NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

US Department of Health and Human Services

Centers for Disease Control

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

Los Alamos National Laboratory Work Group

Thursday, November 29, 2018

The Work Group convened via teleconference at 

10:30 a.m. Eastern Time, Josie Beach, Chair, 

presiding.
2 

Present: 

Josie Beach, Chair

Bradley P. Clawson, Member

James E. Lockey, Member

Genevieve S. Roessler, Member

Also Present: 

Ted Katz, Designated Federal Official

Nancy Adams, NIOSH Contractor

Terrie Barrie

Bob Barton, SC&A 

Catherine Christoffersen

Andrew Evaskovich

Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A

Jenny Naylor, HHS

Christopher Miles, ORAU Team

Jim Neton, DCAS

Lavon B. Rutherford, DCAS

Dan Stempfley, ORAU Team
3 

Contents

US Department of Health and Human Services 1

Centers for Disease Control 1

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health 1

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 1

Los Alamos National Laboratory Work Group 1

Thursday, November 29, 2018 1

Welcome and Roll Call 4

SC&A Status Brief 6

NIOSH Response to SC&A review of SEC-0019 

LANL Addendum White Paper (Sep. 2018) 9

SC&A Review of SEC-00109 LANL Addendum 

White Paper (November 2018) 27

Path forward/WG recommendations/December 

ABRWH meeting plans 65

Petitioner's comments, concerns and questions

70

Adjourn 73
4 

Proceedings

(10:30 a.m.) 

Welcome and Roll Call

Mr. Mr. Katz: So, welcome, everyone. This is the 

Advisory Board on Radiation Worker Health. It's the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory Work Group.

And some preliminaries and then I'll get to roll call. 

But, the SEC petition we're discussing today, material 

related to that.

For the background materials for the discussion today 

are posted on the NIOSH website. If you go to this 

program, schedule and meetings, today's date you'll 

find I think all the materials posted there.

There's a very brief summary, just sort of handout 

just to get things rolling from the dose reconstruction 

and SC&A that's not posted there, but you'll hear it 

orally. So, it's probably not necessary.

And we also ask everyone who's on the line because 

we probably have some people on the line from the 

public, too, to please keep your phones muted for this 

call, if you don't, the petitioner will have an 

opportunity to comment later, but otherwise, the 

public shouldn't be speaking at all and most of the 

public then can just mute your phones. Press *6 you 

don't have a mute button to mute your phone, *6. 

And to take your phone off of mute, you also just 

press *6 again.

And, please, no one put this call on hold at any point 

because that causes grief for everybody on the call. 

So, hang up and dial back in if you have to leave for 

a piece.

Okay, that probably takes care of preliminaries, so, 

for the roll call, for Board Members, the Chair is now 

chaired by -- this Board is -- this Work Group is 

chaired by Josie Beach and has, Brad Clawson, Jim 
5 

Lockey and Gen Roessler on it.

None of the Board Members have conflicts of interest, 

so that doesn't need to be addressed for them. But 

they're all in attendance. And, for the rest of the roll 

call, please, people, speak to conflicts of interests 

when we get to you. 

Mr. Katz: Okay, welcome to everybody. And, 

actually, you're not late, we're just getting started. 

So, we've gone through roll call and some 

preliminaries, Catherine, I've asked and maybe 

Terrie if you were late too, to listen background 

noise, please mute your phones.

Members of the public should have their phones 

muted the whole time except for the petitioner who 

can keep it muted until it comes time for the 

petitioner comments.

And, if you don't have a mute button, press *6 to 

mute your phone; *6 to come off of mute.

So, appreciate you doing that, thanks.

And with that, Josie, it's your meeting.

Chair Beach: Okay, thank you, Ted. And, welcome 

everybody.

We're going to go through -- SC&A is going to give 

us a brief status, I know Ted mentioned that.

And then, NIOSH will go through their White Paper 

with comments from NIOSH's -- or excuse me, 

SC&A's White Paper.

Questions from the Board Members, of course, are 

always welcome and then we'll have a time for 

petitioner's comments.

And then, we'll move to path forward and maybe 

some recommendations for the December 4th 

meeting.
6 

So, Joe, if you're ready, I'll go ahead and turn it over 

to you for the -- thank you for preparing that brief 

status update. It's been a while since we've met.

SC&A Status Brief

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, thank you. Good morning.

This is Joe Fitzgerald. For those who don't have my 

one-pager, I'm going to go through that. And, 

literally, it's sort of a background piece on the 

milestones. There actually has been a lot going on for 

the last year and a half.

So, I think it's useful to revisit what's been going on 

and to bring it to the present.

And, I want to begin with the last SEC Class that was 

defined. That was back in 2012 for all employees at 

Los Alamos, January 1st of 1976 to December 31st 

of 1995 recommended by the Board in October of 

that year made effective by HHS in January of 2013.

And, I just want to mention from the Board's letter, 

the key basis for that SEC. And it was the National 

Institute of Occupational Safety and Health review of 

all monitoring data as well as available process and 

source term information for this facility, meaning Los 

Alamos, found that NIOSH lacked the sufficient 

information necessary to complete individual dose 

reconstructions with sufficient accuracy for internal 

radiological exposures to fission and activation 

products and various other radionuclides of concern.

Which colloquially, we're calling sort of that entire 

group exotics. So, again, that's sort of a shorthand 

for the mixed activation, mixed fission products as 

well as several other exotics such as curium that were 

cited at that time.

So, that was the scope in 2012. Since then, on March 

-- in March of 2017, jumping quite a bit ahead, SC&A, 

we issued a memorandum report to the Work Group 
7 

at the Work Group's request in terms of open Site 

Profile issues.

And, the notion was to begin dispositioning those but 

with the April 2017 ER addendum, we -- the Work 

Group decided to put those aside for now and focus 

on the SEC.

So, again, in April 2017, shortly thereafter, NIOSH 

did, in fact, issue its Evaluation Report addendum for 

the SEC-00109 petition addressing the 1996 to 2005 

period. And that was the period for evaluation.

I think the original petition was '96 to 2011, but the 

period for evaluation was '96 to 2005.

And, SC&A was tasked in May, the next month, May 

of 2017, last year, with providing a review. And we 

did so in a July 27th review which reviewed the 

addendum and for which we made a presentation at 

a Work Group meeting in August of 2017, not '18, 

August of 2017 as well as a Board presentation along 

with NIOSH in August, about a week later, August of 

2018 in Santa Fe.

And, again, a lot of the issues were revolving around 

the question of presumption of compliance as well as 

the -- as well as reviews that spoke to program 

adequacy and completeness.

So, that was much of the discussion last year.

The week of March 2018, this year, based on some 

feedback we received from commenters at the Board 

meeting in Santa Fe, NIOSH led a group, including 

myself and Josie, as I recall, to conduct interviews 

with Los Alamos County workers as well as some of 

the other commenters.

And, that was done in Santa Fe back in March of 

2018. So, that was a follow up to the Board meeting 

previous. I think it was August of 2017.

Now, bringing you up to the current discussion, on 
8 

September of 2018, a few months ago, NIOSH issued 

its response to our review of last year from July and 

that's much of what we're going to go into in terms 

of the details.

And, we, in turn, a few weeks ago, a couple weeks 

ago, November 16, issued our response to NIOSH's 

response of -- in September. And that's much of what 

we're going to, again, address in today's meeting.

So, that's kind of -- that's a thumbnail of where 

things stand.

Any -- I guess, Josie, if you have any questions or if 

the Board -- the Work Group has any questions on 

that, I think that's pretty much the background.

Member Roessler: Joe, this is Gen, I don't have any 

questions, but thank you for putting that together. 

That's so helpful.

Member Lockey: Yes, Joe, Jim Lockey, I don't have 

any questions either.

Chair Beach: Brad, anything from you?

Member Clawson: No, I'm good.

Chair Beach: Okay, yes, it was very appreciative that 

you did that. It does help kind of bring it all back 

together. So, thank you.

No questions, then, NIOSH, if you're ready to go 

through your White Paper? I guess, LaVon, you're 

going to take that?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes, this is LaVon Rutherford and I 

am doing that. I am the SEC health physicist, lead 

health physicist. I'm lead health physicist for Los 

Alamos, too.

I got this slide up, can everybody see that now on 

Skype?
9 

Chair Beach: Yes, I actually don't have Skype up, so 

I'm just going to follow through with your paper.

Mr. Rutherford: That's fine. I'm just -- okay, so those 

of you have Skype, can everyone see that?

Chair Beach: Can I ask, LaVon, did you send that out? 

Your slides?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes.

Chair Beach: Can we send it to my work, my RL 

email, Ted? I don't think I got it there.

Okay, thanks, LaVon, you can go ahead.

Mr. Katz: LaVon, it's showing in Skype.

NIOSH Response to SC&A review of SEC-0019 LANL 

Addendum White Paper (Sep. 2018)

Mr. Rutherford: Okay, all right.

So, I'm going to give NIOSH's -- an overview of 

NIOSH's response to SC&A's review of the LANL 

addendum.

So, I'm not going to go through the background 

because Joe did a wonderful job of doing that and I -

- just a few minor bullets, he went through much 

more detail than I did.

So, a summary -- to summarize our conclusions in 

the addendum, if the site was compliant with the 

federal regulation 10 CFR 835, then workers should 

have been appropriately monitored and their records 

should have been retained.

So, if those two requirements were met, then dose 

reconstruction would be favorable. NIOSH would 

review the radiation protection program required for 

a site and determine when DOE approved the RVP.

We would also review DOE non-compliance tracking 

system and the Occurrence Reporting system looking 
10

for non-compliance as associated with 10 CFR 835.

SC&A, as Joe mentioned, issued their review and a 

general summary of their review is program 

compliance with 10 CFR 835, while necessary under 

DOE's Price Anderson regulatory framework, was not 

sufficient for demonstrating that actual radiation 

program practice was adequate.

Reliance on oversight findings based on noncompliances or incidents is likewise necessary, but 

not sufficient to validating that LANL or any DOE 

contractor had implemented 10 CFR 835 in a 

complete and substantial manner.

SC&A also noted that they indicated that inadequate 

consideration was given to exposures and missed 

doses from radionuclides other than those had been 

well documented, the exotics, especially mixed 

fission and activation products.

So, based on SC&A's review and the Advisory Board's 

reaction to that review, NIOSH decided to reevaluate our approach to the 10 CFR 835 series.

NIOSH concurs with SC&A's assessment that 

compliance with the 10 CFR 835 milestone may not 

be sufficient for demonstrating actual 

implementation of the requirements and reliance on 

oversight findings may not be sufficient for validating 

LANL had fully implemented 10 CFR 835.

So, we determined that we would increase the weight 

of the evidence by doing additional data analysis.

So, our White Paper responsive findings provides you 

additional analysis to support the weight of the 

evidence. The White Paper also includes an appendix, 

Appendix A, which is titled SEC-00109 LANL 

Petitioner Issues.

That table includes the petitioner issues and NIOSH's 

response. The forum the issue was brought up in, 
11

whether that be a Work Group meeting, Board 

meeting, whether it was with the initial petition itself 

and the supporting documents that were provided in 

that forum as well.

One of SC&A findings questions LANL's ability to 

monitor for mixed fission and activation products.

In our paper, we pointed out germanium detectors 

had been widely used at LANL for in vivo 

measurements since the mid-1970s.

LANL used germanium detectors extensively for 

whole body counts and LANSCE workers starting 

March 1979. This is a primary area where it depicts 

with mixed fission and activation products and where 

other exotics would be.

It's true that Phoswich detectors were used as late as 

1998 and used in conjunction with germanium 

detectors and not exclusively relied upon.

Over 7,000 mixed fission and activation products in 

vivo records primarily for LANSCE workers were best 

using germanium detectors.

So, use of -- so in the White Paper -- did my thing 

jump here? Hold on a minute.

Okay, it did, it skipped a slide, I apologize.

So, use of exotic radionuclides, especially mixed 

fission and activation products were rare, especially 

for the period under evaluation, the 1996 to 2005.

As pointed out in SC&A's memorandum, LANL noted 

that internal dosimetry programs were established on 

an as needed basis and monitoring is only required 

for radiological workers likely to receive 100 millirem 

annually from internal exposures.

I want to point out, this is going to come up a few 

times during my presentation. And this is an 10 CFR 

835 requirement. You are not required to monitor 
12

individuals -- personal monitoring for individuals 

where they are likely to receive, unless they are likely 

to receive exposures of 100 millirem CEDE.

So, when we went back to look at what additional 

weight of the evidence can we provide, we thought 

that if we had reasonable evidence that a good field 

monitoring program existed, that was in place to 

routinely monitor for contamination, radiation and 

airborne radioactivity that would identify radiological 

areas where workers were likely to exceed 100 

millirem CEDE, that would be good evidence that 

unmonitored workers did not likely exceed 100 

millirem CEDE.

So, if we're establishing areas, our thought is, if we're 

establishing areas for -- based on the airborne levels 

and that would possibly give a person a 100 millirem 

CEDE, if we define them well and we control those 

areas, then unmonitored workers would not receive 

it.

So, if this is true, if this program existed, then it 

would make no sense for the -- that it did not exist 

for mixed fission and activation products or other 

exotics.

Additionally, we thought that it would be a good idea 

to compare the primary radionuclide exposure which 

we have a lot of data, 200 millirem CEDE, just to see 

how much higher or where they still -- when you 

compare them to the other.

So, next slide?

So, we started with the field monitoring program. It 

appears from our review the health physics program 

had matured over time from the late 1980s when 

DOE Order 54.8011 came out in the early '90s when 

the DOE Rad Con Manual came out.

Each of these required routine monitors to identify 

and control radiological areas and those 
13

requirements ultimately became part of the federal 

regulation.

It identified over 60 procedures addressing 

radiological protection covering program 

administration, exposures, contamination control, 

monitoring, instrumentation, protective equipment, 

emergency response and ALARA, As Low As 

Reasonably Achievable.

Additionally, area specific procedures and 

instructions existed.

We also reviewed field monitoring data from the 

period under evaluation. We looked at the radiation 

work permits, so a monthly and quarterly 

contamination surveys, area specific contamination 

surveys, area specific monitoring data quarterly 

reviews, area sample analysis data, air sampling, 

monitoring technical evaluations, airborne 

radioactivity investigation reports.

We wanted to look at how work controls were 

established and felt from a field monitoring 

perspective, it would be good to look at the radiation 

work permits.

So, we've done multiple -- many data captures at 

LANL over, you know, the number of years. In that 

time, we found many boxes of LANL work permits.

We didn't capture all of the work permits, but we did 

capture quite a few of those that were representative 

sampling.

We also focused on the issue with mixed fission and 

activation products and other exotics, we focused 

applying RWPs that involved non-routine 

radionuclides. Although, we did capture a number 

that included the time we're in.

From our review, the RWPs we found that most 

require pre-job and/or post-job contamination 
14

surveys. Most of them specified respiratory 

protection. Most of them required RCT coverage 

including stop work or hold points for additional 

evaluation.

Most of the work areas included CAMs. Many required 

job specific air monitoring or breathing zone air 

monitoring and associated monitoring were included. 

Several required nasal smears.

The RWPs generally did not include bioassay 

requirements. The RWPs appeared to have been 

designed to minimize the likelihood of intakes via 

engineering control, PPE and respiratory protection.

The RWPs were also designed to detect material 

release via air monitoring and smear surveys. 

Elevated surface or airborne contamination would 

trigger an assessment of the need for bioassay.

So, you had this whole package, it's -- you're doing 

pre-job surveys, you're doing post-job surveys. 

You're doing surveys while their job is going on. 

You're looking to identify airborne areas which would 

-- which could raise to the level of requiring 

bioassays. You're doing those things.

So, in the White Paper, we provide a couple of 

examples of occurrence reports where field indicators 

included CAM alarms, personal contamination 

surveys and nasal smears led to bioassays.

Now, I want to talk about our comparison of 

monitored worker dose to the 100 millirem CEDE.

I think it's important to look at the dose of monitored 

individuals to see how the site was controlling the 

dose to those individuals.

These were the individuals the site felt were most 

likely to be exposed and they determined that their 

field monitoring program -- and they determined that 

from their field monitoring program and verified it 
15

through bioassay when necessary.

So, as pointed out earlier, LANL noted that its internal 

dosimetry monitoring programs are established on 

an as needed basis. Monitoring is only required for 

radiological workers likely to receive 100 millirem 

annual for the internal exposures.

They further noted LANL has an in vivo monitoring 

program established for fission and activation 

products and has historically used in vivo monitoring 

for these nuclides -- radionuclides.

A spectral analysis of each count was performed by 

an in vivo staff during each review, all peaks were 

identified and accounted for.

NIOSH received the LANL Bioassay Repository 

Database. The database includes 106,950 in vivo 

records.

Now, as expected, most of them are associated with 

plutonium-239 and americium-241, 82 percent. U234 and thorium-234 made up 10 percent. But, the 

bulk of the remaining records are the 7,000-plus 

records are primarily comprised of fission and 

activation product radionuclide for the LANSCE 

employees that were required via germanium 

protectors.

Primary radionuclides, tritium, plutonium and 

uranium, there were over 450,000 LANL urinalysis 

dating from 1945 to 2008.

As previously mentioned, we had over 100,000 in 

vivo records. The data are presented and evaluated 

in the internal dosimetry coworker data for LANL.

We pulled tables -- the tables in our White Paper, 5-

1 through 5.- are pulled from OTIB-0062 which is 

that coworker data. And they show for the primary 

radionuclides, dose per workers generally goes down 

over time. And dose for monitored workers are less 
16

than 100 millirem CEDE with one exception.

So, basically, what they've shown is that, over time, 

LANL has taken actions to reduce the exposure to the 

monitored workforce. So, that in itself would make 

no sense if they wouldn't also be reducing the 

exposure to the unmonitored workforce.

And, doses for the monitored workforce is already 

less than, for the most part, less than 100 millirem 

CEDE required for monitoring.

We also included in the White Paper, as I mentioned, 

an Appendix A, a table. A number of issues have been 

identified by the petitioner over the course of several 

years.

Mr. Evaskovich, who's on the line now, has been very 

active in this process. In the initial petition, he 

provided a 102-page written narrative with a CD with 

a number of documents.

He's provided other documents over the years. And 

he's, as I mentioned, been very active in Advisory 

Board meetings, Work Group meetings and others.

So, Appendix A identifies the petitioner issues and 

provides NIOSH's response to those issues.

As mentioned earlier, it also indicates the forum that 

the issue was identified in, whether that be a Work 

Group meeting, Board meeting or in the initial 

petition.

So, in conclusion, the field monitoring and 

contamination control programs at LANL were well 

established and formalized by January 1, 1996 to 

ensure areas where workers were likely to exceed 

100 millirem CEDE were well identified and 

controlled.

Based on review of existing bioassay results, workers 

monitored for the primary radionuclides were unlikely 

to have received intakes exceeding 100 millirem
17

CEDE.

So, based on our evaluation of the routine monitoring 

program and the comparison of the monitored worker 

dose to the 100 millirem CEDE, NIOSH found -- has 

found no evidence to suggest that unmonitored 

workers were likely to have received 100 millirem 

intakes for the common radionuclides or the exotics.

And, that's the end of my presentation.

Chair Beach: All right. Thanks, LaVon. A couple 

things jumped out at me when I was reading your 

White Paper.

Mr. Rutherford: Okay.

Chair Beach: Back in August 23rd to be exact, we had 

a full Board meeting with presentations from both 

you and SC&A.

One of the big things that came up was the 1999 

LANL Self-Assessment. And in that, NIOSH had 

agreed to go and look at that and report back to the 

Work Group. What happened to that planned followup?

It was important to know whether those findings 

were real issues, bioassay data, completeness in 

1990s. And do you have any plans to resolve this 

concern over the --

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah.

Chair Beach: -- adequacy and completeness?

And then there's another one, too. In that same 

transcript when I was reviewing it, we had, you had 

mentioned the PAAs of, that were completed in 

October of 2000. And there was a plan. Apparently, 

there was some data from the Denver Federal 

Records. And you were working on retrieving that 

information.
18

And you were also going to report back to the Work 

Group with an update on that. So those two things 

just to start with.

Mr. Rutherford: Okay. Well, I will agree that we did 

not do a really good job of coming out with a 

response to NC ID, the non-compliant 484 for in this 

White Paper. And that is one action that we need to 

complete.

I will say, though, that, you know, my general review 

of the response -- we did get the, roughly 150 pages 

of, back from, between Los Alamos and the other 

record center that we went to.

And my general review of that, it did not drive a 

broad revamp of the bioassay program. What was 

driven was additional administrative controls and to 

ensure that individuals could be identified that were 

on bioassay programs, whether it be for a plutonium, 

americium, or whatever.

And it also provided a management tool for them to 

go back and look at which individuals were on it. And 

it helped them to ensure that management could get 

those people to do their proper bioassay. And that 

was done.

Initially, they were going to do that with bioassay 

cards. Ultimately, they moved to a more electronic 

approach for doing that.

And again, I agree. We did not respond to that well. 

And we will provide a formal response to that. And I 

see no problem with getting that formal response 

together before the April Board meeting.

Chair Beach: Well, the April or --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Rutherford: Excuse me?

Chair Beach: The December or April?
19

Mr. Rutherford: Well, I don't know that we can --

Chair Beach: Oh.

Mr. Rutherford: Actually, after reviewing -- and I'm 

not going to jump into Joe's presentation. He actually 

identified a couple of things that I'm not sure we had 

looked at. And so I think when we do our proposal as 

well we could --

Chair Beach: Okay.

Mr. Rutherford: -- when it comes to assessments.

But the issue of the, you know, the assessment that 

was completed, we will provide a actual formal 

response to that.

Again, I do not believe that the corrective actions that 

were taken -- I want to point out that the corrective 

actions that were taken none of, at no time did they 

change how they would identify individuals that 

required bioassay.

They still used a work package. The internal 

dosimetrist would identify if bioassay was required 

based on a threshold quantity. And then the routine 

monitoring program, the field monitoring program 

would verify this when the activities occurred.

That did not change after the 1999 assessment. Also, 

the methods of doing personal monitoring did not 

change. They did not change from the 1999 

assessment how they monitored for mixed fission 

and activation products. And they did not change how 

they would monitor for other exotic radionuclides.

But again, I will -- I did, I agree that I did not provide 

a good response to that in this White Paper. And that 

will be done.

Chair Beach: Okay. So, my last question, then I'll let 

someone else take us, some questions if they have 

any.
20

Slide number 10, and it kind of follows up on what 

we were just talking about. NIOSH is emphasizing 

that LANL's field monitoring programs are well 

established and formalized by January 1, 1996. So it 

seems like that's the, what you're falling back to.

Does NIOSH also consider whether these programs 

are actually carried out according to the 

requirements and procedures to also be relevant to 

the question of program performance?

So you've got the procedures. You've got --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, Josie, I can respond to that 

question. Yeah, that's, the idea of looking at the field 

monitoring data was to see if they were actually 

doing some of these things they committed to in their 

program procedures.

So I'm looking at the air sampling data, looking at 

the RWPs, looking at the quarterly contamination 

surveys. All these different things we were looking.

That's where you're implementing those things in the 

field, or at the field level. You're implementing the 

field monitoring program. So, yes, we did look at 

those things.

Chair Beach: Okay. But it just keeps bringing me 

back to those 1999 results. But I'll let someone else 

-- does anybody else have any questions for NIOSH?

Member Roessler: Josie?

Chair Beach: Yes.

Member Roessler: This is Gen. I have a question.

Chair Beach: Okay. Go for it, Gen.

Member Roessler: Okay. My slides don't have 

numbers for some reason. But I think it's slide 
21

number 7. I counted in. And the title on the slide is 

NIOSH response to SC&A issues continued. If you 

could find that, that's where I have the question.

Mr. Rutherford: Okay. I'll see if I can put it up on the 

Skype. Okay.

Member Roessler: And it's the first bullet that says 

technical capabilities, et cetera.

Mr. Rutherford: Yes.

Member Roessler: And then under that, you say use 

of exotic radionuclides at LANL were rare especially 

up into the 1990s.

Well, it seems what we want to know is what was the 

use from '96 on. This kind of implies that they might 

not have been there in the period that we're 

interested in.

Mr. Rutherford: Well, I apologize. That actually was 

noted after I had already completed the presentation.

The actual, the use of exotic radionuclides was rare 

from '96 till the end of the -- or was rare for the entire 

period we evaluated. You could basically look back 

and you'll actually see some of that pointed out in 

Joe's presentation.

You can see how for LANSCE. The exposure potential 

dropped off increasingly over the years, especially 

when they approached 1995, '96.

Member Roessler: Okay. Okay. That helps on that.

But then just a little bit of follow up on the exotic 

radionuclides, the slide before that, you're talking 

about the germanium detectors being used. And 

somewhere in here you talked about the fact that 

they could identify all the peaks.

And I think what you're trying to say is by these 

measurements that if there were any radionuclides of 
22

interest present except, of course, the beta emitters, 

but that they could see it.

Mr. Rutherford: That's correct.

Member Roessler: Okay.

Mr. Rutherford: They -- somebody started to say 

something?

Chair Beach: Yeah, this is Josie. I was going to say 

something, but I'll let you finish on that topic.

Mr. Rutherford: You know, and I will, you know, I'll 

just say that's correct.

Member Roessler: So, if they were monitored, then 

they should have been able to see any of the exotic 

radionuclides.

Mr. Rutherford: Yes, with the germanium detectors.

Member Roessler: With the -- yeah, okay. Good. 

That's all for me.

Chair Beach: Yeah, and this is Josie, again. Isn't it 

true on that same topic if they were asked to look for 

them, if they were, they could do it, but they weren't 

always asked to look at that? Is that correct?

Mr. Rutherford: So I would say that that's true. I 

think that was, I think that's what Joe points out in 

his --

Chair Beach: Yeah, okay.

Mr. Rutherford: And I will -- but I'll also respond to 

the fact that, you know, if you have a LANSCE 

employee and you have air sampling data that 

supports that we need to do a bioassay on that 

employee, that obviously the internal dosimetrist is 

obviously going to look at mixed fission and 

activation products, the nuclides of concern for that 

area that that individual is working at.
23

Chair Beach: Okay. Thank you, LaVon. Any other 

questions for --

Member Clawson: I did. Josie, this is Brad.

LaVon, I want to tell you something. I've got a 

problem right now. I know we've been through this 

numerous, numerous times.

But you're expecting us to be able to say that we are 

going to say that they will monitor because of the 

implementation of CFR 835 and stuff. You do realize 

that even in today's world we're still having trouble 

with companies not complying to that. But you're 

wanting us to be able to say, yeah, they were 

complying by this, so everything is wonderful.

I just want to be right up front. I really have a 

heartache with that, because even in today's world, 

we're still getting violations. We're having problems 

with interpretations still of this CFR.

So, for us, and also a few I -- to tell you the truth, I 

have not seen much of a change from what we 

discussed in the first go-around with this. You're still 

coming back to, well, 10 CFR 835 in our eyes LANL is 

doing it, so we're good with it. But I still really haven't 

seen -- it's the ones that we don't see.

And I just want to be up front of where I'm at on that. 

So I just, I've got a heartache with this, because 

you're wanting us to take a program, say, well, this 

was implemented. And we're still arguing over that 

program in today's world and still fighting with 

companies to comply with it because it comes down 

to some of their interpretations.

And if you look out there, we're still getting violations 

to it. So, for you to be able to tell us that this is, we 

can, it's not an SEC, but then all of a sudden, they're 

right there, I have a heartache with it.

And it's nothing against your work or whatever. 
24

There's just a lot of void there. And I am not going to 

take it on blind faith that this was all implemented. 

And it's because of my background that I say that.

Mr. Rutherford: Can I respond to that?

Member Clawson: Sure.

Mr. Rutherford: Well, I understand your concern. And 

that's the reason why we went back and we actually 

did the additional work. I know you, you know, you 

don't think we did additional work.

But the idea is if they are implementing their field 

monitoring program -- and the way you're going to 

evaluate whether they're implementing their field 

monitoring program is to look at that field monitoring 

data and go down it and see if they're doing that.

So, if they're implementing a field monitoring 

program -- and clearly they were for the primary 

radionuclides because we verified that through the 

bioassay that we looked at.

You know, if they're implementing it through for the 

primary radionuclides, why would they not be 

implementing it for the mixed fission and activation 

products in the exotics? It's the same program and 

the same people in charge of the same program.

So, you know, I understand your concern. And, you 

know, we will do whatever is necessary to, you know, 

to resolve it. But I'll just leave it at that.

Chair Beach: LaVon, it goes back to they weren't 

doing it prior to '96. So why can we believe they were 

doing it after '96? I don't know if we've got the proof 

that shows --

Mr. Rutherford: Okay. Well, I'll respond to that, too, 

as well.

Chair Beach: Okay.
25

Mr. Rutherford: Okay. I admitted that their methods 

for monitoring in the '70s and that's why, you know, 

for mixed fission and activation products were not 

appropriate. That's why they changed in the late '70s 

and into the '80s and all the way up to the '90s to a 

degree.

But the requirements for routine monitoring that I 

can talk about, the field monitoring, they evolved 

over time. They weren't necessarily there in the '70s 

and the early '80s.

DOE Order 5480.11 came out with some of those 

hard requirements. Then the DOE RadCon Manual 

came out and followed that up with a little more 

detail. And all of these went into 835.

So programs progressed over time. And it's pretty 

clear that they did when you look at how doses 

dropped over time.

Again, I will do whatever is necessary but, to, but --

Mr. Stempfley: LaVon?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes.

Mr. Stempfley: This is Dan. We are in the process --

we didn't really verify compliance with 835. We're 

actually, as part of the SEC, we're evaluating the 

ability to reconstruct those with sufficient accuracy. 

So we kind of focused in on certain areas.

Mr. Rutherford: That's --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Stempfley: -- did not identify anything that 

indicated that we, as the SEC group, could not bound 

those with sufficient accuracy, not complete 

compliance with 835, but just the dose reconstruction 

part that we're looking at, right?

Mr. Rutherford: That's correct. We looked at whether 
26

the areas, the parts of 835 that we needed to, 

whether -- and those are the parts that were they 

identifying areas where the individuals were likely to 

exceed 100 millirem CEDE. We looked at that through 

the field monitoring program. And then are those 

records retained? And do we have those records? 

Yes.

Member Lockey: LaVon? Jim Lockey.

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, Jim.

Member Lockey: I had one question to ask you. I 

don't know what slide it was anymore. I can't -- I 

didn't write it down.

But when you were talking about the doses for 

monitored workers, you said there was one worker 

that exceeded the 100 millirems. Is that right?

Mr. Rutherford: No, that's incorrect. What I said was 

when you compared the 100 millirem or when you 

compared the monitored workers -- I'm going to pull 

that slide up real quick for you here. I know it's --

yeah. I was wondering if that would be 

misinterpreted.

Either way, what I was saying was we took the 

primary radionuclides and we took those primary 

radionuclides and that was all documented in our 

coworker model. And we looked at the numbers for 

the monitored workers. And this is the whole group 

of monitored workers.

And we had proposed an approach using two percent 

of the SALI for, which basically approached the 100 

millirem CEDE. We had proposed that approach for 

unmonitored workers. We would use that dose and 

those intakes and for unmonitored workers.

And so what we were doing was comparing that 100 

millirem CEDE to what the actual doses were to the 

monitored workers. And in one case, which is actually 
27

I think Super-S uranium, the actual monitored 

workers' doses were higher than what we had 

proposed for the unmonitored workers.

And, but, you know, again that's for uranium, an 

isotope that we had not found any infeasibilities for. 

And it was a factor of ten I believe.

And again, that was for monitored workers. Does that 

answer your question? It wasn't a specific individual.

I would point out that we have found no indication 

where LANL has ever been, LANL has ever identified 

individuals that were not monitored and ultimately 

were monitored and exceeded 100 millirem CEDE.

Yeah, I hope that answers your question.

Member Lockey: I think it does, yeah. Thank you.

Chair Beach: Okay. Any more questions for NIOSH at 

this time? Joe, are you ready for your presentation?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes.

Chair Beach: Okay. Thank you.

SC&A Review of SEC-00109 LANL Addendum White 

Paper (November 2018)

Mr. Fitzgerald: Again, Joe Fitzgerald. I also don't 

have the on-screen capabilities. So I'm just going to 

go through this.

And I apologize. I also notice there's no numbering 

on this either. So we'll, I'll have to use the titles to 

peg this.

Anyway, we did, in fact, review the September White 

Paper and provided our reflections. The first slide, I 

just wanted to -- and we did reach out. So I'm not 

going to go into detail.

But the, in terms of the SEC-109 Evaluation Report 

Addendum, we didn't go into the Addendum. The end 
28

date of December 31, '95 for that Class is, was based 

on the presumption that LANL would have been in full 

compliance with 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational 

Radiation Protection, by that date.

And with full compliance, again, NIOSH would 

assume that all DOE work sites, including Los 

Alamos, would have satisfied the monitoring 

requirements contained in the rules, thereby 

resolving any limitations, which is important 

because, again, the limitations were the exotics as 

far as monitoring prior to the end of '95.

So the presumption of January 1st was that with the 

promulgation of the rule the presumption is that Los 

Alamos, across the board, would, in fact, have 

implemented the 100 millirem CEDE in terms of a 

monitoring criteria for anybody, including 

unmonitored workers.

So, in any case, that would certainly remedy the 

challenge of demonstrating a, you know, a 

monitoring program and sufficient records for dose 

reconstruction in a coworker model for the various 

exotic radionuclides.

In any case, NIOSH in response to some of the 

comments that we made, and I think LaVon 

mentioned this, has concurred that, yeah, one can't 

necessarily presume on January 1st that the, that a 

decision on, that 100 millirem CEDE could be based 

on sort of the legalistic or compliance basis for things 

turning around on January 1st, that one would need 

to look at more objective evidence of the 

implementation of the bioassay program in response 

to 835.

And that was the, I think the basis for providing the 

additional information, the additional evidence that 

LaVon has gone through to indicate what Los Alamos 

did and whether or not that would be a sufficient 

basis for, again, sticking with the 100 CEDE on that 

particular date.
29

Now, one comment I would make before leaving this 

slide, I think LaVon mentioned that, you know, and 

we agree that the mixed activation products and 

mixed fission products, perhaps exotics in general, 

were rare, were in rare usage and exposure potential 

compared with plutonium, uranium, and tritium, the 

primaries at Los Alamos.

I think that's been pretty much a given throughout 

the operating history, including the last SEC period.

But I would also just want to make sure it's clear, 

though, that in the Evaluation Report I think NIOSH 

acknowledges, as do we, that in terms of potential 

occupational exposure, the mixed activation and 

mixed fission products were deemed as of sufficient 

interest and significance, along with the primaries, 

that you would want to address whether or not, in 

fact, you could dose reconstruct and whether or not, 

in fact, you could have coworker models that would 

address any unmonitored workers.

So, in one breath, we say that, yeah, they're 

relatively rare when you compare it with the 

production of, or the usage of plutonium and 

uranium. That was pretty clear at the lab.

On the other hand, they're not insignificant nor 

negligible in the context of dose reconstruction. They 

need to be addressed, need to considered, and in 

fact, were the basis for the SEC Class, as I indicated 

earlier, that was defined up through '95.

So, you know, they do have that significance. I didn't 

want to get that lost.

The next slide, I just want to summarize where I 

think -- and LaVon went through this, so I'll be quick 

on this.

NIOSH did concur, based on our review of last year, 

that 10 CFR Part 835, the presumptive compliance 

aspect wasn't sufficient, that one needed to show 
30

more in the way of evidence that 100 millirem per 

year CEDE, in fact, applied and applied to exotics, 

applied to unmonitored workers exposed to exotics, 

as well as in the primaries.

And I think from that standpoint, as LaVon has gone 

through, he finds that the other bases that NIOSH is 

advancing beyond what was said last year, which was 

the presumptive compliance, include the field 

monitoring programs.

And in terms of the number of in-scope requirements, 

procedures, documents, I think he's gone through all 

that. So I won't repeat it, but certainly the scope and 

extent of those documents exemplifying, as he was 

pointing out, a program that appeared to be pretty 

comprehensive and would have, in fact, provided the 

monitoring across the primaries and would, as he just 

indicated, presumably include the exotics as well.

And beyond that, I think the question of sort of 

testing the 100 CEDE criterion from the standpoint of 

looking at the bioassay data, fundamentally the 

primaries, and looking at whether or not the fact the 

program could be seen as controlling intakes such 

that the 100 CEDE would, in fact, be seen as 

effectively implemented.

And finally, as we pointed out in our paper, I think 

NIOSH concludes, or makes a judgment anyway, that 

one should view the implementation of Part 835 as a 

paradigm shift in the way DOE operated. And that 

would apply to Los Alamos.

And whereas, you would perhaps see some shortfalls 

in how the bioassay program may have been 

implemented, in this context it would have been 

exotics, those shortfalls would not be evident with 

the implementation of 835, so again, going from a 

presumption of compliance to what I would call an 

assumption of implementation, again, around the 

100 CEDE.
31

And again, with all that, I think NIOSH is making a 

conclusion surrounding a weight-of-evidence 

argument that if you take all of the above, that one 

can conclude that the 100 millirem CEDE can be 

applied to intakes, which equates to a two percent of 

the SALI, and that would be justified for unmonitored 

workers for 1996 to 2005, and that would remedy the 

basis for the preceding SEC Class going forward. So 

I think that was the conclusion that we read.

Okay. Again, let me just sort of go into, and this is 

covered in more detail in our paper, but the -- we 

wanted to, you know, respond to what we thought 

were the two central arguments that LaVon and the 

paper present.

And the first one we tackled was this question of 

program adequacy. And we define program adequacy 

with the emphasis not only on the definition, the 

scope, the formality, you know, whatnot, but also 

whether or not one could demonstrate that the 

program was being implemented effectively.

So, from our standpoint, when one is looking at 

program adequacy, it's both the definition and 

documentation, but, you know, as importantly, 

maybe more importantly, whether or not the 

contractor and the personnel were carrying out those 

procedures and making it happen on the ground so 

that there would be some confidence that, you know, 

these controls, this monitoring, field monitoring, 

contamination control, whatever it is, was, in fact, 

happening and being effectively implemented.

So that's kind of what we focused on. And that's 

where we had I think our biggest concern. And we 

reviewed all the documentation, looked at the scope. 

And it's impressive, but, you know, not surprisingly 

so.

We're talking about a premier laboratory with a 50, 

60-year history with some of the top health physicists 

in the country, a mature program that, you know, as 
32

LaVon pointed out, had evolved and had refined its 

documentation. And it had a, certainly an impressive 

scope of documentation that was very current and 

very much in keeping with accepted practice and 

requirements and whatnot.

So we certainly don't question the, you know, the 

scope of that program, the formality of that program, 

the fact that it's established.

What we're focused on is the, sort of the other issue

of whether, in fact, given all those, that 

documentation, those requirements, procedures, 

expectations, whether, in fact, they were being 

adequately carried out on the ground and being 

implemented by the facility.

And going back, this self-assessment is probably 

becoming somewhat famous. But the reason we 

wanted to highlight that is, one, it was a selfassessment. This is something Los Alamos lead.

They went through the, I thought rather 

extraordinary initiative to bring in outside experts, 

people, other dosimetrists who actually had very 

current experience with similar concerns at other 

sites. And in this case they brought in MJW from 

Mound and health physicists from Savannah River.

And they wanted to focus on the implementation of 

the bioassay program, in particular whether, in fact, 

the enrollments, the checklist, the special and, you 

know, RWP-driven, job-specific bioassays were being 

identified and collected and whether, in fact, they 

were complete, again, quite apart from the extent of 

the procedures.

And this doesn't say the procedures, the process, or 

the requirements were flawed. It really speaks to 

whether or not they were being implemented 

effectively, whether, in fact, the management was 

holding the staff accountable to making sure that, 

you know, people were being identified and that, in 
33

fact, bioassays were coming in.

And I think we get into this later. But DOE had frankly 

identified the fact that at a number of sites that, you 

know, probably likewise had very comprehensive 

bioassay procedures and requirements, the 

execution of those procedures were coming up short. 

And workers were not being identified or weren't 

providing bioassays.

And that was of fundamental concern to the 

department. And I'll get into that later.

But that would be certainly a reason to look at the 

1999 self-assessment, not from the standpoint of, 

you know, to what extent did they change the 

requirements. I mean, it's not necessarily the 

problem with the requirements.

The question is execution or implementation. Did 

they, in fact, follow their procedures adequately? And 

what's the implication?

And this gets to, I think one of our biggest concerns 

is what's the implication. You have a finding of 

incomplete enrollments by the CTW contractor. You 

have incomplete bioassay submissions in response to 

RW-required, job-specific bioassays.

Okay. That's a sampling. And that was a sampling 

done I think in probably less than a week of review.

What are the implications to the completeness, 

adequacy and completeness of your bioassay records 

for that time period? And I would say the time period 

is the late '90s, because the corrective actions took 

place in 2000.

You know, what's the implications? Was this sort of a 

situation where they did find that bioassays weren't 

necessarily submitted, but it turns out in terms of the 

follow-up that, you know, it was a small percentage 

or the percentage they found didn't reflect the body 
34

of bioassays collected was at just one facility? In 

terms of the CTW, in terms of an enrollment, was this 

a isolated situation or was it reflective of a broader 

problem?

You know, at other sites in the context of evaluations, 

when situations were identified where clearly you had 

incompleteness in terms of, or evidence of the 

incompleteness in terms of the bioassay program, 

the notion was to not only look at the outcomes in 

terms of procedures revised, but to look at the 

implications for the completeness, adequacy and 

completeness of your records, bioassay records.

That's the key in our view that, yes, this is a 

sampling. But what are the implications for the 

completeness of those records?

If it's five percent missing, is that a significant issue? 

If it's 20 percent missing, and whether it's 

enrollments or bioassays, that, you know, to me 

would be certainly something very significant that 

would have to be addressed in the dose 

reconstruction program.

So, anyway, that's sort of the backdrop on this 

question of the 1999 self-assessment from our 

standpoint.

And it stands as probably the only -- and I can be 

corrected. But we didn't, we haven't found any other 

what I would call validation review, one that actually 

goes to the ground level and looks at implementation 

in that way during that time period up through 2000.

That stands as a pretty significant review and one 

that speaks to this question that we're after, which is 

quite apart from the all the requirements and 

procedures and, you know, expertise and technology. 

Did they, in fact, execute and collect bioassays in 

enrolled workers as they should in terms of the 

CTWs?
35

And in that slide, we also pointed out that, again, you 

know, NIOSH I think had pointed out that the 1990 

review or oversight in general weren't really a 

sufficient basis for looking at adequacy. But we would 

point out that it's a necessary thing. We did say 

necessary not sufficient.

And again, the oversight that matters I think goes 

beyond the paper and looks at the execution. And 

that's kind of where we were going with this whole 

question of necessary but not sufficient.

Oversight review is necessary but unless one actually 

gets beyond the requirements and procedures and 

looks at implementation, it's not sufficient. So that's, 

from our standpoint, it's the implementation that 

ought to be the focus at Los Alamos as well.

Next slide, and this gets to the question of whether 

the intakes can be bounded by 100 millirem CEDE. 

And we identified as sort of a data completeness, 

adequacy and completeness question in the White 

Paper, not to mention the Addendum, NIOSH is 

looking at the primary LANL radionuclides, okay, the 

tritium, the plutonium, uranium. This was the 

mainstream operational source terms at Los Alamos. 

And they're pretty much up front.

And we've gone through a number of questionnaires 

and interviews with the dosimetry staff that that was 

the focus of the program, that the primaries, in fact, 

were the focus of the program. And that's where the 

bioassay data are abundant.

And it's pretty clear that from NIOSH's review, and 

we don't, you know, certainly dispute that, that 

based on the amount of the data and the analysis in 

terms of what the intake values appear to be, that 

they appear to be boundable by 100 millirem CEDE. 

So we don't have any issue with the question of the 

primaries.

But we do have a question with the statement that 
36

based on that and based on sort of a general review 

of the program, the formality of the program and 

what Los Alamos has indicated, that NIOSH would 

find no reason to believe, and this is again no reason 

to believe that intakes of exotic radionuclides by 

unmonitored workers would be substantially 

different. Okay.

And what we are trying to focus on is the basis, the 

objective evidence that backs up the belief that's 

stated here.

You know, when you say you believe something like 

this, given the context of a SEC having been based 

on the lack of, you know, bioassay data for exotics 

and an applicable DR method, you know, the 

statement that there's now in '96 versus '95 no 

reason to believe that intakes would be different, 

then I think the first thing that we're trying to focus 

on is what is the basis for that, what has changed in 

terms of whatever evidence is being presented that 

wasn't available in the prior years that makes a 

difference.

And if it's not compliance with 835 on January 1st but 

the implementation of the bioassay program in that 

same time period, then I think it sort of raises the 

question, well, what has changed in that program 

that would make that much of a difference from one 

year to the next that one could have a confidence 

level that the, that one could bound those intakes.

And I think the first issue we have is that we could 

not find any substantiation for NIOSH's belief. I 

mean, I certainly understand the discussion on the 

formality of the program and the fact that, you know, 

certainly on paper NIOSH, I mean, LANL has a very 

comprehensive field monitoring program. We're not 

disputing that the procedures, requirements, RWPs 

are very comprehensive.

We're not disputing that for the primary 

radionuclides, plutonium, tritium, and uranium, that 
37

there is, in fact, an abundance of data and that, in 

fact, that when one goes through that data from a 

coworker standpoint that there's, you know, certainly 

a lot of information that would provide bounding 

intakes for the primaries.

But we have not been able to discern from any of that 

any new data, any new analysis or a method that 

would demonstrate that one could dose reconstruct 

the exotics or certainly bound the intakes of the 

exotics in a way which wasn't available in the 

preceding time period.

And going back over -- and this is going back a long 

ways. And admittedly, we're talking probably seven 

or eight years ago. But looking at the transcripts, as 

I'm sure some of you have done as well, we spent a 

great deal of time talking about the question of how 

one could remedy the lack of data, bioassay data, for 

the exotics.

And we turned and certainly NIOSH turned to the 

primary radionuclides and I thought, you know, did a 

yeoman's effort to find methods such as, you know, 

the substitute nuclide approach using primaries to 

bound intakes of exotics because of presumed similar 

handling of those exotics to the primaries and other 

assumptions that would allow you to do that.

But over the course of a year or two, I think the 

conclusion that was reached by both the Board, the 

Work Group, and NIOSH, and I'm sure NIOSH will 

want to jump in at some point, was that, no, as hard 

as one could try, and I think a great deal of effort 

went into it, there were some fundamental reasons 

why trying to compare or use the primary data to 

bound or to indicate that the intakes of exotics were 

similar just came up short because they weren't 

handled necessarily the same in all cases.

And, you know, the type of operations involved were, 

in fact, in many cases different. You're talking labtype operations, experimental operations versus 
38

more production-oriented operations. So you're 

talking about maybe more intermittent exposure 

pathways versus more chronic pathways.

And it's laid out in our report. So I won't go through 

that. But it just seems that we've already gone 

through much of the discussion about how that 

doesn't work.

The third bullet I want to dwell on a little bit is -- and 

I think LaVon mentions this, and certainly we have 

acknowledged this as well.

But, you know, Los Alamos, in response to a number 

of inquiries as well as interviews, you know, indicates 

that, you know, the reason we don't see, you know, 

a lot of bioassay data for the exotics is that the 

workers were not required to be monitored for them, 

that, you know, they were scarce, that there was a 

judgment that they weren't significant. So they 

weren't, they just weren't monitored for them.

And that is a, as you can see, that's a fundamental 

challenge because, again, as one can look in the ER, 

there were actually some fairly substantial exposure 

pathways associated with the exotics. In fact, mixed 

fission and mixed activation products were flagged, 

along with plutonium, tritium, and uranium, as 

source terms of note in the ER. So I think there's 

definitely a conflict with that.

And one thing I want to point out is that, and give 

NIOSH a lot of credit for this, that certainly in the 

2012, 2013 timeframe I know they went through a 

lot of effort to try to pin down Los Alamos from the 

standpoint of providing what's called objective 

evidence, in other words, yes, after January 1st of 

'86 you were obliged to implement a program that 

would provide a 100 CEDE basis for monitoring.

And I think NIOSH went through, went to the extent 

of providing a detailed questionnaire for the lab to 

respond to just trying to ascertain how was that 
39

implemented and is there any concrete evidence that 

you can show us that it was, in fact, directed out and 

that it was accomplished and what the timeframe 

might have been.

And in short, and this is documentation that's 

available in the SRDB, LANL declined to provide any 

objective evidence, which was the specific request of 

NIOSH, to back up its statements.

You know, and these are the statements that we've 

been reading that, in fact, there was monitoring on 

an as-needed basis, that 100 millirem was, in fact, a 

criterion and if, you know, if there's no data, it's 

because the workers didn't meet that criterion, that 

there wasn't any significant exposure, and that Los 

Alamos, in fact, has always had in vivo programs for 

mixed activation products and mixed fission products 

and has used them. The fact that there's no data or 

little data is beside the point that the capability was 

always there.

And I just want to just mention that the questions 

that NIOSH posed to the lab in 2013 and requested 

any objective evidence in return included how Los 

Alamos ensured compliance with 835.402 for exotics, 

when current procedures and practices for exotics 

were put in place, whether such procedures and 

practices to ensure compliance with 835 for exotics 

were in place by January 1, 1996, whether the 

implementation of these procedures and practices 

were manifest in LANL's monitoring records after 

January 1, 1996, and if not, when they were, in fact, 

put in place, and were they, in fact, in place now.

In the response that came back from the lab, you 

know, basically the lab lumped all the, you know, this 

was repeated for each of the exotic nuclides, lumped 

them all together and said, you know, listen, we, you 

know, have procedures in place and, you know, we 

have the capability, and if they're not monitored, the 

source is not significant to, in fact, be monitored.
40

So it's actually declined to provide the objective 

evidence. And that's kind of getting down to what 

concerns us in a lot of respects, that we're at this 

stage now, you know, seven or eight years later 

debating some of the same issues, that, in fact, yes, 

Los Alamos makes these claims and, yes, there is, in 

fact, you know, procedures and requirements that 

one can look at. And the primaries, certainly there's 

an abundant database for the primaries.

But essentially, there's just no, as far as I can tell, no 

new objective evidence from either the lab or from 

the analysis themselves in terms of exotics to give us 

a basis for knowing that, in fact, 100 CEDE per year 

is something that has been implemented and is, 

applies for the exotic nuclides, which, in fact, were 

the basis for the preceding SEC.

Okay. So, anyway, and this is something I'll get back 

to a little later. But, look, you know, if one takes the 

dates off of this, and we're not talking, you know, 

post-'95 but say an earlier timeframe, and we have 

a source term or series of source terms actually in 

terms of the exotics -- and this is nothing new. We 

certainly deal with exotics in most of the laboratories.

If we lack bioassay data, if we lack sufficient air 

sampling data, and the source term information is 

not usable for coworker model development, you 

know, the only recourse in our respects is to come up 

with some modeling of some sort to either 

demonstrate some negligible exposure or find some 

way to bound it. And that's been sort of the recourse 

I think in the past. And that's the precedent.

And in this particular case, and I'll talk about this a 

little later, it just seems like we're recycling or going 

back to some programmatic, you know, arguments 

and primary nuclide arguments that we've already 

covered and we covered almost eight, nine years 

ago.

So I'd like to think that, you know, for this final time 
41

period, there's some other avenue to, you know, 

basically provide the, quote, objective evidence that, 

in fact, things have changed and that there's a 

capability to bound these doses or not. And that's 

kind of where I see the 100 millirem per year CEDE 

issue.

Next one, and these will go faster I think, I promise, 

the 10 CFR Part 835 as a paradigm shift, this is 

something we talked about last year.

And, you know, we agree very clearly with NIOSH's 

point that when 10 CFR 835 was promulgated, that 

raised the stakes. You know, an enforcement 

program will do that. It raised the stakes, got 

people's attention. And I think accountability did 

increase or it did improve. But it did not necessarily 

happen on January 1st of that '96 time period.

You're talking about deeply embedded programs, 

ways of doing things, processes, people, not just 

paper but people, who have done perhaps bioassay 

collections and have done checklists, have done their, 

you know, their enrollments the same way for years. 

And, you know, the expectation that that culture, 

that, you know, those habits would change overnight, 

even with a Price-Anderson enforcement program, I 

don't think is necessarily true.

And this was borne out and very clearly borne out by 

a recognition by DOE itself certainly a year or two 

later that, you know, as they were making the 

rounds, they were seeing very much the same kinds 

of shortfalls in bioassay program implementation at 

a number of sites. And, you know, these were 

mentioned in the report.

But, you know, starting with Mound, going through 

Savannah River, and three other sites, as well as 

those two sites, when you get up to five or six sites, 

I think the notion was, okay, we have a generic issue. 

And it was a determination by [identifying 
42

information redacted] at the time, who headed 

DOE enforcement, that, you know, it wasn't doing 

any good to deal with this piecemeal.

But apparently, there was a common, as they say, a 

common issue. And rather than take additional or 

further enforcement actions, because they were 

citing various sites notice of violations, they felt it 

would be more productive to have a moratorium, 120 

days grace period where no more enforcement 

actions.

But all of the DOE sites, every DOE contractor would 

need to go back and conduct its own self-assessment 

along the, you know, given the list of, I think they 

had something like 30, 35 deficiencies that were 

identified earlier, and using that as a starting point, 

self-assess its own program, provide those results 

back to DOE.

And as long as that was done and reported when DOE 

actually -- at the end of the 120 days, when DOE 

would, in fact, start strictly looking at bioassay 

programs, if they, in fact, took the corrective actions, 

then that would get them off the hook for any further 

enforcement action.

So I guess our conclusion is that 835 was a paradigm 

shift but one that took time. It was certainly through 

the '90s that, late '90s that you got accountability to 

the provisions in 835, particularly for bioassay 

programs.

I had looked for other instances where DOE took that 

kind of an action, a moratorium, which was a pretty 

significant initiative. I didn't find one.

So I think the fact that they singled out bioassay 

programs in DOE for an action like this sort of 

signifies that there was a generic difficulty in bringing 

the DOE sites into conformance with 835. And that 

took some time to happen.
43

Anyway, next issue, and technological limitations, 

I'm not going to go through all these. I think, you 

know, NIOSH raised some exceptions to some of the 

issues that we identified.

I will admit that we weren't very clear on the 

distinctions with the germanium detectors. And we 

acknowledge that certainly the germanium detectors 

were in place. That's something we noted in our 

review, our last review, and that part of the confusion 

was the introduction of the three-detector array in 

'98 and the way we cited that.

So I think there was some, you know, probably 

wording that could have been improved on that. And 

we certainly admit that there's some issues that 

could be clarified. But there's no disagreement at all 

on that question.

The points that were raised in that particular section, 

you can read them for yourself. The only one that we 

disagree with frankly is there was a mention that 

there was a dose reconstruction approach for exotics 

that was, and referred back to the ER Addendum that 

was, that it would apply to exotics.

And looking at the citation in the Addendum, it 

basically goes to the label implementation of 835. So 

it's a little bit circular in the sense that the method 

is, in fact, the implementation of 835 on January 1st.

So, and we have a, obviously, have an issue with that 

in general. So we don't think there's a dose 

reconstruction method per se at this point once you 

take presumption off the table. So that's what we're 

kind of wrestling with.

Next issue, this one deals with the oversight finding 

in 2001. I'm not going to go through that either 

because I think we explain it pretty much in detail in 

the report.

But again, this is a question that Los Alamos had the 
44

capability, no question, for MAPs and thorium. 

However, as DOE pointed out, in terms of how they 

managed that process between LANSCE and the 

dosimetry office, implementation would have been 

hampered. And that's pretty much the bottom line 

there.

I don't want to make too much of it. But certainly 

there is a discrepancy in how that was handled.

Neptunium, this goes hand in hand with the general 

issue of the presumption if one has an issue with 100 

millirem CEDE based on to what extent the reg was 

implemented, then I think one would have an issue 

with whether or not these other neptunium, potential 

neptunium exposure sources ought to be reviewed.

And we covered this last year. And I think that's also 

pretty well clear, too.

Another specific issue was DOELAP accreditation. I'm 

not going to spend a lot of time on that either.

All we would say is that based on experience at this 

site and other sites that DOELAP did have a role in 

advancing I think 835 implementation for the internal 

dose program, internal dosimetry programs.

And in fact, I think it was '98 there was a coupling 

between 835 and a requirement for DOELAP 

accreditation to be achieved. I think I got that right.

And for Los Alamos, in particular, as early as '97 the 

lab and DOE agreed that they would advance 

accreditation as a, one of the corrective actions for 

weaknesses found in the plutonium bioassay 

program. That was a non-compliance issue under 

Price-Anderson.

So I think from that standpoint I wouldn't have, I 

would certainly say that DOELAP was relevant. This 

is not speaking to the dosimetry. Obviously, it's 

speaking to the functionality of the program. But 
45

nonetheless, there's a relevance in terms of 

advancing the tenets of something like 835.

Okay. Sort of going to the creative part of this 

presentation, you know, looking at this thing and 

realizing that we were treading very much the same 

ground we treaded seven or eight years ago, I got a 

little frustrated in the sense that, you know, what's 

not, what's really not happening, what's not 

happening is if one can't come up with the objective 

evidence that your programmatic implementation of 

100 millirem CEDE is expansive enough to include the 

exotic, the monitoring of the exotics as well as the 

primaries, then how could one look at the exotics 

from perhaps a different vantage point to see 

whether or not since the threshold of 100 millirem 

CEDE, and the question is, you know, we're talking 

about exotics. These are sporadically used. And we 

don't disagree that they contain perhaps a rarer 

commodity as time went on.

Could one look at exotics in the post-'95 standpoint 

to, you know, find ways to demonstrate that, in fact, 

you're talking about exposures that would be 

uniformly under 100 millirem for the operations and 

the workers that existed, that continued to exist past 

'95?

And I went ahead and chose LANSCE. I mean, it's 

just one sliver of certainly the operations that 

historically handled exotics, in this case, gaseous 

mixed activation products. But it was one that was 

fairly easy to focus on and present as an illustrative 

example. And that's all this is. It's just an illustrative

example of circumstances that certainly changed in 

my view dramatically once you got into the 1990s 

and beyond.

And I think the graphs that we presented and the 

tables we presented, I mean, the information came 

from Los Alamos environmental documents, as well 

as NIOSH's ER. But essentially it just shows that what 
46

was at one point and described in ER as, you know, 

a dominant source of airborne radionuclides at Los 

Alamos, such that you were measuring doses at the 

fence line, by, certainly by the 1990s almost became 

a negligible exposure source.

And looking at it from the standpoint of, and using 

immersion dose as a marker, it's not, you know, 

obviously internal. But using it as a marker, the 

whole body dose calculated also declined 

dramatically. And you can look at the table from that 

standpoint as well.

Whereas, as late as 1990, you could look at 120 

millirem whole body as a calculation. That went down 

to virtually negligible by '98, '99, what have you, 

certainly well below 100 millirem.

I guess I wanted to put that out there. And again, 

this is average worker, not max worker, but put that 

out there as saying, whereas before '96, I think the 

data and the, you know, whether it's air sampling or 

source term or whatever was not manageable in 

terms of a bounding dose per se, looking at these 

exotics from the standpoint of usage and whether, in 

fact, they were available for exposure and if so in 

what context, I think, and I don't know, but I think 

there might be a pathway to demonstrate, provide 

what I would consider more objective evidence that 

these would all fall under 100 CEDE rather than in my 

view conjecturing based on LANL statements that 

aren't backed up by objective information or relying 

on the paperwork, the requirements that may or may 

not have been implemented effectively.

It just seems to me that once out of this dilemma and 

it is to establish whether or not the conditions at the 

site from the source term standpoint perhaps had 

changed enough by the mid to late '90s that, you 

know, that would be possible.

And also the marker of 100 CEDE, because that is the 

threshold that I think, again, has been advanced 
47

because of 835, is a more manageable marker than 

what we typically had to deal with, which is if it's not 

negligible then one has to find a dose reconstruction 

method that would characterize.

In this case, I think what one is characterizing is 

whether or not one can show that you can come 

below 100 CEDE, which it may or not depending on 

the typical nuclide, may or may not be manageable.

But I wanted to throw it out there as a postscript, 

because I think otherwise we're sort of in this 

impasse, which I don't see an easy way out per se.

So, in any case, that's for the benefit of the Work 

Group and one that takes, sort of takes off from this 

question of these exotic exposures becoming 

increasingly sporadic, as NIOSH claims and as we 

agree, in the '95 to 2000 timeframe.

Conclusions, basically three, that first, that we still do 

not see a substantiation that, in fact, for the exotics 

that 100 millirem per year of CEDE would bound 

exotic intakes. We don't see the new information, the 

new analysis that supports that.

I think what NIOSH is providing in its White Paper 

speaks to the fact that this is the case for the 

primaries, that some of the analysis they did was

pretty good and the information provided is pretty 

thorough for the primaries. So I think, you know, 

clearly one can make that conclusion for the 

primaries. But I don't see how, you know, whether 

there's any new evidence for exotics that would 

apply.

The second one is this question of the '99. And, you 

know, again, it was a question mark why there was 

no treatment of that. And I think LaVon has discussed 

that. But, you know, the question of the implications, 

you know, I want to go back to that.

It's the implications of adequacy and completeness 
48

which is the key. Yes, they sampled. And they found, 

you know, bioassays weren't submitted. And they 

found enrollments were incomplete.

Does that speak to a broader lab-wide issue? Or 

for whatever reason, was that isolated and not 

reflective of the overall bioassay program?

That implication is the key one because that speaks 

to whether or not you have a adequacy and 

completeness issue that would hamper dose 

reconstruction with sufficient accuracy. And I think 

that's where we always come down to when we find 

that evidence.

And I know for other sites that we're going through 

the exercise of trying to demonstrate that. And I 

think that's where we're at for that particular finding.

And again, finally, the DOE enforcement moratorium 

in '98 in our view underscores the commonality, you 

know, the, you know, more generic problem of 

deficiencies in bioassay program implementation, 

since we're talking implementation across the DOE 

sites. And this is three years after 835 was 

promulgated.

And on that basis, you know, I know we have 

switched from a presumption of compliance to what 

I would call an assumption of implementation. But I 

don't think one can assume implementation of 100 

millirem CEDE based on the kind of fundamental 

problems that I think DOE picked up on in terms of 

how these programs are being implemented, 

including Los Alamos.

And it doesn't appear that, you know, the corrective 

actions necessary to bring these around were 

completed until probably in the 2000 timeframe 

based on, you know, DOE requiring that they be, in 

fact, put in place and providing evidence that, in fact, 

they were effective. So I think that's the takeaway 

from that.
49

Any questions?

Member Lockey: Joe? Joe, Jim Lockey. Can you hear 

me?

Chair Beach: Yeah, go ahead, Jim.

Member Lockey: So I wanted to look at Slide 14 again 

so I really understand what you're -- what were you, 

in one sentence, what were you trying to say in this 

slide?

Mr. Fitzgerald: I'm sorry. What --

Member Lockey: Slide 14.

Mr. Fitzgerald: What's the header on that?

Member Lockey: Yeah.

Mr. Fitzgerald: What's the --

Member Lockey: Slide 14, that's the average 

occupational external doses from LANSCE that you 

put up. Sorry, Joe.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Oh.

Member Lockey: In relationship to how the Board can 

take this slide to get us moving forward, what --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, what I wanted to show there, 

again, was just taking one sample, one example, in 

this case the gaseous mixed activation products that 

were being emitted by LANSCE.

Member Lockey: All right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And, you know, NIOSH makes the 

statement that, you know, these became more 

sporadic and they were relatively rare. And I wanted 

to say, yeah, you know, we're not trying to suggest 

that things didn't change, that the further you go 

time-wise the exotics seemingly had been handled 

less and less.
50

And I wanted to take one example, in this case the 

MAPs from LANSCE, and instead of dealing with it 

qualitatively and saying, yeah, we think, you know, 

subjectively they became rarer and rarer and, you 

know, the exposure potential became less, I wanted 

to test that thesis.

And so I took the LANSCE emissions for 1990 through 

2002. And based on the release values and the 

maximum exposed individual -- and this first one is 

environmental, so don't -- you know, again this is the 

estimated dose to the maximum exposed off-site 

individual. And this is at the fence line.

And I think it's pretty dramatic. I think, you know, in 

the time period of the previous SEC, you know, we 

had some fairly substantial -- I mean, even as late as 

1990, you're talking about, you know, a fair amount 

of emissions in terms of 120,000 curies and a 

measurable dose at the fence line, so, but if you look 

at the trend, by the time you get to '95 and '96, a 

dramatic decline, almost negligible by '99, but 

certainly well below what was taking place in the 

years previous to that.

On the next slide, we do turn to occupational. And 

this comes strictly from the NIOSH Occupational 

Environmental TBD. It's right in there as a table.

And this deals with using argon-41 as the marker, 

but includes immersion dose as well as whatever 

internal dose to come up with a whole body 

calculation. You know, so correspondingly, the 

occupational dose as measured likewise goes down 

considerably from 1990 down to '96 and well below 

100.

And, you know, I didn't want to spend a lot of time 

doing what would obviously be NIOSH's research. But 

I wanted to, for the sake of discussion and for the 

Work Group, just suggest that, you know, this notion 

that things had changed at the lab is something I 

think ought to be addressed and ought to be given 
51

some focus, because certainly the source term data 

and air sampling information may not have been 

adequate before '96.

However, if, in fact, the source term effectively went 

away or certainly could be shown to be less than 100 

millirem max, then, you know, one could 

demonstrate certainly much more objectively than 

we have that 100 millirem CEDE would be a reasoned 

threshold to apply.

Otherwise, I don't think even with all the Los Alamos 

statements, you know, there just isn't any new, 

objective information, analysis, data. That hasn't 

changed.

And please correct me. We've looked and I don't see 

anything new as far as bioassay data. I don't see 

anything new as far as actual bounding analyses. And 

I don't see anything from Los Alamos that would be 

a basis, objective basis for their claim.

So I just think the Work Group is in a tough spot. And 

I think the only way you could have a, you know, sort 

of a objective basis to agree that, you know, there's 

no more presumption of compliance that would be 

the basis for 100 millirem, but perhaps there's a way 

to show that the source terms have diminished and 

could be shown for the worker to be, you know, 

consistently below 100 millirem for the exotics of 

concern.

And for this case, I just looked at G/MAPs from 

LANSCE. But it certainly appears to be the case for, 

you know, again, that one source term.

Member Lockey: All right, Joe. It's very helpful. 

Thank you.

Chair Beach: Yeah, thanks, Joe. Any other questions 

for --

Member Roessler: Josie, this is Gen.
52

Chair Beach: Hi, Gen. Go ahead.

Member Roessler: Yes, that was a very long 

presentation. And Joe brought up a lot of concerns, a 

lot of things to think of.

But it seems to me that what he is saying is that, and 

in fact he said there is an out for NIOSH and that they 

need to establish that the condition, and I think when 

he said condition he means that the implementations 

of this program, that it had changed by the '90s, by 

the late '90s.

And, Josie, you also brought up the question what 

was changed in '96. It seems to me that's really the 

whole focus perhaps.

And I'm wondering now NIOSH has listened to the 

presentation and certainly they must have 

anticipated this as they read his report. I think at this 

point the Work Group needs to hear from NIOSH as 

to how they'd approach Joe's concerns.

Chair Beach: And I certainly agree with that, Gen. I 

was just going to let the Board Members ask any 

questions and then punt it back to NIOSH. So, with 

that, Brad, do you have any questions from SC&A's 

presentation?

Member Clawson: No, I think it was just saying the 

same thing I was saying, just a little bit more 

professional. So, no, not at this time. Thanks.

Chair Beach: All right. And for me the key slide was 

-- and I don't know what number it is again. But it 

goes back to the NIOSH or 1996 when everything 

changed.

Yes, 835 wasn't implemented in late '95. But you also 

have to look at the programs, the deficiencies. I 

mean, there was widespread deficiencies across the 

complex. That was in '97 and '98. You have to look 

at the 1999 report. That's really all we have as a basis 
53

to look at as to how that was actually working.

So I'm going to leave it at that for right now but, and 

let NIOSH answer those questions that were brought 

up by both Lockey and Gen, if you're ready for that, 

LaVon.

Mr. Rutherford: Well, you know, I'll just -- you know, 

I'm going to let Jim, Dr. Neton, define what we will 

consider going forward. I think he's maybe, has a 

little more even keeled on this in going forward and 

can give a better response on what we can do.

I would say that the statement that we never 

provided a sample dose reconstruction was incorrect. 

We did provide it. That sample dose reconstruction 

method was based on the 100 millirem CEDE. But 

what it did was it was, it included all isotypes. It didn't 

matter whether it was primary radionuclides or 

exotics.

And maybe I misunderstood what Joe was saying on 

that. But we did provide a sample dose 

reconstruction. And I don't think SC&A has provided 

anything that supports that that dose reconstruction 

is not valid.

But again, I'll let Jim comment on where he sees this 

path going.

Dr. Neton: Thanks --

(Laughter.)

Mr. Rutherford: Well, that was a good one. Well, I did 

that because I felt like you were probably, you were 

going to be a little more objective and have ideas that 

we can, you know -- 

Dr. Neton: Well, just a couple comments I wrote 

down while Joe was talking. And it was a pretty 

comprehensive discussion.

You know, regarding that, the original audit that 
54

occurred would identify some non-compliance of the 

bioassay program, I don't recall them ever saying 

that there should have been a mixed activation 

product bioassay while focused on the routine of 

bioassay samples that were being taken.

So, in that sense, you know, no one ever criticized 

the fact that they weren't having a routine bioassay 

sample for mixed activation products. I'll have to go 

back and look at that a little closer. But that just 

crossed my mind.

The other observation I would make is that it seems 

like there was general agreement, although I'm not 

sure 100 percent on this, that we can do the routine, 

we can do dose reconstructions for the routinely 

monitored nuclides.

We have coworker models that go all the way through 

2008 for these nuclides. And we could use those 

coworker models if need be. We were trying to make 

it a little simpler than that.

If that is true, then we're left with the exotics. And 

Joe raised some good points that we probably haven't 

done a good enough job demonstrating why we 

believe the source term is so different from the earlier 

Class that was added and how the monitoring 

program changed to allow us to say we can do dose 

reconstruction now.

I know there was some preliminary data that we've 

looked at recently that did just that. It demonstrated 

at least for one year that the, they took a lot of mixed 

activation product samples in facilities like LANSCE. 

And my recollection is virtually all the samples were 

non-detectable.

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, and I will comment on that. 

And that is correct.

And I will also comment on the -- I didn't know about 

which way you were going with that, Jim. But I was 
55

going to comment that, yes, the data that we had 

looked at so far there was very little activity.

And it's very clear from the LANSCE reports, the 1994 

report where their concern was emissions from 

stacks, because they controlled at the source with 

glove boxes and closed systems such that exposure 

to the occupational workforce in the area was 

minimal.

Dr. Neton: And so I think there's some work that we 

could do to shore up that end of it. I do recall the 

source term for the earlier Class was fission products 

to a large extent. And I think that at one point they 

were analyzing pieces and parts or whatever that 

were taken during the weapons testing at the test 

site. I don't know if that existed in this 1996-plus 

period.

So I think we do need to go back. And if we could just 

agree that we can do routinely monitored nuclides 

and we can show the source term changed 

significantly in the 1996 forward period and show 

that either for the source term and/or the monitoring 

data that we have, then maybe we can come to some 

sort of an agreement.

But, you know, there's work to do on our part. And I 

think that NIOSH will go back and relook at the mixed 

fission, mixed activation product source term.

Chair Beach: Jim, this is Josie. What kind of a 

timeframe are you thinking here?

Dr. Neton: Well, that's a good question. I can commit 

to anything because in April I'm retired.

Chair Beach: Exactly.

Mr. Rutherford: Josie, I'd like to comment on that. 

The timeframe totally depends on how much we've 

got to dig down into and how much data we got to 
56

dig down in to find to give you an answer that you 

can make a decision on. So it could go three months. 

It could go three years.

Dr. Neton: Yeah, that's a good point. I mean, I think 

trying to come up with --

Mr. Rutherford: Understanding what it's going to take 

to get an answer, that's a pretty critical point.

Dr. Neton: Well, one thing that we've done at other 

sites, and Savannah River comes to mind, is that we 

could put forward a strategy, a sampling plan or an 

analysis plan, and provide that to the Work Group 

and see if they would -- before we go on, embark on 

this endeavor, we could see if everybody agrees that 

this would be, if we could do, you know, actuate this 

sampling plan, that it would be sufficient to prove our 

point.

Chair Beach: Yeah, I'm just a little frustrated that a 

year ago, over a year ago we asked for the 1990 in 

MAPs. It got noisy in here all of a sudden.

Anyway, I'm just a little frustrated about the NIOSH 

didn't give us back anything that we asked for last 

year on that, the 1999 assessment that was done at 

LANL. So it's, that's a bit frustrating.

Member Lockey: Jim Lockey. When can you give us 

an analysis plan?

Dr. Neton: That would be up to Bomber I suppose. 

But we'd have to go back and look at the source term 

data and what we have as far as air samples, how 

difficult -- this would more than likely require the 

data capture effort, correct, Bob and LaVon?

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, I need to -- well, we need to 

look at what data we have, the source terms, as Jim 

mentioned, decide, you know, what additional data 

we may need. And then we can come up with a 

schedule.
57

Member Clawson: Well, I'd also like to mention, 

realize that we've been on this coworker model at 

Savannah River for numerous years now. And you 

know my frustration on that part of it.

Yes, this last time we sat down and went into great 

details and stuff. But this is about the third or fourth 

different sampling plan that we've gone through, too, 

you know. So, you know --

Dr. Neton: I think, Brad, this is a little different. I 

mean, we're talking here about demonstrating that 

the potential to receive 100 millirem CEDE was not 

there for this particular source term. And --

Member Clawson: Well, I meant --

Dr. Neton: -- if the 1999 data is any indication where 

they're all non-detected, you could have some pretty 

significant airborne activity for mixed activation 

products and be below 100 millirems. It shouldn't be 

as difficult as the Savannah River --

Member Clawson: Coworkers.

Dr. Neton: Those are coworkers. We're really parsing 

the data there quite a bit and the broad overview of 

what the exposure potential is during this time period 

of the source term.

Mr. Rutherford: And, Josie, I will say, we will get you 

the response on the assessment. That will be, that 

can be done, as I mentioned, before the next Board 

meeting. And it may be sooner. I don't know. But 

that's not going to be our long haul, I don't think. I 

think it's the, this answering the mixed fission and 

activation products.

Chair Beach: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, this is Joe. I just have a 

comment. Of course, the reason I included the 

LANSCE analysis was to prompt this kind of 

discussion. And I think this is good.
58

But, you know, I think the gateway question into this, 

you know, the -- I read the basis for the SEC for, you 

know, through '95. And it was the lack of available 

monitoring data, as well as available process and 

source term information, that would be a basis for, 

you know, bounding these doses.

And I agree with Jim that 100 millirem is more 

forgiving. But I think the gateway question is 

whether, you know, that condition, the availability of 

source term data and sampling information, 

monitoring data across the, you know, the exotics 

that we're talking about, you know, would be 

different, would be more available or, you know, 

could be assessed differently such that you get where 

you're going to get.

It's almost like a feasibility question before launching 

the data capture. And I don't know the answer to 

that.

The reason I threw out that one notion was that if 

you step back, it certainly looks like the source terms, 

at least in this one case, have come down

considerably. And that very well may be the case for 

the others.

But then the question becomes from a method 

standpoint is there enough grist for, you know, to 

actually come up with the analysis given the fact that 

I don't think there's more bioassay data, but certainly 

there might be enough characterization information 

from the operations that could give you that lead.

So that, I think maybe that would be an initial 

question followed by, you know, capturing that 

information. But, you know, maybe a yes or no to 

whether or not that exists for the, you know, the 

exotics in question would be a good question to 

answer.

Mr. Rutherford: Well, I'd like to say that if, you know 

-- and I understand where Joe is going. But we can 
59

also look at air sampling data if air sampling data 

proves my point that they were controlling the source 

and they were controlling individuals -- then the 100 

millirem is correct whether, I mean -- so it's not only 

the source term. It's not only the fact that the source 

term is diminishing.

If we could show that by air sampling that the air 

sampling was there and they were doing, they were 

monitoring for mixed fission and activation products, 

then our analysis was correct.

Dr. Neton: The problem we're going to run into, and 

maybe I'll throw this on the table right now, is that 

these are likely to be general area air samples. But 

based on our first analysis that I heard about, they 

were extremely low, like less than MDA.

So, if one can allow for the fact that general area 

samples are not necessarily representative of the 

workers breathing zone, but you can allow for some 

amount of difference, like a factor of ten or 

something, and incorporate that in there and still 

show that these are below 100 millirem, that may be 

sufficient.

I just want to be clear that, you know, I know we've 

had issues before with using general area air sample 

data. But that's likely what we're going to have.

Chair Beach: Okay. Thanks.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, so, yeah, I think, you know, 

that is headed in the right direction. And that coupled 

with a dispositioning of the 1999 issue -- and there 

to me it's strictly a data completeness question, a 

records completeness. You know, what are the 

implications for -- and this is the same thing as 

Savannah River. What is the implications for knowing 

that the bioassay program is sufficiently complete in 

terms of those records?

And, Jim, you said earlier that you didn't hear any 
60

mention of mixed fission products or activation 

products on that particular review or audit. And I 

agree.

I mean, but to me it's not so much that question. I 

think this speaks to the completeness question in 

general as to whether or not, you know, whether or 

not the bioassay program was, in fact, complete 

enough to rely on the records for dose 

reconstruction.

And it may very well turn out that the way the 

sampling was done, these were isolated, not 

consequential to that question. But I think that would 

be in the follow up that you're planning. It's not just 

simply whether procedures were changed, but what 

are the implications for the completeness of the 

bioassay records based on what one would see from 

that. And I don't have an easy path forward as how 

one does that.

But, you know, I'm a little concerned that that was a, 

you know, it was a internal audit. It was a sampling 

exercise done in one week. So, you know, I don't 

want to put too much, you know, significance to it 

other than the fact that it's a signal that there's an 

issue. And the question is how big is the issue.

Dr. Neton: Yeah, and I'm not sure about this one. If 

I recall, it wasn't like they were missing gross 

segments of the population, just certain people that 

were on the RWP weren't sampled and didn't get the 

word.

And we have a lot of bioassay data for the routinely 

encountered radionuclides. Like I say, we have full 

coworker models already from 2008 for the routine 

nuclides.

And my recollection is that their 50th percentile is 

below the MDA. And I think in some cases, their 95th 

percentile may be below the MDA.
61

So, in that case, if you're missing a few workers out 

of the thousands that were monitored, I think you 

would have to come up with some scenario that the 

most highly exposed workers were missed in this 

sampling shortfall. So --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, what I would be interested is 

exactly what he just said. Is it a few workers or is the 

implication that it's more than a few workers? And 

it's hard to tell based on the little information we have 

on that audit right now.

Dr. Neton: See, that's why I got a little confused, Joe, 

because I think during your presentation, at one 

point you sort of indicated that you thought, well, 

maybe for the routine 100 millirem is okay. But then 

on the other hand, you're saying, well, there would 

be findings, and for the routine ones, they missed 

some people. So you still got to go back and validate 

--

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, I think the issue for the audit is 

strictly the completeness of the bioassay records in 

terms of whether the CTW contractor enrolled, you 

know, a appreciable number of the workers that they 

were supposed to enroll and whether, in fact, on jobspecific bioassays they were, in fact, complete.

I mean, this is reminiscent and it's not surprising, 

because this was a generic issue that DOE directed 

self-assessments across the board. But that would be 

a question of whether it has any implications for the 

completeness question taken broadly.

Dr. Neton: Yeah, okay. Well, I think that's an easier 

issue to address than the mixed activation products.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, yeah. And I want to make that 

distinction, because I think that's kind of the, I don't 

want to call it typical, but an issue we see at many 

sites. You come up against some evidence of 

incompleteness in the data. And then the obvious 

question is that incompleteness reflective of 
62

something that would be consequential for, you 

know, dose reconstruction or not.

And I think then, you know, there's definitely some 

avenues of inquiry that will tell you is this reflective 

or is it, you know, clearly not going to be significant 

enough to affect, you know, as you were saying, 

affect the coworker models.

Dr. Neton: Right, and again, I was trying to also bring 

up a point that that audit was really about a finding 

against Los Alamos missing people who should have 

been monitored, you know, or the people that 

identified that should have been monitored and they 

were missing people.

But again, I saw no evidence I don't recall that said 

they're missing major source terms of people that 

weren't monitored like mixed fission products, mixed 

activation products, that sort of thing.

And I don't know if that audit actually addressed that 

issue when they did a more broad scope review or 

whether they just looked at what they were 

monitoring and determined that they were, you 

know, were monitoring the people they thought they 

should have been monitoring properly, not are we 

monitoring the people in general.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, I don't think we know enough 

on that review, which is, of course, the reason to 

follow up on it. But those would be, I guess, questions 

that need to be answered.

And I just want to make sure, though, that the overall 

thought that, you know, the implications for dose 

reconstructability is clearly the outcome. And I think, 

you know, it sounds like, you know, you would be 

looking at it from that standpoint.

It's not a question of mixed activation products 

versus the primaries. It's just really a standard 

question of completeness.
63

Dr. Neton: Yeah.

Chair Beach: Okay. Thank you. Any other questions 

before we sort of talk about -- well, one thing I want 

to throw out there, too, is why -- I guess I want to 

ask the Work Group Members why shouldn't the Work 

Group advance a recommendation for an SEC 

extension through 2000.

I know we talked about an analysis plan. I know 

we've been working on this for the last ten years or 

so. This analysis plan will take some time. Again, 

once we decide if we want to go forward with the 

analysis plan, that's going to take some time. And 

Jim indicated a year, three years. It's really we don't 

know at this point with more data capture.

So I guess I'm throwing out, based on all of that, why 

not extend the SEC through 2000. And I'm just 

looking for Work Group Members' thoughts.

Member Clawson: Josie, let me -- and the basis for 

that is because of the findings that we found in that 

one document that we really didn't get a report back 

on of the shortcomings.

Chair Beach: Right.

Member Clawson: I see no problem with it. I think, 

I'll be the first one to say I move that we ask for SEC 

up through 2000.

Member Roessler: Josie, this is Gen. I'm not quite, 

I'm not ready to go with that yet. It seems to me that 

some of the things that Jim and LaVon mentioned 

that they would look at, and I think they need some 

time to consider what was brought up today. I think 

they have one more step before we go that route. 

And that would be to get a response from NIOSH 

after today's discussions.

Chair Beach: Okay. And I bring it up only because a 

lot of this stuff we talked about today is stuff we've 
64

been talking about for a while. So thanks, Gen and 

Brad, and then Jim.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Josie, if I might make a comment.

Chair Beach: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: If you're going to think about adding 

a class to cover the 1999 assessments, that is based 

on the routinely monitored radionuclides not being 

adequately monitored. It has nothing to do with this 

mixed activation product discussion that we've been 

having.

Chair Beach: I understand.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And we've already agreed prior, in the 

Class before that, we can do dose reconstructions for 

workers for the routinely monitored nuclides. So 

there would be a major disconnect in the logic of 

going down that path based on the 1999 assessment 

--

Chair Beach: Yeah, I guess I was going -- yeah, thank 

you. I was going back to the program adequacy due 

to that -- well, the cutoff date, '95 may have been a 

few years premature based on the ability to 

reconstruct dose for those mixed fission products. 

And that is a benchmark of what the program looked 

like.

I mean, I understand what you're saying about 

pinpointing the primaries versus the exotics. So 

thanks for that clarification.

And then, Jim, did you have any comments?

Member Lockey: Yeah, my comment is I think I'd like 

to give NIOSH a chance at the next Board meeting to 

lay out what it would take and what timeline it would 

take to look at the source terms over that period of 

time. If it's going to be a two-year process, that's too 

long. If it's going to be a short process, I'm willing to 

wait for a short process.
65

Chair Beach: Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you. So 

I'm going to go back to NIOSH. And can your. 

Katz: Let me just address -- this is Ted.

Katz: Let me just address what Jim just said because 

I think there's something else that's important here.

I mean, Jim said if it's going to be a two-year process, 

that's no good. But honestly, I mean, that is not a 

basis for having an SEC as to how long the research 

follow up would be. That won't swing it.

If the Board believes that the path forward will not 

be productive, that's sort of a different matter. But 

for the path forward, because it might take longer 

than the Board would like, you have that issue with 

a number of sites. We've had that issue, you know, 

multiple times over these past 15 years.

And it's just, there's no getting around it. But that's 

not a decision criterion for adding your class. I just 

want to make that clear. But --

Member Lockey: Thanks, Ted. I appreciate that 

comment. I just, you know, we all get frustrated how 

long it takes.

So I think if NIOSH can come up with a reasonable 

timeline that we agree that, the Board or the Working 

Group agrees that would most likely answer the 

question one way or the other, that would be the best 

approach. Yeah, thanks, Ted.

Path forward/WG recommendations/December 

ABRWH meeting plans

Chair Beach: Okay. So, LaVon, can you summarize 

moving forward a plan of action?

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, I can --

Chair Beach: And then --
66

Mr. Rutherford: I think the two key -- okay, yeah --

Chair Beach: Do you mind if I just jump in? And I 

don't want the petitioners to think we have forgotten 

them. We have not. So I just want to wrap this up, 

and then we'll get to petitioners' comments. Thanks.

Mr. Rutherford: Okay. I think we've committed to two 

things. One is the responding to the assessment, 

1999 assessment, giving our response and how that 

assessment and what came out of that assessment 

potentially affects dose reconstruction. And that one 

I think can be done prior to or by the April Board 

meeting.

The other one is the, actually coming up with a plan 

for determining the source term, coming up with a 

plan that lays out how we're going to determine 

whether the 100 millirem CEDE is a good number for 

mixed fission and activation products.

And I think I heard somebody say that they'd like to 

have some kind of a schedule by the -- are we talking 

by this Board meeting + 

Mr. Katz: That's no time. That's truly right around the 

corner.

Mr. Rutherford: I was hoping that I could get, have, 

you know, some time. And, I mean, it may not take 

me till the April Board meeting to come up with this, 

lay this out and everything. But having it by this 

Board meeting is going to be very tough.

Chair Beach: No. LaVon, can you have it maybe sent 

around to the Work Group before April so we have a 

chance to comment on it and maybe have it more 

shored up by April, the same time you send, the 1999 

assessment comes out? Would that be reasonable?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes, I think that's 

Mr. Katz: Yeah, this is Ted. I just, I think this should 

be a very high priority. And it would be great to, I 
67

believe to have a draft out to the Work Group to look 

at and SC&A, not -- I mean, April is a lot away, I 

think, you know, even earlier in March at least so that 

they can weigh in and consider it and since this, you 

know, very important I think for the Board to move 

on when it can.

Chair Beach: And potentially do you think we could 

have a meeting before the April Board meeting or 

would we have to wait till after? What's your sense 

on that, LaVon? Or do you need to get back to me?

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, I mean, I really need to get 

back to you. But I don't know. The initial thoughts 

are I think we could have one if we got you a draft 

sometime in March and we were able to have a Work 

Group meeting to discuss it prior to the April Board 

meeting.

Chair Beach: Okay.

Mr. Rutherford: And my initial thoughts are we could. 

You know, if we start laying it out and everybody 

starts screaming at me, I'll let you know.

Chair Beach: Okay. Okay.

Member Lockey: LaVon, just before we leave the 

subject on scope, though, I know you mentioned 

mixed activation and mixed fission. Given the scope 

preceding SEC included also these other nuclides, 

was that your intent just to focus on part of that or 

did you intend to include curium and, you know, 

some of those other exotics?

Mr. Rutherford: I think we'll look at all the exotics 

and, you know, that we can, that there's a source 

term of concern in this period. And so --

Member Lockey: I'm just saying the jump-off point 

was that the nuclides that were the basis I think prior 

to '96 and whether that would be carried forward in 

your review.
68

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, I think we could comment on 

it all.

Member Lockey: Okay.

Chair Beach: Okay. Any other comments on the plan 

forward? And being that the Work Group is divided 

on this, I think we need to move forward with NIOSH 

providing this to the Work Group and giving them the 

time to do that.

Any other comments? Okay. I'm going to go to the 

petitioners' comments. But before I do that, again, 

LaVon, you did mention you created a table at the 

back of your White Paper. But you did a very good 

job in looking at all petitioners' concerns. And there 

were a lot of them.

Joe actually had comments on one of them. Joe, is 

that something that you'd like to discuss now or just 

-- there was no time to get it out to the Work Group, 

so just something to verbally discuss and then get it 

out after it goes through the normal process.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, I mean, I think a lot of the 

questions we would have relate back to the 

discussion we just had with respect to the 

implementation of 835, because a lot of the answers 

in the right-hand column dealt with that.

So there was one, beyond that there was one issue. 

And this goes to Issue 55. This was one that was a 

little different than the others in terms of 835 

implementation.

And in that Appendix A response for 55, NIOSH 

stated that given the, quote, short half-lives of the 

numerous bioassay results for beryllium-7, carbon11, nitrogen-13, and several other activation 

products, these spallation products were, quote, 

unlikely to have been significant contributors to 

worker doses.
69

And I guess the only question I had was there was 

another activation products, such as argon and 

oxygen, and these are all referenced in the ORAU 

TBD but are not in Table 4.1 of the White Paper. And 

they were used, argon and oxygen actually were used 

as the basis for the estimated whole body and skin 

doses that were in that table I used.

So I guess just a clarifying question really, and, you 

know, while we agree that these doses were not 

substantial, the table seems to suggest that there 

were doses that were in the 11 to 120 millirem. And 

for at least argon, half-life is two hours. So, as far as 

occupational dose, that one would certainly be 

perhaps a controlling one as far as inhalation or 

immersion.

And again, based on Table 4-1 of the White Paper, it 

still remains unclear whether NIOSH has any 

bioassay or air monitoring data since this wasn't 

included, oxygen-15 and argon-41, such that you can 

do mixed activation products.

And, you know, the fact that there is beryllium in the 

carbon, nitrogen isotypes, as I recall, there was still 

a problem with ratios and being able to do a dose 

estimation based on mixed activation products even 

though there were some separate analyses of those 

nuclides.

So this is more of a clarifying question, trying to 

reconcile what's, you know, in the Appendix table for 

that particular item with what was in the ER and 

what's been discussed in past Work Groups.

It just seemed like, you know, the focus was on those 

specific nuclides and the ability to monitor and the 

fact that there were, in fact, a lot of in vivo data for 

them, which is true. But whether that enables, you 

know, a dose estimation for MAPs, mixed activation 

products, the whole schmear, I think there was some 

real difficulties coming up with a way to do that.
70

So that was kind of one comment. And that relates 

to Item 55. The rest of them I think really tie into the 

discussion we had today.

Chair Beach: Thanks, Joe. And have you sent that 

through the DOE process yet or is it in the process?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, like I said, I didn't want to hold 

up the main report and the other items. But this one 

thing I can certainly make sure it gets to the Work 

Group and NIOSH in the next few days. I'll just go 

ahead and process it.

Mr. Rutherford: Yeah, after we get the specific 

response from you, we can, we'll take a look at that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, that's the essence of it, though. 

It's a clarifying question.

Petitioner's comments, concerns and questions

Chair Beach: Okay. Thank you. Anything else from 

Board Members, NIOSH or SC&A?

Member Roessler: Nothing here.

Chair Beach: Okay. Hearing none, Andrew, you've 

been very patient. And have you got some comments 

or questions, concerns?

Mr. Evaskovich: Yeah, this is Andrew Evaskovich. I 

do. I'm on speaker. Is that okay? Does it sound okay?

Chair Beach: Yes, it does. You're clear for me.

Mr. Evaskovich: Okay. All right. So I've raised issues 

about the inventory. And there have been at least 

three separate reviews indicating problems with the 

inventory.

And, basically, the inventories were identified as 

source terms, which would be to the air monitoring 

and the sampling. So, if your inventories aren't 

correct, then you don't know where to go sample in 
71

order to, you know, start looking.

One of the major ones was the Clean Air Act lawsuit

in dealing with stacks. And there were issues with 

LANSCE concerning the stacks and the emissions 

there.

So, going into the routine monitoring from that, and 

there have been problems indicated with that. As far 

as the comments, one example is the SM-66 

americium incident. They sent uranium pellets from 

TA-55 to SM-66, and they were contaminated with 

americium.

Now, contamination was not detected prior to leaving 

TA-55. And there were problems with receiving the 

samples. But additionally, the monitoring there did 

not detect the americium, the hand monitoring. Now, 

that would indicate that there are problems with the 

routine monitoring as far as, you know, going into, 

establishing whether or not somebody needs a 

bioassay.

And the only reason that this contamination was 

discovered is because an RCT saw some radioactive 

labelings in a regular trash can. And the only reason 

he saw that is because the trash wasn't emptied 

because the custodian was on vacation that week and 

nobody covered that area.

So, basically, it was just dumb luck that it was 

discovered. It may have been discovered at some 

point later on. But still, it took I think seven or ten 

days before it was discovered.

Now, as far as the exotics go, the neptunium, there 

was a finding that the air monitoring was not 

adequate in order to determine if there should be 

bioassay. So, you know, with the exotics, I think they 

didn't calibrate I believe the air monitoring or the 

neptunium. It was a separate calibration from either 

americium or plutonium.
72

So I think those problems need to be looked at, 

because you need to establish where the exotics 

were. And you need to determine if there was your 

basic air monitoring and sampling to determine 

whether or not bioassay should have been done.

As to the three-year question as far as, you know, 

working on this, I would think that indicates data is 

lacking. And that's basically what causes an SEC or a 

cohort to be added is the data is lacking. You can't 

do an accurate dose reconstruction.

So I think, you know, three years is too long. And I 

think if it does, you know, extend for, or if it goes for 

an extended period, that does indicate that a cohort 

needs to be added for the later years.

There were other things I'd like to address, but I'm 

going to do that in writing. I'm still working up on 

that. And I'll submit that I believe before the next 

Board meeting. I'll send that in to NIOSH to be 

distributed.

And I think that's all the comments that I have for 

today.

Chair Beach: Okay. Thank you, Andrew. We do 

appreciate your comments. And we'll look forward to 

your comments in writing.

Mr. Evaskovich: Thank you.

Chair Beach: Any

Mr. Katz: For the good of the order.

Chair Beach: For the good of the order, yes. Okay. I 

think we have a path forward. I think we'll look for 

something from NIOSH.

And if there's any scoping that needs to go back and 

forth between SC&A, I'm assuming you can do that 

via 
73

Mr. Katz: Yeah, absolutely.

Adjourn

Chair Beach: Okay. Okay. Well then, I would say that 

we can complete our call for today. With no o

Mr. Katz: Yeah, thank you, everybody, for all the hard 

work that went in to the deliberations today. I really 

appreciate that.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 12:55 p.m.)