THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


DAY ONE
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held in Hebron, Kentucky on 


March 27, 2006. 

 

2 

 6 

C O N T E N T S
 

March 27, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


MATRIX 25 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 218 

3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

 

4

 P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 

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IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

ADLER, TIM, ORAU 


BEHLING, HANS, SC&A 


CHEW, MEL, ORAU 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


KERR, GEORGE, ORAU 


LIPSZTEIN, JOYCE, SC&A 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


NETON, JIM, NIOSH 


REID, STEVE, ORAU 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


STEMPFLEY, DAN, ORAU 


TANKERSLEY, BILL, ORAU 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (10:10 a.m.) 

(Note from the Court Reporter: The following 


transcript contains a great number of 


“unintelligible” messages. Unfortunately 


transcription was often rendered impossible due to 


faulty audio-visual equipment of the meeting facility 


and poor telephonic connections. Please know these 


gaps in transcription are not the fault of the court 


reporter and not the fault of the speakers.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO


 DR. WADE: Could I ask if anyone is on the 


phone, joining us by phone right now? 


 MR. STEMPFLEY: This is Dan Stempfley from 


Cincinnati with the ORAU team. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome. 

 MR. REID: Steve Reid from Richland office. 

 MS. MUNN: No kidding. 

 DR. WADE: Welcome. Is Mark on yet, Mark 

Griffon? 

 (No response) 

Anybody else but the two gentlemen who 


identified themselves? 

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MR. ADLER: Tim Adler. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) with SC&A. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, welcome. 


 MR. GIBSON: Hi, Lew, this is Mike Gibson. 


 DR. WADE: Hi, Mike, how are you? 


 MR. GIBSON: I'm doing okay, a little under the 


weather. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. There's a lot of that going 


around this time of year. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, another under the weather 


person, Mark Griffon. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: How far under? 


 MR. GIBSON: Walking pneumonia. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, geez. 


 DR. WADE: I hope you take care of yourself. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, yeah, I'll be okay, thanks. 


 MS. MUNN: You like injections. Right? 


 MR. GIBSON: Oh, yes. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, yeah. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill Tankersley and 


Tim Adler. 


 DR. WADE: Well, maybe we can begin. I think 


all the principals are here. This is a working 


group meeting of the Advisory Board. This is 

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the working group that looks at site profiles, 


individual dose reconstruction reviews, as well 


as procedures reviews, and it's chaired by Mark 


and is populated by Wanda and Robert, Mike and 


Mark -- I don't think I've forgotten anyone. 


Mark acts as chair. 


Let me just sort of put you in -- put this 


meeting in context. The Board and SC&A have 


been looking at the Y-12 site profile for some 


time now, identifying issues and trying to 


resolve those issues, you know, through the 


Board sort of six-step process. And we've made 


a great deal of progress and this is another 


meeting along that line. So this is a meeting 


dealing with the Y-12 site profile. So while 


we have a member, Robert, who is conflicted, 


his conflict really manifests itself relative 


to a site profile as not being able to vote or 


make motion. As a working group we really 


won't be voting or making motion, so Robert is 


fully empowered to participate in the 


discussion. I don't think there's anyone else 


who's materially conflicted for Y-12. 


Now the thing we have going on in almost 


parallel is we have a Y-12 SEC petition that is 

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pending before NIOSH. NIOSH intends to bring 


that evaluation report to the public and Board 


the first week in April. What will happen is 


this working group will sort of transition to 


start to look at SEC issues when it meets next 


-- and that will be the afternoon of April 11th 


here in Cincinnati. So again, today we're 


focusing on the site profile. At the next 


meeting, at the 11th, we'll be focusing on the 


SEC petition. The meeting on the 11th will be 


after NIOSH releases to the Board and the 


public its SEC petition evaluation report. 


SC&A is also tasked with doing a focused review 


of the Y-12 SEC petition, and we'll know more 


about what's precisely involved in that when 


they're in receipt of the evaluation report. 


Now that's probably confusing to everyone, but 


hopefully not too confusing to everyone. 


We also have going on a Rocky Flats situation 


that's really exactly parallel. Tomorrow this 


working group will meet concerning the Rocky 


Flats site profile. There will be a meeting 


the morning of April 12th looking at the Rocky 


Flats SEC petition, again with this working 


group transitioning. 

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Dr. Melius is chairing a working group that's 


looking at the generic issues associated with 


SEC petition reviews by the Board's contractor. 


That workgroup will meet the morning of April 


11th, also in Cincinnati. 


NIOSH does intend to bring both petitions, Y-12 


and Rocky Flats, before the Board so that they 


can be considered at the Board's face-to-face 


meeting in the end of April in Denver, 


Colorado. 


 Again, we don't know exactly how this will all 


play out 'cause we haven't seen the NIOSH 


petition evaluation report. SC&A hasn't had an 


opportunity to react to that report itself. 


But again, those are the -- the paths we're 


moving down. If there are any questions about 


that I'd be pleased to take them and try and 


say more clearly than I did the first time what 


I just said. 


 MS. MUNN: I have one question. This is Wanda 


Munn. I'd like to get a feel before we get 


started from both NIOSH and SCA about their 


feelings with respect to how close we're -- 


we're coming here. When I look at the matrix, 


personally, I still see a great many things 

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that are unresolved, especially following the 


GAO report with respect to how the Board 


operates and how our, as a consequence, working 


groups -- the operative word being "working" -- 


operate. I'm a little concerned that we inside 


the working groups have not come to grips with 


some of the issues that appear to be such that 


there will always be differences of scientific 


opinion with regard to their resolution. And 


so I guess I -- I would be very appreciative if 


both NIOSH and SC&A could just, in 25 words or 


less, give us a feel whether they feel like 


we're -- we're really and truly getting closer 


to resolution of these sticky wickets. 


 DR. WADE: If I might -- while you think about 


the question, I'd like to complete one other 


aspect of the introduction, and that is I think 


it's important as we come face to face with 


issues of conflict of interest that I ask Jim 


to identify his team and who's here and their 


roles, and then, John, you might want to do the 


same thing, highlighting any issues that need 


to be before the Board and the public as we 


have these discussions. Jim. 


DR. NETON: Okay. Well, with us at the table 

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to my immediate left are Mel Chew and George 


Kerr. Mel is a 30-year employee of Los Alamos 


-- or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 


has retired -- since retired and owns his own 


consulting firm. Mel was involved for many 


years at Lawrence Livermore with the weapons 


testing program and, to some extent, he did 


interface with Y-12 folks in the testing of the 


weapons that were processed through Y-12. He 


is serving as an expert for us on the internal 


dosimetry issues and is also assisting in some 


data validation -- some of the data reliability 


testing that we've been asked to do. 


 George Kerr has spent 37 years at X-10, I 


believe is retired from X-10 at this point. 


He's also an independent consultant and he's 


specifically a subject matter expert in 


external dosimetry issues. He was involved 


from -- almost all of his career in external 


dosimetry research at X-10, not Y-12, and we 


are relying on George as our subject matter 


expert for external dosimetry issues at Y-12. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. And then we have Bomber. 


DR. NETON: Then we have LaVon Rutherford, who 


is the team leader for Special Exposure Cohort 

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petitions from NIOSH, and Emily Howell who is 


with OCG. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. John, how about your team? 


DR. MAURO: Our team, I guess as it pertains 


specifically to Y-12 and Rocky, which we will 


be covering today and tomorrow, as far as 


conflict situations possibly go, I have no 


conflict. My entire career has been either 


consulting for the nuclear utility industry or 


consulting for the Nuclear Regulatory 


Commission or the Environmental Protection 


Agency. I have had no involvement on working 


on any work related to Y-12 or Rocky in my 


career. 


Joe Fitzgerald has had very senior positions 


with the Department of Energy in health and 


safety where he had health and safety oversight 


for many of the operations. In fact, Joe, you 


may want to give a little bit more development 


on what involvement you may have had in terms 


of your role as health and safety tiger team 


related to either Y-12 or Rocky for the -- for 


the benefit of the working group. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. Well, I was at 


Department of Energy in management positions 

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for 20 years and headed the health and safety 


office for ten. Basically my experience and 


involvement was in the policy side for 


radiation protection policy, DOELAP program, 


all those were inaugurated under my watch. 


However, less so operationally. I did lead two 


tiger teams, but not at Y-12 or Rocky Flats, so 


for those two sites there's no direct conflict. 


DR. MAURO: Another key individual that's part 


of our team is Hans Behling. Many of you know 


Hans. Hans again came out of the nuclear 


utility industry, GPU Nuclear. He has a key 


role on the work we're doing, especially in 


external dosimetry. 


Some of you folks know Joyce Lipsztein, who is 


our specialist on internal dosimetry, the work 


we're doing, and she's -- basically has been in 


academia and as part of ICRP responsible for a 


lot of the ICRP standard making protocols. She 


has no involvement at all directly with any of 


these facilities. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Excuse me, John? 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's very hard to hear you. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I'll speak up a little 

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further --


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm sorry, and I know I should be 


there anyway. I feel guilty not being there, 


but... 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, shame on you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know. I know, shame on 


me for --


DR. MAURO: I'll -- in a nutshell --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- even being awake right now. 


DR. MAURO: Mark, in a nutshell, I just 


introduced Hans --


 MR. GIBSON: Thanks Mark, I can't -- the volume 


seems really muted today for some reason. 


DR. MAURO: How's this -- is this a little 


better? This is John Mauro. 


 MR. GIBSON: That's much better. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: I was just introducing Hans 


Behling, who's not here today, but I wanted to 


point out that he is -- he is a key member of 


our team and has no involvement in his 


employment history in -- with either Y-12 or 


Rocky Flats. 


 I also mentioned Joyce Lipsztein having a key 


role on internal dosimetry. Again, her main 

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area of professional involvement has been in 


the academic community and in support of ICRP 


standard setting bodies. 


And the last, and certainly not least, member 


of our core team, core group, is Arjun 


Makhijani. Arjun has been invovled in some 


work related to Fernald in terms of supporting 


certain -- I guess there was some litigation, 


but I do not believe you have had any 


involvement at all in work related to either Y12 or Rocky Flats. Please elaborate. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, that's correct. I -- in 


Fernald I -- I was one of the experts for the 


plaintiffs in both the worker lawsuit and 


neighbor lawsuit, but I've not had any 


involvement in Y-12 or Rocky Flats. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, John. I just wanted to 


have that discussion. We'll have discussions 


like that. I mean conflict of interest and 


dealing with who's going to be a big part of 


how we conduct our business, and the way to 


deal with it is disclosure and then independent 


review, and I think we're practicing both 


today. 


Now let's go back to Wanda's $64,000 question, 

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which is certainly pertinent and either side -- 


NIOSH or SC&A -- wish to take on the question? 


DR. NETON: Well, I guess -- I guess I could 


start where I think -- I view that there are 


three key areas that we still have to discuss, 


and hopefully we can discuss those today some ­

- in some detail. The first area I think that 


we need to talk about is the progress that 


we've made on the evaluation of reliability of 


the data, that's -- that's something that we've 


been talking about and we've got some -- some 


additional information to discuss today. 


That's the first issue I think that's on the 


table that needs to be discussed. 


The second issue I think is related to this 


external cohort data, and most recently -- I 


think on March 21st -- SC&A passed over to us 


another memo that expressed concern about some 


of the interpretations that we were using in 


that area, and I think that needs to be 


discussed. We are prepared at this meeting 


today to go over that in some detail and 


express our opinions as to where we stand on 


that issue. 


 And somewhat tangentially related to that 

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external cohort information was this exposure 


evaluation of weapons assembly/disassembly type 


workers and how that may come to bear on the 


analysis we've done for the external dosimetry 


coworker model, and we -- we've got some very ­

- very nice additional information to discuss 


for that class of workers. 


Now the third issue I think is related to this 


investigation of these other radionuclides. 


That's been an ongoing issue for some time now. 


Mel Chew in particular has been down at the Y12 area much more than he'd probably like, and 


we're prepared to discuss a lot about the 


exposures at the Cyclotrons and Calutrons and 


some of these other exposures such as 


plutonium, thorium and neptunium. 


So in my mind those are three issues on the 


table, and then subsequent to that I think we 


probably need to get -- engage in a discussion 


about the eleven example dose reconstructions 


that were passed over and, in light of our 


discussion today, how relevant they might be 


for us to pursue and clean those up. 


That's where I think I stand. I hope I'm not 


too far off the mark that I see 

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(unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. From my 


perspective that's exactly the list that we 


have in mind also. Joe, do you see any --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I was going to say -- 


no, my list is exactly the same, which I guess 


is progress -- to answer your question. And 


like I -- like I say, you know, we -- we -- 


when we originally did the site profile review 


and got into this issue of the other nuclides, 


it was, to me, a long horizon to answer a lot 


of the questions that we're in the process of 


answering. So I just -- be -- sort of a light 


of optimism. I think we're making a lot of 


headway on that particular issue. Maybe a 


little less so on the other two tracks, but I 


think today might be a good day to converge on 


those, as well. But on the other nuclides, I 


thought that was the furthest we had to go, 


Wanda, and I think we've made a lot of progress 


and I think where we are now is to hear more 


about I think what Mel's going to be talking 


about hopefully today, which is about some of 


the issues on U-233 and neptunium and what -- 


what was said, so --

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 MS. MUNN: Good, I -- I really see that as key, 


personally, because this is not going to be 


simply a Y-12 issue. That's going to come up 


again and again and again, this issue of -- of 


radionuclides --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- anything in the decay chain is 


going to be there, and that's -- that's good 


news. Okay, fine. 


 DR. WADE: For those on the phone, we're 


working to upgrade the phone system. Shouldn't 


be long and we'll come through clear as a bell. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, thanks. 


 DR. WADE: Mark, do you have anything that you 


want to say in -- in your role as chair? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah -- no, I mean I -- I don't ­

- I think that was a good overview of where I ­

- I think that's also where we stand on the 


items, and I don't know that -- I think the -- 


I don't think on any of these we're at the 


point -- I think Wanda said something about, 


you know, are we at a point where there's just 


disagreement between the two sides. I don't 


think we've got all the pieces far enough along 


to know whether there's just a disagreement or 

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-- you know, so we -- we've still been waiting 


for some action items to be completed and I 


think we're -- we've made good headway, but -- 


and maybe after today or tomorrow we'll -- you 


know, we'll have moved the ball further along 


here. That's -- that's what I hope. 


 DR. WADE: See, the work -- the SEC process 


brings an element of -- of timing to the -- to 


the table that we're -- we haven't dealt with 


as -- when we've dealt with individual dose 


reconstruction reviews or site profiles or 


procedures, and -- and again, in the ideal 


world, scientific issues would be raised, 


debated and closure would be reached. It might 


not be possible in the time frame. And I think 


short of that, what the Board needs, in my 


opinion, is a complete airing of the issues so 


the Board can make its own judgments. Now 


again, closure is the best, but sometimes we're 


not going to be able to reach closure because 


of time, and some of these issues are really 


quite vexing. But I think a complete airing of 


them so the Board can understand the 


differences, if they exist, and then vote as 


they see fit is really the process as it'll 

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play out. 


I think an excellent effort has been made on 


the part of this working group to raise issues 


and resolve issues. And Mark, if anyone in the 


world has no reason to feel guilty, it's you 


for the work you've brought to this. But you 


know, we'll see where we are when the vote 


comes and -- but no -- regardless of where we 


are, no one can say there hasn't been a 


concerted effort made by right-thinking people 


to try and address some very difficult 


technical issues. 


 MS. MUNN: That was really I think the basis of 


my question, Lew, thank you, is -- is when are 


we going to reach a point that we can say to 


the Board these are the differences in -- in 


scientific thought and we must resolve them as 


a board. So... 


 DR. WADE: I think the SEC process is going to 


bring us to that, and I think that's fine. I'm 


glad it's coming when it did, after we've been 


able to develop really a level of trust and 


facility in terms of working issues. This is 


really a fairly mature process and everyone has 


accorded themselves very professionally. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Are we going to -- ready to start 


through the matrix, is that the best way to 


proceed, or... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, before we start, why don't 


you give him a chance to -- 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, we're going to -- in a minute 


we're going to have a second flying saucer on 


the table here that will -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


 DR. WADE: -- allow you to hear points of view 


from both sides of the spectrum. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Do we just stay on the line, Lew, 


or -- okay. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, please do. 

DR. NETON: They're just connecting a -- 

 DR. WADE: They're just adding a -- adding a 

unit. 

(Pause) 

We've got more hardware now than you could 


believe. 


THE COURT REPORTER: Mark, is it still hard to 


hear the table? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, it sounds much better. 


 DR. WADE: While we have a quiet moment, Mark 


has also asked -- and I think it goes for Mike, 

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as well, that if there are any -- 


 (Whereupon, a portion of the telephone 


connections were disrupted.) 


(Pause) 


Okay, now we have two unit -- 


(Pause) 


Bear with us, we're working this out. 


(Pause) 


Can you hear me? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. That's pretty good? 


 MR. GIBSON: Sounds a lot better to me. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yep. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we're going to try and 


exercise discipline on this side, and even 


maybe, you know, if there's going to be a long 


statement made, make sure that the person comes 


to the microphone or the microphone to the 


person, and please shout out if you -- if you 


have any difficulties -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Sure. 


 DR. WADE: -- so we're going to go now -- Mark 


had raised the question or made the proposal 

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that maybe the thing to do is to march through 


the matrix. When we get back to the table, 


I'll ask Ms. Wanda to offer her view on that 


and we will begin. 


(Pause) 


THE COURT REPORTER: Of course those of you who 


are telephonic, make sure that your input 


volume is up to its max, just in case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, can you hear us fine there? 


THE COURT REPORTER: We can hear y'all fine. 


MATRIX REVIEW

 DR. WADE: Okay. Okay, Wanda --

 MS. MUNN: Yes? 

 DR. WADE: -- Mark wondered if we should start 

with the matrix, and since now you and Mark are 


going to do this as a team, we -- we offer you 


the option of agreeing with that or making a 


better proposal. 


 MS. MUNN: I had expected that we would be 


working from the matrix that has action items, 


February 28, 2006 on it, since that's what we 


were last looking at and I have some items 


marked up on mine -- I'm assuming you do, as 


well -- that I had thought we'd be carrying 


through. It would be nice, from my point of 

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view, Mark, if you and the others here at the 


table consider any of these items now closed. 


I would really like to be able to mark -- just 


mark them off. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: But yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, if -- yeah, I mean if we 


start with 1-A --


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- action number one is that 


NIOSH provided something -- 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- so I think that is a closed 


item, right. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, there are several -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yep --


 MS. MUNN: -- there are several -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- there's quite a few of those. 


 MS. MUNN: -- of those. One of the other 


things I hope this working group may be 


instrumental in doing is helping to codify what 


we've talked about before, how we are going to 


track these items, since obviously our lack of 


tracking them has attracted more attention than 


we would like to have. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Right, I agree. Okay, why don't 


we -- why don't we go on to number two then, 


this is a question of -- under data 


reliability, and the action was a follow-up of 


the -- of the HP reports. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


DR. NETON: Okay, this is Jim Neton. Tim 


Adler, are you out there? 


MR. ADLER: Yeah, I'm here, Jim. 


DR. NETON: Okay. I've asked ORAU -- and I'm 


passing around the table -- I don't think, 


Mark, you're going to have all of this, but 


there are four handouts going around that may 


be spoken from, I'm not sure, between Bill -- 


Tim Adler and others, but they speak to some of 


these issues that we've talked about. One of 


the handouts is a summary statistics for 


distribution of delta view uranium data. One 


is titled OCAS request for Y-12 CER data 


validation. Another one is a delta view Y-12 


uranium urinalysis comparison, and there's 


another one titled monitoring data sufficiency. 


These all represent individual pieces of work 


that have been ongoing, and some of them we had 


promised to provide at the last meeting so we 

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are handing them out here. And Tim, if you'd 


take the ball and -- and just provide a status 


as to where we are with this data reliability 


issue, please. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Jim, those weren't part of the 


ones on the O drive, were they? 


DR. NETON: Some of them were, some of them 


aren't. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: I think that the CER data 


validation one was on the O drive where they 


did the external data comparison, if you 


remember. Bill Tankersley was speaking of how 


he did a comparison -- was it Bill Tankersley ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I don't recall that being 


on there, but it might have be-- yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: It is. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, it's there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: And I think that's the only one 


that's out there on the O drive right now. But 


Tim, if you'd just kind of work us through 


where -- where -- where you are on this issue, 


I'd appreciate it. 

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MR. ADLER: Okay. Some of it will undoubtedly 


be -- kind of rehash of stuff we've talked 


about at the last meeting, but as 


(unintelligible) instances, we've pushed them a 


little bit further. In the effort of going 


through these HP reports and finding references 


to number of analyses performed and maximum 


values and discrepancies between number of 


analyses performed and what we have on record 


in the electronic database, we've got a few 


things to discuss. 


As we discussed earlier, we know from 


interviews with the laboratory workers -- well, 


let me back up for just a second. We know that 


the HP reports typically contain more analyses 


referred to than we have in the database. Now 


as we discussed, there are interviews with 


laboratory workers and people familiar with the 


programs in place within the subject time 


period have stated that standard analytical 


procedure was to frequently run many additional 


quality control analyses such as blanks, 


standards and matrix spikes, and it's these 


types of analyses were likely included in the 


total report, but not -- but they would not 

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have been included in the database which was 


designed to keep individual monitoring records. 


In our last discussion, Mark, I believe you 


raised a question regarding numbers of analyses 


in the HP reports being as much as twice as 


high as the number of analyses or records in 


the database for the corresponding time. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. ADLER: I checked into that a little bit 


further and we examined -- Bill Tankersley 


helped, we examined all the available reports 


to us and we identified a typical difference of 


about 30 to 60 percent. However, it was -- the 


first quarter of '51 there was a nearly 90 


percent difference seen in that quarter. So to 


investigate that further, I recontacted a 


urinalysis laboratory technician I had talked 


to earlier and posed the question. He 


responded that the differences of that 


magnitude would also not surprise him. He said 


that during the two and a half years that he 


worked doing urinalysis, they ran full metric 


and gross alpha methods on nearly 100 percent 


of the worker samples as a quality control 


check and just to make sure that the exposures 

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weren't being missed. 


Additionally he said that, you know, unexpected 


discrepancies results would warrant even more 


analyses or resampling, but he thought that 


that was not -- not at all surprising. 


 Two additional checks we performed and came out 


of Bill's additional work are related to a 


reference made to percentage of urinalysis 


samples exceeding the MPO of 70 DPM for 24­

hour, and also referenced it was made to a 


maximum urinalysis result. In the January to 


July 1952 report is the following statement on 


page 30. It said (reading) to date ten to 30 


percent of the total number of urine samples 


analyzed for uranium have exceeded the MPO* of 


70 DPM for 24-hour voidings. I think it's safe 


to assume that the range of above NPL* results 


is reflecting a range of weekly or monthly 


(unintelligible) that they're making within 


that six-month reporting period. 


We examined -- Bill examined the electronic 


record from that same six-month period and -- 


to -- to check out above-MPO results and that 


yielded a result of 18 percent of the results 


for that period being above the NBL*, which is 

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right in -- right in the middle of that ten to 


30 percent, so it's not too surprising. 


Then there's a statement in the November to 


December 1950 report that said the highest 


excretion level of uranium was 795 DPM per 24­

hour voiding, and within that time period in 


the database (unintelligible) for the 


(unintelligible) result, it is 795 DPM that is 


there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. ADLER: Discrepancies between the number of 


film badges processed I believe we've covered 


before. Do you have any interest in hearing 


about that again? You know, we know that they 


were processed on a weekly basis often, but -- 


DR. NETON: Tim, why don't we stick with the 


urine samples right now -- 


MR. ADLER: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- because I think we've got some 


more stuff to talk about here. 


MR. ADLER: Yeah, we've got some more stuff to 


talk about. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. ADLER: Okay. Last week urinalysis results 


specifically associated with 22 individuals 

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were located and obtained from a classified 


health physicist report from November 13th, 


1953. The results were presented as average 


uranium urinalysis results for the month of 


October 1953. The number of analyses, the 


number of analyses exceeding the MPL and the 


final (unintelligible) presented for each 


individual. These results were compared to the 


Y-12 electronic record, and I'm not sure 


whether or not you have a table showing these 


results or now -- Mel, do you have that? 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: What's the title of it, Tim? 


MR. ADLER: I don't think I actually got around 


to giving it a title. It says -- the headings 


are headings and data as presented in HP report 


and Y-12 electronic record results for October, 


1953. 


DR. NETON: No, we don't have that table here. 


MR. ADLER: Okay, well --


UNIDENTIFIED: Wait, actually we do -- 


MR. ADLER: -- it's in the --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Tim, this is Bomber, is it in 


your draft monitoring data sufficiency -- 


MR. ADLER: It is. 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay, could you pull that 


report out? It's back on about six pages, it's 


report -- reported urinalysis results. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I believe that's the one 


you're talking about. Am I correct? 


MR. ADLER: It is. And actually I guess it's 


not too critical to have the table in front of 


you because it doesn't take much imagination to 


see that the results that were pulled up from 


the electronic database are identical to those 


that were cited in the report -- 


 MS. MUNN: Great. 


MR. ADLER: -- in all 22 cases. There's one 


minor difference, one exception, for a worker 


that we'll just call number 13, on that table. 


Three results were found in the Y-12 record 


with values of 157, 152 and two. The results 


of 152 and two were recorded on the same day. 


Average dpm per 24 hours for all three values 


is 104, which is less than I guess the 155 


that's in the table. But if you exclude the 


two dpm anomalous result, the average is 155, 


which is exactly the same as what's reported in 


the report. So I think it's safe to assume 

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that the authors of the '53 report decided it 


was appropriate to not use that questionably 


low result in their summary. However, serving 


as the official record, it would be expected 


that the questionable result remain part of the 


Y-12, you know, electronic database. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro, just a quick 


question -- I get a little oriented -- so you 


went into these health physics progress reports 


I guess this, what, randomly found a 1953 set 


of data representing 22 workers, so it was a 


grab. 


MR. ADLER: Well, we've been pursuing this sort 


of data for quite a while, John. 


DR. NETON: I think it's the only dataset they 


could find that had individual workers 


identified. 


MR. ADLER: Right, trying to find individual 


data that we --


DR. MAURO: Okay, and then you went ahead and 


just mapped that back onto the CER. 


DR. NETON: Right. 

DR. MAURO: Okay, thank you. 

DR. NETON: Right, that's the problem with the 

health physics report is they tend to be 

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summary statistics as opposed to individual. 


This just happened to be one that had had some 


data. 


MR. ADLER: This is -- was out of a classified 


report that we did not have. All the 


classified ones, we did not have anything but 


the summary type data. And that reference to 


the maximum, 795, that was helpful, too, but... 


That's it on the reports. Want to talk about 


the punch card? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think it would -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, did -- just one question. 


Did you look at the 50th, 90th, 75th 


percentiles from these graphs versus the 


database, by any chance? 


MR. ADLER: I don't think we did that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's something that was noted 


in there. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Mark, this is Bill. What did 


you ask? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, the -- the graphs in the 


health physics reports have -- have by week, 


they show a data point, and I -- I understand 


you might not be able to exactly confirm the 


number, but it's just on a graph for the whole 

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half a year, but it graphs the 90th percentile 


of the distribution of results for that time 


period, and the 50th, and I thought that -- 


that's the most important thing, to me, is if 


you're in agreement there with the database, 


then I think that could -- if that's the main 


way you're going to use the database is -- is 


as a entire distribution, so if you're in the 


same ball park on those, I think we could all ­

- you know, that would raise my level of 


comfort, anyway. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Yes, I remember those graphs 


now. No, I did not look at those, and yes, we 


can. 


MR. ADLER: On to punch cards? Do you have any 


other questions? 


DR. NETON: No, I think -- I think that's a 


good thing that we -- we need to take note of, 


this 90th percentile, and it sounds like, you 


know, a mark would certainly -- like Mark said, 


raise his confidence level. And you're right, 


Mark, that these -- these data are more 


important for coworker situations -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- because when we have the data -- 

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I mean we have what we have. We have 


individual monitoring points. 


 We're prepared to talk a little bit about these 


punch cards if people -- people are ready to 


move into the -- into that segment, and I think 


Mel Chew --


 MR. GRIFFON: Is that really number three -- 


under number three more? 


DR. NETON: Is that number three? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Or -- I guess two or three, 


whichever. 


DR. NETON: Right, it's sort of related to the 


log books or lack thereof and what we believe 


would happen with the data once it left the 


analyst's hands. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: And Mel, I think -- or Tim, are you 


going to take that or is Mel going -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, I'll -- start with it, Tim, 


and I'll pick it up. I have the cards in my 


hand here. 


MR. ADLER: Okay, I'll start that off. Okay, 


the internal data consistency effort was a full 


exam by comparing these punch cards with the Y12 electronic record. I'll give you a little 

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bit of background. The cards were used to 


record Y-12 employee monitoring information for 


decades. They were prepared with 


identification data and accompanying 


individuals' bioassay samples to the analytical 


lab. Sample information details and a raw 


analytical count data were typically recorded 


by hand directly on the card at the time of 


analysis. Typically -- typical identification 


type information included on the cards would be 


worker I.D., sample date, sample volume, time 


interval, and department. 


At this point, to date, the oldest punch cards 


located for this assessment have been from the 


mid-'70s. These cards were therefore used to 


check for consistency electronic database in 


terms of flow of the sample and analytical data 


from the laboratory to its final entry into the 


monitoring record. 


Selection of about 50 cards from the mid-'70s 


to early '80s was randomly chosen from a box of 


cards and then cleared by Y-12 personnel for 


our use late last week. At some point -- I 


mean at this point, eight of these cards have 


been compared to electronic database. The 

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names, identification numbers, sample 


information -- such as the void times, sample 


sizes, dates, et cetera -- they correspond 


precisely with the information stored in the 


electronic database for each of the cards. 


 Comparing raw analytical count data present on 


the cards to the final dose recorded in the 


database requires performing a very simple but 


a well-documented math calculation. Some of 


the variables required to perform the 


conversion are specific to analytical runs, 


such as background measurements and possibly 


(unintelligible) recovery. This analytical 


run-specific information's not present on the 


cards. However, recoveries and background 


numbers described as typical or desired are 


available in other literature. And when we 


applied these to the punch card data and do the 


conversion, the results come out to be very 


close to that of the electronic record. 


Now Bryce, do you want to add anything to this? 


 MR. CHEW: Go ahead, Bryce. 


 MR. RICH: I -- I think that's a -- a good 


summary, Tim. 


 MR. CHEW: I'd like to -- Mark, you were not -- 

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I'm holding three cards that came out of that 


particular box. I want to thank the Y-12 


management, all the way to the top there, 


allowed me to take these cards out of the 


classified vault. When we were pulling these 


cards there was two radiation monitors that 


carefully surveyed the backs and forth of these 


cards, making sure they're not contaminated. I 


told this to the people after I passed the 


cards around to them (unintelligible) plastic 


sleeve (unintelligible). But these are the 


original data and I -- I firmly believe that 


one of them on just that electronic database 


was used as the official record and there was 


really no reason to keep these later on. 


(Unintelligible) very fortuitous, after a very, 


very lot of help from the Y-12 vault people to 


locate these cards and pull them. And anything 


more anybody wants to say? I think just to 


have these -- to know that these things -- the 


procedures were done and the very fact that the 


numerical values hand-written on these cards 


that correspond to what is punched on the 


things are really the key. 


DR. NETON: I'd just like to ask a question. I 

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think I know the answer, too, but I'll ask it. 


Is it our opinion -- and I think that it is -- 


it is -- that these cards go back well before 


the 1970s. I mean this is what we were able to 


find as a sample, but I believe Bill 


Tankersley, at least in talking to him last 


week, suggested that he thought they went 


pretty far back so that this sampling, although 


it does not validate the SEC period, would be 


indicative of the similar process used for that 


period. Is that right, Bill? 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill. It's not just 


my thinking, either, Jim. Everyone at Y-12 is 


certain that the punch cards were used all the 


way back, possibly even into the early '50s, 


definitely back to the '60s. We don't know why 


we haven't found any cards -- actually we found 


cards back to January of '68. We don't have 


any earlier than that. But they were used, and 


they definitely were using IBM machines back in 


the '50s, and we really are certain that this 


system -- not necessarily the automated system 


that's used now; there's not any handwriting on 


the cards, you know, presently, but -- but the 


punch cards were used back into the '60s and -- 

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and they say probably back into the '50s. 


 MR. CHEW: I'd like to add one more comment, 


Bill, if I may. In searching for the logbooks, 


there was a lot of discussion about logbooks 


(unintelligible) people, there are some 


logbooks, but they appear to be the special 


samples when there are either a special 


sample's required either due to an incident or 


some additional information needed. Now there 


are clearly some handwritten logbooks that date 


back into the '50s and '60s that are still 


apparently currently kept at the Y-12 vault. 


don't think many of us (unintelligible), so 


they are there. 


 MR. RICH: This is Bryce Rich. It just occurs 


to me that from a -- just briefly, from a 


background discussion -- Y-12 was one of the 


pioneers I think in terms of using punch cards 


in terms of keep analytical data well organized 


and providing a mechanism for sorting and -- 


and (unintelligible) data analysis and the 


like. It's interesting to note that they had 


modified the punch cards themselves to -- and 


placed filter papers for air samples, and they 


used them also for contaminated smear analysis 


I 
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and traced the air sample by punch card, 


identifying the location and time and whatever. 


We looked for the air sample punch cards but -- 


primarily because of the fact that the samples 


taken were radioactive -- I'm sure that they 


are placed either someplace else or perhaps 


disposed of. And as we all remember, the 


DOE/AEC did approve the electronic database as 


the record, and so as a consequence there was 


perhaps less attention to -– although oh 


there's a remarkable amount of storage in the 


classified vaults and elsewhere of primary data 


of this kind. But what we were able to find is 


that a -- an example box of 1,300 punch cards 


that identified this type of procedure 


recording analytical data on the punch card in 


a pre-printed form. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Now maybe I -- maybe I missed 


this -- this is Mark Griffon -- did you look at 


any of the punch cards compared with the 


database, even though they weren't in the time 


period of interest? Did you do -- did you 


cross-walk any of those to see if the results 


were --


MR. ADLER: Yes, we did, Mark, and as I 

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mentioned, some of the data specific to run -- 


you know, analytical runs -- is not on the 


cards, but using typical type background 


measurements for (unintelligible) recovery 


numbers, they come out very close. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Have you -- have you 


written that up in any form? Maybe that's one 


of the handouts that you have, I don't know -- 


MR. ADLER: No, no --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. ADLER: -- (unintelligible) just very 


recently just got the cards. 


DR. NETON: I think -- we -- we have a document 


that I've just seen for the first time myself ­

- this is always late-breaking, the way these 


sessions go -- called monitoring data 


sufficiency. And I think some of these 


comparisons are written up in here, but not the 


punch card comparison. Is that what I -- my 


sense is. Is that right? 


MR. ADLER: That's correct, yeah, just -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah, and so you have sort of a 


straw man, a rough version of where we're going 


with -- how we intend to document all that was 


done here is going to be included in this 

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appendix. In much of the discussion we've 


heard, some of it's here, some of it's not, but 


that would be our -- our end product. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, okay. 


 MS. MUNN: There's a section in the draft for 


it. 


DR. NETON: Right, it is where -- where we 


ended up at the end of the day. As -- as Lew 


indicated earlier, though, you know, we -- you 


know, we do have finite time limits here, and 


it's unlikely that, you know, some bolus of 


information is going to drop in our lap that's 


going to allow us to, you know, definitively 


prove this beyond any shadow of a doubt. But I 


think -- in the last few weeks I think -- hope 


folks would agree we've made pretty good 


progress here in documenting, at least to the 


extent that there's nothing right now to 


indicate that there are major discrepancies 


that we've found. And in fact, there's some 


indications that these things look pretty close 


to what you'd expect. I -- I do think that 


Mark's suggestion about looking at the 90th 


percentile ranges and stuff would -- would 


certainly, you know, add to that -- that 

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analysis. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and actually, you know, 


I've done a few really quick looks at that and 


it looks -- it also looks consistent for the -- 


the few reports I looked at, but I haven't gone 


through -- there are several graphs and I think 


that'd be worthwhile to -- to do that 


comparison. It's fairly quick -- quick to do, 


too. 


DR. NETON: Sure. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: And Mark --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: -- this is Bill Tankersley, 


because this is so critical, let me -- let me 


just restate, if you will, what -- what Tim 


reported. On the cards there are four, five or 


six pieces of data written on there in addition 


to just the printed information as to the 


person, the department and so forth. You have 


the volume of urine written. There's also a 


piece of information called time interval. 


It's in hours or fractions of hours, and that's 


the time between the voiding and the previous 


voiding. Then you have the raw counts. 


There's always two. As the RadCom manual says, 

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they always run the samples in two counters, 


but often there's four different readings, 


they've done them again. In one case I just 


saw where there was six readings. So all of 


those are variables that are found in the 


RadCon manual, and you know, everyone has 


access to that on the O drive, Y-1401 or 


something like that. All of those variables 


are there to be used in that calculation. It's 


a very simple --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: -- equation, A times B 


(unintelligible) over C over (unintelligible) 


times (unintelligible) which amount to 


(unintelligible). The raw counts, you know, 


are on the -- what they call total counts are 


on the card (unintelligible) you know, we have 


the results in dpm for 24 hours of voiding. 


Now when -- when I first calculated those, the 


number did not, you know, come out to be, you 


know, the same. And then I -- we discovered 


that, you know, the background is not included 


in that and so in the RadCon manual they -- 


they say that they -- their goal is to keep the 


background at a certain level, which was .12 

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counts per minute and it's a 30-minute count. 


And so anyway, when I then subtracted that 


background, as Tim said, the numbers do come 


out really quite close. But because they don't 


include -- we were -- Bryce and I were a little 


surprised that they didn't include the -- the 


background information on the -- the card. But 


you know, that would be the same for hundreds 


and hundreds of cards, you know, per day and so 


I -- I'm sure tht they delivered that number to 


the HP group and the computer people who was 


goign to calculate this. If you simply use 


that background number, you come out with 


numbers really quite close. It's a -- you 


know, they're very credible numbers. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I have a 


question which steps back a little bit. Am I 


correct in understanding when we first had our 


discussions regarding these matters and we were 


talking about the CER database, in this case 


the internal dosimetry, am I correct we're 


primarily talking about data that relates to 


urinalysis for uranium? Is that where we are 


right now, for all intents and purposes? Now, 


when we were speaking about this originally, we 

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were working with the CER database and it was 


represented as a primary database that was 


converted -- that is, there was an original set 


of data that DOE converted electronical into 


this CER database, but at that time -- cor-- am 


I correct about that? 


DR. NETON: Well, it's -- not really. DOE 


didn't convert it in the CER database. DOE 


made an electronic database of their records. 


The CER database, which is Center for 


Epidemiological Research at ORAU, is an -- a 


copy of the database. 


DR. MAURO: A copy, but now -- thank you. Now, 


what I'm hearing now -- at that time there was 


some discussion that the original records, the 


hard copy records, were not, at least at that 


time, readily available or there was a lack of 


knowledge of the degree of availability. 


Apparently some of these records are in fact 


available. What I'm looking at right now is an 


example of what those records looked like back 


then. 


Now am I correct to assume that if we were to 


go back and collect all of those cards, how 


many there are, those cards in effect -- and 

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the -- what we're really talking about now, 


there's a one-to-one correspondence between the 


cards and the electronic information. And it's 


not that there -- and if there are more cards 


than there are electronic information on 


individuals, that has something to do with what 


we talked about earlier, this redundancy. So 


for all intents and purposes, what I'm hearing 


is that not only do we have the CER database, 


but we apparently have a substantial amount of 


the original records, also. 


DR. NETON: Well, we only have 1,300 cards 


we've identified --


DR. MAURO: Okay, that --

DR. NETON: -- (unintelligible). 

DR. MAURO: -- that's where I was going. So in 

other words, we -- you -- you managed to 


actually find some subdivision, which certainly 


doesn't represent -- it represents some 


fraction --


 MR. CHEW: John, let me just say the answer's 


yes and no. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: We found the 1,300 cards exactly in 


this form with the handwritten. But there are 

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other cards that didn't have the handwritten 


information in, but they were punch cards -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: -- that I was able to now feed into 


the database. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: They're just plain punch cards. 


They have nothing written on them. 


DR. MAURO: No, I -- I'm sort of like saying 


okay, so where we are now is that because of 


having these cards and a sub-- subset of which 


are actually able to be discerned what the 


information is, along with other information, 


you were able to I guess confirm at least eight 


numbers. I mean what I'm hearing is out of all 


the car-- I mean 50 cards were pulled out of 


the 13-- 1,300, and there were -- and I guess 


part of the reason you pulled those cards were 


they were fairly complete, they had fairly 


complete information on it? 


 MR. CHEW: It was just like this. 


DR. MAURO: Just like that, and then out of 


those you went ahead and said listen, let's 


take eight of them --


 MR. CHEW: No, no, we're --

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DR. MAURO: You -- what --


 MR. CHEW: -- they're working on all 50. 


DR. MAURO: All 50. 


 MR. CHEW: Right, Bill? 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Well, the only reason why 


there's only eight, when I discovered that we 


did not have the background information, I 


(unintelligible) you had to identify -- had to 


get the I.D. number for the person. The person 


has -- it's either the Social Security number 


or a badge number there, and then -- this all 


takes, you know, time and work to identify the 


record in electronic database. And so when I 


discovered that we did not have the background 


information so that, you know, the numbers were 


not going to come out exactly the same, you 


know, I stopped doing these calculations. But 


you know, I -- it's -- it's obvious that these 


are the same records. They match perfectly on 


date, on the volume of urine, on the time 


interval and every piece of information that's 


on there, and I -- we certainly can do the 


others. It didn't seem to be worthwhile to 


look at the others since we don't have the 


background information. 

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DR. MAURO: Now when you refer to the 


background information, is this gross alpha for 


some control group representing the activity in 


urine when you -- I'm not sure what you mean 


when you say background. 


 MR. CHEW: Bryce and Bill, I think this is the 


background count -- counting -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: (Off microphone) Right, it is 


the (unintelligible) explained very clearly in 


the (unintelligible) RadCon manual Y-1401. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, thank you. 


DR. NETON: I think, though, it is fair to say 


that all 50 -- there's an indication that all 


50 of those samples were in the electronic 


database. That's true. Right? I mean the 


volume matched up, the date and all that kind 


of stuff. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: I did not do that. 


DR. NETON: Oh, you didn't do that. Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: He did eight of them. But actually 


you did -- did you not do these three I have in 


my hand plus eight, Bill? 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: I did eight of them 


altogether. 

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 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, what's -- I guess -- 


what's the intent, to have all 50 reviewed and 


provided as is, or as far as you can get? 
I 


guess -- finish your question then. What's the 


intent in terms of the sampling on this issue? 


DR. NETON: Well, I guess we're doing this on 


the fly as we're going because this is late-


breaking information, but I think we should -- 


we should pursue that and follow up with the 50 


-- see, this is one piece of the puzzle, 


remember. You know, we've done other things. 


We've looked at the health physics -- every 


health physics report and looked at ran-- we're 


going to look at the 90th percentiles. We've 


looked at the ranges and the ranges match up in 


the health physics reports. The sample numbers 


don't match up, but we've got some very good, 


rational explanations from the health physics 


staff why they -- why they wouldn't. 


We're going to look at the -- we have 22 


records that we found in a health physics 


report that match up almost identically, and 


then the punch cards were the last piece of the 


puzzle to suggest that well, these records were 

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entered electronically into the database, and 


in fact on these the lab results were entered 


on the card by -- it looks like very close to 


the lab analyst state, so they're right into 


the database. So how could one then make an 


argument that the database is corrupt at that 


point? If this is the raw data and it's 


electronically keypunched, the only argument 


one could make is there may be some errors in 


the keypunching. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Now when you said there was -- 


I'm sorry. No, you said there was -- there 


were other hand-- there were other punch cards, 


they just didn't have handwritten values on 


them? 


 MR. CHEW: That's right (unintelligible) years. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Were there other punch cards from 


the -- the time period of concern? Was there 


anything from '50 to '57? 


 MR. CHEW: Mark, I don't know that for sure. 


just was busy looking at -- to see which cards 


had the numbers on them, so I apologize, I did 


not look. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, that's all right. Punched 


values can you -- can -- would you be able to 


I 
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cross-walk those? Not -- not seeing them in 


front of me, I'm not sure what -- what you 


would be able to do with the punch cards if 


they didn't have handwritten values on. Could 


you do anything with them as far as comparison 


against the database? 


 MR. CHEW: Bill, if I give you a blank -- give 


you the punch cards, not the handwritten, can 


you actually read the information on the punch 


cards here? 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Mel, I assume that we would 


find the same things from the cards that are 


not marked with handwritten information. And 


by the way, Mark, you know, there's thousands 


of cards over there. It's just that, you know, 


Mel and them found these that had the 


handwritten information -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: -- we're not 100 percent sure 


-- I guess just changes through history -- 


we're not sure why the other cards don't have 


handwritten information on them. But you 


certainly can read the cards. You know, you're 


familiar with the --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

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 MR. TANKERSLEY: -- you can read the 


information on the cards. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The only reason I asked, Bill, 


was if -- if you had a sampling -- even if they 


didn't have the handwritten data, I agree, 


that's more information. But if you had a 


sampling of the others from the ti-- the 


relevant time period, that would even further 


strengthen the ca-- you know. 


 MR. CHEW: But the -- Mark, the error really 


would be the person taking the raw information 


-- I see here in the -- I wish you were here to 


see this, but the numbers that are on the card 


and how that person punched it into the 


machine. 


 MR. GRIFFON: True, true, database was never 


modified or anything -- 


DR. NETON: That's true. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that's all, you know. Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: As far -- Mark, I don't think 


any of us can say for certain -- you know, Mel 


and Bryce spent a lot of time out there. They 


don't think -- that is, the Y-12 people don't 


think that those cards go back into the '50s. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: There's a possibility that the 


earlier cards have been sent to another place. 


We refer to it as Summit or Summit Drive, 


something like that. But from what -- this is 


the new place where they're moving all of -- a 


lot of the records over there and it's our 


understanding that no one -- emphasize no one ­

- you know, is allowed over there, that -- that 


one of the records centers have to make request 


from an index, and they have searched that 


index and do not find any -- any item, any line 


item there that appears to be health physics 


punch cards, you know, for the earlier period. 


But for the place where, you know, Bryce and 


Mel and I and Jack visited the other day, there 


are lots of other cards, I mean thousands of 


them. But as far as anyone knows, we -- or the 


Y-12 people in charge of that set of records, 


do not -- cannot say that there's any records 


prior to I suppose these 1968 cards that we 


saw. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: But we can -- you know, we can 


continue looking for that if that's what needs 

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to be done. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, not necessarily. I mean I 


-- I just -- I was thinking if you had some 


from that relevant time period, even if they 


didn't have all the information, it might be 


worth the very -- you know, cross-walking it. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But if -- if that's -- if it's 


unlikely that there are -- are any -- it 


doesn't -- it doesn't lessen the information 


you found. I mean I still think that's 


relevant to -- to demonstrating that the 


overall database -- you know, the overall 


database's reliability, so I think that was 


useful. But I was thinking that if you had 


something from that time period, it'd be even 


more, you know, important. 


 MS. MUNN: By the same token, this turns out to 


be a perfect example of how much is enough. 


How far do you have to go to not prove a 


negative. And in view of the fact that random 


information that has been presented is very 


clearly in sync, and mindful of the fact that 


the whole purpose in providing -- in 


transferring handwritten data into electronic 

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data has always been two-fold. One is to 


dispose of the paper from which it was 


transferred; and two is to be able to sort the 


data after it has been electronically recorded. 


It's marvelous that we've been able to find any 


 MR. CHEW: I thought so, too. 


 MS. MUNN: -- anything, so the fact that it 


doesn't get the right year that we would like 


most to see is, from my point of view, 


secondary. It's --


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Also the folks at Y-12, I 


assure you, are very aware -- since we've, you 


know, said it 25 times to them -- you know, 


that we're really interested in this earlier 


period -- not that we're disinterested in the 


later periods because we know we're going to 


have to address that, but they are aware that 


the period up through 1957 is of great import 


to us. And so they -- I'm telling you, they 


have their antennae up, always alert to listen 


and watch for any information about this. They 


have not said -- you know, they can't say as a 


fact that none of the cards are available for 


that period, but you know, the time's been 

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I 

short and other work is being done, but it's 


possible maybe they would come across that. 


definitely agree with Wanda. I think we've 


shown, you know, some -- some clear matching 


from health physics reports in '53 and in '57 I 


think, and then finally these later reports. 


So I think the electronic database -- it is 


what the original data were. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and -- and I -- I agree 


with -- with Jim Neton's earlier statement that 


this is not, you know, using one source to 


demonstrate it, you're using a bunch of 


different pieces to demonstrate reliability. 


And that's fine, so that's -- that's -- that's 


just what I'm -- you know, I'm -- I'm -- well, 


you know, what is enough. When we put this all 


together, I think that's we have to -- to 


judge. I think you've done a lot of work on 


it, so that's good. 


Can I address Mel's statement on the logbooks? 


You said you did find some logbooks but they 


were only for special urinalysis -- 


 MR. CHEW: It appears so --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- campaigns? 


 MR. CHEW: It appears so, Mark. The logbooks 

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would have, for instance, even some urine 


results and in some of the -- like incident or 


something and it would have that kind of 


information in it, but it was not like -- it 


was not analytical logbooks from the analysis 


folks that were just transferring data from a 


counter into the logbook. They were -- they 


were not that (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: Who -- who generated the logbooks 


then, the health physics program? 


 MR. CHEW: It appeared to be like people who -- 


health physics people who were operationally on 


the floor. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: Bryce, would you -- you saw the 


logbooks as well as I did, too -- you did, too, 


Bill. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: That's true, Mel. 


DR. NETON: And these were not, though, from 


the SEC time period, though. Is that correct? 


 MR. CHEW: Jack, were you -- are you -- you 


copied some of the information I gave you on 


the logbook as I handed it to you. Do you 


remember the time periods that I 


(unintelligible) -- Jim? I mean Jack Beck, 

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were you there? Is he there? 


DR. NETON: I don't think Jack's on the phone. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Mel, I don't -- I don't know 


that Jack is on the line --


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: -- or if (unintelligible) saw 


the logbooks. Now they were from -- they were 


from earlier periods, but they were -- as Mel 


said, they were very clearly special examples 


where a whole body count did not look right, 


and so they would do these special samples of 


all types of -- of special quality control, 


double-check kinds of samples. But they were 


from earlier periods. Right now I can't quite 


remember the years, Mel. 


 MR. CHEW: I don't, too. I don't want to --


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so nothing that would 


really be useful in -- in rel-- in comparison 


to this database. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, thes-- these are the kinds of 


things that are -- probably would have shown up 


from delta view because somebody copied them. 


Yeah, not necessarily -- I don't think these 


kinds of samples would be in the electronic 


database or the CER database. I don't think 

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so, Don -- or Mark. I'd just like to sort of 


give you a feeling that there -- we did a 


comprehensive search to look for the things 


that you're asking for. 


 MR. GRIFFON: If I understood Jim -- if I 


understood correctly for (unintelligible) sort 


of follow-up on that action item three, all 


these analyses are going to be sort of rolled-


up into your evaluation report. Right? The --


the punch cards, the -- you know. 


DR. NETON: Yes. Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So that -- you know, that 


DR. NETON: I don't know if it's going to 


appear as an appendix or not. That's what it's 


listed at right now, but we would have a 


monitoring data sufficiency write-up somewhere. 


Bomber may know better than I do. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Mark, this is Bomber. The 


plan right now is -- is you will have an 


appendix, so the monitoring data sufficiency in 


the report itself will have a summary that will 


summarize basically what's in that section, as 


well as the outcome. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. And -- and 

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there was a comparison to the delta view data, 


too. Is that right? Or is that later for the 


other radionuclide information? Am I getting 


ahead of the matrix here? 


DR. NETON: I think that is the other 


radionuclide -- although there was a uranium -- 


there was an outstanding issue that -- that was 


related to the uranium data in the delta view, 


and did that have any -- would that have any 


effect on the integrity or the validity, for 


example, of the coworker models that -- or 


coworker datasets that were developed from the 


electronic database. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: And I believe that Bill Tankersley 


 MR. CHEW: I think Tim is prepared -- 


DR. NETON: Tim is prepared to talk about that? 


 MR. CHEW: -- Bill. 


MR. ADLER: (Unintelligible) talk to you about 


this bounding exercise? 


DR. NETON: No, we're talking about the uranium 


values that were in the delta view database and 


how they -- what the -- what effect they may 


have on the CER -- the electronic database in 

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the -- that was used to develop the coworker 


models. 


MR. ADLER: Okay. Well, now you should have 


that analysis. We -- we sent that in, you 


know, about a week or two ago and, you know, 


keep in mind that there's -- well, 500,000, 


600,000 uranium urinalyses total and that the 


set (unintelligible) is like four -- four -- 


no, 280,000, I think. The delta view uranium 


set is -- Jim, do you have that in front of 


you? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, we do have it. I believe 


it's called Delta View/Y-12 Record, Uranium 


Urinalysis Data Comparison. 


MR. ADLER: Yeah. How many uranium samples are 


in the delta view? 


DR. NETON: The delta view, it says 479. 


MR. ADLER: How many? 


 MS. MUNN: 479 from '52 to '57. 


 MR. CHEW: And then the total '52 to '88 was 


1,359. (Unintelligible) looking at the same 


thing --


DR. NETON: Oh, yeah -- yeah, right. Between 


'52 and '57 there are 479 uranium records in 


delta view, and in the same time per-- well, 

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from '50 to '57 on the electronic database 


there were almost 150,000 samples. 


MR. ADLER: Okay. Now --


 MR. GRIFFON: It -- it was also unclear to me, 


though -- those numbers sound like the numbers 


that you presented in your Excel spreadsheet, 


Mel. Is that correct? 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, I think that --


 MR. GRIFFON: But I thought that in our 


discussion we said that the -- the delta view 


was searched on other radionuclides and uranium 


came out because it was run along with those 


other radionuclides --


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and that there may be more 


uranium data in delta view. Did -- did anyone 


look back to see --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Mark, this is Bomber. 


Actually we -- I know what you're talking about 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- when we -- we had that 


workgroup meeting we discussed well, if those ­

- those uranium data -- if there's uranium data 


there, searching for other radionuclides -- if 

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we searched solely for uranium, would we get 


more. And Bill Tankersley can discuss that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- but Bill found out that 


there was no other uranium data in there. It 


was -- it was exactly -- pretty much as 


discussed before, that that delta view was used 


for the other radioisotopes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thanks. 


DR. NETON: So --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So then will this -- not 


having this report in front of me, Bill, maybe 


you can summarize --


 MR. TANKERSLEY: I think by far the most 


important point was this. The question was did 


the -- the Y-12 electronic database bound -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: -- the data that are found in 


the delta view, and we certainly showed that 


that was true. The actual -- actually the 


range of the uranium data in the delta view 


dataset I think only went up to 230 dpm for 24 


hours voiding, and of course the, you know, the 


Y-12 dataset certainly does have some values 


higher than that. And I actually calculated 

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the -- the percentiles on that and -- and I 


know there's a -- well, Jim must have that 


report, and it shows that the -- I guess I did 


the 25th and the mean and the 75th percentile, 


and you know, they're all really very, very 


low. Bottom line is that the Y-12 uranium 


dataset urine uranium dataset of course bounds 


that small set of uranium data in the delta 


view set. So that should not present any 


problem at all -- although, you know, the delta 


view data are available, you know, for use by 


the dose reconstructors and -- and will be 


used, as I understand, Jim. Isn't that true? 


DR. NETON: Well, if -- if the uranium value -- 


if we have a claimant who has uranium data in 


the delta view database, that's routinely 


provided with the response from DOE, so that 


would certainly be used. But what -- what I 


think Bill's saying here, and I think it's 


true, is that the -- the electronic database is 


-- has much more variability, which is what you 


would expect for 150,000 records, and the 


effect of 500 records dumped into a pool of 


150,000 records is not going to have any real 


effect on the 95th percentile or the 50th 

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percentile of the dataset. 


DR. MAURO: The only thing I lost tra-- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I guess the other important 


conclusion there was that there are no more 


uranium data --


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- in the delta view. Right? 


DR. NETON: Correct. 


DR. MAURO: The only thing I may have missed, 


and you may have mentioned this, is then the 


people who have this urinalysis in the delta 


view, are they a subset of the entire one or a 


different group of workers? 


DR. NETON: I'm sorry, I'm not sure what you're 


asking. 


DR. MAURO: All right, let me say it again. In 


other words you've got -- you've got the Y-12 


database of 149,000 -- okay? -- people, or 


measurements. Then you've got the delta view 


of 479. Are those 479 part of that -- 


DR. NETON: No. 


DR. MAURO: They're their own --


 MR. CHEW: We looked at that --


DR. MAURO: They're their own separate group 


and the data show that that group, in it-- by 

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its very nature, had lower exposures as a 


distribution --


DR. NETON: In general, that -- yes. 

DR. MAURO: -- and that -- these data show 

that. 

DR. NETON: Right. 

DR. MAURO: They do. 

DR. NETON: So I guess the concern was that if 

the delta view data were all incident samples 


that had extremely high values, then maybe we'd 


have some concerns about the upper limit of the 


database. But according to the analysis that 


Bill's done, that doesn't show that. So I 


think -- I think we're pretty -- on very good 


grounds to say that, you know, this -- the 


incorporation of the delta view data into the 


electronic database is going to have 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) exposure, Don -- 


John -- hey, Tim, I -- Tim, you there? 


MR. ADLER: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: I think you -- you or Bill mentioned 


to me that -- let me just make sure I'm saying 


this correctly -- none of the urinalysis for 


uranium in the delta view, the same people 

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showed up in the electronic database. Is that 


correct? 


MR. ADLER: No, I don't think that's true. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay, --


DR. NETON: Wait a minute -- no, no -- the 


people may have showed up, but the urine -- 


 MR. CHEW: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- samples did not. 


 MR. CHEW: Right. Oh, the urine samples did 


not, okay. That was the point. 


MR. ADLER: The same people (unintelligible) 


not -- not the urine samples themselves. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay, I'm sorry. The urine samples 


(unintelligible) --


DR. NETON: They were -- urine samples, for 


whatever reason, were not part of the routine 


program. 


 MR. CHEW: Right. That -- that's our 


(unintelligible). 


DR. NETON: Our suspicion -- our suspicion was 


that they took a plutonium sample, they went 


along and analyzed it for uranium anyway. 


That's sort of what -- what (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. CHEW: We've answered John's question, I 


think. He just nodded and walked away. 

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DR. NETON: So I think -- in my mind, that 


addresses the issue that delta view data did 


not invalidate the coworker data for -- that we 


used from CER. So that -- that piece has been 


-- we've provided analysis for that piece. You 


guys can be the judge as to what there -- if it 


addresses the issue, but in our opinion it 


does. 


 MR. GIBSON: This is Mike Gibson. Can I ask a 


question on this? So if I'm understanding you, 


the original bioassay sample that was collected 


and analyzed and -- from this -- these punch 


cards or whatever, and then there's these 


additional samples you talked about, Jim, that 


are in this other database, and they're 


different samples, not related to the original 


sample. Is that correct? 


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. Is this the case where DOE 


has had the practice -- well, the DOE 


contractors have had the practice of if they 


get a bioassay sample and it comes back 


positive, they will request two additional 


samples and they will run those and they use a 


two out of three method. And if the -- if two 

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of the samples come back less than detectable 


limits, they conclude it to be a false 


positive. Could that be the case here or is 


this something --


DR. NETON: I know the practice that you're 


speaking, I think, of which, but I don't know 


there's any indication that this is -- 


represents that. There -- I think -- I don't 


think that these are multiple -- two additional 


samples in the database, nor do they 


correspond, to my knowledge, to the same 


incidents or, you know, the same -- I think 


what really more happened is the uranium 


urinalysis dataset for CER was -- was the 


routine monitoring program, with maybe some 


incidents. The delta view data are, for 


whatever reason, special samples. In my 


opinion, it seems to be that when they took 


plutonium samples, for example, on workers who 


may have been working with Calutron, plutonium 


or whatever, they would have analyzed for 


uranium on top of -- as long as you're doing an 


isotopic analysis, it's not that big a deal to 


pull off the uranium and analyze for it 


separately. That seems to be the case, 

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although we have nothing in writing that says 


that. 


 MR. CHEW: But let me expand on that, Jim. 


 MR. RICH: This is Bryce Rich. As you look at 


the delta view, you'll find a num-- at least 


two different analytical laboratories. There 


were a large number of -- ORNL or the X-10 


analytical laboratories that did analysis, 


bioassay, for people working at Y-12, and a 


good share of those uranium analyses came over 


on -- as a part of the -- on datasheets 


identified as ORNL analytical laboratory data, 


and so -- and it also came over, as you 


indicate, as a -- support of a comprehensive 


analysis on samples that were taken, and if 


it's -- it's clear that they were a different 


set of -- and probably associated with the R&D 


program. 


 MR. CHEW: And Bryce, you remember we looked at 


the -- many of those images here. 


(Unintelligible) specific letters to either a 


special group or a department that focus in on 


those people that handle those (unintelligible) 


plutonium and the -- and I think Jim was 


correct, the uranium came along with it, and so 

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they were really individual letters to 


departments that -- that just focus a number of 


people. Remember that, Bryce? 


 MR. RICH: That's right, and then -- and 


analyzed by Oak Ridge Analytical Laboratory. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. RICH: At least in the case of the uranium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can I just -- I think we're still 


on number three or thereabouts, but can I do 


one -- one follow-up on -- on the logbook 


question again? Mel, did -- did you -- I know 


-- I know it was special and -- but I -- I 


don't know -- I -- I don't remember if you did 


any comparison against the database. Were --


were there any values to compare within those 


logbooks, or would it be not a useful exercise, 


in your opinion, there? 


 MR. CHEW: I'm not so sure they'd be really 


useful, Mark. I think there was only like one 


-- one -- a few numbers in here -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: -- and that we would have to pull 


that logbook and try to discern what -- you 


know, what -- particular incident even by name. 


It was just numbers in a bunch of logbooks that 

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just -- that showed up here. I mean we could 


do that, but I think it would be like looking 


at a few small data points that 


(unintelligible) just want to pull a sample to 


compare. I'm not even sure -- confident that 


they would be entered into an electronic data-- 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's the other question that I 


have was, were the specials even included in 


the over-- yeah, in the routine database. But 


there were -- there were identifiers and stuff 


that you could, if you chose to, and how -- how 


many data do you (unintelligible) were in those 


logbooks? I mean was it hundreds, was it -- it 


may -- it may be hard to estimate, but... 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, we thumbed through the 


logbooks just to get a feel for what was in 


there --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: -- Mark, and we made the decision 


there was probably no consequence, so I don't 


want to misinterp-- mis-- 


 MR. RICH: Just -- this is Bryce Rich. I know 


there -- just impression from looking at those 


specific logbooks, which are in a box, and we 


were on the lookout for primarily analytical 

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logbooks, and it appeared that these logbooks 


were -- you know, they -- they had things like 


incident investigation where there was air 


sample results and survey readings and -- and 


some -- some -- you know, the classical things 


that you do to document a -- an unusual 


occurrence. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill. Let me add one 


more thing, and I've thought about this. Mel 


and Bryce, you know, one of the books, the one 


that we focused particularly on if I'm not 


mistaken, had on the front of it or in the 


title page -- I think it was 1963 through '78, 


you know, to show -- this was really a fairly, 


you know, small, you know, book. But now there 


were others in the box that Mel referred to. 


don't know, it seems like to me there were five 


or six or seven others. Now we did make a 


request for several pages. I marked -- I think 


I marked a half a dozen pages out of, you know, 


one of those books, and that's supposed to be ­

- they did not get it cleared for us last week, 


but that's supposed to be coming to us, and it 


might be useful or worthwhile, you know, for 


I 
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you to look at those. You know, I think it'll 


show you very clearly what Mel and them have 


described. They are definitely special samples 


following a -- you know, a high air sample or 


something, and didn't -- was not a lot of data 


in them. But when we get those pages we'll 


make those available and, you know, Jim, you 


can do with those what you want. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And again, those weren't from the 


'50 to '57 time period, either, though. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Were there any in that time 


period or no? 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No. Okay. All right. Jim, did 


you have anything to continue on this topic 


with or... 


DR. NETON: No, I think we've -- we've covered 


the waterfront on number three, at least in my 


mind. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And then number four is the -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think you provided that. 


Right? The conversion? 


DR. NETON: We provided that, right after Bill 

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Tankersley had. Everyone should have access to 


a copy of that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And is -- is -- SC&A, did you 


have time to look at that and any comment on 


that? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: No, we did have Joyce and some 


of the other internal dosimetrists look at it. 


We have no issues that I know of. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: The -- the one -- this is 


Arjun. The one question that I had is from the 


site profile in which -- that we said in the 


site profile, that because (unintelligible) 


method was used from -- for all uranium from 


'48 -- pre-1950 that you'll use a default 


assumption of (unintelligible) uranium 


(unintelligible). And at the last meeting when 


we discussed this question of conversion 


(unintelligible) I had the impression from the 


notes that -- I mean only natural uranium was 


subject to fluorometric analysis. It seems to 


me that it makes a -- makes a difference of 


about a factor of -- well, three orders of 


magnitude between natural uranium and highly 


enriched uranium, so it -- it seems that you 


get a very drastic reduction in dose estimate 

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when you go from '50 to '51 if you adopt that 


method. And that's the one conversion issue 


that seems to me -- not -- that -- for that 


time slot. 


DR. NETON: I don't think that there are any 


urine samples prior to 1950. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, there aren't -- there are 


no --


DR. NETON: I don't believe. I don't know if 


anyone's on the phone that can confirm this, 


but I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, I see. 


DR. NETON: -- I don't -- and -- and so we 


don't have urine data prior to '50, and what is 


used there is a backwards extrapolation from 


'51 time frame to go back into the '48 and '49 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, okay. 


DR. NETON: -- period. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, then the -- that section 


in the site profile just (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: (Unintelligible) just -- yeah, 


right. So we would use whatever the coworker 


data was from the '51 going backwards in time, 


documenting that the processes were similar. 

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In fact I don't think there was almost anything 


going on --


UNIDENTIFIED: There were not (unintelligible). 


DR. NETON: -- in '48, '4-- see, that's when 


the Cyclotron stopped producing anything -- or 


Calutron stopped producing and they were 


gearing up for production. But they took very 


little samples because there wasn't much going 


on. Production increased in '51, they started 


taking urine samples, so I think we feel fairly 


comfortable that the urine sample distributions 


in the '51 time frame will pretty much bound 


what happened in '48 and '49. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


DR. NETON: That's the -- I think -- 


 MS. MUNN: We can call four done. Right? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think we can call four done. 


Is that correct? 


UNIDENTIFIED: From our standpoint, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And five and six are also 


completed, I believe. We --


DR. NETON: Right, to the extent that we can't 


find any QA/QC data to help -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Unless you can -- right, unless 


something comes up. Right. 

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DR. NETON: Right. Before we leave this, I'd 


just like to give ORAU some credit. They have 


really burned the midnight oil. I mean, you 


know, you end up with a few little snippets of 


data and it seems like wow, how hard can that 


be, but there are many people that have worked 


well into the evening hours trying to make some 


sense out of this, and I'd just like to 


acknowledge their hard work. 


 MR. CHEW: The logistics of getting into the 


vaults with everyone and -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- having everyone (unintelligible). 


DR. NETON: We applied a lot of pressure in the 


right areas to get folks to help us, and it's ­

- it's really -- it's really I think paid off 


and I think a lot of -- lot of effort behind 


the scenes that just is not apparent when you 


look at one table that shows 20 samples 


compared, but that may have taken a lot of -- 


lot of hours. 


Before we move on, also I would just like to 


caution everyone that in looking through some 


of the handouts there are several pieces of 


Privacy Act information that are contained 

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here, so please treat them as such. I don't 


know that there's any issues with anyone here 


having that in their possessions, but please, 


these should not be distributed anywhere. And 


in fact, if you have no need for them when 


we're done, please give them back to me. I'll 


collect them and dispose of them properly. 


There's not much, but I just noticed there's a 


couple of pieces. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Do we want to go into 


(unintelligible) at this point or do people 


need a break? I'm (unintelligible) if Ray's 


raising his hand or anything. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we have one hand waving. 


We'll take a brief break. Let's say ten 


minutes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Ten minutes? Okay. 


 DR. WADE: It's 2:30, so be back on at 2:40; 


we'll keep the line open, though. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:35 p.m. 


to 2:45 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: Where are we in our quest? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Item 1(b). 


 DR. WADE: 1(b). 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, 1(b), is Ray up and ready? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think so. 


 MR. CHEW: Ray's ready. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. 1(b) -- number 


one, obviously, is -- is complete. It remains 


in the site profile review, I guess, but not in 


the SEC. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And then on to number two. We're 


back to the delta view. Now we might have 


covered some of this, but not -- certainly not 


the other radionuclide portion. 


DR. NETON: Right. I think, as we talked about 


when -- on the Board conference call, the 


spreadsheet including -- well, I don't know 


about any raw data, but everything that was in 


the delta view that was coded is out there now 


on the O drive. We put it out there -- it's 


been a few weeks. It's an Excel spreadsheet 


that's there. I think there's something like 


1,000 records or somethi-- somewhere 


thereabouts, so that is there. 


And then I think the next line that talks about 


will -- NIOSH will determine why the additional 


uranium samples were collected as part of the 

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delta view database and why they're not in the 


CER database. We kind of touched on that, 


although I wouldn't say that we, you know, have 


definitive answers on that. But it does appear 


that these were special samples collected as 


parts of special projects, and they weren't 


part of the -- of the routine uranium 


monitoring program. 


 And then -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can you -- can you just go back 


to number two for a second, Jim? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Was -- was there analysis files ­

- the spreadsheet was definitely provided, but 


did you mention descriptive statistics this 


morning of those? 


DR. NETON: No, we did not. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


DR. NETON: No, we -- we don't have -- I don't 


believe at this point we've done -- Mel, have 


you done any descriptive statistics on the 


delta view? 


 MR. CHEW: Be more -- be more specific, Mark. 


What -- what --


 MR. GRIFFON: Or -- or any -- I guess -- I 

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guess what I was kind of looking for, and maybe 


this is going to be saved for the evaluation 


report, is exactly how will these data be 


applied --


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to -- for -- for the workers 


of interest or -- or more broadly, the site, 


you know. 


DR. NETON: Right, I think that maybe some of 


that will become more apparent as we discuss 


what Mel's learned about the different 


processes that we're going to talk about, but 


as of this point, the question is do we have 


any proposed coworker models using delta view 


database. The answer -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- is no --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- that we don't. Okay. And then 


the next, 2(b) -- 2(b) in that write-up talks 


about what we just discussed, which is we're 


going to compare the delta view data to 


determine how it compares with coworker models 


in the CER dataset, and that's exactly what 


Bill Tankersley just discussed. So I think 

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that all of 2(b) we've talked about already, in 


my mind. 


 MS. MUNN: So done? 


DR. NETON: I don't want to speak for the 


group, but --


 MS. MUNN: We're done. 


DR. NETON: -- we're done. 


 MS. MUNN: I'm getting heads nodding. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I mean we haven't looked at 


it yet so I think that -- but -- but as far as 


an action for NIOSH, I think it's complete. 


Correct? I bel-- I agree with that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. Mark, this is Arjun. 


just -- since there's a lot of new material -- 


I mean is there a process of kind of signing 


off more than instant for things that are more 


complex than -- well, the obvious, obviously -- 


if there's something obvious, sign off on it, 


but the proc-- do you have a deadline or 


process in mind, given the shortness of the 


time? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm sorry, I couldn't -- I 


couldn't hear a lot of that, Arjun. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark -- sorry. I was just --


 MS. MUNN: Sorry. 


I 
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 MR. GRIFFON: No, I did hear you, Wanda. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- wondering, for the new 


complex items, what's the process of sign-off. 


I mean NIOSH has put a lot of work on the 


table, and how do you envision -- is there 


anything for us to do further than to take note 


of it or to give a tentative comment? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I guess that's a good 


question, but time frame of the SEC evaluation 


process, I'm not -- I -- I don't know the 


answer to that. I -- I think that all these 


pieces are going to be pulled together probably 


in support of your conclusion in your 


evaluation report, but I -- I think at this 


point SC&A should have all these deliverables 


and, you know, be reviewing them in an-- in 


anticipation that they'll be used in some way 


in the final evaluation report. I don't know 


that there's any action -- follow-up action. 


Is there? I'm asking my other workgroup 


members or -- or anyone -- 


 MS. MUNN: I wouldn't think so, unless there's 


something -- some obvious concern that jumps 


out at you and whacks you across the head. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. No, obviously, Ms. Munn, 

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what -- if there's an obvious concern we -- we 


would say so right away. 


 MS. MUNN: But otherwise I wouldn't anticipate 


that you would be required to submit a 


statement to the effect that that's okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, I agree. So -- so 2(b), 


from that standpoint, is completed. Correct. 


Are -- are we on to 2(c)? And you did provide 


some information on the O drive, Jim. Correct? 


DR. NETON: Right, there are Cyclotron, 


Calutron references out there, those -- I think 


they're annual reports -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Did -- did you -- did you by any 


chance put together any sort of simplified time 


line on -- on what production runs were done 


over what -- over that -- especially over that 


'50-'57 time frame? 


DR. NETON: You make a good straight man, Mark. 


We're ready to go with that and -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: There you go. 


DR. NETON: -- I appreciate that. Mel -- Mel 


Chew actually has some handouts which -- it's 


unfortunate you can't see 'cause they're pretty 


colors. 

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 MS. MUNN: They are. 


 MR. CHEW: Mark, I wish I can show you this 


(unintelligible). I have a few copies, but I 


also have it on the (unintelligible). Mark, 


what we did, to answer your question. I 


appreciate your comment the last time to go 


look for that and we did not realize that -- 


how reasonably extensive that would be. It 


would have been easier for me to bring you the 


table of isotopes and tell you what's not 


there, you know, but -- but -- and I did that. 


I actually have a copy of the table of isotopes 


(unintelligible) in case we need to reference 


some of the half-lives or (unintelligible). 


Let me (unintelligible) you what you have in 


front of you that you do not see and the other 


members of the Board do see. You want -- Bob? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Go ahead. 


 MR. CHEW: I have -- I have -- we developed 


that and I -- thanks to several people who 


worked entirely through the evening -- most of 


the data we got -- recovered from the Oak Ridge 


National Laboratory library, and if any of you 


have not been there, it's about the size of a 


football field and very well put together here. 

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We worked so late one evening that the janitor 


closed the light (unintelligible) on us, Mark, 


on the way -- on the way out then that we had 


to yell to him to bring the lights back on. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: Okay, very good. Most -- it turns 


out that pretty much both the Y-12 information 


and the ORNL information was all together in 


one location here, but we supplemented that 


also by pulling some of the information from 


the classified portion of the -- of the Y-12, 


but it was also declassified and put into the 


ORNL library. 


I have a spreadsheet in front of me by years on 


the upper column from '47 to '68, and then I 


put -- I focused in that particular period of 


time here, and I literally -- this is from A to 


Z and it's a 340 some-odd isotopes that I have 


listed, and all these are entered by hand from 


aluminum 28-M, okay, to zirconium -- I can pull 


the last page here, I think all you guys can 


see this if I open it up -- to zirconium 96, so 


it's really A to Z here. And if you look at 


the -- it's in alphabetical order and it's -- 


it's available electronically. I'm going to 

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have to make a small -- I put it draft because 


as we were putting this spreadsheet together 


for you we had one person pulling the 


information, I think it was Bryce. I was 


reading the information to the person putting 


it into the computer, and sometimes my 


remembrance of some of the rare earth was -- 


the spelling was not exactly correct, so I'd 


like to go back and correct that. It was -- it 


was clearly not a chemistry (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: You should -- you should all 


clearly label what you have in your hands as 


"draft." It will -- it will be edited 

slightly. 

 MR. CHEW: We al-- we also did one thing. We 

also separated out the radioactive species here 


in millicuries, or curies in case may be, and 


al-- except for the uranium and thorium because 


they were -- those information was in grams. 


Okay? And I don't think we needed to do a 


conversion because it takes a lot of grams to 


make a few milli-- millicuries (unintelligible) 


microcuries --


 MR. FITZGERALD: And now again the units mean 


what? The units themselves, are these annual ­
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- or total? 


 MR. CHEW: This -- this is the -- that -- what 


the -- the particular quarterly -- or the 


annual records showed that that particular 


isotope was produced in that year. Okay? Not 


necessarily tell you what -- exactly which -- 


well, we could go down (unintelligible) 


quarter, but we basically put everything in 


that year the total amount that was produced. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Total amount. 


DR. NETON: It's the annual production of that 


isotope --


 MR. CHEW: Annual production. 


DR. NETON: -- from the Cyclotron -- 


 MR. CHEW: And the --


DR. NETON: -- and the Calutron. 


 MR. CHEW: -- Calutron. Along with this, later 


on in the years -- in the past years when the 


two divisions actually were transferred over to 


the isotope division, we had a little bit more 


trouble, Mark, because the stable isotopes -- 


we put together the same -- the information 


with the radioactive species, so we had to 


figure out which ones were stable and which 


ones were radioactive so we can clearly mark -- 

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they are, and so the ones that are stable are 


marked -- they're marked -- introduced or 


presented in grams and the active ones in the ­

- colored yellow in the millicuries or activity 


as necessary. So we got you 342. We're always 


afraid that we're going to give this to our 


esteemed colleagues from (unintelligible) Joe 


and John (unintelligible) and Arjun says well, 


they'll take out some isotope, he says well, 


how do you do the dose reconstruction 


(unintelligible), you know, we're prepared to 


do that. 


We -- so this is what -- a fairly comprehensive 


list. It was a little bit more than the few 


isotopes than we had originally had thought for 


obvious reason that we should have not done 


otherwise. 


There's a -- there's a denotation of a B there, 


Joe and Arjun. You see there's a little B? 


What it means, B, that since my computer does 


not have the scientific notation for cross-


section and B stands for (unintelligible), 


thank you, and as I think all of you know and 


have in your past work and know what the 


(unintelligible) looks like. Okay? So B 

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stands for -- that was (unintelligible) trace 


isotopes produced for cross-section work. 


Okay? So that's what we have from that 


standpoint. 


I'd like to go on (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: Mel, before you go -- is it true, 


then -- I think it's obvious, but is it not 


true then that the -- all the blue stable 


isotopes were produced in the Calutron -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yes. 


DR. NETON: -- because there would be obviously 


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) separation, yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- separations from the Calutron. 


 MR. CHEW: One of the things that we also had 


to look at when we looked at this report, they 


have to bring in the example -- if you were 


going to look for a specific specie, like you 


were going to separate thorium or plutonium, 


they had to bring in the small parent quantity 


and then we listed that, too -- okay? -- in our 


example, so it was -- it was known it was to be 


there -- okay? -- so there's a little bit more 


information about some of the isotopes 


(unintelligible) doing just to separate a 

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specific specie in that particular isotope. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Now in terms of the -- the 


years you have, it looks like it's -- it's 


interesting from an operational standpoint -- 


'57 is the cutoff, certainly a step function, 


or is that a anomaly of -- you just cut it off 


 MR. CHEW: If you look at that last few sheets, 


Joe, where the uranium -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, I saw that. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, the majority of that was done 


early (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Early years. 


 MR. CHEW: -- separation of uranium. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: Then they tried to do some of the 


separations for plutonium and then went on to ­

- to -- on to (unintelligible) cross section 


research and the medical research that was 


using both the Cyclotron and Calutron for that 


particular purposes, and that's why you see a 


lot of activity going on. But also at the same 


time they really got those machines 


(unintelligible) working (unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But you really -- you really 

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did the analysis for '57 and then just showed 


the cross-sections after '57? 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah (unintelligible). Joe, ask me 


the question again (unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I wondered if there's an 


anomaly -- I think -- anomaly in the 


presentation. Is it pretty much just through 


'57 that you looked at the detail of the 


production and then after that you just noted 


the cross-sections? 'Cause '57 you have all 


the -- all the production numbers and then '58 


there's very little. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, that particular isotopes was 


mentioned earlier, and then if there was a 


trace quantity that we could not identify -- 


any place where the reports told us either 


activity or in mass or activity, we put it in, 


Joe. Where they said trace quantities 


(unintelligible) for research and only mention 


the isotope without any quantity 


(unintelligible). 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think we talked a little 


bit about it -- this at lunch, and there may be 


some additional production after '57 that's not 


here. It's very -- it's very conclusive, 

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though, for '57, and that's what we want to 


talk about today, but -- 


 DR. KERR: Mainly I think what listing is 


behind on some of this is isotope production 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Medical -- medical isotopes, 


yeah. 


 DR. KERR: -- medical isotopes, and there's was 


-- I looked at promethium 147 and that was a 


big medical isotope --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, and (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. KERR: -- and it's not showing up after 


that date, so you've got some medical isotope 


data to add to that yet. 


 MR. CHEW: Now, the -- it -- it's interesting, 


Joe, we had the -- as I said, again, there -- 


there was -- the reports we're looking at 


combined both -- all of the isotope production 


group. That includes Calutron or -- or -- I 


beg your pardon, Cyclotron, and also the 


reactor. And so it was -- obviously we pulled 


out the reactor-producing -- I mean like the 


cobalt was produced in large quantities and 


things like that -- okay? -- and that did not 


show up here --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: -- because I think the original 


question from you, Mark, was to address what 


was produced by the Calutrons and Cyclotron. 


 DR. KERR: But -- this is up through the SEC 

period. 

 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) SEC --

 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- okay, and we focused on that 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: We have a table with 342 pretty 


colors there, Mark. I wish you'd been there. 


You will get a copy here. 


DR. NETON: I'll make sure we get a copy out on 


the -- well, O drive and --


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- it's small enough that I might 


e-mail it, too, for those who have trouble 


accessing the O -- O drive. 


 MR. CHEW: And now it brings up the question, 


now we have all these isotopes, what do they 


do? You know, what is the safety involved. 


Well, in going -- in doing the research, and I 


like to show a couple of pictures here I can 

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show on the site, I'd like to pass them around, 


this is a picture of some of the early uranium 


separation -- and Mark, you cannot see that. 


Let me try to describe to you is a person who 


is working on the collect-- 


DR. NETON: Mel, do we have this on the -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, we have actually on the screen 


here, I've got to find which one, but he's 


working with a respirator on and inside of a 


glovebox, and this picture was taken in 1949. 


 MS. MUNN: Wonderful. Excellent. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. I have another picture here ­

- we talked about the dees last time and I sort 


of waved my arms and described to you what a 


dee looked like, so I brought you a picture of 


a clean dee -- okay? -- and so that's 


available, too. That's what the dees look like 


here and this is where the contamination would 


show up. Don't forget, the majority of it's 


collected in the collector, but when they open 


up the chamber and rigging up the vacuum, 


things will come back through the Cyclotron and 


contaminate the dees at the same time or if 


(unintelligible) the dees do get contaminated. 


Well, what do they do? That's another set of 

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question -- pictures here and I think I 


(unintelligible). There was two pictures I 


thought was worthwhile. There's a -- here is a 


-- a (unintelligible) and a plastics bag, 1951­

'52 data, and I interviewed the health 


physicist who was the Cyclotron health 


physicist, Doc Emerson everybody called him. 


Many of you might remember Doc Emerson, Lewis 


Emerson, who worked -- who was the health 


physicist at Y-12 responsible for the 86-inch 


Cyclotron and he was -- I interviewed him on 


Thursday, and he remember the bag and he 


remembered the suits that the people wore, but 


this is the real -- most important one. Joe 


would appreciate that, being an operational HP. 


This is the cleaning of the liners and the dees 


and the suits, and they just showed that. 


Okay? All right. I think that's 


(unintelligible) important aspect to show that 


this is the kind of level of protection, and 


this is why sometimes you didn't necessarily 


find bioassay results, you know, for people. 


Maybe they just didn't feel (unintelligible) 


well enough to take them. There's clearly 


records that there was contamination and that 

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some of them are fairly high level. This is 


the level of protection that the people used. 


This is the picture of transferring the plastic 


bag as they moved (unintelligible) from the 


Cyclotron and the dee in to where the locations 


were -- the dees were cleaned and so this is a 


picture (unintelligible). I tried to describe 


this the last time but I thought of -- when 


finding a picture in the report which you can ­

- is I think a -- talks about the -- 


DR. NETON: Those plastic suits were from what 


era, do you know? 


 MR. CHEW: This is 1951-'52. 


DR. NETON: Okay, so that's the relevant time 


frame. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. I thought the --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) pictures were 


taken? 


 MR. CHEW: Did I talk to any? Is that what 


you're saying, Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, just out of curiosity. 


You're talking about operational physics, I 


think --


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, I did talk to Doc Emerson -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- health physics manual, but -- 

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 MR. CHEW: Right. Doc -- let's see, I have a 


record of when he actively showed up -- Doc 


showed up in 1949 at X-10 as a researcher. 


Then in 1950 he was the Y-12 health physics -- 


health physicist. And then I think a couple of 


years after that he was the head of the health 


physics group, but his first assignment at Y-12 


in 1950 was the 86-inch Cyclotron. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I -- I mean other than the 


health physics -- did you interview -- 


 MR. CHEW: Oh, I'm sorry --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- like maintenance people or any 


other -- probably hard to find some of them -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. No, I did not -- I did not do 


that, Mark. I did not (unintelligible) some of 


these people. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: But I think clearly that what I can 


show you here is that -- you know, the people 


(unintelligible) the suits (unintelligible) 


protection -- I would say the people -- well, 


you didn't see this -- people cleaning the dee 


would either be either operational or 


(unintelligible) maintenance person where -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

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 MR. CHEW: -- where I -- I -- little bit more 


discussion were the people, the maintenance 


person or like a -- like a person in part of 


the SEC, like a pipefitter or a plumber, could 


get involved with actually working there is 


that many of these -- all the dees and all the 


liners were water-cooled. There was tubes. 


You can actually see this in the picture here, 


and sometime when the beams stray they would 


punch a hole in the -- in the -- in the tube. 


You would know that right away because you lose 


vacuum and then -- and then they would have to 


open the Cyclotron to get those things out to 


repair. But I think you can see that they 


probably clean it because I think not only did 


they clean it for -- to reduce the 


contamination, but I think every one of these 


materials are quite valuable, as you well know, 


and then they went back in and repaired the 


tubes. I don't -- I don't have any pictures of 


that, but I just know that from my personal 


experience at the 90-inch Cyclotron in 


Livermore. We did the same thing. 


 DR. KERR: There were also -- we also had some 


write-ups of what was required for people to go 

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and work in the Cyclotron pit, and we've got 


those and it tells you exactly what you had to 


do, you (unintelligible) to work, so 


(unintelligible) the pictures essentially show 


this. 


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) we will get them to 


you. And then that brings -- I think that's 


probably the -- the part of the Cyclotron 


story. We can now continue and have a 


discussion of other isotope -- is that what's 


next (unintelligible) continuing? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. Well, when Joe Fitzgerald -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: Go ahead, Mark. 


DR. NETON: Unless there's any --


 MR. GRIFFON: I just wanted to (unintelligible) 


one follow-up on that (unintelligible) I don't 


have that one (unintelligible). Did you crosswalk the data in the delta view against 


(unintelligible) history to see if you had 


ample coverage for the -- (unintelligible) 


polonium and plutonium, thorium and others that 


were mentioned in the delta view. Were they --


was there, you know, data (unintelligible) 

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delta view database that (unintelligible) 


spreadsheet --


 MR. CHEW: Well, I can quickly say -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) --


 MR. RICH: Yes, we did. 

 MR. CHEW: Go ahead, Bryce. 

 MR. RICH: This is Bryce. Yes, we did crosswalk that. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. RICH: The delta view bioassay matched the 


operational periods. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, 'cause for instance 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. RICH: I might just add that -- that the 


Calutrons obviously were used for isotopic 


separation and enrichment, purification, and at 


times it's clear that radioactive material 


would be produced, and then the isotopes of 


those radioactive materials would be separated 


in the Calutron. And of course the Calutron 


itself, that uses the radioactive material as 


the ion source, would be more vulnerable of 


course to the contamination of the dees, and 


that was the process they're most concerned 


about. And also the one where the collection 

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of the product and the -- and the isotopic 


counts would be done in -- in glovebox control 


of that -- of that kind. The plutonium 


separation of course in the Calutron was one of 


the big ones, as well as the -- the polonium 


production in the 86-inch Cyclotron. 


(Unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Can -- Bryce, I'm sorry to 


interrupt. The polonium was of interest to me. 


Did that -- was there any production '50 to 


'57? 'Cause there was no data in the delta 


view dataset for that time period. 


 MR. CHEW: They actually stopped producing the 


plutonium/polonium (unintelligible) -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: '52. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, we know that for a fact, Mark. 


 MR. RICH: Then -- and -- and the production of 


different polonium isotopes continued in -- in 


the reactor, though. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. RICH: And the -- the -- as Mel indicated, 


the -- in June of 1951 of course the R&D 


program at X-10 assumed administrative 


responsibility for the Y-12 programs, and so 


it's all rolled in together, the isotopic 

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production and the interchange between the 


reactor production and separation in the 


Calutrons and the like. So it's -- it's a -- 


there's a certain amount of complexity 


introduced as a result of that administrative 


combination. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Example, would you believe that they 


did some cross-section work for polonium 209 


and 211 in trace quantities in 1961 and '68. 


It's on the spreadsheet there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: I mean that's example 


(unintelligible). I hope we're answering your 


questions here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay, I -- I think -- I think this 


puts -- I'd like to thank all the people who 


helped put this table together. It was a lot 


of -- many hours to populate this table, to 


pull the information from the reports, but the 


reports are there and they're certainly 


documented. 


 MS. MUNN: Really interesting. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, it is very interesting because 

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(unintelligible) give an idea of what kinds of 


things that they were doing and so now -- now 


you sort of know where the data comes from when 


you see the isotopic chart with all the 


nuclides. Go ahead, George. 


 DR. KERR: Yeah, I was going to say that the 


Cyclo-- the 86-inch Cyclotron was used up 


through 1980 for medical isotope 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mel --


 MR. CHEW: Yes, sir? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I saw -- there is some 


polonium (unintelligible) data in the late 


'50s. Would that be reactor related? But it's 


in the Y-12 -- I saw that in the delta view -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, I mean this (unintelligible). 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- database -- uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, the (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And so if there was no 


production, why would there have been bioassay? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think the -- Arjun, that was 


thorium (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, that was thorium, I -- why 


do I keep mixing those two things? That's the 


second time I've done that. 

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DR. NETON: Polonium data would be hard to 


interpret because of natural incidence -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) the isotopes. 


 MR. CHEW: I know. That's why when Joe, on the 


last working group, said well, what other 


isotopes, I said oh, my gosh, Joe, I didn't 


know the question was going to be 


(unintelligible) -- you opened the door there. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Oh, sorry. No, I thought 


(unintelligible). 


DR. NETON: I think -- let's back up a little 


bit here. We now know the source term, at 


least, for each year for each isotope, and then 


you also need to remember, I think, that as we 


discussed previously, the exposure would only 


really occur when the target is taken out. And 

the targets themselves -- correct me if I'm 

wrong, Mel -- were processed over at X-10. Is 

that not right? 

 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 

DR. NETON: So there was some potential for 

exposure -- the largest potential for exposure 


is when they would move the target and move it 


over to the (unintelligible). So -- so as we 


indicated before, even though these are large 

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quantities there, the potential for exposure is 


on a very limited basis per removal of the 


target. And I think even when Mel was talking 


about the water lines being ruptured, that 


would not be the target material, would it be? 


 MR. CHEW: That's right, it would be. 


DR. NETON: It would have been the dees who 


were contaminated with the induced products in 


the materials. So that's a fairly stable 


commodity. I mean it would be known what those 


were. It would not be dependent upon what the 


target materials, which were encapsulated in 


the -- in the accelerator. 


 DR. KERR: Yeah. Also the targets could be 


removed by remote equipment. 


DR. NETON: Right. Yeah, 'cause they were 


actually very radioactive -- 


 DR. KERR: (Unintelligible) shielding -- 


DR. NETON: -- as far as (unintelligible). 


 DR. KERR: -- and they could remove the target 


material and even position it into peaks for 


shielding to move it, so -- 


 MR. CHEW: I'd like to add one more comment to 


what Jim has said, the -- when you're talking 


about the quantities, you know, the quantities 

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may be in activity, but in mass it's 


(unintelligible) you know, very small because 


these are very short half-life materials here. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: So when you see a millicurie of 


something very short half-life, we're only 


talking about a few nanograms. Okay? And so 


that's -- so -- but all this is written down, 


Mark. I think when you see the chart, I think 


I -- I think I tried to answer your question, 


sir. 


DR. MAURO: So the story we have here is we -- 


we have a handle on the time periods and types 


of radionuclides that were being handled under 


very special and controlled circumstances. We 


also have the delta view database which coin-- 


which is a urinalysis samples, I assume. Some 


of these radionuclides show up. Along comes a 


worker, that time period, and you want to 


reconstruct his doses as part of his story. 


And you know that -- let's say you know he -- 


he worked in this area, based on his records, 


or you suspect he might have. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


DR. MAURO: And you -- you want to somehow take 

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all this into consideration, this story we just 


whole -- heard. Now I could see several lines 


of -- of attack, one being well, you know, we 


don't have any bioassay data for this fella, 


and everything we just heard, it's unlikely 


that you really got much of an exposure. 


Everything was conturned -- contained. But we 


do have a few people who are picking up some of 


these. Right now do you have a model in your 


head about how do you -- how do you come to 


grips with that -- that particular worker when 


you -- when the time comes to reconstruct his 


doses, given everything that you -- that you 


now know about this? 


 MR. CHEW: Jim, you want to talk -- 


DR. NETON: We need to flesh out some more 


detai-- I mean the source term has just become 


obvious to us. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I understand. 


DR. NETON: We know that there are episodic, 


small increments of time when they could have 


been exposed, and how they actually apply to 


the class -- which is steamfitters, pipefitters 


and plumbers -- is also an issue. Because, 


again, were those people there during the time 

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period when these things were being -- targets 


were being moved and were they really at 


potential for exposure? 


DR. MAURO: Could I wander into an area that 


may be a little bit off the direction button? 


I know that the scope of the SEC petition 


explicitly defines those categories of workers. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: And that petition is that petition. 


But now we're starting to learn more about the 


story that goes on here and -- is -- is that 


going to be a boundary? In other words -- I 


hate to say it like this, but is that good 


enough to just say well, listen -- well, we 


know he wasn't a pipefitter; he's out of the 


picture and we're going to walk away from that. 


Or are we go-- or do you feel as if there's an 


obligation here? Let me explain -- I'm going 


to -- I'm -- again, take -- take the hat off 


for a second, just think about it. Here we 


have some workers. Turns out he wasn't a 


pipefitter. Okay? So therefore does not fall 


into the box that's been created in the SEC 


petition. He's applied. He's part of -- well, 


he's not part of the SEC, but he -- he worked 

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there at that time, did some of these things, 


and -- and you feel as if you have an 


obligation to this person to ease his mind that 


we understand his exposures, or is he just 


going to be cut right out of the picture 


because he wasn't a pipefitter? 


DR. NETON: Well, no, no, we have an obligation 


to review any potential class within -- within 


the period of time we're investigating. That's 


absolutely true. But we also have a primary 


obligation, though, to give these people an 


answer for the class that was petitioned -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- in a fairly timely manner, so we 


will evaluate this class. If we -- if we can, 


we will, you know, expand the boundaries to 


other classes that might be relevant. 


DR. MAURO: The reason I ask is from a 


practical standpoint -- and I guess I've 


crossed the boundaries going from SEC to dose 


reconstruction --


DR. NETON: Yeah, sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- is SEC going to be that clean, 


so that well, we've answered the SEC issue. 


But of course we still have an obligation if 

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this fella is a claimant. We have to take care 


-- we have to address him, and so he'll fall 


into that box. So it's really one of -- of 


parsing out, or -- or is -- 


DR. NETON: No, no, I think you've seen our 


approach. I mean I'm trying to remember which 


one we did this on, but I think -- National 


Bureau of Standards comes to mind where there 


was a fairly narrow petition class -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 

DR. NETON: -- and we opened it up -- 

DR. MAURO: You did, okay. 

DR. NETON: -- to say well, we really can't 

tell, you know, who -- who was in harm's way 


necessarily for that class -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- and we'll do that sort of 


analysis --


DR. MAURO: And you'll bring it out on that 


basis. 


DR. NETON: -- to the extent we can, given -- 


you know, what we -- what time frame -- 


 DR. WADE: The obligation is to do dose 


reconstruction for individuals. 


DR. NETON: Sure. 

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 DR. WADE: And if we can, we can. If we can't, 


then we need to deal with it at some point. 


DR. NETON: Right. But whether it pops out 


immediately during our analysis or not is hard 


to predict. But you're right, there are -- 


there are other workers who may have been, you 


know, exposed here during the handling of the 


issues, but they may not have been -- I'm not 


saying they were or not, but if they were, they 


may not have been plumbers, pipefitters or 


steamfitters. 


 MR. CHEW: John, I'd like to just add 


(unintelligible) specific question here. I'd 


like -- I think we have a model in our minds 


and our thoughts, but I'd like to make sure I 


run it through --


DR. MAURO: I understand. 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) before I 


(unintelligible). You know, we've looked at 


the data and -- and anticipated your question. 


I think, you know, it's a fair question. Okay? 


DR. MAURO: Certainly. 


 MR. CHEW: I think I would like to make sure I 


discuss it with OCAS before (unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: Sure. 

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DR. NETON: And keep in mind these are very 


short duration isotopes so doses tend to be 


fairly small per unit intake, even though 


they're large -- large amounts of activity with 


short half-lives, the doses are fairly small, 


so we -- we need to think -- that in mind, we 


need to keep the potential exposure population 


in mind and the short episodic duration of 


their exposures. And then -- and there are 


some actual reports of some measurements for 


these folks. They're not -- they're not zero. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So you have some actual like 


bioassay --


DR. NETON: There -- there have been -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: -- you know, there have been some 


incident evaluations that we can rely on to 


possibly bound these exposures. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh. 


DR. NETON: If there were incidents and you 


know what the exposures were during some what I 


would call off-normal circumstances, then one 


may be able to say well, during normal 


operation it would certainly be less than that. 


It's no more than (unintelligible), and we just 

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haven't fleshed that out to the extent we need 


to right now. 


 MR. CHEW: Let me pick up on Joe's question the 


last time, the other isotopes, and I'd like to 


discuss -- not necessarily in isotopes, Joe, 


because as you -- I saw -- you show -- I just 


showed you 340-some of them. Let's -- to 


answer -- the real question is what other 


radioactive or hazardous materials that Y-12 


workers may happen to work that potentially 


give them a rad-- a radiation exposure. I 


think I'd like to attack the question from that 


side (unintelligible) materials, not 


(unintelligible) isotopes. 


Let me tell you what we did, trying to answer 


your question. We went back and started with 


the materials balance ledgers. Okay? 


(Unintelligible) key, those are documented 


ledgers. Every one that we -- every page we 


had to look at had to be hand-monitored and 


surveyed before we were able to touch the data. 


Wonderfully, Y-12 actually kept uranium 235, 


natural uranium, plutonium, neptunium 233, 


tritium and thorium in separate ledgers. We 


were able to discover that. So for a given 

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year if you want to find out how much 235 or 


233 or plutonium, it showed you exactly where ­

- the material balance when it came in. You 


can identify things like parts -- 


(unintelligible) talked to Bob Presley about 


that today and I'll go ahead and discuss that a 


little more. So we looked at the plant 


records. We went to the -- there's some 


classified records that the plant manager was 


obligated to talk about the yearly activities. 


I think Bob is probably familiar 


(unintelligible) some yourself. And those were 


all the classified information of the different 


programs and the projects that involved 


materials. And so even programs that did not 


involve (unintelligible) were in there. There 


was four or five, six boxes that we went 


through, this -- particularly focusing on this 


particular period to see if we could identify 


any programs and mention of other materials 


that we have not talked about (unintelligible) 


address. So with that, I'd like to -- I'd like 


to talk about that a little bit. 


Let's -- let's pick on the -- let's talk about 


plutonium, and I want to be careful that we do 

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not (unintelligible) on anything classified. 


Okay? There was some plutonium parts that 


actually came in to Y-12 clearly confined to 


the time period that we were able to -- 


identified in the ledger. It came in and came 


out. They were clearly part of the test 


program for the Nevada Test Site. 


DR. NETON: Just before Mel goes on, I want to 


make it clear, I think that what Mel's talking 


about is plutonium that's above and beyond any 


plutonium that was processed through the 


Calutrons. So this would be in addition to 


that. 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh, and I think -- you know, 


Joe, if you really pull the string or ask me to 


pull the string and tell me what tests, I 


probably can do that, but I think the ledger 


defines exactly the period of time. 


We actually confirmed that with several other 


interviewees that we can talk about because 


that was part of a (unintelligible) and that's 


part of a story (unintelligible) talk about the 


people who actually did assembly. They 


remembered it very well. They even talked 


about it. I think Mr. Presley (unintelligible) 

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that, too -- confirm that. There was two --


two incidences and two separate time period 


year that those parts came in that would -- 


what I consider a significant quantity of 


plutonium that came in. It was -- the material 


was cladded -- okay? -- (unintelligible) 


covered. It was protected. It was never 


handled let's say out like we would see around 


the class. This was an actual part. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay? You can see the part number 


on there. And I think that's all I really want 


to -- unless you want to pull the -- the string 


on that one --


 MR. FITZGERALD: But time frame-wise, we're 


talking about this being (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. CHEW: '62 -- '62 was the first part and 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay, so this doesn't -- 


DR. NETON: It's not relevant to the SEC. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: It's not relevant to the -- 


'57. 


 MR. CHEW: It isn't. I do not see any ledgers 


telling me that there was any significant 


quantities of plutonium like this in the SEC 

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period other than what Jim said was produced in 


the Calutron. This was also confirmed by the 


people who were there. 


 MS. MUNN: Most of that was (unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: Rocky Flats. There was also a 


tritium part that came in, Joe -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Before you go on to tritium -- 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- what significant quantity of 


plutonium? You said no significant quantity of 


plutonium. 


 MR. CHEW: No, no, I said it is significant. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, before '62 you said 


there wasn't any significant quantities except 


for the Calu--


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) grams, less than 


grams. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Less than grams. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


grams. Okay? This was significantly more than 


that. That's -- I think that's all I really 


feel comfortable saying. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But there wer-- wa-- were gram 


quantities in the '50s? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Yeah, I think so. 

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You know, Calutron certainly -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, outside of the Calutron -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Oh, outside -- not 


that we could see --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: -- there -- there were some traces 


that came in, but nothing that we could see 


that we would consider (unintelligible). Okay? 


But you can see also there were bioassay for 


plutonium through that particular period. You 


can almost track, you know, exactly what they 


acquired. There were concerns about when these 


particular (unintelligible) come in. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Now the PU bioassay -- I mean 


it -- that went from the -- I'll call it the 


SEC period onward --


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- you say you can see the 


step function when these operations began in 


the early '60s, you can sort of -- you can 


actually track --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Oh, we can track 


exactly when the part came in and when it left 


and went -- went to the Test Site. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, in terms of the number 

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of bioassays and what have you. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Yeah, okay, I -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I'm saying they -- they 


had -- certainly they had plutonium bioassay in 


the '50s. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: They were doing work at the 


Calutron. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But you didn't really see 


perhaps a pick-up in the bioassays as far as 


numbers, as well as maybe even activities, 


until the '60s? 


 DR. KERR: You would see it (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: I'm not sure --


 DR. KERR: -- at least (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I'm just trying to clarify 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. KERR: There wouldn't be any internal 


exposure. 


DR. NETON: It wouldn't necessarily follow 


they'd monitor plutonium because if they were 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I was wondering if you -- I 

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thought you said something about bioassays. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


Let me tell you what I didn't do. These --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I have not looked 


at -- for instance, there's a group of 


bioassays that focus in when that particular 


part came in. I haven't done (unintelligible) 


lay it on top of each other yet. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) And so I'm sure we 


can do that, but I think the (unintelligible) 


necessarily had to be done. These parts were 


only handled --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- only a few people, very clearly, 


like two. 


 DR. KERR: And they (unintelligible) processed 


when they come in. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Nothing was 


processed. 


 DR. KERR: Nothing was processed. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Nothing was 


processed. The part came in and put into a -- 


a device --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) test Nevada and 


-- and then taken out. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay, that helps because I 


think, from the site profile standpoint, the 


time frame wasn't clear and it was -- 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I -- I think 


clearly the Y-12 people -- and I want to make 


sure I say this --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- correctly here -- are very 


sensitive to the very fact that 


(unintelligible) plutonium did show up at Y-12 


and I think that was kept very -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: -- to a minimum for knowledge 


(unintelligible) you can understand that 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, sure. I -- I think 


going back to John's comment earlier, even 


though for this very specific petition, you 


know, we're -- we're clearly comforted by 


getting those time frames straight 'cause that 

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was something we couldn't get in the site 


profile, it certainly has relevancy for 


characterization for further -- future work. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) We are talking 


about (unintelligible) beyond isotopes and it 


may cross over SEC, and I'll bring it back. 


Okay? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: All right. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) There was a -- yes, 


sir? 


DR. NETON: Couple more questions. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Off microphone) You said that 


before '61 or whatever (unintelligible) (on 


microphone) there were traces that came in of 


plutonium. What do you mean by that? In the 


form of recycled uranium or what -- what do you 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, I think that's a --


 MR. GRIFFON: Mainly that would be the --


 MR. CHEW: Yes, I was going to talk about the 


recycled uranium here, and that would -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: The traces wouldn't be from some 


other -- I mean what -- that would -- that 

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would be the form mainly. Right? 


 MR. CHEW: Well, I do have a -- a table that we 


pulled out, and just give me a second here and 


let me look for it and (unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Is the mass balance that 


precise that you could see the 


Calutron/Cyclotron production and the trace 


materials, as well? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


Joe, I think -- I'm not sure that all of the 


Calutron/Cyclotron production was put into the 


ledgers -- okay? -- because they are 


(unintelligible) more R&D. You know, this is 


for accountability (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: This is strictly --


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) -- go ahead, 


Mark. 


 MR. RICH: I don't -- I don't think that detail 


was in the ledgers. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes. Okay. You don't --


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) It was -- it was 


(unintelligible) quantities (unintelligible) 


the Calutron for separation. 


 MR. CHEW: Bryce, you probably have that piece 

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of paper in front of me, I just can't reach -- 


when you were holding some of the information 


from the classified ledger of some of the 


smaller quantities of plutonium in the early 


years. 

 MR. RICH: My overnight mail just got here -- 

 MR. CHEW: I have here, I just --

 MR. RICH: Okay. 

 MR. CHEW: But no, I don't -- I can't pull it 

up right now with my hand. Do you have that in 


front of you? 


 MR. RICH: I think -- I think it was -- I don't 


have it in front of me. That's my problem, it 


didn't get here in time. 


 MR. CHEW: I do, actually. I apologize. 


 MR. RICH: I think it was in the '62 time 


frame, though. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, but that was the larger 


quantity --


 MR. RICH: Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) and they even 


keep a track down to the milligram quantity to 


the kilogram quantities, Joe. I did not have ­

- I have a -- I have a ledger example on that. 


There was 56 milligrams in 1951 

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(unintelligible) example. Okay? 


 MR. RICH: In the ledger? 


 MR. CHEW: 1950 was three --


 MR. FITZGERALD: The answer --


 MR. CHEW: -- to five milligrams. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: The answer to Mark's comment, 


you have the -- you know, there are gram 


quantities, small gram quantities, but if it's 


not the Cyclotron/Calutron, you would have to 


attribute that to the recycled uranium? 


 MR. CHEW: Well -- and it could be, and I'm -- 


I don't want to --


 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) if I -- I said 


we -- to pull down exactly what that part was, 


I --


 (Whereupon, Mr. Chew, Mr. Fitzgerald and other 


participants began speaking simultaneously, 


rendering isolation of individual comments 


impossible.) 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) there was a -- 


in the note remember we had to use notes 


declassified, Joe -- okay? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: There was -- in 1949 there was like 

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69 milligrams and it was called engineering 


device and --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I'm just trying to 


clarify, is the inventory components and 


devices but would not necessarily envelope 


something like trace materials in -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- in recycled uranium. I 


mean --


 MR. CHEW: No. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- it would seem like it 


wouldn't because this would be mostly what the 


inventory suggests coming in -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- (unintelligible) and 


recycled is more or less a contaminant in the 


material itself, so --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I'll talk about the 


recycled --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Separated --


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: So this is really -- this is 


really --


 MR. RICH: The recycled uranium contaminants 


did not show up in that --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: In the ledger. 


 MR. RICH: -- in the listing. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay, Joe --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I had one more question about 


the plutonium in the '50s. 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh, sure. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Which is the -- the delta view 


database has these -- I don't know, several 


hundred odd whatever -- several -- several 


hundred plutonium bioassays. 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So I guess the implication of 


what you're saying is that they were not 


related to any production type of things 


related to devices, but they were related to 


the Calutrons or recycled uranium? Can we dis­

- are we in a position to distinguish what 


those bio-- why those bioassays were done for 


plutonium in the '50s? 


 MR. CHEW: Arjun, I'd like to say this -- I 


think the plutonium bioassay represents both of 


what you're saying. Okay? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: It would probably representing some 

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of the isotopes in production of -- separation 


of plutonium, but later on to assure that the 


contamination of plutonium was not present in 


those parts we're talking about -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- there may be a bioassay that is 


also in the data -- data (sic) view because it 


expands to past those years. 


DR. NETON: But I do think that we know that 


the plutonium samples were not -- I don't think 


those plutonium samples were taken to monitor 


for recycled uranium. 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


DR. NETON: Exposure to recycled uranium. 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


mostly -- mostly for the Calutron separation of 


plutonium isotopes. 


DR. NETON: Right. That I think addresses one 


of the comments we received from you guys that 


the ratios appeared to be out of line with what 


would be in the recycled uranium. I think they 


just weren't collected for that purpose. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. So that would re-- that 


would sort of resolve that issue because the 


numbers didn't otherwise make sense. 

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DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Joe, the -- you 


asked a question (unintelligible) bring it to 


another material that -- the issue here is this 


tritium. I think -- I mentioned in the last 


meeting, tritium monitoring was triggered by a 


letter from Pantex that (unintelligible) 


potentially was (unintelligible) contamination 


from some of the parts that may be coming back 


after this assembly because of issues with 


tritium being released and so I know Hap West 


was (unintelligible) about that, started a 


tritium bioassay program, but we do have in the 


ledger a part that came in. I can't -- it was 


a classified part for part of the Nevada test 


and that part actually came in from there and 


it showed up and then it was sent out to Nevada 


Test Site. Probably on a couple of occasions 


that particular test -- that particular 


component did come in, but these were 


(unintelligible) called encapsulated because 


they were part of (unintelligible) unit that 


(unintelligible). So I would say the tritium, 


even though we see some tritium bioassay, I can 


comfortably say there was no significant amount 

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of tritium that was handled here at the 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh, any sense of time 


frame on that one, too? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Actually I can pull 


the ledger. I just didn't (unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. I mean I just wondered. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) We were trying to 


minimize (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Fifties -- '50s or -- 


 MR. CHEW: -- '60s. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- to the '60s, okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) The neptunium story 


-- right? -- it was a very good question 


(unintelligible) about what happened 


(unintelligible) neptunium. The neptunium came 


in in several different ways. It's -- so 


(unintelligible) talking about neptunium 237, 


it is part of obviously the contaminant for the 


recycled uranium here. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Not necessarily. 


 MR. CHEW: Well, I'm going to go on. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) You're absolutely 


correct, not necessarily. But then -- then -- 

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so I don't need to discuss about the 


contaminant -- the neptunium, but as the 


recycled uranium did come into the plant there 


was a call by the Atomic Energy Commission to 


try to recover as much neptunium 237 as 


possible to be a target material for the 


production of plutonium 238, as you all know, 


and therefore there was some (unintelligible) 


exchange (unintelligible) put into the -- into 


the process line to pull (unintelligible) out 


of the uranyl nitrate. These (unintelligible) 


exchange (unintelligible) were installed in the 


uranyl nitrate (unintelligible) program, and so 


they did pull out the neptunium and -- and 


actually shipped the columns directly back to 


Savannah River, and so they were 


(unintelligible) --


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) I think they went 


to Oak Ridge. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Okay, they went to 

Oak Ridge? Which --

DR. NETON: X-10? 

 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) They went to X-10? 

 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) X-10. 

 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Okay. 
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 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) They -- they were 


sealed off and sent as (unintelligible) X-10 


developed a process for that tritium extraction 


by ion exchange method and that -- that 


(unintelligible) chemical separation 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) And Bryce, I will 


just add this that it was known by a few 


individuals in the plant. An ion exchange 


column was installed in the uranyl nitrate 


(unintelligible) to specifically remove 


neptunium from the incoming SRS RU for use in 


another program. Okay? 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


for uranium to liquid form had processed it in 


a chemical processing system, and that included 


all the gaseous diffusion plants and -- and 


fundamentally Y-12 and the gaseous diffusion 


plants. 


 MR. CHEW: From (unintelligible), Joe, there 


was a significant amount actually in the -- the 


total amount of RU that came in was like 


150,000 kilograms (unintelligible) material, so 


the overall balance that there was about 220 -- 


2,200 grams of neptunium available, you know, 

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141 

based on concentration, and so -- which only 


represents 1.75 curies. I just want to make 


that particular point here. And they -- they 


were able to go back and they thought some of 


it went to the S-3 ponds and by sampling the S3 ponds they can only kind of account for about 


145 grams. And so by deduction they basically 


said the other parts of it went out in those 


particular exchange columns, you know, back to, 


as Bryce says, it went to X-10. 


DR. NETON: Back up a second, Mel. They were 


pulling off this neptunium on these ion 


exchange columns. Now what were they looking 


for in the waste ponds then, the material that 


was in the recycled that was... 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


get it all. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Didn't get it all. 


DR. NETON: Okay, right, so this essentially is 


what would have been -- what we would 


characterize in the recycled uranium analysis 


then for --


 MR. RICH: Yes, that's --


DR. NETON: -- dose reconstruction. 


 MR. RICH: It's just part of the raffinate that 

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went out to the disposal -- 


DR. NETON: The fact that -- it would be -- the 


neptunium exposures would actually be lower 


than we would account for -- 


 MR. RICH: Yes, yes. Yes. 


DR. NETON: Okay, I just want to make clear on 


that. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But in terms of the 


operations, are you saying there was no -- 


certainly they -- they took what they 


extracted, but you're saying there was no 


rolling or any processing at Y-12? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Not of neptunium 


but I will come to (unintelligible), Joe. 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


(on microphone) neptunium at Y-12 as a result 


of the neptunium extraction. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) And Joe asked a 


specific question (unintelligible) ledger. 


 MR. RICH: Yes. Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Joe, there was a -- 


an introduction to the ledger. There were 


about -- ther was a sample of -- I'm just going 


to say it was less than 70 grams -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 

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143

 MR. CHEW: -- of neptunium 237 that came in, 


and this was a part of a classified project 


(unintelligible) used the neptunium as a 


diagnostic tool for the weapons test program 


(unintelligible). And Joe, it's just --


looking at --


 MR. FITZGERALD: The time frame, or is that 


classified? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Yes, we know it's 


in the '60s. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Early in the '60s. 


Okay? Now it's clear that that was shown up in 


the ledger and they -- and we were able to then 


plot exactly what they did with -- by looking 


into a classified report that showed what they 


did with the material and -- and so that was -- 


as I said, was part of a tool that they put on 


-- the neptunium was used as part of the Nevada 


Test Site program, the weapons test program. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I want to 


(unintelligible) more information that you 


might need --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 

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144

 MR. CHEW: -- should be --


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) This is Bryce Rich 


again. I think it's worth mentioning that the 


exposure potential is so low we have found no 


neptunium bioassay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: You have found no bioassay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Not -- 

 MR. RICH: Yes. 

 MR. CHEW: -- so far, Joe. 

 MR. RICH: What's that? 

 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I was just 

confirming what you just said. Joe asked if 


you had not found any neptunium bioassay. 


DR. NETON: Mel --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) There was other 


ways we were trying to do that rather than with 


some -- (unintelligible) go ahead then, Jim. 


DR. NETON: Well, there's two questions, Mel. 


The neptunium 237 that was processed through 


these ion exchange columns, what time period 


was that? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Ah --


 MR. RICH: Well, that was early on in the -- 


right after the initiation of the recycled 


uranium program in the very early to mid-'50s. 

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145 

DR. NETON: Okay, so -- so that -- that portion 


is certainly relevant -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is relevant. 


DR. NETON: -- to the SEC period, but then the 


only other -- and we can account for that with 


our recycled uranium -- 


 MR. RICH: Yes. 


DR. NETON: -- (unintelligible), I believe. 


The only other neptunium then that was at Y-12 


is this less-than-70-gram quantity -- 


 MR. RICH: Yes. 


DR. NETON: -- and we have no bioassay for that 


at this point. 


 MR. RICH: Right. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I have some issues, but 


they're post-'61 issues so I'm not going to 


raise them here because even though I have 


cleared material, it's just not worth getting 


into --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Okay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- but there are certainly 


some questions from a site profile standpoint 


that would be mid-'60s and involve handling of 


material that would be more than the gram 


quantities you're talking about that would be 

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pertinent for the site profile. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Okay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: We'll have that off-line. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Okay. Thanks, Joe. 


Let's go on. The -- the uranium 233 was well 


documented, particularly (unintelligible) -- 


okay? -- and the ones we were focusing in -- 


there was a -- several tests in Nevada that 


used U-233 to a significant (unintelligible), 


and so these were cast and made into parts in 


the mid-'60s, 1965 to '66 time period. You can 


also track -- almost track by their ledgers 


when these particular parts -- uranium 233 was 


brought into the Y-12 plant as coincide with 


the specific tests that we're looking at. 


 Bryce, want to comment on any other U-233 


activity here? 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) No, I think you've 


covered it. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) As you -- we know, 


on U-233, you know, the bioassay program for 


uranium (unintelligible) is primary an external 


-- use that information, but there was some 


processing, Joe, and this was in the '60s time 


frame with the 233. It's cov-- I think this 

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covered -- you can almost track exactly when 


those different parts came in and came out as 


corresponding to the tests. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: The only discrepancy in what 


you've just said -- I think we had '62 as the 


early part of U-233 --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) That's true. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- (unintelligible), so you 


know, just --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) It was 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- again, it doesn't get into 


the --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) to 


say the peak was in '66, but then -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- I do have the log so exactly when 


(unintelligible) I can tell you how much the 


ledgers show (unintelligible) '62. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I think we're on the same 


page. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Right. There were 


-- there were some there, and it was really to 


try to develop the process for handling 233 -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 

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 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) program before 


they actually made the parts. It's one of the 


crazy Livermore experiments (unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, so this would fall 


outside of the SEC, as well. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Yes, again 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But not by much. I think it's 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) Actually the 


uranium came in (unintelligible) (on 


microphone) they developed a small unit, 


glovebox contained, to actually do the F4 


conversion to metal and then the creation of 


the parts, so it was contained in glovebox 


operation. Also I think it'd be well to 


mention the fact that uranium 233, from the 


bioassay standpoint, would have been handled as 


any other uranium isotope and dose 


reconstruction be converted on the basis of 


234, so it should show up in the claimant's 


file adequately and be adequately 


reconstructed. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I want to continue 


-- does that answer your question, Joe, 

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(unintelligible) --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, thank you, Bryce. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Let's go on with 


some of the other (unintelligible) materials 


that we were able to pull out as you -- along ­

- in the recycled uranium there's plutonium, 


primarily in the form of plutonium 238, and the 


neptunium, the technitium 99, but there was few 


parts per trillion -- Bryce actually calculated 


it this morning, said it was like .4 parts per 


trillion and -- of ruthenium 103 and ruthenium 


105, zirconium 95 and niobium 95, and I just 


want to mention that for completeness here and 


(unintelligible) isotopes that -- trace 


quantities of that -- in this -- this -- 


actually information will show up in the RU 


report. Is that correct, Bryce? I 


(unintelligible) say that correctly here. 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) We're putting 


together an OTIB for the -- complex-wide for 


the recycled uranium (unintelligible) and this 


information will show up, Joe. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, and this -- this -- 


just getting on back to our original issue, 

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this will be the basis for whatever modeling 


would have to be done to address these 


materials -- say post-'60, basically -- in the 


site profile itself. Okay. 


DR. MAURO: I've got a question on -- more for 


my edification. Now the -- the U-33* was 


produced from what, irradiation of thorium 232? 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Yeah, they had to 


make it by (unintelligible) -- right, Bryce? 


Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: So --


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, my question had to do with -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) How'd they make the 


233. 


DR. MAURO: -- the starting point -- it sounds 


like there was a time period where thorium 232 


was used as feed stock for producing uranium 


233. 


 DR. KERR: Molten salt reactor* 


(unintelligible) produce (unintelligible) U233. 


DR. MAURO: So did -- was -- was there -- 


 DR. KERR: It was the thorium. 


DR. MAURO: The thorium was the starting point. 

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In other words, that -- was it the thorium -- 


 DR. KERR: (Unintelligible) thorium fuel cycle. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, and the thorium fuel cycle 


took place where? 


 MR. RICH: It was -- there were thorium targets 


in -- in Hanford, and -- and then processed at 


ORNL. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so it was sep-- so it was 


chemically separated at Hanford, and the 233 


was shipped -- but -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) As 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. RICH: To Y-12 as uranyl nitrate. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, and -- okay. And there -- at 


that -- now if I recall, one of the problems 


with 233 was 232, which was a strong gamma. 


 MR. RICH: Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) That's -- that's 


the issue with thorium 232 is it carries about 


50 parts per million, and with this particular 


part we're talking about a U-232, which decays 


to thorium till -- down the chain to 228 and it 


goes down to like thalium 208 (unintelligible) 


DR. NETON: Right, just like thorium 232 

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exposures. 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) --


DR. MAURO: So from a --


 MR. CHEW: -- gamma (unintelligible) -- 


DR. MAURO: So from a dose reconstruction point 


of view, what you're -- your starting point, 


though, is not the thorium 232 here. The 


starting point is the material that showed up 


in Y-12 at some date, perhaps early -- as early 


as the early '60s, I guess -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- was U-233 and, from a dose 


reconstruction point of view, what I -- as I 


understand it is you have your strong gamma -- 


okay? -- you've got --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Let me -- let me 


jump in here, John -- John, because I happen to 


be familiar with that part that was made, and 


help me, guys, with the chemistry here. 


(Unintelligible) going down there, they always 


said well, it's pretty -- about as clean as it 


can be right now 'cause we just did a thorium 


strike on it. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) That was the term 

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they used. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) And then they got 


rid of the thorium and so we basically started 


with as low as a radiation part as we can so we 


can handle it 'cause literally with an 


instrument you can -- I'm exaggerating -- you 


can sit there and watch it grow in. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) And they grow in in 


days. Okay? 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) And so -- so it's 


not like you receive old-age 233 with aged 232 


in it 'cause I'm -- now I was about to -- you 


asked me the specific chemistry, how they did 


that, I don't -- don't know, but I do remember 


mentioning the -- the thorium strike. 


DR. NETON: (Unintelligible) strip out the 


thorium 238 (unintelligible) chemically, so 


then you take out all the -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. RICH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


for certain (on microphone) quantity of thorium 


-- or uranium 232 with the 233. The 232, as 

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you've indicated, was the source of the -- the 


grow-in of the uranium 232 daughter products, 


which were very high energy, and over a period 


of a relatively short period of time it would 


become an external radiation hazard. That's 


the reason it didn't wind up in the stockpiles. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) I do remember 


(unintelligible) some less than -- well, it was 


about 50 parts per million 232. 


DR. MAURO: Well, I'm visualizing exposure of a 


worker to 233 somehow. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: It becomes an internal emitter. 


Then alpha -- that's -- I assume an -- that's 


your -- an alpha problem -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- and along -- now any in-growth 


or any -- the residual 230 -- thorium 232 of 


course is also the alpha -- an alpha 


contributor, which would be small, I presume, 


in terms of parts per million -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- (unintelligible) in terms of 


picocuries or curies or whatever. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Right. 

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DR. MAURO: But then the radium 228 or whatever 

--

DR. NETON: Thorium 228. 

DR. MAURO: -- the thorium 228 coming in -- 

 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

DR. MAURO: Okay. So -- so I guess what I'm 

understanding is then if you're going to do a 


dose reconstruction for workers who might have 


been involved in uranium 233 handling -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- the way you track it is -- is 


urinalysis for uranium -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- and you get a -- now -- now 


there -- is this -- now you get dpm per -- per 


24-hour --


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- and the -- you've got your dpm, 


but you're not quite sure what it is. 


 MR. CHEW: (Off microphone) Well, you assume 


it's (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: No, 230-- well, you'd assume it was 


a uranium-233 intake. No? 


DR. MAURO: Oh, for that -- because you'd -- 


(unintelligible) work with your own 233. 

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 UNIDENTIFIED: You’d assume it’s -- what’s your 


intake of uranium 233 and then knowing what the 


contaminate is of 232 you could fold that into 


the calculation. You just can’t -- you 


wouldn’t measure the 232. 


DR. MAURO: Let’s say -- okay, let’s say we had 


a situation where you’re really not sure -- 


this guy had multi-tasked. He did a lot 


(unintelligible) -- he worked for, you know -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (unintelligible)
 

MR. CHEW: Not -- not in this particular -- 


DR. MAURO: Oh, is that right? Well, see, this 


is an important part of the story, too. 


 MR. CHEW: That’s an important part of the 


story. Yeah, that was very unique. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. So this becomes a track. In 


other words, what you’re saying is you’ve got 


bioassay data. You look at a dpm per liter, a 


dpm for 24 hours. You know you could follow up 


with uranium 238 after 233. So therefore you 


know U 233 and you also could assume that along 


with that came everything else -- 


MR. CHEW: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- that would normally be 


associated with that. 

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 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) was clearly -- 


because it was quite hot externally a number of 


people worked on it very quickly. And I 


remember at Y-12 we were -- they were very 


happy to get rid of it. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh (affirmative). 


 MR. CHEW: And then when we got it to Nevada it 


sat around for a little while and made us a 


little nervous (unintelligible). 


 MR. KERR: The separation with U-233, Y-12 well 


documented. And it was almost -- was entirely 


a closed operation. And they monitored the 


workers, even go back and look at some of the 


reports and some of the -- the preliminary 


stance to -- to build up to work with it. They 


monitored the workers extremely well. That 


monitoring data is all in the reports. It’s a 


-- It’s a very well documented thing. 


 DR. RICH: Yeah, they wouldn’t have had any 


problem detecting that with a personal 


dosimeter because of the energy of the 


radiation. 


 MR. CHEW: They go hand in hand. 


(Unintelligible) right now. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And just to follow on where 

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you’re all headed. So the groups of workers 


that would have been involved, and not just 


this one but perhaps all of these, the 


plutonium, neptunium and U 233 would be fairly 


well defined I would think. You would know 


pretty much who they are. 


 MR. CHEW: You know, that’s a very fair 


question. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I’m saying is that 


something that has come out of your review or 


is that something that -- 


 MR. CHEW: Well, we know that they’re well 


defined. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: That’s what the people tell us, you 


know. We --


 MR. FITZGERALD: So it’s not going to be a 


challenge trying to figure out -- 


 MR. KERR: These U 233 workers were specially 


trained to handle this material so it wasn’t 


just going out and getting -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. KERR: -- some people in to say come in 


here; we need your help. They got them in 


there and trained them before the -- 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: When they come in for DR 


you’re going to -- you’re going to be able to 


know that as soon as they mentioned NP> or 


mentioned PU> they’re going to, you know, 


certainly be categorized fairly well. 


 MR. CHEW: And I --


MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) I don’t disagree 


with (unintelligible) that statement. It’s one 


thing to know who they were but going backwards 


to identify might be a little -- little 


different, especially if it’s a survivor 


claimant. You know, they -- because are the 


departments specific enough? In other words, 


that might be another question for -- for all 


of these isotopes. And I think, you know, in 


other words, I don't know that you had a 


department that specifically was assigned to U 


233 processing. 


MR. CHEW: No, I don’t think you could find 


that, Mark. (unintelligible) 


MR. GRIFFON: So, you know, you might -- they 


might have well been specially trained and 


assigned just to work in those areas for certain 


time periods but retrospectively looking back 50 


or 40 years or whatever --

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MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- whether it’s survivor you may 


not necessarily know just from the records that 


they were in that area. Is that fair? I don't 


know. Maybe I’m --


MS. MUNN: Well, by the same token one should 


just from the information you know be able to 


eliminate casual workers, concerns over 


individuals who might have been sweeping up or 


moving through the building as a security 


guard, those kinds of things. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I think that’s absolutely 


correct. You would not have a security guard 


or a janitor picking up and working with those 


type of things. It would be an assembly person 


and the assembly person’s supervisor and that’s 


it. 


DR. MAURO: In terms of surprises they’re 


always, you know, looking for, you know -- I’m 


over here. Search for an SEC. You know, 


search for where -- where can you get fooled, 


you know. Okay. Take a urine sample of a 


worker. And I get my dpm for 24 hours. And 


I’m not -- and I assume that -- that what we’re 


looking at is, you know, natural uranium. But 

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lo and behold it turns -- because you’re in 


dpm, an alpha -- gross alpha count. You’re 


assuming that, well, that he was a uranium 


worker and you may throw in some recycled other 


-- other radionuclides that go hand in hand 


with that, say. But then along, you say, what 


happened -- how much different is the dose when 


-- if you -- when in fact it turned out was U 


233 that was giving you the alpha along with 


whatever else comes with it. Are we talking 


about differences that lend to a critical 


(unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (unintelligible) 


DR. MAURO: -- per dpm per -- per -- per liter 


between U 233 versus the U 238 or natural 


uranium series. Are we talking about big 


differences? 


 DR. NETON: I don't know. We’d have to do the 


calculations. 


 DR. MAURO: Because you see, if it turns out 


it’s not a big difference then -- 


 DR. RICH: My understanding is that the part of 


the uranium dose reconstruction is done as 


though the uranium is uranium 234 which is 


unequivocally claimant favorable in all cases. 

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162

 DR. MAURO: I know that’s true for natural 


uranium. I -- I wasn’t quite sure -- I think 


we need to do it for U-232 -- 


 DR. NETON: Right. I think we need to -- we 


need to answer that question 


 DR. MAURO: -- with this other stuff that goes 

with it. 

 DR. NETON: I know your head -- 

MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- (unintelligible) worth worrying 


about if it doesn’t make a difference in the 


dosimetry. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. MAURO: What I’m concerned about is I’m 


sitting back here saying, geez, how do I get 


surprised? If it turns out that that 


difference makes no difference then I don’t 


need to worry about it. 


 DR. RICH: What we need to worry about is the 


thorium 228 --


 DR. MAURO: That’s what I was going to say. 


 DR. RICH: -- that would have a different 


exposure -- internal exposure profile than the 


uranium. 


 DR. MAURO: You see, where that -- where that 

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163 

puts you is if that -- there is a substantial 


difference between the two scenarios. 


DR. RICH: Sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- then it becomes critical that 


you know when it’s 233 and when it’s not 233. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. MAURO: (Unintelligible) I guess that -- 


but if it turns out that the difference is not 


a big difference then it’s not so -- so 


important any more. 


 DR. CHEW: I think that’s a very good question, 


John, and I think --


 DR. RICH: One additional perspective. This 


was a very short-term project and it was also 


the formative materials involved was very small 


relatively. It was kilogram quantities as 


opposed to metric tons and the process was 


fundamentally enclosed in -- in a glovebox 


operation. And so with all of those I suspect 


that the -- the -- all of those factor involved 


I suspect that the concern and -- and plus the 


fact that the number of people involved would 


probably be very restricted. 


 DR. NETON: But notwithstanding those issues we 


would still need to address what John mentioned 

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164 

and also --


 DR. RICH: Yes, that can be done easily. 


 DR. NETON: But if we can’t identify who was 


there and there are significant dose issues 


then we need to maybe think somewhat 


differently about this problem. I would remind 


everyone that this is the mid-’60s. 


 DR. MAURO: (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. NETON: Now, that doesn’t mean that we 


don’t have to address this and -- and deal with 


it. 

 DR. MAURO: That’s -- That’s more -- 

 DR. NETON: But as far as the current petition 

--

 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) asking for 


the dates because a lot of these issues are on 


the cusp of the (unintelligible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) a lot of these 


issues and I think we should move on 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: That’s exactly correct. It’s 


-- It’s an issue that we need to resolve but ­

-


 MR. CHEW: The last one we want to talk about 

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is the thorium. In the SEC period, Bryce, you 


-- you know, since you wrote this up you may 


want to just go ahead. We can hear you pretty 


clearly here. This is under your section on 


the thorium study group (unintelligible) today. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Did you finish recycled U? Did 


you -- I mean, Mel, I guess my question on the 


recycled U is more one of methodology and that 


-- is that going to be forthcoming in some of 


the examples, Jim, or – or -- 


 DR. NETON: Well, we need to talk about that 


because I think, you know, our approach to 


using the generic default values for the 


recycled uranium are still -- we believe to be 


valid. The issue was raised in one of the 


example dose reconstructions about the Paducah 


feed plant ash that came in. And I think Bryce 


Rich has gone and pulled that thread pretty 


far. And we’re -- we’re prepared to talk about 


that particular issue. I think that was an 


issue that SC&A was trying to surface to 


question as to were there other, you know, more 


enriched to use that term, you know, quantities 


of recycled uranium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, concentrated more. 

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 DR. NETON: Right. And -- And I’m not sure of 


any where it was concentrated more other than 


this Paducah issue that was -- was raised and, 


you know, we -- we’re prepared to discuss that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Those areas were raised in the 


recycled U report; is that not true? 


DR. NETON: In the recycled U report? 


MR. GRIFFON: In the -- In the mass balance 


report I should say, DOE mass balance report it 


was cited. 


MR. CHEW: Bryce -- Bryce, the -- the report 


2000 you’re referring to, right? 


DR. RICH: Yeah. 


MR. CHEW: Uh-huh (affirmative). Go ahead, 


Bryce. Do you want to talk about this since 


you were part of the authors of that report? 


What the issue was specifically, we know there 


were some mistakes in it, Mark, if that’s -- is 


that what you’re talking about? 


MR. GRIFFON: Not necessarily mistakes but the 


question of, you know, the bottom line of it is 


are -- were there areas where there were higher 


concentrations -- certain process areas that -- 


that would be of concern from a dose 


reconstruction --

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 DR. RICH: This -- This -- This has been 


addressed in the current version of that 


technical basis document but there were -- 


MR. GRIFFON: So that’s your final version of 


that -- of how -- of the bounding condition is 


in the TBD? 


 DR. RICH: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. RICH: And the -- other than the fact that 


there’s additional information related to the 


fission plant contaminants which actually do 


not contribute significantly to the dose and 


can be legitimately ignored. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. RICH: The approach for assigning default 


amounts as a result of recycled uranium 


contaminants, which in the case of Y-12 since 


the processed -- since the -- the bulk of the ­

- all your contaminants came by way of very 


high enriched -- over 80 percent for high 


enriched uranium. In these cases plutonium 238 


becomes dominant and neptunium 237 plus thorium 


238 has a significant contrafusion as a result 


of residing in the -- the highly enriched 


uranium residing in the -- in the reactors. 

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And -- And of course technitium 99. The 


approach there because of the fact that they 


exist in parts per billion to parts per 


million, bioassay was inadequate to demonstrate 


exposure to those contaminants so the approach 


for recycled uranium contaminants is simply to 


assign an -- -- a -- an adequately concertive 


ratio of contaminants, plutonium, neptunium, 


thorium, technitium to each uranium analysis. 


And that’s -- that -- that technical basis 


document I think describes that approach. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. I guess the 


question -- the real question was the ratios 


but -- and I’ll leave it at that -- 


 DR. RICH: Okay. Just on a -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. RICH: -- related to enrichment the Y-12 


processed every -- all of the enriched uranium 


that they received through chemical extraction 


but primarily tuned to removing heavy metals 


and to cleaning up the uranium, or purifying 


uranium. There was some removal of trace 


quantities but not nearly so much as in a 


standard liquid -- liquidonics, a processing 


plant. But there was some enrichment in the -- 

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the raffinates which has already been 


mentioned, which went directly to the disposal 


ponds but that’s been adequately addressed also 


I believe. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. CHEW: Mark, you okay? 


 MR. GRIFFON: We’ll leave it as it’s, yeah, the 


final version. I just wanted to make sure 


there wasn’t an update on that as described in 


the TBD. 


 DR. RICH: There is none other than the fact 


that the <fission> product contaminants are 


addressed in a little more detail -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. RICH: -- in the -- in the technical basis 


document for -- as general RU contaminants for 


the site-wide. 


 DR. NETON: Bryce, this is Jim Neton. I 


thought that, you know, SC&A had raised this 


issue with the Paducah feed plant ash, which I 


don’t think is --


 DR. RICH: Yes, thank you, Jim. The Paducah --


when they -- when they shut down the feed plant 


they sent -- they distributed the feed plant 


ash which was enriched in the contaminants a 

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significant amount by orders of magnitude. 


They sent it (unintelligible) who processed it 


and blended it in with existing materials. 


That that came to Y-12 was held in storage and 


never processed. So it was held as -- and 


(unintelligible) able to determine in sealed 


metal containers. And most of it was returned 


to Paducah and the other -- there’s a small 


faction of it that was buried in I think it’s 


called Bear Creek Disposal Area in sealed 


containers. But it was never processed in Y12. 


 DR. NETON: That was the only update I think we 


had was that this material was -- and this had 


a higher enrichment of the recycled product -- 


contents. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can I ask a silly question on 


that, Bryce? 


 DR. RICH: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Why was it -- why did Fernald 


blend it? 


 DR. RICH: Well, after they -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Was it for dilution what were 


they trying to --


 DR. RICH: Yes. Yes, it -- they added -- they 

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blended it in with the current stock -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay.
 

DR. RICH: -- because the current stock was 


orders of magnitude greater than the amount of 


materials that they received. But they -- it 


was sent there for uranium recovery. There was 


a significant amount of uranium in the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. RICH: -- in the ash. They -- They just 


blended but they did not remove as they 


processed it. Blended it with the current 


inventory and still stayed below the -- the -- 


the inventory. It turns out that that plant 


ash doubled their inventory of (unintelligible) 


but was still in the (unintelligible) range -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. RICH: -- maximum. 


 MR. CHEW: Mark, are you okay? Can we move on 


to the next part of the discussion? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. Bryce, I’m going to -- you 


can either do that or I’ll go ahead. This is 


the -- the Y-12 thorium and we’d like to just 


talk about, you know, where the calutron and 


then (unintelligible) process. Bryce, since 

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you wrote this up do you want to go ahead and 


(unintelligible)? 


 DR. RICH: There were a couple of processes 


that used uranium at Y-12 and it takes us back 


to the -- the ID program with calutrons and the 


-- and the cyclotron program. 


 MR. CHEW: You mean thorium. 

 DR. RICH: Thorium. Did I say -- what did I 

say? 

 MR. CHEW: You said uranium. 

 DR. RICH: Pardon me. It was a small program, 

100 gram quantities of -- for separation and 


enrichment of thorium 230 on (unintelligible) 


and that shows up on Mel’s table. The other 


process was in terms of kilogram quantities of 


thorium that was used as a salting agent in -- 


as a -- as a removal -- as they cleaned up the 


calutrons, 1,100 and some odd calutrons that 


they cleaned up and removed the uranium from -- 


left over from that process, they -- they used 


that as a salting agent for precipitation of 


the uranium. That -- and there were some 


thorium fecal samples in the SEC period which 


was about the best they knew how to do at the 


time. Urinalysis was not an effective way and 

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for that matter fecal was not well done but 


that was before lung counting so those two 


processes existed before they -- and then the ­

- a third one was that they used some -- and I 


-- I presume although we don’t have a quantity 


but (unintelligible) was used in the 


engineering metallurgical laboratory to develop 


the processes that would eventually be used to 


process the hundreds of metric tons of thorium 


during the 16-year period of time from 1960 to 


’70, up to the mid-‘70s. There were recorded 


air sampling that was done in the metallurgical 


laboratories. I -- I -- We didn’t find 


bioassay confirming information in that -- in 


that time period so the assumption is made 


although we don’t have any firm data to support 


that is that that was a small operation in the 


RD process development area. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You have -- you said there -- 


there’s air sampling data? 


DR. RICH: A single air sampler was mentioned 


in one of the --


MR. GRIFFON: Oh. 


DR. RICH: -- health and safety reports -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

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DR. RICH: -- as a monitoring tool for that -- 


MR. GRIFFON: We don’t really have any -- any 


data per se? 


DR. RICH: No, I don’t have -- we have not been 


able to retrieve the results from that single 


sample which would be in the ’57 to ’58 time 


frame. 


MR. GRIFFON: And you said there was some fecal 


sampling from ’50 to ’57 for the -- 


DR. RICH: In that time period, yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, I didn’t -- in that -- was 


that in the delta view or that was -- 


 DR. RICH: It’s in the delta view. 


MR. GRIFFON: Because I didn’t see anything 


pre-’58. Maybe I’m -- maybe I’m mistaken 


though. 


DR. RICH: I’ll have to look at that again. 


Maybe I’m incorrect. 


MR. GRIFFON: I thought most of it was in 1958. 


I think --


MR. CHEW: Arjun remembers. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun. 


DR. RICH: You’re probably right. I’ll --


I’ll take -- I’ll take a look at that, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

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MS. MUNN: Arjun says you’re right, Mark. 


DR. NETON: Bryce, could you -- could you sort 


of go over the time frames as to when these 


materials were used? It wasn’t clear to me. 


You talked about the 100-gram quantities. 


DR. RICH: That was a little later than the -- 


let’s pull that up. 


DR. NETON: Do you have that on your -- 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s on Mel’s table, right? 


DR. RICH: Yes. 

MS. MUNN: Post-1960 data we talked about 

before? 

DR. NETON: 1952 was 150. 

MR. CHEW: Bryce, what you have here is between 

1952 and 1957, the isotopic separation program 


with the beta calutrons used small quantities 


of 100-gram quantities of thorium. However, in 


the ledgers that we looked for Y-12, Mark, is 


in the -- in this ’49/’50/’51 time frame there 


is quantities of thorium that came into the 


plant. These were probably in kilogram 


quantities and -- and it stayed about that 


particular level. I actually have a table or I 


mean I have a chart that talks about the 


kilogram quantities present all the way through 

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each of the years. And it really seems to 


increase in the 1959 to 1960 time frame to 


many, many thousands of kilograms of -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. That’s when the air 


sampling came in and all that, yeah. 


MR. CHEW: That’s when the bioassay program was 


more important, you know. 


DR. NETON: Well, but they also had -- you’ve 


got the --


DR. RICH: I just -- I just -- I just pulled 


up the -- Mel’s chart and there’s a thorium 230 


separation in -- in 1952 -- 


MR. CHEW: Right. 

DR. RICH: -- so they were working that at that 

time. 

MR. CHEW: That was for the main calutron but 

the other material came into the plant because 


it came into the ledgers -- 


DR. RICH: Yes. 


MR. CHEW: -- for that to be worked to develop 


the program, for the -- for the weapons 


program. 


DR. RICH: Well, I don’t have my notes for that 


so if you have yours, Mel -- 


MR. FITZGERALD: Your notes are basically based 

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on this ledger and it would tell you for 


example -- although I think Bryce was saying he 


wasn’t sure -- you would have some measure of 


the amount of thorium that was being handled in 


the pilot program. Was that coming in? 


MR. CHEW: Well, we certainly have -- 


MR. FITZGERALD: Late ‘50s? 


MR. CHEW: Yeah, we certainly have the kilogram 


quantities -- important quantities and it goes 


back to I have data as far as ’49. 


MR. FITZGERALD: Right. You have some handle 


on the thorium inventory. 


MR. CHEW: Sure. Yes, we do. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This would be 232. 


 DR. RICH: (Unintelligible) 


MR. CHEW: I hope so. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, because I heard you talking 


about this 150 grams of thorium 230 that was 


part of this table. 


MR. CHEW: That’s for the calutron. 


DR. MAURO: Calutron. And then you crossed 


over; then I heard the kilogram quantities and 


I thought you were still there. 


 MR. CHEW: No. No. That is only calutron 


millitron. 

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DR. MAURO: Very good. 


MR. CHEW: And what I’m telling you is what 


came in (unintelligible). 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. 


DR. NETON: Now, Bryce, you talked about these 


kilogram quantities used as salting agents for 


the calutron. Those were sort of like coprecipitants -- precipitants? 


DR. RICH: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 


DR. NETON: So when they were trying to extract 


all the uranium they would add this thorium -- 


kind of interesting -- to -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


DR. NETON: -- to help it precipitate out just 


like we would use iron -- 


DR. RICH: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- to help co-extract uranium now ­

- plutonium nowadays. I assume they chose to 


use thorium 232 as the co-extractant. So --


DR. RICH: That was -- that was interesting. 


never heard that used that way. 


DR. NETON: These were definitely wet processes 


then. 


DR. RICH: Yes. 


DR. NETON: Wet --


I 
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DR. RICH: Right. And -- And -- And beyond 


that I don't know if a -- haven’t been able to 


find a lot of information other than just that 


simple report in the -- an operational report. 


DR. NETON: And what time frame were these 


salting agents used? 


DR. RICH: I’ll have to look at that again, 


Jim. I don't have that right in front of me. 


DR. NETON: Because Mel talked about ’49 to 


’51. 


MR. CHEW: That’s -- That’s for the Y-12 


plant. See, the salting is only used for the 


calutron activity there. Right, Bryce? 


DR. RICH: That would -- that would have been 


in the ’47 to ’50 time period. 


DR. KERR: After the calutrons were shut down. 


DR. NETON: After the calutrons were shut down 


they were going to -- 


 DR. RICH: Yes. 


 DR. NETON: -- (unintelligible) out the -- the 


processes. 


DR. RICH: Right. And -- And -- And it could 


have been briefly before that because they were 


recovering uranium all during a period from, 


you know, the ’43 time period on. I’ll just 

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have to look and get a -- get a more -- 


 DR. NETON: Okay. 


 DR. RICH: -- precise time period for that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: You don’t have information 


about the reactor program, the molten salt 


reactor experiment and fuel preparation. It 


seemed to me that -- I think -- did we send 


along the reference showing that there was 


quite a bit of funding for the molten salt 


reactor experiment in ’56, half a million 


dollar --


MR. CHEW: They were going to make the fuel for 


molten salt --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: They were going to make the fuel for 


the molten salt with the funding. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. I -- I mean I don’t -- 


I don’t have a document directly saying that 


but I would presume since they were going to 


build a reactor that prior to that they would 


be doing some fuel preparation -- 


MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- work which would probably 


involve quite a bit of chemistry and quite a 


bit of thorium. 

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MR. CHEW: This could have been in the time 


frame we would be talking about, the 


’52/’53/’54 time period. It was a few hundred 


kilograms if I’m --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- exactly right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Those -- Those would be sort 


of (unintelligible) or do you know whether they 


were like fuel preparation pilot programs or -- 


MR. KERR: I would think they did -- they did a 


little fuel preparation at Y-12 but they 


certainly didn’t do much. 


MR. CHEW: I think that’s because -- 


MR. TANKERSLEY: I would almost say -- I’d 


almost be willing to bet that -- 


MR. KERR: Because I think they used enough 


molten salt or enough thorium that they 


probably got it from some other supplier rather 


than Y-12. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Right. 


MR. KERR: I can’t imagine Y-12 providing that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: What was the few hundred 


kilograms for? 


MR. CHEW: I’m under the impression it was 


stocking for the development for the weapon 

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182 

program because (unintelligible) -- because 


they needed them. Because the later production 


was significantly much more than that and this 


would -- and actually, Arjun, to -- to really 


(unintelligible) we can go back to the ledger 


and it tells you which MDA it went to, like the 


RD MDA and you can track that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


MR. CHEW: And if it would have went to fuel 


application it might probably have went to a 


different MDA. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) 


MR. CHEW: Yeah, so you could do that. 


MR. FITZGERALD: Now, in contrast to the other 


source trends we were talking about, neptunium, 


uranium, whatever, it strikes me that from what 


we described in terms of the uses of the 


thorium, that this may not be as exclusive in 


the (unintelligible) work group. Would you be 


able to identify the workers that might be 


associated with the pilot activities for 


example? 


MR. CHEW: I think we could do that, Joe. 


MR. FITZGERALD: You really think so? 


MR. CHEW: Yeah, but I think for the -- for the 

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large production run which you can really point 


out that in a the year’s period of time there ­

- well, you know, it depends some on the 


timeline. You know, they -- they actually did 


some melting and (unintelligible). That was 


done in the box for example. I mean, you know, 


I’m thinking of your question. 

 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I’m just saying. You’re 

talking about pipefitter or -- 

 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 

 MR. FITZGERALD: Definitely --

 MR. CHEW: A process worker. 

 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) focus. I mean 

would you -- I would -- I would agree that you 


wouldn’t expect those folks, even if they’re 


rovers to get anywhere near the 233 or the 


plutonium activity. It probably wouldn’t be, 


you know, likely. 


 MR. CHEW: That’s true. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But for the thorium operations 


which were pilot activities and some of these 


other evolutions I’m not sure. I’m not as 


convinced that you might not have -- 


 MR. CHEW: I’m still comfortable saying that 


for the pilot activity, probably not, Joe. 

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184

 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: But possibly of when they actually 


went and processed (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. When we went into 


production that’s when you start worrying about 


your pipefitters and stuff like that because 


when we would do a development, an R&D program, 


it was all done in development and there was 


very, very few --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Close confined. 


MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, very much confined. When 


we went into production, things like that, 


that’s when I’d worry about the craft people. 


 MR. CHEW: On that note, that’s the -- it 


starts to -- starts to pick up around 1960s 


time frame --


MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- so we clearly have about 10,000 


lung counts. That’s when they really start to 


do the lung counts for all the people that were 


involved with the thorium. I have not pulled 


the data of how many, you know, of -- of those 


kind of maintenance people but from a period of 


-- this particular period -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 

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185

 MR. CHEW: -- I really pulled ’60 when they 


really --


MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I think the question we 


had posed the last time around was the fact 


that we wanted to characterize better that pre­

’60 period because -- 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- it wasn’t clear if that was 


as --


 MR. CHEW: Well, I can tell by the masses here 


they did not do any production (unintelligible) 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Production (unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: -- in ’60. Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. (Unintelligible). Okay, 


Mark. Well, Joe, I’d like to make a closing 


comment. And now that we’ve kind of gone 


through what we would characterize the isotope, 


I’d like to make a kind of a comment here other 


than maybe something that you have uncovered, 


I’d like to say that other than 


(unintelligible) sources that they brought in, 


you know, (unintelligible), neutron source and 


all that, I don’t think by looking at the 

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classified plant records, the ledgers, the 


alpha six programs and any program 


documentation, I really cannot -- I have not 


found any additional significant radioactive 


material (unintelligible) at Y-12. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I thought you said that the few 


hundred kilograms of thorium was -- it was in 


the weapons program so you can’t describe what 


it was. But wasn’t it part of the production ­

-


 MR. CHEW: It was in the development 


production. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. And when they -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Now, did they have some health 


physics bioassay measurements, air samples 


associated with that? 


 MR. CHEW: Well, that’s what Bryce is talking 


about. Some of the -- in the R&D area that we 


-- at least we know of one air sample being 


taken. As I said, you know, the thorium 


doesn’t show up in the bioassay or the urine 


sample very closely --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- and it doesn’t -- I don’t think 

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there’s even an attempt to -- because they saw 


that they were -- the lung -- that’s why the 


lung counting was -- was initiated. To answer 


your question specifically I -- I don’t -- I 


don’t probably know how many are considered 


data from people, thorium, you know, prior to 


1960 that would -- could be developed into a 


co-worker. I would say that the amount of 


people would be limited to the amount of 


(unintelligible). Does that answer your 


question? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I think that’s a good 


characterization. You know, we looked at some 


of the classified information and went down -- 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- dug some samplings, too, so 


this -- this tends to characterize in a better 


way. We couldn’t get down to the level of 


follow-up that you did but I think this kind of 


corroborates what we were looking at in terms 


of source trend. I think the most useful part 


of it is the time frames. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: We couldn’t really nail those 

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down precisely enough. We were right on the 


cusp so this -- this helps a great deal. 


 DR. MAURO: There’s going to be quite a 


disparity (unintelligible) in the evaluation 


report. 


MR. CHEW: I hope you’re recording it. I don’t 


think we want to do it again. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, because the granu-- I never 


expected this much granularity. You guys 


really, really mined this thing. 


 MR. CHEW: Thank you. 


 DR. MAURO: And it’s an education to listen to 


the -- I mean the history basically of this 


whole weapons program that’s (unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: I do have one more story. Mark, 


with you -- with your permission I’d like to 


move on to something I think was worthwhile 


because it took us several days and I want to 


(unintelligible) some credit. And that is the 


question that you have about the weapons 


disassemblers. Could I move on to that? Mark, 


have you --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) external 


(unintelligible). Were there several 


questions? 

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MR. CHEW: I can’t --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. CHEW: I’ll be back, you guys. 


 DR. MAURO: Before we leave the internal, I 


guess just to say that I think what we have -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: John, I can’t hear you. 


 DR. MAURO: I’ll speak up. It’s just I’m 


thinking about the days not too far in the 


future we’re going to be looking at the 


evaluation report. And it’s clear that you 


really I guess dug as hard as you can dig to 


tell the story, the complete story, all of the 


nuances, all the relationships. And as a 


health physicist I was racing just to keep 


track of you -- to keep track of you because 


it’s another world. But what’s going to be 


equally important is as you move through the 


story -- because what you really have is 


chapters, overlaid chapters of what was going 


on. The implications of it with regard to the 


dosimetry, internal dosimetry -- now we’re 


talking internal dosimetry -- and how to -- if 


I were a claimant, to convince the claimant 

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that you have a handle on being able to 


reconstruct his doses. You were talking the 


thorium 232 story for example. Now, I’m not 


quite sure, once you understand the story and 


the quandaries and when it showed up. It 


sounds to me like there might be more to the 


story on the -- the way in which a worker might 


have been exposed or if he was exposed. And 


then how do you go about convincing yourself 


that you’ve got a handle on how to make sure 


that I could place a plausible upper bound, not 


only on the thorium 232 but whatever comes with 


it. Now, so I guess all I’m saying is that 


story is a net that has to be unfolded and for 


-- for -- looking at it from our perspective I 


assume it’s going to show up a table someplace 


along the way. I guess I just ask, the amount 


of work that went into it, if it could be 


reflected in the work product so that we can 


follow it and -- and so that we are convinced 


that not only have you dug up the story but you 


have a tractable way to reconstruct the doses 


that is -- that is defendable. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is the method (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAURO: Yeah, and there’s a lot here. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: -- and apply it to people. 


 DR. MAURO: To people, real people. And so all 


I want to say is you’ve got quite a challenge 


in front of you to tell that story. And it’s 


an amazing story. My compliments. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. I was going to add to 


that. I’m assuming that, you know, like I said 


before, this is all being shaped into the next 


edition of the site profile which will then 


turn around into an implementation document 


made. Even though this is thorium 


(unintelligible) very precise time frame with 


specific SEC (unintelligible) and a lot of this 


is really getting into that. 


 DR. NETON: Right. That’s what I was going to 


suggest is that most of these issues that we 


talked about do fall outside the SEC time frame 


with the exception of thorium 232 I think is 


what I’ve heard here. 


 MR. CHEW: And a little bit of plutonium. 


 DR. NETON: And a little bit of plutonium. We 


need to go back and we have some plutonium 


monitoring data. We have almost thorium data. 


So then we need to go back. And John’s right, 


flesh out what processes were -- were these 

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workers involved with. And for instance I’m 


hearing salting agents used to precipitate 


uranium. If one could get a handle on the 


percentage of thorium that was added to 


precipitate presumably pounds of uranium -- 


 DR. MAURO: Right. Right. 


 DR. NETON: -- then you might have some better 


handle on the potential concomitant exposure of 


both those radionuclides. You’ve got uranium 


data, you know. There are approaches that can 


be developed with the thorium. What concerns 


me a little bit though is when we’re talking 


about the thorium that may have been used in 


the development of the weapons program. We’re 


going to have -- we’re going to have to flesh 


that out to some degree. 


 MR. CHEW: There was 10,000 -- Bryce 


(unintelligible) there was 10,000 lung counts 


that was taken that we had data on. 


 DR. NETON: But that was not until 1960. 


 MR. CHEW: 1960 but you can certainly, you 


know, you consider what (unintelligible) and -- 


 DR. NETON: Well, one can. 


 MR. CHEW: Use that as co-worker and -- 


 DR. NETON: We could possibly do that but you ­
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- we want to make sure that we do plausible 


bounding scenarios so then you could take a -- 


if you back-extrapolate a ten-year-old thorium 


lung measurement you’re going to end up with 


gram quantities in the lung potential as the 


upper limit so that -- I think that we need to 


look at some fecal data that may exist post-


1960-some --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I think we have fecal data 


from ’57/’58 time frame. 


 DR. NETON: If we start taking thorium fecal 


data and then developing chronic exposure 


scenarios. How much chronic exposure could one 


have, you know, occurred and still have almost 


no thorium in 1960, and look at that and see if 


it’s a plausible boundary analysis. And 


there’s a lot of -- a lot that we can do but we 


need to do our homework and go back and look at 


that. 


 DR. RICH: (Unintelligible) summary of 


(unintelligible) quite a bit of bioassay on 


thorium in the ’56 time period and then it 


jumps into the ’60s. 


 DR. NETON: I think the question is are those 


sufficient? 

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 DR. RICH: (unintelligible) 


 DR. NETON: That’s the issue I think that 


strikes me between the eyes as being one that 


probably needs to have more -- more detail. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: When it comes time to actually 


doing the dose reconstructions let me remind 


all of us that, you know we have the capability 


of tracking the workers, each individual worker 


the very day that they go into any particular 


department, the very day that they go into any 


particular job and job code. And so this is 


not perfect of course, but I think that in -- 


and then I haven’t looked at the claimants but 


I think it would be possible to exclude -- 


easily exclude probably many of the claimants 


from the work that we’re talking about. Now, I 


-- I’m assuming that there might be, you know, 


some population of workers that -- that we 


would not be able to exclude from this type of 


work. But do keep in mind that we can track 


these workers very, very precisely in what they 


were doing department-wise, job-wise, job-codewise and so forth. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. And that comes in the -- 


in the description of the approach, Bill. 
I 

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think if you say, you know, any thorium worker 


who has been in the time frame from ’50 to ’57 


was likely to involve departments, you know, 


26-whatever, 27-whatever, 23, you know. Then 


you narrow down your -- your -- your workers of 


interest and you can use an approach for those 


who fall in it and those who fall outside of it 


are not affected by it. Yeah. But -- But we 


haven’t seen, you know -- that’s I guess what 


we’re talking about as we’re waiting for that. 


We’ll see that in the final analysis I suppose. 


Can we move on to 1B5 I think is the last one 


in the internal section. 1B5, we’ve sort of 


discussed the REU but we haven’t specifically 


answered the question that this is an action 


for you to look at SC&A’s comments and maybe 


that’s -- I think we’ve heard the answer is the 


final approach is as described in the TBD; is 


that correct, Jim? 


 DR. NETON: I believe so. I don't know. I’m 


trying to -- I’m trying to remember this a 


little better now. I thought that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I know this is sort of a 


(unintelligible) process. 


 DR. NETON: Right. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: SC&A did -- did provide comments, 


yeah. 


 DR. NETON: I’ve actually forgotten which 


version of the site profile SC&A reviewed 


because it had been updated. I don’t really 


remember to be honest. So I think we need to 


go back and -- and check that. I honestly 


can’t remember. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, maybe just consider it in 


your final --


 DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- approach I guess. That’s all 


I would say. 


 DR. NETON: Yeah, we’ll consider it in the 


final. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I don’t think we closed 


-- we didn’t close that action. I think we did 


send you the analysis. I’m not sure. We’ve 


talked about it but there was no specific 


response. I think that’s what happened. 


 MS. MUNN: Still on for April. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. MAURO: Jim, the -- coincidentally I’m 


right now reviewing I guess it’s an O-TIB 18, 


an O-TIB -- the latest O-TIB 4, both of which 

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have guidance in it related to recycled 


uranium. And there are look-up tables in 


there. And I find myself reviewing a number of 


documents, very large documents dealing with 


recycled uranium. One is dated 1985 and one is 


dated 2000. And I’m starting to -- that’s 


where I’ve noticed the -- the Paducah ash, and 


these two (unintelligible) higher than all the 


other sources in terms of relative to the 


uranium. I -- Is the story that’s going to 


emerge on recycled uranium associated with Y-12 


substantively different than those procedures? 


Should I put those procedures on ice until we 


get back into (unintelligible) 


 DR. NETON: Well, I think Y-12 is Y-12 


specific. I believe that they knew what was 


coming in. I think what you’re looking at in 


TIB-14 and 18 are generic --


 DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 DR. NETON: -- generic factors -- 


 DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 DR. NETON: -- that were used for bounding 


estimates for the efficiency process. 


 DR. MAURO: They are. 


 DR. NETON: Then that’s not what we’re talking 

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about --


 DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. NETON: -- in the Y-12 site profile. 


 DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. NETON: Yeah. Yeah. We would not -- not 


assume them to be --


 DR. MAURO: There -- There -- There’s not --


There’s not --


 DR. NETON: -- comparable. 


 DR. MAURO: -- necessarily --


 DR. NETON: There’s no parity there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Do we want to try to get 


through external sections? 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I don’t -- looking at my copy 


of the -- of the site profile there aren’t very 


many items. 


DR. NETON: Well, actually we have a fair 


amount of discussion on this issue I think. 


 MR. GRIFFON: On 147 worker issue I think we’ve 


got a fair amount, yeah. 


 DR. NETON: I think -- I think --


 MS. MUNN: Not the number of items is what’s 


material it seems. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 


 DR. NETON: I think that there’s still some -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, this is -- you -- you sent 


three lengthy Word documents, I know that. 


 DR. NETON: Yeah. And, you know, SC&A has sort 


of reevaluated and reassessed our opinion on 


this and I think we need to take the time to 


really think about this issue in this session 


and -- and, you know, examine all the issues. 


I don't know that we can do it in half an hour. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, that’s the question 


(unintelligible). Could we look at -- does it 


make sense to look at the example now and save 


the external section for tomorrow morning or -- 


or --


 DR. NETON: Yeah. I'm sorry, Mark. I was 


having a sidebar. What did you just say? 


 MS. MUNN: What he was saying, is it worth a 


look at the examples that have been run now? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Get the bigger -- I don't know. 


Given the time I'm not sure we want to delve 


into the 147 worker --


 DR. NETON: No, not at this point. I think 


maybe -- maybe a piece of the external that Mel 


was prepared to talk about might fit in at this 


point which is -- well, here’s my thinking, 


Mark. It seemed to me that your -- your 

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concern was -- was centered about were the 147 


workers that were used to do the backward 


extrapolation really all the exposed workers or 


-- or were they representative. Let’s put it 


that way. And you had identified this sort of 


pocket of workers who possibly didn’t wear 


their badges and were doing some other work. 


And we pulled the thread on that and Mel’s done 


a good job, you know, interviewing folks, and I 


think we’re prepared to address, you know, that 


issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Yeah. 


 DR. NETON: And I think Mel can cover that 


probably fairly --


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 DR. NETON: -- easily in the time we have. 


 MR. CHEW: I can do it pretty quickly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: I’d like to first thank Bill 


Tankersley who set up the interviews with 


several real key people. (unintelligible) 


privacy information I’m not going to mention 


their names here (unintelligible) phone but 


they were the department heads for assembly; 


they were the supervisors and actual people who 

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did assemblies and disassembly and it was quite 


an honor for me to be in the same room with 


those people. I’d like to mention that the key 


area, the issue that you brought up, Mark, I 


think -- I’m hoping I’m addressing it because 


I’m getting this second-hand. You and I were 


going to try to have a conversation but we 


never made it -- is the issue about the dry 


room. And there’s clearly -- when the people 


had to work with the dry room, it really 


started right in about the 1960 time frame, 


okay. So to me it’s outside of the SEC but I 


think it’s important to -- to go ahead and 


discuss it here. The dry room, the people, 


because of the components that they were trying 


to put together, which I think you know what 


they are. They were quite hydroscopic. The --


The people had to go in -- not a lot of people, 


two at a time, had to wear what they called an 


Air Force suit. I think (unintelligible) Air 


Force suit because they were colored that 


color; they maybe got them from the Air Force. 


They didn’t like them but that’s a separate 


issue here. The inspectors, other people, 


looked through the window. And you were 

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correct. When the people had to put on the 


suits to work with these particular materials 


and the assembly, they left their badges 


outside of the dry room on their coveralls 


because they were required to remove all their 


clothing -- on -- and just put on this suit 


here. We pulled the string on this thing as we 


said. There -- We -- We have received in 


discussions with them the number of hours in a 


week that they would have potentially had in 


this suit example. It’s like it could be as 


much as a maximum of about 20 hours per week, 


but in reality only about half of that time or 


even less of that time near the parts of 


concern, that potentially can give them an 


(unintelligible) exposure here. When any 


maintenance worker came in they basically 


didn’t have to wear the suit because they 


basically shut down that operation when these 


people were badged because they didn’t have to 


wear the suits here. And several of the people 


mentioned they were only in there minutes per 


week at a time here. No pipefitters, plumbers 


-- No pipefitters, plumbers and steamfitters ­

- I asked the question even though it was 

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outside of the SEC -- was in the area while 


these kinds of operations were going on. The ­

- The people who were potentially close -- 


what do they call them -- millwrights and the 


machinists, but we even did ask them to -- to 


show me what kind -- what they were doing with 


the assembly and even down to the particular 


units that we’re talking about which we have 


some familiarity with. But the parts that they 


were coming in contact with was both the -- the 


depleted v naturally depleted uranium and the 


uranium 230 ore (unintelligible) a few seconds 


of the particular time here. We -- Probably 


the key, Mark, in the order of dose 


reconstruction, I asked the health physics 


people to pull me some information on a 


measurement of these particular units. And lo 


and behold, they were able to uncover a 


measurement, direct measurement of both with 


contact at one foot and at the three foot level 


of the particular unit that was built in the 


1960s, okay, which would be representative 


here. So I would say that -- that we also 


pulled the information. There was on the 


interviews they gave us names of about 16 

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different people that potentially was involved 


because there was a limited number and they all 


kind of knew each other very, very well. And 


Bill Tankersley has pulled the information, 


both external and bioassay just this morning. 


I didn’t have a look at the data but in the way 


of dose reconstruction it is -- I think George 


characterized this thing correctly. It’s 


really a missed dose, there’s something that 


needed to be added, okay? And so if these 


people who were working in those particular 


time frames, I think by the measurements and by 


the time that they were involved, how close 


they were to the particular units here, I think 


a good health physicist will be able to do the 


dose reconstruction on these particular groups 


of people. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (unintelligible) 


 MR. KERR: Could I add one thing Mel left out? 


The reason they didn’t wear their badges is 


they sweat profusely inside these clothing that 


they had to put on and they sweat so much that 


it would have ruined the film and the badge to 


wear it that way. 


 MR. CHEW: That’s good. 

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 MR. KERR: That was one reason they didn’t wear 


the badges. The other thing that a couple of 


these people said, and (unintelligible) there 


wasn’t much exposure in doing these things 


because we didn’t spend that much time close to 


these units. So these people didn’t seem too 


concerned about the fact that they didn’t wear 


badges in there although now we know that they 


didn’t and they had some exposure that wasn’t 


recorded on their badge. And the other thing 


is that I -- I did dig out is this I guess to 


start this off is there’s a history of Y-12 by 


Wilcox. And he documents very carefully in 


there when dry rooms were first used. And in 


1960 he discusses the weapons were assembled in 


dry boxes before that time. And they got up 


here and of course, this -- they were really 


(unintelligible) to a different kind of a 


device which necessitated moving into dry rooms 


and then they went on to say eventually they 


built long, narrow dry rooms with glove ports 


in. And instead of wearing suits inside they 


worked alongside, more of a production line. 


And even in the dry rooms, welders never went 


inside the dry rooms. They could push things 

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over to the side of the dry room and a welder 


could work through glove ports into the dry 


room if there was any welding needed to be 


done. So some of these people didn’t 


necessarily have to go inside the dry room 


during assembly. They could work through glove 


ports --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. KERR: -- if they needed to so ... 


 MR. GRIFFON: (unintelligible) 


 MR. KERR: You know, I think we really tied -- 


tied this down and it’s a question, I think, of 


not a cohort problem but it’s a missed dose 


problem for these people who worked in 


assembly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (unintelligible) this is only 


1969. 


 MR. KERR: 1969. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Prior to that any assembly work ­

-


 MR. KERR: Was in a glovebox. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Was in a glovebox? 


 MR. KERR: Yeah. And they wore their badges. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, they wore their badges. Bob 


was going to say something. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, also inside those dry rooms 


there were also TLD’s. And when you put stuff 


together you also had -- and therefore argue 


they did have physicists doing some of the 


monitoring right there. So there should be 


plenty of data on what went on in those dry 


boxes while the stuff was being put together. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. That was going to be my 


question. (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: You have to help me out on that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) if it matters 


that much here in this discussion but yeah, 


it’s a question of missed dose. I just didn’t 


know how significant or not significant it 


could have been. 


 MR. CHEW: I can give you a range now, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I had some discussions that they 


said they -- they just kind of sit and -- I 


can’t discuss it here but certain ones they 


described as being pretty -- 


 MR. CHEW: Warm. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- elevated. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The exposure was 


(unintelligible). 

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 MR. TANKERSLEY: Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Bob, is that you? 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill Tankersley. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, I'm sorry, Bill. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Mark, a moment ago you asked, 


you know, how much data there were. I just got 


the information to Mel this morning. We did 


look at, you know, 16 people. And these are 


definitely assembly/disassembly people during 


the -- the earlier period, the SEC period. And 


those people had -- were very well represented 


in both the external dosimetry data set as well 


as I think prior to 1960 those 16 people had 


500-and-something urinalyses. And how many 


film badge readings did they have, Mel, prior 


to 1960? I think --


 MR. CHEW: Prior to 1960 was film badge 


(unintelligible). You gave me 163. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Yeah, that’s right. 


 MR. CHEW: Throughout the whole period there 


was 1,243. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don’t doubt that, Bill. The 


question I have was -- because all these guys 


that I talked to had badges, too. It’s just 


they weren’t wearing them when they were doing 

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the hot work. So that was really the question, 


you know. It’s not a matter of them not being 


in the database. And -- And if it -- I don’t 


-- I didn’t interview the folks regarding the 


assembly work prior to, where they were in the 


gloveboxes so I’ll, you know -- you explained 


that they probably did keep their badges on in 


that situation, and that’s -- that’s 


reassuring. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Again, be really -- be really 


clear on that if you will. Now, the -- the 


people -- you did not hear people say that when 


they were working with the gloveboxes that they 


took off their badge? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I did not. No, I did not. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But my focus was on the dry rooms 


so it was a later -- yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: But these people are easily 


identified and are very limited in number so 


that their missed dose would not be any major 


problem. 


 MR. TANKERSLEY: It would be estimated. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm not sure how easily 

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identified they are but -- because the assembly 


department -- I'm not sure -- the assembly 


department I think is much broader than the 


people that actually got into those -- 


 MR. CHEW: Oh, much. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- individual areas, you know, so 


-- but I think you could at least narrow it to 


a department probably. 


MR. CHEW: There were interviews and we asked 


them kind of the numbers of people that were 


involved in this kind of operations. I think 


one of the persons who was a supervisor listed 


about 100. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (unintelligible)
 

MR. GRIFFON: That’s consistent with what I’ve 


heard, too. 


 MR. CHEW: Mark, we’re talking about the dry 


room? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. 


 MR. CHEW: But it lasted a long time. Actually 


it still exists. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah. 


 MR. GIBSON: This is Mike Gibson. Can I ask a 

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question? 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. GIBSON: I'm sorry. I didn’t -- I didn’t 


hear who was making the statement that 


perspiration or moisture could affect the 


reading of dosimeters. Who was that? 


 MR. GRIFFON: That was George Kerr. 


 MR. GIBSON: George, okay. I just want to make 


sure we get this on the record that that could 


be a case or a problem not only for this site 


but that could be a problem complex-wide. 


 MR. KERR: Well, no. It was these guys sweated 


so profusely in these suits. They were heavy 


and they were made out of extremely heavy 


material and they were supplied with air inside 


the suits. And every one of them said you just 


sweat in them. And this is not like a guy 


working out in his coveralls. 


 MR. GIBSON: No, no, no. But (unintelligible) 


for years. That’s what he’s making 


(unintelligible). 


MR. KERR: Well, I’m saying that’s the reason 


they didn’t wear their badges. 


 MR. GIBSON: My -- No, my -- my statement is, 


you know, and I’ve been at the DOE site and, 

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you know, I have personally lost seven pounds 


in one day due to sweat. And so I’m just 


saying it’s not necessarily this site or this 


suit but there -- I’m just wondering -- this 


could be a complex-wide issue that if 


dosimeters could be damaged or have misleading 


readings because of moisture then this is 


something -- I’m speaking as a person right 


now, not on behalf of the Board, but I think if 


the group agrees, we need to bring it up to the 


Board. This could be a complex-wide issue for 


multiple sites. 


 MR. KERR: I think there’s a difference. If 


you sweat and your badge is out to the open I 


don’t think the moisture is going to affect it 


as much as if you put it in a closed 


environment where it’s exposed to a high 


humidity. It’s a -- It’s a different 


situation I think. And keep in --


 MR. GIBSON: What I’m talking about is wearing 


full-face and plastic suits where you are 


completely totally enclosed. There’s no 


supplied air, and yes, you did sweat profusely. 


Otherwise you wouldn’t lose seven pounds in one 


day. So I just think that’s just an issue I 

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just want put on the record just for future 


discussion, just to make sure that we consider 


that situation and that fact. 


 MR. KERR: You know, it could be. I -- I --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. It’s a good point. And ­

- And it could -- I mean I'm not sure -- I’m 


sure there’s actually probably been some 


studies on this type of thing. 


 MR. CHEW: I think so, too. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The effects of film and -- might 


be different for -- it would be different I 


would think for film or TLD. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, it would. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. That’s --


 MR. CHEW: That’s a point well taken. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Good point, yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: We’ll just investigate that. 


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. So is there anything 


else on the assembly work? 


 MR. CHEW: Do you have any questions, Mark? 


Because really it was primarily for your -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean it still -- I think that 


answers the question of the dry room is out of 

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the time frame so it’s good to know. And I 


think in your analysis, I think the assembly to 


power workers were actually included in the 147 


workers if I -- I read that correctly. 


 DR. NETON: That -- that was a relevant issue I 


think was were the assembly workers included in 


the 147 workers that were used to generate the 


back extrapolation. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Now, the (unintelligible) and 


part of it raised my interest from the dry room 


standpoint was the guys I interviewed never 


phrased it as or never brought up the issue of 


it might damage the dosimeter as part of the 


reason they didn’t wear them. They just said, 


well, that was the protocol; that was the 


procedure. We didn’t, you know. And I thought 


maybe it was associated with actually some 


concerns, you know, some classification 


concerns that they didn’t want too many -- 


didn’t want this measurement data getting out. 


 DR. NETON: I don’t think so, Mark. 


 MS. MUNN: No. 


 DR. NETON: These devices, the material in 


there is no different than what was pretty much 


the exposure in the plant. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, you got plain exposure in 


there, you got people who were working in 


there, people that were standing by the machine 


-- machine (unintelligible) 


 DR. NETON: In fact I would think that the 


exposures of the workers in the plant are 


bounding for exposures to those workers working 


in those plants. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, the people that are -- that 


are working in the dry box have a dry room suit 


on. The people that are working in the machine 


shop standing in front of the part watching it 


turn have cotton coveralls on. I’d say that 


the difference would be in the people in the 


machine shop. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (unintelligible) I think I’m 


satisfied with the answer. We’ll leave it at 


that. And I still think we have the broader 


question of the, you know, the analysis put on 


the table and we’ll save that for the morning, 


right, Jim? The 147 worker -- 


 DR. NETON: I think so. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah, analysis. 


 DR. MAURO: What time do we want to begin in 


the morning, 8:00 o'clock? 

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 DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAURO: We’ll start at 8:00 in the morning. 


 DR. NETON: Just a quick question. I just want 


to make sure as part of that discussion for 


tomorrow we did send out a memo from Joe and 


everyone’s got it. The most important thing is 


table 1. So I guess just as a preview for 


tomorrow we have a handout (unintelligible) 


want to read tonight. You had some -- 


 DR. MAURO: I already have it. 

 DR. NETON: Oh, had it? Okay. George Kerr has 

it. 

 DR. MAURO: Yeah. George Kerr has provided a 

handout called beta and gamma regression 


analysis that if anybody really would like to 


do some homework tonight it would be good 


reading. And that does -- that speaks to some 


of the issues in there. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. That’ll be great. 


DR. MAURO: So we have to do our homework 


tonight and we’ll be prepared then to talk 


about the issue raised in the memo versus 


(unintelligible) Yeah, I’ll -- I’ll get you a 


copy, Mark. And yes, anybody that has any 


materials, share them with Mark and Mike 

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(unintelligible) so they can have access to the 


beta gamma regression analysis. 


 DR. NETON: To Mike as well. 


DR. WADE: That’s good because then folks can 


maybe look at it a little bit and 


(unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: 10:00 o'clock is for Rocky Flats. 


 DR. WADE: We decided to start at 10:00 to 


accommodate the people from Rocky Flats joining 


us so we can start at 8:00 on these issues. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think that would be good. That 


will give us two solid hours tomorrow. 


DR. WADE: We’ll probably need to break for 


Rocky fairly on time, though, because of the 


Colorado folks. 


We can’t start early though. We can start a 


little bit later if we need to. 


Okay, so tomorrow at 8:00, same time, same 


station. 


We’re going to break off the call now. 


(Whereupon, the proceedings adjourned at 5:00 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

218 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of March 27, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


3rd day of May, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102