[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11118

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ADAM EDGAR STAGNER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00193-TFM-MU-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11118

Before WILSON, LUCK, AND ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Adam Stagner appeals following the revocation of his supervised release and the district court’s imposition of a 24-month term 

of imprisonment. We previously ordered Stagner’s counsel to 

brief: (1) whether Stagner knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

right to counsel before the district court, and (2) whether Stagner’s 

sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court 

failed to consult the Sentencing Guidelines and determine the 

guideline range applicable to Stagner’s violations. Counsel has 

briefed one of these issues, as well as a third issue: whether Stagner 

was denied the opportunity to participate in his own defense. We 

address the parties’ contentions in turn. 

I. Right to Counsel

We first asked counsel to brief “whether Stagner knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his right to counsel below.” Under our

caselaw, a party “must adequately brief each issue by ‘plainly and 

prominently’ raising it.” United States v. Cooper, 926 F.3d 718, 730

(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 

F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Campbell, 26 

F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 967 

F.3d 1196, 1204 n.5 (11th Cir. 2020). The failure to properly raise 

an issue for appeal results in “forfeiture of the issue,” subject to sua 

sponte review only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Campbell, 

26 F.4th at 873. In United States v. Williams, we concluded that an 

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appellant had abandoned a challenge to the denial of his right to 

self-representation under Faretta because his appellate counsel 

failed to brief the issue. 29 F.4th 1306, 1307, 1311-15 (11th Cir. 

2022). In that case, similarly, the issue that was abandoned had 

been identified by the Court in an order on an Anders motion which 

directed counsel to analyze the issue. Id. at 1311-12. But because 

counsel’s initial brief, “even when read liberally,” failed to argue 

that issue, we affirmed the issue as forfeited. Id. at 1314. We also 

concluded that no circumstances were present that justified 

“reviv[ing the] forfeited issue.” Id. at 1314 n.5 (citing Campbell, 

26 F.4th at 873).

Here, regardless of the potential merit of this issue, which 

we ordered briefing on, Stagner’s initial brief does not “plainly and 

prominently” discuss the issue, so it is abandoned. We conclude, 

also, that no exceptional circumstances exist to justify reviving the 

issue, so we affirm on that issue. See Williams, 29 F.4th at 1307, 

1311-15 & n.5. 

II. Opportunity to be Present at the Revocation Hearing

Generally, where a defendant does not raise a challenge below, we review the argument on appeal only for plain error. United 

States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing a 

constitutional challenge for plain error); see also United States v. 

James, 210 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing a challenge 

under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for plain error). Under the plain-error standard, a defendant must show: “(1) error, 

(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States 

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v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United 

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)). If the defendant establishes these requirements, we then have discretion to correct an error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239, 

1261-62 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 

725, 736 (1992)).

The doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party induces or invites the district court into making an error. United 

States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 838 (11th Cir. 1998). Once a defendant 

invites error, an appellate court will not review an error invited by 

a defendant, on the rationale that the defendant should not benefit 

from introducing an error at trial. Id. 

Because revocation proceedings are not part of a criminal 

prosecution, the full panoply of constitutional rights due in a criminal prosecution do not necessarily apply. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 

U.S. 471, 480 (1972). That said, defendants are entitled to certain 

minimal due process protections in supervised release revocation 

proceedings, which are incorporated in Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.1. United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir. 

1994). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant 

at a supervised release revocation proceeding is entitled to: (A) 

written notice of the alleged violation; (B) disclosure of the evidence against him; (C) an opportunity to appear, present evidence, 

and question any adverse witness; (D) notice of his right to retain 

counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if he cannot obtain 

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counsel; and (E) an opportunity to make a statement and present 

any information in mitigation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A)-(E). 

We have explained that the right to be present at a trial 

stems from “the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 43.” United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 

997 (11th Cir. 2001).1

 The right to be present under the Due Process Clause guarantees the defendant a “right to be present at any 

stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his 

presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Id. at 

998 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)). A defendant’s presence contributes to the fairness of the procedure 

when he has personal knowledge or relevant information, such 

that his presence would be useful or more than just a shadow of his 

counsel. United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 954 (11th Cir. 1997). A 

defendant must offer more than conclusory statements to demonstrate that, had he been present, “he could have assisted either his 

counsel or the court in a way that would have resulted in a more 

reliable hearing.” Id. One “critical stage” of the criminal proceeding that receives protection under the Due Process Clause is when 

the defendant’s sentence is imposed. United States v. Jackson, 

923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1991).

1 We need not determine the precise contours of the right to be present at trial that applies in the supervised release context, because Stagner cannot show error under the more favorable right to presence at trial standards. 

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We review “a district court’s decision to proceed with trial 

in a defendant’s absence only for abuse of discretion.” United States 

v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]e first review 

whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that the defendant voluntarily waived the right to be present.” 

Id. In doing so, “we adopt the district court’s factual findings as to 

whether the defendant’s absence was voluntary unless they are 

clearly erroneous.” United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 234 (11th 

Cir. 2013). If the district court’s finding that the defendant waived 

his right to be present was proper, “’we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that there was on balance a controlling public interest to continue the [proceeding] in 

the defendant’s absence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bradford, 237 

F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001)). If the district court erred in continuing the proceeding without the defendant, “we determine

whether the error was harmless.” Id. When reviewing for harmless error, reversal is not required absent a showing of prejudice. 

United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1144 (11th Cir. 2021). “[A] 

defendant’s obstructionist and willful behavior, and its effect on the 

orderly administration of the court’s docket and the trial at hand, 

implicate a compelling public interest . . . and are properly considered by the district court in deciding whether to continue or postpone trial in the defendant’s voluntary absence.” Bradford, 237 F.3d 

at 1314.

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Here, we conclude that Stagner invited any error relating to 

his continued absence from the courtroom during the final revocation hearing because he explicitly chose not to return to the courtroom after his removal. Accordingly, we do not consider his challenges on this issue. Stone, 139 F.3d at 838.

As to Stagner’s initial removal from the courtroom, we find 

no error, let alone plain error. Stagner’s conduct was patently disruptive and his presence in the courtroom would have only further 

derailed the proceedings. His subsequent decision not to return 

when given the chance suggests that his initial removal was part of 

a calculated decision to absent himself from the proceedings. Furthermore, any error related to the initial removal was harmless, because there is nothing suggesting that Stagner’s presence would 

have led to a more reliable or fair hearing nor that his absence prejudiced him in any way. For these reasons, we affirm on this issue 

as well. 

III. Procedural Reasonableness of the Sentence

We generally review a sentence imposed upon revocation 

of supervised release for reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 

(11th Cir. 2014). In determining procedural reasonableness, we review a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de 

novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Arguedas, 

86 F.3d 1054, 1059 (11th Cir. 1996). If a party does not raise a procedural argument before the district court, however, we generally 

review only for plain error. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 

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1222 (11th Cir. 2010). However, a district court must “elicit fully 

articulated objections, following imposition of sentence, to the 

court’s ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” United 

States v. Mosely, 31 F.4th 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting United 

States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other 

grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993) (en 

banc)); see also United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1346, 1348-

49 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Jones to supervised release revocation 

proceedings). We review de novo whether “a district court has 

given a defendant the required opportunity to object to its factual 

and legal findings.” Mosely, 31 F.4th at 1334. If the record is sufficient to review the parties’ objections notwithstanding a sentencing court’s failure to give a defendant the requisite opportunity to 

object, we review the objection de novo. Campbell, 473 F.3d at 1347.

When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we normally use a two-step process, whereby we first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error. United States 

v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935-36 (11th Cir. 2016). Procedural errors 

include failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guideline 

range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous 

facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the guideline range. Id. 

The failure to calculate the guideline range is a “significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). That is 

because, as the Supreme Court has explained, “the Guidelines 

should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” at 

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sentencing “[a]s a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency.” Id. at 49.

Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines contains policy statements that provide ranges of imprisonment that a court may follow 

when revoking supervised release. U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. Although the Guidelines and their policy statements are advisory, 

judges are still required to consider them. United States v. Booker, 

543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). The consultation requirement, “at a 

minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.” United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005). Under Chapter 7, in calculating the guideline range for a sentence upon revocation of supervised release, the district court should consider the grade level 

classification of the revocation provoking conduct, the defendant’s 

criminal history at the time of the underlying offense, and the class 

of the underlying offense of conviction. Campbell, 473 F.3d at 

1348-49; U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4. After imposing its sentence, the 

district court must ensure that the grounds are clearly stated. See 

Campbell, 473 F.3d at 1349 (vacating and remanding in part because 

the district court failed to consider the Sentencing Guidelines and 

the defendant’s advisory sentencing range).

In Campbell, we held that a district court can satisfy the consultation requirement by providing “some indication” on the record that it was aware of and considered the Guidelines. 473 F.3d at 

1349 (quoting United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th 

Cir. 2000)). However, because the district court “never explicitly 

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mentioned [the defendant's] advisory Guidelines range during the 

revocation hearing” in that case, we held that the defendant’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable, even though both parties 

mentioned the defendant’s guideline range. Id. at 1349 & n.2 (noting that “the district court never said the word ‘Guidelines’ during 

the entire hearing”). 

Here, while Stagner did not preserve any challenge to the 

procedural reasonableness of his sentence, as neither he nor his 

counsel objected on any ground, the government is correct that de 

novo review applies, because the district court did not elicit objections after pronouncing the sentence. 

Under a de novo standard of review, the district court erred 

in failing to consider the Sentencing Guidelines, and, more specifically, Stagner’s Guidelines range, in sentencing Stagner. Nothing 

in the record suggests that the court calculated a Guidelines range, 

discussed whether to impose a guideline or non-guideline sentence, or, with one exception, mentioned the Sentencing Guidelines at all in sentencing Stagner. While the Guidelines are not 

mandatory, we and the Supreme Court have explained that error 

occurs when courts fail to consider them. While the government 

notes that the district court made a single mention of “Chapter 7,” 

we conclude that this statement, which implied that the court believed a Guidelines-sentence was “appropriate,” does not show 

consideration of the Guidelines because the court actually imposed 

an above-Guidelines statutory maximum sentence. In addition, 

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the statement does not suggest that the district court considered or 

calculated Stagner’s Guidelines range, as our precedent requires.

Finally, we conclude that the government has not shown 

that this error was harmless, as there is nothing in the record to 

suggest that the district court understood that it was varying upward and the extent of its variance, nor any statement by the district court that it would have imposed the statutory maximum sentence notwithstanding the Guidelines range. Accordingly, we vacate and remand Stagner’s sentence for resentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN 

PART.

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