Review of 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report Addendum

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A 

Los Alamos National Laboratory Work Group

Teleconference Meeting

August 15, 2017
Work Group Members

 Josie Beach, Chair 

 Bradley P. Clawson

 James E. Lockey, MD, MS

 Wanda I. Munn
Background: LANL Special Exposure Cohort

 Petition 61, 1943–1963: NIOSH finds inability to dose reconstruct 

radioactive lanthanum exposures for specific LANL operations. Board 

recommends SEC class for potentially exposed workers (10/11/06).

 Petition 51, 1943–1975: NIOSH finds inability to dose reconstruct. Board 

recommends SEC class for all workers (“should have been monitored”) 

(5/23/07).

 Petition 170, 1943–1975: NIOSH finds inability to dose reconstruct. Board 

recommends SEC class for all workers (6/11/10). 

 Petition 109, 1976–2005: NIOSH finds inability to dose reconstruct exotic 

alpha emitters, mixed fission products (MFPs), and mixed activation 

products (MAPs). Board recommends SEC class for all workers (10/31/12).

 Addendum to Evaluation Report (ER), 1996–2005: NIOSH finds dose 

reconstruction (DR) with sufficient accuracy feasible for “Service 

Support Workers” given enactment of 10 CFR Part 835 requirements.
SEC-00109 ER Addendum

 Original petition submitted April 2008; ER Addendum issued 

May 2017

 ER Period: January 1, 1996–December 31, 2005

 Addresses post-1995 unmonitored intakes of exotic alpha 

emitters, MAPs, MFPs (same as Rev. 01 of ER for 1976–1995)

 Service Support Workers (e.g., CTWs, security guards, 

firefighters, delivery persons, rad techs)

 January 1, 1996, was promulgation date for 10 CFR Part 835 

for occupational radiation protection 

 NIOSH presumes compliance with rule resolved DR limitations 

on which preceding SEC class was defined 
SC&A Review: Lines of Inquiry

1. Is use of 10 CFR Part 835 presumption of compliance a valid basis 

for dose reconstruction feasibility? [DOE policy review]

2. Assuming the enactment date of January 1, 1996, is reasonable, 

what metrics can be applied to confirm or validate 10 CFR Part 835 

implementation?

 Was radiation protection program fully defined, evaluated, and 

independently reviewed before enactment?

 Any evidence of post-1995 nonconformances with rule with 

substantive implications for DR?

 Any internal dosimetry program implementation issues prevalent 

after enactment of rule that may hamper DR?
Presumption-of-Compliance Criterion

 Compliance is not equivalent to Implementation.

 Reviewing actual dosimetry program implementation is 

important for DR because non-adherence or non-participation 

can lead to monitoring gaps.

 Reviewing oversight or compliance findings is necessary but 

not sufficient for establishing soundness of dosimetry 

programs.

 Improvements in internal dosimetry at DOE sites were 

evolutionary during 1990s – no uniform timing for full and 

successful conformance with all requirements until DOELAP 

accreditation milestone (2002).
Review of 10 CFR Part 835 Implementation 

at LANL

 Deliberate review, verification, and approval process followed before 

enactment of 10 CFR Part 835 in 1996

 But uniform acceptance criteria lacking, wide latitude on 

interpretation

 Noncompliance Tracking System, ORPS, oversight issues reviewed –

one 1999 noncompliance stands out: broad issues with internal 

dosimetry program, including 835.402(c)(1) violations: checklists, 

RWP job-specific bioassays, CTW bioassay enrollments

 Original bioassay inadequacies and lack of monitoring for MAPs and 

MFPs not demonstrably resolved by 1996

 Neptunium – scope of operations, source term, and exposure 

potential remain unsettled
Considerations

 Proposed “presumption of compliance” represents significant 

precedent; should presumed compliance preempt a 

deliberative review of program implementation?

 Significant noncompliances for LANL, Mound, and SRS 

regarding respective bioassay programs illustrate effective 

implementation took time; DOELAP accreditation is arguably 

only milestone based on full bioassay program functionality. 

 Continuity and coherency of technical evaluation is important 

– how are established bioassay deficiencies and air monitoring 

gaps resolved from past SEC period?