SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

58 

CAF 15-02170 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, AND CURRAN, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF JAMES P., JR., ALSO KNOWN 

AS JUSTUS H. 

------------------------------------------- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 

TIFFANY H., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (KRISTEN MCDERMOTT OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

ROBERT A. DURR, COUNTY ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (MAGGIE SEIKALY OF COUNSEL),

FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

ANTHONY P. BELLETIER, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, SYRACUSE. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County

(Michael L. Hanuszczak, J.), entered December 10, 2015 in a proceeding

pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, among other

things, terminated respondent’s parental rights. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this permanent neglect proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 6 and Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent

mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated her parental

rights with respect to the subject child. Initially, we note that

“where, as here, a parent admits to permanent neglect, there is no

need for [petitioner] to put forth evidence establishing—nor is it

necessary for the court to determine—that [petitioner] had exercised

diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship” (Matter of

Aidan D., 58 AD3d 906, 908; see Matter of Eleydie R. [Maria R.], 77

AD3d 1423, 1424). 

Contrary to the mother’s contention, Family Court did not abuse

its discretion in limiting the evidence concerning whether the subject

child’s foster parents were qualified to adopt him. The court

permitted certain questioning concerning the suitability of the foster

parents to adopt the subject child, and there is clear and convincing

evidence supporting its determination that it was in the child’s best

interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights and free him for

adoption. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in

limiting any further evidence regarding the foster parents at the
-2- 58 

CAF 15-02170 

hearing. Indeed, “it must be emphasized that termination of parental

rights does not hinge upon a comparison of the relative benefits

offered a child by his [biological] family to those offered by the

foster family” (Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117, 124). In any event,

“the ultimate purpose of the dispositional inquiry was not to

determine whether the [child was] in the best possible foster

placement—a determination statutorily entrusted to petitioner—but to

decide whether [his] best interests required termination of the

mother’s parental rights” (Matter of Michael JJ. [Gerald JJ.], 101

AD3d 1288, 1293, lv denied 20 NY3d 860). Here, “[g]iven the evidence

that the [child’s] progress in the foster home was satisfactory, and

the lack of any evidence that the mother was capable of offering [him]

a safe home, the court’s determination to commit the [child’s]

guardianship and custody to petitioner was in [his] best interests”

(id.). 

Contrary to the mother’s further contention, the court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to grant a suspended judgment. It

is well settled that a suspended judgment “is a brief grace period

designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” (Matter

of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 311; see Family Ct Act § 633). The record

establishes that the mother made “only minimal progress in addressing

the issues that resulted in the [child’s] removal from her custody,

which was not sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the

[child’s] unsettled familial status” (Matter of Alexus R.L. [Ashley

K.], 140 AD3d 1699, 1700 [internal quotation marks omitted]). 

Entered: March 24, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court