THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


VOL. III 


DAY THREE 


ABRWH BOARD MEETING
 

The verbatim transcript of the 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at the Four Points by Sheraton, 


Denver, Colorado, on April 27, 2006. 

 

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C O N T E N T S
 

April 27, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 8 


DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 


ROCKY FLATS SEC 8 


SC&A PRESENTATION 12 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. BRANT ULSH, NIOSH 42 


PRESENTATION BY PETITIONERS 91 


WORK GROUP REPORT, MR. MARK GRIFFON, CHAIR 143 


BOARD DISCUSSION 165 


BOARD WORKING TIME, 169 


DR. LEWIS WADE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 


FUTURE SCHEDULES/BOARD CORRESPONDENCE 212 


PROGRAM UPDATES 


NIOSH, MR. LARRY ELLIOTT, NIOSH 222 


DOL, MR. PETER TURCIC, DOL 261 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 277 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- / signifies speaker failure, usually failure to 


use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


DeHART, Roy Lynch, M.D., M.P.H. 


Director 


The Vanderbilt Center for Occupational and Environmental 


Medicine 


Professor of Medicine 


Nashville, Tennessee 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 

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GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


STAFF
 

LASHAWN SHIELDS, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 

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SIGNED-IN AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS
 

ADKINS, LEONILA 


ALCORN, JAMES, ROCKY FLATS 


BEACH, M. JOSIE, NCO 


BEATTY, SR., EVERETT “RAY” 


BEHLING, HANS, SC&A 


BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A 


BLACKMON, CARMEN 


BLACKMON, MATTHEW 


BOLLOR, CAROLYN, CONG. MARK UDALL 


BRENTLING, PAULA, USDOL 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC 


BROWN, GLENN 


BROWN, ROSE MARIE 


BURKE, MARY 


CHANG, CHIA-CHIA, HHS 


CURNE, NORMA 


DAUGHERTY, NANCY M., ORAU 


DEHART, JULIA 


DEMAIORI, A.W., USW 


DUKE, LAURA, CONG. BOB BEAUPREZ 


FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A 


HALILES, MARJORIE, ROCKY FLATS 


HARDEN, JERRY, USWA 


HARRIS, WAUDE, ROCKY FLATS 


HAUSBURG, MILDRED 


HILLER, DAVID, SEN. KEN SALAZAR 


HINNEFELD, STU, NIOSH 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


IMSE, ANN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 


JOSEPH, TIMOTHY, ORAU 


KENOYER, JUDSON 


KIEDING, SYLVIA, USW 


KIMPAN, KATE, ORAU 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


KURTZ, FLORENCE JEAN, ROCKY FLATS 


LAWSON, DIANE, ROCKY FLATS 


LEWIS, MARK 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MCFEE, MATTHEW, ORAUT 


MCGOLERICK, ROBERT, HHS 

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MILLER, RICHARD, GAP 


MORMAN, KAREN, DOL 


MORRIS, ROBERT, CHEW AND ASSOC. 


MYLES, QUANISHA 


NETON, JIM, NIOSH 


PADILLA, JUDY, RFP 


PAUL, ROSALYN 


POSEY, ROBERT V., ROCKY FLATS 


RINGEN, KNUT, CPWR 


ROSE, WILMA 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


SABEC, DON, USWA 


SANDERS, JAMES, ROCKY FLATS 


SCHULTZ, JEFF & LAURA 


SHEPPARD, BOBBIE, ROCKY FLATS 


STACK, VICTORIA 


STEELE, LAVONNE 


TURCIC, PETE, DOL 


ULSH, BRANT, NIOSH 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(8:35 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR
 

DR. ZIEMER: Take your seats and we will get under 


way. As we continue the 37th meeting of the 


Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health I 


start with my usual reminder for Board members, 


federal staff people, observers and members of 


the public, please register your attendance 


with us. If you haven't already done so, you 


can do so later this morning. In the entryway 


are the registration booklets. 


I also point out that there are copies of the 


agenda and a lot of related materials on the 


table in the back. Some of those are materials 


from portions of the meeting that have already 


been covered, and some that will be covered 


today, so please avail yourselves of those as 


you may feel necessary. 


ROCKY FLATS SEC
 

We're going to concentrate a good part of our 


session this morning on the Rocky Flats Special 


Exposure Cohort petition. And before we have 

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our first formal presentation I want to take 


this opportunity to see if any of the 


Congressional delegates or any of the staffers 


are here this morning from any of the Colorado 


-- yes, okay. If you would, please come to the 


mike and identify yourselves. And actually we 


do want to give you an opportunity, if you have 


any formal statements to make to the assembly, 


you can do that or you can wait till later if 


you prefer. 


MS. MINKS: Sure. My name is Erin Minks. I'm 


from Senator Salazar's office. My coworker 


David Hiller will be here shortly. I would say 


right now we'll wait until the conclusion and 


then we'll --


 DR. ZIEMER: And Mr. Hiller did present a 


formal -- made a formal statement to the 


assembly yesterday and that is on the record 


already. 


MS. MINKS: And we would likely repeat that so 


we can --


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


MS. MINKS: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: You could if you wish. It's not 


necessary from the Board's point of view, but 

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it's entirely your call there. 


Yes. 


 MS. ALBERG: Good morning. My name is Jeanette 


Alberg. I'm with U.S. Senator Wayne Allard's 


office. We made a statement last night during 


the --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MS. ALBERG: -- public comment period which was 


read into the record. I do have press releases 


on that statement, as well as a couple of 


copies of the statements, but the press release 


is on the back table. If you'd actually like a 


letter, please see me. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Do you have enough copies that the 


Board members could have a copy? 


 MS. ALBERG: I think I gave them to you guys 

last night. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, that's the one you had last 

night. 

 MS. ALBERG: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, very good. Okay, thank you 

very much. 

Then we will proceed and before the actual 


presentation of the SEC evaluation we're going 


to hear from Joe Fitzgerald, the representative 

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of SC&A. Joe, before you begin, I need to 


catch my breath a minute. 


I neglected to ask our distinguished Federal 


Official, Dr. Wade --


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- to make his opening comments. 


 DR. WADE: More distinguished every day, as it 


turns out. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, aren't we all. 


 DR. WADE: Only that we do have a Board member 


who's conflicted on Rocky Flats. That's Brad 


Clawson. So Brad, while we will miss you, if 


you would please take a seat in the audience 


and then we will proceed. We'll welcome you 


back when we finish our deliberations on Rocky 


Flats. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Also we do need to double-check on 


Mr. Presley, who's -- can't travel because of 


health today, to see if he's on the line this 


morning. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Good morning, Paul. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Have we had him call in? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Can y'all hear me? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Not that we're aware. And --

 MR. PRESLEY: Paul? 
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 DR. ZIEMER: -- Dr. Lockey, also, who was ill 


and couldn't travel but may be on the line. 


Are either of you there this morning? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Paul, can you hear me? 


 DR. WADE: Supposed to be. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hello? 


 DR. WADE: We're hearing --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, here's -- here's -- I hear a 


distant echo. 


 DR. WADE: Get the volume up as... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Talk real loud and -- is that you, 


Robert? 


 MR. PRESLEY: It's Robert. I'm yelling. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, it sounds like you're way 


off in a cave there, up on a mountaintop in 


Tennessee, but can you hear us? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I can hear you all wonderfully. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I couldn't hear your response. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I can hear you all wonderfully. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, very good. We can't hear 


you very wonderfully, but we'll proceed. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

SC&A PRESENTATION

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. So Joe 

Fitzgerald, representing SC&A, then will give 

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us the report from SC&A on their evaluation of 


the Special Exposure Cohort review -- or their 


review of the Special Cohort Evaluation. One 


of those. It's too early, Joe. Thanks. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. Good 


morning, members of the Board, Congressional 


staff, NIOSH team and the -- certainly the 


audience. What I want to do is just give you a 


-- you're going to have a lot of different 


talks this morning on Rocky, but to give you 


our perspective on the -- a little higher? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Move it a little higher. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay, let's do this -- is that 


better? Is that better? 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay, good. -- give you an 


update on the evaluation -- independent 


evaluation that we're doing as part of the SC&A 


audit role on behalf of the Board. And I want 


to -- take this down a little bit -- I want to 


sort of give you a little background as far as 


how we approach this. 


(Pause) 


Okay. First off, I think there's been much 


said about the intensity of the process, but I 

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just want to give you a real quick look at the 


number of meetings and interchanges that we've 


had on Rocky Flats since the site profile was 


issued in December and since we came up with 


the issue resolution matrix, which was right 


after New Year's. So it's been a fast-paced 


process over the last several months in order 


to be able to I think evaluate what's been done 


by the NIOSH team and to come up with some 


recommendations and feedback to the -- to the 


Advisory Board. 


I think you heard much about Y-12 being sort of 


a model for how we're doing the SEC reviews 


from our standpoint. This was likewise a bit 


of a prototype in the sense that it's a focused 


review. We had a site profile. We did come up 


with issues related to the site profile. But 


we launched right into a SEC evaluation 


process, and in that process we focused on the 


issues that were critical to the SEC. And in 


particular we wanted to highlight those issues 


that were in fact raised by the petitioners 


that focus on establishing what some of the 


concerns would be from the standpoint of 


technical data and corroboration, and to 

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attempt over the last several months to 


converge in a working group environment on an 


understanding of what the issues seem to be and 


whether or not we agree with the NIOSH 


evaluation. 


I might add there was no evaluation during this 


process. What we were looking at were the 


documents, the records and the analyses as they 


were emerging. This was a real-time review. A 


lot of the guidelines, a lot of the Technical 


Information Bulletins, were being generated and 


finalized during the same time frame that this 


exchange was going on. So a lot of the issues 


that we had initially were issues that were 


responded to by these documents as they were 


generated by NIOSH, and so it gives you some 


sense of the process and why we had so many 


interchanges. As these documents were provided 


us, we would then have comments and then we 


would have the interchanges and provide 


guidance back to the workgroup. The workgroup 


I think was a very effective mechanism, and I 


think it moved and propelled the process 


forward. 


I'm going to go right into our key issues, and 

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you'll hear more about these issues from NIOSH 


and from the working group. But from our 


standpoint, we had four principal issues. The 


first issue -- the first issue had to do with 


the sensitivity of bioassay methods to detect 


highly insoluble super S -- or I think someone 


was calling it super Y, it's also the high-


fired issue, so it goes by many names. But 


it's the question of whether or not you can 


detect the highly insoluble form of plutonium, 


and certainly at Rocky Flats that was -- that's 


an issue, the petitioners have cited the issue. 


And we're looking beyond the question of 


detecting lung burdens in the lung, but also 


looking at the relevancy of detectability in 


the respiratory and GI and systemic organs. 


We had two independent reviews of this. Now I 


heard Bob Bistline's name mentioned by some of 


the petitioners. Bob Bistline is on our team. 


He certainly is a site expert, as well as a 


subject matter expert on the subject of high-


fired plutonium. And certainly we are going to 


rely on his expertise as a subject expert, but 


we also have Joyce Lipsztein, who is right 


here, who I'm going to ask to come up in a few 

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minutes, who has a wealth of information and 


knowledge and has been involved heavily with a 


number of ICRP task groups looking at this 


subject and other subjects. So I think we 


benefit from a considerable amount of 


expertise, both on the NIOSH team as well as on 


our group, on this particular subject. So I 


think the petitioners can be assured that for 


the subject of high-fired plutonium, the super 


S issue, we're certainly going to have a fairly 


comprehensive and detailed analysis and 


hopefully a answer on the questions by the next 


Board meeting. 


Now before I go beyond this, I do want to have 


-- for the benefit of the Board, have Joyce 


Lipsztein come up and give you a little bit 


more of a flavor for what I think is a lot of 


analysis and work that's been going on 


independently within the SC&A team on this 


question, and perhaps not giving you a final 


answer, but giving you the process by which we 


examined this issue and where we're going to go 


with it. Joyce. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Good morning, members of the 


Board. Good morning, members of the public and 

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fellow... 


We have reviewed the NIOSH proposed method to 


evaluate the lung dose, systemic organ dose, ET 


and GI tract organ doses due to the inhalation 


of high-fired -- so-called high-fired plutonium 


oxides, also called super S because of its long 


retention in the lung. 


The ICRP has not provided us at present with 


absorption parameters from the lung that should 


be used in case of inhalation of this very 


insoluble plutonium oxides. There will be no 


draft parameters from the ICRP before the end 


of this years (sic), and probably before the 


end of next year, so we recognize that NIOSH 


cannot wait that long. 


So NIOSH has provided us with two documents, 


OTIB-0049 for lung adjustment factors, and a 


draft "Approach to Dose Reconstruction for 


Super Type S Material" that was dated March 


2006. Those two documents give multiplication 


factors that should be used to derive doses 


from the so-called super type, SS or super S 


from calculations done with type S compounds. 


So the dosimetry for the type S compounds is 


well-established, so the NIOSH approach was to 

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give us an adjustment factors that we should 


multiply the doses that were calculated for a 


type S. 


The first document, OTIB-009 (sic) gives the 


adjustment factors for the lung content for the 


super type S compounds. What -- the NIOSH 


approach was to look at several cases that has 


-- had this high retention in the lung. They 


took the two cases with the highest retention 


in the lung and derived an empirical model for 


them. It's an empirical model -- I'm saying 


it's an empirical model because the lung 


parameters were modified to fit mathematically 


the data. This fitting is not biologically 


realistic or it's not done in a way that would 


be accepted, for example, by ICRP. But in 


favor of the NIOSH approach, the only thing 


that is important in this case is to be 


claimant favorable. And in this document the 


adjustment factors that are used for the lung ­

- they are claimant favorable. They were made 


with the two highest cases of intake and they 


are favorable -- claimant favorable for the 


lung -- adjustment of lung. 


 Then after you adjust the lung content, you 

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also have to adjust for the intake if the data 


comes from bioassay, from urinalysis. And the 


way they did this was through the other 


document, the one that was handed out in March 


2006, and it's proposed that you should 


multiply the intake by 4 or 4.7, depending if 


it is chronic or acute intake, and then adjust 


for the intake, calculated using super type S. 


We are still evaluating this approach because 


you come from an empirical -- empirical lung 


fitting, and it's okay for the lung because the 


lung was adjusted like that. But then to go 


down to the systemic and to the adjustment of 


intake, I think it will require from us a 


little bit more work in order to validate that. 


NIOSH has compared the results they obtained 


with this multiplication factor for the intake 


with autopsy cases from Rocky Flats, seven 


cases of autopsy from Rocky Flats, where they 


have compared the lung content of these people 


and the liver content. And they say it's 


claimant favorable. Okay. So they -- if you 


do this adjustment, you come out with a number 


that is higher than the one that were found on 


those autopsy cases. They did not give us the 

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data for bone also, just liver and lung. But 


we have looked at the bone data from two cases 


that were published from the U.S. Transuranium 


Registry, and it also super-estimates the bone 


content on those two cases. 


On the other hand, there were -- there is 


another model that is proposed in the 


literature that was done by Keith Eckerman and 


some coworkers from Russia using Mayak exposed 


workers also to insoluble plutonium. Eckerman 


and coworkers, they examined 58 autopsy cases, 


and 50 were smokers and eight were non-smokers, 


so Eckerman examined the data model for smokers 


and no smokers. The approach used by -- by 


Eckerman was to modify the absorption 


parameters to -- to the lung by introducing -- 


by using a bounding compartment and -- to -- 


with an infinite half-time in the lung. 


 The approach used by Eckerman is one that would 


be, for example, accepted by the ICRP. I'm not 


saying it is the one that ICRP is going to 


take, but it's one that is accepted by ICRP. 


And we have compared Eckerman's prediction in 


organs from urinary bioassay data taken one 


year after single acute intake and the approach 

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taken by NIOSH, and we have come to the 


conclusion that NIOSH is more claimant 


favorable than Eckerman's model for systemic 


organs and GI tract and ET, also. 


Also, in Eckerman's paper he also points out to 


the problem that he adjusted the lung -- the -- 


the model to fit the lung, and then his -- 


should not really be used for systemic. 


So -- so now what we have to do is to take -- 


to take a further look on this approach to 


calculate systemic organs from this model. But 


we believe that NIOSH is going on the direction 


of claimant favorability. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I wonder if you would remain at 


the mike just for a moment. I want while 


you're there, Joyce, to see if any of the Board 


members have any questions on what you've just 


related to us. Well, since I have a question, 


I will start. 


 Very quickly, did I understand you to say that 


there were two cases in the Transuranic 


Registry that actually involve super S -- 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- category? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah, that were published in 

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2004 --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, so there --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- on the record, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. And then I was trying to 


understand what you said about the Eckerman 


model and a -- a compartment that had an 


infinite half-time -- basically you're saying 


there -- a compartment with no biological 


clearance, I believe. Is that --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, right. What -- the ICRP 


approach on the lung model, even from ICRP-66, 


has this bound compartment. It was never used. 


It's always -- like -- this is -- are all not, 


you know, mathematical compartments -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- so the lu-- it's like as if 


there were small lungs in all those 


compartments, so there is a fast retention time 


and there is a long retention time compartment, 


so those two compartments were used until now. 


But the bounding compartment was always there, 


it just was never used. I know for sure that 


the ICRP is going now to start using for 


several nuclides this bound compartment to 


explain a longer retention of some nuclides in 

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the lung. It has not yet come with the 


parameters for this lung bound -- bound 


compartment, and Eckerman has proposed a model 


for these parameters, some numbers for those 


parameters, based on the Mayak autopsy data. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So in principle, the third 


compartment was there -- and I understand these 


are model -- these aren't physical entities, 


they are mathematical compartments, but in -- 


in the other cases you could always describe 


the clearance with the first two compartments, 


the long and --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Exactly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and the shorter half-time. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Exactly, because when the lung 


model was derived there was not so many data on 


all the nuclides. Now the ICRP approach is 


going to be that for many compounds they are 


going to have specific parameters different 


from just type S and -- and S, so each compound 


will have a speci-- for each compound that we 


have enough information to derive those data -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: And then --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- and the plutonium oxide is 


one of the --

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 DR. ZIEMER: And then one final question, and 


just asking for a sort of ball park answer, in 


terms of what we know in a preliminary way on 


the super S, and maybe based on the Transuranic 


Registry material, is it -- do we have some 


feeling for what percent of an intake of super 


S would remain in that longest-term compartment 


during our lifetime? Is that a major portion 


of the --


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: No, it's a small portion, but 


it may -- because of the infinite half-time, 


then it remains for a long time. That's --


 DR. ZIEMER: And delivers lung dose. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: And --


 DR. ZIEMER: A small percentage, okay. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Is a small percentage, yes, but 


it remains for a long time so it makes a -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- a difference, and I have 


also compared the NIOSH approach with some 


draft things from ICRP, and NIOSH is always 


claimant favorable, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, and that was sort of my 


final question, are there some drafts that you 


know about -- 'cause I know you work with the 

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ICRP so even though they haven't published, you 


sort of know where they're going on this. 


Okay. Thank you. 


I guess Dr. Roessler has a question. 


DR. ROESSLER: I think you answered one of 


them. I just wanted to verify what you said, 


Joyce, about the -- your evaluation, knowing 


what's happening with the ICRP models, that the 


NIOSH models are claimant friendly -- or 


favorable. 


But I have one specific question. Just to 


repeat, when you talked about the Transuranic 


Registry, what I understood you to say is that 


the one thing you got answered was the dose to 


bone from that. And from those results, again, 


you have concluded that the NIOSH approach is 


claimant favorable. Is -- is that what you 


said? 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: The content in bone. There are 


two cases that were published from Rocky Flats. 


One of them, even if you used type S, you are 


okay with bone and --


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- the other case, if you used 


the multiplication by 4 for the intake, then 

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you are -- you are super-estimating what was 


found in -- in bone. 


DR. ROESSLER: So there actually were two cases 


from Rocky Flats. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, but --


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. LIPSZTEIN: -- NIOSH -- in their document 


they examined seven cases from Rocky Flat. I 


don't have the data for those cases, and they 


claim that they were all super-estimating, the 


liver content and the lung content. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We have the data for those cases. 


Right? We have the data for those cases. Jim 


-- Jim -- he's going to... 


DR. NETON: Yeah, this is Jim Neton. Yeah, 


those -- those data are on the O drive. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: They might be difficult to find, 


but they are there. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much for 


that clarification. 


Okay. Thank you very much for that 


presentation. Now we return to Joe Fitzgerald. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Okay, we have -- the next two 

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issues, one dealing with the measurement of 


americium-241 and how it relates to the ability 


to measure plutonium, and the next one on 


neutron measurements, are two that we've spent 


a great deal of time on and I think have 


achieved a lot of convergence. There's been a 


lot of give and take on it. 


These are issues that came from the original 


site profile that we've carried forward into 


the SEC discussions. And on the americium-241 


it's just a question of whether DOE, and then 


secondarily NIOSH in its assessment, had a 


handle on what the americium assay would be in 


the plutonium handled at Rocky. And the 


implication there is the ability to measure 


plutonium because the americium, in terms of 


its gamma radiation, is what you actually peg 


to in terms of your in vivo counting. And I 


think -- this was a question of our seeing 


additional documentation than that which was 


provided as part of the original site profile 


that NIOSH produced. And what I just detailed 


there, for your information -- again, we can go 


into more detail, but -- additional 


documentation was given to us that -- that kind 

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of detailed the specifications which the 


Department of Energy used at the site; 


certainly indicated that there was blending 


going on to maintain the americium 


concentrations at a certain specification -- 


that was important for the weapons program -- 


and that there was a -- certainly a minimum 


content of americium at 100 parts per million, 


which in fact is the value that the TBD uses. 


So I think this was a useful process by which 


we were able to get additional information to 


confirm a concern that we originally had in our 


initial evaluation last year. So this is where 


I think the working group certainly served a 


good purpose, but I just wanted to report that 


since that was a key issue that came out of the 


site profile that we felt could have SEC 


implications. But I think we've gone a long 


ways -- we're not finished yet because we 


certainly have some questions about how one 


measures americium -- pure americium, 


particularly in the sludges and the process 


streams that existed at Rocky. So there's 


still one lingering issue, which I think we're 


pretty hopeful we'll get additional information 

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from NIOSH on. 


The -- this next one here, this was a issue 


that had so many facets, I think we spent a lot 


of time just sort of getting the taxonomy right 


in terms of the different elements and 


different documentations that were being 


produced. This was in fact a real-time or 


just-in-time type evaluation where NIOSH was 


completing some very critical guideline 


documents. OTIB-50 is essentially how they 


would apply the NDRP data and interpret neutron 


dose estimates for Rocky. The NDRP database of 


course is the database which was made available 


for the first time and finalized sometime 


middle of last year, and OTIB-58, which is up 


there, is the -- in fact a NIOSH model for how 


coworker doses are going to be handled for 


external dosimetry. And again, that was the 


last piece or the last foundation block that we 


received, and we got that last week. So as 


these pieces, these guidelines, have come 


forward, we have reviewed them, have had I 


think very fruitful evaluations with the NIOSH 


team, and have come to a point where we do have 


some remaining issues, but certainly not as 

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many as we had before. And what -- our major 


thrust, as indicated in the last bullet, is -- 


we're doing two things, really. One is to now 


step back, now that we have all the essential I 


think implementation guidelines -- the OTIB-50, 


the NDRP database and now the coworker model -- 


and trying to figure out more holistically does 


that work on the neutron dosimetry side, and 


external dosimetry side, and make sure that -- 


I guess from our own standpoint to be able to 


inform the Board that, you know, nothing tends 


to fall in the cracks; there's no issue 


relative to the whole picture, because we have 


looked at this in pieces, and certainly the 


coworker model is one of particular concern 


because it deals with I guess an issue we heard 


last night, which is how do you deal with 


unmonitored workers working in environments 


where you do have neutron fields, which you 


would have had in Building 771 and some of 


these other facilities. So I think this is an 


important question and we're certainly going to 


have a detailed section in the review that 


we're going to produce in the next few weeks 


for the Board. 

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That's where we are right now on that 


particular question, but there's been I think a 


lot of progress in going through these 


different implementation guides and coming to a 


appreciation of the overall approach that NIOSH 


has taken on that issue. 


I want to get to data reliability, and 


certainly that was a fairly strong subject from 


last night's public hearing. We share that 


concern. I mean I think in our original site 


profile review that we issued over the winter 


we did indicate in a section that we were 


concerned about the questions of -- of zero 


entries, of allegations of false entries, this 


-- this -- this terminology of no data 


available. And we certainly took those issues 


very seriously and we brought those forward 


into the SEC review. I think our initial 


impression was we had certain issues that, 


independent of the petitioners, we felt, based 


on our review, spoke to these questions of -- 


of data reliability. And certainly the 


petitioners have advanced, in their petition, 


similar but maybe somewhat separate questions. 


 The Chairman asked us to go ahead and 

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consolidate the issues that came out of our 


site -- our site profile review with some of 


the issues that figured in the petition that 


was submitted, and that's where we came up with 


I think our starting point of 17 issues that 


deal with some aspect of data reliability or 


integrity that we felt needed to be pursued and 


taken to ground. And as we worked through this 


with the working group and with NIOSH, I think 


it became very clear that, you know, part of 


the problem is being able to corroborate in 


some fashion what happened, why it happened and 


to establish whether it was systemic. 


Is this an isolated case? You know, maybe it 


just affected one worker. Or was this 


reflective of a pervasiveness or a systemic 


nature of a problem that figured at Rocky? We 


wanted to get to the root of that issue. Is 


this something that -- really typi-- is really 


typical of the site? And that I think required 


a degree of investigation that we didn't quite 


foresee, but we're certainly in the midst of it 


now. 


I think some of you -- I'm talking to the 


petitioners -- have met Katherine Robertson­
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DeMers. She's working from our standpoint and 


interviewing petitioners, and actually trying 


to identify document sources that would help us 


establish the veracity of some of these 


allegations and corroborate some of the 


concerns over the reliability of the data. I 


just listed some of these, but certainly 


there's -- in the back there's a report that we 


issued on the 19th which is a status report on 


the specific issues that we felt strongly about 


in terms of pursuing to grounds as far as 


documents and interviews. 


So -- and together with NIOSH, we have 


established a -- essentially a action list on 


behalf of the workgroup to pursue each and 


every of the 17 issues and establish a 


resolution of those issues in terms of the 


documents that we can find and what the 


interviews can take us to. And we're in the 


process of doing that right now. We are 


obtaining log books. We are obtaining further 


documents that would serve to corroborate the 


affidavits, serve to corroborate some of the 


concerns that have come out of this issue. 


It's not an easy process. It's a time­
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consuming process because, again, we have to go 


to DOE, obtain the documents, bring them back, 


examine them, compare them and what-not. And 


what we have established is a process by which 


I think NIOSH is going to proceed to obtain a 


broad band of documentation and go through the 


analysis. We're going to do samplings of the 


same analysis and try to bring this thing to a 


point for the Board where we can establish 


here's the best we can do in the time that we 


have in terms of what the records and the 


interviews tell us about these issues. But 


again, I think that's pretty much where it 


stands. 


This is happening in real time. We're 


collecting documents this week and we hope to 


have some assessment that would be available by 


the middle of -- certainly by early June and 


have a report by the middle of June. 


I think the Board's been pretty informed on 


this thing as we've gone along. There's been a 


high level of activity. A number of documents 


have been submitted over this month, so I 


won't, you know, take any more time with them 


unless you have any questions on -- on the 

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process. I think all of us have been very 


devoted to this particular question and trying 


to figure out how to resolve it. 


And again I'm not going to spend too much time 


on it, these are the three specific actions 


that have -- had come out of the April 19th 


review in terms of taking us forward for the 


next several weeks, and the process is ongoing 


as we speak in terms of obtaining documents and 


also looking at these documents from the 


standpoint of corroborating some of these 


issues. And we're hopeful that we're going to 


find some certainly information in these log 


books and accounts that will give us some 


indication of what really happened in these 


particular situations and whether you can 


establish whether the zeroes in fact were 


zeroes, or is there some evidence that perhaps, 


as we heard last night, that these were being 


driven by incentives or management decisions 


that had something -- nothing to do with the 


actual measurements. 


This is a wrap-up. We are, as Joyce pointed 


out, spending considerable time focusing on I 


think bringing the super S analysis to a close. 

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We are going to have sort of a expert review 


with Dr. Bistline, Joyce and some other folks 


that we have to -- to really cross the T as far 


as this issue's concerned. This issue is a 


prototype issue. We're going to see this issue 


again and again at other sites, so I think it's 


well worth the time to get the science on the 


table and to be able to come to a conclusion on 


it because we're going to be using this 


information at other sites as we go. And I 


certainly can tell you for a fact -- I just got 


back from Mound and Los Alamos -- we do have 


this issue, and we have this issue for other 


nuclides. 


The -- and we of course finished the series of 


reviews on the neutron dose assessment. We are 


doing the on-site interviews. Again, we're 


working on the data integrity and reliability 


question. 


We just got the coworker models over the last 


week or so, and I think that's probably the 


last piece of information that we're now 


focusing on. We're reviewing it as we speak 


this week, both the external and internal 


coworker models, and that's going to have a big 

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bearing on of course the unmonitored worker 


issue. 


And I think the rest of this is pretty obvious. 


Next step, we are in the process of working up 


the review of the NIOSH SEC evaluation. It's 


going to certainly have the same format and 


details that you saw in the Y-12 review, and we 


certainly are aiming toward having that in 


advance of the -- of the next meeting of the 


Advisory Board and hopefully with a couple of 


weeks of lead time so there'll be enough time 


for interchange and review. 


 That's -- that's pretty much it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Joe. If you'd 


stay put for a minute, let's -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- see if there are questions that 


Board members have regarding your presentation, 


the SC&A report so far. Any questions? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Thank you very much then. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I've been told that Libby White 


from Department of Energy, who's had some 


involvement I guess in obtaining the data -- or 

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the records, may be on the line. Libby, are --


are you on the line? 


MS. WHITE: Hi, yes, I am on the line. Can you 


hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, we can hear you quite well. 


Libby, I'm told that you may have some comments 


relative to the Rocky Flats dose -- and other 


information. Is that correct? 


MS. WHITE: You know, we have nothing other 


than a brief comment, which is just that DOE 


will be as responsive as we -- as we can in 


pulling the records and additional documents 


that the team needs to look at in -- in working 


through these issues. And -- and just as much 


lead time I guess as they can give us in 


advance, that will help us to have all the 


records ready for their review when -- when 


they get to the site. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Libby, for 


that expression of cooperation. Certainly the 


issue of obtaining records in a timely fashion 


has -- has been important to this Board and to 


our contractor and to NIOSH, so we're pleased 


that -- that there is that willingness to be 


cooperative. I know you need more than a 

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minute or two of advance notice, and we're all 


working in real time here and we're all 


pressed, so we do thank you for that effort. 


MS. WHITE: Certainly. Certainly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Libby, hang on just a minute. 


MS. WHITE: Sure. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Wade has some --


 DR. WADE: Libby, could --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- comments. 


 DR. WADE: -- you just give us your name again 


and your position, your title? 


MS. WHITE: Sure, it's Libby White, and I'm the 


director of the Office of Health Services with 


the Department of Energy. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much, Libby. 


MS. WHITE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Mike Gibson has a comment 


here. Mike? 


 MR. GIBSON: LIbby, this is Mike Gibson. I 


just want to know, are all relevant -- are all 


documents available or have any been disposed 


of? With regard to Rocky Flats. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Libby, are you still on the 


line? 

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41 

I 

MS. WHITE: I am on the line. I'm not sure 


that I'm capable of answering that question. 


think we'd need the records people with Legacy 


Management to help -- to help with that. But 


anything that we have -- that we currently have 


certainly we'd be more than happy to make 


available, and we work with our records people 


out in Colorado to do that in our Legacy 


Management office. 


 MR. GIBSON: Could -- maybe we could get an 


answer from the Legacy Management people? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Maybe we could, or maybe -- I 


guess one part of this would be if NIOSH or if 


SC&A identifies in fact records that they need 


that they are not able to get, that would in 


part answer that -- or at least tell us. Have 


there been -- are we running into any records 


issues now where we're -- we're identifying 


records that are not being able to be located 


on this --


MS. WHITE: Not to my knowledge. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Joe or Larry, do you know? Any --


any Rocky Flats records so far that you've 


requested that people don't know where they are 


or have not been found? 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: No, I -- I think certainly 


given the pace that we're under, I think DOE's 


been very responsive. What's happened of 


course is, you know, there's a lead time to 


identify and to generate the records, and you 


know, we find ourselves moving in a time frame 


of days and weeks and I think DOE's been very 


responsive in terms of providing those 


documents. So I appreciate that support, as 


well. And no, I don't have anything to report 


as being a problem. 


PRESENTATION BY NIOSH, DR. BRANT ULSH


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Next we'll hear the formal 


presentation by NIOSH. Dr. Ulsh is going to do 


that presentation. This is the presentation on 


the NIOSH -- basically the NIOSH 


recommendation, their evaluation of the SEC 


petition. 


 DR. ULSH: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. I'd like to 


thank the Board for giving me a chance to come 


back to Colorado. I did some of my graduate 


work right up the road in Fort Collins, so -- I 


was also relieved to see the weather break 


yesterday. I've been telling all my colleagues 


about how great the mountains are in Colorado, 

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and of course when we landed you couldn't see 


them. So as of yesterday when the clouds 


lifted, in fact yes, there are mountains in 


Colorado, so that was a relief. 


I'd like to start by thanking a few people and 


me just explaining my role in this process. 


I'm a research health scientist with NIOSH. 


I've been there for about three years. And I 


am the -- I guess, for lack of a better word, 


project manager for NIOSH's evaluation of the 


Rocky Flats petition. 


I'd also like to acknowledge a few other folks 


explicitly. Bob Meyer and his team from the 


TBD team. They've provided some very valuable 


technical input -- I'd say invaluable technical 


input to this process. And also Karin Jessen 


and her team for putting together the 


evaluation report. She had a huge part in 


putting that together, and without the help of 


those two people and their teams, I wouldn't be 


here prepared to talk to you about our 


evaluation today, so I just wanted to 


acknowledge them. 


There are a couple of other people who I think 


deserve some thanks, and that is Tony DeMaiori 

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and Jennifer Thompson. I think the workers 


already know the debt that they owe those two 


people, and I would just like to take the 


opportunity to speak for NIOSH and to thank 


those two individuals in particular for putting 


together a very thorough, very good petition, 


and it really got us to take a good hard look 


at how we're doing dose reconstructions at 


Rocky Flats. It's been a grueling process, I 


can say that. I think SC&A would agree and the 


working group would certainly agree. But it's 


been a productive process, and I think that as 


a result of going through this process our 


efforts at Rocky Flats are stronger. 


 And finally and most importantly, I'd like to 


thank the workers who came out last night and 


told us their concerns, and also expressed 


those concerns through the petition. This is 


the most valuable information that we can get. 


And the more specifics we have -- it's kind of 


like trying to put together a puzzle. The more 


pieces that you start with, the easier it is 


and the faster it is to get to the big picture. 


So I can't over-emphasize how important your 


input into this process is. 

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All right. So let's move right into the 


presentation then. First of all, for those 


members of the Board who may not be as familiar 


with Rocky Flats as most of the people in the 


audience probably are, let me just go through a 


nickel tour of what happened at Rocky Flats. 


The main mission of the Rocky Flats Plant was 


the production of plutonium triggers for 


nuclear weapons. And another important mission 


that was performed there is the processing of 


retired weapons for plutonium recovery. 


I hope y'all can hear me over the weed-eater. 


If not, give me the high sign and -- I don't 


know what I'll do; try to talk louder, I guess. 


In terms of the site history, ground-breaking 


actually began in 1951 and production 


activities commenced in 1952, and those 


continued through 1989 when the focus of the 


Rocky Flats Plant switched to decommissioning 


and decontamination. And that effort is far 


along now. If you go out to Rocky Flats, as 


most of the people here know, you won't see a 


whole lot. There's only a building or two 


left, so that's what's been happening since 


1989. 

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All right. In terms of the SEC petition 


qualification, the first step, once we receive 


a petition, is to evaluate that petition in 


terms of getting it into shape so that we can 


evaluate it. And we went through that process 


and the petition was formally qualified on June 


16th of 2005. And upon that qualification the 


petitioners were notified and a notice was 


published in the Federal Register in late June 


of last year. 


 The original proposed class in the petition was 


all United Steelworkers of America members 


employed between April of 1952 and February of 


2005. We fairly quickly determined that we 


couldn't really just limit this -- this class 


to just union members. It -- it wouldn't be 


feasible for us to do that, and non-union 


members, we determined, should also be 


considered in this petition because they also 


had potential for the kinds of exposure and the 


kinds of concerns expressed in the petition. 


So we expanded that class to include all 


employees in that time frame. 


Okay, I want to tell you about some of the 


petition-related activities that have occurred. 

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Some of these started even before the petition 


was submitted, and the first milestone I think 


that we came to was the issuance of our 


Technical Basis Documents. There are six 


Technical Basis Documents that make up our 


Rocky Flats site profile, and those six TBDs, 


Technical Basis Documents, were issued between 


January and June of 2004. 


NIOSH and SC&A held a series of conference 


calls to discuss each TBD after SC&A was tasked 


with a review of the Rocky Flats TBD, and those 


conference calls occurred in early September of 


2005. SC&A then issued their draft TBD review, 


and as -- as Joe described earlier, we quickly 


moved into a very focused review to support the 


evaluation of the SEC petition. And their 


draft report was issued December 8th, and I 


think, Joe, you said it was shortly after New 


Year that you issued the issue matrix. This is 


also the second Advisory -- the second meeting 


of the full Advisory Board to consider Rocky 


Flats TBD and SEC issues. 


The real bulk of the evaluation -- the work 


that went into this evaluation was conducted 


during five working group meetings. And I can 

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only describe that process as grueling. I saw 


Arjun out in the hall a couple of days ago and 


we just kind of looked at each other we were so 


tired. This has been a very exhausting process 


but, as I said, it's been a very productive 


process. And there's just been enormous 


amounts of work put in by -- certainly by 


NIOSH, also by the Board working group members 


and by SC&A. 


Okay, some of the communications that we've had 


with the petitioner. The first submission was 


received on February 15th of 2005, and we 


received a supplemental submission on May 24th 


of 2005. The first submission I think was 


approximately 500, give or take, pages -- so 


very extensive, very thorough. Then the second 


-- the supplemental submission I think was 


around 700 pages, so there's an enormous amount 


of documentation that went into this on the 


part of the petitioners and also on the part of 


we who are evaluating the petition. 


In addition, the petitioner submitted 13 


questions to NIOSH. These -- this was a result 


of the petitioners' participation in our 


working group meetings, and that was very 

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helpful. So they -- after one of those 


meetings, they had some questions that were 


related to that and they submitted those to us, 


and we responded to those questions in March of 


2006. 


We also requested some -- some further 


information specific to the data integrity 


concerns raised in the petition. I sent a 


letter to the petitioners on March 16th of this 


year, and we received a response on March 28th. 


And then I conducted a further -- a follow-up 


telephone conversation with -- with Tony. And 


what we were looking for here is some specific 


examples of concerns that he had with -- with 


data integrity that we could then go run down 


and -- and see if we could figure out what was 


going on. So those were very helpful. 


And we also have now, especially after last 


night -- we heard a number of concerns, some of 


which were pretty specific, so our -- our 


research in this area continues, and I'll get 


more into that a little bit later. 


Okay, the available information that we had to 


inform this evaluation of our -- of this SEC 


petition included dosimetry records. And these 

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are contained in a number of electronic 


databases -- I've got them a little out of 


order here. I think the first electronic 


database was the HSDS, which I believe stands 


for Health Science Data System. That was 


preceded of course by handwritten records since 


this was prior to the computer era, and that 


was up through about 1969. With the 


implementation of the HSDS, those records were 


migrated into that -- that database. And then 


there were a number of subsequent databases 


where the records were migrated to follow-up 


databases. So we started with handwritten 


records. We went to HSDS. Later was the RHRS, 


now let me see if I can remember that one -- 


Radiological Health Research System, I believe. 


Don't quote -- don't quote me on all these 


acronyms. I can't be certain that I'm getting 


all the acronyms correct. And then finally, 


just very recently, HIS20. This is the most 


recent of the electronic databases that contain 


dosimetry records. 


We also had access to CEDR database which 


contained internal and external data. That was 


useful to us in coming up -- especially with 

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the internal coworker model that we put 


together. 


We also accessed the ORAU Site Research 


database, which is a compendium of documents 


and information about not only Rocky Flats but 


sites all across the complex. Of course we 


focused on Rocky Flats for this particular 


effort. 


We also had documentation provided by the 


petitioners in the petition, and by site 


experts that we consulted with. And again, as 


I said before, a really valuable source of 


information was information from you, the 


workers. Keep in mind, I didn't work at Rocky 


Flats. I'm coming at this from the outside. 


So you folks are my window into what happened 


at the Rocky Flats site, so anything that you 


can tell us, that -- that is absolutely 


critical. It's very valuable to us. 


So SC&A issued a report on April 19th that Joe 


mentioned suggesting additional documents for 


review. And at the time that the report came 


out, we weren't sure whether we would be able 


to locate these documents. We were going to 


investigate the feasibility of it. We've 

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actually had some conversations with the DOE 


records folks, and we're encouraged. They seem 


optimistic that we can get -- I don't want to 


say 100 percent, but certainly a large part of 


the documents that SC&A has suggested, so we're 


very encouraged by that and our research on 


those documents of course is going to continue. 


Okay, in terms of the availability of 


dosimetry, these are numbers that I pulled out 


of our tracking system, NOCTS -- which is the 


NIOSH/OCAS Claims Tracking System -- as of late 


last week. If you go on there today, the 


numbers might be a little bit different because 


they're continually being updated, but this is 


an approximate picture. 


The cases that meet the class definition -- now 


remember, the class definition is all workers 


at Rocky Flats, so this number tells you the 


number of claims that have been referred to 


NIOSH by the Department of Labor for dose 


reconstruction. It's approximately 1,100. 


In turn, we have completed dose reconstructions 


for almost 700 people -- I think the number's 


actually over 700 now, as of early this week -- 


so that represents about two-thirds of the 

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cases that were referred to us we had actually 


completed the dose reconstructions for those 


cases. 


 Now I've actually got the -- these last two 


numbers reversed. One of the people on my 


support team kindly pointed that out, but I 


couldn't correct it in the write-up in time, so 


those two numbers should be reversed. 


In terms of cases with internal monitoring 


records, there are approximately 1,000 -- about 


1,015 -- so that's a great many of these cases 


have internal monitoring records. 


The same with external monitoring records, that 


number's actually about 1,056, so we've got 


pretty extensive dosimetry records here for 


Rocky Flats. And that's in contrast to some of 


the -- in particular the AWE sites, maybe some 


of the other DOE sites. We've got a large body 


of -- of dosimetry records here, and this is 


the primary information that we use for dose 


reconstruction. 


Okay, now let's get to the petition. There 


were seven bases -- seven main bases that 


formed the basis of the SEC petition, and I'll 


just walk through these briefly and then 

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consider some of them in detail. 


The first was exposure to highly insoluble 


plutonium oxides, and you heard SC&A -- Joyce 


talk about some of the issues that we've looked 


at related to this particular basis. Just to 


avoid confusion, let me repeat that when we're 


talking about highly insoluble plutonium, some 


other terms that you might hear to refer to the 


same thing are super S or super Y. That all 


refers to this -- this issue, this form of 


plutonium that's very insoluble. 


The next basis for the petition was the 


inability to link exposures to specific 


incidents. That was a great concern in -- in 


the petition. 


And the next one was periods of inadequate 


monitoring. Again, I'm going to go into some 


of these in more detail. 


Those first four petition bases were the ones 


that qualified the petition. They -- they 


directly speak to NIOSH's ability or inability 


to conduct dose reconstructions with sufficient 


accuracy, so we focused most of our efforts on 


-- on those four. 


 The last three, the first of which is negative 

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effects of site closure, the -- the concern 


here was that since the site is now in a 


closure phase that the subject matter experts 


that have insights into what happened at Rocky 


Flats and -- and the details of the dosimetry 


would not be available to us. We didn't find 


that to be the case. The DOE Legacy Management 


office maintains archives of the files that 


were generated during the history of Rocky 


Flats, and we've had very good success working 


with those folks to get access to the records 


that we need, and we've found them to be very 


responsive and very timely. We also have had 


access to subject matter experts to inform our 


-- our evaluation. That -- that really hasn't 


posed too much of a challenge for us. 


The next issue was the cessation of worker 


recall monitoring programs. And while this is 


a very important concern, it -- it really 


doesn't impact our ability to conduct dose 


reconstructions because we rely on biodosimetry 


-- I'm sorry, we rely on dosimetry that was 


collected during a worker's time at -- when 


they were actually employed. 


Now don't get me wrong. If we have results 

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that are available after employment was 


terminated, we will use them. They -- they can 


be helpful. But the absence of -- of that kind 


of information really doesn't prevent us from 


doing dose reconstructions of sufficient 


accuracy. So while this is a very important 


issue, maybe not in the -- in the framework and 


the context of an SEC petition. 


And the final basis of the petition was the 


link between plutonium exposure and cancer. 


It's well understood that there is a link 


between ionizing radiation exposure and several 


types of cancer. And plutonium, as a 


radionuclide, emits ionizing radiation. So you 


could, by analogy, link plutonium to cancer. 


And in fact that's -- that's the whole reason 


why we're here talking about this, because 


ionizing radiation is a potential carcinogen 


and that's why we do dose reconstructions. So 


we didn't really see that that prevented us 


from doing dose reconstructions of sufficient 


accuracy. 


So we -- again, we focused mainly on the first 


four bases of the petition, so let me walk 


through some of these. 

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The first is super S, and we are very 


encouraged by the preliminary results of SC&A's 


analysis and we look forward to discussing that 


with them once that's finalized, but we're very 


encouraged that it at least appears right now 


that we're being claimant favorable with the 


way that we're going to approach this. 


 The particular concerns that were expressed in 


the -- in the petition related to super S were 


three, primarily, the first of which is self-


shielding. The idea here is that super S 


particles are ceramicized, and so the concern 


expressed by the petitioner was that this would 


prevent the ability to detect this type of 


plutonium in the lungs through lung counting. 


The second concern related to super S was 


particle size. The petitioner was concerned 


that we were using in -- in our bioassay models 


that the particle size that we were using was 


inappropriate. 


And the final concern was the detection of -- 


of super S through bioassay. And I think the 


concern here is that since this form of 


plutonium is so highly insoluble, that 


urinalysis results are going to relative 

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insensitive to detecting this. So I'd like to 


go through and tell you about our evaluation of 


each of these concerns. 


First -- the first thing that we determined was 


that yes, in fact there is evidence of super S 


material -- super S plutonium at Rocky Flats. 


And Joyce mentioned a couple of the sources of 


data that we used to make that determination, 


primarily the results of autopsy cases that we 


obtained from the U.S. Transuranium Registry. 


And in fact they do show evidence of plutonium 


that is more insoluble than type S. So that's 


the first thing. It does appear that there is 


super S at Rocky Flats. 


Now in terms of the specific concerns that the 


-- that were in the petition, the self-


shielding -- this was kind of a head-scratcher 


for me because when we do lung counts to try to 


detect plutonium, what we're using to measure 


that is the gamma radiation that comes off of 


the daughter of plutonium, americium-241. And 


I'm just not aware of any physical mechanism 


that would shield that radiation inside the 


particle. I went back to first principles and 


looked at a particle of the appropriate size. 

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If you just consider a plutonium atom encased 


in a particle made of lead, which is a very 


effective gamma shield, the attenuation or the 


shielding is just -- it's negligible. So we're 


-- we're just not aware of any plausible 


mechanism of self-shielding. And in fact the 


Transuranium data that we looked at supported 


the ability to detect plutonium, in whatever 


form, through lung counting. 


The next concern was the particle size, and 


Joyce mentioned our approach that we have put 


out to handle super S plutonium, and smaller 


particle sizes that might result from fires at 


the site are explicitly considered in that -- 


in that approach. 


We also took a look at what this means in terms 


of bioassay results. And it is certainly true 


that if the plutonium is very insoluble and 


sits in the lungs, then it doesn't get out into 


the rest of the body as readily as some of the 


more soluble forms and therefore it doesn't 


show up in the urine. The concentrations in 


the urine are less than you would expect to see 


from more soluble forms of plutonium. 


 However, it's not infinite. The solubility of 

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-- of this type of plutonium leads to bioassay 


detection limits that are high, but they are 


finite. There is a number. And so what we 


determined is that the intakes that we 


calculate with our bounding approach for super 


S, those intakes, when you back them off from 


bioassay results, result in claimant-favorable 


estimates of intake. So while this is 


certainly an important issue and it will affect 


the way we do dose reconstructions, it doesn't 


prevent us from doing dose reconstructions of 


sufficient accuracy. 


 The next basis in the petition was that there 


are instances when it is not possible to link 


intakes to specific incidents. And the concern 


here -- if I can just present a hypothetical 


situation to you. A worker's going along on a 


routine biomonitor-- bioassay program, let's 


say for plutonium. He gets a plutonium 


bioassay; it's negative. Gets another one a 


few months later; negative. Gets another one a 


few months later; positive. Well, then the 


question is where did that intake come from? 


Without having special bioassay results -- if 


an incident is recognized at the time that it 

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happens, for instance a glovebox fire, what 


will typically occur is that special bioassay 


would be requested. But in the absence of that 


-- I mean there -- there are exposure scenarios 


where the worker wouldn't even know that he had 


been exposed. That has certainly -- that 


certainly occurred at Rocky Flats, and other 


places throughout the complex. 


And so in some situations we als-- we agree 


with the petitioner that it's not always 


possible to link intakes that you observe in 


bioassay results back to specific incidents. 


It's helpful when we can do it, that is true. 


But this is an issue that is -- has been widely 


recognized in the science of dose 


reconstruction. In fact, the International 


Commission on Radiological Protection has 


weighed in on this issue, and I've listed the 


citation there, and they've recommended methods 


for obtaining unbiased estimates of intake when 


you can't pin it to a specific incident. 


And so Rocky -- Rocky Flats is certainly not 


the first time that we have encountered this 


issue. I mean we -- we -- it happens all the 


time in -- in dose reconstruction, and we have 

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developed methods to arrive at claimant-


favorable estimates of organ doses when this 


occurs, usually -- I don't want to get too much 


into the details of those, but we assume a 


chronic intake scenario that analyses have 


shown is bounding. It gives a claimant-


favorable estimate. 


So while it is certainly true that these 


incidents occur and we can't always tie an 


intake to an incident, again, that doesn't 


prevent us from doing dose reconstructions of 


sufficient accuracy. 


Okay, the next basis was the periods of 


inadequate monitoring, and the concern here -- 


again, there were -- there were three sub-


concerns that fall under this umbrella. The 


examples presented in the petition included no 


routine lung counting until the late 1960s. In 


fact the lung counter at Rocky Flats came on 


line in 1964. Prior to that there was no lung 


counting at Rocky Flats. 


The next two deal with neutrons. In the 


petition the concern was expressed that there 


was no neutron monitoring prior to the late 


1950s. The specific year is actually about 

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1957. That's when they came on line with 


routine neutron monitoring. 


 And furthermore, there was a concern expressed 


about erroneous neutron measurements prior to 


1970. This is the neutron film badge area -- 


film badge era, from about 1957 up through 


1970. That's when neutron dosimetry 


transitioned to thermoluminescent dosimeters. 


The concern is for that film period. 


So in our evaluation of these concerns we 


concluded that, again, while lung counts are 


helpful when they're present -- when we have 


them, you know, we use them -- but the primary 


data that we use to conduct internal dose 


reconstructions is bioassay data, urinalysis. 


And those types of data -- those types of 


results are available for the entire time span 


that the plant operated. That is our first and 


our preferred data that we use. So we didn't 


see that the existence of the period before the 


lung counter came on line as preventing us from 


doing sufficiently accurate dose 


reconstructions. 


Now the next two deal with neutrons. In terms 


of the periods when Rocky Flats employees may 

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have been exposed to neutrons but were not 


monitored for that, and also the concern that 


once they were monitored that there were 


problems, there were issues with the NTA film 


that was used to do that monitoring, these 


problems were recognized. They were the 


genesis of the Neutron Dose Reconstruction 


Project, and that project was intended to 


address these issues. We have access to the 


Neutron Dose Reconstruction Project results. 


We are using them in dose reconstructions. So 


again, we don't see that this prevents us from 


doing dose reconstruction with sufficient 


accuracy. 


Now I should mention that that Neutron Dose 


Reconstruction Project also was overseen by an 


advisory board similar to this one, which 


contained -- which included individuals both 


from the site and from outside the site, 


experts in neutron dosimetry from outside of 


Rocky Flats. So we are using -- we are 


accessing that. We are using it in dose 


reconstruction. 


Okay, the next basis for the petition was 


unmonitored exposures, and the examples that 

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were provided included super S plutonium. 


We've already talked about that one. It also 


included a concern that there were certain 


areas where there was no monitoring, or there 


was monitoring but dosimetry chips were lost or 


destroyed, and this would have applied to the 


era when they were using TLDs for dosimetry, so 


we're talking post-1970. And finally there was 


a concern about lack of accurate work location 


records, so let me walk through the evaluation 


of these concerns. 


First of all, in terms of unmonitored exposures 


-- we've talked about how to handle -- how we 


propose to handle super S. But if we're 


talking about other issues, other -- 


unmonitored exposures that might have occurred 


either from intake of radioactive material or 


to external sources, we have coworker data that 


we can use for unmonitored workers. But I have 


to tell you that the need for this at Rocky 


Flats is pretty minimal, in contrast to other 


sites. Of the approximately 700 cases that 


we've completed, we're aware -- currently aware 


of two cases that are on hold for coworker 


data. So it's not zero, but it's pretty small 

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in comparison to what we see at other sites. 


And I think I'd like to take the opportunity 


just to explain a little bit about how we apply 


coworker data when we do it. There seems to be 


a pretty large misconception that we take -- if 


-- if John has a gap in his dosimetry, we give 


him Joe's dose when Joe stood beside him. 


That's not the way that we do coworker data. 


 Instead, what we look at for an individual who 


has a gap in their monitoring history, we look 


at the entire population of monitored workers 


at the particular site for the time period in 


question, and we look at the distribution of 


that data, the population of that data. And we 


pick a percentile value, usually if -- if the 


worker had a significant potential for 


radiation exposure, that usually is the 95th 


percentile that we pick and assign for that gap 


in monitoring. 


Now what that means is that for that time 


period that worker is assigned a dose that 


exceeds the dose that 95 percent of the people 


on site received. We think that that's pretty 


claimant-favorable and so that -- that's why we 


have used this approach. 

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We also have other techniques to deal with gaps 


in dosimetry. If a worker was going along, he 


was monitored and there was a break in his 


dosimetry, and he was working along again and 


there's dosimetry results, we can use what's 


called the nearby technique -- assuming of 


course -- this technique would only be 


applicable in situations where we're confident 


that the worker was doing the same job through 


the whole time period, there were no conditions 


that could have led to differences in exposure, 


so we can use his own dosimetry results to fill 


in gaps in some situations. 


Okay, the absence of work location information. 


We do have actually quite a lot of work 


location information, but I won't tell you that 


it's 100 percent complete. I can't tell you 


where every worker worked every minute of the 


time he was employed at Rocky Flats. That is 


true. But this is more of a concern when we're 


doing dose reconstructions through a source 


term approach, in situations where the workers 


aren't wearing -- don't have dosimetry results 


and we have to estimate doses based on the 


material that we know was there that he was 

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working with. This has -- this has happened at 


other sites. But at Rocky Flats, again, we 


have extensive, actual personal dosimetry 


information. So that information about work 


location, while it is important and it is 


helpful to us in dose reconstruction, it's not 


as critical as it might be at some other site 


where we don't have the types of dosimetry 


information that we have here. 


Okay, the -- I think everyone would agree that 


the primary issues that are still on the table 


here for Rocky Flats, the outstanding remaining 


issues, revolve around data integrity, 


questions about data integrity. And we heard a 


lot about that last night. I'll get into that 


a little bit more in just a minute, but the 


Advisory Board established a working group to 


deal with this issue, how do we demonstrate 


data reliability. And one of the -- one of the 


things that we -- the Board wanted us to 


address was the internal consistency of the 


data. So for instance, we've got -- for 


external dosimetry, for instance, we've got 


beta/gamma worksheets. These are the 


handwritten records from the earlier period in 

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Rocky Flats. And then we've got a series of 


electronic databases as those records were 


migrated over the years. 


So what -- what you want to do is look and see 


if we've got internal consistency. Do we see 


agreement between the handwritten records from 


the early period and the databases that they 


were migrated into. And what we have found, 


first starting with external dosimetry, is that 


we do have pretty good agreement between these 


two repositories, two sources of external 


dosimetry data. 


We did a comparison of approximately 120 worker 


quarters, so 120 quarters of data for workers, 


and we compared the results from the original 


beta/gamma worksheets -- so this was prior to 


1969, when they were doing handwritten records 


-- compared those to the latest database, 


HIS20. And what we found was that 73 percent 


of all those quarterly data were found, and the 


total annual dose was in complete agreement 


with HIS20. So that was a pretty good number. 


We also found in 17 percent of the cases there 


was one quarter missing from our handwritten 


data, but the annual total for that year agreed 

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with HIS20. So what that told us was that we 


weren't successful in locating all of the 


beta/gamma worksheets that would have applied 


to that individual, but the annual totals were 


in complete agreement. 


So that's where I got that 90 percent number, 


the 73 plus 17 percent. And we felt that that 


was -- that gives us some degree of confidence 


that the external data is internally 


consistent. 


Now I also want to take this opportunity to 


tell you that we don't rely on only HIS20 data, 


and we don't rely on only the handwritten 


records. We take all of the data that we have 


available to look at for dose reconstruction so 


that we have the most complete dataset to 


inform that dose reconstruction. 


 Okay, next internal data integrity. We also 


did some statistical comparisons to look at 


this, and what we found was that we again had 


pretty good agreement. We compared 


approximately 306 worker samples -- so what 


that means is an individual sample on an 


individual worker -- and we looked for 


agreement or disagreement between the 

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handwritten records, bioassay cards, when that 


was the method of recording the data, and later 


HSDS printouts -- we compared those to what we 


saw in the latest database, HIS20. 


And so we -- for workers for which both 


bioassay cards and HIS20 data were available, 


that was approximately 215 cases -- 208 of 215 


cases of the records were in complete 


agreement. And all 34 comparisons of the 


printed data from HSDS were in complete 


agreement with HIS20. So if you total those 


two you get that 97.1 actually percent 


agreement. 


In only seven of those cases -- seven of the 


215, that's about three percent, was there an 


imperfect match between the data found on the 


bioassay cards and HIS20 data. 


So that -- that could raise a flag for you. 


You could say well, do we see any evidence of 


systematic censoring of high data. In other 


words, when these data were migrated into the 


electronic database, did they censor out high 


data. That's what we took a look to see if 


there was any evidence of that. And what we 


found was that in the instances of the seven 

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where we didn't have -- where we had bioassay 


data and we didn't find it in HIS20, six of 


those were in fact non-de-- let me get this 


right. In six of those we found that the value 


in HIS20 database were larger than the card 


data, so it doesn't, in our mind, indicate that 


there was systematic censoring of high data. 


Now as expected with record systems this large, 


there were some discrepancies. There were 


about 41 individual records from three workers 


for which there was bioassay card data, but we 


couldn't locate them in HIS20. So again, you 


would naturally ask the question, is there any 


evidence of systematic sampling -- systematic 


censoring of high values. And we continued to 


investigate this, but what we have found is 


that in 40 of these 41 cases, 41 individual 


comparisons, they were non-detects. They were 


below the detection limit. In only one was 


there a positive value, and that was just 


slightly above the detection limit. So this 


doesn't really indicate a censoring of high 


data, because this is the low data. 


So in summary, there's pretty substantial 


agreement on both the external and internal 

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site between these various repositories of 


data, and that demonstrates that there is 


pretty good internal consistency. 


But this is not the end of the story on data 


integrity. This is only one piece that was 


raised in the working group's report. The 


other concerns that were included in the 


petition are, first of all, workers don't trust 


the dosimetry results. And I'll go into this 


in detail. 


We also heard -- I don't know if this was 


actually in the petition or if it was just 


expressed during the working group meetings by 


the petitioners. We heard that workers 


sometimes manipulated their own badges, and I'm 


going to talk about both of these concerns. 


So first of all let's talk about the issues 


that lead workers to mistrust their dosimetry 


results. There were several examples provided 


in the petition and, to the extent that we 


could locate specific information or the 


specific information was provided, we have 


investigated that as far as we could, and I'll 


talk about some specific examples. 


 But the concerns that kept coming up repeatedly 

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included a concern that when the badge results 


were too high they just assigned zero. That 


was a concern that we heard expressed 


repeatedly. And you have to separate out the 


time periods here in terms of film badges and 


the TLD era. 


 For film badges, one of the concerns was that 


when the film badges were blackened, they would 


just assign a zero dose. So I -- what we have 


here is a situation where some workers are 


saying -- you know, the workers who were 


wearing the dosimetry are saying that other 


workers, those who worked in the dosimetry 


department, falsified data. And so we're 


coming at this from the outside and we have to 


evalu-- as best we can, we have to objectively 


evaluate what the data tell us about these 


situations. 


And in terms of film badge blackening -- I want 


to take an opportunity to communicate some of 


the known limitations of film badge dosimetry, 


and blackening is one of them. As with any 


photographic film, if it's exposed to light, it 


turns black. And these film badges were 


contained in foil packs to prevent light from 

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reaching the film badges. But as with any 


other human device, these are not perfect 


devices. Sometimes that foil pack could be 


damaged and it could lead to light 


contamination. Now that's usually pretty 


easily to dis-- easy to distinguish because it 


doesn't -- typically it doesn't blacken the 


whole badge, and you can go to another area on 


the badge and read it. But that could lead to 


film blackening. We also know that film badges 


are subject to environmental conditions such as 


high temperatures, humidity conditions, can 


lead to film blackening. 


Of course another thing that can lead to film 


blackening is high exposure. That is certainly 


the case. 


So we looked at the specific examples that were 


provided of film blackening, and we simply 


didn't see any evidence that -- that this 


constituted deliberate manipulation or 


deliberate falsification of data. We just 


don't have the evidence for that yet. We 


continue to investigate. We continue to 


accumulate your concerns, some of which were 


expressed last night, and we're going to 

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continue to look. But to date, we haven't 


located a particular example that makes us 


think that these results were -- were 


falsified. 


Now the TLD era. The concern here is that when 


a TLD chip read high they would just assign a 


zero dose. Well, similarly to the film badges, 


we know that TLDs have certain limitations. 


Contaminants on the badge -- for instance, hair 


or body oil or detergent -- can lead to 


anomalously high film ba-- TLD results. It's 


also a limitation of TLDs that the crystals can 


sometimes be dropped. They can sometimes be 


missing. If the badge is damaged the crystal 


can be lost. That -- that is one of the 


limitations of TLDs. 


At Rocky Flats the design of the TLD badge 


contained multiple crystals, and so when one or 


more crystals were lost, most often they could 


recon-- they could estimate the dose from the 


remaining crystals in the badge. So again, we 


-- we arrived at the same -- in the same place. 


We don't yet have an example that demonstrates, 


in our mind, conditions that are outside of 


what you would expect in a dosimetry program 

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like -- like was in existence at Rocky Flats 


and at other DOE sites. But we continue to 


look. I mean this is obviously still a concern 


to the workers and we are going to continue to 


look. We took notes last night. We're going 


to try to track down some of the specific 


examples that were presented then. 


Okay, the -- in a situation where we have a 


suspect badge result, we do have the same 


techniques that I described for dealing with 


gaps, those same techniques can be applied here 


to deal with suspect badge results. So it's 


not -- it's not like we're out in the cold if 


we don't have, you know, 100 percent complete 


dosimetry record, or a period where we have a 


suspect dosimetry record. We do have methods 


to handle those types of situations. 


Okay, now the next concern, that workers 


manipulated their own badges, this is -- this 


is a sticky one. I mean there are some ethical 


implications here that I'm going to leave to 


the Board to consider in their deliberations. 


I'm only going to speak to the scientific, 


quantitative aspects of -- of this particular 


concern. 

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Okay. The situation here -- first of all, let 


me describe the system -- the radiation control 


system at Rocky Flats. It is certainly a fact 


that there was a radiation control system at 


Rocky Flats, and workers were encouraged to 


keep their doses as low as reasonably 


achievable. That's -- that's a standard 


feature of radiation control programs and it's 


a standard feature at Rocky Flats. 


It is also true that workers could be 


restricted from certain jobs if their radiation 


-- recorded radiation doses approached limits. 


That's -- that is true. The goal there is to 


make sure that the workers are not getting 


doses that exceed the regulatory limits. 


 So the motivation that was expressed by the 


petitioner during the working group meetings 


for this kind of situation where workers would 


be motivated to manipulate their own badges 


were so that they could remain eligible for 


premium work, for overtime work, and not be 


restricted from -- from that kind of work. Now 


this going to be a tough issue to deal with 


quantitatively, because as you can imagine, 


workers may have some reluctance to discuss 

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doing this. I mean that -- that's certainly 


the case. 


So what I'd like to do is talk more 


qualitatively to you about how pervasive a 


problem this could be. Let's try to establish 


some perspective on how big an issue that we're 


talking about here. And it occurs to me that a 


chain of events has to occur for this to 


present a problem in our dose reconstruction 


program. 'Cause as a first link in this chain 


is that a worker has to be motivated to do 


this, and we've talked about the motivations 


that were advanced for this. And presumably 


the motivation to do this would be strongest 


when a worker actually approached a limit, an 


administrative limit or a regulatory limit. 


Now that may not be the only time, but that -- 


that is when the motivation might be strongest. 


Again, I'm going to walk through a series of 


steps here, and none of these steps 


individually is impossible, none of them. They 


are all possible to some degree or other. 
I 


think that some of them are fairly unlikely, 


but absolutely not impossible. 


And the motivation in terms of a worker 

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approaching a limit certainly existed. There 


were some workers at Rocky Flats who approached 


regulatory limits, but not -- a great majority 


of the population at Rocky Flats did not 


approach the limits, but there were some. So 


again, not impossible that a worker could be 


motivated to engage in -- in this. 


 Secondly, that same worker would have to be 


willing to do it. And I spent some time at a 


nuclear facility and -- just qualitatively 


speaking now, I think most workers would not be 


willing to engage in this, but some would. 


And if they were motivated and they were 


willing, then they would have to leave their 


badges in their locker or stick them in their 


back pocket, and they would have to not get 


caught while doing it. Again, not impossible. 


The petitioner described some situations and 


the statement that really stuck with me is 


these people were not stupid. If they wanted 


to do this, they could come up with a way to do 


it. And I can per-- I can easily accept that. 


But I don't want to also represent this as 


being an easy thing to do, especially during 


the period when the badge was combined. The 

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site access -- the security badge was combined 


with the dosimetry results from 1964 up into 


the 1990s. So a worker would have to be not 


wearing a security badge or a dosimetry badge. 


Again, not impossible, but maybe not as easy as 


-- as -- as you would think. 


So if a worker was motivated and willing to do 


this, and was able to do it without getting 


caught, that same worker -- in order to prevent 


a problem in our program, that same worker 


would have to get cancer and file a claim in 


our program. Now I don't know the total 


figures of the number of workers that worked at 


the Rocky Flats Plant over the entire operating 


history, but I know that it's at least in the 


tens of thousands, if not more. We have 1,000 


claims from Rocky Flats. Is it impossible that 


one of those workers who was motivated and 


willing to do this and able to do it without 


getting caught could get cancer and file a 


claim in our program? Absolutely not, it is 


possible. But look at the odds here. There's 


not going to be a pervasive number of people 


doing this. 


Next, that same worker who filed a claim in our 

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program would have to have a probability of 


causation less than 50 percent. Again, that 


can happen. If it's over 50 percent, it's not 


going to be as big an issue in that dose 


reconstruction because that individual's most 


likely going to be compensated. But if the 


probability of causation is less than 50 


percent, we may have an issue. 


So let's consider that situation a little 


closer. It's not all cases that are less than 


50 percent, it's those cases that have a 


probability of causation close enough to 50 


where the dose that would be missed or would 


not be recorded on this badge could have an 


impact on the compensation decision. 


Now I don't have a quantitative number for 


this, but I think it's going to be probably our 


best-estimate cases, those where the PCs are in 


the 40s, maybe. So again, that's a pretty 


small number. In fact, at Rocky Flats -- now 


since we're talking about external dosimetry, I 


took a look at our claim population at Rocky 


Flats of the 700 or so that we have completed. 


Our best estimates are where we did a full-


blown external dose reconstruction. Out of the 

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700 that we've completed, nine were best 


estimates for external dose. Nine. 


Is it possible that one of these workers is in 


that nine? Yes, it is. Absolutely it is. But 


is it likely? I don't know. I'll let you draw 


your own conclusions there. 


And finally, the last step in the chain is that 


we would have to not know about this instance. 


Now I think that -- that is probably more 


likely than the other steps, because as I said, 


workers are understandably reluctant to talk 


about doing this, and in some cases we're 


dealing with survivors so they may not even 


know that the employees might have -- might 


have done this. So it's certainly not 


inconceivable that we wouldn't know about it. 


Now in some cases we have methods for detecting 


this kind of thing. If we're looking at a 


best-estimate case and we see a tail-off, which 


could indicate that the worker was pulled out 


of the area, restricted from work, or it could 


indicate that his badge was pulled out of the 


area, left in his locker. But I don't want to 


represent to you that that is a foolproof 


method. It's certainly conceivable that we 

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would not know about this if it happened, and 


that's just -- that's just a limitation that we 


have to deal with and the Board has to 


deliberate about. 


So what we have here is a string of events, 


none of which are impossible. Not one of them 


is impossible. But I think, to varying 


degrees, they're unlikely. And when you string 


those unlikely events together you arrive at a 


pretty unlikely scenario that would present a 


problem for our dose reconstruction prog-- a 


widespread problem for our dose reconstruction 


program. 


Okay, let's talk about our evaluation report. 


I've given the regulatory citation here that 


governs -- governs our evaluation report. And 


that report was issued -- it was completed and 


issued on April 7th, and the Board has access 


to that. 


And the evaluation process that that report 


covers -- the Board members have seen this. 


This is familiar to them, but for the members 


of the audience it may not be as familiar. Our 


regulations established a two-pronged test for 


evaluation of an SEC petition, and I've again 

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given the regulatory citation there. 


The first prong of that test is this question: 


Is it feasible to estimate the level of 


radiation doses to individual members of the 


class with sufficient accuracy? If the answer 


to that first question, that first prong of the 


test, is no, then we are obligated to go to the 


second prong of the test. And that question 


says, given that you can't reconstruct doses 


with sufficient accuracy, is there a reasonable 


likelihood that radiation doses experienced by 


this class could have endangered the health of 


-- of the members of the class. But you only 


go to that second step if the answer to the 


first one is no, it's not feasible. 


So our conclusion from this report, based on 


the evidence that we have so far -- and I want 


to emphasize that we are continuing to 


investigate. We are working with our 


colleagues at SC&A. We are working with the 


working group and the full Board to continue to 


investigate the concerns. Our conclusion is 


that the monitoring records, process 


descriptions, source term data that we have are 


sufficient to estimate radiation doses with 

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sufficient accuracy for this class of 


employees. 


Again, we are continuing to investigate your 


concerns. And to the extent that you can help 


us, give us examples -- as specific as you can 


-- that will help us. Now I'm not saying that 


the burden is on you to reach back 40 years and 


tell me the specifics of where you were on a 


given day. But as complete a picture as you 


can give us, that will help us to zero in, help 


us to go get the records and -- and determine 


what -- what happened in these situations. 


So in summary, the class was 1952 to present. 


We determined the first prong of the test, that 


it is feasible, based on the evidence that we 


have on hand now, that we can feasibly 


reconstruct doses. So we didn't go on to the 


second prong of that test. If we had, I think 


the answer would certainly have been yes. I 


mean there were condition-- potentially 


hazardous conditions at Rocky Flats that could 


have endangered the health of the workers. But 


again, that -- we only satisfied the first 


prong of the test which asked if it was 


feasible. 

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 Okay, that concludes my slides. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Let's open 


this up now for questions or discussion. Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think a couple things that you 


mentioned, especially on the coworkers, the -- 


the coworker models and how limited that would 


be to -- I think you said two cases that remain 


for coworker type dose reconstruction. 


 DR. ULSH: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm trying to understand, and 


we've talked about this a little bit and 


started to bring it up in the workgroup, but 


I'm trying to understand if any of the -- does 


that mean they -- they -- when you said certain 


number of workers had -- one of your early 


slides said how many records -- how many -- 


 DR. ULSH: Right, about 1,000. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- claimants had internal 


records, how many claimants had external. Does 


that mean they had a full set, enough to do 


dose reconstruction --


 DR. ULSH: No, that doesn't imply that there 


aren't gaps in some of those 1,000. What it 


says is that for -- of the 1,100 cases there is 


at least some external data and there is at 

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least some internal data. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just wanted to be clear with 


that on the record, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: I appreciate that clarification. As 


I -- all I can say is that of the 700 cases 


that we've done so far, we only have identified 


two. I know, Mark, you'd expressed a concern 


about neutrons -- neutron and does that 


constitute coworker data, so let me ju-- shall 


I answer that question or -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (inaudible) 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. And I talked about the early 


time period when we -- when there was no 


neutron monitoring and we apply a neutron to 


gamma ratio. And it is true that that neutron 


to gamma ratio is a measured value, and in some 


cases it could be based on other workers. So 


in the strictest sense, that could constitute 


coworker data. But I'm referring to it in the 


sense that we normally refer to it at other 


sites where we have no dosimetry for this 


person and we assign doses from coworkers. In 


this case that we're talking about here, 


applying a neutron to gamma ratio, we start 


with that individual's gamma reading. So we 

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have gamma dosimetry for that person. And then 


we apply the neutron to gamma ratio to 


calculate the neutron dose. So in the 


strictest sense, that might constitute coworker 


data, but I was referring to it in the more 


limited context. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and the -- the only other 


question was, you mentioned a -- a nearby 


technique --


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- which we understand how that 


works. Has that been applied to any of the 


cases, to your knowledge, that you've done? 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, gee, Mark --


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause I don't know that you -- 


you normally -- or -- or often use that. 


 DR. ULSH: We don't often use it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: I can't say whether there are any 


cases at Rocky Flats where we have used it. 


It's pretty uncommon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess some concern that we've 


heard expressed from the petitioners and from 


some people last night is that, you know, if 


there was -- if they have records for a couple 

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of quarters, then missing records, then records 


for a couple more quarters, the records that 


were missing might in fact have been because 


they were in those high exposed areas. So --


 DR. ULSH: Yeah --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- I think caution would -- 


should be applied to that -- 


 DR. ULSH: I completely agree. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- nearby technique. 


 DR. ULSH: The appropriateness of the nearby 


technique is predicated on the fact that 


exposure conditions are constant. If we can't 


demonstra-- if we can't validate that that is 


the situation, then the nearby technique would 


not be appropriate. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Further comments, questions? 


 (No responses) 


 Okay, thank you very much. 


 DR. ULSH: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think it would be appropriate if 


we had a comfort break for the assembly for 


about 15 minutes, and then we'll resume and 


hear from the petitioners. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Paul? 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:15 a.m. 

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to 10:40 a.m.) 


PRESENTATION BY PETITIONERS


 DR. ZIEMER: We're ready to reconvene the 


assembly. Next in connection with the Rocky 


Flats SEC we will hear directly from the 


petitioners, and Tony DeMaiori -- am I 


pronouncing it correctly? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Absolutely. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Close enough. I'm good on the 


Tony part. Tony, welcome back to the -- the 


podium, and please -- and others who may be 


with you, we're pleased to hear from you at 


this time. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Good morning, Dr. Ziemer, 


members of the Board. As -- My name's Tony 


DeMaiori. I'm the former president of the 


United Steelworkers Local 8031. We represented 


the Rocky Flats facility. During the height of 


the D and D we had 1,600 members active that we 


petitioned on behalf of. As -- we'd like to 


open up our presentation with a video to give 


everybody an idea of the type of work that we 


did at Rocky Flats, and the people that were 


there, as we think we need a little bit of the 


human aspect here. So as -- if it would please 

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the Board as -- we'd like to show this video. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Please proceed. The 


court reporter is trying to figure out how to 


record this now, just -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Well, we can give you a copy 


'cause I --


 DR. ZIEMER: No, we understand. We like to kid 


him now and then. 


 (Whereupon, a videotape was played for the 


Board and the public.) 


UNIDENTIFIED: Excuse me, ladies and 


gentlemen, this is why I'm here, because ten 


years down the road, the gestation period for 


radiation inhalation, a lot of these people are 


going to be sick. This is why I'm here. I 


care about these people 'cause these people are 


my people and I can't let them go through what 


we did. This -- this can't -- this can't 


happen. We've got to figure out what to do 


because it's not going to go away. It's here. 


And a lot of this stuff these people worked 


with are (inaudible). That means 24,000 years 


to that (inaudible) so we've got to remember 


this. Ten years down the road we're going to 


be buried with people getting sick, wondering 

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why. This is reality. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Go ahead, please. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Thank you. And I'd like to 


thank everybody for giving us the opportunity 


to recognize the workers and to get -- get an 


idea of the type of work that we did at Rocky 


Flats all those years as this video was 


dedicated to all the people who had dedicated 


their lives to the production and the 


protection of special nuclear weapons, and the 


ultimately the cleanup of the Rocky Flats 


facility. As make no mistake, members of the 


Board, as Chairman Ziemer, that in fact the 


workers at Rocky Flats were true patriots as we 


worked a lot of hours, we worked a lot of 


hardships. Rocky Flats was a 7-day shift. 


That is, it never closed. We worked 24 hours a 


day, seven days a week. 


 Our working conditions were abnormal, to say 


the least. There are several incidents that I 


can cite that weren't day-to-day operations, 


you know, with myself personally as I laid in a 


supplied breathing air suit for nine hours 


below tanks that contained resins. We were 


trying to separate the plutonium, but we just 

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started the facility, 371, and we had to flush 


the facility with water, H2O, because the 


piping was so massive during construction, it 


filled up with dirt, dust. So we did, we 


flushed it with water, and then we couldn't get 


the DOWEX resins to extract the plutonium, to 


grab it -- that's in the ion exchange. So I 


laid there for nine hours with my dosimeter in 


my front pocket, taped, shielded by my torso, 


with my head at the bottom of the ion tanks. 


And every 15 minutes my boss would say hey, 


Tone, take another sample, and I'd take another 


sample. Every two hours he'd say give me the 


bag of samples. We'd slide it back under the 


door. But these are the types of things. 


Now when we go into dose reconstruction they're 


going to say well, Tone, during 1982 you were 


caustic treatment. You were treating caustic 


from the SOE operation, and that's a low-dose 


job. Absolutely the truth. But I also did the 


job up on the ion exchange, the sampling. I 


was a young man. The money was really good, 


time and a half. That's -- it helped feed my 


family, buy houses, clothing, that's -- I have 


to tell you, no regrets. It was a wonderful 

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job that I had out at Rocky Flats, and I think 


most people would tell you that. But we're 


here today to discuss the adverse effects, the 


health effects due to ionizing radiation and 


the -- the exposures, the chemical cocktails. 


Let us not forget the chemical cocktails, the 


plutonium nitrates that we worked with at Rocky 


Flats. That's... 


So anyway, at this point in time I'm gong to 


refer to Jennifer Thompson and she's going to 


start the presentation. Thank you. 


MS. THOMPSON: Good morning. Can you hear me? 


I wanted to thank you for giving us the 


opportunity to present to the Board. We 


greatly appreciate the role that you play in 


bringing a pure scientific, objective and fair 


treatment to our petition for Special Exposure 


Cohort. 


My role in this process has been as a former 


Rocky Flats employee, worker and a volunteer. 


I've worked long hours, evenings and weekends, 


to help the steelworkers prepare their 


petition. I do this as an individual and 


former worker. 


I also want to appreciate all of the workers 

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who have contributed to the petition, all of 


the hourly workers, and thank Kaiser Hill* and 


the Department of Energy at Rocky Flats for 


being supportive of our efforts back in the -- 


December of 2004 and January of 2005 time frame 


when we were actually preparing this petition. 


At this point I wanted to make a couple of 


clarifications based on the earlier 


presentation by NIOSH. As you could see by the 


video, Rocky Flats is gone. There are not a 


few facilities left standing. The project is 


completely over. In October of 2005 they hung 


the lock on the gate out at Rocky Flats, 


signifying completion. 


I also wanted to clarify that the class of the 


petition that we submitted -- that the 


Steelworkers submitted on behalf of its 


membership was a much smaller class than what 


you see today. And the class that was 


submitted was submitted based on the legal 


right of representation of the Steelworkers for 


its membership, and that was the limitation. 


In addition to that, we limited our class as -- 


as we thought was instructed through the 


legislation to clearly define a class of people 

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that had -- either wore dosimetry or worked in 


areas that had been sense proven to require 


dosimetry, rather than addressing a broad 


population of -- of 10,000 people, which is 


what the case is now. 


I also wanted to clarify the issue with 


closure. I'm sure -- and I'm grateful for DOE 


that NIOSH has had great access now in 


obtaining records, but what about five years 


from now? And in addition, the workers who are 


involved in their own individual dose 


reconstructions are required to remember back 


that many years, so closure is a factor. When 


the facilities are not there, it is a factor. 


 Another clarification is that plutonium 


actually emits alpha. It's not ionizing. The 


daughter product of plutonium is where the 


ionizing radiation comes from. 


 The other clarification is that it was listed 


that the preferred data analysis to be used is 


urinalysis, and I understand that. But that 


does not account for, as -- as recognized, that 


does not account accurately for high-fired 


oxides, so the preferred method of analysis 


that NIOSH employs does not account for high­
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fired oxides. 


 Another clarification or -- or point from that 


presentation is it showed a 73 percent 


correlation of data, and that may be acceptable 


to some people, but I don't think if you have 


cancer that 73 percent is acceptable to you. 


 Another issue I'd like to clarify is an issue 


on limits. The presentation earlier said that 


not very many Rocky Flats people approached the 


legal regulatory limit. Well, that may be 


true. What the presenter failed to recognize 


is that at Rocky Flats we had an 


administrative control level of 500 millirem, 


so people actually were -- were relocated from 


job positions when they approached a 500 


millirem level, not the regulatory legal limit, 


so that is a -- is a -- is a big difference 


there. 


Okay. I've never used one of these before so 


I'll probably mess up, but -- one other thing I 


wanted to say is -- is that the gentleman early 


talked about a picture and a puzzle. And if 


you don't know what the picture is that you're 


trying to build, how do you know you have 


missing pieces from the puzzle? You don't know 

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the pieces even exist. 


Okay. The basis for our petition has already 


been presented by others at this point so I'm 


going to skip -- skip that. 


What I'd like to talk about first is the 


petition time line. The law requires NIOSH to 


make a recommendation to you folks, the 


Advisory Board, 180 days from receipt. Health 


and Human Services has decided in its own rules 


that 180 days from receipt actually meant 180 


days from the point that NIOSH certified the 


petition. Today if 440 days later, and now it 


appears that NIOSH is pressuring the Board for 


a quick decision. This delay has cost the 


petitioner a lot, a lot in terms of the fact 


that all of our workers are now laid off; a lot 


in terms of the fact that Rocky Flats is now 


gone; a lot in terms of the fact the Rocky 


Flats Union is gone; a lot in terms of the fact 


that site experts are gone. We have lost our 


ability as petitioners to access records 


because now Privacy Act limitations prevent us. 


We have no official capacity. We have been 


crippled by this delay in terms of our ability 


to respond --

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 (Pause) 


There we go. I know this is hard to read. 
I 


apologize for the small type, but basically 


this is a detail of the time line. In 2000 the 


EEOICPA was passed by Congress. It took NIOSH 


four years to publish the rules, and then in 


October of 2004 it was amended, and it was 


amended to put in the requirement for 180-day 


turnaround after receipt. Congress noted the 


importance of a timely review and a timely 


response. 


On February 15th of 2005 the Steelworkers 


submitted their petition. That's day zero. 


That's when the clock started ticking. On day 


61 Health and Human Services issued a letter to 


the petitioner asking for additional 


information and gave us a 30-day turnaround, 


which we met, 26 days later submitting 500 


additional pages of documentation in 28 days. 


On day 113 our petition was certified, June 


16th, 2005. On September 13th of 2005, many 


months after our petition was submitted, Health 


and Human Service amended its rules to 


accommodate the 180-day requirement and 


determined that what Congress really meant was 

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certification and not receipt, as the law 


states. 


In December of 2008 (sic) S. Cohen & Associates 


submitted a site profile review, and we believe 


that that review, which was done with great 


detail and high quality, supported the premises 


of our petition in very, very many ways, and 


we're grateful for the work of S. Cohen & 


Associates in putting that together. 


On day 303, 179 days after the petition was 


certified -- and there's no coincidence there ­

- Health and Human Services Director Larry 


Elliott issued a letter saying that their 


recommendation was to delay the recommendation 


of the petition. 


Day 440 after receipt of petition, 315 days 


after certification, we believe that today was 


the formal recommendation but I'm not certain. 


This other issue is a sensitive one, and I have 


to preface it with -- with that sensitivity. 


The Steelworkers would love for everybody at 


Rocky Flats who gets cancer to be covered under 


this legislation and under this -- this cohort 


status. However, the law was quite clear when 


we submitted the petition. That was that we 

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had to submit only on behalf of those folks 


that were legally represented by the union. In 


fact, we had to provide copies of all the union 


agreements, proving that we had legal right of 


representation for those people. So by law we 


could not have petitioned on behalf of other 


folks. As such we did not gather affidavits 


from salaried workers. We did not ask for 


their input into this petition. They have dose 


reconstruction challenges and examples of 


failures -- systematic failures that were not 


included in our petition because this petition 


was never intended to represent the total 


universe of people at Rocky Flats. 


Now NIOSH has decided to expand the class -- 


covered class under this SEC petition. This 


dilutes the class, creates too large of a group 


to ever get funded. You all know the politics 


involved in Special Exposure Cohort. It's a 


sad thing, but it is reality. It took our 


group's size from less than 1,500 people to 


nearly 10,000 people. If Congress has a 


problem funding Special Exposure Cohorts, do 


you really think that a 10,000-person class is 


a realistic way to go about doing a Special 

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Exposure Cohort petition or class of people? 


The most sad part of this is that this denies 


people who are not involved in preparing the 


petition, and who are not represented by the 


petition, but yet denies them Special Exposure 


Cohort status. We -- we take issue with that, 

obviously. 

Uh-oh... 

(Pause) 

 DR. ZIEMER: This one's still working. That 


one must have gone into a sleep mode or... 


MS. THOMPSON: Okay. Can the AV person maybe ­

- I'll continue, but can somebody try to get 


the other screen up? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Go ahead. 


MS. THOMPSON: Okay. My next premise is -- is 


best described using a visual description, and 


-- and we feel like that the Rocky Flats 


petition and the situation of dose 


reconstruction at Rocky Flats is like a dam 


that's failing. And a hole breaks in one point 


and NIOSH just puts its hand over that hole, 


and that's a new Technical Information Basis 


Document (sic). And then a hole comes over 


here and they put their foot over that one, and 

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that's another Technical Information Basis 


Document (sic). And then there's another hole, 


and we've got an assumption for that. And then 


there's another issue, and we've got an excuse 


for that. But all the while they're putting 


their hands over the holes and blocking the 


water, they're failing to see that the dam is 


failing. They fail to look at the systematic, 


systemic failures of dose reconstruction. 


Yes, you can come up with an assumption, an 


excuse, to explain nearly every thing. And I'm 


sure if we brought 100 more issues, there would 


be 100 more assumptions and 100 more excuses. 


These are band-aids. They're not fixing the 


problem. 


The new -- the new TIB for high-fired oxides, 


great, should have been put in place years ago, 


it's not even final yet, but that's one of the 


band-aids. The changes for co-located worker, 


the new TIB -- another one, great. Adjustments 


for lead aprons, you have factors you can use, 


you have assumptions you can make. The zero 


versus missing data assumptions. What we have 


here is degrees of separation. Each time you 


make an assumption, each time you use 

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reconstructed dose from another source, you're 


getting further and further away from reality, 


further and further away from your ability to 


accurately construct dose. 


The question is not can someday we accurately 


reconstruct doses. The question is as of 


February 15th, 2005 when this position (sic) 


was submitted, could dose be accurately 


reconstructed. And we believe the answer is 


no. Dose reconstruction is flawed, no matter 


how many band-aids NIOSH is willing to put in 


place. 


The site profile does not even still 


acknowledge the D and D operations at the site. 


Post-1995, none of the incidents, none of the 


operations, none of that is taken into account 


by the site profile. And I believe there's no 


intentions to modify that. You saw the video. 


That's the type of work these people were 


involved in the last ten years, not production 


operations. 


The band-aids put in place are not -- not going 


to heal the problem with dose reconstruction. 


High-fired oxides and their effect on the human 


body and how the body processes them is not 

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sufficiently studied to produce an accurate 


TIB. Okay? And the TIB is not even approved 


yet. This is a new phenomena (sic). In 2003 


people said wow, we've got this new thing and 


we're not really even sure what it is. It's 


only three years later, and now we're going to 


say we can accurately put together something 


that's going to allow us to reconstruct dose? 


 The lead apron adjustment only works if the 


worker knows that they had that issue and 


reports it during their dose reconstruction. 


Many people might not even think to mention it. 


And also, this assumption that -- that lead 


apron use was not very prevalent at Rocky Flats 


is not true. During the clean-up operations 


lead aprons were used in D and D residue 


operations, thermostabilization and plutonium 


packaging. But again, the site profile does 


not account for any of those. 


This issue of the zeroes on your dose records, 


and I'm going to speak to this personally in a 


little bit, are inconsistently used. And you 


can cite that there's a procedure in place at 


the site that says you're supposed to do it 


this way, but practice and procedure are not 

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always the same thing. There's too many varied 


situations in which a zero is entered onto a 


person's dose record. 


And -- and finally, the six cases that are 


cited in the NIOSH evaluation report -- they 


used six cases and then applied it to 9,537 


people. I'm not a statistics person, but that 


doesn't seem like a very good population to be 


basing assumptions from. 


Okay. So now the other is that -- is that -- 


as I mentioned, it's every time an issue comes 


up, there's an answer. But there's lots of 


other issues that haven't even come up yet. 


Our -- our NDA folks carried cans of plutonium 


(Pause) 


The NDA folks carried cans of plutonium under 


their arms, under the armpit. The dosimeter's 


on the front of their body. Okay? They're 


getting exposure under their arm that's not 


being measured by their dosimeter. 


Workers working in lead-shielded gloveboxes, 


their dosimeter is against the lead shielding. 


Their face is against the plexiglass. The 


plutonium is in front of their face. 

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And there's many others that haven't been 


brought up. And the incentives for workers to 


mask dose in order to remain in the areas of 


job preference or higher earning potential, 


NIOSH spent a lot of time on that, and this is 


not an issue that we -- we want to say is an 


issue of credibility for our work force. It's 


a -- it's a reality when you have work that 


requires you to wear a dosimeter and you're 


approaching your level and you might get 


relocated, that could become a factor in the 


decisions you make on a day to day basis. 


The third thing we want to bring up is the bias 


of the data credibility of information 


presented to the Board. There's a letter by 


Congressman Hostettler regarding a -- a -- I 


don't even know what it is. At Rocky Flats, he 


says, a manager of health physics programs 


prepared NIOSH's site profiles, TIBs, is 


actively involved in the evaluation of an SEC 


petition -- and that's our petition -- which 


includes validation of the results used in his 


previous work. We believe that that is a 


conflict of interest. Individuals who have 


testified against workers in Worker 

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Compensation hearings are serving key roles in 


the NIOSH process, and we believe that is a 


conflict of interest. This results in 


information that skewed the in-- has skewed the 


interpretation of reality. 


 The government's own General Accounting Office 


has identified conflict of interest as an 


issue. 


This gets to -- to my individual case, and I 


want to clarify something. I, in my job at 


Rocky Flats, probably did not have the 


potential to get enough exposure that I would 


ever file a claim, so this is not driven by my 


personal desire to get compensated. This is 


just to give an example, and the reason this 


example is so good is because my dosimetry file 


is probably like that thick. I only maybe have 


three in there, incidents over time. I brought 


up an issue where a dose reconstruction had to 


be done because my dosimeter showed an 


abnormally high reading, and the dosimetry 


department did an investigation, asked me to 


remember all the places I'd been for the 


previous six months and who I'd been with. 


But because of the nature of my job, I had been 

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into nearly every plutonium facility at Rocky 


Flats during that six-month time period. It 


was impossible to ascertain the cause of that 


exposure. And at the time I understood that. 


And at the end of the -- of the evaluation and 


the investigation and construction, they 


entered a zero on my dose record. And when I 


got my report in the mail it showed zero. 


Instead of recording the dose that my dosimeter 


said, because we couldn't find the source of it 


and they didn't believe the credibility of the 


-- of the dosimetry reading, I got a zero. 


 This incident was brought to the attention on 


one of the working group meetings and NIOSH 


went off and pulled my records, and then later 


reported to the Board on one of the only other 


of the three incidents that I had in my 


history, about the time that I left my 


dosimeter on my coveralls when I exited the 


area and it ended up in the laundry basket. 


Okay? That -- that is not the incident I was 


talking about. And then they said that the 


dose reconstruction was done based on that 


incident, which I find very hard to believe 


because I was never spoken to regarding that. 

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The dosimeter was left in the laundry basket on 


my way out of a radiation area. My dosimeter 


was with me the whole time I was in the 


radiation area, so I fail to see the need for 


the dose reconstruction in that incident. 


And I just give that as an example. It 


highlights a bigger issue than that. 


And the effects of closure, I kind of touched 


on this earlier that it's interesting to me at 


one hand that -- that we're hearing that all of 


the records are readily available and that 


there's no problem with the closure in terms of 


the ability to do dose reconstruction, but in 


the evaluation report NIOSH recommended that -- 


that -- against the Special Exposure Cohort 


status, but then stated that it would take two 


to four months to get the dose investigation 


report that the petitioner suggested might be 


helpful for this -- this petition. So on the 


one hand they say they can get everything, and 


on the other hand they say it will take too 


long. 


As -- I alluded earlier to the politics that 


come into play, and I'm sure the Board is 


feeling some of the pressures of -- of the 

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political situation. An OMB past back member 


to the -- memo to the Department of Labor 


outlines a plan to contain growth in benefits 


from new Special Exposure Cohorts by requiring 


administrative clearance before the Health and 


Human Services Secretary can make a decision, 


and calls for a White House-led inter-Agency 


task force to address any imbalance in the 


Advisory Board's membership. In this context, 


this appears to intend to tilt the Advisory 


Board's composition against approval of Special 


Exposure Cohorts. 


Now I -- I want to talk about what we thought 


the law was asking us to do. We thought that 


the law was asking us to prove that there was a 


class of Rocky Flats workers that existed for 


whom it was not feasible to accurately estimate 


the radiation dose they received, and then to 


show that they had had their health endangered 


by their exposure to radiation. Number two it 


appears everybody is in agreement with. Number 


one is what -- what we're having issues with 


here. 


In terms of proof about it not being feasible 


to accurately estimate dose, S. Cohen & 

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Associates' December 8th report says that the 


Rocky Flats site profile falls short in fully 


characterizing underlying issues that are 


fundamental to die-- guiding dose 


reconstruction. In terms of proof, the report 


also says a number of historical issues and 


discrepancies cast doubt on the validity of 


dose records being relied on for dose 


reconstruction. The precise nature of super 


class Y material is not known. Upper bound 


doses from external gamma, neutron and beta 


exposure are often underestimated, sometimes 


considerably, particularly when doses are 


reconstructed. 


We believe just the fact alone that now these 


new TIBs are being put in place that the site 


profile's changing and not -- acknowledges the 


fact that at the time we submitted the petition 


dose could not be accurately reconstructed. 


And we believe the situation will exist even 


after those band-aids are put in place for the 


reasons I mention -- mentioned before. 


(Pause) 


Members of our Colorado Congressional 


delegation asked NIOSH not once, not twice, but 

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three times to grant our petition a fair and 


timely review. U.S. Congress required NIOSH to 


make a timely recommendation. NIOSH has not 


complied on either account. It is obvious we 


can no longer get a timely review. Now we are 


asking the Board to ensure that we get a fair 


one. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Tony, do you 


have additional individuals to present? Thank 


you. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Thank you, Jennifer. Thank you, 


members of the Board. The next person I'd like 


to introduce is Charlie Wolfe. Charlie. 


MR. WOLFE: Can you hear me? Does it work? My 


name is Charlie Wolfe. I was the project 


manager from 1995 to 2000 at Rocky Flats in the 


771 facility, and also I was a deputy project 


manager when we tore down the first facility on 


779. Previous to that I am a -- you got to 


excuse me, sometimes I forget things. 1991 I 


graduated with a chemical engineering degree 


from Ohio State and an MBA. When I left school 


I went to -- to Savannah River and worked 


there. I worked in two of their plutonium 


facilities, Pu-239 and Pu-238 facilities, for 

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the Cassini, so I've got -- been in the 


facilities a lot. 


One of the things that I did, and I'm sure the 


Steelworkers will admit it, at every one of the 


facilities I went to, I dressed out every day. 


Okay? I put my masks on and I went out with 


the people to see what they were doing. One of 


the things I don't agree with right here is how 


many of you people dressed out over the time 


period and went through the facilities to see 


what the workers actually did instead of doing 


a paper analysis of what they did. That would 


give you a lot of your answers, to see what 


issues many of these people are talking about. 


I've -- I was out there a few times. The 


Steelworkers did a great job of helping people, 


but there were a lot of cases where you took 


off your -- yes, protective equipment and put 


it out where somebody could see it, but you 


never had an analysis of it. There were a lot 


of times where you didn't have your badges in 


the correct place where you could get it. 


We found out -- I had my office in there, and 


they found out after we were there, I don't 


know, five years, six years, there was 

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radiation exposure in that facility and in the 


office areas. I never had my TLDs on when I 


was in those areas. I was in the office. My 


TLDs were on when I walked through the facility 


with the -- with the work force. 


They -- at least as likely as not was what they 


put on my record in donation -- in -- what do 


you call it, dosimetry and stuff. Okay? Well, 


geez, I got a big hole in my head and I don't 


see it as likely as not -- okay? -- from that 


standpoint. And I sent several things back to 


NIOSH, DOE and everybody else that it wasn't 


just radiation that was put in there, but there 


was uptakes of plutonium and toxicity of that 


radiation is different. Plutonium has a 


different radionucleide (sic) than just looking 


at radiation. Okay? And people don't take 


that into account, as well. 


One of the things that the gentleman that was 


speaking earlier said, well, yes, he was 


talking -- said that radiation is one of the 


reasons that people get cancer. Okay. I've 


talked to a lot of doctors. It doesn't take 


much. It doesn't take much. And you know, 


that's one of the problems that I have. 

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I 

They talk about NIOSH or -- records. One of 


the records -- it took me over three months to 


get this fixed because they had trouble finding 


my job requirements for Rogers Iron Company. 


don't even know who Rogers Iron Company is. 


Okay? And that's one of the records that they 


kept sending back to me over and over again for 


that company. I had no idea. So I don't know 


how I can even trust, you know, some of the 


other evaluations because of that. 


I received -- I have at home, I couldn't carry 


it. I got documents that are this high. They 


sent information on where you were, what 


radionucleide (sic) were you associated with -- 


I mean it must have been 15 pages long. Like I 


said, I'm a chemical engineer, but I was a 


little bit -- had a hard time deciphering that 


because of my injury. My wife is a chemical 


engineer. Trying to go through that and find 


out the information they were asking, it was 


almost impossible for us to do it, so I don't 


know what other people had to do in terms of 


the Steelworkers and everything to do it. 


My picture is up at the top there. The reason 


is, like I said, I went through the facility 

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every day with my steelworkers. I went through 


the facility when I was at Savannah River every 


day. I know what they did. I know where they 


were at. I know the issues that they had to -- 


to fight. And it's not fair. I mean the 


paperwork is incorrect on terms of where some 


of these people got their exposure, what types 


of exposure, there are different areas in the 


facility when you walk through that you can get 


a higher level exposure. 


When you got an inhalant -- I was in several 


rooms that the alarms go off. Okay? So you're 


inhaling something, potentially. And you get 


outside of the room, if they find something you 


take your anti-Cs off. But you don't go right 


to the -- what do they call the -- the medical 


to check to see if there's anything that you 


inhaled or anything that could infect the top 


of your head. 


And I don't understand, you know, just sitting 


there looking at pieces of paper and -- you 


know, I know they're very intelligent people. 


I have no problem with that. But understanding 


what these guys went through, what people did, 


what they were exposed to is unavailable if you 

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haven't walked through the facilities. 


And I -- and I'll ask one -- one last question 


because I can't remember half of what I wanted 


to say, sorry. But the one thing is how many 


of you in here -- it's -- it's too late now, 


Rocky Flats is gone -- not just taken a tour -- 


okay? -- you know, there's the tours where they 


dress you up and everybody feels real cool, you 


know, walking through, but it's an area that 


has been inspected, checked out and make sure 


there -- there's absolutely no problems through 


there. But how many of you put a mask on and 


watched -- sat in the room and watched the 


workers in terms of taking care of pulling down 


the facilities and what they had to do and what 


was in those areas? You know, unless you've 


done that, you don't understand it. And I 


don't think there's a lot of you that would 


feel very comfortable, from this point on, if 


you went and had to put a mask on and go in and 


watch that. 


That's about all I had to say. I think I had ­

- I can't write very straight anymore. I think 


that's about -- most of the items. 


Can you look real quick, Jennifer, and make 

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sure I covered everything? 


(Pause) 


Thank you very much for -- for listening to us. 


I appreciate the time that you've spent. One 


of the things I'm going to pass around 'cause I 


don't -- I'm not technically able to put it 


here, but I got plenty of them at home. But 


this is what my brain tumor looked like. Okay? 


And that's how much of my brain they had to 


take out. All right? So I'm here because I've 


seen these guys do a great job, and I think 


they need to be compensated for the problems 


that they have now because these guys, like the 


movie, they are heroes. They fought the wars 


that we didn't, just in a different way. And I 


would like to applaud those guys for what they 


did on the work, and I think you guys -- I hope 


you guys will continue to look at this and 


support these guys because they deserve it. 


They did the work. They saved you guys from 


not having to deal with things like this. And 


thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Charlie. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Thank you, Charlie. As -- our 


next speaker will be Jerry Hardin. Jerry. 

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Jerry's past president of the United 


Steelworkers three times, as Jerry'll take us 


back, radiologically, into the Stone Age. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I get a lot of that, too, Jerry, 


so --


 MR. HARDIN: It matches the appearance. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- don't feel bad. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Before I turn the mike over, 


Jennifer has reminded me that, for a point of 


record, Charlie has been denied on his third 


claim. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. HARDIN: Good morning. My name is Jerry 


Hardin, as Tony's already mentioned, and I hope 


you won't hold the other information against 


me. I worked at Rocky Flats for over 37 years. 


Part of the time was as union president, 


majority was as a radiation protection 


technologist. 


The thing that I'd like to do today is to poke 


a few holes in some of the things that I've 


overheard, you know, through the course of this 


presentation this morning. 


First off, I think you need to partition time 


periods off in -- in regard to talking about 

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anything with Rocky Flats. Some things -- you 


know, as this thing evolved -- got better, but 


not everything. 


Back when I first hired on, for instance, there 


was virtually no gamma shielding on most of the 


dry boxes. That came about in 1968. 


Ironically, some of that same shielding 


contributed to the cataclysm of 1969, which 


we're about to celebrate the 37th anniversary 


of, the worst industrial fire in U.S. history, 


dollar-wise, to that point. 


 Now the reason I'm going to make some of these 


statements is to merely emphasize that I don't 


understand why Rocky Flats would be a problem 


to you people at all. 


The other thing that I wanted you to know, and 


I don't know how familiar you are with the 


floor plan of building 771, but I heard stories 


about dose reconstruction today. But I want to 


tell you, in room 114, in a distance of about 


100 feet, you could go from extreme neutron 


field to an extreme gamma field, the gamma 


field being Line 1, which was the americium box 


where the product was eventually bagged out and 


sold. The neutron field was the labyrinth 

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shield for the hydrofluorination and the pink 


cake. And I don't know how familiar you are 


with pink cake, but according to the 


instruments that I carried, neutrons flew all 


over the place. So what I'm telling you is in 


a distance of 100 feet or so you could have a 


totally different picture of radiation dosage, 


and I don't know how you could ever extrapolate 


a worker's possible exposure based on -- on 


that difficulty alone. 


The other thing I would tell you is I carry a 


36-rem body burden that I suspect is a product 


of high-fired oxide. The reason that I have 


that suspicion is because it didn't show on my 


-- on urinalysis results for quite a while. 


Those of you that are familiar with Langham's 


Curve know that the excretion usually is very 


significant at first and then it tapers off to 


near nothing. The point that I'm trying to 


make is that they never attributed my exposure 


to anything particular, and all of a sudden I 


showed up in 1988 and I lit up the clock. And 


the reason that that's of concern to me is 


because the evolution of the technology as well 


as, you know, the way that they defend it. 

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 The other thing I would tell you is that this 


has been a -- a ongoing series of deceit and -- 


and denial dating way back to my first 


employment. We had a thing after the fire in 


1969 where they denied the presence of tritium 


anywhere on site. Then all of a sudden some 


fine fella decided that he would run a test and 


they discovered tritium in Great Western 


Reservoir that sits west of -- of Broomfield. 


The irony of that is, management denied the 


presence of tritium anywhere on the plant site 


until finally someone said hey, it was a site 


return. We were -- we were ambushed. 


The reason that that's important to you is 


because this is going to be a sequence of 


denial and betrayal, in my opinion, of good 


science as well as some of the information. 


 The thing that I would also try to point out to 


you is dosimetry was sorely lacking. As it's 


already been mentioned, neutron dosimetry was 


virtually non-existent and there were 


occurrences of black badges, certainly back in 


the film days. June Malsik* was their -- was 


their sole technician to count the tracks, and 


I think she's probably on to the big dry box in 

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the sky by now, but the point being is it was 


primitive and everyone knew it. 


 The emphasis at that time was on KG of fissile 


material out the door. It wasn't on good 


health and good housekeeping practices. As a 


rad tech, we tried to keep the walkways less 


than about 1,500 counts per minute alpha. You 


go any distance either side in building 71 and 


you could find most any number that you chose 


to -- to recognize. 


 Technology has improved over years and some of 


it I think has been very useful to the workers. 


Other things I think have been more useful to 


the lawyers. 


And the problem that I've got is access to the 


records. The thing that you need to know is 


that this management and this government agency 


has not been very cooperative to anyone. And I 


would wave this headline to everyone's 


attention. This is a result of the infamous 


Cook case, and these were landowners adjacent 


to Rocky Flats. And initially the workers were 


attempting to file a case that was somewhat 


similar at the same time and our case was ruled 


invalid due to the Workmen's Comp law that 

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exists in this state. 


 The federal judge came, had to threaten to cite 


the contractor and DOE for contempt because 


they didn't provide the records in a meaningful 


and time-- timely manner. And the reason that 


I bring this to your attention is how do you 


think that a worker, especially now that the 


plant is closed, is going to have access to 


things that he thinks is necessary to support 


his claim? And I suspect that it's going to be 


extremely difficult. 


In fact, just yesterday I talked to an attorney 


named Bruce Duboski*. This name may not mean 


anything to you, but Bruce was the successful 


attorney on the four provable radiation death 


cases that I'm aware of, that being Cromback*, 


Gable, Shamper* and Downing. And Bruce told me 


yesterday by telephone that he would be willing 


to submit a statement to you people about the 


difficulties he had in getting data to prove 


these cases. 


My purpose today is not to do anything other 


than stimulate a little cross-talk and maybe a 


cross-pollination of ideas. You've heard the 


intellects, and I don't pretend to be one. But 

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I've certainly been involved in this process 


for -- for the many years. 


And now I'm going to have to throw a few 


stones. This is -- you know, onions and 


orchids. I have been through I don't know how 


many of these hearings over the years. We had 


the Ahern Committee, we had the Defense Board, 


the tiger teams, and it goes on and on and on, 


and yet the conclusions always seem to be about 


the same from the workers' perspective, and 


that's nowhere. And the thing I would ask you 


to do is to -- to look at some of these 


findings from these other groups. Most all of 


them have detected problems. The GAO report 


back many years ago on 371 building said hey, 


that building's got big problems, and no one 


did anything about it. And so the workers 


continued to be assigned to those jobs. And 


some of the problems were corrected, but not 


all of them. 


So you need to know that these things are a 


matter of record. Seems like every time a new 


group of you come to town we start with a clean 


sheet of paper where we're forced to field our 


complaints and whatever information we might 

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have, you know, to try to persuade you. 


If you read today's newspaper, you people have 


already pretty much made up your minds that 


you're going to deny Rocky Flats the cohort 


status. And that may not be your assessment of 


it, but I'm telling you -- just being on the 


outside looking in -- that was mine after 


reading that article. I hope that that doesn't 


prove to be the case. 


Now in regard to some of the other health 


issues, I don't know if you're familiar with 


the brain cancer report from about 20 years ago 


by Greg Wilkinson* who worked on George 


Boltz*'s staff out of Los Alamos. And the 


state health department also conducted a study 


at the same time, and they concluded that there 


was a higher incidence of brain tumors and 


brain cancers in Rocky Flats workers, but 


nothing ever came out of it that I was aware of 


as far as a remedy. The problem that we have 


are all these loose ends. 


In regard to the documentation, I don't know if 


you people remember Hazel O'Leary, but she was 


the Secretary of Energy. And when she made the 


public disclosure of how much plutonium the 

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U.S. had, she said there was approximately 100 


tons. And she also made a comment that there 


could have been three tons in residence at 


Rocky Flats that didn't show on the inventory 


or on any floor plan. Now think about that. 


That's a strategic material of unknown value 


that no one knew the whereabouts of. Now we're 


talking potentially, for health effects -- oh, 


I don't know what magnitude down from that, but 


a very small amount, so if you've got three 


tons that you don't know about, it isn't 


unreasonable to say some of these workers 


probably got some of that, too. And as I 


already confessed to you, I carry some of it in 


my body, and it isn't for sale -- at least at 


the moment, but -- subject to negotiation, 


though. 


So you know, my purpose is not necessarily to 


amuse you, but to -- to again stimulate a 


thought process that seems to be sorely 


lacking. 


I was a local union president back in 1985, and 


that was where the first case of berylliosis 


was detected. And prior to that we had nothing 


but denials and -- and, you know, 

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incriminations about beryllium. The records 


were very poor. All of a sudden beryllium 


turned into be an emotional thing, you know, 


worthy of the National Enquirer, which it still 


is -- and I'm not trying to belittle it, I'm 


merely trying to put perspective to it. We 


were a plutonium laundering facility. 


Beryllium was merely a sideline. 


 The other thing that I was disturbed about in 


the course of this thing is virtually no 


mention of the solvents and other chemicals. 


We were the biggest users of carbon 


tetrachloride in the entire country. We had 


over 20,000 gallons of it in residence in 


tankage. And I don't know your recollection of 


carbon tet exposures, but it isn't a good 


thing. Private industry got out of that 


business years ago. We had it at Rocky Flats 


until the day they finally said hey, the W-88's 


dead; we're not going to do these things 


anymore. So you need to be aware that the list 


of potential contaminants and exposures is 


long. 


The other thing I wanted you aware of, and I 


don't know the records because I was a worker. 

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I wasn't up in the Mahogany Row. I don't know 


the records. Building 771 was closed down in 


the springtime of 1968 due to a project that we 


were involved in with the United Kingdom called 


Zipper. Zipper burned all of us out. They 


closed the building down. 


 Ironically, they moved me to area 903, the 


barrel pad. Again, management and DOE didn't 


answer to anyone because we were under the 


Atomic Energy Act of 19-- whatever it was, '42 


or whatever, and so they had barrels of 


plutonium-contaminated lathe coolant there, and 


this was out in the open. The barrels were 


stacked, you know, all over that parcel of 


land. 


 And the reason that that's important is because 


it reinforces what I've asked you to do 


earlier, and that is partition time -- time off 


in -- in the 50-some-year history of Rocky 


Flats. We didn't always do the same things 


over that period of time. Some things 


improved, but not everything. The only thing 


that has been consistent is the denial and the 


ordeal, especially as individuals trying to 


prove a claim. And that's why I would again 

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make the offer -- in fact, I would virtually 


insist that you allow me to get Duboski to give 


you this statement about his difficulties in 


gathering information to pursue these cases 


through the compensation process. 


The important thing is not necessarily listen 


to my war stories, but to try to flesh out some 


of the things that you may have already heard. 


I'm very concerned about the workers. I've 


seen the contractor get an alleged bonus of 


$450 million net. I have yet to see a group of 


workers come anywhere close. These landowners 


possibly, if they go into the year 3000, might 


get some part of that. If you remember -- like 


for now, their settlement was $75 million and 


the attorneys took a third of it, so the reason 


I'm telling you this is because it seems like 


we're more inclined to litigate things until 


the complainants die than we are in trying to 


satisfy legitimate claims. 


I would ask your indulgence, and I don't know 


your time line, but the stories go on and on. 


But the thing that I would tell you is the 


record-keeping has been very poor, very spotty. 


I would use my personal example of my lung 

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burden that I've already confessed to you. And 


it depended on which body -- or lung burden -- 


hello -- lung count cell that they counted me 


in as to what the numbers were. I made an 


offer one day that they would just count me 


back to back in different cells and see how 


those results correlated. They refused. It 


was always a puzzle to me how my numbers were 


quite a bit different from one to the other, 


and I realize the randomness of radiation 


decay. But I also understand that it's very 


important for a worker to have reasonably 


accurate records. There were times in my 


career when they gave me credit for -- like a 


ring dosimeter or something that I didn't even 


have access to, much less any need for. I was 


not a hands-on worker most of the time. I 


carried the radiation instruments. 


So the point being is some of the data is 


erroneous. I don't know how you would ever 


extrapolate a person's dose. As I've already 


mentioned, just a matter of a few feet could 


make a world of difference as to -- to the 


nuclides as well as the forms of emission that 


were generated. 

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Again, always keep in mind that the contractor 


got a bonus for KGs of material out the door -- 


or units or pits or whatever you choose to -- 


to use today. The emphasis was moving the 


merchandise. The workers were merely an 


implement to do that. 


So I think I've probably bored you to death at 


this point, and I hope you don't wait till our 


deaths before you satisfy some of our concerns. 


So thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity 


to vent my -- my anger. Yes, thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, thank you, Jerry. We'll go 


back to Tony now. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Great. Thank you, Jerry. For 


my final speaker I'd like Don Sabec. Don. 


To give you a little history, Don Sabec was a 


Steelworker that's very fond to us all as when 


Don retired he was number one on the seniority 


list at Rocky Flats. Don has over 42 years out 


of the 50 years of Rocky Flats. Don. 


MR. SABEC: Hi. Is this thing working? Okay. 


I've just got about three things I'd like to 


discuss. I'm not going to try and outdo Jerry 


Hardin 'cause he's got a very good memory for a 


lot of this stuff. Him and I worked together 

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for quite a few years. 


I'd like to emphasize on Charlie's statement of 


entering the area. I personally walked with 


him several times taking visitors through the 


771 complex, and he did every day come back in 


the area, not unless he was required to be in a 


meeting -- and I don't remember too many of 


those -- but he did come back in the area. And 


if we were in there working, doing break-outs, 


whatever we were doing, he'd be back there 


asking us, you know, is there anything I can do 


to help, do you need anything. And most of the 


time we -- you know, just say no, thanks, 


appreciate it. 


But anyway, one of my concerns is the -- the 


record-keeping. I worked in progression 


committee for about a year, and we were in a 


trailer up by the union office. And one day we 


come to work Monday morning and our trailer had 


-- had -- our -- our equipment had been moved 


to one half of the trailer, our computers and 


desks and what-have-you. And the other half of 


the trailer, which there was a door between the 


two, it was a two-room trailer, had boxes and 


boxes and boxes piled up in it. And of course 

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being as the curious nature that RCTs are 


supposed to be, we started looking into these 


boxes. They weren't sealed or anything. And 


they were original records from the buildings 


that they -- they kept in the buildings, and 


they were put in these boxes. And we got to 


looking through them, some of them were 


personal records of exposures, others were 


surveys of radiation for areas, contamination. 


Mainly that's what they were was -- was 


records, but they had never made it up to the 


hist-- program part where they would put it 


into the computer. And this was during a GAO 


audit that these records were put in there. 


Those auditors had never come into our -- our 


trailer to look at these -- these surveys and 


documents. They were there for approximately 


three to four weeks. 


After the audit was over with we come back to 


work again one Monday morning and the -- and 


the boxes were gone. Three or four days later, 


as the truck driver was delivering water -- 


'cause we had bottled water in the trailer -- I 


was talking to him about all these records. 


said do you -- do you guys know what happened 


I 
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to these records? He says oh, yeah, we were 


called in Sunday to put them in trucks and we 


took them up and they were deemed no longer 


necessary and we dumped them in the landfill. 


That was one of the reasons at the Broomfield 


meetings I asked that they go back to those 


landfills and look for records and 


contamination 'cause I'm sure -- I know there 


was in all probability some contamination put 


in our landfill. 


 Enough said about that. The second issue is -- 


is that -- is the lead aprons. When we first 


started this lead apron for mainly bag-outs at 


the radiation areas where you're going to have 


the frontal assault, we had to wear our badges 


on the insides. Some period down the road they 


decided that wasn't right, we needed to put 


them on the outside for the lens of the eye, 


and they would calculate the body exposure by a 


formula they'd come up with. And I went to my 


rad engineer and I asked him, I says why aren't 


we using the -- we had the TLDs then -- or the 


TLD on the inside to confirm that your -- your 


methods are right and the badge on the outside 


-- I know there's other facilities that have 

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done this. I've talked to the facilities that 


wore badges inside and out. 


I'm trying to think of what my third issue was. 


Again, giving you an -- can't remember. 


(Pause) 


Anyway, my -- well, my dose records -- that was 


it, the -- I -- I have personally got a dose of 


113 rem for my lifetime exposure. Nothing is 


wrong with me yet that I know of -- I mean 


other than the fact that I'm not the overly-


intelligent individual, but I -- I myself -- I 


talked to the individual that talked up here 


about the dose reconstruction and I -- I cannot 


believe that you people can accurately get a 


dose reconstruction done, as what Jerry Hardin 


was talking about. I worked in Building 771 


the majority of the time I was out there, and 


you can go from one job to the next to the next 


job and in three days you could have ten 


different jobs from high -- high photons to 


neutrons. I was there before they even had the 


gamma or the neutron shielding and they -- my 


dose reconstruction, after I'd been out there 


about 30 years or so, they did a dose 


reconstruction. They added 35 rem to my 

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exposure at the time and I'd already received a 


50 rem lung exposure, and they don't know -- I 


assume it was the high-fired oxide because we 


have no idea where I got it from. They asked 


me where I'd been and I told them look, I -- 


and then we're only doing the yearly body 


counts, and that's when they found my lung 


exposure and it -- it -- it's there, there's no 


doubt about that. 


But about eight years before I retired I 


requested a copy of all my radiation exposure 


records, and I ended up getting my medical 


records. There's no radiation records in-- 


whatsoever involved. When I retired in 2004, 


June -- end of June, I did a formal request of 


my radiation records to be sent to me. And by 


the end of this coming June it'll be two years 


and I haven't received anything yet on my 


radiation records, and I'm just wondering if 


I'm going to have to start doing out-of-pocket 


money to pay $40 an hour and ten cents a copy 


for something that I requested two different 


times that legally is -- should be mine for no 


charge whatsoever, and I should have them now 


but I don't. 

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What I don't understand is how you people can 


get to my records 'cause the individual talked 


about it remembers doing my dose 


recalculations. Obviously he has all of my -- 


my radiation records, but I can't get them. 


Now why is that? Can -- can you tell me why 


you people, when I signed the petition that you 


could get to my records but Rocky -- Rocky 


Flats cannot give me my own records. There's 


something wrong with this picture. 


So with that, I appreciate your indulgence, and 


I hope you can really see the true picture 


that's happening out at Rocky Flats and help 


these people that really need it. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Thank you, Don. Thank you, Dr. 


Wade, Dr. Ziemer, members of the Board. As to 


wrap this up for the United Steelworkers Local 


8031, the petitioners, I'd like to say a couple 


of things. As one, due to the delays from 


NIOSH, United Steelworkers no longer have the 


ability to defend this petition as we don't 


have the right to represent, the workers are 


gone. They're no longer dues-paying members. 


We don't have the ability to pull records. 

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Under our collective bargaining agreement, we 


have 14 days guaranteed by our employer to get 


any records -- dosimetry, medical, whatever. 


Now it's a minimum of six months per person, if 


you can get the records at all. What we're 


experiencing from the Department of Energy 


pulling records is please be more specific. We 


get that from NIOSH, please be more specific. 


As we've been severely handicapped in our 


ability due to the timeliness of this 


partition; as we no longer have the financial 


funding, we don't have the ability to pull the 


records -- in fact, we can't even find half of 


our people as we've been dispersed all across 


the country; as three people are on this 


petition, two of them are not present here 


today, one's working in New York, the other 


one's working in Denver trying to feed his 


family. I almost wasn't here myself. I almost 


got a job last week, so -- so you know, 


seriously, what I'm telling you is I'm happy to 


hear that NIOSH and DOE doesn't have any post-


closure problems. But the United Steelworkers, 


we do, as we have a lot of post-closure 


problems, and we can't adequately do this. So 

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we have to rely on Sanford Cohen & Associates 


to pick up the ball for us. We -- we don't 


have any other choice as -- and so at this 


point in time I would please ask the Board to 


consider delaying this petition until SCA has 


the opportunity to make a complete evaluation 


on our behalf because we no longer have the 


ability to do that as -- I have reduced that to 


writing and I will provide it to all the Board 


members. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Now let me 


sketch out a little bit here, we -- we have yet 


to hear from our own workgroup that's been 


working with NIOSH and working with our own 


contractor, SC&A. And we also need some 


additional time for Board discussion. It now 


is past the noon hour. And Mark, I think --


Mark headed up the workgroup. I think probably 


it would be -- well, let me ask it this way 


'cause I know many of the Rocky -- Rocky Fork ­

- Rocky -- I say Rocky Fork because my wife and 


I vacation in a place called Rocky Fork -- but 


Rocky Flats -- Rocky Flats people here may not 


wish to hang around too long. So Mark, how 


long would the workgroup report require? 

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 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I -- I can probably 


summarize in 15 minutes or so. I think we do 


want to make --


 DR. ZIEMER: But then we still need some -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- to continue work. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We also need time for discussion, 


too. Right. Maybe you can give us a quick 


bottom line of what the workgroup's -- what you 


think the recommendation is going to be and 


then we'll hear the full report. That might be 


helpful. 


WORK GROUP REPORT, MR. MARK GRIFFON, CHAIR


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think the 


recommendation for -- for Rocky Flats -- SC&A 


hasn't even completed, as they said in their 


presentation, a review of the petition, so at 


this point we're recommending to continue the 


workgroup process and work on these issues. 


think the understanding is that the data 


integrity and reliability is -- is the most 


outstanding issue that we have to try to 


investigate further. I think Brant also 


acknowledged that. So I think everybody's sort 


of in agreement on that, but I think that's our 


-- our recommendation from the workgroup. 


I 
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 DR. ZIEMER: So this is at this point given as 


a report rather than a formal motion, but what 


it would say is that the Board would anticipate 


receiving from the workgroup a formal motion to 


postpone action on the petition until the work 


of our contractor can be completed. And that ­

- that recommendation probably is -- seems to 


me is in alignment with the request of the 


petitioner, also. So -- and -- and let me 


suggest then that we take our lunch break. We 


will reconvene as close as we can to 1:00 


o'clock, receive the full workgroup report, 


have an opportunity for the formal motion at 


that time and opportunity for additional Board 


discussion. 


 So without objection, let us recess for lunch 


for --


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Paul --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- about an hour and see if we can 


conclude. Hang on just a moment. Bob Presley 


on the phone. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Paul? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Bob. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can you call me here at home? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. You mean before the 

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session? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, if you don't mind. I need 


to talk to you before this next session -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- and I'll be here until 3:00 


o'clock my time, which will be 1:00 o'clock 


your all's time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much. He's 


probably going to tell us a vote. 


Okay. Thank you. We're in recess till 1:00 


o'clock. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:05 p.m. 


to 1:15 p.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're ready to resume our 


afternoon session now, continuing the agenda 


item on the Special Exposure Cohort petition 


for the Rocky Flats site. And we now will hear 


officially from the leader of our workgroup, 


Mark Griffon. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I'm -- I'm going to keep this 


fairly brief 'cause I think a lot of the points 


have -- have been touched on in the earlier 


presentations, but I do want to kind of say 


where the workgroup is and -- and what our next 


steps are. As you remember, before lunch we 

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already sort of gave our recommendation that 


we're planning on continuing our workgroup 


work, that we're not prepared to make a 


recommendation today on -- on voting on the SEC 


evaluation report, so we would put off any vote 


on the -- we will recommend putting off any 


vote on the SEC evaluation report before us, 


but that we're going to continue to work on the 


-- on the outstanding issues that we've been 


working on on the workgroup. And I just wanted 


to summarize, from the workgroup's perspective, 


sort of where we are. 


I did want to point out the time line, and it's 


much the same as I said yesterday in the Y-12 


report, for those of you who were here. The 


time line on this thing -- we -- we -- to 


condense down the time line, it started much 


earlier, but from April 7th on is kind of where 


we -- we first received the SEC evaluation 


report, and given the timing here, SC&A working 


with the Board, we made a decision on the 


workgroup to prioritize Y-12 at the time and -- 


and have SC&A complete their review report, 


given that -- that we had about a week, we said 


focus your efforts on Y-12; there's no way you 

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can do two of these reports in one week or so. 


Focus on Y-12 and -- and we'll hold off on 


Rocky Flats. And part of the reason we did 


that, part of the rationale, was we felt there 


were more outstanding items for Rocky anyway 


and we didn't think we were going to be able to 


come to -- to close on those. So we -- you 


know, as -- as Joe Fitzgerald from SC&A 


acknowledged earlier, SC&A has not yet done a 


review report of NIOSH's proposed SEC 


evaluation report --


 MR. PRESLEY: Paul --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- so we're -- that -- that will 


be the next step for SC&A is to take on that 


review of that evaluation report and -- and 


move forward that way. 


In the workgroup discussions we did -- you 


know, the -- the priority things that were -- 


that were remaining on our list -- we started 


as a site profile review. We narrowed our 


focus to what we thought were SEC, Special 


Exposure Cohort, issues. And we ended up with 


sort of -- some internal is-- dose issues, some 


external dose issues and a lot of discussion on 


data validation and data integrity. And I'll 

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just summarize some of those points. 


 For the internal dose issues, you heard earlier 


some discussion on this super S issues. 
I 


think where we're at on that is we have a 


Technical Information Bulletin from NIOSH. 


SC&A has certainly done preliminary review on 


that. I think it -- it's -- it -- from -- from 


the current analysis, it looks as though the 


model is claimant-favorable. I think there's a 


few things to further button up on that 


analysis. I think both NIOSH and SC&A agree 


with that. The systemic organ mod-- approach 


still needs to be reviewed further. 


The second thing -- the other thing I will add 


on that is that I think that we just received 


some of the specific case data to support the 


TIB, and I think that SC&A's analysis thus far 


has focused on the data in the TIB going 


forward. And I would ask that -- that they 


consider the specific case data used in the TIB 


and just do -- at least do a review of that 


data to -- to make sure that it has been 


independently looked at. And part of the 


rationale for this is that much of this 


analysis was done by the contractor coming 

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forward, and that -- that came up pretty 


clearly in the Board meetings, so I think to 


the extent we can take an independent look at 


that, it -- it is worthwhile. 


But super S I -- I believe is -- is -- we're -- 


we're fairly far along on that question. 


The americium -- I think the remaining -- the ­

- the primary remaining issue on the americium 


is in -- during our discussions americium 


separation was identified as a separate 


operation, and although I think we've heard 


responses from NIOSH and it sounds like they 


have, at least from what we've heard on the 


workgroup calls, a claimant-favorable approach 


which basically would be during certain years 


of operation they would only have gross alpha 


counting data and they've indicated that in 


those cases they would just basically assume 


the worst case radionuclide, whether it be 


americium or plutonium, and assume the worst 


case in either scenario and move the claim that 


way, so -- but we haven't specifically seen 


that sort of protocol laid out, so that -- but 


again, I think that's close to resolved, but we 


want to cross the Ts, so to speak. 

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 For the internal dose coworker model -- and 


this is OTIB-38, if you're following all these 


Technical Information Bulletins -- again, on -- 


on this I think NIOSH indicated that very few 


individuals within the number of claimants will 


-- will be -- will require coworker type 


analysis. I think we still wanted to just take 


one final look at the way that TIB is used. 


One question in -- in the TIB they talk about 


monitored -- they talk about unmonitored, and 


if -- and if they determine that individual's 


unmonitored, they may assign environmental air 


sam-- may assign their dose based on 


environmental air sampling, depending on the 


job title. And then they have another category 


where -- where they determine unmonitored but 


should have been monitored, based on job 


assignments. And I guess that -- that needs 


maybe a little more investigation on SC&A and ­

- and the workgroup's part. It just -- just as 


-- as to how they determine -- how they're 


going to make those determinations. But again, 


I -- I think -- you know, and part of -- part 


of my sort of wanting to take that a little 


further is just to make -- make clear in my 

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mind that the coworker model is going to be of 


very limited use, as well. So I think we want 


to explore both factors further. I think 


Brant's pretty confident with the -- the 


minimal use on the coworker model. Brant from 


-- Brant Ulsh from NIOSH is. So if that's the 


case, it -- it may be a smaller issue, but I 


think we want to take it to the end. 


 On the external dose side, as NIOSH mentioned 


earlier and -- and addressed some of my 


questions, but the neutron dose assignment has 


been a -- a lot of the dialogue on the 


workgroup, and I guess part of the -- in -- in 


preparing for this meeting, I had to step back 


for a second 'cause on the workgroup we ended 


up getting into very specific time-specific 


issues, and the responses by NIOSH were related 


to that particular issue. And when I stepped 


back, it was clear that in -- and this is in 


OTIB-50 -- it's clear that they -- for 


different periods of time, there's -- there's 


different sort of approaches that are being 


used, and I -- I -- it was in-- instructive, 


for me at least, to step back and see how this 


worked. One -- so there's still some remaining 

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questions on the coworker model and exactly how 


-- or -- or whether -- I don't think NIOSH 


would characterize it necessarily as a coworker 


model, but it's clear that on certain time 


periods -- for instance, '70 to '76 appears to 


be a time period where the data available to 


NIOSH have penetrating data rolled all into one 


field and -- and for purposes of doing -- doing 


their assessment, NIOSH needs to separate out 


neutron and gamma. And to separate that out 


they've -- they've -- they've calculated 


neutron to photon ratios from the period of '77 


to '88 and -- and sort of back-calculated or 


deconvoluted the numbers to get the neutron 


dose and the photon dose separated. So you can 


see there's -- there's different time periods 


where they're doing different things, and I 


think we would -- we just want to make sure 


that we've looked -- looked one final time at 


this coworker model and make sure it makes 


sense and -- and make -- and -- and -- you 


know, they -- I guess there's only one other 


issue that I should bring on the table with the 


-- the earlier period data relies on the NDRP 


report data, and this is the Neutron Dose 

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Reconstruction Project data, and that project 


was done by the contractor at DOE at the time. 


And so -- so that's the other reason we want to 


make sure we explore this neutron data 


thoroughly and make sure it's valid and verify 


it. And that's why we're going through this 


process is because an independent review is 


essential here, we think. But also the NDRP 


data -- and the petitioner brought this up in 


their petition and we've -- we've looked into 


this a little bit, but the -- the data was -- 


was -- or that report acknowledged that during 


the NTA film period when they were monitoring 


neutrons with NTA film, they were -- the 


protocol indicated that they were monitoring 


the most highly exposed workers. The NDA --


NDRP report acknowledged that in fact they -- 


they didn't monitor many of the workers in 771, 


which had one of the highest potentials for 


neutron exposures. So I think that's another 


issue we want to look into is that those 771 


workers I think were assigned neutron dose 


data, and yet in another way I think they were 


assigned based on their photon dose reading, 


corrected with a neutron to photon ratio 

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specific to 771 building. So I know that it's 


after lunch and this is probably making a lot 


of people gloss over, but these -- these 


details and the different time periods we want 


to really understand and make sure that it all 


fits together and it's a correct and fair way 


to do this. So we need to spend a little more 


time on OTIB-50 is the bottom line on -- on the 


neutron dose data. 


And the -- the only other -- there's one other 


external coworker model, which we haven't 


discussed a great deal on -- on the workgroup, 


but OTIB-58 now, I think it's a draft OTIB-58, 


and -- and I guess the same question arises 


there on the -- I think there's three 


categories again, and the -- for the 


unmonitored they make a distinction of -- of 


assigning environmental doses to certain 


workers based on job assignments, and then 


assigning sort of a mean of the -- or a median 


of the distribution for workers that were 


unmonitored but should have been monitored 


based on their job titles. And again, I think 


we -- we just want to understand exactly how 


are you going to -- how is this defined, how is 

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this determined. And part of the rea-- I -- I 


think -- you know, part of the reason for 


exploring that a little further is, quite 


frankly, some of the comments made last night 


that, you know, some of the administrative 


people even were indicating that they were on 


and off badges, at least from -- from what I 


gathered in -- in public comment last night, 


that they were taken off the badge program and 


then they realized that from changes in storage 


situations of drums, all of a sudden a couple 


of cycles later they were asked to wear a badge 


and -- you know, so some of these questions 


come up that normally you'd probably say, you 


know, well, the person worked as a secretary 


for the ten years in the '90s, you know, we 


would consider just applying environmental 


dose, but may-- you know, maybe there's a 


qualifier there. Maybe there's a -- you know, 


a further consideration there that needs to be 


given, so we want to at least walk that -- walk 


that through and make sure that's a -- a fair 


way to model it. 


And then the last and -- and primary issue, I 


guess, is the data validation and -- and data 

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integrity. We -- we did -- NIOSH did look into 


the reliability of the database question on 


both sides, the internal dose and the external 


dose data. And NIOSH presented some of their 


statistics earlier. I -- I do -- and we did 


get these reports and -- and I think they're 


included in the evaluation report, but this has 


all come to SC&A and the workgroup at a -- at a 


-- you know, and I know it's no fault of 


NIOSH's 'cause everybody's on the -- the crunch 


here to get these things produced, but we got 


this very -- very recently, so I don't think 


SC&A has fully considered this, and neither has 


the workgroup. 


The -- the one thing that I would say on the -- 


on the external side is that -- or -- or 


actually -- actually for both. I'm -- I'm not 


even sure on the -- how these databases 


separate out, but when -- part of the reason we 


want to look into this further is that it -- 


it's unclear to me -- it's probably much more ­

- clearer to NIOSH. It's unclear to me when 


they compared raw data out of the claim files 


with the database versus when they had database 


printout data within a claimant's file and 

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compared that. And I know Brant did break that 


down, but we really haven't -- as a workgroup 


or SC&A hasn't really teased that apart and 


looked into that. I think we're much more 


interested in how the raw data compares with 


the electronic database than -- you know, 


printout data from the database we would expect 


has a pretty good match to the database itself. 


It's -- or else there's a -- there's some real 


problems. Now I know there were different 


databases so that -- you know, still might want 


to look into that, but the main concern here I 


think is comparing raw data, as best we can 


find it and locate it, with the electronic data 


records. And it's -- in this case, I think 


it's -- in some of the workgroup discussions I 


think the -- this -- this issue has been a 


little bit sidelined, in my opinion, because of 


the fact -- at least the stated fact by NIOSH 


that there's limited reliance on a coworker 


model. But I've -- I've stated in the 


workgroup and I'll state here that, you know, I 


think it's important, for those other reasons 


I've stated is that in the claimant's files 


oftentimes you see database data, not raw data. 

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So when they say they're relying on the 


claimant's file and they have data in the 


claimant's files, I don't think it's always the 


raw -- like the card data or the -- the 


original record. It's actually a printout from 


a database, so we still want to validate that 


database that's, you know -- so I think there's 


-- there's -- you know, the reason for doing 


that is not only to validate the coworker 


models but also to validate that the data in 


the claimant's files matches any raw -- any -- 


the original raw records. 


And then the last part of the data valid-- is 


actually the data integrity, and I think NIOSH 


in their presentation acknowledged -- and I 


didn't do a count on this, but it's some 17 or 


so issues in our matrix that we have developed 


that -- that are around that issue of data 


integrity. And we think that we -- we need to 


track them back to ground, to the -- and as I 


said, I think yesterday -- to the extent we 


can, and we on the workgroup understand that -- 


that sometimes this may lead to inconclusive 


sort of finding and my examp-- I don't if 


everybody was here yesterday, but the example I 

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used is that some people indicated -- or at 


least one of the cases indicated that they had 


certain quarters where they knew they were in a 


high area and their dose of record was zero or 


-- or said no data available. And -- and they 


gave specific dates and everything, so we said 


well, let's -- let's track this back and see 


what we get. Well, when you track back, the 


individual did have dose records, but they had 


zeroes for those quarters of concern. Now you 


could -- you know, so you wonder well, can we 


track back anything else to that, and that's 


where SC&A has indicated there might be -- and 


I think interviewing some of the petitioners, 


they've indicated there may be some logbooks 


and other things that have some more data, 


possibly including secondary dosimetry like 


photo-ionization detectors that they would 


wear, but not turn in -- it's not your badge, 


it's a -- it's a direct reading of what you 


were exposed that day or -- or -- and you often 


turn it in daily, and those logs might have 


that information. Or they might have survey 


data or, you know, other information. 


In the case where it -- they track back and 

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they find survey data, it may still be a little 


inconclusive, so what we're saying, to the 


extent we can, we want to take this to ground, 


but we're going to try to find some of these 


logbooks and other things and -- and resolve 


this. And I think that's two -- for two 


concerns. One is the specific allegation at 


hand, and then the other issue on data 


integrity is the broader question of -- of are 


there systemic problems here. And I think 


NIOSH has offered some preliminary analysis, 


and they've also pointed out the limitations of 


that analysis. I think we want to -- we need 


to further check that and -- and possibly -- 


there might be different ways and we can work 


with SC&A and NIOSH on maybe different ways of 


looking at this question of systemic problems 


with data integrity, possibly not looking at 


the overall population, but a lot of these 


allegations are made with higher areas and the 


workers that were in the higher areas, so there 


may be some ways to look at a subset of the -- 


of the dosimetry data to do some sort of 


analysis on that and see if there's any 


systemic problems. 

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 The other thing that comes out on the question 


of sort of systemic problems is, as we've heard 


from -- from petitioners on the workgroup calls 


and we've also heard last night, a lot of the 


specific testimony that we're hearing is from 


the D and D portion of Rocky Flats operations. 


And I think that that's one thing -- I think 


this is a -- maybe -- maybe force of habit, but 


you know, we tend to look at the oldest parts 


of the operations, especially with regard to 


highest exposures and potential concerns about 


records not being available or et cetera. But 


I think we -- we might want to als-- we -- we 


have to make sure, I think, that we address 


this D and D portion of the operations and the 


D and D workers, and especially where the -- 


the petition goes through the current time 


period, so it would cover all those D and D 


workers. And you know, one concern there I 


guess that -- that we've heard from last night 


was that a lot of the urinalysis programs were 


-- were modified significantly and they went -- 


they've relied more on -- on -- on breathing 


zone air sampling, DAC -- sort of DAC hour 


analysis rather than relying on urinalysis 

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programs, so it might be a -- you know, we 


might want to consider how exactly they're 


being treated. And -- and their data integrity 


questions that arise under that separate sort 


of population of workers, the D and D workers, 


so --


Finally I think -- I -- I might get the number 


wrong, Brant, if I'm wrong -- I think there 


were six example DRs provided. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, that's right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is that right? So we have six -- 


six examples that were provided, and -- and I 


think on one of our last workgroup calls Brant 


briefly introduced them, but certainly the 


workgroup and SC&A has not really gotten into 


those examples. And as I said with Y-12, I 


think that's -- part of the reason we asked for 


these example DRs is to look at proof of 


principle. How -- you know, if NIOSH has the 


data there, show us how you're actually going 


to use that data to do an individual case. And 


-- and we need to thoroughly review those and ­

- and discuss those on the workgroup, and we 


haven't -- just haven't had a chance to do that 


at this point so we need to proceed with that, 

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as well. 


And I think that's sort of a summary. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me ask, Board members, do you 


have questions for Mark before I call on him to 


propose a motion? 


 (No responses) 


Other -- other workgroup members wish to add 


anything? 


 (No responses) 


 Apparently not. Mark, then I'll entertain a 


motion from you on behalf of the workgroup. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I guess I would make a 


motion on behalf of the workgroup that we 


continue our work with the workgroup, including 


NIOSH and SC&A and the petitioners -- continue 


our work and to not -- at this point we're not 


prepared to make any motion regarding the 


petition in front of us, the evaluation report 


in front of us. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That motion doesn't require a 


second since it comes from our workgroup. It 


is on the floor for discussion, and recognize 


that if you vote in favor of the motion -- this 


motion has the effect of postponing action on 


the petition until -- I'm assuming, Mark, 

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although you didn't say it explicitly -- I'm 


assuming it would be the intention of the 


workgroup to bring this to closure by our next 


meeting. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that correct? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that inherent in the... 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I was going to say as soon 


as possible, but -- but -- I -- I mean I would 


love to say the next meeting. I know that we 


have the same time line for Y-12, so -- but 


that -- that certainly is our intent, as soon 


as possible. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Discussion? 


 (No responses) 


There appears to be none. Is the Board ready 


to vote on this motion? Again, the effect of 


the motion will be to continue the work on 


resolving those issues that have been 


identified, and has the practical effect as 


well of -- of postponing action on -- in terms 


of making a recommendation to the Secretary on 


the petition. 


Okay, all those who favor the motion, say aye. 

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 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


 Any abstaining? 


 (No responses) 


The motion carries. Thank you very much. 


 MS. MUNN: On the phone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim Lockey, are you on the phone? 


 (No responses) 


 Robert Presley informed me during the lunch 


hour that he did have to leave for his doctor's 


appointment. He also -- he also informed me 


that he favored the motion that he knew the 


workgroup was making 'cause Mark had identified 


it before this session. 


It is so ordered. Thank you very much. 


BOARD DISCUSSION

 DR. MELIUS: Just a couple of brief comments. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, just -- these remarks aren't 

relevant to the vote we just took, but two 


comments. One is I do think we need to examine 


some of the issues related to representation of 


petitioners and so forth. I've been personally 


disturbed by some of the requirements put on 

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the petitioners. I think the petitioners here, 


Tony and others, really made a good case of how 


difficult it can be for petitioners, 


particularly some of the practices that NIOSH 


has of expanding out the petitions -- which 


have good points in that we're trying to get as 


many people included in decisions as possible 


or it's feasible. But I think we also have to 


recognize that puts an increased burden on the 


petitioners and we sort of have -- in some ways 


have a different situation with Y-12 where we 


have petitioners who are not -- don't -- aren't 


very involved in the meetings and the 


representational part. So I think we need to 


rethink how we're doing that to make sure we're 


getting good representation and that the 


petitioners have the means to -- to adequately 


represent the -- the class that's being -- 


being discussed. 


Also, how do we deal with a situation like this 


where, because of the closures, the petitioners 


-- in this case the union -- have lost the -- 


the -- some of the rights to access records in 


a timely fashion and so forth. And I -- I 


think we need to -- to talk about that and sort 

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of figure out how we can better -- better 


handle that situation. 


 Secondly, partially because of that and I think 


also because some of the time it's going to 


take to obtain records to address some of the 


concerns raised by the petitioners, I would 


hope we wouldn't rush into trying to meet an 


artificial deadline of next meeting or 


something to try to close out this petition. 


think as soon as possible, yes. But let's make 


sure we have complete information. Some of the 


information requests have really just gone in 


and -- and I think we need to make sure that we 


do address all of the concerns and have 


adequate information to be able to do that. 


And if that means, you know -- which can often 


happen -- making more information requests 


after further review, that I think we need -- 


we need to do that. It's very important. This 


is a big site. It's a complicated site. As 


Mark has pointed out, there's sort of different 


operations at different time periods, and I 


think we need to make sure we've covered the 


whole time period adequately and different 


operations within the facility adequately 


I 
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before we make a decision. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, and it looks 


like Larry may have some related comments. Is 


that correct? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, it is, Dr. Ziemer. Thank 


you. 


I want to congratulate Tony and the other 


petitioners, a very well-delivered and reasoned 


set of presentations. And I took special note 


and took to heart the predicament that they, as 


petitioners, are in with the closure of the 


site and the D and D being finished, and their 


not having the ability to access records. And 


I want to assure you that we stand at the 


ready. If there are any records that the 


petitioners want us to pursue for them on their 


behalf, we will. Any records that we collect, 


SC&A collects, we will make sure that they are 


delivered in copy in full to the petitioners. 


I've talked to Tony about this and just want to 


stand there to support them as best we can and 


use the MOU that we have with DOE to make sure 


that there is adequate and a timely response to 


their request for information. And that's my 


commitment to you. I understand that the 

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dilemma that has been presented by our 


expansion of this definition of the -- of the 


class, so I would include that -- that that 


goes to anybody that stands outside the 


Steelworkers, the hourly folks who also want to 


get copies of records, just let us know at 


NIOSH. Talk to me or you can call Brant Ulsh 


or get ahold of us in any way you can and we'll 


work with you to get the record that you want. 


BOARD WORKING TIME


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Okay. Then 


the Chair would recognize Dr. Melius for the 


purpose of presenting a motion that we -- now ­

- yes, we'll bring Mr. Clawson back to the 


table. 


 DR. WADE: This time behave. 


 MR. CLAWSON: You know me. 


 DR. MELIUS: I have two motions here related to 


-- I guess we'll start with Pacific Proving 


Grounds and then there's a -- quite a -- a 


similar motion related to the Nevada Test Site. 


I think LaShawn has extra copies, Larry, that 


can be distributed for -- or someone can let 


her know -- of this -- I think all the Board 


members should have, and actually I e-mailed 

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these to Jim Lockey and Bob Presley a couple of 


hours ago. 


Let me read into the record the first motion. 


Much --

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

 DR. MELIUS: Much of this is very familiar. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Just for purposes of record, this 

was -- this was a motion that was introduced by 


Bob Presley at our meeting on Tuesday -- I 


believe it was Tuesday. 


 MS. MUNN: The first one was. 


 DR. MELIUS: No, no, not the first one was. 


The first one -- his was the Nevada Test site. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, we're on the Pacific Proving 


Ground, okay. I'll hold those remarks. Go 


ahead. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. The -- and I -- as I'm 


reading, if the Board members want to make -- 


pay particular attention to the second and 


third paragraphs from the bottom 'cause those I 


think are a little bit different than what 


we've put in some of our letters before. 


(Reading) The Board recommends that the 


following letter be transmitted to the 


Secretary of Health and Human Services within 

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21 days. Should the Chair become aware of any 


issue that in his judgment would preclude the 


transmittal of this letter within that time 


period, the Board requests that he promptly 


informs the Board of the delay, the reasons for 


this delay, and that he immediately works with 


NIOSH to schedule an emergency meeting of the 


Board to discuss this issue. 


The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 


Health (the Board) has evaluated SEC Petition 


00020 concerning workers at the Pacific Proving 


Grounds under the statutory requirements 


established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 


CFR Section 83.13(c)(1) and 42 CFR Section 


83.13(c)(3). The Board respectfully recommends 


a Special Exposure Cohort be accorded to all 


Department of Energy employees or its 


contractor or subcontractor employees who 


worked at the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) 


from 1946 through 1962 who were monitored or 


should have been monitored for exposure to 


ionizing radiation as a result of nuclear 


weapons testing at the PPG and whom were 


employed for a number of work days aggregating 


t least 250 work days, occurring under this 

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employment or in combination with work days of 


employment occurring within the parameters 


(excluding aggregate work day requirements) 


established for other classes of employees 


included in the SEC. This recommendation is 


based on the following factors: 


 One, these workers were employed during the 


above-ground testing of atomic weapons. 


Number two, there are significant limitations 


to the available monitoring data collected at 


the Pacific Proving Grounds, particularly data 


needed for the accurate reconstruction of 


internal doses associated with the inhalation 


of radionuclides at the site. NIOSH concluded 


that the available information is not 


sufficient to document or estimate the 


potential maximum internal exposures to workers 


at the Pacific Proving Grounds under plausible 


circumstances during the period of AEC 


operations from 1946 to 1962. The Board 


concurs with this conclusion. 


Three, the Board has reviewed information which 


confirms that radiation exposures at the 


Pacific Proving Grounds during the time period 


in question could have endangered the health of 

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members of this class. 


 The Board notes that many of the people who 


were employed at the Pacific Proving Ground 


during the time period in question lived on 


site during their work periods. This should be 


considered during the evaluation of their work 


duration. 


The Board is still evaluating issues related to 


people who may have been exposed to radiation 


during discrete incidents that could have 


involved exceptionally high exposures to 


radiation while working at the Pacific Proving 


Grounds (example, those who were present during 


the actual atomic bomb testing) and who may not 


meet the 250 work day requirement described 


above. The Board will continue to review this 


matter and may make additional recommendations 


regarding this group at some point in the near 


future. 


Enclosed is supporting documentation from the 


recent Advisory Board meetings held in Oak 


Ridge, Tennessee and Denver, Colorado where 


this Special Exposure Cohort petition was 


discussed. Documentation includes transcripts 


of public comments on the petition, copies of 

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the petition, the NIOSH review thereof, and 


related documents distributed by NIOSH and the 


petitioners. If any of these items are 


unavailable at this time, they will follow 


shortly. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. You've heard 

the motion. Is there a second? 

 MR. GIBSON: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Discussion? Wanda. 

 MS. MUNN: A suggestion with respect to the 


last sentence in the second of those new 


paragraphs, the next to the last paragraph. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: There's maybe some reluctance to 


speaking to the near future, wouldn't want to 


raise the assumption that that data might not 


be developed at some considerably future date, 


would suggest the possibility of simply having 


that sentence read "The Board will continue to 


review this matter and may make future 


additional recommendations regarding this 


group,” if that's acceptable. 


 DR. MELIUS: That's acceptable. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'll interpret that as a friendly 


amendment as it appears the mover has agreed to 

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it -- and who was the seconder? 


 DR. MELIUS: Mike. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that agreeable? 


 MR. GIBSON: (inaudible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: So the wording in that sentence 


would now say "The Board will continue to 


review this matter and may make future 


additional recommendations regarding this 


group." 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Which doesn't pin you down to a 


time line. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, it's -- thank you. Any other 


discussion? 


 (No responses) 


Are you ready to vote on this motion? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It appears that we're ready to 


vote. 


All in favor of the motion, say aye. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


Those opposed, no? 


 (No responses) 


 Any abstentions? 

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 (No responses) 


The motion carries. Thank you very much. 


Then the Chair again recognizes Dr. Melius for 


purposes of providing the wording to Robert 


Presley's motion which came from the workgroup, 


and that motion was essentially to recommend 


approval of the Pacif-- of the Nevada Test Site 


petition. 


Mark has to recuse himself, and I did want to 


double-check. I think we indicated to Sandi 


Schubert that if she wanted to be on the line ­

-


MS. SCHUBERT: I'm here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Sandi, you are there. Thank 


you very much. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So we now have the wording of the 


motion, which we will simply identify as a 


friendly amendment to the Presley motion of 


yesterday. We simply deferred action on the 


Presley motion so that we could put the wording 


into our sort of standard wording form. So 


here is now the wording of the proposed -- or 


of the NTS motion. Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: And I will indicate ahead of time, 

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by reading Wanda's mind I am going to make a 


amendment on the fly to this -- slight 


modification to make it read somewhat similar 


to the previous motion. 


(Reading) The Board recommends that the 


following letter be transmitted to the 


Secretary of Health and Human Services within 


21 days. Should the Chair become aware of any 


issue that in his judgment would preclude the 


transmittal of this letter within that time 


period, the Board requests that he promptly 


informs the Board of the delay and the reasons 


for this delay, and that he immediately works 


with NIOSH to schedule an emergency meeting of 


the Board to discuss this issue. 


The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 


Health (the Board) has evaluated SEC Petition 


00055 concerning workers at the Nevada Test 


Site under the statutory requirements 


established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 


CFR Section 83.13(c)(1) and 42 CFR Section 


83.13(c)(3). The Board respectfully recommends 


a Special Exposure Cohort be accorded to all 


Department of Energy (DOE) employees or its 


contractor or subcontractor employees who 

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worked at the Nevada Test Site from January 


27th, 1951 through December 3rd, 1962 who were 


monitored or should have been monitored for 


exposure to ionizing radiation as a result of 


nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site 


and who were employed for a number of work days 


aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring 


under this employment or in combination with 


work days of employment occurring within the 


parameters (excluding aggregate work day 


requirements) established for other classes of 


employees included in the SEC. This 


recommendation is based on the following 


factors: 


 Number one, these workers were employed during 


the above-ground testing of atomic weapons. 


Two, they were -- there are significant 


limitations to the available monitoring data 


collected at the Nevada Test Site during this 


time period, particularly data needed for the 


accurate reconstruction of internal doses 


associated with the inhalation of radionuclides 


at the site. NIOSH concluded that the 


available monitoring data and source term 


information is not sufficient to document or 

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estimate the potential maximum internal 


exposures to workers at the Nevada Test Site 


under plausible circumstances during the time 


period from January 27th, 1951 to December 3rd, 


1952. The Board concurs with this conclusion. 


The Board has received information which 


confirms that radiation exposures at the Nevada 


Test Site during the time period in question 


could have endangered the health of members of 


this class. 


The Board notes that some people who were 


employed at the Nevada Test Site during the 


time period in question lived on site during 


their work periods. This should be considered 


during the evaluation of their work duration. 


The Board is still evaluating issues related to 


people who may have been exposed to radiation 


during discrete incidents that could have 


involved exceptionally high exposures to 


radiation while working at the Nevada Test Site 


(example, those who were present during the 


actual atomic bomb testing) and who may not 


meet the 250-day work requirement described 


above. The Board will continue to review this 


matter and may make additional future 

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recommendations regarding this group. 


Enclosed is supporting documentation from the 


recent Advisory Board meeting held in Denver, 


Colorado where this Special Exposure Cohort 


petition was discussed. This documentation 


includes transcripts of the public comments on 


the petition, copies of the petition and the 


NIOSH review thereof, and related documents 


distributed by NIOSH and the petitioners. If 


any of these items are unavailable at this time 


they will follow shortly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. That motion basically 


came from the workgroup. It does not require a 


second at this time. I'm going to ask for 


discussion or comments on this motion. 


I actually have a question that perhaps might 


lead to a slight change. We refer in bullet 


one to workers were employed in above-ground 


testing. Actually were not some of the shots 


in Nevada underground? 


 MS. MUNN: Some were, yes. 


 DR. MELIUS: But during this time period? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are we exclud--


 MR. ELLIOTT: But during this period it was 


above-ground. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Only -- only -- that's what I 


wanted to clarify. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And could I make a friendly -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- a correction as a friendly 


correction? 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It's an 83.14 case -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Oh, okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- not 13. This is a -- this is 


a situation where, under 82.12, we've 


identified we can't do dose reconstruction. We 


worked with a claimant to file an 83.14. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So that correction should be in 


line three of paragraph two, I believe. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Both of those items -- are they 


both changed to 83 --


 MS. MUNN: I think so, but I don't know --


 DR. ZIEMER: Larry, are both of those -- it 


mentions 83.13 twice. To be correct, do we 


need to have both of those -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, for -- for Nevada Test Site 


for this class, it's an 83.14, so where you 


have 83.13 it should say 83.14, yes. 

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 DR. MELIUS: But does it paral-- do (c)(1) and 


(c)(3) parallel in 13 and 14? We have --


 DR. ZIEMER: One of -- one of the problems will 


be that Jim is using the -- the other 


subparagraphs --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and let us -- let us simply 


indicate we will get the correct reference here 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- if we don't have it right at 

the moment. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: I'd have to see the reg, and I'm 

not --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, Lew has the --

 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- the regs, we'll work on it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: The understanding is that we will 

insert the correct paragraph references there. 


These are in there simply to tie the statement 


back to the --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- to the language of the 


regulation. 


 MS. MUNN: It's 14(b). 

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 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Any other discussions? 

 MR. GIBSON: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Mike. 

 MR. GIBSON: If I could beat Wanda to the 

wordsmithing this time for a friendly 


amendment, the second paragraph, about four to 


five sentences up, it refers to testing at the 


PPG. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, that --


 DR. ZIEMER: He changed that as he read it -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Read it, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- on the fly. That should read 


Nevada Test Station (sic), yes. Our copies 


refer to the Pacific Proving Grounds, but he 


did correct that in his -- in his audible 


version. 


 DR. MELIUS: Dr. Ziemer, you were listening. 


I'm impressed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I was listening. I do listen to 


you now and then. 


Now before we vote, I'm going to ask a question 


because it relates in a -- it's the same kind 


of question, but I just realized on our 


previous motion, in terms of the Pacific 

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Proving Grounds, some of those shots were 


underwater. Do -- are we still restricting 


that one to above-ground? 


Okay, in that case, I'm going to come back to 


that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, yeah, let's --


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to ask if there's a -- 


if we may have to amend that, but let's go 


ahead on this. 


 DR. MELIUS: I actually lifted it from your 


document so we need to... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

 DR. MELIUS: I think. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are there any other changes, 

amendments, discussion on the motion on the 


Nevada Test Site? 


 (No responses) 


If not, all in favor will say aye. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


 Any abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


And just for the record, we've lost Dr. 


Roessler. 

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185

 DR. WADE: But we have a fine quorum. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We still have a quorum and we have 


no nay votes, so the motion does carry. Thank 


you very much. 


If I might return for a moment to the previous 


motion for Pacific Proving Grounds, we indicate 


that -- we -- we've not changed the description 


of the -- of the cohort. Our first bullet 


simply says that this recommendation is based 


on the fact that these workers were employed in 


above-the-ground test-- above-ground testing. 


And my point was, I know in the presentation we 


got from Dr. Neton there were at least some 


underwater shots. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Surface and underwater. 


 DR. MELIUS: So yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. Surface and underwater. 


 MS. MUNN: Can't we simply remove "aboveground" --


 DR. MELIUS: During the testing, yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- and just say during the -- during 


testing of atomic weapons? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think that's a simple solution 

and --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: -- and can we take it by consent ­

- this is basically an editorial correction. 


The bullet would then say these workers were 


employed during the testing of atomic weapons. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Can I -- this is Sandi, and I 


apologize, I don't have any of the paper in 


front of me so it's hard to sort of keep track 


of some of this. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sandi, do we have a e-mail number 


or a FAX number where we can get -- 


MS. SCHUBERT: Jason's been e-mailing me, but I 


don't have any of the documents from the -- any 


of the motions, but I just want to clarify -- 


sort of just make sure I understand. It sounds 


like it's the same discussion for the Proving 


Grounds and the NTS. What you guys are 


recommending that -- is that during the time 


period from like 1951 to 1962 and the 


respective time period for Pacific Proving 


Ground, people who worked there for -- and were 


or should have been monitored for 250 days get 


coverage. They don't have to be present during 


the tests for 250 days, and I don't know if I'm 


making myself clear --


 DR. ZIEMER: They have to be present during 

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that time period. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay. Okay, that's -- that was 


my understanding. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Yeah. 


MS. SCHUBERT: I just --


 DR. ZIEMER: Any period during that opening and 


closing date. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay, so it's irrelevant whether 


it was above-ground test or -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, we simply wanted the -- 


MS. SCHUBERT: -- research or --


 DR. ZIEMER: We simply wanted the verbiage in 


the document to be correct, but it's not -- 


we're not limiting this to individuals who were 


involved in the above-ground tests that -- 


MS. SCHUBERT: That was my understanding. 


Thank you. It's just hard when you guys are -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Actually I think Larry is telling 


us, though, that all those tests in that period 


were above ground. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Yeah. I appreciate the 


clarification. Thank you. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, and I would add that you 


need -- just for the sake of clarity, you can 


aggregate days. This -- this class definition 

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will allow the aggregation of days from other 


classes. For an example, if a person spent 


time at both sites, Pacific Proving Ground and 


days at Nevada Test Site, and you could total 


those up to 250 days. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Wonderful. Thank you so much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. 


(Pause) 


 DR. WADE: Just want to as a mining engineer, 


I'll tell you that underwater is above ground. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I think I understand that. 


That's -- that's quite right. 


 MS. MUNN: Sometimes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's not in here, though. 


 MS. MUNN: Others. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's not atmospheric testing. 


 DR. MELIUS: So it's above ground, I -- thank 


you, Lew, I appreciate the... And Larry 


picking up 83.14, we've got sharp eyes here, 


that's... 


 DR. ZIEMER: We actually had scheduled for 


after lunch our program updates. I'm looking 


to see if there were any other items we needed 


to vote on. 


 Yeah, actually before we lose a quorum, we do 

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want to vote on the next 20 cases, so that will 


-- well, at least the next 20. 


 Board members, we have the report from the 


subcommittee, and it has the form of a list of 


proposed cases. On that list are 39 numbers, 


and what we agreed to was that we would have -- 


you would have the opportunity to go back and 


check your list against the master list, which 


is under the tab -- it's basically the first 


tab after the agenda, the individual dose 


reconstruction tab -- and see if you wanted to 


add or delete any items from this list. This 


list comes --


 MR. GRIFFON: Stu has. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on just a minute and -- Stu ­

- and this list basically comes as a 


recommendation from the subcommittee so it has 


the -- has the status of being before us as a 


motion. 


Okay. Stu, please. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: During Tuesday's discussion, as 


you'll recall, there was -- when we were going 


through the random -- randomized list and the 


selections from the randomized list, the 


question was raised are these really site­
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specific dose reconstructions or were these 


done with generic, complex-wide approaches, and 


I have that information that I can share, you 


know, verbally with you if you'd like. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, you want to just go down the 


list then? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, yes. Selection number -- 


selection number one was the first one 


selected. That is a Y-12-specific dose 


reconstruction for the external dose. The 


internal is the TIB-2 hypothetical intake, but 


you'll see a lot of those. In the early dose 


reconstructions it will be pretty uncommon to 


see a detailed internal dose reconstruction. 


So this is a -- I would -- I would consider it 


probably as a Y-12-specific dose 


reconstruction. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay? So selection number 


three, which is a Rocky Flats Plant, that is a 


site-specific dose reconstruction -- seems to 


be on both sides. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And that was Rocky? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Selection number 28 uses a -- a 


TIB-2 hypothetical intake, but it also seems to 


use the site profile for the external dose, so 


that would be a relatively site-specific 


approach. 


Selection number 41 uses all complex-wide 


approaches. It uses the TIB-2 hypothetical 


intake, uses the TIB-10 overestimating approach 


for film badges, and uses the TIB-6 complex-


wide medical. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: I would ask the Board to note that 


that's a Nevada Test Site case, and we'll make 


note of that and we'll discuss that as it 


relates to the discussion we had with SC&A in 


their report. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Selection number 45 is not 


Sandia site-specific. It uses the TIB-2 


hypothetical intake. It looks like it used an 


ambient external approach because it was not -- 


apparently this was not a monitored person and 


was judged to be properly not monitored. 


Selection 48 appears to be site-specific. It's 


a underestimate so it's in all likelihood a 

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partial dose reconstruction, but it does seem 


to be specific to the X-10 site. 


Selection number 52 uses all complex-wide 


approaches, generic approaches. 


Selection number 64 also uses all generic 


approaches. 


Selection number 95 uses -- I believe that will 


be a relati-- I believe that will be a site-


specific. It's a little hard for me to 


interpret based on the notes I got, but I 


believe that will be a relatively site-specific 


approach. Again, it's an underestimate. It 


will probably be a partial. 


And selection 96, as well, appears it will be 


relatively site-specific, uses the TIB for 


interpreting shallow dose, so presumably these 


two cases have shallow-dose exposures in the 


individual's exposure record, and selection 


number 96 also uses the Paducah coworker 


approach. So there might -- there would be -- 


might be some interest in that. 


The next selection I see is selection number 


144. That uses all -- that uses the generic 


AWE complex-wide approach. 


Selection 154, again, is an underestimate. 

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It's probably a partial. It uses the sitespeci-- site-specific information I believe for 


more than one of the listed sites, actually, 


and how to interpret shallow dose TIB. 


 Selection number 169 seems to use all generic 


approaches, uses the TIB-10 ext-- 


overestimating approach for using film, TIB-2 


hypothetical intake and the TIB-6 complex-wide 


medical approach. 


 Selection number 188 seems to use the site 


profile, site-specific information. 


 DR. WADE: It's also Nevada Test Site. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe that's all the 


selected cases, isn't it? 


 DR. WADE: I’ve got 25 total. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now in -- particularly on these 


complex-wide -- now let's see, we have -- I'm ­

- I think we show six complex-wide ones here. 


To the extent that any of these were chosen 


because of the site, you may wish to change 


some of them. In some cases you may have 


selected them for other reasons. Anyone --


anyone -- well, let's hear if you want to pull 


certain ones from the list. Let's start out 


with 41, is that the first complex-wide? 

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 MS. MUNN: (inaudible)


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I -- I think that out of 


all -- all that we saw at the subcommittee 


level, I -- when we went through this one by 


one I -- I felt like maybe a round of 20 or 25, 


if we really -- you know, I don't think we have 


to stick to batches of 20, but I don't -- I 


would -- I -- my overall sense is I don't think 


we need to try to get 40 out of here, and this 


is even more reason -- that Stu just gave, 


maybe not to do 40, but you know, I was 


thinking maybe to proportion it with more of 


the full estimates and less of the 


overestimates, so I just would hope people keep 


that in mind, you know. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, sure. The minimum 


probably that we want to have on deck is 20, 


and if we come up with 25 or 30 -- at some 


point we'll have to fill in additional because 


I -- I assume that, as a practical matter, 


working with our teams we would take a batch of 


20 for the next group for the contractor to 


work with. That works out well with our teams. 


And then at some later point, if you did not 

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wish to do it today, we can -- and there will 


be additional closed cases that will come on 


line, so --


 DR. WADE: One -- if I might suggest, one 


construct is you have 25 full dose 


reconstructions that you've identified. That ­

- if you identified that as the target for the 


possible next 20 -- you know, we always worry 


about wanting to have a couple of extra in the 


hopper in case some are returned -- we could 


instruct the contractor to begin down that list 


of the first 25, selecting 20 from that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Of the fulls, and just leave the 


random ones on the back burner? 


 DR. WADE: Well, then when -- in June we would 


select the next 20. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. That's --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I mean I think we need to 


give a little more -- closer consideration to 


that full list 'cause I think when we were 


going through it, if you recall, we -- we -- 


like at one point I crossed off 117, then I 


kind of put it back on, then 119 and 20 I 


remember some discussion of well, I want one of 


these steel mills, but probably not too many 

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steel mills. They might be very similar. 


 DR. WADE: Well, let's discuss it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So I don't know if we want to, 


you know, take all -- yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Let's discuss the 25 and if -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- see where we get to, and if we 


need a couple then extra, we can pull from the 


random ones. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is that agreeable? 


 MR. GRIFFON: That's fine. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, then move to the table -- 


well, actually it's the first -- first table -- 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- which is the list of fulls, and 


we can -- let's just quickly go down the list. 


We can either reconfirm or -- or drop, and if 


there's others we can pick up -- 02? Or just ­

- I'll just call it 2. I'm going to just kind 


of move through these. If I don't hear any 


comments pro or con, I'm going to assume we're 


agreed to keep and we'll just go from there. 


Six? 


 DR. DEHART: We've got at least four, possibly 


more, Savannah Rivers, first 25. 

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 MS. MUNN: Against --


 DR. ZIEMER: From the first 25 that we've... 


Oh, in the -- in this 25. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. But are you simply pointing 


that out or are you objecting -- 


 DR. DEHART: In case somebody feels -- I think 


that's too many from Savannah River. 


 MS. MUNN: We're going to need --


 MR. CLAWSON: These are ones that just came 


into 50 percent. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe keep that in mind as we go 


through that, you're -- 


 MS. MUNN: You're looking at a total of 35 


needed from Savannah River and we only have 14 


so far of those completed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, we're still okay. Roy --


Roy's just pointing that out. 


Okay, I'm going to proceed here -- 6? Eight? 


 DR. DEHART: Go back and select 6 out because 


it's a lung case. We've got already a lot of 


lung. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: How about the rest of you? 


 MS. MUNN: I agree. 

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 MR. GRIFFON: That's fine. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we're going to drop 6 -- 9? 


10? 20? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think 10's a borderline one for 


me, but I guess we can keep it in there for 


now. We haven't done Portsmouth, so I can see 


the argument to -- you know. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, 20? 43? 44? 49? I feel 


like I'm calling a bingo game here. 


 MS. MUNN: I'm ready to say we need -- 


 DR. WADE: I need one more. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I need one more. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is 50 on the list? I can't tell 


from my marks here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No? Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: We talked about 49, but not 50. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah -- 68? 73? Mark, did you 


have a comment on 68? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I just was -- Keep in mind 


that's Superior Steel, though. I think we've 


got another one of those coming up, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Which one is that -- 73, 


Superior Steel. 78? 85? 101? 


 DR. DEHART: I would simply point out that 

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we're suddenly doing a lot of GIs. Here we 


have colon and this is like the third colon 


we've run through. 


 MR. GRIFFON: 101's esophagus. 


 DR. ZIEMER: 101's esophagus. 


 DR. DEHART: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, G-- okay, GI, yeah, we're -- 


we're thinking too low. 


 DR. MELIUS: But still above ground. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you for that. When does 


your plane leave? 


Okay, number 110? Number 115? Okay, 117 was 


on and off, I -- it's currently on the list. 


Are we -- I had marked it back off, but is -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I thought at one point we saw a 


better Pantex one or something, didn't it -- 


 DR. WADE: I thought it was further down the 


line. 


 MS. MUNN: Thought there was better. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, maybe that was it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, shall we leave it in for the 


moment? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just think it's five years 


worked and I would vote for it going off, 


actually. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: For 117? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 119? That's the other 


Superior Steel. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. And this is a bladder 


cancer and longer work period I think than the 


previous one is why we -- 73. 


 DR. ZIEMER: 73 is a 25-year. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, they're both long periods of 


 DR. ZIEMER: Both pretty long. 


 MS. MUNN: We were interested in the work 


decade in that one, I think. Wouldn't that 


have been one of the folks who would have 


worked prior to an older worker at the time of 


exposure. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess my -- I would 


say either one, but probably not both is what 


my -- I would think. 


 DR. ZIEMER: 73 and 119, they're both very 


similar, I think. The -- why don't we just go 


with 119, if that's agreeable. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's fine with -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Drop 73, they're both quite 


similar. Now 120? 

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 MR. GRIFFON: I vote to drop that one -- 


another steel company. I'm not even sure -- 


these are all full estimates, but Stu, if the ­

- some of these ones that are full estimates 


like for these steel companies, I'm not sure 


you're going to have -- it's not going to be 


specific bioassay. It likely is a model, 


right? To internal dose. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, it's -- it's likely a 


model. Now there are a number of AWEs where we 


have external dosimetry records -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right, but it's likely not -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and I don't remember -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- it's likely not a Superior 


Steel-specific model, is it, or could it be? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't think it would be. It 


may be a -- the AWE complex-wide -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Model, right, right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And it may actually have -- I 


don't know -- I can't remember now if we had 


dosimetry data for Superior Steel or not. 


There were a number of the AWEs where we --


 DR. ZIEMER: What about U.S. Steel? This one 


is --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It'd be the same. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: -- U.S. Steel. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: U.S. Steel is -- I don't -- I 


don't know. I don't know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Steel companies we might -- we 


want to look at some of them, but I think -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We have Superior, so let's -- we 


can drop 120. 154? 157? 181? 88 -- 188? 


199? And 211? 


 DR. WADE: That's 21. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, 21 gives us at least an 


extra. Let me just pause a minute and see if 


anyone has spotted other ones on the list in 


the meantime that they would like to add. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I saw one from the partial 


list that might be -- or from the random list 


that might be interesting, but I don't know if 


you're looking at that -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We can do that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And I got --


 DR. ZIEMER: There's nothing --


 MR. GRIFFON: Number three -- out of all those, 


I think the only one that was sort of 


compelling to me was number three, and that -- 


it's Rocky Flats. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Number three is a Rocky Flats 

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site-specific --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's add that one back in. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Then we're 22 --


 DR. ZIEMER: That gives us --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- right? 


 DR. ZIEMER: That gives us 20 plus two spares. 


Okay, let me ask, is there any discussion on 


this? We'll vote officially to accept these as 


the next group from which our next cases will 


be audited. Ready to vote? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, all in favor, aye? 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


Abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


 So ordered. 


 DR. WADE: John Mauro, could you come to the 


microphone just briefly for a question? John? 


John, if now you get these 22, you wouldn't 


need the assignment to Board -- specific Board 


members before June, would you -- or would you? 


DR. MAURO: No, but it's -- it's -- we'll 

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proceed with the -- our work. At some point 


the --


 DR. ZIEMER: You can do the early stages of -- 


of these --


DR. MAURO: Yeah, we -- yeah, we -- we don't -- 


we don't need the assignments I would say for 


another month. 


 DR. WADE: Another month? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, in other --


 DR. ZIEMER: You will be ready that soon for 


these? 


DR. MAURO: If we -- we -- we're going to start 


work soon as we -- soon as we receive the set 


of disks. I would say we'll -- we're going to 


get started on them soon as we receive that. 


When we're through, we will send the drafts 


out. You know, it's going to take I would say 


at least six weeks to two months to get through 


the first set of drafts, and sometime in that 


time period, if we had the assignments, you -- 


we --


 DR. ZIEMER: If you guys are ready, actually 


the Chair can assign these. That's my --


that's my prerogative and I can take the -- I 


can take the existing groups and, making sure 

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there's no conflict of interest, just make the 


assignments. 


DR. MAURO: Sure, okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: If you're at that point before our 


next meeting. 


DR. MAURO: Oh -- then that's fine, yeah, we -- 


now or -- yeah, next meeting would be certainly 


soon enough. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, part of the Board working 


session, we have the minutes from the January 


meeting. Dr. DeHart has a correction to offer. 


 DR. DEHART: Page 45. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Page 45. 

 DR. DEHART: Line 3, there's a incorrect date. 

It should read April 5, 2005. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That date is -- refers to the 


NIOSH Rev. 3 of the Savannah River site profile 


that -- the correct date is April 5th, 2005, 


not 2006, so that -- that's a -- even though 


it's a single digit, it's a substantive change 


in the minutes. 


Were there any other corrections or additions 


to the minutes that anyone wishes to offer? 


 (No responses) 


Then I'd call for a motion to approve the 

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minutes, as corrected. 


 MS. MUNN: So moved. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Seconded? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: All in favor of approval of the 


minutes, say aye. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


 Motion carries. Thank you. 


I'll now call on Dr. Melius to report for the 


workgroup on the Iowa SEC. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, this is on the Ames -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Ames, Iowa. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- Ames, Iowa SEC, and -- had some 

internal discussions and in follow-up to the 


SC&A presentation from yesterday, I believe it 


was, and I think what we have decided -- be 


recommending is that we ask SC&A to -- to -- 


three tasks. One is complete a short report 


basically following the outline of their -- 


their presentation that was given today on sort 


of the work to date on reviewing the evaluation 


report and the background information that they 


had reviewed, discussions with the petitioners 

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and -- and so forth. 


Number two, to -- I think there's like -- 


essentially two issues that we'd like them to 


delve into a little bit further. One is the 


issue of the so-called explosions and other 


acute incidents like that at the -- at the 


facility. I think -- I think we're just 


looking for additional information. There's --


the petitioners had raised some question as to 


whether those didn't qualify as discrete 


incidents. 


And then this -- the other issue we'd like some 


input -- the petitioners in their original 


petition had extended the -- their request for 


coverage by one year I believe past what NIOSH 


had, and that -- that was based on their 


concern about any residual contamination or 


continued exposures, even though the facility 


was no longer operational as an AC facility, 


and I think we're just looking for a little bit 


more guidance on -- on that particular issue. 


And I think if you could complete a report and 


present that back to us, I think we -- that 


should suffice for us to be able to, you know, 


come to a conclusion on the Ames petition. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: And this comes as a recommendation 


from the workgroup and therefore a motion 


before the Board. If we approve this, this 


would give direction to the contractor for 


preparing us for a final decision on this. 


I might add, on the third point it's my 


understanding that that extra year was intended 


to cover clean-up operations after the 


cessation of work. I'm wondering if either 


NIOSH or SC&A knows actually if there are -- do 


we know anything about the clean-up dates for 


Ames, and do we even know if that was done by 


Ames workers? I would guess it was more likely 


done by an outside contractor if it was done. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'm speaking second-hand here 


because I wasn't doing the research, but we -- 


we do know -- we do have some information about 


-- like demolition dates of the buildings where 


some of this work was done, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: And I think that's the information 


we're wanting to know whether the cohort should 


really include the clean-up period. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that -- I believe our 


position is that there's -- there's really no 


material difference between cleaning up the 

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work and doing the work, in terms of the 


exposure conditions, and so the clean-up work 


would -- would be included. It's when -- how 


late did the clean-up work go on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, the point I'm making is do 


we know that the clean-up was done by -- by 


Ames workers --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I guess --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- versus something like a FUSRAP 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, standing here today -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- where a complete outside group 


comes in. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right here today, I don't know. 


 DR. MELIUS: I don't think that's -- that's -- 


that was clear and in the conference call we 


had we'd just received the evaluation report, 


and frankly we didn't talk about it very much. 


I -- I think was you, Larry, or who had 


explained how you came up with the date, but 


then we nev-- really sort of didn't spend much 


time talking about it -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we need -- we need to just 

clarify --

 DR. MELIUS: -- and just -- so we're just 
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looking for clarification on that -- that 


issue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So Board members, you've heard 


this recommendation. Any discussion on it? 


 (No responses) 


If not, I'll call for a -- call the question. 


All who favor proceeding on this basis on the 


Ames, Iowa petition, say aye. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed? 


 (No responses) 


No? Abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


It is so ordered. 


 DR. WADE: One other small piece of business 


before we move on. That is just making sure we 


have the workgroups -- that the work assigned 


to the appropriate workgroups. I think on Ames 


it's Dr. Melius's SEC workgroup. Yeah, I think 


on Y-12 and Rocky it's clearly Mark's 


workgroup. But we do have the task of Nevada 


Test Site and Pacific Proving Grounds, and 


which workgroup would take that on, just so I 


can schedule meetings? 


 MS. MUNN: The Nevada Test Site has been Bob 

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Presley's. 


 DR. MELIUS: I think what we had -- Paul and I 


had discussed this briefly -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Discrete event issue -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- be raising, I think. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, and -- and I think what 


might be the -- you know, at least since we 


want to approach that originally sort of 


generically, so forth, is that if our workgroup 


-- I guess my -- workgroup headed by me, I hate 


to call it my workgroup 'cause we all do the 


work, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: In this case it's the SEC kind of 


generic workgroup. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, what do you call it, Paul -- 


or --


 DR. WADE: I call it the S-- SC&A/SEC 


workgroup. 


 DR. MELIUS: Oh, but -- okay -- that we do 


that. But we will coordinate with the Nevada 


Test Site group as -- as we get into specific 


issues related to the Nevada Test Site. Does 


that sound reasonable? 


 MS. MUNN: That's nice. 

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 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Well, it's more than nice. 


It makes -- it makes sense. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So that -- that group is 


addressing sort of the generic issue of 


discrete events --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- which includes those both at 


Nevada Test Site and Ames and perhaps other 


places. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. And to -- to initiate that 


workgroup, I'd like to schedule a short 


conference call with NIOSH just to talk about 


some data issues and sort of figure out how we 


can work together to -- some sort of 


information needs related to that, so we'll -- 


we'll work on that and... 


FUTURE SCHEDULES/BOARD CORRESPONDENCE


 DR. WADE: Then very briefly, our next face to 


face meeting is scheduled for June 14, 15, 16 


in Washington, D.C. Based upon dates 


available, we're scheduling -- we would like to 


schedule a call of the Board on August 8th. We 


might not need it but we'd like to schedule it. 


And then again, based upon your calendars' 


availability, a face to face meeting of the 

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Board September 19, 20 and 21. Now LaShawn 


tells me it's clear on all calendars. 


 DR. DEHART: Except mine. I'll be in India. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. That's right, we did have 


that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Well, now we have a location. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Everybody make sure you 


have those dates on your calendars then. That 


takes us through September and we'll want to 


get later dates reserved fairly soon. 


 DR. WADE: Yeah, I'll ask LaShawn to start 


Monday to -- to schedule the rest of the year. 


 DR. MELIUS: What were the September dates 


again? 


 DR. WADE: 19, 20, 21. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Mark, you have a comment? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just -- just have some other -- 


other potential date here. I wanted to try, if 


the principal players are still here, to get a 


workgroup date -- we're going to need a 


workgroup date, and I was hoping to do Y-12 and 


Rocky all in one day, as we've been doing. And 


I -- in talking with SC&A, I think -- I tried 


to time this so that it would be -- well, first 


so that our workgroup could all attend, and 

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secondly so that SC&A would have a complete 


evaluation report for the Rocky, and they said 


probably mid-May. And the dates we found so 


far are narrowed down to like May 17th, 


possibly May 18th -- I don't know if Jim Neton 


is -- yeah, Jim's still here, or Brant -- if 


there's any major conflicts or if you think 


that's too soon, too late. I don't know if you 


have any --


DR. NETON: I'm sorry, you caught me thinking 


about something else. 


 MR. GRIFFON: May 17th, it would be Y-12 and 


Rocky working group. 


DR. NETON: Okay. It's clear for me. I can't 


speak for Brant, but -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I didn't know. 


DR. NETON: We could arrange it to be clear -- 


since he's not here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So we'll -- at least tentatively 


we'll say May 17th -- 


DR. NETON: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- workgroup, location probably 


Cincinnati -- although I like Boston -- no. 


Probably Cincinnati. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And John Mauro --

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 MR. GRIFFON: May 17th, and we'll probably 


start at 8:30, 9:00 a.m. or something, you 


know, as early as we can -- full day. 


DR. MAURO: Paul, with regard to that date -- 


certainly that's fine with SC&A. I'd just like 


to point out we will be in position to deliver 


and have well in hand Y-12 revised report. 


With regard to having a complete draft in the 


hands of the working group for that date for 


Rocky, you picked a day when -- where we're 


probably going to be in the midst of writing it 


at that time. That doesn't meant we would not 


be in a position to discuss it with you, but we 


probably will not have a clean draft for you 


folks to review prior to that meeting. I mean 


that -- that would be -- 'cause you -- you 


happened to turn out to pick the date when we ­

- we -- we will be receiving our drafts 


internally and integrating it into a draft 


report, so -- but if -- so but we'll certainly 


be in a position to air out the issues very -- 


you know, I would say very thoroughly, but you 


won't have the luxury of -- of -- of reading 


our draft regarding Rocky prior to that 


meeting. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Well, you'll have to decide if 


that's a critical point or not then. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: If it is, then you may have to 


wait a week or two. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And the --


 DR. ZIEMER: When would you issue the report, 


if that's the -- that's the day you start -- 


DR. MAURO: Right --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- putting it together? 


DR. MAURO: -- right now our plan is we will 


probably be assembling the report about that 


time, and deliver the draft to the working 


group and the Board within a week from then. 


So you're about a week early. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I'm going to suggest, 


workgroup, you may need to cogitate on this on 


your own and --


 MR. GRIFFON: We'll tentatively say May 17th -- 


DR. MAURO: That's fine. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- then we'll -- we'll -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: You may have to move it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: We may have to move it, right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

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 DR. MELIUS: Do we have a location for the 


September meeting? 


 DR. WADE: No. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can we come up with one? It makes 


some difference in terms of what we schedule 


our travel plans around. Especially if it's in 


India since it takes us so long to get there. 


 DR. WADE: I mean we don't have a location. 


You know, I don't know what the timing will be 


in terms of the issues that you're working on 


now, so --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we may need to see what's 


coming on the horizon. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: But if you want to pick one today... 


 MS. MUNN: Always Pantex. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, yeah, the Pantex area is 


very hard to get to. 


 DR. MELIUS: How about -- maybe -- it's too 


early for Fernald. 


 DR. WADE: Why don't you let me propose a 


couple of locations next week by e-mail and 


then --


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: -- we'll pick them and then we'll 

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decide by the end of next week. 


 DR. MELIUS: Anybody -- other -- since this is 


back before Lew's time, any locations that we 


had talked about and have gotten bumped because 


of --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, we met one time in South 


Carolina, but we were quite a ways from the 


plant, so it wasn't a very good venue for 


getting input from the workers at Savannah 


River. I wonder if we would do better to get 


closer to the plant. What's the closest -- is 


Aiken the closest town of size? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Aiken is the closest -- Bob 


Presley, I'm back. 


 MS. MUNN: Bob is back. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Bob, you're back. 


 MS. MUNN: Missed the vote. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Bob, we have completed the 


voting. I -- all three of the motions that you 


were aware of have been approved. We are 


discussing a -- some possible future locations, 


and I was asking what -- what's the closest 


decent-sized city to the Savannah River site, 


is it Aiken or is it Augusta? Maybe Augusta's 


a little --

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I 

 MR. PRESLEY: Augusta's -- Augusta's closer 


than Aiken. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Augusta's a little bigger. 


think could probably accommodate -- 


 MS. MUNN: That's where we were. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we were in Charleston. 


 DR. MELIUS: We were both. 


 MS. MUNN: We were in Augusta, too. 


 DR. ZIEMER: How soon we forget. That's been a 


while. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Didn't we meet in Augusta? 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, I'm just getting information 


from you. I've been out-voted already. 


Well, I'm trying to think of other sites. 


We've been to Oak Ridge. Pinellas is a 


possibility. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We've -- we have talked about 


going to Pinellas. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, this would be basically 


Pantex -- well, Pantex is Texas, but -- or 


Pinellas is --


 MR. PRESLEY: Florida. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- Florida. What, St. Petersburg? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Tampa. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Those are possibilities, not -- 

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Fort Myers is way far from Pinel-- from 


Pinellas. 


 DR. WADE: Let me put something together. I'll 


look at Augus-- I'll look at Savannah River and 


Pinellas as two, and if anybody else wants to 


suggest. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Did we talk about Pinellas? 


 DR. ZIEMER: We haven't decided on one, just 


gathering information. Albuquerque is another 


possibility. That -- there's -- Sandia is 


there. You have of course Los Alamos National 


Lab is close by. We have been to Santa Fe. 


Actually there's some other facilities at 


Albuquerque, the -- the Inhalation Tox group is 


there, as well, they -- part of the DOE 


complex. 


 DR. WADE: Dr. DeHart has his thing up. 


 DR. DEHART: It's a different topic, but I was 


wondering if it would be possible to have as an 


agenda item at one of our forthcoming meetings 


-- and this comes out from the presentation 


that Dr. Ringen had the other day -- the other 


evening. The topic then was construction 


workers, and it was mentioned that NIOSH is in 


the process of coming up with a work plan or a 

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method of analyzing dose reconstruction for 


that work group, and I was wondering if we 


could get a status report. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, Larry is shaking his head in 


the affirmative, so perhaps that could go on 


the agenda at -- we saw some things that were 


presented in the public comment period about 


the working group, but we -- and -- and NIOSH 


has told us before about what the plans are, so 


maybe just an update on that -- be timely. 


Thank you, Roy. 


We have a couple of items that we skipped over 


in order to get through the voting portions of 


the meeting. First there's a program update 


from NIOSH, and Larry, you have the current 


status of issues for us? 


 DR. MELIUS: Break, Paul? 


(Pause) 


 DR. ZIEMER: When they're done we'll hear from 


Department of Labor --


 DR. WADE: Dr. Melius asked for a break. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, well, I was just going to plow 


right through there. Okay. I'm usually the 


one most uncomfortable, but we'll take a ten-


minute break while they get set up. 

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 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:50 p.m. 


to 3:05 p.m.) 


PROGRAM UPDATES, NIOSH, MR. LARRY ELLIOTT


 DR. ZIEMER: Larry, welcome back for the latest 


status report. And I actually looked at it 


already and I was astounded. It seemed to be a 


big jump from January on -- on closeouts, 


almost 2,000. Was -- is that right? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, we're just -- we're doing 


fine. Production is -- is moving along and 


quite pleased with the ORAU team support in 


that regard. They are working hard in many 


areas, as the OCAS staff are, in responding to 


the Board's interests and concern with the 


evaluation of SEC petitions, of course, site 


profile reviews. And at the same time we're 


maintaining and improving and increasing our 


production level efforts, so -- and I think 


that's primarily due to the number of Technical 


Basis Documents and site profile tools that 


have been developed and finalized. The more we 


bring on line of those tools, the more claims 


we can complete. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And before you get under way and ­

- I just got a phone call from Bob Presley and 

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he's back on the line again. His staple 


removal went well. But Bob reminded me to be 


sure to tell the NIOSH folks how pleased he was 


with the support you gave to the workgroup that 


he was involved in and really thanks you for 


all that support. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That's -- that's what we're here 


for. We're public servants and we're trying to 


do the best we can in a very difficult 


situation, so -- and with the full intent of 


doing the best we can for the claimant 


population. I'm sorry that we seem to have 


lost most of those folks today, but I 


appreciate those of you who are in the 


audience. 


 Before I start walking through these slides, I 


do want to give you a brief update in response 


to Dr. DeHart's request and with regard to what 


you heard last night from Knut Ringen. 


Unfortunately I wish he had vetted his 


presentation with NIOSH before he decided to 


present it because -- well, you'll see here 


that many -- many points of clarification and 


inaccuracies that I need -- I feel compelled to 


speak to. 

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First of all, yes, we did work with CPWR, asked 


them to help -- help us with the development of 


a Technical Information Bulletin that would be 


used to treat dose reconstructions for 


construction workers. That document was 


completed -- I don't have the date of when we 


initiated that effort and when it was 


completed, but the current status of that 


document is that it's -- it's undergoing some 


final revisions within NIOSH, in OCAS, getting 


also some technical support from ORAU to put 


some finishing touches on that document, 


addressing some concerns that CPWR and their -- 


the esteemed colleagues that they brought to 


bear on the issue raised with us about the 


document and the draft of that document. I 


think that document is about -- perhaps six 


weeks away from seeing completion and being put 


to use. So in the six weeks time frame I hope 


to be able to tell you at the next meeting that 


it's in use and it's underway and we're working 


with it. 


Now points of clarification. There are -- the 


numbers in Knut's presentation were not 


accurate, and let me give you some accurate 

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numbers. There -- and these are raw numbers, 


and they're raw because not only did I get them 


through many people looking through case files 


today back in the office and trying to 


understand the various job titles that a 


construction worker can hold and how can -- you 


know, as many of you know, these people that 


work at these sites hold the different jobs, 


different job titles, as they move through 


their careers. So there are a number of job 


titles that we have to examine to determine how 


many claims do we have that are relevant to 


construction trades. 


In raw number, 4,387 claims have had some 


mention of some -- in their work history, 


development of some construction trade-related 


job. We have -- pardon me? 


UNIDENTIFIED: What was that number again? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: 4,387 total claims that we can 


identify, just -- you know, without -- job 


titles and in the work history file are not a 


searchable -- by electronic means not 


searchable. We have to go through a screening 


process. So that's why this is a raw number. 


I believe it's in the right ballpark, though. 

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2,548 of those claims have been completed, 


using generic tools and dose of record. 168 of 


those claims have been pulled by the Department 


of Labor for a variety of reasons and -- or 


they have been administratively closed by us or 


DOL. And administratively closed means, for 


us, they didn't -- the claim was dose 


reconstructed and the OCAS-1 wasn't signed, and 


we give 60 days and then we give another 14 


days grace period upon that, and if we still 


don't have the OCAS-1, we administratively 


close the claim. And if the claimant decides 


to come back to us with either additional 


information or a completed OCAS-1, then we'll ­

- we'll complete the -- the claim for them. 


137 claims that have had construction trades 


job title in it have been closed out under the 


SEC classes that have been added, leaving 1,534 


active claims, out of which right now 545 are 


pended, awaiting this Technical Information 


Bulletin. So I would offer that construction 


trades has been a priority for us. It has not 


been a forgotten group of workers by any 


stretch of the imagination. So I just leave 


you with that and I'll have a better report for 

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you with more details at your next meeting. 


Yes, production has been going quite well for 


us in completing dose reconstructions. We've 


completed 13,590 draft dose reconstruction 


reports that have been provided to the 


claimants. This is as of March 31st, 2006. 


12,715 of those dose reconstruction reports 


have been sent to DOL, so the remainder, the 


difference between the two numbers are those 


claim reports that are in the hands of 


claimants that we're awaiting an OCAS-1 on. 


As you see here, 940 claims have been sent back 


to Department of Labor for their determination 


of eligibility within a specified class, and 


the breakdown is -- is provided there for you 


in that slide, and I will let you walk through 


that yourself. 


 4,090 dose reconstruction reports have been 


sent back to DOL out of our first 5,000 claims. 


We -- we have a concerted effort to complete 


the oldest claims first, and this gives you a 


statistic on how well we're proceeding in that 


regard. Of that -- in the earliest claims, 


those first 5,000, there's 305 claims where the 


draft dose reconstruction is laying with the -- 

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sitting with the -- the claimants and we're 


awaiting that OCAS-1, so you can add that 


number to the 4,090. We're -- we're close. 


395 of the claims have been pulled for a 


variety of reasons. Again, it's either -- in 


the early days DOL sent us some claims that 


were wrongly submitted to us. They weren't 


cancer, or they were CLL; they pulled them 


back. And again, you've heard me speak about 


this, the worst situation where we have a 


pulled claim is where there's a -- there's no 


survivor and the Energy employee has died or 


the last survivor has died and we've not 


completed the case. I would continue to make 


the same remark I've made in the past. That's 


-- that's a very small number. It's not a 


large proportion of these 395 claims. Forty-


six claims below 5,000 have been 


administratively closed -- again, where we have 


not received an OCAS-1. Those could be 


reopened if we get an OCAS-1 back or if the 


claimant comes back to us with additional 


information that we need to consider in the 


dose reconstruction. 


108 claims are active at this point in time, 

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and we have put -- assigned 56 of those cases 


for Battelle, another contractor, to do work 


on. And these are primarily cases where there 


are one or two per site in the AWE sites, 


primarily. We've tasked Battelle, as I've 


reported to you at last meeting, with pursuing 


with all due diligence the completion of about 


1,400 claims that represent over about 180 


sites. 


With regard to where we stand on the Special 


Exposure Cohort classes, as you know, six 


classes have been added to the Special Exposure 


Cohort and they're listed here -- two at 


Mallinckrodt for those two different time 


frames; the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant also two 


classes with two different, distinct time 


frames; Y-12 in the early years, '43 to -- 


through December of '47; and Linde Ceramics 


Plant. One petition was -- was recommended to 


be added to the SEC, but then the National 


Bureau of Standards was deemed not a covered 


facility at the conclusion of that and it was ­

- a designation was not sent to add it as a 


class. 


Five petitions have been evaluated and provided 

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for your review. They are listed here and 


you've taken action on -- on two of those at 


this meeting, Nevada Test Site and Pacific 


Proving Ground. And of course you've discussed 


and deliberated on Rocky Flats and Y-12, as 


well, and have touched on the starting point of 


your evaluation of -- of Ames. 


 Four petition evaluation reports are currently 


in development. Those are Blockson Chemical, 


Chapman Valve; the Fernald site, Feed Materials 


Production Center; and the Oak Ridge Institute 


for Science and Education. 


We have 12 current requests to add a class to 


the SEC that are going through the 


qualification process, and in that regard we 


have a Bethlehem Steel request, two from 


Hanford, one from -- excuse me, two from Los 


Alamos, one from Nuclear Metals, one from 


NUMEC, one from Monsanto Chemical; and one that 


covers multiple facilities, which I will note 


for you is problematic because we are working 


with the petitioner to narrow it down to one 


facility, that's required by our rule; then we 


have three new Y-12 petitions that we're 


working with the petitioners on. 

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We have had 26 requests for classes to be added 


to the SEC which we have administratively 


closed. They were found not to have met the 


basis for a petition. They were 


administratively closed, that's one reason. Or 


they were withdrawn by the petitioners, or the 


facility and the class for which they were 


petitioning for was already in the SEC. So 


those are the reasons why those 26 have been 


administratively closed. 


Now we'll move on to -- as part of the program 


update from your last meeting, you met with 


Bethlehem Steel and you asked that we provide 


you an update on six outstanding issues that 


were -- we had committed to develop further for 


you, and that's what I'm going to present here, 


the status of those six. 


The first issue was whether or not the model 


used for 1951 and 1952 exposures were -- was 


appropriate, was it fully appropriate in its -- 


in its use of all information. We have 


modified the site profile. That modification 


is now complete. 1951 and 1952 will be treated 


separately in the site profile and we have 


incorporated the adjustment factor for 1951 air 

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samples that are used as the highest data point 


for that year. This is all that was -- this 


particular issue, as you know, as the others 


were, were vetted in discussions with SC&A and 


-- and with the Board. 


The second issue was the -- was the 95th 


percentile does not take into account short-


term episodic exposures. From your -- you can 


go back into the discussion in the transcript 


and you'll find this is what I took from that. 


The Board agreed in principle, but wanted 


additional information about the time that was 


required to cut out the cobbles. And we agreed 


to work with Mr. Walker and stakeholders to 


determine if there was more information that 


could be uncovered about were cobbles actually 


cut with a cutting torch or how were they, the 


cobbles, dismantled and what kind of exposure 


would that have resulted in. And we're still 


working on that. We're still working with Mr. 


Walker to identify individuals that we can 


interview and gain information from about this 


particular work practice. 


The third issue is -- addresses ingestion, and 


the site profile has been modified to 

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incorporate handling and -- ingestion intakes 


based upon handling of other material. It's 


based on an air concentration to surface 


contamination and surface to ingestion transfer 


factor, and so that's incorporated now into the 


site profile. 


The fourth issue was resuspension and whether 


or not we had appropriately accounted for 


resuspension of dust from various surfaces in 


the floor and also the overhead structure in 


the plant. We have incorporated guidelines 


using the median value for -- of exposure for 


'49 through '50 and also then the median value 


separately for '51 and '52 to address this 


particular resuspension issue. 


 The fifth issue that was under study was an 


issue raised by workers about the extended 


contact with uranium, and they didn't feel that 


our site profile addressed this adequately. 


The site profile has now been modified and 


assumes a 1.5 millirem per hour contact from 


clothing contamination and a -- that is 


adjusted on a two-week behavioral practice of 


washing the clothing and results in a 1.8 


millirem -- or 1.8 rem per year from clothing 

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contamination alone. 


 MS. MUNN: That's very generous. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: The last issue was the effect of 


oronasal breathing, and this is a generic -- a 


general concern across several of our site 


profiles, and we're working on that still, and 


we'll be bringing forward generic guidance on 


this issue in the future. 


So Bethlehem Steel site profile has been 


modified. We still have two of the six issues 


that we're still working on, the cobble issue ­

- we're still working with the stakeholders -- 


and this final issue of oronasal breathing. 


And we'll be -- bring the guidance to the Board 


for its deliberation at a future meeting. 


Let's move on to science issues, and as you 


know, we have proposed some scientific 


modifications to our approaches, specifically 


with regard to how we treat lymphoma cases. In 


February of this year we put out a Federal 


Register notice announcing that we were going 


to make this change, seeking public comment. 


Specifically this change responds to our 


evaluation of the current scientific data and 


understanding of what tissues should be dose 

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reconstructed against with regard to lymphomas. 


The injury of the radiation exposure can occur 


at different tissue sites, and we want to make 


sure that we're -- we're giving benefit of the 


doubt as appropriate to the claimants. And if 


we don't have that specific information, we do 


select the tissue or the target organ that 


would give them the most benefit of the doubt. 


We -- it's noted here that this change may 


result in DOL calculating higher POC 


determinations, so we are re-evaluating all 


completed claims. And I can tell you that 


there are around -- I believe five -- 536 


completed claims that are being re-evaluated 


right now, so these would be previously dose 


reconstructed claims that have been found to be 


non-compensable and now they're being reevaluated against this new methodological 


approach. 


 MS. MUNN: Are you getting lots of responses? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Comments? Not on this one, not 


that much. I think -- you can go to our web 


site and we have a docket open for this, and I 


think we've had like -- I want to say about a 


dozen, and they're all in favor of the change, 

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of course. And you know, questions like how 


will this affect my dose reconstruction, but 


I'm in favor of it if it helps me. That's kind 


of -- no real scientific --


 MS. MUNN: That was my --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- debate going on about this 


change. 


 MS. MUNN: That was my real question. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you. We've also proposed a 


change to the NIOSH IREP lung cancer risk 


model. We published a Federal Register notice 


on March 24th, 2006, and that will be open for 


comment from the public until May 23rd of this 


year. We changed the guideline for determining 


the probability of causation for Energy 


employees with cancers of the lung, trachea or 


bronchus. The new guideline bec-- we made it 


effective on February 28, 2006 with the 


introduction of our new IREP version of NIOSH 


IREP and we did so because we wanted to start 


treating cases at that time. We're -- we're 


still involved in public comment and we 


recognize that, and we'll address those 


comments as they come in. And here again, I 


don't know that I see a lot of public -- or 

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scientific concern or interest with this 


change. This change is -- I remind you is in 


concert with what the NCI IREP had provided, 


and we find it to be claimant-favorable. 


Now I give you some of the typical graphics 


that we talk about when we give you our program 


update. The blue line in this graph are cases 


received from the Department of Labor. The 


green line shows those draft dose 


reconstruction reports that we have provided 


back to claimants. And the red line shows 


those final dose reconstruction reports that 


have been sent on to DOL. And you can see that 


-- I think very clearly that we're working off 


our backlog. Not as quickly as I want, but 


we're -- we're picking up the pace. 


With regard to how we're standing with our 


support from the Department of Energy on 


exposure record requests, these -- each claim 


has -- as soon as we get a claim from the 


Department of Labor, we send a request for any 


dose-related information, whether it's badge-


related, TLD or bioassay, breath analysis, lung 


count data, whatever they have acquired on an 


individual for that claim, we ask them for 

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provision of that to us. I remind you that we 


don't use annual summaries. We want the raw 


data, the raw information, the raw count 


numbers. 


Right now we have a number of 274 outstanding 


requests, and of that number 81 are greater 


than 60 days. And I'll just jump in here and ­

- maybe for the sake of timeliness 'cause I 


know I'm going to get this question. Of those 


81 claims that are over 61 days, the Boeing 


Company out in Santa Susana are our worst 


offender there. We have 40 of the 81 that we 


are persistently watching and monitoring 


progress -- or lack of progress on those 


claims. And these numbers do change. It's not 


the same claim numbers in some instances. In 


some it is. And so we're monitoring that very 


closely. I have staff who provide OCAS and 


ORAU and Battelle and DOE and the site contacts 


at DOE a report every 30 days on where these 


things stand. And she also tics off those that 


seem to be problematic in some way and we fire 


letters off to DOE, and we're working with DOE 


to make sure that we have the information we're 


requesting. 

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The biggest -- next biggest problem child would 


be the Ohio Field Office, which covers 


specifically Fernald, Mound and Battelle, the 


King site, and West Jefferson Street site. And 


so there's 23 cases there where they are over 


60 days in response. And then the rest of the 


remainder are distributed across a variety of 


sites. 


Right now we have 4,734 cases in what we call 


pre-dose reconstruct or assignments -- 


development, screening. These are where we're 


gaining information, we're trying to triage the 


case load and determine how best they can -- 


they can be reconstructed, what tools should be 


used. 


We have 1,273 cases currently assigned with a 


dose reconstructor. This was as of March 31st. 


These numbers have changed, I'm sure, but the ­

- there are 749 draft reports sent to the 


claimants. We have, as I told you earlier, 


completed 12,715 that have been sent to DOL for 


decision. 


Give you another graphic here. As you know, we 


assign a tracking number to our claims. 


Whereas the Department of Labor uses a Social 

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Security number, we use a tracking number and 


we use this number in various ways, but here's 


one way that we use it. We try to look at, by 


1,000 increment cases, where we stand in the 


completion of those cases. And of course we 


are looking at the oldest cases and trying to 


work those off our books before we deal with 


those that are down in the 21,000 range. And 


you can see what's going on there. 


The blue cases are those that are completed. 


The red cases are those that have been pulled 


or administratively closed. And the green 


cases are those that have been pended. Again, 


I'll remind you pended -- the construction 


workers is an example. There are a variety of 


reasons why a case might be pended. For 


technical reasons, it could be pended because 


we're -- we're hearing from DOL that they're 


developing further information on the claim and 


we don't need to be expending our resources 


doing dose reconstruction until they provide us 


that additional development, whether it's 


another cancer or additional employment. And I 


think I've explained cases pulled and cases 


administratively closed, so I won't -- unless 

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there's questions, I won't belabor that point. 


This is just to show you how many cases and by 


-- by month from the start of our dose 


reconstruction experience how many cases we 


have administratively closed. I think perhaps 


at the next meeting I'm going to add something 


to this slide that will show you how many we 


have re-opened and then re-closed with a -- 


with a final decision, 'cause there are some of 


those that are happening now. They're coming 


back to us and saying well, I do want a 


decision, or I've got additional information 


and we complete the dose reconstruction and 


move the claim on. And so -- but this gives 


you a sense that it's -- it's not a lot. 


Reworks, I think this is my last slide. 


Reworks -- here again, you -- you may have 


heard me mention this -- I don't know which day 


it is now or which day I said this earlier in 


the week, but the reworks that are returned to 


us from DOL based upon a need to redo the dose 


reconstruction for a variety of reasons -- it 


can be additional cancers, it can be additional 


employment that's been developed, or it can be 


a technical issue with how we did the dose 

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reconstruction, a complaint or appeal point on 


-- we didn't factor something in. And as you 


see here, we're running about a 9.8 percent 


rework return rate, and I said earlier in the 


week that less than two percent of those are 


really technical reworks where we have to 


rework the case because we didn't account for 


something in a dose reconstruction we should 


have. So the seven percent -- almost seven 


percent is due to additional employment or 


additional cancer. 


And I think that concludes my presentation. 


I'd --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, very good, Larry. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- questions. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let's see if there's additional 


questions now. Jim? 


 DR. MELIUS: I did cross off the DOE question. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I didn't anticipate the other 


one, though. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Well, first there's a 


comment and it was a slide you put up reminded 


me of -- we're talking about possible sites. 


One that might come to mind that we might be 


ready and -- in terms of a -- these are the 

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ones that -- where we've had SEC petitions that 


are currently under evaluation. Chapman Valve 


I think is in Springfield, Massachusetts area, 


and I believe there's a fair number of cases -- 


not a huge -- it's a huge facility. It's --


this -- the AEC part of it was small, so atomic 


weapons part of it was small, so -- but I think 


there's been some public meetings there, some ­

- some interest. Richard Miller will invite 


you to his -- all of us to his house for dinner 


-- lives up there, he lives near there, but 


that might be someone -- Springfield area we 


may want to think about. Hartford airport's 


not that far away -- Hartford/Springfield 


airport -- doing that. And then -- and I don't 


know, at some point Cincinnati -- I think 


Fernald under-- at least my guess from the size 


of the infor-- amount of information and so 


forth, it's going to take some time before 


you're ready to -- I'm not sure that'll be 


ready by September, but we -- we may want to 


think -- put Cincinnati on the list of a place 


to visit. And then the final place -- a little 


bit of a question -- this, but came up during 


the Congressional hearing, it's Rocketdyne. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: Rockedyne --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- out in California? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, out in California and so 


forth. Certainly the Congressman out there was 


interested and I understand there's been some 


delays related to issues of -- of which parts 


of the facility were -- were covered and so 


forth, which I -- I think's delayed, but again 


might be a possibility for -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Have we had claims from Rockedyne? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, we have. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And if I can help you out there a 


little bit in this regard, the Chapman Valve 


evaluation report, it's our full intention to 


meet the 180-day mark there, and that will be 


due May 8th --


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- to you. We hope to get that 


in your hands May 8th and meet our deadline 


there. The Fernald -- Fernald petition didn't 


qualify till April 6th of this year, so 180 


days or six months, you've got a -- we've got a 


while for that. Let me see, we've got the Oak 

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Ridge National Institute for Nuclear Studies, 


ORINS, and that is -- that's due -- that's 


imminent, I think we're -- probably next week, 


due for that one. It qualified on October 6th 


of '05, so maybe we're over -- a little bit 


overdue on that. 


 DR. WADE: Just -- when you mention Chapman 


Valve, then you said May. It's quite possible 


that the workgroup on SEC petitions might want 


to consider that evaluation report when it 


comes out and decide what it might want to do 


in terms of having SC&A look at it. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Yeah, that's a good... 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We also have Blockson Chemical. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Blockson Chemical was qualified 


in March of this year, so -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Where -- is that Joliet or where's 


-- where's --


 MR. ELLIOTT: It's around there somewhere. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, that -- so that'd be the 


Chicago area, so be another -- it's like -- 


it'd be helpful -- Chapman -- well, depends on 


the report and our evaluation whether we'd -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We could pick up a couple in the 

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Chicago area 'cause Argonne National Lab of 


course is a big site, and I don't know if 


Batavia has any eligible people. They're 


probably too new, the accelerator. 


 DR. MELIUS: Anyway, just so I have some 


questions. One is just back to -- not to get 


into a debate or -- or whatever but just to 


point out, in Dr. Ringen's defense, I do 


believe the 5,000 pending case -- construction 


case figure came -- at least was based on some 


information from another source within ORAU or 


NIOSH, and I think the best way to resolve this 


is a full report so -- at the next meeting, so 


let's move -- move forward on that -- that 


basis and so forth. And do that. 


The -- and I appreciate the update on Bethlehem 


and making progress, so I'm not sure Mr. Walker 


will be as pleased, as always, but I'm glad 


you're making progress and following through on 


that. 


One of the issues that's come up in public 


meetings, and I'm not saying it's a huge 


problem and so forth but it's certainly a 


difficult one, embarrassing one in some ways, 


and that's cases where there are errors in 

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terms of the organ -- communication errors with 


the -- with the claimants or years worked that 


don't -- you know, where your records don't 


match what the records that the claimant has 


and so forth. And I would view these more as 


sort of QA/QC problems that -- that go along. 


And we really -- at one point several years ago 


we had a -- a working group that looked at that 


issue, and met with you and so forth 'cause 


Tony Andrade, myself, I forget who else was 


part of that, but reviewed. And maybe some 


thought that that would be a topic for 


presentations --


 MR. ELLIOTT: We certainly would -- I would 


welcome the opportunity to present to you on 


our quality control program. But I'd offer 


this. What you heard last night, what you 


heard in Oak Ridge about the discrepancies in 


communication were not ours. These are DOL 


letters. 


 DR. MELIUS: No, no, I -- I --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Pete and I talked about this. 


 DR. MELIUS: No, I understand, but there have 


been --


 MR. ELLIOTT: I have no control over what they 

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cut and paste. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I -- I think we understand 


that, it's just that there -- there have been 


other instances where it's been NIOSH issues 


and so forth, and I'm not speaking to the 


particular instances, but I'm just thinking in 


terms of timeliness of us --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Sure. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- addressing that issue again 


'cause I think it's good -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We would be happy to present on 


quality control/quality assurance. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, be good, 'cause I -- I 


suspect it's changed and improved since we 


looked at it, and that -- that would be good. 


My --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, let me interrupt there for 


just a minute, too, because in thinking about 


that yesterday I wondered -- and I don't know 


the answer to this, but I wondered to what 


extent our own contractor is focusing so much 


on the technical issues that perhaps is not 


looking at did they record -- do they have the 


right starting information and so on, which is 


part of an audit, as well. And per-- I think 

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most of the -- well, maybe -- Hans, you're 


still here. Do you guys look at that at all? 


You know, do they have the right dates and so 


on? Are you still looking at that? I couldn't 


remember whether you were or not 'cause we -- 


we tend to focus on all the more technical 


issues. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, that -- that --


 MS. MUNN: They have a task. 


 DR. MELIUS: They -- they -- they do that, and 


I think they pointed out some small 


discrepancies that -- that are questions about 


-- certainly have arisen about that. To me, 


it's the type -- I don't think we necessarily 


would want them to focus on that, which might 


require a different kind of sampling and 


evaluation --


 DR. ZIEMER: No, but if they're already doing 

it --

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, they -- they certainly 

should include it, I agree, and I think it's 


more how sort of NIOSH does its QA and QC in 


this issue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Roy, any comment on that? 


 DR. DEHART: Yes, just a question. When there 

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is DOL error, is there feedback to them? Are 


they aware that we may be picking up something 


or a claimant is? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I -- I know Jeff was here 


in the audience last night. I'm sure he took 


notes of that. I know that Pete's been made 


aware of what we heard in Oak Ridge. In fact, 


I pulled a lady in Oak Ridge aside to -- 'cause 


I was very concerned. If you recall her 


remarks, she was given a dose reconstruction 


report with the wrong cancer and the wrong SSN, 


so when I looked at the report, it was not our 


dose reconstruction report. It was Pete's 


letter or his District Office letter informing 


them of the decision. So you know, I recog-- 


 DR. WADE: Just for the record, I forget the 


young lady's name from DOL who was at the 


meeting, but she went right up to that lady and 


made contact --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- immediately. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, we're -- we're -- we share 


these things, and I'm sure Jeff took notes last 

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night. We're trying to be coordinated on this. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thanks. Go ahead, Jim, you were 

--

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, and my --

 DR. ZIEMER: -- one other. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- my final questions, I believe 

at the tail end of our last meeting there was 


some -- some work that SC&A reported on some 


doses where there appeared to have been some 


overestimates on their doses, and you were 


going to do some follow-up, Larry, and I'm just 


trying to get an update on where that stands. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And I was expecting that to be a 


point of discussion in the review of the fourth 


round, and I'm sure it will be, but yes, we 


have looked at that very carefully. This was 


an instance in a point in time where we were 


working very hard to complete cases as fast as 


we could and we were trying to be as timely as 


we could. We chose to use a methodology that 


would -- was intended to be an overestimating 


methodology to show non-compensability, and it 


got used in the wrong way and we found some 


quality control issues and how we reported that 


in some of the -- some of the dose 

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reconstruction reports, and it was not clear 


that our methodology was being appropriately 


used. And we're very cognizant of that. We 


know exactly how many of those cases were done 


that way. We're looking carefully at the 


report language and we'll be going back and 


making any changes as we need to for those 


individual reports. I'll have better -- better 


statistics and details on where we stand with 


that when we take that up in the fourth round 


review. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. Thanks, Larry. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda? 


 MS. MUNN: You know, sometimes I think we may 


see these reports as -- as of primary interest 


to us, and certainly the kind of report that 


Larry just gives us in -- can be easily 


segregated into two things. One of them is 


where are we with cases and how is the daily 


work progressing that the public sees. And the 


other is where are we with SECs and -- and site 


profiles, things that I think of as internal 


Board activities. We're more interested in 


that than anything else. But it strikes me -- 


didn't we earlier in our program sort of as a 

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matter of course have both NIOSH and Labor do 


some -- some graphs and here's where the whole 


program is, up front, earlier, so that -- that 


the public and the petitioners who were there 


had an opportunity to see where we were -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, actually it used to be at 


the front end of the program. I think what has 


happened here was taking into consideration I 


believe the concern about having quorums for 


the vote. Is that not the case, Lew, sort of ­

-

 DR. WADE: Right, although -- I mean I think 

Wanda's point is well made. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, it certainly would be useful 


for the general public to hear some of these 


figures. 


 MS. MUNN: I really think it's just crucial for 


them to see this. We -- we have -- we have 


public meetings where we do everything we can 


to get as many people here and to tell us what 


their concerns are. But one of the overriding 


concerns appears to always be you're not moving 


fast enough and you're not doing things we feel 


that you ought to be doing. But if they don't 


see the progress numbers, if -- if we hold this 

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closely into -- to a little group -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think that's an excellent point. 


 MS. MUNN: I really -- I can see how Larry's 


report -- that -- that type of report can 


easily be divided into two things. But the --


the overall program report seems to me, both 


from NIOSH and Labor, would do very well to go 


up front. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: If I either remember or find my note 


that I just made, that's what I'll do. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll remind him. 


 DR. WADE: And if you remember to remind me. 


 DR. ZIEMER: It's been -- it's interesting, 


because we used to have two-day meetings, also. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And we are packing more and more 


into our meetings, and in the press for time I 


think this has occurred. I think the point is 


a good one in terms of the fact that the 


general public is more likely to be around at 


that point and have the opportunity to sort of 


get an overview of what's happening. 


 MS. MUNN: And there's a great -- an enormous 


impact in the enormity of the final numbers, as 

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well. The perception that claims are not being 


paid cannot continue to be made in the light of 


-- of the millions of dollars that have already 


gone out. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Jim. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, only my recollection -- and 


it may be wrong -- is that we used to provide 


some of that information as a handout sheet or 


something for the public meeting portion, the 


evening meeting, and I frankly haven't been 


paying attention recently as to whether that's 


been done, but -- but that may be another way 


of getting the information out 'cause a lot of 


the people that are at the evening meeting are 


not the people at the -- during the daytime. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, that's certainly true, and 


of course the information is available on the 


tables, but I don't believe we ever had the 


presentation at the evening meetings. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We didn't do the presentation, 


but I can assure you that my slides have always 


been on the table at the start of the meeting, 


so --


 DR. MELIUS: But I would say -- you know, we 

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may want to format it a little bit more -- 


friendlier to the public rather than as slides, 


and have some sort of a handout available and ­

- and actually hand it out, draw attention to 


it. How much time we spend on it may be a 


separate issue, and it's not separate from what 


gets presented, but -- we don't want to change 


how we present it or anything, but I think some 


more active outreach at -- at those meetings 


would be -- in that way would be -- in an 


educational sense would be helpful. I know 


Larry has staff here. DOL at times has had 


staff at these meetings that help people with 


claims issues and -- and so forth, so I think 


that's another important part of a -- of that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me suggest something you might 


think about and that is to have a truncated 


version of these reports that we might include 


in public comment period as -- at the 


beginning, kind of an overview of -- so people 


can see, you know, where does Rocky Flats fit 


into the scheme of things, what else is going 


on. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Two or three slides. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: And I think it may also help 


people understand perhaps that not all of this 


can be done at one time. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, if that's what you want, 


I'm sure I can --


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, let's give it some thought 


as to how -- obviously the people have not come 


to hear us give lengthy papers. But a five or 


ten-minute capsule at the beginning, overview 


of --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Two or three slides I think would 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- might be a good way to kick off 


-- we might think about that as formatting the 


meeting next time, and then go from there. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Very good suggestions, I 


appreciate hearing this. And I would be remiss 


if I didn't comment on the -- on the staff that 


are here that you probably didn't see this 


time. I know in Oak Ridge you saw them 'cause 


they were -- we were all cramped together in 


the entryway aisle and that presented us some 


problems with Privacy Act concerns. But staff 


were here. We had two health physi-- or two 


public health advisors here who had scheduled 

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appointments. They worked a 10-hour day, plus 


the meeting yesterday. I believe they saw on 


order of about 85 claimants this time. 


We were also doing -- we -- we have -- at the 


next meeting I'll give you a little bit more on 


my program report about our communication 


efforts. Right now we have some increased 


efforts on communications. We're revising the 


dose reconstruction report, hopefully to make 


it more reader-friendly and understandable. 


want to be able to just tell you where we're at 


on that. 


We're upgrading our web site. I want to be 


able to tell you what's going on with that. 


There is so much information on our web site 


right now it's hard to navigate, it's hard to 


find, and I want to take an opportunity to 


point folks to some tools that exist or will 


exist on the web site that will enable people 


to find things that they want to see. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Also I want to -- I want to make 


note of what goes on in these interviews with 


claimants. Yes, they are talking about 


individual claims, but they're equipped to 


I 
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answer questions like how many cases have you 


done, so they have my presentation, they're 


able to point to it. They're -- they're 


equipped to bring a technical question out here 


and bring it in front and get a health 


physicist, bring -- you know, Stu or LaVon or 


whoever's here, Jim -- and take them back and 


answer their technical questions if they don't 


feel comfortable and confident in responding on 


that regard. 


So I'll -- I'll factor that into my 


presentation for you next meeting to tell you 


what all we're doing in communications. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Good. Another comment, Jim? 


 DR. MELIUS: No, actually a question 'cause 


Larry reminded me of it -- that's on the web 


site. Are the Battelle conflict of interest 


information posted for the dose reconstructions 


that they're doing? 'Cause I actually looked 


for it a while ago and it was -- I had trouble 


finding it. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It wasn't there probably a month 


ago. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I think around two weeks ago we 

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got their link. The way we have to operate in 


this regard is that the contracting entity has 


to have on their web site the disclosure 


statements --


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- and they were putting that in. 


We have to have a link then that takes you 


there. We do have and did have the Battelle 


conflict of interest policy, which is 


essentially the same as SC&A's. And we have 


been working with Battelle and ORAU and EG&G, 


which is another contractor you haven't heard 


much about, but EG&G provides Jim's staff or 


the science staff technical support in the 


science arena. So they're -- they're back 


crunching numbers and doing various things, but 


we want to make sure that they address their 


staff with full disclosure and abide by the 


conflict of interest policy, as well. And so 


EG&G will have a link on our site, too, very 


shortly. They're not up there right now, I 


don't believe. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, good. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thanks. Other question -- 

comments? 
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PROGRAM UPDATES, DOL, MR. PETER TURCIC


 Okay, then we're ready to hear the Department 


of Labor report. Pete, welcome back. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: You've got a slide show? 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. 


(Pause) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Pete, we do have the handouts if 


you want to --


 MR. TURCIC: Okay, why don't I just go -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Maybe you can just -- 


 DR. WADE: Does everybody have the handouts? 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: There are copies on the table. 


It's just a two-pager with -- 


 MR. TURCIC: Yeah, and rather than just 


repeating it all, maybe I'll just hit some -- 


some issues that, you know, just -- has come up 


and try to address -- you know, I think that 


was a very good point that Wanda raised. 


And in the -- in the slides I think what gets 


to the heart of it is the back -- the back 


page, I think. And if you look at that, it's 


the total compensation issued. And this is, 


you know, in Part B. And you know, to date -- 


well, as of April 13th -- Part B payments -- 

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there was 18,526 payments, in excess of $1.46 


billion dollars. Now in addition -- and then ­

- you know, in addition, nearly $100 million in 


medical benefits. And then if you go over and, 


you know, look at the Part E statistics -- 


which Part E has only been in existence now for 


a little bit over a year -- you know, we've 


paid over $300 million in Part E already. 


One of the -- on the -- under the section on 


compensation of the NIOSH cases, you know, it's 


showing $373 million have been paid to 3,521 


individuals. But something that needs added on 


there, you know, that only includes cases for 


which a dose reconstruction was done. So we 


have about 1,000 new SEC cases that are being 


paid, so really you need to add about another 


$150 million onto that. So in round numbers, 


it's about a half a billion dollars now has 


been paid directly from the work that, you 


know, NIOSH has accomplished. 


And just -- just some of the other points, in 


Part B, you know, we had 73,000 cases, which is 


about -- or 73,000 claims. It's about 52,000 


cases involved. And in our District Office 


over 40,000 -- nearly 41,000 have recommended 

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decisions and another 11,300-some are what we 


call pending. So that would include cases that 


are at NIOSH, plus our normal work flow. And 


we normally have about a two-month to three-


month backlog -- or working inventory of -- of 


cases, you know, that -- that fall into that 


category. 


And we show pending at NIOSH 7,900. Now that's 


a little bit different because in our pending 


at NIOSH, if it goes -- because of the way our 


-- you know, the system works and we get the 


counts, if a case goes back for a rework, then 


that gets counted back in, you know, as a case 


that's -- that's at NIOSH. 


 And under final decisions in our claims, I 


think it's an interesting point and it's 


something that will be going away now. If you 


notice that under final decisions denied, over 


29,000 denied, almost 11,000 of those were non-


covered conditions. We had an awful lot of 


cases that were asbestosis, COPD, that was 


filed under Part B. Now that'll go away now 


because we no longer have people file under B 


or E. They merely file a claim now. Yeah, so 


if it's a DOE facility, you know, and it's a 

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cancer, then it gets -- a cancer or beryllium 


disease or silicosis, it gets a B -- we just 


write the decision, and the decision will say, 


you know, whether it's denied -- approved or 


denied, and then benefits. You know, you're 


entitled to certain benefits under B and 


certain benefits under E. So that's -- the 


only way -- a claimant can still insist, and we 


do have claimants that insist, no, I want it 


evaluated under B, also. Then we would have to 


take that case and, you know, issue a denial 


for non-covered condition. So that -- that 


number will -- you know, for all intents and 


purposes, under the B statistics, should 


disappear in the future. 


 The NIOSH referrals, our count is near 21,000 


with 12,000 -- over 12,300 returned with dose 


reconstructions. Another 1,101 returned where 


dose reconstruction not required, so that would 


include the -- the ones that are pulled for, 


you know, an SEC. 


And then there's the breakdown, the cases with 


recommended decisions -- you know, 3,000 to 


approve, 8,200 to deny. And then those that -- 


those gone all the way to a final decision, 

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2,567 to approve, 7,000 to deny. 


One of the other points that I wanted to make, 


the issue that when -- that came up about 


Boeing, to give you a little update on that, 


there was a delay, and I think -- you know, the 


cases were pended with NIOSH and it's probably 


why DOE, you know, was slow on responding. The 


issue was that DOE -- and Boeing was -- was 


basically interpreting -- the Santa Susana 


Field Laboratory is kind of a inter-- a mixed 


campus, and DOE had a portion in what's called 


Area Four. Well, after the amendment and after 


our regs came out, the -- it's now DOL's 


determination of what is a DOE facility. 


Now Boeing was interpreting that only people 


were covered were those that were in that area 


that were actually working on DOE projects. 


Well, but that's not -- that doesn't fit with 


the real definition of a DOE facility. And so 


now we've come out and all of Area Four is a 


DOE facility, so there were a lot of people 


that Boeing and -- and DOE were saying were not 


covered that now are covered, and that probably 


amounts to some of the delay. And in fact, on 


May 9th I'll be meeting -- I'm going to a 

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meeting out there with some of the groups, and 


one of them is Boeing, in order to, you know, 


let them understand better about the program 


and what our definition was and so, you know, 


their response hopefully will, you know, start 


to improve after -- after they have some of 


that understanding. 


On -- on the issue -- you were talking about 


looking at the dates -- you know, the dates 


don't match. 


 DR. MELIUS: Uh-huh. 


 MR. TURCIC: One caution there, the dates have 


to match what is accepted employment. 


Oftentimes what's on the claim form will not 


match what is in the dose reconstruction or the 


decision because sometimes, you know, some of 


that employment may not be covered. I mean we 


had a lot of people that were -- they might 


have had time as a subcontractor, for example, 


at an AWE. That doesn't count. So even though 


their employment, you know, may be longer, 


really what needs to match is what is in the 


dose reconstruction and what is in what we send 


as the NIOSH referral document, which means 


that here is the employment that is actually 

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covered. And -- and again, those often are 


quite different. 


 And with that, I think if -- if there are any 


questions --


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Pete, and actually I 


think the Rocky slides -- Rocky Flats slide 


that you didn't mention -- 


 MR. TURCIC: Oh --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- would have been very 


interesting to the folks here tonight (sic) and 


is interesting to me. I certainly didn't 


realize that basically $22 million in claims 


has already been awarded to Rocky Flats 


workers. That probably would have come as a 


surprise to many of the folks here last night. 


Other comments or questions? Yes, Michael? 


 MR. GIBSON: Pete, you mentioned about the -- 


the Boeing facility and that you've made a 


determination that everyone at the site's 


covered, you know, if the -- not -- 


 MR. TURCIC: The entire Area Four at the Santa 


Susana Field is the DOE facility. 


 MR. GIBSON: But didn't -- if -- did I hear you 


right to say that they thought just the people 


working on DOE projects were covered, but in 

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fact everyone there --


 MR. TURCIC: Yes. See, there was intermixed -- 


at Area Four there could have been people -- 


Rockedyne and -- it was kind of an intermix, 


and a lot of people used the word Rockedyne for 


the facility. But to explain what that really 


was, the -- and to make the determination of 


what the DOE facility was, you have to go back 


to the contractor. And see, the contract was 


with North American Aviation and not Rockedyne. 


Really there's no such thing as Rockedyne. 


It's merely a division of North American 


Aviation. So what we were getting back on 


employment when we would -- when we would send 


for employment, basically we would get back yes 


and no from DOE -- really from Boeing through 


DOE, and so then when these issues came up we 


started asking for -- you know, and looking 


behind that, and basically what was behind that 


was anybody who was listed as Rockedyne was 


automatically kind of excluded like they -- but 


they were actually doing the work, because the 


contract also allowed, you know, them to use 


anybody at the facility to do the work. So now 


that's all been resolved. 

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 MR. GIBSON: Okay. I -- I don't know if you're 


aware and I just wonder how you guys have or 


would interpret this. Of the accelerated 


clean-up sites -- I mean I know Rocky's turned 


into a wildlife refuge, but Mound is going to 


be an industrial park. We've demolished some 


buildings. Some buildings we've decontami-- 


they've decontaminated now and are co-inhabited 


by private businesses, but it's still a DOE 


facility until the clean-up is finished and the 


work is done, and there's a -- and it's deeded 


over to the city. So would these private 


employers be covered under this -- 


 MR. TURCIC: On-- only if -- that -- that's a 


good point. They would be if there was a 


contract with DOE for them to do operation or 


maintenance. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Interesting. Pete, in the case we 


heard last night where the woman pointed out 


that her husband's claim record showed that he 


started two years earlier than he actually did, 


was she misunderstanding or misinterpreting 


that, or --


 MR. TURCIC: I would have to look at the 


specific case, but -- but -- oh, we've had 

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that. We have had -- that is not uncommon. 


Probably the biggest one that I've heard of was 


-- ended up being like an addition of 17 years. 


But here it was -- the wife knew nothing about 


that 17 years, and when we went and started 


doing the employment verification, we found 


that there was significant employment prior to 


the -- the -- you know, the spouse even 


knowing. 


DR. NETON: I -- I could speak briefly to 


that. There are situations that we find where 


the Department of Labor will send us the start 


of covered employment and we will go back and 


get the records and we'll find bioassay samples 


from maybe two years prior to the start. And 


usually what happens there is the person may 


have started as a subcontractor for those two 


previous years and then hired on at the 


facility and -- and those subcontractor -- is 


not covered, so it would appear to be a 


difference in the employment history that is 


explained. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MELIUS: It just -- my point was not to 


make any accusations of who was responsible or 

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anything, it was more -- more of the QA/QC 


thing. There ought to be something in the 


system that would, you know, notate that or 


explain that and just -- to make sure that gets 


-- that gets carried through. We're -- we're ­

- and some of that's the communication between 


NIOSH and -- and DOL on -- on these issues and 


that's --


 MR. TURCIC: Well -- well, a lot of it. I'll 


tell you what a lot of it is, and a lot of it 


is that, you know, in the last six months we 


hired 200 new claims examiners. And you know, 


when -- when we're -- at the rate we're making 


decisions now -- you know, for the last few 


months, we've been issuing in the neighborhood 


of anywhere from 1,000 to 1,300 recommended 


decisions a week. And there is a lot of cut 


and pasting going on and we -- we -- we're 


always working on that. And it's useful to 


hear, you know, issues. Like some of the 


issues that I heard of was the issue on when 


some claimants are getting letters under Part E 


asking for their doctor to make a 


determination. Well, really what that is, and 


maybe it's not clear in the letter and we need 

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to, you know, take a better look at that. All 


they're doing is giving the claimant the 


opportunity for their physician to make some 


link. And a lot of times it's some illness 


that there is no known, you know, occupational 


exposure and -- but to give the due process, 


we're giving the opportunity, you know -- if 


your physician can -- we can't find anything 


that's -- you were exposed to that explains 


this illness. If your physician wants to give 


a rationale, then that's needed. 


The other -- the other issue on the 30 days 


that -- that seems to be -- and these are 


really starting to take off now -- are -- 


claimants have an option to get their 


impairment ratings done. We give them an 


option. One, they can -- they can choose to go 


to anybody they want and have an impairment 


rating done and submit it. And if it meets the 


criteria, we would use that and issue a 


decision. Or they can choose to have certain 


tests done that they can go get done anywhere, 


and then we would have the impairment rating 


done for them. One of the letters that go out 


-- when that letter goes out, it -- it tells 

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them -- see, we have no idea, especially on the 


25,000 claims that we got from DOE, we have no 


idea -- are they really claiming impairment. 


We've made a causation decision. We said okay, 


this illness is caused, but we don't know 


whether they're claiming wage loss or claiming 


impairment. So a letter goes out that says we 


need to know if you're claiming impairment. 


Now if you want to get your -- and we need that 


-- we're asking for that in 30 days. If you 


want to get your -- your own tests done, here 


are the tests -- you know, asbestosis, here are 


the pulmonary function tests that you need to 


get and all that. And -- I mean we realize 


that that's not -- you can't make an 


appointment with a doctor and get in to see 


them that quickly, so there's some -- and we 


need to polish our -- our letters to -- to do a 


better job. 


There's a lot of confusion, for example, when 


people get the OCAS-1 and -- about -- well, if 


they disagree with it, where can they appeal 


it. So we have a draft that we're about ready 


to send to Larry of -- coming up with a flyer 


that we're -- you know, that could be included 

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and then the same thing on a recommended 


decision. You know, the flyer would say you're 


not agreeing with this. If you have issues 


when you get your recommended decision, that's 


where you appeal those issues. So we're --


we're trying to -- to -- but it is a complex 


program. 


 DR. MELIUS: Just one -- one request for Pete 


rela-- related to sites for public meetings, 


since we've made the rounds of a lot of places. 


Certainly if you or your fie-- you know, 


District Office or whate-- have a site where 


you're hearing a lot of questions about the SEC 


or this program and so forth and you think it'd 


be worthwhile for us to have a meeting out 


there, I think we'd appreciate the -- 


 MR. TURCIC: The Simi Valley area would be a 


good -- good area because people have been 


waiting. You know, it was a -- a legal 


question that took a long time, so that -- and 


there are quite a few claims out there. 


 DR. MELIUS: I think you have a site report 


you're working on, Larry, or -- is that -- no, 


no, it's not, just the -- okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Don't have enough claims to 

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warrant that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Stu, did you have a comment? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: (inaudible)
 

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm not getting that. 


 MS. MUNN: He's not getting anything. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Say that again, Stu. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Is that not on? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, that's what -- I think that 


was the issue that came up at the hearing, and 


that issue was related back to the decision --


you know, how can you do a site profile unless 


you know what the site is kind of thing and -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We want to get Stu's comment on 


the record here again. 


 DR. WADE: Stu's been amazingly silent at this 


meeting so we can get him on the record. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Probably everybody's benefit 


that I don't say much at these meetings. Yeah, 


we have just recently finished a site profile 


for the Santa Susana Area Four facility, and 


there's some related facilities in the 


neighborhood that are -- that these people also 


did this same related work at, and they're all 


covered in this at -- it was known at ETEC for 

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a while and what, AI, Atomics International, 


was that their term-- or is that somebody else? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I -- it's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's any number but we're -- 


but we're pretty clear on the -- on the names 


of the facilities now and so -- and they're -- 


they are all called out in that site profile. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, and it is names. That's the 

problem. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Let me ask if there's 

anything else to come before the Board this 


afternoon? 


 (No responses) 


If not, we thank everyone. We stand adjourned. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting adjourned at 4:15 p.m.) 

______________________________ 

277 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of April 27, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


27th day of May, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102