COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, McCl anahan and Senior Judge Willis

TIFFANY JACKSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2757-06-1 PER CURIAM MAY 15, 2007 CITY OF PORTSMOUTH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH James A. Cales, Jr., Judge (Darell Sayer; Ferrell , Sayer & Nicolo, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (G. Timothy Oksman, City Attorney; Sheila C. Riddick, Assistant City Attorney; Barrett Richardson, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

On October 12, 2006, the trial court entered an order terminating the residual parental rights of Tiffany Jackson, ap pellant, to her daughte r, H.J., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), 16.1-283(C)(1), and 16.1-283(C)(2). On appeal, appellant contends the evidence did not prove termination was in H.J.’s best interests. Findin g no error, we affirm th e trial court’s decision.
FACTS We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fair ly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). H.J. was born on July 4, 2003. The identity of H.J.’s father is unknown.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - In August of 2004, appellant le ft H.J. at the home of a friend with the friend’ s children. The friend had not grante d appellant permission to leave H.J. at the home. When appellant failed to return for H.J. for seve ral days, the friend contacted the Portsm outh Department of Social Services (DSS), which took H.J. into custody and place d her in foster care. Following H.J.’s foster care placement, DSS atte mpted to help appellant regarding issues of substance abuse, inadequa te housing, and inadequa te supervision of her children. DSS referred appellant to several resource agenci es and made appointments to help her achieve the goals required for reunification with H.J. DSS repeatedly sent lett ers to appellant advising of the services that had been initiated on appellant’s beha lf and reminding her of various sche duled appointm ents. Other than completing a psychological evaluation, however, appellant achieved none of the required goals. While H.J. was in foster care, appellant did not provide the ch ild with toys, letters, money, or items that could be used in her care. Eventu ally, DSS lost contact with appellant, and she failed to appear for scheduled visits wi th H.J. after December 30, 2004. DSS was unable to locate any relative of appellant who was ab le to take custody of H.J. Appellant did not appear at th e termination hearing in circuit court on Octobe r 12, 2006, and her attorney was unaware of her whereabouts. DS S presented evidence that H.J. had bonded with her foster parents and was th riving in their care.
DISCUSSION On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficien cy of the evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the circuit court “thorough ly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requireme nts, and made its determination based on the child’s best interest s.” Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly- 3 - wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. (quoting Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). In its capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains “broad discretion in making the decisions ne cessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Farley , 9 Va. App. at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795. Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Social Services , 46 Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2005). Moreover, In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests of the child or children. Barkey v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). At the time of the termination hearing, three- year-old H.J. had been in foster care for more than two years. During that period, appellant had made no provisions for her child. In fact, appellant had no contact with H.J. after Decem ber 2004. Other than completing a psychological evaluation, appellant made no progress toward the goa ls required for her to be reunited with H.J. The evidence proved appellant completely failed to avail herself of the assistance and resources provided by DSS. Appellant did not maintain cont act with DSS or with the attorney representing her in the termination action. At the time of th e termination hearing, H.J. was thriving in her foster parents’ care. We recognize that “‘[t]he termin ation of [residual] parental ri ghts is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Departme nt of Public Welfare of the City of Richmond , 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). Howeve r, “[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a le ngthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent- 4 - will be capable of resuming his [or her] res ponsibilities.” Kaywood v. Ha lifax County Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Clear and convincing evidence proved that term ination of appellant’s parental rights was in H.J.’s best interests. Accordingl y, we affirm the trial court’s decision. Affirmed.