F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C E N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v.

D A V I D B E R N H A R D T , in his official capacity

as Secretary

of the United States Department of the I nterior; U.S. D E P A R T M E N T
O F T H E I N T E R I O R , D efendants-Appellees
,

P A C I F I C L E G

A L F O U N D A T I O N ; A L A S K A O U T D O O R C O U

N C I L ; B I G G A M E F O R

E V E R ; K U R T W H I T E H E A D ; J O E L E T A R T E ; S A F A R I C L U B I N T E R N A T I O N A L ; N A T I O N A L R I F L E A S S O C I A T I O N
O F A M E R

I C A , I N C .; S T A T E O F A L A S K A D E P A R

T M E N T O F L A W , Intervenor-DefendantsA ppellees. No. 18-35629

D.C. No. 3 :17-cv-00091-SL G

OPI NI ONC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 2

A ppeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska Sharon L . Gleason, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted Aug ust 5, 2019 A nchorag e, Alaska

F iled December 30, 2019

B efore: Richard C. Tallman, Sandra S. I kuta, and N. Randy

Smith, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by J udg e I k

utaC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 3

SUMMARY *

Congressional Review Act / Jurisdiction

The panel affirme d i n p a rt, and d ismissed in part, the district c ourt’s dismissal of the Center for B iolog ical Diversity (“CB D”)’s c omplaint that soug ht to comp el the Department of the I nterior to reinstate the Refug es Rule that prevented Alaska from a p p l y ing certain state hunting
reg ulations on federal wildlife refug es.

The Cong ressional Review Act (“CRA”) was desig ned to g ive Cong ress an ex pedited procedure to review a nd disapprove federal reg u lations. B e fore a rule can take effect, the p romulg ating F ederal ag e ncy submits a report. After

rece iving the a g ency ’s report, Cong r ess has a specified time period to enact a joint resolution that disapproves the
reg ulation (the “Disapproval Provision”). Once an ag e ncy ’s rule has been disapproved by joint r esolution, the ag ency may not reissue the same, or similar, rule u nless t he new rule is

s p e cifically authoriz ed by a law enacted after the join t resolution disapproving the orig inal r u l e (the “Reenactment Provision”).

The U.S. F ish & Wildlife Service s p r o mulg ated the Refug es Rule p rohibiting Alaska’s predator-control methods

on national wildlife r e f

ug es, along w ith certain methods o f hunting bears and wolves. Cong ress passed, and the President sig ned, a J oint Resolution disappro v i n g the Refug e s Rule.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 4

G e nerally
, the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction ove r CB D’s statutory c laims and concluded that CB D ’s constitutional claims did not a lleg e a p lausible b asis for relief.

The panel held that because CB D failed to all e ge an injury in f act that was more than speculative, it did not have Article I I I standing to c halleng e the Reenactment Provision. The panel therefore dismissed CB D’s arg ument that the Reenactment Clause violated the nondeleg ation doctrine.

The panel turned nex t to CBD ’s c laim that the Disapproval Provision and Cong ress’ J oint Resolution violated the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Concerning the CRA’s jurisdiction-stripping -provision, which on its face barred judicial r e v iew of all challeng es to actions under the CRA, including constitutional cha l leng es, the panel presumed that Cong ress did not intend to bar constitutional review because the jur i sdiction-stripping

provision did not include any e x plicit lang uag e barring judicial review of c o nstitutional claims. CB D arg ued that the CRA a nd J oint Resolution violated separation-of-power principles because they inte r f ered with the Ex ecutive B ranch’s duty u nder the Take Care Clause of the Constitution by preventing the Department of the I nterior from implementing its constitutional duty to faithfully ex ecute the laws by properly manag ing the federal wildlife r efug e sy stem. The p anel rejected the arg ument because Cong re s s p r operly

en a c ted the J oint Resolution, thereby validly amending I nterior’s authority to a dminister national wildlife refug es in Alaska, and Congr es s, according ly
, did not prevent the President from ex ercising his constitutional duty to f a ithfully

ex e c ute the laws. The panel concluded that because the J oint Resolution did not violate the Take C a r e Clause, CB D ’s complaint failed to state a claim that was plausible o n its face.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 5

F inally
, the panel considered CB D’s statutory claim that the Refug es Rule c o uld not be submitted in accordance with CRA’s provision at 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1), which s p e c i f ies certain d eadlines. J oining other circuits, the pa n e l held that federal courts do not have jur i s d i ct ion over statutory c laims
t h a t arise under the CRA. T he panel h eld that here where CB D challeng ed Cong ress’s e nactment o f the J oint Resolution, and where Cong ress enacted a joint resolution o f disapproval that was an action under the CRA, there was no jurisdiction to consider the claim.

COUNSEL

Howard M. Cry stal (arg

ued), Center for B iolog ical Diversity
, W a shing ton, D.C.; Collette A dkins, Ce nter for B iolog ical Diversity , Circle Pines, Minnesota; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

B enjamin Mandel Shultz (arg ued), Attorney ; Mic h a e l S

. R a ab

a nd Tara S. Morrissey
, Appellate Staff; B r y an Schroder
, United States Attorney ; J oseph H. Hunt, Assi s t a n t Attorney General; Civil Division, United States Department of J ustice, W a shing ton, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

David Deerson (arg

u ed), J ames S. B u rling
, Oliver J

. Dunford, and J effre y W

. McCoy
, Pacific L eg al F oundation, S acramento, California; J onathan Wood and Todd F

. Gaz iano, Pacific L eg a l F oundation, Arli n gton, Virg inia; Z a charia Olson, Yturri Rose L L P, Ontario, Ore go n ; for I ntervenor-Defendants-Appellees Pacific L eg al F oundation, A l a s k a O u t d o o r Council, B ig Game F orever, Kurt Whitehead, and J oe L etarte.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 6

Michael T. J e an, N ational Rifle Association o f America, F airfax
, Vir ginia; Anna M. Seidman and J eremy E. Clare, Safari Club I nternational, W a shing ton, D.C.; for I ntervenorDefendants-Appellees Safari Club I nternational and National Rifle Association of America, I nc.

Chery l Rawls B rooking and J essica M. A l l o way , Assistant Attorney s G eneral, Alaska Department of L a w , Anchorag e , Alaska, for I ntervenor-Defen d a nt-Appellee State of Alaska Department of L aw.

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

Enacted as part of the Contr ac t with America Advancement Act of 1 996, Pub. L

. No. 104-121
, 1 1 0 Stat. 847, the Cong ressional Review Act (CRA) was desig ned to g ive Congress an ex pedited procedure to review a nd disapprove f

ederal r eg ulations. 5 U.S.C. § § 8 0 1–808. I n 2017, Cong ress used this procedure to order the Department of the I nterior (I nterior) to rescind a reg ulation that prevented Alaska from a

pply ing certain state hunting reg ulat ions on federal w ildlife refug e s. The Center for B iolog ical D iversity (CB D) broug ht this leg al action to compel I nterior to reinstate the rule. B ecause we lack jurisdiction over CB D’s statutory claims and c onclude that CB D’s constitutional claims do not alleg e a p lausible b a sis f or relief, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of CB D’s complaint.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 7

I

The CRA assists Cong ress in discharg ing its responsibilities for overseeing federal r eg ulatory ag e ncies. I t provides that “[ b ] efore a r u l e can take effect, the F ederal
ag ency promulg ating such r u l e shall submit” a report that includes “a concise g e n e r al statement relating to the rule” a nd

a “proposed effective date.” § 801(a)(1)(A). 1 After r eceiving the ag ency ’s report, Cong r e ss has a s p e cified time period to enact a joint resolution that di sapproves the reg ulation a nd
states that “such rule shall have no force or effect.” § 802(a) (the “Disapproval Provision”). Ty pically
, Con gr e ss has 60 d a y s to e x ercise the Disapproval Provision. Id. B ut if an ag ency submits a rule to Cong ress during the final 60 d ay s o f

a cong ressional session, or submits the rule when Cong ress is
not in session, the 60-day c lock does not start to run until the 15th day of the subsequent cong ressional session. § 801(d)(1)–(2)(A) (the “Carry over Provision”). 2

1 T h is req u irem en t th at an ag en cy su b m it i ts rep o rt b ef

o re its ru le can tak e ef f ect do es n o t ap p ly t o “ an y ru le t h at estab lish es, m o d if ies, o p en s, clo ses, o r co n d u cts a reg u lato ry p ro g ram f o r a co m m ercial, recreatio n al,

o r su b sisten ce activ ity related to h u n tin g , f ish in g , o r cam

p in g .” § 8 0 8 (1 ). S u ch a ru l e w ill “ tak e ef f ect at su ch t im e as t

h e Fed eral ag e nc y p ro m u l g atin g th e ru le d eterm in es.” Id

.

2 Sectio n 8 0 1 (d )(1 )– (2 )(A ) p ro v id es:

( d )(1 ) In ad d itio n to th e o p p o rtu n ity f o r rev i e w

o th erw i se p ro v i d ed u n d er th is c h a p t er, in th e case of

an y ru le f o r w h ich a rep o rt w as su

b m itted in acco rd an ce

w ith su b sectio n (a)(1 )(A ) d u rin g t h e p erio d b eg in n in g

o n th e d ate o ccu

rrin g

–
(A ) in th e case o f

th e Sen ate, 6 0 sessio n

d ay s, o rC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 8

I f the House and S e nate pass a joint resolution o f disapproval, and the President sig n s it into law, the ag e ncy ’s rule “ shall not take effect (or continue).” § 8 01(b)(1); see also U .S. Co n s t

. art I
, § 7, c l. 3

. O nce an ag ency ’s rule has been disapproved by joint resolution, the ag ency may not reissue the same rule “i n substantially the same form,” a nd
may not issue “a new r

ule that is substantially the same” a s the di s a p p r o ved r

ule “unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authoriz ed by a law enacted after the date of the

(B ) in t h e case o f th e H o u s e o f Rep resen tativ es, 6 0 leg islativ e d ay s,

b ef o re t h e d ate th e Co n g ress ad j o u rn s a s e ssio n of Co n g ress th r o ug h th e d ate o n w h ich th e sam e or

su ccee d i n g Co n g ress f

irst co n v en es its n ex t sessio n , sectio n 8 0 2 s h all ap p ly to su c h r u le in th e su cceed in g sessio n o f Co n g ress.

( 2 ) ( A) In ap ply i n g s ectio n 8 0 2 f or p u rp o ses o f su c h ad ditio n al rev iew
, a ru le d escrib ed u n d er p arag rap h (1 ) sh all b e treated as th o u g h

–
(i) su ch ru le w ere p u

blish ed in th e F ed eral Reg ister (as a ru le th at sh all tak e ef f ect) o n

–
(I) in th e case o f th e Sen ate, th e 1 5 th sessio n d ay , o r

(II) in th e case of th e Ho u se o f Rep resen tativ es, th e 1 5 th leg islativ e d ay ,

af ter th e s u cceed in g sessio n o f Co n g ress f irst

co n v en es; an d

(ii) a rep o rt o n s u ch ru le w ere su b m itted to Co n g ress u n d er su

b sectio n (a)(1 ) o n su ch d ate.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 9

joint r esolution disapproving the ori gi n a l rule.” 5 U .S.C. § 801(b)(2) (the “Reenactment Provision”).

Th e C RA streamlines Cong ress’s ty pical procedure for enacting leg islation. F or instance, the CRA limits debate on

a joint resolution “ to not more than 10 hours,” § 80 2 ( d ) ( 2 ), and a llows the Senate to take a joint resolutio n a way from a Senate committee after 20 day s and place it on the calendar f or c onsideration by the full Senate on the vo t e o f 30 Senators, § 802(c). The CRA declares that this accelerated procedure is “a n e x e r cise of the rulemaking p o wer of the Senate a n d House of Representatives, respectively ,” a nd invokes the c onstitutional authority of Cong ress to amend its rules of procedure. § 802(g ); see U.S. Const. art I
, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may deter m i n e the Rules of its Proceeding s . . . .”).

As p art of its effort to ensure an ex p e d i t e d process, the CRA provides that “ [ n] o determination, f i n d ing
, action, o r omission under this chapter shall be subje c t t o judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 8 0 5 (the “J urisdiction-Stripping Provision”).

I I

This case stems from conflict over t h e manag ement o f wildlife in national wildlife refug es in Alaska. Cong ress has authority u nder the Property C l a u s e of the Constitution to “make all n e edful Rules and Reg ulations respecting the Territory or other Property b elong ing to the United S t a tes.” U

. S

. Const. art. I V, § 3, cl. 2. F ederal statutes applicab l e t o the national wildlife refug es at issue in this case inclu de the National Wildlife Ref

u g e Sy stem A dministration Act o f 1966, Pub. L

. N o. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (codified as amendedC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 10

at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd

– 6 6 8 e e (1998)), the National W ildlife Refug e Sy stem I mprovement A ct of 1 9 9 7, Pub. L

. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified as amended at 16 U .S.C. § 668dd–668ee (1998)), a nd the Alaska National I nterest L ands Conservation Act (ANI L CA), Pub. L

. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2 371 (1980) (codified at 1 6 U

. S

. C. §§ 3 101–3233). Eac h o f these statutes authoriz e s I nterior to manag e the federal wildlife refug es for conservation and public use.

S t ates also possess broad p owers over f ish and wildl i f

e wi t h i n t heir borders. See, e.g. , 16 U .S.C. § 668dd(m). Alaska’s laws for manag ing w ild l i fe a re applicable in the national wildlife refug es in the state unless p r eempted b y federal l a w

. See Kleppe v

. New Mexico
, 4 26 U.S. 529, 542–43 ( 1976); see also 50 C.F .R. § 32.2(d)

. I n 1994, the Alaska leg islature a

uthoriz ed the B oard of Game (B oard) “to provide for intensive manag ement p r og rams to restore the abundance or productivity of identified big ga m e prey populations as necessary to achieve human consumptive use g oals.” Alaska Stat. § 16.05.255(e) (2014). To that end, the Bo a rd permitted hunters to specifically targ et big ga m e predators, like black bears, brown b e a r s , a nd wolves. See Alaska Admin. Code tit. 5, §§ 92.110, 92.115, 92.124 (2019). Over the y ears , t h e B oard has ex panded its intensive
manag ement prog ra m a n d permitted hunters to eng ag e in a rang e of predator-control activities.

Concerned that Alaska’s intensive manag ement prog ram

was “in direct conflict” w ith the fede r a l mandate for administering national wildlife refug es, the F ish & W ildlife Service (F W S) promulg ated an ex pansive n e w rule that substantially d eviated from the state’s reg ulations

. See Non-Subsistence Take of W i l dlife, a n d Public Participation and Clo sure Procedures, on National Wildlife Refug es inC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 11

Alaska, 81 F ed. Reg

. 5 2248-01, 52252 (Aug. 5, 2 0 16) (the “Refug es Rule”) (codified at 50 C. F. R

. § 36.32(b), repealed by 82 F e d. Reg

. 52009-01(Nov. 9, 2017)). The Refug es Rule prohibited Alaska’s predator-control methods on na tional wildlife r efug es, along with certain methods of hunting bears

a n d wolves. 81 F ed. Reg

. at 52252. The Rule effectively
pre v e nted the B oard from implementing Alaska’s intensive
manag ement law o n federa l l an d

. See id. ; Alaska Stat. § 16.05.255; Alaska Admin. Code tit. 5, §§ 92.106–92.127.

On October 5, 2016, consistent with t h e C RA, I nterior submitted the Refug es Rule to Cong ress and the Comptroller G e n eral. 3 At the time, less than 60 day s remained in the 114th Cong ress. 4 Therefore, the CRA’s Carry over Provision applied and the 60-day clock would not start running until the 15th day of the subsequent cong ressional session. § 801(d)(1)–(2)(A). I n F ebruary 2017, within the time period established by the Carry over Provision, a j o int resolution disapproving the Refug es Rule was introduced in the House of Representatives ( “ J oint Resolution”). H .R.J

. Res. 69, 115th Cong . (2017); see also 5 U.S.C. § 801(d). The House and Senate passed the J o int Resolution, a n d t he President

3 S ee 16 2 Co n g

. Rec. S6 3 3 9

- 04
, S 6 3 4 6 (d aily ed

. No v

. 1 5, 20 1 6 ) ; 1 6 2 Co n g

. Rec. H6 1 60

- 0 1
, H6 16 9 (d ail y e d

. No v

. 14
, 2 0 1 6 ); GAO Fed e r a l Ru les S

umma ry Listin g , U.S. G OV ’ T A CCOUNT A BI L I T Y O F F ., h ttp ://w w w .g ao .g o v /f

ed ru les/1 8 6 1 8 9 (last v isited Oct. 2 2 , 2 01 9).

4 A f ter Octo b er 5
, 20 1 6
, less th an 6 0 s e s s i o n d ay s (Sen ate) an d less th an 6 0 leg islativ e day s (Ho u s e o f Rep resen tativ es ) r e m ain ed b ef o re th e 1 1 4 th Co n g r e s s ad j o u rn ed o n Jan u ary 3
, 2 0 1 7

. S ee Pa st Da ys in S essio n o f th e U.S

. Co n g r e ss , C ONG RE SS

. G OV , h ttp s://w w w .co n g ress.g o v

/p ast- day s- in

- sessio n (u n d er “ Sen ate,” click th e lin k n ex t to 1 1 4 t h
, 2 n d Sessio n ; u n d er “ Ho u se,” click th e lin k n ex t to 1 1 4 th , 2 n d Sessio n ) (last v isited Oct. 2 2, 2 0 1 9 ).C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 12

sig ned the J oint R e s o l u t i o n into law on April 3, 2017. Pub. L . No. 115-20, 131 Stat. 86 (2017).

The J oint Resolution states:

P r o v iding for cong ressional disapprov a l u n d e r chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the final r ule of the Department of th e I nterior

r e l a ting to “Non-Subsiste n c e T a k e o f W ildlife, and Public Participation and Closure Procedures, on National W ildlife Refug es in Alaska”.

Resolved by the S

enate and House of Represe n t a tives of the United States of America in Congress as s embled
, That Cong r ess disapproves the rule submitted b y the Department of the I nteri o r r elating to “Non-Subsistenc e Take of W ildlife, a nd Public Participation and Closure Procedures,

on National W ildlife Refug es in Al a ska” (81 F ed. Reg

. 52247 (Aug us t 5, 2016)), a nd such rule shall have no force or effect.

Id.

F ollowing the enactment of the J oint Resolution, I nterior promulg a ted an administrative rule r escinding t h e Refug e s Rule and reverting “to the tex t of the reg ulations in eff ect immediately prior to the” Refug es Rule. Effect u a t i n g Cong r essional Nullification of the Non-Subsistence T a ke o f W ildlife, and Public Participation and Closure Procedures, on N a t i o n al W ildlife Refug es in Alaska Under the Cong ressional Review Act, 82 F ed. Reg . 52009-01, 52009 (Nov. 9, 2017).C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 13

I n April 2017, CB D sued I nterior in d istrict court, seeking
to r einstate the Refug es Rule. 5 F ive months later, CB D filed

an amended complaint in w hich it alleg ed (1 ) t h e J oint Resolution and the CRA violate the T a ke Care Clause of the Constitution; (2) the CRA’s Reenactment Provision suffered from unconstitutional v agu e n ess (on appeal, CB D c larified that it was actually asserting a violation of the nondeleg ation doctrine); and (3) I nterior acted ultra vires in adhering to the J oint Resolution a

nd rescinding the Refug es Rule. The district court g ranted I nterior’ s m o tion to dismiss, holding that CB D f

ailed to e stablish Article I I I standing and failed to state a claim. CB D timely appealed. W e review the district

c o u r t ’ s order de novo. L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.
, 869 F .3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017).

I I I

W e beg in by considering the g overnment’s arg ument that

w e lack jurisdiction to consider CB D’s claim that the Reenactment Provision violates the nondeleg ation doctrine, the rule that Cong r ess cannot d eleg a te i t s leg islative powers unless it “lay [ s] down by leg islative act a n intellig ible principle to which the pers o n or b ody a uthoriz ed to [ a ct] is directed to conform.” J.W

. Hampton, J

r., & Co. v. United S t a t e s , 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The g overnment arg ues that CB D lacks standin g t o raise this claim. W e r eview jurisdi ct i o nal questions de novo. I n re Gugliuzza
, 852 F .3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2017).

5 T h e d istrict co u rt p erm i tted s ev er a l p arties to in terv en e, i n clu d in g th e P acif ic L eg al Fo u n datio n , A lask a Ou td o o r Co u n cil, Bi g G a m e Fo rev er, Ku rt W h iteh ead
, J o e L etarte, Saf ari Clu b In tern atio n al, th e Natio n al Rif

le A sso ciatio n

o f A m erica, an d th e State o f A lask a.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 14

“To establish standing
, a plaintiff must present an injury that is c oncrete, particulariz ed, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the de fendant’s challeng ed action; a nd redressable by a f

avorable ruling .” Horne v. Flores
, 557 U.S. 433, 445 ( 2009). Conjectural, hy pothetical, or speculative injuries, such as “[ a] lleg at i o ns of p ossible future injury
, ” do
not suffice. W

hitmore v

. Arkansas
, 495 U .S. 149, 158 ( 1 990);

see also Lujan v. Defs. o f W i l dlife
, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). R a t h e r, “[ a] threatened injury must be c ertainly impending to constitute injury in fact.” W hitmore , 495 U.S.
at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Babbitt v

. United F arm W orkers Nat’l U

nion
, 4 4 2 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA
, 568 U .S. 398, 409 ( 2013). A plaintiff must establish stan d i n g for every claim it wishes to challeng e , even where a plaintiff raises the

same leg al challeng e to multiple sections of the same statute. Get Outdoors II, LLC v. City of San Diego
, 506 F .3d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, CB D ’ s c h a lleng e to the Reenactment Provision is leg ally d istinct from its challeng e to the Disapproval Provision and the J oint Resolution. Therefore, C BD m ust separat e l y establish standing for its arg ument that the Reenactment Provision violates the nondeleg ation doctrine. See id. CB D arg ues it has a dequately demonstrated standing because the Reenactment Provisio n deprives I nterior of the ability to reissue the Refug es Rule “in substantially the same form,” or to issue a new rule that is substantially the same a s the Refug es Rule. 5 U.S.C. § 8 0 1 (b)(2). As a result, CB D claims, the Reenactment Provision precludes I nter i o r from protecting wildlife that CB D’s members enjoy obser v i n g in the national w ildlife r efug es in Alaska. According ly
, CB D ’s members have suffered a cog niz able injury in fact due to the operation of the Reenactment Provision.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 15

This arg ument f

ails because CB D’s alleg ed injury rests on

a speculative chain o f f uture possibilities, which do not satisfy the r equirements of Article I I I

. W hitmore
, 495 U .S. at 157–58. “At the pleading stag e, g eneral f actual alleg ations o f injury resulting from the d e f e n dant’s conduct may suffice,” Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 561, but such alleg ations must “permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility o f [injury ]
, ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). CB D’s alleg ed injury h ere is premised on the assumption that I nterior would

r e i ssue the Refug es Rule or a substantially similar rule i f a court ruled that the Reenactment Provision were invalid. B ut CB D alleg ed no f

acts raising a plausible inference that I nterior w ould take such steps, and thus has not “nudg ed” its claim of injury “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
, 5 50 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). B ecause CB D has f ailed to all ege a n i n

jury in fact that is more than speculative, it d oes not have standing to challeng e the Reenactment Provision. W e therefore dismiss CB D’s arg ument that the Reenactment Clause v i olates the nondeleg ation doctrine.

I V

W e nex t turn to CB D’s claim that the Disapproval P ro v ision and the J o int Resolution violate the Take Care Clause.

A

W e first consider w hether the CRA’s J urisdictionStripping Provision bars review o f this constitutional c laim. The J u risdiction-Strip p ing Provision provides that “[ n ] o determination, finding
, action, or omission under this chapter shall b e subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 80 5

. On itsC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 16

face, this lang u ag e bars judicial review of all challeng es to actions under the CRA, including c o nstitutional c halleng es. The Supreme Court has held, however, that when we construe “a statute that p urport s t o deny any judicial f orum for a col o r a b le constitutional claim,” we a pply a heig htened standard. Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury
, 5 67 U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W ebster v. Doe
, 486 U .S. 592, 603 (1988)). Under the applicable canon o f statutory con s t r uction, “where Cong ress intends to preclude judicial r eview of constitutiona l c l ai m s its intent to do so must be clear.” W

ebster , 486 U.S. at 603. I n the absence of

a n ex p licit statutory provision th a t “ b a rs j u d i c i al consideration of appellee’s constitutional claims,” Johnson v

. Robison
, 415 U

. S

. 3 61, 3 6 7 ( 1974) (emphasis added), we should conclude that Cong ress did not intend to “ preclude consideration of colorable c onstitutional claims arising out o f

. . . actions” taken under a federal statute, W ebster
, 486 U.S.
at 603. This rule of statutory construction is nece s s a r y to avoid “the serious constitutional question that would arise if

we constru ed [ a statute] to deny a judicial f orum for constitutional claims.” Bowen v

. Mich. Acad. of Fam i l y Physicians
, 476 U .S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W einberger v. S

alfi
, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975)). B ecause “[ i] t is presumable that Cong ress l eg islates with knowledg e o f [ the Supreme Court’s] basic rules of statutory co nstruction,” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., I nc ., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991), we may p r esume that Cong r ess will use specific lang uag e if it intends to foreclose judicial review o f c onstitutional claims. Here, the J urisdiction-Stripping Provision does not include any ex plicit lang uag e barring judicial review of constitutional claims. Therefore, we presume that Cong ress d id n o t intend to bar such review.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 17

B

B e cause we are not barred from considering CB D ’s constitutional claim, we turn to CB D’s arg ument that the CRA and J oint Resolution violate s eparation-of-powers principles because they interfere with the Ex ecutive B ranch’s duty under the Take Care C l a use of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art I I
, § 3 (“[ The Preside n t ] s h a l l take Care that the L aws be faithfully ex e c uted

. . . .”). As the Supreme Court has ex plained in a naly zing similar claims, a c o urt’s understandi n g of “the reach and purpose” of the constitutional provisi o n at issue (here, the Take Care Clause) must be informed by “[ t] he separation-of

- p o w ers doctrine, and the history that influenced its d esign

. ” B o umediene v

. Bush
, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008).

Cong r ess deleg ated its authority under the Prope rty Clause to manag e the federal wildlife r efug es in Alaska to the Ex ecutive B ranch (i.e., I nterior) pursuant to the National W ildlife Refug e Sy stem Administration Act, the National W ildlife Refug e Sy stem I mprovement Act, and ANI L CA. According t o C BD, Cong r ess did not amend those acts throug h the constitutionally required process of bicameralism and presentment, and therefore I nterior retains all the authority deleg ated by C o n gress in those acts. B y enacting the J o int R e s o l ution, CB D contends, Cong ress r equired I nterio r to r evoke a rule that I nterior deemed necessary for
manag ing the f

ederal wildlife refug e sy stem. Therefore, CB D
arg ues, the J oint Resolution prevents I nterior f r om implementing its constitutional duty to f aithfully ex ecute the laws.

This arg ument fails. W hen Cong ress enacts leg islation that directs an a g ency to issue a particular rule, “Cong ress hasC E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 18

amended the law.” Alliance for the W ild Rockies v. Salazar
, 672 F .3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012). I n Alliance for the W ild Rockies
, Cong ress enacted leg islation ordering the F W S to reissue a rule that had been struck down by a district court on the g round that it violated the Endang ered Species Act. Id. at 1173–74. W e held that the leg islation effectively a m e nded the E ndang ered Species Act. Id. at 1175. Moreover, w e h eld that because the leg islation chang ed the substantive law, it did “not violate the constitutional separation of pow e r s” even t houg h it “ directed an ag e ncy to take particular a ct i o n challeng ed in pending litiga t i o n by chang ing the law applicable to that c ase.” Id

. at 1174. Fo r t h e same reason, validly enacted leg islation that re q u i res an ag ency to take a specified action does not imping e on the Take Care Clause o r violate separation-of-powers principles.

Here
, Cong ress complied with the process o f bicameralism and prese n t m e nt in enacting the J oint Resolution, 6 because the J oint Resolution passed both houses of Cong ress and was sig ned by the Presi d e n t into law. B y enacting the J oint Resolution, Cong ress amended t he substantive environmental law and d e p r i ved the Refug es Rule of any force or effect. A c c o r d i n g ly
, the J oint Resolution is enforceable as a c hang e to substantive law, even thoug h it did
not state that it constituted an a m e n d m ent to the National W ildlife Refug e Sy stem Administration Act, the National W ildlife Refug e Sy stem I mprovement Act, or ANI L CA.

6 A rticle I o f th e Co n stitu

tio n v ests th e leg islativ e p o w er in C o n g ress

an d p rescrib es th e pro cess b y w h ich a b ill b eco m es a la w

. U

. S

. Co n st. art. I, § § 1, 7

. Un d e r th e P resen tm en t Clau se, t h e Ho u s e of Rep resen tativ es an d th e Sen ate m u st each p ass a b ill, an d th en presen t i t to th e P resid en t, w h o m a y t h e n s ig n th e b ill in to law

. U.S. Co n st. art. I, § 7
, cl. 2

. T h is p ro ce s s i s r e fe rred t o as b icam eralism an d p resen tm en t. S ee INS v. Ch a d h a , 4 6 2 U.S. 9 19 , 9 5 1 (1 9 8 3 ).C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 19

B e cause Cong ress p roperly enacted the J oint Resolution, and the refore validly amended I nterior’s authority to administer national wildlife refug e s in Alaska, Cong r ess did

no t prevent the President f rom ex ercising his constitutional duty to faithfully ex ecut e t he laws. I ndeed, the President

now has the constitutional oblig ation to ex ecute the J oint Resolution. U.S. C o n s t. art I I
, § 3; see a lso Alliance for the W ild Rockies
, 672 F .3d at 1174. B e cause the J o int Resolution does not violate the Take Care Clause, CB D’s complaint f ails to state a claim that is plausible on its face.

V

F inally we consider CB D’s statutory claim. CB D c laims that § 801(d)(1) (which all o w s C ong ress to disapprove o f

a rule introduced in the previous Cong ress) applies only
to rules that were s u b mitted “in accordance with” § 801(a)(1)(A) (which provides that “[ b] efore a rule can take effect, the F ederal ag e n cy promulg ating su ch rule” must submit a specified r eport to Cong r ess)

. A c c ording to CB D
, the Ref u ges Rule could not be submitted “in accordance with” § 801(a)(1)(A), because that section requires a federal
ag ency to submit a report to Cong re s s “ [ b ] efore a rule can take effect,” but the Refug es Rule took effect on September 6, 2 016, the date specified b y I nterior, nearly a month before the r e p o rt was submitted to Cong ress. See Refug es Rule, 81 F ed. Reg . at 52248; 5 U.S.C. § 808 (providing that a rule relating to a “reg

ulatory progr a m” for hunting “shall take effect at such time as the F e d e r al ag ency promulg ating the rule determines”). B ecause the Refug e s Rule was n ot elig ible for disapproval in the new session of Cong ress, CB D a rg u es, the J oint Resolution was invalid and it did not authoriz e I nterior to rescind t h e R efug e s Rule. Therefore, CB DC E

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. B E R N H A R D T 20

concludes, I nterior acted ultra v ires in r escinding the Refug e s Rule pursuant to the (invalid) J oint Resolution.

B ec a u s e this claim is b ased o n the statute, we first consider whether the CRA’s J urisdiction-Stripping Provision b a r s judicial review. Cong ress is g enerally free to lim i t t h e jurisdiction of federal courts. U nited States v. H

udson
, 7 Cranch 32, 3 3 (1812). B ut in order to do so, Cong r ess must enact a statute that provides “clear a n d convincing evidence that Cong ress intended to deny ” a c cess to judici a l re v iew. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp F i n

. , Inc.
, 502 U .S. 32, 44 (1991). A statute p rovides su c h c l ear a nd convincing evidence, “and the presumption favoring judicial review [ is] overcome, whenever the cong ressi o n al intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly d iscernible in the statutory scheme.’” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. , 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984) (quoting Ass’n of

Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v

. Camp , 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)).

Here, Cong ress’s intent to preclude judicial review is “fairly d iscernible.” Pursuant to the J u r isdiction-Stripping Provision, we are deprived of jurisdiction to review any claim challeng ing a “determination, f i n d ing
, a ction, or omission” under the CRA. 5 U.S.C. § 805. I n reaching this conclusion,

we join our sister circuits which have likew i s e h e ld that feder a l c o u r

ts do not have jurisdiction over statutory c laims that arise under the CRA. See Montanans For Multiple Use

v. Barbouletos
, 568 F .3d 225, 229 ( D.C. Cir. 2009); Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt
, 509 F .3d 1259, 1271C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 21

n.11 ( 10th Cir. 2007), a brogated on other grounds by Azar v

. Allina Health Servs. , 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019). 7

Here, CB D challeng es Cong ress’s enactment o f the J oint Resolution. B ecause enacting a joint resolut i on o f disapproval is an action under the CRA, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim.

CB D nevertheless arg ues that because the Refug es Rule

was not elig ible for disapproval in th e new session o f Cong r ess, the J oint Resolution was not enacted “ u n der” the CRA and therefore is not a “determination, finding
, a ction, o r omission und e r t h i s chapter” f or p urposes of § 805. I n making this arg ument, CBD relies on I n re Border Infrastructure Environmental Litigation
, which considered a jurisdictional bar imposed b y the I lleg al I mmig r ation Reform and I mmig rant Responsibility Act (I I RI RA). 915 F .3d 1213, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 2019) ( BIEL ). The j u r i s d ictional bar provided that “ [ t] he district c o u rts of the United States shall have ex clusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or claims a rising from any action undertaken, or a ny decision m a d e, by the Se cr e t ary of H omeland Security pursuant to” a statutory

w aiver provision g iving the Secretary authority to w a i v e

c e r tain leg a l requirements. Id. a t 1220 (quoting I I RI R A § 1 0 2(c)(2)(A)). W e held that a p l a i n t i ff’s claim “ arises from” the waiver provision, and is thus su bject to the jurisdictional bar, only when the plaintiff challeng e s a w aiver

7 CB D arg u es th at Lieseg a n g v. S ec’y o f Vetera n s Af

f a irs h eld th at

co u rts h a v e j u risd ictio n to co n sid er statu to ry ch allen g es to th e CRA

. 3 1 2 F.3 d 1 3 6 8
, 1 3 7 3 (Fed

. Cir. 2 0 0 2 ), a men d ed o n reh ’g in p a rt , 6 5 F. A p p ’ x 71 7 ( F e d

. C i r

. 2 0 0 3 ). We d isag ree; th e p lain tif f s in Lieseg an g d i d n o t r a i se th i s issu e, an d t h e Fed eral Circu it th u s h ad n o

o ccasio n to co n sid er it. Id

.C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 22

decision by the ag en cy , not w hen the plaintiff c halleng e s ag ency action authoriz ed by some other part o f the statute. Id. at 1220–21.

CB D contends that (like in BIEL ) a plaintiff’s claim is subject to CRA’s J urisdiction-Stripping Provision only if the plaintiff challeng es an ac t i o n u nder CRA. B ecause CB D is challeng ing I nterior’s rescission of the Refug es Rule a nd not any action under CRA, CB D arg ues, its claim is no t b a r r ed. W e disag ree. CB D challeng es I n terior’s rescission of the Re f u ge s Ru le solely on the g round that Cong ress did not vali d l y e nact the J o int Resolution. Therefore, CB D’s claim necessarily involves a challeng e to a cong r essi o n al “determination, f

inding
, action or omission” under the CRA, and as such is subject to the J urisdiction-Stripping Provision. According ly
, we lack autho ri t y to consider this c laim. 5 U.S.C. § 805. 8

***

I n short, Cong ress’ s e f

forts to ex ercise o versig ht o f fe d e r a l administrative ag e ncies by means of the CRA a re consistent with the “structure of this g overnment, and the d i s tribution of this mass of power a mong its constitue n t parts.” The F ederalist No. 47, p

. 3 2 1 ( J a mes Madison) (Easton Press 1 979). Cong ress can t h e r e f o re use the streamlined procedure in the CRA to disapprove fe d eral

8 B ecau se w e lack j u ri s d i c t i o n to rev iew CB D’ s s tatu to ry claim
, w e d o n o t reach th e qu estio n w h eth er CB D’ s claim is n o n

- j u s t i ciab le u n der th e Ru les Clau se, U.S. Co n st. art. I, § 5
, cl. 2

. S ee Co n sejo d

e Desa rro llo Eco n o mico de Mexica li, A.C. v. Un ited S ta t es , 4 8 2 F.3 d 1 1 5 7
, 1 1 72 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (in terp retin g th e Ru l es Clau se an d co n clu din g th at “ th e Co n stitu tio n tex tu ally co m

m its th e q u estio n o f leg islativ e pro ced u ral ru les
to Co n g ress”).C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y V

. B E R N H A R D T 23

reg ulat i o n s without offending the T a ke Care Clause, a nd Cong r ess has v a lidly deprived us of jurisdiction to consider claims that it violated the CRA’s statutory requirements.

AF F IRMED IN P ART; DISMISSED IN P ART. 9

9 Each p arty

sh all b ear its o w

n co sts.