### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Fe brua ry 8, 200 5 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . FRANK PETER PINCHAK

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty

No. 242161 Rebec ca Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2004-01184-CC A-R3- CD - F iled April 25, 2005

The de fendant, Frank Peter Pinchak, enter ed a nolo c ontender e plea to vehicular

assault, ag g ravated

assa u l t , and viol ation of the implied consent law . The trial c ourt defe rre d the impositi on of two

concur rent two-y ear

sentenc es for

vehicular assault and ag g ravated assault, placing the def endant on judicial d i v er s i o n for a term of six y ear s. For violating the implied consent law, the trial court suspended the de fendant’s license for one y ear . The trial c ourt then dismissed su a s po nte the implied

c on se nt l a w v iol a tio n, no ti ng that th e ind ic tme nt f a ile d to c ha

rg e a c ri min a l of

fe ns e . T he Sta te appea ls the single issue of whether the trial court e rre d in dismi ssing the implied conse nt violation and ar g ues t hat di version is inappropriate i f the off ense is re instated. Concluding that an indictment is not a nece ssary

prer equisite to adjudication of a civil impli ed consent law violation, we r ever se the tri al co u rt ’s d i smissal of the char g e, re mand the ca se for reinstateme nt of the trial court’s orig inal imposit ion of a one-y ear suspension of the defe ndant’s driver’ s license, and conc lude that diversion is not appropriate for this civil offe nse.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

J.C. M C L IN , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

J erry H. Summers, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Fr ank Peter

Pinchak.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; John H. B le ds oe , A ssi stan t At torne y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam H. Cox , I I I ., District At t o rn eyGene ral; and Steve n H. Strain, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F acts and P roce dural Hi story-2-

The facts presented at the pl ea hearing established t hat t he defenda nt was oper ating a motor

ve hic le on L ake Re so rt

Drive in H a mil tonCou nty on No ve mbe r 3 , 2 00 1. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le struck a van, causing it to veer off the road and flip upside down. The c ollisi on cause d phy sical injury to two victims, who were inside t h e v an

. When police offic ers r esponded to the a ccide nt, the defe ndant appe are d intox icated, r efuse d to submit to a field sob ri et y t es t , and re fused to sig n an imp lie d c on se nt f

orm.

The Hamilton C ounty

Gra nd J ury

returne d an indictment cha rg ing the defe ndant with (1) driving under the influence of an intoxi cant ( D.U.I .); (2) ve hicular a ssault; (3) ag g ravated assault; and (4) violation of the implied conse nt law. Pursuant to an ag ree ment by the parties, the State dismissed the D. U. I . c ha

rg e , a ndthe de fe nd a nt p le d n olo c on te nd e re to the re ma ini ng thr e e of fe ns e s.

For the vehicula

r assault and the ag g ravated assault, the tria l court s entenc ed the de fenda nt to two concur

rent two-y ear

sentenc es but g rante d the def endant’ s reque st to b e p l ac ed on judicial diversion for a

term of six y ear s. Be fore g ranting diversion, the trial c ourt hea rd t h e t estimony of defe nse witnesses, finding that “[the defe ndant] ha s made extraordinary eff orts towards r ehabilitation and the a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty .” Fo r v iolation of the implied consent law, the trial court suspended the de fendant’s driver’ s license f or one y ear

.

The de fendant then filed a post-he aring memorandum, a rg uing that th e trial court ha d the

auth ority to g rant jud ic ia l div e rs ion fo r the imp lie d c on se nt v iol a tio n. Th e de fe nd a nt a lso state d th a t,

a lth ou g h h e ini tia lly

re fu se d a br e a tha ly zer

te st, hesu bs e qu e ntl y

of fe re d to take a

blo od a lc oh ol t e st and blood was dr awn at the hospital. The State objecte d to the defe ndant’s conte ntion, arg uing that the one- y ear

suspension was appr opriate. The trial court e ntere d an orde r that stated:

[C]oun t 4 o f the ind ic tme nt, tho ug h it c ha rg e s the de fe nd a nt with fa ilu re to s ub mit to

a blo oda lc oh ol t e st, do e s n ot c ha rg e a c ri min a l of

fe ns e , th e Cou rt

fi nd s th a t it

sh ou ld be dismissed su a s

po nte , the defendant’s request for defe rra l of t he entry of judg ment on that count denied a s moot, and the state’s r equest for suspension of the def

endant’ s driving privileg es pursua nt to [ section] 55 10 406 denied. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55 10 406(a) (3) (providing that a violation of that statute is not a criminal off ense, e x cept when it occur s while the def endant is driving on a re voked, suspende d, or cancelled lic e ns e , inwh ic h e ve nt i t c on sti tut e s a Cla ss Amis dem eanor) ; T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 12 (b )( 2) (a

uth orizin g a

tr ia l c ou rt

to no tic e the failu re to c ha rg e a n o ff e ns e a t a ny

tim e during the pende ncy

of proc eeding s).

. . . . Th e Cou rt

the re fo re OR DE RS a s f

oll ow s: (1) that the subje ct re quests be denie d and (2) that c ount 4 of the indictment be dismissed.

The trial c o u r t th e n e n te r e d a n u n c p r o tu n c o r d e r

th a t s e t f o r thth e c o n d it io n s o f

ju d ic ial d i v e r s i o n f

o r t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s au l t a n d v e h i c u l ar a s s a u l t c h ar g e s a n d f o r m a l l y d i s m i s s e d t h e D

. U

. I. and implied consent c harg es. From this order the State a ppeals.-3- Ana lys is

Be fore addre ss i n g t h e merits of this appeal, we believe a revie w of Te nnessee ’s implied consent law will be helpful. I n Tenne ssee, “[a] ny person who drives any motor vehicle . . . is de emed to have g iven conse nt to a test for the pur pose of de termining the alcoholic or drug content of that person’ s blood; provide d, that such test is administ ere d at the dire ction of a la w enf orce ment office r having rea sonable g rounds to beli ev e s u ch p erson wa s driving w hile under the influence of an intox icant or dr

ug .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-406(a )(1) . This statute “cle arly intends that the offic er with knowledg e about the av ai l ab l e . . . equipment a nd fac iliti es shall selec t the testing me thod.” State v. Turner , 913 S.W .2d 158, 162 (Tenn. 1995) . When a law e nforc ement off icer reque sts a

driver
to s ub mit to a te st, that of

fi c e r “s ha ll, prior

to c on du c tin g su c h te st, a dv ise the drive r that r e fu sa l to submit t o such test will result in the suspension of the drive r’s operator’ s license by the court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10- 406(a) (2). T h u s , o n e arr ested for D.U.I . who re fuses to submit to a test, after being advised that re fusal will result in a suspension of the driver’s lice nse, is char g ed with violation of the implied consent law . Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-406(a ).

T h e c o u r t r e s p o n s i b l e f

o r d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a d r i v e r v i o l a t e d t h e i m p l i e d c o n s e n t la w i s “the sa me court as the one disposing of the offense for which such driver was pl ace d under a rre st.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406( a)( 3). I f the court determines a driver to ha ve violat ed t h e im plied

c on se nt l a w, the c ou rt sh all revoke the driver’s l icense for the period of time desig nated in the statute. I d. (empha sis added).

The statute de lineating the implied consent law is not “a criminal statute, but a statute which confe rs an a dminist rative penalty .” Turner
, 913 S.W .2d at 163; see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10- 406 (a) (3) ( “[T] he drive r shall not be con s i dere d as having committed a criminal offense .”). Howeve r, if the c ourt or jury finds that the driver violated the implied c onsent law while driving on
a re voked, suspende d, or cancelled license as a result of a prior e numerated conviction, “suc h driver commits a Class A misdemeanor a nd shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and sh a ll be se nte nc e d to a

min imu m ma nd a tory

ja il o r w or

kh ou se se nte nc e of

fi ve (5 ) d a y s w hic h s ha ll be served conse cutively , day for day , and which se ntence cannot be suspended.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406( a)( 3). “[A] driver is not subject to the criminalsanctions . . . unless he or she has one of the re fe re nc e d p ri or

c on vic tio ns and
, as a re sult thereof, w as ‘driving on a revoke d, suspended or

canc elled license ’ at the time of the stop.” State v. Michae l Doug las Wil lis, No. E2002-00769-CCAR3-CD, 2002 WL

31556510, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Nov. 19, 2002) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10- 406(a) (3))

.

I n the instant case , we init ially note t hat t he record provides no indication that the def endant was driving on a re voked, suspende d, or cance lled license. Thus, the defendant pled nolo c ontender e to a civil violation of the implied consent law, not a c riminal offe nse.T enness ee R ul e o f C ri m i nal P roce d ure 12 (b)(2) aut ho ri zes a t ri al co urt t o noti ce a d efect i n an i nd i ct m ent 1

a t an y ti m e d u rin g the p e n d e n c y o f t h e p ro c e e d ing s.

-4- Recog nizi ng that the indictment did not charg e a c riminal offe nse, the tria l court employ ed Tenne ssee Rul e of Crimi nal Proce dure 12( b)(2) to su a s po nte dismiss the indictment. Howeve r, a 1 valid indictment is not a prere quisite to the trial co u rt ’s ability to suspend the def

endant’ s driver’ s license f or a c ivil viol ation of the implied consent law. The State simplychose to notify the def endant of the implied consent violation throug h use of an indictment. The statute at issue does not clarif y what cha rg ing instrument should be used to adjudicate a per son for violating the implied consent law. Howeve r, this Court has previously upheld the imposit ion of a civil impli ed conse nt violation framed in an indictment. See Wil lis, 2002 WL 31556510, at *3. As provided in the statu t e, “[t] he de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r a dr ive r vio la te d the [imp lie d c on se nt l a w] s ha ll b e ma de a t th e sa me tim e and by the same co u rt as the one disposing of the offe nse for which such driver wa s place d under

arr e st. ” Te nn . Co de An n. § 55 -1 0- 40 6( a )( 3)

. Th us , a lth ou g h thi s vio la tio n is c ivi l in natur e , it s til l must be adjudicate d along with the ancillary indicted criminal offense s and in the same c ourt.

Th e de fe nd a nt d id n ot c on te st the fa c ts a s pr e se nte d at th e he ari ng . B a se d u po n th e se fa c ts, the t rial co u r t i n it ia ll y

d e te r mi n e d th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t h a d v io late d th e imp li e d c o n s e n t l a w a n d, there fore , suspended his li ce nse for the statutorily

define d period of one y ear . This imposi tion was proper and must now be reinstated. Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10-406( a)( 3) states that “the c ourt shall revoke the license of such driver” for a period of one y ear if the driver is determined to have c ommitt ed an implied conse nt violation.

Fina ll y , the State arg ues that judicial diversion is not authorized under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-313 ( 2003) f o r a c ivil im plied consent violation. We ag ree . Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 55-10-406( a)( 3) mandates that a drive r in violation of the implied consent law ( 1)

“ sh a ll b e c ha

rg e d w ithvio la tin g thi s su bs e c tio n” a nd(2 ) that th e tr ia l c ou rt “ sh a ll r e vo ke the lic e ns e of su c h dri ve r. ” Th e tr ia l cou rt c a nn ot ci rc umv e nt the ma nd a tory la ng ua g e of

the statut e in this c a se by g ranti ng jud ic ia l di ve rs ion . F urthe rm or e , the de fe nd a nt’ s v iol a tio n o f the imp lie d c on se nt l a w i n this case is not a c riminal offe nse; it is a civil offense imposing an “ administrat ive pena lty .” The judicial diversion s tatute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406, only applies to adjudication of criminal offense s under the T ennesse e Sentenc ing Re fo rm Ac t o f 1989. I n conseque nce, the defe ndant’s re quest for judicia l diversion of the mandatory one-y ear licen s e s u s p ensi on is without merit in this case.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing rea sons, we r ever se the dismissal of the implied consent law violation and

rema nd the ca se for

reinstateme nt of the trial court’s orig inal imposit ion of a one -y ear suspension of the def endant’ s license.-5- ___________________________________ J .C. McL I N, J UDGE