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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. 

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 

Centers for Disease Control

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

Y-12 Plant Work Group

Thursday, September 24, 2020

The Work Group convened via Videoconference, at 

1:00 p.m. EDT, R. William Field, Chair, presiding. 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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2 

Present: 

R. William Field, Chair

Genevieve Roessler, Member

Loretta Valerio, Member

Also Present: 

Rashaun Roberts, Designated Federal Official

Nancy Adams, NIOSH Contractor

Bob Barton, SC&A

Terrie Berrie, ANWAG

Grady Calhoun, DCAS

Nancy Chalmers, DCAS

Rose Gogliotti, SC&A

Joe Guido, ORAU

Stephen Hicks

Lara Hughes, DCAS 

Mark Lewis, ATL

Jenny Naylor, HHS

Chuck Nelson, DCAS

Lavon Rutherford, DCAS

Tim Taulbee, DCAS
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

3 

Contents

Centers for Disease Control National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health Y-12 Plant Work Group 

Thursday, September 24, 2020 1

Roll Call/Welcome by Rashaun Roberts 4

Overview of Y-12 Plant Efforts, NIOSH 

Presentation by Dr. Hughes 5

SC&A Review of the SEC-00250 Evaluation 

Report for the Y-12 Plant (February 21, 2020)

42

Adjourn 56
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4

Proceedings

(10:30 a.m.)

Roll Call/Welcome by Rashaun Roberts

Dr. Roberts: So, good afternoon. Welcome to the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. 

This video and teleconference is for the Y-12 

Working Group. I'm Rashaun Roberts. I'm the DFO 

for the Advisory Board.

So before we move into Work Group business, and I 

can hear some background noises, so if people 

could mute, please. That would be great. Can you 

still hear me?

Chair Field: Yes.

Dr. Roberts: Okay, great. So let's go ahead and 

move into roll call. And also address conflict of 

interest. And I'll speak to that with respect to the 

members of the Board, who sit on this Working 

Group.

Really, in order for them to be on the Working 

Group, they really cannot have any conflict. So let 

me move into the roll call. And I will start with the 

members of the Board who are on this Work Group, 

starting with our Chair.

(Roll call.)

Dr. Roberts: Okay, very good. Well, with the 

attendance completed, I'd like to welcome all of 

you.

Let me just go over a couple of additional items 

before we get started. Before I give the floor over to 

Bill Field, who I had mentioned is the Chair for this 

Work Group.
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5

Again, in order to keep things running smoothly and 

with minimal disruption, please mute your phone 

unless you're speaking of course. If you're on the 

phone and you don't have a mute button, press *6 

to mute. If you need to take yourself off, *6 again.

If you're on Zoom, the mute button is at the bottom 

lower left hand corner of your screen, I believe.

The agenda and the presentations and other 

documents that are relevant to today's meeting can 

be found on the NIOSH/DCAS website. All of these 

materials were sent to the Board Members and staff 

prior to the meeting.

So with that business covered, let's get started. And 

I'm going to turn it over to you, Bill.

Chair Field: Okay, thanks so much. So this is our 

first meeting of the Work Group. And I know we've 

been a Work Group for a while, but it's nice to 

finally have something to work on. And now that we 

have a start, there's a good number of things that 

we have to cover today.

So we have an agenda that's pretty straight forward 

and hopefully we just get to that. So the first thing I 

have on the agenda is the NIOSH presentation, it's 

sort of an overview presentation by Lara.

Overview of Y-12 Plant Efforts, NIOSH Presentation 

by Dr. Hughes

Dr. Hughes: Yes, okay. So let me try to see if I can 

share my screen.

Chair Field: Yes, looks good.

Dr. Hughes: Can you see that, can you see the 

presentation?

Chair Field: Yes, yes.
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6

Dr. Hughes: Okay, I'm not sure what it looks like on 

your end. So, I'm trying to go into presentation 

mode. Okay, so I'm not sure why it's not at the 

beginning, okay.

Chair Field: Yes, it looks good.

Dr. Hughes: Can you see the first, the title slide 

now?

Chair Field: Yes, looks good.

Dr. Hughes: Okay, great that worked. I've never 

done a Zoom presentation, I've only done Skype, 

so. Alright.

So good morning, good afternoon. This is the Y-12 

update to the Work Group. It's some background on 

what all is going on with Y-12. It's a large site. 

There's been a lot of work going on over the course 

of the project. And there will be more work going 

on. So there's quite a lot.

I'm the health physicist with NIOSH that oversees 

this. That does not mean I do the majority of the 

work, by no means. There is a very large team of 

the ORAU contract staff that is involved in this work 

and they know vastly more about the site than I do. 

So, I just like to give credit where credit is due.

So, this my overview. I give you three slides of 

background, which again does not even come close 

to the scope of what Y-12 does or did. But I just 

tried to keep it somewhat brief.

I talk about the SEC petition history for the NIOSH 

project. There have been several. Then I'll focus on 

the SEC-250, the current, somewhat current 

petition evaluation. And also I'll talk a little about 

the Evaluation Report Addendum and what the 

status is of that.
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7

Briefly, addressing what's going on with the coexposure effort and the Y-12 issues matrix. And 

then at the end we'll address the recent petitioner's 

submission. So the petitioner for the most recent 

SEC submitted a write-up with some issues and we 

would like to address those. And then there will be 

room for questions and discussion.

So, Y-12 background, it's an 811 acre site. It's 

located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It's about three 

miles long, half a mile, a little over half a mile wide. 

It's a very large site. The peak employment was 

22,000 workers. And they're roughly down to 5,700 

by 1998. And the EEOICPA covered period is 1942 

to the present.

A little bit of the site history is generally divided into 

three, what we call three eras. The first, the very 

first era that goes to 1946 was the uranium 

enrichment, and the calutrons. The second era goes 

roughly to 1994 was cold war nuclear weapons 

components manufacturing, which includes 

production of key components of nuclear weapons. 

Stockpiling of highly enriched uranium and 

technology development for new weapons designs.

The third era after 1994 consisted of what we call 

multiple new missions. They continued storing of 

highly enriched uranium, smaller scale of weapons 

parts production. And also looking into 

environmental and waste management issues.

The last two SEC petitions that were done for Y-12 

focused mostly on the thorium that was processed 

at the site. Because it's a large challenge from an 

internal dosimetry perspective.

So the production of thorium parts began in 1959. 

This process involved what we call arc melting, 

which is a process where the thorium is melted into 

various shapes. And those shapes are then 
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8

processed to produce metal parts for nuclear 

weapons.

The arc melting, the issue with arc melting is that 

the not only the thorium that is present in the 

metal, but also the thorium decay products. 

Because thorium is a member of a decay chain. And 

what happens is that the radium that's a part of the 

decay chain, volatilizes before the parts of the 

decay chain. Volatilize, so it creates an internal dose 

hazard.

The main production period is 1961 through the 

mid-1970s when metric ton quantities of this metal 

were processed. And there was a smaller scale 

effort that went on until 1989.

And In 1994, the plant was moved into a stand 

down mode. And the only thorium work that went 

on after that was like special work projects.

I'd like to point out though that the thorium 

production was a small, was a relatively small part 

of the overall Y-12 effort. The main thing they 

processed is uranium.

So, as for the Y-12 SEC petitions, here's the table. 

The two top rows they're kind of pink colored. This 

is the current effort that is going on. So, SEC-250 

was evaluated last year. And NIOSH recommended 

that the Class be added to the SEC for 1976 through 

the middle of 1979.

And also determined that dose reconstruction is 

feasible for part of the qualified period. And part of 

the qualified period was also reserved during that 

evaluation because some additional research 

needed to be done. And that period is from 1987 to 

1994. And that is an ongoing effort.

The previous SEC petitions, SEC-251 was evaluated 
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9

around '19 -- sorry, 2018, and added the Class to 

the SEC for Y-12 for 1958 through 1976. And this 

was also, that was due to infeasibility to reconstruct 

doses from thorium, and plutonium-241. And 

there's some early SEC Classes that effectively 

added all the period up to 1957 to the SEC.

So, this most recent petition evaluation, SEC-250, 

this Evaluation Report was presented to the 

Advisory Board in August 2019. Again, a Class was 

recommended to be added to the SEC from the 

beginning of 1977 through the end of July, 1979. 

This Class became effective in November of 2019. 

And it determined that dose reconstruction is 

feasible for the period that was not recommended 

from August 1979 through the end of 1986.

And again, there was a reserve period starting in 

1987 going through the end of 1994. This period 

was reserved because there were data accessibility 

issues at Y-12. Essentially, we were looking for 

thorium in vivo data. And we knew it was available, 

but we didn't actually have it or have access to it. 

And so, we needed more time to evaluate this.

SC&A has since issued a review of SEC-250, 

Evaluation Report that came out in February of this 

year. And also NIOSH has issued a response paper 

to the SC&A review. And I'll get to that in just a 

minute.

So, for SEC-250 the petition qualified based on 

basis F.4 for issues related to in vivo thorium data. 

It's actually an issue that came out of the previous 

SEC evaluation, SEC-251, which was an 83.14 

petition. The reason it has a higher number has 

something to do with how long some of these 

evaluations take, and when the petition was 

received.

So, what we evaluated was the feasibility to 
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10

reconstruct internal doses from thorium. Again, 

during this evaluation we identified three different 

periods, 1977 through 1979, when thorium internal 

data is only available in milligram results. We have 

no calibration data available. And therefore, the 

thorium dose reconstruction is infeasible and NIOSH 

recommended the Class.

From 1979 through 1986 the thorium in vivo data 

are available and they have in vivo count data for 

lead-212 and actinium-228 available. These data 

can then be used to bound internal thorium doses 

with available methods, and therefore NIOSH 

concluded that dose reconstruction is feasible.

From 1987 through 1994 thorium data are available 

but they had to be collected and analyzed and 

evaluated. And therefore NIOSH recommended to 

reserve that period until the time when we had a 

chance to look at this data.

The SEC-250 Evaluation Report by SC&A, I do 

believe SC&A will actually present this today and go 

into a little more detail. And I'm going to address 

this very briefly. There are four findings, 12 

observations. And some of the main points were the 

scope of work of thorium, process, the quantity and 

quality of the thorium in vivo data. They looked at 

job categories. They looked at uranium, the 

uranium data that was used in the existing coexposure model for Y-12. They addressed some 

exposure at Y-12 to workers machining uranium or 

machining metal parts. And they also had a finding 

on exotic radionuclides, especially plutonium-241, 

which actually is related to RPRT-90, which actually 

an ORNL effort. So we don't really address it under 

Y-12.

So, NIOSH issued a response to the SC&A review of 

SEC-250 that came out in June of this year. And 

really a lot of the findings were kind of addressing 
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11

or going a little further ahead than we are with the 

thorium evaluation at this point. A lot of the findings 

were kind of pursuing or looking at a potential 

future thorium co-exposure model. And what would 

be required of that.

And so we actually are not quite there yet to issue a 

co-exposure model. So to address these comments 

what we're willing to say is that any thorium coexposure model will be based on the new coexposure guidelines. And also, you know, at the 

level of the data completeness evaluation.

One issue was regarding the thorium inventory data 

lacking and we actually were able to collect some 

inventory data late in 2019. And that is available 

now in the NIOSH Site Research Database. There's 

also some comments on the existing co-exposure 

models.

And as most of you are aware, there's new 

guidelines for co-exposure models so any revision of 

existing co-exposure models would follow those new 

guidelines, including the one for Y-12. That's 

actually on ongoing process right now.

One finding regarding the monitoring ability of 

plutonium-241, NIOSH responded that this 

addressed in the previous Evaluation Report, SEC251 when it states at what date the data becomes 

available for this nuclide and monitoring capacity is 

there. And overall there's some remaining issues for 

RPRT-90 and those are addressed under the ORNL 

effort.

So, the Y-12 addendum, again the reserved period 

is 1987 to 1994. What we had to do to address this 

-- to complete this addendum was additional data 

requests to Y-12 for in vivo thorium data.

And this data has been received by NIOSH. We do 
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12

have the data, and then but this in the form of 

database output, so there had to be several calls

and emails to Y-12 to clarify and corroborate 

information on thorium data.

So, just because the data is in the form of database, 

doesn't necessarily mean it's necessarily easier to 

use for the people analyzing it, because they need 

to go through significant effort to understand what 

exactly this data represents.

There were several different issues with the 

available data. One involved the lack of lead-212 

channel data in the records from 1992 to 1994. And 

that was actually something that we were able to 

address by some analysis that was done by Dr. 

Neton. And this was published earlier this year in 

the form of DCAS RPRT-8 that is available on the 

NIOSH website.

And the current status of the addendum is that it 

will be finalized after receiving final data clarification 

from Y-12. With Y-12 their response had been 

hampered a little bit by the current situation, in that 

not all of their staff is or was working in the office. 

So, there has been a little bit of slow because of 

that.

So, co-exposure model revisions, the current effort 

on this front for Y-12 is the revision of the external 

co-exposure model using current methods. And that 

addresses the need to update some of the older 

OTIBs 44, 45, 46 and OTIB-64.

And what that specifically involves is to perform the 

data analysis of Y-12 data using the new guidance. 

And completely revise the existing external coworker model -- co-exposure model, sorry, with the 

new guidelines. And I think once this is completed, I 

think we might look into the internal co-exposure 

model, but I could not give you any timeline.
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13

So, what this involved is the database evaluation. Y12 has a lot of the data they require. So the data is 

available in various databases. But again, this data 

has to be looked at and understood, and has to be 

figured out basically what it means. And what do we 

do if it's not in exactly the format that we need?

So, what's currently going on is that the instructions 

are being developed to do the statistical analysis. 

There were several questions to the Y-12 dosimetry 

staff to clarify issues with the datasets, so the 

statisticians can correctly interpret the data.

Some of these issues, for example, involved things 

like the exchange frequency of badges, wear time 

gaps, wear time overlaps, which means if there's 

gaps in the dosimetry data, what exactly does that 

mean and things like that?

We did receive responses back from Y-12. They 

were actually very helpful, very responsive and 

provided answers. And we received that back in 

mid-September so that's being looked at and 

addressed, and then this effort is moving forward.

The next thing that's going on with Y-12 is the Y-12 

issues matrix. This is something from way before I 

started on the project. There was an SC&A review of 

the Y-12 documents, the TBD and some of the TIBs 

from around 2005. I had first became involved in 

that around 2008, when there was an effort to 

address some of these issues.

However, then what happened is that the former Y12 Work Group retired. And this effort was put on 

hold. Since then, lots of the documents have been 

revised.

So, some of these issues might just have been 

addressed through a revision, and data being 

incorporated. We've also incorporated several SEC 
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14

Classes and the new co-exposure models are on the 

way.

So, where we're at now with this is that we have to 

reassess what of those issues remain and need to 

be resolved. And lastly, there has been some 

communication from the petitioner for SEC-250.

The first part was that they contacted NIOSH with a 

suggestion that we should interview a former 

worker from Y-12 that had experience with the in 

vivo counting facility. And so this individual was 

interviewed along with the petitioner.

And there were some issues addressed, or some 

points were made by the interviewees, such as that 

the workers received hand contamination from 

machining. That employees were indeed surveyed 

before in vivo counts, but the survey also 

sometimes was a reason that people were rejected 

for in vivo count, because they were being 

contaminated.

There was some allegations that survey meter use 

was done incorrectly, which would suggest a bias 

towards detecting surface contamination when none 

was present. And then that contaminated workers 

were deferred from receiving an in vivo count.

It was stated that workers were restricted from 

work if they were found contaminated. And kind of 

the contention was that this might have produced a 

frequency of in vivo counts that might have shown 

exposure in workers.

The transcript for this interview will be available in 

the Site Research Database. It's not currently there 

yet because it's still in the upload process. This was 

done, the interview was done within the last month 

and the interview transcript has to be cleared before 

it's uploaded.
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15

So there was some additional submission. It was a 

write-up submitted that was titled, Analysis of 

Working Conditions, Worker Exposures and 

Monitoring, from 1980 to 1994. Those were received 

in August and that is available to the Work Group, 

and SC&A, in the DSA application.

The issues that were raised in this document were 

compliance issues. Some discussion of the database 

quality for Y-12. There were some issues were 

brought up from the previous SC&A review of the Y12 TBD from 2005.

Some contention was made that worker records are 

not available for dose reconstructions. And there 

was this issue that machinists were not wearing 

gloves or long sleeves when they were machining 

uranium parts because of the entrapment hazard.

This was reviewed by NIOSH, and in a nutshell, 

there's no information that would indicate that 

there's an infeasibility for thorium in vivo dose 

reconstruction. Or any of the other nuclides such as 

uranium for the reserved period.

So, I have a little more detailed table here that 

addresses these issues. So, the first issue was that 

the CER dose records are not of sufficient quality 

and can therefore not be applied for the NIOSH 

coworker model. And the reference that was used 

was for a very specific item related to this CER 

database.

And we looked into this reference and found out, 

you know, the CER database has undergone a 

quality control and has been found suitable for use. 

And also one contention was that the dose data that 

is reported from this database is not sufficient. But, 

you know, I'd like to just point out that NIOSH uses 

bioassay data when they do those. They do not use 

the reported doses.
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16

There was a statement that the lead-212 

background level is too high for in vivo analysis of 

thorium. This is not something that we were able to 

find in the references provided with this document. 

What we found when analyzing data for the 

addendum is that the lead-212 lung count 

methodology, or that the lead-212 data from the 

lung count is available. And there is a methodology 

that is available for dose reconstructions starting in 

the middle of 1979.

There was a statement made that thorium lung 

counting was discontinued in 1984. And we have 

not found that. That might be an issue with how, 

what do you call it? I mean if you called it thorium 

analysis, you may not find it in the records because 

the radionuclides that we look for is actually 

actinium-228 and lead-212, which are used to infer 

the thorium lung burden from the in vivo count.

There was a statement that insoluble, internal dose 

monitoring was not done until 1981. That was a 

very specific comment related to Y-12 reinstating 

fecal monitoring. It's not directly related to the 

NIOSH ability to assess internal doses, because 

suitable bioassay is available at Y-12 prior to 1989 

as defined in the Technical Basis Document and 

other documents.

There was a contention that bioassay for some 

workers was more frequent than for others. 

Generally NIOSH has not observed, excuse me, that 

there's a bias toward salaried workers in the 

records. But, you know, this is something that could 

be addressed with the available dose reconstruction 

method.

Again, there was the issue of machinists being 

required to work without arm/hand coverings. That 

is a very valid issue with that. NIOSH has reviewed 

and actually can address in dose reconstructions 
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17

when necessary.

And also that some machinists were not monitored. 

Internally unmonitored dose can be assigned using 

the co-exposure models. There was a statement 

that supervisors determined who needed 

respirators. That is not directly related to whether 

or not NIOSH can do dose reconstruction. And 

generally for respirators that's taken into account 

during dose reconstructions.

There was an issue that uncertainties in bioassay 

data needed to be addressed. This was related to 

the super S plutonium and 48 hour samples. This 

was from the, I do believe it was from the early 

activity review from 2005. This has been, to some 

extent, addressed.

Methodology for super S plutonium has been 

developed, and some other issues related to 

bioassay data may still need to be addressed. We 

still need to look into that.

There was a statement that air monitoring is 

insufficient to estimate internal doses. This was 

specifically related to environmental dose, I believe. 

And we looked into this allegation, and this is 

something related to, yes, the environmental TBD 

which at this point provides an alternative 

methodology to arrive at a more claimant-favorable 

estimation of environmental internal dose.

And I do believe this is the last slide. There were 

several issues that came out of the Tiger Team 

report for Y-12, some findings related to air 

monitoring. Again, those are somewhat, they're 

more related to compliance issues and they do not 

affect the dose reconstruction feasibility for Y-12.

There was just allegation that other radionuclides 

were not monitored. Again, this was related to the, 
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information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

18

this was related internal dose. And that is addressed 

in the revised version of the TBD which contains 

guidance on the interpretation and assessment of 

exposure from the nuclides listed in this Petitioner's 

submission.

Some additional assessment may be needed on this 

part. This is also something that will be addressed 

in the issues matrix revision. There was one finding 

regarding 10 CFR 835 requirements on PNADS. This 

is not something that would affect NIOSH dose 

reconstruction.

There was several DOE regulation issues such as 

workers eating or smoking in work areas. Again, 

this is a compliance issue that does not impact the 

NIOSH feasibilities to complete dose reconstructions 

for Y-12 claims.

And another statement was that worker dosimetry 

data is not available, or that it is incorrect. Not sure, 

there might be a difference between what, you 

know, an individual, a former employees might be 

able to receive from the site and what NIOSH 

typically receives in response to the request for 

dose reconstruction.

But worker dosimetry data at Y-12 has been 

reviewed and found suitable for dose reconstruction 

approaches and co-exposure models. And again, the 

issue was that workers have trouble accessing their 

own records. And it assumes that NIOSH has the 

same issue.

NIOSH does receive worker records from Y-12. So 

that has not been an issue. Y-12 has been very 

forthcoming with -- or has been forthcoming with 

information when asked.

And that is my update to the Work Group, so I'll 

give it over to questions and discussions. I know it's 
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19

covered a lot of ground here, so.

Chair Field: Lara, thank you for that interesting 

presentation. You're right it does cover a lot of 

ground. So, it sounds like we've a number of 

unsolved issues with the co-exposure model 

completion, and then matrix issues. So it sounds 

like there's a good bit of work to do yet.

Dr. Hughes: There is, I wouldn't say unresolved 

issues with the co-exposure model. It's just that it 

takes time and work and effort. It's a large effort 

and so it's not so much a problem, as it is a large 

effort at this point.

Chair Field: Probably the effort I guess.

Dr. Hughes: Yes, well.

Chair Field: Just in that way. Yes, so I want to make 

sure Gen has a chance. I'm not sure how long she 

can stick around. Do you have any questions, Gen?

(No audible response.)

Chair Field: She's still with us, I think. Yes, she's 

still with us. Gen, you on mute by chance?

Well, I think she's still there, well it says Owner is 

still there.

Member Valerio: Dr. Field.

Chair Field: Yes.

Member Valerio: This is Loretta.

Chair Field: Okay, Loretta. I don't see Gen. Do you 

have any questions?

Member Valerio: No, but I have an urgent call, so I 

need to step away for about two minutes.
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20

Chair Field: Okay.

Member Valerio: Okay.

Chair Field: Okay.

Member Valerio: So, I will be right back.

Chair Field: Okay. Our Committee got much, much 

smaller. Gen, I still see you're there. Are you able to 

hear us, do you have any questions?

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Roessler: I'm here, everything on is still 

punched, yes.

Chair Field: No questions?

Member Roessler: No questions.

Chair Field: Okay, I just had a quick question. In 

the exposure model, is thoron actually included 

within that model for exposure?

Dr. Hughes: I'm sorry, could you repeat the 

question?

Chair Field: Yes, is thoron included within the 

exposure models?

Dr. Hughes: No.

Chair Field: Okay. Is there a potential for thoron 

exposure?

Dr. Hughes: I'm not sure. It has not been 

addressed.

Chair Field: Yes, I'm just wondering. Maybe it's 

something someone else could address or we can 

discuss at a later time?
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21

So I guess at this point if there's no other 

questions, maybe it'd be worth probably to move on 

to SC&A review? And Bob, you able to present that?

Mr. Barton: Yes, absolutely. Can everybody hear me 

okay?

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Hicks: This is Steve Hicks, I just --

Chair Field: I'm sorry, Is someone else talking?

Mr. Hicks: Yes, this is Steve Hicks. I just want to 

make the Work Group aware that 9203, Beta 3 was 

a Oak Ridge National Lab building, but it was 

located on the Y-12 side. And the Y-12 employees is 

the ones that was in the building.

And they also, you know, had plutonium-241. And 

they had it stored in that building, up to, into the 

cleanup in and around 2007/9. You know, when 

Obama issued money for the cleanup. And that was 

still in the building at that time. So I just wanted to 

make the Work Group aware of that.

Chair Field: Okay, thanks Steve, I appreciate that.

So, Bob do you want to share your screen time?

Mr. Barton: Yes, can everybody see?

Chair Field: Yes, we can see it.

Mr. Barton: Slide show should have just popped up. 

Okay, great. And can everybody hear me okay?

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Chair Field: Yes, there you go, looks good.

Mr. Barton: Alright, great, great. Alright I'll move 

right along here. This first slide here is sort of a 
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22

repeat of what Dr. Hughes already covered. So I 

won't spend a lot of time on it.

But I think one of the main things here is that as 

you see, investigation is mainly centered around 

whether it's feasible to reconstruct thorium 

exposure, though there are a couple of other issues 

that were discussed at the August 2019 meeting 

that are also addressed here that were included as 

part of SC&A's focused tasking for this review.

So this slide here, it describes our review approach. 

And the real key question from our point of view is, 

is dose reconstruction to unmonitored workers 

feasible?

The other side of that coin is if you have a 

monitored worker, can you use those records? In 

other words are the measurements adequate to be 

able to use in dose reconstruction?

But beyond that, and we'll address adequacy with 

thorium in vivo monitoring later in this presentation, 

but I think the main question here, and as Lara 

indicted, a lot of the responses to SC&A's review 

centered around the development of a co-exposure 

model, which again, has relatively new 

implementation criteria.

And the three main sort of facets of that criteria are 

completeness, adequacy, and representativeness. 

So we're going to get into each of those.

As I said, there was an additional concern, 

regarding uranium exposure that was discussed 

back in August 2019. And it was brought up and 

specifically with exposure of machinists who were 

doing that sort of metal work. So SC&A was tasked 

with specifically looking into that as well.

And then the other facet of this is what about other 
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23

sources beyond thorium and uranium exposures at 

Y-12? Because there was sort of a wide variety of 

work going on in those three facilities down in 

Tennessee. So we'll address that briefly as well.

However, that review really centered around a 

separate report, RPRT-90 that SC&A also reviewed 

back in 2018. But we'll briefly address how that 

applies here.

So, the first thing we looked at in any type of these 

reviews is what is contained on the Site Research 

Database as far as documentation? We really want

to see if there's more information about production, 

the management, the thorium, information about 

worker exposures and different exposure 

configurations.

And as I said before, the efficacy of the method. Is 

the in vivo method used to measure thorium 

adequate? And for monitored workers, and if it's 

adequate for monitored workers, then the follow-on 

question is can it be used to formulate a coexposure model for those workers who are not 

monitored?

And so we looked at captured documents and these 

really go again to that adequacy completeness and 

representativeness. So adequacy again, can we use 

the method to accurately measure the exposure 

we're interested in? In this case, thorium and its 

daughter products, completeness, again we're 

looking for documents of what locations handled the 

thorium.

The Site Profiles for Y-12, which was back in, I think 

it was last updated in 2007, contains a fairly 

complete, but maybe partial list. So we did discover 

some additional documentation in the Site Research 

Database that expands a bit, and mostly confirms 

that list that was found in the TBD, which again was 
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24

updated way back in 2007.

So our review has a list of about 14 specific 

locations. But it's really not clear to us from the 

documentation, to what extent or what time periods 

they were necessarily were specifically thorium 

areas. Did they share operations with uranium? So 

there's some uncertainty there.

You know, also what was the magnitude of this 

source term over time? Are there other potentials or 

sources of thorium exposure that really have not 

been considered yet in the ER? And this review also 

included three particularly germane interviews with 

former workers that were conducted back in 2018 

regarding thorium.

Now, so that's sort of the completeness approach 

for SRDB documentation. We're going to get into 

some completeness analysis and the actual dataset 

in a little bit.

And then that third facet representativeness, what 

types of workers and specifically job types were 

included in the thorium processing, and by 

extension should have been monitored, or were 

monitored?

And again, we have interviews and other 

documents. And if you look at Table 1 of the SC&A 

review, there were a number of specific job titles 

that were found in the SRDB documentation that 

would be associated with thorium work.

These would include the radiological engineers, 

process quality control workers, procedure 

coordinators, system engineers, supervisors, 

process engineers, boilermakers, plant 

maintenance, chemical recovery, machinists, your 

laborers, janitors, and material handlers. That was 

the list we got from, specifically from 
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25

documentation.

There are probably more, and as you'll see a little 

bit later, we did do a job specific scoping analysis. 

Just to get an idea of who in that thorium dataset 

was actually monitored and who we have records 

for?

The other thing we looked at is what departments 

typically handled the thorium work? And again, we 

looked into the SRDB, that's the Site Research 

Database. And we had trouble necessarily 

differentiating specific thorium departments from 

uranium departments. It seems there was a lot of 

overlap. They might be doing thorium work at one 

time and uranium work at another time.

So, if you look at Table 2 in our report, we listed 33 

distinct department numbers that we found in the 

documentation that had the potential for thorium 

work, but the question is, is this list exhaustive? We 

really don't know. Tend to think it probably isn't but 

that's the state of information we had when we did 

this review.

And this comes with Observation 1, and I'll just read 

this one because it's important to understand that 

when we did this review, there are some limitations 

because of key information and data we had at the 

time. But again as Dr. Hughes indicated, as coexposure models are developed, each of these 

facets really should be filled in with additional data 

and information.

So, anyway Observation 1 and I think this one is 

important to sort of read into the record, says, 

"Although SC&A uncovered additional information 

concerning process departments and areas 

associated with thorium work, no definitive list was 

identified to aid in assessing the scope of thorium 

monitoring at the Y-12 plant.
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26

"Sought-after documentation might have included 

those workers actually classified as thorium workers 

in addition to department and work area 

designations. Such information would have aided in 

evaluating the monitoring program's effectiveness."

And as Dr. Hughes indicated, the response, and this 

is a common theme, is that essentially these issues 

that SC&A brings up should be addressed through 

the proper implementation of new co-exposure 

guidelines, which I believe were possibly approved 

by the Board, I believe last year.

If anyone has any questions, please jump in. 

Otherwise I will just keep going on.

Okay, now this is specifically talking about the 

completeness of thorium data that we have in hand. 

So, the typical way we do this is you find an overall 

report, and usually these would quarterly reports or 

monthly reports by the Health Physics Department 

that actually lists how many people or how many 

samples you have in a given timeframe.

And then we compare that total to the number of 

samples that we have in hand that were used in coexposure models. Now, unfortunately, the state of 

the data when we did this review was that we only 

had those HP quarterly reports for eight of the 

quarters during the period of interest.

And this was not because the other HP quarterly 

reports didn't exist. It's that they simply stopped 

reporting the total number of thorium in vivo 

counts.

So we had those reports up through the third 

quarter of 1981. And then obviously the period of 

interest we were looking at here specifically ended 

in 1986. It's because after that period it is reserved.
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27

So that was essentially Finding 1. So there's very 

limited information available to determine the 

completeness of the data we have in hand. But for 

the limited comparison we had for those eight 

quarters, it showed a pretty good agreement. We 

had about 95 percent of the data in hand, when we 

compare it to those summary reports.

And the NIOSH response is again, is NIOSH really 

committed to a full completeness evaluation during 

the formulation of their co-exposure model, which 

again will be in line with the co-exposure 

guidelines?

Sort of a parallel observation here, that was 

Observation 4, was that SC&A found additional 

thorium monitoring records that may supplement. 

Some of the in vivo records were actually 

designated as uranium, though during the uranium 

count, they also reported lung burdens of lead-212 

and actinium-228 that might also be used to expand 

on the dataset we currently have for co-exposure 

modeling.

And NIOSH's response was that again, they intend 

to perform a formal completeness analysis and that 

will include any additional records that are captured, 

including the ones identified by SC&A.

Moving onto slide 6. Aside from the comparison to 

health physics quarterly reports, another potential 

way you can evaluate completeness, though rather 

more indirectly, is you can compare the number of 

samples you have during a given period, and the 

number of workers that are sampled, to what the 

actual production activities were on a temporal 

basis.

So if you have a certain year where a significant 

amount of thorium was processed, you'd want to 

look and see, well was there a marked increase in 
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28

the number of samples, or perhaps the number of 

workers who are included?

And that would give -- now if the opposite was true 

and suddenly you see well during that year and 

subsequent years, you know, there's really no data, 

well that might pose a problem from a co-exposure 

model.

To try to do this, we did find one reference, it was 

titled, The Historical Review of Accountable Nuclear 

Materials at the Y-12 Plant. However, at that time 

the key piece of information, which was throughput 

of thorium to the plant, was actually redacted from 

the document. And so that was the source of 

Finding 2.

NIOSH responded with information again. Their 

response earlier this year was that, I believe they 

actually captured a more complete picture of the 

thorium throughput as part of the recent data 

capture addendum in 2019, or that really postdated 

this review. So this, Finding 2 might be taken care 

of just by the fact that we have more data on that 

throughput to actually compare again with the data 

we have in hand.

Moving onto adequacy, and as I said before, the key 

question here is, is the analytical method effective? 

Is it actually measuring accurately the exposures 

we're trying to reconstruct? And this one is 

interesting because there's actually precedent for 

this particular monitoring method for thorium 

already in the EEOICPA program.

The same technology that was used at Y-12 was 

used in the development of what's called the Mobile 

In Vivo Radiation Monitoring Laboratory. Again, Y12 developed that, and it was used in other sites, 

notably Fernald. I believe it was also intended to be 

used at Paducah and Portsmouth.
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29

So this technology that we're looking at was actually 

already sort of evaluated during the Fernald SEC, 

which is SEC-46. And SC&A was part of that review. 

Our internal dosimetry expert, Joyce Lipsztein was 

part of that review. And really any issues that were 

part of that technology were adjudicated and was 

found to be suitable for dose reconstruction.

However, one thing that came out of that SEC-46 

review was that it was found that a negative bias 

may have existed for some of the years and some 

of the measurements, meaning you would need 

some sort of an adjustment factor to account for 

that in the measurement technic. And again, that 

was reviewed by SC&A as part of the Fernald SEC. 

And adjustments were developed under that SEC 

review.

And NIOSH has agreed that they will formally 

evaluate the potential for bias as part of its coexposure monitoring development, and to assess 

the adequacy of the method. But as I said, the 

technology itself has really already been adjudicated 

in this program.

Representativeness, this is a really important aspect 

of whether you can adequately apply co-exposure 

intakes to an unmonitored worker? Now the 

implementation guidelines that are referred to, that 

all new co-exposure models have to adhere to, 

really describes three types of internal monitoring, 

in a general sort of way.

You have your routine representative sampling, sort 

of a blanket sampling. You have routine 

measurement of the workers with the highest 

exposure potential. So really targeted sampling. 

And then there's incident-based sampling, where 

you only monitor if there's a reason to monitor. 

There was no real routine program in place.
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30

And one way to evaluate that is to look at job title 

information. And see, alright, which workers are 

included in part of this set of monitoring data that 

we are going to try to apply to unmonitored 

workers? Unfortunately, job title information was 

not available for all of the thorium data points.

But what we can do is we can look at a subset of 

the claimants who are among that monitored 

population. So that's one way we came at it since 

we didn't have job title information for every single 

monitored worker. But we can at least look at a 

subset.

So, what we did is we classified the claims that were 

monitored to eleven generic categories that we 

came up with. Sort of our, really our professional 

judgment. And again these were claimants 

monitored for thorium. And we looked at the 

number of samples that were included in the 

dataset. And also the number of workers who were 

monitored.

So, if you look at Figure 2, of the SC&A report and 

the number of total sample included, again among 

that claimant subset, the highest represented 

category from a total number of samples, again this 

is not number of workers, but number of samples, 

was the Health Physics staff. At about 28 percent of 

the total samples among that claimant 

subpopulation.

And behind that was radiography and inspections, 

operators and assembly workers. They were often 

also referred to as weapon assembly workers.

And I would note that often these workers who are 

in this category, would alternately describe their 

work as machinists. Again, machinists will be 

discussed a little bit later in this presentation. And 

following that was E&I and maintenance personnel.
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31

So that was the number of samples, and that was in 

Figure 2. Figure 3 in the SC&A report looked at the 

total number of workers, regardless of the number 

of samples. And it's really the same general 

category, radiography and inspection, operators, 

assembly workers, E&I, and maintenance.

Administrative and inventory workers also had a 

high percentage relatively of the monitored 

population. What's noteworthy is when we looked at 

the number of workers, health physicists while they 

had the highest number of total samples, they had 

far fewer actual monitored workers when compared 

to the other job categories.

So, that's sort of our look at representation among 

again, the claimant subpopulation. We also tried to 

look at department codes to see if there were 

certain departments from the monitored dataset 

that really either dominant the records, or are not 

included.

Unfortunately, we don't have a list necessarily to 

translate a department code to a specific name or 

location on what they did. One department code we 

did, we were able to identify was code 2373, which 

again was associated with health physicists. And 

they had a very similar number of records as what 

was found in the claimant subpopulations.

Also interesting from that analysis, is that directly 

54 distinct department codes that we observed in 

the in vivo dataset. So 54 different department

codes seems like a lot. But almost two-thirds were 

associated with just five of those department codes.

Despite that, I mean looking at this data, there's no 

real discernible trend. Like I said there's a high 

number of samples for health physicists, but it's not 

necessarily geared towards one job type. It's pretty 

spread out if you look at those figures.
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32

So, what SC&A concluded from this, and this is in 

Observation 5 and 6, is that the most likely, I 

guess, categorization of this monitoring program is 

probably routine representatives.

Because you also had a high number of 

administrative inventory workers, but you also had 

a high number of the operators, assembly workers, 

which again were often described as machinists.

And NIOSH's response again is that these of issues 

will be evaluated during its formulation of the coexposure model, to determine if the dataset is truly 

representative.

Moving on to the uranium, and again, this is one of 

the facets that the Advisory Board wanted us to look 

at when this was tasked to us back in August of 

2019. And again, we're looking at completeness and 

representation.

Completeness, we did the same exercise as for 

thorium by comparing those health physics reports 

with the data we have in hand. And that comparison 

was available for all but one quarter during this 

period of interest that we were looking at, which 

was up to 1986. However, there was also numbers 

available for 1987 and 1988.

The range by any individual year was 75 percent, in 

other words 75 percent of what the health physics 

reports were indicating, again by quarter. It says by 

year, but it was actually by quarter. That's a 

mistake on my part.

So in some months the low was 75 percent, data on 

hand. But in other months it was 120 percent of the 

data on hand.

In other words we had a lot more than what was 

indicated. And if you look at the completeness 
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33

overall for the entire period when we did the 

comparison, it was about 98.4 percent which is 

pretty high for this, compared to other sites where 

we've done similar work.

As far as representativeness, unfortunately, we had 

no information in the uranium dataset to allow for a 

job title or department code assessment, as we 

were able to do for thorium. And that was Finding 3.

So at that time of our review, we couldn't really say 

anything about how representative the uranium 

data was for co-exposure model development and 

representing workers who were unmonitored.

Again, NIOSH's response is that these types of 

issues and evaluations will be performed as part of 

the co-exposure model development. The other 

thing that SC&A identified specific to the overall 

uranium data is that there's in vivo as well as the in 

vitro data.

And so we said to ourselves, well is there a group of 

workers out there who should have been monitored 

by in vivo and weren't? But the co-exposure model 

uses urinalysis data. You know, how do those 

workers get represented if they should have been in 

vivo, they don't have the data, and the co-exposure 

assignment is based on in vitro? You know, how 

does that all work?

And again, NIOSH is committing to evaluate that 

available data and to see how useful it would be in 

developing co-exposure intakes in a claimantfavorable manner.

What about the machinists? Again, this is a specific 

concern by the petitioner and discussed at the 

August 2019 Board meeting. So what we did is we 

took a review of the claimant population to identify 

machinists, and let's see how many of them were 
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34

actually monitored for uranium?

So we've done that 47 percent had internal 

monitoring records with the caveat that they were 

also wearing a dosimeter. So, what does this really 

mean for dose reconstructions?

Well, and I'll explain this in a second because you 

may be scratching your head on this. What we 

found is that 51 percent of the machinists we 

observed, did not even require a co-exposure 

assignment. In other words, their records they have 

are adequate to just use, you know, regular dose 

reconstruction manner. They did not need a coexposure assignment.

Twenty four percent would require at least partial 

co-exposure assignment, in other words there was 

unmonitored periods in their covered employment 

that would typically be considered it's unmonitored, 

but they should have been monitored, so they 

should be assigned a co-exposure dose. And 25 

percent roughly would require a co-exposure 

assignment for the entire employment.

Now, you might be asking if only 47 percent had 

internal monitoring for uranium, how could 51 

percent not require a co-exposure assignment? 

When we looked at that 47 percent number, I 

looked at anyone, any dosimetry records, regardless 

of whether they were in a covered employment 

period by DOL or not.

When I narrowed that down to do the -- what about 

the dose reconstruction numbers, I only considered 

periods that are considered covered by the 

Department of Labor. So that's the difference 

between those two numbers.

In addition to that, looking at the claimant 

population we wanted to ask some questions, and 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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35

see what we could see in the data about exposure 

potential for machinists compared to other types of 

workers.

So, what we had was average uranium air 

concentration data for three categories. We had 

metal fabrication, which was described as a 

machining operations, the machinists. And then two 

types of metal preparation.

And what we found was that in all but two cases, 

the fabrication, that's the machine operation 

samples, again only on average, were bounded by 

the preparation category air samplings. And that's 

in Figure 8, and was the subject of Observation 9.

So, that's a limited look, but it is one piece of 

evidence that sort of looks at, do we have a group 

of workers out there who weren't monitored but 

should have been, and had a significantly higher 

exposure potential? To the point where we can't 

develop a bounding dose for them. In which case, 

dose construction is not feasible.

And the NIOSH response gets into the concept of 

stratifications. Do we have enough data, if that is 

the case, and we determine there's a group of 

workers out there that had a higher exposure 

potential?

And do we need to develop essentially a separate 

co-exposure model, a separate distribution to cover 

those workers, but to stratify a co-exposure model 

into two or more parts to cover that? And so NIOSH 

will be looking at that as part of their co-exposure 

analysis.

And the final thing is what about other sources of 

exposure beyond uranium and thorium? And as 

noted previously in the NIOSH presentation, there's 

a lengthy and complex document, RPRT-90. SC&A 
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36

did review that document. There are a number of 

issues that are currently under discussion based on 

that document. And that's what Observations 11 

and 12 point out here. So those issues are in the 

queue so to speak. And will be handled with the 

RPRT-90 review and discussion going on per Oak 

Ridge.

Now this middle bullet concerning plutonium-241, 

which is Finding 4, this one was really born out of 

SC&A's review of RPRT-90. RPRT-90 actually noted 

in it the following sentence that, Items Requiring 

Additional Evaluation, the one remaining, 

plutonium-241 was processed and handled on the 

Y-12 campus. And as such, not addressed further in 

this document.

So it was sort of left out. Based on that sentence 

that's how we read it anyway. And we had noted 

that plutonium-241 was actually part of a previous 

Class added to the SEC for Y-12 under SEC-251. 

Again, this is talking about today's SEC-250, but 

SEC-251 went up through 1976.

And NIOSH's response to this finding, they said, 

well SEC-251 as opposed to what we're talking 

today, concludes that dose reconstruction to 

plutonium-241 is feasible at least after 1966 when 

they found viable bioassay data.

So, I went back and sort of prepping for this 

meeting, because I don't believe SC&A did any sort 

of review on SEC-251. We typically don't because 

the Class was recommended, so what is there for us 

to really do?

But I found on Page 18 of that Evaluation Report, it 

says that plutonium-241 separations began in 1953 

and continued through 1973, and provided a 

reference, which is SRDB 89989 from 1998. And so 

I dug up that document and it is dated 1998. But I 
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37

can't find other dates listed in there to verify that 

date range of activities with plutonium-241.

I might be misreading the information there, so 

maybe some clarification I think would be helpful 

from NIOSH. Because if the operations with 

plutonium-241 ended in 1973. Then they may not 

be necessarily relevant to an SEC discussion.

Though I would note that in RPRT-90 the Isotopes 

Division Report, it does indicate that the material is 

present, at least at Oak Ridge inventory until at 

least 1986. It doesn't really indicate what if 

anything was being done with it.

And so, I guess, two questions, and I don't know if 

NIOSH wants to comment on them now, is where 

did that date range necessarily come from? And this 

can perhaps be sorted out down the line, and 

determine if there was actually no plutonium work 

being done after 1973, then the issue may be 

necessarily an SEC issue.

And the other question is would a co-exposure 

approach be appropriate for unmonitored exposures 

to plutonium-241 after 1973, and whether from 

D&D activities? But to determine that operations did 

extend past 1973.

So, that is actually the end of my presentation. I 

don't know if NIOSH wants to expound a little bit on 

the plutonium-241 issue I just spoke on, or we can 

just open it up for questions from the Work Group?

Chair Field: Okay, Lara do you want to comment on 

this question?

Dr. Hughes: Yeah, I would have to get back to you 

about the dates of operations. The issue, though, is 

that it's not so much that we focus on the end of 

operations, but at the point where we can feel like 
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38

we can do dose reconstruction using available data. 

And that is clarified in SEC-251 and that's where 

we're going from here.

I'm not clear on exactly how much data is available, 

and I cannot speak to a potential co-exposure 

model. I do not believe that there is a -- the 

exposure potential is of that magnitude as in there 

were not that many workers involved.

Now, the potential unmonitored, I'm not sure how 

we will address that going forward. I'm not clear if

we have enough data to do a potential co-exposure 

model for plutonium-241.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Rutherford: We need to get back to you on that, 

get back to the Work Group on this and give you a 

specific answer.

Chair Field: Okay. Thanks, Bomber.

Lara, did you have any other comments about Bob's 

presentation?

Dr. Hughes: No. I mean, we have responded to the 

-- there's a formal NIOSH response out and a lot of 

the issues are related to future efforts, really.

Chair Field: Mm-hmm. So a lot of the issues are 

going to be addressed as you develop these 

models?

Dr. Hughes: That is the plan. I can't speak to the 

extent of it right now.

Chair Field: Yeah. So, I just had a question. In the 

slide for the uranium data summary that Bob 

presented, when you're looking at how it completes 

the data overall or you're looking at 

representativeness, if there's no data available to 
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39

evaluate representativeness, like in Finding 3, what 

do you do in that case?

Mr. Barton: I'm not quite sure -- it was hard to hear 

you a little bit, but you said if there was data to 

evaluate --

Chair Field: You indicated that there's no data 

available to evaluate the representativeness of the 

uranium data.

Mr. Barton: Right. We can't -- we can only say, on a 

temporal basis, that there don't appear to be gaps. 

When we say "representativeness," it's really asking 

the question, is there a group of workers out there, 

for example, perhaps, machinists, where they 

weren't monitored sufficiently and can we represent 

those workers with a co-exposure model? Or was 

there exposure such that the workers that we do 

have monitoring data for just simply won't bound 

their doses?

That's really the SEC question we're asking when we 

talk about representativeness.

Chair Field: Okay. You had mentioned it and NIOSH 

said they'll look into that issue. So I was just 

wondering how you look at that issue.

Dr. Hughes: I would have to defer to the data 

analysis team, because I actually do not look at that 

issue.

Chair Field: Okay. Fair enough.

Dr. Taulbee: Bill, this is Tim. What we tend to do in 

looking at the representativeness is we look at a 

variety of different things.

For one thing is who is supposed to be monitored. 

And then we'll do some checks to see were those 

workers monitored, much like what Bob was talking 
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40

about with the machinists. And we're looking for is 

there, you know, kind of a population that is 

missing. And then when we don't see any evidence 

of one that's missing, then we assume that, you 

know, the data set is representative.

And, in some cases, we're looking at large numbers 

of bioassay here. So, you know, when you start 

looking at a population and you're looking at 

thousands of bioassay, you kind of begin to get a 

feel, you know, it doesn't look like there's really 

anybody missing here.

Chair Field: Thanks for that.

Gen, did you have any questions?

Loretta?

Member Valerio: Actually, I do.

Bob, if you would go back to the slide that talks 

about the information that was redacted.

Mr. Barton: Let's see here. Where was that?

Member Valerio: Right there.

Mr. Barton: Oh, okay. There we go, yes.

Member Valerio: So, the information that was 

redacted, was that specific just to thorium, or to the 

plutonium-241 as well?

Mr. Barton: I believe, in that specific document, it 

didn't delineate by the different isotopes of 

plutonium. It would just simply say plutonium, 

uranium, and thorium.

We were specifically examining that document for 

thorium, but, again, I don't think they necessarily 

had throughput information available on the specific 

isotopes and weights and such specific to 
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41

plutonium-241.

Member Valerio: Okay.

Mr. Barton: We certainly didn't find anything as far 

as a specific throughput or, really -- again, that's 

what our question was, the production timeline, did 

it really stop in 1973? Or, as Dr. Hughes points out, 

what was the actual exposure potential from that 

activity? And is there a way to bound the doses for 

workers who maybe weren't necessarily monitored 

with a valid bioassay method? Which I believe was 

developed right around 1967.

And, again, that's part of the RPRT-0090 review that 

analyzes those 213 really unique isotopes that could 

have been handled. It's focused on Oak Ridge, but 

it's sort of parallel to Y-12 as well.

Member Valerio: Okay. Alright. Thank you.

Chair Field: I don't know if Gen's still on. If you 

have any questions, Gen?

(Pause.)

Dr. Taulbee: Bill, I don't see Gen on the list of --

Chair Field: You don't see her? Okay. So, unless 

anyone else wants to comment, I guess we can 

move on to Ms. Vinson and Mr. Hicks' presentation.

Mr. Hicks: I didn't exactly hear what you said.

Chair Field: I said --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Chair Field: We received your presentation. I was 

just wondering if that's something that you want to 

go through and have us look at what you've 

provided, or it's something you want to share on 

screen. I don't know if you're able to share or not.
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42

Mr. Hicks: No, I don't have any way to share it on 

screen. I've got a statement to read, though.

Chair Field: Okay. That would be fine.

SC&A Review of the SEC-00250 Evaluation Report 

for the Y-12 Plant (February 21, 2020)

Mr. Hicks: Okay. Good afternoon, Dr. Field and 

members of the Work Group. This is Steve Hicks, 

SEC-250 petitioner. Thank you for allowing me the 

time to present the petitioner's position to the Work 

Group.

Our position is quite simple. NIOSH cannot, and will 

never be able to, reconstruct dose with reasonable 

accuracy for the Y-12 Plant. It is not reasonable for 

anyone to conclude that they can. The evidence I've 

submitted with the petition is strong. The 

documents are DOE and the Y-12 contractors' own 

documents.

Additionally, Ms. Kathy Vinson submitted the one 

from [identifying information redacted] in the 

White Paper. DOE and the Y-12 contractors 

admitted that their records are false.

I'm going to hand this off now to Kathy Vinson, 

primary author of the White Paper titled "Analysis of 

Working Conditions, Worker Exposures, and 

Monitoring, 1980 to 1994."

Ms. Vinson: Thank you, Steve. Well, this is referring 

to slides that we're not actually able to take a look 

at at this point. So I won't read those slides, but I'll 

just highlight the main points.

No. 1, NIOSH says that if a claimant has fecal 

monitoring that would prove that they were exposed 

to uranium, yet the Y-12 uranium exposure study 

said this wasn't done before 1999, so how can 
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43

NIOSH assume that only workers with a fecal 

sample were exposed to uranium?

No. 2, DOE's memo of 1999 states that internal 

dose assessments are not accurate. 

And No. 3, [identifying information redacted]

letter to [identifying information 

redacted]e]states that, prior to 1989, bioassay 

measurements were not assessed for internal dose, 

and external exposure data on these history tapes 

have recently found to include errors. Even SC&A's 

report of 9/19/2005 found similar issues, and that 

was 15 years ago. And many of those findings have 

been ignored.

So, our question is, how can NIOSH say that they 

can reconstruct dose when DOE and their 

contractors say they can't? And what more do you 

need to prove the records NIOSH is using to 

reconstruct dose contains errors and are not 

accurate?

Part of this next section is new to the Work Group, 

NIOSH, and SC&A, and it concerns the statistics of 

people who were monitored at Y-12. And I'll hand 

this off to Terrie Barrie, SEC Petition 00250 

authorized representative.

Ms. Barrie: Thank you, Kathy. And good afternoon, 

Members of the Work Group and everyone else.

Yes, we don't have the ability to share the 

presentation, but it has been circulated. So I'd like 

to call your attention to Slide No. 11, which is from 

NIOSH's Evaluation Report.

You may remember that when the Board met in Oak 

Ridge in August 2019, Mr. Hicks explained that we 

could not figure out where NIOSH got their 

percentages. We went to a professional statistician, 
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44

Dr. Chris Barker, and asked him to explain what we 

were missing, but even he could not reproduce the 

calculations NIOSH has in this table.

In the table, NIOSH shows a number of individuals 

who are monitored by urine sampling by year from 

1977 to 1988. If you add up the total numbers of 

the individuals monitored by urine sampling in the 

third column, the total is 12,852 and not 3,675.

SC&A mentioned earlier in this meeting that they 

reviewed health physics reports and available coexposure urinalysis for uranium exposure and they 

found that there was a completion rate of 98.4 

percent. The petitioners don't have access to this 

database or the other documents that NIOSH and 

SC&A used.

The next slide --

Ms. Vinson: Terrie, this is Kathy.

Ms. Barrie: Yes.

Ms. Vinson: I'm actually able to share the 

PowerPoint presentation. So if you could just tell me 

which slide you're on, I'll go to it.

Ms. Barrie: Okay. Well, why don't you start with 

Slide 11, and give the Board Members a moment to 

take a look at that.

Ms. Vinson: Okay. Hold on a second.

Okay. Can everyone see that?

Ms. Barrie: Yeah. And so, I was talking about the 

third column, "Number of Individuals Monitored By 

Urine Sampling," and the total for Column No. 3 is 

off by like 9,000 sampling numbers.

Slide 12 is another important one. And if you can 
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45

pull that up, Kathy. There you go.

Deb Jerison, the executive director of the Energy 

Employees Claimant Assistance Project, researched 

the CEDR database. She was able to ascertain the 

total number of Y-12 employees who were 

monitored for external exposure from 1981 to 1988. 

And, as you can see, the number of employees 

monitored for external radiation range from 6,000 

workers to almost 8,000 workers per year. 

I then compared EECAP's data to the Department of 

Energy's Occupational Radiation Dose Reports for 

the same years. And those reports are for workers 

who were monitored for internal radiation. I found 

that, on average, less than eight percent of the 

workers who were monitored for external radiation 

received internal monitoring.

These numbers are not adding up. I don't 

understand -- we don't understand why there's such 

a huge discrepancy, and we'd like an explanation of 

where everyone is coming up with these figures.

And on that note, I'll hand this back to Mr. Hicks for 

the conclusion. Thank you.

Mr. Hicks: Thank you, Kathy and Terrie. I'd like to 

add a comment about the statistics. 

Just on Monday I found a 1992 report, a Y-12 

document about internal dosimetries. As noted on 

Slide 12, Chapter 2.3.2 states that 50,000 urine 

samples was collected in about two years, from the 

end of 1989 to approximately the end of 1991. 

Going back to NIOSH's table, on Slide 11, only an 

average of 5,130 urine samples per year were 

collected, per year, between 1977 and 1988.

The last issue I want to raise is NIOSH's summary 

of the worker interviews. First, let me discuss my 
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46

interview.

I explained to NIOSH that at one time I was sent to 

the body counter. The procedure was to monitor on 

the way out of the production area. Then, before we 

entered into the body counter, I needed to shower 

and change into coveralls. Then, before you go into 

the body counter, you were monitored again.

One time I did all of that, but when I was monitored 

after the shower, the monitor showed I was 

contaminated. Because of contamination, I was not 

allowed to enter the body counter.

As shown on Slide 13, the former worker who was 

also interviewed worked at the body counter. He 

would monitor the workers before they entered the 

body counter. He was instructed to contact his 

supervisor if the body counter come up with a 

positive reading.

The supervisor would then manipulate the survey 

incident and recheck the worker. When the 

supervisor found skin contamination after the body 

count, the original body count was considered 

invalid and removed from the worker's record.

I'm not sure why the other worker's interview was 

included the NIOSH presentation. I have been in 

touch with him this week and I know I didn't receive 

a copy of the draft of my interview until Tuesday.

As for the Work Group's path forward, I think you 

should recommend that the workers who were 

employed 215 days by 2030 (phonetic) 1989 should 

be included in the SEC. There are just too many 

issues that NIOSH chose to ignore to decide 

anything else. Thank you again and I'll be happy to 

answer questions. 

Chair Field: Okay. Thank you. Thank you for 
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47

providing the slides. I think they were very helpful.

Are there any comments from either NIOSH or 

SC&A or perhaps from --

Dr. Hughes: This is Lara Hughes. I'd just like to 

comment that it would be helpful if I actually could 

get a copy of this presentation. That would facilitate 

answering some of these questions.

Dr. Taulbee: Lara, this is Tim. We did get a copy, 

sorry, late yesterday.

Dr. Hughes: Oh, I see. Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: I apologize.

Dr. Hughes: I have not seen it. That's why I was 

like, okay --

Dr. Taulbee: Yes. I apologize for not giving that to 

you.

I did want to comment a little bit about the table 

and the discrepancies, or the believed discrepancies 

there. They are explainable. These are things that 

we can go through and we will provide a response 

to the petitioners and to the Work Group with 

regards to those.

Some of this is coming from getting data from 

different sources, and clearly, looking at our table, 

it's not clear as to what we were trying to 

communicate there. And we're actually mixing a few 

things together there. So, we will clarify those.

Chair Field: Thank you, Tim. I think that would be 

very helpful.

Mr. Barton: Well, Dr. Field, from SC&A's point of 

view I think doing these types of interviews, you 

had asked before how you establish representation 
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48

in a co-exposure model if you don't have, 

necessarily, job titles to go along with each data 

point.

And it's really the interviews with former workers 

that are often very helpful in establishing whether 

there is a subpopulation or job type of a particular 

group of workers who was not monitored who we 

have sufficient reason to believe had a higher 

exposure potential than those that were monitored.

So, in that way, former worker interviews are 

extremely helpful.

Chair Field: That makes sense. Are there any other 

questions for either Mr. Hicks or Ms. Vinson?

Member Valerio: Dr. Field, this is Loretta.

Chair Field: Yes.

Member Valerio: Can we go back to the -- I think it 

was one of the last slides, or the last slide, where he 

was discussing the in vivo, if I could look at that 

real quick.

Chair Field: That's slide 13. Yeah, 13.

Member Valerio: Okay. And, Mr. Hicks, do you recall 

what year that was?

Mr. Hicks: It was approximately around 1984. Late 

'84, '85.

Member Valerio: Okay. So, my comment to that is, 

in the Evaluation Report, on page 9, and I believe it 

was paragraph 5, it stated that internal dose 

monitoring or bioassay was not required until 1989, 

I believe, at Y-12. So I'm a little confused on isn't 

the in vivo part of the internal monitoring?

Mr. Hicks: This was where I was polishing parts at a 
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49

center line with sandpaper and the 235 fines got up 

beneath my fingernail and caused it to abscess. Just 

before it did that, that's the time I went to body 

count and I had monitored out of the area, went 

through a guard station with a radiation monitor 

and a metal detector, and when I got to body count, 

I took a shower and I put on a paper suit. And they 

come in there to monitor me and they found my 

finger hot, you know, contaminated.

And they washed it three times and then they 

wouldn't let me in the area. So, they sent me back 

and restricted me from work for several days. It 

was probably a week or longer.

In the meantime, my finger swelled up and busted 

open and I had to go to medical and they lanced it 

three times. I went to my primary care doctor and 

he lanced it. He left it open. And when I soaked it in 

-- he told me to soak it in Epsom salt and water. 

And when I did that, the fines -- all the infection 

come out, plus in the bottom of the cup was actually 

some little fines of enriched uranium.

And eventually I went back to the body count and I 

had a body count and then, you know -- but when I 

went back to the work area, I wasn't supposed to --

I had short sleeves on and we wasn't wearing -- had 

short sleeves and no gloves, because long sleeves 

and gloves was a danger around rotating 

equipment.

So, there I had stitches in my finger and they 

wanted me to polish that part without gloves. But I 

wore like a -- it was like a big latex glove. And, you 

know, I asked them about that and, you know, they 

kept arguing with me and finally they just give up 

and let me polish it with a glove on.

And then shortly after that, I bid out on another job, 

an RED mechanic, and, you know, I left the 
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information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

50

machining and become an RED mechanic for about 

seven years.

I don't know if that answered your question or not, 

but that's what happened.

Member Valerio: So, I think my question is probably 

more for -- and I appreciate the explanation, but, 

going back to my question, and maybe I'm not 

phrasing it correctly, maybe for SC&A or for NIOSH, 

if the statement in the Evaluation Report is 

indicating that internal dose monitoring or bioassay 

was not required at Y-12 until 1989, and this 

incident occurred, you know, two, three years 

before that, isn't that considered internal 

monitoring?

And the next question would be, if there was a 

wound count, is that part of the internal monitoring? 

So, I just need clarification on that.

Mr. Hicks: Okay. On our bioassay records that we 

have, at the bottom of it has footnotes and it says -

- it has A, I believe -- I don't have one handy, but it 

says, A, you know, internal monitoring not required.

And then if you watch on the bioassay records, 

when you get to 1989, they start recording that. 

And then, in 1999, they discovered they was 

monitoring for the wrong type of uranium. I think it 

was soluble and they discovered that they should 

have been monitoring for insoluble and that they 

should also have been doing routine fecals. 

And that was about 1999 and 2000 they initiated 

that. And when they did, there was a whole bunch 

of workers come up contaminated from their fecal 

and they moved them out of the area.

And if they come up -- and when their count went 

back down, they was allowed to go back in. And if 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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51

they did that three times, they was restricted not to 

ever work in the area again.

Ms. Barrie: Steve, this is Terrie. Do you have -- in 

your records, were you -- do you have any 

urinalysis records in your file or wound counts in 

your file?

Mr. Hicks: No. I was not able to get the workman's 

comp records from Y-12. So, it's -- the only records 

I got is just the regular records. The work comp 

records, I have requested them twice and I cannot 

get them. 

So, that's in my record. But in my records that I do 

have, it showed that when I went to body count, the 

reason that I didn't get to be monitored is that I 

didn't wash my hands, is what it said in my records 

that I have. And I actually have that record where it 

says I did not wash my hands.

Ms. Barrie: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Hicks: And then on the dose record, also, you 

know, like I said, until 1989 it says internal 

monitoring not required. And then the document 

from DOE actually states that also. I believe it's the 

DOE internal standard.

And it says also in that standard, on page 99, I 

believe it is, that there's no way that DOE could 

convert the records -- I'm doing this from memory -

- from MP, maximum permissible body something --

MPVE, I believe it was, to E50 -- I think it's E50 or 

H50 numbers, to analyze, you know, what kind of 

internal dose you got.

Dr. Taulbee: If I may, Loretta, answer your question 

a little bit here, but what we're going to prefer to do 

is to actually write this up to explain, both to the 

petitioners and to the Work Group as a whole, 
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52

because there are multiple forms of bioassay 

monitoring.

Many people refer to bioassay as just urine, but it's 

really encompassing in vivo counting, urinalysis, 

fecal samples, as well as wound. And all of those 

can be used to estimate internal doses here. And 

so, we will address all of this in a formal response 

here to the Work Group to make it more clear.

There was lots of changes in regulations and 

requirements from that standpoint, but workers 

during this time period were monitored for uranium 

-- or for urine bioassay, as well as in vivo in this 

time period.

There were some difficulties, but these are things 

that we can address in dose reconstruction. And 

we'll get into that in our response to the Work 

Group, as well as the petitioners.

Member Valerio: Thanks, Tim. I appreciate that. 

And I was just going -- I was reading that 

statement again where it actually addressed the 

soluble testing was begun. So, thank you.

Chair Field: And, Tim, you also indicated you're 

going to provide some information on Slide 11 and 

12, right?

Dr. Taulbee: That is correct, yes. 

Chair Field: Okay. Good. So, it sounds like NIOSH 

will be working -- a lot of work to do with 

development of the model and such.

As far as the Work Group goes, what do you think, 

as far as the recommendations from NIOSH and 

SC&A as far as what the next meeting should be 

and what activities that we should be expecting?

(Pause.)
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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53

Dr. Taulbee: I'm sorry, were you asking me there, 

Bill?

Chair Field: Lara or Bob.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay. Sorry.

Dr. Hughes: Okay. So, this is Lara. So, the NIOSHproposed path forward is that, as Tim just indicated, 

that we will provide a formal response paper to the 

Work Group that hopefully would address the 

petitioner submissions, like the write-up that we 

received and the questions that were raised in this 

presentation.

So that would be my suggestion of path forward, 

and that would be in the form of a formal NIOSH 

response paper issued to the Work Group and the 

Board.

Chair Field: Okay. That sounds good.

Mr. Barton: I guess, from SC&A's perspective, so 

many of these issues are dependent on how that coexposure model development turns out.

I know one thing that was asked, back in August 

2019 during the original discussions of this, was

whether additional worker interviews would be 

sought after. And the thought was, at that time, 

was that SC&A would go and look at the data that 

we have right now to see if there's any sort of 

reason we think that it's just infeasible to even try 

to perform a co-exposure model.

I think our review shows that, while we have a lot of 

questions, we did not find that smoking gun as of 

yet. But until we see these various facets of it, 

representation and completeness, it's tough for us.

And I don't know who we would necessarily pursue 

as far as workers going forward, but that was one 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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54

aspect of it that was sort of left. A lot of times 

during our SEC review we'll target certain workers 

as suggestions to interview via teleconference, but 

that was not necessarily part of our tasking.

But, as of right now, I don't know who -- again, who 

we would necessarily pursue in that end. But if 

there are ideas on that, we can certainly work to try 

to identify who we feel would be good candidates if 

there's a certain criteria.

But, again, until we see the analysis on 

representation, I don't know what group of workers 

that would necessarily be.

Mr. Hicks: I know one worker that you can 

approach. His name is [identifying information 

redacted] (phonetic). He was an RED mechanic 

that was in Beta 3. He just quoted a bunch of 

isotopes. You know, I worked there from 1987 to 

'89 with him, but the only one I could remember 

running was thallium. But he worked in there longer 

than I did. And me and him was talking the other 

day and he was quoting off quite a few of the 

isotopes that they run in Beta 3.

Chair Field: Okay. Well, I think that would be 

helpful. 

I think we've covered a lot for the first meeting. The 

first meeting we get sort of caught up with what 

activities have been going on, and it was good to 

hear from Ms. Vinson and Mr. Hicks as far as -- and 

from Terrie as far as concerns that they have or 

things that they would appreciate the Working 

Group looking at. So I think we're well on our way 

to do those things.

So, I guess, at this point, it's a matter of waiting for 

responses back. And then, as the process goes 

toward the exposure models, planning a meeting 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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55

sometime down the road when we get some of 

those materials. Does that sound good?

Member Valerio: That sounds good to me, Dr. Field. 

Thank you.

Just a suggestion. If there's individuals, you know, 

that they may think may be good interview 

candidates, maybe emailing NIOSH with names and 

contact information.

Chair Field: That would be helpful.

Okay. So, Lara or Tim or Bob, do you have anything 

else?

Ms. Vinson: I have a question. This is Kathy Vinson.

Chair Field: Go ahead.

Ms. Vinson: I have a question about Loretta's 

previous statement. Do those names and contact 

information need to go to any particular party at 

NIOSH? Or if we just send it to NIOSH, it will get to 

the right place?

Dr. Taulbee: I actually don't know the answer to 

that. I believe there's a place to submit information 

-- go ahead, Bomber.

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah. I was going to say if you send 

that in to the normal route for the petitioner, 

through Josh Kinman, or you can send it directly to 

me, either way we'll make sure that they get to our 

Y-12 team and Dr. Hughes.

Ms. Vinson: Thank you.

Mr. Barton: Also, could I ask the Work Group that, if 

we do decide to proceed with more interviews of 

former workers, is that something that you want 

SC&A to be involved in? Because we were not 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

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56

involved in the previous two -- I guess the two 

recent interviews that occurred just a few weeks 

ago.

Chair Field: Yeah. So, I'm not sure how many 

additional -- I think that's something that may be 

worthwhile to determine when we find out the 

number we have. We can decide at that time. Do we 

need a formal meeting just to get that tasked? I 

don't -- I'm not sure, perhaps we do.

Mr. Barton: In the past, it's really just been done 

informally across lines.

Chair Field: Okay. Yeah. Well, why don't we pursue 

that? I think that if there's, you know, sufficient 

numbers and interest, I think it would be well worth 

doing.

Anything else?

(No response.)

Adjourn

Chair Field: Okay. Well, I think we're good for 

today. Like I said, we have a lot -- we sure have a 

lot to go back through and review. I've learned a 

lot, and feel somewhat caught up, but I think 

there's a lot to -- and probably other members of 

the Working Group, have to go over and review and 

get updated on.

So, I appreciate everyone's presentation. Bob, 

thank you for that. I think that was an excellent 

presentation, as well as Lara. I couldn't ask for 

anything more. That was very helpful. Thank you so 

much.

I think we can adjourn. Okay. Thank you everyone.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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57

record at 2:43 p.m.)