COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

LILLIE ROSENBAUM COMBS, S/K/A 

 LILLIE MARIE COMBS

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1846-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 OCTOBER 26, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

B. A. Davis, III, Judge Designate 

Jesse W. Meadows, III, for appellant. 

Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Lillie Marie Combs (appellant) was convicted in a joint 

bench trial with her husband, Nathan Allan Combs, of 

solicitation of money or other thing of value in connection with 

a placement or adoption, in violation of Code § 63.1-220.4, and 

conspiracy to solicit money or other thing of value in 

connection with a placement or adoption, in violation of Code 

§§ 18.2-22 and 63.1-220.4.1 On appeal, she contends the evidence 

was insufficient to convict her of the offenses charged. For 

the following reasons, we affirm. 

 1

 Appellant was originally indicted for two counts of 

solicitation of money or other thing of value in connection with 

a placement or adoption under Code § 63.1-220.4 and one count of 

conspiracy. However, after trial, at the sentencing hearing, 

the trial court granted appellant's motion to set aside one of 

the solicitation counts. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the prevailing party below, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). 

The judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury, is 

entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be 

set aside unless it appears from the evidence that it is plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it. See Stevens v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 238, 240, 415 S.E.2d 881, 882-83 

(1992). 

 The evidence established that appellant and Nathan Combs 

(Combs) married in January 1996. Their daughter, A.C., was born 

October 23, 1996. The family moved to a rented trailer in a 

mobile home park in April 1997. By June 1997, appellant and 

her husband were experiencing severe financial difficulties. 

Neither appellant nor Combs had a steady job, and their public 

assistance payments expired. They sold a vehicle, furniture, 

and other items to pay for ordinary household necessities. 

 On June 13, 1997, appellant contacted Bill Devlin at 

Catholic Charities, an adoption agency in Roanoke. Devlin met 

with appellant and Combs at their home on June 20, 1997 and 

discussed with the couple placing A.C. for adoption through the 

agency. Appellant and Combs stated they were under a great deal 

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of emotional and financial stress. Combs asked if the agency or 

the potential adoptive couple could "help out with their 

situation." Devlin explained that any exchange of money or 

property in return for the child would be a violation of the 

law. Devlin agreed to return in a few days with the necessary 

legal documents and to take custody of A.C. 

 Devlin returned to appellant's home as agreed on June 23, 

1997, but found no one at the trailer. Devlin saw appellant 

later that day, and she advised him that her mother was going to 

keep the child. Subsequently, appellant called Devlin and said 

she wanted to proceed with the adoption. However, Devlin never 

heard from appellant again. 

 Debbie Farthing (Farthing) testified that in July 1997, one 

month after appellant's initial meeting with Devlin, she met 

with appellant and Combs at their trailer. Farthing did not 

know appellant or Combs but understood that they were to be 

evicted from the trailer and that they wanted someone to take 

their baby. During the meeting, appellant sat and held the baby 

in the same room with Farthing and Combs. Combs said they 

wanted someone to take the baby, wanted $1,500 to buy a truck 

and wanted to leave town. Appellant offered no objection. 

Combs said an adoption agency "was wanting to take the baby" but 

that he "wasn't going to do it" because they were going to "make 

thousands of dollars off the baby." Combs said he was not going 

to "give the baby away free." Farthing took A.C. with her after 

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the meeting but returned the baby to appellant and Combs the 

same day because Farthing's husband refused to cooperate with 

the plan. 

 Thelma Farrar (Mrs. Farrar) was the owner of the mobile 

home park where the Combs lived. She visited appellant's 

trailer in late June or early July. At that time, appellant was 

in the living room holding her baby. Combs told Mrs. Farrar 

that he would give her the baby in exchange for $1,000. 

Appellant again offered no objection. Combs also commented, "I 

wouldn't be selling her, there's not enough money in the world 

to buy my baby." 

 Combs worked periodically for Bobby Farrar (Mr. Farrar) in 

a security business. While working on July 19, 1997, Combs 

asked Mr. Farrar if he and his wife had decided whether they 

wanted A.C. Combs said he now wanted $2,000 for the child. 

Combs indicated he wanted to use the money to catch up on his 

rent and buy a cheap car. 

 On July 23, 1997, Mrs. Farrar confronted Combs outside the 

trailer about his overdue rent payments. Combs asked Mrs. 

Farrar to "give [him] a little money" and accept A.C. for the 

rent he owed. Mrs. Farrar refused the offer. 

 Mrs. Farrar saw Combs outside his trailer two days later. 

Combs said: "[T]hese nice people in the trailer are from Texas 

and they're going to take [A.C.]. I just want to see if you 

want her, because I would rather you have her than these 

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people." Combs told Farrar the Texas couple was going to give 

them $3,000 for the baby. Mrs. Farrar responded that she did 

not have that kind of money. Appellant left the trailer and 

asked Mrs. Farrar to call Molly, Combs's mother, and ask her to 

bring A.C.'s birth certificate. Mrs. Farrar saw the Texas 

couple put A.C.'s things in their car. The evidence also 

established that the Singletons, a couple from Texas, took A.C. 

from appellant's home to Texas within twenty-four hours of their 

having met Combs and appellant. However, the child was 

subsequently returned to Virginia and placed in the custody of 

Combs's mother. 

 Appellant testified that she and her husband pursued an 

adoption for A.C. because of their financial situation but that 

they did not attempt to receive money in return. The trial 

judge accepted the Commonwealth's evidence and rejected 

appellant's testimony. Accordingly, appellant was convicted of 

solicitation of money or other thing of value in connection with 

a placement or adoption, in violation of Code § 63.1-220.4, and 

conspiracy to solicit money or other thing of value in 

connection with a placement or adoption, in violation of Code 

§§ 18.2-22 and 63.1-220.4. 

II. SOLICITATION OF MONEY 

 Code § 63.1-220.4, the statute under which appellant was 

convicted, prohibits, inter alia, the solicitation of money or 

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any thing of value in connection with the placement or adoption 

of a child. Under Code § 63.1-220.4, 

[n]o person or child-placing agency shall 

charge, pay, give, or agree to give or 

accept any money, property, service or other 

thing of value in connection with a 

placement or adoption or any act undertaken 

pursuant to this chapter . . . . No person 

shall advertise or solicit to perform any 

activity prohibited by this section. Any 

person violating the provisions of this 

section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. 

(Emphasis added). 

 In the instant case, appellant contends the evidence was 

insufficient to establish either that she violated the statute 

or that she "counseled, enticed or induced" another to violate 

Code § 63.1-220.4. Specifically, she argues that "[t]here is 

absolutely no evidence whatsoever to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [she] committed criminal solicitation." However, 

appellant was not charged with criminal solicitation, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-29,2 which requires the Commonwealth to 

prove that the defendant intended to induce another to commit a 

crime. See Ford v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 224, 227, 391 

 2

 Code § 18.2-29 provides: 

Any person who commands, entreats, or 

otherwise attempts to persuade another 

person to commit a felony, shall be guilty 

of a Class 6 felony. Any person age 

eighteen or older who commands, entreats, or 

otherwise attempts to persuade another 

person under age eighteen to commit a 

felony, shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. 

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S.E.2d 603, 604 (1990). To the contrary, appellant was charged 

with violating Code § 63.1-220.4 by soliciting payment of money

or other thing of value with the placement of A.C.3

 "Generally, the words and phrases used in a statute should 

be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a 

different intention is fairly manifest." Woolfolk v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994). 

The commonly accepted definitions for the word "solicit" 

include: "to make petition to," "entreat, importune," "to 

approach with a request or plea (as in selling or begging)." 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2169 (1993). Code 

§ 63.1-220.4 contains a clear prohibition against the request or 

plea for payment of money or any other thing of value in 

connection with an adoption or the placement of a child. 

 In the instant case, the Commonwealth's evidence proved 

that Combs, in appellant's presence, attempted to obtain money 

from Farthing, Mrs. Farrar, and the Singletons in exchange for 

 3

 The amended indictment charged appellant with the 

following: 

On or about July 18, 1997, through July 25, 

1997, in the County of Pittsylvania, 

Virginia, Lillie Rosenbaum Combs did 

unlawfully and feloniously, in connection 

with the placement or adoption of A.M.C., 

born October 23, 1996, solicit payment of 

money or other thing of value not 

specifically allowed by Code 

Section 63.1-220.4, Code of Virginia. 

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placing their child, A.C., for adoption. Combs commented that 

he was not going to give A.C. away for free because he could 

make thousands of dollars for the child. Appellant did not 

object to Combs's comment or to his offers to sell the child. 

Additionally, it was appellant who first contacted Devlin, only 

to learn that an adoption through the agency would not result in 

the payment of any money to her and her husband. In fact, when 

Devlin saw appellant a few days later, she falsely told him that 

she had made arrangements for A.C. to stay with a grandmother. 

Finally, while the Singletons were present at the trailer, 

appellant tried to obtain the child's birth certificate to 

facilitate the adoption. 

 The trial judge accepted the Commonwealth's evidence and 

rejected appellant's testimony that she did not attempt to 

receive money in return for the placement or adoption of A.C. 

"The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the 

evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the 

opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented." 

Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 

732 (1995). "In its role of judging witness credibility, the 

fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony 

of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to 

conceal his guilt." Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 

509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). 

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 Considering the totality of facts and attendant 

circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of violating Code 

§ 63.1-220.4 by soliciting the payment of money in connection 

with the placement of her child. 

III. CONSPIRACY 

 Additionally, appellant was convicted of conspiring to 

violate Code § 63.1-220.4. On appeal, she contends the evidence 

was insufficient to prove a conspiracy because the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that appellant and Combs agreed to unlawfully 

solicit payment of money or other thing of value in connection 

with the placement of A.C. We disagree. 

 "Conspiracy is defined as 'an agreement between two or more 

persons by some concerted action to commit an offense.'" 

Feigley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 722, 432 S.E.2d 520, 

524 (1993) (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 502, 505, 

297 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1982)). Proof of an explicit agreement is 

not required, and the Commonwealth may, and frequently must, 

rely on circumstantial evidence to establish the conspiracy. 

See Stevens v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 238, 241, 415 S.E.2d 

881, 883 (1992). "[A] conspiracy may be inferred from the overt 

actions of the parties, and a common purpose and plan may be 

inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances." 

McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 418, 425, 451 S.E.2d 704, 

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708 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted), aff'd en 

banc, 20 Va. App. 753, 460 S.E.2d 624 (1995). 

Where . . . it has been shown that the 

defendants "by their acts pursued the same 

object, one performing one part and the 

others performing another part so as to 

complete it or with a view to its 

attainment, the [fact finder] will be 

justified in concluding that they were 

engaged in a conspiracy to effect that 

object." 

Brown v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 73, 78, 390 S.E.2d 386, 388 

(1990) (citations omitted). 

 The fact that the perpetrators of a crime are husband and 

wife does not, without more, create an inference that they 

conspired to commit the offense charged. See Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 75, 82, 396 S.E.2d 844, 848 (1990). A 

conspiracy, even one between husband and wife, requires a 

showing of an agreement between the conspirators. See, e.g., 

Stumpf v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 200, 206, 379 S.E.2d 480, 484 

(1989); Henry v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 194, 197, 342 S.E.2d 

655, 656 (1986). 

 The evidence demonstrated a concerted plan of action by 

appellant and her husband from June 13 to July 25, 1997, to 

place their child in return for a financial payment. Appellant 

first contacted an adoption agency about the matter. However, 

Devlin advised appellant and Combs that they would receive no 

remuneration in the arrangement, and they withdrew their 

request. While appellant held the child in the same room, Combs 

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subsequently negotiated with Farthing to exchange the baby for 

$1,500 and offered the baby to Farrar for $1,000. Appellant, 

the child's mother, raised no objection and did not intervene. 

Combs admitted on July 25, 1997 that they had agreed to give the 

baby to the Singletons for $3,000.4 While the Singletons were 

present at the trailer, appellant tried to have A.C.'s birth 

certificate delivered. 

 Where two or more people act to pursue the same object, 

such as appellant and Combs, "one performing one part and the 

other performing another part so as to complete it or with a 

view to its attainment, [the fact finder] will be justified in 

concluding that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that 

object." Amato v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 544, 552, 352 S.E.2d 

4, 9 (1987) (quoting 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 42 (1979)). 

Considering all of the attendant circumstances, the evidence was 

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant and 

her husband conspired to solicit money in connection with an 

adoption and, in fact, did so. 

 4

 We need not address appellant's argument that Combs's 

statements may not be attributed to her as a co-conspirator. 

Appellant did not object to the statements as being inadmissible 

at the time they were offered into evidence, and her claim is 

barred on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Marlowe v Commonwealth, 2 Va. 

App. 619, 621, 347 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1986) ("To be timely, an 

objection must be made when the occasion arises -- at the time 

the evidence is offered or the statement made."). 

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 For the foregoing reasons, appellant's convictions are 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 

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