COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 21, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal Nos. 2022AP1943-CR

2022AP1944-CR

Cir. Ct. Nos. 2014CF314

2016CF947

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JON M. GLIDDEN,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from judgments and an order of the circuit court for 

Kenosha County: MARY KAY WAGNER and WYNNE P. LAUFENBERG, 

Judges. Affirmed. 

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.
Nos. 2022AP1943-CR

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2

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jon M. Glidden appeals from judgments convicting 

him of multiple felonies. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction 

motion for a new trial. Glidden raises two arguments: (1) the circuit court judge 

demonstrated bias during trial; and (2) he received ineffective assistance from his

trial counsel. We affirm.

¶2 Glidden was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual 

assault of a child, two counts of incest with a child, and one count of repeated 

sexual assault of the same child. Two years later, he faced additional charges: four 

counts of solicitation to intimidate a witness (domestic abuse) and four counts of 

felony bail jumping, all related to his initial case. These cases were consolidated 

for a jury trial, where Glidden was convicted on all counts.1 He subsequently 

sought postconviction relief, requesting a new trial. After a hearing, the circuit 

court denied his motion.2 

¶3 Glidden’s first argument is that the circuit court judge showed 

improper bias during the testimony of N.G.,3the child victim in the sexual assault 

cases. He claims that when N.G. became upset while testifying, the judge’s act of 

 

1

 The Hon. Mary Kay Wagner presided over the trial and entered the judgment of 

conviction.

2

 The Hon. Wynne P. Laufenberg presided over the postconviction proceedings and 

denied the postconviction motion.

3

 Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4), we use initials when 

referring to the victim in this case. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 

version unless otherwise noted.
Nos. 2022AP1943-CR

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3

providing N.G. with a tissue and a glass of water suggested to the jury that the 

judge was sympathetic towards N.G. and believed her testimony.

¶4 Due process requires that a defendant receive a fair trial before an 

unbiased judge. State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶25, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 

N.W.2d 772. When reviewing a claim of judicial bias, we begin with a 

presumption that the judge acted fairly and impartially. State v. Goodson, 2009 

WI App 107, ¶8, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. This presumption can be 

rebutted if the party claiming bias proves it by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶24. Objective bias is present if a reasonable 

person, considering the judge’s actions under all the circumstances, could question 

the judge’s impartiality. Id., ¶26.

¶5 We reject Glidden’s claim of judicial bias for two reasons. First, 

Glidden forfeited this argument by failing to raise a contemporaneous objection 

during the trial. As noted in State v. Klapps, 2021 WI App 5, ¶29, 395 Wis. 2d 

743, 954 N.W.2d 38, “failure to object, even to a claimed structural constitutional 

violation, forfeits the challenge.” Contemporaneous objections allow the circuit 

court to address alleged errors immediately during the trial.

¶6 Second, even if Glidden had not forfeited his argument, he has not 

rebutted the presumption that the judge acted impartially. Angel Kegg, an 

alternate juror, testified that the judge’s actions seemed like something any normal 

person would do in that situation. Kegg observed that the judge’s actions 

appeared to calm a visibly upset witness rather than endorse N.G’s credibility or 

showing bias. Furthermore, the judge provided an affidavit stating that she did not 

hug or console the witness during her testimony and that she always takes great 

care to avoid any appearance of bias.
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¶7 We agree with the postconviction court that the judge’s actions were 

minimal and aimed at maintaining courtroom order. They did not indicate bias in 

favor of N.G. Additionally, the judge’s actions occurred in a single moment 

during a lengthy trial and were insufficient to suggest bias to a reasonable 

observer.

¶8 Glidden next argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel because his attorney did not call Kristine Rowley as a defense witness. 

He contends that Rowley’s testimony would have impeached N.G.’s testimony by 

showing that N.G.’s mother and other family members attempted to extort money 

from Glidden by threatening to cause him trouble if he did not meet their 

unreasonable demands. Glidden asserts that Rowley’s testimony would have 

provided a plausible motive for N.G. to fabricate the sexual abuse allegations. 

¶9 A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 

demonstrate both that his lawyer’s representation was deficient and that the 

deficient performance was prejudicial to the defendant. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prove deficient performance, a 

defendant must show specific acts or omissions of counsel that were “outside the 

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. Trial counsel’s 

decisions regarding strategy are afforded a strong presumption of reasonableness. 

State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶75, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93. A 

reviewing court “will not second-guess a reasonable trial strategy [unless] it was 

based on an irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than judgment.” Id. 

¶10 During the postconviction motion hearing, defense counsel 

explained that he had to make tactical and strategic decisions about witnesses, 

always prioritizing Glidden’s best interests. He initially considered calling 
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Rowley as a defense witness because she was in a personal relationship with 

Glidden during the period when the witness intimidation and bail-jumping charges 

occurred, and he believed that she might support the defense strategy. However, 

he decided against calling Rowley before trial, believing that her testimony would 

not serve Glidden’s best interests. This view was reinforced as the trial 

progressed, considering the prosecution’s approach and the jury’s reactions. 

Additionally, Rowley’s romantic relationship with Glidden would have been a 

distraction from Glidden’s defense theory. 

¶11 The postconviction court found that trial counsel’s decision not to 

call Rowley was a reasonable strategic choice based on the law and the facts of 

this case. Rowley had credibility issues, including her romantic involvement with 

Glidden and her own felony charges related to unlawfully harboring him, making 

her a potentially unreliable witness. The court emphasized that counsel’s decision 

was based on a thorough assessment of the trial’s progress and the jury’s 

responses. By not presenting Rowley, counsel aimed to avoid risks and 

distractions from the primary defense against the sexual-assault allegations. 

Strategic trial decisions, when rational, do not constitute deficient performance. 

See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶75. Ultimately, Glidden failed to demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient. Therefore, we reject Glidden’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.

By the Court.—Judgments and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2021-22).