NO. 96-384 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, In and for the County of Park, the 

Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Judge Presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Edward C. Overton (pro se), Livingston, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Micheal Wellenstein, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Tara DePuy, County Attorney; Kendra K. Anderson, Deputy County 

Attorney, Livingston, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: August 7, 1997 

Decided: August 26, 1997 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published 

by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter and West Publishing Companies. 

Edward Overton, pro se, appeals his convictions from the Sixth Judicial District 

Court, Park County, where he was found gnilty of theft and issuing a bad check. We affirm. 

We restate the following two issues Overton raises on appeal: 

1. Was Overton denied effective assistance of counsel? 

2. Did Overton waive appellate review of his claims set forth in his caption 

"Request For A New Trial" by not first raising them in district court? 

BACKGROUND 

In September 1994, Overton issued a check to William Maloney for $2,150. When 

Maloney accepted the check, he believed there were sufficient funds in Overton's account 

and thought he could cash the check. When Maloney attempted to cash the check, it was 

returned because the account was closed. According to bank records, the account had been 

closed prior to December 3 1, 1992. 

Overton testified that when he gave Maloney the check, Overton knew the account 

was closed, but he did not inform Maloney. Overton claimed the check was a receipt to 

verify a loan from Maloney. Maloney testified the check was a payment. 
In midJanuary 1995, Overton lost all of his money he had invested in commodities. 

On January 21, 1995, he purchased a pickup from Kimard's Auto and RV in Livingston for 

$2,070. On his credit application, he listed Gary Zemlick as his employer and listed as 

additional income $1,600 per month from commodities. Overton gave Kimard Kunneman 

a security interest in the pickup which was filed with the State. Overton never made any 

payments on the pickup. 

Kunneman attempted to contact Overton at the Zemlick Ranch regarding the 

payments. He was informed that Overton no longer worked there. Overton mailed 

Kunneman a letter from Grand Junction, postmarked February 14, 1995, but no payment or 

forwarding address was included in the letter. Overton did not contact Kunneman again or 

return the truck. 

Overton testified that he quit after six days of working at the Zemlick Ranch. In 

February 1995, he traveled to Livingston, but did not return the truck or contact Kunneman. 

Overton explained that he did not contact Kunneman because he had his son with him and 

had a job in Arizona. Overton claimed he still intended to purchase the truck. In June 1995, 

Overton was arrested near Townsend for not having licensed the truck and for not having 

insurance. 

The State charged Overton with theft and issuing a bad check. Following a bench 

trial, the District Court found Overton guilty of both counts and sentenced him to two 

concurrent ten-year terms, both suspended. Overton filed a motion for a new trial which the 

District Court denied. Overton appeals. 

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DISCUSSION 

1. Was Overton denied effective assistance of counsel? 

This Court applies the two-part test &om Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 

668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

First, Overton must establish that his counsel's performance was deficient in that he did not 

act within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687; State v. Baker (1995), 272 Mont. 273, 901 P.2d 54. In making this 

determination, judicial scmtiny of counsel's actions is highly deferential and counsel's 

performance is strongly presumed to fall within a wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. Kills On Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32, 901 P.2d 1368. Second, Overton 

must establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, and that "but for" his 

counsel's performance the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687. Overton must establish both deficient performance and prejudice to prevail on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Overton claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel 

failed to inform him of his right to ask for a different judge; his counsel failed to inform him 

of Montana's "three strikes and you're out" law; his counsel failed to advise him that waiving 

his right to a jury trial was inadvisable; his counsel failed to properly question witnesses; his 

counsel failed to introduce a letter that Overton wrote from Grand Junction; and his counsel 

failed to emphasize to a greater degree that Overton paid for repairs on the pickup. 
Nothing in the record supports Overton's claim that his counsel failed to inform him 

that he could substitute the district court judge. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 

appeal must be confined to the record. State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194, 199, 864 

P.2d 787,791. 

Overton claims his counsel was ineffective because he did not inform him of 

Montana's "three strikes and you're out" law contained at 5 46-18-219, MCA. This statute 

became effective on July 1, 1997, and is inapplicable to Overton. Therefore, his counsel did 

not provide ineffective assistance by not informing him of it. 

Overton asserts that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to inform Overton 

that waiving a jury trial was inadvisable. The record does not support this argument. Before 

trial, the court questioned Overton whether he had talked with his attorney about waiving his 

right to a jury trial. Overton responded that he had discussed the matter with his attorney and 

that the decision to waive the jury trial was his. 

Overton next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to ask certain 

questions during trial and failed to introduce a letter that Overton wrote from Grand Junction. 

Questioning of witnesses and decisions of whether to introduce evidence are generally 

matters of trial tactics and strategy. State v. Henry (1995), 271 Mont. 491, 898 P.2d 1195. 

This Court will not second-guess trial tactics and strategy. &, 901 P.2d at 59. 

Finally, Overton argues that his counsel was deficient because he failed to emphasize 

to a greater degree that Overton made repairs on the pickup. Overton's counsel attempted 

to introduce the repairs into evidence, but the court sustained the State's objection that the 

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evidence was irrelevant. The State's objection was properly sustained. Counsel's failure to 

introduce the irrelevant evidence does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See 

State v. Hildreth (1994), 267 Mont. 423,432-33, 884 P.2d 771, 777. 

Overton has failed to demonstrate his counsel did not provide assistance within the 

range required by defense attorneys or there is a reasonable probability that, but for his 

counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. We conclude 

Overton was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 

2. Did Overton waive appellate review of his claims set forth in his caption "Request 

For A New Trial" by not first raising them in district court? 

Overton argues it was improper for the State to try him on both the theft and bad 

check charges at the same time. He claims that by being tried for both offenses together, he 

was denied the right to answer each charge individually; his ability to cross-examine was 

compromised; his counsel was unduly burdened; and he was prejudiced by having witnesses 

testify about each offense in one trial. 

Overton's claims are not properly before this Court on appeal because he failed to 

raise them in the District Court. See 5 46-20-104(2), MCA; State v. Arlington (1994), 265 

Mont. 127, 151, 875 P.2d 307,321. We decline to further address these claims on appeal. 

Affirmed. 

Chief Justice 
We concur: