1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAWN PETTY, Plaintiff,

v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, Defendant. Civil Action No. 21-3161 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (December 17, 2021) Following allegations of se xual misconduct, Plaintiff Sh awn Petty resigned from his position as a National Vice President of Defe ndant American Federation of Government Employees (“Defendant” or “AFGE”). In the even ing of December 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a [9] Motion for a Temporary Restraining (“TRO Motion” ), seeking—among other relief—to enjoin an internal trial committee hearing that was then scheduled for 11:00 a.m. on December 9, 2021. Plaintiff argued that he had not received timely notice of the trial committee proceeding or the charges against him. He also argued that his resignation as a National Vice President was “ineffective,” that he continues to hold that positio n, and, therefore, that AFGE must proceed with any disciplinary actions pursuant to Article XIII of its National Constitution—instead of the procedures provided by Articles IX and XXIII, whic h guide disciplinary procedures for members. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order (1) reinstating him as National Vice President; (2) requiring AFGE to send a letter informing all AF GE members and officers that he did not resign2 from his national position; and (3) cancelling the trial committee hearing, wh ich is now scheduled to take place no earlier than December 20, 2021. 1 Upon review of the pleadings, 2 the relevant legal authority, and the record as it stands at this early juncture, the Court conc ludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to the drastic relief of a temporary restraining order preventing the trial committee hearing from proceeding on December 20, 2021 or later, reinstating Plaintiff as a national officer, and requiring that AFGE inform its members that Plaintiff did not resign. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES the remainder of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
I. BACKGROUND Defendant American Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”) is a national labor union, which maintains its principal office in Was hington, D.C. and is comprised of 1,067 local affiliates. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, ECF No. 1. AFGE is governed by a National Executive Council (the

1 Plaintiff’s TRO Motion also sought to enjoin a special election scheduled for December 11, 2021 to fill the position from which Plaintiff had resigned. The Court previously addressed that portion of the motion and denied Plaintiff’s request for a TRO to prevent that election from proceeding. See Order, ECF No. 28; Mem. Op., ECF No. 29. This Memorandum Opinion addr esses the remaining relief requested by Plaintiff in his TRO Motion. See Order, ECF No. 20. 2 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following:

x Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraini ng Order (“Pl.’s TRO Mot.”), ECF No. 9;

x Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“Pl.’s TRO Mem.”), ECF No. 12;

x Defendant AFGE’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 21;

x Plaintiff’s Reply on the Issue of Whether Plaint iff Timely Rescinded his Resignation or Whether Kelley Had Authority to Accept Resignation Wit hout Approval of the NEC (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 22;

x Defendant AFGE’s [Second] Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“Def.’s (2d) Opp’n”), ECF No. 32;

x Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant AFGE’s Oppositi on to Plaintiff’s Motion for a TRO (“Pl.’s (2d) Reply”), ECF No. 34. In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).3 “Council”), comprised of the National President, the National-Secretary Treasurer, the National Vice President for Women and Fair Practice, and twelve National Vice Presidents. Plaintiff Shawn Petty is a member of AFGE’s Local 916, which repr esents employees of the U.S. Department of Defense at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff was elected to serve as “National Vice President for District 9” on October 3, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5, 8. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to resign from his position as a National Vice President following allegations that he had sexually harassed and/or assaulted an AFGE member at a union-hosted event in October 2021. See id. ¶¶ 114–36. Plaintiff now claims that his resignation was not “effective” because it wa s not “approved” by the Council before he communicated to AFGE’s National President th at he wanted to rescind his resignation. Id. ¶¶ 137–53, 159–60. Based on that claim, Plaintiff f iled a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) on December 8, 2021, seeking, among ot her relief, to enjoin a December 9, 2021 trial committee hearing and a December 11, 2021 special election to fill the position from which he resigned. See Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 1. With both parties’ agreement, the trial committee hearing was postponed until at least December 20, 2021. See Order, ECF No. 20. The Court has already denied Plaintiff’s request to enjoin the special election. See Order, ECF No. 28. To provide context for Plaintiff’s last-minute re quest to enjoin these events, the Court shall present the facts—as they are alleged in the Complaint or otherwise presented on the current record—underlying Plaintiff’s resignation and his efforts to rescind his resignation. The Court shall then discuss Plaintiff’s present request for immediate injunctive relief, as it pertains to the remaining portions of Plaintiff’s TRO Motion that were not addressed by the Court in its December 10, 2021 Order and Memorandum Opinion, ECF Nos. 28, 29.4 A. Factual Background Plaintiff attended a three-day training session s ponsored by AFGE at a Days Inn in Altus, Oklahoma from October 19–22, 2021. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 24. He claims that, during that event, he had a “consensual physical contact” with an “Unnamed Female,” who is also an AFGE member. Id. ¶ 40. The “contact” purportedly occurred in the presence of witnesses and was captured by the hotel’s surveillance cameras. Id. ¶¶ 106, 108. Plaintiff claims that this “Unnamed Female” initiated the “contact” by flirti ng with him and massaging his s houlders, and that she did not complain to other AFGE local and national officers present at the conference that the contact was “unwelcomed.” Id. ¶¶ 66, 89. Plaintiff alleges that on October 25, 2021, he received a telephone call from AFGE’s National President, Everett Kelley. Id. ¶ 113. Mr. Kelley told him th at the Unnamed Female had filed charges against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 114. Mr. Kelley then told Plaintiff that he had viewed the surveillance video from the Days I nn and that “it doesn’t look good.” Id. ¶ 117. Mr. Kelley then allegedly told Plaintiff that it would be “bes t” for Plaintiff’s family and AFGE’s National Executive Council for Plaintiff to resign from his position as a National Vice President. Id. ¶ 130. Plaintiff responded that he wanted to go on “s tress leave” for a few weeks before making any decision, but Mr. Kelley refused this proposal. Id. ¶¶ 131–32. Mr. Kelley then allegedly informed Plaintiff that if he did not immediately submit a letter of resignation, Mr . Kelley would “call an emergency meeting with the [National Executive Council] tomorrow, and with everything going on, it would be political suicide for the [Council] not to remove you from your position. It would be best if you made it easy for yourse lf and the [Council] by resigning.” Id. ¶ 133. Plaintiff told Mr. Kelley that he woul d consider resigning. Id. ¶ 134. Plaintiff alleges that, approximately 90 minutes after this phone call, Mr. Kelley called him again and “pressured him to resign.” Id. ¶ 136. At 9:45 p.m. on October 25, 2021, Plaintiff sent5 an email to Mr. Kelley, stating, “Due to persona l reasons, I am resigning as 9th District National Vice president effective today, October 25, 2021.” Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 4, 10/25/21 9:45 PM Email from S. Petty to E. Kelley, EC F No. 21-4. Less than one hour late r, Mr. Kelley responded, “I accept your resignation effective immediately. You are no longer authorized to act on behalf of AFGE, and you have relinquished all right s and privileges of your office. ” Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 5, 10/25/21 10:22 PM Email from E. Kelley to S. Petty, ECF No. 21-5. The same email noted that AFGE “reserves it rights to investigate the conduct a lleged against you and take any and all action it deems appropriate.” Id. After Mr. Kelley accepted Plaintiff’s resigna tion, he immediately notified the Council. See Def.’s Opp’n at 10; Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 2, 10/25/21 Mem. re: Vacancy in District 9 National Vice President Position, ECF No. 21-2; Def.’s O pp’n Ex. 7, 10/25/2110:45 PM Email from E. Kelley to “NEC Only,” ECF No. 21-7. Mr. Kelley also informed “District 9 Leaders” on October 26, 2021 that Plaintiff had resigned from his position a nd that Mr. Kelley had accepted his resignation. Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 12, 10/26/21 12:22 PM Email from E. Kelley, ECF No. 21-12. He noted that a special election would be held to fill the vacancy. Id. On October 28, 2021, Plaintiff changed his mind about resigning. Compl. ¶ 146. He sent a letter by email to Mr. Kelley, indicating that he wanted to resc ind his resignation. Id. ¶ 147. In a subsequent telephone conversation, Mr. Kelley told Plaintiff that he did not know whether or not Plaintiff could withdraw his re signation, but that he would speak with AFGE’s General Counsel about the matter. Id. ¶¶ 150, 152. On October 29, 2021, Mr. Kelley res ponded to Plaintiff by letter, indicating that Plaintiff’s resignation was “final and binding,” that his “attempted recission [ sic ] is not effective,” and that “given the nature of the alleged misconduct, your atte mpted recission [ sic ] would not be accepted,6 regardless.” Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 11, 10/29/21 Letter from E. Kelley to S. Petty, ECF No. 21-11. Mr. Kelley’s letter recounts that Plai ntiff had resigned from his position “first verbally and then in writing, on Monday October 25, 2021,” and that Mr . Kelley had “responded in writing on that same date accepting your resign ation on behalf of AFGE.” Id. It further notes that Plaintiff’s “alleged conduct, specifically an alleged sexual assault/s exual harassment, in a public area of a hotel during an AFGE event with witnesses present and a security camera recording the entire scene, was utterly egregious” and that he had “referred the matter to the Legal Rights Committee for investigation and recommendations concerning wh at further actions, if any, AFGE should take against [Plaintiff].” Id. On November 1, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Mr. Kelle y, all members of the National Executive Council, and AFGE’s General C ounsel, stating Plaintiff’s position that Mr. Kelley had no legal aut hority to accept his resignation because only the Council had authority to do so. Compl. ¶ 159. The same letter stated Pl aintiff’s position that Mr. Kelley did not have authority to reject Plaintiff’s attempt to resc ind his resignation because the Council had not yet voted to accept his resignation. Id. ¶ 160. Plaintiff’s counsel subs equently notified Defendant’s counsel, on November 11, 2021, that Plaintiff intende d to seek a temporary restraining order, enjoining the special election. See Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 9, 11/11/21 8:37 PM Email from K. Morten to D. Borer, R. Sanghvi, ECF No. 21-9. On November 15, 2021, AFGE’s counsel sent to Plaintiff’s counsel a letter from Mr. Kelley addressed to Plaintiff, indicating that, pursuan t to Articles IX and XXIII of the AFGE National Constitution, he was “preferring charges” agai nst Plaintiff based on the allegations of “inappropriate sexual conduc t” during the training event in Oklahoma. See Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 3, 11/15/21 Letter from E. Kelley to S. Petty c/o K. Morton at 1, ECF No. 21-3. The same letter7 indicates that, under Article IX, Section 5(e), Mr. Ke lley would “appoint[ ] a trial committee to adjudicate the charges against you.” Id. In his TRO Motion, Plainti ff indicates that he was not “serve[d]” with these charges until December 6, 2021, when he received them by certified mail. Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 14. Plaintiff also claims that he was only notified on December 6, 2021 that the trial committee was scheduled to take place on December 9, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. Id. On November 23, 2021, Plaintiff announced his candidacy for the National Vice President for District 9 special election. Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 10, 11/23/21 Email from S. Petty to E. Bunn (AFGE), ECF No. 21-10. After the Court denied Pl aintiff’s TRO Motion to the extent it sought to enjoin the special election, the election proceeded as scheduled on December 11, 2021; Plaintiff was not elected to the National Vice President for District 9 position. See Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 9.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order In the evening of December 8, 2021, Plaintiff f iled a [9] Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and later, at 11:02 p.m., filed a [12] Memorandum of Po ints and Authorities in support thereof. On December 9, 2021, at 9:15 a.m., the C ourt held the first of tw o teleconferences with the parties. During this first teleconference, the Court discussed with the parties the more imminent event Plaintiff sought to enjoin—the tr ial committee hearing then-scheduled to begin less than two hours later, at 11:00 a.m. The Cour t discussed with the parties what notice Plaintiff had received of the charges against him and of the trial committee hearing date. Plaintiff indicated that AFGE’s National Constitution requires that he receive 14-days’ notice of the charges against him and of the trial committee hear ing date, but that he did not receive notice of either until December 6, 2021. AFGE’s counsel indicated that AFGE had provided Plaintiff notice of the charges by letter to his counsel on November 15, 2021 and that it had notified Plaintiff of the December 9, 2021 hearing date as of November 24, 2021. Plaintiff’s counsel responded that, at the time Mr. Kelley preferred char ges against Plaintiff on November 15, 2021, the scope of her8 representation of Plaintiff did not encompass th e internal disciplinary proceedings initiated by AFGE, which she claims was conveyed to AFGE’s counsel when she informed AFGE that she would not accept “service” of the charges on Plaintiff’s behalf. The Court directed the parties to provide to the Court their communications showing when Plaintiff received notice of the charges and the hearing date. Upon review of these communications, the C ourt concluded that whether Plaintiff’s counsel had clearly communicated the scope of her representa tion and whether Plaintiff had received sufficient notice of the charges and hearing date was not clear-cut. Accordingly, after its initial review of these communications, the Court he ld a second teleconference with the parties, at 12:30 p.m. on December 9, 2021 to discuss how to proceed with addressing Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. See Minute Order (Dec. 9, 2021). During the second teleconference, the parties agreed that the trial committee hearing would be postponed until at least December 20, 2021—14 days af ter Plaintiff indicates he received formal “service” of the charges against him and notice of the trial committee hearing date. The parties also agreed that they would first proceed with briefing Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to his request for a TRO enjoining the Decem ber 11, 2021 special election. See Order, ECF No. 20. The Court denied that portion of the TRO Motion on December 10, 2021. See Order, ECF No. 28; Mem. Op., ECF No. 29. 3
The remainder of Plaintiff’s TRO Motion is now before the Court. Plaintiff seeks an order “reinstating” him as the National Vice President for District 9; directing AFGE to “send a letter” to “all AFGE members, officers, and staff informing them that that [Plaintiff] did not resign due

3 On December 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a [30] Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s TRO Motion to the extent it sought to enjo in the special election. The Court denied the motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2021. See Order, ECF No. 31.9 to allegations of misconduct, but ra ther that he rescinded his resigna tion and denies that he engaged in misconduct”; and “[c]an celing” the “trial committee hearing” and “restraining” Mr. Kelley from “appointing a trial committee” to adjudicate the “Artic le XXIII charges.” Pl.’s TRO. Mem. at 34.
II. LEGAL STANDARD “Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are ‘extraordinary remed[ies] that should be granted only when the party seeki ng the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” Lofton v. District of Columbia , 7 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). An application for a TRO is analyzed using the same factors applicable to a request for preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g. , Gordon v. Holder , 632 F.3d 722, 723–24 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying preliminary injunction standard to district court decision denying motion for TRO and preliminary injunction); Sibley v. Obama , 810 F. Supp. 2d 309, 310 (D.D.C. 2011 ) (articulating TRO elements based on preliminary injunction case law). Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraord inary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius , 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that shoul d not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” (int ernal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief “must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an inj unction is in the public interest.” Aamer v. Obama , 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (interna l citation and quotation marks omitted). When seeking such relief, “the movant has the burde n to show that all four factors, taken together,10 weigh in favor of the injunction.” Abdullah v. Obama , 753 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal citation and quotation mark s omitted). “The four factors have typically been evaluated on a ‘sliding scale.’” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 571 F.3d 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under this sliding-scale framework, “[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” Id. at 1291–92. It is unclear whether the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s sliding-scale approach to assessing the four preliminary injunction factors survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter

. See Save Jobs USA v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 105 F. Supp. 3d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2015). Several judges on the D.C. Circuit have “read Winter at least to suggest if not to hold ‘that a likelihood of succe ss is an independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction.’” Sherley , 644 F.3d at 393 (quoting Davis , 571 F.3d at 1296 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)). However, the D. C. Circuit has yet to hold definitively that Winter has displaced the sliding-scale analysis. See id. ; see also Save Jobs USA , 105 F. Supp. 3d at 112. In light of this ambiguity, the Court shall consider each of these factors and shall only evaluate the proper weight to accord the likelihood of success if the Court finds that its relative weight would affect the outcome.
III. DISCUSSION A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits In order to receive a TRO, the moving “p arty must show, among other things, ‘a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.’” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (empha sis added) (quoting Mills v. District of Columbia , 571 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “The merits on which plain tiff must show a likelihood of success encompass not only substantive theories but also establishment of jurisdiction.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t11 of Com. , 928 F.3d 95, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (internal quota tions and citations omitted). Therefore, “[t]o establish likelihood of succe ss on the merits, Plaintiffs must first establish that their claims are justiciable.” Rai v. Biden , No. 21-CV-863-TSC, 2021 WL 4439074, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2021) (citing Food & Water Watch, Inc. , 808 F.3d at 913). A plaintiff who fails to show a substantial likelihood of jurisdicti on is “not entitled to any relie f, let alone the extraordinary remedy” of preliminary injunctive relief. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. WMATA , 514 F. Supp. 3d 197, 212 (D.D.C. 2020), aff’d No. 21-7008, 2021 WL 4928730 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 2021). As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to car ry his burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his remaining requests for re lief, and he ha s similarly failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, this first factor weighs decidedly against granting the drastic relief Plaintiff seeks here.
1. Plaintiff’s Claims Regarding Lack of Notice Are Moot Due to the Postponement of the Tr ial Committee Hearing. In his TRO Motion, Plaintiff sought to enjoin the trial committee hearing from proceeding on December 9, 2021 based, in large part, on his claim that he had not received 14 days’ notice of the hearing date and had not been “served” with the charges at issue until December 6, 2021. See Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 14, 23, 32, 34. The AFGE C onstitution requires that “the presiding officer shall notify the accused and those who preferred th e charges by registered or certified mail of the time and place of trial, and such tr ial shall be held prom ptly but shall not be held less than two weeks after the mailing of the notice[.]” AFGE Constitution Art. XXIII § 4. AFGE agreed to postpone the trial committee hearing until at least December 20, 2021— 14 days after Plaintiff indicates that he was “served” with the charges and notice of the hearing date. See supra Section I(B); Order, ECF No. 20. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a TRO to enjoin the trial committee hearing based on lack of adequate notice is no longer a live issue.12 2. Plaintiff Has Failed to Demonstrate a Subs tantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits of His Remaining Claims for Relief. In addition to challenging the timing of the tr ial committee hearing, Plaintiff also seeks an order “cancelling” the trial committee hearing alt ogether, based on his claim that AFGE must follow the procedures provided in Article XIII of the AFGE Constitution, which applies to charges against national officers. See Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 20–21 (“[M r.] Kelley should have filed disciplinary charges against Plaintiff under Article XIII which governs disciplinary charges filed against national officers. Inst ead, Kelley filed Article IX and Article XXIII charges[.]”). Mr. Kelley appointed the trial committee pursuant to Articles IX and XXIII, which provide the procedures for addressing misconduct of members. See Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 3, 11/15/21 Letter from E. Kelley to S. Petty c/o K. Morton at 1, ECF No. 21-3; Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 19. But Plaintiff’s argument that AFGE has relie d on the incorrect constitutional provision hinges on his argument that he is likely to suc ceed in demonstrating that his resignation was “ineffective” and therefore that he remains a national officer who is entitled to the disciplinary procedures provided in Article XIII. See Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 4. As th e Court previously concluded, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he likely to succeed on the merits of such a claim. See Mem. Op. at 10–14, ECF No. 29. As the Court previously explained, Plaintiff has not identified any portion of the AFGE Constitution guaranteeing him any “right” to have a resignation “approved” by the Council before it is deemed effective. Id. at 11. To the contrary, Plaintiff concedes that AFGE’s Constitution is “silent” as to this issue. Id. (citing Pl.’s Reply at 8). Instead, Plaintiff argues that Roberts Rules of Order apply in this situation, and thos e rules of procedure direct that the power to accept resignations lies solely with the Council, see Pl.’s Reply at 8; Compl. ¶¶ 142, 143 (“In order for NVP Petty’s resignation to have become effective, the members of the NEC would have had to have met and accepted it.”). The Court rej ected this argument, concluding that13 Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that Robert’s Rules apply in this situation, and, even if they did , they suggest that the Council does not , in fact, have the power to accept the resignation of an NVP, let alone the sole and exclusive power to accept such resignations. 4 See Mem. Op. at 12–13. The Court also previously concluded that, “[b]ecau se neither the text of the Constitution nor Robert’s Rules of Order specify that the power to accept resignati ons lies exclusively with the Council,” Plaintiff has “not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits on his claim that his resignation was ‘ineffective.’” Id. at 14. Despite the Court’s earlier conc lusion, Plaintiff’s most recent Reply seeks to re-litigate the issues of who has the authority to “accept” his resignation and whether or not Plaintiff still holds the National Vice President position. 5 See Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 2–7. The Court previously concluded that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a substantial likely of success on the merits of his claim that his resigna tion was “ineffective,” and so he has also failed to demonstrate a substantial like lihood of success on the merits of hi s claim that he is entitled to the procedures applicable to “national officers” in Article XIII. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to a TRO to enjoin the trial committee proceeding brought under Articles IX and XXIII, which shall address the future status of his membership in AFGE. See Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 19– 20. Plaintiff’s failure to demons trate a substantial likelihood of su ccess on the merits of his claim

4 Plaintiff now argues that Roberts Rules “prevail when not inconsistent with the National Constitution and NEC Policy,” Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 7, but does not offer any analysis as to how that alters the Court’s earlier reasoning. Nor does it address the Court’s conclusion that even if Roberts Rules applied , they would not direct the outcome Plaintiff seeks here. See Mem. Op. at 13.
5 In his efforts to persuade the Court to alter its previous analysis, Plaintiff analogizes his situation, guided by the AFGE’s National Constitution, to what would happen under the United States Constitutions if a member of the United States House of Representatives resigned. See Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 3–6; id. at 6 (“If the full House of Representatives cannot accept the resignation of a House member, certainly, the Speaker cannot do so. Likewise, if the full NEC cannot accept a re signation of a National Vice President, then NP Kelley certainly cannot.”). It is unclear to the Court how this comparison applies; the two constitutions are, of course, entirely different.14 that his resignation was “ineff ective” also undermines the othe r facets of the TRO he seeks— requiring AFGE to send a “letter” to AFGE member s indicating that he did not resign and ordering that Plaintiff be reinstated to the National Vice President position. See TRO Mem. at 34. Finally, in his Reply, Plaintiff argues that the Court should “enjoin Defendant from removing Plaintiff . . . as a member based solely on hearsay allegations an d without first affording Plaintiff an opportunity to defend himself[.]” Def.’s (2d) Reply at 11. This argument, in Plaintiff’s own words, puts the “cart before the horse,” as the trial committee hearing has not yet occurred, and it is unknown what the outcome of that proceeding will be. Id. at 9. Moreover, as AFGE notes, any decision by an internal trial committee regarding his AFGE membership status may be appealed to the [Council].” Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 5. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims that he is entitled to a TRO to enjoin the trial committee and to require AFGE to take other actions based on his claim that he is still the National Vice President.
3. Plaintiff Has Failed to Demonstrate A Likelihood of Success that the Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider Claims Regarding the Trial Committee Hearing. In light of the Court’s earlier conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on hi s claim that he did not “resign” from the National Vice President position, the Court also finds that he has failed to demonstr ate that the Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the claims pertaini ng to AFGE’s internal trial committee proceeding.
See Obama v. Klayman , 800 F.3d 559, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘merits’ on which a plaintiff must show a likelihood of success encompass not onl y substantive theories but also establishment of jurisdiction.”). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to its internal disciplinary process are preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction15 to consider them. See Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 20–23. The CSRA “establishes a comprehensive scheme to deal with labor relations[.]” AFGE v. U.S. Sec’y of Air Force , 716 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dep’t of Def. v. FLRA , 685 F.2d 641, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). This “comprehensive scheme” conveys Congress’s intent that “individuals bringing membership and election claims of the type governed by the CSRA must seek redress through its administrative pathway, not through the district court.” Hudson v. AFGE , Civil Action No. 19-2738, 2020 WL 3035039, at *5 (D.D.C. June 5, 2020); see also Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury , 567 U.S. 1, 11 (2012) (“[E]xtra statutory review is not availabl e to those employees to whom the CSRA grants administrative and judicial review.”). At least one other district court in this jurisdiction has concluded that the CSRA preempts claims against AFGE by a former-federal-employee member brought pursuant to the LMRDA. See Hudson , 2020 WL 3035030, at *5. Plaintiff responds only with the conclusory assertion that he re mains the National Vice President for District 9 and therefore “his claims . . . are not preempted by the CSRA.” Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 7. This assertion rests on his Plaintiff’s reasoning that, as a national officer of AFGE, he is a “private sector em ployee” and therefore the CSRA does not apply to him. Pl.’s Reply at 3–4; Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 7. But, as the Court has previously concluded , Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a substan tial likelihood of success that he does remain in that position— and so, this argument fails. See Mem. Op. at 10–14. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not provide any supporting argumen t or legal authority for the proposition that the CSRA does not apply to him wh en, as Defendant notes, his membership in the AFGE appears to be predicated on his status as a former federal employee. See Def.’s (2d) Opp’n
at 22. In Hudson , for example, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s LMRDA claim against AFGE was preempted by the CSRA even though th e plaintiff had retired from federal service.16 Hudson , 2020 WL 3035039, at *6; see also Buesgens v. Coates , 435 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–4 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdicti on over federal-sector re tiree’s claim against his union because it was covered by CSRA and coul d be brought only befo re the appropriate administrative agency). At most, Plaintiff pointed out in an earlier pleading that the district court
in Hudson did not consider whether the CSRA preempts claims of former-federal employees currently holding private sector positions because that argument was not raised. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 18. But, again, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden that he is likely to succeed in showing that he continues to hold his National Vice President position. He relies exclusively on the conclusory proposition that this Court “has s ubject matter jurisdiction to hear his claims because they are not preempted by the CSRA.” Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 7. This assertion—devoid of any legal reasoning or supporting le gal authority—is insufficient for Plaintiff to carry his burden of demonstrating the likelihood that the C ourt has jurisdiction over his claims. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims . Although failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits alone is sufficient to defeat a motion for a TRO, the Court sha ll nonetheless briefly address the remaining TRO factors. See Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass’n, Inc. v. USDA , 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Apotex, Inc. v. FDA , 449 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
B. Irreparable Harm The Court next considers whether Plainti ff has demonstrated “i rreparable harm.” CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision , 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). To constitute “irrepa rable harm,” the injury alleged must be “both certain and great, act ual and not theoretical, beyond remediation, and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA ,17 787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quot ation marks and citation omitted). And “[p]laintiffs seeking preliminary relief [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (internal citations omitted). A “possibility of irreparable harm” is not enough. Id. “[P]roving ‘irreparable’ injury is a considerable burden, requiring proof th at the movant’s injury is ‘certain, great and actual—not theoretical—and imminent, creating a clear and present need for extraordinary equitable relief to prevent harm.’” Power Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 404 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaint iff has not adequately demonstrated a certainty of irreparable harm arising from allowing the trial committee hearing to proceed no sooner than December 20, 2021. This shortcoming weighs heavily against Plaintiff’s request for a TRO. In his TRO Motion, Plaintiff indi cates only that he would “su ffer irreparable harm” if the trial committee were to proceed on December 9, 2021—based on his claim that he received insufficient notice and time to prepare. Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 32. As indicated supra Section III(A)(1), is no longer at issue in light of AFGE’s agreement to postpone the trial committee proceeding until at least December 20, 2021—two w eeks after Plaintiff i ndicates he received notice of the charges and hearing date. See Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 14, 23; Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 25. As to Plaintiff’s claim that the tria l committee was improperly constituted under the incorrect provision of AFGE’s National Const itution, he provides no argument or analysis demonstrating that permitting the trial committee hearing to proceed would “irreparably harm” him. At most, Plaintiff argues that suspension or loss of his membership would cause “irreparable damage to Plaintiff’s reputation within the AFGE organization[.] ” Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 30–31. But these claims of “damage” are speculative, as they turn on the outcome of the trial committee18 proceeding. And, as Defendant notes, the AFGE National Constitution provides a process to appeal the outcome of a trial committee hearing to the Council in the event Plaintiff disagrees with the outcome. See Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 26. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate his burden of demonstrating that any alleged harm is actual, imminent, and irreparable. Mexichem Specialty , 787 F.3d at 555. Similarly, in his Reply, Plaintiff contends that the alleged “unlawful removal” from his position as National Vice President amounts to irreparable harm because “it will become permanent” the trial committee hearing proceeds on December 20. See Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 7. This argument too rests on speculation, and it ignores th e Court’s reasoning in its earlier Memorandum Opinion that loss of employment is typically not “irreparable harm” that can warrant a TRO. See Mem. Op. at 17–18.
C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest “The final two factors the Court must c onsider when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction [or a tempor ary restraining order] are the ba lance of harms and the public interest.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 41 (D.D.C. 2013). When “balanc[ing] the competing claims of injury,” the Court must “consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Plaintiff’s conclusory nods to the final tw o TRO factors—public inte rest and balance of equities—fail to establish that he is entitled to the drastic remedy of a TRO. In his TRO Motion, Plaintiff contends only that “any harm from enjoining the proposed December 9, 2021 trial committee. . . would be outweighed by the antidemocratic effects of AFGE unlawfully removing an officer elected by District 9 AFGE members an d depriving those members of the representative of their choice.” Pl.’s TRO Mem. at 33. As the Court has previously discussed, Plaintiff has not19 demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on his claim that he was “unlawfully removed as an officer.” See Mem. Op. at 10–14. In his Reply, Plainti ff claims only that “the balance of equities and public intere st demand that Plaintiff’s request be granted because AFGE and the public will be seriously harmed [if] AFGE is pe rmitted to proceed with the December [20, 2021] hearing under Article XXIII.” Pl.’s (2d) Reply at 7. This bare asser tion—devoid of any supporting analysis—is insufficient to demonstrate that these final TRO factors weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. AFGE, on the other hand, contends that granting Plaintiff’s requested TRO would undermine the results of its special election and preemptively interfere with its internal disciplinary procedures and available appeals process. See Def.’s (2d) Opp’n at 25–26. Weighing these competing interests, the Court concludes that that Plaintiff has not carried his burden to demonstrate the balan ce of equities tips in his favor, or that the public interest requires the Court to enjoin the trial committee hearing, require him to be reinstated, or to direct AFGE to inform its members that he did not resign.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a substa ntial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, a certainty of irrepara ble harm, or that the balance of hardships and the public interest weigh in his favor. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the remainder of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order that was not previously addressed by the Court in its [28] Order. An appropriate Order accompanie s this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated : December 17, 2021 /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge