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IN RE INTEREST OF ARTAMIS G. ET AL.

Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

In re Interest of Artamis G. et al., 

children under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee and cross-appellee, 

v. Krysta G., appellee and cross-appellant, 

and Larry M., appellant and 

cross-appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed June 1, 2021. No. A-20-653.

1. Interventions. Whether a party has the right to intervene in a proceeding is a question of law.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an 

appellate court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently 

of the conclusions reached by the trial court.

3. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings.

4. Interventions. As a prerequisite to intervention under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-328 (Reissue 2016), the intervenor must have a direct and legal 

interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the 

direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered 

by the action.

5. Interventions: Pleadings. A person seeking to intervene must allege 

facts showing that he or she possesses the requisite legal interest in the 

subject matter of the action.

6. Parental Rights: Interventions. Grandparents have a sufficient legal 

interest in dependency proceedings involving their biological or adopted 

minor grandchildren to entitle them to intervene in such proceedings 

prior to final disposition.

7. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Proof. For a juvenile court to terminate parental rights, it must find that one or more of the statutory 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

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Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

grounds listed in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016) have been 

satisfied and that such termination is in the child’s best interest.

8. Constitutional Law: Parental Rights: Proof. A parent’s right to raise 

his or her child is constitutionally protected; so before a court may terminate parental rights, the State must show that the parent is unfit.

9. Constitutional Law: Parental Rights: Words and Phrases. In the 

context of the constitutionally protected relationship between a parent 

and a child, parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity 

which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which caused, or probably 

will result in, detriment to the child’s well-being.

10. Parental Rights: Parent and Child. In proceedings to terminate parental rights, the law does not require perfection of a parent; instead, courts 

should look for the parent’s continued improvement in parenting skills 

and a beneficial relationship between parent and child.

11. Parental Rights: Appeal and Error. In cases where termination of 

parental rights is based solely on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7) (Reissue 

2016), appellate courts must be particularly diligent in their de novo 

review of whether termination of parental rights is, in fact, in the child’s 

best interests.

12. Parental Rights. Where a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate 

himself or herself within a reasonable time, the best interests of the child 

require termination of parental rights.

13. ____. Children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care, nor 

be made to await uncertain parental maturity.

Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: 

Amy N. Schuchman, Judge. Affirmed.

Andrea Finegan McChesney, of McChesney Family Law 

Omaha, for appellant.

Mark Hanna, Deputy Douglas County Attorney, and Rachel 

Lowe, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee State of 

Nebraska.

William R. Harris, of Berry Law Firm, for appellee Krysta G.

Anne E. Troia, P.C., L.L.O., guardian ad litem.

Moore, Riedmann, and Bishop, Judges.
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Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

Riedmann, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Larry M. asserts he is the grandfather of Krysta G.’s six 

children. He appeals the order of the separate juvenile court of 

Douglas County denying his complaint to intervene in proceedings to terminate Krysta’s parental rights to the children.

Krysta cross-appeals the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(1), (2), 

and (5) through (7) (Reissue 2016).

For the reasons set out below, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Krysta is the mother of Auburn G. (born 2007), Mollie G. 

(born 2008), Esme G. (born 2010), Artamis G. (born 2012), 

Persphyne G. (born 2014), and Athena G. (born 2016). In 

February 2017, law enforcement received a Child Protective 

Services report regarding child abuse. The report indicated 

that Krysta’s eldest child reported Krysta had kicked her and 

hit her with a back scratcher. Upon examining the child at her 

elementary school, the officer noticed a scratch on her ear. The 

child stated that she kicked Krysta while being disciplined and 

that Krysta returned a kick to the child’s ear, causing her to 

bleed. The officer then went to Krysta’s home, where Krysta 

explained that the scratch likely came from Krysta’s fingernail 

when disciplining the child.

Upon seeing the home, the officer relayed concerns about its 

condition. The officer stated it was difficult to move about the 

home due to so many items covering the floors. The house had 

cockroaches throughout, as well as a strong odor of cat urine. 

The home contained four cats, and there were cat feces and 

cat litter on the floor and covering the stairs. All the cabinets 

were locked, and there were only five items in the refrigerator. There was one heater for the entire residence, and it was 

located in the master bedroom. There were no towels for bathing, and there was one bottle of shampoo. Two adults and 
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Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

six children were living in the three-bedroom house. Huey 

M., the father of three of the children, did not appear to reside 

in Krysta’s home and refused to take custody of the children 

when asked by police.

Krysta was originally charged with six counts of caretaker 

neglect on March 17, 2017, in the county court for Douglas 

County. Through a plea agreement, Krysta pled no contest to 

and was convicted of one count of caretaker neglect. She was 

sentenced to 18 months’ probation. Krysta repeatedly violated 

the terms of her probation, including testing positive for marijuana use a total of 14 times.

A petition seeking to adjudicate the children under Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016) was filed in February 

2017. The six minor children were removed from Krysta’s care 

due to the home’s unsanitary conditions. Krysta was ordered to 

attend all supervised visits with her children, undergo random 

drug testing, participate in outpatient programming, participate 

in counseling for substance abuse and mental health issues, 

undergo a psychiatric evaluation, take all medications as prescribed, obtain adequate housing, and participate in parenting 

classes, among other directives.

In January 2018, the court entered an ex parte order suspending Krysta’s visitations for four of the children due to the 

visitations’ inconsistencies, Krysta’s improper parenting skills, 

concerns of Krysta’s drug use, and the potential trauma for 

the eldest child per her therapist. Visits resumed in February. 

In March, Krysta’s home was deemed appropriate for visitations. However, at the end of March, another order was filed 

to suspend visitations as to four of the children due to Krysta’s 

threats, yelling, and use of profanity outside of the office of 

one of the children’s therapists. Supervised visitations resumed 

in May.

1. Termination of Parental Rights

On July 19, 2018, the State filed a motion to terminate 

Krysta’s parental rights under § 43-292(2) and (5) through 
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Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

(7). Visitations were suspended as to four of the children 

again in October, because Krysta had grabbed a knife out of 

anger at one visit and continued to test positive for marijuana. 

Supervised visits resumed again in November. In February 

2019, the court ordered no visitation between Krysta and the 

children, per the recommendation of the children’s therapist.

On July 7, 2020, the State filed an amended motion to terminate Krysta’s parental rights under § 43-292(1), (2), and (5) 

through (7). A hearing on the termination of Krysta’s parental 

rights was held on July 10, 14, and 15. At the hearing, the 

family’s caseworker testified that all six children had been out 

of the home for more than 15 of the past 22 months, as they 

were all removed in February 2017 and never returned to live 

with Krysta.

Mollie was diagnosed by her therapist with disruptive mood 

dysregulation disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. 

Amber Jarzynka-Schmigel has been Mollie’s therapist since 

May 2019. Mollie had told her therapist that Krysta had hit her 

with a hanger occasionally and that Huey, the father of three 

of the children, had sexually abused her while in the home. 

Jarzynka-Schmigel testified that Mollie “expresses extensive 

anger regarding her mother not providing for her, not taking 

care of her, not loving her.” Jarzynka-Schmigel testified that 

Mollie “was doing a wonderful job functioning,” “managing her emotions,” and “utilizing coping skills” after starting 

therapy until December 2019, when she “took a nosedive” and 

began running away from her foster home, having “emotional 

outbursts,” and having difficulty talking about past trauma. 

Mollie’s behavior had changed because her oldest sister had 

moved to Texas, but her behaviors had started to improve 

again. Mollie told Jarzynka-Schmigel she wished to remain 

with her foster family. Jarzynka-Schmigel testified it was not in 

Mollie’s best interests to have any contact with Krysta.

The foster parent of Artamis, Persphyne, and Athena testified that those three children had been in her care since 

February 2017. At the time of the termination hearing, Esme 
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Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

was also with them on a 10-day respite. According to the 

foster parent, Artamis was in therapy twice per week for 21⁄2

years and was banging her head as a coping mechanism, but 

she had improved and stopped that coping mechanism. She 

now just does therapy “check-ins.” Persphyne had a speech 

delay and had been attending speech therapy for “apraxia and 

VPI” and had surgery to correct them in November 2019. She 

attended 1 year of behavioral therapy, has discontinued that, 

and is now only in family therapy. Athena entered foster care at 

approximately 3 months of age and had not needed therapy. In 

February 2018, during a therapy session between Artamis and 

Krysta, Krysta threatened to burn down the three girls’ foster 

parents’ house and “blow up” the therapist’s office, leading 

the therapist to call the police. Krysta has had no contact with 

these three children since February 2018.

Kerrie Wellman, Esme’s cognitive behavioral therapist 

since September 2019, works with Esme “identifying feelings, relaxation techniques, coping skills, educational trauma 

and trauma narratives,” with the ultimate goal of addressing trauma. Wellman testified this trauma stems from Esme’s 

interactions with Krysta. Esme told Wellman her memories of 

Krysta “hitting her and her sisters with a metal hanger” and 

that “[c]onsequences in the home would consist of [Esme’s] 

being sent outside in snow with not proper wear, without coats, 

socks, shoes, and things like that.” Early in her treatment, 

Esme struggled with identifying feelings and hoarding food 

because “she was not in a stable and structured environment” 

and due to living in a neglectful environment when living with 

Krysta. Esme stated to Wellman that she “wants to live with a 

family in a loving environment” and realizes that Krysta cannot provide her with that.

Regarding Krysta’s behavior, the family’s caseworker testified that Krysta self-reported using marijuana for the purpose 

of self-medicating and takes prescription medication for cysts 

on her ovaries and back pain. The court had ordered Krysta to 

seek “therapy, a legal source of income, housing, abstaining 
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from the use of drugs and alcohol.” Krysta did not obtain a 

legal source of income and had been ordered to complete a 

psychological evaluation by the court and did so but neither 

attended nor completed therapy. Krysta has been diagnosed 

with depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.

Amy Sissel, a family permanency specialist from October 

2017 to April 2019, testified that contact with Krysta was 

“[s]poradic.” Sissel never received proof of legal income from 

Krysta. Sissel stated that although Krysta never participated 

in any parenting assessment, she did participate in outpatient 

therapy but stopped attending because she had a warrant for 

her arrest and was fearful of the warrant. Sissel believes Krysta 

repeatedly neglected and refused to provide her children with 

necessary parental care and protection. Krysta was not complying with her required medication management routine after 

being diagnosed with bipolar disorder and attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder. Krysta also did not consistently comply 

with the court’s order for urinary analysis. Krysta was discharged from two different treatment centers for testing positive for alcohol or drugs a total of three times.

Dr. Elizabeth Morell, a clinical psychologist, performed 

psychological and parenting assessments in July 2018. Morell 

diagnosed Krysta with bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder with generalized anxiety disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. Her mental illness was considered 

“chronic and severe,” would continue for an indeterminate 

period, and made her unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. Morell testified that Krysta’s symptoms “dramatically 

impact her day-to-day functioning, let alone her parenting.” 

Morrell explained it takes longer for Krysta to understand tasks 

and new skills and that she would need consistent services. 

Krysta also was considered high risk for negative childrearing practices.

Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated Krysta’s rights as 

to all six of her children pursuant to § 43-292(1), (2), and (5) 

through (7) on August 25, 2020.
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Cite as 29 Neb. App. 922

2. Complaint to Intervene

In late April 2019, Larry filed a complaint to intervene in 

the proceedings pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-328 (Reissue 

2016), alleging that he was the grandfather of the children and 

therefore had a right to intervene. The guardian ad litem for the 

children filed an answer, denying that Larry was the children’s 

grandfather. A hearing was scheduled for August 12, but on 

that date, Larry’s counsel made an oral motion to continue the 

hearing, which was granted; the hearing was rescheduled for 

October 28. On October 28, the parties agreed to set the complaint to intervene for a “status check hearing” on December 

17. On that date, the “status check hearing” was held. On 

February 24, 2020, Larry filed a notice of hearing, scheduling 

the hearing on the complaint to intervene for March 5. On that 

date, Larry’s counsel agreed to a continuation of the hearing, 

but asked that it be set prior to the hearing on the motion to 

terminate Krysta’s parental rights. Larry’s counsel filed another 

notice of hearing, rescheduling the matter to April 30. On that 

date, the court intended to hold a full hearing on the motion to 

intervene, but ran out of time. Consequently, it scheduled the 

hearing for May 29.

At the hearing on May 29, 2020, Larry testified that he 

was residing in Leander, Texas, and had lived there for 12 

years. Larry stated on direct examination that he did not have 

any children but that he had adopted Krysta as his daughter 

in March 2018. He later said on cross-examination that he 

adopted Krysta in December 2017. Larry stated that Krysta 

“had been with [Larry and his wife] since she was 17 and she 

wanted us to adopt her.” A birth certificate for Krysta from 

North Carolina, which had an issue date of March 15, 2018, 

was received into evidence. When asked on cross-examination, 

Larry stated that Krysta’s adoption took place in Texas and 

that Krysta was 31 years old at the time of the adoption. He 

also acknowledged that the adoption took place after the present case had been filed. And although Krysta had a guardian 

ad litem in the juvenile case at the time of the adoption, one 
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was not involved in the adoption proceedings. Larry stated on 

cross-examination that he knew Krysta’s biological mother was 

alive and had in the past lived with Larry and his wife, Krysta, 

and the two oldest children.

During the hearing, Larry testified that he considered 

Krysta’s children to be his granddaughters. He claimed to have 

purchased birthday and Christmas presents for two of the girls; 

bought them clothes; and paid for a medical appointment for 

Auburn, beds, and other essential items. On cross-examination, 

Larry explained that Krysta and the two oldest children lived 

with him for a period of time, but that they moved out prior to 

the third child being born. Krysta moved from Texas to Omaha, 

Nebraska, more than 5 years prior to the hearing. He admitted 

that he has never seen the youngest three children.

The juvenile court took the matter under advisement and 

had not yet entered an order when the hearing on the motion 

for termination of Krysta’s parental rights was held in July 

2020. On the same day it terminated Krysta’s parental rights, 

the juvenile court entered its order denying Larry’s complaint 

to intervene. The order relied in part upon our prior opinion, 

In re Interest of Artamis G. et al., 27 Neb. App. 135, 927 

N.W.2d 830 (2019), in which we affirmed the juvenile court’s 

denial of a motion to intervene filed by Larry’s wife on the 

basis that she had failed to prove she had lawfully adopted 

Krysta. Although the court determined that Larry “entered 

into a form of adoption with Krysta,” it denied the motion to 

intervene, stating:

Upon reviewing In re Artamis G[.], 27 Neb. App. 135 

(2019), the Court finds that the same deficiencies in 

proof that a legal, valid adoption exist [sic]. The evidence 

established that [Krysta’s] biological mother is alive and 

that her rights were not terminated prior to the adoption, nor did she relinquish her parental rights to Krysta. 

No evidence exists that Krysta was abandoned by her 

mother or that her mother was incapable of consenting to 

an adoption.
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The order also explained that “[e]ven if the adoption of Krysta 

. . . was proper, the parental rights of Krysta . . . have been 

terminated. The rights of grandparents are extinguished once a 

termination or relinquishment occurs.”

Larry timely appeals, and Krysta cross-appeals.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Larry assigns that the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

denying his complaint to intervene.

Krysta cross-appeals, assigning, restated, that the juvenile 

court erred in finding the six minor children to be within the 

meaning of § 43-292(1), (2), and (5) through (7) and that the 

termination was in the children’s best interests.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] Whether a party has the right to intervene in a proceeding is a question of law. Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 283 Neb. 

940, 814 N.W.2d 737 (2012). When reviewing questions of 

law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the conclusions reached by the trial 

court. Id.

[3] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on 

the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the 

juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 

151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016). When the evidence is in conflict, 

however, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the 

juvenile court observed the witnesses and accepted one version 

of facts over another. Id.

V. ANALYSIS

1. Right to Intervene

Larry argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

denying his complaint to intervene. However, whether a party 

has the right to intervene in a proceeding is a question of law; 

therefore, we resolve that question independently of the juvenile court’s decision. See, id.; In re Interest of Artamis G. et 
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al., supra. Section 25-328 governs Larry’s ability to intervene, 

and it states:

Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to 

an action, or against both, in any action pending or to be 

brought in any of the courts of the State of Nebraska, may 

become a party to an action between any other persons 

or corporations, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming 

what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the 

defendants in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by 

demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and 

defendant, either before or after issue has been joined in 

the action, and before trial commences.

[4,5] Thus, as a prerequisite to intervention under § 25-328, 

the intervenor must have a direct and legal interest of such 

character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct 

operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered by the action. Wayne L. Ryan Revocable Trust v. Ryan, 

297 Neb. 761, 901 N.W.2d 671 (2017). An indirect, remote, 

or conjectural interest in the result of a suit is not enough to 

establish intervention as a matter of right. Id. Therefore, a person seeking to intervene must allege facts showing that he or 

she possesses the requisite legal interest in the subject matter 

of the action. Id.

Larry asserts on appeal that he has a direct legal interest in 

the adjudication proceedings because he stands in loco parentis 

over the minor children. Additionally, Larry argues that he has 

a direct legal interest in the adjudication proceedings because 

he adopted Krysta, thereby holding the same legal rights as if 

he were Krysta’s father. We reject both arguments.

(a) In Loco Parentis Status

Larry first argues he stands in loco parentis over the minor 

children; however, he sought to intervene solely upon his 

status as the children’s adoptive grandfather, and this is the 

basis upon which the court denied his motion. One seeking to 
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intervene in an action must submit a petition setting forth the 

facts on which the intervention rests. In re Interest of Destiny 

S., 263 Neb. 255, 639 N.W.2d 400 (2002), disapproved in part, 

In re Interest of Enyce J. & Eternity M., 291 Neb. 965, 870 

N.W.2d 413 (2015).

Furthermore, although Larry’s counsel sought to elicit testimony that there was a significant beneficial relationship 

between Larry and the children, neither testimony offered nor 

argument made support a determination that Larry was making a claim of in loco parentis status at the hearing. Appellate 

courts will not consider issues on appeal that were not presented to or passed upon by the trial court. In re Interest of 

Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003). 

Therefore, we do not address Larry’s argument that the court 

erred in denying his complaint to intervene on the basis that he 

stood in loco parentis over the children.

(b) Status as Grandfather

[6] Regarding Larry’s right to intervene as a grandparent, 

the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that grandparents have 

a sufficient legal interest in dependency proceedings involving their biological or adopted minor grandchildren to entitle 

them to intervene in such proceedings prior to final disposition. See In re Interest of Kayle C. & Kylee C., 253 Neb. 685, 

574 N.W.2d 473 (1998). Larry testified that he and his wife 

adopted Krysta in Texas in either late 2017 or early 2018, and 

he offered a North Carolina birth certificate that indicated he 

was Krysta’s father. The juvenile court found that Larry had 

“entered into a form of adoption with Krysta” in Texas, either 

in December 2017 or March 2018; however, it also found that 

there were deficiencies in proof that a valid legal adoption 

occurred because of the timing and circumstances under which 

the adoption occurred. Regardless, it held that because it had 

terminated Krysta’s parental rights, any rights Larry would 

have as a grandfather no longer existed.
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(c) Delay in Ruling

Larry argues that the court’s delay in ruling upon the complaint to intervene until after the termination hearing violated 

his due process rights. We disagree.

As set forth above, numerous continuances were granted 

regarding the hearing on the complaint to intervene, several of 

which were agreed to or initiated by Larry. During the interim 

between the filing of the complaint to intervene and the May 

29, 2020, hearing, Larry’s counsel received notices of hearings 

and participated in them. We note counsel attended the January 

31 “status check hearing” on the motion for termination of 

parental rights and participated in the February 5 placement 

hearing. The court allowed counsel to participate in mediation. She also attended the March 5 hearing in which the court 

addressed permanency planning, a motion to continue hearings 

on the termination of parental rights, and the complaint to 

intervene. She attended an April 30 hearing in which the court 

held a review and permanency planning hearing and addressed 

a motion to continue the complaint to intervene.

Following the May 29, 2020, hearing, Larry’s counsel continued to receive copies of pleadings, including an amended 

motion for termination of parental rights and witness lists. She 

filed motions jointly with Krysta’s counsel for appointment 

of counsel for Auburn and for an in camera interview with 

Auburn. Moreover, she was present at the July 10, 14, and 15 

hearings on the motion to terminate Krysta’s parental rights. 

She actively participated during the July 10 hearing regarding 

a complaint filed against the guardian ad litem for Auburn. At 

the beginning of the termination hearing, she sought permission to “[c]ome and go” as she pleased. The court stated that 

it did “not have a problem with” her coming into the hearing, 

recognizing that it had not yet ruled on the motion to intervene. 

Counsel made no motion to continue the termination hearing until a ruling on the complaint to intervene was entered. 

Furthermore, she objected during Wellman’s testimony on the 

first day of the termination hearing and also during Larry’s 
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testimony on the second day of the hearing. She was still present on the last day of the hearing.

Exercising their right of intervention simply enables those 

grandparents wanting to keep abreast of dependency proceedings to receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard 

with respect to actions taken by a juvenile court which could 

significantly affect their relationship with their grandchildren. 

In re Interest of Kayle C. & Kylee C., 253 Neb. 685, 574 

N.W.2d 473 (1998). Given the facts of this case, and the continued involvement of Larry’s counsel pending the issuance of 

a ruling on the complaint to intervene, we cannot say that the 

juvenile court violated Larry’s due process rights by failing 

to rule on the complaint to intervene sooner. And as correctly 

noted by the juvenile court, once Krysta’s parental rights were 

terminated, Larry had no continuing rights as a grandfather. 

See id.

Having found no error in the timeliness of the court’s order, 

we need not address the validity of Larry’s purported adoption 

of Krysta. We affirm the juvenile court’s order denying the 

complaint to intervene.

2. Termination of Parental Rights

[7] Krysta asserts on cross-appeal that the juvenile court 

erred in terminating her parental rights under § 43-292(1), (2), 

and (5) through (7). For a juvenile court to terminate parental 

rights under § 43-292, it must find that one or more of the 

statutory grounds listed in this section have been satisfied 

and that such termination is in the child’s best interest. In re 

Interest of Becka P. et al., 27 Neb. App. 489, 933 N.W.2d 873 

(2019). The State must prove these facts by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

(a) Statutory Grounds for Termination

Krysta argues there was insufficient evidence to terminate 

her parental rights under § 43-292(1), (2), and (5) through (7). 

The juvenile court found the State had presented clear and 
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convincing evidence to satisfy all five sections. Upon our de 

novo review, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court; specifically, we find the evidence clearly and convincingly established the children were in out-of-home placements for at least 

15 of the most recent 22 months, as required by § 43-292(7).

Section 43-292(7) grants termination of parental rights when 

“[t]he juvenile has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen or more months of the most recent twenty-two months.” It 

operates mechanically and, unlike the other subsections of the 

statute, does not require the State to adduce evidence of any 

specific fault on the part of a parent. In re Interest of Kenna S., 

17 Neb. App. 544, 766 N.W.2d 424 (2009). In a case of termination of parental rights based on § 43-292(7), the protection 

afforded the rights of the parent comes in the best interests step 

of the analysis. In re Interest of Kenna S., supra.

In this case, the record contains undisputed evidence that 

all six children were removed from Krysta’s care in February 

2017 and that they each resided in an out-of-home placement 

throughout the entire proceedings. As a result, at the time of 

the State’s filing its amended motion to terminate Krysta’s 

parental rights in July 2020, the children had each been out of 

Krysta’s care for over 36 months. Therefore, the circumstances 

required by § 43-292(7) were met, as the State’s evidence 

proved the children had been in an out-of-home placement for 

at least 15 of the most recent 22 months.

If an appellate court determines that the lower court correctly 

found that termination of parental rights is appropriate under 

one of the statutory grounds set forth in § 43-292, the appellate 

court need not further address the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support termination under any other statutory ground. In re 

Interest of Becka P. et al., supra. Because the State presented 

clear and convincing evidence that each of the children had 

been in an out-of-home placement for 15 or more of the most 

recent 22 months, statutory grounds for termination of Krysta’s 

parental rights exist.
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(b) Best Interests

[8,9] Krysta assigns that the juvenile court erred in finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate her 

parental rights. In addition to providing a statutory ground, 

the State must show that termination of parental rights is in 

the best interests of the child. In re Interest of Becka P. et al., 

supra. See In re Interest of Jahon S., 291 Neb. 97, 864 N.W.2d 

228 (2015). A parent’s right to raise his or her child is constitutionally protected; so before a court may terminate parental 

rights, the State must show that the parent is unfit. Id. There is 

a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the child are 

served by having a relationship with his or her parent. Based 

on the idea that fit parents act in the best interests of their 

children, this presumption is overcome only when the State has 

proved that the parent is unfit. Id. In the context of the constitutionally protected relationship between a parent and a child, 

parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity 

which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance 

of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which 

caused, or probably will result in, detriment to the child’s wellbeing. Id.

[10] The best interests analysis and the parental fitness 

analysis are fact-intensive inquiries. And while both are separate inquiries, each examines essentially the same underlying 

facts. Id. In proceedings to terminate parental rights, the law 

does not require perfection of a parent; instead, courts should 

look for the parent’s continued improvement in parenting 

skills and a beneficial relationship between parent and child. 

In re Interest of Joseph S. et al., 291 Neb. 953, 870 N.W.2d 

141 (2015).

[11] In cases where termination of parental rights is based 

solely on § 43-292(7), the Supreme Court has held that appellate courts must be particularly diligent in their de novo 

review of whether termination of parental rights is, in fact, 

in the child’s best interests. See In re Interest of Aaron D., 

269 Neb. 249, 691 N.W.2d 164 (2005). In such a situation, 
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because the statutory ground for termination does not require 

proof of such matters as abandonment, neglect, unfitness, or 

abuse, as the other statutory grounds do, proof that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child will 

require clear and convincing evidence of circumstances as 

compelling and pertinent to a child’s best interests as those 

enumerated in the other subsections of § 43-292. In re Interest 

of Aaron D., supra.

In February 2017, law enforcement received a report of 

neglect and the unsanitary conditions of the home in which 

the children resided. Throughout the pendency of this case, 

lasting over 3 years, Krysta received numerous services from 

the Department of Health and Human Services in an effort to 

reunify Krysta with her six children. There were periods when 

Krysta kept her residence in better living conditions and was 

able to have visits with her children in her home. However, her 

visits were suspended multiple times for inappropriate behaviors, including threatening to “blow up” her children’s therapist’s office and grabbing a knife out of anger. Additionally, 

there was minimal change in Krysta’s attitude toward reunification, as she tested positive for marijuana 14 times while 

on probation.

Four of Krysta’s six children entered the foster care system 

requiring therapy for the trauma they endured while in Krysta’s 

care. The eldest child struggled with her mental health and 

her ability to navigate the foster care system throughout the 

pendency of this case; however, the three children next in age 

all saw dramatic improvements in their coping skills while in 

the foster care system and attending therapy sessions. Multiple 

therapists and Department of Health and Human Services’ 

officials who were questioned during the termination hearing 

stated they believed it was in the children’s best interests not to 

reunify with Krysta.

[12] Where a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate 

himself or herself within a reasonable time, the best interests of the child require termination of parental rights. In re 
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Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 

(1997). The evidence presented indicates that Krysta has not 

made any lasting changes to her behavior and that based on her 

diagnosis of bipolar disorder, her refusal to take her prescribed 

medications, and her repeated marijuana use, she is unlikely 

to do so. Krysta has not shown any improvements in her parenting ability throughout the time her children have been in 

foster care, despite the provisions and support provided for her 

through the case plan goals.

[13] Furthermore, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care, nor be made to await uncertain parental maturity. Id.

The six children have been in foster care since February 2017. 

Because they deserve stability and should not be required to 

await Krysta’s rehabilitation when she is unable or unwilling 

to do so, we find termination of Krysta’s parental rights to be 

in the children’s best interests, as proved by the State through 

clear and convincing evidence.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in denying Larry’s complaint to intervene 

or in terminating Krysta’s parental rights to her six children.

Affirmed.