UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4753

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BOBBIE JO BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4754

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MITCHELL EDWARD GARVIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District 

Judge. (1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-13; 1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-26)

Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: August 7, 2014

Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Casey Allen Sears, II, Johnson City, Tennessee; Douglas L. 

Payne, LAW OFFICE OF DOUGLAS L. PAYNE, Greeneville, Tennessee, 

for Appellants. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, 

Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Bobbie Jo Brown and Mitchell Edward 

Garvin of multiple counts of passing false and fictitious checks 

with the intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 514(a)(2) (2012), and conspiracy to pass false and fictitious 

checks with the intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371 (2012). On appeal, Brown and Garvin challenge their 

convictions, arguing that the Government did not meet its burden 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they had the intent to 

defraud. We affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Strayhorn, 

743 F.3d 917, 921 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2689 

(2014). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Government. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The test is 

whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 
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Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

We consider “the complete picture” created by the 

evidence, United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir. 

1996) (en banc), including both circumstantial and direct 

evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from such evidence 

in the Government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 

326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). If the evidence supports different 

interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to 

believe, and we “may not overturn a substantially supported 

verdict merely because [we] find[] the verdict unpalatable or 

determine[] that another, reasonable verdict would be 

preferable.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862. Rather, “[a] defendant 

bringing a sufficiency challenge must overcome a heavy burden, 

and reversal for insufficiency must be confined to cases where 

the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Engle, 

676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012). 

To sustain convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 

§ 514(a)(2), the government must prove, among other elements, 

that the defendant had the intent to defraud when cashing the 

false or fictitious instrument. See 18 U.S.C. § 514(a) 

(“Whoever, with the intent to defraud . . . .”); Ingram v. 

United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (“Conspiracy to commit a 
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particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the 

degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense 

itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like other facts, 

“[f]raudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the 

circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.” 

United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993). 

Moreover, under the doctrine of willful blindness, knowledge may 

be inferred where a defendant deliberately avoids enlightenment. 

United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).

Here, although there was no direct evidence that 

Appellants had the intent to defraud, we conclude that the 

circumstances surrounding the check-cashing scheme were 

suspicious enough to alert even the most unsophisticated 

individual to the fraudulent nature of the scheme. Moreover, 

the evidence suggests that Appellants took very few actions to 

ascertain the validity of the checks even when the transpiring 

events gave them reasons to suspect that the checks were not 

legitimate. Finally, Brown testified that she was generally 

wary of requests to cash monetary instruments but cashed the 

checks nevertheless, having only the bald assertion from someone 

she barely knew that they were legitimate. Thus, the jury could 

have concluded that Appellants “subjectively believe[d] that 

there [was] a high probability that” the checks were not valid 

and that they took “deliberate actions to avoid learning” that 
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they were in fact invalid. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. V. SEB 

S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).

Accordingly, we conclude that the Government met its 

burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants had 

the intent to defraud, and we affirm the district court’s 

judgments. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED