IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

TIPASA LESUMI UILIATA,

Appellant.

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No. 34591-2-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Tipasa Uiliata appeals after his convictions for three 

counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm and two counts of possession of 

controlled substances with intent to deliver, with the latter counts enhanced because they 

occurred within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. He claims various errors entitle 

him to relief: (1) two purported errors in the search warrant require the firearms and the 

controlled substances to be suppressed, (2) neither the warrant nor exigent circumstances 

permitted seizure of the firearms so the firearms must be suppressed, (3) because there is 

no record of the trial court’s in camera inquiry of the confidential informant, the matter 

must be remanded for a new inquiry, (4) there is insufficient evidence to prove the school 

bus route stop enhancements so dismissal of the enhancements is required, and (5) two 

FILED

MAY 3, 2018

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
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State v. Uiliata

2

scrivener’s errors require remand for correction. 

The State disagrees with Uiliata’s first four arguments, but concedes that remand is 

required to correct the two scrivener’s errors. We agree and remand for correction of the 

two scrivener’s errors but otherwise affirm.

FACTS

Detective Frank Randall of the Klickitat County Sheriff’s Office was contacted by 

a concerned citizen who wanted to provide local drug information and was eager to do 

controlled buys. Detective Randall enlisted him as a confidential informant (CI). The CI 

conducted two controlled buys at Roger Neal’s residence, a trailer house on Dallesport 

Road in the town of Dallesport. Both times, the CI purchased $20 worth of 

methamphetamine. Uiliata was present in the trailer house for both purchases. 

On March 24, 2016, Detective Randall applied for a search warrant to search the 

trailer house. The affidavit appended to the application stated the above facts. It also 

stated the two controlled drug purchases occurred “[o]n or about the week of March 20-

24, 2016,” that Uiliata was a wanted fugitive from Oregon for controlled substance 

deliveries and that he was considered to be armed and dangerous. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 

21. The magistrate issued the warrant authorizing law enforcement to search the trailer 

house and to seize controlled substances, evidence of conspiracy, evidence of dominion 
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and control, and computer programs and storage disks evidencing drug distribution or 

currency expenditures. 

On March 25, 2016, law enforcement executed the search warrant. Uiliata fled 

through the back of the trailer house, but was quickly apprehended and arrested. 

Detective Randall searched the trailer house for items specified in the search warrant. He 

found paperwork in the front bedroom evidencing that the bedroom belonged to Uiliata. 

In that bedroom, he also found methamphetamine, heroin, a digital scale, small plastic 

“baggies” and three firearms—a shotgun in the closet, and two handguns on the bed.

On March 28, 2016, the State charged Uiliata with five felonies: three counts of 

first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, one count of possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance—heroin, and one count of possession with intent to deliver 

a controlled substance—methamphetamine. In addition, the State charged enhancements 

on the two controlled substance counts, alleging that those crimes occurred within 1,000 

feet of a school bus route stop. 

PROCEDURE

Suppression motions denied

Uiliata moved to suppress the seized substances and firearms. He argued that the 

warrant was stale because it failed to state the specific dates of when the drugs were
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4

purchased by the CI. The court rejected this argument. Uiliata also argued that the 

officers should have obtained a second search warrant before seizing the firearms. The 

court similarly rejected this argument. 

In camera inquiry not recorded

Uiliata sought to compel the disclosure of the CI’s identity. He argued that he 

needed to cross-examine the CI at trial on whether the CI purchased methamphetamine 

from him during the two controlled buys. Uiliata’s trial theory was that Neal was selling 

drugs, not him, and that the CI was biased against him. Citing State v. Petrina, 73 Wn. 

App. 779, 871 P.2d 637 (1994), Uiliata asked the trial court to conduct an in camera 

inquiry to determine whether the CI’s identity should be disclosed. The State countered 

that the CI’s identity was not relevant because it intended to rely solely on the items found 

in Uiliata’s bedroom to prove the charges. 

The trial court determined that Uiliata had made a sufficient preliminary showing 

to conduct an in camera inquiry of the CI. The court, however, failed to make any record 

of the inquiry. Because of this, there is no record of what questions the trial court asked
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and what responses the CI gave.1 

We glean some insight into the trial court’s inquiry from its oral ruling:

I inquired of the confidential informant—to determine whether he had any 

biases against Mr. Uiliata, whether—what the source of his information 

was, and other matters, and made a determination after that hearing that 

based on my understanding of how the prosecutor will use him as a witness, 

that in fact there is no need to pierce the privilege by the defendant or the 

defense lawyer to know who he is or to get him in court.

The [S]tate will be—merely relying on [Detective Randall’s] 

affidavit to get the officers into the house and everything will flow from 

that. There won’t be any—any statements whatsoever made by the 

confidential informant—There will be nothing said by the officer about 

what the informant said.

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 45-46. After denying disclosure, the trial court entered a 

written order. The trial court’s order clarified that it would “allow testimony of the CI’s 

actions but [would] not allow any hearsay statements to be solicited by the State.”

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 92. 

Summary of trial testimony and verdict

The two-day jury trial commenced on July 6, 2016. The State called Roger Neal. 

In exchange for favorable treatment by the State, Neal testified that people he did not 

 

1

In appendix C of his opening brief, Uiliata attached a motion to supplement the 

record, together with various e-mails of the Klickitat County court administrator and trial 

counsel. These e-mails establish that no record of the trial court’s inquiry could be found 

and that the trial court met in its chambers with the CI and the State. The State does not 

object to Uiliata’s motion to supplement, which we grant.
No. 34591-2-III

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know often came to his front door and asked for Uiliata. These people would then enter 

Uiliata’s bedroom, close the door, and leave soon after. Neal further testified that on a 

couple occasions, he facilitated the sale of methamphetamine by taking money given to 

him by people who came to his residence and giving the money to Uiliata in exchange for 

methamphetamine. 

The State also called Detective Randall. He described the procedures for the two 

controlled buys at Uiliata’s residence. He also described the items he later seized at the 

residence, including the firearms, controlled substances, digital scale, and small plastic 

baggies found in Uiliata’s bedroom. 

The State called two witnesses to testify about the distance between where the 

offenses occurred and the nearest school bus route stops. The first witness was the 

director of transportation for the Lyle School District, the school district for the town of 

Dallesport. The witness identified two bus route stops that were within 1,000 feet of 

Uiliata’s residence on Dallesport Road: one at the intersection of Dallesport Road and 

Williams Street, and the other at the intersection of Dallesport Road and Cypress Street. 

The second witness was a facilities technician for Klickitat County. He testified 

that he used a wheel attached to his car to measure the distances between Uiliata’s 

property and the two intersections identified by the director. His measurement began at 
No. 34591-2-III

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the sidewalk adjacent to the middle of the trailer house and continued to the middle of the 

identified intersections. The technician testified that the distance between the boundary 

of Uiliata’s property and the intersection of Dallesport Road and Cypress Street was 141 

feet, and the distance between the boundary of Uiliata’s property and the intersection of 

Dallesport Road and Williams Street was 511 feet. 

The jury found Uiliata guilty of the charged offenses and found that the bus route 

stop enhancements applied. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and 

sentenced Uiliata. He timely appealed. 

ANALYSIS

1. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED

a. The information was not stale

Uiliata first contends that because the search warrant affidavit contained a five-day 

range of dates, March 20-24, the information in it was too stale to issue a warrant. We 

disagree.

Probable cause to issue a warrant is established if the supporting affidavit sets 

forth “facts sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude the defendant probably is 

involved in criminal activity.” State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 209, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). 

This court tests the affidavit in a common sense rather than hyper-technical manner. State 
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v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). The existence of probable cause is 

a legal question that a reviewing court reviews de novo. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 

30, 40, 162 P.3d 389 (2007). However, we afford great deference to the issuing 

magistrate’s determination of probable cause. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 366, 693 

P.2d 81 (1985).

Facts supporting the issuance of a search warrant must support the conclusion that 

the evidence is probably at the premises to be searched at the time the judge issues the 

warrant. State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 360, 275 P.3d 314 (2012). Common sense is the 

test for staleness of a search warrant affidavit’s information. State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 

499, 505, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004). Accordingly, the issuing judge must determine whether

the passage of time between the officer’s or informant’s observations and the application 

for a warrant “is so prolonged that it is no longer probable that a search will reveal 

criminal activity or evidence, i.e., that the information is stale.” Lyons, 174 Wn.2d at 

360-61. The issuing judge determines staleness based on the totality of the 

circumstances. Id. at 361.

Here, the investigation took place during a five-day period and law enforcement 

applied for the warrant on the fifth day. We hold that the magistrate and the trial court 

were correct in holding that this period of time did not render the information in the 
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9

affidavit stale. See State v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 8-9, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (holding that 

waiting three or four days after the last controlled buy in a continuing drug operation did 

not render the warrant invalid). 

b. Independent police work corroborated the CI’s credibility 

Uiliata argues that the affidavit provides conclusory statements as to the 

informant’s credibility and does not give sufficient information to the magistrate to make 

a probable cause determination. The State responds that the two controlled buys 

sufficiently corroborated the CI’s credibility. We agree.

Although abandoned in the federal system, under Washington law, courts still 

evaluate an informant’s reliability under the two-pronged Aguilar/Spinelli test. State v. 

Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 436, 438, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 

U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 

89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 

S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), but adhered to by Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432). Under 

this approach, to create probable cause the officer’s affidavit must establish (1) the 

reliability of the informant’s basis of knowledge, and (2) the veracity of the informant. 

Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 435. If the informant’s tip fails under either prong, “probable 
No. 34591-2-III

State v. Uiliata

10

cause may yet be established by independent police investigatory work that corroborates 

the tip . . . .” Id. at 438.

Here, the two controlled buys corroborated the informant’s claim that he could 

procure drugs from where Uiliata lived. Even though Detective Randall’s affidavit 

contained conclusory statements about the informant’s veracity, the controlled buys 

satisfy both prongs of the Aguilar/Spinelli test. See State v. Casto, 39 Wn. App. 229, 234, 

692 P.2d 890 (1984) (properly executed controlled buy conducted by CI generally 

satisfies both prongs of the Aguilar/Spinelli test). 

2. THE FIREARMS WERE PROPERLY SEIZED

Uiliata next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress 

the eight2firearms. Uiliata argued below and on appeal that neither the search warrant 

nor exigent circumstances permitted the firearms to be seized. We disagree with his 

argument.

If officers discover an item immediately recognizable as contraband during their 

search, the item is subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine. State v. Temple, 170 

Wn. App. 156, 164, 285 P.3d 149 (2012). In order for an item to be immediately 

 

2 We limit our analysis to the three firearms found in Uiliata’s bedroom. He was 

not charged with firearm offenses relating to the five firearms found outside his bedroom.
No. 34591-2-III

State v. Uiliata

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recognizable as contraband, the officer need not possess certain knowledge that the item

is contraband. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 400, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986). Rather, 

the test is whether, “considering the surrounding circumstances, the police can reasonably 

conclude that the [item is] incriminating evidence.” State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 

118, 874 P.2d 160 (1994).

Here, Detective Randall testified he knew that Uiliata was precluded from 

possessing firearms and that he found three firearms in Uiliata’s bedroom during his 

search for items specified in the search warrant. We conclude that the trial court properly 

denied Uiliata’s motion to suppress the three firearms. 

3. FAILURE TO RECORD UNNECESSARY IN CAMERA HEARING WAS HARMLESS 

ERROR

Uiliata argues that the trial court erred in failing to create a record of the in camera 

inquiry with the CI. He claims that the failure to create a record prevents effective 

appellate review and thus requires a new in camera inquiry. 

Before addressing Uiliata’s argument, we must first discuss when an in camera 

inquiry of a CI is and is not warranted.

An in camera inquiry by a court into the nature of a confidential 

informant’s information is a proper means of determining whether 

compulsory disclosure of the informant’s identity is required to protect the 

constitutional rights of the accused. The court is authorized to conduct an 

in camera [inquiry] under CrR 4.7(h)(6).
No. 34591-2-III

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An in camera [inquiry] is necessary when the defendant makes an 

initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that 

would be relevant to the defendant’s innocence. An in camera [inquiry]

will not be conducted, however, if the defendant’s contention that the 

informant may have relevant information is based upon speculation.

12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 2512 (3d ed. 2004). 

Conversely, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to disclosure of an 

informant’s identity when the information provided by the informant relates only to 

probable cause and not to guilt or innocence. State v. Selander, 65 Wn. App. 134, 138 

n.1, 827 P.2d 1090 (1992) (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. 

Ed. 2d 62 (1967)). In that event, an in camera inquiry is not warranted. 

The State concedes that the trial court erred by not recording its inquiry with the

CI. The State argues that Uiliata cannot show how this error prejudiced him. 

Specifically, the State argues that the information provided by the CI was used only to 

obtain probable cause for the search warrant and that Uiliata was not charged with crimes 

relating to the two controlled buys. 

To determine whether an in camera inquiry was warranted, we now turn to the two

reasons Uiliata sought disclosure of the CI’s identity. Uiliata first argued that disclosure 

was required to establish that the CI purchased methamphetamine from Neal, not him. 
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We do not believe that this would be a sufficient reason for disclosure. Even had the CI 

purchased methamphetamine from Neal, Uiliata was not charged for crimes relating to 

those prior purchases. Instead, Uiliata was charged based on the items law enforcement 

found in his bedroom: methamphetamine, heroin, small plastic baggies, and a digital 

scale. We conclude that Uiliata’s first argument for obtaining an in camera inquiry was 

insufficient.

Uiliata also argued that disclosure of the CI’s identity was necessary to establish 

bias against him. We do not believe that this would be a sufficient reason for disclosure 

either. Even if the CI was biased against Uiliata, this bias does not account for the 

controlled substances, small plastic baggies, and digital scale found in Uiliata’s bedroom. 

Uiliata does not contend that the CI snuck into the trailer house and planted these items in 

his bedroom. Uiliata’s second argument for obtaining an in camera inquiry was also 

insufficient. 

Because an in camera inquiry was not warranted, the lack of a record does not 

prejudice Uiliata. We conclude that Uiliata is not entitled to a new in camera inquiry.

4. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR SCHOOL BUS ROUTE STOP ENHANCEMENT

Uiliata claims the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he committed the 

drug offenses within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. 
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When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational 

trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 

Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence 

must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” 

Id. Furthermore, “[a] claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and 

all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” Id. In a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry equal 

weight. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410 (2004).

RCW 69.50.435(1)(c) states that a defendant is subject to a school bus route stop

sentencing enhancement if he or she violates RCW 69.50.401 by delivering a controlled 

substance “[w]ithin one thousand feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school 

district.” 

a. Temporal requirement sufficiently established

Uiliata argues that the State provided insufficient evidence that either of the two 

school bus route stops identified by its witnesses existed on the date of the offense, 

March 25, 2016. While this is true, the testimony of the State’s school bus stop witnesses 

occurred on July 6, 2016. A trier of fact could reasonably infer from the director’s 
No. 34591-2-III

State v. Uiliata

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testimony that the two identified school bus route stops were for the most recent school 

year. 

b. Distance requirement sufficiently established

Uiliata argues that the location of the charged offenses was his bedroom, not the 

sidewalk adjacent to his property line. Uiliata argues that the State’s proof was therefore 

insufficient to establish the 1,000 foot proximity between his bedroom and either school 

bus route stop. 

In State v. Clayton, 84 Wn. App. 318, 927 P.2d 258 (1996), we reviewed the 

evidentiary sufficiency of a school zone enhancement. There, the State was required to 

prove that the defendant manufactured marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school 

playground. Id. at 321. The State established that the distance between a school 

playground and the edge of the property where defendant’s offense occurred was 926 

feet. Id. at 322. The State also established that the distance between the edge of the 

subject property and the house where the offense occurred was 30 feet. Id. We held that 

the terminus of the 1,000 foot measurement must be the actual site where the offense 

occurred, not the property line or the house. Id. at 321-22. Because the State failed to 

present such evidence, we reversed the enhancement. Id. at 322-23. 
No. 34591-2-III

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The State argues that Clayton is distinguishable. We agree. In Clayton, the 1,000 

foot terminus extended only 74 feet3into the property, which might not include all rooms 

within the house. Whereas here, the 1,000 foot terminus extends 859 feet4into the 

property. 

Uiliata lived in a trailer house in the town of Dallesport. From this evidence, the 

State asks us to infer that Uiliata lived on a lot small enough so that all parts of the trailer 

house would be within 859 feet of the middle of the front edge of his property line. This 

distance is equivalent to almost three football fields. We believe that such an inference is 

justified. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of 

fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance between where the offense 

occurred and the closest school bus route stop was within 1,000 feet. 

c. Definitional requirement established

Uiliata argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that the route stop was 

for a school bus, as defined by statute. 

RCW 69.50.435(6)(b) defines “school bus” as:

 

3 1,000 feet minus 926 feet.

4 1,000 feet minus 141 feet.
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[A] school bus . . . owned and operated by any school district and all school 

buses which are privately owned and operated under contract . . . for the 

transportation of students. The term does not include buses operated by 

common carriers in the urban transportation of students such as 

transportation of students through a municipal transportation system.

Here, the State presented the testimony of the school district transportation 

director. Admittedly, the school district transportation director testified repeatedly about 

“bus stops,” not school bus stops. RP at 198. Nevertheless, given the nature of the 

witness’s employment and the requirement that the State is entitled to the benefit of all

reasonable inferences from the record, we conclude that the school district director’s 

testimony concerned school bus route stops, not municipal bus route stops. 

In sum, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the 

school bus route stop enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt.

5. UNDISPUTED SCRIVENER’S ERRORS

The judgment and sentence contains two scrivener’s errors that should be 

corrected on remand. First, the judgment and sentence provides the wrong statutory 

citation for the unlawful possession of a firearm offenses. The judgment lists 

RCW 6.41.040 but the correct provision is RCW 9.41.040.
No. 34591-2-111 

State v. Uiliata 

Second, the judgment indicates the offenses were committed while Uiliata was on 

community placement or community custody. However, the sentencing court specifically 

found the offenses were not committed while on supervision. 

These errors are undisputed by the State. We direct the trial court to correct these 

two errors on remand. 

6. APPELLATE COSTS 

In a separate motion, Uiliata requests that we deny the State an award of appellate 

costs in the event the State substantially prevails. We deem the State the substantially 

prevailing party. If the State seeks appellate costs, we defer the award of appellate costs 

to our commissioner in accordance with RAP 14.2. 

Affirmed, but remanded to correct scrivener's errors. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Siddoway, J. 0 

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