UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1241

GRAPHIC ARTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; UTICA MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

CALDWELL CHEVROLET, INC., d/b/a Fred Caldwell’s Clover 

Chevrolet,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior 

District Judge. (0:11-cv-01255-MBS)

Submitted: June 17, 2013 Decided: July 5, 2013

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Adam J. Neil, Wesley B. Sawyer, MURPHY GRANTLAND, P.A., 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth S. Skilling, 

John A. Merrick, Robert F. Friedman, HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & 

WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In this diversity insurance coverage dispute, the district 

court issued a declaratory judgment finding the insurer had no 

duty to defend or indemnify the insured. See Graphic Arts Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Caldwell Chevrolet, Inc., No. 0:11-01255-MBS (D.S.C. 

Sept. 10, 2012). The insured now appeals and we affirm.

This appeal grows out of a suit filed by a number of 

plaintiffs in state court against Caldwell Chevrolet, Inc. and 

other car dealers. Plaintiffs asserted that the dealers had 

engaged in a common practice of collecting illegal 

“administrative fees” from buyers. The dealers allegedly 

characterized the fees as “mandatory,” administrative 

reimbursement for actual costs to the dealer, rather than simply 

a way to inflate the price of a car. Caldwell sought a defense 

in the state action from its insurer, Graphic Arts, which agreed 

to defend under a reservation of rights. Graphic Arts then

initiated this action, seeking a declaration that it had no 

obligation to Caldwell under the policy.

The district court held that the policy issued by Graphic 

Arts did not provide coverage to Caldwell in the underlying 

action. The court reasoned that the endorsement for failing to 

comply with a “[t]ruth in lending statute, or any statute that 

. . . regulates disclosures” did not apply because the 

underlying complaint “d[id] not allege violation of a lending or 

leasing disclosure statute.” The court also found that 
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“coverage does not exist” because the policy expressly excludes 

coverage for “[a]ny dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or 

intentional act . . . committed by the ‘insured’” and the 

underlying complaint made allegations falling “expressly” within 

this exclusion.

On October 9, 2012, within twenty-eight days of the 

district court’s entry of judgment, Caldwell filed a Rule 59 

motion asking the district court to alter or amend its judgment 

inter alia on the basis of “newly discovered evidence.” This 

“new” evidence was a March 2009 letter sent to Graphic Arts

which assertedly triggered coverage. The district court denied 

the motion, finding Caldwell had failed “to demonstrate due 

diligence to discover the alleged relevance of the March Letter 

to this litigation.” See Boryan v. United States, 884 F.2d 767, 

771 (4th Cir. 1989).

Caldwell then noted this appeal raising the same arguments 

rejected by the district court. After careful review of the 

record, the briefs of the parties, and the controlling law, we 

affirm on the basis of the careful opinions of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED