alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of H&H Imports, Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on his knowledge:

(1)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: May 5, 2011

| |                                                      
| | -----------------------------------------------------
| |                                                      
| |                                                      
| | /s/ STEVEN ROGAI                                     
| | Steven Rogai                                         
| | Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act**

**of 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of Cannabis Science, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Richard Cowan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  May 4, 2010

*/s/ Richard Cowan*

Richard Cowan

Chief Financial Officer
#### State of West Virginia *ex rel.*Arlie C. White *v.*Otto C. Boles, *Warden, Etc.*

*(No.*12403)

Submitted February 16, 1965.

Decided March 2, 1965.

*Glyn Dial Ellis,*for relator. '

*C. Donald Robertson,*Attorney General, *George H. Mitchell,*Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Calhoun, Judge:

In this original proceeding in habeas corpus,' Arlie C. White, the relator, seeks to be released from his present confinement in the state penitentiary so far as his imprisonment relates to the former of two sentences. The validity of the latter of the two sentences is not assailed in this proceeding.

On January 17, 1962, the relator entered his plea of guilty to an indictment for forgery pending in the Circuit Court of Logan County and, on February 24, 1962, he was sentenced by that court to confinement in the state penitentiary for an indeterminate period of from two to ten years. Subsequently he was released from the penitentiary on parole. While on parole, he was, on May 13, 1964, again indicted for forgery by a grand jury of the Circuit Court of Logan County. On May 25, 1964, he appeared before the court in person and by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to the latter indictment and was sentenced by the court on that day to confinement in the state penitentiary for an indeterminate period of from one to ten years, the penalty for the offense of forgery having been changed since the date of the former sentence. The sentence imposed on May 25, *2821964, provided that it should run concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1962.

In his habeas corpus petition, the relator alleges that he was denied the assistance of counsel in connection with the former arraignment, plea of guilty and sentence. In the return filed in behalf of the respondent, it is admitted that the 1962 orders showing the relator’s arraignment, plea of guilty and sentence are silent on the question whether he was then represented by counsel, whether he was advised of his right to assistance of counsel, and whether he intelligently and understandingly waived such right. There is no denial, therefore, of the relator’s allegation and we cannot presume, upon a silent record, or from the prisoner’s plea of guilty, that he waived his right to counsel.

The Court holds that, in these circumstances, the decision of this case is governed by the principles enunciated and applied in *State ex rel. May*v. *Boles, Warden, etc.,*149 W. Va. 155, 139 S. E. 2d 177; that the sentence of February 24, 1962, is void; that the relator is relieved of his confinement in the penitentiary pursuant to the void sentence; but that he is not entitled to be released from the penitentiary so far as it relates to the sentence imposed on May 25, 1964, the validity of which has not been questioned. The relator is, therefore, remanded to the state penitentiary and to the custody of the respondent to continue his imprisonment pursuant to the sentence of May 25, 1964, the validity of which has not been questioned.

*Prisoner remanded.*
Order entered April 22 , 2013

In The



## Court of Appeals

**Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05

- 12

- 01 715

- CV

ALEXANDER R. DAVIS A ND REBECCA R. DAVIS

, Appellant s

V.

TEXAS MUTUAL INSURAN CE COMPANY

, Appellee s

On Appeal from the 1 60 th Judicial District C ourt

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 11

- 06356



### O RDER

Because the clerk’s record filed electronically April 1 5 , 2013 is defective, and a corrected

record was filed April 17 , 2013, we STRIKE the April 15 th record from the record of this cause.

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE
The Honorable William G. Cambridge, Chief Judge, United States Distric t 1 Court for the District of Nebraska. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2305

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Sergio Hernandez, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 28, 1997 Filed: October 30, 1997

___________ Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. After completing an 18-month prison term for a drug-distribution charge to w hich he had pleaded guilty, Sergio Hernandez was deported to Mexico. During the threeyear supervised release portion of his drug sentence, Hernandez returned to the United States where he was arrested for assault and firearm charges. Based upon these events, He rnandez & s probation officer petitioned the District Court to revoke Hernandez & s 1 supervised release. Following Hernandez & s guilty plea to a separate charge of illegal-2-

re-entry, in violation of 8 U .S.C. § 1326(a) (1994), and his admission that the re-entry violated his supervised release, the Court revoked Hernandez & s supervised release and sentenced him to two years imprisonment. Hernandez appeals, argu ing that the District Cou rt erred in sentencing him in excess of the Guidelines revocation imprisonmen t range. We disagree, and affirm Hernandez & s revocation sentence.
When a d istrict court finds that a defendant has violated a condition of hi s supervised release, the court may revoke supervised release, “and require the defendant to serve in prison all or pa

rt of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the off ense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for tim e previously served on postrele ase supervision.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994). Upon our ca reful review of the record, we conclude the District Court did not abuse it s discreti on in departing from the Guidelines range suggested under U.S. Sentencin g Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, p.s. (1995) (range of imprisonment available upo n revocation). See United S tates v. Carr , 66 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (Chapter 7 Guidelines are advisory and non-binding; District Court may depart from revocatio n

imprisonment range when, in its considered discretion, such departure i s warrante d); United States v. Grimes , 54 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1995) (revocatio n sen tence reviewed for abuse of discretion). Hernandez & s revocation prison sentenc e di d not exceed the maximum prison term authorized under section 3583(e)(3), th e Dis trict Court specifically stated it had considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C

. §§ 3553 and 3583 (1994), and the Court & s stated reasons for imposing the two-year term reflect consideration of those factors. Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
## United States Court of App eals
F O R T H E E I G H T H C I R C U I T

__ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 1- 12 93

__ __ __ __ __ _ Tho m as H. Bray , *
* App el la nt , *
* App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s v. * Dis tri ctCo ur t fo r th e * Dis tri ctof No rth Dako ta

. Ban k o f Am eri ca; MERS In c. * (Mo rtg ag e Ele ct ro ni c Reg is tra ti on * [UNPUBLISHED] Sy st em s) ; Co un trywide Hom e Loa ns , *
* App el le es
. *

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ *
* Co un trywide Hom e Loa ns ; Ba nkof * Am eri ca; an d M ERS In c., as a *
no m in ee o f Am eri ca’s Ho m e Loa ns * LLC, it s s uc ces so rs an d a ss ig ns , *
* Co un te r Cl ai m an ts , *
*
v. *
* Tho m as H. Bray , in di vi du al ly andas * al le ge d Tru st ee o f Mu lt ig rai n C PT a/k/a * Mu lt ig rai ns CPT; M ic ha el D. Harris , * Trus te e o f Bra y

10 Fam il y

Trus t; Ken * Cam pb el l, al so kn own as Ke nn et h * Cam pb el l; Sh aren daBray W ie be ; *Dev inBray; an d P or tfo li o R eco ve ry *

Ass oc ia te s, *
* Co un te r Defen da nt s. *

__ __ __ __ __ _ Subm it te d: Sep te m

be r 28 , 20 11 Fi le d: Octo be r 4, 2 01 1

__ __ __ __ __ _ Befo re MELLOY, BOW MAN, an d S HEPHERD, Circ ui t J ud ge s.

__ __ __ __ __ _ PER CURI AM.
Tho m as Bray ap pe al s th e di st ric t co ur t’s adve rs e su m m ary jud gm en t de ci si on 1 in th is act io n in vo lv in g Bray’ s co m pl ai nt se ek in g t o qu ie t ti tl e to hi s pr op ert y , an d de fen da nt s’ co un te rcl ai m se ek in g fo recl os ur e on th at pr op ert y an d se ve ral ot he r sp eci fic form s o f rel ie f. Bec au se th e d is tri ctco ur t’s jud gm en t d idno t fu ll y di sp os e
o f al l of th e cl ai m s in th is act io n, an d in pa rti cu la r di d no t ad dr es s al l of th e rel ie f reque st ed an d al l of th e co un te rcl ai m de fen da nt s, we la ck juri sd ic ti on
. See 28 U.S.C. § 12 91 (co ur ts of ap pe al s sh al l ha ve juri sd ic ti on of ap p e a l s fro m al l fin al de ci si on s of di st ric t co ur ts ); Fed

. R. Ci v. P. 54 (b ) (an y or de r th a t ad jud ic at es fewer th an al l cl ai m s do es no t en d act io n as to an y cl ai m s or pa rti es ); Tho m as v. Bas ha m , 93 1 F.2 d 52 1, 52 2- 23 (8 th Ci r. 19 91 ) (juri sd ic ti on al is su es wil l be rai se d su a sp on te whe n th ere is in di cat io n t ha t juris di ct io n i s l ack in g) . Accor di ng ly, th e ap pe al is di sm is se d.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

The Hon or ab le Dan ie l L. Hov la nd , Unite d St at es Dis tri ct Ju dg e fo r th e Dis tri ct 1 of Nort h Dak ot a. -2

-
CHAIRMAN:

Paul L. Ziemer, Ph.D.
Lafayette, Indiana

MEMBERS:

Josie Beach
Richland, Washington

Bradley P. Clawson
Rexburg, Idaho

Michael H. Gibson
Franklin, Ohio

Mark A. Griffon
Salem, New Hampshire

James E. Lockey, M.D.
Cincinnati, Ohio

James M. Melius, M.D., Ph.D.
Albany, New York

Wanda |. Munn
Richland, Washington

John W. Poston, Sr., Ph.D.
College Station, Texas

Robert W. Presley
Clinton, Tennessee

Genevieve S. Roessler, Ph.D.
Elysian, Minnesota

Phillip Schofield
Bosque Farm, New Mexico

STAFF:

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY:

Christine M. Branch, Ph.D
Washington, DC

COMMITTEE MANAGEMENT :

Zaida Burgos
Atlanta, Georgia

ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH
4676 Columbia Parkway, MS: C-46
Cincinnati, Ohio 45226
(513) 533-6825

April 30, 2008

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The Honorable Michael O. Leavitt
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, DC 20201

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (The Board) has
evaluated SEC Petition-00100 concerning workers at the
Kellex/Pierpont facility in Jersey City, New Jersey under the statutory
requirements established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 CFR
Sec. 83.13 and 42 CFR Sec. 83.14. The Board respectfully
recommends Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) status be accorded to all
AWE employees who worked at the Kellex/Pierpont facility in Jersey
City, New Jersey from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1953
for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days
occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with
work days within the parameters established for one or more other
classes of employees in the SEC. The Board notes that although
NIOSH found that they were unable to completely reconstruct
radiation doses for these employees, they believe that they are able to
reconstruct portions of the external radiation doses and the
occupational medical dose.

This recommendation is based on the following factors:

e The Kellex/Pierpont facility was involved in early research
and development work for the manufacture of atomic weapons.

e NIOSH was unable to locate sufficient monitoring data or
information on radiological operations at these laboratories in
order to be able to complete accurate individual dose
reconstructions involving internal exposures throughout the

time period that the facility operated. The Board concurs with
this conclusion.


The Honorable Michael O. Leavitt April 30, 2008

e NIOSH determined that health may have been endangered for the workers
exposed to radiation at the Kellex/Pierpont facility in Jersey City, New Jersey
during the time period in question. The Board concurs with this determination.

Enclosed is supporting documentation from the recent Advisory Board Meeting held in
Tampa, Florida where this special exposure cohort class was discussed. If any of these items
are unavailable at this time, they will follow shortly.

Sincerely,

Paul L. Ziemer, Ph.D.
Chairman

Enc.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-6408
DANITA CORBIN, Petitioner - Appellant, versus BARBARA J. WHEELER, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (1:06-cv-01296-GBL) Submitted: May 31, 2007 Decided: June 8, 2007 Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Danita Corbin, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Danita Corbin seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Corbin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ESEQUIEL GARCIA ORTA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 13-70830

Agency No. A091-696-407

MEMORANDUM*

ESEQUIEL GARCIA ORTA, AKA

Esequiel Garcia, AKA Esiquiel Garcia

Deotra, AKA Esequiel Orta, AKA

Esequiel Garcia Orta,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 13-73672

Agency No. A091-696-407

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

FILED

FEB 18 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Submitted February 12, 2016** 

Pasadena, California

Before: KLEINFELD, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

In this consolidated case, Esequiel Garcia Orta petitions from the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of his two motions to reopen the proceedings.

Although Garcia Orta filed a timely motion to reopen, he did not attach his

supporting documents. As the BIA noted, the immigration judge held the record

open until the deadline for motions to reopen, in case Garcia Orta submitted his

supporting documents within the time period, but Garcia Orta did not do so. 

Garcia Orta’s argument that the immigration judge’s failure to allow him to

supplement the record after the time period expired fails because whatever

arguable claim Garcia Orta might have had for reopening, the immigration judge’s

failure to extend the deadline did not rise to the level of a due process violation. In

Yeghiarzaryan v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2004), unlike this case, the

alien was deprived of the full 90 days in which to submit his new evidence. Orta

received “a fair opportunity to present his case.” Id. at 1000. Therefore we need

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2
not decide whether the agency’s alternative ground for denying Garcia Orta’s

motion, defective service, was supported. 

 Garcia Orta then filed a second motion to reopen, after the deadline had

passed, but the evidence he submitted with it, articles concerning the treatment of

the blind in Mexico and declarations regarding his own condition, was duplicative

of and predated his first claim, so he did not demonstrate it was unavailable at the

time of his hearing. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010). The

BIA accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying Orta’s motions to reopen. 

See Lainez-Ortiz v. INS, 96 F.3d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1996). 

PETITION DENIED.

3
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

CertificatePursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350as Adopted Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of AccessAnytime Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof  (the “Report”), I, Norman R.Corzine, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board, certify, pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1. The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

2. The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  March 4, 2003 |   | /s/ Norman R. Corzine |
|---------------------------|--------|-----------------------|
|                      |   |                  | Norman R. Corzine, Chairman of the Board, |
|                      |   |                  | Chief Executive Officer*(Principal  Executive Officer)* |

 

----
Exhibit 10.7


 





FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE

BEACON ROOFING SUPPLY, INC.

2014 STOCK PLAN


 


WHEREAS, Beacon
Roofing Supply, Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc. 2014 Stock Plan (the “Plan”);
and


 


WHEREAS, the
Board of Directors of the Company is authorized to amend the Plan and has authorized an amendment to the Plan, as described below.


 


NOW, THEREFORE,
BE IT RESOLVED, that Section 4.1(e) of the Plan is hereby amended, effective as of August 12, 2015, to read as follows:


 


(e)The number
of shares of Common Stock available for Awards under the Plan shall be reduced in accordance with Section 4.1(a) of the Plan by
(i) the number of shares subject to Substitute Awards or (ii) available shares under a stockholder approved plan of a company or
other entity that was a party to a corporate transaction with the Company (as appropriately adjusted to reflect such corporate
transaction) that become subject to Awards granted under this Plan (subject to applicable stock exchange requirements). Any reissuance
of shares subject to Substitute Awards shall be in accordance with Sections 4.1(c) and (d).


 


This First Amendment
has been executed by the Company, by its duly authorized officer, as of this 12th day of August, 2015.


 


 





	 	BEACON ROOFING SUPPLY, INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	 	 
	 	Title:
A96A0900.

#### MELTON v. THE STATE.

(472 SE2d 547)

Ruffin, Judge.

This case involves the proper sentence for a kidnapping with bodily injury conviction. It is again before us after remand in *Melton v. State,*216 Ga. App. 215 (454 SE2d 545) (1995). We remanded this case to determine the validity of Melton’s 1987 sentence following his conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury. Originally, Melton was sentenced to life as a recidivist pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7. We expressed concern over the use of the recidivist statute in that Melton’s 1979 rape and sodomy convictions were not convictions within the meaning of OCGA § 17-10-7 since that appeal was currently pending. *Melton,*216 Ga. App. at 215. In addition, one of the convictions upon which the recidivist sentence was invoked was a misdemeanor conviction, and only felony convictions can be used to invoke the recidivist statute. Id. at 216.

On remand, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing and sentenced Melton to life in prison. In his sole enumeration of error, Melton contends he was “sentenced to an unconstitutional, invalid, and excessive sentence which violates his constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.” For reasons which follow, we affirm.

It is not disputed that the only sentences authorized for a conviction of kidnapping with bodily injury are life imprisonment or death. *779OCGA § 16-5-40 (b). See also *Melton,*216 Ga. App. at 215; *Hasty v. State,*210 Ga. App. 722 (2) (437 SE2d 638) (1993). However, Melton contends the statute is unconstitutional. He attacks the statute because it robs the trial court of any discretion to sentence him to a lighter sentence regardless of the severity of the injury. This Court has previously considered and rejected Melton’s argument in *Green v. State,*193 Ga. App. 894 (2) (389 SE2d 358) (1989), and *Albert v. State,*180 Ga. App. 779 (10) (350 SE2d 490) (1986). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit, and the sentence is affirmed.

Decided June 19, 1996.

Walter K. Melton, *pro se.*

*Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Joan V. Bloom, Nancy I. Jordan, Debra H. Bernes, Assistant District Attorneys,*for appellee.

While Melton also argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of kidnapping with bodily injury, this issue was previously resolved against him in *Melton v. State,*204 Ga. App. 103 (4) (418 SE2d 428) (1992). Moreover, it is not properly before this Court.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*McMurray, P. J., and Johnson, J., concur.*