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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2990

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

C AR L O S B E L TR

AN , Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 08 CR 38 8 — Joan B. Gottsc hal l , Judg e.
A RGU E D M A

Y 22, 2013

— D E C I D E D M A Y 15, 2014

Before F L AUM

, R OVN E R , and S YKE S

, Circ uit Judges.

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. A jury convic te d C a r los Beltran of both posse ss ing and conspi ring to possess, wi th the intent to di strib ute, 500 gr ams or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1), 846. The di stric t
cour t o r d e r e d hi m to serv e a ter m of 168 months in pris on. Beltran appeals, contending that the di st r ict court err ed in denyi ng hi s motion to supp ress the evidenc e—i nclu ding large2 No. 12-2990 quanti ties of cocaine and heroin, and v arious i tems associ ated wi th narcotic s tr affi cking—sei zed from hi s resi dence on the day of hi s arrest. W

e affi rm. I. Our sum mary of the facts i s based large ly on the di stric t
co ur t ’ s findings below

. W e hav e, in a few instances, supp lemented those findings wi th addi tional relev ant details di sclosed by the testim ony presented at the supp ressi on hearin g. Beltran ow ed a tw o-flat resi dence in Berwyn, Illi noi s. At approx i mately 2:30 p.m. on May 13, 2008, sev en members of a federal Drug Enforcement Admini strat i on (“DEA”) task force, compri sed of both federal ag ents and local poli ce offi cers, arr i v ed at Beltran ’ s r esi dence t o interv i ew him

. There w as no response wh en they rang the door bells for the fi rst- and second- floor apartments and knocked at t he front door , but fiv e minutes later

, task force offi cer Sam A yy ad spo t t e d
someone in a second- floor window and asked hi m to come down t o the front entry

. Beltran’s co-defendan t, Jesu s Iv an V azquez-Rami rez compli ed wi th A y y a d’s request and came down to t he front po rch of the bui lding. V azquez-Rami rez, who w as conv ersi ng in Spani sh wi th
someone on hi s cell pho ne when he emerge d from the bui lding, informed the task force members that he di d not speak Engli sh v ery w ell but that he had the owner of the bui lding on the phone; he then handed the phone to DEA speci al agent Donald W

ood. Belt ran id entifi ed hi mself to W ood, and W

ood explain ed th a t he and the other offi cers w ere at hi s resi dence and wi shed to speak wi th hi m. Beltran indi cated that he w as at

w or k and that i t w ould take hi m at leas t an hour to get home.No. 12-2990 3
In response to W

ood’ s inqui ries, Beltran deni ed that there w as a ny illeg al contraband in the resi dence, agr eed to let the offi ce r s co nduct a search o f t he premi ses, but asked that they

w ai t for hi s ar r i v al before doin g so. Beltran also advis ed the offi cers t hat he lived in t he fi rst floor of the bui lding and that V azquez-Rami rez li v ed in the second- floor apartment. W ood
a sk ed Beltran to inqui re of V azquez-Rami rez whether he

w ould consent t o a search of the upstai rs apartment and handed the phone back to V azquez-Rami rez. After a short
conv ersation in Spani sh betw een the tw o men, W ood re-to ok the phone and learned from Belt ran that V azquez-Rami rez
w ould also agr ee to a search but that he too requested that the offi cers postpone their se a rch unti l Beltran arr i v ed. W ood agr eed, ended the c a l l, a n d returned V azquez-Rami rez’s phone to hi m. V

azquez-Rami rez remain ed on the front porch wi th
sev eral of the offi cers wh ile they aw ai ted Beltran’s arr i v al. During the w ai t, V

azquez-Ramirez placed or receiv ed a nu mb e r of calls (speaking in Spani sh)

. He w as sweating and appeared nervous to t he offi cers. About 15 minutes after W ood fini shed the call wi th Beltran,
one of the of fic ers, look ing from the edge of the front porch tow ard the back y ard, saw so me o ne that he beli ev ed to be Beltran w a lk into the back y ard from the alley , talking on hi s cell phone. (The o ff icer s had seen a pi cture of Beltran.) When that information w as conv ey ed to the o t her offi cers, offi cer Mar k P or li er mov ed tow ard the rear of the resi dence to a poin t where he could see ov er t he back fenc e. P or li er could see that the back door to the bui lding w as closed and that there w as no one in the back y a r d

. He remain ed there

. Meanwhi le, agents W ood and A

yy ad he a r d foot steps coming from the second4 No. 12-2990
floor apartment and/or the stai rw ay connecting the fi rst and
se cond floor s; they also heard the door to the upstai rs a p a r t

ment bein g slammed shu t. V azquez-Rami rez, of course, w as sti ll in front of the bui lding wi th t he a g e nts, and he had p r e vious ly advis ed W

ood that no one else w as present in the bui lding. Ov er t he next 20 or so minutes, V azquez-Rami rez remain ed on the fro nt por ch w i th the ag ents. During thi s period, offi cer Mike Bedalow, who had posted hi ms elf in the alley behind the bui lding i mmedi ately after Beltran ’ s a r riv al, notic ed a set of tr ash cans in the alley , just outsi de of the fence surr ounding the back y ard; the cans had the street numb er of Beltran’s bui lding stenci led on them. Bedalow deci ded to look insi de the cans

. He d i scov ered pack a g ing materials whi ch, based o n his tr aining and ex perience, look ed li ke they had been used to wr ap one or more kilogram-si zed “bri cks” of narcotics

. The materials w ere compri sed of multi ple lay ers of gr een p lasti c wrapping (v arious ly describe d b y the w i tne s s e s as resembling cellophane
or Sar an wrap), packing tape, and dry er sheets (us ed to mask

® the odor of narcotics from poli ce and drug-sni ffing dogs). The di scarded materials ret ained the b ric k shape of their prev i ous contents. Appro xim a te l y 2 0 to 2 5 m inu te s after P or li er posted hi mself at the back of the resi dence, he saw Beltran emerge thro ugh the back door of the bui lding wi th one of hi s hands ins ide of hi s shi rt

. Although P or li er called out to Beltran, di rect ing him to p lace bot h o f his hands where he could see them, Beltra n d id not i mmedi ately comply

. P or li er w alked ov er to Beltran and fri s ke d hi m. P or li er felt something in Beltran’s front pocket and ask e d him i f i t w as cash; Beltran told hi m i t that i t w as, andNo. 12-2990 5
P or li er w as able to look into the pocket and confi rm that i t w as a sub stanti al ro ll of money

. Accordi ng to P or li er, Beltra n w as “sweating, seem ed v ery nerv ous, and w as sh akin g.” R. 270 at 121. When W ood w as advis ed t ha t Beltran had just emerge d from the resi dence, he handcuffed V azquez-Rami rez, left hi m on the front porch wi th A y y a d, and w alked to the rear of the resi dence to speak wi th Beltran. He found Beltran to be vis ibly
nerv ous and soaked in sweat, as i f he had just been engaged in vigoro us physi cal acti vity

. Offi cer James He aly , who had accompan i ed W

ood to the back y ard, described Beltran as “all

sweaty and he seemed out of breath and exci ted.” R. 259 at 41. Agent W ood asked Beltran what he w as doin g, and Beltran sai d that he had just arr i v ed from w or k and w as coming to talk to the agents. W

ood beli ev ed that thi s w as a li e, and that Beltran in fact had arr i v ed so me 20-plus minutes earlier

. Beltran deni ed havin g j us t bee n insi de of the bui lding and insi sted that he had j ust arriv ed in hi s car . When W ood asked Beltran to s how hi m where he had parke d hi s v ehi cle, Beltran led hi m to the alley and i denti fi ed hi s car , parke d halfw ay down the block. W

ood notic ed that there w ere sev eral open parking spots much closer to Beltran’s resi dence. W ood asked Beltran for the second tim e whether there w as any contraband insi de of the r e sid ence; once again , Beltran answered in the negativ e. Also for the second tim e, W ood soli ci ted Beltran’s permi ssi on to search the resi dence and, ini tiall y , Beltran (agai n) gav e i t, adding tha t he di d not hav e the authority to consent to a search of the second- floor apartment that V azquez-Rami rez6 No. 12-2990

w as renting from hi m. But, at that poin t, the conv ersation too k
a turn. Beltr an asked W ood wh ether he had a search w arr ant. W ood replied that he di d not. Beltran then wi thdrew hi s consent for a search and indi cated he w ould p r e fe r that the agents obtain a w arr ant. W ood t old hi m that w as fine. W ood began to secu re the premi ses in or der to maintain the status quo whi le a w arr ant w a s sought. The first step he too k tow ard that end w as to handcuff Beltran. He aske d B e l t r an whether there w as anyon e else insi de the resi dence. When Beltran replied that there w as not, W ood asked hi m whether i t

w ould be alright i f he look ed insi de to ma k e sure. Beltran agr eed. W

ood and other offi cers then perfor med a prot ecti v e swee p of the premi ses and confi rmed that no one else w a s present. At the conclu si on of the sweep, W ood ret urned to the front of the resi dence and, wi th the help of a Spani sh- speaking agent whom W

o o d contacted by telephone, soli ci ted VazquezRami rez’s permi ssi on to search the second-floor apartment; V a zquez-Rami rez or ally agr eed to the search and there after si gne d a Spani sh- language consent form. W ood and Healy then conduc ted a 1 0 t o 15-minute search of the apartment. Insi de of an other wi se empty bedroo m in the apartment, they fo un d tw o stor age bins. One of the bins contai ned a mone y counter , packagin g material si mi lar to that whi ch Bedalow had found in t he g a r bage cans in the alley , and other i tems the offi cers beli ev ed w ere used in narcotics tr affi cking; the other bin cont ained o v er $1 mil li on in cash. Elsewhere in t he apartment, the offi cers di scov ered a lo aded pi stol.No. 12-2990 7
W ood and Healy ret urned to the back y ard, told B e l t r a n what they had found in V azquez-Ramirez’s apartment, and advis ed hi m that he (Beltran) w as going t o be take n wi th the offi cers back to the DEA offi ce where they w o ul d prepar e an appli cati on for a search w arr ant. Whi le W ood w as w a lkin g Beltran to a v e hic le, Beltran announc ed that he wi shed to cooper ate and that he w ould agr ee to a search of hi s resi dence. Th e a gents presented Beltran wi th a wri tte n consent for m, whi ch he s i gned after reading i t. Th e search of Beltran’s fi rst-floor resi dence and baseme nt produced, among other i tems, a shotgun, scal es, a heat sealer , tw o bott les of drug-cuttin g agents, more pack a gin g material which w as consi stent in color and tex ture wi th the material found both in the upstai rs apartment and in the tr ash cans left in the alley

, and a numb er of clear plasti c bags that w e r e cov ered in some type of resi due and appeared damp. A drugsni ffing dog later alert ed to t hose baggies

. When ag en t s l o o k ed insi de of a w asher and dr y er located
on the secon d fl oor landing outsi de of V azquez-Rami rez’s apartment, they foun d another large stash of money insi de of the w ashing mach ine and, insi de of the dry er , a Loui s V

ui tto n bag contai ning approx i mately three kilograms of cocaine

. A
mo r e thor ough search of the bins in the apartment bedroo m unearthed ni ne kil ogr ams of heroi n. Beltran sat in the front ro om of hi s resi dence chatti ng wi th P or li er whi le the search w as underw ay

. Appro xim a t e ly 40 minutes after Beltran si gned th e consent-to-search form, he

w as read hi s Miranda rights, and W ood asked hi m whether he

w ould agr ee to an interv i ew . Beltran decli ned, indi cating that8 No. 12-2990
he had already cooperat ed by giving hi s consent to search hi s resi dence. A gr and j ur y sub sequently indi cted both Beltran and V azquez-Rami rez of conspi ring to possess and possess ing 500
or more gr ams of cocaine and a kilogram or mo r e o f he ro in wi th the int ent to di strib ute them, in violati on of secti ons 841(a)( 1) and 846. They w ere a l so charged wi th possess ing fi rear ms in furtherance of drug tr affi cking acti vity

. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

. They both fi led motions asking the co ur t t o supp ress the large quanti ties of cocaine, heroin, and cash , among other evidenc e, di scov ered in the search of the tw o-flat. Beltran contended that hi s consent to search the port i on of the bui lding outsi de of the second- floor apartm e nt w as the pro duct of coerci on rat her than free wi ll, as W ood had handcuffed hi m when he insi sted on a search w a r rant, whi ch Beltran view s as an arr est desi gned to pressure hi m into giving hi s cons ent. The di stric t cour t deni ed Beltran’s motion to supp ress (as

w ell as hi s co-defendan t’s motion, whi ch w e need not di scu ss) after conduc tin g a lengthy evidenti ary hearin g that featured testim ony from Beltran, V azquez-Rami r e z (wh o had fi led hi s own motion to supp ress), and sev en of the offi cers who play ed
some ro le in the ev ents of M a y 1 3 , 2008. See United States v
. Beltran , No. 08 CR 388, 2010 WL 379873 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010). At t he outset, t he court not ed that Beltran’s accoun t of ev ents diver ged materially from those of the offi cers; and after poin tin g out multi ple aspects of Beltran’s testim ony that w ere shown to be false, the court credi ted the offic e r s’ v ersi on of
ev ents ov er his. Id. , at *5. Fr om there , the court proceeded toNo. 12-2990 9 analy z e t he offi cers’ interaction wi th Beltran upon hi s arr i v al at the r esi dence. The court agr eed that P or li er had ini tiated an inv esti gato ry stop of Beltran when Be l t r a n exited the back door of the resi dence and P or li er approached hi m and patted hi m do wn. See T erry v
. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 27, 3 0

– 3 1 , 8 8 S

. Ct. 1868, 1880, 1883, 1884–85 (1968). Based on the facts known to Por li er, the court held that reasonable sus pi ci on su pport ed both the stop and the fri sk, as (1) Beltran, knowi ng that the offi cers w ere
w ai tin g to speak wi th hi m, had chosen to enter the bui lding for
some period of tim e rat her than meet wi th the offi cers i mmedi

ately upon his arr i v al; (2) the pac kaging materials di scov ered in t he tr ash cans in the alley w ere suggesti v e of narcotics acti vity; and (3) drug tr affi cking is often associ ated wi th the
use of fi rear ms. Thus, P or li er could reasonably sus pect that Beltran w as engaged in narcotics tr affi cking and that he mi ght be armed. 2010 WL 379873, at *1 0

. W ood’ s deci si on to place handcuff s on Beltran w as li kewi se appropr i ate, the co ur t reasoned, given that W ood not only knew what P or li er knew bu t also had heard someone moving aro und the upstai rs apartment. Id. , at *11. The court added that wi thi n a short tim e after W ood w as placed in handcuff s, the reasonable sus pi ci on that support ed the inv esti gato ry detention of Beltran ri pened into probable caus e to arr est hi m, wi th the di scov ery of the one mil l i on dollars in cash

, the loaded pi stol, and the packagin g materials in V

azquez-Rami rez’s apart ment. Id. The court also found that Beltran’s consent to search the remain der of the bui lding w as the product of his fr e e will rat her than coerci on by W o o d a nd the other offi cers. Because the court had deemed Belt r a n’ s detention to be lawfu l, hi s10 No. 12-2990

consent w as v ali d so long as the government proved by a preponder ance of the evi dence that Beltr an gav e that consent freely and v oluntarily

. Id. The court emphas i zed prelim inarily that Beltran had admi tte d, dur ing hi s testim ony , that he
un d e rsto od what a search w arr ant w as, that the offi ce r s needed a w arr ant to se a r ch hi s resi dence absent hi s consent, and that he had the right to wi thhold his co nsent. These admi ssi ons themselv es “stro ngly suggest[ed]” to the cou rt that Beltra n’ s consent w as v oluntary

. Id. Nonetheless, the court

w ent on to consi der Beltran’s speci fi c contentions to the contrar y in li ght of t he mu l tipl e factors w e hav e i denti fi ed as bearin g on the knowi ng and v oluntary nature of hi s cons e nt. Id. (ci tin g United States v
. Sandov al -V asquez, 435 F .3d 739, 744 (7th Ci r
. 2006), and United States v
. Figu eroa- E s p an a , 511 F .3d 696, 704–05 (7th Ci r . 2007)). The court found i t most si gni fi cant that the offi cers had consi stently adhered to Beltran’s requests ov er the course of th e e nc o unter: At Beltran’s behest, t hey w ai ted for hi s ar riv al at the premi ses rather than proceeding imm edi ately wi th a search after he told W

ood ov er the phone that he w ould agr ee to a search; W

o o d r espected Beltran’s later wi thdraw al of hi s consent to search; and finally , i t w as Beltran who ulti mately

v olunteer ed hi s consent once he learned what the offi cers had di scov ered in the ups tairs apartment. Id. Although Beltran arg ued that hi s consent w as the product of what he characterized as “ev er -present coerci on” by W ood and the other offi cers—becau se they had “parke d themselv es”
on hi s door step whi le aw ai tin g hi s ret urn, placed hi m in handcuff s when he arr i v ed, and repeat edly soli ci ted hi s consent to search, see id. , at *12—the court rej ected thi s notion.No. 12-2990 11
The fact th a t Beltran w as in handcuff s di d not “mechani cally viti ate” hi s c on s e nt: Although Beltran had not y et been advis ed of hi s rights, he admi tte d that he understood hi s right to refuse; the fact that he had giv en, and then wi thdra wn hi s consent, and that the offi cers complied wi th hi s wi thdraw al, indi cated that he had some contro l ov er their acti ons; and although he ulti mately gav e hi s consent to search t he bui lding, he di d not agr ee to be interv i ew ed. Id. And although hi s consent to search

w as soli ci ted more than once, the court noted that Beltran had i mmedi ately agr eed to a search during W ood’ s fi rst conv ersation wi th hi m ov er the phone, whi ch indi cated to the court that there w as nothin g mag ica l about the fact that Beltran w as asked more t han once for hi s permi ssi on to search the resi

dence. Id. , at *13. Fin ally , the court rej ected Beltran’s contention that W ood’ s declaration that he w ould get a search w arr ant w as a “threat ” ai med at pressuring Beltran to yield. Beltran had wi thdrawn hi s consent to search at that poin t, W ood had a reasonable factual basi s to beli ev e he had probabl e cause for a search

w arr ant, and he si gnaled his int e nt to obtain a w arr ant in response to B e ltran’s expr essed wi sh that the offi cers follow that v ery course. In short, the court w as not persuaded t ha t W ood’ s declaration w as a mere pret ext a imed at coercing Beltran t o (again) give hi s cons ent. Id. After the co ur t deni ed Beltran’s motion to supp ress, he proceeded to tr i al. (V

azquez-Rami rez pleaded gui lty .) The jury convic ted Beltran on the tw o narcotics ch a rg es, although i t acqui tte d Beltran on the fi rear m charge. The sole i ssu e that Beltran pursues on appeal i s whether the di stric t court properly deni ed hi s moti on to supp ress.12 No. 12-2990
II. Beltran’s appeal hinges on tw o key co nt entions : fi rst, that he w as effectiv ely arr ested bef o r e t he offi cers had probable
caus e to beli ev e he w as inv olve d in anythin g cri minal, and second, that hi s consent to search hi s resi denc e w a s the product of both the wrongful arr est and the addi tional efforts of W ood and the other offi cer s t o (allegedly) coerce hi m into consenting. The fi rst contention hinges on the notion that what began
as a proper T

e rry stop morphed into a wrongful arr est once W ood placed hi m in handcuff s. Beltran does not di spute that there w a s reasonable sus pi ci on for P or li er to commenc e an inv esti gato ry detention, nor does he quarrel wi th Por l ie r ’ s deci si on to pat hi m down. But once P or li er had fri sked hi m and di scov ered hi m to be unarmed, Beltran argues, there w as no reason to beli ev e that he needed to be physi cally restr ained whi le the offi cers pu r sued their inv esti gation. See, e.g. , United States v
. Glenn a , 878 F .2d 967, 972–73 (7th Ci r
. 1989 ) (f inding de cisi on to place defendant in handcuff s di d not tr ansf or m inv esti gato ry detention into arr est, where offi cers had reason to beli ev e defendant w as armed a nd dangero us, and that concerns f or offi cer safety ther efore j usti fi ed use of restr aints;

“ w e are unw i lling to hold that under T erry, the placing of a sus pect in handcuff s wi thout pr obable cau se i s always unlaw

ful”) (emphas i s in or i gin al); but see also United States v
. Howard, 72 9 F

. 3 d 6 5 5, 661 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (“Handcuff s in a T erry stop and fri sk are not and sh ould not be the nor m.”). Beltran i s corr ect that physi cally restr aining someone, as by puttin g hi m in ha nd cuffs and/or confining hi m in the back o fNo. 12-2990 13

a poli ce car

, normally i s indi cati v e of an arr est. See Glenn a , 878 F .2d at 972; see also United State s v
. Ne wto n , 369 F .3d 659, 676 (2nd Ci r
. 2004) (collecting cases ). The go v e rnm e nt c ounters that this i s not inv ariab ly so, inv oking Glenn a and i ts prog eny to arg ue t hat the use of handcuffs in th is ca se w as bot h j usti fi ed and consi stent wi th the pu rposes of a T erry stop, an d thus di d not tr ansfor m the stop into an arr est. It reasons that in view of the offi cers’ reasonable sus pi ci on that Beltran w as inv olv ed in drug t raffi cking, whi ch oft en inv olv es firearms, it w as appr opriate for the offi cers to restr ain Beltran for offi cer safety whi le they pursued their inv esti gation, ev en after the patdown
rev ealed that he w as unarmed. Handcuffing Be l t r a n w as particu larly appropr i ate, the government ma in ta in s, give n that t he offi cers had reason to beli ev e that he w as not only lyin g about when he had a rr i v ed home from w or k and whether he had been insi de the bu ild ing , but li kely w as atte mpting to destro y ev i dence.
W e need not deci de whether th e us e of handcuff s w as consi stent wit h an ongo ing T erry stop under the rat i onale of Glenn a and i ts prog eny

. For e ven i f w e assu me that placing Beltran in handcuff s tr ansf or med the inv e st ig a tor y stop into
a r rest, we beli ev e, contrar y to Beltran’s premi se, that W o o d had probable caus e to arr est Beltr an at that po int i n ti me. Making a materially false statement to a federal agent i s a cri me. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2 ). When W ood confronted 1 Beltran after Beltran emerge d from the bui lding and asked hi m

Thi s possi b i l i ty was at l east mini mall y raised duri ng the suppressi on 1 hearing and i n the b ri efi ng be l ow and on appeal. See R. 97 at 8; R. 25 9 at 23 8– 29 ; Go v ’t Bri ef at 20 n.3.14 No. 12-2990
what he w as doin g, W

ood had reason to belie ve t hat Beltran told hi m at l e a st t w o li es: (1) that he had just arr i v ed on the premi ses, and (2) that he had not been insi de the tw o-flat. Both statements w ere demonstrably false in li ght of what W ood and hi s col l e a g ues knew

. Beltran had been seen sneaking into the back y ard from th e a l l e y so me 20 to 25 minutes earlier , and W ood had heard hi m “rummaging arou n d ” upstai rs, to use the di stric t court’s phrase. 2010 WL 379873, at *2. See United States

v
. Amar al -E s trada , 509 F .3d 820, 827–28 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (defendant’s statement to agent that he knew nothin g about automobi le that agent “ ha d just seen hi m park and exit moments earlier” supp li ed probable caus e to a r r e st defendant for maki ng false statement in violati on of § 1001). Beltran’s false statements w ere material in the sens e that they consti tuted an effort to cov er up hi s evide nt a tte mpt to conceal or destro y evidenc e, it se lf a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (1) (cons tr ued in United States v
. Johnson , 655 F .3d 594, 603–05 (7th Ci r
. 2011)), and § 1519; see a lso United Stat es v
. Lupton , 620 F .3d 790, 806–07 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“When statements are ai med at mi sdi recting agents and their inv esti gation, ev en if t he y mi ss spectacu larly or stand absolutely no ch a n c e of s u c c e e ding, they sati sfy t he materiali ty requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.”). In sh or t, the facts confronting W ood w arr anted a reasonabl e person in beli eving that Beltran ha d just commi tte d a cri me. See, e.g. , Gutierrez v
. Kermon , 722 F .3d 1003, 1008 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (defining probable caus e to arr est). It does not matter whether W ood had secti on 1001 in mind wh e n he placed Beltran in handcuff s; what matter s i s th a t g iv en the facts known to hi m at that tim e, he reasonably could hav e believ ed that Beltran had made a false statement to hi m in violati on of thatstatute.No. 12-2990 15
See Devenpe ck v
. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593–94 (2004); see also , e.g. , Maniscalco v
. Simon , 712 F .3d 1139, 1143 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 3 ); W

illiams v
. Rodriguez , 509 F .3d 392, 399 (7th Ci r
. 2007). As the di stric t court noted, not l o ng a fter Beltran w as handcuffed, t he offi cers dev eloped probable caus e to beli ev e that Beltran w as i mpli cated in addi tional cri mes. Once the offi cers searched the upstai rs apartmen t wi th the consent of V azquez-Rami rez, they di scov ered more of the packagin g material, a loaded fi rear m, and ov er a mi lli on dollars in cash. Those addi tional di sco v eries, coupled wi th Beltran’s ev asiv e behavi or and the other facts known to the offi cers, w arr anted
a reasonable beli ef that Beltran w a s engaged in narcotics tr affi cking. Notably

, the s earch that yielded these di scov eries 2 too k place wi thi n a short tim e after Beltran w as place d in handcuffs. The recor d reflects that less than 20 minutes separated the wri tte n consent to search that V azquez-Rami rez sig ne d from the wri tte n consent that Beltran si gned after he

w as informed of what the offi cers had di scov ered in VazquezR a mir ez’s apartment. (By that tim e, W ood had informed Beltran that he w as going to be detain ed and take n wi th the offi cers bac k to the DEA offi ce.)

Beltran h as contende d tha t t here wa s no ev i dence l i nking the n arcoti cs2 rel ated material s to him: no one saw him pl acing the packaging material s i n the all ey trash cans fo r exa mple , and the mil l i on-p l us do l l ars i n cash , the pi stol , and the other i tems tha t were di scovered i n his tenan t’s apartment rather tha n his own. But particul arly i n l i ght of Bel tran’s surrepti tio us entry i nto the b uil d i ng and his activity upstairs b efo re he emerged and was detained , i t was entir el y reasonab l e fo r the of fi cers to b el i eve tha t he had a cul pab l e co nnectio n to tho se material s.16 No. 12-2990
The remaining questi on i s whether Beltran’s cons ent to search the remain der of the bui lding w as v oluntarily giv en. As the di stric t court recog ni zed, the government bore the burden of proo f on thi s poin t. Schn eckloth v
. Bustam onte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973) (collecting cases ); see als o , e .g. , United States v
. Hicks , 6 5 0 F .3d 1058, 1064 (7th Ci r
. 2011). Factor s bearin g on thi s questi on inclu de (1) Beltran's age, intelli gence, and educati on; ( 2) whether h e w as advis ed of hi s consti tutional rights; (3) how long he w as detain ed before he gav e hi s consent; (4) wh e t he r hi s consent w as i mmedi ate, or
w as prompte d by r e peated requests by the authoriti es; (5) whether any physi cal coerci on w as used; and (6) whether he w as in poli ce cus tody when he gav e hi s consent. E.g. , United States v

. Pineda-Buenaventu ra , 622 F .3d 761, 776 (7th Ci r . 2010); United States v
. Raibley, 243 F .3d 1069, 1 0 7 5

– 7 6 (7th Ci r
. 2001). The court’s finding that Beltran’s consent w as freely giv en i s a factual deter mina t io n that w e rev i ew for clear err or

. E.g. , United S tat es v. Groves , 530 F .3d 506, 513 (7th Ci r . 2008). There w as no obvious mi stake in the court’s w ell supp or ted
a nd thor oughly explain ed finding that Beltran’s consent w a s freely giv en. Cert ain of the relev ant factors w ei gh negativ ely in the calculus : Beltran w as not only in cus tody but in handcuff s at the moment he gav e his co ns ent, and he had not y et been advis ed of hi s consti tutional rights. Beltran natu r a l l y focus es on the arr est and the restr aints, arg uing that W ood placed hi m in handcuff s wi th the ai m of ext racting hi s consent a nd t ha t there w as no intervening ev ent, act of wi ll, or sig nif icant pass age of tim e suffic ie nt to atte nuate hi s consent from hi s arr est. Y et, as the di stric t court rightly emphas i zed, Beltran not only demonstrate d a wi llingness to cons e nt duri ng hi s fi rstNo. 12-2990 17 (telephoni c) contact wi th W ood, but more to the point, he saw fi rst hand that W

ood and the other offi cers w ould accede to hi s wi shes wi th respect to a search of hi s resi dence: They w ai ted for hi m to arr i v e at the resi dence as he requested, a nd when Beltran wi thdrew hi s consent to search after twi ce ha v ing giv en i t, expr essing a wi sh that the offi cers o btai n a w arr ant, W ood told hi m that w as fine and that they w ould obtain a
w arr ant. (There i s no indi cati on that W ood’ s statement about obtaining a w arr ant w as pret ext ual.) And as the court poin ted out, ev en after Beltran changed hi s mind and allow ed the search to proceed, he declined t o be interv i ew ed, ci tin g hi s consent to the search as suffi ci ent cooper ation—thereby demonstrating a wi llingness and abi li ty to exercis e hi s consti

tutional prer ogat i v es as he chose. Beltran a dmi tte d at the hearin g that he understood what a search w arr ant w as, that in the absenc e of hi s consent the offi cers w ould hav e to obtain a

w arr ant, and that he had the right to r efus e hi s consent; and from the sequenc e of ev ents during hi s encounter wi th the task force offi cers, one could reasonably concl ude, as the di stric t court di d, that Beltran w as able to make an informed, deliber

ate, and volun tar y choi ce whether to w ai v e hi s constituti onal rights. “[W]e hav e held that an arr ested, handcuffed sus pect i s capabl e of giving v oluntary consent to the search of hi s home,” United States v
. Figu eroa, 622 F .3d 739, 742 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (ci tin g United States v
. Bernitt, 392 F .3d 873, 876

– 7 7 (7t h Ci r
. 2004)), and the recor d l ends suffi ci ent supp or t to the di stric t court’s finding that when Beltr an orally consented t o the search, and confir me d t hat consent in wri tin g, he di d so knowi ngly and

v oluntarily

. It i s a fai r infer e nce that once the search of V azquez-Rami rez’s apartment had expos ed the ov er one18 No. 12-2990
mi lli on dollars in cash and other incri minati ng i tems, Beltran rightly surmi sed that a search w arr ant for the remain der of the premi ses w as inevitable, and he made a calculated deci si on to cooper ate by allowin g the sear ch of hi s resi dence to pro ceed. III. The di stric t court corr ectly conclu ded that Beltran w as not wrongfully arr ested whe n the offi cers placed hi m in handcuff s; the offi cers had probable caus e t o beli ev e that Beltran had made materially false statements to a federa l o ff icer in violation of § 1001

. The court also commi tte d no clear err or in fin d in g th a t B e l tr an’s sub equent consent to search hi s resi d e n c e
w as knowi ngly and v oluntarily giv en. Fin ding no err or in the deni al of Belt r a n’ s motion to supp ress, w e AFF IRM the judgment.