## IN TH E C OU RT OF C RI MIN A L A PP EA LS O F T E XAS

No. PD-0670-07
CLARK D EWAYN E M AY S , App e lla nt
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Di sc re tio na

ry Re vie w o f C a se 06 -0 6- 00 07 5- CR of the Sixth C ourt

of Ap pe a ls, L amar C ounty
W O M ACK , J., delive red the opinion of the Court, in w hich K EL L ER , P.J., and P RICE , K EAS L ER , H ERV EY , and C OCHRAN

, JJ., joined. H

O L C O MB , J., filed a dissenting opinion, i n which M EYERS and J OHN S ON , JJ., joined.
The a ppellant, duringvoir dire in a mur der tria l, sought to ra ise the subject of diminis hed capa city as it aff ects a defe ndant’s culpa

ble mental state at the time of the off ense. The trial court ruled that it would exclude any evidenc e of the appellant’ s dimini shed ca pacity and invited the appellant to prof

fer evidenc e. The State here raises the issue of whe ther the a ppellant’s prof

fer ofMay s - 2

See P E N A L C ODE § 1 9
. 0 3 (a)( 2 ). 1 16 0 S.W
. 3 d 56 8 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 5 ). 2 evidenc e wa s sufficient to pre serve that rulingfor a ppeal. Holdingthat it was not sufficient, we sh a ll r e ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he Court of Ap pe a ls. T ri al P ro ce ed i n gs Th e a pp e lla nt w a s c ha

rg e d w ithc a

pit a l murd e r; the State c ho se no t to se e k th e de ath

1 penalty . The c ase pr ocee ded to trial bef ore a jury . Duringvoir dire, the a ppellant made the followingstatement: “The law in Texas is that we ca n look at [defendants’] history , their medica l his tor y , th e ir ps yc ho log ic a l hi sto ry , th e ir ps yc hiatr ic his tor

y , a nd we c an lo ok

at th os e fa c tor s to d e t e r m i n e th e i r

s t at e o f m i n d
. ” T h e p r o s e c ut i o nr e s p o n d e d , “ Y o ur H o n o r , m ay

w e a p p r o a c h ?” The judg e excused the jury from the c ourtroom. Ther e followe d a discussion wher ein the trial judge considere d the admissibilit y of mental-impair

ment evidenc e. At the outset of the discussion, the trial c ourt ruled: After rea ding the Jack

son case , it appear s to me that there is no de fense of diminis hed ca

pacity . There is no need for this ty pe of e vidence of diminished cap ac i ty fo r t h e p urp o s es o f s en t en ci n g b ec au s e th er e i s n o i s s u e o f s en t en ci n g, there is only

an issue of guilt or innocence , so I ’ve r uled that I

will not hear a

ny e vid e nc e of

dim ini sh e d c a

pa c ity . [D e fe ns e Couns e l] a sk e d f or an o pp or tun ity to make a rec ord and I ’m g lad to g ive him that opportunity . You may proce ed. Def ense c ounsel proce eded to a rgue that, although J

ac k so n v . S tate reje cted diminished 2 capa city as an a ffirmative defe nse in Texas, it recognized the releva nce a nd admissibili ty

of
e vid e nc e of

me nta l im

pa ir me nt t o “ sh owthat th e de fe nd ant l a c ke d th e c a pa c ity , if you wi ll, to fo rm the sp e c if

ic int e nt o r t

he int e nt e le me nt o f m

ur de r. ” He the n s tate d: “ [T]he e vid e nc e in t his
c a se , w e re we a llo we d to pr e se nt i t, w ou ld s ho w that be c a us e of me nta l and

me dic a l im

pa ir me nt,May s - 3

“In a ll p ro se c u tio n s fo r m u rd e r, the sta te o r th e d e fen d a n t sha ll b e p e rm itt e d to o ff e r te stim o n y a s to a ll 3 r el eva nt f

act s an d ci r cums t anc es s ur r oundi ng t he ki l l i ng an d t he prev i ous r el at i ons hi p exi s t i ng bet ween t he acc us ed and t he d eceased , t o get her wi t h al l rel evant f act s and ci rcum st ances going t o s ho w t he co nd i t i o n of t he m i nd of t he acc us ed at t he t i me of

t he of f ens e. ” C O D E C R IM . P R OC . art . 38
. 3 6 (a). the def endant lac ked, at the time of the alleg ed commission of this crime, the a bility to form the requisites of the me ntal state re quired of intentional a nd knowing .” He also outlined the applicable Texas law that he be lieved re ndere d the evidenc e admissible. De fe ns e c ouns e l r e vie we d w iththe c ourt e a c h o f a se ri e s o f s lid e s h e ha d p repa re d to sh owand dis c us s w iththe jur

y pa ne l du ri ngvo ir dir e . F or ins tanc e , D e fe nd ant’ s E xhibi t 1 (m ist ake nly

mark e d in

the re c or d a s State ’s Exhi bit 1) sa id: CO ND I TI ONOF TH E M I ND : Y ou are ins tr uc te d th at you

may c on sid e r a ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s surroundingthe killing, if a ny , and the pr evious relationship ex isting betwe en the a ccuse d and the de cea sed, if any , toget her with allr e le va ntfac ts and c ir c um st anc e s g oin g t o s how t he c ondi ti on o f them ind o f th e a c c u s e d

atth e t i m e o f

th e o f f e n s e , i f any. Def ense c ounsel summarized his planned discussion with the jury panel, with re g ard to this slide,
a s f oll ow s: [W ]e would have voir dire d the jury as it relate s to the condition of the mind of the ac cused at the time of the off ense. We would have aske d questions conce rning Article 38.36 a s it relates to re levant fa cts and c ircumstance s g oing to show the condition of the mind. 3 Th e su bje c ts o f t he re ma ini ngsli de s and

c ouns e l’ s summa

ry of the m w e re sim ila

rl y c on fi ne d to Te xas l aw r e g ard ingme nta l st ate s and le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s, a s w e ll a s g e ne ra l st ate me nts reg ardingthe questions counsel a nticipated askingthe pane l. Counsel offer ed the slides as exhibi ts, and the cour

t admitted them for the r ecor d. Def ense c ounsel furthe r objec ted to the rulingag ainst using the e vidence for voir dire
. Th e tr ia l ju dg e a ff

ir me d h is r uli ngand re ite ra te d h is und e rs tand ingthat Jack son allowedMay s - 4

See R . A PP . P
. 25
. 2 (a)( 2 ), 66 T ex. B
. J. 16 7 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 3 , am end ed 20 0 7 ). 4 diminis hed-c apac ity

evidenc e only

at punishment, not at the guilt phase. Be cause punishment was not at issue in this case , he said that the e vidence would not be admissible. He a lso ex cluded the evidenc e bec ause of

prejudice , irrele vance , and conf usion to the jury . Def

ense c ounsel argued these points and fina lly

stated: J udg e, my

position i s that the blanket e x clusion of evidenc e of me ntal impairment in the guilt/i nnocenc e phase of this trial to show that as a matter of evidenc e the de fenda

nt lacked the ability

or ca pacity , if you will, to form either a n int e nti on a l or

kn ow ingstate s [ sic ] of mind as culpable mental states f or the offe nse of murde r is not the corr ect state ment of the law
. At this pointin time, if we ca n take that issue up on a

ppeal, without having considere d waivingthe appe al on the point, we would be of the opinion that if you consente d to that, we would ente r a ple a of guilty to the offe nse of c apital murder in this case. I ’m saying that with the reser vation that beca

use I have be en told that no e vid e nc e wh atso e ve r u nd e r a ny c ir c ums tanc e s w ou ld b e a dmi ssi ble a s it applies to that issue, that Imight not and would not put on any rec ord as to the defe ndant’s past menta l health history other than I

would offe r into evidenc e – well, I just – at this poi nt that’s my position. Now, if we are not willing to g o on the re cord f rom the cour

t’s perspe ctive and say that it jus t depe nd s o n what e vid e nc e Ihe ard fr om whate ve r m e nta l he a lth expert that you prese nted, I need to g o ahea d and bringmy mental hea lth ex pert do wn and make my re c or d. B ut i f t

he c ourt ’s of

the op ini on , a s I

un de rs tand

it a s a blanket ruling , that no matter what that evidence said, then I think we have to ge t int o th e pr ob ativ e pr e

jud ic ia l po int

of it b e c a us e Ido n’ t w ant t o w a ive an a pp e llate point in reg ards to that aspe ct of it. But if the court’s position is that reg ardle ss of the pre judicial element of

it, that Tex as law doe s not allow the introduction of evidenc e of me ntal impairment in the guilt-innocence phase to show the de fenda nt l a c k e d th e c a p a c i ty t o f

o r mth e n e c e s s ar

y m e n s r e a

o f i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r

kn o w i n g l y, I ’m willing to proc eed f

orwa rd with the cour

t’s permission to appea l that pa rt ic ula r p oint. The trial judg e agree d to cer tify the appe al and ac cept the a ppellant’s guilty

plea. 4 The State a sked to make a n offe r of pr oof fr om its ex pert witness, to counte r the de fe nd ant’ s e xpe rt .May s - 5

See Act of

Ju ne 16 , 199 1, 72nd Leg. , R. S. , ch
. 652 , § 9, 199 1 T ex. G en. Laws 239 4, 239 5 (a mended 5 2 0 0 5 ) (c u rr e n t ve rs io n a t C O D E C R IM . P R OC . art. 3 7 .07 1 , § 1 ). “If a d efen d an t i s f

o un d guil t y i n a ca p i t al f elo ny ca se in w h ic h the sta te d o e s n o t se e k the d e a th p e n a lty, the ju d g e sh a ll se n te n c e the d e fen d a n t t o li fe im p riso n m e n t.”

T he C o urt of A p p eal s summ ari zed t he sol e i ss ue as “ whether t he d ef ense may present evi d ence at t he 6 g u i l t / i n n oce n ce ph as e of t h e t r i al t o s h ow t h at t h e def en dan t i s a f

f l i ct ed wi t h me n t al or ph y s i ca l i mpai r men t s or a b n o rm a lit ie s w h ic h b rin g into q u e stio n w h e the r h e p o sse sse d the re q u ire d sta te o f m ind a t t h e ti m e o f t h e o ff e n se ; i n o t her word s, whet her a def end ant ’ s st at e o f

m i nd i s such t hat i t de creases hi s ab i l i t y t o f o rmulat e o r po ss ess t he i nt ent t o com mi t a c r i me of

t he nat ur e wi t h w hi ch he i s ch ar ged. ” M ay s v . S ta te , 22 3 S.W
. 3 d 65 1 , 65 3 (T ex. A p p . — T exarkana 2 0 0 7 ). [P ROSECUTOR] : Ithought that [Defe nse Counsel] said that he was g oing to do an o ff e r o f p ro of

wi th a n e xpe rt . [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: No, he indicated that he would not – as I hear d you, judge , not fall bac k on the probative prejudice argument, and it was a blanket ru lin gthat su c h e vid e nc e wa s in a dmi ssi ble . T hat’ s h owIun de rs too d you to s ay it. [TRIAL CO UR T]: T hat’ s th e wa

y Ime ant i t. [PROS ECU TO R]: In th at c a se , w e do n’ t ne e d to do that. [ T R IA LC O U R T ] : It ’ s n o tn e c e s s ar y t o p uto nany e v i d e n c e o f m e n t a l c a

p a c i ty. It’s all presumed in the de fenda nt’s favor in an appe al of this ty

pe. The a ppellant pleade d guilty , and his sentenc e wa s set automatically at life imprisonment. He a

ppeale d. 5 Court of Appea ls Decision Th e iss ue on

dir e c t a pp e a l c e nte re d o n whe the r t he e vid e nc e wo uld

have be e n a dmi ssi ble at the guilt phase of the tria l and, there fore , whether the trial cour

t erre d in excluding it. As the 6 trial court ha d done, the Court of A ppeals a naly zed the question under Jack son . T he Court

sa id that, althoug h Jack

son made plain that Te x as jurisprudenc e does not include an af firmative defe nse of diminished ca

pacity , it “does, howe ver, r ecognize something ver y closely akin to it, ...May s - 6

M ays , 223 S. W
. 3d, a t 654. 7 I bi d. 8 I bi d. 9 I bi d. 10 I d. , a t 654- 55. 11 I d. , a t 655. 12 I bi d. 13 thi s b e ing‘s imp ly

a fa ilure -o f- pr oo f d e fe ns e in whic h th e de fe nd ant c la ims that th e State fa ile d to prove that the defe ndant had the r equire d state of mind at the time of the offe nse.’” 7 The Court of Appe als found the a ppellant’s prof

fer to have f allen within the ambit of the Jack son diminis hed-c apac ity

doctrine. The Court re cognized that “there was no showingof the

8 nature of the e vidence which wa s to be produce d.” But it looked to the appe llant’s stated g oal 9 for of fering the evidenc e, which “ was to show that he w ould have e x plored re levant fa cts and
c ir c ums tanc e s g oin gto s ho w the c on dit ion of his min d at th e tim e of

the kil lin gand

to a pp ly it t o the lesser included off

ense of neg lige nt homicide.” The Court dete rmined this to be a 10 permissible purpose–a

nd there fore the evidenc e to be a dmissibl e at the guilt phase of the trial–under Jack

son , and it conclude d that the trial cour t had abuse d its discretion in ex cluding the evidenc e. 11 The Court asc ribed to the trial c ourt’s rulingnot only the fa ct that “no e vidence was pr e se nte d f

ro m whic h [it

c ou ld] d e te rm ine wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr on e ou s r uli ngsu bs tanti a lly
a ff e c te d M ay s’ [s] su

bs tanti a l r ights ,” but a lso the a pp e lla nt’ s guil ty

ple a its e lf
. B e c a us e it 12 deter mined the er

roneous r uling to have nece ssarily

contributed to the c onviction, the Court
reve rsed the judgment and re manded the c ase to the tria l court. The State pe titioned for re view. 13May s - 7

J o n e s v . S ta te , 9 4 2 S .W .2 d 1 , 2 n.1 (T e x . C r. A p p . 1 9 9 7 ); a c c o rd A rc h ie v . S ta te , 221 S. W
. 3d 695, 698 14 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 7 ); Ha le y v . S ta te , 17 3 S.W
. 3 d 51 0 , 51 5 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 5 ). 173 S. W
. 3d, a t 515- 17. 15 Our Review In this court, the State’s first ground is whether the appe llant failed to pre serve err or for revie w. B efor e we rea ch the State’ s g round on its merits, we addr ess the appe llant’s contention that th e pr e se rv atio n is su e is n ot p ro pe rl y be fo re thi s c ourt . The a ppellant ar gues that the State ra ises the issue her e only for the f irst time and that the Court of Ap pe a ls d id n ot r e nd e r a de c isi on , e ith e r e xplic it o r i mpl ic it, on pr oc e dura l de fa

ult
. Be cause this court’s jurisdiction is li mited to reviewing“dec isions” of the cour ts of appea ls, he say s, we have no jurisdiction to reviewthe issue in this case. We disagree . This court has sa id, “Preser vation of er

ror is a sy stemic requir ement that a f irst-level appellate court should ordinarily revie w on its own motion.” Precisely for this rea son, in Haley 14 we f ound a proc edura l-defa

ult question, raised by

the State for the first time in its petit ion for discretionar

y revie w, to be prope rly

befor e this court, and in so de ciding , rea ched the merits of the issue. Moreove r, her e ther e is no rea son to believe that the Court of A ppeals de viated fr om 15 ordinary proce dure. A lthough ne ither par ty raised the issue in the Court of Appea ls, it was incumbent upon the Court itself to take up e rror prese rvation as a

threshold issue. Implicit in t he Court ’s re vie w o n th e me ri ts w a s a de c isi on on pr oc e dura l de fa

ult , whic h is the re fo re pr op e rl y befor e this court. Ac cording ly , we now tur n to the question of whethe r the a ppellant pre serve d
err or.May s - 8

R. E V ID . 10 3 (a)( 2 ). 16 W a rn e r v . S ta te , 96 9 S.W
. 2 d 1, 2 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 9 8 ). 17 I bi d. 18 S T E V E N G OOD E , O L I N G UY W E L L B OR N II I & M. M I C H A E L S HA R L OT , 1 T EXAS P RACTI CE

– G U ID E T O T H E 19 T EXAS R U L ES O F E VI DENCE : C I V I L A ND C RI M I NAL § 1 0 3
. 3 (19 9 3 ).

W arner , 969 S. W
. 2d, a t 1. 20 In order to preser ve er ror r eg ardinga trial c ourt’s dec ision to ex clude e vidence , the complainingparty

must comply

with Rule of Evidence 103 by makingan “of

fer of proof ” which sets forth the substanc e of the proff ere d evidenc e. Rule 103(a) (2) pr ovides: “Err or may not be 16 pr e dic ate d u

po n a ru lin gwh ic h ... e xclu de s e vid e nc e un le ss a su bs tanti a l r ight o f t

he pa rt y is aff ecte d, and ... the substanc e of the evidenc e wa s made known to the c ourt by offe r, or wa s appar ent from the c ontextwithin which questions were asked.” The off er of proof may

consist of
a conc ise statement by

counsel, or it may

be in question-and- answe r for m. I f in the for

m of a 17 statement, the prof

fer “must include a r easona

bly specific summary

of the e vidence offe red a nd must state the rele vance of the e vidence unless the re levanc e is appa rent, so that the c ourt ca

n deter mine whether

the evidenc e is rele vant and a dmissibl e.” 18 “The primary

purpose of

an off er of proof is to ena

ble an a ppellate c ourt to determine whether the exclusion was err oneous and ha rmful. A sec ondary

purpose is to permit the trial judge to rec onsider his rulingin light of the a ctual evide nce.” 19 This court’s opinion in W arner is instructive, as it was pre dicated on a simil ar se t of
c ir c ums tanc e s. War

ne r, in a he ari ngbe fo re vo ir

dir e on the State ’s mot ion

in l imi ne , o bje c te d to a portion of the motion re questingthat the def endant not discuss in front of the jury any evidenc e
conce rninghis counselingor re habilitation for a stre ss disorder. The de fenda nt told the trial 20May s - 9

Ib id
. 21 Ib id
. 22 I d. , a t 1- 2. 23 I d. , a t 2. 24 Ib id
. 25 Ib id
. 26 court he intended to adduc e evide nce at the guilt phase that he wa s a Vietnam War vetera n who suffe red f rom post-traumatic stre ss disorder (PTSD), a nd that he had r ece ived counse ling f or the disorder. He f

urther c ontended that the e vidence was a dmissibl e to prove that he lac ked the 21 sp e c if ic int e nt t o c omm it the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s. War

ne r “ did no t, h ow e ve r, de fi ne ‘p os t- 22 traumatic stre ss disorder’ f or the c ourt or explain how he intended to pr ove that he suf fer ed fr om the disorder . [He] also di d not expl ain how evide nce of PTSD would be releva

nt to the question of spec ific intent.” The trial c ourt grante d the State’s motion and found the e vidence to be 23
a dmi ssi ble on ly

at th e punis hme nt p ha se of the tr ia l. War

ne r d id n ot o ff

e r t he e vid e nc e of

PTSD 24
atth e gu i l tp h a s e an d

w a s f o un d gu i l ty b y a

j ur y. 25 On direc t appea l, Warner a rgued that the tria l court er red in e x cludingthe evidenc e fr om the guilt phase. The Third Court of Appea ls affirme d. This court initially g rante d Warner’ s petition for discre tionary

revie w on the same question, but after deter mining fr om the rec ord that h e h a d n o t p r e s e r

v e d th e e r r o r f o r r e v ie w , w e d is mi s s e d

h is p e ti ti o na s im

p r o v id e n tl y

g r an te d
. We conclude d that he had not made an ade quate of fer of proof , either during the hearing on the motion or at the guilt phase. 26 There can be no doubt that the trial judg e in the instant ca se intended his rulingexcluding all evidenc e of the appellant’ s dimini shed ca pacity to apply , not simpl y

for pur poses of voir dire ,May s - 10

but to the entire guilt phase of the tria l. In order to preser ve er ror, the a ppellant there fore was oblige d to make an of

fer of proof that extended beyond the anticipate d questions to, and topics of discussion with, potential jurors duringvoir dire. He was re quired to prof fer , with some degree of specific ity , the substantive evidenc e he intende d to present, dur ing the guilt phase, of the appellant’ s mental impairments and their impac t on his mental state at the time of the of fense
. This he fa iled to do. Th e a pp e lla nt’ s p ro ff e r o f h is s lid e s a

nd the qu e sti on s h e wo uld

have po se d to the jur

y in
vo ir dir e pr ov ide us wi th j us t th at–t he su bs tanc e of

his anti c ipate d d ia logue wi th t he jur y pa ne l. The re cord r evea ls that the appellant prof fer ed nothingthat rises to the leve l contemplated in our Rules of Evidence and this court’s pr ece dent. The only statement on the re cord that might eve n be c on sid e re d to a

pp ro a c h a n a de qu ate of

fe r o f p ro of

wa s h is s tate me nt t

hat, “ [T]he e vid e nc e in this case, we re w e allowe d to present it, would show that bec ause of mental and medic al imp a ir me nt, the de fe nd ant l a c ke d, at th e tim e of the a lle g e d c omm iss ion

of thi s c ri me , th e a

bil ity to form the re quisites of the mental state r equire d of intentional and knowing .” B ut as is evident fr om W arner , this sort of summary , in the most ge nera l and cur sory terms, without any

of the
me at of the a c tua l e vid e nc e , w ill no t su ff ic e to p re se rv e e rr or . T he a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l hi mse lf admitted, duringthe cour se of the disc ussion, “Iwould say that how could we know if that evidenc e would be mor e pre judicial than probative when we haven’ t even ha d a cha nce to se e what that evide nce is.” This is not a case in whic h the trial judg e af forde d the appe llant no opportunity to make a proff er. O n the contra

ry , the appe llant’s counsel ha d ever y occa sion to make a prope r off er of proof. We ca

n see f rom the excerpts of the rec ord above , howeve r, that both the trial judg e andMay s - 11

W e d o not reach t he second ground of whi ch we grant ed revi ew: “I s error i n t he t ri al co urt ’ s rul i ng duri ng 27 vo i r di re t hat i t wi l l not ad m i t dimini shed cap aci t y evi d ence at gui l t - i nno cence autom at i cal l y harmf ul when t he a pp e l l a n t c h a n g e s h i s pl e a t o g u i l t y a s a r e s u l t of t h e r u l i n g ?” the appe llant’s counsel we re mistaken a s to the need f or the substanc e of the proff er which the law r e qu ir e s. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that tr ia l c ouns e l w a s p repa re d to “ br ing[his ] me nta l he a lth expert down and make [hi s] record” of the a ppellant’s “pa st mental health history” had the ruling been mor e limited in scope. B ut the appellant’ s counsel cle arly believed that the trial judg e’s

“ bla nk e t r uli ng ” e xclu din ge vid e nc e of me nta l im

pa ir me nt f ro m th e guil t ph a se sh ie lde d h im fr om t he ne c e ssi ty

of pr of fe ri nge vid e nc e of

the a pp e lla nt’ s me nta l im

pa ir me nt. Th is i s si mpl y incorre ct. That the tria l judge sanctioned this mistaken belief by agree ing that such a prof fer was
unnece ssary , does not relieve the appe llant from his burden. It was the re sponsibili ty of the
a pp e lla nt t o e ns ur e that th e su

bs tanc e of

the e vid e nc e wa s p la c e d into t he re c or d, and

he fa ile d to do so. Be cause the appe llant failed to make a prope r off er of proof, we hold that he did not prese rve his complaint for appea l. We rever se the judgment of the Court of Appe als and a ffirm the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt . 27
Deliver ed Apr il 22, 2009. Publis h.