Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Gibbs v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 2014 IL App (1st) 123681

Appellate Court 

Caption

ELIZABETH (LIBBY) GIBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLITT AND 

GAINES, P.C., Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-12-3681

Filed February 11, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

Plaintiff’s individual and class action complaint against defendant law 

firm for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based on 

the filing of a collection action against plaintiff on behalf of a debt 

collection firm not licensed in Illinois was properly dismissed, since 

licensed attorneys at law are expressly exempt from the requirements 

of the Act.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CH-3381; the 

Hon. Neil Cohen, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, of Chicago (Daniel A. 

Edelman, Cathleen M. Combs, James O. Latturner, and Thomas E. 

Soule, of counsel), for appellant.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford, David 

M. Schultz, and Justin M. Penn, of counsel), for appellee.
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Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Simon and Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff Elizabeth (Libby) Gibbs appeals from the order of the circuit court dismissing 

her amended complaint for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 

U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006)) against defendant Blitt & Gaines, P.C. (Blitt & Gaines). On 

appeal, Gibbs contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim because law firms 

may be held liable for violations under the FDCPA even if the Illinois Collection Agency Act 

(Illinois Act) (225 ILCS 425/1 et seq. (West 2012)) expressly excludes attorneys from its 

requirements. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 JURISDICTION

¶ 3 The circuit court entered its order granting Blitt & Gaines’ motion to dismiss on 

December 4, 2012. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on December 11, 2012. Accordingly, 

this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303, governing 

appeals from final judgments entered below. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. 

May 30, 2008).

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Gibbs resides in Mackinaw, Illinois, located in Tazewell County. On October 9, 2008, 

Blitt & Gaines filed a suit against Gibbs on behalf of its client, CACH, LLC (CACH), a debt 

collection firm, to collect an outstanding debt of $17,663.66 Gibbs allegedly owed for credit 

card purchases. CACH was not an Illinois-licensed debt collection agency when it filed the 

suit. On May 12, 2009, approximately seven months after filing the suit against Gibbs, 

CACH obtained its Illinois license. Gibbs was served in this underlying debt collection case 

on September 13, 2011, more than two years after CACH became licensed in Illinois and 

almost three years after its debt collection case against Gibbs was filed.

¶ 6 Gibbs filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on this district’s appellate opinion in LVNV 

Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2011 IL App (1st) 092773. After Gibbs filed her motion to dismiss, 

she and CACH entered into a settlement agreement and on March 1, 2012, the trial court 

entered an agreed order wherein CACH voluntarily dismissed its case against Gibbs, with 

prejudice, and reimbursed her $119 in fees. This dismissal, with prejudice, effectively erased 

Gibbs’ credit card debt and barred CACH from pursuing Gibbs’ debt in court in the future.
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¶ 7 Gibbs subsequently filed her own complaint in Cook County based on the underlying 

debt collection suit, along with class action allegations, against Blitt & Gaines, which 

employed the attorneys who filed the suit on behalf of CACH. Gibbs’ individual and class 

action suits attempt to hold the law firm liable for its attorneys’ actions in filing suits against 

Gibbs and all other similarly situated plaintiffs, on behalf of CACH and other collection 

agencies not licensed in Illinois. The complaint alleged that the law firm’s actions in filing 

suit on behalf of unlicensed debt collection agencies made the firm a debt collector. Gibbs 

also alleged that by filing suit on behalf of unlicensed collection agencies, the law firm 

violated the FDCPA and she sought statutory and actual damages, attorney fees and costs and 

other relief on behalf of herself and all members of the class.

¶ 8 Blitt & Gaines filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the 

Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2012)), raising numerous 

defenses to Gibbs’ individual and class action complaints. On December 4, 2012, the trial 

court granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615, holding that “it is clear 

Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is based solely on Defendant’s alleged violation of the [Illinois Act] 

by filing collection lawsuits on behalf of an unlicensed debt collector. Defendant, however, is 

expressly exempt from the provisions of the [Illinois Act]. Plaintiff cannot use an 

inapplicable Illinois statute to manufacture a claim under the FDCPA.” Gibbs filed her timely 

notice of appeal.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Blitt & Gaines filed its motion to dismiss under both section 2-615 and section 2-619. A 

section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings and the court 

determines whether the allegations of the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party and taking all well-pleaded facts as true, are sufficient to state a cause 

of action upon which relief may be granted. Dratewska-Zator v. Rutherford, 2013 IL App 

(1st) 122699, ¶ 14. A section 2-619 motion to dismiss, however, “admits the legal sufficiency 

of the complaint, but asserts affirmative matter outside the complaint that defeats the cause of 

action.” Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 235 Ill. 2d 351, 361 (2009). The court construes the 

pleadings and any supporting documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367-68 (2003). Under 

either section 2-615 or section 2-619, our review of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Kean, 

235 Ill. 2d at 361.

¶ 11 Gibbs contends that Blitt & Gaines violated the FDCPA by filing suit on behalf of an 

unlicensed debt collection agency in violation of the Illinois Act. In her amended complaint, 

Gibbs alleged that Blitt & Gaines violated section 1692e of the FDCPA. Section 1692e 

provides, in part, that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 

(2006). Gibbs relies on Trice to support her argument that Blitt & Gaines engaged in false or 

unfair debt collection. In Trice, this court found that “a complaint filed by an unregistered 

collection agency is *** a nullity, and any judgment entered on such a complaint is void. The 

subsequent registration of the collection agency does not absolve the agency of the crime of 
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debt collection by an unregistered collection agency, and it does not validate a judgment 

entered on the void complaint.” Trice, 2011 IL App (1st) 092773, ¶ 19. Gibbs argues that 

Blitt & Gaines was aware of the appellate court’s decision in Trice and should have known 

that filing a complaint on behalf of an unregistered collection agency would result in a void 

judgment. The firm, however, chose to pursue CACH’s claim against Gibbs. She concludes 

that such action violates the FDCPA, which “prohibits the use of false or unfair 

representations in the course of debt collection.”

¶ 12 However, when the appellate court rendered its decision in Trice, resolution of the claim 

was far from conclusive. The court remanded the cause in Trice to the trial court and upon a 

petition for rehearing, the appellate court modified its judgment to acknowledge that new 

constitutional arguments had been raised which the trial court would address on remand.

Trice, 2011 IL App (1st) 092773, ¶ 22. On remand, the trial court determined that the Illinois 

Act’s provision criminalizing the failure to register as a collection agency is unconstitutional, 

and that the underlying judgment against the debtor “should have been voidable rather than 

void.” LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, No. 11 CH 11741, slip op. at 30 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. 

Apr. 23, 2013). The trial court therefore upheld the judgment originally obtained by LVNV 

Funding against Trice. Id. Trice is currently pending on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme 

Court. LVNV, LLC v. Trice, No. 116129.

¶ 13 While the constitutionality of the registration provision is pending before our supreme 

court, we decline to speculate on whether a judgment obtained by a complaint filed by an 

unregistered collection agency is void or voidable as a result. In any event, Trice as it 

currently stands does not sufficiently support Gibbs’ claim that Blitt & Gaines engaged in 

actionable debt collection by pursuing a frivolous complaint against her.

¶ 14 Furthermore, the Blitt & Gaines attorneys did not violate the Illinois Act by filing 

CACH’s complaint against Gibbs. The purpose of the Illinois Act is to “protect consumers 

against debt collection abuse.” 225 ILCS 425/1a (West 2012). The Illinois Act defines a 

“collection agency” or a “debt collector” as “any person who, in the ordinary course of 

business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in debt collection.” 225 

ILCS 425/2 (West 2012). The Illinois Act, however, exempts certain persons from its 

requirements:

“This Act does not apply to persons whose collection activities are confined to and

are directly related to the operation of a business other than that of a collection 

agency, and specifically does not include the following:

* * *

5. Licensed attorneys at law[.]” 225 ILCS 425/2.03 (West 2012).

¶ 15 Blitt & Gaines is a law firm comprised of licensed attorneys who file suits on behalf of 

collection agencies. As such, we find that it is exempt from the requirements of the Illinois 

Act pursuant to the above provision. Since Blitt & Gaines committed no violation of the 

Illinois Act, and therefore engaged in no misconduct by filing CACH’s claim, Gibbs’

contention that the firm violated the FDCPA cannot stand.
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¶ 16 Also, the issue of whether the filing of the complaint here violates the FDCPA is one of 

first impression in Illinois. Therefore, Illinois courts may properly look to federal law for 

guidance. People v. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d 540, 553-54 (2003). “The FDCPA was 

designed to provide basic, overarching rules for debt collection activities; it was not meant to 

convert every violation of a state debt collection law into a federal violation.” Carlson v. 

First Revenue Assurance, 359 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004); Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, 

Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2007) (the FDCPA “creates its own 

rules” and “does not so much as hint at being an enforcement mechanism for other rules of 

state and federal law”). The FDCPA was enacted “to protect consumers from a host of unfair, 

harassing, and deceptive collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on 

ethical debt collectors. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Trade 

Comm’n v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2007).

¶ 17 Fick v. American Acceptance Co., No. 3:11 CV 299, 2012 WL 1074288 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 

28, 2012), is instructive here. In Fick, a debtor sued both the unlicensed debt collector and 

the law firm representing the debt collector, alleging that in filing the underlying collection 

suit the law firm was also a debt collector whose actions violated the FDCPA. Id. at *1. The 

federal district court dismissed the debtor’s section 1692e claim against the law firm, holding 

that the section applies “to threats to take action that cannot legally be taken, but not illegal 

actions actually taken.” Id. at *4. Here, Gibbs’ claim is based on the underlying suit actually 

filed by Blitt & Gaines. Pursuant to Fick, her section 1692e claim cannot stand.

¶ 18 Finally, federal cases have held that the act of filing a debt collection suit under various 

circumstances, without more, is not sufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA. See 

Williams v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman, LLC, No. 09-6177 (WJM), 2011 WL 843943 

(D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2011); Harvey v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 

2006) (filing a debt collection suit without immediate means of proving the debt); 

Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 127 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897-98 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (bringing a debt 

collection suit based on disputed charges not unfair).

¶ 19 Due to our disposition of this appeal, we need not consider other issues raised by the 

parties.

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 21 Affirmed.