Opinion issued September 1 6 , 2021

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 19
- 01006
- CV

——————————— HARRIS COUNTY ( SELF
- INSURED ) , Appella nt V. L EVENT DOGAN , Appell e e
On Appeal from the 189th District Court

Harris Coun t y, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2017
- 14504

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal in a workers ’ compensation case. Appellee Levent Dogan suffered a heart attack whi le tr ain ing to be a Har ris County Sheriff ’ s Office deputy. He sought workers ’ compensation be n efi ts, but a hearing officer and an

a dministrative appeals panel found that h is hea rt attack was not compensab le and2

that he had no disabi lity

. Dogan sought judicial re view in the district court , and a jury found that he did have a compensable heart attac k . The trial cou rt entered judgment in D ogan ’ s favor, finding that he su stained a comp en sable injury in the form of a heart attack and that he was disabled from March 10 , 201 6 to July 10,
2 016. Harris County appealed. On appeal, Harris County argues that ( 1) the court erred by entering judgment that Dogan suffered a disability because he did not request a jury question on disability and none was submitted to the jur y; (2 ) the court erred by submitting a liability question ask ing whether Dogan suffered an “ i nju ry ” ; and (3) the judgment is void because Dogan did not comply with a statutory requirement to file a c opy of the pro posed judgment wit h the Division of Workers ’ Comp ensation (the

“ Division ” ) prio r to ent ry. We conclude that Dogan ’ s failure to timely f ile wi th the Division the proposed judgment that was actually signed by the court rendered the trial court ’ s judgment void. We dismiss thi s appeal for want of jurisd iction. Backg round On March 9, 201 6, Dogan suffered a heart attack after running a mile a s part of his training to become a Harris County Sher iff ’ s Office deputy. He was taken by ambulance to an emergency room , and l ater , he under went hear t cathe terization and the placem ent of four stents.3

Dogan filed a claim for workers ’ compensation. Th e pa r ti es fai led to resol ve disputed issues at a b en efits review con ference, and a contested case hearing was
held , specifically a ddressing whether Dogan ’ s h eart attack was a result of the natural progression of underlying disease or was caused by the physical st ress a nd exertion during the work

- r elated traini ng exercises

. The hearin g offi cer found the f ollowing facts:

. . . . 3. [ Dogan ’ s] heart attack was n ot caused by a specific eve nt occurring in the course and scope of his employ ment with Harris County as a correc tions officer. 4. The p reponderance of the medica l evidence regard ing th e heart attack indicates that [Dogan ’ s] work was not a substantial contr ibuting fact or of the attac k. 5. The preponderance of the medical evid ence regarding the heart attack i n di cates th at [Dogan ’ s] heart attack was a result of a pre

existing conditi on and the natural pr ogression of that pre

- existing condition. 6. The heart at tack of March 9, 2016 was a cause of [Dogan ’ s] inability to obtain and retain employment at wa ge s equiv a le nt to his preinjury wage during the period in dispute, from March 10, 20 16 thr ough July 10, 2 016, but at no other times thr ough the date of the contes ted case hearing in th is ma tter. The hearing officer concluded that : (1) Dog an “ did not susta in a com p en sable heart attack on March 9, 2016, ” and (2) “ [ b]ecause the c laimed injury is not compensable, [Dogan] had no di sability. ”4

T he appe als panel adopted the heari ng officer ’ s decision and order , and Dogan filed a lawsuit seek ing judicial review. Dogan chal l en ged th e conc lusion s that his

“ inj ury was not compensable and that he had no disability

. ” He challe nged the determination s tha t “ he did not sustain a compensable heart attack on March 9, 2016 and a follow

- on injury on March 15, 2016 ” and th at “ he di d not su stain d isability

. ” A jury found that Dogan had sustained a compensa ble heart attack and rec eived an injury in the cour se and scope of his employ ment with Harris C ounty. On August 30, 3019, Dogan moved for entry of judgment on the verdict and attached a p ropose d final judgment. He served the motion and proposed final judgme nt on the Gen er al Coun sel for the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers ’ Compensation ( “ the Division ” ) by certified mail, return receipt
reques ted. On September 23, 2019, Do gan re q uested that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a second , revised pro posed final judgment , which was served on the Division seven days befor e the trial court entered judgment

. The trial cou rt entered findings o f fact a nd conclusions of law regarding disability and b ased on the hearing officer ’ s repo rt

. On September 30, 2 019, t he trial
court enter ed final judgment that Dogan sustained a compensable injury in the form
of a he a rt attack and t hat he was disabled fr o m March 10, 2016 to J uly 10, 2016. Harris County appea led.5 Analysis Harris County raises three issues on appeal , but we focus on its th ird issu e, which is disposit ive. In its third issue, Harris County argues that the trial court ’ s judgment is ent irely vo i d becaus e Dogan failed to provide the Division of Work ers ’ Compensation a copy of the proposed judgment p rior to entry in co m pli ance with th e Labor Code. T he Texas Labor Code provides: The party who initia ted a proceeding under this subchapter [Subchapter F. Judi c ial R evie w

— Gen eral P rovisions] or Subcha pter G [ Subchapter G. Judicial Re view of Issues Regarding Compensability or Income or Death Benefits] must file any proposed judgment or settlement , including a proposed default judgment or pro posed agreed j u dg ment, with the [D] ivision no t later than the 30 th da y before the date on which the court is scheduled to enter the judgme nt or approve the settlement. T EX
. L ABOR C ODE § 410.258 (a) (emphasis added)

. “Di vision ” means the “ division of workers ’ compensation o f the d epartment , ” and “ de partme nt ” means “ the T e xas Department of Insurance. ” T EX
. L ABOR C ODE § 401.011(13

- a) (department); i d. § 401.011(1 6

- a) ( division). Section 410.258 “ gives the Division the right to intervene in a judicial review proceeding. ” Univ

. o f Te x. Sys. v. T

homas , 464 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. App

. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.)

. Section 410.258(f) provides : “ A judgment entered or settlement approved without complying with the requirements of this section is void. ” T EX
. L ABOR C ODE § 410.258 ( f)

. Some courts of appeals have held that the notice r equirement in section
410. 2 58 does not app ly to judgments entered after fully adversarial proceedings,6

such as contested summary

- judgment motions or a trial. See, e.g. , Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Elmer , No. 0 5

- 1 9

- 0038 6

- CV, 2020 WL 5525181, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Sept. 15, 2020, pet. d enied ) (mem. op.) ; Clewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of A merica , 287 S.W.3d 197, 202

– 03 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) ; Tex

. Property & Casualty Ins

. Guaranty Ass ’

n for Petroi ns uran ce Casualty Co. v. Brooks , 269 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. App.

—

Austin 2008, no pet.)

. However, this court has held t hat compliance with the notice provision of section 41 0 .258 “ is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to give the requi red notice r e nder s a judgment void

. ” Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson , 212 S.W.3d 797, 800

– 01 (Tex

. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)

. We have held that the notice requirement applies “ in all cases ” and that

“ regar d less of whe ther the trial court renders judg ment after an adversar ial proceeding . . . the part y ini ti a ting judicial review of th e D ivision ’ s decision must send notice of the proposed judgment to the Division pursuant to section 410. 258 or the trial co urt ’ s judgment is void. ” Thomas , 464 S.W.3d at 7 59

. Dogan sent the Di vision notice of the first proposed judgment he filed on August 30, 2019, an d he sent the Division notice of his second, revised proposed judgment on September 23, 2019. The trial court si g ned the seco nd , revised proposed judgment on Sept e mber 30, 2019

. Al though Dogan served both proposed ju dgments with the Division, he failed to timely file the proposed judgment that was actually signed by the court by serving it a mere seven days

— not 30 d a ys

—

before7

th e date on which the court was sch edule d to enter judgm ent

. Because D ogan did
not comply wit h section 410.25 8(a ) ’ s mand a tory and jurisdic tional notice requirement , we hold that the judgment is void. We su stain Harris County ’ s t hird issue. See T E X
. L ABOR C OD E § 410.258 (a) ( r equiring “any ” p ropos ed judgment to be filed with the Division); Thomas , 4 64 S.W.3d at 759 (failure t o comply with statute
renders trial co urt judgment void); Jackson , 212 S.W.3d at 800

– 01 (same; statute is manda tory and ju risd ictional). Conclusion
W e dismiss the appeal for l ack of appellate jurisdiction

. See Thomas , 464 S.W.3d at 760 ; Jackson , 212 S.W.3 d at 799 ( “ [ A] void judgment is a legal nullity, and the trial court retains plena ry power to dispose of the case by ren dering a va lid
fi nal judgment. ” ).

Peter K elly Jus tice Panel cons ists of Justices Kelly, Land au , and Hightower

.