THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


ROCKY FLATS
 

VOL. I 


The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held in Hebron, Kentucky on August 31, 


2006. 

2 

 6 

C O N T E N T S
 

August 31, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


SUPER S MODEL 16 


NEUTRON DOSE/TIB-58 COWORKER MODEL 

INTERNAL DATA 


18 


OTHER RADIONUCLIDES 49 


INTERNAL COWORKER MODEL/TIB-38 76 


D&D WORKER DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 175 


DATA RELIABILITY: 193 


EXTERNAL DATA 232 


SAFETY REPORTS 254 


INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS IN PETITION 317 


’69 DOSIMETRY GAPS 323 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 367 

3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

 

4

1 

 P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 

5 

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

ALLEN, DAVE, NIOSH 


BARKER, KAY, ANWAG 


BARRIE, TERRIE, ANWAG 


BRACKETT, LIZ, ORAUT 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC 


BUCHANAN, RON, SC&A 


CHEW, MEL, ORAUT 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


FALK, ROGER, ORAUT 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


JESSEN, KARIN, ORAUT 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


LIPSZTEIN, JOYCE, SC&A 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MCFEE, MATT, ORAUT 


MEYER, BOB, ORAUT 


MUNN, WANDA 


POTTER, GENE, ORAUT 


RICH, BRYCE 


ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY, SC&A 


SHARFI, MUTTY 


ULSH, BRANT, NIOSH 

6 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (9:30 a.m.) 

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WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO


 DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade, and I have the 


pleasure of serving as the Designated Federal 


Official for the Advisory Board, and would like 


to welcome you to a working group meeting. 


This is a working group that has devoted itself 


to -- to many issues. Today it's looking 


specifically at issues that surround Rocky 


Flats. It started by looking at the Rocky 


Flats site profile and now has sort of focused 


its efforts on those issues in the Rocky Flats 


site profile that are germane to the Board's 


consideration of the Rocky Flats SEC petition. 


And again, this is a long-working and hardworking working group. 


It's chaired by Mark Griffon and its members 


currently include Mike Gibson and Robert 


Presley. I will talk a little bit about 


membership of the group in a moment as I 


explain to you the current status of Wanda 


Munn. 

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But before I do that, let me ask if there are 


any Board members on the call at the current 


time? 

 MR. GIBSON: Lew, this is Mike. I'm here. 

 DR. WADE: Okay, Mike. Welcome. Any other 

Board members on the call? 

 (No responses) 

Okay, we don't have a quorum of the Board and I 


didn't think there was any risk that we would. 


That's something that I need to check into. 


Let me deal with the situation with regard to 


Wanda Munn. I think -- for those of you who 


haven't heard any of it, I'll start at the very 


beginning and go quickly. The Board has a 


policy of rotating members off periodically. 


was notified that the White House, who handles 


such appointments to this Board, had made the 


decision to rotate off Wanda Munn. This was 


some months ago. But I made that announcement 


and we proceeded down that path. I was then 


notified that Wanda had been reappointed -- the 


intention was for Wanda to be reappointed to 


the Board, and that is my current belief, that 


we are in the process of having Wanda 


reappointed to the Board. It's my extreme hope 


I 
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that Wanda will be reappointed to the Board and 


duly seated by the mid-September Board meeting 


in Las Vegas. 


While Wanda was absent from the Board, the 


Board took an action to re-staff its working 


groups based upon the fact that Wanda and Dr. 


DeHart were being rotated off the Board. With 


regard to this working group, the Board decided 


to leave its current members of Griffon, Gibson 


and Presley and not add any additional members. 


So technically speaking today, as best I know, 


Wanda is not a member of the Advisory Board. 


If Wanda was to be a member of the Advisory 


Board by the executive action, she would not be 


a member of this working group until the Board 


reinstates her, which I have every expectation 


it will do, but the Board can only take actions 


when it meets with a quorum present. So I 


would imagine the Board would address itself to 


that issue early on in its deliberations in 


September. So we're left with this call and 


its work. 


I've always believed that one should make their 


decisions based upon what serves the process 


and the people best. And I believe that the 

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process and the people would be best served by 


having Wanda participate fully in this working 


group call -- not as a member of the working 


group, not as a member of the Board, but we 


have let members of the public participate in 


this process when it's the opinion -- when it's 


my opinion and the opinion of the chair that 


the process is better served by their 


participation. 


I've discussed this with the chair and he 


concurs. I am inclined to allow Wanda to 


participate fully in this working group. 


Remember, it's not a subcommittee, it's not a 


committee, it takes no formal action. I am 


inclined to allow Wanda to fully participate in 


this call of the working group, but I would 


open it up to any comment that any would like 


to make pro or con the position I'm putting 


forward. 


So is there anyone on the call or around the 


table who would like to speak to the issue of 


Wanda's participation in this working group 


call? 


 MR. GIBSON: Lew, this is Mike. I agree. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Mike. 

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 DR. WADE: Okay. Hearing no objection then, 


for the record, I would make the decision that 


the working group would invite and encourage 


Wanda to participate fully in these 


deliberations. 


 Wanda, we appreciate your being with us and we 


appreciate your forbearance in this, certainly. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you, Lew. I understand. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Okay, so now to the 


business of introductions. We'll go around the 


table here. Again, as members of the SC&A or 


NIOSH or the ORAU team identify themselves, 


please identify any conflicts you have -- 


personal conflicts you have with regard to our 


deliberations. Then we'll hear from people on 


the line, and then finally you'll get -- be 


able to get down to work. 


This is Lew Wade and I serve as the Designated 


Federal Official of the Advisory Board. 


 MS. JESSEN: I'm Karin Jessen and I work with 


ORAU -- the ORAU team, and I have no personal 


conflicts. 


 DR. ULSH: This is Brant Ulsh with NIOSH, no 


conflicts. 


MR. MEYER: Bob Meyer with the ORAU team, no 

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conflicts. 

 MS. HOWELL: Emily Howell with HHS, no 

conflicts. 

DR. MAURO: John Mauro with SC&A, no conflicts. 

MR. ALLEN: Dave Allen with NIOSH, no 

conflicts. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Larry Elliott, NIOSH, no 


conflicts. 


 MR. CHEW: Mel Chew, ORAU team, no conflicts. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A, no 


conflicts. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani, SC&A, no 


conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Let me ask that -- oh, I'm sorry. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And Mark Griffon -- that's all 


right. Mark Griffon, no con-- no conflicts. 


No comments, either. 


 DR. WADE: I -- I -- okay. On the line do we 


have other federal employees who are on this 


call in an official capacity? 


 MR. KOTSCH: Jeff Kotsch for the Department of 


Labor. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Jeff. 


 MR. BROEHM: Jason Broehm from the CDC 


Washington office. 

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 DR. WADE: Welcome, Jason. Other federal 


employees on this call in an official capacity? 


 (No responses) 


Other members of the NIOSH contract family, 


ORAU team? 


 MR. FALK: This is Roger Falk, and yes, I am 


conflicted. 


MS. BRACKETT: This is Liz Brackett, I'm not 


conflicted. 


MR. MCFEE: Matt McFee with the ORAU team. I 


am not conflicted at Rocky. 


 MR. POTTER: Gene Potter, ORAU team, 


conflicted. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Ron Buchanan, SC&A, not 


conflicted. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Ron. Always a pleasure to 


have you with us. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Other members of the SC&A team? 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Kathy Demers, not 


conflicted. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome, Kathy. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Joyce Lipsztein, SC&A, no 


conflict. 


 DR. WADE: Any other of our colleagues from 

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SC&A? 


 (No responses) 


Anybody else on the line who wants to identify 


themselves? 


 MS. MUNN: This is Wanda Munn. I'm confused 


but not conflicted. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Wanda we -- you must have 


drifted away. We -- could you repeat your 


comment, Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: I said I'm not conflicted, only 

confused. 

 DR. WADE: Okay, no --

 MR. GIBSON: This is Mike, I have no conflicts. 


 DR. WADE: Well, I share your confusion. 


Anyone else who wants to identify? Do we have 


petitioners or petitioners' representatives on 


the call who wish to identify themselves? 


 MS. BARRIE: This is Terrie Barrie with ANWAG. 


 MS. BARKER: Kay Barker with ANWAG. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you both for joining us. We 


appreciate your participation. And feel free 


to participate as fully as you would like. 


 MS. BARKER: Thank you. 


 MS. BARRIE: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Anyone else? 

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 (No responses) 


Okay, Mark. Sorry. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I guess we'll -- we'll 


start the workgroup meeting off and I -- I'm 


trying to wonder -- trying to figure out if we 


should work -- I -- I think I'd rather work 


from an agenda that I drafted on the plane this 


morning on the way here rather than go through 


the entire matrix one by one. And then at the 


end of the meeting, time -- time available, we 


can double-check to make sure we didn't miss 


any matrix items. But I think I'd rather -- 


'cause there's some large priority issues that 


I don't want to miss or save till late in the 


afternoon when we're all trying to rush out of 


here, which I think would be better. So let 


me just run down the issues and then we can see 


if this makes sense. 


 MS. MUNN: Mark, (unintelligible). 

 DR. WADE: I'm sorry, Wanda, we can't hear you. 

 MS. MUNN: I asked if he might have e-mailed 

that. 

 DR. WADE: Did you e-mail? 

 MR. GRIFFON: I can't e-mail it 'cause it's 


chicken-scratch on my pad of paper right here, 

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so you're hearing it live right now. It's 


nothing new, though, Wanda, that you won't -- I 


mean it -- it's just a way to -- to sort of 


boil down a lot of these matrix items into some 


-- some of the bigger items. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Number one is just an update on 


the super S question. 


Number two would be issues related to neutron 


dose issues and -- and the TIB-58 coworker 


model, which is that external coworker model. 


Number three is this other radionuclide section 


-- starring Mel Chew, I imagine. 


 Number four -- number four will be the internal 


coworker model, TIB-38, some discussions on 


that. 


Number five is the data reliability question, 


which has several sub-pieces, including both 


the external data, internal data checks, the 


safety reports, the '69 dosimetry gaps and some 


-- and -- and the -- a fairly long list of 


individual -- I guess I'll call them individual 


allegations or -- or statements in the petition 


itself, so... 

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And then the last one, number six, is a 


question on the D&D worker dose reconstruction. 


So I think that gets most of them. You know, 


like I said, at the end we might want to 


quickly go through the matrix, or I can even at 


lunch kind of go through and check off which 


ones we got through and see where we're at with 


that, but I propose kind of starting with that 


and see how it -- see how it evolves, if that's 


okay. Everybody okay with that? 


 (No responses) 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is that all right, Brant? 


 DR. ULSH: Sure, Mark. 


SUPER S MODEL


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. First item is the super S 


-- the question on the super S model, and I -- 


I think where this still stands is -- is that, 


you know, we -- we've had a -- had a fair 


amount of review by -- by SC&A on the model 


itself. NIOSH did provide the 25 cases that I 


was asking about, just to make sure the design 


cases were the -- the, quote/unquote, right 


ones. And -- but I think that's sort of 


hanging out there, that we haven't closed that 


out as far as anyone looking at those 25 cases 

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and checking it against the -- the design cases 


used just to see if they -- if -- if the 


selections made sense and -- and were 


appropriate and were at least consistent with 


the other cases. So -- is that right, Joe? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't think that SC&A's really 


looked at that. We have the -- the things on 


the O drive, the identifiers of -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- those individuals. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: We had some other issues that 


we're pursuing, but that's underway and 


presumably -- and I guess Joyce will be a judge 


on that, too -- will be a couple -- at least a 


couple, two or three, weeks before we would 


have the analysis, but yeah, we understand the 


-- the need to do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But -- and I think, as we said 


last meeting, the big thing I think was that 


the model seems to be -- everybody seems to 


agree that it's solid, you know -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I think that was -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we're okay with the model 


itself. Right? 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, that -- the run-up to 


the last workgroup meet-- not workgroup 


meeting, Advisory Board meeting, I think we 


spent a great deal of time looking at the 


model, so I think now we're just doing the 


validation on the data, and that's something we 


can finish up --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- relatively soon. 


NEUTRON DOSE/TIB-58 COWORKER MODEL


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And the second item is -- 


I -- I think I -- it sort of rolls into some 


sub-items, but I'll -- I'll frame it in -- 


under the category of TIB-58 and the coworker 


model, and I actually -- there was a -- a call 


-- between meetings here I think NIOSH and SC&A 


got together to discuss both these coworker 


models, so -- and I'm a little out of the loop 


on that one. I -- I did see some e-mail 


traffic, but I -- I'd turn this over to maybe 


Joe to kick off or Brant to kick off, either 


way. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I thought it was a 


pretty productive conference call and I think 


it clarified a lot for us in terms of some of 

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the issues. And a lot of the issues were the 


back extrapolation in terms of the neutron-tophoton ratios and I -- I think the minutes for 


that meeting are pretty much where we're at now 


in terms of the understanding and the -- I -- I 


thought there was another couple of actions to 


go back and pursue it and we did get your e-


mail a couple of days ago with a little more 


clarification, so... 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, there were about -- well, 


there were a number of action items that -- for 


NIOSH that came out of that meeting. First was 


to obtain HIS-20 external dosimetry data from 


Ken Savitz* and post that on the O drive. That 


is available on the O drive, to the extent that 


-- I mean the HIS-20 data that was used for the 


coworker model is available on the O drive 


right now. 


 The next action item was that we committed to 


recheck the numbers in OTIB-58 Table 7.1 and 2 


for the years '52 through '69 using the NDRP 


data in HIS-20. And this was an issue that we 


discussed at some length during the meeting. 


What was done in the current version of the TIB 


is we looked at the distribution of I think 

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penetrating doses for all of the Rocky Flats 


workers for that -- for that year -- you know, 


the relevant years. That was in one table. 


And then we did the same kind of exercise, but 


excluding NDRP data, ND -- people who are 


involved in the NDRP. And that -- that second 


analysis was then used -- the idea here was to 


de-convolute which part of the penetrating 


doses was due to gamma and which part was due 


to neutrons. And throughout the course of our 


discussion with SC&A I think we became kind of 


convinced that that may not be the best 


approach to take, so what we committed to do 


was go back and take another look at those 


tables and make sure that what we're doing is 


appropriate and modify where appropriate. That 


is in progress. 


 The next action item was to add some 


descriptive language to the TIBs explaining the 


basic use for our extrapolation of neutron-togamma ratios for two time periods. We had some 


ratios in '59 and those were extrapolated back 


into the '50s. We also have neutron-to-gamma 


ratios from 1977 forward, and those were 


extrapolated back to cover the time period 1970 

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to '76. And SC&A had some questions about 


that. You know, what -- what bases we were 


using to make sure that that was appropriate. 


As Joe mentioned, I did send over some language 


that we are in the process of inserting in 


those TIBs -- just a couple of days ago, so I'm 


sure you haven't had time -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- to review it yet. So we look 


forward to getting SC&A's thoughts on -- on 


that. 


 The next action item was Roger Falk was going 


to investigate the NDRP Table 1.1 and provide 


some background to Ron Buchanan. That was 


accomplished fairly quickly. On August 15th 


Roger sent that to Ron. 


And then the final thing we were going to do is 


spot-check the coworker methodology by 


comparing calculated versus measured neutron 


doses for '52 to '59. So once we come to an 


agreement on exactly how we should go about de-


convoluting these penetrating doses, then we 


would then go back and look at people for whom 


we have measurements, just to make sure that 


our method gives a claimant-favorable approach. 

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And I think -- I think it was John, you come up 


with some really pithy statements that tend to 


stick with me, John. I think you described 


that as kind of the coup de grâce in terms of 


validating this approach, so we are also in the 


process of doing that. 


And I think that's pretty much where -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: Some of the action items have at 


least moved out of our court. Some of them 


we're still working. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can -- can you go back to the 


fourth one there, NDRP Table 1.1? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You sent some background 


materials to Ron. Was that posted or is that 


just sent to Ron? 


 DR. ULSH: That was an e-mail that Roger sent 


to Ron and copied me on -- on that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a copy of that in my 


computer, so --


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so it wasn't a lengthy 


document or --


 DR. ULSH: I don't --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- anything --

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 DR. ULSH: No, no, no. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- it was a --


 DR. ULSH: It was just a --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- more or less a response. 


 DR. ULSH: -- yeah, a couple of paragraphs, I 


think. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, this is Ron. Yeah, they ­

- he just sent at -- explained that -- where 


those figures came from and that was 


preliminary report and not a -- complete the 


report in the NDRP. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: It was a matter of 


clarification then. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, uh-huh. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: The other item, Ron -- and 


again, we've only had a couple of days to look 


at the descriptive language, but I think in our 


conversation in the meantime, informal 


conversation, I thought there was some question 


about whether in fact there were some neutron-


to-photon ratios from the earlier years that 


could be also used to benchmark. Is that clear 


-- was that pretty much what we're arriving at, 

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Ron? 


MR. BUCHANAN: Well, yes. Brant sent -- 


yesterday or day before yesterday, I'm thinking 


day before yesterday -- some explanation, and I 


have no qualms with his explanation, but I did 


think that if we could at least look at some 


benchmark -- you know, experimental or 


something that was done in the early years -- 


compare that to the N/P values of '59, it'd be 


a little more reassuring numerically that they 


matched. And so I don't know if those figures 


are available, but I think somebody at some 


time made some kind of neutron and photon 


measurements in the '52 to '58 time frame that 


we could look at and see if those are, you 


know, similar to what they're listing in the 


NDRP table -- 11.1, I think it was. You know, 


they list at about 1.3, in that area, which is 


reasonable. But it'd be nice -- more 


reassuring if we could look at a couple of 


measurements actually made during that period 


of time. And the same way with these -- the 


'76 time frame comparing to the later time 


frame. If we could just find a few 


measurements representative of work area and 

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they showed a ratio of about one, then that'd 


be more reassuring. 


 DR. ULSH: I don't want to react to that on the 


fly --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I know. Again, this was 


sort of a dialogue we've had over a couple of 


days now since we received the memo and it just 


struck us that, you know, instead of the 


modeling aspect, if there was actually some 


empirical way, that would really put it to bed 


and -- we don't know. And I -- certainly we 


haven't seen any data and there might -- but 


certainly in the later period -- you'd think in 


the '70s there would be data. I'm not sure 


about the '50s, but... 


 DR. ULSH: I'll talk it over with the team and 


see if -- if that might exist somewhere and, 


you know, we'll see what we can do on that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We're talking about the last 


item. Right? The one that -- that -- 


 DR. ULSH: This is -- I think we're talking 


about the extrapolation -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: That would be action item three of 

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these from the meeting -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I think the dialogue resulted 


when we got the descriptive language, but it 


was sort of like a light bulb or something -- 


you know, why isn't there at least an empirical 


benchmark; that would kind of put it to bed 


without getting into a lot of modeling. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Doesn't that go to the last 


point? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: It does go to the last point, 


as well. 


 DR. ULSH: Spot-check coworker methodology by 


comparing calculated versus measured neutron 


doses? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I think what that one was, Arjun, if 


my memory serves correctly, for those people 


for whom we had both measured neutron and 


measured gamma, what we would do is take the 


gamma measurements for those people, apply our 


 MR. GRIFFON: De-convolution technique 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ULSH: -- yeah, apply our methodology that 


-- you know, if it's a ratio, see what -- what 

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kind of a neutron dose would be predicted, and 


then compare that to what they actually had 


measured. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So you would do that for people 


for whom you had records for neutron and gamma 


for both periods, '58/'59 and '52 to '57. 


That's what I remember us discussing last time. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm not sure about the '70 to '76. 


I think we had the issue there -- I don't know, 


I don't want to speak off the cuff, Arjun, 


'cause I'm not too sure about this -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I remember the-- 


 DR. ULSH: -- but I was thinking that we only 


had penetrating, we didn't have the de-


convoluted in '70 to '76. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, it was '70 to '76 we 


understand that you only have -- this is Ron 


again -- you -- you only have the composite 


dose and so they'd use the .42 N/P ratio to de-


convolute that and -- and calculate the doses 


separately and compare that to the total 


assigned dose and see which was higher and 


would use that. That's the way I understood 


that, that the '70 to '76 was a composite dose 

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in the records. 


 DR. ULSH: I think that's right, Ron. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But last time I understood 


Roger to say that for the NDRP period, '52 to 


'69 -- right, Roger? 


 MR. FALK: Yes, that is right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. For the NDRP period 


there were actually paper records of these 


doses with separate gamma and neutron dose 


records that they were actually able to go and 


make a database out of it, which is how they 


did their work. And I'm just wondering if 


there are these paper records for '52 to '69, 


which are already -- we don't need to be de-


convoluted. Right? There are already separate 


gamma and neutron doses. Why are they not 


there -- why would you expect that you wouldn't 


find them for '70 to '76? 


 DR. ULSH: I don't know the answer to that off 


the top of my head. Can anyone jump in? 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yeah, this is Ron again. I 


think that the NDRP covered the time from '52 


to '69, and so they -- they reread it so you 


had a separate neutron/gamma reading, whereas 


'70 to '76 was not covered by the NDRP report 

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and so all we have there is composite. And so 


-- now let me add that the '52 to '58 did not 


have hardly any neutron measurements, so even 


though you -- you do the NDRP, those earlier 


years had very few -- few neutron plates read 


by Los Alamos. And so the question remains and 


-- is that -- that you have to use N over P to 


determine the neutron dose in the '52 to '58 


time frame because there was hardly any neutron 


measurements; even if you went back and reread 


them all, there's very few. And that brought 


down to the fact that I requested what data was 


available '52 to '58 in the neutron field on 


the individual worker basis, and as of yet I 


have not received that information. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: My -- my understanding was -- 


was not that. But Roger, you have to correct 


me if I'm wrong here because this -- this is my 


understanding of what I think you did is that 


for the people who had -- who -- who had the 


potential for neutron exposure but were not 


necessarily monitored, for all of those people 


you found paper records for their doses. Is 


that right? And made a database of them that 


you can actually query. 

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 MR. FALK: We found the paper dosimetry 


worksheets for the beta/gamma doses. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So for the whole '52 to '69 


period for -- for all workers who had the 


potential for neutron exposure, even those who 


were not monitored. Right? 


 MR. FALK: Yes, and that was used -- that was 


used as the basis for the nosherel* doses 


because you -- you then multiply the gamma dose 


that was recorded on the worksheets times the ­

- times the neutron to gamma ratio. That is 


the whole basis for nosherel dose. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And that -- that's where I 


think this whole discussion of comparing the 


calculated de-convoluted dose with the NDRP 


query-able database came from -- sorry, a 


mouthful -- and so I'm -- I'm wondering if 


there are these paper records, why can't -- I 


did take a look at your 1976 -- 1970 to 1976 


and how -- the justification for back-


extrapolation. Obviously it was a very quick 


look. There's been a lot of paper. And I 


actually am a little bit uncomfortable with a 


statement -- it doesn't seem to be consistent, 


that it took -- it took time to recover from 

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the fires, so it means there were new things 


going on during the recovery period. But at 


the same time, the '70 to '76 period in its 


entirety was similar to the post-'77 period 


when production had resumed, when new equipment 


had been installed and everything was 


presumably functioning very smoothly and so on. 


So I -- I just -- I just -- I think it would be 


much better to -- to actually look at the 


records if they're available, at least to find 


out whether they're available or not. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, a couple of clarifications 


there, Arjun. Mel's going to go into more 


detail about the recovery efforts from the '69 


fire a little bit later on the -- I'm looking 


at Mark's agenda -- somewhere today -- 


 MR. CHEW: It's not on the agenda. 


 DR. ULSH: -- we'll talk about that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll get it in there. 


 DR. ULSH: So we'll cover that point. Now in 


terms of things being different, I think that ­

- I mean there were a couple of events that 


happened around '69 and '70. One was certainly 


the fire. The other was the switch-over from 


NTA film to neutron TLDs. And I think op-- 

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well, operations were certainly transferred out 


of the buildings affected by the fire. That 


was 776 and 777. But carrying forward into the 


future even past '76 -- you know, up into the 


post-'77 era, those were essentially 


accomplished. I mean those aren't expected to 


change. So I -- I don't know, Arjun, if -- if 


we're talking about different action items 


here. I mean in terms of we -- we committed 


to, in the '50s at least -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 DR. ULSH: -- doing the spot check. Have I --


have I accurately described -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No -- yes. No, that's 


accurate. 


 DR. ULSH: That's okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's what was committed to. 


I don't think there was an action item with 


respect to '70 to '76 in the last call. 


 DR. ULSH: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But this kind of has come to my 


mind, reading your explanation for the back 


extrapolation of having some hesitation about 


(unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I'm listening 

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to the discussion, and we are here mainly 


because we're concerned about the SEC more than 


we are about the site profile. Is that 


correct? Is that general-- I mean that's -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Correct. 


DR. MAURO: And what I'm -- what I'm listening 


to right now is a conversation that sounds more 


like a site profile conversation than an SEC. 


What I'd be very interested in -- certainly 


discussing how to de-convolute and extrapolate 


has great value because if you could resolve 


that, you have resolved the SEC issue. 


But let's say we can't resolve that to the 


level of precision that we would like because 


of these uncertainties and incompleteness of 


data sets. I'd like to hear a little bit about 


okay, what's the fall-back position that -- is 


there a way to say well, we could place a 


plausible upper bound. Given the limitations 


of the available data and knowledge of process 


-- process knowledge, what was going on in 


different times periods, is there a general 


agreement that -- or not -- that it's possible 


to place a plausible upper bound on what the 


neutron-to-photon ratio may have been in a 

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given time period or location. The reason I 


ask that question, because I -- and I think it 


goes to the heart of why we're here, if -- if 


there is general consensus -- let's say we hear 


from Ron yes, we're working -- I saw a number 


here of .41 for certain -- .429 as a neutron-


to-photon ratio, and it sounds like there maybe 


some discussion how do you validate that, how 


do you make sure you got it right. And then I 


would say okay, let's say we can't make sure we 


got it right because there's always going to be 


a little bit of fuzziness around the edges. Is 


there a way we can get to a point where someone 


say okay, granted that we're -- we're sort of 


stuck with this uncertainty, can we put a 


number on that, and everyone would say yeah, 


that's certainly a plausible upper bound -- and 


re-- and reasonable. So I guess I just -- 


seeing where -- if that subject has value 


around this table today. 


 DR. ULSH: I think it does, John. I'm going to 


take a risk here because I'm not an expert in 


neutron dosimetry, but let's talk about that 


'70 to '76 time period. We've got a 


penetrating value. We know that part of that 

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is a gamma dose, part of it might be neutron 


for some -- you know, for some workers that's a 


reasonable thing. At worst -- and I'm not 


proposing this as a strategy, but at worst, 


could we not say -- let's say you've got a -- 


I'm making a number up -- a two-rem penetrating 


dose. At worst could you say assign two rem 


gamma, assign two rem neutron -- double 


counting. You know that that's an upper -- an 


overestimate, but you know you've bounded the 


dose. 


DR. MAURO: My reaction to that was I think we 


also have an obligation that it has to be 


plausible. So there may -- so I mean you're on 


the -- and in my mind you're on the right trail 


because we -- we put the thing in a box and 


maybe -- so I am -- you know, I am looking at 


things a little bit differently than the 


conversation. Is there a way we could put this 


problem in a box and everyone would agree yeah. 


It's not inconceivable -- 'cause I don't -- I 


don't know because we've been through this 


before where we assigned things that were 


scientifically not plausible, and -- and we 


can't go down that route. It's still got to be 

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scientifically plausible, but at the same time 


everyone agrees that it's an upper bound. And 


that approach you just described might very 


well be that. In my mind, I -- to the extent 


to which we can do -- accomplish both in a 


meeting like this where we're talking in terms 


of how do we validate the specific values 


you've set forth and that would solve all 


problems, but if -- if there's go-- but that 


seems to be a protracted process and that may 


turn out to be something that's going to be 


hard to do between now and September. But 


maybe this other thing I'm talking about is 


something we could do pretty quickly, and then 


all of a sudden that becomes -- that -- and all 


of a sudden we're at least (unintelligible) -- 


and if we agree on that before September, what 


we've got is, okay -- like we've done in other 


cases -- we don't have an SEC issue here, and 


it's -- and that -- that's always very helpful 


if -- if our main objective is SEC. 


I've said my piece. 


 DR. ULSH: I agree with you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I agree with -- I -- I 


agree with the -- I agree with the concept. 
I 
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-- I think we have to -- we've been down that 


path before, as you said -- 


DR. MAURO: Absolutely. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- where we can -- we can't just 


throw a high number at the wall and say -- 


DR. MAURO: That's right. I agree with that, 


too. Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- all right, that's not good 


enough, make it a little higher -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But my understanding -- you're 


-- you're talking about -- you know, the 


difference between -- what we're trying to do 


right now is validate the existing model for 


the early years versus perhaps looking at plan 


B, which is an upper bound. But it seems like 


we getting to a point where you ought to be 


able to provide some validation -- a coup de 


grâce I think you called it the last time -- 


and I think that would pretty much re-- provide 


the reassurance we're talking -- I -- I don't 


see us being that far away and it sounds like 


that -- after the conference call I felt we 


were much closer and being very specific about 


what needed to be done. I think Roger was 


going to nail that. So I thought we were a lot 

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closer than having to maybe go to plan B right 


now. 


 DR. ULSH: I agree. I agree. I was operating 


on your premise here. 


DR. MAURO: Good, we're on the one-yard line on 


this -- on nailing this thing, then let's 


finish this up, put it to bed, because it 


sounds like -- if we're that close. But at the 


same time I think it's always important to keep 


(unintelligible) listen. If it looks like 


things are unfolding in a way where we can't 


quite get there and get a touchdown on this, 


then there are other (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I do -- I think I do 


agree, though. I think we're -- and not as 


much in SEC space as trying to provide the 


validation that would put -- put the thing to 


bed. I don't think we're really talking about 


not being able to do it. I think it's --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, we're discussing which numbers 


are appropriate --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- rather than is there a number 


that's appropriate. 


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to keep in mind as we go through this, that 


we're really more in site profile space, in 


terms of just making sure the Ts are crossed. 


But the -- the problem I think I saw was, 


without the validation, you're -- I think we're 


shaky on the early years and I think that's 


what -- that's kind of where we left it on the 


last call, that there was some uncertainty 


about that that could be settled. 


 DR. ULSH: I agree with you. There is 


certainly a degree of assumption, educated 


assumptions in back-extrapolating -- always. 


And so that was, you know, my -- the language ­

- those few paragraphs that I sent over. This 


is why we assumed this. But it is -- at its 


root, it is an assumption. And I agree with 


you. I think that if we can go back and do a 


spot-check for those few workers where we do 


have both gamma and neutron, that might provide 


a comfort level. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And for those who were in the 


Y-12 discussions on the SEC, I think this is 


reminiscent of the early '50 issue where we're 


talking about needing to spot-check and 


validate '52, '53 -- but you know, the back­
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extrapolation itself I think was felt not to be 


an SEC -- so it's I think very analogous from 


that standpoint. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, it is very similar -- this is 


Wanda. I -- I had thought when I saw the five 


items that were listed at the end of the 


neutron call notes that were sent out that it 


was looking as thought the actions were pretty 


clearly defined and that we really and truly 


were just about where we needed to be. It's 


just a matter of -- of identifying specifics 


and -- but I couldn't hear enough of our 


discussion that was going on there in the room 


to be clear as to whether or not we're backing 


off from those five specific action items and 


back into -- into negotiations about what to do 


or not. Am I -- I misinterpreting what I 


thought I heard? 


 DR. ULSH: Wanda, I don't think we're backing 


off. I think --


 MR. GRIFFON: No. 


 DR. ULSH: -- we're just reaffirming that -- 


that indeed these action items that we've set 


forth are how we want to pursue this. 


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on the actions, Wanda. We'll try to speak up, 


too. I apologize. 


 DR. ULSH: Sorry. 


 MS. MUNN: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The -- the only -- I don't know 


if there's an additional action from what John 


was saying, which is, you know, should NIOSH 


propose sort of this back-up approach or -- I ­

- I --


 DR. ULSH: I don't know, I don't think we're -- 


I mean I think it is worthwhile to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right --


 DR. ULSH: -- ask that question, John. At 


worst, are we talking about an SEC or a TBD 


issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 DR. ULSH: I propose to you that at worst we're 


talking about a TBD-type issue. Now it's 


always dangerous to shoot from the cuff, and I 


just kind of threw this out here, this -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- but I don't think -- I mean, in 


ans-- to my mind, I don't think it could be 


worse than a factor of two. I mean double-


counting. But --

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 MR. GRIFFON: Well, that -- that --


 DR. ULSH: -- I don't --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- I'm not proposing that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you shouldn't. I'm stopping 


you from throwing that out there because I'll ­

- I mean I'll tell you why and Jim Neton will 


tell you why, too. I mean if you're going to 


go down that path, plausible does come into 


play. 


 DR. ULSH: I know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And if you start saying well, we 


just can't get this right so we're going to 


double everybody's neutron dose, then you're 


going to say well, wait a second, these 


administrative workers were unlikely to have -- 


you know, you've got -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to determine areas and -- you 


know, I mean it's got to be reasonable so -- 


 DR. ULSH: I agree. I agree. I don't think 


we're --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- if that is a back-up, at least 


come with -- with some defensible models for 


who -- who gets which --

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 DR. ULSH: Who gets it and who doesn't. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- approach when, you know. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: That still puts us back in the 


process of misleading people about what -- what 


we're doing and what's real. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, exactly, we don't want to 


like over-- assign these very high doses to 


people that we know weren't even in neutron 


areas. Right? So... 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, it would be typical of what we 


do in other issues like this in dose 


reconstruction. If we know where they are, we 


can assign the appropriate one. If we are 


unsure about where they are, we just go 


claimant-favorable on it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But I think we're -- so we're -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I think --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- the actions that are in that 


memo are still on the table and -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, in addition, if there's 


any possibility of -- and I don't think this 


would take a lot of work, but just to identify 


if there's any benchmarks in the mid-'50s to 

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late '50s and the mid-'70s that might be 


neutron or photon benchmarks. If nothing else 


it'll calibrate the model and provide this 


reassurance I think that Ron was referring to. 


 DR. ULSH: We'll check it out. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I think for the '70s --


 MR. GRIFFON: Confirmatory data, yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I think for the '70s it 


should be -- I would be surprised if it wasn't 


available. Now '50s, I'm not sure about, that 


might be --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, we'll check it out. And Joe, 


there might be something like -- like that in 


the NDRP already, I don't know. I'll have to 


check on that -- for the -- for the NDRP years. 


Now '70 to '76, that's not covered by the NDRP. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: And I'll see -- you know, I'll talk 


to the team and see if they know of anything 


like that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I agree that the five action 


items are the ones and were the general tenor 


of the discussion. I just had a -- the reason 


I -- I (unintelligible) with this 1970 to '76 


question was -- I don't know what the process 

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for commenting on the materials we've recently 


received from Brant and so I was just trying to 


-- because I had happened to read it, I was 


making a comment on that as -- well, 


specifically, since so many facilities were 


destroyed in the fire that were not usable, the 


-- well, let me pose a question to Roger. Were 


there sort of makeshift facilities and while 


the new equipment was being put into place 


where the production work continued in the 


interim, or did production work stop? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, there was some. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And my question really relates 


to that -- when I saw the back-extrapolation 


discussion, I was comfortable with the idea 


that once the new equipment was put into place, 


you can certainly back extrapolate that nothing 


new was going on. But I have a specific 


concern in relation to any makeshift equipment, 


the recovery operations, and whether the 


neutron-to-photon ratios from the '77 period 


onward can be back-extrapolated to that group 


of workers, and I have some degree of 


discomfort with that idea. And -- and I think 


that -- I had not thought about that before. 

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It just came to my mind because there was a 


very clear statement that you can back 


extrapolate because everything was the same, 


technically. And it seemed to me that that's ­

- I don't know, I -- it's a question for Roger, 


who -- who was there. 


 MR. FALK: The -- the answer is that the -- 


that the activities in Buildings 76 and 77, 


which was the metal working and the assembly 


area for the product, were never -- were -- 


were -- were not resumed in Buildings 76 and 


77. What they were doing -- actually Building 


707 was in the process of being constructed as 


-- I -- I -- and what happened was is that they 


stopped the metal-working processes until they 


could get Building 707 operations to the point 


where those operations could be transferred. 


do not know precisely when Building 707 did 


start to become operational, but probably in 


1970. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, then that question would 


be answered, that there were no makeshift type 


operations that would have been different. 


 MR. FALK: None that I know of at Rocky Flats. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Fair enough. 


I 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: At some earlier point in our 


discussions, someone who was expert -- I can't 


remember who -- made the statement that there 


were no production operations during that 


period following the fire until the new 


building was ready. That was -- that statement 


was made at some point in our previous 


discussions. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, this is Ron. Yeah, I 


remember, that was made in reference to the 


'69-'70 data, one explanation why the doses 


were lower --


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- had a lot of zeroes during 


that time is because the production was -- 


plutonium production was stopped during that 


period. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, that's what I remembered. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Then that's -- that would take 


care of it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So I think where we stand 


is the existing action's in that memo and the 


possibility that you may propose another model, 


if necessary, not as --

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 DR. ULSH: If we can't come to agreement. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- as needed, right, yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: But I think we will. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean keeping in mind that main 


goal is to answer the SEC question as quickly 


as possible. That's the driver here. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Did we include in that action 


item to try to validate a couple of points in 


the '50s --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


MR. BUCHANAN: -- and in the '70s? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: The benchmarks for that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's sort of a new one -- yeah, 


the benchmarks. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, that's --


 MR. GRIFFON: Check for --


 DR. ULSH: -- number five in the meeting 


minutes, Ron --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so --


 DR. ULSH: -- I think. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You see that different than -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Oh, no, no, I --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- number five or --


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- I think that's a little 


different. I think this is a reaction to your 

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most recent memo. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, right, right, we're going to 


look for --


 MR. FITZGERALD: See if we --


 DR. ULSH: -- measured neutron-to-photon 


ratios. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, neutron-to-photon 


benchmarks in the '50s and '70s. It's a little 


different than what was (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: One a-- one additional one there, 


yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, but related. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. Anything more on this 


TIB-58? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: No, I think we spent a good 


amount of time on the conference call -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- on a lot of these issues so 


I think that helped. 


OTHER RADIONUCLIDES


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, if everybody's ready, 


I think we'll go to other radionuclides. 


 DR. ULSH: Starring Mel Chew. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Starring Mel Chew, yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: I was going to be ready to talk 

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about the fire, then you caught me by surprise 


here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Not a problem. Yes, sir. Were 


there some -- any questions, because we had 


like an explanation. Were there some -- any 


issues that -- that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Really the -- the -- I think 


there's two primary questions that I have, 


maybe other people have -- you know, one, we -- 


we had asked for that -- sort of that overview 


that you gave to be consolidated in a nonclassified form, if possible -- 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and I don't think we've -- 


we've had that product yet. 


 DR. ULSH: Not yet. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So I don't know if that's in the 


works or if it's a --


 MR. CHEW: Yes, we can --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- classification review problem 


or what -- what -- you know, if that could be 


made available. That was one question. 


 MR. CHEW: What that -- Brant and I chatted 


yesterday. We -- we -- the consolidation of 

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what we found in the MDA in total can be -- 


still described as being very -- still 


sensitive. There are a couple of isotopes that 


are still considered (unintelligible) sensitive 


information here. We do have the information 


and I think (unintelligible) was going to -- 


say you that -- speak up a little bit? 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, please. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. We were going to ask me to 


show it to you directly, off-line, on this 


discussion here. And so I do have the matrix 


is what you were looking for. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: That would list the findings, the 


chronology by year and by isotope. I think 


that's what you were really looking for. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But it's problematic posting it 


is what you're saying? 


 MR. CHEW: I think so, too. I think there'll 


be -- I mean without going through -- when you 


put all the information together, I would 


consider the statement still looks -- could be 


-- I don't want to violate any classification 


issues and so it could be still sensitive. And 

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without having someone actually review it from 


-- a set of eyes that could recognize what the 


issues are. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. But -- but it wasn't 


reviewed since the last meeting. 


 MR. CHEW: No, it has not been. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That was my understanding was you 


were going to try to see if you could put it 


out there and I thought -- 


 DR. ULSH: Well, we've --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- that would involve a review -- 


 DR. ULSH: We've got the write-up that is the 


written version of what Mel presented at the 


last working group meeting, and it does contain 


some generalized numbers -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- that we're pretty comfortable, I 

think --

 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 

 DR. ULSH: -- right, Mel? 

 MR. CHEW: That's very true. 

 DR. ULSH: Now if you want to see more detail, 

Mark -- I mean I know you have a clearance and 


-- and --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 

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 DR. ULSH: -- so does Mel, so he can show you 


the detail. But I don't think we want to put 


that in the --


 MR. GRIFFON: But the generalized numbers can 


be made available --


 MR. CHEW: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- openly? 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, sir. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think so. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I think I -- we might be 


interested in both, but at least the 


generalized information I think would be good. 


 MR. CHEW: Yes. 


 DR. ULSH: We're very --


 MR. GRIFFON: We can't share classified 


information here anyway, even if it's on the 


side. 

 DR. ULSH: Right, right. 

 MR. CHEW: That's very true. 

 DR. ULSH: We're very near to putting that 

write-up out, we're just putting the finishing 


touches on it right now. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: This is referring back to our 

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original matrix issue number 29, is it? 


 MR. GRIFFON: That -- I'm not working from the 


matrix, but --


 DR. ULSH: Hold on, I got the matrix; let me 


look. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I'll trust you on that, Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Do you remember, Mel? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes -- yes, it is number 29. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, yes, number 29. So --


okay, so we'll wait and --


 MR. CHEW: Were there any specific questions 


that -- after our -- our discussions at the 


last working group that you'd like to ask? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it was more -- I think 


you presented it and I think -- 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- either I'd have to look back 


at the transcript or get (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: The leading -- leading 


question I was giving you at the time, and I 


think there was some hesitation because of 


these -- this issue -- to get into maybe what 


other nuclides --


 MR. CHEW: Oh, that's right, I was 


(unintelligible). 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- because we're coming across 


references in log books to some of these other 


sources and -- and, you know, there's enough 


anecdotal information to suggest they were 


present, so it would be helpful just to confirm 


that. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: What I'm -- what I might propose 


is that if we can get this summary form before 


the next Board meeting -- we're going to have a 


subcommittee on the first day of the next Board 


meeting --


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- if we can have that out, 


something that you're not worried about posting 


 DR. ULSH: I'm going to put Mel on the spot. 


think we can get it within a week. Right? 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, sir. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, good. Good. 


 MR. CHEW: It's available. It's basically 


done, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


 MR. CHEW: We'll make sure -- and it will be 


I 
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appropriate, too. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And then what I was going to say 

is if we --

 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm sorry. In a week you're 

promising this document. Does this document 


have to go through classification review? 


 DR. ULSH: No. 


 MR. CHEW: No. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It does not? Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: This is the one he's comfortable 


not having to do that. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That's based upon Mel's opinion, 


though. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh. 


 MR. CHEW: Well, that is true. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And I want to be doubly sure, not 


that I doubt Mel's opinion -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- but you know, anything that 


goes up on the web site, we run a great risk. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I was -- I was asking by 


the Board meeting, so maybe hedge on your -- 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, we'll put that hedge on there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- time line a little bit, you 


know. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: We'll get it to you as soon --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- as we possibly can, with -- 


with confidence that we're not going to divulge 


 MR. GRIFFON: I agree. I agree, yeah, we don't 


want to --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- information. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- go down that path. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. By way of 


process, let's say once we do get it in place ­

- a chronology of different radionuclides and 


their role, their quantities, where they were ­

- what do you envision as being okay, now that 


we have that, how do we bring that issue to 


closure. Other words, all right, now -- let's 


say we know -- I know in the past there was 


some intuitive sense -- intuitive sense that 


when there were quantities that were in the 


gram range -- we were talking about I guess 


thorium at the time, at some other site -- 


 MR. CHEW: Californium and, you know, some of 


the -- yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- and we'd say -- and everyone 


said --

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 MR. CHEW: Curium. 


DR. MAURO: -- you know, don't worry about 


that. Well, when they were in the kilogram 


range or greater, multiple kilograms, are we in 


a similar situation -- that is, we're really in 


step one, let's first characterize what's 


there, how much, and then we -- we come up with 


a strategy for achieving closure on whether or 


not these are an SEC issue, these are 


dosimetric -- of dosimetric concern; and if so, 


then we'd have to answer the question how do we 


reconstruct the doses to people who may have 


handled that. How far down the road have we 


gotten --


 MR. GRIFFON: I --


DR. MAURO: -- in talking about that? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I feel like I'm in step one. I 


hope that NIOSH is in the final steps -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you know. 


DR. MAURO: Because you know why? We are --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible), you know. 


DR. MAURO: What I think is important here is 


that in the process of doing this we're laying 


out a path, a path that's going to serve us -- 

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not only here, but in every other one that we 


encounter because we keep encountering these 


issues. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: And I -- and I think that -- you 


know, we're ac-- we're actually inventing a 


process now that allows us to come to closure, 


whether it's -- whether it's an SEC closure 


process or it's a site profile closure process, 


though. I know the extent to which we're 


thinking in those terms -- you know, while 


we're gathering the data, also at the same time 


thinking in terms of okay, what are we going to 


do with it once we get it and how do we 


distinguish between what we're going to do to 


bring this to closure as an SEC issue and what 


we think we might need to do to bring it to 


closure as a site profile issue. Other words, 


basically think -- thinking a little bit more 


globally and putting something like that in 


place, and then that's going to serve us well 


for every other one that's going to be coming 


down the line. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And that's -- that's my -- my 


second question really was, you know, the -- 

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the how and the who. You also have the 


question of who was exposed or potentially 


exposed and -- and how are you going to 


reconstruct their dose -- 


DR. MAURO: Exactly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and --


 DR. ULSH: Actually --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we've had this discussion a 


little bit with there is gross alpha data 


available over different time periods for 


different buildings. I think that all has to 


come together, at least for SC&A and the 


workgroup -- you know, I'm sure those that are 


closer to it, you know, understand how it fits 


together better, I would hope, but -- 


 DR. ULSH: The document -- the document that 


you're going to get, Mark, as soon as Mel and I 


agree on the final form -- and Bryce -- is 


basically going to present our -- our 


evaluation that there was simply not a 


significant exposure potential for a number of 


these radionuclides. I don't -- let me see 


which ones, Mel. 


 MR. CHEW: Curium, californium, example. There 


were -- not only the quantity, but because of 

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the way -- there was a process and this -- I 


spent more time last time discussing what they 


did with the material, and I think John's -- 


the question is correctly now is there any 


potential for exposure or were -- there was any 


incidences reported with those potentials 


there. And secondly, if the material was -- 


happened to be in pure form, you know, was 


there a -- how, for instance, if any incident 


did occur, dose reconstruction could be 


accomplished. I think we're going to try to 


include that -- that kind of discussion here. 


Example, if you've got Pu isotopes that are not 


normally weapons grade plutonium, it would 


still look like plutonium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Uranium-233 will still look like 


uranium, and things like this, and we'll use 


that kind of analogy. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But go -- go -- going back to 


what Mark was saying, though, and even what 


John is pointing out, it almost seems like you 


do have a -- a model or an approach on this 


thing, and one is how much of it do you have; 


is there enough to even be concerned about it. 

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And then was it -- you know, was it monitored 


for. I mean was there a monitoring program in 


place, and if so, who was monitored and who 


might have been potentially exposed. And that 


kind of then leads you to the answer as to, you 


know, does -- does the current -- current 


approach in terms of the internal and external 


dose assessment accommodate these nuclides or 


not. If they don't, then you sort of get into 


the situation we got into at Y-12 with well, 


okay, can you in fact come up with a way to do 


that or not. And if not, then you're in SEC 


space. And I'm glad you mentioned that point 


because I think Los Alamos -- I'll mention that 


word -- is going to lead us into a lot of those 


issues and --


 MR. CHEW: That's next. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- certainly -- yeah, next -- 


with Rocky, we're picking up references in the 


log books that point to nuclide constituencies 


that we frankly didn't see in the site profile, 


we didn't know existed. And now I think the 


way to reconcile that is to see this material 


balance and say okay, we're seeing references, 


this is kind of odd. Are you picking this up 

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in the materials balance; and if so, can we 


then nail that down a little better because 


clearly people were being monitored for some of 


these constituencies back in the '50s and '60s. 


Something was going on. I'm not going to 


mention them because I'm not sure now whether 


some of it's sensitive or not -- not 


classified, sensitive, but what does it mean. 


Can we put it to rest as being insignificant. 


They monitored, and appropriately so. The 


results are reasonable and there's a way to 


envelope that dose estimation process, and if 


that's all the case, then we're all -- we're 


fine, within the bounds. If we're not in any 


of those case, and more than we thought, they 


didn't monitor or they didn't monitor everyone 


they should have monitored, then we're in that 


space where we have to establish the SEC. 


 MR. CHEW: We tried to frame the description of 


-- the kind -- the level of processing, and not 


necessarily have to identify individuals, but ­

-


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- make class of groups of people -- 


may -- could be a chemist, you know, working on 

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a very unusual isotope that's alloying in for a 


tracer for a specific test and that will be a 


very limited set, and we'll try to identify it. 


You know, I'd like to clarify if we talk about 


the -- you know, where people monitored. You 


know, in -- in those situations, you know, 


unless there was a -- an episodic incident, you 


know, that the person just be happening to 


handle that particular pouring and he spilled 


it, you know. Well, he'd be chastised for 


spilling it, in the first place, because he'd 


lost a very valuable material. But unless that 


did happen, he probably most likely would not 


have been monitored. Okay? So I don't -- want 


to make sure that we clarify that just because 


some isotope has been identified inside of a 


box, unless there was some reason for that to 


be monitored, that may not necessarily have 


happened because those operations were not 


considered routine. It was really more of a 


R&D or one-of-a-kind kind of operation, so I 


want to make sure that we -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But -- but I was also going to 


add, though, I think there are a couple of 


cases where it wasn't necessarily routine. 
I 

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mean it was in fact something that was a 


routine enough operation -- 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- where they apparently put a 


bioassay program in place for a short -- 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- time period. So it was 


something that was coming through -- a campaign 


almost --


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- that was maybe six months a 


year. They put the monitoring in place, 


campaign was over, apparently that was it. So 


 MR. CHEW: I'm working very closely with Gene 


Potter, who has got the HIS-20 information, and 


when I bring up these particular isotope, I ask 


for -- you know, and since I know approximately 


the year based on the MDA or -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: -- what, I also see 


(unintelligible), and ask him what kind of a -- 


a monitor, and then monitoring was done, if 


any, and if there was, a example of a bioassay 


result or some result, either a lung count -- 

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conceivably can relate back to either routine 


monitoring or an episode, and then try to 


minimize that --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Or an --


 MR. CHEW: -- or try to have that discussion. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- operational campaign where 


they ran something through, which they did 


frequently in the '50s and '60s. 


 MR. CHEW: We'll try to include that discussion 


and detail. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's reassuring that it's going 


to be in the same document so we'll move that 


along a little further. As John was saying, we 


won't -- we're not doing (unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: We'll try to put the exotics kind of 


all in one question to answer the question -- 


but you're right, the bottom line is -- is if 


there are issues to -- regarding to potential 


exposure, can that be addressed properly by the 


dose reconstruction. I think that's the real ­

- that's the real question. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And the other -- the other 


thought I had was that in -- in addition to 


getting this hopefully by the Advisory Board 


meeting in Nevada, I'm just wondering if -- if 

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we saw that in advance of the meeting and we 


decided there might be a need to see some of 


the classified data --


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- then we're in Nevada where we 


can probably get a classified room -- 


 MR. CHEW: Check --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you know, have -- late in the 


evening or earl-- you know, early evening and 


pull out the people that can go and, you know, 


do it there. I mean that's -- that's -- we'd 


have to schedule that ahead of time, but 


(unintelligible) -- so that -- you know. 


 MR. CHEW: We can do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll try to alert you if we look 


at this and say you know what, we really want 


to see the whole thing and -- 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you know. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mel, you said that, you know, 


some -- for some radionuclides, people may have 


been working but would have been monitored only 


if there was an incident because it was felt 


that maybe there was no reason to monitor them. 


And in that -- you know, the -- that -- the 

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call -- I mean was it a subjective judgment 


that there was no exposure potential, is it 


technically demonstrable -- say if you have a 


sealed source, for example, I think it's 


technically demonstrable that unless you have 


an incident, they don't have internal exposure 


potential. And -- and we went through this in 


Y-12, not -- it -- clearly if there was 


material being processed, say under a hood, I ­

- I would be uncomfortable with a judgment 


that's subjective that said I don't think 


there's exposure potential because there was 


adequate ventilation, you know, some -- a 


general statement like that that's more or less 


hypothetical about the state of ventilation, 


the (unintelligible) whether the operating 


procedures were being followed. We know 


operating procedures are not always followed. 


So the question of exposure potential I -- I 


think, as we're going through, it would be very 


helpful if we know where -- where there was a 


subjective judgment that there was no exposure 


potential, but there could have been if 


operating procedures weren't followed or the 


materials being processed where it was being 

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done in a glove box or under a hood, or where 


there was really no exposure potential because 


of the technical reality of the situation. 
I 


think that -- that is very helpful because 


otherwise it becomes very difficult. You're in 


this place where you don't know the meaning of 


unmonitored, and that's -- we're going to come 


to that when we discuss TIB-38 is how do we 


establish that unmonitored people had no or low 


exposure potential. 


 MR. CHEW: I understand your question. This is 


something that we face every day in operating 


plutonium -- of facilities of high-hazard 


materials, especially when you're dealing with 


more -- more unusual isotopes and you're doing 


what Joe said, a campaign, one of a kind. And 


you're right, you know, you set up a monitoring 


program because you're going to handle a small 


milli-- few milligrams of curium, you know, and 


-- and the answer is probably, you know -- I 


don't think you're going to find that we're 


going to see a piece of paper that says, you 


know, I've analyzed, you know, what they're 


going to be doing there and there is no 


exposure potential there so we're not going to 

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monitor them. I don't think you're going to 


find that kind of data. At least I'm not 


familiar with that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm not looking for that. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: You know, I think what -- what 


I'm looking for is -- and maybe this is where 


Mark's, you know, review of -- in a classified 


setting might come in is a review of what was 


done. And if some -- some -- if there's no 


piece of paper from the time, then a review of 


what was done to establish -- now, in 


retrospect, because a lot of situations -- you 


know, we had this discussion with Y-12 at 


length that --


 MR. CHEW: I remember. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- people were not monitored -- 


right, people were not monitored without their 


not had serious exposure potential, but -- and 


maybe we still have a difference of opinion 


about this, but we concluded that they were 


trying their best, and sometimes they actually 


succeeded in identifying people who were not at 


risk and sometimes they didn't. So they didn't 


monitor people who were at risk, and then they 

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eventually did monitor people who were at risk 


because they late identified who was at risk, 


some -- and we have -- they went the other way, 


too. They monitored people who were not at 


risk and then took them off monitor. And I 


think that in light of that experience, we 


can't trust the judgment that was made at the 


time, outside of -- outside of some kind of 


evaluation that this is not important in dose 


reconstruction. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I think that's reasonable, Arjun, 


but I -- I think -- and I agree, we need to 


pick that up and examine it. And what forms 


the answer that we're seeking here is was that 


potential exposure a heavy contributor to dose, 


would that potential exposure drive a best-


estimate over the 50 percent mark, 'cause it 


certainly perhaps won't do it for the 


overestimate approach and it's not necessary 


for an underestimate approach. So I think, you 


know, as we -- as we take these things up and 


look at them, I agree with you. I think that's 


a reasonable approach and we need to consider 


them, but consider them in the light of what 


they're going to be used for. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: I completely agree, and that's 


the -- that's -- I think the point of my remark 


is the judgment of the time was made for one 


purpose. It was not anticipated then that you 


would be doing today what we're doing. And so 


we have -- we have to examine that judgment in 


light of what we're actually doing with the 


information. So I -- I completely agree with 


you. 


 MR. CHEW: I think I understand your -- your 


issue, your question, and we'll try to 


characterize that for you. I understand your 


concern. We'll try to -- try to identify as 


close as we can what we do know about those 


kinds of operations and what kind of judgment 


of monitoring necessary. I think that's where 


we are now. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And to -- to the extent you can ­

- I mean I don't know that we can get much more 


in this conversation without seeing the 


document, but to the extent you can, you're 


going to include the where, possibly the who -- 


and when I say the who, I'm talking was it -- 


was it ten workers in a lab, was it likely 


hundreds of workers, you know. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: Via job titles. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, or --

 MR. ELLIOTT: You can characterize the type of 

work that experienced the expo-- potential for 


the exposures. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay, we've had a chance to talk to 


 MR. GRIFFON: To the extent you can include 


those things, that would be -- that would be 


very helpful. 


 MR. CHEW: We've had a chance to talk to -- 


like Ed Vevjoda, who was very much involved 


with some of the special materials that was 


handled, and discuss that kind of an issue. So 


yeah, we were not anticipating 


(unintelligible), which is the discussion we 


were -- you know, we'd like to know ourselves 


and to get (unintelligible). 


 MR. ELLIOTT: At the risk of taking us too far 


on this, but I can feel the need to again draw 


us back on making sure we deliver a report that 


does not divulge national security information. 


And when we combine facts of -- such as 


location or building and certain types of 

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material, we find ourselves in trouble. So 


that's what we need to do is really be careful 


here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think I understand that avenue 


very well. 


Okay, anything else on the other radionuclides? 


I think mainly we're waiting for the 


deliverable and have a richer discussion after 


that, I'm sure. 


 DR. ULSH: Just a quick clarification. I think 


Wanda was asking which matrix item this is, and 


I think it's --


 MR. GRIFFON: 29. 


 DR. ULSH: -- 29, but it's also 35. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, is it -- okay. It's 


continued into (unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: So Wanda, 29 and 35. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes, you're right, you're right, 


29 and 35. Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Say, Mark, I'd like to mention 


something which is a little off-line, but 


relevant. I'm noticing that the -- what you -- 


what you're doing is a narrative approach to 


issue resolution and sort of separating 


ourselves, at least for the time being, from 

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the matrix. I would just like to say that I -- 


I like it. In other words, it allows a flow of 


ideas that coalesce together and are much 


easier to discuss, and then later, after we go 


through this process -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I (unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: -- we hook into the -- the matrix 


and try to track it. I bring this up because 


it's the very same question that came up 


recently on Savannah River. We had a 


conference call recently and we sort of came to 


the same judgment you came to independently. 


We like the idea of the narrative, and this 


seems to be working very well. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. The matrix serves its 


purpose, but I think for -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- these discussions it's better 


to get the main ideas out. Right? 


All right, you want -- want to take a five-


minute break or something? 


 DR. WADE: We're going to break for five 


minutes, which could stretch to six or seven. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, probably ten minutes, 


realistically. All right. 

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 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:45 a.m. 


to 11:00 a.m.) 


 DR. WADE: Okay, this is the -- the conference 


room. We're back. Two items, one of 


administrative importance, one of personal 


importance to me. 


I would ask everyone to mute their phones if 


they're not speaking. 


 The personal importance to me is I'm a 


grandfather for the first time, so I get my 


granddaughter's name on the record. Margaret 


Wade was born last night and that's our first 


grandchild. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Congratulations. 


 MS. MUNN: Congratulations, that's wonderful. 


 DR. WADE: I got her name on the court reporter 


record. Okay. 


INTERNAL COWORKER MODEL/TIB-38


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. I think we'll go -- I 


think we're done with other radionuclides. Is 


that agreed? The fourth item I had on my 


schedule here was the internal coworker model 


and this focuses on OTIB-38. Again, I think 


that was part of the discussion on that meeting 


between NIOSH and SC&A the other day, or a week 

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ago or whenever that occurred. 


 DR. ULSH: Actually -- actually, Mark, I don't 


think it was. That was --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, you -- oh, you didn't discuss 


that one? 


 DR. ULSH: No, that was --


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. 


 DR. ULSH: No, that was done (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So -- well, then OTIB-38 


is the internal coworker model, and I think 


there's a couple of ways in which this comes 


up. One is the -- certainly just the coworker 


model aspect of it, but the other part is I 


think there's some -- some certain things where 


this is going to overlap a little bit into the 


data integrity question, you know, so -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but I think we'll focus on the 


coworker model here, and try to capture those 


data integrity issues -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and then in the next section ­

-


 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) other facets. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so I'll let Joe --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, just as a little 


background -- of course we did get OTIB-38 and 


58 both to review. Ron, as we just noted, took 


a look at 58 and Joyce, who's on the phone, has 


been taking a look at the internal coworker 


model as well. So this review has been going 


on for about a month or two. And we did 


mention it in the last conference call, but 


only just to see if we could get the OTIB-38 


expert available for this discussion more than 


anything else, 'cause we're not really quite 


ready. We have as many questions as we have 


analyses to offer and we thought at this point 


it'd be better to have a good discussion of it 


and make sure that we -- we understood what we 


were looking at and we're clear on that. 


And it does have a number of different facets, 


and I think Arjun's been involved a lot from 


the standpoint of crosswalking it, so I think 


what we'd like to do is just maybe -- since 


Arjun probably spent more time thinking about 


the broader picture and Joyce has been getting 


into I think the very specifics of the model 


and how it's used, maybe have Arjun provide a 


overview to sort of tee up the broader issue, 

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then maybe give Joyce an opportunity to, you 


know, provide some of the specific questions 


that we have and some of the concerns, and then 


maybe start the discussion that way. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. You have to excuse me, 


Joyce, or jump in if I make any mistakes. 


Let's see, the -- let me just -- give me a 


minute to open my notes here. 


(Pause) 


Well, first -- the first question that arises 


is who -- who -- who was -- well, the first 


question is who was unmonitored, so I alluded 


to this before -- before the break, and that 


arises specifically in a question of the 


coworker model, TIB-38, as NIOSH has made a 


statement that unmonitored workers would be 


less exposed than the highest reading you have 


available for bioassay in the various 


categories. And that's -- appears at the 


present to be not a validated or demonstrated 


judgment. And we took a look at the problem of 


how you -- you know, whether there was 


documentation at the time as to who was 


monitored and who was not monitored, and 


whether the unmonitored can be regarded as part 

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of the same statistical distribution as the 


monitored workers. 


I -- Joyce and I -- and I think Mark also -- 


looked at -- at the data, and actually the 


available data don't even fit into a sensible 


distribution, and so there's a question of 


where the unmonitored workers might belong and 


whether you can apply the available data in 


some scientifically-defensible way to the 


unmonitored workers. 


So that's a sort of a big question and 


demonstrating that they belong in that group -- 


somewhere in the group of monitored workers, 


whether they're related to the highest exposed 


or somewhere in the median, is a technical job, 


did they work -- you know, what were the job 


types, what were the radionuclides they worked 


with and so on. I think that -- that's a -- 


looks like an issue that hasn't been settled. 


The -- the other issue with the data, that the 


model is constructed in relation to reporting 


levels, and there are lots of questions about 


the relationship of the reporting level to the 


MDA. The MDA is a calculated MDA because in 


the '50s they didn't do MDA so you calculated 

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them. The lots of data that are non-zero 


values below the reporting level, and it seems 


that -- say the reporting level is .88, those 


values will be taken as .88 dpm for 24 hours, 


but that isn't actually put in as part of the 


distribution, so there's -- there's a lot of 


technical questions that may or may not be -- 


that -- that simply relate to how -- how a 


coworker model should be constructed. 


Tentatively at least it was Joyce's conclusion 


that doing things in relation to the reporting 


level, with so many non-zero values -- in many 


cases, a majority of non-zero values -- being 


below the reporting level and with an uncertain 


relationship of the reporting level to the MDA 


did not -- did not -- was scientifically 


questionable, at least, and we -- at this 


stage, let's just put it that way. So it 


didn't look like the coworker model was on -- 


was on solid scientific ground in that regard. 


And then looking -- looking at the data -- I 


lost my summary. Looking at the data, a few 


other questions came up is that we didn't find 


some of the high values from the log books in 


the HIS-20 database. But as Mark mentioned, 

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we'll cover that later. 


The -- where's the rest of my summary. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It does raise the question of the 


representativeness of the coworker model, too, 


so if there was any -- you know, if that turns 


out to be a problem, then it also affects the 


coworker model. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, I'd just like to point out 


that we used the CEDR database, not the HIS-20, 


and I'm not certain --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes -- that's Liz Brackett --


yeah, and we -- we -- we went through these 


convolutions as well, Liz. There's also a 


question on that, Li-- 


MS. BRACKETT: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you know, just a question of 


how, for a given year, CEDR has more values 


than HIS-20. HIS-20 -- it's my recollection, 


at least in these meetings, HIS-20 has always 


been sort of expressed as the database of 


record, and I assume-- I assumed, and maybe -- 


obviously wrongly so, that CEDR was extracted 


from HIS-20. And then I was confused on how 


HIS-- how CEDR had more values in certain 


years, certain time periods, than HIS-20. If 

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anything, I would think it would have less, but 


it has more. Do you know -- have you looked at 


that or... 


MS. BRACKETT: We have someone looking, but I 


was not the one who did that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And I remember there was 


an analysis provided on comparing HIS-20 and 


CEDR. 


MS. BRACKETT: Right, and I thought in general 


for internal they were pretty similar. I 


thought that was the -- the conclusion was that 


they were -- there was very little difference 


between them. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The conclusion -- yeah, I think 


the conclusion was that the distributions were 


similar enough --


MS. BRACKETT: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to not have to re-do the model 


based on HIS-20. But --


UNIDENTIFIED: I felt that, too, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Anyway, let's just lay these out 


now and then we'll -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- review (unintelligible) -- 


MS. BRACKETT: Okay, sorry, I just -- I wasn't 

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sure if, you know, there might be a slight 


difference between them. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Agreed, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: My memory was that we had put that 


to bed. I -- I thought we'd agreed that there 


were enough similarities that it wasn't a 


problem. 


 MR. GRIFFON: My --


MS. BRACKETT: I thought that was the case, 


too, but I just wanted to point out, since it 


was said that the data were taken from HIS-20, 


when we in fact used CEDR for -- for the 


coworker. I just wanted to make that 


(unintelligible). 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, but I thought we had -- had 


gotten comfortable with the relationship 


between CEDR and HIS-20, to the point where it 


had been my memory that we pretty much agreed 


that what we looked -- what you had looked at, 


Mark, and what others had looked at, found that 


there were very few dissimilarities, that they 


were close enough to be -- the few -- few 


dissimilarities were not of major import. 


We're -- we're still looking at that? 


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mean we -- we got a response from NIOSH, Wanda, 


you're correct. I think it was one that we got 


right before our workgroup meeting, as is most 


often the case. But I don't know that SC&A 


ever re-- you know, analyzed the response -- 


 MS. MUNN: Mmm. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- so -- and the -- you know, the 


reason this comes up is I think it was part of 


-- of going down this path of the data 


integrity as well, and again, I -- and maybe 


I'm wrong on this, but I think HIS-20 has 


usually been presented in -- in our recent 


discussions on data integrity, as the sort of 


database of record. And I talked --


 MS. MUNN: I thought that was why we were 


looking -- checking it against CEDR, to 


identify that there were very few if any 


dissimilarities or -- or holes between -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, there -- there are 


dissimilarities, that's -- that's what I'm 


saying. And -- and I think NIOSH's analysis 


was basically saying that there might be 


dissimilarities, but the effect on the annual 


intakes projected from a CEDR model -- a model 


based on CEDR data versus a model based on HIS­
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20 was not going to be greatly different. 
I 


think that was kind of the conclusion. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, that's what I thought. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and that's -- you know, 


but -- but again, I don't think SC&A looked at 


that. We -- but they did -- NIOSH did present 


that and gave it to us. But you know, the 


other way this comes up for me is the fact 


that, you know, in going through some -- 


actually I came about this in sort of the back 


door, which was looking at these log books and 


comparing against the HIS-20 database as a 


means to say okay, you know, the data looks 


reliable, the relia-- data reliability 


question. And in doing that, it -- it strikes 


me that I -- I assumed I guess that HIS-20 was 


the database of record and that's -- that's why 


I'm saying it doesn't make sense to me now that 


CEDR would have less values. I'm still not -- 


I'm not at a point where I would say that it 


likely would affect the -- the analysis 


provided before, that just -- the coworker 


distributions may actually yield the same 


product, but it does raise this other question 


which I -- you know, I suggest is a bigger 

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discussion and our next topic, which is the 


data reliability. You know, why were these 


values not in the HIS-20 database. 


 MS. MUNN: So do I understand correctly that 


what you're specifically asking for is an 


agreement of some kind from SC&A? Or you're --


you're relying on SC&A's interpretation of 


whether the data is reliable enough. Is 


that... 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I --


 MS. MUNN: I guess I'm confused as to what we 


want -- what the next step is, what's wanted. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, why don't you -- why don't 


you hear -- hear SC&A out first, and I'm not 


sure I know the next step, but all I'm saying 


is there's two parts of the issue. One is the 


coworker model, which we've heard again and 


again is not very much relied on in the Rocky 


Flats claims. And then the other part of that 


is the -- the data integrity itself. 


 MS. MUNN: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, and --


 MR. GRIFFON: So just bear with us for a few 


minutes. 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, and again, this is a 


analysis in progress and we came up with, 


again, more questions that we felt would be 


useful to discuss at this table now before 


presenting a written piece on this, and that's 


the purpose of just trying to set the stage. 


Unless you have anything else, Arjun. I don't 


know if Joyce --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, what -- what -- what -- 


yeah, why doesn't Joyce pick it up from here. 


Maybe I can (unintelligible). 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think -- I think Joyce has a 


more --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- yeah, detailed grasp of what 


she has written than I do, so... 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. Should I start? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, go ahead, Joyce. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. From the pattern of the 


HIS-20 and the CEDR database, the CEDR database 


has more data than the HIS-20 database. And 


what was presented by the NIOSH is that they 


knew that -- that really for some years the 


CEDR has more data than the HIS-20, most of the 

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years they have it, some years the HIS-20 has 


more data. And they say that most of the data 


that is -- the different is mostly from people 


that were -- that the zero doses, that's more 


on the CEDR and then the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: What kind of dose, Joyce? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Zero, zero. Zero, most of the 


zero. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Zero, okay. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah, yes. And then the CEDR 


database was used on the coworker model and -- 


okay. And then on the revision on the -- 


review of -- NIOSH review of this application 


evaluation report, there is a whole chapter -- 


whole section seven on the credibility and 


consistent of the Rocky Flat dosimetry data, 


and then all the comparison is done -- were 


based on the HIS-20 database as the primary 


source of the data. So that's one of our 


(unintelligible) is how come the CEDR database 


has more data than the primary source, which is 


the HIS-20. And then it says that the HIS-20 


was compared with original hard copy records 


for a number of individuals, and they say there 


is no evidence of systematic errors. I'm 

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reading from the SEC petition evaluation report 


by NIOSH. HIS-20 was compared with original 


hard copy records for a number of individuals 


and no evidence of systematic errors or 


significant difference between the HIS-20 


database and the hard copy data was observed. 


I don't know what is this hard copy data, but 


the problem is that many -- not only the zero 


results are missing from the HIS-20 database, 


but a lot of high results are missing from the 


HIS-20 database, at least for internal 


dosimetry. I have reviewed some of the log 


books, and I have noticed, for example, from 


the '57 to '60 that like there were four people 


exposed in an incident. Only one is reported 


on the HIS-20 database. But they are present 


on the CEDR database, so my question is from 


where does the data from the CEDR database come 


from. And how can we rely on the HIS-20 


database when many high activities are missing. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, I have a question then. 


Why do we need to rely on the HIS-20 database 


if we didn't use this for coworker, then why -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I don't know that. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- why (unintelligible) -- 

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 DR. LIPSZTEIN: That's what NIOSH says on the 


SEC petition evaluation report. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, Liz -- Liz, this does go 


back, and I mean it -- we are waking this issue 


up, to some extent, but it does go back to the 


-- the argument that -- you know, originally we 


-- we questioned why CEDR, why not the primary 


source, so then NIOSH offered an analysis that 


said well, we don't have to redo the model 


because basically we get the same results with 


CEDR versus HIS-20. 


MS. BRACKETT: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And now we're saying why -- you 


know, we're kind of looking at that answer 


again -- and maybe in more detail, I agree, but 


you know, we're all working real time here -- 


looking at that and saying wait a second, we 


see some -- some things that don't seem to make 


sense, you know, and Joyce just laid those out 


very well, you know, why -- 


MS. BRACKETT: But I guess my question, though, 


is why do we need to look any further at the 


HIS-20 database if we're not actually using it 


for anything. 


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-- I've been told that I can use that to -- to 


validate hard co-- you know, we're validating 


that --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, actually Liz, I think I can 


answer --


MS. BRACKETT: The coworker --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- that. We used the HIS-20 -- I 


mean that is part of the worker's record. That 


is probably what we would rely on to do dose 


reconstruction. 


MS. BRACKETT: Okay, I guess I didn't realize 


that the --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, so individual DRs are 


using that. 


MS. BRACKETT: There's not -- there's not 


handwritten records or anything that goes in 


them --


 DR. ULSH: Yes, there are. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- because that's what the DRs 


would go back to. 


 DR. ULSH: In the early years certainly, and I 


don't know --


 MR. GRIFFON: You're -- you're getting ahead of 


us, but that --

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MS. BRACKETT: Sorry. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- 'cause I'm coming up with 


those questions, but thank you, no, pursue down 


this path. That's fine. 


 DR. ULSH: In the early --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: And the --


 DR. ULSH: In the early --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: And the super S also we were 


told to look at the HIS-20 database for the 


cases that were used on the super S. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, which is the first time I 


noticed. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: The fire -- the 1965 fire and 


the design cases we are told to look at the 


HIS-20 database for those cases. 


MS. BRACKETT: Okay, I didn't realize that -- 


you know, I -- I guess I was just raising the 


question --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and --


MS. BRACKETT: -- what is it being used for. 


 DR. ULSH: In terms of --


 MR. GRIFFON: Let me -- let me try to -- and 


Brant, jump in if I get this wrong, but I -- 


the -- the case files I've reviewed, it seems 


like there's a combination of database printout 

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data and then, for the early year -- and I'm 


trying to get a handle on when that early years 


is defined. I think -- what I've seen, it's 


sort of -- the latest I've seen is up to '69 


where you have actual bioassay card type data 


or -- or for-- a grid -- grid form kind of 


thing, yeah, where you have handwritten numbers 


in -- in a worksheet of sorts. But that's 


only, it looks to me -- I've found things in 


the '50s and up to as late as '69, but then 


after that it's all database printout data. So 


I was told, you know, that -- that's why we're 


concerned about the database. We've got to -- 


we want to compare that against hard copy 


records, and to some extent we were trying to 


do that with our log book analysis with the 


urinalysis logs are going down that path 


because that's what's in the individual records 


and that's what's being relied upon for dose 


reconstruction. 


MS. BRACKETT: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Does that make sense -- 


 DR. ULSH: I agree, Mark. I mean I -- it 


matches my experience, too, that you see their 


handwritten cards up to maybe '69, don't hold 

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me to that but that's about right, I think. 
I 

think I recall presenting at the Denver 


Advisory Board meeting an analysis -- a 


comparison of hard copy versus HIS-20 data. 


That was part of --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and we -- I think -- what ­

- what we're now asking maybe is maybe we need 


a little clarification of what you meant when 


you said hard copy. Was it database printout 


data, was it this six-- you know, know these 


early card data, and you may have laid that out 


specifically, but we may have not understood it 


at that time so that might be part of -- 


 DR. ULSH: Craig Little performed that. 


Unfortunately, he's in Tuscany -- right, 


Tuscany? Unfortunately for me. But our 


recollection -- Bob Meyer and I -- is that he 


looked at card data. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Card data. So when you say hard 


copy data it's -- it's -- 


 DR. ULSH: It's those things you're talking 


about up to '69, the handwritten, compared to 


HIS-20. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MEYER: That's correct. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: All right. But you gave -- I 


mean you have several -- I'd have to look back 


at Craig's report, but he gave -- I think he 


also compared the other data, too. Right? Or 


was it only the card data? 


 DR. ULSH: I don't know that I can say it was 


only the card data. It was at least the card 


data. There might be other pieces. I'd have to 


look back, too, Mark. 


MR. MEYER: (Off microphone) I think 


(unintelligible) got into the other comparison 


in his --


 MS. MUNN: My understanding at the time in 


Denver was that it was card data. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I didn't even know that they had 


cards in their files when (unintelligible) 


Denver, so -- but... 


Okay, so -- so that -- I guess that's -- I -- I 


think we're going on Liz's question, which is 


why are we looking at HIS-20. That's really 


the reason why we're even bothering to look. 


And even if it was card data, I think that 


probably gets us up to late '60s, then you 


still have some question about '70 through -- 

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 DR. ULSH: Oh, 'cause that's -- that's where we 


have -- you're con-- I think, now it's coming 


back to me a little bit, we started out with 


analysis between -- what was it, HIS-20 and 


something else, and your concern was that 


that's -- I think I recall you saying something 


like that's not really what I'm interested in; 


what I want to see is comparison to the hard 


copy record. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: And I think that's why we -- you 


know, in response to that, we went back into 


the card data. And like you said, that only 


exists up through '69. After that, they were 


electronically recorded. So to get to your 


desire to see a comparison of electronic versus 


hard copy, that's why we did that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And there might have been -- 


might have been some talk. I wasn't as 


familiar with the claims files. I took some 


time in the last month or so and looked at a 


number of them. When you were saying hard copy 


from the claims files, I was wondering if it 


was just still printouts or whatever, so -- 


 DR. ULSH: I see. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: -- we need to reconsider that 


Craig Little report. I think SC&A needs to -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Take another look. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know, as part of this, but -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, but that's -- that's -- that 


probably fits into the next action -- the next 


agenda item, data reliability. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: But in terms of OTIB-38, the 


questions are --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Joyce -- did you have anything 


else, Joyce? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Not on the HIS-20 database, but 


I think I would like to compliment what Arjun 


has said about -- about OTIB-38. May I? Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes, please. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. The first thing that 


Arjun said about it is one first question that 


we ask ourself -- we have to ask is who was 


monitored. The first thing on the coworker 


model is that statistical methods were used to 


calculate the coworker intake, assuming that 


the bioass-- bioassay results for 

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(unintelligible) that were monitored have a 


lognormal distribution. We accept -- let's say 


that we would accept that the workers have a 


lognormal distribution. I'm not discussing 


this now. We could argue about that, but let's 


not discuss this now. When you have a 


statistical design of workers that were 


monitored, then you have to know wherever you 


place the worker that was not monitored, 


because when you have a distribution -- a 


statistical distribution to represent workers, 


where do you place the workers with some 


(unintelligible) probability of selection into 


that sample, because if you have workers with 


some (unintelligible) of selection into a 


sample, where to place this is not a 


statistical decision, it's a subjective 


decision, and that's the main problem with the 


coworker distribution. You -- if you want to 


use the -- the coworker model as a 


representative statistical distribution of 


unmonitored workers, you have to know the 


probability of all the members of the target 


population, the people that were selected to be 


included in that distribution and the people 

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that were not selected to be put in the -- in 


the -- in that distribution, and we don't know 


that. At least NIOSH did not inform what was 


the criteria and what was exactly where we 


should put the -- the -- the unmonitored 


worker. We cannot say it behaved like the 


median or the 85 percent because we don't know. 


We don't know what -- what would be the 


probability of selection of the unmonitored 


worker and where he sh-- what -- where he would 


stay in that population. And NIOSH says on the 


SEC petition evaluation report that in general 


participation in a bioassay program involved 


workers who have the largest potential for 


exposure, but we don't know what was the real 


policy for Rocky Flats. On -- on the ORAU TBS5 (sic) -- 11.5, which is the internal 


monitoring document, it says that in the '50s 


the practice of Rocky Flats was to monitor 


workers only if they were expected to be 


exposed to ten percent or more of the limit of 


tolerance, and later the goal was to operate at 


less than ten percent and (unintelligible) 


investigation conditions if an air sample 


exceeded 100 percent of the limit. So we don't 

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know who really was monitored and we -- we see 


that all this is a subjective -- was a 


subjective decisions. There is -- NIOSH did 


not provide us with any statistical or 


technical basis to say that the unmonitored 


worker would receive less dose than the most 


highly exposure or -- or -- or the -- or what 


the people that had the -- the -- I'm sorry -- 


that participation on the bioassay program 


involved only workers who had the largest 


potential of exposure because all of this were 


based on subjective decisions. 


We also know from reading the log books from 


the early years that it had a lot of discussion 


on who should have been monitored and which 


tasks needed monitoring. So if you go through 


the log book you'll see that in many 


(unintelligible) there are a lot of discussions 


saying these people should be monitored -- 


would have been monitored -- should it monit-- 


that practice, should we not monitor that 


practice and then they had conference and 


things like that, and they were -- they were 


not sure and there were complaints with the 


union saying that they should be monitored and 

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they should not. And also if you go through 


the log book you would say that -- you would 


see that some workers that were monitored and 


presented high exclusion rates. Also the 


radiation protection people because they say 


all -- they have a discussion and they say we 


don't know, we have investigations and we find 


no reasons for the high urine results. So from 


this we can conclude that some jobs that might 


have presented radiation contamination risks 


might have been misjudged and workers might not 


have been monitored. So my -- my -- our first 


concern is on the application of this model to 


the unmonitored worker. 


Our second problem -- so let -- let's say -- 


well, let's go into the model itself. When we 


go to the coworker model itself there is a 


suggested linear distribution to substitute 


values less than the reporting levels 'cause 


there were reporting levels for uranium and for 


plutonium at that time. But there is no real 


scientific value reason to be used -- to use 


these linear distribution. And in fact when 


you looked at what was done, you know, on the 


OTIB-0038, although it says they -- linear 

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distribution to substitute values less than 


reported levels should be used, it was not used 


for plutonium. Instead they used the exact 


values, even if they were below the reporting 


levels. And even the zeroes were not 


substituted for that linear distribution but 


they were substituted by the reporting level 


for plutonium. And for uranium NIOSH used 


another distribution that is not the one 


described -- this linear distribution that was 


described on OTIB-38. So I don't understand 


what's done and why it's presented a linear 


distribution that in fact was not used. 


Now the third problem that we have with this 


coworker model is that there were many results 


reported below the reporting levels. And for 


example, there -- for plutonium, for example, 


there were between 76 and 80 percent of the -- 


eight -- even sometimes 87 percent of the 


positive results were below this reporting 


levels. 


 And another problem that we have is that for 


most of the uranium and for some of the 


plutonium the reporting level is below the MDA 


for the median conditions. So we don't know 

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what really these numbers mean when they are 


below the -- the MDA for the median con-- 


condition. And -- and so the problem with the 


MDA, it was calculated (unintelligible) not at 


that time, and then the MDA was calculated for 


the median and for the extreme conditions. So 


I don't know what the median MDA 


(unintelligible), we don't know what a 


reporting level below the -- the median MDA 


means, and we don't know why substitute the -- 


the zeroes for reporting levels and not by the 


MDA, we don't know -- we -- we need some 


explanation why this was done like that. 


MR. ALLEN: All right, Joyce, this is Dave 


Allen. I think I can start this off anyway. 


MS. BRACKETT: Okay, I was going to jump in 


'cause I was -- been reviewing the data, but... 


MR. ALLEN: Let me start it off, Liz. First of 


all, the TIB-38 was -- the sole purpose of that 


document was to analyze what data we had as far 


as monitored workers, determine what type of 


distribution. It wasn't so much as to 


determine who it would apply to other than 


unmonitored workers. And how that is applied, 


I believe right now would be up to the dose 

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reconstructors themselves based on the 


specifics of a case. If you get a case that is 


a clerical worker that says she never went into 


any of the plants and stayed in an 


administrative building, you would have one 


assumption, versus someone that said they was a 


security guard and they made routine security 


checks through various buildings, that would 


probably give you a different assumption. The 


whole purpose of TIB-38 was to give you the 


distributions of the people that were 


monitored, and essentially end it right there 


as far as that document goes. 


As far as the minimum detectible activity of an 


analysis, that is the statistical analysis of a 


single sample to determine whether or not the 


level of that sample is truly greater than 


background and not a statistical anomaly with 


background. That's the -- essentially the 


purpose of an MDA. When you're analyzing a 


larger population of samples, the detection 


limit is really irrelevant for the distribution 


of that -- that population. What's important 


is the sensor level, which here is the 


recording level. You mentioned a .88 a few 

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times in the earlier years, and I think .2 in 


later years for plutonium. So the purpose of 


this was essentially to -- well, the bulk of 


the mathematics anyway, was to essentially 


determine a distribution of the urine samples 


for each quarter or each year, depending on how 


many samples we had, and then to put that into 


an IMBA analysis to determine the intake rates. 


The -- as far as the big piece of the samples 


being less than the recording level, and 


they're simply recorded as let's say less than 


.88, that is true. The issue is, because the 


bulk of your samples are recorded as less than 


some value, does that truly make them 


worthless. The idea that a large percentage of 


samples recorded less than some number, you 


know, in my opinion has a lot of worth. It 


tells you a lot about the distribution or about 


the -- the type of activity in the samples. So 


the technique that was used -- the technique 


that we tried to use anyway -- is to rank all 


the data, including the sensor data, to 


determine what percentile all the data is in, 


and then we fit the -- the positive data to -- 


essentially we are making the assumption that 

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it's lognormal and then fitting the recorded 


tail of that lognormal distribution in order to 


determine the parameters of that distribution. 


We also use a goodness of fit parameter in an 


attempt to verify that lognormal assumption. 


 The problem we run into in Rocky Flats is that 


the .88 sensor level or recording limit -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Excuse me, if you're on the --


could you mute your phone if you're -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: That's Bryce, isn't it? 


 MR. CHEW: Bryce? Bryce, could you mute your ­

- mute your phone? I think you're -- I know 


you're talking on the phone with Ed. Thanks. 


MR. ALLEN: Anyway, back to where I was. The 


.88 recording limit -- if I can remember where 


I was -- oh, the problem we ran into with Rocky 


Flats was the .88 recording limit was for 


routine analysis, so we had a number of 


samples. For most quarters you'll have, you 


know, some samples greater than that .88 and 


they're recorded whatever value they came out 


to be. You'll have a great deal of samples 


recorded as less than .88. And then you have 


some samples that are not routine or for some 


reason they wanted to record an actual value or 

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to get a more statistically rigorous sample of 


those samples -- or analysis of those samples, 


so you end up with some positive readings that 


are below that .88, such as say .5 or .4. We 


did not want to throw out positive data. I 


mean that's some of the real numbers we have 


rather than .88 -- or less than .88 -- and we 


struggled a little bit with the appropriate way 


to deal with that. 


One way was to just rank all the positive data 


and put all the sensor data below, but then you 


end up with these .4s that are -- have a higher 


percentile than what's -- you know, some of 


these less than .88s that are probably above 


that. The opposite is to put all those at the 


other end of it and then you're going to end 


up, you know, with the opposite effect. You've 


got .4s recorded as a very low percentile when 


in reality some of those less than .88s are a 


much lower percentile. We've done these type 


of analysis both of those ways. The -- another 


method is to use a substitute value for the -- 


for the sensor data. It's -- it's --


 DR. WADE: We do need you to mute your phone. 


There's all kinds of noise coming through here. 

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 MR. RICH: I'm sorry, that wasn't me this time. 


 MS. MUNN: I hope that was a door slamming and 


not a revolver. 


 DR. ULSH: No angry screams from Bryce. 


 MR. RICH: I had it on mute before and it 


was... 


 DR. WADE: Okay, well, just -- everyone can 


mute if they're not speaking, please. 


MR. ALLEN: One other standard -- fairly 


standard technique that people use in these 


type of situations when they have a lot of 


sensor data is to -- to substitute a value. 


Often it's half of that sensor value, so in 


this case .44 for those values. That gives us 


-- well, that -- that's three options. Then 


the fourth option we're talking about is this 


linear distribution where we put in there. 


That is essentially an attempt to rank these 


positive values, such as the .4s, et cetera, in 


the proper location, where they would belong in 


that large distribution that is less than .88. 


The -- one way that was thought of of doing 


that is to assume that all those less than .88s 


are lognormally distributed and -- and simply 


substitute a value for that set between zero 

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and .88 in a lognormal distribution. That's 


making the analysis come out to a lognormal 


based on your assumption. It's kind of -- you 


know, it's almost like cheating, you know, it's 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It's compounding your 


assumptions. 


MR. ALLEN: A decision was made to make the 


assumption that we simply can't make that -- we 


can't make that assumption and we wanted to 


stick with what we did know, and what we know 


is the value was less than .88. We made the -- 


what I think is a good assumption -- that the 


true value was greater -- or was not less than 


zero, and we assumed nothing else other than it 


was somewhere between zero and .88 and it was ­

- we gave equal probability all along there, 


which essentially is a uniform distribution -- 


or some people would call that the distribution 


of maximum ignorance -- and that's what I would 


like to -- that's what we did with this rather 


than making the assumption that it was 


lognormal. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But it seems to me -- you 


answered at least one of my questions, which is 

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what are these values less than .88 that are 


real values, so --


MR. ALLEN: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I understand that now. But 


what -- why -- there's a different combinations 


in -- in the coworker model. Right? For 


uranium it looks like you went with a linear -- 


MR. ALLEN: Right. 


MS. BRACKETT: Right, if I can speak up here -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) and for 


plutonium you have other ones -- go ahead, Liz, 


I'm sorry. 


MS. BRACKETT: I'm sorry. I was just going to 


point out that we in fact did not use the 


linear distribution for the plutonium -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- because the majority of the 


samples were not recorded as less than the 


recording level. We -- we only use that 


distribution when the vast majority of results 


are less than some cut-off level. And when I 


say vast majority, I mean 90 percent or more. 


And that was not the case for plutonium, so the 


plutonium less-than values were just ranked 


wherever they fell, but the actual -- no value 

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was actually used when the fit was performed 


for those. The uranium, on the other hand, we 


did do the substitution for many of them 'cause 


an awful lot of the results were less than the 


MDA or the -- the recording level. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: That was not exactly the same 


distribution as described. There was another 


kind of linear distribution for uranium but it 


is not the one that is described in OTIB-0038. 


MS. BRACKETT: It should be. 

 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No, it isn't. I -- I checked 

and it's not. 

MR. ALLEN: Well, we'd only -- Joyce, this is 


Dave again. It would only be the values that 


were recorded as less-than, and some of those 


at least were --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I know. 


MR. ALLEN: Okay. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah, exactly. I noticed that 


plutonium was completely different, and then 


for uranium it's another kind of distribution 


but it's not the one that is described in OTIB0038. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, we'll have to go back and 


look at that then because it should be. 

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 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, please. 


MR. ALLEN: Yeah, we can look at the linear -- 


you know, what's supposed to be the linear 


distribution in the uranium. And yeah, I'm 


aware the plutonium did not use that. The --


the length of time it just took me to describe 


what we did is -- kind of tells you why we 


tried to avoid using that. We tried to avoid 


substitution at all in these, but as Liz said, 


when we get to a point where almost all the 


samples are recorded as a less-than value, we 


had to use something. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And for -- for the plutonium 


years, it seemed to me that the point -- the 


.88 decade or whatever, I follow you, the .2 


decade seemed to be consistent, but -- or -- 


it's basically replacing all zeroes with that 


recording limit of .2. 


MR. ALLEN: No, not for plutonium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No? That's what I saw, I 


thought. 


MR. ALLEN: What they ended up doing -- well, 


for the plutonium urinalysis, the method that 


ended up being done was one of those options I 


gave you in the beginning, and in this 

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particular case it was the resource -- the 


positive results recorded above the recording 


level of course are ranked, you know, as the 


high samples. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. ALLEN: The positive results recorded below 


that were all ranked at the low end. What that 


ended up doing was giving us a slightly 


inflated values for the -- the distribution. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


DR. MAURO: I've got a question. You know, 


getting to the point we're at right now, I was 


following the correspondence involved and saw ­

- number of conference calls, I -- it was my 


understanding that the -- the reporting level, 


this .88 number, dpm per 24 hours -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- is lower than the MDA -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I can't hear you. Can you 


speak louder? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, Joy-- yeah, Joyce, this is 


John. Am I --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: Am I correct that the reporting 


level, this .88 number that I'm hearing, is 

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that lower than the MDA? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No, the --


MS. BRACKETT: No. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- the -- when it comes to .2 


it's lower than the MDA, and the 8.8 (sic) dpm 


that is used for reporting level of uranium is 


below the median MDA, yes. 


DR. MAURO: So is -- so now -- let me -- just ­

- I -- it's a simple question. If -- if the 


reporting level is in fact lower than the 


median MDA, then in my mind the reporting level 


is a metric that has no meaning. Other words, 


you know, if you're saying well -- well, we 


selected a reporting level, but if the MDA is 


above it, it's the MDA that is at play here 


where -- that we should be looking at. Why are 


we even looking at a reporting level and 


somehow keying in on that as a -- as a -- as a 


meaningful number if it's below the MDA? 


MR. ALLEN: Well, that -- that's why I 


mentioned that first. The MDA is only a value 


that's worthwhile for a single analysis. In 


the analysis of a population the detection 


limit is really irrelevant. The only thing 


that's relevant in this analysis would be the 

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sensor level, and that would be what level you 


recorded values at and what level do you simply 


record them as some kind of less-than value. 


In fact, if you were to take a -- a large 


number of blank samples and run analysis on it, 


it would be a legitimate statistical analysis 


of what the background's doing in determining 


what your MDA is, so the MDA itself on 


analyzing the population is not a relevant 


number really. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I don't agree with you. I 


think -- and NIOSH even has used that, and I 


don't agree with the way NIOSH is using the MDA 


'cause it's taking the median MDA from a 


population and dividing it by two to assign it 


for people that had the zero levels. 


Let me -- let me point this out. You -- NIOSH 


has presented us with a DR example of how to 


deal with -- how they would deal with the data. 


This DR example is a worker who for two year 


was not monitored, and then after that he was 


monitored for I think four years, I don't 


recall exactly how many years, but had zero 


results for his monitoring. And what does 


NIOSH -- the way NIOSH is resolving this 

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example is that it's assigning to this 


hypothetical worker, for the time he was not 


monitored, the coworker model for uranium. And 


for the four years after which he was 


monitored, the zero results was -- was 


calculated the missed dose based on the median 


MDA divided by two. So I don't know why this 


difference. I don't know why the zero results 


in one place is -- you assign a value that is 


equal or -- to the 8.8 -- to the reporting 


level -- 'cause we're talking for uranium, the 


DR example's for uranium -- which is below the 


-- the median detection level and then when he 


has zero results in his records, then you 


assign to him the median MDA divided by two, 


which doesn't make any sense also. It's not 


consistent the way the zeroes are treated all 


through. 


MR. ALLEN: I think we're mixing up the 


concepts here. I mean I'm not saying MDA is 


always worthless. I'm saying MDA's associated 


with a single analysis. When you're doing -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Oh, yes, I agree, and it will 


be different from analysis to analysis. 


MR. ALLEN: Right, but I mean --

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 DR. LIPSZTEIN: But if you --


MR. ALLEN: What you're doing with the sample 


is what's important. If you're talking two or 


three samples from an individual, then you have 


to consider the detection limit on it. If you 


want to determine the distribution of a -- a 


large population of samples, the MDA of those 


individual samples aren't what's important. 


It's what the recorded value is. That's kind 


of two different issues. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No -- no, because there was no 


-- the MDA was not -- from that time was not 


calculated at that time. I would agree with 


you if there was a calculation of MDA at that 


time. The MDA was calculated now, based on the 


background and of the time of counting on the 


(unintelligible) of the detectors at that time. 


MR. ALLEN: Right, but that is to determine 


what the true value or what the sensitivity of 


that single analysis was. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think -- I think --


MR. ALLEN: Are we -- are we talking two 


different times here? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I -- let -- let me try. 


Put yourself back -- back in the '50s and 

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forget the calculated MDA. The procedure that 


was being used at the time had some detection 


limit, even though it was not calculated. It 


had. 


MR. ALLEN: Sure. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: There was -- there was a blank 


that above some level that blank would be 


considered contaminated. That result -- none 


of these things were calculated at the time, 


but there was a physical reality of the blanks 


and samples that were being measured. 


Now if you have -- if you had the real MDA at 


ten, and your result came out at five or four 


or three, what is the meaning of that result? 


It has no particular meaning. 


MR. ALLEN: On an individual basis. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No. If -- if all your results 


came out below the MDA and you don't know -- 


and your MDA is ten, that's the only statement 


that you can make if all -- all the results are 


below the MDA. 


MR. ALLEN: No, that's not true. If you were 


to take say 100 blank samples and run them 


through your analysis and record the values, 


you can get values like one, two, negative two, 

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various numbers. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


MR. ALLEN: If the laws of statistics work out, 


the average should end up being zero. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Uh-huh, that's right. 


MR. ALLEN: And you can determine a 


distribution about those blank samples. If we 


sampled everybody at Rocky Flats -- you know, a 


thousand different samples -- and before the 


plant started up, you get a thousand urine 


samples and nobody's been exposed to plutonium, 


hopefully those urinalyses are going to come 


out, on average, to be zero and you can 


determine a statistical distribution about 


those samples. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


MR. ALLEN: That's all we're doing, what is the 


statistical distribution of the samples is all 


we're doing, whether they're positive, negative 


or whatever. The only issue you have is what 


to do with values that are recorded less than 


some recording level -- the sensor data. 


That's the only thing important in that type of 


analysis. Now when you want to use a single 


sample to determine an intake, then the 

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detection limit is very important. But to 


determine the distribution of a set of samples, 


the detection limit is not important. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, if -- if you analyze a 


set of blanks and you come up with the aver-- 


and it has a normal distribution, you come up 


with an average value of zero, you can say with 


some confidence that this is an uncontaminated 


set of samples. But if -- if -- 


MR. ALLEN: But -- just -- just to catch that 


real quick. You can say that if you know your 


average is zero and what your standard 


deviation is. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Uh-huh. 


MR. ALLEN: Right? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, if --


MR. ALLEN: That's what we're doing is 


determining those parameters for that 


distribution. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But you can't make a sensible 


statement about the standard deviation if you 


don't know your detection limits. 


MR. ALLEN: You have to know the standard 


deviation in order to determine the detection 


limit. You're getting the cart before the 

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horse here. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But -- but --


MR. ALLEN: You can determine detection limits 


from a distribution of blank samples. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: But what Arjun is saying is 


that if you -- if you had -- even if you had a 


distribution where the median detection limit 


was such-and-such and the -- the detection 


limit for extreme condition, as NIOSH has 


calculated, is such-and-such, how do you know 


that the zero is because it's below 8.8 or 


because it's below the -- the MDA, the 


detection limit? How -- why do you 


(unintelligible) the zeroes by the -- the 


reporting level instead of (unintelligible) it 


for the -- the MDA. Why -- why does the zero 


signify it's below the -- the reporting level, 


not below the detection limit of that sample? 


MR. ALLEN: Well, when you have a zero recorded 


-- if -- if you had --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, when you have a zero 


recorded. 


MR. ALLEN: If -- if you had all values 


recorded, nothing was recorded as zero, nothing 


was recorded as less than some number, then you 

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would have no sensor data, you could determine 


a distribution of that population even if all 


of it was below the sensitivity of the 


analysis, and that's how you would determine 


MDA -- or one method you could use to determine 


MDA. 


As far as zero, like I said, the only question 


here then is sensor data and what that zero 


means. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Uh-huh. 


MR. ALLEN: And from --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes. 


MR. ALLEN: -- all the information from the 


site and from -- I don't remember the exact 


years, I think '52 to around '62, the zero was 


recorded if it was less than .88, after that it 


was recorded if it was less than .2, and after 


the second quarter of 1970 it was recorded as-


is. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah, but that's not -- but how 


do you know that someone got zero because it 


was a number below the -- the reporting level 


and not because they found zero because they 


could not detect? 


MR. ALLEN: Well, again, I think what -- we're 

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mixing up the concepts here. For the TIB-38 


distribution, all we're trying to determine is 


that distribution. And then what you were 


talking about before, about actually analyzing 


someone's intake from their individual 


urinalysis, then you have to -- yes, you have 


to worry about the detection limit -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No, no, no, no --


MR. ALLEN: -- and what that really means. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- you are doing a distribution 


where you have substituted all the zeroes by a 


linear distribution around the .8 -- around the 


8.8, that's what you say you did -- you didn't 


do exactly like that for uranium, but that's 


what you say. You have substituted all the 


zeroes by a linear distribution around the 8.8 


detection -- reporting level. 


MR. ALLEN: Yes. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: So first of all, there is -- I 


-- I don't know what's the scientific reason 


for substituting the zeroes by this linear 


distribution. And second of all, how do you 


know that this is the best statistical 


distribution for -- for a zeroes when the -- 


with -- even when the reporting level is 

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probably below the detection limit of the -- of 


the technique at that time. 


MR. ALLEN: Well, I think that was two 


questions. The -- as far as how do we know 


lognormal is a decent assumption, I think was 


in there --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No, no, no, no, I'm not talking 


about --


 MR. GRIFFON: Linear -- I think it's linear. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- lognormal. I'm off of --


MR. ALLEN: Oh. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- the positive lognormal. I'm 


talking about these linear distribution. You 


are substituting all the zeroes by a linear 


distribution whose maximum is the reporting 


level. 


MR. ALLEN: Right, and I explained that a 


little bit earlier. Basically that that's -- 


that's because we didn't want -- we didn't have 


a rigorous statistical analysis to say that 


every population of urinalysis is lognormally 


distributed, even though we got some decent 


information indicating that, and I think a lot 


of people that have seen that essentially 


believe that. The linear distribution -- we 

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just didn't want to make that assumption, so we 


assumed equal probability for the whole range, 


zero to the recording level, and that gives us 


a slightly --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: That's right. 


MR. ALLEN: -- favorable distribution than if 


we had assumed it was lognormal. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No, I don't know, I think this 


is arbitrary. There's no real statistical 


decision on that. I -- I don't know why, first 


of all. Second, I don't know what any of this 


zeroes means because they were below the median 


detection level at the time so I don't know 


what any of the zeroes means on that 


distribution, and I don't think this is a real 


-- you know, the way to treat data below the -- 


the -- the -- that could be below the detection 


level is (unintelligible) but there are many 


statistical ways to -- to treat it, but it's 


not sufficient to think the zeroes for a linear 


distribution by the maximum value is your 


reporting level. 


MR. ALLEN: Right, there are many ways to treat 


it, and one of the standard techniques is to 


substitute half of the recording level, and 

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that's a slightly less favorable -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: That's not -- that -- now 


that's not the standard. That's the first time 


NIOSH uses it and doesn't apply it to plutonium 


and --


MR. ALLEN: No, NIOSH did not invent that. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- and -- and also -- also 


there's no statistical justification, nothing. 


It's just arbitrary. 


MR. ALLEN: No, NIOSH did not invent that. 


There's several papers out there, but there is 


no consensus on how to deal with -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I -- I -- I didn't see any 


paper on that. I -- I see paper using Bayesian 


distributions, Bayesian methods to treat data, 


but never saw that. 


MR. ALLEN: Well, the -- the idea of fitting 


the positive values above the recording limit ­

- using all the data to determine the 


percentiles and then fitting only that, gives 


you the same answer as the maximum likelihood 


method would give you. It's only a question of 


dealing with them when you have positives that 


are below that recording limit is where we had 


some issues, and we took essentially a 

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favorable approach to it. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Let me tell you, I would like 


to see something written about the basis for 


using that, not just putting like that, a 


linear distribution was used. I would like to 


see it (unintelligible) statistical methods we 


are right because it's -- it's claimant 


favorable, because anything. I even accept 


things that are not exactly statistically 


perfect, but they are very claimant favorable. 


Okay, that's -- like -- like the super S model. 


It's not a model itself, but it envelopes 


everything, it's claimant favorable, it's okay. 


I don't see anything claimant favorable 


justified here. It's just putting here, we use 


that linear distribution. In fact, it's not 


exactly the one that was used for uranium and 


there's no justification for that and there's 


nothing about the (unintelligible) of this was 


the MDA, so I don't know what the zeroes mean. 


So I would like to -- you know, NIOSH to do 


that, to justify for me why this was used and a 


reason for its use, if it's just to show me 


that it's claimant favorable and -- and to show 


me that it doesn't have any conflict with the 

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MDA. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And another -- another part of 


this, just to -- to break off your conversation 


here, is -- I think what we have to think about 


now also is -- is there's -- several issues 


have been laid out, some of which I think are 


more -- some I think could -- could impact our 


SEC decision process, but some may not and -- 


and you know, may be TBD issues rather than SEC 


issues. We may still have some critiquing of 


the -- the approach to modeling, but you know, 


can a plausible upper bound be, you know, 


identified for coworker models, may-- you know, 


I'm just saying there may be two sets of issues 


that -- that might help us in getting through 


this, at least for the SEC concerns. We need 


to focus on those that have to be dealt with 


for SEC and maybe we can put aside some of 


these other, you know, concerns. 


John, you were doing a draft while we were -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I got -- I got caught up in 

this. 

MR. ALLEN: You got caught up in it. 

DR. MAURO: I got caught up in this, and I -- 

and I -- see, I look at things very simply, and 

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-- and during all these meetings, we've had 


lots of conference calls, and we had out 


statisticians aboard and I've seen curves and 


critical values and MDAs, and I said oh, my 


God, I'm getting a headache. Okay? Let me --


I'm looking at it from a common sense point of 


view. Let's say someone came over to me and 


says John, I've got myself 10,000 measurements 


of urine -- okay? -- dpm for 24 hours, got a 


whole bunch of them for a bunch of workers that 


worked at a given time period. Okay? During 


that very same time period -- I'm not going to 


change the time period. Let's say it's a ten-


year period. I've got some solid data. Okay? 


This is real -- just simple stuff. So okay, 


good, I've got data. But there's a whole bunch 


of guys that have got numbers that are -- are 


some -- are suspect. That is, I know damned 


well if I'm above -- let's say -- I'm using 


.88, I think that's your critical value -- 


MR. ALLEN: Recording level for plutonium. 


DR. MAURO: -- the reporting level. I don't 


care what the number is. 


MR. ALLEN: Early on. 


DR. MAURO: There's some number that if we all 

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got together and we said you know, if it's more 


than this number, it's real. This guy's got 


some plutonium or this guy's got some uranium. 


I don't want to quibble whether it's the MDA or 


it's the reporting level or it's a critical 


value. It's almost like a -- and my 


understanding is, we go back far enough in 


time, didn't even have these equations for what 


an MDA is. Other words, there was some 


judgment made -- hell, we got a hit here, or 


no, we don't, it's kind of -- so let's say just 


for now we could all agree that there's some 


number and dpm for 24 hours that if you're 


above that, it's real. If you're below that, 


we don't -- really don't know if a guy got 


exposed or not. And let's say we could agree 


on that. For now let's -- I just picked these 


.88 for -- now, and I go in and I plot, and I 


say okay, either -- my -- either percentage or 


a cumulative distribution -- other words, no 


one got more than that. Other words, I've got 


10,000 workers. Out of the whole 10,000 


workers, no one got more than that. Okay? And 


then -- and then -- and then I just keep 


plotting. I get a cumulative distribution and 

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so I say okay -- and -- and this is what I know 


is true. That is, here's my distribution for 


those workers that says this is what -- this is 


how things were. No one got more than that, 


and as far as we can tell, people -- this is 


the lowest positive value we saw. And about --


let's say 20 percent of the population, or some 


number, either 20 percent -- or absolute 


number, doesn't matter what this axis is. It 


could be an absolute number or it could be a 


percent of the population. 


Then after that, we don't know what the heck's 


going on. There may be 1,000 workers that are 


in here somewhere. Okay? They're in here 


somewhere. We don't know, anywhere between 


zero and .88, we don't know. Okay? And along 


comes a worker and we get his records, we look 


at his records and we say it's less than .88, 


which means that we don't know what it -- I'm 


going to argue this. Now statisticians and 


very -- you know, may -- may disagree with me, 


but as far as I'm concerned, I don't know. He 


may have gotten zero, he may have gotten 


something just below eight, but I don't know. 


What do I do with him? Okay, so what I say is 

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well, what do you do with him? You say well, 


the reality is he's in here someplace. If you 


-- you know for sure he's not more than that. 


Well, if you want to be claimant favorable -- 


okay? -- you say well, you give him that. 


Okay? You want to make sure you don't 


underestimate because this is -- if he's 


measured, this is if he's measured. Okay? So 


he's measured, come back -- and let's say he's 


measured every month -- every month, month 


after month after month, and every month he 


comes back, it's something less than that. 


Well, common sense tells me -- ah, the chances 


are, every month over ten years, he just 


happens to be in that .87, that's not going to 


happen. Okay? So I could see someone coming 


back and say well, common sense says well, it's 


sure as hell every month for ten years he 


didn't come in at .87. You know, probably came 


in at -- you know, I mean it could have been 


zero every month if he was in a clean 


environment. If we don't know anything about 


what he did, we can say that he -- probably 


someplace in here. 


See, to me, common sense says well, you know 

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what I would do is I would pick, for this guy, 


over a long period of time now -- 


(unintelligible) was saying unless he has many, 


many years of experience, we've got 


measurements made, I'd drop him in someplace in 


here. Would -- at what, one-half? I mean, to 


me -- yeah, one-half. However, it's -- it's -- 


this would be for the people that you have 


measurements for. 


Well, let's say you've got a guy, he wasn't 


monitored. Okay? He wasn't mon-- I mean it's 


-- see, to me, anyone could understand this. 


All right, the guy -- this -- these -- I just 


told you the story of the guy that's monitored. 


Okay? And you're -- you're coming in and I say 


well, as far as I'm concerned, you drop him in 


here somewhere. 


Now if the guy is mon-- if the guy is not 


monitored, you say well, what do I do with him? 


I sure -- I -- you know, if he's not monitored, 


I can't drop him in here. It ain't right, 


unless I know for sure, based on his operating 


life, that he really wasn't exposed in an area 


where he could have gotten anything. Well, 


then I say to myself well, you could -- you 

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could either give him zero or you could drop 


him in here somewhere, just in case, to be 


claimant favorable. You -- but -- you know, if 


you were really confident that he wasn't likely 


to be exposed at that time. 


But let's say he was a guy -- and say you know, 


he really should have been monitored. There's 


a time period where we didn't monitor 


everybody, but you know what, he probably 


should have been monitored because we know -- 


so you know what I say? You pluck off the 95th 


percentile, or you -- or you assign the full 


distribution. Me, I would pick the 95th 


percentile if I knew nothing about him except 


that he probably should have been monitored. 


So notice just what happened here. Now I'm --


I'm putting something on the table. What just 


happened here is I didn't even mention -- 


except somehow we've got to agree with where 


are we going to dr-- cut this thing off, and I 


-- and I can see that whe-- this cut-off point 


is kind of fuzzy. You know, we've be-- there's 


a lot of debate regarding is it the MDL, is it 


the reporting level, you know, is it the 


critical value -- and by the way, we didn't 

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even talk about that, but I was talking to some 


of my statistics friends, there's a thing 


called a critical value which is less than the 


MDL that's also an important metric. You --


you pick a number. Now in my mind -- and I 


won't take up too much more, but this has been 


-- 'cause I've been involved in a lot of these 


conversations. Why can't we do something like 


this? And it's simple, it's understandable, 


it's almost common sense. Why are we over-


analyzing this thing? 


MR. ALLEN: We're not. I think you've -- 


you've pointed out the -- the difference right 


now. You said something about you would assign 


either the distribution or the 95th percentile. 


You cannot do that until you have the 


distribution. 


DR. MAURO: Well, I'm saying you have the 


distribution, you have -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Can you speak more loudly? 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, we just got an e-mail that the 


microphone at this end of the table is not 


working real well. The one down at --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Huh-uh. 


 DR. ULSH: -- Mel's end, and Mark, that's 

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working pretty well, but this one is not so 


great, so I don't know what to do about that. 


MR. MEYER: And it may be it's not working at 


all and they're just hearing through that one. 


DR. MAURO: Well, I was yelling -- 


 DR. WADE: At lunch we'll -- at lunch we'll 


work on that. 


DR. MAURO: But the -- you see, this is your -- 


you didn't -- you don't assume anything, you've 


got data. You've got data, and you -- you make 


a cumulative plot. I -- I haven't seen the 


time yet when I put my cumulative plot and I 


couldn't draw a straight line and I was pretty 


close to it, you know, a power function and a 


lognormal, every time I plot these data, the 


real numbers -- they look like this. 


MR. ALLEN: And that is essentially what we're 


doing. We're fitting the tail of a 


distribution there to determine what that 


distribution is. 


DR. MAURO: This part down here? 


MR. ALLEN: Yeah, we're using -- we're doing 


just what you're doing right there -- forget 


the linear part right now. We're doing exactly 


what you're saying right there. We're fitting 

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only the data that's above that .88 there, it'd 


be the -- the uncensored data. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


MR. ALLEN: We're fitting that, but we're 


fitting it to, you know, what percentile it is, 


essentially what you're talking about. If you 


have only ten positive samples out of a 


thousand, you're talking about the upper what, 


99.9 percentile? If you had half of the 


samples were detected, then that bottom of that 


-- where that recording level is would be your 


50th percentile. That's what we're doing. 


DR. MAURO: I didn't hear that. 

MR. ALLEN: Okay. 

DR. MAURO: I have to say, when I read this 

stuff and I think about it, it's just not -- 


and what I'm looking at is this is not a 


complicated problem. But somehow it's -- 


MR. ALLEN: I agree. 


DR. MAURO: When I read it --


 MR. ELLIOTT: We would agree, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- I say why is it so complicated. 


I think that what -- what I've been hearing is 


-- we've been talking about this. I don't 


think we're ever going to agree on what that 

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is, except if we all decide that listen, the 


right place to put this threshold is some 


place. 


MR. ALLEN: But what's important here in 


urinalysis, if those Xs would go all the way 


down to say .01 --


DR. MAURO: Oh, that would be great. 


MR. ALLEN: -- you would draw your line through 


the whole (unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: That would be great. 


MR. ALLEN: So what if the analysis had a 


detection limit, though, of .5 -- would you use 


that data that's down below there if you had 


1,000 points? 


DR. MAURO: If -- if you're below the MDL? 


MR. ALLEN: Yeah, to draw your line through the 


data points, would you use that data? 


DR. MAURO: I guess my answer would be -- I 


would just extend this -- 


MR. ALLEN: Just to determine the distribution. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, I would -- yeah, I would just 


keep this thing going all the way. Yeah, 


that's what I would do. 


MR. ALLEN: That's the argument we're having 


here is the detection limit -- when we're 

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determining the parameters of this 


distribution, the detection limit is 


irrelevant. 


DR. MAURO: I agree with that. 


MR. ALLEN: It's only the censored level. If 


you had these five points you've got on the 


board here, and then 100 that were recorded as 


less than .8, you know, those 100 are censored 


DR. MAURO: Someone said they were zero, and in 


the report they say it's zero. 


MR. ALLEN: Well, they're recorded as zero and 


we know that means .88 -- 


DR. MAURO: We know it's not zero, that means 


it's less than some number. 


MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

DR. MAURO: And -- so what do you do --

MR. ALLEN: There's no such thing as a -- 

DR. MAURO: -- what do you do with that guy? 

MR. ALLEN: Well, it's not so much that guy, 

it's just how do you analyze this -- what do 


you use for parameters for this distribution 


based on this censored data. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


MR. ALLEN: Essentially, if you've got enough, 

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you don't use it -- other than to determine the 


percentile, that I've got ten percent data 


recorded and I'll use that ten percent, that 


tail. 


DR. MAURO: It sounds like that we're 


conceptually in agreement, but I know that 


Arjun and Joyce don't exactly agree with this. 


And I want to understand what's wrong with it. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It sounds to me like our OTIB-38 


doesn't introduce and explain what it's -- how 


we arrived at this distribution, or the 


distributions it's reported. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think it does -- it 


references those Procs that -- the general -- 


MR. ALLEN: There's a separate TIB that 


discusses the analysis, or the Proc, we call -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is this the same model that was ­

- yeah. 


MR. ALLEN: -- the technique. 


MS. BRACKETT: Now OTIB--


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) for 


Mallinckrodt and other sites -- several other 


sites (unintelligible). 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Does it go back to our 


Implementation Guide? 

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142 

MS. BRACKETT: OTIB-19 discusses this. 


 MR. GRIFFON: OTIB-19. Isn't that a Proc, too? 


MR. ALLEN: There --


MS. BRACKETT: Yes, 95. 


MR. ALLEN: Yeah, but I think that's just the 


administrative, isn't it, as far as who does 


what? 


MS. BRACKETT: No, 95 is the specific details 


of how to do the analysis. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, yeah. OTIB-19 and Proc 95. 

Right? 

 MR. ELLIOTT: So -- I hear -- I hear Joyce 

asking for an ex-- a written explanation of 


this, and I think that's -- you know, if -- if 


it's not coming across in the -- in the 


introduction or the purpose of the -- of the 


OTIB or the supporting -- or the documents that 


is referenced in that, maybe we can do that for 


you. 


MR. ALLEN: Yeah, we can -- we can summarize 


everything in a White Paper as far as... 


 MR. GRIFFON: If it's not -- I mean I think 


she's looked at those procedures. I'm not sure 


-- Joyce, if you've looked at OTIB-19 and Proc 

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 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, yes, I did --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- I did, yes. Yes, I did. 


MS. BRACKETT: I think that I may have figured 


out what the issue is with the substitute -- 


the linear distribution not appearing to be 


correct. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Uh-huh. 


MS. BRACKETT: I don't know if you have been 


given the actual spreadsheets that were used, 


because there's -- for uranium there's two sets 


of data basically that were merged together to 


do the analyses, and so they -- the two of them 


had different recording levels, and so a 


separate distribution was run for each of them, 


so the --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, I know, the -- the 


(unintelligible) the uranium had a different -- 


MS. BRACKETT: Yes, uh-huh. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah. 


MS. BRACKETT: And so --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I saw that. 


MS. BRACKETT: So each of those -- so all of 


the results that were depleted uranium, they 


had a reporting level of 5.2, so a distribution 

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 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, instead of 8.8, right. 


MS. BRACKETT: And so the distribution on those 


was run up to 5.2, and then a separate 


distribution was run for the samples with a 


reporting level of 8.8, so I don't know if you 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I've tried that, but I couldn't 


-- I couldn't figure you out, though, why you 


had that distribution and they had many similar 


-- many repeated data and -- I don't think this 


is the most important thing, but I -- what I -- 


I would like to see is why does this 


distribution (unintelligible) unmonitored 


worker, why the median value represent the 


unmonitored worker or who of the unmonitored 


worker is represented by the median value of 


intake that was derived on -- on the -- based 


on the median activity, and why a linear 


distribution is a good substitute for zero 


values. Those three things I would like to 


see. 


DR. MAURO: And I have a question, though. 


When -- when you have a person -- and I'm not 


sure what the answer is from reading the 

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material. When you have a person that you say 


should have been monitored -- now he could have 


been within the population of people -- let's 


say this is some time period and he-- and he's 


a member of that population during that time 


period when you were monitoring bioassay and 


you -- let-- he should have been monitored but 


he wasn't. Okay? What do you use? Do you go 


here, use the full distribution? See, in my 


mind, you've got no choice but to use the 95th 


percentile. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I don't want to answer for 


Jim Neton, but I mean in our past meetings 


that's usually where he falls to 


(unintelligible) --


DR. MAURO: And I haven't heard that. 


MR. ALLEN: And I don't want to say that 'cause 


I'm not positive, so I don't (unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: Okay, now I --


MR. ALLEN: But there is a difference between 


what we've done in the past when you have just 


a very sketchy set of data versus 300,000 data 


points, so --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, sure. 


MR. ALLEN: So I mean the distribution itself 

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seems better to me, but it depends somewhat 


subjectively on what the person actually was 


doing. 

DR. MAURO: But I'm interested in that. Other 

words --

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, I understand that, I just 

don't have an answer --


DR. MAURO: I'm almost done and I'll sit down. 


Let's say this is not -- this is a time period 


that covers a ten-year period where you have 


data, and now you're going to extrapolate and 


use it as a coworker set for some other time 


period. Okay? And all -- because that's all 


you've got, 'cause let's say in another time 


period they didn't have any bioassay data. 


It's not clear to me the criteri-- how do you ­

- how do you build a bridge? 


MR. ALLEN: Okay, what -- what we've done and 


what's usually ignored in this whole analysis 


is the distributions and the hard core math 


that you've seen in all this data gives you a 


50th percentile and an 84th percentile 


urinalysis for that quarter, and that's done 


for each and every quarter throughout the 


history of the site. And then those are 

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punched into IMBA as if it's this one 50th 


percentile person and an 84th percentile person 


to get intake rates that'll vary from time 


frame to time frame, generally a little higher 


in the early years and a little lower in the 


later years. And the 84th intake rate, divided 


by the 50th percentile intake rate, will give 


you the geometric standard deviation. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


MR. ALLEN: So we really end up getting an 


intake -- a distribution of intake rates based 


on the population of 300,000 urinalyses. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You really -- it really is worth 


going through TIB-19 and Proc 95 and walking it 


through -- in through IMBA and doing -- I did ­

- I went through that task for Mallinckrodt and 


it -- it explains a lot, you know. I like to 


work with the numbers rather than hearing 


words, that's just the way I work, but that -- 


that was instructive. I mean the question -- I 


have some -- just to emphasize Joyce's point, 


the question of -- of who is in this database 


is raised again, you know. If -- if -- and I 


think something that wasn't said earlier but we 


had discussed it the other day, maybe Joyce and 

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I and Arjun were talking on this issue, you 


know, it -- it -- the statement that if someone 


wasn't monitored they would have never been -- 


obviously couldn't have gotten in the 95th 


percentile of the database but in fact we 


learned through this process that, for the 


neutron exposures, the highest neutron building 


in the early years was missed on the monitoring 


program, so -- so it may happen. I think we 


need a little more evidence that that is very 


unlikely that that happened for the internal -- 


you know, for the internal side. 


The other -- the other thing I was struggling 


with is the -- the type of measurements that 


are in this database. This is just kind of 


everything, I think, and you've got routines 


with specials with --


UNIDENTIFIED: Incidents. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah, and then in some cases 


on the individual spreadsheets -- Liz I'm sure 


is listening -- there is some high values that 


were censored of your model because they -- 


they appear to be, I don't know to the extent ­

- the extent to which these were investigated 


back, but they appear to be associated with a 

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large incident or something, so the high values 


were truncated off. But I don't see -- I'm 


sure there's other incidents that were lower, 


and oftentimes, looking in these log books, 


I've seen places where people were, you know, 


believed to have an intake. They were sent for 


a special. The urinalysis came out quite low, 


actually, and then they did like maybe two 


follow-ups, so you've got all their -- three 


specials in there in addition to a lot of 


routine data. You know, I -- I think it's a 


hodge-podge of results in here and I don't know 


to what extent that -- that biases it toward 


the null or not. That -- that's the question 


I've been grappling with. 


MR. ALLEN: Well, the idea was to not throw out 


any data if you could at all avoid it. There 


was some -- you know, with the fires, et 


cetera, there are some in there that are pretty 


outrageous and driving a whole distribution. 


And when you have one very high sample at the 


high end, you can actually drive the geometric 


mean --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I'm not saying it was 


inappropriate, I'm saying -- 

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MR. ALLEN: -- below the data. I mean it's not 


necessarily favorable in that case, but the 


idea was just to get a distribution of all the 


samples, regardless of what those samples were. 


And if you start tossing out, you know, small 


incidents, et cetera, you get to the point 


where how -- you have to start figuring out how 


often can you have a small incident before 


that's a routine operation. Okay? And I mean 


in virtually every quarter you see some -- a 


little tail at the top there where you got some 


-- some higher ones, but they're used in the 


distribution, unless it's just an outrageous 


thing that really throws it off. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I hear you saying --


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess it's really dependent on 


who -- like who was monitored for different 


time periods. I bet it -- I bet it changed. 


don't know if the policy for Rocky was always 


to monitor everybody for plutonium or if it was 


a subset in the beginning, like other sites, 


you know, and then they -- 


MR. ALLEN: Right, but this -- this 


distribution --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but eventually you might get 


I 
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to the point where -- my point here is that 


your -- you know, some of the quarterly models, 


you get into the point where you have your 50th 


equaling your 84th on your -- on your -- 


MR. ALLEN: On just the population? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, on your population data, so 


it's like --


MR. ALLEN: Are you -- are you suggesting -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- how claimant favorable is this 


model? You know, it's a -- it's so skewed to 


the zero values, if you assign the 50th for 


someone who was working in a -- in a -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Or if you have a number of --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) that didn't 


have data then, I think you're in trouble, you 


know. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Or if the data really had a lot 


of specials that turned out to be zero -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, or --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- there -- so are you 


suggesting, Mark, (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) just follow-up, 


you know, several follow-ups for one 


individual. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, yeah, the follow-ups you 

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would expect to be -- you hope there's -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: You hope they go in there. 


Right? 


MR. ALLEN: Well, ninety -- in general, though, 


when you've got follow-ups, it's because you 


had some highs -- initial samples, so most of 


the incidents and most of the follow-ups tend 


to skew it a little higher. 


 MR. GRIFFON: A little higher. 


MR. ALLEN: Nobody's going to do a lot of 


follow-ups from negative samples. 


 MR. GRIFFON: What I'm saying, the monitoring 


practices over time could skew it to zero if -- 


MR. ALLEN: Right, but we're getting -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- start adding --


MR. ALLEN: From this we're getting -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) into your 


population that was monitored. 


MR. ALLEN: Right, but from this analysis we're 


getting urinalysis for that quarter or 


whatever, so they're all associated with the 


same monitoring practice -- you know, assuming 


the practice doesn't change drastically 


throughout the three months, and the results of 


all these analysis basically gives us a data 

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point for each quarter throughout the history 


of it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's true. 


MS. BRACKETT: And I don't see any years where 


the 84th is the same as the 50th or -- or even 


relatively close to it. At least -- I'm 


looking at plutonium right now. I'm -- I 


haven't looked at uranium, but -- 


MR. ALLEN: For that distribution, I don't 


think so. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that may have been a 


uranium --


MR. ALLEN: The actual values, I mean they 


might have both been, you know, more than 84 


percent below the recording level. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. ALLEN: So the -- if you look at the -- you 


know, the halfway point and the 84th point, you 


get the same number, but the distribution we 


derived would not have that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. BRACKETT: But I mean -- well, right, but 


then that would just give you a very small GSD 


and we don't have any GSDs that are that small. 


MR. ALLEN: Well, that's true. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, we don't -- well, we don't 


assign weightings to different types of data, 


we have looked at these kind of issues that 


Mark's raising, have we not, or have we missed 


the boat on that? Liz, can you help me? 


Whoever's built a coworker model, don't we look 


at the contribution that the data makes to the 


overall model and determine whether or not it ­

- there's -- there's an undue influence from 


that source of data? 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, I'm not sure what you mean 


by source of data. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That type of data, not 


necessarily the source, but the type of data. 


MS. BRACKETT: I still don't understand the 


question, I'm sorry. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Do you understand my question? 


MR. ALLEN: I think I understand your question. 


In general, no. I mean we're trying to get a 


distribution of the urinalysis from monitored 


workers, period. You know, that is the 


distribution we're getting. The only reason to 


look at what you're talking about there to 


evaluate individual ones would be to throw them 


out as an outlier because they're, you know, 

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associated with some major incident, and we try 


to avoid that. We have done that with a few 


that were just, you know, very skewed. Other 


than that, we look at the distribution and see 


how well it fits that assumption, that 


lognormal assumption. If it fits it well, 


we're good. If it doesn't fit it well, we do a 


bit of an analysis and say well, there's, you 


know, various small incidents associated with 


this that kind of skew it high a little bit and 


don't bother trying to, you know, go through 


the evaluation of tossing out these -- these 


higher ones. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess what -- I guess what I'd 


ask at this point, I -- you know, I have less 


concerns on the -- the model side than the data 


validation issues related to this. I think 


Joyce still has some outstanding issues. I 


guess I'd ask, you know, SC&A and -- and all of 


us to think about, of all these issues rai-- of 


all these concerns raised, you know, which ones 


are more TBD issues rather than SEC issues, you 


know. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, I would ask for that. I'm 


at a loss right now to figure out this -- what 

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we've just been talking about, how has it 


become an SEC issue? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I guess my -- my 


biggest SEC issue is more on the data integrity 


question and I'll -- we can go into that more 


this afternoon, but I -- I mean I looked in 


the --


 MR. ELLIOTT: I could see that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, you know, so -- go ahead. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, the first part of the 


question that Joyce raised, especially in 


relation to her log-- and correct me if I'm 


wrong, Joyce, and -- and maybe you should 


finish this. I'm just raising the point that 


Joyce's finding in the log books that the 


unmonitored workers -- internal unmonitored 


workers were at -- some of them may have been 


at high risk -- at some risk of high exposure, 


so -- so that the assumption that unmonitored 


workers were not at risk, I -- and whether they 


belonged in the same distribution, I think may 


be the one issue that is an SEC-level issue -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- in this -- in this question 


of distributions and so on. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, then we need to see -- we 


need to hear from you, hear from Joyce those 


instances where you raise that question. We 


need to understand what you're seeing there 


that we evidently have not seen. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: So if you could help us, we need 


that guidance. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, that's in process. I 


mean Joyce, did -- am I right about that? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah. 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I think the MDA reporting 

--

 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, 'cause that goes to a 


judgment call that we're making. We're saying 


there is an unmonitored worker. We don't see 


any potential for a high internal dose 


exposure. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And you're saying just the 


opposite. You're saying you see something 


there. 


 DR. ULSH: We're not saying that unmonitored 


workers have no exposure -- 


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all, there was some -- on the log books you can 


see some discussion on who should be monitored 


and which practices should be monitored. So if 


there was some discussion, it's because people 


when -- did not know exactly who should be 


monitored and which practice would result in 


contamination of workers and might be a 


misjudge at that time. 


And second, when -- there were some people that 


were monitored that were high results on the 


urine results, and then you see the health 


physicists, they had discussion why they had 


high urine results when they don't see any 


reason for getting that. So --


 DR. ULSH: These are --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- again there was a judgment 


that that practice wouldn't result in -- in 


activities in urine and even though they -- 


they had high urine results. That means that 


some people that were not monitored might have 


been misjudged on the practice that they were 


doing and would not be monitored, so we don't 


know where to place --


 MR. ELLIOTT: So -- so it's not NIOSH's 


judgment --

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 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- the person on that coworker 


model. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It's not NIOSH's judgment you're 


referring to. You're referring to the judgment 


of the day when the health physicist got around 


the results --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, yes --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- and said what --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- exactly, so --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- what happened here -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- so you have some unmonitored 


workers that might -- that were not monitored 


but might have had high results. So when you 


see an unmonitored worker, where do you place 


him in that coworker model. 


 DR. ULSH: So I'd like to make a request and a 


comment. The request is, if you're seeing this 


kind of a discussion in the logs, can you give 


us the specific citation -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, yes. 


 DR. ULSH: -- so that we can look at it and 


evaluate it. The comment is, we are not 


assuming that unmonitored workers have no 


exposure potential. I mean we, NIOSH, are not 


making that assumption. That's why we're 

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talking about should we assign them the 50th -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Missed dose. 


 DR. ULSH: -- percentile or the 95th 


percentile, or whatever we agree that it is. 


In doing that we're admitting that it is 


possible that some unmonitored workers should 


have indeed been monitored. They do have 


exposure potential. Now --


 MR. GRIFFON: And that's true, but part of your 


-- part of your premise and assumption on this 


whole model is that the most like-- the most 


high-- the highest exposed workers were 


monitored. 


DR. MAURO: This is a recurring theme. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, it's a recurring theme. We 


DR. MAURO: And I think that when you get to 


the heart of it, the SEC issue lies when you 


have a population of workers that you think 


that curve could apply to, when you don't have 


any basis for it. In other words, if you have 


a group of workers that worked in a given time 


period when you don't have bioassay data, and 


we've seen this in Y-12, somehow you've got to 


make a case why this other group of workers 

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that may have been later, when you do have 


data, you can use it as a coworker. We -- I 


have -- one of the fallacies I've been -- and 


Arjun helped me with this -- is that well, just 


use the 95th percentile for the worker set that 


you do have numbers and apply that to the 


earlier set. And you're right, can't do that, 


because there's one more thing you've got to 


do. You've got to show that there is a bridge 


between the worker population that you do have 


your data for and the worker population that 


you don't have data for. That bridge may be 


air sampling data where you don't -- you -- you 


know, in other words, you may have air sampling 


data and you could show well, listen, looks 


like the distribution of the air sampling 


concentrations for uranium or plutonium pre1961 are not all that different than post-1961 


when you look at the aggregate data. But you 


got a hook now that says oh, okay, things 


weren't that different, early versus later. So 


I guess -- to me, the only SEC issue here is 


when you deci-- see, you -- we could argue from 


now until doomsday where this point should be 


and where you should pick from in the 

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distribution, but eventually we know we could 


pick an upper end value that everyone would be 


comfortable with. Some won't -- some won't 


like it because it's too conservative, but you 


could pick one and it would be plausible. The 


real problem is when you can't use that curve, 


that dataset that you do have, and apply it to 


another set of workers where you don't have any 


data. That's the SEC issue. And when we're at 


a loss to be able to build a bridge between 


those two populations, I think it's an SEC 


issue. See, it's very clear to me, but maybe 


not to everyone else. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I -- and I think it's been 


argued before that for most workers at Rocky 


Flats you -- you're not going to rely on the 


coworker models. Is that -- is that -- 


MR. ALLEN: Right, and I think that's because 


the bulk of them were monitored. True? 


 DR. ULSH: I wish I had Al Robinson on the 


phone, but I don't. I tried to call him 


yesterday to verify that. I figured you might 


ask that, Mark. 


MS. BRACKETT: Is Mutty Sharfi on the phone? 


 DR. ULSH: No, he's not. 

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 MR. SHARFI: Yeah, I'm here. 


MS. BRACKETT: I thought he was. I sent him 


the information a while ago. He wasn't on at 


the start. 


 DR. ULSH: So Mutty, at some point in time 


earlier, if -- I remember saying this at an 


earlier working group meeting, or maybe at the 


Advisory Board meeting, I made the statement 


that in general we -- the use of internal 


coworker models is pretty minimal at Rocky 


Flats, and I know that some number of weeks and 


months have passed since I said that. Is it 


your understanding that that is still true 


today? 


 MR. SHARFI: Yeah, it's -- I mean outside 


probably the few rare -- the construction 


worker claims that have -- that fall under the 


OTIB-52 rule, it's -- I don't -- I don't think 


we've put -- I mean at Rocky, at least, 


particularly, it's been pretty rare that we've 


actually needed coworker data for the internal 


part. 


DR. MAURO: I was speaking to Bob Bistline and 


he said pre-1957 -- please correct me if I'm 


wrong, it was a conference call we had with Bob 

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on a Thursday I think it was, or a Friday -- 


pre-'57 there aren't any data and you've got to 


use the post-'57 data to reconstruct the pre­

'57. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, now that's --


DR. MAURO: Tell me if that's correct. 


 DR. ULSH: That's if we're going to rely on 


coworker data. We have other tools at our 


disposal. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, that's --


MR. ALLEN: We have urinalysis all the way 


back. 


MS. BRACKETT: Yes, that's -- the urinalysis 


starts in 1952. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and according to Bob, the 


number of -- the percentage of those 


measurements were minuscule. 


MS. BRACKETT: You're right, 1952 there's only 


22 -- 26 samples. 195--


DR. MAURO: I'm sorry? 


 MR. GRIFFON: '52 there's how many, Liz? 


MS. BRACKETT: Twenty-six. 


DR. MAURO: Samples? 


MS. BRACKETT: Twenty-six samples, yes. 


DR. MAURO: And what percent is that? 

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MS. BRACKETT: Right, '53 is 492 samples -- 


from 140 employees; '54 is 736 samples from 165 


employees; yeah and -- it -- it slowly 


increases up to 1957 there's 1,576 samples. 


DR. MAURO: These are samples, but not people. 


I mean they're -- this could be like a monthly 


sample taken for --


MR. ALLEN: She was giving you --


MS. BRACKETT: Right, I -- I have the number of 


people, also. The number of employees sampled 


in 1957 is 439. 


DR. MAURO: That was '57. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Liz -- Liz, do you have a 


spreadsheet with these statistics on it? 


MS. BRACKETT: Yes, if you were given the 


statistics that we did, it's in there -- the 


spreadsheets that we used for doing the 


coworker --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, so we can pull them off 


there. 


MS. BRACKETT: There's a summary page, which I 


would assume you got if you got everything 


else. It's the summary. It lists the number 


of samples that were used and the number of 


employees per each analysis time period. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, so these are --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Do we know what fraction of 


total workers were monitored who were total 


production or at-risk workers were monitored, 


including what was considered the cold side, 


like the uranium side? 


MS. BRACKETT: Right, I -- I don't have that 


information. I don't know if somebody else 


here would. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: See, that's -- that's the 


critical piece. 


MS. BRACKETT: Right. Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Purely from the numbers that 


you are reading, it seems to me that a minority 


of workers -- in some years a small minority of 


workers -- were monitored, because there were ­

- there were thousands of workers at Rocky 


Flats. 


 DR. ULSH: Liz -- wait a minute, I want to talk 


about that a second. '52 and '53, Liz, can you 


tell me how -- can you give me the numbers for 


those years? 


MS. BRACKETT: For -- pardon me? 


 DR. ULSH: 1952 to 1953. 


MS. BRACKETT: Somebody made a noise just -- 

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MR. ALLEN: That was me, Liz, sorry. I've got 


the numbers on my screen. I'm handing them 


over to Brant here. 


 DR. ULSH: In 1952 what I see is we have 26 


samples on 11 employees. 


MS. BRACKETT: Yes. 


 DR. ULSH: In 1953 it jumps to 492 samples on 


140 employees. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, but Arjun's point is that 


there were probably more than 11 people on the 


site. 


 DR. ULSH: Not in 1952. That was the 


construction year. They didn't start full 


production --


 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe that was --


MR. ALLEN: '52 doesn't matter much. 


 MR. GRIFFON: There were more than 11 still. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I don't know the numbers. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think we need to know the 


number of workers --


 (Whereupon, Mr. Griffon, Mr. Allen, Dr. Ulsh 


and Dr. Makhijani spoke simultaneously.) 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Including the workers that were 


considered to be on the cold side but where 

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there were radionuclides involved, because the 


cold side, as I understand it, in the early 


years was considered to be uranium and the hot 


side was plutonium. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, in 1953 197 people were 


sampled for uranium. The -- the numbers I was 


just giving you were for plutonium. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Oh. 


MS. BRACKETT: So in fact there were more 


people sampled for uranium in 1953 than there 


were for plutonium. 


 DR. WADE: But this shouldn't be a hard story 


to --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. WADE: -- quite simple, I mean -- John's 


common sense approach is the right approach. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I think the other -- the 


other piece of this for me is the data 


validation issue, which we'll get into more 


after lunch, yeah, but you know, the -- the 


question of, you know, John's point that the 


upper end is fine, is fine as long as -- as -- 


you know, I ran across one log book for uranium 


which I have some concerns about with -- with 


the high values not being in the database -- 

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DR. MAURO: Oh, that's a problem, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- so that would obviously be a 


problem. But that's a data validation issue. 


I'm trying to separate those two. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: So the issue about providing 


some of these references in the log books would 


be the next discussion (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think so, yeah. The citations 


that Joyce was referencing were more sort of 


the HP discussions back and forth of who and -- 


who should and should not be monitored, what's 


-- what's happening here and why are we getting 


 MR. CHEW: Can I ask Joyce a real quick 


question? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: When you talk about the HPs, were 


they like the RCTs on the floor, Joyce, or 


these were kind of -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: I -- I can't hear you well. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Talk a little --


 MR. CHEW: Joyce, let me ask the question here, 


and I'd like to see the log books because, you 


know, if the people were on a routine sample -- 


I'm just giving you an example -- and there may 

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be some -- like a little spill or something 


like this, and then people would be a -- 


reasonable to discuss among the people right on 


the floor to say well, you know, should the 


person go in for a special sample, and so that 


-- you may have been misinterpreting that 


person not being monitored. But I'm not saying 


that. I'd like to see the log book to see what 


the references and the citations -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, SC&A will provide that -- 


 MR. CHEW: -- I think we'd like to analyze it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I think we all agree that 


that's a deliverable -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, that's a deliverable 


and --


 MR. CHEW: That's a normal practice. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I think part of the reason 


it wasn't ready for this meeting was there's 


privacy -- you know, they've got to -- 


 MR. CHEW: I understand. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: They've got to clean up the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- clean up the document, take -- 


take references out to names and things like 

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that, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, as long as you communicate 


that stuff to us so we can look at it. I mean 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- there are no issues between us, 


but if it's going to go in the public domain, 


absolutely. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: The bottom line on this piece 


of the discussion that John was alluding to and 


what Joyce and I said earlier is you have to 


show that the workers were in the same 


distribution as the monitored workers. 


(Unintelligible) a group of workers that were 


unmonitored that were at risk that are 


completely separately characterized from, 


whether they worked with radionuclides that -- 


they were in areas that there was no monitoring 


or radionuclides that there was no monitoring, 


you can't draw from a uranium/plutonium sample 


for monitored workers and say it's good for 


this piece. But if you characterize the 


workers by radionuclide area, period and so on, 


and you know they were in the same 

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distribution, then you can -- then it's not an 


SEC issue. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: That'll be in the piece that you 


send over to us? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: And the other problem is that 


when you see the data from -- for uranium, for 


example, you have the same worker. A lot --


you know, a lot of samples from the same 


workers, and some of the samples have zero 


results, some of the samples have high results. 


So when you put all of that in the distribution 


and you place an unmonitored worker, you know, 


how -- how do you place him because if you took 


the monitored worker, he wouldn't be placed 


anyplace on that distribution because sometimes 


he have a zero result, sometimes he has a 


median activity and sometimes he has a high 


activity, or he may just have zeroes or he may 


-- you know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I -- I was -- one 


thing I was trying to -- I don't know if I 


conveyed this very well, but one of my things 


that I saw in the log book is there is one 


individual that comes up many, many, many 

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times, and I'm almost wondering from the 


experience I've had from some of the sites if 


this guy wasn't an HP and he wasn't doing some 


field research, really -- I mean on himself, 


basically. It looks like that kind of thing. 


There -- there are like -- there's like six or 


seven days in a row where they've got data, and 


a lot of it's in the database, and a lot of 


them are very low values, zeroes sometimes, but 


I think they're just trying to decide, you 


know, should we do -- and they -- it wasn't 


clear -- I think some said spot, but in -- but 


they're in there as a 24-hour sample. Some 


said 24 hours, some said average, and I don't 


know what average meant, really, in the log 


book I couldn't tell. But then -- so some were 


in the database, some were not in the -- in the 


HIS-20 database, you know, but they're all 


considered sort of equal in this -- in this -- 


you know. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we -- I think we --


 MR. GRIFFON: So that was my point is like, you 


know --


 DR. WADE: I think when we come back, this -- 


this data reliability issue really needs to be 

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worked, but --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- I think it's appropriate for us 


to break for lunch. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: How long do you want to take for 


lunch? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Lew is calling for lunch. 


 DR. WADE: Well, I think we'll be more 


productive when we --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, let's take an hour. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: An hour for lunch. 


 DR. WADE: So we're going to -- we're going to 


reinitiate the call at a quarter to 2:00, 


eastern time. Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:45 p.m. 


to 1:50 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: This is the working group conference 


room. This is Lew Wade. We're slowly 


assembling. We're almost here. 


(Pause) 


 ... materially all here. I'd like to start 


with one announcement. To my knowledge, I have 


been told that Wanda is now a Board member. 

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 MS. MUNN: Oh, is that true? 


 DR. WADE: That's what I was told. I don't 


know if it's true or not. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, I'm so glad to hear that. 


 DR. WADE: And we're -- we're -- we're glad and 


we welcome you. As a new Board member, you 


probably will need some advice from the older 


Board members and --


 MS. MUNN: I am sure that I'll have plenty. 


 DR. WADE: -- I'm sure they will help you -- 


they will help you. There's some shortcuts one 


Board member can follow -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Get some big filing cabinets. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you very much. 


 DR. WADE: So welcome back. 


 MS. MUNN: Thanks for the information, Lew. 


appreciate that. 


 DR. WADE: Welcome back. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Mark? 


D&D WORKER DOSE RECONSTRUCTION


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. I was going to say 


maybe we should skip item five and -- and do 


item six, which is the D&D workers question. 


Item five is data reliability and I -- I 


I 
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imagine that's going to be a fairly lengthy 


item, so -- I'm not sure where we stand on the 


D&D worker question and I'm pulling my matrix 


open now, but Brant, do you recall if we -- I 


mean the real question is what kind of data do 


we have for tho-- that group, and I don't know 


if you --


 DR. ULSH: There were a couple of specific 


questions that we --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- were pursuing, Mark. At the -- I 


think at the last working group meeting Mike 


Gibson expressed some concerns about -- 


particularly in the D&D era -- who received 


bioassay monitoring and who didn't. And we had 


talked about taking a look at I believe rad 


worker-2 training records and making sure that 


-- well, let me give you a little more -- back 


up just a step. 


 MS. MUNN: I can hardly hear you, Brant. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, sorry, Wanda, the microphone 


at the end of the -- this end of the table 


doesn't appear to be working very well. 


 MS. MUNN: Okay, thank you. 


 DR. ULSH: Is this any better? 

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177

 MS. MUNN: Much better. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. During the last working group 


Mike had some concerns about bioassays during 


the D&D era, and we heard from Steve Baker and 


Gene -- Gene Potter, I think, that during that 


era it was a prerequisite if you were on rad 


worker-2 training, that you had to have that to 


go into radiological areas. And so the way 


this issue evolved was that it was suggested 


that we should then go back and pull out those 


rad worker-2 training logs and pull people out 


and see if they were indeed included in the 


bioassay program. 


Well, we've talked about that some since, and ­

- Gene, are you on the line, Gene Potter? 


 (No response) 


Ooh, that's very unfortunate. 


 DR. WADE: Gene Potter? It might be muted? 


 MR. POTTER: Yes, I am, and I can barely hear 


Brant, so I take it that he called on me. 


 DR. WADE: He did. 


 DR. ULSH: I did, Gene. Sorry, I'm going to 


hold this up like a telephone. Can you hear me 


now? 


 MR. POTTER: I can hear you just -- it's very 

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faint still. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, that's not on. I bet it's the 


other microphone. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Maybe you could just slide the 


other mike over while Brant's talking. 


(Pause) 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, Gene, how about now? 


 MR. POTTER: Oh, that's much -- much, much 


better. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, that's -- that's great, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: We seem to have a microphone that's 


defunct, and I've just evicted -- or Arjun just 


kindly volunteered to get out of his seat and 


let me sit there so --


 MS. MUNN: Thank you, Arjun. 


 DR. ULSH: -- at any rate, we've had some 


thoughts on this and Gene and Steve pointed out 


that to follow the course that we had suggested 


is kind of reinventing the wheel. We might --


this kind of thing has already been done in 


terms of some audits that were done, and the 


purpose of those audits was to evaluate the 


compliance with the requirements for bioassay 


among the Rocky Flats worker population during 


the D&D period. We have located those audits. 

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They're in the process of being scanned and 


will be put up shortly. Gene, why don't you 


just give a few sentences about what is in 


those reports. 


 MR. POTTER: Okay. This primarily consist of ­

- consisted of output from out self-assessment 


program where we did, as part of DOELAP 


accreditation we did quarterly assessments on 


various topics, so there's some -- you know, a 


bunch of miscellaneous things, some of them 


related to this question. And as well there 


are three audits that were done under the 10 


CFR 835 triennial audit scheme by Kaiser Hill. 


These were independent people who did not work 


in the program who came in and made findings 


and recommendations based on their -- the 


requirements of 10 CFR 835. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. So this question about, you 


know, who was bioassayed and who wasn't and 


what was the state of compliance we think is -- 


Gene's very familiar with these audits so we 


think that that will hopefully address the 


questions that were raised on this issue. 


 MR. GIBSON: Brant, this is Mike. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, Mike. 

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 MR. GIBSON: My question basically more went to 


the fact of what's called a routine bioassay 


program. And in the production days at least, 


from my experience, you were bioassayed at 


least quarterly. And in the D&D phase it was 


still called a routine bioassay program, but it 


was an annual bioassay and the rest of the time 


they tracked your dose by DAC-hour tracking, 


and so I was wondering how complete the dose of 


record is for these people if that's the case. 


 DR. ULSH: I think, Mike -- I'm going back to 


the previous working group meeting -- the DAC-


hour tracking was on top of the bioassay 


program. In other words, once you hit a 


certain number of DAC hours, and I don't know 


that number off the top of my head, but that 


would trigger -- that would be a trigger for an 


additional bioassay on top of the routine 


bioassay that was being done underneath. So I 


guess where I'm at is let us post these audit 


reports and -- I don't know, I'm trying to get 


my head around what your question really is, 


Mike, and -- and make sure that these reports 


that we're going to provide are going to answer 


that. But it's going to talk about, you know, 

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181 

what the requirements were and how successful 


Rocky Flats was in meeting those requirements. 


Does -- I know that you can't really comment on 


a report that you haven't seen yet, but 


assuming that that's an accurate description, 


is that the kind of thing you're looking for? 


 MR. GIBSON: I guess I could wait and look at 


the reports, but basically my question is 


during the production years was Rocky Flats 


ever on like a quarterly bioassay program and 


did it change to an annual. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Gene, do you know the answer 


to that question? 


 MR. POTTER: Yes. The program remained -- from 


the -- from the '90s in the D&D era the program 


remained basically an annual urine sampling 


program. I'm kind of glossing over things, but 


we were never on a quarterly routine bioassay. 


I should mention that the real way to detect 


plutonium intakes in particular, at the levels 


of regulatory interest to DOE, was not through 


routine bioassay but through special fecal 


bioassays taken relatively early after an 


event. So that was the real way we detected 


new intakes. The routine bioassay program was 

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overlaid on that as a safety net, it was 


sometimes termed, to catch any large intakes 


that would not have been anticipated. And by 


and large these were not seen in the few cases 


people's doses from their historical record was 


-- were changed upwards because of new bioassay 


information, but generally these were old 


intakes that we were seeing because of the 


better sensitivity in urine. But the main -- 


main way to detect new intakes was through 


early sampling, which always included fecal 


sampling, and in the higher cases also included 


urine sampling, especially urine sampling and 


lung counting. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you -- and of course you're 


assuming that -- when you say they were mostly 


old intakes, that's -- that's sort of an 


assumption 'cause you had no field indicators. 


Right? 


 MR. POTTER: Well -- well, yeah, we -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: And the history of the data I 


guess. 


 MR. POTTER: Yeah, the history of -- the 


person's history, and inter-- you know, this 


would be followed by an investigation which 

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included interviews with the individual. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess my -- I know, Mike, 


you've raised this quarterly versus annual 


before. I think my issue was more toward, you 


know, was everybody at least on an annual 


program, and I think part of this stems from 


some of the statements we heard at one of the 


meetings in Denver -- I think it was in Denver 


-- where some of the folks came up and they 


kept emphasizing the air monitoring program. 


I'm not -- you know, I don't know if they ever 


said they weren't on urinalysis programs at 


all, but this question of did -- did -- you 


know, certainly a few people could have fallen 


through the cracks, but was it significant -- 


was it a large number, was -- were these 


subcontractors picked up in this program. And 


on paper, you know, I -- policy-wise, it seems 


that they would have been covered, but we were 


asking for validation of that policy by -- you 


know, sort of show us the records that indicate 


that that was in fact -- the policy was being 


practiced. And that's -- I'm not sure if these 


-- self-assessment audit program's going to -- 


going to cut it. It might. I mean I haven't 

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seen it, so I can't -- I can't respond to it 


too much --


 MR. FITZGERALD: The other question, too, if 


it's a DOELAP accreditation review, it may not 


answer some of the operational questions, who 


actually received the monitoring. It would 


have looked at the quality -- the quality 


assurance aspects of what was done, whether the 


-- you know, whether the sensitivity was where 


it needed to be and all that. 


What -- what's puzzling, just to reaffirm what 


Mark said, is we did get testimony certainly in 


Denver, and having been involved in the Mound 


review, we also got site expert input at Mound, 


that raised some questions about whether 


routine bioassay monitoring was maintained into 


the D&D phase or whether reliance was somehow 


whole or partly switched to lapel sampling and 


special bioassays. And I think in both cases, 


at Rocky as well as Mound, we got sort of 


conflicting input from workers. So it seems to 


me if we could somehow get, one, a -- since 


this is fairly -- relatively recent compared to 


a lot of the work that we're looking at. This 


is going back to the '90s. If we can get 

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written policies, what was the written policy 


or procedure for internal bioassay in the D&D 


phase at Rocky, I mean I don't think I -- we've 


looked for it and we didn't find it, but 


certainly it must exist. That would be helpful. 


And then the question just becomes if that was 


the policy, how was it implemented, whether 


these first, second, third tier subcontractors 


-- which is a complicated picture -- at some of 


these clean-up sites were encompassed and in 


fact included in the program or not, 'cause 


there's a cost issue there. At a lot of the 


sites they were pushing hard time-wise and 


cost-wise, and you know, there's certainly a 


potential for people being left out for those 


reasons. So I think that would be the second ­

- second set. 


 DR. ULSH: So if I understand what you just 


said, Joe, one piece is what were the 


procedures. And I think -- I think we can very 


quickly provide you with a copy of what the 


procedures were in terms of who needed to be on 


bioassay and who didn't. That we can do pretty 


easily. Right, Gene? We've got those readily 


at hand. 

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 MR. POTTER: Yes, there was, you know, changes 


over time, and so the easiest thing is to 


provide, you know, what the last policy was. 


To provide a complete history would probably 


take more effort. 


 DR. ULSH: But we're talking about the time 


period from about 1990-ish forward. Right? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: '90 -- I'd say '91 or 2 


forward, and it would be helpful to have two or 


three different time frames within that ten 


years, because I think it did evolve. I agree 


with you, it did evolve from the early days. 


But specific to workers who were involved in 


D&D 'cause what we've heard I think -- part of 


the conversation we've had is that rad worker-2 


D&D workers were the ones that were, you know, 


earmarked for both training as well as for 


routine bioassay. And you know, the question 


that we'll -- had before that were, you know, 


what was the -- the criterion for being able to 


work in a D&D environment with potential for 


radiation exposure. We're told you had to have 


a rad worker-2 to get in. Okay? So that was ­

- that was the benchmark. So if -- if you 


could demonstrate that everyone who could get 

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into a D&D area by virtue of the procedures had 


to be rad worker-2 trained, and if you're rad 


worker-2 trained you got routine bioassay -- 


even if it was once a year -- then I think the 


issue goes away. I don't -- you know, I think 


then you have the policy, you have -- you've 


benchmarked who was involved in that policy of 


workers, and then you've also established that 


in fact the records show these people were 


bioassayed. It wasn't just the first tier, but 


the second and third tier that might have been 


involved were bioassayed. There's nobody left 


out. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Then the issue goes away. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: The issue goes away, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, so a couple of things. First, 


we'll give you the procedures. That's one 


prong of this. Second is let us put up these ­

- these audit reports and you guys take a look 


and see whether that answers your questions or 


not --


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean you've looked at the audit 


reports. Do they -- do they contain the 


operational sort of questions we're asking of 


who was -- who was in the monitoring program? 

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 DR. ULSH: Gene? 


 MR. POTTER: The --


 MR. GRIFFON: Are they more on the laboratory 


end and detection limits, the sensitivity? 


 DR. ULSH: That's (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. POTTER: Now this -- now they were audits 


against the 835 requirements, and -- and -- 


now, in some cases -- some -- some of them may 


have been, you know, less specific to answer 


the exact question that you're asking. But 


certainly those audits did include a review of 


appropriate people being bioassayed. As to 


what, you know, detail they're written up and ­

- I can't, you know, vouch for at the moment. 


It's been several years since I've read through 


them thoroughly. 


 DR. ULSH: So -- so I guess what I propose is 


we'll give you those procedures. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, that's fine. 


 DR. ULSH: We'll put up those reports. If you 


have remaining questions, let us know and then, 


you know, we can talk about whether to go 


further. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, any questions whether 


this -- whether the three audits would perhaps 

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some of these questions (unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: I don't know that there's three. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Oh, okay, I just heard three. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Two or three -- three different 


individuals worked on the audit I think he 


said. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Oh, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Three independent people worked 


on -- it might be one audit report. 


 DR. ULSH: Could be. 


 MR. POTTER: Yeah, I think there's -- there's a 


triennial audit, so I think we had one probably 


in '97, 2000 and 2003 or 4. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, what -- we'll I guess 


see what's in there and decide whether it 


answers these questions and get back as soon as 


we can. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Just to be clear, I think the 


question that Joe was raising, and Mark, is 


there may or may not be a need, but the ques-- 


the question that needs to be answered, other 


than the procedures, is were the people who 


were required to be monitored by the procedure 


actually monitored -- under the pressures of 


the accelerated clean-up and all the things 

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that went on in -- and some verification may be 


necessary or not. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think -- I think these 


audits are going to speak directly to that 


question --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay, great. 


 DR. ULSH: -- but if they don't --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- take a look, if you want more, 


just -- let's discuss it. 


That was -- now when you say D&D, Mark, I'm -- 


I'm thinking that that was the major issue was 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that was it, right, the 


D&D work? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Is that working over there? 


Otherwise you can just sit here and I can move. 


 DR. WADE: I think it's a work in progress. 


(Pause) 


 DR. ULSH: Just to let you know where we are, 


folks, we're experiencing technical 


difficulties. We're getting another microphone 


hooked up. It might be just a minute or two. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Joe, was that it on the D&D 


issue, that --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, and again --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- was the main 


(unintelligible)... 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- it was, you know, a 


question of whether bioassay was the primary or 


whether in fact it somehow -- lapel sampling 


and DAC-hours somehow became the replacement 


primary I think was the question raised by a 


couple of people that testified. I think this 


is the question we're just trying to answer 


since that was laid out there. 


 MR. POTTER: This is Gene again. It might be 


worth making the point again that we didn't 


treat subcontractors any differently than site 


employees as far as routine bioassay goes. Now 


you are -- you are right that they are a diffi­

- a more difficult group to track down and keep 


track of, frequent comings and goings and so 


forth, and that was done primarily through 


tying entry into the program through getting a 


TLD. And most areas were posted, RCTs and the 


plutonium site, for much of the D&D era. HIS20 was an access control system as well as a 


records system, and so you had to have the 


right qualifications to get into certain areas. 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: And was our understanding then 


that in fact for D&D controlled areas rad 


worker-2 was pretty much the required training 


for anyone to have access? 


 MR. POTTER: Right, and as for -- if you look 


at the definition of what rad worker-2 was 


supposed to encompass, you know, working in 


contamination areas and above. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So it had to be in -- at least in 


designated contamination areas. Right? Yeah. 


And that gets --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Which isn't 100 percent, but 


it's close. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That gets down to defining the 


designated areas, too. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: But that's -- that's a tough 


one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We know the problem with that, 


but anyway -- all right. 


 DR. WADE: Sound check. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Sorry. 


 DR. WADE: Brant, you want to talk a little 


bit? 

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 DR. ULSH: Yeah, can -- can anybody hear me 


now? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Is it on? 


 MS. MUNN: I don't hear you much better than I 


did before, Brant. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MS. BRACKETT: (Unintelligible) okay, thanks. 


(Pause) 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, now we're trying musical 


chairs so I've moved to a better spot, I hope. 


 MS. MUNN: And you sound remarkably clear. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Stand by just another minute or 


two here. 


(Pause) 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, we're ready to go 


again, I think. Thanks. 


So I think we're wrapped up with the D&D for 


now. We've got those actions. Right? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


DATA RELIABILITY:


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. And last but not 


least is the data reliability questions. And I 


guess -- you know, there's several tiers of 


this. I was proposing to first discuss the -- 


and I'm not sure where this falls on the 

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matrix, but I can crosswalk this later, but the 


question of looking at the log books -- there 


was a action item to outline a methodology for 


checking the logs, various time periods, 


various process areas, against the HIS-20 


database. And Brant, I think you said you had 


a -- a update on that, at least, on where 


you're at. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, we had a conference call on 


Monday with SC&A and NIOSH -- well, mainly me ­

- and Mark participated as well. Yesterday I 


had an update with the team to get a better 


picture on where we are with the log books, and 


I've asked Bob Meyer to put together kind of a 


summary of where we are with that, so I'll turn 


that over to him. 


Bob, you might have to come down here, I -- the 


microphone situation. 


(Pause) 


MR. MEYER: Have to bring the right file up on 


the screen there (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: Are you working from something 


that we have or this is new -- brand new -- 


MR. MEYER: This is new --


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 

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MR. MEYER: Here it is, you're welcome to have 


it. I --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, that's... 


 DR. ULSH: I just asked for like a summary last 


week. 


MR. MEYER: What Brant asked for was a -- a 


summary of the log books that we have in our 


possession, and we extended that a little bit 


to include some other information related to 


the log books. We have access to all of the 


log books that either we have requested in the 


course of the investigation or that Kathy had 


requested, as well, because they're all in the 


same area over there. And I've got a 


description of the -- the contents of the log 


books that we have. There's a total -- and 


I'll either go through the whole thing or I can 


provide it to you, either way. There's a total 


of 44 log books that we have in our possession 


and they -- the dates range from -- I'm 


scanning through this, it's not in order -- 


1953 to 198-- where'd that one go, I'm sorry -- 


1985. And I'll give you just a smattering of 


the contents and you can ask -- ask questions 


or -- or look at the listing yourself. 

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They include log books -- 1957 special analyses 


log book from -- the contents actually go from 


1966 to 1969. One that's simply a log book for 


the period '63 to '68 that's presumably an HP 


log book but it -- we don't have a summary in 


here. Another HP log book from 1968 to '71, so 


that's inclusive from '63 to '71. We have a 


log book called "Building 771 fire, 1957" in 


our possession. We have a log book with a 


personal name; I probably shouldn't -- from 


1965. It's an HP log book. We have --


 DR. ULSH: (Unintelligible) 


MR. MEYER: No, it's (unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, yeah. 


MR. MEYER: (Unintelligible) and I'd rather we 


-- you're obviously welcome to -- to see that. 


We have two industrial hygiene and safety 


historical collections. They're dated 26 May 


1969, so it sounds as though the collection was 


put together then. 


We have, from 1953, a medical or health 


research project case file -- I'll just read 


the parts that matter -- including urinalysis 


lab records and -- and there's a note in here 


that at that time -- there are discussions of 

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coprecipitation electroplating, which Gene and 


I were interested to see at that -- was 


occurring at that date at -- at Rocky Flats. 


There's a 1954 log book with the same title, 


essentially medical or health research project 


case files, so that includes urinalysis lab 


records. There the note has to do with the 


type of extraction they were doing at the time. 


It was an ether-based extraction at that time. 


 1955, essentially the same notebook, urinalysis 


results, ether extraction and coprecipitation 


were noted. Was that a question? 


UNIDENTIFIED: No. 


MR. MEYER: These are out of date order, I 


apologize. I should have sorted them. 


There's a 1969 health physics and internal 


dosimetry collection. These are Roger Falk's 


daily dosimetry logs for 1967 through 1969. 


I'm kind of reading from several columns at 


once here. 


1972 log book, the Kittinger log book that 


you've heard about a number of times, medical 


or health physics case files. Brant has spent 


a lot of time with the Kittinger logs. 


We have a 1985 log book, health physics and 

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internal dosimetry collection log book, staff ­

- it's a staff log book -- and the inclusive 


dates there are 1981 through 1985. 


We have the Kittinger log book number 111 and a 


foreman log number 71, and I don't have any 


details on that. They're both dated -- that's 


not correct; I don't have the dates on those. 


Then we have a series, and I won't go through 


all of these, of 1957 logs that are all called 


radiation monitoring protection. There's a 


series of 24 log books that are called the 


foreman log books, and they include the dates 


1957 through 1975, so 24 log books for that. 


Let's see, I've got two sets of dates here, 


interesting -- no, that's correct, 1957 through 


1975, so -- so that's the bulk of the set. 


Even though that -- those are called 1957 log 


books, that's the begin date. They actually 


are an 18-year period of radiation monitoring 


protection logs. 


Now we -- we cross-checked this just to make 


sure that we understood that we had everything 


that Scott Raines, who's the records management 


fella who's been helping with this at -- at the 


Mountain View Records Center, and the list of 

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log books that he has extracted, either for us 


or for Kathy is the same list. So these are 


the logs that we have. 


I've got another set of descriptions of those 


log books that Amy Dean had put together for 


me. 


We have a set of log books that was a disk that 


just came in today, and I actually haven't seen 


that disk. I was in an airplane yesterday and 


haven't -- haven't seen that one yet, so as 


soon as we understand the contents of that 


disk, we'll -- we'll provide it to you. 


Let's see -- oh, and Scott Raines, in looking 


for -- we've -- we've made approximately 100 


requests to date for materials from the 


Mountain View Records Center based really 


almost entirely on your requests. I've asked 


Scott, just for the fun of it -- let's just see 


if he responded just now -- how many actual 


documents we've retrieved because we were 


interested in determining that -- and I don't 


have an answer yet. I'm guessing it's well in 


excess of 1,000 individual documents that we've 


physically retrieved based on requests related 


to the SEC petition and originally the SC&A 

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review of -- of the TBDs, but primarily that's 


SEC petition-related work. 


So those are the log books that we have in our 


possession. 


 DR. ULSH: So just to summarize, we have about 


40 --


MR. MEYER: 44 -- 46 (unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: -- 46 log books that we have in our 


possession that are -- that are scanned. 


MR. MEYER: Yes. 


 DR. ULSH: And my first -- the top of my 


priority list next week is to get those up on 


the O drive so that you guys can see what we've 


got in hand. 


Just to bring everyone up to date on other 


actions on this log book issue, Kathy has 


suggested that the Kittinger log -- I just 


looked at one of the Kittinger logs. There's a 


set of them that covered different time 


periods, had a lot -- it was -- it had a lot of 


information that was data rich, and that did 


indeed turn out to be the case. I presented my 


analysis of the first Kittinger log at the last 


working group meeting. 


Now I want to hand a packet around the table 

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here -- maybe get this going both ways -- just 


to -- just to kind of give you a perspective. 


We had a short discussion on log books during 


the call on Monday, and I mentioned that some 


of my HP-- some of the HPs at -- at NIOSH had 


already looked through a couple of these log 


books, and I've just scanned the first five 


pages of -- of the three that we've looked at 


already. There are two decon dailies and one 


that is called a contamination control report. 


I just want -- I think it's just worthwhile to 


show you what these logs look like, what kind 


of information is and is not in them. 


Now based only on these three -- only on these 


three -- we didn't find much in these three. 


These three are already posted on the O drive 


so if you're interested you can go look at the 


whole -- the whole log. But I think it's 


worthwhile just to get a perspective as to what 


we're talking about with these logs. 


Now during Monday's conference call Mark and 


Kathy indicated that they had had some -- some 


better luck finding data that could be crosschecked against radiation files to -- just to 


see whether or not they -- to what extent they 

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agree. And I requested that -- you know, if 


you've had better luck, if you've gotten 


luckier than -- than I have so far, please send 


me those logs -- I mean just tell me which logs 


those are so that we can make sure that we 


include those in our analyses. 


When we last spoke about this at the last 


working group meeting, we committed to provide 


a plan. The detailing of that plan is really 


kind of contingent on what we find in the logs. 


I mean it would be one thing for us to say 


we're going to look at this, that and the other 


log, and then once we look at it there's 


nothing in it. So we are looking through them 


right now, just taking a brief first-pass 


through to see whether particular types of log 


books turn out to be -- to have data that we 


can actually look at. So that piece will be 


coming as we take a look at these 48 log books 


that we have in our possession. 


In addition, I don't know if maybe you called 


them by another name, Bob, the urinalysis log 


books were considered kind of a separate type 


of log book. That I think everyone -- I think 


it's pretty safe to say that those are going to 

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have of course pieces of data that we can check 


against the rad files, and we have located some 


of the urinalysis logs from -- in the '50s, I 


don't remember the exact dates. 


MR. MEYER: Right, Gene actually has the exact 


dates. Gene, are you there? 


 MR. POTTER: Yes. That'd be '52 to '55, and 


then '60 through about '68. 


 DR. ULSH: All these musical chairs, I've lost 


the document I need. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And that -- is that it, Gene? 


 MR. POTTER: Yes, other than to say that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Nothing in the '70s. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, we do have --


 MR. GRIFFON: Nothing yet, anyway. 


 DR. ULSH: -- we do have a piece of information 


for you on that, Mark, as soon as I can find it 


in my matrix, which I just relocated. 


Okay. We have both uranium and plutonium 


urinalysis logs for '52 through '55. We have 


both plutonium and uranium for '63 through '68. 


We are currently looking for urinalysis logs 


for '69 through '71. Now at some point -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: You mean you know they exist but 


you just can't locate them, or -- 

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 DR. ULSH: We know that they exist; we have not 


yet located them. 


At some point after 1971, we don't know the 


exact date, they went to an electronic 


reporting system, so these log books would have 


ceased to be prepared. That's after '71, but I 


don't know exactly when. So for the ones that 


we have, we're going to start going through 


them. As we agreed at the last working group 


meeting, I'm going to -- it will probably be 


me. I'll go through and pick out a handful of 


data points from representative logs -- 


urinalysis logs -- and we'll bounce that off of 


HIS-20 and see to what extent they do or do not 


agree. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So there's -- post-'71 they were 


entering directly from the laboratory -- 


 DR. ULSH: At some --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to some sort of database, 


which then might have been merged with HIS-20 


or whatever. 


 DR. ULSH: Exactly. At some point after 1971, 


I don't know the exact date. We know that 


there -- there should be log books up through 


at least 1971, and sometime after that there 

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won't be any, but we don't know exactly when 


that happened. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So there's no real paper record 


to check after -- after -- some point after 


'71. I mean after -- once they went to that 


electronic system, there's no real paper record 


to --


 DR. ULSH: I'm going to --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- check against. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm -- I'm going to say that there 


were -- those results were recorded 


electronically from the get-go. Now, Gene, is 


that correct? 


 MR. POTTER: Those -- those results that -- 


after that system went into effect would have 


been, you know, exchanged between databases and 


the printouts put in the folks' files, so the 


most direct evidence of a bioassay is in the 


individual files. And I was involved when they 


shut down the last LIMS system from Building 


123 when we went to all off-site analyses, and 


this occurred early in '97. I think the LIMS 


system was checked and rechecked to make sure 


that all the data was gleaned from it, and then 


it was archived in some fashion, which you 

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know, we would have to further investigate as ­

- you know, probably the software that ran is 


no longer current. The platform it ran on is 


probably no longer available. And so the most 


direct evidence is -- is what was printed out 


and put into individual files. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Gene, can you clarify the LIMS 


system, what --


 MR. POTTER: The Laboratory Information System 


or some such acronym for it. There were two -- 


there were two -- at least two versions of 


that. The last was called L-I-M-S, LIMS. The 


one before, I never remember what it was, 


certainly well before my time. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


 DR. ULSH: That's where we're at. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. MEYER: And I did -- the list actually did 


just come in. We have ten additional log books 


in our possession on the disk that came in this 


morning or last night. They include 1964 to 


1968 monitoring surveys; 1961 radiation history 


files, health physics log books, including 


urinalysis results; 1962 radiation history 


files including urinalysis results; 1962 -- the 

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first one was the first part of '62, the next 


one is late '62 to early '63, same thing, 


radiation history files including urinalysis 


results; the same type of log book for later in 


1963; two -- one decontamination facility log 


book for 1996; one clean-up log book for 1969 ­

- 5/21/1969, which will be interesting, that's 


the second one of those that we've -- that 


we've found and it just -- just came in; and 


two more down here at the bottom that were 


radiation monitoring protection log books -- 


this is a full set, 1982 to 1990, two -- two 


sets. Those must be large files. I don't 


actually have the files in here yet, but I just 


requested the list. So what's happening is -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. MEYER: -- I meant to say earlier that 


Scott has been going back through their records 


using different types of keyword searches 


because that's the key to the whole thing with 


that large a record set, and this last week -- 


understanding what it is we've been looking for 


-- he's gone back and dug out some additional ­

- you know, they're not random sets, but things 


related to all of the requests that we've made 

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and that's what this disk contains. 


 DR. ULSH: The other piece to this, and I don't 


know if this is the right time to get into 


this, Mark, or not, but we've also posted a log 


from the 1969 fire. What kind of log book is 


that, do you remember? 


MR. MEYER: It's -- it looks to be a foreman 


log. It -- it's -- it's difficult to tell 


actually who wrote it. It's one of those 


that's kind of scratchy -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is -- is -- is it -- is it a log 


book from the fire or around the time of the 


fire? 


MR. MEYER: It -- it actually covers -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Nothing that has dates that we're 


miss-- I --


MR. MEYER: It covers the period of the fire, 


and you can -- and I actually have it on here 


if you -- and it's available to be looked at. 


It covers the period of the fire up to the 


period. It's routine events, the night of the 


fire. It's -- it's a sort of -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Catastrophe. 


MR. MEYER: -- catastrophe event, and there is 


a period in the log book when there's just an 

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occasional note that they were in there again 


all night. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


MR. MEYER: That sort of a note. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's a different one than I saw 


then. 


MR. MEYER: Okay, it's -- it's a -- real time 


during the -- during the event itself. It's an 


interesting log to read, and you can tell 


during that first couple of days he didn't have 


much time to write. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. MEYER: Mel has a lot more information on 


that period of the fire itself. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and we can -- I won't --


I'll let you share that, too, Mel, but I -- I 


want to stay on this for a second, though. The 


-- Brant, I think to some extent your question 


might have been answered by those last entries 


that came in. By the titles of those it sounds 


like they have urinalysis records -- 


MR. MEYER: It does by the titles, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- in several of those, so at 


least to some extent we -- maybe they're not 


data rich, but --

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 DR. ULSH: It could be that --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- by the title it sounds like 


they might have something. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: But -- but your interest here is 


to cross-check the data from the log book for 


urinalysis with that that's in a database. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. Well --

 MR. ELLIOTT: That's your interest here. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- you know, just to go 

back to, you know, why -- I mean the whole 


thing is -- the main thrust is is the data 


that's being used for the dose reconstruction 


reliable, and not only are -- is the workgroup 


and SC&A interested in that, but we've had the 


petitioners -- the sense of them is the -- you 


know, and not one individual allegation, but 


you know, we've heard that from several people. 


We even heard it from Jennifer Thompson saying 


that, you know, it's not my case, I'm just 


using mine as an example of what might have 


happened to others, so -- yeah, so we're trying 


to look at that broader issue and -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And we -- and we -- when we 


interviewed the former RCTs, you know, and 


said, you know, where's the corroboration, we 

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kept hearing the allegation of, you know, 


really no documentation. And the response was 


well, you know, look in the safety concerns. 


There are safety -- this is coming from the 


union, of course, the safety concerns file -- 


and log books. The RCTs were pointing to the 


log books, so that -- that was the genesis of 


saying okay, if there's any corroboration it's 


going to be found in those two locations -- but 


nothing specific. That's probably part of the 


challenge is deciding how you look at it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So that -- that's where this is 


coming from. That -- what you just said about 


sometime after '71 and going down electronics, 


this might -- that's the first I had heard of 


that, too, so that --


 DR. ULSH: You mean (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- explains a lot of what we're 


seeing in the files 'cause you don't see the -- 


the raw data anymore after a certain time 


period there. 


 DR. ULSH: And it could be that these last ten 


things that we've got, Mark, maybe they're not 


called log books, maybe they're -- I don't 


know, maybe they're something else, but -- 

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MR. MEYER: It looks as though something like 


that is happening that they're testifying 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ULSH: We'll have a better feel for it, 


though, after we take a look, but -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: So I mean I'm -- I'm looking at 


this sort of like we did at Y-12. We -- we had 


multiple prongs and -- and it wasn't any -- any 


-- necessarily any neat, formal method, but by 


looking at a number of different sources, 


including monthly progress reports, quarterly 


progress reports, some urine cards in one case, 


you know, got enough corroboration with the 


database that we said, you know, it looks good. 


Now in this case I think we're -- it's a little 


bit different because I think we're less 


concerned about the database for use as a 


coworker model where at Y-12 that was the big 


thrust, you know. I think here we're more 


conc--


MR. MEYER: On an individual basis. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- right, more concerned that the 


individual record is actually reliable. 


 DR. ULSH: And so what I see in the immediate 


future on this -- this particular item is that 

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next week I'm going to work to get as many of 


these log books that we have in our possession 


up on the O drive so that you and SC&A -- the 


workgroup and SC&A can look at them, and then 


we're going to do an initial -- an initial run-


through on these log books and identify which 


ones contain data that we can actually compare 


and which ones don't. 


To date -- and I want to make it clear, I've 


only looked at a very few log books. The 


Kittinger log books do have a lot of stuff in 


them. The two decon dailies and the 


contamination con-- one contamination control 


log book that I looked at didn't have much in 


them. But as I mentioned, you know, you found 


some stuff, Mark, and Kathy said she found some 


stuff, so if you guys could let me know which 


ones those are, we'll make sure to look at 


that, too. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, it seems like the 


process is to -- to feed to each other. I mean 


if there are some entries that illustrate the 


possibility of useful information, we'll pass 


that on to you --


 DR. ULSH: Absolutely. 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: -- and you're going to pass on 


where, you know, hey, these log books are 


proving to be not too fruitful, which is the 


process I think we're looking at, trying to 


figure out if there's anything here that could 


corroborate the -- the people that are alleging 


falsification and other issues. If not, so be 


it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. The -- the -- I was just 


going to say from our -- from my standpoint, 


I've looked at -- well, let me step back. The 


46 you mentioned in your presentation, does 


that include the ones that were posted already? 


'Cause we have about 16 or so -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, there's a bunch of foreman's 


logs up there now. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I can't remember the -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, they're mostly foreman's logs, 


there may be one Kittinger log on there. 


MR. MEYER: And actually as of this morning, 


now it's 56. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, so now it's 56, right. 


 DR. ULSH: But those do include the ones that 


are up --


MR. MEYER: Right. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Those do include --


MR. MEYER: Yes, it's everything we have. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And we've (unintelligible) the 


foreman's logs are not very useful. 


 DR. ULSH: At think we agreed to that at the 


last --


 MR. GRIFFON: Then let me just -- just say what 


I've sort of done spot check-wise was -- I 


started looking at some of these logs. I found 


some entries, and I did have an e-mail exchange 


with -- with you, Brant, on the -- I was 


finding -- a bunch of the logs had indications 


that people were sent for lung counts, and 


sometimes they gave the values in there, 


sometimes they just said, you know, had a 


potential incident, sent him for a lung count ­

- had the name, had the date. So I said I 


don't even care if -- if I have a count, I can 


at least corroborate that the individual -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- right, right, that it 


occurred, right. And -- and I checked a number 


of these and I wasn't finding any matches, so I 


e-mailed Brant and said, you know, wha-- this 


seems like something's wrong here; is HIS-20 

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complete with regard to the data. And I think 


 DR. ULSH: Well, the answer's no. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, if you can -- if you can 


tell me exactly -- you know, why -- maybe it's 


in the TBD, but if you can just give me a once-


over what does it have in it, if it's not all 


of the in vivo for a certain time period. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, there are a number of -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause there's 147,000 points or 


something like that of lung count data. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm going to have to rely to some 


extent on -- on Roger and Gene to talk about 


the problems with the in vivo data in HIS-20. 


What I can tell you is that we don't use the in 


vivo data in HIS-20 for any -- any purpose 


because we know that there are problems with 


it. That doesn't apply to the urinalysis, it 


doesn't apply to the -- the external dosimetry 


results. And there are a number of issues that 


are way beyond my expertise. 


Gene, maybe you can --


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, maybe explain why it 


doesn't apply to the other two, too, if they 


can't -- like how do you know one's a problem 

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and the others aren't or... 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Well, I think the rea-- to 


answer that question, Mark, the issues that 


we're talking about are specific to in vivo, 


that -- they're just not relevant for -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: -- for bioassay. But Gene, can you 


maybe start off with some of the problems that 


we know exist with the lung count data in HIS20? And Roger, chip in. 


 MR. POTTER: Yeah, Roger probably does a better 


job on the earlier things, but to kind of 


summarize, there -- there was -- there's -- 


HIS-20 recorded all in vivo results in units of 


microcuries, for one thing. And so the 


previous databases used nanocuries, so a factor 


of a thousand different. Even in the -- you 


know, '95 on when we had Canberra software to 


run our lung counter and -- and Canberra -- 


HIS-20, the two systems were supposed to talk 


to each other and in fact they -- they did, but 


only in units of microcuries, so some of the 


results were so small that they wouldn't have 


shown up in -- in the database. And so I mean 


that's just one of a number of issues, so 

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basically all you can use, even for the modern, 


wonderful stuff, is either a positive count, 


which will be -- you know, that was well above 


detection. You can see those in there where 


the peak was identified, or it was above 


decision level. But other than that, for 


routine counts that were below, you're not 


going to see much more in HIS other than the 


fact that a lung count was taken on that date. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But you should see that a count 


was taken. 


 MR. POTTER: Yes, you should see that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: See, I don't even see that. 


That's -- that's my issue. 


 MR. POTTER: Yeah. Well, the earlier days 


relied --


 MR. GRIFFON: This is the early days, yeah. 


 MR. POTTER: In the earlier databases -- from 


the very start of the -- of the lung counting 


program, it's been my observation that a hard 


copy report of the lung count was always placed 


in the individual records. And to get it into 


some sort of database initially required a hand 


entry, so therein lies probably some of the 


problems and, you know, depending on how many 

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people they had to do such things over the 


years. And in -- I know that when -- the end 


of the RHRS area -- era, which is the database 


that preceded HIS-20, we were still -- or my 


technicians were still making hand entries into 


RHRS that a lung count had been performed, up 


until the time we could do the electronic 


transfers. And I've already discussed that even 


those had problems. But just to maybe make one 


more point about HIS and -- it was originally 


procured and kind of rushed into production for 


Y2K issues, as well as access control. And as 


evidence of that, I offer the fact that it was 


originally given to rad engineering to 


implement and set up access control points and 


such. And then it became the bioassay database 


as well. So -- and of course it was 


implemented in the time of shrinking resources, 


the site was ready -- you know, designated for 


closing and so forth. So we inherited many of 


the problems of the databases where, you know, 


every time you change one of these things it's 


almost like pounding a square peg into a round 


hole. You have different field names. They 


mean different things. And so none of -- you 

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know, not all those problems were solved. 


 MR. GRIFFON: What -- I -- I -- I'm -- in the 


early days you said hard copy reports were put 


in the file. I -- I see that readily in the 


claims files I'm looking at. 


 MR. POTTER: Yes, I think that continued 


throughout the whole history of in vivo 


counting. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But we just -- I -- I just also 


heard a history of the urinalysis program where 


up through '69 the same thing was true with the 


urine records, you had a hard copy record put ­

- being put in the files. Why would that be 


any different than the -- I mean what -- was 


the intention to update HIS-20 based on the 


hard copy records of urine files and your in 


vivo files or was there more emphasis -- I -- I 


don't understand why... 


 MR. POTTER: Why urinalysis and lung counting 


would be any different? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, why -- why -- why you're -- 


why you're -- why -- why we're -- I mean I'm -- 


I'm coming away with the understanding that 


HIS-20 should be reliable for the urinalysis 


data all the way back to when -- '52 or 

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whatever, but now you're -- you're -- you're 


making a case for the fact that it's probably 


not as reliable for the early years for the in 


vivo because there would have been hand entry, 


but the same thing would have been true for the 


urine data, wouldn't it? I -- I'm getting a 


disconnect on that. 


 MR. POTTER: Uh-huh. Yeah, you have -- 


basically you have different people doing it. 


I think there was a whole records group and -- 


and I think we'd better maybe tap into Roger's 


expertise, but at one time there was, within 


the rad health organization, quite a large 


records group. And the bioassay results were 


hand -- the urine results were hand-entered by 


those folks. In fact, they went back and 


caught up all the data that was on the -- on 


the bioassay cards. I'm not saying that this 


was done 100 percent to perfection, but -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: So you're saying --


 MR. POTTER: -- I'm not -- I've never seen, you 


know, a big discrepancy there. For some reason 


or other, lung counting -- which was probably 


done by people -- you know, started in '65, 


relied on a -- the people in internal dosimetry 

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or lung -- the lung count area to provide that 


information in some sort of electronic form. 


We talked about, you know, there being a LIMS 


system, you know, sometime after '71 where the 


data then became electronically available for 


transfer whereas, you know, the lung counting 


did not reach a similar state of technology 


until '95. 


 DR. ULSH: And is it fair to say, Gene and -- 


and Roger, that priority would have been on the 


urinalysis data because that's -- that's what 


you use for regulatory compliance, so that's 


the primary means of detecting an intake. Is 


that fair to say? 


 MR. POTTER: I don't think we ever looked at it 


in those terms, per se. I think it was just 


two different groups, two different systems of 


doing things. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So -- but -- but the bottom line 


is your -- your experience is that the one is ­

- is much less -- has more flaws with it than 


the -- the in vivo has more flaws than the 


urinalysis. 


 DR. ULSH: And the analyses that we've done so 


far, Mark, tend to bear that -- bear that out. 

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You've seen yourself the problems with the in 


vivo. But Craig also presented -- you know, we 


talked about this earlier -- that analysis 


where he bounced the handwritten cards off of ­

- off of HIS and we found very good agreement ­

- handwritten bioassay cards. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. Okay, that was 


helpful -- the explanation. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. So before we get off the log 


books -- are we still on log books? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we're still on log books. 


 DR. ULSH: Joe, there was -- there was one 


thing that puzzled me. I want to make sure 


that I have -- I'm interpreting this correctly. 


This is the write-up that you sent out 


yesterday, and there was something that changed 


between yesterday's version and the one last 


week. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: It's -- let me tell you where it is 


in the document. I've got it under section 


two, external dosimetry procedures, it's on the 


next page, the very bottom of the page. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ULSH: It's part of the paragraph that says 

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(reading) The field log books; e.g., 


contamination control and RCT log books, also 


have minimal discussions around specific 


external exposure investigations, indicating 


that this is not an appropriate reference for 


this type of information. 


Can you just explain to me what -- what that 


means? 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Joe, you want me to take 


it? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm sorry, where are you at? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, I'm sorry, this is -- this is -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Page three on the bottom. 


 DR. ULSH: This is the document -- it's the 


write-up that Joe circulated yesterday -- yes, 


that the correct document. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, why don't you take that, 


Kathy. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. Basically what 


I'm saying is after going through 30 log books 


-- meaning field log books, not dosimetry log 


books --


 DR. ULSH: Right. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- that I found no 

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information -- or very minimal, actually -- on 


investigations in those log books about lost 


dosimetry, et cetera. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. If you've looked through 


those kinds of log books, Kathy, the 


contamination control and the RCT log books, 


have you found information like -- well, like I 


was looking at in the Kittinger log, you know, 


things that we can bounce off of data in the 


rad files. Have you found that kind of thing 


in those log books? 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yes. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, you have. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And I would highly 


recommend that you -- let me get the dates 


right here -- that you look at the log book for 


'57 --


 DR. ULSH: Is that an RC-- is that an -- 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- through '60. 


 DR. ULSH: '57 through '60, is that a 


contamination control or an RCT or -- or what 


is that, Kathy? 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: It's -- it's one of the 


original log books. I don't think it specifies 


whether it's foreman or RCT. 

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 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. MEYER: Could you send us the cover page 


and a few specific pages from that one, just so 


it's easier for us to track back to it? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I can probably give you file 


references, too. I think that's one of the 


ones -- the same ones I looked at, Kathy. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah, it's the one that 


I think you're calling the uranium... 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Well, that might be what I 


asked -- that might be the same thing -- might 


be the same thing we talked about Monday where 


you guys said that you had seen some -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I think --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- that's the same. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. It would be very helpful for 


us if you could -- I mean if you've already 


looked through some of these log books and you 


know that some of them are useful -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, I think we can agree to 


do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we can narrow it down, 


right. 

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 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Now the reason I'm 


picking on that log book is not only because of 


the urinalysis data, but because of several 


entries that state that badges were destroyed. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Which cannot be really 


compared back, or at least in the case of the 


population situation. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: But that's also some of 


the stuff that we're coming across. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and we -- at least, if my 


memory serves me on this, I -- the first 


reference I saw to that was that the badge 


appeared to be contaminated and therefore it 


was destroyed and they -- I think they even 


gave references to whose badge was destroyed. 


And my question was not so much the practice of 


destroying the badge, but -- but crosswalk it ­

- what did they assign this guy, you know -- 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Whether they did 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- how did they assign dose, or 


what did they do -- you know. 


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you've --


 MR. GRIFFON: And it happened -- it's more than 


one. It was several -- I'd say dozens, you 


know. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, if you've got particular 


instances where the individual's identified and 


we know which badge exchange cycle -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: We can find --


 DR. ULSH: -- we can find out at least what 


dose appears there probably. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, you have a log 


book date --


 MR. GRIFFON: That's right. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- is what you have. 


 DR. ULSH: You have a... 


 MR. GRIFFON: You have a log book date so you 


should be able to find the exch-- if it happens 


right on a exchange cycle, you might be unclear 


which quarter you're in or whatever, but you 


know, you have the date -- the log entry date. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You don't necessarily know -- 


right. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, yeah, it'd be -- okay, we've 

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already talked about that. Thanks. 


 MS. MUNN: And Mark, let me understand. Do you 


want to crosswalk that to see that some sort of 


indication that appears in the worker's 


personal file? Is that the crosswalking you're 


doing? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, see, this -- this is what 


I'm trying to grapple with is I was -- I was 


trying to find a way to test the reliability of 


the data without having to go back to the 


individual files like Brant did with the 


Kittinger log book all the time 'cause that's ­

- that's extensive work to go -- to pull the 


individual files, especially the non-claimant 


files, so I was trying to say let's check HIS20, you know. Then -- then I run into this 


problem with the lung count data. I know you 


don't use the lung count data, but it's another 


way of saying --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- is my record complete. That's 


what the -- that's what the workers care about, 


you know, so that was, you know, neither here 


nor there whether you use that data. But --


and -- and you know, I -- I am still kind of 

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surp-- you know, questioning the lung count 


data. I -- I randomly checked maybe 15 of them 


and didn't find any entries in there, so you 


know --


 DR. ULSH: It may be that the --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- all in the early years, I got 


to say, you know, but -- 


 DR. ULSH: There are some peculiarities about 


the dates that appear -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's what I --


 DR. ULSH: -- so that might (unintelligible) 


something, I don't know what. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But you know, that -- that's -- 


that's what I -- I'd like to do, Wanda, and 


then -- then you -- I mean really the end prod­

- the end game here is, you know, do we -- can 


we demonstrate, to the extent possible over all 


time periods, that the data in -- in the 


individual files is reliable, and we've got -- 


I've got a much better understanding now of 


what's in the files because you do have raw 


records for urine, and it looks like up through 


'69 or somewhere thereabouts you have these 


urine cards and --


 MS. MUNN: That's -- that's why I was 

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questioning. I wasn't really certain what 


crosswalk you wanted, whether you wanted it 


HIS-20 or whether you wanted it to the original 


records. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right -- all right, I -- I think 


I would like to say let's do -- I -- I'd like 


to cross-- I mean that's why it's being put -- 


I'm answering this question -- why am I 


answering this question, that's a good -- 


that's the number one question. I mean that's 


what I asked Brant to lay out a methodology 


really, because I think -- you know, it's not 


the Advisory Board's role to kind of 


demonstrate that. We're asking the que-- you 


know, show us that the data you've got in these 


files is reliable and -- and give us some 


method by which you're going to demonstrate 


this and we'll weigh it and -- and, you know, 


considering all factors, you know, make -- make 


our recommendation. I think that's where I 


stand. I've got some thoughts on it, 


certainly, but I would rather -- I don't have 


access to all the logs, certainly I don't have 


access to all the documents and the materials 


that -- that NIOSH does, so that's sort of 

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where we -- you know, that's where I stand. 


And I would say my -- this is my personal 


opinion is I would first look to HIS-20, but 


then do even a smaller subset against the hard 


copy files and that would be -- that would make 


a strong argument, I think, if you did 


something along those lines, you know. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: This is Kathy DeMers. 


actually did apparently crosswalk three people 


back to the external dosimetry database, and 


one individual had a dose -- a positive dose 


for the quarter in question, and the other two 


had zeroes. So it might be a good idea to 


track the zeroes back to the hard copy records. 


 DR. ULSH: Can you send me the specific 


information, Kathy? The --


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: It's all in that log 


book, and the two individuals are actually on 


page 64 and (unintelligible). 


EXTERNAL DATA


 MR. GRIFFON: And now external dose is a little 


different because external dose you have -- 


from what I've seen, you have worksheets. You 


don't really have raw data of any sort. You 


don't have punch cards or anything like that. 


I 
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You have worksheets which usually give annual 


or quarterly summary -- usually they're 


handwritten, from what I've seen, but -- but 


they're summary --


 DR. ULSH: '57 to '60, I'm trying to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I didn't see any -- you see any 


card data or anything like that? 


UNIDENTIFIED: No. 


 DR. ULSH: I don't think there is --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I'll have to send you 


the actual dates --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, that would --


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- then you'll be able 


to find it. 


 DR. ULSH: That would be very helpful. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And now -- now -- again, just -- 


just to bring all my -- I mean just another 


part of this data reliability question, in -- 


in the -- Y-12, the other very powerful piece I 


think that we found was some of those quarterly 


reports, not only because they had individual 


data points in them with certain individuals 


identified, but the most convincing thing to 


me, quite frankly, was there were several -- I 

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think it was quarters in a row where they had 


summary urinalysis data showing the 


percentiles, the 50th percentile by month and 


the 90th percentile by month. And you could 


pull these number off the graph and say okay, 


let me pull the database over here and sort -- 


look at the 90th percentile in the database, 


compare it with the graph, and they were 


matching very, very closely. So that was like 


we don't have to worry about matching, you know 


UNIDENTIFIED: Individual (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- Joe A. Smith to Joe A. Smith 


and one data point at a time, and this was 


great -- you know, that gave me a lot of 


confidence in that time period that -- that it 


was looking good. Now --


 DR. ULSH: It kind of looked like -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- Y-- Y-12 was a little 


different, but I didn't know -- you mentioned 


the other day these dosimetry summary reports, 


at least for one issue you were talking about ­

-


 DR. ULSH: Are you talking about the progress 


reports? 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe it's the progress reports 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ULSH: Dosimetry section progress reports. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I don't know if they have 


that kind of information in them, though, but ­

-


 DR. ULSH: Those particular things -- those 


particular documents don't have -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: -- percentile values. They do have 


 MR. GRIFFON: Or -- or anything useful for this 


kind of analysis. 


 DR. ULSH: They have a number of people wearing 


badges, I think, in them. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. MEYER: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ULSH: I'm not sure on that, I'd have to go 


look at them. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So there -- there might be 


something to glean from those, and you say 


they're on the O drive. I'm not sure I know 


where. 


 DR. ULSH: No, I didn't. Kathy said they were 


on the O drive. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, Kathy said they were on the O 


drive. Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: I have them on a disk. I don't know 


whether I've ever put them on the O drive. 


That hasn't been requested but I can -- I'll 


put them on. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That would -- that might be 


useful. If there's nothing there, there's 


nothing there we can use, but it might be 


useful even --


 DR. ULSH: Dosimetry section progress reports. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's a lot easier than going to 


the individual files all the -- if -- if we can 


corroborate that way, that's what I'm trying to 


achieve here. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, that's an idea. That's about 


where we are with the log books. I don't -- is 


there anything else we want to talk about on 


that? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Let's see, I -- Joe, do you have 


any -- anything else on the log book section? 


I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Did you bring up the -- the 


entries you didn't find for the bioassay 


(unintelligible) --

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, well, I will provide these, 


Brant, but I -- I've done -- and that was from 


-- the main ones that I was able to crosswalk 


was the uranium log book that Kathy referenced 


and it's -- it covers that '59/'60 period, I 


think. I think we're talking about the same 


log book, Kathy, I'm not sure. 


 DR. ULSH: Kathy said '57 to '60, is that -- 


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I'm talking '57 to '60. 


 MR. GRIFFON: '57 to '60? Well, maybe I looked 


mainly at '59 measurements, but it might cover 


back to '57, too. But '59 and '60 I looked in 


and I -- I focused on the -- the -- and I think 


these log entries focus on the higher entries 


'cause they're -- you know, that's -- that's 


sort of what they did. We had an incident, you 


know, someone still got a sample, they mention 


later that his analysis came out at 330 percent 


of the MPL or what-- what-- however it's 


recorded. Sometimes it's in dpm, sometimes 


it's in percentages of the MPL. And looking at 


these high values for that '59 to '60 time 


period I -- I know it was -- it was more than a 


third of them were not in the database. I know 


it might have been as -- 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I count-- I counted the 


ones -- when you showed me your spreadsheet 


this morning --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- you'd looked at 76 cases, 


and you didn't find anything in 33 of them. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, so 33 out of 76 --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: About 40 percent. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- were not in HIS-20. That 


doesn't mean it's not in the individual record, 


so there might be a sub-tier level that for 


some of these -- because a number of these 


people -- you see the name again and again. 


It's the same guys that were getting high 


exposures, same men and women -- probably men, 


but -- so you know, that's just a snapshot of 


one very tiny period, but it -- it raises some 


questions. And these were all on the high end 


of the distribution, you know, when you -- you 


know, these were the higher readings that were 


not there, so -- and again, I'll share this -- 


these log books to save time. We don't want to 


duplicate efforts, for sure. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And Joyce also found -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- high value missing, as she 


said earlier. 


 DR. ULSH: She was going to send those to us, 


too. Right? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. She's got some other 


information that we're going to -- that you're 


going to --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- share in your report -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, I just --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- about some of the writ-- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I just have to arrange to 


get the privacy stuff -- it's in a funny form 


so I have to get all the stuff typed up and the 


privacy information taken out. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm not sure I understand that. I 


mean if you're giving it to us -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Why do you have to take the 


privacy information out? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Presumably this will be a 


memorandum that will become part of the report 


 MR. GRIFFON: If it -- if it gets shared in the 


meeting, that would -- I guess that's what 


they're concerned --

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Also this is part of a report 


that Joyce hadn't quite finished, so I thought 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I understand that part. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- while we were -- as we were 


doing that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- but we can certainly send 


you the --


 MR. GRIFFON: I would say send the version 


first and then try to -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We can do --


 DR. ULSH: We're going to need that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- try to clean it up before the 


Nevada meeting, but send it -- yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I think all the input we're 


talking about directly to you is not going to 


be influenced by privacy issues 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Sure, of course. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- names, everything --


 DR. ULSH: That's my point, yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I'll just correspond with Joyce 


and -- and get that sent to you. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: To answer your question, I 


think that's pretty much -- just items two and 


three are log book items on the safety 


concerns. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The only other -- the only other 


question I have on the -- not so much really 


the log books, but back to this crosswalk 


question and the -- just understanding HIS-20. 


I mean I -- we -- we threw that question out. 


I don't know -- I don't expect an answer on the 


spot unless you know right off, but that 


question of HIS-20 clearly was missing a lot of 


high values. When we looked in the CEDR 


version, the piece that was used for the 


coworker model, some of those high values were 


in the CEDR. I'm not sure if it had all of 


them. I didn't do that kind of crosswalk. But 


you know, it raised in my mind -- I -- I always 


sort of thought that CEDR was derived from HIS20, and even if -- if you look at Craig 


Little's piece, I pulled it up before the 


break, and -- and -- you know, he starts off 


his defense -- or his comparison of the model 


saying, you know, assuming that -- that -- that 


HIS-20 is a valid model -- or a valid database, 

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you know, and if it's missing all these high 


data points, I wonder if the rest of the 


analysis --


 DR. ULSH: Well, I'm going to have to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- sort of is questionable. But 


anyway --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I can't comment on that 


because I don't know what the high values are. 


If you send those over, we'll -- we'll look 


into it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, we -- yeah. I mean does 


anybody know the derivation of CEDR, where -- 


where --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Are we talking the Comprehensive 


Epidemiologic --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- Data --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- Resource? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And that database --


 MR. ELLIOTT: And isn't that database generated 


 MR. POTTER: This is -- this is Gene. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: -- by all of the study results 


that have been used in the epidemiologic 


studies? No? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I'll -- I'll catch you up on 


the -- the history. I mean -- mean we -- we 


first saw that the coworker model was -- was 


derived from CEDR and immediately raised, in my 


mind, the same questions we had been down with 


Y-12. Well, what's the -- what's the pedigree, 


where -- where -- you know, is this the full 


database, and they said really the primary 


source was HIS-20, and then they said but 


rather than do -- redo the coworker model, 


Craig Little offered an analysis that said 


basically if we used HIS-20 or -- 


 DR. ULSH: No, that was (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, I'm sorry. All right, I got 


the wrong person. I apologize. There -- an 


analysis was offered that it wouldn't matter if 


you used HIS-20 or -- or the CEDR database to 


do the coworker model, little fluctuations but 


basically the intakes derived would be the 


same. That was the -- the piece that was 


offered to the workgroup 'cause -- 'cause we 


raised that question, you know, what -- you 

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know -- so then I said okay, HIS-20's the 


primary source. So then if you go back and say 


well --


 MR. ELLIOTT: No, it's not. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- how does CEDR have more data, 


and it was suggested in the write-up that most 


of the additional data in CEDR were zero 


values, and I forget the reasoning behind that, 


but we clearly found a lot of the high values 


were in CEDR but not in HIS-20. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay --


 MR. GRIFFON: So --


 DR. ULSH: -- it is Comprehensive Epidemiologic 


Data Resource, Larry. The reason we're calling 


it the CEDR data is it is a data set that was 


pulled out of CEDR. As far as the pedigree, 


I'm a little fuzzy on this and Gene started to 


jump in, I hope he's got some more details, 


more than I do. I know that some of the data 


was taken by Los Alamos, and then it was 


obtained by Colorado Department of Public 


Health -- maybe -- maybe Ruttenberger, I don't 


know. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm fairly familiar with all of 


this, so --

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 DR. ULSH: Gene, do you have more details to 


offer on that? 


 MR. POTTER: I just was going to jump in with 


the observation that it wouldn't technically be 


correct to call it derived from HIS-20. It 


would have been a prior -- a predecessor of 


HIS-20, probably the health sciences database, 


given the timing of when the CEDR studies were 


done. But that still doesn't explain why high 


results would not be in there. 

MS. BRACKETT: This is Liz Brackett. I 

actually have the CEDR catalog in my lap. It 

says that annual readings of whole body 

penetrating dose for external ionizing 

radiation are available from 1961 to 1989. The 

data from August 1976 through December 1989 


were taken from computerized dosimetry badge 


readings provided by RFP. Data from 1952 to 


1978 were abstracted from microfiche records 


also provided by the RFP. I -- there must be 


another place for internal because what it says 


here -- well, it doesn't say exactly where it 


came from, it just says the second file 


contains internal exposure data for americium 


and plutonium but not uranium. Exposures are 

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listed by sample date and percent of maximum 


permissible body burden -- which we have more 


than that, so I'm going to see if I can find 


another study in here. But it indicates that 


not all of the external data were taken from a 


database. The early years were from 


microfiche. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I wonder if it wouldn't be 


beneficial to have Donna Kragle* speak to the 


working group about CEDR and the contents of 


the data for Rocky Flats, because -- I could 


speak to it, but I'm not confident that I know 


all there is to know about it. I will share 


what I know here, and that is that I believe it 


to be the case that all of the protocoled epi 


studies that were done on a given site, like 


Rocky Flats, when Laurie Wiggs* was at Los 


Alamos doing these kinds of studies, the data 


that she used in a study had to be entered into 


CEDR. So right there I have a problem because 


typically those studies only looked at white 


males. They didn't look at everybody. They 


didn't even bother to identify, in most cases, 


who was not monitored. They looked at 


monitored people. Okay? So that's my 

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perception -- that's what I think I understand 


about CEDR. 


I also think that CEDR -- there's two versions 


of CEDR. There's a de-identified version of 


CEDR that anybody in the general public can get 


access to if they get a password and get 


approval from -- from -- I guess it's DOE and 


ORAU -- to use this information, publicly. And 


then there is identified data. The identified 


data, I believe -- and Donna would have to, you 


know, correct me if I'm wrong here or expound 


upon this, bring accuracy to it, but I believe 


there's more -- they put more information from 


a given site in a de-i-- in an identified form 


in the identified database. And so what the 


public only sees is the protocoled study data. 


And I think what you're seeing -- I think what 


we're seeing, what we're tapping into in the 


identified -- identifiable database is perhaps 


more than the study protocol, but I don't know 


how much more. So maybe we need to get Donna 


to speak about this. 


MS. BRACKETT: Actually I can speak to this a 


little bit more. This is Liz Brackett again. 


You're right, and when we say CEDR, we're 

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actually not being technically correct. What 


we're using is the --


 MR. GRIFFON: CER. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- CER database, which is -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: CER database, which is the -- 


MS. BRACKETT: Right, which is the one you're 


talking about that still has the identifiers. 


That's the original one collected by the 


epidemiologists. It's not the one that 


actually ended up in the CEDR database that was 


de-identified. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I would say we should be careful 


with the term CEDR because pe-- to CEDR -- to 


people on the outside, that means something 


different than CER. 


MS. BRACKETT: Right -- you're right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We should probably stick with 


CER, and we should have Donna Kragle speak to 


us about the contents of CER. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, yeah, we probably got a 


little sloppy with that early on and we just 


kept it through the matrices, but yeah, we know 


it's CER. The real question is why would CER ­

- the CER database ever have more than HIS-20, 


and that's the one we can't -- that's the -- 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, maybe she could help us out 


with that, I don't know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe, yeah. I could see it 


having less if it were only white males or only 


-- you know. I could certainly see it being 


truncated, but I can't -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Does HIS-20 proclaim to have all 


of the data ever, or does CER proclaim to have 


more than --


 MR. GRIFFON: HIS-20 was -- was presented to me 


as the prim-- more primary source. Now Gene's 


saying that -- that the predecessor of that 


might have been really where CER was derived 


from, but you know, the reason -- going down 


that path, the reasoning was -- the coworker 


model's based on CER, probably because you had 


access to that more readily than the other one. 


It took a little longer to get in the door or 


whatever. So then instead of redoing the whole 


model, they -- they -- NIOSH/ORAU team made an 


argument that it doesn't really matter, we 


don't need to redo all this, they're pretty 


close in what they're going to end up with as 


results. So --


MS. BRACKETT: When we started on this project 

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we were told that we could not have access to 


site databases. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. BRACKETT: That's why we were using -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- what we could from CER. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, so I understand why that 


happened, but then when we asked about it, 


people told me fine, we'll compare it to the 


primary source, which was presented to me as 


HIS-20. Now if that's the primary source, how 


is it missing -- you know, so I -- I think 


we've been over this ground, but -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, would it help to have 

Donna? 

 MR. GRIFFON: It may if we ask her that 

specific question. Maybe Brant can -- you 


know. 


 DR. ULSH: Maybe I'll just talk to Donna and -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Just talk to Donna and if she can 


give us something -- give the working group 


something --


 MR. GRIFFON: If she can shed some light, 


that'd be great, yeah, yeah. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: -- that'd be fine. She doesn't 


have to be physically present and verbalizing 


answers. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: Where are we, Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, where are we. I think 


we're done with log books. Right? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Bio-break. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, we've got a request for a biobreak. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. All right. We're all 


going to go leave some bio-- no. Why don't we 


take a ten-minute break if that's okay -- 


comfort break, ten minutes. Be back at --


 DR. WADE: Yeah, we'll stay on the line. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- 3:25. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:15 p.m. 


to 3:25 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: This is the conference room. We're 


just about ready to start. Let me ask what 


Board members are on the call -- on the line. 


 MR. GIBSON: Mike Gibson. 


 DR. WADE: Any other Board members? 


 (No responses) 


Is Wanda with us? 

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 (No response) 


Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We're back live? 


 DR. WADE: We're ready, we're live. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I think -- one thing I 


wanted to mention before we -- we've got 


hopefully just a -- just a few items left. 


They might be fairly large, but just a few 


items left. Before I -- I go into -- I just 


wanted to -- to touch on one point. Arjun 


reminded me on the break, the -- the analys-- I 


wanted to at least put this out as an action 


for SC&A that the analysis that was done on the 


percentages that Brant mentioned, the 


percentages of raw records, the number of data 


points you matched against the HIS-20 database, 


the raw records, et cetera -- 


 DR. ULSH: This is Craig Little's? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is that Craig Little's analysis 


where --


 MR. FITZGERALD: That was mentioned earlier. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It's also mentioned in your -- in 


your SEC evaluation report. I don't know if -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think you're right. I think 


we did pull stuff out of Craig's analysis and 

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put it into there. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, so I would -- I would ask 


if SC&A can, you know, re-look at that in light 


of what we know now about the claimants' files 


and -- between last meeting and this meeting I 


know SC&A has spent a little time, and I -- I 


looked at some of the claimants' files to 


understand better what -- what kind of data 


covered different time periods and, you know, I 


was curious how much raw data for the 


urinalysis side was in the claimants' files. 


And it -- you know, as I said earlier, I -- I 


generally concluded that, you know, in the late 


'60s it kind of all went to printout data, 


which is what we're hear-- you know, it makes 


sense now that we're hearing from Gene that's 


the -- sort of what happened. They rolled over 


into an electronic system. So we -- we had 


some questions about those claimants' files, 


but I'd ask you to include that with your 


analysis. You know, re-look at that issue and 


see if you -- you know, I think that's one 


piece that NIOSH is offering for the 


reliability of the -- the data. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Completeness of claimant 

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files. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Is Craig Little's report on the 


O drive somewhere or in a site? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it was presented at the 


March workgroup meeting, but I -- 


 DR. ULSH: I know I talked --


 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) handout or 


what. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Could you e-mail it to me, 


please? 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm sorry, what --


 DR. ULSH: I've got to e-mail Craig Little's 


analysis to --


 MR. FITZGERALD: If you could send it to 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: -- SC&A. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you. 


SAFETY REPORTS


 MR. GRIFFON: And then -- so now we can move on 


to another item, under data reliability still, 


but this is the review of the safety reports, 


and I think --


 DR. ULSH: Mark, if I could make a brief 

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request. Before we get into that, this will 


make sense in a little bit, I think -- I just 


wanted to go over something that I got from the 


petitioners. It was an e-mail from the 


petitioners back in February. This was after 


one of our working group meetings and they sent 


a list of 13 questions, one of which dealt with 


coworker data -- the question specifically 


asked about extremity data, but this would also 


apply I think to deep dose, and I'd like to 


just maybe discuss this for just a second. 


 Coworker data for extrem-- this is the question 


that the petitioners asked. (Reading) Coworker 


data for extremities is not an accurate way to 


estimate a person's dose. In particular with 


plutonium, proximity is the key. One worker 


may get a lot of exposure during a work 


evolution and others may get minimal, and you 


have no way of telling -- telling this much 


later, whether the worker you are looking at 


had this -- had his hands in the gloves or was 


closest to the source, or if he was sitting in 


a chair around the corner writing work notes. 


In D&D sometimes the coworker in the same job 


class was not even in the pod area of the 

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building but was assigned the responsibility of 


being on the outside to get the tools, 


materials, parts and run paperwork approvals 


for the job. 


So the point that they're making here -- and 


actually I think they're very good points -- 


you can't -- you have to be very careful when ­

- if you've got an unmonitored worker or a 


worker for whom the monitoring is suspect, you 


have to be very careful about assigning another 


individual worker's dose to that person. I'm 


not saying it can't ever be done, but you have 


to really be careful about how you do that. 


And so I thought that was a good point. 


Now I think that this demonstrates a 


misunderstanding of how we do coworker data, 


and that was my response to the question, that 


that's -- these are good points, that's exactly 


the reason that NIOSH doesn't take individual 


coworker data. We take a claimant-favorable 


percentile of all the monitored workers at the 


site. I mean I think -- I think everyone 


around the table can agree that these are valid 


points that the petitioner is raising. I mean 


I don't hear any disagreements with that. 

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Right? And so I think it makes sense that, you 


know, we also acknowledge that and -- and 


that's why we take, you know, the 95th 


percentile of the entire monitored population. 


 Now -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Part -- part of that is just 


expediency, too. I mean you're --


 DR. ULSH: Exactly. Yeah, if --


 MR. GRIFFON: If you had a good -- you know, if 


you had a larger group of all pipe fitters from 


one building, I think you might consider that 


population --


 DR. ULSH: Exactly. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- as more representative, so -- 


 DR. ULSH: Exactly, sure, we could do that. 


DR. MAURO: But on a one-on-one, that's -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't want to be led -- I don't 


want to be led down a path too far here. 


 DR. ULSH: Like I'm saying --


 MR. GRIFFON: I got a feel -- leading --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, yeah, yeah, a little bit. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I was going to object to leading 


here. 


 DR. ULSH: There's a reason -- and you're 


right, Mark, there's a reason -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know. 


 DR. ULSH: But I do think that these are valid 


points. You've got to be very, very cautious 


about assigning one particular worker's dose to 


another worker. 


 And now here's the leading part, Mark. Moving 


on into the safety concerns, we have -- just to 


give you a brief history on these safety 


concerns and how these developed, SC&A 


originally became aware of these documents, 


these safety concern documents -- and this was 


a mechanism for workers to raise particular 


issues that they were concerned about and get 


management response from them. And the 


earliest date that we can find -- we think this 


mechanism came into existence in about 1970, so 


SC&A originally identified six or seven -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Seven. 


 DR. ULSH: -- seven that they were initially 


interested in and I performed an analysis on 


those -- an evaluation of those, and then it 


was also suggested that we get the database of 


all the safety concerns that we could find, go 


through and look at the brief descriptions of 


those and identify other safety concerns that 

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might be of interest. 


Well, there were about 5,000 we found, spanning 


1970 up through -- I don't even know when the 


last one was, 2000 something-or-other. But I 


went through an initial pass and identified 33 


of them that I thought looked to be of interest 


from a data integrity/data reliability 


standpoint. And I prepared an analysis of most 


of those 33, I think there might be one or two 


still left outstanding, and I sent that over -- 


sent that out to the distribution, the working 


group and SC&A -- oh, I think it was earlier 


this week, maybe Monday. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: A few days ago. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, a few days ago. But in the 


meantime, SC&A has looked at my evaluations for 


the first six or seven that they were initially 


concerned with, and I think SC&A concurred with 


my evaluation on five of those, but there were 


two that they had some problems with my 


evaluation. And so I'd like to maybe address 


those -- those two particular ones. 


Okay, let me make sure I've got the right ones 


here. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: This is on page two of this 

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handout --


 DR. ULSH: Thank you, that's a big help. 


 MS. MUNN: Are these the issues that were 


covered in your e-mail day before yesterday, 


Brant? 


 DR. ULSH: Day before yesterday -- I think it 


was actually Monday, Wanda, Mon-- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Monday, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Anyway. 

 DR. ULSH: Yeah, this is matrix item 30. 

 MS. MUNN: Ah, okay. 

 DR. ULSH: Okay. I'm going to go a little bit 

out of order. Concern -- safety concern 71-4 


is one of the ones that SC&A had a problem with 


my evaluation on. Here is the concern as 


expressed by the worker. (Reading) My film 


badge results for December of 1970 did not show 


the high level of neutron exposure which, 


according to instrument readings and film badge 


results of other monitor on the same special 


job, should have been expected. 


Okay. Now this is a concern that we have heard 


not only here, but it's been expressed often. 


This is one of the reasons that we frequently 


hear cited for workers distrusting their 

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dosimetry results. They have an impression 


from working in the field, based on postings 


of, you know, areas with dose rates, some of 


the doses that their coworkers got, that their 


dosimetry results don't accurately reflect the 


conditions that they experienced in the field. 


Now, as -- as the petitioner so eloquently laid 


out for us -- and I -- I've discussed this on a 


number of occasions in previous working group 


meetings, it is not reasonable to assume de 


novo that my film badge results should be the 


same as a coworker's results. It's simply not 


reasonable to assume that under all conditions. 


Now we don't have a lot of specifics in this 


safety concern. We don't know the particular 


details about where these people were working 


when this concern arose. We don't know a lot 


of that -- a lot of those factors. The only 


way to determine whether or not you would 


expect two particular workers who worked on the 


same job to have similar dosimetry results 


would be a detailed time and motion study, and 


there is simply no way that we can go back and 


do that some 30, 35 years later. 


And so in my response to this safety concern, 

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71-4, I -- I laid out the arguments for this, 


that you wouldn't necessarily expect these two 


-- these two workers to have similar results. 


The fact that they had dissimilar results is 


not sufficient in and of itself to demonstrate 


a data integrity concern. And the petitioner 


themselves have made this point. You can't 


assign an individual coworker's -- I would say 


you have to be very careful about assigning an 


individual coworker's dosimetry results to an 


individual who has let's say suspect dosimetry 


results for exactly the reasons that the 


petitioner laid out. They may not be even in 


the same room. They may be different distances 


from the source. They may be doing entirely 


different duties, particularly for neutrons, 


which is what this one concerns. A very good 


shield for neutrons is any material that 


contains a lot of hydrogen, like human bodies. 


If -- if one worker is between another worker 


and the source, you cannot expect that both of 


those workers are going to have the same 


neutron doses. You simply cannot make that 


assumption without knowing the specific 


details. 

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263

 MR. FITZGERALD: On the other hand, though, I ­

- I, you know, certainly agree with you in 


terms of -- relatively speaking, if somebody 


has a -- you know, say has half the neutron 


dose or whatever of a fellow worker, but if 


somebody shows up with a zero -- this is kind 


of the issue we've been wrestling with -- if 


somebody shows up with a zero reading when a 


coworker has a positive reading or where 


there's a high area readings, that's a more -- 


seems a more difficult proposition, one that 


isn't sort of a question of maybe it was 


geometry, maybe it was, you know, shielding. 


But it sort of suggests that, you know, if this 


person has -- is working in the same work 


environment -- of course that's the issue is 


are you in the same work environment -- how 


could one have a zero versus a -- presumably a 


positive reading through dosimetry or from area 


monitoring. And we have enough cases like that 


that that's -- I think that's the reason -- 


Kathy, jump in any time you want -- that's the 


reason we're hesitant on this one because we've 


heard it before and we've heard the 


explanation. But in the case of a -- you know, 

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we're looking at the systemic question, you 


know, the question of not any particular 


individual but in general if you have a number 


of repeated readings where you have a high area 


reading and a high coworker reading but an 


individual has zero, not just simply a portion 


of that reading, and we're giving the worker 


the benefit of the doubt, I just think somehow 


there's got to be a way to corroborate that -- 


you know, this series of readings can be 


attributed, as you're saying, to simply a 


circumstance where you would expect to have 


different readings. Different, yes. Zero, I ­

- I guess I -- I kind of pause when that -- 


when we're talking about zeroes. That doesn't 


seem credible or plausible -- 


 DR. ULSH: Well, you make --


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- although there might be 


some specific instances where it's possible. 


 DR. ULSH: You're making a number of 


assumptions there, Joe, that I think go beyond 


the information that we have in this safety 


concern. It doesn't say that he had zero, and 


it doesn't really say what dose -- what neutron 


exposure his coworker had. It could have been 

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-- I don't know what the -- what the limit of 


detection on neutron dosimeters was at that 


time. I don't know, but let's throw out a 


number, let's just say 40 millirem. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: One guy has 40 -- 45 millirem. The 


coworker's -- the guy with the concern comes 


back zero. All you know is that it's less than 


the detection limit. It could be 38. We don't 


know. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Do we have -- we don't have the 


names of these people? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, we do. I don't want to say 


them out loud. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, no, but I'm just saying I 


think -- I think --


 DR. ULSH: We have the name of the individual 


who filed the safety concern. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Filed the safety concern -- 


 DR. ULSH: We don't have the name of the 


coworker. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and do we have some tracking 


on that safety concern and the job that they 


did. A couple of the explanations that you 


gave, Brant, are not applicable to this safety 

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concern 'cause they said it was the same job at 


the same place. So the shielding part may be ­

- they said it was the same job. Right? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: But that may be interpreted, 


Arjun, as they were working on the same 


project. Maybe not -- they didn't have the 


same functions. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It says the same special job. 


 DR. ULSH: It says (reading) My film badge 


results of other monitor -- I assume that's a 


typo -- other monitors on the same special job 


should have been expected. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: But again, you don't know the 


details of -- of this in terms of -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I don't know the details. 


All I'm saying is that -- that the -- the two 


things -- and this -- this should be done in 


the other cases, too, the -- the famous eight 


rad stacker thing --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, we'll get to him. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- where we've come across the 


same issue, is we -- we need to -- we need to 


go back to the original record, if possible, of 


the people involved and look at their doses -- 

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especially here -- and then if possible just 


talk to the person as to -- as to what they 


were doing. It -- it should -- if -- if that 


is possible. 


DR. MAURO: I would take a different tact. If 


I were trying to -- to convince this person 


that everything is fine, I would go back and 


say well, we -- we looked at your exposure 


records for these five or six months -- let's 


say it's a monthly -- were these monthly? -- or 


whatever they were, and then -- and his -- and 


his friend, his buddy, and look at him. And 


say by the way, the previous month you got the 


dose and he didn't. 


 DR. ULSH: We don't know who his buddy is. 


DR. MAURO: He -- he won't tell us? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, all I'm saying is the safety 


concern -- we don't have -- we don't know who 


it is, it's not named. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: It's not in the documentation. 


DR. MAURO: You see what I'm getting at? 


Again, it's -- it's sort of like if I were him 


and I -- I could easily see me being that 


person, and if -- and if you -- I asked you is 


this -- what do you do to convince me that 

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everything's okay, I would say oh, yeah, and 


the month before that it went the other way. 


Other words, we -- you weren't -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: You know, and I would say oh, okay, 


and that would be the end of it -- if I was 


him. I would be convinced with that. Now I 


don't know whether that's true, but that's 


something that could be done. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: The thing (unintelligible) we're 


trying to convince him that everything's okay, 


and if we can convince him, then for all 


intents and purposes, we have also convinced 


ourselves. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, again, the only way to answer 


this definitively is, like I said, to have a 


detailed time and motion study so you would 


know whether or not to expect them to have the 


same results. It could be that the month 


before they were doing totally different jobs. 


DR. MAURO: I don't think you can do that. 


 DR. ULSH: I know you can't. That's my point. 


DR. MAURO: I wouldn't even try to do that. 


 MS. MUNN: Brant -- Brant --

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) a detailed 


time and motion study (unintelligible) straw 


man. We know it can't be done. The -- but --


but you can try to locate this person and -- 


pick up the phone and call them and see who the 


buddy was --


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and what was the evolution 


of this and go back -- try to go back to their 


records. Now if you can't, you can't, and you 


can't actually take it farther than the 


argument that you've done -- that we're doing 


at this table. But I think it is possible to 


take it considerably farther, simply by 


identifying these two people and going to their 


dose records. 


 MS. MUNN: I can hardly hear you, Arjun. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, you're in the -- you're in the 


(unintelligible) now, too. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Can you hear me now? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I can hear you better now. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm sorry, I was hiding behind 


my computer screen. I said that most of this 


can be addressed by identifying the two people 


and going to their dose records. We know who 

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one of them is, so --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I -- we can look at the -- I 


can very easily go to this particular badge 


exchange cycle and tell you what the dose was 


for this individual named in the safety 


concern. In terms of identifying his buddy, 


well, number one -- I mean yeah, we -- it's a 


question of how far we're going to pull the 


string here, and I think we need to look 


further down the road and see what these things 


that you're proposing are going to get us. 


Let's say we talk to the guy who filed the 


safety concern -- if he's still alive and we 


can locate him, we could try to contact him. 


We could say tell me where you were in 1970 


when you filed this, tell me who -- who this 


person is that you're concerned about. Then we 


track -- try to locate that person. At the end 


of it, you might be left with -- you've got -- 


okay, best case scenario, you've got two rad 


files. Now what are you going to find in the 


rad file? You're going to find the 


individual's dosimetry results for these time 


periods. It might be exactly what you say, 


John. The month before, they were -- 

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DR. MAURO: Reversed. 


 DR. ULSH: -- they were reversed. But even 


there we don't know if they were on the same 


jobs at that time. 


DR. MAURO: It may turn out they're not 


reversed. 


 MS. MUNN: The bottom line is, no one can make 


a valid assessment without more information 


than is given in the safety concern. 


 DR. ULSH: And given that, I think then -- I 


think we can all agree with that point. Given 


that, my question is how far does the working 


group want us to pursue this, particular -- 


this particular example. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: If I could make one comment on 


this, it strikes me we're -- we're sort of in 


that boat (unintelligible) reminds me of the 


discussion on the '69 data -- missing data. 


You know, certainly on one end of the scale you 


can deal with reasoned hypotheses. Okay, we've 


gone through a series of hypotheses to explain 


why we're seeing the phenomena or the zeroes 


that we're seeing in '69, for example. You can 


go to the other extreme. In this case we're 


talking about, you know, the impractical time 

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and motion studies. In '69 I'm sure there's 


another very comparable extreme you could go to 


to nail that to the ground. But I don't think 


any of us are talking about that. We're saying 


is there anything beyond a reasoned hypothesis 


as the response to some of these fundamental 


issues raised in data reliability. And if you 


can take it, you know, one step further than 


the hypothesis, meaning a reasoned judgment 


without any corroborating facts, then I think, 


you know, we should take a hard look at what is 


that intermediary step or something that's 


further than the hypothesis. And in this case 


I think it's certainly possible maybe to go and 


get a little bit additional data. Otherwise I 


agree with what Wanda's saying. You know, if 


you are operating in the confines of the safety 


concern, all you have is a hypothesis, which, 


you know, for purposes of the context of an SEC 


discussion, you know, I think we have to really 


scratch our heads and decide if that's 


sufficient. It may be necessary, but is it 


sufficient. So I don't know. 


 MS. MUNN: But Joe, my -- my concern with 


SC&A's failure to accept this explanation lies 

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partly in the resolution that was given at the 


time, that the employee's supervisor talked to 


the employee about this and the indication is 


that the employee was satisfied with the 


discussion afterwards and understood what had 


likely transpired. Then it's difficult for me 


to understand why this is becoming a flashpoint 


for us in disagreement now, especially since I 


-- I do not even know whether this individual 


is a claimant. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Again, I don't -- that's why I -- 


I asked that we consider some of this stuff in 


aggregate rather than one -- picking apart one 


case at a time. That -- you know, we can pick 


apart most of these cases individually, but I 


think if you've got -- we've got a number of -- 


of concerns expressed in different forms, in 


safety reports and affidavits, et cetera -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- about the data and the fact 


that their -- their record was less than they 


believed they received. And you know, I -- I 


think my -- you know, this question of -- I 


think you have to go back to -- I do like the ­

- the -- and I know you're going to get to the 

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stacker-loader case, but I mean I think that 


the workers do have -- did have a sense of the, 


quote/unquote, hot areas when they were working 


in them. And --


 MS. MUNN: They certainly should have. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, and especially the RCTs, 


so you know, when -- when -- when that RCT 


expressed a concern about their exposure and 


gave some very specifics about the fields in 


the area, I think just to kind of pick that one 


apart and dispose of it, I wonder if that's 


appropriate, especially if we're getting a 


number of these. So I would -- I would say 


let's -- that's why my approach more is to step 


back, given all these concerns expressed. 


We've laid out this methodology to test the 


reliability of the data used in all the claims 


cases, and -- and you're not necessarily 


responding to any individual claimant's file 


when you're testing the claimant data available 


for the Rocky Flats site in general. You know, 


that -- that's how I've been kind of 


envisioning it instead of -- I can -- you know, 


again, I agree with Joe that, you know, you can 


hypothesize what might have transpired in each 

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individual case, why a dose might be different 


for two coworkers, et cetera. But given --


given the level of interest expressed in the 


petition and elsewhere on this issue, I think 


the answer is NIOSH is taking this very 


seriously and wants to address the overall 


reliability of all data being used in -- in all 


claims cases -- in a general sense, to make 


sure there's no systemic problems. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm glad to hear you say that. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah, yeah, I think -- 

 MR. ELLIOTT: 'Cause we can have infinite 

scenarios, we're running around trying to 


figure out what happened. 


 MR. GRIFFON: These were useful to express the 


-- the -- the specifics of the concerns. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I think -- you know, the tension 


here, as I see it, we -- we want to be 


responsive and address the affidavit 


allegations that have come forward. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: But --


 MR. GRIFFON: We can't answer each case. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- we can't answer every one 


because there'll be a host behind each one of 

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those --


 MR. GRIFFON: I agree. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- that are going to expect a 


similar amount of effort. What -- what I hope 


we could do, same as what you just said your 


vision was, can we identify the salient issues 


here, the --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- categorically can we put those 

together --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- and knock them down as a 

category or say no, there is something there, 


there's a problem there, and the problem -- and 


it goes back to we have to rub off what we are 


doing here against the -- the acid test is 


there -- is there a data reliability issue that 


prevents NIOSH from achieving sufficiently 


accurate dose reconstruction. Is there -- is 


there a data reliability issue here that 


presents an inability for us to cap the dose -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: Is there --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- for an SEC petition -- 


 MS. MUNN: -- a pervasive --

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 MR. GRIFFON: And it goes --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- or for a group of workers. 


 MS. MUNN: -- systemic (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- it goes back to -- I mean I -- 


maybe -- maybe in the workgroup process we've ­

- we've missed -- misled -- I don't know, I 


didn't think --


 MR. ELLIOTT: No, no, I don't --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- but I think we wanted to be 


responsive to all the concerns expressed in the 


petition, but that didn't mean that each one 


had to have an individual response, you know, 


that you can -- some of these are very similar, 


and I think grouping them makes sense. And you 


know, I think a response that a lot of these 


people -- I mean, you know, we -- we had 


Jennifer Thompson on the phone -- I'm getting 


confused now what day, but about her particular 


case, and basically she said, again, this is 


not about me and my 54 millirem that I think 


was missed or whatever -- or missing or 


whatever was the issue with the 54 millirem. 


just bring this up as an example of what I've 


heard from other people that were represen-- 


you know, that she has named petitioners 


I 
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representing. So I think NIOSH's response 


should address the broad issue, not every 


specific claim. And hopefully you can -- you 


can sort of -- in those -- in those responses 


you can reference the individual affidavits 


that were brought out in the petition and say, 


you know, this is in response to, you know, 


this list of people that have, you know, 


concerns about this kind of issue, not that 


you're looking at each individual case -- 


'cause I think you could go down that path 


forever and you're never going to satisfy 


those, either, so... 


 DR. ULSH: So -- so Mark, just to clarify then, 


I -- I understand what you're saying. With 


regard to this particular safety concern, Mark 


and Wanda and Mike and Bob, if you're out 


there, do you want to see more action on this 


or do --


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: We want to see more 


action -- this is Kathy -- from a general 


sense, and that's why I felt it was applicable 


to the SEC petition. If you -- if the workers 


don't believe that their -- their dosimetry 


results, in general, then explain to them why 

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they were zero. And you -- and -- and you've 


got the explanation in your head because you 


just stated it at the beginning of this issue. 


 DR. ULSH: It's in the evaluation that I 


prepared for the -- for the safety concerns. 


mean I -- I laid this out in my evaluation of 


this particular safety concern. And so my 


question then is --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- given what you've just said, do 


you want me to pursue this further or just 


address the more general issues. That's what 


I'm asking. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I --


 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: You want me to vote, 


Mark? 


 DR. WADE: No, this is not your question. 


DR. MAURO: No, this is -- this is a Board 


question. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: My personal preference would be to 


address the general issue, because this is not 


even a site-specific issue. This is a complex-


wide issue, and the issue is essentially always 


the same. My badge doesn't look like -- my 


I 
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badge readings do not give me the same report 


as I believe my coworker received. And this is 


not going to be an issue that's going to go 


away. If we cannot adequately address it, then 


we need to say we can't adequately address it. 


I believe that we can, and I believe that -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: You believe that we can -- can't 


hear you, Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: -- (unintelligible) reasonably good 


job of beginning to do that. 


 DR. WADE: Say we believe she -- we can and 


we're doing a reasonably good job of beginning 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- my opinion is I don't 


want you to look at all these individual cases 


to prove back -- I don't know that I would say 


don't look at any of them, but I would say 


don't look -- certainly we don't want to look 


at all. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, the --


 MR. ELLIOTT: So we may look at -- we may -- 


Brant may look at some -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Pull the string on a few -- 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- in order to --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- on a few that -- that --
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 MR. ELLIOTT: -- to show other -- in defense of 


-- of what we've done or to support -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- what is being alleged. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. ULSH: Okay. So given then that -- I know 


you guys haven't had time to review this yet -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you may have done that to 


some extent already, the -- the stacker-


retriever person, that string has been pulled 


quite a bit, so that -- that's a -- that's a 


prime example I think 'cause there's a lot of 


rich information in that affidavit and -- 


 DR. ULSH: Very specific information we can 


check. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Very specific, right, right. So 


that's the kind of one that I think might be 


fruitful to pull the string a little bit. But 


otherwise, I agree with Wanda. I want to -- we 


have to answer the general question. You know, 


is the data reliable, as best as we can check 


and determine, you know, over the course of 


time at Rocky 'cause this covers the whole span 


in Rocky Flats, the petition, over the course 


of time for all areas, is the data reliable. 

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That's the question we have to focus on. 


 DR. ULSH: And when you're saying address that 


more general issue, it deals with the things 


we've already talked about -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: All those --


 DR. ULSH: -- the log books, things -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- all those columns that we're 


talking about, log books, urinalysis books, et 


cetera. 


 DR. ULSH: And I know you haven't had a chance 


to review the evaluation of the first 33 safety 


concerns. I will prepare a similar evaluation 


for the next 16 that SC&A -- have we already 


talked about that today? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah -- no, those --


 DR. ULSH: SC&A also proposed 16 additional 


ones to look at in a similar manner to the way 


that we've done the first 33, and I'll go ahead 


and do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And if -- I don't know -- I asked 


this during the break, but is there -- are 


there categories of these things? I mean one 


category here is -- is they don't believe the 


dose they were assigned. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, another one -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: That probably covers several 


people. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- neutron blackening, what -- 


I think that's something he actually sent us a 


e-mail on. 


DR. MAURO: This is a very, very important 


conversation we're having right now. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, it is. 


DR. MAURO: I think -- I think we're finally 


star-- it's emerging from the process and this 


is the way it's supposed to be. What's emerged 


from this process is the realization that we're 


not going to chase -- and we really -- there is 


no -- there's no great value to chase every 


allegation on a particular case. When they 


come in, we -- the process is to use that as a 


way to start to categorize areas of inquiry 


that have broad-base implications regarding 


data reliability. It's a process. We actually 


are now building a process. The light just 


went on, 'cause I don't know if you recall, 


there was a time that I was sort of thinking 


different. I was thinking well, you know, we 


have an obligation to these individuals to try 


to help -- no, I -- I was just convinced the 

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way you said -- use these individual cases -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think we have a obligation to 


be responsive, but --


DR. MAURO: Yeah -- yeah, but --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- the way you respond is 


different, right. 


DR. MAURO: -- I mean -- yeah, responsive, but 


not the way --


 MR. GRIFFON: And I apologize if I haven't been 


clear with that. That's kind of the way I've 


been seeing it for a while. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah -- no, no, I -- I think that 


there's a process that just emerged from here 


which is -- which will satisfy the individual 


affidavit, but in the process of satisfying 


that, we're going to satisfy the other thousand 


that go along with that, that are -- that -- 


and I think that that's how it -- you know, 


that's how we'll build -- this emerged right 


from this conversation when a light just 


started to go off in my head. 


MR. MEYER: You know, if this is a complex-wide 


issue -- which a lot of these probably are, a 


number of them are, as Wanda had said -- it's 


probably up to the Board to establish the 

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category --


DR. MAURO: Absolutely. 


MR. MEYER: -- and the specific example that 


maybe each group has to track on their own, but 


-- or maybe it's just track once, I'm not sure. 


 DR. WADE: And the Board has -- to the Board -- 


the Board did have a work-- working group that 


looked at this -- this broad issue of criteria 


to be considered when evaluating an SEC 


petition, and it was NIOSH's burden then to 


present. So I think that work has already been 


done. I think in each individual petition, 


based upon the petition itself and based upon 


the digging that SC&A does, certain issues 


emerge. Clearly for Rocky Flats, data 


reliability is an issue, and these are some of 


the characteristics of the issue and it needs 


to be addressed. The Board has provided 


guidance and the working group guidance. In 


some cases it doesn't raise as high as an 


issue, but in this case it has, and the 


petition does it and the SC&A report did it. 


And I think now it needs to be put to bed, but 


it needs to be put to bed systemically. You 


can't chase these things. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: If it's a general issue across 


sites, but it's not -- in the context of its 


issue at a given site, it can be different. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: You've already pointed that out. 


Y-12 was substantially different in doing what 


we were doing than we are here at Rocky. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I was going to say it takes a 


little different form on each -- each place we 


go. Mallinckrodt --


 MS. MUNN: It was, but the basic question was 


the same. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And I would say at Rocky 


you're going to have certain categories that'll 


be very distinct and you're going to hear those 


issues perhaps more frequently. I think this 


one about zeroes and presumed places of high 


exposure and blackening of badges, for example, 


are two that you hear repeated fairly often. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I agree. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And there's going to be some 


others that will be very infrequently you'll -- 


you know, so I think certainly those broad 


areas need to be --

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 MR. ELLIOTT: And certainly those broad areas 


have perhaps the most impact if -- if they 


become, you know, an issue -- in capping dose 


or in reconstructing dose -- that -- that 


covers a breadth of the claimant population. 


DR. MAURO: And this is going to carry over to 


other sites. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: This process we're building right 


now is going to carry over to other sites. 


This is -- this is important. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a procedural question 


about -- and maybe Dr. Wade or Lar-- Larry, you 


could illuminate this -- is the -- in the 


specific instance, NIOSH, in the process of, 


you know, evalu-- qualifying the SEC petition, 


elicited more information from the petitioners. 


And a very large part of what we're dealing 


with is -- it's 500 or 700-odd pages -- is the 


information that was given by the petitioner in 


response to NIOSH's request, which consists 


primarily of these affidavits. And I agree, 


you know, some of these individual things at 


the anecdotal level don't resolve the larger 


issue, even if you trace them down. But if you 

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do it in the reverse, if you say okay, we've 


looked at the 90 percentiles and that was okay 


for Y-12; in Y-12 we didn't have affidavits 


from individual petitioners, what is -- what's 


the bar in terms of responding to the petition, 


especially procedurally. So I may be, as a 


scientist, satisfied that the quantity of data 


available is okay and the integrity of the 


data, you know, it matches in sufficient 


numbers. How do you go back from that and 


speak to the SEC petition, especially when 


NIOSH has elicited the information? That's --


that's part of the reason why I've been feeling 


a value in this process in this particular 


case, whereas it didn't come up in Y-12, is 


because we've got these affidavits in the 


petition. And so it's a little bit 


procedurally difficult. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think -- isn't -- isn't 


part of the reason you have all these 


affidavits is 'cause you did go back -- I mean 


went back and asked for more information to 


support certain claims within the original 


petition -- right? Is that -- is that correct, 


or -- I'm not sure of the history -- 

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 MS. JESSEN: Can I step in here? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MS. JESSEN: This is Karin. In the original 


petition there were statements from different 


workers that had made their statements, but in 


the rule it does say that if you're going to 


make those statements you do have to provide an 


affidavit. So in the second group of things 


that came in from the petitioner, the 500 


pages, most of those pieces of information from 


the workers that were in the first petition, if 


you will, showed up in the second petition as 


an affidavit. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. JESSEN: So a lot of the information was 


the same, it was just the behind-the-scenes 


paperwork --


 MR. ELLIOTT: The formality of it. 


 MS. JESSEN: -- the formality that we needed 


the affidavit. There were several additional 


items that were provided regarding the second 


petition that came in, or the piece of 


information that came in, but there -- there 


was some overlap. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That's absolutely --

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 MR. GRIFFON: That's a good clarification, 

yeah. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- right on, but I think Arjun 

raises a very good point, because this petition 


and the fact that we have these affidavits -- 


heavily loaded with affidavit concerns -- 


 MS. JESSEN: I think there's like 22. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah -- how do we go about, you 


know, responding to those -- to those 


individuals. They've had -- they have some 


ownership here. They've vested themselves this 


way. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's a good point. 


 MS. JESSEN: And one of the things that I would 


like to clarify, in the evaluation report we 


did respond generically, if you will, to the 


concerns that were brought up by the petitioner 


in the affidavits. That was responded to in 


the petition (sic). One of them was lead 


aprons, the other one -- I don't remember all 


of them -- inaccurate exposure, but you know, 


the whole thing. All of the issues were 


addressed as presented in the petition, and we 


did respond to that in a general way, which was 


NIOSH's job to do -- because remember, we're 

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looking at a class and we're not looking at 


individuals. And we have pulled the thread and 


gone a little bit more with these 41 examples 


in the data integrity. We have -- we have done 


that. We have tracked back to that. So I 


think with regards to our discussion here, the 


evaluation report was presented in a way that 


NIOSH felt it should be presented based on the 


rule, and then with the working board, you 


know, requests, we have gone back and pulled 


some of the strings and answered those 


questions specifically. 


 DR. WADE: All right. Do you want to answer 


Arjun's -- or you want me to -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I'd like to go on a little 


bit and add to what Karin just said. I 


certainly think that our evaluation report had 


to take a stand or establish a position, and 


was already late. We were overdue. As we go 


into future evalua-- wasn't it late? 


 MS. JESSEN: No, it was --

 MR. ELLIOTT: No, it was not? 

 MS. JESSEN: -- it was early. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: It was early, okay. My -- I'm 

getting it mixed up with another one -- 

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 DR. WADE: We've been late enough. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm getting to the 180-day thing. 


As we get into petitions -- as we get into 


petitions with a 180-day time frame to turn 


around, we're not going to be able to dig as 


deeply as this working group has dug -- 


 MS. JESSEN: That's true. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- and SC&A has dug. 


 MS. JESSEN: That's true. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay? So that's up front. Now 


how do we respond to these affida-- I'm sorry, 


I got this one mixed up with another one in my 


mind that -- you know. Just to let y'all know, 


I'm monitoring this 180-day thing pretty 


closely, but I'm not on top of which ones are 


going through the system (unintelligible). But 


how do we respond? You know, I think certainly 


this -- this whole deliberation of the working 


group -- and SC&A's efforts as well 


contributing to that -- is one way that we -- 


we speak to these issues. We have a 


transcript. We are on the record. But that 


doesn't get back, in my opinion. These folks 


are not going to pick up these transcripts. 


They're not going to listen in, as you can 

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tell, every day to these working group 


discussions. And so I think we owe -- at the 


end of the trail here, we owe the petitioners 


and those who contributed to the petition an 


explanation of what has been developed through 


this deliberative process and what 


understanding has been arrived at, whether it's 


the position we originally took in the 


evaluation report or whether that -- on a -- on 


a given issue, or whether that position has 


been modified because of the deliberative 


process. I think we have to go back. Now how 


that happens, I don't know that we have a clear 


sense -- in my mind or anybody else's mind -- 


yet how we -- how we make that happen. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, I mean I would add a little 


bit. I mean it -- and they're two separate 


issues. They're both important, but they're 


very separate. The primary issue that NIOSH is 


concerned with and the Board is concerned with 


now is that we have an SEC petition. We 


presented an evaluation report. We need to be 


sure that that evaluation report scientifically 


addresses the concerns as well as they can, and 


the Board will comment upon that. And that's 

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the primary activity. 


NIOSH is left with another burden, which is the 


burden of good communication to the people that 


it serves. That's even -- may be a greater 


challenge that we face is to -- how do we deal 


with these people who have raised these issues. 


How do we -- how do we allay their concerns and 


fears, and we need to work very hard on that, 


but it's separate and apart from the evaluation 


process. And I mean I think we have to -- we 


have to keep --


And the Board has to realize that its 


responsibility is to oversee the scientific 


quality of what NIOSH does and make a 


recommendation to the Secretary, and -- and 


that needs to be the focus of the Board's 


activity. 


 We welcome all the advice that you'll give us 


on how to deal with this communications dilemma 


that we have, but that's a separate issue than 


the issue of coming to the right evaluation 


report and the Board coming to its judgment. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We may never be responsive to 


everybody or allay anyone's concerns or fears, 


but we at least owe them an honest, frank, 

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candid communication about what has happened, 


what -- where we're at at the end of that 


trail. 


 DR. WADE: And I would also then add a little 


bit of editorializing. I think SC&A and the 


working group has served the process extremely 


well on both fronts, and yet you have to keep 


the issues separate. 


DR. MAURO: I've got one other -- another facet 


to this, and that is -- a model just took form 


in my head and I like when this happens. The 


idea that the --


 MR. GRIFFON: I think we do, too, John. We'll 


let you know in a second. 


DR. MAURO: Well, what I see is okay, good -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is this a tree with balloons? 


DR. MAURO: What we have here is that okay, 


these affidavits come out, the petition's out, 


and somehow imbedded in that we allow -- form ­

- something to take form. Okay. We're going 


to have to -- like -- as you pointed out, the 


blackened film badges, the lost film badges -- 


other words, you can start to just start to see 


-- what emerges -- you just have to sort them 


into categories, you've got a bunch of bins 

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now. Okay? And you say now if we could put 


each one of these bins to bed -- you know, we 


do two things. One, we've convinced ourselves 


that the data's reliable and second, probably 


in the process have convinced the -- the person 


who filed the affidavit there's good reason to 


believe that we've got this thing -- we 


understand it. But here's where we really are 


right now, and I don't think we realize we're 


at this place. We think somehow these -- these 


different categories of documents, these log 


books, the foreman's reports, these -- or the 


Kittinger report -- other words, we've got -- 


we -- what we have now is -- the real dilemma 


we have now is there's all of these categories 


of information that are recorded away, 


apparently vast amounts of information, and 


what we're -- I could see that we're struggling 


with is my God, how do we get at that stuff to 


help us say something intelligent about -- 


about each of the bins and where -- is there -- 


is there information in there is not -- I -- I 


think we're -- we're in a pro-- we're in what I 


would call a chaotic phase. I like -- I like ­

- we're in a chaotic phase right now. That's 

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okay. Whereby we're pulling -- we're pulling 


scope -- you know, different log books and 


we're looking at them, we try this, we see a 


title, let's pull it and see what it tells us 


and -- and it's almost like we -- we're not 


quite sure whether or not it's going to serve 


us well. And I think that's the part of the 


process we're in right now, and that's okay. 


I'll be frank, I think we're a little bit lost 


at sea in there somewhere. That is, where is 


this stu-- you know, is it going to help us. We 


don't know yet. But I think that when we're 


through with the process that you're in the 


middle of right now, and I guess, you know, 


some degree of frustration trying to find the 


gold inside this mountain. But when we're 


through with that, we're going to have -- we 


are going to have built a process that's going 


-- that -- that probably has an -- is going to 


be analogous to many other sites. So even 


though it's -- it's painful right now, I think 


we've got to go through this process and find 


out where -- where it takes us. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't see this data validation 


-- at least -- other than the individual cases, 

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I see it very similar to what we did at Y-12, 


for those of you who dug through records. 
I 


mean I -- you know, we did a lot of the same 


(unintelligible). 


 (Whereupon, transcription of comments by 


speakers at the table was rendered impossible 


due to telephone interference.) 


 DR. WADE: Okay, it went away. Wanda, are you 


there? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I am. 


 DR. WADE: Mike, are you there? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: Good. Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know, it's not like you have, 


you know, okay, here's our master set of raw 


records here and here's our electronic database 


here and we just have to samp-- you know, come 


up with a sampling strategy -- stratified 


sampling strategy and do it that way. It's not 


-- it's not -- we don't have that, so you have 


-- you have little bits and pieces and you get 


at it that way. We did the same thing at Y-12. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I was going to say, it wasn't 


clean in the beginning, though. Each site's a 


little different, and this site differs from Y­
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12 because when we went to the petitioners and 


went to the people that had the affidavits and 


allegations and said, you know, this did-- you 


know, we understand what you're saying, but 


there doesn't seem to be any corroborating 


evidence, where can we find this -- they 


weren't giving us anything, no documentation to 


back it up. They (unintelligible) the safety 


concerns log books, but not with any specific 


references. So to some extent we had a 


sampling issue from the very get-go, and I 


think that's where -- you know, where we are 


now. How do we sample this vast amount of 


information when they did not have a specific 


date, reference -- nothing, which is kind of 


surprising, but that's kind of where we are. 


 DR. WADE: But the other thing -- you know, I 


agree with everything except that it's okay. I 


mean you have to look at some other things. I 


mean there -- there's a great deal of pressure 


on us all to act in a timely way. I don't have 


to tell you that every week I'm reminded that 


people are dying while we do this. So we have 


to -- we have to decide how we want to approach 


this and it's -- it's not an easy process, and 

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I applaud the work that's been done to this 


point. But we just can't do it forever, so -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I'm saying. We -- we 


may -- you know, we may -- I guess we're -- you 


know, we learn as we go, but we may get a 


generic lesson out of this, which is that, you 


know, we really have to, you know, focus on the 


class and those issues rather than -- you know, 


these examples are great 'cause they're very -- 


well, you know, they sort of define the 


problem, you know. But then you have to step 


back and say okay, how does that affect the 


whole class, and I think we might have spent a 


little too much energy on -- on each individual 


-- maybe not -- maybe not. 


 DR. WADE: Three things happened -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Anyway --


 DR. WADE: Three things happened at Rocky 


Flats, it seems to me, but -- the nature of the 


petition itself, the history of the site in 


terms of the FBI and raids and all of the 


concerns. NIO-- I mean SC&A's initial digging 


in where they said there -- there's something 


here -- I mean that elevated it to the level 


where it's taken the attention that we've 

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brought to it, but we need to realize that 


while we're doing this, you know, literally 


there are people dying and -- and that's a 


concern --


 MR. ELLIOTT: It seems to me that if you look 


at our evaluation report and you look at 


Section 7.5 where we attend -- or attempt to 


attend and address the affidavit issues, the 


issues that are raised not only in the original 


petition, but then those that are -- come back 


and supported by affidavit, can we -- can we 


look at those in the context of -- of has 


anything changed from where we're at, from our 


evaluation report, to the work that has been 


done, the deliberation that's been given, would 


we modify anything that we have to say now, 


would we augment it, would we add to it, would 


we -- would we change our -- our thought, our 


position that is stated in that evaluation 


report. 


 MR. GRIFFON: See, that -- that's -- that's 


part of where I was going with the too much 


time spent on individual cases 'cause I think 


we've neglected the broader issues for a while 


and that's a little bit of my frustration 

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coming into this meeting is that some of the -- 


the tasks that I thought would be moved quite a 


bit further along have sat idle while other 


tasks have mushroomed into much bigger things 


than I ever thought they would be, so I -- I -- 


I don't know that we've changed. I'd have to 


look at that, but I -- I know a lot -- the 


other way --

 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I'm not saying that for 

you. I'm --

 MR. GRIFFON: No, no, I -- yeah, yeah --

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- saying that for NIOSH and the 

ORAU team. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I don't know that we would 

have made a persuasive argument to make you 


cha-- you know, for you to want to change that 


section yet, but I mean I think one big issue 


is the other radionuclides and we're still -- 


at this point haven't seen a report in front of 


us and that's a little bit of frustration on my 


-- you know, 'cause I feel that time pressure, 


too, especially coming into the Nevada meeting, 


you know, and having to face the petitioners 


again. 


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only hearing people say, you know, people dying 


all the time --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- you guys are debating this, 


but the other pressure I feel is making sure 


that we apply the resources that we have in 


NIOSH and the ORAU team appropriately and -- 


and I'm concerned, too, about the other 


radionuclides and where we're at and how much 


time can we spend on that given we're, you 


know, chasing down log books here, there and -- 


and trying to figure out what benefit or merit 


they have to answering a question on 


reliability. So you know, I think we need to 


have very clear guidance from the working 


group, from the Advisory Board, on how you want 


to approach this. How do you want us to 


proceed. What -- what -- you know, what focus 


do you want us to give a particular over-


arching issue, like data reliability. How do 


you want us to tackle that. How do you want us 


to tackle some of the other issues. That's 


where I'm at today. That's why I thought I'd 


better attend the meeting and see where we were 


going. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think we've -- I -- I 


feel like we have a reasonable path forward for 


the data reliability question. I feel like we 


shouldn't -- we haven't reviewed this safety 


concerns report, but I would say, as far as 


pulling the string on any individual case, I 


would definitely hold off on that at this 


point. If SC&A reviews this and finds one or 


two or something that, you know, they see some 


merit in pursuing further, then that -- you 


know, I would leave it open for that. But 


otherwise I would say we need to focus on the ­

- the log books and these other checks -- to 


check the reliability of the -- of the data 


within the claims files. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Speaks in a general sense to data 


reliability --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- but in a --

 MR. GRIFFON: And we haven't had --

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- specific sense to an 

individual's concern. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I -- you know, I hear 


people asking me well, what do you want us to 


do. Well, at the last meeting it was agreed 

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that NIOSH would come back and propose a 


methodology, and I was hoping that the 


methodology proposal would come between these 


two meetings via e-mail and then -- you know, 


so we wouldn't hold those up, but we haven't 


even got a methodology -- and I know Brant -- 


Brant's saying partially because, you know, 


they just haven't found a lot in the log books 


so they -- you know. 


DR. MAURO: Well, where we are now, we've got a 


thousand documents -- at least a thousand -- I 


mean --


MR. MEYER: It is, I just got the estimate back 


from Scott. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, now we've got a thousand 


(unintelligible) this important place, we're at 


a milestone as far as that, but we have a 


thousand documents that cover a broad range of 


activities and time periods at the facility. 


And in theory, imbedded in this -- and I don't 


even know how many pages a thousand documents 


are, it maybe 10,000 pages, maybe 100,000, I 


don't know, but we're operating from a 


perception that someplace imbedded in that -- 


in those -- those pages is information that's 

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going to give us some insight into each of 


those bins that we've created in our minds. We 


don't know if it -- it does or it doesn't -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: But -- but -- but we do, to some 


extent. I mean I --


DR. MAURO: To some extent, okay. I guess I --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I mean we have examples. 


It's not like we're (unintelligible) at this 


point. We have examples that some logs have 


information in them and we're going to provide 


that to NIOSH, titles that Bob read off the 


spreadsheet said, you know -- some of those at 


least said urinalysis records. That -- that 


gives me an indication that yeah, there might 


be something there -- there, you know, it's not 


a worthless goose -- you know, a wild goose 


chase on (unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: It's clear that the urinalysis logs 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- but no one I think would say that 


those are going to lack value, that's -- that's 


clear. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But -- if -- he was talking about 


other records that contain urinalysis data, I 

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think --


 DR. ULSH: It may not be log books. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: It may just be other raw records of 


urinalysis. That's -- that's clear. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So I think if we can cover the 


time periods with these urinalysis raw records, 


then -- then you -- you've got this semblance 


of a methodology --


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- there, you know. 


 MS. MUNN: But folks, this -- this basic 


question has not changed from the outset, and 


the basic question still is how much is enough 


to satisfy this Advisory Board on the 


verifiable nature of the data that's available. 


It's never going to be perfect. The 


information that we have is never going to be 


perfect. There are always going to be single 


instances that we can find where things don't 


match perfectly because none of the information 


that I have ever seen anywhere about anything 


is ever going to be perfect. So our job, as I 


see it, is an enormously difficult one. It's 


to answer the question how much is enough. We 

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can go on with this forever, but someone -- and 


I think it has to be the Board -- must say this 


is enough. This is adequate. The job can be 


done with the information we have. 


 DR. WADE: Or correspondingly, there are enough 


open issues that we can't make that judgment. 


So the Board has to come to a decision. I mean 


I -- just again, to get over -- slightly beyond 


my role, I mean I think this overview of data 


reliability and how it's put to rest, and I 


think the other radionuclides issue, those are 


-- those are the big issues that are left 


before this working group, and we need to tee 


them up as quickly as you can. 


The other things we've been talking about are 


interesting --


 MR. GRIFFON: It shouldn't have been a 


surprise, given our Y-12 deliberations. 


 DR. ULSH: Well, I would like to clarify that 


the first time that -- that I recall, at least 


-- the other radionuclides issue being asked 


was in a write-up by SC&A two working group 


meetings ago, I don't know, I don't -- I don't 


remember the exact date. 


 MS. MUNN: Three working group meetings ago. 

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 DR. ULSH: Okay. At the last working group 


meeting we gave the oral presentation. The 


written report is going to be in your hands -- 


barring classification issues -- very, very 


soon. So at least on that one, I think -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


 DR. WADE: Well, no need to be defensive. I 


mean this is really --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, no, I'm not pointing -- I'm ­

- also -- Wanda, to your point, I mean I just 


think, you know, how much is enough, we do have 


to keep that in mind all the time, but -- 


 MS. MUNN: We do. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we also have to -- my -- I 


guess my approach in this has been to sort of 


go where the data takes me, too. And when we ­

- when we see new pieces of data, you know -- 


you know, you -- you have to sort of follow 


that to some extent, you know, and -- so we 


don't know, you know, on every site how much is 


going to be enough unti-- you know, until you 


look at the data, you just don't know, so you 


don't know --


 MS. MUNN: But we're not going to come up with 


perfect data, no matter what we do. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: You're not going to come up with 


perfect data, but you know -- I mean we're 


lucky -- you know, we're just starting to see 


any raw data so, you know, that -- that's -- 


 MS. MUNN: We have to weigh that against our 


responsibility not only to the claimants, but 


to the taxpayers and to the rest of our 


colleagues, as well. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


 MS. MUNN: So it's not an easy question to 


answer. 


DR. MAURO: It took us a long time to get to 


this point. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yes. And let me just note that 


it took us a long time to get to thorium at Y12, as well. 


DR. MAURO: And I -- and I -- I --


 MR. GRIFFON: So I don't think this is a wasted 


effort. 


DR. MAURO: No, I -- I'm -- I'm optimistic now 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- that we have a path that we -- 


there's this thousand documents that some type 


of process is going to be used to cull through 

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that to address the different bins. So in 


other words -- I almost -- see, I have to say, 


before listening to all the conference calls I 


felt as if we were lost in the woods. You 


know, I -- I don't feel that way right now. 


feel as if we've got a -- we've got a path now 


and we're going to -- and we're going to close 


this --


 MR. GRIFFON: And can I help you find yourself 


a little more on that? I don't think -- I 


don't think it's a thousand documents. I'd 


love to see --


DR. MAURO: Well, that's --


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I believe you've obtained 


a thousand documents in this process. 


DR. MAURO: Those are going on the O drive. 


Right? 


 DR. ULSH: Whoa, whoa, whoa --


DR. MAURO: No, no, no --


 MR. FITZGERALD: There were 46 that were. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think we're focused down to 


about 46 plus urinalysis logs, plus some other 


pieces, you know. You -- you've obtained a 


thousand documents --


 DR. ULSH: A thousand documents, John -- 


I 
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 MR. GRIFFON: -- through this whole process. 


 DR. ULSH: -- we have asked Scott Raines to 


retrieve for us. That includes individual rad 


files --


 MR. GRIFFON: Individual rad files is -- 


 DR. ULSH: -- which are not going to go on the 


O drive, right. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay, so -- so the process is a 


thousand documents is something you identified 


by titles -- is that what it -- I'm -- 


 DR. ULSH: Well, throughout the course of the 


working group meetings over the past year or 


whatever it's been, in response to some of 


these requests, we've requested from Mountain 


View about a thousand documents. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: We include log books -- 


DR. MAURO: That came in, these -- 


 DR. ULSH: -- and rad files --


MR. MEYER: We've looked over probably 5,000 


summaries and had him extract -- I would guess 


-- and I had him extract about a thousand from 


the records that --


 DR. ULSH: Now not all of those are going to be 


on the O drive. 

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DR. MAURO: And out of that, based on your 


judgment of looking at that, there's some 


subset of that that you feel is going -- might 


be of value, might --


 DR. ULSH: Forty-six. 


DR. MAURO: It's important to --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Forty-six. 


MR. MEYER: Forty-six. 

DR. MAURO: I didn't hear you. 

MR. MEYER: Forty-six. 

DR. MAURO: Okay. And -- and those 46 are 

going to be your holy grail -- in theory. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm going to look at them first 


before I commit to that. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I'd just say -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I've got to say, I think -- a 


thousand documents, I've been waiting for a 


while for these log books and -- you know, if I 


could have put on hold those 950 and -- and had 


the 50 up front about three meetings ago, I 


would have been much happier, you know, so I 


don't know what those thousand -- 


MR. MEYER: Those included responses to a lot 


of other queries, too, the -- the JT files, for 


example, are included in that thousand, among 

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other things that we've talked about, so it's ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and a lot of them were the 


individual rad files for the individual cases 


that you pulled -- that you tracked back -- 


 DR. WADE: Let's get back to the task. 


Everyone around the table can feel proud of 


what they've done and what they're doing, but 


it's more about tomorrow than it is yesterday, 


so we need to just go on. 


 DR. ULSH: Mark, there are a couple of data 


integrity things. The safety concerns -- I 


don't think I'll say anything more about that 


right now, let you guys have time to review it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: The two things that I propose to you 


-- and agree or don't -- that we should maybe 


cover is let Karin give a brief summary of the 


data integrity write-up that she has prepared. 


One of the issues that is commonly heard in 


terms of the data integrity issue is film 


blackening and --


 MR. GRIFFON: So this is a -- let me just -- 


just step in for a second, Brant. This is a 


summary of the -- Karin went through and -- and 

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pulled out all the affidavits or individual 


assertions from the petition -- 


 MS. JESSEN: Well --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and did you -- did you -- do 


you have those? 'Cause we've been waiting for 


that, or was that -- that was delivered. 


Right? Yeah. 


 MS. JESSEN: Brant put -- Brant put that on the 


O drive on Monday --


 MR. GRIFFON: That was the 70-page document or 


whatever --


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. JESSEN: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I got that. I haven't looked at 


it. 


 DR. ULSH: To clarify, it's the -- it's the 


affidavits from the petition, it's the public 


comments that we've heard at the Denver 


Advisory Board meeting primarily, and other 


concerns that were expressed by members of the 


public and the petitioner throughout the course 


of our working group meetings. All of the -- I 


hope all of those are captured in this 


document. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. JESSEN: Yeah, I do, too. 


 DR. ULSH: So maybe we can just let Karin give 


a brief summary of that and then, if the Board 


so desires, then I'll talk a little bit about 


the blackened film issue. Does that sound... 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, wait, wait, wait, we forgot the 


'69 fire. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We want to get to the fire -- we 


want to get to the fire, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I'll skip the blackened film, unless 


you guys really want to hear it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Do you have something in writing? 


 DR. ULSH: I have written it. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: We have the memo and --


 MR. GRIFFON: Do you have something in memo 


form? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, it's been e-mailed to you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Why don't we --


 MS. MUNN: Your memo's pretty thorough, Brant. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay, I'll skip that off the table. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, let's hear the summary -- 


 DR. ULSH: Karin and Mel. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- and cover the plutonium fire 

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and (unintelligible) planes to catch, yeah. 


INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS IN PETITION


 MS. JESSEN: Basically -- basically Brant just 


covered it, and that -- and what we have right 


here are 41 examples that, as Brant stated, 


were pulled from the petition, conversations 


between the petitioner and Brant, public 


comment meeting -- I went through the notes 


from the public comment meeting, both on 


Wednesday, April 26th in the evening, plus 


Thursday, April 27th during the day where 


individuals had made statements regarding their 


issues. And all of the -- all of that 


information has been pulled together into this 


70-some-odd-page document. 


Basically there are issues that come out that 


are a little bit more reoccurring than -- than 


others, but the -- the two most reoccurring in 


-- in all the information that we've gathered 


so far has been the inaccurate records and the 


recording of zeroes. The other thing covered 


are blackened badges and lost crystals and the 


lead apron issue, and no current data 


available. And so we have addressed all these 


issues in this document via the individual. In 

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other words, we've gone back to their personal 


rad files and --


 DR. ULSH: Where appropriate. 


 MS. JESSEN: -- where appropriate and pulled 


that information and followed that back to try 


and answer those concerns, and that's all in 


this document here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think -- Karin, I missed one of 


yours I think -- inaccurate records, recording 


zeroes, blackened badges, lead aprons -- I 


missed --


 MS. JESSEN: Lost crystals. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Lost crystals, okay. 


 MS. JESSEN: And no current data available. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MS. JESSEN: And as far as the evaluation 


report, some of these issues were covered in 


the evaluation report, some of them were 


covered generally. In the evaluation report I 


didn't cov-- I have statements from the 


affidavits pulled out in the evaluation report 


and have addressed those, without the 


identifiers, but those issues have been 


discussed in the evaluation report and in -- in 


this document here. And in answer to the 

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question, have we made more progress since the 


evaluation report and what was discussed in the 


evaluation report and in the data integrity 


issues that we have, there have been -- there 


has been some good information that we have 


discovered. I mean it hasn't been a lost 


cause, it's been very informative. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Does -- do -- do you 


feel it necessary to modify the evaluation 


report, based upon what you've done at this 


point? 


 DR. ULSH: I think I should probably answer 


that one. 


 MS. JESSEN: Feel free. 


 DR. ULSH: No. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, that's fine. Thank you. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Would this document serve as a 


supplement to the evaluation report to explain, 


when we have to find ourselves communicating to 


individuals who submitted an affidavit, what 


happened with their -- with their concern? 


 DR. ULSH: If you desire, Larry, or if the 


Board desires, we would certainly be willing to 


do that. I mean it's -- it does address the 


individual affidavits in the petition, plus a 

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lot more, so --


 DR. WADE: Something for NIOSH to consider. 


 MS. JESSEN: And I would like to say -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'd like to read it first. 


 MS. JESSEN: -- that -- yeah, the issues that 


were covered in the evaluation report -- I have 


no problems with what NIOSH wrote in the 


evaluation report. I mean I think those issues 


have been addressed and I think they've been 


addressed adequately, without doing these 41 


examples. However, the 41 examples have 


provided some additional insight -- for me, for 


one -- to, you know, to better understand what 


the issues were, but -- but I do believe that 


the evaluation report did cover these 


adequately. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I of course haven't read this 


yet, but I would like to read it in that -- in 


that frame of mind, is this something that can 


be shown as a supplement to the evaluation 


report that can then aid in our communication 


to these folks. 


 DR. ULSH: It goes into the issues in more 


detail than we covered in the evaluation. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You mentioned a couple of times, 

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you know, you learned something from doing this 


or you got some insights -- for examp-- can you 


give an example of -- comes to mind? 


 MS. JESSEN: A specific example? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- we can -- we can read the 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Like zeroes. 


 MS. JESSEN: Zeroes is a good one, blackened 


badges is another one. Inaccurate records I 


would say is probably a good insight that -- 


that I learned --


 DR. ULSH: What the concerns were. 


 MS. JESSEN: -- what the concerns were -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, okay, okay. 


 MS. JESSEN: -- yeah. And -- and doing some 


research on -- on those particular issues. 


 DR. WADE: Now just -- I mean as the 


Secretary's representative, it's entirely 


possible that such a supplement would be of 


benefit to the Secretary to make the record 


complete. That's a judgment that NIOSH needs 


to make. The Board and the working group can 


offer an opinion on it. 


 MS. JESSEN: One of the things that I would 


like to add, in the original petition that came 

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in there were seven bases for the petition, 


which was discussed in the evaluation report. 


And then the affidavits, if you will, were 


little fingers of those seven bases, and so I 


believe the seven bases were covered in the 


evaluation report, as well as the general 


issues that were brought up. And -- and I 


believe everything was answered in the 


evaluation report based on both parts of the 


petition that came in, which is well over 700 


pages. 


 DR. WADE: Good, thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. WADE: Move on. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Can we -- before we go on to the 


next one, can we just take one step back in -- 


in a moment of time here when I said this 


evaluation report came to us late. I don't 


know what you were thinking about -- 


 MS. JESSEN: Yeah, I wanted to --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- but the evaluation report 


(sic) was qualified in June of 2000 or whatever 


that date --


 MS. JESSEN: 2005. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- 2005. If you mark 180 days 

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from that, it would have been due in December ­

- or January sometime, and we provided the 


report in --


 MS. JESSEN: It was April, and when I said 


that, I was thinking of my time to NIOSH. 


 DR. ULSH: Right, I would start yelling at you 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. ELLIOTT: 

--

So -- so we -- just so we cleared 

 MR. GRIFFON: 

record. 

Thank you for correcting the 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- correct the record, because 

not only do I not want to be wrong when I'm 


right, I want the petitioners who have made it 


very clear to me that this report took too much 


-- too long in its coming, so... 


 DR. WADE: And our friends in the Colorado 


delegation have made that very clear. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you for clarifying that. 


 MS. JESSEN: That's okay, but let's talk 


afterwards 'cause I want to ask you something 


about (unintelligible). 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Sure. 


 MS. JESSEN: Clarify that issue. 


’69 DOSIMETRY GAPS
 
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 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and purposefully I've 


saved Mel for last 'cause I knew he'd have -- 


 DR. WADE: The crowd would --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- great insight on the plutonium 


fire and --


 DR. WADE: -- stay to hear Mel. I wouldn't 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- he's a very good presenter so 


 MR. CHEW: Well, thank you --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) --


 MR. CHEW: -- very much, Mark, for the 


introduction. I just want to clarify -- go 


back to the exotic -- one before 


(unintelligible) -- we do know your report. 


I'm glad we had that discussion today because 


what I had in a report in draft form would not 


have answered some of the questions that Arjun 


brought up about how it links to dose 


reconstruction, so it will give us a little bit 


of time to improve the document to answer those 


specific questions to minimize your going back 


and forth (unintelligible). Okay? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Fine. 


 MR. CHEW: With that I'm going to -- I was 

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thinking about how to make this presentation. 


I was asked just last week -- I think it was on 


Wednesday when Brant sent me a kind of a 


cryptic message on e-mail says "should you 


choose this mission," it was almost a little 


bit of like Mission Impossible, and he said the 


message would self-destruct, could you track 


down a little bit about the Rocky Flats fire 


and try to glean some information, if there's 


any, that could possibly even answer some of 


the issues about the -- the data gap. This was 


some of the discussion about, you know, some 


badges were lost because they got contaminated 


and the (unintelligible) was in there. And so 


this led us -- I'm thinking about how to make 


this presentation. I'm going to try to keep it 


down to a reasonable time because we're all 


getting late and tired. 


I'm going to pass something out first. I think 


it's -- picture shows a thousand words. If you 


can read the report on the Rocky Flats fire, I 


don't think you fully realize what it looks 


like and what the impact until you see 


pictures. I have two sets of color photographs 


in here. 

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First it starts off with the (unintelligible) ­

- I'm going to pass it down to you, Lew and 


Ray, if you folks would share that, and I'm 


going to pass this one to -- this one to you 


folks. I'm going to come back (unintelligible) 


and you can just flip through the pictures here 


because it will say. 


The first one talks about the benelex, some 


description of benelex. Then there's a color 


photograph -- just flip through it so you can 


get an idea when I talk about the -- the 


report, you will get a feel for what we're 


looking at, especially the last couple of 


pictures which shows the actual glovebox in 


question that actually blew -- the initiating 


event of the fire. Okay? Just 


(unintelligible) that. I just want to give you 


a moment. 


Then I think you heard about -- I mentioned the 


benelex. I've been carrying this around for 


quite a few years, at least probably 30 or 40 


years. I've had a piece of benelex in my 


office. I just want to show you -- this did 


not come from the fire -- and so I will pass a 


piece of benelex so you can feel -- feel a 

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little bit what it looks like and this is 


probably one of the mechanisms that really was 


part of the cause of the fire. 


 Wanda, I apologize. I was going to -- hoping 


that you'd be there 'cause you always know I 


bring something to show and tell. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, yes, and I am so sorry that 


you don't have this in electronic form. 


 MR. CHEW: Thank you, Wanda. All right, as we 


pass around these pictures and it gives you a 


feeling for what we're talking about, let me 


just talk about the fire itself and I will 


start -- this happened 37 years ago -- 37, 


1969. You know, the only thing about -- we 


talk about how we've been spanning Rocky Flats 


for about the last 50 years, but this happened 


37 years ago. All right? And at that time it 


was still the Atomic Energy Commission. And 


the -- the fire has -- I want to clearly -- 


Brant gave me some clear direction. He says 


Mel, don't downplay the fire -- like it was a 


little small fire and everybody went back to 


work the next day, but also making sure that 


you give it proper perspective as far as the 


fire is concerned. 

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The fire, I would like to say, had a major -- 


it was a significant fire in the history of the 


U.S. government. I'm taking that privilege to 


say that. I was told that several times, 


because its total impact to not only Rocky 


Flats, its workers, the production, but to the 


Atomic Energy Commission, the national 


laboratories and the Defense Department was 


great. Okay? It was great. There was no 


question about it. Right? It was the height 


of the Cold War, remember -- us -- many of us 


don't even remember what that is anymore. 


Okay? It was the height of the Cold War. And 


many, many production units were in full 


production at Rocky Flats. There was 


significant increase of the quantities of 


plutonium that had to be required to be 


processed and -- and to supply the weapons -- 


to supply the weapons complex. 


To that note, Hanford and Savannah River was 


trying to continually to produce as many and 


much plutonium supplied to Rocky Flats to -- to 


make the necessary weapons components. But 


that didn't even do the job as part of the 


requi-- meeting the demand. 

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 The other side of it that -- there was a lot of 


machining operations and chip operations that 


went on that many -- much of the plutonium 


could be recovered. I'm just giving you a 


little bit of background of what was some of 


the leading reasons for what (unintelligible). 


Arjun, I think you're going to enjoy my first 


statement here. Let me put my reading glasses 


on. Because of the -- of certain -- well, 


additional quantities of -- of the plutonium 


needed -- right? -- in the system here, they 


had to basically process and try to make some 


new material, using a foundry process, to -- to 


supply materials into -- into the -- into 


making plutonium -- to reprocess plutonium for 


the machining operations and chip and -- and 


because of that -- because of that, additional 


neutron shielding had to be needed. Okay? And 


this is why you see a piece of benelex being 


passed around. 


Well, the -- the concern for the -- concerns 


for the increased levels of penetrating 


radiation, like neutrons, for employees led to 


significant amount of increased shielding, not 


only in front of the gloveboxes to reduce the 

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exposures -- this talks about installing lead ­

- lead glass, lead glass, benelex and -- and -- 


and plexiglass in various thicknesses on the 


gloveboxes and in the conveyors. But that 


didn't still do the job because that's -- tried 


to be too -- an exterior. And when you add 


exterior shielding to the outside of the 


glovebox, it makes it very difficult for the 


workers to work. They can't reach in there. 


So at the time, as you saw -- there's some 


pictures of -- here and I want to -- want to 


share -- share -- show a picture of the -- of 


the cans inside the benelex shield. 


(Unintelligible) so we can focus on what's 


happening here. 


They -- there was briquets that were made, 


briquets they made from the machining 


operation. What those briquets and chips were 


-- and you can see them -- was that as the 


machining operations were taking place, the 


chips are now brought into a -- a press and 


pressed into a briquet. Well, the machining 


takes a -- requirement -- uses oil for -- as 


(unintelligible) machine, and there's a 


considerable amount of oil. Oil -- then the 

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chips are dropped into carbon tetrachloride and 


to -- to try to remove as much of the oil as 


possible, and then dried, and then -- and then 


mal-- the material was pressed, as best as they 


can. But there's still enough residual oil. 


Okay? I'm leading to the mechanism of what 


started the fire so we can all understand that. 


These oil that -- during the pressing operation 


the oil drips from the press and then there 


were rags that was used to wipe up the chips. 


There was two theories of how this -- the fire 


started. It was because they have the oily 


rags and the chips containing plutonium -- that 


is a slightly exothermic -- that potentially 


started the fire and start that initial fire, 


that's the initial mechanism -- mechanism that 


started the fire. 


 There's another theory, probably less theory. 


There's some annealing furnaces nearby and the 


oil rags was still by, there was just enough 


heat to basically start that fire going. 


But be it so, the actual mechanism is probably 


focusing on the combination of the plutonium 


and chips along with the oily rags. In turn it 


set some of the briquets on fire -- okay? -- on 

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fire, some of the plutonium briquets, as you 


can see some of the pictures here. And in turn 


it started the plexiglass -- the plexiglass and 


the gloves -- those gloves that was inside a 


glovebox. They were probably the most 


vulnerable (unintelligible) start on fire. The 


fire -- the smoke from the fire was primarily 


from the plexiglass. 


The benelex, as you see -- there was a large 


cabinet built into the -- into that particular 


glovebox that you will see -- in the pictures 


you will see, and I'd like to bring back and so 


I can hold the picture up and you can see it -- 


thank you. Now you see, these are -- these are 


the benelex cabinets in here. This is in the 


well-known glovebox 134.24, and I showed you a 


couple of pictures here of what the -- of this 


-- of what the -- in part of the line, the box 


-- Wanda, I'm sorry you can't see some of these 


pictures here, but it shows how -- where the 


north wall was and which box -- this is box 


134.24 in this particular area. And I gave you 


folks a little bit of an artist's perception of 


-- artist's conception of what the box line 


looked like. Okay? You can see -- you can see 

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that -- that's why I showed it around first, 


you can see the box line. This is the box line 


that had the benelex box in it. 


This box was about 14 feet long -- okay? -- and 


it was about two and a half inches high and 


about 12 inches thick. Because they could not 


shield it from the outside, they decided to 


make -- modify the box to put the benelex 


cabinets inside the box. Right? So now you 


can see the scenario. We have some large -- we 


have large gloveboxes here with a large cabinet 


-- basically a cabinet, a drawer, full of these 


benelex -- layers of benelex for additional -- 


for neutron shielding, and the cans that held 


these briquets and chips while it's either 


waiting to be pressed or waiting to be -- after 


it was pressed -- to go back into the foundry 


and to -- to be -- to be made into ingots for 


plutonium. So you can see the scenario going 


there. Okay? 


Well, I think we all know that this particular 


fire -- and now I will now talk specifically 


about the fire (unintelligible). Okay, thank 


you very much for your patience here. 
I 


mentioned about the briqueting operation. I'll 

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just now go directly to the fire. 


It happened on Mother's Day, May 11th, 1969, 


about 2:30 in the afternoon. Many of the 


shifts that -- that the -- the majority of the 


work was not -- there was no work being done in 


776. There was a little bit of packaging work 


that was being done in 77, even on Sunday. 


There was quite a bit of work being done on 


Saturday to actually help produce some of these 


particular chips and make these briquets to go 


into these storage cabinets. 


At about 2:30 in the -- even early in the 


afternoon the people who were the roaming 


guards and there are people who are the -- what 


they called the operators who maint -- 


maintenance operator of the -- the building 


itself. These are not like the process 


operators. These are people worrying about -- 


to make sure the ventilation is working and 


things like this was making their normal rounds 


and did not see anything unusual. 


 The first alarm came in at about 2:27 in the 


afternoon. Right? And the first alarm was 


basically a heat detector from underneath box 


134.24. Interesting sight -- in hindsight and 

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going back into some of the -- some of the 


issues here, these heat detectors in the past 


was put on top of the cans where the chips 


were. But because they had to put the benelex 


cabin inside, the cans were put inside the 


cabinetry, the heat detectors were placed 


underneath the box -- underneath the benelex, 


so there was a significant amount of shielding 


from the heat detector -- from the -- from the 


chips itself. So that's probably -- in fact it 


probably smoldered for a while before the heat 


detector even start to sense it for any 


initiate -- enunciation. 


Well -- put my reading glasses on, this is 


(unintelligible). Thank you. 


At about -- the -- the alarm came in to the 


fire department and -- and they immediately 


responded. There were several alarms. It 


turns out that there is a -- there was two 


alarms that came in from the same enunciator 


just becau-- the times were slightly different, 


but that was resolved because the clocks on the 


dispatcher and the enunciate panels were 


slightly off sync, but they were the same 


alarm. 

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Then at about 2:33 another alarm came in, and 


that was the operator who was upstairs on the 


second floor, had smelled some smoke and he 


decided to initiate the alarm. 


By that time the fire captain on duty, along 


with three fireman -- four people -- responded 


to the fire in building 776 right about 2:29 -- 


okay? -- about two minutes after -- after the ­

- the alarm came in. They saw smoke coming out 


of the -- of the -- of the corridor in the box 


line here, and one of the firemen or the 


captain said that out of the top of the 


glovebox line there was about 18 inches of 


(unintelligible) flames. 


Now I know I'm talking about this -- this is 


doc-- I'm pulling everything -- this is going 


to save me from writing you a report, Mark, I'm 


going to make this little humor here, because 


everything I'm taking from -- is on a -- is on 


the full report that you folks now have, which 


is the redacted version. Okay? You actually 


see that. And I'll tell you the little 


difference between the classified version and 


the unclassified version of the -- of the fire, 


because we did look at the classified version. 

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Okay. The fire captain directed the people to 


fight the fire with the CO2 extinguisher, man-- 


manual one, and even the 50-pound extinguisher 


really, but to not much avail here. Shortly 


after, you know, the -- the captain -- at about 


2:34, as been in a document, which was only 


about less than seven, eight minutes after he ­

- they re-- responded or saw the alarm, they 


decided to attack the fire with water. And now 


this is significant because it was his 


decision, even though they were told very 


clearly because of -- you can all understand, 


because of criticality issues, you know, fire 


was not to be used and that's probably one of 


the issues of why sprink-- that facility was 


not sprinklered. You know, from now on, they 


all are, but at that particular time that was 


not the criteria, and so they decided to fight 


the fire with -- with water, a very, very 


important decision based on the captain and his 


heroism and decision was clearly commended by 


the Atomic Energy Commission -- I'm getting 


feedback here. 


Okay? The -- now the -- the -- when he took 


the initial -- they actually tried to even 

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fight some -- the fire with magnesium fluoride, 


and there's some stories and anecdotal stories, 


but documented also in the report, the firemen 


actually started to put some water directly 


even on the plutonium. The plutonium sparks 


when it did that, and surprisingly enough, this 


is something that they found afterwards, the 


fire actually helped the amount of plutonium 


being dispersed easily because it actually 


helped crust the plutonium. 


UNIDENTIFIED: You mean the water. 


UNIDENTIFIED: You mean the water. 


 MR. CHEW: What the water did, yeah, contrary 


to what they even have thought, and -- and that 


was a surprise and I directly had that message 


at -- remember the last time we mentioned Dr. 


Roland Felt and we had called Roland? He was 


one of the consultant that was part of the 


investigating board, and he made sure that he 


mentioned that. That was his finding as being 


a metallurgist that -- how interestingly the 


thought to now put water on -- on plutonium was 


completely contrary to what they ever thought, 


and that probably helped a lot. 


So I'm going to try to run by the story very 

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quickly (unintelligible). The firemen did go 


up to the roof. The -- I'm going to draw to 


one picture, I thought it was important and I'm 


going to pull this out of the -- the 


(unintelligible) report here because it has a 


nice picture of the -- of the (unintelligible). 


Give me a second, sir, to pull the report out. 


(Pause) 


 I'm just going to show a picture here because 


you will see a -- a picture that shows the -- 


where in -- in -- in diagram form of -- the 


fire started this particular point, worked down 


this particular box line, came down this way 


and went this -- down this particular machining 


line. This particular fan that was pulling on 


the exhausts of these particular gloveboxes 


plugged almost immediately and -- and so the 


fire that was being pulled -- that's why it 


came down -- this line was pulled by this 


particular exhaust fan. The significant of 


this is that the roof stayed very much intact. 


The building structure never was compromised in 


the fire here. And matter of fact, thank to 


the alertness of the fire department to go up 


and actually spray to keep the roof cool 

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probably helped that situation entirely. But 


also the smoke was coming out of the -- of the 


filters of the -- the ventilation system that 


is pulling the air out of this particular line 


here. 


This goes through about between four to six -- 


four to six stages of HEPA filter before it's 


released. All right? This is the glovebox 


line here. The room filters only go through 


one -- if one or about two stages of filter, 


but the -- the glovebox line is the one that 


they saw some of the smoke from, and the 


majority of the releases of plutonium to the 


environment did come from this particular box 


line. 


Well, I think I've talked a little bit about 


the fire here. Let's talk about some of the -- 


the initial response and the -- what I consider 


the -- the health physics implications here. 


Okay? We'll go directly to that. 


A total of 33 firemen and security guards were 


utilizes different times and -- of the fire 


during that particular day. There was some 


fortuitous here. It was right about during a 


shift change that happened, so there was a 

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maximum amount of fire department was able to ­

- was -- happened to be on-site at that 


particular time, something maybe fortuitous we 


looking back. No outside fire department units 


were -- came to -- to have to help assist in 


fighting the fire. In -- in all, about 41 


people was involved within the first 20 -- one 


-- 24 hours that -- that help responded to -- 


to the initiating of -- for help in fighting 


the fire, and -- and out of that 41, the people 


and -- and I'm going to add onto that, there 


was an additional -- about 70 additional 


people, a total about 110 people, that was 


counted for lung counting for -- for possible 


intake or possible inhalation due to the -- 


responding to the fire. But the 41 people were 


counted within the 24-hour period. And these 


were lung counts. All right? I'll just 


mention about --


 MR. GRIFFON: Who -- who were the ten people, 


'cause I'm reading the 41. You said ten is a 


subset? 


 MR. CHEW: There was a -- there was a -- 41, 


you're --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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 MR. CHEW: -- well, there was 33 firemen. 


There were 41 that was counted within the first 


24 hours, but a total of about 110 were counted 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, 110. 


 MR. CHEW: 110, I'm sorry, I added some -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm reading (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. CHEW: Oh, you're reading the same report, 


that's good. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: That's good. As you can see the 


pictures that I showed you, the -- most of the 


plutonium -- and it was a large quantity of 


plutonium. The val-- the difference, Mark, 


between the unclassified report and the 


classified report is the total quantities of 


plutonium that were either in any one location 


or totally involved with the fire, or was 


totally involved in the buildings themselves. 


Right? And the only other -- other thing that 


is -- was redacted that we have seen that's in 


the classified report, there's a little bit of 


-- talking about the different shapes or the 


different phases of the plutonium, and that's 


about the only difference that you see. So 

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pretty much what you see here is -- is a pretty 


complete report. Okay? I want to make sure 


that you -- you know that. 


The -- the fire -- the fire was basically put 


out about -- they -- they av-- they said in the 


report, pretty much by about 5:00, 6:00 


o'clock, late in the afternoon, and pretty much 


what they would consider under cont-- in 


control at about 8:00 o'clock time period. 


The RAC* report has -- had -- went back and 


several people have -- went back and reanalyzed exactly how much plutonium and how 


much material might have escaped from the -- 


from the roof and from the ventilation system. 


A nominal value has been chosen to be around 20 


millicuries. And weapons grade plutonium at 


that particular time, that would represent 


something in the order about 200 milligrams of 


plutonium escaped (unintelligible). 


Now this is probably where -- the part that 


Brant wanted me to talk about here is what 


after the -- the report that you will be seeing 


really focusing in -- really focuses on what 


caused the fire and probably just a few -- a 


few days apart of initiation of the -- of the 

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344 

I 

event itself, the fire itself. Now I have been 


interviewing several of the people who helped 


to -- helped decontaminate due to the fire. 


have not personally talked to any people who 


were the initial first responders. I did talk 


to Dr. Roland Felt himself, and Mr. Ken 


Caukins*, and I would like to just share what 


they had to say about what the significant to ­

- what -- for this particular discussion here. 


The -- the building -- the investigating team 


stayed on-site until about the June time frame, 


late June time frame. They were doing the 


investigation, so no work was being done inside 


776. But you can picture now -- why I -- why 


I showed you the pictures earlier -- we have 


quite a bit of burned plutonium and plutonium 


in oxide form laying on -- on -- inside the 


conveyers and --


 MS. MUNN: Mel? 

 MR. CHEW: Yes, ma'am. 

 MS. MUNN: I understand you have triangulation 

problems, but I -- my ear is just about to fall 


off I've been pressing my phone against it so 


hard trying to hear you. 


 MR. CHEW: Oh, thank you, Wanda. 

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 MS. MUNN: Is there any way you can -- I don't 


know what -- part of it may be your whole 


system --


 MR. GRIFFON: We -- we just moved you, Wanda. 


 MR. CHEW: Wanda, can you hear me? Is that a 


little bit better? 


 MS. MUNN: That's much better. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You're sitting next to Mel now. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 MR. CHEW: I was -- I was trying to look at 


Arjun when I was talking because I know he 


would take great interest in what we're trying 


to discuss here. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 MR. CHEW: I apologize for that, though, Wanda. 


Let me pick it up here. I'm going to talk 


about what happened -- well, shortly thereafter 


to the building itself, and this is what is not 


in the report, Mark, and basically on 


interviews and discussion of some of the 


chronology of some of the events that may be 


important to -- to some of the things that -- 


issue are -- the discussion. 


Many people in the whole plant helped -- 


responded to help -- help with the fire. They 

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didn't have to help fight the fire, but help 


decontaminate as a result of the fire, so you 


will talk to a lot of people says yes, we 


helped the decon of the -- of the -- of the 


Rocky Flats fire. That's true. They pulled 


people from everywhere. 


Then what they did was, because there was 


significant amount of contamination to the 


adjacent buildings, like the other parts of 777 


that wasn't affected by the fire, but it was 


contaminated because the smoke -- 70-- 771 


included. There's some adjacent quarters that 


attach to each other, some tunnels. The water 


that was used to fight the fire probably is the 


one that spread the majority of the 


contamination, that once the water was dried or 


picked up, you know, it had to be 


decontaminated, so there was a lot of people. 


And everyone I talked to said yes, they were 


suited up. They only had to work for limited 


time 'cause it was hot. The ventilation was 


not on. But they were clearly monitored, as 


you -- as I was -- and that was a clear 


question I will make sure that I asked them, 


that they were monitored as they went back in 

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to help decontaminate. 


But I want to make a point that not until the 


investigating team released the building 776 


where the fire that you see started and where 


the majority of the plutonium was did -- did 


anyone go back in to do anything in that 


particular building. Okay? But now, as you 


can see, Arjun, the -- many of the shielding is 


gone because the benelex, you know, has been 


burned and -- and the plexiglass is burned. 


The benelex pretty much stayed, as you can see, 


even fairly intact, still providing some 


neutron shield, but now the -- the cover, 


including the windows, including the plexiglass 


windows and the plexiglass windows that is 


sitting in front of the containers are also 


been burnt out. Okay? So it does offers a 


source, there's no question of that. 


So after the -- the investigating group 


released the building so the recovery of the 


material took place. There was significant 


amount of material that needed to be recovered, 


to be retrieved, actually. Now there has been 


several reports that you will see, and in the 


order of about 1,000 KGs was potentially in 

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that particular area, and in the later reports 


that only about 300 to 400 kilograms of it 


really needed to be reprocessed. Must -- much 


of it actually -- the chips and -- and -- and 


the metal stayed fairly good, and so they were 


able to put that right back into the foundries. 


So that just gives you a -- some -- a feeling 


of magnitude. 


A key point was that -- I talked to the 


gentleman that was responsible for leading the 


attempt to go back in to recover the material. 


I'm going to spend a little bit of time there. 


The recovery of the material was taken with a 


tremendous amount of caution, mainly because 


there was great concern for criticality, and 


because the conditions of the water and -- and 


only salaried people was asked to -- 


volunteered to go back in to help recover the 


material. I think that's a -- that's a -- was 


a key point that I wanted to bring up under 


that discussion here -- the discussion with Mr. 


Caukins here, Mark, that the salaried people 


were asked to do that, and they were the 


professionals -- mainly because there was -- 


they were coming into conditions that they were 

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unknown, and so therefore they had to make on-


the-spot decisions and that's why they were 


working directly with the criticality people. 


And what the process -- what -- they literally 


went in with a little brush and -- and a dust 


pan and -- and basically picked up the oxide 


and put it into cans -- these are the cans that 


you see pictures of -- and then passed -- and 


bagged that out and then pass it on to some 


counters that counted the material right away 


and -- and so they can keep track of -- from an 


accountability what they pulled out of the -- 


of the -- of the fire and then they went into 


building 771 to -- to be recovered. Right? 


This process took quite a bit of time in -- in 


the September/October time frame that was used 


quite a few of the professional staff to 


actually remove all the material out of -- that 


was involved with the fire. The dec-- the 


decontamination was still going on -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: When you're talking about 


professional staff, are -- how many -- how 


extensive was this -- was this -- 


 MR. CHEW: The number of people? 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- tens of people or was it -- 

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 MR. CHEW: You know, I didn't -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- 25? 


 MR. CHEW: -- ask Ken --


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm just curious. 


 MR. CHEW: -- that question and I forgot, I 


apologize, I didn't ask him -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's okay. 


 MR. CHEW: -- how many people were involved, 


but that's a very good question, but it was the 


professional staff, Mark, and I think that's a 


-- that's worthy of note here. Okay. Again. 


Okay? 


Well, as you know, the -- the decontamination, 


even of the surrounding building to get it back 


into -- into operation even took quite a while. 


Decontamination even had lasted for several 


years. But much of the operation after the 


shops were processed and recovered and to make 


useable was back into operation shortly after, 


within the six to seven-month time frame. 


I'm going to stop at this particular point to 


see if there's any questions and see if I have 


basically discussed the fire and -- and Kathy, 


I'd just like to say, yes, there was a fire, 


and thank you for that particular comment in 

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the log book. The -- Bryce Rich and myself 


went to the Denver (unintelligible) Center. We 


reviewed four boxes of classified documents, of 


which the redacted versions you have. We also 


reviewed all 90 of the personnel interviews 


that was part of the investigation. And out of 


the 90, many of those were the first responders 


and -- and also people who -- who have 


knowledge of what was going -- what was going 


on that would potentially contribute to the 


initiation of the fire here. Okay? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 


 MR. CHEW: Any questions? I'm going to stop at 


the particular point, Mark, (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think I'm -- I'm 


just gleaning through volume one of five or 


whatever it is. 


 MR. CHEW: Right, I was going to mention that ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: It's interesting that there's -- 


I see this last section, fire experience, from 


'66 to May of '69, you know, that have been a 


total of 164 fires, 31 involved plutonium. 
I 


didn't -- I didn't realize there were that 


many. 

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 MR. CHEW: Well, smaller --


 MR. GRIFFON: Smaller magnitude, I'm sure. 


 MR. CHEW: Plutonium fire chips was quite 


common. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Matter of fact, everything -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Not unlike uranium -- right. 


 MR. CHEW: Right, plutonium chips -- you know, 


even though we know about the pyrophorescity* ­

- and that's quite a word here, but 


pyrophorescity of the material, of plutonium, 


I'd like to make a good comment -- that's a 


very good comment -- and they went back -- when 


they actually recovered the plutonium, they 


actually found them in nice little piles. All 


right? Now plutonium burns -- I think all of 


us recognize -- like -- pretty much like a 


charcoal briquet, and it smolders, and it just 


burns down like a charcoal briquet. And that 


makes it easier to recover. And on top of 


that, when they put the water on it, it 


actually even formed a little crust, so going 


back to recover it was actually not a very 


difficult process -- difficult from the 


logistics standpoint, but the actually recovery 

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of material and put them in can was not 


difficult. 


I just only mention two or three -- four more 


things for the record here. Volume two 


contains some of the pictures and the maps and 


the ben-- and the discussion about the benelex 


which I brought for you, and this is the -- 


why. I thought the pictures in color was a 


little bit better. When you look at the 


redacted version, you can see that -- the 


picture, but you cannot make it out like I 


brought the pictures, and that's why I asked -- 


I was -- I chose to make a decision to bring 


the pictures to show you that directly here. 


Volume three is the con-- some of the 


conclusions that led to the fire, but 


everything is pretty much spelled out in volume 


one. It's just a very summary of the 


conclusions that led to the fire. 


Number -- volume four is the organizational 


aspects, what are some of the organizational 


responsibility, some of the decisions made by 


the organization responsibility that might have 


contributed to some of the issues that was 


brought forth in the fire. 

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And the last one is a discussion of some of the 


management issues, and that's volume five of 


the report. But the majority of the int-- 


things that we're interested in as far as 


potential for -- add to the people involved and 


the dose reconstruction really is contained in 


volume number one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Did they -- did they say anything 


about -- for the responders, was there any 


special dosimetry, was -- were they using -- 


 MR. CHEW: The initial responder -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- their regular badges or -- 


 MR. CHEW: -- had what they had on. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: They had what they had on, and all 


those people, you know, were obviously 


externally monitored and they carry -- the -- 


when the -- when the people went back for 


recovery -- very good question -- then 


obviously the additional concern -- I talked to 


Mr. Caukins directly and says oh, yes, we're 


obviously very concerned about criticality, and 


so there were additional things that even they 


monitored just in case there was a criticality. 


I don't know if there was any double-badging 

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involved, but they -- they -- he mentioned -- 


volunteered they were very carefully monitored 


because of -- of the potentially safety issues 


regarding to a criticality (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ULSH: I think we actually talked to Wayne 


Jesser*, the fire captain at the time, the guy 


that also made the decision to use water, and 


he said that they were double-- didn't he say 


they were double-monitored? 


MR. MEYER: Yeah, he specifically said they 


were double-badged. They had one inside the 


protective gear, basically this SCUBA -- self-


contained breathing apparatus they were using, 


and one mounted externally, and he recalled 


that clearly. He was -- he escorted all of the 


investigators during the early period. 


 MR. CHEW: When he did the original response, 


was -- were they -- do you know if they were 


double-monitored? I know what you're saying is 


that when they brought in the investigating 


people, they did that. What is that -- is that 


a normal thing that they were during daily -- 


MR. MEYER: I didn't ask him that. 


 MR. CHEW: Ah, okay. 


MR. MEYER: I assumed this because they did it 

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during the entire investigation, but I didn't 


ask him that. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure, sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Are you -- a bunch of people I 


think are --


 MR. CHEW: Right --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- fighting the clock with planes 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- yeah, yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- quick question. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead, quick question. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: How complete are the monitoring 


records of the people who were -- went for 


recovery operations? 


 MR. CHEW: Good question. I knew you were 


going to ask that, Arjun. The 110 -- the 


(unintelligible) -- the 110 people that were 


lung-counted -- okay? -- I didn't get into the 


detail -- there was probably -- as you will -- 


probably will see the report, there was one 


person, one fireman, that they feel that had 


what they consider significant lung counts. 


Right? And his lung count showed, Arjun, he 


had about 1.4 times the maximum permissible 

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357 

lung burden at that particular time. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: His initial counts showed it much 


higher, but it looks like he inhaled the 


material rather than -- I mean -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Ingested it. 


 MR. CHEW: -- ingested it rather than inhaled 


it, I should say correctly, 'cause it showed up 


very highly in his fecal sample. And so that 


was the only one that they showed that was 


above the permissible lung burden by lung 


counting. And I want to clar-- clar-- that the 


minim-- the detectable -- minimum detection at 


that particular time was about a half a lung 


burden. Okay? 


MR. MEYER: Jesser, the fire -- the fire -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: 7.5 rem, whatever. Do they -- do 


they -- do they credit this to -- I'm wondering 


why '65 had so many heavier lung burdens than 


the '69 fire, the '65 fire that they're using 


for our super S model, is this -- it just 


dawned on me why -- why not some of these cases 


for the super S model, but it seems that they 


had higher ingestion and less lung burdens and 

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 MR. CHEW: Well, I think because I think there 


were --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) it a super S 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. CHEW: -- there were people there -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, exactly. 


 MR. CHEW: -- and there was nothing -- nobody 


there when the fire occurred in 776. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: And by the time they responded, it 


was --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) proximity 


(unintelligible) proximity to that. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, well, they were -- they were 


there and present when the fire -- when the -- 


happened with the earlier one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: When it happened with the 


glovebox in '65, right? 


 MR. CHEW: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: In the '69 fire they responded with 


gear on. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. So there was nobody in 


the area --


 MR. CHEW: Exactly right. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: -- evacuated and getting exposed. 


 MR. CHEW: There was nobody there. 


(Pause for telephone interference to be resolved.) 


MR. MEYER: He did -- Jesser, the fire captain, 


did specifically say that the exposure 


occurred, best of his recollection, when they 


were removing their protective gear afterwards. 


There -- there was --


 MR. CHEW: Exactly right. 


MR. MEYER: -- contamination that moved and -- 


and that -- lost control of it once or twice. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We do have these records. 


They're not part of the destroyed '69 records 


or --


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, this is the question -- I ­

- you had the same question I had, was did you 


crosswalk these -- do we have these 110 names 


and does -- does this in any way explain this 


data gap. I -- you know. 

 DR. ULSH: I know that we're trying to wrap it 

up --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know --


 DR. WADE: But this is important. We should 


spend time on important things. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. The 110 people -- the 

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accounts that we've heard was that they were 


all monitored, externally monitored. Correct? 


Am I correct? 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. In terms of -- I mean we -- 


Mel just found this out like a couple of days 


ago so we haven't gone and pulled the rad files 


to see if they were monitored. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 


 DR. ULSH: Now the other piece of this puzzle 


is that -- that progress report that I 


mentioned to you, Mark, the dosim-- monthly 


dosimetry progress report, where it was stated 


that people who were stationed in non-plutonium 


areas and on quarterly badge exchange cycles -- 


and those people are the ones that were thought 


to be, you know, at low risk -- they would 


continue to wear film badges, but those film 


badges would not be read unless circumstances 


warranted. 


Now this decision was made before the fire. It 


was like in April, I think, of '69. All right? 


So you've got people working over in the 


uranium buildings and the administrative 


buildings that -- their badges were not read. 

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Now the fire happens, and they call people in 


from all over the site to respond, but that is 


only after the plutonium had been secured by 


the -- what did you call them, Mel, the 


materials recovery group? 


 MR. CHEW: Well, come of the people came in 


earlier to decontaminate, you know, peripheral 


areas of the buildings, not in-- not involved 


with 776. 


 DR. ULSH: Right. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, so that did happen at the same 


(unintelligible) -- sorry, go ahead 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ULSH: So we're thinking that the data gap 


is largely explained by that decision to -- 


that those other people -- not to read their 


film badges. Those are essentially unmonitored 


people in 1969. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, I -- say it again -- well, I ­

- I'm just going to add onto what you say. 


Clearly there could have been people who was 


part of that quarterly exchange and not have to 


be read that was asked to come in and help 


decontaminate, because they were only looking 


for small traces of alpha contamination, like 

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either on a walkway or something like that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But in those other areas, it 


would have been the professionals, the -- 


 MR. CHEW: Right. Yeah, and -- and -- and 


there would -- probably there was no expo-- 


external exposure, and so I don't think they 


would have said okay, well, now we've got to 


put on badges because he's going to be -- have 


an increased external exposure. They could 


have been the same people and have been -- 


still stayed on the same quarterly exchange. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) same badges, 


okay. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, okay. That seems 


reasonable, but I -- I don't know that it gets 


-- I think we need time to digest this issue. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, and you have to obviously 


have time to go back and see if these records 


are there and they're not part of the missing 


records. 


MR. MEYER: Something that may be important, 


Scott Raines had indicated last week that they 


will be relocating their records offices -- he 


said last week -- in a month or two, date not 

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specific. They have to -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


MR. MEYER: -- send most of their stored 


records -- they have 100 boxes of our records 


there right now. They have to send most of 


those back, he hasn't quite said how many, and 


there certainly will be a hiccup here in 


retrieval during that period. 


 DR. ULSH: Let's get our log books before they 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: All the more reason to get what 


we need quickly -- yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: Mark, I would have no problem if we 


have some additional dialogue if necessary 


because --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) chance to ask 


some questions to people, what their roles were 


-- specifically. I mean they say I helped 


decon the fire. Well, where would you decon 


fire, were you inside that particular building 


where the material was? No, I --


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that's (unintelligible) ­

-


 MR. CHEW: -- wasn't I was outside, some things 

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like this. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- becomes important because of 


that '69 data gap question. 


 DR. ULSH: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We've got hypothesis, but it 


seems like we have different hypotheses each 


time we count, so --


 DR. ULSH: Well, actually this one's holding 


up. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, well --


 DR. ULSH: This one's holding up though. 


 MR. GRIFFON: At least through this workgroup 


meeting. Let -- let -- I mean I think this 


might be worth-- but we have -- rich -- rich 


dataset here, too, that we don't have to, you 


know, go very far to dig in, you know, I would 


think, so -- anyway, let's leave it there for 


now I think but --


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- the last thing I would say, 


just -- just as a follow-up, I don't know if we 


specified that as an action, but Brant, you 


said you -- you will post these monthly 


dosimetry progress reports, can you -- 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: -- put those on the O drive. 


 DR. ULSH: It's on my to-do list. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right, I didn't know if I got 


that or not. Okay. 


Any -- I think we may need some informal calls, 


at least between now and the meeting. 


 DR. WADE: I think so. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm also going to work with Lew 


on -- the first day we have a subcommittee 


meeting, but we also probably need to schedule 


a workgroup -- some workgroup time -- 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- so that we can present on the 


next day to the full Board. 


MR. MEYER: I also think some calls between 


would be --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I expect those to happen 


and we'll -- we'll e-mail back and forth. We 


know how to get ahold of each other, so -- but 


thanks for all your work. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you for your leadership. 


Thank you all very much for your time. 


We're going to end the call now. Thank you --


 MR. GRIFFON: Thanks, everybody. 


 DR. WADE: -- all on the call for your patience 

1 

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in trying to hear through -- 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 5:15 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

367 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of August 31, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


30th day of September, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102