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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JUSTIN T. KEVALIS

(SC 19120)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McDonald and Espinosa, Js.

Argued December 2, 2013—officially released September 23, 2014

Patrick D. Skuret, with whom was Daniel D. Skuret,

for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s attorney, and Michael A. DeJoseph, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ESPINOSA, J. The issue that we are called upon to

decide in this appeal is whether a trial court has discretion to make a finding of satisfactory completion of the

accelerated rehabilitation program (program) when the

defendant has been convicted of a crime during his

participation in the program, but the conduct forming

the basis of the conviction occurred before the defendant was granted entry into the program. The defendant,

Justin T. Kevalis, was charged with, inter alia, interfering with an officerin violation of General Statutes § 53a167a. In connection with that charge, the defendant

applied for, and was accepted into, the program pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e.1 Following the expiration of his probationary period in the

program, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the

charge of interfering with an officer. The trial court

denied the motion afterfinding that the defendant failed

to satisfactorily complete the program because he had

been convicted of several unrelated crimes while participating in the program. Pursuant to § 54-56e (f), the

defendant appealed from the denial of his motion to

dismiss,2 arguing that the law governing violations of

postconviction probation applied to accelerated rehabilitation probation and, thus, the trial court did not

have the discretion to consider the convictions in its

finding because the conduct that formed the basis of

the convictions occurred before he entered the program. The state argued that the trial court correctly

denied the defendant’s motion because convictions

obtained during accelerated rehabilitation probation

violate the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation

statute. We agree with the state, and conclude that

because the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation

statute is to grant onetime offenders an opportunity to

maintain a clean criminal record, a conviction obtained

while participating in the program violates the purpose

of § 54-56e and requires a finding of unsatisfactory completion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts.

On April 4, 2009, the defendant was arrested in Bridgeport and charged with one count of failure to keep a

narcotic drug in the original container in violation of

General Statutes § 21a-257, one count of interfering with

an officer in violation of § 53a-167a, and one count of

possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes

§ 21a-279 (a). On July 29, 2009, he applied for the program with respect to the charge of interfering with an

officer. After the requisite canvass of the defendant,

the court accepted the application and continued the

case until August 27, 2009, in order for an investigation

to be conducted of the defendant’s eligibility for the

program.

While his application for accelerated rehabilitation
was pending, the defendant was arrested in Newington

on August 4, 2009, and charged with one count of

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence

of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General

Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 14-227a and one count of possession of narcotics in violation of § 21a-279 (a). On

August 19, 2009, in Bridgeport, the defendant again was

arrested and charged with a violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 14-227a. He entered inpatient treatment at the detoxification unit at South Central

Rehabilitation Center on August 25, 2009. Consequently,

because of his inpatient status, the August 27, 2009

hearing on his accelerated rehabilitation application

was continued. In September, 2009, the defendant was

arrested in Massachusetts for assault. The eligibility

hearing was continued several times, and, on November

12, 2009, the case again was continued because the

defendant was receiving treatment at an inpatient

facility.3

The eligibility hearing on the defendant’s application

for accelerated rehabilitation was held on January 8,

2010. After the trial court received the eligibility report

from the Department of Probation, it addressed the

disposition of the defendant’s two narcotics charges

pending before the court, noting: ‘‘[T]he other charges

that are not eligible to be considered for [accelerated

rehabilitation] are the narcotic[s] charges. They’re

going to be held in abeyance and if [the defendant]

successfully complete[s] the [program], if I grant it,

they’ll be nolled at that time and, of course, if he is not

successful, he’ll face those charges again.’’ The state

then recited the factual basis for the defendant’s arrest.

Defense counsel asked that the application be granted,

arguing that the defendant had been ‘‘inpatient in

regards to drugs and alcohol. He just was actually

released today in regards to a psychiatric inpatient,

involuntary inpatient that he was in today . . . .’’ After

finding that the crime was not of a serious nature and

that the defendant was not likely to offend in the future,

the trial court granted the defendant’s application for

accelerated rehabilitation, set a condition of substance

abuse evaluation and treatment, if necessary, and continued the case until January 9, 2012.

On April 27, 2010, while he was on accelerated rehabilitation probation, the defendant pleaded guilty to the

August 4, 2009 charge of operating a motor vehicle

while underthe influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs

and the charge for possession of narcotics. For the

charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the

influence, he was sentenced to six months of incarceration, execution suspended, and eighteen months of probation. He received one year of incarceration, execution

suspended, and one year of probation for the charge

of possession of narcotics. On April 30, 2010, the defendant pleaded guilty to the August 19, 2009 charge of

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence,
as a double first time offender, and was sentenced to

six months of incarceration, execution suspended, and

eighteen months of probation. In 2011, the defendant

pleaded guilty to the assault charge in a Massachusetts court.

On January 9, 2012, the defendant returned to court

in Bridgeport and moved for a dismissal of the charge

of interfering with an officer. The state objected, and

moved for a finding of unsuccessful completion of the

program. The state argued that when a defendant is

convicted of a crime while participating in the program,

such conviction makes completion unsuccessful

regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.

The court agreed, stating that its interpretation of the

accelerated rehabilitation statute was that ‘‘to apply for

it and to ultimately be deemed successful there [must]

be no convictions upon application nor dismissal. Now,

yours is a little bit more of a difficult situation. You’re

entitled to have a hearing, as is the state, with regard

to a termination of the [program], but I think you’re in

a precarious situation when there’s a conviction while

on accelerated rehabilitation.’’ When defense counsel

argued that the conduct underlying the defendant’s

three convictions took place before the defendant was

admitted into the program, the courtresponded, ‘‘I don’t

think that matters. A conviction is a conviction.’’ The

court then continued the case to allow the parties an

opportunity to submit briefs on the issue.

The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss

all three of the original charges and requested that the

court find that he had successfully completed the program.4 At the hearing on the motion, the defendant

acknowledged that between the time that his application had been accepted and when he was granted entry

into the program, he had been arrested several times

and that the hearing on whether to grant the application

had been continued numerous times because of substance abuse problems for which the defendant had

been seeking treatment. The defendant argued that

since his participation in the program, he had ‘‘shaped

up his act’’ and that accelerated rehabilitation probation

should be considered no differently than postconviction probation.

The court disagreed with the defendant’s characterization of accelerated rehabilitation probation as equivalent to postconviction probation, noting that the

accelerated rehabilitation statute was intended to benefit a defendant who had not been convicted of a crime.

The court explained that the ‘‘intention of the legislature

through the accelerated rehabilitation statute was . . .

trying to preserve somebody’s record. You come in

clean, you go out clean, you get a dismissal. You come

in clean, you don’t go out clean, you have not earned

a dismissal. The [defendant’s] status has changed.

That’s the distinction that I see.’’ While the defendant
acknowledged that the purpose and benefit of accelerated rehabilitation is to allow a defendant who has

made a single mistake to use the program to preserve

a clean record and that he did not have a clean record

because of his other convictions, he argued, nonetheless, that the law governing violations of postconviction

probation should apply to determine whether he satisfactorily completed the accelerated rehabilitation probationary period. In the defendant’s view, he was

entitled to a dismissal of the charge of interfering with

an officer because (1) the state had been aware of the

pending charges prior to the defendant’s entry into the

program, (2) the defendant’s record was clean with

the exception of the convictions obtained during his

participation in the program for conduct that occurred

before he was admitted into the program, and (3) during

his participation in the program, the defendant had done

everything that the court had required of him.

Ultimately, the court denied the defendant’s motion

to dismiss the charge of interfering with an officer. The

court stated: ‘‘To me, what it comes down to is what

the intent and purpose is of accelerated rehabilitation.

[It] is that, not only is it a crime not of a serious nature

and that you will not offend in the future, but [also]

that you have no criminal record not allowing you to

be eligible for accelerated rehabilitation . . . going

into the application process, [during] the pendency and

[at] the completion process of the accelerated rehabilitation. And my belief is that when one is convicted

during accelerated rehabilitation and albeit, convicted

for a new offense or convicted for an offense that was

pending at the time you were granted accelerated rehabilitation, accelerated rehabilitation no longer becomes

a successful completion because you no longer are without a criminal record.

‘‘To me, the intent of the legislature was that to . . .

get [accelerated rehabilitation] and to succeed at it, you

had to have no criminal record. Once a criminal record

exists, accelerated rehabilitation has been and the

intent of the statute has been violated. That is the basis

of my decision. That is the reason I distinguish it from

a nonaccelerated rehabilitation case when we’re talking

about conviction versus a pretrial diversionary status.’’

This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that accelerated

rehabilitation is a form of probation, albeit pretrial, and,

as such, the law governing violations of postconviction

probation for conduct occurring before the probationary period begins also should apply to the finding of

successful completion of accelerated rehabilitation.5

The state counters that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant’s repeated convictions prohibited a finding of satisfactory completion because the

purpose of accelerated rehabilitation could no longer

be served. We agree with the state.
Whether a conviction obtained while participating in

the program for conduct that occurred prior to acceptance into the program, compels a finding that a defendant has failed to satisfactorily complete the program

is a question of first impression for this court. The

legislature’s repeated use of the term ‘‘probation’’ in

the accelerated rehabilitation statute renders § 54-56e

ambiguous because it results in two reasonable interpretations of the meaning and import of the term. By

referring to probation, the legislature could have

intended to incorporate the entirety of the Probation

Act, General Statutes § 53a-28 et seq., the postconviction statutory scheme, and, more specifically, the law

governing violations of postconviction probation, into

the accelerated rehabilitation framework. If so, a conviction resulting from conduct that occurred prior to

the commencement of the accelerated rehabilitation

probationary period could not be considered in the

court’s determination of satisfactory completion. As we

explain in this opinion, however, it is equally reasonable

that the legislature did not intend that accelerated rehabilitation probation be akin to postconviction probation

for two reasons: (1) there are significant differences

between the accelerated rehabilitation statute and the

Probation Act; and (2) the legislature did not reference

explicitly provisions of the Probation Act in the accelerated rehabilitation statute, as it did in the statute governing the suspension of prosecution and the ordering of

treatment for alcohol or drug-dependent persons, General Statutes § 17a-696, a similar pretrial diversionary

program (dependency treatment statute). Because the

invocation of the term probation in the accelerated

rehabilitation statute does not resolve whether the law

governing violations of postconviction probation

should apply to accelerated rehabilitation probation,

we look to extratextual evidence to determine the

meaning of the term probation within the accelerated

rehabilitation statutory scheme. The clarity and consistency of the express statements of legislators over the

course of the forty-one years of the statute’s existence

persuades us that the legislature intended for a trial

court to find that a defendant has not satisfactorily

completed accelerated rehabilitation if he receives a

conviction during participation in the program.

Because this appeal presents an issue of statutory

construction, ourreview is plenary. See State v. Thompson, 307 Conn. 567, 577, 57 A.3d 323 (2012). ‘‘In construing a statute, the first objective is to ascertain the intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of the case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . General Statutes § 1-2z directs this

court to first consider the text of the statute and its

relationship to other statutes to determine its meaning.

Only if we determine that the statute is not plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results may we consider extratextual evidence of its

meaning, such as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative

policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles

governing the same general subject matter . . . . The

test to determine ambiguity is whetherthe statute, when

read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . We presume that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.

. . . [S]tatutes must be construed, if possible, such that

no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void

or insignificant . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Ward, 306 Conn. 698, 707–708, 52 A.3d 591 (2012).

We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory

provision. General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (a)

provides in relevant part: ‘‘There shall be a pretrial

program for accelerated rehabilitation of persons

accused of a crime or crimes or a motor vehicle violation or violations for which a sentence to a term of

imprisonment may be imposed, which crimes or violations are not of a serious nature.’’ Subsection (d) of

that statute further provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any such

defendant shall appear in court and shall, under such

conditions as the court shall order, be released to the

custody of the Court Support Services Division . . . .

If the defendant refuses to accept, or, having accepted,

violates such conditions, the defendant’s case shall be

brought to trial. The period of such probation or supervision, or both, shall not exceed two years. . . .’’ General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (d). Finally, General

Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (f) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘If a defendantreleased to the custody of the Court

Support Services Division satisfactorily completes such

defendant’s period of probation, such defendant may

apply for dismissal of the charges against such defendant and the court, on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss such charges. . . .’’

Because the accelerated rehabilitation statute does

not define probation, we compare the accelerated rehabilitation and postconviction probation statutes to

determine whether the use of the term probation is

consistent in both schemes. Although there are superficial similarities between accelerated rehabilitation probation and postconviction probation, two significant

differences between the probations suggest that the

term probation as used in the two statutory schemes

is not to be treated similarly when determining whether

accelerated rehabilitation probation has been completed successfully. First, accelerated rehabilitation

probation and postconviction probation are imposed at

different times. Accelerated rehabilitation probation is

a ‘‘pretrial program for . . . persons accused of a

crime or crimes or a motor vehicle violation or viola-
tions for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment

may be imposed, which crimes or violations are not of

a serious nature.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes

(Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (a). It only is available prior to a

conviction and operates as a suspension of prosecution.

Postconviction probation, on the other hand, ‘‘is, first

and foremost, a penal alternative to incarceration

. . . .’’ State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 168, 540 A.2d 679

(1988); see also General Statutes § 53a-28 (b). Consequently, postconviction probation exists only after the

service, or suspension, of a period of incarceration.

Second, and relatedly, the procedures and consequences for violations of the conditions of probation

are starkly different under accelerated rehabilitation

probation and postconviction probation. Under accelerated rehabilitation, if a defendant ‘‘refuses to accept,

or, having accepted, violates such conditions [of probation], the defendant’s case shall be brought to trial.’’

General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (d). Thus, should

a defendant participating in the program violate any of

the terms set by the court, the court simply terminates

accelerated rehabilitation and the case is brought to

trial.

A finding of a violation of postconviction probation,

because it implicates a liberty interest and, thus, must

comport with the requirements of due process; State

v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 294–95, 641 A.2d 370 (1994);

requires significantly more procedural safeguards than

a finding of unsatisfactory completion of accelerated

rehabilitation. When a defendant is charged with a violation of postconviction probation, he mustreceive notice

and a probation revocation hearing within 120 days

after arraignment. General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 53a32 (c). He must be informed of the allegations of the

violation, his right to counsel, his right to cross-examine

witnesses and his right to present evidence. General

Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 53a-32 (c). Should the court

determine that a violation of probation has been established, it may ‘‘(1) [c]ontinue the sentence of probation

. . . (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation

. . . (3) extend the period of probation . . . provided

the original period with any extensions shall not exceed

the periods authorized by section 53a-29; or (4) revoke

the sentence of probation . . . . If such sentence is

revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve

the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence.

. . .’’ General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 53a-32 (d).6

On the basis of our examination of the differences

between accelerated rehabilitation probation and postconviction probation, we cannot conclude that the language of the statute reveals a legislative intent to treat

the term probation in § 54-56e as incorporating the laws

governing postconviction probation into the program.

Moreover, the ambiguity in the use of the term probation in the accelerated rehabilitation statute is not
resolved by comparing it to the dependency treatment

statute. As in the program, a defendant’s eligibility for

suspension of prosecution under the dependency treatment statute is limited to specific offenses, and a trial

court must make certain findings prior to acceptance

into the dependency treatment program. General Statutes § 17a-696 (a) and (b). Also like accelerated rehabilitation, the court may set conditions for participation

in the dependency treatment program and must make

requisite findings prior to a dismissal of the charges.

General Statutes §§ 17a-696 (c) and 17a-697. Particular

to the dependency treatment statute, however, is the

explicit option for the trial court to require compliance

with General Statutes § 53a-30, which sets forth the

standard conditions of postconviction probation.7

‘‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains

a given provision, the omission of such provision from

a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is

significant to show that a different intention existed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) M. DeMatteo Construction Co. v. New London, 236 Conn. 710, 717, 674

A.2d 845 (1996). The unambiguous reference to § 53a30 in the dependency treatment statute in juxtaposition

to the language in the accelerated rehabilitation statute,

which only refers to ‘‘conditions as the court shall

order’’; General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (d); supports the interpretation that, by not referencing the

standard conditions of postconviction probation provision in the accelerated rehabilitation statute, the legislature did not intend for that provision, and its attendant

rules, to apply to the program.

Moreover, ‘‘it is a well settled principle of statutory

construction that the legislature knows how to convey

its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting

terms when it chooses to do so.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchesi v. Board

of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608, 618, 72 A.3d 394 (2013). If

the legislature had intended to incorporate the standard

conditions of postconviction probation and the law governing violations of those conditions, it could have done

so expressly by referencing § 53a-30, as it did in § 17a696 (c). Thus, one could infer that the legislature did

not intend for all of the laws governing postconviction

probation to apply to accelerated rehabilitation probation. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the legislature would

import § 53a-30, which imposes stringent conditions of

probation on persons who have been convicted of a

crime, into a program designed for persons who have

been accused of committing only nonserious crimes

and are presumed not to offend in the future.

Nevertheless, the analysis of the plain language of

the statutory text and relevant related provisions does

not categorically resolve whether the legislature

intended to incorporate the law governing violations of

postconviction probation into the accelerated rehabilitation scheme. Despite the significant practical differ-
ences between accelerated rehabilitation probation and

postconviction probation, and the fact that the legislature explicitly referenced § 53a-30 in the dependency

treatment statute, the meaning of the term probation

in the accelerated rehabilitation statute is unclear.

Because the statutory text does notresolve the question

of whether the legislature intended for the law governing violations of postconviction probation to apply to

the accelerated rehabilitation statute, we must turn to

the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation statute by

examining its legislative history. That review unequivocally reflects the purpose of § 54-56e and compels our

conclusion that when a defendant is convicted of a

crime while participating in the program, the trial court

must deny a motion to dismiss the charges, and return

the case to the trial docket.

Since the legislature’s enactment of the accelerated

rehabilitation statute in 1973,8

the legislature has repeatedly and consistently expressed that the purpose of

accelerated rehabilitation is to give first time offenders

who have been charged with nonserious crimes a second chance to keep their criminal record clean. In 1973,

during debate in the House of Representatives on the

creation of the program, Representative Samuel S.

Freedman, the sponsor of the bill, addressed the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation statute, stating:

‘‘This bill affects the first offender, most often the victimless crime.’’ 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1973 Sess., pp.

5712–13. After outlining the procedural process for

determining a defendant’s eligibility for, and participation in, the program, Representative Freedman noted

that a defendant would be ‘‘put on probation of a period

up to two years and if he successfully completes his

probationary period, the [c]ourt may then dismiss the

charge entirely. If he does not I repeat—if he does not

successfully complete his probation he must then come

back and face the [c]ourt for trial. . . . [W]hat this will

allow us to do is to utilize in the more hopeful cases,

the cases where people are hurting themselves and not

others for the most part, all of the community services

which are available. . . . [I]n Pennsylvania it’s used

very sparingly only for the more hopeful cases, but it

has been highly successful and I would recommend its

passage and adoption here.’’ Id., pp. 5714–15.

In 1974, the House of Representatives debated a revision that gave the court,rather than the state’s attorney,

the discretion to grant an application for accelerated

rehabilitation, and allowed persons charged with class

A, B or C felonies to be eligible for participation in the

program if ‘‘good cause is shown . . . .’’9 House Bill

No. 5481, 1974 Sess. Representative James F. Bingham

remarked during the debate that in the previous session,

the legislature had ‘‘passed [the accelerated rehabilitation] bill which permitted the diversion of certain people away from the [c]ourt system into probation with

the possibility of receiving a dismissal so that they
would not have a record on their name.’’ (Emphasis

added.) 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1974 Sess., p. 627.

The legislature addressed the purpose of accelerated

rehabilitation in 1985, when it legislatively overruled

this court’s decision in State v. Parker, 194 Conn. 650,

659, 485 A.2d 139 (1984), in which we held that a denial

of a motion to dismiss following the purported satisfactory completion of the program was not a final judgment

for purposes of appeal. Public Acts 1985, No. 85-374.

During the House debate on an amendment to the bill,10

Representative Christopher Shays remarked: ‘‘We got

it in 1973, and accelerated rehabilitation is a program

that says, that the court can give you a program in

which you have to fulfill certain obligations, and that

if you fulfill this program . . . two years after you have

successfully completed accelerated rehabilitation,

there is a record that you went through the program,

but the record of your offense disappears. You have no

record. It’s a very attractive program.

‘‘It was only supposed to affect the individual who

say, went into a supermarket, and an elderly woman,

say, and made a foolish mistake and shoplifted, and we

wanted to prevent this kind of person from having a

‘record’. It was also supposed to apply to maybe a young

person who foolishly did something which might give

them a ‘record’ that would follow them for the rest of

their lives.’’ (Emphasis added.) 28 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14,

1985 Sess., pp. 5048–49.

The legislature again discussed the purpose of accelerated rehabilitation in 1993, during debate in the Senate on a bill that allowed individuals who had been

charged with multiple crimes or motor vehicle violations for a single transaction or for transactions within

a short period of time of each other to be eligible for

accelerated rehabilitation. Senate Bill No. 977, 1993

Sess. Senator George Jepsen, in describing the impact

that the bill would have on the program, explained that

‘‘the eligibility for accelerated [rehabilitation] remains

the same standard that the crimes cannot be very serious in nature. The judges look at the cases [individually]

to decide whether the person should be in jail [or] not

and it is available only one time. You get one bite at

the apple.’’ (Emphasis added.) 36 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1993

Sess., pp. 2143–44. Senator George L. Gunther, however,

opposed the bill, stating: ‘‘The thing that bothers [me]

is there are many alternative ways of having a person

serve. Giving him the distinction of an accelerated rehabilitation I think sort of semi-wipes his slate as if it is

not a serious type thing and some of the examples that

[Senator Jepsen] gave us just now, such [as] multiple

minor crimes and that type of thing, are nonetheless

criminal in my book and I think we shouldn’t do that.

We should go to the alternate sentencing. We should

go to other ways we have and they don’t necessarily

have to be locked up in a jail in order to serve that
time, but not to give him the designation of accelerated

rehabilitation.’’ Id., pp. 2144–45.

In 1995, the House of Representatives was debating

whether to exclude persons charged with class A and

B felonies from eligibility for accelerated rehabilitation,

and to allow persons charged with class C felonies to

be eligible only if good cause was shown. Representative Dale Radcliffe, arguing in favor of the bill, succinctly stated the purpose of accelerated rehabilitation:

‘‘We have made the program exactly what it should

have been, a program for minor offenses, for individuals who make one mistake, to give that individual a

second chance and to give that individual a clean

record.’’ (Emphasis added.) 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 12, 1995

Sess., p. 4182. Senator Thomas F. Upson reiterated that

position during the Senate debate: ‘‘Remember, this is

allowing the state . . . allowing someone, saying

you’re not going to get a record. What you did is not

of a serious nature and you deviated from your path

once. Therefore, we’re going to let you continue your

path on life and not have a record.’’ (Emphasis added.)

38 S. Proc., Pt. 10, 1995 Sess., p. 3472.

In 2001, the Senate debated whether to allow persons

who had been charged with the class B felony of larceny

in the first degree, in cases in which no physical force

was involved, to apply for accelerated rehabilitation.

44 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 2001 Sess., pp. 999–1002. Senator

John Kissel stated: ‘‘[Accelerated rehabilitation] allows

people that one bite of the apple so that they can go

forward as productive citizens with a clean record and

again, I think it’s a valuable program. It works to reduce

a lot of the pressures in the criminal justice system and

I think a lot of people have benefitted by it. Not only

victims, but also the accused and they’ve turned their

lives around and overall I would support the bill.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id., pp. 1001–1002.

The legislative intent regarding the purpose of the

accelerated rehabilitation statute is to give onetime

offenders an opportunity to demonstrate that the

offense was a onetime occurrence and to reward them

by erasing any evidence of a criminal record. In light

of the legislative intent, we conclude that accelerated

rehabilitation is intended to allow an offender to maintain a clean criminal record, not to eliminate one of

multiple convictions that a person might receive. Its

purpose is to ensure that those who have made one

minor mistake will not have a record of conviction that

could impact them negatively in the future.

Given the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation

statute, it is not reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended, as the defendant claims, that the law

governing violations of postconviction probation

applies to accelerated rehabilitation probation and that

his convictions, obtained during the same time period

as his participation in the program, should not be con-
sidered by the court in its finding of satisfactory completion because the conduct occurred prior to his

acceptance into the program. To conclude that the date

of the defendant’s conduct, rather than the date of his

conviction, controls a trial court’s satisfactory completion determination in the accelerated rehabilitation context would run contrary to the purpose of the statute.11

Because a conviction obtained during the period of a

defendant’s participation in the program is contrary to

the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation statute,

a defendant cannot be deemed to have satisfactorily

completed the program. Thus, the trial court in the

present case properly denied the defendant’s motion

to dismiss the charge of interfering with an officer,

because the defendant’s multiple convictions obtained

during his participation in the program obligated the

court to enter the denial.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 Although § 54-56e has been amended by the legislature several times

since the events underlying the present case; see, e.g., Public Acts 2010,

No. 10-43, § 1; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this

appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the 2014 supplement of

the statute.

2 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the

appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-1.

3 The record does not reveal where the defendant was seeking treatment.

4 The defendant noted in the motion that the agreement with the state

was that the charge of interfering with an officer was the only one that was

eligible for accelerated rehabilitation and that the other two charges would

be nolled upon his successful completion of the program.

5 General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 53a-32 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘At

any time during the period of probation . . . the court or any judge thereof

may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the

conditions of probation . . . .’’

In State v. Deptula, 34 Conn. App. 1, 10, 639 A.2d 1049 (1994), the Appellate

Court held that ‘‘a violation of probation cannot occur until the probationary

period has begun.’’

6 Other differences between accelerated rehabilitation probation and postconviction probation also support our conclusion that the legislature did

not intend to treat the two types of probation similarly. Those differences

include: (1) the types of crimes that are eligible, as well as the eligibility

criteria, for each type of probation; see General Statutes § 53a-29 (a); General

Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (c); (2) the procedures for setting and modifying conditions with which a defendant must comply; see General Statutes

§ 53a-30 (a) and (b); General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (d); and (3) the

disposition of a case upon completion of probation. See General Statutes

(Supp. 2014) § 54-56e (f).

7 General Statutes § 17a-696 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The court or

the Court Support Services Division may require that the person (1) comply

with any of the conditions specified in subsections (a) and (b) of section

53a-30 . . . .’’

8 The accelerated rehabilitation statute originally was enacted by No. 73-

641, § 1, of the 1973 Public Acts, and was codified at General Statutes (Rev.

to 1975) § 54-76p. In 1981, the statute was transferred to § 54-56e.

9 The original statute had excluded persons charged with class A, B and

C felonies from eligibility for the program. Public Acts 1973, No. 73-641, § 1.

10 The amendment sought to exclude persons charged with class A and

B felonies from eligibility. It did not pass.

11 By concluding that the law governing violations of postconviction probation does not apply to accelerated rehabilitation probation, we do not imply

that none of the laws regarding postconviction probation would ever be

applicable. There could be situations in which a postconviction probation

statute would also apply to accelerated rehabilitation. See, e.g., State v.
Tucker, 219 Conn. 752, 762–63, 595 A.2d 832 (1991) (applying General Statutes § 53a-33, which provides for termination of postconviction probation

for good cause prior to completion, to accelerated rehabilitation case).