THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


CHAPMAN VALVE SEC
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held telephonically on April 23, 2007. 

2 

C O N T E N T S
 

April 23, 2007 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 6 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


FROM SENATOR KENNEDY’S OFFICE 9 


H.K. FERGUSON REPORT 18 


INCINERATOR EXPOSURE 37 


M AND S EXPOSURE 50 


MACHINISTS EXPOSURE 52 


PRESENTATION TO THE BOARD 58 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 86 

3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

4

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


BOARD MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


POSTON, John W., Sr., B.S., M.S., Ph.D. 


Professor, Texas A&M University 


College Station, Texas 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 

5 

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

BASSETT, BETHANY, SEN. KENNEDY 


BLOOM, CINDY, NIOSH/ORAU 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC WASHINGTON 


CHANG, CHIA-CHIA, NIOSH 


DOWNS, AMIA, NIOSH 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


NETON, JIM, NIOSH 


ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (9:00 a.m.) 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO
 

DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade. I serve as the 


DFO, Designated Federal Official, for the 


Advisory Board, and this is a meeting of the 


work group of the Advisory Board, this work 


group focusing on the Chapman Valve SEC 


petition. It’s chaired by Dr. Poston with 


members Griffon, Clawson, Roessler and Gibson. 


I’ve heard all of those individuals identify 


themselves as being on the call. Are there 


any other Board members on the call other than 


the members of this working group? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Any other Board members other 


than the members of this working group? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: I would ask that the NIOSH/ORAU 


team identify themselves and whether or not 


they’re conflicted on this site. Then I’ll 


ask the SC&A team, ask for other federal 

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employees. I’ll ask for workers, worker reps, 


member of Congress or their staffs, and then 


anyone else who would like to identify. So 


let’s start with the NIOSH/ORAU team. 


DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton, NIOSH, and no 


conflict. 


MR. ROLFES: This is Mark Rolfes, NIOSH 


health physicist, no conflict. 


MS. BLOOM: Cindy Bloom, ORAU team, no 


conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Other members, NIOSH/ORAU? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: SC&A team? 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro, no conflict. 


 DR. WADE: Other SC&A? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: Other federal employees who are 


on the call by virtue of their employment who 


are working on this call? 


MR. KOTSCH: Jeff Kotsch, Department of 


Labor. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning, Jeff. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Liz Homoki-Titus with 


Health and Human Services. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning, Liz. 

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Other feds? 


MS. CHANG: Chia-Chia Chang with NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning. 


 MS. DOWNS: Amia Downs, NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning. 


Other feds? 


 (no response) 


 DR. WADE: How about workers, worker reps, 


members of Congress or their staffs? 


 MS. BASSETT: Hi, this is Bethany Bassett in 


Senator Kennedy’s Boston office. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning. 


MS. BASSETT: Good morning, how are you all? 


 DR. WADE: Fine, thank you. Thank you for 


joining us. 


MS. BASSETT: Of course, I just wanted to 


put out there, I know it’s about 9:15 now, and 


I have another emergent matter to get to at 


about 10:00. So if there’s any possibility of 


us talking specifically about Chapman Valve 


between that time, that would be fantastic. 


 DR. WADE: When you say, do you want to make 


a statement or --


MS. BASSETT: We just have a couple of 


issues to raise. I don’t know what the first 

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point of the agenda is. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we can raise your issues 


when we finish the introductions if that’s 


acceptable with you, Dr. Poston. 


DR. POSTON: That’s fine. 


 DR. WADE: Other introductions, members of 


Congress, workers, worker reps, Congressional 


staff? 


MR. BROEHM: This is Jason Broehm from CDC, 


joining a few minutes late. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning, Jason. 


Is there anyone else on the call who 


would like to be identified for the record? 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Lew, I just wanted to let 


you know that Emily Howell is dialing in right 


now. 


 DR. WADE: Good. 


Anyone else who would like to identify 


for the record? 


Ray, you’re up and ready to go? 


COURT REPORTER: Yes, sir. 


FROM SENATOR KENNEDY’S OFFICE


 DR. WADE: Well, why don’t we hear from our 


friend from Boston. Please, the floor is 


yours. 

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MS. BASSETT: Okay, we just wanted to raise 


a couple issues regarding Chapman Valve, in 


specific, the Ferguson Reports. We haven’t 


seen that, and we’re hoping there’s a 


possibility that we actually could see that 


document. Do you guys know if that is 


possible? 


 DR. WADE: Jason, I would leave that to your 


good offices. 


MR. BROEHM: Yes, I’ve been in touch with 


Liz and Emily about that, or at least Liz, and 


they’re still waiting to get a ruling on that. 


They need to check on both FOIA and Privacy 


Act issues. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Yeah, we’re waiting for 


the CDC FOIA Privacy Act office to get back to 


us on that. 


MS. BASSETT: Okay. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: I will call them again 


today although I doubt I will get an answer 


before tomorrow because we have a meeting with 


them to go over a number of issues tomorrow. 


MS. BASSETT: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Jason will be your point of 


contact. 

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MS. BASSETT: Great. 


MR. BROEHM: I will work to get that to you 


as soon as I can. 


MS. BASSETT: Thank you, Jason, Portia and I 


both -- Portia can’t be on the call this 


morning unfortunately. 


And I also just wanted to raise 


another issue, and it’s -- please, anyone feel 


free to jump in with this if you have comments 


or concerns. Regarding the date of the fire, 


we originally had down, and correct me if I’m 


wrong in any way, but May 23rd? And we’re 


finding just in talking to our constituents 


and other folks that there may have been an 


earlier fire. So we just wanted to raise the 


point that could it be taken into account 


higher exposures because of this earlier fire 


that we’re finding out about now. 


 DR. WADE: Do you have any information or is 


there any information that anyone could share 


with the work group more than that? 


MS. BASSETT: I can get some paper on that. 


We’ve kind of just heard it in discussions 


mostly with constituents. I know that we had 


originally said the fire date was May 23rd, and 

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then I believe samples have been done for June 


11th
 . 


MS. BLOOM: I think maybe May 23rd is the 


date that you’re thinking the fire is. We 


originally assumed that it occurred sometime 


in June --


MS. BASSETT: Okay. 


MS. BLOOM: -- moved that back to May 31st , 


and now this report clearly states that there 


was a fire on May 23rd . 


MS. BASSETT: And is the report the Ferguson 


Report? 


MS. BLOOM: Yes. 


MS. BASSETT: Okay, that’s probably what 


we’re hearing it from then just from 


constituents who are hearing that this report 


is out there and floating around, and they 


wanted to let us know. So we just wanted to 


raise the point that if there was this earlier 


fire, is it going to be taken into account 


that there may have been higher exposures. 


MS. BLOOM: I did look at that, and it 


doesn’t look like it’ll change the coworker 


model, but it certainly would change the 


individual models. 

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MS. BASSETT: And then just one other issue, 


and I know you’ve heard us all talk about this 


before, but the enriched uranium, is the 


enriched uranium being taken into account? I 


know there’s been some issues with the time 


line on that. 


DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton in NIOSH. 


We’re not taking the uranium into account 


during the covered period as defined by the 


Department of Labor because it’s pretty clear, 


and especially -- I hate to keep relying on 


the Ferguson Report -- but it’s very clear 


that it was natural uranium that was processed 


during that time. But we have relayed an e-


mail or a memo to the Department of Labor and 


the Department of Energy suggesting that they 


look at other periods for enriched uranium 


activities based on some of the interviews 


that SC&A conducted with workers at the site. 


MS. BASSETT: So they will be looking at 


some --


DR. NETON: Well, I can’t speak for what 


they’re going to do, but we have informed them 


that we have this information, and they should 


take this into consideration. 

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MS. BASSETT: Okay, our main concern --


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: May I just clarify one 


thing? 


MS. BASSETT: Oh, please. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: I just wanted to let you 


know. The Ferguson Report is going to come to 


you. The only thing we’re trying to figure 


out is if our FOIA Privacy Act office is going 


to require it to be redacted. So it’s either 


going to come to you tomorrow, or we’re going 


to make it top priority to get it redacted and 


get it to you in a couple of days. 


MS. BASSETT: Okay. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: We’re not blocking the 


release of it. I just wanted you to know that 


you are going to get it. 


MS. BASSETT: That’s wonderful, great, thank 


you, we appreciate that. 


Just with our constituents our main 


concern is that they’ve gone so far in this 


process and many of them are looking at 


documents that say enriched uranium. So we 


just understand that it would be extremely 


frustrating for them to have to go all the way 


back to begin again. So if we could just, I 

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guess, the fact that you’re telling them to 


look at the enriched uranium is great. 


 DR. WADE: I guess, Jason, if I could ask, 


impose upon you to look at our communications 


with the Department of Labor and, if possible, 


if we could share them. 


MR. BROEHM: Okay. 


MS. BASSETT: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think, I don’t know, was 


that, that came up last meeting on the phone 


call that actually DOL was having a meeting 


the same day that we were about Chapman. And 


I don’t know if there’s any update the DOL can 


provide us on this call. 


Lew, is that --


 DR. WADE: I don’t know. 


Jeff, are you in any position to 


comment? 


MR. KOTSCH: I’d have to check. 


I think, Jim, I assumed it went to 


Carolyn or somebody else other than me. 


DR. NETON: Actually the memo itself I think 


went to Pete. 


MR. KOTSCH: I have to admit I don’t know 


what the status of that is. I can check and 

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get back to the Board. 


 DR. WADE: Well, if it’s appropriate for us 


to share that with our friends on the Hill, 


then we should leave that to others to decide. 


MS. BLOOM: Just an aside on that, on the 


enriched uranium issue, the only thing that 


we’ve seen are those environmental samples in 


later years. There was a health physics 


journal that came out May 2007 that does have 


an article under the liability of U-235 to U238 ratios. And I’ve just glanced at it so 


far, but it appears to indicate that those 


ratios are not very reliable. 


Again, I think it’s worth pursuing 


with DOE to find out if there’s any other 


information there. In looking at this article 


my sense is that those ratios may not be very 


meaningful, especially at low levels, but 


that’s probably worth pursuing as well, 


looking at that to see if that answers any 


more questions. 


 DR. WADE: Anything else? 


MS. BASSETT: That’s it from us for now. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


MS. BASSETT: Thank you. I’ll be on until 

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about 10:00, so thank you, guys. 


 DR. WADE: John, belatedly, it’s yours to 


begin. 


DR. POSTON: Basically, let’s see, there’s 


four issues to address. Certainly, we’ve 


already heard the H.K. Ferguson Report needs 


to be discussed a little bit from last time. 


There was some discussion that NIOSH is going 


to look at the implications of the combined M 


and N exposure matrix, whether or not there 


was a special intake that should be added for 


incinerator exposure. I’m not quite sure 


about that. And then the fourth issue was 


whether or not the machinists’ exposures were 


adequately addressed by the limited number of 


bioassay samples that were taken, that is, the 


40 samples. 


That’s all I had on my hit list. If 


there’s anything else that the working group 


members have to discuss, we probably need to 


put it on the list now. Anything else? 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I’m not sure there’s 


much to discuss about it, but I do have 


specifically an action item was that NIOSH was 


going to give us an update on DOL’s 

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investigation of this other time period, but I 


guess there’s no information. So I’m not sure 


how far we can go with that. 


DR. NETON: I’m not sure, Mark, that would 


affect our ability to make a decision here for 


this covered time period. 


MR. GRIFFON: No, no, I understand. 


 DR. WADE: The work group has an interest, 


and we should keep them informed. 


DR. POSTON: I was trying to focus on the 


things that are left to do and seeing if there 


isn’t the possibility we could wrap this up so 


we could have a recommendation to the Board at 


the May meeting. That may be specious, but I 


think we’re getting down to the end of this, 


of these considerations. I think that NIOSH 


and SC&A and the work group are all coming 


together reasonably well so I don’t know 


exactly how to proceed. 


H.K. FERGUSON REPORT
 

Maybe, Mark, maybe you could take a 


minute or so and talk about the Ferguson 


Report. I know you sent out an e-mail that 


covered it quite well, but you might summarize 


what you sent out. 

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MR. ROLFES: This document is in the site 


research database as well. It’s available on 


the X drive in case no one had the opportunity 


to look at it yet. I would definitely 


encourage everyone if they haven’t looked to 


quickly look through the document and see some 


of the pictures and some of the various 


operations. 


This document is titled “The Machining 


of Uranium for Brookhaven Reactor”. And it 


basically summarizes the entire process of the 


operations, describing the uranium rods that 


were sent in from Hanford to the Chapman Valve 


facility. It describes the building where the 


operations were conducted, the floor plan. 


We have an updated map, the location 


of the incinerator, the location of every 


machine that was involved in the production 


operation, very detailed and intricate 


descriptions of each machining operation 


through the entire process, any shortcomings 


associated with that process and corrective 


actions that were taken, description of the 


machining oils and coolants that were used at 


each station, the health physics program and 

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procedures and regulations, as well as some 


correspondence documents. 


Then we have the description of the 


fires that occurred, a description of the 


clean up and decontamination, and a 


description of the waste disposal following 


the completion of the project. Now this 


document also gives us quite a bit of detail 


about the first machining operation involving 


200 slugs of uranium which were produced by 


April 15th, 1948. And it also indicates that 


at the maximum production rate they were 


producing approximately 1,200 slugs per day. 


We’ve got the total source term, and 


we have a date for the end of the project 


indicating October 7, 1948. So taking what we 


have in this document in comparison to what we 


have assumed in our Technical Basis Document 


for dose reconstruction -- This just concerns 


that we’re claimant favorable by extending 


what we’re using for dose reconstruction by 


extending the time period that we’re assuming 


that exposures occurred. 


I guess if there are specific 


questions, we can get into those now, but --

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DR. NETON: Mark, I might just want to add a 


couple things. 


MR. ROLFES: All right, thank you, Jim. 


DR. NETON: One thing that I know we’re 


going to get into later is the furnace 


operations. And Mark indicated there is a 


diagram of where the furnace was, but there’s 


also a picture and a fairly detailed 


description of the design of the furnace. It 


was sort of a homemade operation including the 


flow rates, the air flow rates through the 


furnace at the aperture, through the exhaust 


duct. 


And also we have initial information 


about the number of times that chips were 


roasted or burned in the furnace. Looks like 


it was done during peak production, at least 


stated it happened twice a week. Also it was 


an interesting fact that they only roasted the 


fines, the grinding operation-type samples and 


not the turnings that were produced as a 


result of some of the lathing operations. So 


that limited the source term of the burnings a 


little more, but we’ll be talking more about 


that. But I think there’s enough information 

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there to have a pretty good discussion about 


the potential exposure of people involved in 


the furnace operations. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I guess I’d 


like to add a few items also. I agree with 


the characterization that Mark just gave, and 


Jim. And I think that there are aspects of 


this write-up that does change the way in 


which we, at least I have been viewing the 


exposure matrix. 


And I think in fact the operations, 


the fire, the date of the fire, the 


incinerator, the air sampling program, clearly 


there was a lot more air sampling going on 


than we would have previously understood. And 


because you can see when you read through the 


report that each time a visit was made some 


air samples were collected. By the way most 


of which showed negative results. 


The fire interestingly enough is 


referred to as a fire associated with the 


incinerator, and there are many aspects, 


without getting into them right now. When 


we’re ready we will. There are many aspects 


of this report that are extremely important in 

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terms of fully characterizing what had 


transpired at that facility. And I think it’s 


important that many of the elements that are 


contained within this report need to be 


discussed within the context of how they may 


affect the exposure matrix that has been 


adopted. 


DR. NETON: John, I’ve got a question. I 


didn’t recall that the fire was associated 


with the furnace. 


DR. MAURO: Well, the reason I say that is 


on page 51, during one of the health physics 


visits that were taken periodically -- This is 


the health physics visit that was taken on 


June 1st . Do you have a copy of the report in 


front of you? 


DR. NETON: Yes, I do. 


DR. MAURO: They talk about, it’s on that 


particular report. Apparently, there are 


these four or so visits that were made, and 


this was made in the first visit on June 1st . 


And if in that letter regarding the sort of 


status report of the program where they make 


mention of May 23rd as being the date of a 


fire, and in that very same write-up, on 

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number five they use the words “air samples 


taken at the roof during the course of the 


fire in the incinerator.” That sort of struck 


me as strange. 


DR. NETON: I think in the course of the 


fire in the incinerator. I mean, that was the 


whole point of the incinerator was --


DR. MAURO: That’s what I didn’t understand, 


the fire in the, this is one of the examples 


of the things that I wanted to air out a 


little bit. This is one of the letters where 


they talk about the May 23rd fire. And then a 


little further on on the page they use the 


term -- and I actually wrote a note that said 


this sounds strange -- they use the term 


“course of a fire in the incinerator,” and 


they talk about that fire. And I guess that 


led me to think that what does that mean, a 


fire in the incinerator? 


DR. NETON: I think though if you look at 


page 40 there’s a pretty good summary of what 


the fires, there were two fires --


DR. MAURO: Yes. 

DR. NETON: -- which both turned out to be 

minor. 
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DR. MAURO: Yes, I agree. 

DR. NETON: But neither of them refer to the 

incinerator. I think the incinerator by 

nature is a, I think what the intent of 51, at 


least my impression was that while they were 


burning chips. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I understand. 


DR. NETON: So that’s how I read it. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s how I read it, too. 


DR. NETON: At any rate I think we can talk 


about that more later, but I think that’s what 


they were talking about. 


DR. MAURO: Well, I wasn’t, at this point 


there are a lot of elements like this like 


page 51 that I think we need to air out a bit 


regarding what the implications might be for 


the exposure matrix. I think some of the most 


important things that emerged for me was there 


was obviously a very, very strong health 


physics program. They took it very seriously, 


but at the same time, and there were air 


samples collected. 


And there’s a lot of feedback that 


says that very little airborne activity, 


contamination was there. But then on the 

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other hand we do see some discussion of the 


date of the fire being the 23rd . I’m not sure 


what that does to the matrix. And it also 


means to me that maybe the single most 


important thing that struck me is that it may 


be that the June 11th samples, each of those 


four samples, the June 11 samples may not have 


been taken because of the fire. 


In other words if the fire occurred on 


the 23rd and then a visit for health physics 


coverage or update was performed on June 1st , 


and then the urine samples were not taken 


until June 11th, it may be that the June 11th
 

urine samples were just part of the ongoing 


periodic urine sampling program. 


MR. ROLFES: John, let me stop you right 


there. I have a letter dated January 27th , 


1949, from George, I’m sorry, it’s from B.S. 


Wolfe to George Fox, and I’ll read the first 


paragraph here. 


It says, “In response to your letter 


of January 19th, 1949, the following laboratory 


results have been reported on the urine 


samples collected from the seven employees 


involved in the fire fighting episode last 

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June.” 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so now the thing that’s 


interesting is though that what we have is the 


23rd to the 11th . So now the time period 


between when the fire occurred and when the 


urine samples were taken is substantially 


longer than what we were discussing earlier. 


I’m not quite sure what the implications of 


that are in terms of what intake should be 


assumed. 


I still have these conflicting 


perspectives. One is I still agree that 


there’s a point where the dust loading is so 


high that you really can’t have protracted 


exposures. And that was one of the reasons 


why I was saying that it doesn’t seem 


reasonable that you could have had exposures 


much earlier than June 10th and be responsible 


for .08 milligrams per liter on June 11th . 


So we have that, but then we have this 


May 23rd fire, so what the implications are is 


that I don’t think the June 11th data and the 


.08 milligrams that we clearly observed is 


necessarily related in any to the fire except 


maybe they collected the sample because there 

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was a fire. But I don’t think the levels that 


were observed were due to the fire. It 


doesn’t seem to make sense. 


Do you see where I’m going with that? 


DR. NETON: No, I don’t. I don’t think that 


the levels observed were not necessarily due 


to the fire. 

MS. BLOOM: Maybe I could jump in for a 

second. 

DR. MAURO: Sure, help me out. 

MS. BLOOM: Because I think that these were 

workers that were involved in the clean up as 


well, and so this was probably a chronic 


exposure rather than an acute exposure that 


occurred. It’s still, in looking at the data 


and playing around with different dates and 


different scenarios, that June 10th still gives 


the highest intake in doses for the coworker 


scenario. 


But now if you’re looking at the 


individuals you would use that data a little 


bit differently. While my sense is definitely 


that this was a, you actually had two fires 


during that period, one was a much, much 


smaller fire, but you had clean up ongoing 

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after the fire. And so you have really a 


chronic exposure period I think, not an acute. 


Although in fitting the data, and because we 


don’t know exactly when that period was, it’s 


more favorable to assume an acute. 


But still I looked at an acute on the 


23rd versus an acute on the 10th with the other 


chronic period under it, and I still get 


higher doses for that June 10th assumed date 


even though we now know that the 23rd is a more 


reasonable date for that. 


DR. NETON: Not to confuse here, but that’s 


when we applied a coworker model assuming that 


the person was chronically exposed to the 70 


MAC operation in addition to an acute fire. 


We reconstruct a dose for the person 


involved in fighting the fire differently. 


And that’s what Cindy alluded to is that that 


individual dose calculation would go up for 


someone who only fought the fire if there was 


an acute exposure on the 23rd and we had a 


sample on the 11th . 


MS. BLOOM: (Unintelligible) data and the 


fire date. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can you help me out, Cindy? 

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How did you determine, you just said one of 


the fires was much smaller? How did you, I’m 


reading what Jim was just quoting from which 


says that there were two fires, both of which 


turned out to be minor. 


MS. BLOOM: If you look at -- I’m sorry, 


I’ve had a week of it with the floods and lack 


of phone and so my brain’s not totally here 


today. But there’s the can and there’s a 


second one where the turnings caught on fire. 


DR. NETON: The first fire -- and we’re 


looking at page 40 -- is a bucket of fine 


grindings where they had covered with water 


and the water went below the top surface, and 


they ignited. Then they put this out with an 


extinguisher, bicarbonate of soda and sulfuric 


acid. 


The second one was a ten-gallon steel 


drum filled with oil fill turnings. They had 


as a practice of, none of these turnings were 


roasted by the way. The drums were filled 


with oil and shipped directly, I think, to Oak 


Ridge. But while they were spot welding the 


top on, some of the turnings caught fire in 


that drum. And then it said the cover was 

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removed and the fire was easily extinguished 


with flaked graphite. 


So these do appear to be two fairly 


minor fires. I mean, we’ve had images 


thinking all along about these huge fires 


engulfing large portions of the plant. In 


fact, they were both confined to either a drum 


or a bucket. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, that was my next 


question, Jim. I thought, and maybe I’m 


wrong, but I thought there was response from 


the town on this fire that we were thinking 


about --


DR. NETON: I don’t think we have evidence 


that happened. 


MR. GRIFFON: Never confirmed that or --


MS. BLOOM: There was not, we’ve seen no 


information. I know [Name Redacted] was 


looking into that as were some of the folks 


from Chapman, but they could find nothing that 


indicated that the town responded. In fact, 


they were looking at other --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know they were looking 


at the firehouse records and stuff. 


MS. BLOOM: -- and they found nothing that 

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indicated that they’d come in. 


DR. NETON: This document is kind of 


interesting in the sense that it’s a 


retrospective evaluation of this entire 


project from start to finish. And it seems to 


me that this person who wrote it, Kemmer and 


Musgrave and Fox, were fairly well involved in 


this process. I mean, it’s amazing the amount 


of detail they have. But, see, I don’t know 


that, the fire department may have come to 


Chapman Valve at various times, but it does 


not appear that it would have been to these 


two small fires. 


MR. GRIFFON: So out of these two -- to go 


back to the original question -- so out of 


these two fires you think the first one 


mentioned on page 40 here is the larger? I 


mean, I’m trying to, I didn’t see a date for 


this second one I don’t think and --


DR. NETON: No, we do have a date. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, you do? 


MS. BLOOM: It’s in another memo. It’s a 


handwritten note at the bottom of a memo that, 


I think we provided that last time. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, you probably did. 

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DR. NETON: It’s also mentioned in this 


report somewhere. I’ve forgotten where it 


was, but they were both in late May. 


MR. GRIFFON: So they both occurred before 


the June 11th sampling. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. They had a bad May. 


We’re having a bad April. 


MR. ROLFES: I believe later on in the H and 


K Ferguson document as well it does refer to 


the larger fire on the 23rd is the one that was 


responsible for some of the contamination in 


the shop as well. 


DR. NETON: That one would have been the 


ten-gallon steel drum. 


MR. ROLFES: That was the first one on the 


23rd which --


DR. NETON: That was the one with the chips 


in a bucket near the grinder. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. 

DR. NETON: Not the chips but the fines. 

DR. MAURO: That would be the write-up 

that’s on page 51 of the Ferguson Report? I 


think that special report that was sent to 


Musgrave by Mirkle*, and that was one of those 

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MS. BLOOM: Right, and that’s where he says, 


gives the date of the first fire there. 


DR. NETON: May 23rd . 

DR. MAURO: Yeah. 

DR. NETON: And that would make sense 

because they apparently weren’t successful. 


They tried to put out that first fire, or that 


fire with the bucket, with water and it didn’t 


do very well. 


DR. MAURO: You know what was interesting is 


on that memo, item number two says, “Air 


samples taken in the shop showed no detectable 


contamination.” Now it’s not really clear 


when, if the fire occurred on the 23rd in this 


write-up I’m looking at on page 51, the visit 


was made on the first. So apparently there 


are these periodic visits made. 


I’m assuming that that’s when these 


assessments were performed, during these 


special visits of the health physics crew, and 


when they collected samples. They took swipes 


of various locations, and they investigated 


the status of operations in this two-page 


report. But one of the items they mention is 


these air samples. 

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So I guess when I look at this I 


notice that that happens repeatedly. During 


each one of these visits apparently some air 


samples were collected, and there was no 


detectable contamination. I think that’s an 


important piece of information. And that 


information, especially if we can get some 


idea of how they took the sample. In other 


words what the lower limit of detection was. 


Because what this would help do, quite 


frankly, is if we could somehow say that, 


okay, for each of these visits air samples 


were collected, and we had some information 


regarding what the lower limit of detection 


was for the sampling analysis that was done, 


and then somehow juxtapose that, those air 


samples that were collected, and these were 


taken in the shop areas, you know, where the 


activity was going on. 


And juxtapose that to the default 


assumption of 70 MAC, I think that it would go 


a long way as independent confirmation that 


your choice of the 70 MAC as being the chronic 


exposure to which everyone experienced, it 


would certainly be bounding. And I think 

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right now your choice of the 70 MAC can be 


argued as certainly bounding. 


DR. NETON: John, I was looking at it from a 


slightly different perspective. I think, you 


know, I don’t know where these air samples 


were taken, whether they just stuck them in 


the middle of the shop area or what, but we’ve 


got the specific process operations going on 


presumably while they’re taking this air 


sample. And so for us to bound the workers, 


we need to have a better feel, or we need to 


focus on what the workers were experiencing at 


these operations. 


Now one thing that struck me as 


supporting our case that 70 MAC is bounding 


is, and I think Mark put this in his e-mail, 


that all of the operations that involved 


grinding and turning and such were all done 


with liquid coolants. In other words they 


were not just dusty operations. They were 


cooled by either oil or by water-based 


coolants which would tend to keep the dust 


levels down. 


And, of course, if you look at reports 


like, not the Adley one but the Harris Report, 

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they characterize exposures depending on 


whether they were cooled with oil or not. 


And, of course, the ones that were oil cooled 


or liquid cooled are much lower. 


Secondly, I think it struck me that I 


think these processes were by and large 


ventilated. Liquid cooled operations which 


are keeping the dust levels down in addition 


to ventilation which would explain why the 


general plant air is clean. It would also 


help support the fact that the operations 


themselves, the process-specific operations, 


were also on the lower end of the airborne 


scale. 


DR. MAURO: I came away with the same 


perspective on that also. That is, most of 


what you read here confirms that this 


operation was controlled. Even though it was 


an early operation, it had a great deal of 


controls, the use of the coolant and the fact 


that they had such health physics oversight. 


INCINERATOR EXPOSURE
 

The issues related to the fire, I hear 


what you’re saying. That is, your model for 


the exposed individual would be bounding. I 

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guess the area that is left a little bit 


uncertain still is when I read the incinerator 


section, you know, twice a week the 


incinerator was used for fines. 


And I think that that also is an 


interesting story because as you pointed out, 


the turnings were not included which would be 


the larger pieces, and it was mainly fines. 


Now, I’m not quite sure what the implications 


of that are in terms of does that mean you 


have reduced potential for airborne exposures 


entering into the operating areas? 


And I can’t really tell from the 


description of the incinerator whether or not 


the removal -- as you know from reading these 


other reports, Harris and Adley, it’s when 


they’re loading and unloading the incinerator 


that is when you get quite a bit of airborne 


dust. But most of the attention in this 


write-up, interestingly enough, was not, you 


would think that given the sensitivity they 


had with these issues, it was not with any of 


the airborne dust that may have been generated 


with loading and unloading, it was more 


associated with the discharges to the 

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atmosphere and the contamination of the roof. 


So I guess indirectly, I mean, one 


could say that they really didn’t even speak 


toward what type of dust loadings were 


associated with the loading and the unloading 


of the incinerator. And they describe a 


design with an opening, so I can’t really tell 


from reading that that perhaps -- and they 


also describe a hood. Whether or not the 


nature of the operation and the design of the 


incinerator helped to reduce the potential for 


airborne dust loading within the facility. 


Clearly, there was a problem with 


discharges to the atmosphere that they were 


very concerned about and the contamination of 


the roof. I don’t know whether you folks have 


any sense for this particular incinerator, the 


picture. When I look at the picture it 


doesn’t tell me anything. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, John, I’ve got a few 


thoughts on that. I was pretty amazed that 


how small it was first of all, and it was kind 


of like how Cindy characterized it, a small 


furnace. I think it was a 15-by-15 inch 


square aperture to insert the material to be 

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roasted. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


DR. NETON: On top of that if you read 


further, there was a 500 linear feet per 


minute flow rate going through an eight-inch 


exhaust duct connected to the furnace. That 


is a pretty high flow rate, and I’d forgotten 


that calculate the capture velocity at the 


face of the furnace, but it’s a pretty 


sufficient capture velocity. So I think the 


idea that this furnace was spewing exhaust 


into the room would not have much credibility. 


I think that --


DR. MAURO: You know, I hear you, and now so 


you’re saying that when they were loading 


underneath this hood which had the capture 


velocity, that would be operating during the 


loading and unloading operations, not just 


during the actual --


DR. NETON: I don’t know about, I can’t 


guarantee that, but what I’m saying is while 


it’s burning there’s simply, I don’t think 


there’s much concern about the material being 


vented into the atmosphere --


DR. MAURO: No, I agree with that. It’s 

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clear that --


DR. NETON: To get into the loading and 


unloading operations, I think one needs to 


maybe look at the scale of the operation. I 


did a rough calculation, and this is very 


rough. But we have exact dimensions of what 


kind of grinding and turnings were done on 


each of these slugs. I mean, it’s amazing 


detail. 


They’d come in with 12-foot long bars, 


one-inch diameter, and they describe exactly 


how they were cut, and how they were lathed 


down to within certain specifications. They 


turned down these bars by .1 inches. It was a 


one-inch diameter and a little button on the 


top. If you calculate how many fine materials 


would be ground off of those bars at peak 


production which was 1,200 slugs per day, 


you’d get something on the order of every two 


days -- and this is during only that four-


month period where they did this -- you would 


get something on the order of -- I don’t have 


the calculation in front of me, but something 


around, I think, five kilograms of fines 


generated every two days. 

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DR. MAURO: How does that compare to the 


magnitude of the fines that were processed, 


let’s say, in the other reports we looked at 


where we saw these high levels of handling? 


Because I think you’re zeroing in on really 


some good quantitative arguments that could be 


made. 


That is, if you could show that the 


quantity of fines that were being consumed or 


roasted at this facility were substantially 


lower than the quantity, let’s say, that was 


described either in the Harris, Adley, I 


guess, yeah, those two reports, there would 


be, what that would help do is to sort of rule 


out that you really could not have a situation 


where you can get dust loadings of the types 


that they observe, for example, in the Adley 


Report. 


DR. NETON: I haven’t looked at that, or we 


haven’t to my knowledge, but I think we could 


even take this one step further and say 


uranium’s a pretty dense metal so we did a 


quick calculation. If you have that mass of 


fines every two days, and you’re going to put 


it in a furnace, what does that correspond to 

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in terms of volume? 


Uranium is pretty dense. It’s about 


16 grams per cubic centimeter. Although I’ll 


agree, if you have fines, it’s going to be a 


little fluffier than something like a pure 


metal. But even U-03 powder is about, I don’t 


know, 15 grams. If you can do that 


calculation, you end up with something, and 


this is a rough calculation, but say about a 


half a liter of fines generated per two days. 


You’re talking about something that is 


like the volume of a large 16-ounce Coke 


bottle. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, yeah. 


DR. NETON: And so it’s hard for me to 


envision if you roast things that small a 


volume every two days that you could generate 


70 MAC continuous or something --


DR. MAURO: Yeah, or something, yeah. That 


would actually affect, I mean, you couple that 


up. I’m leaning in that direction also. The 


amount of additional airborne dust loading 


associated with the fines from incineration 


intuitively would seem to be small and not 


really change a time integrated intake at all 

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because of the assumption you’re using is 70 


MAC. 


What would be the clincher would be, 


because you see looming in the background is 


the fact that there were these very high 


exposures associated with the loading and 


unloading of incinerators at these other large 


facilities like out at Hanford. And if it 


could be shown that, well, the magnitude of, 


the scale of the operation was such that the 


amount of material that was handled, loaded-


unloaded, at Hanford dwarfed the amount that 


was being handled here, I think that would be 


the end of the story. 


DR. POSTON: Well, this is where I’ve been 


trying to figure out where we were going. Are 


we going to turn this into a research project 


or are the assumptions that have been made of 


continuous exposure over 16 months and so 


forth, are those the bounding kinds of 


calculations that we really need to do to, and 


have been done to make a decision here? I 


mean, we can suggest a lot of different things 


that need to be done or could be done, maybe 


not need to be done. I’m trying to understand 

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exactly where we’re going here. 


MS. BLOOM: I think we’ve already looked at 


the general inventory amounts that went 


through those different facilities. I’m not 


sure that the information is readily available 


on the actual amounts incinerated per day. 


DR. MAURO: That’s a good point. What 


you’re saying is throughput alone would be a 


good metric of scale potential for fines 


associated with the loading and unloading as 


opposed to going directly to the amount of 


material that was incinerated. 


DR. NETON: And qualitatively I’m looking at 


some of the notes that Cindy put out on that 


last document that compared a lot of different 


processes, and when you look at the oxide 


burnings, they’re talking about shoveling 


oxides from trays into barrels, some oxides 


still red hot, shoveling, I mean, their 


shoveling this into large barrels. 


DR. MAURO: Yes, yes. 


DR. NETON: It indicates to me that it’s 


fairly larger. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, absolutely. 


DR. NETON: But, you know, I just still 

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think if you’re shoveling something that’s a 


liter or so --


DR. MAURO: You’re using a spoon. 


DR. NETON: I don’t know about that, but 


first of all I think that when they’re going 


into the furnace, these things were always 


kept under, it appears from the write-up, 


under some type of a liquid form, whether it’s 


water-based coolant or oil, to keep the fires 


from happening in the plant. I don’t think 


that they actually dried these things off 


before they put them into the furnace. So the 


loading operation I wouldn’t think would be a 


problem. 


And unloading would be, in my mind, 


the only potential here for a large exposure. 


And if you’re unloading a small tray, and we 


even have the dimensions of the tray. I’ve 


forgotten what it was, but it’s like a two 


foot by something tray. Well, it’d have to be 


smaller than two foot because the opening to 


the furnace is only 15 inches. These are 


pretty small trays. 


I would be surprised if they would 


actually roast more than one tray every two 

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days. And we don’t have a quantitative nail 


on this, but I think qualitatively it 


certainly points in the direction of 70 MAC 


continuous for the entire week is, entire time 


period is pretty favorable. 


DR. POSTON: Yeah, I agree. So where do we 


go from here? What needs to be done? 


MR. GRIFFON: I was just going to ask you a 


question on the inventory. 


Cindy, you just mentioned the 


inventory. Did NIOSH, did anyone check this 


H.K. Ferguson document with your site profile? 


Is it consistent with the, I know they 


mentioned some numbers in the beginning here, 


page five to seven or eight, I think. 


MS. BLOOM: I don’t know that I had an exact 


inventory in the site profile. I had a 


guesstimate in that last document that I sent, 


and it looks like I was a little bit low. 


These numbers are a little bit higher, but 


not, I think they’re within a factor of two of 


what I put out in the last paper based on 


estimates of the source term and the 


Brookhaven reactor. So they’re similar. 


DR. NETON: I also think if one looks at the 

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extended time period here, almost all of the 


operations of the grinding of the slugs or 


machining of the slugs occurred, it looks to 


me, it’s over about a four-month period. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


DR. NETON: And so maybe there was some 


ancillary grinding and machining going on, but 


it would have been even a lot less that, what 


I had just calculated was for peak production 


of 1,200 slugs per day, and it drops off 


dramatically on either side of that. So then 


you end up with an equivalent air 


concentration of something like, pick a number 


three or four times that that we’re assigning 


during the peak period. 


MR. GRIFFON: And maybe, I don’t know if, 


well, I mean, the question, John, I think you 


had this question of how does the date of the 


fire affect, I assume if you know individuals 


who were involved in this, and I think Cindy 


just said that it might affect individual dose 


reconstructions where we have their individual 


data, but the coworker model, the one you 


currently have on the table, notwithstanding 


my question of M and S, would be the most 

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conservative. Right? 


DR. NETON: I think that’s correct. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean, I think that M-S mixed 


issue is a, I don’t think that’s an SEC issue 


necessarily anyway. I don’t know if you’ve 


had a chance to assess that, but --


MS. BLOOM: I did take a look at that. I 


can talk about that if we, I don’t know if we 


want to finish up with this first. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think we do. 


DR. POSTON: Anything else that we need to 


discuss in here? 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean, John, do you have any 


follow-up questions on that? 


DR. MAURO: No, I --


MR. GRIFFON: I think the date thing, as far 


as the date of the fire being earlier, my 


personal review says that it’s not going to 


affect that coworker model at all. So I don’t 


think it makes a difference there. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: But I don’t know if you guys 


have looked at that. 


DR. MAURO: No, we haven’t. We just noticed 

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it when reading it, and that’s why I put it 


out in my e-mail as something we needed to 


talk about. But we did not do any analysis 


though. 


DR. POSTON: Anything else we need to 


discuss on this issue? 


 (no response) 


M AND S EXPOSURE
 

DR. POSTON: Mark, you make a comment that 


you didn’t think the combined M and S type 


exposures is an SEC issue, so do we even need 


to talk about that? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I don’t think we need to 


necessarily resolve it on the call. My quick 


look at it said that it might have affected 


the intakes. It might have increased them 


slightly higher, but Cindy may disagree with 


that. But I don’t think that’s an SEC issue 


so we can --


MR. ROLFES: I think it’s safe to say also 


that any increase in intakes would be 


adequately captured by the extended production 


period that we’ve already assumed in our 


Technical Basis Document as well. 


MS. BLOOM: Well, I think the answer’s 

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really quick. I did a, Mark, you said you 


tried to look at this, and so you know how 


many different scenarios you can actually have 


to look at in order to look at it. By the 


time you look at 20 different organs and 50 


years and, it became a challenge. But I 


figured out a way to do a rough and dirty 


calculation for 50 years for all the organs 


and do that quickly. And I apologize for not 


sending that out. 


But in looking at that it looks like, 


except for the first year, the doses are going 


to be higher in the later years for pure Type-


S. And that’s because your dose conversion 


factors combined with your intake retention 


factors are going to produce the highest doses 


in your organs. Now there’s some exceptions 


for exposure periods less or of a year or 


less. And it might be in between there into 


that one-to-two years range. You know, to do 


it that finely is a tough job. 


But in looking at that, the worst 


case, I think, was for the liver. And I 


looked at the first year dose and that’s about 


ten percent lower for pure Type-S than it is 

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for that combination M and S. But I would say 


that for a person where you’re only 


considering that first year dose, your 


probability of causation is going to be less 


than one percent. 


So in terms of changing the outcome of 


any claimant it’s just not going to happen. 


And so as a way to expedite claims, I think 


it’s still reasonable to use either a Type-S 


or a Type-M, that is, and try to mix up your 


different types. 


DR. POSTON: Okay? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I mean, I’ll accept 


that, and we always have the assumption that 


NIOSH is going to use the most claimant 


favorable approach given the organ and 


whatever, organ of interest. 


DR. POSTON: Is there any more that we need 


to talk about on the special intake for the 


incinerator or do we think that that’s bounded 


by the assumptions that are already used? Do 


we need to discuss that anymore? 


 (no response) 


MACHINISTS EXPOSURE
 

DR. POSTON: The last issue I had was 

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whether or not the 40 bioassay data points 


that we have actually do cover the machinists. 


I think it was Mark that pointed out that --


not Mark, I forget who it was now. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, it might have been me. 


MR. ROLFES: Mark, Mark Rolfes. There were 


40 bioassay results that were taken during the 


highest production rate period between June 


and October. It appears that they were 


sampling these individuals at the time period 


where there was the highest potential for 


intake of uranium. And also, these 40 uranium 


urinalysis results were taken from a 


population of workers of approximately 70 


individuals as documented in this H and K 


Ferguson Report. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, and I was asking about 


whether we felt that the sample, and I would 


say the three samples were good enough to 


bound. Because my argument was that, or 


question, was whether the highest potential, 


potentially exposed worker was monitored 


sufficiently that we could bound exposures. 


And, you know, I see three machinists that 


were monitored over this time. It’s 40 

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samples, yes, I agree. But it was distributed 


amongst various types of job types. So that 


was the question really. 


MS. BLOOM: Right, but it doesn’t look like 


you have a lot of, I mean, just looking at the 


setup I wouldn’t say that there’d be a lot 


more than three machinists. You might have 


six maybe. 


DR. NETON: In fact, I looked through the 


film badge records, and I found there were 


about three or four other machinists, but 


their film badges were much earlier in the 


time period than these guys were who were 


working during the 1,200 slug per day peak 


production era. That was the way it appeared 


to me. 


And then secondly, I think this 


exercise we’ve done by looking at the 70 MAC 


air that was derived from the bioassay data 


and doing sort of a sanity check and saying 


are we comfortable with the fact that the 


answer we got from the bioassay seems to be 


reasonable given what we know about the plant. 


And I think our previous discussion this 


morning seems to indicate to me that, yes, the 

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70 MAC is a fairly reasonable upper bound that 


was produced by the bioassay results 


themselves. I can’t, you know, given the fact 


that we had the liquid process and the 


ventilation over the machines and that sort of 


thing. 


MS. BLOOM: Mark, I don’t know if you had 


the time to look at the layout of the machine 


shop, but it looks like there’s only one 


centerless grinder. There’s only one milling 


machine. So it doesn’t look like you’d have 


that many more workers. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, I agree with 


the, I mean, I looked at the film badge sheets 


also, and it did look like maybe eight or ten 


at most were in the machine grouping. And I 


think I agree with Jim’s other statement that 


the, given our other general uranium 


information that you compiled and looked at. 


I think that also supports the argument for 


the 70. I don’t think I have any more 


questions on that. 


I think, you know, I still say it’s 


fairly limited for those jobs, but given 


you’ve got documents now that support that it 

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was definitely not open air machining. You 


have the oils or, you know, over the 


machining, and you’ve got other general 


documents that suggest you’re in the right 


ballpark if not very conservative. So I think 


it’s okay. 


DR. POSTON: Anything else? 


 (no response) 


DR. POSTON: I’m at a loss as to what’s the 


next step. Perhaps Dr. Wade can help me here 


since I’m a rookie. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I ask one more thing on 


this Ferguson, just to close out the Ferguson 


thing for myself. I found this and I know, I 


was looking through some other documents I 


have on terminology. But there’s a reference 


to TX metal. Can anyone help me out there 


what that means? 


MR. ROLFES: Mark, this is Mark. That 


appeared to be the metal that wasn’t, it 


appeared that it might have had some air in it 


because its density wasn’t the same as the 


other uranium that was sent. And it said that 


-- oh, wait, I take that back. The TX metal 


was sent along with the virgin rod material, 

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as they called it. The TX metal was from 


other uranium that had been, it describes it 


pretty well in the H&K Ferguson documents, but 


it appears to be metal that had been machined. 


And it was scrap that was, I guess, put back 


into a rod, and it didn’t have the, I guess 


they weren’t able to re-melt it into a solid 


piece as they were the virgin material. 


MS. BLOOM: The quality just wasn’t as good. 


MR. GRIFFON: So there’s no chance that this 


was, I mean, I was trying to think if that TX 


in any way stood for a, I mean, there’s no 


chance that it was other contamination in 


this. It’s natural uranium by all 


indications, right? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, correct, it’s not recycled 


uranium to our knowledge. It just appears to 


be metal that didn’t have the same 


specifications as the virgin rod material. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, on page six the actual 


wording says TX metal was reported to have 


been extruded from ingots reclaimed by remelting scrap and to be somewhat inferior to 


virgin metal in chemical, physical and nuclear 


properties. I guess, you know, it would 

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appear that that means that their only concern 


with the TX metal was that it did not have the 


same purity level, but there was no 


implication that it had any, that it was 


either recycled or enriched. 


MR. GRIFFON: That was the question, and it 


just seemed to me this cohort, they didn’t 


know what TX metals, if it had a definite 


definition, if anybody knew that. I guess it 


might just be reclaimed from scrap. I don’t 


know. 


MS. BLOOM: I think the codes change from 


site to site. While they’re somewhat similar, 


my experience has been that it’s hard to say 


that the code at one site means the same thing 


at another. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, I agree, yeah. 


MS. BLOOM: You usually start out thinking 


that and then sometimes I’m surprised. 


 DR. WADE: John, this is Lew. If you’re 


ready, I could begin to answer your question. 


DR. POSTON: That’d be fine. Go ahead. 


PRESENTATION TO THE BOARD


 DR. WADE: Let me start by verifying some 


facts, and Jim or Mark, I depend upon you for 

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this. It is my recollection -- and tell me if 


I’m right or not -- that the Chapman Valve 


evaluation report is out there and has been 


presented to the Board. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. 


 DR. WADE: And the Board then asked SC&A to 


look into the issue and had a working group 


formed. What would happen, John, again, the 


way the Board and its working groups have done 


its business is that the working group doesn’t 


bring a formal recommendation to the Board. 


But what would happen is we have an 


agenda spot set aside for Chapman Valve SEC 


petition. The opportunity would be there for 


the petitioners or their representatives to 


speak if they would like. And then I think 


the working group would provide its thoughts 


to the Board, not in the form of a formal 


recommendation, but the Chair, or in your case 


someone that you would designate, would say to 


the Board we’ve looked into these issues. 


Here’s what we found. 


There’d be an opportunity for SC&A to 


comment if the Board would like to hear from 


SC&A. There’d be the opportunity for a 

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minority report if whoever’s making the 


presentation if another work group member had 


other thoughts that they would like. Enriched 


by that, that is, petitioners’ comments, 


working group report delivered by a 


representative of the working group, minority 


reports if appropriate, comments by SC&A. 


Then the Board would go back to the 


petition and decide how it wanted to proceed. 


It could decide it wanted to move forward and 


make a recommendation on the petition. It 


could decide it wanted more information. So 


that’s a long answer. The short answer is 


that the work group needs to be prepared to 


make a fairly succinct and as much of a 


consensus report out to the Board as possible 


next week. 


DR. POSTON: Okay, now you brought up the 


major problem for me is next week I’m going to 


be, as we say, behind the fence. That is, 


when you go to some of these DOE sites, you 


don’t have any way to communicate. So someone 


on this work group will have to represent the 


thoughts of the work group to the Board 


because I won’t be even able to communicate by 

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telephone. 


 DR. WADE: Well, Chapman Valve for the 


record is scheduled for next Thursday, May 3rd , 


at 4:00 p.m. 


DR. ROESSLER: John, this is Gen. I’d be 


willing to make the presentation as long as 


you have some time this week to work with me 


on it. 


DR. POSTON: Okay, I should have some time. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, I have to leave on 


Sunday, so I’d have to work on it before then. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: I also think good practice, 


particularly given this very special case 


would be if all of the working group members 


could have an opportunity to see it either to 


say they agreed with it or to prepare to make 


some sort of minority statement if they 


wished. I don’t anticipate that; I’m just 


leaving open the possibility for good 


practice. 


So if John’s and Gen’s sort of report 


could be in a form that the other work group 


members could see it and have an opportunity 


to comment or prepare comments for real time 

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delivery, I think that would be a good thing. 


DR. POSTON: Okay, we could try to get it 


done this week since Gen said she had to get 


it done this week. 


I guess, Lew, the other thing is based 


on what I’ve heard one would lean toward this 


is not an SEC situation, that NIOSH seems to 


have the information necessary to do the dose 


evaluations. Is that the next step? Is that 


what we’re going to talk about? 


 DR. WADE: Well, I think now again you would 


need to frame your thoughts with Gen and now 


you’ve told the rest of the work group what 


your thoughts are. Awaiting other detail 


there could be a discussion of that now, and 


you could see if you had consensus for that. 


Others might want to wait to see more formally 


what you have to say, but again, I think that 


would come as comments from the work group. 


SC&A would have an opportunity to comment, and 


then the Board would pick it up. So I think 


it’s quite reasonable for you to give a sense 


to the work group of where you think this is 


going and see if you have consensus of your 


work group. 

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DR. POSTON: Okay, well, based on the 


discussions that we’ve had in the last three 


meetings, it seems to me that the report to 


the Board would indicate that we believe that 


with their conservative assumptions of chronic 


exposure over 16 months and then bioassays, 


they have the ability to estimate the doses 


sufficiently for this purpose, and this would 


not be an SEC issue. So that would be, that’s 


how I see it. And if there’s a dissention, I 


guess we need to know about it or would like 


to know about it. 


Anybody want to speak to that? 


MR. GRIFFON: I agree. For the time period 


in question in this --


DR. POSTON: Right, right, only for the time 


period in question. I’m not --


MR. GRIFFON: I just think we might want to 


say something to that and maybe, if possible, 


get DOL to give us a report in May because I 


know that’s one question that the Senator’s 


office has had, ongoing questions about. So I 


think we need to make sure that DOL is on top 


of this, and we are researching this. It’s 


not going to drop off after this petition’s --

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DR. POSTON: Okay, so let me make sure I 


understand, Mark. So what we’re saying is for 


this time period, the 16-month time period 


that we’ve been discussing, you’re in 


agreement. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. POSTON: But the enriched uranium and 


all the other stuff raise other issues that 


need to be looked at by --


MR. GRIFFON: It’s this question of whether 


there were other operations prior to or 


possibly post but more likely prior to this 


time period. 


DR. ROESSLER: John, I think it would be 


helpful if you state the dates for the record 


of this 16-month time period. 


DR. POSTON: I’m going to have to dig 


through my paper to do that. 


DR. ROESSLER: I think I have it here, and 


let’s see if Lew agrees. I think it’s January 


1st, 1948 through December 31st, 1949, and then 


I’m not so clear about this, but then there’s 


another date on here, January 1st, 1991. I 


don’t think this really goes as part of it. 


MR. ROLFES: Gen, this is Mark Rolfes. I 

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can clarify the dates for you if you’d like. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


MR. ROLFES: The current 16-month time 


period that we’re talking about was the 


assumed chronic intake and exposure time 


period associated with the uranium machining 


operation which was conducted from January 1st , 


1948 through April 30th, 1949. 


DR. ROESSLER: April 30th, okay. 


MS. BLOOM: That’s our assumed end date. 


The DOE assigned dates of ’48 to ’49 for the 


operational period, the AWE period. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, I think we need to have 


that on the record. 


 DR. WADE: I’ll ask Jeff Kotsch. Jeff, are 


you still with us? 


MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, I’m here. 


 DR. WADE: The work group is asking that if 


possible, DOL covers the status of this during 


their program update or in real time during 


this discussion. Can this serve as adequate 


request from the work group to DOL to do that? 


MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, because I’ll be there 


next week, and I want to make sure I have at 


least whatever the status of this, of the 

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review is. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, thank you. 


DR. POSTON: I’ve heard from Mark and Gen. 


How about Brad. Do you have anything? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I was just listening to 


Mark and you, and I just guess I need a little 


bit of clarification because one issue that’s 


still raised with me is the enriched uranium 


sample. But from hearing what Mark said, that 


isn’t really a part of this SEC. Is that 


correct? 


DR. POSTON: Yes. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, so we’re not just 


totally dismissing the enriched uranium 


samples that were found, right? 


DR. POSTON: Right, we’re not dismissing it. 


MR. GRIFFON: That along with those 


interviews, I guess the one interview really, 


that SC&A did, and we’re going to look into 


the possibility of whether operations --


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, then that’s --


MR. GRIFFON: -- DOL is looking at that. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, that was my only thing 


because as we’ve found at many of these other 


sites, there’s a lot of interesting stuff that 

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came in and went out that really weren’t 


documented that well. But this is just for 


the SEC petition pertaining to that time frame 


that we had discussed, correct? 


DR. POSTON: Correct. 


Mike, are you still there? 


MR. GIBSON: Yeah, I’m still here. 


DR. POSTON: Do you have anything you want 


to -- are you okay with what we’re doing? 


MR. GIBSON: Yeah, pretty much, I’m like 


Brad. I just want to make sure we don’t let, 


you know, we’ve take into consideration the 


workers’ perspective and don’t let that fall 


through the cracks even though it’s not part 


of this process. 


MR. GRIFFON: Actually, one more question, 


John. As a refresher to me, and I’m glad you 


brought up the time frames, Gen. The 16 month 


was my focus, and I think most of our focus. 


But ’91 through ’93, can someone refresh my 


memory of how, I’m sure it’s addressed in the 


site profile, but I just haven’t looked at it 


in awhile. How are you doing dose 


reconstructions for that time period? 


MS. BLOOM: Why are you picking ’91 to ’93? 

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MR. GRIFFON: I don’t know. It says ’91 to 


’93 in the evaluation report. Am I wrong? 


DR. NETON: ‘Ninety-one to ’94, I think is, 


oh, through ’95. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m looking at page seven of 


your evaluation report I thought. 


MS. BLOOM: Okay. 


DR. NETON: And a proposed class definition 


for this period was through December 31st, ’49 


and from January 1st, ’91 through December 


31st, ’93. 


DR. ROESSLER: That’s what I’m looking at so 


I need clarification on these dates. 


MR. ROLFES: I believe in our evaluation 


report we had delayed the later time period 


during remediation for a separate evaluation 


report. 


MR. GRIFFON: You did, okay. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. There was a 


time period where there was a remediation 


phase which was around the ’94, ’95 time 


period which was delayed. But then there was 


another time period before that was prior to 


remediation, but there was residual 


radioactivity prior to going into the clean-up 

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operation. 


And there was a characterization done 


as part of the, I think it may have been part 


of the FUSRAP Program, and there’s lots of 


data. That is, they got a lot of information 


of what the residual radioactivity was. I 


believe they gathered that data in the 1980s 


as part of the characterization program for 


clean up. 


And that data, if I remember, is the 


data that is being used for the purpose of 


dose reconstruction for claimants that may 


fall in that time period. I think it was ’91 


to ’94. I’m sort of doing this from 


recollection because we haven’t looked at that 


in quite some time. But I remember when I 


reviewed the evaluation report I remember 


indicating that that time period seems to be 


fairly well covered with good data because it 


was a time period that had data collected in 


the, I guess, late ‘80s. 


MS. BLOOM: It was in 1990s, and so that’s 


the data that we’ve used for the residual 


period because we didn’t have this earlier 


data which I will look at this again. But the 

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’94 and ’95 were the clean-up points. I’m 


looking at the site profile now, and it’s 


jogging my memory. But that was the clean-up 


period. 


Now, I don’t believe, I believe I 


looked at this before, and my recollection is 


that there were no Chapman employees on site 


or no claims for Chapman employees at that 


time. I think they were all offsite by that 


time. 


DR. WADE: So let’s have a concise statement 


by NIOSH of the time periods and what this 


work group is being asked to make a 


recommendation on. 


Mark? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, let’s see. I would have 


to pull up my evaluation report. I apologize. 


 DR. WADE: Why don’t you do that. 


MR. ROLFES: The main dates of discussion 


here are January 1948 through April 30th, 1949, 


which is what we have assumed in our Technical 


Basis Document. The actual covered employment 


period as covered by DOE is 1948 through the 


end of 1949. I would say that this discussion 


relates to the uranium machining and clean up, 

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1948 through our assumed date of April 30th , 


1949. 


 DR. WADE: What about the dates in the ‘90s? 


MR. ROLFES: The dates in the ‘90s, I 


apologize. I’m slow here. 


 DR. WADE: Take your time. 


MR. GRIFFON: Hey, Mark? 


MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can you tell us what document 


you’re looking at, too, so we can all be 


looking at it, too? I’m looking at C-H-A-P-ME-V-A-L-R-dot-pdf. And I’m seeing different 


dates and getting confused here. 


DR. ROESSLER: That’s why I brought it up. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, thank you, Gen. 


DR. ROESSLER: I’m looking at the SEC 


petition evaluation report that was signed and 


dated August 30th, 2006, and that’s where the 


dates don’t match up. We need to know what 


document we’re going from so we can refer to 


it. 


MR. ROLFES: Okay, yes, the proposed class 


definition in the SEC evaluation report was 


January 1st, 1948 to December 31st, 1949. 


DR. POSTON: You said the 30th? 

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DR. ROESSLER: December 31st, 1949. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s the proposed. And then 


Section 9 -- I think I’m looking at page 38 


where it clarifies it, Mark, if you want to 


look. 


MR. ROLFES: Thank you. 


MR. GRIFFON: The second paragraph is year. 


For the purposes of this evaluation, the 


period from January 1st, ’48 through April 


30th, ’49, is evaluated as the operational 


period. I think this is what you’re, if that 


helps you, Mark. 


MR. ROLFES: I’m looking at page 38 at the 


top, and it says Table 7-8 summarizes the 


results of the feasibility findings at Chapman 


Valve for each exposure source for the time 


period January 1st, 1948 to December 31st , 


1949, and from January 1st, 1991 through 


December 31st, 1993. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then on down below in 


Section 9.0 I think you, at the bottom of page 


38, the second paragraph was useful for me to 


look at. 


MR. ROLFES: Okay, for the purposes of this 


evaluation, the period from January 1st, 1948 

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through April 30th, 1949 are evaluated as the 


operational period. The periods from May 1st , 


1949 through December 31st, 1949 and from 


January 1st, 1991 through December 31st, 1993 


are evaluated as residual radioactivity 


periods. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then you, this is what you 


kind of describe. The latter time period of 


the petitioner requested class was reduced 


from ’91 through ’95, to ’91 through ’93 in 


order to expedite the evaluation of the SEC 


petition. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: For the period ’94 through ‘5, 


’94 through ’95 period, will be evaluated as a 


remediation period. That’s a separate, so 


that’s going to be a separate SEC evaluation. 


Am I reading that correct? 


MR. ROLFES: Let me verify what the actual 


class definition or initially our proposed 


class was. Yes, we did receive an initial 


proposed class definition from the petitioner 


to include ’91 to ’95. So we have evaluated 


’91 through ’93 in this document, and we would 


have to evaluate the years of 1994 and 1995 as 

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well. 


MS. BLOOM: If we have, I think we need to 


verify that we have a claim then. Is that 


true? If there’s no claim during that period, 


would that still have to be evaluated? 


MR. ROLFES: I don’t believe we have a claim 


at this time, and I’m not sure honestly how 


that would work. If we don’t have a claim, 


why we would need to evaluate --


 DR. WADE: Well, let’s just talk about what 


we’re doing now, and we’ll worry about that 


later. So what is the petition evaluation 


report that the Board will likely vote on and 


that this work group will comment on? What 


are the dates? 


MR. ROLFES: Would you like me to summarize 


that, Lew? 


 DR. WADE: Yes, please. 


MR. ROLFES: This would be January 1st, 1948 


through the end of 1949, which would be 


December 31st, 1949, and then also January 1st , 


1991 through December 31st, 1993. 


 DR. WADE: And anything that goes beyond 


12/31/93 is not being dealt with here. How, 


and if it needs to be dealt with is another 

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determination. 


DR. NETON: Lew, this is Jim Neton. I’ve 


got LaVon coming up to my office right now to 


clarify because he is the one who has his 


pulse on all these dates and where they are, 


but I think what you said is correct. I want 


to verify that that’s --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that seems correct, and 


can I ask again back to my original question. 


So we are voting on at least some residual 


periods, not the clean up periods from ’94 and 


‘5, ’94 and ’95, but this residual period 


which is what you’re saying, ’91 through ’93, 


and also May 1st of 1949 through December 31st , 


1949, are considered residual exposure time 


periods. 


How are -- and this is a refresher for 


me really, I apologize. But how are you 


assigning dose during those time periods? Is 


that in the site profile that’s based on what, 


some survey data or what’s the basis? I’m 


trying to remember. 


MS. BLOOM: It was based on the FUSRAP 

Survey data. 

DR. MAURO: And I recall one of the, and now 
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that we’re bringing these up because we really 


haven’t focused in on this in some time, I 


recall now that one of our concerns was that I 


believe the FUSRAP data were collected in the 


‘80s. And you’re applying 1980 data for that 


residual time period that covered, I guess, 


from May through December of ’49. 


That was the time period that it was 


called a residual exposure, and the 1980 data 


from FUSRAP was used as a basis for 


reconstructing doses for that time period. 


And we did express some concern that won’t 


work because of the several decades between 


those two time periods. However, conversely, 


we felt that the FUSRAP data collected, I 


believe, in the late ‘80s perhaps, whatever 


the time frame was --


MR. GRIFFON: I think it was actually the 


‘90s, right, Cindy? 


DR. MAURO: The data was collected in the 


‘90s? Okay, then that data did look good for 


the residual period that was covered in, I 


guess, it was 1990 that is part of the scope 


here, the ’91 to ’93 or ’94. So I remember, 


it’s coming back to me. I remember that it 

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looked like inadequate data to reconstruct 


doses. 


And our report says this on your 


evaluation report. But it did look like there 


were some weaknesses in using that very same 


data to reconstruct residual exposures in the 


late 1949 time period. I think that might 


still be an issue that’s on the table that we 


raised, SC&A raised, and that perhaps that’s a 


subject that we should discuss. 


MS. BLOOM: I misspoke before; there is one 


employee in that later years (sic). He was a 


stockroom/warehouse employee that was still 


onsite. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, let’s deal with the issue 


of the second half of 1949. 


MS. BLOOM: I think even there, even though 


we know things were shipped off there, I think 


that the exposure assumption for that whole 


first third of the year based on the 70 MAC is 


going to be claimant favorable for 1949 


especially when included with the later data. 


I have started to look at the 


contamination remaining based on the H.K. 


Ferguson Report. And that doesn’t initially 

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seem to contradict anything that I’ve looked 


at in terms of what the contamination levels 


that were measured in the 1990s were. So I 


think it will turn out, although I won’t swear 


to it, but I think it will turn out that the 


numbers from the FUSRAP Survey will be in the 


right ballpark and probably favorable. 


 DR. WADE: But for the second half of ’49 


you’re proposing to use the exposures from the 


first half of ’49? Is that what I heard you 


say? 


MS. BLOOM: No, I’m saying that we’ve 


already accounted for a lot of exposure during 


that period because we know that material was 


sitting in cans waiting to be shipped. And we 


weren’t sure exactly when the shipping date 


was. 


Now the report that we have is much 


more definitive in terms of saying everything 


was packaged up and things were neat and tidy 


by that date, by the end of 1948. But we’ve 


already included exposures through April 30th , 


1949 because we had some uncertainty there 


about when material was actually moved 


offsite. 

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MR. GRIFFON: I guess in theory, Cindy, 


someone could have started on May 1st, 1949, 


right? Then they’d only get the residual 


exposure. 


MS. BLOOM: Right, right. And again, I --


MR. GRIFFON: I see what you’re saying, but 


I guess there is the potential. 


MS. BLOOM: Again, I’ve started to look at 


the H.K. Ferguson data as well, and what I’m 


seeing there is that doesn’t appear to be 


contradicting anything that I’m finding in the 


regular years. 


MR. GRIFFON: Your back extrapolation from 


the ‘90s --


MS. BLOOM: Right. 


DR. MAURO: It looks like there’s a lot of 


discussion and description of the 


decontamination program that took place 


following operations with a lot of information 


there. And you’re right. If that information 


could certainly be used as a basis to compare 


to the 1990 FUSRAP data to see if they ring 


true. So I do think you have a hook upon 


which to confirm that the assumptions will 


work for those workers who might have only 

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worked there post-May 1st, 1949. 


MS. BLOOM: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Help me out. This is Brad, 


because everybody’s been throwing out dates 


there. So what dates are we actually looking 


at? I looked at the site profile, and it says 


you have production reports clear up to April 


30th, 1949. What dates are we going to be 


looking at here? 


MS. BLOOM: The site profile says that there 


was a shipment of waste offsite some time, it 


appeared there was one letter that indicated 


that it happened at the end of 1948. There 


was another letter that indicated that it 


might have happened in ’49. I found an 


inventory report from Electromat* that had a 


processing date of the Chapman Valve waste in 


April of 1949. And that’s why I assigned that 


April 30th, 1949, because I didn’t have any 


other date to close out that period. 


So although the indications were that 


the work had all been completed by the end of 


1948, we didn’t know exactly when the 


materials had shipped, and so that April 30th
 

date was a conjecture on our part. We now 

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have some more information that indicates that 


-- and I’m not sure that I saw a shipping date 


in here, but it looks like we’ve got clean up 


numbers, and we can pin the whole thing down 


better. 


 MR. CLAWSON: So this SEC petition, we are 


just looking at the end of 1948 then? 


DR. NETON: Yes, Brad, I can read to you 


right from the proposed class definition. 


It’s January 1st, 1948 through December 31st , 


1949, and then from January 1st, 1991 through 


December 31st, 1993. ‘Ninety-three, it stops 


at December 31st, 1993 because there was 


subsequent clean-up work by Bechtel for DOE. 


We don’t have the data for it. We’re 


still trying to get it, and we didn’t feel 


comfortable at that time that we were going to 


get it in a timely manner. And it turns out 


we didn’t, and so therefore to move this thing 


forward we said through December 31st, 1993 is 


as far as we can evaluate this SEC. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, I was just, there was a 


lot of different dates going around there, and 


I was kind of getting confused --


DR. NETON: But those are the two that are 

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on the proposed class definition, January ’48 


through December ’49; January ’91, December of 


’93. 


DR. MAURO: Jim, I noticed in looking at 


Appendix C of the Ferguson Report which is 


dated January 17th, 1949, it is a very detailed 


description of the decontamination operations 


at the plant. 


DR. NETON: Exactly. 


DR. MAURO: And the only thing, I guess, 


when I was looking at it, I noticed that they 


expressed lots and lots of information on 


swipe samples expressed in terms of DPM. That 


is, after clean up they took swipes, and they 


cleaned up some more and took some more 


swipes. And everything is expressed in terms 


of DPM. I’m used to seeing DPM per hundred 


centimeters squared. 


MS. BLOOM: Those are per hundred square 


centimeters in the text in there. It says 


that all wipes were taken in a hundred square 


centimeters. 


DR. MAURO: Thank you for that 


clarification. So I think I have to say from 


my perspective I think you have an enormous 

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amount of information in order to fully 


characterize the time period between May 1st , 


1949 and the end of 1949 contained in Appendix 


C to the Ferguson Report. 


MS. BLOOM: Pardon? 


MR. GRIFFON: I was asking what page that 


was on. 


DR. MAURO: Page 63. 


MR. GRIFFON: Sixty-three. 


DR. POSTON: Anything else we need to 


discuss? 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m trying to pull up the 


page. Did they talk about decontamination of 


the roof? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, everything. 


DR. NETON: It goes all the way through page 


75, so it’s a fairly detailed description of 


all the decontamination operations. 


MR. GRIFFON: That makes me happy. It looks 


like most of the contamination was on the 


roof. 


DR. NETON: A lot of it. They blew that 


back from the furnace went out on the roof. 


DR. MAURO: Yep. 


DR. POSTON: Is everybody still in agreement 

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though with the way we decided to proceed? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. POSTON: Is there anything else that we 


need to discuss on this call? 


 (no response) 


DR. POSTON: Well then, my understanding of 


how we will proceed is that Dr. Roessler and I 


will get together as soon as possible this 


week, try to put together a statement as to 


what are the conclusions of this work group, 


and we’ll circulate it to the work group so if 


anyone has comments or has a minority opinion, 


they will have the opportunity to express that 


at the May meeting. And also, that Dr. 


Roessler will represent the working group at 


the Board meeting. I will not be able to 


attend. 


Is there anything else? 


 (no response) 


DR. POSTON: Are we ready to adjourn? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Jim, this is Brad. 


DR. NETON: Yes. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Gen, Gen Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, yes, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I’ve got some work away from 

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my other work out there. I just wanted to 


make sure if you could send that to me to my 


home address. I believe that you have that. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, home e-mail address? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, that’s my msn address. 


DR. ROESSLER: Well, listen, let me jot it 


down to make sure. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, because I won’t be able 


to get my site. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, give it to me now. 


 MR. CLAWSON: [Information Redacted] 


DR. ROESSLER: I’ll make sure we use that 


one. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, thank you so much. 


DR. POSTON: Well, thank everyone for your 


time and your contributions, and we’ll get 


this out to you as soon as we can. And I’m 


sorry I’m not going to see you in Denver, but 


I’m sure I’ll see you at the next meeting. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you very much. 


DR. POSTON: Thank you everyone, bye now. 


(Whereupon, the working group meeting 


concluded at 10:40 a.m.) 

______________________________ 

86 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of April 23, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


13th day of June, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102