L ARRY KL AYMAN,

Plaintiff,
v. J UDI CI AL

WATCH, I

NC., e t al

. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 06-670 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (June 25, 2009) Currently pendingbefor e the Court is Plaintiff L arr y Klay man’s (“ Klay

man”) Objections to Mag istrate Judge A lan Kay ’s Marc h 24, 2009 [301] Memorandum Opinion and [302] Order, wh ic h g ra nte d D e fe nd ants ’ [2 18 ] Mot ion fo r S anc tio ns fo r P la int if f’ s F a ilure to C omp ly

wi th Court Or de r a nd pr oh ibi ts Pl a int if

f f ro m te sti fy

ingto o r i ntr od

uc ingint o e vid e nc e any

do c ume nts in support of his claims for damag es or in support of his def enses to De fenda

nts’ counter claims. Inad d i t i o n , Kl ay

m an h as al s o m o v edfo r d i s qu al i fi ca t i o no f M agi s tra t e J u d ge K ay . Al th o u gh Klay man does not spec ify , it appear s that he ar g ues Mag istrate Judge K ay should be disqualified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which re quires a f eder al judg e to re cuse himself “ in any proce edingin which his impartiality might re asonably

be questioned.” Klay

man’s motion
a pp e ars to p ri nc ipa lly

a sse rt that Ma g istra

te Judg e Ka

y ’s ru lin g s in

thi s c a se , a s w e ll a s h is alleg ed “liber al” political views, c reate an a ppear ance of bias that re quires re cusal. Upon
sear chingconsideration of Klay man’s Objec tions, Defenda nts’ Opposition, Klay

man’s Reply , the
re le va nt c a se law, and

the e nti re re c or d h e re in, the Court c on c lud e s th a t: ( a ) P la int if f’ s r e qu e st that this Court di squalify

Mag istrate Judge K ay

is DENI ED, as the Court c oncludes that re cusal2

is neither re quired nor w arr anted; and ( b) Klay man’s Objec tions [ 304] t o Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s M ar ch 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 M em o ra n d u mOp i n i o nan d

Or d er m u s tb e O VE R R

ULED , an d

M agi s tra t e J u d ge Kay ’s [302] Orde r shall be AF FI RMED acc ording ly
. I. BACKG ROUND The Court shall assume f

amiliarity with the numerous opinions issued by both this C ourt
and Ma g istra te Judg e Ka

y , w hic h s e t f

or th i n d e ta il the fa c tua l ba c kg ro un d a nd a lle g a tio ns of

thi s
c a se , a nd sh a ll the re fo re pr ov ide on ly a br ie f s umm ary

of the ins tant c a se a s is ne c e ssa ry to provide c ontext for r esolution of Klay man’s objec tions now before the Court. See Klaym an v. Judicial W

atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL140978 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2007); Klayman v. J

udicial W atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL1034936 (Apr. 3, 2007) ; and Klayman v. J

udicial W atch, Inc

. , Civil Action No. 06-670, 2007 WL1034937 (Apr. 3, 2007) (her einaf ter “ Klayman I

”). D efe ndant J udicial Watch, Inc. is a 501(c )(3) org anization formed under the laws of the D istrict of Columbia and headqua rtere d in the District of Columbia. Klayman I

, 2007 WL 1034937, *2. Def endant F itton is President of Judicial W atch, De fenda nt Orfa nedes is the Sec reta

ry and a D irec tor of Judi cial Watch, and D efe ndant Fa rre ll is a Director of Judi cial Watch. Id. Plaintiff L arr y Klay man is the self-de scribed f ounder a nd former Cha ir man, Ge ne ra l Co un se l and Tr e a sure r o f Jud ic ia l Watc h, wh o r e sid e s in and pr a c tic e s la

w i n the State of F lorida. Id. Klay man, an attorney , is curre ntly repr esentinghimself pr o s e in t his matter. Kl ay man’ s Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int and Judic ia l Watc h’ s A me nd e d Co un te rc la im i n this action include var ious leg al claims stemming f rom eve nts that occurr ed af ter Kla y man left J udicial Watch in September 2003. Id. Many of these c laims arise out of the Seve ranc e3

Ag ree ment enter ed into by Klay man and Judicial W atch on Septembe r 19, 2003. Id. The Court need not a ddress the spe cifics of the par ties’ claims at this time, other than to note that, inte r a lia , Kl ay man a sse rt s c la ims a g a ins t th e De fe nd ants un de r t he L anh am A c t f

or un fa ir c omp e tit ion

in the form of

false a dvertising and fa lse endorse ments and for brea ch of c ontrac t relatingto the Se ve ra nc e Agre e me nt. 2d

Am . Co mpl . ¶

¶ 9 7- 10 6; 1 15 -1 62 . Jud ic ia l Watc h a sse rt s
c ounte rc la ims a g a ins t K lay man und e r t

he L anh am A c t f

or tr a de mark

inf ri ng e me nt, un fa ir
c omp e tit ion

in t he fo rm of fa lse a dv e rt isi ngand

fa lse a sso c iatio n, and

c y be rs qu a tti ng . A m. Count. ¶¶ 84-116. On Dec ember

3, 2007, this Court refer

red the instant case to Ma g istrate Judge K ay for dis po sit ion

of a ll p e nd ingand

futur e dis c ov e ry -r e late d mo tio ns purs ua nt t o L oc a l Civ il Ru le 72.2(a)
. See Docke t No. [85] . As is releva nt to Klay man’s Objec tions, on November 2, 2007, Def endants ser

ved on Klay

man their Supplemental Reque sts for Production of Doc uments. See 3/12/08 Mem. Order , Docke t No. [117] , at 4. Klay man’s re sponses wer e due on D ece mber 6, 2007. Id. No re sponses wer e provide d by that date, howe ver, a

nd on Dec ember

17, 2007, counsel for

Def endants sent a

letter to then-Plaintiff’ s counsel indicatingthat they would file a motion to compel unless they rec eived the doc uments by Dec ember

19, 2007. Id. On Dec ember 18, 2007, Klay

man serve d Responses on Def endants, in which he asser ted var ious objections and claims of privileg e, but did not provide any documents re sponsive to Defe ndants’ Supplemental Requests or provide a privileg e logsubstantiating his cla ims of privileg e. Id. at 4-5. On January 9, 20 08 , D e fe nd ants a g a in w arn e d K lay man th a t th e y

wo uld fi le a mot ion to c omp e l if

the y did not rec eive r esponsive docume nts. Id. at 5. Klay man fa iled to produce the documents, a nd Def endants filed a

motion to compel on Febr uary 6, 2008. Id. a t 5; De fs ’ S up pl. Re qu e sts Mo t.Mag istrate Judge K ay separ ately

awa rded D efe ndants the re quested moneta ry sanctions 1 in an orde r date d J uly

1, 2008. SeeDocke t No. [199]
. 4 to Compel, Docket No. [106-2]. S pecif ically , Def

endants re quested that Mag istrate Judge K ay compel Klay

man to produce materia ls responsive to document r equests nos. 1-57 a nd 60, and
a lso re qu e ste d th a t K lay

man b e re qu ir e d to pa

y the fe e s a

nd c os ts i nc ur

re d b y De fe nd ants in filing the ir motion to compel. 3/12/08 Mem. Order at 5. Each of the document r equests at issue relate, in larg e par

t, to Defe ndants’ counte rcla ims, and many also relate to Klay

man’s cla ims for dama g e s. See id. at 8, 9. On Marc h 12, 2008, Mag istrate Judge K ay g rante d Def

endants’ motion as to all but one document re quest. See 3/12/08 Order, D ocket No. [117]. Bec ause the document re quests soug ht rele vant information and K lay man had not ade quately

demonstrated that the reque sts were imp ro pe r, Ma g istrate Judg e Ka y or de re d Pl a int if

f t o s up ple me nt h is r e sp on se s to the do c ume nts within ten day s. Id. at 11. In addition, Mag istrate Judge K ay g rante d Def

endants’ r equest for
mon e tary sanc tio ns , a

wa rd ingDe fe nd ants c os ts a

nd a tto rn e y s’ fe e s. Id. at 12. Klay man filed 1 objections to the Orde r, see Docke t No. [125] , which we re ove rruled by this Court, see Docke t No. [167] . Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s Marc h 12, 2008 Memorandum Or der w as there fore aff irmed in its entirety
. See id. There afte r, on Jul y

7, 2008, Mag istrate Judge K ay held a Status Confere nce a fter the schedule d close of disc overy to addre ss any

outstanding discove ry

issues. On J uly

9, 2008, Mag istrate Judge K ay

issued an Or der a ddressingall such re maining disc overy issues and memorializing the sche dule set duringthe Status Conferenc e. See 7/9/08 Order, D ocket No. [200] . As Mag istrate Judge K ay noted in his J uly

9, 2008 Orde r, “Plaintiff re prese nted [at theIn the interve ning time pe riod, pursuant to this Court’s previous sche duling or der, the 2 parties e ach f

iled their motions for summary judgme nt on November

25, 2008. See Do c ke t N os . [266 ], [26 7], [2 68 ], [26 9], [2 70 ], [27 5]. A c c or din g ly , D e fe nd ants we re re qu ir e d to fi le the ir motions for summary

judgme nt and re spond to Klay man’s par tial motion for summary

judgme nt without the reque sted documents. 5 J uly 7, 2009 Status Conferenc e] that he will be able to provide [t he] documents [sought by Def endants] to Defe ndants by J uly 25, 2008.” Id. at 2. Mag istrate Judge K ay further stated that

“ [t]he Court

c a uti on s Pla int if

f t o b e min df

ul o f t his de a dli ne , a s f

ur the r n on c omp lia

nc e wi th h is discovery obligations will expose him t o risk of sanc tions.” Id. Klay man, howeve r, fa iled once
a g a in t o p ro du c e the re sp on siv e do c ume nts to D e fe nd ants . There afte r, on August 12, 2008, Defe ndants filed a motion re questing that Klay man be prec luded from testify

ing or admitting any

purported e vidence in support of any of his alleg ed
c la ims fo r d ama g e s o r i n s up po rt of his a lle g e d d e fe ns e s to De fe nd ants ’ c ounte rc la ims a s a sanction for

his failure to produc e the r equeste d discovery as re quired by

Mag istrate Judge K ay . See D e f s . ’ M o t . f o r P l
. ’ s F a i l ur e t o C o mp l y w i thC o urtO r d e r , D o c k e tN o . [ 2 1 8 ]
. S i g n i f i c an t l y, Klay man did not respond to De fenda nts’ motion for sanctions nor did he pr oduce the reque sted documents. 3/24/09 Mem. Op. at 6. Indeed, a s of Marc h 24, 2009—more than six mont hs after Klay man’s opposition to Defenda nts’ motion would have bee n due—Klay man had yet to respond in a ny wa y to e ith e r D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s anc tio ns or

the outst and ingdo c ume nt r e qu e sts . 2 Consequently , Mag istrate Judge K ay issued a Memora

ndum Opinion and Orde r, date d Marc h 24, 2009, treating De fenda

nts’ motion as conce ded pursua nt to L CvR 7(b). Id. a t 7. Ma g ist rate J udg e Ka y nonetheless pr ocee ded to consider the substantive merits of De fenda nts’ reque st for sanctions and r eviewe d in detail the proc edura l history surroundingDef

endants’ outstanding document re quests. See ge nerally id. Mag istrate Judge K ay ultimately

conclude d thatSpecifica lly , Klay man asser ts that he “moves to disqualify the Mag istrate Judge on the 3 same g rounds” upon whic h he pre viously moved to disqualify

this Court. P ls.’ Objs. at 2. Refer ence to Klay

man’s motion to disqualify this Court shows t hat Klay man soug ht rec usal under 28 U .S.C. § 455(a). See Pl
. ’ s M o t. f o r Re c u s a l a

n d /o r D is qu a li f ic a ti o n , D o c k e t N o . [2 9 8 ], at 1. 6 Klay man’s fa ilure to produce the re levant mater ial sever ely prejudice d both the Def

endants a nd the jud ic ia l sy ste m, a

nd that K lay man, in r e fu sin g to c omp ly wi th t he Court ’s dis c ov e ry

or de rs , acte d willfully

and with full knowledg e that his ac tions were not in ac corda nce w ith the Fede ral Rules and Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s orde rs. Id. at 8-9. As pr ior attempts to ensure K lay man’s compliance throug h application of the lesser sa nction of monetar

y costs and fe es had pr oved fruitless, Mag istrate Judge K ay g rante d Def

endants’ r equest to prohibit Klay man from testify

ing or introducinginto evidence any documents in support of his claims for da mag es or in support of his defense s to Defe ndants’ counte rcla ims. Id. at 9. Klay man now objec ts to thi s Order
. II. LEGAL STA ND AR D A ND DI SCU SSIO N As discussed above , Klay man has c ombined his objections to Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s Marc h 2 4, 20 09 Or de r w itha re qu e st t o d isq

ua lif y Ma g ist rate Judg e Ka

y . T he Court

sh a ll b e g in first by addre ssing Kla

y man’s re quest to disqualify Mag istrate Judge K ay

befor e than turningto a discussion of the Marc h 24, 2009 Orde r and c onsideration of K lay man’s objec tions to t hat ruling
. A. Di

sq ua lif ic ati on of M

ag ist ra te J ud geKay is N e ith e r A pp ro pr iate or Ne c essa ry As stated above , Klay

man has moved f

or disqualification of Mag istrate Judge K ay . Although K lay

man does not spec ify

the leg al authority

for this reque st, it appears that he contends that Mag istrate Judge K ay should be disqualified pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 455(a)
. 3 Under section 455(a ), a litig ant is permitted to seek r ecusa l of a fe dera l judge “in any proce eding in which his impartiality

might re asonably

be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). In assessingKlay man also states that his motion to dis qualify Mag istrate Judge K ay

incorporates by 4 ref ere nce a ll arguments asserte d in his separately -filed motion to rec use this Court, Docket No. [298]
. See Pl.’s Objs. at 2 (“Plaintiff incorpor ates by ref ere nce the rec usal and disqualification mot ion of the tr ia l ju dg e and

re sp e c tf ull y mov e s to dis qu a lif

y the Ma g istra

te Judg e on

the same g round.”) . Howeve r, as the D .C. Circuit has emphasized, “[r]ecusal is a hig hly persona l decision.” Liberty Lobby, Inc. v . Dow Jones &Co., Inc. , 838 F.2d 1287, 1301 ( D.C. Cir. 1988). I t is the re fo re un c le ar t o th e Court ho w a rgume nts re latin g to a

n a pp are nt b ia s o n th e pa

rt of thi s J udg e would also be rele vant to a motion to recuse Mag istrate Judge K ay . Nonethele ss, to the e xtent K lay

man h a s in c or

po rate d a ny su c h a rgume nts , th e y

fa il f or the same re a so ns se t f

or th i n the Court’s Orde r, issued today , denying K lay man’s motion to recuse this Court. In addition, the Court notes that, in his ins tant Objections, Klay man has made various al l ega t i o n s th atap p ea r t o b e d i re ct edt o wa rd s th i s J u d ge a s we l l as t o wa rd s M agi s tra t e J u d ge Ka y . In p art ic ula

r, Kl ay man r e pe a ts h is a

rgume nt, a sse rt e d in iti a lly in h is s e pa

ra te Mo tio n to Recuse a nd/or Disqualify

this Court, see Docke t No. [298] , that this Court m ust be disqualified based on the fac t that it was appointed by the forme r Clinton adminis tration. Ag ain, the Court ha s, by se pa rate or de r i ssu e d to da

y , d e nie d K lay

man’ s mo tio n s e e kin g to r e c us e thi s Co ur t, finding that rec usal is not warra nted, justified or nec essar y . 7 section 455(a ) motions, the D.C. Circuit applies an “objec tive” standa rd: “Rec usal is require d when ‘ a re asonable and informe d observe r would question the judg e’s impar tiality .’” S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit

Found. Inc. , 3 9 2 F. 3 d

4 8 6 , 4 9 3 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Microsoft Corp. , 253 F.3d 34, 114 ( D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. de nied , 534 U.S. 952 (2001))) . Her e, althoug h Klay

man’s brie fingis far f

rom a model of c larity , it appear s that he alleg es two sourc es of bias that he c ontends would ca use a “ rea sonable a

nd informed obse rver ” to question Ma g istrate Judg e Ka

y ’s imp art ia lity . F ir st, Kl ay man a sse rt s th a t va

ri ou s r uli ng s b y Ma g ist rate J udg e Ka y cre ate a n appea ranc e of bia s ag ainst him. P l.’s Objs. 1-4. Second, Kla y man ar g ues that Mag istrate Judge K ay should be disqualified bec ause of his alleg ed political bac kg round. Id. at 3-4; Pl.’s Reply

at 4-5. The Court shall address e ach in turn. 4 Be fore doing so, how ever , the Court notes that Klay man makes his re quest to disqualify Ma g istrate Judg e Ka

y fo r t he fi rs t ti me be fo re thi s Co ur t. A lth ou g h n e ith e r p a

rt y ha s r a ise d th is8

issue, it is not entirely

clea r whe ther the r equest for

disqualification is theref

ore pr operly

befor e this Court. As the D.C. Ci rcuit has obse rved, “ [r] ecusa l is a highly persona l decision.” Lib e rty Lobby, Inc. v . Dow Jones &Co., Inc. , 8 38 F .2 d 1 28 7, 13 01 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 8) . Amot ion to r e c us e pursuant to sec tion 455(a) r equire s that a “judg e must assess the truth of the fac ts alleg ed and deter mine if they

would impeach his impartiality .” Id. I t is therefor e “not a decision that an appellate panel may

make f or a district c ourt judg e in the first instance .” Id. Rather, “ [i ]t is for the district court judg e to dec ide as a n initial matter whether

he will . . . step aside in fa vor of another judge .” Id. at 1302. Her e, Klay man see ks an orde r fr om this C ourt disqualifying Ma g istrate Judg e Ka

y wi tho ut f ir st p ro vid ingthe Ma g ist

rate Judg e wi th a

n o pp or tun ity to evaluate the re quest himself. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Liberty Lobbywould there fore seem to counsel ag ainst consideringKlay man’s re quest without first providing Ma g istrate Judge K ay the op po rt

un ity to “ a sse ss t

he tr uth of the fa c ts a lle g e d a

nd de te rm ine if

the y wo uld imp e a c h h is impartiality

or appe ara

nce of impartiality .” Id. at 1301. In this case, howe ver, it is rea dily appar ent upon re view of K lay man’s brie fing that he has, in fac t, failed to set for th any specific fac ts or evidenc e supportinghis request to disqualify Mag istrate Judge K ay . Rather, Kla y man’s re quest is based solely on his own unfounded speculation and his evident displeasure with cer tain unfavor able r

ulings. The Court theref

ore
c on c lud e s th a t, i n th is p art ic ula r c ir c ums tanc e wh e re Kl ay man h a s f a ile d to a lle g e any

sp e c if ic fa c ts s up po rt inghis re qu e st t o r e c us e , th e re is n o b e ne fi t—t o e ith e r t his Court or to M a g ist

rate J udg e Ka y —in requiringKlay

man to first raise his request for disqualification bef

ore the Mag istrate Judge. Q uite simply , the Court sees no ne ed to provide Ma g istrate Judge K ay with an opportunity

to first “asse ss the truth of the fa cts alleg ed,” when no such f acts have eve n beenThe Court notes that this is not the first tim e Klay man has moved this Court to remove 5 Mag istrate Judge K ay

from this case
. SeeP l
. ’s M o t . t o R ea s s i gnC as e t o M agi s tra t e J u d ge Fa cciola on D iscovery

and Relate d I ssues, Docke t No. [217] . The Court denie d that motion by Orde r date d August 25, 2008, concludingthat Klay man’s alleg ation that Mag istrate Judge K ay had take n sides in favor of Def endants wa s “entire ly

devoid of mer it.” See Docke t No. [227] , at 2. 9 alleg ed. Ac cording ly , the Court shall proce ed to the mer its of Klay man’s asse rtion that Mag istrate Judge K ay

must be disqualified pursuant to sec tion 455(a). 5 1. Klay

man’s Dissatisfac tion with Magistrate J udg e Ka y ’s Rulings Doe s Not Warrant Disqua lification Klay man broa dly

alleg es that var ious rulings by Mag istrate Judge K ay

have c reated an appea ranc e of bia s ag ainst him. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that, although Kla y man complains g ener ally

of Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s dec isions on several issues, he fails to provide any citations to the specific ruling s that he believe s are evidenc e of bia s. Rather, Kla y man makes
a va ri e ty of un su pp or te d, c on c lus or

y state me nts a tta c kin g un sp e c if ie d d e c isi on s b y

Ma g istrate J udg e Ka y . See, e .g., Pl.’s Objs. at 3 (alleg ing w ithout support that Magistrate J udg e Ka y “ac ted
c a pr ic iou sly and unre a so na

bly and c on tr ary to e sta bli sh e d p re c e de nt” ); id. at 4 (a lleg ing w ithout support that ruling by

Mag istrate Judge K ay

“is contra

ry to acc epted pr actice and leg al norms”)
. The D.C. Circuit has c ounseled, howe ver, that “[a] j udg e should not rec use himself base d upon conclusory , unsupported or te nuous alleg ations.” See I n re Kaminski , 960 F.2d 1062, 1065, n. 3 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 2) (p e r c ur ium ); see also Iv ey v . Nat’l Tr easury Em ployee s Union , Civ. Act. No. 05-1147, 2008 WL4091676, *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2008) (“ g ener al and c onclusory” stateme nts are ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a mot ion fo r r e c us a l) . F or

thi s r e a so n a lon e , th e n, Kl ay man’ s a rgume nts
are insufficient to wa

rra nt disqualification. Mo re imp or

tantl y , it is e vid e nt u

po n r e vie w o f K lay

man’ s b ri e fi ngthat hi s a

rgume nts10

a ime d at Ma g istrate Judg e Ka y ’s ru lin g s in

thi s c a se are sim

ply ba se d o n h is d isa g re e me nt w ith decisions unfavorable to him. Discovery in this case has be en conte ntious and, in the three year s sin c e Kl ay

man f ile d h is c omp la int

in t his matte r, Ma g ist

rate Judg e Ka

y ha s is su e d mo re tha

n f if ty order s. Unsurprising ly , not all rulings have bee n in Klay man’s fa vor. The f

act that Kla

y man
rema ins displeased with Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s ruling s, howeve r, is not sufficient to support disqualification. As the Supreme Court has made c lear , “judicial ruling s alone a lmost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or pa

rtiality motion.” Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555. Rather, judicial
ru lin g s b y the mse lve s “ c ann ot p os sib ly sh owre lia

nc e up on an e xtra jud ic ia l so ur c e ; and

c an o nly in the rar est circ umstances e vidence the deg ree of favoritism or antag onism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved.” Id. Th e re fo re , d iss a tis fa c tio n w itha c ourt ’s ru lin g s “ a lmo st inv ari a bly” pr ov ide s a

pr op e r gro un d f

or a pp e a l—not

for r ecusa l. Id. In th is c a se , K lay man h a s, in fac t, exercised his rig ht to appeal in almost eve ry instance, obje cting to virtually all substantive discovery order s issued by

Mag istrate Judge K ay . See D o c k e t N o s . [9 9 ], [1 0 3 ], [1 2 3 ], [1 2 5 ], [154 ], [16 2], [1 72 ], [17 3], [1 75 ], [17 6], [2 03 ], [21 5], [2 54 ], [25 5]. T his Court , a ft e r c are fu lly revie wing the cha lleng ed ruling s, aff irmed ea ch of the m in all respec ts, finding them well-re asoned a

nd well-supporte d by

the re cord. The Court specifica lly considere d and re

jected
eac h of Klay

man’s Objec tions to Magistrate J udg e Ka y ’s ruling s, and found ne ither fa ctual nor leg al er ror on Ma g istrate Judge K ay ’s par t. SeeD o c k e t N o s . [1 3 4 ], [1 6 7 ], [1 8 3 ], [1 8 4 ], [1 8 5 ], [1 8 9 ], 8 /7 /0 8 M in

u te O r d e r , [2 6 1 ], [2 6 2 ]. Pla int if f’ s c on tin uin g dis ple a sure wi th M a g istra te J u d g e K ay’ s r

u l i n g s s i mp l y d o e s n o te s t a b l i s hb i a s o nth e p arto f

M a g i s tr a t e J u d g e K ay,Despite Kla y man’s foc us on those decisions issued by Mag istrate Judge K ay

ruling 6 a g a ins t K lay

man, the Court

no te s th a t Ma g istra

te Judg e Ka

y ru le d in fa vo r o f K lay

man w ith respe ct to at least one discovery dispute (and that this Court aff irmed his ruling in that respec t over D efe ndants’ objec tions), and furthe r notes that Mag istrate Judge K ay has g rante d Klay

man a number of e x tensions and continuanc es over Def endants’ obje ctions. See, e .g., Docke t No. [167] (over ruling Def

endants’ O bjections to Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s Marc h 12, 2008 Memorandum Op ini on ); see also 3/13/08 Minut e Or der ( g ranting , over D efe ndants’ objec tions, Klay man’s reque st to continue his deposition); 8/13/ 08 Minute Order (g rantingKlay

man’s re quest to rese t cer tain depositions over De fenda nts’ objections).

11 p arti c u la r ly w h e r e th is Co urt h a s u

p h e ld w it h o u t e xc e p ti o nM a g is tr a te Ju d g e K ay ’ s r u li n g s . “ [I ]f

6 disqualification wer e re quired ‘me rely as a r esult of counse l’s disag ree ment with judicial conclusions re ache d in the course of litigation, the judicial sy stem would g rind to a halt.” Loving Spirit Found. , 3 9 2 F. 3 d

at4 9 4 (q u o t i n g Barnett v. City of Chicago , 952 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D. I ll. 1998)). Klay man also appe ars to take issue with the tone or wor ds used by Mag istrate Judge K ay in cer tain instances, br oadly

complaining that Mag istrate Judge K ay has evide nced a

“hostile” attitude and has “ show[n] animus toward him.” Pl.’s Reply at 3. Klay

man, howeve r, has—onc e
a g a in— fa ile d to dir e c t th e Court to a ny e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g thi s c la im n or

is t he Court its e lf
awa re of any su c h e vid e nc e . M or e ov e r, su c h a c omp la int

do e s n ot d e mon str a te bia s. As the D. C. Circuit has explained, “[s] harp w ords spoken by a trial c ourt to counsel do not by themselves establish impermissible bias. There is a modicum of quick temper that must be allowed e ven judge s.” United States v. Lawson , 4 9 4 F. 3 d 1 0 4 6 , 1 0 5 5 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States
v . D on ato , 9 9 F .3 d 4 26 , 4 34 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) ); see also Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555-56 (“ Not establishing bia s or par

tiality , howeve r, ar e expressions of impatience , dissatisfaction, annoy ance , and eve n ang er.” ) (e mphasis in origina l). The Court ther efor e conc ludes that Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s ruling s do not warr ant disqualification.The Court notes that Klay man was c ounsel of re cord f or Plaintiff in the Ma c

Draw case . 7 See138 F.3d at 35. 12

2. Disqualification B ased on Ma g istrate Judge K ay ’s Alleg ed Political Ba ckg round is Not Warrante d Either Klay man next arg ues that re cusal is nec essar y beca use of Ma g istrate Judge K ay ’s alleg ed p o l i t i c a l b a c k g r o un d

an d b e l i e f s . S p e c i f i c a l l y, K l aym ana l l e g e s th a t“ M a g i s tr a t e J u d g e K aye [ sic ] [] is qu ite lib e ra l and a De moc rat,” and

that an a pp e ara nc e of bia s th e re fo re e xists a g a ins t Klay man, who is a self

-desc ribed “ conser

vative public intere st advocate.” Pl.’s Reply at 4. Once ag ain, Klay

man has fa iled to cite any fac ts or evidenc e in support of his claims. See ge nerally id. Ho we ve r, e ve n a ssumin g that Ma g istra te Judg e Ka

y is a “ lib e ra l” and

/or a “ De moc ra

t,” the se fac ts by themselves do not war

rant disqualification. “J udg es g ener ally have political backgrounds to one degree or anothe r but must be presumed, a bsent more, to be impar

tial. At least in the fe dera l sy stem, judge s separ ate themse lves from politics when g oing on the bench, and their life tenure reduc es any felt re liance on political patrons.” MacD raw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc. , 138 F.3d 33, 38 ( 2d Cir. 1998), cert. de nied , 525 U.S. 874 (1998) (r ejec ting Plaintiff’s alleg ation that rec usal is warr anted ba sed upon judg e’s a lleg ed political af filiation)

. 7 Cf. Kar im-Panahi , 2004 WL1588167, * 4 (af firming lower c ourt’s denia l of motion for rec usal ba se d o n a lle g a tio ns that th e jud g e wa s “ bia se d b e c a us e of he r ‘ po lit ic a l- re lig iou s c onne c tio ns ’
and he r a lle g e d lo y a lty

to t ho se wh o s e le c te d, c on fi rm e d a nd a pp ointe d h e r” ). Ac c or din g ly , it is clea r that, eve n if true, the me re f act that Ma g istrate Judge K ay may be a D emocr at and/or ha ve a lib e ra l po lit ic a l ba c kg ro un d d oe s n ot w arr ant o r r e qu ir e re c us a l.Ba sed on these a lleg ations, Klay man re quests “an e videntiary hear ing c oncer

ning the 8 communications betwe en the Ma g istrate Judge a nd the trial judg e in dra fting , formulatingand issuing the Me morandum Opinion and Or der that are beingappea led her ein,” a s well as “the pr od uc tio n o f e ma il a

nd e vid e nc e of

oth e r c omm

un ic a tio ns be tw e e n th e tw o o ff ic e s. ” Pl. ’s Ob

js. at 2. Noticea

bly , Klay man has fa iled to identify a sing le ca se authorizing the ty pe of discove ry he now de mands, which is not surprising consideringthe rather e x traordina ry relief he re quests. 13 3. Klay

man’s Unsupporte d Alleg ations Attackingthe Court’s Integ rity Are Who lly I na pp ro pr iate Finally , the Court notes that, throug hout Klay man’s Objec tions, he has made va rious
un su pp or te d, un su bs tanti a te d, and

highly ins ult inga lle g a tio ns a c c us ingthi s Co ur t and Ma g istrate J udg e Ka y of colludingtoge ther to intentionally deny Klay man his fair da

y in court. F or example, Klay

man has a ccuse d this Court and Mag istrate Judge K ay , without any support, of “w o rk [ i n g] i nt an d em [ t o ] d es tro y [ ] th e i n d ep en d en ce o f t h e M agi s tra t e J u d ge a n d tri al j u d ge revie w proc ess.” Pl.’s Objs. at 2. Klay man has a lso brazenly

alleg ed—ag ain without any evidentiar y or fa ctual support—that this Court and Mag istrate Judge K ay are “in obvious league” toge ther a nd have w orked to “ ‘cle verly ’ pre vent[] Plaintiff from having[certain discove ry ] i ssues hear d by the appe llate cour

t.” Id. at3
. He al s o ac cu s es b o thth i s C o urt an d M agi s tra t e J u d ge Kay of “e ffe ctively

[t hrowing ] [ Plaintiff’s motion] into the trash;” of or deringdiscovery as “‘ pay back’ to Plainti ff f

or his public interest ef

forts;” a nd of “a llow[ ing] this case to be transfor med from a c ommercia l dispute into a sleazy divorce action” a s “appa rent pa y back.” Pl.’s Reply

at 2, 4. Stil l y e t, K lay

man a sse rt s th a t “ thi s c ourt and the ma g ist

rate -j ud g e ha s [ sic ] brow-beaten and punished Plaintiff.” Id. a t 5. Th e se a lle g a tio ns have e a c h b e e n ma de by Kl ay man b a se d s ole ly
on his ow n r e c kle ss a

nd un fo un de d s pe c ulatio n w ith out c itatio n to any fa c ts o r e vid e nc e . It is patently clea r that such c onclusory

and unjustified alleg ations are wholly insufficient to wa

rra nt
rec usal. See I

n re Kaminski , 9 60 F .2 d at 10 65 , n . 3 ; see also Iv ey, 2008 WL 4091676, *1. 8More importantly , as stated a bove, Klay

man’s alleg ations upon which this reque st is based are g rounded in nothingmore than unf ounded spec ulation. The Court there fore denies Kla y man’s un s u p p o rt e d an d unp r e c e d e n t e d

r e qu e s tf o r d i s c o v e r y. 14 The Court, howe ver, is conc erne d by the incre asing ly

uncivil tone exhibi ted in Klay man’s
mos t r e c e nt f

ili ng s, c ulm inatin g in h is w ild ly sp e c ulativ e a tta c ks on

the int e g ri ty

of bo th t his Court and Mag istrate Judge K ay . The Court is awa re tha t Klay man appa rently “has a history of
acc using judg es of bias or prejudg ing c ases.” Macdraw , Inc. v . CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 447, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (sanc tioning Klay man, as c ounsel of re cord, f or unprofe ssional comments in connec tion with a reque st for re cusal a nd citing c ases in which Klay man, ac ting a s counsel of r ecor d, filed similar motions seeking to disqualify the pre siding court ba sed upon the trial judg e’s a lleg ed bias). I ndeed, in this ca se alone , Klay man has now broug ht two motions seekingremova l of Mag istrate Judge K ay and one motion see king r ecusa l of thi s Co ur t, a nd ha s unn e c e ssa

ri ly re pe a te d th e un fo un de d a lle g a tio ns a sse rt e d th e re in i n substantive briefing
. See Pl.’s Mot. t o Reassig n Case to Mag istrate Judge F acc iola on Discover y and Relate d I ssues, Docke t No. [217] ; Pl.’s Mot . for Rec usal and/or Disqua lification, Docke t No. [298] ; Plainti ff’ s Objs., Docket No. [304]; S econd A ffidavit of L arr y Klay man, Docke t No. [288] . These f

ilings ar e mar

ked by an uncivil tone that is simply unacc eptable. T he Court the re fo re pla c e s K lay

man o n n oti c e that it

sh a ll n ot t ole rate an in a

pp ro pr iate and

un c ivi l to ne in the futur e . K lay

man is c a pa ble of su bmi tti ngfi lin g s th a t are bo th a pp ro pr iate and

c ivi l. B. Ma

gis tra teJ ud geKay ’s Ma rc h 2 4, 20 09Me mo ra nd um Op ini on an d O rd

e r a re W e ll- Su pp or te d a nd

W e ll-Re as on e d, an d S

ha ll b e Af fir me d in The ir E

nti re ty The Court now turns to Klay man’s Objec tions to Magistrate J udg e Ka y ’s Marc h 24, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and O rder . Upon a se arc hing r eview of that Memorandum Opinion and15

Orde r, as we ll as Klay

man’s Objec tions, Defenda nts’ Opposition thereto, Klay man’s Reply , and the initial briefingreg ardingthe under ly ing motions, the Court conc ludes that Klay man’s Objections [304] for the r easons state d below.

1. L eg al Standard f

or Review of

Klay man’s Objec tions P ursuant to L CvR 72.2(b) Un de r L oc a l Civ il Ru le 72 .2 (b ), “ [a]ny pa rt y may fi le wr itt e n o bje c tio ns to a ma g ist rate jud g e ’s ru lin g un de r [L oc a l Civ il Ru le 72 .2 (a )] w ith in 1 0 d ay s[.]” L CvR 72 .2 (b ). L oc a l Civ il Rule 72.2(b) fur

ther provide s that “[t] he objec tions shall specifically desig nate the or der or

part there of to which objec tion is m ade, a nd the basis for the objection.” Id. Pur su ant t o L oc a l Civ il Rule 72.2(c) , “a district judg e may modify or set aside any

portion of a mag istrate judg e’s or der under this Rule found to be c lear ly err oneous or c ontrary

to law.” Se e als o Fe d. R. Civ. P . 72(a) (“The district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify

or set aside any po rt ion of the [ma g istrate jud g e ’s ] or de r t hat is clearly e rroneous or is contrary to law .”) (empha sis added). Acourt should make suc h a findingwhen “ ‘on the e ntire evide nce’ the cour t ‘is left with the def

inite and firm convic tion that a mistake has bee n committed.’” Neuder v. Battelle Pac. Northwest Nat’l L ab. , 1 9 4 F. R
. D. 2 8 9 , 2 9 2 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 3 33 U. S. 3 64 , 3 65 (1 94 8) ); se e als o G luc k v . A ns e tt A us tra lia , 204 F.R.D. 217, 218 (D.D.C. 2001). In light of this standar d, the Court reiter ates that “ [p] arties must take be fore the mag istrate, not only

their best shot, but all of their shots.” Borden v. Se c’y of Health & Hu ma n S e rv s. , 836 F.2d 4, 6 ( 1st Cir. 1987).See, e .g., 5/1 2/0 8 O rd e r, Do c ke t N o. [167 ], at 4 ( a dv isi ngKl ay man th a t hi s o bje c tio ns to 9 failed to c omply

with L CvR 72.2(b)); 5/28/08 Order , Docke t No. [183] , at 4 (same ); 11/6/08 Orde r, Doc ket No. [261] , 4-5 (same); 11/6/08 Order , Docke t No. [262] , at 4-5 (sa me). 16 2. Klay

man Has N ot Demonstrated that Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s Marc h 24, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and O rder are Clearly

Errone ous or Contrary to the L aw The Court notes at the outse t—as it has with respec t to each of Klay man’s pre vious Ob je c tio ns to M a g istrate Judg e Ka y ’s ru lin g s in

thi s c a se —th a t K lay

man’ s O bje c tio ns fa il t o

“ sp e c if ic a lly de signate ” the pa

rt s o f M a g ist

rate Judg e Ka

y ’s Me mor and

um O pin ion

and Or de r t o which Klay

man objects or pr ovide “the ba sis,” i.e. , any leg al authority , for spe cific obje ctions, as require d by

L ocal Civil Rule 72.2(b). See ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Objs., Docket No. [304] . Klay man’s Objections do not provide this Court with any analy sis or discussion of Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s ruling , let alone pr ovide any specific desig nation of the portions of Ma g istrate Judge K ay ’s ruling to whic h K lay

man o bje c ts. Kl ay

man’ s o bje c tio ns are sim ila rl y de vo id o f a

ny c itatio n to supporting c ase la

w, and c erta inly

do not provide the Court with sufficie nt leg al authority or “basis” to support his objec tions, as require d under loc al rules. Ac cording ly , Klay man’s objections are , onc eag

ain , in direct violation of the loca l rules of this Court. Klay man’s
c on tin ue d f a ilure to c on fo rm

his Ob je c tio ns to t

he re qu ir e me nts of

the loc a l r

ule s o f t his Court —d e sp ite the Court ’s re pe a te d a dmo nis hme nt t o K lay man th a t hi s o bje c tio ns are in vio latio n o f L CvR

72 .2 (b ) —is y e t ano the r e xamp le of Kl ay man’ s d isr e g ard

fo r t his Court and its 9 Orde rs. Moreove r, bec ause K lay

man fa iled to file any

opposition t o Def

endants’ motion for sanctions below ( despite havingmore than six mont hs in which to do so), Klay man ra ises all of his arguments ag ainst Defe ndants’ motion for the f irst time before this Court. As ex plained17

above, how ever , the “[p]arties must t ake be fore the mag istrate, not only their best shot, but all of their shots.” Borden , 836 F.2d at 6. “[A] motion for rec onsideration is ‘not simply an opportunity

to rea rgue fa cts and theor ies upon which the c ourt has alr eady ruled.’” Glob ala w Ltd
. v . Ca rm on &Car

mo n La w O

ff. , 4 5 2 F. S u

p p . 2 d 1 , 5 9 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Funds from Prudential Sec. , 245 F. Supp. 2d 41, 44 (D.D .C. 2003)). “N or is it ‘a vehic le for prese nting theor ies or ar g uments that could have been pr esente d ear lier.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Funds from Prudential Sec. , 2 45 F . Su pp . 2 d at 38 ). As De fe nd ants no te , K lay man’ s a rgume nts qu ite
c l e ar l y could have been pr esente d ear lier to the Mag istrate Judge a nd are there fore an improper basis for Kla

y man’s objec tions. See Def s.’ Opp’n at 5. The Court conc ludes that Klay man has there fore waived his a

rguments to Defe ndants’ motion reque sting sanc tions. Marshall v. Chater , 75 F.3d 1421, 1426- 27 (10th Cir. 1996) (“ I ssues raise d for the f irst time in objections to t he mag istrate judg e’s r ecommenda tion are de emed wa ived.”)
. No ne the le ss, the Court

fi nd s th a t, e ve n if

it w e re to c on sid e r K lay

man’ s o bje c tio ns —to the e xtent he a c tua lly

make s a ny su bs tanti ve argume nts —th e Court wo uld c on c lud e that hi s objections are wholly

without merit. I ndeed, K lay man’s objec tions offer no r eason to c onclude that Ma g istra

te Judg e Ka

y ’s Marc h 2 4, 20 09 Me mor and um O pin ion

and Or de r a re c le arl y
err oneous or c ontrary

to law. As Mag istrate Judge K ay explained, Rule 37 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil P roce dure pr ovides that a c ourt may sanction a pa

rty that fails to obey

a discove ry

order
. See3/24/09 Mem. Op. at 6 (citingFe d. R. Civ. P . 37). Specific ally , Rule 37(b)(2) (A) pr ovides that, “if a party . . . fails to obey

an orde r to provide or

permit discover

y , including a

n order made under [Rule 37(a) ] . . . t he cour t in which the ac tion is pending may issue further

just orders.” This includes an orde r “pr ohibiting the disobedient pa rty from supportingor opposing desig nated18

cl ai m s o r d ef

en s es , o r f

ro mi n tro d

u ci n g d es i gn at edm at t er s i n t o ev i d en ce , ” o r “ s tri k i n g p l ea d i n gs in whole or in par

t.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 37(b)( 2)(A) (ii)-(iii). Sig nificantly , Klay man has made no
e ff or t to dis pute Ma g istra

te Judg e Ka

y ’s fi nd ing s: ( 1) that K lay man r e pe a te dly

fa ile d to c omp ly with the discovery

order s requiringhim to produce doc uments responsive to De fenda nts’s discovery reque sts, despite the fac t that he “soug ht, and was r epeatedly provided, more than adequate time to produce the re quired discove ry documents,” see 3/24/08 Mem. Op. at 5-6, 8; and (2) that he has not, to date , produce d any documents re sponsive to Defe ndant’s discove ry
re qu e sts , id. See ge nerally Pl. ’s Ob js. Ind e e d, e ve n n ow , K lay man ma ke s n o e ff or t to c omp ly with Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s discover y order s, as af

firmed by this Court, and in fact make s no
re pr e se ntatio n th a t he wi ll at a ny po int make a ny eff orts to produce the re sponsive documents at issue. See ge nerally Pl. ’s Ob js. Acc ording ly , it is bey ond dispute that Mag istrate Judge K ay was well within his discretion to sanction Klay man. Th e on ly qu e sti on the n is wh e the r t

he sa nc tio n o rd e re d b y

Ma g istra te Judg e Ka

y is appropr iate in this case. Ma g istrate Judge K ay ruled that Kla

y man is “prohibited fr om testify ing to or introducinginto evidence any documents in support of his claims for da mag es or in support of his de fe ns e s to De fe nd ants ’ c ounte rc la ims .” 3/2 4/0 9 M e m. O p. a t 9. In s o d oin g , M a g istrate J udg e Ka y observe d that, “[w]hi le the sanc tion of barr ing c erta in testimony and evide nce f

rom
a dmi ssi on

is g e ne ra lly

no t a s se ve re a s th e sa

nc tio n o f a

de fa ult jud g me nt, the sa

nc tio ns that w ill be applied he re ma

y g o to the hear

t of Plaintiff’s claims and de fense s.” Id. at 7. In such a situation where a

more ser ious sanction is contemplated, the D .C. Circuit has advised a tria l court to c on sid e r “ thr e e ba sic jus tif ic a tio ns that su

pp or t th e us e ” of

a mor e se ve re sa

nc tio n, su c h a s a defa ult judgment: “( 1) a de termination that ‘the e rra nt party ’s behavior has seve rely hamper ed19

the other pa

rty ’s ability

to present his ca se’; (2) ‘the pre judice ca used to the judicial sy stem where the pa rt y ’s mis c on du c t ha s p ut a

n intol e ra ble burd e n o n a

dis tr ic t c ourt

by re qu ir ingthe c ourt

to mod if y its ow n d oc ke t and

op e ratio ns in o rd e r t o a c c omm od a te de lay ’; and (3 ) ‘ the ne e d to sanction conduc t that is disrespectful to the c ourt and to dete r similar misconduct in the future .’” Perez v . Berhanu , 5 8 3 F. S u p p . 2 d 8 7 , 9 0 -9 1 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g W ebb v. D istrict of Colum bia , 146 F.3d 964, 971 ( D.C. Cir. 1998)). F inally , while the D.C. Circuit does “not r equire a district cour

t . . . to ex haust lesser sa

nctions befor e turning ” to a more sever e sanc tion, the Circuit does “re quire that the c ourt explain it s rea sons for issuing [the more se vere sanction] rathe r than a

lesser sa nction.” W

ebb , 146 F.3d at 971. Her e, Mag istrate Judge K ay proper ly applied D.C. Circuit prec edent a nd conclude d that the sanc tio n r e qu e ste d b y De fe nd ants wa s a

pp ro pr iate . Si g nif

ic antl y , K lay

man, in h is Objections, does not make any attempt to dispute the Mag istrate Judge’ s findings that: (1) Klay man’s “c onduct has seve rely prejudice d Def

endants by

preve nting them f

rom revie wing any documentar

y evidenc e re lating to Plaintiff’s damag es or a lleg ed counte rcla ims,” id. at 8; (2) Kl ay man’ s “ c on du c t thro ug ho ut t his c a se , a

nd pa rt ic ula rl y wi th r e sp e c t to his re c a lc itr anc e to provide any discovery

in response to the instant discove ry reque sts, has burdene d the Court,” id. (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; and (3 ) K lay man “ ha s a c te d w ill fu lly

and wi th f ull kn ow le dg e that hi s actions we re not in ac corda nce w ith the Fede ral Rules and this Court’s orde rs,” a nd has “re peate dly

failed to mee t” his obligations to a party befor e the Court, id. at 9. Se e ge ne ra lly Pls. ’ O bjs . N or

do e s K lay

man c on te st M a g istra

te Judg e Ka

y ’s c on c lus ion , b a se d o n th e re c or d in this case, that “ [p] rior attempts to alter Plaintiff’ s behavior w ith the lesser sanc tion of monetary costs and fe es have proved f ruitless,” id. at 9. See ge nerally id. Klay man thus points to no20

fac tual or leg al er

ror in the Ma

rch 24, 2009 Me morandum Opinion and Or der, which the Court conclude s is amply

supported by

the re cord in this case
. Rather, Kla

y man simply

repe ats his argument that the under lying disc overy , which re lates in part to his claims for damag es, is improper. The se ar g uments, howeve r, have alre ady been
re je c te d b y bo th M a g istrate Judg e Ka y and thi s Co ur t. I nd e e d, Kl ay

man f ile d a pe tit ion fo r a wr it of mandamus with the D.C. Ci rcuit re questing the Circuit compel the “ prese rvation and pr e ve nti on

of the pr od uc tio n o f c e rt a in d oc ume nts . . . r e qu e ste d b y [De fe nd ants ] an d o rd e re d to be produc ed . . . by

J udg e Colleen Kollar -Kotelly .” See Do c ke t N o. [224 -2 ] at 2. Th e D. C. Circuit denied Klay

man’s petition, as we ll as his moti on for r ehea ringen banc
. Se e In re Klayman , N o. 08 -5 12 8 ( D. C. C ir . Jul. 25 , 2 00 8) (d e nyingKl ay man’ s p e tit ion

fo r m and amus ) (p e r c ur iam) ; id. (D
. C
. C i r. S ep t . 1 0 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( d en yi n g Kl ay m an ’s m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g en banc ) (p e r c ur iam) . It is the re fo re e vid e nt t hat K lay man, lik e a ll l iti g ants , h a s h a d a n o pp or tun ity to appea l the discovery

order s at issue. Havingfailed to re ceive a fa vorable decision, howe ver, K l aym anm ay not simply ignor e his obligations without repe rcussion. See, e .g., W eisberg v. W ebster , 7 49 F .2 d 8 64 , 8 72 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 4) (f ind ingthat tr ia l c ourt

wa s w ith in i ts d isc re tio n to dismiss case as sanc tion for par ty ’s “willful” f

ailure to timely

comply with court’s discove ry order s). In a dd iti on , K lay

man, se e min g ly

c on c e din g that so me sa

nc tio n is wa

rr ante d in thi s circ umstance, a

rgues that Mag istrate Judge K ay should have instead “ issued a civil contempt finding ,” which, a ccor ding to Kla y man, would then per

mit him to appea l the underlying discovery issues directly

to the D.C. Circuit. Pl .’s Obj. at 3. Klay man wildly

speculates that the Mag istrate Judge de clined to do so only in a “c lever [] ” ploy

to “pre vent[] Plaintiff from having21

the issues hea

rd by the appe llate cour

t.” Id. As an initial matter, Klay man fa iled to file an op po sit ion

to D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s anc tio ns be low

and so ne ve r r e qu e ste d th a t Ma g istra te Ju d g e K ay

is s u e a c iv il c o n te mp t o r d e r

a s ana lt e r

n a ti v e s an c ti o n . M o r e o v e r , a “ d is tr ic t c o urt[ ] [has] discretion whe ther to hold a pa rty who re fuses to comply

with a discover

y order in civil or criminal conte mpt.” In re Se aled Case No. 98-3077 , 1 51 F .3 d 1 05 9, 39 1 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 8) ; see also Beec ham v. Soc ialist People’ s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 424 F.3d 1109, 1112 ( D.C. Cir. 20 05 ) ( “ Di str ic t c ourt s c an im po se any numbe r o f s anc tio ns be sid e s c on te mpt wh e n a pa rt y fa ils to c omp ly wi th a dis c ov e ry

or de r. ” ). Ma g ist

rate Judg e Ka

y wa s th e re fo re we ll w ith in h is d i s c r e t i o ni nc h o o s i n g n o tt o i s s u e a c i v i l c o n t e mp to r d e r

i nth i s c a s e . M o r e i m

p o rt an t l y, howeve r, Klay

man’s ar g ument is predicated on an incor rec t statement of the law

in this C ircuit. Contrary to Klay man’s asse rtions, the D.C. Circuit has made c lear that “a c ivil contempt order ag ainst a par

ty in a pendingproce edingis not appeala ble as a final orde r.” Byrd v. R eno , 180 F .3 d 2 98 , 3 02 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 9) ; se e als o Bee cham , 4 24 F .3 d at 11 12 (“ Th e law o f t his c ir c uit
no w i s th a t ‘ a

c ivi l c on te mpt

or de r a g a ins t a

pa rt y in a pe nd ingpr oc e e din g is n ot a pp e a la ble a s a fi n al o rd er

u n d er 2 8 U. S
. C
. § 1 2 9 1
. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g By rd , 1 80 F .3 d at 30 2) ). Kl ay man’ s a sse rt ion

is thu s n e ith e r s up po rt e d b y the re c or d o r b y

the c a se law o f t

his Cir c uit
. The Court conc ludes that Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s Marc h 24, 2009 Memorandum Opinion
and Or de r gra

nti ngDe fe nd ants ’ [2 18 ] Mot ion fo r S a nc tio ns fo r P la int if

f’ s F a ilure to C omp ly with Court Order is we ll-rea soned, thoroug h, and supported by the re cord, a

nd shall be af

firmed
as a r esult. The Court shall there fore overr ule Plaintiff’s Objec tions to Magistrate J udg e Ka y ’s [301] Marc h 24, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and [302] Order, a nd aff irm that Memorandum O r d e r i ni t s e n t i r e ty.22 IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, the Court sha ll DENY Plaintiff’s re quest to disqualify Mag istrate Judge K ay , shall OVERRUL E Plaintiff’s [304] Objections to Mag istrate Judge A lan Ka y ’s M ar ch 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 M em o ra n d u mOp i n i o nan d

Or d er , an d

s h al l AF FI R M M agi s tra t e J u d ge Kay ’s Marc h 24, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and O rder in its entirety . An appr opriate O rder
acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: J une 25, 2009
/s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ct J u d ge