THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Appellant, 

v. 

Jamie Lee Simpson, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-002210 

Appeal From Richland County 

Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5706 

Heard April 9, 2019 – Filed January 8, 2020 

REVERSED 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 

Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, 

Jr., of Columbia, both for Appellant. 

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, 

for Respondent. 

MCDONALD, J.: The State appealed Jamie Lee Simpson's sentence following 

his guilty plea to four counts of second degree sexual exploitation of a minor, 

arguing the circuit court erred in permitting home detention in lieu of the minimum 

two years' imprisonment mandated by section 16-15-405 of the South Carolina 

Code. We reverse. 

Facts and Procedural History 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On February 19, 2014, Special Investigator Lucinda McKellar of the South 

Carolina Attorney General's Office conducted an online investigation using file 

sharing programs to identify individuals distributing child pornography. McKellar 

was able to download and receive five files containing child pornography from a 

user later identified as Simpson. The videos were explicit and disturbing, 

containing images of children being forced to perform sexual acts and sexual 

assaults against children as young as six. 

During a second investigation in March 2014, McKellar was again able to 

download explicit child pornography from Simpson. After obtaining subscriber 

information, McKellar identified Simpson's Richland County residence as the 

location from which the child pornography was being shared. 

The Richland County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on Simpson's 

home on January 9, 2015, and seized several computers. Simpson admitted to 

police that he searched and downloaded child pornography using a file sharing 

network. A forensic examination revealed child pornography or the remnants and 

artifacts of child pornography on multiple seized devices, with file dates from 2006 

through 2014. The Sheriff's Office arrested Simpson on January 13, 2015, 

charging him with sexual exploitation of a minor in the second degree. 

On November 4, 2015, Dr. Thomas Martin of Martin Psychiatric Services 

conducted a comprehensive psychosexual evaluation of Simpson, which included a 

full interview and the review of discovery and investigative reports provided by the 

State. Dr. Martin concluded Simpson was not a pedophile, a psychopath, or a 

sexual predator. Following the evaluation, Simpson attended group therapy 

sessions with Dr. Martin twice a month. According to Dr. Martin, Simpson 

actively participated in the sessions, showing he was motivated for treatment, and 

cooperated in Dr. Martin's medication regimen, which included treatment for 

depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other combat-related issues. 

Additionally, Dr. Martin opined Simpson is "a very low risk to sexually reoffend." 

In January 2016, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted Simpson on four counts 

of sexual exploitation of a minor in the second degree under section 16-15-405(A) 

of the South Carolina Code (2015).1 Simpson pled guilty to all counts on October 

18, 2016. 

1 "An individual commits the offense of second degree sexual exploitation of a 

minor if, knowing the character or content of the material, he . . . distributes, 

transports, exhibits, receives, sells, purchases, exchanges, or solicits material that 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Second degree sexual exploitation of a minor is classified as a violent felony,2 and 

§ 16-15-405 mandates that upon conviction a person "must be imprisoned not less 

than two years nor more than ten years. No part of the minimum sentence may be 

suspended nor is the individual convicted eligible for parole until he has served the 

minimum sentence." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-405(D) (2015) (emphasis added). 

At sentencing, Simpson requested to serve the two-year, mandatory minimum 

sentence on home detention. Simpson argued serving his sentence on home 

detention would satisfy both the Legislature's penological concerns as well as any 

community safety concerns. Emphasizing his military service and lack of a prior 

criminal history, Simpson argued home detention would protect the public and 

deter future criminal conduct. Additionally, Simpson noted if he were to be 

incarcerated for more than sixty days, he would lose his military benefits and 

retirement pay, causing great financial hardship to his family and the likely loss of 

their home. Concerning his rehabilitation, Simpson argued incarceration "would 

provide no needed treatment or vocational training" and his "continued access to 

private counseling and treatment with Dr. Thomas Martin [would] be far more 

effective to maintain his mental health than the correctional environment of a 

prison." 

After reviewing § 24-13-1530, which addresses home detention programs as an 

alternative to incarceration, the plea court stated, "based on the testimony that was 

heard from Dr. Martin, apparently [Simpson] is a low risk [for reoffending]. The 

question really comes down to the non-violent adult offenders." Acknowledging 

"[t]his particular crime has been classified as violent under the statute," the circuit 

court expressed concern as to whether or not the home detention program "is 

available." However, the court found Simpson "would be a good candidate for 

home detention" and opined that despite the Legislature's classification of second 

degree sexual exploitation of a minor as a "violent offense," "it is not [typically] 

what we consider [a] violent offense." 

Over the State's objection, the plea court sentenced Simpson to four years' 

imprisonment, suspended upon his service of two years' home detention and two 

contains a visual representation of a minor engaged in sexual activity or appearing 

in a state of sexually explicit nudity when a reasonable person would infer the 

purpose is sexual stimulation." § 16-15-405(A). 

2 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 2019). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

years' probation. The court imposed restrictions on the home detention, including 

restricting Simpson to his residence except for work and medical treatment. The 

court ordered electronic monitoring and mandatory continued counseling, 

prohibited Simpson from having access to a personal computer, and required that 

Simpson register as a sex offender. 

Standard of Review 

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v. 

Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). A sentence will not be 

overturned absent an abuse of discretion; an abuse of discretion occurs "when the 

ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary 

support." In re M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010). "A trial 

judge has broad discretion in sentencing within statutory limits." Id. "A judge 

must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear 

on the proper sentence for a particular defendant." Id. 

Law and Analysis 

I. Threshold Mootness Question3 

Simpson argues this case is moot as he has already served the two years of home 

detention, which he argues is the "imprisonment" portion of his sentence. See 

Hayes v. State, 413 S.C. 553, 558, 777 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ct. App. 2015) (explaining an 

individual's completion of a sentence renders an appeal on the propriety of that 

sentence moot); McClam v. State, 386 S.C. 49, 55, 686 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 

2009) (dismissing appeal as moot where the State appealed an order releasing an 

individual after the individual completed the SVP program and was released from 

confinement); In the Interest of Kaundra C., 318 S.C. 484, 486, 458 S.E.2d 443, 

444 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding a juvenile's appeal of her sentence was moot because 

she had already served the determinate sentence). "However, 'an appellate court 

can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if the issue raised is capable of repetition 

3 On October 26, 2018, Simpson moved to dismiss this appeal as moot because he 

had completed his home detention sentence. This court denied Simpson's motion 

by order dated November 19, 2018. On December 6, 2018, Simpson moved to 

amend his final briefs to address the mootness question. The court declined to 

require the parties to amend their briefs, but requested that the parties submit 

supplemental memoranda addressing mootness. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

but evading review.'" Hayes, 413 S.C. at 558–59, 777 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting 

Curtis, 345 S.C. at 568, 549 S.E.2d at 596). 

The State has argued persuasively that the sentencing question raised here is 

capable of repetition yet generally evades review in that the suspension of 

mandatory minimum sentences continues to occur in circuit court, but due to the 

duration of the home detention or probationary portions of such sentences, the 

question presented here generally evades review. At oral argument, the State 

referenced another case involving the suspension of a mandatory minimum 

sentence to home detention pending in this court as well as our prior unpublished 

case, State v. Williams, No. 2014-001886, 2016 WL 6471974 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 

2, 2016). Accordingly, while we find the question of Simpson's own sentence 

moot due to his completion of the determinate home detention portion of the 

sentence, we find this home detention sentencing issue is capable of repetition yet 

generally evades review. Thus, we will address the merits. See Nelson v. 

Ozmint, 390 S.C. 432, 433–34, 702 S.E.2d 369, 370 (2010) (addressing moot issue 

of the Department's calculation of the prisoner's sentence as not including good 

time credits or earned work credits because it was an issue that was capable of 

repetition, yet it would usually evade review); Hayes, 413 S.C. at 558, 777 S.E.2d 

at 9 (taking jurisdiction, despite mootness, because the issue raised was capable of 

repetition but evading review). 

II. Statutory Considerations 

The State argues the circuit court erred in interpreting § 24-13-1530(A) to allow 

two years of home detention as an alternative to §16-15-405's mandatory minimum 

term of two-years' imprisonment because the plain language of § 24-13-1530(A) 

limits its application to "low risk, nonviolent adult and juvenile offenders." We 

agree. 

Section 24-13-1530(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018) provides: 

(A) Notwithstanding another provision of law which requires mandatory 

incarceration, electronic and nonelectronic home detention programs may be 

used as an alternative to incarceration for low risk, nonviolent adult and 

juvenile offenders as selected by the court if there is a home detention 

program available in the jurisdiction. Applications by offenders for home 

detention may be made to the court as an alternative to the following 

correctional programs: 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(1) pretrial or preadjudicatory detention; 

(2) probation (intensive supervision); 

(3) community corrections (diversion); 

(4) parole (early release); 

(5) work release; 

(6) institutional furlough; 

(7) jail diversion; or 

(8) shock incarceration. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-1530(A). Simpson pled guilty to four counts of sexual 

exploitation of a minor in the second degree under § 16-15-405. The sentencing 

provision of § 16-15-405 mandates: 

(D) A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony 

and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned not less than two years nor more 

than ten years. No part of the minimum sentence may be suspended nor is 

the individual convicted eligible for parole until he has served the minimum 

sentence. 

Second degree sexual exploitation of a minor is a violent crime. See S.C. Code 

Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 2019) (stating "[f]or purposes of definition under South 

Carolina law, a violent crime includes the offenses of . . . sexual exploitation of a 

minor second degree (Section 16-15-405)." 

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative 

intent." State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2011) (quoting 

Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). "As such, a court 

must abide by the plain meaning of the words of a statute." Id. "When interpreting 

the plain meaning of a statute, courts should not resort to subtle or forced 

construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." Id. "Where the statute's 

language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the 

rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose 

another meaning." Id. (quoting Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581). "What 

a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the 

legislative intent." Id. at 587, 713 S.E.2d at 622–23 (quoting Hodges, 341 S.C. at 

85, 533 S.E.2d at 581). "Although it is a well-settled principle of statutory 

construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the state and in 

favor of the defendant, courts must nevertheless interpret a penal statute that is 

clear and unambiguous according to its literal meaning." Id. at 587, 713 S.E.2d at 

623. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In accepting the plea, the circuit court expressed its concern that the home 

detention statute might be inapplicable to Simpson, noting home detention 

programs are available only to "nonviolent" offenders—and Simpson was pleading 

to charges statutorily defined as "violent." Compare § 16-1-60 (defining violent 

crimes) with S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-70 (2015) (defining "nonviolent crimes" as 

"all offenses not specifically enumerated in Section 16-1-60."). By its own terms, 

§ 24-13-1530(A) applies only to "nonviolent" offenders.4 

We are unable to reconcile that the Legislature would consider the crime of sexual 

exploitation of a minor in the second degree so serious as to enact a minimum 

sentence of not less than two years imprisonment—and require that no portion of 

such minimum sentence may be suspended—with the circuit court's decision to 

allow Simpson to serve the minimum two-year sentence in the same home where 

he participated in the file sharing of child pornography. See State v. Sweat, 386 

S.C. 339, 351, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) ("Courts will reject a statutory 

interpretation which would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have 

been intended by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention. A 

statute should be construed so that no word, clause, sentence, provision, or part 

shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous.") (internal citations omitted). We 

find the only reasonable interpretation of § 24-13-1530 is that the Legislature did 

not intend a person convicted of a "violent offense" as classified in § 16-1-60 be 

considered a "nonviolent offender" for purposes of substituting home detention for 

a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.5 

Conclusion 

4 In an unpublished opinion, Williams, supra, this court found the plea court abused 

its discretion in sentencing Williams to one year of house arrest "because the home 

detention statute does not apply to trafficking in marijuana, ten to one hundred 

pounds, first offense." Id. at *3. Declining to find the matter moot, the panel 

reversed and remanded for resentencing. Id. at *1–2. This court found the plea 

court erred in interpreting § 24-13-1530 to allow a sentence of house arrest for a 

violent crime "when the plain language of the statute unambiguously states it only 

applies to "low risk, nonviolent adult and juvenile offenders." Id. at *1. 

5 Moreover, the nature of the material Simpson sought out and viewed—along with 

the fact that he repeatedly accessed the material over several years—foreclosed any 

finding that he was a "low risk, nonviolent" offender. 
 

 

 

 

For offenses classified as "violent" under § 16-1-60 of the South Carolina Code, 

§ 24-13-1530 does not authorize the substitution of home detention for a statutory 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. 

REVERSED. 

LOCKEMY, C.J. and SHORT, J., concur.