### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 13-10175 Summary Calendar

SHEMIKA D. SPRAGUE, Individual and Next Friend of Minor Child G.S., Plaintiff - Appellant
v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES; JOE BILL JONES; CHRISTINE E. CLARDY; PAM S. POLLARD; ELIZABETH TAYLOR; KRISTYN GONZALES; CONNIE DAVIS;GEORGANNA ECKER; RUDY RIVAS, Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court f or the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 2:12-CV-30

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-Appellan t S hemika D

. Sprague appeals the district court’s dismissal of her s uit b rought pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1983 on behalf of herself and as next friend of her minor child. The complaint also alleged violations of Texas law. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM. U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Nov em ber 15, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

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Sprague f

ile d t h e i n s t a n t s u it against the Texas Department of Family and P r o t e c t i v e S e r vices (“DFPS”) and eight D FPS e mployees i n both their official an d individual capacities. Previously, Sprague had filed suit against the inst a nt defendants, 1 making t he same f actual allegations that are contained in the instant suit. In the p revious suit, the district c ourt dismissed the federal claims with prejudice a nd the relevant s tate law claims w ere dismissed without prejudice. Thus, in the instant suit, the district court held that Sprague’s federal claims are barred by res judicata. Sprague does n ot c hallenge t h at r uling on appeal. Indeed, Sprague’s brief “assume[s] t hat t he district court’s findings were correct as to any federal claims Sprague seeks on her own behalf t o l i t igate in the second action.” Brief at 18 (emphasis in original).

Claims Brought as “Next Friend” Sprague c ontends that the district c ourt erred i n ruling t hat s he was not qualified to asser t claims on behalf o f her minor child as a “next friend.” Sprague relies on Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Ci v i l P r o c e dure, which provides in pertinent part t h at: “A m inor

. . . who does not have a duly a ppointed representative may sue by a next f riend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order —to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in a n action.” We affirm the district c ourt’s ruling on the narrow ground that because Sprague is proceeding pro se , she may not assert claims on behalf of her minor child. 2

1 Sp rague ad d ed one d ef end ant, Rud y R ivas , to the ins t a n t law s uit that w as not nam ed in the p revious s uit. The d is trict court f ound that Rivas “w as and is in p rivity w ith one or m ore nam ed d ef

end ant em p loyers in the f irs t action. ” Sp rag u e d o e s n o t challenge that ruling on ap p eal.

2 Sp rague contend s that the d is trict court erred by cons id ering m atters o u t s id e the p lead ings in its d eterm ination that Sp rague w as not qualif ied to bring the s uit as “next f riend ” f or her m inor child

. We need not reach this contention becaus e w e conclud e that Sp rague m ay not bring the s uit as “next f riend ” s olely on the g round that s he is proceed ing p ro se
.

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In federal court, p arties are guaranteed by s tatute the right to proceed p ro

se
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (providing tha t “parties may plead and conduct their

own cases personally o r b y counsel”). However, this Court has held that a party could not proceed pro se on behalf of anyone other than himself when he brought suit o n behalf of himself, his wife, and her minor c hild. Johnson v. L ufkin Daily News , 48 F. App’x 917 ( 5th Cir. 2002) (citing § 1 654); see also Morgan v. Texas , 251 F. A pp’x 894, 896 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that because the plaintiff was proceeding pro s e , she did not have the authority to assert claims o n behalf of the minor child); A duddle v. Body , 277 F

. A p p ’ x 4 59 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that

even assuming the g randfa t h e r was the legal guardian of the grandchild, because he was not an attorney, he did not have the authority to represent her

on a pro se basis). Indeed, the “vast majority of our sister ci r c u its” have held that “non-attorney parents generally may not litigate the claims of their minor children in federal court.” Myers v. L oudoun Cnty. Public Sc h

. , 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) ( s t r i n g c ite omitted). N onetheless, we have r ecognized an

exc e p t i o n to this rule, allowing parents to bring suit pro se on behalf o f minor children in an attempt to secure socia l security benefits. Harris v. Apfel , 209 F

. 3 d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000). In Harris , we distinguished social secur i t y proceedings from the g enera l r u l e , stating that the minors’ rights would be adequately p rotected w ithout legal counsel because those p r o c eedings “essentially involve t he review of an administr a t i v e r e cord.” Id. ; see also Machadio v. Ap f

el, 2 76 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (allowing a n on-attorney parent to r epresent a minor child in a social security appeal i f the parent has a sufficient interest in t h e c a s e and m eets basic standards of competence). In contrast, we are aware o f “ n o c o m p a r able exception [that] has ever been [expressly] r ecognized for a lawsuit b a sed on § 1983 or general state tort law,” which are the claims brought in the instant lawsuit. Elustra v
. Mineo , 595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, because Sprague w as proceeding pro se , we hold

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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without
p rejudice the claims Sprague brought as “next friend” on behalf of her mino r child. Sprague’s State Law Claims The only remaining claims before us are the state law c laims t hat Sprague brought on her own behalf. 3 The district court declined to exercise its
sup p l e m e n tal jurisdiction over Sprague’s pendent s tate law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. This Court reviews the decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse o f discretion. Regan v
. Starcraft Marine, LLC , 524 F .3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2008). A district c ourt “may d ecline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a c l aim under subsection (a) if

. . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over w hich it h a s o r i ginal jurisdiction.” 28 U .S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, if all t he f ederal l aw claims are dismissed prior t o t r i al, a district court should dismiss the state law c laims. R oberts o n v
. Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, “the dismissal of t he p endent claims should expressly be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may refile his claims in the appropriate state court.” Bass v. Parkwood Hosp. , 180 F.3d 234, 2 46 (5th Cir. 1 999) (emphasis in original). As s e t forth above, the district court had p reviously d ismissed all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Thus, S p rague has failed to show that t he d i strict c ourt abused its “wide” d iscretion i n declining to exercise its s u p p l emental j urisdiction o ver Sprague’s pendent state law claims. Robertson, 161 F.3d at 296. For the a bove stated reasons, the d istrict court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

3 Sp rague contend s that the d is trict court erred in hold ing that her s tate law claim s w ere barred by res jud icata; how ever, the d is trict court d id not hold that her state law claim s w ere barred by res jud icata. Ins tead , the court d eclined to exercis e sup p lem ental j uris d iction
over her s tate law claim s and d is m is sed thos e claim s w ithout p rej ud ice, op ining that if “Plaintif f s w is h to p urs ue thos e claim s they mus t d o s o in s tate court. ”
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