NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. 

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 

US Department of Health and Human Services

Centers for Disease Control

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

139th Meeting

Thursday, April 15, 2021 

The meeting convened at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Time, 

via Videoconference, Rashaun Roberts, presiding.
2 

Members Present: 

Henry Anderson, Member

Josie Beach, Member

Bradley P. Clawson, Member

R. William Field, Member

David Kotelchuck, Member

James E. Lockey, Member

David B. Richardson, Member

Genevieve S. Roessler, Member

Phillip Schofield, Member

Loretta R. Valerio, Member

Paul L. Ziemer, Member

Also Present: 

Rashaun Roberts, Designated Federal Official

Nancy Adams, NIOSH Contractor

Bob Barton, SC&A

Zaida Burgos, NIOSH Contractor

Grady Calhoun, DCAS

John Cardarelli, DCAS

Josh Fester

Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A

Rose Gogliotti, SC&A

Warren Johnson 

Josh Kinman, DCAS

Greg Lewis, DOE

Jenny Naylor, HHS

Chuck Nelson, DCAS

Lavon Rutherford, DCAS

Tim Taulbee, DCAS
3 

Contents

US Department of Health and Human Services 

Centers for Disease Control National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health 139th Meeting 

Thursday, April 15, 2021 1

Welcome 4

SEC Petitions Status Update 10

Savannah River Site SEC Petition 103 14

Adjourn 115
4 

Proceedings

(1:00 p.m.) 

Welcome

Dr. Roberts: So, anyway, welcome everyone. I'm 

Rashaun Roberts. I'm the DFO, Designated Federal 

Official, for the Advisory Board on Radiation and 

Worker Health. 

You are here at the second final half day of our 

Board Meeting 139. Like yesterday, I'll just go over 

the typical preliminary. 

If you are just participating by telephone, all the 

materials for today the agenda, the presentations, 

the background documents, et cetera, are all posted 

on the NIOSH website under scheduled meetings for 

April 2021. You can go there and pull up the 

presentations and follow along as you're listening. 

All of the materials that were posted were provided 

to the Board Members and other staff prior to this 

meeting. 

If you take a look at the website, and also if you 

pull up the agenda for today, there is a Zoom link 

which will enable you to hear, to also speak and 

also to watch the presentations through Zoom. If 

you happen to be on Zoom, you do want to make 

sure periodically that you are muted if you're not 

speaking. The mute button for Zoom is located near 

the bottom left-hand corner of your screen. 

If you are on a telephone line, please mute your 

phones unless, of course, you're speaking. If you 

don't have the mute button press *6 to mute. If you 

need to take yourself off just press *6 again.

And also, if you are on the telephone, because we 

are unable to see you on Zoom, if you could identify 

yourself before any questions or comments that you 

might have. And I do see that there is a telephone 

line ending in 222 that appears not to be muted on 

Zoom. So, if you could go ahead and mute. 
5 

Yeah, extension 222, well, the ending number --

there you go. Thank you so much.

So, with that important business squared away, let's 

just go ahead and roll right into our roll call starting 

with Board Members in alphabetical order. So, that 

would be you, Andy.

(Roll call.)

Dr. Roberts: So, thank you and welcome to 

everyone. And I -- actually let me reiterate. I did 

say this yesterday, but I will repeat it again, that 

there are no conflicts of interest for the Board 

Members today with any of the agenda items.

So, welcome everyone. Let's prepare to go further 

into the agenda. Again, you just want to make sure

you're on mute on Zoom or by telephones, *6 if 

you're by telephone to mute, *6 to take yourself off 

mute.

So, I mentioned earlier that there was a bit of a 

twist from yesterday that we can thank for our 

technology for creating. Apparently during the 

public comment session there was a person, Dr. 

Dan McKeel, who had prepared comments for the 

Board and was on last night, but was unable to 

deliver those comments to the Board because he 

was unable to make himself heard through the 

technology.

So, I would like to see if Dr. McKeel is online or on 

the telephone at this point. And because, through 

no fault of his own, he was unable to make his 

comments, I just want to carve out a little time, 

since we are ahead of schedule anyway, to let him 

go ahead. And, if not, I can read the comments.

Mr. McKeel or Dr. McKeel, are you on?

Member Ziemer: I'm wondering if it's -- is it Dr. 

McKeel, maybe, not McNeil? 

Dr. Roberts: Yeah, Dr. McKeel. 
6

Member Ziemer: McKeel, yes. 

Dr. Roberts: McKeel, I must be mispronouncing 

that. Yes, Dr. Daniel McKeel, Jr. 

Okay. Well, I don't hear him. Hopefully, he's not on 

here and having the same difficulty. I did resend 

him the connection information today. But I will go 

ahead, since I don't hear him to go -- I will go 

ahead and read the letter. 

So, hello, I am Daniel W. McKeel, Jr., MD and 

currently serve as the SEC co-petitioner for General 

Steel Industries, GSI, and Dow Madison AWE sites 

in Illinois, and for Texas City Chemicals, a Texas 

AWE site. 

My main purpose today is to bring new information 

never before brought to the attention of the 

ABRWH, to the best of my knowledge, before this 

Board. The main subject is new information that 

supports a long-held assertion by 14 affiant Dow 

Madison workers and the SEC-0079 petition team 

that truckloads of magnesium-thorium alloy metal 

sheets and plates were shipped from Illinois Dow 

plant to Rocky Flats Plant, RFP, in Golden, Colorado. 

RFP has two SECs, numbers 30 and 192. As 

background the ABRWH Number 16 meeting in 

Naperville, Illinois on March 22nd and 23rd, 2017 

transcripts are most relevant in this regard. 

The 3/22/17 transcript during the public comment 

period on March 22nd, I had Ted Katz, Board DFO, 

read my comment into the official transcript record, 

see pages 216 to 221. I am the -- something was 

redacted -- MD presenter identified on page 216. 

I also forwarded to NIOSH and the Board through 

Mr. Katz additional summary information titled MagThor Alloy Use at DOE Rocky Flats plant dated 

March 21st, 2017 consisting of six pages and seven 

exhibits.

This document contained explicit information that 
7

proved Dow Madison Illinois site mag-thor alloy 

metal was used by RFP workers in Building 440 to 

shield DOE ATMX rail cars and secure semi-trailer 

trucks. An anonymous and three named Building 

440 RFP workers confirmed they machined magthor alloy metal and named ten other living RFP 

workers who could verify their accounts with 

information about shipping manifests, work orders, 

and inventory of these metal plates. I encouraged 

interviews of these RFP source people. 

The 3/24/17 transcript. The following day Board RFP 

Work Group Chairman David Kotelchuck reviewed 

the use of mag-thor alloy at RFP and summarized 

why NIOSH and the Board had concluded there was 

essentially no evidence to back up the 14 Dow 

Madison Site SEC-0057 affiant workers who testified 

that Dow Madison did, in fact, ship copious amounts 

of magnesium-thorium alloy to RFP, and in turn 

recycled mag-thor scrap for RFP shipped back to the 

Madison, Illinois site.

The purported 400 boxes of RFP data at LANL were 

also discussed. The new information was brought to 

my attention by a Dow Madison site expert. It 

recites a website as a 9-page document that was 

fully titled The Thorium Encyclopedia, the link as 

follows. 

I won't read the link, and I'll just circulate this 

document after this Board meeting so that you can 

see it.

Page 3 of 9 includes at least 12 new pieces of 

information that specifically identified the new uses 

for Dow Madison mag-thor alloy in DOE-modified for 

security ATMX railcars. I will read page 3 of 9 into 

the record information that was new to me on 

January 24th, 2021. 

Okay. So, let me read through that page. Okay. 

Another example of mag-thor's broad utility was in 

the ATMX 500 and 600 series armored railcars. The 
8

mag-thor used on Union Carbide's special 500 and 

600 series railcar carriage plates were produced 

exclusively by Dow Chemical at their Madison, 

Illinois plant. 

These series of railcars were used to transport 

nuclear weapons, mag-thor turnings intended for 

recycling, spent solid, and liquid nuclear waste, and 

other manufactured raw and processed uraniumthorium, their respective salts and oxides, and other 

interim materials to and from Rocky Flats and other 

facilities. Structural and floor and wheel panel 

components for the ATMX 500 and 600 rail cars 

were specifically reinforced using mag-thor, though 

not to contain a nuclear explosion. 

In addition, specially fitted Fruehauf semi-tractor 

trailers using the HK31 and HM21 type alloy, see 

Table 1, were created for terrestrial hauls. Dow 

supplied almost all of the mag-thor alloy including 

HK31A, HM21A, HM31A, HZ32, HZ32A and ZH62A, 

see Table 1, used by the military from 1957 to 

1960, with approximately 64 metric tons of pure 

thorium coming from Canada. The balance, 16 

metric tons, coming from Dow plants in the U.S.

Dow Madison continued to produce thorium alloys at 

their Illinois plant and to a lesser extent the Dow 

Bay City in Midland, Michigan plant until as late as 

1992. Materials and equipment transferred to the 

Rocky Flats weapons production facility over the 

ensuing decades was seamless, given that Dow 

Chemical managed Rocky Flats from 1952 to 1974, 

much of this processing was performed in Building 

440 at the Rocky Flats campus.

From time to time, the Mallinckrodt Chemical 

Company was given permission by Dow to operate 

at Rocky Flats.

So, that's the end of that page.

Pages 6 through 9 of this document contain 

references, two of which refer to the same paper I 
9

co-authored. 

And there's a link where you can access the paper.

Interestingly, our paper was not the source of any 

of the new facts. This week I will transmit to the 

Designated Federal Official my March 4th, 2021 

ABRWH public comment and relevant portion of the 

ABRWH Meeting Number 116 public comment and 

related documents for your review and further 

consideration and appropriate action. Thank you. 

Daniel W. McKeel, Jr., MD. And it's dated 

4/14/2021.

Okay. So, hopefully I did that justice. Some of the 

terminologies are little bit new to me but --

Member Kotelchuck: And Dave, I'm the Chair of the 

Rocky Flats Working Group. So, you'll send it to all, 

but I will take -- I will -- certainly, this is new 

information, and we'll certainly look at it decide how 

to go further with the working group.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Will do and again, either today 

or tomorrow I will send that forward to the Board.

Okay. So, with that -- Paul, were you saying 

something?

Member Ziemer: Just very quickly. I wonder of the 

Dow Madison site needs to take a look at that a 

well, not just Rocky Flats? I think that Dr. McKeel 

particularly has an interest in pursuing the Dow 

Madison issues. If I understand it correctly.

Josie?

Member Beach: Yeah, Paul, I was going to say the 

exact same thing, that our work group should look 

at it also.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Mr. Rutherford: This is Lavon. I want to also -- as 

soon as we get the information, we can pass that 
10

information on to the Department of Labor for their 

consideration if covered employment should be 

considered.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, very good.

Member Ziemer: Yeah, I think the -- I think before 

the work groups do anything, we need to have 

NIOSH look at this, and if there's further evaluation 

to be done that should be done probably before the 

work groups get involved.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Yes, okay. And, yes, okay, so, NIOSH 

will be included, of course, in that dissemination, as 

per usual, and then we will go from there.

Okay. So, we are a few minutes behind for Mr. 

Chuck Nelson's presentation on the SEC petition 

status update, but I'd like to invite him at this point 

to do his presentation. Chuck?

SEC Petitions Status Update

Mr. Nelson: Thank you, Rashaun, I will attempt to 

share my screen here. Let's see. Can you all see 

that?

Dr. Roberts: Yes.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. My name is Chuck Nelson. I'll be 

doing the SEC update for today. Okay. 

We do this update at every Advisory Board meeting 

to give the Board an indication of the petitions and 

qualifications and their evaluation. In addition, this 

update provides the evaluations currently under 

review with the Advisory Board, as well as any 

working 83.14s. 

This update can help the Advisory Board prepare for 

future work group meetings, as well as any 

upcoming Advisory Board meetings.

To date we have had 258 petition submittals. We 
11

currently have no petitions that are in the 

qualification process. We do, however, have one 

new petition evaluation in process, which is for 

Pinellas, and we will discuss that a little bit in the 

next slide.

Currently, we have 12 reports that are under review 

and with the Advisory Board. 

Okay. So, the Pinellas Plant, that's the newest SEC 

petition currently under evaluation, it's for the time 

period of 1957 through 1990, and this is SEC-0256 

and it's being evaluated for all employees during 

that timeframe. The expected completion of the 

evaluation report is late 2021. I think we talked 

about that a little bit yesterday. And with that we 

would be targeting a presentation of the evaluation 

report at the Advisory Board meeting in August 

2021. That would be a full Board meeting.

Okay. Next, we have Lawrence Livermore National 

Lab. It's for the time period of 1990 to 2014. It's 

SEC Petition 0221. This was a reserve period in the 

previous evaluation report. So, this would be an 

addendum. Some of you may remember that the 

expected completion date for this one has moved 

out a number of times. We've made some attempts 

to get on-site to address some issues that we still 

are currently working on, but with the ongoing 

Covid-19 pandemic we have not been able to get on 

the site. 

We have received a pretty good cache of records 

that were currently going through, that came in 

some time in February, quite a few records, in fact. 

Okay. Next is the Y-12 plant, which is SEC-0250. 

The time period for this is 1987 through 1994. This 

time period was previously reserved. So, NIOSH is 

now completing an addendum for this time period. 

The addendum expected completion date is hoped 

to be July 2021. 
12

Okay. Other petitions under review with the 

Advisory Board. Okay. It says Hanford SEC-0256 

that's not correct. It was a typo that I did not catch 

until reviewing this recently. So, that's Hanford 

SEC-0057. All the SEC issues are closed except 

those related to the ongoing co-exposure modeling 

effort. That's progressing well and expected to be 

done in late 2022.

Next is Savannah River Site, SEC-0103. And I'm 

sure everybody is aware that we are going to be 

talking about that following this presentation.

Next, Los Alamos National Lab, LANL, SEC-0109, 

NIOSH is working to resolve issues raised by SC&A 

in a working group. 

We have Sandia National Lab, that's SEC-0188, 

NIOSH is currently working on completing our 

response to SC&A's review of the Addendum 2 from 

Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque, and we hope to 

be getting that to you by the end of May.

Okay. Next Idaho National Lab is SEC-0219. NIOSH 

is working to resolve issues raised by SC&A in a 

working group. The were some issues with REAC 

reviews and OTIB-0054 and responding to some 

working group and SC&A issues on the burial 

grounds.

Next Argonne National Lab - West, SEC-0224. 

NIOSH is working to resolve issues raised by SC&A 

in a working group, specifically they are looking at 

Report 97, which is BZ to GA, breathing zone 

general area air samples and how to relate those. 

And that'll feed into a specific report for ANL West, 

will be report 89.

Okay. Next is Area IV, Santa Susanna, SEC-0235. 

We are waiting for records to be released from 

EMCBC. That's a records center here in Cincinnati 

and we are also working on a response paper 

related to some petitioner supplied materials. 
13

And we have Metals and Controls SEC-0236. It says 

right there an update scheduled for today's 

meeting. You know, in our effort to try to get these 

presentations out earlier, earlier to the Advisory 

Board and everybody and posted to the web 

sometimes we have some things in there that were 

on like draft agendas that may come off and that's 

the artifact of that. So, Josie did talk about this 

some yesterday.

Okay. A De Soto Avenue Facility SEC-0246. NIOSH 

is working to provide clarification on a few 

remaining issues and, again, we are waiting for 

records to be released from a Record Center here in 

Cincinnati.

And that brings us down to Reduction Pilot Plant 

SEC-0253. Again, that's an artifact of providing this 

early and getting it out on the web, but this was 

talked a little bit about yesterday. SC&A and the 

Advisory Board work group, specifically SC&A, 

completed their evaluation of our evaluation report 

and so we have that on our side, and I believe there 

was some discussion yesterday about moving the 

remaining issues into another established work 

group. So, that is the update on that one.

Okay. Brings us down to sites currently under 

Advisory Board review awaiting action, and for this 

it's a list of the applicable time periods for each of 

the sites. One thing I'll have to make a correction 

of, and which Brad Clawson brought up during the 

December Advisory Board meeting which I did not 

catch until shortly ago. The Savannah River time 

period is '72, not '73, through 2007.

So, if you want to look down through each of those 

sites and for the Savannah River, Los Alamos, 

Sandia Idaho, Lawrence Livermore, Argon National 

Lab West, Area for Santa Susana, Metals and 

Controls, De Soto, Y-12, Reduction Pilot Plant, you'll 

see the years under review.

Finally -- I think I got out of order there or skipped 
14

some things. Okay. 

Finally, potential 83.14s, these are NIOSH-initiated 

SEC petitions. We have West Valley Demonstration 

Project. And SEC has already -- an SEC Class has 

already been previously addressed, but at this time 

we are evaluating the time period from 1966 to 

1968. We are still in the evaluation process and we 

still have a large number of documents that we 

received from a data capture, and we've not 

completed going through those yet. So, this review 

is still ongoing.

And that is it for the SEC updates, if there are any 

questions.

Member Beach: I was going to say good job, Chuck. 

All the things I wrote down you corrected already. 

So --

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Thank you, Josie.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Any other questions for Chuck, 

or comments?

Savannah River Site SEC Petition 103

Okay, great. So, we are right at about 1:30 to set 

up this next agenda item. As you can see that item 

is the Savannah River Site, SEC-Petition 103 and 

you'll note that the remainder of today's session is 

devoted to that agenda item. 

The agenda allows for presentations from the SRS 

Work Group, NIOSH, SC&A, and also the Petitioners 

will be welcome to present as well. And I believe 

there was a Petitioner yesterday who stated his 

intent to present. 

Now, we did start to address the SRS Petition our 

last Board meeting in December and we had tabled 

-- we had tabled the discussion. So, we do need to 

untable the agenda item before we start with the 

presentation. So, to start out, we need a motion 

from a Board Member to untable the agenda item.
15

Member Beach: Rashaun, this is Josie. I'll make that 

motion to untable.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. And I need a second.

Member Clawson: I can second it.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, Brad, you say you'll second?

Member Clawson: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay -- I'm sorry?

Member Ziemer: Could you read the motion that I 

coming before us now?

Dr. Roberts: Sure. We are untabling the Savannah 

River Site discussions of the Savannah River Petition 

103.

Member Ziemer: What is the motion?

Dr. Roberts: The petition.

Member Ziemer: What is the motion that we are 

taking off the table. There is a specific motion that -

-

Member Clawson: It's the SEC, Paul.

Dr. Roberts: Right. So, back in December we tabled 

the discussion. The discussions were really -- were 

not complete. So, I'm just -- this is a motion to 

untable it so that we can move into the agenda 

item.

Member Ziemer: I'm sorry. Did we table a motion, 

or did we table discussions?

Dr. Roberts: We tabled -- I'm sorry. We tabled the 

agenda item, so we are trying to untable it so that 

we can resume the business.

(Simultaneous speaking.) 

Member Ziemer: Well, I don't think you table 

agenda items and it's -- well, okay, go ahead, that's 
16

fine.

Member Beach: That's not correct. There was a 

motion on the table as an SEC for Savannah River 

and we tabled that during the discussion because 

we ran out of time. So, there was a motion on the 

floor that we tabled. And I don't have it in front of 

me.

Member Ziemer: That was my thought too, because 

tabling is done on motions. 

Member Beach: Yeah, there was a motion and I 

believe it was read, I think Brad sent that around 

several months ago. 

Member Clawson: Correct.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Well, then how about this. Since 

-- Brad, since you had the language for it can you 

do the -- let's just start this over so that we can get 

into the presentation.

Member Clawson: Yes. What we have is a proposed 

class action which was all construction issues of the 

Department of Energy subcontractors, excluding 

employees of the following contractors, who worked 

at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina. 

During the specific time period --

Dr. Roberts: So, Brad, can you stop for a second? I 

can't hardly hear you, and I don't know if it's 

interference from other people, but -- I'm having a 

hard time.

Member Valerio: There's a lot of static out there.

Member Clawson: There's a couple of people that 

are not muted.

Member Ziemer: There's an echo of some sort.

Member Clawson: Okay. Is that better? Okay. By 

your muted face, Paul, I can see you said yes. 

Okay. I'll start over. 
17

What we had is a proposed Class Definition, all 

construction trade employees of the Department of 

Energy subcontractor, excluding employees of 

following prime contractors who worked at 

Savannah River in Aiken, South Carolina during the 

specific time period, i.e., DuPont de Nemours and 

other companies October 1st, 1972 through March 

31st, 1989, and Westinghouse Savannah River April 

1st, 1989 through December 1st, 1990, who worked 

at the Savannah River Site from October 1972 

through December 30th, 1990 for a number of days 

aggregated at least 250 days occurred either solely 

under this employment or in combination with other 

work days within the parameter established for one 

or more other Classes of employees, including the 

Special Exposure Cohort. 

That's what we were discussing, Paul, and that's 

what we are taking back off the table. And now we 

are opening it up for more discussion. 

And I'm still hearing a little bit of feedback.

Dr. Roberts: So, okay, so anyway let's --

Member Clawson: You have a real echo, it's hard to 

hear you.

Member Beach: Everybody is echoing. Somebody 

needs to mute.

Member Lockey: Let's everybody mute, let's see if 

that takes care of it.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Can people hear better now?

Member Beach: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. So, you know, maybe there is a 

little bit of confusion about this, but I'm thinking, 

you know, we can go ahead -- so, he's read the 

motion. That was -- I'm wondering if that's a little 

bit premature, if we should do the presentations --

should have been doing the presentations first, 

because I thought the discussion --
18

Member Clawson: Well, you've got to understand 

what Paul was trying to tell you, is we have this 

motion on, it was tabled. We are just refreshing the 

portion of what the motion was. And then we are 

going in and let NIOSH and SC&A do their 

presentations, if that's okay.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Yes, that will work. 

Member Clawson: And it sounds like I'm echoing 

right back -- I may go get another headset and put 

on here, but that being said, Tim, are you going to 

present or John going to present for NIOSH?

Dr. Taulbee: I'm going to present.

Member Clawson: Okay, well, I'll turn that over to 

you and I'll go try to get another headset to 

straighten stuff out.

Dr. Taulbee: Alright. Thank you very much, and 

give me just a second here to share my screen.

Okay. Can everybody see my screen?

Member Beach: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: Thank you. Alright. Well, thank you, 

Mr. Clawson. And the purpose of this presentation is 

really just to give a summary and an overview. If 

you recall back in December, I gave a very lengthy 

presentation. And so, this one is to just touch on 

some of the key items and to try and clear up some 

of the issues that seemed to cause some confusion 

during our March work group meeting.

So, before I get going, I do want the recognize my 

colleague John Cardarelli, he helped me pull all this 

together, as well as the ORAU team led by Mike 

Mahathy. They've done a fantastic job of helping us 

throughout this. So, thank you all.

Alright. Let's see if I can advance here. Okay. Well, 

I first wanted to go over the two key dose 

reconstruction documents for unmonitored 
19

subcontractor construction trades workers at the 

Savannah River Site. And the first one is DCAS-IG006. And this is the criteria for the evaluation and 

use of co-exposure data sets.

And within this presentation, if you've pulled it up 

from the web, if you click on these blue underlined 

components, that will take you to the document that 

I'm referring to here. These are hyperlinks, and so 

you can open them up directly.

There's been a lot of discussion about completeness 

for the co-exposure data sets. And so, I wanted to 

point out what it is that DCAS-IG-006 actually says 

about completeness. And to read this into the 

record. What it states is: to determine if there's 

sufficient measurements to ensure that the data are 

either bounding or representative of the exposure 

potential for each job exposure category at the 

facility. 

It goes on to indicate that the evaluation for 

completeness should consider temporal gaps in the 

data, and it provides an example with respect to the 

completeness from the Nevada Test Site. And if you 

recall from that example that I went over in 

December, it gave an example of radiation safety 

personnel were the only ones who were monitored 

for internal exposure to plutonium during certain 

time periods, and in latter time periods it was both 

the rad safety folks and the security personnel. But 

construction trades workers were not at the Nevada 

Test Site during those time periods. We don't have 

that situation here at Savannah River, when you go 

through all of these documents.

So, in the context of completeness, that is the 

context of it. One thing to keep in mind is when we 

talk about completeness and we talk about 

percentages that might be brought up, if we had a 

100 percent of people being monitored there 

wouldn't be a need for a co-exposure model; a 100 

percent of the people who were exposed.
20

So, were not going to have 100 percent monitoring 

along those lines. Our context of completeness 

deals with, are all of the job exposure -- are all of 

the jobs covered, do they have monitoring in each 

of the time periods, and do we have any gaps, and 

do we have evidence that the highest exposures are 

present in this dataset?

This is all outlined in OTIB-0081 that we have it for 

the Savannah River Site. This is the internal 

dosimetry co-exposure data for Savannah River. 

There are nine radionuclide co-exposure models: 

nine for construction trades workers, and nine for 

non-construction trades workers. This is the 

document that is actually used in dose 

reconstruction for the Savannah River Site, whether 

you're a construction trades worker or nonconstruction trades worker. Okay? That document 

contains the actual models.

Next, I want to talk a little bit about job-specific, 

and I've got versus routine bioassay samples, but it 

really should be and routine bioassay samples. And 

this is a direct quote out of a Savannah River 

document: the purpose of the job-specific bioassay 

sampling program is to collect bioassay samples 

from workers whose routing bioassay program does 

not include some or all the radionuclides present at 

the work site, or who are not on a routine program. 

Okay? So, the job-specific bioassay program is 

really a supplemental to the routine monitoring 

program. It's not a separate program in and of 

itself, it is a supplemental. If you're not on a 

particular routing bioassay, you're signing into an 

RWP and that states you need to be monitored for a 

particular radionuclide. Then you are to leave the 

job-specific bioassay. 

Most of the workers, including the subcontractor 

construction trades workers at Savannah River, 

were on a routine bioassay schedule. In 1997, there 

was a DOE Notice of Violation, and this was a 

procedural violation, and it indicated that only 21 
21

percent compliance -- that there was only 21 

percent compliance of submitting job-specific 

bioassay. 

When you go through the numbers, that meant that 

only 68 of 324 workers submitted their job-specific 

bioassays as they were supposed to. The workers 

who did not submit job-specific bioassay, the 

remaining 79 percent, or 256 of the 324 workers, 

were followed up and none -- and there was no 

indication of an internal exposure of those people.

So, this was a violation. They did follow up after 

they -- this was identified, and these 256 workers 

left bioassay, and nobody had an indication of an 

exposure. This is due to the defense and depth that 

the Savannah River Site had of engineering 

controls, air monitoring going on in the workplace, 

personal protective, respiratory protection, 

contamination surveys, and then the bioassay is 

that last line of defense that we have talked about 

in the past.

It's important to note that at Savannah River in 

1997, when this violation came up, there were over 

6,000 routine non-tritium bioassays. This indicates 

that the job-specific bioassay program comprises a 

relatively small fraction of the overall internal 

monitoring program, and likely has an insignificant 

impact to the co-exposure models that we 

developed.

Now, we couldn't address this latter component 

precisely back a few years ago when this was first 

brought up before the Board. This led to the 

evaluation of the RWPs. Okay? It was this ability --

because it was postulated that subcontractor 

construction trades workers may more preferentially 

be monitored via job-specific bioassay versus 

routine.

So, the goal was to look at RWPs, look at 

construction trades workers who signed in on the 

RWPs, and were they monitored, yes or no. Okay? 
22

So, that was the goal of Report 92 and we were to 

look across the entire site, all the different areas, 

over the entire time period from 1972 through 

1997. 

Okay? And during that, one other thing that SC&A 

had indicated that they wanted to see some proof or 

evidence of, is the workers who were not 

monitored. Were they physically working on the 

same RWP with a monitored worker? And Report 92 

goes through that in great detail, of looking at 

individual RWPs and when somebody was not 

monitored, was there a monitored worker on that 

RWP? And we went through and we were able to 

demonstrate that that was the case. 

When you go through Report 92 you'll see 

monitored, directly monitored, and effective 

monitoring. That effective monitoring column in 

each of those tables is the combination of the 

directly monitored workers, and then the paired 

unmonitored workers, and you'll see that the 

percentage monitoring jumps into the 90-percentile 

type range. So, those workers that were not 

monitored, whether it was via job-specific or routine 

bioassay, whichever it was, they were paired with 

monitored workers.

When we did Report 92, we noted that we had data 

gaps. That we didn't have RWPs, we didn't have job 

plans prior to 1991 for all areas. Now, we did have 

them for one area, A Area. We were also able to 

look at incident monitoring in Report 92 to make 

sure that the highest exposed workers, those 

involved in incidents where things went wrong, were 

they actually monitored. And that's all in Report 92. 

And we found that, in fact, they were monitored.

So, we know the bounding data would be in the coexposure monitor -- co-exposure data set. But due 

to these gaps and a concern for other areas, we 

looked at the NOCTS data as a whole, and this was 

Report 94, entitled Bioassay for Subcontractor 

Construction Trades Workers at Savannah River 
23

From '72 To '97.

And what we were specifically looking for is, do we 

see any trends in the data or gaps in the data 

where, if you go back to that Nevada Test Site 

example where there are certain time periods where 

there was no monitoring for construction trades 

workers?

And with NOCTS we were able to look at specifically 

the subcontractors to make sure there weren't any 

gaps, and there were not when we went through 

this. And so, over this time period what we did find, 

much like in Report 92, there was a lower 

percentage of workers monitored in the 1970s, and 

in the 1980s that percentage of monitored workers 

increased, and in the 1990s it increased further.

One of the findings that SC&A had about Report 92 

was that we weren't able to look across all of the 

areas; we could only look at A Area with respect to 

monitoring of subcontractors in the -- up through 

1990.

In response to that finding, we went back to 

Plutonium bioassay logbooks and we analyzed, do 

we see monitoring across other areas, more 

Plutonium prevalent areas, such F and H area, and 

what we found was that there were 11,316 bioassay 

samples from 7,000 subcontractors between 1972 

to 1990. And these are plutonium bioassay. So, 

what we found is the majority of those samples, and 

I presented a graph in December that showed the 

majority of the plutonium samples were from F and 

H area, the two main plutonium processing areas 

where you'd expect to find more monitoring. But we 

found that the subcontractors were, in fact, 

monitored more frequently in those area and so this 

further confirmed that there is monitoring data 

across other facilities, not just A Area.

Another issue that has been raised with regards to 

the co-exposure models, is our combination of what 

we'll call DuPont construction trades workers, and 
24

subcontractor construction trades workers. In 

response to that back in 2019, we wrote a White 

Paper comparing those two groups, this would be 

for plutonium, and this was presented to the work 

group back in November. And what we found is that 

there's really no real difference between these two 

groups. 

And what we found is when you look at and you 

carry through from TUPAS into the intake modeling 

for these two particular groups, we found the 

geometric mean for DuPont construction trades 

workers to be slightly greater than the 

subcontractor construction trades workers. When it 

got to the 95th percentile of those distributions, 

that the DuPont CTWs had a higher 95th percentile 

in the 1970s than subcontractor did in the 1980s. 

But as Dr. Ziemer pointed out, the numbers were 

really quite comparable. 

And there was a question that was raised by Dr. 

Lockey about, did we do any bootstrap comparison 

to look at the uncertainty associated with those 

geometric means and the geometric standard 

deviations in the 95th percentiles, and we had not 

at that point. And so, what we decided to do is try 

and do an uncertainly analysis of these co-exposure 

models.

During this with plutonium is very difficult. It's not 

impossible, but very time consuming. Not 

something that we could do in just a couple of 

months. So, we did the analysis with tritium, 

because tritium was an easier radionuclide to do 

this with and provide the analysis to give some idea 

of what the uncertainty of across these bounds 

would, be geometric mean in the 95th percentile, 

and that's the subject of the 2021 bootstrap white 

paper.

Now, Dr. Anderson yesterday mentioned about 

doing the bootstrap analysis across other coexposure models, and I just want to be clear: at 

this point we do not intend to do this at this time 
25

across the board with other co-exposure models 

unless really requested by the Board. If this is 

something you feel we must do, then we can do it. 

But that is not something that we are preparing, or 

we are -- we have on or radar to do.

Developing these co-exposure models already takes 

a lot of time, and to do this would actually just 

extend that time.

The final white paper that I want to point you to, 

and again, you can get to all of these documents by 

clicking on the link, is the 2021 Practical 

Implications. What we found from this bootstrap 

analysis is, again, the DuPont CTWs in the 1970s 

appeared to have higher geometric mean than the 

subcontractor CTWs did, and the same with the 

95th percentiles when you look at it across all the 

years.

However, when you compared that uncertainty from 

the bootstrap, they really overlap. So, there's really 

no practical difference between the DuPont and the 

subcontractor CTWs, even though in the latter years 

we had more subcontractor CTWs than we had 

DuPont in doing that comparison. 

So, all of this forms our weight of evidence for our 

conclusion from the evaluations, the stratification 

and uncertainty analysis. We feel there's a robust of 

contractor CTW monitoring in the 1990s. We feel 

there's an acceptable subcontractor monitoring, 

more than half in the 1980s, from what we found 

during our evaluation. And there's limited 

monitoring in the 1970s for subcontractor CTWs, 

but our indications with tritium and plutonium when 

we dove into the detail more, that the DuPont CTWs 

would be bounding for these two groups.

We do not see any evidence where subcontractor 

construction trades workers were not monitored to a 

degree that would bias the current co-exposure 

models. So, based upon our weight of the evidence, 

we believe the co-exposure models are bounding 
26

and representative of the exposures that would be 

received by an unmonitored subcontractor 

construction trades worker and, therefore, we 

conclude that dose reconstruction is feasible.

We hope that when you go through all of these 

documents and you look at the logic that we've laid 

out here and the presentations that are previously, 

we hope that you'll all come to that same 

conclusion.

And with that I'll be happy to answer any questions 

you may have, thank you.

Member Lockey: Tim, let me ask you a question. 

Jim Lockey, let me ask you about --

Dr. Taulbee: Jim, you went on mute. Sorry.

Member Lockey: I wanted to start my video again. 

Let me ask you a question, Tim, about the practical 

indications of the bootstrap uncertainty analysis. 

Your last bullet point on this slide. If you had found 

that the tritium cohort, even though because there's 

overlaps in the geometric center of deviations there 

was no difference, but the trend line was opposite, 

the trend line for the tritium was substantially 

higher for the subcontractors than -- from the 

contractors, what would have been your thoughts 

on that?

Dr. Taulbee: Let me, I'm assuming you're talking 

about, I believe it's this type of slide of the --

Member Lockey: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay. If those two had been inverted, 

I would actually be much more considering of a SEC 

for the early time period up through 1980. And the 

reason that I would say that is due to this particular 

graph, of the number of workers in each of the 

groups. And here you are -- we are seeing that the 

DuPont CTWs out-number the monitoring for the 

subcontractor, but it's inverted in the 1980s. Okay. 
27

Member Lockey: Alright.

Dr. Taulbee: But when you look at the two trends 

between the two, if the blue open squares here had 

been subcontractors, I would be quite concerned 

with that from the standpoint of we had less data 

and they were showing a higher exposure potential 

within this, but they are not. So, --

Member Lockey: That was my conclusion. If this 

would have been, if it would have shown that I 

would have had real heartaches with -- particularly 

before 1980, in relationship to whether your data 

related to subcontractors and contractors have 

similar data.

The other question I was going to ask you is when 

you're looking at tritium one of the things that we 

were thinking and I would logically think this also, 

that subcontractors may be put into job tasks that 

are more potentially hazardous. Does that not apply 

to tritium in what we are looking at here?

Dr. Taulbee: It does, and it doesn't. And let me 

answer this in two ways. A lot, there's a lot of 

misconception with regards to -- and I was actually 

guilty of using some imprecise terminology early on 

in these discussions a few years ago. 

Savannah River had a zero-intake policy, with the 

exception of tritium, okay? And so, they didn't 

intentionally try to get anybody an internal 

exposure. When they would bring in outside workers 

for the, quote, hot jobs, in many cases it was 

because of the external potential that was there, 

not the internal potential. It was more from the 

standpoint of they're going to be around fresher fuel 

or more -- an area where they would get a higher 

external dose. And so, they would bring them in 

more from that standpoint where they could control 

it. Because DOE had set limits of, I believe at that 

time it was 3 rem per year that they had. And so, 

their operations folks could get burned out. 
28

Now, burned out from an external standpoint, not 

an internal. They weren't purposely exposing 

anybody to internal. Everybody would be wearing 

respirators, when respiratory protection required. It 

was -- they were trying to protect and prevent any 

internal exposures. 

Does that answer your question?

Member Lockey: I'm not sure. I guess what I was 

trying to get a handle on is: you know plutonium 

levels were -- plutonium levels for the contractors 

and subcontractors were more equal in comparison 

to tritium. So, why? I'm trying to figure out why. 

Why is that different? Is it because of the location 

the worked in? 

Dr. Taulbee: Actually, I believe it has a lot more to 

do with the duration of exposure, in a sense. 

Subcontractor would be brought in for a shorter 

duration job; whereas the DuPont CTWs would be 

there for all year-type of scenarios. So, when you're 

tallying the final dose, the actual final dose would 

be less.

There is a lot of question as to whether their 

exposure would be higher over a shorter time 

period, and whether they're equivalent or not. And 

that was one of the reasons that we went to 

stratifying the datasets between routine operations 

and non-routine.

Now, within the DuPont CTWs, that's non-routine 

work that they are doing, that they are primarily 

exposed to, much like the subcontractor CTWs. So, 

an argument can be made that, you know, both the 

DuPont and the subcontractors are doing short-term 

work, and why they are significantly higher is -- my 

best guess is that they were doing more of it. They 

were just doing that work more frequently than a 

subcontractor coming in for a one-off job.

Member Lockey: Okay. 
29

Member Anderson: Are the tritium and the 

plutonium exposures in the same work areas?

Dr. Taulbee: No. No, not at all.

Member Anderson: So, there would be -- it could be 

different people working in different areas?

Dr. Taulbee: And it absolutely is.

Member Anderson: But comparing them is not --

Dr. Taulbee: Well, it's showing the overall --

Member Anderson: The tritium population would 

appear to be different than the plutonium 

population, as far as exposures. 

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, absolutely. The tritium exposures 

were in the reactor areas, as well as the tritium 

separations facilities. Whereas the plutonium is 

restricted to really the F and H B lines where 

plutonium was separated and the research in A 

Area.

Member Lockey: And the only reason that the 

tritium level and the subcontractors may be lower, 

they are working in the reactor areas where tritium 

is, is that they likely were short-term workers there 

in comparison to the -- in comparison to the prime 

contractors.

Dr. Taulbee: That's my best interpretation of it, yes, 

that they would be doing the same, same basic type 

of work. I can't -- I can certainly envision them 

doing the same type of work, you know, really side 

by side. We saw that on the RWPs. The timing is the 

only major difference that I -- that I really can see 

from that standpoint.

Member Lockey: And one other question --

Member Ziemer: Could I ask a question? 

Member Lockey: Go ahead, Paul.
30

Member Ziemer: This is Ziemer. This is a -- I don't 

even know who to ask this question to. But I have 

always appreciated David Richardson's analysis of 

these kinds of data and so I think he's on the work 

group. But I haven't heard any of David's sort of 

valuations of the NIOSH information, or indeed of 

the SC&A. I don't know if David is on the call today, 

but I'm concerned that we haven't heard from David 

on these issues.

Member Richardson: Yeah, Paul, I'm on. I think 

there was a, there was a question, I didn't want to 

cut off Dr. Lockey. 

Member Lockey: Well, David, you want me to go 

ahead?

Member Richardson: Sure.

Member Lockey: Okay. So, then --

Member Clawson: I've got an idea. You know, we've 

got two sides of this coin and we are playing with 

one side of it right now. Why don't we get, why 

don't we go through SC&A's and then we can 

compare because right now we are just looking at 

one side of this coin. Well, this would be my 

suggestion but it's up to you if you want to continue 

on with this. But I think we ought to deal with all of 

the information and then start to question it 

because we can sit here and nitpick back and forth 

and not come up with anything. 

So, Jim, if it was alright with you, I'd like SC&A to 

be able to give their presentation and then I'd like 

to come back and open this up for discussion. If 

that would be alright with everybody.

Member Lockey: Brad, that's okay with me. I just --

it's easier for me to -- we'll have to bring back some 

slides then because --

Member Clawson: Well, and we may have to. But 

you know what, when we are sitting here looking at 

one side of this and we've got a whole another side 
31

I understand too and that's why I take a lot of notes 

is because I want to be able to come back to these, 

but I want us to be all, dealing with all the 

information and not just part of it.

Member Richardson: Yeah, and I think you have to 

look at both sets and I have questions about both 

sets that I think that both sides need to come in 

and try to answer because some of this --

Member Lockey: Very much so, and I'm not trying 

to take it away from this time or anything else like 

that but I'm wanting us to deal with the whole issue 

and look at both sides of what we've got.

And so, with that being said and if it's okay with 

Rashaun and stuff, I'd like to be able to allow SC&A 

to be able to give their presentation, Joe, and we'll 

go from there.

Dr. Roberts: Brad, one thing I am concerned with is 

that there may be Board members that may have 

questions at this point. So, before we get into the 

SC&A presentation can we check in with some folks 

we haven't heard from and just see where they 

alright at with this information and then we can 

proceed.

Member Clawson: Sure.

Dr. Roberts: And if everybody is comfortable with 

just moving on. So, for instance, Gen or Bill, do you 

have any particular perspective at this point?

Member Beach: Rashaun, you can call -- oh, sorry. I 

was going to say I'm fine.

Member Field: This is Bill. I'm really, you know, 

everything has been said is very helpful so far and I 

see approaching it different ways. But like, Paul, I'm 

interested in what David's view is, but I'm also 

interested in the follow-up questions that Jim may 

have had as well. So, however you want to 

approach it I'm all in. But right now, I just sort of 

like store information since I wasn't on either of the 
32

working groups that looked at this issue.

Member Roessler: Rashaun. 

Dr. Roberts: Hi, Gen. 

Member Roessler: Hi, I don't think it matters too 

much which direction we go as far as we get ample 

time to go back if we wish to ask some questions on 

the NIOSH presentation.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. 

Member Field: And Rashaun, it seems like the 

feedback is when people are talking, and you're not 

muted. So, it seems like when you mute the 

feedback stops.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Well, so it sounds like people -

and Loretta, did you have a particular perspective?

Member Valerio: Can you hear me okay?

Dr. Roberts: Yeah.

Member Valerio: I think I want to listen to SC&A's 

presentation and then ask my questions. 

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Well, then unless somebody 

opposes that, let's go ahead, Brad, with your 

recommendation to do the SC&A presentation.

Member Clawson: Thank you. Okay, Joe, I'll turn 

the time over to you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Just wait for these slides to 

come up. First off, can everyone hear me?

Member Beach: Yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Am I coming through?

Member Beach: Yes, we sure can.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. I just wanted to make sure. 

Good afternoon, this is Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A, and I 

will try to be brief as well so we can get back into a 
33

discussion. 

NIOSH just addressed the dose reconstruction 

feasibility question by emphasizing it has, as it has 

throughout, that there's considerable SRS routine 

bioassay data. Literally thousands of data points 

which includes subcontractor information. And that 

this data, given its amount and scope, would 

represent or bound whatever subcontractor jobspecific bioassay data may be missing. With a, you 

know, as Tim just said with a conclusion that there 

would be little difference between the exposure 

potentials of each.

But the issue I think that's before us today, I 

wanted to simplify this because we've gone through 

so much in all the different discussions, but I want 

to simplify this.

The issue before us today is how can one make the 

comparison and reach the judgment that Tim is 

referring to if one of the two data sets that we are 

talking about is missing or indistinguishable from 

the other. And that's the subject of the slide that's 

up right now in terms of job-specific versus routine 

bioassays. 

Now, Tim gave his perspective from the NIOSH 

standpoint I want to give you SC&A's. From SC&A's 

standpoint what bioassay may be missing is not of 

little significance. Okay. For an entire year, you 

know, as late as 1997, I just want to remind 

everybody, almost 80 percent, 80 percent of RWP 

required job-specific bioassays went uncollected. 

Okay. The Department of Energy at the time not 

only fined Westinghouse for this oversight, but also 

fined them for the repetitive nature of the problem 

going back in time and for the fact that corrective 

actions that they were required, and this is again 

the contractor was required to take, were 

unsuccessful. 

So, I want to emphasize this was a, clearly an 
34

embedded safety culture issue. Okay. one that 

remained persistent at Savannah River and 

implicated how Savannah River managed its 

bioassay monitoring. So, you can talk about defense 

in depth, but here is a circumstance as late as the 

mid-90s where you had a major shortcoming in an 

important monitoring program. 

And while, in 1997 as Tim just pointed out, this may 

have only involved 324 workers at Savannah River 

no one has any idea of how many are implicated in 

many of the earlier years at Savannah River that we 

are talking about in terms of this SEC and what 

internal exposures may have occurred in those 

years. Okay. 

I think and we have made this pretty clear that we 

are left to pretty much speculate or assume on that 

very specific question it cannot be determined. You 

have to, you have to do a reach in terms of 

extrapolating what you do know.

Keep in mind that job-specific bioassays were 

ordered for work involving non-routine, non-routine 

radionuclide sources ones not covered by the 

routine bioassay program as Tim pointed out. And 

transient subcontractors figured in such RWPs, jobspecific bioassays. 

So, NIOSH needs to establish, as IG-006 calls for, 

to show or to demonstrate as stipulated by these 

guidelines that this routine exposure data can 

represent or bound these non-routine bioassay 

samples that were taken over 25 years. This is 1972 

to 1996 when the enforcement action took place 

and Westinghouse Savannah River revamped its 

entire program.

But -- and this is the crux of what we have 

concluded -- NIOSH has been unable to locate and 

distinguish records for the non-routine bioassays for 

the years and facilities in question other than for 

1997 and perhaps for some of the years beginning 

in the mid-1990s. That's where you, in fact, have 
35

enough RWPs and there's an accountable system 

such that you can track down and evaluate the jobspecific bioassays but not outside of that timeframe.

Next slide, please.

Okay. I want to focus on the primary investigation. 

This is the RPRT-0092. And as we have made clear 

in several presentations to the Board, we continue 

to find that RPRT-0092 -- and this is NIOSH's 

evaluation of bioassay data for completeness for 

subcontractor CTWs at Savannah -- we think it's the 

most valid assessment of the SEC issue that we are 

addressing today. Okay. Just from a history 

standpoint it was the product of a detailed sampling 

plan that both SC&A, the Work Group and NIOSH 

reviewed and pretty much came to closure over. 

And it was based on the co-exposure guidelines and 

it addressed the completeness of job-specific 

bioassays for subcontractors.

I want to remind the Board that unfortunately 

despite finding 800-plus boxes of additional records 

in late 2017, and I say unfortunate because that 

was a, I think an opportunity that all of us thought 

would solve this issue, but it did not because 

inadequate job plan records were identified for the 

'70s, '80s and into the early '90s. And for only 

773a, the A-Area and that was the only facility that 

could be, in fact, identified through these job plans. 

Gaps were identified. Even for that one facility and 

particularly for americium bioassays. So, even in 

that case there was definitely deficiencies.

And programmatically and we keep talking defense 

in depth but keep in mind that a working RWP 

program, I'm talking radiological work permits, RWP 

program was not in place at Savannah River until 

the mid-90s, 1993-94. So, you know, here's an 

operation, a large site that did not have an 

accountable system of tracking and ensuring permit 

required by assays were performed one that I think 

most of us would be familiar with in terms of 

modern operations. So, you know, it's a -- I would 
36

say it's kind of a revelation that a program as late 

as the mid-90s would only then be implementing 

the kind of systemic RWP program that would, in 

fact, ensure accountability to bioassays required by 

those permits.

So, in summary and again we did present on our 

review of RPRT-0092 last year and I might add we 

have summarized in a table, which is in an appendix 

to a report that was issued last month, and you 

have that. We have summarized essentially the 

status of our findings, the discourse that took place 

with the Work Group, and kind of worked things 

stand. But in summary our conclusion remains that 

RPRT-0092 was unable to establish data 

completeness, which was the original basis for the 

Work Group referring the SEC issue to the full Board 

not with the impetus behind the Work Group 

submitting this to the full Board late last year.

Okay. Next slide please.

In terms of alternate investigations, and you might 

recall at the last Board meeting NIOSH expanded its 

basis for dose reconstruction feasibility when, again, 

the Work Group had advanced an SEC proposal. 

They came forward and proposed to include the 

NOCTS claimant data, the RPRT-94 data and 

plutonium logbook data together with the RPRT-92 

and the weight of evidence approach, so-called 

weight of evidence approach. And the Work Group 

asked SC&A to consider this now expanded dataset.

Our evaluation is provided in our written report and 

work group presentation, both of which you should 

have. So, I'm not going to walk through all of that 

but in general terms we found that NOCTS and 

plutonium logbook data, and I'm going to refer to 

that as A, you know, Subject A or Topic A, or, you 

know, Record A, we believe that reflects routine 

bioassay data, routine bioassay data. And there's no 

ready means to compare it with the non-routine 

data, you know. Let's call that B, from job-specific 

monitoring. 
37

So, if A is routine say NOCTS and plutonium logbook 

data, and B is non-routine data that would be jobspecific monitoring, there is no way to actually 

compare those A to B because the B data is not 

available. We have not been able to distinguish or 

identify job-specific bioassay data such that one can 

do that kind of a comparison. 

So, it leaves you instead to surmise or assume by 

the sheer force of numbers. And I think that's kind 

of where we have difficulty. The amount -- you're 

forced to actually try to apply the routine bioassay 

data points and examine the distribution and trends. 

You saw the arrows in that one graph. You have to 

look at the distribution and trends and actually try 

to discern whether those trends and those 

distributions are favorably inclined to support the 

case because you really don't have the actual nonroutine job-specific bioassay data. So, you're kind of 

compelled to look at subcontractor data from the 

standpoint of the routine database and those that 

are on RWPs.

And I might add, as NIOSH has already 

acknowledged, and this is going back to RPRT-94 

NOCTS data does not necessarily represent actual 

site data and any completeness must be inferred. 

And I go back to that term because it was used last 

year when we first started talking about RPRT-94. 

And as already noted, SC&A finds completeness by 

inference not to satisfy the tenets of IG-006, the coexposure guidelines, which as NIOSH in its quote 

emphasized calls for a co-worker dataset to be 

based on a determination, a determination of 

whether there are sufficient measurements. And we 

think that's a stronger or a higher bar than an 

inference or a deduction.

While the Board needs to consider closely this 

apparent new interpretation of the co-exposure 

guidelines, you know, essentially because it will set 

a precedent for all future SEC reviews where data 

completeness is being addressed, we do not 
38

consider relevant to these current SEC deliberations 

for Savannah River for the reasons stated. Okay. 

We again believe that if we are looking at applying a 

routine bioassay dataset as the means to compare 

with a non-routine that you don't have, there's little 

way you can demonstrate the representativeness 

that you need to accomplish by virtue of the 

guidelines. So, you know, it just doesn't work.

Next slide.

Let's talk about bootstrap. We, you know, got that 

late in the game. We, you know, received the 

review December/January whenever it was and did 

look at it and reviewed it as we could. And from our 

review of the analysis approach, and we had a 

statistician involved, I think our conclusion we find 

no fault with the statistical analysis. I mean it's a 

good tool. It certainly is based on a lot of precedent 

in terms of how these statistical tools are applied. 

There may be issues on implementation. I think that 

was mentioned yesterday by Knut Ringen in one of 

his comments, but in general it's not so much the 

way bootstrap would work so much as whether it is 

particularly relevant to the issue we are talking 

about here.

We have stressed and we continue to stress that, 

based on the co-exposure implementation guide and 

the hierarchy that's discussed in that, validating 

data completeness must come first. And if you, you 

know, the handout that we provided the Board, I 

think it's two or three pages, walks through the 

history of this issue as it, you know, was originally 

formed. And this issue came from the recognition 

early on back in 2017 that the records for 

subcontractors before the electronic database was 

put together was -- the records were actually 

maintained quit differently. You know, three by five 

cards, loose three by five cards and by company 

name. 

And so, our obvious question was, how confident 

would one be that you had a complete set of that 
39

and are we sure that the electronic database 

actually reflected all these subcontractors' transient 

as they are so that you could rely on that database. 

And at the time it was pretty clear that there had 

not been what we have called traditionally in this 

program a V&V, a validation and verification, of data 

completeness for that data.

And what we are saying here is that before one 

does the kind of stratification analyses that 

bootstrap represents, your first question is whether 

the data in the first place, in other words, your jobspecific bioassay data is, in fact, complete or not 

and how do you know that. And so, so the analysis 

in an analytic way we are, you know, we don't have, 

nothing, no real issues with the statistical analysis 

provided by bootstrap. But we do have a problem 

with trying to apply it before one has confirmed the 

completeness of the data that you're actually 

applying it against. 

So, again, we go back to that original issue and it 

actually is the original issue from 2017, you have 

job-specific bioassays but there isn't the 

confirmation of how complete that is going back in 

time before 1997 when it was established that many 

of those bioassay data points were missing.

So, anyway if I can get to conclusions -- there we 

go. 

SC&A bases its conclusions regarding the -- this 

SEC on the outcome of NIOSH's detailed analysis of 

the completeness of job-specific bioassays. This is 

the bottom line provided in RPRT-92. And you'll 

hear us go back to RPRT-92 because we spent an 

enormous amount of effort working with NIOSH and 

the Board to design the sampling plan to actually 

build on experience that was in RPRT-83 and our 

review at SC&A that took place in 2017 or SRS in 

2017. 

And that was -- RPRT-92 was a two-plus year effort 

to look at the question of completeness of job-
40

specific bioassays for subcontractors on permits. Job 

plans or RWPs. And it was based on thousands of 

pages of permit and bioassay records for '70s, 

1980s, 1990s. So, no small, no small job. 

So, at any rate our conclusion was NIOSH had been 

unable, based on all that work, unfortunately, to 

demonstrate the completeness and 

representativeness of subcontractor job-specific 

bioassay data and we felt that was the case for at 

least the earlier years, that DuPont era, so to speak, 

1972 to 1990 and without being able to ascertain 

completeness we just again felt that would preclude 

application of a co-exposure model as the guidelines 

provide.

Now, beginning in the early '90s, Westinghouse 

stood up an RWP program and, you know, sort of on 

the heels of the Tiger Team findings and a lot of 

attention by both the field and DOE headquarters, 

there was a fundamental revamping of the former 

DuPont program and an RWP program was put in 

place. It did have the kind of accountability 

measures, the procedures, the enforcement by 

management that focused on, you know, identifying 

the bioassays required and providing a process by 

which those bioassays would be done.

Unfortunately, a 1997 enforcement action showed 

the culture was strong enough that a lot of these 

measures didn't make a big enough difference in 

terms of completeness of those bioassays later on. 

But at the very least, we feel the circumstances in 

the '90s in terms of RWPs actually being written up 

is different than the situation in the DuPont era 

where you really didn't have much of a system. You 

had a job plan system, but it was up to the facility 

managers to implement that system.

That's all I have but are there any -- I guess we are 

going to go ahead and take questions from 

everybody for both presentations. So, I'll turn it

back to Brad and Rashaun and, you know, I guess 

you can figure out and choreograph that.
41

Member Clawson: Okay. Well, that being said, thank 

you, Joe. I appreciate that and we've kind of given a 

back history of where we have been, and we have 

gotten to the point where we are at now.

Lockey, Ziemer, any other Board members I'd like 

to open this up for questions at this time and this 

way I feel like you're dealing with the full picture of 

both sides and not just one side. So, I'll open that 

up for any questions and I know that you had some, 

Lockey, I will turn it back to you.

Member Lockey: Well, let me ask maybe we can go 

rotation so we're going through and making sure we 

understand what's being presented to me. One of 

my problems, so the reason I unpack this data to go 

back and look at it again, is I find it troubling that 

we have two fairly highly competent groups with a 

lot of experience and knowledge evaluating a site 

that has hundreds and hundreds of workers with 

tens of thousands of bioassay samples and a 

rigorous groundwater monitoring program and they 

find it difficult to reach some type of consensus in 

relationship to dose reconstruction.

Member Beach: Jim. This is Josie. Sorry for breaking 

in. Could you speak up just a little louder. I don't 

know if anybody else -- I'm having trouble hearing 

you clearly.

Member Lockey: Is that better, Josie? Is that 

better? Josie?

Member Beach: I think so, yeah.

Member Lockey: Okay. And so, you know, that's 

one reason I went back and sort of unpacked this 

data to see if I could come up with some kind of 

explanation as to why these, why are two groups 

who I said are knowledgeable and experienced and 

they still have such divergent views in relationship 

to this rather extensive population with a huge 

database. 
42

And it's been a process and I've gone through as 

many I can go through and I still have questions, as 

I'm sure you all do -- and I still have questions. 

So, Tim, let me go back to your slides for a second. 

Do you have those?

Dr. Taulbee: Give me just a second to pull them up, 

not a problem.

Member Lockey: I mean you had the slides.

Dr. Taulbee: How is this? Can you see them? 

Member Lockey: Go to Slide Number 8, that slide. 

Okay. Let me see if I'm reading this. I've looked at 

this slide numerous times and every time I look at 

it, I have to relook at it again. So, the way I read 

this slide is that you have 3200 samples and these 

are workers who have signed in and they -- into an 

RWP. 

Dr. Taulbee: That's correct.

Member Lockey: Bioassay samples; is that correct? 

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct.

Member Lockey: And then -- these workers 

participated in a routine bioassay sampling program 

with a radionuclide specified in the RWP, correct?

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct.

Member Lockey: And 95 percent provide samples.

Dr. Taulbee: Ninety-five percent participated in a 

routine program for those radionuclides.

Member Lockey: Right. They were -- the routine 

program covered those individuals.

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct. Yes, sir. 

Member Lockey: And five percent did not and when 

you ran it through the algorithm, there was another 
43

1.6 percent that went over and you were also 

covered, correct?

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct. Yes, sir. 

Member Lockey: Okay. So, the question -- I guess 

the question I'm asking at least Westinghouse had 

set up what I consider a very elaborate 

environmental monitoring system and set 

thresholds at ten percent, used workers as sort of --

they didn't want workers exposed but they did have 

a routine bioassay program to see if their program 

was working correctly. I look at the plutonium levels 

and they're relatively low. I look at the tritium levels 

and they are extremely low. 

So, I guess I'm getting -- I'm trying to understand, 

Joe, and this is the question I'm going to ask you 

now. If you look at the slide, if routine 

biomonitoring is covering 95 percent of RWPs for 

the specific radionuclide, what am I missing here?

Mr. Fitzgerald: You're missing the workers that 

would have been on job-specific bioassays for nonroutine mixtures, non-routine radionuclides or you 

know, specialized work.

And I might point out by the way that this is a 

diagram of how the procedures, how the RWPs and 

related bioassay programs should have worked. 

Okay. This is the -- this was Westinghouse's intent. 

The actual practice, the actual on the ground 

implementation of this program was so deficient 

that DOE had to go to an enforcement action and 

one that actually applied to the entire DOE complex. 

Westinghouse had to come up a corrective action 

program that took over a year, maybe two and they 

had to revamp their entire program, bioassay 

program so that, in fact, these non-routine 

bioassay, these job-specific bioassays were, in fact, 

performed adequately. And this was not a one-off 

situation in 1997 as both DOE and SRS 

acknowledged. This was a persistent problem that 
44

went back a number of years and that required that 

they up the training, up the procedural compliance 

and held management accountable.

So, you know, I guess my difficulty is seeing 

diagrams like this and hearing terms like defense in 

depth when the actual result, not so much the 

expectation, not the policy, not what Westinghouse 

intended but the actual result on the ground was 

you were missing almost 80 percent of the required 

bioassays that RWPs required in 1997 and we have 

little idea of what the extent of that gap would be 

going back in time '70s and '80s and, you know, 

one could, you know, guess that certainly the 

compliance in terms of providing bioassays for job 

plans were much, much worse.

So -- yeah. Yeah, you know, I -- my reaction would 

be this looks really good, but I still go back to the 

fact that, you know, data completeness is a 

fundamental basis for deciding, you know, whether 

or not one can do dose reconstruction. That's why 

we developed a co-exposure model. 

Member Lockey: Joe, let me --

Mr. Fitzgerald: I haven't seen evidence that we can 

actually speak to the question of data completeness 

for these kinds of bioassays before 1997.

Member Lockey: So, let me go back to the original 

question, though. Is this -- Tim, I assume that 

these 3200 samples are actual samples you looked 

at; is that correct? 

Dr. Taulbee: This is actually an assessment that 

DOE did. And I'd like to point out that a -- this is 

what they put in their assessment, this was the 

existing process. So, this was actual. This wasn't 

nice to have or what Joe insinuated there, that, you 

know, a diagram of how it's supposed to work. This 

is what they found actually was happening. These 

bullets off to the side here of 1, 2, 3, are indicating 
45

why didn't this person, this RCO note the 

requirement for the sample on the RWP. And these 

are the reasons --

Mr. Fitzgerald: What year was this?

Dr. Taulbee: This is 1997. This is the follow-up to 

the Notice of Violation as to what they found and 

what the process was. Okay. These 3200 samples, 

these are 3200 workers signing in on RWPs. So, it's 

non-routine work singing on RWPs. And this is what 

they found. Like I said, there's 1, 3, and 6, of you 

go down here to this portion you'll see that 1, the 

worker didn't realize a job-specific sample was 

required. This is what they found that led to that 21 

percent compliance. That's the blue part here, 

coming over to the side. Okay. Worker submitted 

the required sample.

The red assessments here the 3200 this is a limited 

assessment that was done in the first quarter. The 

full assessment, which was done later, which is 

where the compliance ratio dropped from 33 

percent to 21 percent when you back out the 

numbers from 256 you end up with 6481 instead of 

3200 up here for that blue scenario. But we still had 

95 percent of workers on a routine bioassay 

schedule and submitting their samples under that 

routine program.

Member Beach: So, Tim, this is Josie. Let me cut in 

for a second and ask. This diagram you have up 

right now, this is strictly for the year 1997 or was it 

--

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct. 

Member Beach: Okay. So, what about between 

1973 on up to 1997, what kind of samples are you 

looking at there?

Dr. Taulbee: For that evaluation we did not have an 

RWP program. There were job plans that were 

conducted and, on the job, plans we could identify 
46

workers and one of the check-boxes on the job 

plans was respiratory protection. And so, what we 

did is we went through a very similar analysis of 

looking at the RWPs. We looked at these job plans 

and said, okay, this person signed in on a job plan 

that required respiratory protection; do they have 

monitoring, yes or no. We didn't look at whether it 

was job-specific or routine. 

It really doesn't matter from that standpoint. If they 

were monitored under a routine or under a jobspecific that's what we use for dose reconstruction. 

We are not just looking at job specific. We are 

looking at their work history and their monitoring. 

And that's the important thing that we use for dose 

reconstruction. 

We can't do this analysis of job-specific versus 

routine. This was an assessment that was done by 

Westinghouse as part of this Notice of Violation. 

Okay. We don't have that resolution of data 

especially in the '72 to 1990 time period. All we can 

look at this worker signed in on a job plan wore 

respirator. Were they -- do they have bioassay 

monitoring? And that's what that assessment does.

And it really doesn't matter whether, in our opinion 

whether they are on job-specific or routine 

bioassay. We have bioassay for the subcontractors 

doing the work on that job plan or the RWP. 

Mr. Fitzgerald: But the one thing, if I can just chime 

in. The one thing that is lacking is for those workers 

who aren't on a routine that's covered in the RWP 

for anything that would be outside of the routine 

source terms. There's a large percentage of those 

specific bioassays that went uncollected for various 

reasons, but they went uncollected. That was the 

impetus for the concern that came out of the selfassessment that Westinghouse did and what DOE 

reacted to.

So, you know, it's one thing to say that -- and it's 

not surprising if you have all these workers, this is 
47

to answer Jim's comment too. All these workers 

working in tritium areas, plutonium areas and you 

have RWPs for specific jobs I'm not surprised 95 

percent would have been covered by virtue of their 

routine plutonium sampling or their routine tritium 

sampling. 

I would be concerned about radionuclides that they 

might have been exposed to in places like 773A 

doing D&D and waste management where you don't 

have those mainstream primary source terms like 

plutonium and uranium and tritium where you 

would rely on your job-specific bioassay to, in fact, 

pick up on and monitor for those non-routine 

nuclides. And for those, if you're talking 80 percent 

are not doing or performing these bioassays that 

would give you that answer, then you do have an 

issue. You have a gap in the knowledge for those 

particular nuclides. 

So, this is not so much a question of tritium and 

plutonium and uranium and you see, certainly, you 

have a lot of graphs and tables looking at the 

routines for those for subcontractors. It's the nonroutines that would not be covered by your routine 

program, which, you know, 1997, yes, there were 

300-some samples that were not collected. Is that 

something to worry about? Yeah, I don't know. I 

don't think there is any data on that. We don't know 

what we don't know.

We don't know what source terms were missed. 

Now, 1997 we do because they went back and did a 

100 percent resampling. But before that we don't 

know what the source terms might have been. We 

don't know the magnitude of the number of those 

kinds of job-specific bioassays that went 

uncollected. And we certainly don't know the trend 

in that particular issue going back to 1972, we have 

no idea. 

The only reason we could even do the kind of 

analysis, which is illustrated in this figure is by the 

mid-'90s Westinghouse, again, I said that before, 
48

implemented traditional RWP program that allows 

you to track the very numbers that you put up here. 

I can tell you that certainly before that RWP 

program was put up in '93,'94, there would be no 

idea of any of these numbers for that time period. 

And which is the reason we are talking that before 

Westinghouse there just isn't any information and I 

think you did say that, Tim, about routines versus 

non-routines in terms of job-specific bioassay. You 

have to go the mid-'90s or 1997 to do this kind of 

analysis and try to draw conclusions.

But I would contend you can't back-extrapolate 

what you have here to the prior years. There's just 

no way to know that. 

Dr. Taulbee: The one clarification that I disagree 

with you on, Joe, is that we can start from here, of 

a worker signing in on an RWP, and we did that. We 

used job plans and RWPs and we could look at down 

here whether their sample was received. 

So, it's all of the data that we have in RPRT-92 for 

A-area, which is 773A, one of the exotic areas that 

you mentioned. We have data for that area, 

especially in the 1980s and we could start here at 

the RWP or job plan and we could look down here in 

the bottom corner of whether their sample was 

received. So, we can get that resolution.

Member Clawson: Or 1997 --

Dr. Taulbee: No, for the 1970s.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, again, I would be pleasantly 

surprised -- yeah, I would be pleasantly surprised if 

one could do that kind of a tracking back in the mid-

'80s at 773A. Again, without an RWP system and a 

facility-based program it would be difficult but at 

773, in fact, implemented a rigorous RWP-like 

program for the job plans it might be possible to 

track this down. That wouldn't, and we've talked 

about this a lot, wouldn't help characterize the site 

or the other years. But nonetheless, you know, I 
49

would leave it as an open question whether you 

could do it for 773A for the specific years that 

you're talking about.

Dr. Taulbee: That is what we did in RPRT-92. That is 

the A-area that we looked at with 773A. We started 

with the job plans in the 1970s through the 1980s, 

actually even through the 1990s, A-area is one of 

the areas we sampled. And so, we looked at the 

RWPs and job plans, we looked down here if they 

had a bioassay sample. That is what RPRT-92 does 

in between the years.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, but remind me, when you talk 

about have a bioassay sample, I think the protocol 

was to look at whether or not they had any bioassay 

sample, at least one bioassay sample for the facility 

in question, in this case the plutonium operations at 

773A. But I don't think it's the degree of specificity 

in terms of what was written because nothing was 

written on the job plans that you could actually 

track. Am I right on that or am I mistaken?

Dr. Taulbee: No, you're correct. It wasn't written on 

there whether there needed to be a plutonium 

bioassay or fission product bioassay, but we looked 

at the location where the work was being conducted 

and what work was conducted there and that was 

how we made that determination and whether they 

were a respirator, yes or no, and if they did then 

that was when we went and looked to see if they 

had bioassay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, and our review of RPRT-92, 

which encompassed the 773A analysis I think we 

were pretty I think concerned about the fact that 

there was no policy in DuPont area for a bioassay to 

actually stem from respiratory protection. That 

came along in Westinghouse's 521 I think it was 

called procedure that was put in place in '93 -- '92, 

'93 where there was actually a specific requirement 

for bioassay following respiratory protection and as 

you just pointed out, we did not see any linkage 

between a job plan and a specified bioassay. There 
50

was nothing. And I looked through every single job 

plan that was there for 773A and you could assume 

that, you know, whatever bioassays were done for a 

particular worker was, in fact, tied to the job that 

they might have been involved with. But there was 

no one-to-one linkage that says this is what the job 

plan required because the job plan had no 

requirements for bioassays and what bioassay was 

in fact done.

And 773A is problematic and we pointed that out 

too, as did Westinghouse later, because it had --

because it was a laboratory operation there was an 

evolving and very changing set of source terms. I 

mean you had one-off experiments. You had 

research going on. You had, you know, a number of 

different activities that involved nuclides that were 

non-routine nuclides.

So, it's not an easy facility to say that you could 

ascertain by facility, you know, just by the facility 

identity what the source terms would have been on 

those bioassays. I think it's pretty clear and this 

was a precaution that Westinghouse actually put out 

in '98 that one had to be very careful with 773A 

because the complexity of the activities and the 

nuclides that were being handled.

So, I, you know, I hear what you're saying but, you 

know, we have indicated in our, in our reviews that 

it is very problematic to, you know, to take the kind 

of conclusions that we are talking about from '97, 

which is where I think you actually begin to get very 

specific information based on a program that's a 

modern program, modern RWP program and try to 

back-extrapolate that 20, 25 years and believe that, 

you know, you have a way to ascertain 

completeness, data completeness. 

And that's the crux of pretty much what we were 

looking for, was any way to go back in time, given 

the findings in 1997 and figure out, you know, 

whether it would be non-routine job-specific 

bioassays that data is complete, complete enough 
51

where you could have confidence applying a coexposure model. And the frustration, you know, and 

the fact going back to Jim's comment, you know, we 

haven't been able to get consensus is the fact that 

we can get past data completeness. That's a 

fundamental, you know, start here, do not pass go 

type of thing. And if you can't establish data 

completeness everything that would follow 

afterwards, the stratification, the comparisons, the 

co-exposure model isn't feasible. Isn't well-founded 

and that's probably the frustration that all of us feel. 

But, you know, we still can't ascribe to the data 

completeness of these bioassays because 

programmatically and from a standpoint of the 

records themselves, there's no way to actually pin 

down, you know, how complete they are.

Member Lockey: Let me answer --

Member Clawson: I want to -- hold on a second, 

Jim, I want to be able to go back to why we are 

actually even getting here because I want to, I want 

to make sure everybody understands what the Work

Group did when they chose these years.

We chose years that we felt that there was very 

insufficient data. In getting into the '90s everything 

was changing. I thought this was going to be a very 

simple thing. If we would have had the data, we 

wouldn't be sitting here today. If would have had 

the completeness and everything else, we wouldn't 

be sitting here. That has not been touched.

I want people to realize what SRS really is, 310 

square miles of facilities. This was a leader. Did you 

realize that DOE was not even allowed on Savannah 

River? DuPont ran everything. They contracted for 

DOE for widgets. Don't come into my plant. We own 

it. We do it. 

There's a plaque sitting on their wall in SRS I 

believe it was the late 1970s when there was an 

agreement for them to even be able to come in 
52

there. We are sitting there saying that we can backextrapolate from 1970 back into -- no. 

You know what, I've got to go back to not my 

history of what I went through. DOE has lots of 

rules out there and everything else like that and 

they take ten to 12 years to be able to implement. 

There've been times that we had to shut down 

because we could not operate under the 

requirements because they didn't understand what 

it took to do this. DuPont was a very interesting 

contractor. DuPont did things the DuPont way. 

I felt that this was a very clear-cut timeframe to 

where we could actually cut this out and be able to 

work this. And same as the Work Group did with 

this. If we had the data, do you think we'd really be 

sitting here today? No, it's opinions and we could 

back-extrapolate, and I don't want damn smoke and 

mirrors. I want the information and if we can't do it, 

that's where the SEC comes in. If we have 

insufficient information, that's where the SEC comes 

in.

Member Lockey: Well, Brad, I think we have 

sufficient information from 1980 on. I don't -- I 

think prior to 1980 it's really iffy for me. 

But let me ask Joe, Joe and Tim, I have a question 

to ask you. I went back and pulled the violation that 

Westinghouse was issued and it's an interesting 

read and there's no question there was a violation 

they had an internal program where they were 

supposed to go back and do sampling analysis of 

specific job tasks and they didn't do that. That was 

their internal program. At the same time DOE has 

noted that they had a very rigorous and 

comprehensive and the comprehensive use of a field 

indicator -- indicators doing work activities the 

single unexpected events and they had an extensive 

air sampling and surface survey. And I would expect 

that in the 1990s based on the number of plants 

I've been through and where I have been.
53

What I'm asking, Tim, did that exist -- previously 

did that -- do we have documentation that that type 

of rigorous program as identified by DOE was in 

existence during the '70s?

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, we do. If you go and look at the 

survey contamination results, there are thousands 

and thousands of pages of those along with air 

monitoring and at all of the facilities, that those 

were conducted. So, that is a history that is there. 

We certainly -- we don't go into that level of detail 

for dose reconstruction, so we haven't captured all 

of that by no means. And plus, I don't think we 

could, actually, I mean there's thousands and 

thousands of pages.

So, yes, that did exist beforehand. And one of the 

things I would also like to point out is that SRS's 

procedures for monitoring of the workplace 

environment, surface contaminations, and air 

sampling is well documented in procedures 

manuals. These are DuPont procedures manuals. 

And we see that that data was collected, in fact.

Member Clawson: So, wait a minute. So, Tim, 

you're saying this robust evaluation. Let's go to Par 

Pond. When did they stop them from fishing in Par 

Pond because of the contamination in it and having 

the fish fries on Friday afternoon?

Member Lockey: Brad, I can't answer that's like --

Member Clawson: 1995.

Member Lockey: I can't answer that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Dr. Lockey, can I answer that 

question? 

Member Lockey: Yeah, go ahead.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Yes. DuPont and I've lived this 

in real time experience when I was in charge of 

safety for DOE headquarters. So, I know -- I knew 

in the '80s what DuPont was about. DuPont had a 
54

world class safety --

Member Lockey: I didn't hear what you said. You 

were in charge of what?

Mr. Fitzgerald: I headed safety at DOE 

headquarters. Okay. In the late '80s. So, I had 

firsthand experience. 

Let me just, you know, provide some perspective on 

this thing and this is I think the reason why there's 

a lot of misunderstanding about even DuPont. 

DuPont had a world-class reputation record for 

safety performance. Okay. Unparalleled. I mean 

when I went to Savannah River and sat in the car, 

the DuPont driver would not start the car and I 

asked him why because I had not put my seatbelt 

on in the back seat. And that's the level of safety 

regime. I mean it was very, very stringent and very 

driven.

At the same time DuPont was, like many DOE 

contractors, in an insular world. No one really 

bothered it. DOE didn't review it. It was -- it did its 

own thing. It was very much an expert-based safety 

culture. It was based on pretty much DuPontdeveloped protocols, approaches to how they did 

business. And these approaches pretty much 

remained the same from the '60s, into the '70s, into 

the '80s.

The problem is rad protection and nuclear safety 

had progressed beyond that point. So, when you 

got to the situation in the '80s you had a problem 

where, you know, a Tiger team from the outside 

and this is the, you know, this is one of the first 

times an independent review was done. Not an inhouse review but an independent review came in to 

look at, you know, safety performance and safety 

programs as they ought to be in terms of national 

standards and national expectations and 

departmental expectations.

DuPont fell very short, and the Tiger Team findings 
55

are very much ones that we have cited. They are 

available for anyone to look at. But they essentially 

found that, you know: one, DuPont wasn't enforcing 

and managing bioassays adequately and weren't 

ensuring workers were providing bioassays. That 

sound familiar? 

They also found that there wasn't an RWP program 

being implemented even though that was something 

that you would expect to find in that program. They 

found that site characterizations where you would 

characterize the radiological source terms so that 

they would be appropriately identified in RWPs --

well, in this case job plans. That was not being done 

adequately in any facility except the Naval Fuels 

facility, which is just one facility out of the 30-plus.

So, yes, there was a world class safety reputation. 

But it was, from the radiological nuclear standpoint, 

it was a program that had fallen out of step with 

modern expectations. And when K reactor went 

down, okay, it went down because the operators, 

this is after Three Mile Island, did not have the 

knowledge necessary to know what they were 

dealing with and came up with some anomalies that 

they couldn't handle, and they didn't shut the 

reactor down when they should have shut it down. 

The investigations that took place afterwards 

confirmed that DuPont had a very insular nuclear 

and radiological program that was out of step with 

what would have been required at other radiological 

facilities. 

So, you know, keep things in perspective that really 

you did not have the kinds of robust programs that 

I think seems to be touted for Savannah River in 

that timeframe and it was only from the dual shock 

of DuPont leaving, Westinghouse coming in, K 

reactor, the production reactors being shut down for 

good. And with the Tiger Teams and a new 

Secretary of Energy, Watkins, a new Assistant 

Secretary, Paul Ziemer and other notables that 

made a wholesale change in the way things were 
56

run there. 

So, really it was only the early '90s, if you want to 

talk about robustness, and a health physics program 

that would compare with other sites, it was only in 

the early to mid-'90s that that happened. Okay. 

Before then you had an expert-based, a facilitymanaged program. It was the facility managers that 

called the shots, decided who got bioassay, 

whatnot. There wasn't the RWP site-wide 

requirements that you have now. 

So, you know, if you look at it from that context, it's 

less surprising to see situations where you have 

gaps in bioassays and where it's not easy to find the 

kind of records that you want to find when it comes 

to these non-routine exposures. The routines are 

straightforward. You know, no one who is on routine 

monitoring for plutonium and tritium and whatnot, 

are likely to be missed. The production workers are 

going to be covered. But these subcontractors and 

transient workers, that's a different story and one 

where the site was not -- did not easily adapt to the 

thousands of -- or hundreds and thousands of 

workers that came on site to do these specialized 

jobs.

So, it -- I do think that the operational history of 

DuPont and Westinghouse are very pertinent when 

you're looking at questions like this.

Member Roessler: Brad, Brad.

Member Clawson: Yes.

Member Roessler: Can I say something?

Member Clawson: Sure.

Member Roessler: Okay, and then I see David has 

his hand up too. I'm not sure how productive this 

conversation is. It seems that we're getting a lot of 

selective information, speculation. I think it's really 

distracting to the whole conversation. And for those 

of us who are Board Members trying to sit here and 
57

make an evaluation, I guess it's difficult.

I'd like, and I guess the other thing I see is, every 

time a specific problem is brought up, and if Tim is 

given the opportunity, he can support his theory 

with regard to doing dose reconstruction, and 

answer that concern.

I'm mainly interested knowing is, could there be a 

group of workers missing from this co-exposure 

model. And if they are actually, with regard to dose 

reconstruction, can that be bounded?

I mean that's the thing we're really looking for, not 

a lot of little ifs and buts that maybe we speculate 

on.

Dr. Taulbee: If I could address that, Brad. We don't 

see any groups of workers that are missing, Dr. 

Roessler. And how we base this is based upon this 

particular graph here that I have, of the 

subcontracting monitoring in NOCTS.

These are from the claimants. And we see all of the 

subcontractors, CTW groups, identified, the 

electricians, pipefitters, laborers, carpenters, iron 

workers. And we see that all of them have 

monitoring data.

So, we don't see that there is any subgroups that 

are missing. And that's the context of the IG-006, 

the Implementation Guide for co-exposure models. 

So we're not seeing any of those particular groups, 

where we're missing data from that standpoint. I 

hope that answers your question.

Member Roessler: Yes, thank you.

Member Clawson: Okay. So NOCTS data, how 

good's the NOCTS data? I mean 100 percent, Tim. I 

want the exact, how good is it? Is it just so clean 

that we shouldn't even be here?

Dr. Taulbee: NOCTS data is, this represents the 

claimants. These are the people who have filed 
58

claims. And so this data, we've got a total of 6,000 

total SRS claimants, 886 are subcontractors. Okay.

So, we have data for these subcontractors, 

construction trades workers. And so this is a 

representative sample of the entire population. And 

a case could be made that these are the -- it's a 

subset of the total population. But these are people 

who got cancer. These are people who got cancer 

and filed claims.

So, if you're looking at it from a holistic type of 

approach, these are the people who should have the 

highest exposures. These are the people --

Member Clawson: Should -- this is where we get 

into our problems, Tim. They should, we really don't 

know. But, you know, in theory this would be --

yeah, it should be. We don't have an ideas if we've 

got the highest ones or not. These are the people 

that are filed and there is a lot of people that 

haven't filed.

And we've seen this at numerous sites. This is 

where the problems that we start to get into, Gen. 

Yes, this looks great, but this is a -- it's so what. 

The NOCTS data, we should be in there, we 

shouldn't. That's our problem. It's, this is all, 

should, it should. I don't want should. I want is. It is 

it. This is the clean information and we don't have 

that.

Member Richardson: Brad.

Dr. Taulbee: I see Dr. Richardson has his hand up.

Member Clawson: Go ahead.

Member Richardson: Thanks. Could we go back to 

the previous slide we were looking at with the flow 

diagram?

Dr. Taulbee: Certainly.

Member Richardson: One of the points of contention 
59

when thinking about, sort of the co-exposure model, 

it seems to me to be, Tim, as you were describing 

this flow diagram -- which is very helpful -- was an 

assertion you made several times that the sample 

received, it doesn't matter from your perspective, 

whether it's a routine or a job-specific bioassay. The 

fact is that the sample was received.

And I can see that from one perspective and I, but 

it seemed to me one of the issues being raised, in 

thinking about the co-exposure model is, where 

does the missing data, where do the missing data 

arise? And are they, and is it, what causes 

missingness?

So the co-exposure model should work under 

certain conditions. And that's where -- let me stop 

there. So, in the flow diagram, it appears that for 

routine, for the routine bioassay monitoring 

program, there's very little missing data.

And for the job-specific bioassay flow, arm of the 

flow diagram, there's a substantial amount of 

missing data. So, one of the determinations of 

missingness is, is it routine or is it job-specific? So, 

from that perspective if we just think about what's 

the mechanism leading to missingness?

Routine versus job-specific is important. If, again 

from your perspective, on the modeling side of 

deriving a value, you don't really care whether it 

was routine or job-specific. It's we have the data. 

We observed those, this number of values for these 

characteristics, the workers.

But for us to do, to use the co-exposure model, we 

would have to believe missingness is kind of noninformative, between these groups. And so the 

question maybe that I have is, for a co-exposure 

model, for assigning values to workers for different 

types of radionuclides that they might have been 

exposed to, does it matter if it's job-specific versus 

routine?
60

Dr. Taulbee: We don't believe that it does. And let 

me back that up a little bit here. When we did 

Report 92 and did the evaluation, we were basically 

looking at the very first box. Worker signs in on an 

RWP, and did they leave a sample? Yes or no?

And so that was the one main question. For those 

workers where the answer was no, they did not 

leave a sample. We went back to look at those 

RWPs to see if there was a worker on that RWP, 

that did leave a sample. And that's where it 

becomes applicable for the co-exposure model.

And so we looked at those workers who were not 

monitored, to see if they worked on an RWP with 

somebody who was monitored. Kind of the very 

definition of a co-exposure model, they worked 

alongside one another in the workplace.

And when they did that, that was what we did in 

Report 92 and referred to it as effectively 

monitored. And when you look at the percentages of 

effectively monitored in Report 92 for A Area -- that 

gets into the pre-1990 type of time period -- what 

we found is that there's a large number of these 

subcontractors who would be following down this 

kind of job-specific path. And not leaving a sample, 

that they were physically working on the same job 

plan as somebody who was monitored.

Member Richardson: But --

Dr. Taulbee: That's what gives us confidence that 

that co-exposure model is valid.

Member Richardson: But Tim, when you do that, for 

that comparison, is that a comparison of the 70 or 

80 percent of the workers who were not monitored 

to the 20 percent who are also moving down that 

same flow diagram, who were monitored?

Dr. Taulbee: Could you say that again? You lost me 

a little there.

Member Richardson: So if we move down this 
61

pathway to job-specific bioassay. Are you saying 

that there are workers who had samples, who 

should have had a job-specific bioassay? Twenty 

percent of them did have a job-specific bioassay 

and 80 percent didn't, but you compare those and 

that's the definition of the coworker?

Dr. Taulbee: No, we looked at basically this group 

over here, of sample not received.

Member Richardson: Yeah.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay, and then we looked to see if 

there was somebody else on that RWP that was 

monitored, whether it was routine or whether it was 

the job-specific.

Member Richardson: I mean you didn't know 

whether it's routine or job-specific --

Dr. Taulbee: No.

Member Richardson: One could imagine, and this is, 

I think this again gets to the nature of it, you don't 

know whether you're comparing them to the routine 

people or to a job- specific.

So, let's say that because they had the same job 

title in the same year, under the same work plan, 

they were job-specific as well. That comparison 

would have been between two people who, one of 

them, actually collected a sample for that jobspecific task, and another one didn't.

Dr. Taulbee: All we look, all we were able to refine 

was did they sign in on an RWP, and did they leave 

the bioassay? And the ones that did not, we looked 

to see if they worked with somebody who did.

Member Richardson: Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: That's the best we could do.

Member Richardson: Right, I'm not -- I'm just trying 

to understand it, because, you know, naively one 
62

might think that the types of things which are 

monitored for, and the exposure conditions for the 

routine bioassay program could lead to different 

types of exposures and magnitudes of exposures, 

than those which one encounters under the jobspecific bioassay plan, where they're having things 

which are non-routinely encountered. And so they 

might be different.

And yet the imputation is largely to the job-specific 

front areas where there is missingness. And 

attempting to impute with the routine information, 

which is the vast bulk of the non-missingness.

And that's, so this is my question, is, if we, you're 

saying that the comparison that you did in that 

example, those appear to be comparable? Which 

maybe from a process idea at least as kind of -- I 

still am, I'm kind of a little surprised I think.

Dr. Taulbee: I mean the key is that they both 

signed in on the same non-routine RWP. Both 

workers did. And so one was monitored and one 

was not. That's why we feel that the co-exposure 

model works.

Member Clawson: But Tim, when you say that, how 

many people are on these RWPs?

Dr. Taulbee: It can vary, 20, 30 --

Member Clawson: This is the point I'm trying to get 

to. Because not all those people made the dives. 

That person that submitted that bioassay may not 

have been the one that went in.

Dr. Taulbee: We specifically looked at workers that 

went into the areas with sign-in, sign-out, and that 

they were matched at the same times. Okay, we 

specifically looked at that.

If somebody went in and we didn't pair them with 

somebody else that went in on a different day on 

that RWP, no. We looked at workers side by side in 

the same radiological environment.
63

Dr. Kotelchuck, I see you have your hand up.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes, I'm here --

Member Beach: Dave, you're on mute.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes, I did. I -- we rely, I mean 

as Board Members who are not Members of the 

Working Group, I mean we rely often on the 

recommendation of the Working Group. And I don't, 

I'd like to hear from Brad, what was the 

recommendation of the Working Group that was 

given to us last time? Was that unanimous? And if it 

wasn't, what was the vote?

Member Clawson: It was unanimous.

Member Kotelchuck: Recommendation for --

Member Clawson: For an SEC.

Member Kotelchuck: Okay.

Member Clawson: Then when we got to the 

presentation, one of them had a lot more questions. 

But when we took the vote, it was unanimous.

Member Kotelchuck: Okay.

Member Lockey: I can answer that, Jim Lockey. I --

Brad and I agree that this has gone on long enough 

and we needed to get it out. And I vote, my vote 

was to, we need to get this out and have the Board 

decide it. But then we had some additional 

presentations.

And at that point, I went back and what I call, is 

unpacked the data, to look at the data more 

detailed. Because I was having trouble really 

understanding the discrepancy between these two, 

what I feel are very reliable groups, trying to see 

why there is a discrepancy --

Member Kotelchuck: Well I -- Jim, I respect the 

need to come to some decision. It is striking to me, 

if not embarrassing to the reputation to our 
64

Advisory Board that we have something, that we 

have an SEC petition from people who introduced it 

15 years ago, and we're talking about many of them 

have passed away.

So I do feel, I share the feeling that we do finally 

have to come to some decision. That way the 

people can, who are claimants, can either accept 

whatever decision we make or appeal that if they 

feel they should.

Member Clawson: And Jim, I apologize if I made it 

sound wrong to that. I honor everybody's opinion on 

this. And each one of us has our own vote. And we 

vote for what we feel and that's all I can ask. That's 

all we're trying to do. But at some point, we have to 

be able to take care of this and get to the point.

We all have one vote. I did not want to single you 

out in any way.

Member Clawson: And Jim --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Lockey: And you and I agree, we both 

talked about the frustration that we've had. And I 

don't, and particularly after our last look for data. 

Went back, and you know, talking about, Joe was 

talking about before 1995, 1994 was there any 

other additional data and records that could help 

us? There wasn't any additional data.

You know, at that point I said, we're not going to 

look for any more data. We have to make a 

decision. And from my perspective this decision is 

really, was down to a board deciding at what level 

of precision do we need in this, what I feel is a very 

extensive database, in order to say we can do dose 

reconstruction or we can't do dose reconstruction?

What's the level of precision we have to arrive at? 

And that's not an easy decision, but I think that's 

where we're at, Brad.
65

Member Clawson: And I understand, you know, 

we've -- somebody isn't on mute that really should 

be, I think, Rashaun.

You know, we went through the same thing with 

this with Fernald. The whole thing was, was Brad, 

but we have 350,000 urinalysis, look at all this data. 

But if it is not the right data for what we need, it 

doesn't work.

Member Lockey: Brad, what --

Member Clawson: And that's where I get into the 

problems with it.

Member Lockey: Yes, and Brad what troubles me 

about it all is that, you know, NIOSH has looked at 

the data using different methodologies. They looked 

at NOCTS data to see if that comparable and it was.

I know you raised the point is, that maybe the nonclaimants have higher exposures. That possibly is 

the case but from a medical perspective it's 

probably not the case. But that's just from my 

medical experience. And cancer tends to occur, it's 

dose-related and the higher the dose the more likely 

you're going to get a cancer. That's just the way 

cancer works.

But that aside, it gets to a point of, and I think in 

the comments yesterday, I think Knut said it to us, 

I think, you know, the bootstrap analysis was a 

good analysis. It's a good analysis that you'd use on 

established data. It doesn't tell you about data

that's not there. It can just tell you how the data is 

distributed.

And he's probably had experience with it in the 

construction trade worker analysis. But he said it's 

not going to help you on an individual basis. It's not 

going to help you on the individual worker. And 

that's actually true.

So, I think as a Board, we have to decide, is the 

level of precision that NIOSH has derived in 
66

relationship to their idea that they can do dose 

reconstruction based on the objective data they 

analyzed, adequate?

And one of the things I've asked for is, is there any 

objective data that indicates that what they've done 

is not correct, in this extensive database? And as far 

as I know, Panel Members can correct me if I'm 

wrong, I don't think that data exists.

If I saw standard deviations for instance in the 

tritium, that were astronomically and not anywhere 

close in comparison to the prime construction 

workers. And that curve was much much higher, I 

would say this is not enough.

It's not representative, there's no question about 

that. If I saw differences in the plutonium data, then 

that would raise all kinds of red flags to me. If I saw 

differences in the RNP data between the groups, 

that would raise all kinds of issues to me.

I definitely have issues with the 1970s, because 

there's no, particularly '73 through '79, there's a 

real paucity of data, and I have an issue with that. 

But after 1980, I haven't seen anything that to me 

raises a red flag that there's objective data out 

there that's not covered by the dose reconstruction 

within 95 percent confidence intervals.

Member Clawson: And these are your opinions and 

they're valuable opinions --

Member Lockey: Yes.

Member Clawson: But I want to make one thing 

clear, not using the NOCTS data is speculation. 

Because you do not know, period. You're thinking, 

well you know, this should work this way. But it's, 

you know, you're infer -- you can't use that. This is 

what I'm having such a hard time with.

Member Lockey: It's maybe, Brad, it's just I've -- I 

deal with cancer so much from an environmental 

occupational exposure, and if cancer's, I'm an old 
67

person, so cancer is an old person disease. It's a 

reflection of lifetime cumulative social or 

environmental or occupational exposures. And any -

-

Member Clawson: What --

Member Lockey: And it is a dose response disease 

process. So the people that have cancer are in 

general, are going to have higher dose.

Member Clawson: Well and Jim, I don't want to 

criticize in anything but I want you to realize 

something. You're deducing that or inferring based 

on red flags that can't show or demonstrate because 

we don't have the information.

Member Lockey: Well, and --

Member Clawson: You're looking for a red flag. I 

could, I bet you, I could tell you what, I could run a 

lot of numbers right now and make everything look 

really rosy. But I get back to the same thing that 

has been the very one issue from the beginning. 

And that's the validation of the information. And I 

still don't see it.

Now that being said, that is, each one of us has a 

vote on it. Each one of us has our opinion on it and 

we can go from there.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, can I interject here. I've been 

just trying to just wait so that I'm not talking over 

anyone. But there are a couple of things that I did 

want to clarify. I know Dr. Kotelchuck asked about 

the vote and the Work Group to bring the 

recommendation for adding the SEC to the Board.

And Brad, you're correct in that it was a unanimous 

vote among the Members that were in attendance of 

the Work Group when that vote was taken, but Dr. 

Richardson was not present for that.

Member Clawson: Right.
68

Dr. Roberts: The other thing I wanted to just check 

in on is that we do want to give the Petitioner an 

opportunity to speak and to make their 

presentation. Unfortunately, in the last meeting 

there wasn't enough time and they got cut off. So, I 

want to make sure that we are extending the 

courtesy to the Petitioner that would like to make 

their presentation.

So, I'm asking if this is a good time. I know the 

discussion is still continuing about the two 

presentations we've seen so far. But I do want to 

make sure that we do hear from the Petitioner and 

that they have adequate time.

Member Kotelchuck: Rashaun, is this an appropriate 

time for a comfort break, after we decide what 

we're doing?

Dr. Roberts: Sure. That would be fine with me. But 

yes, let's try to get the path forward after the 

break.

Member Lockey: That would be good for me.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes, thank you.

Dr. Roberts: So, Brad are we dismissed?

Member Clawson: Yeah, let's take a ten-minute 

comfort break. I see it as being what, 2:30?

Member Kotelchuck: Right.

Member Clawson: Then, let's come back in ten 

minutes.

Member Kotelchuck: Okay.

Member Clawson: So 2:40.

Dr. Roberts: Ten minutes, and at that point will we 

open up with the Petitioner?

Member Clawson: Yes.
69

Member Kotelchuck: Yes.

Member Clawson: At that time we'll open up with 

the Petitioner, thanks.

Member Beach: Sounds good.

Dr. Roberts: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 3:28 p.m. and resumed at 3:41 p.m.)

Dr. Roberts: So, before we broke, we said that we 

would lead in this portion, hearing from the 

Petitioner. And I know that Mr. Fester sent a 

presentation that he wanted to make. His exhibits 

were circulated to you all prior to this Board 

meeting.

So, Mr. Fester, are you ready to go with your 

presentation?

Mr. Johnson: Dr. Roberts, this is Warren Johnson on 

behalf of the Petitioners, and I believe Mr. Fester 

will have some comments after me as well.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, great. Welcome.

Mr. Johnson: Thank you. And I've circulated our 

exhibits, I'm not particularly good with technology, 

so I'm going to just comment and reference the 

Bates stamp numbers on those, but otherwise not 

attempt to share my screen or slow this down.

I understand it's a long day, and we're going to try 

and be brief. Having said that, as has been 

discussed before, this has been going on for nearly 

15 years, and I feel like every meeting is, to some

degree, Groundhog Day. We just keep doing the 

same things over and over again.

I don't dispute that NIOSH has done the best they 

can, but I think that's the point here, is that their 

best is not good enough to ensure claimantfavorability and to carry out the mission that 
70

Congress has assigned.

A lot of talk's been made of the job-specific versus 

routine bioassays. The job-specific bioassays are 

somebody's, some RadCon person's decision and 

professional judgment as to what is necessary for 

that worker to be considered appropriately 

monitored on that job.

You cannot ignore the importance of the fact that 

they ignored requiring that job-specific bioassay, 

that means that person was not appropriately 

monitored.

To substitute the routine, and consider that 

effectively monitored, overlooks the fact that they 

required that to address specific radionuclides of 

concern for that job, and also the timeliness of that.

We have not discussed how -- what is the proximity 

in time from the job, and when they should have 

submitted a sample, to when it may have gotten 

caught on a routine.

That's a significant difference because of the body's 

effort to get this toxin, or this radiation out of it. 

And that's, the body metabolizes. And so, you're 

also going to have a falsely low dose if you catch 

that on routine versus the job-specific.

So, ignoring that is just trying to get numbers to 

plug into a model, versus trying to get accuracy, 

and trying to provide a claimant-favorable, accurate 

dose reconstruction.

The second problem that Petitioners have with 

NIOSH's approach is the fact that they make a lot of 

assumptions that are based on the, well, the 

assumption that the Savannah River Site always 

followed its written procedures. And, in fact, I think 

there was, quoted at the last meeting by, I think it 

was Dr. Cardarelli, radiological practices were 

consistent with DOE orders in place at the time.

Well, what I provided to the Board, I think 
71

demonstrates that that's not true. Approximately a 

million dollars in fines from DOE is pretty strong 

evidence that that assumption is incorrect.

I'm going to briefly go through those violations 

because there seems to be this feeling that 

somehow everything got better after the Tiger Team 

came in, and that somehow the low participation 

and follow-up bioassays was a one-off event that 

they fixed.

Well, if you look at Petitioner's Number 2, that's 

Enforcement Action 9712, roughly 100,000 in fines, 

notes violations for multiple failures to follow your 

radiological work control procedures. You failed to

stop and evacuate when airborne radioactivity 

exceeded stop-work level of the radiation work 

permit. That happened approximately a hundred 

times.

Failed to follow a procedure leading to unplanned 

and unnecessary intake, and significantly, violations 

are similar to deficiencies reported in 1995. Well, 

that's in '97, still doing it.

You look at Petitioner's Number 12, Enforcement 

Action 9809, another 75,000. Workers and 

management routinely failed over a period of two 

years to follow the procedures and as it relates to 

radiological work.

DOE identified bioassay sample submittal 

deficiencies as early as November 1995. 

Enforcement Action 2000-08, another quarter 

million dollars. Significant deficiencies in quality 

assurance, radiological work practices and controls, 

procedural compliance, in response to off-normal 

conditions.

They note similar deficiencies were identified in the 

prior 1996 event. Number 36, that's Enforcement 

Action 2002-01, violations of radiological control, 

contamination hazards not recognized. Resulted in 

contamination of an uninvolved worker.
72

And Number 39, Enforcement Action 2004-03, 

another quarter million dollars. Violations of FB line 

facility for work processes, ALARA violations, written 

procedures not followed, again, and Number 4, 

falsification of radiation dose records.

So, to look at the documents and assume that they 

always followed on, and therefore, the way we know 

somebody didn't need to be monitored is there's no 

records, quite frankly, is just wrong. And there is 

certainly no way to convert that into claimantfavorability.

As it relates, to NOCTS, there is a problem in that it 

only represents those people who have developed 

cancer and filed a claim. The second part though is 

that, and that omits a number of people. The 

second part is that, it is based on, as I understand 

it, the numbers represented there are the recorded 

doses.

And if you'll look at Number 54, which I produced, 

this is a document created by Savannah River Site, 

Head of Radiation Physics, Dennis Hadlock, in 

response to some private litigation, and I've 

redacted the gentlemen's name, but his badge 

number is listed in the dose estimate.

As you can see, this was based on, as a result of the 

deposition, an unrecorded uptake was discovered in 

his chest count for americium-241. And that was 

from a test done in 1973, that was the first chest 

count they had ever done on him.

The resulting dose in a claimant-favorable, or the 

most conservative dose estimate applied was 43.4 

rem as a result of that one uptake, and that's 

referenced on Petitioner's Number 59.

Well, if you look at Number 60, the official dose, as 

of 2007, as of the time this family had applied in 

NOCTS, shows internal zero. He had never had an 

uptake of any kind, according to that.
73

The 2016 reconstruction, from that one uptake, 

would not be reflected in NOCTS. How sure can you 

be that every, that there's no other instances just 

like that? Have we looked back at every chest 

count? Have we looked back at every whole-body 

count, every bioassay, and looked at the timeliness 

of those bioassays?

We certainly haven't because we don't have those 

records. That's part of the problem here. There's 

been a number of references to the change in 

culture, or the problems with culture.

And at the last meeting I referenced the Atomic 

Energy Commission's -- the legislative history from 

one of the congressional hearings regarding the 

site, and it discussed the concerns over telling 

workers that they were getting a dose. And the 

concerns that that would lead to increase in claims 

and hazard pay, and poor morale.

Well, the next exhibit that I attached is labeled 

Petitioner's 61. This is a presentation done by Mr. 

Hadlock on behalf of the Westinghouse Savannah 

River Company, discussing the use of personal air 

monitoring at its site. And what they were doing 

was testing the people that were working, basically, 

cutting the trees.

And they put personal air samplers, or lapel 

monitoring on these people, and were finding that 

even doing the tree work, they were getting a dose. 

It was small, but it was because of the increased, 

primarily, cesium-137 around the site, that these 

were considered radiation workers.

And if you notice on Number 77, when they -- this 

was dropped because, as he says, non-HP 

management was concerned about the impact to 

the workers being exposed internally, and disagreed 

with our programmatic approach. Then they go on 

to scrap it because no one told our workers they 

would get internal dose assigned when wearing a 

personal air sampler.
74

Assigned a dose. That's different than if you don't 

assign it, that doesn't mean you didn't get it, that 

doesn't mean that it's healthy. But that's what 

happened, as it was bad for morale. And if you look 

at the last page of that, Page 83, it says, continuing 

problem of management workers believing that if 

routine bioassays is negative, it means zero. This 

concern was essentially dropped. Beating up your 

bioassay program is not a good career path.

The point of that is that culture, it continues. The 

belief that it's better to not tell the workers that 

they're being exposed, it's better for them, it's 

better for morale, is just wrong. But it illustrates 

that if that's still a concern in modern times, and 

we've seen it back from the '50s on, quite frankly, 

that may explain why we don't have some of these 

records.

But, the other part of it is that there's been a, every 

meeting it seems there's a reference to the 

destruction of the records, or the gaps in the 

records.

And NIOSH has been pretty strong in there, or 

committed to defend that there's no evidence of the 

destruction despite even Congress recognizing that. 

And I guess to that, I would just note, it doesn't 

matter whether they were destroyed, it doesn't 

matter whether they're lost, it matters that they 

don't exist.

And if they existed, perhaps, you could find a dose 

with sufficient accuracy, and ensure claimantfavorability. But we don't have the records, we don't 

have enough records. And these attempts to 

redefine what is monitoring simply to get numbers 

so that you can plug it in to a formula, it still can't 

average out the inaccuracy of that. You cannot just 

create new data.

I think Mr. Taulbee referenced that in 092 that the 

effective monitoring is essentially a coworker model. 

Well, that's to get enough numbers to be able to 
75

plug into the next coworker model, they're trying to 

create a mini coworker model. And I've been 

through a number of these files where you have a 

number of people involved in an incident, and every 

one of them tests different.

It's rare that you're going to have two people, doing 

the exact same job, and they're going to have the 

same uptake. That's just, it's unlikely, and but, 

what we're doing here with this coworker, or the 

mini coworker model, is just assuming, well, we 

found somebody that was somewhere in that 

facility, doing a similar job. And therefore, we can 

consider anybody else around there effectively 

monitored, so we can expand the numbers and get 

the accuracy, somehow.

Again, I think that this is, yet another effort, and I 

commend NIOSH on their efforts, but they just, 

they don't have enough data to go by.

And for 15 years, these families have been receiving 

dose reconstructions that tell them that this is the 

dose that your loved one received, and then more 

information is discovered, then there's a rework, 

that dose reconstruction is vacated, and they do it 

all over again.

For 15 years NIOSH has been saying we've bound, 

we have bound the dose, we can bound the dose. 

And now, today, we find that we're going to scrap 

everything that was required in 092 because we 

didn't need it anyway. And we're just going to go by 

NOCTS and we can get there another way by 

bootstrapping.

I think this is just, yet another, round that 

demonstrates that the data is not complete and it's 

impossible to feasibly bound a dose with sufficient 

accuracy to assure claimant-favorability. And for 

that reason, I would submit that the SEC needs to 

be granted, and my colleague, Josh Fester, I think, 

has some additional comments.
76

Mr. Fester: I do. Thank you, Warren. In anticipation 

of Work Group meeting today, or the Board 

meeting, in a discussion with Warren and Dr. 

Ringen, we thought it was important to look back at 

the timing of the Board's work on this. And I was 

pleasantly surprised that the SC&A team was sort of 

thinking along the same lines, and essentially 

provided somewhat of a time line in their position 

statement, provided ahead of today's meeting.

And I know, we've discussed this every time, every 

opportunity we've had for public comment, but it 

can't be understated that this is, this is about real 

people. And time matters to these EEOICPA 

claimants.

We've had petitioners die, hell, I had two widows 

call me this morning before this meeting today 

about their potential claims. And that's typical, you 

know, that's a typical day for me, typical morning.

The original, authorized representative and 

attorney, who led the SRS SEC petition for years, 

Bob Warren died last year. To put this into further 

context, you know, I wasn't even out of high school 

when this petition was originally created, you know. 

And now I've been advocating for these claimants 

for going on six years as an attorney.

Warren Johnson, and I like to joke that he and 

myself have three, between the two of us, three 

children in kindergarten this year that their 

existence wasn't even considered when this Board 

began working on this issue of subcontractor dose 

issues in 2013.

And, you know, that's a rosy, lighthearted marker of 

time, that I prefer to think about most days, than 

the grim reality of, you know, the sheer number of 

workers dying, you know, every week, month, and 

year that the Advisory Board tarries in rendering a 

decision on this.
77

And, you know, 2013 that's when the Board, and 

this Work Group, became aware of the issue with 

subcontractor CTWs at the SRS. And that's when 

you all found out that the dose records were 

maintained separately, there was no verification of 

completeness, that's eight years.

In 2016, well -- in the last week I went back and 

reviewed the history of the petition. And in 2016, in 

discussion about what NIOSH was looking for on 

bioassay data compliance, or bioassay compliance.

Tim stated on Page, Dr. Taulbee stated on Page 21 

of the hearing transcript for September 26th, 2016 

meeting, quote, I'd consider success if we're greater 

than 75 percent, unquote. I'd expect 100 percent on 

that one, but -- or I don't expect 100 percent on 

that one, but I do think, I do anticipate that we will 

have a very reasonable success rate, unquote.

Today we're hearing about 50 percent, or a little 

over 50 percent, and that's based on incomplete 

data. On Page 27, and 28 of that transcript from 

2016, he provided that after seeing the data set 

from 773A, which was retrieved from the SRS 

EDWS system, that quote, so, there are job plans 

out at the site. Every area had job plans, how they 

controlled their work. We just felt that this was a 

very convenient group of records that we could 

evaluate to make some quick determinations on, 

unquote.

Quote, I can't see where it would be any different, 

from this area, versus other areas in this period of 

time, or at this time period. It was all controlled by 

DuPont and they did things pretty uniformly across 

the whole site, unquote.

Mr. Fitzgerald agreed, it was sort of acknowledged 

that DuPont did ride hard on the subcontractors, he 

said. And unfortunately, by no fault of anyone, and 

I'm going to, I'm probably going to say this several 

times because I feel that our attacks on the site's 

policies, policy implementation, monitoring, 
78

radiation controls, and records keeping are taken

personally when they shouldn't be.

By no fault of anyone here, that assumption was 

just unfounded, we don't have completeness of data 

for RWPs, and actual job-specific bioassay data on 

subs out at the site for the relative time period.

And by the November 2017 meeting, when it 

became more clear that getting this evidence and 

showing data completeness was going to be more 

difficult than expected, NIOSH began to divert 

everyone's attention from the glaring issue of 

subcontractor CTW bioassay compliance 

assessment, in the form of the 1998 notice of 

violation from DOE showing 21 percent compliance.

They began to divert attention from that by saying, 

well, you know, those guys are on a routine 

bioassay sample. Only about five percent were not. 

And we heard that again today, we heard that in 

2018 and 2019 as well.

You know, this 1998 violation since, is spoken about 

as if it's some sort of distraction from the bigger 

issue. But the job-specific bioassay data has been 

the issue from the outside, the outset, excuse me. 

And can't be understated as it goes to the even 

bigger issue whether employees were monitored for 

the specific source terms of concern.

And moreover, as my co-counsel, Mr. Johnson, just 

discussed at length, this is one of a number of 

issues, at the Site that we can point to, that 

illustrate this decades-long systemic issue with 

monitoring data that are, in part, cultural at the 

site.

This isn't some sort of one-off, and the Site 

shouldn't be given the benefit of the doubt 

concerning their monitoring practices of 

subcontractors, or any employees for that matter.

At the February 2018 meeting, Chairmen Clawson, 
79

in discussion with Mr. Taulbee, or Dr. Taulbee, 

about gathering RWPs and subcontractor CTW jobspecific bioassays, Mr. Clawson stated, quote, this is 

our last-ditch effort to try and be able to take care 

of this. And I want to make sure, if we decide on a 

path forward, that it is going to accomplish, and it is 

going to do what we need me to do.

Quote, I don't just want a knee-jerk reaction, spend 

another year out there gathering stuff, and not get 

what we really need. And Tim's response was, I 

totally understand, would it be okay with you, at 

this time, if we pursued getting more information 

about those 852 boxes?

You know, as we know by now, you know, that 

didn't give us the data that we needed. And by the 

December 29th meeting, even NIOSH can't deny 

that data is missing. RWPs were destroyed, 

subcontractor data is missing, misplaced, or has 

been destroyed, and there's a general 

acknowledgment of subcontractor CTW records 

destruction.

And whether at this point, as Mr. Johnson pointed 

out, they were destroyed, missing, misplaced, it 

doesn't matter. That's not NIOSH's fault, but we 

just don't have the data to verify completeness.

And this, essentially, is admitted by everyone at the 

November 2020 meeting, but I'd like to point out 

that in December 2019, in response to comments 

from Warren Johnson, Ted Katz reassured everyone, 

quote, we're not on an endless road anymore, 

unquote.

Folks, that was over a year ago, that was December 

of '19, we're in the second quarter of 2021. You 

know, we're now -- NIOSH is now asking for that 

second last ditch to run some new numbers, 

essentially make up, fathom new data out of thin 

air, out of averages, through bootstrapping.

And, you know, for reasons previously outlined by 
80

SC&A, and by others, it's just simply not feasible. 

The only appropriate remedy here then is, which 

should've been, frankly, granted at least four years 

ago, is an SEC.

And so, we would -- that, that would be our request 

that, you know, this SEC be granted. It's long 

overdue. As Dr. Ringen pointed out yesterday in his 

comments, you know, anything you'll do is, won't 

be sufficient because it's taken this long.

But that's our position on this, and I'll leave it to 

you all or any other folks for public comment.

Dr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Johnson and Mr. 

Fester. And I assume that that concludes your 

presentation?

Mr. Fester: That does.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. I would like to open it up for 

questions, or comments from the Board.

Member Clawson: We have none, I have --

Member Schofield: Rashaun, this is Phil. I'd like to 

make some comments.

Dr. Roberts: I'm sorry, who's speaking?

Member Clawson: Phil.

Member Schofield: Phillip Schofield.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Hi, hi, Phil.

Member Schofield: You know, I've got a lot of 

experience dealing with, what we refer to, as hot 

jobs. And a lot of these things were covered by 

RWPs, but a lot of hot jobs, quite often, are not.

There's something that needs to get done and 

needs to get done right now, or it's outside of the 

RWP because it's not something they anticipated.

And when you're talking about 21 percent, you get 
81

into any abnormal, which is what you would expect 

from an RWP, you're not doing normal routine 

things. Whether you bust the window, whether you 

puncture a glove, whether you have a valve leak, it 

doesn't matter.

Two guys, working side by side, one can get all 

crapped up, and the other one doesn't. The other 

thing is, you can say, well, they had on face masks, 

but if you bump your face mask at the wrong time, 

you can get an intake.

And if you don't leave a sample, and particularly, 

since the rotation of these small contractors was 

horrendous. They just come and go, you know, 

some of these people you listen to them and they 

worked for four or five different contractors in the 

short time they were there.

It is more than possible, and I would say it is more 

than likely, some of those people got doses 

internally that were never documented or found.

Yeah, you can get a higher dose on a lot of these 

jobs, but any time you're doing anything that's 

abnormal, the risk of internal exposure goes up, and 

it doesn't take much if that plutonium, that 

americium, or whatever it is gets into your lungs, or 

gets in your blood stream, now you've got a real 

serious problem.

And, you know, I mean, these are not routine 

things. And so, that risk, if you do not have good 

records, if everybody did not leave a sample, that 

doesn't mean the one who left the sample got the 

same dose as the guys who did not leave the 

sample.

And a lot of those guys have said that, you know 

what, once we got done all we wanted to do get 

changed and get out there and go home. And I 

would challenge anybody that's done very many hot 

jobs to show me where that does not happen. And 

that's my two cents.
82

Dr. Roberts: Thank you, Phil.

Member Valerio: Rashaun, this is Loretta. I have a 

question for Joe Fitzgerald.

Dr. Roberts: Go right ahead, Loretta.

Member Valerio: So, and I couldn't find it, and 

maybe I didn't look in the right place, but I was 

trying to find the Tiger Team findings on Savannah 

River Site. So, I believe Joe said earlier that DuPont, 

the Tiger Team findings, indicated that DuPont was 

not managing the bioassay program.

I was just wondering, if in those findings, they 

indicated how far back that was an issue? I'm 

assuming it went back to the beginning of time, but 

again, I couldn't find the Tiger Team reports. I just 

wanted clarification on that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, the Tiger Team results are in a 

2000, I think it was in 2000, or maybe it was 1999 

report. And actually, the actual citations, the 

findings on the monitoring is in our Review of 

Report 92, which you have a copy of.

If you want to take a look through there, you can 

actually see those findings, but DOE did take some 

time to evaluate the programs, and this is a year 

after DuPont left, so these are essentially still 

DuPont-era programs. Westinghouse did not have a 

chance to change them.

But certainly, they did identify the lack of 

accountability in collecting bioassays from workers 

as a key finding in that review. And corrective 

actions were to have been taken, but apparently 

were not successful, and this was a similar issue to 

what was picked up later.

Member Valerio: Okay, thank you, Joe. And I did 

read the report, but I didn't make a note of it for 

some reason. So, the monitoring that they did 

identify was more for routine workers or did that 

include, I'm assuming that it also included the job-
83

specific monitoring issues, is that correct?

Mr. Fitzgerald: It was, yeah, it was both. It was a 

general finding on ensuring that workers submitted 

bioassay samples, and the fact that when workers 

did not, management did not hold them accountable 

and eventually just allowed those samples not to be 

collected.

So, again, it's a pretty significant finding. The other 

major finding that we highlight, excuse me, the 

other major finding that we highlighted was the lack 

of facility characterization for what source terms 

you would identify in an RWP.

If, in fact, there was a -- when you developed an 

RWP, you would need to know what nuclides to 

monitor for. And that was a finding by the Tiger 

Team that there was not a, essentially, a systematic 

system in place that would identify those source 

terms. So, that was another finding by the Tiger 

Team.

Member Valerio: Okay, thank you, Joe. And I have 

one more quick question, and this one is for Tim 

Taulbee.

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, ma'am?

Member Valerio: So, I believe you said earlier that 

the work permits identified radionuclides that were 

potentially of concern during the project, or the job, 

or whatever. Do you know, in NOCTS, were there 

any notations, maybe in the CATI reports, that the 

workers encountered radionuclides that were not 

listed on the work permits?

Dr. Taulbee: We did not look from that level of 

detail within the NOCTS dataset, basically what 

you're asking there. Savannah River has a base set 

of radionuclides, and that's the nine co-exposure 

models that we have in OTIB-81.

And so, we looked across those particular radio --

that particular monitoring set in a global, large, a 
84

more coarse scale, than what you're talking about. 

So, I guess the answer would be, no, we did not 

look at it from that standpoint to see if there's 

anything in the CATIs that was not covered on the 

RWPs.

In general, the different areas that we were 

sampling from, you get plutonium in the plutonium 

area, americium in some of the A areas, and, you 

know, uranium in M area, and so, it was really more 

separated by the process areas and the known 

radionuclides in those areas. Does that help?

Member Valerio: Yes, it does. Thank you.

Member Ziemer: Rashaun, I'd like to make a 

comment too.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, sure.

Member Ziemer: Am I good to go?

Dr. Roberts: Yes. I was just going to state that --

Member Ziemer: Okay, just a couple comments. I 

should probably preface this by saying that I fully 

support the report of the Tiger Teams, and, as well 

as the earlier reports from DOE that led to some of 

those finds in the late '80s.

We should also keep in mind that the -- all of those 

things dealt with the adequacy of protecting the 

personnel at the time. That is, the Health Physics 

Radiation Safety Programs were inadequate. That, 

in itself, does not inherently mean that you can't do 

dose reconstruction.

It may indicate something about the inadequacy of 

the dataset, but one the reasons we're dealing with 

coworker models is the very fact that we lack some 

of this information; in some cases, a lot of it.

So, the question, I hope we're not simply influenced 

by the fact that there were legal issues and fines, 

but ask ourselves are the data -- the data that is 
85

available, is it adequate -- sorry, my clock is 

chiming in the background, maybe that means to 

quit talking, but -- okay it has stopped.

In any event, we have this in many cases whether 

or not there were legal issues and so on, we always 

have the fact, particularly, going back where we 

don't have as much data as we would like, the 

adequacy of the data, in part, is the question of 

whether or not we can, correctly, do a coworker 

model?

And I hope everyone is clear, including the 

petitioners, that a coworker model doesn't mean 

we're matching one person against one other 

person. The coworker model is taking data from 

many, many workers, and trying to find the upper 

bound of the data that we would assign.

Typically, it is way more -- I say typically, there 

could be a very occasional exception -- typically, it 

is a bounding data much, much higher than the 

assigned data that an individual worker would 

typically get from their own data.

Particularly when we select the upper 95 percent of 

the distribution for assigning it. So, keep those two 

things in mind as you think about whether or not, 

particularly though the '80s, or late '70s and '80s, 

whether there is sufficient and adequate data for 

dose reconstruction.

Member Lockey: And Paul, to follow up with -- Jim 

Lockey. I didn't see any data that -- any objective 

data -- that indicates that that is not true.

In other words, I kept looking at areas that, is there 

something, something that's falling out of this, 

there's something that doesn't make sense. Is there 

data that we have that is, doesn't match all the 

other databases we have in this particular co-work 

to indicate that we are missing something, that's 

not covered by the 95 percent confidence levels. 

And I haven't seen that, and I don't know if that 
86

exists, and I haven't seen it, but haven't seen it.

Member Clawson: Well, and I --

Member Ziemer: And I'll make one other comment 

on that. I hope it's clear that NIOSH is not making 

up numbers out of thin air. There is a methodology 

that is intended, certainly, to be claimant favorable. 

One could argue -- and Tim, you're not restricted to 

the NOCTS data in terms of establishing a coworker 

model certainly?

Member Lockey: No, no.

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct, we are not. And, in 

fact, thank you for bringing that up. We use the 

NOCTS data because it is easier to use and 

convenient, but we have all of the data physically, 

all, from all of the log books, it has not been coded. 

We've only used the NOCTS data for the plutonium 

and for the tritium.

And for the tritium models -- and keep in mind 

there's 140,000 data points that we have. So, you 

know, we could get more, we can go to the log 

books and get more, but we don't think that it's 

necessary.

Member Clawson: Well, and that all being said, and 

I know, Lockey, your mindset there, you're looking 

for red flags up there and stuff. I guess the 70-

about-9 percent incomplete gives a pause for 

coworkers.

I think that data may assume that, you know, that's 

kind of a bad thing. But if data is missing, how can 

we possibly know what exposures are out there? We 

don't, and that's the issue. We're having to draw a 

lot of lines, and everything else like that, but you 

know what this comes down to, is we've got on our 

plate here to be able to, to vote --

Member Lockey: I'm -- Brad --

Member Clawson: What.
87

Member Lockey: Brad, what I'm looking for is at 

least some circumstantial, objective, evidence that 

what NIOSH is proposing is not true. So, I went 

back and looked at the Westinghouse citation. And 

he came back level two, I'm not sure what level two 

means, you probably know better than I do.

But I looked at that citation, and if Westinghouse 

went back and looked at those 256 people, and five 

of those people, or 10 of those people had internal 

dosimetries that were significant, that would be the 

end of the story for me. But none of them did, Brad. 

None of them did.

And then they went back, they were going go back 

another year, but they said based on where these 

people worked, and our 100 milligram cut off, none 

of them worked at a job task where they had that.

And so, I'm not saying that, says that's the way it 

was back in years previously that, but the way I 

approach this database is, is there something wrong 

with the database that indicates it may not be true. 

And I just don't have that data, Brad. I know there's 

data missing, I know that, I understand that. But I 

don't have any indication that the database as 

presented is not true, I wish I did.

Member Clawson: What about the '70s and 80's?

Member Lockey: I didn't like the '70s, okay.

Member Clawson: Hallelujah.

Member Lockey: I told you that.

Member Clawson: I realize that this is all 

circumstantial, this is what the issue is.

If we had all the information, we wouldn't be here. 

If we had all this.

Member Lockey: The data from '73 up through '78, 

'79, to me, is, there's not enough data points to 

make any opinion about that data, and I wouldn't 
88

rely on that data, I really wouldn't.

Member Clawson: Well, I'm telling you what I feel, 

and that's that, we're being asked to infer, or 

deduce completeness. And I don't think that we are. 

With that being said, like I said before, everybody's 

got their own vote, everybody can go the way that 

they want.

The thing is, is we've got to get this taken care of, 

because if it doesn't go the way, that's fine, but we 

can all vote.

Member Lockey: I'm with you, Brad. We got to take 

care of it, not let it go on after today.

Member Clawson: Okay.

Member Lockey: I mean, I don't want any more 

delays here because I think, from my perspective, 

the issue for the Board is how good is this data? I 

think the data is pretty good from '80 on, I don't 

like the data in the mid '70s because I think it's 

deficient.

But I think the data is good from the '80s on, and I 

haven't seen anything that SC&A has presented that 

is objective data that indicates it's not valid, and 

that's my problem.

Member Beach: Jim, could I ask you a question? 

You said the '80s, give me a time frame in the '80s 

you're thinking of.

Member Lockey: '73, '74, '75 --

Member Beach: No, no, no, I know that's where you 

don't agree, but when do you think the data got 

good in the '80s?

Member Lockey: I think 1980. I looked at the data -

-

Member Beach: Oh, 1980. Okay.

Member Lockey: Yes, that's what I'm thinking 
89

about. I mean, I like, the data before that to me is, 

you know, the numbers are small, and the data we 

have from the job tests are small. There's just not a 

lot of data that I would feel comfortable in.

I would never put that in a database and do any 

statistical analysis because the numbers are too 

small. The more recent data, like the tritium data, 

that's a huge database, and I was surprised that 

their exposures were less than the prime 

contractors.

I was thinking that they were going to be higher, 

and that would answer my question, but they were 

lower. Now there might be a reason for that, but if 

they were higher, I would just assume that was the 

subcontractors and contractors are different groups, 

and the prime contractors do not represent what the 

contractors were doing, they were lower.

Member Anderson: But the tritium is only in certain 

areas, I mean, you don't know about the workers in 

the other areas. That's, I mean if you look at the 

tritium data, they can see that over the years it's 

really come down --

Member Lockey: Let me ask you a question.

Member Anderson: -- which some say was higher in 

the past.

Member Lockey: Let me ask you a question. If it 

were to come out to reverse, would you be saying 

the same thing? No, you would have been saying 

that proves that the subcontractors were different 

than the contractors.

Member Anderson: Well, no I mean the idea is it 

adequate for the subcontractors, for all of the jobs 

they did? Not just the jobs they did in certain, you 

know, Building A. My issue is you got Building A and 

yes that's the plutonium areas and that addresses 

the plutonium things, but not the other, and so it's 

a complete -- I go back to the completeness issue, 
90

is how complete is the data? And when do you think 

the data is complete for dose --

Member Lockey: I go to the consistency of the data, 

and all the data is consistent. Hundreds and 

hundreds of data points are consistent across the 

years. If I would have seen any inconsistency, 

Andy, any, if I would have seen Westinghouse go 

back and look at those 258 people and say, 10 

percent of them have doses that weren't recorded 

that are significant, that's the end of the story for 

me.

If I would have seen the tritium much higher than 

the prime contractors, that would have been the 

story. But that's not the case. Those results are 

consistent with everything else.

Member Anderson: Yes, I mean 1997 is, that's 

beyond our area of consideration. That's where it 

was all good. I mean they had done what they 

could, and a lot of improvements, and the 

measurements in following back on those people 

how does that talk about those where the tritium 

levels were higher?

Member Lockey: But all the data is consistent, 

Andy. It's not inconsistent. It's consistent. I know 

there's reasons for each little data point, you could 

grow problems with it. But they had the NOCTS 

data in a population that is at risk or is being seen 

because they have cancer, as reflective of a higher 

exposure level. You know, that's a very powerful 

population to look at.

Member Clawson: Well, that being said, Rashaun. I 

don't know how you want to do this, but I've got a, 

Knut Ringen was no longer able to keep with us and 

you made a comment earlier. Rashaun, do you want 

me to just read what Knut wanted read into the 

record?

Dr. Roberts: Yes, but -- can I just check in with 

other folks? I know David Richardson has had his 
91

hand up for a little bit.

Member Ziemer: Yes, is Knut's a public comment 

thing? Because we don't have public comments 

today.

Member Clawson: Well, we just -- he's part of the 

petitioners. So, I kind of think that's pretty good.

Member Ziemer: Oh, he, okay. I'm sorry, I forgot 

he was part of the petitioners.

Member Clawson: So go ahead, Rashaun.

Dr. Roberts: I'm sorry, I missed the question about 

the petitioner.

Member Clawson: He's been part of the petitioners 

for the last several years. I just wanted to make 

sure this got read into the record. He was -- had to 

go to another meeting and sent this.

Dr. Roberts: Okay.

Member Lockey: Rashaun, Jim Lockey, I have to 

step away for five minutes, okay? I'm sorry. Just 

continue.

Dr. Roberts: I'm sorry, I can't tell who's speaking? 

Was that Jim Lockey, Jim?

Member Lockey: Yes, I got to take this phone call, 

I'll be away for five minutes, but then --

Dr. Roberts: Oh, I see. Okay, but yes I did want us 

to just circle back around really quickly, because I 

know Dave R. had his hand up for a little bit, and 

just see if there are any remaining questions or 

comments, before we move on.

Okay. So one question I have is, do the people just 

feel like this has been discussed fairly well at this 

point? Do people feel like they have, you know, the 

answer to any questions they may, that might be 

lingering?
92

Member Beach: Yes, I feel like I have everything I 

need after today.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Now, Brad, since you, I'm sorry 

things were cutting in and out. So, you said you had 

something you wanted to read into the record?

Member Clawson: Well, Rashaun I sent it to you on

your phone. It was just a comment, it was a 

comment that sent by Knut Ringen. He's been 

involved with this from the very beginning for the 

petitioners. And I just wanted to read this in, 

because I told him that I would.

Dr. Roberts: Okay.

Member Clawson: Brad, I would like to be able to --

I will not be able to participate any longer. In 

response to Lockey's comment about cancer and 

dose response, we have published several peer 

review reports showing that construction trade 

workers in DOE facilities have sufficient, higher of 

cancer associated with rad. Exposure to production -

- exposures that production workers suggest 

indicates higher exposure.

The EEOICPA claims data that Tim indicates are not 

representative of everything. They have been as 

many -- there have been as many construction 

trade workers in DOE facilities as production 

workers. But they represent only 20 percent of all 

the claimants.

And I sent this to your phone, Rashaun, because I 

didn't know how you wanted to be able to do it. But 

everything being said, I would like to just remind 

everybody what the proposed Class is. And I'd like 

to be able to get this to a vote. So, my question is, 

is I'd like to be able to post up here, Bob, if you 

could post up what the Class Definition is.

This is the proposed Class Definition that we had 

have had. This is the same thing that we proposed 
93

to you earlier. I think that -- and like I say, 

everybody has their own vote, everybody has their 

own feelings on this. I just want to bring this before 

the Board, I want to be able put this up there, and I 

move that we vote on this Class Definition for an 

SEC.

And I think I've already had a second. I don't know, 

Paul. Do I have to completely redo it again or what?

Member Ziemer: No, I think the motion has been 

before us since we started the session. And what 

we've had is a discussion, which one could interpret 

as in support of or not in support of the motion.

So, I think we're fine.

Member Anderson: We can call --

Member Ziemer: I think --

Member Anderson: Call the question.

Member Ziemer: I think Rashaun has to chair it 

though, I don't think the Chairman of the Work 

Group can chair his own recommendation.

Member Clawson: There you go, sounds good.

Member Anderson: But we can call the question, 

Paul.

Member Ziemer: Oh, yes.

Member Beach: This is -- Rashaun, this is Josie. I 

would suggest that you maybe read the proposed 

Class for those on the line that can't see that.

Dr. Roberts: Yes.

Member Beach: It wasn't real clear earlier. Thank 

you.

Member Ziemer: Good point.

Dr. Roberts: The other thing though is that I did get 
94

a couple of notices of folks needing to step away. 

So, I think Jim, may still be on his call. And then 

David Richardson sent something saying that he 

needed to step out.

So --

Member Lockey: Jim Lockey, I'm back.

Dr. Roberts: Oh, you're back, okay. And David, are 

you back yet?

Member Kotelchuck: If people have to step away, 

then I think it's more important to get the vote 

while everybody is here. And you might just ask 

people on the phone, if they need the Class 

Definition read again. If they do, you'll read it of 

course. But they may not need it.

Member Ziemer: While this is up, do we know if --

has counsel looked at this also for applicability -- or 

not -- whether it can be carried out by labor?

Member Clawson: That doesn't even play in until 

after the vote.

Member Ziemer: Okay, thanks.

Member Clawson: And we've -- we've dealt with 

construction workers like this. This is boilerplate to 

it.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Member Clawson: That we have dealt with at 

Hanford and every other place.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Ms. Naylor: Okay, just a point of clarification. For 

those two examples that you -- well, for Fernald and 

Hanford, we did check with DOL ahead of time, 

before the Class Definition was voted on.

And that actually took place behind the scenes 

between Ted Katz and Dr. Melius. And so it's that 
95

those were -- have been done previously before the 

Board actually voted on them.

But I think this Class Definition, we haven't 

presented that to DOL, and I do have certain 

concerns about the wording here, because this 

actually is not boilerplate. We've never done 

excluding employees of the following prime 

contractor language, previously.

So, I am a bit concerned about this. I think --

Member Clawson: Hanford. Hanford, this is the 

exact same thing.

Ms. Naylor: So, I think what we could do is, if the 

Board would vote with the understanding that the 

wording of the proposed Class Definition may 

change, and perhaps a second vote would need --

have to take place.

Member Beach: Jenny, this is Josie and I would just 

like to step in and say a couple things. First of all, 

this Class Definition was posted several meetings 

ago, so there was ample time. But with that said, 

understanding that our Board is under a different 

circumstances without having a Chair, I can see why 

that may have gotten missed.

So, I feel it is okay to move forward without 

changing -- with changing the wording potentially, 

but not changing the actual definition of the class. 

So, I feel like it would be fine to move forward, 

unless I'm missing something.

Dr. Roberts: But I would say that the caveat is that 

when this does go to DOL to see if it's able to be 

administered, you know, we may need to come 

back around and do some work on it.

Member Clawson: And that's fine. If there's a big 

issue like that then we've always -- we've always 

dealt with that.

Member Ziemer: And I think the intent of the 
96

motion is fairly clear even if we have to massage it 

a little bit to make it work.

Member Beach: Right.

Member Clawson: As we have in the past.

Dr. Roberts: And just to clarify my understanding of 

this is that it was kind of a strawman and kind of a 

work in progress. So that may have been a 

misunderstanding on my part. But at any rate, 

we're where we are and we can just -- we can 

forward.

Member Ziemer: Right.

Member Clawson: Okay.

Dr. Roberts: So the question is are there folks who 

would like me to read this?

Member Clawson: Why don't you -- Rashaun, why 

don't you just read it just for everybody? Just so we 

don't miss anything.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, let me see if I can -- it's really 

small on my screen. I'm going to have to adjust 

something, if you'll just give me a minute.

Okay, so the proposed Class Definition is, "All 

construction trade employees of Department of 

Energy subcontractor -- that's subcontractors, and 

there's a parenthesis -- excluding employees of the 

following prime contractors who worked at the 

Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina during 

the specified time periods, E.I. du Pont de Nemours 

and Company, October 1st, 1972 through March 

31st, 1989; and Westinghouse Savannah River 

Company, April 1, 1989 through December 31st, 

1990, who worked at the Savannah River Site from 

October 1st, 1972 through December 31st, 1990 for 

a number of work days aggregating at least 250 

work days, occurring either solely under this 
97

employment, or in combination with work days 

within the parameters established for one or more 

other classes of employees included in the Special 

Exposure Cohort."

So, any discussion of this proposed Class Definition? 

Ms. Naylor: Rashaun, this is Jenny. Just a point of 

clarification. So, the sentence -- or the first two 

lines here, it specifically talks about subcontractors, 

but it is excluding employees --

Member Beach: Jenny, just -- Jenny, just a second. 

Rashaun, can you mute, because she's -- thank 

you.

Okay, go ahead Jenny, sorry.

Ms. Naylor: Okay. So, just a point of clarification I 

want to make sure that it's intentional. For instance, 

the first two sentences say all construction trade 

employees of DOE subcontractors. But then the 

parentheses is actually excluding employees of the 

prime contractors, which is a very different 

approach from the Hanford definition -- bio Class 

Definition out of Petition 226.

So, I just want to make sure that we are setting this 

up as a subcontractor Class, but then we are 

specifically excluding employees from the prime 

contractor, even --

Member Clawson: That's true.

Ms. Naylor: -- the actual definition there does not 

include contracting, only subcontracting, does that 

make sense?

Member Clawson: That is correct, because we only 

have a petition from the subcontractors.

Ms. Naylor: And so excluding employees from the 

prime contractors, is the Board's intent to 

specifically exclude them even though they're not 

included in the petition to begin with?
98

Member Clawson: Just like what it was in Hanford, 

was construction trades.

Ms. Naylor: Okay, to --

Member Clawson: We were going to all the 

construction's subcontractors and we called out --

Ms. Naylor: Okay, to be sure --

Member Clawson: -- Rust and everybody else.

Ms. Naylor: Okay, to be sure the Hanford Class 

Definition includes contractors and subcontractors, 

and then you go on to exclude certain employees of 

the prime contractor. But here I just want to make 

sure that not only that this Class is specifically for 

subcontractors, but we're also intentionally 

excluding employees from the prime contractors. So 

if this is the specific intent, that this is not a mistake 

or not a word just missing, then --

Member Clawson: This is not. We are excluding the 

prime.

Ms. Naylor: Okay. Thank you for that clarification.

Member Clawson: Okay.

Dr. Roberts: Any other comments or discussion 

about this? And does everyone on the Board, you 

know, do you grasp this definition?

Member Roessler: Are we open to discuss the 

motion or are we going to discuss the next step?

Dr. Roberts: Yes, this is the discussion piece.

Member Roessler: Okay. I would like to make a 

comment -- a couple comments. I just wanted to 

indicate ahead of time that I'm going to vote 

against the motion. I'm convinced that NIOSH can 

do dose reconstruction. Particularly on the 

information today.

I thought the summary of their procedures and the 
99

clarification of their database was well done. It 

addressed some questions I had. And I especially 

was convinced by their specific response to all of the 

SC&A areas of concern.

Also I think supporting my decision has come based 

on comments from other Work Group and Board 

Members. I do want to add though if the vote on 

this is not unanimous, whichever way it goes, I 

hope that kind of information does go to the 

Secretary. Because we really don't -- don't seem to 

be very unified on this one way or the other. And 

also I think the Secretary should know that NIOSH 

feels they can do dose reconstruction.

And I'll make one other comment that has sort of 

bothered me throughout this whole SRS area of 

discussion, and that's the one paragraph in the 

letter that usually goes to the Secretary. It says --

let's see if I can -- yes, it does say -- typically say, 

the Board determined that health may have been in 

danger for these -- and in this case, we'd say SRS 

workers.

And my conscience kind of bothers me a little bit if -

- to be a part of the signature on a statement like 

this. In this particular case, the doses are so low 

that I really have a hard time myself saying that I 

think that at those doses their health may have 

been endangered. And that's the end of my 

comments.

Member Ziemer: If I could respond, just on that last 

part, Gen. I think the legal requirement if an SEC is 

supported by the Board, the legal requirement is 

you have to have a finding that health is 

endangered. Otherwise, you can't recommend an 

SEC.

So if one is voting for this, you also have -- I mean, 

Tim you can -- or maybe Grady can clarify that, but 

I think there is a requirement that you would have 

to -- the Board would have to say that health is 

endangered if they make such a recommendation.
100

Member Roessler: If I were to vote against it, then I 

don't have to be bothered by my concern about that 

comment? Is that what you're saying?

`Member Ziemer: Well, I'm just saying, I believe 

there's a legal requirement. Maybe either Tim or 

Grady can clarify that.

Ms. Naylor: This is Jenny again --

Member Ziemer: You can't call for an SEC and say 

that unless you say that health is endangered.

Dr. Taulbee: Jenny, you were going to say 

something?

Ms. Naylor: Yes, so Dr. Ziemer is correct that under 

EEOICPA statute that the Secretary had to find that, 

"it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient 

accuracy the radiation dose that the worker has 

received," so basically we have to identify what that 

dose is that cannot be reconstructed.

And it goes on to say that, "there is a reasonable 

likelihood that such radiation dose may have 

endangered the health of members of the Class." So 

it's the dose that you cannot reconstruct, it's also 

the dose that can cause -- that may have 

endangered the health of a member of the Class.

And in the SEC regulations we have defined that 

health endangerment is to mean exposure to under 

50 days. And so then you see that part of the Class 

Definitions talks about the number of work day 

aggregating to at least 250 work days.

Does that explain that?

Member Roessler: Jenny, I'm sorry, I guess it's my 

hearing problem. But I didn't really hear what you 

said. But when I looked at this again I think maybe 

I can justify my conscience on this because the 

statement does say that health may have been in 

danger. Maybe that word is enough in there that I 

could live with it, if it goes through like this.
101

Ms. Naylor: Yes, and lastly, just also that when 

you're voting against this Class Definition, you're 

also voting against the proposition that this dose is 

high enough that in the aggregate of 250 work day 

is necessary to harm the workers.

And so I think your one vote against the Class 

Definition including those two parts -- you know, 

the identification of the Class of workers plus the 

250 work days -- would sort of I think state your 

objection on the record.

Member Lockey: So this is Jim Lockey, I didn't 

understand that. Does that mean if you don't think 

the dose was a level that represents a health 

endangerment, what does that mean?

Member Ziemer: Jim, I think it means, essentially if 

you say you can't reconstruct the dose, in essence 

you're saying, we don't know what the doses were. 

But if they occurred from -- and this becomes a 

very arbitrary part of the law I think, but it is what 

it is.

It's a part of where science intersects with public 

policy, and the policy is that if the exposure 

occurred for at least 250 days, whatever it is, then 

you pass some kind of imaginary threshold where 

endangerment may have occurred.

Member Lockey: Well, that --

Member Ziemer: That's about as arbitrary as you 

can get. But that's the law I think.

Ms. Naylor: Yes, so the reason --

Member Anderson: Aren't there a lot of -- there are 

thousands of cases in the NOCTS database. Have 

any of them been awarded?

Member Lockey: Yes, 300 -- 3,100 are in the --

Member Ziemer: Well something like $1.6 billion to 

the site.
102

Member Anderson: Yes --

Member Ziemer: Now, that's not all -- that's not all 

construction workers.

Member Anderson: No, but I mean in the -- there's 

construction workers in the database --

Member Ziemer: Sure.

Member Anderson: -- that have been compensated.

Member Ziemer: Sure.

Member Anderson: So that would be -- I would 

assume that's an endangerment.

Member Ziemer: Exactly.

Member Anderson: So, I mean it's kind of a moot 

point that they have had dose reconstructions done 

on them. And they were awarded.

Member Ziemer: Right.

Member Roessler: So Henry, I think what you're 

saying in this particular situation, that comment is 

true. And I can go with that.

Member Anderson: Yes.

Member Ziemer: That is true.

Member Clawson: Okay, Rashaun, it's yours.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. I also wanted to check in -- and 

Brad I don't know if you have this on another slide 

or anything. But just to get a very clear articulation 

of the technical basis. I know that we've talked 

about a lot, I just want to --

Member Clawson: You mean the feasibility 

statement? Is that what you're looking for?

Dr. Roberts: The basis for the proposed Class, 

adding the proposed Class.
103

Member Clawson: Yes, we've got a feasibility 

statement. And we've also got a Class Definition 

implementation too.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. So is everybody clear on the 

technical basis, do we need to read that?

Member Clawson: There you go.

Ms. Naylor: Brad, would you mind reading that into 

the record?

Member Clawson: What's that?

Ms. Naylor: Would you mind reading that --

Member Clawson: I'll have Rashaun read it in, thank 

you, Jenny.

Dr. Roberts: Yes, I'm trying to increase my screen 

again, sorry. It's going to take me a minute so I can 

do that.

Member Anderson: While you're looking at that, I 

would just point out that that's way more extensive 

than we've ever provided the Secretary in the past, 

if this is approved.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes.

Member Anderson: We usually have two or three 

brief bullets.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes.

Member Anderson: I would be hopeful if the --

Member Clawson: Well, we want to really --

Member Anderson: If the petition passes, I would be 

hopeful that we could condense this considerably.

Member Clawson: Well, you knew we don't have to 

worry about this until after the vote, but --

Member Anderson: Oh, I understand. I understand.
104

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Clawson: For some reason the scientific --

Member Anderson: I was just saying --

Member Clawson: Right.

Member Anderson: I said if it passes, then we can 

worry --

Member Clawson: Right.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. I think I've got it to where I can 

try to read this. Okay. So the -- okay, feasibility 

statement for ABRWH consideration for this 

meeting.

Feasibility of dose reconstruction findings. "This 

current evaluation of Petition SEC-00103 proposes a

Class that begins on October 1st, 1972 and extends 

through December 31st, 1990.

The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 

finds there to be insufficient information, including 

job-specific radiobioassay monitoring data for 

subcontractor construction trade workers, and 

workplace monitoring and source-term data to allow 

it to estimate with sufficient accuracy the potential 

internal doses from radionuclides associated with 

fuel handling, reactor operations, fuel reprocessing 

or research activities to which the proposed Class 

may have been exposed during the period from 

October 1st, 1972 through December 31st, 1990.

NIOSH finds that it is likely feasible to reconstruct 

occupational external dose as well as medical dose 

for Savannah River Site subcontractors with 

sufficient accuracy.

The ABRWH Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Findings 

are based on the following points."

First bullet, "Subcontractor construction trade 

workers conducted a broad range of work activities 
105

supporting research, fuel handling, transuranic 

material processing and separation, 

decontamination and decommissioning, and reactor 

outages including work in high contamination and 

high airborne radioactivity areas."

Next point, "Principal sources of internal radiation 

exposure for members of the proposed Class 

included radionuclides such as isotopes of uranium, 

thorium and plutonium, neptunium-237, americium241, tritium, and mixed fission and activation 

products."

Next bullet, "Subcontractor construction trade 

workers were sometimes considered transient in 

that they may not have worked for long periods at 

SRS, may have been intermittently tasked with nonroutine radiological jobs under work permits and 

thus were not likely enrolled in the routine, 

including termination bioassay monitoring program, 

and should have been monitored."

Next point, "Contemporary interviews with 

subcontractor construction trade workers including 

Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews indicate 

that some contractor construction trades workers 

may have been utilized for short-term high 

exposure work tasks to save on the potential 

radiological exposures to in-house prime contractor 

personnel."

Next point, "Deficiencies in the conduct of permitdriven job-specific monitoring were noted by SRS 

and DOE as late as 1997, for example 79 percent 

bioassay incompleteness."

Next point, "The ABRWH has determined that 

insufficient information exists to establish the 

completeness and representation of job-specific 

bioassays, for at least the time period from 1972 to 

1990. The Board recommends a cutoff of the Class 

Definition for December 31st, 1990 in recognition of 

the lack of specific internal exposure information 

concerning the conduct of job-specific monitoring 
106

that persisted until at least the end of that year."

I'm going to have to pause right there because I 

can't see the rest of this. Okay, let's see, and the 

last bullet.

"The ABRWH finds that the completeness and 

representation of subcontractors who were or 

should have been monitored via the permit-driven 

job-specific monitoring program has not been 

sufficiently established. Therefore dose 

reconstruction for unmonitored subcontractor 

construction trade workers who should have been 

monitored via the permit-driven job-specific 

monitoring program are not feasible using current 

co-exposure models developed by NIOSH."

So that was a mouthful. Okay.

Member Beach: There's another page.

(Laughter.)

Member Beach: Yeah, I think there's a second page 

there.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, I can see it, sorry. Okay, alright, 

so three paragraphs on that page, right? Am I 

cutting anything off?

Member Beach: Nope, that's three on the last page.

Dr. Roberts: Okay so this is the last bullet.

NIOSH has determined that available external 

monitoring data may be used in accordance with 

existing procedures on a case-by-case basis for the 

purpose of partial dose reconstructions.

NIOSH has also determined that adequate 

reconstruction of medical dose is likely to be 

feasible by using claimant-favorable assumptions in 

the technical information bulletin, Dose 

Reconstruction from Occupational Medical X-ray 

Procedures.
107

ORAU-OTIB-0006 and the SRS site Profile 

documents pursuant to 42 CFR 83.3(c)(1), the 

ABRWH determined that there is insufficient 

information to either, number one, estimate the 

maximum radiation dose for every type of cancer 

for which radiation doses are reconstructed that 

could have been incurred under plausible 

circumstances by any member of the Class. Or two, 

estimate the radiation doses of members of the 

Class more precisely than a maximum dose 

estimate.

All though the ABRWH found that it is not possible 

to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed Class, NIOSH intends to use any internal 

and external monitoring data that may become 

available for an individual claim, and that can be 

interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures. Therefore 

dose reconstructions for individuals employed with 

subcontractors during the period from October 1st, 

1972 through December 31st, 1990 but who did 

qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed 

using these data as appropriate.

Member Clawson: Okay.

Dr. Roberts: Is that all?

Member Beach: Yes, I think so.

Member Clawson: Yes.

Mr. Calhoun: This is Grady, can I, I'm not making 

any recommendation here or anything. I just want 

to just note something for you.

As written, since we're saying all internal cannot be 

reconstructed -- somebody's got to mute their 

phone. But since we're saying all internal cannot be 

reconstructed without data, I think we all know 

there's a lot of tritium data but we mostly discussed 

americium. But since you say all, that means that 

we can't use any coworker models for the people 
108

who don't qualify under the SEC.

Again, this isn't a recommendation, this is just a 

note. If it was limited to americium, the same

population would be covered, but we would be able 

to assign dose with coworker studies to people who 

didn't qualify under the SEC.

For example if somebody has lymphoma, leukemia, 

or lung cancer, or a combination of all of those and 

only worked for ten months, they can't get into the 

SEC. If they weren't monitored, we can't assign 

dose. But if it was limited to one of the other 

nuclides, we could assign dose based on a coworker 

study.

Member Clawson: Well, Grady --

Mr. Calhoun: No recommendation, I just wanted to 

point that out.

Member Clawson: Okay, well Grady, I just wanted 

to point out we used the boilerplate NIOSH claim 

language, but we can take it out. Why just 

americium-241?

Mr. Calhoun: I don't -- that's up to you. You guys 

were talking about it. I just wanted to point that 

out. That's all.

Member Clawson: Okay, well, we've just used 

NIOSH's language so I thought we were pretty good 

on that one there. But, you know, if we need to --

but here's the thing. Is this whole thing right here, 

now we're getting back to what you talked about 

earlier, Rashaun. This is our first attempt at it.

The whole thing is, is usually we don't even have to 

go into this unless we're, unless we've already 

voted on this. The whole thing is, we need to get 

this to a vote before any of this even really matters. 

It may not pass, and it may pass.

But the thing is, is we've got to be able to vote on 

this. Bob, do you have any thoughts on the 
109

statement that Grady said?

Mr. Barton: Well again, as Grady pointed out, sort 

of for informational purposes, I will say that, you 

know, based on the review that SC&A has done, I 

think americium would certain a worst actor, so to 

speak. And Grady is correct that if it's all internal, 

then all those co-exposure models are no longer 

applicable to workers who don't qualify for the SEC. 

All that is correct.

However, I think the infeasibility here, for your 

consideration, the infeasibility was the job-specific 

bioassay program. So, if that's the infeasibility that 

is voted on by you all, then I think all internal 

might, is appropriate. Because the deficiency, the 

infeasibility is with those job-specific bioassays, 

which wouldn't be restricted necessary to a specific 

radionuclide.

Member Clawson: Mm-hmm.

Mr. Barton: But Grady points out there's a lot of 

americium and I agree with that. It's probably the 

worst actor out of the ones that were able to be 

evaluated, specifically in Report 92, which was the 

report that looked at the RWPs and the subsequent 

monitoring, whether it was routine or not.

Americium was the most problematic, however, it's 

the deficiency, the infeasibility is determined to be 

the job-specific monitoring program as a whole, 

which I would contend is the only Class of workers 

generally, because they were under abnormal 

circumstances and weren't routinely monitored. And 

it's a problem with the internal bioassay program, 

not necessarily restricted to americium.

I don't know if that clarifies or answers the issue.

Member Clawson: Well, and also too, you know, 

we're kind of in a different situation here, because 

this is usually always being done by NIOSH in their 

ER review. And the Board needs to play with the 
110

language to the Secretary a little bit, so be it, then 

that's fine.

But the whole thing that we're voting on is the SEC. 

We've put the feasibility out there. If we need to 

tweak with that, then that's fine. But I feel, 

Rashaun, that we need to get this voted on so that 

we can continue on.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Are there any remaining 

questions or comments about either the Class or the 

technical basis that's been presented, or any 

concerns?

Okay, well, I'm hearing none. Let me just, I know 

there were Board Members that, you know, had 

stepped out. I think Lockey is back, Jim is back with 

us, I want to say. And the other person was, oh, 

David Richardson. Are you back with us, David?

Member Richardson: Yes, I am.

Dr. Roberts: Great, great, great, great. Okay, so Dr. 

Ziemer you can correct me if I'm wrong. But, you 

know, we've already made the motion for this. 

We've had discussion, you know, it seems that 

people have enough information at this point. So, at 

this point, I am thinking we can go ahead and do 

the vote.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Member Clawson: I just, Rashaun, this is just Brad, 

I just want to clarify what the vote is. Can you mute 

your phone for a second, Rashaun?

Dr. Roberts: Oh, yes, sorry.

Member Clawson: A vote yes is for the SEC. A vote 

no is for no SEC. I just wanted to make sure that 

we understood what we're voting on.

Member Kotelchuck: Sure.

Member Clawson: So Rashaun, I'll turn it over
111

Dr. Roberts: Okay, and let me find the grid so that 

we could do the vote. And I think, Brad, I think you 

vote last. Let me -- let's see. Let's see, okay.

Member Clawson: I what?

Dr. Roberts: So, I think you may be, since you're 

Chair of the Work Group, I want to say that you 

vote last.

Member Clawson: Oh, I was going to say we usually 

do it by the same way we take the roll, but that's 

fine.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, either way.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, so let's start with Anderson.

Member Anderson: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: I'm sorry, you said, yes?

Member Anderson: Yes, yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay.

Member Anderson: I think the data is inadequate.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, Josie.

Member Beach: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Bill.

Member Field: Field, right?

Dr. Roberts: Yes.

Member Field: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: That was a yes?

Member Field: Yes, that was a yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, Dave K.

Member Kotelchuck: Yes.
112

Dr. Roberts: Jim Lockey.

Member Lockey: No.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Dave R.

Member Richardson: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Gen.

Member Roessler: No.

Dr. Roberts: No?

Member Roessler: No.

Dr. Roberts: Okay. Sorry, I'm having trouble 

hearing, Phil.

Member Schofield: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, yes.

Member Schofield: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Yes, okay, that's for Phil. And Loretta.

Member Valerio: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Ziemer.

Member Ziemer: No, no.

Dr. Roberts: No, okay and then Brad.

Member Clawson: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, so I think we've got a vote for 

everyone. And I've got one, two, three, four, five, 

six, seven, eight yes, and three no, by my count. 

So, it would appear that the Board has voted for 

yes. The Class should be added.

Okay, so given that there are a few loose ends to 

this, and like I said earlier, you know, obviously 

we're going to need to contact DOL, or some 

contact needs to be made with DOL to figure out 
113

whether or not the Class can be administered. And, 

you know, on the technical basis it sounds like some 

things need to be clarified or taken out of that.

So, I think in our next meeting, typically there's a 

letter that is read into the record, you know, at that 

point. But just kind of be warned that there may be 

some adjustments and things that we need to make 

to this.

So, I think pretty much does it.

Member Beach: Rashaun, I have a question.

Dr. Roberts: Yes.

Member Beach: Moving forward, who will, who's 

going to work on this to clarify?

Dr. Roberts: That would seem to be a combination 

of the Work Group, myself, I can certainly reach out 

to DOL and see about the administrability of the 

Class and kind of get some clarity around that.

So, as far as, for the immediate that's what we can 

do to move forward.

Member Anderson: At the last meeting, didn't Grady 

volunteer that NIOSH would also help with the 

definition?

Mr. Calhoun: I did.

Member Anderson: Yeah, okay. I'm going to hold 

you to it, Grady.

Member Ziemer: I should point out that there was 

some objection from the general public about Grady 

doing that. I think it's okay in the sense that NIOSH 

can help with the issues relating to how it could be 

administered effectively through the Department of 

Labor.

Member Anderson: Yes, that is what I'm meaning.

Member Ziemer: So, I believe Terrie Barrie was 
114

concerned about that, or maybe it was someone 

else.

Member Anderson: No, it was Terrie Barrie.

Member Ziemer: I think the point is, it's not for 

NIOSH to develop the definition so much as to make 

sure it's one that can be administered.

Member Anderson: Yes.

Member Ziemer: So, I think to me it's appropriate. 

And also I'd like to say that I think that from the 

Board's point of view, I don't think we, I think we 

could handle the rest of this on the next phone call 

meeting rather than the regular two-day meeting.

It's going to be a matter of getting the right 

wording, particularly if counsel has some changes or 

paper, how, some administrative changes. And then 

as I said before, I would hope that the feasibility 

statement could be considerably shortened.

Because that's the one that goes to the Secretary of 

HHS. And we don't need a three-pager or fourpager letter to the Secretary. It could be supported 

with other material. But if it could be more, it would 

be good.

Member Clawson: Paul, understand something 

though.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Member Clawson: You know, this is all kind of a 

little bit different. We usually have a work, a Board 

Chair --

Member Ziemer: Yeah, I understand.

Member Clawson: -- and we work through a lot of 

this.

Member Ziemer: Yeah, I understand.

Member Clawson: And I want to say right now, I've 
115 

said that about the letter that we have sent to the 

Secretary for years with all the dangling participles, 

and everything else like that. I think we could have 

summed it up in about a half a page.

But the thing is, is we've got this vote taken care of. 

We can change any of these things. We'll involve 

NIOSH in it, and go from there. But this is the 

Board's information and we'll go from there.

But it'll just, the one thing that I would like is 

Rashaun, as we do this with the Department of 

Labor, I'd like this in writing so that we can share 

this with all the Board Members. So that when we 

come to the next Board meeting, we can fully 

understand what their issues are or so forth.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, certainly. And yeah, there is a 

just to kind of speak to your point, Paul, about, you 

know, covering this in the teleconference versus 

waiting for the two-day meeting, and hopefully we 

will have the loose ends tied up and be good to go.

Adjourn

Okay, alright. Well, with that I think we can go 

ahead and adjourn.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 5:16 p.m.)