United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 19-3266

___________________________ 

Ria Schumacher

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SC Data Center, Inc., doing business as Colony Brands, Inc.

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

____________ 

Submitted: April 27, 2022

Filed: May 3, 2022

____________ 

Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

In February 2016, Ria Schumacher commenced this purported class action,

alleging SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x. In May 2016, the parties 

reached a tentative settlement agreement. Four days later, the Supreme Court 

decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), which led SC Data to move to 

dismiss this action for lack of standing. Without deciding standing, the district court 
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approved the settlement. This Court vacated the district court’s approval of the 

settlement agreement and remanded for a determination on whether Schumacher has 

standing to pursue her claims. Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc., 912 F.3d 1104, 

1105 (8th Cir. 2019). On remand, the district court determined that Schumacher has 

standing as to all three claims. SC Data again appeals. Because Schumacher lacks 

Article III standing to bring her FCRA claims, we vacate the district court’s orders 

and remand to the district court with directions that the case be remanded to the state 

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2015, Schumacher applied for employment with SC Data. As part 

of the application process, she responded “no” to a question asking whether she had 

ever been convicted of a felony. She added the following handwritten explanation:

“was once arrested in 1996 at age 17 and then found Not guilty.”1

 Schumacher 

signed a certification on the form attesting that the answers she provided to the 

questions were true and correct and further authorized SC Data to contact, among 

other entities, references, past or present employers, law enforcement agencies, and 

“any other sources of information which may be relevant to [her] application for 

employment.” SC Data reviewed Schumacher’s application and called her to let her 

know that it would send her links to complete pre-employment tests. After 

Schumacher completed the tests, she was offered a position to begin on October 21, 

2015. SC Data sent Schumacher an orientation email and asked her to complete an 

Authorization for Release of Information (“Authorization”) form. 

The Authorization notified Schumacher that SC Data intended to use Sterling 

Infosystems “to conduct a criminal background search.” It further stated that a 

“search will only be conducted once an offer of employment has been made.” 

1

According to public records and a book authored by Schumacher, in the late 

1990s, Schumacher, among others, was implicated in a murder case involving a drug 

deal. Although only 17 years old, she was tried as an adult, convicted, and sentenced 

to a term of 25 years in state prison. She was released after serving 12 years. 
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Schumacher was directed to read the form because it contained information 

pertaining to the FCRA and her rights under the Act. The Authorization contained 

five paragraphs of information, including:

• A statement advising Schumacher that the company may refuse or 

terminate employment if she provides false or misleading information 

on her application or during an interview.

• Authorization for Sterling Infosystems and its representatives “to 

make an independent investigation of [her] criminal records 

maintained by public and private organizations.” The form also 

contained an additional statement applicable to those applying for 

motor carrier positions.

• A statement that Schumacher would be provided with a copy of the 

report and a written description of her rights under the FCRA prior to 

the denial of an assignment, extension, reassignment, or promotion.

• A statement informing Schumacher that if she “disagree[d] with the 

accuracy of any of the information in the report” then she had five 

days from receipt of the report to notify the company. Upon a 

challenge to information in the report, the company advised 

Schumacher that it would not make a final decision until after she had 

“a reasonable opportunity to address the information contained in the 

report.” 

• A release of liability from any claims or lawsuits regarding the 

information obtained to verify her background, as well as 

authorization and a release of liability if the company, upon request, 

submits information regarding her employment to government 

agencies or private organizations.

SC Data requested, and Sterling Infosystems prepared, a “Background 

Screening Report” on Schumacher. After SC Data reviewed the report and one week 

before Schumacher wasscheduled to start, SC Data called Schumacher and informed 

her that it was withdrawing the conditional offer of employment and that a 
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confirmation letter would follow. Schumacher was afforded neither an opportunity 

to correct nor to explain the results in the report before the employment offer was 

withdrawn. Schumacher received a letter two weeks later—one week after her start 

date had passed. The letter stated: “The report received as a result of [the 

background] check contains information which, if accurate, would prevent us from 

offering you employment at this time.” The letter went on to state: “If your intent is 

to dispute the Criminal Background Report, it is required you inform us within seven 

(7) days from receipt of this letter. A final hiring decision will not be made until 

after you have had a reasonable opportunity to address the information contained in 

the report.” Enclosed with the letter was the report and a description of her rights 

available under the FCRA.

The background report Sterling Infosystems provided to SC Data consisted of 

the following components: county criminal records, an enhanced nationwide 

criminal search with national sex offender, locator-county validator, and a national 

sex offender search. The report stated that a Social Security trace/address locator 

search was completed “to locate jurisdiction for purposes of expanding the scope of 

the criminal background check.” It specifically explained that the applicant’s Social 

Security number was not checked against Social Security Administration records. 

The database searches uncovered Schumacher’s 1996 felony convictions for murder 

and armed robbery. Handwritten at the top of the report was “offer rescinded - did 

not disclose felony K.H.” Schumacher has never disputed the accuracy of the 

information. Instead, her claim is premised on a right to contextualize and explain 

negative information in her report.

Schumacher, individually and on behalf of others, commenced this action 

alleging SC Data committed three violations of the FCRA: (1) taking adverse 

employment action based on a consumer report without first providing the report to 

the applicant, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (“adverse action claim”); 

(2) obtaining a consumer report without providing a disclosure form that complied 

with the FCRA, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (“improper disclosure 

claim”); and (3) exceeding the scope of the Authorization by obtaining more 
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information than disclosed in the Authorization, in violation of 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“failure to authorize claim”).

SC Data moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 

12(h)(3) for lack of standing. The district court construed the motion as a factual 

attack on jurisdiction. The court initially denied the motion as to the adverse action 

claim and granted it as to the two remaining counts. On reconsideration, the district 

court discovered that it overlooked evidence in the record regarding Schumacher’s 

failure to authorize claim and reinstated count three. It also reinstated count two 

after re-evaluating the evidence and the law, reasoning that SC Data’s failure to 

provide a clear disclosure regarding the type of consumer report it was procuring 

amounted to a de facto injury-in-fact resulting in harm that was not only akin to a 

common law claim of invasion of privacy but also claims based on misrepresentation 

and contract. SC Data appeals, contending Schumacher lacks standing to pursue any 

of her FCRA claims.

II. ANALYSIS

 

It is well-established that a party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish 

three elements to meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) 

facts demonstrating “an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has 

construed injury in fact as meaning “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that 

is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 

(1992)). Concreteness is determined by assessing “whether the asserted harm has a 

‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a 

lawsuit in American courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various 

intangible harms” such as reputational harm. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 

__, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
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The FCRA has two goals: “to promote ‘fair and accurate credit reporting’ and 

to protect consumer privacy.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). While the FCRA

grants a person a statutory right to sue to vindicate violations of the statute, “Article 

III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” 

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. In another words, “an injury in law is not an injury in fact.” 

TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205. When courts are examining whether a plaintiff has 

suffered a concrete harm, it is important to distinguish between those that suffered a 

physical, monetary, or cognizable intangible harm from those seeking to collect 

statutorily allowed damages as a way to ensure a defendant’s compliance with the 

law. Id. at 2206. The first group has standing to pursue statutory violations while 

the latter does not. With these principles in mind, we turn to each of Schumacher’s 

FCRA claims. 

A. Adverse Action Claim

Schumacher’s first count alleges SC Data took an adverse employment action 

based on her consumer report without first showing her the report. SC Data

repeatedly disputes the characterization of the report it obtained, noting it only 

procured a “limited consumer report” reflecting Schumacher’s criminal history. 

App. Br. at 7. The FCRA defines “consumer report” as “any written, oral, or other 

communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a 

consumer’s credit worthiness . . . character, general reputation, personal 

characteristic, or mode of living . . . collected in whole or in part for the purpose of 

serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . employment 

purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). SC Data obtained a type of consumer report 

within the meaning of the statute.

As to employers seeking to gather consumer information, the FCRA provides, 

in relevant part: 

In using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any 

adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person 
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intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to 

whom the report relates - - 

(i) a copy of the report; and 

(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under 

this subchapter, as presented by the Bureau under section 

1681g(c)(3) of this title.

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). The undisputed facts establish that Schumacher was 

offered a job, given a start date, and that the job offer was rescinded before she was 

given a chance to see or respond to the consumer report. SC Data relied on 

information in the report when it took adverse employment action. Under the FCRA, 

Schumacher had an unambiguous right to receive a copy of her consumer report 

before the adverse action was taken. Nonetheless, there are competing views on 

whether an employer’s failure to comply with the FCRA by providing a copy of the 

consumer report prior to taking adverse employment action is a bare procedural 

violation or conduct that causes an intangible harm sufficient to meet minimum 

Article III requirements for standing. 

The debate over what qualifies as an “injury in fact” in the realm of consumer 

protection laws stems from competing interpretations of the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Spokeo, 578 U.S. 330. While describing Spokeo’s instruction as 

“Delphic,” one judge noted the immense amount of ink that has been spilled trying 

to decipher the difference between intangible harm sufficient for Article III standing 

and “a bare procedural violation.” Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 

1250 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Given the rather amorphous 

guidance, courts have reached different results. 

On the one side, the Third Circuit has concluded that “taking an adverse 

employment action without providing the required consumer report is ‘the very harm 

that Congress sought to prevent, arising from prototypical conduct proscribed’ by 

the FCRA.” Long v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 324 (3d Cir. 

2018) (quoting Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
-8- 

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit determined that a plaintiff had standing to pursue her 

adverse action claim, finding that an informational injury can be concrete when the 

plaintiff is entitled to receive and review substantive information because 

“[p]roviding context may be more valuable than contesting accuracy” since 

“information that seems damning at first glance might not be so bad in context.” 

Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018). 

On the other side, the Ninth Circuit has found Article III standing wanting 

when the plaintiff failed to show “actual harm or a material risk of harm.” Dutta v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2018). The Dutta 

court reasoned that none of the inaccuracies or explanations the plaintiff would have 

provided to the prospective employer would have changed the employer’s decision

to deny admission into its hiring program. Id. 

The harm present in the cases where courts found standing for a violation of 

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) was premised on a prospective employee’s right to 

discuss with an employer the information in the consumer report prior to the 

employer taking an adverse action. However, the right to pre-action explanation to 

the employer is not unambiguously stated in the text of the statute. To find such a 

right, we would have to infer that Congress, by requiring an employer to provide a 

prospective employee a copy of the consumer report before the employer takes an 

adverse action, also intended to afford an opportunity for job applicants or 

employees to explain to the employer any information, both accurate and inaccurate,

contained in the report. At least one court examining this issue has concluded that 

while the FCRA provides a right to dispute inaccurate information in a consumer 

report, there is no right mandating an employer provide a prospective or current 

employee an opportunity to dispute or explain the contents of the report directly with 

the employer. Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 953 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020). In 

Walker, the court concluded there was no provision of the FCRA that establishes a 

right to dispute a report with an employer directly, as opposed to with the consumer 

reporting agency, and noted the lack of authority to suggest the right to dispute is 

broader than what is set forth in the plain language of the statute. Id. at 1093. 
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The legislative history comports with the Walker court’s interpretation. When

Congress amended the FCRA in 1996, the “driving force behind the changes was 

the significant amount of inaccurate information that was being reported by 

consumer reporting agencies and the difficulties that consumers faced getting such 

errors corrected.” S. Rep. No. 108-166, at 5-6 (2003). In addressing this issue, the 

Committee expressed concerns regarding employers’ use of consumer reports

because they “may create an improper invasion of privacy.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, 

at 35 (1995). The Committee was also concerned about the “unreasonable harm” 

current and prospective employees may endure “if there are errors in their reports.” 

Id. The Committee bill, therefore, required employers, before taking an adverse 

action based on a consumer report, to give the current or prospective employee “a 

copy of the report, a description of the individual’s rights under the FCRA, and a 

reasonable opportunity to respond to any information that is disputed by the 

consumer.” Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-486 (1994) (documenting under 

“Explanation of Legislation Title I – Amendments to Fair Credit Reporting Act – 

Sec. 103. Furnishing Consumer Reports; Use for Employment Purposes” that 

employers “must also provide the consumer with a reasonable period to respond to 

any information in the report that the consumer disputes and with written notice of 

the opportunity and time period to respond”). The legislative history does not evince 

a right afforded to an employee or prospective employee to provide context as to 

negative information in a consumer report nor otherwise discuss directly with the 

employer accurate information in the report.

Neither the text of the FCRA nor the legislative history provide support for 

Schumacher’s claim that she has a right under the FCRA to not only receive a copy 

of her consumer report, but also discuss directly with the employer accurate but 

negative information within the report prior to the employer taking adverse action. 

While it is true that Schumacher did not receive a copy of her report prior to 

rescindment of the job offer, she has not claimed the report was inaccurate. SC Data 

wrote on the report the reason for the job offer withdrawal—the undisclosed felony 

convictions. Schumacher may have demonstrated an injury in law, but not an injury 

in fact. One of the primary goals of the FCRA is to protect consumers and employees 
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from the dissemination of inaccurate information. We decline Schumacher’s request 

to create an additional right under the FCRA—that is, the right to explain to a 

prospective employer negative but accurate information in a consumer report prior 

to the employer taking an adverse employment action. Schumacher’s adverse action 

claim is not redressable under the plain language of the statute.

B. Improper Disclosure Claim

Schumacher next asserts that SC Data obtained her consumer report without 

first providing her with a disclosure form that complied with the FCRA. 

Specifically, Schumacher contends the disclosure was not clear and conspicuous

because most of the text in the Authorization was no larger than six-point font, 

constituting “eye-straining text” within “a host of non-disclosure language.” App. 

Br. at 23. She also contends the Authorization was non-conforming because it did 

not use the words “consumer report” and did not tell her that a consumer report may 

be procured for employment purposes, although it did expressly inform her that a 

criminal background search would be conducted only after an offer of employment 

was made. Another alleged non-conforming defect was that the Authorization 

violated the “solely” mandate by including extraneous information, such as a 

statement regarding the consequences for failing to provide accurate or complete 

information, information applicable only to those applying for motor carrier 

positions, release of liability provisions, and information about what to do if the 

report contains disputed information.

When a consumer report is procured for employment purposes, the FCRA 

requires an employer to provide to the applicant “a clear and conspicuous” written 

disclosure “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). Even so, “Congress did not enact § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) 

to protect job applicants from disclosures that do not satisfy the requirements of that 

section; it did so to decrease the risk that a job applicant would unknowingly consent 

to allowing a prospective employer to procure a consumer report.” Groshek v. Time 

Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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This Court has held that, without something more, a technical violation under

§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) is insufficient to confer standing. See Auer v. Trans Union, LLC, 

902 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 2018) (even if there are technical violations of the statute, 

a plaintiff who consents to the procurement of her consumer information for 

employment purposes must specifically plead facts of an intangible injury sufficient 

to show she suffered a concrete injury); see also Groshek, 865 F.3d at 887 (finding 

no concrete privacy injury in light of employee’s admission that he signed the 

disclosure and authorization form and made no allegation that he was confused by 

it). The “something more” may encompass facts indicating the additional 

information caused confusion as to the consent being given; that the employee would 

not have provided consent but for the extraneous information; or that the disclosure 

was so lacking in clarity that the employee was unaware that a consumer report 

would be procured. Groshek, 865 F.3d at 887. Absent specific facts describing the 

harm, a plaintiff has alleged nothing more than a statutory violation “completely 

removed from any concrete harm or appreciable risk of harm.” Id. 

Schumacher’s improper disclosure claim consists of a panoply of alleged 

defects in the Authorization along with an allegation that SC Data acted in willful 

disregard of the Federal Trade Commission’s guidance and the unambiguous 

language of the statute. Notably absent is any claim of harm, neither tangible nor 

intangible. Schumacher has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due 

to the improper disclosure. She lacks standing to pursue her improper disclosure 

claim. See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2206 (explaining persons not seeking to 

remedy any harm to themselves but instead are simply seeking to ensure a 

defendant’s compliance with the law lack Article III standing). 

C. Failure to Authorize Claim

Schumacher’s last claim is that she did not authorize SC Data to obtain a 

consumer report. She did, however, explicitly authorize Sterling Infosystems to 

conduct a criminal background search and “make an independent investigation of 

[her] criminal records maintained by public and private organizations.” 
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The document prepared by Sterling Infosystems was titled “Background 

Screening Report.” While the report contained information about Schumacher’s 

criminal history, it did not contain any information about Schumacher’s credit 

history or worthiness, personal characteristics, or other information that is typically 

included in a comprehensive consumer report. Nonetheless, the Authorization (and 

report obtained by SC Data), though not employing the term “consumer report,” fits 

within the FCRA’s broad definition of consumer report set forth in 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681a(d)(1). 

The FCRA precludes an employer from obtaining a consumer report unless 

the employee “has authorized in writing . . . the procurement of the report.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). It is indisputable that Schumacher authorized SC Data 

to obtain a type of consumer report documenting her criminal history. Sterling 

Infosystems utilized several databases to conduct an expansive criminal background 

check. The only arguable search that was “non-criminal” pertained to the database 

search listed as “National Sex Offender.” 

As noted by SC Data, there is a public National Sex Offender Website that 

enables anyone to search for the identify and location of convicted sex offenders. 

https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/sex-offender-registry (last visited Feb. 24, 

2022). The public website, coordinated by the United States Department of Justice, 

allows an individual to search for the latest information on known sex offenders from 

all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and numerous Indian 

tribes. In contrast, the National Sex Offender Registry is a database available only 

to law enforcement that is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Criminal Justice Information Services Division. Schumacher does not suggest nor 

is there evidence to indicate the database used by Sterling Infosystems went beyond 

the information available in the public database. By definition, a person would only 

be included in the database if he or she had a qualifying criminal conviction for a 

sex offense. The sex offender database has a relationship to a person’s criminal 

background. Because Schumacher consented to a criminal background check, which 

a search of a sex offender registry is not so unrelated to criminal history so as to 
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plainly fall outside the scope of the Authorization, Schumacher has failed to plead 

an intangible injury to her privacy that is sufficient to confer Article III standing. 

See Auer, 902 F.3d at 877 (finding no intangible injury sufficient to confer standing 

when a plaintiff’s consents to the invasion of a protected interest). 

Assuming arguendo that conducting a search in the national sex offender 

database went beyond the scope of Schumacher’s authorization because it is “noncriminal” in nature, the only possible harm noted by the district court was invasion 

of privacy. Schumacher, however, has not pleaded any facts demonstrating a 

concrete harm—a prerequisite for Article III standing. See Sofka v. Thal, 662 

S.W.2d 502, 509-10 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (noting “invasion of privacy” is a general 

term used to describe four different torts, each with distinct elements and a separate 

interest that can be invaded); see also Auer, 902 F.3d at 878 (explaining speculative 

harm, a “naked assertion” of harm devoid of further factual development, and even 

general factual allegations of injury fall short of plausibly establishing injury 

sufficient for Article III standing). Schumacher lacks standing to pursue her failure 

to authorize claim. 

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s orders. When a case 

is in federal court because it has been removed there by the defendant and it turns 

out the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the claims, “the case 

shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 

F.3d 1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that if a case has been removed to federal 

court and the plaintiff lacks Article III standing to confer federal jurisdiction, “the 

federal court must remand the case to the state court from whence it came”). We 

remand to the district court with instructions to return this case to the state court.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

I agree that Schumacher has failed to allege an injury in fact and therefore 

lacks standing to pursue her claims under the FCRA. I write separately to clarify 

my reasoning and my understanding of the scope of the court’s ruling.

I agree that SC Data obtained a credit report, as defined by the FCRA, and 

took an adverse action as to Schumacher before providing her with a copy of that 

report, in violation of the statute. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, 

Inc. v. Robins, the question then is whether Schumacher has alleged a “concrete 

injury” or only “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm.” 578 

U.S. 330, 341 (2016). Here, Schumacher has not alleged any harm that arose from 

SC Data’s failure to provide a copy of the report before informing her of the adverse 

employment action. She was ultimately provided with a copy of the report, and she 

has not suggested there was anything in that report she would have disputed if not 

for the fact that SC Data withdrew her offer of employment before providing the 

copy. Therefore, Schumacher has not pleaded an essential element of constitutional 

standing—a concrete injury.

Second, I agree that the legislative history highlighted in the court’s opinion 

suggests that Congress’s focus was on “disputed” information in a consumer report. 

This is relevant because in Spokeo the Supreme Court noted that Congress plays a 

role in “identifying and elevating intangible harms” when it legislates and that 

Congress’s judgment is “instructive and important,” though not definitive, in 

identifying intangible harms for purposes of constitutional standing. Id. To the 

extent the court relies on the legislative history of the FCRA to conclude that 

Congress identified and elevated only intangible harms that involve disputed

information, I agree that a “dispute” is necessary for a plaintiff to have standing.2

 

2

I also note that the term “disputed” used in the statute’s legislative history is 

not an exact synonym for “inaccurate.” One can imagine factual scenarios in which 

a consumer genuinely “disputes” information contained in a report without it being 
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I do not understand our opinion as going further, as that would inappropriately 

collapse the non-jurisdictional issues of statutory standing or the scope of a cause of 

action into the jurisdictional question of constitutional standing. As I read the 

opinion, it does not create a heightened burden for standing in the context of the 

FCRA or rule out standing in any case where there is an alleged dispute over the 

information contained in the report and the report is not properly disclosed. In 

Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reviewed a dismissal for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), not a motion 

challenging the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), see 953 F.3d 1080, 

1086 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020), but the citation is relevant to the extent it informs an 

analysis of the type of harm Congress identified for standing purposes. See

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (“For standing purposes, 

therefore, an important difference exists between (i) a plaintiff’s statutory cause of 

action to sue a defendant over the defendant’s violation of federal law, and (ii) a 

plaintiff’s suffering concrete harm because of the defendant’s violation of federal 

law.”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (“[I]t may be said that 

jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal court has the power, under the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case; . . . cause of action is a 

question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that 

may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court.” (citations 

omitted) (emphasis in original)). The scope of a plaintiff’s right under the FCRA is 

a merits question not before this court: the parties in this case entered a settlement 

agreement as to the merits of Schumacher’s claims. The only remaining question is 

whether the district court has jurisdiction to approve that settlement. I agree that it 

does not. 

One final note as to Schumacher’s failure-to-authorize claim. In my view, it 

is not necessary to speculate whether the “national sex offender” search included in 

Schumacher’s credit report was coextensive with publicly available information on 

categorically “inaccurate.” That is not the situation alleged here, however, and so 

further exploration of the distinction is not necessary.
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the National Sex Offender Website. The fact that Schumacher has not alleged SC 

Data obtained any information beyond the scope of the authorized search is 

dispositive of the third claim. 

______________________________