Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the 

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound 

volumes go to press. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 22-BG-0943

IN RE PABLO A. ZAMORA, RESPONDENT.

A Suspended Member of the Bar of 

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 998467)

On Report and Recommendation 

of the Board on Professional Responsibility 

(Disciplinary Docket No. 2017-D142)

(Board Docket No. 21-BD-003)

(Submitted November 16, 2023 Decided March 7, 2024)

Robert C. Bonsib, for respondent.1

Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Julia L. Porter, 

Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Theodore (Jack) Meltzer, Senior Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, and Caroll Donayre, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on 

the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Before BECKWITH, DEAHL, and SHANKER,* Associate Judges.

 1 Mr. Bonsib filed a motion to withdraw as counsel less than a month before 

the scheduled oral argument. The court granted Mr. Bonsib’s motion to withdraw 

and ordered that the case be submitted on the record and briefs filed by counsel 

without oral argument. 
2

BECKWITH, Associate Judge: A hearing committee determined that

Respondent Pablo Zamora violated a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 

including Rule 1.15(a), misappropriation of client funds, and Rule 1.15(e), failure to 

hold unearned advance fees in trust. A majority of the hearing committee concluded 

Mr. Zamora had misappropriated client funds negligently rather than recklessly and 

recommended a six-month suspension for the negligent misappropriation.

2 On 

review, the Board on Professional Responsibility agreed with the hearing 

committee’s findings except for its conclusion that Mr. Zamora acted negligently. 

The Board determined that he acted recklessly and recommended that he be 

disbarred. Mr. Zamora urges us to adopt the hearing committee’s conclusions in 

full. We agree with the hearing committee’s conclusion that Mr. Zamora acted 

negligently and accordingly adopt the committee’s recommended sanction. 

 

* Associate Judge AliKhan was originally assigned to this case. Following 

Judge AliKhan’s appointment to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 

effective December 12, 2023, Judge Shanker has been assigned to take her place on 

the panel.

2 Mr. Zamora was also issued two additional one-month suspensions pursuant 

to his violations of Rule 1.3(a), Lack of Diligence and Zeal, and Rule 1.16(d),

Terminating Representation, ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $750.00 plus 

interest, and required to attend a continuing legal education program regarding flatfee billing practices. 
3

I.

Rule 1.15(a) requires attorneys to hold client property in a separate trust 

account; Rule 1.15(e) specifies that “[a]dvances of unearned fees and unincurred 

costs” qualify as client property until they are earned, and must be kept in a separate 

trust account pursuant to Rule 1.15(a) “unless the client gives informed consent to a 

different arrangement.” Flat fees received at the outset of a representation are 

considered unearned fees and are subject to the requirements of Rule 1.15(e). In re 

Mance, 980 A.2d 1196, 1205 (D.C. 2009).

“Informed consent” as defined by the rules generally requires an attorney to 

communicate “adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and 

reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” Rule 1.0(e).

To obtain informed consent to a flat-fee arrangement, attorneys must make five 

specific disclosures:

(1) ‘the attorney will treat the advance fee as the attorney’s 

property upon receipt’; (2) ‘the attorney can keep the fee 

only by providing a benefit or providing a service for 

which the client has contracted’; (3) ‘the fee agreement 

must spell out the terms of the benefit to be conferred upon 

the client’; (4) ‘the client must be aware of the attorney’s 

obligation to refund any amount of advance funds to the 

extent that they are unreasonable or unearned if the 

representation is terminated by the client’; and (5) ‘unless 

there is agreement otherwise, the attorney must . . . hold 

the flat fee in escrow until it is earned by the lawyer’s 
4

provision of legal services.’

In re Ponds, 279 A.3d 357, 359 (D.C. 2022) (quoting In re Mance, 980 A.2d at 1206-

07).

II.

Mr. Zamora was hired to represent an undocumented man, Jose Ascensio, in 

removal proceedings.3 Mr. Zamora determined that the best way for Mr. Ascensio

to avoid deportation would be to apply for a U-Visa. But partway through his 

representation of Mr. Ascensio, Mr. Zamora filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.

He testified that he was frustrated by Mr. Ascensio’s wife, Teka Stiles, using other 

attorneys’ advice to second guess his own and concerned by his client’s request that 

he continue an upcoming bond hearing in hopes of appearing before a more 

favorable judge. Mr. Ascensio and Ms. Stiles agreed to the withdrawal and Ms.

Stiles asked for a detailed bill to account for the flat fees. Mr. Zamora provided her 

with a bill, which Ms. Stiles did not initially challenge. She later sought a refund for 

both matters and filed for fee arbitration in D.C., but was told that she had not 

exhausted all avenues of relief. Ms. Stiles then filed the underlying bar complaint 

 3 The hearing committee explained its decision to “refer to Mr. Ascensio 

Torres as ‘Mr. Ascensio’ and [his wife] Teka Stiles-Ascensio as ‘Ms. Stiles’” as 

consistent with how they were referred to during the hearing. We adopt the same 

approach. 
5

against Mr. Zamora.

Because Mr. Zamora contests only the Board’s determination of reckless 

misappropriation, we recite only the facts relevant to that determination. Prior to 

beginning any work on Mr. Ascensio’s case, Mr. Zamora provided Mr. Ascensio’s 

wife, Ms. Stiles, with two fee agreements, one for the U-Visa matter and one for the 

removal proceeding. The fee agreements differed in describing the work to be 

completed and the fee amount, but both contained a waiver provision stating, “I 

hereby WAIVE the requirement that the flat fee, given to Pablo A. Zamora, Esq. for 

work to be performed on my behalf, is to be held in trust.” The waiver provision 

erroneously referred to “Rule 1.15(d)” as support for this provision because Rule 

1.15(d) stated the rule regarding unearned fees until a rule change 2010, when it was 

renumbered as Rule 1.15(e). See Order, No. M-235-09 (D.C. Mar. 22, 2010). Each 

agreement also clarified the specific benefits to be conferred upon the client pursuant 

to the flat-fee agreement, and Mr. Zamora’s obligation to refund any unearned 

portion of the flat fee should the client terminate the attorney-client relationship. 

Ms. Stiles signed and initialed all the provisions of both fee agreements, including 

the waiver provision.

Mr. Zamora testified that he discussed each page of the retainer agreement
6

with prospective clients and explained the flat-fee provision. He specifically told 

Ms. Stiles the flat-fee provision “meant that [the fees] would not be placed into a 

trust account. And [he] further advised her . . . of her right to an accounting of the 

money or return of any unused funds.” Mr. Zamora testified that he did not think

Rule 1.15(e) required him to notify clients of the risks of not using a trust account.

In his view, there were not any material risks that necessitated such an explanation

because he would have refunded any unearned fees. He said he believed that, to 

obtain informed consent, he was required to inform clients “in writing” that the flat 

fee would not be placed into a trust account and to have them “initial” “if they 

agree[d]” to that arrangement. He testified that he could not recall In re Mance, 

which sets out the specific requirements for informed consent in the flat-fee context. 

Ms. Stiles testified that Mr. Zamora “skimmed through” the agreements without 

discussing any of the risks or consequences of not using a trust account for client 

fees. The hearing committee deemed both Mr. Zamora and Ms. Stiles not entirely 

credible, and concluded that Mr. Zamora did not go through the fee agreements with 

Ms. Stiles as thoroughly as he testified to, but that he did review them “somewhat.”

Having made this finding, the hearing committee determined that Mr. Zamora 

failed to obtain informed consent from Ms. Stiles, pointing to Mr. Zamora’s own 

testimony that he did not explain the material risks of the proposed course of conduct
7

because he did not believe any existed. In that regard, it was the view of the majority 

of the hearing committee that Mr. Zamora mistakenly believed that his actions—

putting the waiver language in his agreements, reviewing the agreements with clients 

to some degree, and having clients initial and sign each provision of the fee 

agreement—were sufficient to obtain informed consent under Rule 1.15(e). The 

majority concluded that Mr. Zamora was negligent because he had a “good-faith but 

incorrect” understanding of Rule 1.15(e)’s requirements, rather than a “conscious 

indifference” to the obligation of informed consent. The dissenting member of the 

hearing committee determined that Mr. Zamora acted recklessly because his 

misunderstanding of the requirements of informed consent—a “long standing” 

concept defined in the Rules of Professional Conduct—was not reasonable. 

On review, the Board adopted the hearing committee’s findings of fact and 

legal conclusions except for the conclusion that Mr. Zamora’s misappropriation was 

negligent. The Board concluded that Mr. Zamora’s testimony and the waiver he 

included in his fee agreements demonstrated that he was aware that he needed 

informed consent and did not obtain it. Regardless of his awareness of the specific 

disclosures required by In re Mance, it was not reasonable to be unaware of the 

general requirements of informed consent or the risks posed to clients by not using 

a trust account. Because “disbarment [is] . . . the only appropriate sanction” in cases 
8

involving reckless misappropriation, the Board recommended that Mr. Zamora be 

disbarred. See In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).

III.

Mr. Zamora contests only the Board’s conclusion that he acted recklessly and 

its corresponding recommendation that he be disbarred. We accept the Board’s 

factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. D.C. Bar 

R. XI, § 9(h)(1). But we review de novo “ultimate facts,” including whether 

Disciplinary Counsel has carried its burden to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that an attorney’s conduct was reckless. See In re Haar, 270 A.3d 286, 

294 (D.C. 2022) (quoting In re Micheel, 610 A.2d 231, 234 (D.C. 1992)). We must 

adopt the Board’s recommended disposition unless doing so “would foster a 

tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would 

otherwise be unwarranted.” Id. at 299 (quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1)). 

Reckless misappropriation is marked by the attorney’s “conscious 

indifference to the consequences of [their] behavior for the security of the funds.” 

In re Anderson, 778 A.2d 330, 339 (D.C. 2001). Conscious indifference may be 

demonstrated by showing that an attorney made a “conscious choice of a course of 
9

action” with either “knowledge of the danger to others” or “knowledge of facts that 

would disclose this danger to any reasonable person.” In re Ponds, 279 A.3d at 362 

(quoting In re Gray 224 A.3d 1222, 1232 (D.C. 2020)). Negligent misappropriation, 

on the other hand, is marked by a “good-faith but inadequate effort to comply” with 

Rule 1.15 or the requirements of In re Mance. Id. at 361. Our cases have emphasized 

that an attorney’s good faith attempt to comply will not preclude a finding of 

recklessness if the attorney’s errors or mistaken beliefs were objectively 

unreasonable. See In re Gray, 224 A.3d at 1232; see also In re Ponds, 279 A.3d at 

362.

Disciplinary counsel does not dispute that Mr. Zamora was honestly mistaken, 

and argues only that Mr. Zamora’s mistaken understanding of informed consent was 

not objectively reasonable. In assessing the contours of which mistakes are 

objectively reasonable in the flat-fee context, we are guided by two cases: In re Haar

and In re Ponds.

In Haar, we concluded that Mr. Haar’s failure to comply with Rule 1.15 was 

negligent because his ignorance of the rule’s application to flat fees as clarified by 

Mance was reasonable. 270 A.3d at 298. In 2012, three years after the Mance 

decision, Mr. Haar deposited a large flat fee from a client into an operating account 
10

rather than a trust account. Id. at 292. While this client’s case was still pending, 

Mr. Haar became aware of Mance, and brought his accounting practices into 

compliance with that decision’s requirements, but only prospectively. Id. The 

hearing committee found that Mr. Haar acted recklessly with regard to this pending 

case because his ignorance as to Mance’s application to pending cases was not 

reasonable. Id. at 293. But we found otherwise, in line with the Board: Mr. Haar’s 

practice involved low fees and his clients’ cases resolved quickly, leaving him with 

“little reason to consider Mance’s application to unearned flat fees.” Id. at 297. We

also noted that Rule 1.15(e)’s application to flat fees is not discernible from the text 

of the rule—it would be impossible to glean without knowledge of Mance—and that 

the rule “now imposes essentially the opposite restriction to that which it required 

when Mr. Haar began his career.” Id. at 298. Ultimately, we concluded that “a 

practitioner who operated according to Mr. Haar’s typical fee arrangements could 

reasonably fail to perceive” the dangers inherent in holding unearned flat fees in a 

personal bank account. Id. 

In Ponds, on the other hand, we deemed reckless Mr. Ponds’s failure to

comply with the informed consent requirements of Mance. 279 A.3d at 361. Unlike 

Mr. Haar, Mr. Ponds was aware of the Mance decision. Id. at 360. Yet both

Mr. Ponds’s fee agreement and conduct were “fundamentally incompatible” with 
11

the requirements of Mance: “[r]ather than making clear that the unearned portion of 

a flat fee must be returned, [his] fee agreement indicated precisely the opposite,” and 

“[r]ather than complying with the requirement to return unearned advance fees, 

Mr. Ponds refused, despite an arbitral award requiring him to comply.” Id. at 361.

Mr. Pond’s knowledge of the requirements of Mance, in conjunction with his 

blatantly noncompliant fee agreement and conduct, rendered his claim of a 

good-faith mistake “implausible.” Id. at 362. But we declined to “rest . . . on a 

conclusion of subjective bad faith,” concluding for many of the same reasons that 

Mr. Ponds’s course of action was sufficient to demonstrate “conscious indifference” 

to the requirements of Rule 1.15(e) and Mance regardless of whether he was 

attempting to comply in good faith. Id. at 362.

Disciplinary Counsel urges us to view Mr. Zamora’s conduct as in line with 

that in Ponds rather than Haar. Disciplinary Counsel points out that Mr. Zamora 

had reason to know of the risks posed to his clients. While he was not aware of the 

specific requirements laid out in Mance, the waiver provision in his fee agreement 

demonstrated that he at least knew he needed to obtain informed consent to his 

proposed arrangement. According to Disciplinary Counsel, while it may have been 

reasonable under the circumstances for Mr. Haar to be ignorant of Mance, it was not 

reasonable for Mr. Zamora to be ignorant of the requirements of informed consent
12

generally, namely the obligation to explain the material risks of a proposed course 

of conduct.

But Mr. Zamora was not entirely ignorant of the requirements of informed 

consent. His failure to explain the material risks of not using a trust account 

stemmed from his belief that his proposed course of conduct did not create material 

risks because “if there had been a request [for a refund], we would’ve come to a 

resolution . . . if fees were due . . . for any work that they disputed they would have 

received a refund of those fees.” While this testimony reflects Mr. Zamora’s

disregard for other potential risks—namely that funds not held in a trust can be 

“spent, lost or exposed to a lawyer’s creditors”—we do not view his overall 

impression of the material risks of his proposed arrangement as unreasonable.

Mr. Zamora’s contention that he knew of his obligation to refund any 

unearned fees, and would have done so, is supported by his fee agreement. While 

Mr. Ponds’s fee agreement erroneously described the flat fee as nonrefundable, In 

re Ponds, 279 A.3d at 359, Mr. Zamora’s fee agreement alerted clients of their right 

to a refund of any unearned portion of the fee. And while Mr. Ponds refused to 

comply with an arbitration board order directing him to refund his client’s entire fee, 

id. at 360, Mr. Zamora never received a refund request from Ms. Stiles prior to the 
13

initiation of disciplinary proceedings. It was not unreasonable for Mr. Zamora to 

conclude that the additional dangers posed by creditors or his own spending 

presented little risk to his clients based on his commitment to refunding them any 

unearned fee. 

And Mr. Zamora’s fee agreement satisfied many of the requirements laid out 

in Mance, despite his lack of familiarity with that case. Of the five specific 

disclosures required by Mance, Mr. Zamora’s fee agreement explicitly satisfied at 

least two of them: his fee agreement spelled out the terms of the benefit to be 

provided to his clients and informed them of the requirement that he refund unearned 

fees. His fee agreement also conveyed two additional required disclosures in less 

exact terms: (1) that the fee would be held in escrow until earned unless an 

alternative agreement was reached, by requiring prospective clients to “WAIVE the 

requirement that the flat fee . . . be held in trust”; and (2) that Mr. Zamora could keep 

the fee only by providing the service for which the client contracted by noting that 

if the attorney does not “fail[] to perform the services contemplated . . . the fixed fee 

will be earned in full.” Mr. Zamora’s fee agreements were not “fundamentally 

incompatible” with the requirements of informed consent, unlike Mr. Ponds’s. In re 

Ponds, 279 A.3d at 361.
14

Ultimately, we conclude that Mr. Zamora’s efforts to obtain informed 

consent—though obviously lacking—did not demonstrate “conscious indifference” 

to the security of his clients’ funds or the purposes of informed consent. It was not 

objectively unreasonable for him to believe that the disclosures in his fee agreement 

were sufficient to obtain informed consent, particularly given his erroneous belief 

that his willingness to refund unearned fees mitigated any potential risks to his 

clients. Though this is a close case, Mr. Zamora’s ignorance of the specific 

requirements of informed consent is more akin to Mr. Haar’s ignorance of Rule 

1.15(e)’s application to flat fees than to Mr. Ponds’s plainly noncompliant fee 

agreement. Mr. Ponds was familiar with Mance, and presumably knew that Mance 

required him to refund all unearned fees, and yet his fee agreements stated the 

opposite; Mr. Zamora knew that he needed to obtain informed consent to his flat-fee 

arrangement under Rule 1.15(e), but made only some of the disclosures necessary to 

obtain it. These distinctions reflect the line between “conscious indifference”—

recklessness—and negligence. We therefore agree with the hearing committee that 

Mr. Zamora misappropriated funds negligently. 

IV.

If we accept the Board’s conclusions, we must adopt the Board’s 

recommended disposition unless doing so “would foster a tendency toward 
15

inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be 

unwarranted.” In re Haar, 270 A.3d at 299 (quoting In re Rodriguez-Quesada, 122 

A.3d 913, 920 (D.C. 2015)). But here, because the Board based its recommended 

punishment upon its finding of recklessness—a finding we reject—we look instead 

to the hearing committee’s recommendation. “The purpose of imposing discipline 

is to serve the public and professional interests identified and to deter future and 

similar conduct rather than to punish the attorney.” In re Rodriguez-Quesada, 122 

A.3d at 921 (quoting In re Kanu, 5 A.3d 1, 16 (D.C. 2010)). The hearing 

committee’s reasoning adhered to these principles. 

After noting that “a six-month suspension without a fitness requirement is the 

norm for attorneys who have committed negligent misappropriation,” In re Edwards, 

870 A.2d 90, 94 (D.C. 2005), the hearing committee examined the range of 

punishments typically levied for violations of Rule 1.3(a) and Rule 1.16(d) and

determined that additional one-month sanctions for each of those violations would 

be appropriate. Finally, the hearing committee determined that Mr. Zamora owed 

Ms. Stiles and Mr. Ascensio $750 and added restitution in that amount to the baseline 

punishment—establishing a baseline punishment of eight months suspension and 

$750 restitution. 
16

The hearing committee then carefully considered the requisite factors to 

determine if a departure from this presumptive sanction was warranted. These 

factors include: “(1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client, 

(3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary 

rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has 

acknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances.” In 

re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053 (D.C. 2013). In considering these factors, the hearing 

committee placed particular emphasis on Mr. Zamora’s lack of any prior disciplinary 

history spanning his ten-year career as a federal immigration practitioner with high 

case turnover, the generally underserved population his practice serves, and the 

difficulties faced by solo practitioners who maintain high volume practices. The 

hearing committee ultimately found the mitigating factors (lack of prior disciplinary 

history, lack of dishonesty, and the additional mitigating circumstances noted above) 

to carry equal weight to the aggravating circumstances (seriousness of misconduct 

and prejudice to client), and left the recommended sanction largely unchanged, 

merely adding the requirement that Mr. Zamora attend a continuing legal education 

program regarding flat-fee billing practices.

Because we agree with the hearing committee’s careful analysis, we suspend 

Mr. Zamora for eight months for negligent misappropriation and order him to pay 
17

$750 plus interest in restitution and attend a continuing legal education program 

regarding flat-fee billing practices. 

So ordered.