THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes 


MEETING 46 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


DAYS ONE AND TWO 


ROCKY FLATS EXCERPTS 


The verbatim transcript of the 46th 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at The Westin Westminster, 


Westminster, Colorado on May 2 and 3, 2007. 

 

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C O N T E N T S 

May 2, 2007 

PUBLIC COMMENT 6 

May 3, 2007 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL 

ROCKY FLATS SEC PETITION 

MR. MARK GRIFFON, WORK GROUP CHAIR 

PETITIONERS 

PUBLIC COMMENT 

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COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 406 
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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

BEACH, Josie 


Nuclear Chemical Operator 


Hanford Reservation 


Richland, Washington 


CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 

 

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LOCKEY, James, M.D. 


Professor, Department of Environmental Health 


College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati 


MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


SCHOFIELD, Phillip 


Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 


Los Alamos, New Mexico 

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MAY 2, 2007
 

PUBLIC COMMENT


 DR. ZIEMER: Good afternoon, everyone. This is 


the public comment session of the Advisory 


Board on Radiation and Worker Health. I've 


been asked to announce that our session this 


afternoon is being videotaped by CBS and by 


Denver Post On-Line. Apparently if we have a 


good program here we'll replace American Idol 


or something, but... -- or CSI, right. 


I'd like to ask if there are any members of the 


Congressional delegation -- Colorado delegation 


here tonight? 


 DR. WADE: Staffs? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Would -- would you just quickly 


identify yourselves for the folks that are 


here? 


MR. THIELMAN: Jason Thielman with 


Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave's office. 


MS. MINKS: I'm Erin Minks with Senator Ken 


Salazar's office. 


 MS. BOLLER: Carolyn Boller with Congressman 


Udall's office. 


 MS. ALBERG: Jeanette Alberg with Senator 

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Allard's office. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And... 


 MR. (UNINTELLIGIBLE): My name's Greg 


(Unintelligible) with Congresswoman Marilyn 


Musgrave's office. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Any others? And we 


thank them for being with us tonight, as well. 


I'm Paul Ziemer. I serve as Chair of this 


Advisory Board and I want to remind you all 


that this is an advisory board. We are -- we 


are not part of the government. We are 


independent individuals that have been 


appointed to this task. We are not the ones 


that make the decisions on dose reconstruction 


compensation. We are advisory for the program. 


One of the things we do is we do give advice, 


for example, on whether or not there should be 


addition to the so-called Special Exposure 


Cohort, but we do not make that determination. 


We are one of the groups that give advice to 


the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 


So your input to us helps us in giving advice. 


We're not the guys that make all the decisions. 


Sometimes we're glad we're not; sometimes we 


wish we could, but we do have the opportunity 

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to provide input to the program, particularly 


the dose reconstruction program and the Special 


Exposure Cohort portion of the program that's 


administered through Health and Human Services 


by the National Institutes for Occupational 


Safety and Health. 


 But the individuals that you see before you 


here are individuals who are not connected with 


those agencies. We do not work for them. 


We've been appointed separately by the 


President of the United States to serve in this 


capacity. 


 The Board recently established a time limit for 


public comments, a ten-minute per person time 


limit. Now that's -- that's sort of an upper 


limit. It's not a goal to be achieved, 


necessarily. I have over 30 individuals who 


have indicated that they would like to speak 


this evening, so you can do the math. And 


although our agenda says that we are meeting 


from 5:00 to 6:00, we are quite willing to stay 


here much longer, if needed. But if we stay 


here, we want you to stay here, too. So we ask 


that those who are speaking -- that you be 


cognizant that there are others. 

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I'm -- I'm usually not a very nasty guy, but 


I'm going to try to be nasty in the sense that 


I've asked Lew Wade -- Lew is a Designated 


Federal Official. And although the rest of 


these are Board members, appointed Board 


members, Lew is the Designated Federal 


Official. He does work for the government, and 


all of these boards are required to have one of 


those government guys around. But I have to 


put him to work and make him earn his money, so 


he's going to help me keep track of the time 


tonight. And when Lew nudges me and says ten 


minutes are up, I'm going to try to stop you if 


you're still talking. I hope I can be somewhat 


successful without hurting your feelings, but ­

- in fact, if you have 20 minutes worth, we're 


willing to give you the other ten at the end of 


the line, so you know, you can do half and half 


-- if anyone is still around to hear you at 


that time. 


 But nonetheless, be cognizant of other 


individuals who may wish to address the Board. 


In general, we looked at this as -- as it's 


called, a comment session, simply for you to 


make your comments. Some of you have provided 

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written material for the record. Everything 


that -- all of these comments are transcribed 


by our court reporter. They will go on our web 


site. Everything is -- is open to the public. 


This Board does not do anything in private, so 


any comments you make will be on the web site 


very soon for all the world to see, as well as 


your written comments. 


So I'm just going to go through the list in the 


order given. You can come here and use the 


mike, and if you need any assistance, let us 


know. We do already have handout materials 


from some of you. If others have materials for 


the Board members, you can make them available 


at that time. 


So we'll begin with Kay Barker, who's a Rocky 


Flats claimant. Kay, you can kick us off this 


evening with your comments. Welcome. 


 DR. WADE: I'll point out that there are chairs 


up here, too, if people need to sit. We have 


some chairs up here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Additional chairs in the front. 


We're -- we're running out of space. I don't 


know, the fire marshal's probably cringing 


somewhere, but -- and maybe -- maybe NIOSH is, 

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too -- or the OSHA people, but anyway, we're -- 


we're packed in here, but there is room -- if 


you're standing and want to sit, there are 


seats back... 


 MS. BARKER: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer and members 


of the Board. Thank you -- thank you for 


allowing me these few minutes to speak. I'd 


like to address the one Board member who hates 


to hear from the same claimants offering the 


same comments Board meeting after Board 


meeting. If you would listen and try to 


understand what we are saying rather than 


shutting us off, we wouldn't have to continue 


saying the same things over and over again. 


You think we like having to repeat ourselves 


all these times? No. But until you accept and 


understand we are telling you the truth and 


that we have proof, we'll have to continue. 


My repeat comment is that there is a conflict 


of interest here in allowing NIOSH to go 


forward with the dose reconstruction project 


per the ORAU OTIB-0058 effective January 8th of 


2007 that was released on March 30th, 2007. As 


I told you in September of 2006, the NDRP was 


written by Roger Falk, co-authored by J. M. 

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Aldridge and Nancy M. Daugherty, all of whom 


once worked for Rocky Flats and have a major 


conflict of interest on anything that has to do 


with Rocky Flats. 


 Approximately 2003 NIOSH developed a COI policy 


which stated that no person who worked at the 


site would be involved in performing dose 


reconstruction or authoring technical documents 


used in the dose reconstruction, yet you have 


Roger Falk, Jim Aldridge and Nancy Daugherty, 


who did just what NIOSH said they wouldn't 


allow. 


I understand that it is NIOSH's policy not to 


have health physicists who have testified 


against employees in a Workers Compensation 


claim participate in site profiles where the 


claim originated. Well, I would like to bring 


to your attention that Roger Falk was an expert 


witness for Rockwell International and 


Travelers Insurance against [name redacted] 


Worker Compensation claim in 1996, which is 


another conflict of interest that NIOSH said it 


wouldn't allow. 


In any science field this would be considered a 


conflict of interest. How many of these 

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conflicts do the Rocky Flats claimants have to 


accept that are SEC issues that NIOSH said they 


would never follow? The NDRP is not only a 


conflict of interest, it is not accurate. 


NIOSH never had the NDRP independently reviewed 


before accepting and using it for dose 


reconstruction. Dosimetry records are not 


complete nor present for 1997. Now isn't that 


the definition of an SEC petition? 


The NDRP, under 2.0, Application and 


Limitations, states except for the application 


of the NDRP ratios as described in section 


4.1.6, the methods described in this TIB apply 


only to workers at Rocky Flats Plant plutonium 


facilities during the period of 1952 to 1970. 


There are three important cavets (sic) or 


limitations. The final NDRP neutron dose for 


1997 may not be accurate. Recorded dosimeter 


data was not always complete. The gamma dose 


information for 1997 may not be present. The 


information on gamma dose was collected only 


when applicable to the NDRP effort. 


 If the original NDRP lists these cavets (sic), 


how can NIOSH assume they can use it for dose 


reconstruction? 

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I gave each one of you a copy of my late 


husband's NDRP showing that he has doses for 


two years before he even started working at 


Rocky Flats, which in itself makes the NDRP 


inaccurate. Not only does his report show the 


two years before, but of the 316 incidences, 15 


of those exposures were for years he wasn't at 


Rocky Flats. How can [name redacted] NDRP be 


accurate, or anybody else's as well? I'm still 


waiting for an answer as to why my late 


husband's – [name redacted] -- NDRP is so 


inaccurate. 


The second area I wish to address tonight is 


your allowing NIOSH to have answers for all the 


zeroes in the claimant files, claiming they are 


applying claimant-friendly dose. In [name 


redacted] dose reconstruction NIOSH has listed, 


under external dose, 143 dosimeter cycles 


recording zeroes for a 30-250 keV photons. 


They also listed his missed neutrons as having 


163 dosimeter cycles of do-- zeroes, yet NIOSH 


feels they can give him accurate, claimant-


friendly dose for these missed cycles when they 


don't even know where he was working during a 


missed cycle as his work required him to be in 

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the plant all the time and not just sitting at 


the desk that was in another location. 


 Lawrence worked in the hot -- following hot 


buildings: 991, 771, 776, 777, 778 and 444. 


You don't even know why the cycle was missed. 


According to Brian with NIOSH, who stated -- 


during my final interview before NIOSH rendered 


its first decision to DOL in November of 2004 ­

- that [name redacted] file seemed to have a 


lot of missing data. I would agree with this, 


considering he has a total of 306 dosimeter 


cycles reporting zeroes. 


In SC&A's report on the completeness of records 


there is a chart on page 4 and 5 of the report 


which I've enclosed in the packet you have been 


given. As you know, they found that for 1969 


and 1970 approximately 36 percent of the 


records are missing. However, this is also 


noted in the report. From 1977 onward to 1989, 


the percentages of missing data are equal to or 


greater than the ones for '69 and '70. 1981 


has a whopping 63 percent missing. SC&A has 


not investigated the reasons for so much 


missing data. You cannot reconstruct dose with 


reasonable accuracy without reliable data. 

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 On Friday, September 1, 2006 I e-mailed Mr. 


David Sundin of NIOSH a FOIA request asking for 


a search of the logbooks in NIOSH's possession 


for a copy of each entry, including badge 


destruction, contamination incidents, trip to 


lung counter, references to contaminated scrub-


downs and any other entries the logbooks might 


show. On that same date at 10:56 a.m. Mr. 


Sundin replied, stating we will respond to your 


request when we obtain images of the logbooks, 


which I am told will be very soon. I am still 


waiting for this information and today is May 


2nd, 2007. I'm wondering how much longer I'm 


going to be waiting for this information. 


My third and final comment is that, without 


good reason, you accept the credibility of 


NIOSH/ORAU, but yet you refuse to accept the 


credibility of the very people who worked at 


Rocky Flats. They know what they did, where 


they worked, what chemicals, toxins, solvents 


and metals they worked with or around. I know 


all of them would be more than happy to tell 


you about some of their frightening experiences 


and what it was like to work at Rocky Flats. 


Yet you refuse to accept their word, but would 

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rather take the word of somebody who never set 


foot on Rocky Flats soil. 


I hope you will give the Rocky Flats workers 


your full attention and be open to what they 


have to tell you. I hope you will really 


listen and take the witness seriously. If you 


do, I believe you will understand why you 


should vote in favor of the Rocky Flats SEC 


petition. 


In closing I want to remind you that the NDRP 


is a conflict of interest, as well as a 


conflict of NIOSH's own rules, which makes it 


an SEC petition issue and a positive vote for 


the SEC petition. Also you can't reconstruct 


dose with reasonable accuracy without reliable 


data. This makes it an SEC petition as well. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Kay. Next 


we'll hear from Dr. Charles Milne, representing 


a claimant. Dr. Milne. 


DR. MILNE: Thank you. I'm glad to be here. 


got my PhD in entomology from Ohio State 


University. My master's is in genetics from 


the University of Washington in Seattle. 


worked with [Name Redacted], Nobel laureate, and 


I 

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he is now the current head of the Fred 


Hutchinson Cancer Institute. I teach biology 


at Mountain State University in West Virginia, 


so I'm a long way from home. I teach human 


genetics and genetics, as well as some other 


biology courses, and one of the topics I do 


cover is the relationship between cancer and 


genetics. 


 I'm the son-in-law of [name redacted], who was 


a contract worker at Rocky Flats from 1963 to 


1991. He died of male breast cancer in 2005. 


His [Identifying Information Redacted] and I 


attended his first hearing because he was 


denied compensation because of a calculated 


probability of causation of 36.36 percent. He 


did have exposure to radiation. It was 


documented in the few radiation records that 


they have, dosimetry readings. 


There's a number of other known risk factors 


for male breast cancer. He didn't have any of 


those, but he had exposure to radiation. The 


incidence of male breast cancer in the white 


American population is eight in a million 


males. And if you take the -- I don't know how 


many people actually worked at Rocky Flats. If 

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we just assumed 20,000 workers at Rocky Flats, 


half of them male and only eight in a million 


get male breast cancer, that would be only an 


eight percent chance that a male at Rocky Flats 


would contract male breast cancer. You'd have 


to have 12 Rocky Flats facilities spread across 


this country to reach the probability of having 


one person die from male breast cancer. That's 


how rare breast cancer is. 


Now I'm a scientist and I've been looking at 


the dose reconstruction, the assumptions, the 


models, and I -- I'm not an epidemiologist, but 


I have the ability to look at these kinds of 


things and to study them and to make some 


comments. 


The reason we're here today is because the 


government wrongly assumed that there was no 


threshold for exposure to radiation. There has 


been no proof that there is a threshold. A 


threshold would mean there's a level below 


which you can be exposed to a certain amount of 


radiation and not have a detrimental effect of 


some -- of some kind. Government assumed there 


was a threshold. There's no proof that there 


is a threshold. In fact, a threshold would be 

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very difficult to measure because you'd have to 


expose a large number of individuals to 


radiation and then follow them to find out what 


fraction of them might have contracted cancer. 


That experiment would actually be fairly 


unethical to run on humans. If we did it on 


lab rats, you may be able to get enough rats to 


do it and to run it, but it would be 


questionable as to whether you could take that 


and apply it to humans being exposed to 


radiation. 


But I would argue that actually the U.S. 


government's actually done the experiment at 


Rocky Flats of taking a large number of 


individual humans and exposing them to 


radiation. I'm not an epidemiologist. I've 


not looked at the known cancer rates among the 


U.S. population and among workers at Rocky 


Flats. Is it higher than the normal population 


or is it the same? I don't know. But if it's 


higher, that would indicate that the experiment 


has been successful in showing that there 


probably isn't a threshold for radiation 


exposure. 


Now I want to address dose reconstruction, the 

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whole process. Missing doses -- the previous 


lady addressed missing doses. Apparently they 


exist. They exist for [name redacted] exposure 


record, and they just assumed -- as far as I 


can understand, assumed claimant-favorable 


averages that were among individuals at a 


facility. But that ignores the fact that 


individuals at the facility -- I never worked 


at Rocky Flats; I'm a university professor -- 


but those that worked at the facility did 


different jobs and they had different 


exposures. That ignores that entire fact and 


making assumptions like that is -- is really 


unwarranted. 


Let's look at the models of how we are able to 


arrive at -- after dose reconstruction to be 


able to say an individual had enough radiation 


exposure to say there's at least a 50 percent 


probability that it was caused by the -- by the 


radiation exposure. To do that you must 


develop what's called a -- a dose response 


curve, and it's a curve for a cancer that 


represents how much dose and the chances are of 


causing that cancer in a population of 


individuals. And then when you determine how 

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much dose an individual had, if you can do it 


accurately, then you just -- you'd use the 


curve and determine the probability of -- of 


causation from that curve. 


 The dose response curves are arrived at by 


looking at a cohort of individuals that 


survived the atom bomb blast in Nagasaki and 


Hiroshima. And first of all, their doses -- 


they weren't wearing badges, but their doses 


were estimated based on the distance from 


ground zero. But again, that's an estimate 


based on how far they think they were from 


where it hit. That's not that accurate. 


They also are -- have a different genetic 


makeup than do the U.S. white male population. 


I refer to white males because -- not because 


I'm one, but because my [identifying 


information redacted] was one, and the cancer 


rates in different populations -- such as 


Japanese-Americans, Filipinos, white Americans 


-- are going to be different for different 


cancers. And that's not taken into account in 


this procedure. 


The radiation that was received through those 


atomic bombs was probably different than the 

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radiation that was received by different 


individuals at Rocky Flats, and we're trying to 


compare apples and oranges here. 


 The NCI/CDC working group to revise the 1985 


NIH RadioEpidemiological Tables wrote that, 


quote, The choice of the transfer model 


involves considerable uncertainty. 


Transferring information about the Japanese 


cohort to American workers involves 


considerable uncertainty. 


And also it's possible that the workers that 


were -- that survived the atomic bomb might be 


healthier than the average American that was 


exposed and working at Rocky Flats. We're 


taking average Americans and those that 


survived. They may have been healthier and 


that's the reason they actually survived. 


After locating this group of individuals that 


survived the atom bomb blast, they were 


followed for a period and determined basically 


the rates of occurrence of various cancers. 


The dose response curves that were developed 


were for a massive, acute dose of radiation. 


My [identifying information redacted], and 


other individuals that worked at Rocky Flats, 

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most of them had chronic exposure, low levels 


of exposure over a long period of time. We're 


trying to compare massive exposure to chronic 


exposure. There's no evidence that acute and 


chronic exposure to radiation are equivalent, 


or that dose response curves for cancers 


developed from acute exposure cohorts are 


appropriate for chronic radiation exposure. 


You need proper dose response curves for 


chronic exposure to be able to really calculate 


any accurate probability of causation. 


Probability of causation calculations are based 


on a large number of assumptions. And for a 


scientist, the more things you assume, the less 


certain your result becomes. And there's a 


large number of assumptions in the calculation 


of reconstructing the dose -- I don't care if 


it is claimant favorable; we're talking about 


assumptions here. The calculation for the 


probability of causation for a cancer involves 


numerous assumptions for dose, and assumptions 


in the model which render the calculated PC 


value one with great uncertainty. 


Also there's a whole principle of anytime you 


measure anything in science, it has an error 

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that's associated with it. I don't care if 


it's weighing a lab rat, it's going to have a 


certain amount of error associated with it. 


The more error you have in calculating an end 


result, the more error that end result has 


associated with it. 


I took my -- the matrix of exposure, went to 


the IREP -- the NCI web site, put it in and 


calculated my own probability of causation 


based on the values that was provided from the 


dose reconstruction. His matrix had over 1,000 


input variables, each with an associated error, 


and there are numerous internal values. The 


probability of causation that was calculated -- 


36.66 percent in mine, 36.36 -- has a huge 


error associated with it. You have to 


understand that 36.36 is being used to deny my 


[identifying information redacted] claim, and 


yet it has a tremendous error. There's no 


confidence interval given on this value. Is it 


36 percent plus or minus two, or 36 percent 


plus or minus 40? That is a serious 


shortcoming in the calculations. 


There are also -- somehow, I'm not sure how, 


but there's uncertainty distributions involved 

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in calculating the probability of causation. 


And those are also part of the uncertainty, 


assumptions and errors that goes into 


calculating probability of causation. 


It's -- with -- with the numerous assumptions 


made, compounded errors and uncertainties that 


are used, the calculated PC value has little 


confidence, in my mind, as a scientist. I'm 


not trying to disdain those scientists that 


came up with the science behind it, but you 


have to understand that every value that's 


calculated has a certain amount of confidence 


associated with it. It just doesn't convey any 


confidence to me as a scientist. 


I have two quotes to read. I'd like to read 


two quotes. One is from the 1985 Oversight 


Committee report by the National Academy of 


Sciences, National Research Council, 1984. 


They held that the ratio called the probability 


of causation applies to populations and not 


individuals, and cannot be interpreted as a 


probability that a given cancer was caused by a 


given radiation exposure. You cannot -- 


according to these individuals that developed 


the probability of causation, you can't use it 

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to determine if an individual's cancer was 


caused by it. 


 Here's another one. The NCI/CDC working group 


to revise the 1985 NIH RadioEpidemiological 


Tables wrote that the PC is not intended to 


represent the probability that a particular 


individual's cancer was caused by his or her 


radiation exposure, but rather the fraction of 


cases of a particular kind of cancer in a 


populations (sic). 


The PC calculations were never intended to be 


used this way. It is scientifically 


inappropriate to use the PC calculations to 


calculate and to deny the claims of 


individuals. I'm addressing this to the whole 


approach that NIOSH uses. It's scientifically 


invalid. And of course Special Exposure Cohort 


-- these apply also. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Next we'll 


hear from Richard Olds, a claimant. Richard. 


 MR. OLDS: Thank you. My name is Richard Olds. 


I'm the owner of NIOSH tracking number 


[Identifying Information Redacted]. Basically I'm 


probably rehashing things that you've already 


heard. I started work at Rocky Flats in 1984. 

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I worked as a security guard. I talked with 


the Department of Labor and everything else 


about the numbers that NIOSH came up with. 
I 


told them I had no argument with that. I said 


they had their numbers, where they got them, 


what they -- how they used them. They knew 


what they were doing. The only part about it 


was that it didn't take into effect all of the 


other areas of exposure that we dealt with, 


that we didn't have dosimetry badges. We were 


in offices, we were in hallways. We were in 


cafeterias. We were in break rooms that were 


right next to contaminated areas. We picked up 


background radiation that you people wouldn't 


want. We -- the exposures, even to myself, I 


wanted to tell somebody about -- I sat in a 


hallway as a security guard, with a conveyor 


belt running over my head that took 


contaminated parts from one building to the 


next building. My job was to get off -- get up 


off my chair and turn the alarm off, so I -- 


obviously I was exposed. 


Another job that I had was sitting in a 


hallway, supposedly a cold hallway, which meant 


there was no radiation in that area. We didn't 

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wear dosimetry badges. I leaned on a wall for 


about three and a half to four years. Then 


somebody decided to check the wall and found 


out it was low level contamination from the 


americium that was behind the wall. So, I get 


the cancer. 


Right now I'm sitting on basically a -- my 


claim has been deferred. Eventually it may be 


heard. Probably some of that depends on your ­

- ladies' and gentlemen's -- decision to 


forward their recommendations. 


The other numbers -- if they're missing data 


and the other information that's necessary, 


that's not even in their info-- in their data 


or other exposures, I can't see how you can use 


their information. Thank you, I'm -- take up 


your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And thank you, Richard. Then next 


we have Terrie Barrie. Terrie. 


 MS. BARRIE: Good evening, Dr. Ziemer and 


members of the Board, and thank you once again 


for listening to our public comments that we 


feel that -- must be -- keep on going. 


Tomorrow you will be tasked with deciding the 


Rocky Flats SEC petition. There are so many 

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issues that need to be addressed -- tenth-hour 


discovery of documents, NIOSH is adopting NDRP 


without independently verifying that the data 


is valid, not accepting affidavits as the truth 


from the workers. 


But I'm going to focus basically on just one 


issue tonight, and that issue is I get very 


upset and disturbed when I hear that an issue 


discussed among the working group is not an SEC 


issue but is rather a site profile or TBD 


issue. An excellent example of this is the 


thorium issue. Now I have a whole lot of 


issues going on in here. 


 SC&A's report, as far as I know, says that this 


is an SEC issue. The reason for this decision 


is that NIOSH stands by using the NUREG-1400 as 


the model to reconstruct dose for thorium 


workers. NIOSH objected to the status as a SEC 


issue, and there was quite a lively debate on 


April 19th working group meeting. NIOSH and 


some Board members thought that this issue was 


resolved and that it would be designated a 


technical bulletin issue. 


I wonder if you realize what it means to have 


an item classified as a TBD issue. Once the 

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scientific debate is over and NIOSH and SC&A 


come to an agreement, with the Board's 


approval, claims will need to be reopened. I'm 


aware of two such revisions, the NDRP and the 


target organ for the lymphoma procedure. These 


revisions were finalized at two separate times, 


the NDRP I believe in 2005 and the target organ 


for lymphoma this year. 


 Theoretically, a claimant who worked in the 


early years who has lymphoma, has had his dose 


reconstructed three times already -- once by 


submitting the original claim, once again -- 


once to have the NDRP applied, and lastly to 


have the target organ procedure applied. 


Hanging out there of course is the concern of 


the OMB pass-back memo, the memo that wanted to 


control the cost and growth of benefits for 


this program. Has any federal official 


considered controlling the growth in 


administering this program? Do you realize how 


many times the claims will need to be reopened 


each time NIOSH revises a procedure? For the 


high-fired oxide calculations that was agreed 


upon, if the thorium issue is ever resolved, 


when someone finally realizes the Building 881 

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did have a foundry in it. I have, by the way, 


a copy of a DOE document about this. 


It sounds to me and a lot of other claimants 


now because it -- there's a pretty nice 


bureaucratic empire that has been set up. 


According to the Rocky Mountain News article 


last Saturday, approximately $4 million per 


month goes to ORAU to reconstruct dose. Yes, 


let's make most of these issues TBD issues that 


have nothing to do with the SEC petition. 


Let's have prolonged scientific debate on which 


methods are the best to use to reconstruct 


dose. And yes, let's be very, very thorough. 


God forbid one person who worked 250 days at 


Rocky Flats is allowed to receive compensation 


that may not deserve it. 


 And while this debate goes on, workers die. 


This program was not set up to give job 


security to dose reconstructors and the 


administrative personnel. It was set up to 


compensate the workers. If any document used 


in dose reconstruction is in error today, and 


there are, then NIOSH cannot reconstruct dose 


with reasonable accuracy. That is true now, as 


well as when the petition was first filed. 

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Please, vote yes tomorrow to compensate all the 


workers who have one of the 22 cancers from the 


Rocky Flats facility, and make them an SEC 


cohort. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Terrie. I'm 


hesitating here because I don't want to mess 


this name up too much. I think the last name 


is Padilla --


UNIDENTIFIED: Judy Padilla. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Judy Padilla. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, you guys know who it -- who 


it is, okay. And yes, that -- that -- I got to 


work on my -- maybe my Spanish pronunciation, 


Padilla -- Padilla. I stand corrected -- it's 


P-a-d-i-l-l-a, for the court reporter, who 


probably is worse than me in Spanish. No? 


Okay. Thank you. 


 MS. PADILLA: Hi, I'm Judy Padilla. I worked 


out at Rocky Flats for 22 years. I saw this 


written on a wall during the demolition of 


Building 771, considered the most dangerous 


building in America. We walked with the dust 


of plutonium, which cannot be shaken away. It 


lives deep within us for we've breathed it 


every day. 

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I think that I'm one of the fortunate ones. My 


cancer was diagnosed early, and so far I'm a 


survivor. But with a lot of people, by the 


time their cancer is diagnosed, there's nothing 


they can do because it's terminal. 


As a nuclear worker at Rocky Flats Plant, I was 


a Cold War veteran. I feel that I sacrificed 


my health, even my life -- like the soldiers in 


Iraq are doing -- and we got no acknowledgement 


from our government, no thank you. We don't 


even get the courtesy of a flag on our coffin 


when we die. 


I would like the advisory panel to know my 


story. In 1983 I came to Rocky Flats as a 


metallurgical operator in Building 707, the 


foundry. The first six years I handled 


thousands of grams of weapons-grade plutonium 


on a daily basis. My specific task was to put 


pure plutonium buttons in tantalum crucible and 


place the loaded crucible in the melt coil of a 


Stokes* furnace. After the temperature of the 


furnace reached the classified degrees, the 


molten plutonium metal was poured into a 


graphite mold to cool. The plutonium ingot was 


then broken out of the classified-shape mold 

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and transferred via a chainveyor into a storage 


vault, or to the rolling mill for processing. 


These operations were performed in an inert 


gas, oxygen-free atmosphere glovebox. Glovebox 


work consisted of placing your hands and arms 


into lead-lined gloves fixed onto a box so that 


you can manipulate the radioactive material 


safely. Your face and chest are pressed 


against the window inside of the box so that 


you can see what you're doing. 


Due to the fissile nature of weapons-grade 


plutonium, high gamma and neutron exposures 


were created. We were expected to turnover 


each furnace at least three to four times per 


shift, three shifts a day. These were 


production days, and we had a tight schedule to 


maintain. The interior of the furnaces were 


regularly cleaned of splashed metal particles 


and oxides with carbon tetrachloride and 


perchlorethylene chloride, perc, known 


carcinogens. 


 Two coworkers, [Name Redacted] and [Name 


Redacted], died from brain stem tumors. My 


foreman, [Name Redacted], had breast cancer -- 


very rare in men. He has also passed away. My 

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cancer was diagnosed in June, 1998. I had 


worked there for 15 years. I had a radical 


mastectomy, which is an amputation, of the 


right breast and I had aggressive chemotherapy. 


I returned to work in eight months, March of 


1999. 


You may wonder why I would go back to work 


there if I thought my job had caused this 


cancer. Well, [identifying information 


redacted] [Name Redacted] and I had three 


children in college, so I went back to Rocky 


Flats Plant and I stayed there till they 


demolished the whole plant in 2005. I received 


genetic testing twice for the BACR4 gene, with 


negative results. My oncologist, [Name 


Redacted], stated that my ductal carcinoma in 


situ was most probably linked to my radiation 


exposure. 


It is well known that Rocky Flats Plant records 


were notoriously sloppy, and the results of our 


dosimetry badge analysis were frequently 


returned stamped no data available. The RCT 


training manual states, on page 1.08 through 


.09 in the biological effects section, and I 


quote, cancer is a non-threshold disease. 

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Which means stochastic effects, those in which 


the probability of the effects occurring, 


increases with dose, without a limit or 


threshold. Any dose, therefore, no matter how 


small, has a certain probability of causing the 


effect. Carcinogenic cancer inheritable 


effects are examples of stochastic effects. 


Cancer may be shown to exert an almost 


universal carcinogenic action, resulting in 


tumors in a great variety of organs and 


tissues. The main sites of solid tumors are 


the breasts in women, thyroid, lung, and some 


digestive organs. These tumors have long 


latent periods, approximately ten to 30 years, 


and occur in larger numbers than leukemia. 


Leukemia has a much shorter latent period, and 


I close quotes. 


But I'm singing to the choir here. You are all 


scientists and doctors, so you know these facts 


to be true. If -- if not, why would they be 


taught to all radiation control technicians as 


part of their DOE training? 


 Realizing these facts to be true, I applied for 


the compensation for nuclear workers in August 


of 2001. Imagine my surprise when a mere four 

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and a half years later my claim was denied. My 


dose reconstruction was determined to be 43.19 


percent, 15 years worth of exposure. What kind 


of bogus statement is "as likely as not"? How 


can there be a 50 percent limit on a non-


threshold disease? 


 I appealed this decision, but was told that 


NIOSH has the final say in these matters, 


another denial. I have read that dose 


reconstruction is an inexact science. It is 


also hugely expensive, and NIOSH takes many, 


many shortcuts, with only 80-- 88 quali-- semi-


qualified employees. How can this 


scientifically-invalid equation stand up to 


scientific scrutiny? Ask yourself, is it 


really worth it? 


Put yourself in our shoes for one moment. Is 


it worth mere money to be cancer-free or pain-


free? How much is it worth to be able to see 


your children grow, to graduate or get married? 


Boy, what some of us would give to be in your 


shoes. You have your health and you have all 


that power. Our lives and peace of mind rest 


in your hands. We -- we're like the men on 


death row waiting for the governor's phone 

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call. 


I believe in my heart that people are basically 


good. And given the chance, they want to do 


the right thing. But I have a few questions 


for you. Is there any truth to the newspaper 


article of February 18th, 2006 in the Rocky 


Mountain News that the Bush administration has 


proposed a 44 percent reduction, $686 million, 


from the program for the sick nuclear workers? 


Can you honestly say that that's fair? 


And just who were the lawyers that got $350 


million for the property owners downwind of 


Rocky Flats Plant? Are we less than property? 


And who will be the one with the integrity to 


step up to the plate, the one with true honor, 


who loves his fellow man as much as himself, 


the real American? America is watching and 


waiting and wanting a hero. Is it you? Will 


you give yourself an honest act of courage? 


Will you take the -- or will you just take the 


coward's path? Is the American spirit still 


alive, or have we been corrupted beyond all 


hope? This is a priceless opportunity for a 


selfless act. What goes around comes back to 


you. We Cold War veterans did the right thing 

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for America. Now it's your turn -- all of you, 


it's your turn. 


 In conclusion I would like to say that I feel 


my government has stooped to a new low to prey 


on cancer victims, to promise compensation, 


delay for five years, and then to deny claims 


based on trumped-up estimations. It's not only 


cruel, but it's also criminal. 


The Reverend Martin Luther King once stated 


everything that Hitler did was legal, but it 


was still wrong. 


 Your conscience will tell you the truth. 


You'll be able to look at that person in the 


mirror with clean, clear vision. And when 


accounting for your life you can credit 


yourself with a pure act of genuine generosity 


and kindness, a real American. Let us live so 


that when it's over we can all look each other 


in the eye and know we have acted honorably. 


 Judy Padilla, nuclear worker, Cold War veteran, 


cancer survivor and American citizen. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Judy, and very well 


said, with great passion. 


And now we'll hear from Robert Carlson. 

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Robert's a claimant. Robert, welcome. 


 MR. CARLSON: Ladies and gentlemen, in 1961 -- 


my name is Robert I. Carlson. In 1961 when I 


came out to Colorado, I quit drinking and quit 


smoking, so that has no effect on the cancer I 


had. I worked at Rocky Flats for 27 years. I 


worked as a janitor, assistant chemical 


operator, monitor and experimental operator. I 


worked in every building they had out there. 


When I first put my application in for a job at 


Rocky Flats, I had to pass a test consisting of 


math, chemistry, physics and mechanical 


aptitude. If you passed this test, you had to 


get a Q clearance, that was the top secret 


clearance in the country. If that -- if you 


had any kind of a act against any law in the 


country, you would not be hired. At a place in 


Michigan where I worked I -- the government 


checked everyone that I worked with back there. 


There was about 28 people. So the people at 


Rocky Flats were the top of the working class. 


They did not lie, they did not steal. They --


even today they do not lie or steal. What they 


tell you is the truth. 


What we have in our body is like a stick of 

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dynamite, and each one of us seems like it's 


going to explode at any time. This dynamite is 


plutonium. 


In a square mile -- in -- in a -- in a square 


mile, in each square inch there is a 149 


trillion, 956 billion, 796 million, 500 


thousand, 357 atoms if one gram of material was 


spread evenly over this square mile. 


 [Name Redacted] and [Name Redacted], head of
 

health safety and environment, trained the 


monitors and said it was far worse to have 


internal contamination than external 


contamination. 


I have 50 disintegrations of plutonium per 


second in my body and five disintegrations of 


americium in my body. That is 3,300 


disintegrations per minute. That is 188,000 


disintegrations per hour. Disintegrations 


means that an alpha particle is given off, so 


in an hour 198 (sic) alpha particles are given 


off in your body. An alpha particle is an ion. 


It extracts two electrons from a body cell and 


kills that cell. Killing body cells cause 


cancer, according to four cancer doctors on 


Charlie Rose last week. 

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 Working at Rocky Flats for 27 years as a 


monitor for more than 17 years, I was exposed 


to many accident, fires and alarms. Every time 


plutonium was in a building, accidents 


happened. Reversal of fans, gloves stood out 


straight, no vacuum on a dry box, more 


contamination. I was there. Glovebox burned 


off and fell on the floor contaminating room 


149. I was there. Holes in dry box gloves 


contaminated yourself. I was there. Changing 


filters on the incinerator all upstairs of 771 


building got contaminated. I was there. Nash 


pumps leaked and caused contamination. I was 


there. Snake pit or the infinity room where 


Nash pumps leaked was highly contaminated. I 


was there. Floors in 771 building were 


contaminated and I threw a lot of booties away 


when I was a monitor when they were over 20,000 


counts per minute. SAAM alarms went off 


frequently in 771 building, indicating 


plutonium was in the air. 776 building, trying 


to take tape off the underside of a dry box 


contaminated a large area of 776 building, 


including three workers and myself. They had 


insulation on a dry box in 776 building, and 

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they were trying to remove the insulation, but 


it was foam. And every time you touched that 


foam, the SAAM alarms went off. I was there. 


776 fire contaminated all of 776 building and 


could have contaminated Denver if it wasn't for 


the fire department, the monitors, guards and 


helper -- helpers. I was there. Drums outside 


the helicopter pad leaked plutonium and oil in 


the ground. I was there. The evaporative 


ponds outside had plutonium in them and -- 


because I checked a bulldozer that was -- had 


10,000 counts on the tracks from mixing this 


sludge in this pond. This was outside now. It 


was like a big egg beater. Someone missed the 


stainless steel cans that was brought over to 


the monitor station at 776 being to smeared out 


(sic). It was highly contaminated and it 


contaminated me and the person I was training, 


along with our desk and monitoring equipment. 


More internal contamination. 


I was there and got contaminated 100,000 counts 


per minute on my head and face in 71 -- 771 


building, and breathed some plutonium. I was 


taking drums to 80 building. It was named 


something else later on. And my film badge was 

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overexposed and health physics told me not to 


go back in the 80 building, but the supervisors 


made me an exception because I knew where 


everything was in 80 building. I went back 


into 80 building, even though health physics 


tell me not to go back in the building. 


If you got contaminated, you washed off what 


you could in the building you worked in. You 


couldn't get the rest off, you were sent to 


medical where they washed the rest of it off 


with Clorox. I was there. The original amount 


was not noted because the -- it could be 


infinity. Only the contamination you couldn't 


get off in the building where you worked in was 


recorded. 


They were checking the film badges by the color 


of the film for gamma, and had to actually 


count the tracks for neutrons on the film. How 


accurate was this? I was one of the first 


people to check out the new TLDs for accuracy. 


I followed the worker around all day, testing 


him for radiation, comparing it to the TLDs. 


I was there and did everything that was 


required of me. When I first worked at Rocky 


Flats they had Frieden calculators that were 

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mechanical. I ran a computer program later on 


in 865 that the results were very critical in 


every unit that left Rocky Flats. 


I had to stop at a place that Rocky Flats had 


that had in Broomfield and was amazed by what I 


saw. There were items that had purple tags on 


them that were contaminated. How did they get 


to Bloomfield? Purple tags meant that they 


could not get out of the building. How did 


they get out of the plant site? 


Every chemical that they had at Rocky Flats I 


was exposed to. You can look at the list I 


have. 


When wearing respirators for any length of 


time, you could dump liquid out of the 


respirator. If you were in an area where 


plutonium was in the air and a SAAM alarm was 


ten feet away, you could inhale some plutonium 


before the SAAM alarm went off. If you coughed 


wearing a respirator, you swallowed what you 


coughed because you couldn't take your 


respirator off. This is how plutonium got 


throughout your whole body. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And Bob, do you have a 


-- could you provide our court reporter with a 

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copy of your remarks? 


 MR. CARLSON: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That would be helpful. Thank you. 


The next person will be Laura Schultz. 


(Pause) 


Would you like to use a chair there, Laura, or 


-- you're okay? Okay. 


 MS. SCHULTZ: It's -- I have something quick to 


tell you. My name is Laura Schultz. I worked 


the majority of my working life at Rocky Flats 


Plant. I started in the process engineering 


and design, and later become a technical 


support for Building 771. I spent a lot of 


time in the process buildings. I found out 


that my designs would be successful if I did 


extensive field work and met the users, the 


people that installed the equipment specified 


in the designs. 


While my records may say that I was an 


engineer, I was really a 771 resident. I had 


numerous medical problems. I've had cancers 


that are li-- covered listed. I applied for 


compensation under this program in May of 2003. 


I have been denied. 


It is not normal for a woman my age, I'm 49 

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years old, to have all the medical problems. 


The NIOSH model apparently says that my 


radiation and chemical exposure had nothing to 


do with my current condition. I got 39 percent 


-- 39.9 causation. Do you believe that they 


are current -- the current model is biological 


-- system, a human body was -- with bad missing 


data. I certainly do not. 


NIOSH has gathered a wonderful group of 


mathematicians and scientists together to model 


an extremely complex set of daily exposures to 


both radiation chemicals. Listening to them on 


the teleconference yesterday you can tell that 


they really enjoy technical challenge and their 


work, and each other. They seem to really like 


their jobs. Unfortunately, they never set foot 


on Rocky Flats Plant site. They can only guess 


at what it's like. What they didn't seem to 


realize is that there are human beings 


associated with these calculations. 


We have been more than patient and 


understanding. Two years for dose 


reconstruction? Sure, why not? By now, years 


later, we see that DOL has a plan to deny our 


benefits because of the high cost of paying 

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claims to so many people from Rocky Flats. We 


waited many years assuming that you would not 


(sic) deal with us fairly. We are now 


approaching the point we cannot believe 


anything that you say. 


We come from a very secret, private community. 


We are the invisible fighters of the Cold War. 


When something in the plant was broken, we 


fixed it. When there was a fire, we put it 


out. When there was a spill, we cleaned it up. 


Our weapons were needed to defend our country. 


Do you believe that our plant was 100 percent 


cleaned after a spill or a fire? Our health 


was affected by the past and present events. 


We were trained to do our jobs safely. We were 


given equipment to protect us from the hazards 


of the workplace. We were surrounded by 


support personnel whose sole job was to monitor 


our safety. We were told that we were safe. 


guess they were sadly wrong. 


Years ago I never would tell anybody about the 


working and the operations of the plant. We 


were all part of a working -- a very difficult 


and dangerous job. If something went wrong, we 


considered it to be our business on the plant 


I 
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site, and we fixed it. Why would we involve 


our neighbors or the press, or who would co-- 


who were against us? 


Today the table is turned. My friends and 


family are getting sick and are denying -- are 


dying at an alarming rate. My own government 


has offered me compensation for unknowingly 


giving me cancer, but is turning to weasel out 


all their promises. They have gathered a group 


of high-dollar scientists to prove that the DOE 


is innocent and that our cancers are just a big 


coincidence. They have us beat. 


They have people who speak in babble, a 


language that only the people in their fields, 


the years of experience could ever understand. 


I believe they are wrong. Unfortunately, it 


would take a lifetime for me to come to up a 


speed (sic) in their field to try to show them 


that their calculations are wrong. 


The claimants do not have an unlimited amount 


of time and budget like NIOSH does. When NIOSH 


is informed they have a problem with the 


neutron dose recalculation, the answer is 


simply make the claimants wait another six 


months and give us more guys and money and 

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we'll work out the problem. 


 Well, claimants are faced with a problem. DOE 


is not our friend. NIOSH is certainly not our 


friend. Our plant has been flattened. Our 


friends are res-- and our colleagues are sick 


and dying. What do we do next? 


 Our senators and congressmen say they're trying 


to help us. The press is very interested and 


compassionate about our dilemma. I think I 


have no choice but to start telling the really 


embarrassing stories about the plant that the 


public really never needed to know. It's time 


to seek legal help and counsel class action 


suits against the government and operating 


contractor. If we had been dealt with fairly, 


this probably -- subject would have never came 


(sic) up. The public has a right to know how 


many people from that plant has been sick and 


are dying across this country. Well, let them 


decide who is at fault. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And thank you, Laura, for taking 


the effort to be with us today. 


 MS. SCHULTZ: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jeff Schultz -- Jeff, you also 


have -- oh, okay. 

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Kevin Newby, and I think I have some written 


comments also. Kevin, I'll distribute these. 


MR. NEWBY: I want to start by thanking the -- 


you for giving me the opportunity to share this 


story. My name is Kevin Newby and I worked at 


Rocky Flats for 22 years. I was 25 years old 


and very healthy when I started working at 


Rocky Flats. I had various jobs throughout my 


22 years with the Flats. I worked in buildings 


883, 865, 444, and in gloveboxes in 707, and 


also at the warehouse. 


 On January 21st, 1994 and April 20th, 1994 and 


March 6th of 2001 I had positive blood tests 


showing beryllium ac-- sensitivity. This 


entitled me to enter into the beryllium 


program. At that time I had no idea the price 


I would pay for working in this environment. 


In June of 2002, on a routine visit to my 


beryllium doctor in Philadelphia, I had a CAT 


scan that concerned my doctor, nothing serious. 


He did a blood test the day of my procedure 


that came up negative, which meant I was not 


showing beryllium sensitivity in my blood. But 


the doctor thought it was a good idea to do a 


lung biopsy, as long as I was okay with it. 

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The procedure is called a bronchostomy (sic). 


This is only true way to prove chronic 


beryllium disease. When they do the blood 


work, they have both false negative and false 


positive readings. This is the only way to 


diagnose beryllium sensitivity, even though the 


test is flawed and false readings, they have 


not come up with a better way to do this. The 


bronchostomy (sic) or lung biopsy did show 


lymptocycius (sic) in my BAL cells. The 


conclusion is I have chronic beryllium disease. 


Remember the day of this procedure I had a 


negative blood test. 


When I got back from Philly I filled out the 


paperwork and a claim under Section B. This 


was in 2002. And of course I was denied. They 


did not feel disease was far enough along to 


entitle me to compensation under Subsection E 


(sic). My problem was I was still alive. 


In 2004 I resubmitted my claim and all the same 


information and I was approved. 


In summary, I -- had my doctor not offered the 


lung biopsy, I never would have been found out 


that I had chronic beryllium disease. There's 


only a certain stage that they can do the lung 

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biopsy. This is not a standard procedure. 


Remember, the blood test for beryllium 


sensitivity is flawed with false negatives and 


false positives. 


Had I not had the fortune to persevere, I still 


would be sitting there thinking I was denied. 


We worked in a adverse situation. If you, like 


me, were exposed to metal poisonings, you need 


to know. This does not just affect you. This 


affects your entire family and down the road 


when they take care of you and you can come 


incapacitated. Being in the program has opened 


many doors that would otherwise have been 


closed. The average doctor does not understand 


metal poisoning. You need a specialist, and 


they're expensive. 


 I'm not advocating the system is set against 


you. All I'm saying is that most health care 


situations you need to be your own etiquette 


(sic). Get informed, don't settle for no. 


The moral to this story is persevere. I felt 


it was my moral obligation to share this story 


with you. Please do not give up hope. If I 


can help anyone with their paperwork, please 


let -- feel free to call me. Thank you. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Kevin. Next, Walter 


Mobley. Walter Mobley. 


 MR. MOBLEY: Good evening, and thank you for 


taking the time to listen to us. I began 


working at Rocky Flats in February, 1991. 


Before we had any training, my foreman took 


myself and three carpenters down to Building 


991. We were uncleared at that point. He took 


us down a hallway and told us to build a 


scaffold. We started building the scaffold. 


He left. A yellow light started flashing and 


an alarm went off. We continued building the 


scaffold for another five, ten minutes before I 


walked down the hall to find someone to ask 


them what this yellow light meant. We were 


told it was a faulty SAAM alarm, that there was 


no problem. The SAAM alarm was the problem, 


not that we had actual airborne radiation. 


We didn't know what that meant at that point 


anyway. 


I did receive extensive training over the next 


year, teaching me how safe Rocky Flats was. 


And they convinced me that Rocky Flats was a 


safe place to work. 


A year and a half later, it was about August or 

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September, 1992. We were working in the 


vaults. We were working in high radiation 


areas. We were receiving dose greater than 100 


millirem per hour. I, as a carpenter, did not 


work in there a lot, but I did do some work. 


The electricians in our group worked in there a 


lot. They were getting close to their annual 


dose limit. We came to work one morning. In 


the pre-evolution briefing we were told all of 


the dosimeter records have been lost. Your 


dosimetry reading is zero. Go in and go to 


work. 


One of those electricians was [Name Redacted].
 

In 2004 [Name Redacted] was diagnosed with 


stomach cancer, and he was dead in three 


months. 


I thought the electricians might have been 


over-reacting a little bit. I was still new at 


Rocky Flats. I'd been there for a year. They 


were way below the -- the DOE annual dose, and 


the Rocky Flats annual dose is half of that, so 


I think they're just making a mountain out of a 


mole hill. Well, I find that that's not true. 


In 2001 I contracted non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. I 


began doing a lot of research on my own. I 

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found that the Department of Energy, on their 


web site, admits that they do not know what the 


biological effects of a chronic low dose of 


ionizing radiation will do. 


I was more fortunate than [Name Redacted]. I
 

had a pain in my back. I had this pain for 


five months before I went to the doctor. When 


the doctor found out where I worked, he began 


looking for cancer. He wasn't looking for 


other medical problems; he began looking for 


cancer. I don't believe that was a lucky 


guess. I believe that was an educated 


diagnosis. He found my cancer on the first 


visit. Because of the early detection, I am in 


remission right now. But I don't know when 


it's going to come back. 


 All through my medical treatment the nurses and 


the doctors that I talked to all agreed that 


there was a good chance that I contracted 


lymphoma because of where I worked, at Rocky 


Flats. 


I applied for compensation through the EEOICPA 


in 2001, shortly after the program was 


initiated. After five years I have become 


fatigued with the bureaucratic process, 

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constantly asking for more information, asking 


for phone interviews. After five years I was 


denied. I appealed the denial. 


On the notebook that we signed up on tonight it 


asked if we had a written statement to submit. 


I didn't know that was going to be on the form. 


I feel like I have submitted my written 


statements more than once. 


Six months later, after my first appeal, I was 


denied again. A year later I was denied again 


under Part B. I believe that DOE, DOL, NIOSH, 


Oak Ridge University -- I believe pretty much 


all of them have probably spent considerably 


more denying my claim than it would have cost 


to pay my claim and let me enjoy my life. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Walter. Next I have 


Ron Buffo. 


MR. BUFFO: Thank you for letting me speak 


before you tonight. My name is Ron Buffo. I'm 


here to speak on behalf of [name redacted] who 


worked at Rocky Flats from 1952 until 1987, one 


of the original guys who started out there. He 


was a machinist. He was a tool grinder for at 


least 23 of those years, those first 23 years, 

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and he worked in buildings 44, 881, 776 and 


460. 


He has had prostate cancer. He has skin 


cancer. At this point he's 75 years old. And 


just to sort of reiterate some of the things 


that some of the other people have been saying, 


and I think it's very basic stuff -- I mean 


this -- this isn't global warming. This is --


these are real things that we know are 


happening to these real people. 


 [identifying information redacted] was a 


machinist working with uranium and working on a 


lathe where he was shaping uranium. Uranium 


has a tendency to catch on fire without proper 


ventilation, and when it caught on fire he was 


breathing in the fumes, of course, and I think 


certainly has shown the effects of what's 


happened with that. 


Along with that -- he was exposed to that on a 


daily basis, but he was also exposed to a thing 


called perchlorethylene, a cleaning solvent. 


He cleaned machines every day when work was 


done, with his bare hands and this cleaning 


solvent. And we know that to be carcinogenic 


in nature, as well. He also lost his hearing 

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because there wasn't adequate hearing 


protection. So I mean there are just a variety 


of things that -- that all of these -- these 


wonderful people had to go through. 


I will tell you this. A true patriot, like all 


of these people. When I was growing up in 


Lewisville, not too far from Rocky Flats, I 


knew [identifying information redacted] worked 


at Rocky Flats, but I'll tell you what, I 


didn't know what he did until about five years 


ago. He said no, that's -- that's -- I don't 


talk about those things, I signed a security 


clearance. And I had no idea. Kids at school 


would ask what does your dad do? He's a 


machinist. Oh, yeah? I don't know what he 


makes, but he's a machinist, that's for sure. 


It was strange coming to my house when I -- you 


know, I'd go down to the bathroom and I saw all 


these little bottles down by the toilet and I ­

- what the heck is that stuff for? I had no 


idea. You know, the fact of the matter is, 


very few of these people in the early stages, 


and I'm sure for many, many years, really had 


no idea what radioactivity could do to them. 


really believe the safety training programs 


I 
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61 

were inadequate. These men and women were not 


told what these kinds of things could do to 


them, and today they are suffering because of 


that. 


So I'm here on behalf not of just [identifying 


information redacted], but -- but of all these 


people. You know, we talk about the 


bureaucratic red tape that is -- that has been 


going on for years now. He made a claim five 


years ago. Last fall he was denied. We wrote 


a letter back to the Department of Labor -- and 


I'm not kidding you, we got a response back in 


one week on the appeal -- denied. It took five 


years to get that first one, but it took about 


a week to get that second one. And when I -- I 


helped [identifying information redacted] sit 


down and write the letter, and what we said 


was, you know, you need to look at this. 


You're denying our claim. You say that 


prostate cancer is not caused by his exposure 


to radiation. We don't agree with that, and 


that's why we are not going to sign this claim. 


We consider our case to continue to be active 


and we're going to see what happens here. 


Two months later he got a phone call from a man 

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with the Department of Labor who said hey, 


what's this letter all about? [identifying 


information redacted] said it's about my claim. 


And he says well, you know, where you going to 


go with this? He goes well, it's pretty 


obvious I can't go too far with it, but he said 


I'm not signing it. And that's the way that 


it's going to be. We are going to stay with 


this and we're going to stay the course on -- 


on fighting for what we think is right, and 


these are from people who are very patriotic. 


They have no huge beefs with their patriotism 


and what they've done for this country. These 


are the original Cold War warriors, and -- and 


we have to honor them and we have to show them 


that we are responsible for the things that 


they were exposed to. 


And I think -- when I look at all these 


wonderful people here, I think we have to ask, 


if not us, then who? And if not now, then 


when? Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Ron. Next I 


have Charles -- Charles Milne -- didn't we have 


a -- I think we already had Charles Milne, 


somehow got on the list twice. 

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63 

Dennis Romero -- is it Romero? 


 MR. ROMERO: Romero. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Correct. 

 MR. ROMERO: Yeah, I'm pretty short. My name's 

Dennis Romero. I worked out at Rocky Flats as 


-- four years as a building trades pipe fitter, 


18 years as a steel worker. I've had three job 


classifications out there, as a production 


welder, chemical operator, radiological control 


tech at the end. 


My first job was 444 as a production welder. 


Worked with beryllium, uranium, stainless, 


titanium, machining it -- not machining, but 


welding it, plating it, coatings. While 


working in that building we would often have 


air reversals because we'd have a power 


(unintelligible). Instead of the air coming 


out of the main vents, it'd be coming out of 


the return air vents that were filthy. We'd 


have dust everywhere. We'd get the evacuations 


and evacuate the back area because they don't 


know what's in the air. 


We'd have fires, just like the gentleman 


mentioned about uranium. They'd have uranium ­

- 55-gallon drums where the machines would 

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throw the shavings in there. Occasionally 


they'd throw a hot chip in there. When they 


would machine this uranium it would glow red, 


red under the liquid. That's how hot it was. 


And they would throw a chip in there that's too 


hot, it'd catch on fire and then we'd have a 


fire in the back area and they would say if 


you're not in immediate danger, stay where 


you're at; if you are in danger, evacuate the 


area. Be smoke in the air. 


I worked in that building about five years as a 


production welder and then went down -- 707 as 


a production welder. Worked with plutonium, 


beryllium, uranium assembling the pits that we 


used for final product to ship off site. 


Every month we'd have a thing we'd call IP, 


that we'd meet a certain quota every month to 


get parts out. If we didn't get the parts out 


on time, management would say well, we're going 


to lose our funding, maybe be layoffs, so we'd 


have to work the overtime to meet our quota 


every month. 


At times our dosimetry badges would be peaking 


out, and if they peaked out they would pull us 


out of the area and then we couldn't meet our 

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product every month. So naturally management 


would make a suggestion -- put your TLD in your 


back pocket. Don't have it up on your chest 


where it's getting the right exposure; put it 


in your back pocket. Or there were times when 


we'd leave them in our lockers because 


management did not want to lose their funding, 


did not want the trucks not to be able to come 


in and DOE would be unhappy with their 


progress. So we would do whatever we could to 


meet IP every month, and that went on for years 


out there until they finally shut us down. 


When I was done being a production welder, I 


went down to 771 as a chemical operator. Our 


job down there was do (unintelligible) 


inspections, decontaminate floors, gloveboxes, 


tanks -- basically the cleanup people for the 


building. That's our job is to clean up, decon 


workers. We'd go in the back area, we'd have a 


spill. Of course everybody knows 771 was 


(unintelligible) with all kinds of chemicals -- 


hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, 


numerous other chemicals been on my shirt right 


here. 


When we'd go back in the areas and decon the 

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floors 'cause there'd be a tank leak, spill. 


Recontainments on the valves were leaking, 


flanges were leaking, gloveboxes were leaking 


because everything's been taken out of service, 


wasn't maintained. It was set -- 'cause they 


thought they were going to start back up, but 


it never did happen so we'd have to go back 


there and baby-sit the place. 


We'd go back there in a full-face respirator, 


particular air purifying filter, cleaning up 


chemical spills. The only people in the 


building that had chemical respirators were the 


painters, because they did the epoxies. 


Workers in the back area were doing decon 


coverage, did not have chemical respirators. 


We'd have a particulate and that was it. 


 Times we'd have SAAM alarms. 771's notorious 


for having a lot of SAAM alarms. Problem with 


771 during thunderstorms, we'd have a high 


concentration of radon. The SAAMs would not be 


able to distinguish between radon buildup or 


plutonium particle, so it would go off and we'd 


have to deal with that. We'd go out in the 


hallway and wait for RCTs to come, see what the 


problem was. 

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At that same time I had went across to be an 


RCT so I'd learned a lot more. I went through 


rad con training, radiological training, and 


they -- what we'd do is we'd have SAAM papers 


that were contaminated with Pu or radon. We 


would let them sit for four hours. We'd count 


them initially, wait for four hours, take the 


people's names that were in the rooms at the 


time the SAAM went off 'cause we didn't know if 


they were positive or negative SAAM alarms. 


We'd wait for four hours, wait for the decay, 


see how much decay would happen on that sample. 


If there wasn't enough decay, we'd give it 


another four hours. There was times they would 


wait up to maybe a day and a half to two days 


to count that sample to see if enough decay 


would drop out so we could blame it on radon, 


because the room was posted and the workers 


were having a hard time getting the work done 


because working in a full-face is hard. 


Management wasn't happy with that scenario, 


they'd make us go back and do additional air 


samples so we could de-post the room and get it 


down to less than a tenth of a DAC. A DAC was 


a Derived Air Concentration of plutonium in the 

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air. It had to be less than a tenth of a DAC. 


One DAC equates to 2.5 millirem. 


When we started doing D&D out there, we had 


procedures -- even production had procedures. 


Full-face respirators, 50 DAC; you exceed it, 


you shut the job down till you increase your 


engineering controls, your PPE controls -- keep 


it down to less than 50 DAC because the 


respirator's only certified up to 50 DAC. 


Anything above that, they couldn't quantify how 


much of it was getting in your respirator. 


They needed to be, we'd go to PAPRs, PAPRs were 


good for 1,000 DAC. We couldn't keep it down 


below 1,000 DAC, supplied breathing air, in-


line supplied breathing air was used. That was 


still 1,000 DAC protection factor. 


 When management couldn't control the back areas 


properly when D&D happened because everything 


was going on, piping's being cut, gloveboxes 


being dropped off, the DAC started going out of 


control. It would exceed 50 DAC. They just 


changed the RWPs to warrant what they wanted to 


get done, because our training told us anytime 


you exceed protection factor respirator, a 


certain amount was getting in the respirator. 

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When we exceeded 1,000 DAC on PAPRs, that 


happened quite often -- they'd be 100,000, 


200,000, maybe even up to 500,000 DAC on an air 


sample they would be counting. We was told in 


training that for every DAC that you exceeded ­

- the protection factor 1,000, for every 1,000 


that you exceeded at, one DAC was 


(unintelligible) be in your respirator. So if 


you're in a DAC atmosphere of 500,000, you tell 


me how much DAC was probably -- how much 


plutonium might have been inside your 


respirator. 


 They would wear these respirators on 10, 12­

hour days. There was a job going on in 774 


that guys were in DAC atmosphere about 100,000 


DAC. They were cutting out these four large 


tanks, using a plasma cutter. They used liquid 


-- a fixative to spray on the linings of these 


tanks, the gloveboxes, to try to keep the 


airborne concentration from going higher than 


that. The problem with when you're using 


liquid, spraying in the atmosphere where using 


a air-purified respirator, it's a paper filter. 


That paper filter starts degrading when it gets 


wet. And they would use liquid or water to try 

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to keep the concentration of the plutonium 


down. 


 Workers would come out of the back area after a 


12-hour day, take their filter cartridges off 


their respirators, dump the respirator in a 


bin, dump the cartridges. They would look in 


their cartridges on the inside of that 


cartridge where -- that's the closest part to 


your face and a lot of times they'd be green. 


That was the color of the fixative they were 


using inside the tanks. So if that respirator 


was filtering, how much of it was it really 


filtering? 


We would survey respirators on a daily basis so 


we could send them back off to laundry. Wasn't 


no -- no big deal to find 10,000, 500,000 on 


the outside of the respirator. Was that person 


given a PI factor worksheet to find out how 


much of it they got inside their lungs? Was 


any incident reports done? 


Management, towards the end, starting not 


documenting things because of a thing called 


Price Anderson out there. Price Anderson was a 


group that went around when companies could not 


do radiological control practices safely, they 

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would fine them. People have skin 


contamination, internal contamination, they 


would get fines. Well, in order to not get 


fines, you don't do the documentation, so you 


didn't have the PI factor worksheets. You 


didn't have the radiological deficiency 


reports. You didn't have any logs to denote 


that this stuff happened on the job. 


There's so much more information that your 


dosimetry cannot tell you because a lot of the 


information wasn't done -- or it's scattered 


all over the place, 'cause we did records. We 


did DAC hour tracking whenever the DACs were 


too high. But my question is to you people, of 


all the records you got, do you have all of 


them? I don't believe you do. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Thank you, Dennis. 


Now we'll hear from Richard Olds -- Richard? 


 MR. PRESLEY: He's already spoken. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Maybe he -- yes, was -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, he's ended up on the list 


twice, too. Sorry. 


 Let's see, then next I have Larry -- Larry 

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Pazier or Pazier -- P-a-z-i-e-r. 


 MR. PAZIER: That's close enough. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Close enough? You can give us the 


correct pronunciation, Larry. 


 MR. PAZIER: It's Larry Pazier. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Pazier, thank you. 

 MR. PAZIER: [name redacted] was a Rocky Flats 

employee, and I -- I'm not a Rocky Flats 


person, and all I did was hear these things 


second-hand, but I know that she was exposed at 


least twice. Five years later after she was 


exposed, she was diagnosed with colon cancer 


and two months ago she passed away. 


She was a vegetarian. No -- no cancers in the 


family, went to the gym five or six days a 


week, only exposed twice. And I hear the 


probability and the statistics that some of the 


people are saying, including a doctor, but what 


does it really mean? One in a thousand? What 


if you're the one? One in 100,000, what if 


you're the one? 


My -- my concern is really not for what's going 


on here today. The money, sure, is going to 


help the people out that are living, help them 


with their doctor bills, et cetera. What I 

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would like to do is suggest and somehow get out 


to the public that there needs to be more 


testing done. It's my understanding that -- 


you know, that they had testers -- test 


indicators that give you an idea if you've been 


exposed. But when the people leave working for 


a nuclear facility, are they getting PET scans 


and CAT scans to test, if they have been 


exposed, if they have cancer? If this could 


have been done, it may have saved my wife. 


The other thing I'd like to say is, you know, 


to -- to just -- to get the word out to other 


workers in nuclear facilities of the risks 


they're taking. I don't believe that they 


understand the total risk that they're working 


under. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. I have what I think is 


Larry -- Ramos? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Rands? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Or Rand, maybe it's Rand -- Larry 


Rand, yeah. Okay. 


MR. RANDS: Hi. As Paul said, my name is Larry 


Rands. I spent 20 years at Rocky Flats. I had 


the opportunity last year to provide you with a 


summary of my jobs on the site and my lung 

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cancer that was diagnosed in 2003. I donated a 


lung to the cause, went through chemotherapy 


after and I'll play with the side effect of the 


chemotherapy the rest of my life. 


It's my understanding that you folks are an 


advisory board to tell health and safety or 


someone to -- that's going to make a decision 


on the outcome of the future of the workers of 


Rocky Flats. And I thank you for that 


opportunity to talk to you last year, and I'm 


happy to be able to be here this year. I would 


ask, and I implore you, to unite to advise the 


people that are going to make the decision for 


the efforts that are being expended and for 


these people that have suffered and are 


suffering, please help them. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Then Cheryl Meaney. 


 MS. MEANEY: Hello. My name is Cheryl Meaney 


and I worked at Rocky Flats for 21 years. At 


the present time I am not ill due to working at 


Rocky Flats. [Identifying Information and Name 


Redacted],also worked at Rocky Flats for 32 


years as a security guard. He couldn't be here 


this evening so he asked me to come and speak 


for him. 

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In 2005 he was diagnosed with thyroid cancer. 


As a result, he had surgery to remove his 


thyroid that same year. His physician says 


there are only ways to get thyroid cancer. 


Heredity is the first reason, and the other is 


radiation exposure. There isn't any known 


thyroid cancer in [identifying information 


redacted] family, so one must assume that his 


cancer is the result of radiation exposure at 


Rocky Flats. 


He is missing quite a lot of his dose records 


due to poor radiation record-keeping at Rocky 


Flats. Records show he worked in Building 123 


for the majority of the time, but that was only 


his base building. He went to Building 123 


every day to change into his uniform, get his 


gun and have his morning meeting for the plan 


of the day. His regular job duties consisted 


of the following: 


He walked routes throughout the entire complex, 


including the radiation and contamination 


areas. He was required to sit on the docks in 


close proximity to all radioactive material as 


it was loaded onto trucks for shipment. He was 


required to watch people and guard material in 

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the various vaults. Even if the alarm sounded, 


he had to stay to guard the vault he was 


assigned to. Everyone else could evacuate. He 


was part of the team that loaded trucks for 


transport to other facilities. This material 


was the completed product, so it was very 


radioactive. He had to crawl on and around the 


radioactive drums in order to secure them 


properly. He also had to transport radioactive 


material samples in his security vehicle right 


in the seat beside him. 


All of this was done without wearing a lead 


apron or shielding of the samples. 


He took great pride in the job he did to 


protect our national security, and now hopes 


his government will take care of him. We pray 


that [Name Redacted] cancer does not reoccur. 


But if it does, it would be helpful for him and 


his family to have a little financial security 


to help cover the medical bills as a result of 


his radiation exposure in his work at Rocky 


Flats. 


 Please vote yes and give all Cold War veterans 


peace of mind. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Cheryl. Next, Juan 

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Abilu -- Abilu? 


MR. ABILA: The last name's Abila, A-b-i-l-a. 


 DR. ZIEMER: A-b-i-l--


MR. ABILA: A. 


 DR. ZIEMER: --a. 


MR. ABILA: Right. I really don't have much 


more to say, other than what everybody else has 


said. The only thing that I would like to ask 


is why are we having to prove what, in most 


cases, a DOE or Rocky Flats doctor has verified 


or diagnosed us with? I think -- I think 


everybody else has covered what I had to say 


and I appreciate it and thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, thank you, Juan. 


And then Jack Weaver. 


 MR. WEAVER: Good evening. Thank you for 


letting me speak. I also want to thank the 


people that are here in the audience, my 


brothers and sisters that worked with me at 


Rocky Flats. 


This is an emotional time for everybody that's 


here, me included. I happen to be in fairly 


well -- fairly good health, but I have some 


relatives that worked at Rocky Flats for a 


number of years that -- that are not in such 

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good health, so hopefully I'm here to represent 


them. 


I -- I started to work at Rocky Flats September 


the 5th, 1961. I left there June 5th, 2002, so 


you know I've been there a long time. I worked 


in just about -- well, I did work in every 


building on the plant site at one time or 


another in some capacity. I worked 12 years as 


a hourly individual and the rest of my time was 


spent in various supervisory positions, all the 


way up to a deputy AGM under EG&G, so I've been 


the gamut from all the way at the bottom to all 


the way to the top. 


I also participated in -- in -- starting in 


2001 on the oversight committee for the ORISE 


dose reconstruction. I was asked to come and 


participate in that, and after talks with [name 


redacted] and his group, I decided I would do 


that. And the main reason I participated in it 


was because the people -- very intelligent, 


very smart individuals -- didn't have a clue 


about Rocky Flats, and my job was to try and 


make them understand, teach them what we did, 


how we did it, why we did it and what the 


consequences of some of that stuff were. 

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Just like everybody said, I -- I understand 


that there are missing pieces of information in 


the -- in the dose and stuff. I think they did 


the best they could with what they had, they 


just didn't have everything, as -- as people 


have said before. 


The other issue that I have that -- that 


doesn't seem to get across at these meetings is 


that Rocky Flats was a chemical processing 


facility to recover plutonium from scrap and to 


produce the final product, pits. Okay? The 


plutonium processing in these buildings was -- 


was a -- a -- primarily a nitric acid process, 


although there were a lot of other chemicals. 


And when we were doing the cleanup in -- in the 


'90s, or preparing for the destruction of the 


plant, one of the things that we did was a -- 


was a chemical inventory -- and at the time I 


was working in 71 building; I spent 32 years in 


71 building. And I have this document. I 


provided it to the -- to the group last year 


when we met. It's a 53-page document of excess 


chemicals. It has 5,700 containers listed on 


it of everything imaginable. 


 And with [Name Redacted] permission -- I was 

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working in the building with [Name Redacted].
 

She was doing part of the -- the inventory. We 


were working on the inventory with [Name 


Redacted] and a lot of other people, names that 


you are familiar with. Exposure to these 


chemical -- I mean there were things that -- 


that -- I'll give you a for instance. One of 


the things that -- that people don't associate 


too much wi-- or don't know about at Rocky 


Flats from the outside is hydrogen peroxide. 


Most people think of hydrogen peroxide to be 


put on -- on a cut on a finger, color your hair 


or something like that. We used hydrogen 


peroxide in the plutonium processing to make 


plutonium peroxide precipitate. We used 50 


percent hydrogen peroxide. That's the same 


stuff they use in rockets to fire them off, you 


know? And after a couple of explosions, we 


went to 35 percent because it wasn't quite as 


volatile. 


But we had numerous ex-- explosions. We had 


fires. We had everything you can think of 


under the sun. And as these people have 


already stated, and I don't -- I don't think 


you want to hear all my war stories 'cause you 

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ain't got enough time left in this week to hear 


all the stories that I could tell you about 


Rocky Flats and 71 and 371 and all those. 


I just want to say that -- that Abe just made a 


very good point. We worked under the AEC, IRTA 


and DOE, and yet when it comes down to this 


issue that we have here on the table today, the 


burden of proof is on these people here to 


provide something. 


Now when I went to work at Rocky Flats you were 


supposed to keep records, and I always thought 


there should have been a place where all the 


records that were kept -- everything from a 


piece of paper that somebody scratched on, a 


note or something, all the way up to plans, 


procedures and everything -- should have been 


kept in a place where they could be gotten to. 


That never happened, so a lot of stuff got 


lost. And all these exposures to -- to 


radiation and the exposures to chemicals, 


they're -- there are missing records for -- 


primarily with the chemicals, because there was 


no -- there was no activities on the site until 


1986 when we put in an HF monitor to monitor 


hydrogenfluoride gas, there was nothing that 

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monitored releases to the atmosphere of 


chemicals. So these people were exposed to 


concentrated nitric acid, hydrochloric acid, 


hydrofluoric acid, everything you can think of. 


And to me, that's just as dangerous as the 


plutonium. 


So I'm not going to stand up here and spout a 


bunch of war stories right now 'cause you don't 


need to hear those tonight. I've taken up 


enough of your time on that. I'd just like to 


say that Rocky Flats provided a service to the 


United States of America during the Cold War, 


and we handled a lot of the most dangerous 


chemical in the world, as the -- as it's been 


called, plutonium. What we pushed out the door 


was a product for the government to use as a 


deterrent to keep the rest of the world away 


from our doors. Some of those were used at 


Nevada for tests. I recently read in the paper 


where Nevada got their SEC. Those people 


handled the final product, had very little 


radiation connected with it. And when I go to 


Nevada and talk to those people, and I have 


many times, they're scared to death of anybody 


from Rocky Flats 'cause they know that most of 

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the people at Rocky Flats were exposed. You 


know? So they -- they don't understand why we 


ever did what we did and why we would continue 


to work at Rocky Flats when -- they thought 


they had issues; they don't even begin to 


compare to Rocky Flats. 


So I'd just like to say please consider what 


all of these wonderful people have told you 


about their experiences at Rocky Flats. And as 


I told the people last year when we met and I 


gave them the documents, you've got my name and 


address and phone number. If you want to hear 


any story from the time I got there, 1961, to 


the time I left in 2002, I'll be glad to sit 


down with you and tell you any of it. I was 


involved in the fires and the cleanup and all 


that. I have an extremely large -- for most 


people -- radiation exposure. But I'm just one 


of hundreds of people that had large exposures 


-- larger than what was allowed by the DOE 


regs. Those -- those, to me, aren't being 


considered. 


The arbitrary number that's been set is -- is 


another thing that's of great concern to me 


because -- again I'm going to use [Name 

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Redacted] as a -- as a for instance because we 


worked side by side. What affects me maybe not 


affects her. What affects her maybe does not 


affect me. Our genes are different, our 


backgrounds are different, everything. So how 


can you set an arbitrary number on somebody 


who's had the problems that she's had? 


I thank you for your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Jack. I -- I want to 


find out how many would like about a ten-minute 


comfort break or -- we have quite a few folks 


to go yet, but --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Shall we keep going? We'll keep 


going, and individually if you feel like you 


need to slip out -- Board members, too, just 


don't stay out long -- but we'll keep going 


then. Okay. I -- I don't want any of you to 


feel like you -- if you really need to slip 


out, please do that. 


 Hannah Marschall. 


 MS. MARSCHALL: Hi. I'm Hannah Marschall. 


This is the first time I've been in front of a 


board like this, so don't have any notes. 
I 


worked at Rocky Flats from the early 1980s 

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until they -- Kaiser Hill declared physical 


completion in 2005. I think all of us that 


worked out there knew that we were working 


around danger-- dangerous materials. However, 


we trusted our government to keep us safe. And 


I -- I just think it's incomprehensible, to me, 


that our government now is making those of us 


that are sick grovel for such a stippance (sic) 


of money. There aren't that many of us left, 


and it's not that much money. And it just 


seems as though the government could take the 


high road and admit that possibly they put us 


in harm's way and those that -- of us that only 


have a couple years left to live, that they 


could approve our claims and allow us, our 


spouses and our children to have whatever time 


we have left to live it with dignity and with 


some peace of mind. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Hannah. Mary 


Ann Rupp. 


 MS. RUPP: Hi. I also want to thank you for 


the opportunity to address this Board. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mary Ann, pull the mike down just 


a tad. Thank you. 


 MS. RUPP: Thank you. 

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I 

 UNIDENTIFIED: Us short people got to stick 


together. 


 MS. RUPP: I want to thank you for allowing me 


to address the Board, as with everyone else. 


am here tonight on behalf of [name redacted], 


who could not be here as he died 11 years ago 


at the age of 49 from lung cancer. I've had a 


hard time with this because when he was 


diagnosed his diagnosis was -- the primary site 


was lung. However, it metastasized to the 


brain. 


I'm here to put a face to his claim tonight, 


because he was a vibrant man, a family man, a 


patriotic man -- as with everybody else in this 


room -- and he believed in what he was doing, 


also. 


He was diagnosed and he was considered terminal 


as soon as we had his diagnosis. He was a man 


who -- he -- he was active, and I -- as I said, 


vibrant. He lost his ability for speech. He 


wa-- suffered paralysis. We spent a lot of 


time playing charades because he couldn't 


communicate with the family like he wanted to 


do. 


I have here which is what many of these people 

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have heard from NIOSH and it's called findings 


of fact. The evidence of record does not 


establish that exposure to toxic substances 


experienced at the DOE facility was a 


significant factor in aggravating, contributing 


to or causing the lung cancer of [name 


redacted] Rupp. Therefore, Mary Ann Rupp is 


not entitled to the benefit because she did not 


establish that he developed a covered illness 


through the toxic substance at the Department 


of Energy facility, pursuant to 42 USC 7385S-4. 


And I'm sure many of you are familiar with this 


very same letter. 


This is my third appeal, and I'm not only 


appealing on behalf of my family, but on behalf 


of everyone in this room. You can do little to 


help [name redacted] and now, but you can do a 


lot to help the people that are left here. 


 I just basically wanted to tell you how I came 


to this. [name redacted] worked at a pipe 


fitter out at Rocky Flats. He was also out 


there as a field engineer and an iron worker. 


He was there from 1983 till approximately 1992. 


The first two years that he was on site he had 


absolutely no dosimetry monitoring. We've --

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you know, we received -- I, as the other lady 


did, talked to David Sundin, requested all the 


dosimetry records, and I received a partial 


list -- and I do stress "partial". He was 


there for nine years and the dosimetry records 


I have consisted of approximately three pages, 


the majority of which said zero because there 


was no monitoring, as I said, for the first two 


years. 


What brought me to this was that [name 


redacted] was exposed while he was working on 


the plant site. He was not in a building. He 


was working outside of building 776, along with 


a coworker. They unearthed some contaminated 


items there. And I had not realized this had 


happened until this whole program started and 


his fellow worker, a [Name Redacted], who was 


the [Identifying Information Redacted] for pipe 


fitter Local 208 out of Denver, came to me and 


he says I think you and [Name Redacted], who was 


the wife of the other exposed worker, need to 


put in a claim. And then he told me why. 


And when I first started the whole process with 


NIOSH, you know, I went through the interview. 


I told them that I -- I had come to this for 

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this reason, that I'd found out of his 


exposure, and it was never considered a valid 


reason. In all the times that I spoke with 


NIOSH, all the interviews, all the letters, 


other meetings I've been to, I -- I always told 


them that this was what was in the forefront. 


This was why I was here. But they never once 


investigated it, which to me is unbelievable. 


And I'd like to read to you just basically what 


I've sent to them, and hopefully, as I said, 


it'll put a face to my claim and help put a 


face to many of the other claims and that the ­

- that you will consider Rocky Flats for the 


SEC. 


I am again objecting to the fact that 


[identifying information redacted] was on site 


from July of 1983 to September of 1992, as 


corroborated by the District Office of NIOSH. 


Information obtained from the Freedom of 


Information Act on partial dosimetry records -- 


and I stress partial, as I have supplemental 


badge reports that were not listed on the 


dosimetry badge report in the dosimetry and 


radiation monitoring. Those records, which I 


have included, state that they absolutely had 

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no monitoring data for -- in 1983 or '84, and 


the first dosimetry readings on [name redacted] 


did not begin until September of 1985. The two 


-- the two full years without dosimetry 


monitorings of any type. 


I am also objecting to the lack of 


investigation of an incident that initially 


prompted me to file the claim in 2003. It 


involved both [identifying information 


redacted] and another employee, whose wife has 


also filed a claim on his behalf as he is also 


deceased. They died approximately a year from 


one another. [Name Redacted] cancer was cancer 


of the brain, brain was primary site; Martin's 


was lung that metastasized to the brain. 


The incident of exposure was witnessed by their 


supervisor/coworker, who is also [Identfying 


Information Redacted] of the pipe fitter Local 


208 in Denver. No interview regarding the 


incident was ever conducted. It appears to 


have been totally disregarded by NIOSH 


investigators. 


During my telephone interview of March 3rd, 


2006 in which I stated in section six, 


radiation incidents, that yes, there had been 

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an incident of contamination; and in section 


eight, identify coworker and other witnesses, 


in which I identified the coworker and also his 


former owner and operator of the company for 


which he had worked. He was one of the 


subcontractors who [name redacted] worked with 


at Rocky Flats for many years and had detailed 


information on job sites and locations, which 


specified buildings and specific duties. 


According to the NIOSH report of dose 


reconstruction under dose from radiological 


incidents, the record of the telephone 


interview was evaluated carefully, and while 


the telephone interview was used to assist in 


determining whether [name redacted] worked 


there, there had been no mention of any 


incident of exposure -- which was not true, I 


had mentioned that several times. The events 


of the contamination were mentioned several 


times throughout the course of the process. 


The job of NIOSH was to investigate any and all 


forms of the -- throughout the course of the 


process, phone interview and witnesses to look 


at all the data, gather from all possible 


sources and then determine its validity. 

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Without adequate investigation into this 


incident and without interviewing the witnesses 


who could give insight into the circumstances 


of exposure and the background to Martin's 


activities while employed at Rocky Flats site, 


I don't feel the claim was given credence it 


deserved. 


NIOSH has based its evaluation of potential 


exposure on inadequate and incomplete 


information supplied by Rockwell International, 


a company that was allowed to plea bargain out 


of their culpability into alleged environmental 


crimes to the tune of $18.5 million, to forever 


seal from the public the information uncovered 


by a grand jury in 1992. 


 I have attended several of the neighborhood 


meetings that have been held by the Department 


of Labor, and the same information rings true, 


that Rockwell International has falsified 


information regarding dosimetry readings of 


former Rocky Flats workers. Over and over I 


have listened to individuals tell their own 


experience of -- of readings from wrist 


dosimetries that were never assigned, and 


reports that for many years they were required 

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to wear their dosimeters under lead aprons, 


with no reading to cover their heads and 


extremities. 


[name redacted] worked on the water main 


building in 771, the plutonium production 


building, which has been labeled by the 


Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 2001 as the 


most dangerous building in America. 


Microscopic particles of plutonium were 


extremely toxic if inhaled. [name redacted] and 


his coworker were both exposed when working 


outside of Building 776 while digging a trench 


with a backhoe, and they unearthed something 


hot -- a direct quote from my witness. 


According to the EPA Superfund record, USEPA 


Region 8, Congressional District Number 2, EPA 


ID number 890010526, bore hole data indicated 


that radioactive contamination is generally 


contained in the top 12 inches of native soil. 


That plutonium, uranium and americurium (sic) 


contaminated soil in the central and eastern 


portions of the site, with the most 


contaminated areas being on the eastern edge of 


the industrial area. That alone should have 


strongly suggested that further investigation 

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of the incident of contamination should have 


been conducted. 


It is also stated that significant amounts of 


plutonium were in liquid form contained within 


the deteriorating piping systems, which is what 


[name redacted] did as a pipe fitter. He also 


worked on process piping systems, water 


heaters, flumes, exhaust fans, heat exchangers, 


steam conversions, cooling towers, plenums, 


heating and air conditioning. 


I respectfully ask that -- that reconsideration 


of my claim -- claim be seriously reconsidered 


due to the lack of investigation into incident 


of exposure and all the areas that [name 


redacted] worked in on plant site. 


I am not confident in the fact that NIOSH has 


estimated his exposure adequately without 


investigating all the facts I have submitted. 


I believe that many of the people in this room 


have the same problem. I have dosimetry 


readings that were scrawled on pieces of paper, 


just handwritten, no scientific data, nothing 


to back it up. And I believe that along with 


[identifying information redacted] and everyone 


in this room, they deserve the right to have 

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everyone consider this and take it out of the 


hands of NIOSH and the Department of Labor, and 


please consider their claims. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Mary Ann. Next we'll 


hear from -- I think it's -- could it be [name 


redacted]? I'm have a little hard time reading 


the first name -- [name redacted]? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Yvonne Garrimone -- Garrimone? Yvonne? 


Okay. 


 MS. GARRIMONE: Hi. Yes, my name is Yvonne 


Garrimone and I'm here to speak on behalf of my 


[Identifying Information Redacted], who passed 


away [Identifying Information Redacted]. 


He started at Rocky Flats in October of 1981. 


There he was a NDT tech, and I only know these 


things second-hand and just through talking 


through it with his coworkers, speaking with 


people from the steel workers' union and trying 


to do research on my own through the incomplete 


records that was provided to me and 


[identifying information redacted] from the 


Rocky Flats Plant. 


Every time -- he first -- when we first found 


out he was ill, it was April, 2001. After an 

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extensive stay in the hospital in ICU and 


trying to recover, he placed his claim for -- 


with -- with NIOSH. He -- we -- we actually 


received his dose reconstruction I believe a 


month after he had passed away and to which 


[identifying information redacted] got a phone 


call asking her if she wanted to stay with what 


my [Identifying Information Redacted] had gone 


on record as what he believed, which we do 


believe, what he was exposed to. And just 


having to go through this fight and be denied 


time after time after time is a slap in the 


face, not only to us, the survivors, but to 


people who are living with the illnesses and 


various diseases that they got through their 


exposure at Rocky Flats doing their job, doing 


what they thought was right to protect, you 


know, not only their country, but to protect 


their families and to provide for them. 


I know that not only did my [Identifying 


Information Redacted]-- was he diagnosed with 


pancreatic cancer, but two other people in his 


group, as well. He never once, through the 


whole ordeal that he was put through, 


complained. But the one thing that he did make 

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me promise and as well as [Identifying 


Information Redacted] is that we would fight, 


not only for him, but for everyone else that 


has been put through this whole ugly, ugly 


mess. 


The only thing that I really want, more than 


anything else -- not the money. It doesn't 


matter. But for my [Identifying Information 


Redacted] to be able to see his ten-month-old 


granddaughter, to see everything that he's 


missing. When [Identifying Information 


Redacted] died at the age of 47 from pancreatic 


cancer, and I will tell you, that is the most 


horrible way to watch somebody die. My 


[Identifying Information Redacted] was a very 


active man, and that ugly disease took him away 


from me, [identifying information redacted], 


his grandson and everybody else who loved him 


and knew him. And I did not mean to get this 


emotional, but please, for -- not just for me, 


but for everyone else and anyone else who gets 


sick from this place, pass the special cohort 


status for these people so that we don't have 


to do this fight and get slapped in the face 


every single time. Thank you. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Yvonne, and for being 


brave enough to share that. 


 Don Saber. 


MR. SABEC: Sabec? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Could be Sabec, S-a-b-- S-a-b-e-k, 


is it? 


MR. SABEC: C, c, c. 


 DR. ZIEMER: B-e-z. 


MR. SABEC: S-a-b-e-c. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, S-a-b-e-c, get it on the 


record here correctly. Thank you. 


MR. SABEC: My name's Don Sabec, as you well 


know now. I started at Rocky Flats in April of 


1961 and I retired the end of June of 2004. 


What I want to talk to you about is these dose 


recalculations. You know, it -- it took 33 


years before I finally got a true dose 


assessment. And July 28th of 1994 they 


notified me that they did a dose reassessment 


on me and had to add 30-- 36,108 millirem to my 


exposure. And at the time I had a calculated 


dose of 71,415, and when you add it all up I 


ended up with 107,523 millirem. 


But 23 years later is -- or 33 years later, 


excuse me, is just a little too late on -- on 

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that. And during that calculation they 


happened to add in two years that I missed 


Rocky Flats -- I got to go to work for the 


Department of Army for a couple of years -- and 


they did give me a dose for that. And I 


brought it to the attention in the meeting -- 


the summer meeting at Jefferson County Airport 


that they added that two years that I wasn't 


even at the Rocky Flats, and I don't know what 


-- the numbers they come up with or how they 


come up with it. And there was a gentleman 


there from NIOSH that heard me make that 


statement. Well, again, I was down at the 


Marriott with -- with [Name Redacted] last -- in
 

the -- in the -- I guess it was the fall that 


we went in there, and said something about it 


when I made a testimony again, and he got me 


after I made my testimony and says Don, he 


says, I -- I remember doing yours 'cause I 


remember the two years that you said that you 


had an exposure from Rocky Flats that you 


weren't even there, he says, and I did a dose 


recalculation on you. But he said I had to add 


another eight rem to your exposure. And I said 


well, that -- not too good. He said -- and I 

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thought he was going to mail me a -- a copy of 


that -- that exposure value. I never received 


anything from that, and I kept telling 


everybody I'm pretty lucky, I haven't had any 


symptoms at all from Rocky Flats. Until 


October -- it was early October they found 


cancer in my eye -- I don't remember the date. 


Anyway, October 11th they removed it and I -- I 


don't know, I go back tomorrow to see if it's 


coming back again, but when I talked to the 


Department of Labor when I -- I made a claim. 


That's the first time I've ever done anything 


like that, and I told them it wasn't malignant; 


it's very hard to get malignant cancer in your 


eye, they said well, if it's not malignant, we 


don't even compensate you for it. But I did 


have an interview over the telephone, thought 


everything was -- they would contact me and 


make -- have a hearing. That -- that didn't 


happen. They -- they sent me another form to 


fill out that they want to know my entire 


history of the jobs I performed. 


Well, in 44 years of work out there, I don't 


know if anybody could remember the jobs -- all 


the jobs they performed. I -- I was a chem op 

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for seven years. That's when the -- I probably 


got my -- most of my neutron excess, but -- and 


I really feel that this dose recalculation 


thing is -- is just about like a dart board 


effect. You -- you throw a dart, hit a number 


and that's what you're going to get, because 


there's so many incidents that we had that was 


not reported -- spills, contamination. We'd 


take them in -- in 771 we'd taken them in there 


if they had their hands contaminated and their 


face contaminated, we -- we'd wash them down in 


the area in a decon room and there -- most of 


the time there was never even a record made of 


it. So I -- I don't know how you people can 


make an intelligent decision on the exposures 


of people at Rocky Flats, when -- when I can't 


even get records -- I -- I had to really cry 


the blues to get my own records. Rocky Flats ­

- when I retired I requested a copy of them. 


It was two and a half years before I even got 


anything from them. 


So I just want to say that the dose 


reconstruction is -- is almost impossible for ­

- for the lack of record keeping Rocky Flats 


did because the number one game was production. 

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When you're in production, you know, it's damn 


the torpedoes, full speed ahead. And -- and 


the same -- same criteria, same mentality, was 


the same way when we're in D&D. That's one of 


the reasons I got out as early as I did 'cause 


I felt very healthy and felt I could keep 


working, but the way things were going, I 


thought -- you know, somebody's going to 


really get hurt -- which they didn't; they 


lucked out. 


Anyway, I appreciate you people coming down 


here and looking at this and -- and hopefully 


that you -- you can come up with something that 


is going to compensate people for what they 


really deserve. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Then – Jack -- is it – 


[name redacted] or --


UNIDENTIFIED: He left. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, he left? Okay. How about 


[name redacted]? 


 (No responses) 


 Michael Logan. 


MR. LOGAN: I just want to thank you for 


hearing us and all, and hopefully we can get 


things squared away. But I started at Rocky 

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Flats in October of 1978, worked there until 


June 19th of 2003, got laid off and took the 


early retirement. In the meantime, in '94 I 


left for ten months and then came back, take 


care of some family business. And there's so 


many stories you can hear, you know, starting 


out out there. 


For example, I started out as a janitor, then I 


progressed to a service attendant, working in 


the garage servicing the fleet vehicles. And 


then I went to a metallurgical operator working 


in the foundry with the plutonium and dealing 


with all the castings and material with stuff 


like that. 


Some days we'd have SAAM alarm go off probably 


ten, 15 times. The way they did the air flow 


is that the air may be flowing towards you, the 


SAAM alarm's behind you, and by the time it 


goes off you've already got an uptake. A lot 


of times if you request to go to body count, if 


you're fortunate enough to let someone agree to 


send you up there, it come back as background. 


But yet if they do nasal smears or anything 


like that, it comes out that you've got an 


intake. 

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Far as the radiological records, I've been 


fighting for three months now trying to get 


mine and I keep getting the runaround. 
I 


talked with a gal in Washington, D.C., her 


name's [Name Redacted] at Rad Records, and she 


keeps referring me to someone else, they refer 


me to someone else, but I -- I keep getting the 


runaround. I don't know what else to do. 


A lot of the people here have very, very viable 


complaints, issues over it that needs to be 


addressed. You know, we hope everything will 


come out okay and everything's done right. You 


know, it's kind of like when I was brought up 


as a kid, you know, you -- you're taught to do 


right and do the right thing, but it doesn't 


appear that it's either, one, it's the system 


or the people handling the system. 


Every time I get on the computer I just -- I 


get real angry, looking at the different issues 


with Rocky Flats. [Name Redacted] has diagnosed 


me of having asbestiosis (sic). National 


Jewish says it is inconclusive, but all the 


symptoms are there as far as the thickening of 


the pleural lining of the lungs, which also has 


the same consistency as berylliosis, which I've 

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worked with that also. Now [Name Redacted] also 


wrote an article on the beryllium testing, the 


program, and gone into great detail on how it 


works. But there was another partner with 


them, another doctor, and this kind of scares 


me to death, he was a doctor of veterinarian 


medicine. Now either, one, he does have some 


knowledge of the background of radiation or 


beryllium; or two, were we guinea pigs? I mean 


I don't mean to sound nasty, but there's a lot 


of inconsistencies of them losing records, 


records come back incomplete, or they're 


changing our dose to zero when we've been in 


the area. So what you're saying is by waving 


the magic pen, we don't -- we automatically 


don't get any radiation, we don't have no dose? 


Right now I'm fighting with a tumor in my 


spinal cord. I haven't had any comment back on 


that from the Department of Labor. Far as the 


asbestos of that, I've been denied the 


financial. They say they would like to do the 


medical surveillance on it, but I haven't seen 


anything on paper. 


I had to fill out some paperwork the Department 


of Labor sent me far as have I ever filed a 

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suit against any labor department or workmen's 


comp or do I have any claims pending, which I 


don't. We FAXed it to them. I get a call 


today, where -- where's the paperwork? Well, 


you guys have -- it's been FAXed to you. I 


have the paperwork that shows that you have it. 


I hate to see it, it's kind of scary, but 


either, one, they're hiding stuff, which I 


would not like to believe; or two, somebody's 


just not doing their job. 


I don't think we're asking for every -- you 


know, there's no way that DOE can come up and 


just wave their magic wand and everything's 


right. We want them to stand up and at least 


make an honest effort. You know, at first, 


when I was really scared and mad about the 


tumor in my spinal cord, I thought that the 


Department of Energy didn't care about us. I 


thought we were just a piece of meat and a 


number, but a piece of meat's a precious 


commodity. I'm not sure, we were just doing 


our job, what we were told to do. We were also 


told that the radiation exposure that we got by 


going to the dentist or having a couple of X-


rays a year -- you know, chest X-rays -- you 

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know, you get more radiation exposure there 


than you did at Rocky Flats in a full year. 


I'm still at the point now, there's only two 


things they've told us: Lies, and more lies. 


If I was to go out and get drunk and run over 


somebody, I'm held accountable. But is our 


government held accountable for what they do? 


It's got to be a two-way street. I was brought 


up to do things right and do the right thing, 


and I've done my best to do that, working for 


Rocky Flats doing what I felt was in the best 


interests of my country. I cared. And a lot 


of these people here, you -- you won't find a 


more dedicated group of people. We're a honest 


bunch of people, and more caring. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Michael. Cheryl 

Hewitt-Ballou. 

 MS. HEWITT-BALLOU: Good evening. [Identifying 

Information Redacted] is why I'm here. His 


name is [Name Redacted] and he was diagnosed 


with berylliosis chronic disease and 


asbestosis. He was one of the first people 


that actually helped build Rocky Flats in the 


late '50s and going through the '60s and into 


the '70s. He's been in every single building 

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on the facility. 


His job was working for the sheet metal workers 


Local Number 9. He would crawl in and out of 


ductwork that had been contaminated with 


beryllium dust. He had it covering him. There 


was no security. There was no OSHA, if you 


will. There was nothing to let him know that 


the dust that he carried home to his family was 


actually radioactive dust, and that he had 


inhaled it, he had also ingested it. He had it 


all over his lunch pail. 


As a child growing up and watching [Identifying 


Information Redacted] come home from this 


facility, I would of course greet him when he 


came home with loves, kisses and hugs. He also 


had a little trick that he did every day for 


me. He'd always leave a little tidbit in his 


lunchbox for me to eat. Well, I did this every 


single day that he brought home his lunchbox. 


This box was covered with dust. We had no clue 


as to what the dust actually was until many 


years later. 


Now I am as mad as hell, and I don't want to 


take this anymore -- if I may quote a famous 


actor in a movie. He yelled out the window. 

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All of these people that are here, and the ones 


that did not get the information that this 


meeting was being held this evening due to lack 


of correcting themselves and making sure that 


you address the people the correct way with 


notification of ample time to get them here to 


this meeting. One newspaper article isn't 


enough. 


These people are sick and they're dying. I'm 


sick and I'm dying. I went through a double 


mastectomy at the age of 49 years of age due to 


the beryllium poisoning that I have in my 


system. I documented this beryllium poisoning 


in my system when I was pregnant with my son 


that is now 16 years of age, because I was so 


concerned of it being transmitted. I realized 


[Identifying Information Redacted] had brought 


the dust home. I realized that we had contact 


with it physically, by inhaling it and 


ingesting it. I was so concerned I went to 


National Jewish Hospital with [Identifying 


Information Redacted] on a specific 


appointment, and I asked the doctor 


specifically, is this transferable to my child 


that I'm carrying. And of course he could not 

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answer me. But now at this point of my life, 


at 51 years of age, after going through a 


double mastectomy, I am now looking at where 


it's involving my liver and my kidneys and my 


lungs. 


 Now these beautiful, wonderful Americans stood 


by the country and they did their job. They 


were screwed. I'm sorry, I'm not very polite. 


I like to put things black and white. They've 


been screwed by the government by lack of 


keeping records, by lack of truth, by lack of 


supplying ample, complete records for them to 


be able to go to doctors that should be 


supplied by the government to take care of 


them. They did nothing wrong but to do their 


job. 


We're not asking for any miracles because we 


already know that we've been contaminated. We 


already know what our outcome is. You're not 


one of those people. You're being paid to sit 


here and listen to the sob stories and then 


you'll walk away and you'll dismiss it, just 


like all the rest of these meetings have done. 


All of these years we've talked, we've begged, 


we've pleaded and we've asked nothing but to do 

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the right thing by these people, the Americans 


that supported the country that we believe in. 


I don't think that's too much to ask. 


The families have been affected so much that 


they've been basically put back on the shelf, 


shut up, nothing to do about it, the government 


will eventually get their act together. Well, 


you know what? I don't believe that the 


government's going to actually get their act 


together. And the reason why? You haven't 


done it yet. How many more years do you wait? 


You'll wait long enough for every one of these 


people and their family members to die, and 


then you'll go oh, guess what? I guess we were 

wrong. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Cheryl. Diane Jensen? 

Is Diane with us? 

 MS. JENSEN: As you stated, I'm Diane Jensen. 


I spent 22 years out at the Flats, and my first 


eight years I spent as a chemical operator. 


That meant hands-on processing with plutonium. 


And as a chemical operator, we went through 


progression period. That meant we learned how 


to handle plutonium in a liquid form, a solid 


form, a metal form. We bagged in, we bagged 

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out. We touched it hands-on every day, moving 


it from one glovebox to the next. 


The remaining years I spent in technical 


support in a production building. I was always 


within 50 feet of the production area. 


In 2003 I was diagnosed with breast cancer. 


I'm currently in -- was in remission. I now 


have a growth on my thyroid. 


I want to thank you very much for this venue to 


tell you about our concerns, the inaccuracies 


that I've found in struggling with this huge 


system. I want to address my concerns to you 


because you are the audience that can make the 


decision. You are the decision-makers for our 


future, so that we can quit fighting and get on 


with our lives. 


 Special Exposure Cohort status is extremely 


important to those of us who have been ill, but 


I need to let you know that the system that's 


in place is broken, how it is broken, and that 


the administrators of the program cannot fix 


it. They do not have the expertise, the 


ability or the resolve to handle the issues. 


 The Department of Labor is currently tasked 


with administering this program. They have no 

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knowledge of radiation. I spent some time with 


a hearing officer for the FAB board. My report 


from that meeting lists my exposure, measured 


in grams. Now I was under the impression it's 


millirem, rem -- again, they have no concept of 


radiation. 


The hearing officer is not the least bit 


concerned that they don't understand radiation, 


because NIOSH is the determining factor. They 


are only in place to make sure that the NIOSH 


determination is enforced. And they hide 


behind that law. It is on-- and it is the only 


tool they have to make their determination 


because NIOSH is the rule that determines least 


as likely or not. It is not their job to 


understand, but only to implement. They have 


no idea of the relevancy of radiation dose. 


And to make it more frustrating, you cannot 


question the methodology. You cannot question 


the numbers they use, because only NIOSH can 


handle that. They can send questions back to 


NIOSH, but they can't address concerns, and 


they forbid you from questioning the 


methodology because NIOSH is the governing 


body. 

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Well, I have many questions, and they have a 


common theme for many of the people here. 
I 


have missing doses. I have zero readings, and 


I have inaccurate readings. 


NIOSH also makes assumptions about the readings 


they have, and -- for example, they assume that 


if you have a zero reading, or if you have a 


missing dose, that the dose was too low to 


calculate, so they apply a small value to your 


dose to say this accounts for the missing dose. 


Well, they had it wrong. The assumption is 


wrong. They are adding a small value, when in 


actuality the dose that is missing is high. 


Many doses that I have missing in reality came 


back as no data available from times that I 


spent inside vaults, times that I've spent 


looking for cans or buttons that we had to find 


during inventory, so you spent hands-on time in 


a room that has 400 millirem for exposure. And 


your dose comes back zero or no data available? 


I'm sorry, that's wrong. 


 This statement also translates into a statement 


they put on your dose reconstruction that says 


everything applied is claimant favorable, so 


this small factor that they added for a dose 

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that was too high to calculate was used to say 


it is claimant favorably (sic) because they 


added something for that zero. 


These statements are also like a narcotic to 


the claims administrators. Though they have no 


knowledge of the questions about radiation, 


they falsely believe that the system is built 


to compensate the employees with a foreseeable 


air factor, and that it's been applied. 


They're confident this mechanism's in place. 


I also have concerns about the inaccurate 


reading due to the process, the procedures to 


subtract background from actual readings. What 


if an employee actually received background? 


In 1991 when I was an office worker, my dose 


went down drastically from when I had hands-on 


experience. My dose for the year was 46 


millirem. But to be claimant favorable, they 


gave me 100 millirem. My office was room 101 


in building 771, and my wall -- my desk was on 


-- was adjacent to the abandoned americium line 


in 771. In 1993 the Department of Defense said 


hey, we have 300 millirem at the badge board, 


and this has been adjusted downwards for 2,000 


man hours. One, we worked 50-hour weeks, so 

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there's no concept of 2,000 man hours. And my 


office is here, between the source and the 


badge board. A badge board's 300? The source 


is constant. Tell me how I got 46. I don't 


know a physics book that comes up with numbers 


like that. 


 In the mid-1990s the operator realized that had 


issues with dose in 771. They'd placed metal 


shielding in the wall for what was my office. 


We had people here who'd mentioned the guard 


posts, the vestibule in 771. The radiation 


dose coming off the americium line, the 


abandoned americium line, was so high it was 


setting off my monitors. They had to install 


metal shielding. Give me a break. How can you 


tell me I got 46 millirem? 


This affects all office workers in production 


buildings. By definition of the term "office 


worker", someone who was not required to wear a 


badge, we were assigned 100 millirem because, 


by definition, we were supposed to receive less 


than 100 millirem. 


In the mid-1990s Building 371 housed the 


majority of the plutonium on plant site. 


(Unintelligible) said it was 12.9 metric ton. 

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And you can move that plutonium all you want. 


You can move drums from one location to the 


next to change doses in areas, but you still 


have office areas exposed to dose because the 


office areas are adjacent to the vaults and are 


positioned directly above the vaults. 


I actually brought with me tonight things I 


would like to submit, which are dose records 


for 1996 and 1997, and the dose records for the 


office areas in Building 371 and 374 you will 


note significantly the bottom mark is 100 


millirem. The bars on the right are 371 and 


374 office areas, doses ranging from 200, 300, 


400, 500, 600 and 700 millirem, office areas. 


Us office workers got credit with 1,000 (sic) 


millirem to be claimant favorable. There's an 


error here. Something is wrong. We were 


short-changed. NIOSH's assumption is not 


claimant favorable. The numbers are wrong, 


whether intentionally manipulated to meet 


corporate bonus structures, due to company 


policy to bring them down to 2,000 man hours, 


or the natural inclination to disbelieve your 


indicators when you have high doses. No matter 


what the reason, the result is the same: The 

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numbers are wrong. 


Office workers got significant dose. The 


numbers they use are not claimant favorable. 


And the Department of Labor is not experienced 


enough to know the difference between a gram 


and a rem. I have very little confidence in 


their ability to administrate the system. 


When you're voting tomorrow, please consider 


the accuracy of the numbers that were used to 


determine our destinies. Think of the false 


assumptions that contributed to our assigned 


dose. Think about the consequences of your 


decision. Special Exposure Cohort status will 


not make us well. We do not want sympathy. 


want acknowledgement. I want to get on with my 


life. I don't want to spend it fighting the 


system. So tomorrow please vote yes on the 


Special Exposure Cohort status for Rocky Flats. 


Thank you for your attention. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Thank you, Diane. 


Next, Dennis Virgil (sic). Just for planning 


purposes, folks, we've got Dennis and then 


Jerry Mobley and Liz Huebner will complete our 


list. So Dennis... 


MR. VIGIL: Members of the panel, workers -- 


I 
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hi, cuz -- my wing man, another wing man. Not 


real good at this kind of talking. I'd like to 


thank the Board. I appreciate your patience. 


I don't know that I would like your job, either 


-- paperwork and all that's involved. 


Dennis Vigil, I was a Navy electrician and a 


Seabees lineman, and I came to work. I wor--


and we're part of elite groups, construction, 


mine workers, maintenance people, production, 


monitors and operators. We are the band of 


brothers and sisters. We learned our trades 


and did our jobs well. Rocky Flats, we gave 


you the best years of our lives. Along with 


other families, I was a lineman electrician at 


Rocky Flats. I have a blood brother that was a 


'lectrician at Rocky Flats. He lost a kidney 


to cancer. I myself have been learning medical 


terms as far as lung nodules, nodules in the 


lung, cysts in the kidneys and the National 


Jewish Hospital has brought some of these 


records out. Our claims have been denied. All 


I ask is that we take time so that America, you 


need to hear our cry. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, and Jerry Mobley? Hi, 


Jerry. 

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 MR. MOBLEY: Hello. First I want to compliment 


all of you. I'm almost amazed that you have 


eye contact with the people talking. None of 


you have fallen asleep or become bored, that I 


have seen. I've been watching you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I hope we don't start now 

then. 

 MR. MOBLEY: In a minute, with your permission, 

I'm going to ask for a raise of hands of the 


people -- I don't know if it's appropriate or 


not, but I will. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Depends on how embarrassing the 


question is, I think. 


 MR. MOBLEY: My name is Jerry Mobley. I was a 


stationary operating engineer in Building 371 


for 13 years. I came down with a skin cancer 


on the scalp -- the worst kind you could have. 


Then it went into my lymph nodes as mestastic 


(sic) malig-- anyway, it went into my lymph 


nodes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MR. MOBLEY: Shortly after that, I had a real 


balance problem. I still have a balance 


problem. But they did a CAT scan and 


discovered I have a ping-pong-sized tumor in my 

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left cerebellum. When the doctor came to the 


house, which was unusual, to tell us about 


this, that I was going to have to have some -- 


see a brain surgeon the next day, he told my 


[identifying information redacted] and I that 


we needed to get my affairs in order. And 


[identifying information redacted] said so then 


this next month we should, you know, get things 


set up. And he said no, this week, before the 


surgery, 'cause he's not likely to make it. 


Well, I'm still here, thank goodness. 


It wasn't a tumor. You know what it was? 


Severe radionecrosis. When the surgeon came 


out to tell the family after the surgery -- 


which lasted one-fourth of what it was supposed 


to last in time -- the surgeon was quite 


baffled. He said how did -- Jerry hasn't been 


exposed to radiation. And what did my family 


say? What did my family say? Yeah, he's been 


at Rocky Flats. And the surgeon says huh? 


'Cause this is his first radionecrosis that 


he'd ever seen as a brain surgeon. They 


thought it was going to -- they were going to 


find mestastic (sic) malignant melanoma in my 


brain. 

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 Well, anyway, to make a long story short, they 


didn't. 


Now, I'm still here, thank goodness. But this 


last January I had to file bankruptcy. I have 


been fighting medical bills -- every time I go 


for a PET scan, they want $400 from me. When I 


went to work at Rocky Flats, one of the 


benefits was you're going to have lifetime 


medical. They're going to take care of all 


your medical bills. Has that happened? 


THE AUDIENCE: No. 


 MR. MOBLEY: No. $86,000 I had to file 


bankruptcy on last December. I told the doctor 


last week when he wants to do another PET scan 


coming up 'cause I'm having breathing problems, 


where's the $400 going to come by? He's 


working on it. Hopefully he can come up with 


it. I don't have it anymore. I'm busted. 


Now, what I wanted to ask for a raise of hands 


was, there are 12 of you here, the exact number 


that was in my group in 371 for the 13 years. 


They weren't all the same group, but when we 


finished up there were 12 SOEs. Of the 12 


SOEs, five have skin cancers, the worst kind. 


But wait a minute, that doesn't fit the profile 

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for natural skin cancer according to NIOSH 


because I'm not even supposed to have skin 


cancer from radiation. It doesn't happen. 


Right? 


Okay, the numbers are telling me something 


different. Now when I was going to ask for a 


raise of hands, how many of you are from -- not 


from Denver here in Colorado? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Not from Denver -- not from 

Denver. 

 MR. MOBLEY: Not from Denver. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Not from Denver. 

 MR. MOBLEY: If you were told when you came 

here that if you go to this Denver, you're 


going to have -- five are you are going to come 


down with skin cancers -- oh, but it's not 


connected with anything up here; it's just that 


the probability is so high if you go to Denver 


-- would you come? 


When I -- no, you -- right, you wouldn't. You 


wouldn't take that risk. I wouldn't take that 


risk if I'd known what was happening. We 


didn't know we were coming -- all coming down 


with skin cancer until all of a sudden it's 


happening. 

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And so when you vote tomorrow, a yes -- I don't 


know if it's going to affect me because they 


say melanomas are not covered, even though it's 


cancer. This doesn't make sense. And severe 


radionecrosis isn't on the list because it's 


not supposed to happen, but I hope that -- I 


doubt honestly that I will ever see any of the 


benefits. I don't think I'm going to live that 


long. But I would hope for my wife, who has 


supported me completely, will be able not to 


have to sell the house. We've mortgaged the 


house to the hilt to try to -- 'cause I feel 


that -- I've always felt that I want to take 


care of my debts. I never wanted to go out and 


establish a debt and then walk away and say you 


figure out how -- so with that, thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, Liz Huebner. 


Liz? 


 MS. HUEBNER: I -- I'm Liz Huebner and she's 


helping me here because the other day we made 


some posters that we were going to put around 


on our behalf and I started at Rocky Flats 


February of '98 and halfway through the '98s 


the doctors told me that my body was starting 


to be the body of a 90-year-old and I had a lot 

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of things happen and a lot of muscular and 


different things. And I worked in 883 building 


and [Name Redacted] came in and said well, the 


chairs don't match, we have to take them away. 


And so we sat on the uranium ingots and the 


LIPS project and all that and the engineer came 


through and says well, you shouldn't be setting 


on that because that affects your production 


organs and so I've had a full hysterectomy and 


all that. 


But a couple things I'd like to bring up about 


this reconstruction is we have MSDS sheets, 


which everybody knows is material safety data 


sheets, and for chemicals and all kinds of 


things. That stuff on there gives you things 


that it affects in your body. Now these 


manuals were written and so I don't understand 


why all of a sudden these manuals are in 


question about chemicals and how they affect 


your body because some of the chemicals we 


used, like say in 883 building, when the fans 


went down the chemicals caused a -- it was as 


tall as this -- it was a white wall, to turn 


yellow, and we were told to continue working. 


We never had respirators. It was a uranium 

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facility and when we left the building for 


breaks, we had to take all of our clothes off ­

- we had our boxer shorts and our T-shirts -- 


and then we'd go to break. But all the carpets 


would come up hot all the time and so forth. 


 And another thing is when we went to body count 


working in the uranium -- and they had 


beryllium in there, also, because it was the 


foundry building -- we took two showers to get 


body counts. We had to take one at the 


building, and we had to take another shower at 


the medical building before we took our body 


count because they knew that the dust would be 


on us and the dust got in the offices on the 


second floor. They had to replace the carpets 


many times because they would come up hot. And 


so like -- I don't understand the 


reconstruction part. 


The same with radiation. The radiation -- they 


had standards for those radiation things, and 


it gave what effects it does on your body. And 


some of the medical problems I had at the time, 


I would bring this up and they would say oh, 


no, it can't be that. Now I know they say it 


was chronical (sic) over a period of time, but 

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during production periods people got acute 


doses. You take the doses over a whole working 


time, that doesn't matter. They should be 


taking the times when we got the high doses. 


When I worked in 707, every other month I had 


to be taken out of G module because I'd get 100 


millirem. They'd take you out a month, then 


they put you back the next month. You'd get 


your next 100 millirem, then you're out a 


month. 


Another thing was they used air flow patterns 


for wearing respirators, so when we worked in D 


module, if a SAAM alarm was going off at one 


end of the building, at this end we would 


continue to work in the gloveboxes and not 


required to wear a respirator because the air 


flow supposebly (sic) kept all the radiation at 


that end of the building, so we continued 


working. 


Then we had another time when the bellows had 


been leaking, and nobody knows how long, in one 


of the gloveboxes. And one day they had the 


janitors come in and do the floor, so they were 


supposed to clean the floor, and the procedure 


was supposed to be that you had the floor 

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surveyed first. Well, the survey was not done. 


The floor was swept. And that one sweeping 


contaminated the whole room because there was a 


bellows leaking that nobody had any inclination 


that it had been leaking all this time. And 


once it got spread around the room and we had 


to decon 24 hours straight for three days we 


deconned that room. 


A lot of procedures were in place but not 


followed, and we were told to go ahead and do 


the work anyhow. Things -- I was an inspector 


out there in the machine shop. I worked all 


the buildings except of course 111 and 115 -- I 


didn't work those -- but all the others, and we 


had training as inspectors and I was an RCT. 


was in the labs. In the labs we were working 


without gloves and that happened to be the time 


I had my hand surgery. You know, I was getting 


a lot of radiation exposure to my hands, but 


they said no, you know, that can't be. But yet 


you look at the books and the books say with 


this amount, this can cause this kind of health 


problem. 


So I do not understand. They wrote manuals. 


They were supposed to be god. We were supposed 


I 
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to follow them, but all of a sudden these 


manuals are incorrect and they're not to be 


used. 


The dose out at Rocky Flat was spread among all 


the people, not just the workers, but they took 


everybody on site so they would keep our dose 


down per individual. So all the workers -- 


you're getting high dose. 


 [identifying information redacted] -- he was 


diagnosed with the Be, had the lavages, and he 


couldn't -- he wasn't supposed to, during the 


days of -- of decon and cleanup, he wasn't 


supposed to work around beryllium. And he was 


on the beryllium program. Now the last lavage 


they tried to perform on them, they couldn't 


finish it 'cause they couldn't extract anything 


back out. Now here all of a sudden he's not in 


the program. He has to start over. They say 


you're not in the program now, we -- you have 


to reapply. And then they said well, your 


papers aren't original, they aren't this and 


that, and we're finding that papers are getting 


shredded, documents, documents that were legal 


according to the law. I just don't understand 


how all these documents can be denied. 

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And I'd like to bring up about a man out there. 


He lives in Ohio now because he used to be a 


machinist. He worked in 707 with me and one 


night the machine got some plutonium in his 


arm. He waited over 45 minutes for the rescue 


-- or the rescue team to come and take him up 


to medical. He now has MS so bad he's 


wheelchair-bound and nobody's putting anything 


together for him. I -- I feel that with all 


the muscular things that went on, those should 


be considered also because bones and muscular 


were in the books, too. 


And let's face it, Rocky Flats did a lot of 


things that were illegal, 'specially at the 


end. I had people that I checked out on the 


step-out pad that had infinity on the 


respirators and on their clothes, yet they were 


not given nasal/mouth smears. There was no 


record kept of this. I said aren't you to get 


one? They said it's not required in our work 


package. So there's all these young people 


said oh, when I get sick down the road, I'll 


come and claim. I said there will be no 


company. 


So I just want to make a point that you had 

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things in writing, and they were connected to 


things, yet you sweep them under the carpet. 


Everybody was put in one pot and things were 


split among 5,000, 6,000 people, when the 


people who got the exposure -- it -- sure, you 


know, they say it's chronic over a long period. 


But there was a lot that was right then and 


there and it was acute, and that was 


overlooked. 


How can just one month being out of a room help 


your dose? You get 100 millirem. Okay, we'll 


keep you out a month, then go back. I mean the 


things were black and white, yet now they have 


to be reconstructed and I just don't understand 


how the government is two-faced. 


 But anyhow, that's -- oh, one other thing. 


Bioassay was never taken seriously, either. 


had positive bioassay. I never found out for 


four or five months that I had been in positive 


bioassay. And so there's so many things, so 


many loopholes that were made out there that 


are not being put in the reconstruction, and 


the workers that were out there -- we were made 


to look like we were saints, that we came to 


church, we just did our thing, no harm was 


I 
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there, yet there was harm all around us. 


A bag-out that was done, over 100 millirem of 


material bagged out and just left to set. The 


rules were -- were supposed to be in place, but 


towards the end they weren't, and people were 


getting acute, not just chronic doses, and 


we're paying the rest of our lives. 


I pray that I don't live to be very old. I 


don't want to suffer anymore. I live on 


morphine and pain pills and this and that. I 


go every two months to get shots in my spine. 


I don't want to live old. But still I think 


people should be compensated. We thought we 


were helping keep America safe. Those bombs 


were to keep America safe, and now it's like it 


didn't matter. We're just like the soldiers 


that they throw aside, too. We want to be 


considered just like soldiers 'cause that's 


what we were. We were civilian soldiers, but 


we were like soldiers. We were keeping America 


safe. 


Thank you for your time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Liz. Now I had 


indicated that Liz was the last on the list, 


but now I have another list. There -- there 

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are a few more, if you'll bear with us. 


Henry Mosely? Is Henry still here? There you 


are. Henry. 


 MR. MOSELY: I'm a little bit unorthodox so 


you'll have to deal with me. They're used to 


it, you're not. Everybody stand up. Every 


once in a while during this lecture to these 


people, a few of you sit down. The ones that 


are sitting down are the ones that are dying. 


I want you to look at these people up here. 


don't want you people to look at me. These are 


the people we're talking about. These are the 


people that, rather than the government say no, 


we're not going to help you -- excuse my 


language -- go to hell, you come up with a dose 


reconstruction. It's BS. I know it. 


Everybody else -- shake your heads when you 


agree with me -- it's bullshit. 


You can't -- everybody out here worked at the 


Flats. Very, very few people did the same job 


day after day. Very, very few people did the 


same job from 9:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock. 


To say this is the dose they got that day, you 


don't know. Nobody knows. We don't know. 


was an RCT out there. I was supposed to know. 


I 

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I tried to know. There's no way. There's too 


many buildings. There's too many different 


procedures. There's too many bosses that 


didn't care. There's too many people that just 


went and did what they were told to do, whether 


it hurt them or helped them. So dose 


reconstruction -- that's a joke. 


You need to consider this. Now look at these 


people out here. These are the ones that 


you're saying no, they're just here to whine. 


Well, I'll tell you what. We worked out there 


-- I worked out there a long time. I probably 


met 20,000 people, the same 20,000 people that 


you'll meet through your life, but the number 


of people that are sick, the number of people 


that are dying, the number of us that are going 


to die, the percentage is so much greater than 


what you'll ever see in the 20,000 people 


you'll meet in your lifetime. To say okay, 


let's do a dose reconstruction -- just tell us 


no. That's a lot -- that's a lot more humane 


than to say okay, get out there and work, get 


out there and do this job. We need to close 


this down. We'll take care of you. And then 


when we come up sick, to say, you know, we're 

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going to do a dose reconstruction. You know, 


that's wrong. I think it's wrong. I think my 


cohorts think it's wrong. And I think you 


think it's wrong. 


Vote the way we need it to vote tomorrow. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you for a very 


articulate presentation, Henry. Donna Quinlan? 


Is Donna here -- uh-huh. 


 MS. QUINLAN: Yes, I'm Donna Quinlan. 


[identifying information redacted] survived 


World War II, but he didn't survive Rocky 


Flats. [name redacted], as he was commonly 


known, worked out there for 27 years. He was 


in industrial engineering. I knew he did -- he 


was an industrial engineer, but I had no idea 


what he did. I didn't know what Rocky Flats 


did, and I still don't know. All I know is 


what I've heard from these people at -- a 


couple of times, some of them. 


[name redacted] was a very active man all his 


life, in extremely good physical condition. He 


was a loyal employee, he worked hard. He -- I 


never heard anything from him about Rocky 


Flats, other than it was where he worked. 

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That's all I knew -- until it came out in the 


newspapers. And even after that, he didn't 


talk about it. He didn't ever discuss 


anything. All I have learned is -- trying to 


fill out this paperwork, I talked to fellow 


employees and learned some horrible things 


after his death. 


He, as I said, was very active, very physically 


strong and was into everything -- skiing, 


bicycle riding, motorcycling, running. He 


could outrun a man half his age. He was still 


very -- going strong until 70. Then he began 


to -- I don't know, what's going on with me, 


you know; I'm sure feeling my age. And then 


toward the end of his 70th year really had 


trouble. He'd go out biking and come back and 


say I can't imagine what's wrong with me. He 


says it's so hard just to ride a bike anymore. 


And so -- and this goes on for a while. 


Anyway, then in the early -- his early 71st 


year he -- that's when he was experiencing the 


problems with bicycling and walking, 


everything, and just not himself. This is the 


man who could figure out how to do anything 


anytime. And yet when he was trying to get 

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ready for our children to all come back and we 


were all going up to Pearl Lake for a week, we 


had rented a cabin, and he couldn't even figure 


out this -- he'd finished a bathroom, except 


the shower door. And all of a sudden he 


couldn't understand the directions, what he was 


reading. And he just wasn't himself. He just 


kind of was off in his own world and every time 


I'd turn around he'd be lying down someplace in 


the house on the floor asleep. 


So we went to the doctor. He sent us on to a 


neurologist. The neurologist sent us that day 


for an MRI but without contrast, and called me 


that night saying that [name redacted] had a 


brain tumor, and he had probably had it for 26 


years. [name redacted] had worked at Rocky 


Flats at least 26 years -- up to 26, whatever. 


Anyway, he could have had it for a very long 


time because it was on a silent part of the 


brain. It was on the part that affected his 


coordination and balance, and thus his problems 


with all he'd been having problems with. 


And so then he sent us on to a neurosurgeon and 


he -- oh, he said it looked bad. So he sent us 


on to a neurosurgeon. He took a look at it and 

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said he would have to send us right on for 


another MRI, with contrast, but he was sure 


that it was malignant -- a tumor in the last 


stages. And that's what we found when I 


carried the X-rays to him. 


 He had scheduled that -- first appointment, he 


scheduled -- this was on August 5th he -- that 


he was -- the -- the first MRI. He set --


scheduled surgery for August 12th and it was 


very lengthy surgery, and he had said that it 


was just so far advanced, he told [name 


redacted] all he could do was buy him a little 


time. There was no way he could get it all. 


It was too dangerous and surgery was very 


lengthy. 


And anyway, [name redacted] -- he pulled 


through. He was then put on steroids, which 


kept him alive for a while. We had hospice 


that -- home care, and the steroids made him -- 


at first made him bounce back, you know. He 


was doing -- the hospice advised him to live 


his life as fully as he could, so -- he still 


had problems all the way, though, and this, 


like I say, was August 12th when he had the 


surgery. Hospice said he would never make it 

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to December or even Christmas. And he says oh, 


yes, I am. He died January 1st. 


I forget what I was going to say. Anyway, my 


family do-- our family doctor had a very large 


practice in Arvada at the time, and he told me 


– after [name redacted] was diagnosed he said, 


you know, he says every single patient who has 


prostate cancer works at Rocky Flats -- and he 


had a very large practice. So he didn't tell 


me any numbers, but he said that he hadn't kept 


-- he hadn't done any studies, but it made him 


very suspicious and other things. 


So in all this, [name redacted] never talked 


about it. He never gave any reason. But in 


talking to a former worker, he did have 


occasions where he was exposed and he -- in his 


early years out there all he did was time 


studies, at first, because he was in training. 


He hadn't gotten his degree as an industrial 


engineer yet. He did go to school at nights 


for years and years and years. Anyway, he --


he was not in the big fire and I -- I don't 


know, I'm not familiar with terms, I think it 


was Building 71 or 76. Anyway, but talking 


with his coworker, who also has very serious 

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cancer, lives in Texas, said that yes, they 


were not in the fire that day, but they were in 


there next day. And it's been proven in the 


cleanup it was in the ducts, it was everyplace, 


so how did this keep from affecting everybody 


all the time? And yet he -- he was working in 


all the hot spots all those early years. 


Anyway, I just ask you to seriously consider 


all these things these people have said. I 


don't know where to go. The last line of the 


NIOSH claim said you can reopen or you can -- 


you -- you cannot -- you cannot reopen unless 


you have medical facts. Where do I get these 


medical facts? I don't have any access to 


records. 


And I have another thing. Listening to all 


these people at other times, every single one 


of them say yes, that first NIOSH dose 


reconstruction was nearly 50 percent. The 


second one is way down. And that's exactly 


what happened with [name redacted]. 


And another thing. Later, after I had filed, 


then later I thought, after -- I don't know how 


many interviews I had, there were several -- 


after I hung up I thought oh -- so I called 

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back and said [name redacted] was sent to 


several plants over the years. I don't know 


what he did. I don't know what he did there, 


but he was sent to Oak Ridge, he was sent to 


Albuquerque, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore -- 


those are the ones I can remember, yet -- so 


they reopened. They did another -- they 


contacted all those facilities. There's no 


record of his even being there. 


 So anyway, please consider SEC for Rocky Flats. 


Some -- Las Vegas was just -- is it, Nevada or 


someplace was just given this status. Rocky 


Flats should, too. 


My grand-- my kids miss [identifying 


information redacted], their grand-- their 


father. My grandkids miss their grandfather. 


My greatgrandkids will never know him. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Got two more folks here, Leslie 


(sic) Britton and then [name redacted]. 


Leslie? 


 MR. BRITTON: Lessie. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. BRITTON: Lessie. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I -- L-e-s-s-i-e, I -- 

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 MR. BRITTON: I'm just sort of a newcomer. My 


name is Lessie Britton and I worked in Building 


707 in G module, and I contracted beryllium 


there. And the gentleman the put the beryllium 


in the building, or helped put it in 


(unintelligible), he's sitting outside there, 


he told supervisors and managers that we need 


tiebacks and PAMPRs (sic), and he told them 


like for six months every day. It never 


happened. 


But see, for me, I have a two-fold thing about 


the people in this country and the people that 


run things in this country. The first one, 


then I'll get back to the last one, is that 


there were Viet Nam veterans. Okay. Now when 


we come home, we were the only veterans that 


got spit on and talked about. All right? When 


we came home from this war. Saw a lot of my 


friends die. 


Okay. So like I go to Rocky Flats to help 


close it down, and same thing. I don't 


understand is that when you have people that go 


and put their lives on the line to help this 


country do something, help people in -- that 


run this country do something good -- other 

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words, like close the plant site down or where 


they get rid of some of the nuclear waste -- 


you throw them away. 


Why do you throw them away? I mean I -- this 


thing about any of your children or your uncles 


or uncles or dads or aunts was any of these 


positions, would you want to throw them away? 


But you do. And it doesn't make any sense to 


me. And you sit on a board and you sit and you 


talk. Now it be somebody on that board going 


to say one thing, they knew the job was 


dangerous when they took it. Now that didn't 


run across everybody's mind in here. 


 But anyway, being patriotic and being part of 


America, you want to try to help do things 


right, but we do people so badly once they get 


a job completed, once they put their lives on 


the line for this particular job, and then you 


turn your back on them. I never understood 


that. 


And I never understood anybody that sit in a 


high place to dictate policy that haven't done 


any of this, haven't been in any of the wars or 


haven't come out and went to these plants and 


been exposed to any of this junk that we 

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created. 


I asked an engineer one time, I said well, you 


know that that piece of plutonium has a half-


life of 21,000 years. And the first thing come 


out of his mouth -- well, we had a cold -- we 


had a war going on. You didn't think about how 


you're going to get rid of this junk when you 


invented it? Never crossed your mind. But 


then when you have people to put their lives on 


the line to get -- or to try to neutralize it 


some kind of way, you know, you throw them 


away, or you hide them or you kill them. 


I been fighting the VA for ten years. But I 


surprised them. I'm still alive. I'm 62. And 


they're wondering when are you going to die. 


Only when God says for me to die. 


But like when you get ready to vote on 


anything, you think about how folks have 


sacrificed themselves, you know, and how people 


are sitting in places that make decisions and 


write policy have not participated in any of 


these dilemmas, you know, just sit and talk 


about it and have your -- your peons or 


whatever sit off to the side there, get a 


earful and come back and give you information. 

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You are not going to get all the information 


that you need. 


And this lady said that her [identifying 


information redacted] went to six different 


facilities. Now we have to sign in and sign 


out, some of them with computers, and all of a 


sudden you're not listed? I mean just think 


about it, now who -- who is the jackass here? 


You know -- you know, I'm serious. You know, 


how can you lose those records, and how can you 


be so proud to stand up and say that, well, 


like, you know, something sharp or smart about 


that they knew the job was dangerous when they 


took it. 


But then all of a sudden, like this gentleman 


up here the way he -- he asked -- he made one 


statement, why do you have to prove something 


that's been already designated that you have? 


Why do you have to do that? 


I've had two bronchoscopies. The last one I 


had was in January. I call it a wash and dry, 


but the (unintelligible) -- the first one 


didn't hurt, the second one did. And like, you 


know, this young doctor, he made a statement 


about being forgetful or having hallucinations, 

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and he's 39 years old, he was talking about his 


mom. I said, you know, your mother has to love 


you because you're an idiot, you know. We tell 


you something is wrong with us and it hurts us, 


but yet we're hallucinating. I don't know what 


happened to this man's neck, but I know he's in 


pain sometime. I have no idea what happened to 


him, and I'm going to sit and look at him and 


say oh, you just got that around your neck to 


look cute, you know, and try to draw some 


money. 


People sitting in this chair -- when I left 


[name redacted], she was walking up straight. 


She used to watch over me. She was RCT. 


Charlene (unintelligible) back here, that lady 


took care of me, literally took care of me. 


She worked there 35 years, from what I 


understand. Tonight I asked her, I said are 


you sick? She said no, ain't nothing wrong. 


She got blessed. But you have people to take 


care of -- we took care of one another as best 


we could with what we had, and then we have 


people sitting in high places that's going to 


throw us away. 


However you vote, think about how you got here. 

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Think about why you're here, and look at the 


people around. You've got folks dying like 


flies. 


Now one other thing I just don't understand, 


and I'm going to leave it alone. You spent $93 


million on some paperwork. Tell me what -- 


about that paperwork. How did that happen? 


When they first started this thing about -- 


during -- trying to get the paperwork together 


for the people that had beryllium and whatever, 


berylliosis, you spent $93 million for people 


sitting on their behind shuffling papers? I'd 


like to know who -- I'd love to have that job 


because you're making good -- you threw away -- 


you threw away good money on some BS, and you 


lose records purposely. You deny yourself the 


things you shouldn't deny yourself. You lie to 


yourself, and how do you do that, I don't know. 


So whatever you decide to do, you know -- 


because I figure that God will keep me around 


here. Whatever you decide to do, think about 


your -- think about your country. Think about 


when you wake up in the morning and shave your 


face and put your lipstick on or whatever it is 


you may do, look in the mirror and look at 

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yourself. And when you walk -- if you -- all 


of a sudden you grab a hand and all your hair 


come out. That's not happening to you, but it 


happened to your friend or somebody you know. 


Think about what you're going to do. You know, 


you need to tell these people that's in charge 


of this stuff you all are BS-ing the public. 


Very serious. You make bad decisions and you 


stand on it and you compound it with bad 


decisions. 


Only thing I ask you is don't throw us away 


again. You did that in '65. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Lessie. Richard 


Gaffney. Richard? 


 MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah, hi. My name is Richard 


Gaffney. I spent 23 and a half years at Rocky 


Flats. I started out as a chemical operator 


and moved up into management and managed 


maintenance and utilities. I was probably one 


of the last production managers before 


production shut down in Building 771. 


And first of all, I just want to say to all you 


guys here, I really love you and, you know, I 


don't know if anyone else in the world 


appreciate us but I just appreciate the hell 

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out of you guys for the incredible job that you 


did. And I got to tell you, thank God you guys 


were doing that job and not the people that 


have been supposed to been taking care of you, 


or we'd have lost the Cold War and we'd be 


speaking Russian right now. 


Yeah. You know, I am -- other than [name 


redacted], I think I'm (unintelligible) people 


that can say that I'm not sick -- at least, you 


know, not right now. And you know, knock on 


wood or -- or whatever -- thank you, [name 


redacted]. He was pointing out the wood for 


me. We -- 'cause we have -- every, you know, 


two or three months we'll have a party and all 


us old guys'll get together, and everybody's 


sick. You know, it's not, you know -- you 


know, like your regular place that you go to, 


you know, that you socialize where this 


person's sick or that person's sick. 


Everybody's sick. 


And the whole idea -- you know, I'm just a 


simple country boy, but the idea of a dose 


reconstruction, when you're talking about 


tritium, uranium, plutonium, a whole bunch of 


other things that are classified that I can't 

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talk about, thousands of different chemicals 


used in hundreds of different conversation, I'm 


not too bright but I can tell you a dose 


reconstruction is impossible. And anybody with 


an eighth-grade education can tell you that. 


You know, I mean it's just impossible. I can 


sit down and just, you know, start doing the 


math with, you know, trying to combine a 


hundred -- can't be done. 


The second thing is, we are sending our stuff 


to the wrong agency, 'cause I got to tell you, 


I wrote a check for $10,000, sent it to the 


IRS, it was taken care of within a week. 


The -- and then -- I was a shift manager, shift 


tech-- you know, a technical advisor. People 


probably remember me from 771 and 991. It was 


my job to determine whether a job was safe. 


And if I shut down a job, which I did many, 


many times and people here are probably still 


mad at me for that, but if I shut down a job, I 


could take a look at my watch and it wasn't two 


minutes before a vice president or a manager, 


you know, a building manager or facility 


manager would be in there wanting to know why I 


shut it down. And you know, that was a lot of 

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pressure -- that was my job. I got paid to do 


that and basically if I shut it down I just 


could look at the requirements and say this is 


why. 


And you guys all remember the work packages. 


Right? Okay. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) you used them. 


 MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah. Well -- you know, 'cause I 


-- you know, someone would bring 


(unintelligible) that packages and there -- 


there would be signoffs for nuclear safety and 


radiological engineering and health and safety. 


And I got to tell you, maybe one in a hundred 


packages, if that, you know, do I personally 


believe that anybody read. They just signed 


them off because I would look at the job that 


was going to be done, and I kind of knew what 


all these people would be doing because I've 


probably personally handled enough plutonium to 


blow this world up two or three times. I'd go 


-- do you got any idea what you're sending 


these people in to do without having properly 


reviewed this work and the safety controls. 


And it was -- it was not, you know, like, you 


know, one out of a hundred package. It was 

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like the majority of the work packages that 


were done, the reviews were incredible. I mean 


it was just non-existence (sic) because people 


-- I don't know if anyone ever got to be in one 


of my closed-door meetings when I pulled 


somebody in from health or safety or 


radiological engineering and our nuke safety 


and did the old famous ass-chewing, but it just 


-- it just didn't -- it just didn't happen. 


The controls weren't there then, and obviously 


they're not there now because I can't believe 


we're talking about reconstructing a dose when 


everybody knows, that's got any kind of brain 


at all, that's impossible, can't be done. But 


I'll tell you what, you know when you have 


emphysema. You know when you've got cancer. 


You know when you have an autoimmune disease. 


And this is just a point. Everybody knows 


that's been working there, they're -- you know, 


they're -- probably got a little time bomb 


clicking. Ain't nobody saying this is what you 


could do now to be proactive to keep me from 


getting sick. 


And I got to tell you, I will never file a 


claim. If I got a cancer and my doctor says 

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you've got two years left, the last thing I'm 


going to do is waste my precious time trying to 


get benefits that are obviously impossible. 


So that's all I've got to say, and like I say, 


love you guys and I hope we all see you at the 


next get-together because we're dropping like 


flies here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, there's a couple 


of individuals who've already spoken that maybe 


have a question or comment. We need to, with 


respect to everybody here, respect the time. 


But go ahead, a quick question or comment. 


 MR. ROMERO: My name's Dennis Romero. I've 


already talked once, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. ROMERO: -- bear with me. We talked about 


our stories and stuff happened at work. 444 


building, prior to me getting there, people had 


berylliosis, for whatever reason. They used to 


eat, smoke and drink in the back area of 444 at 


their work stations, and then they'd take the 


stuff home to their kids and families. Like 


the one woman said, her daddy's lunchbox was -- 


BE on it. Well, there's why. We used to have 


this stuff in the back or you'd eat in the back 

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area. 


771, 750 cafeteria, 771 cafeteria, 371 


cafeteria, the locker rooms -- Don could access 


(sic) to this -- these areas would 


predominantly come up contaminated. Somehow 


somebody got the rooms contaminated. 


 Common work areas, people working there don't 


even go in the back, they went to the 


cafeterias and they went to the locker rooms. 


They took the stuff home. 


There's been numerous times, you don't see it 


on TV, people's homes were gutted, people's 


cars were taken away because they found 


contamination in their homes and their cars. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. ROMERO: What kind of doses are you going 


to give the people and their families for that? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. ROMERO: Oh, I got one question. I forgot 


to mention my medical problems. I've had two 


prostrate (sic) surgeries, two knee surgeries, 


reconstructed shoulder surgery. In year 2005 


when I had to leave the plant I came down with 


Graves disease. I want to ask Dr. Lewis, can 


Graves disease be caused from working at Rocky 

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Flats? I want a answer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: He doesn't know. 


 MR. ROMERO: Is that your answer? Can Graves 


disease be caused from working at Rocky Flats? 


 DR. WADE: I don't know. 


 MR. ROMERO: That's all I want to know. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


MR. LOGAN: Mike Logan, I've already spoken 


before, but when I left for ten months and went 


back to work for British Nuclear Fields, which 


is part of the national conversion pilot 


program, a private firm, upper management -- 


not all management, we had some decent managers 


out there, but some of those select upper ones 


had a really bad attitude about the hourly 


workers. They didn't really care. And one of 


the British guys from British Nuclear Fields -- 


and I'm going to quote word for word -- the 


American worker is the most unsuccessful, 


unmotivated, laziest bastard on the face of 


this earth. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


MR. LOGAN: Yeah, we do. Now we had to clean 


up places of nitric acid baths that had dried 

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powder in the bottom. They put us in full-face 


with chemical respirators, all the proper anti-


Cs. And you're cutting it up with wood saws 


that's got metal blades in it, and after five 


minutes you're going -- you're tasting it in 


your mouth. The people who manufactured those 


respirators, the full-face -- or anyone, even a 


chemical, whatever it is -- it will not protect 


you. The only thing that'll protect you is 


supplied air. They wouldn't do it because of 


the money. 


Now why is it now -- okay, they've got it 


closed. They got it done ahead of schedule. 


Certain management got up to $3 million per 


person bonus, but yet the hourly people who did 


the job, who were in the trenches, got maybe 


between $1,000 and $4,000 a year for maybe four 


years as a bonus. Isn't the success of any 


company, any business, is the people in the 


trenches? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I hear you. 


MR. LOGAN: Why do we get kicked to the curb? 


I mean the whole key -- doing things in life is 


attitude. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

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MR. LOGAN: How can you expect to have a good 


attitude when we keep getting beaten down, 


getting turned down and getting treated like 


second-class citizens? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


MR. LOGAN: I mean put yourself in our shoes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Understood. 


MR. LOGAN: I mean I'd sure love to be able to 


stay around and watch my grandkids grow up -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


MR. LOGAN: -- see my great-grandkids. 


Wouldn't you folks? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. Sure. 


MR. LOGAN: I mean -- but we've been put down. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We've got another -- try to 


make it quick, want to respect people who 


haven't had a chance to address us yet. 


 MS. RUTTENBER: My name is Margaret Ruttenber 


and I'm a research scientist, epidemiologist, 


who studied this worker cohort for the last ten 


years, from 1990 through 2000 -- both 


[identifying information redacted] and I did. 


And I don't really want to address the dose 


reconstruction. I think enough has been said 


about that. 

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158 

What I would like to address is a missed 


opportunity that the Department of Labor had, 


and just give you one example of several, and 


I'll be brief. 


Two years ago Brady White from the Department 


of Labor came to my office and asked for my 


assistance in doing a new match with the cancer 


registry at the State Health Department to 


identify those workers from our -- the Rocky 


Flat cohort, of which we have the database for 


it -- who were -- who had cancer, and then also 


do a match with our vital records department at 


the health department to make -- to see who -- 


you had to do a mortality match to see who was 


still living so we would not -- we were 


sensitive to the issues of either contacting a 


worker or survivor. This was two years ago. 


We concer-- we designed a letter. It was to be 


sent through the University of Colorado Health 


Sciences Center to the workers. We contacted 


them several times and have heard nothing more 


from the Department of Labor. 


I was contacted by a reporter last week 


questioning what I knew about the worker study 


and -- and you know, I've done the definitive 

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159 

study on this cohort, as I said, with 


[identifying information redacted] as well. 


And it appears that the Department of Labor has 


kind of dropped the ball in terms of 


communicating. And if they really wanted to 


identify and connect with these people, they've 


had many opportunities, both through our 


databases with the registry. 


Today the director of our cancer registry came 


to me and said didn't that letter already go 


out? And I said no, it never did. So there 


are certainly -- probably a large number of 


people aren't even aware of this compensation 


program, but they -- both NIOSH and the 


Department of Labor have been given ample 


opportunity and access to our data and 


information and have not chosen to use it. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Very quickly, a 


comment here, and then I think we need to come 


to closure. Go ahead. 


 MS. NORMAN: My name is Joan Norman and I 


worked for Rocky Flats for 21 years. I, like 


the rest of us, voluntarily went to work for 


Rocky Flats and the United States Department of 

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Energy. Ironic that three of us in this room 


have had -- been diagnosed with breast cancer, 


and breast cancer happens to be on the list of 


no pay, no claim. 


And in 2005 I was diagnosed with colon cancer. 


Again, the doctors had asked for medical proof 


that this was related. I did receive 


information from my gastroenterologist. I will 


read one sentence, and it says this is based on 


a scientific review journal article by a Dr. 


Sandler in gastroenterology in 1983, volume 


four, page 51, radiation-induced cancers of the 


colon and rectum, assessing the risk, and I was 


told this is merely a study. 


Excuse me, but as I said, I'm not repeating 


what everybody else said because what everybody 


else said here is true. We gave of ourselves. 


We gave to the government. Why is the 


government not supporting us? I am going to 


continue to be a little gnat on the 


government's head, and I will not go away until 


the government -- until we get our justice. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

 MS. NORMAN: Please vote for us. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Folks, I want to remind -- oh, I'm 
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sorry, do -- okay. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: You'll have to use the mike. We 


have a -- everything's being recorded, so we 


need to be able to hear you through the ear 


phones here. Give us your name and... 


MS. BOWIE: My name is Marie Bowie and I'm here 


as a representative for [name redacted], who 


was [identifying information redacted] . He 


worked for Rocky Flats from January of '58 


until September of '73. 


In 1979 he was diagnosed with pancreatic 


cancer, and within nine months he was gone. He 


went through two major surgeries, bypass 


surgeries, because the pancreas was unable to 


be removed and the first bypass didn't take. 


He was only able to go through one session of 


chemotherapy treatment due to the fact that his 


body had deteriorated so badly from the 


penetration and the continued growth of the 


cancer cells throughout his body. By the time 


they did his second surgery, which was two 


weeks after the first one, it had already 


infiltrated into his lymph nodes. 

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So he passed away in 1980 and unfortunately the 


program was not initiated until 2000. Along 


with that information, by the time 20 years had 


gone by, there was very little access to 


additional medical information, other than what 


I could get from Pacific Records. 


We just received the first denial of 


[identifying information redacted] claim on 


behalf of [identifying information redacted], 


and his dose reconstruction -- that took time 


to do -- was at 43.77 percent probable cause, 


which was exclusively done just for the 


pancreas itself. I would like to know how I 


could possibly get that extended, with the 


limited time that I have, to continue his claim 


with the infiltration of the cancer to the 


other organs. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have some NIOSH people here, 


they may be out in the corridor, but we can -- 


we'll -- after the meeting we'll hook you up 


with someone who can help you with the next 


steps for you --


MS. BOWIE: That will be great. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- to follow that up. Yeah. 


MS. BOWIE: I also have a couple of articles in 

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here, the very first one when President Clinton 


was the one who initiated -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


MS. BOWIE: -- the program. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


MS. BOWIE: And also of a family that, together 


combined, has 130 years of service out at Rocky 


Flats. And in the article that was written 


they said that in the beginning, in the '58 


into the early '60s, the only protection the 


men had in -- going into hot spots – 


[identifying information redacted] was a 


maintenance person, pipe fitter -- was double 


coveralls. So --


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


MS. BOWIE: Yeah, exactly. So I just -- you 


know, I'm hoping that -- that this Board will 


vote for the people, all of them here, all of 


them that have gone beyond that are family 


members hoping to be benefited in some form or 


fashion for the loss of their loved ones. 


[identifying information redacted] served eight 


years in the Navy. And hope that you guys will 


see that this gets pushed through for us. 
I 

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know that other plants that are still standing 


have been given this benefit, and it would just 


really be nice to see Rocky Flats get that 


benefit as well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Folks, I 


want to remind you that tomorrow morning at 


8:15 this Board will begin the official 


deliberations on the Rocky Flats SEC petition. 


So -- and that -- that part of our agenda will 


consume most of the morning. That will be 


presentation from our workgroup. There will be 


presentations from the petitioners, as well as 


from NIOSH, and then deliberations by the 


Board. So -- and the -- the meetings are open, 


so you're welcome to be back at that time. 


Thank you all very much for being here tonight. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 9:00 


p.m.) 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(8:00 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO
 

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. I do want to 


remind you, if you've not already done so, to 


please register your attendance with us today, 


and you can do this during the break if you 


haven't already done it. There's a 


registration book in the foyer. 


There are also a variety of documents on the 


back table, including the agenda and some Rocky 


Flats-related materials, as well as other 


materials that the Board is dealing with. We 


have a number of SEC petitions actually that 


we're dealing with today, and if you need 


copies of those, those are on the back table, 


as well. 


 Pardon my early-morning voice, but we'll make 


it through if you can bear with me. 


 I'm looking to see whether we need more chairs, 


and if -- if any of the staffers, or maybe 


Larry Elliott can make a quick assessment and 


see if we need to request more. And if I see 


too many people standing, maybe we'll need to 

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request more, but I think there are apparently 


some seats yet. Okay. Thank you. 


Let me call upon -- oh, I also want to point 


out that Dr. Melius has joined us today, was 


able to arrive last night. Dr. Poston will not 


be able to be with us today. Josie Beach is 


not at the table, and we'll explain why in just 


a moment. In fact I'll ask Mr. -- Dr. Wade to 


do that when he makes his opening remarks now. 


 DR. WADE: Well, thank you, Paul, and welcome, 


all, again. We very much appreciate your being 


here. We appreciated your comments last night. 


It was a -- it was a long night, but a very 


important night I think for the Board to 


experience, so thank you for your patience and 


we appreciate your comments. 


As Paul mentioned, Josie Beach is conflicted 


with regard to this particular petition at 


Rocky Flats and is not at the table, following 


the Board's procedures. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. Let 


me outline quickly how we will proceed here. 


We're going to begin with the presentation from 


NIOSH where they give us an update on the SEC 


petition evaluation. The evaluation report is 

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an official part or step in the SEC process. 


Following that we will hear from the 


petitioners. Then there will be an opportunity 


for members of the Congressional delegations, 


and there are a number of those here this 


morning, to add official comments for the 


record. 


We will then hear from the Board's working 


group. The Board has a working group on Rocky 


Flats and they will provide their report. 


Then after that, the Board will have a 


discussion period and deliberate on the -- on 


the SEC petition material. 


I do want to remind you, in case you had 


forgotten, and that is that the Board's final 


product is a recommendation. We're not the 


ones that determine whether or not there will 


be a class added to the Special Exposure 


Cohort. We make a recommendation on that. 


That recommendation goes to the Secretary of 


Health and Human Services, together with 


recommenda-- any recommendation from NIOSH. 


And from that the Secretary of Health and Human 


Services passes along or makes an official 


recommendation to Congress. It is Congress 

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that ultimately makes the decision in this 


process. So what we do here today is part of 


that process. 


There are time limits on it, though, so we -- 


for example, whatever the Board's 


recommendation is, that will go immediately -- 


after this meeting -- to the Secretary. He 


will act rather promptly on that, within -- I 


think it's 30 days, yes, and then Congress has 


another 30 days to react to that. So there's a 


little time delay there. 


But that is the process, so I want to make you 


aware that this Board -- or remind you that 


this Board is advisory. We're -- we're not the 


folks that make the ultimate decision on that. 


Ultimately it really rests in the hands of 


Congress. 


ROCKY FLATS SEC PETITION
 

So with that as preliminary remarks, we're 


going to begin first with the Rocky Flats SEC 


petition evaluation update. That will be 


presented by Dr. Brant Ulsh, who is a member of 


the staff of NIOSH, and Dr. Ulsh, we welcome 


you to the podium to present the SEC petition 


update -- or petition evaluation update. 

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 DR. ULSH: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. Good 


morning, everybody. As Dr. Ziemer mentioned, 


I'm just going to give a brief update. Many of 


you were here a year ago when I presented 


NIOSH's evaluation report on Rocky Flats, and 


I'm not going to repeat that whole 


presentation. There are a couple of members of 


the Board who were not seated on the Board at 


that time, so I will just give a brief update 


for their benefit, and just to remind everyone 


since it's, you know, been some time since I 


last spoke to you. 


I would like to start today the way that I 


started a year ago, and that is to say thank 


you. I think a lot of times we don't say thank 


you to the people who really deserve it. And 


first of all I'd like to thank the petitioners. 


Tony DeMaiori, who I understand is not here 


today, but Tony was intimately involved in this 


process -- he even attended a couple of the 


working groups, and it was very valuable to 


have him at the table and to get his insights ­

- and Jennifer Thompson, who I see is going to 


present next. Both of these people worked 


tirelessly on your behalf, and so I think that 

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there's a debt there, too. So I'd like to 


thank them. 


 Most importantly, I'd like to thank the former 


workers. You gave a valuable service for your 


country, and I have benefited from it, we've 


all benefited from it, and we recognize your 


sacrifices. So I want to say thank you to the 


workers. 


 The question that the Board is going to be 


deliberating on today has nothing to do with 


the workers' loyalty or dedication. That is 


beyond reproach. There is no question in 


anybody's mind about that. 


There is also no question that the workers are 


suffering. All of you here today have been 


touched by cancer personally or a member of 


your family has been touched by cancer 


personally. My family has been touched by 


cancer. I understand what that's like, and 


there's just no question the suffering that -- 


that you all are going through. 


But the question that the Board is wrestling 


with today is upon what basis should 


compensation decisions be made, and so I'd just 


like to give you a brief update here. 

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First of all, the -- the proposed class 


included all United Steel Workers who were 


employed at Rocky Flats between 1952 and 2005. 


NIOSH expanded this class because we determined 


that it wasn't really feasible to limit it to 


the United -- to the union members, so we 


expanded it to all workers between those time 


periods. 


I'd like to talk to you about the information 


that we have available to complete dose 


reconstructions, and the primary source of 


information that we use is dosimetry records, 


both internal dosimetry and external dosimetry. 


Now in terms of internal dosimetry, we have 


over half a million results. And by that, I'm 


talking about primarily urinalysis samples, but 


also lung counts, fecal samples -- so there is 


a wealth of internal bioassay results. 


Now on the other hand, we also have external 


dosimetry results, and this is a little bit 


difficult to pin down the exact number. We 


have 231,500, more or less, external annual 


dosimetry totals. Now to get the number of 


actual external dosimetry results, you would 


have to multiply that by the number of exchange 

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cycles, and I can tell you that that translates 


to well over a million individual external 


dosimetry results. 


We also have access to an extensive records 


collection at DOE's Mountain View facility, and 


we have called upon them numerous times 


throughout the course of the working group's 


investigation. 


And finally we have interviews with former 


workers. Both NIOSH and SC&A have availed 


ourselves of talking to the people who actually 


worked at Rocky Flats, and that has been one of 


the greatest pleasures for me over the past -- 


well, year plus, is getting to know some of the 


people who contributed to the Rocky Flats 


story. 


So in terms of the dosimetry results that I 


just told you about, here's what this 


translates into. We have received 1,207 or so 


cases referred to us from the Department of 


Labor for dose reconstruction. Of those 1,200 


we have completed dose reconstructions on 


1,061. You might have noticed Larry gave -- 


Larry Elliott gave some numbers yesterday. 
I 


think his were just a touch higher. He might 

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have gone onto the database a little bit later 


in the day, so... What this breaks down to is 


we have external dosimetry for 1,100-plus of 


these claims. We also have internal dosimetry 


for almost 1,100. And so when you look at the 


total number of claims, 1,207, we have some 


dosimetry -- at least -- of both type for 1,068 


claims. 


Now just to briefly review -- I'm not going to 


go into detail here. I think we're at the 


stage of the process where getting into the 


details is the prerogative of the working group 


and so I won't really get down into the 


details. Just to review, though, the bases of 


the petition as it was submitted -- there were, 


I believe, seven -- and four of those bases 


qualified the petition for evaluation, and 


those bases are listed here. The ones in 


yellow are the ones that qualified. 


And those were external (sic) to highly 


insoluble plutonium oxides. You might have 


heard this called "super S" or "super Y". And 


here is one -- this is one topic where I think 


it should be pointed out that going through 


this arduous process of evaluating the SEC 

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petition has had some real benefit to the 


workers, because we were certainly aware of 


this super S issue, but going -- considering 


this in the course of the working group 


investigation accelerated our thinking and our 


putting together a position on this, and we 


have promulgated methods to handle super S -- 


potential exposure to super S plutonium in dose 


reconstruction. So I think that -- that is 


something you can certainly point to and say 


that it was information that was provided to us 


by the public. We have heard it. We have 


seriously considered it and we have responded. 


 The next basis of the petition was an inability 


to link exposures to specific incidents. And a 


year ago I acknowledged that yes, it's not 


always possible to -- in fact, it's often not 


possible to link particular exposures to 


specific incidents. But we have methods of 


handling that in dose reconstruction. 


The next basis was periods of inadequate 


monitoring. And I'm trying to recall back into 


the petition, I think the examples that were 


provided were the super S again, exposure to 


super S and concerns about whether or not that 

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could be accounted for, and also neutron 


monitoring. 


And similarly, the neutron monitoring issue 


came up under the context of unmonitored 


exposures, because in the earlier years there 


were people who were at risk of neutron 


exposure who were not monitored. 


 And then there were three more bases of the 


petition that did not qualify. Those are 


listed here. 


Okay, so that takes us through the time period 


where the petition was presented and NIOSH 


presented our evaluation of the petition, and 


that was April 27th of last year. So what has 


happened since then? 


Well, at that time the Advisory Board referred 


the matter to a working group, which is a 


subset of the people that you see sitting up 


here in the front. And between April 27th of 


last year and now, so a little over a year, the 


working group embarked on a very extensive, 


very comprehensive investigation of your 


concerns. And the other parties involved in 


that investigation were NIO-- the NIOSH/ORAU 


team and also the Board audit contractor, SC&A. 

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This has been a very active working group. 
I 


think you can come away from this process 


confident that we have kicked over every rock 


that we could. We considered your concerns 


very seriously. The topics that were covered 


throughout the course of that investigation are 


listed here. One of the biggest concerns I 


think was data integrity, and also data 


completeness, which is closely related. 


Another topic was coworker data. We also spent 


a lot of time on other radionuclides at Rocky 


Flats, and by that I mean other than uranium 


and plutonium, the main radionuclides. And 


also early neutron doses. 


Now again, I'm not going to get into details 


here. I think that's the prerogative of Mark 


Griffon, and you'll be hearing from him a 


little bit later. 


And finally, this is the position that we 


presented a year ago, and it is our position 


today, that we feel that we have the ability to 


do dose reconstructions with sufficient 


accuracy. 


Now I know that that may not be a popular 


decision. I'm aware of that. But at the end 

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of the day, what we're faced with is making 


compensation decisions based on an SEC 


designation or based on dose reconstruction. 


And NIOSH is required to bring to bear the best 


available science and to conduct these dose 


reconstructions where it's feasible. Because I 


think, at the end of the day, what I owe you, 


what NIOSH owes you, is an answer to the 


question: Did the cancer that has touched me 


or my family, as a -- as a former worker at 


Rocky Flats, was that a result of the radiation 


exposure that you received at Rocky Flats. It 


is only through dose reconstruction that we can 


answer that question and provide you with 


closure, and we owe you that. 


So with that, that ends my presentation. I 


would be happy to entertain any questions from 


the Advisory Board, if there are any. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Brant. Board members, 


do you have questions at this time on Brant's 


comments, or anything related to the evaluation 


report? 


I -- I do want to ask one question. Maybe you 


can elucidate this, in case -- and I think it's 


been discussed before, but we -- we've heard a 

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number of cases where individual records have 


zeroes entered where -- in -- or minimal dose 


values entered. And on many sites we 


understand that that reflects the fact that the 


dose was low enough it could not be detected. 


But we also recognize there's some limit of the 


device and therefore the agency assigns a 


number that's above zero to account for the 


fact that the dose may really not be zero. Now 


we've heard I think from a number of folks at 


Rocky that allege that in their case the zeroes 


may really represent cases where they were 


either told not to wear their badges or, for 


one reason or another, the true dose was shall 


we say hidden. Do you have a way to account 


for that on individual dose reconstructions if 


the -- if the person ha-- makes that allegation 


re-- with respect to their own record? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, Dr. Ziemer, this was a topic 


that I spoke about a year ago in -- in -- well, 


the part of it that I spoke about a year ago 


was the concern where workers might have left 


their badges in their lockers. I went through 


some logic as to why we don't feel that that is 


a -- that systematically compromises our 

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ability to do dose reconstruction. 


Now, in terms of the individual case, certainly 


if we are aware of a situation or the workers 


tell us of a situation where this might have 


been done -- well, we have coworker 


distributions that could be applied, if 


necessary. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So in the individual case, you 


wouldn't necessarily always use that other 


value, which is basically halfway between the 


minimum detectable and the zero point -- 


 DR. ULSH: Well --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- if you know, for -- if -- if 


there were an affidavit that indicated that 


there was some shenanigans going on. 


 DR. ULSH: If it -- if we had credible evidence 


that that kind of thing was going on, and we 


could pin it down, certainly that would call 


that particular reading into question. And you 


know, at the end of the day, if necessary, you 


could just treat that as not a -- not a 


datapoint that we should use and we could 


certainly assign coworker data. 


Now I don't want to leave you -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, I --

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 DR. ULSH: -- with the impression that we 


routinely do that --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: -- but if, you know, a worker was -- 


you know, could pin it down for -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: There -- there is a method for 


handling that --


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- in those cases. That -- that's 


the point I wanted to make. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other Board members, questions or 


comments? 


Yes, Dr. Lockey. 


 DR. LOCKEY: Yesterday one of the petitioners 


had mentioned -- I think she was an office 


worker -- that the vaults were near the office 


area, and how is that handled? I'm just 


curious about that. 


 DR. ULSH: Dr. Lockey, I'm reluctant to get 


into individual dose reconstructions. I can 


tell you that in terms of -- in the general 


situation where we have a worker who was 


monitored, we would use their dosimetry 


results. But if we're talking about a worker 

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who was not monitored, we have methods in our 


dose reconstruction where we can evaluate where 


that person worked, evaluate their potential 


for exposure to radioactive materials, and we 


have coworker data. You know, if the worker 


was not monitored, we apply either the 50th 


percentile -- I'm talking external dosimetry 


now -- the 50th percentile if they were 


intermittently exposed to radiation, or the 


95th percentile if they were routinely exposed 


to radiation. So in a situation like this -- 


again, I don't know the intimate details of 


this particular situation, but if a worker were 


not monitored but they had the potential to be 


routinely exposed to radiation, we would give 


them a -- a dose that is higher than 95 percent 


of the people who were monitored on site. 


 DR. ZIEMER: This is off the subject, but the 


AV man has reminded me that if you're on-line 


listening by phone, would you please mute your 


phone. We're apparently getting a lot of 


background noise. For those who are on the 


phone lines, if you're simply listening in, if 


you would please mute your phone. Thank you 


very much. 

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Okay, Board -- other Board members with 


questions? Yes, Michael Gibson. 


 MR. GIBSON: Brant, you mis-- mentioned that 


there's well over one million individual 


results. Do you know how many employees were 


employed at Rocky Flats between 1952 and 2005? 


And of that number, how many of those employees 


should have been monitored? 


 DR. ULSH: Between 1952 and 2005. Well, Mike, 


I can't -- I can't give you the exact numbers 


of workers who were employed. I can tell you 


the badging policies at the site, which can 


give you -- give you some clues about this. 


Pretty much throughout the site I think, at 


various times, if a worker was expected to 


receive greater than ten percent of the 


exposure limit they were required -- let me 


restate that. If a worker had the potential to 


receive greater than ten percent of the 


exposure limit, they were required to be 


externally monitored. 


Now during the D&D era, the DOE limit was 100 


millirem per year, and so if you were expected 


to have the potential to receive greater than 


100 millirem per year, then you were required 

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to be externally monitored. 


Now to answer your question directly, no, I 


don't know the exact number of people employed 


at Rocky Flats by year. Those are the policies 


that were in place at the time that dictated 


who was to be monitored. 


 MR. GIBSON: Well, I guess -- to follow up on 


that, I guess what I'm trying to get at is -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Use the mike -- use the mike, 

Mike. 

 MR. GIBSON: Out of these in excess of one 

million results, could you give us an idea of 


what that equates to as far as how many 


monitoring records per employee that you're 


basing this on? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, that gets to the other part of 


the discussion which -- let me see if I can 


find it -- nope, wrong way. You actually bring 


up a good point and I'm glad that you did 


because I can clarify a little bit here. 


When I talk about the numbers for whom we have 


external and internal dosimetry, these third 


and fourth bars, there's another part of the 


equation and that is the completeness of the 


monitoring. And as you know, Mike, on the 

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working group we did look at data completeness 


and we evaluated 52 workers, 32 who -- who were 


randomly selected by SC&A and 20 who were known 


to be among the workers who received the 


highest cumulative doses at -- on site. And we 


looked at their records and what we found was 


that they were by and large complete. And what 


I mean by that is there were certainly periods 


where there was no monitoring data, but those 


largely corresponded to periods when either the 


worker was not on site or they were in jobs 


that had low exposure potential such that they 


would not be required to be monitored. 


So again, Mike, I can't give you exact numbers 


of how many people worked at Rocky Flats over 


the years. It was certainly in tens of 


thousands, if not higher. And I can tell you 


that the people who we expected to be 


monitored, the evidence -- the weight of the 


evidence points us to that they were. So I --


I can't answer your question directly about how 


many -- of the workers, what percentage was 


monitored. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Follow-up, Mike? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah. And then that -- the 

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results of when they should and should not have 


been monitored is based on site 


characterization records or what... 


 DR. ULSH: No -- no, it was based on -- well, 


the analysis was completed in two steps. SC&A 


completed the first step, and that was to look 


at the records and determine when there was 


monitoring present and when there was not 


monitoring present. And then NIOSH took that a 


step further and looked at those periods when 


there was not monitoring data. And again, the 


-- the goal of the data completeness 


investigation was to decide -- was to evaluate 


whether there was any evidence that there were 


missing records. In other words, here's a 


person who clearly should have been monitored, 


we would expect them to have monitoring 


information, but do we see it or don't we. And 


what we found was that in every case where we 


saw a period without monitoring data, there was 


a very logical explanation for that. It's not 


like you had a process operator in 771, who 


were among the high-- highest exposures on 


site, who was not monitored. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Other questions? 

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Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Brant, I understand, you know, 


and NIOSH has done an excellent job, I'm -- and 


I'm not criticizing this, but using coworker 


data I have a very hard time with. Out of 


anybody on this Board, I still suit up day 


after day and go into these zones. I'm going 


to give you an example, because two weeks ago 


there were four of us that went into the cell, 


did the same work, same respiratory, and when 


we walked out we were sitting with 50 to 75 MR 


difference between the lowest guy and the 


highest guy. And I -- I really have a hard 


time using coworker data because, you know 


what, you can get into a lot of different 


things because I've brought the same questions 


up. When I can go into a zone or in -- into a 


cell handling the actual product myself, with 


my hands and my finger rings, and it shows that 


my dose to my hands is half what it was to my 


body, I -- you know, there's -- there's 


integrity of a lot of this stuff and I really 


have a hard time with worker -- coworker data. 


 DR. ULSH: Thank you, Brad. You bring up a 


very good point, and I'm glad you did. In 

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terms of -- in terms of coworker data, I think 


that there's a great misunderstanding about how 


we apply coworker data, and you've exact-- 


you've just hit on the exact reason that we 


apply it the way that we do, because if you 


have two workers who work on the same job, for 


instance, the recorded doses can be very 


different for those two workers. As you 


probably know -- I'm sure that you do -- 


distance from the source, shielding, there are 


vari-- various factors that can make those two 


workers have different doses. And so you would 


have to be extremely cautious to -- to apply 


one worker's data to another individual worker, 


and that's why we don't do that. 


What we do is we look at all of the workers who 


were monitored on site, all of them, and we 


apply the 95th percentile. That means that 


that particular worker would have had to 


receive greater than 95 percent of the workers 


who were monitored. So we understand that 


that's a concern, and so we don't apply one 


worker's dose to another worker. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Phil. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I got a question on the 

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bioassays. Now some people I assume were on 


annual, some semi-annual and maybe some 


quarterly. Particularly some of those people 


who are on the manual (sic), they may -- had a 


job where they worked or passed through an area 


and could have actually picked up some low-


level intake. If, during their interview, you 


find this -- that they said look, you know, I ­

- I remember once I had positive nasal smears 


but they never had me submit a bioassay sample 


out of that, how are you going to account for 


those missed... 


 DR. ULSH: That's a very good question, Mr. 


Schofield. Again, what we go back to is -- 


there's a couple of issues that you've 


mentioned there. If the worker was monitored ­

- be it on an annual basis, a quarterly basis, 


whatever basis -- and let's say they're going 


along, they have a nega-- they have a zero 


bioassay result or lower than limit of 


detection, another one, another one, and then 


all of a sudden you show up with a positive 


bioassay result. Well, this gets to the 


concern that was expressed in the petition: At 


what point did that exposure happen. 

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Well, it was sometime between the last two 


bioassay points, and what we do is assume -- we 


take the situation that gives the highest dose 


to the worker and we say it was the day after 


that last bioassay result. Now, what that 


leads to -- since we consider a chronic intake 


exposure, that leads to the highest possible -- 


it's essentially a bounding estimate. 


Now what happens if you've got a situation 


where the worker was unmonitored, completely 


unmonitored. Well, that's where we resort to 


coworker data, again. Normally we apply the 


50th percentile intake. In other words, the 


average intake at the site. However, in the 


case of Rocky Flats, due to some concerns that 


Mark may talk about later, or may not, I don't 


know, we have agreed to go at the 95th 


percentile there, as well. So if you've got a 


worker who walked through a contaminated area 


and picked up some material -- some plutonium, 


uranium, whatever it was -- we will be 


assigning for unmonitored workers the 95th 


percentile, and that means we're giving them 


credit for a higher dose than 95 percent of the 


workers -- including the operators, the people 

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who were dealing with plutonium on a daily 


basis -- for that very reason. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: One more question. How about 


the people who were exposed to potentially 


maybe a mixture of maybe plutonium, americium 


or thorium or uranium, but their bioassays -- 


they were only really being looked at for like 


plutonium. How you going to account for that 


when the person says look, you know, I didn't 


work just with plutonium. I also did work with 


uranium, I did work with thorium. But in their 


bioassays they were only looking for plutonium, 


so how you going to account for those missing 


things? 


 DR. ULSH: We do account for that. In terms of 


an overestimating dose reconstruction, we have 


methods to look at the highest doses across the 


complex -- or highest intakes, rather. We also 


look at the individual's job history. We have 


job history cards that tell where they worked 


and when. If we know that they were working in 


Building 71, we know that they were potentially 


exposed to plutonium and americium, for 


instance, and we consider that. If they were 


working in Building 881, we know that uranium 

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should be added to the mix. So we do -- we do 


explicitly consider the radionuclides that they 


could have been exposed to in various areas of 


the site. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: How accurate are these job 


cards? I mean how often were they actually 


updated or reflected a person's work history? 


 DR. ULSH: What we found -- what we found is 


that these cards were pretty detailed. They 


were primarily available for employees of the 


prime contractor. I'm trying to remember how 


far up we have those -- from the early years up 


through the later years, I can't remember 


exactly what year. And they're very detailed. 


They talk about any time there was a job 


change, any time there was a salary increase, 


they're on those cards, so they're very 


detailed. And that's actually quite different 


from what you might see at other sites. I 


don't know, I haven't been involved intimately 


-- as intimately at other sites as I have with 


Rocky Flats, but these are a very valuable 


resource for us. 


Also, the -- well, the -- the NDRP also used 


those job history cards, so that's not really a 

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separate source of data, but they're pretty 


detailed. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay, what about people like 


some of the crafts you would have, some of the 


guards who may on their cards actually be 


assigned to a certain particular area or 


certain particular building, yet because of the 


nature of their work they actually -- or the 


RCTs would be another case -- could actually be 


floated or moved around, and yet those cards 


are not going to necessarily reflect all the 


areas they were in. 


 DR. ULSH: You're right, there are certain job 


categories -- like the trades workers, for 


instance; fitters, for instance -- who could 


have floated around the site and we do consider 


that. I don't want to say at all times 


periods, but certainly at some time periods in 


-- during the Rocky Flats history, some of the 


crafts were located -- headquartered in one 


particular building, but they went where the 


work was needed. And so we're aware of that 


and we consider where they could have possibly 


went and to what radionuclides they could have 


possibly been exposed, and we do take that into 

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consideration in their dose reconstruction. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: So exactly how are you handling 


that information on their dose reconstruction? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, for instance -- well, if they 


were monitored, it's pretty straightforward to 


-- well, as straightforward as, you know, dose 


reconstruction ever is. If they were not 


monitored, again, we resort to the coworker 


information that we have, and we know that 


those parti-- in those particular situations 


where you're talking about the trades who 


might've worked anywhere on site, we know that 


we have to consider not only plutonium but also 


uranium, whatever they could have been exposed 


to, and so we do assign coworker or missed dose 


on that basis. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Further questions? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Thank you very much, Brant, and we'll 


now move on to the petitioners. And let's see, 


who's going to start for the petitioners? Oh, 


okay, please... 


(Pause) 


MS. THOMPSON: My name is Jennifer Thompson and 


I'm a representative of the petitioner. As 

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noted earlier, Tony DeMaiori, the most recent 


former president of the steel workers, could 


not be here today. He's the primary agent for 


the petition; however, he's working at a 


nuclear power plant in South Carolina and could 


not come away for the meeting today and he 


sends his -- his apologies to you, as well as 


his thanks to you for all of your efforts on -- 


on this Special Exposure Cohort petition. 


I've been involved in the petition process 


since the beginning. I volunteered to help the 


United Steel Workers in drafting the petition, 


and that was about two and a half years ago, 


and never dreamed then that two and a half 


years later I'd be speaking to you today, so 


it's been a very -- very long process and I 


appreciate everybody's involvement and 


dedication to the process throughout. 


I worked at Rocky Flats for 14 years, starting 


in 1991. I worked in plutonium facilities, 


Building 707, Building 776, Building 777, 


Building 371, so I'm familiar with the site. 


am not a scientist. I'm not an industrial 


hygienist. I'm not a radiation protection 


expert. But I do have a good understanding of 


I 
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the methods, processes and procedures that were 


in place and used at Rocky Flats throughout the 


time period that I was there, and am familiar 


with the history of the site as well, having 


drafted history documents on the site. 


Again, I just want to thank the Board for its 


service so far. We appreciate your dedication. 


I want to thank Mark Griffon and the entire 


working group, who have spent many, many, many 


hours, and we appreciate their hard work. 


I want to thank some of the folks in the Rocky 


Flats community -- Terrie Barrie, Laura Schultz 


and others who have worked countless hours. 


There's many of you, too many names to mention, 


but -- but thank you to all of you. 


I also want to thank our Colorado Congressional 


delegation, who have done an outstanding job 


delivering unprecedent (sic) bipartisan support 


of this effort, as evidenced by the letter that 


you all received yesterday, the public 


statements that they have made. It is -- it is 


refreshing in -- in terms of renewing faith in 


government to know that our elected officials 


care deeply about the people that they 


represent, and we greatly -- greatly appreciate 

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that. 


Last night the Board patiently heard from 


dozens of Rocky Flats workers, those that have 


cancer, those that have other illnesses, those 


who have family members who have cancer and 


other illnesses. And this petition process is 


-- is really for them, and we are very -- very 


concerned and one of our goals is that we don't 


believe that our workers should have to fight 


with the government over dose reconstruction at 


the very time that they are fighting for their 


lives. This -- the process that is put in 


place -- the process itself is not feasible, 


and so beyond the science, even if the science 


were perfect, the process does not deliver 


timely, accurate dose reconstruction. 


I'm going to speak for a while and then I have 


a few other folks who are going to come up and 


speak, so I hope you'll bear with us when we go 


through the transition. The major things I 


want to address during my presentation are the 


timeliness factor, the fairness factor, 


feasibility, the law and -- and -- and what is 


the right thing. 


We were asked when we went into this petition 

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process to prove that there was a class of 


Rocky Flats workers for whom it was not 


feasible to accurately estimate -- estimate the 


radiation dose they received. We believe that 


our petition has done that, as evidenced by the 


two-year process, and I'll get into that later. 


We also know that they had their health 


endangered by their exposure to radiation, and 


we do not feel we had to prove that because the 


government itself has said that there's 22 


cancers for which radiation is a causal factor, 


and so we feel like that was taken care of. 


As the gentleman of NIOSH went over the basis 


of our petition already, we submitted it on 


February 15th. Our major factors were exposure 


to the high-fired oxides, which was a unique 


form of plutonium; inability to link exposure 


to specific incidents; periods of inadequate 


monitoring; lack of monitoring; changes in 


methodology and inconsistency in procedures; 


unmonitored/undetected exposures surfacing 


throughout time; and the negative effect of 


site closure on the accuracy of dose 


reconstruction. And I know that that one was 


kind of thrown out, but we still consider that 

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to be a valid factor. 


The timeliness of the petition has been a big 


issue, and those of you that were here over a 


year ago heard me speak on this and I'm going 


to hit upon it again. The law required that 


NIOSH make a recommendation within 180 days of 


receipt of our petition. The -- Health and 


Human Services implemented its own rules to 


implement the law, and they said that the 180 


days actually meant 180 days from when NIOSH 


determined the package was certified. In 


either case, that deadline was not met. The 


petition -- the recommendation from NIOSH did 


not come until 440 days after submittal. And 


now here we are, two years, two months, 18 


days, 807 days from submittal. I'm not going 


to go over the details of the time frame here, 


but as you can see, it's been a long and 


arduous process. 


 And while the petitioner was required to meet 


every deadline in the process or run the risk 


of having our petition thrown out, the same has 


not held true for the government. We had 30 


days to respond to the questions initially 


during the validation process. We responded 

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with over 500 pages of additional information, 


and we met that 30-day deadline, even though we 


are all volunteers. 


The length of this process severely hindered 


the petitioners' ability to respond. We have ­

- we no longer have any union -- access to 


union resources or backing. We have no money, 


and most of us are gainfully employed, thank 


goodness, in -- in other areas and so 


difficulty in attending daily working group 


meetings and things like that, whereas if Rocky 


Flats was still open, our employer was flexible 


and would have allowed that participation. 


We have a handful of volunteers at this point 


versus the Goliath that NIOSH has created on 


the other side of the table. You know, when 


we're in meetings, it's fairly intimidating 


when you're one person and -- and you've got 


over 20 people with PhDs and -- and science 


backgrounds and everything, and access to the 


records that we can't even get, you know, on 


the other side of the table, so that's a little 


frustrating. 


Closure has made records retrieval difficult. 


NIOSH has the ability to command the records, 

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and still sometimes it takes them months to get 


them. The workers do not have that ability. 


When they request their records, sometimes they 


wait as long as a year to get their files, and 


then the files that they get are incomplete. 


This severely hinders their ability to present 


their case during the individual claim process. 


 The Rocky Mountain News has been covering this 


topic very closely and has provided a bunch of 


information, and I want to thank them, and I 


quote a lot from their articles today -- and 


I've tried to give attribution where due. 


[name redacted] -- I'm not sure the sp-- how to 


say the name -- is someone who's a biophysicist 


and an expert in dose reconstruction, and he 


said that government scientists have ongoing 


discussions about the validity of dose 


reconstruction, and he says -- he says that -- 


basically that if you can spend enough time and 


enough money, you may get it right. But the 


question is, timeliness is one of the factors 


in delivering the conditions of this program. 


And if you can't do it in a timely manner, it 


becomes unmanageable and it's no longer 


feasible. 

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Members of the Congressional delegation for 


Colorado have asked NIOSH not once, not twice, 


but four times now to grant this petition a 


fair and timely review, and to date have been 


unsuccessful in securing that. The U.S. 


Congress required NIOSH to make a timely 


recommendation, and Congress has never intended 


for this process to drag on for years while 


scientists search for new methods. 


 Another petition we're aware of was recommended 


for approval based on the timeliness factor. 


We believe that sets precedence for the Board 


today with respect to the Rocky Flats petition. 


If timeliness were ever an issue, at Rocky 


Flats it definitely is. 


 The question has never been could NIOSH ever 


reconstruct dose at some point in the future 


time with accuracy. The question was, when we 


submitted the petition February 15th of 2005, 


could dose accurately be reconstructed. The 


law did not say Petitioner, point out flaws in 


the government's ability to reconstruct dose. 


NIOSH, fix some of the flaws, admitting 


inabilities, and then recommend denial of the 


petition based on a new set of standards that 

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did not exist at the time the petition was 


submitted. The law clearly states the purpose 


of the compensation program is to provide 


timely, uniform and adequate compensation. 


Justice delayed is justice denied. 


We have learned, and as evidenced by the empty 


chair at the table today, that some members of 


the Board have been instructed that they cannot 


vote on the Rocky Flats petition based on 


relationships with the United Steel Workers. 


As a direct result in NIOSH delaying this 


petition, if this -- if this conflict were ever 


valid, such a restriction is no longer valid 


today for the following reasons: The Rocky 


Flats workers on behalf of which this petition 


was filed no longer have any financial or 


contractual relationship with the United Steel 


Workers. Local 8031 no longer has a single 


nuclear worker in its membership. United Steel 


Workers no longer receive any dues from the 


former Rocky Flats members, nor do they provide 


representation or services to the members. The 


United Steel Workers, as an organization, does 


not benefit in any financial way from this 


petition being granted. 

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NIOSH, on its own right, expanded the class to 


include all Rocky Flats employees, so this is 


no longer a steel worker petition. This is now 


a Rocky Flats petition. Therefore, no 


relational conflict exists, and we urge that 


all members of the Board demand their right to 


vote today. And if they are not allowed to 


vote, we request of NIOSH to provide, in 


writing, the legal basis for any restrictions 


on voting to the petitioner within 14 days. 


It appears that there's a double standard on 


the conflict of interest issue, as the Board is 


being -- members of the Board are prevented 


from participation due to conflict of interest, 


but NIOSH repeatedly relies on experts that 


have conflicts of interest. And experts who 


have testified against workers in worker 


compensation hearings are serving key roles in 


this process. The government's own General 


Accounting Office identified conflicts of 


interest in this process as an issue. 


As you well -- as the Board is, I'm sure, too 


closely aware, there's been a tremendous amount 


of political pressure to not approve Special 


Exposure Cohort petitions, in particular the 

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Rocky Flats petition. This dates back to -- to 


2005 when an OMB pass-back memo encourages 


administrative clearance on petitions before 


they could be approved and asked the 


interagency to address any imbalance on the 


Board and -- and actually resulting in changing 


out of members of the Board and things along 


those lines. 


This is a excerpt from an e-mail from a Deputy 


of La-- Depu-- Deputy for the Department of 


Labor, who stated that we should do everything 


possible to oppose these SEC petitions. 


Further evidence of the tampering is this 


address any imbalance in membership of the 


President's Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health, require NIOSH to apply conflict 


of interest rules and constraints to the 


Advisory Board contractors. The government is 


clearly trying to manipulate the process. 


Getting back to the feasibility of the actual 


science, F. Owen Hoffman stated that this is -- 


that dose reconstruction is an inexact science, 


that -- that it depends on an extensive amount 


of judgment; that two different investigators, 


given the same data, would come up with 

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different doses. The -- the people that are 


doing the dose reconstruction, 88 of them, not 


all of them have degrees in health physicists 


(sic) and with the workload that they're placed 


with, reviewing one and a half cases each 


workday, we believe that this process leads to 


a situation where it is not feasible for them 


to accurately reconstruct dose. 


Further evidence of this has to do with -- I'm 


sure you -- you all will recall who were here 


last year [name redacted], who presented with 


us, and he couldn't be here today because he's 


volunteering at a cancer clinic up in Loveland. 


He -- his case was denied three times, and then 


approved finally just recently based on 


inaccuracy of records. And what this points 


to, and we're going to hear more about this 


later, but what this points to is [name 


redacted] had a tremendous perseverance, 


tremendous capabilities and resources to be 


able to fight his process for four years. He 


kept at it and kept at it. He could have given 


up after the second denial, but he didn't. How 


many other workers are like [Name Redacted] who
 

have submitted and been denied but haven't had 

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the ability, capabilities or financial strength 


to continue through this process? How many 


other workers in the end would NIOSH have to 


come back and say we can't do it because the -- 


the records are inadequate? How can they three 


times deny [Name Redacted] based on science, and 


then finally approve him, throwing up their 


hands, saying we -- we don't have the records? 


 Another person, [name redacted], had a dose
 

reconstruction done. She's -- she's -- was -- 


talked to you guys last night, and she came out 


with a 42 rem dose reconstruction. Then they 


reconstructed her dose and came out with 25 


rem. So one time 42 rem, one time 25 rem. 


Where's the accuracy in that? 


We have heartbreaking stories of people with 47 


percent probability that are denied. How do we 


know that their doses weren't off by ten rem 


and they should have been approved? 


NIOSH would like you -- the Board to believe 


that the issue with high-fired oxides is taken 


care of. We do not believe that, as the 


petitioner. In 2003 it was stated that the 


precise nature of super class Y material is not 


known, and here we are just four years later 

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saying we have the whole problem figured out, 


that we've got a new model -- although it's not 


tried and validated, tested or proved, that we 


have a new model now and that just fixes 


everything. We believe that there's no way 


that we could know enough today about high-


fired oxides. Where's all the research? 


Where's the scientific expertise that looks 


into this? Usually challenges like this take 


decades for the scientific community to 


resolve. 


SC&A pointed out upper bound dose limitations 


having to do with coworker dose models, and 


that's not a new factor. The Defense Threat 


Reduction Agency dose reconstruction program 


found the same challenges when dealing with 


dose reconstruction. 


And this is an interesting dichotomy. I think 


you'll remember [name redacted] from a previous 


e-mail I showed you, but in 2004 he was singing 


a different song. In 2004 he said if there's a 


justification for an SEC anywhere, common sense 


suggests that it should be Rocky Flats. He 


also said does it make any sense to continue to 


defend a do-- a dose reconstruction process 

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that will just get more complicated and 


attenuated. 


We believe there's many unresolved petition 


issues to date. We believe that the neutron 


doses between 1952 and 1970 are still 


problematic. We believe that the issue of 


missing records is -- is still prominent. The 


issue of the zeroes in 1969 to '70 was fully 


looked at and NIOSH was proud that only 26 


percent of the ones they thought were missing 


were actually missing. Twenty-six percent is 


not good enough when you have cancer. 


And they looked at one year in detail. What 


would happen if they looked at every year in 


detail? Would they not find similar examples 


of missing data every single year? 


SC&A -- there's large gaps in internal dose 


data, notably from 1964 to 1992. We're still 


concerned about the adequacy of the coworker 


model, in particular for workers that are 


involved in high-dose work activities. A 95 


percent of the average site employment is not 


appropriate for high-dose workers. 


We're concerned about the thorium dose 


reconstruction abilities. I've already talked 

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about the dose records for people with high-


dose rate jobs. We're concerned that the new 


models have not been sufficiently tested or 


proven. We're concerned that when they are 


proven or when -- when things are researched 


that the -- the sample size looked at is 


statistically invalid when you're talking about 


a population of potentially 20,000 people and 


you look at 52 cases -- okay? If I was giving 


a PhD dissertation and I turned that in, I 


would get laughed at -- okay? That is not a 


statistically accurate sampling. 


We're concerned about lack of independent 


verification on the use of the neutron dose 


reconstruction project. And SC&A was also 


concerned about NIOSH's ability to validate or 


to demonstrate that it can apply its stated 


methods, approaches and coworker models to 


enable dose reconstruction with sufficient 


accuracy. Again, I would say even if your 


models were perfect, could this be done, could 


it physically be done? 


We're still concerned about high-fired oxides 


and their effect on the human body, and the 


fact that this is a relatively recent 

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phenomenon and that it hasn't been given the 


attention that it deserves. 


We're still concerned that the site profile 


still fails to recognize plutonium production 


mission in Building 881, even though NIOSH has 


been repeatedly told that there were plutonium 


operations in that facility. 


 We are concerned that no effort has been made 


to determine the radioactive cocktail effect 


described in the petition whereby plutonium, in 


combination with chemical exposure, could have 


implications to how plutonium is metabolized in 


the body. 


These are a lot of issues, two years and three 


months into the process. 


 We believe that just the fact alone that the 


working group met this week to discuss issues 


that are still unresolved means that our 


petition was valid, and that it should be 


approved. We believe that since it's been more 


than two years and significant factors are 


still unresolved means the petition was valid 


and should be approved. The fact that NIOSH 


has made the changes to the site profile, added 


new TIBs, changed the particle size for high­
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fired oxides, developed new coworker models, 


added adjustment factors, tweaked other models 


-- all of these changes prove that the petition 


was valid. If the petition was not valid they 


would not have had to make all these changes. 


The law asked us, when we submitted that 


petition on February 15th of 2005, to show that 


you could not accurately, feasibly reconstruct 


dose. We proved that when we submitted the 


petition. The law never said submit a 


petition, have all of the challenges addressed 


over a long, arduous process, and then have 


that petition denied based on a new set of 


standards that did not exist at the time the 


petition was submitted. These new factors, 


these new models, they are unproven, they are 


untested and unvalidated. 


 We believe that the Board has no legal or moral 


choice other than to approve this petition in 


its entirety today. We ask you to consider the 


law, ignore the politics. A law is a term for 


-- for dose and radiation exposure. A law is 


not a term for cost of worker health benefits. 


We ask you to look deep into your heart and ask 


yourself what did Congress intend, what does 

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the American public intend, and what do our 


workers deserve? Someday is not good enough. 


The fact that maybe tomorrow or five years from 


now or two years from now we may be able to 


reconstruct dose, that is not good enough. The 


law requires timeliness. The law meant today. 


At this point I would like to invite Jerry 


Harden, the former president of the United 


Steel Workers of America, Local 8031, to come 


present on behalf of the petition. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Jennifer and 


Jerry, before you take the podium, I understand 


we have Senator Salazar now on the phone, so if 


you would concede the mike for a few minutes, 


we'll hear his comments. 


MS. THOMPSON: Yes, we will gladly concede to 


the Honorable Senator. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Senator, welcome. We 


have just heard from the peti-- 


SENATOR SALAZAR: Hello -- Dr. Ziemer? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good morning. We've just heard 


from the petitioner. We're pleased to hear 


your comments to the Advisory Board at this 


time. 


(The following statement was greatly distorted 

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by faulty telephonic transmission.) 


SENATOR SALAZAR: Thank you very much, Dr. 


Ziemer and let me welcome you and members of 


the Board to Westminster, Colorado. Also 


welcome to the Rocky Flats workers and their 


families. 


To the Board, I appreciate your service to our 


country. I know that you work very hard 


carrying out your responsibilities, so I want 


to thank you for doing so and I also want to 


thank you for allowing me to speak to you very 


briefly this morning. I know you have a full 


agenda and I have a number of issues that I'm 


trying to work through to develop a bipartisan 


approach to (unintelligible) whole host of 


things, so I wanted to take time out today just 


to speak to you about the workers at Rocky 


Flats (unintelligible) other nuclear weapons 


facilities. I believe that the workers really 


are part of that generation of World War II and 


Cold War heroes of our nation and we need to 


make sure that we are (unintelligible) what 


they have done for our country. They risked 


their lives and their health to help us prevail 


in our long struggle against the Soviet Union 

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(unintelligible) recognition of their service 


and the price they paid in terms of illness and 


mortality, Congress enacted the Energy 


Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 


Program Act. The mission under that program is 


to compensate those workers for illnesses or 


(unintelligible) exposure to radiation and 


other harmful substances. 


In passing the legislation, Congress explained 


(unintelligible) the purpose of the 


compensation program is to provide for timely ­

- and I underscore timely -- uniform and 


adequate compensation, end of quote. And 


Congress (unintelligible) also recognizes there 


would be circumstances where there isn't 


(unintelligible) information about what workers 


were exposed to or when or in what amount, so 


these workers would be able to 


(unintelligible). In recognition of that fact, 


Congress created the Special Exposure Cohort to 


reduce the burden of proof off these workers. 


(Unintelligible) workers should become part of 


the Special Exposure Cohort when their dose -- 


doses can't be calculated with sufficient 


accuracy. 

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Well, now it's been more than six years after 


the passage of the Act and more than two years 


after the filing of the Rocky Flats workers' 


SEC petition. (Unintelligible) painfully clear 


that there's (unintelligible) about how to 


calculate the dose of radiation 


(unintelligible) Rocky Flats workers with 


sufficient accuracy. (Unintelligible) the 


Board's own workgroup struggled over this issue 


for nearly (unintelligible) to determine 


(unintelligible) methodologies or 


(unintelligible) would be able to 


(unintelligible). 


I don't question the capabilities or the 


(unintelligible) of all those who participated 


(unintelligible) over the last 


(unintelligible). But (unintelligible) the 


issue is sufficient accuracy, we have totally 


lost focus of the essential purpose of this law 


that says timely compensation (unintelligible). 


The Rocky Flats SEC petition was submitted on 


February 15th, 2005 (unintelligible) about the 


methodologies sufficient accuracy 22 months 


later and whether or not (unintelligible) 


workers (unintelligible) Special Exposure 

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Cohort all nine members of the Colorado 


delegation (unintelligible) this happens we 


consider to be the most important issue that's 


facing our state (unintelligible) Republican, 


Democrat, Senator Allard and myself coming 


together (unintelligible) delegation joining 


together (unintelligible) the Rocky Flats 


workers to ask you (unintelligible) this 


petition. So today I am calling you, Mr. 


Zimmer (sic) and members of the Board, to 


expressly request on my behalf as a U.S. 


Senator, on behalf of my colleagues here in 


Congress, to reinforce the request 


(unintelligible) my request is to 


(unintelligible) the timely approval of what 


was (unintelligible) Congress stated in the 


statute passed by Congress and so I'd ask of 


you to move forward and to (unintelligible). 


Thank you, Mr. (sic) Ziemer -- Zimmer (sic) 


again for the opportunity to speak to you and 


the Board. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Senator, for 


your comments, and we will be continuing our 


deliberations. David Hiller is here with us 


today from your staff and will keep you 

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informed of the progress. So thank you for 


being with us. 


SENATOR SALAZAR: (Unintelligible) appreciate 


that and I look forward to the (unintelligible) 


the Board. Thank you very much 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, now we'll be 


pleased to hear from Jerry Harden. 


 MR. HARDEN: Good morning. Once again I'm 


appearing in front of you nice-looking people 


that have toured the country, staying in good 


hotels, listening all day to sad stories. 


Now with that being said, my name is Jerry 


Harden. I was a 37-year employee at the Rocky 


Flats nuclear weapons site. I was also a 


three-term president of United Steel Workers of 


America, Local 8031, representing the hourly 


production and maintenance workers at the 


plant. 


Today I want to point out two important 


anniversaries. First is the 38th anniversary 


of the 776 building fire, causing the biggest 


dollar loss in U.S. history to that point, and 


that occurred on May 11th. Second is the one-


year anniversary, April 27th, of my appearance 

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before this panel pleading for cohort status 


for sick Rocky Flats workers. How much has 


that year cost in lost dollars and heartache? 


This was a well-intentioned program that has 


since been grossly mismanaged. It has meant 


windfall profits for contractors, 


administrators, intellects, bureaucrats and 


attorneys, providing only token relief for the 


sick Rocky Flats workers. 


As you on the Board should know, U.S. 


Department of Energy has been funding studies 


and gathering data on its radiation workers for 


approximately 40 years through the United 


States Transuranium and Uranium Registries. 


This effort analyzed thousands of organs and 


tissue samples from dead DOE radiation workers. 


Hundreds of dead Rocky Flats workers were part 


of this effort with their donations of organs, 


or in some cases their whole bodies, to be 


dissected and studied to determine the effects 


of their work exposure to specific medical 


conditions. Today Rocky Flats workers are 


still waiting for cohort status, recognizing 


the health conditions caused by their job site 


exposures. 

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These previous and ongoing efforts should have 


provided the information to handle these 


claims. Why hasn't it? How many more millions 


of dollars and years of time will be squandered 


on other pseudo-science projects such as dose 


reconstruction in the ongoing effort by the 


Department of Energy and its contractors to 


ignore, deny and minimize the health damage to 


Rocky Flats workers? 


I will offer some other related examples of the 


mismanagement of the Rocky Flats plant by the 


Department of Energy and its contractors that 


have been recognized by truly independent 


agencies. The first is the Colorado State 


Workers Compensation process, and we have had 


four provable radiation deaths that have 


proceeded through that, proving that those 


workers' survivors' claims were valid. 


The first of the claims was [Name Redacted], the 


second was [Name Redacted], followed by[Name 


Redacted], and [Name Redacted]. All of these
 

men were Rocky Flats workers who were employed 


in the hot areas. 


The second item I'd like to mention today is 


the [Name Redacted] landowner lawsuit decision 

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in Federal Court. They took over 15 years and 


$30 million by the contractor and DOE to 


prepare for the case. But we were headlines in 


the Rocky Mountain News with a $350 million 


settlement, and this is of course being 


appealed by the DOE. 


 The third case is the [Name Redacted], false
 

claims lawsuit decision, in Federal Court as 


well. His attorney claims that $500 million 


has been spent by DOE and the contractors to -- 


to pursue that case. The Department of Energy 


has appealed these verdicts, using their 


typical strategy of denying, stalling and 


creating more red tape to prevent settling 


these cases. 


This is similar to the way that the sick Rocky 


Flats workers' claims have been handled. The 


federal government and the Department of Energy 


have been proven unable to provide a meaningful 


way for these affected by their actions to have 


a realistic and timely justice provided. How 


did Department of Energy hold these 


corporations involved accountable? By 


providing them additional bonuses and by paying 


for their legal fees for their disgraceful 

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performances. I wish that the sick Rocky Flats 


workers could benefit from some of their 


generosity as well. 


In summary, there is autopsy data on hundreds 


of dead Rocky Flats workers establishing health 


effects; one of the worst industrial fires in 


U.S. history; two very large Federal Court 


judgments against the Department of Energy and 


the contractors for safety conditions at Rocky 


Flats; four proven radiation death cases 


through the State Workers Compensation Program; 


and numerous out of court settlements. What is 


it going to take to prove that employ at -- 


employment at Rocky Flats hurt some of the 


workers? 


And with that, I would say I'm open for any 


questions or comments -- chickens. Please help 


the sick Rocky Flats workers, granting them 


cohort status. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Jennifer? 


MS. THOMPSON: Thank you. At this time I would 


like to introduce Mr. Jack Weaver, long-time 


Rocky Flats employee, particularly focused in 


Building 771 as a subject matter expert noted 


by DOE and numerous others. Thank you, sir. 

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 MR. WEAVER: Oh, I tore up the equipment. 


Thank you, Jennifer. Good morning to the 


Board. Good morning to my brothers and sisters 


from Rocky Flats -- appreciate you being here 


again. 


I'm going to take a little different tack at 


what's going on here. I'm going to talk a 


little bit about me personally because 


obviously I have a long tenure at Rocky Flats. 


Then I'm going to talk about some of the issues 


that we had. 


I started at Rocky Flats September the 5th, 


1961. I started on a labor gang 'cause that's 


one of the ways you got into the plant to get a 


job. Two months later I had signed a posting, 


passed the test and became an assistant 


chemical operator. I was supposed to be 


assistant chemical operator for -- for two 


years, but for -- because of the need of -- of 


operations personnel, operators to run the 


production equipment, six months later I took a 


test, I became a chemical operator. I worked 


12 years as a hourly chemical operator and a 


chemical operator crew leader. I became a 


foreman after that. After foreman, a 

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supervisor, building manager, operations and 


building manager for 771 and 371, ultimately 


became an assistant dist-- or general manager, 


deputy general manager under EG&G. 


So I -- I had a chance to work in all positions 


from the lowest on the hourly rung to almost 


the highest at the plant site. I had the 


chance to work in many different situations, so 


I'll go back and start with some of those. 


The first day I worked in 771 building as an 


assistant chemical operator I was taken in and 


given a briefing about the building and the 


rules of the building, went to lunch. Came 


back from lunch, was taken to the locker room, 


shown how to dress out, given a half-mask 


respirator and told to follow the crew leader. 


We went back into the hallway at 771 building 


and he says climb up in those pipes, we're 


going to decon the overhead. What does that 


mean? You know, I had no clue what that meant. 


Well, what it meant was take a bunch of chem 


wipes and what we called KW and go clean the 


pipes -- literally wipe down the contamination. 


There was no check on the respirator. It was a 


single-strap half-mask respirator. I was in a 

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space approximately four foot by four foot with 


a multitude of pipes running through it. I was 


a pretty skinny kid at that time so I could get 


through it pretty easily. I don't know I could 


do that today. But that's what we did. 


As an assistant chemical operator you were kind 


of a go-fer and a -- and a do-all for the 


operators; all the dirty jobs, the decon job, 


we got them. 


Well, when I became an operator I started 


learning the processes. Initially at Rocky 


Flats, in the '50s and early '60s, you were 


assigned to a job, you stayed on that job. 


Well, as it -- as the production schedules 


changed and need for increased production and 


because of radiation exposure, people started 


having to be rotated. And so we were rotated 


from job to job to job, so we had to learn 


every job, and we worked every job. And that 


included an operation called chemical makeup, 


some people called it chem prep, in which you 


had to prepare chemicals for the processes in 


which you were -- you had no respiratory 


protection, no monitoring or anything. But you 


were working with raw chemicals -- 

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(unintelligible) nitric acid, hydrofluoric 


acid, hydrochloric acid, all kinds of things 


like that that were used in the process -- and 


so you inhaled those. 


Do we know what that does to you? I don't. 


All I know is that a lot of people became sick 


because of the chemicals that -- that we dealt 


with. 


Anyway, moving on. Working in 771 building was 


a -- was a very unique experience in the early 


days because we didn't have a lot of -- of 


safety programs. You walk in and you might 


work on this side of the glovebox through a set 


of gloves, looking on the back side of the 


glovebox. There weren't any gloves; they'd 


rotted off, but they were taped over. You were 


not in respirators, but the back side of the 


glovebox was posted for respirators, you know? 


You had dosimeters -- or you didn't have 


dosimeters; you had film badges in those days. 


And our frequency was a change of every two 


weeks. And sometimes you would -- you would 


come back, as people have stated, no data 


available, or less than readable data and 


stuff. I had some of that -- I had -- I 

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changed my badge frequently, every two weeks. 


I got information back, but it wasn't always 


the information that -- you know, you'd go ask 


well, what happened? I mean I worked beside 


this guy; he got 100 millirem, I didn't get 


any. How come? No answer. 


 Anyway, things changed somewhat. We in-- we 


in-- installed some programs like the glove 


quality program where we changed gloves on a 


periodic basis so we wouldn't have those gloves 


falling off the gloveboxes and stuff. But we 


worked in a chemical processing building that 


had 26 miles of processing piping; 200 tanks 


with sight gauges on them, each with a 


potential for a leak; 12,000 flanges, 15,000 


welded joints, that sort of thing -- every one 


of them with a potential to leak, and most of 


them did. So we had a lot of issues with -- 


with deconning and dealing with radiation 


exposure, alpha contamination, et cetera. 


For me personally, I got data in 1962 -- and if 


you -- if you know the history of Rocky Flats, 


1962 was -- summer of '62 was the first year 


that Rocky Flats suffered a strike by the 


union. It went on for 28 days, in August. 

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When I got back from strike I was called into 


the office and told I was -- we were back about 


a week and I was called into the office and 


told you've exceeded 5,000 millirem for the 


year; you're going to have to go to 774 


building and cool off. So I went to 774 


building to cool off. First of the year I was 


back in 771, doing my normal thing. It went on 


like that. 


'69 I was working midnight shift. I had a call 


on May the 11th about 6:30 in the evening from 


my boss, [Name Redacted], and he says get your 


carpool and get to work now. I said what's 


wrong, [Name Redacted]? He said I haven't got 


time to explain it, just get here. So I called 


my carpool, said I'll be by and pick you up in 


five minutes and we're going to work. What's 


up? I don't know, we're going to work. So we 


get out on the hill there at 128 and we look 


over towards Rocky Flats and all you can see is 


red lights flashing all over the place and you 


go -- do I really want to go to work? I'm not 


sure, but we did. 


We pulled into the east gate. Guard said where 


the hell do you guys think you're going? Well, 

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we're going to work down in 71. Oh, well, 


don't go near 76. And I said well, what's 


wrong? He said there's a big fire going on 


down there and they haven't got it contained. 


Well, we got down to 71 building, got dressed 


out, went to the office and boss said there's a 


fire in 76 building. They're putting water on 


it. It's running down the elevator, through 


the tunnel and into the back of 71 building. 


Go get the floor pickups and decon -- start 


deconning the hallways and get it back to the ­

- the tunnel. So we did that, worked all night 


long getting water picked up and stuff. 


About an hour into this, boss came in and says 


you guys come out here. He says I got 


something for you. So we went out to the -- 


the clean area. He says here, put these on. 


Say what the hell's that? He says that's a new 


type of respirator, called a full-face mask. 


We were wearing half-masks when we first got 


there. He gave us a full-face respirator, but 


actually what it was was an old World War II 


gas mask with a particulate filter on it. 


Well, as you can see, I wear glasses. My 


vision at that time was 20/800, 20/850, so I 

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didn't see real well without them. But I 


pulled my glasses off, put this thing on and 


bumped into a few walls and stuff and spent the 


rest of the night deconning. 


The following weeks we wound up going into the 


tunnel, which was between 71 and 76, and 


cleaning that, then eventually going up to 76 


building and into supplied breathing air suits 


and -- and cleaning -- packaging oxides and 


bringing them to 71, drying them, storing them 


and processing. 


We processed a lot of material. We processed 


millions of grams of plutonium. People talk 


about plutonium. They don't really understand 


or know the amount of material that went 


through that site. I'm not talking a few 


grams. When I read the books and -- and hear 


the stories and talk to the people from Los 


Alamos and they talk about what they did back 


in the Manhattan Project, and they were dealing 


with micrograms and milligrams of plutonium. 


We dealt with kgs per hours, kgs per shift, 


hundreds and thousands of kgs per year, 


millions of grams of oxide that went through 


the process. 

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What we did it for was to keep this country 


safe, and we did it very well. But we paid a 


price, because if you talk to people at other 


plants, and I've been to every one of the other 


plants, save Paducah and -- and the one in 


Ohio. Every one of them, when you talk about 


Rocky Flats, they just can't understand why -- 


why we did what we did and how come we put up 


with what we did because they don't have the 


people that have been exposed like we do. They 


don't have the hundreds of people that have 


high exposures and -- and internal depositions 


that we did. And it's hard to deal with that 


kind of stuff because some people it affects 


and some people it -- it doesn't affect, but 


probably will in the future, and I'm probably 


one of those. 


I continued to work, as I say, Rocky Flats. 


Through the years I -- I became a foreman in 


'73 in 71 building on midnight shift. I worked 


there until 1980 and I went up to 371 to start 


that building up, and I did. I started it up. 


I also shut it down, because it was not what we 


had asked for. In 1968 the government came to 


the people in the building and asked for -- 

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what we would like to see in a new facility 


because they felt that 71 building had a 25­

year life span and it ought to be closed down 


after 25 years, so they were going to build a 


new facility called 371 and 374 to replace 771 


and 774. It was supposed to be on line in 


1976. I went there in 1980; it was still not 


on line. We didn't put the first plutonium in 


until 1981. 


A lot of things that we asked for did get put 


into the building. A lot of things we didn't 


ask for got put into the building. The 


building was not designed properly to handle 


acid atmosphere plutonium recovery, and 


therefore it did the same thing as 71 building 


-- it leaked. People got exposed. 


One of the things -- and I'll back up for just 


a moment and talk about -- is americium. 


Americium is a byproduct of plutonium. It in-


grows in the plutonium in the -- in the weapons 


in the field, and after a period of time has to 


be brought back and reprocessed and -- and the 


americium removed from the plutonium because in 


the field what it's doing is giving the 


military folks high doses of gamma, and the 

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military doesn't want to put up with that. 
I 


don't blame them. So they send them back. 


So we had a process in which we recovered the ­

- the plutonium and the americium, did a 


separation process, purified the plutonium, 


sent it back into the weapons product. And we 


separated the americium, purified it, made it 


into an oxide and we sent it to the americium 


pool down at Oak Ridge for a number of years 


until we filled the pool up so full they said 


that we didn't need any more americium because 


there'd be more than five lifetimes worth of 


americium for everybody to use. 


So we quit saving it, so it became a waste 


product. And it went into the waste in what 


was now a cold process for buildings like 774 


and 374, now became a hot process because of 


all the -- the gamma that was going through the 


system in the waste -- americium waste. So 


those people got exposed where they weren't 


exposed previously to the higher levels. 


Another thing I'd like to speak about for a 


minute is when I went to work there in 71 


building, the talk in radi-- in the radiation 


field was obviously about alpha and gamma and 

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beta. Nobody talked about neutrons. Nobody 


had an idea what was going on with neutrons. 


It wasn't until about 195-- or 1965, 1966 that 


they determined that neutrons were an issue, 


and that we ought to do something about it. 


And what they did was they started installing 


plexiglas and benelex around the gloveboxes. 


Makes it harder to work in the glovebox, makes 


it a -- a tougher job for you to do your job 


and therefore you spend longer exposure time in 


the glovebox. And it really got, in a lot of 


cases, more exposure, especially to your -- 


your hands and wrists and chest area, than you 


did without the -- the benelex and plexiglas. 


What they didn't realize or didn't pay 


attention to was benelex and plexiglas are 


extremely hazardous, flammable-wise. And so 


when the fire started in '69 in 76 building, as 


it burnt through the first window and got to 


the outside protection, benelex and plexiglas, 


and started burning that. When it started into 


the benelex, benelex is -- comes in sheets 


about a quarter-inch thick and they laminate it 


together -- one inch, two inch, three inch, 


four inch -- whatever thickness you need. So 

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it would get into this benelex and get to the 


glue and start burning. And one of the reasons 


that the fire continued to burn as long as it 


did was because they couldn't get the benelex 


put out. 


They put water on the plutonium. That didn't 


put it out 'cause water won't do anything to 


put out a plutonium fire. The only thing you 


can do to put out a plutonium fire is take the 


oxygen away from it. So all the plutonium 


burned into oxides, so we spent a lot of time 


taking care of the oxides and getting all of 


that stuff out of the building before we ever 


got to the point where we were tearing out the 


equipment and cleaning up the building. 


Although it was never completely cleaned; a lot 


of it was covered over with paint. 


 Anyway, moving right along, I continued to work 


at the Flats and participate in the programs. 


One of the things that I saw early on was that 


I'm getting exposed. 


Oh, I forgot to tell you that right after the 


fire in '69 we were working cleaning up and 


stuff. Well, in -- in August of '69 again I 


come into the office on midnight shift. The 

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boss says you're out of here. I said what's 


up? He says you're over-exposed. Well, '69 


was the only other year that I got notice that 


I had exceeded the five rem limit for exposure. 


And the reason I'm talking about this is 


because I'm going to bring something up here in 


a few minutes about my exposure. 


So anyway, we continued to work. I continued 


to -- to ask questions and -- and participate 


in the programs. I talked to you about the 


frequency earlier. One of the questions was 


about how frequent was -- were people's badges 


changed, how frequently were they body-counted 


and how frequently did they have urinalysis and 


that sort of thing. My personal situation was 


that after I was identified with an internal 


deposition and a high -- high dose and exceeded 


the -- the guideline, I had a body count every 


six months. I got a pee bucket every six 


weeks. Every one of those came back extremely 


high in plutonium and americium. I could do 


one today and it would still do the same thing. 


The last one I did, just before I left, the 


information was you're still in the category of 


extremely high. 

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I 

So I'm sitting here with -- with plutonium and 


americium in my system. I'm fortunate. 


haven't had what a lot of these other folks 


have had as far as health issues. I've had 


some minor health issues, but I haven't had the 


heavy issues, the cancer issues and that sort 


of thing. Will I? I don't know. Probably. 


mean how can you not have, if you've got an 


internal deposition and a large body burden -- 


I mean a large dose. 


I just want to share this one piece of paper 


here with you. This -- this is the Rocky Flats 


Environmental Technology Site annual report 


card for the year 2000, individual lifetime 


report, Jack Weaver. Cumulative TEDE reported 


since 1/1/89, 659 internal -- no, I mean 


external; no internal; 659 millirem total dose 


for the year. 


Now in 2000 I was working in a situation where 


I was doing contract work and oversight, 


reviewing work packages and et cetera, so I 


wasn't on the floor every day, but I would go 


out and review the packages on the floor with 


the workers and such. So I still received 659 


for the year, even though I didn't have handsI 
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on in the -- in the gloves or hands-on to the 


equipment. 


But here's -- here's the results on a lifetime 


dose. External, 89967; internal, 119796, for 


a total of 209763. How many people in here are 


you going to find that's got that kind of a 


dose? Not many. I'm probably one of those 20 


or 30 people that they talked about that -- 


that got reviewed because I'm in the high end 


of things. There are other people that are 


higher than I am, and quite a few of them that 


are in that area of 100 to 200 to 300 rem over 


the -- over the -- or millirem, I'm sorry, over 


the -- no, rem -- over the lifetime of -- of 


working at Rocky Flats. 


Anyway, what I -- what I wanted to convey was ­

- was this. There are a lot of great people, 


brothers and sisters that worked at Rocky 


Flats, that did a hell of a job maintaining the 


integrity of -- of our armed services so this 


country could stay free and -- and be able to 


stand here today and talk to you people. It's 


a shame that these people have not been treated 


with the dignity that they haven't 'cause they 


deserve better than what they've been getting. 

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I just want to say that I hope you people find 


it in your hearts and in your heads today to 


listen to what Senator Salazar had to say, to 


listen to what Jennifer -- by the way, who did 


an outstanding job, in my mind, of presenting 


this morning -- to what Jerry said, to what Tom 


will say here in a few minutes, what [Name 


Redacted] will say, and what the people said 


last night, and please, please pass the SEC 


cohort. When you go to other sites and you ask 


them about how many of their people are -- are 


exposed, how many of their people have had 


internal depositions and stuff, you won't find 


any site, not even Hanford and Savannah River, 


that have the people that have been exposed 


like Rocky Flats people have. These people 


deserve to be treated with justice and dignity. 


Please do that for them. Please vote for the 


cohort. 


I thank you for your time. 


MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Jack. Now I would 


like to introduce Mr. Bill Brady, a law 


professor at the University of Denver Sturm 


College of Law, who teaches an advanced law 


class in hazardous waste and toxious (sic) 

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torts. He represents cancer victims and others 


who've been exposed to toxic substances. Thank 


you. 


MR. BRADY: Mr. Chairman, members of the 


committee, it's already been a long morning and 


I don't know if you had a break planned at all, 


and I would offer you the opportunity -- if it 


was your preference -- to take the break now. 


The --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I'm (unintelligible) -- 


MR. BRADY: -- derriere can only endure -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- you so much time afterwards 


that --


MR. BRADY: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- no, I -- unless you are going 


on for an extended period, I think -- we have a 


few moments yet. We'd be --


MR. BRADY: Okay, great. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- pleased to have you --


MR. BRADY: I don't plan on going on for an 


extended period, but I am a lawyer, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we -- we've been duly 


warned. Thank you. 


MR. BRADY: Mr. Chairman, members of the 


committee, I was here last night and heard some 

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of the testimony, and actually I also read much 


of the transcript from last April. And it 


struck me that there has been a huge disconnect 


in what has been going on. One thing I've 


learned in 30 years of -- of practicing law and 


teaching law students and trying cases to 


juries and judges and teaching young lawyers 


and older lawyers in post-doctorate programs is 


that human nature doesn't change much. Most 


people are not impervious to the kind of gut-


wrenching pain and suffering that have -- have 


been presented over the last two days. Whether 


you're a steel worker, a scientist, a lawyer or 


a -- a member of a blue-ribbon government 


panel, you can't be impervious to this kind of 


pain. You'd have to be awfully cold and 


callous and anesthetized to the hu-- human 


condition we've heard about. 


 So how then, given the constraints of your 


abilities under the law and your charge as 


members of this Board, how can you help? Well, 


what I'd like to do is very, very briefly talk 


to you about a client of mine, who many of you 


know and have heard from, and that is [Name 


Redacted]. [Name Redacted] is a -- is a very
 
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special person. Now I know that this is 


anecdotal and you've heard tons of anecdotes 


the last few days. And many of you are 


scientists, and I've worked with scientists 


before, and experts, and I know that anecdotal 


evidence is only indicative of that one 


person's case. But I think [Name Redacted],
 

case is very, very illustrative of many of the 


cases here, and I'd like to take a few minutes 


to talk to you about it. [Name Redacted], came
 

to me seven months ago. He had been denied 


three times in various petitions that he had 


submitted under the EEOICPA, and he was a very 


frustrated person because he had now just been 


diagnosed with a second primary cancer. His 


first primary was a glioblastoma multiform, an 


extremely deadly form of brain cancer. The 


reason I say [Name Redacted], a very special 


person is because [Name Redacted], is still 


alive. He's lived four and a half, almost five 


years now from his diagnosis in June of 2002. 


But unfortunately, he now had been diagnosed 


with a second primary, a myelodysplasia 


syndrome, which is a form of bone marrow 


cancer. And he was very frustrated. 

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 [Name Redacted] has degrees from Ohio State 


University, both a bachelor of science and a 


master's degree in nuclear engineering, and is 


a very smart guy, and I had a lot of respect 


for him. He was 42 years old at the time of 


his diagnosis, way outside the profile for this 


particular condition. [Name Redacted] and his
 

wife, who is also an engineer, had been trying 


desperately to get the government's attention. 


I brought a banker's box over there of 


materials that I've accumulated in the last 


seven months on this case. [Name Redacted], has 


three others of those, documents that he had 


submitted over time. His first petition was 


filed in September of 2002, over four and a 


half years ago. The process has gone on 


interminably. 


Well, I looked at his case. I talked with his 


oncologist. We talked with an expert over at 


the University of Colorado Health Sciences 


Center, Dr. Jim Ruttenber, and they were as 


perplexed as I was as to why [Name Redacted] 


claims had been denied. 


We talked to him about his work. [Name 


Redacted] had spent 16 years at Savannah River 

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as a project engineer, manufacturing plutonium 


triggers; another six years doing the same work 


at Rocky Flats, and another six months doing 


similar work at Fernald. He left Rocky Flats 


in June of 2000. And what was curious to me 


was when I looked at some of the site exposure 


matrices, I found that [Name Redacted] was
 

listed as still being employed at Rocky Flats 


in the fall of 2003. He'd left in June of 


2000. He was diagnosed with the glioblastoma 


multiform brain cancer in June of 2002, and 


they still had him at Rocky Flats working there 


some -- more than a year later. 


So we started taking a look at some of the 


other records, and we found that there were 


numerous calculation errors, mathematical 


errors, based upon the doses to which he had 


been exposed. In addition to that, there had 


been chemicals which had never been factored 


into his dose reconstruction process, chemical 


exposure -- not just radiation. 


 [Name Redacted] had had significant amount of 


neutron radiation and described to me how he 


used to wear a bellybutton dosimeter under two 


layers of protective equipment, and that very 

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often he would stick his head into an area 


where there was plutonium and have to work with 


it, yet there would be no reading on the 


dosimeter. This whole issue of neutron 


radiation and some of the issues that were 


raised in the petition today by Jennifer, the 


areas that she had raised, we raised in [Name
 

Redacted] case. We got into the whole issue of
 

high-fired oxides and the inaccuracies of 


bioassays. We further studied plutonium, a 


number of other issues that have been raised by 


the committee in their questions to Dr. Ulsh 


earlier, as well as by Dr. Ruttenber raised -- 


who raised them to us. 


Well, we got a hearing in front of the 


Department of Labor Final Adjudication Board, 


and I had [Name Redacted], the oncologist, 


testify. He stated that he'd only had one 


other case that he treated of a glioblastoma 


multiform, and that was an individual who had 


worked at Rocky Flats, and [Name Redacted], -­

two cases. [Name Redacted] has been practicing 


oncology in the Denver metro ar-- metropolitan 


area for over 20 years. He was amazed that 


[Name Redacted] had been denied, and basically 

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said to me you can't look at an elephant and 


keep calling it a zebra. That's what they're 


doing. It is absolutely clear that this man's 


cancer, at 42 years of age, outside of every 


profile, is absolutely caused by his chemical 


and radiation exposure. But the chemical 


exposure had never ever been considered in the 


dose reconstruction process. 


So we went forward. We presented the evidence. 


And about a month ago we got a decision. And 


the decision is very, very instructive because 


of the findings that were made in [Name 


Redacted] case. And I'd like to read just a
 

short portion of that decision to you. 


(Reading) The Final Adjudication Board reviewed 


your case and the new statement of accepted 


facts was written based upon the extensive 


research of toxicants you presented as having 


been exposed to during your employment. The 


toxic substances you identified were researched 


through other site exposure matrices not 


previously available, a repository of 


information related to toxic substances 


potentially present at covered DOE sites. It 


has now been accepted that you were exposed to 

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the following toxicants while employed: 


plutonium nitrate and chloride solutions, 


plutonium oxide, plutonium oxalate, plutonium 


fluorides, plutonium dibutylphosphate, uranium 


oxides, neptunium oxides, acids such as 


hydrofluoric, sulfonic, oxalic, ascorbic, 


nitrous and hydrozene, sodium 


tetraphenylborate, volatile organic -- organic 


compounds and organic solvents such as TCE, 


carbon tetrachloride, MEK, PCBs, mercury, heavy 


metals such as lead, chromium and cadmium, 


thorium, ferrous sulfumate and aluminum nitrate 


nonhydrate -- nonahydrate. None of that had 


been considered previously. 


Based on this new information, the case was 


then referred to a new district medical 


consultant, different from the prior district 


medical consultants who had denied [Name 


Redacted] previous petitions. The new district 


medical consultant, who this time was a doctor 


skilled in occupational medicine and not the 


cardiologist who had previously denied [Name 


Redacted] claim -- a cardiologist who, by the 


way, stated that he spent three hours 


reviewing[Name Redacted] case and consulted 

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WebMD in order to research his condition. The 


new district medical consultant stated the 


development of cancer is a multi-stage process 


which can best be understood as involving -- 


promoting malignant conversion and tumor 


progression. In general, carcinogen-related 


cellular DNA damage that is not reversible is 


term initiation. The process of promotion 


occurs when DNA-damaged cells begin to 


replicate. Known chemical promoters include 


many of the toxicants to which [Name Redacted],
 

was exposed, and are capable of promoting the 


initiated cells. Some of the toxicants to 


which [Name Redacted] has been accepted as 


having been exposed to are suspected human 


carcinogens, and he cites a whole list of them. 


In summary, although the literature and 


epidemiological basis of evidence is non-


confirmatory of an occupational toxicant 


exposure etiologic basis of brain cancer, there 


is insufficient evidence to suggest any 


alternative causal etiology. An assessment of 


the medical evidence and all potential causal 


factors for brain cancer suggest that it is at 


least as likely as not that the occupational 

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toxicant exposures at Savannah River were a 


significant factor in contributing to [Name 


Redacted] cancers.
 

Now, I don't know how many other folks here 


have submitted petitions and have received the 


same treatment that [Name Redacted] received the 


first three times. I suspect that there are 


quite a few. 


I listened to Dr. Ulsh's answers today. They 


troubled me. The scientific process permits 


reasonable assumptions giving the applicant, as 


the law requires, the benefit of the doubt so 


long as there is a modicum of evidence, a 


modicum of competent evidence upon which to 


base those reasonable assumptions. But when 


there is no longer a residuum of competence 


evidence, confounding factors are too great to 


overcome. The science of risk assessment and 


causation conclusions based upon that science 


is reduced to little more than junk science 


when you rely upon irrelevant, irrational, 


incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable evidence. 


The operative -- the operative -- the operative 


phrase I think these days, in the words of my 


kids, is garbage in/garbage out. 

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There's a wall of human suffering out here, and 


they deserve better treatment than they've been 


given. When Rocky Flats contractors provide 


evidence that is incomplete, inaccurate and 


unreliable, the logical result mandates 


approval of the Special Exposure Cohort. These 


people from whom you've heard do not have, as 


[Name Redacted] apparently has had, the luxury 


of time. Time is a commodity many of these 


folks cannot afford. 


 [Name Redacted] case took four and a half years. 


Fortunately, thank God, he's still with us. 


But other people are dying, and their families 


-- as you know -- are being left economically, 


as well as emotionally, devastated. 


You can end that suffering today. Please, by 


the grace of God, approve the petition. Thank 


you. 


MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Bill. I would now 


like to ask Michelle to come up. You heard 


from Michelle last night, but she'd like to add 


one additional comment on -- on behalf of her 


family. 


 MS. DOBROVOLNY: Good morning, panel. Thank 


you for taking the time. I actually didn't get 

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a chance to speak last night, but that's okay. 


I believe there's just been so much said here 


that it doesn't need to be repeated, but I just 


want to give you a very quick synopsis of my 


situation. 


My name is Michelle Dobrovolny. I'm 42 years 


of age. I am also sick. I have been denied 


six times. I don't know if I'll have the 


luxury of a seventh. I have watched many of my 


family members -- whom all worked out at Rocky 


Flats -- die, one right after another, of 


cancer -- hideous cancers. It's a very sad and 


difficult situation. [identifying information 


redacted] is sick with berylliosis. He, too, 


will succumb to death. 


As I stand here before you, I don't really need 


to go into a lot of detail because I think many 


have covered everything that needs to be 


covered. But as you make this decision for our 


lives and the compensation that could help some 


of us, I want you to remember that you are 


going to affect those that have died, those 


that are in the process of dying, and those 


that are in the future that may face the same 


consequences that we have. Please also keep in 

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mind that sometimes calculations of the 


smartest people don't apply to this. It's 


simple common sense. 


Your cause to action would be to vote yes for 


us. When we left that plant site and ended 


with the chemicals that we worked with, that's 


when your job really began. We gave 100 


percent of our time, our effort and our lives 


in dedication to doing what we needed to do to 


support our country. It's time that you give 


100 percent back to us as employees. I speak 


on behalf of -- this is a family. We're not 


individuals. We are a Rocky Flats family, and 


we deserve the very most integrity, the same 


integrity that we gave our job when we showed 


up every day at plant site. Thank you very 


much. 


MS. THOMPSON: We have one additional gentleman 


who wasn't able to come last night. Mark 


Danhauer has a brief comment that he would like 


to give, and I appreciate your indulgence on 


this matter. Thank you. 


MR. DANHAUER: Good morning. I started working 


out at Rocky Flats in -- I think it was 


beginning of '02. I worked out there a year, 

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and I started working in G mod and about two 


months later I was going into kidney failure 


and I found out that I had stage three large B-


cell non-Hodgkin's lymphoma that was from my 


chest to my pelvic area. They gave me about a 


25, 30 percent chance to survive as I've been 


in remission now for three and a half years 


now, thank God. 


I'm 41 years old and I'm totally disabled. I 


can't work. I have so much chronic pain that 


they can't even figure out what to give me 


anymore. They've tried the -- you know, the 


morphine, the fentanyl patch, which I have on 


right now, and the methadone and I take 19 and 


a half pills a day. And I look like I'm in 


pretty good shape, look like I can work. I 


mean I worked construction for 20 years. But 


at the end of the -- probably right around the 


middle of the day, I have a hard time climbing 


ten stairs to go up to my bedroom. It -- I --


I can't even begin to explain or make you 


understand, unless you are a cancer patient and 


have gone through the intense chemo, you know, 


that I've been through and I know some of the 


people here have been through. It is the most 

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humiliating and degrading and painful thing 


I've ever gone through in my entire life, and I 


went through that for eight months, and I 


continue to go through it. 


Just because I'm in remission for three and a 


half years doesn't mean that I have no more 


pain. I just went in for a checkup a couple of 


weeks ago, and they found a spot on my lung. 


I'm going to keep an eye on it. It's not 


really -- I'm not too concerned about it yet, 


but it's still a big concern for me and my 


family and [identifying information redacted] 


and -- I'm not going to sit here and try to beg 


you guys to -- to pass this bill, but the 


monetary and the health insurance -- I think 


the health insurance is more important than the 


money, even though I've been financially 


devastated from this. I've gone through the 


bankruptcy 'cause of the medical bills, 


everything. 


It's just the peace of mind I think for having 


the health insurance and not having to worry 


about that because right now it costs me 


probably -- I'm filing for Social Security 


disability. You know how that works. I'll 

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probably never get it, or if I do, it'll be 


four or five years down the road. 


I -- I have no income. [identifying 


information redacted] supports me. I'm 


supposed to be the man of the house. Instead, 


I'm at home, doing little chores here and 


there, trying to get through the day. It's not 


the way it's supposed to be. I guess sometimes 


I don't feel like a man 'cause I can't take 


care of my family, and that sucks. 


And I know I'm one of the younger ones to have 


this type of problem, but I'll always have it, 


and I know I'll never be able to work again. 


was 37 years old when I got sick. I almost 


needed a kidney transplant, you know, all kinds 


-- by the grace of God, I made it through it, 


but the aftereffects are just inexplainable -- 


unexplainable. You can't even begin to 


understand it unless you've been there. 


And I'm not going to sit here and try to 


convince you to pass this bill or, you know -- 


I'm kind of at a loss for words. I'm a little 


nervous, little upset. I just hope that you 


guys take the time to realize this affects so 


many people, down to my grandkids, down to my 


I 
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step-grandkids. They're -- they're still my 


babies. I can't even play with them. So take 


all that into consideration, that that just 


doesn't affect us. It affects everybody, our 


whole family, the kids. So -- I've been up 


here long enough and made a fool of myself, so 


-- but thank you for your time. 


MS. THOMPSON: I want to thank the Board for 


all the time that you've given us, and it's for 


people like that that we've applied for Special 


Exposure Cohort, 'cause we really believe that 


people like Mark should not have to fight for 


compensation at the time they're fighting for 


their lives. I ask you to please consider the 


law -- again, ignore the politics -- to look 


into your heart and to do the right thing. It 


was never the intent of this program that it 


should go on this long. It was never the 


intent of this program that the petitioners' 


findings would result in all these changes and 


then the petition would be denied based on 


that. And don't get me wrong. We're really 


glad that our petition has been the impetus for 


better science and for a better model and for 


all those things. But what we're saying is 

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that the models are unproven. You still can't 


accurately reconstruct dose. I'm asking you to 


look at the fact that someday is simply not 


good enough, that accuracy and feasibility 


means today, and I ask that you please today 


approve our petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Jennifer, and 


other folks from the petitioning group. We do 


want to hear from the -- the Congressional 


delegation, but I think it would be appropriate 


that we -- we take our break first, so let's 


take a 15-minute break. Try to be back here 


promptly about 25 of, and then we'll have an 


opportunity to hear from a number of the 


members of the Congressional delegation. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:23 a.m. 


to 10:45 a.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have a number of individuals 


from the Congr-- Colorado Congressional 


delegation that are going to provide some 


remarks for the record. We'll begin with 


Jeanette Alberg, who is on the staff of Senator 


Wayne Allard. Jeanette, we'd be pleased to 


hear from you at this time. 


 MS. ALBERG: Thank you. It is a pleasure to be 

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here today to speak on behalf of U.S. Senator 


Wayne Allard. David Hiller with Senator 


Salazar's office and I will be reading a letter 


from the Colorado Congressional delegation. 


Before we read the letter I did want to preface 


the letter with a couple of comments, basically 


echoing Senator Salazar's earlier comments. 


It's important to note that this letter has 


bipartisan support. All nine members of the 


Colorado Congressional delegation have signed 


onto this letter in support of the Rocky Flats 


Special Exposure Cohort petition, so thank you 


for your fair consideration of that. 


I mentioned the bipartisan aspect because 


today's decision, the decision that you're 


faced with, is not about politics. It's about 


making the right decision and making -- being 


fair to the people at Rocky Flats. So thank 


you for your fair consideration of these 


comments. 


(Reading) Dear Dr. Ziemer, Dr. Wade and members 


of the Advisory Board: As members of the 


Colorado Congressional delegation, we write to 


you again in support of the Special Exposure 


Cohort petition of the former Rocky Flats 

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workers. The men and women who served at the 


Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant throughout 


the Cold War are national heroes. Many in the 


Rocky Flats workforce knowingly and unknowingly 


risked their lives to help protect our country. 


They deserve to be honored and cared for by the 


nation they served. 


The intent of Congress in passing the Energy 


Employee Occupational Illness Compensation 


Program Act was to ensure that the men and 


women who put themselves in harm's way by 


working at Rocky Flats and other nuclear 


production facilities had a clear and just 


process for applying for appropriate financial 


and medical benefits and compensation under the 


law and authorized by Congress. By law, Cold 


War veterans who became ill from exposure to 


radiation, beryllium and silica while working 


at DOE facilities were to be provided timely, 


uniform and adequate compensation. 


As you know, the administration of the EEOICPA 


program has not been without controversy. 


Tragically, administrative waste and 


programmatic difficulties have delayed the 


payment of program benefits author-- authorized 

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by Congress. Numerous reports have accused the 


Department of Energy and the Department of 


Labor of mismanaging the Energy Employee 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program, and 


delaying and wrongfully denying benefits due to 


Rocky Flats and other nuclear workers. Agency 


documents suggest that the Department of Labor 


delayed and denied such benefits as a result of 


conscious administrative policies. 


In a few instances, NIOSH, too, has contributed 


to some delays and denials by insisting that it 


can reconstruct workers' radiation doses in the 


absence of adequate data, spurring public 


skepticism. While NIOSH has worked with the 


Board's contractor to develop alternative 


methodologies, the resulting changes in 


methodology have led to long delays in the 


demon-- in the determination of claims. In 


these instances, NIOSH's defense of its 


methodologies in the face of legitimate and 


documented criticism has frustrated the 


Congressional intent to provide timely benefits 


and has raised questions regarding the fairness 


of the EEOICPA program. 


 The Advisory Board, too, has been dragged into 

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this sorry history, through no fault of your 


own, with the disclosure of communications 


between the Office of Management and Budget and 


the Department of Labor. These communications 


suggest a deliberate effort to -- by some to 


reduce compensation to nuclear energy workers 


by stacking the Board with opponents of 


compensation who would vote against Special 


Exposure Cohort petitions. 


The history of Rocky Flats offers its own 


examples of misconduct and mismanagement, from 


inadequate monitoring of workers, efforts to 


disguise the absence of data or the intentional 


destruction of monitoring data, disastrous 


fires, and even a raid by the Federal Bureau of 


Investigation to seize and protect records. 


Many Rocky Flats workers who helped clean up 


the extremely toxic contamination from fires at 


the plant have been denied benefits for 


illnesses, even as a federal judge has 


determined that neighboring landowners are 


entitled to compensation for financial losses 


due to contamination of their properties from 


these very same fires. 


As a result of this long history, many Rocky 

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Flats workers and their families wonder if 


their government has abandoned them. These 


workers, the people of Colorado and their 


elected officials are justifiably upset by the 


conduct of the responsible agencies. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And we'll hear from David Hiller 


from Senator -- oh, from Senator Salazar's 


staff. Thank you. 


 MR. HILLER: Let me conclude the -- the 


delegation letter that Jeanette began. 


(Reading) We remind you of this unfortunate 


history because you do not write on a blank 


slate. Instead, the Board's actions over the 


coming days will be viewed by the people of 


Colorado and the nation with these sad facts in 


mind. 


On February 15, 2005, the United Steel Workers 


of America, Local 8031, filed a petition to 


have its members who worked at Rocky Flats 


included in the Special Cohort -- Special 


Exposure Cohort under the Energy Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act. 


Much has changed since the petition was filed. 


The cleanup at Rocky Flats has been completed, 


all of the workers have been laid off, and the 

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Steel Workers Local 8031 no longer counts a 


single former Rocky Flats worker among its 


current membership. As a result, Local 8031 is 


a representative of the petitioners in name 


only. The Steel Workers provide no financial, 


technical or legal support to the petitioners. 


It is also worth noting that NIOSH elected to 


expand the class of workers subject to the 


petition far beyond the class of workers who 


were formerly represented by the Steel Workers. 


By NIOSH's action, the class of workers subject 


to this petition now includes all employees of 


DOE, DOE contractors or subcontractors who have 


worked at the Rocky Flats plant from April, 


1942 through February, 2005. 


Approval of the pending petition and membership 


in the cohort would not guarantee benefits to 


this broad class of workers, but it would make 


it easier to obtain benefits for workers with 


the kinds of cancer known to be caused by 


radiation. NIOSH has opposed this petition, as 


it has opposed other petitions, claiming to 


have adequate data and methodologies to 


calculate the exposures of Rocky Flats workers. 


However, the Advisory Board's contractor, 

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Sanford Cohen & Associates, has documented 


areas of inadequate data and unreliable 


methodologies. 


 Two years after the filing of this petition and 


more than six years after of the Act, NIOSH's 


methods and dose reconstructions of Rocky Flats 


workers remains subject to substantial doubt. 


The Advisory Board is now tasked with making a 


recommendation as to whether or not it is 


feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy 


the radiation dose that members of the Rocky 


Flats SEC petitioning class received. NIOSH, 


Sanford Cohen & Associates and the Advisory 


Board's Rocky Flats workgroup have debated this 


issue for nearly 18 months. Congress did not 


intend to create an endless program that would 


re-evaluate constantly-evolving sets of data 


with ever-changing methodologies. To the 


contrary, the Act expressly states that the 


purpose of the compensation program is to 


provide for timely, uniform and adequate 


compensation. 


We are long past the point of timeliness in 


compensating the Rocky Flats workers. Many of 


these Cold War veterans have already died, and 

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many of their surviving families continue to 


struggle economically due to lost income and 


unpaid medical bills. Many more are ill and 


continue to suffer, medically and economically. 


Granting Special Exposure Cohort status to 


these workers will not resolve all of the 


injustices that have been inflicted upon them, 


but it will allow some of these workers and 


their survivors to receive benefits while it 


can still provide meaningful relief. Many seek 


only the comfort of knowing that their 


survivors will be taken care of. 


We therefore urge the Advisory Board to act 


promptly on the Rocky Flats SEC petition 


request, while keeping in mind that there are 


documented concerns regarding NIOSH's ability 


to accurately reconstruct doses for all class 


participants, and that it is far too late to 


further postpone a decision with the hope that 


accurate doses can yet be calculated. Thank 


you in advance for your full, fair and prompt 


consideration of this petition. 


Signed by all nine members of the Colorado 


delegation: Senator Salazar, Senator Allard, 


Representative Diane DeGette, Representative 

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Doug Lamborn, Representative Marilyn Musgrave, 


Representative Ed Perlmutter, Representative 


John Salazar, Representative Tom Tancredo, 


Representative Mark Udall. 


And I would now like to introduce Carolyn 


Boller, representative of Congressman Udall. 


 MS. BOLLER: I just want to thank you all for 


the work that you've put into this. I think 


I've rewritten my comments at least 45 times in 


the last 24 hours. 


I just want to say that I've had the honor of 


working with the Rocky Flats workforce for 15 


out of the last 20 years. I worked for 


Congressman David Scaggs prior to Congressman 


Udall, and over that period of time I've heard 


those stories. I've heard them from the 


Department of Energy. I've heard them from the 


plant site managers who bo-- and the workforce, 


who all tell me we don't have records. 


As of January I had a conversation with the 


Kaiser-Hill representative who said I don't 


understand why this petition can't be granted. 


We don't have records that support the ability 


to do accurate dose reconstruction. 


So what I'd say to you is grant this full 

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petition. Let's move on, let's get these folks 


the help that they need, the security that they 


need, and the recognition. And I appreciate 


your consideration. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. And also we have Jason 


Thielman representing Representative Musgrave's 


office. 


MR. THIELMAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the 


Advisory Board, thank you for giving us an 


opportunity to address you today. Behalf of 


Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave and the scores 


of residents from the Colorado Fourth 


Congressional District, I request that you make 


a recommendation for the special SEC status. 


In my preparation for visiting with you this 


morning I visited with the Congresswoman, and 


she reminded me that for years the workers of 


Rocky Flats have put their health on the line 


for the security of our nation, and that they 


should not be given the runaround by the 


federal government when Congress has made it 


clear that they should be given indemnity for 


prolonged exposure to radiation. Yesterday in 


listening to the testimony from the many 


impacted workers, I was particularly struck by 

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a comment from Laura Schultz describing the 


service of the workers of Rocky Flats as 


invisible Cold Warriors. She and many others 


also additionally mentioned that they felt they 


could no longer believe anything their 


government says. 


Many of us here work for the government and 


believe in public service. And probably what 


is most disturbing to me is something that we 


believe in passionately and work for has been 


so undermined in the face and the hearts of 


people who have committed so much to their 


country. These folks are invisible and have 


been treated as they are invisible. And we 


cannot correct the wrongs that have been done 


to them, but we do have an opportunity to set 


it right. And I urge this committee to do so. 


You probably have it within your ability to 


address the form of the law and allow you to 


not grant the status. However, the substance 


of the law, I believe, demands that we treat 


these pe-- these people and their family with 


the respect that they deserve for the 


commitment and dedication they have given this 


country. Thank you. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: And then we're pleased to hear 


from Bill Holer, who represents Representative 


Perlmutter's office. 


MR. HOLER: Thank you, Dr. Zimmer (sic), 


members of the working group, it's an honor to 


be here today and I've had the opportunity, 


though have not been involved with the working 


group as long as some of the -- my other 


colleagues here, but I participated in several 


of the meetings and am very, very impressed 


with the quality and the professionalism that ­

- that's entailed in this group. 


 Congressman Perlmutter has signed the Colorado 


Congressional delegation letter and is in full 


support of its recommendations to approve fully 


and completely the Special Exposure Cohort 


petition to grant relief to the Rocky Flats 


workers. Congressman Perlmutter, since taking 


office, has worked closely with several Rocky 


Flats workers who are seeking relief under the 


provisions of the EEOICP Act, and working with 


those individuals to hear their personal 


stories, their problems and their frustration 


over lack of timely and -- and decisions in the 


matter have -- have certainly made Congressman 

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Perlmutter and myself aware that these delays 


have gone on too long. 


As has been demonstrated by the independent 


evaluation by Stanford (sic) Cohen & 


Associates, many of the NIOSH evaluation 


procedures, methodologies, the missing data, 


and in some cases by, quote, an order of 


magnitude in inaccurate measurements of 


estimated exposure data when tested against 


known data. In other words, in spite of all 


the work, when tested, the evaluations and 


exposure levels can vary in -- in significant 


numbers, and I think that points to the fact 


that -- that we don't have an accurate picture. 


And it's time to stop -- to stop doing the 


evaluations and it's time to really move 


forward and -- and -- and take care of this 


class of worker that deserves it so much. 


 Accordingly, Congressman Perlmutter urges that 


this working group grant the SE (sic) petition 


today. Thank you very much. 


 MR. HILLER: Dr. Ziemer, let me also introduce 


my colleague on Senator Salazar's staff, Erin 


Minks, who many of you know because she has 


been doing a great deal of direct constituent 

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work with members of the Rocky Flats community. 


Erin Minks. 


MS. MINKS: Thank you, David, and my colleagues 


here and members of the Board, I didn't know if 


I wanted to speak this morning because 


generally when your -- your boss speaks, you 


don't always need to follow. It's kind of a 


tough act to follow. But this does have a 


personal meaning for me so I guess this morning 


I speak on behalf of other Congressional aides 


who are tasked with working with their 


constituents during these process, and I wanted 


to, first and foremost, thank the Board and the 


working group members for -- for allowing and ­

- and working with us as we try to participate 


and understand this process to interpret to the 


folks here in the audience. 


 We understand, regardless of how adversarial 


this can become, that ultimate this is a huge 


sacrifice of your personal time, and we really 


respect the work that you do and really 


appreciate that. But generally, as -- as 


having worked with a lot of the folks in the 


audience on individual cases, I will say, as a 


caseworker, that there are many different 

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layers to the story of the site. There are 


many different chapters. There are different 


patterns of monitoring. And this program 


itself fundamentally, based on the scientific 


evaluations, needs to have that affirmation to 


go forward to substantiate what we're talking 


about today. 


 However, I speak for not just me but other 


folks here in the audience and other 


Congressional aides, that when it comes to 


explaining how zeroes after the '69 fire are 


not reconciled, and yet folks who have cancer 


from those years still don't go over 50 percent 


in their POC. That's -- as a policy-maker and 


as an aide and as someone trying to interpret 


and represent their interests, that is a 


challenge which I imagine we may continue to 


have to work with. 


And so once again, we appreciate your work and 


we ask that you continue to work with us as we 


interpret your decisions. But it's -- it's 


been an interesting road and we just generally 


-- there is no easy answer to this process and 


we understand that, so thank you again for 


letting me speak today. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: We thank all the representatives 


of the Congressional delegation who are here, 


and I suppose just on a personal note, you 


know, sometimes it's pleasing to see that there 


are things that we can get bipartisan support 


on now and then. 


Now, we're going to hear from our workgroup 


chairman. While he's getting ready there, let 


me point out and maybe share with you a moment 


one of the sort of struggles this Advisory 


Board has, because what you see here at Rocky 


Flats is multiplied over the country -- at 


Hanford, at Savannah River, at Oak Ridge Y-12 ­

- the same kind of issues. And we are 


struggling, this group of 12 people, to address 


these same kinds of issues all over the 


country, as -- as is NIOSH and as is our Board 


contractor. And -- and indeed, a lot of time 


and energy has been put in, particularly by 


this workgroup, the Rocky Flats workgroup, in 


trying to be diligent in saying what is there, 


what -- what do we have in the way of 


information, because we are obligated by law to 


look at that. We -- we are also obligated to 


consider the issue of timeliness, and we 

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struggle with that, too, realizing that the 


timeliness issue is countrywide and we're 


trying to deal with multiple sites almost 


simultaneously and try to handle that issue of 


timeliness. 


But be that as it may, one of our sort of 


required responsibilities is in fact to look at 


the NIOSH evaluation report. We have help from 


our contractor to do that so that we get 


basically an independent look at it. Recognize 


that we have a mix of individuals on this 


Board. We're not all technical people -- some 


are, some are not. But we -- we rely on 


outside help, too, to get an independent look. 


Now whenever you do that, obviously not 


everybody will see things the same way, and 


then we face the issue of sorting out NIOSH's 


view, our contractor's view, our individual 


views, the viewpoints of the constituents, so 


all of these -- all of these aspects are here 


before us. 


So we want to hear from our workgroup that has 


looked very hard at the NIOSH evaluation 


report. They've worked with our contractor 


very closely in trying to evaluate what data we 

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have here at this site, its validity, its -- 


its extent in terms of missing or adequacy, 


missing data or adequacy of data, its 


reliability -- all those issues, we're 


obligated to do that under law. We -- we 


recognize that this has taken time, and that 


timeliness issue comes upon us as a -- in some 


cases, an overriding issue because we recognize 


that this kind of process, particularly for 


scientists, they just love to study things, you 


know, and keep studying things. But we realize 


at some point you have to make a decision, and 


-- and that point is upon us. 


Now we -- we have a working group that's really 


been a hardworking group. Mark Griffon's been 


chairing it. Mark, introduce the members of 


the workgroup for the folks here, and then give 


us your report and then we'll have a discussion 


period. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Yeah, the workgroup is 


myself and Wanda Munn, Bob Presley and Mike 


Gibson. And I -- I have a few slides which 


you're -- are going to help me advance here. 


-- I have so many notes I could-- I didn't want 


to stand at the podium, but I think everyone 


I 
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should be able to hear me from here. 


It -- the -- you can go to the first slide, I 


guess. 


I think one of the -- one key point here is -- 


is, you know, just to reinforce, for those of 


you who weren't involved in all of our 


workgroup meetings, we -- we did have -- I 


think we say 12 -- down there 12 workgroup 


meetings, 19 conference calls, some of those 


technical calls were in between workgroup 


meetings. We did keep minutes for all those 


conference calls, so you know, to -- to say we 


-- I -- I -- I think I agree with NIOSH on this 


that, to the extent we could, we certainly 


looked at -- at everything and we -- you know, 


we -- we dug into these issues as -- as 


completely as we could, for sure. I think 


everybody's effort was commen-- you know, to be 


commended in that regard. SC&A certainly put 


an extensive amount of work to support the 


Board in this effort, and -- and all the work ­

- all the information provided by the 


petitioners and their -- their attendance on 


the conference calls, as well as Congressional 


staffers attended several of our workgroup 

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meetings via conference call, so it was a -- a 


lengthy process and a lot of issues were -- 


were certainly considered. 


For those of you who were not involved so 


closely in the workgroup, through the course of 


the workgroup we had a -- a -- a matrix that we 


developed, and I probably have nine iterations 


of this matrix. I believe the final one is in 


the back -- is that -- is that correct? The 


final one, dated April 30th, should be 


available in the back with the materials. It's 


not? I'm seeing -- do we have that available, 


Lew? 


 DR. WADE: I believe it is. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll check on that, but we'll 


make additional copies if they're not there. 


This matrix details -- and I think we have a 


total now of 38 comments, 38 items on the 


matrix, and some of them have sub-items 


actually on them, but this is our detailed way 


of sort of tracking what we were reviewing and 


if it was resolved or not resolved. And as we 


went along, sev-- a lot of -- many of these 


items in the matrix are -- are sort of -- they 


fall into one broader category, so when I 

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present today, I'm going to touch the mean 


broad categories, not necessarily every matrix 


item. But I think this is certainly very 


useful to look at for the -- a little more in-


depth read on what we -- what we went through. 


So I think we'll go to the first slide and some 


of these -- for those of you who have followed 


our workgroup, you'll recognize these issues 


from Brant's introduction, as well as 


Jennifer's presentation. But these are the 


main -- I think there's nine items on this list 


that we covered and I'll -- I'll go -- I'll 


just go through these one by one. They're not 


necessarily in any order, but starting with the 


-- go to the next slide. 


The question of -- of super S and, you know, we 


-- we examined this in the workgroup for -- for 


an extended period of time. It is correct that 


a model was developed during the process of 


this review, finalized during the process of 


this review, and we -- or -- or some of us were 


certainly -- wanted to see further proof that 


actually this was a bounding model, so we asked 


-- and this is -- this was part of our balance 


of -- of how to do our job in the workgroup. 

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You know, we wanted this demonstration that the 


model worked and bounded all workers in the 


class. That -- that's sort of our criteria. 


To do that, we asked for more information, for 


more proof from NIOSH, and that took a little 


lon-- a little more time. 


The proof -- some of the things we asked for 


was the model relied on six cases to develop 


sort of an ov-- overarching approach that would 


be bounding for all workers with regard to 


super S exposures. We knew that there were 


several other workers that could have been 


defined as -- as having a -- a super S exposure 


that could have been considered in developing 


this model, and we asked for all that case data 


so that we could compare to see if -- if, in 


looking at those other cases -- I think there 


were about 25 of those -- if those other cases 


were in fact bounded by the -- the approach 


offered by NIOSH, put forward by NIOSH. And in 


fact at -- at the end of this, and it did take 


an extensive period of time, SC&A did agree 


that the model provided -- this -- this TIB-49, 


which is this new super S model, did bound the 


doses for all worker-- and was claimant 

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favorable for all workers, with regard to this 


super S situation. 


I think we can go to the next one. 


External and internal data completeness. We --


this was -- this was mentioned a little earlier 


this morning, and -- and this sort of came at 


the -- in the -- in the middle to the end of 


our -- our cycle of workgroups. We -- we had 


some questions originally about some of the 


database data and -- and some of the databases 


that are used in this program, had some 


questions about the data that populated the 


data. I think someone earlier said garbage in, 


garbage out. We certainly were -- were -- you 


know, had concerns with that regard. We wanted 


to check the integrity of that data. 


As -- as we evolved in this, we realized that 


at Rocky Flats there's less extensive use of 


coworker models and more extensive use of 


individual radiation files. So then we said 


well, you know, it -- it certainly seems, based 


on some presentations, that most workers had 


some radiation fi-- some radiation records, 


internal and external, but were they complete 


records. So we wanted to see -- you know, when 

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-- when you say a worker has radiation records, 


does that mean one record out of 20 years or 


does that mean, you know, pretty complete for 


all their years of employment. So we did this 


analysis. 


It was 52 case-- cases selected. We did try to 


stratify that a little bit so that we had some 


statistical validity to the analysis. We did 


look at -- at production workers, which would 


have been the -- the likely higher exposures, 


and we did another set -- subset that was a 


randomly-selected set. I won't get too far 


into the details of this, but a -- again, the ­

- and -- and we looked at -- at -- I think we 


also looked at annual gaps. We didn't 


necessarily look at every badge cycle, so you 


know, it wasn't a perfect analysis, but we 


wanted to get a sense of whether these 


individual radiation files were complete. 


And a -- a couple sub-items came out of this 


review. We -- we did note some -- or SC&A's 


report noted some gaps in the early period, 


especially in the early years, for -- related 


to some of the workers. And we also had this 


sort of separate issue that we were tracking 

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independently, but it certainly fell into this 


same range of data completeness, and that was 


with regard to the '69-'70 -- we did find, and 


NIOSH agreed with this, that there were cases 


where there were zeroes in the database, and 


the individual actually had not been -- or 


their dosimeter had not been measured. And --


and we actually tracked back memos that explain 


why this -- when this policy was sort of put 


into place and there was some rationale for it 


based on the -- the risk of exposure. 


Nonetheless, here we are -- are. We had people 


that were not measured and they had zeroes 


ente-- entered into the database. So that was 


troubling. 


NIOSH did agree, through this workgroup 


process, that for '69 and '70 all those zeroes 


would be removed out of the database. And this 


-- this really only affects the -- these 


coworker models that we do. All these coworker 


models are year by year. So if we remove all 


those zeroes, at least we're -- we're biasing 


the average results higher, so any time we have 


to use that coworker model we're going to be a 


little more claimant favorable anyway. So that 

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was the idea, is we can't trust these zeroes. 


NIOSH agreed, let's just get rid of them. 


We did ask -- and I think Jennifer sort of 


alluded to this, we did look at the question -- 


and I know I specifically asked this question ­

- how do we know when this policy stopped or 


when it started. You know, we had this memo we 


were kind of hanging our hat on, or NIOSH was 


hanging their hat on, but we -- we were 


questioning on the workgroup, you know, when 


did this stop or start. We had SC&A look into 


this through this data completeness analysis, 


and we couldn't find any other year where we -- 


we found this practice. So we looked at -- we 


had hard copy records comparing against 


database. We didn't -- we just did not find 


this to be pervasive in any other year, so that 


correction was acceptable at the workgroup 


level. 


 Two other sub-groups came out of that. 


Building 81 -- some of the gaps we found in the 


early records from -- I -- I -- I'm -- I think 


it was the fi-- mainly in the '50s, I don't 


think it extended into the '60s, involved some 


individuals that worked in Building 81 or -- or 

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some -- some of the uranium buildings, and they 


did not have any monitoring rec-- any external 


monitoring records. And at this point we -- 


we've had a presentation for -- sa-- and NIOSH 


-- NIOSH agrees to this point. They -- they do 


say, however, that the -- they've looked at 


their coworker model that they have and -- and 


given what they know about the processes, 


they've made a strong argument to the workgroup 


that the -- the -- they would apply the 95th 


percentile for all those years. Probably from 


'52 up to '60 they'd apply the 95th percentile. 


In other words, some of the highest doses -- 


external doses found on site would be applied 


to those individuals, and they made a -- a 


compelling case to the workgroup that that 


would be a bounding approach for that -- for 


those uranium workers in -- in -- I think it's 


just Building 81. I might -- there might be 


related buildings there. 


Now that -- I -- I should also point out that ­

- that we -- we -- we had compelling evidence. 


We didn't necessarily see a -- a -- I don't 


think that, at that stage of the game, we had a 


-- a sort of demonstration case on the table 

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for that. 


Okay, I think -- oh, one more thing on data 


completeness. Another issue related to sort of 


the Building 81 issue was -- Building 44 came 


up in the discussions and we had a similar 


question as to whether they had data that could 


bound penetrating and non-penetrating doses for 


Building 44. And actually through the 


workgroup process, they identi-- they -- they 


brought out raw film badge records that 


supported their -- their case that they could 


in fact bound those individuals. They -- they 


-- that -- that particular building had some 


fairly significant skin doses in -- especially 


in those early years, but they did -- through 


this process we -- they made available the -- 


the hard-copy records of film badge data for 


those workers and, you know, it -- it was 


compelling to the workgroup that they could 


bound all doses for those workers in that 


building. 


Okay. The neutron data for 1952 through 1970, 


this is the NDRP -- Neutron Data -- Neutron 


Dose Reconstruction Project doses. I -- I know 


it's come up earlier. You -- you can note by 

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the timing of that bottom report, SC&A 


submitted a supplemental -- April 30th, so I -- 


I don't even know if this is posted on the web 


site at this point, but it certainly -- this 


has been the last sort of sprint to Denver for 


us. We've had, you know, two workgroups and 


probably four technical phone calls in the last 


couple of weeks working through this issue, and 


-- and it -- it -- we had this on our -- on our 


matrix early on. It's just that as we -- some 


of the issues didn't sort of come to the 


surface until later in -- in the -- in the 


process, and we do have some issues and 


specifically the lack of records in the early 


period requires some back-extrapolation for one 


time period. And then throughout that whole 


time period there's a reliance on -- in the 


NDRP what they call notional dose, which is 


basically an -- an estimated dose. It's not a 


-- an individual's film badge measurement. 


It's -- it's a -- it's a -- an estimate based 


on a neutron-to-photon ratio, so a lot of these 


people had badges with gamma measurements, but 


they didn't have a neutron badge. So this NDRP 


project tried -- attempted to calculate 

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neutron-to-photon ratios that could be applied, 


and they calculated these notional doses and 


these were added into the individuals' dose 


records. But certainly they're not -- they're 


not original film measurements. They're --


they're -- they're estimates. And -- and I -- 


we -- we'll go more into the neutron thing at 


the end of -- get through the rest of these and 


then we have -- I have a little more to say on 


the neutron question, so... 


 The data reliability question, one -- one slide 


does not do this service for what we went 


through for looking at data reliability, or for 


what the petitioners provided in terms of 


affidavits and testimony, even as of last night 


and -- and this morning. Your petition that 


was put before us provides a -- a wealth of -- 


of information that we -- we did, in the 


workgroup level, attempt -- and I think we 


captured all of them -- attempted to go through 


the petition and include those all in our 


matrix and cover all those issues. Many of 


those fall into the broad category of data 


reliability, and that -- so when you see the 


matrix, there's items -- I think 12 through 27 

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or so -- a lot of those are the specific issues 


brought out in the petition regarding data 


reliability. And -- and we -- in -- in looking 


at this, we looked at several different 


components, but we -- we -- we did want to look 


at -- we had database data, and you know, my -- 


my inkling with -- as -- as a member of this 


Board for the entire time, as most of my 


colleagues know by now, is -- you know, I tend 


to -- if you have an electronic database, 


that's fine, but show me the raw data and I 


want to validate that electronic data to make 


sure that everything's -- everything's kosher 


within that database, and that was part of the 


effort. 


 And then additionally we looked at the raw 


records -- and these would be logbooks, 


urinalysis logs, a number of different things 


that we looked at -- and we compared them to 


individuals' radiation files to see -- you 


know, okay, did this information get into the 


individuals' files correctly. We also looked 


at -- at safety logs, as another just check. 


So we looked at a number of different kind of 


logbooks to check this data reliability 

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analysis. 


 Generally speaking, what -- I -- I guess what 


we -- we -- the bottom line on this is that we 


didn't really see any systemic problems with 


data reliability. But we did see some 


discrepancies, and that doesn't -- that doesn't 


mean that, you know, some of the allegations 


that are made are not correct. We -- we --


SC&A's report does note some discrepancies when 


-- when looking at some of the issues raised by 


the petitioner. But in general, in looking it 


as a -- an overall question of do we see this 


as a broad issue for the entire class and does 


it impact, you know, the ability to be able to 


reconstruct doses for all members of the class, 


we didn't see a systemic problem, so... 


I think I'm ready for the next one. 


The -- other radionuclides, we -- we also spent 


a -- a -- quite a bit of time on this. At --


at the end we got down to -- some of the 


significant ones we discussed were americium 


operations. We also discussed neptunium, 


several other nuclides, and -- and we basically 


found that -- that they -- they did have 


sufficient either individual records or -- or 

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other information that they could bound doses 


for those nuclides. 


We did come down to -- to thorium as a problem 


or -- or a little more of a problem. We had to 


-- we took a little longer in assessing this 


problem. The -- basically the -- the final 


result on the thorium was that -- NIOSH 


provided an approach using a certain method, a 


NUREG-1400 method, and SC&A concluded that that 


basically was not an appropriate approach and 


it was not bounding. However, what -- what 


NIOSH has given us in addition to that was they 


have other -- other process-specific 


information that gives us a -- a -- strong 


evidence to the workgroup that in fact that 


they can bound the doses on -- on these cases, 


so -- now this -- this also is one of those 


that we haven't seen a demonstration of this 


other data being used, so we haven't seen this 


proof of principle necessarily. But there's a 


strong impression at the workgroup level that 


they do have process-specific data that would 


be applicable to this situation and could bound 


doses for these -- these thorium workers. 


Internal dose -- and this is one of the -- the 

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coworker models. I -- I think the -- one -- 


one important thing to preface th-- with this 


slide is that it -- it appears, at least on 


NIOSH's review of the current claimants -- now 


that doesn't necessarily mean that population 


might not -- we -- we certainly understand that 


population could change, and will change. But 


based on the current claim files they have, 


there's a very limited number of individuals 


that will be required to use the coworker model 


for internal dose assessment. And our data 


completeness review sort of supported that -- 


or it did support that. You know, individuals, 


for the most part, had urinalysis records. 


They might not have had them for every cycle 


for every year, but -- but there were 


urinalysis records there that we felt were 


sufficient to be able to reconstruct internal 


doses. 


Now if you get to the coworker question, where 


-- where we -- and I think Brant alluded to 


this earlier in his presentation for NIOSH, the 


coworker model is based on HIS-20, this 


database data -- actually a -- a pedigree of 


that original HIS-20 database. We -- in -- in 

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our analysis we did find some discrepancies 


between the raw data and this electronic 


database, and -- and we did note that there 


were -- there were some discrepancies. NIOSH 


concedes that there's some discrepancies in 


there. We did, however, find that -- that all 


upper-bound values that we could check seemed 


to be in the database, and therefore NIOSH is 


saying we -- we acknowledge limitations in the 


database, in the data itself, and therefore we 


will rely only on a 95th percentile, or the 


upper bound of this data, to use for coworker 


dose assessment. And you know, I think that is 


a reasonable approach, especially considering 


the fact that most -- most individuals have 


their own individual bioassay records, or -- or 


some rec-- you know, enough records to do dose 


reconstruction. 


Oh, okay, this goes back -- this goes back a 


few workgroups for -- the -- the lung count -- 


the question of the adequacy of the lung 


counting data came up, and I believe -- I want 


to make sure I get this right, but I believe 


early on NIOSH basically conceded that there 


were problems with the lung counting data in 

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the database, and that -- but however, they 


point out that they're not going to use any of 


that data for dose reconstruction for the 


cases. They're going to rely on urinalysis 


data. The only way they might use the lung 


counting data is to -- to -- along with the 


urinalysis data, to check dose determinations 


that way, but they will not just solely rely on 


lung counting data. So they acknowledge that 


there's some problems with that data, but their 


method doesn't rely on that data. So this goes 


back to the TIB-38, which is the model that 


uses the urinalysis data along with that -- 


TIB-49 references that super S model that we 


talked about earlier on, so we -- we felt this 


was reasonable. 


 And the decontamination/decommissioning period, 


specific questions on this period came up. We 


actually -- and this is another situation where 


a TIB was actually developed during the time 


the workgroup was meeting, so -- but this was 


sort of a TIB -- a Technical Information Bulle­

- the bulletin that extended the coworker model 


out to the D&D period and -- similar to TIB-38 


and a similar approach would be used regarding 

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the 95th percentile. And I think given those 


two factors, we -- we still believe it -- it is 


a bounding approach, al-- although I -- I 


agree, it was developed, you know, kind of 


during our workgroup process, so... 


 Are there any more? Okay. 


Okay, and -- and this is the external and 


internal -- or I mean ext-- external gamma and 


external beta, and -- and the conclusion on 


this really was that the external gamma models 


and external beta models -- coworker models 


seem adequate for reconstructing doses. Some 


of these models also have a neutron com-- these 


models also talk about neutrons. We've 


separated that issue out 'cause we -- we do 


have some remaining concerns on the neutron 


monitoring, so the coworker models seem applic­

- or seem sufficient with regard to gamma and 


beta exposures. We have the separate remaining 


questions regarding the neutron NDRP data, and 


that would also revert to this coworker model 


because it is populated with NDRP data. 


And that's it -- and then I -- I think the -- 


the -- the final -- I think some of the 


conclusions that we have here is -- are 

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primarily focused on the neutron NDRP -- the 


adequacy of the neutron NDRP data and we -- 


we've kind of -- this is -- this is a complica­

- this is a complicated issue to discuss. We ­

- we've spent, like I said, these last several 


weeks digging hard into this issue. And at 


this point I think it's best to sort of present 


it the way the workgroup sees it over different 


time periods, 'cause I think there were 


definitely different factors to consider in 


different time periods. 


1952 through '58, and I'm sorry I don't have 


these on slides, these are -- well, you saw the 


report came out on the 30th, so I don't have 


these on slides yet. But 1952 through '58, one 


thing -- it appears to the workgroup in 


reviewing this that many of the highest exposed 


people to neutrons for that time period were 


not measured for neutron exposure. They --


they were assigned notional dose, as we talked 


about before, but they weren't measured. A 


couple of different -- and these are just 


factors that we considered in this time period. 


 The proposed method for '52 through '58, or the 


NDRP method, is to -- basically they rely on a 

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-- a ratio developed for 1959, and they apply 


it backwards into the earlier years. And we 


have some concerns about that, for a few 


reasons. One is we -- we think there could be 


a large -- they -- they use building-specific 


ratios, and we've seen that there could be a 


large variation of -- of neutron/photon ratios 


at the worker level or -- or, you know, sub-


building level, sort of, so you've got a wide 


variation and you're using one central estimate 


of a neutron/photon ratio to do your estimates, 


and we think that's problematic. 


Another very important piece for this -- this 


sort of back-extrapolation period is that there 


were some significant process changes during 


that time period and -- you know, this included 


mo-- they -- they -- they moved certain 


operations, including -- assembly went from 


Building 91 to Building 76, I believe, and 


there was some other significant changes. I 


don't want to detail them here in this 


presentation, but we have them and if -- if 


this comes down to a motion, they'll be 


detailed in that way. But there were several 


process changes and we couldn't be sure that 

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all these process changes were going to either 


have no effect on the neutron/photon ratio in 


19-- you know, when comparing to 1959 or if 


they would bias it one way or another, we just 


weren't sure. There were many changes that 


made it uncertain and we couldn't determine 


whether -- which direction it could go. 


And finally, the NDRP report itself 


acknowledges that they -- they had no 


independent validation of the NP ratio during 


tho-- those years of interest. In other words, 


they had no measurement data from '52 through 


'58, field surveys or things like that, that 


would support that those building NP ratios 


from '59 were in fact in the right ball park, 


so that was one time period where they had the 


least amount of data. I want to stress that. 


The next time period -- we've got four little 


time periods here -- '59 through '64. It 


appears still that many of the highest exposed 


workers were not measured for -- for neutron 


exposures. A lot of them had -- a lot of the 


individuals seemed to have notional doses 


assigned, so that problem remains. 


Again, the proposed -- we have the same 

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question of the NP ratio, the proposed NP 


ratio, relies on this central estimate by 


building. And if we look at -- at that, at the 


worker level there seems to be a wider variance 


of those NP ratios, so we're not certain that ­

- we can't be certain that that's approp-- 


appropriate for bounding the doses. And I -- I 


think those are the -- the main two issues 


there. 


The -- the strength during that time period is 


that they have a lot more measurement data, and 


they -- I -- I believe they do have some 


independent measurements during that time 


period to sort of support the -- the NP ratios 


of that time. 


Going on to '65 through '68, at this point -- 


'65 we do see a transition in the data where -- 


and -- and this is supported by some of the 


expert -- that we heard from -- that -- that 


worked on -- on the project, but nonetheless, 


the data sort of -- of supports it, which is 


that most of the highest exposed now from '65 


onward seem to be -- seem to have been 


measured. There -- there are film badge 


measurements there for them. In other words, 

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you don't see this trend of the highest exposed 


being all notional or estimated dose. It --


it's more of the individual film badge-measured 


data. 


'65 through '68 still has that remaining 


question of a building-wide neutron/photon 


ratio, central estimate, being assigned to 


individual workers. And you know, how do you 


know if that average is appropriate for every 


worker, so we still have that remaining 


question. 


And finally, the last sort of sub-group is '69 


and '70. This period of time has a high number 


of original films which were not recovered or ­

- or -- I -- I guess just not recovered. In 


the process of doing this NDRP project, they 


recovered all these films and reread a lot of 


them for -- for inclusion to do this better 


estimate of dose. And for '69 and '70, a lot 


of the original films could not or were not 


recovered for this project. So you have a lot 


more sort of missing data and a lot more 


notional dose in that time period. And then --


and then I gue-- so that's one distinction for 


that last -- those last two years. Again, 

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still the remaining issue of the -- one central 


estimate for the neutron/photon ratio versus a 


-- a -- you know, a building-wide central 


estimate used. 


So that's the four periods. In this -- I did 


want to say, from '59 on through '70, so -- so 


we have four time peri-- I know this gets a 


little confusing, but looking from '59 forward, 


the -- the one issue that -- that was 


consistent through all those, that kept coming 


up, was this use of the neutron/photo ratio -- 


a building-specific central estimate of the 


neutron/photon ratio to estimate these -- these 


neutron doses. And NIOSH has indicated, and -- 


and I -- I'd actually like NIOSH, if Jim Neton 


or Brant Ulsh is available -- has indicated 


that they have -- within the NDRP data itself, 


that they have data that they could possibly 


use something other than a central estimate for 


the neutron/photon ratio but rather more like a 


95th percentile approach, but I'll let Jim 


speak to that. 


DR. NETON: Thank you, Mark. Jim Neton, 


Associate Director for Science in OCAS. It's 


correct, we -- we have a large amount of 

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information between '59 and through '70. 
I 


believe there's a total of 87,000 neutron 


measurements that were reread for the NDRP, and 


most of those are in this period. Admittedly, 


in '59 there are fewer, and they become more 


prominent as you go forward, but we believe 


there's sufficient data there to estimate the 


95th percentile of the distribution by year. 


Currently the model -- the -- the variance of 


the model has already been calculated and used 


in our dose reconstructions at the 95th 


percentile. For example, overestimating dose 


reconstructions do use the 95th percentile of 


the building-specific ratios. And for best 


estimates, we apply -- Mark correctly 


identified -- a central estimate and an 


associated uncertainty distribution about it. 


But we believe there are sufficient data 


available to allow us to calculate the 95th 


percentile, either through the variance of the 


model or just the straight 95th percentile of 


the distribution of the NP ratios observed, to 


bound the neutron doses for workers in -- in 


the '59-forward time period. 


I don't know if there's any questions on that, 

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but --


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you. And -- and you know, 


I guess -- I -- I think that's -- that's kind 


of where -- I guess that completes my report 


out. I would ask other workgroup members if 


they had anything to add or -- or comment on at 


this point. 


 DR. ZIEMER: This -- this is for workgroup 


members. Workgroup members? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, Board members, do you have questions for 


Mark? Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I have a number of 


questions, so --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I know, I got to -- figure 


out all these cords here. 


 That's my last question. Fir-- first of all, 


I'm a little confused on the April 30th report 


from SC&A as to whether that was made available 


to the petitioners and to the general public in 


any way? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Can someone (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: My under--


 DR. MELIUS: (Unintelligible) available here at 

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this meeting? 


 DR. ZIEMER: My understanding is that -- I 


think -- is Joe Fitzgerald here? Joe, did we 


get copies of that to the petitioners? If --


if we did, it's been within the last hour, I 


think. It's -- it's not been -- if you want to 


talk about timely. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, we -- we made one hard 


copy which we gave to Terrie -- Ms. Terrie 


Barrie. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And the electronic copies were 


distributed to the Board, probably after you 


left home or --


 MR. FITZGERALD: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- I -- I don't believe I got a 


copy of it yet. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: My understanding was the 


electronic copy was cleared through General 


Counsel at NIOSH probably Friday sometime. 


From there, I'm -- I'm not sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: There were some Privacy Act issues 


with that report that required a -- I guess a 


legal review, but in any event, I don't -- my 


guess is Board members have not seen it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Our -- our intention in -- in the 

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workgroup process, for those who followed it, 


was to -- to get a report to all petitioners 


and Congressional staffers at least a month in 


advance of this meeting, and I think we -- I 


think the main report was put out -- I hope 


they got SC&A's main report about early April ­

- no? I'm seeing --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, there -- there were two -- 


there was I think two volumes -- or two parts 


to that report. Those were distributed a 


couple of weeks ago, I believe. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But this supplemental certainly 


is -- was -- I mean just completed, you know, 


within the last, you know, four or five days, 


so -- but we need to at least get it now to 


everyone. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: It's been --


 DR. MELIUS: -- I -- I mean I would just like 


to point out, I -- I -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- I hardly think that's a fair 


process for the people that are -- the 

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petitioners nor people trying to address this 


issue, and I think we need to -- also as -- the 


Board and working with NIOSH, come up with a 


better process for communicating these -- and 


distributing these reports. I understand the ­

- the need for reviewing and so forth, but this 


process seems to keep breaking down and -- in 


terms of that. I mean, for example, I have the 


-- the pre-- pre-privacy-cleared copy of it, 


the April 27th draft, which I -- and I have no 


idea -- I don't think there are major changes, 


but there are only a few changes in it and I 


really don't think it's fair for the 


petitioners or for the people interested in the 


site to come here and not have this information 


made available to them in a -- in any fashion 


here, other than I guess within the last hour. 


I -- I have some questions. I'd like to know 


more, and I don't know if -- who -- whether 


Mark, you're the person answering this or -- or 


Joe Fitzgerald or who -- the basis for the -- 


the sampling of the -- the 52 cases that were 


looked at where we're looking in terms of data 


integrity issues and -- and so forth. I think 


there was a comment from I believe one of the 

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petitioners that commented on -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- how that hardly seems to be an 


adequate sample, and I'm trying to understand 


the sampling better. I --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, maybe Joe -- Joe or -- or 


Arjun, if you can speak to that, I -- I would 


appreciate it. 


Go-- going -- I -- I will say that going 


through 52 full claims files was, you know, a 


rigorous amount of work, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Makhijani --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- we did want a good set of 


records, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Makhijani perhaps can answer 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I'm Arjun Makhijani from 


SC&A. As was mentioned, the 52 cases consisted 


of two groups. There were 32 randomly-selected 


and that was done with the help of our 


statistician, Harry Chmlynski, and we sampled a 


sufficient number to get an idea of the size of 


the gaps. It wasn't at a level where you could 


tell what was going on for individual workers, 

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but it was to explore whether there were 


significant gaps overall in the data record for 


the groups of workers. They were split up into 


two periods, '52 to '63, inclusive, and '64 to 


'92. And that was done because in the earlier 


period there were a large number of workers who 


were not badged because they were thought to be 


at risk of low exposure or -- for instance, 


Building 881 was not badged in the '50s. And 


then in '64 the policy had been -- said that 


all workers were badged, but then it turned out 


that it wasn't quite all workers, but it was in 


the 90-plus percents of workers who were 


badged. So we wanted to examine the extent of 


the gaps in monitoring in the two different 


periods, and we did that. 


In the second piece of it, we identified a 


number of gaps in -- in both periods in 


internal and external monitoring records and so 


the second part of the exercise was to look at 


20 workers who had the hi-- among the highest 


cumulative exposures. This was workers in the 


1990s whose records were looked at by Rocky 


Flats retrospectively, and they were grouped 


into categories, one to four, and three and 

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four were the highest exposed cumulatively, and 


we selected ten from each group to see if there 


were gaps in the records of workers who were 


acknowledged by Rocky Flats to be the most 


exposed cumulatively. 


And there -- in the internal dose records we 


did not find big gaps -- that is, annual gaps ­

- but we did find some gaps in the external 


dose records. And so that's why subsequently -- 


particularly in the '50s. And so that's why 


subsequently a lot of the effort of looking 


into the adequacy of data focused on external 


dose in the 1950s. 


Sorry for the long reply. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you -- that's good, thanks. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim, a follow-up and -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, just to fol-- I mean I would 


just point out that -- I mean while I 


understand the amount of effort involved in 


this, I don't want to, you know, downplay that, 


but at the same time, for -- a small sample 


like this would not necessarily identify subgroups that may be -- where there may be issues 


with. It -- it may be adequate statistically 


if the -- we're assuming that whatever these 

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gaps are, problems are, are there 


systematically, but -- and cover everybody. 


But certainly for sub-groups of workers in 


certain buildings or certain parts, it would 


not address that and would -- would not 


identify that, and I -- I think that still 


would be an ongoing concern. 


I also have related to that the issue of -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Arjun has an additional 


comment on that, and then we'll move on. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I think Dr. Melius is 


right about that, but the statistical sampling 


was a very -- it was a very broad-mesh 


sampling. It was not designed to reveal say 


gaps in monitoring for individual 


radionuclides, and it was not designed to yield 


information that was statistically valid on 


gaps for individual job types and so on. It 


was are there -- you know, what's the size of 


the group of workers in these two periods that 


have gaps, and so it was a very broad-screen 


take. So you're -- you're right about that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Proceed. 

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 DR. MELIUS: Thank you. And I think related to 


that in sort of a -- as a separate effort, 


there was an issue of these data discrepancies 


and so forth which were I think individual 


reports of potential problems, and so forth -- 


that -- and on that my understanding is that, 


again, there was no systematic problem found 


with that in -- in the investigation of that, 


but there were a number of individual reported 


discrepancies that were, you know, verified by 


-- by the process. And my question there is 


then -- then -- then what happens with those? 


How are those individual discrepancies 


identified, because one of the problems with 


this overall process is it -- to me, that -- I 


would think that would end up being dependent 


on the claimant being aware of the potential 


discrepancy and pointing it out. And given the 


problems in getting access to records and 


giving the problems in -- you know, many times 


the original worker has died and so it's a 


family member with, you know, very little 


information trying to file the claim. So I 


guess my question is more for the -- the 


workgroup and maybe for NIOSH, how do we -- how 

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are these then identified or are we just sort 


of, you know, getting rid of them, not -- 


pretending they don't exist? 


 DR. ZIEMER: And perhaps Dr. Ulsh from NIOSH 


can address that. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, Dr. Melius. Actually the 


integrity of the individual radiation files 


were approached by the working group, NIOSH and 


SC&A via a number of different approaches, one 


of which was to look at -- as Mark has 


mentioned, at the database itself which was 


used for -- in situations of generating 


coworker data. But in terms of this exercise, 


looking at the 52 -- the 52 hard copy radiation 


files, the objective of that exercise was to 


determine whether or not there were -- first of 


all, whether there were periods where 


monitoring data didn't exist; and secondly, if 


so, were there reasonable explanations for 


that. So we did not find in that particular 


piece of the investigation -- I'm speaking only 


for NIOSH -- we didn't find any unexplainable 


gaps in either internal or external, with one 


exception. We looked, as -- as Arjun has 


mentioned, there were 52 workers, and you 

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multiply that -- that by the number of years 


that they worked, and then double it for 


internal and external. And what we found was 


that for internal, they were complete. In 


other words, there were no gaps that -- where 


you would expect them to have been monitored 


and the records were not present. And 


secondly, in the external dosimetry, we found 


out of the 52 workers with several years of 


employment each, we found only one case where a 


worker was missing -- didn't have dosimetry 


data for one year, and that was clearly noted 


in his radiation file. So as I think Mark 


said, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, 


Mark, we didn't find anything that compromised 


our -- our ability to -- at least systema-- 


systemically, to accurately reconstruct doses. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, I -- as I understand the 


question you asked, though, in an individual 


case if the -- if the individual did not self-


identify that they thought records were 


missing, how would we know it. Is that --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- the nature of the question? 

 DR. MELIUS: -- I mean the issue is when 
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there's the discrepancy reported, and part of 


the problem with -- is that the -- since these 


are individual data, the SC&A report on this is 


-- does not identify the examples very well and 


so it's a little hard -- I'm just trying to get 


an asses-- assessment of -- of this issue and ­

- that. I think Arjun already addressed the 


issue with the -- the sampling of the 52. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: You might perhaps be thinking of -- 


and I -- again, I don't have SC&A's report in 


front of me. There was another piece of this 


data -- data integrity investigation and that 


involved the -- we looked at every single 


concern expressed in the petition, every single 


concern that was expressed by the public at the 


last work-- Advisory Board meeting in April -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ULSH: -- and the concerns expressed by 


members of the public throughout the working 


group process. And NIOSH captured all of those 


and we went through and evaluated each one of 


those to determine whether or not they 


presented a systematic problem for us. I think 


it's fair to say that NIOSH and SC&A, on a few 

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individual instances, may not be in agreement 


whether or not there is a problem in that 


particular case. But we certainly did not find 


anything systematic that would prevent us from 


doing dose reconstruction. Does that --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that -- and that's what we 


tried to look at and -- and -- and I know what 


you're saying, Jim. If -- you know, if we had 


some individuals that were -- were -- you know, 


not everyone's going to dig into the data the 


way some of these individuals did, and -- and ­

- for example, there was a particular case, the 


question of zeroing the dose, and the person 


felt that they -- they -- you know, they have 


affidavits saying worked a high rad job for a 


couple quarters and dosimetry's basically 


zeroes or whatever, and so we -- we had several 


of those. And some of them -- which I agree 


that we didn't reach agreement on between SC&A 


and NIOSH. We did, though, try to look and say 


okay, by looking at the database and other 


records and other reviews that we did, do we 


see any sort of pattern that would indicate 


that this was going on, and -- and I -- you 


know, we -- we didn't find any systemic 

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problems like that. 


Now I'm not sure that we had a perfect, you 


know, method to be able to detect those 


problems, but we -- we did try several 


different approaches to try to find those kinds 


of problems, 'cause they were raised in several 


-- either in open testimony or -- or in -- as 


part of the petition, so we were aware of those 


problems and we did look into those. But it --


it remai-- you know, the question remains -- I 


guess the other question would be, and I think 


it came up in earlier public comments, is how ­

- how do you -- would you basically acknowledge 


that in an individual DR, and you might treat 


that differently than just using LOD over two 


for assi-- for fixing that zero. But in the 


case where a person doesn't have the 


information to support as much, then it's 


probably treated as -- you know, as -- as zero, 


so -- you know. 


 DR. ULSH: It depends on the --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: It's hard to speak generally about ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, right. 

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 DR. ULSH: -- about this. It would depend on 


the specifics of the individual case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Brant, before you sit down, I have 


another question I think maybe you can answer. 


My understanding then would that be as a result 


of this review, NIOSH has made a number of 


changes in how they're handling certain aspects 


of dose reconstruction? And so I presume that 


in effect the site profile is being re-- redone 


or up-- updated. My question is, for -- for 


the record is will you then follow the usual 


policy and go back and recalculate dose 


reconstructions for all the people that have 


already had those done who would be affected by 


these changes? 


 DR. ULSH: That process is already underway. 


Some of the issues that have been captured we 


have completed Program Evaluation Reports. 


Some of them we're going to have to wait for 


the dust to settle here today to go back and, 


you know, put those changes into place. But 


yes, Dr. Melius, the answer to your question is 


yes, we certainly will in cases where the 


changes -- you know, in response to public 

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comment and -- and the investigation that the 


working group has conducted, we certainly will 


go back and look at cases that have been 


completed in the past that have a probability 


of causation of less than 50 percent and 


evaluate the impact of any of those changes on 


those case. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Thank you. I have one more 


set of questions. These are for Mark and -- do 


that. If I understand you correctly, the -- as 


a result of your review, there are I believe -- 


well, three areas that -- where NIOSH has not 


demonstrated the ability to do adequate 


individual dose reconstructions? One is the 


thorium issue you mentioned in one slide? 


Thorium and some related (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: As far as seeing proof of -- of 


the -- of the process yet, the thorium question 


remains in -- in that SC&A did not believe that 


the approach was appropriate for bounding. But 


we -- we have seen the other documents and the 


data that are available that we believe could 


be used to bound. So they -- they haven't 


given us a -- a necessarily case example, but 


it's only because they -- they still bel-- you 

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know, th-- we had a -- a situation where the -- 


SC&A and NIOSH were not in agreement on the 


final comment as sort of a -- a backdrop. 


They're saying they have this other information 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- which could be used to bound, 


and so that's where that stands. We haven't 


seen the case demonstration of it, no. That's 


right. 


 DR. MELIUS: And -- and the -- the second area 


is the neutron dose, '59 to '70 that I think 


Jim Neton -- I may have it --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I --


 DR. MELIUS: -- time period wrong. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I should actually clarify the 


-- the neutrons -- time frame I just discussed. 


I -- I -- I think, as a workgroup, for the '52 


through '58 time period, I believe we have, you 


know, come to consensus on that, that that time 


period just -- the concerns I've stated exist 


and I -- and cause problems in terms of being 


able to -- to reconstruct doses. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


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periods, I still have those concerns, but we 


don't have a consensus in the workgroup -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Well --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- on all those items, so I -- I 


just wanted to say that for -- for the record. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, and I understand, I'm just 


trying to -- the sort of the factual -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- question is is has -- I think 


if you remember right, our, you know, SEC 


review process was to take into account -- it's 


a demonstration that they can actually do the 


dose reconstruction in the way they say they 


can, and -- and my understanding is that, both 


for the thorium and the neutron '59-'70, they 


have not yet. There may be data available for 


doing so, but the-- there's a question -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, the '59-'70, right now the 


approach stands as -- as they've -- I mean they 


-- they've given us a case example, but it uses 


their current approach. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: What Jim Neton said today on the 


record is -- is, again, a -- another option 


that they may use, but they haven't demonstra-- 

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we haven't seen a demonstration of that, no. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's correct. And -- and I 


think lastly, just -- I -- I did point this out 


in my presentation, but it might have got lost 


a little bit, but the pre-1960 Building 81 


uranium workers for external dose -- again, we 


-- we -- we had ample evidence put in front of 


the workgroup that they could bound these 


doses, but we haven't seen a -- a case example 


for that, so that's another one, just for 


completeness. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Thanks, Mark. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mark, you -- you've been largely 


silent on the period beyond 1970. Does the 


workgroup have any conclusions or position on 


the ability to reconstruct doses for the period 


beyond 1970? Or did you not address that? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- no, we -- we certainly 


addressed it. We -- I mean part of -- what -- 


what Arjun said is cer-- is -- is accurate, 


that we -- in this data completeness review we 


were looking at all time periods, and the 


reason that we ended up targeting the '50s was 


-- was that we found some of these data gaps 

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and -- and issues. So I agree, that wasn't a 


perfect -- you know, necessarily a robust 


statistical sample, but we did do sort of -- 


when we found areas that looked like potential 


issues, we did sort of drill down to more 


probative investigations. Those went into the 


areas such as Building 81 and -- and such as 


the early '50s for neutrons and other things. 


Post-1970 -- well, the NDRP, they -- they went 


from film to TLD at that point. The -- but -- 


but we didn't find any indication for internal 


or external dose that there'd be a problem for 


reconstructing. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. The reason I asked 


that question, certainly in a number of other 


sites the Board has made recommendations where 


certain years are covered and other years are 


not covered by SEC status, and it wasn't clear 


to me whether the workgroup was comfortable -- 


maybe that's not the word to use, but was 


suggesting that the question of reconstructing 


dose after 1970 was not, in their minds, a -- a 


problem as compared to those earlier years. 


That's sort of rhetorical at this point -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: -- but I was trying to ascertain 


that. 


Okay, other -- other questions, Board members? 


Let -- let me suggest a couple of things here. 


We have some options before us, one -- one of 


which -- well, all of them involve some sort of 


action, I want to push the Board to take some 


sort of action. Your -- your options are, 


number one, to accept or agree with the NIOSH 


evaluation. Number two, to disagree with the 


NIOSH evaluation -- that is, to basically state 


that doses can-- cannot be reconstructed with 


sufficient accuracy and therefore to recommend 


SEC. 


You would have an option, although I would 


certainly be uncomfortable with it, to extend 


this process further to tie up loose ends. 


There clearly are loose ends, but those loose 


ends seem to continue to occur month after 


month. We tie up one set of loose ends and 


others appear. It reminds one a little bit of 


"Fantasia" and the brooms that multiply 


exponentially. 


Or you would have an option of subdividing 


this, I -- I guess, as has been done in other 

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cases, and saying yes, part of this is 


straightforward. We're -- we -- we feel an SEC 


is clear and perhaps part of it not. 


So those are four options. You may want to 


cogitate on this for a bit. I -- I know some 


of you want to get refueled with food. The 


lunch hour is upon us. We hadn't wanted -- I ­

- I had hoped we could come to closure to this, 


but we've heard -- we've heard a lot of 


different -- we've heard testimony from the 


petitioners, we've heard testimony from the 


Congressional staff, we've heard testimony from 


NIOSH, from our working group, we've had a lot 


of input. You may want to reflect on this for 


a bit and then come back and be prepared to 


make a motion, but I'd like some comments on 


whether you would like to do that or proceed at 


this point with some action. Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: I had hoped that your fourth option 


would be lunch. Clearly this is not going to 


be a closure that's reached in a matter of five 


or ten minutes. This will be a discussion that 


will be of significant time constraint, I 


think. Pushing past the lunch hour to 


undertake that probably is not wise for us. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? 


 (No responses) 


What is your pleasure, Board members? You want 


-- you want to continue now or -- our lunch 


break was scheduled for 11:45 so we're into 


that hour. You're too numb to react? Is that 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let's go eat lunch. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, that gives the Chair 


the prerogative then, if no one has any 


particular opinions, we'll go with mine. 


That's the way it works, you know. Let us take 


a one-hour lunch break and come back. We will 


continue deliberations on the Rocky Flats 


petition, and we will adjust the other items on 


the agenda accordingly. So those will slide 


back in-- into place. So thank you all. We 


will reconvene as quickly as we can after 1:00 


o'clock, probably about 1:15. Thank you very 


much. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:15 p.m. 


to 1:35 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: If you would take your seats, 


we'll try to come to order, please. 


(Pause) 

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Thank you very much. I'll declare the meeting 


to be back in order. Before we continue our 


deliberations, I -- I have received a hand-


carried letter from Governor Bill Ritter. I'd 


like to read this rec-- letter into the record. 


The record -- the letter says (reading) In care 


of: Paul Ziemer, Chairman; Lewis Wade, 


Executive Secretary; and members of the 


Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, 


Regarding Rocky Flats United Steel Workers of 


America, Local 8031, Special Exposure Cohort 


petition. Dear Drs. Ziemer and Wade and 


members of the Advisory Board: I am writing 


today to join in and endorse the letter you 


received yesterday from the entire Colorado 


Congressional delegation seeking justice for 


the Special Exposure Cohort petition of the 


former Rocky Flats workers. That letter 


compellingly documents the reasons why this 


petition should be granted. Simple fairness 


dictates that give these workers the benefit of 


the doubt in light of their exposure to 


radioactive materials, beryllium and silica. 


In an ideal world, the Department of Energy 


would have maintained comprehensive and useful 

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dose records. In the absence of such records, 


and given adequate time, perhaps NIOSH could 


adequately reconstruct dose and exposure 


records and calculate likely health 


consequences. But as you know, this is far 


from an ideal world. The dose monitoring 


records and other data accumulated at Rocky 


Flats were, in too many circumstances, less 


than adequate to the task at hand. NIOSH's 


efforts to reconstruct doses and exposures have 


encountered methodological and data challenges 


and have dragged out far too long. 


Mr. Chairman, working together with the State 


of Colorado and the federal government -- 


working together, the State of Colorado and the 


federal government made dramatic and even 


unprecedented progress in cleaning up the Rocky 


Flats site and converting much of that site to 


a wildlife refuge. Surrounding property owners 


are moving forward in their efforts to be 


compensated for the damage done to their 


properties by releases of radioactive 


materials. One enormous task remains 


unfinished, and it is the task with -- with by 


far the greatest human element. It is time, 

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far past time, that fair compensation is 


provided to the people who worked and toiled at 


Rocky Flats on behalf of a great national 


purpose, and who may have been stricken as a 


result of their work. 


I urge you in the strongest possible terms to 


act promptly on the Rocky Flats special 


exposure petition. 


 Respectfully, Bill Ritter, Jr., Governor. 


 Now Board members, you've had time to cogitate 


over your lunch, brief as it may have been, and 


I'd like to urge that we take action on the 


proposal that is before us. The Chair 


recognizes Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: I'd like to offer a --

 DR. ZIEMER: Get -- get closer to the mike, 

Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I will. Can you hear me 

now? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I'd like to offer a general 

motion that would cover two separate steps. 


The first was I believe that, based on the 


reports we received and the discussions we had 


earlier, Mark's presentation, the SCA reports 

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and so forth, that we should move forward 


approving a Special Exposure Cohort for the 


people exposed to neutrons or who should have 


been monitored for neutrons from 1952 through 


1958; that --


Number two, that we need further review on 


three particular issues that, again, were 


discussed this morning and which would be 


requesting that NIOSH come back to us with 


further information; that we -- also that we 


work with our contractor, SC&A, to evaluate 


three separate issues. One is the neutron 


exposure from 1959 to '70. Second I believe is 


the exposures in I believe it's Building 81. 


And then third is this issue of thorium 


exposures and some related nuclides that -- in 


-- in some areas of the facility. All those 


are where there -- involve where there's some 


monitoring data, but we really haven't had an 


adequate evaluation of whether that data is 


sufficient for use for individual dose 


reconstruction. 


I would propose that we -- for the latter three 


that we try to move that along as quickly as 


possible. I understand the timeliness issues. 

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And that, if possible -- and I -- this may be a 


question for NIOSH to consider -- is that -- 


try to get that work done and that we, at our 


next Board meeting, would be I believe 


scheduled for June 12th, that we have that 


meeting to -- a person -- in-person meeting 


rather than a telephone meeting, to consider 


those three issues. 


 DR. ZIEMER: You've heard the motion. Is there 


a second? 


 MR. CLAWSON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: There is a second, Brad Clawson. 


Let me ask for a clarification. The first part 


of your statement you referred only to 


individuals exposed to neutrons. I assume that 


we're talking about all individuals who were 


monitored or should have been monitored -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I should have -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- in that period --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- not just those exposed -- 

 DR. MELIUS: Right, right --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- to neutrons. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- yeah, yeah, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Let me also add that, 
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should this motion carry, I'm going -- I will 


ask that the mover re-- reconstitute the motion 


to put it in the usual form that would make it 


useful to send forth to the Secretary, which 


specifies that -- for example, that the 


Chairman take certain actions within 30 days 


and -- and we have some sort of standard, 


boilerplate language that has to go forward, so 


we -- I would ask for a formal rewording of 


that, but this gives at least the intent of 


what the motion would be. 


 DR. MELIUS: Correct, and I would propose that 


we do that -- the second part, should this 


Board agree on this, that we would do that 


tomorrow morning and we would work on -- this 


afternoon and tonight work on a specific letter 


with the justifications and the format that's 


required. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now should -- should this 


motion pass, my understanding is that we would 


proceed to make the recommendation for the 


Special Exposure Cohort status for the early 


group immediately; that the other group time 


frames -- and actually I think you've only 


spoken to addressing issues dur-- for the time 

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frame up to '70, you haven't said anything be-- 


beyond '70, but that would, by implication, 


have to be addressed, as well. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: What this would do would be to 


postpone action for approximately one month on 


the rest of the time frame until I -- I believe 


it would be proof of principle on the dose 


reconstructions for the neutrons, or was it for 


the thorium? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Those three items. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, neutrons, thorium and the 


other issues, okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And 881. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And 881 -- is it 881? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Discussion. Dr. Roessler. 


DR. ROESSLER: I was so concentrating on the 


first part, which you now clarified, that I 


didn't really get all the points in your second 


part. So my question is, with regard to 


procedure, are we going to -- before we vote -- 


see this written so that we can fully 


understand it? Or are we going to be required 


-- if we're going to be required to vote right 

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now, I need to have Jim go over that second 


part again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll ask for a rereading of this 


in a moment. Other comments? 


 DR. WADE: Well, I -- I would like to just get 


clarification on the first part of the motion 


relative to monitored or should have been 


monitored. Are we talking about neutron dose 


or what are we talking about? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Monitored or should have been 


monitored for neutron exposures, yeah. 


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, for neutron exposures. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Was that not what... 


DR. ROESSLER: I'm still not clear on that. 


Does that mean then the whole population of 


workers during that time period, or is there 


some way to determine which workers should have 


been monitored for neutrons? I think that's 


the big question on that one. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I guess I was trying 


to avoid defining by various buildings, but -- 


you know, that may be possible, but I was 


trying to avoid -- you know, basically not 


charging the Board with doing that, but having 

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that be determined by NIOSH. But I don't know, 


to the extent we can specify, I guess -- I'm 


not sure how we want to go on that. 


 DR. WADE: Well, you know, the Board has 


adopted its procedures of sort of passing a 


motion in principle and then reviewing it that 


night and consulting in fact with the 


Department of Labor as to how these issues 


might be adjudicated. So I think that's 


appropriate to do here. I don't know that this 


issue's been broached yet with the Department 


of Labor. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: Unless I'm mistaken, the working 


group had general consensus with respect to 


this cohort that exists from 1952 to 1959, 


although it is not clear that any meaningful 


worker exposure could have occurred during 


1952. That being the case, then there still is 


confusion, from my perspective, with respect to 


why we're focusing specifically on neutrons. 


It would appear to me that since one of our key 


arguments was there were very few actual 


records that were available because very few 


people were monitored for anything during that 

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early period, why are we specifying neutrons? 


My other question is, if we are in fact going 


to delay the vote on our post-'58 cohort, and 


we're doing so ostensibly to ask for proof of 


principle from NIOSH, must we not be very clear 


with respect to our directions to NIOSH as to 


what we will and will not accept as proof of 


principle? Must not that be a basic part of 


our motion here? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I can respond to that -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I can respond to the first 


part. The -- we're focused on neutrons because 


we -- we did not find that there was a 


deficiency with regard to bioassay data for 


those early time periods, and in fact they do 


have gamma data -- penetrating measurements. 


That's sort of how they had -- neutron/photon 


ratio has to be multiplied by something. It 


was the gamma results from those early periods, 


so they did have more monitoring, it's just 


that they had very little neutron data. That 


was the -- so -- so it is targeted on neutrons, 


I think limited to neutrons. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So as this has been defined, the 

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special cohort status would be restricted to 


individuals, perhaps in certain locations, for 


whom neutron monitoring should have been or was 


-- or should have been provided, but would not 


provide special cohort status for others on the 


site during that period if they were not in the 


identified areas. Is that the correct 


understanding? 


 MS. MUNN: So again, aren't we going to have to 


be very specific with respect to what those 


buildings are and what those areas are when we 


make this kind of designation? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I guess that's the 


question I would -- I would say what Lew says 


is that, you know, if we need to be more 


specific to allow DOL to adjudicate, then we 


can do it. I -- I just didn't -- I didn't have 


a -- a complete listing and I didn't want to 


miss any buildings, so I said -- the easier way 


for me to define it right now, just for our 


discussions, was to say "monitored or should 


have been monitored". I didn't want to miss 


any building or anything, so -- but we can -- 


you know. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But the practical question will -- 

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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- arise in specific cases as to 


how will DOE --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- not DOE, DOL identify whether 


or not a worker was or should have been 


monitored for neutrons. I suppose that would 


fall back on the NIOSH report then, would it 


not? Would they iden-- 


 DR. WADE: I don't want to speak for DOL. 


Jeff, do you want to run the risk of standing 


before us and talking about this? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll hear -- hear from DOL, but I 


can anticipate that that would be a difficult 


question unless we provided some sort of 


information on what parts of the site this 


covered. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Yeah, I'm not certain. I haven't 


seen their information if you could put it by 


building, but then I don't know how you 


determine that people were in that building if 


they -- I don't -- is there a lot of bioassay 


data for that period of time that would put 


people in buildings? 


 MR. GRIFFON: They -- they -- they -- well, 

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they have work history cards -- I mean I'll let 


Brant respond to that maybe, behind you, but... 


 DR. ULSH: As I understand the status of your 


discussions, the part of the NDRP that is under 


question has to deal with the methods that were 


used to estimate doses from '52 to '58. What 


the Neutron Dose Reconstruction Project 


provides, aside from that -- from the methods 


of estimating neutrons -- is a very fine cohort 


in that it included people in the plutonium 


buildings who were at risk of neutron exposure. 


So all of the buildings where people at Rocky 


Flats could have received neutron exposures 


were considered explicitly in the NDRP. That 


would be --


 MR. GRIFFON: See, that -- that -- I wasn't 


ready to take -- that next step was -- I wasn't 


sure that NDRP had included every building that 


could have had neutron exposures, so I wanted 


to at first define it more broadly saying -- 


and then make sure we get the full list of -- 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- buildings with that potential. 


And how we define that I think it -- it's 


either defined by the Board or -- 

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 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- you know. 


 DR. ULSH: Would you be looking for action from 


NIOSH on that to provide a list of those 


buildings, or -- or --


 DR. MELIUS: Well, I -- I think we need to have 


some discussion, if I can speak to this. One 


is my understanding from our last discussion 


with Pete Turcic about this general issue a few 


Board meetings ago was that it -- it appeared 


to be better that -- to have this "monitored or 


should have been monitored" was a more workable 


approach in most instances, not all instances, 


but in most instances that seemed to be more 


workable than -- than a building by building 


issue, for some of the reasons that have been 


stated. But I -- I think that we need to sit 


down and talk about that a little bit and would 


offer something more specific tomorrow for -- 


for consideration. I also -- in response to 


what -- Wanda's comment, second comment about 


the proof in prin-- of principle and the 


follow-up. What I would propose is that we 


would offer up a -- a more fleshed-out motion 


tomorrow that would be more -- as specific as ­
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- I won't -- well, more specific about what 


would be expected back. I -- I -- I think 


there's -- hard to be, you know, too precise 


about that, but I -- I think we can make 


something that's more clearly understandable by 


everybody involved so that when we come here -- 


come back on June 12th to discuss it, that it 


can be -- will be addressed by that time, 


hopefully. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? Okay, 


Phil. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I think we need to leave a 


little broader than --


UNIDENTIFIED: We can't hear you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Use your mike. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I think we need to leave it a 


little broader than just specifying certain 


buildings because until we can actually prove 


people were not in those buildings, rather than 


having each individual -- a lot of these 


claimants are doing this for loved ones who 


have already passed on, and they're not going 


to be able to say well, we know they were in 


Building 770 or 881. Rather, we need to leave 


it a little broader because there's -- has to 

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be the assumption that at some time they may 


have been in those buildings working. So it's 


almost the burden of proof to show they weren't 


in those buildings, I think. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Mike Gibson. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer, I'm going to voice a 


little bit of a -- I guess a difference of 


opinion here. I feel that NIOSH has had ample 


time, close to two years now, to determine -- 


to determine the scientific validity of these 


exposures. In my opinion, they've used people 


who are conflicted to put together the 


evaluation report and I've heard the scientific 


end of it and I've heard from the people, and 


in the spirit of the legislation, us working in 


a timely manner, I think it's time to vote on 


the petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So Mike, are -- you're speaking 


against this particular motion or in this form, 


at least, I guess? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes, yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments or 

questions? 

 (No responses) 


Dr. Roessler, did you want Dr. Melius to read 

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that motion again -- or Dr. Melius, are you 


prepared to -- to reread the motion or not? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I can. I'll be glad to. 


The motion would be that we would move ahead 


and approve an -- as -- to add to the SEC those 


people that worked at the Rocky Flats site from 


1952 through 1958 that were monitored, or 


should have been monitored, for neutron 


exposure. 


And the latter part of that would need to be -- 


we need to talk to NIOSH and -- and to DOL, 


make sure that that's the right way to 


essentially def-- define the class. 


Then secondly, there are three areas that we 


need to get further information from NIOSH, 


basically demonstration that areas that they 


believe can -- they -- they have adequate 


information to do dose reconstruction but have 


not demonstrated that adequacy of that data to 


us or to our workgroup yet. Those are the 1959 


through 1970 for neutron exposure. There's a 


building 81 issue and, as I understand it, an 


issue with exposures to thorium in certain 


areas of the facility. All three of those --


there are some monitoring data, but that data 

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is not -- been evaluated in the sense of -- of 


being -- showing that it is adequate for doing 


individual dose reconstruction -- asking that 


that information be brought back to our next 


workgr-- or next Board meeting and for -- for 


further consideration, and we'll have to make a 


determination whether that data is adequate or, 


if it is not adequate, then whether -- adequate 


for dose recon-- individual dose 


reconstruction, as to whether additional groups 


should be added to the Special Exposure Cohort. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler, did that clarify the 


points for you or do you still have questions 


on --


DR. ROESSLER: I -- I understand everything 


except -- tell me about Building 81. 


 DR. MELIUS: Mark, can you help me? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Building 81 -- actually what we 


found was that workers were not monitored in 


the early period, actually up to 1960, so there 


was a question about back-extrapolating to 


determine -- being able to bound external doses 


for that early period. We -- we've also heard 


today -- the only -- and this is my -- also 


reluctance to further define the buildings for 

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neutron exposures, but we've heard today -- and 


which was brought to us before, but we probably 


-- may have overlooked it, the use or potential 


use of plutonium in that building. So I think 


we should also evaluate -- make sure that, you 


know, there's not other things going on in that 


building that might affect our outcome, as 


well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: We did however in the workgroup 


identify the fact that the first plutonium 


arrived in Building 81 in 1983. At some 


juncture during our deliberations we defined 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 198-- I don't recall that, so -- 


but you know, I just asked that we -- we might 


want to consider closing that out. If that's 


been closed out, that's -- I accept that, but 


it was brought up today so I just wanted to 


make sure we --


 MS. MUNN: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


'53. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, one more clarification. 


think your motion indicated that we would meet 


I 
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face-to-face on June 12th rather than 


teleconference. My schedule is kind of 


difficult to do that, but I think we should get 


a feeling from other people on the Board how 


many of us could actually do that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. You -- you all presumably 


have blocked some time out for a face-to-face ­

- or for a -- at least a phone call meeting -- 


DR. ROESSLER: But not traveling. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We might -- we might want to look 


at potential other dates because I'm just 


thinking -- I'd hate to be in the same position 


where we have a report one day before, or the 


same day, and we're giving it to the 


petitioners and all interested parties. We 


want to be able to do that in advance, so I 


don't want to be in this, you know, position 


again. And June 12th -- by the time we get the 


workgroup back together and work on these 


issues, you know -- comes up kind of quickly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? Again I remind 


the Board that if -- if you pass this motion, 


you also are extending the -- the issue 


further, but that's -- that is certainly an 


option that's open. It closes part of it and 

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keeps part of it open, in effect. And I think, 


Mike, that's what you were speaking against at 


that point. 


Other comments? Board members, just -- this is 


not on the main motion, but if the motion pass, 


how many of you are prepared to meet in person 


on June -- is it June 12th? 


 MS. MUNN: It was June 12th, but I think that 


ought to depend largely on whether or not NIOSH 


can get the requested information back, as -- 


as Mark said. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I don't know if anyone from 


NIOSH is prepared to make a commitment on that 


today. Brant is sort of moving -- he's -- he's 


deliberating with Jim Neton, I think, and -- 


kind of put -- put them on the spot, as well, 


Brant and... 


 DR. ULSH: Could -- on the second part of Dr. 


Melius's motion about additional clarification 


that you would like to see, could we get a 


little better feel for what kind of a product 


you're asking for from NIOSH on those three 


issues -- thorium, Building 81 prior to 1960, 


and I believe neutrons after 1958. 


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flesh that out tonight? I think that -- you 


know, I -- generally we're looking for that 


proof of principle question, but I think Wanda 


has already asked that we might want to be 


clear in exactly what we're looking for there, 


and maybe just -- you know, just discuss 


schedule tomorrow morning or whatever, but -- 


 DR. WADE: We could leave schedule till 


tomorrow morning. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, unless we know -- unless 


NIOSH knows what we're talking about, they 


would be very, I think, reluctant to commit to 


a timetable, number one. Number two, unless we 


spell it out, we've just added uncertainty to 


the -- to the system. So I want to press the 


Board a little bit. We need to have some 


clarity here if -- if this is to be the -- the 


case, we need to be very clear on what is to be 


expected, what the Board product will be -- 


again, I don't want to drag this on. I don't 


want to come back in a month and say well, we 


need another month or whatever it is. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think the -- the timeliness 


issue is upon us. Mike's point is well taken, 

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and if -- if we are to delay, we have to have a 


good reason with an expected outcome that we 


will be able to make a decision then -- within 


a few weeks. The Chair certainly can tolerate 


that, probably more so than the workers, but -- 


but we simply need to move ahead on this, so -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'd just ra-- I'd just rather try 


to write something out than try to describe, 


you know -- I'd rather put a little thought 


into it and write it out and provide it 


tomorrow morning, if that's okay, rather than 


just trying to do it ad hoc here around a 


table. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now let me now suggest a 


strategy then, Board members. You have a 


motion. We've had some discussion. We've had 


-- the Chair's trying to get a sense of the 


level of support for this motion, because if 


there's not a lot of support, then we need to 


defeat it and move on. If there is some 


support, then I'm going to suggest that we 


table the motion and get the wording defined 


for action tomorrow morning. I think Mike has 


spoken against the motion. Phil, do you have a 


comment? 

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 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes, I've got just one comment. 


On the timeliness issue, we need to set a 


deadline where we give these people either a 


yes or no answer instead of dragging this on 


and on and on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, precisely my point. Thank 


you, Phil. 


Others? Anyone wish to speak for or against 


the motion? I think it would be helpful to get 


some idea of the level of support here. That 


will help us... 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mike, another comment, then Wanda 


Munn. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, I'd just like to point out, 


you know, we're -- looks like we're in a way 


marching down a path to ask NIOSH to go back to 


the well and -- and do something else, when in 


Section 8.0 of their SEC evaluation report 


they've said that they have enough information 


to determine it is feasible to estimate the 


dose with sufficient accuracy for this class. 


So if that information is available to them, in 


their opinion, you know, why -- why should we 


give them more time to go back and then try to 

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come up with some other information? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Anything that requires a further 


postponement of this issue is difficult for 


everyone concerned. It's difficult for every 


single one of these petitioners, and it's 


difficult for everyone sitting at this table. 


And I think, from what we have heard today from 


Congressional staff, the Senator and from the 


Governor, they are quite eager to get on with 


this. 


NIOSH has said that they are capable of doing 


these -- these dose reconstructions, and we 


have an abundance of evidence that they can and 


have in the past done so. I personally would 


like to see us make a definitive decision one 


way or the other today, if we can possibly do 


so. I understand the concern with respect to 


establishing precedent and proof of principle, 


but the proof of principle with respect to 


every other aspect of these dose 


reconstructions has been shown to us 


repeatedly, especially in the working group, on 


more than one occasion. I would prefer to see 


the vote on the entire SEC request done today, 

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segmented or not. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim Melius and then 


Gen Roessler. 


 DR. MELIUS: No, I'll -- I don't have any 


comments right now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: I think as a Board, we have 


mostly been able to reach consensus or close to 


consensus on many things, and I think at this 


point I see the Board fairly divided on this 


issue. If we were to vote today on the whole 


petition, I think we'd be divided. Plus we're 


missing one Board member. I think that this is 


a -- I -- I don't like to see the people in 


this area put off for a while, but I think we 


can reach a fair decision if we do allow a 


little more time, so I -- I'm willing to vote 


in favor of Jim's motion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other comments? Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Reluctantly. I think -- I just 


want to remind fellow Board members that our -- 


our SEC procedures do ask for this proof of 


principle. You know, we -- we say that we will 


look at this, so you know, when -- and then 


there -- there -- there is a -- I guess there's 

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a difference between do they have the 


information -- you know, NIOSH'll probably say, 


in the case of the neutron issue, they have the 


information, but they haven't necessarily shown 


us how they're going to mo-- so we're asking -- 


well, show us how it's going to work and how 


it's going to be bounding. I think their 


evaluation report was -- was stating that they 


had the information available, but -- you know, 


so we -- and that's specifically why we wrote 


those procedures that way, because we said 


well, you know, that's kind of a -- there's a 


lot in the middle there, and we want to sort of 


see how this is going to work and -- and give 


ourselves assurances that we're going to be 


able to bound doses for all members of the 


class. So I -- I think we have to remember 


that that is in our own procedures and, to that 


extent, I think we should, you know, follow our 


own procedures. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Lockey. 


 DR. LOCKEY: I -- I've -- I think this working 


group and Mark in particular have put an 


extensive amount of time into the Rocky Flat 


issue and a very complex exposure situation, no 

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doubt about it. I think NIOSH has put in an 


extensive amount of time, as has our consulting 


group. I think that I would support Jim's 


motion in that if we can get this done 


relatively quickly, within 30 days, 


particularly under the direction of Mark and 


how knowledgeable he is in this -- in this 


particular situation, it's worth that 30 days. 


I don't think it's worth any longer than that, 


but I think it's worth that 30 days. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Other comments, pro or con, 


in support or in -- in opposition to the motion 


that's before us? 


MS. THOMPSON: (From the audience and off-


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now since we -- we don't have the 


exact wording, you can -- I can ask the Board 


if you wish to have what we might call a straw 


vote, with the understanding the final wording 


would come back for review. Or we can table. 


MS. THOMPSON: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) decide. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Do you wish to vote now on the 


motion as it's been presented, Board members? 


 (Whereupon, multiple Board members responded 

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simultaneously.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we will vote by a show of 


hands. Those who favor the motion, raise your 


right hand. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. 


 Opposed, raise your hand? 


 (Negative responses) 


One, two, three. 


So the motion carries by a vote of seven to 


three. We will have a final wording of that 


motion, the refined wording which would be in a 


form that could go forward to the Secretary, 


tomorrow for a final review. That wording 


would specify that the 1952 to '58 period -- it 


would recommend that that group become part of 


the Special Exposure Cohort; it would recommend 


that proof of principle on those identified 


items be provided within basically one month by 


NIOSH and that we would be committed to voting 


up or down on the rest of those time periods 


within one month. Okay? 


Yes, a comment from the petitioner. 


MS. THOMPSON: With all due respect, we came 


here today wanting a vote on the petition as a 

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whole. Okay? It is clear that the law is not 


being followed. The law states that as the day 


we submitted the petition could you or could 


you not accurately reconstruct dose. I think 


you have proven, by all the changes that have 


been made, the new models and everything, that 


you could not accurately reconstruct dose, or 


NIOSH could not -- excuse me, I'm not blaming 


the Board -- NIOSH could not accurately 


reconstruct dose at that point in time. This 


delay is unacceptable to the people that are 


dying, and I will defer to my previous 


statement that our workers should not have to 


fight with the government when they're fighting 


for their lives. The purpose of this 


legislation was to grant timely and fair 


compensation to our workers. These models are 


not tested, they're not proven, they're not 


tried, they're not true. It's science and it ­

- the question is not at some future day can 


NIOSH reconstruct dose, although I'm not sure 


they ever can do it accurately. This has gone 


on long enough. Please vote. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. The vote has been 


recorded. We will review the wording tomorrow, 

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and then we will plan to meet again -- we will 


try to make an effort to have that meeting here 


in one month, if we can make the arrangements. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We -- we're 


going to move on to our next agenda item. I'll 


allow -- this is one of the petitioners. We'll 


allow an additional comment here. 


 MR. HARDEN: Sir, with all due respect, if this 


is prolonged, I would ask that the petitioners 


have a chance to rebut some of the information 


that has occurred this afternoon. For 


instance, we haven't had access to this report 


that was just revealed today. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MR. HARDEN: And the other thing I would do is, 


in support of Jennifer Thompson, I think this 


has developed into some kind of a charade and 


that -- that's not a reflection on you as 


individuals. It's a collection of information 


that we've suffered for two years, and I think 


it's long overdue that we put these intellects 


in their places and we bring a decision to 


these folks that have been waiting by the 

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sidelines all these months and years to have 


their claims answered one way or another. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. HARDEN: Thank you for the opportunity. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Could I just ask a point of 


clarification? Did you just vote against the 


majority of the petition or not? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, we --


UNIDENTIFIED: Or did you just postpone the 


majority of the petition? 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we -- the vote was in favor of 


the motion. The motion was to grant -- or to 


recommend SEC status for the period of 1952 to 


'58 and to defer action on the -- the remaining 


time periods for one month until we could get 


the proof of principle information from NIOSH, 


at which time --


 (Whereupon, multiple audience members spoke 


simultaneously.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: The rest of those time periods. 


The recommendation is to include '52 to '58, to 


recommend that time period as part of the 


Special Exposure Cohort. 


UNIDENTIFIED: The motion has three specific 


issues in the second part for the post-1958, so 

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are you limiting the discussion to those three 


specific issues, are you -- and saying 


everybody else is out, or not? I don't think 


people here understand what you just did. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let -- let me try to 


clarify. 


UNIDENTIFIED: For the post-'58, I don't think 


they understand whether you've rejected most of 


them or you're only going to look at those 


three issues, or is the whole post-'58 still 


open for discussion? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, the whole post-'58 is open, 


but those are the issues that the Board needs 


closure on. I think we're clo-- we have 


closure on the other items. Those are the 


issues that the Board has not -- has asked for 


additional clarification from, so those other 


time periods -- we're not recommending that 


they not be included. We're simply saying we ­

- we will vote on those in one month. The 


first period -- the Board has recommended that 


that period be added to the Special Exposure 


Cohort. 


Did -- did -- is that clear, or did I not say 


that very well? 

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 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess to -- out of 


tho-- out of those three follow-up items that 


we have, the only -- the -- the neutrons extend 


from '59 through '70, that issue. The -- the 


881 is an early time period issue, pre-1960. 


The thorium one would potentially affect the 


entire time frame of the site. So I think, to 


that extent, the entire time per-- period's 


left op-- open, but only really with regard to 


thorium in this case. I think that's -- to be 


clear, you know. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) What about (unintelligible)? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) Case by case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I -- I just said post-1970, 


thorium still is potentially an exposure 


potential, so we have to see proof of principle 


on the thorium. We've asked for that, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Dr. Roessler, a comment? 


DR. ROESSLER: I think we have members of the 


press here who will want to meet some deadlines 


for today and not wait for these details for 

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tomorrow, and I'm not sure that they're clear 


on that first period. I think we said for 


those workers who were monitored or should have 


been monitored for neutrons, so it could mean 


it's not the whole group. 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's correct. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm from Associated Press and I 


would like to know how you decide who should 


have been monitored and who was monitored. Can 


I simply declare that I worked in building 771 


and therefore qualify, or is NIOSH or somebody 


else going to decide whether I should have been 


monitored or whether I was monitored? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Yeah, Mark, can you clarify 


that for us? You can't right now, but -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: No -- yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- it will be part of what we 


provide, because we have to provide that same 


information to the Department of Labor to 


administer this. So the likelihood is it will 


relate to building locations, is my 

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understanding. 


 A question here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I'm from the Rocky Mountain 


News. I'd like to clarify whether the thorium 


issue can apply to everyone or just certain 


people who worked with thorium. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just certain people who 


worked with thorium, and that's correct, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just the individuals who have 


worked with thorium, yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: So the effect of this vote is 


you've excluded almost everyone. Is that 


right? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) You can't prove (unintelligible). 


UNIDENTIFIED: I think they want to know the 


answer to that question -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- on how you voted. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, right now the periods from 


'59 onward are not acted upon. They are 

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deferred till the next meeting. The issues 


will be individuals who were exposed -- or were 


monitored or should have been monitored for 


neutrons, so that's a -- probably a large 


number of people, individuals exposed to 


thorium, and then the -- the building 81 issue, 


so --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) How are you going to 


(unintelligible) the contractors are 


(unintelligible) documentation (unintelligible) 


prove you were out there? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) report. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm -- a question --


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) the steel 


workers signed the cards, they kept records for 


the steel workers. You have numerous vendors, 


contractors, people that moved in and out of 


those buildings prior to '59. How you going to 


prove who it was that came and gone? How --


how you going to prove it? A lot of them are 

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probably not even around anymore. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Gen, did you have an 


additional comment, or -- okay. 


Members of the press, do you have any 


additional questions that you need clarified? 


Okay. 


Dr. Lockey has a comment. 


 DR. LOCKEY: This comment is -- is more generic 


in nature, and it has to do with when the 


EEOICPA law was passed, it was a laudable 


effort initially to recognize and provide at 


least some compensation for people who were 


injured in the nuclear production industry. It 


was a patched-together law -- I think Jim would 


probably support that -- trying to get it 


passed through a very difficult political 


situation. 


Over the ensuing years, as NIOSH and SC&A and 


this Board have tried to work -- and 


petitioners, particularly petitioners -- have 


tried to work with this law, there are parts of 


it that don't work. It's created conflict and 


it's created frustration and it's been very 


time-consuming. And there's no -- there's no 


question about that. So there's parts of this 

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law that need to be streamlined and fixed -- 


fixed. 


Now you know, we go to St. Louis and we pass 


Mallinckrodt, and the Congressional delegation 


is there, like they are here today, supporting 


their constituency. They get their SCE (sic). 


But you know, I'm not -- it's not clear to me 


that, other than representing their state, 


we're representing everybody in the United 


States. This is a bipartisan issue -- 


Republican, Democrat -- 'cause these plants 


were spread throughout the United States. The 


law needs to be updated, streamlined and made 


more user-friendly. 


If I was in your situation and I got a 48 


percent PC, and my neighbor that I worked with 


for 30 years got a 52 percent PC, then I would 


be just beside myself. That's understandable. 


That is clearly understandable, and that type 


of conflict needs to be eliminated. There's 


ways to do it and Dr. Melius has suggested ways 


in the past. 


It's really your Congressional people who need 


to step forward and not just represent you here 


in Colorado, but represent the rest of the 

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workers in this industry throughout the United 


States to streamline this law and update it to 


make it more user-friendly. It's their duty. 


We're trying to work within the law, and we 


have good people in NIOSH who are -- who are 


public servants, who are preventive health, 


public health oriented. They're doing their 


damnedest to get the work done, and SC&A's the 


same way, and people on this Board are the same 


way. But we were constrained by a law that has 


a catch-22 -- 180 days to reconstruct radiation 


doses, generate new science that takes -- that 


can take years? That's what the law is -- it 


put us into conflict, and it needs to be 


changed. It needs to be updated. It needs to 


be streamlined, and the conflict needs to be 


taken out of it. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. 


MS. FRANK: I'm Laura Frank from the Rocky 


Mountain News. So the press just wants to be 


clear for what we report next. The petition 


before you includes everyone who ever worked at 


Rocky Flats. You have carved out, if I'm 


clear, a 1952 to 1958 piece of people who were 


exposed -- potentially, who -- which should 

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have been monitored or were monitored for 


neutron dose. Does that mean the rest of the 


potential class is still before you, or only 


those people who fall into the three categories 


that you're continuing to look at for next 


month? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Only th-- only those other 


categories that we're looking forward to. 


MS. FRANK: So everyone else is out. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's right. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, no, next month we would be 


looking at the other time periods. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right --


 MR. GRIFFON: Only three categories. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- right. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's correct. That's correct, 

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I 

that's correct. 


Okay. Let's take a brief ten-minute break. 


know the press folks may have additional 


questions. We'll -- we'll catch our breath 


here and then we'll resume. Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:20 p.m. 


to 3:00 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's -- I'd like to ask you 


to be seated and we'll come back to order. 


It's -- it's very clear to the Chairman that 


there's been a lot of confusion on what action 


was taken and -- and what was covered and what 


wasn't. Let -- let me try to clarify and I -- 


I'm aware that sometimes clarifications make 


things even more confusing. 


The action that the Board has taken will 


recommend to the Secretary the addition of 


special cohort status to a group of individuals 


from the '52 to '58 time frame who were 


monitored, or should have been monitored, for 


neutrons. So it's a subset of the total group 


in that time period. 


We have not taken specific action on the rest 


of the time periods, including '59 to '64, 


which was segmented out; '65 to '68; '69 to 

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'70; or '70 and onward. 


Now there was some question as to -- since the 


neutron, the -- and thorium in Building 81 


issues tend to focus on those three middle 


groups, did that automatically exclude '70 and 


beyond. It's the Chair's ruling that the '70 


and beyond is still an open question for two 


reasons. Number one, the thorium issue could 


indeed extend beyond '70; we don't know that. 


Number two, it would be my intent that the 


Board specifically go on record with '70 and 


beyond period, to either vote it up or vote it 


down, so it's very clear where the Board stands 


on that; that it not simply be -- fall by the 


wayside simply by exclusion. So it would -- 


it's the Chair's intent that at our next 


meeting we take specific action on all of the 


remaining time periods so that everybody knows 


what the recommendation is on all of those and 


what groups are specifically covered. 


So what is -- what has transpired is the 


recommendation to add one subset to the Special 


Exposure Cohort, and the possibility then is 


open to add additional subsets from the 


remaining time periods. So I hope that is a 

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little more clear than it apparently was at the 


time of the break. And we're --


UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we're not -- we're not sure 


whether the media will make it more or less 


clear as they attempt to explain this, because 


they've talked to different folks and I think 


have gotten different versions of what Board 


members thought they were voting on, and so -- 


and that's unfortunate, and I'm -- I'm sorry if 


that occurred. But we -- we -- we hope that 


that adds some clarity. 


Yes, I'll allow a question here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: May I ask a question? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay, you say you're going to 


vote on people prior to '59 on for thorium and 


-- 'cause the neutron -- photon thing -- photon 


thing. How you going to prove from '59 on up 


for everybody else that might have been exposed 


to thorium? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I think that remains to -- 


for the Board when we get our material next 


time. I can't predict what the Board might do 

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at that point, but at least those time periods 


are still open before us, so that will be the 


main order, and basically the only order of 


business as we return, hopefully in a month, 


and -- and try to pin down the final answer on 


those. 

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MAY 3, 2007
 

PUBLIC COMMENT


 DR. ZIEMER: Good evening, everyone. We're 


going to go ahead and start the public comment 


session of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health. I have a list of individuals 


that have indicated they wished to speak to the 


assembly this evening and we'll just take the 


list in the order given. 


I do want to -- many of you were here last 


night, and I will repeat a couple of things in 


case you weren't here, and that is that this 


Board is an advisory board. We're not a board 


that makes the final decisions on anything. 


That's sometimes good and sometimes bad. 


Sometimes we wish we could, but the fact of the 


matter is we simply give advice. We're -- we 


do not adjudicate the cases. We evaluate the 


program, really is what it amounts to. That is 


the dose reconstruction program. 


We do have a -- we do have a responsibility to 


provide an opinion on Special Exposure Cohort 


petitions. We have -- before the Board at this 


meeting there are five petitions that are being 


examined, one of which is Rocky Flats. And as 

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many of you know, we had an extensive 


discussion, a public comment on that last 


night. The Board had that action before it 


earlier today. And if you weren't here for 


that, you may not know that the Board 


recommended approval of a portion of the time 


frame for the Rocky Flats for the neutron 


workers. There are some other portions of that 


petition that will be finalized in -- at our 


next meeting, next month, which we hope will be 


back here so that those of you from Rocky Flats 


can be present. 


There are several folks -- well, I -- I also 


want to mention, because it's sometimes 


confusing for folks, and that is that the folks 


you see here -- we do not work for NIOSH or for 


Department of Labor. We are just an 


independent board. I often introduce the 


individuals. A number of these, like -- like 


me, I'm a retired educator, and we have a mix 


of people on this Board, some of whom are 


retired, some of whom are still working; some 


of whom have technical backgrounds, some who 


are in the medical field, some who are 


individuals who are union workers. So we have 

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a cross-section of folks here on this Board. 


We are not part of NIOSH. We are not part of 


Department of Labor. So we're -- our job is to 


give kind of an independent look at things. 


We have to struggle, as it were, with a lot of 


viewpoints -- the viewpoints of the 


petitioners, the viewpoints of the agencies, 


and we even have our own contractor that we 


hire to help us evaluate the various issues. 


So it -- it's a job that this Board does, not 


only here at the Rocky Flats, but dealing with 


sites all over the country. 


We will be hearing from individuals from some 


of those -- representing some of those other 


sites in fact tonight, but I notice here there 


are still a few Rocky Flats folks and I'll just 


take them in the order that they are. We have 


imposed now a ten-minute time limit on people. 


That's something new, but in order to provide 


time for everyone to -- to give their remarks, 


we ask you to -- to stick with the ten-minute 


time limit. Also, as I mentioned last night, 


the ten-minute is not a goal to be achieved but 


is an upper limit. So if your remarks are less 


than that, that's quite fine. 

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Jack Weaver, who identifies himself as a 


retired Rocky Flats worker. [name redacted] 


 DR. WADE: [name redacted] has left. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Signed up earlier today but 


perhaps couldn't make it. 


Cliff DelForge? That's Cliff, you've got the 


first mike here. 


MR. DELFORGE: My name is Cliff DelForge -- 


Clifford DelForge. I worked at Rocky Flats for 


35 years, primarily in the areas of 


radiological safety. I'm not here on my behalf 


'cause I'm not sick. I -- primarily involved 


in here because of my [Identifying Information 


Redacted]. He worked at Rocky Flats for 24 


years and he is ill, and he is -- his illness 


was -- I think I was able to prove pretty 


significantly that it was caused at Rocky Flats 


-- by his work at Rocky Flats. 


I'm not here to talk about [Name Redacted] 


either. I'm just going to make some general 


comments, if I may. 


You've heard a lot of testimony from people. 


Some of it -- a fair amount of it was not 


probably technically appropriate for dose 


reconstruction, but all of it was morally, 

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ethically and emotionally valid for the SEC. 


I think we've kind of missed the boat on some 


of this stuff. Otherwi-- some of the people 


who got up here and talked were talking about 


specific instances where they were showing 


that, because of the work that they were doing 


and the places that they were, that they should 


have had a -- some dose on their dosimeters, 


should have had some dose, and that in most 


cases it came back either as a zero dose or as 


no current data available. 


I got -- that got me thinking about my own 


personal situation, and there are a couple of 


things that I'll discuss here shortly on my own 


personal experience regarding the validity of 


our dosimetry program. And that's fairly 


important 'cause you're talking about making a 


recommendation on whether or not to approve 


Rocky Flats for the SEC status. 


The last time I went out to the Rocky Flats 


plant -- I retired in 1995, and the last time I 


actually went out to the plant proper was as 


part of one of the many programs that I was 


involved with -- the uranium study, the 


plutonium study, the americi-- I mean the 

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beryllium study and the chemical study. And 


while I was out there I was talking to a 


gentleman and he was explaining to me that they 


had just started a new program where they were 


bringing back the film badges from the Denver 


Tech Center and they were going to reread these 


badges and then they were going to compare that 


data with the data that they had on the 


existing documentation. And the very first 


batch of badges they brought back, one 


gentleman, they reread his badge; his 


documentation showed zero, his bad (sic) was 


reading 1,000 millirem. They were off by a 


factor of 1,000 on that one individual. 


I don't know how far they went with this. I --


I would be willing to bet that they did not 


read every badge and bring every badge back, 


'cause they're talking about a lot of badges 


over many, many years. But that one instance 


should have indicated at least that they should 


have probably done that. 


The reason that -- if I understand it 


correctly, the reason that there were so many 


no current data available on the documentation 


was because they didn't read the badges. They 

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didn't have the time. It was just physically 


impossible to read all the badges, so they just 


put down no current data available. 


 I'm personally aware of three unauthorized 


experiments that were done to determine the 


validity of our dosimetry program. Now 


americium salts are the highest level of 


radiation that I've ever seen at Rocky Flats, 


and that was my job as a radiation monitor when 


I first got into radiological safety. I had a 


reading off of a fiber pack of the beryllium 


salts that read 22,000 millirem, which is 


extremely high, especially for Rocky Flats. A 


gentleman was -- I don't know if he was coerced 


into it or anything, but he -- several -- a 


couple of the RCTs or the radiation monitors 


said we ought to test this program, so they had 


him put his badge in a can of americium salts 


for 30 minutes. I don't know what the reading 


on that particular can was, but it had to be 


fairly high and there had to be some exposure 


to that badge. And his results came back zero. 


Another guy -- a different period of time -- 


put his badge in a glove on the americium line, 


which was the highest gamma radiation line at 

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the -- in 771 building, and he left it in there 


for the majority of his shift and he sent it 


in, and there had to be significant radiation 


exposure to that badge. It came back zero. 


I personally -- I was assigned to a special 


project as a radiation monitor. We had to have 


special badges because the material we were 


working with had a very robust gamma associated 


with it. I must have been in a union frame of 


mind at the time because I decided I was going 


to do my own test. All the other people who 


had the special badges wore their badges on the 


inside of their lead aprons and they were 


required to wear lead aprons the entire time 


they worked with the material. I set my badge 


on the outside, looking for some -- there had 


to be some difference between my badge and 


everybody else's -- and it came back zero. 


There was no difference. 


In my son's case, doing some investigation, I 


found two instances where they'd found a small 


amount of -- of exposure on a badge on two of 


his different badge, and they said well, you 


know, this -- this can't be real. It's not --


it's bogus, so we're just going to knock 

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everything back to zero. 


I firmly believe that their standard operating 


procedure was whenever there was any kind of an 


anomaly with their program, if they had a high 


reading here or something like that, they 


simply said well, this can't be right, it can't 


be true so we'll just forget it and knock it 


down to zero. I mean if they were doing 


anything else, they would have come and 


investigated. And in my case if there was -- I 


had a high exposure on my badge, somebody 


should have come down and said, you know, 


what's -- what's the problem here, at which 


case I probably would have been in a little bit 


of trouble because I did this in an 


unauthorized manner. 


I think -- and I think we missed the boat 


because, with the people that talked about 


their specific situations and my own 


experiences, we should have gotten together 


with all the people that -- from Rocky Flats, 


all the people work in the back areas, and sat 


down and interviewed them and said what 


personal experiences do you have that would 


show that the documentation of the dosimetry 

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program was not up to snuff, it wasn't doing 


what it was designed to do. I think we could 


have provided you with a very large document. 


I think everybody -- 'cause everybody that I 


talk to just casually said yeah, yeah, I know 


this situation. This happened in my case, and 


everything else. 


It's kind of disheartening to sit and listen to 


Mark say, you know, that he -- he's perfectly 


comfortable that there was no credible 


evidence, I guess, to -- that there was any 


problems with the dosimetry program. I don't 


believe that. I believe that there were some 


problems with it. I think that the -- with the 


numbers of no current data available, I don't 


know how you can possibly extrapolate -- and 


that's another thing. 


If you're talking about well, we're going to 


extrapolate here, we're going to calculate 


here, we're going to -- you know, you -- just 


making up numbers, is all you're going to do is 


make up numbers, and I don't think you can do 


it accurately. I don't think there's enough 


information that you really need to have to do 


that. 

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The -- you can't use situations with other 


plants with regard to Rocky Flats. We had --


we had unique materials, we had unique 


mixtures, we had unique processes. You can't 


say well, what happened over here -- we're 


going to say well, we can say that the same 


thing happened over here. 


You can't use common denominators. You look at 


people as individuals, and you don't know if a 


person got a exposure in a -- in an hour, or in 


a week or in a month if his badge was on a 


monthly basis and he got a total over that 


period of time, or if he was in a back area one 


hour and got that -- that exposure. You don't 


have that kind of information to know who was 


working what lines and how long they were there 


and anything else. There's just so much 


information out there that's -- that you need 


to have in order to do a valid thing -- at 


least in my opinion. 


It's kind of funny, it's -- it's almost like 


this program, this compensation program, was 


like a fresh zebra kill. And the top predator, 


the Department of Energy, got in there ripping 


off huge chunks of flesh, to the tune of $90 

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million in paperwork that went in their 


pockets. And isn't it amazing that the two 


people that were involved in that program 


resigned shortly after that came to light -- 


not because of that. No, it didn't have 


anything to do with that. They were going to 


retire anyhow. And -- and now the vultures and 


the jackals are picking at the -- the bones of 


this thing. And they've apparently done a 


pretty good job, at least on one leg of the 


beast. 


I saw this article in the paper today, Rocky 


Mountain News, and it says here that the 


government is about to run out of money to 


complete dose reconstruction. They're about to 


run out of money. So the vultures have picked 


that leg clean, pretty close to it. 


And now I ask you, what are we going to do now? 


Are we going to -- when it runs out of money 


are we just going to say well, we're just going 


to put it on hold until we get some more money 


and start doing our job again? I got a good 


idea. Maybe what we can do is do a kind of a 


pool and see how many more Rocky Flats 


employees are going to die in the interim. 

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We need to have some processes done -- we need 


them done now. We need to have -- I think the 


things that you've heard -- what they do to me. 


Obviously I have an agenda of my own. I've got 


a son who's ill. I've got friends who are ill. 


I would ask you right now -- I would ask that 


you all unanimously recommend to whoever is in 


charge that any further dose reconstruction 


should be discontinued immediately. It's a 


waste of time and a waste of money. And I'd 


also recommend that you unanimously recommend 


that Rocky Flats be given the SEC status. I 


don't ask you to do this because you feel 


compassion for the people who are ill. I don't 


ask you to do this because you may be angry at 


some of the way that some of the people were 


treated. I ask you to do this because it's 


scientifically appropriate to do it. Thank 


you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Cliff. Then [Name 


Redacted], -- is [Name Redacted], with us? 


 (No response) 


Okay, we'll come back and check. [Name 


Redacted] I think is the last name. I'm trying 


to read the first name. Is there a [Name 

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Redacted]? Rocky Flats retired person -- [Name 


Redacted]?


 UNIDENTIFIED: (From the audience and off 


microphone) What was it? I can't hear you very 


well. The sound system is very muffled. 


 DR. ZIEMER: [Name Redacted] is -­

UNIDENTIFIED: No, I'm sorry. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Not [Name Redacted]? Okay. Next
 

is Dr. Dan McKeel, and I believe Dr. McKeel's 


representing the Dow Madison petition. 


 DR. MCKEEL: Good evening, Dr. Ziemer and the 


Board. Actually tonight I want to talk about 


our other site, General Steel. I do have --


 DR. ZIEMER: I think tomorrow you'll have an 


opportunity then I believe as the petitioner to 


 DR. MCKEEL: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- talk about the Dow site, yes. 


 DR. MCKEEL: Dr. Ziemer was kind enough to 


allow me -- I had a rather complex comment 


tonight, so I made that in writing, appropriate 


to what the Board has just decided, and I'll 


try to keep this short for you. The remarks I 


want to make tonight are for my colleague, John 


Ramspott, who you all know. And I have 

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basically two brief remarks. 


The first one is about the Battelle task order 


16 contract, and as you heard yesterday, Larry 


Elliott announced that due to fund shortages at 


NIOSH, this contract would soon be terminating, 


at the end of this month, with no further work 


done and all monies spent. This is an 


important contract to us because both the Dow 


site and the General -- General Steel 


Industries sites are under this contract. 


As you know, the original contract was to have 


been for 12 months and was to have ended last 


October, and has been extended. There were, as 


far as I'm aware, three dose reconstruction 


guidance documents that have been produced, 


TIBs 5000, 6000, 6001. I heard Larry yesterday 


say that there were 16 site-specific appendices 


to cover the 256 sites that were charged to 


Battelle to review. General Steel is 


apparently one of those 16 appendices. We 


don't know when that appendix will materialize, 


although I was very encouraged to see that the 


first four appendices were posted on the -- on 


the OCAS web site today. 


 Mr. Elliott also told us -- told our group that 

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384 

Dow, which is another site, will not have a 


site-specific appendix and Dow also has no site 


profile. The original intent, and the reason 


I'm bringing this up tonight, was to generate 


appendices for all 256 sites. And I derived 


that idea because the OCAS web site right now 


says the following about Battelle TIB-6000. 


Quote, Following the main body of this document 


is a collection of appendices, with one 


appendix for each AWE site that performed 


metal-working operations, and the TIB is about 


uranium and thorium -- end quote. 


Only 308 of the more than 1,400 claims, or 


about 22 percent of the total, have been 


completed dose reconstructions at Battelle. An 


unstated number of 83.14 SECs may be 


forthcoming, and added work remains for other 


branches of NIOSH to complete undone tasks. 


My comment is that this doesn't really seem 


like very satisfactory overall performance on 


this contract, given the significant time 


extension. And the comment for the whole 


EEOICPA program is that in a time like this of 


constrained funding for NIOSH operations is -- 


was the Battelle task order -- was it a wise 

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385 

investment, considering basically the low 


overall productivity on all the major goals. 


The second comment tonight is -- in a -- in a 


way I apologize, but I came to you tonight, 


again, about the General -- I mean the Granite 


City Steel naming issue because, although we 


have brought that up repeatedly to the Board, 


that problem still persists today, and I want 


to give you a -- a very practical reason why 


it's important. 


 John Ramspott and I have jointly written in our 


written comments a detailed recounting of two 


claims, and both of those together show the 


Department of Energy, Department of Labor and 


NIOSH have really not dealt adequately with 


this Granite City Steel naming error and the 


description of the facility at DOE. 


Claim number one was from a [Identifying 


Information Redacted] filed EEOICPA claims in 


2004. He went through the entire dose 


reconstruction process, was assigned a 


probability of causation of 36.23 percent, and 


then he was denied in April of 2005. 


The problem is that Granite City Steel did no 


AEC uranium work, and was a different site at a 

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different location from Gra-- General Steel 


Industries, which was the real covered site. 


GSI did perform Betatron non-destructive 


testing on Mallinckrodt uranium ingots from 


1953 to 1966. In contrast, Granite City Steel 


didn't have any Betatrons. 


We had obtained the redacted version of this 


claim from NIOSH by the FOIA process, and we 


got that because this was one of the four dose 


reconstructions that have been performed for 


Granite City Steel -- or correctly named, 


General Steel Industries. 


We then located the worker's children, one of 


whom verified that it -- one of her -- that her 


claim was one of the ones that was dose 


reconstructed. She verified that her father 


always [Identifying information Redacted] from
 

Granite City Steel, always [Identifying 


information Redacted] work, and never set foot 


at GSI, even after Granite City Steel bought 


the GSI grounds and property in 1974. 


Well, we were interested in that because, as I 


say, there've been a very low production of 


completed dose reconstructions. John and I 


believe in fact that probably all four DRs that 

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have been attributed to General Steel 


Industries may have actually been done on 


Granite City Steel workers in error. In our 


written comment we provide indisputable 


documentation that the original facility 


misidentification occurred at the Department of 


Energy, and went unrecognized by Labor and 


NIOSH during the dose reconstruction process, 


including assignment of a POC of 36.23 percent. 


The second claim highlighted in our written 


comment is that of an authentic [Identifying 


Information Redacted] GSI employee who was a 


[Identifying Information Redacted]. He was told
 

by a Department of Labor supervisor and by 


Social Security that he really worked at 


National Roll Company in Pennsylvania, and that 


GSI was not a covered site. It took multiple 


calls and a FAXed newspaper story to convince 


Labor that claimant number two worked at GSI, 


that GSI was a real covered site, and that his 


claim would be processed. And -- and that was 


effective, but he still awaits his dose 


reconstruction, along with 208 other people 


with claims at NIOSH from General Steel 


Industries. 

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In light of these two claims that I think are 


well documented, we therefore are requesting 


that the Department of Labor re-examine all of 


the 305 denied Granite City Steel and GSI 


claims with respect to the site employment 


issue. After this meeting is over we will work 


with the Illinois Congressional delegation to 


request a remedy in a formal way. Therefore, 


we will assist the agencies with the -- this 


effort if -- if they ask us to do so. 


We think that several hundreds of claimants 


could have been affected. There are now 819 


Part B and E ostensible GSI claims, and 546 


ostensible GSI cases. We need to know for sure 


how many claims were denied (a), from people 


who never worked at GSI, and (b), from workers 


who worked at GSI but were denied in the early 


years because both Department of Labor and 


Energy misconstrued the name and location of 


GSI as the authentic covered facility, thinking 


it was Granite City Steel. 


 The DOE facilities list database and the DOL 


statistics by state web sites have only been 


partly corrected in this regard. 


And -- and the final comment is that John and I 

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389 

at least hope one day that the children 


claimants of claim number one worker will get 


an apology, and I think it needs to be a 


special apology from all three of those 


agencies. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dan. And I have the --


the more extensive copy. I think we can get 


this onto the web site perhaps and I'll ask the 


-- NIOSH to do that. 


 DR. MCKEEL: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Also, Dan, I believe you have been 


in contact with Pete Turic (sic), have you, 


from Labor? I --


 DR. WADE: Turcic. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- or Turcic. We want to make 


sure that you're not relying on our -- 


 DR. MCKEEL: No, sir. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- our --


 DR. MCKEEL: Right, that's what I meant to say. 


I --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- proceedings to see that this 


gets --


 DR. MCKEEL: -- obviously this has to be taken 


up with all three --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 

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390

 DR. MCKEEL: -- agencies, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I think I knew that you were 


going to do that, I just want to make -- 


confirm --


 DR. MCKEEL: I did transmit my e-mail copy sent 


to you to Mr. Turcic and to Libby White at 


Department of Energy --


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. 

 DR. MCKEEL: -- so they would be of this -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. 

 DR. MCKEEL: -- and -- and to Larry Elliott. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Okay, thank you. Jerry 

Mobley from Rocky Flats -- is Jerry with us 


tonight? 


 (No response) 


 Sometimes folks sign these things early in the 


day thinking that they are registering their 


attendance, and they end up on the -- the 


speaking sheet. 


 How about Stan -- is it Beitscher? 


 MR. BEITSCHER: Yes, it is. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Stan. 


 MR. BEITSCHER: Would it be better if I spoke 


from that podium? 


 DR. ZIEMER: You -- you can do either one -- 

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391

 MR. BEITSCHER: The sound is very --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- whatev-- whatever you prefer. 


 MR. BEITSCHER: It may be my ears. The sound 


is very muffled. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, you can try that one, if you 


prefer. 


 MR. BEITSCHER: My name is Stan Beitscher. I 


worked at Rocky Flats from 1963 to 1993. I 


came there when I was 30 years old. I left 


when I was 60 years old, with a number of 


medical conditions. I look very healthy from 


the outside, but I have a number of situations 


internally that are not apparent. But my first 


comments have to do with the special cohort 


program, and I'd like to add to Mr. DelForge's 


comments from a slightly different perspective. 


Let me tell you what my background is. I was a 


research scientist at Rocky Flats in the area 


of metallurgical engineering. I graduated from 


the Colorado School of Mines with a degree in 


metallurgical engineering, with a minor in 


minerals beneficiation. I went to Rensselaer 


Polytechnic Institute and received a master's 


degree in metallurgical engineering with a 


minor in nuclear engineering. I then went back 

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to the Colorado School of Mines, received a PhD 


in metallurgical engineering with a minor in 


physics. 


So I can't really claim that I did not know 


that radiation and toxic material exposure is 


dangerous. I was very well schooled in these 


areas. I'm not a world expert in these areas, 


but I have read thousands upon thousands of 


pages concerning the effects of radiation and 


toxic material exposure in my lifetime. I've 


written hundreds of research papers dealing 


with material science. 


And I can tell you, first of all, that the 


emphasis at Rocky Flats was production first; 


safety, yes, but came second. Nothing would 


take -- would stand in the way of meeting 


production schedules. And although there was 


concern for safety, safety was second. 


Furthermore, the implication that working -- 


for working at Rocky Flats was that largely 


radiation effects on biological systems is 


largely unknown. This is a very crude science. 


In 1963 very little was known about the limits 


of -- of dangerous exposure, not only to 


radiation but to the host of other extremely 

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393 

dangerous materials that were handled at Rocky 


Flats. The list is staggering and almost 


amazing. Every -- virtually every toxic, 


dangerous material was at one time or another 


present in my work area in my -- in the 


research building of Building 79 where I spent 


about 28 of the 30 years. The other year and a 


half was spent in Building 771, which is 


acknowledged as the most dangerous building in 


the United States. 


So to limit compensation based on perhaps the 


absence of some information or some material is 


preposterous. The radiation was widespread and 


the exposure to other toxic material was 


extremely widespread at Rocky Flats. 


Furthermore, you cannot predict biological 


effects based purely on some sort of 


reconstructed dosage effects. Large amounts of 


radiation can-- cannot -- and in some cases, 


not cause biological effects. Small amounts of 


radiation in other species can cause enormous 


effects. And to limit -- to limit compensation 


for horrible conditions for some imaginary 


limit of -- of exposure is preposterous. And I 


stand behind what Mr. DelForge said. 

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394 

First of all, I'd like to add just one other 


comment on that. Dosimetry, and that's a 


subject that I followed very closely in my 


career because I was subject to dosimetry. 
I 


worked in a hot area. I worked in a glovebox. 


I worked in a very high radiation area. 


Dosimetry is -- is not an exact science, and it 


is impossible -- I think, and from my opinion ­

- to reconstruct dosage at Rocky Flats. I -- I 


don't know what else I can tell you, and that's 


the reason that I feel fairly strongly that the 


cohort program should be approved at Rocky 


Flats. The dosimeter program at Rocky Flats 


was run probably you might say to the best of 


the ability of the people running it, but that 


doesn't mean it was run very well. There were 


a great deal of unknowns. 


And dosimetry -- dosimeters are not accurate. 


The placement of dosimeters are not always at 


the right location. People didn't always wear 


their badges. They were not read correctly. 


And furthermore, the science of dosimetry is -- 


is -- is work -- is a work in -- a work in 


progress. It is not an exact science. 


Okay. Let me just switch gears a little bit, 

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395 

if I may, and talk about the compensation 


program. I've studied this compensation 


program for five years. I still don't 


understand it. And let me explain why. 


I have a -- I have a claim in for a number of 


illnesses that are not cancers. I don't 


believe they're cancers yet. To -- without 


being really specific or explicit, I have 


respiratory problems. I also have a very large 


particular gland that causes me tremendous 


discomfort and I have respiratory problems and 


I have a hearing defect, and I feel that all of 


these were at least greatly caused by my 


employment at Rocky Flats. 


Part B -- as I understand the compensation 


program, Part B covers 22 cancers, beryllium 


disease, silicosis and beryllium sensitivity. 


Part E, on the other hand, covers other things, 


but will only compensate you for loss of 


income. 


Now there is no way I can -- I can just-- I can 


understand this. In other words, if you don't 


have these -- one of these 22 cancers, 


berylliosis or silicosis, you're not subject to 


compensation. If you don't have these cancers 

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and you have other conditions, you're only 


compensated if you have -- if you can prove a 


loss of wages. Well, I'm retired. I -- I 


can't prove a loss of wages. But yet I have 


what I consider to be extremely serious medical 


conditions -- perhaps not as serious as some, 


but fairly serious. When I wake up in the 


middle of the night gasping for breath, I think 


it's fairly serious, although it's not cancer. 


I don't understand. I mean I think -- I think 


some reasonable effort was -- was made to make 


the program fair, but there's a great big hole 


in it. And for the life of me, I don't 


understand -- I don't understand why I'm not 


covered for compensation because -- simply 


because I don't have one of these 22 cancers 


yet, or berylliosis or silicosis. 


There are very serious health effects that are 


not cancer, and let me just name three that I 


can think of. There may be a number of others, 


and I just can't think of these others. Noncancerous tumors are not cancers, but tumors 


are very serious medical effects. They're not 


covered by Part B. They may be covered by Part 


E, but my experience is Part E is not very 

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sympathetic to these conditions, and proving 


that these conditions are caused by some sort 


of exposure at Rocky Flats seems to be 


virtually impossible. 


Asthma and other respiratory conditions such as 


congestive obstructive pulmonary disease are 


not cancers, but they're very serious health 


effects, life-threatening health effects, and 


they're not covered by Part B. They're only 


covered -- perhaps, I think -- by Part E. But 


my experience is not very sympathetically. 


So I think there's a ways to go, and I think 


that a greater consideration should be given to 


some of these claims that are not presently 


given, and certainly, to go back to dose 


reconstruction, I think that people working on 


dose reconstruction are benefiting themselves 


by their employment and not really doing 


anything for anyone else. 


Thank you for listening to me. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Stan. I 


understand that we have an individual who's 


called in by phone, [Name Redacted]. [Name 


Redacted], are you on the line? 


 (No response) 

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Is it [Name Redacted]? 


 DR. WADE: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: [Name Redacted], are you on the 

line? 

 (No response) 

 Okay, perhaps not. Let me check back again on 


the other names -- Jerry Mobley? [Name 


Redacted]? Mr. [Name Redacted]? Mr. Weaver --


Jack Weaver? 


 (No responses) 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is this [Name Redacted]? 


 MR. EARLEY: No, Lynn Earley. 


 DR. WADE: Say again, please? 


 MR. EARLEY: Lynn Earley. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Would you like to speak? 


 MR. EARLEY: Yes, I would. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Please proceed. Tell us your name 


again, Lynn --


 MR. EARLEY: Lynn (unintelligible) Early -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: E-a-r-l--


 MR. EARLEY: -- (unintelligible) analyst, 


organic (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. EARLEY: And I am also chair of the 

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International Science Oversight 


(unintelligible), newly-formed (unintelligible) 


to analyze (unintelligible) government agencies 


(unintelligible). I have (unintelligible) that 


I would like to go over. I don't know how much 


time you have, but I have some (unintelligible) 


that I --


 DR. ZIEMER: You have a ten -- you have a ten-


minute limit, sir. 


 MR. EARLEY: -- would like (unintelligible) I 


have to get (unintelligible) to get those so 


I'll (unintelligible) 20 seconds. 


 MS. MUNN: I don't think he heard you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: He's switching phones, I -- 


 DR. WADE: Putting the dog out. 


(Pause) 


 MR. EARLEY: (Unintelligible) serious question 


relative to the whole question of low dose 


exposure. These exposures have been analyzed 


by independent scientists down through the 


years and have been underestimated by many of 


the international bodies, including IAEA and 


the International Commission on Radiological 


Risks. I would hope that this advisory 


committee would take (unintelligible) some of 

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these low dose issues. There is a book that 


recently was published that is entitled 


Chernobyl, 20 Years (unintelligible). It 


documents a whole host of non-cancer effects 


from these Chernobyl exposures, many of which 


were quite low doses. But he Japanese A-bomb 


studies did not document -- in fact, they only 


looked at the mortality (unintelligible) from 


(unintelligible) bomb blast and they were 


looking at cancer mortality exclusively. This 


book, which just came out last year, documents 


a whole host, a whole range of issues 


(unintelligible) anybody on the internet 


(unintelligible) by the European Committee on 


Radiation Risk -- a simple Google for ECRR will 


come to that text -- and interestingly, the 


IAEA, the World Health Organization, the ICRP 


had these Russian studies in hand but never 


translated them. Consequently, they have 


ignored many non-cancer risks. And I listened 


to the testimony quite carefully last night and 


was shocked to find that -- and some of the 


testimony today indicates that there are 


several -- and of course the last speaker 


alluded to other non-cancer risks. 

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Now this of course is something that is being 


overlooked, disregarded and the scientific 


literature has been underestimated because the 


scientists that are doing this work have been 


uniformly almost shunned in the scientific 


community. Give you a classic example. The 


BEIR VII committee, which was organized to take 


cognizance of the latest updated information on 


low dose risk. Unfortunately there were 


members of the (unintelligible) community that 


-- and I was doing freelance and still do 


freelance medical writing -- there were many 


organizations in the public interest community 


that nominated several members to BEIR VII. 


These members were independent scientists, well 


qualified to analyze the effects of low dose. 


There were about a dozen of them. None of them 


were appointed to the BEIR VII committee, and 


obviously many of the people -- and I've been 


doing conflict of interest studies -- many of 


them had conflicts. In fact, right on the 


Advisory Board that I'm addressing right now 


there are three members that I can recognize 


quickly who are in the Health Physics Society, 


two with official positions. Health Physics 

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402 

Society has a position statement, and I quote, 


Below five to ten rem, and which includes 


occupational and environmental exposures, risk 


of health effects are either too small to be 


(unintelligible) or are non-existent. This is 


a (unintelligible) unscientific and completely 


unethical statement. 


The -- there was a paper put out by 


(unintelligible) National Academy of Sciences, 


November 25th, 2003, and the -- there are 15 


cancer experts on this study. Cancer is 


attributable to low doses of ionizing 


radiation, assessing what we really know. 


You'll recognize those in the field. Their 


names (unintelligible) Richard (unintelligible) 


Goodhead, Charles Land of the NCI, John 


(unintelligible) of Harvard, Dale 


(unintelligible), President, Elaine 


(unintelligible), National Cancer 


(unintelligible), Jonathan (unintelligible), 


Richard (unintelligible) and this study that 


they did indicated that there is good evidence 


existing in epidemiological data that suggests 


ten to 50 millisievert exposure an acute dose 


and 50 to 100 millisievert for a protracted 

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403 

exposure, but the scientists will not accept -- 


and this of course refers directly to the 


exposures at our weapons labs -- that 


protracted exposure of small doses of any 


radioactive elements over time have a greater 


effect than the same acute dose that is given ­

- one exposure. Now you will find that most of 


the so-called experts in the field reject this 


theory completely, and yet there's sufficient 


evidence to show otherwise. 


So there are numerous studies in the low dose 


field to absolutely question the 


recommendations that ICRP has put out, 


primarily because it's based upon the A-bomb 


study, as much of the literature is. 


Consequently, what they're not looking at is 


internal emitters, the alpha emitters. 


Certainly the A-bomb study did not, and all of 


the subsequent studies of course do not take 


recognition of these internal emitters, which 


are at least 20 times more serious than 


external emitters, and this has been documented 


again in the literature. 


I've been studying radiation health effects for 


35 years. I'm a retired consumer economics 

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404 

teacher. (Unintelligible) testimony as vice 


president of consumer (unintelligible) Michigan 


in the 1970s, became an early opponent of 


nuclear power because of what I was reading 


about radiation and health effects. What 


nobody has alluded to is the fact that when 


these weapon labs were first organized, the 


Atomic Energy Commission and all of the other 


governmental agencies were given the power to 


put a (unintelligible) label on all radiation 


research, and that meant restricted data and it 


was only available to a few limited persons. 


That of course took place all through the Cold 


War. The (unintelligible) atomic audit by 


Brookings Institution documented how the United 


States (unintelligible) $5.8 billion on these 


atomic weapons development, and it is a wealth 


of information that is contained in that book 


certainly attest to the fact that the secrecy 


that took place (unintelligible) us a 


tremendous amount of (unintelligible) and a 


lack of information in dissemination of 


information, at least up until 1982 -- 1992 


when President Clinton of course put out the 


order -- Executive Order to declassify many of 

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these studies (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Earley, we'd ask you to -- 

 MR. EARLEY: -- (unintelligible) --

 DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Earley, I'm going to ask you 

to try to wrap up. You're at your ten-minute 


limit, so if you could wrap up quickly, thank 


you. 


 MR. EARLEY: All right. I would certainly 


conclude by stating that the dose 


reconstruction program, which not only affects 


these workers in our labs but also applies to 


the atomic veterans, some 400,000 or more 


atomic veterans who were at -- in Japan and in 


the Pacific Theater during the atmospheric 


tests. This process of utilizing dose 


reconstruction is unscientific, has no basis in 


fact. Indeed, much of that information in many 


of the early years was either destroyed, was 


never taken accurately and for anyone to think 


that this is an accurate measure is completely 


preposterous, as has been alluded to by many of 


the speakers. I would say that the speakers I 


heard last night, all of them, certainly 


deserve a honorary degree because they could 


run circles around many of the experts, many of 

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406 

whom I've interviewed as I was doing medical 


writing, so I commend those persons who have 


taken a stand and come out with their testimony 


and I hope that it will bear upon decisions 


that are made, not only by the advisory 


committee but by the agencies themselves that 


will of course make the final determination. 


So again, thanks again for the tremendous work 


that you people have done, who are the workers 


at the labs, and I certainly appreciate and am 


looking forward to working with you because 


we'll be developing some of the issues in the 


future and our (unintelligible) oversight for 


will certainly take cognizance of your 


testimony. Thank you for your work. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Mr. Earley. 


Let me open the floor, if there's any others 


that didn't sign up but do wish to make a 


comment tonight, we've completed the list here. 


Are there any others who wish to make comment? 


Yes, and give us your name for the record here. 


MS. BAYES: Certainly. My name is LeeAnn 


Bayes. My [Identifying Information Redacted] 


was [Name Redacted], who was the [Identifying 


Information Redacted] at Rocky Flats for a 

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407 

number of years. He worked at Rocky Flats from 


1971 until September 12th of 1988. That was 


the morning he died. 


 I consider my [Identifying Information Redacted] 


very fortunate because he had the opportunity 


to have excellent medical care for the duration 


of his illness. And I think it is 


reprehensible that our government has denied 


that same coverage to these people who have 


given so much to grant us our civil liberties 


and to guarantee us our Constitutional rights. 


I know nothing about dosimetry. I know my 


[Identifying Information Redacted] didn't get to 


see me graduate from high school, college, 


graduate school, get married or have children. 


And I don't think that it's fair that you 


should deny these people the opportunity to 


have every chance at surviving their illnesses 


or bearing through them with some degree of 


comfort and especially dignity. 


I don't have a scientific background, but I do 


know what it's like to be an orphan of the Cold 


War. And that needs to be taken into 


consideration. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Well, let me 

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408 

thank all of you again for coming out this 


evening. Been a long day for many. We -- the 


Board will reconvene tomorrow morning. We will 


be taking up the SEC petition from Dow Chemical 


and the SEC Petition from Chapman Valve. So 


some interesting additional activities. You're 


all welcome to join us at that time. We begin 


tomorrow at basically 8:15. The agenda says 


8:00 to 8:15 is the, quote, welcome. That 


means a chance to get here and have a cup of 


coffee and say hello, and then we'll get 


underway at 8:15. 


We will be meeting in a different room 


tomorrow. I understand it's the Sherman Room? 


DR. ROESSLER: (Off microphone) 


(Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Savannah Room. 


 DR. WADE: No, Stanley -- Stanley -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Close enough for an old guy -- 


begins with an S. Let me get it straight, 


Stanley 1, somewhere down the hall, I 


understand. We'll try to find each other. 


Thank you. Good night. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 8:35 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

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5 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the days of May 2 and 3, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


5th day of June, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102 

410