Slip Op. 17-

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff,

v.

GREENLIGHT ORGANIC, INC.,

Defendant.

Before: Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge

Court No. 17-00031

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

[Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is granted. Defendant’s motion for a protective order is 

denied.] 

Dated: December 18, 2017 

William Kanellis, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of 

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff. With him on brief were Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. 

Josh Levy, Marlow, Adler, Abrams, Newman and Lewis, P.A., of Coral Gables, FL, for 

Defendant. With him on brief were Peter S. Herrick, Peter S. Herrick, P.A., of St. Petersburg, 

FL, and Frances Pierson Hadfield, Crowell & Moring LLP, of New York, N.Y.

Choe-Groves, Judge: Plaintiff United States (“Government”) brings this case against 

Defendant Greenlight Organic, Inc. (“Greenlight”) to recover civil penalties, unpaid duties, and 

fees under 19 U.S.C. § 1592. The statute prohibits companies from making false statements or 

omitting material information in the course of importing merchandise into the United States 

through fraud, gross negligence, or negligence. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(1) (2012). The 

Government alleges that Greenlight misclassified and undervalued its subject merchandise 

fraudulently in violation of the statute. 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 2 

Before the court are two discovery motions. The first is the Government’s Motion to 

Compel Discovery Responses pursuant to Rule 37 of this Court. See The United States’ Mot.

Compel Disc. Resps., Oct. 25, 2017, ECF No. 40 (“Pl.’s Mot.”). The Government claims that 

Greenlight “has delayed producing and has withheld disclosure” of information “integral to the 

prosecution of its case,” id. at 1, and requests that the court order Greenlight to produce complete 

responses to the Government’s Requests for Admission 1–4, as well as all documents, 

information, and other evidence related to Government Interrogatories 3, 5, 8–11, and 15. See 

id. at 14. Greenlight objects to the Government’s motion and argues, in part, that the 

Government’s requests are overbroad and irrelevant to the case, and that Greenlight has already 

produced documents to the Government over the course of the investigation. See Def’s Resp. 

Opposing Pl.’s Mot. Compel Disc. Resps. 1–3, Nov. 7, 2017, ECF No. 43 (“Def’s Resp.”). 

The second discovery motion is Greenlight’s Motion for Protective Order Limiting 

Discovery of Parambir Aulakh and Monika Gill’s Personal Finances pursuant to Rule 26(c) of 

this Court. See Def.’s Mot. Protective Order Limiting Disc. Parambir Aulakh & Monika Gill’s 

Personal Finances, Nov. 7, 2017, ECF No. 44 (“Def.’s Mot.”). Greenlight seeks a protective 

order to limit discovery with respect to the personal finances of two of its officers, Mr. Parambir 

Aulakh and Ms. Monika Gill, arguing that the Government has not properly alleged claims to 

establish the relevancy of the proposed discovery. See id. at 11. The Government disagrees, 

stating that the requested discovery is relevant to its case-in-chief for a fraudulent business 

scheme and to a potential claim for piercing the corporate veil. See The United States’ Opp’n

Def.’s Mot. Protective Order 5, 10, Nov. 22, 2017, ECF No. 49 (“Pl.’s Resp.”). The court held a 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 3 

telephone conference with the Parties regarding both motions on December 4, 2017. See 

Teleconference, Dec. 4, 2017, ECF No. 52. The court will address each discovery issue in turn. 

A. Legal Standard 

District courts have broad discretion in deciding discovery matters. See generally Accent 

Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging 

court’s discretion in denying additional discovery); Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Tr. v. VanVoorhies, 

278 F.3d 1288, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting court’s discretion in denying motion to compel 

discovery). Discovery must be relevant to the issues in the case, including any party’s claim or 

defense, or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See USCIT R. 

26(b)(1). The court must limit discovery if it finds that “the burden or expense of the proposed 

discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” USCIT R. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 

B. The Government’s Motion to Compel 

1. Requests for Admission 1–4

The Government’s Requests for Admission 1–4 seek an admission from Greenlight that 

Mr. Aulakh and Ms. Gill “participated in Greenlight’s determination” of both the valuation and 

classification of the subject merchandise. Pl. Mot. Ex. 1, at 1–2. Greenlight objects to the 

requests, arguing that they seek discovery on matters outside of the scope of the case and 

irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims. See Def.’s Resp. 15. The Government responds that the requests 

are relevant because they relate to “who made the valuation and classification decisions at 

Greenlight.” Pl.’s Mot. 4–5.

USCIT Rule 36 permits a party to serve a request for admission on another party. A 

party has thirty days to answer or object to the admission, or else the matter is admitted for the 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 4 

purpose of the case. USCIT R. 36(a)(3). The responding party must “specifically deny it or state 

in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it” in its answer, USCIT R. 

36(a)(4), or state the grounds for objection. USCIT R. 36(a)(5). In the event of a dispute, “[t]he 

requesting party may move to determine the sufficiency of an answer or objections. Unless the 

court finds an objection justified, it must order that an answer be served.” USCIT R. 36(a)(6). 

The Government’s Requests for Admission are relevant to the case because they seek 

information regarding the actions of Ms. Aulakh and Ms. Gill in their capacities as Greenlight’s 

officers. It is a well-known principle that officers serve as agents of the corporation, and thus, 

the officers’ actions in their official capacities represent the conduct of the entity. See Jones v. 

N.Y. Guar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 628 (1879) (“A corporation can act only by its 

agents.”); Kellogg Brown & Root Serv., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (“[T]he general rule is that an agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal when 

employees are acting within the scope of their authority or employment, absent special 

circumstances.”) (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003)); see also Long Island Sav. 

Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying general rule of 

imputing agent’s knowledge to principal in action against financial institution); Manville Sales 

Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (officers’ knowledge of acts,

conducted within the scope of their employment, made the company liable for direct 

infringement). In its Requests for Admission, the Government inquired about Mr. Aulakh’s and 

Ms. Gill’s conduct in their capacities as officers of Greenlight. Because Greenlight is the named 

Defendant in this case, and Mr. Aulakh and Ms. Gill are officers of the corporation, the court 

will allow discovery regarding the conduct of Mr. Aulakh and Ms. Gill in their capacities as 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 5 

officers of the Defendant. The court directs Greenlight to respond to the Government’s Requests 

for Admissions 1–4.

2. Government Interrogatories 

The Government served Greenlight with multiple interrogatories, seven of which are at 

issue in this dispute.1 The Government contends that Greenlight has not fully complied with 

requests for documents, information, and other evidence related to the seven interrogatories, and 

asks the court to compel Greenlight to produce any and all missing documents, information, and 

other evidence.

USCIT Rule 33(a)(2) allows a party to serve any other party with an interrogatory that 

“may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” The responding party 

must “separately and fully” answer or object to each interrogatory within thirty days of service of 

the interrogatory. USCIT R. 33(b). Objections should be “stated with specificity,” and “[a]ny 

ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the 

failure.” USCIT R. 33(b)(4). USCIT Rule 34(a) permits a party to serve any other party with a 

request to produce “any designated documents or electronically stored information,” as well as 

tangible items. Similar to Rule 33, the responding party must respond within thirty days of 

service of the request. USCIT R. 34(b)(2)(A). Objections to part of the request “must specify 

the part and permit inspection of the rest.” USCIT R. 34(b)(2)(C).

 

1 The Government does not explicitly request relief from the court with respect to Government 

Interrogatory 6. Because both Parties discuss Government Interrogatory 6 in their briefings, 

however, the court will take it into consideration and address it here. 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 6 

a. Government Interrogatory 3 

 Government Interrogatory 3 requests that Greenlight “[n]ame all manufacturers of 

Subject Merchandise imported by Greenlight from January 1, 2007 through February 9, 2012.” 

Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 5. The interrogatory asks Greenlight to identify contact information for 

Greenlight’s manufacturers, documents related to the subject merchandise, and all 

communications between its manufacturers and Greenlight. Id. Greenlight objects to the 

interrogatory, arguing that it is overbroad and that the timeframe requested is outside the scope 

of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Def.’s Resp. 8–9. Greenlight asserts also that it 

cannot produce communications with certain vendors because Greenlight no longer has access to 

a “defunct and inaccessible” former email address associated with the website 

“greenlightorganic.com.” See id. at 3–4, 10.

Greenlight’s first objection that the interrogatory is overbroad is improper because it 

constitutes a general objection, which is insufficient to contest an interrogatory. Courts have 

recognized that the “mere assertion that interrogatories are overly broad, burdensome, 

oppressive, or irrelevant is not adequate to constitute a successful objection.” Sellick Equip. Ltd. 

v. United States, 18 CIT 352, 354 (1994). “A successful objection offers a recognized reason for 

objection buttressed by substantiated, detailed proof of the claim.” United States v. Optrex 

America, Inc., 28 CIT 993, 995 (2004). The court finds that Greenlight’s general objection is 

insufficient with respect to Government Interrogatory 3. 

The court rejects also Greenlight’s objection that Government Interrogatory 3 requests 

information outside the time period alleged in the complaint. The complaint seeks penalties and 

unpaid duties for athletic wearing apparel imported between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 7 

2011, while the interrogatory requests information between January 1, 2007 and February 9, 

2012. The Government argues that in order to prove a trade fraud case, it is helpful to compare a 

company’s actions before and after the alleged fraud occurred. See Telephone Conference at 

0:28:33–0:31:42, 0:32:48–0:33:33. The court finds that the Government’s inquiry into 

Greenlight’s actions between January 1, 2012 and February 9, 2012, the time period outside the 

scope of the period alleged in the complaint, is relevant to the Government’s claims and is 

reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. See USCIT R. 26(b)(1). The court 

instructs Greenlight to supplement its response to Government Interrogatory 3 with information, 

documents, and other evidence for the full time period from January 1, 2007 to February 9, 2012. 

 With respect to email communications associated with the defunct website 

“greenlightorganic.com,” Greenlight argues that it cannot produce or search for any of these 

prior emails because it abandoned its former website. See Def.’s Resp. 3–4, 10. Greenlight’s 

counsel agreed during the telephone conference call with the court that he will send a letter to the 

third-party email service provider requesting copies of the communications. See Telephone 

Conference at 0:40:05–0:41:00. Counsel for Greenlight also represented that he will consult 

with his client regarding any additional relevant documents that may be in his client’s

possession. See id. at 1:01:35–1:01:40, 1:04:40–1:04:45. The court orders Greenlight’s counsel 

to file a letter with the court reporting on Greenlight’s efforts to obtain communications from its 

third-party email service provider. 

b. Government Interrogatories 5, 6, and 15 

Government Interrogatory 5 asks Greenlight to “[i]dentify every company, other than 

Greenlight, with which any owner, director, manager, or employee of Greenlight participated in 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 8 

the importation of merchandise into the United States.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 7. The interrogatory 

also asks Greenlight to provide contact information for every company. Id. Greenlight contends 

that it has “turned over the documents and communications of which it is aware and in 

possession regarding customs brokers.” Def.’s Resp. 13. 

Government Interrogatory 6 asks Greenlight to “[i]dentify all documents and 

communications relating to Greenlight’s determinations that the Subject Merchandise was made 

of woven or knit materials.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 8. Greenlight responds that the documents have 

already been provided to the Government, and that “Greenlight relied upon the expertise and 

certifications of its vendors, suppliers, and customs brokers for tariff classification advice.” Id.;

see also Def.’s Resp. 12.

The Government asserts that Greenlight has failed to produce documents with respect to 

Government Interrogatory 15, which asks Greenlight to “[i]dentify all documents and 

communications of Greenlight relating to the labeling of Greenlight Wearing Apparel as 

‘recycled polyester.’” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 16. Greenlight argues that it has already produced 

documents related to the interrogatory to the Government. Def.’s Resp. 12–13.

 During the telephone conference with the court, the Government stated that additional 

documents acquired from third parties provide it with good faith reason to believe that 

Greenlight has failed to produce all relevant documents. See Telephone Conference at 1:04:45–

1:05:06. Accordingly, the court orders Greenlight to conduct another search of its documents 

and to produce any remaining materials that are responsive to Government Interrogatories 5, 6, 

and 15, or are responsive to any other discovery requests for which Greenlight has performed 

incomplete document searches. The court instructs counsel for Greenlight to file a letter with the 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 9 

court reporting on Greenlight’s efforts to search for responsive documents in compliance with 

this order. 

c. Government Interrogatories 8–11

Government Interrogatories 8–11 ask Greenlight to “[i]dentify all sources of income” for 

Mr. Aulakh and Ms. Gill from January 1, 2007 through June 19, 2017 and to “[i]dentify all 

companies or persons” with whom the officers engaged professionally. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1, at 13–

15. Greenlight objects on the basis that the Government’s complaint does not allege individual 

wrongdoing or individual liability and the inquiry is outside of the scope of the complaint. Id. 

The Supreme Court has held consistently that discovery statutes are to be broadly 

construed “to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter

that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 

437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). Discovery is 

not necessarily limited to the issues in the pleadings because “discovery itself is designed to help 

define and clarify the issues.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., 437 U.S. at 351. Greenlight’s argument 

contradicts the traditionally liberal nature of discovery. Because discovery is not limited to the 

complaint, Greenlight’s objection that the Government has not yet alleged individual 

wrongdoing is improper at this stage of litigation. The Government has stated that the purpose 

of Government Interrogatories 8–11 is for the Government to obtain information to assist it with

determining whether to amend its complaint to include charges of individual liability against 

Greenlight’s officers. See Telephone Conference at 1:09:28–1:10:20. The Government’s 

actions fall within the liberal nature of discovery and thus will be allowed. 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 10 

Liability for claims brought under Section 1592 is not limited to companies. Under 

principles of agency law, “an agent who actually commits a tort is generally liable for the tort 

along with the principal, even though the agent was acting for the principal.” United States v. 

Trek Leather, Inc., 767 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Restatement (Second) of 

Agency § 343 (Am. Law Inst. 1958); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01 (Am. Law Inst. 

2006)). An officer of a corporation may be liable personally for violating Section 1592, even 

when the conduct falls within the scope of the officer’s authority. Trek Leather, Inc., 767 F.3d at 

1299. The court will allow discovery into the officers’ sources of income and the companies 

with whom the officers have conducted business, in order to determine whether Greenlight’s 

officers may be liable individually in the Government’s Section 1592 case. The court directs 

Greenlight to respond to Government Interrogatories 8–11.

C. Greenlight’s Motion for Protective Order

Defendant’s motion for a protective order seeks to limit discovery into Mr. Aulakh’s and 

Ms. Gill’s personal finances, asserting that discovery is improper and irrelevant. See Def.’s Mot. 

11. The Government argues that the information is necessary in order to prove the existence of a 

business fraud scheme and is probative as to “whether it would be appropriate to pierce the 

corporate veil.” See Pl.’s Resp. 5–6.

USCIT Rule 26(c)(1) permits a party to move for a protective order in the course of 

discovery. The court may issue a protective order if it finds good cause, including “forbidding 

inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure of discovery to certain matters.” 

USCIT R. 26(c)(1)(D). 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 11 

The Government provides adequate justification as to why the court should allow 

discovery regarding the personal finances of Greenlight’s principals, stating that “[e]vidence of 

financial benefits received by Greenlight principals and their business associations are central to 

the fraud scheme the Government will detail at trial.” Pl.’s Resp. 6. For instance, “[e]vidence 

collected thus far shows that soon after they became aware of the Government’s investigation,” 

Greenlight’s officers “took steps to deplete Greenlight’s assets and establish a new apparel 

company.” Id. The Government believes that “[e]vidence of financial benefits and other 

business opportunities received” by Greenlight’s officers are “probative of a common plan” for 

fraud and evasion of customs penalties. Id. at 8. Because the proposed discovery is related to 

the Government’s claims against Greenlight, the court determines that discovery related to the 

personal finances of Mr. Aulakh and Ms. Gill will be permitted. The motion for a protective 

order relating to Mr. Aulakh’s and Ms. Gill’s personal finances is denied.

Upon consideration of the motion, and all other papers and proceedings in this action, it 

is hereby: 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is granted; and it is further 

ORDERED that Defendant will provide complete responses to the Requests for 

Admission 1–4 by January 12, 2018; and it is further 

ORDERED that Defendant will provide all documents, information, and other evidence 

related to Government Interrogatories 3, 5, 6, 8–11, and 15; and it is further 

ORDERED that Defendant will file a letter with the court by January 12, 2018 reporting 

on Greenlight’s efforts to search for responsive documents and to obtain email communications 

from the third-party service provider; and it is further 
Court No. 17-00031 Page 12 

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for a protective order is denied. 

/s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves 

 Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge 

Dated: December 18, 2017 

 New York, New York