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Centers for Disease Control

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

Savannah River Site (SRS) and SEC Issues Work 

Groups Joint Meeting

Friday, December 6, 2019 

The Work Group convened in the Cincinnati Airport 

Marriott Frankfurt Room, 2395 Progress Drive, 

Hebron, Kentucky, at 8:30 a.m., Eastern Time, 

Henry Anderson and Bradley Clawson, Work Group 

Chairs, presiding.
2 

Present: 

Henry Anderson, SEC Issues Work Group 

Chair

Bradley P. Clawson, SRS Work Group Chair

Josie Beach, Member

James E. Lockey, Member

Genevieve S. Roessler, Member*

Phillip Schofield, Member*

Paul L. Ziemer, Member

Also Present: 

Ted Katz, Designated Federal Official

Matt Arno, ORAU Team*

Bob Barton, SC&A 

Liz Brackett, ORAU Team

Ron Buchanan, SC&A*

Grady Calhoun, DCAS

John Cardarelli, DCAS

Nancy Chalmers, ORAU Team

Josh Fester, on Behalf of the Petitioner*

Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A

Rose Gogliotti, SC&A*

Warren Johnson *

Mike Mahathy, ORAU Team*

Jenny Naylor, HHS* 

Knut Ringen, CPWR*

Mutty Sharfi, ORAU Team*

Dan Stempfley, ORAU Team*

John Stiver, SC&A*

Tim Taulbee, DCAS

* Participating by phone
3 

Contents

Centers for Disease Control National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health Savannah River Site 

(SRS) and SEC Issues Work Groups Joint Meeting 

Friday, December 6, 2019 1

Roll Call/Welcome 4

Review of ORAU RPT 92 5

Path Forward 91

Adjourn 100
4 

Proceedings

(8:32 a.m.)

Roll Call/Welcome

Mr. Katz: So good morning, everybody. This is the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. 

It's a joint Work Group meeting of the Savannah 

River Site Work Group and the SEC Issues Work 

Group.

And we were dealing with -- yesterday we dealt a 

lot with the guideline for the coworker models and 

discussing -- uh oh, I'm getting a -- hello? Okay, 

it's all right.

Participant: Hello?

Mr. Katz: So whoever is on the line, can you just 

mute your phones? *6 to mute your phone.

Anyway, so yesterday we had a lot of discussion 

about the coworker models in relation to the 

Savannah River Site coworker models to sort out 

the guidelines that NIOSH uses to develop coworker 

guidelines. And today we're going on with the rest 

of more -- to more focus on the SRS issues 

particularly.

So the materials for today's meeting are -- that are 

available for the public, not everything can -- could 

have been -- could be cleared through DOE and all 

that, but everything that's available for today, 

including the agenda, is posted on the NIOSH 

website under schedule of meetings, today's date. 

So you can find those materials there and follow 

along and also see some of the background 

materials that these discussions are based on.

What else? For phone, just let me just again note 

keep your phones on mute. You shouldn't be --

have your phones open except when you're 

addressing the group.

There is no public comment session, but there is an 
5

opportunity for the petitioner at some point before 

we close where the petitioner will have an 

opportunity if the petitioner has comments. So we'll 

note that. That will be later this morning, I'm sure.

And the meeting is breaking today, is ending today 

at noon. So that's -- that's the schedule.

Roll call. So I'm going to do roll call, and as we did 

yesterday and always, conflict of interest because 

there's a site involved here.

Board members that are involved in these two Work 

Groups don't have any conflicts with Savannah 

River Site, so we don't need to address that.

I'll run through roll call, and I'll cover all the people 

that are in the room since I can see them here, and 

then we'll go to the phone for Board members, then 

we'll go on to the rest.

(Roll call.)

Mr. Katz: Okay, then. So then without further ado, 

just again remind please keep your phones muted, 

and *6 if you don't have a mute button, and let's 

go.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Mr. Katz: Joe.

Review of ORAU RPT 92

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, thank you, Ted.

Joe Fitzgerald again, and I'm going to start off the 

presentation on SC&A's review of the RPRT-92, 

which was the evaluation of bioassay data for 

subcontracted construction trade workers at the 

Savannah River Site.

And just a little background. Well, let me -- let me 

first, I know Tim acknowledged the ORAU and the 

NIOSH team. I just also want to acknowledge the 

work that they've done over the last year and a 
6

half.

Member Roessler: Joe, may I interrupt? There's 

nothing showing on the Skype screen.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, this isn't on Skype.

Participant: Bob, can you put it on?

(Laughter.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, it's going to be put on Skype 

right now. And I'll try to be very careful about 

giving you the run through.

At any rate, again I want to acknowledge the work 

that the NIOSH and ORAU team, and I'm talking 

Mike, Dan, and the rest, it was a -- you know, I 

think it was a pretty tall order. And I agree it was a 

lot of work, so I just want make sure it's clear that 

we understand that as well.

What I want to do from the SC&A standpoint is, you 

know, step back a little bit and look at the overall 

project. We've been pretty much focused I think 

with the 1990s, the '97 notice of violation. I mean 

there's a history on this that we've gone through 

the last couple of years.

But I want to certainly today walk through the '72 

to '98 in its entirety and look at it in that 

perspective. And we're talking 27 years, so it's a 

fairly long period that's under consideration. And I 

think that's part of our review that we wanted to 

look at it from that standpoint.

And as with OTIB-81, I think a lot of the issues, this 

is certainly for the Work Group, a lot of the issues 

that we're addressing are pretty fundamental ones. 

And I think are going to help define how the 

coworker models applied. I mean I'm talking about 

the guidelines.

So this is really in addition to 81, taking the 

guidelines and applying it to Savannah River, I think 

92 in some respects, is also a way to take a lot of 
7

those guidelines, interpret them, and apply them to 

a particular circumstance or circumstances at 

Savannah River.

And so these have some, I think, pretty 

fundamental implications for how one views the 

guidelines, how one applies those in terms of the 

coworker model. So this all relates, I think, to what 

we've talked about for the last day or so.

Okay, so first, again the -- what we call subCTWs, 

which is short for the subcontractor construction 

trade workers, you know, it's pretty clear they often 

performed the non-routine jobs at the sites, and 

this is not just Savannah River, across the DOE, 

involving unique radiological source terms or 

conditions, and these -- and they required a lot of 

times the RWPs, the permit required bioassays to 

verify whether or not intakes occurred.

Now, I think Tim has made it clear there was other 

ways one could monitor, but clearly the bioassays 

were a important component of verifying intakes.

SC&A's original evaluation of subcontractors, and 

this is going back to 2017, you know, we found the 

incompleteness in the range of 66 to 84, but in the 

range of that spectrum and concluded RWPs before 

1999 were likely not complete nor consistently 

applied with respect to job-specific bioassays.

So that's from our 2017 review, and that review 

also cited the -- the Westinghouse findings of 

incompleteness in 1997 that we talked about at 

some length yesterday.

And, again, that was a 100 percent review of RWPs 

in 1997 and found 21 percent incompleteness. And 

that was the basis for the 1998 DOE enforcement 

action, a very significant action, that involved a 

penalty at Savannah River, and also contributed to 

a departmental decision at that time in 1998 to 

have a complex-wide moratorium on enforcement 

actions relative to bioassays so that the complex 

could, in fact, take corrective actions to self-assess 
8

and take corrective actions in a rather prompt 

manner.

So this was a significant and compelling issue that 

faced the Department of Energy in '97 and '98, and 

therefore we thought it was equally compelling that 

this program needed to consider that issue and the 

implications of that issue.

This is --

Member Ziemer: Joe, could I just interrupt very 

quickly?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes.

Member Ziemer: So you said the finding was 21 

percent incompleteness, and I think, just for the 

record, I think you meant 21 percent completeness.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes, if I said 

incompleteness, it's completeness.

Member Ziemer: I don't know if Jim has the slides 

yet, but just.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Yes, excuse me. That would 

be 21 percent completeness or conversely the 79 

percent incompleteness.

Member Ziemer: Right. And that refers to the slide 

that Tim talked about where it was 21 percent of a 

subset?

Dr. Taulbee: Twenty-one percent of 5 -- 5 percent 

of the job-specific --

Member Ziemer: Right, yes, okay.

Dr. Taulbee: -- bioassay.

Member Ziemer: Just trying to correlate in my 

mind, okay.

Dr. Taulbee: So it is not 21 percent of all 

bioassays.
9

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, this is job-specific bioassays. 

But I wanted to make sure it was clear that --

Member Ziemer: Yeah.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- the significance of lacking that 

completeness in terms of submission of bioassays 

for RWP required bioassays was significant not only 

to Westinghouse, but also to the Department of 

Energy.

Member Ziemer: Thank you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So this was not a passing issue; this 

was a fundamental issue. And I don't recall their 

being too many moratoriums on the Price-Anderson 

enforcement across DOE, so this was taken pretty 

seriously.

Did you have a question?

Member Lockey: Joe, could I ask you something 

about the second bullet point?

Mr. Fitzgerald: I'm sorry?

Member Lockey: The second bullet point you have 

on the background.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Go ahead.

Member Lockey: Is -- you said 66 to 84 percent 

completeness, correct?

Mr. Fitzgerald: That's correct.

Member Lockey: And then you went on and said 

the RWPs before '99 were neither complete nor 

consistently applied. So those are two different 

statements, is that --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right, there's two different issues 

here. We did our own review, which was the Board 

mandate back in 2017. We were tasked to do a 

broad sampling review --

Member Lockey: Of the RWPs.
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Mr. Fitzgerald: -- of the RWPs --

Member Lockey: Yeah.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- that we could identify. This was 

similar to what NIOSH, not identical, but similar to 

what NIOSH had done for '91 to -- I'm sorry, '81 to 

'86 for 773-A. They're sort of in parallel.

And our initial indication and because this was a, 

you know, a preliminary sampling, it was a 

indication that that was the percentages we were 

looking at. Now they weren't that dramatically 

different than what was found at 773-A or what has 

subsequently been found, somewhere in the 

neighborhood of 70-80 percent, maybe up to 90 

percent depending on how you adjusted that for 

long-lived nuclides.

Member Lockey: So when you say they weren't 

complete, what does that mean? When they need 

their complete -- what does that mean?

Mr. Fitzgerald: That means we could not establish 

a job-specific bioassay. In the case that got 

reviewed in 2017, we couldn't find a job-specific 

bioassay tied to that RWP within I think it was 30 or 

90-days.

Member Lockey: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Of the -- of the RWP.

Member Lockey: Got you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And we've had subsequent 

discussion, I won't go through that right now, about 

how one would adjust that for long-lived nuclides. 

But certainly we felt -- well, actually we found that 

there was a level of incompleteness.

Now we're going to get into the question of how 

incomplete is incomplete. That's another, you 

know, and that's -- that's a judgment call. But 

basically, that's what we came out with in that 

timeframe.
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Member Beach: Joe, you should put your pin in 

before it kicks you out.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Oh.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Katz: You can just -- actually you can just close 

that because you don't need it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Mr. Katz: There you go.

Mr. Fitzgerald: In any case, the Savannah River 

Work Group Board members, requested NIOSH 

conduct further evaluation of the subcontractor data 

completeness for '72 to '98. This is the RPRT-92 

that we're discussing now.

And I think the significance of this is that it was felt 

by the Board at that point in time, and this is 

available in the transcripts, that the review that we 

did, which was a preliminary review focused on, 

frankly, just a few years in the '90s, and the NIOSH 

review up to that point, which was focused on one 

facility from '81 to '86, wasn't of sufficient scope.

I'm talking about sufficient facilities or sufficient 

timeframe to really provide a good answer to the 

question of the completeness of the data and the 

representativeness of the data. So from that 

vantage point, the Board was looking for a more 

fundamental review of that issue.

I think the next slide is basically the '92 review, and 

Tim pretty well covered that, so with your 

permission, I'm going to skip most of that. I don't 

think there's anything here that we haven't already 

talked about.

We did comment on the sampling plan; we did 

express in particular a concern over the 1972 to 

1989 DuPont era. That was a, in fact, an appendix 

to our comments on the sampling plan, and we felt 

that was going to be an issue. Because even as 
12

early as the sampling plan, I think NIOSH 

recognized the availability of permits and, you 

know, plans were going to be sketchy at that stage.

So we had some concern over that.

Co-Chair Anderson: Do we have a sense of what 

started this was the identification of a lot more 

boxes, and I'm wondering how much did the new 

records contribute?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I think, you know, clearly --

Co-Chair Anderson: Well, I'm just, I mean partly it 

cost two years to process all of this, and I just want 

a sense of was it -- was it worth the effort or?

I mean in hindsight at the time, we --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Are you asking Tim or I?

Co-Chair Anderson: Well, either of you how you felt 

about it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Well, I think --

Co-Chair Anderson: Could you tell?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, you know, I -- one, if you go 

back to 2017 there was a frustration. And, you 

know, I was down in the trenches with Mike, Dan, 

and the rest as well, and Tim looking for records.

Co-Chair Anderson: Yeah.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And permits were very hard to find. 

We went through EDWS and all kinds of other 

sources, and we found what we could find. But they 

were not complete in terms of years and particularly 

not complete in terms of decline. But you know, in 

particular, it was hard to go backward in time and 

find the records that would enable you to look at 

that.

And we had I think reached a point where, you 

know, the question before all us and the Board in 
13

particular, well what do you do about the issue. 

You know, we can't really take the findings that we 

had for '97-98 where there's some, you know, 

measure of incompleteness, and decide if that 

incompleteness would typify the years before that.

And that was the question as far as the SEC period. 

And we can't just answer the question for '97 or '96 

or '98, what's the answer for the entire spectrum?

Dr. Taulbee: And if I could?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes. I'm sorry.

Dr. Taulbee: And where I think that the -- the 

benefit from that evaluation was is that we were 

able to more completely fill in back to 1991. So we 

were able to clearly answer from '91 up through '98 

with that additional records.

Co-Chair Anderson: So the records were mostly '91 

to '98?

Dr. Taulbee: Well, yes and no, because --

Co-Chair Anderson: Well, we don't need to dwell on 

it, I'm just again, you know, there was today --

Mr. Fitzgerald: There was additional job plans that 

we --

Co-Chair Anderson: -- you stressed on how much 

time and effort and everything it took, and I -- I 

would like to --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, the expectation --

Co-Chair Anderson: -- just confirm it was helpful.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. The expectation was -- or 

hopefulness was that there in fact would be enough 

records to fill in the blanks.

It turns out the records, I think, were available for 

773-A, you know, which was the facility that was 

reviewed back in -- for the '81-'86 period. And it 
14

also was for the Westinghouse era, but became 

diminishing returns after that.

So, but there was no -- there was no anticipation of 

that before going into it.

Co-Chair Anderson: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: It's just that was the result of the 

review.

In any case, the -- that obviously influenced the 

sampling, and, as Tim explained yesterday, whereas 

one was able to do a statistics-based random 

sampling with all the bells and whistles and a very 

good review of the 1990s, we were sort of stuck 

with what we had in the past with some 

augmentation for '72 to '89.

Co-Chair Anderson: Yeah.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And we'll go into that, but that, you 

know, that, you know, could not be handled the 

same way.

Okay, from our -- switching to what we did. We, 

when we got the report, and again, it was a fairly 

detailed report, but it was pretty clear it went into a 

number of different aspects of this review. It was 

very comprehensive.

So we wanted to have an equally comprehensive 

evaluation. And so we wanted to look, we wanted 

to start from the get go looking at sampling premise 

and the assumptions because again, on something 

like this, the assumptions you make have a 

fundamental effect, and I think we'll go into this to 

some degree, on what results you end up with. And 

we wanted to be sure that we were able to probe 

that. You know, what are the assumptions, and 

what are the -- what is the premise behind the 

sampling that was done?

The second aspect on the execution, I think it was 

clear that certainly NIOSH was going to randomly 
15

select radiological workers, and do the evaluation 

of, you know, comparing monitored to unmonitored. 

But in terms of how that was done, were the 

considerations and the factors, and the 

adjustments, and how the assumptions were 

applied, was that done and executed in a sound 

manner, and do we have any issues with that?

And, finally, on coworker datasets, and this gets 

back to the implementation guidelines, this is the 

tie-in I was talking about. Did the evaluation state -

- satisfy the guidelines in terms of demonstrating 

that the monitored subcontractors and the 

unmonitored subcontractors in fact work side by 

side in the same radiological environment and would 

have had the same comparable exposure potential. 

So that fundamental question.

So we did look at it from those three standpoints. 

And we chose -- and this -- this came from, I think, 

NIOSH's experience as well, that we chose to look 

at two distinct Savannah River operational periods. 

It was pretty clear that, you know, we had spent 

most of our time focused on the 1990s and the 

Westinghouse era, and we had not spent as much 

time looking at the DuPont era even though that 

actually, relatively speaking, constituted more of the 

time period.

So we wanted to actually look at those two distinct 

operational periods. Two different contractors, and 

as we'll get into it, we believe two different 

operational philosophies and management 

approach, as well as procedures. And I think there 

is a distinction between those time periods.

And, finally, we wanted to test the thesis. I think 

this gets down to the foundations for the review. 

Can, in fact, bioassays be linked to the 

corresponding work permits that the monitored and 

unmonitored CTWs -- subCTWs can be compared? I 

mean, that's the final bottom line.

Okay, so for the first one, the -- our first finding, 

SC&A, this is the assumption and basis for 
16

subcontractor data sampling. This is now we're 

going to focus on '72 to '89, and I want to make it 

clear that the -- we did take these by period.

So all of the findings I'm going to discuss, the 

context of what I'm going to discuss, is the DuPont 

era, what Tim was calling the mid- and late DuPont 

eras, 1972 to '89 is what we're addressing from my 

discussion. And we'll switch to Westinghouse at the 

end, but right now we're talking about the DuPont 

era.

Okay. Our first question, which is our first finding, 

since we're looking for permit indicated or required 

job-specific bioassays and trying to establish 

completeness, you know, what is the relationship. 

Can we actually find job plans in this case, or 

special work permits that have job-specific 

bioassays associated with them?

I mean this seems kind of a straightforward 

question, but as we examined the actual results and 

the experience of doing the evaluation, it became 

clear to us that we could not actually identify a good 

linkage between the DuPont SWPs, special work 

permits, or the job plans to job-specific bioassays.

We looked at the procedures, we looked at policies, 

we looked at the SWPs themselves. We looked at 

the job plans, and all we are looking for is some 

indication that, in fact, the bioassay was tied to any 

of those documents, that, in fact, you could survey 

the job plans and find a related bioassay.

Because you're really measuring completeness, so 

therefore you have to establish that there's some 

relationship there. And in particular we looked at 

the special work permits, which actually resemble 

and mirror what we, you know, we understand as 

radiological work permits, RWPs. They actually do 

have a box that you can check off requiring jobspecific bioassay.

Yeah?
17

Dr. Taulbee: And what Joe is pointing out is 

correct. On the SWPs there is a bioassay box. 

Those were beginning to be phased out in 1972, at 

the beginning of this.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Dr. Taulbee: The job plans did not have a box.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right, I'm going to get to that.

Dr. Taulbee: For bioassays.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right, and so we looked at the 

SWPs in the 1970s, and they were being phased 

out, but they were actually still in use through most 

of the '70s. And we did not find -- and, again, we 

looked at all of them, all the SWPs we could find in 

the '70s and early '80s. There were a few in the 

early '80s.

And none of the job-specific bioassay requirement 

boxes were checked. And that led us to say okay, 

that's kind of curious because, again, given the 

numbers involved and the -- and the operations 

involved, you would expect to see some linkage 

with a bioassay being required for a SWP.

The job plans, as Tim just pointed out, were more 

extensively used. In fact, took over and were used 

for the '70s and '80s, and that's a little more 

difficult. Because as Tim points out, the job plans 

don't have a check off.

In fact, the reliance was on the managers, you 

know, using the DPSOLs, the procedures and the 

guidance in the procedures to decide when a 

bioassay would be required on a job-specific basis. 

And they were very general.

I mean it's not, you know, it was -- I would call it a 

performance-based procedure. If you, you know, 

have these considerations, then you have the 

leeway and ability to do a bioassay. But it wasn't 

one of these one for one requirements or check offs 
18

that you could trace as easily.

Member Ziemer: Joe, could you just remind us a 

job plan might have a number of SWPs under it, is 

that how it worked?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No.

Member Ziemer: No, it didn't?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, no.

Member Ziemer: So then what is the difference 

between the job --

Dr. Taulbee: The job plan covered the task that 

was to be done. It was a different form of an RWP, 

kind of they -- they initially had these safe work 

permits which were much closer to RWPs. They 

went to these job plans which would just list the 

tasks, the PPE required, and sign in and sign out.

And so it wasn't as -- well, Joe's got an example 

there to show you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: This is a job plan, and the -- what 

I'm showing to those of you on the phone is --

Member Ziemer: Now --

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- in the report we have --

Member Ziemer: -- I saw --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: I was trying to -- I had in my 

mind that a job plan was a bigger thing, and that 

there were a number of tasks under it that might 

have --

Mr. Fitzgerald: No.

Member Ziemer: Oh, okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, the job plan is exactly that, it 

was a form.
19

Dr. Taulbee: They're a package.

Member Ziemer: If there was a job plan, there 

wouldn't have been an SWP, is that what you're 

saying?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. They supplanted the SWP.

Member Ziemer: I got you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Although there was an overlap.

Dr. Taulbee: There was an overlap --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Dr. Taulbee: -- there's times when they're using 

both.

Member Ziemer: Thank you, that clarifies it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: But, you know, when we --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- we talk about, when we talk 

about the classic RWP that, you know, we were 

familiar with in the 1990s that Westinghouse 

implemented, and actually across --

Member Ziemer: Right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- the complex what we knew of a 

radiological work permit. The SWP came a lot 

closer to resembling that than the job plans.

Member Ziemer: Right. And the policies might still 

say you should have a bioassay if you did this kind 

of work, but it wasn't specifically --

Mr. Fitzgerald: No.

Member Ziemer: -- showing up, wasn't that --

Mr. Fitzgerald: It was general --

Member Ziemer: Yeah.
20

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- and I think there's no 

disagreement it was general.

We did go through a lot of review of what 

procedures they actually had through the years in 

the DuPont era, just trying to figure out did they

ever get any more explicit about the job-specific 

bioassays being required of line managers, you 

know, looking at the DPSOLs. And, frankly, it 

provided the ability to ask for bioassays, but there 

was no explicit requirement.

So, anyway, the -- and we also did the same for 

looking for procedures under DuPont where 

respirator use would be, in fact, required. Oh, I'm 

sorry, job-specific bioassays would be required 

when respirators were used. And, again, did not 

find the linkage.

Go ahead.

Dr. Taulbee: Just to clarify from our standpoint, 

that was the trigger that we used on the job plans is 

if somebody was required to wear a respirator, that 

was our trigger for required bioassay.

Now that wasn't by procedure, it wasn't required, it 

wasn't written down that they had to send people 

for bioassay at that standpoint, but that was the 

standard we used in RPRT-92 in looking at the job 

plans when it wasn't specified, was were these 

workers required to wear a respirator? A respirator 

or full line -- well, full line respirator --

Member Ziemer: And were you assuming --

Dr. Taulbee: We're assuming --

Member Ziemer: -- that under the policy they 

would have? Even though they didn't designate it?

Dr. Taulbee: We were assuming that by today's 

type of standards, if somebody's in a respirator, 

they're going to be on a bioassay. That was --

Member Ziemer: It wasn't explicit?
21

Dr. Taulbee: No.

Member Lockey: So that's when you looked if they 

-- if they had a respirator, was there a bioassay 

associated with it?

Dr. Taulbee: That's exactly right. Yes, sir.

Member Lockey: But that was never written down?

Dr. Taulbee: That's correct.

Member Lockey: I got you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, so really the finding here is 

that we wanted to start with the fundamental 

question of, you know, what are we evaluating and 

is there, in fact, evidence that a job-specific 

bioassay program tied to permits, job plans, 

whatever you want to call it, existed in the DuPont 

era, and we weren't able to find that.

So, I mean --

Member Lockey: Can I ask you a question?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah.

Member Lockey: So did the job plans or the SWPs 

say anything about respirator, required respirator 

use?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, respirator use was a check off 

box on the SWP, and there was a actual yes or no 

thing in the job plan for either on soft mask or 

something, a respirator, yes. So it was actually 

covered in both.

Member Lockey: Okay, so if the job plan required 

respirator use, it was -- that was checked off. And 

what I'm taking is that when you saw that, then you 

assume is there any bioassay and searched there?

Dr. Taulbee: We started looking for everybody who 

worked in that job plan, did they have the bioassay?

Member Lockey: Okay.
22

Mr. Fitzgerald: So, anyway, the finding is just that. 

I mean we're not trying to judge the decision to 

look for bioassays, just saying that before we go 

much further, the distinction between the DuPont 

era and the Westinghouse era is that you do not 

have that linkage, as far as we can find, in 

procedures or policies under DuPont. 

And practices. We looked at log books, and we just 

couldn't find it. So there is that distinction between 

the two operating eras.

Okay, for finding 2, what we wanted --

Member Lockey: Let me -- let me ask you about 

that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Oh, I'm sorry.

Member Lockey: I'm sorry; I have to ask you one 

more time. So you say there was no link between 

the SWPs and specific bioassays?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Member Lockey: But NIOSH found a link between a 

check on respirator use in bioassays?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. I think what they're saying is 

they assumed that the bioassays would be a follow 

on to the respirator use as part of their evaluation in 

92.

Member Lockey: Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: Basically, we figured that people who 

were wearing the respirators were at a risk of 

inhaling radionuclides, and so from a follow-up 

standpoint of contamination control, that final 

verification would be the bioassay.

So we would go and look and see were these people 

on a routine bioassay, a job-specific bioassay? It 

didn't matter. Was there a bioassay that related to 

what that exposure was that we could estimate?
23

Member Lockey: Yeah, well the flip side of that 

were people -- did you look at people wearing 

respirators who weren't bioassayed?

Dr. Taulbee: Whenever somebody -- we looked at 

all subcontractors that wore a respirator. And if 

somebody was not monitored for bioassay, then we 

went and looked to see if there were any coworkers.

So, yes, we did look, if they don't have bioassay, we 

then took the next step to see if somebody else on 

that job plan did have a bioassay. Does that make -

- does that answer your question?

Mr. Fitzgerald: That's -- they're asking a different 

question.

(Laughter.)

Dr. Taulbee: Ask the question again. I'm sorry.

Member Lockey: What I was asking is, I'm trying to 

establish -- I'm trying to figure it out. Was the 

respirator, was -- if I'm requiring -- if we're in an 

SWP or a --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right, job plan.

Member Lockey: -- and in there it says the 

respirator is checked, the assumption was -- or 

maybe management says we have to do bioassays 

on these people.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. There was no -- there was 

nothing in the procedures or policies that would 

have obliged management to do a bioassay. And 

we looked hard at that particular issue. We did find 

a requirement put on the books by Westinghouse in 

1991, I think, that actually made it explicit. But 

before that, we could not find evidence that there 

was a one-for-one requirement to do that.

I think what Tim was explaining that he -- he was, 

for the purposes of the 92 review, making the 

assumption that that would have been the case. 

But there's nothing that I can find that says that 
24

that was a requirement.

Dr. Taulbee: That's correct. What Joe's saying 

there's no policy, there's no procedure that said if 

you put people in a respirator, they need to leave 

bioassay.

So --

Member Lockey: All right, so my question is if we 

assume that was the case, did you find that what 

you found verified that, if you were in a respirator, 

you got a bioassay done?

I guess that's what -- that's my -- that's --

Mr. Fitzgerald: If they were in a respirator did they 

have bioassay done? Well, in the 1980s, generally 

yes, that is the case.

Member Ziemer: You're sort of asking that question 

of --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: -- did we miss a lot of -- were a 

lot of bioassays not done because they didn't have 

the box checked is sort of that question, and the 

reverse is are they getting the bioassays regardless 

of whether the box is there or not?

Member Lockey: No, my question is if the 

respirator box was checked, did they get -- was 

bioassays done? That's what I'm asking.

Dr. Taulbee: And that was the question that we 

addressed. Was if that respirator box was checked, 

did they have bioassay, yes or no.

Member Lockey: Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: And so our goal was to determine 

what percentage of the people who were wearing 

respirators exposed to this airborne environment, 

who were subsequently -- left bioassay samples and 

they, therefore, would be represented in the 
25

coworker model.

Mr. Fitzgerald: But -- and also recognize the 

consideration that this includes workers that were 

doing a pre-scheduled cycle. I mean --

Dr. Taulbee: Not necessarily.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, no, but I'm just saying that 

you, for the longer-lived nuclides, you were 

considering those as well.

Dr. Taulbee: Yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So that added into the percentages. 

So, you know, workers were on pre-scheduled for 

plutonium, what have you, every two or three 

years, or even four times a year as we heard 

earlier.

So the fact they had a respirator checked off on a 

particular job plan, they, if they were on a preschedule to get bioassayed anyway, that would 

have been counted as a match. It wouldn't have 

been specific, you know, to that respirator use that 

they got that bioassay.

They were on the cycle of being reviewed anyway 

routinely. So it's a little more complex.

Member Lockey: You see why I'm trying to ask, 

you understand where I'm --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, and I -- our, you know, there's 

two things going on. You know, you have the 

evaluation and how that was done, but the reality of 

the operational practice and procedures is another 

thing, too.

So that's another dimension which I -- we felt didn't 

really get presented in the review that was done.

Co-Chair Anderson: That wasn't the charge 

question.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, it wasn't -- well, the charge 
26

question was look at completeness. But I think the 

context is important to understand that when we 

were evaluating completeness using these 

assumptions, and recognize that we're looking at 

the premise of the review.

And one of our fundamental findings is be clear that 

the DuPont era, there wasn't a linkage in 

procedures or policies for that to happen based on a 

coded or respirator use.

So we can do the evaluation and make that 

assumption, but it's not tied to the actual practice 

on the ground. And that -- I think that's got to be, 

you know, that's got to be clear, and one has to 

look at the implications of the results in that -- in 

that way.

Member Lockey: Yeah, so there was no 

management regulation says if you wear a 

respirator, you need to get bioassay done?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. And, you know, yeah.

Member Lockey: The assumption you made if they 

wear a respirator there's a --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Lockey: -- bioassay. So the question is --

Mr. Mahathy: This is Mike, Mike Mahathy if you can 

hear me?

Mr. Katz: Yes, we can hear you.

Mr. Mahathy: There was a requirement for a person 

to be on a respirator, wearing a respirator, to also 

be on the bioassay program. I'd have to get that, 

find that document, but that linkage was there.

Dr. Taulbee: What time period, Mike? We're 

talking about --

Mr. Mahathy: '70s, '70s and '80s.
27

Member Lockey: I missed what he said.

Dr. Taulbee: He said that there is some 

documentation that if somebody is on a respirator, 

that they were required to be on a bioassay 

schedule.

Mr. Mahathy: On the routine bioassay.

Dr. Taulbee: On a routine bioassay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Not job specific though, or permit 

required or?

Mr. Mahathy: No, because they didn't have a 

permit. They didn't have job-specific bioassays in 

'70s and '80s.

It was basically if you were on -- you were on a 

routine bioassay and if your sample came up high, 

they did a special bioassay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And certainly, the question --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- yeah, the question, Mike, would 

also be if you were on a -- if you were a 

subcontractor on an intermittent work and you were 

on a job plan, if that respirator box was checked, 

would you be required to leave a bioassay because 

of that job or not. I mean if you were --

Mr. Mahathy: Yeah, that's the question. I don't 

know.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, I know. I think if you were a 

standard worker and you were in respirators all the 

time, I think it would be very -- it would be very 

clear that you would -- you would be leaving 

bioassays. I don't think that would be in question. 

But I think we're trying to make that distinction, as 

well.

Okay, let me proceed to finding 2.
28

Co-Chair Anderson: Thank you.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, so we turned to the other 

premise on the evaluation and wanted to kind of 

understand that better, which is the radionuclides of 

interest.

And here again, we wanted to look at the DuPont 

perspective of how things were done. And, you 

know, one concern we had going in, you know, 

there was a very thorough characterization 

approach that was developed by Westinghouse.

And the Farrell and Findley paper I think goes into 

some lengths to describe how one can go about 

doing a comprehensive source term 

characterization, and there's no fault with that. I 

mean I think that's, you know, that's the Cadillac 

version of how one does it.

But our concern was more on using some of those 

guidelines going backwards and trying to establish, 

you know, what source terms ought to be addressed 

in the evaluation. This is the 92 evaluation, RPRT92 evaluation for the DuPont era.

There, we looked at the policies, procedures, and 

findings that were conducted back in that timeframe 

and don't see, again, evidence that DuPont 

necessarily exercised the same degree of scrutiny or 

analytic capability to look at the various source 

terms that figured in the facility operations.

And I'm not talking about the fundamental, you 

know, you have the canyons, they did this, you 

have the reactors, they did this. You know, tritium 

in the reactors, plutonium in the canyons.

I'm talking about the laboratory operations, the 

waste management operations, tank farm 

operations, where the source terms are a little more 

complicated, and where you have a variability in 

what was being handled, and where you're talking 

about specific jobs, tasks, that were given 

subcontractors day to day, year to year, that would 
29

have been highly variable.

And if you're talking about a laboratory 

environment, you're not talking about what comes 

over the transom's going to be the same year to 

year -- year to year or even week to week. It's 

going to vary.

And that was actually acknowledged in later 

Westinghouse reviews of even 773-A, that you had 

to be careful about how one does characterization 

for a laboratory facility for that reason.

And in 1990, you know, this is during the March 

1990 Tiger Team. And I want to make one thing 

clear. You know, DuPont really did not have much 

in the way of external reviews. I mean, I -- I recall 

three major external independent reviews that took 

place when DuPont was there, and the third one 

actually happened -- the Tiger Team happened 

about eight, nine months after DuPont left.

So that it looked at DuPont practices before 

Westinghouse revamped them. But DuPont was 

gone by then.

You know, the National Academies came in in 1987 

to look at the reactors. You had the P reactor 

restart in 1988, that was August of '88, and that led 

to congressional hearings about, you know, nuclear 

safety and management at the Savannah River 

reactors. And you had the Tiger Team that looked 

at everything basically in March of 1990.

And the Tiger Team, and particularly on this 

particular question of radionuclides of interest, 

found that the radiological areas at Savannah River, 

and this is a quote from the report, have not been 

sufficiently characterized to provide a technical 

basis for the assignment of bioassay sample type 

and frequencies.

Now this was the table that I think Tim showed us 

an example of yesterday, sampling types and 

frequencies. And they really found only one facility 
30

on the Savannah River Site, and this was the naval 

facility.

And actually, the naval facility was a bit of an 

anomaly. That was under Naval Reactors, and as 

Paul will appreciate, Naval Reactors had its own 

little thing going, and so they weren't really under 

Savannah River, per se.

But they were the one facility that the Tiger Team

established actually had a comprehensive source 

term characterization program where they actually 

had an analytic approach and looked at the source 

term in that comprehensive manner. And they cited 

non-compliance with the DOE order for the balance 

of the facilities at Savannah River.

The reason I'm raising this is I think for that DuPont 

era, you did not have the level of analytic review 

that NIOSH has pointed to in terms of the Farrell 

and Findley and the Savannah -- what would be the 

Westinghouse approach. It was more of an expertbased, experience-based approach to identifying 

what radionuclides were of significance and 

consequence at different facilities.

And not to belittle that, DuPont had a high level of 

expertise and a high level of safety consciousness. 

I mean corporately, I think DuPont had no parallel 

at the time in terms of a safety culture. But the one 

problem with DuPont, and this was reflected in the 

problems with the reactors and the reactor restart 

in '88, is that because they were isolated from 

developments in the nuclear -- commercial nuclear 

industry and what have you, there was insularity 

that grew at DuPont.

They, you know, they had their own safety culture, 

they operated -- well, they almost operated in a bell 

jar. They had their own approach to how they did 

business, and it was -- a lot of it was based on their 

expertise.

DuPont actually built and ran the Hanford reactors, 

and that's why they were selected to build the 
31

Savannah River reactors. And from 1951 forward, 

they actually operated those facilities to great 

success.

Now the design and the operations were based on 

1950s engineering and technology, and they 

developed that over the years. But, nonetheless, 

they had no external oversight, no external review.

And that was the -- that was the problem that arose 

in the '80s because given Three Mile Island, 

Chernobyl, and the rest, the scrutiny on DOE's 

reactors got to the point where they were exposed. 

The operations were seen as out of step with what 

accepted practice would be.

So in terms of the -- this issue of radionuclides of 

interest, I think this external review kind of put the 

spotlight on the fact that the bioassay sample type 

and frequencies, the ones that were in fact, in the 

Appendix on 81, but certainly figures in the 92 

review itself, may not be, in fact, an accurate 

reflection -- accurate reflection of -- I just lost the 

picture here, didn't I?

Dr. Taulbee: Joe, can I ask a question here?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah.

Dr. Taulbee: I'll wait till you get your screen back 

up.

When you were doing your evaluations of -- or in 

coming up with this finding, did you consider or look 

at Farrell and Findley as to how much it changed 

from 1972 up through 1999 for these various areas?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, what I looked for, really, was 

the granularity as far as whether or not there was 

any acknowledgment of other source terms that 

may have existed at the laboratory, for example at 

the 773-A and the waste management, whether 

waste management was treated or not.

And I will again point to this particular question 
32

because the answer -- the answer that -- and this 

was a 1990 outside -- the answer that 

Westinghouse gave to this particular finding was 

that they felt that the experience-based and 

common sense approach to identifying source terms 

was fine for them. But they turned around, went 

ahead and did the comprehensive assessment 

thereafter.

So the question that we're raising on this finding is 

the degree to which, and this is not addressed in 

92, the degree to which there is confidence in the 

source terms that are used as radionuclides of 

interest in 92 given the fact that there was some 

question raised on the DuPont era, not the 

Westinghouse era, the DuPont era by findings such 

as this.

And we haven't gone any further than that. We're 

just raising the issue because, again, the finding 

was it was out of step, it was not a comprehensive 

characterization, and the fact that Westinghouse 

turned right around, did a site-wide characterization 

of all the facilities right afterwards, developed the 

comprehensive approach which led to the Farrell 

and Findley assessment.

So the question back to you is are you confident, 

given those findings, that, in fact, these 

radionuclides of interest are sound in the 92 

evaluation?

Member Lockey: So the question is did the 

Westinghouse findings, can you apply those to the 

DuPont area -- DuPont era?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right, that's that's the finding. Can 

you do that? And I, I'll leave it at that. And I think 

you have --

Dr. Taulbee: We will --

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- you have --

Dr. Taulbee: -- respond to the finding.
33

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- you have broached the question. 

I know you haven't had a chance to develop the 

response, but that's our question. Because I think 

that's a pretty significant finding in 1990 relative to 

DuPont.

And I think the context of the basis for your 

radionuclide selection and the samples and 

frequencies in '81 have a lot of grounding in Farrell 

and Findley, and the Westinghouse era. That's all 

we're saying.

Member Lockey: That's a valid, very valid question.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Member Ziemer: I have one question just pops into 

my mind. Is a naval nuclear part of Savannah 

River, are those folks eligible for the EEOICPA 

program?

Dr. Taulbee: I don't know the answer.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I don't know the answer to that 

either, because they reported the naval reactors but 

they were, they were a tenant at Savannah River.

So I -- they didn't report to the Savannah River 

office.

Member Ziemer: That's right --

Mr. Calhoun: Certainly the one in Idaho isn't it?

(Laughter.)

Mr. Calhoun: So, I --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: In your last bullet point --

Mr. Fitzgerald: I think --

Member Ziemer: -- there doesn't imply that they 

would necessarily, well, what's the term --

characterize the naval nuclear. The Tiger Team 
34

couldn't have looked at them. They wouldn't have 

allowed them there.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, they did. And --

Member Ziemer: They did?

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- I'm not sure why they looked at 

them but they did because actually, the finding they 

made was it was the only facility that touched all 

the bases as far as the source term 

characterization. So I don't know why they looked, 

but they must have.

Member Ziemer: Well, okay. That is very unusual. 

And --

Mr. Fitzgerald: I was wondering about that, but I 

don't know how they came up with it. That --

Member Ziemer: No, we had -- the Navy had had 

other sites in DOE facilities and DOE inspectors were 

never allowed to look at those.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I was wondering if the Admiral 

might have given a dispensation to have it looked 

at.

Member Ziemer: He did, he did. And my guess is -

-

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: -- he probably -- you recall, Joe, 

almost every DOE order had an explicit exclusion at 

the end that said it didn't apply to the nuclear -- or 

the Navy.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Exactly. This is one of the rare 

instances where there was actually a finding that 

addressed the naval facility. I think it was because 

of the Admiral and the Tiger Team.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

(Simultaneous speaking.)
35

Mr. Fitzgerald: But, yes.

Anyway, that's the context of that finding and I 

would expect you would have a response to that.

Dr. Taulbee: We will address that in our response.

Mr. Fitzgerald: All right.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: We're on finding 3 right now, and 

again, we talked -- we touched on this yesterday, 

but you know, the original -- the original charge 

from this Advisory Board was that the initial scope 

of I think NIOSH's review, and I'm talking about the 

report '83 review. If you recall, that was the review 

that was done for 773 for 1981 to 1986, that there 

was concerns over the scope of that. 

And that was before it was even completed that the, 

that more facilities needed to be addressed, more 

years needed to be addressed, in order to have a 

adequate treatment of the question of data 

completeness for subcontractors.

And so certainly one, one of our findings, and that

this was I think advanced in our comments on the 

sampling plan is our concern that if the availability 

of permits, job plans, whatever precluded a review 

of anything but 773 again, and even there for only 

intermittent years, we just felt it would not provide 

a representative treatment of the subject of 

subcontractor data completeness, because you're 

essentially leaving out a lot of major facilities. And 

I listed some just off to top.

But, you know, as far as having a, a sense of the 

question of to what extent job plans generated 

bioassays, sufficient bioassays for the canyons, tank 

farms, PuFF, PEF, ETF, RBOF, Uranium Target 

Fabrication Facility, and all these are -- have 

substantial worker populations have and particularly 

the canyons, certainly contamination histories, and 

a, a number of source terms.
36

And at the same time, I acknowledge the frustration 

of the fact that, you know, you have what you have. 

You know, and what we have is just the records 

apparently for 773 in terms of permits. So, you 

have to, you have to use what you have.

But on the other hand, the result is less than 

satisfactory because the original intent was to 

expand the scope of, and that was impossible.

So I think this was probably not a surprise finding, 

and I'm not sure there's going to be disagreement 

on this, but it certainly has implications for being 

able to answer the question of representativeness, 

which I think the guidelines, if you're going to go 

back to the guidelines, that's an essential attribute 

of the guidelines.

And at the same time, we went back and took 

another look at NOCTS because, you know, we 

wanted to reassure ourselves that NOCTS was more 

representative of facilities and timeframes.

And I think what we found, and this is something 

Ron Buchanan did and we'll report on it. Yes, I 

think NOCTS is more representative, much more 

representative of a facility in timeframes.

So, this again, focuses on what the scope of the 92 

review is. And at any rate, that was our third 

finding.

Any questions on that? I think we covered --

Member Lockey: So, were there any records were 

available for 773-A?

Dr. Taulbee: For job plans, yes.

Member Lockey: Is there?

Dr. Taulbee: Yes. They switched from safe work 

permit methodology to DPSOLs, the DuPont 

standard operating lists. So, a lot of those tasks 

that they would be doing, they just initialed off on. 

And so there's no way to tie those initials back to an 
37

individual person.

And we're only able to find those DPSOLs for a small 

period of time, as well. They weren't maintained as 

if you would a rad record these days.

Member Lockey: So, there's 30, as you say, these 

are for 30-plus facilities that weren't sampled?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Major radiological facilities.

Member Lockey: You have no records?

Dr. Taulbee: Well, yes. But, I mean major 

radiological facilities here. I take issue with what 

Joe's saying there. I mean PuFF and PEF, they're 

all, they're both in 235-F, it's a pretty small 

building.

Yes, it's a major radiological facility doing a lot of 

production. We have a lot of contamination 

records. We know when the construction work was 

done on that.

So, there's more information than just these, you 

know, the job plans as --

Member Beach: But can you tie those to any 

workers?

Dr. Taulbee: Yes and no. We can from external 

dosimetry for some degree. For construction 

trades, it gets a lot harder because of they could 

have been from central shops coming up there.

Member Beach: How about internal?

Dr. Taulbee: For?

Member Beach: Internal?

Dr. Taulbee: For internal --

Member Beach: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: -- records? General areas, yes. F 

area, H area, that's how the bioassay was collected.
38

So, the major areas, like I said, F, H, A, N, each of 

the reactors we can tie the -- the internal to those 

areas.

So, through a combination of things, so that's why I 

take exception of, you know, there's no information 

whatsoever. There's a lot of other ancillary 

information. It's not what we had that we were 

trying to evaluate here.

Member Ziemer: Is there any reason to think that 

job plans and work permits at the other facilities 

would be somehow different than what we have for 

773?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Who knows?

Member Ziemer: And would have the same 

shortcomings?

Mr. Fitzgerald: We don't know.

Dr. Taulbee: I have no indication that they would 

be any different.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, but we don't know.

Member Ziemer: No, no, I understand that, but --

Mr. Fitzgerald: It's sort of like we can assume, we 

can speculate, but we don't know.

Member Ziemer: Well, if you assume they did, then 

you have the same shortcomings.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I'm just saying that --

Dr. Taulbee: Exactly. It's the same shortcoming 

either way.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- we, we don't know to what 

degree they would swing either way. But going 

back to the comment how major is major, it's like 

how complete is complete?

You're talking about a pretty big reservation, okay?
39

Member Ziemer: Oh, yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: The number of nuclear radiological 

facilities, and we're focused on a completeness 

evaluation that only looks at one. So.

Member Lockey: So, what, what percentage is 773-

A population wise for that facility?

Mr. Fitzgerald: What would you say?

Dr. Taulbee: Probably 15 percent, 15 to 20. Maybe 

to a 10 percent type of thing, so.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Ten percent maybe. I don't know. 

It's somewhere, it's certainly a fraction of the --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Dr. Taulbee: I mean as Joe mentioned, you know, 

and not saying I did look at the NOCTS data, and in 

the '70s we, you know for the graph that I showed 

yesterday, there's a marked decrease of 

subcontractor monitoring in the '70s.

But in the '80s its up around 80, 90 percent, which 

is why I can under the belief that job plan 

methodology was handled about the same over this 

time period. Because we're seeing a large number 

of them being monitored.

So, somehow these subcontractors were making it 

into the bioassay system.

So, you know, if, whether it is not all of them would 

be on a routine schedule, some of them who came 

back frequently would be, sure, so it's working but 

we don't have the proof that, that Joe's indicating 

here.

But we don't have evidence that it's not, either.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And we don't have any real 

evidence of what the completeness would be. 

Because even though the, the numbers were going 

up, the degree to which, you know, recognize where 
40

this all came from was this finding in 1997 that they 

weren't collecting the majority of the job-specific 

bioassays required by RWP.

So, that's why we're even looking at this issue. And 

what we're trying to establish is what the 

completeness.

Dr. Taulbee: I take exception to what you just said 

there, Joe.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: Because you said that, that you 

weren't leaving the bioassays from the RWPs. A 

small fraction weren't, about 5 percent of the jobspecific bioassay were not being left.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Job specific bioassays.

Dr. Taulbee: And that is why DOE fined the site on 

a procedural violation. They went back and did a 

re-sampling. None of those workers had any 

intakes in that time period.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I would argue --

Dr. Taulbee: Okay, that was done.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, but I would argue --

Dr. Taulbee: And so --

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- that, you know --

Dr. Taulbee: -- you're making the assumption that 

--

Mr. Fitzgerald: No.

Dr. Taulbee: -- all these people were -- none of 

them were monitored. It's a smaller fraction.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, but keep, keep in mind, I, I 

would have a problem writing this off to a 

procedural when --
41

Dr. Taulbee: That wasn't the fine.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, no.

Dr. Taulbee: It was 10 CRF 30, not at 35.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I hear echoes of Westinghouse. 

We're looking at a dose reconstruction context here. 

The question is --

Dr. Taulbee: It is the coworker model.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- the question is -- yes, the 

coworker model. We're asking about data 

sufficiency, and whether or not that data is available 

to be reflected in the coworker model or not.

And if it's missing, you know, by a large degree, 

that's an issue. Now, if, you know, the, the 

question of whether it's missing because of a 

procedural problem or not, it's missing.

And also, I think the connotation that it was simply 

a procedural mishap, I think ignores the question of 

well, why do we do job-specific bioassays when 

required by radiological work permit?

Well, because you have a unique or specialized 

issue that requires a prompt bioassay that would 

look at whether or not, or timely bioassay, looking 

at whether or not there was intake. You would not 

do them otherwise.

So, I think it's not just simply a procedural issue, 

it's something that has some substance to it.

Dr. Taulbee: And yesterday Joe, we went through 

and looked at all the 1990 to 1998 and we showed 

that those workers who did not leave samples, 

violating that procedure, were monitored alongside 

other -- or other workers working beside them were 

monitored.

So, from a coworker standpoint in dose 

reconstruction, they are represented in that 

coworker model. Therefore, we can do dose 
42

reconstruction.

Mr. Fitzgerald: In 1998?

Member Lockey: I don't think we're talking about 

that. We're talking about before '90, you know.

Mr. Fitzgerald: We're talking about yes, the '72 to -

-

Dr. Taulbee: But he brought up in violation again 

from 1997, so.

Member Lockey: Yes, but --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, no, that's, that --

Member Lockey: We're talking about the DuPont 

era.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I'm talking '72 to '89.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: I don't have an argument with '98.

Member Lockey: You're talking about the DuPont 

era.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I'm talking about DuPont era.

Member Lockey: Well, he's talking about --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, and the impetus to look 

backwards is, for that reason that if you have, and 

you're putting out the numbers of subcontractors 

for, that were being bioassayed or monitored was 

going up, I don't disagree with that.

I think that clearly, in the mid-80s and beyond, 

more subcontractors were coming onsite and -- and 

particularly by time you got to Westinghouse, the 

monitoring was done very well.

However, the degree to which that actual job-
43

specific bioassay was complete is the question that 

we're trying to weigh.

And I think for the DuPont era, that's not clear 

because we have a assessment that focuses on one 

facility maybe 10 percent, who knows, of the 

radiological workers, and my question on this 

particular finding is given the fact that the Advisory 

Board, in the very beginning, found the scope to be 

wanting in terms of the numbers of facilities, 

meaning one, and the numbers of years involved, I 

would question whether that scope has improved 

that much that the question can be answered very 

well.

Now, notice I'm not saying that there was an 

answer, I'm just saying that it's difficult to answer 

the question with, with one facility over intermittent 

time periods. We don't even have all the time 

periods in 773-A.

That's the, that's the finding in three.

So, the question is, you know, while NOCTS may be 

more representative of the facilities' source terms, 

there's no argument there, we find that the report 

in 92 evaluation is not.

And we think it makes a conclusion regarding the 

Savannah River subcontractor completeness onsite 

like basis questionable, and that's our finding for 

number 3.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay, so --

Member Ziemer: Well, you'll have a chance to 

respond.

Dr. Taulbee: We will be responding, yes. Well, John 

will be responding.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: He's using the royal "we".

(Simultaneous speaking.)
44

(Laughter.)

Member Lockey: So, Tim, the presentation you 

made to us yesterday regarding 773-A, we can't do 

for the other facilities because the data's just not 

there?

Dr. Taulbee: That's correct.

Member Lockey: Okay, that's, I think that's what I 

need to know.

Dr. Taulbee: That's correct.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, so moving on.

And again, we're still on assumptions and premise.

Finding 4, this is a more specific question and, you 

know, in the '92 review, and as Tim covered 

yesterday, they did look at incident-based data, 

bioassays that were done in the, was it the canyons, 

Tim?

Dr. Taulbee: It was in F and H areas.

Mr. Fitzgerald: F and H areas.

Dr. Taulbee: It wasn't just the canyons. It was --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right. Looking at incident data as a 

source of information as to whether or not 

bioassays were in fact, linked and performed and 

addressed the, the nuclides in questions.

And our question here, and it's sort of an open 

question, but, you know, it's, it's of concern to us, is 

we looked at these incident reports and we 

understand the context, and the context is, you 

know, we, we, you know, certainly NIOSH only had 

773-A.

So, you're, you're trying to and I think Tim actually 

mentioned this, but you're trying to look and see 

what other sources of information you have that 

would indicate that, that in this case, DuPont was 
45

performing bioassays as they should.

Dr. Taulbee: On subcontractors.

Mr. Fitzgerald: On subcontractors, and certainly the 

incident is something you can track a lot easier than 

job plans, which you can't really track much at all in 

some cases.

But in the incident review, these involved in a lot of 

cases that we can find, they involve special 

bioassays, and special bioassays were incidentdriven bioassays. And in the DuPont regime, not to 

mention Westinghouse regime, that's a whole 

different kettle of fish.

They had unlike your normal bioassays, the 

procedures that DuPont actually had for special 

bioassays were quite explicit. I mean they actually 

walked down a lot of detail about the 

documentation, the management responsibility and 

accountability, and what Health Physics did, what 

line management did, all these were specified in, in 

the DuPont procedures.

And it was pretty clear that if there was a incidentdriven, or incident involving a potential intake that, 

under the special bioassay procedures, you know, 

you would have to respond. You would have to in 

fact, provide the bioassays, and you would have to 

do it in a very timely way, and there were a number 

of responsibilities that were assigned along the 

process.

So, the question we're raising here is if we're 

looking at the completeness of the, you know, jobspecific bioassays as a consequence of permits, it's 

almost like this is a non sequitur.

We can't quite figure out, this is useful information 

but does it really contribute to a understanding of 

the completeness question?

Can it be used along with, or can it complement the 

matching process that NIOSH went through to look 
46

at, you know, job plans and looking at whether or 

not there were job-specific bioassays or not, and 

taking credit for that.

We think in this case, that given the degree of 

accountability and explicit responsibilities that we'd 

be more surprised if they didn't have 100 percent 

for these. It really didn't give you a whole lot of 

leeway for not responding. So, it's unclear to us.

Although we understand the value of just having 

more information, we don't see this as necessarily 

contributing, per se, to the question of 

completeness on the job plans as far as job-specific 

bioassays.

The job-specific bioassays just, just are not the 

same in our view as the special bioassays that were 

required under DuPont procedures. That's the 

essence of our finding here.

Dr. Taulbee: And so maybe we can respond more, 

but if I could just make a quick comment here.

When we did this, I mean one of the things we were 

looking at in our mindset and our thought here was 

if we look at these incidents, and none of these 

subcontractors we find bioassay for, clearly there's 

a problem.

But if we find a bioassay for them then, like Joe's 

saying, is that really answering the completeness? 

Well, no, but it certainly would have answered it the 

opposite way if we had not found any bioassay for 

these people.

That was our mindset in going through this. Okay.

Member Ziemer: And this is pretty much site-wide 

on these, right?

Dr. Taulbee: We had F and H area.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, this is, this is just one complex, 

but it's a bigger complex.
47

Dr. Taulbee: Well, there's, that's most your 30 

radiological facilities.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: It's a bigger, it's a bigger complex, 

yes.

Dr. Taulbee: So, it's.

Co-Chair Anderson: It's where the incidents 

occurred.

Member Lockey: So, let me see if I -- so DuPont 

had in place for special incidents, what I'm hearing 

you say is that they were pretty strict on making 

sure everything was followed?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, even more so, and you know, 

the procedures -- we find DuPont procedures to be 

pretty general procedures, more performancebased. You know, they didn't, you know, compared 

with what Westinghouse came out with later.

Member Lockey: Well, I'm talking about the --

Mr. Fitzgerald: These special bioassay procedures 

though, were, were, a lot more explicit, more 

detailed about responsibilities than the other 

procedures on bioassay.

So, I'm just saying that the distinction when you 

look at these, these special bioassays, is the level of 

accountability, responsibility and definition of 

responsibility. So --

Dr. Taulbee: Identifying the source term, the 

radiation --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Dr. Taulbee: -- characterization he was talking 

about is there.

Mr. Fitzgerald: You had, yes, it was all there, and, 

you know, it would be wonderful if you actually saw 
48

that for the balance of the bioassay program.

But for special bioassays, they were accorded a 

level of attention you don't see elsewhere.

So, we're saying that when you look at this, it's, it 

has to be in the context that this is a much different 

beast than the other job-specific bioassays.

And if they were, if they came up with percentages 

that were pretty low, I would be shocked because it 

doesn't give you a whole lot of leeway. It says you 

shall do this, this, this and that. You document this, 

this, and that. So.

Dr. Taulbee: It's not 100 percent.

Mr. Fitzgerald: No, and I was, actually, I was 

surprised it wasn't 100 percent because actually --

Dr. Taulbee: You can't compel somebody to always 

leave a bioassay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes. So, in any case, but that's my 

only -- in terms of apples and oranges, I think 

again, this is not necessarily the same, and it has 

implications for how you would address that as far 

as a question of completeness.

It's useful, it's ancillary, but I, I think our finding is 

it should be, it should be viewed in the context of 

not being the same necessarily.

Dr. Taulbee: And I don't dispute that but I would 

like to point out that that data is also in the 

coworker model for those subcontractors, and it's 

typically if they caught in intake, that's going to be 

some of your higher data.

So, that is already in the coworker model that we 

are making.

Member Ziemer: And probably the reason 

management had such explicit detail on this 

because the potential for higher exposures on these 

is much greater than the routine models.
49

Mr. Fitzgerald: Exactly. You have evidence of 

intake.

Member Ziemer: Right.

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, potential evidence of intake.

Member Ziemer: Right, yes.

Dr. Taulbee: Because not everybody got an intake.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes. Okay, so anyway, that's the 

fourth finding.

The finding 5, which is the last one of this sort of 

suite of questions on assumptions and basis for '72; 

again, we're talking '72 to '89.

Returning to an old issue. I mean this issue was 

raised repeatedly over the last five to ten years. 

But, I think it's worth revisiting it one more time, 

okay, because you know, almost all sites when we 

have destruction of records, it's a significant issue, 

it's something that the Board and SC&A and NIOSH 

has examined at some length because it has 

implications. You know, what records and to what 

extent and what are the implications of having 

those missing records.

And for Savannah River, it's pretty clear based on 

the interviews that when, when DuPont was leaving 

the site there was a destruction of subcontractor 

records, the scope of which is not clear. But based 

on the interviews, and this is a quote from the 

interview summary, it likely included monitoring 

records and time cards. That's two examples.

Now, it's not clear, there was no inventory, there 

was no interview of the people that did the 

destruction. So, this is kind of anecdotal.

But it was, it was pretty clear that when DuPont was 

leaving the site as contractor, there were, there 

were, you know, 38 years they were the operating 

contractor at Savannah River. When they were 

leaving, there was a effort to destroy, shred or 
50

whatever, the subcontractor records going out the 

door.

And as I think Tim's team has attributed, some of 

the difficulty in finding permit and -- and job plans 

and what have you for other facilities, it may 

actually lend itself to the fact that that may have 

been part of the records that were destroyed.

On top of that, when the Tiger Team came in not 

too long after that, if you think of DuPont actually 

ceased being operating contractor at the end of 

March in 1989 and the Tiger Team was March of 

1990, they found many personnel files where 

radiation dose data are missing for many years.

And did some probing and in addition to, you know, 

the possible destruction of records, which they did 

not site but they raised the question of the -- there 

was a DuPont policy of transferring records to the 

federal records repository after, you know, two 

years, I guess it was.

And that it proved to be systemically difficult to 

retrieve them in any organized way. And this sort 

of harkens to some of the experience that we've 

had with the, the repository that it, you know, you 

can send records to a repository, but trying to 

retrieve them in a way which makes them useable is 

a challenge.

And I think in our report we point out that we had 

something similar at Sandia where, you know, they 

had a vast amount of records but it was hard to 

retrieve them in a organized way.

So, that was DOE's finding. I'm not going to -- you 

know, we did not review that other than we're just 

saying that that was also something that DOE found 

back in 1990.

Dr. Taulbee: Again, to comment on that one. And 

we will be writing a response to this one as -- well, 

we're writing responses to everything for the Work 

Group to review.
51

But, in this particular case, this particular finding of 

the radiation dose data missing for many years is 

related to it not being physically onsite. Okay, that 

was the actual finding within the DOE.

And one thing I'd like to point out and then Paul, 

you may remember and because early on in this 

program when we started, we started to request 

records from the various DOE sites, and initially we 

started just receiving annual records back, and we 

started asking and we need the actual dosimetry 

records.

Each of the sites had to go back and retrieve all of 

their records from these federal records centers, the 

actual dose data. They did not retrieve the SWPs or 

the job plans and all of that information. They 

retrieved all the internal, all the external data to 

respond to our claimants.

So, in 2002, 2003 timeframe at Savannah River 

along with Idaho and all the major sites made these 

massive requests back from the records centers, 

that effectively I would say cancels out this 

particular finding that, that DOE, that the Tiger 

Team had.

Yes, the missing -- the data was not onsite, that's 

why they were cited in the Tiger Team. But as a 

result of our program, these, each of these sites 

pulled the records back and they catalogued them, 

Idaho did a phenomenal job with cataloguing but 

you found that, that one of the things we found with 

the Idaho cohort was the subcontractors whose 

temporary badges were not coded, and now they 

have been coded.

So, that's, that's where this is.

Member Ziemer: But they didn't find these SRS 

records?

Dr. Taulbee: No, they did.

Member Ziemer: Oh, they did find them?
52

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, they found them and they're all 

back there.

Member Ziemer: Oh, they are all back?

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, yes.

Member Ziemer: Okay, got you.

Dr. Taulbee: All the external dosimetry, all the 

internal dosimetry is back.It's the special work 

permits, the job plans, the other contamination 

surveys, air sample data. That they didn't pull 

back; they haven't pulled it all back.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And I, yes, I don't disagree. I think 

this is something that we wanted to have a 

punctuation point on because it's a pretty pithy 

issue as far as completeness goes.

The question I think I would leave, though, is I'm 

not sure and I've heard you touch on this. I'm not 

sure whether we established as part of this process 

that given the acknowledged destruction of the 

subcontractor records, that in fact, there's a 

confidence that, that you have the exposure or the 

dose records for subcontractors, that you feel that's 

a complete database.

I mean if the, the --

Dr. Taulbee: I look at NOCTS.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, no, that is the claimant file. 

But, you know, what, what would give you 

confidence given the, the interview finding that, that 

these records were destroyed, and may have 

included monitoring records that, that the 

monitoring records were probably air sampling and 

not exposure?

Because I think there was something in there that 

the exposure records were segregated, so they 

would not have been available for destruction.

You may be answering this in your response, but I 
53

think that would be useful for the record is to 

there's no issue with that destruction because as 

you point out, it was limited, more than likely 

limited to, you know, air sampling, permits and not 

the dose records themselves.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay, we will respond.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Because I think that, that really 

hasn't, I mean I think we've talked about them but 

it hasn't, I haven't seen it actually addressed per se.

That's the question in finding 5, that we still have 

this question of, of whether or not key exposure and 

dose records for subcontractors may have been part 

of the records destruction that took place.

And you're saying, you're saying that it wasn't.

Dr. Taulbee: Well, we have evidence that it was. I 

mean, we have ancillary evidence that some records 

were destroyed from the interviews with workers.

Mr. Fitzgerald: But some records, but not 

necessarily the key records.

Dr. Taulbee: No. Yes, I mean.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, that's, that's a distinction I 

think would be useful for NIOSH to respond to that 

in fact, it was the ancillary records, the records that 

are useful to have as far as surveys like we're doing 

in 92. But not the essential dose records.

Dr. Taulbee: We have no evidence that those 

records are missing.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: From that time period.

Member Ziemer: All right, keep in mind that many 

facilities of this type, those records -- duplicates 

exist in more than one place.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes.
54

Dr. Taulbee: Yes.

Member Ziemer: And it would not be unusual, 

particularly if they're pulling out to get rid of the 

duplicates because the originals have been --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Member Ziemer: -- sent to the repository.

So, it may very well be that some dosimetry records

were destroyed. But, I would be very surprised if 

there weren't duplicates that they didn't need 

anymore.

There may not be a way to prove that, but.

Dr. Taulbee: I think the claimant response that we 

did in NOCTS is pretty significant from the, you 

know, somebody works on the site, you know, we 

ask them were they monitored, and we go and we 

get their monitoring records.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: So, clearly those records weren't 

destroyed.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Well, anyway, I think you 

obviously --

Co-Chair Anderson: You get the work plans? I 

mean, you don't have the work plans for this period.

Dr. Taulbee: We don't. Well, we have one area.

Co-Chair Anderson: Yes, but do you have any 

indication that although you got all sorts of other 

records back from the federal repository that are 

there, are those records still there? Or are they not 

there?

Dr. Taulbee: We have --

Co-Chair Anderson: You sort of implied that they 

sent all this other stuff, but these were not sent 

implies that they are there. I mean I'm not saying 
55

you want to take two years to get them, but if 

they're there on an individual basis it might be 

helpful.

Dr. Taulbee: Not the individual -- well, the 

individual records, they were sent and they were 

retrieved back by the site and they're all physically 

on the site now. And we've been into that records 

room multiple times.

Some of the other records that were sent away, 

such as air sampling and contamination surveys, we 

believe that those were not destroyed either. 

Because we do see them in the inventory 

catalogues, so the EDMS system.

Co-Chair Anderson: Okay.

Dr. Taulbee: And so, but in searching for job plans, 

we can't find them and neither can the records 

folks. They know they existed at one point, but 

they're not in their --

Co-Chair Anderson: Yes, got it.

Dr. Taulbee: -- inventory system. That's our 

indication --

Co-Chair Anderson: So, it's not a --

Dr. Taulbee: -- that they were --

Co-Chair Anderson: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: -- destroyed.

Co-Chair Anderson: Yes.

Member Ziemer: So, one other comment.

So, most large organizations have rules on what 

you can destroy, and when. And I would be 

surprised if dosimetry records were ever destroyed.

Dr. Taulbee: Exactly.

Member Ziemer: Because those, those lifetime 
56

dose record rules went into effect in the '50s. But, 

it wouldn't surprise me if you had an early destroy 

date on something like a job plan. By early, I mean 

--

Dr. Taulbee: Right.

Member Ziemer: -- a decade or two.

Dr. Taulbee: Yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right, and I think with the --

Member Ziemer: But you never found any, any 

administrative information on how long to keep 

different records at that site?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. Well, actually.

Member Ziemer: I mean they would have it for 

financial records, and they would probably have it 

for firing records.

Dr. Taulbee: They follow a federal records 

schedule.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, yes. And I think Westinghouse 

came up with a very explicit look in response to the 

Tiger Team, very explicit records policies.

But I think I agree that before that, you had federal 

requirements. And my sense is that you didn't have 

radiation dose records, the critical records, 

destroyed. There were other records destroyed.

But I think given these findings, it would be very 

helpful just to have a punctuation point on that 

question before we wrap this up. Because it, these 

findings from DOE in these interview comments are 

ones that raise some questions about the 

subcontractors in particular, and what will happen 

when DuPont left the site.

I mean just the perspective of DuPont leaving the 

site and there's a, you know, several days' effort to 

destroy subcontractor records by numbers of people 
57

with a pickup truck, I think that was the interview, 

it doesn't -- it's not a good pictorial.

And I think that would be useful closure on that 

particular item.

Co-Chair Clawson: How about a comfort break? I 

just saw a lot of submarines in somebody's eyes.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, well, that was the five 

findings, so we'll pick up from here.

Mr. Katz: That's good; it's 10:00 o'clock. Let's take 

it -- make it 15 because we keep saying 10 and it 

ends up being 15 anyway.

So, 15 minutes.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 9:59 a.m. and resumed at 10:16 a.m.)

Mr. Katz: So, we're back, almost exactly on time. 

Joe?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. We're going to expedite this 

a little bit. The next one is an observation, and I've 

already touched on this already, about the 

difference between the Westinghouse and DuPont 

era, and the cautionary note about trying to -- or 

not trying to, but inadvertently applying some of the 

assumptions that are, in fact, valid for 

Westinghouse, but aren't necessarily valid for 

DuPont.

Now, I'm not going to go through this in detail. You 

have it in the slides. One thing I want to point out 

is that the '88 to '90 is a tremendously big change 

time period for Savannah River. And I just threw 

those out -- actually, I left out one, which was the 

1987 National Academy review post-Chernobyl.

So, there was a lot of things going on in terms of 

reviews and changes at Savannah River that 

ultimately ended up with Westinghouse the new 
58

operating contractor, and a fairly substantial 

revamp of the management approach and 

procedural basis for the radiation protection 

program, and the internal dosimetry program in 

particular.

So, you know, I think that threshold, that change 

time period needs to be kept in mind, because it, 

again, is I think very relevant to the question of 

how complete are the records and what was 

happening.

I'm going to stop there, because we really need to 

get into the other sections of the report which deal 

with, what I called the earlier, the execution and the 

results the matching criteria that NIOSH supplied. 

And I'm going to turn to Bob Barton, who actually 

did a lot of the -- did the work on the sampling part 

of this.

Again, this is 1972 to '89. We're still in the DuPont 

era, so keep that in mind. Bob?

Mr. Barton: Thank you, Joe. Yeah, in this section 

what we're really talking about is the percentage of 

the workers who were on job plans and were 

monitored or not monitored.

And there's really two main metrics here to keep in 

mind. There's those who were directly monitored, 

either via --

Mr. Katz: Wait, hold on a sec, Bob. I'm just

realizing the phone -- and thank you to all -- the 

phone is here and you are there.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Do you want to move here?

Mr. Katz: Let's see if I can't -- yeah, why don't we 

do that actually, if you can.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah.

Mr. Katz: And you can pop right to the laptop, 

how's that?
59

(Pause.)

Mr. Barton: Okay, I'll start again. Yeah, this is the 

section where we're really going to talk about the 

calculation of the actual percentages.

And there's really two metrics to think about. 

There's those workers who were directly monitored. 

They had urinalysis or chest counts associated with 

that job plan.

And then there's the effectively monitored 

population, which is a combination of those workers 

who were directly monitored and those workers who 

had a coworker. They may not have been directly 

monitored, but they had a coworker on the job plan 

who was monitored.

So, again, that's the two metrics: the directly 

monitored, and the effectively monitored expands 

upon that to include workers who would be 

represented by a monitored worker who was on that 

job plan.

So, when we went in and looked at the data for 

1972 to 1989, we made three major adjustments. 

We removed internal monitoring that was outside of 

the acceptable timeframe between the end of the 

job plan and the observed internal monitoring 

result. And what I mean by "acceptable timeframe" 

ism if you have a chest count, after two years it's no 

longer considered a valid measure of the internal 

exposure. And that even goes for the longer-lived 

radionuclides.

But, if you have urinalysis results, those can be 

many, many years down the line and still be a valid 

result. And for urinalysis for fission products, it's 

also a two-year cut-off.

So, basically, if you were outside of two years from 

the end of the job plan -- with the exception of 

urinalysis for long-lived radionuclides, such as 

plutonium and americium -- it's really not 

considered a directly monitored result anymore. 
60

So, that's one thing that we adjusted for.

We also found a couple of instances where coworker 

matches had been made for two different job plans. 

In other words, you had an unmonitored worker on 

Job Plan A and that was matched to a monitored 

worker on a completely different job plan, so, Job 

Plan B. So, we adjusted for that.

And the last one concerns this effectively monitored 

population. We adjusted that to only reflect if the 

coworker result would actually be used in a 

coworker model. For example, americium is based 

on urinalysis results. So, if the coworker actually 

had an in vivo result, that's not actually used in the 

coworker model; thus, it's not a representative 

sample for the unmonitored worker.

So, we're going to start with americium here. And 

we're just kind of pointing out, again, the limitations 

of what years we had for analysis. For americium, 

it was actually just 1973 and the period from 1981 

to 1987. So, again, there's no -- we had not job 

plans for analysis in 1972, '74 to '80, or '88 to '89.

The evaluation does include both urinalysis and in 

vivo samples for americium, because both are 

capable of detecting it. But, again, outside of two 

years, in vivo -- or chest count samples would be 

more accurate -- are no longer considered a valid 

monitoring result. Again, outside of two years.

And, again, as I mentioned before, only urinalysis 

data is used in the coworker model for americium. 

So, only those monitoring results are relevant when 

you start to calculate that effectively monitored 

population.

Dr. Taulbee: Can I ask a question?

Mr. Barton: Sure.

Dr. Taulbee: So, if we had developed a coworker 

model with the inclusion of both urinalysis and the 

in vivo counting, would you have considered that, 
61

then, to be included?

Mr. Barton: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay.

Mr. Barton: So what we're looking at here is a 

chart, just to kind of show the spread of these 

various monitoring results in relation to the end of 

the job plan. On the X axis you have the number of 

years after the job plan, and we have plotted here 

in the orange triangles the urinalysis results and the 

chest counts for americium. And we have the black 

vertical line there right on the two year mark.

So, as you see, all those blue circles to the right of 

that line would no longer be considered relevant to 

this study because they're outside of that two-year 

cut-off.

Again, only for chest counts. All those orange 

triangles count even though they could be, as you 

see here, five, six years down the line from the end 

of the actual job plan.

So, this brings us to observations 2 and 3, and I'll 

read these in. Observation 2: during the 1972 to 

1974 period, RPRT-92 only evaluates one job 

plan/worker combination, and that was Job Plan No. 

46, for potential americium exposure.

However, we noticed that in Attachment D to RPRT92, it actually indicates there is one other job plan, 

Job Plan No. 47, that required americium 

monitoring. However, evaluation of that job plan 

showed the workers involved in that weren't 

monitored either. So we're just pointing out that 

RPRT-92 shows there was only one job plan to 

evaluate. It actually might have been two, but the 

result is the same: those workers weren't 

monitored.

Observation 3: only 13 percent of the subcontractor 

job plan combinations, and there were 17 total, had 

americium urinalysis performed that could be 
62

considered relevant to coworker modeling.

Eleven of the 17 urinalysis data points represented 

incident-driven monitoring that were actually 

outside of the period of interest and in a different 

area.

On to findings 6 and 7. And, again, we're talking 

about americium here.

For the period 1980 to 1989, only 20 percent of the 

identified subcontractor job plan combinations 

identified by NIOSH as requiring americium 

sampling had internal monitoring performed within 

the acceptable timeframe. So, again, that's chest 

counts within two years but a urinalysis result pretty 

much anywhere down the line. So, 20 percent were 

directly monitored when making those adjustments 

for that two-year cut-off point.

Finding 7, and this is regarding the effectively 

monitored population. So, this is when you add in if 

the unmonitored worker had a monitored coworker 

on the same job plan.

So finding 7 is the total effectively monitored 

population for americium -- again, those monitored 

directly or have a coworker on the same job plan 

with a urinalysis result during the 1980 to 1989 

period -- is approximately 33 percent.

So that's the 20 percent that were directly 

monitored, and, on top of that, there's another 13 

percent that we can match to a coworker who had a 

urinalysis result.

Moving on to finding 9, you'll notice these are 

slightly out of sequence, and that's just because 

we're talking about americium in this section.

Finding 9: SC&A does not find that the data 

collected as part of RPRT-92 support the premise 

that subcontractors on job plans that should have 

required internal monitoring for americium were 

either directly monitored -- again, around 20 
63

percent -- or alternately represented in the derived 

coworker models for SRS, around 13 percent. So, 

again, that gets us to the effectively monitored 

percentage of just 33.

Monitoring of fission products. SC&A's monitored 

total is about 70 percent and it really closely 

matches NIOSH's, which was 74 percent. And the 

difference is really, again, due to the removal of 

those samples that were greater than two years 

after the end of the job plan. And, again, this goes 

to what data is actually used in the coworker model. 

All the fission product monitoring identified for this 

earlier period, '72 to '74, is based on urinalysis, not 

in vivo. The coworker model is based on in vivo.

So, again, the effectively monitored population 

really remains unchanged because, even though 

people on the same job plan might have been 

monitored, it was via urinalysis. The coworker 

model is based on in vivo. And that's so the 70

percent effectively monitored can be compared to 

the RPRT-92 reported total, which was actually 94 

percent.

Moving on to the '80 to '89 period, SC&A again were 

about 73 percent and the RPRT-92 total was at 78 

percent. The difference here is, again, removal of 

those entries that were greater than two years.

And a few of the entries we just couldn't verify. A 

couple of them we couldn't find the actual source 

dosimetry file, and the remaining one, when we 

found it in the dosimetry file, we couldn't find the

actual sample in that file.

And, again, the majority of these fission product 

monitoring is based on urinalysis, not in vivo, so the 

effectively monitored population in this case only 

marginally increased to 74 percent. And that can 

be compared to the 99 percent, which was reported 

in RPRT-92.

So, this is basically that finding, that many of the 

workers, around 70 to 73 percent, who should have 
64

been monitored for fission products underwent the 

appropriate internal sampling. And this is for the 

entire period prior to 1990, and this is fission 

products.

But, again, very few of these monitored workers 

underwent in vivo counting. Thus, they are not 

included in the coworker model and can't be 

considered as representative to the unmonitored 

worker.

And this sort of brings us into the Westinghouse 

era, which is Ron Buchanan's domain.

Co-Chair Anderson: Just --

Mr. Barton: Yes, I'm sorry.

Co-Chair Anderson: This was still only Area A?

Mr. Barton: Yes.

Co-Chair Anderson: Okay.

Mr. Barton: Yes. Oh, one more thing. You will 

notice there's no slides here for plutonium. That's 

because our numbers pretty much exactly matched 

what NIOSH presented. So, really no point.

Dr. Taulbee: One thing I would like to point out 

about the americium -- and this is important, in my 

opinion -- is that americium, in most of the areas, 

based upon the Farrell and Findley document, is tied 

with where the areas where it's now required, 

whereas before it wasn't necessarily required, was 

due to the ingrowth of americium and aged 

plutonium as it grows.

However, Savannah River, unlike many other sites, 

most other sites, actually did americium separation, 

okay, where they purified it, where they made it 

ultra-pure so plutonium isn't the tied in. Where that 

took place was in three areas onsite, two of them 

were in A Area, that we've been kind of focusing on 

and we only have there. There's only one other 

facility, the F Area, where americium exists by itself 
65

without being tied to plutonium.

Member Ziemer: Bob, I have a question on finding 

6 that it may be that I'm not understanding the 

wording, but it appears to say that americium 

sampling was required in the job plan. Twenty 

percent of the subcontractor job plan combinations 

identified by NIOSH as requiring americium 

sampling.

Mr. Barton: As identified by NIOSH as requiring 

americium sampling.

Member Ziemer: Oh, okay. I thought you were 

saying the job --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Dr. Taulbee: No, not in the plan.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: Okay, I thought you said the job 

plan combinations that you identified -- the job 

plans didn't require it?

Dr. Taulbee: No, we made the assumption that if 

they wore a respirator it would be required under a 

modern standard.

Member Ziemer: Okay, yeah.

Mr. Barton: And these were also job plans that 

were in a specific area of --

Member Ziemer: No, no --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: I think someone could interpret 

that as saying that the job plan was requiring it. It 

should say that combinations -- well, okay. NIOSH 

said it should be required.

Mr. Barton: That's right.

Member Ziemer: The job plan.
66

Mr. Barton: Yes. Right.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Mr. Barton: Okay, was there any other questions?

Ron Buchanan, you have the phone if you want to 

take over for the Westinghouse era, 1990 to 1998.

Dr. Buchanan: Yeah, this is Ron. We've been 

talking about the lack of representation of areas in 

the earlier period, and so what I wanted to do was 

look at the 1990 to 1998 period and see did the 

RWPs -- and we'd also previously done this with the 

NOCTS data -- cover the different areas, or was it 

limited to mostly Area A, as we've seen on the 

issues there in the past.

And so I looked at the RWP data and I found that it 

was representative of several major areas, A, E, F, 

H, M and G, for the period '91 to '98. Now, 

however, it did bring out the fact that there was 

only one RWP for 1990, which was for Area F, and 

there was no monitored subcontractor trade 

workers in that RWP.

And so the next slide, please.

Okay, so, this led us to finding 10, that the data for 

1990 is lacking. That 1990 should be included with 

the period of limited data of '72 to '89, and not 

bundled in with the year '91, because in RPRT-92, 

they include '90 and '91 as bundled together.

However, there was corporate changes taking place, 

as we've discussed earlier. However, we've seen it 

took a while for this to take effect, that in 1990 

there was only one RWP and we're considering 

RWPs in '92. And so not necessarily claimant data, 

but RWPs.

And so, in SC&A's estimate, 1990 should not be 

bundled with 1991, but should be treated with the 

earlier era. And so that would break the time 

period up into '72 through '90, and '91 through '98, 
67

so that 1990 is considered an era with very limited 

data.

Okay, next slide, please.

Okay, now, this has been kind of a touchy subject in 

should you require that all radionuclides that are 

listed on an RWP, or assume to be required. Now, 

as we've seen, there's a problem in listing the 

radionuclide on either a job plan or RWP or 

whatever it is. And in RPRT-90, NIOSH assumes, 

according to the respirator requirement or the 

requirements that were listed sometimes later in the 

'90s, the radionuclides listed on the RWP, were they 

monitored for?

And so, say that you had plutonium, uranium, and 

strontium was supposed to be monitored on a RWP 

according to the documentation. And the sub was 

monitored for strontium but not monitored for 

uranium or plutonium. And so what I understood 

NIOSH to say is that, well, they would count that as 

a score that the sub was monitored according to 

that RWP if he is just monitored for just strontium, 

because a coworker could be assigned for the 

others.

We disagree. We say that if the RWP requires three 

radionuclides, then there should be three 

radionuclides monitored either by spatial bioassay, 

by routine bioassay, something in the records in a 

reasonable amount of time that Bob just alluded to, 

to be counted, to fulfill the RWP requirement. 

Because if you can assign coworker dose for 

plutonium and uranium because he had a strontium 

bioassay, what if he didn't have a strontium? You 

can assign a coworker there and count it as a score, 

too.

So, I don't see that they're related, if you have one, 

why that allows you to assign coworker to the other. 

I think that all three should be required.

So, say that you do assume that requirement, that 

all the listed radionuclides either on the RWP or 
68

recommended by NIOSH according to that particular 

area and time.

So, we went through it and we sorted this out and 

we said that the directly monitored -- that's one 

where the sub actually left a bioassay -- it would 

range from 47 to 77 percent compared to 76 to 96 

percent listed in RPRT-92, because you're not 

accounting for as many scores as you do if you only 

have one of the on or more radionuclides required. 

And if you extend this to the coworker and the 

effective monitoring, then we get a range of 55 to 

89 percent, compared to 85 to 99 percent reported 

in RPRT-92. This difference is particularly 

noticeable, of course, in the earlier pre-1990 eras.

So, if you look at the next slide, it summarizes this 

in a table received for the different periods. And 

you've got directly monitored according to RPRT-92, 

and then SC&A's calculation where you had to have 

all the required bioassays. And then we have the 

effective and then, again, SC&A's calculation.

See, in the early years it drops substantially from 

76 percent down to 47 percent for the directly 

monitored, and the effective monitored drops from 

85 to 55 percent, and then, of course, no data for 

part of '70s.

And then, in the '80s, it drops from 90 percent to 51 

percent, and 99 percent to 66 percent. And for the 

'90s, then, it doesn't drop as much, but it still drops 

some, from 96 to 77 percent, and 97 to 89 percent.

So, what we wanted to illustrate here by this 

summary table and our exercise that we performed, 

was that if you consider all the radionuclides being 

required that's listed, then you don't have as large 

percentage as RPRT-92 shows. And so that is what 

the purpose of this exercise was.

Okay, next slide. Okay.

And so this brings us to, again, this coworker issue. 

I have some issues with saying a person is 
69

monitored because he worked beside somebody 

else. And so I wanted to look at was this coworker 

criteria actually applied strictly?

I think that if a person is directly monitored, you 

know that. However, if he's working with someone, 

then there are some criteria that has to be applied 

to say that his intake would simulate the 

unmonitored worker's. And so we looked at the 

data in RPRT-92 and we used their criteria of what 

radionuclides should be monitored for, and such as 

that. And we looked at the unmonitored worker vs. 

the assigned coworker that was monitored, and 

they was on the same RWP 96 percent of the time. 

Okay, so 4 percent of the time they used a 

coworker from a different RWP. 

Unmonitored worker compared to the monitored 

worker had the same job title 60 percent of the 

time. Now, I know that in the previous talk I 

believe NIOSH said that they did not consider that 

the crafts necessarily have to be the same. And in 

some cases, that might be true, but I think, in a lot 

of cases, you don't know that, and so that is 

important that the craft be the same. Because, with 

a glove box, if you've got a electrician working on a 

glove box and then you've got a pipefitter coming in 

and working on a glove box, that might be true. 

They're exposed to similar situations.

However, in a facility, if you've a plumber working 

on a sump pump and you've got a electrician 

working on the case, the wiring in the case, on the 

same RWP at the same time, same date, their 

exposure potential is quite a bit different. And so 

we looked at the craft title -- or job title also.

Dr. Taulbee: Can I ask you a question there, Ron?

Dr. Buchanan: Yeah.

Dr. Taulbee: Did you go through and look at the 

actual work that was being conducted, the tasks on 

that RWP where we were doing those matches? 

And did you see a significant difference of people in 
70

that latter example that you just indicated?

Dr. Buchanan: No. We went by what was given in 

the appendix of RPRT-92 whether the craft title was 

the same. Because if you go back through all the --

we assumed that you went back through all the 

records when you matched them up. But if the craft 

titles weren't the same, then we didn't count it as a 

match. So, the answer is no.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay.

Member Lockey: Jim Lockey. I'm not sure what --

I'm not sure what you were trying to do here. You 

were assuming that the craft title should be the 

same?

Dr. Buchanan: Yes.

Member Lockey: Why? 

Co-Chair Clawson: They should be doing similar 

work.

Dr. Buchanan: Because --

Member Lockey: I don't know, if you're in the 

construction job trades you can have a plumber, 

electrician, and carpenter all doing the same work --

different work within that job title. That doesn't 

make sense to me.

Co-Chair Clawson: No. That's not true. You go 

into a glove box, you have an electrician that's 

going to take and disconnect electricity, he's going 

to be in there for a matter of minutes to be able to 

disconnect it. Then you have a pipefitter or a 

mechanic that's going to be pulling out the glass, 

changing the boots. He may be there three to four 

hours. You can't do that.

Member Lockey: No, I know.

Co-Chair Clawson: Anybody that's worked in --

Member Lockey: They're different job titles.
71

Co-Chair Clawson: They're totally different, but 

they're going to be on the same -- being able to say 

that, well, they're doing the same, they're going to 

get the same, no, that's --

Member Lockey: Well, what I see here is 60 

percent of the time whether they were the same. Is 

that a reasonable figure? Sixty percent of the time, 

is that a reasonable figure, Brad? Is it 40 percent, 

is it 20 percent? Is it 80 percent? 

Co-Chair Clawson: Honestly, I don't think you can 

ever do that, to tell you the truth. I have a hard 

time with the coworker and --

Member Lockey: I know, but when you're looking 

at trades that are coming and doing specific 

subcontract work, I mean, are we going to say that 

unless you have 100 percent that they had to be the 

same trade? That doesn't fit the job process being 

done. It just doesn't work.

Co-Chair Clawson: They need to be doing the same 

thing. Let's take, you bring in a pipefitter now, a 

pipefitter/boilermaker, they weld. Is there going to 

be any difference between that and electrician? 

Substantially --

Member Lockey: Now, we're talking about the title 

of the trade person, that's all we're talking about. I 

mean, this was matched on that they had the same 

title, as I saw.

Dr. Taulbee: Right, and the example that I gave 

yesterday was four people doing the same work of 

all deconning inside a hut, deconning the V2 riser. 

Okay, that's a case where I assume they would find 

there isn't a match, therefore, they weren't doing 

the same work. And I'm saying on the RWP, it says 

what they were doing. The description.

And I'm asking did Ron evaluate those descriptions, 

and he didn't. He indicated that. And I'm not sure 

that we went through in that level of detail. But 

we're on two different sides here. We've got to 
72

match the job title or be in there at the same time. 

And I think perhaps the appropriate one was were 

they doing the same work, or the same type of 

work, in the same exposure environment? And it's 

not one or the other, is the point.

Mr. Fitzgerald: It's not like you need the exposure 

environment because as --

Dr. Taulbee: That's what we were --

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- I think Ron was pointing out, the 

function of the trade or the type of activity, you 

would have a exposure potential of being higher or 

lower.

And that seems to be the question, right?

Member Lockey: Oh, I would agree with that. The 

plumber may be different than a carpenter.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Which would be difficult because, 

you know, but an electrician that had difficulty 

would be there longer. I mean I don't know how 

you --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: Well, the unmonitored worker is 

going to be assigned a number that's based on the 

model, and virtually is never going to match the 

actual data of the workers.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes.

Member Ziemer: It's almost always going to be 

substantially higher.

Co-Chair Anderson: Which was included in the 

model.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Member Ziemer: And that's why the model is used

because it's, it's almost an upper -- well, if they're, 

if they're both working the same site, he's going to 
73

get the 95th value.

So, it's going to be substantially higher. Because 

you can't really account for what you're describing 

here on such a granular basis for every coworker.

Mr. Barton: Let me just clarify something here 

though.

So, during the DuPont analysis, SC&A did not make 

any adjustments based on job title. The only 

adjustments made on coworker matches was if they 

were actually on different job plans.

So, you know, on slide 16 when we report that only 

20 percent were directly monitored, we didn't make 

any adjustments if NIOSH had made a match 

between a coworker and an electrician.

We do note it in the report, but in these totals, 

there's no adjustment for that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Co-Chair Clawson: So, this is just flat out --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Sixty percent of the --

Mr. Barton: That's the earlier careers.

Mr. Katz: Earlier careers, not the careers Ron 

Buchanan's discussing right now.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay, but in the, in the current one, 

60 percent of the time they're on the same job title. 

The example I gave yesterday showed four people 

doing the same work, two laborers, a sheet metal 

and a carpenter. We counted them as the same. 

SC&A would not be counting them in this case.

Co-Chair Clawson: Correct.

Dr. Taulbee: That's the difference.

Mr. Barton: Okay, understood.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Would the clarification notes and 
74

your responding to our review, would the 

clarification be to show, you know, how this would 

play out as far as if you look at the activity vs. the 

job title, or is that too, maybe too complex?

Dr. Taulbee: Well, it would be, it's going to be very 

complex --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, I was going to say --

Dr. Taulbee: -- to do, and there's going to be fully 

a position of judgment --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- when you pull back the cost 

comment, it may not be answerable anyway.

Dr. Taulbee: But it's yes, so it's not --

Member Ziemer: That's why you have the coworker 

model.

Dr. Taulbee: Yes, sir.

Dr. Buchanan: Okay, can I make a clarification 

here?

Mr. Katz: Wait, one sec Ron.

Co-Chair Clawson: Wait a sec.

Mr. Katz: Brad wanted to say something.

Co-Chair Clawson: You're building a model and 

what's this model chosen for? It is to give 

unmonitored workers' dose. Ninety-five percentile, 

correct? Ninety-five percent of nothing is still 

nothing and you get into that.

You think about the petitioner looking at this, the 

people that are actually in these hot cells, actually 

doing this work. And by the way, when you put a 

different person in there that's -- you're not, you're 

not going to stay in there. You get in there, you get 

your job done, you get out.
75

And so you're taking those type of doses given to 

somebody that's over there doing a similar job. I 

see some problems with it. But, you know, I 

understand that we've got to try to figure out some 

way to be able to give the unmonitored workers a 

dose. But it's --

Member Lockey: It's not perfect, Brad, that's for 

sure. 

Co-Chair Clawson: It what?

Member Lockey: It's not perfect, that's for sure

Co-Chair Clawson: It's not perfect but I think it's 

my personal opinion is that it's way off.

Just working in the industry that way, it's, it's just 

little hard for me to swallow.

Go ahead.

Dr. Taulbee: Go ahead, Ron.

Dr. Buchanan: Okay. Well, what I want to clarify is 

that when NIOSH here in RPRT-92, when they are 

matching a coworker to an unmonitored sub, they 

are not talking about the coworker model 95th

percentile, 50th or anything. All they're doing is 

trying to determine whether that sub was monitored 

or not.

If he was monitored, that's a score. If he worked 

with a, a given person on that job, that is a score, 

too, a monitored coworker.

That coworker is different than the coworker model 

you're developing. All we're using is to see if it 

scored or not.

And so we're not saying this unmonitored worker is 

going to receive 95 percent of the tables in a book, 

we're saying is he monitored or not? 

And, that's actual monitored himself or effectively 

monitored because somebody was working with him 
76

which would represent him being bioassayed.

So, coworker here is different than the coworker 

model in a table. And, so I just want to clarify that 

because some of these discussions, it seemed like 

those were being mixed.

Okay, so anyway, regards to the person's view on 

what, what constitutes a similar exposure in, in a 

coworker. If you use the job title as a guide, we 

find that 60 percent were signed in on the same 

RWP.

And, then the next issue were they same in same 

time -- same date? And, that was on the RWP and 

that was 77 percent of the time that the coworker 

and unmonitored worker were signed in on the 

same RWP.

So, the next slide -- yes?

Dr. Taulbee: Just a clarification point on this. By 

same date and time, how were you determining the 

time from that standpoint? Did it have to be exact 

sign in?

Dr. Buchanan: Well, no, it mainly was it --

Dr. Taulbee: Time is --

Dr. Buchanan: -- they signed in in time like 

intervals, like 11:00 o'clock -- 10:00 o'clock to 

11:00 o'clock in the morning. Or, was one signed in 

in the morning and one signed in the afternoon? 

Or, one signed in at 9:00 o'clock and left at 10 and 

the other one signed in at 12 and left at 1.

The half overlap. Was there overlap in a similar 

time period? Now, because if one was in there --

Dr. Taulbee: Okay.

Dr. Buchanan: -- for an hour and the monitored 

worker was in there an hour and the unmonitored 

worker was in there for two hours, then I can't see 

that you say that the unmonitored worker was 
77

represented by the monitored worker because he, 

he would get twice the exposure. So, similar time 

periods.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay. Just wanted clarification on 

that. Didn't quite follow that in the discussion of 

what you were defining as that.

Dr. Buchanan: Okay. Okay, next slide.

Okay, and so okay, this, this is really the next bullet 

point here. They were both signed in on same time 

interval roughly. I mean it takes time to, to suit up 

and unsuit and stuff, but roughly at the same time 

to represent similar intakes.

Okay, and so if we -- you went through and you 

went through those four criteria, RWP, date, similar 

time intervals and same craft, we see that at 45 

percent of the time, that indicated that they were 

actually in the same time doing similar work sideby-side for the same period.

And, so what, what I wanted to bring forth here is 

that I, I feel like Brad does that this use of a 

coworker is kind of iffy, and if we are going to use 

it, then we have to be fairly strict on how we use it. 

And, so this was what this purpose of this exercise 

was for.

So, the coworker used in R-92 is somewhat I would 

say in some cases, would be questionable.

Okay, next slide.

Okay, and so now we talked about the change in 

operating companies, change in DOE's regulations 

and everything, and that we've seen that of course, 

the additional data that's been obtained recently, 

and all, and all the boxes has helped the case with 

the 1990s.

However, I don't want to be under the delusion that 

this solves all of our problems come, you know, 

January 1, 1990. Because it's a large, very large 
78

facility, very ingrained habits, and so it took a while 

to implement all of this.

Not 1990s, early 1990s was not free of their data 

issues. And, we've seen that it wasn't a step 

function as we see in the 1990 it only has one RWP 

that we could find. And, so, and that's the reason I 

recommend be included with earlier years.

And, to look at this in some quantitative detail, I 

looked at the RWPs and seen when they started 

requiring specific radionuclides. This is one of the 

contentions in the earlier years was that the 

radionuclides weren't specified and in the '90s also. 

Excuse me.

And, so I looked and seen how this progressed as 

the 1990s went on and you see there at the first 

bullet point, we see that the plutonium 

requirements listed on the RWP either increased 

from 4 percent in '93.

So, '90, '91, '92 wasn't any, and then '93 is 4 

percent. And, then see we see '94 it was 78 

percent, and in '95 it was 100 percent.

So, apparently, you know, they got into the flow of 

things in about the mid-1995. Looked at strontium 

and fission products, similar case. Zero '93, 92 

percent in '94, and 100 percent in '95.

So, this exercise was mainly to illustrate that while 

the 1990s did see improvement that there was -- it 

took a while for it to be implemented, and this was 

the purpose of this exercise.

Okay, I think that's the last of my slides. Any 

questions on them so far?

I'll turn it back over to you, Joe.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, thank you, Ron.

What I'm going to do is, is more or less these aren't 

findings or observations, just perspective for the 

Working Group and, and NIOSH.
79

And, we did take a look at RPRT-94. We don't have 

any response to 94, but there were some 

interesting perspectives and I found it pretty 

valuable review of the, I think it's mostly the 

DuPont era. I think it was '72 to '89 or something 

like that.

Dr. Taulbee: That one's going to get added. We'd 

already done the Westinghouse.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right. And, but it addressed the 

subject of, yes, the time span between employment 

and bioassay, and we kind of touched on that 

several times the last couple of days.

And, and I guess my only issue there, and I hope 

that Tim will address that in his response, is that it, 

it sort of represents as we discussed, sort of a very 

fungible issue depending on what you count, and 

what is considered a missed monitoring or not.

And, you know, there's been, I know initially, in 

2017 we were using a year or the normal 

preschedule cycle as, you know, as capturing it. 

Now, we're seeing maybe three years, I think three 

years was cited in '94.

But, you know, as '94 points out, the fraction of 

monitored subcontractors would increase for each 

year that you increase that span.

So, it's, it's certainly a question that does influence, 

you know, the matching percentages not only in '92 

but maybe even as a measure of completeness in 

the future.

So, that would be useful as, you know, to tie 

together I think some of the thinking that's been 

going on for a year or two or three on the question 

of, you know, how does one actually gauge what's 

monitored and what's not monitored in terms of 

completeness as a function of that time period.

And, you know, a lot of what we did in adjustments 

is to simply taking a different perspective on that. 
80

And, I think that's sort of a fluid area. So, I would 

invite that review and some consideration on that.

And, I don't think we're saying this is wrong, this is 

right, but we're saying you can take a different 

perspective depending on what the adjustments are 

on that.

The second question, and I want to raise this 

because we've gone through some discussion about, 

you know, how solid the SRS monitoring program is, 

and, you know, the Defense in Depth.

I have no issue with the soundness of the radiation 

protection program, the monitoring program. And, 

we're very explicitly focusing on the question of jobspecific bioassay follow up, and whether that, those 

records are complete enough to support a coworker 

model period.

And, I just want to make that clear because we 

spent a lot of time trying to, to address the 

completeness, the soundness and the availability of 

data.

And, I don't think there's any, any debate on that as 

it pertains to the routine, overall program. So, I 

just wanted to make sure that that was clear.

The next one we talked about yesterday, which I 

think is a very, very important question for the 

Board in particular, but, you know, how complete is 

complete?

We've hit that a number of times and yesterday, we 

actually kind of broached that subject. You know, 

well, if it's, you know, if 80 percent's not 

demonstratively complete, what would be complete, 

and I think Tim was allowing that, you know, in his 

view 50 percent, you know, in this context and in 

this particular consideration, would be a threshold.

But, and there was an asterisk, that could be lower 

depending on the circumstances, as I recall.
81

I think this is an important question because I, you 

know, going back over time, and I have to admit I 

guess some of us have been in the program a long, 

long time. We used to get concerned -- I remember 

in an earlier SEC discussion back 10 years ago, we 

were concerned about 10 percent incompleteness as 

I recall.

I think Paul, you were chairing back in those days. 

I mean I forget what site it was and I tried to look it 

up, I couldn't find it. But, we were concerned about 

10 percent data incompleteness and spent a great 

deal of time trying to chase that down and 

determine whether that was significant or not.

Now, we're in the realm of 50 percent and in this 

particular discussion, and even lower as, as I think 

Tim pointed out in terms of the circumstances.

So, since EEOICPA, the large part of the origins of 

the Act was based on the incompleteness of records 

in DOE, and the fact that it would be difficult in 

some cases to reconstruct because those records 

are missing, that was certainly a contributing basis 

for the SEC process.

And, you know, this question of completeness and 

how complete is complete, and to what extent does 

one address that, I think is a very, very important 

question.

And, really if the context is how representative is 

the data, then if you only have a third to 50 percent 

of that data, is that sufficient to give you a 

representative dose distribution to come up with a 

bounding, or a bounding estimate or not?

And, going back over the guidelines, I think the 

2015 guidelines are very explicit on that subject.

And, you know, I just want to for the record, just 

stress that coworker datasets should be established 

for monitored workers with comparable activities 

and relationships to duration of environment.
82

To accomplish this, one must carefully evaluate 

each coworker dataset to ensure that it's either 

representative of the distribution of exposures for 

the intended population, or that it provides a 

plausible upper bound for those workers.

So, you need enough data to come to that 

conclusion. And, I don't, you know, I don't know 

what the, you know, and the answer may be 

relative to the circumstance. But, certainly 50 

percent or less gives me pause.

And, I think that, that I would lead that issue and 

it's a policy consideration on both sides, and so I 

don't want to go any further than that.

But, certainly at least we have spent some time 

talking about percentages of matches, what's 

enough, and I think that comes down to is that 

fundamental question: what is representative, and 

how much data does it take to give you that, that 

basis?

Dr. Taulbee: I would just like to, to add to what, 

what you're saying there but add a word of caution 

here in the percentages that are reported in RPRT92. Because these are for subcontractors, okay?

Our coworker model went with all construction 

trades, both DuPont and subcontractor. And, so to 

use the example of yesterday of the americium 

where in the 1980 time period, our number showed 

that only 34 percent were directly monitored. In 

that particular case, I'm using round numbers here, 

30 percent not monitored, 30 percent we were able 

to match, and 30 percent were unmonitored.

That's in the context of just the subcontractor 

workers. If you add in our, what we can discern 

from the job plans, that subcontractor work made 

up about 15 percent of the total construction work.

So, if you go through the actual numbers here of 

100 workers, and I'm rounding here, is 85 would be 

DuPont construction, 15 would be subcontractor.
83

Of those 15 subcontractors, 5 were directly 

monitored, 5 we can place with those directly 

monitored subcontractors, and the other 5 we 

declared as unmonitored at this time and not having 

a match.

But, we didn't go and look and see if there was a 

DuPont construction trades worker with them, or 

anything along that. We were only matching 

against subcontractors.

So, what we effectively have here is 90 percent 

monitored, 10 percent not monitored, 5 of that 10 

percent we know is represented by that 90 percent.

So, that's a case of, I agree with what Joe is saying 

that, you know, anything below 50 percent causes 

us some pause. But, it needs to be taken into the 

broader context of what the coworker model is 

doing, and how we are taking that data in the end 

and applying it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And, I, you know, associate myself 

with that comment.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: Sorry about that.

Anyway, but, you know, on Section 2.2 on data 

completeness, I'm going to go back to the 

guidelines because I think this is really an important 

consideration.

It says the amount of available monitoring data 

must be evaluated to determine if there are 

sufficient measurements to ensure that the data are 

either bounding or representative of the exposed 

potential for each job or exposure category at the 

facility.

So, when we're looking at subcontractors, I guess I 

would ask you is that a job or exposure category 

that deserves the attention from the standpoint of 

the exposure potential, that in other words, does 
84

the data represent the exposure potential for that 

group or not?

So, even if you meld it into the larger CTWs, you, 

and this gets back to the stratification issue, are 

they distinct populations or not? If they're not, then 

I think the data completeness issue is a different, 

maybe a different issue.

And, we're kind of grappling with both questions. 

Are they distinct populations, and is the data 

complete, but they're actually related from that 

standpoint.

So, we haven't gotten into our exchange on 

stratification but I think that's still an open question.

So, I just want to make sure, and these are all 

station identification issues. I mean we don't have

a finding, they're still unprocessed, but I think that's 

an important if not a determinative, consideration 

that certainly the Work Group will need to be 

mindful of.

Mr. Calhoun: And, I think it's really important that 

to keep our eyes on, you know, we talk about the 

bounding. There would have to be some indication 

that people from any population would have 

exceeded the dose that we would assign with the 

coworker data.

So, if, if there, if our coworker model is such that it 

encompasses everybody, I mean we almost have to 

work from it in the other direction that, you know, I 

need some indication that there was a population or 

a person that exceeded the dose that would be 

assigned in a coworker study.

And, it doesn't seem like that right now because it 

seems like most of the highest exposed people are 

included in that study, and it would be a bounding 

dose assigned. To me.

Member Lockey: Is your exposure data pretty 

homogeneous?
85

Dr. Taulbee: It's mostly non-detect.

Member Lockey: So, we have homogeneous 

exposure data across the whole population. Was 

there any indication that there's undocumented 

excursions above that? Or where there is incidence 

data that doesn't fall within their realm?

Dr. Taulbee: No. I mean whenever most of the 

high data are, are from incidents that were caught 

in the workplace, and sent for special bioassay, and, 

and that's --

Member Lockey: Are they included in the --

Dr. Taulbee: In the coworker? Yes, they are.

Member Lockey: And, they're bounded by that?

Dr. Taulbee: Uh-huh.

Mr. Barton: If I might make a comment here 

though, that the whole purpose of this exercise was 

to establish representativeness. You know, if this 

particularly for workers is not represented 

sufficiently in the coworker model, you can't really 

make a determination whether that coworker model 

bounds that group or not.

Member Lockey: No, but if you have, if you have 

incident protocols in place, that's going to apply to 

everybody.

Dr. Taulbee: Yes.

Member Lockey: Okay? And, that's worst case 

situation.

Mr. Barton: But again, we're trying to figure out if 

this coworker model can apply to the unmonitored 

worker.

I mean if there's a group of unmonitored workers 

out there, those that were supposed to be 

monitored by job plans, and they're not sufficiently 

represented in that coworker model, I'm not sure 
86

how we can make the determination that it's 

bounded.

Mr. Calhoun: There'd have to be some indication 

that they were higher exposed than the bounding 

dose of the coworker.

Mr. Barton: Well but how would you know --

Mr. Calhoun: That's the only --

Mr. Barton: -- if they were or not?

Mr. Calhoun: Well, you're making, you're jumping 

to a conclusion that you have super high exposed 

people that weren't monitored.

Dr. Taulbee: There's no contamination control, 

there's no airborne samples, nothing --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Calhoun: But we need an indication of that. 

We can't just have a gut feeling that that happened.

Member Lockey: And, that's what, that's what I 

was asking. How, if the data was very 

heterogeneous, so in other words, it was all over 

the place and we had data points that we don't 

know where they came from and what job title was 

associated with it, and they are five standard 

deviations away from what we would expect, then 

that's a whole different ballpark.

Member Ziemer: Well, they're really just asking the 

question. I think NIOSH has the burden to show 

that what they are using for the model does, in fact, 

improve it.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: So, it's a valid question, they 

need an answer.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And, I actually think that what 

Grady was saying is true. That for the DuPont era, 
87

you know, one needs to demonstrate that in fact, 

the management and administrative procedures or 

what have you, would have done that or not.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: You would have, would have 

prevented or precluded those exposures because 

you do have the firm linkage and the very definitive 

procedures and follow up you have in the 

Westinghouse era. But you don't see that so much 

in the DuPont era, which I think the questions we're 

raising is without having that kind of information, 

what are you left with?

Well, I think what you need to do then as a 

compensatory approach is to demonstrate that 

okay, you don't have one for one as you might have 

in the Westinghouse era that gives you confidence 

that in fact, those intakes would have been 

precluded because of the program they have in 

place.

DuPont's more general. They don't have definitive, 

you know, requirements for jobs with bioassays, et 

cetera. You have to make a lot of assumptions.

Can you provide the kind of assurance I think that 

we're talking about that you wouldn't have those 

higher exposures amongst the subcontractors in 

DuPont time period or not.

I mean I think with the results that we're seeing, it 

certainly doesn't, doesn't answer the question that 

the representativeness isn't going to get you there, 

so what else can get you there?

The only thing I can think is if maybe along the lines 

we're talking about is compensatory, can you 

actually show that DuPont managed this thing in a 

way that you would not have -- you would see any 

intakes or exposures that would have been above 

and beyond the coworker model for subcontractors.

I mean I don't think, you know, to me, we can't get 
88

there with the data we have from the DuPont era at 

this point. So, what do you do when you can't?

You know, I'm looking at the guidelines and saying 

the guidelines say you need to evaluate the data 

and, and demonstrate it's representative and can be 

--

Dr. Taulbee: Or bounding.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Huh?

Dr. Taulbee: Representative or bounding. There's 

a hierarchy in there that's listed.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

And, I think if it's not representative, that --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: You have to show that in fact, 

there's nothing that would go above your bounding 

dose.

Member Ziemer: Why it's, yes, why it's bounding.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So --

Member Ziemer: You know, we've bounded some 

sites with no data.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Member Ziemer: Although granted, they're much 

simpler than this site.

Mr. Fitzgerald: But, you know, we've been, we've 

been moving toward demonstrating the 

completeness of data that support 

representativeness, but it sounds like we may be 

beyond that and saying okay, can you demonstrate 

bounding.

Does that make sense?

So, I think that's kind of where we're at.
89

Co-Chair Anderson: And, that kind of goes back to 

also looking at how you calculate your 95 percent. 

You don't have a bell-shaped curve of exposure, so 

you have a --

Member Ziemer: No, it's a lognormal.

Member Lockey: Lognormal, it's still 95th.

Co-Chair Anderson: Yes. Well, but you have a 

whole lot as you said, the majority of them are nondetects. So, how you assign a value to the nondetect will, will impact what your 95 percent.

Member Lockey: Yes, but the non-detector most, 

it's mostly based on -- there's a lot of data on the 

non-detects.

Co-Chair Anderson: Well, I mean there isn't an 

exposure but when you're then trying to estimate

what 95 percent is, it isn't that you're looking at --

it's a statistical approach to it, and it depends on 

what you assign to the value for the non-detects will 

impact the predicted 95th percent.

You don't look at what are the, what's the top 5 

percent of the people? And, what is the value 

where you've cut 95 percent of the people are below 

that? This is a predicted.

Member Lockey: So, we looked at non-detect the 

way you did, the way you did it, or take -- divide by 

one half and do it that way. Either way, one way or 

the other, you get.

Co-Chair Anderson: Yes.

Member Lockey: And, you see if anybody falls 

above that 95 percent. Is there any data?

Member Ziemer: Right, that doesn't, that doesn't 

affect the 95 percent value very much.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, just to wrap things up, I think 
90

we touched on these key issues. But in terms of 

our conclusions, you know, I think NIOSH concluded 

a large percentage of the subcontractors were, in 

fact, monitored for potential intakes while working 

under either a job plan, SWP, or RWP.

And, so we noted that that premise for the 

evaluation would hold for the Westinghouse era. I 

think it's pretty clear there was a very explicit RWP 

program with job-specific bioassay requirements 

and as a function of respirators.

But, we do not find that linkage as much in the 

DuPont era, or in fact, any evidence at all. And, 

that, I think, is a concern.

The SRS procedures and practices for RW required 

job-specific bioassays were not defined, codified or 

implemented.

So, as far as we can tell, until 1990 when 

Westinghouse came in and as part of the 

Radiological Improvement Program, basically 

overhauled most of the procedures, set up a 

Technical Basis Document, and actually brought 

these requirements into place and implemented 

them.

And, finally, we are concerned about the adjustment 

factors, and I say fungibility, that's an accounting 

term. But, you know, the fact that these 

percentages swing depending on what assumptions 

one makes, adjustments one makes, that as far as 

the time span and the, the other factors how you 

count those. And, I think settling on how one 

gauges that is going to be very important to the 

final answer of completeness.

And, finally, if the focus is job-specific bioassay 

completeness, I don't think that's explicitly confined 

to just subs. I mean I think other workers were on 

job-specific bioassays. I just wanted to throw that 

in because we've been focused on subcontractors 

quite exclusively.
91

It's really the job-specific bioassays as required by 

permits and job plans that were, that's the context 

of the discussion. So, I just wanted to -- sort of a 

post script.

That is it. Is there any questions on that end point?

Dr. Taulbee: We will provide the responses. I don't 

know when yet, certainly it would be after the first 

of the year. But I don't know if it will be in January 

or February.

But, I will, well, John will let you know, Brad.

(Laughter.)

Dr. Taulbee: When we get a date.

Co-Chair Clawson: I was waiting for that. I was 

waiting for John to make that call and I'm like okay, 

well.

Dr. Taulbee: But, we will let you know as soon as 

we get a time on the schedule.

Mr. Katz: Okay. Josh Fester, are you still on the 

line?

Mr. Fester: We're here.

Mr. Katz: Okay.

Mr. Johnson: It's Warren Johnson as well, also 

attorney for the petitioner.

Path Forward

Mr. Katz: Yes, I recognize your voice. Thank you, 

I'm glad you're here.

So let me -- there's a lot of background noise -- but 

let me just explain because I'm not sure you folks 

were on the line yesterday morning when I just 

talked about the general track we're on here and 

the upcoming meetings.

But, yesterday and today's meetings were sort of 
92

focused on two things, two separate somewhat 

interrelated but separate things.

One is sort of giving a final approval to the 

guidelines that NIOSH and the Board use in 

assessing and developing -- developing and 

assessing coworker models, coworker -- the use of 

coworker data, or co-exposure data as we're talking 

about it now.

And, the second is sort of specific to the SRS, SEC 

petition.

And, next week as you know, we have a Board 

meeting. And, for the Board meeting and for this, 

the SRS-specific matters are really at this point, 

sort of with the Work Group and then the full Board 

will be doing is being updated on where we are with 

this evaluation, what we've learned, what we are 

able to address these Work Groups and what, and 

sort of a path ahead.

The action part of the Board meeting next week is, 

is limited to the, finalizing the coworker guidelines. 

The use of co-exposure data, so that, so that that 

approach can be used at other sites, too, because 

there are a lot of other sites that are sort of 

awaiting finalization on that matter.

So, and then I would say January, February, March. 

During that period, we will surely be having more 

Work Group meetings. They may be joint; they 

may be just SRS. I think in some cases, it's, I think 

it's been very useful to have both Work Groups 

together to discuss the SRS issues.

But in any event, we'll be having more Work Group 

meetings towards what we would like to see is 

action on the petition at the April Board meeting, 

and I don't have the date in my head, but it's like 

mid-April.

So, I just wanted to let you know A) that that's sort 

of the, the work plan ahead of us. And, then B) 

about commenting. Obviously, we're going to let 
93

you comment now but, during the Board meeting 

next week, we're going to try to get through the 

discussion during the session that's there for both 

coworker exposure and the SRS matter update.

We're going to try to get through the discussion --

the Board. There's not likely going to be time but 

we'll see, for the petitioner representatives to speak 

during that. But, we would be open, happy, 

welcome your comments during the public comment 

session at the end of the day.

So, sort of plan on that although you know, and if 

you, you know, if we have time left, I kind of doubt 

we will, we have a two hour session to deal with 

coworker and SRS, but if we have time left, we, we 

could possibly fit you in during that session. But 

anyway, otherwise you'd have that opportunity at 

the end of the day.

So, I just wanted to let you know sort of the game 

plan so you can just understand where we are in the 

process and what to expect going forward. So, I 

hope that's helpful.

Mr. Johnson: No, it is and I appreciate that. 

Mr. Katz: Okay.

Mr. Johnson: Now, if appropriate do I have time to, 

to make some comments at this time, or?

Mr. Katz: Yes, you absolutely, that's what we're 

here for.

Mr. Johnson: All right, sir.

I've listened with, with great interest the last two 

days and quite frankly, I'm concerned that well, I 

guess I'm concerned that NIOSH has lost sight of 

the actual mission here.

The issue to be addressed is simply has NIOSH 

demonstrated that it's feasible to reconstruct the 

dose for these workers with sufficient accuracy. You 

can't ignore the two main words of that sentence, 
94

which is feasible and sufficient accuracy.

Feasible is defined as whether it can be easily done 

or achieved, whether it's practicable. You can't --

those considerations take into account both time, 

effort, and expense. And, this has been going on 

for over 11 years, this petition has been pending.

Many years before that NIOSH embarked on the 

quest to perform dose reconstructions with 

sufficient accuracy. Once again, now NIOSH is here 

today and yesterday, suggesting yet another new 

path forward conceding that we aren't there yet.

Quite frankly, I think the calendar itself is proof that 

this is just not feasible.

NIOSH has the burden of proving that it's met its 

charge. It's not done so. This isn't happening in a 

vacuum. People are being deprived of benefits that 

Congress intended for them to receive.

This isn't about academics. This isn't about whether 

or not NIOSH has done the best that they can. If 

they -- I don't question their effort, I just do 

question that this is, this has become an exercise in 

academics without really concern over what the 

focus should be is, is this feasible?

You can't ignore the second part of that either, 

which is sufficient accuracy. We've had evidence 

that records have been destroyed. We've had -- it's 

undisputed that if workers were supposed to be 

wearing respiratory protection, that that's an 

indication they were in an area that they should 

have been monitored, should have submitted 

bioassays. That's with radiation safety practice 

that's mandated by today's standards, and the 

records are missing on that.

To presume that the destroyed records have no 

bearing on this is simply inconsistent with common 

sense. In the law, we have pretty much every state 

adopts a rule of evidence that says that's spoliation 

of evidence, and that people don't destroy --
95

common sense tells you this: people don't destroy 

things that are helpful.

And, so missing records should be presumed to be 

both relevant and quite frankly, evidence of dose. I 

don't think you can assume that it's claimantfavorable while assuming that the records would 

have proved that the person didn't get exposed. 

That's just defies logic.

Again, I don't question the effort that NIOSH put 

into this, but I just don't think it's, based on what 

I've heard for the last two days, we're just 

compounding assumptions on top of guesses on top 

of what we believe as evidence that we've done the 

best we could. That's just not, that doesn't get to 

sufficient accuracy.

You can't, you can't compound guesses, put them in 

an elegant model and then end up with a sufficiently 

accurate result.

You can't change the sample sizes by redefining 

where it's appropriate just so you can feed that into 

a model. But, my concern on that is the coworker 

model that we discussed. In order to get a 

reasonable sample size, NIOSH had to redefine it as 

both monitored and effectively monitored.

Now, effectively monitored as I understand it, is 

simply a mini coworker model, which we don't even 

know whether you're accurately defining the craft, 

whether the person was doing the same thing as 

the monitored person was. There's just no way to 

know that. It's essentially a guess.

It's just it's beyond dispute that SRS had a problem 

with identifying and testing for the appropriate 

radionuclides of concern.

You know, I'm just a dumb lawyer; I'm not a health 

physicist. But as I understand it, it is indisputable 

that a bioassay at least in regards to the urinalysis 

would only find a radionuclide that they're looking 

for.
96

In other words, if you're handling plutonium, you 

had a update -- uptake of plutonium but you're 

tested for uranium, it's, you're going to show up as 

nothing. You didn't get a uptake according to your 

record then.

But that doesn't change the body burden that the 

worker actually received, and we can't ignore the 

reality of that.

The impact on these people is significant. We get 

people that are being deprived of health care and 

having to rely on their family members and 

neighbors and friends to take care of them as 

they're dying. That's not what Congress intended 

by this. And, I just don't know that putting it off yet 

again is going to do any good.

The fact that the site was supposed to be able to 

demonstrate compliance of radiation safety to show 

that these workers didn't receive a dose above the 

allowable level, but we're missing records. We're 

missing significant amounts of records.

There's been numerous assumptions made that, 

that they must not have been around it. They rely 

on the, in regards to the trivalent radionuclides, 

were relying on records that as I understand it, defy 

logic.

And, records that the MDA that they're claiming and 

going into the coworker model is achievable only 

through alpha spectrometry.

If you look at the Westinghouse paper, Evolution of 

Internal Dosimetry Bioassay Methods at Savannah 

River Site, according to it, they only implemented 

that technology in 1990. How did they apply that 

prior to having that technology is baffling to me.

That's yet another thing that I think has to be 

answered.

But, to a further issue is to consider somebody 

monitored simply because they were monitored for 
97

any radionuclide is also ridiculous. That's just --

each of these problems undermines accuracy.

Each of these problems requires that to go back and 

be reworked and let's come up with yet another 

model, meanwhile, people are dying. They're being 

deprived of the whole point of this, which is to 

essentially let's take care of the people that were 

essentially sacrificed to allow us win the Cold War.

This is going on for over a decade at this point. It 

sounds like there's still no end in sight. I don't, it 

just does not seem that redefining just to make it 

sound like this is an actual model can possibly 

change the fact that the data is just not adequate to 

get there.

And again, you've got a inaccurate definition, or 

inaccurate monitoring that when you put workers 

into an effectively monitored category, that you're 

then going to use to couple that with some people 

that were directly monitored, and then you're going 

to formulate a coworker model from that. Well, 

that's a problem on its own.

But then, from there to add in when you apply it to 

the individual, the fact that there is strong evidence 

that their records were either inadequate, they 

weren't appropriately monitored, or they were 

destroyed, you just can't fix it.

The only fix is to, is to recognize that it's no longer, 

that this is just simply not feasible to be able to 

bind the dose for these workers with sufficient 

accuracy.

And, to simply put this off again and I understand 

that the vote won't come till April, but I anticipate 

that NIOSH is going to have yet another round of 

solutions for this, and that it will take yet another 

year or two for them to attempt to fix it. Then, 

there's going to be flaws in that.

How many years does this take? What is 

appropriate? I mean that's, that's the problem.
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 Are the Members of the Board comfortable that 

NIOSH has got it right this time? Because even 

assuming that it is, we're still looking at over a year 

to re-run these dose reconstructions at best. And, 

quite frankly, in all likelihood, be much longer than 

that.

I think clearly the answer is that they have not met 

the charge. And, that's not for lack of trying, that's 

pretty clear. But, that's quite frankly, that's based 

on the facts that exist, and that's the site's fault.

I appreciate your time and appreciate the 

opportunity to be heard.

Mr. Katz: Thank you, Mr. Warren, right?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, I'm Warren Johnson.

Mr. Katz: Yes, that's Mr. Warren, Warren Johnson, 

I'm sorry. Warren Johnson, I'm sorry.

Thank you. I appreciate you taking the time to 

comment, and to listen and to comment.

And, I think just a couple things I would just say. I 

don't think we're on an endless road anymore. I 

hope we're not, and I hope we will see actually 

action sooner than you're afraid we might not. So I 

hope we can solve that part.

And I also think it would be a good idea for the 

comments that you made today that are sort of of a 

technical nature as to how can this, how can that 

be, so on.

It would probably be good, I think, if we can take 

this transcript, Tim, and address some of those 

comments directly, that would be helpful for Mr. 

Warren. And all those comments that can be 

addressed.

Yes, but we are doing that and on the NIOSH team 

but I think, I think they should be sort of addressed 

to he's representing the petitioners here and they 

deserve to sort of understand some of those issues 
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that he's raising in sort of the simpler context that 

he poses them.

So, thank you, Warren --

Dr. Ringen: Ted?

Mr. Katz: -- and -- sorry?

Dr. Ringen: Ted, it's Knut Ringen. Can I make four 

very brief comments since I'm not going to be at 

your Board meeting?

Mr. Katz: Yes, of course you can. We have, yes, 

we have time. Go ahead.

Dr. Ringen: Going to be very fast.

The first is that the, I want to thank you, Mr. 

Johnson, for making his comments because they're 

entirely fair. There should be some time estimate 

and we've talked about this before.

And the real problem is that to receive sufficient 

accuracy requires that sufficient accuracy be defined 

somewhere and you've still not done that.

When Tim Taulbee says we feel this is within the 

realm of sufficient, sufficient accuracy, I cringe both 

at listening to the word feel, and the way that the 

word sufficient accuracy is used.

The point I'm going to make is really quickly that 

you can't, first of all, you cannot do the coworker 

modeling without stratification I'm sorry to say, but 

you can't do it with stratification either. And that's 

the problem.

Through stratifying your numbers become too small, 

and if you don't stratify they become too general.

Dr. Lockey suggested that we can compare different 

trades but you can't do that. A boilermaker does 

something that's totally different from an 

electrician.
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And within trades even, there are lots of sub-trades. 

Just like in the medical trades, there are subspecialties and specialties, and you cannot compare 

exactly what they do. They work entirely different 

ways. And you have to take that into account.

You cannot rely on the radiological work permits, or 

any other work permits to do a very clear definition 

of how work is done. That's even true today. We 

know that the radiologic work permits are 

administered for very old houses, site work 

supervisor works them. And they are very different 

-- there are lots of variance in the management of 

work permits that needs to be taken into account. 

It is not possible to do that statistically.

And, finally, imputation is in statistics, a measure of 

last resort. And if you have lousy data to begin 

with, and you try to impute more of the same lousy 

data into them, you're still not going to get a very 

good inference in the end.

And I think that to assume that you can do this 

correctly and with any degree of fairness to 

individual claimants is incredibly unlikely.

Clearly, a good number of claimants are going to be 

denied benefits that they would have if you continue 

along this road of coworker modeling.

And perhaps maybe 5 percent is okay with you. 

Maybe that's sufficient accuracy. But, for those 

individuals who end up being denied, it certainly is 

not.

Thanks a lot.

Adjourn

Mr. Katz: Thank you, Knut. So any others?

All right. Well, again, I appreciate everyone's hard 

work coming up to this meeting, the meeting itself, 

I much appreciate the attendees -- attendance from 

the public as well, and we'll see some of you next 
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week in California.

Thank you, we're adjourned.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 11:36 a.m.)