J-S29003-17

2017 PA Super 184

JAMAR OLIVER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

SAMUEL IRVELLO

Appellee No. 3036 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 12, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 1916 August Term, 2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 13, 2017

Jamar Oliver (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the judgment,1entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his motion to correct 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 The order reads: 

AND NOW, this 11th day of August 2015, after consideration of 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration regarding the Court’s Order 

entered on August 5, 2015[,] denying Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Correct the Record awarding Defendant’s attorney’s fees in the 

amount of $500.00 for responding to the Motion, it is hereby 

ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED. 

Order, 8/11/15. 

 “As a general rule, an appellate court's jurisdiction extends only to review 

of final orders.” Rae v. Pa. Funeral Directors Ass'n, 977 A.2d 1121, 

1124–25 (Pa. 2008); see Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). An order denying a motion for 

reconsideration is not a final order and, thus, not appealable. See 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S29003-17

- 2 -

the record to reflect that he was the verdict winner and awarding counsel for 

Samuel Irvello (“Defendant”) $500.00 in counsel fees. After our review, we 

affirm in part and reverse in part. 

Plaintiff, who had elected the limited-tort2option on his motor vehicle 

insurance policy, filed a personal injury action against Defendant after a 

motor vehicle accident on May 26, 2011. Following trial, the jury found 

that: (1) Defendant was negligent; (2) Defendant’s negligence was a factual 

cause of Plaintiff’s harm; and (3) Plaintiff “did not sustain a serious 

impairment of a body function as a result of the accident[.]” See Jury 

Verdict Form, 7/7/15 (emphasis added). Question #3 on the verdict form 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Cheathem v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 743 A.2d 518, 521 (Pa. Super. 1999). 

“Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal . . . shall 

be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is 

taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). The filing of a motion for reconsideration does not 

stay the appeal period. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3). Here, Plaintiff has captioned 

his appeal as from the order denying his motion for reconsideration of the 

order denying his motion for correction of the record. The appeal properly 

lies from the August 12, 2016 judgment entered on the verdict in favor of 

Irvello (“Defendant”). We have revised the caption accordingly and, 

because the appeal was filed within 30 days of the date of entry of 

judgment, the appeal is timely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903.

2 Section 1705(a)(1)(A) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 

Responsibility Law (MVFRL), provides that a driver who purchases limitedtort coverage “may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket 

expenses, but not for pain and suffering or other nonmonetary 

damages unless the injuries suffered fall within the definition of 

“serious bodily injury” as set forth in the policy[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1705(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
J-S29003-17

- 3 -

was followed with the statement that, if you answer “No,” Plaintiff cannot 

recover. Thereafter, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of Defendant. 

On July 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to correct the docket to 

reflect that Plaintiff was the verdict winner, asserting that the error on the 

docket precluded Plaintiff from recovering costs. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1726(a)(2).3 See also Smith v. Rohrbaugh, 54 A.3d 892, 897 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (“costs inherent in a law suit are awarded to and should be 

recoverable by the prevailing party.”). Defendant filed a response, arguing 

Plaintiff’s motion was unsupported by case law. Defendant filed a bill of 

costs, to which Plaintiff filed exceptions; Defendant also filed a motion for 

sanctions. Thereafter, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to correct the 

record and granted Defendant’s motion for sanctions, ordering Plaintiff to 

pay Defendant’s counsel fees in the amount of $500.00. 

____________________________________________

3

 Section 1726(a)(2) of the Judicial Code provides: 

(2) The prevailing party should recover his costs from the 

unsuccessful litigant except where the:

(i) Costs relate to the existence, possession or disposition 

of a fund and the costs should be borne by the fund.

(ii) Question involved is a public question or where the 

applicable law is uncertain and the purpose of the litigants 

is primarily to clarify the law.

(iii) Application of the rule would work substantial injustice.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1726(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
J-S29003-17

- 4 -

On August 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which 

the trial court denied on August 11, 2015. See note 1, supra. Plaintiff filed 

an appeal. This Court quashed the appeal because the verdict was not 

reduced to judgment.4 See Pa.R.A.P. 301; Pa.R.C.P. 227.4, 237. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a praecipe for entry of judgment on the verdict, and 

the court entered judgment on the verdict on August 12, 2016. This appeal 

followed. Plaintiff raises the following issues: 

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law in denying the 

Plaintiff’s motion to correct the record to reflect that the 

Plaintiff was the verdict winner? 

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the 

Defendant attorney’s fees as a sanction under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2503 where the motion to correct the record was not 

frivolous or done in bad faith, but instead was based on a 

reasonable interpretation of the law and was supported by 

case authority?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration where in the period between 

the denial of the motion [to correct the record] and the 

motion for reconsideration the Philadelphia Court of 

Common Pleas in Bailey v. Pham, 2015 Phila. Ct. Com. 

Pl. LEXIS 328, *4 (Oct. 20, 2015)[,] issued an opinion 

supporting the Plaintiff’s potion on the underlying motion?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Plaintiff argues that he is the “prevailing party” under section 

1726(a)(2).” He states that although the jury found he had not suffered 

____________________________________________

4

 Oliver v. Irvello, 2745 EDA 2015 (unpublished memorandum, filed July 

25, 2016).
J-S29003-17

- 5 -

serious impairment to a bodily function and thus could not recover noneconomic damages, the jury did find liability on the part of Defendant. In 

support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to a trial court decision, Bailey v. 

Pham, 2015 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 328, *4 (Oct. 20, 2015), and to the 

unpublished memorandum decision of this Court that affirmed that decision. 

Bailey v. Pham, No. 2526 EDA 2015 (filed June 29, 2016).

First, we note that Plaintiff is prohibited from relying on or citing to an 

unpublished memorandum decision of this Court. The Superior Court 

Internal Operating Procedure (IOP) § 65.37(A) provides: 

An unpublished memorandum decision shall not be relied 

upon or cited by a Court or a party in any other action or 

proceeding, except that such a memorandum decision may be 

relied upon or cited (1) when it is relevant under the doctrine of 

law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, and (2) when 

the memorandum is relevant to a criminal action or proceeding 

because it recites issues raised and reasons for a decision 

affecting the same defendant in a prior action or proceeding. 

When an unpublished memorandum is relied upon pursuant to 

this rule, a copy of the memorandum must be furnished to the 

other party to the Court.

210 Pa. Code § 65.37 (emphasis added). We, therefore, will not address 

this portion of Plaintiff’s argument.5

Next, Plaintiff argues that, notwithstanding the fact that the jury did 

not award him compensatory damages, he was the verdict winner. Plaintiff 

____________________________________________

5

In any event, we point out that Bailey v. Pham was not a limited tort 

election case. 
J-S29003-17

- 6 -

insists that the damages question has no bearing on the liability issue, and 

therefore he was the prevailing party. We find this argument unavailing as 

well. 

“It is a general rule in our judicial system, stemming from the Statute 

of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1275), that costs inherent in a law suit are 

awarded to and should be recoverable by the prevailing party.” De Fulvio 

v. Holst, 362 A.2d 1098, 1099 (Pa. Super. 1976). The issue, then, is 

whether Plaintiff was a prevailing party in a limited tort case where he did 

not meet his threshold burden of proving serious injury. Several cases have 

addressed the issue of “prevailing party,” but not in the context of a limited 

tort case.

In Zelenak v. Mikula, 911 A.2d 542 (Pa. Super. 2006), plaintiffs filed 

a personal injury claim against defendant, seeking damages in excess of 

$30,000.00. Prior to trial, defendant offered a settlement of $11,500.00. 

The plaintiffs declined the offer and, following trial, a jury returned a verdict 

in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $7,000. Defendant sought costs, 

arguing the trial court erred in determining that plaintiffs were the 

“prevailing parties,” and citing the inequity of being forced to pay costs after 

making an offer to settle the case for more than what the jury had awarded. 

Id. at 545. On appeal, this Court, finding the argument meritless, stated: 

“The plain meaning of `prevailing part’ is the party who wins the lawsuit. In 

this case, it was [plaintiffs], and consequently, they were entitled to record 

costs.” Id. 
J-S29003-17

- 7 -

In Zavatchen V. RHF Holdings, Inc., 907 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 

2006), this Court addressed what “substantially prevailing party” means 

under the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CSPA). 73 P.S. §§ 

501-516. There, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages in the amount 

of $89,369.33, plus legal interest, late charges and attorney’s fees under 

section 512(b) of the CSPA. Section 512(b) states, in relevant part: 

“Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the substantially 

prevailing party in any proceeding to recover any payment under this act 

shall be awarded a reasonable attorney fee in an amount to be determined 

by the court or arbitrator, together with expenses.” 73 P.S. § 512(b) 

(emphasis added). Following trial, plaintiff was awarded $300.00. 

Defendants then sought attorney’s fees, claiming they were the 

“substantially prevailing parties” under the CSPA because plaintiff recovered

less than 1% of the amount he sought in his complaint. The trial court 

denied defendants’ motion, and on appeal, we affirmed, stating: 

While the mandatory language of section 512(b) requires an 

award of attorney’s fees to a substantially prevailing party, . . . 

the issue of whether any party to a lawsuit substantially 

prevailed is left to the trial court’s discretion. See [Bridges PBT 

v.] Chatta, 821 A.2d [590,] 593 (Pa. Super. 2003) . . . 

Therefore, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not 

reverse a trial court’s determination of whether a party is a 

substantially prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney 

fees under section 512(b) of the CSPA.

Zavatchen, 907 A.2d at 610. 

We went on to state:
J-S29003-17

- 8 -

The terms “prevailing party” and “substantially prevailing party” 

have not been clearly defined with regard to the CSPA, especially 

as they pertain to defendants. However, these terms have been 

addressed in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions where 

contracts or statutes similar to the CSPA make the recovery of 

attorney’s fees dependent upon a party's status as a 

prevailing or a substantially prevailing party. In Profit 

Wize Mktg. v. Wiest, 812 A.2d 1270 (Pa. Super. 2002), this 

Court explained that:

[a] ‘prevailing party’ is commonly defined as ‘a party in 

whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the 

amount of damages awarded.’ While this definition 

encompasses those situations where a party receives less 

relief than was sought or even nominal relief, its 

application is still limited to those circumstances where the 

fact finder declares a winner and the court enters 

judgment in that party's favor.

[Id.] at 1275-76 (interpreting prevailing party in employment 

agreement) (internal citations omitted). 

Zavatchen, 907 A.2d at 610. See also 25A Standard Pennsylvania Practice 

2d § 127:8 (defining “prevailing party” as “[a] party in whose favor a 

judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded.”). 

Section 1705 of the MVFRL sets forth the limited tort elector’s right to 

recover, and clearly states that “unless the injury sustained is a serious 

injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be 

precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss.” 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(d) (emphasis added). In order to recover on his claim for 

noneconomic damages in a limited tort case, Plaintiff was required to prove 

a serious injury. See id.; see also Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636, 639–40 

(Pa. Super. 2013); cf. Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 740 (Pa. 

1998) (threshold determination of whether plaintiff suffered serious 
J-S29003-17

- 9 -

impairment of body function should be made by jury in all but clearest 

cases). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is meritless.

The statutory language, as well as the above case law, leads us to the 

conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

Defendant was the “prevailing party” in this limited tort case. Chatta, 

supra. As a limited tort elector, Plaintiff chose not to limit his damages, 

but to restrict his ability to maintain an action for noneconomic damages. 

This is not a matter of the “amount of damages awarded,” even if zero or 

nominal; Plaintiff did not prevail because the action could not proceed. 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(d). 

Next, Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 

the Defendant attorney’s fees as a sanction under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503. 

Plaintiff contends his motion to correct the record was not frivolous or filed 

in bad faith. 

Our review of a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is limited. We 

may only consider whether the court “palpably abused its discretion in 

making a fee award.” Thunberg v. Strause, 682 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 

1996). The Judicial Code permits an award of reasonable counsel fees “as a 

sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious 

conduct during the pendency of a matter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7). 

Here, the trial court awarded attorney’s fees as a sanction against 

Plaintiff for filing his motion to correct the record, citing to section 2503(7). 

The court stated: “The only case cited by Plaintiff did not address the issue 
J-S29003-17

- 10 -

raised by Plaintiff and therefore provided no support for his argument that 

he was the verdict winner.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/16, at 8. Admittedly, 

the case cited did not support Plaintiff’s argument, but we have found no 

case addressing this particular issue in the context of a limited tort matter. 

“The relentless pursuit of a claim which plainly lacks legal merit 

warrants an award of counsel fees.” Miller v. Nelson, 768 A.2d 858, 862 

(Pa. Super. 2001). “A suit is vexatious if brought without legal or factual 

grounds and if the action served the sole purpose of causing annoyance.” 

Id.

After review, we do not find Plaintiff’s petition to correct the record so 

vexatious as to be “wholly without legal or factual grounds[.]” In re 

Barnes Foundation, 74 A.3d 129, 136 (Pa. Super. 2014). Precisely due to 

the lack of case law on this specific issue, we do not find that the petition 

was brought purely for the purpose of annoyance, nor was it so plainly 

obdurate or vexatious as to warrant the award of counsel fees. Id. We, 

therefore, are constrained to find that the court abused its discretion in 

awarding Defendant counsel fees under section 2502(7).6 

We, therefore, affirm the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s petition to 

correct the record, and reverse the court’s order granting Defendant counsel 

fees.

____________________________________________

6 Based on our disposition, we find it unnecessary to address Plaintiff’s third 

issue on appeal. 
J-S29003-17

- 11 -

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2017