Draft

ADVISORY BOARD ON

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

DRAFT REVIEW OF INTERNAL ALPHA EXPOSURE 

POTENTIAL AT CPP PRIOR TO 1963

Contract No. 211-2014-58081 

SCA-TR-2017-SEC008, Revision 0 

Prepared by

Robert Barton, CHP 

SC&A, Inc.

2200 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 300 

Arlington, Virginia, 22201

Saliant, Inc.

5579 Catholic Church Road 

Jefferson, Maryland 21755 

July 2017 

DISCLAIMER

This is a working document provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) technical 

support contractor, SC&A for use in discussions with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health (NIOSH) and the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH), including its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Documents produced by SC&A, such as memorandum, white paper, 

draft or working documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH products or positions, unless specifically 

marked as such. This document prepared by SC&A represents its preliminary evaluation on technical 

issues.

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the 

Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a and has been cleared for distribution.
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SC&A, INC.: Technical Support for the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health Review of NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Program

DOCUMENT TITLE: Draft Review of Internal Alpha Exposure Potential at CPP Prior to 

1963

DOCUMENT NUMBER/

DESCRIPTION:

SCA-TR-2017-SEC008 

REVISION NO.: 0 (Draft)

SUPERSEDES: N/A

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 10, 2017

TASK MANAGER: John Stiver, MS, CHP [signature on file]

PROJECT MANAGER: John Stiver, MS, CHP [signature on file]

DOCUMENT 

REVIEWER(S):

John Stiver, MS, CHP [signature on file]

John Mauro, PhD, CHP [signature on file] 

Joe Fitzgerald, MS, MPH [signature on file]

Record of Revisions

Revision 

Number

Effective 

Date Description of Revision

0 (Draft) 7/10/2017 Initial issue
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 5

1.0 Introduction, Background, and Approach ............................................................... 8

2.0 Health Physics Daily Shift Reports and Logbooks ............................................... 10

3.0 Alpha Monitoring in the CPP Product Bottle Room During 1955 ....................... 18

4.0 Examples of Alpha Area Survey Maps from 1954, 1955, 1957, 1960, and 1961 22

5.0 Air Monitoring Data from Room 216 ................................................................... 30

6.0 SC&A Interviews with INL Workers ................................................................... 36

6.1 Documented Communication with EE 1 .............................................................. 36

6.2 Documented Communication with EE 2 .............................................................. 37

6.3 Documented Communication with EE 3 .............................................................. 38

6.4 Documented Communication with EE 4 .............................................................. 38

6.5 Documented Communication with EE 5 .............................................................. 38

6.6 Discussion Concerning Relevant Claimant Interviews ......................................... 39

7.0 Examination of Claimant Monitoring Records ..................................................... 40

8.0 Documented Incidents Involving Uranium Prior to 1963..................................... 44

8.1 in ............................................................ 44

8.2 in ................... 45

9.0 References ............................................................................................................. 47

Appendix A: [Redacted in Full] ................................................................................................. 50

Appendix B: [Redacted in Full] ................................................................................................. 51

Appendix C: [Redacted in Full] ................................................................................................. 52
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

α alpha 

μCi/cc microcurie per cubic centimeter

ABRWH Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

CAMS continuous air monitoring system 

CATI computer-assisted telephone interview

cpm, c/m counts per minute 

CPP Chemical Processing Plant

Cs cesium

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

dpm/100cm2

 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters 

DR dose reconstruction 

EE energy employee

ER evaluation report

FAP fission and activation products 

HEU highly enriched uranium 

HP health physics or health physicist

INL Idaho National Laboratory 

MPC maximum permissible concentration

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

ORAUT Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team

RESL Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory 

RWP Radiation Work Permit 

SEC Special Exposure Cohort 

Sr strontium 

SRDB Site Research Database

TBD technical basis document 

U uranium 

U3O8 uranium oxide 

WG Work Group 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents SC&A’s review of the feasibility of dose reconstruction (DR) at the 

Chemical Processing Plant (CPP) prior to the currently recommended Special Exposure Cohort 

(SEC) period, which begins in 1963. SC&A’s review focuses on the feasibility of reconstructing 

internal doses to alpha-emitting material at CPP, as this was the basis for the proposed SEC 

period from 1963 to 1974. Currently, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) proposes to employ a “ratio method” using existing internal urinalysis results for 

fission and activation products (FAP) to reconstruct internal doses to uranium and other 

transuranic constituents found in the radiological source terms at CPP. 

It is important to note that SC&A has issued a previous report (SC&A 2015) on reconstructing 

internal doses to fission products in which it concluded that DR was feasible if a sufficiently 

robust coworker model could be developed in accordance with Neton 2015. This was discussed 

and agreed upon at the March 2016 Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Work Group meeting 

(ABRWH 2016). Additionally, SC&A has prepared a report that evaluates the proposed method 

of using modeled activity ratios of alpha to beta/gamma constituents (namely strontium-90 

[Sr-90] and cesium-137 [Cs-137]) to develop intakes of unmonitored uranium and transuranic 

contaminants. That report, titled SC&A’s Evaluation of Cs-137/Sr-90, Fission and Activation 

Product, and Actinide Values Using INL Monthly and Annual Waste Reports in Relation to 

Assigning Intakes (SC&A 2017), is currently under consideration by NIOSH and the INL Work 

Group. 

While both of those reports discuss site-wide issues related to internal monitoring, this report 

focuses solely on the exposure potential to alpha emitting material at the CPP for the period of 

radiological operations prior to 1963. Based on its review, SC&A identified five findings and 

five observations as follows: 

Finding 1: SC&A found multiple examples in sampled Health Physics (HP) logbooks that

indicate alpha contamination was detected without corresponding indications that beta/gamma 

contamination was also present. This is indicative that there were certain situations and locations 

at CPP in which alpha contamination may have existed that was not comingled with FAP

material.

Finding 2: SC&A found examples of alpha monitoring taking place in the Product Bottle Room, 

including smear surveys of product bottles and bird cages, as well as air monitoring for alpha. 

This is evidence that alpha contamination, including airborne contamination, was of concern to 

the HP staff for this area. Given the nature of routine work activities encountered in the Product 

Bottle Room, it is unlikely that workers in this area would also encounter FAP that are 

comingled with the enriched uranium. 

Finding 3: SC&A identified several area contamination survey maps from 1954, 1955, 1957, 

1960, and 1961 that indicate that alpha contamination may have been the primary radiological 

concern for certain locations at the time of the survey. In many cases, the survey is a general 

contamination survey that did not detect beta/gamma activity, but directed that the identified 

locations with alpha contamination be cleaned up. 
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Finding 4: Based on a limited set of air samples in Room 216 from November of 1954, it is 

apparent that there was airborne alpha activity present. Evidence suggests the airborne alpha 

activity was uranium-233 (U-233) in the form of uranium oxide (U3O8). In two of the three 

examples, the airborne long-lived alpha activity bounded the airborne beta activity. 

Finding 5: SC&A identified a single example in which 

(specifically U- ) occurred out of the 32 reviewed claims who held job titles with the potential 

for laboratory work at CPP. were provided in monitoring record; 

however, a log of all medical treatment indicates that occurred, 

which are missing from the dosimetry records supplied by the U.S. Department of Energy. 

 was located via the NIOSH process known as “optical recognition 

imaging.” The disposition and availability of the is unknown. 

Observation 1: Based on five identified interviews with former CPP workers having some 

knowledge of radiological operations, it is apparent that the HP staff were aware of, and took 

steps to control, alpha contamination in certain areas of the plant. These areas include the 

laboratories and other “product” areas. While the interviews indicate that an “incident”-based 

internal monitoring program was employed for alpha emitters, it is unclear what levels of alpha 

contamination would actually trigger “special bioassay” samples versus more common 

decontamination activities.

Observation 2: who worked at CPP prior to and had job types 

most likely to be associated with laboratory work did not have any 

. It cannot be inferred from 

available files whether these workers should have been monitored and were not, were 

monitored and the records are unavailable, or did not experience any exposure potential to 

 warranting routine monitoring. 

Observation 3: During its review of claimants who may have worked in the areas of 

CPP, SC&A identified several non-claimants who appear to have been part of a regular routine 

monitoring program for . This is logically indicative that a group of workers existed at 

CPP who had the potential for that was of 

radiological concern to the health and safety staff. 

Observation 4: A documented incident involving airborne activity in the 

 indicates that HP was notified immediately and appropriate actions were taken, including 

air sampling, area swipe contamination surveys, and worker nasal swipes. Multiple 

samples were collected in the days immediately following the incident. Analysis of the available 

related to the incident indicates that exposures were likely minimal. This incident was 

also discussed in NIOSH 2015b. 

Observation 5: A documented incident in describes a maintenance 

activity that resulted in a in the . The activity involved an 

” and also had an HP presence in at least maintenance locations. 

Follow-up reports indicate HP and safety permits required more detail to avoid future incidents. 

Although not specified in the incident report, SC&A located at least one sample 

that was taken for a involved in the .
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Based on these findings and observations, SC&A has concluded that exposure potential to alphaemitting material that was not comingled with significant FAP material likely existed for at least 

some workers, time periods, and locations within CPP. This conclusion is based on area 

contamination survey maps, HP daily shift logs, product smear surveys and air sampling found 

for certain locations. 

Internal monitoring for alpha-emitting material, in particular transuranic material, was 

expectedly limited as such monitoring was incident-based and the actual exposure potential was 

likely restricted to a relatively small portion of the workforce. Evidence of incident-based, rather 

than routine, monitoring was identified in interviews with former CPP workers (see Sections 6.1 

and 6.5). Additionally, SC&A located two incident reports in which uranium spills occurred and 

involved follow-up internal sampling (see Section 8.0).

However, SC&A also found evidence to suggest that at least some workers were on a routine 

uranium monitoring schedule. Such routine monitoring could potentially form the basis of a 

uranium coworker model and would be beneficial to explore. SC&A would note that while the 

number of workers on a routine uranium monitoring program is likely small, such limitations are 

allowed for in coworker model development if the exposed population is also likely small 

(Neton 2015). 

Furthermore, evidence suggests that the CPP HP staff were aware that alpha contamination could 

be an issue in certain locations and for certain activities, such as laboratory work and the final 

steps in the product analysis and bottling. This premise is demonstrated by planned alpha 

contamination surveys and air sampling in specific areas of CPP as seen in Sections 2.0–5.0. 

Additionally, interviews with former workers discuss the use of blotter paper, regular surveys, 

and cleaning of the laboratory areas as frequently as every shift (see Sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5). 

Therefore, it is unlikely that a high-level alpha source term could have existed for an extended 

period of time at the facility that would automatically preclude the feasibility of DR. 

Nonetheless, based on the findings/observations of this review (and in conjunction with the 

conclusions found in SC&A 2017), SC&A does not feel it has been sufficiently demonstrated 

that the ratio methods presented in the INL technical basis document for occupational internal

dose (NIOSH 2010) adequately bound the exposure potential to at least some workers and 

locations. Namely, those workers who may have worked in laboratory areas in which the source 

term could have primarily been alpha-emitting material. Justification of any proposed ratio 

method is necessary to assure that assigned doses are sufficiently accurate and bounding to all of 

the exposed workers at CPP. 

Summary Conclusion: SC&A identified several example locations and time periods for which 

alpha contamination was identified and was not directly comingled with FAP. Reconstruction of 

internal exposures to alpha material by ratioing to calculated intakes of FAP material would not 

be technically appropriate for at least some workers, activities, and locations within CPP.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND APPROACH

On July 21, 2015, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) issued 

Revision 01 to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Special Exposure Cohort evaluation report 

(SEC ER) (NIOSH 2015b). In that report (NIOSH 2015b), NIOSH determined that dose 

reconstruction (DR) was infeasible for energy employees (EE) exposed at the Chemical 

Processing Plant (CPP) for the period from January 1, 1963, through December 31, 1974. The 

chosen start date for the recommended SEC was explained as follows: 

The SEC class start date was established as January 1, 1963 because, in the face 

of increased alpha contamination, the CPP radiation protection program did not 

initiate a corresponding increase in the number of bioassay samples taken. 

[NIOSH 2015b, page 3]

Furthermore, NIOSH 2015b, page 6, states:

For the period from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1974 at CPP, NIOSH 

has not located sufficient personnel or area monitoring documentation to support 

complete reconstruction of internal personnel exposures to uranium, neptunium, 

plutonium, and other related transuranic radionuclides. Without additional 

personnel radiation monitoring data or air monitoring data during this period, 

NIOSH has insufficient information to appropriately characterize radioactive 

material intakes of these radionuclides during these INL operations. 

It is important to note that the technical basis for the recommended SEC designation was 

identical in Revision 00 of the SEC ER (NIOSH 2015a), Revision 01 (NIOSH 2015b) and 

Revision 02 (NIOSH 2017). NIOSH presented its original SEC ER findings to the Advisory 

Board on Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) on March 26, 2015, during the 104th meeting 

of the ABRWH in Hanford, WA (ABRWH 2015). At that time, SC&A, Inc. was tasked by the 

ABRWH to review NIOSH 2015a, including the recommended cohort as well as the relevant 

areas at INL for which NIOSH has deemed DR feasible. This report represents SC&A’s review 

of the DR feasibility at the CPP prior to 1963 (i.e., prior to the recommended SEC period from 

1963 to 1974). 

As described above, the basis for the SEC from 1963 to 1974 was the inability to reconstruct 

internal exposures to alpha-emitting material with sufficient accuracy. NIOSH contends that such 

alpha exposures can be feasibly reconstructed prior to 1963. Although not specifically stated in 

the SEC ER, it is SC&A’s understanding that NIOSH plans to use available beta/gamma 

urinalysis data in conjunction with ratio methods developed in Tables 5-22 and 5-23 of the INL 

technical basis document (TBD) for occupational internal dose (NIOSH 2010). Underpinning 

this method is the assumption that alpha-emitting radionuclides are comingled with fission 

products to allow for a sufficiently accurate ratio to be developed, which bounds the dose from 

alpha emitters. It is important to note that the development of appropriate ratios between fission 

products and alpha-emitting material is evaluated in a separate document (SC&A 2017) and 

therefore not discussed further in this report. 
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SC&A’s initial review focused on available documentation referenced in the SEC ER 

(NIOSH 2015a, 2015b, 2017), the site-specific INL Internal TBD (NIOSH 2010), and available 

references contained on the Site Research Database (SRDB). SC&A, along with concurrence 

from the INL Work Group (WG), recommended that further site-specific data capture and 

interviews with former workers would be beneficial in establishing whether DR was indeed 

feasible with sufficient accuracy at CPP prior to 1963. SC&A’s concerns centered on whether 

internal exposures to alpha-emitting material prior to 1963 might be similarly infeasible to 

reconstruct, as was the case during the subsequent SEC period (1963–1974). Therefore, data 

capture and interview efforts were focused on the potential for internal exposure to such alphaemitting material that may not have been comingled with fission and activation product (FAP) 

contaminants to allow for a sufficiently accurate and/or bounding ratio method. SC&A, in 

conjunction with NIOSH/Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team (ORAUT) and the INL WG, 

undertook several interview efforts with former workers, as well as two data capture trips, as 

follows: 

• January 25, 2016, to January 27, 2016: In-person interviews with former INL workers

• January 28, 2016: INL onsite data capture 

• February 16, 2016: Telephone interviews with former INL workers

• March 15, 2016, to March 16, 2016: INL onsite data capture 

• April 5, 2016: Telephone interviews with former INL workers

• November 8, 2016, to November 10, 2016: In-person interviews with former INL 

workers

• December 15, 2016: Telephone interviews with former INL workers

Data that was captured at INL during these efforts included Health Physics (HP) shift logbooks 

(Section 2.0), air monitoring results (Sections 3.0 and 5.0), and area contamination survey maps 

(Section 4.0). The results of interviews with former workers having knowledge germane to 

exposure source terms at CPP prior to 1963 are discussed in Section 6.0. 

In addition to the interview and data capture efforts, SC&A conducted an exhaustive review of 

the current INL claimant population to identify scientists, laboratory workers, and other 

technicians who may have been included in alpha contamination events and subsequent internal 

monitoring. The results of this claim review are presented and discussed in Section 7.0. Finally, 

Section 8.0 discusses two documented contamination incidents identified at CPP that involved 

uranium material spills in which the contaminants became airborne. 
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2.0 HEALTH PHYSICS DAILY SHIFT REPORTS AND LOGBOOKS 

SC&A examined a set of HP Daily Shift Reports (for brevity called “Shift Reports” in this 

section) for information concerning exposure potential to alpha contamination which may not 

have been comingled with FAP (CPP HP Various Dates-a). Figure 1 presents an example 

screenshot of a Shift Report from January 10, 1955. The bottom of the figure indicates that this is 

the report from Crew “C” on the third shift (1600–2400 hours). Highlighted in the figure are 

entries 6, 7, 9 and 10 which indicate HP activities in Room 207. The second column of the Shift 

Report indicates that the work was performed for “Ch,” which presumably represents the 

chemistry division at CPP. The horizontal checklist for these entries indicates the following 

services performed:

• Contamination survey 

• Consultation or special services

• Smears taken 

• Smears counted 

For entries 6 and 7, the “Remarks and Explanations” column (highlighted to the far right) 

indicates that alpha contamination was found on the floor (9 smears taken and counted) and wall 

(5 swipes taken and counted) of Room 207. Entries 9 and 10 are likely representative of a 

“resmearing” of the room and again found alpha contamination present on the floor and wall 

(9 and 4 smears, respectively). Notably, entry 7 also indicates the instrument used was a 

“Samson,” which was a common alpha detector used at the time. 

Table 1 provides additional examples of observed Shift Reports from 1953 to 1955 where alpha 

contamination was identified. As seen in the table, there were several specific areas that were 

associated with alpha contamination including laboratory areas, individual hot cells, and the 

product room area. 
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Figure 1. Example Screenshot of Health Physics Daily Logsheet Indicating Alpha Contamination on the Floor and Wall of Room 207 

from January 1995 (CPP HP Various Dates-a)
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Table 1. Examples of Alpha Contamination Identified in Captured Health Physics Logbooks (CPP HP Various Dates-a)

Ex. 

# Date

Shift

(Military 

Time)

Origin of 

Job 

Request

Remarks and 

Explanations 

from Logbooks

(Direct Quotes)

Actions Taken Area Instrument Additional SC&A Notes

1 11/23/1953 0800-

1600

Health 

Physics

“Alpha 

Contamination”

Contamination Survey, Radiation 

Tag Issued, Consultation or Special 

Services, Clothing Issued, Samples 

or Smears Taken (approx. 250)

All Areas Samson — 

2 12/2/1953 1600-

2400 Operations “Survey - cont. 

(α)”

Contamination Survey, Radiation 

Tag Issued, Consultation or Special 

Services, Samples or Smears Taken 

(50)

LB Halls Smear — 

3 12/2/1953 1600-

2400 Operations

“α 

contamination 

incident”

Contamination Survey, Radiation 

Tag Issued (3), Consultation or 

Special Services, Clothing Issued, 

Air Samples Taken (1), Samples or 

Smears Taken (24)

W. 

Stairwell 

Product 

Rm & LC 

Hallway

UV Hudson, 

Samson — 

4 12/3/1953 1600-

2400 "WL" “α cont. check”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Samples or 

Smears Taken (14)

LC-12 Smear

Area was rechecked on the 

same shift with an additional 

8 smears taken and counted.

5 12/4/1953 Not Listed Operations “α 

contamination”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Incident Report 

Completed, Samples or Smears 

Taken (20)

PO Corr Samson — 

6 12/11/1953 800-1600 Operations “α cont hands” Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Clothing Issued LB-1 Samson — 

7 1/8/1954 1600-

2400 Operations “Alpha 

contamination”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Samples or 

Smears Taken (8)

PM Area Not Listed

Smear samples taken on two 

different occasions during the 

shift.

8 1/8/1954 1600-

2400 Operations “Alpha 

Contamination”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Clothing Issued LB-1 Samson — 
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Ex. 

# Date

Shift

(Military 

Time)

Origin of 

Job 

Request

Remarks and 

Explanations 

from Logbooks

(Direct Quotes)

Actions Taken Area Instrument Additional SC&A Notes

9 1/21/1954 800–1600 Chemistry

“Spill of α 

contaminated 

liquid”

Contamination Survey 208 Samson

A separate activity was 

logged during shift involving 

a survey with a Samson 

meter in 208 that was 

requested by the maintenance 

branch. Record states: 

"Surveyed hood before 

cocooning"

10 4/20/1954 800–1600 Chemistry “α 

contamination”

Contamination Survey, Radiation 

Tag Issued (2), Samples or Smears 

Taken (1)

LB-1 Not Listed — 

11 11/17/1954 800–1600 Samson “α - floor near 

hood”

Contamination Survey, Samples or 

Smears Taken (2) 207 Samson

A second contamination 

survey for α-β-γ on the floor 

of Area 207 occurred using a 

"Sampson" meter and 

Geiger-Mueller counter. 

Later in the log, an "alpha 

spill" was also noted for Area 

207. After that, an alpha 

contamination check was

made in the 200 Hallway at 

the request of the Chemistry 

Branch.

12 1/19/1954 800–1600 Operations “α cont. on 

coveralls”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Clothing or 

Personnel Monitored

LB-1 Samson — 

13 11/19/1954 800–1600 Chemistry “α 

contamination”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Samples or 

Smears Taken (22)

212-216 Samson — 

14 12/4/1954 800–1600 Health 

Physics

“α 

contamination”

Contamination Survey, Floor Plan 

Completed, Radiation Tag Issued, 

Consultation or Special Services, 

Clothing Issued, Samples or Smears 

Taken (35)

212-216 Samson — 
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Ex. 

# Date

Shift

(Military 

Time)

Origin of 

Job 

Request

Remarks and 

Explanations 

from Logbooks

(Direct Quotes)

Actions Taken Area Instrument Additional SC&A Notes

15 12/13/1954 1600–

2400 Operations

“Alpha Activity 

(Final Product 

Bottle)”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Services, Samples or 

Smears Taken (2)

Product 

Rm Not Listed — 

16 12/19/1954 1600–

2400 Maintenance

“Surveyed 

clothing for α

Surveyed tools 

for α”

Direct Radiation Survey, 

Consultation or Special Services, 

Clothing or Personnel Monitored

201 Not Listed — 

17 12/30/1954 1600–

2400

Health 

Physics “α cont survey” Samples and Smears (13) 212-216 Not Listed

Later in the shift the area was 

rechecked after mopping with 

7 additional smears taken.

18 1/8/1955 1600–

2400 Chemistry “Explosion 

Incident”

Direct Radiation Survey, 

Contamination Survey, Radiation 

Tag Issued, Consultation and 

Special Services, Clothing or 

Personnel Monitored, Incident 

Report Completed

207

Samson, 

Geiger 

Mueller

There was a decontamination 

survey the following day 

shift using only the Samson 

radiation meter.

SC&A was unable to locate a 

corresponding incident 

report.

19 1/9/1955 800–1600 Chemistry “α survey” Contamination Survey, Samples or 

Smears Taken (6) 204 Not Listed — 

20 1/10/1955 1600–

2400 Chemistry

“Wall 

contamination 

(α), floor 

contamination 

(α)”

Contamination Survey, Consultation 

or Special Surveys, Samples or 

Smears Taken (14)

207 Samson

The first shift on 1/10/1955 

(0000-0800) indicated that 2 

drawers in Area 207 were 

checked for alpha 

contamination. Follow-up 

surveys occurred later in the 

shift in Area 207, noting 

alpha contamination and 

floor contamination.

21 1/10/1955 0000–

0800

Health 

Physics

“Alpha 

contamination 

(207)”

Incident Report Completed L-01 Not Listed

SC&A was unable to locate a 

corresponding incident 

report.
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Ex. 

# Date

Shift

(Military 

Time)

Origin of 

Job 

Request

Remarks and 

Explanations 

from Logbooks

(Direct Quotes)

Actions Taken Area Instrument Additional SC&A Notes

22 10/12/1953 0000–

0800

Health 

Physics

“Proportional α 

counter not 

operating”

Instruments Calibrated, Instruments 

Inspected or Other Instrument Work LB-13 Not Listed — 

23 12/6/1953 0000–

0800

Health 

Physics “α cont” Samples and Smears Taken (8) LC-12 Not Listed

Two other α contamination 

surveys were made in the 

LC-12 area during this shift.

24 12/6/1953 0000–

0800 Operations “α cont” Direct Radiation Surveys, 

Contamination Surveys Q-Cell "UV" — 

25 11/26/1953 1600–

2400 Operations “Possible α 

spill”

Direct Radiation Surveys, 

Contamination Surveys E Cell UV — 

26 12/27/1953 800–1600 Maintenance “Floor α 

contaminated”

Contamination Survey, Samples and 

Smears Taken (5) LB-12 Not Listed

A second survey occurred 

during the same shift in LB12 with 4 more smears taken. 

Remarks and Explanations 

also indicate “Floor α 

contaminated”
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In addition to the general shift log entries shown in Figure 1 and described in Table 1, SC&A identified 

available HP records that contained handwritten logs of individual activities with additional detail 

(CPP HP 1954a, b). One such example is the surveys performed in LB-32, which are shown in Figure 2. 

Although such entries have difficult legibility, Figure 2 shows a contamination survey occurring in 

LB-32 and LB-28 between 1000 and 1630 hours (the specific date is not provided but the logbook itself 

was dated January of 1954). The remarks and actions taken appear to read: 

Got to checking around LB32 after floor plan showed quite a bit of α contamination. 

Took smears off of walls, equipment etc all extremely contaminated. The only thing this 

can be due to is airborne contamination. To add to the problem. Most of the activity is 

U233 which is 3 to 4 times more hazardous than U235. Started a 24 hr air sample & 

‘roped off’ area. ~15 smears taken & counted. LB-28 smeared on tops of various equipt 

pieces max 28 [legibility issues] c/m on top of south locks. 7 smears [emphasis added] 

Figure 2. Example of Handwritten Health Physics Logs Detailing a Specific Activity in 1954 

(CPP HP 1954a) 

Additional logbook entry examples are summarized in Table 2. The entries were numbered for ease of 

reference to the reader. Many of the example entries shown in Table 2 involve alpha contamination 

issues in particular laboratory areas. Lab-32, which was also the subject of the activity shown in 

Figure 2, had noted alpha contamination issues shown in examples 4 and 7. Example 7, in particular, 

noted: “Found α cont. in LB-32 again” (CPP HP 1954b). Additionally, an air sample that was taken in 

the north sampling corridor (see Example 6) showed airborne alpha contamination that was comparable 

to the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) and would require respiratory protection (NIOSH 

2010). The logbook entry for this event notes that no significant beta-gamma airborne activity was 

measured at that location.
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Table 2. Additional Examples of Health Physics Logbook Entries with Detailed Handwritten 

Notes from January and February 1954 (CPP HP 1954a, b) 

Ex. 

# 

Type of 

Survey, 

Instrument

Requestor Location Quotes Labelled as “Remarks and Action Taken”*

1 α Cont., 

Smears Chem. LB-12

“Checked desk tops, etc. in LB-12 request of radio-chem lab 

personnel. Found furniture tops cont. up to 100 c/m α. Since

[name redacted] will be out of lab by today, advised thorough 

cleaning tomorrow.”

2 Cont., Smear [Name 

Redacted] PM Area

“7 smears taken behind barrel area on R, Q & S platform. Found 

max 27 c/m alpha on floor excluding area under small tables. 

Advised to scrub area with citric or dilute solution of nitric. 

Subsequent survey to be made... contamination (α) survey of P, Q, 

S platform area after decontamination work with nitric. 5 smears 

taken. All count to ~35 c/m. Advised more scrubbing... 4 smears 

taken on P, Q, &S platform after repeated nitric scrub. Max 

10c/m alpha. Advised O.K. to remove barricade.”

3 Cont., 

Samson

[Name 

Redacted] LB-1 

“Survey made on [illegible] which had been juiced by metal joint 

apparatus used to siphon material. Significant alpha 

contamination found.”

4 

Cont., GM – 

Juno - Scaler - 

Counter

Routine LB Area

“Made routine area surveys 3 labs – LB-28, LB-32, LB-44. α cont 

to 250 c/m found. Mostly on desk and bench tops. Marked all 

plainly for Monday A.M. cleanup. Floor plans completed + 

distributed – 26 smears counted. 3 tags issued.”

5 Cont., 

Counter

[Name 

Redacted] LB-28A “Made smear survey of previously α cont area now scrubbed. 2 c/m α max found – O.K.ed floor plan.” 

6 Air Sample, 

Hudson

[Name 

Redacted]

N. Sample 

Corr.

“10-min air sample taken near vicinity of K plug openings. Air 

blowing from these openings into corridor. Calculated 

concentration 4.4×10-11 μc/cc (alpha). No significant βγ counts 

Alpha concentrations appear to be approx. allowable level 

(40 hr/wk).”

7 

Rad. and 

Cont., GM 

and Smears 

Routine

LB-2, 4, 

11, 12, 13, 

28, 32, 31

“Routine Area Surveys. Found several hot pots. Reported same. 

41 smears taken and counted for αβγ. Found α cont. in LB-32 

again.” [note: underline appears in original record]

* The quotes presented in the “Remarks and Action Taken” column were transcribed to the best of the author’s ability.

SC&A found multiple examples in available HP logbooks in which alpha contamination was detected at 

various locations at CPP including hot cells and laboratory/product room areas. The logbook examples 

did not necessarily indicate that beta/gamma contamination was also present in these same areas during 

the identified shift. However, there was evidence that areas were resurveyed during the same shift, 

which is likely indicative of cleanup efforts (see examples 4, 7, 17, 18, 20, 23 and 26 in Table 1 and 

examples 1, 2, 4 and 5 in Table 2). 

Finding 1: SC&A found multiple examples in sampled HP logbooks that indicate alpha contamination 

was detected without corresponding indications that beta/gamma contamination was also present. This is 

indicative that there were certain situations and locations at CPP in which alpha contamination may have 

existed that was not comingled with FAP material.
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3.0 ALPHA MONITORING IN THE CPP PRODUCT BOTTLE ROOM 

DURING 1955

The Product Bottle Room at CPP is of particular interest to potential alpha exposures as this would be 

the final stage in which purified highly enriched uranium (HEU) would be encountered without the 

fission product component. Figure 3 shows an example of alpha smears taken on product bottles in the 

product bottle room. The figure notes that certain product bottles had been identified as requiring 

decontamination and other bottles had been cleaned and rechecked after decontamination. 

Figure 4 shows a similar decontamination survey log1 in which bird cages (assumed to be used for 

movement of materials) were checked for alpha contamination. 

1 Figure 4 is actually the combination of two successive survey logs, rather than a single survey logsheet.

The figure indicates that bird cage 

numbers “101” and “155” had checkmarks which are assumed to indicate an unacceptable level of alpha 

contamination. Later in the same day, they were rechecked for alpha contamination (presumably after 

cleaning) and found to be at acceptable levels. Finally, Figure 5 shows an example alpha air sample 

from 1954 in the product bottle room. The record seems to indicate that the units are in “microcurie,” 

however this would not be consistent with other observed air sampling records, which were all given in 

units of “microcurie/ml” or “microcurie/cc.” It is possible that the record was partially cut off and the 

activity units were actually normalized per unit volume. 

Finding 2: SC&A found examples of alpha monitoring taking place in the Product Bottle Room, 

including smear surveys of product bottles and bird cages, as well as air monitoring for alpha. This is 

evidence that alpha contamination, including airborne contamination, was of concern to the HP staff for 

this area. Given the nature of routine work activities encountered in the Product Bottle Room, it is 

unlikely that workers in this area would also encounter FAP that are comingled with the enriched 

uranium. 

 
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Figure 3. 1955 Example of Alpha Smears Taken on Uranium Product Bottles Showing Decontamination Was Required on Three of 

the Bottles (CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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Figure 4. 1955 Example of Alpha Smears Taken from Product Bottle Room Bird Cages – Shows Bird Cages Marked for Resurvey 

Likely after Appropriate Decontamination (CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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Figure 5. Alpha Air Sample Taken in the Product Bottle Room in 1954 Showing Positive Alpha Air Activity 

(CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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4.0 EXAMPLES OF ALPHA AREA SURVEY MAPS FROM 1954, 1955, 1957, 

1960, AND 1961

SC&A identified several examples of HP area survey maps that either solely or primarily indicated 

alpha contamination. Figures 6–8 show routine radiation and contamination surveys in Room 216. 

Figure 6 shows a routine “rad & cont.” survey from December of 1961. The survey found alpha 

contamination in a sink, on a chair, and inside a hood and a glovebox. A fifth area of alpha 

contamination was not specifically identified in the survey floor plan, but it appears to be a bench or 

desk. The survey notes that these areas should be decontaminated with the entry: “Cleaning of shaded 

areas recommend.” No beta/gamma contamination was noted in the survey. 

Figure 7 shows a specific alpha contamination survey of Room 216 in May of 1955 and identifies a 

significantly contaminated hood. Figure 8 displays a magnified image of the hood area of the survey 

floor plan. This figure shows contamination inside the hood as 1,500 disintegrations per minute per 

100 square centimeters (dpm/100cm2) which is 75 times the radiation control guideline (RCG) for alpha 

contamination (NIOSH 2010). The contamination survey notes that the blotter paper should be changed 

in this area. 

Figure 6. Example Alpha Survey of Rooms 212 and 216 in 1961 (CPP HP 1961) 
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Figure 7. Example Alpha Survey of Room 216 in 1955 (CPP HP 1955) 

Figure 8. Close Up of Hood in Figure 7 Showing Alpha Contamination Prompting Clean-up 

Action (CPP HP 1955) 

Figure 9 shows an alpha/beta/gamma contamination survey of the X-Cell which occurred in October 

1961. As the figure shows, alpha contamination was found in several locations within the cell (sink, 

desk, bench, hood, table, and floor). Only one location within the X-Cell was noted to have beta/gamma 
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contamination (bottom left of the figure). Another location on the floor noted contamination to 5 counts 

per minute (cpm), but does not specify the type of contamination. 

Figure 9. 1961 Alpha/Beta/Gamma Contamination Survey in X-Cell Showing Single Labelled 

Beta/Gamma Result (CPP HP 1961) 

Figure 10 shows a routine “Cont. + Rad” smear survey of Rooms 204 and 207 that occurred in July of 

1961. Two shaded areas of the map show alpha contamination on a table and a sink. A note on the 

contamination survey floor plan suggests that those areas be cleaned. No beta or gamma contamination 

is noted on the survey map.
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Figure 10. Example of a Routine 1961 Radiation and Contamination Survey in Rooms 204 and 

207 (CPP HP 1961) 

Figure 11 shows a survey floor plan of the shift control laboratory from April of 1960. The survey notes 

that the floor is “OK” but that alpha contamination was found on the furnace and face of a hood. The 

type of survey was “Rad + Cont” and so it is assumed to be an “alpha/beta/gamma” contamination 

survey. 
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Figure 11. Example of a Shift Lab Floor Plan from 1960 Showing Alpha Contamination 

(CPP HP 1960) 

Figures 12 and 13 contain “radiation and control” surveys of Rooms 100, 102, and 104 in 1960 and 

Rooms 102 and 106 in 1957. Figure 12 notes that alpha contamination was found in several places in 

Room 102, including apparent spots on the floor and on a stool. Figure 12 also notes that all beta/gamma 

smears were less than 50 cpm for all three rooms. Figure 13 notes that a hood in Room 102 contained 

levels of alpha and beta contamination. Although units are not specified in the radiation survey, the 

numerical values assigned for alpha are over an order of magnitude higher than the numerical values 

assigned for beta. Also shown in Figure 13 is an area of Room 106 that indicated alpha contamination 

and also notes that a portion of the floor needs to be mopped. 
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Figure 12. Example of a General Contamination Survey in 1957 for Rooms 100, 102, and 104 That 

Shows Alpha Contamination on the Floor but All Beta/Gamma Contamination Swipes Were Less 

Than 50 cpm (CPP HP Various Dates-c)
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Figure 13. Contamination Survey Map from 1957 in Rooms 102 and 106 

(CPP HP Various Dates-c)

Finally, Figure 14 shows an alpha contamination survey report from Lab 32 in November of 1954. The 

survey shows that alpha contamination was found on the floors, in a hood, on lab benches, and in a sink. 

As a result of the survey, it was recommended that the floor be mopped and rechecked. Also, it was 

recommended that a glass plate on the bench at the spot welder be cleaned, as well as the sink drain 

boards. 

Finding 3: SC&A identified several area contamination survey maps from 1954, 1955, 1957, 1960, and 

1961 that indicate that alpha contamination may have been the primary radiological concern for certain 

locations at the time of the survey. In many cases, the survey is a general contamination survey that did 

not detect beta/gamma activity, but directed that the identified locations with alpha contamination be 

cleaned up. 
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Figure 14. Contamination Survey of Lab-32 from 1954 Indicating Alpha Contamination with 

Instructions on which Spots Needed Decontamination (CPP HP Various Dates-c)
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5.0 AIR MONITORING DATA FROM ROOM 216

SC&A identified a set of air sampling records for Room 216 that was intended to quantify long-lived 

airborne activity in November of 1954. Figures 15 and 16 were analyzed only for long-lived alpha 

emitters, and it was determined that there was airborne uranium-233 (U-233) present in the room. 

Figure 15 also contains a note which states that the material is likely U3O8. 

Figures 17–19 contain measurements of both long-lived beta emitters and long-lived alpha emitters, but 

do not identify a specific isotope. Figure 17 shows that long-lived alpha emitters were measured while 

there were no long-lived beta emitters present. In Figure 18, both long-lived beta and alpha emitters 

were detected. It is not clear from the record whether the alpha air concentration is 9.6×10-12 microcurie 

per cubic centimeter (μCi/cc) or 9.6×10-13 μCi/cc. However, in either case the airborne alpha activity is 

higher than the airborne beta activity. Finally, Figure 19 shows alpha and beta air concentrations of 

1.2×10-13 and 6.7×10-13 μCi/cc, respectively. In this last case, the beta air activity is higher than the 

alpha activity, however they are of the same general order of magnitude.

Finding 4: Based on a limited set of air samples in Room 216 from November of 1954, it is apparent 

that there was airborne alpha activity present. Evidence suggests the airborne alpha activity was U-233 

in the form of U3O8. In two of the three examples, the airborne long-lived alpha activity bounded the 

airborne beta activity. 
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Figure 15. Air Sample Taken in Room 216 and Analyzed for Both Long-Lived Beta and Alpha Activity on November 5, 1954 

(CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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Figure 16. Air Sample Taken in Room 216 and Analyzed for Both Long-Lived Beta and Alpha Activity on November 9, 1954 

(CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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Figure 17. Air Sample Taken in Room 216 and Analyzed for Both Long-Lived Beta and Alpha Activity on November 16, 1954 

(CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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Figure 18. Air Sample Taken in Room 216 and Analyzed for Both Long-Lived Beta and Alpha Activity on November 22, 1954 

(CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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Figure 19. Air Sample Taken in Room 216 and Analyzed for Both Long-Lived Beta and Alpha Activity on November 30, 1954 

(CPP HP Various Dates-b)
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6.0 SC&A INTERVIEWS WITH INL WORKERS

As part of its review, SC&A participated in interviews with former workers who might have knowledge 

of radiological conditions (specifically those related to alpha-emitting material) at the CPP prior to 1963. 

These interviews were conducted jointly with NIOSH/ Division of Compensation Analysis & Support, 

ORAUT, and members of the ABRWH INL WG. While the interview effort is obviously complicated 

by both the timeframe in question (work performed more than 50 years in the past), as well as the highly 

technical nature of the information sought as part of this review, five interviewees were identified who 

provided information that is germane to this investigation. These five interviews are discussed in 

Sections 6.1 through 6.5. Section 6.6 contains a brief overview and characterization of the five 

interviews.

6.1 DOCUMENTED COMMUNICATION WITH EE 1 

EE 1 ( ) was interviewed on at least two separate occasions in which information germane to 

radiological conditions at CPP was discussed: September 10, 2015 (ORAUT 2014a), and December 11, 

2014 (ORAUT 2014b). worked as an at CPP from 

 when he was transferred to another INL site area. 

describes the routine HP monitoring program of the 1950s as very comprehensive and disciplined. 

With regard to possible alpha-emitting material, stated that plutonium-238 (Pu-238) was never 

extracted at CPP during that time because there was never enough of it to make it worthwhile. However, 

the interview notes from ORAUT 2014a also state: 

The analytical lab did U and Pu separations on 3rd cycle process samples in the 1950s 

for process control. The lab was surveyed at every shift. Pu-238 contamination was found 

on a lab bench – it was found, reported, and cleaned up because of the shift surveys.... 

When alpha contamination was discovered in the lab (1950s), the entire crew was sent 

for urine bioassay – looking for U and Pu. Alpha bioassay was done when conditions 

indicated; alpha contamination was not seen often.... Alpha bioassay would be done if 

alpha uptakes were suspected, mostly for lab personnel. The highest potential for internal 

alpha exposure was the 3rd cycle extraction. 

In a separate interview, reiterated the HP practices of surveying the laboratory areas. ORAUT 

2014b states: 

 informed us that the lab had benches, hoods, and gloveboxes and that it was 

surveyed every shift. He noted that if plutonium contamination was found in the lab, it 

was immediately cleaned up and plutonium bioassay was implemented as needed. The 

sample analysis in the Analytical Labs looked for alpha and beta/gamma. If alpha was 

detected on a sample then an isotopic analysis was performed to determine the 

radioactive contributor. He also noted that filters from CAMS and other air monitors 

were counted for alpha and beta/gamma. Occasionally, alpha contamination was found 

in the laboratory areas. 

As indicated in both statements, CPP locations where unmingled alpha contamination was possible were 

routinely surveyed, and urinalysis specific to alpha emitters was performed on an “incident” type basis 

when contamination or uptakes were suspected. This is confirmed in ORAUT 2014a: 
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At ICPP in the 1950s, bioassays were conducted for suspected uptakes. Workers were 

sent to RESL for bioassay if they had any facial contamination or if they worked in an 

area where airborne contamination was detected. When alpha contamination was 

discovered in the lab (1950s), the entire crew was sent for urine bioassay – looking for U 

and Pu. Alpha bioassay was done when conditions indicated; alpha contamination was 

not seen often.... Alpha bioassay would be done if alpha uptakes were suspected, mostly 

for lab personnel. The highest potential for internal alpha exposure was the 3rd cycle 

extraction.

Finally, indicated that there was a concern over alpha emitters (specifically plutonium) at CPP. 

ORAUT 2014a states: 

 tried to make management and workers aware of Pu. He gave the interview 

team a copy of a document titled, “

” This was a presentation he gave to staff in the 

. It was not well understood. Fission products were the controlling dose issue. 

The technical staff believed the controls were adequate for alpha contamination, and the 

survey equipment was capable of detecting alpha contamination. Pu was only present in 

small amounts, but it was recognized that it doesn’t take much to create a problem. 

Although a presentation on plutonium at CPP was provided by the interviewee, evidence suggests this 

presentation was not given in , but sometime later (possibly ). It is not known if a different 

presentation was given in , or if there was a typo in the interview notes when it was noted there was 

a presentation in . At this time, it is not known if the original handwritten interview notes were 

available. However, given that worker interviews are documented by multiple individuals, and the 

summaries of those notes are reviewed by the interviewee prior to finalization, it is likely the statements 

are at least partially accurate.

6.2 DOCUMENTED COMMUNICATION WITH EE 2

EE 2 ( ) worked at CPP from as a in the 

. describes his day to day activities as follows:

He performed analyses on the . An example of an analysis was a 

“FLOSSIE.” This was a test of uranium content that was done by dropping process 

liquid onto a chalk-like pellet. The uranium analyses were important for criticality 

control.[ORAUT 2015] 

 also described the use of anti-contamination measures during lab work: 

In the Shift Lab, blotter paper would be placed on benches and floors. Even the interior 

of the hoods would be papered down. All of this was done to control contamination and 

keep the work surfaces as clean as possible. Health Physics did smears at the end of the 

shift. They (analytical lab) always prepared blotter paper for the next shift as directed by 

the HPs. Papering was done quite frequently. [ORAUT 2015]
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In general, described the HPs at CPP as doing a “good job” and mentioned that they would 

monitor transfers and cleanup activities. stated that while HP was around for many activities, 

sometimes the workers would self-monitor and then report their results to the HP Department.

6.3 DOCUMENTED COMMUNICATION WITH EE 3

EE 3 ( ) started work in as a until moving to the 

, which developed techniques to analyze the chemical constituents of 

various CPP waste streams. was transferred to another INL facility in . With regard to 

the presence of alpha-emitting radioactive material, stated the following: 

HPs did their job. They took smears with filter paper for alpha monitoring. He doesn’t 

know the results, but they were taking samples routinely. [ORAUT 2016a] 

The former worker also described a project at CPP which involved developing a method to dissolve and 

analyze Naval Reactors Facility fuel rods which likely involved fuel that had not yet been irradiated 

(i.e., did not yet contain significant FAP). 

6.4 DOCUMENTED COMMUNICATION WITH EE 4

EE 4 ( ) began full-time work as a in the 

 at CPP beginning in was specifically asked 

about the presence of alpha material at CPP and the interview notes include the following: 

He wasn’t very knowledgeable of HP instrumentation. He recalls taking a sample of the 

end product, which contained uranium. Several people were there. Security had to open 

the door/vault to access the sampling area. He doesn’t specifically recall HP monitoring, 

but they were probably there. [ORAUT 2016b] 

6.5 DOCUMENTED COMMUNICATION WITH EE 5

EE 5 ( ) began employment as an at CPP in and continued as a 

until . indicated that the highest priority for HPs was exposure control because high 

exposures were common; however, the EE also indicates that contamination within the plant was more 

of a concern than direct radiation. In particular, the interviewee mentions concern over strontium-90 

(Sr-90) due to its relative insolubility and tendency to migrate to the bone. described the 

use of the HP logbooks (see Section 2.0 for examples) but does not recall using survey maps (examples 

shown in Section 4.0). 

ORAUT 2016c describes the regular contamination control measures, as recalled by , as 

follows: 

HPs were very concerned about contamination. They assumed contamination was 

present everywhere, and they took precautions to protect the workers. 

• Upon entering CPP, workers changed into anti-contamination clothing. On the way 

out, they showered, put on clothes, and walked through a monitor. Anyone who set off 

an alarm was expected to report to HP office for follow-up. 
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• Floors were cleaned every day.

• Air samples and smears were taken to determine contamination levels. A certain 

number of smears had to be taken during each shift. 

• Blotter paper was used a lot at CPP for contamination control. HPs typically put it 

down. 

• Operations workers helped police and keep the area clean, and they had to help clean 

up when contamination occurred. 

With regard to the bioassay program, noted that HPs were not directly involved in the 

routine monitoring program but that they could send a worker to get a “special” sample if an intake was 

suspected. Specific to potential alpha contamination, the interview notes state: 

“ was aware of one location at CPP where alpha contamination was a 

concern. He is not certain of the specific location now; it may have been the uranium 

packaging area or an analytical laboratory. He only recalls alpha contamination events 

happening about 3-4 times during his years at CPP; he doesn’t recall details clearly. 

[ORAUT 2016c]

6.6 DISCUSSION CONCERNING RELEVANT CLAIMANT INTERVIEWS

Based on the limited interviews performed with EEs who worked at CPP prior to 1963 and who had 

knowledge of radiological source terms and operations, it is apparent that the presence of alpha 

contamination was of concern to the HP staff in certain areas of the plant. The HP staff performed daily 

or even shift-specific contamination surveys in lab areas where alpha contamination may have occurred 

(see Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.5) and also often used blotter paper on the floor and on potentially 

contaminated surfaces to try and limit exposures (see Sections 6.2 and 6.5). 

Exposure to alpha emitters was primarily of concern with the laboratories and “end product” locations 

(see Sections 6.1 and 6.5). The interviewees in Sections 6.2 and 6.4 describe taking uranium samples out 

of the product stream for analysis. Internal monitoring for alpha emitters was characterized as 

“incident”-based, in that special bioassay for alpha emitters could be requested at the behest of the HP 

staff (see Sections 6.1 and 6.5). Such incidents would involve contamination or other events in which an 

uptake of alpha emitting material was suspected. However, the actual threshold levels for conducting 

“non-routine” or “special” bioassay were not provided, and it is not clear what would constitute a 

significant enough contamination event to require internal monitoring for alpha contamination. For 

example, somewhat regular contamination events might be not be considered “incidents” for the 

purposes of conducting special internal monitoring and simply would require that the area be cleaned up 

or existing blotter paper be removed and replaced (see Section 4.0 for examples where HP surveys 

directed such activities).

Observation 1: Based on five identified interviews with former CPP workers having some knowledge 

of radiological operations, it is apparent that the HP staff were aware of, and took steps to control, alpha 

contamination in certain areas of the plant. These areas include the laboratories and other “product” 

areas. While the interviews indicate that an “incident”-based internal monitoring program was employed 

for alpha emitters, it is unclear what levels of alpha contamination would actually trigger “special 

bioassay” samples versus more common decontamination activities. 
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7.0 EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT MONITORING RECORDS

SC&A acknowledges that internal monitoring at CPP was overwhelmingly driven by beta/gamma 

bioassay monitoring during the period of interest. However, in order to characterize the less common 

monitoring practices associated with uranium and other alpha emitters, SC&A reviewed the monitoring 

files for claimants who may have worked in laboratory areas or who had job types that could have 

potentially exposed them to source terms which did not contain alpha emitters comingled with FAP 

material at CPP during the period of interest. 

Specifically, SC&A examined the records of claims with job titles that generally included: laboratory 

technicians, chemists/chemical engineers, research engineers, and scientists. SC&A identified 62 

claimants who fit this job criteria prior to 1963, with 32 of them assigned for some or all of their 

employment at CPP. 

Of the 32 claimants who matched SC&A’s job type and location criteria, only result 

was observed for uranium (Claim ). This EE worked at continuously from 

. The EE’s computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) report lists the following job 

titles: “ ,” as 

well as the following work locations: “

 

The EE describes their routine duties in the CATI as follows: 

For the first five years as a , he . In 

, he the 

plant. 

Additionally, the EE described the use of Radiation Work Permits (RWPs): 

Radiation work permits were required when he worked with 

 He did not work under one routinely. 

On , the EE submitted a which was not labelled as either 

being routine or special. A second ) was 

collected on . Both were and can be seen in Figure 20. 

Examination of the claimant’s “Chronological Record of Medical Care” provided in the Department of 

Labor files shows that a was taken on , and that 

were provided on (see Figure 21). The latter 

 taken in were not provided in the claimant records supplied by the 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 

One of those was identified via the NIOSH process known to SC&A as 

“optical recognition imaging.” While the is dated , for , this is likely 

when the was collected, rather than when the was provided by HP. 

That record contained a handwritten note stating that the was found to be 

 but does not provide further information. There was no incident report observed that was 

associated with the series of . 
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Figure 20. 
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Figure 21. 

Finding 5: SC&A identified a single example in which (specifically 

U- ) occurred out of the 32 reviewed claims who held job titles with the potential for laboratory work 

at CPP. were provided in monitoring record; however, a log of all medical 

treatment indicates that occurred, which are missing from the 

dosimetry records supplied by DOE. was located via the NIOSH 

process known as “optical recognition imaging.” The disposition and availability of the is 

unknown. 

The remaining 31 claimants who did not have evidence of any 

 are described in Appendix A. Inspection of Appendix A shows that this subset of CPP 

workers generally had extensive 

. 

Observation 2: who worked at CPP prior to and had job types most 

likely to be associated with laboratory work did not have any 

. It cannot be inferred from available files 

whether these workers should have been monitored and were not, were monitored and the records are 

unavailable, or did not experience any exposure potential to warranting routine monitoring. 

During SC&A’s review of the records described in Appendix A, 

SC&A observed several who were on a routine schedule for . 

These workers are listed in alphabetical order in Table 3 with an example number assigned for ease 

of reference. It is important to remember that the routine in Table 3 likely do not 

represent the extent to which these workers were routinely . These 

workers and their monitoring records were simply observed as a byproduct of the claimant study 

discussed previously. 
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Table 3. Listing of Observed Workers with Routine Urinalysis Results

As seen in Table 3, results in were labelled as “special” though 

the same worker would later submit . The majority of observed routine samples 

fell between . For certain examples, it appears that the EE may have been on a 

routine monitoring schedule as frequent as (see Examples 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13). Other 

monitoring intervals observed in Table 3 were on the order of ; however, 

this may simply be the result of this dataset representing only a sampling of the internal monitoring 

records for these workers. The fact that certain workers appear to be on a routine, and not a “special” or 
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incident-driven, monitoring schedule for is logically indicative that there were groups of 

workers who had the potential for chronic exposure. 

Observation 3: During its review of claimants who may have worked in the areas of CPP, 

SC&A identified several non-claimants who appear to have been part of a regular routine monitoring 

program for . This is logically indicative that a group of workers existed at CPP who had the 

potential for that was of radiological concern to the 

health and safety staff. 

8.0 DOCUMENTED INCIDENTS INVOLVING URANIUM PRIOR TO 1963

SC&A identified two incident reports which specifically involved exposure to uranium solutions at CPP 

during . These two incidents are described in the following sections with the full incident reports 

reproduced in Appendices B and C. 

8.1 IN 

In , there was a documented contamination incident in which was 

detected as a vapor that was emanating from the sump in ( ). This incident is also 

briefly described in Section 5.4.2 of NIOSH 2015b. SC&A examined the available incident reports for 

further information on the circumstances and radiological response. NIOSH 2015a describes the area 

where the incident occurred ( ) as follows:

 was the last stop for 

. For a time, the was stored and packaged for shipment in at a 

facility set up within . 

An air sample taken in using an alpha proportional counter indicated an air concentration of 

2×10-6 μCi/cc which was 10,000 times the MPC at the time. Three smears that were taken also showed 

positive alpha contamination on the floor near the sump, the stairs that lead to the bottom of the cell, and 

the in the product room near the exit from the cell. 

Nasal smears taken at the time of the incident showed no detectable contamination. However, 

samples collected the day after the incident for workers who had been present in the cell were 

positive for . The sample results are shown in Table 4. 

Table 4. Samples Collected 1 Day after Documented Contamination 

Incident
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The workers were resampled four days and again ten days after the incident, and all the samples 

were below the detection limit of 1×10-5 grams/liter. 

A memo documenting the incident can be found in Appendix B and states the following: 

The vapors from the sump were very heavy and did not seem to disperse into the air but 

settled to the floor immediately. Exposures to the activity concentration reported above in 

the vapor itself was not probable. In fact, the vapor was visible and was reported as soon 

as detected such that exposure to even low-level activity was improbable. [ ]

Using what the memo referred to as “gross over-estimates,” the maximum possible body burden was 

calculated to be approximately one-half of the maximum permissible amount. However, the memo also 

notes that expected dose to the limiting organ (bone) would only be a few millirem. The memo 

concludes: 

The consequences of this particular incident are not especially alarming except that the 

situation could very well have been more serious. Perhaps operational procedures with 

respect to this area of work should be reviewed to avoid future like incidents, since 

hazards from ingested and/or inhaled uranium are present. [ ]

A follow-up report to the incident indicates that the following changes were made as a result of the

airborne contamination ( ): 

1. A rotameter was instilled on to measure the amount of air to the 

spargers and prevent excessive sparging. 

2. The flow of air was increased in the . 

3. The procedure for any further mixing experiments was changed to pull only one sample at a 

time while the are in operation. 

Observation 4: A documented incident involving airborne activity in the 

indicates that HP was notified immediately and appropriate actions were taken, including air sampling, 

area swipe contamination surveys, and worker nasal swipes. Multiple samples were collected 

in the days immediately following the incident. Analysis of the available related to the incident 

indicates that exposures were likely minimal. This incident was also discussed in NIOSH 2015b. 

8.2 IN ) 

On , there was a maintenance activity on a where a 

 had been identified. The maintenance activity involved cutting into the 

 and replacing approximately . Due to an 

 that had been unexpectedly , approximately 

( ). This incident is documented in two follow-up 

reports: (shown in Appendix C). The spill was described as follows: 

Most of [

. outer 
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 were gathered up in a and the was cleaned up and all 

were taken to the for further recovery. [ ]

The incident indicates that a Safe Work Permit was issued and also an “HP Permit,” which is assumed to 

be the equivalent of an RWP. In addition, indicates a member of the was present 

in at least one of the two locations of the . Subsequent to the incident, the following 

recommendations were stated in : 

1. Don’t start a critical job without having the written work request in the hands of the 

maintenance foreman. 

2. All work requests contain written precautions. (If to be checked back by operations, 

approvals by safety, safeguards, etc. when special hazards exist) 

3. If there are critical hazards, maintenance should be advised how to do the job safely. 

4. Add details of HP and safety procedures on the HP and safety permits. 

5. Adhere strictly to the tag out procedure. 

Although neither nor specify what follow-up internal monitoring was 

requested, SC&A observed that one of the involved in the incident (

) submitted a on the day of the (see Figure 22). It is 

unknown, at this time, if all workers involved in the were likewise monitored internally for 

. 

Figure 22. Special Follow-Up for Involved in 

Observation 5: A documented incident in describes a maintenance activity 

that resulted in a in the . The activity involved an ” and 

also had an HP presence in at least maintenance locations. Follow-up reports indicate HP 

and safety permits required more detail to avoid future incidents. Although not specified in the incident 
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report, SC&A located at least one sample that was taken for a involved in the 

. 

9.0 REFERENCES

ABRWH 2015. Transcript of the 104th Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation Worker Health, 

Centers for Disease Control – National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health – Advisory Board 

on Radiation Worker Health. Richland, WA. March 26, 2015. 

ABRWH 2016. Transcript of the Idaho National Laboratory Work Group, Centers for Disease Control – 

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March 1, 2016. 

CPP HP Various Dates-a. Health Physics Daily Shift Reports from CPP (Examples of Alpha Monitoring 

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CPP HP Various Dates-b. Air Sampling at CPP Including Alpha Sampling 1953–1955, Chemical 

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CPP HP Various Dates-c. Example Floorplans, Routine and Contamination Surveys Rooms 100, 102, 

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Support, Cincinnati, OH. March 12, 2015. 
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NIOSH 2010. Idaho National Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory – West – Occupational 

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ID 142398] 

ORAUT 2014b. Documented Communication SEC-00219 with on INL December 11, 2014, 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team. December 11, 2014. [SRDB Ref. ID 141471] 

ORAUT 2015. Documented Communication SEC-00224 with about Employment with INL 

(SEC-00219) and ANL-W (SEC-00224) November 4, 2015, Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team. 

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ORAUT 2016a. Documented Communication SEC-00219 with on Idaho National 

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ID 159725] 

ORAUT 2016b. Documented Communication SEC-00219 with on Idaho 

National Laboratory January 25, 2016, Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team. January 25, 2016. 

[SRDB Ref. ID 159728] 

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ID 166587] 

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Claimants (1949 – 1970), SCA-SEC-2015-0074-E2, Revision 0, SC&A, Inc., Vienna, VA. October 

2015. 
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SC&A 2017. SC&A’s Evaluation of Cs-137/Sr-90, Fission and Activation Product, and Actinide Values 

Using INL Monthly and Annual Waste Reports in Relationship to Assigning Intakes, SCA-TR-2017-

SEC002, Revision 0, SC&A, Inc., Arlington, VA. January 20, 2017. 
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APPENDIX A: [REDACTED IN FULL] 

[Appendix A is withheld in its entirety to prevent the disclosure of Privacy Act protected information.]
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APPENDIX B: [REDACTED IN FULL] 

[Appendix B is withheld in its entirety to prevent the disclosure of Privacy Act protected 

information.] 
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APPENDIX C: [REDACTED IN FULL]

[Appendix C is withheld in its entirety to prevent the disclosure of Privacy Act protected 

information.]