THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes 


MEETING 48 


ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


VOL. II 


The verbatim transcript of the 48th 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at the Red Lion Richland Hanford 


House, Richland, Washington, on July 18, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES 

NATIONALLY CERTIFIED COURT REPORTING 

404/733-6070 
 

2 

C O N T E N T S 

July 18, 2007 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

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CHAPMAN VALVE SEC 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

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BETHLEHEM STEEL SEC 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

PETITIONER COMMENTS 

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BLOCKSON CHEMICAL SEC 

DR. JAMES NETON, NIOSH, OCAS 

161 

TIMELINESS DISCUSSION 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 

215 

AMES SEC 

MR. LAVON RUTHERFORD, NIOSH, OCAS 

221 

PUBLIC COMMENT 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

275 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 364 
3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

BEACH, Josie 


Nuclear Chemical Operator 


Hanford Reservation 


Richland, Washington 


CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 

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LOCKEY, James, M.D. 


Professor, Department of Environmental Health 


College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati 


MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


SCHOFIELD, Phillip 


Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 


Los Alamos, New Mexico 

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IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS 


ADKINS, LINDA M. 


ALLEN, ED 


ANDERSEN, WARREN G. 


ANDERSON, GARY, CLAIMANT 


BARKER, RICHARD 


BISTLINE, R.W., SC&A 


BRASWELL, CHET 


BREYER, LAURIE, NIOSH 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 


CARRICO, MARYANN, HANFORD SEC PETITIONER 


CARY, ANNETTE, TRI-CITY HERALD 


CHALER, LLOYD R., RETIRED 


CHANG, CHIA-CHIA, NIOSH 


COLEMAN, VERNA, RETIRED 


CONANT, JOSEPH 


COX, C. 


CROSS, DARLENE 


DEAN, DELORIS 


DENGATE, IVA 


DENGATE, RICHARD 


DOMINIA, KIRK, USW 


DUNCAN, DIXIE, CONG. HASTINGS 


EDENS, BARBARA 


FAUST, LEO, CHEW & ASSOCS. 


FISHBACK, KATHLENE 


FLINT, SUSAN 


FORDHAM, EARL, DEPT. OF HEALTH 


GOSSEEN, RANDALL 


GOSSEEN, SHERRY, ZENITH ADMIN. 


GILBERT, BURTON, RETIRED 


GLOVER, SAM, NIOSH 


GOSSEEN, SHERRY, ZENITH ADMIN. 


GUFFEY, KATHRYN M. 


HARTCORN, BETTY 


HINNEFELD, STU, NIOSH 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


HOYT, ROSEMARY, HANFORD SEC PETITIONER 


HWANG, JON, ATL 


JAMES, CHRISTOPHER 


JAMES, WANDA 

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JANOS, CHRIS A., LEGAL REP. 


JANOS, WANDA K., SPOUSE 


KEELS, FRED 


KIDDER, LORENE 


KITE, MERLE A. 


LEDFORD, P.L., SEMI-RETIRED 


LEDFORD, T.C., RETIRED 


LEGGET, DONALD 


LISK, BARB. CONG. HASTINGS 


LONG, CHRISTY, DOL 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MARSH, PETE 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MCDANIEL, ART 


MCDONALD, ELDEE 


MCFEE, MATTHEW, ORAU TEAM 


MCKEEL, DAN, SINEW, VI NEWS 


MCKENZIE, ROGER 


MERRIL, BILL 


MILLS, PATRICIA D. 


MONTGOMERY, ROBERTA 


OGLESBEE, GAI, NAT’L NUCLEAR VICTIMS FOR JUSTICE 


OLSON, CAROL A. 


OSOWSKI, DEANNA 


ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY, SC&A 


ROWE, FRAN 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


SCHULTZ, DENISE 


SHATELL, CHARLES W. 


SIEKLE, DIANA 


SMITH, FRANKLIN 


SMITH, SANDRA J. 


SORENSEN, ADELE 


SORENSEN, JOEL 


SPLEH, GAIL, DOE 


TOMES, TOM, OCAS 


TRUDEAU, JULIE 


VALDEZ, GEORGE 


VENTURN, SUSAN, PROF. CASE MGMT. 


VLIEGER, FAYE 


WARE, D.C., RETIRED 


WENDLAND, JAMES A. 


ZACCHERO, MARY JO, ORAU TEAM 

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JULY 18, 2007
 

9:45 a.m.


 P R O C E E D I N G S 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS


 DR. ZIEMER: Good morning, everyone. We're 


going to open our second day of our session 


here in Hanford of the Advisory Board on 


Radiation and Worker Health. I'd like to 


remind all of you -- I'd like to remind all of 


you, if you haven't already done so, to 


register your attendance in the foyer. Even 


if you did that yesterday, you need to do that 


again today -- Board members, visitors, 


government staff people. 


Also again I'll remind you there are copies of 


the agenda and other documents on the table in 


the back. Please avail yourself of those, as 


appropriate. 


We're pleased to have Dr. Lew Wade back with us 


this morning, our regular Designated Federal 


Official. Lew, welcome, and if you have some 


opening remarks we'd be pleased to hear from 


you. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Paul. Very briefly, I 


apologize for not being with you yesterday. 


There was an unavoidable scheduling conflict 

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that had me doing other NIOSH business in 


Washington, D.C. and I apologize for not being 


here. I thank Ms. Chang for filling in in my 


absence. And as always I'll -- I'll start my 


comments by thanking the Board members for the 


tremendous effort that they put forward on 


behalf of the Department and the people that we 


all try and serve with -- with quality. So 


thank you and let's move on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. For the record, I want to 


double-check and make sure Dr. Roessler is on 


the line. Gen, are you there? 


DR. ROESSLER: I am on the line. 


 DR. ZIEMER: How's the sound level today, 


better? 


DR. ROESSLER: Sound today is -- is very good. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. And then Brad Clawson 


I don't believe will be able to be with us due 


to another conflict, so we have ten Board 


members here, which is a quorum of course, plus 


Dr. Roessler. 


CHAPMAN VALVE SEC
 

At our previous meeting -- which previous 


meeting? A couple of meetings ago we had the 


Chapman Valve SEC on our agenda. The workgroup 

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made a presentation on -- and a recommendation 


on that SEC. Dr. Roessler made that 


presentation. That was a time at which there 


was a document that the petitioners had not yet 


received. I believe it was the SC&A report on 


-- on Chapman Valve, as I recall. And so the 


motion from the workgroup, which was a motion 


concerning that SEC, was tabled in order to 


permit the petitioners to -- to review the 


document that they had not seen. 


So it would be appropriate now for us to remove 


that motion from the table and then to have 


discussion, both from the petitioners and from 


the workgroup on the Chapman Valve SEC petition 


so I would entertain a motion to remove the 


Chapman Valve motion from the table and bring 


it back before the group, and that motion was ­

-


 DR. POSTON: So moved. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Poston has moved that we untable the motion. Is there a second? 


 MS. MUNN: Second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And seconded. Now we will vote on 


bringing the mo-- the motion to the table. 


You're not voting for or against the SEC, but 

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simply to consider that previous motion. Any 


questions on that? 


Okay. A question on this motion to take -- 


 DR. MELIUS: I actually have a comment on the ­

- just like to speak about the motion 'cause -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: The motion to bring the -- yes, 


sure. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, right, right, yeah, yeah -- 


which I th-- my recollection, and I may be 


wrong 'cause I didn't look at minutes or 


anything, but was that the -- there was another 


concern that -- about the Chapman and that was 


the covered period issue and that we were also 


hoping for additional information -- be 


available regarding the covered period. There 


was -- my understanding -- supposed to be some 


evaluation going on as to -- to that issue and 


I don't believe we had -- that NIOSH was in a 


position to provide us with an update on that 


at the last meeting and I -- I guess I would 


question sort of the usefulness of going on 


until we've heard more about the status of that 


particular issue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So your question is whether to 


bring the motion on the table -- in other 

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words, do we have the information that caused 


it to be tabled in the first place? Is that 


what you're asking? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, you -- cor-- correct. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Can we -- can we get -- that's a 


point of information, basically. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: I -- I could comment on that, if I 


-- if I may. I think the additional 


information that was requested is not relevant 


to voting on this particular time period. The 


time period here is 1948 and 1949. The 


additional activities that occurred were 


believed to be well before that time period, so 


it would not have any bearing necessarily on 


voting on this particular class designation. 


think that we discussed that at that time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MELIUS: Well, I -- I think -- I don't 


think it's your prerogative to tell me what we 


can consider or not consider -- 


DR. NETON: Well --


 DR. MELIUS: -- in voting. I'd consider it to 


be relevant, Jim, and I guess I'm -- all I'm 


asking for is do we have additional 


I 
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information? 


DR. NETON: At this time we do not have any 


additional information from the Department of 


Labor on the activi-- on their evaluation of 


those additional activities that occurred prior 


to 1948. 


 DR. MELIUS: So -- so there's -- there's been 


no follow-up or discussion -- I'm just looking 


for an update. Is --


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- and if you're basically saying 


there's been no communication -- 


DR. NETON: We have not heard back from the 


Department of Labor as to -- on their 


deliberations on this additional covered 


exposure. 


 DR. MELIUS: Have you asked? I mean I --


DR. NETON: I don't recall asking in the last 


month or so, but maybe Larry can help out. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: This was -- the -- this issue was 


brought up at the May Denver Board meeting, I 


believe, and DOL was in the room. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We understood them to hear this. 


I have not followed up with Pete Turcic on the 

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status of it. I don't know where DOL's at on 


this or if they're pursuing it at all, so I'm ­

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 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- I'm sorry that -- that we 


haven't taken any action on this, but it's a 


DOL responsibility and we feel that they need 


to come forward if they're going to adjust the 


time frame for the AWE. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, appreciate the update. I --

I --

 DR. ZIEMER: So the brief answer then is 

there's no -- to our knowledge, there's no 


change in the status on that particular issue, 


as I understand it. At least we're not aware 


of it. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: All I know is that DOE and DOL 


have been reviewing various site time frames 


and site descriptive -- you know, in DOE's 


listing. They've been reviewing that. They've 


-- they've taken off three or four sites that 


are now not covered. I have not heard anything 


from either agency about Chapman Valve and -- 


and changing its covered period or its 


designation as an AWE. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Wanda, did you 


have an additional question? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I did. Once we have voted to 


bring this issue back on the table, I'm 


assuming that we then will have additional 


discussion opportunity and additional 


presentation to renew our -- our memories. I 


may be the only one here who does not clearly 


remember exactly what we said. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, and indeed we -- we also have 


I believe on the line someone from Senator 


Kennedy's staff who wishes to make remarks 


regarding Chapman Valve, so we would do that as 


well. 


 MS. MUNN: Good. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? This -- this is a 


motion to bring the item from the table for 


consideration. Are you ready to vote? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, so the vote would be on 


whether -- whether we will consider Chapman 


Valve today, basically. 


Now all who favor this, say aye? 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 And opposed? 

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 DR. MELIUS: I'm opposed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let -- let's get a -- let's 


get a show of hands and -- so we can get a -- 


accurate count here. 


 Ayes raise your hand. We've got one, two, 


three, four -- I'll vote -- five in favor. And 


Gen Roessler? 


 (No response) 


 Gen Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are you vot--


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, I vote aye. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, that's six. 


And nays? One, two, three, four, five -- five 


nays. The ayes have it so the motion is back 


before us. 


Let me ask Dr. Poston to review for us what the 


motion is from the working group. 


 DR. POSTON: I'd asked Jim Neton to give us 


sort of an update and then I was going to go 


over a short presentation of what we've done so 


far. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


DR. NETON: I -- I was just going to take a few 


minutes to refresh the Board's memory as to a 

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little bit about the specifics of Chapman 


Valve. It was presented initially at the 


September 2006 Las Vegas Board meeting, at 


which time a working group was established to 


review, in conjunction with SC&A, the 


evaluation report for Chapman. That group was 


assembled and chaired by Dr. Poston. 


Just to refresh your memories again, Chapman 


was a facility that machined natural uranium 


rods into slugs for the Brookhaven Graphite 


Research Reactor in the 1948/'49 time frame. 


They actually partitioned off a -- a section of 


the plant known as Building 23 where they did 


these activities. 


The definition of the class -- expanded 


definition of the class was all workers who 


were monitored, or should have been monitored, 


for work performed in Building 23 from January 


1st, 1948 through December 31st, 1949, and 


there was also a residual contamination period 


from 1991 to 1993. 


The -- we -- in the evaluation report that we 


presented we recommended that the -- we -- we ­

- class be denied in that we could perform dose 


reconstructions with sufficient accuracy at 

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that facility. The working group has met on 


several occasions and I think Dr. Poston is 


prepared to talk about the conclusions of the 


working group. 


 DR. WADE: Just for the record, the working 


group was chaired by Dr. Poston, members 


Griffon, Clawson, Roessler and Gibson. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. You have some 


slides, John? 


 DR. POSTON: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. POSTON: These -- just to refresh 


everyone's memory, as Dr. Wade said, Brad 


Clawson, Mike Gibson, Mark Griffon and 


Genevieve Roessler served on this working group 


with me. 


And the -- these are just a history of what 


happened in terms of the outreach meetings and 


so forth, and then down at the bottom the 


meetings of the working group. I did accompany 


John Mauro and Dr. Makhijani to -- to the site 


and participated in the interviews, the tours 


and so forth at the -- at the site so that I 


could better understand the issues that the 


working group was charged to -- to -- to make 

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decisions on. So that's -- we both had faceto-face meetings and teleconferences to try to 


resolve these issues. 


This is what Jim just read to you. It does 


focus specifically on Building 23. There is a 


-- a specified time frame, January the 1st, 


1948 through December 31st, 1949, so a two-year 


period. The production period was shorter than 


that actually, according to the records, but 


that was the period. And then the second 


period that was considered is more recent. 


Dr. Melius raised an issue that has never been 


brought to the working group in terms of a 


period before this, before 1948. We didn't 


address it. We weren't charged to. We only 


focused on -- on the two time periods that are 


in the -- in the SEC petition. 


We did do a fair amount of work and had a good 


working relationship with the NIOSH folks, as 


well as SC&A. We looked at a lot of different 


reports, and one of the most valuable reports 


that we were able to review was the H. K. 


Ferguson report which gave a lot of details on 


the machining of the uranium and its use in the 


Brookhaven reactor. So there was a fair amount 

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of documentation that we were able to look at 


to understand the issues and understand the 


exposure pathways and so forth associated with 


this -- this operation. It is a metal 


machining operation, so such things as lots of 


airborne radioactivity and so forth are -- are 


somewhat minimal in this particular situation. 


So looking at NIOSH, they took the position 


that they did have data to bound -- provide 


bounding estimates of the exposures at Chapman 


Valve. They -- they took some -- they made 


some assumptions which are quite -- using a 


health physics term, quite conservative; that 


is that really, in -- in I think the opinion of 


the workgroup, overestimated the doses that 


people could have received from these -- these 


exposures. 


So we -- as a working group, we agreed with the 


time period for the petition. The dose 


estimates do rely heavily on a limited number 


of bioassay samples, but the conservative 


assumptions that went into the calculations I 


think take that into account. 


So after a lot of discussion back and forth 


among all the participants, not just the 

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working group but -- but the NIOSH staff and 


SC&A staff, we -- we concluded that the appro-- 


the NIOSH approach wou-- to dose reconstruction 


would provide a bounding but very claimant-


favorable estimates of doses to the workers 


over the period of interest in this particular 


petition. And based on this conclusion, we did 


not recommend that SE-- SEC status is warranted 


for this particular situation. 


I think that's -- there may be one more, but I 


think that's just -- yeah, that's it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Let me check and see 


now if we have on the phone Sharon Block -- 


MS. BLOCK: Yes, I am. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- who's with Senator Kennedy's 


staff. 


MS. BLOCK: Yes, I'm here on the phone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sharon, you have some comments, I 


understand. Would you like to present them? 


MS. BLOCK: First -- yes, I just wanted to let 


you know that Portia Wu, who I think has been 


participating in this -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, uh-huh. 


MS. BLOCK: -- process from the beginning, 


wishes that she could be with all of you, but 

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she's with the Senator right now on another 


matter, but she might try to get on if she can. 


But I think Portia, if she was here, and I 


would just like to express, you know, from the 


Senator's point of view disappointment with 


this process. It's just been an incredibly 


frustrating process I think for the 


petitioners. It's gone on so long, you know. 


We're almost now at two years since the 


petition was filed and, you know, from what 


we're hearing, we obviously have serious 


concerns about where the Advisory Board is 


heading on this and -- and I think our concerns 


are generated by, you know, I just -- a litany 


of events throughout this process that have 


called into question sort of the -- the -- the 


accuracy of the outcome. You know, things like 


the -- the original site profile not taking 


into account the employees' evidence and 


information, using data from other sites, the 


difficulty that everybody is having getting 


information which, you know, begs the question 


of whether there is other information out there 


that -- that hasn't come out. So we just 


wanted to express, you know, on behalf of the 

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Senator's constituents who -- who have been 


through this process and found it so 


frustrating, our concerns. And we'd like to 


provide a -- a more formal written statement to 


the Board, you know, following this meeting. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That would be fine, Sharon. Are 


there any other representatives of the 


petitioners on the line at all? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Okay, apparently not, so -- now this 


motion is open now for discussion. The motion 


that comes back to the table is basically the 


one that you've summarized at the end of your 


presentation, so we'll now open the floor for 


discussion. The motion that's before us is a 


motion to support the NIOSH position that dose 


can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 


 Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, my first question is do we ­

- do we know that the actually -- that the SC&A 


report actually did get to the petitioner? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think -- who can confirm that 


for us? I -- my understanding is they -- they 


actually got it the day of our meeting, but 


let's see if we can get a confirmation here. 

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 MS. BREYER: It was sent. We always send the 


documents FedEx, so we did send it FedEx and 


then we did receive receipt confirmations that 


they received them. 


 DR. MELIUS: And they -- they were aware of the 


meeting today and --


 MS. BREYER: Yes, I contacted -- one contacted 


me a month ago when the agenda wasn't out, and 


I did tell her the dates -- we did know the 


dates at the time -- and I told her it'd be the 


same number and pass code, and then I left the 


messages as well last week with the call-in 


number and the pass code, and neither returned 


my call before I left. But I did leave all the 


information on voice mails for them. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh, okay. 


 MS. BREYER: And e-mails, 'cause I had e-mail 


addresses for them both as well, so they both 


got e-mails from me. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Laurie. 

 DR. MELIUS: Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments or questions? Yes, 

Jim Lockey. 

 DR. LOCKEY: I have a question for Jim. Jim, 
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were -- is there a concern on your part about 


the expos-- about the -- before 1948, that 


there might have been something going on at the 


plant site at that time frame that wouldn't be 


reflected in '48 on? 


 DR. MELIUS: Correct, and there's this issue, 


and my recollection is this was uncovered 


during one of the site visits there, or in 


subsequent follow-up from SC&A. I believe it 


was referenced in the SC&A report that was 


brought to the workgroup or maybe to some 


discussion. I don't -- I was not part of the 

workgroup --

 DR. ZIEMER: Maybe we can get some -- 

 DR. MELIUS: -- so I don't know if a printout 

would be --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- clarification of that -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- and whether or not that would ­

- that could be a subject of even a separate 


petition, I suppose, but Jim? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I -- I'll try to -- to the 


best of my ability -- reflect on what happened, 


and I think SC&A can -- can chime in if I'm 


off-base, fill in the gaps. 

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My recollection was, during an interview with 


some of the workers during a worker outreach 


meeting at the Blockson -- at the Chapman site, 


it was brought to light by one of the workers 


that there may have been a shipment of -- I 


think they were barriers, is that correct? 


Some type of uranium --


UNIDENTIFIED: Manifolds. 


DR. NETON: -- manifolds -- manifolds from -- 


from the Oak Ridge facility that were shipped 


to the site and possibly could have contained 


trace amounts of enriched uranium. And that 


might have explained the -- might help explain 


the discovery of some -- what appear to be 


enriched uranium samples outside about the 


facility. But it was also -- and this was an 


early time frame, prior to 1948. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


DR. NETON: It was also mentioned, I believe, 


though, that those things were shipped -- 


although they were shipped to the site, they 


were fairly quickly transported to another 


building somewhere remote from the actual 


Blockson (sic) facility that we're reviewing 


today. 

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 UNIDENTIFIED: Chapman. 


DR. NETON: For Chapman -- I'm sorry, I've got 


too many facilities on my mind today. 


So that -- that, in essence, created yet 


another facility designation because Building 


23 is the designated class for what we're 


reviewing today. This has -- you know, we 


believe it had merit. We passed on that 


information to the Department of Labor and, as 


Larry said, we're still waiting to hear their 


opinion on that. 


If Arjun can fill in a few of the gaps -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, well, John and I and Dr. 


Poston were there during -- during this 


interview. This was a person that did not work 


during the Manhattan Project at Building 23. 


This person -- this worker was at another 


facility and actually knew of these -- 


personally knew because -- handled the 


paperwork around this and was able to provide 


quite a lot of detail around what was involved, 


but no radiological details other than 


manifolds came from Oak Ridge, and provided 


names of contacts and so on -- which of course 


those -- those who have Privacy Act materials 

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have that information, including NIOSH. 
I 


don't know if it's been passed on to the 


Department of Labor. 


We -- we don't know about the quantities of -- 


of the materials. We did a little bit of 


research, which is in our report, that leads 


one to suspect or make an educated guess that 


it might have been from the electromagnetic 


separation during the Manhattan Project. 


This person also did tell us that the project 


that the employee was aware of ended a few 


months after World War II. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me ask maybe Arjun or John or 


Jim, is there any reason to think that that 


material would have any impact on the time 


period we're talking about here? As I 


understand it, this was earlier and was moved 


away from the --


 DR. POSTON: Yeah, we were -- when we spoke -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: John. 

 DR. POSTON: I participated in the -- as Arjun 

said, I participated in the interviews. This 


was an elderly woman who was a secretary or -- 


who processed the paperwork for these 


shipments. But we were also told by other 

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workers that none of those manifolds entered 


the building. They -- there was a -- a rail 


spur there that they brought these in, they 


transferred them to a truck and took them to 


another facility. So when we considered the 


dose reconstruction, we did not consider that 


that was relevant to what we were charged to 


do. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Mark, did you have a 


comment on that as well? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I just -- reflecting on ­

- and I don't disagree with the description by 


Arjun or Jim, but I do note in -- in both of 


their descriptions -- here's the concern I 


have. We're saying believe to be -- I think 


Jim used the phrase "believed to be" before the 


time period, and Arjun said might have been 


from this other facility. And I think we're -- 


you know, I'm saying, you know, I wish we had 


more information at this point. We have -- you 


know, it's not like we're just -- it's not like 


we have no information, but we have a lead that 


there was other -- other processing, other sort 


of operations that may have gone on and, you 


know, we -- we're guessing that it was before 

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this time period in question. I mean we -- we 


have this one inf-- interview that says it was, 


but we have these other samples that were taken 


in the 1990s and they're near Building 23. 


They're not associated with this other 


building, so you know, I'm not sure that I'm 


convinced that it was definitely before the 


time period in question and I -- my -- my 


opinion is, you know, why -- why vote on this 


time period until we hear back from DOL and 


let's make sure it doesn't overlap or something 


or -- or there's not other operations that we 


don't even know of that -- you know. 


DR. NETON: Well, I used the word "believe" 


because there was one assertion made by one 


person at the time, and I think Arjun indicated 


that it was -- ended prior -- or shortly after 


World War II, 1946. So you know, it wouldn't 


have been in the 1948 time frame -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: But -- but we also have those 


questionable samples (unintelligible) -- 


DR. NETON: And the samples -- the samples that 


were detected, if I'm not mistaken, were 


actually -- one of the enriched uranium samples 


was at the loading dock outside the building. 

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It was not actually in the building itself, 


which sort of supports this possible drop-


shipment theory, so -- and we have no evidence 


of any other --


 MR. GRIFFON: Possible. 


DR. NETON: -- enriched uranium -- well, I mean 


I can't prove a negative, Mark. I mean that 


seems to be a recurring theme here and, you 


know, there is no other information besides 


that. It could take six months, it could take 


a year, we may never find that information. 


And -- and in light of that, this evaluation 


report would languish for a long extended 


period of time for some po-- some long-term 


possibility. 


Right now the information, as we have it, 


suggests nothing beyond the rolling operations. 


We have a very detailed report for this 


project, the H. K. Ferguson report. It's a 97­

page document that -- that details in 


excruciating detail every piece -- every 


operation that was done, the thickness of the 


uranium that was removed for all these slugs, 


the exact numbers and how they were shipped to 


Brookhaven. Nothing in this time period, which 

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is all documented in this report, suggests that 


there were any other activities at this plant 


during that time period. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Larry, a comment? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I stepped out a moment ago and 


called Roberta Moser at DOL. She is deputy to 


Pete Turcic, and I asked her where they stood 


on this issue. I had expected to hear from 


them, I haven't. I don't have anything in 


writing. She was going to search for that. 


don't know if Roberta is on the line now or if 


Jeff Kotsch is on the line now, but I asked 


that they try to make themselves available for 


the Board to hear their opinion on this. I 


can't share that because, you know, it needs to 


come from them. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Larry. Jim, 


additional comment? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I would just point out -- 


and part of my concern about this issue has 


been raised by the unfortunate in-- incidents 


in communication we've had regarding the -- the 


Dow site, and I think all the Board members saw 


some of the problems there, and it seems that 


these particular issues of covered period and 


I 
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so forth seem to get lost and there's poor 


communication on -- and poor follow-up on -- 


and -- and I'm concerned about sort of letting 


go of these issues in a way that they then ap-- 


appear to disappear and we have, you know, 


petitioners that are concerned. We have people 


that have -- have ra-- you know, raised this 


is-- issue as part of a -- a NIOSH -- you know, 


Board evaluation of the site and I think we 


need -- we have some duty to -- to follow up on 


it and I get concerned when we go to a meeting 


and -- and NIOSH then has to call DOL to get an 


update. And I don't think we can, you know, 


give up on our responsibilities to -- to follow 


up on these, as appears to -- what has happened 


with the Dow site, which we'll talk about 


tomorrow. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. John, with a comment? 


 DR. POSTON: Well, I'd just like to point out 


that -- first, that I respect my colleagues 


here on the Board, but when we made this 


recommendation, it was unanimous. And I think 


the record will show that Mark indicated orally 


during that time that he didn't think that the 


slightly enriched uranium-235 had anything to 

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do with this case. So now I'm a little bit 


confused that this seems to be a huge roadblock 


to something that was unanimous among the 


working group that we should proceed with this. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: There is nothing that will prevent 


an additional petition from being filed if in 


fact any evidence presents itself or is 


uncovered which would indicate that any of the 


activities that occurred prior to this time 


should be the topic of an SEC or further 


investigation in terms of technical accuracy. 


That being the case, the fact that some other 


time period may have been involved does not 


appear to be a valid basis for failing to move 


on this particular SEC at this time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments. Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I guess I have to defen-- I 


-- I haven't looked back at my trans-- you 


know, what I said on the record, but I -- I 


don't think I said it had nothing to do with 


this case, but I certainly did -- and I still 


feel that the enriched uranium -- you know, the 


-- the work that we looked at, I think that 


dose reconstruction could be done with -- with 

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the data we had. It's this -- this question of 


it -- it is likely that that enriched uranium 


or -- or some other activities were prior to, 


but you know, my only hesitation is that, you 


know, if -- if we -- if these processes or 


other operations could have occurred 


overlapping this time period, then are we -- 


are we hastily voting potentially against this 


-- this covered time period. So I -- I guess I 


would -- I would just clarify my -- and if I 


said that before, you know, that -- that's my 


only hesitation, and it's not that I don't 


think that -- that they didn't demonstrate 


fairly well that -- and the H. K. Ferguson does 


detail those activities that we looked at, and 


I'm convinced very well that for those 


activities that doses can be reconstructed. 


But I have -- I'm -- I'm hesitant because of 


the -- this question mark about other 


activities. And if they did overlap this time 


period, then what are -- what's the recourse 


for those that would have already been voted 


out in this time period? I'm not sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let -- let me ask a question on 


that shipment that's been referred to. Was 

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there supporting documentation that showed that 


shipment arriving there and being transferred 


and so on? How do we know -- or is it the re-- 


recollection of the one person that it even -- 


 DR. POSTON: Right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- was there to start with? 

 DR. POSTON: Yes, it was -- as I said, it was a 

secretary who remembered processing the 


paperwork for these manifolds, and she 


described them as being quite large, about the 


-- she pointed to a huge window that was in the 


meeting room which was probably about seven 


feet by seven feet, and she said they were 


roughly that -- that big. And Arjun and John 


and I talked about it and we concluded they 


probably came from the Y-12 operation with the 


electromagnetic separation. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And was it her recollection that 


they had been transferred, or was that someone 


else's? 


 DR. POSTON: The -- I for-- I don't remember. 


I think -- but we were told -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: John Mauro perhaps --


 DR. POSTON: -- that those manifolds never 


entered the building. They were simply 

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transferred, there was a trans-shipment there. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, my recollection is she 


referred to a relocation to a -- a facility on 


Dean Street --


 DR. POSTON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- where they were tested -- 


pressure tested, I think that they -- the way 


it was described, so these manifolds were sent 


there for particular testing if they would hol­

- withhold a certain pressure at a -- at that 


facility and I -- that's I think the extent of 


the description that -- that -- that was 


provided. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And that is another -- a different 


Chapman facility, Dean Street? 


 DR. POSTON: Yes. 


DR. NETON: Yes. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, it -- it -- it was a 


different location, yes, and there was a transshipment point and might have been cleaning of 


these manifolds involved, also. We -- we did 


not go to the Dean Street facility at that 


time. We just kind of made notes and the -- 


the -- the notes from that meeting are in an 


attachment to the report and there's a fair 

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amount of detail in there. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So that if -- if indeed such 


material went to Dean Street and work was done 


there, that would have to be established 


separately as a covered site, which it is not 


now. Is that correct? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, the -- the -- the transshipment happened -- I mean presum-- from this 


one account. I'm just telling you -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- what -- what was said. It ­

- it -- at -- at the Chapman Valve main 


facility, so presumably workers over there 


would have been transferring the thing from the 


train on which it arrived to a truck which took 


it to the Dean Street facility, but that -- 


that extent of work would have happened there 


and -- and fr-- and then we didn't -- I 


personally went -- when John and I drafted the 


report, I did -- I did look at the official 


Manhattan Project history. There -- there are 


further details as to contractors that were 


involved. I believe it was Stone and Webster. 


So there was -- it wasn't just a recollection. 


There was -- there was more rich detail that 

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led -- you know, more credence to the idea that 


-- that such a thing actually happened because 


it checked -- whatever coul-- I could check 


out, checked out with the official AEC history. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Ji--


 MR. GRIFFON: But -- but also this -- you know, 


if this transfer was rail to truck, I'm not 


sure how this loading dock being -- having a 


potentially elevated U-235 sample sort of 


supports this whole scenario, you know. I mean 


it -- it doesn't sound like it ever got to the 


loading dock, from what I'm hearing from John 


and from Arjun, you know, so -- 


DR. NETON: Well, I don't know, but -- but what 


I would point out, though, and remind the Board 


that the -- the class definition here 


specifically refers to work in Building 23. 


And if one looks at the H. K. Ferguson report, 


there's a very detailed account how Building 


23, in 1948 and '49, was specifically set up 


and -- and partitioned off to handle the slug 


work for the Brookhaven Graphite Research 


Reactor. So in -- in a sense, we have a very 


good accounting of what transpired in Building 


23 that was specifically configured for that 

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operation in 1948 and '49. It would not 


preclude the addition of a class at other 


sections of -- of the main Blockson (sic) 


facility, or even this Dean Street fac-- I'm 


sorry, I keep saying -- I've got a Blockson 


report later this afternoon and so I -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We understand. 


DR. NETON: So anyway, it -- it is just 


Building 23 that we're -- we're discussing 


here, not the balance of the plant. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, Jim Lockey, then 

Jim Melius. 

 DR. LOCKEY: If -- if perchance it was -- when 

you -- if more information is made available, 


it's found that in somehow Building 23 was in 


some way involved with these -- this manifold 


that were being shipped there, how would that 


be handled in relationship to the petitioners? 


Could they refile another SEC at that point or 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well --


 DR. LOCKEY: I'm just looking for 


clarification. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- let Larry answer, but the issue 


for NIOSH would be whether they could 

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reconstruct dose if that material was handled 


in that building, and -- 


 MS. MUNN: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


just a trace. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, we -- if -- if information 


come to light that indicated Building 23 with 


enriched uranium, then we would have to reexamine our evaluation as to whether we can 


reconstruct that dose. If it comes to light, 


or as we hear in the speculation, that it went 


to another building across the street, that's 


not part of the covered facility here. That's 


-- that's what I think DOL is wrestling with, 


is my under-- I'm stepping out here where I 


didn't want to be and speak about DOL's 


responsibility, but what they're looking at is, 


one, is there -- does the AWE designation for 


Chapman Valve cover this reported manifold 


transfer and cleanup or whatever happened to 


it. If it doesn't, should it; should a new AWE 


designation be granted for Chapman Valve to 


include that building. The other thing that I 


think they're looking at is whether or not this 


is covered work. They -- they have opined that 


the Dow situation is not covered work, and I 

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think they're also examining Chapman Valve 


under the same lens; is that covered work for 


this program. I don't know where they're at on 


either one of these examinations and I wish 


they were on the phone to tell you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim and then Josie. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I actually wish they -- 


they were here, too. I mean they've had -- had 


several months to do that. I'm -- I'm not 


faulting the work of the -- first of all, the 


workgroup -- do that. I understand what they 


did and so forth. I just think that before we 


as a Board reach closure on this that I would 


like to have better information on the status 


of this follow-up from DOL -- that's maybe them 


calling Larry now -- and -- and understanding 


and -- and -- about it. And I think that 


that's there, and given some of the 


communication issues we've already had with 


this -- remember we've had a -- the SC&A report 


that somehow got lost for six months and I 


found out that it'd never been submitted to the 


petitioners by accident at the May meeting as I 


was trying to understand what was -- ha-- 


trying to understand what everyone had done on 

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the site, and I think it's only fair to the 


petitioners and so forth, given how old the 


site is, given their limited resources and -- 


thing, and given the limited access to the -- 


to the process that -- that we wait and get an 


update and find out what -- what DOE -- DOL is 


doing about this site and have a presentation 


from DOL about it and not a last-minute phone 


call. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Josie? 


MS. BEACH: My question is do we have a sense 


of if the workforce moved from Chapman Valve 


over to Dean facility, were they mobile? Did 


you look at that at all? 


 DR. POSTON: We -- we did not specifically ask 


that question, as I recall, or -- but it was my 


impression that the Dean Street facility was a 


separate facility and had a separate workforce. 


And Arjun probably can -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, the -- the -- the Dean 


Street facility was a physically separate 


facility, but I believe the workforce was a 


Chapman Valve workforce institutionally. And 


the person who gave us --


 DR. POSTON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

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question, Arjun. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Sorry? No, the --


 DR. POSTON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


question. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm -- I'm trying to finish the 


answer. 


 DR. POSTON: Well, I think you're answering a 


question that she didn't ask. She -- as I 


understood it, and the way I answered it, she 


was wanting to know did the people in Building 


23 go to the Dean Street facility to do work. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: What I'm saying is the reverse 


did happen, is the person who told us this 


subsequently went to work at the main plant, so 


that would indicate that the personnel were 


interchangeable. I don't know of anybody that 


went the other way, but we do know that this 


person went from working for this Dean Street 


project when it closed, or when she said it 


closed, to the main facility. 


 DR. POSTON: The sec-- the secretary, you're 


talking about. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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 DR. POSTON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Further comments? Oh, 


okay. The latest update? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I feel like the -- don't shoot 


the messenger. Okay? 


DOL has not memorialized this -- their opinion 


in a documentation yet. That is forthcoming. 


I have no idea, I asked her when it was coming. 


Essentially what I said earlier are the two 


issues they're wrestling with, and right now 


they're saying that they have no primary 


evidence other than this re-- this -- this 


anecdotal comment, and that's it. And DOE has 


no primary evidence and so they're going to 


provide written documentation of their position 


on this. What it will say, I can't -- I can't 


speak to. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Other comments? 


Anyone wish to speak for or against the amend-- 


or the --


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just to --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- motion. Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just to say one more thing on the 


-- and -- and I agree with -- with Jim Neton 


that -- I don't want to let this linger 

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necessarily. I guess the -- the -- the other 


side of it is that I think if I looked at the ­

- we had a slide yesterday and I can't remember 


the exact numbers, but a lot of the Chapman 


Valve cases have been completed, so I'm not 


sure how our vote here is affecting any work or 


any claims processing or ver-- very many. I 


mean a lot of these claims have been completed. 


Isn't that correct? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We have not pended any claims or 


any action on dose reconstruction for Chapman 


Valve. I'd have to look up -- I don't have it 


here. I'd have to go look up in the -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: The DOL slide from yesterday had 


some numbers in it. It looked like --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. Well, then you have that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- looked like a high percentage 


were already completed. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I think there is a high 

percentage. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: I could go get my data, but -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Denied, yeah, and -- but denied, 

I -- I agree, yeah, yeah. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Anyway... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Further comments? 


 DR. WADE: Comment not pertaining to this, but 


after the Board does its business, I would like 


to have a discussion with the Board about how 


we proceed from a procedural point of view to 


sort of avoid these issues in the future. I 


don't think we should have that discussion now, 


but after you conclude your business on this I 


think we should talk about this. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Wanda, did you have an 


additional comment? 


 MS. MUNN: I was -- just in response to the 


question about the number of -- of cases. The 


slide that was presented to us yesterday showed 


NIOSH dose reconstructions of 73 and Part B 


approvals of 34 completed of a total of 215 


claims. 


DR. NETON: I have the numbers from the 


evaluation report that was issued -- 


 MS. MUNN: The final decision number was 175. 


DR. NETON: -- August -- August of '06, so 


these are a little bit out of date, but these 


are the numbers that were in Table 4-1 of the 

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Chapman Valve evaluation report, and it says 


that there were a total number of cases 


submitted for Energy employees who meet the 


proposed class definition was at 106. The 


number of dose reconstructions completed for 


those employees were -- was 91, so Mark's 


correct, we -- we've done the vast majority of 


those cases. I guess those were the two 


relevant numbers out of this table, but again, 


a -- a fair number of these have been denied, 


and I'm sure there are people out there waiting 


with hope that if this decision is made and 


their -- their case may turn over one way or 


another based on what happens with the SEC 


process. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I know they're 


waiting, but I would also like to see, you 


know, exactly what DOL did to investigate this. 


I mean if -- if they didn't look for any more 


data, I'm sure they didn't find any primary 


data, so I'd like to see to -- to what extent 


did they investigate what -- we actually gave 


them some potential things to research, 


including the -- the contractor. I don't know 


if everybody's ever looked at the contractor 

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that came in and did the cleanup. We asked for 


those -- that data and the data for shipments 


that probably went to Clive, Utah, you know, 


that -- that might shed some light on some of 


the nature of the contamina-- you know, the 


contamination that they removed, so I don't 


know if any of that was followed up on. Some 


of it was in the later time period, but some 


might also reflect on overall operations that 


occurred at the site, so -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I'd like to see what DOL 


investigated this to make their determination. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Further comments? Wanda, 


additional comment or -- 


 MS. MUNN: At the risk of being repetitive, we 


have determined that a bounding case can be 


made for these workers and, in the event that 


additional information occurs, there's nothing 


to prevent an SEC from being filed covering 


this new information. I -- there seems to be 


no reason why we shouldn't proceed with this 


one, with the full understanding that 


additional information is wide open to any 


additional claimants. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim, a comment? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, and I would argue the 


opposite, that no harm done in delaying until 


we've got a full report from -- I won't say a 


full report, but at least a report from DOL on 


-- and DOE on what their evaluation is of the 


covered period and covered facility for the 


site. And therefore I think -- believe this is 


the right way to proce-- procedurally, in terms 


of voting, I would move to re-table the motion 


until our next meeting. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, there's a motion to -- to 


table this --


 DR. MELIUS: Table, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- and is there a second? 

 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 

 MR. SCHOFIELD: Second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And it's seconded. This is not a 


debatable motion. We must vote immediately. 


Those who favor tabling the motion, say aye -- 


raise -- raise your hand if you vote -- if you 


favor tabling the motion. 


One, two, three, four, five. 


 DR. WADE: We have -- have Gen. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Gen Roessler? 

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DR. ROESSLER: There are people on the line who 


are not muting their phones so I -- I did not 


hear the latest --


 DR. ZIEMER: This is motion -- this is a motion 


to table the Chapman Valve motion. 


DR. ROESSLER: Right. I vote against it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, you're voting no. Let me 


see the ayes again, there were -- ayes? 


 (Affirmative responses) 


Okay, the no’s? One, two, three, four, the 


Chair votes no, that's five -- 


 DR. WADE: And Gen. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and Gen is six. The motion 


fails. So we're back to the main motion now. 


The main motion is that the Board support the 


position of NIOSH on the Chapman Valve 


petition. Are we ready to vote on that? Any 


final comments, pro or con? You can -- okay, 


we're ready to vote? 


Okay, those who favor the recommendation of the 


workgroup will say -- or vote -- raise your 


right hand. Okay, one, two, three, four, the 


Chair votes aye is five, Gen Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: I vote for. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's six. Those voting against? 

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One, two, three, four, five. 


The vote is six to five, so the motion carries, 


and the Chair will prepare a -- a letter to the 


Secretary so indicating. I assume that the 


usual 21-day caveat for preparation of that 


would be in effect. 


 The Chair would note that the fact that this is 


a split vote will perhaps cause the Secretary 


some concern or -- he has to make the final 


decision, but this is not a strong endorsement 


at this point. We recognize that, but 


nonetheless the Board has so voted and that 


will be the recommendation. 


Again, a note that if additional information is 


uncovered or developed, subsequent petitions 


could be addressed appropriately. 


A comment now, Lew. 


 DR. WADE: Well, first on the -- the recently-


completed action, the process we have been 


trying to follow is that a draft of the -- the 


motion would be put together and shown to all 


tomorrow during our working session. We need 


to deal with the issue of the 250 days and we 


need more specificity in terms of -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 

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 DR. WADE: -- of the motion, so if someone 


would take on the task of providing those 


words, I think that would be appropriate. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Maybe I'll ask the workgroup chair 


to do this since our usual mover was not in 


favor of the motion. But we -- we have the -- 


sort of the standard wording from which you can 


develop that and we'll -- we'll have a final 


wording tomorrow to -- to look at for editorial 


purposes. Okay. Thank you. 


(Pause) 


Okay, did you have some additional 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. WADE: Yeah, I would like to have a general 


discussion, two or three points. Now I'll talk 


to you as the DFO. Again, close votes create 


difficulty, obviously, for the Secretary. It 


doesn't mean they're not appropriate and if 


they need to happen, they should happen. I 


think it's incumbent upon me and -- and 


whatever abilities I have to try and preclude 


situations that could cloud votes from 


happening, and I'd like to talk about one now. 


We have -- we have this -- we al-- we'll always 


have competing issues. There is a desire to do 

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the work of the -- of this Board in a timely 


way, and we all understand that pressure. 


We'll talk more about that this afternoon. And 


then there's an equal pressure to do a complete 


job, to see that the people are indeed served, 


the workers are indeed served by seeing that -- 


that all of the questions have been addressed 


adequately. And there's a tension that will 


always exist between those two things of 


timeliness and complete. And again, we can 


deal with that. 


Except now there's a new wrinkle in front of us 


and that is that the work that needs to be done 


for the Board to feel that everything has been 


done completely is not work to be done by the 


Department of HHS. It's -- now we're talking 


about DOL and DOE need to do certain things. 


And I don't question that in these cases, those 


that have asked for that work to be done in a 


timely way are correct and justified, given the 


charter of the Board. So the question is what 


do we do. 


I guess I would -- I would make a preliminary 


proposal to you that I would like you to think 


about and improve, and again I'll ask counsel 

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to comment on it as we go. I think it's 


appropriate that at the end of each of -- at 


the end of each Board meeting that I prepare a 


letter to a contact point in DOE and a contact 


point in DOL identifying issues that the Board 


would like to see discussed at the subsequent 


Board meeting, and giving them a time certain 


for that discussion and identifying the issues. 


I have to point out to you that there is 


nothing binding in what I ask for and that 


might not take place, but I don't think we want 


to find ourself in a situation where we are 


expecting something and we realize it's not 


been forthcoming. Again, there is no guarantee 


in what I do, but I think we need to do the 


best staff work we can to avoid this issue. So 


I'd like some discussion of that and refinement 


of that and -- and guidance on that. 


And first of all, counsel, I'm sure I can write 


such letters. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And it certainly makes sense that 


we at least formalize that process if -- if we 


want Labor to -- if we would like Labor to do a 


certain thing -- again, we can't -- or DOE, we 


cannot mandate it, but we can certainly go on 

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record as asking for it and -- and that would 


certainly formalize it so that we are -- we're 


not just assuming because they heard something 


that they will necessarily follow up 


automatically. 


 DR. WADE: And it's Labor and Energy both. I 


think in --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- in both cases --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. WADE: -- I think it comes to play. And 


then I would -- my last little wrinkle of that 


is that I could draft such letters and share 


them with the Board before they went -- they 


would be sent. And again, all I would ask for 


would be individual comments from the Board, no 


consensus on the letters. 


Larry? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Along this line of discussion, at 


the -- at the conclusion of the May meeting in 


Denver I took it upon myself to task my folks 


to get with DOL and DOE. We sent an e-mail on 


May the 8th to both DOE and to DOL asking them 


about their position on Chapman Valve, 


providing them all the information we had at 

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that time. I would -- you know, I would 


welcome Lew's volunteering to take on as the 


intermediary here because I think it does need 


to come from the Board. It comes from me, I -- 


I get a response. I know that Shelby Hallmark 


is now on top -- at DOL is now on top of what's 


going on with Chapman Valve at DOL. He's 


sending us an e-mail saying he will follow up 


on this and get a written response to the 


Board. But you can see my frustration as well. 


We've taken action as we thought necessary and 


we're still waiting. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: And you can also strike my name from 


the proposal and put Paul's. I mean I just 


think something needs to happen. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I -- I think it's fine if it 


comes from you acting in behalf of the Board. 


Wanda, you have a comment? 


 MS. MUNN: Nothing is more helpful to an 


individual -- and I assume to an organization ­

- with multiple, differing sites and issues to 

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deal with than a simple action list. An action 


list is the most direct and simple tool of 


which I am aware that can be used in 


circumstances like this, and it appears to me 


that any agency or individual who received it 


would be extremely pleased at having before 


them exactly what is being asked of them and 


the time line as to when that might occur. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In fact, hav-- having heard you 


say that, I might just follow up and suggest 


that a -- an action list for all follow-up 


activities would be perhaps useful, is a 


certain workgroup to do something. Some of 


these things we -- can slip through the crack. 


We -- we talk about it and say okay, such-andsuch a workgroup should follow up and -- and 


you know, if we don't have a list like that, 


it's easy for those things to fall through the 


crack, for them to forget to do it or for us to 


forget to follow up. So I'm wondering if we 


shouldn't think about expanding that, not only 


what we would like in terms of the -- the 


agencies to do as follow-up but what we need to 


do internally, whether it's workgroups or 


individuals. 

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 DR. WADE: I mean I agree with that. I -- I 


mean I -- I think that's been needed for quite 


some time. I've been working to try and get 


staff dedicated to that. It's my sincere hope 


that at the next face-to-face meeting of the 


Board there will be staff here who can keep a 


real time record of action lists so I'll assume 


the responsibility at this meeting. Hopefully 


we can more formalize it at the next. But just 


so you tell me when to add something to the 


action list, I'll add it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And this would include 


contractors, if -- if we want SC&A to do 


something -- normally we're tasking them 


anyway, but we -- we may need to include those 


kinds of things. 


Jim. 


 DR. MELIUS: I would just point out that we've 


had action lists before and they last about two 


meetings and then they disappear. 


 DR. ZIEMER: They disappear, uh-huh. 


 DR. MELIUS: We never see them again, and it 


continues to be extremely frustrating -- NIOSH 


is not committing adequate resources to doing 


the kind of follow-up that's needed for this 

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program on -- on activities as well as -- as 


sharing information with the petitioners and so 


forth, and I think it's -- continues to hurt 


the credibility of this program with the people 


that are supposed to be served by the program, 


as well as their elected representatives and I 


-- I think I -- I question whether it's even 


worth doing another action list because we 


don't seem to ever follow up on it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, are you speaking against an 


action list? I -- I think you -- 


 DR. MELIUS: I mean I --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- you would like an action list 


that would work, that is -- that -- that we 


follow up on and somebody's responsible for the 


action list. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I've been asking for the 


last three meetings that there be some action 


planned for dealing with Privacy Act reviews 


and I still don't have any -- that and it still 


continues to be a -- a problem. And I'm 


getting pretty cynical about whether this is -- 


I bel-- I will, I'll say it, I believe this is 


intentional on the part of the agency to try 


to, you know, slow down our process and slow 

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down anybody trying to -- that may take -- 


disagree with their actions and their 


decisions. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Robert? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, I thank Lew for what he's 


offered to do, but I have one comment. Would 


it have more teeth in what you plan on doing to 


bounce this to the Secretary and let the 


Secretary then bounce it over to Labor and put 


more teeth in that Labor needs to take a little 


bit better action or take more action and 


faster action. And if there's a problem with 


HHS, then maybe he could put some -- some teeth 


into that, too. But would that -- that take 


some of the -- the problems off of your back 


once you do this and -- and bounce it to the 


Secretary. 


 DR. WADE: Oh, I mean certainly if the 


Secretary was to send such a letter it would 


have much more teeth. I don't think it's going 


to happen and I think the staff work that it 


would take to make happen would be an order of 


magnitude more than what I'm proposing. 


Secretaries aren't necessarily in the business 


of telling each other their -- what to do, and 

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I 

 MR. PRESLEY: I realize that. 


 DR. WADE: -- so you know, if that's the sense 


of the Board, I'd be pleased to pursue that. 


would advise against it, though. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thanks. Other comments? Okay. 

Thank you. 

(Pause) 

We -- some of these items are sort of fixed 


time in terms of folks that are going to join 


us by phone, including Bethlehem Steel and 


Blockson, so let's look ahead a minute, some 


items -- perhaps some housekeeping items that 


we can take care of -- what, schedules? 


 DR. WADE: Well, first to finish that item, is 


it the sense of the Board that I'll send these 


letters? 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, let me --


 MR. PRESLEY: Do we need a motion or --


 DR. ZIEMER: We don't need a motion if it's the 


sense of the Board. Lew has agreed to do it 


and there would -- he would develop an action 


list which presumably would get distributed and 


would advise us -- each meeting we'd have the 

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previous meeting's action list before us, I -- 


I would assume, to make sure that -- that we 


have put on the agenda the items that need 


follow-up and -- and have some method of 


assuring that the actions actually occur, so -- 


I mean once you have the action list, it has to 


be tracked to be effective. Jim's comment that 


having an action list, by itself, doesn't 


assure anything because you have to take action 


on the action list. So -- but and then that's 


 DR. WADE: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- that's a staff support thing, 


but certainly been -- I think it's -- unless 


somebody objects wildly, the sense of the Board 


is that it would make sense to do this, so... 


 DR. WADE: Okay. If that's the case, then my 


second question would be should I put anything 


on the list relative to Chapman Valve for DOL 


and DOE? Or is that issue behind you or do you 


want me to task them, as best I can, with 


coming forward with anything for the next 


meeting? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Jim and then Mark. 


 DR. LOCKEY: I would like to hear from both DOL 

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and DOE at the next meeting regarding this 


question 'cause it may provide an avenue if in 


fact (unintelligible) was occurring in this 


particular building that the petitioners can 


refile a new petition, so that's important 


information for the Board to hear. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mark, you --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I guess --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- you (unintelligible) that? 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I guess Larry -- I'm just 


basically saying the same thing Jim said. I 


think Larry indicated that they do have a more 


formal report and we -- I think we should keep 


it as an action on the list then to -- to see 


or hear from them -- see the report or hear 


from them. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I see others nodding. It seems to 


be the consensus that a follow-up is warranted 


in this case. 


 DR. WADE: And the specific question then is, 


if I could have it framed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I need some help on this. 


-- I think it has to do with is -- in this 


particular case, is the covered facility 


description adequate; that is, should -- should 


I 
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it be expanded. I believe there's a time frame 


issue, also, and maybe workgroup -- what -- 


what are the -- what are the cogent questions 


that either -- well, those who had concerns 


about the petition to start with or workgroup 


members, what are the issues? I -- it's -- the 


time frame is one, right? For the covered 


period? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, the ti-- the covered time 


frame, the covered facility or facilities, and 


I guess did they research -- their -- results 


of their research regarding other activities; 


e.g., enriched uranium activities. 


 DR. LOCKEY: And also cross-employment, was 


there any cross-employment (unintelligible) two 


buildings, if in fact there was manifold work 


there. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, and your -- your desire would 


be to have -- have this reported at the next 


face-to-face Board meeting? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or as soon as possible. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. Yeah, I have no -- I have 


no problem (unintelligible) the report and 


sending it to us so we can read it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: I have no problem with them 


sending the report to -- e-mail and -- and so 


we can read it and if something needs to come 


up, then at that time we can put it back on the 


-- the table at the next face-to-face. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me ask a question. Is this 


strictly a follow-up by Labor? Are there some 


DOE things that come into play here? I don't ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


relies on DOE for some of the (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Larry, can you help us on 


that? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: The AWE designation as to whether 


all the buildings that are included in that 


designation are complete and accurate is a DOE 


responsibility. The time frame for Chapman 


Valve, Building 23, is a DOL issue, DOL 


responsibility to respond on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So we've got both. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We've got both. 


 DR. LOCKEY: Say it's both. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Can I -- can I ask just -- just 


to follow up on Lew's offer, what is this 

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action list? Is this going to go -- cover all 


Board activities, subcommittee activities, 


workgroup ac-- I mean are you going to sort of 


track -- are you going to have staff track 


actions related to, you know, the Board's 


requests to SC&A, NIOSH, et cetera, but also 


internally, or -- or what -- what's -- I guess 


what's the proposal here for -- 


 DR. WADE: Well, I mean my proposal started 


with a -- a letter to DOL and DOE, following 


the meeting, with specific action items the 


Board feels it needs to have completed for its 


-- for it to do its work. So it starts with 


that. 


It's now grown to if you indicate to me you 


would like a particular action captured on a 


list of actions, then I'll do that. I can go 


beyond that, but that's what I've done to this 


point. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wor-- certainly workgroups will 


have their own internal -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- action items, but if the Board 


asks a workgroup to report at the next meeting 


on something or other, then it seems to me that 

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could go on the action list. If you --


 MR. GRIFFON: I was wondering where the cutoff 


was on --


 DR. ZIEMER: No, I -- certainly at this point 


workgroups have to keep track of their own 


business. I don't think we can ask Lew to do 


that at this point. Ji-- or Bob. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Do we have somebody here at this 


point in time from Labor? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We don't, do we? Could that be a 


point of discussion, that we make sure that 


Labor does have a representative -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: They had someone here yesterday 


and I think normally they have covered our 


meetings almost completely. I'm not sure what 


occurred this time. 


 Comment, Larry? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I don't know why they're not here 


other than they have told me that there are 


various -- well, Mr. Turcic is on vacation. 


There's a lot of activity going on at DOL that 


required Jeff Kotsch to be there for that. 
I 


don't know why DOE has no one here other than I 


know that Pat Worthington is locked up in some 

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classified vault down in Los Alamos or NTS or 


somewhere and -- and you know, Libby White has 


moved on and now we have Regina Kano* and she's 


busy doing something other -- somewhere else 


for DOE. They committed to have somebody 


during the agency updates for Dow tomorrow on 


the phone, but the rest of the meeting I was to 


call and, you know, get their input as best I 


could. So that's where I'm left. That's where 


we're all left. 


 MR. KOTSCH: (Unintelligible) Labor. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That sounds like Jeff Kotsch on 


the line. Thank you, Jeff. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, I -- I came on a little 


while ago. Unfortunately I'm in and out as far 


as attendance goes, but I'm at least picking 


up, a little bit belatedly, on the Chapman 


Valve discussion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. And Jeff, do you -- do you 


have any other general comments? You heard the 


discussion on our -- our action list? 


 MR. KOTSCH: I -- yeah, I heard on the action 


list. I -- I missed I guess the earlier 


portion, you know, where the Board was voting. 


I was told by Shelby that we'll try to get a 

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response tomorrow to the Board -- a written 


response, but I don't know if that's too late 


now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, actually one of the follow-up 


things is we're still interested in the other 


issues pertaining to the extension of the time 


periods and -- and the location. Part of 


that's a DOE responsibility and part Labor, so 


 MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, I was instructed to inform 


you that there will be something coming out. 


mean I'm not the principal on that particular 


piece of -- that --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MR. KOTSCH: -- that document, but there will 


be something they're going to try to get you 


tomorrow. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Another 


comment. Josie. 


MS. BEACH: The original evaluation report 


qualified the SEC through 2005, and then 


further down in the report -- and John, you may 


be able to answer that -- it said that to 


expediate (sic) it, they changed the dates to 


'93 and that NIOSH was still looking at those 


I 
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later years. Do we expect to hear something 


from NIOSH on those later years? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Whenever we determine 


feasibility that we can do dose reconstruction, 


we focus our class only on what was proposed by 


the petitioner. So we do not go beyond that. 


So in this case we would not -- we would not do 


any additional feasibility work past the years 


that were identified by the petitioner. 


 Do you understand? 


MS. BEACH: Okay, the original said it was 


through '95, so --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, the actual -- the original 


petition is as described in the class -- I 


believe, if I've got the -- Jim, do you have 


the actual -- let me see it. 


(Pause) 


I see -- okay, I do see -- you are correct, it 


does say up to '95 and -- I'll let Jim 


follow... 


DR. NETON: I think up to -- up to '94 or '95 


were considered the remediation period -- 


MS. BEACH: Correct. 


DR. NETON: -- where a sub-- I forget which 


contractor took over, and we are still pursuing 

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records from Bechtel. We don't have them yet, 


but you know, that's -- that's still marked as 


reserved in the site profile and we will be 


making attempts to make sure we have that. 
I 


can't give you an update as to exactly where we 


are with those records searches right now, 


though. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Yeah, Jim, okay. 


 DR. LOCKEY: This is for you, Lew. In 


relationship to the action items for the 


Board's edification and -- and for us to stay 


up to date with what we proposed in the past or 


what we were looking for in the past, is it 


feasible to have a DOE/Board action item list 


and a Board/DOL action item list that we have 


in our folder for each meeting, with the dates 


and requests and who they went to so we can 


keep track of things we requested and whether 


we've gotten a response or not? 


 DR. WADE: I mean what I would propose to do is 


to, after each meeting, send a communication 


and make that communication then part of the 


record, and those communications would be the 


record. If you'd like me to do more, then tell 


me. 

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 DR. LOCKEY: For me it's easier -- when I come 


to this meeting if I say well, this is what we 


requested last meeting and the meeting before 


we requested this, and then I can make a note 


did we ever hear from anybody about these 


issues. 


 DR. WADE: So if I was to give you all of those 


requests, would that satisfy your needs? 


 DR. LOCKEY: It would, but in another respect, 


by sending copies of those action item lists to 


DOE and DOL, it notifies them that the Board 


will be looking at these lists on an ongoing 


basis and looking for responses. And that 


sometimes can prod responses otherwise you may 


not get. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, I think I understand. So if I 


was to send them a note after this next meeting 


and ask for three things, and those three 


things happened to the Board's satisfaction, 


then that would be finished. If it didn't 


happen to the Board's satisfaction, then I 


would add it to the list that would go out 


after that next meeting. 


 DR. LOCKEY: That's correct. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, that I --

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 DR. ZIEMER: So it would be sort of a 


cumulative list, things could drop off and 


other things could be added, I think is the -- 


 DR. LOCKEY: That's correct and --


 DR. ZIEMER: May have to try some 


configurations to see what that looks like. 


 DR. LOCKEY: And -- and before the next 


meeting, DOE and DOL get that list and -- 


saying we need updates before the next meeting 


'cause it's on the agenda and this is the 


items. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good suggestion. Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: But again, I have no wherewithal to 


make it happen. All I can do is -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Understood. 


 DR. WADE: -- send them. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Understood. Lew, do you want to 


talk about the -- the sched-- future schedules. 


 DR. WADE: Well, the next -- well, we do have a 


schedule out -- I won't remind you of it, 


although I can once I find it. But I would 


like to talk about the location of the next 


meeting. The next face-to-face meeting is 


scheduled for October 3, 4 and 5. There is a 


call on September 4. So the question is where 

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on October 3, 4 and 5. I guess we have -- the 


only material we received -- Laurie, you want 


to come up and tell us? 


 MS. BREYER: I received a request from the 


NUMEC petitioners, which I forwarded on to Dr. 


Ziemer and Dr. Wade, asking that it be in 


Kiskee Valley, Pennsylvania. After speaking to 


the petitioners, they have agreed that 


Pittsburgh is about 25 miles away from that 


area and they would like it to be in Kiskee 


Valley, but that Pittsburgh would be acceptable 


with them as well, so they've requested that 


the meeting be held there because we're hoping 


that the NUMEC petition will be ready to be 


discussed at that time. 


And I believe the Hanford petitioners have also 


asked at one point, several months back, that 


the follow-up meeting possibly be in Richland 


as well. So those are the two requests I've 


had to come through me. 


 DR. WADE: The other -- the other discussion 


I've had is for somewhere in Illinois, 


following up on a number of the sites in 


Illinois. 


 MS. BREYER: I heard that through the 

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grapevine, but not made through me. 


 DR. MELIUS: And I thought there was discussion 


of Nevada Test Site, also. 


 DR. WADE: Correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Just want to throw 


everything --


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- out there. 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 DR. MELIUS: And I al-- understand that there 


was some issues regarding NUMEC regar-- with 


the report or status of the report, refresh -- 


memory. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I reported yesterday in my 


program status report that -- or afterward, 


that NUMEC 180-day mark had come to pass last 


week. We contacted the petitioners and 


informed them that we weren't going to be able 


to deliver the evaluation report in the time 


that we had under the 180-day deadline, and 


that was due to -- primarily that the report is 


-- is -- is being reviewed right now for 


security concerns. And once we have that out, 


then -- then we'll put it in front of 


everybody. We anticipate that'll happen by the 

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next Board meeting. 


I would -- I would advocate for Hanford or 


Nevada Test Site rather than Pennsylvania. 
I 


think you're going to -- you'll see more 


claimants in those two sites and I think the 


outcome of the petitions would be best 


warranted for Board discussion in those venues 


than the NUMEC one -- without divulging the 


outcome of the -- but you can maybe see which 


way we're leaning. 


Other comments? So potential sites are 


Pittsburgh, Nevada -- Las Vegas and Hanford and 


Illinois would again be -- what, western 


suburbs, I suppose, and -- what do we need? Do 


you just need some --


 DR. WADE: I -- there's a strong sense -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- some 'druthers, do you -- some 


'druthers? 


 DR. WADE: Or you could just -- we could leave 


it open. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I ask a question? What issues 


would be ready for the Illinois one for the 


next meeting? I guess -- trying to 


understand... 


 DR. WADE: I don't know what the Board will do, 

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for example, with regard to Blockson, with 


regard to Dow -- there are a number of issues ­

- General Steel Industries -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- that -- that really await this 


discussion this week, but I wanted to put it 


out there, since it is I think a possibility. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, okay. Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: It appears that Nevada is one of 


those places that's reasonably easy access by 


air, and certainly has adequate meeting space 


for anyone who wants to -- to have additional 


side meetings and things of that sort. We 


certainly have a great deal to do with respect 


to that site before the October meeting, and 


I'm sure later in the -- in the meeting we'll 


hear some information with respect to where we 


are with NTS. But there's a great deal to be 


said for that particular site. And of course 


you're always welcome back here, any time you 


want to fly in and out of Pasco. I'm sure 


Josie and I both welcome you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Robert and then Jim. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, I've -- Larry and I've been 


going back and forth, and he says that they can 

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be ready by the next Board meeting for NTS. We 


do have some work to do. Once we get the 


report I do want to give a couple of weeks to 


SC&A and the working group to look at this, but 


we do have time for a face-to-face in 


Cincinnati on this and hopefully be ready for 


our recommendation by October the 3rd or the 


4th. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Larry? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We're on pace to deliver that 


evaluation on NTS in August --


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- late August I think, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- that would give adequate time, 


I hope. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I would -- I would say that we 


can be ready to do our thing, hopefully, in NT­

- on NTS in Vegas in October. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Jim? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I guess this is sort of a 


question you -- we also have the 250-day issue, 


and I guess my question to Arjun and to Jim 


Neton is do you think -- I mean we -- it 


certainly is going to require at least one 

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meeting of the workgroup, but do you think the 


timing would be such that we'd be ready for an 


Octo-- early October meeting? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I can have a response to what 


Jim has put up on the O drive in mid-August, 


and so we'll be able to meet on that. 


I just wanted to make a clarification about 


what Mr. Presley was saying, and I think what 


Larry just said. Larry was talking about the 


evaluation report for the SEC petition from '63 


onward, and I believe Mr. Presley was talking 


about the revised site profile. And Mr. 


Presley and I talked yesterday, and of course 


we do get that we'll have some comments -- at 


least in a preliminary nature -- on the revised 


site profile, but I don't -- the Board hasn't 


charged us to do anything on the SEC from '63 


onward. I just wanted to clarify, since there 


were two different things being talked about. 


 MR. PRESLEY: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


talking about site profile (unintelligible). 


 DR. WADE: We don't have to decide it now. It 


would be -- be well, I think, for you if we 


decided it tomorrow, you know, at the end of 


the meeting. But I thought it'd be worth 

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hearing inputs and letting you comment. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, it may be that we can make a 


final decision. You've heard some preliminary 


ideas and maybe come to closure tomorrow after 


we see where we are and --


 DR. WADE: You seem to be leaning towards 


Nevada, but we'll hear a number of Illinois 


issues and if that sways the Board, that's 


fine. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, so we'll delay a final 


decision on that till tomorrow afternoon then. 


Very good. 


Do we have any other brief housekeeping things 


we need to address? It's almost lunch hour 


now. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we have -- we do have 


Bethlehem on our agenda. Right? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, but we only have -- 


 DR. WADE: We could --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we only have five minutes -- 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, that's -- that's -- it's not 


worth it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- till the break time, so -- 


 DR. WADE: I think lunch is good. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, we'll go ahead and recess, 

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take our lunch break. We are scheduled to be 


back here at 12:30, so it's kind of an early 


lunch hour, but 12:30, Bethlehem Steel SEC is 


on the agenda. Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 11:25 a.m. 


to 12:40 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're ready to resume our 


deliberations. Let me check and see if Dr. 


Roessler is on the line again. 


DR. ROESSLER: I'm on the line. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Gen. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, I can hear you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And others can hear, as well? 


DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, Paul, I'm on the line, but 


your voice is very -- very hard to hear. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I -- let's -- let's check 


the sound level. How is this, any better? 


DR. ROESSLER: Well, I can hear you, but I -- I 


think, again, it's probably people on the line 


who are not able to mute their phones. 


 MR. BROEHM: I also -- this is Jason Broehm. 


have a message from Dan Utech in Senator 


Clinton's office; they can't hear. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We'll see if the sound 


person can help us here. 


I 
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 DR. WADE: And while they're doing that, I'd 


ask everyone out there if at all possible, if 


you can mute the instrument you're dealing 


with, mute it. Don't be on a speaker phone. 


When you speak to us, speak on a handset. Be 


mindful of background noises and try and put 


yourself in a situation where they're not 


there. 


It's important that we be able to conduct our 


business by phone sometimes, and it takes 


discipline on all of our parts. So I'd ask 


each one of you to consider your own situation 


and do what you can to improve it for others 


that are on this call. Start by muting, if at 


all possible. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


DR. ROESSLER: Lew, this is Gen. I think 


you're giving your usual recommendation to the 


people on the phone line, but I could barely 


hear you so I don't think they could, either. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, let me -- let me try again. 


If you're on the telephone, mute your phone. 


Please mute your phone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're getting a lot of echo and 


feedback here, but -- Gen, can you hear any 

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better? 


DR. ROESSLER: I can hear -- I can get by. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And the folks at the Senator's 


office, any better? 


UNIDENTIFIED: I really can't hear you and my 


phone is a government phone; I can't mute it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, that's the problem, it's a 


government phone. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I know, blame them for 


everything. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, we're trying to 


correct that here. We had that problem 


yesterday. We thought we had it corrected this 


morning. The sound man is working feverishly 


to try to correct it. 


I think we'll try to proceed and we'll try to 


talk loud, although we're getting a lot of 


feedback here, echo, but -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: You know what, I'm going to hang 


up and try to call back from another line that 


I can --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, good, let's do that. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. Thanks. 


 DR. WADE: Anybody else out there have any 


particular issues they want to raise in terms 

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of sound quality? Can you hear me better now, 


Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: Not much better. In fact, your 


voice is kind low. I don't hear the background 


noise, but your voice is low. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, we're going to try to 


proceed here. We'll do --


 DR. WADE: What would --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we'll do the best we can. 


 DR. WADE: What would you like us to do on 


that? We --


DR. ROESSLER: I'm going to call in on another 


line and see if that helps. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) signal. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Try -- try not to -- 


 DR. WADE: Don't touch the mike and speak 


normally. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Maybe -- maybe with us 


yelling, it makes it worse. 


 DR. WADE: Grabbing hold of the microphone. 


BETHLEHEM STEEL SEC


 DR. ZIEMER: Speak slowly, right? Okay, the 


next item on our agenda is the Bethlehem Steel 


SEC. Just to remind you of what has progressed 

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before, we had the SEC at our May meeting. It 


was presented -- or the report from NIOSH was 


presented. And then a question was raised on 


the use of surrogate data. And because we had 


a desire to learn from NIOSH counsel about the 


agency's interpretation of the use of surrogate 


data, we held off on any motions or actions on 


Bethlehem Steel, in a sense just deferred to 


today. So we don't actually have a motion 


before us. We do have the SEC petition for 


which we will need some sort of action. 


We might take a moment and ask NIOSH if they 


have any general comments on their evaluation 


report, and then an opportunity for the 


petitioners -- am I still on? It seemed to 


sound a little changed -- an opportunity for 


the petitioners to comment. 


I did want to check and see if Ed Walker is on 


the line. Do we know if Ed -- representing the 


petitioners? 


He was going to be on the line. 


 DR. WADE: Yes, he was. Maybe he can't hear 


us. Laurie, are you in the room? I can't make 


eye contact. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We may have to check independently 

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to see if Ed is either on the line or going to 


join us. 


MR. UTECH: This is -- this is Dan Utech with 


Senator Clinton's office. Ed was on --


 MR. WALKER: Yeah --


MR. UTECH: -- a few minutes ago. 


 MR. WALKER: -- I'm on now, Dan. 


MR. UTECH: Oh, okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, very good. Okay, we're 


going to hear briefly from Jim Neton from 


NIOSH, and then we'll have an opportunity for 


Ed and for representatives from the Senator's 


office to address the assembly, as well. Jim? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, just very briefly I'll set 


the stage. I don't have a lot to add. The 


Bethlehem Steel evaluation report was presented 


to the Advisory Board at the May, 2007 meeting 


in Denver. I think that was actually 


Westminster, Colorado, which was the first 


Denver meeting -- not the second one that we 


had the follow-up for the Rocky site profile. 


It was presented by Sam Glover. I think Sam 


had a fairly extensive, 50-something-slide 


presentation that spoke about the rolling 


operations that occurred in Bethlehem Steel 

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between 1949 and 1952. He provided a fairly 


detailed report on how we prepared those dose 


reconstructions, how we did them and how we 


interacted a fair amount with the Advisory 


Board and SC&A on -- on going through and 


documenting what we had done for those dose 


reconstructions and reviewing the scientific 


validity and accuracy of them. 


With all that said, we -- our conclusion was 


that we could do dose reconstructions with 


sufficient accuracy for Bethlehem Steel and 


that we recommend that the petition be denied. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Jim. Now let's 


hear from Ed Walker --


MR. RAMSPOTT: This is John Ramspott, I... 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry? 


UNIDENTIFIED: ... at the -- at the meeting. 


will tell Lew that they're having trouble with 


the phone. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, thanks. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Ed Walker, can you hear us? 


 (No responses) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Who was that from the Senator's 


office? 


I 
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 DR. WADE: Dan Utech, I think. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dan Utech, are you there? 


 MR. UTECH: ... hear you. I don't know if Ed 


can. I -- Dr. Ziemer, I can hear you. 
I 


couldn't hear Jim Neton at all. 


 MR. WALKER: Yeah, I --


MR. UTECH: And I don't know whether -- 


 MR. WALKER: -- I can --


MR. UTECH: -- I think Ed can hear me and I 


don't know if he can hear you or -- or what the 


situation is. 


 MR. WALKER: No, I can only hear you, Dan. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's -- Dan, if you would 


ask Ed to -- ask Ed to go ahead and make his 


presentation, if you would. 


MR. UTECH: Can you all hear Ed? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. We're -- at least -- 


MR. UTECH: Ed, they can hear you, if you want 


to present. I mean I guess... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, now we're not hearing 


anyone. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) change lines again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to -- we're going to 


change lines again. 

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 (Pause) 


 Now we're apparently back on. Ed or Dan, can 


you hear us? 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: I can hear you. This is Sarah 


from Senator Schumer's office. Can you hear 


me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, very well. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Hmm. 


 MR. WALKER: Yes, I can hear you, too, Sarah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: But Mr. Walker, can you hear 


the people in Washington? 


 MR. WALKER: In Washing-- no. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: The Board? 


 MR. WALKER: No. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: No, you --


 MR. WALKER: Now -- now that -- just -- I can't 


make out a thing. I can just hear mumbling 


like. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Yeah. 


DR. ROESSLER: Ed's not the only one. This is 


Gen Roessler. I -- I hear a very faint signal 


from the Board. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Yeah. 


DR. ROESSLER: I sent a message through -- 

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hope-- hopefully somebody there knows we have a 


problem. 


 DR. WADE: We know you have a problem and we're 


working on it. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: I'll relay that. They know we 


have a problem and they're working on it. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 MR. WALKER: Oh, I see, okay. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: I can't hear you very well. 


can just make out the barest... 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're able to hear you quite well 


at this end, so I'm not quite sure -- well, I 


guess -- I guess --


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Hmm. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- none of us is sure what the 


problem is, but they're -- 


DR. ROESSLER: We're probably shouting at you, 


thinking the connection is bad. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Hmm. 


 DR. WADE: Give us a moment. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Okay. He said give us a 


moment. 


(Pause) 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're still working on it, hang -- 


stand by. 


I 
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 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Okay. 


(Pause) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we'll do a sound check 


again. 


DR. ROESSLER: Much better. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Gen --

 MR. WALKER: Ah, much better. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- much better? 

DR. ROESSLER: Much better. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, some-- something worked, 


then. 


 DR. WADE: Eddie -- Ed Walker, can you hear us? 


 MR. WALKER: I -- I hear -- I hear my name. 


That's all I could make out. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We were just asking if you 


could hear us, Ed. 


 MR. WALKER: It's coming in a little better 


than what it did, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Ed, do you want to go ahead 


and make your presentation? We can hear you 


pretty well. 


 MR. WALKER: Okay, I'll -- kind of awkward to 

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do, but -- I kind of -- hear what you had to 


say first, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, let me just tell you that 


Jim Neton made about a one-minute summary of 


the evaluation report because it had already 


been presented to us at our previous meeting, 


so he just pointed out that -- reminded us that 


that had been heard, and that's where we are. 


 MR. WALKER: Uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: You're under no obligation, Ed, to 


make comments. You can wait until you hear 


discussion and then comment as you would like. 


We just wanted to afford you the opportunity. 


 MR. WALKER: If that's Jim talking, I can't 


hear him. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, that was Lew Wade -- 


 MR. WALKER: Oh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- asking if you wanted to make 


comments or if you would rather wait until -- 


 MR. WALKER: I --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- the discussion. 


 MR. WALKER: I would ra-- I would rather wait 


until -- I -- I would rather wait to -- now I'm 


getting an echo. I hear myself --

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. WALKER: -- so I -- I'll try and wait, and 


hopefully the connection will -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we'll -- we'll hold off on 


your comments. 


 MR. WALKER: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have comments from Senator 


Schumer's office? 


 DR. WADE: Clinton or... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or Clinton's office? 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Was that question directed to 


me? 


 DR. WADE: No, I think we have a letter going 


to be read into the record. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Jason is going to read into 


the record a letter from the Senator's office. 


 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Excellent. 


 MR. BROEHM: Yes. Can you hear me on this 


mike? All right. I think that's Sarah 


Birmingham on the phone from Senator Schumer's 


office. She shared this testimony from Senator 


Charles Schumer to the Advisory Board, so I'll 


read that into the record. 

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95 

(Reading) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing 


me the opportunity to submit testimony to the 


Board on the subject of the petition to have a 


class added to the Special Exposure Cohort for 


the former workers of the Bethlehem Steel mill 


in Lackawanna, New York. 


As you know, hundreds of men and women worked 


at the Bethlehem Steel plant during the 1940s 


and '50s. Their contributions were crucial to 


the United States' development of the 


overwhelming nuclear force that deterred 


Communist aggression and ultimate brought the 


Soviet Union to its knees. 


The superiority of the American arsenal they 


helped to create was so absolute that it 


prevented an escalation of the Cold War into a 


hot war. The sacrifice that these workers made 


was integral to our nation's and allies' 


continued safety and prosperity, and they 


deserve our deepest gratitude for having 


protected us. 


In light of the work that these men and women 


did to protect America from her enemies, they 


should be honored as veterans of one of our 


nation's longest and ugliest wars. These Cold 

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War veterans deserve to have their government 


make reparations to them for the harms caused 


them by their service. Everyone who is sick 


with one of the 22 covered cancers should be 


fully compensated, and so I urge you to add 


this class to the SEC as quickly as possible. 


 When Congress created the Energy Employees 


Occupation Illness Compensation Program Act in 


2000, it provided two paths to compensation 


under Part B, dose reconstruction and the SEC. 


The existence of the SEC is an acknowledgement 


of the potential weaknesses of dose 


reconstruction. While dose reconstruction is 


widely recognized as a very useful and often 


very accurate tool for determining causation, 


it is only a practical tool in those cases 


where there is sufficient background evidence 


to make accurate calculations. Even the best 


formula are rendered useless by a lack of good 


data. 


 The National Institute for Occupational Safety 


and Health recently reinforced this when it 


added the Rocky Flats class because of 


insufficient data on the levels of neutron 


exposure experienced by employees. The 

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situation at Bethlehem Steel is not dissimilar. 


If NIOSH was willing to recognize the lack of 


data available in the Rocky Flats case, surely 


the same consideration can be given to those 


workers from Bethlehem Steel. As with Rocky 


Flats, in the case of Bethlehem Steel there are 


no good data available to make these 


calculations. 


As a result, NIOSH and Sanford & Cohen (sic) 


have been using data to use these dose 


reconstructions from the Simonds Saw and Steel 


Corporation, another factory in New York. 


Unfortunately, employees from Bethlehem have 


consistently pointed to vast discrepancies 


between the conditions under which they worked 


at Bethlehem and the conditions at Simonds. 


The Simonds plant is simply not similar enough 


to Bethlehem Steel to provide a meaningful 


comparison. 


As I stated in my letter to Dr. Ziemer of June 


21 of this year, I do not believe it is fair to 


use proxy data to perform dose reconstructions. 


EEOICPA requires that all probabilities of 


causation be made in, quote, claimant-friendly, 


unquote, paradigm, and it is impossible to 

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apply that principle when using proxy data. To 


be claimant friendly, the calculations must 


give claimants the benefit of any doubt on 


every possible criterion. 


For example, if NIOSH does not know where an 


air filter was located in a facility, they must 


assume that every applicant was working at the 


point in the facility farthest from the filter, 


thereby increasing their exposure to airborne 


particles. But when using proxy data there are 


too many unknown variables to determine whether 


or not an assumption is claimant friendly. 


Surely it would be claimant friendly to assume 


that an air filter is farthest away from the 


employee than it really was -- farther away 


from the employee than it really was. But in 


the case of Bethlehem Steel, NIOSH is assuming 


that the concentration of radioactive particles 


in the air was the same in both Simonds and the 


Lackawanna site. There is no way to know 


whether the assumption is claimant friendly or 


not, and so the use of proxy data cannot meet 


the legal req-- legal requirement under EEOICPA 


that the dose reconstructions are claimant 


friendly. For this reason I urge you to 

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declare Bethlehem Steel a class of the SEC. 


One of the greatest tragedies of this 


controversy is that many of the victims of this 


Cold War battle are not only sick but also 


aging. Many of them are in their mid-eighties. 


In such a case it is crucial not only that 


NIOSH add this class, but that it be added as 


quickly as possible. These men and women need 


their government's assistance, and they and 


their families need to be assured that their 


country acknowledges their enormous sacrifices 


and is deeply grateful to them. 


It is because of this that I, along with 


Senator Clinton, introduced S-776 on March 6th 


of this year. This bill, and its companion 


legislation in the House, would amend EEOICPA 


to include the former employees of Bethlehem 


Steel in the SEC. These veterans have 


sacrificed for America and they are owed the 


thanks of a grateful nation. 


Please, I encourage you to grant their SEC 


petition as quickly as possible. 


Thank you for allowing me to share these 


thoughts with you. I eagerly await the outcome 


of this week's meeting. 

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100

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. And the 


letter of June 21st that was referred to in 


this letter is the one that I distributed to 


the Board members a couple of weeks ago, so you 


should have that in your files, as well. 


Do we have an additional -- Dan, are you on the 


line? 


MR. UTECH: I am. I'm -- I'm --


 DR. ZIEMER: Was there --


MR. UTECH: -- (unintelligible) off for the 


moment, thanks. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Hold off for the moment, 


okay. 


Then this -- this petition then is open for 


discussion, Board members. Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I guess I'll try to take up 


where I left off a few meetings ago. 


 MR. WALKER: I still -- is anybody else -- can 

anybody... 

 DR. MELIUS: This is -- I'll get closer to the 

mike now. Can you hear me, Ed? 


 (No responses) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Apparently not. 


 MR. WALKER: I'm -- I'm getting feedback on -- 


everything I say, I -- I get a feedback on. 

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101

 DR. ZIEMER: May-- maybe -- maybe someone that 


Ed can hear could suggest that he try calling 


in again on -- get another line. It might --


it helped some of the others, apparently. 


 MR. ROLFES: Ed, Mark Rolfes with NIOSH. If 


you could please hang up and try to dial back 


in --

 MR. WALKER: Okay. 

 MR. ROLFES: -- that might -- that might help. 

Thank you. 

 MR. WALKER: Okay. 

(Pause) 

 DR. WADE: Gen, can you hear us? 


DR. ROESSLER: I can hear you -- try -- try -- 


no, I hear an echo, too. I hear my voice in 


the background. I don't think it was just Ed's 


connection. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we'll try and rebuild this one 


brick at a time. How about now, Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: Just barely, and I still hear my 


echo. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Stand by, we're still working 


again on the line, so the silence in this case 


is because it's silent. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. Now I don't hear the 

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echo. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Maybe you should proceed, 

Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

 DR. WADE: Ed, are you back on, just as a 


courtesy? Ed Walker? 


 (No responses) 


Eddie, are you back on? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, I -- we'll proceed. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Well -- well, my concern 


continues to be the problem with the use of 


data from other sites. And the fact that we 


have never developed criteria for that that 


evaluates when is that appropriate, when is 


that not appropriate and how will we reach, you 


know -- determine that, in this case I feel 


that in Bethlehem we've gone to an extreme 


where for certain time periods we're almost 


entirely reliant on data from another site, 


this -- Simonds Saw, and that that has some -- 


I have serious questions about the validity and 


appropriateness of doing that. I think that 


there may be other situations where it -- in 


other types of circumstance where it may be 

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103 

appropriate. I believe in Chapman Valve, for 


example, that it was used as -- as sort of a 


comparison, a -- a check on the data there by 


comparing some similar data from another site, 


but the primary data for dose reconstruction 


was -- was from the Cha-- was the actual 


monitoring data from Chapman Valve. And 


Bethlehem, as I said, for -- at least for part 


of the time period we're almost entirely 


reliant on da-- data from another source. It 


certainly has issues in terms of credibility 


with the people involved and it also I think, 


from the point of view of how we -- how we 


approach these, that does not, you know, I 


think appear to be an appropriate approach for 


all circumstances and I think it's -- behooves 


the Board to take a look at this issue and make 


a determination on -- on when can such data be 


used, when -- when is it appropriate, what are 


-- when is it not appropriate, that... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Other comments? 


While you're thinking of your comment, let me 


insert one myself here. I know that early on ­

- this is -- this is a site we looked at quite 


a while back, in -- in some depth, also with 

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the help of our contractor, and -- and 


struggled with the very questions I think that 


you've asked there, Jim, both to applicability 


and appropriateness. And the ultimate question 


was could -- was this a way to fairly bound the 


doses. And we -- we asked our contractor to 


help us with that question as well. And I 


thought that we had arrived at a conclusion at 


that time that, although there was a fair 


amount of use of the Simonds Saw's data, that 


in fact it was -- it did fairly bound the doses 


for Bethlehem Steel because of both the 


comparison of parameters as well as those 


intercomparison of where we did have some 


datapoints for Bethlehem as well to cross-


validate. And of course that remains the 


question, did we fairly bound the doses. But I 


just remind you that as we reviewed the site 


profile and went through that process, that was 


indeed what we were asking. Now we may have 


second thoughts on that, but at least I 


certainly felt at the time that -- that 


although the Simonds Saw data was -- played a 


big role, that it was not an unfair use of that 


data in terms of finding that sort of upper 

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boundary or bounding the doses in the manner 


that is required to assess the -- the dose 


reconstructions. 


 DR. WADE: Well, Pa-- I'd like to add just -- 


and maybe it's nuance, but I think it's worth 


informing the discussion. The early work that 


the Board did relative to Bethlehem Steel had 


to do with the review of the site profile -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. WADE: -- which is a document to support 


dose reconstruction. Now the Board is looking 


at a question under a slightly different lens, 


and that is SEC. It could be that they -- they 


coincide in your mind and that's fine. I would 


just point out that the previous workgroup 


looked at site profile issues. Now you're 


considering an SEC petition. Whether or not 


they're the same issue, that's for you to 


decide. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I elaborate on that -- 


 DR. WADE: Sure. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- a little bit. We may have to 


hire a Board historian or something, we've gone 


through so many meetings, but I also re-- I 


think we can re-- if I recall correctly, the 

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discussion on -- initial discussion on 


Bethlehem Steel was be-- prior to us having 


Special Exposure Cohort regulations. That --


that part of the Act had not been implemented 


yet, and so we were operating without the 


consideration for how -- how those would and -- 


and I recall -- maybe this is -- you know, 


maybe not be totally correct, I don't -- it was 


a long time ago, but that we -- we raised 


issues and members of the public raised issues 


about the use of -- of being so reliant on data 


from another source for this particular site 


and that we've, you know, agreed at the time 


that it was an issue we needed to examine. 


Like many issues that we wanted to examine or 


expressed desire to examine, we've 


procrastinated on doing that, largely 'cause 


we've had so much else to do. But particularly 


on -- on a lot of the proce-- sort of the 


procedural issues, there are now another number 


of I bel-- TIBs that also instruct dose 


reconstructors on the utilization of data from 


other sources. It's -- it's actually come up I 


believe in some of the other SECs that we've 


done, though. I don't recall any SEC that 

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we've turned down on the ba-- where the -- 


there's such a heavy reliance on data from 


other sources, and I recall one where we 


actually -- the issue I believe was radon with 


Ames, one of the Iowa sources, where we 


actually -- Iowa sites where we actually turned 


down that particular -- I -- was it -- I 


believe radon or something that they were using 


data from a different site to try to 


reconstruct the radon? Is -- is that wrong, 


Mark? I --


 MR. GRIFFON: (Off microphone) I -- I -- I 


don't -- I don't remember (unintelligible). 


 DR. WADE: No, not radon. 


 DR. MELIUS: I know there's something. Anyway, 


that -- that where we -- I don't know if we 


formally rejected, we certainly ended up giving 


the SEC there, so I -- I just think it would -- 


again, it -- we'd be better given the fact that 


this was considered at such an early time prior 


to the existence of the SEC regulations, and -- 


and that since the start that the Board has not 


evaluated this issue in any sort of systemic -- 


systematic way that -- that it would behoove us 


to do that before acting on the Bethlehem 

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Steel. 


 DR. WADE: Right. I'll speak as the Board 


historian of recent vintage, and we did talk 


about the Bethlehem Steel site profile after 


the SEC rules were in place, but I don't say 


that to take away the strength of your point. 


What I would like to do is read from the 


Board's charter as to what the Board is 


supposed to do, and there is some difference 


here. Under the functions of the Board, it 


says the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 


Health shall (a) advise the Secretary HHS on 


the development and guidelines under Section 


(2)(b)(i) of Executive Order 13179B, advise the 


Secretary HHS -- okay, that's -- you've done 


that. That's the development of the -- the 


rules. 


Then it says (b) advise the Secretary HHS on 


the scientific validity and quality of dose 


reconstruction efforts performed under this 


program. 


And I pause, that's when you look at dose 


reconstruction reviews and site profile reviews 


which support dose reconstruction reviews. 


And then (c) upon the request of the Secretary 

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HHS, advise the Secretary on whether there is a 


class of employees at any DOE facility who were 


exposed to radiation but for whom it is not 


feasible to estimate their radiation dose. 


And then it goes on. So there is a difference 


between your task relative to dose 


reconstructions, which is scientific validity 


and quality, and then with regard to SECs which 


asks you to comment on whether or not it is 


feasible to estimate the radiation dose. Now 


whether you find distinction there or not, I 


leave to you. But those are two of the things 


you're asked to do. 


Much of the Bethlehem Steel work that was done 


was done under the dose reconstruction mantle. 


Now you're considering something under the SEC 


mantle. 

 DR. MELIUS: And ag-- again --

 DR. ZIEMER: Go ahead. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- to remind -- I think before you 

were part of our efforts, Lew -- I mean one of 


the problems with -- well, comment two things. 


One of the problems that the Board noted in our 


comments on the original SEC regs, the ones 


that are currently in place, was the fact that 

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the lack of a conne-- a tight connection 


between -- of going from dose reconstruction to 


do-- tho-- essentially it's the absence of a -- 


of a good definition of sufficient accuracy or 


criteria for sufficient accuracy, and that's 


what's made a lot of our work very difficult 


over the years in considering various Special 


Exposure Cohorts. 


Secondly, I would also note that on the dose 


reconstruction issue we approved a set of very 


sketchy regulations. We did those in order 


that there be a -- at least some framework for 


NIOSH to develop -- to go ahead and do dose 


reconstructions in the early days of the 


program. We actually reserved and actually 


included in those regulations and the 


prerogative that we would need to go back and 


look at the implementation of certain sections, 


particularly when there were new -- and I 


probably use the wrong legal term here, but 


essentially sig-- you know, new procedures or 


significant changes in procedures that -- that 


were developed as -- as part of the 


implementation of that. We've struggled a 


little bit -- we've done that very few times. 

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I think we've only done that once or mayb-- at 


the most, twice. And I -- I certainly think 


that this type of issue, the use of data from 


other sources -- from other sites, is the type 


of issue that we need to -- to -- and should 


take a -- a look at systematically. And I 


would think that we need to do it both from the 


perspective of individual dose reconstructions 


as well as how it comes up in Special Exposure 


Cohorts -- evaluations 'cause I think they are 


interconnected. I mean it's one or the other. 


I mean it's -- it -- it -- do that. And -- and 


I think it's -- it's hard to separate, but I -- 


I -- I think it is important that -- that we do 


that, much as we're, you know, reviewing other 


procedures and so forth overall. But if we --


taking a bigger look at this I think would be ­

- would be helpful. 


 DR. ZIEMER: If I can further annotate what 


you've said, Jim, you seem to be arguing for a 


systematic look at how one uses data from other 


sites, not specifically only the Bethlehem site 


but generically --


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- how one might do this. And I 

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think a good argument can be made for doing 


that very thing, to examine the conditions and 


parameters under which data from one site can 


be said to be applicable to another site. 


 On the Bethlehem Steel case, one could argue -- 


I'm not going to claim that this argument is 


necessarily fully convincing, but one could 


argue that, based on existing results of dose 


reconstructions there, that is an outcome 


argument, looking at Bethlehem Steel compared 


to other sites and asking the question do -- do 


the outcomes look greatly different. 


For example, I guess I -- I'm -- would argue 


that if the success of claims were 


substantially lower than other sites, one might 


have a prima facie evidence that something is 


wrong. We -- we know in fact that in the 


Bethlehem case the success rate of claimants is 


quite high. It may -- I'm not certain, it may 


be higher than any of the other sites. 


 Now that doesn't necessarily prove, but one 


could argue that it at least indicates that 


there was a kind of success in bounding because 


of the -- simply the success rates of the 


claimants. Now I'd -- I'm -- I understand that 

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that --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- the argument I just made is not 


necessarily one that is, by itself -- it 


doesn't stand fully convincing, but it is a 


type of argument one could make to say that at 


least we're not way off in the wrong direction. 


But at the same time, the suggestion of 


examining the -- the issue generically, I 


certainly agree that that's useful and one 


could argue that if you're going to do that, 


one might want to hold off on the Bethlehem 


till it's done. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I -- yeah, if -- if I could 


just respond. I -- I think we've -- to some 


extent may have been comforted in our decision 


by the fact of what the success rate has been 


on individual dose reconstructions there, given 


the original site profile, as well as the 


subsequent changes to that -- that site 


profile. I just worry about that then becoming 


-- I guess two-fold, two issues. One is --


well, you -- you never know. I mean I think, 


as you recognize, you never know what -- what 


really should have happened there 'cause you 

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can have a site that has more exposure versus 


less and so forth and -- with that. But 


probably more importantly is that we -- we set 


a precedent for how -- what would happen at 


other sites, and then in some -- essence we're 


giving directions to NIOSH on how they should 


approach other sites, and that's as much my 


concern with this as you -- maybe it's not just 


the issue of Bethlehem, but it's how are we 


going to generally approach Special Exposure 


Cohorts --

 DR. ZIEMER: Exactly, it's a --

 DR. MELIUS: -- and with a lot --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- generic issue that's important. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, and with a lot of these 

older sites that are -- come up or will come 


up, I mean that -- they -- I think the choice 


may very well come down to do you utilize data 


from another site as -- as part of the process 


for dose reconstruction or do you not. And you 


know -- and -- and that'll make certainly 


significant impact on how those sites -- sites 


are handled. So again, I think the argument 


would be that we -- if we could take a -- you 


know, again, a -- back up, take a broad look at 

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this and -- and think about where it's 


appropriate, where it may not be, and -- in 


these circumstances. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, other comments? We don't 


have a particular motion on the floor. We have 


the report that we're responding to, the 


evaluation report, and at some point we -- we 


do need some sort of a motion to move us 


forward, but --


MS. BEACH: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- it's open discussion on the 


report. Josie and then -- then Jim. 


MS. BEACH: Just a quick question. Didn't we 


say that SC&A looked at this for us, this 


issue? Did we get a report from them? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, not -- we have a -- we have a 


report on the site profile. 


MS. BEACH: Site profile. 


DR. MAURO: Correct, we were never formally 


requested to review the evaluation report, so 


when the evaluation report did come out we just 


read it to see the degree to which -- and this 


was not directed to us by the Board, just my 


own desire to see how things have changed, so 


but -- but no -- the answer is no, we were not 

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asked to formally review it and address all of 


the issues. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim Lockey? 


 DR. LOCKEY: Josie asked one of my questions, 


but maybe I can follow up on -- with SC&A. 


Have you -- have you done any review for the 


panel where you've looked at something similar 


to Bethlehem Steel where -- where other 


facilities were used as surrogate for exposure? 


DR. MAURO: I would say I've been very close to 


reviewing many of the exposure matrices for AWE 


facilities in general, and many cases. And I 


could say that whenever I look at -- whether 


it's an exposure matrix or a case -- I always 


look at data from other AWE facilities that had 


similar or related activities to reinforce to 


and con-- help me convince myself that the data 


that I'm looking at for a given facility does 


in fact ring true. So I for one, in terms of 


doing my job in reviewing either a case or an 


exposure matrix for an AWE facility, find it 


extremely valuable and essential -- not 


valuable, but essential that I look at the 


bigger picture of the experience at a broad 


range of AWE facilities when I'm looking at a 

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particular one. 


 DR. LOCKEY: In follow-up to that question 


then, you've done that and you've done a number 


of those reviews, and what's your general 


feeling about the comparisons? 


DR. MAURO: Whenever I make these comparisons 


and I see a disjunction -- that is, something 


doesn't ring true -- that becomes a finding. 


Other words, if I see -- and whether it's a 


case or it's -- for example, Chapman Valve will 


be the perfect example. Whether it's a case or 


it's a -- an AWE site profile and I see 


something that does not ring true with the vast 


amount of data -- there's quite a bit of data 


on many, many -- but the -- it's piecemeal. 


Some places there was more and some places 


there's -- was less regarding -- whether it's 


air sampling, breathing zone sampling or 


bioassay sampling, and the different types of 


activities, different types of controls, a lot 


was written on the subject. And when I see 


things don't ring true, very often what I would 


do is make that a finding and say I -- I notice 


a disparity and this is something I believe is 


important that we discuss. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Let me point out, however, that 


this is not quite the same question. You --


you're looking at similarities in a certain 


sense, whereas here we're looking at using data 


from one site to clarif-- to characterize 


another site. It's not quite the same 


question. I mean you -- you are operating 


under an assumption that there's a kind of -- 


there is a kind of similarity. I mean after 


all, you have a number of facilities doing 


similar things. If the outcome in one is very 


different, why does that occur. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But -- and it raises a flag, but 


it is not quite the same question. Just keep 


that in mind. 


Another comment, Jim. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I was actually just -- I 


think -- reinforced the point I was going to 


make, so -- yeah. Yeah, I -- I -- I think it's 


-- it's -- it's not a question we -- I don't 


think anyone was proposing to ignore, you know, 


data from other facilities. The question is 


how is it utilized for dose reconstructions and 


how is it utilized in -- in the context of 

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Special Exposure Cohorts and -- and... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Further comments? 

 MR. WALKER: Dan? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes -- Ed, are --

 MR. WALKER: Can anybody hear me? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, who is it? 

 MR. WALKER: Eddie -- Eddie Walker. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Ed, go ahead. 

 MR. WALKER: I've only heard I would say maybe 

15 percent of the conversation, but you're -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: I hope you heard the good 15 


percent. 


 MR. WALKER: Probably the bad. But I think you 


were talking about comparing facilities and -- 


with similarities, of course -- with Bethlehem 


Steel, and I just -- what I do here, you know, 


I like to get in what I can. Bethlehem Steel 


was a state-of-the-art facility in its time. 


There was no other facility that came close to 


having -- to doing that procedure in the -- in 


the world, as a matter of fact. So there is no 


similarities. When you talk about size of the 


plant, I had a little of that in my 


presentation that I was working on, the size of 


it, and what went on at Simonds Saw, and 

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compared the procedures that they were using -- 


isn't anywheres near close. They had two 


rollers compared to six. They were hand-


operated as far as putting in and taking out. 


Bethlehem was continuous, running at a much 


higher speed. There's a -- there's a lot of 


discrepancies on the similarity between the 


two. They only had basically two machines 


running and that in an area of about 100 feet 


by 100 feet. Bethlehem Steel, just the 10-inch 


bar mill alone was 1,000 feet long and 100 feet 


wide, ten times the size of Simonds Saw, so -- 


and the cooling bed, again, was almost that -- 


almost that in -- in size that we had that -- 


Simonds Saw didn't even have a cooling bed. 


They had a quench -- a water quencher, which 


is, for better -- lack of words, a bathtub 


where the put the thing in -- hot uranium in 


and cooled it with water, where Bethlehem Steel 


air -- air -- done air cooling. That was, 


again, 450 feet, 70 feet across, with all these 


rods, covered the whole thing six inches apart 


the full length of that while they air-cooled 


and the people were walking by it. 


So I can't see where there was any similar 

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procedures done at Bethlehem Steel than there 


was at -- at Simonds Saw. The other ones I 


can't attest for, but being a state-of-the-art 


facility, I don't believe you can compare it 


with any facility in the world. Not only in 


the United States, in the world. So I'll get 


off for a minute and if I hear anything that 


maybe I can interject, I'll try and put in -- 


if it's okay with you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, okay. Thank you, Ed. 


Thanks. 


Other comments? Jim. 


 DR. LOCKEY: I wanted to ask NIOSH, when I 


reviewed the -- the report, my impression was 


from Simonds Saw and Steel that the data used 


for dose reconstruction at Bethlehem was the 


1948 data. Is that correct? That was 


available? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, the -- the data that we used 


from Simonds Saw and Steel was from 1948. We 


were -- we were using that to reconstruct the 


inhalation exposures at Bethlehem Steel in 1949 


and 1950. 


 DR. LOCKEY: And was that -- was that pre- or 

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post-inhalation data at Simonds Steel? 


DR. NETON: This was prior to them installing 


ventilation at Simonds Saw and Steel. Now 


there -- there is -- and we cover this in the 


site profile. There was a small hood over the 


quenching station that Mr. Walker just spoke 


about, but there was no active ventilation 


directly over the rolling operation itself. 


That was installed after the -- the time period 


in which those air samples were taken. And 


they were taken by the Health and Safety 


Laboratory in New York City, which is the same 


-- the same people that took the air samples at 


Bethlehem Steel in 1951 and '52. They were 


evaluating the same operations, basically, 


throughout the complex at the time. 


 DR. LOCKEY: Okay. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I would -- I'm not going to 

do this as a motion initially, but what I would 


like to propose is that we set up a working 


group that would work with SC&A and NIOSH that 


would examine the issue of how data from other 


sources or use the various procedures that are 


entailed in that; that as a first step we ask 

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our contractor to work with NIOSH to identify 


those procedures and that -- and that the 


workgroup evaluate that and then come back to 


the Board with recommendations on, you know, 


how to proceed and -- and with some, you know, 


recommendations. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Right now you're-- you're 


offering this as a trial suggestion -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Trial suggestion, yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- to see how people --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- react to this before -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- it's a formal motion. 

 DR. MELIUS: Correct. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Neton. 

DR. NETON: I'd just maybe like a point of 

clarification. Would that be a generic 


evaluation or would that be specific to 


Bethlehem Steel? Because Bethlehem Steel was 


evaluated over a period of a year and a half, 


between SC&A and NIOSH and the Board, and we 


reviewed those extrapolations in some detail 


and in fact made adjustments to our 


extrapolations to accommodate SC&A's concerns. 

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So I'm not sure revisiting that again would -- 


would -- I'm not sure what that would 


accomplish if we were specifically focusing on 


the Bethlehem Steel evaluation. We've gone 


over that in some detail. 


 DR. MELIUS: I will -- would look at that -- I 


think that's up to the workgroup to decide the 


level of detail they go. I think first we want 


them -- I would propose that they step back and 


look at all of the situations -- procedures 


that -- where data from other sites are being 


used and how they're being used and that -- to 


put the Bethlehem situation into -- to context, 


and then come back to us with -- with 


recommendations. And those recommendations 


would -- that review would include, you know, 


what is the context for -- for Bethlehem; how 


does that fit in that -- the overall 


procedures. What are some of the weaknesses and 


so forth, but I think it's up to the working 


group to reach conclusions on -- on that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim? 


DR. NETON: I would just add that I think SC&A 


has reviewed almost all of our procedures by 


now, including those that use extrapolations 

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such as TIB-4, which is the DOE complex-wide 


approach, and so -- again, I'm -- I'm not sure 


-- we have not had any findings from them that 


these were inappropriate extrapolations, so 


unless there's some other way to look at it, I 


guess -- maybe it's from the SEC perspective, I 


don't know, but we -- we've gone through these 


in some detail. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Jim, aren't there -- aren't there 


a couple new procedures -- or maybe it's one 


new procedure -- looking at the group of AWE 


facilities, uranium-type facilities, metal or 


processing uranium facilities? 


DR. NETON: That's --


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean that's --


DR. NETON: That's the new TIB-6000 -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- fairly new on the -- 


DR. NETON: -- right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It seems like that -- that seems 


like one --


DR. NETON: Okay, that -- that one is fairly 


new, that's correct. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I don't think SC&A has looked at 


that yet, or... 

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DR. NETON: But -- but there are a number of 


other ones that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- rely on very similar approaches, 


but you're right, TIB-6000 is a new one that 


appro-- that addresses specifically AWE sites. 


 DR. WADE: And if I might speak briefly at this 


point from a clarif-- clarifying point of view, 


now I'm speaking as the contracting off-- the 


technical project officer for the SC&A 


contract. They have a task to look at 


procedures, and I think that it would not be 


inappropriate for the Board to ask SC&A to take 


a -- a group of procedures, possibly all 


procedures that deal with this question, and 


look at it within a certain light or against a 


certain question. And I think that would be 


appropriate -- if those are the kinds of 


procedures you're referring to, Dr. Melius, the 


procedures that exist for the work that NIOSH 


does. And I think there is a task in the SC&A 


contract to do that. You can bundle some 


procedures. You can put a particular question 


on that task. And I think we can do that under 


your Task III then, John. 

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 David Staudt, are you on the phone? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. I'll assume that's okay then with the 


contracting officer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In his silence. Let me ask a 


question. Under the proposed motion which is 


not yet a motion, the -- is it -- is it implied 


or explicit in the motion that action on the 


petition evaluation report would then be 


deferred to a later date? Because that's still 


a separate issue. 


 DR. MELIUS: It -- it -- it's a separate issue 


and it -- it's -- it is implied where I was -- 


wanted to separate the issues. I wanted to 


have a better understanding of the -- the 


timing and -- and -- of -- and how other Board 


members felt about the idea of the workgroup 


and -- and then a sense of what -- so I -- I 


think it would -- should be deferred. I'm not 


sure it has to be necessarily deferred until 


that workgroup has reached its, you know, 


ultimate report back to us. They -- they may 


find there's another area they want to look at 


in more detail or something like that, but you 


know, may recommend that -- example, that the 

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process and so forth used at Bethlehem is well 


within the parameters of -- of what they 


believe that we should support, they -- they 


may not, and I'd like to leave that -- leave 


that open. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. I guess, Jim, that must 


have answered your question then. 


 DR. LOCKEY: The one I had a moment ago. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Being a part of the procedures 


workgroup, I'm struggling here with trying to 


sort out in my mind how this particular kind of 


procedures review fits into what we're already 


doing with the overall procedures review, and 


I'm trying to define whether this is such a 


completely separate activity that it should be 


viewed in an entirely different light or 


whether it falls under the same category of the 


kinds of things that we've been putting 


together matrices for with respect to findings 


from -- regarding --


 DR. ZIEMER: Certainly a good question, and let 


me give you my initial response -- others may 


see it differently -- but it seems to me that 


this is a somewhat different task. It -- it is 

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-- would ask, as Lew's -- has sort of framed 


it, a different -- it would ask a specific 


question and ask how the procedures apply in 


this case, whereas your workgroup is looking at 


all procedures in a more generic way and -- and 


asking is NIOSH following the procedures. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or ORAU, as the case may be. This 


-- this is asking more how those procedures 


apply to the-- this particular issue. I think 


it's a separate workgroup. 


 DR. WADE: I think it's a separate workgroup, 


but I do think it would happen under the 


contract task already in place, and that's 


important to us because we only have certain 


contract tasks. So I'm convinced that, as 


you've defined it, it could be bundled and 


assigned to SC&A under Task III. I happen to 


agree with your logic that possibly a different 


workgroup would look at it. 


 MS. MUNN: So do I. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other -- another comment, Jim? 

 DR. MELIUS: No. 

 DR. LOCKEY: Just one point of clarification. 

If -- if -- using comparison populations to do 

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dose reconstruction will have -- will filter 


through the whole system. It's not just 


Bethlehem Steel, it's everybody. Is -- if in 


fact SC&A and the Board goes back and we look 


at this and find that there has to be 


adjustments made in that comparison data, does 


that -- can that reopen the application for -- 


I mean would NIOSH then have to go back and 


adjust their dose reconstruction for that 


population? And at that point they found -- 


finding that, with this adjustment, they can't 


do that, then that would move into a Special 


Exposure Cohort at that point? 


 DR. WADE: I would bow to the... 


DR. NETON: As with any -- any advice we 


receive from the Board, we would go back and 


re-look at those cases to see what effect they 


may or may not have on -- on the past dose 


reconstructions. And in fact if -- if it's 


determined that we couldn't use the surrogate 


exposure data, that we couldn't adequately 


bound the exposures, then it may make that site 


a ca-- a candidate for a SEC. 


 DR. WADE: I would -- one clarification to what 


you said. It's not based upon the strength of 

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the Board's recommendation only. The agency 


would have to hear the Board and then decide 


upon its reaction. But that said, everything 


that Jim said then follows on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Phil. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: (Off microphone) I would 


definitely (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Use your mike there for... 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I'd definitely back Jim on 


this, that I think the -- there needs to be a 


working group to look at this entire issue of 


using data from other sites. And the second 


part on this, since we are discussing Bethlehem 


Steel, from the photos we saw, I have questions 


about the cooling -- those people who worked 


around and under those cooling beds and how 


they're going to be handled with the data from 


Simonds Saw since they didn't have anything 


comparable. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I actually -- well, go ahead, John 


and then Jim. 


DR. MAURO: I guess I have more of a question 


'cause I -- I have to see if I understand this 


correctly. Is this discussion regarding the 


procedures that we have already reviewed -- and 

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there are 100 and -- over 100 procedures now. 


What am I -- am I hearing to go back and say to 


what degree did these procedures, when they 


were written, capture -- make use of 


information from other sites. Other words -- 


and that also goes for perhaps some site -- I 


mean -- and bear with me, I'm struggling with 


this. There are site profiles, there are TIBs 


and there -- this whole array of procedures. 


Now is the question to what degree and under 


what conditions is information from one site or 


data from one site have been brought in and 


used to support a position taken in a given 


procedure or protocol, or is it -- and to what 


degree is the procedure really self-contained. 


 Perfect example, let's say we're looking at a 


procedure for doing a dose reconstruction at 


Rocky Flats, and let's say it's -- whatever the 


-- a neutron exposure, and there is some 


protocol for a cohort protocol. Now the 


question could be to what degree does that 


protocol depend on information that comes from 


another site. And we've never -- I can say 


right now, when we review the procedures, we -- 


we never pose that question to ourselves. We 

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just look at the technical merits of the 


procedure as it stands, but never ask ourselves 


the question to what degree do they draw upon 


these other site. But we do ask ourselves the 


question when we -- when that happens, and I 


can't say off the top of my head when that was, 


you know, whether or not that makes sense. So 


-- and to a certain degree, when we do review 


our procedures and we come out with our 


findings, if there's some aspect to it that we 


say oh, the neutron-to-photon ration you used 


here you got from this place, and I -- and we 


would raise that as an issue. So I -- I would 


say that to some degree we have captured some 


of these issues, but I think I -- is that what 


we're talking about, seeing the degree to which 


that's done? 


 DR. ZIEMER: It appears to me that that's 


certainly a part of it. We may have to go back 


and pick up those and -- and see to what extent 


-- that's sort of using one site's information 


and applying it to another site. And we may 


have to -- if -- if this proceeds, we would 


have to go back and I think identify what 


procedures are in those categories. 

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 DR. WADE: The workgroup. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The workgroup would have to do 


that. Jim. 


DR. NETON: I'd just -- I'd just add my two 


cents. I guess I sort of view this as -- as an 


evaluation of how well NIOSH has used their 


source term evaluation, because in a way this 


is really taking source term -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- (unintelligible) to Bethlehem 


Steel, we knew how much uranium was there -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, right. 


DR. NETON: -- and saying how much could have 


been generated, and we constructed exposure 


models from other facilities based on the 


source term that we know the workers are -- are 


working with. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And in a sense, this --


DR. NETON: And that's -- that's a -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- this is a good question to ask. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I mean I -- I don't disagree 


with that. I just -- there's a -- it's a 


pretty daunting task. There's a lot of water 


under the bridge by now, but I -- I think I 


have a clearer picture of what you're talking 

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about now because really it -- our rule 


specifies that source term is an option. And ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- normally we have to know 


something about the source term, and that's 


actually in one of the rules, before we would 


use this extrapolation of surrogate material. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


DR. NETON: And -- okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Okay, Dr. Melius, another 


comment. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I -- I -- just to follow up 


on Jim's comment, I mean I -- I agree it's 


potentially a daunting task, but I also think 


we've -- may have waited too long and -- in 


doing this, and I think it -- it behooves us to 


-- to get on with it and -- and do it and so 


forth. And again, it's not a value judgment 


that -- on -- moment on, you know, whether 


what's been done is right or wrong, but let's ­

- let's -- let's take a step back and take a 


look at what we have in place and -- and you 


know, evaluate that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Glover. 

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136

 DR. GLOVER: Thank you. I did -- I did want to 


mention briefly, Dr. Griffon (sic), as part of 


the Board, you actually did move to approve 


that Simonds Saw was an appropriate surrogate 


data as part of the review. There actually was 


a specific motion that was approved by the 


Board that that was appropriate to use as 


surrogate data. If you like, I'd be happy to 


discuss some of the -- why that's an 


overestimate at the rolling mill. I don't want 


to belabor particular issues when it sounds 


like we're talking about broader issues, but if 


-- if that could be done at a better time, I'd 


certainly -- would be happy to discuss that -- 


or you'd like to wait. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well --

 DR. GLOVER: It's really at the Board's -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- we'll do that. Actually let's 

sort of finish up this discussion and -- this 


is still part of the Bethlehem Steel issue 


anyway, so we'd be glad to hear that. I just 


want to try to -- we've heard from a few 


people. I'd sort of like to get the sense of 


the Board, and I think you were asking, Jim, 


for what is --

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 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- the sense of the Board on this. 


Is this worth floating a real motion or are we 


just having a general discussion here. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can I just clarify proce-- 


DR. ROESSLER: Can I comment? 


 DR. MELIUS: -- what I would suggest it -- 


DR. ROESSLER: Hello? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Gen has a comment. 


DR. ROESSLER: Hello? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on -- hang on, Gen. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. MELIUS: What I would suggest is that if 


there's some general agreement that this could 


be a way forward, that I would write up a 


motion or work with somebody else to wri-- 


write up a motion for us to consider, and that 


motion would include a more specific charge for 


that -- that workgroup and fle-- flesh that out 


a little bit so we have some -- you know, make 


it a -- a little bit more definite and some-- 


something people can, you know, react to. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Gen Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, Paul. Ed Walker is trying 


to make a comment and I don't think you can 

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hear him. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, we couldn't. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, so maybe if he's still on 


the phone, he could try to make his comment 


now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. Ed? 


 MR. WALKER: Yes, Doctor, thank you. I don't 


know what you were talking about. I -- I don't 


know if -- where I'm butting in, I -- I may be, 


you know, a half-hour off on when this should 


have been brought up, but last night as I was 


going through the technical base (sic) document 


and putting some of my notes together, I see 


where the technical base (sic) document states 


time and time again where we rolled natural 


uranium at Bethlehem Steel. I have sent out -- 


you probably have got the e-mail, but I kind of 


(unintelligible) times, but I found types of 


uranium that were rolled ba-- in the late '40s. 


And we rolled -- we done the finished rolling 


for Simonds Saw, so anything that went through 


Simonds Saw, we handled -- according to what 


all the documentation says. They used, and it 


went through Simonds Saw, recycled uranium in 


both forms; normal uranium and depleted uranium 

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were rolled at the Simonds Saw plant, according 


to the receipts from Hanford. So apparently it 


wasn't natural uranium we rolled at Bethlehem 


Steel for four years because during those four 


years it's all that Simonds Saw handled, plus 


thorium. But being that the records are lost 


for so many years -- deliberately or not, I 


don't know why -- but how do we know? We know 


that they rolled what they had and we know what 


they rolled now, and I was asked by another 


health physicist, do you have any connection 


between Simonds Saw and Bethlehem Steel that 


you rolled and any railroad receipts or 


transportation receipts. And I have a document 


that says there was eight tons sent out from 


Simonds Saw to Lake Ontario Ordnance. It set 


it on the ground. Two ton of it got corroded 


at the base. They took that two ton, send it 


into Buffalo to another small facility and 


ground the corrosion off of it, send it back to 


Lake Ontario, put it with the remaining six ton 


that was there and shipped the total eight ton 


of this to Bethlehem Steel. So there is a 


connection between what this document has that 


I have, the types of uranium rolled at Simonds 

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140 

Saw and Bethlehem Steel. And if Simonds Saw 


rolled it and, as NIOSH has claimed all along, 


we done all the finish rolling, it -- to me, 


it's reasonable to think that we rolled the 


same thing they did. And I think this is 


important issue and still the technical base 


(sic) document calls it natural uranium. The 


DOE called it normal uranium that -- when -- 


after it was depleted, they called it normal 


uranium. So it's wrong in the technical base 


(sic) document on what you said we rolled 


there. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Ed. I 


understand that someone from Senator Clinton's 


office is waiting to make comment -- or Jason, 


are you going to provide the comment? 


 MR. BROEHM: Yes, I just got a statement e-


mailed to me by Dan Utech, who's on the phone 


from Senator Clinton's office but is having a 


little bit of the same phone difficulties 


everyone else is so he asked me to read this 


and that he may have some additional comments 


to make on his own. 


So this is the written testimony of Senator 


Hillary Rodham Clinton on behalf of the SEC 

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141 

status for Bethlehem Steel workers. 


 (Reading) The President's Advisory Board on 


Radiation and Worker Health has the authority 


and responsibility to oversee the work the 


agencies that implement the Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program. One 


of the Board's specific responsibilities is to 


make recommendations to the Secretary of the 


Department of Health and Human Services about 


whether to approve Special Exposure Cohort 


petitions that have been referred by NIOSH. 


You have such a petition before you for a class 


of workers at Bethlehem Steel. I urge you to 


recommend approval of the petition. 


Like workers at many other sites around New 


York and our country, Bethlehem Steel employees 


were essential to our Cold War effort. These 


people literally built our nuclear arsenal in 


the decades after World War II, and helped us 


eventually to win the Cold War. 


In the late 1940s and early '50s, the 


government contracted with Bethlehem Steel to 


roll uranium at their plant, but the workers 


weren't told what they were working with. They 


weren't provided with safety equipment to 

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shield them from radiation. They weren't 


monitored to determine how much radiation they 


were being exposed to. Many of these workers 


subsequently got cancer. And for decades 


they've petitioned their government for help 


and have been denied. 


 Congress finally did the right thing in 2000 


with the Act that you're part of administering. 


This was a landmark law, and it was such in the 


tradition of our country to acknowledge the 


wrong that the government had done, and 


promised timely compensation to workers and 


their survivors. When Congress passed the law 


in 2000 it recognized that reconstructing doses 


would be impossible in many cases, and that's 


why the Special Exposure Cohort process was 


included in the law. 


The statute, to my reading, is pretty clear. 


It says that if the government doesn't have the 


information to reconstruct doses, then workers 


should be given the benefit of the doubt and 


their claims should be paid. More precisely, 


it provides for classes of workers to be added 


to a Special Exposure Cohort if it's not 


feasible to estimate the radiation doses with 

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sufficient accuracy, and there is reasonable 


likelihood that the radiation dose may have 


endangered their health. 


I don't think we could have a clearer case than 


Bethlehem Steel, where not a single worker wore 


a radiation badge, where the only radiation 


measurements we have are a handful of air 


samples, where workers rolled uranium and where 


many of them got radiation-related canc-- 


radiation-related cancers. 


I have introduced legislation with Senator 


Schumer that would require approval of Special 


Exposure Cohorts in such cases, as I believe 


the original statute requires. But I appeal to 


you today to bring the Bethlehem Steel process 


to a conclusion by recommending approval of the 


petition. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sam, you want to proceed? 


 DR. GLOVER: Just -- I -- briefly, some of the 


uranium discussion that Mr. Walker just 


provided, I want to make sure it is very clear 


to the Board that Simonds Saw was the primary 


rolling contractor for Hanford. Bethlehem 


Steel rolled a very small fraction of the 


finished uranium -- a very small fraction. 

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Mostly Hanford -- or Savannah -- Simonds Saw 


provided that directly to Hanford. Only one of 


the rollings from Simonds actually came to 


Bethlehem Steel. Other than that, it was from 


another rolling. Those were experimental 


rollings until the very end, which they had a 


few before Fernald kicked in. So I did want to 


be very clear about the -- the extent of the 


Bethlehem Steel rolling. They did not finish-


roll the entire feed stock for the Department 


of Energy. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Board members, any 


other comments on the general approach that's 


been suggested here -- in terms of evaluating 


the issue of use of surrogate data and the 


implications for the Bethlehem Steel petition? 


 John Poston. 


 DR. POSTON: I don't have a -- a stated opinion 


yet, but could you -- suppose we vote this -- I 


understand what happens if we approve Jim's 


unmade motion, but what if we don't approve it; 


what's the next step? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I -- I think Jim's -- Jim's 


motion was going to include something in terms 


of -- or was it separate -- for Bethlehem, per 

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se. We've got to do something on the Bethlehem 


Steel petition. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, it'd include both but it'd 


be delaying a decision on Bethlehem Steel. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It would delay a decision on 


Bethlehem Steel until the completion or till 


something was --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. POSTON: But if -- that's --


 DR. WADE: And if it was to be --


 DR. POSTON: -- the motion --


 DR. WADE: -- if that was to be voted down, 


then you would have Bethlehem Steel in front of 


you again to consider. 


 DR. POSTON: All right. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? 


 (No responses) 


Jim, I'm -- I'm going to suggest that you -- 


that you frame a trial motion to get it on the 


floor. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: If it is -- we can then defer 


action on it till tomorrow, to get the wording. 


Or -- or we can just defer this till tomorrow 

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anyway if you want to -- 


 DR. MELIUS: No, I mean I can --


 DR. ZIEMER: Or -- or someone can make a 


different motion. I mean --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah -- yeah, let --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- but we need some -- we need to 


take some action. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. In order to sort of promote 


the action and recognizing that there's -- 


we'll need to sort of fill in some of the 


issues and -- particularly in terms of the 


specific charge to the -- the workgroup, but I 


-- I would move that we delay consideration of 


the Bethlehem Steel SEC evaluation review 


pending a report back to us from a newly-


established workgroup that would evaluate the 


use of -- evaluate the -- the NIOSH procedures 


involving the use of data from other sources 


for dose reconstruction. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or if we might say surrogate data 


or --


 DR. MELIUS: Surrogate data for dose -- yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is there a second to that motion? 


MS. BEACH: I'll second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Seconded. And we've already had a 

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lot of discussion on the anticipated motion. 


The suggestion is that, before we act on the 


motion, we get the exact wording which could 


occur later in the meeting, perhaps tomorrow, 


but we can have additional discussion now. 


John Poston. 


 DR. POSTON: Are we going to discuss the -- the 


motion again tomorrow? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We may. 

 DR. POSTON: Well, I think --

 DR. ZIEMER: I don't think we have the exact 

words. We have the intent of the motion. 


 DR. POSTON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But we can -- we can discuss it. 


You can --


 DR. POSTON: Well, does that mean -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- pro and con and we'll simply 


delay the actual action until we have the exact 


wording, but --


 DR. POSTON: Okay. Well, with-- without a 


motion on the floor, then it's -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we have -- we have -- 


 DR. POSTON: -- not proper to comment. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we have -- we have the general 


motion. We don't have the exact words. The 

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intent of the motion --


 DR. POSTON: Well, to me, there's two things. 


One, there are many times when using surrogate 


data makes a whole lot of sense, scientifically 


valid approach to doing a dose reconstruction. 


And you know, to me, it is a very site-


dependent kind of situation. We -- as John 


pointed out -- John Mauro pointed out, we 


started down that road with Chapman Valve. We 


were fortunate enough to find a very valuable 


report that took us off that path, but we were 


going that direction because we had no other 


way --


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


 DR. POSTON: -- other way to do it. Then SC&A 


did invest a fair amount of time looking at 


other sites that -- and that was suggested and 


agreed-upon by NIOSH and -- and the working 


group that that was probably the way we should 


do it. So this -- this is such a generic 


situation that it doesn't seem to me that 


establishing a workgroup, unless they're going 


to do all the site evaluations, is -- makes any 


sense. I mean it's a -- it's a site-specific 


kind of evaluation. So I -- I just see this as 

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delaying the inevitable of making a decision on 


-- on the -- this particular SEC and not really 


providing any guidance or anything to -- to the 


committee at all. So I would -- I'm -- I'm 


very opposed to this motion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments, pro or 


con? Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: I, too, am concerned about how this 


process can be worded in such a way that it 


would be specific enough to be of any value to 


any unique SEC or group, and still be broad 


enough to be realistic in terms of the world we 


actually live in. As I think I inferred 


earlier, certainly not enthusiastic about 


including this in the other views that we are 


currently undertaking with respect to all of 


the procedures, but it's an uncomfortable thing 


that's being posed to us here. It's 


particularly discomfiting, partly because of 


its being based on the Bethlehem Steel site 


which, as Mr. Glover pointed out, we really 


covered very thoroughly when we were looking at 


the site profile. We did a lot of work on 


Bethlehem Steel. We heard a lot of testimony. 


There was a great deal of scrutiny given to 

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each of these issues. The issues that we're 


discussing right now were discussed in 


significant detail at that time. 


Viewing it from an SEC point of view does put 


an entirely different light on it, but it still 


raises very similar kinds of questions which we 


have covered in such depth that it's 


uncomfortable to think about going through that 


entire process again unless we are being very 


concise about where we're going. So I look 


forward with great expectation to the precise 


wording of what's going into this because there 


is confusion in my mind right now where we're 


actually going. I understand, I believe, the 


intent -- which sounds good until taken to its 


ultimate goal, and that ultimate goal may put 


us in a very difficult position with respect to 


realistic, scientifically-based reviews of 


SECs, and for that matter, some sites. 


So I would propose that we wait until we see 


the actual wording, regardless of the -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we will --


 MS. MUNN: -- goodness of the intent. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we will do that. This is --


nonetheless I'm allowing a little bit of 

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discussion on the idea, but we will have 


further debate on the -- when we see the exact 


wording. Jim, do you have some additional 


comments? 


 DR. LOCKEY: I -- I think it's worthwhile to -- 


to have a working group look at how surrogate 


data can be used. I think that'd be a 


worthwhile endeavor, but I think -- I think the 


Bethlehem Steel issue is -- was here before I 


came on the Board and it sounds like we -- we 


carried that Bethlehem Steel issue as far as we 


can at this point in time. And I would think 


there really are two separate issues. I think 


there's the generic issue about looking at 


surrogate data, and I think there's a Bethlehem 


Steel issue that we should deal with today. 


don't think further delay is helpful to 


anybody. If whatever reasons in the future, 


the way that surrogate data is used needs to be 


modified, there's a process in place to allow 


us to do that, both from dose reconstruction, 


as well as reapplication for an SEC petition 


based on perhaps inadequate data based on 


modifications that have to be made. So I 


really think there -- there's a Bethlehem Steel 


I 
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issue which I think needs to be taken care of, 


and then there's a generic issue I think that 


Jim has mentioned that's worth our looking at 


further. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? 


 DR. POSTON: Gen just sent an e-mail saying 


that she can't hear anything. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We got an e-mail from Gen, 


are you still -- are you still there? 


DR. ROESSLER: Still here, can you hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, very well. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, the people on the phone 


cannot hear, and I think there's some confusion 


as to whether you're talking about Bethlehem 


Steel or Blockson or what. The connection is 


very bad and I -- I think that -- that they're 


not being able to make their comments, and I 


certainly can't hear. I can hear almost 


nothing. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Well, we're not on 


Blockson, we're on Bethlehem Steel yet and -- 


yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: It would be good to have Lew 


make his speech on telephone etiquette, and it 


would also be good to check the line. 

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 DR. WADE: Okay. Well, let's -- let's try and 


do both. 


I'll ask the AV person to begin to do what you 


can. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) take a break. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, we'll take a break in a 


minute. 


 MR. WALKER: Can't hear nothing. 


UNIDENTIFIED: We can barely hear you. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we're going to take a break 


for five minutes and check the line. We'll 


come back then and do a little bit of phone 


etiquette and see where we are. A break for 


five minutes. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:05 p.m. 


to 2:23 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we're going to re-- 


reconvene and we'd like to come to closure on 


the Bethlehem Steel-related issues and then 


we'll move on to Blockston (sic). 


 DR. WADE: Use the gavel. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now I -- I have -- I have sensed 


from Dr. Lockey's comments that -- and I don't 


know if they reflect others, but a concern that 


we perhaps think about separating the Bethlehem 

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Steel action from the more generic action, 


which was the workgroup materials and so on -- 


workgroup investigations of the generic use of 


surrogate data that Dr. Melius was suggesting. 


And I need -- I need the Board to help us come 


to closure on this. Does the Board wish to act 


separately on the Bethlehem Steel petition 


today, or to tie it in with the -- the effort ­

- workgroup effort that was described by Dr. 


Melius, which is sort of a -- a preliminary 


motion for which we don't have the final 


wording. 


 Mr. Presley. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I would like to see two motions. 


I would not like to see this tied together. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. What -- what do the others 


of you feel? Dr. Lockey has expressed a 


similar thing, I think in part because you have 


to leave tomorrow to -- 


 DR. LOCKEY: Well, not -- not necessarily that. 


I -- I think that -- again, as I understand it, 


the Board has been dealing with Bethlehem for a 


long time, relatively long time, and -- I think 


before I came on the Board. And it sounds like 


we've taken Bethlehem as far as we can do it, 

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and there is an avenue available for reevaluation of that process at some point in the 


future if there's -- if the workgroup, SC&A and 


the Board feel that the surrogate population 


data has to be used in a modified manner or -- 


and so I'm -- I see that as a way to -- to 


relook at not only Bethlehem, but other 


potential SE (sic) petitions that are in 


similar situations. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, okay. Wanda Munn and then 


Jim Melius. 


 MS. MUNN: There are two separate issues. They 


should be separated. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Jim? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I would just point out -- 


Jim Lockey's response, I think the Board has -- 


while NIOSH has a procedure and has very 


appropriately gone back and redone -- 


recalculated dose reconstructions based on 


changes in procedures or Board findings and so 


forth, we've never had to go back and un-- undo 


or redo a SEC petition. And I -- I think it 


would certainly -- lot of damage to the 


credibility of the program if we had to -- for 


example, would turn -- we had to go back and 

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then, at a later time, declare something like 


Bethlehem a -- a, you know, SEC after we 


initially had turned down the -- the petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. MELIUS: So I -- I think there's a little 


difference in terms of the -- sort of the 


finality of that -- that particular action and 


the impl-- the implications of the action. 


Cert-- certainly if it's just a question of a 


dose reconstruction, that's different, though. 


I mean it does -- does have implications and I 


-- be concerned, but... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Jim? 


 DR. LOCKEY: Maybe I have to get better 


understanding. If -- if NIOSH -- if it's 


determined that the surrogate population is -- 


is -- was not handled correctly and NIOSH is 


given different directions to look at dose 


reconstruction and they find they can't do it 


based on those new -- that new data, does not 


that group then automatically get qualified as 


an SEC? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I can't say automatically it 


would. We'd have -- it'd have to be looked at 


on -- individual circumstances associated with 

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it. 


 DR. LOCKEY: That's what I meant. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: If we're talking about Bethlehem 


Steel, it's important to understand that '48 


and '49 we have no primary evidence or 


documentation that shows they even rolled 


uranium in those two years. We gave them that. 


So if we find that surrogate data -- in this 


instance for this example -- is not 


appropriate, and we consi-- that's what we hear 


from you and we consider it, it could be that 


we look at that and say gee, well, there's no 


data, no evidence that rollings occurred in 


those two years so there's no exposure. That's 


entirely different than where we came out the 


first time around. We gave the benefit of the 


doubt and we used the surrogate data to provide 


a model that provides, I think, claimant fav-- 


very claimant favorable dose estimates for all 


four years. 


 DR. LOCKEY: Well, Jim -- well, Jim (sic), let 


me ask you a question generically then. If --


if -- suppose Bethlehem -- there's good 


evidence they did roll uran-- uranium in '48 


and '49 -- okay? -- and the surrogate exposures 

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that you were using after the workgroup has 


made the deliberations indicates that perhaps 


you have to approach that in a different 


manner, and you've found that you could not do 


dose reconstruction, then what would happen at 


that point? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: If we find that we cannot do dose 


reconstructions, then that is a justification 


for a class. 

 DR. LOCKEY: Okay. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. That answered your 

question? Yeah. 

Now the -- I'm trying to identify possible 


outcomes for you here as you think about this. 


The general motion that Dr. Melius referred to, 


which also defers action on Bethlehem Steel, 


the effect on that is that there would, at 


least for now, be no Special Exposure Cohort 


for Bethlehem Steel. 


If we separate the action, we have the 


possibility of an up or down vote. An up vote 


-- that is, one supporting the motion -- would 


declare Bethlehem Steel to be a Special 


Exposure Cohort now. A down vote would have 


the same effect as the Melius motion, 

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temporarily at least, in that it would not be a 


Special Exposure Cohort at this time. 


And I think, Jim, your -- Jim Lockey's question 


was if that were to happen and something 


changed later, in the findings of the 


workgroup, for example, can you go back and 


sort of make the correction. And I think Dr. 


Melius was suggesting that there is a down side 


to doing that, perhaps in terms of how that -- 


how that is perceived from the outside as -- in 


terms of first saying it is not qualified and 


then saying it is, for example. 


So I'm trying to sort out these different 


issues so -- to help -- if you want to decide 


what you want to do in terms of going forward. 


 DR. WADE: I might offer a comment, and it's 


not to the technical issues, but you know, 


speaking on the Secretary's behalf -- again, I 


mention the constant tension between being 


complete and being timely, and we'll talk more 


about that. On the other hand, I think the 


more this Board can do to approach consensus in 


its recommendations to the Secretary, the 


better. It doesn't mean that there aren't 


situations where we'll have very close votes. 

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160 

And if that's the case, so be it. But I think 


some effort needs to be made to try and 


approach a more consensus recommendation by the 


Board. And I don't say that on either side of 


the issue, I just say that. 


Now my -- my original recommendation was going 


to be to defer action on this till tomorrow so 


that we could see the wording of the Melius 


motion, and that could be voted up or down and 


-- and depending on that outcome, there could 


be a subsequent motion on the Special Exposure 


Cohort, if so needed. 


I am sensitive to the fact that just in respect 


for Dr. Lockey, who cannot be here tomorrow -- 


although you might want to call in, if that 


were possible -- he would lose his voting 


privilege on this particular issue. 


 DR. WADE: That's -- that's -- I think that's 


just the way it is. 


 DR. LOCKEY: That's just the way it is. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Okay. But my original 


recommendation was that we would simply defer 


action on the Bethlehem Steel till tomorrow so 


we could see the -- see the wording of the 


motion that we've been sort of discussing, and 

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then it could be voted up or down. 


 So without objection, that's what we will do 


and we will -- this will return to our agenda 


tomorrow for formal action once we have the 


wording on the motion. 


BLOCKSON CHEMICAL SEC
 

Let's move on then to Blockston (sic) Chemical. 


Blockston Chemical -- we had a presentation on 


that at -- but then additional information came 


to light and the evaluation report was pulled 


by -- by NIOSH, so basically it went back off 


the -- off the agenda and we had no -- I don't 


believe we ever were able to take action 'cause 


NIOSH -- we had it on the agenda and NIOSH 


reported to us that this new information had 


come in, so they pulled the evaluation report. 


I think we now have the new evaluation report ­

- or is it a revision? 


DR. NETON: It's a revision. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So Dr. Neton will give us that 


revision and then we'll have opportunity -- do 


we have petitioners? -- we do have petitioners 


on the line that will speak to us, as well -- 


if they can hear us. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I can hear you. 

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162

 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. Here's Dr. Neton. 


DR. NETON: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. It's my 


pleasure to present to you a revision to the 


Blockson Chemical Company SEC evaluation report 


that as --


 DR. WADE: Can people hear Dr. Neton speak? 


UNIDENTIFIED: No. 

UNIDENTIFIED: I can. 

UNIDENTIFIED: He needs to speak to the back of 

the room. 

DR. NETON: Testing, can you hear me now -- 


better? 


UNIDENTIFIED: This is (unintelligible). I 


cannot hear. 


DR. NETON: I'm not sure I can speak any more 


directly or -- or loudly into this microphone. 


 DR. WADE: Can you hear me speak? This is Lew 


Wade, can you hear me speak? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible), yes. 


 DR. WADE: Yes? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) can hear you. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, I can hear you. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, Jim, you might have to do it 


from here -- or can we make such arrangements? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 

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163 

(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: He's fine, go ahead. 


DR. NETON: I'm fine? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Go ahead. 


DR. NETON: Okay. This is SEC evaluation 


report number 00058. As Dr. Ziemer mentioned, 


it was presented originally by Brant Ulsh at 


the Naperville Board meeting in December of 


2006. I think it's probably gone to sleep on 


me here. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, stay still. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) Try to turn 


towards (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: There it is. 


DR. NETON: And precisely for the reasons Dr. 


Ziemer mentioned, the report was withdrawn 


shortly after the meeting in Naperville because 


we -- we came to the realization that we did 


not have all of the covered exposure dealt with 


properly in the -- in the site profile. 


 The original site profile covered Building 55 


operations, which was to extract uranium out of 


the phosphate-generating process that Blockson 


dealt with in its normal operations. And then 


we had the uranium covered, and I believe we 

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164 

also on the original site profile covered radon 


exposure, with the idea being that even though 


Building 55 was remote from the plant, the 


radon, being an inert gas, wafted about the 


site. We couldn't really guarantee that it was 


confined only to the areas of the general 


plant. 


But these related activities involving rock 


calcining -- that's oxidation, essentially, 


under high temperature to get rid of organic 


material -- acid oxidation and other support 


activities in the balance of the plant were not 


covered in the original site profile. 


This little diagram sort of depicts what I mean 


by that. Blockson Chemical took phosphate 


rock, primarily from Florida, that had a very ­

- and made -- made phosphoric acid out of it. 


And what they would do is -- is calcine it, 


heat it at a high temperature, drive off the 


organic material and dissolve it in sulfuric 


acid. Under that process, the phosphoric acid 


would go through the plant and they would -- 


the end product would be technical grade 


phosphates -- monosodium phosphate, trisodium 


phosphate -- and the remainder, the balance 

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that did not go into solution, would go into 


the phosphogypsum phase and go out into the 


waste piles. 


 Well, phosphate rock, by its very nature, has 


some natural radioactive contaminants, that 


being uranium and its associated progeny -- 


which we're assuming, for purposes of these 


dose reconstructions, are in 100 percent 


equilibrium with the uranium parent. And 


because of that, through the various processes 


in the plant, workers were exposed to radium, 


lead-210, radon, those -- those types of 


radionuclides. And in fact there was also some 


smaller quantities of thorium decay series 


present in this operation. 


A brief history of what's going on at Blockson, 


the AEC approached Blockson Chemical in early 


1951 to explore the possibility of retrieving 


some of the uranium that was naturally present 


in this ore as part of their normal plant 


operations. Blockson agreed to do that, and in 


1951 they constructed a pilot plant -- we're 


not exactly sure where or what that was, but 


pilot plant operations did commence in early 


'51 trying to essentially develop the process. 

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They had I think two or three pilot operations 


that had a several-week duration where they 


tried to perfect and optimize that process. 


And in fact, eventually a patent was issued to 


Blockson Chemical -- or actually a patent was 


issued to the Atomic Energy Commission for the 


uranium recovery process from the phosphoric 


acid. 


At the same time, Building 55 -- the early 


pilot plant processes were so successful that 


they concurrently started construction of 


Building 55 between 1951 and '52. This was a 


building that was separate from the main plant, 


a fairly small, one-story building that was 


under 20,000 square feet. I think it was 100 


by 175 feet in dimension. And this was where 


the uranium was going to be precipitated out of 


the phosphoric acid pipeline, if you will, and 


-- and drummed and shipped to the Department of 


-- not the Department of Energy at that time 


but the Atomic Energy Commission. 


It was a fairly modest operation, as things go. 


Blockson, on average during the 10-year period 


-- the contract started in '51 and ended at the 


end of '62 -- they averaged somewhere in the 

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vicinity of one barrel of uranium a week. So 


we're not talking a major production operation 


here. It's a fairly small operation, as 


uranium production facilities go. 


Just as a side note, the ownership was 


transferred from Blockson Chemical to Olin 


Mathieson Chemical Corporation in 1955. 


 The SEC petition was qualified in March of 


2006, but that was the first petition we 


received, which was SEC-0045. Subsequently we 


received a second petition, which is SEC-0058, 


and that was qualified on August 9, 2006. 


Subsequent to that, these two petitions were 


merged into SEC-0058 as one petition and it was 


merged to form one petition on August 30th, 


2006, and the relevant time period was 1951 


through 1962 and the entire duration of the two 


end years, January 1st, '51 through December 


31st, 1962. 


 The initial class definition that was proposed 


by the petitioners is shown here, which was all 


Atomic Weapons Employers contractors and 


subcontractors who worked in Building 55 -- 


this was the stand-alone operation that 


generated the uranium product -- from '51 to 

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'62. NIOSH looked at that class definition and 


expanded it to include all Atomic Weapons 


Employer personnel who worked on activities 


related to the production of uranium at 


Blockson Chemical from '51 to '62, the 


significant difference here being that the 


balance of the plant would now be covered for 


their exposures to the progeny in the uranium 


decay series, and to some extent, a lesser 


degree, the progeny -- thorium-232 decay series 


and some associated progeny there, as well. So 


we've really increased the exposure profile of 


these workers in doing this. 


At the Board meeting in Naperville this class 


definition was somewhat different. I think it 


was only workers who worked in Building 55 and 


the pilot plant were originally covered. And 


as I mentioned at the beginning of my 


presentation, we recognized that legally we had 


to cover the other exposures. 


A little bit about the petition bases. There 


were four -- four -- four main bases filed in 


this petition, and these are shown here -- that 


there was no monitoring of the worker exposures 


or that the worker exposure monitoring data 

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were not available, had been lost somehow; 


particle size was not claimant favorable -- 


that is they -- they challenged the use of a 


five micron default particle size; asserted 


that the inhalation to ingestion pathway was 


not considered; and that the uranium daughters, 


specifically the short-lived daughters of 


uranium -- thorium-234 and protactinium-234(m) 


-- were not addressed. And I'll spend a few 


minutes going over each of those -- NIOSH's 


response to each of those petition bases a 


little later on in the presentation. 


First I'd like to go over some of the available 


information that we had at our -- our disposal 


to -- to perform dose reconstructions, and 


these are the NIOSH site research database -- 


that's a compendium of a huge volume of data. 


I think we had something on the order of 96 


documents in the site research database that we 


could rely on. We also had available 


information from the petitioners, which 


included in this case interviews from five 


former workers at the facility who were 


interviewed by telephone and -- not transcripts 


necessarily, but minutes of those discussions 

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were -- were recorded and are on our web site. 


Not on our web site, but on our -- in our 


files. And we did go back and conduct worker 


outreach meetings in Joliet, Illinois on 


January 24th and 25th to hear more about the 


workers' perspectives as to how these 


operations actually -- actually came about 


during the covered period. 


In addition to the discussion with the wor-- 


the petitioners, I -- I'm not sure if I 


mentioned that we also do the Computer-Assisted 


Telephone Interviews, so every -- every 


claimant is interviewed, as you well know, in 


this process to determine -- to garner any 


relevant information related to their 


exposures. 


 And the phosphate industry itself -- it's been 


well-known for years in the health physics 


community that there's natural radioactive 


materials associated with the processing of 


phosphate ores, so there's numerous studies of 


the phosphate industry available in technical 


journals such as the Health Physics Society 


journal, Journal of Environmental Chemistry and 


-- and other such documents. 

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I have a little bit of amplification on each of 


those points here. The site research database 


had a fair amount of information related to the 


contract. The original contract was a letter 


contract with Blockson Chemical Company, later 


converted into a formal contract, that detailed 


in some -- some specific detail the nature of 


the operations, the employees that would be 


involved, how many, that sort of thing. 


A fair amount of information about the Blockson 


Chemical process. I had mentioned that this -- 


this process was actually patented, and if any 


of you have gone through a patent application, 


there's a lot of information that's supplied as 


part of that. So we know -- the good news is 


we know a fair amount about the chemistry 


associated with this operation. 


 Production data was available in DOE reports 


and internal Blockson Chemical memoranda. 


And we also had in the site research database 


from one of our data capture efforts -- I 


forget where we retrieved this information; 


most likely HASL, though I don't recall -- 


bioassay data during operations from 1954 


through '58. We actually had bioassay data for 

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-- I think it's 122 samples -- 122 samples 


representing 25 individuals, which is somewhat 


significant because I mentioned that we knew 


quite a bit about the operations and the number 


of employees involved. And it appears that no 


more than 20 to 25 people worked on this 


operation in Building 55 over -- at a -- over 


the ten-year period of the production of 


uranium. 


We have some facility radiological data from 


1978. Argonne National Laboratory went into 


Blockson as part of the FUSRAP, Formerly 


Utilized Site Remedial Action Program, to do 


some fairly extensive surveys of the site to 


look at residual contamination, and we took 


advantage of that to develop our dose 


reconstruction approach during the residual 


contamination period. And there are various 


other AEC documents and memos that -- that were 


at our disposal. 


The worker interviews -- I've highlighted here 


some bullets that -- that describe some of the 


information that we learned from conducting 


these interviews. We -- we learned that the 


access to Building 55 required a security 

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clearance. This was fairly common in the early 


days in AEC operations. We -- we saw that same 


exact thing at Chapman Valve. They actually put 


up a security post, and in fact it's typically 


-- in those days was required that workers have 


Q clearances to work on these operations. We 


did not go back and retrieve the listing of the 


people who had Q clearances. We didn't think 


that would be very expedient or necessarily 


fruitful, but it was -- did require a security 


clearance and was controlled by posted guards. 


The work crews in Building 55 were small. 


There were about two to six people per shift, 


and they did have a night shift -- we learned 


that -- that had two operators. However, as 


with many operations of this nature, various 


maintenance personnel and others entered 


Building 55 as necessary. This sort of led us, 


as you'll see later, to the opinion that we 


really can't position any worker on this 


process in time and space very well. That is, 


we have a somewhat generic model, similar to 


what we did at Chapman Valve, where we 


basically have two classes of workers: Those 


who were either clearly involved in the 

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production operations or tangentially involved, 


then the second part of workers are those who 


are administrative personnel who had very 


little chance for exposure. 


 We learned something about the process. The 


operators actually had to manually remove the 


filter cake that contained the uranium. This ­

- this material in Building 55 came out of the 


-- the process was precipitated into these 


collection trays that were about two and a half 


feet by two and a half feet -- I forget now, 


several inches in depth. They would dry them, 


and then these trays would be actually manually 


scooped and placed into drums -- which is 


something different than we originally thought. 


We thought originally there was some sort of a 


hopper -- hopper process involved. 


Kind of getting ahead of my little self a 


little bit here, but this talks about the 


uranium concentrate, how it was dried and 


dumped by hand. 


None of the workers we talked to recalled any 


dosimetry program or radiological control 


program. However, I did mention we have the 


bioassay data, so clearly there was some -- 

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some bioassay program taken, although it's not 


uncommon for workers, in my experience, to 


confuse medical monitoring and radiological 


monitoring for urine to be the same process. 


Work areas in the plant were swept or washed 


down every shift. They did indicate that they 


thought a dust collector was used, and various 


other details were -- were learned. 


A little bit about the phosphate industry 


studies, this is the Florida Institute of 


Phosphate Research. A fair amount of research 


has been done by these people. We -- we 


actually used one of their studies to help 


bound the exposures in the plant for external 


exposure in the non-uranium areas. 


The EPA also has done some -- a fair amount of 


work in this area of the phosphate 


manufacturing business. They've gone out and 


done surveys -- radiological surveys, airborne 


surveys at phosphate plants and we've used that 


to fill in some of the details of our dose 


reconstructions. 


And I mentioned previously these technical 


reports that appeared in Health Physics and 


Journal of Environmental Radioactivity. 

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Okay, I mentioned I was going to get into the ­

- our discussion of the four bases that the 


petitioners raised and our responses to them. 


This is the first one, that the -- there was no 


monitoring data or that if there was, no 


exposure records were kept. 


It is true that we have no external exposure 


data that we were able to locate for this 


facility. However, this was a uranium 


facility, so we were able to model the exposure 


from the drums of the uranium using Monte Carlo 


techniques. 


We have no evidence of air sampling data in the 


covered period. But we do have, as I 


mentioned, results of 122 bioassay samples that 


were taken over this four-year period -- which, 


by the way, was a higher production period. It 


was somewhat smaller in production, the early 


days, as you can imagine. And they ramped up 


to this -- about 50,000 pounds a year. And we 


have this available for 25 workers, so we did 


have multiple samples on a number of workers. 


And there are a few reports available for 


radiological surveys. I mentioned the Argonne 


National Laboratory FUSRAP report in '78, and 

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in 1996 Building 55 was actually demolished. 


And about halfway through the demolition 


process they stopped and took some samples 


around the facility and we -- we have those 


data. 


Particle size, I -- I mentioned they challenged 


the use of the five micron particle size as not 


claimant friendly. We saw no evidence that a 


five micron was not appropriate. This is the 


default recommended in the ICRP-66 lung model. 


It seems that possibly the petitioners' concern 


was that we might have been using a discrete 


particle size of five microns. However, if you 


look at the ICRP-66 lung model, it's a five-


micron geometric mean with a geometric standard 


deviation. And I'm forgetting now, but I think 


it's about two and a half, so it has a fairly 


substantial geometric standard deviation, 


meaning that a large spectrum of particle sizes 


are allowed under the ICRP-66 five-micron 


default and -- and would -- would deposit into 


the lung. 


Also, just to mention that the -- if -- if we 


did look at a one-micron particle size with a 


GSD of two and a half, it would raise the 

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committed doses at least by about 15 percent 


over that of a five-micron exposure. This 


example shown here just to demonstrate that the 


-- even if it were true that five micron was 


not valid, then we could still do dose 


reconstructions using a smaller particle size 


if -- if the data did indicate that. 


The inhalation to ingestion pathway, the 


concern was that material that is ingested is 


not -- we're not accounting for the material 


that is cleared from the lung via the 


mucocilliary ladder. That is, every time you 


inhale something, a substantial portion of the 


contaminant is cleared up the mucocilliary 


ladder and subsequently swallowed. And the 


fact is, ICRP-66 explicitly considers inhaled 


material -- the dose from material that is 


cleared to the GI tract through that process, 


so that is covered. 


In addition, we do have a direct ingestion 


pathway covered in this model. There are 


certain conditions under which the inhalation 


is not the bounding dose for -- for exposure. 


And specifically I'm referring to the GI tract. 


If one ingests a lot of materials chronically, 

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the GI tract dose would be higher, so we've 


allowed for taking the urinalysis data and 


doing both an inhalation dose and an ingestion 


dose and taking the higher of the two, as need 


be. 


The next concern referred to the lack of taking 


into account the short-lived daughters, 


progeny, of -- of uranium, thorium-234 and 


protactinium-234(m). We actually have done 


that. The ICRP models that we use account for 


the ingrowth of the -- I think it's a 24-day 


half-life thorium-234 daughter, and it is 


specifically addressed in the site profile. It 


may not be obvious to one who doesn't do 


internal dose calculations all the time, but 


it's -- it's clearly explicitly addressed in 


the model. 


Also as I mentioned earlier, we do have 


exposure to the progeny of the entire uranium 


and thorium decay series covered in this 


analysis. That is, the trace contaminants that 


were carried through the chemical process of 


the plant are addressed at each step along the 


way. 


By the way, I should mention that Tom Tomes and 

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Sam Glover of -- of NIOSH did this work, and I 


-- I think they've done a really good -- good 


job at this. 


Okay. The evaluation report was issued on 


September 1st, 2006. But as -- as we 


mentioned earlier on, it was withdrawn to 


correct some omissions in the covered exposures 


that I've discussed, and the revised site 


profile -- the revised site profile, and we 


issued a revision to the evaluation report on 


early July of this year. I think actually the 


site profile came out more towards the end of 


June and then the -- we couldn't complete the 


evaluation report till the site profile was 


done, so they -- they followed each other, but 


pretty much toward the end of June we signed 


off on the site profile and then incorporated 


those elements that were relevant into the 


revision to the evaluation report. 


 Okay, I've talked about some of these so I'll 


go through them fairly quickly. We included 


additional information that we learned from 


talking to the workers. We also included an 


evaluation of the dose outside of Building 55; 


that is, all the exposure from the radium decay 

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series -- radon, polonium-210, lead-210 and 


thorium series. I mentioned that again, 


potential for the exposure to various progeny 


of uranium and thorium series. 


And we also revised the original radon exposure 


value that we had. I think in the -- in the 


original site profile we used the median value 


of the radon that was measured in the phosphate 


industry, and in this site profile we've 


selected the 95th percentile. This was in 


response to an SC&A com-- review comment that 


was made. 


 The external dose outside of uranium operations 


is estimated from doses received at similar 


facilities. What we did was we looked at some 


facilities that processed uranium -- I think 


this was the Florida Phosphate Research group 


that did this, and the upper bound dose that we 


could come up with -- essentially the highest 


dose that we could -- we could determine -- 


they actually used TLDs to measure workers in 


the plant so it was -- seemed to be a fairly 


well-done study -- was about 200 millirem. But 


we also modeled the Building 55 dose for a 


worker standing next to a drum of uranium that 

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contains about 1,000 pounds of uranium, and 


those doses came up somewhere on the order of a 


couple of rem, depending on the organ. So here 


we have a huge disparity. We have chosen to 


assign the Building 55 dose, to be claimant 


favorable, over the doses that were measured in 


the balance of the plant since we wouldn't know 


actually where -- if we don't know where the 


worker was positioned in time and space. 


And some of the Building 55 modeled doses have 


been increased over the original site profile. 


The original one only assumed that uranium was 


being dumped into the -- into the drums. But 


we've also recognized now that -- in modeling 


the chemistry process that some of the 


contaminants from the original ore come along 


with the uranium, so we've accounted for the 


dose to some of the trace amounts of radium and 


its daughters that appear in the uranium 


product itself, so that -- that's covered as 


well now. 


The internal dose, the intakes outside of 55 


were estimated using a bounding airborne dust 


estimates. I mentioned that the EPA has been 


involved in looking at phosphate plants. They 

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evaluated a number of operations at a wet 


phosphate plant very similar to the Blockson 


Chemical plant, and the highest measured dust 


loading they came up with in their evaluation 


was somewhere around 50 milligrams per cubic 


meter, a fairly high dust loading. We did have 


some -- some fairly contemporary data at -- at 


Blockson Chemical in Building 55. I forget 


exactly what time frame that was taken, it was 


somewhere in the '80s, I believe. The dust --


the highest dust loading that was measured at 


Blockson was around six milligrams per cubic 


meter. We chose to use the bounding value of 


the EPA report of around 50. 


The Building 55 intakes were -- were based on 


the bioassay measurements that I mentioned that 


we had access to. We took the 122 samples and 


fit a lognormal distribution for the workers' 


intakes -- from a chronic worker intake 


scenario and selected the 95th percentile of 


that distribution to assign to workers in 


Building 55. That would be if we were sure 


that the worker was there working as a chemical 


operator or something in that building. If it 


was more of a accessory worker, an ancillary 

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staff member, we would assign the 50th 


percentile of the distribution. That's up to 


the discretion of the dose reconstructor, of 


course based on -- based on the data that he 


has at hand. 


 The uranium progeny and natural thorium progeny 


were added as a function of the uranium intake. 


That is, we just scaled the amount of uranium 


one -- one breathed in, we just scaled -- we 


knew the percentages of the contaminants in the 


uranium feed -- feed stream, and we just scaled 


those val-- those dose values concomitantly. 


And the radon exposures are based on a TIB -- I 


forget, TIB-42 I think it is -- is that TIB-- 


43? I was one off. TIB-43, Technical 


Information Bulletin 43 had some time ago 


established a methodology for reconstructing 


doses from radon exposures at phosphate plants. 


We have -- Blockson's just not the only AWE of 


this type. We have several others that we need 


to cover so we developed a generic approach to 


modeling the radon at these facilities. 


 Our usual summary about what we have at hand as 


far as our dose reconstruction demand. There 


are 111 cases as of July 2nd, 2007 that meet 

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the class definition that we talked about, and 


we've completed 102 of those dose 


reconstructions thus far. 


 You've seen this slide many times so I won't 


belabor it, but there's a two-pronged process 


here. First we have to determine if it's 


feasible to estimate the dose with sufficient 


accuracy. And if we can't, is there a 


reasonable likelihood that such radiation dose 


has endangered the health of the members of 


this class. 


Well, after looking through all these data and 


doing 102 dose reconstructions, it's our 


opinion that the monitoring records, process 


descriptions and source term data are 


sufficient to estimate these doses with 


sufficient accuracy. 


And this is a summary of the normal checklist 


that we provide that talks about what dose 


reconstructions are feasible and what's not. 


And so here we have internal, and we've broken 


it into the various categories of uranium and 


progeny, thorium and progeny are feasible. 


Radon is -- is really a uranium progeny, but 


we've broken it out separately because of its 

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special nature. Being an inert gas, it doesn't 


follow the particulate dispersion like the 


other daughters. 


And in the external area we have determined 


that we can do the beta-gamma exposures 


associated with those operations, as well as 


the occupational medical X-ray dose. We don't 


have an explicit line here for environmental 


dose, but since we're doing occupational dose 


reconstructions on each and every member of the 


class, we don't need to have environmental dose 


models for the workers. 


And I think with that, that's my last slide, 


except for this recommendation that says we are 


-- it's feasible to do dose reconstructions 


from January 1, '51 to December 31st, '62, and 


that we didn't have to do a health endangerment 


analysis because we could do the dose 


reconstructions. 


That's it. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Jim. Board members, do 


you have any questions while Jim is at the 


mike? Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: Don't have any real questions. A 


couple of comments as chair of the working 

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group which was charged with overseeing the 


issues that were brought forward, we got off to 


a very slow start with this and postponed 


having any face-to-face meetings until we had 


the documents that we needed available to us. 


Compliments to both NIOSH and to SCA on very 


rapidly, in the last month, those documents 


have come together and, although we still have 


not had an opportunity to meet, we've not had 


that much time with the documents in our hands, 


both SC&A and NIOSH have clearly done an 


admirable job of addressing each of the issues 


that had been brought forward by the SEC group 


and -- and have apparently addressed each of 


those very carefully, as best I can tell from 


Jim's presentation here. We had -- if I can 


call upon John to make any comment he might 


have, my -- my short version of -- of SC&A's 


review of this document that has just been 


released yet this month was that the two basic 


issues -- that is, are the adequate number of 


issues being addressed, and very specifically, 


were the questions about thorium incorporated 


properly -- have been pretty much addressed. 


John, please? 

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DR. MAURO: Yes, after receiving your report we 


did review it and -- and we concurred with 


virtually all of the points except there are 


two areas that we feel need to be looked at a 


little further. One has to do with there is 


imbedded in the process described here is the 


assumption that the uranium, yellowcake, that's 


inhaled is type M. And -- and in the report --


Jim's report, NIOSH's report -- they cite 


certain literature that provides the basis for 


it. When we reviewed that literature we found 


the literature was a little bit more ambiguous 


than that in that it wasn't that clear-cut that 


in fact type M is universally the type -- form 


that you would encounter. Our review of that 


literature and other literature indicate that 


you really can't rule out type S, and that 


could be important depending on the cancer. As 


you could imagine, if in fact you assume it was 


type S that the person inhaled instead of type 


M, it could -- it could change the -- the dose 


substantially. So one of our findings is that 


at least the literature that's cited in the 


report does not provide, in our opinion, 


compelling evidence that in fact the -- the 

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form of the yellowcake is in fact always type M 


and should be treated as type M. I -- I find 


that is something that just requires a little 


bit more development in the report to -- to 


provide convincing evidence -- or 


alternatively, use the approach that, depending 


on the cancer, you could either use type S or 


type M in order to be claimant favorable. So 


that was one finding. 


 The other finding I consider to be a little bit 


more substantial in terms of challenging to 


deal with. That is, one of our first findings, 


technically, in our original review was the 


thorium-230, which is part of the process, 


wasn't originally addressed in -- in the 


original work that was done. And in this 


version, this report, the thorium-230 -- which 


is a very important radionuclide from an 


internal emitter point of view -- is in fact 


explicitly addressed, and it's assumed that the 


thorium sort of tracks the uranium and ends up 


in the can with the uranium. 


We've had a couple of -- we have two 


independent chemists -- tried to track where 


they believe the thorium would end up, and in 

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their opinion it's not immediately apparent 


that it would necessarily follow the uranium. 


And the only concern we have is if it comes out 


someplace else, doesn't sort of follow the 


uranium but comes out in some other raffinate 


or side-stream, in theory it could come out in 


a form that perhaps is more concentrated than 


it is diluted in this large container of 


uranium, and in theory develop an inhalation 


scenario that could be higher than the 


inhalation scenario that is imbedded in the 


process. So we felt that a little bit more 


discussion of the chem-- the basis for assuming 


that the thorium in fact -- and stays with the 


uranium all the way through the process does 


not appear to be very well-developed and we'd 


like to hear a little bit more about the 


rationale for that. 


So those are the two comments that are in the 


report that you folks have now. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, and as a -- as a result of 


that, it had been my hope that at this meeting 


all of the individuals who were involved -- the 


working group, NIOSH and SC&A -- could find a 


date where we could actually have a face-to­
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face meeting of this workgroup, by which time I 


would hope that these technical issues might 


have been able to be worked out a little 


better. Although neither of these appear to be 


overwhelming issues, the thorium issue and 


where it goes in the raffinate is one of those 


which I personally had hoped -- especially 


following the work-- the meeting with the 


workers on site back in January, I had hoped 


that that issue would be thoroughly put to bed 


before we made our final decision on Blockson. 


Does -- it seems to me that we're not too far 


from there, but I'd like to hear from other 


members of the workgroup with respect to 


whether they agree with my considered approach 


here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim has a --


DR. NETON: Yeah, I'd --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- response and --


DR. NETON: -- like -- I just might make a 


slight follow-on comment to John's comments. 


think -- I think we would agree with SC-- I 


think SC&A and NIOSH would agree that the type 


M or S issue is not really a SEC-related issue. 


We've come across this before in -- in other -- 


I 
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other evaluation reports, and it's a matter of 


selecting one or the other. It doesn't 


necessarily prevent us from bounding the doses. 


I think it's still our position that uranium 


diuranate, yellowcake, if you will, is truly 


more represented by type M than S, and maybe we 


just haven't done a good enough job documenting 


that. 


The second issue I think is -- is a more 


substantial one, as John raised. But we did 


have our own expert chemist from Clemson 


University review this document and we're -- we 


were fairly convinced that the -- and my 


knowledge of uranium and thorium chemistry -- I 


happened to work at that for a while as one of 


my jobs -- tends to indicate that uranium is 


much more similar to thorium in its -- its 


chemical processing parameters -- for the most 


part; there are differences -- and we believe 


that it follows through the process. But 


again, we could meet and discuss our various 


opinions there and maybe come to some -- some 


ground. 


You also would have to entertain the 


possibility that there is some -- some sperry 

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cake or something process, if you will, similar 


to Mallinckrodt where the thorium was existing 


in concentrated form. If in fact the thorium 


tracked with the phosphogypsum phase, you've 


essentially diluted this thorium in sort of a 


gamesh* of materials that would make it 


somewhat -- you know, a very low concentration 


contaminant, not -- not really that 


dosimetrically significant. We believe we've 


optimized that by including it in the uranium 


inhalation product. But again, we're open for 


discussion on that -- that issue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Dr. Melius? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I have a comment and then a 


question for Jim. My comment is just to note 


that I think one of the things that came up at 


our December meeting in Naperville about this ­

- I think when we first talked about this site 


and it was when we set up the workgroup -- was 


the issue -- need to do a site visit and I was 


pleased to see that that site visit was as 


helpful as it was in terms of better defining 


the work process there and -- and how people 


may have been exposed. And certainly something 


that -- kinds of information you don't get from 

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the sort of the more generic worker interviews 


or case interviews that are -- that are done as 


-- as part of the dose reconstruction process, 


so I was glad that was followed through on and 


I was glad to see that it was -- proved to be 


helpful. That was my comment. 


My question concerns -- I believe there was an 


issue about sort of definition of the -- of the 


site and scope of the site and so forth and at 


the -- came up again at the Naperville meeting, 


and I believe sometime after that there was a 


letter from DOL clarifying that. That's 


certainly part of the public record now on -- 


on -- on this site and I just would like to 


have someone -- Jim, if you could, or whoever 


else could explain sort of the process behind 


that and -- and what the conclusions were and 


if -- I guess if I'm putting anybody on the 


spot, I mean I certainly would like -- that's 


something that we could at least discuss with 


the workgroup if we can't discuss it here 


'cause I think it's germane to what -- we've 


been talking about that site for a long time 


and may or may not but -- affect our 


discussions of the SEC petition, but I'd like 

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to get some-- something on the record about it. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim, can you respond to that? 


DR. NETON: I guess I'm not exactly clear what 


-- what the question is, other than how we came 


about deciding eventually that the other -- 


balance of the plant -- exposures in the 


balance of the plant were covered exposure? 


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


DR. NETON: Is that the question? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --


DR. NETON: Yeah. It was our opinion early on 


that -- we knew that there was this oxidation 


step, and essentially what that was was the 


addition of chlorine bleach, to use the common 


term, to the phosphoric acid line to make sure 


the uranium remained in the right oxidation 


state to optimize recovery of the -- of the -- 


of the product. It didn't appear to us that 


that was really something that would involve 


much exposure. If one would -- someone had to 


naively think about this, just go and every 


once in a while inject some -- some chlorine 


bleach into what is essentially a closed 


pipeline going through the plant. 

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But then when we looked a little closer at the 


definition, I -- I have the definition written 


here. I didn't read it, but it talks about 


Building 55 as the covered facility, but on the 


DOE web site it also says (reading) This 


listing is also intended to cover the AEC-


funded lab, pilot plant and oxidation process 


related to work in Building 55. 


When you start adding the pilot plant and then 


the oxidation process, if you look at that a 


little closer, they did several things. They 


added chlorine bleach or sodium hyposulfite or 


something like that, I forget what it was. 


But they also, we learned in more detail, 


looking at some records we obtained, modified 


the calcining process. Now that's a fairly 


messy process when you start, you know, 


basically charring off the organics from 


phosphate rock. And once we learned that, we 


realized then that then you have processes in 


the balance of the plant that were modified 


specifically for the uranium production that 


would expose these workers to the progeny of 


the uranium. 


So it was -- now that -- that parenthetical 

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thing that I just read -- the AEC-funded lab, 


pilot plant, oxidation processes -- were not in 


the original definition on the DOE web site. 


I'll be honest with you, I don't remember when 


it was added, but at some point it showed up 


there and -- and -- and, you know, when we 


looked very closely after the Naperville 


meeting, it was there, clear as day and -- and 


you know, we looked at it much more -- examined 


it much more closely and that's how we came up 


with our decision. 


I don't know if that's helpful or not. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Does that answer your question, 

Jim? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, it -- it -- it actually 

helps. There's a letter on the web site and 


the -- dated February of 2007 to Larry from 


Pete Turcic --


DR. NETON: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- regarding this issue and 


providing some clarification. I -- I think 


it's better to deal with it in the workgroup 


issue. I don't want to take up more time here. 


I was trying to get -- better understand the 


process and how it affected our decisions 

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and... 


 DR. WADE: But no need to follow up with DOL in 


terms of this --


 DR. MELIUS: Not -- not at this point. I was 


just -- I -- I think -- I think Jim and Larry 


and others can provide adequate -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- clarification. 

 DR. ZIEMER: It might be appropriate now if we 

heard from petitioners. Do we have petitioners 


on the line for Blockson? 


 MR. KELLOGG: Yes, we have one --


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, you do. 


 MR. KELLOGG: -- Dennis -- Dennis Kellogg from 


Chicago. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) Martin from 


Joliet. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay, we have two. 


MS. PENCETTI: Cathy Pencetti from San Diego. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Three, okay. Other --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) from 


(unintelligible), Illinois. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


MS. WALSH: Mary Walsh from (unintelligible), 


Illinois. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we have quite a few. Do we 


 MR. KELLOGG: Your Honor, I'd like to start. 


I'm on the -- I'm the attorney that started the 


petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Give us your name again for 


the record. 


 MR. KELLOGG: Dennis Kellogg, K-e-l-l-o-g-g. 


MS. PENCETTI: And I'm the petitioner for -- 


Number 58, Cathy Pencetti. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Why don't we have the first 


petitioner begin then. 


 MR. KELLOGG: Okay. It was very difficult to 


hear everything but I'll try to just make my 


points 'cause I could not hear what was going 


on, for the most part. 


But basically we would challenge the concept 


that this is appropriate for dose 


reconstruction and we've have four or five 


arguments in that regard. Number one, the -- 


most of the data's based on estimates with 


incomplete underlying points. So in other 


words, 25 workers is not enough workers to 


really come to the conclusions that you're 


coming to -- seem to be coming to. The 

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monitoring was based on five workers. The 


assumption was that each worker worked 40 


hours, but there was numerous testimony and 


representations of excessive overtime, so that 


the exposure would be based on a higher -- 


higher on that basis alone. 


As far as production, I think it was addressed 


today but I did not get a understanding of it. 


But my understanding was from the USA Today
 

articles, the production was in the 


neighborhood of two million pounds, and the 


figures that I think were used for your data 


was -- was like 500,000 pounds, about one-


quarter of that amount. 


 The radon levels were not addressed properly. 


They were not addressed in a way that would be 


meaningful. 


The -- we would be asking to postpone it -- 


postpone a decision to clarify the discrepancy 


in production and to hold a meeting for any 


other -- other -- more data to be inputted 


(sic) in and we'd be asking for a focus on that 


radon issue. 


We -- we feel that the -- though unfortunately 


we have -- you have some brilliant people 

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working over there, but I think the problem is 


that the -- they just have an incomplete amount 


of data and they're reaching some extreme 


conclusions based unfortunately on not enough 


information. This is a very appropriate 


situation for a special cohort status because 


we're talking about a large number of people 


with a large number of exposure, and the 


amounts of information directly available is 


not really sufficient to make all these extreme 


and broad conclusions that are being made. 


I do respect your opportunity and have your 


attention, and I think that's pretty much what 


I wanted to say and I appreciate your 


consideration. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. Then 


we'll hear from the other petitioner. 


MS. PENCETTI: Yeah, I would have to agree with 


some of the things that Mr. Kellogg -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Give us your name --


MS. PENCETTI: -- brought up. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- for the record -- give us your 


MS. PENCETTI: Oh, I'm sorry --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- name again. 

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MS. PENCETTI: Cathy Pencetti, and I'm in San 


Diego. There was a lot of usage of the words 


"estimates", "assumptions" and it's -- it's 


kind of similar to what you were talking about 


when you were reviewing the Bethlehem Steel 


that how much of information that you got from 


other sites can be extrapolated and applied to 


this site. There was on a couple of pages in 


the report, page 39 and 40, where they used the 


estimate of eight hours a day, one day a week, 


standing a foot from the drum. And I just 


wondered what a person did the other, you know, 


72 hours that they usually worked that week, 


'cause there was a lot of people working 


doubles. That was more typical than out of the 


norm, and I know that was another estimation, 


but when the guys go on vacation or are out 


sick -- like my dad was in the hospital for 


three weeks during that week, specifically 


because of this stuff -- someone had to cover 


his job. So if you are doing the hopper, if 


you're covering for somebody else, you don't 


keep doing the hopper; you do the other stage 


that you're covering for. So there was a lot 


of cross-training and a lot of people doing a 

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little bit of everything. So I wanted to bring 


that out. 


And also there was a comment regarding 111 


applications were submitted and 102 were 


complete as far as the dose reconstructions, 


and I wondered if that was based on this report 


or was that prior to this report being 


completed, or what? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think those perhaps were the 


Department of Labor numbers that were presented 


to us. Does anyone know for sure? Yes. 


MR. TOMES: The -- the numbers that was in the 


-- in the presentation, 111, those were the 


actual --


 DR. ZIEMER: Those were -- okay, those were -- 


MR. TOMES: Those were the actual claims 


submitted to NIOSH --


 DR. ZIEMER: To NIOSH. 


MR. TOMES: -- from DOL that fit into the -- 


the proposed class. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Did you hear that? 


MS. PENCETTI: Yeah, and 102 of those were 


approved to be added to the class, or... 


MR. TOMES: Those were -- those were the ones 


that had dose reconstructions completed. 

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MS. PENCETTI: Based on this information? 


Based on this report? 


MR. TOMES: I'm sorry, I didn't understand that 


question. 


MS. PENCETTI: Okay, it said that 102 dose 


reconstructions were completed? 


MR. TOMES: Yes, ma'am. 


MS. PENCETTI: And that was based on 


information from this report? 


MR. TOMES: That was based pre-- those were 


previously completed, prior -- prior -- you 


know, back -- as of a few weeks ago. 


UNIDENTIFIED: As of a few weeks ago? 


MR. TOMES: Yes, sir. 


UNIDENTIFIED: May I jump in here just for a 


second? It was my understanding -- I couldn't 


hear --


 DR. ZIEMER: Give us your name. 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- being said, but I -- from 


what I could hear, the little bit I could hear, 


I -- I thought that you were still in the 


process. Is that correct? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: And the second thing is, those 


who submitted a claim, all of them will be 

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reviewed, even the ones that were denied. Is 


that correct, also? 


DR. NETON: Yes, that's correct. We're going 


to go back and look at all of those 102 cases 


that have been completed thus far and reevaluate them in light of the new information 


that's included in this site profile. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, and from what I was able 


to pick up, we have some real issues to resolve 


as to the outcome of this -- this dose 


reconstruction. Is that correct? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Like when you talked about 


thorium M and thorium S, and then whether or 


not the plant -- after the -- after the project 


was finished, the plant was still exposed, 


you're still looking at that, is that correct? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on, we're getting a lot of 


background noise. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I could hear that. 


 DR. WADE: (Unintelligible) an argument of some 


type. 


UNIDENTIFIED: My question is, I -- it appears 


that you're looking more closely at that site 


and the fact that these workers were still 

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possibly exposed, even after the project was 


over. Is that correct? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, that is included in the -- in 


the site profile. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, and have -- have you come 


to any conclusions on that? I couldn't hear 


the whole --


DR. NETON: Yes, we have a -- a method in place 


in the -- in the new site profile to deal with 


exposure to workers after the production of 


uranium was -- was completed. 


UNIDENTIFIED: So that tells me that you have 


taken in consideration that there could be some 


exposure --


DR. NETON: Oh, yes, definitely. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, sounds like you -- it 


sounds like you still have work to do. Right? 


 DR. ZIEMER: And ma'am, we need your name for 


the record here. 


 MS. MARTIN: Oh, my name is Gertrude Martin and 


I'm speaking on behalf of [Name Redacted]. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: Yes, so you understand the process, 


Gertrude, NIOSH has presented its evaluation 


report to the Board. This Board will have a 

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working group begin to look at issues 


surrounding that evaluation report, so there is 


still work to be done. 


 MS. MARTIN: That's good. 


 DR. WADE: As this -- as this workgroup does 


its work, we will try and notify all of you of 


its meetings so that you can participate and 


bring your expertise to bear on the workgroup's 


discussions. 


 MS. MARTIN: That sounds very good. I 


appreciate that. I couldn't hear everything, 


but that part that I did hear made me feel that 


you were really digging into this and doing a 


better job than -- than was done the first 


time. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are there any other comments from 


the petitioners? 


MS. WALSH: My name is Mary Walsh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mary. 


MS. WALSH: And my father did a lot of shift 


work and he was on -- he always called it 


vacation relief, so he always took someone 


else's part of the -- their job while they 


weren't there. And I just want to say there 

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was a lot of shift work, so you can't say when 


you were there, you know, because I don't think 


they kept the records like we do now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay. Thank you. Any other 


comments from the petitioners? 


 MS. MACK: Yes, my name's Monica Mack. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MS. MACK: My dad was an electrician out there 


and he would be called in all hours of the 


night when they had emergencies, especially 


when it snowed and blizzards, and he was hardly 


ever home 'cause he kept getting called into 


work 'cause of emergencies. And I don't know 


how they can use eight-hour shifts because my 


dad never had eight-hour shifts out there. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. A comment here 


from NIOSH. 


MR. TOMES: I'd just like to address the eight-


hour shift. We -- we haven't assumed that 


workers worked strictly eight-hour shifts. We 


-- we've got an exposure model and we assigned 


an uncertainty to it that they were exposed in 


close proximity to the source in -- for eight 


hours per week, being the drum, but we applied 

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an uncertainty to it that they were also 


exposed at other times. 


 MS. MACK: Yeah, 'cause yours is based on 


eight-hour work shifts, according to your 


paperwork. 


MR. TOMES: That -- that is part of the 


distribution we're using, yes, that they were 


in close proximity for eight hours. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Okay, Board 


members, further questions? 


 DR. WADE: Just for the record, the workgroup 


is chaired by Wanda Munn, members Roessler, 


Melius, Gibson and Brad Clawson an alternate. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now it -- it appears, from what 


the chair of the workgroup said and from other 


comments, that there perhaps is additional work 


to be done. Do we need a motion to that 


effect? 


 MS. MUNN: We can -- I can --


 DR. ZIEMER: We can move deferring action on 


this report until the workgroup is able to 


complete its activities and report back, for 


examp--


 MS. MUNN: That was my intent, coming into this 

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meeting, that we would defer action until the 


working group had in fact worked out the issues 


that have been pointed out by SC&A and brought 


forth by some of the petitioners in their 


comments today. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, so you are making such a 


motion? 


 MS. MUNN: I will in fact request that we 


postpone further -- that the Board postpone its 


deliberation on -- or its final deliberation on 


Blockson until the workgroup has had an 


opportunity to meet, with the expectation that 


we will bring a recommendation to you at the 


October meeting. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is there a second? 


 DR. MELIUS: I'll second. I want a chance for 


some consensus on something, so -- 


 DR. WADE: Got to be (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let the record show that Dr. 


Melius has seconded Ms. Munn's motion. 


 MS. MUNN: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is there any discussion on this 


motion, Board members? 


 (No responses) 


Are you ready to vote? All in favor, aye? 

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 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed, no? 


 (No responses) 


 Gen Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Aye. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Aye, thank you. The ayes have it. 


 DR. WADE: One quick -- is there any chance we 


could select a date for that meeting now? We 


have the petitioners on the line. It would be 


wonderful. If not, we'll do it tomorrow. 


 MS. MUNN: I'm certainly prepared to have 


requests from anyone else. I've already 


mentioned by e-mail to other members of the 


working group that since we are -- since -- 


since we have other activities going on in 


Cincinnati on the last week of August, it would 


be helpful from my perspective if we could look 


at that time period as a possibility, possibly 


the Tuesday of that week. I believe that would 


be the 25th. 


 DR. WADE: Tuesday of the last week of August 


is the -- the last -- is the 28th, unless 


you're picky about the fact that Saturday is 


the 1st of September. So the Tuesday of the 


last week of August is the 28th of August. 

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 DR. MELIUS: I'm available that day. 


 DR. WADE: Gen, the 28th of August for a 


workgroup meeting on Blockson? 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Mike? 


 MR. GIBSON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. WADE: Okay, do you want to pick a time 

today? 

 MS. MUNN: Is there any reason why the rest of 

you cannot meet at 10:00 o'clock that day in 


Cincinnati, at one of the airport hotels? 


DR. ROESSLER: Sounds good. 


 MS. MUNN: SC&A and NIOSH folks, is that okay? 


I'm getting nodding heads. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we have the meeting time set 


for that workgroup to continue its exploration. 


 DR. WADE: For the petitioners and -- and 


interested workers, the workgroup has agreed to 


meet at 10:00 a.m. on August 28th. They'll be 


meeting in Cincinnati, but there will be an 


ability for you to call in, and I promise you 


it will be a better system than this. We've 


used the hotels in Cincinnati and the quality 


of sound will be much better. We'll be getting 


out call-in numbers for you. We'll notify you 

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individually after this, but just so you get 


your first inclination of the 28th of August at 


10:00 a.m. 

UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 

UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 

UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 

UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 

 DR. WADE: And please, if you can -- 


MS. PENCETTI: Can I have one more thing to be 


added to the workgroup list of things to look 


at in that meeting? This is Cathy in San Diego 


again. 


 DR. WADE: Please. 


MS. PENCETTI: Okay, on page 26 you refer to 


the urine samples ranging from zero to 17 UGs 


of uranium per liter, and then the range was 


dropped from two and 3.8 and there's no 


explanation why -- why the average is so much 


lower than the 17. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, they can follow up on that 


with you, yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. 


MS. PENCETTI: All right. 


 DR. WADE: And thank you for bearing up with 

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the difficult sound system here. You make our 


work better, certainly. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Well, thank you for letting us 


in on the meeting. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. The Board is 


going to take a break now and we'll resume at ­

- at 3:00 -- at 4:00 o'clock actually for the 


Ames discussion. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we have a -- we have -- the 


timeliness discussion we have, as well, so 


maybe a shorter break? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We can, how -- 20 -- we're going 


to take a break now, in any case. 


 DR. WADE: Come back quickly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: I would like to broach the 


timeliness issue --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- and get it discussed --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: -- if we could. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll have time for the timeliness 


issue. 

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 DR. MELIUS: If we don't make it back on time, 


start without us. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:35 p.m. 


to 3:55 p.m.) 


 DR. MELIUS: Let the record show that I was on 


time for the timeliness discussion. 


 DR. WADE: And who wasn't? 


TIMELINESS DISCUSSION


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. We will try to stick as 


close as we can to the Ames schedule at 4:00, 


but we want to at least get underway with the 


time-- timeliness discussion. And to kick that 


off, we need -- we need advice from legal 


counsel on what the word means, so Emily has a 


timely presentation for us. 


 DR. WADE: As Emily walks to the microphone -- 


I mean this is -- we will constantly be faced 


with the -- the pressures of timely versus 


complete versus accurate versus fair versus 


uniform, and I think we need to discuss it 


periodically. And I asked Emily just to -- to 


refresh us as to where the word appears in -- 


in the governing documents. 


 MS. HOWELL: So at Lew's direction what I've 

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done is just gone through and found some 


various places where the Act and the 


regulations, as well as the Executive Order, 


discuss timeliness, first beginning with the 


Act, EEOICPA. 


 In Section 73.84(d) under the establishment of 


the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 


Compensation Program, letter (b), purpose of 


program, that reads (reading) The purpose of 


the compensation program is to provide for 


timely, uniform and adequate compensation of 


covered employees and, where applicable, 


survivors of such employees suffering from 


illnesses incurred by such employees in the 


performance of duty for the Department of 


Energy and certain of its contractors and 


subcontractors. 


And that's pretty much the only place within 


the actual Act itself that timeliness comes 


into play for Part B and what this Board is 


concerned with. 


 DR. WADE: And there you have the tension 


between timely and uniform. 


 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Then in the Executive Order 


13179 dated December 7th of 2000, providing 

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compensation to America's nuclear weapons 


workers, timeliness appears a couple of times 


and I'll just read to you where it appears. 


 Quote, While the nation can never fully repay 


those wor-- these workers or their families, 


they deserve recognition and compensation for 


their sacrifices. Since the administration's 


historic announcement in July of 1999 that it 


intended to compensate DOE nuclear weapons 


workers who suffered occupational illnesses as 


a result of exposure to the unique hazards in 


building the nation's nuclear defense, it has 


been the policy of this administration to 


support fair and timely compensation for these 


workers and their survivors. 


Later on in that paragraph the Executive Order 


reads (reading) The Departments of Labor, 


Health and Human Services and Energy shall be 


responsible for developing and implementing 


actions under the Act to compensate these 


workers and their families in a manner that is 


compassionate, fair and timely. Other federal 


agencies, as appropriate, shall assist in this 


effort. 


 Timeliness also appears throughout the 

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discussion in the preambles in both the dose 


reconstructions and the Special Exposure Cohort 


rules. However, I'm -- the only place that it 


appears in the actual regulations themselves is 


within the Special Exposure Cohort rule found 


at 42 CFR Part 83 under section 83.1, what is 


the purpose of the procedures in this Part. It 


reads, in part, (reading) The procedures are 


also design-- I'm sorry. The procedures are 


also designed to give petitioners and 


interested parties opportunity for appropriate 


involvement in the process, and to ensure that 


the process is timely and consistent with 


requirements specified in EEOICPA. 


And then later on, under Section 83.13, how 


will NIOSH evaluate petitions other than 


petitions by claimants covered under Section 


83.14, it reads, under letter (a) -- I'm sorry, 


under letter (b), (reading) The Director of 


OCAS may determine that records and/or 


information requested from the Department of 


Energy, an AWE or other source to evaluate a 


petition is not or will not be available on a 


timely basis. Such a determination will be 


treated, for the purposes of the petition 

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evaluation, as equivalent to a finding that the 


records and/or information requested are not 


available. 


So those are the main instances where 


timeliness comes up. There's some other 


scattered references that aren't really 


germane, but if anybody has any questions... 


 DR. ZIEMER: So it appears that the definition 


doesn't actually appear, that it's -- 


timeliness in the regulation almost is in the 


eye of the beholder. What -- there is not a -- 


a clear-cut definition. 


 MS. HOWELL: Correct, there are other deadlines 


associated with the program -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, right, right. 


 MS. HOWELL: -- but timeliness itself is kind 


of a general --


 DR. WADE: Value. 


 MS. HOWELL: -- value, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Comments on 


that -- and Lew, now do you want to add to that 


at this point? 


 DR. WADE: No, I mean I think it's obvious it ­

- that timely, as opposed to or in competition 


with fair, uniform, compassionate, consistent, 

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those are the issues that we face on the Board. 


I think we've been through enough that we start 


to know where the pinch points are, and I think 


periodically we need to talk about them and 


decide how to deal with them. It not only 


applies to NIOSH and DOE and DOL, but it 


applies to us as a Board, as well. And so I 


don't have any magic to say to you other than I 


think it's -- it's a value we all aspire to. 


think we need to talk about it and how we're 


doing and how we can do better at it. And I'd 


like to spend some time tomorrow talking about 


that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, okay. Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


to add quickly (on microphone) two other 


adjectives -- competing adjectives, if -- to go 


on with what Lew said, thoroughness and 


completeness. I think we've -- we've certainly 


run up against that question of timely versus 


complete-- or thoroughness, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: All right. Okay. Well, that's a 


good prelude to -- tomorrow you can give some 


thought to what we might do other than keep the 


value in mind as we proceed and make sure that 


I 
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in -- in giving attention to the other values, 


that we don't neglect the issue of timeliness. 


Is there --


 DR. WADE: I don't know if Robert Stephan -- I 


know Robert Stephan had a desire to -- to make 


mention of issues -- is Robert with us? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, so be it. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And -- on this issue? 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, on timeliness. This is 


Senator Obama's staffer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. If -- if Robert does come 


on the line, why we can insert that at some 


point if necessary. 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


AMES SEC


 DR. ZIEMER: Let's then proceed with 


consideration of the Ames SEC. We're going to 


hear from LaVon Rutherford from NIOSH, and then 


we do -- let me check and see if the 


petitioners are on the line. Dr. Fuortes, is 


he -- are you on the line? 


 DR. FUORTES: Yes, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. How about Bob Staggs? 


 MR. STAGGS: Present, sir. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: And Ralph Applegate? I was told 


Ralph may not be on the line, but after we hear 


from LaVon and then we'll hear from Dr. Fuortes 


and from Mr. Staggs. LaVon. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. Thank 


you to the Board and public for giving me this 


opportunity to speak on behalf of NIOSH and our 


evaluation of the Ames SEC petition, and that's 


SEC-00075. 


Some of you may recall we actually have added a 


class for Ames for the years -- roughly 1943 


through 195-- end of 1954, and that will come 


up during the discussion. 


 This petition was actually received on October 


26th, 2006. We qualified the petition on 


January 30th, 2007, and we issued our report 


May 11th, 2007 to the Board and the 


petitioners. 


 The petition was submitted to NIOSH on behalf 


of a class of employees. It was focused on 


maintenance workers, sheet metal workers, other 


workers of that type that were involved in 


maintenance and renovation activities in 


Wilhelm Hall during the period of January 1, 


1955 through December 31st of 1970. Their 

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basis that the petitioner provided was that 


there was no monitoring data for these 


employees who conducted these renovation and 


remediation or maintenance activities during 


this time period. 


We reviewed the existing claims which we had, 


which we had eight claims at the time, and 


determined that there was no monitoring data 


for those individuals and we qualified the 


petition. 


As indicated, we have determined that, by our 


review, we have eight claims that currently 


would fall within the cla-- the current class 


definition, as defined. However, the final 


determination is made by the Department of 


Labor. 


The Ames Laboratory actually started thorium 


production operations before the Wilhelm Hall 


operations. They actually started thorium 


production operations in 1943, or -- or around 


that time period. They were doing uranium 


production work. They designed -- came up with 


a uranium process for making -- or for coming 


up with uranium metal, and then they were asked 


to look at doing a similar process for thorium. 

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They started work on that in the early 1940s or 


around 1943 time frame in a building called 


Little Ankeny or -- it was the old ladies' 


gymnasium, and from 1943 through 1949 period 


the thorium production work was conducted in 


that facility. 


In 1949 they had built a new facility, Wilhelm 


Hall. It was actually called the Metallurgy 


Building, and they moved thorium production 


operations from the Little Ankeny to Wilhelm 


Hall. In Wilhelm Hall they conducted thorium 


operations from 1949 through 1953. They -- at 


that time period they -- they turned over the 


thorium production operation, or that process, 


to industry. And from that point they moved 


away from thorium production. 


There was a D&D effort that was conducted at 


that time period at Wilhelm Hall removing 


equipment -- they focused mainly on removing 


equipment from the facility. The radiological 


operations we're going to look at are actually 


to a class of -- the class of workers I had 


mentioned, the maintenance workers, sheet metal 


workers and support staff that did renovation 


and remediation activities from 1955 through 

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1970 in the Wilhelm Hall facility. 


 During this evaluation we looked at a number of 


sources for information. A lot of these are 


standard sources that we go through when we're 


doing this. We looked at Technical Information 


Bulletins that ORAU has already developed to 


see if they would help us in our evaluation. 


We looked at the Ames Laboratory site profile. 


We did interviews with former Ames Laboratory 


employees. We interviewed not only workers 


involved during that time period, but we also 


interviewed a health physicist who was actually 


working during that time period, in 1963 to 


1970, to get his input on how much, you know, 


radiological monitoring and exposure -- or -- 


and -- and coverage was provided to these 


employees, and to the relative hazard. 


We looked at case files in the NIOSH database. 


We looked at the site research database. We 


looked at -- and then we reviewed a lot of 


information -- Dr. Fuortes did a great job of 


providing information to us during the 


evaluation, as well as the petitioners. And 


then we reviewed affidavits provided by those 


petitioners. 

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 The occupational exposures that employees 


within the class may have -- or dur-- these 


operations could have caused exposures to the 


employees during -- internal and external 


exposures to the employees -- painting and 


sealing spots of contamination -- and this is 


not all-inclusive; remediation activities are 


kind of broad, and maintenance activities, as 


well, but these are some of the -- some of the 


things that we've actually defined during our 


evaluation -- removing and replacing 


contaminated duct work, removing contamination 


(sic) lab hoods, dismantling machine shop, 


removing ceiling and floor tile, and removing 


contaminated roof equipment. 


 Principal external exposures, from this 


activity of remediation of thorium-contaminated 


equipment, there's not a significant external 


exposure from that activity of beta-gamma 


external exposure. However, there -- there are 


-- there were other exposures that were 


occurring at the Ames site. I just want to 


make note of that. This class -- this activity 


and -- and class is not really part of that, 


but there were other exposures at the Ames 

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Laboratory and -- and I will discuss how they 


relate to this evaluation later. 


The principal internal exposures were from 


thorium -- from inhalation and ingestion of 


thorium-contaminated equipment during the 


remediation and renovation process. 


I will make note that there is a report -- if 


you look on the X drive -- a report on an 


assessment of the thorium-2-- thorium-232 


hazards, uranium-238 and beryllium hazards 


associated with Wilhelm Hall. It was actually 


-- it was done in 1998 and it was done -- 


written by a health physicist and it's a pretty 


detailed report. In that report you'll find 


that inaccessible areas to -- inaccessible 


areas to the routine workers within a facility, 


such as pipe runs, pipe tunnels, things like 


that, areas where maintenance staff may -- may 


go into, there were contamination levels in 


that actual 19-- and post-1970 that -- in 


excess of 10 CFR 835 limits, occupational 


exposure limits. So even up through this -- 


after this class period, there is contamination 


that you can recognize that -- you know, prior 


to that that there was probably much higher 

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contamination prior to the remediation 


activities. 


External monitoring data -- Ames Laboratory 


started their film badge monitoring in 1953. 


However, the focus was on professional level 


staff workers that worked at the operations 


where there were known radiation hazards. So a 


lot of the support staff were not mon-- or were 


not provided film badges, and that's kind of 


consistent with what we've found with the -- 


our data we have with the existing claimants. 


Of the eight claimants, none of them had 


external monitoring data. 


 Internal monitoring data -- there was thorium ­

- some thorium bioassay that was done in 


1952/'53 time period at the end of the actual 


production operations -- thorium production 


operations that -- that was actually pushed by 


I think HASL and -- and their involvement at 


that time. And -- but there was no thorium 


bioassay data after 1953. 


 I've included the tritium bioassay data just to 


give you an understa-- indication of there was 


-- there was monitoring that occurred at Ames 


for other activities, and tritium bioassay data 

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-- we have that from 1965 through 1981, and 


that was for work that was being done with the 


five megawatt heavy water research reactor. 


 Again, we have no internal monitoring data for 


the class. 


As you've seen earlier with Jim's evaluation -- 


with his presentation, the two-pronged test: 


Is it feasible to estimate the level of 


radiation dose of individual members of the 


class with sufficient accuracy; and is there a 


reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses 


may have endangered the health of members of 


the class. 


NIOSH found that the available monitoring 


records, process description and source term 


data are insufficient to complete dose 


reconstruction for the proposed class of 


employees. NIOSH currently lacks access to 


sufficient informa-- monitoring source term 


data and process information to estimate the 


internal dose from thorium. 


NIOSH found that we were available to 


reconstruct other radionuclides. However, 


recognize that -- that associated with this 


activity of renovation and remediation there -- 

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there is no real other -- other isotopes to 


deal with for this given activity. 


I will give an example for the tritium 


monitoring data that we -- I discussed earlier. 


The site profile has a coworker model that was 


developed based on the data that they had from 


1965 through 1981, the operation-- operational 


years. 


NIOSH found that the available external 


monitoring data, process description and source 


term data are sufficient to reconstruct 


occupational beta-gamma exposures, including 


medical X-rays. And the reason why we came up 


-- even though there was no monitoring data -- 


in fact there's -- you know, when I say there's 


no monitoring data, internal or external, there 


-- there is no personal monitoring, either 


bioassay or film badge; there is no dose rate 


surveys; there is no air samples; there are no 


contamination surveys or anything during that 


class period. So -- but the external component 


we feel we can -- we can reconstruct the 


external component based on the knowledge that 


we have of thorium with other operations, as 


well as we do have a coworker model that was 

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developed because of the -- the exposures -- 


the significant external exposure at the site 


was from other activities. A coworker model 


has been developed that addresses the external 


exposure. 


NIOSH has determined that is it not feasible to 


complete dose reconstruction with sufficient 


accuracy and health of employees was 


endangered. And evidence reviewed indicates 


that workers in the class received chronic 


internal and external exposures from 


remediation, renovation of former thorium and 


uranium production facilities. 


I would like to correct that somewhat. That 


slide -- it says thorium and uranium production 


facilities. The actual uranium production was 


at -- was not at this facility at all. The 


only uranium work that was at this facility, by 


the records, are R&D type activities that were 


conducted. 


 Recommended class definition is sheet metal 


workers and physical plant maintenance and 


associated support staff who were monitored, or 


should have been monitored, for potential 


internal radiation exposures associated with 

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the maintenance and renovation activities of 


the thorium production areas in Wilhelm Hall, 


also known as Metallurgy Building or Old 


Metallurgy Building, at the Ames Laboratory for 


the time period from January 1, 1955 through 


December 31st, 1970. 


And I won't read the other part. It just 


basically says 250 days or aggregated. 


Okay, in summary -- and -- NIOSH feels that we 


cannot reconstruct the internal component to 


thorium-232 or the progeny. We do feel that 


other ex-- internal doses can be reconstructed, 


and all external components can be 


reconstructed. 


However, let me point out in this slide as 


well, the neutron component -- there was no 


neutron component associated with this 


activity. There were neutron exposures at the 


site in which -- the site profile has a -- a 


methodology for reconstructing the neutron 


component, and those neutrons were from 


neutron-generating devices, so... 


Come on. Okay, quit on me. Thanks, Jim. Is 


that a lessons learned? Okay. 


 So our recommendations for the period of 

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January 1, 1955 through December 31st, 1970, 


NIOSH finds that radiation dose estimates for 


thorium-232 and progeny cannot be 


reconstructed, so our feasibility is no and our 


health endangerment is yes. 


That's it. Questions? 


 DR. ZIEMER: LaVon, could I ask you to clarify 


a couple of things --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- in the report. I was looking 


at Table 6-1 which delineates the dosimeter 


program at Ames and it lists various vendors or 


suppliers of --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Landauer and --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- film badge and so on. I -- I 


see Land-- in fact, that was my question. I 


see Landauer in your reference list. I don't 


see them as a provider. Are they -- did I miss 


something here? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, I -- and Tom may be able 


to correct me if I'm wrong in here. I think we 


checked with Landauer and -- and their -- but I 


don't think for -- and I would -- I'd have to 


go back and check on that for sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, in -- in fact, all of these 

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Landauer references seem to be for years beyond 


this pro-- this petition, so I was wondering 


what -- what that meant in the reference list. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, like I said, I think we 


checked with Landauer because they took over a 


lot of those operations -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Later. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, so you were just checking -- 


'cause it's -- Landauer's in the reference list 


but not mentioned as -- okay. 


Are you allowed to say who you contacted, or is 


that privileged information? On these 


references it --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- it identifies people as -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I can give you job titles, or 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, there are some -- okay, let 


-- that will help me. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me give you the reference and 


you can tell me the job title. I think I can 


figure out -- I'm wanting to make sure that you 


contacted a certain person. Personal 

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communication with a health 


physicist/industrial hygienist who worked from 


'63 to '93. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That person --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Do you want --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, is -- is that the job title? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: You just said it was a health 


physicist. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, but --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: He was -- the individual -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- was he the radiation safety 


officer, is what I'm going to ask. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: At that time, you know, I -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh -- we'll talk separately then. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I don't --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We do--


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: You're not --


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: -- (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- oh, no, we're not allow-- he's 


not allowed to say the name. Is that right? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I actually --

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MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: (Off microphone) It depends 


on what that person's doing at the time 


(unintelligible) interview them and what they 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I'll --


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: (Off microphone) It's not a 


(unintelligible) question I can stand up and 


answer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- I'll just waive that. I was 


just --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I -- I -- you know, I will -- 


you know, I think --


 DR. ZIEMER: It's not -- it's not going to end 


up being pertinent to (unintelligible). 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: This individual actually 


worked at another AEC site prior to his period 


in 1963 when he started, and -- and they -- he 


was hired as industrial hygienist/health 


physicist. His main reason for hiring was for 


res-- the research reactor that they were 


building at the time and he was going to work 


on that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: However, he was asked to 


provide additional support as needed. And you 


know, I think it's a good -- since you brought 


it up, you know, one of his -- I -- I brought 


that interview with me because that was one of 


the interviews that we -- we really -- I mean 


you take all the interviews' information and 


everything, but one of the things this person 


said is he confirmed his view that most of the 


renovation work and most hazardous renovation 


work performed in Wilhelm Hall occurred from 


1960 through 1966 and that the work involved 


was poorly monitored, if at all. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: So... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments or 


questions? Mark Griffon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just a -- a question in terms of 


the way you define the class, same old kind of 


question that we --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- run across, you know -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: You know, we took the -- and I 


-- I know where you're coming from. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The who -- the who question, huh? 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: How are we going to identify 


these people and have you considered how many 


people this likely covers, is it -- in terms of 


who would fall into that category, is it most 


the... 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, all I'm -- we actually 


talked to -- we actually talked to Department 


of Labor, and I'm not going to speak for the 


Department of Labor, but I will tell you that ­

- that it would be very difficult for -- for -- 


it -- maintenance personnel worked all over the 


site, just leave it at that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, a follow-up to that, I -- I 


guess I was a little confused about why specif­

- why specifically you separated out sheet 


metal workers then. It -- it --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: That was a specific title that 


was given to us by the petitioner as a -- as a 


separate title that -- during that period and 


clearly the sheet metal workers removing the 


duct work and rein-- putting in new duct work 


would have fallen with-- easily fallen within 


that class. 

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 DR. MELIUS: You -- you know, and I understand 


that, but it just seems that they're also 


encompassed under maintenance and -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- that -- that's just -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: All maintenance --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and shop personnel includes 

them. 

 DR. MELIUS: I mean I don't object to --

 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- including them, it just -- is 


there some sort of distinction or something? 


wouldn't --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No --


 DR. MELIUS: -- think so. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- I -- I don't think there 


is. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other questions? 


 (No responses) 


Well, let's then hear from Dr. Fuortes. Are 


you still there, sir? 


 DR. FUORTES: I -- I'm here. I -- I really 


have nothing to add other than thank you. Bob 


I 
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Staggs can clarify much better than -- than I 


can individuals or groups at highest risk. We 


-- we tried to be relatively narrow in -- in 


terms of ensuring that -- that we write down -- 


applying a population who we thought were at 


significant risk. We -- we could have 


certainly id-- identified the population in the 


same air space or -- but -- but that just 


seemed very complicated and so I -- I worked 


with Bob to try to identify who are the people 


who worked in the basement or in the production 


areas who probably had the highest exposure 


that these maintenance workers and -- and 


technical staff are the people who I think 


really did have -- have very high exposures. 


They described being completely covered with 


dust on certain days, smoking their cigarettes 


and eating their lunch completely covered with 


dust from the exhaust -- duct work and roofing 


-- sorry, roofing -- ceiling panels that they 


had been removing. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Bob, do you 


have additional comments? 


 MR. STAGGS: Yes, sir, I -- I would like to -- 


to maybe help the Board clarify your -- your 

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question of why so much of this work fell to 


the sheet metal workers. It has to be noted 


that to transform this -- this building from a 


thorium production area into conventional 


laboratory spaces that you would normally find, 


predominantly all the work really fell to the 


sheet metal people because they had to rip out, 


rudimentary as it was, the -- the older dust 


collection system that was in place during 


thorium production, from the basement to the 


roof, and also other maintenance trades were 


involved in rebuilding of walls and tearing old 


walls out and taking liners out of masonry 


chases, if you will, that went from the 


basement to the roof, and completely renovating 


those spaces from ceiling tile to floor tile. 


During production the production workers had 


the, quote, luxury, if you will, of having 


ventilation air during production, even though 


by today's standards the ventilation might have 


been somewhat rudimentary. But they sensed for 


conversion of this building to normal 


laboratory spaces, all the hoods, all the duct 


work, was necessitated to be pulled out and 


then new put in. So we see those that were 

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tearing out this duct work, they didn't have 


the luxury of -- of any ventilation and -- and 


large quantities of -- of tramp thorium were -- 


were lodged in -- in a lot of this duct work 


and -- and chases and Mr. Applegate at times 


described to me that we -- we took -- 


especially at the bottom of a chase and the 


bottom of the duct work where the air stream 


would not carry it up to the rototone* 


collector on the roof, they took this stuff out 


by the really -- they -- they used small scoops 


that you might scoop up bulk quantities at a -- 


at a older grocery store. They used those 


aluminum scoops and -- and their hands, at 


times, to remove this -- this excess material 


that had collected. So the fact that you -- 


you mention that maybe sheet metal trades you 


thought might be overly represented here, all 


of this -- all of this renovation work of this 


type really fell -- fell to them. 


Is -- is there anything else that I might -- 


might clarify there? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, that's -- that's helpful, Bob. 


I -- I think the question that arose was why 


they were separated out from other maintenance. 

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I -- I think you've indicated that certainly 


they had the -- sort of the main part of the 


job. They still are covered by the other parts 


of the statement, but -- so it's a little 


redundant, but perhaps is of no great 


consequence as far as the -- the final 


statement is concerned. So thank you very 


much, though, for clarifying that. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Dr. Ziemer, we did -- we did 


send --


 MR. STAGGS: Cert-- certainly we're -- we're 


not saying that other trades were not involved 


in the renovation process -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, understood. 


 MR. STAGGS: -- but after the sheet metal 


workers got through their job, the bulk of the 


-- of the dirty work really -- really was 


accomplished. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, okay. Thank you. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I just wanted to --


 DR. ZIEMER: LaVon? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- note, we did share the 


class definition with the Department of Labor 


and they said they could administer the class. 


That's fine. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. LaVon, one other 


question for clarification. You -- you 


mentioned in talking about occupational 


exposure something about exceeding 10 CFR 835. 


Clarify me -- for me what -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I just -- yeah, I brought that 


up because -- you know, the remediation 


activities did not stop in 1970. There was --


there -- there was very -- there was more 


remediation activities, but the documentation, 


the survey information and everything picked 


up. And one of the assessments that was done ­

- and I'd mentioned earlier was an assessment 


of the -- you know, the mitigation of that 


hazard that was done by a health physicist, and 


the report is on the X drive for your review 


and it's actually referenced -- it's the Hokel, 


1998, I believe. And it -- it points out, you 


know, as -- or actually the assessment and -- 


and the report points out that there -- there 


was inaccessible areas to the average person 


that still had contamination in excess of 10 


CFR 835 free release limits in -- in the -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, in 1999 the --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, I --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, yeah, that was my point. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I just point --


 DR. ZIEMER: 'Cause 835 didn't exist -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- at the time of this -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- so I -- I wasn't quite clear on 


why that was referenced. It's because they 


still existed --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- at the time 835 was in effect. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. And I think the point 


was to show that -- that, you know, some people 


may think that -- you know, that there's -- 


there may have not been a great hazard. But if 


you look at the contamination levels that were 


left in '53 --


 DR. ZIEMER: After the cleanup. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- you know, exactly, you 


know, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Other comments 


or questions? 


 (No responses) 

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 Thank you, LaVon. Board members, it would be 


appropriate to have some sort of a motion on 


this recommendation. I've got three people 


wanting to make a motion. 


 MS. MUNN: No, fine -- go right ahead, John. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Robert? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I make a motion we accept this 


SEC petition. 


 MS. MUNN: Second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: A motion is made and seconded that 


we -- that we recommend to the Secretary that 


this SEC petition be approved. I've reworded 


your motion. I think that was the intent. 


 MR. PRESLEY: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


yield to the Chair (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: And it's been seconded. Is there 


discussion on the motion? 


 DR. WADE: Dr. Melius. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius, are you willing to 


amend it -- or to modify it further for a final 


vote tomorrow when we -- we'll need some more 


exact wording? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I -- I was going to ask a 


procedural question. I'd be -- certainly could 


either -- I mean it's up to how the Board would 

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-- and NIOSH I think would like to proceed. 
I 

can either offer a friendly amendment to Bob's 


motion that would I think convey the -- a -- a 


full motion verbally, or if people would rather 


read -- get it, you know, printed out and then 


we could read it in the morning and -- read it 


and then vote on it then. It's up to the Board 


how you'd prefer to proceed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I would suggest, if -- if the 


Board is comfortable with this, that we go 


ahead and -- you apparently have the wording 


ready --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and we can still get the 


printout tomorrow to see if there's any 


editorial glitches, but why not close it 


tonight --

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- if we're able to. Is that 

agreeable? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I'm --

 DR. ZIEMER: This is -- so it would now 

transform the -- Robert's motion, which I went 


through the first transformation. It would 


give us yet another transformation, put it in 

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the form to which we are accustomed as far as 


transmitting it to the Secretary. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. So if Bob will accept this 


as a friendly amendment, I will read it. 


 The Board recommends that the following letter 


be transmitted to the Secretary of Health and 


Human Services within 21 days. Should the 


Chair become aware of any issue that in his 


judgment would preclude the transmittal of this 


letter within that time period, the Board 


requests that he promptly informs the Board of 


the delay and reasons for this delay and that 


he immediately works with NIOSH to schedule 


emergency meeting of the Board to discuss this 


issue. 


The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 


Health (the Board) has evaluated SEC Petition 


00075 concerning workers at the Ames Laboratory 


in Iowa under the statutory requirements 


established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 


CFR Section 83.13. The Board respectfully 


recommends Special Exposure Cohort status be 


accorded to all sheet metal workers, physical 


plant maintenance and associated support staff 


(includes all maintenance shop personnel of 

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Ames Laboratory), and supervisory staff who 


were monitored, or should have been monitored, 


for potential internal radiation exposures 


associated with the maintenance and renovation 


activities of the thorium production areas in 


Wilhelm Hall (as known as the Metallurgy 


Building or "Old" Metallurgy Building) at the 


Ames Laboratory for the time period from 


January 1st, 1955 through December 31st, 1970 


and -- and who were employed for a number of 


work days aggregating at least 250 work days 


either solely under this employment or in 


combination with work days within the 


parameters (excluding aggregated work day 


parameters) established for other classes of 


employees included in the SEC. 


 The Board notes that although NIOSH found that 


they were unable to completely reconstruct 


radiation doses for these employees, NIOSH 


believes that they are able to reconstruct 


components of the internal dose (other than 


thorium) and all external doses. This 


recommendation is based on the following 


factors: 


Number one, people working at the Ames 

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Laboratory during this time period worked on 


maintenance and renovation activities at the 


thorium production areas at Ames Laboratory. 


The NIOSH review of the available monitoring 


data, as well as the available source term and 


other information, found that they lacked 


adequate information necessary to conduct 


accurate individual dose reconstructions for 


thorium and its progeny during the time period 


in question. 


 Three, NIOSH determined that health may have 


been endangered for these Ames Laboratory 


workers. The Board concurs with this 


determination. 


Enclosed is supporting documentation from the 


recent Advisory Board meeting held in Richland, 


Washington where this Special Exposure Cohort 


was discussed. If any of these items are 


unavailable at this time, they will follow 


shortly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Do you accept that as 


a friendly amendment? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim, would you repeat the sentence 


near the beginning that says the Board 

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respectfully recommends? 


 DR. MELIUS: The Board -- it's a long one. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

 DR. MELIUS: The Board respectfully recommends 

Special Exposure Cohort, parentheses, SEC 


status be accorded to all sheet metal workers ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, that -- you can stop there. 


I wanted to make sure it was -- we had the word 


status in there now. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In the earlier letters we left 


that out and were calling it a Special Exposure 


Cohort, as opposed to a -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- a class. Okay. 


 DR. MELIUS: This is cut and pasted from the 


NIOSH --


 DR. ZIEMER: Most recent ones. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- document so I -- well, both the 


-- our most recent letter, as well as the NIOSH 


proposed definition, so I think I got it right 


-- not blame Microsoft, I guess. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Board members, are you 


ready to vote on this motion? 

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 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And we'll have written copy of it 


available for you tomorrow. Yes? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just one -- one item -- 


one item for discussion. I just wanted to ask 


LaVon about the non-thorium -- you may have 


gone over this, but the non-thorium that you 


say you can reconstruct. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: As I mentioned, for this 


activity -- the renovation and remediation 


activities -- the real exposure was only 


thorium and its progeny. And there were other 


activities at this site, and that's what I 


indicated that we could reconstruct the 


internal dose from. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And those other activities, 


though, you have no -- no data still. You're 


still in the same situation as far as data, 


though. Right? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Exactly, but we have also all 


the other professional staff workers were 


monitored internally and -- for those things, 


like tritium, we have a coworker model -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: So you do have data in that -- 


for those other --

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I (unintelligible) -- 


that's what I (unintelligible) clarify. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, we don't have -- for 


those eight claimants that we have, we don't 


have internal monitoring (unintelligible) -- 


got it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, and is that the class size? 


What is the class size on this? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, I -- you know, I don't 


know what the class potentially could be, but ­

- and I don't know what Department of Labor's 


final evaluation will be, but our initial 


review of the claimants that we have at Ames, 


we came up with eight that we thought would fit 


into it. It may be more, I'm not sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, understood. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, are you ready to vote then? 


Okay, all in favor raise your right hand. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


It appears to be unanimous here. Gen Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: I -- in favor. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In favor? Okay, let the rec-- any 


of you -- any no’s? 

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 (No responses) 


 Any abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


Then this motion carries and the recommendation 


will be transmitted to the Secretary, as 


indicated, and you will have a written copy of 


this motion for your record tomorrow. 


 DR. WADE: And the vote is unanimous. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Thank you very much. 


 DR. WADE: We can go back to timeliness a 


little bit. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have a little time for 


timeliness. Lew, help stimulate us on this. 


We -- we have talked about what the -- what the 


law says. We have sort of said timeliness is 


like some other things, I can't define it but I 


recognize it when I see it or I recognize it 


when it isn't there. But what -- what can we 


do to assure -- for example, are there some 


specific steps that we need to be thinking 


about or have you thought about what we could 


do? Are there some tracking issues that would 


help us on this to be able to say you know, 


we're letting something slip through the cracks 


because we haven't paid attention to it. 
I 

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know we have some site profiles we haven't had 


a chance to look at and so on. A lot of these 


things have to do with timeliness issues, but 


surrounding that are our own ability to -- to 


handle a lot of things almost at once. But --


 DR. WADE: Well --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- give us some wise counsel on 


how we need to think about this. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, I'll try, although -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or -- or some not-so-wise counsel, 


whatever it may be. 


 DR. WADE: I think that -- the one thing that 


occurs to me most frequently when -- when I 


think about this is that the Board or a 


workgroup will have an issue in front of it, 


and to take that issue to 100 percent closure 


can take an awfully long time with a great deal 


of resource. To take it to anything less than 


100 percent closure is unacceptable to some of 


us. And yet this is where the tension comes in 


to completeness versus timeliness. And I think 


the Board needs to have a discussion, the Board 


as a whole needs to have a discussion of this 


issue and begin to establish some -- I'm not 


even sure it's deserving of the word 

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parameters, but some understanding of this 


issue and what it means. The Board also has to 


decide how thick its skin is with regard to the 


-- the charges that come to the Board about not 


being timely or not being complete. And I 


don't know that there's any right answer to it. 


I think that it's appropriate that -- that 


periodically the Board discusses this issue. 


And then secondly, the Board needs to, in its 


advisory capacity, look at the agencies, 


particularly in this case HHS agencies, NIOSH, 


and offer any guidance it might want to the 


agencies in terms of their timely behavior, and 


then it can look to its contractor. So I mean 


I have no magic answer other than I think it's 


an important enough issue that I think it needs 


to be periodically discussed, and I think 


there's enough tension now that it would be 


appropriate for us to have some discussion. 


And I know some of you live it more regularly 


than I do, and I think it's important that we 


hear from you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Jim, then Wanda. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, one suggestion that -- that 


I would have is the -- although we do workgroup 

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reports at each meeting, we -- we really -- 


really don't sit down there and then -- you -- 


sort of look at those from a perspective of 


some sort of a master schedule, where we -- 


when are we going to, you know, really catch up 


with some of these things that are -- that are 


outstanding and when can we fit them in and 


make sure that we use our Board meeting time 


efficiently. There -- there are -- and -- and 


this -- this is difficult 'cause you -- we've 


got to schedule in people on calls and -- and ­

- and so forth and -- and -- and these aren't ­

- aren't easy and -- and you know, some of us 


arrive late and leave early and all those 


things that -- that -- that go on and got to -- 


got to juggle that, but -- but I -- there are 


times when I think, you know, we -- we do have 


-- have time that we could, you know, fit in 


discussion of certain issues that -- there and 


-- or that we sort of lose track of what's 


happening with, you know, petitions or 


evaluations and -- and don't properly address 


them, or at least in a timely fashion. So I --


thinking -- keeping a better schedule and -- 


and really reviewing that schedule at each 

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meeting, you know, as the workgroups update 


people -- 'cause I -- I think the workgroups 


actually have been fair-- you -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: They've been active. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- pretty responsible. They're 


active and they're responsive and try to be 


and, you know, the times when NIOSH may be 


holding up things, SCA, may be times when the 


workgroups are just on scheduling issues, but ­

- but we ought to really just sit down and 


review that at each meeting and -- and make 


sure that we're planning the following meetings 


to make as good a use of our time here as -- as 


we can and I -- I don't think we've always done 


that, and not because the agendas aren't full 


or don't look full, but you can't tell. Ames ­

- Ames could have lasted another hour. You 

don't --

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- it's -- it's a guess, and that 


makes -- that makes it hard. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are you suggesting something like 


a master status sheet that we would have 


perhaps at each meeting that would give us the 


status -- for example, what's going on at 

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Hanford, all the sites on the list? 


 DR. MELIUS: And -- and -- and look at when are 


we going to finish out Fernald, when are we 


going to finish out Hanford, when are we -- you 


know, when --


 DR. ZIEMER: And even perhaps establish some 


tentative timetables -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, yeah --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- on some of these? 

 DR. MELIUS: -- yeah. 

 DR. WADE: That is certainly valid. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda, what is your comment? 


 MS. MUNN: Well, until you started that 


business about a master deficiency list, I just 


had a couple of brief comments, but when I 


contemplate what such a list would appear to 


be, especially requiring not just periodic 


updates but almost continual updates, that 


appears to be such a daunting task that we may 


have to institute an additional branch of 


government to do that. I'm not sure that's 


even -- I'm not sure that's feasible, but -- 


 DR. WADE: I don't know it's feasible. It's 


worth an attempt -- certainly it's worth an 


attempt. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Department of Timeliness. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, the Department of Timeliness 


would be well-accepted, I'm sure. 


My -- my two brief comments originally were 


going to be that the issue of thick skin is one 


I think that we've all had to address in order 


to stay in our chairs from time to time. And 


it's -- it's -- that in itself is a fine line 


to find. One needs to be very sensitive to the 


comments that one hears, but at the same time 


you have to decide what's realistic and what 


isn't. 


 The most frustrating issue with respect to 


timeliness, from my perspective, has always 


been an issue of priorities. This is one of 


the few circumstances that I can imagine where 


it is almost impossible to prioritize the work 


that's before us. Everything that comes to me 


appears to be urgent and requiring of immediate 


attention. I find it very difficult to think 


well, I can -- we can postpone this one, we can 


postpone this one, we can postpone this one -- 


there just is -- is no way to -- that I can 


see, to intelligently prioritize the work that 


we have. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Or to say that one's -- one 


facility's workers are less important than 


another, for example. 


 MS. MUNN: I'm unable to do that, and if there 


are people available to us who can do that, it 


would be delightful to hear from them at some 


juncture. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Josie? 


MS. BEACH: I just wanted to jump on in what 


Jim was saying, that possibly we could put that 


on with the action item list, combine those two 


so we don't end up with two separate lists of 


things that need to be accomplished. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Status report and action items, 


uh-huh. 


 DR. WADE: Right. To be realistic about 


approaching this, maybe at the next meeting 


I'll bring you a master schedule for Blockson, 


Hanford, and if you want to add another or two 


-- I -- I don't think it would be appropriate 


for me to come to you with 50, but if we want 


to pick a couple of three and start to do that, 


then we can -- based upon your reaction to 


that, next time we can expand the list to -- to 


hopefully include more and more of what we do. 

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So I'd be open to three or four that I could 


use as example-- Blockson seems a good one to 


me. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Right. 


 DR. WADE: I mean that one should be relatively 


fine. I -- Hanford seems more open-ended and ­

- so there might be -- you have another -- 


MS. BEACH: What about Linde? Linde's been on 


the back burner for a while, as well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: There may be several. I think Lew 


is suggesting he doesn't want to try 100 of 


them at once or something -- 


 DR. WADE: I'd like to -- to pick some 


representative ones in terms of the -- our 


business, and bring them to you. 


 DR. MELIUS: But that's --


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- that's exactly my concern, 


though, is that -- I -- I think we -- we do -- 


I -- it is difficult, but we do need to 


prioritize, but at the same time we can't let 


certain sites keep, you know, falling between 


the cracks simply because there's not a -- you 


know, a vocal petitioner or a vocal senator or 


congressman or whoever that -- that's, you 

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know, pushing us on it. And so, you know, the 


Blocksons and some of the other sites tend to 


get moved forward all the time and Linde, you 


know, falls by the wayside. And -- and I think 


-- and yet I -- you know, frankly, I think that 


the -- frankly, the petitioners that are 


pushing us in terms of timeliness and the 


Congressional people and otherwise would 


understand when we say I'm sorry, we also -- 


you know, Linde's been sitting there for 


however long; we need to address that. They 


might tell us to work a little harder or 


something, but --


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- but -- but I --


 DR. WADE: Understood. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- so I -- I guess for the -- and 


-- and I worry that if we just take on the four 


and -- you know, if you try to prioritize and 


schedule the four, you know, ones that -- sort 


of the greasy wheels, then -- then I think 


we're going to -- squeaky wheels, excuse me -- 


I think we're going to be -- 


 DR. WADE: I understand. I'll -- I'll try and 


bring you a full list. I don't know I can 

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bring you full detail on the full list -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah -- yeah, no, I --


 DR. WADE: -- but I'll include everything -- 


 DR. MELIUS: -- you start -- yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- and then a couple of 


representative examples to run down. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, and actually we have a start 


to that list. You may recall -- actually we 


had a list of -- of the sites for which site 


profiles had been completed and those for which 


SC&A had done their reviews and the resolution 


process, and -- and that's a start on some of 


this if we can expand on that because a lot of 


that is -- leads to the end product, so -- 


 DR. WADE: We have LaVon's look forward at SEC 


petitions that are coming up. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. WADE: We have the procedures review -- we 


have a number of streams -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. WADE: -- that need to get blended and 


brought to you. 


 DR. MELIUS: But -- but I also think that -- 


that that also would better force some issues 


that we -- we haven't taken up, and one of 

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which is do we need another subcommittee. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MELIUS: We've established one, and -- but 


that means that, you know, half of us are 


meeting and the other half, you know, get a 


half-day off. And you know, maybe we need 


another subcommittee and -- and I think we just 


have to recognize that -- that we're not going 


to be able to be as involved in all those 


issues as -- every issue maybe as much as we 


would like to be, but that we have to -- going 


to have to defer actions to -- to a 


subcommittee and then -- that. So I think it's 


things like that we have to consider, also. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Josie, you have an additional 


comment? 


MS. BEACH: Can we consider dates? Aren't 


there dates that these are -- established that 


we could go by instead of schedules? 


 DR. ZIEMER: In some cases there are. 


MS. BEACH: In some cases? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: See, another tension this Board has 


-- offering my respectful opinion -- is that -- 


that the Board as a whole also wants to 

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consider issues and sometimes redo the work of 


the subcommittee or the workgroup. And that's 


fine because, again, people's -- people value 


their votes, and again that's something we have 


to take into consideration. 


 DR. MELIUS: Well --

 DR. ZIEMER: Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: While we're -- I mean another, 

more recent issue is -- was Rocky Flats, and in 


thinking about what went on at Rocky Flats, one 


-- one thing that would -- would have been 


helpful, I think -- twofold. One, it was very 


hard for those of you not -- those of us not on 


the workgroup to grasp that -- the issues that 


were being discussed and what was going on, and 


particularly because it was changing up to the 


last minute. You know, we had -- you know, a 


NIOSH report, an SCA review of that report and 


then a NIOSH, you know, retort to that at the 


last minute that, you know -- and seems -- so 


we're trying to sort of understand what -- gone 


and -- what was going on and so forth and I 


think we need to think about well, do we need 


to have a cutoff date, we're not going to 


consider any more -- and I think -- which I 

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think actually Wanda suggested and -- is that 


we -- I think the workgroups probably have to 


produce a -- at least a small closure report, 


something that goes out to the -- the rest of 


the Board, you know, two weeks ahead of time, 


let us better understand the issues, and then 


go through and catch up with whatever 


documentation we have and -- and so forth and 


on. I know it's more -- more work and again, 


I'm not faulting the Rocky Flats group, but -- 


but something like that, I -- I would have 


found very helpful and would have given me 


time. Instead, ca-- came to the meeting and 


there's all this other data flying out at the 


last minute that was very hard to fig-- figure 


out what was going on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In fact, establishing some sort of 


end-point dates may be valuable because it -- 


it goes to the issue of when is something 100 


percent complete. There's always another 


document out there somewhere that someone's 


going to discover. And at some point you have 


to say we've got to make the decision based on 


what we have. We're not going to wait another 


six months or a year for every last piece of 

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information to come in. 


 DR. MELIUS: And -- and we also need to be fair 


to the petitioners and so forth and 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: And that's part of being timely. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- and the only way to do that, I 


think, is to sort of cut things off, get the 


information to them, too, and -- understanding. 


But it's easier said than done, by 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Lew -- Mark has a comment, and you 


have that on your action list for... 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, I -- I agree with -- 


with most of these rec-- you know, 


recommendations, good comments, and I certainly 


agree with Jim's comments regarding Rocky 


Flats. 


I guess I -- most of our discussion so far has 


-- has pointed internally, and I know it's the 


close of the meeting, but I think there's also 


this question that -- that through this 


workgroup process with Rocky Flats, I think one 


thing we -- or I felt, anyway, was that you -- 


you had this -- we -- we have this basic thing 


we -- I think we need to look -- reflect on, 

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which is NIOSH's hurdle for their evaluation 


report is -- is to come back to the -- to the 


Board, the workgroup -- the Board saying that ­

- do they have enough information available to 


do dose reconstructions. And we add some 


hurdles in our internal SEC procedures which 


say -- and -- and every time they're the same. 


So I -- I would almost say -- and I think we 


said this in Mallinckrodt. We said this in Y12. I think I'm saying it again with Rocky. 


You know the data integrity issue's going to 


come up. You know the other radionuclides 


issues are going to come up. If -- you know, I 


think somehow we have to -- to better address 


those before an evaluation report is out. 


Now I know NIOSH has a clock running, too, so 


that's -- that's an issue. But I think what 


ends up happening is we -- we're -- we -- we're 


investigating these things real time and they 


haven't been -- you know, they're not a hurdle 


necessarily from NIOSH's point of view from the 


regulations standpoint that -- the hurdle says 


information, it doesn't -- you know, the -- and 


-- and the final hurdle we add on is that -- 


the proof of process, which I think we -- we've 

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-- this has sort of evolved through our Board 


deliberations and I -- I still believe we need 


that, but it's not necessarily a hurdle for the 


original evaluation report. So when we start 


with this evaluation report and start 


critiquing it and examining it, we ask all 


these questions, we're asking for more 


information -- what happened with Rocky is -- 


is yes, some of the models weren't complete. 


It didn't mean that all the information weren't 


-- wasn't there, you know. It's just that they 


didn't fully develop the coworker models yet. 


So then we have a -- a time frame. I mean 


there -- and I'm not criti-- criticizing 


anyone, but that's just the reality of what we 


ran across throughout this. So I think we need 


to -- to somehow reflect on that, how can we 


improve that or -- you know, part of it might 


be NIOSH anticipating some of these issues 


'cause they know the Board's procedures exist. 


So I don't know, I just -- I just thought that 


was one thing. 


And then -- and then once we start that 


process, we -- we constantly have the tension 


of when is enough enough. I mean how -- how 

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far do we take the data integrity analysis. 


But I think to the extent it would -- would -- 


it could be done prior to an evalu-- evaluation 


report, it would make it a lot easier. 


 The other thing that -- that comes up in that 


whole process is then we have this -- this sort 


of interesting situation where we have NIOSH, 


who had to get an evaluation report out, you 


know, on a clock, basically, so they -- they 


have a document with their report saying they 


have sufficient information. And we're -- in 


the workgroup we're asking them basically find 


information that may argue against your own 


data integrity argument, you know. So we --


and that's -- that's an awkward sort of 


situation to ask the -- the defender of the 


evaluation report to go and find information 


that may refute their -- their own report. 


And -- and I don't say that they weren't doing 


that in good faith, but I'm just saying it was 


a dif-- interesting situation for the workgroup 


to handle and sometimes it seemed like unless 


the workgroup made very specific requests, we ­

- we had little delays in that regard, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: LaVon? 

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 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, I'd just like to offer 


up that here's, you know, another thing that 


affects timeliness is during the review -- 


SC&A's review and -- of our evaluation and, you 


know, getting theirselves (sic) up to speed, 


the working group getting themselves up to 


speed, it happens every time that we also 


identify other issues that weren't identified 


up front. You know, our goal is -- what we 


typically do when we evaluate a petition, we 


evaluate the issues identified by the 


petitioner and issues that we know that we have 


on the plate at that time. And what tends to 


happen, especially with these big evaluations ­

- Hanford, Rocky Flats -- Hanford hasn't 


happened yet, but it will. It will. Hanford, 


you know, and Rocky Flats, the -- you know, 


these other sites where these large time 


periods is that when you get -- when it moves 


to the working group and it moves to SC&A, 


other issues become identified that are 


actually issues that were not directly 


evaluated within the site -- or evaluation 


report. And that's not -- you know, someone 


could argue, though, the evaluation report 

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should have -- you guys should have seen that. 


Well, you're -- you're focused on evaluating 


issues identified by the petitioner and the 


issues on the plate. We've got to do that in a 


time frame, and so we get that done and we get 


our proof. I just wanted to point that out. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: That's fine. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And I'm --


 MR. GRIFFON: I also -- I just -- you know -- 


and you understand my point is that -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Oh, I -- I do. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I -- I hope that and I think 


you -- you can -- it's kind of obvious, some -- 


some can be anticipated. NTA film might come 


up again, you know. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Oh, sure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: You know --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Exact (unintelligible). 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- certain things -- certain 


things can be (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, as we gain experience, that 


will become evident. I'm wondering also if -- 


in many cases if we allow ourselves sufficient 


time to do the task that we say needs to be 

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done. I know that we're pushing our contractor 


often. We'll say can you have this in three 


weeks and -- and if it takes four, then we're 


going to have a big problem. Or we -- we push 


NIOSH on these. I many cases we're pushing up 


close to our meetings, to start with, and any 


delay or new piece of information causes that 


problem. So to get a report two weeks ahead of 


time, before a meeting, becomes very 


problematical. I think we've been very -- 


overly optimistic as to how long some of these 


tasks will take that we assign, either to the 


workgroup or to our contractor or to NIOSH. 


They're all -- all pushing those deadlines. 


 Other comments? 


 (No responses) 


This has been a good discussion. Lew, I think 


we -- oh, Jim --


 DR. LOCKEY: Just one -- one comment. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- a final comment. 

 DR. LOCKEY: The -- the subcommittee that's 

going to be set up to look at surrogate 


exposures -- I mean I --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) Workgroup. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Workgroup. 

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 DR. LOCKEY: -- that -- that could be a very 


long, involved process and I -- I think that 


perhaps we need to deliberate on that tomorrow. 


You may want to consider how long -- how long 


is that going to delay the Bethlehem Steel 


decision 'cause that's not going to be -- I 


can't anticipate how long that's going to take, 


but it could take a substantial amount of time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, and that's another 


timeliness issue. It's the same kind of thing, 


yeah. 


Okay, I think we'll recess for dinner. We're 


going to reconvene at 7:30 this evening for the 


public comment session, so we'll see you all 


then. Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 5:00 p.m. 


to 7:30 p.m.) 


PUBLIC COMMENT


 DR. ZIEMER: Good evening, everyone. We're 


going to get underway this evening. This is 


the public comment session of the Advisory 


Board on Radiation and Worker Health. My name 


is Paul Ziemer and I serve as the Chairman of 


the Advisory Board. 


I know that a number of you were here yesterday 

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for our public comment session so I'm not going 


to repeat all the comments that I made at the 


beginning of the session yesterday, but I will 


briefly tell you that this Advisory Board is 


not part of the Department of Energy, nor is it 


part of the Department of Health and Human 


Services, nor is it part of the Department of 


Labor. This is an independent board which has 


been appointed by the President to oversee, as 


it were, the work of NIOSH, the National 


Institutes for Occupational Safety and Health, 


as they carry out their part of the 


compensation program, namely the dose 


reconstruction activities. 


 This board is advisory. We are not a board 


that makes final decisions. We do not handle 


the individual claims and cases. We are not a 


-- an appeals board. We are advisory to the 


Secretary of Health and Human Services and our 


advice is -- can be taken or it can be ignored, 


but we do try to advise the Secretary on the 


operation, as it were, of the compensation 


program in terms of trying to identify is it 


being carried out according to the -- the 


wishes of Congress and the laws of the U.S.; is 

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it being carried out fairly; is it being 


carried out in accordance with what has been 


set forth in the law. 


So this Board, as part of its deliberations at 


its regular meetings, has public comment 


sessions so that we can get feedback from 


individuals who have had experience with the 


program -- usually claimants. Not always, but 


individuals who can advise us on their 


experiences; sometimes good, sometimes not so 


good, but we like to hear from you. 


We have found that because we have quite a few 


folks that like to comment that we've had to 


impose a time limit. We didn't really want to 


do this, but we've had to start imposing a time 


limit and that time limit is ten minutes. And 


as I mentioned to the folks yesterday, that's 


not a goal to be achieved, but is an upper 


limit to try to hold it to so that you -- there 


-- so there's an opportunity for others here to 


make their comments, as well. 


We also expect to have some comments by phone. 


They're -- these meetings are open to the 


public, not only locally but nationally. These 


meetings are announced in the Federal Register, 

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so there are normally some commenters by phone 


and we expect to have some this evening as 


well. I know of at least one; there may be 


others. 


We have had problems earlier today with the 


phone lines. We're hopeful that that's been 


corrected. If we do have that problem, we hope 


you'll bear with us as we try to listen to 


those who might join us by phone. 


So with that, I'm just going to go down the 


list. We'll take them in the order of the 


sign-ups here and give folks an opportunity to 


talk, starting with Rosemary Hoyt. 


 Rosemary, welcome. You can use the mike right 


there, if you wish. 


 MS. HOYT: (Off microphone) My sister and I 


(unintelligible) coin and she lost and so she ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: She's going to go first, so this 


would be Mary Ann Carrico, okay. I think she 


won, she gets the first say. 


 MS. CARRICO: My name is Mary Ann Carrico. I'm 


speaking for myself and for my sister, Rosemary 


Hoyt. The Advisory Board has followed the law 


and obtained an independent contractor to 

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review NIOSH's work, SC&A, Sanford Cohen & 


Associates. The Sanford Cohen & Associate 


report is two years old and the findings from 


that report have not been implemented in the 


way NIOSH does its evaluation, to our 


understanding. 


There's been an enormous amount of money spent 


on the SC&A contracts. According to them, the 


Hanford site profile has serious flaws in its 


science and is not claimant favorable in many 


evaluations. The Technical Basis Doc, TBD, and 


the Technical Information Bulletins, TIB, 


revisions have not yet been sent to SC&A for 


review. NIOSH has not used this report -- the 


SC&A report for the EEOICP dose reconstruction 


or for the SEC evaluation. We feel they should 


accept the SC&A report when claimant favorable 


rather than ignoring, disputing or redoing the 


same work. 


NIOSH. NIOSH has said in the 51-7 evaluation 


report that they are able to do external dose 


reconstruction for the period covered. We 


challenge their ability and do not believe that 


the science was available at that time and that 


the calculations are presumptive and 

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speculative. During the March and June worker 


outreach meetings in Richland former workers 


stated that they kept logbooks as -- of their 


exposures or of others' exposures as part of 


their job. Dr. Glover stated that they are 


still trying to find these logbooks. 


 The excerpt here from Section F-2 of the SEC 


petition states -- this is the form that we 


filled out to submit the petition -- quote, 


that indicates that radiation monitoring 


records for members of the proposed class have 


been lost, falsified or destroyed. Dr. Glover 


has stated that NIOSH has the capability to do 


internal and external dose reconstruction 


without any of the lost records. He stated to 


my sister Rosemary that all of the findings of 


SC&A's Hanford finds have been resolved. They 


have not. 


We do not feel NIOSH team's work has been 


claimant favorable or objective. Their 


priority is in getting the job done. Our point 


is that now it has to be redone to resolve the 


SC&A findings, and the super S is an example of 


this. 


The law states that if monitoring records are 

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not available and dose reconstruction is not 


feasible, that a SEC class should be 


established. It does not say you can borrow 


information and extrapolate data from 


sororigate (sic) sites. Using sororigate data 


is pure conjecture, as far as we can see. All 


possible variables cannot be established or 


verified. We don't think a reasonable person 


would consider this. 


 The Advisory Board was rightfully very 


concerned this morning about a statement from 


one secretary at the Chapman Valve site, and 


discussed it at length. SEC-5-- SEC petition 


57 includes three affidavits that records were 


lost, falsified and destroyed. A diary was 


also submitted stating falsification of 


monitoring records as a daily practice, and 


coercion by supervisors and management to 


falsify records. 


These are instances -- instances where we -- 


where in -- there are instances where we were 


intentionally misled by NIOSH. During our 


recorded interview with NIOSH representative 


Pat and health physicist Monica we were 


outright lied to when we were informed that all 

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the findings of the Hanford SC&A report were 


resolved. Further, they stated we could not 


use the SC&A report for our basis of our SEC 


because it was in draft form. 


Conflict of interest is a serious problem. 


Former management personnel are creating 


amendments and influencing the process. The 


suggestion of a member of the Advisory Board 


that claimants file a new SEC as opposed to 


delay for careful consideration all of the data 


is distressing. Filing of any SEC is a 


formidable undertaking. The SEC process is 


overwhelming. We've been working on this for 


years. 


The final minutes of the March Hanford worker 


outreach meeting were not available for use at 


the June meeting. In fact, they were not 


posted until July 12th, 2007. At the June 


meeting Dr. Glover excused this as a funding 


problem. Frankly, funding management does not 


relieve NIOSH or OCAS of its responsibility for 


timely posting of information. 


It is my hope and my sister's hope that NIOSH 


will speed up and improve communications, but 


take care to fully explore all data when 

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considering EEOICP claims and the SEC petition. 


A child growing up in Richland was a unique 


experience, and we're going to speak to this. 


We had to bring home a waiver from school that 


said our parents knew we were drinking milk at 


school from cows that had eaten grass 


contaminated with iodine-131. This was not all 


over the United States. This was unique to 


this area. Parents told stories about being 


exposed. This was a frightening experience for 


a child. There were stories of houses being 


closed, furniture being removed, even the 


floorboards at times were removed due to 


contamination. Fathers came home in different 


clothes than they went to work in due to 


contamination. We came home from school. Dad 


was already home because he had been 


overexposed. This also was very frightening to 


a child. Lots of dads died, devastating 


families. These men did not know they were 


giving their lives. 


 MS. HOYT: This is a very emotional issue. The 


news media has immortalized the greatest 


generation. They got the job done, did what 


was necessary to win the war, went to work when 

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sick to get the job done, falsified their 


records to keep on working. This greatest 


generation now has many faces in the EEOICP and 


the SEC petition process. Not approving this 


SEC would be a great disservice to them and to 


the families they left behind. Thank you for 


your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Mary Ann and 


Rosemary. Next we'll hear from Dan McKeel. 


Dan is actually here representing not Hanford 


but a different group. And Dan, I would 


preface your remarks by saying that we have 


received -- I think it's been distributed to 


all the Board members -- the -- your detailed 


critique of the GSI Appendix B document -- 


 DR. MCKEEL: Right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- that you asked --

 DR. MCKEEL: Good. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- Board members have received 

this. It will also go on the web site so that 


it is --


 DR. MCKEEL: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- generally available. 


 DR. MCKEEL: Thank you, sir. I just did --


wanted to say a couple of sentences about that 

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document right now. The Appendix B-B for TBD6000 was released on the 25th of June, and we 


feel it was a very flawed and scientifically 


weak document. Our group, the Southern 


Illinois Nuclear Workers, has asked that the 


Board task SC&A to please review this report. 


John Ramspott and I have written detailed 


critiques to Mr. Elliott from OCAS, and we're 


happy that they will be recorded as both pub-- 


public comments and as documents on the public 


document, specifically about this particular 


appendix. 


I just wanted to highlight for the Board before 


you've read it that one of our main concerns in 


this document is that five of six unique source 


terms are completely omitted, and there's no 


calculation of Betatron neutron doses, as just 


examples of some of the major flaws we think 


there are in that document. 


Most of what I'd like to talk to you tonight 


about is my experience as the SEC petitioner 


for the Dow Madison site and as a preface to 


tomorrow's session on agency updates on the Dow 


Chemical Company. I want to thank Dr. Ziemer 


in particular, who kindly allowed me to have 

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input into both drafts of the letter he and the 


Board forwarded to Secretary Mike Leavitt of 


HHS on May the 24th, and this letter was 


concerning the passage of Dr. Melius's motion 


to explore the 1961 to 1988 residual period 


that the Board passed unanimously at the Denver 


-- first Denver meeting. 


 I then received a letter from Peter Turcic of 


Department of Labor dated 5/22/07, so two days 


before Dr. Ziemer wrote his letter and sent it, 


and Mr. Turcic's letter was responding to a 


letter I had sent him on March the 27th in 


which I asked him to invoke the subpoena power 


of -- of Section 73.84(w) of the Act to obtain 


records that substantiated that some of the Dow 


Madison thorium activities were related to the 


AEC work done there. Mr. Turcic declined to 


submit that subpoena in his letter. But in 


addition, he provided reasons why Labor would 


not change the coverage period for Dow Madison, 


and he said, quote, that no legible document 


supported this, end quote. Mr. Turcic did not 


say he had reviewed my May 4th Board 


presentation, including the specific 


Mallinckrodt AEC purchase order to Dow Madison 

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to buy magnesium allow 21-A. There was a very 


specific document labeled TDCC316. 


I interpreted those letters and numbers to 


refer to magnesium-thorium alloy HM-21, a 


mainline Dow product. Mr. Turcic's letter did 


not say that Department of Labor had weighed 


worker testimony that Dow Madison shipped 


thorium alloy, not only to Rocky Flats but also 


to Oak Ridge and Los Alamos, that were in 


addition to Mallinckrodt. 


I now know from today's testimony that Mr. 


Elliott had sent Department of Labor a -- a May 


8th e-mail that may have prompted that last 


part of Mr. Turcic's letter. I just found out 


about that today. 


The letter that Dr. Ziemer wrote to HHS on May 


24th suggested that the HHS Secretary contact 


the Secretaries of Labor and Department of 


Energy to examine the facility description and 


coverage period for Dow Madison for 1961 to 


1988, so an extension of the SEC that was voted 


on from '57 to '60. This was asked in light of 


new information that I had presented to the 


Board on May 4th in Denver. 


 Dr. Ziemer's May 24th letter also tasked both 

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NIOSH and SC&A to analyze the feasibility of 


reconstructing thorium doses during 1961 to 


1988 -- 1998, and report back to the Board, 


quote, at its next meeting, end quote. No 


reports by either agency were given at the June 


Board meeting, which was the next meeting. 


SINuW helped SC&A and Mr. Phillips of that 


organization conduct a very successful fourth 


Dow worker meeting in East Alton, Illinois on 


the 20th of June. Simmons Cooper, who's 


working with us at no charge, again paid for a 


court report when SC&A was unable to do so. 


Grady Calhoun from OCAS attended part of that 


meeting. SC&I -- SC&A declined to seek entry 


into the Madison site the next day. Mr. 


Phillips had expressed interest to me in seeing 


the plant and in reviewing archived records we 


believe reside there that are highly relevant 


to establishing links to AEC activities related 


to thorium shipments. 


 Anyway, we sent the verbatim transcript of the 


6/20 SC&A outreach meeting to all parties a 


week ago. 


Then on July the 6th Robert Stephan of Senator 


Obama's office forwarded me a letter dated May 

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23rd, 2007 from Pat Worthington of Department 


of Energy, which was addressed to Larry Elliott 


and responded to two questions that his deputy, 


Dave Sundin, had asked her in a -- in a e-mail 


dated 5/8/07. I communicated orally and in 


writing to Regina Kano* and Pat Worthington of 


DOE my concerns that the May 23rd letter 


contained inaccuracies that needed to be 


corrected with respect to the first question 


that Mr. Sundin had posed, and that was about 


whether the purchase orders were -- were 


legible. Specifically, I was concerned that 


the specific purchase order of interest DOW 


TDC316 may not have been examined closely since 


it was not commented upon by Ms. Worthington in 


her brief responses. I learned at that time 


that Roger Anders, a historian for the 


Department of Energy, had had major input into 


the Worthington letter before he retired from 


DOE on June the 1st. 


I also objected to the fact that -- that 


neither DOE nor OCAS had copied the 5/23 letter 


to me as a petitioner that -- that was sent six 


weeks earlier. So far I've not gotten a direct 


response from Ms. Worthington about my -- my 

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concerns. 


Then last week I learned that the Dow SEC was 


not on the agenda for this meeting. In 


pursuing that I learned from Regina Kano that 


no letter had been received by her agency from 


HHS more than six weeks after the May 24th 


letter from Dr. Ziemer and the Board had been 


sent to HHS. I was very surprised, to say the 


least, and I still am. 


Finally, I was unable to learn from Dr. Wade or 


Dr. Ziemer whether either NIOSH or SC&A were 


going to present written reports to the Board 


on the thorium issue at this second meeting 


follow-- following the 5/24 Board letter to HHS 


with its mandate to report at the next Board 


meeting. John Mauro, on May 4th, had presented 


excerpts from a draft report to the Board that 


has not been released, to my knowledge. I have 


not gotten any reports or feedback on any Dow 


SEC-79 activities from either NIOSH or SC&A 


from May 4th until now, apart from the June 


20th worker meeting held for the benefit of 


SC&A and -- and NIOSH by us at Simmons Cooper. 


In summary, I am very concerned that NIOSH, 


Department of Energy, Department of Labor and 

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SC&A have not kept me properly updated on 


progress with the analysis of the Dow SEC 


extension to cover the residual period from '61 


to 1998. This coverage of the Dow residual 


contamination period under an SEC is analogous 


to today's consideration of the second Ames SEC 


petition. I believe that getting a legal 


opinion from HHS about this Dow matter is 


paramount. It is still my view the Board has 


the authority to recommend an extension of the 


SEC-79 class to 1961-1998, even without getting 


this legal opinion first, and I would simply 


submit that this is supported by the -- today's 


favorable Ames SEC deci-- decision. 


So I thank you for letting me address you. I 


look forward to the session on Dow tomorrow 


morning. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dr. McKeel, and I -- I 


would note that we will have an opportunity I 


believe on the morning's schedule to discuss 


Dow relative to --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- 11:30. We had to change the 


time there becau-- but DOE will be available, 

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at least by phone, and we can try to address 


some of those issues and clarify where the 


agencies are on those issues. Thank you very 


much. 


One of Dan's colleagues, John Ramspott, was 


hoping to be with us by phone. I want to see 


if John is on the phone. 


MR. RAMSPOTT: Sure, can you hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, can you --


MR. RAMSPOTT: (Broken transmission) had a 


little (broken transmission) so we still have a 


little bit of phone (broken transmission) but 


much better. 


 DR. ZIEMER: John, let me tell you also that 


your material that you sent to NIOSH, which is 


an extensive -- again, your -- I think it's 


your analysis of the Appendix B -- has been 


received by the Board and the Board members do 


have copies of that as well and that will be 


also posted on the web site. So we'd be 


pleased to hear your comments. 


MR. RAMSPOTT: Fantastic, thank you. Again, my 


name is John Ramspott. I am assisting and 


representing a number of workers from General 


Steel Industries in Granite City, Illinois. My 

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involvement was brought to light because my 


father-in-law worked at General Steel 


Industries for 35 years, died of leukemia and 


various other cancers, so thus my involvement. 


 The purpose of my (broken transmission) tonight 


(broken transmission) are to acknowledge and 


share with everyone that we did have an 


Appendix (broken transmission) posted on the 


OCAS web site (broken transmission) General 


Steel Industries (broken transmission) that's 


normally a very good thing, but in this case 


it's quite lack(broken transmission) in 


information and hopefully with the 


correspondence that I sent will be a little 


(broken transmission) with NIOSH and of course 


we're going to ask Board to be aware of what is 


taking place with this Appendix. We think 


(broken transmission) extremely important 


because listening (broken transmission) the 


meeting (broken transmission) it is quite clear 


that other (broken transmission) do impact 


(broken transmission) site (broken 


transmission) you go down the road. So to have 


a flawed appendix involving a unique (broken 


transmission) device or procedure (broken 

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transmission) one (broken transmission) or one 


site (broken transmission) definitely cause 


problems for others (broken transmission) the 


road. 


This document, the Appendix (broken 


transmission), is extremely lacking in accuracy 


(broken transmission) many of the facts, all of 


which have been (broken transmission) NIOSH 


numerous others over the past two years. My 


concerns are shared by very many of the former 


workers and site experts (broken transmission) 


have also reviewed and seen this report. Most 


of them attended the NIOSH outreach meeting 


which was held and actually described as one of 


the best that had ever taken place. Of course 


these workers now are wondering why was all 


that good information essentially (broken 


transmission) regard and there (broken 


transmission) in this docu(broken transmission) 


Ramspott reply, about 24 pages, is an honest, 


accurate critique of items we feel are flawed 


or possibly even missing completely. 


Now I did receive an e-mail acknowledgement 


from Mr. Elliott of NIOSH indicating that a 


reply would be forthcoming. We appreciate the 

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fact that (broken transmission) rapid response 


(broken transmission) seemed sincere, so 


(broken transmission) going to be able to 


(broken transmission) this. 


 We're also requesting, as Dr. McKeel had 


indicated earlier, that the Board please 


consider including SC&A in the review of the 


Appendix. We know they have the specialty 


capability of analyzing. We've seen that in 


the past. And some of the particular areas 


that we're going to ask special attention be 


paid is the inaccurate information included in 


the section regarding activation of uranium and 


other alloys while using a Betatron particle 


accelerator. The Appendix and (broken 


transmission) anyone on the Board and anyone 


else that's interested please take a look at 


that, you'll see an oversimplification in those 


sections, in my opinion, and that truly -- in 


my opinion and, I'm sure, others -- is lacking 


in scientific quality. This one-size-fits-all 


narrow analysis is appalling. We have provided 


scientific data to NIOSH. Our (broken 


transmission) collection scientific articles 


actually including a physicist who has assisted 

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us and (broken transmission) noted in this 


Appendix not even mentioned. We believe an 


independent review is the only way we can get 


an accurate accounting. Workers have always 


been suspect of some of the dealings and now 


they actually feel betrayed by the system, and 


that's a shame. That -- that's not how this 


(broken transmission) is also underway all of a 


sudden a rush to do GSI dose reconstructions 


using this flawed information as a scientific 


basis upon which to perform dose 


reconstruction. I mean I personally think 


that's ridiculous 'cause why go ahead with bad 


and incomplete data to do dose reconstructions. 


And I did send an e-mail before my formal 


critique, which Mr. Elliott was kind enough to 


reply to and, you know, I'm definitely going to 


follow through on that because it appears 


there's already a conclusion that's been made 


that (broken transmission) part of the 


correspondence said this would be (broken 


transmission) I guess this is supposed to be a 


good time because it's going to be the 


claimant's first opportunity to file an appeal. 


So (broken transmission) have to file an appeal 

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(broken transmission) this (broken 


transmission) more sense to do it right the 


first time. 


So should the workers be happy about this 


poorly-done appendix? I doubt it. And I don't 


think they really want their first opportunity 


to appeal (broken transmission) and in this 


tight money time and economic times that we've 


heard about, it seems to me like it'd also be 


quite a waste of money to do dose reconduc-- or 


do dose reconstructions in a hurry and then 


redo them. Seems to me it'd make more sense to 


stop the dose reconstructions (broken 


transmission) seem to be in a hurry now for a 


reasonable time, 30 to 60 days, whatever seems 


reasonable, to review the Appendix with the 


help of SC&A, with the help of ourselves -- 


we've always offered to help, put our heads 


together and come up with the right answer on 


this. 


So those are a few (broken transmission) 


thoughts that I wanted to share because, you 


know, this fast approach reminds me of the 


movie "Titanic", full speed ahead, and if we 


hit an iceberg we're going to have another 

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disaster. Why do that? Why not do it right 


the first time. 


So I appreciate your time (broken transmission) 


and my concern really is that this could affect 


not just GSI workers but we know there are a 


lot of these other devices out there and other 


sites and to have that set as a precedent just 


seems like a really, really bad thing (broken 


transmission) to do. Actually we heard some 


discussion about that type of thing today, 


using other site information. 


So I appreciate your time and I've tried to 


watch my time. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much, John. 


 Next we'll hear from Faye -- is it Vliegen -- 


Vliegen? 


 MS. VLIEGER: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MS. VLIEGER: (Off microphone) First of all, 


let me thank (unintelligible) for 


(unintelligible) (on microphone) about this. 


I'm a former Hanford worker and I have been 


helping with some posthumous claims. I don't 


have a radiation claim myself. However, my 


experience with the Hanford site started with 

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my work there in 2001. After my injury I 


became well-acquainted with their methods for 


not revealing documents. 


In my work in helping claimants -- we just get 


together and we talk and we try to get the 


records together -- I have found the same 


reticence from history, starting with the 


Atomic Energy Commission, which -- rightly so, 


it was a war time -- kept classified material. 


As a former military person I understand that 


need. That time has passed. 


My records reviews have proven that the 


documents are not kept by personnel name, so 


when you ask for them by name that's not how 


they're kept. Even today accident records are 


coded without personnel name. So when the 


Department of Labor makes a good-faith effort 


to get them, they're not accessible. You have 


to learn the code words and the secret words 


and the -- the systems that they put the files 


under. Being a former military person, they 


taught me that well. 


What I have found: The records are there, if 


you look by facility type, by program type, by 


contract numbers -- which are obscure, so you 

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have to pull a thread from a side and work in. 


Then when you do find records, you're going to 


find that many of them are missing. People 


were issued dosometers (sic), but the records 


for their exposure may not be there because it 


was particularly frightening. In my own 


experience as an employee out there I had full 


run of the tank farms and I had a dosimeter and 


it was collected twice in two and a half years. 


So we know how accurate that would be, just as 


somebody who's supposed to be only an 


administrative type. 


In looking at the declassified document site 


for Hanford just this evening before I came, I 


found an amazing amount of information -- not 


listed by any program, just records. I know 


y'all don't have them. I know you weren't 


given them, and the Department of Labor has the 


subpoena power to get those records. 


As an employee, when I make the request for 


records there is a cursory search done -- by 


name and Social Security number -- of records 


which are not by name and Social Security 


number. And then if you go back and say well, 


what about the records for this facility? You 

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get a polite letter that says you're going to 


have to pay for it. If you want more records, 


you will pay in advance, thank you very much. 


And that's usually where it stops, 'cause most 


people can't afford $35 to $70 an hour for a 


records research that probably is going to be 


fruitless again. 


So why am I here? As a former military person 


and government employee, I am appalled that 


this is continuing. As a military person, we 


had a term for intentionally hiding documents 


and lying, and it was called "you'll be 


lunching at Leavenworth on a permanent basis." 


There is no way to explain how important this 


is to people. 


On a posthumous basis in trying to get these 


records together, you don't have the ability to 


say where did you work, where did you have 


access, did you have any events that we should 


look for. So in denying that something existed 


and therefore making an assumption with -- as I 


was here earlier in your discussions -- 


surrogate data, or assuming that this is close 


enough for government work, you're doing a 


disservice to the people. 

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Now I'm a current employee and I didn't have 


some of the bad experiences that the people did 


starting at the site. But I can tell you that 


the institutionalized stonewalling goes on, and 


I will just give you one small taste of what's 


going on. 


I have a partially-settled claim against the 


site in January for my injury. Somehow I was 


exposed to phosgene inside a building that was 


not a process building. That claim has been 


substantiated. I have permanent damage. I am 


not able to work. However, when I went to DOE 


FOIA office this spring trying to do my EEOICPA 


claim, the letter I got back -- not once, but 


twice -- was we have no record that you were 


ever injured on the site. But no less than 


four attorneys were involved, including DOE's 


attorney. All of my previous managers, all of 


the managers at DOE locally, DOE headquarters 


was made aware of my claim against them, as 


well as their attorney for their local 


administration of self-insurance. 


Please don't be fooled or lulled into some 


false sense of security that you're being told 


the truth because there are many of us who can 

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tell you that, according to them, we were never 


injured. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Faye. Roberta 


Montgomery -- Roberta? 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: I'm going to have her read 


this for me and --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we'll --


 MS. MONTGOMERY: -- then I'll (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we'll get the mike to you there 


or -- there you go. 


Okay, reading on behalf of Roberta. 


UNIDENTIFIED: On behalf of Roberta, yeah. 


Roberta's somebody I advocate for, so she wants 


to make a public comment. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And can you give us your name, as 


well, so we can show that? 


MS. OGLESBEE: Okay, it's Gai Oglesbee again. 


I gave comment last night -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


MS. OGLESBEE: -- our Special Exposure Cohort, 


which Roberta's part of. She has signed onto 


it, long ago, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


MS. OGLESBEE: Okay. She's got all her 


information here so we'll just give you a copy 

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of this afterwards. 


(Reading) Thank you for listening to and 


accepting my public comment. I am the daughter 


of a deceased Hanford worker, [Name Redacted]. 


My dad worked at Hanford since 1951 until he 


retired in the 1970s. My father was a brave 


and dedicated man who suffered more than I will 


ever fully understand. His character caused 


him to be a person who tried to get along with 


all people and to be congenial. 


I was diagnosed with MS years ago and was 


finally confined to a wheelchair. I have 


struggled with the health effects caused by my 


thyroid disease and other relevant toxic 


exposure elements for years. I am classified 


as a downwinder. I believe my father brought 


the contamination home and harmed me and my 


family members. I am apprised of the health 


effects caused by the "Sea of Green" Hanford 


pollution. One of my brothers has been 


diagnosed with terminal cancer. My brothers 


and I were adopted by these fine people that 


were my parents in every way that counts for 


all of my life. 


With that said, after several attempts to 

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clarify my defendant position -- or no, my 


dependent position regarding my father's 


support in order for me to survive, the 


Department of Labor finally agreed to 


officially classify me as being a dependent 


survivor. I am aware of other adult survivors 


who have been compensated by DOL who were not 


dependent on their worker father or mother at 


when -- when they died. After I was there to 


observed (sic) my father's and my mother's 


painful deaths that caused much suffering. 


After years of processing through the various 


phases of this bad and unenforceable EEOICP, I 


realized that I am m ore than deserving and 


entitled to present evidence of my father's 


pain and suffering that was caused by his 


nuclear facility workplace toxic exposure and 


his management's tormenting ways and means that 


were intimidating and harmful. 


I have never received any dose reconstruction 


papers from Health and Human Services. The DOL 


Seattle District Office agents were directed to 


reassemble my complaint package that they had 


rendered chaotic and unidentifiable. But even 


though I was told the claims package was 

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getting escalated to the next phase, dose 


reconstruction, I never -- I've never heard 


from the NIOSH agents. Dose reconstruction has 


never occurred. Today I have not been apprised 


of the accurate status of my Part B and D aka E 


claims. 


It is well documated -- documented that my 


EEOICP claims have been rejected and reinstated 


several times. My claims re still active right 


now. I like many others -- I, like many 


others, are waiting and waiting and waiting for 


a final decision. Many of us have decided to 


exhaust all possibilities having to do with the 


various phases of the EEOICP. However, it is 


becoming increasingly obvious that the EEOICP 


is dysfunctional. 


My claims files have processed through many so-


called case examiners, who frankly demonstrate 


that they don't have any knowledge of the 


evidence before them. In my case, the case 


examiners express that they have little to no 


knowledge of the -- of my supporting evidence. 


All case examiners have proven to me and my 


family that they are especially unqualified to 


assess medical evidence. One of the most 

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revealing aspects that came to my attention in 


2001 was a case -- local -- was a local case 


examiner's statement made to me, "What is a 


Hanford?" This exclamation -- exclamation was 


witnessed. Another statement made to me by one 


of the examiners when my father's accumulative 


dose was being discussed was, "Why, that would 


kill a man." The dose did kill a man; it 


killed my father. 


My father's dosimetry records clearly 


designated that he took a 30,072 millirem dose 


since about 1954 or 1953. I am informed this 


amount is compensable if I decide to file a 


federal court action. One of his peer group 


function managers' death certificate designates 


that the manager died from his acute radiation 


exposure, or excess body radiation. The 


manager's body was covered with radiation burns 


that were first discovered during a company 


doctor's ex-- examining -- company doctor, who 


was Dr. Fuquay. Keep in mind that the 


Department of Energy's and company doctor, Dr. 


Fuquay's name is important because his name 


appears on other Hanford victims' medical 


records and my father's medical records as the 

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person in charge. The correlating dates of 


this matter-of-fact evidence is very important. 


During the same time frame, my father and other 


witnesses I have discovered had burns on their 


bodies, too. 


My father should be declared a Special Exposure 


Cohort because his dosimetry about three years 


of -- about three years of missing data that 


would definitely increase the official dose 


measurements that were recorded. Just like my 


father's coworkers and the function manager's 


demise, the missing dosimetry readings are 


during this same time frame from 1951 to about 


1954. There is no apparent way I -- I have 


found to discover -- to recover the missing 


dosimetry. And who among us would ever know 


for sure if the dosimetry is accurate or not 


accurate? 


In my father's case, the personnel records 


reveal that he was tormented by his management 


and certain company psychologists when my 


father dared to come forward to disclose his 


medical complaints. That is a very painful, 


emotional and alarming reality for me to 


contend with. We know that the historical 

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records are falsified. And after close 


examination of my father's records, I have come 


to the conclusion that my father's signature 


was forged on certain company medical release 


forms other. Upon review, the questionable 


signatures seem to be reason -- resemble his 


manager's signatures. 


For instance, one of the medical records 


indicate that my father allegedly lit a match 


over an alcohol bottle that -- excuse me -- 


that blew up and burnt him while he was being 


examined by a company doctor, which is absurd. 


My father was never diagnosed with encephalitis 


that was constantly being perpetrated by the 


company physicians. The company doctor's bogus 


diagnosis was intended to explain why my father 


was a troubled man with psychological problems. 


I have expert witness that will affirm that the 


encephalitis company diagnosis is a bogus 


claim. After review of certain Department of 


Energy released personnel records held by my 


father, I knew then and there that I would do 


what I can to clarify this harrowing problem. 


The company's doctors -- the company doctor's 


diagnosis are contrary to my father's personal 

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physicians' diagnosis and prognosis. 


My father was a decent, fine man who once 


studied to be a Catholic priest. His personal 


-- personnel records and Hanford media coverage 


reveal that he often received safety and 


humanity awards. He was a very dedicated man 


and a good provider who took good care of me 


and my needs, especially my medical needs. 


The controversy I am having with the Department 


of Labor regarding my claims is that they 


continue to designate that my records are 


incomplete, have gaps in them and thus are not 


worthy. The many DOL allegations are not 


relevant to my family and I be-- and I because 


we have written many affidas-- affidavits that 


pertain to the gaps in the records. Those 


affidavits are not considered by the DOL 


assessors. There aren't actually any gaps in 


the records because my father's deceased 


personnel (sic) physicians thoroughly explained 


what they were doing about the prostate cancer 


and leukemia issues, as well as other relevant 


diseases. 


For instance, my father's prostate cancer began 


to be diagnosed because his rising PSA levels 

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needed to be carefully monitored. My father 


and my stepmother [Name Redacted] decided to 


simply monitor the progression because my 


father's other life-threatening ailments were 


priority concerns. The deceased physician 


treating the prostate cancer agreed and 


indicated that he would let my father know when 


he believed it was time to perform the 


necessary surgery. Prostate surgery was 


eventually performed. The ever-changing DOL 


case examiners continuously fail to review the 


evidence in detail. Is the -- let's see -- if 


the problem with the DOL agents was not such a 


dire circumstance, the whole affair would be 


laughable. How did it come to be that 


unqualified government agents are so lax in 


presenting a believable accountability? 


 After careful review and re-review of my 


father's historical record, it is easy to 


detect relevant exposure and reta-- and rad-- 


and retaliation information that caused his 


medical problems and emotional state. It is 


conclusive that exposure to radiation and other 


toxic elements at Hanford -- Hanford's 


workplace caused his deteriorating health. 

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For instance, certain Hanford exposure 


incidents caused the Hanford security to hunt 


him down when he left the site because he was 


contaminated. The guards would escort him back 


to the site to decon-- decontaminate him. 


Sorry. They burned his street clothes and 


would send him home in a company-furnished 


coveralls which were likely contaminated, also. 


I remember that my mother would be upset 


because the Hanford administration refused to 


reimburse the cost of the street clothes they 


had destroyed. And my mom washed the 


contaminated clothes that he wore and brought 


home to decontamin-- to -- brought home to 


contaminate us. I am aware of other witnesses 


who have already submitted sworn statements 


that verify the same. 


I am one of the SEC petitioners that is 


recorded on Gai Oglesbee's September 2002 


Hanford petitions. I have reason to believe 


that I am or should be included on the two -- 


two sisters, Mary Ann Corsi-- si-- Corsico 


(sic) and three other petitions. 


The EEOIC has proven to be a bad and 


unenforceable law because too many mistakes and 

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poor judgment are involved. I don't know at 


this point in time if the EEOICPA stipulations 


would ever be reformed enough or in time to aid 


the thousands of workers whose claims have been 


denied. It seems to me that the whole thing is 


in limbo until such time in the future when the 


members of Congress decide to act in a nonpartisan manner to reform the bad and 


unenforceable EEOIC law. It seems that too 


many of the members of Congress believe 


establishing a SEC status is the only option. 


The DOL and HHS need to be ousted from the 


process. This is similar to the reasons for 


the members of Congress to get rid of the DOE's 


interference in October 2004. Roberta 


Montgomery. 


And she would like to say a few things on her 


own. Go ahead. 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: Well --


MS. OGLESBEE: You've been wanting to do this 


(unintelligible) --


 MS. MONTGOMERY: Well, no, actually I -- I 


don't -- I'm not a good orator. 


MS. OGLESBEE: Go on over there and talk. 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: No, I don't -- no, nothing 

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else. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Roberta. You 


can add to that if you wish. 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: Okay. Well, I just feel that 


 DR. ZIEMER: You actually have about two 


minutes left on your time. 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: Okay, well, I could say two 


minutes -- I just feel this -- that this whole 


thing that has started has -- has gone wrong 


and basically every -- the people that you are 


hiring to do the -- check these out, the 


adjudicators, they're -- they're -- they -- 


they don't know what they're talking about and 


you -- you talk to them and they say they're 


going to do this, and they don't do it. And if 


they're doing that with me, I'm sure they're 


doing it with a lot of other people, also, and 


I think that that needs to be looked at because 


I -- it -- and I feel that the funding -- that 


it -- they're misappropriating money all over. 


They're putting it in the wrong places and we 


should be taken care of, the people in our 


country, and not sending money aboard (sic). 


get real aggravated about that because they -- 


I 
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they worked here and they -- these men and 


women deserve to -- to be taken care of. And 


it just infuriates me that I -- the money 


that's supposed to be appropriated for them -- 


they don't get it because it's -- the powers 


that be have other things for it, and I 


shouldn't get into that 'cause I get real 


aggravated about that. But like I said, I -- 


my -- my dad -- and if you want to get into 


records and all, they -- they -- they lied 


about a lot of things in there. When I went 


through this it was like going through a puzzle 


and putting everything together, they -- oh, 


that's -- oh, now I know why this happened or 


that happened. You -- you can't trust any of 


those things that -- you -- it's -- I -- I just 


think it's frustrating for everybody and I feel 


bad for the whole -- all of them. And I think 


they need to get a Board that isn't -- isn't -- 


the President hasn't picked out. I think it 


should be a non-- non-partisan that pick you 


out because -- anyway -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: -- that's enough. I get 


(unintelligible). 

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 DR. ZIEMER: I don't think this Board is chosen 


based on our politics --


 MS. MONTGOMERY: Oh, well --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- by the way. 


 MS. MONTGOMERY: Well, that's good. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We hope that's not the case. 


Okay, let's hear now from Pete Marsh. 


MR. MARSH: Thank you very much for allowing me 


to talk tonight. My name is Pete Marsh. I 


represent the Central Washington Building 


Trades Council. I'm also the business manager 


of IBEW Local 112. We estimate that more than 


100 con-- 100,000 construction and 


subcontractors have worked at Hanford. That's 


a lot of workers. 


These comments apply specifically to 


construction trades claimants only. We want to 


be on the record as saying the dose 


reconstruction process is flawed and it's not 


working for the thousands of subcontractor 


workers who worked at Hanford. We've told you 


this before. 


I wish I could say that we have no stake or 


interest in this program because then we could 


wash our hands of it, but that's not true. A 

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large number of the claimants are either 


building trades members or their survivors, and 


they've not been treated fairly. For those 


construction worker claimants that NIOSH has 


completed dose reconstruction, from which I can 


tell are a small minority, it has done so 


without a valid scientific basis and these 


claimants can have no confidence in the 


findings. How do you expect workers or 


survivors to accept results when there aren't 


any records, or the workers simply were not 


even monitored? 


We are happy to hear about the possibility for 


the Hanford SEC, but we're dismayed that the 


first SEC only covered 1944 to 1946. You need 


to act on the rest of the SEC and approve the 


covered times from 1942 all the way to 1990. 


We hear from our members regularly, or their 


survivors who are having a very difficult time 


getting through this complex system, that this 


SEC would help a lot of the eligible workers. 


It never ceases to amaze me when I hear about 


this program and how claimant favorable it is. 


Maybe we should have some of these workers or 


survivors call you directly. 

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Thousands of construction worker claims are 


being denied justice and the entitlement to 


timely resolution because of the dose 


reconstruction process. It had done so because 


it is hell-bent on pursuing a scientific model 


that is virtually impossible to apply to 


construction workers, and you know this is 


true. 


We urge the Board to move forward on the 


Hanford SEC and to include all years. Enough 


is enough, and these workers and their 


survivors deserve better from our government 


because of what they gave to the government. 


They are ordinary people that were put in 


extraordinary circumstances. 


NIOSH has had seven years to figure this out, 


and hasn't done it. Claimants not only 


deserve, but are entitled to better treatment 


than this. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Pete. Next we'll hear 


from Richard Barker. 


 MR. BARKER: I appealed to NIOSH to produce a 


dose reconstruction, which they did, and the 


information they gave me back -- they gave me a 


number for whole body exposure and I submitted 

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my claim based on those numbers. They came 


back and apparently they took a whole body 


exposure and smeared or averaged that over a 


35-year working career. It doesn't take a 


rocket scientist to understand if you take a 


number and divide it by infinity, the result is 


going to be small. But their analysis was 


badly flawed. 


The whole body exposure that I received 


occurred over a two and a half year period when 


I worked at N reactor. I worked in a group 


called reactor core surveillance where we 


examined the tubes from a position at the front 


or rear elevators, examined the ball channels 


from the top of the unit, and examined the 


control rods from the rod rooms on the right 


and left side. The work was difficult, and it 


took a lot of exposure. 


 But the reactor cycle -- we ran on about a six-


week cycle. There'd be five weeks of 


production for producing plutonium, and then 


there'd be a week left for maintenance and for 


surveillance. Maintenance would come first. 


There would be two or three days left to do the 


surveillance, so the whole body exposure that I 

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incurred is compressed and intestifi-- and 


intensified over shorter and shorter periods of 


time. 


 The NIOSH analysis doesn't recognize that, so 


somehow NIOSH needs to be more astute in 


performing their analysis of -- of the 


biological effects. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Richard. Next on the 


list I have Randall Gossin -- Gosin? 


 MR. GOSSEEN: Gosseen. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Gosseen, thank you. 


 MR. GOSSEEN: Mr. Chairman, ladies and 


gentlemen of the Board, thank you for this 


opportunity. My name is Randall R. Gosseen. 


I'm a business (unintelligible) with Local 598 


for the plumbers and steam fitters here in 


Pasco. We cover 37,000 square miles of -- of 


jurisdiction, Hanford being almost right in the 


middle of it. We've been here since the '40s. 


I represent a proud local union which has a 


large number of its members employed -- or has 


had -- at many Hanford sites. I support the 


designated -- designation of Hanford as an SEC 


site for production workers from '44 to '46. 


think that's great. However, I feel that it 


I 
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falls far short of what's really needed here. 


First of all, construction workers at Hanford 


were exposed to the same hazards and at the 


same places and sites as the production workers 


were. I'd also like to include maintenance 


workers, as well. 


The walls of our hall are covered with names of 


our deceased members. The lion's share of 


those people, since the mid-'40s, have done a 


lot of work out at Hanford. Still there's some 


that are -- that can tell you about the things 


that happened in the '40s. Five decades of 


workers made a living at Hanford and served 


their country while they did it. My father was 


one of those steam fitters and at one time was 


exposed to over 400 millirem in less than 15 


seconds, and we have not been able to get those 


records. They don't exist anymore. 


 Being affiliated with the construction workers, 


I've heard many more stories like this, and 


even worse than this. My point is that I'm 


recom-- that I hope that you would recommend, 


as soon as possible, that NIOSH be advised to 


include all Hanford workers who were employed 


there from 1942 to 1990 'cause I feel it's only 

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right and it's only fair. I'd like to thank 


you for your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Randall. Now 


the next -- I'm having a little trouble, I'm 


not sure if it's Chris or Christy Janos -- it 


must be Chris, okay. Thank you. And I believe 


we heard you -- from you yesterday. Welcome 


back. 


MR. JANOS: Right, I was -- I was here last 


night --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


MR. JANOS: -- as authorized representative for 


my mom. I'm speaking for myself tonight. 


[Name Redacted] was a reactor operator, as you 


recall, and in 1948 he was diagnosed with 


thyroid cancer after coming here in '43, and it 


changed his life dramatically. If you know 


what happens when you get your thyroid removed, 


you know what happens to the person. They 


change. They're not the same, ever again. 


So the reason for my comment here -- it's 


anecdotal. It has to do with ambient radiation 


and I'd like the Board just to be mindful of 


the role ambient radiation, especially 


radioactive iodine, has on people when you 

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advise NIOSH because my impression is they're 


ignoring it. 


 And I'm taking -- this is out of context, but 


it's -- it's -- it's anecdotal and it's 


analogous. My -- my comment is the 


mismanagement of ambient radiation on the 


Colorado plateau, which includes Utah and New 


Mexico -- and you've probably been aware of 


this, AEC mis-steps. 


The following excerpt comes from the book 


Killing Our Own, the Disaster of America's 


Experience With Atomic Radiation, by Harvey 


Wasserman and Norman Solomon. And the doctor 


may know these guys. 


The excerpt says this -- it has to do with 


uranium tailings. Use of tailings as building 


material was widespread throughout the '50s and 


the '60s. Despite repeated warnings from the 


independent experts, the AEC didn't care, and ­

- that these tailings could cause harm to 


people. 


 This carelessness has a direct cost. In Grand 


Junction, Colorado more than 6,000 structures, 


including schools, had known tailing deposits 


in the building materials or the landfill under 

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the buildings. Streets and sidewalks across 


the town were built with tailings -- 270,000 


tons were used in Grand Junction, resulting in 


dangerous radiation levels all over the place. 


State and federal people tried to clean it up, 


but it was too late for many people. 


In 1978 the State of Colorado indicated the 


cancer rates in Mesa County, where Grand 


Junction is a major population center, showed 


acute accumia -- leukemia rate, twice the state 


average. More women were suffering from the 


disease than men, which indicates radiation 


poisoning. 


Now what comes from the uranium tailings, and 


when you think about uranium dust and postprocessing, radon and gamma rays. My sources ­

- the sources quoted in here come from [Name 


Redacted], who studies radiation exposure, and 


a Russian person, [Name Redacted], who 


discover-- discusses radiation poisoning. 


 Similar life-threatening conditions have been 


observed in Durango, Colorado, mostly due to 


radon poisoning, and in -- most especially bad 


cases of tailing poisoning in Monticello, Utah, 


not to mention the damages done to the Navajo 

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nation, on whose lands uranium tailings and 


waste ponds still exist. 


My conclusion: Ambient radiation from nuclear 


fuel processing, uranium mining and milling, 


maims and kills American citizens and Native 


Americans. What more do the Department of 


Labor, Secretary of Health and the Congress of 


the United States need to know about the 


probability of damage and risks to do the right 


thing? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Chris. I 


want to check to see if Terrie Barrie's on the 


phone -- Terrie's from the Denver area. 


Terrie, are you there? 


 MS. BARRIE: Yes, I am, Doctor. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. We'd be pleased to 


hear from you. 


 MS. BARRIE: Okay, thank you so much. Let me 


just turn this fan down. 


Good evening again and thank you so much, you 


and Dr. Wade, for allowing me -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Terrie, can you speak a little 


louder? 


(NOTE: Electronic feedback occurring 


throughout Ms. Barrie's presentation made 

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transcription difficult. A best effort 


follows.) 


 MS. BARRIE: Sure. I -- I want to thank you 


and Dr. Wade for allowing me to call in my 


public comments tonight. Can you hear me okay? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, there's a bit of an echo. 


You're not on a cell phone are you, by chance? 


 MS. BARRIE: No, I'm not. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

 MS. BARRIE: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, go ahead -- proceed. 

 MS. BARRIE: All right. My name is Terrie 

Barrie and I'm with the Alliance of Nuclear 


Worker Advocacy Group. Last week the CDC 


issued the final rule (unintelligible) SEC 


petition. I must admit, this issue slid under 


the radar for me. I know the wheels of 


government often move slowly, but three years 


(unintelligible) seems a bit excessive. I was 


happy to read (unintelligible) that the final 


rule accepted the fact that Congress intended 


NIOSH to issue the evaluation report within 180 


days of the receipt of the petition. I thought 


wow, we won one. 


Then I read exceptions to the rule. Now mind 

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you, exceptions are fine. They give everyone a 


fair shake. But there is one exception that 


bothers me a bit. The rule states that if 


NIOSH denies a petition because 


(unintelligible) insufficient, the 180-day 


clock doesn't start ticking while the 


petitioner is revising the petition to remedy 


any NIOSH-identified deficiencies. 


Now this may be great for petitioners who may 


not be well-versed in the documents that NIOSH 


requires. It would be fair for both NIOSH and 


the petitioners to start the legislative 


deadline clock after the petitioners have the 


opportunity to submit further documentation to 


support the SEC petition. But I worry about 


NIOSH abusing the rule in the similar 


(unintelligible) they abused the law in the 


Rocky Flats petition. 


I read that NIOSH anticipates an additional 33 


SEC petitions may be filed within the next five 


years. Will NIOSH automatically deny petitions 


just so they will have more time to provide 


(unintelligible) evaluation report? The Rocky 


Flats petition is a good example of this 


possibility happening. 

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For those of you in the audience who don't know 


this, Rocky Flats' petition was submitted 


February in 2005 by the Steelworkers Local 


8031. It was (unintelligible). NIOSH, 


however, stated that they needed more 


information and the Local ends up submitting 


500 more pages of documents as evidence. NIOSH 


did not qualify the petition until the end of 


June 2005. I ask the Board to be vigilant with 


any new petition, that they are not just 


dismissed without justification. 


At the May meeting in Denver many Board members 


stated that their hands were tied by the law 


when taking the position against Rocky Flats 


becoming a member of the SEC petition for 


(unintelligible) years of the petition. I and 


many others felt that this was untrue. I think 


what happened was that, after much legal 


finagling, the agency found only 


(unintelligible) that will allow a gross 


miscarriage of justice done to the sick workers 


of the Rocky Flats (unintelligible). And this 


same injustice could just as likely be 


perpetrated against Fernald and Hanford and any 


other place that has or will apply for SEC 

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status. 


The Board laid the blame at Congress's doorstep 


for how the language of the law was written. 


It's funny how the claimants and advocates of 


(unintelligible) understood what Congress 


wanted, but how is it that the federal agencies 


did not. In fact, former Colorado Congressman 


Bob DuPres appeared before this Board last 


month on behalf of the Rocky Flats workers. He 


stated I am here to tell you you are not 


following the intent of Congress, but you, the 


Board, ignored that. 


 (Unintelligible) important issue I want to 


raise is the (unintelligible) services report 


to Congress. This report was due June of 2006, 


a year ago, but was not submitted to Congress 


until July of this year. Congress had asked 


HHS to (broken transmission) should (broken 


transmission) added to the original legislative 


(broken transmission). HHS concludes that only 


one additional cancer could be added, basal 


cell carcinoma. I have serious concerns about 


(unintelligible) of this report and question 


that sound science (unintelligible) applied. 


Why? One reason is because (unintelligible) 

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medical effects of ionizing radiation was used 


as the source. Why does this bother me? 


Because Dr. Fred (unintelligible) was retained 


by (unintelligible) by the DOE processors to 


(unintelligible) in state worker compensation 


systems to deny nuclear weapons workers' 


claims. The conflict of interest here is just 


appalling. Use of this research is very 


questionable, in my mind. I also question why 


NIOSH's (unintelligible) 2005 research of the 


Pantex facility was not considered. This 


report showed, among other things, that there 


was a definite increased incidence of prostate 


cancer at Pantex. Why was that research not -- 


and others ignored when considering additional 


cancers? 


Many people (broken transmission) expressed 


concerns, and even offered ideas of how to 


improve the program. Unfortunately, we (broken 


transmission) see no real change in status quo. 


ANWAG wishes the best to the Hanford 


petitioners. Thank you for your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Terrie, do you -- 


could you provide us with a written copy, 


perhaps by e-mail, of your testimony. We got a 

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lot of distortion at this end and I think may 


have had some difficulty in transcribing it. 


 MS. BARRIE: Okay, I do have a (unintelligible) 

--

 DR. ZIEMER: Do you have a written version that 

you could e-mail either to me or to Dr. Wade? 


 MS. BARRIE: Sure, Doctor, I can do that, 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: That will be good, and then I'll 


provide that to our court reporter so that we 


make sure that we have the transcription 


correct in the record -- 


 MS. BARRIE: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- 'cause we were getting a fair 


amount of distortion as you gave your 


testimony. 


 MS. BARRIE: And to the Board members, too, who 


may not have understood, too? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, if -- if you get it to our 


court reporter -- or get it to Lew Wade -- you 


have my e-mail and you have Lew's, I think -- 


 MS. BARRIE: Yes, I do. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and if you get it to us, we'll 


make sure that the others get copies. 


 MS. BARRIE: I appreciate that. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. 


(NOTE: A copy of Ms. Barrie's written 


statement is attached.) 


 MS. BARRIE: Thank you, Doctor. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is there anyone else on the phone 


lines that wish to make testimony tonight? 


 MR. DRIVER: Charles Driver. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Charles. Give us your last 

name again. 

 MR. DRIVER: Driver --

 DR. ZIEMER: Driver? 

 MR. DRIVER: -- D-r-i-v-e-r. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, please proceed. 

(NOTE: The distorted transmission continued 


through Mr. Driver's statement. A best-effort 


transcription follows.) 


 MR. DRIVER: I'm from Paducah, Kentucky. I 


worked at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 


where we processed uranium. I was there for 14 


years. My concerns are kind of numerous but 


I'm going to try to be brief. I am nowhere 


near as well-educated in a lot of these things 


as some of my friends are -- such as Gai 


Oglesbee, Vina Colley and Terrie Barrie, who 


was just speaking -- but I do support these 

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folks. I've been in communication with them 


for most of seven years now and I know (broken 


transmission). 


One problem that I have with NIOSH as an agent 


of the United States Department of Energy, it 


is not accountable and it ignores, as DOE does 


most often, it ignores any data that is not 


generated by itself. This is something that 


I've been hearing as I listened to this -- 


these testimonies from other people. They 


worded it in several different ways, but the 


bottom line is if they didn't generate the 


information, and no matter how credible the 


other sources, they just ignore it and I don't 


think that that's correct. They should not be 


doing that. 


If you go back to the original two-paragraph 


description of what NIOSH said it was going to 


do -- this was published at least five years 


ago -- in that small two-paragraph document you 


will find at least 14 generalities, statements 


that go along the line of well, we're going to 


estimate this, which we base probably on this, 


or it could be on that and it might be on this, 


and -- and it -- so-and-so is possibly doing 

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this. One generality based on another 


generality (broken transmission) other 


generality, which is totally absurd. I'm 58 


years old and I've never seen a business or any 


organization -- six years in the military, 14 


years at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant -- 


that (unintelligible) adopt such a policy. 


It's absolutely ridiculous that they would have 


so many generalities in the way that they 


process and try to come up with dose 


reconstruction (broken transmission). 


 (Unintelligible) see here. Dose reconstruction 


is impossible due to (unintelligible) exposure 


in that a worker victim could very easily have 


had a part of his or her (unintelligible) 


exposed while another part, maybe where the 


dosimeters that they were wearing did not get 


that dose reading. An example would be that in 


the first three and a half years that I was in 


the Paducah plant I was in the 


(unintelligible), and we were sitting in cloth 


chairs, fabric chairs, on guard posts. These 


chairs had been there for at least ten, maybe 


15 years before I ever came on the scene. That 


(broken transmission) through 1987 -- '87 

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(broken transmission) -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Hello? 


 MR. DRIVER: And then in 1996 one of our health 


physics technicians was checking those chairs 


that we set in for years (broken transmission) 


found the highest reading of radioactive 


material that he'd found at the plant to date, 


and he has been all over this plant. And in 


sitting in those chairs -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Charles -- Charles --


 MR. DRIVER: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to interrupt just a 


moment. We have someone else on the line that 


is causing a lot of background noise. Folks, 


if you're on the line and not speaking, please 


mute your phones. Thank you. 


 Proceed, Charles. 


 MR. DRIVER: Okay. Sitting in those chairs 


there were several security guards that 


developed various illnesses that could not be 


attributed to any source that we could find at 


that time. So my point is that there's many 


other different areas where -- that workers in 


the plant could have been partly exposed and it 


would have never (broken transmission) on a 

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dosimeter, and this is a big part of where that 


NIOSH (broken transmission) information. 


 The other point that I want to make is that 


this focus -- and I know that NIOSH is strictly 


focusing on radioactive material, but in all of 


the Department of Energy and Department of 


Labor research it does not appear that they're 


giving their -- what's the term I should use -- 


consideration to the fact that we were exposed 


to -- in all these many different plants all 


across the nation, we were exposed to numerous 


different types of various toxins and heavy 


metals that are just hardly mentioned. What 


DOE and DOL and NIOSH -- what they want to do 


is they focus on radiation, which they seem to 


have some control over the literature that 


they're producing, but they want to ignore 


other elements such as arsenic, lead, silver, 


nickel, (broken transmission) big long list of 


others. 


Now beryllium is a high-profile element; they 


have zeroed in on that. But they 


(unintelligible) and I think we have more 


people out there that may be suffering not only 


from radiation exposure but combination of 

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radiation exposure and the heavy metal poison. 


Also, the other thing that's ignored is the 


(unintelligible). (Unintelligible) saved my 


life seven years ago. Had it not been for the 


(unintelligible), I'm convinced that I would 


probably be dead by now. And the 


(unintelligible) is so simple, it's so 


inexpensive and it is extremely accurate. The 


reason it's accurate, the problem is that with 


blood tests quite often these elements that are 


lodged in the amino fatty acid tissues of the 


body, they are not exposed. They don't get 


back in the bloodstream unless someone takes a 


chelation-type medicine that would 


(unintelligible). So your blood test and 


urinalysis do not show (broken transmission) 


and (broken transmission) would. So I would 


encourage whoever might be listening that if 


there's some way that we could start to 


emphasize that it would help a lot to save 


lives, and that's the main reason (broken 


transmission). 


I can only parrot a lot of things that have 


already been said. I've already mentioned Gai 


Oglesbee, Vina Colley and my friend Terrie 

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Barrie. These folks that I've communicated 


with for a long time, along with these others 


that have (broken transmission) 100 percent 


behind them. I give them my full support, and 


I thank you for allowing me to provide this 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. 


 MR. DRIVER: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now let me see if there's others. 


I don't have anyone else signed up, but are 


there others here that wish to make a 


statement? Anyone else? Yes, sir, please 


approach the mike. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) I'd like to say 


that you should limit the telephone calls to 


the ten minutes that we (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I -- I'm -- I'm timing them, 


as well. Thank you. 


 Go ahead. 


 MR. VALDEZ: Good evening. My name is George 


Valdez. I'm here on behalf of my father, who 


passed away in 1972. Dad worked at the Hanford 


site as a gandy dancer from 1944 until 1970, 


rarely missed a day of work, hardworking man, 


had quite a few mouths to feed at home, 

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retired, a year and a half he was dead from 


cancer. 


We decided to go ahead and file this claim with 


NIOSH and probably all of you have a book 


that's similar to this. Mine is actually twice 


this size. They're going in for the third dose 


reconstruction for my father right now. The 


first one they did, I think he received 42 


percent probability. They found another year 


and a half of employment so that added about 


another two percent, to 44 -- 44.7. Now I 


understand they're going in for this super 


plutonium -- I'm not sure I understand all of 


that, but anyway, we've been basing our hopes 


on the SEC petition. 


So I'd like to commend the people that are here 


that are speaking out on behalf of the SEC 


petition. I, too, firmly believe that the -- 


the petition should be -- become, you know, 


part of the process to finally give 


compensation to survivors and for those that 


are still living. 


My final statement here, I'd just like to thank 


the two sisters that -- if I hadn't read in the 


newspaper the interview by [Name Redacted] with 

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the two sisters, I was ready to throw in the 


towel. This has been an ongoing, long battle 


for probably four years for me, probably for 


much longer for many of the others. But 


fortunately for me, I worked on the Hanford 


site and I know an awful lot about radiation, 


the effects of radiation, so I've been able to 


do a lot of homework. It was kind of 


interesting at the oral hearing that I had, the 


adjudicator told me that he'd only seen one 


other person as well prepared, and that fella 


was a lawyer. 


So in any case, the S. Cohen & Associates 


report I believe is a real key to answering a 


lot of questions. However, you know, when will 


Hanford answer those audit reports and 


findings. That's a real key I think to 


figuring out just how a dose reconstruction 


should be performed. 


So I thank you again. My name's George Valdez. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, George. Are there 


others here that wish to make statements? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sure, uh-huh. 

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 UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. 


 MR. DENGATE: I'm re-- my name is Richard 


Dengate and I'm a retired General Telephone 


employee. I should have brought my tools with 


me tonight; I'd have worked on that problem. 


But anyway, I worked in -- for 21 years out 


there and I was in every area, all the 


buildings and -- every place there was a phone, 


in the attics, underneath the buildings, and we 


rewired everything out there twice over the 


time that I worked out there. And I had many, 


many contaminations on my skin and on my shoes 


and on my shirt and -- and it -- it took -- it 


took a long time and a lot of work to prove 


that General Telephone was a contractor out 


there. 


That -- it was -- it was amazing and -- but 


being a telephone employee, you're kind of just 


like you're -- you're all by yourself out 


there. Nobody really pays any attention to -- 


you know, they want a phone here and they want 


it now and -- or they want it fixed and they 


want it fixed now and -- and we never had any 

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schooling from 1974 until 1984. The telephone 


company schooled us on their stuff, but Hanford 


never tr-- sent us to the training classes un-- 


until I -- one day I was talking to a -- an 


instructor and I told him when are we going to 


get some training on this, and you could just 


see his eyes light up and -- and that -- 


shortly after that we got some -- in the 


classes then. But that's all I really wanted 


to say. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. 


Probably could have been a good help to us 


today, perhaps. Thanks. 


 Yes, another comment here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I just have a brief comment. 


won't take very much more time. There's not 


very much talk --


 DR. ZIEMER: And for the record, give your name 


again. 


MS. OGLESBEE: Oh, this is Gai Oglesbee again. 


There isn't very much talk about chemicals that 


I've heard. Chemicals are a big factor in 


producing the byproduct and eliminating it, so 


I wondered if I could bring up the fact that B 


Plant is I -- when I was ALARA site and 


I 
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facility chair I saw to it that B Plant was -- 


chemicals, everything, was listed. I gave you 


a copy of it yesterday. I don't know of other 


facilities that have it. I think tank farms is 


correlating a chemical -- a database and I 


don't have a copy of that right now, but that 


was a DOE goal that I set for our board and we 


completed it and it concludes (sic) strontium90, cesium capsules, all that -- everything 


that was at B Plant 'cause it hadn't been done. 


So I'm wondering if there's very many 


facilities that have those chemicals lists 


because I don't think there is and I think the 


NIOSH has a handbook that covers chemicals, but 


it needs to be applied to the impairment rating 


because I was exposed to chronic doses of 


asbestos and they don't even want to talk about 


asbestos, and that was a big lawsuit issue 


since 1970, but I was chronically exposed to 


asbestos on many occasions. And I found out I 


was exposed to beryllium, so I don't hear NIOSH 


estimating that in my dose reconstruction, 


which was inaccurate. And I understand my Part 


B claim was dismissed and administratively -- 


administratively dismissed because I didn't 

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want to sign a closure waiver on the advice of 


an attorney because that the dose 


reconstruction was horribly inaccurate. And so 


here I am fighting Christie Long and Peter 


Turcic (unintelligible) and Secretary Chao 


herself to tell my two Congressmen investigated 


this that I'm not a RECA claimant, I'm an EEOIC 


claimant. It has never been clarified and I 


talked to Christie last night to please write 


another letter to my Congresspeople to tell 


them I'm not a RECA claimant 'cause it's in the 


files. I'm an EEOIC claimant and always have 


been. 


I want to say one more thing. I -- I -- my 


stack of evidence -- my stack of evidence is 


about that tall. I sent it in -- it cost me 


$600 to file it with DOE and with the U.S. -- 


you know, DOL. I've never been reimbursed for 


that. It's the biggest packet, I'm told, that 


has been sent in so far. In that packet of 


information and evidence I submitted a four-


inch packet of expert witness data that says 


I'm irreparably damaged by radiation -- or 


ionizing radiation and components. That's in 


my packet. The D-- and NIOSH doesn't recognize 

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that because they don't -- they say they have 


their own methodology. That's not right. That 


packet of information cost $24,000 and I went 


to a secret place to have the tests done. 


Also I've been -- twice now my damages have 


been 100 percent probability and explained why 


it is, twice, by caus-- you know, the 


causation, so I have -- these people have 


conflicts with me because I've been with them 


for a long time, especially NIOSH. So I have a 


feeling that they're retaliating, and I don't 


want to do that anymore because I went through 


this whole phase for years now, 20 -- 21-plus 


years. I don't want to fight with them anymore 


because they have conflicting (sic) and they're 


denying my claim. And I don't care whether 


they give me their pittance money. I really 


don't. I just want somebody in the government 


to understand that we have made an effort to 


come forward -- to come forward with our 


evidence and it costs a very -- a lot of money. 


So I have had lawyers, I will admit it, but I 


would like NIOSH to talk me on a level that's 


not an insult, because they can't just discount 


what I've already done for myself, and that's 

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what they're doing. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Incidentally, Gail (sic), you 


should recognize -- at least in this part of 


the compensation program -- we're not permitted 


to look, in a sense, at the chemical exposures. 


Congress did not include them in the law, even 


though scientifically we recognize chemicals 


can contribute to health effects. But in this 


Part of the -- the dose reconstruction program 


only addresses the radiation. That's the only 


thing that we're able to look at from basically 


what you'd say would be the legal point of 


view. I understand -- your point is well-made, 


but the NIOSH part of the program only looks at 


the radiation part. Other -- Labor does, under 


the other Part, have the ability to look at 


some other things, and I know you've worked 


with Labor on that, too. But sometimes our 


laws are such that they cannot get a -- a 


handle on all the issues we would like them to. 


But be awa-- I think you are aware of that, but 


just wanted to emphasize that, that it's not 


that this Board is ignoring the chemicals, but 


we're only able under -- under the regulation 


that we work on, to deal with the radiation 

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part, so -- but thank you for making that 


point. 


MS. OGLESBEE: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) this advocate and some of the 


other advocates (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


MS. OGLESBEE: -- (unintelligible). 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Was there 


someone else on the phone line that wanted to 


speak? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


UNIDENTIFIED: There's an echo here. Are you 


hearing an echo, too? My name -- can you -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Will you --


UNIDENTIFIED: -- hear me all right? 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- identify yourself, please? 


 MS. FIERING: Yes, it's Joanie Fiering. I 


called last night, and I woke up at 4:00 


o'clock this morning and couldn't go back to 


sleep thinking about more information that I 


thought you should have. I'll be brief, but 


I'm working with Vina Colley, effective 

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yesterday, with Portsmouth/Piketon Residents 


for Environmental (unintelligible) and 


Security. And my dad worked at the plant for 


four years -- or for ten years, and had four 


different cancers when he died, and my mother 


had a rare form of cancer. It was endometrial. 


Doctors in Michigan didn't know how to treat it 


and they actually named a treatment after her. 


The reason I'm calling again, and the 


testimonies tonight have been so moving and I 


just want people to know that -- that I am, you 


know, with them. I -- I understand what 


they're going through. 


But one of the doctors, because we didn't know 


what my father had done at the A Plant -- I 


didn't even know what the A Plant was until I 


moved back to Portsmouth in 2004. He died 


silent. He died the good soldier that he was. 


He was, you know, in the Air Force and then he 


worked during the Cold War effort at the atomic 


plant in Piketon, and he never told us so the 


doctors assumed that this was genetic. Now one 


of the doctors my mother had during her 


treatment -- five years of treatment was 


concerned for her daughters, who at that time 

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were all under the age of 37, and told us that 


we should have our ovaries removed because they 


assumed it was a genetic factor. They did not 


-- we did not know to tell them about this 


exposure because we did not know about it. But 


my mother had washed my father's clothes for 


ten years. And when my little sister, who I 


spoke to at Christmas time, told me that her -- 


she and her husband don't have children because 


it just (unintelligible) must not be in the 


cards for them, I didn't want to tell her that 


it was probably because of my father's bringing 


home these toxins on his clothes and exposing 


my mother and -- and when she was having us 


girls. 


And I just want you all to know the impact that 


telling people it wasn't the toxins that made 


them sick could have, not only on them and 


their -- their spouses, but the children and 


the future generations. If we had listened to 


this doctor, you know, we all could have been 


completely devastated. So I -- I -- you know, 


I -- this is what kept me up for two hours last 


night, and it's very painful to come forward 


and talk about these things and to have to 

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remember and live -- relive the deaths of 


parents and spouses and children and loved 


ones. So -- and you know -- and if there's any 


way this committee can -- can facilitate the 


reimbursement or the -- the -- the 


compensation, rather, for these workers and 


their families, this is just a small amount of 


money compared to the suffering that families 


have been through and continue to go through 


due to these secondary -- primary and secondary 


exposures, and this is generations. 


So this is why I called back tonight, and I 


just thank you for letting me speak. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you for sharing that with 


us, Joanie. 


 Was there another gentleman on the line who 


also wanted to speak? 


UNIDENTIFIED: I would -- I would like (broken 


transmission) briefly, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Give us your name, please. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Sure, my -- my name's John 


(broken transmission). I worked in the (broken 


transmission) building (broken transmission) to 


1966 operating (broken transmission) man 


(broken transmission) 20 (broken transmission) 

1 -- 

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 DR. ZIEMER: John, let me interrupt you. 


You're -- you're breaking up on the phone. Are 


you on a cell phone? We're not able to 


understand what you're saying. Your phone --


UNIDENTIFIED: Can you hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- seems to be breaking up. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Sir, can you hear (broken 


transmission) -- sir? Can you hear me now 


better? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we can hear you, but we 


cannot understand what you're saying very well. 


I wonder if you could call back in on another ­

- just hang up and then call back in. Maybe we 


can get a better line. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Can you -- can you hear me, sir, 


now? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, really not understanding. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. Sir? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, go ahead and -- and 


try it again, see if we can understand what 


you're saying. Your line seems to be breaking 


up a lot. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Sir, I operated -- I -- I can 


tell there is a very severe echo, sir. I might 

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as well not try to comment, as severe as the 


echo is. I'm not on a cell phone, I'm on a 


land line phone, but there is a very severe 


echo. Can you understand me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're really having a great deal 


of difficulty understanding what you're saying. 


Do you want to hang up and try calling in 


again? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Can you understand me any 


better? Sir? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Really having trouble 


understanding what you're saying. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Can you understand me any 


better, sir? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I can understand that phra-- 


what you're just asking me, but as you've -- as 


you proceed, your voice continues to break up. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm sorry, then. I'll back off, 


sir. I'll -- I'll comment some other time. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay. Thank you very much. 


Any -- anyone else here this evening that 


wishes to make com-- yes, ma'am. 


 MS. TRUDEAU: Yes, my name is Julie Trudeau -- 


do you need me to spell that? T-r-u-d-e-a-u. 

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And actually I've been processing claims on 


behalf of my sister's surviving family. It's 


gone from the radiation to the chemical and 


we'll reopen the radiation exposure. The thing 


that I've been finding are the DO-- the 


Department of Labor's supposed to be handling 


this because they were finding that the people 


were -- were being blocked from a lot of 


things; blocked from records, they seemed to be 


inhibited from just getting their due justice 


and that is getting their medical needs taken 


care of and just -- just being compensated for 


-- for torment, that's the only way I know how 


to put it. 


Now my sister had been there for a period of 


time, '92 to '97, and she was a chem tech, and 


you get the same generic letter from Department 


of Labor, and that is denied -- denied, denied. 


I just got one, you know, four weeks ago. Now 


we're having a hearing coming up, so when I 


talked to the investigator or whatever the -- 


the examiner and I asked her, I said where is 


these specific documents, and I said who read ­

- who read these medical claims? Who read the 


medical documentation that I submitted? Who 

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read that? And she had no answer for me, so 


here the examiner is passing off a denied -- 


recommended denied. It was the same thing that 


I got through -- you know, through the NIOSH 


portion of it. It's -- it's just a generic 


form letter. 


And my sister's deceased now, but there's a lot 


of suffering people out here. And during her 


employment when I met -- read the medical 


records, and I've had a little bit of training, 


what I could see was reproductive disorders 


from beginning to end. And her mission at that 


time -- and she started, you know, realizing 


there were other women in the lab having these 


same miscarriages, stillbirths and 


endometriosis, always reproductive disorders, 


and eventually she developed breast cancer -- 


which we do not have a family history. The 


American Cancer Society states the difference 


between the general population and familial 


genetic can-- cancer is somewhere between two 


up to 50 percent if you have a family history. 


So there's a significant factor in between. 


And toxins, lifestyle, radiation, those do 


affect cancer genetic mutations, all of that. 

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So I believe that, you know, Kathy -- my sister 


-- had all these problems because she worked 


out there as a chem tech. And one thing I'm 


running into is getting just Department of 


Energy documentation -- thank you -- Dorothy 


really is the person responsible for Freedom of 


Information Act. She gave me an estimate, 


after what I thought was wasting two hours -- I 


gave her a very specific list. My sister had a 


very specific chemical inventory list from 


1998. It was a (unintelligible) [Name 


Redacted] document. It was very specific, four 


missing pages. They wasted the two hours that 


I was allotted and didn't come up with 


anything. She gave me an estimate to find 


pages, as well as incident reports in the 


laboratory at 222-S, which is a notorious lab; 


half the people are dead in that lab. And she 


gave me an estimate about 3850 -- $3,850 -- 


just to get documentation that I should not 


have to pay a dime for because my sister's 


dead, and she wouldn't have been had she not 


been working out there. 


And so these hurdles that people are running 


into, they should have this documentation 

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provided without harassment, without delay, 


without standard letter forms and just, you 


know, given what they need. My recommendation 


would be to just pay off all the claims, and 


any other claims from this point -- 'cause I'm 


assuming that things have improved, that now 


with new calculations, start from there. Pay 


off all these people that have been tormented 


for years and start afresh with new claims and 


new calculations and -- and go on, because it's 


been going on for way too long and it's 


ridiculous and -- and I'm glad you guys are 


here. I appreciate your time, and you're the 


people that can do something about this. So 


thank you very much for your time and if you 


have any pull with the Department of Labor and 


these people scheduling my hearing, they made 


it a deliberate, out-of-town distance where 


I've got to try to get witnesses there and I 


can't do it. And you know, then they insist 


that their policy states that I cannot have it 


in the city of Richland where everybody works, 


where Hanford is, so they're making it very 


difficult even with scheduling of hearings and 


so that is also another hurdle that I've got to 

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spend a lot of time. So if you have any pull 


at Department of Labor, I would -- everyone 


would appreciate it, to stop wasting time and 


get this stuff done. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Julie. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Sir? Sir? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Anyone else? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Sir? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: May I (broken transmission), 


sir? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Has he called back -- is this the 


same gentleman? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's give it another try. 


It sounds like it's breaking up again, but go 


ahead and let's try it. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Broken transmission) 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think we're still having the 


same problem. We hear just pieces of words and 


we can't really understand, so -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm sorry. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm -- I'm going to suggest that 


if you -- if you do have some comments that you 


want us to include that you could -- could mail 

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them to NIOSH, but I think it's going to be 


very difficult for us, for some reason, to -- 


to hear your oral testimony tonight. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I understand. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Thank you all for 


being here tonight. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Hey, I'd like to --


 DR. ZIEMER: We appreciate the input -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- I would like to speak 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- that you've given us. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Hello? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, is there someone else on the 


phone line? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, I'm sorry. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Please identify yourself. 


 MS. COLLEY: Hi, I'm Vina Colley and (distorted 


transmission). I spoke yesterday (distorted 


transmission) --


 DR. ZIEMER: Ma'am, are you on a cell phone? 

 MS. COLLEY: No, sir. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Because we're getting a lot of 

echoes, you're very difficult to understand. 


Again, it may -- the trouble may be at this 

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end, but --

 MS. COLLEY: Okay, well, let me go try another 

phone. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. She may just be trying 

another phone in her house. Anyone else here 


in the meantime? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. 


 MS. COLLEY: Hello? Is this (unintelligible)? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are you back on the line, ma'am? 


 MS. COLLEY: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, go ahead, let's see if we 


can understand. 


 MS. COLLEY: Okay, my name (broken 


transmission) Colley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda? Uh-huh. 


 MS. COLLEY: Vina -- Vina Colley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Vina, oh -- okay. 


 MS. COLLEY: Okay? Portsmouth/Piketon 


Residents for Environmental Safety and Security 


and I co-chair national (distorted 


transmission) workers for (broken 


transmission). I did speak yesterday, but 


there's (distorted transmission). I (broken 


transmission) located in Piketon, Ohio. 

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According to (distorted transmission) report, 


Piketon is (distorted transmission) to be the 


worst site. I'm concerned over the dose 


reconstruction because (distorted transmission) 


testified in Congress that records were 


falsified, destroyed, and there's no way that 


you can actually (distorted transmission) how 


much dose those workers had. Piketon is 


considered (distorted transmission). Even as a 


special (distorted transmission) site, workers 


are (distorted transmission) denied (distorted 


transmission) Energy Employees Compensation 


Act. If we're a special cohort site, then 


workers (broken transmission) be denied. I 


(broken transmission) at other sites being 


compensated. They're putting us through the 


same bull crap that we have to go through. In 


(broken transmission) one accident at Piketon 


(distorted transmission) pounds of uranium 


(distorted transmission) to the atmosphere, to 


the land, to the workers and the community. To 


this day that incident was compared to Three 


Mile Island and there's never been a study 


done. I'm not sure that when they did the dose 


if that was added. We had 45,000 (broken 

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transmission) uranium (broken transmission) 


released (broken transmission). (Distorted 


transmission) areas, these workers' exposures 


were so high they had to (distorted 


transmission). I'm (distorted transmission) 


contamination (distorted transmission) to my 


family because we were at the site at one time 


(distorted transmission) and then (distorted 


transmission) to work in their street clothes 


worked in 705 building. It was so hot and they 


had their street clothes on and they wore them 


home. Today [Redacted] can't have a child, and 


I think because I brought contamination home 


and I have to live with that. Besides being 


sick and fighting this (distorted transmission) 


for 20-some years, I have to live with the 


thought of contaminating [Redacted]. In 1999 ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Vina? 


 MS. COLLEY: Yes? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Could I interrupt, please? 


 MS. COLLEY: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to suggest, if you 


wouldn't mind, could you send us your testimony 


in writing? We're just getting sort of like 

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every other word and having a great deal of 


difficulty --


 MS. COLLEY: I don't have --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- I think the phone lines are 


bad. But if you wouldn't mind, we can 


certainly put this on the record and distribute 


it to the Board. But could you -- could you 


send us your -- your testimony in writing. 


 MS. COLLEY: Well, I don't have anything wrote 


down (broken transmission). It's just 


something that I've lived with all these years 


and I know that workers are being denied 


because of this -- this criminal act of the 


dose reconstruction. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MS. COLLEY: I never wrote anything down 


tonight. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. We -- I -- I've been able 


to track -- are you -- are you at Portsmouth? 


 MS. COLLEY: Yes, I (distorted transmission) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, I thought that -- 


 MS. COLLEY: -- plant. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I think we've gotten the gist 


of it, but not all the details. But if you -- 


if you do want to send us those details in -- 

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in writing, that -- we'd be glad to enter it in 


the record. I think the court reporter here's 


had a very difficult time trying to put -- get 


the words for the public record, but I 


understand --


 MS. COLLEY: (Distorted transmission) give us a 


call and we can (distorted transmission)? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

 MS. COLLEY: Will that be okay? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Thank you, 

folks, for your time this evening. I do want 

to let you know the Board will be convening 


tomorrow again at 8:30, and we have the Hanford 


petition on the agenda tomorrow. So I hope 


many of you will be able to be with us at that 


time. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 9:25 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

364 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of July 18, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


20th day of Sept., 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102 


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