Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

Order 

December 27, 2010 

141355-59 & (125) 

RICHARD DUMAS, LYNN MCBRIDE, 

EUGENE PASKO, HAROLD COUNTS, JOHN 

MAUS, KENNETH KWASNIK, RICHARD 

BENNETT, PATRICK CHAPMAN, CHARLES 

DAPPRICH, JAMES DZIADZIOLA, Estate of 

GERALD FITZGERALD, Estate of VERNON 

MANUS, Estate of GEORGE MASSAB, 

LAWRENCE MYLNAREK, Estate of 

ROBERT SINCLAIR, CHARLES OSTERDALE, 

ROBERT J. SONGER, ROBERT DECKERS, 

ELIZABETH ZINNER, RICHARD STIMPSON, 

DONALD DURECKI, and RONALD RIEUS, 

Plaintiffs, 

and 

WAYNE ALARIE and RICHARD MARTIN, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 

and 

THEODORE S. ANDRIS, 

 Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v SC: 141355 

 COA: 279149 

 Wayne CC: 83-316603-CK 

SHELDON L. MILLER, 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

and 

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________________/ 

GERALD NYLUND, ANITA NYLUND, JOHN 

HOUSE, MARY ELLEN HOUSE, DAVID 

REMER, DONNA MARGARET REMER, 
2

LEONARD RAKOWICZ, RITA RAKOWICZ, 

STANLEY ELZINGA, MARILYN ELZINGA, 

JAMES HALLER, JOAN HALLER, JOHN 

JACKSON, WILLIE JOHNSON, EDWARD 

BARTZ, BETTY BARTZ, FRANK 

DOLINSHEK, MARY DOLINSHEK, MICHAEL 

DUNGEY, WINIFRED DUNGEY, FRANCES 

STOCKER, ARTHUR SHEWCHUK, PATRICIA 

SHEWCHUK, DAVID ALBRECHT, LINDA 

ALBRECHT, WILLIAM T MEDLIN, and 

SHIRLEY MEDLIN, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 

v SC: 141356 

 COA: 286342 

 Wayne CC: 94-420311-CZ 

LOPATIN, MILLER, FREEDMAN, 

BLUESTONE, ERLICH, ROSEN & BARTNICK, 

P.C., and SHELDON MILLER, 

 Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 

__________________________________________/ 

WAYNE ALARIE and RICHARD MARTIN, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 

v SC: 141357 

 COA: 286343 

 Wayne CC: 92-215259-CZ 

LOPATIN, MILLER, FREEDMAN, 

BLUESTONE, ERLICH, ROSEN & BARTNICK, 

P.C., and SHELDON MILLER, 

 Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 

__________________________________________/ 

ROBERT DECKERS, ELIZABETH ZINNER, 

RICHARD STIMPSON, and DONALD DURECKI, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 

and 

HAROLD COUNTS, ROBERT IVAN, and 

RICHARD ZICKEL, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v SC: 141358 

 COA: 286344 

 Wayne CC: 93-321648-NM 
3

SHELDON L. MILLER and LOPATIN, 

MILLER, FREEDMAN, BLUESTONE, 

ERLICH, ROSEN & BARTNICK, P.C., 

 Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 

and 

DAVID RAVID, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________________/ 

JAMES K. DZIADZIOLA, MARGARET 

DZIADZIOLA, LAWRENCE R. MLYNAREK, 

JOSEPHINE MLYNAREK, MARTHA 

CHAPMAN, Personal Representative of the 

Estate of PATRICK CHAPMAN, LYNETTE 

MASSAB, Personal Representative of the 

Estate of GEORGE MASSAB, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 

v SC: 141359 

 COA: 287143 

 Wayne CC: 04-418373-NM 

SHELDON L. MILLER, LOPATIN, MILLER, 

FREEDMAN, BLUESTONE, ERLICH, ROSEN 

& BARTNICK, P.C., and SHELDON L. MILLER 

& ASSOCIATES, P.C., 

 Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 

___________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 30, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as crossappellant are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the 

questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

 MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 

 I would grant leave to appeal, and therefore dissent. At issue is the point of 

accrual of the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice cases. The 

applicable statute, MCL 600.5838(1), provides: 

a claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself or 

herself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession accrues at the time 

that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional or 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 27, 2010 

s1221 

 

4

pseudoprofessional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for 

malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or 

otherwise has knowledge of the claim. [Emphasis added.] 

Here, defendant attorney represented plaintiffs insurance sales representatives in 

“wrongful termination” employment litigation. Defendant continued working on appeals 

in this case, even after plaintiffs retained another attorney to pursue “age discrimination” 

claims that plaintiffs believe grew out of the same circumstances as the “wrongful 

termination” claims and that should have been joined with the latter claims. As a result 

of defendant’s failure to join these claims, plaintiffs also filed a professional malpractice 

suit against him for the handling of their original lawsuit. The central question is whether 

defendant’s representation of plaintiffs in their “wrongful termination” appeal can fairly 

be said to have occurred in the course of representing plaintiffs in “matters out of which 

the claim for malpractice arose,” where such malpractice claim concerned defendant’s 

failure to attach “age discrimination” claims to “wrongful termination” claims in the 

original lawsuit. Significantly, MCL 600.5838(1) does not refer to the singular “matter,” 

but to the plural “matters,” and does not refer to the “case,” or the “claim,” but to “the 

matters,” as establishing the accrual point of its statute of limitations. 

 

 Accordingly, if under MCL 600.5838(1) the claim accrues from the time that 

plaintiffs hired a new attorney to replace defendant to represent them in the “age 

discrimination” claim, the two-year limitations period would have elapsed before the 

legal malpractice suit was filed against defendant. On the other hand, if under MCL 

600.5838(1) the claim accrues from the time that defendant concluded his representation 

of plaintiffs in the “wrongful termination” claim—the limited scope of which eventually 

prompted plaintiffs’ malpractice action—the two-year limitations period would not have 

elapsed before the legal malpractice suit was filed against defendant. 

 The reading of MCL 600.5838(1) sustained by the majority may conceivably be 

correct, but it is hardly clear. The majority’s interpretation is predicated upon a highly 

limited reading of the statute that would essentially equate a “case” or “claim” with 

“matters.” Each side in this case, in my judgment, has offered reasonable arguments in 

support of its position that the malpractice action here is, or is not, time-barred. Because 

this involves a significant issue of statutory interpretation, with important practical 

consequences for access to the legal system, I would grant leave to appeal. 

 CORRIGAN, J., joins the statement of MARKMAN, J. 

 YOUNG, J., not participating.