1

Filed 4/3/23; certified for publication 4/28/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

WEST PUEBLO PARTNERS, LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STONE BREWING CO., LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164022

 (Napa County Super. Ct.

 No. 21CV000498)

After a commercial tenant did not pay rent for several months during 

the pandemic, its landlord sued for unlawful detainer. The tenant argued it 

was excused from paying rent because COVID-19 regulations and business 

interruptions triggered a force majeure provision found in its lease. The trial 

court disagreed and granted the landlord’s motion for summary judgment. 

The trial court found that the force majeure provision only excused 

performance if the claiming party was unable to meet its obligations due to 

factors outside its control; but, because the tenant admitted during discovery

it had the financial resources to pay rent during the period of the COVID-19 

regulations but simply refused to do so, it could not invoke the force majeure

provision.
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We affirm the judgment. The trial court correctly interpreted the force 

majeure provision here not to apply where the tenant had the ability to meet 

its contractual obligations but chose not to perform due to financial 

constraints. The tenant’s remaining arguments on appeal are unpersuasive. 

BACKGROUND

I.

Facts

The landlord, West Pueblo Partners, LLC (West Pueblo), is a fourmember limited liability company that holds a single asset: the Borreo 

building (the building), located in downtown Napa. The tenant, Stone 

Brewing Co., LLC (Stone), is a large beer brewing and retail corporation that, 

among other things, operates restaurants known as “brewpubs.”

Beginning in 2015, Stone began negotiating a lease (the lease) with 

West Pueblo to use the building for one of its new brewpubs. The lease was 

executed in May 2016, and provided that West Pueblo would deliver the 

building with certain improvements and that Stone would pay a base rent of 

$38,000 that would increase over the lease’s 20-year term. The lease further 

provided that, absent special permission, “the Premises shall be used for a 

full service restaurant and brewery to include the sale of malt beverages for 

both on and off premise consumption events as well as the sale of [Stone’s] 

merchandise . . . .” 

Among the provisions the parties negotiated in the lease was a force 

majeure provision. That provision states as follows: “FORCE MAJEURE. 

If either Party is delayed, interrupted or prevented from performing any of its 

obligations under this Lease, and such delay, interruption or prevention is 

due to fire, act of God, governmental act or failure to act, labor dispute, 

unavailability of materials or any cause outside the reasonable control of that 
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Party, then the time for performance of the affected obligations of the Party 

shall be extended for a period equivalent to the period of such delay, 

interruption or prevention.”

Stone took possession of the building in January 2018.1 When COVID19 emerged in early 2020, California and local governments imposed severe 

restrictions on Napa restaurants and businesses. From March 20, 2020, to 

May 18, 2020, Stone could not offer any on-premises dining. From July 8, 

2020, to September 2, 2020, it could not offer indoor dining. From September 

3, 2020, to October 19, 2020, it was required to limit indoor dining to 25 

percent capacity. That limitation was loosened to 50 percent from October 

20, 2020, to November 15, 2020, but regulations were again tightened to 

prohibit indoor dining from November 17, 2020, to December 15, 2020. From 

December 16, 2020, to January 24, 2021, Stone was banned from offering onpremises dining yet again. Those restrictions were then loosened to prohibit 

only indoor dining from January 25, 2021, to March 2, 2021.

According to Stone, these restrictions were “devastat[ing]” to its

operating profits. As Stone explained in a letter that requested a rent 

reduction from West Pueblo: “As a result of the forced closure, we were faced 

with the business decision to lay off vast majority of our team members in 

order to minimize the financial losses we started to experience on day 1 of the 

imposed closure. With no known endpoint, we made the decision to continue 

to operate the business with a skeleton crew, not only as a service to the 

Napa community by offering donations to first responders and hospitals, but 

1 Stone’s possession of the building was delayed in part because of 

delays in renovation occasioned by the 2018 Camp Fire affecting Northern 

California; Stone contends that these events are relevant to interpreting the 

force majeure provision and we discuss them in further detail below.
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also with the hope that we could retain a certain number of the management 

team through these uncertain times.”

During the first year of the pandemic in 2020, Stone argues that its 

monthly rent payments became unsustainable based on the negative impact 

COVID-19 regulations had upon its business generally. Stone initially asked 

West Pueblo for rent relief, and later withheld rent for June and July 2020,

contending it was entitled to do so under the lease’s force majeure provision. 

Stone paid full rent through November 2020, but again withheld rent for the 

months of December 2020, January 2021, February 2021, and March 2021

based on the force majeure provision. Stone’s failure to pay rent for these 

four months—December 2020 through March 2021—gave rise to this

litigation. West Pueblo ultimately issued a “Five-Day Notice to Pay Rent or 

Surrender Possession” on March 23, 2021. Stone did not pay, and West 

Pueblo filed an unlawful detainer action against Stone on April 6, 2021.

II.

Motion for Summary Judgment

The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. West 

Pueblo’s motion argued that Stone’s force majeure defense fails as a matter of 

law because the undisputed facts showed that the COVID-19 government 

restrictions did not delay, interrupt, or prevent Stone from paying its rent.

To the contrary, Stone conceded during litigation that it had the ability to 

pay rent for the building, and West Pueblo argued that a mere increase in 

expense or difficulty does not excuse a party’s obligation to perform under the 

force majeure provision.

On October 20, 2021, the trial court granted West Pueblo’s motion for 

summary judgment, denied Stone’s motion for summary judgment, and 
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denied various motions filed by Stone concerning allegedly improper 

discovery conduct by West Pueblo.

In granting West Pueblo’s motion, the trial court held that the force 

majeure provision was unambiguous: “In line with [West Pueblo’s] position 

in the case, the court finds this plain language unambiguously means exactly 

what it says—that . . . the [force majeure] provision would apply to excuse 

Stone’s obligation only if the pandemic delayed, interrupted or prevented 

Stone’s payment of rent.” Applying that interpretation of the lease, the court 

held that the force majeure provision “did not apply because Stone always 

maintained the ready ability to make the rental payments and simply made a 

financial decision not to” pay rent. (Italics added.)

The trial court concluded that there was no triable issue of material 

fact as to Stone’s ability to pay rent based on certain admissions Stone made 

during discovery: “Stone[] repeated[ly] admi[tted] that it nevertheless had 

the financial resources to pay rent to [West Pueblo] from December 2020 to 

March 2021.” In ruling against Stone, the trial court explained: “Stone’s 

presentation of evidence reflecting that the [force majeure] events had a 

degree of negative financial impact on its business, where it admits it never 

lost the ability to pay rent, is simply insufficient to show a triable issue of fact 

as to delay, interruption or prevention of rent payments.”

Stone timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that 

there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 
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subd. (c).) A defendant seeking summary judgment “bears the burden of 

persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant meets this burden by showing that 

plaintiff “has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish” an 

essential element of his claim. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 763, 768.) 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, which means we 

“decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute 

warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” (Intel Corp. v. 

Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.) In deciding whether a material issue 

of fact exists for trial, we “consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, 

except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by 

the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence[.]” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 

When interpreting a contract, a court seeks to ascertain the mutual 

intent of the parties solely from the written contract so long as possible. (Civ. 

Code, § 1638.) The court considers the contract as a whole and interprets the 

language in context, rather than in isolation. (Civ. Code, § 1641.) And where 

the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity, the 

plain meaning governs. (Civ. Code, § 1638.) In this same vein, the court 

“should avoid an interpretation which will make the contract unusual, 

extraordinary, harsh, unjust or inequitable [citations], or which would result 

in an absurdity . . . .” (Harris v. Klure (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 574, 578.)

But, “ ‘Where the meaning of the words used in a contract is disputed, 

the trial court must provisionally receive any proffered extrinsic evidence 

which is relevant to show whether the contract is reasonably susceptible of a 
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particular meaning. [Citations.] Indeed, it is reversible error for a trial court 

to refuse to consider such extrinsic evidence on the basis of the trial court’s 

own conclusion that the language of the contract appears to be clear and 

unambiguous on its face. Even if a contract appears unambiguous on its face, 

a latent ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence which reveals more 

than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet 

reasonably susceptible. [Citations.]’ ” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 

Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351 (Wolf), as modified on denial of rehg. Feb. 19, 2004.) 

“The interpretation of a contract involves ‘a two-step process: “First the 

court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence 

concerning the parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the 

language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by a party. If 

in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably 

susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then 

admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract. [Citation.]”

[Citation.] The trial court’s determination of whether an ambiguity exists is 

a question of law, subject to independent review on appeal. [Citation.]’ ” 

(Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) 

II.

There is No Triable Issue of Fact as to Whether the Force Majeure

Provision Excused Stone’s Rent Payments.

Stone argues the trial court erred in concluding it did not create a 

triable issue of material fact as to whether it was excused from performing its 

obligation to pay rent for the December 2020 through March 2021 period at 

issue due an erroneous interpretation of the force majeure provision. In 

Stone’s view, the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated government closures 

were force majeure events that excused or deferred its obligation to pay rent.
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Stone offers three arguments in support of its position. First, Stone 

argues the ordinary definitions of “delayed,” “interrupted,” or “prevented” are 

not synonymous with “unable to pay,” and that under its interpretation of 

these words, it was excused from performing under the lease because of the

pandemic’s impact on its business. Second, Stone argues that cases which 

have interpreted similar force majeure provisions have not imposed an 

“inability to pay” standard, but have found that a force majeure provision

applied to delay the payment of rent where a force majeure event interfered 

with a party’s operations or revenue. Third, Stone contends that extrinsic 

evidence demonstrates the parties understood the force majeure provision to 

encompass unforeseen events that make “performance [more] difficult and 

expensive than the parties originally contemplated.” Stone points to the 

parties’ course of dealing involving construction delays occasioned by the 

Camp Fire and to the negotiation history of the force majeure opinion. We 

are unpersuaded by these arguments.

A. Plain Meaning of the Force Majeure Provision

We begin our analysis with the language of the force majeure provision 

itself. This provision states in pertinent part: “If either Party is delayed, 

interrupted or prevented from performing any of its obligations under this 

lease, and such delay, interruption or prevention is due to [a force majeure 

event], then the time for performance of the affected obligations of the Party 

shall be extended for a period equivalent to the period of such delay, 

interruption or prevention.”

As the trial court noted, “There is no dispute that the COVID-19 

pandemic qualified as a [force majeure] event potentially implicating the 

[force majeure] provision of the lease.” The only question then, is whether

Stone’s performance of its obligation to pay rent was “delayed, interrupted, or 
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prevented” by the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure orders.

During discovery, Stone admitted in responses to requests for admission that

even though the brewpub operated at a loss, it was able to “and had the 

financial resources to pay rent to [West Pueblo]” for the months it withheld 

rent under the force majeure provision. Further, although the brewpub 

operated at a loss, Stone’s requests for admission responses admitted that it 

generated an overall profit in January and February 2021.2

Stone argues however, that the terms “delayed, interrupted, or 

prevented” under the force majeure provision each have a distinct and 

ordinary meaning and cannot simply all mean “unable to pay” in a literal 

sense as the trial court held. For example, Stone points to the Oxford 

English Dictionary’s definition of “delay” as “to hold back or slow down (a 

person or thing)” and “interrupt” as “to break the continuity of (something) in 

time.” At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court agreed with Stone 

that “[d]elayed and interrupted don’t mean unable, inability” and that “[t]hey 

have their own unique meaning that is not ambiguous.” However, even 

applying that definition, the trial court determined that Stone was not 

delayed or interrupted in its ability to pay rent by its COVID-related 

financial difficulties. The trial court contrasted Stone’s financial hardship

with an interruption in the ability to make timely payment, such as a delay 

2 Stone’s opening brief made no mention of these admissions. Its reply 

brief argued in a footnote that, prior to the subject motion, it amended its 

responses to deny that it made an overall profit in January or February 2021.

Any argument that we cannot rely on Stone’s prior admissions is waived as 

Stone failed to raise it in its opening brief. Even assuming it was not waived, 

Stone failed to seek leave to withdraw or amend its prior admissions

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300. These matters are 

thus deemed “conclusively established” against Stone. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 2033.410, subd. (a).)
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in receiving a line of credit or the post office’s failure to deliver a mailed check

on time. We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. The plain meaning of the 

force majeure provision does not support an interpretation that ties a party’s

obligation to pay rent to its profitability or revenue stream instead of a delay 

or interruption caused by the force majeure event itself.

As our high court has held, where a contract contains a force majeure

provision, the “mere increase in expense does not excuse the performance 

unless there exists ‘extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or 

loss involved.’ ” (Butler v. Nepple (1960) 54 Cal.2d 589, 599.) This standard 

derives from the doctrines of impossibility and impracticability, which are 

common law defenses to contract performance. (See Oosten v. Hay Haulers 

Dairy Employee & Helpers Union (1955) 45 Cal.2d 784, 788.) Although a

force majeure provision is often included in a contract to specify which

qualifying events will trigger its application, the qualifying event must have

still caused a party’s timely performance under the contract to “become 

impossible or unreasonably expensive.” (Watson Laboratories, Inc. v. RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2001) 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1110, quoting 

Oosten, at p. 789.)

As applied here, Stone’s ability to pay rent must have been “delayed, 

interrupted, or prevented” by COVID-19 because timely performance would 

have either been impossible or was made impracticable due to extreme and 

unreasonable difficulty. There is no triable issue of fact as to this issue 

because Stone admitted that it had the financial resources to pay rent to 

West Pueblo for the subject months, even though the brewpub (a small 

component of Stone’s overall business) was operating at a loss. The mere fact 

that Stone was generating less revenue during this time period did not 

render its performance impossible or impracticable, and the force majeure
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event therefore did not impair Stone’s ability to pay its rent. Stone merely 

argues that the force majeure event made it more costly to do so.

Based on the plain meaning of the force majeure provision and the 

undisputed material facts in this case, the COVID-19 and the related closure 

orders did not delay, interrupt, or prevent Stone’s timely performance under 

the lease. 

B. Case Authorities Do Not Favor Stone’s Interpretation of the Force

Majeure Provision.

We now turn to Stone’s next argument, that caselaw favors its 

interpretation of the force majeure provision. We preliminarily observe that 

these cases are out-of-state decisions and supply persuasive authority only to 

the extent we find their reasoning convincing. (See LG Chem, Ltd. v. 

Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 371.) 

Stone primarily relies upon In re Hitz Restaurant Group (Bankr. N.D. 

Ill. 2020) 616 B.R. 374 (Hitz), which it characterizes as the “most analogous 

case” with the facts there “[being] nearly identical.” In that case, as a result 

of COVID-19 business closure orders made in Illinois, the tenant, Hitz,

argued that “rent is excused by the lease’s force majeure clause,” which 

provided relief if a triggering event “prevented or delayed, retarded or 

hindered” Hitz from performing an obligation. (Id. at pp. 376–377.) The 

court concluded that the pandemic could be said to have caused the postbankruptcy petition (ongoing) failure to pay—at least in part—because, even 

had the restaurant re-opened, government restrictions would have prevented 

it from generating sufficient business to cover its rent obligation. (Id. at 

pp. 377–378 [“the [government] order was unquestionably the proximate 

cause of Debtor’s inability to pay rent, at least in part, because it prevented 

Debtor from operating normally and restricted its business to take-out, 

curbside pick-up, and delivery”].)
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We find Hitz distinguishable on its facts. Hitz involved a special 

purpose entity that ran a single restaurant that had already been placed into 

bankruptcy at the time of the litigation. (Hitz, supra, 616 B.R. at p. 376.) 

There was thus no dispute as to the “Debtor’s inability to pay rent,” which 

the court acknowledged. (Id. at p. 377, italics added.) Because the ability to 

pay rent was not disputed, the decision itself includes few facts, but a review 

of the docket3 illustrates the circumstances of the debtor precluded it from 

paying rent altogether: the entirety of the debtor’s assets consisted of $6,000 

in inventory at the restaurant, and $100 in cash; the debtor could not operate 

the restaurant and already owed over $60,000 in rent. Here, Stone is a large 

beer brewing and retail corporation with multiple operations, and more 

importantly, admitted that it maintained the ability to pay rent during the 

disputed months.4

The other cases Stone relies on are similar; each involves a trial court’s 

factual finding that a tenant was rendered unable to pay rent by the COVID19 pandemic and thus was excused from timely payment by a lease’s force 

majeure clause. (Morgan Street Partners, LLC v. Chicago Climbing Gym Co. 

LLC, (N.D.Ill. Mar. 1, 2022) No. 20-CV-4468, 2022 WL 602893; 1600 Walnut 

Corp. v. Cole Haan Co. Store (E.D.Pa. 2021) 530 F.Supp.3d 555.) These cases 

turn not on the contested interpretation of a force majeure clause but rather 

on the particular facts presented by each case. In Morgan Street Partners, 

the court found that the tenants had “offered uncontroverted evidence that 

3 We grant West Pueblo’s unopposed request to judicially notice the 

docket of Hitz pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)(2).

4 We also observe but do not rely upon the fact that the holding of Hitz

has also been questioned as an “outlier” decision. (See 55 Oak Street LLC v. 

RDR Enterprises, Inc. (Me. 2022) 275 A.3d 316, 324, fn. 9 [“The approach 

taken in Hitz is an outlier and has not been followed elsewhere”].)
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the pandemic—and the government orders—[were] the sole reason they could 

not pay rent to Plaintiff.” (Morgan Street Partners, at p. *5, italics added.) 

And in 1600 Walnut Corp., the court found that the government’s “COVID-19 

orders closing and restricting retail businesses are the most obvious 

proximate cause of [the tenant’s] non-performance.” (Id. at pp. 558–559.) 

Here, by contrast, Stone made binding admissions that despite pandemic 

orders it had the ability to pay rent during the subject period. Thus, the 

“cause” of its nonpayment was not its inability to pay rent timely but its 

decision not to make payment. 

A recent California case is more persuasive. In SVAP III Poway 

Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, a 

fitness center was unable to operate intermittently due to COVID-19 closure 

orders. (Id. at p. 886.) In opposition to summary judgment in the landlord’s 

breach of contract action, the fitness center argued that the force majeure

provision in the lease temporarily excused its obligation to pay rent. (Id. at 

p. 888.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant 

of summary judgment to the landlord. (Ibid.) Although the force majeure

provision in that case included an exclusion for any “failures to perform . . .

which can be cured by the payment of money,” the Fourth District

independently held that there was also no evidence “that the pandemic and 

resulting government orders hindered Fitness’s ability to pay rent.” (Id. at 

pp. 892–893.) With respect to impossibility and impracticability, the court 

similarly held that, “Nothing about the pandemic or resulting closure orders 

has made Fitness’s performance of its obligations to SVAP—paying rent—

impossible.” (Id. at p. 893.) Indeed, “Governmental acts that merely make 

performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not suffice to 

excuse a contractual obligation.” (Id. at p. 895.) We agree.
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C. Since the Force Majeure Provision is Unambiguous, We Need Not

Consider Extrinsic Evidence to Aid Interpretation. 

As Wolf sets out, a court in interpreting a contract provisionally 

receives credible extrinsic evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to 

determine whether the contract language is reasonably susceptible to a 

party’s interpretation. (Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) Stone 

proffers extrinsic evidence in support of its interpretation of the lease’s force 

majeure provision. This evidence does not alter our conclusion that the 

provision is unambiguous and is not reasonably susceptible to Stone’s 

interpretation.

For instance, with respect to Stone’s evidence about the parties’ course 

of dealing surrounding the Camp Fire, we conclude that this extrinsic 

evidence sheds little light on the application of the force majeure clause to the 

parties’ rent dispute.5 To elaborate, West Pueblo was obliged by the lease to 

complete certain renovations and deliver the building to Stone by a specified 

date; if delivery was delayed; Stone’s rent would be abated two days for each 

day of delay. At the time of the Camp Fire, Stone summarizes, West Pueblo’s

“construction team was preparing [the building] for Stone’s approaching 

tenancy. But the Camp Fire had created smoky air . . . while [West Pueblo] 

and its workers were free to continue working—the government had not 

prohibited outdoor work—the air quality made that work more difficult.” 

Stone states that it did not hold West Pueblo accountable for delays in 

construction during this time because it recognized the Camp Fire as a force 

majeure event that “delayed, interrupted, or prevented” construction work. 

5 Various portions of the parties’ briefs, including their discussion of 

how the force majeure provision applied to the Camp Fire, are sealed. As a 

result, although we have considered the specific facts detailed in the briefs, 

we discuss them only generally in this opinion. 
15

Stone argues that the parties agreed to postpone West Pueblo’s obligations 

there “even though there was no evidence that [West Pueblo] was, in fact, 

unable to perform.”

First, we note that although Stone argues that the parties had agreed 

to apply the force majeure provision to the delay in construction caused by the 

Camp Fire, West Pueblo disputes that it in fact discussed the applicability of 

the force majeure provision to the Camp Fire with Stone in any detail at that 

time. To what extent the parties agreed to apply the force majeure provision 

to that event remains questionable. 

In any event, as the trial court stated, it is undisputed that the words 

“delayed” and “interrupted” do not mean “unable to,” and so the issue is not 

whether West Pueblo would have been able to continue construction if it was 

determined to do so. Along these lines, Stone argues that “[h]ad it offered its 

construction workers $1,000 per hour, there is little doubt [West Pueblo] 

could have enticed them to complete the job on time.” This reasoning would 

obviate the doctrine of impracticality, as any performance obligation short of 

an impossible one could be satisfied at sufficient expense. This is not the 

standard; rather, the Camp Fire created impracticable construction 

conditions because it made the continuation of such work unreasonably 

difficult and hazardous for the workers. By contrast, as discussed above, the 

COVID-19 closure orders did not directly cause a delay or interruption in 

Stone’s ability to pay rent; rather, Stone admitted it had the ability to pay 

rent at all relevant times, and indeed its business made a profit during two of 

the disputed months. Stone’s ability to pay rent was therefore not made 

impracticable and is not comparable to the impracticability of continuing 

construction work during the hazardous Camp Fire.
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In sum, Stone has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that it was 

delayed, interrupted, or prevented from paying rent due to COVID-19 and 

the related closure orders.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. West Pueblo shall recover its costs on 

appeal.
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_________________________

Van Aken, J.*

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, P.J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

West Pueblo Partners, LLC v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC (A164022)

* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

Filed 4/28/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

WEST PUEBLO PARTNERS, LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STONE BREWING CO., LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164022

 (Napa County Super. Ct.

 No. 21CV000498)

ORDER CERTIFYING

OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on April 3, 2023, was 

not certified for publication. For good cause, request for publication is 

granted.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1120 and 8.1105, the 

opinion in the above-entitled matter is ordered certified for publication in 

the Official Reports.

Dated: __________________ ____________________________

Stewart, P.J.
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Trial Court: Napa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Victoria D. Wood

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant: BraunHagey & Borden

Stone Brewing Co., LLC Matthew Borden

Kory J. DeClark

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent: Munger, Tolles & Olson

West Pueblo Partners, LLC Jacob M. Rosen

Ted G. Dane

Garth T. Vincent

Stephen A. Hylas