THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


CHAPMAN VALVE SEC
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held in Cincinnati, Ohio on 


February 23, 2007. 

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 6 

C O N T E N T S
 

February 23, 2007 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


ISSUES MATRIX FOR CHAPMAN VALVE SEC PETITION 12 


ISSUE TWO 52 


ISSUE THREE 58 


ISSUE FOUR 59 


ISSUE FIVE 74 


ISSUE SIX 99 


ISSUE SEVEN 115 


ISSUE EIGHT 118 


SUMMARY 136 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 146 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


BOARD MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


POSTON, John W., Sr., B.S., M.S., Ph.D. 


Professor, Texas A&M University 


College Station, Texas 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 

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IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

BLOOM, CINDY, NIOSH/ORAU 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC WASHINGTON 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


KATZ, TED, NIOSH 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


NETON, JIM, NIOSH 


RIALI, MARY ANN, CHAPMAN VALVE SEC PETITIONER 


ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH 


STEMPFLEY, DAN, NIOSH/ORAU 


SUNDIN, DAVE, NIOSH 


WU, PORTIA, SEN. KENNEDY 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (8:30 a.m.) 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO
 

DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade, and as always, I 


have the pleasure of serving as the Designated 


Federal Official for the Advisory Board. And 


this is a workgroup meeting of the Advisory 


Board. This is a workgroup on Chapman Valve SEC. 


That work group is chaired by Dr. Poston, members 


Griffon, Clawson, Roessler and Gibson. 


What I’d like to do is first ask if there are any 


Board members connected by telephone, be you 


members of the workgroup or not, I’d like you to 


identify yourself now. Workgroup -- workgroup or 


Board members on the call? 


MR. GIBSON: Lew, this is Mike Gibson. 


DR. WADE: Hi, Mike. How are you? 


DR. ZIEMER: Paul Ziemer, Lew. 


DR. WADE: Good morning, Paul. Thank you for 


joining us. 


MR. CLAWSON: Brad Clawson. 


DR. WADE: Thank you, Brad. 

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DR. ROESSLER: Brad, I –- I blocked him out I 


think. 


MR. CLAWSON: Way to go, Gen. 


 DR. ROESSLER: This is Gen. 


DR. WADE: How are you, Gen? How is the weather 


where you are, Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: It’s –- it’s okay now, but it’s 


supposed to –- we’re supposed to get sleet and 


rain starting mid-afternoon. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Well, thank you for 


participating. 


Are there any other Board members on the call? 


(No responses) 


So by my count, we now have six Board members 


engaged, which is below a quorum, which means that 


we can continue. If at –- if another Board member 


was to join and we were to learn of that, we would 


have to –- to take appropriate steps, but I’m more 


than capable of handling such a situation. 


I thought what we would do is go around the table 


here and introduce ourselves and then we’ll do 


some introductions on the line. When we do 


introduce ourselves, if anyone participating is 


conflicted on Chapman Valve, but I don’t think 


that is the case, but to hold out that 

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possibility, please identify. This is Lew Wade, 


again. I work for NIOSH and serve the Advisory 


Board. 


DR. POSTON: John Poston, Texas A&M. 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro, Sanford Cohen & 


Associates. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Larry Elliot, NIOSH. 


MR. ROLFES: Mark Rolfes, NIOSH. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani, SC&A. 


MR. GRIFFON: Mark Griffon, Advisory Board. 


DR. NETON: Jim Neton, NIOSH. 


MS. HOWELL: Emily Howell, HHS. 


DR. WADE: And Ray is with us, working 


diligently. On the line again, if for the record 


you would identify yourselves. Working group 


members? 


MR. CLAWSON: Brad Clawson. 


MR. GIBSON: Mike Gibson. 


DR. WADE: And Gen. Gen, are you still with us? 


DR. ROESSLER: Sorry, I was on mute. Now I know 


it works. 


DR. WADE: Well, good. And we do, too. And 


other Board members? 


(No responses) 


Paul, are you with us? 

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DR. ZIEMER: Oh, yeah. I thought you were just 


asking for workgroup members. 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I’m –- I’m here. 


DR. WADE: What about members of the NIOSH/ORAU 


Team on the line? 


MS. BLOOM: Cindy Bloom is here. 


DR. WADE: Good morning, Cindy. 


MS. BLOOM: Good morning. 


MR. STEMPFLEY: This is Dan Stempfley. 


DR. WADE: Good morning. Other members of the 


NIOSH/ORAU Team? 


(No responses) 


Members of the SC&A Team? 


(No responses) 


Are there any petitioners, worker, worker 


representatives on the line who would like to be 


identified? 


MS. RIALI: Mary Ann Riali, Chapman Valve SEC 


Petitioner. 


DR. WADE: Good morning. Thank you for joining us. 


We appreciate your being here. And again, the 


working group operates in a way that -– feel free to 


make comment anytime you would like. Again, there’s 


no public comment period during the working group, 

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but for petitioners or worker or worker 


representatives if there’s something you need to 


say, please feel free to say it. Anyone else 


representing workers? 


MS. WU: Well Lew, I don’t know if I count, but this 


is Portia Wu with Senator Kennedy’s Health Committee 


staff. 


 DR. WADE: You certainly count. 


 MS. WU: If I count that way. 


DR. WADE: You certainly count with us. Other 


members or representatives of Congress or their 


staff on the line? 


MS. WU: I think some of the offices –- other 


offices might join a little later. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you very much. 


THE COURT REPORTER: Dr. Wade, I’m sorry. Can I get 


clarification on that lady who was a petitioner? 


DR. WADE: Would the petitioner please restate your 


name, I’m sorry. 


 MS. RIALI: It’s Mary Ann Riali. 


DR. WADE: Thank you, Mary Ann. And your voice is 


coming through loud and clear so again, please, if 


you need to say something, please do. 


 MS. RIALI: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: We will be working from a –-

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 MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Lew? 

 DR. WADE: Yes? 

MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: I’m sorry. This is Liz HomokiTitus with HHS. I didn’t know if you were going to 


ask for other federal employees. 


DR. WADE: Yes. Other federal employees who are 


here by virtue of their federal employment? 


 MR. KATZ: Ted Katz, NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Hi, Ted. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Jeff Kotsch, Labor. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Jeff, for joining us. 


 MR. SUNDIN: Dave Sundin, NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Good morning, Dave. 


 MR. BROEHM: Jason Broehm, CDC, Washington office. 


 DR. WADE: Hi, Jason. 


 MR. BROEHM: Good morning. 


DR. WADE: Other federal employees? Is there anyone 


else on the line who would like to be identified for 


the record? 


(No responses) 


Portia, or any of our -- our friends from the Hill 


who would -– would you like an opportunity to make a 


statement in the beginning, or not? 


MS. WU: Sure. Sure. If this is a -– if this is a 


good time. I’d just like to say that we appreciate 

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the working group getting together in this manner. 


As you know, Senator Kennedy has expressed some 


concern about the pace of response and sent over a 


letter to the Board referencing concerns about that. 


We obviously hope that this, you know, this is taken 


up very quickly, but at the same time, it’s very 


important to us that all of the technical issues are 


explored. I know Dr. Poston raised some in the last 


Board meeting. We do feel there are a number of 


others and we just think it’s important that -– you 


obviously are the experts, but that all of the 


technical issues are explored, that all the 


possibilities for exposure are explored, because 


these people have been waiting a very long time, and 


we really need to be sure that justice is done. So 


we appreciate that and we look forward to following 


(unintelligible). 


ISSUES MATRIX FOR CHAPMAN VALVE SEC PETITION
 

DR. WADE: Thank you, Portia, very much. If there 


are no more introductions to be made, we will be 


working from a document that I think has been made 


available to anyone who would like it. If not, 


please let us know and I think Jason could take it 


on to -- to get it to you. 


It really starts with an issues matrix for Chapman 

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Valve that was prepared by the Board’s contractor. 


We now have SC&A’s finding, and we also have in that 


maxtrix, NIOSH’s response to SC&A’s finding. And I 


think that becomes the document that will guide us 


through this process. 


So, is there anyone who need’s a copy of that –-


those materials? 


MR. CLAWSON: Dr. Wade, this is Brad. Is the matrix 


from February 14, 2007? 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. 


DR. WADE: That’s the matrix. And is that the date 


of your response -– does that include your response, 


Jim? 


DR. NETON: Well, the response was added onto the 


matrix earlier this week. 


DR. WADE: Right. So there’s a matrix with a 


response that’s dated February 20th . 


MR. CLAWSON: Okay. I’ll check through my files, 


but maybe --


DR. ZIEMER: I don’t think the February 20th date 


appears at the -– in the heading. This is Ziemer. 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


DR. NETON: The February 14th is the one. There 


should be a NIOSH response to SC&A findings column 


on the version that’s labeled February 14th . That 

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was a mistake. We should have updated the date. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I’ve got a NIOSH response to SC&A –-


DR. NETON: That’s it. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. Thank you. 


DR. WADE: Okay. So, thank you. So with that, I’ll 


turn it over to Dr. Poston and he can chair the 


technical deliberations. John. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. Thank you very much, Lew. I 


guess the easiest thing to do is start with the 


matrix and ask John to discuss the first issue and 


we’ll hear from NIOSH. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. That will work. The way in which 


–- this matrix, by the way, is a little bit 


different than the one we’ve seen before with regard 


to site profiles. And the reason I did that is I 


felt that in the case of SEC petitions when –- when 


it will work, I started off actually identifying my 


understanding of what the concerns are by the 


petitioners, to try to crystallize it. Because 


that’s really the starting point, as I see it. And 


then I went ahead and took the liberty of -- to 


write up based on the NIOSH, the second column, 


based on the NIOSH evaluation report and matrix, 


exposure matrix, I tried to list some words to 


explain my understanding of what I believe to be 

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NIOSH’s position regarding the petitioners’ 


concerns. It’s not until we get to the third column 


where we start -– where we actually see SC&A’s 


findings, our position regarding NIOSH’s position. 


And so finally, the fourth column is NIOSH’s 


response to our findings. So it’s a little bit 


different than what we’ve done before, but I think 


it will help track the process. And I’d like to 


alert everyone involved that if, you know, if in any 


way along these lines if there’s any petitioner 


concerns, for example, that is not properly captured 


here, we certainly are seeking feedback on this to 


make sure that it’s complete. But with that as an 


introduction, I guess we could start moving through 


the first item. 


I will read, the issues are relatively brief, I will 


read the petitioners’ concern: “The petitioners 


claim that the bioassay data are not adequate to 


support the dose reconstruction of doses with 


sufficient accuracy. They claim that the data are 


not representative of the worker exposed population, 


were collected without any understanding of the 


individuals’ exposure histories, and do not assess 


exposures from a number of industrial processes such 


as cracking furnace, chip incinerator, or possible 

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rolling operations.” 


So, the essence of this -– this concern is that 


there are data, those who will have read the -– the 


–- the site profile and the evaluation report, there 


are external data, there are bioassay data. And 


it’s NIOSH’s position that well, you know, we have a 


lot of –- and please, NIOSH and Jim, you know, Mark, 


if I’m mischaracterizing in any way, please, you 


know, step in. That there are -– there’s a lot of 


external data, there’s a lot of bioassay data. And 


on that basis, plus some other data from other 


sites, the -– NIOSH’s position is that we can work 


with that data and reconstruct doses in accordance 


with the requirements of part 83. 


SC&A’s findings are –- are that we don’t really 


entirely agree with that position. Mainly, we 


believe that, not so much with regard to external, I 


think the external data is quite complete. But with 


regard to internal, we have some concerns. And let 


me try to create a visual. We’ve got these 


approximate 100 workers that worked there in 1949. 


Out of those 100 workers, about 33 were -– had spot 


samples. A single urine sample was taken on a given 


day and three different time periods. And from 


that, a lot could be gleaned, but we also feel that 

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those single samples alone only tell part of the 


story. And I guess our position is –- is -– and 


this is what I try to say in the fourth column, is 


that I think it’s important that that data and the 


story that data –- data tells needs to be explored 


and I guess, supplemented extensively by an enormous 


amount of what I consider to be very, very good data 


that’s in the literature for other uranium 


facilities that performed similar operations at 


about the same time where there’s lots and lots of 


air sampling data, which sort of helps to flush out 


the story. 


And -– and so, I guess, I find our first concern is 


that that other data needs to be brought into the -– 


into the picture. And -- and the matrix explicitly 


address the degree to which those data, such as the 


data from Kingsley, which you do reference, and 


there’s also some data from –- from an NYOO, New 


York Operations Report, 1952, that we found that was 


very valuable to us. And we think by bringing that 


data in, we start to get a fuller appreciation of 


the strengths and limitations of the data that is 


used, the Chapman. 


And so we feel that -– that these –- this part needs 


to be explored a little further, the degree to which 

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it’s judged to be an SEC posi -– an SEC issue, is 


really a matter of the outcome of when you take a 


look at that data and what it tells you and whether 


or not it tells you that you can, in fact, 


reconstruct doses with sufficient accuracy. 


So, I feel as a whole, right now in the matrix that 


could be fleshed out a little better. And that’s 


item number one. I guess I’ll stop at that point. 


MR. ROLFES: I think -– well, we did -– we did hear 


that issue about the completeness of data. And in 


discussions with former workers, we actually had 


heard that. We heard that they were concerned about 


the amount of data. So what NIOSH actually did in 


response to some of those concerns is to evaluate 


some air monitoring data from NUMEC, as well as 


another site. And that’s later in the matrix. I 


apologize. But that is within the technical basis 


document, right now. We actually compared some of 


the -– some of the intakes from Chapman Valve to 


intakes that were incurred at Y-12 and Simonds Saw ­

– Simonds Saw and Steel, as well. 


Let’s see, I’d like to point out that we do have 


bioassay data for -– for the individuals that were 


involved in the operations. And I would just like 


to present our response to some of these issues and 

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concerns that were brought up by the petitioner. 


And I’ll just go ahead and read our response from 


the matrix: “The point about the Chapman Valve 


bioassay data being insufficient for supporting 


internal dose reconstruction is arguable. It’s 


agreed that there is sufficient data regarding this 


uranium process that intake estimates can be made.” 


And I wanted to explain a little bit about the NIOSH 


dose reconstruction process and the claimant 


favorable assumptions that go into it. “NIOSH dose 


reconstructions using the existing bioassay data 


employ layers of claimant favorable decisions.” 


These include the exposure duration, which NIOSH has 


assumed a chronic intake for sixteen months, when we 


have documentation that indicates that the actual 


processing of materials was much less than sixteen 


months. We’re using the highest recorded bioassay 


results to estimate everyone’s intake. Now, if we 


were assigning an acute intake, many of these issues 


may become more relevant. But I don’t feel that 


because we’re assuming that a person is being 


exposed for the entire processing time and NIOSH is 


using the highest recorded bioassay results, I 


really don’t feel that these issues are relevant to 


the situation. 

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The –- furthermore, NIOSH is assuming that the 


intakes that were incurred by the employees were via 


inhalation. Now this intake pathway results in the 


highest internal dose. We are also assuming that 


the material solubility -– we’re choosing, based on 


the type of cancer, we’re choosing the most claimant 


favorable solubility for that cancer, for that 


organ. The solubility class, type M or S, depending 


on the location of the cancer or organ, we choose 


the one that results in the highest internal dose. 


Furthermore, we’re using 100 percent Uranium-234 to 


calculate internal doses. This results in 


additional claimant favorable overestimates of the 


actual dose incurred from natural uranium because 


the alpha energies from U-234 are higher than U-238. 


But we have looked into these issues and heard these 


issues and done our best to evaluate what we -– what 


has been presented to us by former workers, by 


interest groups, and we feel that we’ve got a 


scientific basis to estimate intakes in a claimant 


favorable manner. 


MS. WU: Excuse me, this is Portia Wu. Could I –-


could I just ask a question about this bioassay 


data? 


 DR. POSTON: Sure. 

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MS. WU: We had raised an issue in our congressional 


letter last September being concerned, you know, 


that the last two samples were in September and 


October. But there were very few workers sampled on 


each of those occasions, and none of them in our 


case, the October case, were production workers. 


So, here just to a lay person, can you explain to us 


how you think that bioassay data is truly 


representative as having to use that highest 


supported when you know it’s not representative of 


the overall workplace. 


DR. NETON: This is -– this is Jim Neton from NIOSH. 


We’ve looked at that, and from the July samples that 


were taken in particular, there is a fairly good 


distribution of worker types. In fact, there are 


bioassay samples taken at, if you look at the -– if 


you look at the production issues that John talked 


about, these HASL documents and these Hanford 


documents that demonstrate how high air 


concentrations could be, we have samples of people 


at some of the highest airborne generating machines, 


like the turret lathe operator, I think the 


centerless grinder. Those are real, sort of quote 


unquote messy production operations that generate 


some of the highest air samples. So we – we have 

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samples from those types of workers and I would 


remind you that or suggest that these are not 


necessarily spot samples in the sense that that’s 


the experience that the worker had been exposed to 


on that day or even that week. Urine samples tend 


to be integrating samples. So, in other words, if 


you take a sample in July, it reflects the –- the 


way we do the modeling, it reflects the exposure 


experience of the worker from the first day of 


operations. We’ll –- we’ll calculate the highest 


potential exposure the worker could have had and 


still have been excreting that amount of uranium in 


his urine on that day. So it’s a long-term 


integration of the worker’s exposure experience. 


MS. WU: I understand that from June, but of course 


that -- those samples can’t, you know, take in 


account any exposure that happened subsequent to 


that day. Or July, excuse me. So I was just 


wondering about the representativeness of, you know, 


obviously activities were going on, and how -– 


DR. NETON: Well, we have no evidence that the 


production operations ramped up or down after July. 


In fact, I think -– I think that the material was –-


Mark, help me out here. But --


MR. ROLFES: Most of the documentation that we’ve 

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seen indicates that the actual machining operations 


occurred from about May until November or December. 


However, we do have evidence that the materials were 


shipped to the site in 1948, in January. And they 


were there possibly on-site following the actual 


machining operations until about April, of 1949. 


So, the majority of the work occurred during the May 


to November time period. Yet, NIOSH has extended 


the covered time period, essentially doubled the – 


the covered time period for the site. 


MS. BLOOM: Actually, there is -– this is Cindy 


Bloom, there is evidence that -- or the last film 


badge data that we have was dated November 1, 1948, 


which seems to indicate that most production type 


operations would have been stopped by then. 


DR. NETON: Right. And on top of this, if you look 


at what the urine data predicts, what these intakes 


could have been at a maximum level based on the 


urinary output, the values are very consistent with 


what we would expect from these production 


operations. That is about sixty -– upwards of sixty 


times the maximum allowable air concentration in 


air, is what the urine samples –- are assigning 


these workers. It’s around sixty -– sixty --


MS. WU: And so then you extrapolate from that that 

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you assume a similar level of exposure all through 


November and December -– 


 DR. NETON: Correct. Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I go -– can I go back to, Jim, 


your earlier point. The July samples you said 


represented some of these higher -– 


DR. NETON: Uh-huh. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- exposed jobs, centerless grinder 


and lathe operator. I don’t see that. I see the 


one high value in July is from an inspector. 


DR. NETON: Well, I didn’t say they were the high 


values. I said they were –-


MR. GRIFFON: But they’re not even sampled. I don’t 


see them sampled anyways. Maybe I’m wrong. 


DR. NETON: We have -– does anybody have a copy of 


the evaluation report? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I’m sorry, actually November. 


DR. NETON: Well, that’s even -– even better. In 


November, we have -– November 9th of ’48, we have 


samples from a milling machine operator, a 


centerless grinder, a turret lathe operator, numbers 


of inspectors. 


 MS. BLOOM: No. That would be Oct -– 


DR. NETON: September. 


 MS. WU: November? 

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 MS. BLOOM: Okay. 


DR. NETON: These were all on September 8th, these 


samples were taken. So they are approaching towards 


the end of the production period. And, in fact, 


these samples are not particularly high. In fact, 


they are right at the detection limit of the -– of 


the measurement technique itself. And, in fact, 


there are memos in the file that talk about how HASL 


has re-evaluated these records and asserts that, you 


know, they –- they continue to be low reflective of 


an exposure scenario that would maintain, you know, 


according to their -– their plan. 


MS. WU: Is it correct, though, that you don’t have 


bio -– you’ve taken bioassay urine samples from 


people who had the highest bag levels so we haven’t 


been able to, you know, cross-reference that, is 


that correct? That’s what I recall. 


DR. NETON: The highest bag -– you mean the highest 


external results? 


 MS. WU: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: Well, the highest external results does 


not necessarily equate to the highest internal 


results. In, for example, people who were 


inspecting or whatever materials and were very close 


to the uranium itself could have high external gamma 

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readings, but they may have not had in -– very 


little internal exposure because they’re not, you 


know, working with the material machining and 


grinding it, lathing, whatever, you know, mechanical 


processes that would tend to generate airborne 


radioactivity. 


DR. MAURO: Jim, you had mentioned that -– when I 


backed out my calculations, I came up with chronic 


assumed assumption of 47 MAC. 


 DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Your -– you make mention of 60. What 


did I do wrong? 


DR. NETON: It has to do with when you -– when you 


model IMBA, you put in a daily intake and you can’t 


take off weekends. 


 DR. MAURO: Okay. 


DR. NETON: So, in a sense, when you compress it 


back in a five day work week, you end up getting 


that extra -– 


DR. MAURO: So for the five day work week, you’re 


saying it’s 60, but if you spread out --


DR. NETON: If you spread it out over seven day; if 


you have a seven-day work environment --


DR. MAURO: Okay. I understand. So during the five 


day week the person’s working, he’s at 60. 

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 DR. NETON: Right. 

 DR. MAURO: And then -– I got it. 

DR. NETON: And the other thing that I -- I point 

out that is –- that in the petitioners’ concern and 


SC&A seemed to agree to this, at least in your write 


up, that we did not cover a number or processes 


including the cracking furnace and rolling 


operations. And I’m not certain that there were 


rolling operations and secondly, the cracking 


furnace I don’t think is relevant for this -– this 


investigation. I don’t think that the uranium was 


put through a cracking furnace to my knowledge. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We have no indication -– 


DR. NETON: So, the only remaining one is the chip 


incinerator, which I’ll agree is –- is a potential 


for high exposure. 


DR. MAURO: Before we leave that, while we’re still 


on one. 


 DR. NETON: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: The way I was thinking about it is, I 


asked myself the question, in effect, the model 


you’ve developed saying listen, we’re going to 


assume every worker setting aside the fire for a 


minute in early June, we’re going to assume every 


worker is chronically exposed 47 -- 60 MAC or 47 MAC 

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continuously. And I asked myself the question and 


is it -– does that -- is it possible, now that I put 


myself -– I’m a worker and I show up to work and 


I’ve been working there. And is it possible that on 


any given day, if you took a urine sample from me, 


that it could be higher than that, because the 


highest one was the -– was the .03 milligrams per 


liter. And I asked myself on any given day is it 


possible one of these hundred people might very well 


have had something substantially higher than that. 


And my answer is yeah, of course, because we only 


did thirty –- thirty-seven out of a hundred. And 


these were, you know, basically a one-day sampling. 


Granted it is integration, but when I did the 


models, you’ll notice that if you have an intake, it 


does dip down and the lower limit of detection was ­

- was 15 MAC. In other words, 15 -– in other words, 


.01 milligrams is your low limit of detection, and 


that’s (unintelligible) 15 MAC. 


 DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: So, in effect, what happens is the 47 


MAC, you know, I guess where I’m going with this is 


that I would not be surprised if you in fact -– if 


in fact, all 100 workers were sampled once a month, 


there would be no doubt in my mind that at least 

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some of them would have probably been higher than 


the .03 mite* or milligrams per cubic liter, but 


then I say to myself, but I don’t think it’s 


possible that the same person is going to be at .03 


each and every month for the entire work period. 


So, quite frankly, I walk away with the -– in a 


position where I say is it possible that there -– 


that there were people that were exposed for the 


entire duration which you folks are assuming I 


believe is about 70 weeks; we start in January and 


go through May. So, you sort of stretched it out, 


when in fact really it was probably more like March 


through November. So I agree with that. That --


that perhaps may double the quota. And a good way 


to think about it is a total number of atoms that 


are going to be -- are assumed to be inhaled or 


becquerels or picocuries over the time period. Do I 


believe from looking at the operations, the records, 


that there could have been people that could have 


gotten more than that? And I have to say right now, 


the way I see it, is there are -– this maybe make it 


a little easier for the matrix, because it becomes a 


simple concept. Under what circumstances could I 


envision that the prime integrated total intake of 


uranium for some workers might have been greater 

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than that? All right, that’s the way I look at it. 


And I say no, except for a couple of situations. 


And the two situations are one, this business of the 


fire. And there may have been -– and on that, it 


might have been multiple fires. We know about one. 


DR. NETON: Let’s talk about that separately. 


That’s another issue. 


DR. MAURO: Let me -– I guess I’m sort of stepping 


back and then we can come back to this. But -– so, 


I guess I’m in agreement that selecting 47 MAC is -– 


is a conservative assumption. That it is unlikely 


that the same person is going to be chronically 


exposed month after month after month. And at the 


end, have an average exposure over a whole year -– 


70 weeks that translates to chronic exposure at 47 


MAC. 


DR. NETON: If you look at it, John, I don’t want to 


cut you off but you raise a good point. You know, 


is our exposure bounded. I mean is it a plausibly 


bounding analysis? And the total intake predicted 


from these machining operations, if you use this 70 


MAC or approximately 70 MAC, is 7.2 times 10 to the 


sixth picocuries. So, seven microcuries of uranium 


in a year and a quarter, basically. Which equates 


to over 10 grams of uranium inhalation. The 

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question to ask is, is there a person out there that 


we believe at this facility on a part-time basis, 


inhaled more than ten grams of uranium in that year 


and a quarter. And I would suggest that’s probably 


not -– not plausible. It’s not reasonable to assume 


that because if you look at these other operations 


that have occurred around this complex, you don’t 


see those kinds of exposures. In fact, --


MR. GRIFFON: If it’s not plausible, then is this a 


plausible upper bound? 


DR. NETON: I mean, is it to go way higher than 10 


grams, and I just don’t see a way of getting there. 


DR. POSTON: Well, being a naïve member of the 


committee, it seems to me that what we’re -– what 


we’re talking about here is getting -– going from 


point A to point B, and how you get there. Now, 


what John suggests, and Arjun suggests and doing 


additional research and using other data from other 


facilities and so forth, makes a whole lot of sense. 


But what to me the question boils down to: Did 


NIOSH use the appropriate assumptions or are these 


acceptable assumptions. It’s not the way you would 


like to see them do it, but to me does this provide, 


to be frank, an over-estimate of the potential 


exposures of these people, and is that a bounding 

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estimate. And I answered, yeah, we can do it the 


way SC&A is suggesting but this is another approach 


and I think both of those approaches are going to 


give a result which is going to be very 


conservative. It’s going to be an over-estimate. 


It’s going to be claimant favorable. I don’t see 


that –-


DR. MAURO: I walk away with –- there’s no doubt the 


overwhelming majority of the workers at that 


facility are going to be under that intake, that 


time integrated intake. My only question is 


exploring the possibility that there might have been 


some workers, for example, the ones that were – 


either weren’t monitored or monitored -- you know, 


that could have had a larger intake. You see, the 


problem we’re having is, there’s no doubt that your 


approach is conservative when you look at the 


population in an aggregate of one hundred years. 


There’s no doubt. But are there some workers that 


might have been involved in certain activities where 


they could have experienced relatively short-term 


high exposures which could have resulted in their 


time integrated intake greater than the values 


adopted? Now all I’ve done is say I’ve went into 


the literature and the best study by far is this 

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NYOO report by (unintelligible) and Scott. You’ve 


seen it. And it shows that there are circumstances 


that do occur where the short-term intake could have 


been fairly high and if you –- now the question 


becomes is that enough to say that well, it’s 


possible that that time integrated intake indeed for 


some workers might have been underestimated for 


them. And all I’m saying is that needs to be 


explored. And that question really has never been 


entertained. 


DR. NETON: And you’re talking about fires or –-


DR. MAURO: No. I –- I’m talking about quite 


frankly the –- the furnace. 


DR. POSTON: That’s another issue, though. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, I’m sorry. Yeah. 


DR. POSTON: Well, I don’t understand how you answer 


that question. You’ve seen the data. 


DR. MAURO: Yep. 


DR. POSTON: And they’ve seen the data. And as far 


–- and I’ve looked at the data, and I don’t see any 


indication that in the Chapman Valve stuff that 


would answer that question affirmatively. Now, 


maybe what’s in these other reports for other 


facilities, you can say yes, on this day there was 


an over -- exposure or on this day there was an 

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exposure. But I don’t see any evidence –-


MR. GRIFFON: You can’t decide -– you can’t decide 


in some cases you’re going to rely on external data 


and in some cases you’re not --


MS. BLOOM: This is Cindy -– 


MR. GRIFFON: -- in some cases, you’re not. I mean, 


if you know the operation existed, you can’t 


discount some information from other sites and use 


the other one when it makes your argument. 


DR. POSTON: Well, I don’t completely agree with 


that. I mean, other people -– I mean, people 


operated differently in those -– in each one -– time 


to get up or –- people operated differently in 


different facilities and in some places you didn’t 


have incidents and other places you did have 


incidents. 


MR. GRIFFON: Sure. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. So –- so --


MR. GRIFFON: How do you decide what other facility 


data is relevant and not relevant -– 


DR. NETON: Cindy has a comment. 


DR. POSTON: Cindy. 


MS. BLOOM: This is Cindy Bloom again. We did look 


at bioassay data from Simonds Saw and Steel during 


the same type of period. We looked at the results 

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themselves to see if they were -– the percentiles 


were similar. That’s in the evaluation report. And 


I’ve also looked at a lot of data from other 


facilities. I haven’t tabulated that all, but I 


think what you’ll find is that it’s unusual to have 


results that are much above 30 micrograms per liter. 


Not that they don’t exist, but usually it’s less 


than five percent of the results for -– or around 


five percent of the results for a site, give or 


take. The other thing is I think that New York 


Operations report is a good report to look at, but I 


would caution you to be a little bit careful there. 


For example, a facility like Harshaw was using type 


F material as well, which you expect to see higher 


levels in the urine from a facil – from a facility 


like that. And I think the ore processing 


facilities that you could have higher values. So, I 


think you have to make sure you’re looking at the 


right types of operations and comparing ore 


processors to ore processors and uranium metal 


handlers to uranium metal handlers. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think -– I think it is -– it is 


helpful to separate these issues. And the first 


item, at least as I, when reviewing John’s matrix, 


could see that it was about chronic exposures. And 

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in our review of the literature, we tended to agree 


that when you look at other facilities the approach 


that NIOSH adopted for chronic exposures would be 


okay. But when you look at the evaluation report 


and when you look at the site profile, I mean, 


there’s a burden of demonstration that NIOSH has, 


that we didn’t feel -– I mean -– Cindy says that you 


have looked at these, but they are not documented. 


And I think given that the sampling did not occur at 


the end of operations, but occurred at least a month 


-– month –- if it’s 30 days before the end of 


operations, we’ve got 30 days of no data. 


MS. BLOOM: Well, no, I don’t think that’s 


necessarily true. I don’t think we have an exact 


end date for operations there, Arjun. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. Well, the last film badge 


was on November 1st, so -– I mean, obviously we’re 


operating on skimpy data which I would argue puts a 


greater burden on NIOSH. If you don’t know the end 


date and the last sample is in September, then that 


makes a bigger problem than what you represent 


potentially. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. And that’s –- that’s part of the 


reason that we extended the period of exposure past 


that for another five or six months, actually. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: There’s a bounding way to take into 


account the uncertainty for time period, but I don’t 


think that -– that -– that can -– that can be argued 


to compensate for some unknown that you have –-


DR. NETON: (Unintelligible) 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Wait -– wait -– wait a minute. Wait 


a minute. The -– the -– what I’m say – what I think 


we’re saying in the first item is not that the 


number for chronic exposures could be a lot higher. 


What we’re saying is that NIOSH has a burden of 


providing the documentation that you’ve done this 


research that seems to correspond to our own reading 


of the chronic exposures in uranium operations and 


put it on the table in the Chapman context. So we 


are not doing things such as the one Cindy 


suggested, you know, comparing the wrong types of 


operations and so forth. 


MR. ROLFES: Cindy, could you please explain the 


documentation that you provided to us that we have 


on the X drive, for the advisory board’s review? 


MS. BLOOM: I don’t know -– did they get the 


evaluation report response? Was that available to 


them? I was –- I was trying to see if that was -– 


MR. ROLFES: I was referring to the comparison of 


numbers from NUMEC and BY-12 bioassay data, and 

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such. If you could explain that a little bit -– 


 MS. BLOOM: Right. 


MR. ROLFES: -- because I think that’s what Arjun is 


pointing out, that we haven’t demonstrated. But I 


believe that is documented on the X drive in some 


Excel spreadsheets, if you could explain that, 


please. 


MS. BLOOM: I -– I -– some of that is on there. I’m 


not sure that I have the Y-12 and the Simonds 


information in that particular spreadsheet. But the 


NUMEC data, we did look at their incinerator 


operations. Richard Miller had provided some 


documentation that was very good. So, and we looked 


at that carefully and looked at the bioassay results 


for that. And that comparison is in that 


spreadsheet. It’s also summarized in the site 


profile. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That -- that is a separate question. 


The incinerator, the chip burner and fires. I guess 


maybe that’s not an acceptable way of proceeding. 


What I’m trying --


 DR. NETON: The matrix is -– 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We separated those issues and said 


for the -– for the routine machining type of 


operations that occurred is NIOSH’s construct for 

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chronic exposure, does it look okay? And we said 


two things. We said that it, for that piece it 


looks okay to us. There are these other issues of 


the other items. But the documentation, because 


you’ve got deficient data at this site, you need the 


documentation for the other sites. And that isn’t 


what’s on the table. 


DR. POSTON: It’s not clear to me that what you’ve 


written here says what you just said. 


DR. MAURO: It’s in the full text. Let me help out 


here. 


We like the 47 MAC. We think the 47 MAC places an 


upper bound on chronic exposures. Now, we looked at 


a lot of data from a lot of different reports, what 


the concentrations were, some people, how they vary 


as a function of time. Because these exposures were 


not just flat, these were constant -— they were up 


and down. And we looked at lots of data showing 


that and there’s no doubt in my mind that from the 


point of view of what you would call day to day 


operations chronic exposure, even taking into 


consideration the possibility there might have been 


some rolling operations. Our position is that the 


47 MAC is a good number. It’s bounding and -– but 


we -– now, so, in other words, I think the only 

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thing -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Let me just say for the record, I’m 


not sure I’m there yet. I agree it’s a high number; 


I’m not sure it’s a good number. How we got there 


is what I’m interested in. There’s a lot of 


questions. 


DR. MAURO: Our position is we like the 47 MAC for 


chronic exposure. What we felt was missing in the 


report was a better development of why it’s a good 


number. There’s a –- there’s a lot of mis -– 


there’s a lot of material that’s in the literature, 


and I especially felt that not getting into the data 


that’s in this report that I’m holding in my hand 


called “Study of Atmospheric Contamination in the 


Metalmel* Plant Building,” this is for Hanford; it’s 


an incredibly good document. And it tells a story 


that I believe supports the 47 MAC. And I think 


that similarly a lot of the work in Kingsley –-


DR. NETON: Well, we’ve got two choices here though, 


John. We -– we -– here we have a site where we have 


bioassay data. We tried to use it to the best 


extent possible. And we believe that it’s fairly 


representative of –- of the workers’ experience, 30 


micrograms. Now, if you discount that then the only 


alternative you have then is developing an exposure 

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model based on air concentrations. How do you meld 


those two? 


DR. MAURO: No. 


DR. NETON: How do you meld those two? 


DR. MAURO: I –- I think you can’t. 


MR. GRIFFON: And you don’t have any site-specific 


air monitoring data. 


DR. MAURO: No. No. You use both. You say listen, 


here’s the model. And the way I looked at it is, 


you –- you’ve built a model around 30 -– well, a 40, 


I guess, bioassay samples. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: And on that basis, you came up with a 


matrix. And I said -– but when I asked myself do I 


like this matrix, do I think it does –- places a 


plausible upper bound, namely using the .03 


milligram per cubic meter as if everyone was 


chronically at that level all the time, I had to 


convince myself of that, because I realized that you 


only did 30 percent of the workers. So, there’s 60 


percent you missed. 


DR. NETON: That’s a pretty good percentage. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I know. But that means -– 


No. No. Think of it like this. Your philosophy 


was I’m going to pick the highest number of the 

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workers that I have samples for, other than the 


fire. And I’m going to go with that. And if it 


turned out you had a hundred, I guarantee one of 


them would be higher than .03. You know, it’s going 


to happen. 


DR. NETON: Well, certainly. But --


DR. MAURO: Right. I’m not done. Let me -– let me 


finish. So what I’m saying to convince myself that 


that was a good number, I went ahead and I really 


pored over the -– the other literature. And I walk 


away convinced that yes, 47 MAC’s a good number. So 


all I’m saying is that I think that -– that by 


representing that those 33 samples alone allow you 


to say we’ve got a robust, complete story to tell 


and we can hang our hat on that, I don’t agree with 


that. I think that you ended up in the right place 


using that data, but to support that conclusion, you 


needed to go and review and demonstrate that there 


are lots of other data out there that demonstrate 


that that judgment was, in fact, valid. That’s the 


first point that was made. 


DR. POSTON: So what’s the path forward here? 


MS. BLOOM: John, just -- just to simplify. Is –-


are you saying that if we -– you’re looking for 


added information in the site profile that says we 

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have looked at these Simonds bioassay results, we’ve 


looked at bioassay results at other sites and they 


also indeed support the assumptions? 


DR. MAURO: And -– and air -– and lots of air 


sampling data. And I think that when you 


collectively look at all of this together, then a 


story emerges that says you’re bullet proof. 


MS. BLOOM: Right -– but we -– but we looked at -– I 


guess, we -– you know, it is in the site profile 


that we looked at the Y-12 and the Simonds intakes, 


calculated intake rates calculated for that site 


which are related in Simonds case to both 


consideration of the air sampling data and 


consideration of the bioassay data. We looked at Y12, which is based on co-worker models, which gets 


you back to bioassay. And we can mention those in 


the site profile, but that information is out there. 


It’s partially addressed in an evaluation report. 


To me, it sounds like you’re just saying you want 


some –- some more words added to the site profile. 


You’re not looking for changes unless for some -– 


you know, I can’t imagine that we would find data 


that would indicate that -– that our values should 


be higher at this point. 


DR. MAURO: I -– I agree. I -– but I also say that 

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I think the Simonds and the Y-12, as being sort of 


surrogate information or supplemental information, 


is no where near as powerful and as complete and 


relevant as are the data that’s in this report by 


Adley, Gill and Scott. The Adley, Gill and Scott 


report is right on target for your facility, for 


Chapman. And –-


MS. BLOOM: You said it’s a metal melting facility? 

DR. MAURO: Yeah. And had a whole separate oper --

MS. BLOOM: That sounds different though. 

DR. MAURO: No. It was a metal melting facility and 

it had a whole separate operation that was just 


dedicated to storing, milling, lathing, chip 


burning, and they have an extensive analysis of the 


data. And I -– and I spent a lot of time looking at 


that data, and that data convinced me -– Yeah. That 


data convinced me that the approach that you folks 


have been taking from a chronic exposure point of 


view is valid. 


MS. BLOOM: You’re just saying we should look at 


this other information –- this other reference and 


incorporate that information into the site profile, 


correct? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. And also convince yourself. 


DR. WADE: I think what SC&A is saying is you need 

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to prepare a story, supported by data of various 


types, and you’re pointing out some, that support 


your conclusions relative to chronic. And that’s 


what they are saying. We need to hear from Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead, Cindy. Cindy wanted to say 


something. 


MS. BLOOM: No. I just -- I just wanted to -– I 


guess I feel I’ve looked at a lot of data. I’ve 


provided a lot of write ups of data and so I’m just 


hearing that even though you all looked at other 


data that you feel that there’s not enough 


supporting information although you’ve confirmed 


what NIOSH and the ORAU Team have already done. 


DR. MAURO: That’s how I see it. Yes. 


DR. NETON: Cindy, this is Jim. I don’t think you 


have seen this Adley, Gill and Scott publication or 


document. And it -– it is pretty good. I mean, 


I’ve looked through this; John brought this up 


earlier --


MS. BLOOM: No. And I’m not -– I’m not saying that 


it shouldn’t be looked at. I just -– I just want to 


confirm that we’re just -– 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MS. BLOOM: We’re -– we’re not -– at this point, 


there’s not a process of numbers need to be tweaked 

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but there’s a processing supporting information 


needs to be strengthened. 


DR. WADE: And that process -– the –- the numbers 


need to be looked at critically. And, you know, it 


could be that there could be something found. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. And I understand that, too. But 


from what John says, he doesn’t feel that that’s an 


issue at this point. 


DR. MAURO: That’s where I come down. That doesn’t 


necessarily mean –-


MS. BLOOM: That doesn’t mean that Mark comes down 


in that same place. 


DR. NETON: Not all of the information in this 


Adley, Gill and Scott document are completely 


relevant. I mean there are melting operations. 


There are some very different operations that were 


conducted here. But there are some similarities. 


MS. BLOOM: Is that in the -– is that on the 


terminal server? 


DR. NETON: I believe it is. Mark you put it on 


there? Mark Rolfes? 


I can provide you a copy of this one. 


MS. BLOOM: Could you spell the first last name of 


that? 


MR. ROLFES: If we referenced it in the SEC 

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evaluation report then it should be -– 


DR. NETON: It’s not referenced. This came to light 


during SC&A’s review. And I provided you a copy, I 


thought we asked to get it out there on the O drive. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s not there. 


DR. NETON: It’s not there? 

DR. MAURO: No, I looked for it the other day, so -– 

DR. NETON: All right. We need to put it out there. 

MR. GRIFFON: Can we get it in a sub-folder so we 


know where it is –-


DR. POSTON: So, are we coming to a resolution on 


this first issue? 


DR. NETON: I think we understand what their 


position is and that –- essentially what I’m hearing 


is that we need to balance our analysis, primarily 


against this document among others. And to 


strengthen our position that the –- it’s kind of an 


odd situation to say that the urine data match what 


we’d expect from the air concentrations. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I -– Can I –- just two comments. 


One thing that John brought up I think which is 


important is the site-specific idea versus using 


other uranium facility data. And I think, as we 


move on here it seems like we’re relying less and 


less on -– it seems like we’re relying on none of 

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the Chapman Valve data. 


MR. GRIFFON: You have -– you have one data. 


Urinalysis is one thing you’re hanging your hat on. 


DR. NETON: We took the highest observed value of 


(unintelligible). 


MR. GRIFFON: I understand. 


I have a question which Cindy can follow up on but I 


think that it’s one that you said in September, you 


represented these as some of the highest machining 


operations, but I think this centerless grinder was 


actually a lathe operator. And they are much lower 


exposures. 


MR. ROLFES: We had milling machine operator, 


centerless grinder, turret lathe operators. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. So I’m following up 


the guy’s name, centerless grinder, and I look under 


film badge reports and he’s listed as a turret lathe 


operator. It’s a mistake, but either way, 


centerless grinding is a lot higher potential 


airborne exposure than the lathe operation according 


to your own document and the attachment. 


DR. MAURO: It’s here. The centerless grinder, the 


lathe operator, every -– 


DR. NETON: We know what those concentrations are. 


DR. MAURO: We know what they are. And that’s why I 

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agreed with the petitioners. I read the 


petitioners’ concern, they said listen, the data, 


the urine data alone and some supplemental data from 


Simonds Saw and from Y-12, they were –- they were 


uncomfortable with that. They said we don’t think 


that really locks it up. And I agreed with that. I 


–- I was not comfortable. So I said listen, let me 


go and look at this further. And then that’s when I 


read Kingsley and I read Adley, Gill and Scott. I 


did a whole bunch of calculations and I said the 


numbers are good. But it wasn’t until I did that, 


that I convinced myself that your numbers are good. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, and then the other -– the other 


thing I was going to say is the other thing that I 


think in site profile or in any support of the 


argument here, I think it wasn’t clear to me, it may 


be very clear to Cindy, but it wasn’t clear to me, 


that we’re comparing apples -– you’re comparing 


apples and apples. We have a Y-12 cohort worker 


data from ’47 through ’53 or whatever the time 


period was, being compared to Chapman Valve. You 


know, Y-12 had a lot of different stuff going on and 


you’re making a comparison there I think -– I think 


that -- that has some problems. I think people are 


going to say Y -– we’re not Y, this is nothing like 

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Y-12. You know, why are we making this comparison, 


because the numbers look the same? I don’t –-


MS. BLOOM: No. I think -– you have -– you have -– 


Y-12 is a uranium metal handling facility that did a 


huge variety of activities there. And certainly the 


machining of the metals was probably a small part of 


their work but that was an available data set there, 


where it probably does include exposures from work 


groups that would be thought to have higher and 


lower exposures. Except that Y-12 was known to have 


you know, they built up their uranium contamination 


in the background which when you look at these 


sites, that tends to be a significant exposure 


pathway for workers. So I -- I don’t think that 


it’s a poor choice. It was a readily available 


choice in that time period. And I’m certainly 


willing to look at more information. We also -– Jim 


Neton has provided the information on the different 


air concentrations from machining operations and 


we’ve looked at that, too. I’m glad to look at any 


piece of data that we have to -– to -– to see if 


these numbers are indeed reasonable. And I – and I 


believe they are upper estimates of -- of intakes 


that might have occurred at Chapman Valve during 


this period. 

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DR. POSTON: So can we resolve this by -– by asking 


to look at this Adley report and provide better 


documentation of how you got to where you are, would 


that be reasonable? 


DR. WADE: You need to tell a story. Yeah. Tell a 


story in which you include the validation process. 


DR. POSTON: Sort of a validation of process? 


DR. NETON: Uh-huh. 


DR. POSTON: Is that reasonable? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. We can -– we can do that. 


MR. GRIFFON: And Cindy, if you have this other 


Simonds analysis and Y-12 analysis that you’ve done, 


I think that would be -– 


DR. WADE: All of it should be --


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t think you need to recreate it, 


but if it can be provided to us. 


DR. NETON: Now, we’ve also included in the eval -– 


in the site profile is the analysis that we did 


against the HASL –-


DR. MAURO: Kingsley? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. Kingsley report which summarized 


their experience across the complex, not just at one 


facility of machining, grinding, abrasive operations 


and Cindy, I think that’s appendix B in the site 


profile where it does that comparison. And I 

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thought it gave us a fairly good comfort level that 


we were certainly in the right order here. 


DR. WADE: There’s a story to be told with a number 


of facets and I think you should tell it and then 


share that back with the workgroup. 


DR. NETON: We can do that. 


DR. POSTON: Is there a need to discuss issue two 


and three in somewhat –- in great detail since there 


seems to be concerns? 


DR. WADE: Why don’t we touch on it for the record 


and move past it. 


DR. POSTON: You want to talk about it right quick? 


ISSUE TWO
 

DR. MAURO: Okay. Yes. Again, I will read the 


petitioners’ expressed concern real quickly. Number 


two. We’re on page two of the matrix. The 


petitioners’ expressed concern that NIOSH concedes 


that they have no documentation about why bioassay 


samples were collected and that most of the data 


were below the limit of detection. It appears that 


the petitioners are concerned that the bioassay 


program was poorly designed and did not detect 


intakes for the more highly exposed individuals. 


NIOSH response was NIOSH explains that it was 


standard practice at the time for urine samples to 

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be collected in order to assess exposure conditions 


at the site. In addition, NIOSH states that 


although the exact selection criteria regarding who 


should be included in the bioassay program are not 


stipulated in any of the records, it was standard 


practice for AEC to want to know what were the worst 


case exposures so that they could determine where 


additional controls might be needed. SC&A agrees 


with that response, that -– with NIOSH’s response as 


it applies to chronic exposures to workers at the 


facility. So, for the record, that’s our position 


on this matter. 


MR. ROLFES: Thank you. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I ask -– I mean, I’m just curious. 


You know, I mentioned already that I think there 


were three machines sampling here representing this 


as a machining operation. So I know there were 40 


samples. But there’s also this job title of helper 


that I think in some of the values, but I’m not sure 


if –- this is a question, if for the September -– 


I’m sorry, June 11th samples, if it was known that 


they were follow-up samples from the fire or if it 


was kind of implied or is that a -– was that 


documented in the hard copy records? I didn’t see 


it -– 

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MR. ROLFES: Yeah. We have a letter indicating 


that. I can read that if you would like. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: It turns out that the people involved, 


there were two people with the highest samples. 


They were not really fighting the fire. They were 


involved in the clean-up operations. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. 


DR. NETON: And that’s a slightly different take on 


that. They weren’t the fire fighters themselves. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. 


DR. NETON: That was the .07/.08 milligrams. 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess that was my question was it 


was documented that they were cleanup from the fire? 


DR. NETON: Yes. It’s in the letter that --


MR. GRIFFON: ‘Cause also the -– you know, these -– 


it seems to me that these helpers, a lot of times at 


the facilities, the helpers are the machine helpers 


and they get some of the dirty jobs and they might 


have been some of the higher internal exposed. You 


know, from normal operations. 


DR. NETON: Right. In fact, the highest sample we 


used was –- was an inspector. 


MR. GRIFFON: Inspector. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. Which is kind of -– kind of 

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interesting in itself, but -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: You got to remember. We were using 


these as chronic exposure values over the entire 


period of operation. 


MR. GRIFFON: No, I -– 


DR. NETON: .03 could have been a sample taken two 


days after a guy was jostling with a couple of 


ingots, and you know, uranium’s got a lot of 


surface, you know, material on it. But, you know, 


just because the inspector had a .03 doesn’t mean 


that he was chronically exposed to get that .03 


after ten continuous months of exposure. That’s why 


we believe getting this 60 – 70 MAC is a very 


claimant favorable position. 


MS. BLOOM: (Unintelligible) particular individuals, 


excuse me, by October 7th -– on his October 7th
 

value, he’s one of the few people that had a second 


sample, had a .01 result. 


DR. NETON: Right. And we ignored that. We just 


said this guy got .03 and it was a chronic exposure. 


We ignored the fact that it wasn’t really .03 and we 


just picked the highest value and went with it. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: This is where we feel like, you know, we 

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really -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. No. I’m getting at the -– the 


number of production workers that were sampled more 


so than the values and whether they seem like -– 


DR. NETON: But I think, Mark, the basic message 


here is all the values are low. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: They’re all very low consistent with a 


low level exposure operation. Whether it’s a 


production worker or a shop floor people or 


inspectors. They’re all below .03 micrograms -– 


milligrams per cubic meter. 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t disagree with that, I’m just 


saying the sampling seems pretty sparse, you know, 


the number of samples –-


DR. NETON: Here we go again. I mean, are you 


suggesting they particularly ignored the people that 


had higher potential exposure? 


MR. GRIFFON: No. I don’t have evidence of that, so 


DR. NETON: Right. So how do you –- I mean, what 


leads you to believe that, that these are not 


representative of the general workers’ exposures in 


the facility? 


MR. GRIFFON: I think I could turn that question 

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around. Burden of proof is not necessarily on me. 


I would say what led you to believe that other than 


the fact --


DR. MAURO: To answer your question -– 


DR. WADE: We’re back to the point where -– 


MR. GRIFFON: We’re back to the other documents. 


DR. WADE: We’ve got that covered. 


MR. GRIFFON: But I think the only reason this is 


important is because I think at some point there’s a 


strong reliance on other facility data and very 


little reliance on the site specific data. I think 


we have another potential policy question or issue 


arising. 


DR. POSTON: Wouldn’t –- wouldn’t the actions on, 


even though there’s concurrence here from NIOSH, 


wouldn’t the actions associated with issue one boil 


over into issue two and remove some of this concern? 


That’s the documentation of bioassay samples and so 


forth. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think you’re probably right. 


DR. WADE: I would hope. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I think you’re right. 


DR. WADE: I think it is a major issue that has been 


identified and now we have a path forward. 


DR. POSTON: Can we move on, then? 

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MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. POSTON: Anything else? John. 


ISSUE THREE
 

DR. MAURO: Okay. We’re going to move on to number 


three. 


DR. POSTON: Yes, sir. 


DR. MAURO: On page two. I will read a summary of 


the petitioners’ concern. The petitioners claim 


that there is insufficient bioassay data with which 


to estimate a plausible upper bound dose. That 


process information is too limited to characterize 


exposures. And there is only one day of air 


monitoring data. As such, it is not feasible to 


estimate dose with sufficient accuracy. To 


summarize NIOSH’s response to that claim, NIOSH 


states in summary, NIOSH disagrees with these claims 


because the bioassay program was consistent with 


such programs at that time. And that enough is 


known about Chapman Valve production to estimate 


doses with sufficient accuracy. NIOSH also states 


that air-monitoring data were not used to 


reconstruct doses and, as a result, the fact that 


the amount of the air monitoring data is extremely 


limited is not a significant issue. Finally, NIOSH 


summarizes the basic approach used to develop the 

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exposure matrix and explains that those assumptions 


are compatible with experience at Y-12 at that time. 


SC&A’s bottom line is that we -– we concur with 


NIOSH’s position except that we feel that -– it goes 


back to item number one -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: I say yes to that with the proviso, but 


you must take that together with a great deal of 


data collected from many uranium facilities at that 


time. And only then can you make that statement. 


So, this really is part and parcel to number one, 


again. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. POSTON: Any need to discuss it further or -– 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s rehashing the same –-


DR. MAURO: Yeah. Yeah. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. Great. So we’ll move on to 


number four. 


ISSUE FOUR
 

MR. GRIFFON: We’re moving right along. 


DR. MAURO: Number four, I think number four -– 


DR. POSTON: I am not against progress. 


DR. MAURO: Number four I think is a place –-


MR. GRIFFON: We have to talk more and make this 


trip worth it. 

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DR. MAURO: We’re about to get to the stuff that 


really (unintelligible) here. And that’s number 


four is the beginning of that. Okay, again, 


petitioners claim that since the actual date of the 


fire is not known, the actual uranium intakes 


associated with the May/June 1948 fire cannot be 


estimated. NIOSH response to this concern restates 


the quotes taken from historical records that a fire 


occurred in early June and that the exposure matrix 


takes the exposures associated with the fire into 


consideration using the urine bioassay data 


collected on June 11, 1948, from seven workers that 


were involved in putting out the fire and cleaning 


up following the fire. 


We agree with the petitioners in this regard. We 


believe -– and this goes to one of our major 


findings, and I’ll just explain it conceptually and 


then I’ll –- I guess I’ll ask Mark –- the way I 


looked at it was something very simple. You took a 


urine sample on June 11, and on that basis you back 


calculated well what did the person have to take in 


on June 10th to give you that urine sample on June 


11th . And you got a number and that’s the chronic -– 


and that’s the acute exposure, you’re assuming those 


workers -– 

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MS. BLOOM: John, can I stop you right there, 


because that’s not what we did. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


MS. BLOOM: We actually took that high sample on 


June 11th and then we used the .03 and we fit an 


acute and a chronic intake together. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. And I -– 


MS. BLOOM: We looked at June 1st, we looked at June 


2nd, we looked at June 3rd . We changed all the date 


-– I went through all the dates there and I picked 


the, for the co-worker model, I picked the date that 


gave the highest total intake for the co-worker 


model. There’s no evidence that co-workers were 


involved in the fire. If you look at -– at the 


letter from Chapman, it says, “These are the workers 


involved in the fire and the clean up”. It doesn’t 


say these are some of the workers. And so I assumed 


that most of the people would not have been directly 


involved in the fire, but giving the benefit of the 


doubt for the co-worker model, I modeled it all as 


one exposed group with the same bioassay data. And 


when I do that the highest intake that you can get, 


assuming that the fire occurred in June, which is 


supported by that Chapman letter and the AEC letter, 


is that assuming the intake occurred on June 10th . 

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And that’s because as you increase that acute 


intake, you lower the chronic intake. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. See, I took it from a different 


perspect –- very interesting. I took it from a 


different perspective and because it was not that 


apparent to me when I read the material. I just 


assumed we got these hundred workers working in the 


plant, okay, and they’re all being assumed to be 


chronically exposed at a level that is 47 MAC, or 60 


MAC during the week. Okay. And that’s a baseline. 


We’re going to give everybody that. And then a fire 


occurs sometime between June 1st and June 10th and so 


beside the chronic exposure, now we’re going to hit 


-– that they were living with all along, now we’re 


going to hit them with acute intake. And when I did 


that, and I modeled it, I said okay, let me see on 


that assumption that their baseline’s already at 


this chronic intake, then I’m going to hit them with 


this acute on June 10th, superimpose it on top of the 


baseline and I nail the activity in the urine. In 


other words I got, you know, --


MS. BLOOM: When you only have one point, you have 

to. 

DR. MAURO: Well, I took -– I got the .08, right. 

Right. I mean I said, okay. There it is. 

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I mean, that’s what I did. I said oh, okay. 


There’s a .08. Now –- so I thought I got it right. 


Then I said to myself what would have happened if 


really the person really wasn’t exposed on June 10th , 


but was exposed on June 1st . I come up with a number 


for the acute intake that would give you .08, that 


is 50 times higher. But then I did one more thing. 


I said what kind of dust loading is that, and it’s 


500 milligrams per cubic meter. So I sort of went 


around the circle. I said, well, first of all, I 


don’t like the June 10th assumption because it could 


have been, you know, June 8, 7, 6, 5, 1. But then I 


said but wait a minute. If I go all the way back to 


June 1st, in order for that to happen, the dust 


loading, the fire fighter and the workers had to 


experience, is 500 milligrams per cubic meter per 


eight hours. And I said well, that can’t happen. 


People can’t live in that. So I went around –- I 


went around the circle. Now –- so, that’s where I 


came out. It’s as simple as that. And so I walk 


away with the feeling that well I don’t necessarily 


believe that the -– my scenario works because of the 


500 milligram per cubic meter dust loading doesn’t 


seem to be plausible. But at the same time, it 


seems to me the June 10th assumption, as when the 

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intake occurred is not claimant favorable, 


necessarily. And then I went another step. Bear 


with me as that -– but in the end, the total intake 


from the fire is only 1.5 percent of the total time 


integrated intake of the 70 weeks. So is this -– 


you know, am I making a big deal out of something 


that’s really not that important, because you know, 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Somehow, I think, John, the numbers 


in your report don’t reflect what you just said. I 


think -– I’d want to refer to the report. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, sure. 


DR. POSTON: Can you speak up a little, Arjun? I 


can’t hear you. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I’m trying to find the numbers that 


–- that are in the report that SC&A filed. And I 


don’t think they correspond to what John just said, 


but I don’t have –- I don’t -- I haven’t brought up 


the numbers yet. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think on page 39 of the report -– 


no. I’m sorry. I am not finding the right place, 


so I’ll just try to find it and then interrupt. 


DR. POSTON: But didn’t -– didn’t I hear Cindy say 


that she has -- she went all the way back to June 

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1st? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that’s what -– 


DR. POSTON: And did each day? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. You see, I think conceptually the 


difference in what I did and what you did and could 


we do that again and explain to me, in other words 


conceptually; I laid in this baseline that was 


there. 


DR. NETON: That’s what we’re doing. 


DR. MAURO: Right. And then you -– you say, I’m 


going to -– now I’m going to hit them with this 


acute intake. 


DR. NETON: Right. And what could be the biggest 


acute intake and still be below .08 -– 


DR. MAURO: .08. 

DR. NETON: On that day. 

DR. MAURO: Right. Now, I could get .08 by giving 

this guy 50 times more acute intake on June 1st . 


MS. BLOOM: No, what I -- what I did was I used that 


.03, as well. 


DR. NETON: As the baseline, right? 


MS. BLOOM: Because it’s a co-worker model. So, 


I’ve got an acute intake to account for that early 


sample .08 and then you look at the .03. 


DR. MAURO: Right. Right. Right. 

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MS. BLOOM: And you’ve got two sample points, so any 


date is truly going to fit. So any of those are 


valid from a fitting technique, because there’s no 


way you can’t fit two points between a line. You 


just, you know, it –-


DR. MAURO: Right. It’s pretty easy. 


MS. BLOOM: It defines your line. So, what I did 


was then looked at the total intake from all those 


scenarios. Because I also went back and looked at 


the periods of time when workers were at the site 


and most workers were at the -– were at the site for 


the whole period. So I said well, to maximize 


exposure from this co-worker model, not from just a 


fire scenario, which the dose reconstructors could 


take into account on an individual basis, which is 


noted in the site profile that this co-worker model 


then would define the -– what could happen to coworkers who weren’t directly into -– involved in the 


fire. And the largest exposure that comes from that 


scenario is when you place that acute intake on June 


10th
 . 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Let me –- I think -- I think that 


may not be the right scenario from an individual 


point of view although it’s okay -– 


MS. BLOOM: I agree for an individual point of view, 

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which is why the site profile says for those people 


where there’s indication that they were involved in 


the fire. And really there’s only that group of 


seven that you need to look at their data and 


determine the best scenario, knowing that the fire 


occurred anywhere between June 1st and June 10th . 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. But then if you -– if you 


leave -- if you assume that the person that cleaned 


up wasn’t involved in the chronic exposure, they 


were a helper who was brought in and then their 


urinalysis was done, if you assume a June 1 fire, 


you’d get a much higher intake, I think. 


DR. MAURO: Than adding everything up. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: You could. I’m not sure, but I 


think you could get a much higher intake. And I’m 


trying to find that number -– 


DR. NETON: Do you assume you had a chronic 


exposure, as well? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. 


DR. NETON: See, that’s where you’ve got to -– 


you’ve got to look. I don’t know if you go back to 


June 1st . If it’s an acute intake only, and no 


chronic exposure, is that higher than the chronic 


total exposure assigned to the worker. I thought we 


did that analysis. What Cindy’s saying is, if you 

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know that the guy was involved in this fire, because 


we have the names of the people, if you know the 


names of these people, then we would treat them 


separately and model them as Arjun suggested. 


They’re not built into the general co-worker model 


then because we know they were involved in a fire. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. I think maybe it’s -- I think 


we’re talking by each other. Maybe I didn’t quite 


understand. I thought, you know, the way you were 


going to reconstruct doses for individual workers, 


you’re going to estima -— you say, is this person --


is this person involved in fighting the fire. And 


if he was then that means that this person was 


chronically exposed plus got the fire. And you’re 


saying you’re not doing it that way. 


DR. NETON: Cindy, help me out here. 


MS. BLOOM: For –- for an individual who has data 


missing, for one of the firefighters who has data. 


DR. NETON: That’s correct. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. I would say that if there’s only 


the information associated with that one point, then 


you would do an acute intake for that fire. And 


look to see if that was higher than the co-worker 


model. 


DR. NETON: Right. 

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MS. BLOOM: Now, most of the workers there, you 


would use the .01 for the acute intake. Not the 


.08. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Just for the record, the number -– 


the number in the SC&A report is that if you have a 


June 1 fire by itself, the acute intake is 3.7 


microcuries. And the chronic intake alone is just 


those five microcuries. So -– so the acute intake 


is less. 


DR. POSTON: What page? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This is on page 30. 


DR. NETON: So the chronic intake would give him a 


higher level? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That’s right. So, I just wanted – 


just wanted to say that for the record, because I 


just could not remember the numbers. But it wasn’t 


1.5 percent. So, I just -– I was sure of that. So. 


DR. MAURO: I’ll have to say, I’m not up to where 


you are. I’m not quite following the story. When I 


went through the numbers, the -– the intake that you 


folks –- the way I understand it, the intake 


associated with the fire, the numbers that are 


actually in your look-up table, the certain number 


of picocuries or becquerels that are assumed to be 


taken in acutely are on that day, June 10th . A 

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certain number. Now, then I said to myself, how 


much is that and how does that compare to the total 


number of picocuries taken in by everyone including 


the firefighters over the 70-week period. And the 


contribution of the fire intake to the total intake 


is an extremely small percentage. I came up with 


1.5 percent and so -– see, so you have to understand 


how my thinking went, given the way I was thinking 


about the scenario. I was saying, well, it looks 


like they’ve underestimated the intake from the fire 


because you assumed June 10. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh. I see what you’re saying. 


DR. MAURO: You see what I’m getting? It looks like 

-– 

MS. BLOOM: Wait. But that’s because we considered 

the model as a whole. It wasn’t considered a -– as 


a separate. I don’t think it’s reasonable to 


separate them out and -- and you know, I guess I’m 


here to serve so that’s my technical opinion that 


the data all go together and so you can’t pick one 


point out of the data and use it that way. But -– 


but if you want to that -– 


DR. MAURO: I just want to make sure I understand 


this now. So when you’re reconstructing the doses, 


see I misunderstood something, very profoundly, 

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unfortunately. I thought you were not going to use 


the data from any of the workers. You were just 


going to say was this worker involved in the fire or 


not? And you had two questions you asked the worker 


and that’s all you needed to know. Was he involved 


with the fire or not, and what organ was the 


problem. And then you simply go ahead to your lookup table. If you know it’s a systemic organ, then 


you go with type M. If you know it’s the lungs, you 


go with type S. If the person was involved in the 


fire, you give them the intake associated with the 


fire, you know, the acute intake of the fire, plus 


the chronic intake for the rest of the year. And I 


didn’t -– but you’re saying no. You’re not doing 


that. You’re actually going to use the real data 


for real people to reconstruct the doses? 


MR. GRIFFON: To the extent they’re identified. 


DR. MAURO: See, I didn’t know you were going to do 

that. 

DR. NETON: And we have their names. 

DR. MAURO: Yeah, I know. But so, so when -– so 

when this particular claimant shows up, you’re going 


to use his urine data to reconstruct his dose with 


his (unintelligible) and not the scenario I just 


described. 

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DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. I did not understand that. 


DR. POSTON: So where does that leave us? 


DR. MAURO: I have to go back and convince myself 


that that’s right. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think to help convince him, Cindy, 


you know, you have these IMBA runs. I’m convinced 


on this one, by the way, just for the record. But I 


think the IMBA runs might make it a lot easier. I 


mean, I recalculated and got very close. But I 


think if you’ve got these IMBA results and the IMBA 


runs themselves, it might save SC&A a lot of time. 


They can just look at how you did it and -– 


DR. WADE: So is that a path forward? Can we 


provide the IMBA runs to SC&A? 


MS. BLOOM: Do we want them just posted in that 


advisory board? 


DR. NETON: Yes. Your AB document review –-


DR. MAURO: That’ll work. 


DR. WADE: So, they actually do post them. John, 


you think about it and you let us know. 


MR. ROLFES: I believe the sample dose 


reconstructions that are there, as well, have some 


IMBA runs that demonstrate this, so -– 


DR. NETON: We’ll put the specific ones that Cindy 

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did out there. 


MR. ELLIOTT: In other words, you’ve shown an 


example of somebody who worked in the fire? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


DR. WADE: Okay. So its post IMBA runs --

MS. BLOOM: Jim, do you want me to send you those 

first --

DR. NETON: Yeah. 

MS. BLOOM: -- and have you (unintelligible)? 

DR. NETON: That’d be good, Cindy. I’ll take a look 

at them and I know where to –- where to put them. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, because I think the examples 


actually might -- they just use the final values 


from the TBD. They don’t really show -– 


DR. NETON: Cindy, send them to me. We’ll chat, and 


then I’ll put them out there. 


MS. BLOOM: Okay. 


DR. WADE: So, John. You’ll look at that and you’ll 


look at the sample dose reconstructions and the --


DR. MAURO: I’ll have to say it’s a different 


construct. 


DR. NETON: It still doesn’t address this other 


issue of just the fires, in general. I mean, that’s 


-– 


DR. MAKHIJANI: It’s a separate issue. 

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DR. NETON: Yeah. Because the petition -– 


MR. ELLIOTT: Isn’t it number eight? 


The petitioners express concern that there may have 


been numerous fires at the facility. Is that what 


you’re talking about? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


DR. WADE: I think it’s there. 


DR. NETON: All right. We’ll talk about -– I think 


in number four, SC&A’s response kind of went beyond 


what the petitioners stated in number four, because 


they’re talking about there were multiple fires and 


stuff. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: We’ll talk about it later. 


DR. WADE: Now we have a path forward on four. 


DR. POSTON: So are we ready to move on to five, 


now? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. Let’s see. I will read -– 


DR. POSTON: We keep going like this, Mark can buy 


us all lunch. 


DR. WADE: He can buy us lunch anyway. 


MR. GRIFFON: Better check my wallet. 


ISSUE FIVE
 

DR. MAURO: Okay. Up to number five. I will read 


the petitioners’ concern. The petitioners express 

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concern that enriched uranium may have been machined 


at Chapman Valve. This concern is based on an 


airborne dust measurement taken in the 1990’s, as 


part of the site remediation program. I’m not going 


to read the other sections because I think that 


conceptually it’s easier to talk about it. We 


believe that it’s real. There is a real measurement 


out there that shows enriched uranium. However, we 


do not believe it is applicable to the time period 


of interest. That is, we believe that somehow 


enriched uranium may have showed up at that site 


because of activities that may have gone on before 


the time period of interest and the reason we say 


that is that we found out that there was a lot of 


things going on during World War II. At -- and post 


World War II, prior to the period of interest where 


it was possible that some enriched uranium may have 


found its way there. And it sounds like -- and you 


know we were talking about that at the meeting, 


sounds like certain activities may have taken place. 


We -– so we feel that that it’s a real question, you 


know, where did this stuff come from? And it’s 


probably something that is worthy of following up 


on. For example, they make reference to the Dean 


Street operation where they were testing manifolds. 

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I didn’t know what a manifold was, but John informed 


me that it might very well have been the enrichment 


activity, chambers -– that were being tested and 


being sent back from Oak Ridge to Chapman to test 


the pressure integrity. And I could envision that 


when that happens, some perhaps small amounts of 


enriched uranium may have found its way into the 


milieu. So we walk away from this saying that for 


the reasons given by NIOSH, we agree that the 


enriched uranium is not an issue for the period of 


performance covered by the SEC petition. And that’s 


where we come out at -– and please, Arjun if you 


feel –-


DR. MAKHIJANI: Could I just add a little bit to 


that? 


DR. MAURO: Sure. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: The interviewee gave some very 


specific information. The interviewee was a worker 


in that period associated with the Dean Street 


facility. And gave very, very specific -– names of 


people who visited, letters that were written to 


those folks, the type of materials that were 


purchased to clean out these manifolds, you know, 


and that purchase orders were written. So it’s not 


just a statement of recall. I checked the Manhattan 

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project history to see that the right contractor was 


identified and it was. So there was some extremely 


clear recall there. And there was also a recall 


that things were being sent, not just that there was 


a contract that we know for Chapman Valve for 


manufacture of valves but that things were being 


sent back for cleaning, repair and testing. And 


while it was not at the Dean –- while the sample was 


at the main site, there is also a mechanism sited 


for possible contamination of the main site, which 


is the manifolds that were first shipped to the main 


site of Chapman Valve by train and transferred to -– 


by truck to the -- so there was some activity 


potentially involving enriched uranium contaminated 


equipment that was train shipped to the Dean Street 


site. So that -– that last piece I think is a very 


important connecting point. And one of the things 


we’ve suggested in our report to resolve this issue, 


is you could always sample the Dean Street site. 


DR. POSTON: Is it still there? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. I mean, I don’t think the 


facility is there, but the site may still be there. 


DR. POSTON: Well, I don’t disagree with what you’ve 


said up until the sampling of the site. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 

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DR. POSTON: Based on my visiting the site, I think 


it would be a waste of time, for the following 


reasons, that site is just a dump. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. No. We did not visit the Dean 


Street site. 


DR. POSTON: Oh. I thought you were talking about 


the site where we were. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. No. We did not and I do not 


know the condition of the Dean Street site. I don’t 


know if it would be -– 


DR. POSTON: And if you want to sample the Dean 


Street site, my recollection of what the individual 


told us was that those manifolds were transferred 


from the train to the truck. So they actually never 


went in the facility as far as I’m concerned. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That’s right. 


DR. POSTON: And was therefore, you know, not to say 


that it shouldn’t be considered, but in terms of 


what we’re talking about here, I don’t think this is 


relevant. But it is something that probably needs 


to be looked at. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. No. We agree with that, that 


it’s not within the purview of this particular site 


profile or petition. But it’s a –- it’s definitely 


a material issue that has come up and there is a 

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sample that is part of the analysis and it was a 


suggestion that maybe we could just assume two 


percent enrichment at some point and we -– I 


personally don’t feel that that’s an appropriate 


response to the two percent sample. 


DR. NETON: Well, I mean, we were speaking in those 


terms of, you know, to get to the SEC process, said 


well, if it was two percent we just multiply it by 


2. I mean, that’s possible. I think this is the 


type of issue that we would turn over to the 


Department of Labor, Department of Energy, as new 


information as we always do when we uncover this 


type of stuff. Let them run it through the process 


and determine if it needs to be added as a separate 


facility or an adjunct to the Chapman Valve facility 


or the Dean Street. It seems like it’s an off-site 


location -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: That would not be currently covered 


under the Chapman Valve. 


DR. POSTON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s the sample that brings us to this 


point. Is that the facility that we’re talking 


about, you know? 


MR. ELLIOTT: My sample comes from Chapman Valve -– 

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DR. NETON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- not at Dean Street. 


MR. ELLIOTT: But there’s this concept being played 


out here that maybe the Dean Street facility 


contributed to that contamination at Chapman. 


But the Dean Street facility is not a covered 


facility -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. ELLIOTT: So we need to turn that over to DOE 


and DOL and let them sort that out. 


DR. POSTON: Interestingly, I can come up with a 


scenario. Since the stuff is coming from Oak Ridge, 


it’s being refurbished, tested, and sent back, that 


there could be some contamination at that address. 


A low enrichment based on where it came from that -– 


DR. NETON: My recollection was that sample was 


taken at the loading dock. 


MR. ROLFES: Yeah. Correct. It --


MR. CLAWSON: John, this is Brad Clawson. 


DR. POSTON: Hey, Brad. 


MR. CLAWSON: Hey. I just -– I’m trying to -– I’m 


trying to follow the -– follow the logic here and so 


forth like this. But I’m trying to understand how 


Dean Street falls into the Chapman Valve. Is it 


actually part of the process or is it part of the 

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SEC or is -– I’m just trying –- I’m having a hard 


time understanding what Dean Street has to do with 


Chapman Valve. 


DR. POSTON: Yeah. The short answer is no, but John 


Mauro wants to –-


DR. MAURO: Well, it’s -– see, what we found out was 


that -– and this happened during the discussions 


that the train shipment of these manifolds from Oak 


Ridge to Chapman Valve went by way of this very same 


building and location. That is the railroad spur 


that brought in the –- the same uranium bars for 


milling and showed up on the railroad spur, also 


brought the manifolds. Now, the manifolds don’t 


have nothing to do with the Chapman Valve operation, 


building 23 that we’re talking about. Had nothing 


to do with it. It just so happened that that’s when 


they brought it in, they unloaded it there at the 


loading dock and then from there, they picked them 


up and brought them to Dean Street to do the testing 


that was necessary. And the scenario that we 


envision is that that may be in the process of the 


train shipment, some small amounts of residual 


enriched uranium that may have been contained in the 


-– or left over in the manifolds may be the reason 


why there was local, some local elevated levels of 

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enriched uranium found, which has nothing to do with 


the Chapman Valve operation itself. In addition, we 


believe that -– so all of the uranium that we’re 


talking about that’s in Chapman Valve as exposures, 


the inhalations, the external exposure, we believe 


that that’s all natural uranium for the very good 


reasons given by NIOSH. And we could conceive of 


the way in which that may have -– that one sample or 


two samples could have occurred had nothing to do 


with the Chapman Valve operations. In addition, we 


also go to the next step and say, well, even prior 


to the time period of interest for this SEC petition 


there were things going on, AEC related activities, 


that also could have contributed to that sample. 


That -– the Chapman Valve having this residual 


activity, so where I’m going with this is I think 


there’s an abundance of evidence that it’s unlikely 


that enriched uranium was routinely handled by any 


means at Chapman Valve as part of the contract 


activities that Chapman Valve was involved in, in 


uranium milling for the time period of interest. So 


we basically agree that it is not an SEC issue for 


this particular petition, but it’s something worthy 


of interest. 


MR. CLAWSON: Okay. And I understand that because 

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we’ve seen in many sites that yeah, they had a basic 


job to be able to do, but also other small things 


fell into it. And I understand that, but in reading 


interviews and stuff like that, we -– we came up 


with one enriched sample and it was near the 


crackling furnace in building 23. 


MR. ROLFES: No. That’s incorrect. 


MS. BLOOM: It’s actually near the chip -– it’s 


actually near the chip-burning furnace. It’s not 


near the cracking furnace. 


MR. ROLFES: Let me clarify that, please. Because 


the chip-burning furnace was actually in the most 


southwest portion of the restricted area, this 


sample in 31 was taken a little bit north of the 


dock and so it’s not really close to the chip-


burning furnace. There’s a number of –- probably 


maybe 30 or 40 feet between the two, so -– 


MS. BLOOM: Did you look at the –- okay. 


DR. WADE: Portia, did you have a question? 


MS. WU: Yes, I did. I appreciate this. I 


apologize I’m going to have to get off to go to 


something for my boss. But, you know, we have been 


concerned about the enriched uranium presence and we 


have noted that in numerous congressional letters. 


I guess I’m not a hundred percent sure how you know, 

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given the presence as was just noted of, you know, 


near the furnace, and you know, it seems like there 


was some processes that potentially took place with 


the enriched uranium why it, you know, it seems like 


it’s potentially being discounted for purposes of 


the final SEC evaluation. 


DR. POSTON: I think Mark just stated that it was 


not associated with the furnace, it was outside of 


the area. 


DR. NETON: Right. I think it was an outside sample 


on the loading dock itself. 


MR. ROLFES: Well, let me get the maps here, but it 


was actually right inside the facility, right next 


to the dock door I believe. That’s what I refer to 


it as. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. It was right north of the dock 


door right near the edge of the -– 


MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


MS. BLOOM: The left wall. 


MS. WU: Well, you know, I guess I understand 


there’s been a lot of back and forth on this and on 


the phone it’s a little bit hard to potentially keep 


track of who all is speaking when, but you know, we 


appreciate that you have thoroughly explored this 


issue is important as well as the, you know, before 

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about the bounding of doses from the incinerators. 


Can I ask, you know, is there an informal record of 


this meeting that will be shared because the courts 


may --


DR. WADE: Yes. There’s a court reporter here and a 


record is being kept and will be shared and made 


public. 


MS. WU: That’d be great. I’d be happy to share 


that with the other offices and obviously if there 


are any more thoughts, we’ll be sure to include 


them. (Unintelligible) be so kind as to send around 


a note to our office about the time when you’re 


going to wrap up so (unintelligible). 


DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. 


MS. WU: And I’ll have someone from my office 


listening the rest of the time, but they probably 


won’t be able to comment. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This enriched uranium sample was a 


dust sample, it wasn’t a (unintelligible) sample. 


MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: It was dust on the floor. 


MS. BLOOM: It was dust and debris. 


MR. ROLFES: It was not in the air. It was not an 


air sample. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 

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DR. POSTON: So am I hearing correctly then that the 


action here is to refer this issue to DOL and DOE? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. POSTON: And consider that it’s not part of this 


SEC petition? 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m convinced with John’s call. I’m 


convinced that it wasn’t part of this contract 


during the specified time period. I guess my 


question is you know -– 


MS. BLOOM: The only other thing that I think is 


important to note is that if this occurred 


beforehand then we would include consideration of 


that exposure before the covered period, it includes 


consideration of that radiation exposure in -– in 


the covered period as I understand it. But if it 


was from a DoD type operation after the covered 


period, then I’m not sure it’s an issue. 


DR. WADE: Let’s let Mark finish his point. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean, I think there’s an hypothesis 


that it might have been an earlier operation, which 


is outside the designated time period which I think 


(unintelligible) well that’s DOL instead of the 


whatever street, complex it was. 


DR. WADE: Dean Street. 


MR. GRIFFON: Dean Street. But, you know, I could 

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also see it’s an area where other contracts were 


going on during the time period. I think that’s 


unlikely because it seems like you’ve searched that 


out and it looks like this was the contract 


(unintelligible) but subsequent to that and you 


know, if it was –- if there were DoD operations I 


think it might make an argument that this wasn’t -– 


you know, that’s not relevant to our decision but it 


might explain why you have a sample there as well, 


so that might be worth pursuing if there was some 


mention of some documentation that there were DoD 


operations after this or contracts, and if they did 


involve enriched uranium then they might have at 


least been an hypothesis for why this stuff was -– 


DR. NETON: That would be harder to get than you 


think, though. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. It’s true. I thought of 


that. 


DR. NETON: I hear what you’re saying, you know, 


we’ll turn this over to the Department of Labor and 


Energy for review. And then we won’t drop it, you 


know, if there’s any information we come across, but 


you know we’ve not found anything here to supplement 


this. 


MR. ELLIOTT: In your looking at the information, do 

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you know what time frame the manifold transfer 


happened? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, ’43 to ’46, early ’46. The 


information that we got was you know, amazingly 


clear. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And –-


MR. ELLIOTT: So we need to turn that over to DOL 


and DOE because at risk here is a facility that’s 


not been listed. It’s not recognized as a covered 


facility. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And that’s not to say there might 


not have been other things, but we have -– we have 


some very specific and in my opinion, very credible 


information that checked out from other sources to 


the extent that I could check it just in finalizing 


the interview information. So I think -– I think it 


is kind of important to have a record. 


DR. POSTON: Arjun, do you have documentation that 


it says ’43, that doesn’t seem reasonable to me. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. The –-


DR. POSTON: You said ’43. The first reactor was 


December of 1942, and the X-10 reactor wasn’t even 


built then and gaseous diffusion wasn’t built then 


so I just --

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DR. MAKHIJANI: It is not about the reactor, it’s 


about the electromagnetic separation --


DR. POSTON: I understand completely, but I’m 


telling you the dates of when things were built at 


Oak Ridge. And I don’t think ‘43’s a reasonable 


date. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I -– 


DR. POSTON: I’m asking you if they have 


documentation for that and that’s all I’m asking. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I may be wrong about this, but I 


believe that the electromagnetic separation work 


began sometime in ’43. I may be wrong, maybe. 


DR. POSTON: Well, I’m just asking if you have 


documentation for it, that’s all I’m asking. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, yes, I did check the Manhattan 


Project history. Now, I might -– I might be 


mistaken in my recall as to what I found there. 


DR. POSTON: Well, I’m more interested in when the ­

- when the manifolds were shipped back -– 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh. That specific date I have not 


checked or found any shipping record of transactions 


–-


DR. POSTON: Because that’s relevant to what we’re 


talking about. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. No. 

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DR. POSTON: When the electromagnetic thing, race 


tracks, were built is not relevant. 


DR. NETON: Right. The magnetic separation would 


not be relevant to the manifold. 


DR. POSTON: No. It would be. It could be. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think that -– let me just say for 


the record what I did. There was some pretty 


specific descriptions of what happened during war 


time and stuff that came from Oak Ridge. And that 


it stopped a few months after the Hiroshima bomb was 


dropped. That was the information from the 


interviewee that was quite specific about the things 


that were done there, the people, people from Oak 


Ridge and from Stone and Webster. So, I looked at 


the dates for when Stone and Webster went to Oak 


Ridge, when the electromagnetic separation process 


was started. I tried to find –- I actually bought a 


book about Chapman Valve, I believe, or Stone and 


Webster, I can’t remember. I tried to find more 


detailed information and went through some 


literature but I could not find information about 


the manifolds being shipped. I believe there’s 


enough on the table to pursue it outside of this 


particular –-


(Multiple speakers spoke simultaneously.) 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: I don’t think there’s a disagreement 


there. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. Do we need more or can we move 


on? 


MR. GRIFFON: The only other item I was going say on 


the -– there was a -- there was two Oak Ridge 


reports, survey reports. And these are the M-31 


samples --


DR. POSTON: Right. Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: And VS-1. And my guess is that the VS 


samples were verification samples after 


decommissioning. And I wonder if there’s any –-


anymore data and it might –- I think that Cindy and 


others have probably pursued this, but is there data 


that was kept from that D&D project other than these 


reports that we have, you know, support data, not 


only assay, but also manifested, if this stuff was 


packaged up and shipped. If they had S and M 


material, you’d see it manifested differently than ­

– than if it was just all natural. 


DR. NETON: I’ve looked for that type of stuff and 


we’ve not –- I actually tried to obtain the original 


laboratory analyses of those samples. My thought 


was that that might not –- may be within the 


uncertainty of the measurement itself, but it might 

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not be two percent or X. It might just come out. I 

couldn’t find them. 

DR. POSTON: Well, projects normally kept very 

detailed -– at least the ones that I’m familiar 

with, kept fairly detailed logs. 

And so I don’t know -– 

MR. GRIFFON: This is not an ancient project. It 

was in the ‘90’s, so I thought we might be able 


to drum up some of these records. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: There is a second sample that 


NIOSH has said is consistent with un-enriched 


uranium. Not in the matrix, but in our report we 


did take issue with that and say that we don’t 


think it is consistent with un-enriched uranium 


but consistent with slightly enriched uranium 


because we have the uncertainty –- uncertainty 


bounds for that, confident bounds for that 


particular sample, 1996. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. You don’t know how they did 


the analysis though. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, no. We don’t -– we don’t -- 


MS. BLOOM: There may be some description in 


there, but I also think those second samples were 


very close to background in most instances. 


DR. NETON: That was my recollection. 

93 

DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, fourteen picocuries of U238, which would not be background. 


DR. NETON: No. No. 


MR. GRIFFON: And Cindy, what do we know about 


this? 


MS. BLOOM: For the U-235 measurements, I mean, 


you’re hard-pressed to measure at the levels it 


was measuring in radium-226 is also a confounder 


in the U-235 channel. And they were using gamma 


stack. I don’t recall if it was sodium iodide or 


jelly at this point. 


DR. NETON: That even questions it further. If 


they’re using a gamma stack of sodium iodide -– 


MR. GRIFFON: Sodium iodide, yeah. 


MS. BLOOM: It may have been jelly, I can’t 


recall. 


MR. GRIFFON: Cindy, did the -– in the NIOSH 


response here, it says it is known that Chapman 


Valve also performed work for DoD. Do you have 


documents already that describe that work or –- 


MS. BLOOM: No. I don’t have particulars. 


MR. GRIFFON: Through interviews, okay. 


MR. ROLFES: We do have indication. That 


newspaper article that was provided, Cindy, early 


on, we do have documentation of the large valves 

94 

that were produced under contract with DoD. And 


I have a picture of one here, I believe. Let’s 


see -– 


DR. NETON: Arjun’s right. If it talks about 


military personnel showing up during this time 


period with the Dean Street facility which kind 


of -– 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, there was -– the Manhattan 


Project was military-type personnel. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. But later they also did, I 


think if you read in some of their literature and 


you talk to the people there and particularly I 


think Mary Ann could probably speak on it better, 


but I think they did work for all sorts of 


government agencies and companies. They were one 


of the top of the line companies out there in 


valve manufacturing. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, it’s possible. I’d be 


surprised if there’s not more supporting data to 


go with the Oak Ridge reports that can be drummed 


up. I don’t know, maybe it’s a dead-end. Maybe 


you’ve already gone down that path and there’s 


nowhere else to take it, but that might shed some 


light on the -– on the question. 


DR. WADE: So NIOSH is going to continue to look 

95 

for -– is that the action? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. I just wonder is that -– is 


that relevant for our SEC evaluation right now 


though? I mean, I guess that’s a good thing to 


do. 


MR. GRIFFON: The only relevance I would see is 


if you found more data that said, you know, if we 


have -– if you start seeing manifests where 


they’re assigning dose and then get percentages 


of U-235 to the weigh shipments, then you say 


well, wait a second, more of this was at the 


Chapman facility than Dean Street. Although, 


they may just say worst case, we’ll just assume 


that 2.16 percent. 


DR. NETON: I just don’t know how that’s going to 


play out. 


DR. MAURO: You see, the idea that the doses 


would double --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I don’t care about that. 


just think what are we missing in operations. 


That’s more my -– 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. And I –- although this is 


really more a -– I guess I would say a policy 


decision, if we -– right now, what I’m hearing is 


that there’s general consensus that it’s unlikely 


I 
96 

that there is enriched uranium as an issue as it 


applies to this particular petition for the time 


period of interest. However, in the event that 


we’re wrong, that maybe it could be something of 


substance during this time period of interest, 


then we’re in a position where if you assume that 


the stuff was enriched the doses go up by a 


factor of two. 


MR. ROLFES: I’d like to be cautious about that 


statement because of the current way that we’re 


calculating doses, we’re using 100 percent U-234 


for dose calculations, so –- 


DR. NETON: It might make a small difference. 


think what happened, we had the wrong exposure 


model. If this enriched uranium is related to 


these valves or these manifolds, then you know, 


we’ve got an exposure model that deals with 


machining uranium slugs. 


DR. MAURO: Right. 


DR. NETON: Which by all accounts, they were not 


enriched when they were sent to -- 


DR. MAURO: It has nothing to do with it. 


DR. NETON: It has nothing to do with machining 


uranium slugs. It’s a totally different exposure 


scenario. 


I 
97 

I would prefer to keep that separate, and you 


know -– 


DR. NETON: Yeah. I’m not so much interested in 


how it affects the dose because I think it has 


minimal effects on the dose, but whether we’re 


missing an operation before or after or during 


that time period, you know. 


DR. NETON: Right, but again -- 


MR. GRIFFON: But I think it’s unlikely during 


that time period. 


DR. NETON: Right. But if we don’t set the time 


frame, we can certainly find the information, 


pass it on -– 


DR. WADE: We should pass on what we have. We 


should look, by this discussion, for additional 


information and pass it on. And then Larry, if 


you would just copy the workgroup of your 


communications, then I think the workgroup -- 


DR. POSTON: So are we ready for number six? 


DR. WADE: Number six. 


DR. POSTON: All right. Let’s take a ten-minute 


break. How about that Ray? 


(Whereupon, a break was taken from 10:38 a.m. 


until 10:52 a.m.) 


DR. WADE: I think some people on the phone would 

98 

like to get a sense of when we’re going to be 


done so they can hear the wrap up. I think it’s 


likely that we’ll wrap up about 12:30. 


That gives a half an hour an issue. So I’m just 

going to say that to people. 

We’re getting back ready to begin. Jason, are 

you on the line? 

MR. BROEHM: Yes, I am. 

DR. WADE: Right now, the consensus opinion of 


the workgroup is that we could be to summary at 


about 12:30. Now, again --


MR. BROEHM: So you’re concluding the meeting at 


12:30? 


DR. WADE: Well, just offering the summary of 


what happened at 12:30. 


MR. BROEHM: Okay. 


DR. WADE: That could change again. You never 


know. We have three issues. The workgroup has 


shown great discipline. We’re giving ourselves a 


half an hour or so an issue. But, you know, with 


apologies if we’re wrong, but I wanted to give 


everyone a sense of what the time line looked 


like. 


MR. BROEHM: Okay. 


DR. WADE: Thank you. 

99 

MR. BROEHM: I can share that with congressional 


staff by email right now. I’m going to have to 


break away for a meeting from about 11:00 to 


11:45, but I plan to return to the call after 


that. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Well, that’s our target 


although sometimes we miss our targets. 


MR. BROEHM: Thanks. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. 


ISSUE 6
 

DR. POSTON: All right. I guess we’re back in 


session and we’re going on to issue number six. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. Issue number six on page five 


of the matrix. The petitioners’ concern in 


summary. The petitioners express concern that 


the site profile does not take into consideration 


other industrial processes that may have taken 


place at Chapman Valve such as use of a cracking 


furnace, chip incinerator, or possible rolling 


operations. 


NIOSH’s response: NIOSH response to these 


concerns is that the site profile does take into 


consideration the fact that there was a chip 


burner at the facility and cites data collected 


at the burner’s exhaust location. In addition, 

100 

NIOSH states that the bioassay data upon which 


the exposure matrix is based captures any 


exposures that may have been associated with the 


chip burner. With respect to possible rolling 


operations, NIOSH states that there is no 


documented evidence that rolling operations took 


place at Chapman Valve. NIOSH further states 


that, even if rolling operations took place, the 


bioassay data would have captured such exposures. 


SC&A’s position regarding this is that we are 


concerned with this particular issue. We do not 


feel that NIOSH’s response to this issue is, in 


fact, compelling. We’re -– and the concern has 


to do with the possibility that there could have 


been some workers that –- they even could have 


been monitored workers but also certainly workers 


who were not experienced bioassays that could 


have had amongst their responsibilities cleaning 


out, loading and cleaning out the chip burner. 


The reason this is important is that we have data 


on the levels of dust loading associated with 


cleaning out chip burners without any controls. 


That is if you had a facility where there’s very 


little controls over how you do that, the 


exposures could be substantial, high enough that 

101 

they, in theory, could actually add to some 


degree the total integrated intake that a person 


would get. For example, if a person were 


chronically exposed throughout the order of 47 


MAC throughout his 70 weeks of working, but in 


addition, occasionally had a responsibility to 


help clean out the furnace, in theory, according 


to the literature that we reviewed, there could 


have been a substantial acute short-term intake 


associated with each such operation. And we 


believe that it’s important that this issue be 


explored and quantified to the extent possible by 


NIOSH. I would say that one of the source 


documents that will help in addressing that issue 


is specifically the study I mentioned earlier by 


Adley, Gill and Scott. I’d just like to point 


the Board’s and NIOSH to that particular document 


where they do have data related to the 


concentrations, airborne concentrations of 


uranium, associated with just that operation and 


the duration of time that workers who performed 


that operation spent each day so that in my mind 


that gives you a hook into that particular 


exposure scenario. And I think it would be very 


productive to look into that further. 

102 

MS. BLOOM: John, when I read this comment, both 


in the SC&A report and in the matrix here, I got 


the sense that you all had missed the analysis of 


the NUMEC data. The NUMEC incineration 


operations on page 17 of the site profile. 


DR. MAURO: That’s possible, yeah. Could you 


give me just a quick run down on that one? I 


very well may have. 


MS. BLOOM: Basically, there were some 


measurements from incinerator operations at NUMEC 


in 1966 and 1967. NUMEC was working with both 


normal and enriched uranium. It typically 


handled higher enrichments at NUMEC, but there 


was an introductory letter to the report that 


indicated there were essentially no controls 


associated with this particular operation, that 


there was a real problem with it. And there were 


bioassays from the workers involved, as well as 


air concentration measurements. And we went 


through those and we looked at those and compared 


them to the derived information for the exposure 


analysis for Chapman and found that the data 


appeared consistent with the estimates that we’ve 


made. With that, I think there would have been 


more active -– more, these workers were probably 

103 

more dedicated to the operation at NUMEC, 


although incineration of chips doesn’t appear to 


be a full-time job anywhere. 


DR. MAURO: I’m sorry. The NUMEC write up that 


you just described is located where? 


MS. BLOOM: On page 17 of the site profile. It 


starts with “during the February 14, 2005, worker 


outreach program meeting”. And that’s where 


Richard Miller provided the reference on the 


NUMEC report. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Cindy, I did look at that. You 


know, it may be that there were no or minimal 


controls, but it is from a very different period 


of operations and possibly with different 


equipment. I mean, NUMEC, if I remember 


correctly, was a factory that was built in the 


late -– mid to late ‘50’s. It was built in a 


different period and you were talking about 1948 


which -– and there was generally some kind of a 


break if you look at you know, there were a 


couple of breaks in the history of how things 


were done. One seems to have been in the late 


‘40’s, early ‘50’s. Another seems to have been 


in the late ‘50’s, early ‘60’s, so that, you 

104 

know, from the mid ‘60’s on things were done 


differently. 


MS. BLOOM: Arjun, in general, I would probably 


agree with that. I think if you look at this 


particular report it doesn’t appear that things 


were done very differently at NUMEC in this 


particular period. It seems like a not very well 


controlled operation. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. The specific thing that 


John and I discussed and the concern that I had 


from looking at other operations was that you 


have short duration, very high dust loadings for 


particular tasks, especially loading or unloading 


incinerators. So if you look at the Harrison and 


Kingsley document that you referred to in the 


context of Rocky Flats and even here, I think, 


the –- if you look at just opening the door of a 


gas furnace in which rods were being heated, 


admittedly from a different -– 


(Whereupon, multiple speakers spoke 


simultaneously.) 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But I’m saying that -– I’m not 


saying that that number should be applied here. 


All I’m trying to say is that in this type of 


operation, you can get very diff -– when you’re 

105 

heating up uranium or some uranium is burning on 


the surface of rods or you’re actually burning 


uranium, that dust can be quite concentrated when 


you are opening the doors and handling that ash. 


And I think –- and I think that reference to one 


NUMEC facility from the mid ‘60’s, doesn’t, in my 


opinion, address the issue of what happened to 


that person that was shoveling the ash out of the 


incinerator. It’s a question. 


MS. BLOOM: Well, and I think the other part 


though is that chips were burned at all the 


uranium metal handling facilities. This was not 


a unique operation to Chapman. So I do believe 


that the co-worker data from the other studies is 


representative of what happened to Chapman –- at 


Chapman with the chip burning. You know, this 


isn’t a unique operation. 


DR. MAURO: Could I put on the record a piece of 


information that I think would be helpful. 


Again, in the Adley report, they actually have a 


section talking about oxide -– they call it oxide 


operations. And it’s actually data associated 


with loading and unloading trays in the chip 


burners. Exactly the thing we’re talking about. 


Turns out they observed that during –- now during 

106 

the loading and unloading operation, they 


measured about 1,030 MAC. But that’s only during 


the operation, okay. Then they also say that 


kind of operation only takes place at about .4 


hours per day. That’s at this facility, now. 


This is this Hanford facility. So what happens 


is if one would say okay, yes. There are these 


short periods of time, taking the Hanford values 


-– this Adley report is the Hanford facility, at 


face value, we don’t know the degree to which it 


applies of course at Chapman but just for the 


sake of this discussion, let’s just say does this 


give us any insight. What this says is that, 


okay, you get this concentration of 1,030 MAC 


occurring while this operation’s going on, but 


the operation only takes place .4 hours per day. 


So if you come up –- if you’re looking to get 


average it out, well, what would the average 


daily -– in other words if you average it out –- 


DR. NETON: Time weighted average. 


DR. MAURO: Time weighted average. You come up 


with -– well, that’s all he did. That he got no 


other exposure, now. If he did that and got no 


other exposure the rest of the day, which is 


unlikely, but it turns out to be 51 MAC, okay. 

107 

Now, what does this mean? That means -– that 


means when he did that operation, you know, that 


day, okay. 

MS. BLOOM: 1,030 times .4 hours? 

DR. MAURO: Yeah, .4 divided by 8, in other words 

-– 

MS. BLOOM: Oh. Okay. 

DR. MAURO: So, in other words -– 

MS. BLOOM: So it’s an hourly weighted -– 

DR. MAURO: Right. 

MS. BLOOM: Not a daily weighted. 

DR. MAURO: Right. So what we’re saying is now, 

with this kind of information, now there’s this 


and there’s other places, all of which is really 


not in the report, you see. Now, I think by 


exploring this again, and painting a picture of 


these are the kinds of exposures, the kinds of 


numbers Arjun made reference to whereby some 


statement could be made as to the applicability 


or lack thereof of that particular data, these 


data here and how does this play out with respect 


to this particular exposure matrix. How, you 


know, and if it turns out that now, I’m not quite 


sure from reading this report, whether this 


happened every day. That is, in other words, 

108 

1 

2 

3 

every day was –- did a person spend, you know, 


perform this operation or was it much more 


limited than that. You know, and I think by 


telling that story, well, we could find out 


whether or not the exposure matrix as currently 


constructed deals with incinerator operations 


properly. 


DR. POSTON: So we’re back to issue one. 


MR. GRIFFON: One. Yeah. 


DR. NETON: I don’t disagree with this. 


We could do a better job on bounding the chip burner 


exposure, particularly since we don’t have a 


bioassay sample labeled chip burner. 


DR. WADE: So NIOSH will consider many data 


sources. Again, this is a complex-wide process, 


but including the Adley, Gill and Scott report 


and will look at what that informs us relative to 


the validity of the current exposure matrix and 


if any changes are in order. 


DR. POSTON: Can we also address the rolling 


operation? I haven’t seen, heard or any 


indication that there’s such a thing. 


But SC&A agrees with the petitioner so did you 


see something that we didn’t see? 


MR. GRIFFON: Other than that, I don’t have 

109 

anything. Just a memo that says it’s to find out 


information of the operation. And I think Cindy 


cited this in the site profile, as well. But 


this says there’s one AEC memo, Williams to 


Kelly, date illegible, that indicates that 


Chapman Valve may have also conducted rolling 


operations in uranium metal. I haven’t seen -– I 


don’t know if you have that memo. Yeah. 


DR. POSTON: And we didn’t hear anything from the 


interviewees when we talked to them about it. 


MS. BLOOM: And we looked through all the Tatty* 


reports and there’s no mention of rolling in any 


of the Tatty reports. There was no -– nobody 


recalled anything about rolling when we talked to 


them at the February 14, 2005, meeting. I didn’t 


see anything in the new -– the most recent worker 


outreach meeting. 


MR. GRIFFON: Were they asked about rolling 


operations? 


MS. BLOOM: Pardon? 


MR. GRIFFON: Cindy, were they asked about 


rolling operations? 


MS. BLOOM: They were asked -– if you read 


through those it may not have been a specific 


question, but they asked people what they did. 

110 

MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. BLOOM: And or what was going on or what was 


a concern or so the specific question wasn’t 


there. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Do we know if Chapman Valve had a 


rolling mill operation that would have been taken 


advantage of by the AEC? 


MS. BLOOM: I haven’t seen anything that 


indicated that. I think we -– my recollections 


for the February meeting and I’m not sure that 


it’s in the minutes, is that the subject did come 


up. Again, I think Mary Ann might be able to 


shed more light on it, but I don’t believe we 


found anything indicating that rolling was part 


of the operations or heard anything. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Cindy, is the interview 


documentation on the O drive from 2005? 


MS. BLOOM: Yes. 


MR. ROLFES: Yes, it is. It’s on the website, as 


well. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, okay. 


MR. ROLFES: It’s on the website. I’m not sure 


if it’s on the O drive, but it is on the website. 


DR. NETON: In conjunction with Bethlehem Steel, 


we’ve gone through some extensive reviews of 

111 

rolling operation records from AEC activities and 


I’ve never seen Chapman Valve mentioned in any 


source of rolling. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. And I’ve looked through a 


bunch of the AEC monthly reports, as well, and it 


wasn’t mentioned. 


DR. NETON: I mean, you’ve got a pretty good 


listing of all the facilities and it’s not 


mentioned in any of them. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That I think is a good argument 


because AEC did do –- and I will say that I have 


seen many of these reports that we went over. 


And there were periodic surveys maybe a couple 


times a year even, in which every facility that 


was doing this kind of work was surveyed or at 


least their production was mentioned, their 


operations were discussed. And so if it’s not in 


that, I think, and did not come up in the 


interviews and it certainly didn’t come up in our 


interviews --


DR. NETON: No. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That there wouldn’t be, at least 


in my opinion, wouldn’t be a basis to make that 


an issue. 


MR. GRIFFON: On top of which I don’t think the 

112 

exposures would be read. I mean, maybe a little 


different but –-


(Whereupon, multiple speakers spoke 


simultaneously.) 


DR. WADE: Go ahead, please. You wanted to 


speak, the petitioner wanted to speak. 


MS. RIALI: Yes. This is MaryAnn Riali speaking. 


Cindy, I’m referring to your meeting that we had 


in February about the rolling. I believe at that 


time, in our archives there was a memo in regard 


to possible rolling done at Chapman Valve. I 


have a copy of it and I believe I gave a copy to 


Dr. Poston. 


MS. BLOOM: But that’s that Williams letter, 


isn’t that correct? 


MS. RIALI: I’m not sure. I’m looking for it. 


MR. GRIFFON: If you have that Williams letter 


that would be interesting because I haven’t seen 


it. 


MS. BLOOM: Is that the AEC memo? 


MS. RIALI: Right, right, right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh. The reference is the Williams 


memo. 


DR. NETON: Right. We have a copy of that 


particular document. 

113 

MS. BLOOM: Right. And that’s all we found that 


mentions rolling. There was -– I didn’t hear 


from anybody at the meeting and maybe I missed 


it, but I don’t believe anybody indicated that 


they were familiar with a rolling operation at 


Chapman. 


MS. RIALI: No. I don’t. And I don’t know if it 


was –- if it took place before, before 1947, 


again. 


MS. BLOOM: Uh-huh. 


MS. RIALI: Yeah, with the other situation about 


the manifolds. 


MS. BLOOM: Right. 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


MS. BLOOM: So that sounds like if -– if 


information becomes available while folks are 


looking for -– turning this over to DOL and DOE ­

– 


MS. RIALI: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. 


MS. BLOOM: Then certainly that would be 


considered. 


MS. RIALI: Right. 


MS. BLOOM: But I think again, the -- as we’ve 


discussed before, that doesn’t really change the 


exposure results. 

114 

DR. WADE: Just for my record keeping, you’re 


saying the sense that NIOSH needs to present the 


focused argument on this issue, or is the 


argument already on the record? 


DR. NETON: I think it’s in. 


It’s addressed in the site profile why we don’t 


include rolling operations, I believe. 


DR. WADE: Arjun? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. I would agree with that. 


I just have a question about this latest thing 


that Mary brought up in regard to the letter that 


-– that Larry is going to send DOL. Are you 


going to mention it that this may -– that this 


memo might be tracked down and may have occurred 


at other times since that’s come up for other 


things. That may be something that the DOE or 


DOL might need. 


MR. ELLIOTT: We will ask -– I will ask them to 


confirm the activities that prescribed Chapman 


Valve as a covered facility. Right now, that 


only goes to this uranium milling, not rolling. 


And so I’ll question whether or not rolling was 


done, as well as the Dean Street interaction. 


DR. MAURO: And it’s important that we get this 


down because according to everything I’ve read, 

115 

rolling operations have a greater potential to 


generate airborne activity than milling 


operations. 


DR. NETON: It may be in a different time period, 


too. We might mention that in the letter, that ­

- you know, we’re not sure, but there are 


indications that it may have occurred. It could 


be a different time frame. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That’s what I would –- that’s 


what I was thinking. So that it kind of -– from 


what we’ve been able to tell, it doesn’t belong 


like the enrichment, it doesn’t belong in there. 


DR. WADE: So this will be added to the NIOSH DOL 


DOE action. 


ISSUE 7
 

DR. POSTON: Ready to move on. 


DR. MAURO: Number seven. Petitioners express 


concern that there’s only one day of uranium air 


samples and that one set of -– and that one set 


of samples shows that there were elevated levels 


of uranium throughout the facility. 


NIOSH’s response in the evaluation report: 


“NIOSH agrees with the petitioners’ statements 


and concerns, but explains that the limited air 


sampling data were not used for dose 

116 

reconstruction.” 


SC&A concurs with this. We -– we -– our review 


of the work done by NIOSH shows that –- that in 


no way was that data used for dose 


reconstruction. There is one thing that they do 


do, is they demonstrate that the air sampling 


data that is there, which is very limited to two 


samples, I believe, collected in May, show that 


their –- the model, the matrix is reasonable and 


bounding. Quite frankly, I wouldn’t even use 


that data for that purpose. I think that data is 


–- does not really offer very much value in terms 


of where it was taken and its representativeness. 


So to me, the air sampling data is of -– really 


of no use to this particular dose reconstruction, 


and appropriately so NIOSH is not using it. 


DR. POSTON: Any discussion on that? 


MR. GRIFFON: I just want a clarification that 


the petitioners reference a set of elevated -- I 


don’t even know how it’s written there, but a set 


of samples --


MS. BLOOM: Mark, I’m having a hard time hearing 


you. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m sorry. The petitioners 


reference a set of samples showing elevated 

117 

readings. Is this other samples such as the 


group sample and things like that that were more 


process samples or what? 


MS. BLOOM: There were two sets of samples. 


There was one on May 4th from the furnace outlet 


and up near the roof from the outlet. And then 


there are samples taken in the work place at an 


inspection bench, a packing bench, a workbench, 


the washroom and the lunchroom. So there were 


just those two dates that the samples were 


collected. One was basically associated with the 


furnace and the other date it was associated with 


the work place. 


MR. GRIFFON: And those second set of samples are 


the ones you discuss in section 3.1.2 I think it 


is. 


MS. BLOOM: I’d have to look back at that. I 


know I looked at both of them in terms of 


considering their applicability to intake -– 


DR. NETON: Yes. 3.1.2. They’re not 


particularly high. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. They’re also early in the 


project, too, which you discuss also. 


DR. MAURO: In May, right? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. So I think no further 

118 

discussion on that one. 


MS. BLOOM: It was more just a reality check and 


to point out that there was that information 


there. I think our goal is to try and let the 


reader know all the information that we’ve -– you 


know, in some cases we can’t let everybody know 


of all the information we looked at or we’d have 


thousand page tombs, but -- or tomes, but -- 


tombs may be more like it. 


DR. POSTON: Sometimes they’re like tombs, right. 


DR. WADE: Probably feels like tombs. 


MS. BLOOM: When you read it, but we try to put 


enough information there that you know that you 


could go back and look at something to see that 


we’ve interpreted things in a reasonable way. 


DR. POSTON: Any other questions, comments on 


seven? Move on. I don’t think we’re going to 


finish early because this next issue is the -- 


DR. MAURO: Fires. 

DR. POSTON: -- possible fires. That might take 

awhile. 

ISSUE 8 

DR. MAURO: Okay. Number eight. Petitioners 

express concern that there may have been numerous 


fires at the facility that NIOSH has not taken 

119 

into consideration. 


NIOSH’s response: “NIOSH explains that the 


records only indicate one significant fire in 


early June that is taken into consideration in 


the exposure matrix. They also explain that the 


assumptions used in the exposure matrix for 


chronic exposure account for the possibility that 


other fires may have occurred, because, if the 


bioassay results were in fact associated with 


incidents, the approach used by NIOSH overestimates the exposures.” 


SC&A’S position on this matter is well, it goes 


back to the discussion that we had originally, is 


SC&A believes that the method adopted in the 


exposure matrix to model the acute exposures 


associated with the fire is not claimant 


favorable. That’s our opening statement and of 


course, that’s a subject that we talked about 


earlier and we’re going to revisit that -- that 


particular issue, because of a misunderstanding 


on our part regarding how in fact 


(unintelligible). Let’s move on to the second 


sentence in our response. “However, we believe 


that there is a tractable problem since an 


earliest feasible date,” again that goes back to 

120 

the –- so let’s move on to the next sentence. 


Bear with me, please. “As regards other fires, 


SC&A interviews did not reveal information about 


other fires, but none of the workers interviewed 


worked in the relevant departments full time. 


The issue of other fires merits further 


investigation.” The bottom line is our 


understanding is that fires of this nature did 


occur, based on a review of the literature, quite 


often at facilities like this. However, the 


evidence to date that we have as best we’ve 


looked at it for Chapman Valve, the only fire of 


any significance that was recollected by the 


folks we talked to, was this fire that occurred 


in early June. And I guess the question before 


us is: Is it appropriate –- to what degree do we 


need to explore the possibility that there could 


have been more than one fire. And how -– whether 


that’s a reasonable thing to do and -– and how 


does one go about addressing that particular 


issue in the matrix, if in fact that was the 


case. So I guess that’s where we stand. 


MS. BLOOM: John, we have done newspaper research 


to see if we could find something. We’ve talked 


to claimants. We’ve looked through the 

121 

documentation and we can’t find anything that 


indicates that there were additional significant 


fires. And I use that wording because I think 


that maybe there might be things that occurred, 


you know, under the radar. But I also think that 


uranium -- small puffs of uranium are not unusual 


in this kind of situation. But I think that 


because they had that June fire, that they were 


probably particularly sensitive to issues of 


uranium burnings at that point. And my sense is 


that they would have been extra careful at this 


particular facility. 


DR. NETON: In fact, the chip furnace was there 


to minimize the risk of fires, right? 


MS. BLOOM: Right. 


DR. NETON: I mean, the whole purpose of 


oxidizing uranium is to -– 


DR. MAURO: Get it out of there. 


DR. NETON: Get it burnt before it burns, 


essentially, if you think about it that way, so 


there were precautions to take to minimize fires. 


MS. RIALI: Dr. Mauro? 

DR. MAURO: Yes. 

MS. RIALI: It’s Mary Ann. 

DR. MAURO: Yes. Hi, Mary Ann. 
122 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

MS. RIALI: I believe that Darlene Ryan, when we 


discussed at our interview that day that she was 


going to see if she could get together some 


information on the fires through the fire 


department. I haven’t talked with her on it, but 


I will get back to you with it if I have more 


information from her. 


MS. RYAN: Mary Ann? Mary Ann? 


MS. RIALI: Yes. Go ahead, Darlene. 


MS. RYAN: Okay. I have been looking and I’m 


still going through some old books and archives 


here. However, they like Monsanto, have their 


own or had their own fire department which was 


(unintelligible) to a lot which is probably the 


reason that we do not have documentation of a lot 


of those fires. I have that books (sic) at home 


and I will continue to look through it because 


now I’m during the years before ’48. But like I 


said, they did have their own fire department, 


which was used to take care of those things. 


MR. ROLFES: It’s important to note also that the 


interviews that we went and spoke with one of the 


former fire fighters from Chapman Valve. A 


gentleman that SC&A and myself and John Poston, we 


attended an interview session, I guess, at this 

123 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

gentleman’s house and we had interviewed this 


gentleman -– yes, and the petitioners, as well. We 


spoke with this individual and he didn’t recall any 


fires that were occurring inside of the building 23. 


He did say, however, that there were some other 


fires in other buildings on site, which is 


definitely expected for a steel mill type operation. 


And he mentioned, you know, that there were some 


fires that occurred in possibly building 100. There 


were some fires that occurred in the laboratory, as 


well. But we had no indication that there were any 


other fires in building 23, in the restricted areas. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. Before --


COURT REPORTER: Excuse me, Dr. Makhijani, before 


we get too far. Darlene, could I get your last 


name, please. This is the court reporter. 


MS. RYAN: Darlene Ryan, R-Y-A-N. 


COURT REPORTER: Thank you. 


MS. RYAN: You’re welcome. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think there’s a little bit of a 


issue that needs to be characterized a little bit 


more precisely in light of the comment that Ms. 


Ryan just made. That the person we interviewed 


was not a Chapman Valve fireman or employee. 


MS. RYAN: Thank you. 

124 

DR. MAKHIJANI: The person we interviewed was a 


fireman in the fire department and they responded 


only when they were called. And they presumably 


were called for big fires that couldn’t be 


controlled by whatever was happening on site. 


And so, this person did have a pretty clear 


recollection of fires in building 100 and in the 


1940’s, but you know, some recollections -– he 


did not remember the June 11, 1948 fire, either, 


and we know that that happened. So, I -– I think 


that it doesn’t address the question that was 


raised by Ms. Ryan. Is that if there were fires 


that were handled locally which we feel would be 


smaller fires than the ones that occurred on June 


11th, what data do we have about that? To my 


knowledge we don’t have data about that. 


DR. WADE: Darlene, thank you very much for your 


efforts. And we appreciate what you’re doing. 


Is there any way any of us can help you in your 


efforts? 


MS. RYAN: Well, I have these books that are 


very, very large that I’ve been bringing back and 


I did have some smaller little fires. I did send 


that, it’s the area around there. Nothing 


stating building 23, but I am still going 

125 

through. I’m going prior to that June ’48 date 


now and seeing if I can find anything. But I 


also worked for the fire department and I know in 


the past that even Monsanto has had fires and 


they’ve -– they have their own fire department. 


And unless it’s something real big, it was not 


being reported. And that goes back to 1984 when 


I first started here. So, I’m sure that in ’48, 


there was even less restriction about having to 


call the local authority on any fire. So 


therefore, Chapman Valve was taking care of 


probably a lot of their own fires at that time. 


And I’m going through as many records as I can 


here, but we can’t even find a lot of data on the 


big fire. So, I don’t know if these records were 


somewhere else or if they just never had records 


here, because of the fact that the Springfield 


Fire Department did not respond. 


DR. WADE: Well, thank you again for your 


efforts. If we can help, please. 


MS. RYAN: Thank you. 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s clear to me that this was the 


major one since they brought in outside fire 


help. And I would, you know, notwithstanding my 


other comments on the representativeness of the 

126 

bioassay data, I would think the smaller common 


little fires that they put out at the station are 


covered by the (unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: The 47 MAC. 


MR. GRIFFON: But notwithstanding my earlier 


concerns about the representativeness of your 


analysis data. I think if that model works, then 


it’s going to bound the other. 


DR. NETON: I was going to make the same point. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think we’ve had this before. 


Yeah. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. We’ve had 40 something samples 


here and are they detecting anything way out of 


the ordinary in these workers? Yeah, there could 


have been a sub-population I suppose exposed. 


But, you know, we don’t see it and we can look at 


some fire scenarios. I’m looking at this famous 


Adley report now. There’s a –- there’s a sample 


they took one foot above a bucket of burning 


metal there and it’s 120 MAC. You’ve got a 


bounding -- I mean, we can -– we can maybe piece 


together some of this additional information 


about uranium concentrations around fires and try 


to piece that in with the bioassay that 


demonstrates these exposures are somewhere in the 

127 

40 to 70 MAC calculated range. Yeah. We just 


wouldn’t expect it to be much higher than what 


we’re assigning based on, you know, comparison of 


some of the literature values as well as the 


bioassays. 


I mean, essentially what we end up doing here is 


validating the exposure model to independent 


(unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: I don’t think we have a problem with 


that at all. 


DR. POSTON: Do we move on to the last item? 


MR. GRIFFON: I added one on. But I don’t think 


it’s a lengthy one. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. So this one’s --


MR. GRIFFON: I had a question and this was 


raised I think by the petitioners, maybe not. 


know it came up as a comment, was this question 


of the film badge -- and I think it was raised 


earlier in some of the conversations earlier. 


The question of the film badge using -- Was an 


assessment done to look at this question of high 


badge readings for some people and they didn’t 


have any urinalysis (unintelligible). Jim, you 


offered the opinion, which I don’t necessarily 


disagree with it, I’m just asking, you know, was 


I 
128 

that assessed and --


DR. NETON: I tried to do that independently 


awhile -– a long time ago when this all first 


started and I didn’t take it to the final Nth 


degree, but I couldn’t find any real correlation 


between exposure –- external exposure and 


internal monitoring. It just doesn’t necessarily 


go hand in hand in the uranium facility, just as 


we’ve seen in Y-12 and other facilities. 


DR. MAURO: To add to that also, I’ve looked very 


closely at the external dosimetry data which is ­

– we need to talk about today. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: But I think that it has relevance now 


that you bring it up. When you look at the data 


-– the approach that was taken was most of the 


workers were badged, and we know that maybe a few 


weren’t. But the vast majority were. And what 


was done was each week they had all this group of 


badges, they had all the data that came in which 


was both penetrating and surface and insufficial 


(ph). Then they said, okay. We’re going to take 


the high for that week, we’re going to take the 


highest reading that we observed from that week 


and assign it to all the workers for that week. 

129 

Now, I said, okay. Let me look at that. And as 


it turns out, the highest value in one of the 


weeks in penetrating, I believe it was two 


millirem per hour as being the -– per hour. In 


other words, the weekly dose is there. What does 


that mean as the average external exposure and 


two millirem per hour turns out to be the highest 


dosage you get when standing one foot away from 


an infinite slab of natural uranium. So that, in 


other words, so there was obviously one person 


who spent an awful lot of time up close and 


personal to what would be effectively considered 


to be an infinite slab of pure uranium. Now, the 


question you raise is that and I know there was 


some concern that well, I mean, would there be a 


correlate –- that is wouldn’t that person who is 


doing -– whoever got that dose rate, is it 


plausible that he was also a person that should 


have gotten a very high inhalation exposure. 


Now, and I’m trying to visualize it. And this is 


where experienced people with these types of mill 


operations -– would a person be involved in 


grinding operations and sanding operations, the 


various operations that would generate a lot of 


airborne dust, would he be in a setting where 

130 

he’d be for all intents and purposes up close and 


personal about a foot away to what would be 


considered to be an effectively infinite slab of 


uranium or is it more likely he’d be close to a 


vot* where he’s lathing or sanding? So, my first 


reaction was that -– that there are -- there -- 


you wouldn’t expect a couple. Mainly, the person 


with the highest external exposure would 


necessarily also be the highest person with 


internal exposure. Not that it’s to be ruled 


out, but just thinking about the nature of the 


operations. I would more likely have expected a 


person that was involved in let’s say handling 


large quantities of metal, whereby you were 


packaging and shipping -– 


DR. NETON: Inspectors. 


DR. MAURO: Inspectors. Where they were dealing 


with the product that came in and the product 


that went out. Because then you’re dealing with 


large volumes of materials, up close and 


personal, but you’re not involved in generating 


lots and lots of dust. That –- now, again, this 


is speaking from just reading this material, 


certainly not from firsthand knowledge. That 


sensibility that I get may or may not be valid. 

131 

I would like to hear feedback from folks who may 


be familiar with this personally, hands on. Some 


of the -– because we did not have this 


conversation at the meeting when we visited with 


the claimants and petitioners. So, whether or 


not this sensibility that both Jim and I share 


is, in fact, a reasonable one certainly worthy of 


posing that question to the people who were 


involved in these activities. 


Arjun, do you have a sense on this? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I think the specific context in 


which some of this came up was -– and I’m 


recalling conversations that may not be precise, 


but was in the context of a job description of a 


brusher. A brusher. Somebody who is up close 


and personal in terms of external dose, but who 


also is suspending dust –- 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: By the nature of their 


operations. The job that they’re doing, and I 


think the –- if I remember the Harrison and 


Kingsley report, it actually has mention of a 


brusher –-


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And suspended dust so, I think it 

132 

that it does -– it would be useful, to kind of 


roll this in that specific issue since it has 


been raised more than once into this review with 


that specific job description in mind. In my 

opinion, it does bear some looking at. 

DR. MAURO: Let me take a run at this. Let’s 

postulate for a moment that yes, there could be a 


scenario where a brusher would be being exposed 


to elevated dust levels and simultaneously up 


close and personal to a relatively large amount 


of uranium. Not a single bar, but maybe a lot of 


bars, a lot of uranium. Now, so really the 


question is: is 47-MAC or 60-MAC, a number that 


one would expect that bounds -– that bounds the 


exposure. And the answer is yes. 


DR. NETON: Isn’t that what we’re doing with all 


these analyses, bouncing it against any air 


concentrations to make sure that the urine data 


samples that we have is representative -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. There was no urine data 


samples for a brusher. 


DR. NETON: That’s my point, Arjun. We agreed to 


go back and look at the (unintelligible) report. 


Go back to number one. Are our bounding analyses 


appropriate, given what we know about air 

133 

concentrations at the plants. 


MR. GRIFFON: Let me be clear. I don’t think 


it’s a new item. I brought it up for the record, 


because it’s brought by the petitioners and we 


need to discuss it. 


DR. MAURO: When all is said and done, what we’re 


saying is we’ve identified a number of scenarios. 


Whether it’s brushing or the fire, where there’s 


chip, where there’s grinding, milling, that are 


all activities that generate relatively high 


levels of dust for relatively short periods of 


time. And the question becomes, does a chronic 


exposure to 47-MAC, because that sort of covers 


all sins, so to speak. That is it’s so 


conservative that the time integrated exposure 


that you get from making that assumption is going 


to catch all this. And I think that that story 


is really not told. 


DR. NETON: We’re back to that. Number one. 


Just for the record here, I did look at the -– 


originally there was an issuance of 80 film 


badges to workers on January 4, 1948. I’ve got 


the issuance log here, by name with badge number. 


And I went and looked to see, you know, did they 


really take urine samples on the right people. 

134 

And 40 -- 35 out of the 80 people that were 


originally issued film badges had urine samples 


here. So, there was an intent here, at least to 


measure population that was badged. This wasn’t 


just sort of -– sort of on the fly. You know, 


anybody came in. So, we’ve got 43.7 percent of 


the people that were issued badges, at least in 


January of ’48, have a urine sample at least one 


time. So, it gave me a pretty good feeling that 


at least they were trying to get some sort of 


representativeness of the sampling. 


MS. RYAN: May I interject some points? 


DR. WADE: Certainly. 


MS. RYAN: Okay. Has anybody taken the most 


common thing into consideration, that everybody’s 


body chemistry is different? I have asthma. 


have a sister that is COPD. We both catch colds 


very easily. You may be in the same room with 


them or same household, but if your immune system 


is higher than mine, you’re not going to get as 


sick as I will. I mean, everybody’s body 


chemistry is different. You could smoke 40 years 


and never get cancer. I can smoke for five years 


and get cancer. Does body chemistry come into 


this play at all? 


I 
135 

DR. NETON: Well, this is Jim Neton from NIOSH. 


Not specifically. The science just isn’t there 


to do that on a case-by-case basis. But I will 


point out that the law as is written allows for 


the uncertainty to be put about all these 


estimates, and a decision is made at the 99th 


percentile of the uncertainty. So, there is some 


allowance made for our lack of knowledge, but we 


don’t have the science to specifically address 


it. 


COURT REPORTER: Dr. Neton, just to make sure. 


Was that Ms. Riali? 


DR. WADE: Who asked the question about the 


difference in body chemistry? 


MS. RYAN: Darlene Ryan. 


COURT REPORTER: Oh, Ms. Ryan. 


MS. RYAN: Only because I know. I get sick very 


easily because I have asthma, and my co-worker 


may never be out of work because –- and we’re 


both in the same environment, but I’m just saying 


body chemistry has to play into it somewhere. 


DR. WADE: Right. And I think the answer is that 


there’s not sufficient data for that to happen, 


but it’s attempted to be dealt with through the 


assignment of uncertainty around these different 

136 

distributions. 


MS. RYAN: Thank you. 


DR. WADE: Thank you. 


DR. NETON: I’m not sure if we have an action 


item now as a result of this discussion? 


DR. POSTON: Is there anything else we need to 


discuss? We have time. 


DR. WADE: Well, I think after we do our summary 


then I think the next step’s how do we proceed 


and what’s the time frame and what’s the date. 


DR. POSTON: Looks to me like there’s going to be 


another sort of round of a workgroup meeting 


before we can do anything. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. POSTON: Because there’s things that we need 


to know before we can –- 


SUMMARY
 

DR. WADE: Well, I think there’s a list of things 


that need to be followed up on, some by NIOSH, 


some by SC&A. We need to get a sense of -– now I 


can summarize that John or you, it’s up to you. 


DR. POSTON: I’ve got my list; I’ll just check -- 


DR. WADE: Tell me if I’m wrong. Okay. I’m 


going to just go down the issues. 


On issue one, and then we covered two and three 

137 

and then we discussed it a number of other times. 


That NIOSH is going to prepare a document 


concerning the experience at other facilities 


that can be used to demonstrate that the NIOSH 


approach to chronic exposure is a plausible upper 


limit. This write-up should take into account 


all relative information, but particularly the 


Adley, Gill, Scott report. So that’s number one. 


MS. BLOOM: Could you spell that first name for 


me, please? 


DR. WADE: I spelled it A-D-L-E-Y. 


DR. MAURO: Correct. 

MS. BLOOM: Thank you. 

DR. POSTON: I had a note here. Does that –- is 

it reasonable to expect this to be available so 


we can discuss it in the April Board call? 


DR. NETON: I think we could give you an update. 


I’d have to rely on Cindy and Mark to help. 


MS. BLOOM: Is that in mid-April or early April? 


DR. WADE: There’s a Board call on April 5th . 


That doesn’t mean that the workgroup can’t meet 


at another time. 


MS. BLOOM: Okay. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. I just wonder if it wouldn’t 


be more beneficial to have the workgroup meet to 

138 

discuss it before we broach it onto the general 


Board? 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


DR. POSTON: So, we’d need to discuss it before ­

– what’s the next meeting, May? 


DR. WADE: May. I think our target needs to be 


to have the work group report out in May in 


sufficient detail. Maybe that’s not going to 


happen, but I think that should be a target we 


have in mind. So, therefore, I would think a 


workgroup meeting at some point to consider this 


and give opportunity for additional follow-up, if 


necessary, before May. 


MR. GRIFFON: Late April. 


DR. NETON: I think April. Yeah. It’s got to be 


in April sometime. 


DR. WADE: Okay. The second issue relative to 


issue number four is that NIOSH is going to post 


the IMBA runs that relate to workers exposed to 


fire, and that SC&A will look at this along with 


the sample DR’s that are posted. And then SC&A 


will re-evaluate its response to number four. 


On number five. NIOSH will notify DOL and DOE of 


information learned concerning the Dean Street 


facility, also rolling operations. NIOSH needs 

139 

to look at what it’s learned that goes to the 


issue of the need to consider other facilities as 


being covered facilities. And then NIOSH is 


going to share that communication with the 


workgroup, so the workgroup can be aware of the 


completeness of the NIOSH response. 


Relative to number six: NIOSH will provide an 


analysis of the chip burner facilities at other 


facilities and include information in the Adley, 


Gill and Scott report. This is now a corollary 


of number one, but it relates here to the chip 


burner. And it’s going to the issue of does the 


information learned at those other facilities 


validate or raise question about the exposure 


matrix that NIOSH is using. 


And number eight. The very nice Darlene Ryan is 


going to continue looking for documentation of 


fires and will share with the workgroup 


information she learns. And triggered by that, 


the workgroup will respond. And again, Darlene, 


we can’t thank you enough for your efforts. 


MS. RYAN: You’re welcome. 


DR. WADE: NIOSH is also going to consider the 


development of bounding fire scenarios. Again, 


based upon consideration of the Adley, et al 

140 

report. This is again, a corollary of number 


one. 


And I think those are the issues that I captured. 


So the question then becomes if the workgroup is 


going to receive work product, consider that work 


product, and then meet to determine if additional 


work is necessary prior to a Board meeting, 


when’s the optimum time to do that? Given the 


fact that questions always lead to other 


questions, I would like to leave enough time for 


a workgroup to get together and then to be a 


subsequent meeting if needed. So, what do you 


great minds need to get your work done? 


MS. RYAN: I have one question for you, if I may. 

DR. WADE: Surely. 

MS. RYAN: This is Darlene Ryan, again. I 

received a letter as a close out interview with 


60 days to get it back to them. Now, you’re 


talking about a –- did you say April meeting, 


April 5th and then May? Why would I be sending 


something back when we’re still working on this 


petition and they’re requesting from me, that I 


send my paper work, sign it off that this is a 


closeout? 


MR. ELLIOTT: What you –- this is Larry Elliott. 

141 

What you have before you is a draft dose 


reconstruction report and you’re offered a close 


out interview to explain the content of that 


report answering questions you might have 


separate from our -– the deliberations on this 


SEC petition. This goes to your claim, not your 


petition. 


MS. RYAN: Okay. It has nothing to do -– I just 


thought it was strange I got that before this was 


settled. 


MR. ELLIOTT: And certainly if you don’t send it 


back to us within the 60 days, you’ll get another 


letter giving you another 14 days grace and if 


you still feel you need more time, you just 


simply ask for more time. 


MS. RYAN: Okay. Thank you. 

DR. WADE: Thank you, Darlene. 

MS. RYAN: You’re welcome. 

DR. WADE: So, Dr. Poston, then the question is 

when. It’s up to you guys. 


DR. POSTON: It sounds to me like what I’m 


hearing from them is mid-April, mid-April at the 


earliest. 


DR. NETON: When is the Board meeting in May, 


like what date? 

142 

MR. ELLIOTT: The 2nd through the 4th . 


DR. NETON: The 2nd through the 4th, so it’s got 


to be earlier in April. I would say that. The 


second full week of April, maybe? The 9th, that 


week? 


DR. POSTON: Didn’t you pick a date? 


DR. WADE: Have we got a date? 


DR. NETON: Cindy, you’re going to be working on 


this, I mean. I don’t sense that there’s a tone 


being generated here. I mean, there are some 


pages and documents we need to review, but are 


you comfortable we can get something out by early 


April? 


MS. BLOOM: I think so. As I think about what 


was said, you know, my sense is that the 


information I’m going to look at is not the whole 


world which -– 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MS. BLOOM: -- would be a very different answer 


but I think April is probably very reasonable 


given that you all will provide me with the Adley 


reference. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MS. BLOOM: And then I’ll look at other sites 


where we’ve collected data and put that together 

143 

to see if there’s any other information. And you 


all will be helping out in terms of looking at 


higher scenario -– I don’t know if you have 


additional information. I ran across something 


the other day. 


DR. POSTON: Yeah. We need to –- so, we’re 


looking at a two day meeting, April 10th for this 


working group and April 11th for your working 


group -– 


And it’ll be here. The best thing is face to 


face. I personally like face to face. 


MR. ELLIOTT: And we appreciate you having them 


here so that staff -– we do understand your 


travel constraints, but it helps our staff if we 


can hold this in Cincinnati, these work group 


meetings back to back like they are. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. So, it’s a done deal unless 


we -– I don’t know, Gen, Brad, you guys are -– 


DR. ROESSLER: What is the done deal? I didn’t 


get the deal. 


DR. POSTON: April 10th . 


DR. ROESSLER: Sounds good to me. 


DR. POSTON: Okay. Brad, are you still there? 


MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I am. I’ll put it on my 


calendar. I’ll tell my boss that I’ll be back to 

144 

work, but we also were working on a couple of 


other work groups, too, that Nevada Test Site and 


stuff. And if we can –- if we can kind of group 


them into that -– that time frame, it sure makes 


it nicer for us that are traveling. 


DR. WADE: I’ll try, Brad. I mean, I think 


there’s a cluster going to happen the last week 


in March, and now we’re developing a second 


cluster. 


DR. POSTON: You just want to come here and stay 


the whole week. 


DR. WADE: Also, use your -– use your judgment, 


but telephone participation is fine. 


MR. CLAWSON: And I understand that, but yeah, 


we’ll shoot for that, for the 10th then? 


DR. POSTON: Right. 


DR. WADE: And Mike is on the call as well. 


DR. POSTON: Mike, how about you? 

MR. GIBSON: The 10th should be okay. 

DR. POSTON: Okay. 

DR. ROESSLER: Somebody said something about a 


two day, but you mean just the one day for the 


workgroup. 


DR. WADE: It’s the one day on Chapman Valve. 


The Board has other work and there’ll be other 

145 

1 

2 

3 

work that will happen on the 11th that doesn’t 


relate to Chapman Valve. We certainly welcome 


your participation in that, but Chapman Valve 


will be on the 10th . 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


DR. WADE: And we’ll get out notification to you 


and let you know. 


DR. POSTON: Anything else we need to discuss? 


Are we going to hang around to do a briefing or –
 

-


DR. WADE: Well, with apologies for being done 


early, but I again, thank all of the workgroup 


members and petitioners and interested parties 


for making the time. I think it was a very 


productive meeting. I think we’re on a path to 


getting the people’s done work right -– the 


people’s work done right. 


DR. POSTON: Thanks for everyone, also. 


DR. WADE: Okay. We’re adjourned. 


(Whereupon, the meeting adjourned at 11:48 


a.m.) 

______________________________ 

146 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of February 23, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


2nd day of June, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102