- not the problem, but the divergence between 


the two becomes smaller and smaller. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And -- and I -- yeah, I 


have to -- I have to actually look back at my 


own notes to think about how I characterized 


it, but I was thinking, you know, of something 


where the -- I'll have to look back at my IMBA 


run and compare it with your paper, but I don't 


think it's a major concern. We just want a 


confirmation that we were bounding this sort of 


situation since it was brought out in several 


of the health physics reports from the early 


years, so --


DR. NETON: Yeah, I believe that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- there's one that you sent over 


and there was basically a couple of sentences 


in there that alluded to the fact that they -- 


they could have missed some wounds prior to 

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date of the wound counter. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And I know tha-- the -- I 


will also say that the scenario that I came up 


with I thought was, you know, pretty ext-- 


relatively unlikely because if -- if someone 


got a wound like this, I was showing, you know, 


no monitoring or something for extended time 


period and -- and no follow-up monitoring 


later, and I think most of these people that 


got these kind of wounds -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- were probably in the glovebo-- 


you know, in --


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that line --


DR. NETON: Exactly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- where they would have had 


frequent urinalyses so, you know... 


DR. NETON: Yeah, that's what I would say, too, 


so --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, so I -- I think I -- I sort 


of looked at the worst case, so I think -- you 


know, we've got this probably -- I think this 


is enough for us to make a decision and ma-- 


this ma-- I think, again, this is just to make 

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sure that --


DR. NETON: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we're bounding all situations, 


so... 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, the model certainly covers the 


likely scenario. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, anything else -- and -- and 


Joe, are you on the line? I don't -- I think 


we asked Joyce to look at it, but I don't think 


Joyce had a chance --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, she -- she had some 


access problems. I think those would be 


cleared up, but I think this would be, you 


know, looking at actual claimant data offering 


some analysis of, you know, what -- you know, 


what the coworker model provides and I -- I 


think we'll have that shortly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. It -- it'll have to be 


shortly. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I -- well, 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I --


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- talking to her today, but I 


think --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, okay. 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: -- she just had some technical 


problems getting --


DR. NETON: And I -- I just heard something, 


what are -- what are we going to -- what is -- 


what's going on with this analysis? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, Joyce hasn't looked at it 


at all, so we had asked SC&A to look at this. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But at this late stage in the 


game, I mean I -- I think we just -- you know ­

-


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think that the default 


position is -- I mean not the default but the 


extreme position is that we have a wound model 


that could be applied. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: It's a matter of which is the one 


appropriate to apply. Our position is of 


course that the chronic model is more 


appropriate. But if --


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, but again, Jim, this 


scenario we were just discussing is that you 


have someone that's wounded that you don't kn-- 


you didn't -- it wasn't recognized as -- 


DR. NETON: But that's my point. I mean if --

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- if the anal-- if at the end of 


the day the analysis is that you -- you know, 


if the wound is more claimant-favorable, there 


is a model there that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay, that you can assume all 


these were from wound intakes or -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I'm not suggesting we do that 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


DR. NETON: -- but I mean if -- at the end of 


the day, that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- that is the backup position that 


could be applied, but I don't think it has to 


be. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: So --


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that's what we need to -- 


DR. NETON: And I think at this late juncture 


to start debating this issue then would... 


 MS. MUNN: No, we --


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah, that -- that's true, 


Jim, but we did wait for this product for a 


while, as well, so you know... 

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DR. NETON: No, no, what I'm saying, though, is 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- what -- what -- even if the 


analysis showed that the -- SC&A's position is 


that the wound must be applied, there is a 


wound model that could be applied. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You have a model and that can be 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- be applied, yeah, yeah. 


DR. NETON: So I think the analysis -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- the information is all there to 


be applied. It's just a matter of deciding 


which is more appropriate. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Okay, I -- I follow your 


point. And I agree with that, yeah. Okay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But -- but the judgment is 


that it may be off the table from the SEC 


standpoint, but it sounds like there may be a 


follow-up in terms of context of I guess what 


we've been calling a site profile or whatever. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and it may not even be 


that, you know --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- depending on how Joyce comes 


back. It may just --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I think we're awfully 


close. I think it's just timing. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yep, yep. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, the only reason we asked SC&A 


to look at it was to make sure that the 


approach was a reasonable one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, that we could bound that ­

- that -- yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, and -- and I think that we've 


seen it with the data we have. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, so I -- yeah. I'm 


convin--


 MS. MUNN: We've done it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm convinced of that, too, I 


just -- just -- yeah, I think we do have enough 


information right now, so I think we -- we can 


see that the approach is going to be bounding 


and that they have this other model if there's 


any problem with the approach, so -- you know, 


they have the sort of backup, so either way we 


have the data that we need, I think. 


EXAMPLE CASES
 
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Is there anything else on the table? I think 


we're up to the example cases, as Brant just 


said. And I'll -- I'll let -- well, Joe, I 


don't know if -- has -- has your team evaluated 


these example cases? I think we've discussed a 


lot of the components of them anyway, so... 


 MR. FITZGERALD: We've discussed all the 


components, and of course we -- we went through 


quite a few in terms of the model validation, 


the hypotheticals and what-not. I think Joyce, 


again, needs to look at one or two actual 


claimant cases, which we can't of course 


include in the report, but we certainly would 


like to have some kind of perspective offered 


back this week. And again, unfortunately we 


had the technical issues with her access and I 


think we cleared that up today, but again, time 


is --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- time has been mitigating 


against us in a way on that one, so I'm hoping 


that we will have something for the workgroup 


by the Board meeting. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I mean I -- I've looked at 


the -- I -- I don't know if anybody else on the 

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workgroup has looked at the example cases, but 


I've looked at the external and internal cases 


and I think, you know, other than issues we've 


already discussed today, I don't think there's 


much else to -- to bring up on those cases. 


The TIB-38 ones certainly, you know, would 


change with our discussion. 


 MS. MUNN: We'd just be going over the same 


material --


 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) validation -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah, we've already 


covered these, yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- (unintelligible) quality 


control validation. I know Ron's been doing 


certainly some looking -- continued looking on 


the neutron as well (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I don't know -- did Ron 


look at the example cases? 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, you want me to give you a 


summary of where I'm at on this -- of course 


this is -- we've been doing most of our work on 


the neutron issue --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- so I just took at look at 


this over the weekend and little bit this 

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morning. Just to give a summary of where we're 


at on that is NIOSH provided us with about 100 


cases that had used OTIB-58, with claim numbers 


so that I could go back to the -- the files on 


the O drive and look at those, so I tried to go 


back and look at about ten of them and I tried 


to get some that was in the '50s and '60s to 


compare some of that data. And what I found 


was that -- I hunted for a min/max and -- and 


say a best estimate because though -- because ­

- you can't just evaluate OTIB-58 by itself. 


You've got to -- 'cause it includes OTIB-50 and 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- and 27 and the TBD, and so I 


-- I picked a couple cases that looked likely. 


I didn't find a best estimate yet. I found a 


min and three max I took a look at to see if 


they applied it the way we understood they was 


going to apply it, mainly. I first of all 


looked to see if I could incorporate all these 


factors, the 2.5 and the 1.99, and I found out 


that that was going to take a complete dose 


reconstruction report like I do for Task IV, 


which is really what's needed to -- to see that 

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everything agrees with what we -- we 


understand. 


 However, I did go through -- because of the 


limited time, I did go through these four cases 


that I selected that had some '60s data and one 


that had '50s data, and at this point I guess, 


without crunching all the numbers and see where 


they hit the IREP numbers and everything, which 


takes a lot of time, I did go look and look at 


the philosophy of how they applied OTIB-58 to 


these different cases. And I did find that 


they did apply it to the periods that were -- 


that the worker was unmonitored and -- and 


should have been monitored, and sometimes they 


used the 95th percentile, sometimes they used 


the 50th percentile, depending on his job 


assignment during those gaps. And so that's 


mainly at the point we're at right now is that 


I guess you can state I didn't find anything 


that would say send up any red flags. But I 


haven't got deep enough into it to say this 


proves that everything looks okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. But I -- I think that 


-- that's important, too, just that you've 


found that, you know, they were using those 

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models and they used the 95th or 50th, 


depending on the type of jobs and stuff during 


the gaps and, you know, that -- that deeper 


view may be -- probably -- may be more -- say 


more appropriate for the DR review, you know, I 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, that's really what -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- has to be done. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I -- I mean I -- I think 


we -- and we're discussing these factors, such 


as the 1.99 and the 2.5, with our neutron 


stuff, so I -- I don't know that we nee-- you 


know, we may have enough for our SEC 


deliberations is what I'm saying, without 


getting into that depth. You know, given our 


time frame, that's what I'm most concerned 


about here is I don't want any last-minute 


surprises on this. 


The super S, I -- I also -- I don't think we've 


-- since Joyce has been sidelined with the 


computer, I -- I assume she hasn't reviewed 


that case, but also I know that she's reviewed 


super S up and down and sideways, so I think, 


you know, we're not going to find anything -- 

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you know, I think we're ok-- I think we're 


going to, you know, find that we're going to be 


okay with super S, but we should -- 


 MS. MUNN: This is really (unintelligible) on 


our (unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- time line issue at all -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: -- because we've -- we've dedicated 


more than an adequate amount of attention 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, and like I've --


 MS. MUNN: -- (unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- from my standpoint, I've 


looked at TIB-- the -- the internal model and 


looked at the way it was applied, and it was 


applied as I -- as I thought it was supposed to 


be applied prior to our discussion today and -- 


but that -- that will -- will be modified, so I 


think that -- that's okay, as well. 


So I don't know that there's much more to add 


on the -- the sample cases (unintelligible) an 


issue. 


MR. SMITH: This is Matt Smith (unintelligible) 


and I've got one more thing to add, and that 

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regards the case that's discussed in -- on page 


211 of the main report that was issued on April 


5th. The example given there is a case where 


the coworker model was applied for two 


different years. In the text of the SC&A 


report in a case that a full year of coworker 


dose was applied and then a comparison is made 


that is basically trying to show that somehow a 


coworker dose isn't -- is not bounding. The 


author of the report is Al Robinson, and Al of 


course only passed away late last year, but I 


did review the claims and when you read the DR 


report Al made it fairly clear that only one 


quarter of coworker dose model was applied, and 


when you go into the external dose tool that 


was used to calculate things and also 


(unintelligible) review the dosimetry records, 


what it -- how it reads for that particular 


year, which they called out in the report, 


which was 1969, the doses ran as follows: The 


first quarter was 62 millirem, the second 


quarter was 157 millirem, and the third quarter 


was 15 millirem, the fourth quarter had no data 


and that's where Al then took a portion of the 


OTIB-58 coworker model and he chose the 95th 

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percent because this person was obviously doing 


work, and he applied 447 millirem for that 


fourth quarter. So from my view it seemed 


that, number one, he applied things properly 


and that we've adequately bounded things with 


this claim. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. SMITH: Okay. That's all I had on that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thanks, that's probably more 


detail than we need to digest on -- on -- for 


now, but that's a good clarification so we can 


go back to that if we need to. 


All right, any -- any other issues that we 


haven't discussed? I think the last two things 


I had was the -- two items really which are 


process items. Any other issues that we need 


to discuss? Arjun or Joe -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- or Brant? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: I have nothing more. 


MATRIX


 MR. GRIFFON: The only thing I wanted to say 


was that prior to the meeting, which is closing 

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in on me quickly, I -- I was planning on 


updating this matrix, and I will talk to Liz 


and Emily about how to do that, but I don't 


anti-- I mean I -- it -- it's impossible I mean 


to think that I'm going to put any privacy 


information in there, but I will run this by 


Liz and Emily. And maybe if I update with 


redline comments or something, they can -- 


 MS. HOWELL: Hey, Mark, if --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I don't know, I --


 MS. HOWELL: -- I'm sorry, I --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) -- yeah? 


 MS. HOWELL: I guess it'll just depend on when 


you -- what -- are you anticipating tomorrow 


or... 


 MR. GRIFFON: Tomorrow, yeah. It has to be 


tomorrow. I'm leaving for Denver, you know, so 


tomorrow I need to get it out, yeah. 


 MS. HOWELL: Okay. Yeah, just send it to us. 


I mean we're going to be in travel, too, but we 


can look at it when we get to the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean my -- my -- you know, this 


was our template for several of our workgr-- 


you know, for a good portion of our time, then 


we kind of broke off into the more final, you 

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know, determined serious issues -- 


 MS. HOWELL: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- or, you know, the outstanding 


issues I guess is a better way to put it, you 


know, but I think we need to have a final copy 


for all the members -- you know, for everyone, 


for the Board, for all members of the public, 


so that we can show whether -- how -- how 


certain ones of these items were closed out and 


what the final, you know, con-- conclusion of 


those items was. I think some of them still 


had remaining action items so I'll sort of do 


some final edits on that -- that last piece and 


get it --


 MS. HOWELL: Okay, we'll --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) --


 MS. HOWELL: -- look forward to it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And then the --


 MS. MUNN: I do hope you can, in most cases, 


indicate closed. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, well, that -- I think 


it's clear. 


 MS. MUNN: I know we've not really and truly 


used that kind of nomenclature in the past 


(unintelligible) --

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141

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, no, I think that --


 MS. MUNN: -- would be very helpful I think, 


certainly understanding that a great many 


people who've not been privy to our discussions 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- are likely to see that matrix. 


It would be very wise I think to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, no, no, I --


 MS. MUNN: -- (unintelligible) closed 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I think that's clear, yeah, 


yeah, I agree. 


PRESENTATION TO THE BOARD
 

And the last item was just to -- not really an 


item but just to say -- sort of discuss the 


presentation to the full Board, and I think I 


already --


 DR. WADE: I think maybe, Mark, I could -- this 


is Lew -- I couple of things leading up to your 


comments. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead. 


 DR. WADE: Just thinking about the meeting 


overall, as you know, Wednesday morning will be 


a subcommittee meeting. Wednesday afternoon 

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will be a Board meeting. It will end with a 


public comment period starting at 5:00 and 


going for as long as there are people with 


public comment, so we would assume we would 


begin to hear from the Rocky Flats community 


and interested parties on Wednesday afternoon 


starting at 5:00. 


And on Thursday morning, after a brief 


introduction by Dr. Ziemer, the Rocky Flats 


item, SEC petition, is scheduled to start at 


8:15. I would imagine Dr. Ziemer would make 


some introductory comments, just reminding 


those of previous Board discussions and the 


fact that this issue was assigned to the 


working group to look at. I would think that ­

- and you guys can correct me if I'm wrong -- 


that a brief representation of the SEC petition 


evaluation report by NIOSH, not a full-blown 


presentation but just a reminder, and then the 


floor opened to petitioners for comments, 


possibly members of Congress or their staffs 


just to fill the air with their thoughts and 


views. And then it would go to Mark as the 


chair of the working group to present, and this 


would be the matrix, anything you would choose 

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to do, Mark. 


The way -- the way workgroups have normally 


done it is the chair would make a presentation 


-- not ending in a motion but just simply 


putting before the Board the thoughts of the 


workgroup. Other members of the workgroup 


would be invited to comment by the chair if 


they wished. And then the Board would begin to 


deliberate on the materials presented, moving 


towards a motion of some type. 


So Mark, now I go to you. We can do a 


different order than that or -- as you would 


like. On Thursday evening is another public 


comment period. The Board is scheduled to 


debate and work Rocky Flats through lunch on 


Thursday. As you know, we've built in a time 


always on the last day for the precise wording 


reviews of any recommendations the Board makes 


on SEC petitions, so that would be scheduled 


for Friday at 11:15. So --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Lew, this is Larry Elliott. I 


just want to make sure I heard you correct at 


the start of your -- your comments here. Did 


you say that -- that NIOSH would be expected to 


present a -- our evaluation report again? 

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144

 DR. WADE: It's -- I would think a brief 


synopsis is in order, Larry, but I -- I leave 


that to you and the working group to discuss 


now. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I mean I would -- I 


would think since it was a while ago that we 


had this, I would think it might be appropriate 


just for that brief presentation again by 


NIOSH. 


 MS. MUNN: It was very helpful for me to see it 


again recently. I appreciate that having been 


sent out. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We sent it out -- I asked Brant 


to send it out because the two new Board 


members, or maybe three new Board members -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- hadn't seen it before, or 


didn't -- may not have known of its existence. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 MS. MUNN: That was very helpful. I guess the 


only question is whether the full report needs 


to be duplicated or whether just selected items 


from that would be appropriate. 


 DR. WADE: I mean I leave that to you, Larry, 

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Brant and the workgroup to discuss right now 


and --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I would -- the -- I 


don't think we need as full a -- you don't need 


to repeat everything you said, Brant, if you 


present this again, but I think a synopsis, as 


-- as Lew said, would be good 'cause it would 


give us a -- you know, especially for those who 


are -- have not seen it before. You know 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ULSH: Mark, should I just limit it to -- I 


mean, as you know, after I presented in April 


of last year, we've covered a lot of ground in 


the working group. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: Should I just limit it to the issues 


presented in the petition? 


 MS. MUNN: That would be -- that would be wise. 


That would seem quite wise. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, I think that would be 


-- yeah, that'd be fine, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: All right, well, I can -- I can put 


something together. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: And then the petitioners would be 

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given a chance, and then the workgroup would 


then present -- now I would assume as the 


workgroup presents that, Mark, you might be 


asking SC&A or Brant for some comment or input, 


but -- but that I leave to the working group -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that I would -- 


 DR. WADE: -- as you would --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that I was thinking that I 


would present and my -- my notion was to come 


up with some summary. I mean I'm not going to 


go through the entire matrix, but I'm also 


going to come up with some summary of where we 


stand on -- on some of the issues that we -- 


that, as we wound down, became the critical 


ones and -- and before -- what I was going to 


ask is Wednesday evening the workgroup -- just 


the workgroup members, we can get together and 


-- and go through these -- these sort of final 


points that, as a workgroup, we want to make. 


And although they're not recommendations, I 


think, you know -- you know, they're going to 


be important for the whole Board to hear for 


its deliberations, so... And then my -- my --


my notion was to, sort of as I -- as I discuss 


some points, I might call in SC&A and/or NIOSH 

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to -- to clarify or -- or, you know, to present 


their opinions on certain key points, you know, 


to --


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to add more of the technical 


details -- yeah? 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- when do you want to do this 


now, Wednesday evening? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I was thinking briefly for 


us to get together, not -- not a transcribed, 


full workgroup meeting, but just for the four 


of us to sit down with paper and computer or 


whatever and --


 DR. WADE: I will round -- I will round you up. 


As soon as the public comment period is over -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- I'll try and get the four of you 


to decide if you want to do it then or if you 


want to have a dinner break and then come back 


and -- and I'll take the task on of trying to 


herd you --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- to -- to some interaction. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you, that would be helpful. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Lew. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I just want to be -- this is 


Larry Elliott again. I want to be clear on 


what you were just talking about. That's a 


meeting of the working group themselves without 


attendance by NIOSH/OCAS, or I guess there by 


SC&A. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: For you guys to hash out where 


you want to be. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Understood. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: So Brant and -- and/or the ORAU 

team members will not participate in that 


meeting. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, that's right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you. 


 MS. HOWELL: Lew, Liz and I will be happy to 


help you with that, if need be. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 MS. MUNN: I have a suggestion or so. I would 


hope that either Paul or you, Mark, in opening 


remarks setting this up -- I think it would be 


actually helpful if Paul would do it, but I'm 

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not certain how easy it is to accumulate the 


information -- seems very wise in light of the 


record to include in the opening comments the 


number of meetings that the official working 


group has had, rough approximation of the 


technical interactions between the agency and ­

- and the contractor. It would be -- it seems 


to me very acceptable and almost necessary for 


the audience and for individuals later reading 


the transcript to understand very clearly how 


much effort has gone into this. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah --


 MS. MUNN: I would not want anyone to ever get 


the idea that these issues that were brought 


before us were given short shrift, ever. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. No, I agree with 


that and that -- that's certainly -- 


 DR. WADE: Maybe you, Mark, and I can get with 


Paul at some point and decide how best to do 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. Well, I was going to 


include that, but if Paul wants to give it is 


an -- or either way, yeah, yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Either way? Good. If you bring the 


bullet, somebody can fire it. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Okay. Is there any --


anything else then on that? And -- and I would 


say to my workgroup colleagues that I would 


circulate something, but it might not be till 


we're out there, you know, as far as -- so 


maybe I can, you know, give you something on 


paper to sort of edit -- tear apart and then we 


can meet Wednesday night. I'm not sure that 


I'm going to get it done before I leave 


tomorrow, but you know, I've certainly got a 


starting point, but I'll -- I'll try to get 


something to you as soon as I can and then 


we'll work real time with it, you know -- 


 MS. MUNN: As long as our respective -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- together (unintelligible). 


 MS. MUNN: -- computers (unintelligible) 


systems crash, we're -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Mark --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah? 

 MR. PRESLEY: -- this is Bob. You know, if --

if there's time even Wednesday after your first 


meeting, you'll be there, Wanda'll be there and 

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I will -- I'm coming in Tuesday night. I don't 


know when Mike's going to be. 


 MR. GIBSON: I should be there Tuesday night. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, so but -- you know, if 


there's some time that morning -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Wednesday morning? Yeah --


 DR. WADE: After the -- after the subcommittee 


meeting. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right after the subcommittee 


meeting --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- we could kind of get our 


thoughts together, too, that might help. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's an opportunity to -- 


 MS. MUNN: But that one may run long. 


 DR. WADE: Well, I will try -- at the end of 


subcommittee, I will ask you four what you wish 


to do. I'll make it a point to do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: All right. Thanks. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Lew? 


 DR. WADE: Yes, sir. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Do I need to sit in in the back 


of that audience on that subcommittee since I'm 


an alternate? 

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 DR. WADE: You're more than welcome. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I will do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Well, I think -- I think 

we're done for now. We'll all be reconvening 

in a few days. 

 DR. WADE: Thank you all very much. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, thanks, everybody. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We'll see y'all in a couple of 


days. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Bye. 


 MS. MUNN: Bye-bye. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting concluded at 2:55 p.m.) 

______________________________ 

153 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of April 30, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


29th day of May, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102