In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-21-00416-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2

Parker County, Texas

Trial Court No. CIV-20-0395

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

JON ERIK ROCHA, Appellant

V. 

NASA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jon Erik Rocha, pro se, appeals from the trial court’s turnover and 

receivership order (the turnover order) in favor of Appellee NASA Federal Credit 

Union (the Credit Union). Rocha raises three issues on appeal under which he primarily 

challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction and the evidentiary support of both the turnover 

order and the underlying judgment. Because Rocha’s jurisdictional and evidentiary 

arguments fail and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rendering the turnover 

order, we affirm.

Background

The Credit Union sued Rocha for breach of contract after he failed to make 

monthly loan payments. On September 22, 2020, the trial court granted summary 

judgment for the Credit Union and awarded the Credit Union $50,554.27 in damages,

plus interest and attorney’s fees. Rocha did not appeal from that judgment.

In November 2021, the Credit Union filed an “Application for Turnover Order 

& Appointment of a Receiver.” The application alleged that the Credit Union was 

entitled to appointment of a receiver under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 

31.002 because Rocha “ha[d] nonexempt assets, including but not limited to a bank 

account at Bank of America, N.A., that [could] be used to satisfy the judgment debt 

owed by Judgment Debtor.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002. Rocha 

testified at the hearing on the application, and he acknowledged during crossexamination that he had a Bank of America bank account that had previously been 
3

garnished. The trial court took judicial notice of its previously rendered garnishment 

order regarding that account. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the application and 

rendered the turnover order. The order appointed Stanley Wright as receiver with 

authority to take possession of and sell Rocha’s nonexempt property and ordered Rocha 

to turn over various financial documents and records. Rocha now appeals. 

Standard of Review

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s rendition of a turnover order. 

Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles—that is, if its 

act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. 

Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). Whether any evidence supports the 

turnover order is a relevant consideration in determining if the trial court abused its 

discretion by rendering the order. Beaumont Bank, 806 S.W.2d at 226.

Discussion

I. Rocha’s jurisdictional complaints and challenges to the underlying judgment

Rocha frames his first issue as a challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction, but in his arguments under this issue, he includes multiple complaints based 

on more than one legal theory. We will consider his arguments to the extent that “we 

can determine, with reasonable certainty, the alleged error about which [his] 
4

complaint[s] were made.” See Walker v. Walker, 642 S.W.3d 196, 212 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 2021, no pet.).

Most of Rocha’s briefing on this issue focuses on the underlying judgment. He 

argues that the Credit Union did not support its breach of contract claim with sufficient 

evidence, and therefore the pleadings in this case are not sufficient to invoke the lower’s 

court’s “[j]urisdiction or [j]udicial [p]ower,” and the underlying judgment is 

consequently void.1 That is, although he characterizes his argument as a jurisdictional 

challenge, his real complaint is that the underlying judgment was rendered without 

sufficient evidentiary support. However, insufficient evidence does not make a 

judgment void. Cf. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (stating that incorrect 

ruling did not make judgment void); In re A.E., No. 02-19-00173-CV, 2019 WL

4784419, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 1, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting 

the appellant’s conflation of alleged trial court error with the absence of jurisdiction). 

Rocha did not appeal the underlying judgment, and he may not now collaterally attack 

it. See Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 443; see also Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex. 2009)

1

The Credit Union moved for summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claim 

and attached to its motion a business records affidavit from the Credit Union’s records 

custodian, a copy of the loan agreement, a document showing the balance remaining 

and payoff amount for the loan, and an affidavit from the Credit Union’s attorney 

stating that the Credit Union had incurred $4,700 in reasonable attorney’s fees. The trial 

court granted the motion and rendered the underlying judgment.
5

(stating that an attempt to judicially alter or change the substantive provisions of a final 

decree constitutes a prohibited collateral attack).

To the extent that Rocha contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to 

render the turnover order, we reject that contention. A trial court has the authority to 

enforce its judgments. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 308; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 

§ 31.002.

Rocha further argues under this issue that the Credit Union had no authority to 

sue or be sued in Texas and that, instead, “their venue is Federal Court via 12 U.S.C. 

632 and their delegated powers.” Rocha does not explain how a statute applicable to 

suits involving a Federal Reserve Bank or a transaction involving international or 

foreign banking applied to the underlying litigation and deprived the trial court of 

jurisdiction over the suit. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 632; Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Rocha also 

argues that the loan agreement was signed in Maryland2 and is governed by federal law.

3

However, he does not explain why either fact deprived the trial court of jurisdiction of 

the underlying suit or of the turnover proceeding, and he cites no authority to support 

his argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Rocha further argues that the Credit Union is 

2

The loan agreement stated that the Credit Union “accept[ed] this Agreement in 

Maryland and [that] this loan is made from Maryland.” Nothing in the record indicates 

that Rocha signed the agreement in Maryland.

3

The loan agreement stated that it was governed by and construed in accordance 

with federal law and Maryland law.
6

“not permitted to contract with the general public,” but he cites to no authority or any 

part of the record to support that assertion and does not explain why it matters for 

purposes of the turnover order’s validity. See id. Finally, Rocha argues that the Credit 

Union is not registered with the Texas Secretary of State. Again, he cites to no part of 

the record to support this assertion and, even if he were correct, he does not explain 

why that deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to render the underlying judgment or 

the turnover order. See id.; see also Bierwirth v. AH4R I TX, LLC, No. 01-13-00459-CV, 

2014 WL 5500487, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (stating that holder of note could enforce note without registering to do business 

in Texas). Because Rocha’s arguments under his first issue are without merit, we 

overrule his first issue.

II. Rocha’s evidentiary complaints

In his second issue, Rocha argues that the Credit Union did not put on proof 

that the appointment of a receiver was necessary or that he had any non-exempt assets. 

Like with his first issue, he also makes other unrelated arguments under this issue.

Regarding proof of non-exempt assets, Rocha testified at the hearing that he had 

a Bank of America bank account. He also testified that this account had previously been 

garnished, which is evidence that it is not the type of account that is exempt from 

garnishment. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 42.0021 (listing types of accounts that are 

exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure for satisfaction of debts). Rocha put on 

no controverting evidence. See Robison v. Watson, No. 04-20-00138-CV, 2021 WL 
7

2117936, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial 

court thus had evidence that Rocha had a nonexempt asset. See Heckert v. Heckert, No. 

02-16-00213-CV, 2017 WL 5184840, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 9, 2017, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “[a]lthough there must be evidence that the judgment 

debtor has nonexempt property that is not readily subject to attachment or levy,” the 

turnover statute “does not specify, or restrict, the manner in which evidence may be 

received” and does not require “that such evidence be in any particular form, that it be 

at any particular level of specificity, or that it reach any particular quantum”). Once the 

Credit Union established the need for a turnover order, the trial court was authorized 

by the turnover statute to appoint a receiver to take possession of nonexempt property 

in Rocha’s possession or control. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002(b)(3).

Rocha also argues that the trial court “ignored affidavits and testimony from 

[him] that proved the matter was settled and satisfied,” that is, that he had already 

tendered payment for the judgment. The evidence before the trial court was that the 

only “payment” that Rocha had attempted to make on the judgment was not in a 

legitimate form. Rocha produced as evidence of attempted payment a notarized 

document that he had created, titled “Bookkeeping Entry Credit Remittance Coupon.” 

The coupon stated that it was payable to the Credit Union, and it further stated, “I do 

assign and pledge the total value of the obligation to the United States of America 

through the United States Department of the Treasury to be redeemed for value IN 

BOOKKEEPING ENTRY CREDIT ON ACCOUNT . . . .” When the trial court 
8

asked Rocha to explain from which account the coupon could be paid, Rocha explained 

that it was payable out of his Social Security account, although he acknowledged that 

he is not eligible to receive Social Security payments. Rocha stated that this coupon was 

what he had sent to the Credit Union’s attorney as payment on the judgment and that 

the attorney had “sent [Rocha] a letter back rejecting [his] offer.” Rocha’s coupon, 

however, was not a valid payment. See In re Pease, No. 09-54754-C, 2010 WL 986415, at 

*1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2010) (order); see also Miller v. Exelon, No. 19-CV-0231, 

2019 WL 952273, at *1, *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2019) (mem. op.). Accordingly, the trial 

court correctly rejected Rocha’s evidence of payment.

Under this issue, Rocha also complains about the trial court’s overruling of his 

hearsay objections to the Credit Union’s attorney’s arguments at the hearing. In other 

words, Rocha argues that the trial court should have applied rules of evidence to limit 

the attorney’s arguments. However, as Rocha recognizes elsewhere in his brief, an 

attorney’s arguments are not evidence. See Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd, 624 S.W.3d 199, 208 

(Tex. 2021). Thus, his hearsay objections had no application to the attorney’s 

arguments.

Finally under this issue, Rocha complains about the trial court’s failure to file 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. For this argument, we will assume that various

post-turnover-order documents filed by Rocha in the trial court properly requested 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296, 298.
9

When the trial court’s failure to file findings and conclusions does not prevent 

an appellant from properly presenting its case on appeal, the failure is harmless error. 

Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014). A presumption of 

harm from a trial court’s failure to file findings and conclusions “does not apply to a 

simple case because an appellant is not faced on appeal with the task of dissecting 

multiple permutations of why the trial court may have ruled as it did.” York v. CooperYork, No. 02-20-00356-CV, 2021 WL 2753527, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 1, 

2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Rocha does not explain how the trial court’s failure to 

make findings and conclusions prevented him from properly presenting his case on 

appeal. For example, Rocha does not contend that the Credit Union asserted more than 

one possible basis for the granting of a receiver and the issuance of a turnover order 

and that he was left guessing what the basis was for the order. See In re C.A.B., 289 

S.W.3d 874, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see also Isaac v. 

Burnside, 616 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). 

Rocha was able to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the turnover 

order, and we have addressed that challenge. Any error in failing to file findings and 

conclusions was harmless. See In re C.A.B., 298 S.W.3d at 881; see also Isaac, 616 S.W.3d 

at 614; Tolpo v. Denny, No. 02-15-00231-CV, 2016 WL 1601068, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth Apr. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule Rocha’s second issue.
10

III. Rocha’s complaints about the trial court

In Rocha’s third issue, he argues that the trial judge, “along with other court 

personnel, violated their Oaths of Office as elected officials and [their] Fiduciary Duty 

to the Public Trust” by failing to hold the Credit Union to its burden of proof and that 

the judge “made a decision that would benefit the court, and not the people.” We have 

already addressed Rocha’s evidentiary challenges. Further, Rocha does not explain how 

the turnover order benefitted the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). None of 

Rocha’s arguments under this issue explain how the trial court abused its discretion by 

rendering the turnover order. Moreover, to the extent that Rocha’s third issue 

encompasses a partiality or bias challenge to the court’s actions in rendering the 

turnover order, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 

partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994); 

De Los Reyes v. Maris, No. 02-21-00022-CV, 2021 WL 5227179, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule Rocha’s third issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Rocha’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s turnover order.

/s/ Mike Wallach

Mike Wallach

Justice

Delivered: June 16, 2022