PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4441

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JESMENE LOCKHART, a/k/a Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, a/k/a Jasmene 

Lockhart,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00034-RJC-1)

Argued: November 15, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion stating the judgment of 

the Court. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. 

Judge Floyd wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment.

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH 

CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL 

DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. R. Andrew Murray, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
2

STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
3

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Jesmene Lockhart appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and his mandatory minimum 15-

year sentence of imprisonment imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e) (ACCA). Lockhart contends that the magistrate judge plainly erred by failing to 

advise him during the Rule 11 plea colloquy of his potential exposure to the 15-year 

mandatory minimum. Lockhart asserts that if he had been properly informed of his 

sentencing exposure, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pleaded 

guilty. 

Our holding today is restricted by this Court’s decision in United States v. 

Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009), which imposes an extreme burden on a 

defendant seeking plain error review of a court’s failure to provide correct sentencing 

information before accepting a guilty plea. Under Massenburg, irrespective of the extent 

of the court’s error, a defendant on plain error review affirmatively must show a 

reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been correctly 

advised of his sentencing exposure. See id. at 343-46. The defendant is held to this 

standard even though the Rule 11 error committed by the district court left him in the 

dark regarding one of the most critical considerations in the guilty plea calculus, namely, 

his sentencing exposure. But because we are bound by the holding in Massenburg, we 

conclude that Lockhart has failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden and we affirm the 

district court’s judgment.
4

I.

In September 2014, officers with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in 

North Carolina responded to a report of suspicious activity involving individuals in a 

parked car. When they arrived at the scene, an officer saw Lockhart sitting in the driver’s 

seat of the vehicle. The officer observed Lockhart use his right hand to provide his 

identification, “while reaching down by his left leg with his left hand, where the officer 

saw the butt of [a] gun with a magazine clip.” The officers recovered the loaded handgun 

and an additional magazine from the driver’s side of the car, and the authorities later 

determined that the firearm was stolen. 

Lockhart pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement to a single count of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the magistrate judge asked the government to 

“summarize the charge and the penalty.” The government responded that the “maximum 

penalty” Lockhart faced was 10 years’ imprisonment. At no time during the plea 

colloquy did the court or the government clarify that Lockhart’s criminal history could 

result in a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA.

The probation officer prepared a presentence report (PSR), and recommended 

sentencing Lockhart as an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on three prior 

convictions for North Carolina robbery with a dangerous weapon. In the PSR, the 

probation officer explicitly highlighted the error in the plea colloquy, noting that 

Lockhart “was informed that his statutory penalties . . . were not more than ten years[’] 
5

imprisonment,” but that “based on [Lockhart’s] three prior convictions for violent 

felonies, [his] statutory penalties . . . are not less than fifteen years[’] imprisonment.” 

Lockhart’s counsel objected to the proposed ACCA designation on the grounds 

that (1) his North Carolina convictions, which were consolidated for judgment, should 

count as a single ACCA predicate, and (2) an ACCA sentence would violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Notably, Lockhart did not assert that he previously had been unaware of his 

potential ACCA designation, nor did he seek to withdraw his guilty plea.

After overruling the objections of Lockhart’s counsel, the district court concluded 

that Lockhart qualified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA and imposed the 

mandatory minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment. Following the court’s imposition 

of sentence, Lockhart’s counsel conferred with the government and informed the court: 

I’m going back to his plea colloquy. He didn’t plead to 924(e) [ACCA] it 

was not on the Bill of Indictment. But I went over it beforehand. So I just 

want to put it on the record that he was fully aware of that. I just thought 

about it. 

The government added, “We just wanted to make a record of that.” The district court did 

not ask counsel to elaborate on the issue, and did not confirm with Lockhart whether he 

was aware of his potential ACCA exposure before pleading guilty. Lockhart now 

appeals, represented by new appellate counsel. 

 

II.

Because Lockhart did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, we 

review his challenge to his plea for plain error. United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 
6

364 (4th Cir. 2018). To succeed under plain error review, a defendant bears the burden to 

show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his 

substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). This Court retains 

the discretion to correct such an error but will do so “only if the error seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 

343 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Lockhart argues that if he had known he would be facing a 15-year minimum 

sentence under the ACCA, rather than the 10-year maximum stated at the plea hearing, he 

likely would not have pleaded guilty. Lockhart asserts that the benefit he gained from 

pleading guilty was “so small as to be virtually non-existent” and, thus, that he would 

have had a strong incentive to request a trial to try to avoid the 15-year ACCA sentence.1

 

In response, the government concedes that the magistrate judge committed plain 

error in failing to advise Lockhart of his correct sentencing exposure. Nevertheless, the 

government contends that Lockhart has failed to show a “reasonable probability” that he 

would not have pleaded guilty if the court had advised him of his correct sentencing 

range. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004). Applying 

Massenburg, we agree with the government.

 1 In support of this argument, Lockhart maintains that: (1) the three-level reduction 

in his Guidelines calculation for acceptance of responsibility reduced the bottom of his 

Guidelines range by only eight months; (2) mitigating factors in his background, 

including his youth at the time of the predicate offenses, would have supported a 

downward variance irrespective whether he pleaded guilty; and (3) if he had not pleaded 

guilty to the felon in possession charge, the government might have offered him a more 

favorable plea deal for possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), 

which charge would not have triggered the ACCA enhancement. 
7

Initially, we agree with the parties that the first two prongs of plain error review 

are satisfied here. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, a district court must 

advise a defendant of “any maximum possible penalty” as well as “any mandatory 

minimum penalty” before accepting a guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H), (I). And 

even if a district court is not certain whether a defendant will qualify for an enhanced 

sentence under the ACCA, the court nevertheless must “anticipate the possibility and 

explain to [the defendant] the sentence that would be applicable if he had prior qualifying 

convictions.” United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008); see also 

Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343 (plain error when defendant not advised of potential ACCA 

sentence before pleading guilty). As the Supreme Court has explained:

If the judge told the defendant that the maximum possible sentence was 10 

years and then imposed a sentence of 15 years based on ACCA, the 

defendant would have been sorely misled and would have a ground for

moving to withdraw the plea.

United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 384 (2008). Accordingly, we conclude that by 

failing to inform Lockhart of his potential eligibility for a mandatory minimum 15-year 

sentence under the ACCA, the magistrate judge committed error that was plain.

To establish that a Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights, a defendant bears 

the burden to show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have 

entered the plea.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83. This standard is a demanding one, 

requiring a defendant to “satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the 

entire record, that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.” Id. (citations omitted).
8

In Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, we directly addressed this “reasonable probability” 

standard in the context of incorrect sentencing information provided at a Rule 11 plea 

colloquy. There, in circumstances nearly identical to the case now before us, a district 

court failed to inform the defendant during his plea colloquy that he might receive an 

enhanced ACCA sentence, contrary to later information in the PSR that the defendant’s 

record qualified him to receive such a sentence. Id. at 340. We declined to impose a 

presumption of prejudice for that error, despite the significant increase in sentencing 

exposure caused by the ACCA designation. Id. at 341, 344-46. In adopting this 

approach, we emphasized that the confines of plain error review reflect the importance of 

timely raising objections in the district court. Id. at 345-46. 

In considering whether Massenburg had shown an effect on his substantial rights 

for purposes of plain error review, we reviewed the record in accordance with Supreme 

Court precedent and emphasized three main considerations: (1) whether there were any 

“statements on the record . . . suggesting that [the defendant] would not have pleaded 

guilty if the district court had properly informed him of the sentencing exposure that he 

faced”; (2) whether the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea after learning from 

the PSR that he could be sentenced under the ACCA; and (3) the strength of the 

government’s case against him. Id. at 343-44. Applying those factors, we observed that 

there was an “absence of any evidence in the record suggesting that [Massenburg] would 

not have entered his plea in the absence of the error,” and that the government’s evidence 

was strong. Id. at 344. We therefore concluded that Massenburg had not satisfied the 

“reasonable probability” standard. Id. at 339, 343-46. 
9

To obtain relief on plain error review, a defendant who has been given materially 

incorrect sentencing information at his plea colloquy must show that there is a reasonable 

probability he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been correctly advised. Id. at 343 

(citing Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83). Under Massenburg, this showing must 

appear affirmatively on the record, notwithstanding that the essence of plain error review 

is the defendant’s failure to object to such error in the trial court. See id. at 343-44; Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even 

though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” (emphasis added)); see generally 

Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34. Thus, a defendant who has been misled by the court’s 

misinformation regarding his sentencing exposure effectively is penalized on plain error 

review by the very nature of the court’s plain error. 

As a matter of simple logic, the problem created by such an error, namely, the 

entry of a guilty plea that is not knowing and voluntary, cannot be cured by contrary 

information later provided in a PSR. United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 

1995). A defendant has a right to rely on the accuracy of the information provided by the 

court on which his plea is based. A plea that is predicated on a defendant’s ignorance of 

his sentencing exposure strikes at the very heart of our criminal justice system. And, 

while plain error review reflects the defendant’s failure to preserve his objection to the 

trial court’s error, Massenburg strongly suggests that to succeed on plain error review, 

the defendant must have stated on the record in the trial court that the error affected his 

plea decision, and that he must have moved to withdraw his plea after learning of his 

actual sentencing exposure. 
10

Under Dominguez Benitez, a defendant is not required to make such an affirmative 

statement on the trial record or to move to withdraw his plea after learning of his true 

sentencing exposure. Instead, under the Supreme Court’s holding, a defendant who has 

been advised incorrectly by the court at his Rule 11 hearing can demonstrate an effect on 

his substantial rights by showing based on the totality of the circumstances in the record,

that there is a reasonable likelihood he would have gone to trial if the court had advised 

him correctly. See 542 U.S. at 83 (holding that a defendant must “satisfy the judgment of 

the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different 

result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding” (citations 

omitted)). But this Court in Massenburg has required more.

2

 

Under Massenburg, we are constrained to conclude that Lockhart has not shown 

that his substantial rights were affected by the district court’s error. As in Massenburg, 

Lockhart did not make any statement on the record indicating that he would have 

proceeded to trial if he had been given the correct sentencing information. See 564 F.3d 

at 343-44. Nor did Lockhart express surprise at the statement in the PSR of a potential 

 2 Absent the holding in Massenburg, we would further consider whether the 

magnitude of the present error created a reasonable probability of a different result by 

impairing Lockhart’s ability to evaluate the relative risks and benefits of pleading guilty 

versus proceeding to trial. See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 17, 20-

21 (1st Cir. 2009) (vacating guilty plea on plain error review when court informed the 

defendant that he faced a three-year maximum term of supervised release, when he 

actually faced a maximum term of life, because “the erroneous information dramatically 

altered the sentencing stakes for the defendant”); United States v. Monie, 858 F.3d 1029, 

1032-34 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d at 21) (vacating guilty plea 

on plain error review when defendant was not informed of ACCA exposure).
11

ACCA designation or seek to withdraw his plea on that basis. And the government 

proffered strong evidence supporting the felon in possession charge, based on recovery of 

a firearm and ammunition from the driver’s side of a vehicle while Lockhart was sitting 

in the driver’s seat. Accordingly, bound by the holding of Massenburg, we conclude that 

Lockhart has failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights.

III.

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED

 

 
12

GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment:

According to the record evidence, Jesmene Lockhart entered into a guilty plea 

without the district court properly informing him of his true sentencing exposure. In 

contract cases involving a property interest, this Court would likely grant a party in 

Lockhart’s position rescission based on unilateral mistake. Unfortunately, this is a 

criminal case, and the liberty interests of defendants such as Lockhart are not afforded the 

same level of relief. The majority operates under the mistaken belief that the scales of 

justice are constrained by United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009) and 

the circular logic it employs. Consequently, despite the majority’s trepidation about the 

injustice Massenburg represents, it still acquiesces to an analysis that reflexively 

prohibits defendants from obtaining a second chance to make an informed choice after 

being misinformed by the district court.

Massenburg relies on the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Dominguez 

Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004). There, the Supreme Court held “that a defendant who seeks 

reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court 

committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 

error, he would not have entered the plea. A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of 

the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different 

result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” 542 U.S. 

at 83 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Applying Dominguez Benitez, this Court in Massenburg conducted a plain error 

review of the entire record, examining (1) whether there were any “statements on the 
13

record . . . suggesting that [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty if the district 

court had properly informed him of the sentencing exposure that he faced”; (2) whether 

the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea after learning from the PSR that he 

could be sentenced under the ACCA; and (3) the strength of the government’s case 

against him. 564 F.3d at 343-44.

Upon a closer examination, the considerations used by this Circuit in Massenburg

create a circular logic that prevents defendants from successfully pursuing appellate 

relief. On the one hand, the defendant’s silence at the time of the Rule 11 proceedings 

compels us to use the plain error standard. On the other hand, we use the defendant’s 

silence, as evidenced by lack of statements in the record and a lack of an attempt to 

withdraw the guilty plea, to also deny the defendant relief. It is unjust that the same 

silence that compels this Court to use plain error review also compels us to deny relief 

under that same standard of review. The Massenburg Court also looks at the strength of 

the Government’s case against the defendant. However, Rule 11 cases always occur in 

the context of a defendant taking a guilty plea, and defendants generally do not plead 

guilty when the case against them is weak. This is yet another example of how the 

Massenburg Court employs a nonsensical rubric against a defendant. As the majority 

points out, defendants seeking relief under plain error review should face a higher 

burden, but Massenburg makes this burden impossible to meet.

A proper review of the entire record in this case materially affects the outcome in 

Lockhart. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 80 (explaining that in assessing the effect 

of Rule 11 error, a reviewing court must look to the entire record, not to the plea 
14

proceedings alone). The majority notes that at the end of the sentencing hearing 

Lockhart’s lawyer and the United States Attorney conferred in order to make the court 

aware that Lockhart was allegedly informed of the ACCA enhancement even though the 

court had not informed him of it, and the Bill of Indictment did not list it. Though 

Lockhart’s attorney represented to the court that he had informed Lockhart of his 

sentencing exposure, a pro se notice of appeal filed by Lockhart a mere five days later 

indicates otherwise. In that notice, Lockhart requested that the court appoint a new 

lawyer “because my last lawyer did not____me right.”*

This portion of the record viewed in context indicates Lockhart’s dissatisfaction 

with the advice of his counsel. Indeed, the attorney’s eleventh-hour attempt to address 

the omission of the ACCA enhancement in the Bill of Indictment strongly supports the 

inference that Lockhart was not fully or properly advised by the court or his attorney of 

the criminal consequences of his plea. Moreover, the grievance against Lockhart’s 

attorney communicated in his pro se notice of appeal can only be related to advice and 

communication surrounding his guilty plea given that this case never went to trial.

The deficiencies in communication to Lockhart, both by the court and his attorney, 

undermine the confidence this Court should have in the integrity of the sentencing court’s 

proceedings and strongly suggests that misinformation materially impacted Lockhart’s 

substantial rights. This is especially true because the ACCA enhancement meant that 

Lockhart faced a maximum of life imprisonment even with the guilty plea. Given that 

 * The electronic record obfuscates the missing word and the original record was 

destroyed.
15

Lockhart actually faced life imprisonment, rather than the ten years the district court 

communicated to him, there is a reasonable probability that but for being misinformed, he 

would not have entered into the plea. This satisfies the contested third prong of the plain 

error analysis and demonstrates that the error “affect[ed] the substantial rights” of 

Lockhart. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

Lockhart entered a guilty plea based on misinformation. It resulted in five 

additional years of jail time but could have resulted in life imprisonment. This Court 

chooses to uphold the circular logic of Massenburg and further buttress a system that tells 

defendants that our failure to inform you about your criminal liability does not impact 

your ability to choose to enter a guilty plea or stand trial. The Massenburg Court and 

now the Lockhart Court tells defendants that even if we misinform you, you are still 

better off taking a plea, a proposition that flies in the face of a criminal justice system 

where willful, voluntary, and informed choices are the bedrock of a system where 

transparency and accountability are of paramount importance. Nonetheless, given our 

flawed precedent, I am constrained to concur in the judgment and deny Lockhart the 

opportunity to make a properly informed decision about whether to exercise his 

constitutional right to stand trial. Now may be the time for this Court to remove the 

cloud of Massenburg that obscures a better understanding of the Supreme Court’s 

holding in Dominguez Benitez so that defendants receive the protections that our 

Constitution promises them.
16

FLOYD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

Like my colleagues, I believe that the outcome of Lockhart’s appeal is constrained by 

our decision in United States v. Massenburg, 564 F. 3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009). I also 

believe that there are sound reasons for this Court to revisit Massenburg and limit its 

precedential scope.

In Massenburg, we correctly stated that in order to prevail on plain-error review, an 

appellant like Lockhart must show a “reasonable probability” that he would not have 

pleaded guilty if he had been correctly informed of his sentencing exposure. 564 F.3d at 

343 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)). Personally, I 

find that rule-statement somewhat difficult to reconcile with Massenburg’s analysis. 

Indeed, if we were to go through Massenburg and replace each instance of “reasonable 

probability” with “virtual certainty,” it seems to me that the opinion would read quite 

well. Therein lies the problem. Although our opinion in Massenburg correctly recites 

the rule of Dominguez Benitez, its three-factor analysis has the regrettable effect of 

setting the bar too high for appellants in Lockhart’s position.

Were we to apply Dominguez Benitez to this case directly, rather than filtering it 

through the prism of Massenburg, I cannot help but think that we would have ample 

reason to vacate Lockhart’s conviction. After all, unlike in Dominguez Benitez, it is quite 

easy to see here how the court’s error during Lockhart’s Rule 11 hearing “could have had 

an effect on [Lockhart’s] assessment of his strategic position.” 542 U.S. at 85. Lockhart 

tells us that from the start, he expected a sentence at the low end of the recommended 

range. His expectation was not unreasonable, considering the relatively innocuous 
17

circumstances of his offense. Since it was reasonable for him to expect a sentence at the 

low end of the recommended range, it was also reasonable for him to try to shave as 

many years off the low end of the recommended range as possible. A guilty plea would 

have been a rational way to accomplish that goal before he knew that he would be 

sentenced as an armed career criminal, but not after.

Consider the percentages. Taking Lockhart’s PSR and the 2016 Sentencing 

Guidelines as our benchmark, it appears likely that if Lockhart had not been sentenced as 

an armed career criminal, his guilty plea would have dropped the low end of the 

recommended sentencing range from 5.25 years to 3.83 years—a 26.9% reduction. But 

because Lockhart was sentenced as an armed career criminal, his guilty plea had a much 

smaller effect and made much less sense, given his goal: his plea dropped the low end of 

his sentencing exposure from 15.67 years to 15 years—a mere 4.2% reduction. In 

essence, the initial rationale underlying Lockhart’s guilty plea was rendered all-but 

nonsensical by his later designation as an armed career criminal.1

Added to this numerical analysis is the starkly odd behavior of Lockhart’s counsel, 

and Lockhart’s apparent displeasure with same (which my colleagues have aptly 

highlighted). These factors convince me that if we were not constrained by Massenburg, 

we would grant relief to Lockhart. This is particularly so given that, as I understand it, 

“reasonably probable” does not mean “more likely than not.” See Dominguez Benitez, 

 1 These numbers are necessarily estimates, and I do not mean to suggest that we 

should use this sort of quantitative analysis to decide all cases like the one at bar. The 

percentages referenced here are useful only insofar as they help to illustrate the logic of 

an argument that Lockhart makes on appeal.
18

542 U.S. at 86–87 (Scalia, J., concurring); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-

94 (1984) (distinguishing between “reasonable probability” and “more likely than not,” 

and clarifying that the former is less demanding than the latter).

Finally, I agree with my colleagues that holding a defendant’s silence against him in 

these circumstances is improper. When a defendant, by his apparent silence, fails to 

preserve his objection to a mistake made during a Rule 11 hearing, the consequence is 

that we review for plain error. Once we have entered the realm of plain-error review, it 

makes no sense to continue to hold the defendant’s silence against him. Yet Massenburg

urges us to do exactly that. “The defendant failed to register any surprise or dismay on 

the record,” we say. “Therefore, we review for plain error. In reviewing for plain error, 

we note that the defendant expressed neither surprise nor dismay when informed of his 

actual sentencing exposure, which weighs against him now.” This is quicksand; we 

should distance ourselves from it.

I believe that our decision in Massenburg has had the unintended effect of chipping 

away at our ability to safeguard the legitimacy of criminal-justice proceedings. This case 

presents an excellent opportunity for us to do some mild course-correction.