[Cite as State ex rel. Ames v. Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 2022-Ohio-171.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO ex rel. 

BRIAN M. AMES, 

 Relator, 

 - v - 

BAKER, DUBLIKAR, BECK, 

WILEY & MATHEWS, et al., 

 Respondents. 

CASE NO. 2021-P-0046

Original Action for Writ of Mandamus 

P E R C U R I A M 

O P I N I O N 

Decided: January 24, 2022 

Judgment: Amended petition dismissed 

Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Relator)

James F. Mathews and Andrea K. Ziarko, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 400 

South Main Street, North Canton, OH 44720 (For Respondent Baker, Dublikar, Beck, 

Wiley & Mathews). 

Robert J. Gehring and Saba Nishat Alam, Buechner, Haffer, Meyers & Koenig Co., LPA, 

221 East Fourth Street, Suite 2300, Cincinnati, OH 45202 (For Respondent Ohio 

Township Association Risk Management Authority).

Donald Patrick Kasson and Thomas Neil Spyker, Reminger Co., LPA, 200 Civic Center 

Drive, Suite 800, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Respondent Public Entity Risk Services of 

Ohio).

PER CURIAM. 

{¶1} Relator, Brian M. Ames (“Mr. Ames”), requests a writ of mandamus ordering 

respondents, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews (“Baker Dublikar”), Public Entity 
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Risk Services of Ohio (“PERSO”), and Ohio Township Association Risk Management 

Authority (“OTARMA”) (collectively, “respondents”), to provide unredacted copies of 

invoices for legal services rendered by Baker Dublikar on behalf of its client, Rootstown 

Township (“Rootstown”). Mr. Ames asserts the invoices are public records subject to 

disclosure without redaction. Mr. Ames also seeks an award of statutory damages in the 

amount of $1,000, attorney fees, and costs. 

{¶2} A review of Mr. Ames’s complaint reveals he has been provided with the 

legal invoices he sought, which were properly redacted per the attorney-client privilege 

exception. Furthermore, Mr. Ames cannot establish claims for statutory damages, 

attorney fees, and/or costs. Since Mr. Ames cannot establish any claim upon which relief 

may be granted, respondents’ motions to dismiss are granted. 

Substantive and Procedural Facts 

{¶3} Since 2017, Mr. Ames has been involved in several cases against

Rootstown in which he alleged violations of R.C. 121.22, the Open Meetings Act. Some 

of those cases are still pending. 

{¶4} In his petition for a writ of mandamus against respondents, Mr. Ames 

alleges that he submitted a public record request pursuant to R.C. 149.43 to one 

Rootstown trustee and a Baker Dublikar attorney for invoices for the legal services the 

law firm provided to Rootstown that related to those cases (three cases and six appeals 

– four in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and two before the Supreme Court of 

Ohio). He argues that because Baker Dublikar sent the invoices to PERSO, a third-party, 

and never sent them to Rootstown or OTARMA, the attorney-client privilege does not 

apply and the invoices should not have been redacted. 
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{¶5} OTARMA is a self-insurance pool that provides Ohio townships with an 

alternative to traditional property and casualty insurance, including Rootstown in Portage 

County. A self-insurance pool is a not-for-profit association of members who join together 

for the purpose of sharing losses and spreading risks. OTARMA contracts with PERSO 

to administer insurance claims made against townships that are members of OTARMA. 

The billing records requested by Mr. Ames were issued by Baker Dublikar to PERSO and 

related to the Ames-Rootstown litigation. 

{¶6} Baker Dublikar provided the requested invoices with the narrative portions 

of the bills “redacted as provided by law.” The law firm asserted attorney-client privilege 

and provided Mr. Ames with the nonexempt portions of the bills, i.e., the general title of 

the matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, 

and money charged for the services. 

{¶7} Mr. Ames sent a second public records request to Baker Dublikar, which, in 

turn, sent a reply stating, “We have responded to your public records request for copies 

of the invoices for legal services provided to the Rootstown Township Board of Trustees, 

to the extent required under Ohio law. We are ethically unable to provide copies without 

redacting all privileged communications, without an express waiver from [Rootstown], 

which we do not have.” 

{¶8} After filing his original petition with this court, Mr. Ames sent a third public 

records request “to counsel for each respondent.” Mr. Ames did not attach a copy of that 

request to his later-filed amended petition, nor did he reference it in his attached “Affidavit 

of Verity.” OTARMA asserts Mr. Ames never submitted a public records request to it until 

after OTARMA filed its motion to dismiss the original petition on the basis that no records 
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had ever been requested by Mr. Ames. PERSO asserts the petition fails to allege that 

Mr. Ames made a request of PERSO – only to PERSO’s counsel. 

{¶9} Mr. Ames then filed an amended petition, requesting an order requiring 

respondents to “promptly prepare the public records requested and provide unredacted 

copies to him as required by R.C. 149.43(B).” More specifically, he contends that the 

invoices at issue are public records under the “quasi-agency test” and that the attorneyclient privilege is limited to discussions in executive sessions held pursuant to R.C. 

121.22(G)(3) and (G)(5). Mr. Ames also requests statutory damages, attorney fees, and 

costs. 

{¶10} Respondents each filed a motion to dismiss in response to the amended 

petition. Respondents argue the redacted, narrative portions of the legal invoices fall 

under the protection of the attorney-client privilege since they are descriptions of legal 

services between a lawyer and a client. In addition, respondents assert they are not 

public entities required to comply with public records requests pursuant to R.C. 149.43. 

Finally, OTARMA and PERSO contend Mr. Ames’s action is moot since he was provided 

with the redacted legal invoices he requested. 

The Elements of a Mandamus Action 

{¶11} “Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, 

a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law 

specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” R.C. 2731.01. The 

basic purpose of a writ of mandamus is to require a public official to complete a specific 

act which he has a legal obligation to perform. State ex rel. Cunningham v. Lucci, 11th 

Dist. Lake No. 2006-L-052, 2006-Ohio-4666, ¶ 9. 
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{¶12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relator in such an action must be 

able to satisfy the following three elements: (1) the relator must have a clear legal right 

to have the public official perform a particular act; (2) the official must have a clear legal 

duty to do the act; and (3) the relator does not have another adequate remedy at law. 

State ex rel. Greene v. Enright, 63 Ohio St.3d 729, 731, 590 N.E.2d 1257 (1992). 

{¶13} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 

149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.” State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible 

Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 

N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. Thus, the relator does not have to show the lack of an adequate legal 

remedy to prevail. State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 41. 

{¶14} The relator must establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief 

by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. Avon Lake, 149 Ohio St.3d 

273, 2016-Ohio-5725, 74 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 14 (“Pietrangelo II”), quoting State ex rel. 

McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 

976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 16. Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof 

which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such 

certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will 

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to 

be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph 

three of the syllabus. 

{¶15} The requester must request records before bringing the mandamus action, 

and the “‘request must be specific and particularly describe what it is that is being sought.’” 
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State ex rel. Essi v. Lakewood, 2018-Ohio-5027, 126 N.E.3d 254, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), quoting 

State ex rel. Zauderer v. Joseph, 62 Ohio App.3d 752, 756, 577 N.E.2d 444 (10th 

Dist.1989). 

{¶16} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excludes “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited 

by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record.” Any exception to disclosure 

under the Public Records Act is strictly construed against the public-records custodian, 

and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. State ex 

rel. Pietrangelo v. Avon Lake, 146 Ohio St.3d 292, 2016-Ohio-2974, 55 N.E.3d 1091, ¶ 9 

(“Pietrangelo I”), quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 

81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶17} “‘A court can dismiss a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if, after all factual allegations of the 

complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor, it 

appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ 

of mandamus.’” State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 

931 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-

Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 9. Accord State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 165 Ohio 

St.3d 22, 2021-Ohio-1122, 175 N.E.3d 1122, ¶ 10. 

Public Records and Private Entities 

{¶18} All three respondents argue that they are not public entities and therefore 

not subject to either the mandates of R.C. 149.43 or a mandamus action. 

{¶19} However, it has been determined that when a public office contracts with a 

private entity to perform government work, the private entity can be a “person responsible 
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for public records” sufficient to compel compliance with the Public Records Act, even if 

not a “public office.” Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820, 97 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 43 (5th 

Dist.) quoting State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 106 Ohio 

St.3d 113, 2005-Ohio-3549, 832 N.E.2d 711, ¶ 20. Accordingly, the private entity may 

be subject to R.C. 149.43 under the quasi-agency theory when (1) a private entity 

prepares records in order to carry out a public office’s responsibilities; (2) the public office 

is able to monitor the private entity’s performance; and (3) the public office has access to 

the records for this purpose. Id.

{¶20} For instance, in State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 80 Ohio St.3d 134, 684 N.E.2d 1222 (1997), the Supreme Court of Ohio found 

that the confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement entered into by a public office 

was a public record even though it was in the possession of the public office’s private 

attorney. Id. at 137. 

{¶21} R.C. 149.43(C) permits a mandamus action to be brought against either 

“the public office or the person responsible for the public record” to compel compliance 

with the Public Records Act. This provision “‘manifests an intent to afford access to public 

records, even when a private entity is responsible for the records.’” Toledo Blade Co. at 

¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 550 N.E.2d 464 

(1990) (determining a private entity may be required to produce public records). 

{¶22} Legal invoices in this context, although in the possession of a private entity, 

are public records. See State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 163 Ohio 

St.3d 304, 2021-Ohio-1176, 170 N.E.3d 19, ¶ 14. Even if the public office does not 
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“create” or “receive” the records, the records may nonetheless be “under the jurisdiction” 

of the public office, R.C. 149.011(G). Armatas at ¶ 14. 

{¶23} In Armatas, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently considered whether the 

“quasi-agency test” requires a public office to produce legal invoices based on its 

delegation of its public duty to a private entity. Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶24} The court concluded that the legal invoices the appellant requested from 

the township that were in OTARMA’s possession (which they received from PERSO) 

related to a public duty and satisfied the quasi-agency test, thus demonstrating the legal 

invoice was a public record. Id. at ¶ 22. The court explained: 

{¶25} “The township is ‘a body politic and corporate’ that ‘may sue and be sued, 

plead and be impleaded.’ R.C. 503.01. The prosecution and defense of such lawsuits 

involves a public duty of the township and its trustees. In connection with such lawsuits, 

the township and its trustees must take whatever action is necessary and appropriate to 

protect the public interest—including hiring and supervising attorneys. See id. Although 

the township here has delegated that duty by becoming a member of OTARMA, the 

township still occupies one side of the bilateral formal relationship between an attorney 

and client—a relationship that persists even when an insurer hires an attorney and 

exercises substantial control over the course of litigation. See Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(f) 

(preserving the client’s rights and protecting the client’s interest when the attorney is 

compensated by a third party).” Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶26} Thus, contrary to respondents’ arguments that they are not “public entities,” 

legal invoices in this context, whether they are in the possession of Rootstown, Baker 

Dublikar, OTARMA, or PERSO, pass the quasi-agency test and are public records. 
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Attorney-Client Privilege 

{¶27} All three respondents argue the legal invoices were properly redacted since 

they are descriptions of legal services, i.e., communications between a lawyer and a client 

and are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

{¶28} Mr. Ames contends that the attorney-client privilege belonging to a public 

body is governed by R.C. 121.22(G)(3) and (G)(5) and that it does not extend to public 

records such as legal invoices. 

{¶29} Pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G), “the members of a public body may hold an 

executive session * * * for the sole purpose of the consideration of any of the following 

matters: 

{¶30} “(3) Conferences with an attorney for the public body concerning disputes 

involving the public body that are the subject of pending or imminent court action; 

{¶31} “* * * 

{¶32} “(5) Matters required to be kept confidential by federal law or regulation or 

state statutes * * *.” 

{¶33} Thus, contrary to Mr. Ames’s argument, this statute concerns when a public 

body may hold an executive session under the Open Meetings Act pursuant to R.C. 

121.22, not the response to a Public Records Act request for unredacted legal invoices 

pertaining to a township’s litigation. See Carver v. Deerfield Twp., 139 Ohio App.3d 64, 

74, 742 N.E.2d 1182 (11th Dist.2000) (“These sections enumerate instances where the 

members of a public body may hold a limited purpose executive session”). See also 

Ames v. Rootstown Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2019-Ohio-5412, 151 N.E.3d 37, ¶ 42 (11th 

Dist.). 
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{¶34} In Carver, we explained that “[t]he attorney-client privilege also covers 

communications between government clients and their attorneys pertaining to the 

attorney’s legal advice.” Id. at 76., quoting State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 

379, 383, 700 N.E.2d 12, 16. Further, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) exempts “[r]ecords the 

release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record.” 

{¶35} As the Supreme Court of Ohio explained in State ex rel. Dawson v. BloomCarroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524: 

{¶36} “‘The attorney-client privilege, which covers records of communications 

between attorneys and their government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, 

is a state law prohibiting release of those records.’ State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State 

Univ. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 721 N.E.2d 1044. In Ohio, the attorney-client 

privilege is governed both by statute, R.C. 2317.02(A), which provides a testimonial 

privilege, and by common law, which broadly protects against any dissemination of 

information obtained in the confidential attorney-client relationship. State ex rel. Toledo 

Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Port Auth., 121 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009-Ohio-1767, 905 

N.E.2d 1221, ¶ 24.” Id. at ¶ 27. 

{¶37} “While a simple invoice ordinarily is not privileged,” respondents are correct 

in their assertions that “itemized legal bills necessarily reveal confidential information and 

thus fall within the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at ¶ 28., quoting Hewes v. Langston, 853 

So.2d 1237, ¶ 45 (Miss.2003). Further, “a demand for such documents constitutes an 

‘unjustified intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.’” Id., quoting In re Horn, 976 

F.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (9th Cir.1992). 
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{¶38} Thus, it is well established that “[t]o the extent that narrative portions of 

attorney-fee statements are ‘descriptions of legal services performed by counsel for a 

client,’ they are protected by the attorney-client privilege because they ‘represent 

communications from the attorney to the client about matters for which the attorney has 

been retained by the client.’” Id., quoting State ex rel. Alley v. Couchois, 2d Dist. Miami 

No. 94-CA-30, 1995 WL 559973, *4 (Sept. 20, 1995). 

{¶39} In sum, the Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that the narrative 

portions of itemized attorney-fee billing statements containing descriptions of legal 

services performed by counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Pietrangelo 

I, supra, at ¶ 10, citing Dawson at ¶ 28-29; see also State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning 

Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 36. 

{¶40} Other information on the billing statements, e.g., the general title of the 

matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, and 

dollar amount charged for the services, is considered nonexempt and must be disclosed. 

Id., citing State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 

N.E.2d 975, ¶ 15. 

{¶41} A review of the legal invoices Baker Dublikar provided to Mr. Ames reveals 

that he received the legal invoices he requested and that the descriptions of the legal 

services provided by counsel were appropriately redacted. Further, the mere fact that the 

billing for legal services was sent directly to the claims administrator for the insurance 

carrier does not automatically waive the privilege. In this case Baker Dublikar’s clients 

are Rootstown and OTARMA. 
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{¶42} As the Supreme Court of Ohio remarked in Armatas, “the township still 

occupies one side of the bilateral formal relationship between an attorney and client—a 

relationship that persists even when an insurer hires an attorney and exercises 

substantial control over the course of litigation.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 20. Comment 

12A to Prof.Cond.R. 1.8 further explains that “[w]hether employed or retained by an 

insurance company, insurance defense counsel owes the insured the same duties to 

avoid conflicts, keep confidences, exercise independent judgment, and communicate as 

a lawyer owes any other client.” 

{¶43} Quite simply, “‘an attorney does not become any less of an attorney by 

virtue of state agency employment.’” State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 132 

Ohio St.3d 212, 2012-Ohio-2690, 970 N.E.2d 939, ¶ 38, quoting State ex rel. Leslie v. 

Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, ¶ 29. 

And the attorney-client privilege applies to agents working on behalf of legal counsel. Id. 

The privilege is the client’s and only the client’s to waive. Leslie at ¶ 21 (except under 

circumstances not relevant here, only the client can waive the privilege). 

{¶44} Mr. Ames has failed to establish any claim upon which relief may be 

granted; thus, respondents’ motions to dismiss are well-taken. 

Statutory Damages, Attorney Fees, and Costs 

{¶45} Even if a relator does not prevail on a mandamus claim, it is still possible 

for him to receive an award of statutory damages. State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 

161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-Ohio-3686, 161 N.E.3d 575, ¶ 13. 

{¶46} Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2), the “requester shall be entitled to recover” 

statutory damages if (1) he submits a written request “by hand delivery, electronic 
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submission, or certified mail,” (2) the request “fairly describes the public record or class 

of public records,” and (3) “a court determines that the public office or the person 

responsible for public records failed to comply with an obligation” imposed by R.C. 

149.43(B). Statutory damages accrue “at one hundred dollars for each business day 

during which the public office or person responsible for the requested public records failed 

to comply * * *, beginning with the day on which the requester files a mandamus action to 

recover statutory damages, up to a maximum of one thousand dollars.” Id.; State ex rel. 

Kesterson v. Kent State University, 156 Ohio St.3d 13, 2018-Ohio-5108, 123 N.E.3d 887, 

¶ 21. 

{¶47} A review of both the original petition and the amended petition reveals that 

Baker Dublikar, on its own behalf and as counsel for Rootstown, promptly responded to 

Mr. Ames’s records request, supplying him with all the requested records. Mr. Ames 

submitted his request to Rootstown and Baker Dublikar on Sunday, April 11, 2021. Baker 

Dublikar responded with the requested records on Friday, April 16, 2021. On Monday, 

April 19, 2021, Mr. Ames made a second request to Baker Dublikar, who responded on 

Wednesday, April 28, 2021. Mr. Ames filed the instant action on May 5, 2021, after 

receiving the records he requested. 

{¶48} As previously noted, OTARMA asserts in its motion to dismiss directed to 

Mr. Ames’ amended petition that Mr. Ames never submitted a public records request to it 

until after OTARMA filed its motion to dismiss the original petition on the basis that no 

records had ever been requested by Mr. Ames. PERSO asserts the petition fails to allege 

that Mr. Ames made a request of PERSO – only to PERSO’s counsel. 
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{¶49} Baker Dublikar’s response provided everything requested, redacted only 

the exempt information of the invoices, i.e., the narrative descriptions, notified Mr. Ames 

of the redactions, and made redactions plainly visible, pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(1): 

{¶50} “Upon request and subject to division (B)(8) of this section, all public records 

responsive to the request shall be promptly prepared and made available for inspection 

to any person at all reasonable times during regular business hours. Subject to division 

(B)(8) of this section, upon request by any person, a public office or person responsible 

for public records shall make copies of the requested public record available to the 

requester at cost and within a reasonable period of time. If a public record contains 

information that is exempt from the duty to permit public inspection or to copy the 

public record, the public office or the person responsible for the public record shall 

make available all of the information within the public record that is not exempt. 

When making that public record available for public inspection or copying that 

public record, the public office or the person responsible for the public record shall 

notify the requester of any redaction or make the redaction plainly visible. A 

redaction shall be deemed a denial of a request to inspect or copy the redacted 

information, except if federal or state law authorizes or requires a public office to make 

the redaction.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶51} Mr. Ames’ amended petition establishes he received all the requested 

invoices promptly after the request was made, and he has set forth no contrary allegation 

that respondents “failed to comply with an obligation,” apart from his assertion that he did 

not receive information to which he is not entitled. 
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{¶52} Inasmuch as we have determined as a matter of law that Mr. Ames is not 

entitled to receive the unredacted attorney fees invoices and that respondents did not fail 

to comply with obligations under R.C. 149.43, we determine Mr. Ames has failed to state 

a claim for statutory damages, attorney fees, or costs. 

{¶53} In conclusion, there are no claims upon which relief can be granted since 

Mr. Ames received the legal invoices he requested, which were properly redacted under 

the attorney-client privilege. Further, Mr. Ames cannot establish claims for statutory 

damages, attorney fees, or costs. Thus, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no 

set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus, and we grant respondents’ 

motions to dismiss. 

{¶54} Mr. Ames’s amended petition for a writ of mandamus is dismissed. 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J., CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., MARY JANE TRAPP, J., 

concur.