United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 11, 2019 Decided July 12, 2019

No. 18-1160

KORNITZKY GROUP, LLC, D/B/A AEROBEARINGS, LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

DANIEL K. ELWELL, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 

AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 

SAFETY BOARD,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of

the National Transportation Safety Board

Jana Yocom Rine argued the cause for petitioner. With her 

on the briefs were Elizabeth M. Candelario and Kathleen A. 

Yodice.

Christian A. Klein was on the brief for amicus curiae

Aeronautical Repair Station Association in support of 

petitioner.

Christopher R. Stevenson, Senior Attorney, Federal 

Aviation Administration, argued the cause and filed the brief 

for respondent.
2

Before: SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: In 2018, the National 

Transportation Safety Board revoked the air agency certificate 

held by Kornitzky Group. The certificate authorized Kornitzky 

Group to operate as a repair station that performs maintenance 

on bearings used in jet engines. The Board revoked Kornitzky 

Group’s certificate based on two distinct set of allegations. 

First, the Board found that Kornitzky Group had violated 

aviation safety regulations by repairing engine bearings 

without technical data necessary to ensure it was conducting 

the repairs properly. Second, the Board determined that 

Kornitzky Group intentionally falsified maintenance records 

by representing only that it had inspected the engine bearings 

without indicating that it had also disassembled and repaired 

them. 

Kornitzky Group seeks review of the Board’s decision. 

We uphold the Board’s determination concerning Kornitzky 

Group’s performance of maintenance without the appropriate 

technical data. But we set aside the Board’s 

intentional-falsification charge because the Board departed 

from its own precedents when considering whether Kornitzky 

Group had acted with the requisite knowledge. We thus vacate

the Board’s revocation of Kornitzky Group’s air agency 

certificate. 
3

I.

A.

Kornitzky Group, LLC, was founded in 2010 by two 

engineers, Michael Kornitzky, who has since passed away, and 

Zev Galel. The company performed maintenance on turbine 

engine bearings used in jet engines. The bearings are structural 

components of an engine that connect other components and 

minimize friction, enabling the engine to function as designed.

In August 2011, the FAA issued Kornitzky Group an air 

agency certificate, which authorized the company to inspect 

and clean turbine engine bearings. Between 2011 and 2012, 

Kornitzky Group applied for and received additional ratings 

allowing it to perform repairs on engine bearings in accordance 

with a military specification it presented to the FAA. With the 

additional ratings, the company not only could inspect and 

clean bearings, but also could disassemble bearings, clean and 

polish their parts, reassemble the bearings, and then certify

them for return to service. 

In December 2015, Gary Watson, an FAA Principal

Maintenance Inspector, conducted a three-day inspection of 

Kornitzky Group, during which Watson “did not find any 

discrepancies or anomalies.” Letter from Gary M. Watson to 

Zev Galel (Dec. 14, 2015), J.A. 140. Nine months later, the 

FAA received two complaints about the technical data used by

Kornitzky Group to conduct repairs. The complaints prompted 

the agency’s Flight Standards District Office to forward the 

proposed repair data provided by Kornitzky Group in 2012—

i.e., the military specification—to the agency’s Engine 

Certification Office. The Certification Office determined that 

Kornitzky Group’s data was not specific enough to support the 

repair of turbine engine bearings.
4

On March 24, 2017, Darren Pittacora, who had replaced 

Watson as the FAA’s Principal Maintenance Inspector for 

Kornitzky Group, sent the company a letter advising that the 

agency had incorrectly issued one of Kornitzky Group’s ratings 

in 2012, in part because the District Office had not forwarded 

the proposed data to the Certification Office for review. The 

letter advised Kornitzky Group that it had 10 days to submit to 

reinspection under 49 U.S.C. § 44709 or face suspension of its 

license.

In May 2017, Pittacora and Dr. Chip Queitzsch, the FAA’s

Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Engine System 

Dynamics, among other officials, conducted the reinspection. 

On March 1, 2018, the FAA notified Kornitzky Group that the 

results of the reinspection were unsatisfactory because the 

company had exceeded the scope of work permitted by the 

original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the relevant

military specification. 

That same day, the FAA issued an emergency order 

revoking Kornitzky Group’s air agency certificate. The order 

rested on two distinct sets of alleged violations. First, the FAA

alleged that, by disassembling and repairing engine bearings 

without the requisite technical data, Kornitzky Group had 

violated several maintenance regulations (namely, 14 C.F.R. 

§§ 43.13(a), 145.201(b), 145.201(c)(1), and 145.201(c)(2)). 

Second, the FAA alleged that Kornitzky Group had 

intentionally falsified statements in its repair station records 

when approving bearings for return to service, in violation of 

14 C.F.R. § 145.12(a). The intentional-falsification charge 

related to four work orders documented on an FAA form, Form 

8130-3. The FAA contended that Kornitzky Group had 

indicated on the Form 8130-3 only that it had inspected engine 

bearings without indicating the other work it had performed in 
5

connection with the bearings (e.g., disassembly, polishing, and 

reassembly).

B.

In April 2018, an administrative law judge from the 

National Transportation Safety Board, an independent agency 

that adjudicates FAA enforcement actions, conducted a fourday evidentiary hearing. The FAA presented Pittacora and 

Queitzsch as its primary witnesses, with Queitzsch testifying 

as an expert. Kornitzky Group presented Galel, the company’s 

sole principal, and Emanuel Branzai, its own expert.

The administrative law judge first found that Kornitzky 

Group had violated each of the maintenance regulations

because the company was unable to produce the technical data 

that supported its additional ratings for disassembly and repair 

of bearings. The administrative law judge rejected the 

intentional-falsification claim, however, because Pittacora 

testified that Kornitzky Group’s statements on the Form 

8130-3s were not false when examined alone. The judge thus 

determined that the appropriate sanction was to suspend 

Kornitzky Group’s certificate pending compliance, rather than 

permanently revoke it. 

Both Kornitzky Group and the FAA appealed to the Board. 

See Elwell v. Kornitzky Grp., LLC, NTSB Order No. EA–5840, 

2018 WL 2733940 (May 11, 2018) [hereinafter Board 

Decision]. The Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s 

conclusion that Kornitzky Group had violated the maintenance 

regulations by conducting disassembly and repair of bearings 

without the necessary technical data. Id. at *10–11. The 

Board, though, reversed the administrative law judge with 

regard to the intentional-falsification claim, ruling that the 

FAA had proved that charge. Id. at *7–10. 
6

The Board found that Kornitzky Group’s selective 

disclosure of information rendered the Form 8130-3s false

because the company had excluded other information in a way 

that gave an incomplete and misleading impression of the work 

it had performed. The Board further found that the company 

acted with knowledge of that falsity. Id. The Board decided

that the intentional-falsification charge warranted revocation of 

Kornitzky Group’s certificate because it called into question 

the company’s “care, judgment, and responsibility.” Id. at *12 

(citation omitted). 

II.

We sustain a Board decision unless it is “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” Dickson v. NTSB, 639 F.3d 539, 542 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Kornitzky 

Group seeks a reinstatement of its air agency certificate, 

arguing that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

finding violations of the FAA’s maintenance and

intentional-falsification regulations. We uphold the Board’s 

determination that Kornitzky Group violated the FAA’s 

maintenance regulations, but we set aside the Board’s finding 

that the company intentionally falsified its entries on FAA 

Form 8130-3. We therefore vacate the Board’s revocation of 

the company’s air agency certificate.

A.

 The Board determined that Kornitzky Group’s repairs 

violated certain FAA maintenance regulations: 14 C.F.R 

§§ 43.13(a), 145.201(b), 145.201(c)(1), and 145.201(c)(2). 

Section 43.13(a) requires that each person performing 

maintenance must “use the methods, techniques, and practices 

prescribed in the current manufacturer’s maintenance 
7

manual . . . or other methods, techniques, and practices 

acceptable to the Administrator.” Id. § 43.13(a).

The remaining regulations impose requirements pertaining 

to “technical data.” Technical data refers to the engineering 

drawings and specifications “needed to define the 

configuration and design features” of aircraft engines, 

including the dimensions necessary to determine the 

airworthiness of any altered or repaired aircraft article. Fed. 

Aviation Admin., Collins Interpretation, 2011 WL 1459993, at 

*2 (Apr. 8, 2011). Section 145.201(b) provides that a

“certificated repair station . . . may not maintain or alter any 

article for which it is rated if it requires special technical 

data . . . that are not available to it.” 14 C.F.R. § 145.201(b). 

Section 145.201(c)(1) similarly establishes that a “certified 

repair station may not approve for return to service” any article 

that is repaired without acceptable technical data. Id.

§ 145.201(c)(1). And § 145.201(c)(2) parrots § 145.201(c)(1), 

except that it requires pre-approved (rather than acceptable) 

technical data for a “major repair or major alternation.” Id.

§ 145.201(c)(2).

The Board reasonably determined that Kornitzky Group 

violated each of those regulations. During the reinspection, the

FAA’s inspection officials asked Kornitzky Group about the 

process it used for inspecting and repairing bearings. For each 

of the work orders at issue in this case, Kornitzky Group

disassembled the bearing to inspect its parts with a stylus or 

scribe, looking for scratches, dents, pits, or depressions. In 

each instance, the bearing failed the initial inspection because 

it exhibited signs of burnishing, pitting, staining, or scratching. 

Kornitzky Group then polished and “lapped” the bearing parts

(i.e., used an abrasive to smooth the parts’ surfaces) to remove 

the imperfections and then reassembled the bearing. That 

process necessarily removes material from the bearing.
8

By performing those functions, Kornitzky Group came 

into conflict with the maintenance regulations. First, the 

pertinent OEM manuals for the bearings prohibited 

disassembly, which means Kornitzky Group’s maintenance 

procedures violated § 43.13(a) unless it had other “acceptable” 

maintenance procedures, which it did not. Second, Kornitzky 

Group had no way to determine whether the amount of bearing 

material it removed sufficed to jeopardize the bearings’ 

airworthiness because it had no access to the appropriate 

technical data, in violation of the § 145.201 regulations. The 

company could not produce the technical data because the data, 

according to the company, was stored in a computer once 

owned by its founder Mike Kornitzky and no longer in the 

company’s possession. 

Kornitzky Group now argues that the military 

specification cited in its ratings fulfills the requirements of 

§ 145.201 and § 43.13(a). With regard to § 145.201, however, 

the military specification does not itself contain the kind of 

substantive technical data required by that provision. Instead, 

the specification incorporates OEM technical data, stating:

“The need for maintaining the latest technical data in a readily 

available state cannot be overemphasized. It shall be the 

responsibility of the bearing shop . . . to obtain all drawings 

pertaining to bearings prior to induction in the shop for 

processing.” Military Specification T.O. 44-B-1-122, Ex. A33, R. 1366. Because the military specification relies on the 

possession of OEM technical data—which the company does 

not possess—the Board appropriately determined that the

military specification did not itself satisfy § 145.201.

With regard to § 43.13(a), Kornitzky Group is correct that 

the FAA approved use of the military specification when it 

issued the company’s additional ratings in 2012. But 

Kornitzky Group did not perform the work in accordance with 
9

the specification. The specification requires maintenance 

providers to compare repaired bearings to tolerance drawings, 

which Kornitzky failed to do. Also, the military specification 

provides it is “only to be used on bearings designed to be 

completely disassembled. The bearing drawing or the original 

component technical manual should specify that the rolling 

elements are removable.” Military Specification T.O.

44-B-1-122, Ex. A-30, R. 1363. But the OEM manuals of the 

bearings repaired by Kornitzky Group indicate the opposite, 

that the bearings should not be disassembled. Therefore, even 

if the military specification may be, in a vacuum, an 

“acceptable” alternative method under § 43.13(a), Kornitzky 

still violated that regulation by failing to comply with the 

specification when performing its work.

That leaves one narrow argument advanced by Kornitzky 

Group, pertaining solely to § 145.201(c)(2). That regulation, 

as noted, prohibits returning an article to service after a “major 

repair” unless the repair was performed in accordance with preapproved technical data. Kornitzky Group argues that its 

maintenance functions did not qualify as “major repairs.” The 

Board reasonably concluded otherwise.

A major repair is any repair “[t]hat, if improperly done, 

might appreciably affect weight, balance, structural strength, 

performance, powerplant operation, flight characteristics, or 

other qualities affecting airworthiness.” 14 C.F.R. § 1.1. At 

the hearing, the FAA’s witnesses testified that Kornitzky 

Group’s repairs could affect the bearing’s airworthiness: 

“Anytime that you change the characteristics of the bearing that 

affect its life and its load-carrying capability [as Kornitzky 

Group did], you introduce the potential for the bearing to fail 

in service when it shouldn’t, and that means loss of the engine, 

loss of thrust. You change the performance characteristics of 

the aircraft, and it puts you at risk of an accident.” Hearing Tr. 
10

359, J.A. 187. Additionally, another regulation provides an

illustrative list of major repairs, including “[s]pecial repairs to 

structural engine parts by welding, plating, metalizing, or other 

methods” as a type of “powerplant major repair[].” 14 C.F.R. 

part 43, App. A(b)(2)(iii). And the FAA’s witnesses testified 

at the hearing that bearings were “structural engine parts.” 

Hearing Tr. 29–30, R. 216–17. What is more, Kornitzky Group 

contracted to have “plating” performed on two of the four 

bearings.

Kornitzky Group points to an FAA staff manual, which

does not specifically list engine bearings as a structural engine 

part or as a “main section[]” of an engine. See FAA Order 

8900.1, Vol. 4, Ch. 14, Sec. 12, ¶¶ 4-1622, 4-1623. But 

Kornitzky Group did not rely on the staff manual before either 

the administrative law judge or the Board, meaning we are 

restricted from reviewing the argument absent good cause, 

which Kornitzky Group has not established. 49 U.S.C. 

§ 1153(b)(4); see Gorman v. NTSB, 558 F.3d 580, 591 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). In any case, the cited provisions of the manual are 

illustrative and do not purport to establish exhaustive lists of 

either major repairs or structural engine parts. In the end, the 

record adequately supports the Board’s finding that Kornitzky 

Group’s repairs fall within the FAA’s regulatory definitions of 

major repairs. 

B.

Kornitzky Group next challenges the Board’s finding of 

intentional falsification. The relevant regulation, 14 C.F.R. 

§ 145.12(a)(1)(ii), prohibits making any “intentionally false 

entry” in maintenance records. The three elements of an 

intentional-falsification charge are: (i) a false representation; 

(ii) in reference to a material fact; (iii) made with knowledge 

of its falsity. See Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 
11

1976). Although we affirm the Board’s finding of material 

falsity for purposes of the first two elements, we conclude with 

regard to the third element that the Board failed to make a 

finding of subjective knowledge as required by its own 

precedent. 

1.

The Board alleged that Kornitzky Group intentionally 

falsified entries on four Form 8130-3s. In those forms, the 

company certified bearings as airworthy and authorized their 

return to service. Box 11 of the form is titled “Status/Work” 

and allows space for a short description of the maintenance 

conducted. FAA Form 8130-3s, Authorized Release 

Certificates, J.A. 68, 87, 106, 123. On each form, Kornitzky 

Group completed Box 11 with an entry stating:

“OVERHAULED.” Id.

Box 12 of Form 8130-3, entitled “Remarks,” contains

space for more extensive comments. Agency guidance 

provides further direction about Box 12: “Describe the work 

identified in Block 11 and associated results necessary for the 

user or installer to determine the airworthiness of the product 

or article in relation to the work being certified.” FAA Order 

8130.21H, § 3-6(l). On one of the four forms, Kornitzky Group 

wrote in Box 12, in relevant part, “Work performed [in 

accordance with OEM manual] CFM56-7B ESM, 

CFMI-TP-SM.10, Bearing Inspection Section 72-09-01. Rev. 

55, Dated 15JAN2017 and other data acceptable to or approved 

by the FAA. Work performed met the overhaul requirements 

[in accordance with] Part 14 C.F.R § 43.2.” FAA Form 8130-

3, Authorized Release Certificate, Work Order 107750 (May 

12, 2017), J.A. 106. The other forms contain essentially that 

same entry but substitute the appropriate OEM manual for the 

particular bearing at issue.
12

Kornitzky Group’s Box 12 entries were reasonably 

deemed to have been false in two ways. First, a fair 

interpretation of Kornitzky Group’s entry “Work performed [in 

accordance with OEM] CFM56-7B ESM, CFMI-TP-SM.10, 

Bearing Inspection Section 72-09-01” is that the company’s 

repairs complied with the manufacturer’s guidelines. But 

while the company adhered to the referenced inspection section 

of the OEM manual, other sections of the manual prohibit 

disassembly of the bearings, yet Kornitzky Group 

disassembled each bearing at issue. The Board thus reasonably 

concluded that Kornitzky Group’s representation was false, 

and materially so, in that it was “capable of influencing a 

decision of the FAA inspector.” Thunderbird Propellers, Inc. 

v. FAA, 191 F.3d 1290, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Second, Kornitzky Group cited only the inspection section 

of the OEM manual. Each OEM manual, though, also has a 

separate section addressing repair, refurbishment, and overhaul

of bearings. Kornitzky Group failed to cite those sections even 

though it not only inspected the bearings, but also repaired 

them. The Board reasonably determined that the company, by 

omitting any reference to the repair section and only citing the 

inspection section, failed to “[d]escribe the work . . . necessary 

for the user or installer to determine the airworthiness of the 

product or article,” as required by Box 12. FAA Order 

8130.21H, § 3-6(l).

Granted, certain clues on the certification forms suggest

that Kornitzky Group did more than inspect the bearings. Box 

11 notes that the bearings were overhauled, and each Box 12 

entry notes that the “[w]ork performed met the overhaul 

requirements” of 14 C.F.R. § 43.2. FAA Form 8130-3s, 

Authorized Release Certificates, J.A. 68, 87, 106, 123. But 

clues are not enough: as the Board explained, customers 
13

assume that repair records are “scrupulously accurate,” and the 

certifications here, the Board permissibly concluded,

“provide[d] a false sense of confidence in the maintenance 

work performed.” Board Decision at *7–8. 

In that respect, the Board’s decision was substantially 

supported by the testimony of Pittacora, the FAA’s principal 

inspector for Kornitzky Group. He explained that, even if 

portions of the Box 12 entry were true, the entry was materially 

false because it misled customers: “[T]he reason I think it’s 

false and intentional is because . . . there’s lot of work that gets 

done there that’s not documented on there, that the end user 

should be made aware of to make a reasonable assumption of 

airworthiness prior to installing it in a large turbo engine.” 

Hearing Tr. 420, J.A. 195. The agency’s conclusion that 

Kornitzky Group made materially false entries in documenting 

its critical aircraft maintenance functions thus was not

arbitrary. 

It bears noting that the regulations include a provision 

addressing material omissions in addition to the one addressing 

material falsifications. See 14 C.F.R. § 145.12(b). We have no 

occasion here to address the precise interrelationship between 

those provisions, and we do not suggest that every material 

omission under § 145.12(b) necessarily amounts to a material 

falsification under § 145.12(a). But there is also no reason to 

assume that the regulations occupy mutually exclusive ground. 

See Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1102 (2019). For present 

purposes, it is enough to conclude that Kornitzky Group’s 

entries on Form 8130-3 were incomplete in a manner 

reasonably found to have been materially false.

In sum, the FAA required Kornitzky Group to disclose any 

maintenance affecting the airworthiness of the bearings. The 

Board permissibly concluded that Kornitzky Group made a 
14

materially false representation by referencing some but not all 

of its work affecting the bearings’ airworthiness.

2.

While we sustain the Board’s finding of material falsity, 

we cannot sustain the Board’s conclusion that Kornitzky Group 

acted knowingly. Under its own precedent, the Board was 

required to find that Galel, Kornitzky Group’s owner and sole 

principal, correctly understood the Form 8130-3 requirements 

but still instructed his company to provide a false response. 

Galel’s subjective knowledge, however, was not addressed by 

the administrative law judge and the Board did not make the 

required factual finding. As a result, we must vacate the 

Board’s intentional-falsification charge. 

Our starting point is our decision in Dillmon v. NTSB, 588 

F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Jack Dillmon applied to the FAA

for a medical certificate enabling him to become a pilot. Id. at 

1087. One of the questions on the form asked whether Dillmon 

had any “[h]istory of nontraffic conviction(s) (misdemeanors 

or felonies).” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FAA Form 

8500-8). Dillmon answered no, even though he had recently 

been convicted of felony bribery. The FAA charged him with 

intentional falsification. Id. at 1088. The administrative law 

judge credited Dillmon’s testimony that he thought the 

question covered only drug- or alcohol-related offenses. Id. at 

1088–89. The Board reversed the administrative law judge 

because Dillmon “clearly knew that he had been convicted of 

a non-traffic offense,” notwithstanding Dillmon’s testimony 

that he misunderstood the question. Id. at 1093 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

We reversed the Board because it had deviated from its 

own precedent. Citing Administrator v. Reynolds, NTSB Order 
15

No. EA-5135, 2005 WL 196535 (Jan. 24, 2005), we held that 

Board precedent “require[d] the FAA to prove the airman 

subjectively understood what the question meant.” Dillmon, 

588 F.3d at 1094. By relying only on Dillmon’s knowledge of 

his conviction, we concluded, the Board’s analysis had skipped 

the necessary step of determining whether Dillmon understood 

that the form required him to disclose the conviction. See id.

We have consistently enforced that principle. In Singleton 

v. Babbitt, 588 F.3d 1078, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2009), for instance, 

we reversed the Board’s revocation of a pilot’s license on an 

intentional-falsification charge where the pilot had no 

opportunity to testify about his understanding of the relevant 

question. And in Manin v. NTSB, 627 F.3d 1239, 1244 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011), we again reversed the Board’s 

intentional-falsification charge because the Board had failed to 

consider testimony that the pilot did not think the 

medical-certificate application required him to disclose his 

disorderly conduct convictions. 

The Board of course is free to change course and depart 

from its own precedents if it stays within the bounds of its 

statutory authority. But the agency must recognize it is doing 

so and provide a reasoned justification. Without such an 

explanation, we have no way of ensuring that the Board’s 

“policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not 

casually ignored.” NLRB v. CNN Am., Inc., 865 F.3d 740, 751 

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

There is no indication that the Board intends to abandon

its subjective-knowledge requirement. To the contrary, the 

Board has applied that requirement not only in medical cases 

like Dillmon but also in mechanic cases like this one. In Acting 

Administrator v. Reynolds, NTSB Order No. EA-5641, 2012 

WL 5954694 (Oct. 25, 2012), the Board recognized that 
16

“credibility findings from . . . law judges are necessary in 

intentional falsification cases, because the Board must consider 

a respondent’s subjective understanding of questions on 

medical certificate applications.” Id. at *4. The Board found 

that approach equally “applicable in . . . mechanic logbook 

falsification case[s]” and relied upon it to reject an 

intentional-falsification charge brought by the FAA. Id.

Here, Galel’s testimony suggests that he believed Box 12 

only required Kornitzky Group to disclose the final inspection,

not the work preceding it. He testified that the Form “8130 is 

not intended to have all of the information in block 12. It’s 

supposed to show of the information, representative 

information, sufficient information. And there’s no—the word 

of divulging does not—cannot be contained in that small block 

12. If I had to divulge everything that I did, I would have to 

put all of this in every block 12.” Hearing Tr. 654, J.A. 215. 

He continued, “the block 12 on the 8130s does not require the 

total list of everything that we use to perform the maintenance.” 

Id. 

In the context of Galel’s testimony to that effect, the Board

could not find the subjective-knowledge standard satisfied 

without also finding Galel’s testimony to be non-credible. But 

the administrative law judge made no such determination 

(because he concluded the entries on the forms were not false). 

When the Board overturned the administrative law judge’s 

falsity finding, then, it should have remanded the case to the 

administrative law judge to make the credibility determination 

required by its precedents. 

The Board did not follow that course. Instead, it 

“expressly expand[ed] the Board’s ‘willful disregard’ standard 

from Administrator v. Boardman, Administrator v. Cooper, 

and Administrator v. Taylor.” Board Decision at *10
17

(footnotes omitted). Under that standard, when “an airman 

intentionally chooses not to carefully read the question for 

which he is providing an answer that he certifies by his 

signature to be true, a factfinder can infer ‘actual knowledge’ 

from a willful disregard for truth or falsity.” Cooper v. NTSB, 

660 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

In Boardman, for example, the applicant testified, “I did 

not read [the question]. I just glanced over it.” Acting

Administrator v. Boardman, NTSB Order No. EA-4514, 1996 

WL 748190, at *2 (Dec. 20, 1996). In Cooper, the applicant 

“admitted that it was a ‘big mistake’ to fail to read the question, 

and that, if he had read it, he would have answered ‘Yes.’” 

Administrator v. Cooper, NTSB Order No. EA-5538, 2010 WL 

3358808, at *2 (Aug. 18, 2010). And in Taylor, similarly, the 

applicant admitted he “chose not to read any of the 25 

items . . . contained within question 18 . . . [and] testified had 

he read the question, he would have checked ‘yes.’” Acting 

Administrator v. Taylor, NTSB Order No. EA-5611, 2012 WL 

158766, at *3 (Jan. 9, 2012).

In this case, by contrast, there was no testimony about how 

closely Galel had read Form 8130-3. Nor does the form itself 

give us reason to assume Galel willfully disregarded its

instructions. The form simply provides a place for “Remarks” 

and says nothing else. FAA Form 8130-3s, Authorized Release 

Certificates, J.A. 68, 87, 106, 123. And the FAA’s guidance 

about the form, which instructs a repair station only to describe 

any work necessary to determine airworthiness, does not solve 

the problem. See FAA Order 8130.21H, § 3-6(l). Galel could 

have reasonably (even if incorrectly) assumed that disclosing 

the final OEM inspection is all that is needed to determine 

airworthiness, especially given that Kornitzky Group had 

passed prior Administration inspections that way. 
18

In short, the Board identified no evidence that Galel had 

intentionally disregarded the Form 8130-3 instructions, and the 

Board thus could not rely on any “willful disregard” principle 

to satisfy the subjective-knowledge standard required by its 

precedents. The Board’s departure from its precedent falls 

short of reasoned decision-making. See Ramaprakash v. FAA, 

346 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

The FAA observes that the Board can set aside an

administrative law judge’s findings as arbitrary and capricious, 

reweigh the evidence, and make its own factual findings, as

long as the new findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

See Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1095. That may be true, but here, the 

administrative law judge never determined whether Galel 

subjectively understood the requirements of Form 8130-3. See 

Board Decision at *9, *22. And in any event, we can affirm 

the Board’s decision only on the grounds upon which it acted: 

Galel’s alleged willful disregard for the instructions. See SEC 

v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943). On that score, 

the Board nowhere in its decision purported to reweigh the 

evidence and find that Galel subjectively understood the Box 

12 requirements. The Board concluded only that “[t]he 

evidence taken together suggests that [Galel] knew the 

information provided on the forms in question was not 

complete.” Board Decision at *10. That is no different than 

the Board’s argument in Dillmon that Dillmon had acted 

knowingly because he “knew he had been convicted of a 

non-traffic offense.” Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1093 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The argument failed then, and it 

fails again today. 

C.

Our vacatur of the Board’s intentional-falsification finding

requires us to vacate the Board’s revocation of Kornitzky 
19

Group’s air agency certificate. FAA guidance allows for two 

types of remedial sanctions: (i) revocation, and (ii) indefinite 

suspension pending compliance. FAA Order 2150.3B at 7-1 to 

7-3. Revocation is appropriate when the FAA determines that 

the individual or company “lacks the qualifications to hold the 

certificate,” such as when its conduct demonstrates “a lack of 

the degree of care, judgment, or responsibility” required of a 

certificate holder. Id. at 7-2. Meanwhile, indefinite suspension 

pending compliance is appropriate when “there is a need 

temporarily to suspend the privileges of the certificate or rating 

pending demonstration of qualification or compliance with 

statutory or regulatory requirements.” Id. at 7-1 to 7-2. 

The Board held that Kornitzky Group’s intentional 

falsification warranted revocation of the company’s certificate 

because it undermined the company’s “care, judgment, and 

responsibility.” Board Decision at *12 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But because we vacate the Board’s 

intentional-falsification charge, revocation of the certificate 

can no longer rest on that rationale.

The Board further found that “revocation is appropriate for 

the remaining violations” for two reasons, neither of which 

withstands scrutiny. Id. The Board first concluded that 

indefinite suspension must originate with the FAA as the 

charging agency rather with than the Board. But the Board’s 

own precedent indicates otherwise. See Acting Administrator 

v. Air Trek, Inc., NTSB Order No. EA-5440, 2009 WL 

1157988, at *10 (Apr. 21, 2009) (affirming administrative law 

judge’s reduction of sanction from revocation to indefinite 

suspension). And the Aviation Act grants the Board authority 

to “amend, modify, or reverse” an FAA order as air safety 

requires. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1). 
20

The Board additionally observed that the technical data at 

issue is “irrevocably lost” and that imposing an indefinite 

sanction pending compliance would “put both parties in an 

endless, repeating loop.” Board Decision at *12. In that regard 

the Board evidently equated the required technical data with 

the data on the lost Kornitzky computer. But the record 

confirms that the company can acquire technical data in other 

ways. Queitzsch testified that Kornitzky Group could license 

the technical data directly from the OEM, as is typically done.

Or, as Queitzsch testified, the company could develop the 

technical data itself by “reverse engineering” it (a contention 

confirmed by Galel). Hearing Tr. 310, 555, J.A. 171, 207. And 

in oral argument, the FAA conceded that Kornitzky Group 

could license the technical data from the OEM for the right 

price or reverse engineer the data itself. Oral Arg. Tr. 9. It 

would be up to Kornitzky Group to decide whether to obtain 

the required technical data as a means of ending an indefinite 

suspension of its certificate. 

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Kornitzky Group’s 

petition for review in part, vacate the sanction imposed by the 

Board, and remand the matter for further consideration 

consistent with this decision.

So ordered.