DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERT H. STEIN, P.A., and FLORIDA SPINE AND JOINT 

INSTITUTE, LLC,

Appellees.

Nos. 4D22-154, 4D22-155, 4D22-156, 4D22-157, 4D22-158, 4D22-159, 

4D22-162, 4D22-163, 4D22-172, 4D22-173, 4D22-174, 4D22-175, 

4D22-178, 4D22-179, 4D22-180, 4D22-181, 4D22-183, 4D22-184, 

4D22-187, 4D22-189, 4D22-190, 4D22-191, 4D22-193, 4D22-194, 

4D22-195, 4D22-196, 4D22-197, 4D22-198, 4D22-199, 4D22-200, and 

4D22-201

[August 9, 2023]

Consolidated appeals from the County Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; John D. Fry, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 

CONO19-2463, CONO19-2464, CONO19-3968, CONO19-3972, CONO19-

4539, CONO19-4541, CONO19-4546, CONO19-4854, CONO19-4861, 

CONO19-5011, CONO19-6469, CONO19-9278, CONO19-10625, 

CONO19-10966, CONO19-10968, CONO19-10970, CONO19-10971, 

CONO19-12777, CONO19-13361, CONO19-13374, CONO19-13999, 

CONO19-14000, CONO20-964, CONO20-1449, CONO20-3084, CONO20-

3088, CONO20-3090, CONO20-3095, CONO20-3203, CONO20-3573, and 

CONO20-3578.

Kristen L. Wenger, Drew Krieger, and Salvatore T. Coppolino of Rivkin 

Radler, LLP, Jacksonville, and John P. Marino of Smith, Gambrell & 

Russell, LLP, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Douglas H. Stein of Douglas H. Stein, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellee

Robert Stein, P.A.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J.

In this consolidated appeal, GEICO General Insurance Company 

appeals thirty-one fee orders and final judgments (1) awarding Robert 

Stein, P.A., former counsel for Florida Spine and Joint Institute, LLC,
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attorney’s fees for work performed in thirty-one PIP cases, and (2) finding 

GEICO responsible for paying a share of those fees. For the reasons 

discussed below, we reverse.

Florida Spine, through its attorney, Stein, filed eighty-six cases against 

GEICO for PIP benefits. In each case, the contingency fee agreement 

between Florida Spine and Stein stated that Stein was entitled to 

reasonable attorney’s fees. Florida Spine and GEICO filed lawsuits against 

each other concurrent with the PIP cases. GEICO sued Florida Spine for 

RICO violations and fraud, and Florida Spine sued GEICO for defamation, 

among other claims. Notably, Stein did not represent Florida Spine in 

those actions, confining his representation of Florida Spine to only the PIP 

cases.

Stein later filed a charging lien for his fees in each of the PIP cases.

Soon thereafter, Florida Spine discharged Stein as its counsel, retained 

new counsel, and instructed its new attorney to voluntarily dismiss each 

of the PIP cases with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement with 

GEICO reached in the concurrent cases. Those dismissals included a 

provision that “[e]ach party will bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs.” 

Stein was not involved in discussions relating to any agreements made 

between GEICO and Florida Spine pertaining to the voluntary dismissals.

Stein then filed a motion with the trial court to consolidate and re-open 

the cases to determine the amount of his charging lien. Even though the 

motion to re-open was served to both Florida Spine and GEICO, the motion 

did not specifically reference GEICO or indicate in any way that Stein was 

seeking payment for his fees and costs from GEICO. GEICO attended the 

hearing to re-open the cases but made no objections. The trial court 

agreed to re-open the cases “for the sole purpose to set the amount of the 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” That order named GEICO and 

specified GEICO’s attorneys “shall have no responsibilities regarding the 

setting of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” (emphasis added). At 

a hearing a month after the voluntary dismissals, the trial court defined 

GEICO’s role in the coming proceedings:

GEICO: Well, I don’t have a problem attending. I just want to 

make it sure that it’s clear what is happening is not involving 

[GEICO]. 

COURT: All right. So Geico has nothing to do with any of this. 

We can all agree you can appear at your leisure.
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GEICO was notified of, but did not participate in, the first four fee 

hearings that resulted in the determination of attorney’s fees and costs in 

six of the PIP cases. However, GEICO did attend—but did not substantially 

participate in—the last fee hearing that determined attorney’s fees and 

costs related to the remaining cases appealed in this case.

At the conclusion of the hearings determining fees and costs, and 

almost a year after the voluntary dismissal of the PIP cases, Stein moved 

to add GEICO to the final judgment on attorney’s fees and costs. The trial 

court rejected GEICO’s arguments that (1) the charging liens did not entitle 

Stein to attorney’s fees and costs to be paid by GEICO, and (2) the court 

lacked jurisdiction to add GEICO as a party to the judgment more than a 

year after Stein initially filed the charging liens. The trial court granted 

Stein’s motion to add GEICO as a party to the judgments and issued an 

order holding GEICO and Florida Spine jointly and severally liable for 

attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court also entered final judgment in 

each of the cases.

GEICO now appeals its inclusion in those judgments and the court’s 

ruling holding it liable, whether in whole or in part, to Stein for his fees 

and costs.

A trial court’s determination on jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See 

Sanchez v. Fernandez, 915 So. 2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Florida 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) governs the voluntary dismissal of 

actions by parties and provides that an action is dismissed upon the filing 

of a joint stipulation of dismissal. “[T]he effect of a voluntary dismissal 

under rule 1.420(a) ‘is to remove completely from the court’s consideration 

the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of 

“jurisdiction”.’” Giuffre v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2017) (quoting Randle–E. Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68, 

69 (Fla. 1978)). However, “even after resolution of a lawsuit by way of final 

judgment or stipulation of dismissal, the trial court retains jurisdiction to 

resolve ‘collateral matters such as taxation of costs and prevailing party 

attorney’s fees.’” Giuffre, 226 So. 3d at 1038 (quoting Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit 

Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).

Stein correctly asserts the voluntary dismissals did not deprive the trial 

court of jurisdiction to enforce the charging liens or to determine ancillary 

issues such as attorney’s fees and costs. Giuffre, 226 So. 3d at 1038; 

Amlan, 651 So. 2d at 704. But while the court clearly had jurisdiction to 

resolve the issue of the charging liens filed by Stein against his former 

client Florida Spine, that jurisdiction does not automatically extend to 

third parties.
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Here, GEICO negotiated a settlement agreement with Florida Spine in 

the concurrent case, not in the PIP cases. Stein was only an attorney and 

not a named party in those lawsuits. Neither the settlement agreement 

nor the voluntary dismissals included any provision reserving jurisdiction 

for the trial court to consider GEICO’s responsibility for paying fees and 

costs. When parties have reached a settlement agreement, “[t]he only 

choices available to a trial court are acceptance or rejection of the 

settlement as a whole.” Maxwell v. Edwards, 345 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2022) (quoting Hameroff v. Pub. Med. Assistance Tr. Fund, 911 

So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)). The court does not have the 

discretion to vacate or modify the terms of a settlement agreement. Klein 

v. Est. of Klein, 295 So. 3d 793, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“[T]he fact that 

one party to the agreement apparently made a bad bargain is not a 

sufficient ground, by itself, to vacate or modify a settlement agreement.”

(alteration in original) (quoting Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 

1987))). 

By the terms of their settlement agreement, Florida Spine and GEICO 

resolved the PIP cases through Florida Spine’s voluntary dismissals, and 

the settlement agreement explicitly provided that each party would be 

responsible for its own attorney’s fees. The cases were re-opened for the 

sole stated purpose of determining fees and costs payable by Florida Spine 

pursuant to its former attorney’s charging lien. In addition, the trial 

court’s order re-opening the cases advised GEICO that it would have no 

responsibility in setting the fees and costs—essentially giving GEICO no 

responsibility to object to the amounts claimed, no reason to present its 

own experts on the issues, and no notice that it would eventually be liable 

for paying those fees. 

GEICO’s lack of responsibility for Stein’s fees is also buttressed by the 

trial judge’s remarks at the hearing to add GEICO as a party and impose

liability on it to pay attorney’s fees. The trial judge admitted he could 

understand why GEICO did not believe it had an obligation to pay, saying,

“I didn’t really think about it because in my mind, GEICO was not getting 

involved in the fee hearing, the hourly rate, and stuff like that.” Even 

though GEICO was informed of all the attorney’s fees hearings, these 

communications did not notify GEICO that they needed to prepare for and 

actively participate in those hearings because they could ultimately be 

liable for paying Stein’s fees. Imposing liability on GEICO for fees at this 

late juncture—after being informed by the court that GEICO had nothing 

to do with Stein’s fees and costs—deprived GEICO of due process and the 

opportunity to have truly participated in the setting of the fees along the 

way. Zelman v. Zelman, 175 So. 3d 871, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“In 
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observing due process of law, the opportunity to be heard must be full and 

fair, not merely colorable or illusive.” (quoting Ryan’s Furniture Exch. v. 

McNair, 162 So. 483, 487 (Fla. 1935))). 

Furthermore, Florida Spine dismissed the PIP cases against GEICO, 

making GEICO the prevailing party for the determination of attorney’s fees.

See Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 919 (Fla. 1990)

(“[W]hen a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the defendant is the 

prevailing party.”). Even without the parties’ agreement that each would 

bear its own fees and costs, GEICO would remain the prevailing party if 

the cases were re-opened following the voluntary dismissals. Nudel v. 

Flagstar Bank, FSB, 60 So. 3d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Had 

GEICO settled with Florida Spine by paying a settlement to them in the 

PIP cases—rather than in any concurrent litigation—Stein’s argument that 

a GEICO settlement payment equated to a confession of judgment in the 

PIP cases might have had more merit. See Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos. of 

Lloyd’s, 439 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1983) (finding when an insurer pays a 

settlement agreement in an insurance case, such payment may function 

as a confession of judgment). However, that is not the case here.

Because the trial court accepted the parties’ settlement agreement in 

the concurrent case and the voluntary dismissals in the PIP cases, the 

court lacked jurisdiction to modify the settlement agreement’s terms more 

than a year later, particularly the provision specifying each party must 

bear responsibility for its own attorney’s fees. See Maxwell, 345 So. 3d at 

325; Klein, 295 So. 3d at 800; Johnson v. Omega Ins. Co., 200 So. 3d 1207, 

1214 (Fla. 2016) (noting the general custom “is that each party is 

responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees, regardless of the outcome of 

the action”). While Stein may have a valid charging lien enforceable 

against Florida Spine, he has no enforceable claim against GEICO for 

attorney’s fees. Without an express reservation of jurisdiction, or an 

agreement linking Florida Spine’s voluntary dismissals of the PIP cases 

against GEICO with any other matters, including a settlement agreement 

reached between these two parties in a separate case, the trial court erred 

in adding GEICO to the fee orders and final judgments. 

Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order holding GEICO jointly and 

severally liable for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Stein’s charging 

liens and remand for the trial court to remove GEICO as a party to the 

resulting final judgments.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FORST and ARTAU, JJ., concur.
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* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.