THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes 


MEETING 46 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


DAY TWO 


MAY 3, 2007 


The verbatim transcript of the 46th 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at The Westin Westminster, 


Westminster, Colorado on May 3, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES 

NATIONALLY CERTIFIED COURT REPORTING 

404/733-6070 
 

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C O N T E N T S 

May 3, 2007 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL 

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ROCKY FLATS SEC PETITION 

MR. MARK GRIFFON, WORK GROUP CHAIR 

PETITIONERS 

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BETHLEHEM STEEL SEC PETITION 

DR. SAM GLOVER, NIOSH, OCAS 

PETITIONER 

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LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY SEC PETITION 

DR. GREG MACIEVIC, NIOSH, OCAS 

PETITIONER COMMENTS 

261 

WR GRACE SEC PETITION 

MR. LAVON RUTHERFORD, NIOSH, OCAS 

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PUBLIC COMMENT 329 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 369 
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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

BEACH, Josie 


Nuclear Chemical Operator 


Hanford Reservation 


Richland, Washington 


CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 

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LOCKEY, James, M.D. 


Professor, Department of Environmental Health 


College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati 


MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


SCHOFIELD, Phillip 


Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 


Los Alamos, New Mexico 

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SIGNED-IN AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS


 ABILA, EDMUND, MET OP. 


ABILA, JUAN, RF WORKERS 


ADKINS, LEONILA, SPOUSE 


ALBERG, JEANETTE, SEN. ALLARD 


ALLEN, WILLIAM, ROCKY FLATS 


BARKER, CARL, RF RETIREE 


BARKER, KAY, ANWAG 


BARNETT, WILLIAM, RFES 


BARRIE, GEORGE, ANWAG 


BARRIE, TERRIE, ANWAG 


BLAKESLEE, JACK, ROCKY FLATS 


BLAKESLEE, JOANNE, ROCKY FLATS 


BOLLER, CAROLYN, CONG. MARK UDALL 


BRADSHAW, CHARLENE A., RADIATION ORG. 


BREYER, LAURIE, NIOSH 


BRITTON, CAKER J., WIFE 


BRITTON, LESSIE S., RFETS 


BROCK, DENISE, NIOSH 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC 


BUCHANAN, DENNIS, RCT 


BUFFO, RON, SON RF WORKER 


BUTZ, JR., REINHOLT, S.O.E. 


CALDWELL, NANCY, RF WORKER 


CARLSON, AUDREY, SPOUSE 


CARLSON, ROBERT I., RADIATION 


CARRELL, DENNIS 


CHANG, CHIA-CHIA, HHS 


CLARK, DEBBY, RFETS 


DEFORGE, CLIFF, RF RETIRED 


DELFORGE, DOUGLAS, ROCKY FLATS 


DIENST, JOHN, ROCKY FLATS 


DIGIACONO, RON, SELF 


DOBROVOLY, MICHELLE, ENGINEERING 


DURAN, BEA, DOE 


DURAN, SAM J., RF 


ELLIS, ANN, ROCKY FLATS 


ELMLINGER, RON, PCM 


EVASKOVICH, ANDREW K., ICUA LOCAL 69 


FINLEY, B., DPOST 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 

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 FOX, CAREY, RFETS 


FOX, MARY, RFETS 


GADSON, CURZIE, ROCKY FLATS 


GAFFNEY, RICHARD S., RFETS 


GAHOR, PATRICIA A., RFETS 


GARRIMONE, YVONNE, DAUGHTER OF DECEASED 


GOMEZ, DELMA G., RFETS 


GOMEZ, ERNA, ROCKY FLATS 


GONZALEZ, JUAN, ROCKY FLATS 


GONZALEZ, NORMA, ROCKY FLATS 


HANKET, JOE, ROCKY FLATS RETIRED 


HANKINS, LARRY, RETIRED UNION 


HARLAN, RONALD A., ROCKY FLATS RETIREE 


HARLAN, S., SPOUSE 


HARRISON, CONSTANCE, NIOSH 


HARTMAN, ALAN, RF RETIREE 


HEWITT, JAMES, ROCKY FLATS 


HEWITT-BALLOU, CHERYL, DAUGHTER 


HILLER, DAVID, SEN. KEN SALAZAR 


HINNEFELD, STU, NIOSH 


HOFFMAN, GAYLE, RF WORKER 


HOLGERSON, ERIC, ROCKY FLATS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HUEBNER, LIZ, ROCKY FLATS 


IMSE, ANN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 


JACQUEZ-ORTIZ, MICHELE, CONG. UDALL 


JENSEN, DIANE, ROCKY FLATS 


JOHN, PADIA, ROCKY FLATS 


KESSLER, MIKE, 5280 


KLOTZ, JIM, RF 


KOHLER, ROMAN, R.F. HOMESTEADERS 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


KRULL, WARREN S., SAIC 


KUBIAK, MICHAEL S., ORAU/MJW 


LAHTI, ROSE, ROCKY FLATS 


LEVALLEN, BETTY 


LEVEN, TIM, PCM 


LINK, RICHARD A., ROCKY FLATS 


LOGAN, MICHAEL D., ROCKY FLATS 


LUCERO, GENNY, RADIATION ORG. 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MARQUEZ, MARK W., STEELE WORK 

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 MARSCHALL, HANNA, RF WORKER 


MARTINEZ, LADONNA, RFLATS SPOUSE 


MARTINEZ, MATTHEW A., RFETS 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MAYES, CALVIN, RF WORKER 


MCALLISTER, ROBERT J., ROCKY FLATS 


MCCARTHY, BILLY, RETIRED 


MCCARTHY, DIANN, SPOUSE 


MCCLURE, ROB, KCNC-TV 


MCDONALD, SEAN, DENVER POST 


MCFEE, MATTHEW, ORAUT 


MCKEEL, DAN, SINEW 


MEANEY, CHERYL, RFW & SPOUSE 


MEZT, RICHARD, ROCKY FLATS 


MILLER, DUANE R., ROCKY FLATS 


MILLER, HYMAN, ROCKY FLATS 


MILLETTE, RON, RF WORKER 


MILNE, CHARLES, MSU 


MILNE, LINDA, ROCKY FLATS 


MOBLEY, JERRY, ROCKY FLATS 


MOBLEY, WALTER M., CONSTRUCTION 


MOSELEY, HENRY, RF 


NEWBY, KEVIN, RF EMPLOYEE 


NEWBY SHERRY, SPOUSE 


NORMAN, JOAN, ROCKY FLATS 


OLDS, RICHARD, RF WORKER 


PADILLA, JUDY, FORMER RFP WORKER 


PALIZZI, TOM, ROCKY FLATS 


PAZIER, LARRY, HUSBAND OF RF 


RAMOS, LARRY, RF RETIRED 


ROMERO, DENNIS R., RF WORKER 


ROSE, WILMA, SELF 


RUIZ, HARRIET 


RUPP, MARYANN, SPOUSE OF DECEASED WORKER 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


SABEC, DONALD, ROCKY FLATS 


SCHULTZ, JEFFREY W., ENGINEERING 


SCHULTZ, LAURA, RF CLAIMANTS 


SHEPARD, SALLY, SELF 


SHORT, DEBORAH, RF 


SINGER, GARY L., ROCKY FLATS 


SPENCER, BETTY, RF SPOUSE 


STEELE, MARYJO, ROCKY FLATS 

 

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 STEPHAN, ROBERT, SENATOR OBAMA 


STICKERMAN, CHAD, RF ENGINEER 


THIELEN, JEREMY, RFETS 


THIELEN, JOHNATHAN, RFETS 


THIELEN, TODD, RFETS 


THIELEN, VAL, RFETS 


THOMAS, RHONDA, ROCKY FLATS WORKER 


TINKLE, ANN, ROCKY FLATS 


TINKLE, DALE, ROCKY FLATS 


ULSH, BRANT, NIOSH 


VAUGHN, JIM 


VAUGHN, LINDA 


VIGIL, DENNIS E., ROCKY FLATS 


WEAVER, JACK, RETIRED RF WORKER 


WHITE, LIBBY, DOE 


WILLIAMS, RHONDA, FOR PARENT 


YEATER, JADYA, ROCKY FLATS 


ZIEMER, MARILYN 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(8:00 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO
 

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. I do want to 


remind you, if you've not already done so, to 


please register your attendance with us today, 


and you can do this during the break if you 


haven't already done it. There's a 


registration book in the foyer. 


There are also a variety of documents on the 


back table, including the agenda and some Rocky 


Flats-related materials, as well as other 


materials that the Board is dealing with. We 


have a number of SEC petitions actually that 


we're dealing with today, and if you need 


copies of those, those are on the back table, 


as well. 


 Pardon my early-morning voice, but we'll make 


it through if you can bear with me. 


 I'm looking to see whether we need more chairs, 


and if -- if any of the staffers, or maybe 


Larry Elliott can make a quick assessment and 


see if we need to request more. And if I see 


too many people standing, maybe we'll need to 

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request more, but I think there are apparently 


some seats yet. Okay. Thank you. 


Let me call upon -- oh, I also want to point 


out that Dr. Melius has joined us today, was 


able to arrive last night. Dr. Poston will not 


be able to be with us today. Josie Beach is 


not at the table, and we'll explain why in just 


a moment. In fact I'll ask Mr. -- Dr. Wade to 


do that when he makes his opening remarks now. 


 DR. WADE: Well, thank you, Paul, and welcome, 


all, again. We very much appreciate your being 


here. We appreciated your comments last night. 


It was a -- it was a long night, but a very 


important night I think for the Board to 


experience, so thank you for your patience and 


we appreciate your comments. 


As Paul mentioned, Josie Beach is conflicted 


with regard to this particular petition at 


Rocky Flats and is not at the table, following 


the Board's procedures. 


ROCKY FLATS SEC PETITION
 

MR. MARK GRIFFON, WORK GROUP CHAIR
 

PETITIONERS


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. Let 


me outline quickly how we will proceed here. 


We're going to begin with the presentation from 


NIOSH where they give us an update on the SEC 

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petition evaluation. The evaluation report is 


an official part or step in the SEC process. 


Following that we will hear from the 


petitioners. Then there will be an opportunity 


for members of the Congressional delegations, 


and there are a number of those here this 


morning, to add official comments for the 


record. 


We will then hear from the Board's working 


group. The Board has a working group on Rocky 


Flats and they will provide their report. 


Then after that, the Board will have a 


discussion period and deliberate on the -- on 


the SEC petition material. 


I do want to remind you, in case you had 


forgotten, and that is that the Board's final 


product is a recommendation. We're not the 


ones that determine whether or not there will 


be a class added to the Special Exposure 


Cohort. We make a recommendation on that. 


That recommendation goes to the Secretary of 


Health and Human Services, together with 


recommenda-- any recommendation from NIOSH. 


And from that the Secretary of Health and Human 


Services passes along or makes an official 

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recommendation to Congress. It is Congress 


that ultimately makes the decision in this 


process. So what we do here today is part of 


that process. 


There are time limits on it, though, so we -- 


for example, whatever the Board's 


recommendation is, that will go immediately -- 


after this meeting -- to the Secretary. He 


will act rather promptly on that, within -- I 


think it's 30 days, yes, and then Congress has 


another 30 days to react to that. So there's a 


little time delay there. 


But that is the process, so I want to make you 


aware that this Board -- or remind you that 


this Board is advisory. We're -- we're not the 


folks that make the ultimate decision on that. 


Ultimately it really rests in the hands of 


Congress. 


ROCKY FLATS SEC PETITION
 

So with that as preliminary remarks, we're 


going to begin first with the Rocky Flats SEC 


petition evaluation update. That will be 


presented by Dr. Brant Ulsh, who is a member of 


the staff of NIOSH, and Dr. Ulsh, we welcome 


you to the podium to present the SEC petition 

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update -- or petition evaluation update. 


 DR. ULSH: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. Good 


morning, everybody. As Dr. Ziemer mentioned, 


I'm just going to give a brief update. Many of 


you were here a year ago when I presented 


NIOSH's evaluation report on Rocky Flats, and 


I'm not going to repeat that whole 


presentation. There are a couple of members of 


the Board who were not seated on the Board at 


that time, so I will just give a brief update 


for their benefit, and just to remind everyone 


since it's, you know, been some time since I 


last spoke to you. 


I would like to start today the way that I 


started a year ago, and that is to say thank 


you. I think a lot of times we don't say thank 


you to the people who really deserve it. And 


first of all I'd like to thank the petitioners. 


Tony DeMaiori, who I understand is not here 


today, but Tony was intimately involved in this 


process -- he even attended a couple of the 


working groups, and it was very valuable to 


have him at the table and to get his insights ­

- and Jennifer Thompson, who I see is going to 


present next. Both of these people worked 

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tirelessly on your behalf, and so I think that 


there's a debt there, too. So I'd like to 


thank them. 


 Most importantly, I'd like to thank the former 


workers. You gave a valuable service for your 


country, and I have benefited from it, we've 


all benefited from it, and we recognize your 


sacrifices. So I want to say thank you to the 


workers. 


 The question that the Board is going to be 


deliberating on today has nothing to do with 


the workers' loyalty or dedication. That is 


beyond reproach. There is no question in 


anybody's mind about that. 


There is also no question that the workers are 


suffering. All of you here today have been 


touched by cancer personally or a member of 


your family has been touched by cancer 


personally. My family has been touched by 


cancer. I understand what that's like, and 


there's just no question the suffering that -- 


that you all are going through. 


But the question that the Board is wrestling 


with today is upon what basis should 


compensation decisions be made, and so I'd just 

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like to give you a brief update here. 


First of all, the -- the proposed class 


included all United Steel Workers who were 


employed at Rocky Flats between 1952 and 2005. 


NIOSH expanded this class because we determined 


that it wasn't really feasible to limit it to 


the United -- to the union members, so we 


expanded it to all workers between those time 


periods. 


I'd like to talk to you about the information 


that we have available to complete dose 


reconstructions, and the primary source of 


information that we use is dosimetry records, 


both internal dosimetry and external dosimetry. 


Now in terms of internal dosimetry, we have 


over half a million results. And by that, I'm 


talking about primarily urinalysis samples, but 


also lung counts, fecal samples -- so there is 


a wealth of internal bioassay results. 


Now on the other hand, we also have external 


dosimetry results, and this is a little bit 


difficult to pin down the exact number. We 


have 231,500, more or less, external annual 


dosimetry totals. Now to get the number of 


actual external dosimetry results, you would 

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have to multiply that by the number of exchange 


cycles, and I can tell you that that translates 


to well over a million individual external 


dosimetry results. 


We also have access to an extensive records 


collection at DOE's Mountain View facility, and 


we have called upon them numerous times 


throughout the course of the working group's 


investigation. 


And finally we have interviews with former 


workers. Both NIOSH and SC&A have availed 


ourselves of talking to the people who actually 


worked at Rocky Flats, and that has been one of 


the greatest pleasures for me over the past -- 


well, year plus, is getting to know some of the 


people who contributed to the Rocky Flats 


story. 


So in terms of the dosimetry results that I 


just told you about, here's what this 


translates into. We have received 1,207 or so 


cases referred to us from the Department of 


Labor for dose reconstruction. Of those 1,200 


we have completed dose reconstructions on 


1,061. You might have noticed Larry gave -- 


Larry Elliott gave some numbers yesterday. 
I 

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think his were just a touch higher. He might 


have gone onto the database a little bit later 


in the day, so... What this breaks down to is 


we have external dosimetry for 1,100-plus of 


these claims. We also have internal dosimetry 


for almost 1,100. And so when you look at the 


total number of claims, 1,207, we have some 


dosimetry -- at least -- of both type for 1,068 


claims. 


Now just to briefly review -- I'm not going to 


go into detail here. I think we're at the 


stage of the process where getting into the 


details is the prerogative of the working group 


and so I won't really get down into the 


details. Just to review, though, the bases of 


the petition as it was submitted -- there were, 


I believe, seven -- and four of those bases 


qualified the petition for evaluation, and 


those bases are listed here. The ones in 


yellow are the ones that qualified. 


And those were external (sic) to highly 


insoluble plutonium oxides. You might have 


heard this called "super S" or "super Y". And 


here is one -- this is one topic where I think 


it should be pointed out that going through 

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this arduous process of evaluating the SEC 


petition has had some real benefit to the 


workers, because we were certainly aware of 


this super S issue, but going -- considering 


this in the course of the working group 


investigation accelerated our thinking and our 


putting together a position on this, and we 


have promulgated methods to handle super S -- 


potential exposure to super S plutonium in dose 


reconstruction. So I think that -- that is 


something you can certainly point to and say 


that it was information that was provided to us 


by the public. We have heard it. We have 


seriously considered it and we have responded. 


 The next basis of the petition was an inability 


to link exposures to specific incidents. And a 


year ago I acknowledged that yes, it's not 


always possible to -- in fact, it's often not 


possible to link particular exposures to 


specific incidents. But we have methods of 


handling that in dose reconstruction. 


The next basis was periods of inadequate 


monitoring. And I'm trying to recall back into 


the petition, I think the examples that were 


provided were the super S again, exposure to 

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super S and concerns about whether or not that 


could be accounted for, and also neutron 


monitoring. 


And similarly, the neutron monitoring issue 


came up under the context of unmonitored 


exposures, because in the earlier years there 


were people who were at risk of neutron 


exposure who were not monitored. 


 And then there were three more bases of the 


petition that did not qualify. Those are 


listed here. 


Okay, so that takes us through the time period 


where the petition was presented and NIOSH 


presented our evaluation of the petition, and 


that was April 27th of last year. So what has 


happened since then? 


Well, at that time the Advisory Board referred 


the matter to a working group, which is a 


subset of the people that you see sitting up 


here in the front. And between April 27th of 


last year and now, so a little over a year, the 


working group embarked on a very extensive, 


very comprehensive investigation of your 


concerns. And the other parties involved in 


that investigation were NIO-- the NIOSH/ORAU 

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team and also the Board audit contractor, SC&A. 


This has been a very active working group. 
I 


think you can come away from this process 


confident that we have kicked over every rock 


that we could. We considered your concerns 


very seriously. The topics that were covered 


throughout the course of that investigation are 


listed here. One of the biggest concerns I 


think was data integrity, and also data 


completeness, which is closely related. 


Another topic was coworker data. We also spent 


a lot of time on other radionuclides at Rocky 


Flats, and by that I mean other than uranium 


and plutonium, the main radionuclides. And 


also early neutron doses. 


Now again, I'm not going to get into details 


here. I think that's the prerogative of Mark 


Griffon, and you'll be hearing from him a 


little bit later. 


And finally, this is the position that we 


presented a year ago, and it is our position 


today, that we feel that we have the ability to 


do dose reconstructions with sufficient 


accuracy. 


Now I know that that may not be a popular 

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decision. I'm aware of that. But at the end 


of the day, what we're faced with is making 


compensation decisions based on an SEC 


designation or based on dose reconstruction. 


And NIOSH is required to bring to bear the best 


available science and to conduct these dose 


reconstructions where it's feasible. Because I 


think, at the end of the day, what I owe you, 


what NIOSH owes you, is an answer to the 


question: Did the cancer that has touched me 


or my family, as a -- as a former worker at 


Rocky Flats, was that a result of the radiation 


exposure that you received at Rocky Flats. It 


is only through dose reconstruction that we can 


answer that question and provide you with 


closure, and we owe you that. 


So with that, that ends my presentation. I 


would be happy to entertain any questions from 


the Advisory Board, if there are any. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Brant. Board members, 


do you have questions at this time on Brant's 


comments, or anything related to the evaluation 


report? 


I -- I do want to ask one question. Maybe you 


can elucidate this, in case -- and I think it's 

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been discussed before, but we -- we've heard a 


number of cases where individual records have 


zeroes entered where -- in -- or minimal dose 


values entered. And on many sites we 


understand that that reflects the fact that the 


dose was low enough it could not be detected. 


But we also recognize there's some limit of the 


device and therefore the agency assigns a 


number that's above zero to account for the 


fact that the dose may really not be zero. Now 


we've heard I think from a number of folks at 


Rocky that allege that in their case the zeroes 


may really represent cases where they were 


either told not to wear their badges or, for 


one reason or another, the true dose was shall 


we say hidden. Do you have a way to account 


for that on individual dose reconstructions if 


the -- if the person ha-- makes that allegation 


re-- with respect to their own record? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, Dr. Ziemer, this was a topic 


that I spoke about a year ago in -- in -- well, 


the part of it that I spoke about a year ago 


was the concern where workers might have left 


their badges in their lockers. I went through 


some logic as to why we don't feel that that is 

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a -- that systematically compromises our 


ability to do dose reconstruction. 


Now, in terms of the individual case, certainly 


if we are aware of a situation or the workers 


tell us of a situation where this might have 


been done -- well, we have coworker 


distributions that could be applied, if 


necessary. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So in the individual case, you 


wouldn't necessarily always use that other 


value, which is basically halfway between the 


minimum detectable and the zero point -- 


 DR. ULSH: Well --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- if you know, for -- if -- if 


there were an affidavit that indicated that 


there was some shenanigans going on. 


 DR. ULSH: If it -- if we had credible evidence 


that that kind of thing was going on, and we 


could pin it down, certainly that would call 


that particular reading into question. And you 


know, at the end of the day, if necessary, you 


could just treat that as not a -- not a 


datapoint that we should use and we could 


certainly assign coworker data. 


Now I don't want to leave you -- 

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 DR. ZIEMER: No, I --


 DR. ULSH: -- with the impression that we 


routinely do that --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- but if, you know, a worker was -- 


you know, could pin it down for -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: There -- there is a method for 


handling that --


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- in those cases. That -- that's 


the point I wanted to make. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other Board members, questions or 


comments? 


Yes, Dr. Lockey. 


 DR. LOCKEY: Yesterday one of the petitioners 


had mentioned -- I think she was an office 


worker -- that the vaults were near the office 


area, and how is that handled? I'm just 


curious about that. 


 DR. ULSH: Dr. Lockey, I'm reluctant to get 


into individual dose reconstructions. I can 


tell you that in terms of -- in the general 


situation where we have a worker who was 


monitored, we would use their dosimetry 

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results. But if we're talking about a worker 


who was not monitored, we have methods in our 


dose reconstruction where we can evaluate where 


that person worked, evaluate their potential 


for exposure to radioactive materials, and we 


have coworker data. You know, if the worker 


was not monitored, we apply either the 50th 


percentile -- I'm talking external dosimetry 


now -- the 50th percentile if they were 


intermittently exposed to radiation, or the 


95th percentile if they were routinely exposed 


to radiation. So in a situation like this -- 


again, I don't know the intimate details of 


this particular situation, but if a worker were 


not monitored but they had the potential to be 


routinely exposed to radiation, we would give 


them a -- a dose that is higher than 95 percent 


of the people who were monitored on site. 


 DR. ZIEMER: This is off the subject, but the 


AV man has reminded me that if you're on-line 


listening by phone, would you please mute your 


phone. We're apparently getting a lot of 


background noise. For those who are on the 


phone lines, if you're simply listening in, if 


you would please mute your phone. Thank you 

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very much. 


Okay, Board -- other Board members with 


questions? Yes, Michael Gibson. 


 MR. GIBSON: Brant, you mis-- mentioned that 


there's well over one million individual 


results. Do you know how many employees were 


employed at Rocky Flats between 1952 and 2005? 


And of that number, how many of those employees 


should have been monitored? 


 DR. ULSH: Between 1952 and 2005. Well, Mike, 


I can't -- I can't give you the exact numbers 


of workers who were employed. I can tell you 


the badging policies at the site, which can 


give you -- give you some clues about this. 


Pretty much throughout the site I think, at 


various times, if a worker was expected to 


receive greater than ten percent of the 


exposure limit they were required -- let me 


restate that. If a worker had the potential to 


receive greater than ten percent of the 


exposure limit, they were required to be 


externally monitored. 


Now during the D&D era, the DOE limit was 100 


millirem per year, and so if you were expected 


to have the potential to receive greater than 

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100 millirem per year, then you were required 


to be externally monitored. 


Now to answer your question directly, no, I 


don't know the exact number of people employed 


at Rocky Flats by year. Those are the policies 


that were in place at the time that dictated 


who was to be monitored. 


 MR. GIBSON: Well, I guess -- to follow up on 


that, I guess what I'm trying to get at is -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Use the mike -- use the mike, 

Mike. 

 MR. GIBSON: Out of these in excess of one 

million results, could you give us an idea of 


what that equates to as far as how many 


monitoring records per employee that you're 


basing this on? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, that gets to the other part of 


the discussion which -- let me see if I can 


find it -- nope, wrong way. You actually bring 


up a good point and I'm glad that you did 


because I can clarify a little bit here. 


When I talk about the numbers for whom we have 


external and internal dosimetry, these third 


and fourth bars, there's another part of the 


equation and that is the completeness of the 

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monitoring. And as you know, Mike, on the 


working group we did look at data completeness 


and we evaluated 52 workers, 32 who -- who were 


randomly selected by SC&A and 20 who were known 


to be among the workers who received the 


highest cumulative doses at -- on site. And we 


looked at their records and what we found was 


that they were by and large complete. And what 


I mean by that is there were certainly periods 


where there was no monitoring data, but those 


largely corresponded to periods when either the 


worker was not on site or they were in jobs 


that had low exposure potential such that they 


would not be required to be monitored. 


So again, Mike, I can't give you exact numbers 


of how many people worked at Rocky Flats over 


the years. It was certainly in tens of 


thousands, if not higher. And I can tell you 


that the people who we expected to be 


monitored, the evidence -- the weight of the 


evidence points us to that they were. So I --


I can't answer your question directly about how 


many -- of the workers, what percentage was 


monitored. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Follow-up, Mike? 

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 MR. GIBSON: Yeah. And then that -- the 


results of when they should and should not have 


been monitored is based on site 


characterization records or what... 


 DR. ULSH: No -- no, it was based on -- well, 


the analysis was completed in two steps. SC&A 


completed the first step, and that was to look 


at the records and determine when there was 


monitoring present and when there was not 


monitoring present. And then NIOSH took that a 


step further and looked at those periods when 


there was not monitoring data. And again, the 


-- the goal of the data completeness 


investigation was to decide -- was to evaluate 


whether there was any evidence that there were 


missing records. In other words, here's a 


person who clearly should have been monitored, 


we would expect them to have monitoring 


information, but do we see it or don't we. And 


what we found was that in every case where we 


saw a period without monitoring data, there was 


a very logical explanation for that. It's not 


like you had a process operator in 771, who 


were among the high-- highest exposures on 


site, who was not monitored. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Other questions? 


Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Brant, I understand, you know, 


and NIOSH has done an excellent job, I'm -- and 


I'm not criticizing this, but using coworker 


data I have a very hard time with. Out of 


anybody on this Board, I still suit up day 


after day and go into these zones. I'm going 


to give you an example, because two weeks ago 


there were four of us that went into the cell, 


did the same work, same respiratory, and when 


we walked out we were sitting with 50 to 75 MR 


difference between the lowest guy and the 


highest guy. And I -- I really have a hard 


time using coworker data because, you know 


what, you can get into a lot of different 


things because I've brought the same questions 


up. When I can go into a zone or in -- into a 


cell handling the actual product myself, with 


my hands and my finger rings, and it shows that 


my dose to my hands is half what it was to my 


body, I -- you know, there's -- there's 


integrity of a lot of this stuff and I really 


have a hard time with worker -- coworker data. 


 DR. ULSH: Thank you, Brad. You bring up a 

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very good point, and I'm glad you did. In 


terms of -- in terms of coworker data, I think 


that there's a great misunderstanding about how 


we apply coworker data, and you've exact-- 


you've just hit on the exact reason that we 


apply it the way that we do, because if you 


have two workers who work on the same job, for 


instance, the recorded doses can be very 


different for those two workers. As you 


probably know -- I'm sure that you do -- 


distance from the source, shielding, there are 


vari-- various factors that can make those two 


workers have different doses. And so you would 


have to be extremely cautious to -- to apply 


one worker's data to another individual worker, 


and that's why we don't do that. 


What we do is we look at all of the workers who 


were monitored on site, all of them, and we 


apply the 95th percentile. That means that 


that particular worker would have had to 


receive greater than 95 percent of the workers 


who were monitored. So we understand that 


that's a concern, and so we don't apply one 


worker's dose to another worker. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Phil. 

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 MR. SCHOFIELD: I got a question on the 


bioassays. Now some people I assume were on 


annual, some semi-annual and maybe some 


quarterly. Particularly some of those people 


who are on the manual (sic), they may -- had a 


job where they worked or passed through an area 


and could have actually picked up some low-


level intake. If, during their interview, you 


find this -- that they said look, you know, I ­

- I remember once I had positive nasal smears 


but they never had me submit a bioassay sample 


out of that, how are you going to account for 


those missed... 


 DR. ULSH: That's a very good question, Mr. 


Schofield. Again, what we go back to is -- 


there's a couple of issues that you've 


mentioned there. If the worker was monitored ­

- be it on an annual basis, a quarterly basis, 


whatever basis -- and let's say they're going 


along, they have a nega-- they have a zero 


bioassay result or lower than limit of 


detection, another one, another one, and then 


all of a sudden you show up with a positive 


bioassay result. Well, this gets to the 


concern that was expressed in the petition: At 

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what point did that exposure happen. 


Well, it was sometime between the last two 


bioassay points, and what we do is assume -- we 


take the situation that gives the highest dose 


to the worker and we say it was the day after 


that last bioassay result. Now, what that 


leads to -- since we consider a chronic intake 


exposure, that leads to the highest possible -- 


it's essentially a bounding estimate. 


Now what happens if you've got a situation 


where the worker was unmonitored, completely 


unmonitored. Well, that's where we resort to 


coworker data, again. Normally we apply the 


50th percentile intake. In other words, the 


average intake at the site. However, in the 


case of Rocky Flats, due to some concerns that 


Mark may talk about later, or may not, I don't 


know, we have agreed to go at the 95th 


percentile there, as well. So if you've got a 


worker who walked through a contaminated area 


and picked up some material -- some plutonium, 


uranium, whatever it was -- we will be 


assigning for unmonitored workers the 95th 


percentile, and that means we're giving them 


credit for a higher dose than 95 percent of the 

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workers -- including the operators, the people 


who were dealing with plutonium on a daily 


basis -- for that very reason. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: One more question. How about 


the people who were exposed to potentially 


maybe a mixture of maybe plutonium, americium 


or thorium or uranium, but their bioassays -- 


they were only really being looked at for like 


plutonium. How you going to account for that 


when the person says look, you know, I didn't 


work just with plutonium. I also did work with 


uranium, I did work with thorium. But in their 


bioassays they were only looking for plutonium, 


so how you going to account for those missing 


things? 


 DR. ULSH: We do account for that. In terms of 


an overestimating dose reconstruction, we have 


methods to look at the highest doses across the 


complex -- or highest intakes, rather. We also 


look at the individual's job history. We have 


job history cards that tell where they worked 


and when. If we know that they were working in 


Building 71, we know that they were potentially 


exposed to plutonium and americium, for 


instance, and we consider that. If they were 

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working in Building 881, we know that uranium 


should be added to the mix. So we do -- we do 


explicitly consider the radionuclides that they 


could have been exposed to in various areas of 


the site. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: How accurate are these job 


cards? I mean how often were they actually 


updated or reflected a person's work history? 


 DR. ULSH: What we found -- what we found is 


that these cards were pretty detailed. They 


were primarily available for employees of the 


prime contractor. I'm trying to remember how 


far up we have those -- from the early years up 


through the later years, I can't remember 


exactly what year. And they're very detailed. 


They talk about any time there was a job 


change, any time there was a salary increase, 


they're on those cards, so they're very 


detailed. And that's actually quite different 


from what you might see at other sites. I 


don't know, I haven't been involved intimately 


-- as intimately at other sites as I have with 


Rocky Flats, but these are a very valuable 


resource for us. 


Also, the -- well, the -- the NDRP also used 

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those job history cards, so that's not really a 


separate source of data, but they're pretty 


detailed. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay, what about people like 


some of the crafts you would have, some of the 


guards who may on their cards actually be 


assigned to a certain particular area or 


certain particular building, yet because of the 


nature of their work they actually -- or the 


RCTs would be another case -- could actually be 


floated or moved around, and yet those cards 


are not going to necessarily reflect all the 


areas they were in. 


 DR. ULSH: You're right, there are certain job 


categories -- like the trades workers, for 


instance; fitters, for instance -- who could 


have floated around the site and we do consider 


that. I don't want to say at all times 


periods, but certainly at some time periods in 


-- during the Rocky Flats history, some of the 


crafts were located -- headquartered in one 


particular building, but they went where the 


work was needed. And so we're aware of that 


and we consider where they could have possibly 


went and to what radionuclides they could have 

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possibly been exposed, and we do take that into 


consideration in their dose reconstruction. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: So exactly how are you handling 


that information on their dose reconstruction? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, for instance -- well, if they 


were monitored, it's pretty straightforward to 


-- well, as straightforward as, you know, dose 


reconstruction ever is. If they were not 


monitored, again, we resort to the coworker 


information that we have, and we know that 


those parti-- in those particular situations 


where you're talking about the trades who 


might've worked anywhere on site, we know that 


we have to consider not only plutonium but also 


uranium, whatever they could have been exposed 


to, and so we do assign coworker or missed dose 


on that basis. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Further questions? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Thank you very much, Brant, and we'll 


now move on to the petitioners. And let's see, 


who's going to start for the petitioners? Oh, 


okay, please... 


(Pause) 


MS. THOMPSON: My name is Jennifer Thompson and 

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I'm a representative of the petitioner. As 


noted earlier, Tony DeMaiori, the most recent 


former president of the steel workers, could 


not be here today. He's the primary agent for 


the petition; however, he's working at a 


nuclear power plant in South Carolina and could 


not come away for the meeting today and he 


sends his -- his apologies to you, as well as 


his thanks to you for all of your efforts on -- 


on this Special Exposure Cohort petition. 


I've been involved in the petition process 


since the beginning. I volunteered to help the 


United Steel Workers in drafting the petition, 


and that was about two and a half years ago, 


and never dreamed then that two and a half 


years later I'd be speaking to you today, so 


it's been a very -- very long process and I 


appreciate everybody's involvement and 


dedication to the process throughout. 


I worked at Rocky Flats for 14 years, starting 


in 1991. I worked in plutonium facilities, 


Building 707, Building 776, Building 777, 


Building 371, so I'm familiar with the site. 


am not a scientist. I'm not an industrial 


hygienist. I'm not a radiation protection 


I 
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expert. But I do have a good understanding of 


the methods, processes and procedures that were 


in place and used at Rocky Flats throughout the 


time period that I was there, and am familiar 


with the history of the site as well, having 


drafted history documents on the site. 


Again, I just want to thank the Board for its 


service so far. We appreciate your dedication. 


I want to thank Mark Griffon and the entire 


working group, who have spent many, many, many 


hours, and we appreciate their hard work. 


I want to thank some of the folks in the Rocky 


Flats community -- Terrie Barrie, Laura Schultz 


and others who have worked countless hours. 


There's many of you, too many names to mention, 


but -- but thank you to all of you. 


I also want to thank our Colorado Congressional 


delegation, who have done an outstanding job 


delivering unprecedent (sic) bipartisan support 


of this effort, as evidenced by the letter that 


you all received yesterday, the public 


statements that they have made. It is -- it is 


refreshing in -- in terms of renewing faith in 


government to know that our elected officials 


care deeply about the people that they 

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represent, and we greatly -- greatly appreciate 


that. 


Last night the Board patiently heard from 


dozens of Rocky Flats workers, those that have 


cancer, those that have other illnesses, those 


who have family members who have cancer and 


other illnesses. And this petition process is 


-- is really for them, and we are very -- very 


concerned and one of our goals is that we don't 


believe that our workers should have to fight 


with the government over dose reconstruction at 


the very time that they are fighting for their 


lives. This -- the process that is put in 


place -- the process itself is not feasible, 


and so beyond the science, even if the science 


were perfect, the process does not deliver 


timely, accurate dose reconstruction. 


I'm going to speak for a while and then I have 


a few other folks who are going to come up and 


speak, so I hope you'll bear with us when we go 


through the transition. The major things I 


want to address during my presentation are the 


timeliness factor, the fairness factor, 


feasibility, the law and -- and -- and what is 


the right thing. 

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We were asked when we went into this petition 


process to prove that there was a class of 


Rocky Flats workers for whom it was not 


feasible to accurately estimate -- estimate the 


radiation dose they received. We believe that 


our petition has done that, as evidenced by the 


two-year process, and I'll get into that later. 


We also know that they had their health 


endangered by their exposure to radiation, and 


we do not feel we had to prove that because the 


government itself has said that there's 22 


cancers for which radiation is a causal factor, 


and so we feel like that was taken care of. 


As the gentleman of NIOSH went over the basis 


of our petition already, we submitted it on 


February 15th. Our major factors were exposure 


to the high-fired oxides, which was a unique 


form of plutonium; inability to link exposure 


to specific incidents; periods of inadequate 


monitoring; lack of monitoring; changes in 


methodology and inconsistency in procedures; 


unmonitored/undetected exposures surfacing 


throughout time; and the negative effect of 


site closure on the accuracy of dose 


reconstruction. And I know that that one was 

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kind of thrown out, but we still consider that 


to be a valid factor. 


The timeliness of the petition has been a big 


issue, and those of you that were here over a 


year ago heard me speak on this and I'm going 


to hit upon it again. The law required that 


NIOSH make a recommendation within 180 days of 


receipt of our petition. The -- Health and 


Human Services implemented its own rules to 


implement the law, and they said that the 180 


days actually meant 180 days from when NIOSH 


determined the package was certified. In 


either case, that deadline was not met. The 


petition -- the recommendation from NIOSH did 


not come until 440 days after submittal. And 


now here we are, two years, two months, 18 


days, 807 days from submittal. I'm not going 


to go over the details of the time frame here, 


but as you can see, it's been a long and 


arduous process. 


 And while the petitioner was required to meet 


every deadline in the process or run the risk 


of having our petition thrown out, the same has 


not held true for the government. We had 30 


days to respond to the questions initially 

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during the validation process. We responded 


with over 500 pages of additional information, 


and we met that 30-day deadline, even though we 


are all volunteers. 


The length of this process severely hindered 


the petitioners' ability to respond. We have ­

- we no longer have any union -- access to 


union resources or backing. We have no money, 


and most of us are gainfully employed, thank 


goodness, in -- in other areas and so 


difficulty in attending daily working group 


meetings and things like that, whereas if Rocky 


Flats was still open, our employer was flexible 


and would have allowed that participation. 


We have a handful of volunteers at this point 


versus the Goliath that NIOSH has created on 


the other side of the table. You know, when 


we're in meetings, it's fairly intimidating 


when you're one person and -- and you've got 


over 20 people with PhDs and -- and science 


backgrounds and everything, and access to the 


records that we can't even get, you know, on 


the other side of the table, so that's a little 


frustrating. 


Closure has made records retrieval difficult. 

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NIOSH has the ability to command the records, 


and still sometimes it takes them months to get 


them. The workers do not have that ability. 


When they request their records, sometimes they 


wait as long as a year to get their files, and 


then the files that they get are incomplete. 


This severely hinders their ability to present 


their case during the individual claim process. 


 The Rocky Mountain News has been covering this 


topic very closely and has provided a bunch of 


information, and I want to thank them, and I 


quote a lot from their articles today -- and 


I've tried to give attribution where due. 


 Lynn Anspaugh -- I'm not sure the sp-- how to 


say the name -- is someone who's a biophysicist 


and an expert in dose reconstruction, and he 


said that government scientists have ongoing 


discussions about the validity of dose 


reconstruction, and he says -- he says that -- 


basically that if you can spend enough time and 


enough money, you may get it right. But the 


question is, timeliness is one of the factors 


in delivering the conditions of this program. 


And if you can't do it in a timely manner, it 


becomes unmanageable and it's no longer 

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feasible. 


Members of the Congressional delegation for 


Colorado have asked NIOSH not once, not twice, 


but four times now to grant this petition a 


fair and timely review, and to date have been 


unsuccessful in securing that. The U.S. 


Congress required NIOSH to make a timely 


recommendation, and Congress has never intended 


for this process to drag on for years while 


scientists search for new methods. 


 Another petition we're aware of was recommended 


for approval based on the timeliness factor. 


We believe that sets precedence for the Board 


today with respect to the Rocky Flats petition. 


If timeliness were ever an issue, at Rocky 


Flats it definitely is. 


 The question has never been could NIOSH ever 


reconstruct dose at some point in the future 


time with accuracy. The question was, when we 


submitted the petition February 15th of 2005, 


could dose accurately be reconstructed. The 


law did not say Petitioner, point out flaws in 


the government's ability to reconstruct dose. 


NIOSH, fix some of the flaws, admitting 


inabilities, and then recommend denial of the 

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petition based on a new set of standards that 


did not exist at the time the petition was 


submitted. The law clearly states the purpose 


of the compensation program is to provide 


timely, uniform and adequate compensation. 


Justice delayed is justice denied. 


We have learned, and as evidenced by the empty 


chair at the table today, that some members of 


the Board have been instructed that they cannot 


vote on the Rocky Flats petition based on 


relationships with the United Steel Workers. 


As a direct result in NIOSH delaying this 


petition, if this -- if this conflict were ever 


valid, such a restriction is no longer valid 


today for the following reasons: The Rocky 


Flats workers on behalf of which this petition 


was filed no longer have any financial or 


contractual relationship with the United Steel 


Workers. Local 8031 no longer has a single 


nuclear worker in its membership. United Steel 


Workers no longer receive any dues from the 


former Rocky Flats members, nor do they provide 


representation or services to the members. The 


United Steel Workers, as an organization, does 


not benefit in any financial way from this 

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petition being granted. 


NIOSH, on its own right, expanded the class to 


include all Rocky Flats employees, so this is 


no longer a steel worker petition. This is now 


a Rocky Flats petition. Therefore, no 


relational conflict exists, and we urge that 


all members of the Board demand their right to 


vote today. And if they are not allowed to 


vote, we request of NIOSH to provide, in 


writing, the legal basis for any restrictions 


on voting to the petitioner within 14 days. 


It appears that there's a double standard on 


the conflict of interest issue, as the Board is 


being -- members of the Board are prevented 


from participation due to conflict of interest, 


but NIOSH repeatedly relies on experts that 


have conflicts of interest. And experts who 


have testified against workers in worker 


compensation hearings are serving key roles in 


this process. The government's own General 


Accounting Office identified conflicts of 


interest in this process as an issue. 


As you well -- as the Board is, I'm sure, too 


closely aware, there's been a tremendous amount 


of political pressure to not approve Special 

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Exposure Cohort petitions, in particular the 


Rocky Flats petition. This dates back to -- to 


2005 when an OMB pass-back memo encourages 


administrative clearance on petitions before 


they could be approved and asked the 


interagency to address any imbalance on the 


Board and -- and actually resulting in changing 


out of members of the Board and things along 


those lines. 


This is a excerpt from an e-mail from a Deputy 


of La-- Depu-- Deputy for the Department of 


Labor, who stated that we should do everything 


possible to oppose these SEC petitions. 


Further evidence of the tampering is this 


address any imbalance in membership of the 


President's Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health, require NIOSH to apply conflict 


of interest rules and constraints to the 


Advisory Board contractors. The government is 


clearly trying to manipulate the process. 


Getting back to the feasibility of the actual 


science, F. Owen Hoffman stated that this is -- 


that dose reconstruction is an inexact science, 


that -- that it depends on an extensive amount 


of judgment; that two different investigators, 

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given the same data, would come up with 


different doses. The -- the people that are 


doing the dose reconstruction, 88 of them, not 


all of them have degrees in health physicists 


(sic) and with the workload that they're placed 


with, reviewing one and a half cases each 


workday, we believe that this process leads to 


a situation where it is not feasible for them 


to accurately reconstruct dose. 


Further evidence of this has to do with -- I'm 


sure you -- you all will recall who were here 


last year [name redacted] who presented with 


us, and he couldn't be here today because he's 


[identifying information redacted] up in 


Loveland. He -- his case was denied three 


times, and then approved finally just recently 


based on inaccuracy of records. And what this 


points to, and we're going to hear more about 


this later, but what this points to is [name 


redacted] had a tremendous perseverance, 


tremendous capabilities and resources to be 


able to fight his process for four years. He 


kept at it and kept at it. He could have given 


up after the second denial, but he didn't. How 


many other workers are like [Name Redacted], who 

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have submitted and been denied but haven't had 


the ability, capabilities or financial strength 


to continue through this process? How many 


other workers in the end would NIOSH have to 


come back and say we can't do it because the -- 


the records are inadequate? How can they three 


times deny [Name Redacted] based on science, and 


then finally approve him, throwing up their 


hands, saying we -- we don't have the records? 


Another person, Diane, had a dose 


reconstruction done. She's -- she's -- was -- 


talked to you guys last night, and she came out 


with a 42 rem dose reconstruction. Then they 


reconstructed her dose and came out with 25 


rem. So one time 42 rem, one time 25 rem. 


Where's the accuracy in that? 


We have heartbreaking stories of people with 47 


percent probability that are denied. How do we 


know that their doses weren't off by ten rem 


and they should have been approved? 


NIOSH would like you -- the Board to believe 


that the issue with high-fired oxides is taken 


care of. We do not believe that, as the 


petitioner. In 2003 it was stated that the 


precise nature of super class Y material is not 

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known, and here we are just four years later 


saying we have the whole problem figured out, 


that we've got a new model -- although it's not 


tried and validated, tested or proved, that we 


have a new model now and that just fixes 


everything. We believe that there's no way 


that we could know enough today about high-


fired oxides. Where's all the research? 


Where's the scientific expertise that looks 


into this? Usually challenges like this take 


decades for the scientific community to 


resolve. 


SC&A pointed out upper bound dose limitations 


having to do with coworker dose models, and 


that's not a new factor. The Defense Threat 


Reduction Agency dose reconstruction program 


found the same challenges when dealing with 


dose reconstruction. 


And this is an interesting dichotomy. I think 


you'll remember [name redacted] from a previous 


e-mail I showed you, but in 2004 he was singing 


a different song. In 2004 he said if there's a 


justification for an SEC anywhere, common sense 


suggests that it should be Rocky Flats. He 


also said does it make any sense to continue to 

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defend a do-- a dose reconstruction process 


that will just get more complicated and 


attenuated. 


We believe there's many unresolved petition 


issues to date. We believe that the neutron 


doses between 1952 and 1970 are still 


problematic. We believe that the issue of 


missing records is -- is still prominent. The 


issue of the zeroes in 1969 to '70 was fully 


looked at and NIOSH was proud that only 26 


percent of the ones they thought were missing 


were actually missing. Twenty-six percent is 


not good enough when you have cancer. 


And they looked at one year in detail. What 


would happen if they looked at every year in 


detail? Would they not find similar examples 


of missing data every single year? 


SC&A -- there's large gaps in internal dose 


data, notably from 1964 to 1992. We're still 


concerned about the adequacy of the coworker 


model, in particular for workers that are 


involved in high-dose work activities. A 95 


percent of the average site employment is not 


appropriate for high-dose workers. 


We're concerned about the thorium dose 

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reconstruction abilities. I've already talked 


about the dose records for people with high-


dose rate jobs. We're concerned that the new 


models have not been sufficiently tested or 


proven. We're concerned that when they are 


proven or when -- when things are researched 


that the -- the sample size looked at is 


statistically invalid when you're talking about 


a population of potentially 20,000 people and 


you look at 52 cases -- okay? If I was giving 


a PhD dissertation and I turned that in, I 


would get laughed at -- okay? That is not a 


statistically accurate sampling. 


We're concerned about lack of independent 


verification on the use of the neutron dose 


reconstruction project. And SC&A was also 


concerned about NIOSH's ability to validate or 


to demonstrate that it can apply its stated 


methods, approaches and coworker models to 


enable dose reconstruction with sufficient 


accuracy. Again, I would say even if your 


models were perfect, could this be done, could 


it physically be done? 


We're still concerned about high-fired oxides 


and their effect on the human body, and the 

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fact that this is a relatively recent 


phenomenon and that it hasn't been given the 


attention that it deserves. 


We're still concerned that the site profile 


still fails to recognize plutonium production 


mission in Building 881, even though NIOSH has 


been repeatedly told that there were plutonium 


operations in that facility. 


 We are concerned that no effort has been made 


to determine the radioactive cocktail effect 


described in the petition whereby plutonium, in 


combination with chemical exposure, could have 


implications to how plutonium is metabolized in 


the body. 


These are a lot of issues, two years and three 


months into the process. 


 We believe that just the fact alone that the 


working group met this week to discuss issues 


that are still unresolved means that our 


petition was valid, and that it should be 


approved. We believe that since it's been more 


than two years and significant factors are 


still unresolved means the petition was valid 


and should be approved. The fact that NIOSH 


has made the changes to the site profile, added 

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new TIBs, changed the particle size for high-


fired oxides, developed new coworker models, 


added adjustment factors, tweaked other models 


-- all of these changes prove that the petition 


was valid. If the petition was not valid they 


would not have had to make all these changes. 


The law asked us, when we submitted that 


petition on February 15th of 2005, to show that 


you could not accurately, feasibly reconstruct 


dose. We proved that when we submitted the 


petition. The law never said submit a 


petition, have all of the challenges addressed 


over a long, arduous process, and then have 


that petition denied based on a new set of 


standards that did not exist at the time the 


petition was submitted. These new factors, 


these new models, they are unproven, they are 


untested and unvalidated. 


 We believe that the Board has no legal or moral 


choice other than to approve this petition in 


its entirety today. We ask you to consider the 


law, ignore the politics. A law is a term for 


-- for dose and radiation exposure. A law is 


not a term for cost of worker health benefits. 


We ask you to look deep into your heart and ask 

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yourself what did Congress intend, what does 


the American public intend, and what do our 


workers deserve? Someday is not good enough. 


The fact that maybe tomorrow or five years from 


now or two years from now we may be able to 


reconstruct dose, that is not good enough. The 


law requires timeliness. The law meant today. 


At this point I would like to invite Jerry 


Harden, the former president of the United 


Steel Workers of America, Local 8031, to come 


present on behalf of the petition. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Jennifer and 


Jerry, before you take the podium, I understand 


we have Senator Salazar now on the phone, so if 


you would concede the mike for a few minutes, 


we'll hear his comments. 


MS. THOMPSON: Yes, we will gladly concede to 


the Honorable Senator. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Senator, welcome. We 


have just heard from the peti-- 


SENATOR SALAZAR: Hello -- Dr. Ziemer? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good morning. We've just heard 


from the petitioner. We're pleased to hear 


your comments to the Advisory Board at this 


time. 

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(The following statement was greatly distorted 


by faulty telephonic transmission.) 


SENATOR SALAZAR: Thank you very much, Dr. 


Ziemer and let me welcome you and members of 


the Board to Westminster, Colorado. Also 


welcome to the Rocky Flats workers and their 


families. 


To the Board, I appreciate your service to our 


country. I know that you work very hard 


carrying out your responsibilities, so I want 


to thank you for doing so and I also want to 


thank you for allowing me to speak to you very 


briefly this morning. I know you have a full 


agenda and I have a number of issues that I'm 


trying to work through to develop a bipartisan 


approach to (unintelligible) whole host of 


things, so I wanted to take time out today just 


to speak to you about the workers at Rocky 


Flats (unintelligible) other nuclear weapons 


facilities. I believe that the workers really 


are part of that generation of World War II and 


Cold War heroes of our nation and we need to 


make sure that we are (unintelligible) what 


they have done for our country. They risked 


their lives and their health to help us prevail 

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in our long struggle against the Soviet Union 


(unintelligible) recognition of their service 


and the price they paid in terms of illness and 


mortality, Congress enacted the Energy 


Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 


Program Act. The mission under that program is 


to compensate those workers for illnesses or 


(unintelligible) exposure to radiation and 


other harmful substances. 


In passing the legislation, Congress explained 


(unintelligible) the purpose of the 


compensation program is to provide for timely ­

- and I underscore timely -- uniform and 


adequate compensation, end of quote. And 


Congress (unintelligible) also recognizes there 


would be circumstances where there isn't 


(unintelligible) information about what workers 


were exposed to or when or in what amount, so 


these workers would be able to 


(unintelligible). In recognition of that fact, 


Congress created the Special Exposure Cohort to 


reduce the burden of proof off these workers. 


(Unintelligible) workers should become part of 


the Special Exposure Cohort when their dose -- 


doses can't be calculated with sufficient 

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accuracy. 


Well, now it's been more than six years after 


the passage of the Act and more than two years 


after the filing of the Rocky Flats workers' 


SEC petition. (Unintelligible) painfully clear 


that there's (unintelligible) about how to 


calculate the dose of radiation 


(unintelligible) Rocky Flats workers with 


sufficient accuracy. (Unintelligible) the 


Board's own workgroup struggled over this issue 


for nearly (unintelligible) to determine 


(unintelligible) methodologies or 


(unintelligible) would be able to 


(unintelligible). 


I don't question the capabilities or the 


(unintelligible) of all those who participated 


(unintelligible) over the last 


(unintelligible). But (unintelligible) the 


issue is sufficient accuracy, we have totally 


lost focus of the essential purpose of this law 


that says timely compensation (unintelligible). 


The Rocky Flats SEC petition was submitted on 


February 15th, 2005 (unintelligible) about the 


methodologies sufficient accuracy 22 months 


later and whether or not (unintelligible) 

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workers (unintelligible) Special Exposure 


Cohort all nine members of the Colorado 


delegation (unintelligible) this happens we 


consider to be the most important issue that's 


facing our state (unintelligible) Republican, 


Democrat, Senator Allard and myself coming 


together (unintelligible) delegation joining 


together (unintelligible) the Rocky Flats 


workers to ask you (unintelligible) this 


petition. So today I am calling you, Mr. 


Zimmer (sic) and members of the Board, to 


expressly request on my behalf as a U.S. 


Senator, on behalf of my colleagues here in 


Congress, to reinforce the request 


(unintelligible) my request is to 


(unintelligible) the timely approval of what 


was (unintelligible) Congress stated in the 


statute passed by Congress and so I'd ask of 


you to move forward and to (unintelligible). 


Thank you, Mr. (sic) Ziemer -- Zimmer (sic) 


again for the opportunity to speak to you and 


the Board. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Senator, for 


your comments, and we will be continuing our 


deliberations. David Hiller is here with us 

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today from your staff and will keep you 


informed of the progress. So thank you for 


being with us. 


SENATOR SALAZAR: (Unintelligible) appreciate 


that and I look forward to the (unintelligible) 


the Board. Thank you very much 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, now we'll be 


pleased to hear from Jerry Harden. 


 MR. HARDEN: Good morning. Once again I'm 


appearing in front of you nice-looking people 


that have toured the country, staying in good 


hotels, listening all day to sad stories. 


Now with that being said, my name is Jerry 


Harden. I was a 37-year employee at the Rocky 


Flats nuclear weapons site. I was also a 


three-term president of United Steel Workers of 


America, Local 8031, representing the hourly 


production and maintenance workers at the 


plant. 


Today I want to point out two important 


anniversaries. First is the 38th anniversary 


of the 776 building fire, causing the biggest 


dollar loss in U.S. history to that point, and 


that occurred on May 11th. Second is the one­
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year anniversary, April 27th, of my appearance 


before this panel pleading for cohort status 


for sick Rocky Flats workers. How much has 


that year cost in lost dollars and heartache? 


This was a well-intentioned program that has 


since been grossly mismanaged. It has meant 


windfall profits for contractors, 


administrators, intellects, bureaucrats and 


attorneys, providing only token relief for the 


sick Rocky Flats workers. 


As you on the Board should know, U.S. 


Department of Energy has been funding studies 


and gathering data on its radiation workers for 


approximately 40 years through the United 


States Transuranium and Uranium Registries. 


This effort analyzed thousands of organs and 


tissue samples from dead DOE radiation workers. 


Hundreds of dead Rocky Flats workers were part 


of this effort with their donations of organs, 


or in some cases their whole bodies, to be 


dissected and studied to determine the effects 


of their work exposure to specific medical 


conditions. Today Rocky Flats workers are 


still waiting for cohort status, recognizing 


the health conditions caused by their job site 

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exposures. 


These previous and ongoing efforts should have 


provided the information to handle these 


claims. Why hasn't it? How many more millions 


of dollars and years of time will be squandered 


on other pseudo-science projects such as dose 


reconstruction in the ongoing effort by the 


Department of Energy and its contractors to 


ignore, deny and minimize the health damage to 


Rocky Flats workers? 


I will offer some other related examples of the 


mismanagement of the Rocky Flats plant by the 


Department of Energy and its contractors that 


have been recognized by truly independent 


agencies. The first is the Colorado State 


Workers Compensation process, and we have had 


four provable radiation deaths that have 


proceeded through that, proving that those 


workers' survivors' claims were valid. 


The first of the claims was [Name Redacted], the 


second was [Name Redacted], followed by [Name 


Redacted] and [Name Redacted]. All of these men 


were Rocky Flats workers who were employed in 


the hot areas. 


The second item I'd like to mention today is 

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the [Name Redacted] landowner lawsuit decision 


in Federal Court. They took over 15 years and 


$30 million by the contractor and DOE to 


prepare for the case. But we were headlines in 


the Rocky Mountain News with a $350 million 


settlement, and this is of course being 


appealed by the DOE. 


 The third case is the [Name Redacted] false 


claims lawsuit decision, in Federal Court as 


well. His attorney claims that $500 million 


has been spent by DOE and the contractors to -- 


to pursue that case. The Department of Energy 


has appealed these verdicts, using their 


typical strategy of denying, stalling and 


creating more red tape to prevent settling 


these cases. 


This is similar to the way that the sick Rocky 


Flats workers' claims have been handled. The 


federal government and the Department of Energy 


have been proven unable to provide a meaningful 


way for these affected by their actions to have 


a realistic and timely justice provided. How 


did Department of Energy hold these 


corporations involved accountable? By 


providing them additional bonuses and by paying 

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for their legal fees for their disgraceful 


performances. I wish that the sick Rocky Flats 


workers could benefit from some of their 


generosity as well. 


In summary, there is autopsy data on hundreds 


of dead Rocky Flats workers establishing health 


effects; one of the worst industrial fires in 


U.S. history; two very large Federal Court 


judgments against the Department of Energy and 


the contractors for safety conditions at Rocky 


Flats; four proven radiation death cases 


through the State Workers Compensation Program; 


and numerous out of court settlements. What is 


it going to take to prove that employ at -- 


employment at Rocky Flats hurt some of the 


workers? 


And with that, I would say I'm open for any 


questions or comments -- chickens. Please help 


the sick Rocky Flats workers, granting them 


cohort status. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Jennifer? 


MS. THOMPSON: Thank you. At this time I would 


like to introduce Mr. Jack Weaver, long-time 


Rocky Flats employee, particularly focused in 


Building 771 as a subject matter expert noted 

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by DOE and numerous others. Thank you, sir. 


 MR. WEAVER: Oh, I tore up the equipment. 


Thank you, Jennifer. Good morning to the 


Board. Good morning to my brothers and sisters 


from Rocky Flats -- appreciate you being here 


again. 


I'm going to take a little different tack at 


what's going on here. I'm going to talk a 


little bit about me personally because 


obviously I have a long tenure at Rocky Flats. 


Then I'm going to talk about some of the issues 


that we had. 


I started at Rocky Flats September the 5th, 


1961. I started on a labor gang 'cause that's 


one of the ways you got into the plant to get a 


job. Two months later I had signed a posting, 


passed the test and became an assistant 


chemical operator. I was supposed to be 


assistant chemical operator for -- for two 


years, but for -- because of the need of -- of 


operations personnel, operators to run the 


production equipment, six months later I took a 


test, I became a chemical operator. I worked 


12 years as a hourly chemical operator and a 


chemical operator crew leader. I became a 

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foreman after that. After foreman, a 


supervisor, building manager, operations and 


building manager for 771 and 371, ultimately 


became an assistant dist-- or general manager, 


deputy general manager under EG&G. 


So I -- I had a chance to work in all positions 


from the lowest on the hourly rung to almost 


the highest at the plant site. I had the 


chance to work in many different situations, so 


I'll go back and start with some of those. 


The first day I worked in 771 building as an 


assistant chemical operator I was taken in and 


given a briefing about the building and the 


rules of the building, went to lunch. Came 


back from lunch, was taken to the locker room, 


shown how to dress out, given a half-mask 


respirator and told to follow the crew leader. 


We went back into the hallway at 771 building 


and he says climb up in those pipes, we're 


going to decon the overhead. What does that 


mean? You know, I had no clue what that meant. 


Well, what it meant was take a bunch of chem 


wipes and what we called KW and go clean the 


pipes -- literally wipe down the contamination. 


There was no check on the respirator. It was a 

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single-strap half-mask respirator. I was in a 


space approximately four foot by four foot with 


a multitude of pipes running through it. I was 


a pretty skinny kid at that time so I could get 


through it pretty easily. I don't know I could 


do that today. But that's what we did. 


As an assistant chemical operator you were kind 


of a go-fer and a -- and a do-all for the 


operators; all the dirty jobs, the decon job, 


we got them. 


Well, when I became an operator I started 


learning the processes. Initially at Rocky 


Flats, in the '50s and early '60s, you were 


assigned to a job, you stayed on that job. 


Well, as it -- as the production schedules 


changed and need for increased production and 


because of radiation exposure, people started 


having to be rotated. And so we were rotated 


from job to job to job, so we had to learn 


every job, and we worked every job. And that 


included an operation called chemical makeup, 


some people called it chem prep, in which you 


had to prepare chemicals for the processes in 


which you were -- you had no respiratory 


protection, no monitoring or anything. But you 

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were working with raw chemicals -- 


(unintelligible) nitric acid, hydrofluoric 


acid, hydrochloric acid, all kinds of things 


like that that were used in the process -- and 


so you inhaled those. 


Do we know what that does to you? I don't. 


All I know is that a lot of people became sick 


because of the chemicals that -- that we dealt 


with. 


Anyway, moving on. Working in 771 building was 


a -- was a very unique experience in the early 


days because we didn't have a lot of -- of 


safety programs. You walk in and you might 


work on this side of the glovebox through a set 


of gloves, looking on the back side of the 


glovebox. There weren't any gloves; they'd 


rotted off, but they were taped over. You were 


not in respirators, but the back side of the 


glovebox was posted for respirators, you know? 


You had dosimeters -- or you didn't have 


dosimeters; you had film badges in those days. 


And our frequency was a change of every two 


weeks. And sometimes you would -- you would 


come back, as people have stated, no data 


available, or less than readable data and 

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stuff. I had some of that -- I had -- I 


changed my badge frequently, every two weeks. 


I got information back, but it wasn't always 


the information that -- you know, you'd go ask 


well, what happened? I mean I worked beside 


this guy; he got 100 millirem, I didn't get 


any. How come? No answer. 


 Anyway, things changed somewhat. We in-- we 


in-- installed some programs like the glove 


quality program where we changed gloves on a 


periodic basis so we wouldn't have those gloves 


falling off the gloveboxes and stuff. But we 


worked in a chemical processing building that 


had 26 miles of processing piping; 200 tanks 


with sight gauges on them, each with a 


potential for a leak; 12,000 flanges, 15,000 


welded joints, that sort of thing -- every one 


of them with a potential to leak, and most of 


them did. So we had a lot of issues with -- 


with deconning and dealing with radiation 


exposure, alpha contamination, et cetera. 


For me personally, I got data in 1962 -- and if 


you -- if you know the history of Rocky Flats, 


1962 was -- summer of '62 was the first year 


that Rocky Flats suffered a strike by the 

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union. It went on for 28 days, in August. 


When I got back from strike I was called into 


the office and told I was -- we were back about 


a week and I was called into the office and 


told you've exceeded 5,000 millirem for the 


year; you're going to have to go to 774 


building and cool off. So I went to 774 


building to cool off. First of the year I was 


back in 771, doing my normal thing. It went on 


like that. 


'69 I was working midnight shift. I had a call 


on May the 11th about 6:30 in the evening from 


my boss, [Name Redacted], and he says get your 


carpool and get to work now. I said what's 


wrong, [Name Redacted]? He said I haven't got 


time to explain it, just get here. So I called 


my carpool, said I'll be by and pick you up in 


five minutes and we're going to work. What's 


up? I don't know, we're going to work. So we 


get out on the hill there at 128 and we look 


over towards Rocky Flats and all you can see is 


red lights flashing all over the place and you 


go -- do I really want to go to work? I'm not 


sure, but we did. 


We pulled into the east gate. Guard said where 

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the hell do you guys think you're going? Well, 


we're going to work down in 71. Oh, well, 


don't go near 76. And I said well, what's 


wrong? He said there's a big fire going on 


down there and they haven't got it contained. 


Well, we got down to 71 building, got dressed 


out, went to the office and boss said there's a 


fire in 76 building. They're putting water on 


it. It's running down the elevator, through 


the tunnel and into the back of 71 building. 


Go get the floor pickups and decon -- start 


deconning the hallways and get it back to the ­

- the tunnel. So we did that, worked all night 


long getting water picked up and stuff. 


About an hour into this, boss came in and says 


you guys come out here. He says I got 


something for you. So we went out to the -- 


the clean area. He says here, put these on. 


Say what the hell's that? He says that's a new 


type of respirator, called a full-face mask. 


We were wearing half-masks when we first got 


there. He gave us a full-face respirator, but 


actually what it was was an old World War II 


gas mask with a particulate filter on it. 


Well, as you can see, I wear glasses. My 

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vision at that time was 20/800, 20/850, so I 


didn't see real well without them. But I 


pulled my glasses off, put this thing on and 


bumped into a few walls and stuff and spent the 


rest of the night deconning. 


The following weeks we wound up going into the 


tunnel, which was between 71 and 76, and 


cleaning that, then eventually going up to 76 


building and into supplied breathing air suits 


and -- and cleaning -- packaging oxides and 


bringing them to 71, drying them, storing them 


and processing. 


We processed a lot of material. We processed 


millions of grams of plutonium. People talk 


about plutonium. They don't really understand 


or know the amount of material that went 


through that site. I'm not talking a few 


grams. When I read the books and -- and hear 


the stories and talk to the people from Los 


Alamos and they talk about what they did back 


in the Manhattan Project, and they were dealing 


with micrograms and milligrams of plutonium. 


We dealt with kgs per hours, kgs per shift, 


hundreds and thousands of kgs per year, 


millions of grams of oxide that went through 

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the process. 


What we did it for was to keep this country 


safe, and we did it very well. But we paid a 


price, because if you talk to people at other 


plants, and I've been to every one of the other 


plants, save Paducah and -- and the one in 


Ohio. Every one of them, when you talk about 


Rocky Flats, they just can't understand why -- 


why we did what we did and how come we put up 


with what we did because they don't have the 


people that have been exposed like we do. They 


don't have the hundreds of people that have 


high exposures and -- and internal depositions 


that we did. And it's hard to deal with that 


kind of stuff because some people it affects 


and some people it -- it doesn't affect, but 


probably will in the future, and I'm probably 


one of those. 


I continued to work, as I say, Rocky Flats. 


Through the years I -- I became a foreman in 


'73 in 71 building on midnight shift. I worked 


there until 1980 and I went up to 371 to start 


that building up, and I did. I started it up. 


I also shut it down, because it was not what we 


had asked for. In 1968 the government came to 

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the people in the building and asked for -- 


what we would like to see in a new facility 


because they felt that 71 building had a 25­

year life span and it ought to be closed down 


after 25 years, so they were going to build a 


new facility called 371 and 374 to replace 771 


and 774. It was supposed to be on line in 


1976. I went there in 1980; it was still not 


on line. We didn't put the first plutonium in 


until 1981. 


A lot of things that we asked for did get put 


into the building. A lot of things we didn't 


ask for got put into the building. The 


building was not designed properly to handle 


acid atmosphere plutonium recovery, and 


therefore it did the same thing as 71 building 


-- it leaked. People got exposed. 


One of the things -- and I'll back up for just 


a moment and talk about -- is americium. 


Americium is a byproduct of plutonium. It in-


grows in the plutonium in the -- in the weapons 


in the field, and after a period of time has to 


be brought back and reprocessed and -- and the 


americium removed from the plutonium because in 


the field what it's doing is giving the 

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military folks high doses of gamma, and the 


military doesn't want to put up with that. 
I 


don't blame them. So they send them back. 


So we had a process in which we recovered the ­

- the plutonium and the americium, did a 


separation process, purified the plutonium, 


sent it back into the weapons product. And we 


separated the americium, purified it, made it 


into an oxide and we sent it to the americium 


pool down at Oak Ridge for a number of years 


until we filled the pool up so full they said 


that we didn't need any more americium because 


there'd be more than five lifetimes worth of 


americium for everybody to use. 


So we quit saving it, so it became a waste 


product. And it went into the waste in what 


was now a cold process for buildings like 774 


and 374, now became a hot process because of 


all the -- the gamma that was going through the 


system in the waste -- americium waste. So 


those people got exposed where they weren't 


exposed previously to the higher levels. 


Another thing I'd like to speak about for a 


minute is when I went to work there in 71 


building, the talk in radi-- in the radiation 

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field was obviously about alpha and gamma and 


beta. Nobody talked about neutrons. Nobody 


had an idea what was going on with neutrons. 


It wasn't until about 195-- or 1965, 1966 that 


they determined that neutrons were an issue, 


and that we ought to do something about it. 


And what they did was they started installing 


plexiglas and benelex around the gloveboxes. 


Makes it harder to work in the glovebox, makes 


it a -- a tougher job for you to do your job 


and therefore you spend longer exposure time in 


the glovebox. And it really got, in a lot of 


cases, more exposure, especially to your -- 


your hands and wrists and chest area, than you 


did without the -- the benelex and plexiglas. 


What they didn't realize or didn't pay 


attention to was benelex and plexiglas are 


extremely hazardous, flammable-wise. And so 


when the fire started in '69 in 76 building, as 


it burnt through the first window and got to 


the outside protection, benelex and plexiglas, 


and started burning that. When it started into 


the benelex, benelex is -- comes in sheets 


about a quarter-inch thick and they laminate it 


together -- one inch, two inch, three inch, 

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four inch -- whatever thickness you need. So 


it would get into this benelex and get to the 


glue and start burning. And one of the reasons 


that the fire continued to burn as long as it 


did was because they couldn't get the benelex 


put out. 


They put water on the plutonium. That didn't 


put it out 'cause water won't do anything to 


put out a plutonium fire. The only thing you 


can do to put out a plutonium fire is take the 


oxygen away from it. So all the plutonium 


burned into oxides, so we spent a lot of time 


taking care of the oxides and getting all of 


that stuff out of the building before we ever 


got to the point where we were tearing out the 


equipment and cleaning up the building. 


Although it was never completely cleaned; a lot 


of it was covered over with paint. 


 Anyway, moving right along, I continued to work 


at the Flats and participate in the programs. 


One of the things that I saw early on was that 


I'm getting exposed. 


Oh, I forgot to tell you that right after the 


fire in '69 we were working cleaning up and 


stuff. Well, in -- in August of '69 again I 

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come into the office on midnight shift. The 


boss says you're out of here. I said what's 


up? He says you're over-exposed. Well, '69 


was the only other year that I got notice that 


I had exceeded the five rem limit for exposure. 


And the reason I'm talking about this is 


because I'm going to bring something up here in 


a few minutes about my exposure. 


So anyway, we continued to work. I continued 


to -- to ask questions and -- and participate 


in the programs. I talked to you about the 


frequency earlier. One of the questions was 


about how frequent was -- were people's badges 


changed, how frequently were they body-counted 


and how frequently did they have urinalysis and 


that sort of thing. My personal situation was 


that after I was identified with an internal 


deposition and a high -- high dose and exceeded 


the -- the guideline, I had a body count every 


six months. I got a pee bucket every six 


weeks. Every one of those came back extremely 


high in plutonium and americium. I could do 


one today and it would still do the same thing. 


The last one I did, just before I left, the 


information was you're still in the category of 

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I 

extremely high. 


So I'm sitting here with -- with plutonium and 


americium in my system. I'm fortunate. 


haven't had what a lot of these other folks 


have had as far as health issues. I've had 


some minor health issues, but I haven't had the 


heavy issues, the cancer issues and that sort 


of thing. Will I? I don't know. Probably. 


mean how can you not have, if you've got an 


internal deposition and a large body burden -- 


I mean a large dose. 


I just want to share this one piece of paper 


here with you. This -- this is the Rocky Flats 


Environmental Technology Site annual report 


card for the year 2000, individual lifetime 


report, Jack Weaver. Cumulative TEDE reported 


since 1/1/89, 659 internal -- no, I mean 


external; no internal; 659 millirem total dose 


for the year. 


Now in 2000 I was working in a situation where 


I was doing contract work and oversight, 


reviewing work packages and et cetera, so I 


wasn't on the floor every day, but I would go 


out and review the packages on the floor with 


the workers and such. So I still received 659 


I 
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for the year, even though I didn't have hands-


on in the -- in the gloves or hands-on to the 


equipment. 


But here's -- here's the results on a lifetime 


dose. External, 89967; internal, 119796, for 


a total of 209763. How many people in here are 


you going to find that's got that kind of a 


dose? Not many. I'm probably one of those 20 


or 30 people that they talked about that -- 


that got reviewed because I'm in the high end 


of things. There are other people that are 


higher than I am, and quite a few of them that 


are in that area of 100 to 200 to 300 rem over 


the -- over the -- or millirem, I'm sorry, over 


the -- no, rem -- over the lifetime of -- of 


working at Rocky Flats. 


Anyway, what I -- what I wanted to convey was ­

- was this. There are a lot of great people, 


brothers and sisters that worked at Rocky 


Flats, that did a hell of a job maintaining the 


integrity of -- of our armed services so this 


country could stay free and -- and be able to 


stand here today and talk to you people. It's 


a shame that these people have not been treated 


with the dignity that they haven't 'cause they 

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deserve better than what they've been getting. 


I just want to say that I hope you people find 


it in your hearts and in your heads today to 


listen to what Senator Salazar had to say, to 


listen to what Jennifer -- by the way, who did 


an outstanding job, in my mind, of presenting 


this morning -- to what Jerry said, to what Tom 


will say here in a few minutes, what [Name 


Redacted] will say, and what the people said 


last night, and please, please pass the SEC 


cohort. When you go to other sites and you ask 


them about how many of their people are -- are 


exposed, how many of their people have had 


internal depositions and stuff, you won't find 


any site, not even Hanford and Savannah River, 


that have the people that have been exposed 


like Rocky Flats people have. These people 


deserve to be treated with justice and dignity. 


Please do that for them. Please vote for the 


cohort. 


I thank you for your time. 


MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Jack. Now I would 


like to introduce Mr. Bill Brady, a law 


professor at the University of Denver Sturm 


College of Law, who teaches an advanced law 

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class in hazardous waste and toxious (sic) 


torts. He represents cancer victims and others 


who've been exposed to toxic substances. Thank 


you. 


MR. BRADY: Mr. Chairman, members of the 


committee, it's already been a long morning and 


I don't know if you had a break planned at all, 


and I would offer you the opportunity -- if it 


was your preference -- to take the break now. 


The --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I'm (unintelligible) -- 


MR. BRADY: -- derriere can only endure -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- you so much time afterwards 


that --


MR. BRADY: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- no, I -- unless you are going 


on for an extended period, I think -- we have a 


few moments yet. We'd be --


MR. BRADY: Okay, great. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- pleased to have you --


MR. BRADY: I don't plan on going on for an 


extended period, but I am a lawyer, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we -- we've been duly 


warned. Thank you. 


MR. BRADY: Mr. Chairman, members of the 

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committee, I was here last night and heard some 


of the testimony, and actually I also read much 


of the transcript from last April. And it 


struck me that there has been a huge disconnect 


in what has been going on. One thing I've 


learned in 30 years of -- of practicing law and 


teaching law students and trying cases to 


juries and judges and teaching young lawyers 


and older lawyers in post-doctorate programs is 


that human nature doesn't change much. Most 


people are not impervious to the kind of gut-


wrenching pain and suffering that have -- have 


been presented over the last two days. Whether 


you're a steel worker, a scientist, a lawyer or 


a -- a member of a blue-ribbon government 


panel, you can't be impervious to this kind of 


pain. You'd have to be awfully cold and 


callous and anesthetized to the hu-- human 


condition we've heard about. 


 So how then, given the constraints of your 


abilities under the law and your charge as 


members of this Board, how can you help? Well, 


what I'd like to do is very, very briefly talk 


to you about a client of mine, who many of you 


know and have heard from, and that is [Name 

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Redacted]. [Name Redacted] is a -- is a very
 

special person. Now I know that this is 


anecdotal and you've heard tons of anecdotes 


the last few days. And many of you are 


scientists, and I've worked with scientists 


before, and experts, and I know that anecdotal 


evidence is only indicative of that one 


person's case. But I think [Name Redacted] case 


is very, very illustrative of many of the cases 


here, and I'd like to take a few minutes to 


talk to you about it. 


 [Name Redacted] came to me seven months ago. He 


had been denied three times in various 


petitions that he had submitted under the 


EEOICPA, and he was a very frustrated person 


because he had now just been diagnosed with a 


second primary cancer. His first primary was a 


glioblastoma multiform, an extremely deadly 


form of brain cancer. The reason I say [Name
 

Redacted] a very special person is because [Name 


Redacted] is still alive. He's lived four and
 

a half, almost five years now from his 


diagnosis in June of 2002. But unfortunately, 


he now had been diagnosed with a second 


primary, a myelodysplasia syndrome, which is a 

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form of bone marrow cancer. And he was very 


frustrated. 


 [Name Redacted] has degrees from Ohio State 


University, both a bachelor of science and a 


master's degree in nuclear engineering, and is 


a very smart guy, and I had a lot of respect 


for him. He was 42 years old at the time of 


his diagnosis, way outside the profile for this 


particular condition. [Name Redacted] and his
 

wife, who is also an engineer, had been trying 


desperately to get the government's attention. 


I brought a banker's box over there of 


materials that I've accumulated in the last 


seven months on this case. [Name Redacted] has
 

three others of those, documents that he had 


submitted over time. His first petition was 


filed in September of 2002, over four and a 


half years ago. The process has gone on 


interminably. 


Well, I looked at his case. I talked with his 


oncologist. We talked with an expert over at 


the University of Colorado Health Sciences 


Center, Dr. Jim Ruttenber, and they were as 


perplexed as I was as to why [Name Redacted] 


claims had been denied. 

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We talked to him about his work. [Name 


Redacted] had spent 16 years at Savannah River 


as a project engineer, manufacturing plutonium 


triggers; another six years doing the same work 


at Rocky Flats, and another six months doing 


similar work at Fernald. He left Rocky Flats 


in June of 2000. And what was curious to me 


was when I looked at some of the site exposure 


matrices, I found that [Name Redacted] was
 

listed as still being employed at Rocky Flats 


in the fall of 2003. He'd left in June of 


2000. He was diagnosed with the glioblastoma 


multiform brain cancer in June of 2002, and 


they still had him at Rocky Flats working there 


some -- more than a year later. 


So we started taking a look at some of the 


other records, and we found that there were 


numerous calculation errors, mathematical 


errors, based upon the doses to which he had 


been exposed. In addition to that, there had 


been chemicals which had never been factored 


into his dose reconstruction process, chemical 


exposure -- not just radiation. 


 [Name Redacted] had had significant amount of 


neutron radiation and described to me how he 

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used to wear a bellybutton dosimeter under two 


layers of protective equipment, and that very 


often he would stick his head into an area 


where there was plutonium and have to work with 


it, yet there would be no reading on the 


dosimeter. This whole issue of neutron 


radiation and some of the issues that were 


raised in the petition today by Jennifer, the 


areas that she had raised, we raised in [Name
 

Redacted] case. We got into the whole issue of
 

high-fired oxides and the inaccuracies of 


bioassays. We further studied plutonium, a 


number of other issues that have been raised by 


the committee in their questions to Dr. Ulsh 


earlier, as well as by Dr. Ruttenber raised -- 


who raised them to us. 


Well, we got a hearing in front of the 


Department of Labor Final Adjudication Board, 


and I had [Name Redacted] the oncologist, 


testify. He stated that he'd only had one 


other case that he treated of a glioblastoma 


multiform, and that was an individual who had 


worked at Rocky Flats, and [Name Redacted] -­

two cases. [Name Redacted] has been practicing 


oncology in the Denver metro ar-- metropolitan 

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area for over 20 years. He was amazed that 


[Name Redacted] had been denied, and basically 


said to me you can't look at an elephant and 


keep calling it a zebra. That's what they're 


doing. It is absolutely clear that this man's 


cancer, at 42 years of age, outside of every 


profile, is absolutely caused by his chemical 


and radiation exposure. But the chemical 


exposure had never ever been considered in the 


dose reconstruction process. 


So we went forward. We presented the evidence. 


And about a month ago we got a decision. And 


the decision is very, very instructive because 


of the findings that were made in [Name 


Redacted] case. And I'd like to read just a
 

short portion of that decision to you. 


(Reading) The Final Adjudication Board reviewed 


your case and the new statement of accepted 


facts was written based upon the extensive 


research of toxicants you presented as having 


been exposed to during your employment. The 


toxic substances you identified were researched 


through other site exposure matrices not 


previously available, a repository of 


information related to toxic substances 

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potentially present at covered DOE sites. It 


has now been accepted that you were exposed to 


the following toxicants while employed: 


plutonium nitrate and chloride solutions, 


plutonium oxide, plutonium oxalate, plutonium 


fluorides, plutonium dibutylphosphate, uranium 


oxides, neptunium oxides, acids such as 


hydrofluoric, sulfonic, oxalic, ascorbic, 


nitrous and hydrozene, sodium 


tetraphenylborate, volatile organic -- organic 


compounds and organic solvents such as TCE, 


carbon tetrachloride, MEK, PCBs, mercury, heavy 


metals such as lead, chromium and cadmium, 


thorium, ferrous sulfumate and aluminum nitrate 


nonhydrate -- nonahydrate. None of that had 


been considered previously. 


Based on this new information, the case was 


then referred to a new district medical 


consultant, different from the prior district 


medical consultants who had denied [Name 


Redacted] previous petitions. The new district 


medical consultant, who this time was a doctor 


skilled in occupational medicine and not the 


cardiologist who had previously denied [Name 


Redacted] claim -- a cardiologist who, by the 

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way, stated that he spent three hours reviewing 


[Name Redacted] case and consulted WebMD in 


order to research his condition. The new 


district medical consultant stated the 


development of cancer is a multi-stage process 


which can best be understood as involving -- 


promoting malignant conversion and tumor 


progression. In general, carcinogen-related 


cellular DNA damage that is not reversible is 


term initiation. The process of promotion 


occurs when DNA-damaged cells begin to 


replicate. Known chemical promoters include 


many of the toxicants to which [Name Redacted] 


was exposed, and are capable of promoting the 


initiated cells. Some of the toxicants to 


which [Name Redacted] has been accepted as 


having been exposed to are suspected human 


carcinogens, and he cites a whole list of them. 


In summary, although the literature and 


epidemiological basis of evidence is non-


confirmatory of an occupational toxicant 


exposure etiologic basis of brain cancer, there 


is insufficient evidence to suggest any 


alternative causal etiology. An assessment of 


the medical evidence and all potential causal 

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factors for brain cancer suggest that it is at 


least as likely as not that the occupational 


toxicant exposures at Savannah River were a 


significant factor in contributing to [Name 


Redacted] cancers.
 

Now, I don't know how many other folks here 


have submitted petitions and have received the 


same treatment that [Name Redacted] received the 


first three times. I suspect that there are 


quite a few. 


I listened to Dr. Ulsh's answers today. They 


troubled me. The scientific process permits 


reasonable assumptions giving the applicant, as 


the law requires, the benefit of the doubt so 


long as there is a modicum of evidence, a 


modicum of competent evidence upon which to 


base those reasonable assumptions. But when 


there is no longer a residuum of competence 


evidence, confounding factors are too great to 


overcome. The science of risk assessment and 


causation conclusions based upon that science 


is reduced to little more than junk science 


when you rely upon irrelevant, irrational, 


incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable evidence. 


The operative -- the operative -- the operative 

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phrase I think these days, in the words of my 


kids, is garbage in/garbage out. 


There's a wall of human suffering out here, and 


they deserve better treatment than they've been 


given. When Rocky Flats contractors provide 


evidence that is incomplete, inaccurate and 


unreliable, the logical result mandates 


approval of the Special Exposure Cohort. These 


people from whom you've heard do not have, as 


[Name Redacted] apparently has had, the luxury 


of time. Time is a commodity many of these 


folks cannot afford. 


 [Name Redacted] case took four and a half years. 


Fortunately, thank God, he's still with us. 


But other people are dying, and their families 


-- as you know -- are being left economically, 


as well as emotionally, devastated. 


You can end that suffering today. Please, by 


the grace of God, approve the petition. Thank 


you. 


MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Bill. I would now 


like to ask Michelle to come up. You heard 


from Michelle last night, but she'd like to add 


one additional comment on -- on behalf of her 


family. 

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 MS. DOBROVOLNY: Good morning, panel. Thank 


you for taking the time. I actually didn't get 


a chance to speak last night, but that's okay. 


I believe there's just been so much said here 


that it doesn't need to be repeated, but I just 


want to give you a very quick synopsis of my 


situation. 


My name is Michelle Dobrovolny. I'm 42 years 


of age. I am also sick. I have been denied 


six times. I don't know if I'll have the 


luxury of a seventh. I have watched many of my 


family members -- whom all worked out at Rocky 


Flats -- die, one right after another, of 


cancer -- hideous cancers. It's a very sad and 


difficult situation. [identifying information 


redacted] is sick with berylliosis. He, too, 


will succumb to death. 


As I stand here before you, I don't really need 


to go into a lot of detail because I think many 


have covered everything that needs to be 


covered. But as you make this decision for our 


lives and the compensation that could help some 


of us, I want you to remember that you are 


going to affect those that have died, those 


that are in the process of dying, and those 

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that are in the future that may face the same 


consequences that we have. Please also keep in 


mind that sometimes calculations of the 


smartest people don't apply to this. It's 


simple common sense. 


Your cause to action would be to vote yes for 


us. When we left that plant site and ended 


with the chemicals that we worked with, that's 


when your job really began. We gave 100 


percent of our time, our effort and our lives 


in dedication to doing what we needed to do to 


support our country. It's time that you give 


100 percent back to us as employees. I speak 


on behalf of -- this is a family. We're not 


individuals. We are a Rocky Flats family, and 


we deserve the very most integrity, the same 


integrity that we gave our job when we showed 


up every day at plant site. Thank you very 


much. 


MS. THOMPSON: We have one additional gentleman 


who wasn't able to come last night. Mark 


Danhauer has a brief comment that he would like 


to give, and I appreciate your indulgence on 


this matter. Thank you. 


MR. DANHAUER: Good morning. I started working 

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out at Rocky Flats in -- I think it was 


beginning of '02. I worked out there a year, 


and I started working in G mod and about two 


months later I was going into kidney failure 


and I found out that I had stage three large B-


cell non-Hodgkin's lymphoma that was from my 


chest to my pelvic area. They gave me about a 


25, 30 percent chance to survive as I've been 


in remission now for three and a half years 


now, thank God. 


I'm 41 years old and I'm totally disabled. I 


can't work. I have so much chronic pain that 


they can't even figure out what to give me 


anymore. They've tried the -- you know, the 


morphine, the fentanyl patch, which I have on 


right now, and the methadone and I take 19 and 


a half pills a day. And I look like I'm in 


pretty good shape, look like I can work. I 


mean I worked construction for 20 years. But 


at the end of the -- probably right around the 


middle of the day, I have a hard time climbing 


ten stairs to go up to my bedroom. It -- I --


I can't even begin to explain or make you 


understand, unless you are a cancer patient and 


have gone through the intense chemo, you know, 

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that I've been through and I know some of the 


people here have been through. It is the most 


humiliating and degrading and painful thing 


I've ever gone through in my entire life, and I 


went through that for eight months, and I 


continue to go through it. 


Just because I'm in remission for three and a 


half years doesn't mean that I have no more 


pain. I just went in for a checkup a couple of 


weeks ago, and they found a spot on my lung. 


I'm going to keep an eye on it. It's not 


really -- I'm not too concerned about it yet, 


but it's still a big concern for me and my 


family and my wife and -- I'm not going to sit 


here and try to beg you guys to -- to pass this 


bill, but the monetary and the health insurance 


-- I think the health insurance is more 


important than the money, even though I've been 


financially devastated from this. I've gone 


through the bankruptcy 'cause of the medical 


bills, everything. 


It's just the peace of mind I think for having 


the health insurance and not having to worry 


about that because right now it costs me 


probably -- I'm filing for Social Security 

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disability. You know how that works. I'll 


probably never get it, or if I do, it'll be 


four or five years down the road. 


I -- I have no income. [identifying 


information] supports me. I'm supposed to be 


the man of the house. Instead, I'm at home, 


doing little chores here and there, trying to 


get through the day. It's not the way it's 


supposed to be. I guess sometimes I don't feel 


like a man 'cause I can't take care of my 


family, and that sucks. 


And I know I'm one of the younger ones to have 


this type of problem, but I'll always have it, 


and I know I'll never be able to work again. 


was 37 years old when I got sick. I almost 


needed a kidney transplant, you know, all kinds 


-- by the grace of God, I made it through it, 


but the aftereffects are just inexplainable -- 


unexplainable. You can't even begin to 


understand it unless you've been there. 


And I'm not going to sit here and try to 


convince you to pass this bill or, you know -- 


I'm kind of at a loss for words. I'm a little 


nervous, little upset. I just hope that you 


guys take the time to realize this affects so 


I 
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many people, down to my grandkids, down to my 


step-grandkids. They're -- they're still my 


babies. I can't even play with them. So take 


all that into consideration, that that just 


doesn't affect us. It affects everybody, our 


whole family, the kids. So -- I've been up 


here long enough and made a fool of myself, so 


-- but thank you for your time. 


MS. THOMPSON: I want to thank the Board for 


all the time that you've given us, and it's for 


people like that that we've applied for Special 


Exposure Cohort, 'cause we really believe that 


people like [name redacted] should not have to 


fight for compensation at the time they're 


fighting for their lives. I ask you to please 


consider the law -- again, ignore the politics 


-- to look into your heart and to do the right 


thing. It was never the intent of this program 


that it should go on this long. It was never 


the intent of this program that the 


petitioners' findings would result in all these 


changes and then the petition would be denied 


based on that. And don't get me wrong. We're 


really glad that our petition has been the 


impetus for better science and for a better 

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model and for all those things. But what we're 


saying is that the models are unproven. You 


still can't accurately reconstruct dose. I'm 


asking you to look at the fact that someday is 


simply not good enough, that accuracy and 


feasibility means today, and I ask that you 


please today approve our petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Jennifer, and 


other folks from the petitioning group. We do 


want to hear from the -- the Congressional 


delegation, but I think it would be appropriate 


that we -- we take our break first, so let's 


take a 15-minute break. Try to be back here 


promptly about 25 of, and then we'll have an 


opportunity to hear from a number of the 


members of the Congressional delegation. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:23 a.m. 


to 10:45 a.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have a number of individuals 


from the Congr-- Colorado Congressional 


delegation that are going to provide some 


remarks for the record. We'll begin with 


Jeanette Alberg, who is on the staff of Senator 


Wayne Allard. Jeanette, we'd be pleased to 


hear from you at this time. 

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102

 MS. ALBERG: Thank you. It is a pleasure to be 


here today to speak on behalf of U.S. Senator 


Wayne Allard. David Hiller with Senator 


Salazar's office and I will be reading a letter 


from the Colorado Congressional delegation. 


Before we read the letter I did want to preface 


the letter with a couple of comments, basically 


echoing Senator Salazar's earlier comments. 


It's important to note that this letter has 


bipartisan support. All nine members of the 


Colorado Congressional delegation have signed 


onto this letter in support of the Rocky Flats 


Special Exposure Cohort petition, so thank you 


for your fair consideration of that. 


I mentioned the bipartisan aspect because 


today's decision, the decision that you're 


faced with, is not about politics. It's about 


making the right decision and making -- being 


fair to the people at Rocky Flats. So thank 


you for your fair consideration of these 


comments. 


(Reading) Dear Dr. Ziemer, Dr. Wade and members 


of the Advisory Board: As members of the 


Colorado Congressional delegation, we write to 


you again in support of the Special Exposure 

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Cohort petition of the former Rocky Flats 


workers. The men and women who served at the 


Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant throughout 


the Cold War are national heroes. Many in the 


Rocky Flats workforce knowingly and unknowingly 


risked their lives to help protect our country. 


They deserve to be honored and cared for by the 


nation they served. 


The intent of Congress in passing the Energy 


Employee Occupational Illness Compensation 


Program Act was to ensure that the men and 


women who put themselves in harm's way by 


working at Rocky Flats and other nuclear 


production facilities had a clear and just 


process for applying for appropriate financial 


and medical benefits and compensation under the 


law and authorized by Congress. By law, Cold 


War veterans who became ill from exposure to 


radiation, beryllium and silica while working 


at DOE facilities were to be provided timely, 


uniform and adequate compensation. 


As you know, the administration of the EEOICPA 


program has not been without controversy. 


Tragically, administrative waste and 


programmatic difficulties have delayed the 

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payment of program benefits author-- authorized 


by Congress. Numerous reports have accused the 


Department of Energy and the Department of 


Labor of mismanaging the Energy Employee 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program, and 


delaying and wrongfully denying benefits due to 


Rocky Flats and other nuclear workers. Agency 


documents suggest that the Department of Labor 


delayed and denied such benefits as a result of 


conscious administrative policies. 


In a few instances, NIOSH, too, has contributed 


to some delays and denials by insisting that it 


can reconstruct workers' radiation doses in the 


absence of adequate data, spurring public 


skepticism. While NIOSH has worked with the 


Board's contractor to develop alternative 


methodologies, the resulting changes in 


methodology have led to long delays in the 


demon-- in the determination of claims. In 


these instances, NIOSH's defense of its 


methodologies in the face of legitimate and 


documented criticism has frustrated the 


Congressional intent to provide timely benefits 


and has raised questions regarding the fairness 


of the EEOICPA program. 

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 The Advisory Board, too, has been dragged into 


this sorry history, through no fault of your 


own, with the disclosure of communications 


between the Office of Management and Budget and 


the Department of Labor. These communications 


suggest a deliberate effort to -- by some to 


reduce compensation to nuclear energy workers 


by stacking the Board with opponents of 


compensation who would vote against Special 


Exposure Cohort petitions. 


The history of Rocky Flats offers its own 


examples of misconduct and mismanagement, from 


inadequate monitoring of workers, efforts to 


disguise the absence of data or the intentional 


destruction of monitoring data, disastrous 


fires, and even a raid by the Federal Bureau of 


Investigation to seize and protect records. 


Many Rocky Flats workers who helped clean up 


the extremely toxic contamination from fires at 


the plant have been denied benefits for 


illnesses, even as a federal judge has 


determined that neighboring landowners are 


entitled to compensation for financial losses 


due to contamination of their properties from 


these very same fires. 

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As a result of this long history, many Rocky 


Flats workers and their families wonder if 


their government has abandoned them. These 


workers, the people of Colorado and their 


elected officials are justifiably upset by the 


conduct of the responsible agencies. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And we'll hear from David Hiller 


from Senator -- oh, from Senator Salazar's 


staff. Thank you. 


 MR. HILLER: Let me conclude the -- the 


delegation letter that Jeanette began. 


(Reading) We remind you of this unfortunate 


history because you do not write on a blank 


slate. Instead, the Board's actions over the 


coming days will be viewed by the people of 


Colorado and the nation with these sad facts in 


mind. 


On February 15, 2005, the United Steel Workers 


of America, Local 8031, filed a petition to 


have its members who worked at Rocky Flats 


included in the Special Cohort -- Special 


Exposure Cohort under the Energy Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act. 


Much has changed since the petition was filed. 


The cleanup at Rocky Flats has been completed, 

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all of the workers have been laid off, and the 


Steel Workers Local 8031 no longer counts a 


single former Rocky Flats worker among its 


current membership. As a result, Local 8031 is 


a representative of the petitioners in name 


only. The Steel Workers provide no financial, 


technical or legal support to the petitioners. 


It is also worth noting that NIOSH elected to 


expand the class of workers subject to the 


petition far beyond the class of workers who 


were formerly represented by the Steel Workers. 


By NIOSH's action, the class of workers subject 


to this petition now includes all employees of 


DOE, DOE contractors or subcontractors who have 


worked at the Rocky Flats plant from April, 


1942 through February, 2005. 


Approval of the pending petition and membership 


in the cohort would not guarantee benefits to 


this broad class of workers, but it would make 


it easier to obtain benefits for workers with 


the kinds of cancer known to be caused by 


radiation. NIOSH has opposed this petition, as 


it has opposed other petitions, claiming to 


have adequate data and methodologies to 


calculate the exposures of Rocky Flats workers. 

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However, the Advisory Board's contractor, 


Sanford Cohen & Associates, has documented 


areas of inadequate data and unreliable 


methodologies. 


 Two years after the filing of this petition and 


more than six years after of the Act, NIOSH's 


methods and dose reconstructions of Rocky Flats 


workers remains subject to substantial doubt. 


The Advisory Board is now tasked with making a 


recommendation as to whether or not it is 


feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy 


the radiation dose that members of the Rocky 


Flats SEC petitioning class received. NIOSH, 


Sanford Cohen & Associates and the Advisory 


Board's Rocky Flats workgroup have debated this 


issue for nearly 18 months. Congress did not 


intend to create an endless program that would 


re-evaluate constantly-evolving sets of data 


with ever-changing methodologies. To the 


contrary, the Act expressly states that the 


purpose of the compensation program is to 


provide for timely, uniform and adequate 


compensation. 


We are long past the point of timeliness in 


compensating the Rocky Flats workers. Many of 

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these Cold War veterans have already died, and 


many of their surviving families continue to 


struggle economically due to lost income and 


unpaid medical bills. Many more are ill and 


continue to suffer, medically and economically. 


Granting Special Exposure Cohort status to 


these workers will not resolve all of the 


injustices that have been inflicted upon them, 


but it will allow some of these workers and 


their survivors to receive benefits while it 


can still provide meaningful relief. Many seek 


only the comfort of knowing that their 


survivors will be taken care of. 


We therefore urge the Advisory Board to act 


promptly on the Rocky Flats SEC petition 


request, while keeping in mind that there are 


documented concerns regarding NIOSH's ability 


to accurately reconstruct doses for all class 


participants, and that it is far too late to 


further postpone a decision with the hope that 


accurate doses can yet be calculated. Thank 


you in advance for your full, fair and prompt 


consideration of this petition. 


Signed by all nine members of the Colorado 


delegation: Senator Salazar, Senator Allard, 

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Representative Diane DeGette, Representative 


Doug Lamborn, Representative Marilyn Musgrave, 


Representative Ed Perlmutter, Representative 


John Salazar, Representative Tom Tancredo, 


Representative Mark Udall. 


And I would now like to introduce Carolyn 


Boller, representative of Congressman Udall. 


 MS. BOLLER: I just want to thank you all for 


the work that you've put into this. I think 


I've rewritten my comments at least 45 times in 


the last 24 hours. 


I just want to say that I've had the honor of 


working with the Rocky Flats workforce for 15 


out of the last 20 years. I worked for 


Congressman David Scaggs prior to Congressman 


Udall, and over that period of time I've heard 


those stories. I've heard them from the 


Department of Energy. I've heard them from the 


plant site managers who bo-- and the workforce, 


who all tell me we don't have records. 


As of January I had a conversation with the 


Kaiser-Hill representative who said I don't 


understand why this petition can't be granted. 


We don't have records that support the ability 


to do accurate dose reconstruction. 

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So what I'd say to you is grant this full 


petition. Let's move on, let's get these folks 


the help that they need, the security that they 


need, and the recognition. And I appreciate 


your consideration. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And also we have Jason 


Thielman representing Representative Musgrave's 


office. 


MR. THIELMAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the 


Advisory Board, thank you for giving us an 


opportunity to address you today. Behalf of 


Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave and the scores 


of residents from the Colorado Fourth 


Congressional District, I request that you make 


a recommendation for the special SEC status. 


In my preparation for visiting with you this 


morning I visited with the Congresswoman, and 


she reminded me that for years the workers of 


Rocky Flats have put their health on the line 


for the security of our nation, and that they 


should not be given the runaround by the 


federal government when Congress has made it 


clear that they should be given indemnity for 


prolonged exposure to radiation. Yesterday in 


listening to the testimony from the many 

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impacted workers, I was particularly struck by 


a comment from Laura Schultz describing the 


service of the workers of Rocky Flats as 


invisible Cold Warriors. She and many others 


also additionally mentioned that they felt they 


could no longer believe anything their 


government says. 


Many of us here work for the government and 


believe in public service. And probably what 


is most disturbing to me is something that we 


believe in passionately and work for has been 


so undermined in the face and the hearts of 


people who have committed so much to their 


country. These folks are invisible and have 


been treated as they are invisible. And we 


cannot correct the wrongs that have been done 


to them, but we do have an opportunity to set 


it right. And I urge this committee to do so. 


You probably have it within your ability to 


address the form of the law and allow you to 


not grant the status. However, the substance 


of the law, I believe, demands that we treat 


these pe-- these people and their family with 


the respect that they deserve for the 


commitment and dedication they have given this 

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country. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And then we're pleased to hear 


from Bill Holer, who represents Representative 


Perlmutter's office. 


MR. HOLER: Thank you, Dr. Zimmer (sic), 


members of the working group, it's an honor to 


be here today and I've had the opportunity, 


though have not been involved with the working 


group as long as some of the -- my other 


colleagues here, but I participated in several 


of the meetings and am very, very impressed 


with the quality and the professionalism that ­

- that's entailed in this group. 


 Congressman Perlmutter has signed the Colorado 


Congressional delegation letter and is in full 


support of its recommendations to approve fully 


and completely the Special Exposure Cohort 


petition to grant relief to the Rocky Flats 


workers. Congressman Perlmutter, since taking 


office, has worked closely with several Rocky 


Flats workers who are seeking relief under the 


provisions of the EEOICP Act, and working with 


those individuals to hear their personal 


stories, their problems and their frustration 


over lack of timely and -- and decisions in the 

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matter have -- have certainly made Congressman 


Perlmutter and myself aware that these delays 


have gone on too long. 


As has been demonstrated by the independent 


evaluation by Stanford (sic) Cohen & 


Associates, many of the NIOSH evaluation 


procedures, methodologies, the missing data, 


and in some cases by, quote, an order of 


magnitude in inaccurate measurements of 


estimated exposure data when tested against 


known data. In other words, in spite of all 


the work, when tested, the evaluations and 


exposure levels can vary in -- in significant 


numbers, and I think that points to the fact 


that -- that we don't have an accurate picture. 


And it's time to stop -- to stop doing the 


evaluations and it's time to really move 


forward and -- and -- and take care of this 


class of worker that deserves it so much. 


 Accordingly, Congressman Perlmutter urges that 


this working group grant the SE (sic) petition 


today. Thank you very much. 


 MR. HILLER: Dr. Ziemer, let me also introduce 


my colleague on Senator Salazar's staff, Erin 


Minks, who many of you know because she has 

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been doing a great deal of direct constituent 


work with members of the Rocky Flats community. 


Erin Minks. 


MS. MINKS: Thank you, David, and my colleagues 


here and members of the Board, I didn't know if 


I wanted to speak this morning because 


generally when your -- your boss speaks, you 


don't always need to follow. It's kind of a 


tough act to follow. But this does have a 


personal meaning for me so I guess this morning 


I speak on behalf of other Congressional aides 


who are tasked with working with their 


constituents during these process, and I wanted 


to, first and foremost, thank the Board and the 


working group members for -- for allowing and ­

- and working with us as we try to participate 


and understand this process to interpret to the 


folks here in the audience. 


 We understand, regardless of how adversarial 


this can become, that ultimate this is a huge 


sacrifice of your personal time, and we really 


respect the work that you do and really 


appreciate that. But generally, as -- as 


having worked with a lot of the folks in the 


audience on individual cases, I will say, as a 

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caseworker, that there are many different 


layers to the story of the site. There are 


many different chapters. There are different 


patterns of monitoring. And this program 


itself fundamentally, based on the scientific 


evaluations, needs to have that affirmation to 


go forward to substantiate what we're talking 


about today. 


 However, I speak for not just me but other 


folks here in the audience and other 


Congressional aides, that when it comes to 


explaining how zeroes after the '69 fire are 


not reconciled, and yet folks who have cancer 


from those years still don't go over 50 percent 


in their POC. That's -- as a policy-maker and 


as an aide and as someone trying to interpret 


and represent their interests, that is a 


challenge which I imagine we may continue to 


have to work with. 


And so once again, we appreciate your work and 


we ask that you continue to work with us as we 


interpret your decisions. But it's -- it's 


been an interesting road and we just generally 


-- there is no easy answer to this process and 


we understand that, so thank you again for 

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letting me speak today. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We thank all the representatives 


of the Congressional delegation who are here, 


and I suppose just on a personal note, you 


know, sometimes it's pleasing to see that there 


are things that we can get bipartisan support 


on now and then. 


Now, we're going to hear from our workgroup 


chairman. While he's getting ready there, let 


me point out and maybe share with you a moment 


one of the sort of struggles this Advisory 


Board has, because what you see here at Rocky 


Flats is multiplied over the country -- at 


Hanford, at Savannah River, at Oak Ridge Y-12 ­

- the same kind of issues. And we are 


struggling, this group of 12 people, to address 


these same kinds of issues all over the 


country, as -- as is NIOSH and as is our Board 


contractor. And -- and indeed, a lot of time 


and energy has been put in, particularly by 


this workgroup, the Rocky Flats workgroup, in 


trying to be diligent in saying what is there, 


what -- what do we have in the way of 


information, because we are obligated by law to 


look at that. We -- we are also obligated to 

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consider the issue of timeliness, and we 


struggle with that, too, realizing that the 


timeliness issue is countrywide and we're 


trying to deal with multiple sites almost 


simultaneously and try to handle that issue of 


timeliness. 


But be that as it may, one of our sort of 


required responsibilities is in fact to look at 


the NIOSH evaluation report. We have help from 


our contractor to do that so that we get 


basically an independent look at it. Recognize 


that we have a mix of individuals on this 


Board. We're not all technical people -- some 


are, some are not. But we -- we rely on 


outside help, too, to get an independent look. 


Now whenever you do that, obviously not 


everybody will see things the same way, and 


then we face the issue of sorting out NIOSH's 


view, our contractor's view, our individual 


views, the viewpoints of the constituents, so 


all of these -- all of these aspects are here 


before us. 


So we want to hear from our workgroup that has 


looked very hard at the NIOSH evaluation 


report. They've worked with our contractor 

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very closely in trying to evaluate what data we 


have here at this site, its validity, its -- 


its extent in terms of missing or adequacy, 


missing data or adequacy of data, its 


reliability -- all those issues, we're 


obligated to do that under law. We -- we 


recognize that this has taken time, and that 


timeliness issue comes upon us as a -- in some 


cases, an overriding issue because we recognize 


that this kind of process, particularly for 


scientists, they just love to study things, you 


know, and keep studying things. But we realize 


at some point you have to make a decision, and 


-- and that point is upon us. 


Now we -- we have a working group that's really 


been a hardworking group. Mark Griffon's been 


chairing it. Mark, introduce the members of 


the workgroup for the folks here, and then give 


us your report and then we'll have a discussion 


period. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Yeah, the workgroup is 


myself and Wanda Munn, Bob Presley and Mike 


Gibson. And I -- I have a few slides which 


you're -- are going to help me advance here. 


-- I have so many notes I could-- I didn't want 


I 
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to stand at the podium, but I think everyone 


should be able to hear me from here. 


It -- the -- you can go to the first slide, I 


guess. 


I think one of the -- one key point here is -- 


is, you know, just to reinforce, for those of 


you who weren't involved in all of our 


workgroup meetings, we -- we did have -- I 


think we say 12 -- down there 12 workgroup 


meetings, 19 conference calls, some of those 


technical calls were in between workgroup 


meetings. We did keep minutes for all those 


conference calls, so you know, to -- to say we 


-- I -- I -- I think I agree with NIOSH on this 


that, to the extent we could, we certainly 


looked at -- at everything and we -- you know, 


we -- we dug into these issues as -- as 


completely as we could, for sure. I think 


everybody's effort was commen-- you know, to be 


commended in that regard. SC&A certainly put 


an extensive amount of work to support the 


Board in this effort, and -- and all the work ­

- all the information provided by the 


petitioners and their -- their attendance on 


the conference calls, as well as Congressional 

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staffers attended several of our workgroup 


meetings via conference call, so it was a -- a 


lengthy process and a lot of issues were -- 


were certainly considered. 


For those of you who were not involved so 


closely in the workgroup, through the course of 


the workgroup we had a -- a -- a matrix that we 


developed, and I probably have nine iterations 


of this matrix. I believe the final one is in 


the back -- is that -- is that correct? The 


final one, dated April 30th, should be 


available in the back with the materials. It's 


not? I'm seeing -- do we have that available, 


Lew? 


 DR. WADE: I believe it is. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll check on that, but we'll 


make additional copies if they're not there. 


This matrix details -- and I think we have a 


total now of 38 comments, 38 items on the 


matrix, and some of them have sub-items 


actually on them, but this is our detailed way 


of sort of tracking what we were reviewing and 


if it was resolved or not resolved. And as we 


went along, sev-- a lot of -- many of these 


items in the matrix are -- are sort of -- they 

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fall into one broader category, so when I 


present today, I'm going to touch the mean 


broad categories, not necessarily every matrix 


item. But I think this is certainly very 


useful to look at for the -- a little more in-


depth read on what we -- what we went through. 


So I think we'll go to the first slide and some 


of these -- for those of you who have followed 


our workgroup, you'll recognize these issues 


from Brant's introduction, as well as 


Jennifer's presentation. But these are the 


main -- I think there's nine items on this list 


that we covered and I'll -- I'll go -- I'll 


just go through these one by one. They're not 


necessarily in any order, but starting with the 


-- go to the next slide. 


The question of -- of super S and, you know, we 


-- we examined this in the workgroup for -- for 


an extended period of time. It is correct that 


a model was developed during the process of 


this review, finalized during the process of 


this review, and we -- or -- or some of us were 


certainly -- wanted to see further proof that 


actually this was a bounding model, so we asked 


-- and this is -- this was part of our balance 

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of -- of how to do our job in the workgroup. 


You know, we wanted this demonstration that the 


model worked and bounded all workers in the 


class. That -- that's sort of our criteria. 


To do that, we asked for more information, for 


more proof from NIOSH, and that took a little 


lon-- a little more time. 


The proof -- some of the things we asked for 


was the model relied on six cases to develop 


sort of an ov-- overarching approach that would 


be bounding for all workers with regard to 


super S exposures. We knew that there were 


several other workers that could have been 


defined as -- as having a -- a super S exposure 


that could have been considered in developing 


this model, and we asked for all that case data 


so that we could compare to see if -- if, in 


looking at those other cases -- I think there 


were about 25 of those -- if those other cases 


were in fact bounded by the -- the approach 


offered by NIOSH, put forward by NIOSH. And in 


fact at -- at the end of this, and it did take 


an extensive period of time, SC&A did agree 


that the model provided -- this -- this TIB-49, 


which is this new super S model, did bound the 

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doses for all worker-- and was claimant 


favorable for all workers, with regard to this 


super S situation. 


I think we can go to the next one. 


External and internal data completeness. We --


this was -- this was mentioned a little earlier 


this morning, and -- and this sort of came at 


the -- in the -- in the middle to the end of 


our -- our cycle of workgroups. We -- we had 


some questions originally about some of the 


database data and -- and some of the databases 


that are used in this program, had some 


questions about the data that populated the 


data. I think someone earlier said garbage in, 


garbage out. We certainly were -- were -- you 


know, had concerns with that regard. We wanted 


to check the integrity of that data. 


As -- as we evolved in this, we realized that 


at Rocky Flats there's less extensive use of 


coworker models and more extensive use of 


individual radiation files. So then we said 


well, you know, it -- it certainly seems, based 


on some presentations, that most workers had 


some radiation fi-- some radiation records, 


internal and external, but were they complete 

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records. So we wanted to see -- you know, when 


-- when you say a worker has radiation records, 


does that mean one record out of 20 years or 


does that mean, you know, pretty complete for 


all their years of employment. So we did this 


analysis. 


It was 52 case-- cases selected. We did try to 


stratify that a little bit so that we had some 


statistical validity to the analysis. We did 


look at -- at production workers, which would 


have been the -- the likely higher exposures, 


and we did another set -- subset that was a 


randomly-selected set. I won't get too far 


into the details of this, but a -- again, the ­

- and -- and we looked at -- at -- I think we 


also looked at annual gaps. We didn't 


necessarily look at every badge cycle, so you 


know, it wasn't a perfect analysis, but we 


wanted to get a sense of whether these 


individual radiation files were complete. 


And a -- a couple sub-items came out of this 


review. We -- we did note some -- or SC&A's 


report noted some gaps in the early period, 


especially in the early years, for -- related 


to some of the workers. And we also had this 

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sort of separate issue that we were tracking 


independently, but it certainly fell into this 


same range of data completeness, and that was 


with regard to the '69-'70 -- we did find, and 


NIOSH agreed with this, that there were cases 


where there were zeroes in the database, and 


the individual actually had not been -- or 


their dosimeter had not been measured. And --


and we actually tracked back memos that explain 


why this -- when this policy was sort of put 


into place and there was some rationale for it 


based on the -- the risk of exposure. 


Nonetheless, here we are -- are. We had people 


that were not measured and they had zeroes 


ente-- entered into the database. So that was 


troubling. 


NIOSH did agree, through this workgroup 


process, that for '69 and '70 all those zeroes 


would be removed out of the database. And this 


-- this really only affects the -- these 


coworker models that we do. All these coworker 


models are year by year. So if we remove all 


those zeroes, at least we're -- we're biasing 


the average results higher, so any time we have 


to use that coworker model we're going to be a 

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little more claimant favorable anyway. So that 


was the idea, is we can't trust these zeroes. 


NIOSH agreed, let's just get rid of them. 


We did ask -- and I think Jennifer sort of 


alluded to this, we did look at the question -- 


and I know I specifically asked this question ­

- how do we know when this policy stopped or 


when it started. You know, we had this memo we 


were kind of hanging our hat on, or NIOSH was 


hanging their hat on, but we -- we were 


questioning on the workgroup, you know, when 


did this stop or start. We had SC&A look into 


this through this data completeness analysis, 


and we couldn't find any other year where we -- 


we found this practice. So we looked at -- we 


had hard copy records comparing against 


database. We didn't -- we just did not find 


this to be pervasive in any other year, so that 


correction was acceptable at the workgroup 


level. 


 Two other sub-groups came out of that. 


Building 81 -- some of the gaps we found in the 


early records from -- I -- I -- I'm -- I think 


it was the fi-- mainly in the '50s, I don't 


think it extended into the '60s, involved some 

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individuals that worked in Building 81 or -- or 


some -- some of the uranium buildings, and they 


did not have any monitoring rec-- any external 


monitoring records. And at this point we -- 


we've had a presentation for -- sa-- and NIOSH 


-- NIOSH agrees to this point. They -- they do 


say, however, that the -- they've looked at 


their coworker model that they have and -- and 


given what they know about the processes, 


they've made a strong argument to the workgroup 


that the -- the -- they would apply the 95th 


percentile for all those years. Probably from 


'52 up to '60 they'd apply the 95th percentile. 


In other words, some of the highest doses -- 


external doses found on site would be applied 


to those individuals, and they made a -- a 


compelling case to the workgroup that that 


would be a bounding approach for that -- for 


those uranium workers in -- in -- I think it's 


just Building 81. I might -- there might be 


related buildings there. 


Now that -- I -- I should also point out that ­

- that we -- we -- we had compelling evidence. 


We didn't necessarily see a -- a -- I don't 


think that, at that stage of the game, we had a 

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-- a sort of demonstration case on the table 


for that. 


Okay, I think -- oh, one more thing on data 


completeness. Another issue related to sort of 


the Building 81 issue was -- Building 44 came 


up in the discussions and we had a similar 


question as to whether they had data that could 


bound penetrating and non-penetrating doses for 


Building 44. And actually through the 


workgroup process, they identi-- they -- they 


brought out raw film badge records that 


supported their -- their case that they could 


in fact bound those individuals. They -- they 


-- that -- that particular building had some 


fairly significant skin doses in -- especially 


in those early years, but they did -- through 


this process we -- they made available the -- 


the hard-copy records of film badge data for 


those workers and, you know, it -- it was 


compelling to the workgroup that they could 


bound all doses for those workers in that 


building. 


Okay. The neutron data for 1952 through 1970, 


this is the NDRP -- Neutron Data -- Neutron 


Dose Reconstruction Project doses. I -- I know 

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it's come up earlier. You -- you can note by 


the timing of that bottom report, SC&A 


submitted a supplemental -- April 30th, so I -- 


I don't even know if this is posted on the web 


site at this point, but it certainly -- this 


has been the last sort of sprint to Denver for 


us. We've had, you know, two workgroups and 


probably four technical phone calls in the last 


couple of weeks working through this issue, and 


-- and it -- it -- we had this on our -- on our 


matrix early on. It's just that as we -- some 


of the issues didn't sort of come to the 


surface until later in -- in the -- in the 


process, and we do have some issues and 


specifically the lack of records in the early 


period requires some back-extrapolation for one 


time period. And then throughout that whole 


time period there's a reliance on -- in the 


NDRP what they call notional dose, which is 


basically an -- an estimated dose. It's not a 


-- an individual's film badge measurement. 


It's -- it's a -- it's a -- an estimate based 


on a neutron-to-photon ratio, so a lot of these 


people had badges with gamma measurements, but 


they didn't have a neutron badge. So this NDRP 

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project tried -- attempted to calculate 


neutron-to-photon ratios that could be applied, 


and they calculated these notional doses and 


these were added into the individuals' dose 


records. But certainly they're not -- they're 


not original film measurements. They're --


they're -- they're estimates. And -- and I -- 


we -- we'll go more into the neutron thing at 


the end of -- get through the rest of these and 


then we have -- I have a little more to say on 


the neutron question, so... 


 The data reliability question, one -- one slide 


does not do this service for what we went 


through for looking at data reliability, or for 


what the petitioners provided in terms of 


affidavits and testimony, even as of last night 


and -- and this morning. Your petition that 


was put before us provides a -- a wealth of -- 


of information that we -- we did, in the 


workgroup level, attempt -- and I think we 


captured all of them -- attempted to go through 


the petition and include those all in our 


matrix and cover all those issues. Many of 


those fall into the broad category of data 


reliability, and that -- so when you see the 

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matrix, there's items -- I think 12 through 27 


or so -- a lot of those are the specific issues 


brought out in the petition regarding data 


reliability. And -- and we -- in -- in looking 


at this, we looked at several different 


components, but we -- we -- we did want to look 


at -- we had database data, and you know, my -- 


my inkling with -- as -- as a member of this 


Board for the entire time, as most of my 


colleagues know by now, is -- you know, I tend 


to -- if you have an electronic database, 


that's fine, but show me the raw data and I 


want to validate that electronic data to make 


sure that everything's -- everything's kosher 


within that database, and that was part of the 


effort. 


 And then additionally we looked at the raw 


records -- and these would be logbooks, 


urinalysis logs, a number of different things 


that we looked at -- and we compared them to 


individuals' radiation files to see -- you 


know, okay, did this information get into the 


individuals' files correctly. We also looked 


at -- at safety logs, as another just check. 


So we looked at a number of different kind of 

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logbooks to check this data reliability 


analysis. 


 Generally speaking, what -- I -- I guess what 


we -- we -- the bottom line on this is that we 


didn't really see any systemic problems with 


data reliability. But we did see some 


discrepancies, and that doesn't -- that doesn't 


mean that, you know, some of the allegations 


that are made are not correct. We -- we --


SC&A's report does note some discrepancies when 


-- when looking at some of the issues raised by 


the petitioner. But in general, in looking it 


as a -- an overall question of do we see this 


as a broad issue for the entire class and does 


it impact, you know, the ability to be able to 


reconstruct doses for all members of the class, 


we didn't see a systemic problem, so... 


I think I'm ready for the next one. 


The -- other radionuclides, we -- we also spent 


a -- a -- quite a bit of time on this. At --


at the end we got down to -- some of the 


significant ones we discussed were americium 


operations. We also discussed neptunium, 


several other nuclides, and -- and we basically 


found that -- that they -- they did have 

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sufficient either individual records or -- or 


other information that they could bound doses 


for those nuclides. 


We did come down to -- to thorium as a problem 


or -- or a little more of a problem. We had to 


-- we took a little longer in assessing this 


problem. The -- basically the -- the final 


result on the thorium was that -- NIOSH 


provided an approach using a certain method, a 


NUREG-1400 method, and SC&A concluded that that 


basically was not an appropriate approach and 


it was not bounding. However, what -- what 


NIOSH has given us in addition to that was they 


have other -- other process-specific 


information that gives us a -- a -- strong 


evidence to the workgroup that in fact that 


they can bound the doses on -- on these cases, 


so -- now this -- this also is one of those 


that we haven't seen a demonstration of this 


other data being used, so we haven't seen this 


proof of principle necessarily. But there's a 


strong impression at the workgroup level that 


they do have process-specific data that would 


be applicable to this situation and could bound 


doses for these -- these thorium workers. 

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Internal dose -- and this is one of the -- the 


coworker models. I -- I think the -- one -- 


one important thing to preface th-- with this 


slide is that it -- it appears, at least on 


NIOSH's review of the current claimants -- now 


that doesn't necessarily mean that population 


might not -- we -- we certainly understand that 


population could change, and will change. But 


based on the current claim files they have, 


there's a very limited number of individuals 


that will be required to use the coworker model 


for internal dose assessment. And our data 


completeness review sort of supported that -- 


or it did support that. You know, individuals, 


for the most part, had urinalysis records. 


They might not have had them for every cycle 


for every year, but -- but there were 


urinalysis records there that we felt were 


sufficient to be able to reconstruct internal 


doses. 


Now if you get to the coworker question, where 


-- where we -- and I think Brant alluded to 


this earlier in his presentation for NIOSH, the 


coworker model is based on HIS-20, this 


database data -- actually a -- a pedigree of 

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that original HIS-20 database. We -- in -- in 


our analysis we did find some discrepancies 


between the raw data and this electronic 


database, and -- and we did note that there 


were -- there were some discrepancies. NIOSH 


concedes that there's some discrepancies in 


there. We did, however, find that -- that all 


upper-bound values that we could check seemed 


to be in the database, and therefore NIOSH is 


saying we -- we acknowledge limitations in the 


database, in the data itself, and therefore we 


will rely only on a 95th percentile, or the 


upper bound of this data, to use for coworker 


dose assessment. And you know, I think that is 


a reasonable approach, especially considering 


the fact that most -- most individuals have 


their own individual bioassay records, or -- or 


some rec-- you know, enough records to do dose 


reconstruction. 


Oh, okay, this goes back -- this goes back a 


few workgroups for -- the -- the lung count -- 


the question of the adequacy of the lung 


counting data came up, and I believe -- I want 


to make sure I get this right, but I believe 


early on NIOSH basically conceded that there 

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were problems with the lung counting data in 


the database, and that -- but however, they 


point out that they're not going to use any of 


that data for dose reconstruction for the 


cases. They're going to rely on urinalysis 


data. The only way they might use the lung 


counting data is to -- to -- along with the 


urinalysis data, to check dose determinations 


that way, but they will not just solely rely on 


lung counting data. So they acknowledge that 


there's some problems with that data, but their 


method doesn't rely on that data. So this goes 


back to the TIB-38, which is the model that 


uses the urinalysis data along with that -- 


TIB-49 references that super S model that we 


talked about earlier on, so we -- we felt this 


was reasonable. 


 And the decontamination/decommissioning period, 


specific questions on this period came up. We 


actually -- and this is another situation where 


a TIB was actually developed during the time 


the workgroup was meeting, so -- but this was 


sort of a TIB -- a Technical Information Bulle­

- the bulletin that extended the coworker model 


out to the D&D period and -- similar to TIB-38 

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and a similar approach would be used regarding 


the 95th percentile. And I think given those 


two factors, we -- we still believe it -- it is 


a bounding approach, al-- although I -- I 


agree, it was developed, you know, kind of 


during our workgroup process, so... 


 Are there any more? Okay. 


Okay, and -- and this is the external and 


internal -- or I mean ext-- external gamma and 


external beta, and -- and the conclusion on 


this really was that the external gamma models 


and external beta models -- coworker models 


seem adequate for reconstructing doses. Some 


of these models also have a neutron com-- these 


models also talk about neutrons. We've 


separated that issue out 'cause we -- we do 


have some remaining concerns on the neutron 


monitoring, so the coworker models seem applic­

- or seem sufficient with regard to gamma and 


beta exposures. We have the separate remaining 


questions regarding the neutron NDRP data, and 


that would also revert to this coworker model 


because it is populated with NDRP data. 


And that's it -- and then I -- I think the -- 


the -- the final -- I think some of the 

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conclusions that we have here is -- are 


primarily focused on the neutron NDRP -- the 


adequacy of the neutron NDRP data and we -- 


we've kind of -- this is -- this is a complica­

- this is a complicated issue to discuss. We ­

- we've spent, like I said, these last several 


weeks digging hard into this issue. And at 


this point I think it's best to sort of present 


it the way the workgroup sees it over different 


time periods, 'cause I think there were 


definitely different factors to consider in 


different time periods. 


1952 through '58, and I'm sorry I don't have 


these on slides, these are -- well, you saw the 


report came out on the 30th, so I don't have 


these on slides yet. But 1952 through '58, one 


thing -- it appears to the workgroup in 


reviewing this that many of the highest exposed 


people to neutrons for that time period were 


not measured for neutron exposure. They --


they were assigned notional dose, as we talked 


about before, but they weren't measured. A 


couple of different -- and these are just 


factors that we considered in this time period. 


 The proposed method for '52 through '58, or the 

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NDRP method, is to -- basically they rely on a 


-- a ratio developed for 1959, and they apply 


it backwards into the earlier years. And we 


have some concerns about that, for a few 


reasons. One is we -- we think there could be 


a large -- they -- they use building-specific 


ratios, and we've seen that there could be a 


large variation of -- of neutron/photon ratios 


at the worker level or -- or, you know, sub-


building level, sort of, so you've got a wide 


variation and you're using one central estimate 


of a neutron/photon ratio to do your estimates, 


and we think that's problematic. 


Another very important piece for this -- this 


sort of back-extrapolation period is that there 


were some significant process changes during 


that time period and -- you know, this included 


mo-- they -- they -- they moved certain 


operations, including -- assembly went from 


Building 91 to Building 76, I believe, and 


there was some other significant changes. I 


don't want to detail them here in this 


presentation, but we have them and if -- if 


this comes down to a motion, they'll be 


detailed in that way. But there were several 

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process changes and we couldn't be sure that 


all these process changes were going to either 


have no effect on the neutron/photon ratio in 


19-- you know, when comparing to 1959 or if 


they would bias it one way or another, we just 


weren't sure. There were many changes that 


made it uncertain and we couldn't determine 


whether -- which direction it could go. 


And finally, the NDRP report itself 


acknowledges that they -- they had no 


independent validation of the NP ratio during 


tho-- those years of interest. In other words, 


they had no measurement data from '52 through 


'58, field surveys or things like that, that 


would support that those building NP ratios 


from '59 were in fact in the right ball park, 


so that was one time period where they had the 


least amount of data. I want to stress that. 


The next time period -- we've got four little 


time periods here -- '59 through '64. It 


appears still that many of the highest exposed 


workers were not measured for -- for neutron 


exposures. A lot of them had -- a lot of the 


individuals seemed to have notional doses 


assigned, so that problem remains. 

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Again, the proposed -- we have the same 


question of the NP ratio, the proposed NP 


ratio, relies on this central estimate by 


building. And if we look at -- at that, at the 


worker level there seems to be a wider variance 


of those NP ratios, so we're not certain that ­

- we can't be certain that that's approp-- 


appropriate for bounding the doses. And I -- I 


think those are the -- the main two issues 


there. 


The -- the strength during that time period is 


that they have a lot more measurement data, and 


they -- I -- I believe they do have some 


independent measurements during that time 


period to sort of support the -- the NP ratios 


of that time. 


Going on to '65 through '68, at this point -- 


'65 we do see a transition in the data where -- 


and -- and this is supported by some of the 


expert -- that we heard from -- that -- that 


worked on -- on the project, but nonetheless, 


the data sort of -- of supports it, which is 


that most of the highest exposed now from '65 


onward seem to be -- seem to have been 


measured. There -- there are film badge 

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measurements there for them. In other words, 


you don't see this trend of the highest exposed 


being all notional or estimated dose. It --


it's more of the individual film badge-measured 


data. 


'65 through '68 still has that remaining 


question of a building-wide neutron/photon 


ratio, central estimate, being assigned to 


individual workers. And you know, how do you 


know if that average is appropriate for every 


worker, so we still have that remaining 


question. 


And finally, the last sort of sub-group is '69 


and '70. This period of time has a high number 


of original films which were not recovered or ­

- or -- I -- I guess just not recovered. In 


the process of doing this NDRP project, they 


recovered all these films and reread a lot of 


them for -- for inclusion to do this better 


estimate of dose. And for '69 and '70, a lot 


of the original films could not or were not 


recovered for this project. So you have a lot 


more sort of missing data and a lot more 


notional dose in that time period. And then --


and then I gue-- so that's one distinction for 

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that last -- those last two years. Again, 


still the remaining issue of the -- one central 


estimate for the neutron/photon ratio versus a 


-- a -- you know, a building-wide central 


estimate used. 


So that's the four periods. In this -- I did 


want to say, from '59 on through '70, so -- so 


we have four time peri-- I know this gets a 


little confusing, but looking from '59 forward, 


the -- the one issue that -- that was 


consistent through all those, that kept coming 


up, was this use of the neutron/photo ratio -- 


a building-specific central estimate of the 


neutron/photon ratio to estimate these -- these 


neutron doses. And NIOSH has indicated, and -- 


and I -- I'd actually like NIOSH, if Jim Neton 


or Brant Ulsh is available -- has indicated 


that they have -- within the NDRP data itself, 


that they have data that they could possibly 


use something other than a central estimate for 


the neutron/photon ratio but rather more like a 


95th percentile approach, but I'll let Jim 


speak to that. 


DR. NETON: Thank you, Mark. Jim Neton, 


Associate Director for Science in OCAS. It's 

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correct, we -- we have a large amount of 


information between '59 and through '70. 
I 


believe there's a total of 87,000 neutron 


measurements that were reread for the NDRP, and 


most of those are in this period. Admittedly, 


in '59 there are fewer, and they become more 


prominent as you go forward, but we believe 


there's sufficient data there to estimate the 


95th percentile of the distribution by year. 


Currently the model -- the -- the variance of 


the model has already been calculated and used 


in our dose reconstructions at the 95th 


percentile. For example, overestimating dose 


reconstructions do use the 95th percentile of 


the building-specific ratios. And for best 


estimates, we apply -- Mark correctly 


identified -- a central estimate and an 


associated uncertainty distribution about it. 


But we believe there are sufficient data 


available to allow us to calculate the 95th 


percentile, either through the variance of the 


model or just the straight 95th percentile of 


the distribution of the NP ratios observed, to 


bound the neutron doses for workers in -- in 


the '59-forward time period. 

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I don't know if there's any questions on that, 


but --


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you. And -- and you know, 


I guess -- I -- I think that's -- that's kind 


of where -- I guess that completes my report 


out. I would ask other workgroup members if 


they had anything to add or -- or comment on at 


this point. 


 DR. ZIEMER: This -- this is for workgroup 


members. Workgroup members? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, Board members, do you have questions for 


Mark? Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I have a number of 


questions, so --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I know, I got to -- figure 


out all these cords here. 


 That's my last question. Fir-- first of all, 


I'm a little confused on the April 30th report 


from SC&A as to whether that was made available 


to the petitioners and to the general public in 


any way? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Can someone (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: My under--

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 DR. MELIUS: (Unintelligible) available here at 


this meeting? 


 DR. ZIEMER: My understanding is that -- I 


think -- is Joe Fitzgerald here? Joe, did we 


get copies of that to the petitioners? If --


if we did, it's been within the last hour, I 


think. It's -- it's not been -- if you want to 


talk about timely. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, we -- we made one hard 


copy which we gave to Terrie -- Ms. Terrie 


Barrie. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And the electronic copies were 


distributed to the Board, probably after you 


left home or --


 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- I -- I don't believe I got a 


copy of it yet. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: My understanding was the 


electronic copy was cleared through General 


Counsel at NIOSH probably Friday sometime. 


From there, I'm -- I'm not sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: There were some Privacy Act issues 


with that report that required a -- I guess a 


legal review, but in any event, I don't -- my 


guess is Board members have not seen it. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Our -- our intention in -- in the 


workgroup process, for those who followed it, 


was to -- to get a report to all petitioners 


and Congressional staffers at least a month in 


advance of this meeting, and I think we -- I 


think the main report was put out -- I hope 


they got SC&A's main report about early April ­

- no? I'm seeing --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, there -- there were two -- 


there was I think two volumes -- or two parts 


to that report. Those were distributed a 


couple of weeks ago, I believe. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But this supplemental certainly 


is -- was -- I mean just completed, you know, 


within the last, you know, four or five days, 


so -- but we need to at least get it now to 


everyone. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: It's been --


 DR. MELIUS: -- I -- I mean I would just like 


to point out, I -- I -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- I hardly think that's a fair 

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process for the people that are -- the 


petitioners nor people trying to address this 


issue, and I think we need to -- also as -- the 


Board and working with NIOSH, come up with a 


better process for communicating these -- and 


distributing these reports. I understand the ­

- the need for reviewing and so forth, but this 


process seems to keep breaking down and -- in 


terms of that. I mean, for example, I have the 


-- the pre-- pre-privacy-cleared copy of it, 


the April 27th draft, which I -- and I have no 


idea -- I don't think there are major changes, 


but there are only a few changes in it and I 


really don't think it's fair for the 


petitioners or for the people interested in the 


site to come here and not have this information 


made available to them in a -- in any fashion 


here, other than I guess within the last hour. 


I -- I have some questions. I'd like to know 


more, and I don't know if -- who -- whether 


Mark, you're the person answering this or -- or 


Joe Fitzgerald or who -- the basis for the -- 


the sampling of the -- the 52 cases that were 


looked at where we're looking in terms of data 


integrity issues and -- and so forth. I think 

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there was a comment from I believe one of the 


petitioners that commented on -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- how that hardly seems to be an 


adequate sample, and I'm trying to understand 


the sampling better. I --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, maybe Joe -- Joe or -- or 


Arjun, if you can speak to that, I -- I would 


appreciate it. 


Go-- going -- I -- I will say that going 


through 52 full claims files was, you know, a 


rigorous amount of work, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Makhijani --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we did want a good set of 


records, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Makhijani perhaps can answer 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I'm Arjun Makhijani from 


SC&A. As was mentioned, the 52 cases consisted 


of two groups. There were 32 randomly-selected 


and that was done with the help of our 


statistician, Harry Chmlynski, and we sampled a 


sufficient number to get an idea of the size of 


the gaps. It wasn't at a level where you could 

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tell what was going on for individual workers, 


but it was to explore whether there were 


significant gaps overall in the data record for 


the groups of workers. They were split up into 


two periods, '52 to '63, inclusive, and '64 to 


'92. And that was done because in the earlier 


period there were a large number of workers who 


were not badged because they were thought to be 


at risk of low exposure or -- for instance, 


Building 881 was not badged in the '50s. And 


then in '64 the policy had been -- said that 


all workers were badged, but then it turned out 


that it wasn't quite all workers, but it was in 


the 90-plus percents of workers who were 


badged. So we wanted to examine the extent of 


the gaps in monitoring in the two different 


periods, and we did that. 


In the second piece of it, we identified a 


number of gaps in -- in both periods in 


internal and external monitoring records and so 


the second part of the exercise was to look at 


20 workers who had the hi-- among the highest 


cumulative exposures. This was workers in the 


1990s whose records were looked at by Rocky 


Flats retrospectively, and they were grouped 

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into categories, one to four, and three and 


four were the highest exposed cumulatively, and 


we selected ten from each group to see if there 


were gaps in the records of workers who were 


acknowledged by Rocky Flats to be the most 


exposed cumulatively. 


And there -- in the internal dose records we 


did not find big gaps -- that is, annual gaps ­

- but we did find some gaps in the external 


dose records. And so that's why subsequently -- 


particularly in the '50s. And so that's why 


subsequently a lot of the effort of looking 


into the adequacy of data focused on external 


dose in the 1950s. 


Sorry for the long reply. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you -- that's good, thanks. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim, a follow-up and -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, just to fol-- I mean I would 


just point out that -- I mean while I 


understand the amount of effort involved in 


this, I don't want to, you know, downplay that, 


but at the same time, for -- a small sample 


like this would not necessarily identify subgroups that may be -- where there may be issues 


with. It -- it may be adequate statistically 

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if the -- we're assuming that whatever these 


gaps are, problems are, are there 


systematically, but -- and cover everybody. 


But certainly for sub-groups of workers in 


certain buildings or certain parts, it would 


not address that and would -- would not 


identify that, and I -- I think that still 


would be an ongoing concern. 


I also have related to that the issue of -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Arjun has an additional 


comment on that, and then we'll move on. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I think Dr. Melius is 


right about that, but the statistical sampling 


was a very -- it was a very broad-mesh 


sampling. It was not designed to reveal say 


gaps in monitoring for individual 


radionuclides, and it was not designed to yield 


information that was statistically valid on 


gaps for individual job types and so on. It 


was are there -- you know, what's the size of 


the group of workers in these two periods that 


have gaps, and so it was a very broad-screen 


take. So you're -- you're right about that. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Proceed. 


 DR. MELIUS: Thank you. And I think related to 


that in sort of a -- as a separate effort, 


there was an issue of these data discrepancies 


and so forth which were I think individual 


reports of potential problems, and so forth -- 


that -- and on that my understanding is that, 


again, there was no systematic problem found 


with that in -- in the investigation of that, 


but there were a number of individual reported 


discrepancies that were, you know, verified by 


-- by the process. And my question there is 


then -- then -- then what happens with those? 


How are those individual discrepancies 


identified, because one of the problems with 


this overall process is it -- to me, that -- I 


would think that would end up being dependent 


on the claimant being aware of the potential 


discrepancy and pointing it out. And given the 


problems in getting access to records and 


giving the problems in -- you know, many times 


the original worker has died and so it's a 


family member with, you know, very little 


information trying to file the claim. So I 


guess my question is more for the -- the 

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workgroup and maybe for NIOSH, how do we -- how 


are these then identified or are we just sort 


of, you know, getting rid of them, not -- 


pretending they don't exist? 


 DR. ZIEMER: And perhaps Dr. Ulsh from NIOSH 


can address that. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, Dr. Melius. Actually the 


integrity of the individual radiation files 


were approached by the working group, NIOSH and 


SC&A via a number of different approaches, one 


of which was to look at -- as Mark has 


mentioned, at the database itself which was 


used for -- in situations of generating 


coworker data. But in terms of this exercise, 


looking at the 52 -- the 52 hard copy radiation 


files, the objective of that exercise was to 


determine whether or not there were -- first of 


all, whether there were periods where 


monitoring data didn't exist; and secondly, if 


so, were there reasonable explanations for 


that. So we did not find in that particular 


piece of the investigation -- I'm speaking only 


for NIOSH -- we didn't find any unexplainable 


gaps in either internal or external, with one 


exception. We looked, as -- as Arjun has 

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mentioned, there were 52 workers, and you 


multiply that -- that by the number of years 


that they worked, and then double it for 


internal and external. And what we found was 


that for internal, they were complete. In 


other words, there were no gaps that -- where 


you would expect them to have been monitored 


and the records were not present. And 


secondly, in the external dosimetry, we found 


out of the 52 workers with several years of 


employment each, we found only one case where a 


worker was missing -- didn't have dosimetry 


data for one year, and that was clearly noted 


in his radiation file. So as I think Mark 


said, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, 


Mark, we didn't find anything that compromised 


our -- our ability to -- at least systema-- 


systemically, to accurately reconstruct doses. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, I -- as I understand the 


question you asked, though, in an individual 


case if the -- if the individual did not self-


identify that they thought records were 


missing, how would we know it. Is that --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- the nature of the question? 

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 DR. MELIUS: -- I mean the issue is when 


there's the discrepancy reported, and part of 


the problem with -- is that the -- since these 


are individual data, the SC&A report on this is 


-- does not identify the examples very well and 


so it's a little hard -- I'm just trying to get 


an asses-- assessment of -- of this issue and ­

- that. I think Arjun already addressed the 


issue with the -- the sampling of the 52. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: You might perhaps be thinking of -- 


and I -- again, I don't have SC&A's report in 


front of me. There was another piece of this 


data -- data integrity investigation and that 


involved the -- we looked at every single 


concern expressed in the petition, every single 


concern that was expressed by the public at the 


last work-- Advisory Board meeting in April -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ULSH: -- and the concerns expressed by 


members of the public throughout the working 


group process. And NIOSH captured all of those 


and we went through and evaluated each one of 


those to determine whether or not they 


presented a systematic problem for us. I think 

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it's fair to say that NIOSH and SC&A, on a few 


individual instances, may not be in agreement 


whether or not there is a problem in that 


particular case. But we certainly did not find 


anything systematic that would prevent us from 


doing dose reconstruction. Does that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that -- and that's what we 


tried to look at and -- and -- and I know what 


you're saying, Jim. If -- you know, if we had 


some individuals that were -- were -- you know, 


not everyone's going to dig into the data the 


way some of these individuals did, and -- and ­

- for example, there was a particular case, the 


question of zeroing the dose, and the person 


felt that they -- they -- you know, they have 


affidavits saying worked a high rad job for a 


couple quarters and dosimetry's basically 


zeroes or whatever, and so we -- we had several 


of those. And some of them -- which I agree 


that we didn't reach agreement on between SC&A 


and NIOSH. We did, though, try to look and say 


okay, by looking at the database and other 


records and other reviews that we did, do we 


see any sort of pattern that would indicate 


that this was going on, and -- and I -- you 

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know, we -- we didn't find any systemic 


problems like that. 


Now I'm not sure that we had a perfect, you 


know, method to be able to detect those 


problems, but we -- we did try several 


different approaches to try to find those kinds 


of problems, 'cause they were raised in several 


-- either in open testimony or -- or in -- as 


part of the petition, so we were aware of those 


problems and we did look into those. But it --


it remai-- you know, the question remains -- I 


guess the other question would be, and I think 


it came up in earlier public comments, is how ­

- how do you -- would you basically acknowledge 


that in an individual DR, and you might treat 


that differently than just using LOD over two 


for assi-- for fixing that zero. But in the 


case where a person doesn't have the 


information to support as much, then it's 


probably treated as -- you know, as -- as zero, 


so -- you know. 


 DR. ULSH: It depends on the --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: It's hard to speak generally about ­

-

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- about this. It would depend on 


the specifics of the individual case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Brant, before you sit down, I have 


another question I think maybe you can answer. 


My understanding then would that be as a result 


of this review, NIOSH has made a number of 


changes in how they're handling certain aspects 


of dose reconstruction? And so I presume that 


in effect the site profile is being re-- redone 


or up-- updated. My question is, for -- for 


the record is will you then follow the usual 


policy and go back and recalculate dose 


reconstructions for all the people that have 


already had those done who would be affected by 


these changes? 


 DR. ULSH: That process is already underway. 


Some of the issues that have been captured we 


have completed Program Evaluation Reports. 


Some of them we're going to have to wait for 


the dust to settle here today to go back and, 


you know, put those changes into place. But 


yes, Dr. Melius, the answer to your question is 


yes, we certainly will in cases where the 

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changes -- you know, in response to public 


comment and -- and the investigation that the 


working group has conducted, we certainly will 


go back and look at cases that have been 


completed in the past that have a probability 


of causation of less than 50 percent and 


evaluate the impact of any of those changes on 


those case. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Thank you. I have one more 


set of questions. These are for Mark and -- do 


that. If I understand you correctly, the -- as 


a result of your review, there are I believe -- 


well, three areas that -- where NIOSH has not 


demonstrated the ability to do adequate 


individual dose reconstructions? One is the 


thorium issue you mentioned in one slide? 


Thorium and some related (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: As far as seeing proof of -- of 


the -- of the process yet, the thorium question 


remains in -- in that SC&A did not believe that 


the approach was appropriate for bounding. But 


we -- we have seen the other documents and the 


data that are available that we believe could 


be used to bound. So they -- they haven't 


given us a -- a necessarily case example, but 

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it's only because they -- they still bel-- you 


know, th-- we had a -- a situation where the -- 


SC&A and NIOSH were not in agreement on the 


final comment as sort of a -- a backdrop. 


They're saying they have this other information 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- which could be used to bound, 


and so that's where that stands. We haven't 


seen the case demonstration of it, no. That's 


right. 


 DR. MELIUS: And -- and the -- the second area 


is the neutron dose, '59 to '70 that I think 


Jim Neton -- I may have it --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I --


 DR. MELIUS: -- time period wrong. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I should actually clarify the 


-- the neutrons -- time frame I just discussed. 


I -- I -- I think, as a workgroup, for the '52 


through '58 time period, I believe we have, you 


know, come to consensus on that, that that time 


period just -- the concerns I've stated exist 


and I -- and cause problems in terms of being 


able to -- to reconstruct doses. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: For '59 beyond, those other time 


periods, I still have those concerns, but we 


don't have a consensus in the workgroup -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Well --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- on all those items, so I -- I 


just wanted to say that for -- for the record. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, and I understand, I'm just 


trying to -- the sort of the factual -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- question is is has -- I think 


if you remember right, our, you know, SEC 


review process was to take into account -- it's 


a demonstration that they can actually do the 


dose reconstruction in the way they say they 


can, and -- and my understanding is that, both 


for the thorium and the neutron '59-'70, they 


have not yet. There may be data available for 


doing so, but the-- there's a question -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, the '59-'70, right now the 


approach stands as -- as they've -- I mean they 


-- they've given us a case example, but it uses 


their current approach. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: What Jim Neton said today on the 


record is -- is, again, a -- another option 

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that they may use, but they haven't demonstra-- 


we haven't seen a demonstration of that, no. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's correct. And -- and I 


think lastly, just -- I -- I did point this out 


in my presentation, but it might have got lost 


a little bit, but the pre-1960 Building 81 


uranium workers for external dose -- again, we 


-- we -- we had ample evidence put in front of 


the workgroup that they could bound these 


doses, but we haven't seen a -- a case example 


for that, so that's another one, just for 


completeness. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Thanks, Mark. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mark, you -- you've been largely 


silent on the period beyond 1970. Does the 


workgroup have any conclusions or position on 


the ability to reconstruct doses for the period 


beyond 1970? Or did you not address that? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- no, we -- we certainly 


addressed it. We -- I mean part of -- what -- 


what Arjun said is cer-- is -- is accurate, 


that we -- in this data completeness review we 


were looking at all time periods, and the 


reason that we ended up targeting the '50s was 

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-- was that we found some of these data gaps 


and -- and issues. So I agree, that wasn't a 


perfect -- you know, necessarily a robust 


statistical sample, but we did do sort of -- 


when we found areas that looked like potential 


issues, we did sort of drill down to more 


probative investigations. Those went into the 


areas such as Building 81 and -- and such as 


the early '50s for neutrons and other things. 


Post-1970 -- well, the NDRP, they -- they went 


from film to TLD at that point. The -- but -- 


but we didn't find any indication for internal 


or external dose that there'd be a problem for 


reconstructing. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. The reason I asked 


that question, certainly in a number of other 


sites the Board has made recommendations where 


certain years are covered and other years are 


not covered by SEC status, and it wasn't clear 


to me whether the workgroup was comfortable -- 


maybe that's not the word to use, but was 


suggesting that the question of reconstructing 


dose after 1970 was not, in their minds, a -- a 


problem as compared to those earlier years. 


That's sort of rhetorical at this point -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- but I was trying to ascertain 


that. 


Okay, other -- other questions, Board members? 


Let -- let me suggest a couple of things here. 


We have some options before us, one -- one of 


which -- well, all of them involve some sort of 


action, I want to push the Board to take some 


sort of action. Your -- your options are, 


number one, to accept or agree with the NIOSH 


evaluation. Number two, to disagree with the 


NIOSH evaluation -- that is, to basically state 


that doses can-- cannot be reconstructed with 


sufficient accuracy and therefore to recommend 


SEC. 


You would have an option, although I would 


certainly be uncomfortable with it, to extend 


this process further to tie up loose ends. 


There clearly are loose ends, but those loose 


ends seem to continue to occur month after 


month. We tie up one set of loose ends and 


others appear. It reminds one a little bit of 


"Fantasia" and the brooms that multiply 


exponentially. 


Or you would have an option of subdividing 

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this, I -- I guess, as has been done in other 


cases, and saying yes, part of this is 


straightforward. We're -- we -- we feel an SEC 


is clear and perhaps part of it not. 


So those are four options. You may want to 


cogitate on this for a bit. I -- I know some 


of you want to get refueled with food. The 


lunch hour is upon us. We hadn't wanted -- I ­

- I had hoped we could come to closure to this, 


but we've heard -- we've heard a lot of 


different -- we've heard testimony from the 


petitioners, we've heard testimony from the 


Congressional staff, we've heard testimony from 


NIOSH, from our working group, we've had a lot 


of input. You may want to reflect on this for 


a bit and then come back and be prepared to 


make a motion, but I'd like some comments on 


whether you would like to do that or proceed at 


this point with some action. Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: I had hoped that your fourth option 


would be lunch. Clearly this is not going to 


be a closure that's reached in a matter of five 


or ten minutes. This will be a discussion that 


will be of significant time constraint, I 


think. Pushing past the lunch hour to 

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undertake that probably is not wise for us. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? 


 (No responses) 


What is your pleasure, Board members? You want 


-- you want to continue now or -- our lunch 


break was scheduled for 11:45 so we're into 


that hour. You're too numb to react? Is that 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let's go eat lunch. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, that gives the Chair 


the prerogative then, if no one has any 


particular opinions, we'll go with mine. 


That's the way it works, you know. Let us take 


a one-hour lunch break and come back. We will 


continue deliberations on the Rocky Flats 


petition, and we will adjust the other items on 


the agenda accordingly. So those will slide 


back in-- into place. So thank you all. We 


will reconvene as quickly as we can after 1:00 


o'clock, probably about 1:15. Thank you very 


much. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:15 p.m. 


to 1:35 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: If you would take your seats, 


we'll try to come to order, please. 

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 (Pause) 


Thank you very much. I'll declare the meeting 


to be back in order. Before we continue our 


deliberations, I -- I have received a hand-


carried letter from Governor Bill Ritter. I'd 


like to read this rec-- letter into the record. 


The record -- the letter says (reading) In care 


of: Paul Ziemer, Chairman; Lewis Wade, 


Executive Secretary; and members of the 


Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, 


Regarding Rocky Flats United Steel Workers of 


America, Local 8031, Special Exposure Cohort 


petition. Dear Drs. Ziemer and Wade and 


members of the Advisory Board: I am writing 


today to join in and endorse the letter you 


received yesterday from the entire Colorado 


Congressional delegation seeking justice for 


the Special Exposure Cohort petition of the 


former Rocky Flats workers. That letter 


compellingly documents the reasons why this 


petition should be granted. Simple fairness 


dictates that give these workers the benefit of 


the doubt in light of their exposure to 


radioactive materials, beryllium and silica. 


In an ideal world, the Department of Energy 

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would have maintained comprehensive and useful 


dose records. In the absence of such records, 


and given adequate time, perhaps NIOSH could 


adequately reconstruct dose and exposure 


records and calculate likely health 


consequences. But as you know, this is far 


from an ideal world. The dose monitoring 


records and other data accumulated at Rocky 


Flats were, in too many circumstances, less 


than adequate to the task at hand. NIOSH's 


efforts to reconstruct doses and exposures have 


encountered methodological and data challenges 


and have dragged out far too long. 


Mr. Chairman, working together with the State 


of Colorado and the federal government -- 


working together, the State of Colorado and the 


federal government made dramatic and even 


unprecedented progress in cleaning up the Rocky 


Flats site and converting much of that site to 


a wildlife refuge. Surrounding property owners 


are moving forward in their efforts to be 


compensated for the damage done to their 


properties by releases of radioactive 


materials. One enormous task remains 


unfinished, and it is the task with -- with by 

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far the greatest human element. It is time, 


far past time, that fair compensation is 


provided to the people who worked and toiled at 


Rocky Flats on behalf of a great national 


purpose, and who may have been stricken as a 


result of their work. 


I urge you in the strongest possible terms to 


act promptly on the Rocky Flats special 


exposure petition. 


 Respectfully, Bill Ritter, Jr., Governor. 


 Now Board members, you've had time to cogitate 


over your lunch, brief as it may have been, and 


I'd like to urge that we take action on the 


proposal that is before us. The Chair 


recognizes Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: I'd like to offer a --

 DR. ZIEMER: Get -- get closer to the mike, 

Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I will. Can you hear me 

now? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I'd like to offer a general 

motion that would cover two separate steps. 


The first was I believe that, based on the 


reports we received and the discussions we had 

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earlier, Mark's presentation, the SCA reports 


and so forth, that we should move forward 


approving a Special Exposure Cohort for the 


people exposed to neutrons or who should have 


been monitored for neutrons from 1952 through 


1958; that --


Number two, that we need further review on 


three particular issues that, again, were 


discussed this morning and which would be 


requesting that NIOSH come back to us with 


further information; that we -- also that we 


work with our contractor, SC&A, to evaluate 


three separate issues. One is the neutron 


exposure from 1959 to '70. Second I believe is 


the exposures in I believe it's Building 81. 


And then third is this issue of thorium 


exposures and some related nuclides that -- in 


-- in some areas of the facility. All those 


are where there -- involve where there's some 


monitoring data, but we really haven't had an 


adequate evaluation of whether that data is 


sufficient for use for individual dose 


reconstruction. 


I would propose that we -- for the latter three 


that we try to move that along as quickly as 

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possible. I understand the timeliness issues. 


And that, if possible -- and I -- this may be a 


question for NIOSH to consider -- is that -- 


try to get that work done and that we, at our 


next Board meeting, would be I believe 


scheduled for June 12th, that we have that 


meeting to -- a person -- in-person meeting 


rather than a telephone meeting, to consider 


those three issues. 


 DR. ZIEMER: You've heard the motion. Is there 


a second? 


 MR. CLAWSON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: There is a second, Brad Clawson. 


Let me ask for a clarification. The first part 


of your statement you referred only to 


individuals exposed to neutrons. I assume that 


we're talking about all individuals who were 


monitored or should have been monitored -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I should have -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- in that period --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- not just those exposed -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Right, right --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- to neutrons. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- yeah, yeah, yeah. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Let me also add that, 


should this motion carry, I'm going -- I will 


ask that the mover re-- reconstitute the motion 


to put it in the usual form that would make it 


useful to send forth to the Secretary, which 


specifies that -- for example, that the 


Chairman take certain actions within 30 days 


and -- and we have some sort of standard, 


boilerplate language that has to go forward, so 


we -- I would ask for a formal rewording of 


that, but this gives at least the intent of 


what the motion would be. 


 DR. MELIUS: Correct, and I would propose that 


we do that -- the second part, should this 


Board agree on this, that we would do that 


tomorrow morning and we would work on -- this 


afternoon and tonight work on a specific letter 


with the justifications and the format that's 


required. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now should -- should this 


motion pass, my understanding is that we would 


proceed to make the recommendation for the 


Special Exposure Cohort status for the early 


group immediately; that the other group time 


frames -- and actually I think you've only 

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spoken to addressing issues dur-- for the time 


frame up to '70, you haven't said anything be-- 


beyond '70, but that would, by implication, 


have to be addressed, as well. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: What this would do would be to 


postpone action for approximately one month on 


the rest of the time frame until I -- I believe 


it would be proof of principle on the dose 


reconstructions for the neutrons, or was it for 


the thorium? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Those three items. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, neutrons, thorium and the 


other issues, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And 881. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And 881 -- is it 881? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Discussion. Dr. Roessler. 


DR. ROESSLER: I was so concentrating on the 


first part, which you now clarified, that I 


didn't really get all the points in your second 


part. So my question is, with regard to 


procedure, are we going to -- before we vote -- 


see this written so that we can fully 


understand it? Or are we going to be required 

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-- if we're going to be required to vote right 


now, I need to have Jim go over that second 


part again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll ask for a rereading of this 


in a moment. Other comments? 


 DR. WADE: Well, I -- I would like to just get 


clarification on the first part of the motion 


relative to monitored or should have been 


monitored. Are we talking about neutron dose 


or what are we talking about? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Monitored or should have been 


monitored for neutron exposures, yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, for neutron exposures. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Was that not what... 


DR. ROESSLER: I'm still not clear on that. 


Does that mean then the whole population of 


workers during that time period, or is there 


some way to determine which workers should have 


been monitored for neutrons? I think that's 


the big question on that one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I guess I was trying 


to avoid defining by various buildings, but -- 


you know, that may be possible, but I was 


trying to avoid -- you know, basically not 

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charging the Board with doing that, but having 


that be determined by NIOSH. But I don't know, 


to the extent we can specify, I guess -- I'm 


not sure how we want to go on that. 


 DR. WADE: Well, you know, the Board has 


adopted its procedures of sort of passing a 


motion in principle and then reviewing it that 


night and consulting in fact with the 


Department of Labor as to how these issues 


might be adjudicated. So I think that's 


appropriate to do here. I don't know that this 


issue's been broached yet with the Department 


of Labor. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: Unless I'm mistaken, the working 


group had general consensus with respect to 


this cohort that exists from 1952 to 1959, 


although it is not clear that any meaningful 


worker exposure could have occurred during 


1952. That being the case, then there still is 


confusion, from my perspective, with respect to 


why we're focusing specifically on neutrons. 


It would appear to me that since one of our key 


arguments was there were very few actual 


records that were available because very few 

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people were monitored for anything during that 


early period, why are we specifying neutrons? 


My other question is, if we are in fact going 


to delay the vote on our post-'58 cohort, and 


we're doing so ostensibly to ask for proof of 


principle from NIOSH, must we not be very clear 


with respect to our directions to NIOSH as to 


what we will and will not accept as proof of 


principle? Must not that be a basic part of 


our motion here? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I can respond to that -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I can respond to the first 


part. The -- we're focused on neutrons because 


we -- we did not find that there was a 


deficiency with regard to bioassay data for 


those early time periods, and in fact they do 


have gamma data -- penetrating measurements. 


That's sort of how they had -- neutron/photon 


ratio has to be multiplied by something. It 


was the gamma results from those early periods, 


so they did have more monitoring, it's just 


that they had very little neutron data. That 


was the -- so -- so it is targeted on neutrons, 


I think limited to neutrons. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: So as this has been defined, the 


special cohort status would be restricted to 


individuals, perhaps in certain locations, for 


whom neutron monitoring should have been or was 


-- or should have been provided, but would not 


provide special cohort status for others on the 


site during that period if they were not in the 


identified areas. Is that the correct 


understanding? 


 MS. MUNN: So again, aren't we going to have to 


be very specific with respect to what those 


buildings are and what those areas are when we 


make this kind of designation? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I guess that's the 


question I would -- I would say what Lew says 


is that, you know, if we need to be more 


specific to allow DOL to adjudicate, then we 


can do it. I -- I just didn't -- I didn't have 


a -- a complete listing and I didn't want to 


miss any buildings, so I said -- the easier way 


for me to define it right now, just for our 


discussions, was to say "monitored or should 


have been monitored". I didn't want to miss 


any building or anything, so -- but we can -- 


you know. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: But the practical question will -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- arise in specific cases as to 


how will DOE --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- not DOE, DOL identify whether 


or not a worker was or should have been 


monitored for neutrons. I suppose that would 


fall back on the NIOSH report then, would it 


not? Would they iden-- 


 DR. WADE: I don't want to speak for DOL. 


Jeff, do you want to run the risk of standing 


before us and talking about this? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll hear -- hear from DOL, but I 


can anticipate that that would be a difficult 


question unless we provided some sort of 


information on what parts of the site this 


covered. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, I'm not certain. I haven't 


seen their information if you could put it by 


building, but then I don't know how you 


determine that people were in that building if 


they -- I don't -- is there a lot of bioassay 


data for that period of time that would put 


people in buildings? 

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 MR. GRIFFON: They -- they -- they -- well, 


they have work history cards -- I mean I'll let 


Brant respond to that maybe, behind you, but... 


 DR. ULSH: As I understand the status of your 


discussions, the part of the NDRP that is under 


question has to deal with the methods that were 


used to estimate doses from '52 to '58. What 


the Neutron Dose Reconstruction Project 


provides, aside from that -- from the methods 


of estimating neutrons -- is a very fine cohort 


in that it included people in the plutonium 


buildings who were at risk of neutron exposure. 


So all of the buildings where people at Rocky 


Flats could have received neutron exposures 


were considered explicitly in the NDRP. That 


would be --


 MR. GRIFFON: See, that -- that -- I wasn't 


ready to take -- that next step was -- I wasn't 


sure that NDRP had included every building that 


could have had neutron exposures, so I wanted 


to at first define it more broadly saying -- 


and then make sure we get the full list of -- 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- buildings with that potential. 


And how we define that I think it -- it's 

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either defined by the Board or -- 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you know. 


 DR. ULSH: Would you be looking for action from 


NIOSH on that to provide a list of those 


buildings, or -- or --


 DR. MELIUS: Well, I -- I think we need to have 


some discussion, if I can speak to this. One 


is my understanding from our last discussion 


with Pete Turcic about this general issue a few 


Board meetings ago was that it -- it appeared 


to be better that -- to have this "monitored or 


should have been monitored" was a more workable 


approach in most instances, not all instances, 


but in most instances that seemed to be more 


workable than -- than a building by building 


issue, for some of the reasons that have been 


stated. But I -- I think that we need to sit 


down and talk about that a little bit and would 


offer something more specific tomorrow for -- 


for consideration. I also -- in response to 


what -- Wanda's comment, second comment about 


the proof in prin-- of principle and the 


follow-up. What I would propose is that we 


would offer up a -- a more fleshed-out motion 

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tomorrow that would be more -- as specific as ­

- I won't -- well, more specific about what 


would be expected back. I -- I -- I think 


there's -- hard to be, you know, too precise 


about that, but I -- I think we can make 


something that's more clearly understandable by 


everybody involved so that when we come here -- 


come back on June 12th to discuss it, that it 


can be -- will be addressed by that time, 


hopefully. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? Okay, 


Phil. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I think we need to leave a 


little broader than --


UNIDENTIFIED: We can't hear you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Use your mike. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I think we need to leave it a 


little broader than just specifying certain 


buildings because until we can actually prove 


people were not in those buildings, rather than 


having each individual -- a lot of these 


claimants are doing this for loved ones who 


have already passed on, and they're not going 


to be able to say well, we know they were in 


Building 770 or 881. Rather, we need to leave 

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it a little broader because there's -- has to 


be the assumption that at some time they may 


have been in those buildings working. So it's 


almost the burden of proof to show they weren't 


in those buildings, I think. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Mike Gibson. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer, I'm going to voice a 


little bit of a -- I guess a difference of 


opinion here. I feel that NIOSH has had ample 


time, close to two years now, to determine -- 


to determine the scientific validity of these 


exposures. In my opinion, they've used people 


who are conflicted to put together the 


evaluation report and I've heard the scientific 


end of it and I've heard from the people, and 


in the spirit of the legislation, us working in 


a timely manner, I think it's time to vote on 


the petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So Mike, are -- you're speaking 


against this particular motion or in this form, 


at least, I guess? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes, yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments or 

questions? 

 (No responses) 

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Dr. Roessler, did you want Dr. Melius to read 


that motion again -- or Dr. Melius, are you 


prepared to -- to reread the motion or not? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I can. I'll be glad to. 


The motion would be that we would move ahead 


and approve an -- as -- to add to the SEC those 


people that worked at the Rocky Flats site from 


1952 through 1958 that were monitored, or 


should have been monitored, for neutron 


exposure. 


And the latter part of that would need to be -- 


we need to talk to NIOSH and -- and to DOL, 


make sure that that's the right way to 


essentially def-- define the class. 


Then secondly, there are three areas that we 


need to get further information from NIOSH, 


basically demonstration that areas that they 


believe can -- they -- they have adequate 


information to do dose reconstruction but have 


not demonstrated that adequacy of that data to 


us or to our workgroup yet. Those are the 1959 


through 1970 for neutron exposure. There's a 


building 81 issue and, as I understand it, an 


issue with exposures to thorium in certain 


areas of the facility. All three of those --

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there are some monitoring data, but that data 


is not -- been evaluated in the sense of -- of 


being -- showing that it is adequate for doing 


individual dose reconstruction -- asking that 


that information be brought back to our next 


workgr-- or next Board meeting and for -- for 


further consideration, and we'll have to make a 


determination whether that data is adequate or, 


if it is not adequate, then whether -- adequate 


for dose recon-- individual dose 


reconstruction, as to whether additional groups 


should be added to the Special Exposure Cohort. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler, did that clarify the 


points for you or do you still have questions 


on --


DR. ROESSLER: I -- I understand everything 


except -- tell me about Building 81. 


 DR. MELIUS: Mark, can you help me? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Building 81 -- actually what we 


found was that workers were not monitored in 


the early period, actually up to 1960, so there 


was a question about back-extrapolating to 


determine -- being able to bound external doses 


for that early period. We -- we've also heard 


today -- the only -- and this is my -- also 

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reluctance to further define the buildings for 


neutron exposures, but we've heard today -- and 


which was brought to us before, but we probably 


-- may have overlooked it, the use or potential 


use of plutonium in that building. So I think 


we should also evaluate -- make sure that, you 


know, there's not other things going on in that 


building that might affect our outcome, as 


well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: We did however in the workgroup 


identify the fact that the first plutonium 


arrived in Building 81 in 1983. At some 


juncture during our deliberations we defined 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 198-- I don't recall that, so -- 


but you know, I just asked that we -- we might 


want to consider closing that out. If that's 


been closed out, that's -- I accept that, but 


it was brought up today so I just wanted to 


make sure we --


 MS. MUNN: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


'53. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, one more clarification. 
I 
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think your motion indicated that we would meet 


face-to-face on June 12th rather than 


teleconference. My schedule is kind of 


difficult to do that, but I think we should get 


a feeling from other people on the Board how 


many of us could actually do that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. You -- you all presumably 


have blocked some time out for a face-to-face ­

- or for a -- at least a phone call meeting -- 


DR. ROESSLER: But not traveling. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We might -- we might want to look 


at potential other dates because I'm just 


thinking -- I'd hate to be in the same position 


where we have a report one day before, or the 


same day, and we're giving it to the 


petitioners and all interested parties. We 


want to be able to do that in advance, so I 


don't want to be in this, you know, position 


again. And June 12th -- by the time we get the 


workgroup back together and work on these 


issues, you know -- comes up kind of quickly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? Again I remind 


the Board that if -- if you pass this motion, 


you also are extending the -- the issue 


further, but that's -- that is certainly an 

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option that's open. It closes part of it and 


keeps part of it open, in effect. And I think, 


Mike, that's what you were speaking against at 


that point. 


Other comments? Board members, just -- this is 


not on the main motion, but if the motion pass, 


how many of you are prepared to meet in person 


on June -- is it June 12th? 


 MS. MUNN: It was June 12th, but I think that 


ought to depend largely on whether or not NIOSH 


can get the requested information back, as -- 


as Mark said. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I don't know if anyone from 


NIOSH is prepared to make a commitment on that 


today. Brant is sort of moving -- he's -- he's 


deliberating with Jim Neton, I think, and -- 


kind of put -- put them on the spot, as well, 


Brant and... 


 DR. ULSH: Could -- on the second part of Dr. 


Melius's motion about additional clarification 


that you would like to see, could we get a 


little better feel for what kind of a product 


you're asking for from NIOSH on those three 


issues -- thorium, Building 81 prior to 1960, 


and I believe neutrons after 1958. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think we -- should we 


flesh that out tonight? I think that -- you 


know, I -- generally we're looking for that 


proof of principle question, but I think Wanda 


has already asked that we might want to be 


clear in exactly what we're looking for there, 


and maybe just -- you know, just discuss 


schedule tomorrow morning or whatever, but -- 


 DR. WADE: We could leave schedule till 


tomorrow morning. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, unless we know -- unless 


NIOSH knows what we're talking about, they 


would be very, I think, reluctant to commit to 


a timetable, number one. Number two, unless we 


spell it out, we've just added uncertainty to 


the -- to the system. So I want to press the 


Board a little bit. We need to have some 


clarity here if -- if this is to be the -- the 


case, we need to be very clear on what is to be 


expected, what the Board product will be -- 


again, I don't want to drag this on. I don't 


want to come back in a month and say well, we 


need another month or whatever it is. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think the -- the timeliness 

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issue is upon us. Mike's point is well taken, 


and if -- if we are to delay, we have to have a 


good reason with an expected outcome that we 


will be able to make a decision then -- within 


a few weeks. The Chair certainly can tolerate 


that, probably more so than the workers, but -- 


but we simply need to move ahead on this, so -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'd just ra-- I'd just rather try 


to write something out than try to describe, 


you know -- I'd rather put a little thought 


into it and write it out and provide it 


tomorrow morning, if that's okay, rather than 


just trying to do it ad hoc here around a 


table. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now let me now suggest a 


strategy then, Board members. You have a 


motion. We've had some discussion. We've had 


-- the Chair's trying to get a sense of the 


level of support for this motion, because if 


there's not a lot of support, then we need to 


defeat it and move on. If there is some 


support, then I'm going to suggest that we 


table the motion and get the wording defined 


for action tomorrow morning. I think Mike has 


spoken against the motion. Phil, do you have a 

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comment? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes, I've got just one comment. 


On the timeliness issue, we need to set a 


deadline where we give these people either a 


yes or no answer instead of dragging this on 


and on and on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, precisely my point. Thank 


you, Phil. 


Others? Anyone wish to speak for or against 


the motion? I think it would be helpful to get 


some idea of the level of support here. That 


will help us... 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mike, another comment, then Wanda 


Munn. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, I'd just like to point out, 


you know, we're -- looks like we're in a way 


marching down a path to ask NIOSH to go back to 


the well and -- and do something else, when in 


Section 8.0 of their SEC evaluation report 


they've said that they have enough information 


to determine it is feasible to estimate the 


dose with sufficient accuracy for this class. 


So if that information is available to them, in 


their opinion, you know, why -- why should we 

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give them more time to go back and then try to 


come up with some other information? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Anything that requires a further 


postponement of this issue is difficult for 


everyone concerned. It's difficult for every 


single one of these petitioners, and it's 


difficult for everyone sitting at this table. 


And I think, from what we have heard today from 


Congressional staff, the Senator and from the 


Governor, they are quite eager to get on with 


this. 


NIOSH has said that they are capable of doing 


these -- these dose reconstructions, and we 


have an abundance of evidence that they can and 


have in the past done so. I personally would 


like to see us make a definitive decision one 


way or the other today, if we can possibly do 


so. I understand the concern with respect to 


establishing precedent and proof of principle, 


but the proof of principle with respect to 


every other aspect of these dose 


reconstructions has been shown to us 


repeatedly, especially in the working group, on 


more than one occasion. I would prefer to see 

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the vote on the entire SEC request done today, 


segmented or not. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim Melius and then 


Gen Roessler. 


 DR. MELIUS: No, I'll -- I don't have any 


comments right now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: I think as a Board, we have 


mostly been able to reach consensus or close to 


consensus on many things, and I think at this 


point I see the Board fairly divided on this 


issue. If we were to vote today on the whole 


petition, I think we'd be divided. Plus we're 


missing one Board member. I think that this is 


a -- I -- I don't like to see the people in 


this area put off for a while, but I think we 


can reach a fair decision if we do allow a 


little more time, so I -- I'm willing to vote 


in favor of Jim's motion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Reluctantly. I think -- I just 


want to remind fellow Board members that our -- 


our SEC procedures do ask for this proof of 


principle. You know, we -- we say that we will 


look at this, so you know, when -- and then 

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there -- there -- there is a -- I guess there's 


a difference between do they have the 


information -- you know, NIOSH'll probably say, 


in the case of the neutron issue, they have the 


information, but they haven't necessarily shown 


us how they're going to mo-- so we're asking -- 


well, show us how it's going to work and how 


it's going to be bounding. I think their 


evaluation report was -- was stating that they 


had the information available, but -- you know, 


so we -- and that's specifically why we wrote 


those procedures that way, because we said 


well, you know, that's kind of a -- there's a 


lot in the middle there, and we want to sort of 


see how this is going to work and -- and give 


ourselves assurances that we're going to be 


able to bound doses for all members of the 


class. So I -- I think we have to remember 


that that is in our own procedures and, to that 


extent, I think we should, you know, follow our 


own procedures. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Lockey. 


 DR. LOCKEY: I -- I've -- I think this working 


group and Mark in particular have put an 


extensive amount of time into the Rocky Flat 

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issue and a very complex exposure situation, no 


doubt about it. I think NIOSH has put in an 


extensive amount of time, as has our consulting 


group. I think that I would support Jim's 


motion in that if we can get this done 


relatively quickly, within 30 days, 


particularly under the direction of Mark and 


how knowledgeable he is in this -- in this 


particular situation, it's worth that 30 days. 


I don't think it's worth any longer than that, 


but I think it's worth that 30 days. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Other comments, pro or con, 


in support or in -- in opposition to the motion 


that's before us? 


MS. THOMPSON: (From the audience and off-


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now since we -- we don't have the 


exact wording, you can -- I can ask the Board 


if you wish to have what we might call a straw 


vote, with the understanding the final wording 


would come back for review. Or we can table. 


MS. THOMPSON: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) decide. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Do you wish to vote now on the 


motion as it's been presented, Board members? 

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 (Whereupon, multiple Board members responded 


simultaneously.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we will vote by a show of 


hands. Those who favor the motion, raise your 


right hand. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. 


 Opposed, raise your hand? 


 (Negative responses) 


One, two, three. 


So the motion carries by a vote of seven to 


three. We will have a final wording of that 


motion, the refined wording which would be in a 


form that could go forward to the Secretary, 


tomorrow for a final review. That wording 


would specify that the 1952 to '58 period -- it 


would recommend that that group become part of 


the Special Exposure Cohort; it would recommend 


that proof of principle on those identified 


items be provided within basically one month by 


NIOSH and that we would be committed to voting 


up or down on the rest of those time periods 


within one month. Okay? 


Yes, a comment from the petitioner. 


MS. THOMPSON: With all due respect, we came 

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here today wanting a vote on the petition as a 


whole. Okay? It is clear that the law is not 


being followed. The law states that as the day 


we submitted the petition could you or could 


you not accurately reconstruct dose. I think 


you have proven, by all the changes that have 


been made, the new models and everything, that 


you could not accurately reconstruct dose, or 


NIOSH could not -- excuse me, I'm not blaming 


the Board -- NIOSH could not accurately 


reconstruct dose at that point in time. This 


delay is unacceptable to the people that are 


dying, and I will defer to my previous 


statement that our workers should not have to 


fight with the government when they're fighting 


for their lives. The purpose of this 


legislation was to grant timely and fair 


compensation to our workers. These models are 


not tested, they're not proven, they're not 


tried, they're not true. It's science and it ­

- the question is not at some future day can 


NIOSH reconstruct dose, although I'm not sure 


they ever can do it accurately. This has gone 


on long enough. Please vote. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. The vote has been 

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recorded. We will review the wording tomorrow, 


and then we will plan to meet again -- we will 


try to make an effort to have that meeting here 


in one month, if we can make the arrangements. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We -- we're 


going to move on to our next agenda item. I'll 


allow -- this is one of the petitioners. We'll 


allow an additional comment here. 


 MR. HARDEN: Sir, with all due respect, if this 


is prolonged, I would ask that the petitioners 


have a chance to rebut some of the information 


that has occurred this afternoon. For 


instance, we haven't had access to this report 


that was just revealed today. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MR. HARDEN: And the other thing I would do is, 


in support of Jennifer Thompson, I think this 


has developed into some kind of a charade and 


that -- that's not a reflection on you as 


individuals. It's a collection of information 


that we've suffered for two years, and I think 


it's long overdue that we put these intellects 


in their places and we bring a decision to 

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these folks that have been waiting by the 


sidelines all these months and years to have 


their claims answered one way or another. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. HARDEN: Thank you for the opportunity. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Could I just ask a point of 


clarification? Did you just vote against the 


majority of the petition or not? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, we --


UNIDENTIFIED: Or did you just postpone the 


majority of the petition? 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we -- the vote was in favor of 


the motion. The motion was to grant -- or to 


recommend SEC status for the period of 1952 to 


'58 and to defer action on the -- the remaining 


time periods for one month until we could get 


the proof of principle information from NIOSH, 


at which time --


 (Whereupon, multiple audience members spoke 


simultaneously.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: The rest of those time periods. 


The recommendation is to include '52 to '58, to 


recommend that time period as part of the 


Special Exposure Cohort. 


UNIDENTIFIED: The motion has three specific 

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issues in the second part for the post-1958, so 


are you limiting the discussion to those three 


specific issues, are you -- and saying 


everybody else is out, or not? I don't think 


people here understand what you just did. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let -- let me try to 


clarify. 


UNIDENTIFIED: For the post-'58, I don't think 


they understand whether you've rejected most of 


them or you're only going to look at those 


three issues, or is the whole post-'58 still 


open for discussion? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, the whole post-'58 is open, 


but those are the issues that the Board needs 


closure on. I think we're clo-- we have 


closure on the other items. Those are the 


issues that the Board has not -- has asked for 


additional clarification from, so those other 


time periods -- we're not recommending that 


they not be included. We're simply saying we ­

- we will vote on those in one month. The 


first period -- the Board has recommended that 


that period be added to the Special Exposure 


Cohort. 


Did -- did -- is that clear, or did I not say 

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that very well? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess to -- out of 


tho-- out of those three follow-up items that 


we have, the only -- the -- the neutrons extend 


from '59 through '70, that issue. The -- the 


881 is an early time period issue, pre-1960. 


The thorium one would potentially affect the 


entire time frame of the site. So I think, to 


that extent, the entire time per-- period's 


left op-- open, but only really with regard to 


thorium in this case. I think that's -- to be 


clear, you know. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) What about (unintelligible)? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) Case by case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I just said post-1970, 


thorium still is potentially an exposure 


potential, so we have to see proof of principle 


on the thorium. We've asked for that, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Dr. Roessler, a comment? 


DR. ROESSLER: I think we have members of the 


press here who will want to meet some deadlines 

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for today and not wait for these details for 


tomorrow, and I'm not sure that they're clear 


on that first period. I think we said for 


those workers who were monitored or should have 


been monitored for neutrons, so it could mean 


it's not the whole group. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's correct. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm from Associated Press and I 


would like to know how you decide who should 


have been monitored and who was monitored. Can 


I simply declare that I worked in building 771 


and therefore qualify, or is NIOSH or somebody 


else going to decide whether I should have been 


monitored or whether I was monitored? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Yeah, Mark, can you clarify 


that for us? You can't right now, but -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: No -- yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- it will be part of what we 


provide, because we have to provide that same 


information to the Department of Labor to 


administer this. So the likelihood is it will 

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relate to building locations, is my 


understanding. 


 A question here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm from the Rocky Mountain 


News. I'd like to clarify whether the thorium 


issue can apply to everyone or just certain 


people who worked with thorium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just certain people who 


worked with thorium, and that's correct, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just the individuals who have 


worked with thorium, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: So the effect of this vote is 


you've excluded almost everyone. Is that 


right? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) You can't prove (unintelligible). 


UNIDENTIFIED: I think they want to know the 


answer to that question -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- on how you voted. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, right now the periods from 

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'59 onward are not acted upon. They are 


deferred till the next meeting. The issues 


will be individuals who were exposed -- or were 


monitored or should have been monitored for 


neutrons, so that's a -- probably a large 


number of people, individuals exposed to 


thorium, and then the -- the building 81 issue, 


so --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) How are you going to 


(unintelligible) the contractors are 


(unintelligible) documentation (unintelligible) 


prove you were out there? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) report. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm -- a question --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) the steel 


workers signed the cards, they kept records for 


the steel workers. You have numerous vendors, 


contractors, people that moved in and out of 


those buildings prior to '59. How you going to 


prove who it was that came and gone? How --

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how you going to prove it? A lot of them are 


probably not even around anymore. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Gen, did you have an 


additional comment, or -- okay. 


Members of the press, do you have any 


additional questions that you need clarified? 


Okay. 


Dr. Lockey has a comment. 


 DR. LOCKEY: This comment is -- is more generic 


in nature, and it has to do with when the 


EEOICPA law was passed, it was a laudable 


effort initially to recognize and provide at 


least some compensation for people who were 


injured in the nuclear production industry. It 


was a patched-together law -- I think Jim would 


probably support that -- trying to get it 


passed through a very difficult political 


situation. 


Over the ensuing years, as NIOSH and SC&A and 


this Board have tried to work -- and 


petitioners, particularly petitioners -- have 


tried to work with this law, there are parts of 


it that don't work. It's created conflict and 


it's created frustration and it's been very 


time-consuming. And there's no -- there's no 

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question about that. So there's parts of this 


law that need to be streamlined and fixed -- 


fixed. 


Now you know, we go to St. Louis and we pass 


Mallinckrodt, and the Congressional delegation 


is there, like they are here today, supporting 


their constituency. They get their SCE (sic). 


But you know, I'm not -- it's not clear to me 


that, other than representing their state, 


we're representing everybody in the United 


States. This is a bipartisan issue -- 


Republican, Democrat -- 'cause these plants 


were spread throughout the United States. The 


law needs to be updated, streamlined and made 


more user-friendly. 


If I was in your situation and I got a 48 


percent PC, and my neighbor that I worked with 


for 30 years got a 52 percent PC, then I would 


be just beside myself. That's understandable. 


That is clearly understandable, and that type 


of conflict needs to be eliminated. There's 


ways to do it and Dr. Melius has suggested ways 


in the past. 


It's really your Congressional people who need 


to step forward and not just represent you here 

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in Colorado, but represent the rest of the 


workers in this industry throughout the United 


States to streamline this law and update it to 


make it more user-friendly. It's their duty. 


We're trying to work within the law, and we 


have good people in NIOSH who are -- who are 


public servants, who are preventive health, 


public health oriented. They're doing their 


damnedest to get the work done, and SC&A's the 


same way, and people on this Board are the same 


way. But we were constrained by a law that has 


a catch-22 -- 180 days to reconstruct radiation 


doses, generate new science that takes -- that 


can take years? That's what the law is -- it 


put us into conflict, and it needs to be 


changed. It needs to be updated. It needs to 


be streamlined, and the conflict needs to be 


taken out of it. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. 


MS. FRANK: I'm Laura Frank from the Rocky 


Mountain News. So the press just wants to be 


clear for what we report next. The petition 


before you includes everyone who ever worked at 


Rocky Flats. You have carved out, if I'm 


clear, a 1952 to 1958 piece of people who were 

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exposed -- potentially, who -- which should 


have been monitored or were monitored for 


neutron dose. Does that mean the rest of the 


potential class is still before you, or only 


those people who fall into the three categories 


that you're continuing to look at for next 


month? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Only th-- only those other 


categories that we're looking forward to. 


MS. FRANK: So everyone else is out. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's right. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, no, next month we would be 


looking at the other time periods. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right --


 MR. GRIFFON: Only three categories. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- right. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 

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I 

 DR. ZIEMER: That's correct. That's correct, 


that's correct. 


Okay. Let's take a brief ten-minute break. 


know the press folks may have additional 


questions. We'll -- we'll catch our breath 


here and then we'll resume. Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:20 p.m. 


to 3:00 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's -- I'd like to ask you 


to be seated and we'll come back to order. 


It's -- it's very clear to the Chairman that 


there's been a lot of confusion on what action 


was taken and -- and what was covered and what 


wasn't. Let -- let me try to clarify and I -- 


I'm aware that sometimes clarifications make 


things even more confusing. 


The action that the Board has taken will 


recommend to the Secretary the addition of 


special cohort status to a group of individuals 


from the '52 to '58 time frame who were 


monitored, or should have been monitored, for 


neutrons. So it's a subset of the total group 


in that time period. 


We have not taken specific action on the rest 


of the time periods, including '59 to '64, 

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which was segmented out; '65 to '68; '69 to 


'70; or '70 and onward. 


Now there was some question as to -- since the 


neutron, the -- and thorium in Building 81 


issues tend to focus on those three middle 


groups, did that automatically exclude '70 and 


beyond. It's the Chair's ruling that the '70 


and beyond is still an open question for two 


reasons. Number one, the thorium issue could 


indeed extend beyond '70; we don't know that. 


Number two, it would be my intent that the 


Board specifically go on record with '70 and 


beyond period, to either vote it up or vote it 


down, so it's very clear where the Board stands 


on that; that it not simply be -- fall by the 


wayside simply by exclusion. So it would -- 


it's the Chair's intent that at our next 


meeting we take specific action on all of the 


remaining time periods so that everybody knows 


what the recommendation is on all of those and 


what groups are specifically covered. 


So what is -- what has transpired is the 


recommendation to add one subset to the Special 


Exposure Cohort, and the possibility then is 


open to add additional subsets from the 

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remaining time periods. So I hope that is a 


little more clear than it apparently was at the 


time of the break. And we're --


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we're not -- we're not sure 


whether the media will make it more or less 


clear as they attempt to explain this, because 


they've talked to different folks and I think 


have gotten different versions of what Board 


members thought they were voting on, and so -- 


and that's unfortunate, and I'm -- I'm sorry if 


that occurred. But we -- we -- we hope that 


that adds some clarity. 


Yes, I'll allow a question here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: May I ask a question? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, you say you're going to 


vote on people prior to '59 on for thorium and 


-- 'cause the neutron -- photon thing -- photon 


thing. How you going to prove from '59 on up 


for everybody else that might have been exposed 


to thorium? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I think that remains to -- 


for the Board when we get our material next 

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time. I can't predict what the Board might do 


at that point, but at least those time periods 


are still open before us, so that will be the 


main order, and basically the only order of 


business as we return, hopefully in a month, 


and -- and try to pin down the final answer on 


those. 

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BETHLEHEM STEEL SEC PETITION
 

DR. SAM GLOVER, NIOSH, OCAS
 

PETITIONER


 DR. ZIEMER: Now we have a -- another SEC 


petition. It's Bethlehem Steel. Is Sam here? 


We're going to have a presentation from Sam 


Glover of NIOSH, and then we'll hear from the 


petitioner on this one. Sam Glover. 


 DR. GLOVER: Sorry for the unannounced change 


in the schedule. Some of the people calling in 


from the east coast -- Ed Walker -- I think 


this helps with some of the -- just timeliness. 


So this is a -- something that's been worked on 


for a long time with the Board and SC&A. I 


started work with NIOSH January -- let's see, 


over two -- a little over two years ago. When 


I came in the door, Bethlehem Steel was the 


topic that I was handed to begin work on. 


So what today we'd like to talk about is the 


SEC petition 56 concerning Bethlehem Steel. 


I'm going to -- I have a lot of slides. 


There's about 48. Some of them, however, are 


going to go fairly quickly. Some of this is to 


put some of this in background and perspective. 


Most of the Board was present during this time 


frame, but I thought we'd go ahead and take a 


little bit of time and -- we've spent a lot of 

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time on these issues and so I thought -- as 


Larry said, take as much time as necessary, so 


I thought I'd make them -- all the issues 


clear. 


A large -- Bethlehem Steel is a large 


manufacturing facility located in Lackawanna, 


New York. Bethlehem Steel Corporation 


purchased the facility in 1922, and by the end 


of World War II there were over 20,000 


employees at Lackawanna. 


Now I want to make clear that Bethlehem Steel 


is a large corporation, whereas this is the 


Bethlehem Steel Corporation at Lackawanna, New 


York. 


The facility in question -- I'm trying to see 


if we have a laser pointer -- is a state-ofthe-art continuous rolling mill that was added 


in 1947. It's called the ten-inch bar mill. 


And I apologize for the lack of clarity. 


There's not a lot of pictures available for 


Lackawanna facility, but there's actually a 


book called Fire and Ice, and they document the 


changes with time. Here you can see just the 


general size. It's the only real purpose that 


I added for this. The scale is -- for every 

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little increment of measurement, we have about 


500 feet. This is a large plant with many 


facilities, and of which -- this is a 1930 -- 


of which in 1947 they added the ten-inch bar 


mill. 


Mr. Walker provided this very nice picture of 


the ten-inch bar mill, showing one of the 


fastest and most up-to-date mills in the 


country in this time frame. It was actually an 


18-stand rolling mill, of which the last six -- 


which were later renumbered one through six, if 


you actually look at the records -- were used 


to roll uranium. So here you see the long 


string of stands that would just continuously 


crush the ur-- the metal rods into the shape 


that was desired. 


So a little bit about the time frame. In this 


time, there was a need by Hanford to have 


metallic uranium, which -- in billet form, 


rolled into rods which could be put into the 


reactor for plutonium production. These are --


essentially came from Mallinckrodt, a subject 


which you guys have spent a lot of time on, in 


four and a half inch diameter by 12 to 20-inch 


length materials. They were rough-rolled -- or 

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actually the first phase was Hanford actually 


extruded them. From 1944 to 1947 they would 


make a one and a half inch rod 12 to 14 feet 


long. These rods were straightened, cut, 


machined into eight-inch slugs which then were 


packaged for irradiation to make plutonium. 


At that time frame, though, they began having a 


lot of problems with the plugging of the tubes 


in the reactors. And so because of that, what 


they noticed was that there was a metallic 


phase -- a very detailed, metallurgical problem 


-- that it would cause expansion if it was in 


the wrong form. And so they thought well, if 


we roll the material, we're not seeing those 


same problems. So they went from an extrusion 


process to a rolling process. 


 Also, another change occurred in 1947. The New 


York Operations Office took control of the 


uranium supply, so this also changed some of 


the politics and -- and how things were 


occurring in the country, so that would have 


been when AEC took control of the -- of the 


entire program. 


So 1948 Hanford switched to an off-site rolling 


program that reduced the cost and had better 

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metallurgical properties versus the extrusion 


process. These off-site rolling programs were 


expected to be a short-term solution. 


 Two other sites which you guys are probably 


taking up, or at least discussed, were Josylin 


Manufacturing, and also Simonds Saw and Steel. 


These two facilities provided much of the 


rolled material from the late 1940s to the 


early 1950s. 


So detailed health -- let's see. The Health 


and Safety Laboratory of New York Operations 


Office, later called HASL; the Environmental 


Measurements Laboratory -- or actually its 


correct name in 1946 would have been the Health 


and Safety Division of the AEC -- was 


responsible for the safety aspects of the 


uranium programs of the NYOO. The AEC 


recognized that long-term off-site rolling 


programs was inappropriate. They recognized 


that they had overexposure situations. They 


documented that in a 1949 status report. 


In 1952 or thereabouts Fernald was created to ­

- to stop this temporary solution, to bring the 


Mallinckrodt and these rolling programs into 


one facility. 

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So then the AEC contracted with Bethlehem Steel 


to improve the rolling pass schedules for a 


continuous rolling mill, which is what was 


expected Fernald to be. They expected to use a 


continuous rolling mill process, and so they 


needed to understand how was this process going 


to be implemented. Bethlehem Steel had an upto-date, modern rolling mill -- continuous 


rolling mill, and so they found an opportunity 


to do experimental runs to validate the Fernald 


pass. So the goals of the Bethlehem Steel 


rolling program were to finish roll rough-


rolled bars that came from either Simonds Saw 


or Aliquippa on an experimental basis. Not all 


of the rods from Simonds Saw, not all the rods 


from Aliquippa, but before they came to 


Bethlehem Steel they had been rough-rolled into 


a smaller diameter. 


They also wanted to compare lead bath and salt 


bath technologies. Before this the material 


had just been rolled in a raw form. They had a 


lot of oxidation problems associated with that, 


so by using a lead bath they found that it 


coated the material and provided reduced 


oxidation. And they also wanted to test what 

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happens with a salt bath, which was eventually 


used at Fernald. That would -- to increase the 


product through-put and also increase health 


and safety consequences. 


They also were interested in seeing whether 


they heat-treated the rods and billets after 


they were rolled, could that induce the same 


phase changes that would not cause the problems 


of -- in the reactors. They were, again, 


having the issue with the material expanding 


and plugging up the tubes, which was costing 


production. 


 The production of finish-rolled rods from rough 


rods, that was the final main purpose. 


So they started with that and that set the 


background a little bit, why was Bethlehem 


Steel involved with this, what were some of the 


other facilities around them. 


 The SEC submission was submitted on 3/13/2006. 


It was qualified on October (sic) 29th, 2006. 


It designated as SEC-56, Federal Register
 

notice posted 9/7/2006 and an evaluation report 


issued February 21, 2007. The proposed class 


was submitted to NIOSH on behalf of a class of 


employees consisting of the millwrights, 

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welders, electricians, brick layers, 


carpenters, all maintenance, testers, rollers, 


supervisors, crane operators, hookers, clean-up 


crews and grinders who worked in the 10-inch 


bar mill and Blooming Mill from the years '49 


to '52. This is a 10-inch bar mill, and the 


blooming mill is a roughing area, for a rough-


rolling area. 


NIOSH evaluated the following class: All 


Atomic Weapons Employer personnel at the 


Bethlehem Steel Corporation who were monitored, 


or should have been monitored, for exposure to 


uranium during uranium-rolling activities at 


the Bethlehem Steel, Lackawanna, New York 


facility from January 1, 1949 through December 


31st, 1952. 


So we removed those exclusions. We -- all 


employees at the facility. 


Sources that were evaluated for this included 


the site profile documents, and these were -- 


as you know, you were involved with a great 


deal of changes that went on. SC&A and NIOSH 


did a lot of work and were -- ingestion and a 


lot of different -- how -- what models were 


used to interpret -- and triangular 

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distribution versus a lognormal -- how did all 


these things affect the probability of 


causation, so a great deal of input and 


workload of the Board was done. We had the 


first Technical Basis Document, which was done 


at the very beginning of the program, Technical 


Basis 1, Rev. 0, issued March 31, 2003; 


superseded later by a June 29th, 2004 document. 


And that was most recently supervi-- superseded 


by Rev. 1 of -- it should actually be Rev. 0 


because we actually -- that became a NIOSH 


document. That should be OCAS Technical Basis 


003 Rev. 0 issued July 21, 2006. 


Another site profile document that's referenced 


is a Simonds Saw and Steel document which we'll 


discuss. 


 Technical Information Bulletins included the X-


ray procedures and the maximum plausible dose 


to workers of Atomic Weapons Employers. 


A lot of outreach efforts were conducted -- May 


4th, 2004; July 1st, 2004. On January 12th, 


2004 there was a town hall meeting. On June 


26th, 2006 there was a very detailed worker 


outreach meeting that was conducted to get 


worker input. Had extensive discussions with 

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the Board, with Mr. Walker, with individuals 


from this class. During the site profile 


evaluations we also conducted some -- an 


interview with a former employer on October -- 


employee on October 26th, 2006 to get 


additional information. 


A hundred and forty-one documents were 


evaluated as -- in our SR -- site research 


database. These contain information on the 


background, process information, trip reports, 


air sampling datasheets, Formerly Utilized Site 


Remedial Action Program reports and residual 


contamination surveys; documentation and 


affidavits provided the submissioner (sic) 


included 69 affidavits. The Wayne Range 


letter, which we also had previously, was also 


submitted. This has been included in our 


Technical Basis Document. 


So as I discussed, the site -- the Bethlehem 


Steel site profile was the subject of an 


extensive Board review that has lasted at least 


a year and a half. It had two separate reviews 


by SC&A, numerous Board working group meetings 


at which Bethlehem Steel profile was discussed. 


At the end, we believe that all open items were 

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closed and that a new -- prior to the issuance 


of a new site profile in July of 2006. 


 The NIOSH Claims Tracking System -- now this 


was as the time the pro-- that this was 


submitted, my boss, Larry Elliott, had probably 


the most up-to-date statistics of which 


Bethlehem Steel would have been evaluated, but 


this record -- I just left this as the document 


was -- was written -- 732 cases which matched 


the class definition; 634 for which dose 


reconstruction has been completed. We do not 


have internal dosimetry information, no 


bioassay. We don't have external dosimetry 


information directly on these individuals. We 


do have air monitoring data that was conducted 


at Bethlehem Steel. We also have Computer-


Assisted Telephone Interview information from 


workers and their surviving spouses -- the 


survivors. 


So the -- I'm going to read an extensive 


petition basis, parts that were included in the 


petition. These included that information from 


Simonds Saw and Steel was not a valid 


comparison to Bethlehem Steel. They also 


(unintelligible) that other buildings were 

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involved in the uranium work, including the 


blooming mill, that we did not consid-- NIOSH 


did not consider the sub-basement under the 


cooling bed, nor the cooling bed above; that 


there were no records for the time period from 


'49 to 1950. The workers were not supplied 


with personal protective equipment. Thirteen 


tons of radioactive materials were left at 


Bethlehem Steel site. The amount of uranium 


rolling that was listed could not have been 


done in a 10-hour day. The work at Bethlehem 


Steel involved more manual labor than Simonds 


Saw and Steel -- this was discussed in the site 


profile document as a part of it, about why 


Simonds Saw would be a bounding -- and we can ­

- we'll discuss that briefly; that the 


government admitted to destroying records. The 


work areas could not have been cleaned in one 


day. 


NIOSH -- that -- further, NIOSH initially 


stated that the highest dust levels were at the 


rollers and then later that NIOSH stated that 


the highest exposures were somewhere else; that 


grinding had not been initially recognized or 


incorporated into the Bethlehem Steel Technical 

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Basis Document. The workers ate and drank in 


dusty areas and could have ingested uranium; 


that workers wore contaminated clothing. 


So let's discuss some of the radiological 


operations. 


 Uranium billets were prepared by Mallinckrodt. 


It's documented that they were rough-rolled at 


Simonds Saw, and after that at Aliquippa Forge. 


They were shipped to Lackawanna on freight cars 


for finish rolling. Based on numerous 


documents, the work was involved only at the 


10-inch bar mill. 


 The rollings typically occurred on the weekend 


because of production needs of the mill during 


the work week. Documents interviews report 


strict accountability practices regarding the 


collection of scale, residues, fines and 


cropped ends. We actually have a document that 


-- from the Tonawanda sub-office that actually 


reports that -- how many bundles of cobbled 


rods and the number of drums of scrap material 


that were shipped from Bethlehem Steel, so -- 


and that went to Lake Ontario Ordnance Works, 


and that was November, 1951. 

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 We're actually investigating trying to see if 


we can find further documents, but this is 50 


years ago so we don't have a full accounting. 


Department of Labor originally established the 


period from 1948 to 1949. NIOSH obtained 


documents showing that the rollings occurred -- 


we found that the rollings occurred from '51 to 


'52 and DOL extended the time period. The 


first documented rolling occurred in April of 


1951. In addition to the documented rolling 


days, NIOSH assumed one rolling day per month 


beginning in January, 1948 and ending in 


December of 1952, has continued to evaluate the 


'49 -- actually should be January of 1949 to 


December of 1952 -- the '49 to '50 time period 


as if one rolling occurred per month to ensure 


claimant favorability. I apologize for that 


error on the slide. 


No bioassay or external dosimetry data is 


available for Lackawanna. As Larry pointed out 


yesterday, this is a modeled analysis. 


The Health and Safety Laboratory, and later 


National Lead -- Fernald -- conducted air and 


surface radioactivity monitoring during the 


various rolling activities. Data are evaluated 

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with the rolling (sic) collected at Simonds Saw 


and Steel for rollings conducted in the '49 to 


'50 time period. I'll discuss that in the next 


slides. We assumed a heavy worker model to 


evaluate intakes. 


Why is Simo-- why -- why Simonds Saw and Steel? 


Simonds Saw and Steel was one of the largest 


suppliers of rolled uranium for Hanford. In 


October of 1948 -- October 27th, to be specific 


-- the -- Simonds Saw had not implemented the 


recommended changes by the Health and Safety 


Laboratory. We have air monitoring data that 


occurred before they made changes to the 


facility, which included additions of ducts and 


addition of grading and other materials which 


makes the exposures higher than later on, so we 


only used data from that one day, that 19-- 


that October 27th, 1948 rolling. 


The uranium was not coated with lead or salt 


during this time period. Furthermore, samples 


were collected for extremely short periods of 


time during the periods of the highest 


concentration. That data, those very short 


spikes in the air concentration, was what was 


used for the entire 10-hour day, and you'll see 

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what those numbers -- the highest exposed 


worker by the Health and Safety Laboratory was 


-- was calculated to be about 190 MAC at 


Simonds Saw and Steel. One MAC, or Maximum 


Acceptable Concentration, is 70 dpm of natural 


uranium. 


This -- sorry, this -- this graph shows 95th 


percentile, the 553 MAC, which is used to 


evaluate the workers at Bethlehem Steel from 


the Simonds Saw and Steel data. Unfortunately 


I don't have a laser pointer, but you can see 


we use -- in this -- again, part of an 


extensive discussion, but the 95th percentile 


is used to evaluate those entire -- that entire 


period. Originally a triangular distribution 


was used. Eventually this was the updated 


Technical Basis Document. You see only one 


datapo-- that's two datapoints collected that 


entire day, exceed that number, and those -- 


what drives most of this is the rolling mill. 


The rolling process is what drives this 95th 


percentile. 


 Data collected at Bethlehem Steel from 1951 to 


1952 during various rollings. Data consists of 


204 measurements, one of which was considered 

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illegible. We actually went and got the 


original documents from the DOE, looked at the 


legibility, verified what the numbers actually 


said, got the best information that we could 


and one of them still couldn't be read. 


They're paper -- they're onionskin records, 


five of which were QC, so that left us with 198 


measurements at various locations in the mill. 


They were evaluating salt and lead bath 


technologies, so these were at -- measured 


during various times; when those technologies 


were used what was the efficacy of the salt 


bath. 


The fraction of breathing zone samples was not 


as large at Simonds Saw and so a -- what they 


call a supplemented dataset wa-- using 


surrogate breathing zone samples was evaluated, 


or was actually used. So we said all right, 


well, here are the general air samples at 


Simonds Saw; here's the breathing zone samples, 


what kind of a ratio do we see, so we could get 


a larger breathing zone set. Those 


measurements actually drive the upper end of 


our -- of the distribution that you're going to 


see. 

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In addition to the breathing zone and general 


air samples, we also supplemented this with 


process samples, and I apologize for getting 


into the detail, but of those measurements -- 


process samples are things right over top of 


the -- of a process, where a worker would not 


be expected to be, right over -- you know, so 


this -- these are not -- by HASL definition, 


were not supposed to be used, that they were 


not appropriate for worker exposures, that they 


would be -- it's not an area where a worker 


would -- would be able to be. 


This graph shows -- these are the actual air 


monitoring results during the various time 


frames. You can see that in the very 


beginning, 1951 -- of -- of May, or actually 


that's that April rolling, you see a pretty 


good spread. And the 225 MAC is what the TBD 


now is eval-- how it's being used to evaluate 


workers during this time frame. We had a 225 


MAC and later 70 MAC, which 400 -- 4,900 dpm 


per meter cubed. This is the actual 


measurements. You see only one measurement 


point exceeded that 225 MAC. 


These are the actual -- do we have a laser? 

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Ah, see what happens with a little bit of 


training? It's not big, but there we have -- 


so here we have actual and augmented data for 


Bethlehem Steel. This is where the general air 


samples were taken using the factor determined 


at Simonds Saw and Steel from the -- the ratio 


of general air to breathing zone samples, and 


we basically created additional breathing zone 


samples, which really drive these data up here 


-- actually, I'm sorry, this data here is 


driven by these created samples. You can see 


here the 95th percentile of the actual data is 


87 MAC. When we supplement the dataset, the 


95th percentile becomes 225 MAC, so a 


significant increase by using this data. Some 


of that was driven by the lack of information 


on the sheets. They did not include whether it 


was a process or general air sample, and so 


therefore, even though they were very high, 


they were assumed to be GA samples and this 


factor was applied to them. Again, a lot of 


that upper end data is because of that. 


This summarizes the rollings that are 


documented. Here's the April 26th, the 27th, 


1951. This is designated experiment number one, 

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26 billets were rolled, both lead and salt were 


evaluated. We have air monitoring data. I'm 


not going to belabor this slide, but you can 


see in the very beginning they had both lead 


and salt bath. That was that initial period 


why we have that 225 MAC, and then they went to 


only salt rollings. The first five rollings 


were designated experimental, and then they 


began some production runs. 


This was driven because Fernald was not ready. 


Savannah River needed uranium, and so these 


production runs were essentially to support the 


Savannah River start-up. So you can see the 


number of billets that were rolled, and we have 


air monitoring data in this time frame, as 


well. 


I don't want to get too detailed. You have 


this -- and I apologize if the size is not good 


for a slide, but we have the general -- how we 


do dosimetry at Bethlehem Steel in these 


various time frames. From '49 to '50 in the 


10-inch bar mill, although no documentation or 


records have been found to substantiate the 


rolling operations were actually performed, 


uranium rolling is assumed to have been 

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performed. Simonds Saw and Steel is used as a 


surrogate, assuming no protective coatings or 


ventilation was applied. 


So I want to make it clear that the data 


includes the roughing operation. Simonds Saw 


roughed the rolls and then finish-rolled them, 


so in the data that we used for that October 


27th rolling, roughing is included in that as 


part of the assessment. 


 All workers are assumed to be affected at the 


95th percentile value of the maximum dose 


potential dataset. We have added a cobble-


cutting dose model. We've added a number of 


particular issues which were also discussed, 


including ingestion and contaminated workers -- 


contaminated clothing. 


From January '51 to September of '51 both lead 


and salt bath technologies were being utilized. 


Mostly GA samples were being performed, and we 


talked about the breathing zones and GA ratios 


and the surrogate data that was used. Again, 


all workers are assumed to be affected at the 


95th percentile. Again we've also included 


cobble-cutting dose model for people who may 


have been cobble cutters. 

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 From September of '51 through the end of '52 


the salt bath technology only was utilized. 


This resulted in an extremely large decrease in 


air concentration at the rolling mill. So 


other potential technologies and processes 


became potentially limiting. One sample, a 


grinding operation, a process sample was used 


which had a 4,900 dpm per meter cubed for the 


entire period as a bounding air sample, so the 


se-- that 70 MAC air, that's where that number 


comes from. It is a process sample for -- and 


that is in line with other grinding samples 


that were taken at other facilities, and that 


is used as the bounding number as treating 


everybody basically as a grinder. 


Now these various -- the original TBD -- some 


of the different discussions that occur in the 


petition -- use a triangular distribution over 


the entire time frame. This period we've done 


quite a bit more with effective -- of time and 


-- and so because of that, time becomes more 


important potentially on how worker -- the 


doses are actually calculated because if you 


worked in a later frame you see that there's a 


significant reduction, from 553 MAC to 225 MAC 

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to 70 MAC during those various time frames. 


An area we spent a great deal of time on was 


cobble cutters. A cobble is -- I like what -- 


is -- is a train wreck, is what we've been 


describ-- basically these rolling mills had to 


operate in sync, and if they -- if something 


got out of sequence, a little bit of a bend in 


the bar, a cobble would occur and that bar 


coul-- it couldn't pass through the rolling 


mill. That material had to be removed. Work--


worker discussions included -- you know, they 


would cut out what they could, but they want to 


keep the bar mill operating. The -- they have 


a crane appli-- a crane would actually take 


this material, remove it to a fac-- another 


area and someone would cut that up to a 


manageable unit. 


We evaluated the frequency of the cobble -- 


these are things they were concerned about. 


They want to know how often these different 


pass technologies would create a cobble, and so 


they actually record, in the day we have air 


sample data, in the rolling reports how many 


cobbles they had. So we used that information, 


worker interviews assisted with the location 

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and nature and time of the cobble-cutting. The 


Tonawanda reports clearly show repeat (sic) of 


both drum residue and bundles of cobbled rods 


from Bethlehem Steel as part of the scrap 


program. 


There was some discussion at one time about 


cutting up into very small pieces and put them 


all in drums. We've seen actually where 


material had been -- rods had been removed from 


the Tonawanda facility for various applications 


at Hanford, who was interested in what the 


metallurgical properties were, and also based 


on the Tonawanda reports -- so cobbles were 


essentially taken off-line using crane 


necessary cutting allow the rolling to 


continue. 


Based on interviews, the cobbles were cut up by 


one employee. We evaluate the intake rate, 


time required and particle size during a 


cutting, and essentially about two hours per 


day the cobble cutter is assigned 600 MAC at .5 


micrometers. That's based on data that was 


developed for high temperature operation 


cutting operations. Eight hours a day they're 


evaluated at 70 MAC exposure using a 5 micron 

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particle size, 'cause if you were a cobble 


cutter you weren't also going to be a roller, 


not on a continual basis. Rollers could 


potentially help remove the cobble from the 


line. 


 Employees ate and drank in the areas, so this 


was something that the Board and SC&A -- we 


worked on to include ingestion in the Bethlehem 


Steel models. This is assumed to occur both 


during the rolling days and between the rolling 


days. Air concentration was used to determine 


the surface loading, and a dilution model -- 


because five out of the seven days they were 


using this -- actually 29 out of the 30 days of 


the month they were rolling steel. 


So this graph kind of gives you an idea of the 


surface contamination versus the air 


concentration data. This is a compilation of 


data from both Simonds Saw and Bethlehem Steel. 


Rolling data was used to determine the rolling 


day surface contamination values, and general 


air samples were used to determine non-rolling 


day data. 


Mr. Walker should have been an artist. He 


provided us a very nice sketch -- to SC&A and 

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to NIOSH -- as part of this process. This is 


the sub-basement area below the cooling beds, 


and you see a very large 70-foot wide basement 


area with various machinery down here. This is 


obviously one of the areas they're concerned 


about. Uranium would fall through the grating, 


as would steel, and occasionally this material 


would have to be cleaned out. This basement 


area was specifically evaluated to ensure that 


we included the basement area. It required 


occasional cleanup. Worker interviews indicate 


intermittent occupancy. Somebody was not 


always down in this facility. 


Source term data, if you're at the rolling mill 


as a roller, that will bound your inhalation 


exposure. We also -- that steel and uranium 


will mix to dilute the source term as a 


function of time during the month. 


External sources of exposure include uranium 


dust, which if you look at the TBD, this is a 


very low dose. Direct contact with uranium, 


primarily a shallow dose but it also has a deep 


dose component. Residual contamination, reuse 


of contaminated clothing, workers could work up 


to two weeks without washing the clothing. And 

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also occupational medical dose. 


So direct contact dose with the billets was ev­

- was evaluated using a triangular distribution 


to look at the shallow dose and the beta 


particles. Minimum was calculated using -- a 


worker was one meter from the uranium source 


for one hour per day for -- he had a 10-hour 


shift, which evaluates to 90 millirem per 


rolling day. The mode of that was set as the 


survey data from Simonds Saw and Steel, which 


is determined to be about 150 millirem per 


rolling day. The maximum was calculated to be 


six hours at one foot from the extended uranium 


source, which is 150 millirad per hour, and 


four hours at one meter from the source at 90 


millirads per hour. Each of these was 


multiplied by the number of rolling days that 


occurred, and also the deep dose was evaluated 


also on a triangular basis. 


 Residual contamination, the Simonds Saw and 


Steel, which rolled many, many, many tons more 


than Bethlehem Steel did, was used as a 


bounding situation. We assumed that 1.25 times 


ten to the seventh dpm per meter squared were 


on the surfaces at all times for the entire 

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four-year operations. These are the annual 


doses to the skin, which is the largest dose 


from this, bone surfaces, and other organs -- 


primarily the skin, at 1.7 rem per year is the 


major source -- or major dose. 


 Contaminated clothing was -- based on worker 


interviews, was assumed to be worn for two 


weeks after the rolling. Mallinckrodt 


clothing, from their laundry experience where 


they had lots of radium and other contaminants, 


was used to calculate the bounding dose. 


Assigned 1.5 millirem per hour to the skin at 


ten hours per day. This results in 1.8 rem per 


year shallow dose. 


As you're familiar with, occupational medical 


dose -- the AEC did require at several 


facilities. There is no real documentation at 


Bethlehem Steel if this was required, but we do 


assume a pre-employment and periodic annual X-


ray in keeping with AEC practices at larger AWE 


facilities. 


We did -- actually the Bethlehem Steel site has 


been a part of probably a number of the Board's 


reviews and dose reconstruction processes. We 


did six dose reconstruction examples just to 

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provide some flavor of how the thing changed 


with -- with time. Some of the original ones, 


again, were done with triangular distribution, 


and now we have this changing exposure models 


as a function of when you may have begun 


employment. We looked at several cancers, 


employment periods, and also cobble-cutting 


activities. And this period was also part of a 


large Program Evaluation Report which Larry 


discussed yesterday. 


Lung cancer -- obvi-- you're not going to see 


97 percent POCs in our reports because we would 


stop after you get to 52 -- 50 percent. But 


just to give you some feeling for -- if from 


the '49 to '52 time frame, if you had a cancer 


sometime later, former smoker, the POC, 97 


percent. If you were a cobble cutter, again, 


the result -- a cobble cutter would not get 


that high rolling dose during the Simonds Saw 


time frame. They would get two hours at 600 


MAC and 70 MAC for the rest of the day, so it 


actually would reduce your overall exposure for 


your lung cancer. 


Kidney dose, or kidney cancer, not a smoker, 


not applicable; cobble cutter, no; worked from 

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'49 to '52, a POC of 47.9 percent. Obviously 


this is getting in area where you start -- it's 


-- you know, that it's close to compensable. 


Colon cancer, if you worked from 10/51 to '52, 


(unintelligible) the entire time frame, the 


POC's only 2.39 percent -- just showing the 


difference in a non-metabolic organ for uranium 


versus -- and also of course the incidence of 


cancer from -- or its radiogenic -- based on 


the radiogenic models in IREP. 


If you worked only part of the time, still lung 


cancer is paid, whether you're a cobble cutter 


or not a cobble cutter, this was not -- this is 


a hypothetical situation. Some people had 


cancers only a few years after their exposure, 


in which case this would not hold true, but 


these are just some examples to show what kind 


of probability of causations are -- are 


calculated, and I know you guys have looked at 


a lot of these different issues. But still, 


lung cancers are going to be paid at Bethlehem 


Steel what -- no matter what period you would 


have started working in, depending on the 


scenario. 


So as the evaluation report, NIOSH evaluated 

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the petition using the guidelines of 83 -- 42 


CFR 83.13, submitted an evaluation finding and 


petition evaluation report to the Advisory 


Board and to the petitioners. This was issued 


on February 21st, 2007. NIOSH found that 


available monitoring records, process 


descriptions and source term data were adequate 


to complete dose reconstructions with ade-- 


with sufficient accuracy for the proposed class 


of employees, and thus a health endangerment 


determination is not required. 


So a summary of our feasibility, that uranium, 


beta/gamma and occupational medical X-rays are 


all inclu-- as being -- dose reconstruction is 


feasible. 


You can find additional documentation regarding 


this in the document review \ AB document 


review \ Bethlehem Steel subfolder. 


So with that, I'd take any questions from the 


Board. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Sam. Of course we've 


had Bethlehem Steel on and off our -- our scope 


for a long time. I think almost all the cases 


from Bethlehem Steel have been previously 


reconstructed anyway, as -- as I recall, so I 

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guess the -- the remaining issue was the issue 


of using the Simonds Saw's model, as it were, 


for this facility, and it seemed to be a 


continual concern. But the recommendation then 


that comes from NIOSH is that you can 


reconstruct dose, that's the bottom line. 


 DR. GLOVER: Yes, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now let's open the floor for 


questions. Jim Melius, yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: I wasn't here -- can you hear me 


okay or do I need to get a little closer? 


I wasn't here yesterday, but I noticed in 


Larry's presentation the -- he has a 


distribution of probability of causation for 


Bethlehem Steel and it's the -- a very odd 


distribution, at least in comparison to most 


other sites. It's a bifurcated distribution. 


I don't know if he commented on that yester-- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, indeed, he did. Larry, you 


may want to repeat that comment, but it is due 


in part to the fact that the -- the model is 


applied I think to all workers at this site, 


and that makes a big difference, versus -- 


well, here's Jim. 


DR. NETON: I'm not Larry Elliott, but I think 

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I might be able to address the question. That 


odd distribution is -- is an artifact of the 


fact that it is a model that's applied to all ­

- all workers, one size fits all, and that as ­

- as Sam pointed out in his slide, that the 


respiratory tract cancers are virtually 100 


percent compensated at this site, in addition 


to a number of the skin cancers because the 


skin cancer doses are -- the skin doses are 


also very large. And then, save the skin 


cancers and the lung cancer models, the rest of 


the organs that don't concentrate uranium 


internally receive a very low dose. Same 


showed one example for the colon that had I 


think a two-point-something percent probability 


of causation. You would see very similar 


probability of causation calculations for 


organs that don't concentrate uranium, such as 


the prostate or the bladder or any other organ 


that doesn't -- doesn't concentrate those 


radionuclides, so you do have that real 


bifurcated distribution at Bethlehem Steel 


that's unusual compared to other sites. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I -- I would just point out 


probably as an observation, yeah -- and I think 

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I mentioned this before, this model's basically 


-- just takes into account the number of days 


that you worked there, or time period, and your 


-- and the organ site, and is -- actually is 


the SEC model that the Board rejected when 


NIOSH first appro-- in terms of the model 


approach for all SECs. Remember that first set 


of regulations that you presented to us was 


sort of an organ-specific one and we -- 


DR. NETON: But this is not organ-specific. 


This is --


 DR. MELIUS: Well --


DR. NETON: -- individual calculation is done 


for each organ, and where the numbers fall, 


they fall. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: Now the end result may be it 


appears to be somewhat organ-specific, but -- 


 DR. MELIUS: In -- in effect. 


DR. NETON: -- your point's taken. 


 DR. MELIUS: In -- in effect it is. 


DR. NETON: One thing I might add, though, this 


is not the only site that we have a one size 


fits all model. Many of the AWEs are -- are 


done this way. 

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 DR. MELIUS: No, I understand. I wasn't 


claiming it to be unique. It was just odd, 


different. 


I would just raise another concern that I have, 


and I hope it's still on the agenda for 


tomorrow, is a discussion of the legal basis of 


this issue of utilizing data from other sites. 


There's been serious questions raised about it 


and, you know, personally I'm not ready to take 


any action on this particular petition until 


I've heard some presentation and had a chance 


to better understand that issue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Other comments? 


 (No responses) 


 DR. WADE: Ed Walker. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is Ed Walker on the line? Ed 


Walker, are you on the line? 


 MR. WALKER: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Ed, we're asking if you're on 


the line and if you had any comments. 


(NOTE: Telephone connections continued to be a 


problem at this facility with only the random 


word from this speaker being intelligible, 


rendering full transcription impossible.) 


 MR. WALKER: Yes, (unintelligible) I want to 

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thank you again for letting me (unintelligible) 


the meeting, I really appreciate it. And I do 


have (unintelligible) try to keep it down 


(unintelligible) kept it down (unintelligible). 


I'm very, very disappointed (unintelligible) 


program rationale and they did (unintelligible) 


expert workers (unintelligible) technical 


(unintelligible) months before anyone talked 


(unintelligible) not including (unintelligible) 


I don't believe (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Ed, let me interrupt you a minute. 


We're having a great deal of difficulty 


understanding you. Are you on a speaker phone 


or --


 MR. WALKER: (Unintelligible) phone 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are you on a --


 MR. WALKER: Is that better? 


 DR. WADE: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Much better. 


 MR. WALKER: Is that better? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. WALKER: Can you hear me better now? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, that's much more plain. 


Could you proceed again? 

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 MR. WALKER: Sure. And one of the most 


important things was that site expert workers' 


input was (unintelligible) part of the 


(unintelligible), and here our -- our technical 


base (sic) document was 16 months old before 


(unintelligible) during a period it was 


(unintelligible) their conversation. So 


(unintelligible) it was never looked into, it 


is my understanding. I had a call prior to the 


technical base (sic) document where I asked a 


question and (unintelligible) the building was 


still there, which tells me (unintelligible) at 


all 16 months after the technical base (sic) 


document (unintelligible), and at that point I 


(unintelligible) asked (unintelligible) to come 


up and meet with the claimants (unintelligible) 


the site with the claimants -- come up and to 


listen to some of the (unintelligible). We 


take (unintelligible) NIOSH (unintelligible) 


come up at all and this is 16 months after 


(unintelligible) I was (unintelligible) I 


watched (unintelligible) work there. I worked 


there for 40 years and I know the conditions in 


the plant. And I know from what I heard in 


that (unintelligible) years, it's 

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(unintelligible) people at NIOSH, they do not 


realize what those workers went through and the 


dirt and the (unintelligible) many times 


(unintelligible). So I know, I was there. 
I 


(unintelligible) to get some information 


(unintelligible) talked to some 


(unintelligible) experts and (unintelligible) 


to talk to our people (unintelligible) 


researched (unintelligible) with NIOSH on 


(unintelligible) the people that 


(unintelligible) and make sure they were people 


that (unintelligible) at the plant and really 


worked there (unintelligible) I was very 


careful. I didn't want to (unintelligible) 


NIOSH (unintelligible) come out and tell the 


truth, so I'm very disappointed the way they 


approached that, the claimant input, and I 


think (unintelligible) after we had that 


(unintelligible) months after (unintelligible) 


I was told that you used surrogate information. 


I have to be (unintelligible) from Simonds Saw, 


it would be very reasonable to understand 


(unintelligible) Simonds Saw (unintelligible). 


When I inquired about it, Simonds Saw 


(unintelligible) hadn't even been completed, so 

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(unintelligible) months after you were 


(unintelligible) information from 


(unintelligible) that didn't even 


(unintelligible) and a question about surrogate 


information (unintelligible). I couldn't hear 


very well, but I think that Dr. Melius 


(unintelligible) there was some question and 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Ed. 


 MR. WALKER: (Unintelligible) talking about our 


people (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Ed, for your 


comments. 


 Board members, do you have comments, questions, 


either of Ed or of -- of NIOSH staff? 


 (No responses) 


I want to ask Dr. Melius, you raised an -- a 


question regarding -- I -- I think you used the 


term legality of the use of the other 


facility's data -- am I quoting that right? 


Were -- were you suggesting a particular action 


or just -- I -- I assume it was more than a 


rhetorical question. 


 DR. MELIUS: Well, it's more than a rhetorical 


question. It's been raised by a number of the 

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Congressional representatives -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I understand that. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- about that and -- and I guess 


my personal view was I was not ready to take 


any action on this particular petition since 


it's -- the actual dose reconstruction is so 


dependent on the use of data from Simonds Saw 


and, to a lesser extent, from Mallinckrodt that 


-- until I've had a chance to hear some 


presentation from NIOSH regarding this issue. 


We had asked that it be put on the agenda and 


it's on the agenda tomorrow. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I guess -- that was the 


question, are we going to hear from counsel on 


-- or -- yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Yes, we're all right. Tomorrow it's 


scheduled at 10:00 o'clock. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, so the issue will arise. We 


don't need to take any action today -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- so then we can continue. Let's 


see where we are here -- I think we can go 


ahead --


 MR. BROEHM: Actually, Dr. Ziemer, I just 

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wanted to read into the record a letter that 


was received --


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, this --


 MR. BROEHM: -- by the Board from the New York 


delegation. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- right, and this is from the New 


York delegation --


 MR. BROEHM: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and it's pertinent, so Jason, 


if you would read that into the record we'd 


appreciate it. 


 MR. BROEHM: Okay. This is a letter from 


Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton, Charles 


Schumer, and then Representatives Brian 


Higgins, Thomas Reynolds and Louise Slaughter. 


 (Reading) Dear Dr. Ziemer: We urge you to 


recommend approval of the petition to create a 


Special Exposure Cohort for former Bethlehem 


Steel employees who worked at the plant from 


January 1st, 1949 through December 31st, 1952. 


We believe this petition should be promptly 


approved so as to give the necessary relief to 


former workers and their families who have 


struggled for decades because of dangerous 


exposure to radiation and other particulates. 

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The former Bethlehem Steel plant in Lackawanna, 


New York played a crucial part in the Cold War, 


and was a linchpin in western New York's 


industrial economy for over a century. 


Thousands worked long hours and under very 


difficult conditions to create modern machines, 


weapons and devices that were the technological 


innovations of their time. Work intensified 


throughout the first years of the Cold War as 


our country's demand for modern weapons and 


machines increased. 


Work at the Bethlehem Steel plant was 


hazardous, but at the time workers had no idea 


of the immense health risks associated with the 


uranium rolling. Specifically, during weekend 


shifts workers would process upwards of 350 


tons of uranium metal -- material, unknowingly 


ingesting radioactive dust during the process. 


Decades later, only after hundreds of former 


workers developed cancer, did the federal 


government take responsibility for this 


travesty. Passage of the Energy Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 


in 2000 was meant to provide compensation and 


relief to workers like those at Bethlehem Steel 

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who developed debilitating or fatal diseases 


due to work-related exposure to radioactive 


material in service to our nation. The law 


directed the Department of Labor to establish a 


process known as Special Exposure Cohort to 


decide groups of claims for facilities where a 


lack of data prevented dose reconstructions 


from being completed with sufficient accuracy. 


 Bethlehem Steel workers did not wear individual 


radiation exposure monitors when uranium 


rolling occurred. The few ambient air samples 


from between January 1st, 1949 and December 


31st, 1952 were taken at monitors that were far 


removed from the rollers where exposure was the 


greatest. Yet in spite of this complete lack 


of data about uranium exposure at Bethlehem 


Steel, NIOSH has used data from other 


facilities to reconstruct individual radiation 


doses for Bethlehem Steel claimants. In 


addition, NIOSH completed its initial profile 


of conditions at Bethlehem Steel, the document 


that is the basis for dose reconstruction, 


without even interviewing surviving workers. 


Former workers then came forward with 


information that demonstrated major flaws in 

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the site profile. 


While NIOSH has made some improvements to their 


site profile, the data needed to accurately 


reconstruct dose exposure for Bethlehem Steel 


workers does not exist. Under these 


circumstances, EEOICPA requires that Bethlehem 


Steel be placed in a special cohort. 


Finally, the denials are not based on records 


from the Bethlehem Steel plant, but from 


calculated reconstructions based on sampling 


from similar plants. Simply stated, it is 


wrong to deny the former employees at Bethlehem 


Steel the compensation which, through their 


hard labor and sacrifice, they have so 


obviously earned. They served our nation in 


her time of need. They suffered as a result of 


this service, though no fault of their own. 


And now they deserve justice in the form of 


compensation from the very system that was 


established to aid those in exactly this 


situation. 


There are 717 cases arising from the exposure 


to nuclear materials at the Bethlehem Steel 


plant. According to NIOSH, as of March 20th, 


2007 less than half of those claims have 

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resulted in compensation. We believe that this 


record is unacceptable, and that the proposed 


SEC petition would present a much more 


equitable and fair result for these families. 


Therefore, we respectfully request the Board to 


recommend approval of the petition so that this 


terrible situation can be laid to rest, and the 


many families who have been wrought with so 


many tragedies can finally have peace of mind. 


 Sincerely, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, 


Senator Charles E. Schumer, Representative 


Brian Higgins, Representative Thomas Reynolds, 


and Representative Louise Slaughter. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much, Jason. 


 Then let's proceed to the Los Alamos SEC 


petition, and Dr. Greg Macievic is here today ­

- I think Greg's here -- there he is. 


 MR. BROEHM: Actually, I'm sorry, one more -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, we've got one more. Greg, 


hold up -- hold up a moment. 


 MR. BROEHM: I've been told by Representative 


Shimkus's staff that he is calling in right now 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay. 


 MR. BROEHM: -- and would like to make comments 

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on the Dow petition, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, we -- we will waive -- or 


insert that here, even though we're not on the 


Dow topic, to fit his schedule. Are we -- are 


we on the line yet? 


 (No responses) 


(Pause) 


 DR. WADE: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Are we on the line yet? 


 (No responses) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. WADE: Representative Shimkus, are you on 


the line? 


 (No responses) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Representative Shimkus? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, we'll hold just a moment. 


(Pause) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: What'd she say? 


 DR. WADE: He's dialing now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, dialing now. Thank you. 


(Pause) 


 DR. WADE: Representative Shimkus, are you on 


the line? 

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 REPRESENTATIVE SHIMKUS: Hello? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hello, Representative Shimkus? 


 REPRESENTATIVE SHIMKUS: Yes, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, fine, we're pleased to have 


you address the Board here. The podium is 


yours. 


 REPRESENTATIVE SHIMKUS: Thank you. First let 


me introduce myself. I am Congressman John 


Shimkus of the 19th District of Illinois. My 


District does not include where the Dow plant 


sat in Madison, but many of the workers from 


Dow live in my District. I have been involved 


with many of these claims for six years. I 


want to thank Dr. Ziemer and members of the 


Board for allowing me the opportunity to 


address you by phone today. I'm at the airport 


actually, trying to catch a plane, but votes in 


Washington prohibited me from being there 


personally. But my District Director, Deb 


Detmer, is there representing me. She also 


represented me at a meeting in Cincinnati and 


previous meetings in St. Louis. 


I'm not going to take much of the Board's time, 


but do have two issues I would like to raise. 


One, I realize there has been some discussion 

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I 

internally regarding the validity and 


credibility of the workers' affidavits. I want 


to stress strongly to the Board that these 


affidavits should be taken at face value. 


have personally met with several of these 


workers who provided the Board an affidavit. 


know their stories. To suggest that these 


stories are anything less than credible is an 


affront to these men. 


Second, I want to stress my very strong opinion 


that the residual period for uranium should be 


covered under the SEC through 1998. Many of 


these workers have been waiting for dose 


reconstructions and for their cases to be heard 


for years. The Board has the authority and the 


power to add the residual period into the SEC, 


and I strongly urge you to consider that 


option. 


I want to thank you for your service on this 


Board. Thank you for taking time to listen to 


me, and in closing urge you to give my requests 


every consideration. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, 


Representative Shimkus. We appreciate your 


taking the time. We hope you catch your plane. 


I 
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 REPRESENTATIVE SHIMKUS: I think I will. Thank 


you very much. 


LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY SEC PETITION
 

DR. GREG MACIEVIC, NIOSH, OCAS
 

PETITIONER COMMENTS


 DR. ZIEMER: Now we'll proceed to the Los 


Alamos presentation, and Greg -- there you are 


-- please take the podium. 


DR. MACIEVIC: Slowly making my way up here. 


My name's Greg Macievic and I'm a health 


physicist with the Office of Compensation 


Analysis and Support, and I'm here to present 


the SEC petition evaluation report for the Los 


Alamos National Labs. 


Los Alamos -- the petition was submitted to 


NIOSH on behalf of a class of employees. The 


initial class definition that all workers of 


LANL working in all technical areas from 1943 


to 1979 was developed and submitted. The 


number of claims submitted for energy employees 


who potentially meet the proposed class 


definition criteria is 657. 


The evaluation is a two-pronged process 


established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 


CFR 83.13(c)(1) and 42 CFR 83.13(c)(3). And 


one, is it feasible to estimate the level of 


radiation doses of individual members of the 

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263 

class with sufficient accuracy; and two, is 


there a reasonable likelihood that such 


radiation dose may have endangered health of 


the members of that class. 


Los Alamos is a unique site in that you have 


areas that are essentially production-like and 


also areas that are highly labor-- laboratory-


like and do research and special types of 


projects. There are over 80 -- 75 technical 


areas, and the prim-- they are primarily 


concerned with nuclear weapons development, 


testing and related activities. There is 


biomedical -- there are biomedical studies of 


tritium and plutonium, experimental application 


of mesons to medical therapy, fission products 


studies, dynamic testing of uranium, neutron 


cross-section measurements, source development, 


criticality studies, reactor developments and 


controlled fusion studies. 


 The covered employment period begins in 1943 


when the site opened, and continues to the 


present for any dose reconstruction. 


LANL can essentially be broken down into 


several functional areas of activity that are 


relevant to this class. We have weapons 

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development and testing, critical assemblies 


and reactors, reactor development, 


accelerators, X-ray equipment, radiography 


sources, biomedical research, Project Sherwood 


-- which is a fusion research and also other 


fusion research activities, waste treatment and 


disposal, and residual contamination from the 


RaLa project due to strontium-90 post-July 


1963. 


And as you can see from this slide, there are 


several radionuclides of concern, and since 


LANL itself, Los Alamos, dealt with pretty much 


everything under the sun. The alpha radiation 


that we looked at is major concern are 


americium-241, curium, protactinium, plu-- 


polonium; plutoniums-238, 239 and 40; radium226 and its progeny; thorium-230, thorium-232 


and its progeny; uranium-234, 35, 38 and 33. 


 Beta/gamma hazards came from actinium-227, 


carbon-14, cobalt-60, cesium-137, tritium, 


iodine-131, phosphorus-32, plutonium-241, 


radium-226 and its progeny, sulfur-35, 


strontium-90, yttrium-90, thorium-32 and its 


progeny; U-235 and its progeny, essentially 


thorium-231; U-238 and its progeny with 

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thorium-234 and protactinium-234m. 


There also is neutron radiation that was quite 


prevalent at Los Alamos, and we have sources 


from plutonium production, operating reactors, 


accelerators, criticality experiments, 


chemistry and metallurgy, and other neutron 


sources. 


I'd like to give now a summary of the 


information that we have available for dose 


reconstruction at the site. External 


dosimetry, or external radiation exposures, are 


based on routine monitoring to the employees. 


They started out with pocket ionization 


chambers for neutrons and photons, worked up to 


film in the -- 1944/45 time period, then later 


on into the SEC period TLDs were used. Now the 


thing is is that relevant data are not 


available from which an estimate of all the 


radionuclides source terms can be developed. 


And we have for environmental exposures for 


internal and external, for the internal 


exposures to environmental radiation, there is 


-- no data were provided for the years prior to 


1970. 1970 to '75, there's data, but no 


developed methodology exists yet for that -- 

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that data. For external dosimetry, area film 


badge monitoring started post-1965. 


Now the things that we can do or feel we have 


sufficient information to feasibly reconstruct 


some dose is on internal exposures to 


plutonium, uranium, tritium and polonium. And 


this is straight from Table 7-10 of the -- or 


to see Table 7-10 of the ER, and later on in 


the slides I have the actual table so you can 


see what we're talking about. 


And we believe we can do these dose 


reconstructions for these particular 


radionuclides because we do have bioassay 


monitoring, urinalysis data, for a majority of 


the time period for the proposed class. We 


have in vivo monitoring beginning in 1970. 


There is some screening data for Humco devices, 


which were sodium iodide detectors that 


measured for strontium-90 and cesium-137 that 


go back into the '50s, but they are just 


screening methodologies. And we also have 


coworker data that we can develop for these 


particular people with these radionuclides. 


Now this is the list -- a summary of the 


deficiencies in the data that we have for LANL 

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by period. As you can see, 1943 to 1949, we 


don't have data for tritium. It essentially 


starts in 1950 for tritium. No mixed fission 


product or activation product data. We can't 


do -- we're not -- no dose reconstruction for 


americium-241 if we don't have any plutonium 


data that we can associate it with, or we have 


some new bioassay data that we're looking at 


that has to be validated, but otherwise it 


can't be done. 


1950 to 1969 we have mixed fission products 


and, again, the mixed activation products, and 


we need validation on some newly-identified air 


sampling data that's come in. Americium-241 in 


the 1950s, they had pure americium-241 that 


they used in making sources like 


americium/beryllium sources, and you also had 


the americium associated again with the 


plutonium. And if you don't have that data 


associated with it, you can't do anything with 


the americium-241. And again the thoriums, 


actinium, protactinium, neptunium and curium. 


1970 to '75, the same players are in there 


again with the mixed fission products, 


americium-241, the thoriums, neptunium and 

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curium and protactinium. So these are playing 


all through the period, and that's the key, is 


that during the analysis of the data LANL 


health physics and radiation safety basically 


concentrated on the majority -- or on the 


activities that were of the -- that gave the 


largest hazard at the time, which was the 


plutonium, polonium and so on. But there are 


periods throughout the history where these 


other radionuclides make a presence where they 


do become hazards, and there's really no 


monitoring method that was there available for 


us to go back and look and make some kind of 


reasonable estimate of a maximum dose for an 


individual person. 


Air sampling data is not available for all 


years of operation, and is deficient for 


fission products and some of the exotic 


radionuclides like I've just shown on the other 


slide. We have new data, but it's intermittent 


and non-inclusive for all areas. 


For the medical exposure due to chest X-rays, 


we do have information that goes back and can 


reconstruct medical doses. They were on an 


annual basis, the X-ray -- medical X-ray, so 

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that we do have information and also, using 


other Technical Basis Documents, we can -- feel 


we can reconstruct the dose there. 


Now from the petitioner's side, the petitioner 


provided information and affidavit statements 


in support of the petitioner's belief that 


accurate dose reconstruction over time is 


impossible for all workers of LANL working in 


all tech areas from 1943 to '75. And this was 


based on insufficient data, records do not 


exist, and lack of bioassay data. The petition 


was qualified by NIOSH on August 7th, 2006. 


So we come to the conclusion of what is 


feasible to do dose reconstructions for, and in 


this table, this is the table straight out of 


the ER, where for -- source of exposure for 


internal, we have tritium where we can do dose 


reconstructions from '50 to -- 1950 to '75, but 


the early years we don't have because there is 


no information essentially on tritium or any 


urinalysis until 1950, so 1943 to 1949 would 


not be feasible to do dose reconstructions. 


 Polonium, 1944 we believe we can reconstruct 


from 1944 to 1956. Those -- that's -- those 


are the years when the polonium was actually 

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present on-site, so that covers that span. 


That's why 1943's not there; it wasn't present 


in '43. 


For plutonium, 1944 to 1975. 1943 is left out 


because basically there was only milligram 


quantities of plutonium at Los Alamos in 1943. 


Uranium, we feel we can cover the entire period 


from 1943 to '75. But now all those other 


players of actinium, curium, neptunium, 


thorium, strontium, various isotopes of 


concern, other things that we had that were on 


that list, and mixed fission products and 


activation products, the data does not support 


reconstruction of dose. 


 On the external dosimetry side we have gamma 


dose reconstruction, believe it's feasible from 


1946 to '75, but not from '43 through '45. In 


the early years -- they only first monitored 


for just gamma in the early years, but there is 


data in the records for individual persons, but 


when a review was done of all the claimants for 


LANL, they could not find dosimetry information 


previous to -- from '43 to '45 there was 


nothing in the files for that. 


 Beta radiation, shallow dose, skin dose, was -- 

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can be reconstructed from '49 to '75. In the 


earlier years the concern was not on shallow 


exposures or skin dose and beta dose. It was 


shifted more to penetrating dose with gamma and 


also in the neutrons. 


 And neutron dosimetry, we could -- we feel we 


can reconstruct feasibly the dose from 1946 to 


1975, but from 1943 to 1945 it's the same thing 


with lack of data in records that -- before -- 


the individuals for the claimants, and the data 


itself being more sparse. 


 Occupational medical X-rays, we feel we can do 


that for the entire period, 1943 to 1975. 


So as far as health endangerment, there is 


concern. NIOSH has determined that members of 


the class were not exposed to radiation during 


a discrete incident likely to have involved 


levels of exposure similarly high to those 


occurring during nuclear criticality accidents, 


it wasn't a common experience, but we do 


believe -- that is, evidence indicates that 


some workers in the class may have accumulated 


chronic exposures sufficient to endanger their 


health. 


 So, after discussions that occurred yesterday, 

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the -- and re-looking at the class definition, 


we've determined that all employees of the DOE, 


its predecessor agencies or DOE contractors or 


subcontractors, who were monitored or should 


have been monitored for radiological exposures 


while working in operational Technical Areas 


with a history of radioactive material use at 


the Los Alamos National Lab for an aggregate of 


at least 250 workdays during the period from 


March 15th, 1943 through December 31st, 1975, 


or in combination with workdays within the 


parameters established for one or more of the 


other classes of employees in the SEC. And the 


reason we had excluded several Technical Areas 


and NIOSH determined that in all our other 


proposals or SEC petitions where we did make a 


statement of the -- in the class definitions, 


we never put in areas or buildings that were 


excluded from the class. It was always what 


was in the class, so we felt that should not be 


in there. Those were removed, and an addendum 


was made where we lay out all the Technical 


Areas that are included in the class, which 


means any Technical Area that is not in that 


addendum could potentially be solicited to be 

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looked at for further study to see if it should 


be included in some other class or some other 


proposal to see if SEC is required. 


So, for the recommendation, for the period 


March 15th, 1943 through December 31st, 1975, 


NIOSH finds that it cannot reconstruct doses 


for members of the proposed class with 


sufficient accuracy, so the feasibility of 


doing it is no, and health endangerment is yes 


for that class. 


Issues that need to be resolve, and we're doing 


further study with data as some information 


comes, and re-looking at data that we have and 


making some other determinations, we're looking 


at mixed fission products -- and this will all 


be resolved, these issues, by the time of the 


update of the site profile, which is sometime 


in June. We're looking at mixed fission 


products and mixed activation products, data 


that we have -- some extra data that has come 


up in there and looking at validation. 


Determination of processes associated with the 


americium I talked about and its relationship 


with plutonium handling. And then a further 


review of some new information on air and other 

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data for -- and methodologies for actinium, 


curium, neptunium, thor-- thorium and 


protactinium. 


So this -- we recommended this class and 


petition time frame to be added now to the SEC 


rather than delay while we're looking -- we did 


not want to drag on the period while we're 


looking at other data, so we're proclaiming the 


1943 to '75 as the -- as the SEC. So NIOSH can 


reopen a petition or present an 83.14 if 


further evaluation warrants. 


 And with that, I thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, and an added comment 


from Larry Elliott here and then we'll hear 


from the petitioners. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I just want to make it clear for 


the record -- and thank you, Greg. We sprung 


this on Greg when he walked off the plane 


today. We worked with the petitioner, Mrs. 


Ruiz, and with Andrew and with Michele Ortiz to 


refine the definition that you've been given 


now. It is different than the definition that 


exists in the evaluation report that you've 


been provided. We took out the -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have an addendum page, however, 

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that --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay, so you have that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We're going to provide a revised 


evaluation report. This will be the addendum 


to that, so I just want to make that clear for 


the record. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Larry, and 


thank you, Greg. We're going to hear -- give 


Michele Ortiz, who's -- 


 DR. WADE: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, I'm sorry, okay. First -- oh, 


Eleanor, okay -- yeah. I'm sorry, I -- I -- 


yeah. I'm -- I'm getting ahead of myself. 


We'll hear from the petitioner, then we'll hear 


from Michele. Thank you. 


 MS. RUIZ: Good afternoon, Board members, and 


thank you for the opportunity to speak to you 


today. My name is Harriet Ruiz and I am a 


petitioner. I would like to thank you and 


NIOSH for getting us to this point, and all the 


hard work that you do and NIOSH also does on -- 


on behalf of all the SEC petitioners. It 


really is appreciated. 


Let's see, I would now like to read a letter 

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from the Honorable Ben Lujan, who's the Speaker 


of the House and who is also a petitioner with 


me on this petition. I -- I also believe that 


you have a pass-out of that letter. This 


letter was written to Laurie Breyer because 


she's the one that -- she's been the one that's 


contacting him. 


So this is (reading) Dear Ms. Breyer: I 


appreciate the recent correspondence informing 


me of the meeting and discussion on the LANL 


SEC petition evaluation report of (sic) May 3rd 


in Denver, Colorado. I regret that my schedule 


will not allow me to attend the scheduled 


meeting. It is my continued hope and prayer 


that the petition is acted upon favorably, and 


that the DOE will finally take the 


responsibility for the illness for (sic) which 


these workers suffer. Many continue to suffer 


and die spiritually and physically and will 


never see justice rendered. 


It is imperative that the facts contained in 


the petition be addressed and that the brave 


and courageous men and women who worked at LANL 


in the early years and were exposed to 


radiological substances be given the attentions 

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they so deserve. The consistent disregard for 


the occupational safety and health at LANL has 


notoriously become a classic example of 


injustice to the people who, through their 


sacrifice, were essentially in winning World 


War II and especially -- I believe -- and I'm 


adding "especially" -- the Cold War. 


It is my hope that NIOSH will do what Congress 


intended them to do -- lift the burden of proof 


off the shoulders of the workers and accept 


that responsibility. Current Governor Bill 


Richardson, when he was Secretary of Energy, 


said "We are not going to make workers find 


past records because in many cases the workers 


were not told the truth. The burden of proof 


is on the government and not the worker. The 


biggest change in policy is that the government 


will not contest many of the claims and workers 


would receive the benefit of the doubt when 


plant medical records are missing or flawed." 


Thank you all -- thank you for all your efforts 


on behalf of the workers. I pray that there 


will be a favor-- favorable action and the 


treatment of these workers will restore public 


confidence in the process that has not been 

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favorable that have led many (sic) to say "If 


the exposure does not kill you, the process we 


are subjected to will." Sincerely, Ben Lujan, 


Representative, Speaker of the House. 


Thank you. And with that I am going to be very 


short today and I'm going to present Andrew 


Evaskovich and he's going to give you a 


Powerpoint presentation. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Andrew, we'd be 


pleased to hear from you now. 


 MR. EVASKOVICH: Good afternoon. My name is 


Andrew Evaskovich. I'm a guard at Los Alamos 


and I'm a representative from the International 


Guards Union of America, Local No. 69. To 


begin I'd like to thank Larry Elliott and his 


team for working with us today on the class 


definition and actually putting this together. 


We found it to be very beneficial and we 


appreciate what he has done for us. Thank you, 


Larry. 


Let me begin. It is the question that drives 


us. We would not be where we are today if not 


for our inquisitiveness. Archimedes, Newton, 


Rutherford and many others had questions. The 


answers to their questions often led to more 

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questions. 


Let me be more specific. The National Research 


Council report radiation dose reconstruction 


for epidemiological uses states the criteria 


for the design of a dose reconstruction project 


must be expressed in terms of specific 


questions. 


The question before us today is this: Can 


NIOSH estimate radiation doses with sufficient 


accuracy for LANL employees in the years 1943 


to 1975? NIOSH finds that it cannot 


reconstruct doses for members of the proposed 


class with sufficient ac-- accuracy. 


 However, certain Technical Areas needed to be 


evaluated to be included into this petition -- 


in-- into the class. I'm going to talk about 


reason why I believe that NIOSH should evaluate 


these areas and why I think they should be 


included. I will show you several photographs 


and maps, and I will also discuss technical 


reports that say radiation -- radionuclides 


were in these Technical Areas. 


To begin, we have LANL and surrounding areas. 


If you look at the map on display, in the blue 


there is Los Alamos National Laboratory as it 

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exists now. You see the city of Los Alamos and 


the bedroom community of White Rock. To the 


southeast is Santa Fe and Espanola, and it is 


surrounded by Santa Fe National Forest and 


(unintelligible) National Monument. 


This is State Road 502 looking west to the 


(unintelligible) Plateau where Los Alamos is 


located. You see the mountains there. Those 


are the Jemez Mountains, and the brown there is 


the plateau, and on this plateau is where the 


Los Alamos National Laboratory is located. 


This is an aerial view of Los Alamos National 


Laboratory. You see the main Technical Area 3 


here where most of the administrative offices 


and many of the labs are located. The airport 


is located here and the Neutron Science Center 


is located here. S Site is in this area here 


where a lot of the original explosive testing 


was conducted. The residential areas are over 


here, and Biocanyon GHN* is located here. 


This is Ashley Pond and Fuller Lodge. Fuller 


Lodge was the first headquarters of the 


laboratory in 1943. That's where they 


initially set up. Fuller -- Ashley Pond is a 


prominent feature on the Technical Area 1 map 

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that I'll be showing you later, but in the 


background there, that's Fuller Lodge. It's a 


historical building that they preserved and 


they've got some -- a partial museum in there. 


And another view of Ashley Pond. Here's the 


Los Alamos Inn, and this is a building in 


Technical Area 0. It's a current building that 


Los Alamos occupies, the laboratory does. Now 


this area in here was the formal Technical Area 


1 or the main Technical Area. 


This is the current map of Los Alamos National 


Laboratory and the various Technical Areas. As 


you can see, it's a large area, and there are 


many Technical Areas which are displayed here. 


This is the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 


and this is taken from the DOE final 


environmental impact statement number 18. 


There are 30 Technical areas on this map, and 


the numbers and locations are different from 


the map that we just saw. 


NIOSH needs to evaluate these following areas 


in TA1Z which I will discuss later: TA-17, 


which is highlighter there by the laser, is 


listed as canceled in the annex, or the table 


in the SEC report. Currently it is TA-37 on 

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the -- on the current map that's TA-37. 


According to the SEC evaluation and to the 


Technical Basis Document site description, TA37 is a magazine area and has depleted uranium 


stored there. 


 TA-19, which you'll see on this map, is located 


right here. In the evaluation report it's 


listed as the East Gate Laboratory and it was 


deactivated by the AEC, I believe. The East 


Gate Laboratory contained a 300 curie cobalt-60 


source. In addition, Emilio Segré, one of the 


original physicists that was at the Lab, 


conducted spontaneous fission experiments 


there. The source for that information would 


be Los Alamos document LA-UR-92-810. 


Additionally, Richard Rhodes, in his book, The 


Making of the Atomic Bomb, referred to Emilio 


Segré and the spontaneous fission experiments 


at the East Gate Laboratory. And the East Gate 


Laboratory would be located approximately in 


this area here, and the reason they moved it 


over there is because of the radiation from 


Technical Area 1, or the main Technical Area, 


was interfering with the instrumentation that 


he needed to observe the spontaneous fission. 

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TA-28, which is located here, is shown as 13 on 


this map, but you'll see it over here on this 


map. Let me -- let me clarify. That's TA-28 


on this map. On the current Los Alamos 


Technical Area map, it's TA-13. Currently TA28 is a magazine area. Page 36 of the SEC 


evaluation report states that TA-28 has 


depleted uranium. Additionally, page 14 of the 


Technical Basis Document site description 


states that TA-28 has depleted uranium. So two 


documents that NIOSH prepared states that 


depleted uranium in in those areas. 


I'd like to continue and refer back to the RaLa 


petition and the SEC that was approved. I'd 


like to point out that the advisory committee 


on the human radiation experiments prepared a 


report that had a quote from H. L. Shipman*, 


health division leader. He said about the RaLa 


shots very significant levels of activity can 


be deposited on the ground at least within a 


radius of three miles. I've included this 


report information on the disks I've provided 


to NIOSH, as well as the Board. The report has 


a table of the 254 RaLa shots, including wind 


direction and monitored activity of the clouds 

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that were produced from those shots, and I've 


included other reports on Technical Area 10 


concerning radioactive contamination in those 


areas. 


 This petition we're now discussing is a second 


chance to address the issues that have come up 


from the RaLa shots, just to ensure that people 


are covered in the class. That's my concern 


and why I bring that up. 


If we refer to your handouts now, this should 


have been issued to everybody, the maps of Los 


Alamos -- I'm sorry, only the Board members 


have these. If you look at the map, it 


displays New Mexico and it displays Los Alamos. 


If you look at the map where it says Santa Fe 


National Forest and Los Alamos, those areas 


were the original laboratory. They acquired 


all that land in order to be the laboratory, 


and it shrank down to become what is currently 


the laboratory now. 


This is Los Alamos site in 1943. It's known as 


Site Y of the Manhattan Engineering District. 


Right there is the main Technical Area or TA-1. 


The Anchor Ranch Proving Ground, which is 


currently considered S Site now, or TA-16 area. 

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This is Area A, Area B, Area C, Area D and Area 


E. As you can see, the map is different from 


the map that was prepared for the Los Alamos 


Scientific Laboratory. 


Major expansion of the laboratory occurred in 


1951 to 1953 with the addition and construction 


of 14 Technical Areas. As you can see going 


backwards, there have been many changes to the 


Los Alamos area and the laboratory. 


This is Technical Area 1 as it was -- existed 


at the time of -- when the laboratory was first 


initiated. Building G contained uranium and 


22-- uranium and radium-226. Building M 


contained enriched uranium-235, and metallurgy 


and recovery was conducted there. You can see 


here is Building Z and the proximity of the 


buildings to each other is very close. There 


is Ashley Pond as I referred to earlier, a 


prominent feature on this map. 


This is a historical photo of Technical Area 1. 


The buildings were put up in a hurry because of 


the wartime construction. The material used in 


the construction of the building was the same 


as Army barracks. The exteriors were drop 


siding or asbestos cement shingles, pitched 

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roofs with asphalt roofs -- pitched roofs 


covered with asphalt shingles, and the 


interiors were gypsum-board walls, so they were 


not the (unintelligible) construction that we 


have now in buildings containing radioactive -- 


or radionuclides. And if you'll look at the 


photograph, notice the closeness of the 


buildings. In Technical Area 1 they had 


several buildings that were in approximately a 


25-acre area. 


This is TA-1 Building Z. If you look again at 


the construction, the roof, the walls, and this 


is where the Cockroft-Walton accelerator was 


stored. According to the December 1977 report 


LA-6887, radiological survey and 


decontamination of the form-- former main 


Technical Area TA-1 at Los Alamos, New Mexico, 


it states in Appendix B of that report that 


tritium was used in the building. 


This is a photograph of the Cockroft-Walton 


accelerator. The Technical Basis Document site 


description, page 29, states that workers were 


exposed to gamma and neutron radiation from 


this device. 


We need to discuss cross-section. The 

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experiments that were conducted with the 


Cockroft-Walton accelerator were cross-section 


studies. A cross-section is a measure of the 


probability that a collision will occur between 


a beam of radiation and a particular particle, 


expressed as the effective area presented by 


the particle in that particular process. It is 


measured in square meters or barns, and the 


terminology of barns came about from hitting 


the broad side of a barn. 


 Cross-section is also broken down into the 


elastic cross-section, which amounts for all 


elastic scattering in which the radiation loses 


no energy to the particle and the inelastic 


cross-section accounts for all other 


collisions. It is subdivided as to account for 


specific interactions such as the absorption 


cross-section, fission cross-section and 


ionization cross-section. I believe those 


terms are self-explanatory. 


 The cross-section reports. These were repaired 


after they did their experiments, LANS777, 


preliminary results of cross-section, fission 


cross-section of uranium-238, September 8, 


1948. Obviously they did an experiment with 

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uranium. LA-1258, the neutron-induced fission 


cross-section of U-236 as a function of energy, 


May 26, 1951. LA-1279, total cross-sections 


for 14 million electron volt electrons, July 


16, 1951; tritium was used in that experiment. 


LA-1480, cross-sections for the 


D(DN)HE3ND(DP)H3 reactions from 14 to 110 kilo 


electrovolts, October 1952, and tritium was 


used in that experiment. LA-1483, cross-


sections of tritium, hydrogen and helium for 


fast neutrons, October 1952. And LA-1681, 


fission cross-section measurements, June 1954, 


uranium-238. 


I've included these reports as well in PDF 


format on the disk that's available. 


This is Building U of Technical Area 1. It was 


part of the RaLa petition and SEC. In the 


building -- Building U held tritium, uranium235, uranium-238, carbon-14 and radium-226, and 


Building U was adjacent to Building Z. 


Slide 18, this is Building T, adjacent to 


Building Z. This was the division offices, and 


this is just to demonstrate the proximity of 


the buildings and the laboratory. 


This is Building D. This is the plutonium 

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building. The Centers for Disease Control, Los 


Alamos Historical Document Retrieval and 


Assessment, lodger* report, states that the 


airborne effluents through the rooftop vents 


were unfiltered and unmonitored. And this is 


an issue because the winds are from the south 


and southwest consistently in Los Alamos. 


Building D is located here; Building Z is here. 


So the winds would be blowing in this direction 


or in this direction, so the effluents would be 


going towards Building Z. And the source of 


this information is the most recent site-wide 


environmental impact statement that was 


prepared for Los Alamos. 


 Storm Runoff. There's several major canyons in 


the Los Alamos area. Contaminants have been 


discharged into the canyons as waste, and storm 


runoff has carried those down and these will 


affect other Technical Areas from which they 


originated. Sediments containing high 


concentrations of radionuclides have been found 


in Pueblo Canyon, which is located around here; 


Los Alamos, Whartondad (sic) and Ancho Canyon 


discharge. LANL has discharged liquid 


radioactive waste, including tritium, cesium­
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137, plutonium-238 and americium-241 into 


Pueblo Canyon -- located here. Americium-241, 


cesium-137, plutonium-239 and 240 are 


consistently found in sediments in Mortondad 


Canyon, located here. Elevated levels of 


radioactive americium-241, plutonium-238, 


plutonium-239 and 240 have been detected in 


Pajarito Canyon. I've included documentation 


on the waste streams in this -- on the disk, as 


well -- and Pajarito Canyon. 


 Historically TA-45 waste treatment discharged 


into the Pueblo Canyon drainage system, which 


flows through portions of Technical Area-74. 


Detectable levels of plutonium have been found 


also, and discharges from TA-10 Biocanyon could 


have impacted TA-74. LA -- and this is from 


document LA-UR-92-810 again. 


In conclusion, I've shown you several 


illustrations and spoken about reasons why 


Technical Areas should not be excluded from the 


class definition or in fact included, since we 


have changed the definition. I have about 35 


documents included on the disk to support what 


I've said. With the time constraints on 


speaking, that's the reason why the documents 

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are there. This would take several hours if I 


were to refer to everything and all the 


information that's in there. 


 Please forgive me, I know you guys have a lot 


of stuff to read, as well as NIOSH people have 


a lot of work to do, but it's important in 


order to get this right. I realize that the 


LANL SEC petition looks complex, but once you 


get past the issues of the Technical Areas and 


the source terms, at the center it is simple. 


Ask yourself this question. What is claimant 


favorable? 


I'm going to finish with a quote from Victor 


Franco. Victor Franco was a World War II Nazi 


concentration camp survivor. He wrote a book 


about his experience called Man's Search for 


Meaning. He said we needed to stop asking 


about the meaning of life and instead to think 


of ourselves as those who are being questioned 


by life daily and hourly. Our answer must 


consist not in talk and meditation, but in 


right action and in right conduct. Life 


ultimately means taking the responsibility to 


find the right answer to its problems and to 


fulfill the tasks for which it sets for each 

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individual. 


I'd like to thank you for listening to me and 


watching my presentation. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Andrew. Now we'll hear 


from Michele Ortiz. Michele? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I was just going to ask, 


while she's coming to the mike, are -- are 


those handouts on the disk you talked about? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have disk -- we have a copy of 


the disk he talked about. 


 MR. EVASKOVICH: There's a disk and all the 


documents are on there as well as the 


Powerpoint --


 DR. ZIEMER: And I think NIOSH has a copy of 


the disk now, as well. 


 MR. EVASKOVICH: Yes, I provided one, as well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Jason. 


 MR. BROEHM: I think the first thing 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I'm sorry, I -- I took the 


order wrong. Jonathan Epstein is from Senator 


Bingaman's office. He's on the phone, so 


Jonathan, are you there? 


 MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, please. 

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 MR. EPSTEIN: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, thank you. We hear you loud 


and clear so please go ahead. 


 MR. EPSTEIN: Okay. Well, I -- I just want to 


thank you for the -- the time to hear me. It's 


going to be fairly brief. I -- I want to thank 


NIOSH for the excellent technical work they 


did. It's (unintelligible) and it looks quite 


of high quality. I won't get into the details 


and the presentation before looks like it was 


fairly in-depth, but I think the committee 


needs to keep in mind the big picture here of 


what Los Alamos did (unintelligible). It's 


been a laboratory where they produced very 


unique experiments, one-of-a-kind experiments, 


in many cases, by scientists that were then 


later replicated at production plants. That 


being the case, having come from a laboratory, 


when you do a unique experiment you don't work 


out the safety and health protocols in detail 


as you would today. They tend to be one-of-akind with one-of-a-kind unexpected results and 


with (unintelligible) materials and things left 


over over longer periods of time. So that 


being said, I'd just ask the Advisory Board to 

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take that into account as to the wide variety 


and the fact that this all started in the 19 


what, 40 -- 42 time frame, that -- that many of 


the inhalation dose equipment just wasn't 


around and I think NIOSH folks got it right. 


So with that, I'll -- I'll -- I'll thank you 


for the time and I know Senator Bingaman did 


call in in April to you all to express that 


similar support for the petition itself. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, thank you very much, 


Jonathan. Now we'll hear from Michele, and 


she's with Representative Tom Udall's office. 


Michele? 


 MS. JACQUEZ-ORTIZ: Thank you, Chairman Ziemer. 


My boss had intended to call in a little 


earlier, and the way that the -- the day 


unfolded, I'm here to read a statement on his 


behalf. 


(Reading) Chairman Ziemer and members of the 


Advisory Board, I want to express my thanks to 


NIOSH for the revised class definition 


presented to you today that addresses concerns 


raised by Harriet Ruiz and the Los Alamos 


National Laboratory claimants, on whose behalf 

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this Special Exposure Cohort was filed. 


I have expressed concern that claimants who 


lack detailed work history that shows precisely 


where they worked at LANL in the period between 


1943 and 1975 would have been unfairly excluded 


from eligibility for compensation as members of 


a more narrow SEC class. It is clear that 


NIOSH shares my concern that a more narrow 


class definition could delay the processing of 


deserving LANL claims. I support the proposed 


class definition presented to you today, and I 


respectfully request that the Advisory Board 


approve the Ruiz SEC so that it may be 


forwarded to Secretary Leavitt and Congress in 


an expeditious manner. 


Thank you for allowing my statement for the 


record, and for approving this SEC on behalf of 


the many sick Cold War workers who are my 


constituents and who are dying while awaiting a 


determination on their claims. 


And thank you for the time to listen to all of 


us during this presentation, and all of the 


good work that went on behind the scenes 


preceding this presentation by NIOSH. It's 


really important that we acknowledge that. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Michele. I think we 


may have another one of the petitioners on the 


line. Ms. Wallace, are you on the line? 


 MS. WALLACE: Yes, I am on the line. Thank 


you, I -- I have lived in Los Alamos since '58. 


I served six years as our -- as a 


representative on our county council in the 


'80s and I have been a state representative for 


this area since 1991. I have been to 


Washington with -- with Harriet to talk to all 


of our Congressional delegation, and I can only 


endorse what I keep hearing. Our folks are 


dying. The relatives are frustrated and angry, 


and we need to move forward. New Mexico 


(unintelligible) as has obviously some of the 


other states, also, in the whole endeavor, and 


I would urge us to try to move forward and get 


this resolved. And I -- and I really 


appreciate the fact that you're willing to do 


the conference calls so that we can all 


participate. I -- I -- I feel the frustration 


of all my constituents. I know that NIOSH will 


be up here to talk more (unintelligible) on 


next Tuesday and Wednesday, I think, about some 


of these issues that they have problems with. 

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And I -- I think we can (unintelligible) change 


the results. I am also frustrated about where 


the Department of Labor and NIOSH tend to 


overlap and which one is in charge of what, and 


I think we all feel that frustration and I -- 


and I would like to get that sorted out, also. 


With that, I -- I will say I urge you to 


continue to move forward. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Ms. Wallace. 


Now I'm going to open the floor to the Board 


for questions -- oh, who had another comment? 


Yes, please -- yeah, sorry. 


 MS. RUIZ: That's all right. Thank you for 


allowing me this last comment. I would again 


like to thank the Board members. I know -- I 


really know how hard you work. Sitting here 


listening to testimony is very difficult. 


I'd also like to express, along with Michele 


and Andrew, our deep appreciation for the work 


that we did behind the scenes with NIOSH and 


Larry Elliott. It was really appreciated. 


I'd also like to say that Jeannette Wallace -- 


I did serve with her. She's one of the most 


senior members of the House of Representatives. 


Her constituency is Los Alamos. And Jeannette, 

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if you're still listening, thank you for 


calling in. 


I would like to end with one last thing, and 


it's -- it's just what I say, hope. Hope is 


the kind of belief that things -- people, 


conditions, whatever -- can get better. And 


with that, thank you again. I appreciate all 


your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And thank you again. Now Lew, 


comments here? 


 DR. WADE: Briefly for the record, we do have 


two Board members who are conflicted on LANL -- 


Phillip, who's in the front row, and Dr. 


Poston, who is not with us, is also conflicted. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We can open the floor for 


questions for either the -- for NIOSH or for 


the petitioners -- Board members? I -- I think 


-- okay, Mark had a question and it turns out 


it was the same question I had, so I think 


we'll ask Greg, if you'll just come to the 


mike, we need a clarification. And I think 


this clarification has to do with the chart. Go 


ahead, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah, I'm -- I'm comparing 


your -- my mike's on anyway? -- comparing your 

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table 7-10 slide --


DR. MACIEVIC: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to your sort of final 


conclusion slide, and you know, it -- it says 


in the final conclusion that -- cannot 


reconstruct doses for that entire time period 


for all radiological exposures, I think is the 


way it's phrased. But in here in this chart, 


in the detail, it looks like you're saying that 


you can estimate doses for certain 


radionuclides, so I just want to understand -- 


understand --


DR. MACIEVIC: Let me --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- understand what's -- you know, 


which is correct or... 


DR. MACIEVIC: As far as the site, there are 


certain things we can -- we feel we do have 


information enough to reconstruct the doses on. 


It's not for all radionuclides that we don't 


have enough information. It's for essentially 


those outlier group, the -- the thorium, the 


actinium and that, which are -- there is 


information, but there's sporadic information 


and in order to do the dose reconstruction we 


would have to make some very exorbitant 

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estimates on the maximum dose. And the -- we 


don't really -- I mean --


 DR. ZIEMER: I think we understand that, Greg. 


I think the question is perhaps -- if we 


parallel it with -- with the Rocky Flats case 


where we defined the class in terms of the 


doses that could not be reconstructed -- 


DR. MACIEVIC: Ah, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- whereas here it appears that 


we're saying that although some can be 


reconstructed and some can't, we're defining 


the class to cover everyone. That's what I 


think we need a little help on. Are you saying 


that you can't distinguish in this case those 


who have one or the other -- 


DR. MACIEVIC: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- whereas in -- in the case here 


at Rocky, the claim is that we can distinguish 


between those that, for example, had -- or 


didn't have neutron exposures and they -- yes. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Pretty much what you answered 


is correct. What we determined was, one, that 


-- that the exposures and the radionuclides 


were over so many different areas, and -- and 


the time periods were -- you know, bounced 

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around, that we had to include everything, 


so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: So a given worker, you -- you 


can't say well, this one had tritium only. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Exactly. 


DR. MACIEVIC: That's right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Although it may be in an 


individual case that might turn out -- if 


someone didn't meet the SEC qualification for 


cancer --


DR. MACIEVIC: That's exactly right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- they might go back and say 


well, reconstruct on the basis of 


(unintelligible) tritium or -- 


DR. MACIEVIC: If you can show that a worker 


was only with a particular thing and have 


evidence of that, you can say yes, we can 


reconstruct it. But otherwise, because of the 


nature like --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Not exactly, no. Let me --


let me correct Greg on that. What he -- what 


we're saying is right, for certain things, 


individual cases, there -- there are things 


that we can reconstruct. However, in total, we 


cannot reconstruct the complete dose for 

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individuals in all areas. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, that clarifies it for me, I 


think. Mark, does it for you? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sorry, Greg. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other que-- Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

--

 DR. ZIEMER: Use a -- get closer to the mike. 


 DR. WADE: LaVon, I think they're looking at 


you. 


 DR. MELIUS: Don't go away so quickly. I have 


sort of a similar question -- well, first a 


general question, why the cutoff at 1975? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, that's -- that's an 


excellent question. Go ahead, you've got 


something else on top of that? 


 DR. MELIUS: Well, do -- answer that one and 


maybe --


 DR. ZIEMER: While he thinks about an excellent 


answer. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, it's an excellent question 


and I think Greg tried to answer it, but I'm 


not sure he completely answered. If you look 

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at the petition, the petition was submitted to 


us up to 1975. There's still issues on the 


table after 1975, and we recognize those. 


However, for timeliness and -- we wanted to go 


ahead and -- and complete Ms. Ruiz's petition 


up for the time period that she had requested. 


So we have left it open and we -- we have 


committed to -- that we will evaluate those -- 


those issues, and if we can -- if we determine 


it's feasible to do dose reconstruction, we'll 


put the -- we'll identify that in the site 


profile. However, if we determine it's not 


feasible, we will do an 83.14 to add additional 


years onto that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. So -- so -- so I'm clear, 


the issues to be resolved in the revised site 


profile, there's a slide that was shown -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- those are post-'75? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, they continue beyond 


'75. We have data on mixed fission products 


that starts in the '70 to '75 period. However, 


when we went through the process, we were not 

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clear and we could not come up with a 


reasonable conclusion that we had enough data 


that -- that would support that the end of '75, 


yes, definitely, that's it, we're ready to -- 


we can do dose reconstruction beyond that. So 


we committed that we would continue on the 


evaluation of the mixed fission products and a 


few of the other issues past '75 period to 


determine if we need to add additional years. 


 DR. MELIUS: Then I -- I have another question, 


and again, I might have missed part of the 


presentation -- this is Table 7.8, I'm not sure 


who -- the (unintelligible) is -- but you -- 


you have sort of reserved -- you have things 


that you can't reconstruct, but then you say -- 


then you have reserved, you know, sort of 


conditional on that -- there's americium-241, 


if no plutonium data or whatev-- I mean pending 


verification of newly-identified bioassay data 


and I -- I guess I'm trying -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- trying to figure out how this ­

-


 MR. RUTHERFORD: What --


 DR. MELIUS: -- (unintelligible) defined -- 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- what we will do in the 


updated site profile -- this is more for the 


non-presumptive cancers and the cancers that -- 


that we will -- you know, what -- what we will 


do is we will further clarify that in the 


updated site profile. However, we have 


recognized that through the entire period up to 


'75 in total, we cannot reconstruct the whole 


dose for individuals in those Technical Areas. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Okay. So -- so the -- 


those would not affect the definition of the -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, they would not. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- class that might -- of those -- 


that clarification or changes -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- would affect your ability if 


you -- you --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Were not presumptive. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- things that you wouldn't be 


able to do. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: A partial dose reconstruction. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Exactly. Exactly. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments or questions? 


 DR. MELIUS: Just one final --


 DR. ZIEMER: Go ahead. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- final question, and then how 


confident are you then in -- on Table 7-10 on 


the time periods involved? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, we're confident -- 


 DR. MELIUS: You have like '43, '49, is this 


for tritium versus --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We're -- we're fairly 


confident -- we believe that -- that those time 


periods are correct, and -- and we will clearly 


lay that out in the site profile. However, 


going through the amount of data and through 


the evaluation process, we feel pretty 


comfortable with those time periods. I'm not 


going to say that, you know, it may not adjust 


a year or -- or not, but I think that the 


overall conclusion is the same. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Further comments or 

questions? 

(Pause) 

 MR. PRESLEY: Mr. Chairman --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes? 
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 MR. PRESLEY: Or do you got a question? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- just -- just to -- and -- 


and I think I've got the answer and I think I ­

- I accept -- I think I'm (unintelligible) on 


this, but just to clarif-- just to make sure 


this definition -- you know, we're -- it would 


include all workers and -- and the reason we're 


noting we can reconstruct for these other 


nuclides is that if they had a non-presumptive 


cancer, then you can go back and do a partial ­

- I mean it -- it -- we're not, by default, 


excluding certain TA areas because they only 


had like uranium or plutonium or something like 


that. I mean I -- I just don't want to do 


something --


 DR. ZIEMER: It says all --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that I'm not --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- it says all Technical Areas. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: It says all Technical Areas. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All Technical Areas, right. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Now, we'll -- we said all 


Technical Areas --


 MR. GRIFFON: I forgot it was reworded, yeah. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- for (unintelligible), and I 


don't have the definition in front of me -- 

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where radioactive materials -- in fact -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's pretty inclusive. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I just want to make sure, 


you know... 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: But we said all Technical 


Areas that -- moni-- or employees who should 


have been -- who were monitored, or should have 


been monitored, for (unintelligible) exposures 


while working in operational Technical Areas 


with a history of radioactive material. The 


question that we worked with the petitioner 


over the last couple of days, we originally had 


excluded some areas in the class definition. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: One, as Greg had pointed out, 


that we -- we have never excluded areas before, 


and the reason why we don't exclude areas -- we 


identify areas where they -- the issues are -- 


where -- the issues where it's not feasible, we 


know it's in these given areas. We never 


exclude areas, and that's because that would 


force us to -- you know, at a future date we 


may have to go against that if we get new 


information. So what we've said, right now 

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we've got a class definition. In our report we 


identify Technical Areas that we believe 


radioactive material was there. However, a 


petition is going to provide us additional 


information that, in our support to Department 


of Labor or -- in identifying these Technical 


Areas with radioactive material, we may 


determine that those additional areas need to 


be included. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. Thank you. Jim, did you 


have another comment or -- 


 DR. MELIUS: No. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay. I believe Mr. Presley 

had a --

 MR. PRESLEY: Ready to make a -- ready? 

I'd like to make a motion that we accept this 


petition as written. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, the -- the motion -- and the 


Chair will reinterpret a little bit -- is that 


we will recommend the approval -- or recommend 


that the -- to the Secretary that a class be 


added to the SEC, as described in this petition 


and evaluation report then, and if that motion 


 MR. CLAWSON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

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 DR. ZIEMER: -- it's seconded -- if it is -- if 


it is passed, we will ask that it be -- we'll 


get one of these straw votes again, which I 


hope doesn't cause confusion, but we will then 


get it reworded for final submission to the 


Secretary tomorrow. 


Is there additional input, comments, questions 


on this motion? Basically a motion to 


recommend approval of the SEC at Los Alamos for 


the period specified in the Technical Areas. 


 DR. MELIUS: I'll second it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's been seconded. Are -- are 


you ready to vote? Does everybody know in this 


case what we're voting on? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's a little more clear? Little 


more clear. 


All in favor, say aye? Well, we'll take a show 


of hands. Raise your right hand. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 It appears to be unanimous. 


 DR. WADE: It is unanimous. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I'll -- for the record, are 


there any no votes? 


 (No responses) 

311

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 Any abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


If not, the motion carries and we will have the 


revised wording tomorrow so that we have it in 


final form to send forward to the Secretary. 


Los -- New Mexico delegation can certainly 


report this back to your constituents. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I understand that Dr. Melius will 


do the rewording on this? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I'm --


 DR. ZIEMER: I believe Dr. --


 DR. MELIUS: -- pretty close. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius has the template in his 


laptop. 


 DR. MELIUS: No, I actually have most of the 


(unintelligible) --


UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you, thank you, thank you. 


Bless you. Thank you. 


WR GRACE SEC PETITION
 

MR. LAVON RUTHERFORD, NIOSH, OCAS


 DR. WADE: Thank you. I think now maybe we'll 


go to W.R. Grace. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we're going to squeeze a 


little more in here, if we can. We'll move to 


the W. R. Grace petition, so... 


 DR. WADE: While -- while LaVon is getting 

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ready, let me read you an announcement. 


Friday's meeting will take place in Stanley 


One. Please take all your personal belongings 


with you at the conclusion of today's meeting. 


The Stanley One room is located towards the 


front lobby desk, down the long hallway, all 


the way at the end of the hall. So we're 


moving rooms, so if you would bring your 


personal belongings to your room and then to 


Stanley One in the morning. 


For -- for people's scheduling, I would propose 


we begin tomorrow with the Dow Madison 


petition, and then the Chapman Valve petition 


and then back on our agenda. We do this 


because there are people who want to call in 


for those activities and we want to give them 


at least a target for their activity. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: All right. Thank you, Dr. 


Ziemer, Board. I'm LaVon Rutherford. I'm the 


Special Exposure Cohort health physics team 


leader. I'm here to talk about the W. R. Grace 


SEC petition evaluation report. 


The W. R. Grace SEC petition was submitted 


under 83.14 to NIOSH by a petitioner whose dose 


reconstruction could not be reconstructed by 

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NIOSH. Our petition evaluation considered a 


class of workers very similar to the individual 


we determined that we could not reconstruct 


their dose. 


I think you've seen this a few times, through 


Greg and a few others. We have a two-pronged 


test for the evaluation process. Our first 


test is is it feasible to estimate the level of 


radiation dose of individual members of the 


class with sufficient accuracy. If we answer 


yes to that question, we do not go to number 


two. However, if we answer no, then we -- is 


there a reasonable likelihood that such 


radiation doses may have endangered the health 


of members of the class. 


A little background on W. R. Grace site. The 


Davison Chemical Company, a division of W. R. 


Grace, began processing radioactive materials 


in the late 1950s at the site of the current 


Nuclear Fuel Services. W. R. Grace is located 


in Erwin, Tennessee. It was a contractor for 


the Atomic Energy Commission from 1958 to 1970. 


W. R. Grace was contracted by the AEC to 


recover enriched uranium from uranium scrap. 


The AEC was the regulatory authority for this 

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site from 1958 to 1974. After 1974 the Nuclear 


Regulatory Commission, NRC, became the 


regulatory authority in 1975. 


 Radiological process relative to the class. W. 


R. Grace began operations by everything -- data 


-- or documents that we've reviewed, they began 


operations with the radioactive material in the 


latter part of 1957. Their principal 


operations included the conversion of high- and 


low-enriched uranium from UF-6 to a usable form 


to manufacture nuclear fuel. They also 


produced fuel consisting of uranium oxide mixed 


with thorium oxide and zirconium oxide. In 


addition, they produced fuel consisting of 


uranium oxide mixed with plutonium oxide and 


zirconium oxide. The scrap recovery 


operations, they had uranium -- that they did 


in support of the AEC were uranium scrap 


recovery operations. 


 Our sources relevant to the class. They had 


high- and low-enriched uranium from fuel 


fabrication and scrap recovery; thorium and 


plutonium oxide from fuel fabrication; and then 


we had thorium from uranium scrap recovery 


operations. We actually have -- we know that ­
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- here's a good -- the example, the uraniathoria scrap generated by the Elk River Reactor 


pellet fabrication, and we -- we -- I'll 


provide a little evidence of this later in the 


presentation. 


And -- and the pro-- initially we would develop 


a site profile for these sites, and the site 


profiles would be used for dose reconstruction. 


In our development process of the site profile, 


we attempted to capture data at a number of 


sources. We had a formal -- formal request to 


the current operator, Nuclear Fuel Services; 


the State of Tennessee Division of Radiological 


Health; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we 


reviewed records there; we -- we data captures 


at DOE Germantown, National Archives; we 


performed worker outreach and interviews. And 


the worker outreach -- well, especially the 


interviews, continued through the SEC 


evaluation process. 


From these -- from these data captures and 


reviews, through the site profile development, 


and through the SEC evaluation, we determined 


internal monitoring data. We have uranium 


bioassay data starting in 1964. We have AEC 

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reports in 1959 and 1961 containing detailed 


air monitoring. We have urine bioassay data 


for plutonium for the entire years of plutonium 


operations, which -- from the AEC period -- was 


roughly 1964 to 1970. 


We have no thorium bioassay monitoring data 


during the class period. There is thorium 


bioassay monitoring data actually in 1980s, but 


-- but that is after the actual AEC -- or the 


covered period up to 1970. 


We have one single air sample, and it was 


actually from a health and safety bulletin. 


The '59 and '61 reports that I'd identified 


earlier, air sample reports, are strictly from 


the high-enriched U and the low-enriched U 


operations. We have one thorium air sample 


that's identified, a 50 percent MAC in a scrap 


recovery building. That's how we determined 


clearly that there was thorium op-- operations 


in the scrap recovery. 


 External monitoring data. We have external 


monitoring data from beginning of AEC 


operations all the way through the covered 


period. We have -- also have dosi-- we have 


extremity dos-- extremity dosimetry for the 

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operational period. 


There is no neutron monitoring data for the 


covered period -- and I will address that. 


All right, a little overview of the petition. 


From our reviews and our look -- our searches 


for data, we determined that dose 


reconstruction was not feasible for an existing 


claim. On January 16th, 2007 a claimant was 


notified that dose reconstruction could not be 


completed, and was provided with a copy of the 


Special Exposure Cohort Form A. The petition 


was submitted to NIOSH on January 22nd, 2007. 


 Our conclusions were NIOSH lacks monitoring, 


process or source information sufficient to 


estimate the internal radiation doses from 


thorium exposures to W. R. Grace employees for 


the period of January 1, 1958 through December 


31, 1970 -- which is the entire covered period. 


 NIOSH believes it has sufficient information to 


estimate the internal dose from uranium and 


plutonium, and occupational external exposures, 


including medical exposures, for that period. 


We believe that we can reconstruct the external 


-- the neutron by using a neutron-to-photon 


ratio for the -- for the material. We actually 

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have a draft site profile that will -- that 


will use that -- that method. 


Again, I'd already mentioned that we have ex-- 


the other external monitoring data to support 


the rest of the external exposure. The 


internal exposure, we have the uranium 


bioassay, as mentioned, as well as we have 


developed a -- an intake using the air sample 


data to cover the early years of uranium 


operations. And the plutonium operations, as 


mentioned, we have plutonium bioassay through 


the covered period to cover that. 


 Our conclusion, NIOSH determined that it is not 


feasible to estimate the -- with sufficient 


accuracy internal radiation doses, and the 


health of the covered employees may have been 


endangered. 


 The evidence indicates that workers in the 


class may have accumulated intakes of thorium 


during the covered period. 


Our -- our proposed class definition is all 


Atomic Weapons Employees who were monitored, or 


should have been monitored, for potential 


exposures to thorium while working in any of 


the 100 series buildings or buildings 220, 230, 

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233, 234, 301 or 310 at W. R. Grace site at 


Erwin, Tennessee for a number of workdays 


aggregating at least 250 days from January 1, 


1958 through December 31, 1970, or in 


combination with workdays within the parameters 


established for one or more other class of 


employees in the SEC. 


We made our determination of the buildings 


through interviews and document reviews -- the 


affected buildings for this class. What we had 


-- we know from documentation that we do have 


that the thorium operations from -- thorium 


production operations were conducted in the 


same building as the uranium operations. We 


also in-- interviewed a health and safety 


manager working in the period that indicated 


that all 100 series buildings should be assumed 


to have stored or produced or activities 


occurred with uranium and thorium in those 


buildings. Therefore, we included all 100 


series buildings in our class definition. 


 Building 220, 230 and 233 were included based 


on a 1962 health and safety bulletin. 
I 


mentioned that bulletin earlier. That bulletin 


contained the air sample -- the thorium air 

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sample, and it was identified for building 233, 


which is scrap recovery. We noted that 220 and 


230 -- 220 and 230 were added because those 


buildings are adjacent -- are under the same 


roof at 233, and are associated with the same 


operations, so we included those buildings. 


Building 234 was included because of the U-233 


operations. As I'd mentioned earlier, the 


mixed oxide fuels that were produced, one of 


them was with U-233 and with thorium. 


Conclusion, our recommendation for the period 


January 1, 1958 through December 31, 1970, 


NIOSH finds the radiation dose estimates cannot 


be reconstructed for compensation purposes, and 


feasibility's no; health endangerment, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, LaVon. Let's open the 


floor for questions or comments. Gen Roessler. 


DR. ROESSLER: On your -- on your definition of 


the class, does that -- if you could put that 


slide back up again --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


DR. ROESSLER: -- you talk about all workers 


who were monitored, or should have been 


monitored, for thorium, and then list a bunch 


of buildings. So does that include all of the 

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workers in those buildings, or only the ones 


who had the potential for being exposed to 


thorium? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: That would be all workers in 


those buildings. 


DR. ROESSLER: Then I -- I don't know that your 


wording is quite right, but I guess Legal would 


know better, or somebody who's better at -- 


because it sounds to me that it's similar to 


the other one we discussed before, that here 


you're only looking at those who had the 


potential for being exposed to thorium. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, I can --


 DR. ZIEMER: And the chart turns out to be a 


different. I -- and maybe this is just 


internal discrepancy, but the last chart we 


looked at showed what could be reconstructed -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- 'cause we need that 


information, I think, if we proceed on this -- 


for the partials --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- although what you're saying is 


it still covers everybody -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: -- because anyone --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- in there had potential for the 


thorium. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I think that's Gen's question, 


so would you then say it would be analogous 


with Los Alamos, anyone who was monitored, or 


should have been monitored, for radiation 


exposure -- or do you ex-- do you see the -- 


the point we made? I --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, I understand what you're 


saying. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- maybe ask even NIOSH. We seem 


to have the same situation, but it's couched 


somewhat differently. We understand what 


you're saying. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think I'm just looking for sort 


of parallel structure here. Also I -- I'm not 


sure you said anything about medical -- did 


these people have medical -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, they -- and then -- and 


we --


 DR. ZIEMER: And medical could be 

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reconstructed. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- we can reconstruct -- yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: All external exposures can be 


reconstructed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So I guess if -- if this -- if we 


act positively on this, we may want some 


clarity -- clarity on the wording here. Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: But is there any pressing reason why 


we can't use phraseology that clarifies it in 


this -- have we established such a template of 


language that we can't stray from what we've 


done in the past? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, I think Dr. Roessler's 


question is why are we just using the thorium 


here when, in the similar situation for -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, I think if you look at ­

- at especially Los Alamos, there are things we 


can do and can't do over different periods of 


time, and structuring that class definition was 


-- in fact, believe me, we -- we looked at that 


at first and it was impossible. And so we 


recognized that the overlaps were -- and in 


this situation, we know thorium is our -- our 


issue. All right? Now --

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 DR. ZIEMER: So thorium will cover it, so 


that's -- that's --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right, and -- and the 


Department of Labor -- you know, I guess -- you 


know, I don't -- I don't want to speak for the 


Department of Labor, but you know, I think that 


we've -- we have passed this definition on to 


them and I -- I think they felt they could 


implement it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, I think he's saying 


it will -- it will take care of it, so that's 


fine. 


If there are no questions or comments, the 


floor is open for a motion. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I move that we recommend to the 


Secretary that he accept the proposed class 


definition for the Atomic Weapons Employees at 


W. R. Grace as stated in the presentation to us 


today. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And seconded? Again, if the 


motion passes -- we have a second here. If the 


motion passes, we will ask for the refined 


official wording for our consideration 


tomorrow. 

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 Comments first. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just a -- a clarification on the 


-- just, again, looking in terms of consistency 


here, but --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- the question on the thorium 


use, to what -- what were the thorium 


operations --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to what extent -- how do you 


know it -- I mean in -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. In fact -- and I'll go 


into a little detail. When we first developed 


this site -- when we developed the site 


profile, we looked at the uranium -- if we 


could take the uranium metal production or 


operations and actually use the data from that 


operation and develop a ratio to bound the 


thorium. The problem with that was we could 


not verify -- we had no -- we had no real 


process information on the thorium that we 


could verify that the production equipment and 


the -- the sizes of the equipment were similar 


or that they used the same equipment. And the 


only thing we did know, we knew that the 

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furnaces were definitely different because we 


had one report that identifies a furnace as a 


thorium furnace, and then other furnaces 


separate. So we had a pretty good indication 


the thorium furnaces were separate, and we also 


knew that, because of the chemical processes 


involved, that there would definitely be other 


equipment that wouldn't be associated. As well 


as we also were looking at the issues of the 


energy imparted in the process through 


temperature and reactions, can we be for sure 


that those reactions and the temperatures and 


so on, that they wouldn't be higher and 


subsequently increase the mass release from -- 


from -- from a given component. In addition, 


we had no indication of batch sizes that were 


used for the thorium. So -- so we looked at 


that -- all -- all of that was one big problem. 


Then the other problem we had was that we had 


the mixed oxide fuel that we were looking at, 


which was -- one was the 


uranium/thorium/zirconium mixed oxide fuel had 


99 percent thorium to -- with it. We had very 


-- we actually have some air data, not from the 


W. R. Grace site but for another site that was 

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producing the same thing, but very little of 


that, you know, to actually use to develop a 


ratio to -- to possibly bound that. In 


addition, I mentioned the uranium scrap 


recovery operations. We had the air sample 


that we knew that they were -- they were 


actually -- that there was thorium involved in 


that uranium scrap recovery, and we had that 


one air sample, and we have absolutely no 


uranium data for that -- that little operation, 


so... 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and you -- you mentioned 


thorium urinalysis samples but not till in the 


'80s. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: In the '80s. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So were -- were those -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: They were not associated with 


the same operations. 


 MR. GRIFFON: They weren't associated with the 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, not at all. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. That was the question. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda, do you have additional 


comment? 


 MS. MUNN: A question. How si-- how large is 

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this proposed cohort, and how many -- about how 


many claims do we have? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: You know I have to say I 


failed miserably on that. I did not get that 


number. I apologize for that. Larry may have 


it. You know, I --


 DR. ZIEMER: We may be able to get it by 


tomorrow if --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: You know, actually -- 


 MS. MUNN: That's easy to find. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Will that affect your motion? 


While he's looking for that, Mr. Presley. 


 MR. PRESLEY: LaVon --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- this will not exclude 


plutonium, will it? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: It does not exclude plutonium 


workers. If plutonium workers were involved in 


-- and worked in one of these buildings, it 


would not exclude those. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Let me ask now, are you 


ready to vote then, Board members? 


Okay, all in favor, raise your right hand? 


 (Affirmative responses) 

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 And any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


 Any abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


 Motion carries. 


 DR. WADE: The vote was unanimous. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Tomorrow we are going to look at 


the -- as was indicated, we'll -- we'll pick up 


Chapman Valve at -- well, we'll pick up Dow 


first, and then Chapman. And I think we'll be 


able to cover our other materials efficiently. 


We're shooting toward, if we can, a noon 


completion -- at least the Chair is. We'll see 


how it goes. 


 DR. WADE: We might forsake global science 


issues. We will not forsake the use of data 


from other sites. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now, we -- we reconvene back here 


this evening at 7:30, so we need a supper break 


here -- give you time to get something to eat 


and come back. We have a number of people that 


have signed up for comment this evening. 
I 


don't know how many there will be, but we do 


have some who have signed up. So we'll see you 


at 7:30. 

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PUBLIC COMMENT


 DR. ZIEMER: Good evening, everyone. We're 


going to go ahead and start the public comment 


session of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health. I have a list of individuals 


that have indicated they wished to speak to the 


assembly this evening and we'll just take the 


list in the order given. 


I do want to -- many of you were here last 


night, and I will repeat a couple of things in 


case you weren't here, and that is that this 


Board is an advisory board. We're not a board 


that makes the final decisions on anything. 


That's sometimes good and sometimes bad. 


Sometimes we wish we could, but the fact of the 


matter is we simply give advice. We're -- we 


do not adjudicate the cases. We evaluate the 


program, really is what it amounts to. That is 


the dose reconstruction program. 


We do have a -- we do have a responsibility to 


provide an opinion on Special Exposure Cohort 


petitions. We have -- before the Board at this 


meeting there are five petitions that are being 


examined, one of which is Rocky Flats. And as 


many of you know, we had an extensive 

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discussion, a public comment on that last 


night. The Board had that action before it 


earlier today. And if you weren't here for 


that, you may not know that the Board 


recommended approval of a portion of the time 


frame for the Rocky Flats for the neutron 


workers. There are some other portions of that 


petition that will be finalized in -- at our 


next meeting, next month, which we hope will be 


back here so that those of you from Rocky Flats 


can be present. 


There are several folks -- well, I -- I also 


want to mention, because it's sometimes 


confusing for folks, and that is that the folks 


you see here -- we do not work for NIOSH or for 


Department of Labor. We are just an 


independent board. I often introduce the 


individuals. A number of these, like -- like 


me, I'm a retired educator, and we have a mix 


of people on this Board, some of whom are 


retired, some of whom are still working; some 


of whom have technical backgrounds, some who 


are in the medical field, some who are 


individuals who are union workers. So we have 


a cross-section of folks here on this Board. 

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We are not part of NIOSH. We are not part of 


Department of Labor. So we're -- our job is to 


give kind of an independent look at things. 


We have to struggle, as it were, with a lot of 


viewpoints -- the viewpoints of the 


petitioners, the viewpoints of the agencies, 


and we even have our own contractor that we 


hire to help us evaluate the various issues. 


So it -- it's a job that this Board does, not 


only here at the Rocky Flats, but dealing with 


sites all over the country. 


We will be hearing from individuals from some 


of those -- representing some of those other 


sites in fact tonight, but I notice here there 


are still a few Rocky Flats folks and I'll just 


take them in the order that they are. We have 


imposed now a ten-minute time limit on people. 


That's something new, but in order to provide 


time for everyone to -- to give their remarks, 


we ask you to -- to stick with the ten-minute 


time limit. Also, as I mentioned last night, 


the ten-minute is not a goal to be achieved but 


is an upper limit. So if your remarks are less 


than that, that's quite fine. 


Jack Weaver, who identifies himself as a 

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retired Rocky Flats worker. Jack? Is Jack 


here? 


 DR. WADE: Jack has left. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Signed up earlier today but 


perhaps couldn't make it. 


Cliff DelForge? That's Cliff, you've got the 


first mike here. 


MR. DELFORGE: My name is Cliff DelForge -- 


Clifford DelForge. I worked at Rocky Flats for 


35 years, primarily in the areas of 


radiological safety. I'm not here on my behalf 


'cause I'm not sick. I -- primarily involved 


in here because of my [Identifying Information 


Redacted]. He worked at Rocky Flats for 24 


years and he is ill, and he is -- his illness 


was -- I think I was able to prove pretty 


significantly that it was caused at Rocky Flats 


-- by his work at Rocky Flats. 


I'm not here to talk about [Name Redacted] 


either. I'm just going to make some general 


comments, if I may. 


You've heard a lot of testimony from people. 


Some of it -- a fair amount of it was not 


probably technically appropriate for dose 


reconstruction, but all of it was morally, 

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ethically and emotionally valid for the SEC. 


I think we've kind of missed the boat on some 


of this stuff. Otherwi-- some of the people 


who got up here and talked were talking about 


specific instances where they were showing 


that, because of the work that they were doing 


and the places that they were, that they should 


have had a -- some dose on their dosimeters, 


should have had some dose, and that in most 


cases it came back either as a zero dose or as 


no current data available. 


I got -- that got me thinking about my own 


personal situation, and there are a couple of 


things that I'll discuss here shortly on my own 


personal experience regarding the validity of 


our dosimetry program. And that's fairly 


important 'cause you're talking about making a 


recommendation on whether or not to approve 


Rocky Flats for the SEC status. 


The last time I went out to the Rocky Flats 


plant -- I retired in 1995, and the last time I 


actually went out to the plant proper was as 


part of one of the many programs that I was 


involved with -- the uranium study, the 


plutonium study, the americi-- I mean the 

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beryllium study and the chemical study. And 


while I was out there I was talking to a 


gentleman and he was explaining to me that they 


had just started a new program where they were 


bringing back the film badges from the Denver 


Tech Center and they were going to reread these 


badges and then they were going to compare that 


data with the data that they had on the 


existing documentation. And the very first 


batch of badges they brought back, one 


gentleman, they reread his badge; his 


documentation showed zero, his bad (sic) was 


reading 1,000 millirem. They were off by a 


factor of 1,000 on that one individual. 


I don't know how far they went with this. I --


I would be willing to bet that they did not 


read every badge and bring every badge back, 


'cause they're talking about a lot of badges 


over many, many years. But that one instance 


should have indicated at least that they should 


have probably done that. 


The reason that -- if I understand it 


correctly, the reason that there were so many 


no current data available on the documentation 


was because they didn't read the badges. They 

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didn't have the time. It was just physically 


impossible to read all the badges, so they just 


put down no current data available. 


 I'm personally aware of three unauthorized 


experiments that were done to determine the 


validity of our dosimetry program. Now 


americium salts are the highest level of 


radiation that I've ever seen at Rocky Flats, 


and that was my job as a radiation monitor when 


I first got into radiological safety. I had a 


reading off of a fiber pack of the beryllium 


salts that read 22,000 millirem, which is 


extremely high, especially for Rocky Flats. A 


gentleman was -- I don't know if he was coerced 


into it or anything, but he -- several -- a 


couple of the RCTs or the radiation monitors 


said we ought to test this program, so they had 


him put his badge in a can of americium salts 


for 30 minutes. I don't know what the reading 


on that particular can was, but it had to be 


fairly high and there had to be some exposure 


to that badge. And his results came back zero. 


Another guy -- a different period of time -- 


put his badge in a glove on the americium line, 


which was the highest gamma radiation line at 

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the -- in 771 building, and he left it in there 


for the majority of his shift and he sent it 


in, and there had to be significant radiation 


exposure to that badge. It came back zero. 


I personally -- I was assigned to a special 


project as a radiation monitor. We had to have 


special badges because the material we were 


working with had a very robust gamma associated 


with it. I must have been in a union frame of 


mind at the time because I decided I was going 


to do my own test. All the other people who 


had the special badges wore their badges on the 


inside of their lead aprons and they were 


required to wear lead aprons the entire time 


they worked with the material. I set my badge 


on the outside, looking for some -- there had 


to be some difference between my badge and 


everybody else's -- and it came back zero. 


There was no difference. 


In my son's case, doing some investigation, I 


found two instances where they'd found a small 


amount of -- of exposure on a badge on two of 


his different badge, and they said well, you 


know, this -- this can't be real. It's not --


it's bogus, so we're just going to knock 

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everything back to zero. 


I firmly believe that their standard operating 


procedure was whenever there was any kind of an 


anomaly with their program, if they had a high 


reading here or something like that, they 


simply said well, this can't be right, it can't 


be true so we'll just forget it and knock it 


down to zero. I mean if they were doing 


anything else, they would have come and 


investigated. And in my case if there was -- I 


had a high exposure on my badge, somebody 


should have come down and said, you know, 


what's -- what's the problem here, at which 


case I probably would have been in a little bit 


of trouble because I did this in an 


unauthorized manner. 


I think -- and I think we missed the boat 


because, with the people that talked about 


their specific situations and my own 


experiences, we should have gotten together 


with all the people that -- from Rocky Flats, 


all the people work in the back areas, and sat 


down and interviewed them and said what 


personal experiences do you have that would 


show that the documentation of the dosimetry 

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program was not up to snuff, it wasn't doing 


what it was designed to do. I think we could 


have provided you with a very large document. 


I think everybody -- 'cause everybody that I 


talk to just casually said yeah, yeah, I know 


this situation. This happened in my case, and 


everything else. 


It's kind of disheartening to sit and listen to 


Mark say, you know, that he -- he's perfectly 


comfortable that there was no credible 


evidence, I guess, to -- that there was any 


problems with the dosimetry program. I don't 


believe that. I believe that there were some 


problems with it. I think that the -- with the 


numbers of no current data available, I don't 


know how you can possibly extrapolate -- and 


that's another thing. 


If you're talking about well, we're going to 


extrapolate here, we're going to calculate 


here, we're going to -- you know, you -- just 


making up numbers, is all you're going to do is 


make up numbers, and I don't think you can do 


it accurately. I don't think there's enough 


information that you really need to have to do 


that. 

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The -- you can't use situations with other 


plants with regard to Rocky Flats. We had --


we had unique materials, we had unique 


mixtures, we had unique processes. You can't 


say well, what happened over here -- we're 


going to say well, we can say that the same 


thing happened over here. 


You can't use common denominators. You look at 


people as individuals, and you don't know if a 


person got a exposure in a -- in an hour, or in 


a week or in a month if his badge was on a 


monthly basis and he got a total over that 


period of time, or if he was in a back area one 


hour and got that -- that exposure. You don't 


have that kind of information to know who was 


working what lines and how long they were there 


and anything else. There's just so much 


information out there that's -- that you need 


to have in order to do a valid thing -- at 


least in my opinion. 


It's kind of funny, it's -- it's almost like 


this program, this compensation program, was 


like a fresh zebra kill. And the top predator, 


the Department of Energy, got in there ripping 


off huge chunks of flesh, to the tune of $90 

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million in paperwork that went in their 


pockets. And isn't it amazing that the two 


people that were involved in that program 


resigned shortly after that came to light -- 


not because of that. No, it didn't have 


anything to do with that. They were going to 


retire anyhow. And -- and now the vultures and 


the jackals are picking at the -- the bones of 


this thing. And they've apparently done a 


pretty good job, at least on one leg of the 


beast. 


I saw this article in the paper today, Rocky 


Mountain News, and it says here that the 


government is about to run out of money to 


complete dose reconstruction. They're about to 


run out of money. So the vultures have picked 


that leg clean, pretty close to it. 


And now I ask you, what are we going to do now? 


Are we going to -- when it runs out of money 


are we just going to say well, we're just going 


to put it on hold until we get some more money 


and start doing our job again? I got a good 


idea. Maybe what we can do is do a kind of a 


pool and see how many more Rocky Flats 


employees are going to die in the interim. 

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We need to have some processes done -- we need 


them done now. We need to have -- I think the 


things that you've heard -- what they do to me. 


Obviously I have an agenda of my own. I've got 


a son who's ill. I've got friends who are ill. 


I would ask you right now -- I would ask that 


you all unanimously recommend to whoever is in 


charge that any further dose reconstruction 


should be discontinued immediately. It's a 


waste of time and a waste of money. And I'd 


also recommend that you unanimously recommend 


that Rocky Flats be given the SEC status. I 


don't ask you to do this because you feel 


compassion for the people who are ill. I don't 


ask you to do this because you may be angry at 


some of the way that some of the people were 


treated. I ask you to do this because it's 


scientifically appropriate to do it. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Cliff. Then [Name 


Redacted] -- is [Name Redacted] with us? 


 (No response) 


Okay, we'll come back and check. [Name 


Redacted] I think is the last name. I'm trying 


to read the first name. Is there a [Name 

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Redacted] here? Rocky Flats retired person -- 


[Name Redacted]?


 UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) What was it? I can't hear you very 


well. The sound system is very muffled. 


 DR. ZIEMER: [Name Redacted] is -­

UNIDENTIFIED: No, I'm sorry. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Not [Name Redacted]? Okay. Next
 

is Dr. Dan McKeel, and I believe Dr. McKeel's 


representing the Dow Madison petition. 


 DR. MCKEEL: Good evening, Dr. Ziemer and the 


Board. Actually tonight I want to talk about 


our other site, General Steel. I do have --


 DR. ZIEMER: I think tomorrow you'll have an 


opportunity then I believe as the petitioner to 


 DR. MCKEEL: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- talk about the Dow site, yes. 


 DR. MCKEEL: Dr. Ziemer was kind enough to 


allow me -- I had a rather complex comment 


tonight, so I made that in writing, appropriate 


to what the Board has just decided, and I'll 


try to keep this short for you. The remarks I 


want to make tonight are for my colleague, 


[name redacted], who you all know. And I have 

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basically two brief remarks. 


The first one is about the Battelle task order 


16 contract, and as you heard yesterday, Larry 


Elliott announced that due to fund shortages at 


NIOSH, this contract would soon be terminating, 


at the end of this month, with no further work 


done and all monies spent. This is an 


important contract to us because both the Dow 


site and the General -- General Steel 


Industries sites are under this contract. 


As you know, the original contract was to have 


been for 12 months and was to have ended last 


October, and has been extended. There were, as 


far as I'm aware, three dose reconstruction 


guidance documents that have been produced, 


TIBs 5000, 6000, 6001. I heard Larry yesterday 


say that there were 16 site-specific appendices 


to cover the 256 sites that were charged to 


Battelle to review. General Steel is 


apparently one of those 16 appendices. We 


don't know when that appendix will materialize, 


although I was very encouraged to see that the 


first four appendices were posted on the -- on 


the OCAS web site today. 


 Mr. Elliott also told us -- told our group that 

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Dow, which is another site, will not have a 


site-specific appendix and Dow also has no site 


profile. The original intent, and the reason 


I'm bringing this up tonight, was to generate 


appendices for all 256 sites. And I derived 


that idea because the OCAS web site right now 


says the following about Battelle TIB-6000. 


Quote, Following the main body of this document 


is a collection of appendices, with one 


appendix for each AWE site that performed 


metal-working operations, and the TIB is about 


uranium and thorium -- end quote. 


Only 308 of the more than 1,400 claims, or 


about 22 percent of the total, have been 


completed dose reconstructions at Battelle. An 


unstated number of 83.14 SECs may be 


forthcoming, and added work remains for other 


branches of NIOSH to complete undone tasks. 


My comment is that this doesn't really seem 


like very satisfactory overall performance on 


this contract, given the significant time 


extension. And the comment for the whole 


EEOICPA program is that in a time like this of 


constrained funding for NIOSH operations is -- 


was the Battelle task order -- was it a wise 

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investment, considering basically the low 


overall productivity on all the major goals. 


The second comment tonight is -- in a -- in a 


way I apologize, but I came to you tonight, 


again, about the General -- I mean the Granite 


City Steel naming issue because, although we 


have brought that up repeatedly to the Board, 


that problem still persists today, and I want 


to give you a -- a very practical reason why 


it's important. 


[name redacted] and I have jointly written in 


our written comments a detailed recounting of 


two claims, and both of those together show the 


Department of Energy, Department of Labor and 


NIOSH have really not dealt adequately with 


this Granite City Steel naming error and the 


description of the facility at DOE. 


Claim number one [Identifying Information 


Redacted] filed EEOICPA claims in 2004. He 


went through the entire dose reconstruction 


process, was assigned a probability of 


causation of 36.23 percent, and then he was 


denied in April of 2005. 


The problem is that Granite City Steel did no 


AEC uranium work, and was a different site at a 

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different location from Gra-- General Steel 


Industries, which was the real covered site. 


GSI did perform Betatron non-destructive 


testing on Mallinckrodt uranium ingots from 


1953 to 1966. In contrast, Granite City Steel 


didn't have any Betatrons. 


We had obtained the redacted version of this 


claim from NIOSH by the FOIA process, and we 


got that because this was one of the four dose 


reconstructions that have been performed for 


Granite City Steel -- or correctly named, 


General Steel Industries. 


We then located the worker's children, one of 


whom verified that it -- one of her -- that her 


claim was one of the ones that was dose 


reconstructed. She verified her father always 


[Identifying Information Redacted] from Granite
 

City Steel, always [Identifying Information 


Redacted] work, and never set foot at GSI, even 


after Granite City Steel bought the GSI grounds 


and property in 1974. 


Well, we were interested in that because, as I 


say, there've been a very low production of 


completed dose reconstructions. [name 


redacted] and I believe in fact that probably 

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all four DRs that have been attributed to 


General Steel Industries may have actually been 


done on Granite City Steel workers in error. 


In our written comment we provide indisputable 


documentation that the original facility 


misidentification occurred at the Department of 


Energy, and went unrecognized by Labor and 


NIOSH during the dose reconstruction process, 


including assignment of a POC of 36.23 percent. 


The second claim highlighted in our written 


comment is that of an authentic [Identifying 


Information Redacted] GSI employee who was a 


[Identifying Information Redacted]. He was told
 

by a Department of Labor supervisor and by 


Social Security that he really worked at 


National Roll Company in Pennsylvania, and that 


GSI was not a covered site. It took multiple 


calls and a FAXed newspaper story to convince 


Labor that claimant number two worked at GSI, 


that GSI was a real covered site, and that his 


claim would be processed. And -- and that was 


effective, but he still awaits his dose 


reconstruction, along with 208 other people 


with claims at NIOSH from General Steel 


Industries. 

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In light of these two claims that I think are 


well documented, we therefore are requesting 


that the Department of Labor re-examine all of 


the 305 denied Granite City Steel and GSI 


claims with respect to the site employment 


issue. After this meeting is over we will work 


with the Illinois Congressional delegation to 


request a remedy in a formal way. Therefore, 


we will assist the agencies with the -- this 


effort if -- if they ask us to do so. 


We think that several hundreds of claimants 


could have been affected. There are now 819 


Part B and E ostensible GSI claims, and 546 


ostensible GSI cases. We need to know for sure 


how many claims were denied (a), from people 


who never worked at GSI, and (b), from workers 


who worked at GSI but were denied in the early 


years because both Department of Labor and 


Energy misconstrued the name and location of 


GSI as the authentic covered facility, thinking 


it was Granite City Steel. 


 The DOE facilities list database and the DOL 


statistics by state web sites have only been 


partly corrected in this regard. 


And -- and the final comment is that [name 

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redacted]and I at least hope one day that the 


children claimants of claim number one worker 


will get an apology, and I think it needs to be 


a special apology from all three of those 


agencies. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dan. And I have the --


the more extensive copy. I think we can get 


this onto the web site perhaps and I'll ask the 


-- NIOSH to do that. 


 DR. MCKEEL: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Also, Dan, I believe you have been 


in contact with Pete Turic (sic), have you, 


from Labor? I --


 DR. WADE: Turcic. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- or Turcic. We want to make 


sure that you're not relying on our -- 


 DR. MCKEEL: No, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- our --


 DR. MCKEEL: Right, that's what I meant to say. 


I --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- proceedings to see that this 


gets --


 DR. MCKEEL: -- obviously this has to be taken 


up with all three --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

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 DR. MCKEEL: -- agencies, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I think I knew that you were 


going to do that, I just want to make -- 


confirm --


 DR. MCKEEL: I did transmit my e-mail copy sent 


to you to Mr. Turcic and to Libby White at 


Department of Energy --


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. 

 DR. MCKEEL: -- so they would be of this -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. 

 DR. MCKEEL: -- and -- and to Larry Elliott. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Okay, thank you. [name 

redacted] from Rocky Flats -- is [name 


redacted] with us tonight? 


 (No response) 


 Sometimes folks sign these things early in the 


day thinking that they are registering their 


attendance, and they end up on the -- the 


speaking sheet. 


 How about Stan -- is it Beitscher? 


 MR. BEITSCHER: Yes, it is. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Stan. 


 MR. BEITSCHER: Would it be better if I spoke 


from that podium? 


 DR. ZIEMER: You -- you can do either one -- 

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 MR. BEITSCHER: The sound is very --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- whatev-- whatever you prefer. 


 MR. BEITSCHER: It may be my ears. The sound 


is very muffled. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, you can try that one, if you 


prefer. 


 MR. BEITSCHER: My name is Stan Beitscher. I 


worked at Rocky Flats from 1963 to 1993. I 


came there when I was 30 years old. I left 


when I was 60 years old, with a number of 


medical conditions. I look very healthy from 


the outside, but I have a number of situations 


internally that are not apparent. But my first 


comments have to do with the special cohort 


program, and I'd like to add to Mr. DelForge's 


comments from a slightly different perspective. 


Let me tell you what my background is. I was a 


research scientist at Rocky Flats in the area 


of metallurgical engineering. I graduated from 


the Colorado School of Mines with a degree in 


metallurgical engineering, with a minor in 


minerals beneficiation. I went to Rensselaer 


Polytechnic Institute and received a master's 


degree in metallurgical engineering with a 


minor in nuclear engineering. I then went back 

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to the Colorado School of Mines, received a PhD 


in metallurgical engineering with a minor in 


physics. 


So I can't really claim that I did not know 


that radiation and toxic material exposure is 


dangerous. I was very well schooled in these 


areas. I'm not a world expert in these areas, 


but I have read thousands upon thousands of 


pages concerning the effects of radiation and 


toxic material exposure in my lifetime. I've 


written hundreds of research papers dealing 


with material science. 


And I can tell you, first of all, that the 


emphasis at Rocky Flats was production first; 


safety, yes, but came second. Nothing would 


take -- would stand in the way of meeting 


production schedules. And although there was 


concern for safety, safety was second. 


Furthermore, the implication that working -- 


for working at Rocky Flats was that largely 


radiation effects on biological systems is 


largely unknown. This is a very crude science. 


In 1963 very little was known about the limits 


of -- of dangerous exposure, not only to 


radiation but to the host of other extremely 

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dangerous materials that were handled at Rocky 


Flats. The list is staggering and almost 


amazing. Every -- virtually every toxic, 


dangerous material was at one time or another 


present in my work area in my -- in the 


research building of Building 79 where I spent 


about 28 of the 30 years. The other year and a 


half was spent in Building 771, which is 


acknowledged as the most dangerous building in 


the United States. 


So to limit compensation based on perhaps the 


absence of some information or some material is 


preposterous. The radiation was widespread and 


the exposure to other toxic material was 


extremely widespread at Rocky Flats. 


Furthermore, you cannot predict biological 


effects based purely on some sort of 


reconstructed dosage effects. Large amounts of 


radiation can-- cannot -- and in some cases, 


not cause biological effects. Small amounts of 


radiation in other species can cause enormous 


effects. And to limit -- to limit compensation 


for horrible conditions for some imaginary 


limit of -- of exposure is preposterous. And I 


stand behind what Mr. DelForge said. 

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First of all, I'd like to add just one other 


comment on that. Dosimetry, and that's a 


subject that I followed very closely in my 


career because I was subject to dosimetry. 
I 


worked in a hot area. I worked in a glovebox. 


I worked in a very high radiation area. 


Dosimetry is -- is not an exact science, and it 


is impossible -- I think, and from my opinion ­

- to reconstruct dosage at Rocky Flats. I -- I 


don't know what else I can tell you, and that's 


the reason that I feel fairly strongly that the 


cohort program should be approved at Rocky 


Flats. The dosimeter program at Rocky Flats 


was run probably you might say to the best of 


the ability of the people running it, but that 


doesn't mean it was run very well. There were 


a great deal of unknowns. 


And dosimetry -- dosimeters are not accurate. 


The placement of dosimeters are not always at 


the right location. People didn't always wear 


their badges. They were not read correctly. 


And furthermore, the science of dosimetry is -- 


is -- is work -- is a work in -- a work in 


progress. It is not an exact science. 


Okay. Let me just switch gears a little bit, 

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if I may, and talk about the compensation 


program. I've studied this compensation 


program for five years. I still don't 


understand it. And let me explain why. 


I have a -- I have a claim in for a number of 


illnesses that are not cancers. I don't 


believe they're cancers yet. To -- without 


being really specific or explicit, I have 


respiratory problems. I also have a very large 


particular gland that causes me tremendous 


discomfort and I have respiratory problems and 


I have a hearing defect, and I feel that all of 


these were at least greatly caused by my 


employment at Rocky Flats. 


Part B -- as I understand the compensation 


program, Part B covers 22 cancers, beryllium 


disease, silicosis and beryllium sensitivity. 


Part E, on the other hand, covers other things, 


but will only compensate you for loss of 


income. 


Now there is no way I can -- I can just-- I can 


understand this. In other words, if you don't 


have these -- one of these 22 cancers, 


berylliosis or silicosis, you're not subject to 


compensation. If you don't have these cancers 

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and you have other conditions, you're only 


compensated if you have -- if you can prove a 


loss of wages. Well, I'm retired. I -- I 


can't prove a loss of wages. But yet I have 


what I consider to be extremely serious medical 


conditions -- perhaps not as serious as some, 


but fairly serious. When I wake up in the 


middle of the night gasping for breath, I think 


it's fairly serious, although it's not cancer. 


I don't understand. I mean I think -- I think 


some reasonable effort was -- was made to make 


the program fair, but there's a great big hole 


in it. And for the life of me, I don't 


understand -- I don't understand why I'm not 


covered for compensation because -- simply 


because I don't have one of these 22 cancers 


yet, or berylliosis or silicosis. 


There are very serious health effects that are 


not cancer, and let me just name three that I 


can think of. There may be a number of others, 


and I just can't think of these others. Noncancerous tumors are not cancers, but tumors 


are very serious medical effects. They're not 


covered by Part B. They may be covered by Part 


E, but my experience is Part E is not very 

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sympathetic to these conditions, and proving 


that these conditions are caused by some sort 


of exposure at Rocky Flats seems to be 


virtually impossible. 


Asthma and other respiratory conditions such as 


congestive obstructive pulmonary disease are 


not cancers, but they're very serious health 


effects, life-threatening health effects, and 


they're not covered by Part B. They're only 


covered -- perhaps, I think -- by Part E. But 


my experience is not very sympathetically. 


So I think there's a ways to go, and I think 


that a greater consideration should be given to 


some of these claims that are not presently 


given, and certainly, to go back to dose 


reconstruction, I think that people working on 


dose reconstruction are benefiting themselves 


by their employment and not really doing 


anything for anyone else. 


Thank you for listening to me. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Stan. I 


understand that we have an individual who's 


called in by phone, [Name Redacted]. [Name 


Redacted] are you on the line? 


 (No response) 

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Is it [Name Redacted]? 


 DR. WADE: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: [Name Redacted], are you on the 

line? 

 (No response) 

 Okay, perhaps not. Let me check back again on 


the other names -- [name redacted]? [Name 


Redacted]? Mr. [Name Redacted]? Mr. Weaver --


Jack Weaver? 


 (No responses) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is this [Name Redacted]? 


 MR. EARLEY: No, Lynn Earley. 


 DR. WADE: Say again, please? 


 MR. EARLEY: Lynn Earley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Would you like to speak? 


 MR. EARLEY: Yes, I would. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Please proceed. Tell us your name 


again, Lynn --


 MR. EARLEY: Lynn (unintelligible) Early -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: E-a-r-l--


 MR. EARLEY: -- (unintelligible) analyst, 


organic (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. EARLEY: And I am also chair of the 

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International Science Oversight 


(unintelligible), newly-formed (unintelligible) 


to analyze (unintelligible) government agencies 


(unintelligible). I have (unintelligible) that 


I would like to go over. I don't know how much 


time you have, but I have some (unintelligible) 


that I --


 DR. ZIEMER: You have a ten -- you have a ten-


minute limit, sir. 


 MR. EARLEY: -- would like (unintelligible) I 


have to get (unintelligible) to get those so 


I'll (unintelligible) 20 seconds. 


 MS. MUNN: I don't think he heard you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: He's switching phones, I -- 


 DR. WADE: Putting the dog out. 


(Pause) 


 MR. EARLEY: (Unintelligible) serious question 


relative to the whole question of low dose 


exposure. These exposures have been analyzed 


by independent scientists down through the 


years and have been underestimated by many of 


the international bodies, including IAEA and 


the International Commission on Radiological 


Risks. I would hope that this advisory 


committee would take (unintelligible) some of 

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these low dose issues. There is a book that 


recently was published that is entitled 


Chernobyl, 20 Years (unintelligible). It 


documents a whole host of non-cancer effects 


from these Chernobyl exposures, many of which 


were quite low doses. But he Japanese A-bomb 


studies did not document -- in fact, they only 


looked at the mortality (unintelligible) from 


(unintelligible) bomb blast and they were 


looking at cancer mortality exclusively. This 


book, which just came out last year, documents 


a whole host, a whole range of issues 


(unintelligible) anybody on the internet 


(unintelligible) by the European Committee on 


Radiation Risk -- a simple Google for ECRR will 


come to that text -- and interestingly, the 


IAEA, the World Health Organization, the ICRP 


had these Russian studies in hand but never 


translated them. Consequently, they have 


ignored many non-cancer risks. And I listened 


to the testimony quite carefully last night and 


was shocked to find that -- and some of the 


testimony today indicates that there are 


several -- and of course the last speaker 


alluded to other non-cancer risks. 

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Now this of course is something that is being 


overlooked, disregarded and the scientific 


literature has been underestimated because the 


scientists that are doing this work have been 


uniformly almost shunned in the scientific 


community. Give you a classic example. The 


BEIR VII committee, which was organized to take 


cognizance of the latest updated information on 


low dose risk. Unfortunately there were 


members of the (unintelligible) community that 


-- and I was doing freelance and still do 


freelance medical writing -- there were many 


organizations in the public interest community 


that nominated several members to BEIR VII. 


These members were independent scientists, well 


qualified to analyze the effects of low dose. 


There were about a dozen of them. None of them 


were appointed to the BEIR VII committee, and 


obviously many of the people -- and I've been 


doing conflict of interest studies -- many of 


them had conflicts. In fact, right on the 


Advisory Board that I'm addressing right now 


there are three members that I can recognize 


quickly who are in the Health Physics Society, 


two with official positions. Health Physics 

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Society has a position statement, and I quote, 


Below five to ten rem, and which includes 


occupational and environmental exposures, risk 


of health effects are either too small to be 


(unintelligible) or are non-existent. This is 


a (unintelligible) unscientific and completely 


unethical statement. 


The -- there was a paper put out by 


(unintelligible) National Academy of Sciences, 


November 25th, 2003, and the -- there are 15 


cancer experts on this study. Cancer is 


attributable to low doses of ionizing 


radiation, assessing what we really know. 


You'll recognize those in the field. Their 


names (unintelligible) Richard (unintelligible) 


Goodhead, Charles Land of the NCI, John 


(unintelligible) of Harvard, Dale 


(unintelligible), President, Elaine 


(unintelligible), National Cancer 


(unintelligible), Jonathan (unintelligible), 


Richard (unintelligible) and this study that 


they did indicated that there is good evidence 


existing in epidemiological data that suggests 


ten to 50 millisievert exposure an acute dose 


and 50 to 100 millisievert for a protracted 

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exposure, but the scientists will not accept -- 


and this of course refers directly to the 


exposures at our weapons labs -- that 


protracted exposure of small doses of any 


radioactive elements over time have a greater 


effect than the same acute dose that is given ­

- one exposure. Now you will find that most of 


the so-called experts in the field reject this 


theory completely, and yet there's sufficient 


evidence to show otherwise. 


So there are numerous studies in the low dose 


field to absolutely question the 


recommendations that ICRP has put out, 


primarily because it's based upon the A-bomb 


study, as much of the literature is. 


Consequently, what they're not looking at is 


internal emitters, the alpha emitters. 


Certainly the A-bomb study did not, and all of 


the subsequent studies of course do not take 


recognition of these internal emitters, which 


are at least 20 times more serious than 


external emitters, and this has been documented 


again in the literature. 


I've been studying radiation health effects for 


35 years. I'm a retired consumer economics 

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teacher. (Unintelligible) testimony as vice 


president of consumer (unintelligible) Michigan 


in the 1970s, became an early opponent of 


nuclear power because of what I was reading 


about radiation and health effects. What 


nobody has alluded to is the fact that when 


these weapon labs were first organized, the 


Atomic Energy Commission and all of the other 


governmental agencies were given the power to 


put a (unintelligible) label on all radiation 


research, and that meant restricted data and it 


was only available to a few limited persons. 


That of course took place all through the Cold 


War. The (unintelligible) atomic audit by 


Brookings Institution documented how the United 


States (unintelligible) $5.8 billion on these 


atomic weapons development, and it is a wealth 


of information that is contained in that book 


certainly attest to the fact that the secrecy 


that took place (unintelligible) us a 


tremendous amount of (unintelligible) and a 


lack of information in dissemination of 


information, at least up until 1982 -- 1992 


when President Clinton of course put out the 


order -- Executive Order to declassify many of 

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these studies (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Earley, we'd ask you to -- 

 MR. EARLEY: -- (unintelligible) --

 DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Earley, I'm going to ask you 

to try to wrap up. You're at your ten-minute 


limit, so if you could wrap up quickly, thank 


you. 


 MR. EARLEY: All right. I would certainly 


conclude by stating that the dose 


reconstruction program, which not only affects 


these workers in our labs but also applies to 


the atomic veterans, some 400,000 or more 


atomic veterans who were at -- in Japan and in 


the Pacific Theater during the atmospheric 


tests. This process of utilizing dose 


reconstruction is unscientific, has no basis in 


fact. Indeed, much of that information in many 


of the early years was either destroyed, was 


never taken accurately and for anyone to think 


that this is an accurate measure is completely 


preposterous, as has been alluded to by many of 


the speakers. I would say that the speakers I 


heard last night, all of them, certainly 


deserve a honorary degree because they could 


run circles around many of the experts, many of 

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whom I've interviewed as I was doing medical 


writing, so I commend those persons who have 


taken a stand and come out with their testimony 


and I hope that it will bear upon decisions 


that are made, not only by the advisory 


committee but by the agencies themselves that 


will of course make the final determination. 


So again, thanks again for the tremendous work 


that you people have done, who are the workers 


at the labs, and I certainly appreciate and am 


looking forward to working with you because 


we'll be developing some of the issues in the 


future and our (unintelligible) oversight for 


will certainly take cognizance of your 


testimony. Thank you for your work. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Mr. Earley. 


Let me open the floor, if there's any others 


that didn't sign up but do wish to make a 


comment tonight, we've completed the list here. 


Are there any others who wish to make comment? 


Yes, and give us your name for the record here. 


MS. BAYES: Certainly. My name is LeeAnn 


Bayes. My [Identifying Information Redacted] 


was [Name Redacted] was the [Identifying 


Information Redacted] at Rocky Flats for a 

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number of years. He worked at Rocky Flats from 


1971 until September 12th of 1988. That was 


the morning he died. 


 I consider my [Identifying Information Redacted] 


very fortunate because he had the opportunity 


to have excellent medical care for the duration 


of his illness. And I think it is 


reprehensible that our government has denied 


that same coverage to these people who have 


given so much to grant us our civil liberties 


and to guarantee us our Constitutional rights. 


I know nothing about dosimetry. I know my 


[Identifying Information Redacted] didn't get to 


see me graduate from high school, college, 


graduate school, get married or have children. 


And I don't think that it's fair that you 


should deny these people the opportunity to 


have every chance at surviving their illnesses 


or bearing through them with some degree of 


comfort and especially dignity. 


I don't have a scientific background, but I do 


know what it's like to be an orphan of the Cold 


War. And that needs to be taken into 


consideration. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Well, let me 

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thank all of you again for coming out this 


evening. Been a long day for many. We -- the 


Board will reconvene tomorrow morning. We will 


be taking up the SEC petition from Dow Chemical 


and the SEC Petition from Chapman Valve. So 


some interesting additional activities. You're 


all welcome to join us at that time. We begin 


tomorrow at basically 8:15. The agenda says 


8:00 to 8:15 is the, quote, welcome. That 


means a chance to get here and have a cup of 


coffee and say hello, and then we'll get 


underway at 8:15. 


We will be meeting in a different room 


tomorrow. I understand it's the Sherman Room? 


DR. ROESSLER: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Savannah Room. 


 DR. WADE: No, Stanley -- Stanley -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Close enough for an old guy -- 


begins with an S. Let me get it straight, 


Stanley 1, somewhere down the hall, I 


understand. We'll try to find each other. 


Thank you. Good night. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 8:35 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

370 

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6 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of May 3, 2007; 


and it is a true and accurate transcript of the 


testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


15th day of July, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 

371 

CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102