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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re IRVIN, Minors. June 30, 2016

No. 329226 Ingham Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 13-001077-NA

Before: Meter, P.J., and Shapiro and O’Brien, JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent appeals by right from an order terminating his pare ntal rights to his children, MI and KI, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide p roper care and custody) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). We affirm.

In May 2013, the children were removed from their mother’s car e because of ongoing

concerns about domestic violence and substance abuse. 1 Respondent was unable to take placement at that time because a warrant had been issued for hi s arrest due to a probation violation. The children were placed in the care of their pater nal grandmother, and, because of respondent’s outstanding warrant , the trial court “suspended” h is parenting time. Respondent was ordered to comply with and benefit from the initial service s plan, which was completed in

June 2013. Petitioner identified five areas of concern with re gard to respondent: (1) emotional stability and anger management, (2) parenting skills, (3) domes tic relations, (4) sexual abuse concerns, and (5) communicati on and interpersonal skills.

For the first eleven months, re spondent did not participate in any services, and he had only limited contact with the children, including a single visi t, two phone calls, and some written correspondence. In January 2014, respondent was arrested on hi s outstanding warrants and he was incarcerated until April 18, 2014. Thereafter, he began pa rticipating in services, including supervised parenting time, a psychological evaluation, an Alter native to Violence (ATV) class, substance abuse screens, indivi dual therapy, foster care case m anagement, and family team meetings.

1 Although the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) fi led a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child ren’s mother, it appears that s he voluntarily released her parental rights in July 2015.-2- According to petitioner, respondent failed to show a consisten t benefit from the offered services. The record reflects that, throughout the case, respo ndent’s caseworkers had difficulty communicating with him because he was hostile and made threats verbally and by email. There was also testimony that he missed 41 out of 62 offered parentin g times and did not recognize his children’s need for stability in parenting time visits. This i nconsistency in parenting time negatively affected the childre n, who, in addition to inconsist ent parenting time, had to endure four different placements from removal in 2013 through terminat ion in 2015.

Deborah Delcamp, one of MI’s the rapists, observed parenting ti me visits and provided respondent with feedback on how to better meet his children’s e motional and behavioral needs. She opined that respondent had not benefited from services and failed to understand MI’s emotional needs and how her past traumas affected her current n eeds. Respondent agreed that he did not benefit from Delcamp’s services, but added that he thou ght that he had recently started making progress. He stated that he now understands that MI nee ds more consistency and needs emotional help. A caseworker, however, testified that despite services, respondent’s parenting

abilities were “minimal” in rel ation to what MI needs. The cas eworker explained that despite MI’s great need for permanence and stability, respondent still missed many visits and struggled with recognizing MI’s emotional needs. Finally, there was also testimony that KI exhibited anxiety from the inconsistent visits and that respondent had di fficulty engaging him during visits.

In April 2015, approximately 23 months after the children came into care, the trial court ordered petitioner to file a pe tition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Following a termination hearing, the trial court found grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). The court also found that terminat ion of respondent’s parental rights was in the child ren’s best interests.

On appeal, respondent first argues that the trial court clearl y erred in finding statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights and in finding that te rmination was in the children’s best

interests. 2 We disagree.

The trial court may find stat utory grounds to terminate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if it finds clear and convincing eviden ce that “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.” This statutory ground requires tw o findings: the parent previo usly failed to provide proper care or custody for the child and the parent currently cannot provid e proper care and custody for the

child. In re Hulbert , 186 Mich App 600, 605; 465 NW2d 36 (1990). We have affirmed termination under this subsection where there has only been min imal compliance with a case

2 To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by cle ar and convincing evidence one statutory ground for termination of parental rights under MCL 7 12A.19b(3). In re Olive/Metts

, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). We review a trial co urt’s determination of whether statutory grounds exist t o terminate parental rights fo r clear error. In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 356-357, 373; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).-3- services plan. In re BZ , 264 Mich App 286, 297-301; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). We have also affirmed termination where a parent fails to benefit from a tre atment plan. In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 361, 373; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

As discussed above, respondent was unable to provide care and c ustody for the first eleven months, and once he began services after release from pr obation, he displayed continuing hostility to caseworkers and an inability to address his childr en’s needs. Both children exhibited continuing problems with the lac k of consistency and permanence in their lives; however, despite those problems, respondent was inconsistent in attending parent ing time and by his own

admission failed to benefit from offered services.

In addition, respondent underwent a court-ordered psychological assessment in 2014 by Dr. Shannon Lowder, who diagnosed him with “personality disorde r, NOS with narcissistic and antisocial features.” Respondent d isagreed with that assessmen t and never receive d treatment for this diagnosis despite the fact t hat his caseworker believed it was necessary. Respondent did present evidence of other psychological assessments in which th e assessing doctors either concluded that respondent was fr ee of psychological diagnoses, or that rather than having a personality disorder, respondent instead suffered from major de pressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and social anxi ety disorder. The trial court found Dr. Lowder’s assessment of a personality disorder to be accurate and although there was conf licting evidence regarding Dr. Lowder’s opinions, we defer to a “trial court’s credibility det ermination.” In re HRC , 286 Mich App 444, 460; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Further, the trial court fo und that respondent had failed to give an accurate report of himself to his therapists. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convinc ing evidence that statutory grounds existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 3

Respondent also argues that the t rial court erred in finding th at termination of his parental rights was in his children’s be st interests. We disagree.

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests , the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that a dditional efforts for reunifica tion of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). “[W]h ether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. ” In re Moss Minors , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “In deciding whether terminat ion is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the paren t, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the a dvantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

3 Because we conclude that there was no error in finding grounds for termination of parental rights under subsection (g), we decline to consider whether the re were alternative grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).-4- Again, the record reflects the children’s great need for perma nence and stability, and respondent’s inability to provide it. In addition, although th ere was testimony that the children had a bond with responde nt, a caseworker tes tified that MI in p articular did not see respondent as a caretaker. The record reflects that MI was, however, incredi bly bonded with her current foster parents and had made a lot of progress in their home. Further, KI also appeared to be doing well in foster care. Accordingly, based on the record in this case, the trial court did not err in finding that termination of respondent’s pa rental rights was in the chi ldren’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien