1 K.R. testif ie d that a “twenty” was

$20 wort h of cocai

ne, or about enough to fi

ll a thim ble. 

### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-99-00591-CR
Johnny Rodr

iguez, Appellant v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COMAL COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DIS TRICT NO. CR99-025, HO NORABLE GARY L . STEE L, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury fou nd ap pellant Jo hnny Rod rigu ez g uilty o f delivering coc ai n e to a m i nor. See Te x. Heal th & Saf ety Code A nn . § 481.1 22 (W es t S upp. 2 00 0) . Th e j ur y as se ss ed pu n i sh men t, en ha nc ed by a pr eviou s felony co nvictio n, a t impriso nment for sixty year s and a $1 0, 000 fine. We will mod ify

t he judg ment of

co nvic t io n t o de let e t he affir mat ive find ing t ha t Ro dr igu ez us ed a d ea dly weapon i n the com mi ssion of the off

ense an d aff irm the judgm

ent as m odif ie d. Rod riguez’s daughter, K.R., tes t ifi ed t ha t o n Septemb er 9, 1998, when sh e was fourteen ye ars ol d, sh e wen t to t he hous e h er f

athe r shared w

i th h i s m other, K .R.’s

gran dm other. Rodriguez

and K .R. went to hi s bedroom wh ere Rodriguez pro duced a “twenty ” of cocai

ne. 1 Rodriguez

place d t he co caine o n t he t o p o f a s pe ak er , ch o pp ed it wit h a r az o rbla de , an d d ivid ed it in to li nes. Then, usin

g a rolled up doll

ar bi ll , K.R. in hal ed the cocain

e as Rodriguez

watched.2 Ro dr igu ez an d W at t s w er e d ivo r ce d. Bo t h live d in New B raun f el s. K .R. l

i ve d wi th her m other, but of ten v i si ted h er f athe r. 2 Laterthat d ay, K.R. gave her m ot her, Linda W

att s, f our dol l ars to purchase gas oli ne. 2 One of the bi

ll s was the one K.R. had us ed to inha le the cocain

e. Watts noticed some

whi te powder on t he bill. Whe n sh e t as t ed it , it made h er tongue n

um b. Su sp ec ti

n g th e p owder wa s c oca i n e, W atts confronted

K.R., who reveal

ed what had h appened. A uri

ne speci me n taken f rom K.R. the n

ext day tested po si

tive f or co cai ne. Sufficiency of E vidence Rodriguez

co nt en ds t he ev ide nc e is leg ally insufficientt o s upp or t t he jur y’s finding that he del i vered coc ai

ne to K.R. The question presented i s whethe r, afte r viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of f act could have found the essential elem ents of t he offense beyon d a reason able d oubt . See Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) ; Griffin v. State , 614 S .W.2d 155, 15 8-59 (T ex. Cri m. A pp. 198 1).

Rodriguez f

irst arguesthat K.R. was an ac co mplice witne ss, and t hat her t est imony was not adequately

co rrob or ated. SeeTex. Code Crim. Proc. An n. art. 38.14 ( West 1979) (accompl ic e witnessru le). Ro dr iguez re lies on t he o pinion in Blake v. State , 971 S.W.2d 451, 461 (T ex. Crim

. App. 1998), in

whi ch the j uven

il e exception to the accompl ic e wi tness rule was ab oli shed.

The test for det er minin g w he t he ra w it ne ss is a n a cc o mplic e u nd er ar t icle 38 . 14 is whether the wi tness coul d be prosecuted under the sam e i ndictmen t by wh ic h the accus ed was charged. See Gam ez v. Stat e , 737 S.W .2d 315 , 322 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 1 987 ); Reyna v. Stat e , 223

S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—Aust in 2000, no pet. ). It is an

aff irm ative defen

se to pros ecution f

or deliver ing a co nt ro lled subs t ance t o a minor t hat t he actor was younge r than ei ghteen y ears of age. SeeTe x. H ealt h & Sa fet y Cod e Ann. § 481.1 22(b )(1) (W est Sup p. 2000 ). Thu s, w hile ther e is no longe ra blanke t exce pt ion t o t he accompli ce witness rule f

or juveni les, K.R. co uld no t be su cc es sfu lly pros ecute d f

or th e of f en se f orwhi ch Rodri guez was i

ndicted and theref

ore was not an accompl

ic e witness. Rodriguez f urtherar gue s t hat t he St at e failed t o p ro ve t hat he de livered t he co caine to K.R . by

actual trans f er, as al l eged i n the i ndi ctmen t. S ee Tex . H ealt h & Sa fet y Cod e Ann. § 481.002 (8) (West Su pp. 200 0) (d elivery means a ct ual o r c ons t ru ct ivetransfer, or off er to sel l). He ref ers usto the h

old i ng th at “a n actual trans f er . . . con tem pl ate s th e m an ual tran sf er of prop erty f rom t he transferor to t he transf eree.” Heber

ling v. State , 834 S.W.2d 350, 354 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 1992 ). Rodriguez

con str ue s “ man ual tra n sf er” to mean t hat t he t ra nsfero r must physically hand t he co nt ra band t o t he t r an sfe r ee . I n t his case, the evi dence sh ows tha t Rod riguez p l ac ed

the coc ai ne on a fl at surface, f

rom whi ch K .R. in hal ed i t. Th us , a rgue s R odri gu ez , the S tate

did n ot prove an actual trans f er. Rodriguez

m i sc ons true s th e m ea ni ng of “ man ual tran sf er, ” a s th e op i ni on in Nevarez v. State , 767 S.W.2d

766 (Te x. Cri m . A pp. 198 9), de mons

trate s. I n th at c as e, th

e d ef en da nt’ s c oparty shoved a b ag of m

arih uana f rom the f ront o f a pi

ckup truck bed to t he rear, where i t was han dle d and exam i ne d by an und ercover of

f i cer. See id. at 767. T he court held tha t t hi s evi dence was sufficient to prove an actual trans f er of the m ari hua na . See id. at 768. T he f

acts in the present cause arean al ogous to Nevarez . Rodriguez m anual l y pl ac ed the coc ai ne wi thi n K .R. ’s rea ch . Sh e took4

po ss es sio n o f it by

i nh al i ng i t, thereb y com pl eti ng th e del i very . The ev i den ce

i s l eg al l y suf f i ci en t to prove deli very by actual transf

er. Point of error t hree i s overruled. Rodriguez

als o co nt ends t he evide nce is fac t ually insuffi cient t o p ro ve de livery by actual t ra nsfer. The evidenc e r ega rd ing t he nat ur e o f the deliver y was u nc on t ra dict ed, and Rod riguez’s arg

um en t i n s upp ort of thi s c onte nti on i s m ere l y a re sta tem en t of the argumen

t discuss ed in t he t wo pr ece ding parag

raphs. A neutral review of all the evidence does not convince us that the proof of guilt is so obvious ly weak or s o grea tly outweighe d by contrary pr oof as to undermine confidence in the jury’s de term inati on. SeeJohnso n v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Point of error four is over

ruled. Extr aneous Offense s In his sevent h po intof

err or , Ro dr igu ez co nt en ds t he dis t r ict co ur t er r o ne o us ly adm itted ex trane ous of

f en se e vi den ce. K .R. testi

f i ed th at Rodri

guez f i rst gav e h er coca i ne i n Jan uary 1998, and that he sub sequentl y ga ve h er co caine o n t went y to t hirt y occ asio ns bet wee n Janu ar y and Septem ber. One of K.R. ’s cl assm ates testifi ed t hat she sa w Ro dr iguez give K. R. co caine o nce d ur ing t he sum me r of that year. Rodriguez

urges that this

testim ony h ad no rele van ce other than character co nfo r mit y, that i s, to prove his b ad ch

aracter i n orde r to show acti on i

n c onf ormi ty th erewi th. See Montgom ery

v. State , 8 10 S .W. 2d 3 72, 387 (T ex. Cri m . A pp. 199 1) ( op. on

reh’g); Tex . R. Evid. 404(b). He further argues that if these extraneous offen

ses were rel

evan t apart from

character co nfo r mit y, this

relev ance was subs t ant ially

ou t weighe d by

the danger of

unf ai r prej udice. SeeTe x. R. Evi d. 403.5 An ext ra neo us o ffense is an a ct of misco nduc t t hat is not sho wn in t he cha r gin g i nstrumen t. See Rankin

v. State , 953 S.W.2d740 , 7 41 ( Te x. C rim. App . 1 996 ). The indict ment in t his cause all

eged that appell

ant deli vered cocaine to K.R. “on or about” September 9, 1998. Wh en t he ind ic t ment alleges t hat a cr ime occ ur re d o n or abo ut a pa rt icular dat e, t he St at e may pre sent evidenc e o f the offense being comm itted at an y t ime p r io rt o t he filing o f t he ind ict men t an d w it hin t he li m i tations peri od. See Sled

ge v. State , 953 S.W .2d 253 , 256 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1997 ). Th e t est imony of whi ch Rodri guez compl

ai ns was not evide

nce of e xtraneous off

enses , but rather evi dence of the repeatedcomm

is si on of the off

ense al le ged i n the i ndictmen t. Ro driguez was enti

tled to re quir e t he St at e t o e lect t he o ccu rr ence on w hich it so ught t o r ely for c onvict ion, but in the absen ce o f a r eq ue st fo ran ele ct io n t he r e w as no er r o rin adm i ttin g the chal l enged testim

ony . See Worley v. State , 87 0 S .W .2d

62 0, 6 22 -2 3 ( Te x . A

pp .—H ouston

[1 st D i st. ] 1 99 4, p et. ref’d) ; see also Craw ford v. State , 696 S.W .2d 903 , 905-0 7 ( T ex . Cr im. A pp . 19 85 ) . Po int o f er r o rse ve n is overruled. Enhancem ent of P unishme nt

In poi nts of error fiv e and si x, Rodriguez conten

ds t he ev ide nc e is leg ally a nd fac t ua lly insufficientt o su pp o rt t he ju ry’ s find ing t hat he h ad bee n pr evio us ly co nvict ed o f a f elony . SeeTe x. Penal Code A nn . § 12.42 (b) (W

est Sup p. 2000 ). The enh

ancem ent paragraph al

le ged t hat app ellant was convi cted of attempted aggravated robbery on J uly 26, 1976, in the Com

al Cou n ty di str i ct c our t, in cau se nu mber 7 925 . T o p ro ve t his pre viou s co nvictio n, t he Stat e i ntroduced a peni

tentiary packet that was linked t o R od rigu ez by his fingerp rint s. T he exhibit c ont ains a jud gment ref le cting tha

t Rodriguez

was convi

cted of t he o ffense allege d, on t he da t e allege d, in the cour t alleged, but in cause3 Art icle 42. 12, sec t ion 3 g( a) (2 ) p ro vides t hat an affirmat ive find ing sha ll be ma de “w he n it is shown that a deadly

we ap on a s de fined in Sec t ion 1 .0 7, Pena l Cod e, was use d . . . dur ing t he comm is si on of a f

el ony of fen se . . . and that the defen

dant used . . . the deadly

weapon . . . .” 6 num ber 762 5. The exhibit also co nt ains t he co rr esp ond ingsentence , which b ears cause n umb er 7925. Rod riguez’s ch

al l en ge to th e s uf f i ci en cy of th e ev i den ce

i s b as ed on th e d i screpa n cy wi th re sp ec t to the c aus e n

um ber. To be fat al, a var iance be t wee n t he pl eading and the proof regardi ng a previ

ous con vi cti on use d t o e nhance punishment must be bo t h mate rial and prejudi ci al to the def

endan t. See Hall v. State , 61 9 S. W.2d 156 , 15 7 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 80) ; Ples singer v. State , 536 S.W.2d 380, 38 1 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 1976). Rodriguez doe s n ot al l eg e or s how tha t he wa s m i sl ed , su rpr i se d, or un ab le to det er mine the p re viou s co nvictio n t he St at e so ught t o pr o ve . T he r e is no fat al v ar ian ce in t his cause . See Col

e v. State , 611 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim . App. 1981) (cause num ber 87954 al le ged, cause num

ber 87594 proved; n

o fatal va ri ance); Straugh ter v. Sta te , 801 S.W.2d 607, 611 (T ex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 19 90 , no pet.) (cause num ber 494,316 alle ged, cause num ber 474,316 proved; no fa

tal va rian ce). Points of error fi

ve an d si x are overrul ed. Deadl y Weapon F inding The St at e g av e n o t ice in t he ind ict men t t ha t it wo uld seek a fi ndi ng that Rodriguez “used a deadl y weapon, to-wi

t: cocain e” duri

ng th e com m i ssi on of the a l l eged off en se. SeeTe x. Code Crim

. Proc. An n. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)( 2) (West Sup p. 2000 ). 3 The deadl

y weapon question was subm itted to the j ury

i n a spe cial i ssue, a nd t he jury ’s af

fi rmati ve f in din g is refl ected in the dis trict cou rt ’s judgm

ent. In po in

ts o f error o ne and two, Rodriguez co ntends the e vidence is legally and7

fac t ua lly insufficientto su st ain the finding tha t he us ed t he co caine a s a d ead ly weapo n dur ing t he comm is si on of thi s off

ense. We are ci ted to no opini

on dis cussi

ng whether, in

a prosec uti on f

or deliv erin g a contro ll ed su bs tan ce , i t ca n b e s ai d that the sub sta

nc e w asa d eadl

y we ap on us ed d ur ing t he com m i ss i on of the off ense wi thin the me ani ng of arti cl e 42.12, section 3g(a)( 2). The State conceded at t r ial t ha t it was “pus

hi ng the en vel ope” with respect to t he deadl y weapon fi

ndi ng, and a ske d t he jury to “m ake a de cision t hat t hen will allow higher aut hor ities t o u ltimat ely decide t he i ssue.” To det er mine wh et he rt he de ad ly

weapon f in din g was appropriate, we mus t answer two questions: was t he cocain

e “used . . . duri

ng the com

mi ssion of a felony of

fen se” and wa s t he co ca ine a d ea dly wea po n. Was the cocaine used by R odriguez during the commission of a felony?

The only fel ony of fen se comm itted by Rodriguez

wasthe del

i very of c ocai ne to K.R., a mi nor. Ro driguez a

rgue s that cocaine

cann ot be used to deli

ver i tself . He urges that it was ne ces sary t o sho w t hat t he co caine w as u sed t o fa cilitat e t he co mmi ssio n of a n asso ciat ed felo ny di st inc t fr o m t he de live ry.

All fel onie s are theoretical

ly suscepti bl e to an affirmative f

i nd i ng reg ard i ng the us e or ex hi bi ti on of a dead l y weap on. See Pa tters on v. State , 7 69 S .W. 2d 938 , 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) . The phrase

“‘us ed . . . during the co mmiss io n of a felony o ffense’ r efer s ce rt ainly to t he wielding of

a [wea pon] wi th e f f ec t, but i t ex ten dsaswe l l to anyemployment of a dea dly weap on, even it s simple po sses sion, if such po sses sion fac ili t at es t he associ ated fel

ony.” Id . a t 941 (q uo t ing Patter son v. Stat

e , 723 S.W.2d 308, 315 (Tex. A pp.—A usti n 19 87), aff’d , 769 S.W.2d938 (T ex.8

Cr im. App. 1989 )). In Patterson , f orex am pl e, th e def en da n t’s pos se ss i on

of a f i re ar m wa s f oun d to f ac i l i tate his po sses sion o f metha mphet amine, t he off ense f or which he wasconv i cted. See id. at 942. Rodriguez

re lies on t he o pinions in Ex parte P etty , 833 S.W.2d145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) , and Narr

on v. State , 835 S. W.2 d 64 2, 644 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 199 2) . I n Petty , t he defend ant was co nvicte d o f unlawful po sses sion o f a firear m by a felon, a nd an a ffi rmat ive finding

was m ade base d so lely on his unlawful po sses sion o f the handg un. See Pe tty , 833 S.W .2d at 14 5. The court wrot e, “[I] n

order t o ‘ use ’ a d ead ly weapo n for affirmative finding p ur po ses, t he we apo n must be util iz ed to ach i ev e a n i n ten de d r es ul t, nam el y , the c om m i ss i on of a f el on y of f ense se pa ra te and di stin

ct f rom ‘m ere’ possessi

on.” Id . The affi

rmative f in din g was im permi ssible i

n that case “because there was no a sso ciat ed felo ny facili t at ed by t he Appl

ic ant’s possess ion of

the deadl y weapon.” Id . at 145- 46. In Narron , a

prosec uti on f or posse ssi

on of a proh i bi ted wea pon, the court

fol lowed Petty

and del eted an af

fi rmati ve f in din g based, as in Petty , so lely on t he po sses sion o f the wea po n for which he wasconv i cted. See Narron , 835 S.W.2d at 644. In Tyra v. Sta te , 897 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Crim . App. 1995), the d efen dant was convi cted of invo lunt ar y manslaught er ar is ing o ut o f his o pe r at io n o f a mo t o rve hic le w hile in to xi cated, and an

aff irm ative f in din g was made that he used the vehicl e as a dea dly weap on d ur ing t he co mmi

ssio n of t he o ffense. Citing Petty and Narron , the defen

dant argued that t he affirmat ive finding wa s imp er miss ible b ec au se his use of t he vehicle w as a n esse nt ial element o f the of f en se f or whi ch he was convicted; he did not use t he veh icl e to faci li tat e a separat e and disti

nct asso ci ate d f elony . See id. a

t 79 8. Th e c our

t re j ec ted th i s a rgum en t, w ri ti n g th at Petty and Narron mea n o nly9

that “ mere

pos se ss i on

of the we ap on w

i thou t putti ng i t to an y us e or pu rp ose wh ats oev er doe s n ot” con sti tute “u se” of the wea

pon wi thi n the m ean i ng of arti cle 42.1 2, se cti on 3g( a)(2). Id . Petty and Narron “ do n

ot sta nd f ort he pr o po sit io n t ha t t he ph r as e ‘ us ed o rex hibit ed a d ea dly wea po n dur ing com m i ss i on of a f el ony of fen se’ n ecessari ly me ans ‘ used or exhi

bi ted a dead ly weapo n dur ing com m i ss i on of a n o ffen se wh ich do es no t o t he rwis e r eq uir e t he us e o rex hibit io n o f a d ea dly weapon.’” Id . T he co ur t ad de d, “T he r e is simp ly no t hing in t he ph r as e ‘ us ed a d ea dly we ap on ’ to imply that it must alway

s be us ed to co mm

it an ‘ associ ated off

ense.’” Id . T he co ur t held t hat t he affirmative finding was pro per even though invol untary man

slaughter alway

s in volved the useo f a de ad ly wea po n. See id.; see also Mann v. State , 13 S.W .3d 89 , 91 (Tex . A

pp .—A us ti n 20 00 , pe t. granted) (upholdi

ng f in din g that defenda

nt used automobile

as de ad ly we ap on d

uri ng com m i ss i on of f elony dri vi ng w hi l e i ntoxi cated) . Rod riguez w asnot c onv

i cte d of me rely possessi ng cocai ne. He “u sed ” t he co caine by deliver ing it in t he sa me sense t hat t he de fendant in Tyra “used” h isautomobile dur ing t he com m i ss i on of t he invo lunt ar y mansla ug ht er . I n light o f Tyra , we must reject R odr iguez’s ar gument that the deliv

ery of a controlled s

ubstance c ann

ot , in itsel f, consti tut e the “use”o f the s

ubstance “dur ingthe commission of a f elony offense ” w i

thi n the m ean i ng of arti cle 42.1 2, se cti on 3g( a)(2). Wh ether t he affir mat ive find ing wa s a pp r o pr iat e in t his cau se t her efo re t ur ns o n whet her t he co caine was sho wn t o be a de adly wea po n. Was the cocaine a

deadly w eapon? Under the penal code, t here are two ki

nds of deadly weapons. First, t here are tho se thin gs tha t are de adl y we ap ons by de si gn : “ a f i rea rm or an y thi ng man i f es tl y de si gned , m ad e, or10

adaptedf or the pu rpose of i nf l i cti ng d eath or seri ous b odi l y i nj ury .” Tex . P enal

Code A nn. § 1.07(a )(17)(A ) (We st 1994 ). Secon

d, there are those thin

gs that become de adl

y weapons by

use: “an ythi ng that in the ma nne ro f it s u se o rint en de d u se is ca pa ble o f ca us ing de at h o rse r io us bo dily i nj ury .” Id . § 1.07( a)(17) (B). If a t hingi s sh own to be a dea dl y weap on by

des i gn, i t is not ne ces sary to prove in

a particul ar case that it wasr ea lly ca pa ble o f ca us ing de at h o rse r io us bo dily in jury in that case. See Thoma

s v. State , 821 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Crim . App. 19 91 ). B ut i f th e S tate se ek s to pr ove tha t a th i ng be ca me a de adl y we ap on by the ma nne r of i ts use or intended us e, the evi dence must establish

t hat it w as c apa ble of ca using d eat h or ser iou s bo dily i njury as u sed by the defend ant i n that cas e. See Hold

er v. Stat e , 837 S.W .2d 802 , 807 (Tex. A pp.—A usti n 19 92, pet. ref

’d). The Stat e does not cont end an d ma de no effo r t t o pr o ve t ha t t he co ca ine in que sti on was a deadl

y weapon by

design. Instead, the State sought to prove that t he co ca in e w as a d ea dly we ap o n be ca us e it wa s c ap ab le of ca us i n g d ea th or s eri ousbod i l y i njury i n th e m an ne r of i ts u se or in tended us e. T he r e is no evi

dence that Rodriguez’ s use of the cocai ne diff ered from hi s i ntended use, so we wi l l ex am i n e th e r ec ord to det er mine

if ther e is evide nce t o s upp or t a finding t hat t he co caine wa s u se d b y Ro dr ig ue z in a ma nne rca pa ble o f c au sin g d ea t h o rse r io us bo di ly inju ry.

The o nly ev ide nc e p er t ine nt t o t he de ad ly wea po n issue w as t hat of D r. Char les Smith, a fam il y practice phy

si ci an i n New Braun

fel s. Dr. Smi

th testifi ed that cocaine c an h

ave “ a wi de variety of eff ects” ranging “f

rom mi ld to pro found systems [ sic ] such as a coma, convulsi ons, even he artattack and death.” Accordi ng to the wi

tness, the short-term eff

ects of cocain

e use i ncl ude in creased hear t ra t e, swe at ing, incr eas ed blo od pr essu re , d ilatio n of t he pupil s, and som

etim es cardiac arrhy thmi a. Lon g- ter m ef f ec ts can i ncl ude chroni

c dam age to the heart mus cl e. The docto r testifi ed that “the re’s n ot been a m i ni m um saf e dose establ

i she d f or cocain e. So any dose could b e a potential4 The St at e also offer ed t he t est imony of Jo rg e Ro dr iguez , a n age nt wit h t he Dr ug E nfor cement

Administr at ion. A ge nt R odri guez d es cri

be d the p roce ss

by wh i ch coc ai ne i s extr ac ted f rom co ca le aves in countries such as

Boli via and Col

umbia . He al so test if

ie d that cocaine s old on the street can be ov er n i n ety per cent pur e, but is oft en “cu t ” by the addi tion of other substances. Agen t Rodr iguez had no informat ion, how ever , r ega rd ing t he co caine d elivered t o K. R. by appe llant Ro dr iguez , a nd the State does n ot rel y on h i s testi mony on ap peal . 11 t ime bomb. ” Dr . S mith was of t he o pinion t ha t “ coc aine is a ver y lethal su bst ance ” t hat “has t he ca pa b i l i ty to cause a m

yri ad of ef fects, ei ther short term or l

ong term.” In t he do ct or ’s o pinion, “one ma y be l ucky enough to survi

ve sev eral en cou nte rswi th c ocai ne , [b ut] h e or s he may not sur vive the next one. Th

ere is j ust no way

to know.” Duri

ng c ro ss -exam

in ation, Dr. Smi

th confi rmed that co caine has s ome l

egi tim ate medi ci nal us es , an d a ck no wle dg ed t ha t it is pos si bl e that a si ngl e u se of co caine mi

ght not cause death or serious i nj ury. He al so said tha

t cocaine m

ust be i ngested in order to h av e a n y ef f ec t. 4 Dr. Smith’s t est imony do es no t sup po rt a finding t hat t he co caine in this cause was ca pa ble of ca us i ng de ath orseri ous bodil

y i nj ury i n the m ann er of its use by Rodr iguez. First, Smi th’s t est imony wa s i rre l evan t to Rodri guez ’s use of the cocai

ne. Rodriguez

“use d” t he co caine d ur ingt he offense by

pla ci ng i t o n a f la t surface, choppi

ng i t with a razor blade, and arrangi n g i t in to li nes. Smit h di d n ot tes ti f y —a nd the re i s n o othe r ev i de nc e— tha t thi s u se of the coc ai ne wa s c ap ab l e of cau sing ser iou s bo dily i

njury o r d eat h. I ndee d, Smith t est ifi ed t hat co caine mus t be inges t ed t o ha ve a del eterious ef

fect. There i s no evi

dence that

Rodriguez i

nj ected K.R. with cocai

ne or forced her to i n ge st i t. It i s h

el pf ul to di sti ng ui sh Rod riguez’ s c ond

uc t f rom t hat of t he defend ant in Davis
v. State , 955 S.W.2d34 0 ( Te x . A pp .—F ort W

orth 19 97 , pe t. ref’ d). The defen

dant in that case was an oral surgeon wh

o, it was shown, routinel y a dmi ni stered excessi

ve do sa ge s o f se da t ive s t o his5 A

rti cl e 4 2.1 2, s ec ti on 3 g(a

)(2 ) pe rm i ts a n a f f i rm ati ve f i nd i ng base d on an othe r pe rs on’ s u se of a d ea dly w ea po n o nly if

th e def en da n t i s c on v i cte d a s a

pa rty to t he o ffen se an d k ne w t ha t a d ea dly we ap o n w o ul d b e u se d. Ro dr ig ue z w as no t co nvi ct ed as a p ar t y. 12 pa ti en ts by i nj ection dur

i ng s urgi cal procedu res. See id. at 342 -4 6. On o ne suc h oc cas ion, t he pa t ient die d. See id. The defend ant was co nvicte d o f manslaught er and t he jur y found t ha t he us ed a d ea dly wea po n, t he se dat ives, d ur ing t he co mmi ssio n of t he off

en se. See id. at 35 2. T he co ur t o f ap pe als he ld that t he ev

ide ncesupported a finding t hat t he de fendant use d t he mixtu re of d ru gs d ur ing t he off en se i n a man ner capa bl e of caus i ng d eath . See id. Unl ike t he de fendant in Davis , Rodri guez merel y made th e coca i ne av ail ab l e to K.R., al bei t knowing that

she w ou ld inhale the dr ug . T he St at e w o uld ha ve t his C o ur t su st ain t he de ad ly
w ea pon findi ng be cause Rodriguez deliv ered a drug to K.R. that was used by K.R
. in a m ann er cap able o f caus ingdeath or serious bodil y i nj ury. The State, however, was obl iga ted to prove that Rodriguez

used the cocai

ne i n a m ann er ca pa ble o f c au sin g d ea t h o rse r io us bo di ly inju ry. 5 Dr. Sm i th’s testi mony does n ot speak to Rodri guez ’s

use of the coca

i ne i n th i s ca use . Second, even if a finding t hat Ro dri guez u se d a

de adl y we ap on c oul

d b e b as ed

on K.R.’s use o f the coc aine, Dr. S mi th’s t estimony is insuf

fi ciently related to that use. S mi th’s t est imony b roadl y estab l i sh es th at th e r ecre ati on al us e of coc ai n e c an re su l t in phy si cal re act ions rangi ng fro m “mi

ld t o p ro fou nd, ” including d eat h in some c ase s. B ut an allege d de adly wea po n’ s ca pa b i l i ty o f ca us ing se r io us bo dily inju ry o rde at h in th e m an n er of i ts use must be eva luat ed in light of t he facts that actuall

y e xi sted when the f

el ony was com

m i tted. See Williams v

. State , 946 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. A

pp.—F ort Worth 19 97), rev’d on other grounds , 970 S.W.2d 566 (T ex. Crim . App. 1998) . The

record b ef

ore us i s si l en t in that reg ard. There i s no evi dence as to the purity

or po tency13

of t he co caine Rod

ri gu ez de l i v er ed to K .R , or o th er

wise su gg esti n g th at th i s c oca i n e w as l i ke l y to cause a seri ous, rat her than a m il d, physi cal

reaction i n the user. There is no evi dence that the ma nne r in whi ch K .R. used the cocain

e, in hal in g it i n i ts powder form, was m

ore li kel y to resul t in s erious i nj ury to the us er th an othe r f orms of use , such a s i

nj ecti ng i t in sol uti on. Thereis

no evi dence that K.R. was espec ia

ll y s usceptib le to an adv erse reaction f

rom cocain

e use. To supp ort a finding t hat t he co caine w as a dea dly weap on in t he ma nne r of i ts use, t he Stat e was re qui

re d to dem

on strate th at th e c oca i n e i n th i s c au se

wa s c ap ab l e of

ca us i n g d ea th or seri ous bodil

y i nj ury as it was use d in

this cause. See Holder , 837 S.W.2dat 802. Test im ony tha t there i s a n un kn own pos si b i l i ty of a s eri ous ad v er se ph y si ca l ef f ec t ar i si n g ou t o f t he us e o f so me co caine by so me per so ns und er so me circu msta nces do es no t sat isfy that bur den.

We hold that the ev

ide nceis legally i

nsufficient t o s upp or t t he finding t hat t he co caine was a dea dl y weap on i n the m an ner of i ts use by Rodri guez and sus tai n poi nt of error one . We n

eed not a ddr es s th e f ac tua l su f f i ci en cy ch al l en gei n p oi nt two. The dist rict co ur t ’s judg ment is modified t o d elet e t he affir mat ive find ing t ha t a d ea dly we ap on wa s u se d du

ri ng the com m i ss i on of the of f en se. See Williams , 970 S.W.2d at 566 (remedy when aff irm ative fi ndi ng erroneously

ma de). As m

odif ie d, the judgm

ent is aff irm ed.

Bea An n Sm ith, Justice Be f oreCh i ef Ju sti ce A b ous si e, Ju sti ce s K i dd an d B . A . Sm

i th14

Modif ie d and, as Modi fi

ed, Af fi rmed File d: Novem

ber 2, 2000 Publish