UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 

JAMES ROBINSON, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-03150 (UNA) 

 ) 

JOE BIDEN, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, a resident of Alabama, has filed a pro se petition for mandamus, ECF No. 1, and 

an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For reasons explained 

below, the court will grant the IFP application and dismiss this matter without prejudice. 

The petition is difficult to follow. Petitioner sues the President and the Vice President of 

the United States. He seeks a writ of mandamus directing respondents to enforce unspecified

constitutional rights pursuant to the “Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support 

for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” and requests a finding that he 

“do[es] not have to serve any time under Alabama law.” He does not explain how this Executive 

Order is applicable, if at all, to his intended claims, but as far as it can be understood, petitioner 

contends that the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, granted his petition for writ of habeas 

corpus and released him from state custody in 2018. He then, in 2019, apparently unsuccessfully 

filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or another petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. He contests the determinations 

and the jurisdiction of the Middle District of Alabama, and also perhaps the Circuit Court of 

Houston County. It seems as if one or both of these courts either vacated an existing order and/or 

declined to extend post-conviction relief to petitioner in additional cases. 
Petitioner faces several hurdles that he cannot overcome. First, federal district courts 

generally lack jurisdiction to review or otherwise interfere with judicial decisions by state courts. 

See Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(citing District of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Similarly, this court generally lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 

review the determinations of other federal courts. See In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992);

Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United 

States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 

553 (D.D.C. 1986)). Consequently, this court cannot review the determinations of the Middle 

District of Alabama or the Circuit Court of Houston County, and if he seeks reconsideration of 

their respective determinations, he must do so in those courts. 

Second, to whatever extent petitioner may seek another writ of habeas corpus, or to revisit 

a previous petition, he is not currently incarcerated, so it is unclear if he standing to demand such 

relief. A “writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a [petitioner] unless” he is “in custody” under 

some authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). A person is generally considered “in custody” if he is 

being held in a prison or jail, or if he is released on conditions of probation or parole, see, e.g., 

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240–43 (1963) (holding that a paroled petitioner is “in 

custody” because parole restrictions “significantly restrain petitioner’s liberty”), or subject to other 

“substantial” non-confinement restraints on liberty, see, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 

345, 351–53 (1973) (holding that a petitioner released on his own recognizance pending appeal of 

his sentence was “in custody” for purpose of habeas). Nothing in petitioner’ssubmissions suggests 

that he is currently is incarcerated or is otherwise legally restrained, and it is unknown if he is 

currently supervised on probation or parole. 
To the extent that petitioner is still in custody, he still has no recourse in this federal district. 

Federal court review of state convictions is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but only after the 

exhaustion of available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l). Thereafter, "an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus [] made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State 

court . . . may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in 

the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and 

sentenced [petitioner] and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain 

the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Consequently, if petitioner has exhausted his state remedies, 

he must file for such relief in a United States District Court in Alabama. 

Finally, though it is unclear what precise relief petitioner seeks from the respondents, it is 

notable that this court is without the authority to direct the President of the United States to grant, 

process, or even consider a pardon request. See Yelvington v. Presidential Pardon and Parole 

Attorneys, 211 F.2d 642, 643–44 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (affirming denial of mandamus petition to 

compel attorneys to submit inmate's petition for clemency to the President, noting that pardoning 

power “expressly vests in the President” and “should . . . be free of judicial control”). 

Moreover, regardless of the relief sought, a writ of mandamus “compel[s] an officer or 

employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1361. “[M]andamus is ‘drastic’; it is available only in ‘extraordinary situations.’” In re 

Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Only if “(1) the plaintiff has a 

clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate 

remedy available to the plaintiff,” Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2014), is 

mandamus relief granted. Petitioner does not address, let alone meet, any one of these elements. 
For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed. A separate order of dismissal accompanies 

this memorandum opinion. 

DATE: November 30, 2022 ____/s/___________________

 JAMES E. BOASBERG 

United States District Judge