Hangar 481

Special Exposure Cohort

Petition Evaluation Report Upd

Samuel E. Glover, PhD

Research Health Scientist

National National Institute Institute for Occupational Occupational Safety and Health

Division of Compensation Analysis and Support

August 2011

Richland, WA
Hangar 481 Site History

 Located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquer

New Mexico

 Ross Aviation, with operations based at Hanga

during the covered period, was under contracagreement with DOE

• Provided air transportation of personnel and equip

using government owned aircraft at government o

facilities associated with DOE operations at the SaNational Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico

 Transported equipment—included packages

containing radioactive materials associated watomic weapons programs
Petition Overview

 February 27, 2009: 83.13 petition received

 September 8, 2009: Petition qualified for

evaluation

 December 18, 2009: Evaluation Report issu

 February February 2010: Evaluation Evaluation Report present

present

Advisory Board meeting

• D l e ay request de by petitioner until Freedom o

Information Act (FOIA) material could be prov
Petition Overview—cont.

 July 2010: FOIA completed (DOE and NIOSH September 23, 2010: Revised Revised Evaluation Evaluation Re

issued (updated photo of Hangar 481)

 November 2010: Evaluation Report re‐prese

at Advisory Board meeting

 January 2011: NIOSH and petitioners tour H

481 and provided a list of f ll o ow‐up questio

Office of Secure Transport (OST) (DOE)

 June 2011: Responses Responses provided provided by OST

 August 2011: Addendum to the Evaluation R

issued for Hangar 481
Summary of Petitioner Conce

1. Raw data lacking or unavailable

• Secondary summary data used for the evaluations

2. Contract existed back to 1970

• Covered period should be extended

3. Newly available documents had not been evalu4. Radioactive shipments were delivered to the H

481 building and stored

• The “hot pads” were used to load explosive materials• Reliance on an interview with one former worker as t

for determination that all radioactive shipments were at the “hot pads” was criticized
Summary of Petitioner Concern

5. Radioactive shipments were made using the AL

container

• In 1991, found to be i d na equate to shi ld e the content

(shielding for alpha and beta radiations was not dispu

6. The Evaluation Report’s ambient external meth

not bounding

7. One individual states that barrels were stacked 

hangar which may have been nuclear waste an

no apparent indication of “sweeps” that were dthe hangar building or adjacent areas

8. One pilot left his dosimeter in his locker and ha

abnormally high dose reading when the badge 

processed
NIOSH Follow‐up Actions

 NIOSH and ORAU were able to work with Lan

(the holder of Eberline’s data) to obtain the

individual individual results results rather than rely on summar

summar

from REIRS from 1990‐1994

• Data were compared to REIRS data and a complete 

was obtained except for one year (1994)

• It was determined that an error had occurred in th

database during data entry since the lifetime cumu

dose was entered rather than the annual dose

—This difference explained the one year which had a hig

reported annual dose (1994)

• Program Manager for Occupational Exposure and W

Health – Center for Epidemiologic Research (OEWH

assisted in review of the data to help determine th

of the discrepancy
NIOSH Follow‐up Actions

 January 2011: NIOSH and petitioners tour Han

481 and provided a list of follow‐up questions 

OST (DOE)

 March 2011: NIOSH received employee data f

Landauer (who now owns Eberline, the dosim

provider to Hangar 481 during the covered per

• NIOSH has also provided copies of the original dosi

to DOE

 June 2011 : Responses provided by OST August 2011: Addendum to Evaluation Report

issued for Hangar 481
Update on Claim Data

(as of July 26, 2011)
NIOSH/Petitioner Questionna

 NIOSH and the petitioner were provided

a detailed to

the Hangar 481 facilities in January 2011

 NIOSH, with input from the petitioner, assembled

a s

questions following the onsite tour and submitted th

formall

y

t

o OST

 Topics addressed in the questionnaire included:

 Facility information Radiological activities External dosimetry program

 Internal dosimetry program

 The following slides summarize the responses and fin

regarding regarding dose reconstruction reconstruction at Hangar 481
Facility Location
Building Layout
Photos Inside Hangar 481

Interior Interior of Hangar 481 Pilot Lockers Lockers in Hang
OST Response: Facility Informa

 Contracted activities began around 1970 and

remai d ne essentially unchanged

• DOL determines the covered period to be March 

through F be ruary 29, 1996

• Ross Aviation operations were actually relocated 

different facility to Hangar 481 in A il pr 1984

 Separate “hot pads” are shown separate fro

Hangar 481
OST Response: Facility Informatio

 Drawings provided show the Hangar facilit

pads, personnel lockers, and location of wnon‐destructive testing was performed

 Starting in 1985 the facility was operated 2

hours per day, 7 days per week, with

approximately 200 employees

• Per the OST response, administrative personne

only day shift with no overtime

 After 1987, operations were two shifts per 

days per week, with staffing levels reducin

about 80 employees employees in 1996
OST Response: Radiological Acti

 OST stated that no radiological activities were

performed in Hangar 481

• Radiological packages were handled and loaded on

hot pads 2 and 5

• Unmonitored personnel were not allowed to come 

contact with the packages

• Packages predominately tritium

 Non‐destructive testing of planes was conduc

once per year for a very short duration as pre

discussed

• OST describes strict access controls and also that t

were done at ni hg t
OST Response: External Dosim

 OST stated that Ross Aviation dosimetry p

developed and managed by Eberline and S

 No area dosimetry was performed at Hang

 Neutron Neutron dosimetry dosimetry was never provided provided at

Hangar 481

 No X‐rays for medical medical purposes purposes were cond

cond

at Hangar 481 facilities
OST Response: Internal Dosim

 OST stated that no bioassay program was eve

implemented at Hangar 481

 No Ross facilities were monitored for contami

• There was no need to perform surveys due to lack o

use/storage use/storage of radioactive radioactive materials materials at the facility facility

 Surveys were performed off site (on the hot p

where radioactive materials were handled

 OST indicated that no radiological accidents

occurred at Hangar 481

 OST further indicated that thoriated welding r

were not used or present at Ross facilities
OST Response: General Quest

 The highest exposed were monitored for

external dose (cabin security specialists an

pilots) who actually handled the radiologic

materials

 No radioactive containers were ever delive

the flight line adjacent to Hangar 481

 All Air Force and Sandia containers control

them until loaded at hot pads

• Any other delivery would have been a security

violation
OST Response: General Questio

 No radiation monitoring was performed 

Hangar 481 or the adjacent adjacent flight line

 The circumstances and locations related 

pilots’ lockers lockers and radiographic radiographic activities activities 

only during off hours) provide the only avexplanation for elevated personnel dosim

readings as described by the petitioner
Internal Exposures

 On August 7, 1997, the Transportation Safety Div

(TSD) of DOE’s Albuquerque Operations Office issthe Technical Technical Basis for Radioactive Radioactive Material Material IntakPotential regarding activities performed by Ross

Aviation at Hangar 481

 Based on:

1. The TSD special agents tasks (i.e., no contact wit

package contents)

2. The TSD’s operational history with confirmatory 

(i.e., no package breach or leakage)

3. The use of DOT compliant shipping packages and

programs

 The document concluded there is no credible pat

intake of radioactive materials during normal ope
Dosimetry Updated Results
Summary of External Dose Feas

 External dose records exist for many Ross Avia

personnel personnel and have the REIRS reported reported data b

verified using Eberline data from 1990‐1994

 Data from the 1994 REIRS report was found to 

incorrectly entered into the database (lifetime 

instead of annual dose) and has been correcte

this addendum addendum and DOE notified notified

 The individual results of these records or use 

highest dose received by monitored personne

adequately bounds unmonitored worker exte

dose
Summary of External Dose

Feasibility–cont.

 Data from 1996 was not included in REIRS (

period ends February 29, 1996)

• NIOSH will use the highest annual dose for previ

for this 2‐month period

 NIOSH will use the highest dose received in 

entire year previously to bound any externa

for all employees

 The circumstances and locations related to t

pilots’ lockers lockers and radiographic radiographic activities activities (do

during off hours) provide the only available

explanation for elevated personnel dosimet

readings as described by the petitioner
Summary of External Dose

Feasibility–cont.

 There is no credible potential for neutron exp

 Potential doses from off‐hour radiographic te

would be included in the reported personal

monitoring data

 Ambient environmental external doses are inc

by using the existing existing personnel personnel external external moni

moni

data

 X‐ray examinations examinations are not included included because because

medical X‐rays were not performed on‐site atHangar 481
Summary of Internal Dose Feasi

 No radioactivity was stored or handled at t

Hangar 481 facility facility

 Radioactive materials handled by workers 

Hangar 481 were in sealed DOT‐compliant compliant

containers and monitored in accordance w

DOT regulations to verify radiation and

contamination levels on package exteriors

• Results of available radiological surveys perform

the packages and in the transport aircraft suppo

premise
Summary of Internal Dose

Feasib li ity—cont.

 Based on the available information on th

radiological program and potential for in

exposure sources, NIOSH concludes that 

radiological exposures to Ross Aviation

employees resulting from services rende

the DOE at Hangar 481 are unlikely to ha

occurred

 Sandia National Laboratory, being an adj

facility, was used to provide a bounding e

of the dose from ambient environmental

internal dose during the covered period
Feasibility Summary

Feasibility Findings for SEC‐00139

Source of Exposure

Dose Reconstruction

Feasible

Dose Recons

NOT Fea

Internal

X

External

‐ Beta‐Gamma X‐ Neutron N/A‐ Occupational

Medical X‐ray N/A