IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on briefs December 13, 2011

MICHAEL J. DENSON v. DAVID A. SEXTON, WARDEN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County

No. 5882 Robert E. Cupp, Judge

No. E2011-01471-CCA-R3-HC-FILED-OCTOBER 31, 2012

The petitioner, who stood convicted following a guilty plea to numerous crimes

including aggravated kidnapping, brought a petition for habeas corpus claiming that the trial

court was without jurisdiction to enter a pretrial order amending one count of his indictment

from a charge of especially aggravated kidnapping to a charge of aggravated kidnapping.

Consequently, he urged that his conviction for aggravated kidnapping was void. The habeas

corpus court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the

petitioner’s claims, if sustained, would merely render his judgment voidable, not void. On

appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process right to fair and

impartial review by failing to accurately grasp the merits of his claims and including nongermane material in its order. After review, we conclude that the habeas corpus court’s order

did fairly address his claims and did not violate his due process rights. Consequently, the

judgment below is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M.TIPTON,

P.J., and JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., joined.

Michael J. Denson, pro se, for the appellant.

Robert E. Cooper,Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Cameron L. Hyder, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 5, 2007, the petitioner, Micheal J. Denson, pled guilty to numerous

charges including aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of

fourteen years and did not file a direct appeal. On November 24, 2010, the petitioner filed

a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his indictment was deficient with regard to

the kidnapping count to which he had pled guilty and that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to amend that count from especially aggravated kidnapping to the lesser included

offense of aggravated kidnapping, as it had sought to do via pretrial order. The State

promptly filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the habeas corpus court on June

8, 2011. The habeas corpus court’s order reads in full:

This matter came before the Court upon the respondent’s motion to dismiss the

petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a review of the petition, the motion

to dismiss, and the entire record in this matter, it appears to the court that the

motion to dismiss is well-taken. The petitioner’s claims, if sustained, would

render the judgment voidable, not void. Moreover, even if the petitioner’s

claim under the Interstate Compact on Detainers would render the judgment

void, the petitioner has failed to establish a violation of the compact.

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the respondent’s motion is GRANTED

and the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Clerk of this court is directed to send copies of this Order per the

certification.

The petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and we proceed to address his claims.

ANALYSIS

The petitioner’s appellate brief contains three separate claims: (1) that the trial court

erred by dismissing his petition “based on an inaccurate grasp of the merits,” (2) that the trial

court erred by stating that its dismissal was based on the record and filings in this matter

when the merits of the petitioner’s claim had “absolutely nothing to do with the Interstate

Compact on Detainers,” and (3) that for these reasons he did not receive a fair and impartial

review of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The crux of the petitioner’s argument is that

the two sentences in the trial court’s order that reference the Interstate Compact on Detainers

reveal that the trial court never fairly considered and adjudicated his claim. It appears to us

from our review of the record that the petitioner is correct in his assertion that the habeas

corpus court included in its order some discussion of an issue that was not germane to the

resolution of any legal claim that he had raised.

The habeas corpus court’s order states that the petitioner’s claims were being

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dismissed because his allegations, even if proved, would merely serve to render his

conviction voidable, not void. Therefore, his claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus

case. See Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 163-64 (Tenn. 1993). Stricken of its nongermane material, the court’s order still contains enough of its reasoning to permit the

petitioner to surmise the basis of its ruling and provides a fair basis for appeal of the issue.

Regardless, on appeal, the petitioner does not raise any challenge to the habeas corpus

court’s conclusion that his claims, if proved, would still fail to render his conviction void.

Nor do we discern any obvious error in the lower court’s ruling. It is well-established that

habeas corpus relief is only available if “it appears upon the face of the judgment or the

record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a convicting court was

without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of

imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164 (internal quotations

omitted). However, it appears from the record that the petitioner’s judgment was entered by

a court of competent jurisdiction, and his sentence has not expired. Consequently, the

petitioner is entitled to no relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

_________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE

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