Be cause this a ppeal focuse s primarily

on fac ts involvi ng Alejandr o Perez, for simplicity ’s 1 sake w e will ref

er to Ale jandro Pere z as “Perez” a nd Bobbie Perez as “Mr s. Perez.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 292 -CV
Alejandro P ere z and Bob bie P ere z , Appellan ts

v. Em bree C onstruction Gr oup, I nc. , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY , 51ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. A-01 -10 86- C , HO NORAB LE THO MAS J. GO SSETT , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N

A le ja n dr o Pe r e z an d

h is w if e , Bobbi e Pe r e z, broug ht suit aga inst Embree 1 Con str uc tio n G ro up , Inc . to re c ov e r d a mages for pe rs on a l in jur ie s su ff

e re d b y Pe re z wh e n h e fe ll from the roof of a buil ding located on a construction site in San Ang elo, Tex as. At the t ime of the fall, Pere z was employ ed by Kent Elliott Roofing, a r oofing subcontrac tor hired by Embree . Embree

serve d as the g ener al contra ctor on the projec t. Perez broug ht suit aga inst Embree on the ba sis of

ne g lig e nc e . M rs . Pe re z br ou g ht a los s o f c on so rt ium

c la im. On Dec ember

19, 2003, the trial cour

t gr anted a partial summary judgme nt in favor of Em br e e , d ism iss ing Pe re z’s ne g lig e nc e c la ims that invo lve d all e g a tio ns that Embr e e ow e d a du ty of ca re to Pere z under its contrac t with Kent Ell iott and that Embre e had a ssumed a g ener al duty of2

car e to Perez throug h control-in-f act of the workpla ce. T he matter s resolved by the par tial summary judgme nt a

re not at issue in this appe al. The tria l court allowe d the trial to g o forwa rd on the limited theory that Embree owed a

duty to Perez to stop work if i t became awa re that Kent Elliott was routinely violating sa fety

regulations. At the close of Perez’s ca se, the trial c ourt direc ted a ve rdict for Embre e, finding as a matter of law that Embree did not have a dut y to stop work. The trial c ourt

e nte re d a fi na l ju dg me nt t

hat Pe re z take no thi ng and de nie d his mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l. B e c a us e Mr s. Pe re z’s los s o f c on so rt ium c la im w a s d e ri vativ e of

Pe re z’s c a

us e of a c tio n, he r c la im f

a ile d a s w e ll. Pe re z ra ise s f

our p oin ts o f er

ro r on ap pe a l. He c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in (1) g ranting a dire cted ve rdict in favor of Embre e, (2) striking his cla ims for neg lige nce pe r se a nd punitive damag es, (3) striking his expert wit ness on premises safety and federa l regulations, and (4) d en y i n g h i s m o t i o nfo r n ew t ri al wi t h o u ta h ea ri n g.

We a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t cou

rt ’s dir e c te d v e rd ic t. We fu rt he r h old that th e tr ia l c ourt

did not abuse i t s d i s cre tion in st riking Perez’s cla ims for neg lige nce pe r se a nd punitive damag es or de nyinghis mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l and

that th e trial co ur

t’ s e xclu sio n o f P e re z’s e xpe rt wi tne ss testimony was ha rmless err or.
BACK GR OUND On Aug ust 16, 1999, Perez fell from the roof of an Ecker d DrugStore that was unde r construction in S an Ang elo, Texas. Perez’s employ er, K ent Elliott R oofing , had bee n hired to do roofingwork on the Ecke rd project by Embree , the g ener al contra ctor. Ke nt Elliot t employ ees ha d been w orking on the roof of the building since Aug ust 9, 1999.There was extensive de bate at trial conce rning the heig ht of the para pet wall in r el ation 2 to t he slo pe d r oo f. B e c aus e th e hei ght of the pa ra pe t w a ll i s n ot r e le va

nt t o th e ou tc ome of

thi s appea l, it is sufficie nt to note that the para pet wall wa s no more than f our fe et tall at any

point. Embree cl ai m s that Perez did in fact r ece ive a sa fety war ning f rom I smael Gue rre ro, 3 another Kent Elliott emp lo ye e . E mb r ee, in its motion for summary judgme nt, cites Perez’s testimony 3 The roof was surr ounded on thre e sides by a par apet wa ll, leaving th e fo urth side unprotec ted. At the time of the ac cident, Pere z was assig ned to cut insulation along the unprotec ted 2 edg e of the roof. While cutting the i n sulation, Perez discovere d that his knife would not cut completely

throug h the mater ial, so he attempted to bre ak the insulation off ma nually . Whil e doing so, Perez los t his balance and fe ll approxi mately 26 fee t to the gr ound below, landingon a pile of construction mater ials and seve rely fra cturing his hip, among othe r injuries. Embree contends that at t he time of the f all, Kent Elliott employ ees use d the par apet

wa ll f or fa ll p ro te c tio n o n thre e sid e s o f t he ro of , w hil e a sa fe ty -m on ito ri ngsy ste m se rv e d a s fall protec tion along the unprotec ted edg e.

Three day s after

Perez’s fa ll, an Occ upational Safe ty and He alth Administration (O SHA ) i ns pe c tor

c a me to t he job sit e to i nv e sti g a te the a c c ide nt. Whe n qu e sti on e d a bo ut the fa ll protec tion in place at t he ti me of the accident, Ke nt Elliot t employ ees pr oduced a safe ty harne ss and rope, c laiming that whe n the safe ty harne ss was in use, it wa s secur ed by another worke r holding the end of the rope.

Pe re z te sti fi e d th a t he wa s n e ve r g ive n a saf e ty ha rn e ss to we ar on t

he Ec ke rd job sit e
and wa s n ot a

wa re of any fl a g s mark ing the are a ne ar the un pr ote c te d e dg e of

the ro of . Pe re z al so testified that he did not see a safe ty monitor on the roof on the da y of the fa ll and did not rece ive any safe ty war nings w hile working near the unprotec ted edg e. Perez stated that he did not know of 3that, “I

hear d I smael but once that I was falling—whe n Iwas fa lling down. He told me, ‘Care ful,’ he said.” This Court declines to indulg e the ar g ument that a shout of “Ca ref ul!” fr om a fe llow roofer once Perez was alre ady

falling off the r oof could c onstitut e the ty pe of sa fety

war ning c ontemplated by the OSHA re g ulations reg ardingthe safe ty -monitoring sy stem. 4 any on e wo rk inga s a

sa fe ty mon ito r on any of the c re ws he ha d w or ke d o n f or Ke nt E lli ott . In h is de po sit ion , Pe re z state d that he did no t no tic e any Ke nt E lli ott e mpl oy e e s w e ari nga

sa fe ty ha rn e ss held by another worke r. To by Ga lin do , K e nt E lli ott ’s pr oje c t ma na g e r, wa s wo rk ingon

the ro of a t th e tim e of the a ccide nt. Galindo testified that he wa s “sure there was” a saf ety monitor on the roof ba sed on his e xpe ri e nc e wo rk ingfo r K e nt E lli ott , b ut h e wa s unc e rt a in w ho it w a s at th e tim e of Pe re z’s fa ll. Galindo also testified that he could not reme mber whe ther ther e we re f lag s marking the unprotec ted

e dg e of the ro of a t th e tim e of

the fa ll. Billy Moffe tt, Embree’ s superintende nt on the Ecke rd projec t, state d in h is d e p o sition that he spent the ma

jority of his time on the job site working in his trailer. Moffe tt also stated that he wa s not familiar enoug h with OSHA fall-protection reg ulations to know whether a fall-pr otection sy stem was compliant. Ga lindo testified that he informed Moff ett prior to beg inning wor

k that Kent Elliott would use a sa fety -monitoring sy stem as fa ll protection.

Th e tr ia l c ourt too k jud ic ia l no tic e of the OSH A r e g ulatio ns re g ard inga pp ro ve d f a llprotec tion procedur es. While the exact slope of the roof of the Ec kerd project is not clear , the par ties ag ree that the roof slope d at a rate no g reater than one inch per f oot, making it a low- slope roof f or OS HA regulation purposes. See 29 C.F .R. § 1 92 6. 50 0( b) (2 00 6) . T he OSH A- a pp ro ve d f

a llprotec tio n p r o c e d

u r e s f o r lo w - s lo p e r o o f

s in c lu d e a g u ar dr a il s y s te m an d a c o mb in a ti o n of a5

war ning- line and saf

ety -monitoring sy stem. Id . § 1926

. 5 0 1(b)( 10) (2006) . A safe ty -monitoring sy stem in the absenc e of a war ning line is not an a

pproved f all-protec tion procedur e. Id. Galindo testified that prior to the a ccide nt, he told Moffett t h at Kent Elliott’s employ ees s h o u l d n o t work on the r oof while it had a n unprotec ted edg e. Ac cordingto Galindo, Mo ffet t ins ist e d th a t K e nt E lli ott c on tin ue wo rk on the ro of any wa y . M of fe tt d e nie s th is

conver sation and claims that he voiced safe ty conce rns reg arding the unprotec ted edg e to Galindo,

and that G a lin do do wn

pla y e d h is c on c e rn s. On September

3, 200 4, Perez attempted to ame nd his petition t o add cla ims for neg lige nce pe r se a

nd punitive damag es o n the basis of g ross neg lige nce, a lthough a n amende d pleadingdeadline of

Dec ember 12, 2003, had been s et by the trial cour

t’s scheduling order . The trial

c ourt g ra nte d E mbr e e ’s mot ion

to s tr ike the a me ndme nt. The c ourt’s sche duling or der a lso set S eptember 30, 2003, as the de adline for de sig natin g e xpe rt wi tne sse s. On Se pte mbe r 10 , 20 04 , Pe re z ma de a fo rm a l de sig natio n of Jim Se a ly

a s a n e xpe rt wi tne ss re g ard ingfe de ra l sa fe ty re g ulatio ns and

ind us tr y sta nd ard s f or c omp lyingwi th those regulations. Perez filed a motion to enlarg e time f or an expert-witness desig nation, which the tr ia l c ourt

de nie d. The tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d E mbr e e ’s mot ion

to e xclu de Se a ly ’s e xpe rt -w itn e ss testimony on the basis of untimely

desig nation.

DI SCU SSIO N The Direc ted Ve rdict

I n Perez’s first issue, he argues t hat t he trial c ourt err ed in g ranting Embree ’s motion fo r d ir e c te d v e rd ic t be c a

us e Em br e e e xer c ise d s uf

fi c ie nt c on tr ol ov e r K e nt E lli ott ’s wo rk to c re a te6

a fa ct issue with respe ct t o whether Embree owed a

duty to Perez to stop work if it became awa re of routine sa fety

violations. I n revie wing a directed verdict, we must deter mine whether

there is any

evidenc e of probative f

o rc e t o ra ise fac t issues on the material que stions presented. Col lora v . Na v arro , 57 4 S. W.2 d 6 5, 68 (T e x. 19 78 ). We e xami ne the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the pa

rt y suffe ring an adve rse judg ment. Id

.

Gene rally , a g ener al contra ctor does not ha ve a duty to se e that a s u bcontra ctor perf orms work in a s af

e m an n er . Redinger v . Living, Inc. , 689 S.W .2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985). Howeve r, a limited duty

arises if a g ener al contractor retains control ove r a subc ontrac tor’s methods of work or

operative details, so that the subcontra ctor is not entirely fre e to do the work in his own way . Koch Refining Co. v. Chapa , 11 S.W. 3d 15 3, 15 4 (T e x. 19 99 ). A g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor ’s “ du ty

o f r e a s o n a

b le c ar e is c o mm e n s u r a te w it h th e c o n tr o l it r e ta in s ” o v e r th e s u b c o n tr a c to r. Hoe chstCelanese Corp. v. Mendez , 967 S.W .2d 354, 355 (Tex. 1998)

. Gene ral supervisory control that does not relate to the activity

causingthe injury

is not sufficient to cre ate a duty

. Ha

gin s v . E -Z Ma rt Stores , 128 S.W .3d 383, 388-89 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.). A g ene r a l c o n tr a c to r th a t r e ta in s c o n tr o l o v e r s a f e ty matt e r s o w e s a d

u ty to a subcontra c to r ’ s e mp lo y e e s if th e g e n e r a l c o n tr a c to r

“ is aw ar e th a t i ts c o n tr a c to r r o u ti n e ly ig n o res applicable fede ral guidelines and standa rd compa ny policies related to safe ty .” Mende z , 967 S.W .2d at 357. Where a

n injury is cause d b y

a subcontra ctor’s r outine disreg ard of safe ty g uidelines and policies, a Me nd

e z du ty of c are ari se s if

the g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor

e xer c ised con tr ol o ve r t he sa fe ty proce dures r elated to the injury

. Se e id ; Hagins , 1 28 S.W. 3d a t 38 9; Hanna v. Vastar Res., I nc. ,7

8 4 S. W

. 3 d 3 7 2 , 3 7 7 ( T e x . A p p . — B e a u m o n t 2 0 0 2 , n o p e t
. )

. T h e r e f o r e , E mb r e e o w e d Pe r e z a Me nd e z du ty of c are if it e xer c ise d c on tr ol o ve r K e nt E lli ott ’s fa ll- pr ote c tio n p ro c e dure s. The Te x as Supreme C o u rt has g ener ally looked to whether

a g ener al contra ctor approve d or require d specific safe ty proce dures in or der to de termine if the g ener al co n t rac tor exercised c ontrol over sa fety matters. See D ow Chem . Co. v. Bright , 89 S.W .3d 602, 609 (Tex. 2002) (holding that pre s en ce of g ener al contra ctor’s sa fety repr esentatives on job site was i n s u ff i ci en tt o es t ab l i s h co n t rol wher e represe ntatives did not sp ec i fi ca l l y ap p ro v e o r h av e k n o wl ed ge of sa fe ty pr oc e dure s u se d b y

su bc on tr a c tor ); L ee L ew is Constr., Inc. v. Harrison , 70 S.W .3d 778, 784 (Tex. 2001) (finding that g ener al contra ctor re tained contr ol over sa fety matters whe n it assigne d

e mpl oy e e to o ve rs e e and ro uti ne ly

ins pe c t su

bc on tr a c tor ’s us e of

fa ll p ro te c tio n) ; Mende z , 96 7 S.W. 2d a t 35 7 (h old ing that g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor ha d c on tr ol ov e r sa fe ty iss ue s w hen it promulg ated spe cific sa fety proce dures a

nd require d subcontrac tors to follow them). The subcontract between Embr ee a nd Kent Elliott gave Embre e the r ight to stop work in t he e ve nt t hat K e nt E lli ott

dis re g ard e d la

ws , o rd ina

nc e s, ru le s, re g ulatio ns , or or de rs of a pu bli c authority . Perez argues that the rig ht to stop work imposed on Em b re e t he duty to do so if Kent El lio tt v iol a te d sa fe ty re g ulatio ns and g a ve Em br e e su ff ic ie nt c on tr ol o ve r s a fe ty -r e la te d matte rs to

cre ate a Me nd

e z duty . Howeve r, the Te x as Supreme Court ha s held that “a g ener al rig ht to order the work stopped” in the event of a saf ety hazard is insufficie nt to establish that a gen er al contra ctor exercised c ontrol beca

use “[t] o hold otherwise would deter g ener al contra ctors fr om setting e ven minimal safety

standards.” Dow Chem. Co. , 89 S.W .3d at 607-08. As a re sult, Embree’s g ener al ri g ht t o s top wo rk un de r the c on tr a c t doe s not co ns tit ute su ff ic ie nt co ntr ol ove r Ke nt Ell iott’ s f a llpr ote c tio n p ro c e dure s to g ive Em br e e a du ty of c are re g ard ingfa ll- pr ote c tio n s a fe ty vio la tio ns .8 Ga lin do , K e nt E lli ott ’s super vis or , c la ims that pr ior to t he a c c ide nt, he sp ok e wi th Moffe tt, Embree’ s superintende nt, to voice his conce rns that Kent Elliott’s employ ees should not work on the r oof whil e it had an unpr otected e dg e. Ac cordingto Galindo, Moffe tt insi sted that Kent Elliott continue work on the roof any way . Moffe tt denies thi s conver sation and claims that he voiced safe ty conce rns re g ardingthe unprotec ted edg e to Galindo. F or purp os e s of vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to Pe re z, the pa

rt y suffe ring an adve rse judg ment, we will assume that Ga lindo’s t es t i m ony is true. Howe ver, e ven taking Galindo’s testimony as true, a n order from a g ener al contra ctor to a subcontrac tor to continue working is not evidenc e that the s ubcontra ctor was not fre e to do the work its own way or evide nce that the gene ral contractor controlled the method of work or its oper ative deta ils. See Koch Refining Co. , 11 S.W .3d at 154. Moffe tt’s instruc tion to continue w orking did not deprive Ke nt Elliot t of the fr e e do m to im ple me nt i ts o wn me tho d o f f

a ll p ro te c tio n. Ke nt E lli ott , a lth ou g h c omp e lle d to continue wor

king on the roof, rema ined fre e to control the oper ative deta ils of its roofing a ctivities and fa ll-protection proc edure s. A g ener al contra ctor “ must have some latit ude to tell its independent contra ctors what to do, in gene ral ter ms, and may

do so without becoming subject t o liability .” Id

. a t 15 6. Mo ff

e tt’ s g e ne ra l in str

uc tio n to c on tin

ue wo rk ingfal ls un der Embr e e ’s “ g e ne ra l r ig ht t o order the work to star

t or stop, to inspect prog res s o r re ceive repor ts,” which doe s not reac h the d e g r e e o f c o n tr o l r e qu ir e d to im p o s e a d u ty o f c ar e o n a g e n e r a l c o n tr a c to r. R ed i nger , 689 S.W .2d at 418.

Th e re is no e vid e nc e that E mbr e e sp e c if ic a lly a pp ro ve d o f K e nt E lli ott ’s fa llprotec tion sy stem, assig ned employ ees to inspec t or overse e the fall-pr otection sy stem, or re quired Kent Elliott to follow a specific f all-protec tion proce dure. Embree ’s gene ral right to stop work under9

the contra ct and Moffett’s i nstructions to Kent Ell iott to continue roofing do not constitut e contr ol over the methods or oper ative deta ils of Kent Elliott’ s s af et y p rocedures. B eca

use the e vidence , when view ed in the l ight most favor able to Perez, does not cre ate a fac t issue conce rning whether Em br e e , a s g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor , e xer c ise d a su ff ic ie nt l e ve l of c on tr ol ov e r the a c tio ns of Ke nt E lli ott to owe a duty

of ca re to Pere z, we overr

ule Pere z’s first issue.

Trial Am endm ents

I n Pe re z’s se c on d is su e , h e c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rred in str iki nghis amendments a dding c laims for neg lige nce pe r se and punitive da mag es based on g ross neg lige nce beca use Embre e did not make a showing of pre

judice or sur

prise. A trial cour

t’s decision on whe ther to allow the amendment of plea dings is re viewed under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard. Ohio Med. Prods., I nc. v. Sube r , 758 S

. W

. 2 d 8 70, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1988, writ denied) . A trial cour t has the discre tion to refuse a n amendment of pleading s if the opposing party prese nts e vidence of surprise or prejudice or t he amendment is pr ejudicial on its face

. Gree nhalgh v. Service Ll oyds Ins. Co. , 787 S.W .2d 938, 939 (T e x. 19 90 ); see also Te x. R. C iv. P. 66 (d ir e c tin g that the c ourt sh ou ld “ fr e e ly ” a llo w a

me ndme nts when it subserve s the merits of the c ase a nd the opposing party

fails to show prejudice ). I f an a mendment is prejudicial on its fac e, the opposing party does not bear

the burde n of showing prejudice or surprise , as such a showing “may be based on the trial court’ s conclusion that the amendme nt on its face is c alculate d to surprise or that the amen d m en t would resha pe the

cause of ac tion, prejudicing the oppos i n g party and unnec essar ily

delay ing the trial.” H a rdin v . H

ar din , 5 97 S.W. 2d

34 7, 34 9 ( Te x. 19 80 ); see also Tex. R. C iv. P. 63 (providing that10

le a ve to f ile a me ndme nts sh ou ld be g ra nte d unle ss “the re is a

sh ow ingthat su c h f

ili ngwi ll o pe rate

as a sur prise to the opposite par

ty ”). Al t h o u gh t h e t ri al co u rt ’s s ch edu l i n g o r d e rs et t h e d ea d l i n e f o r a m en d edp l ea d i n gs as De cembe r 12, 2003, Pere z filed an amended plea ding on Septe mber 2, 2004, to include a dditional claims for ne g lige nce pe r se a nd punitive damage s . The c ase w as orig inally filed on Aug ust 17, 2 0 0 1 , an d trial beg an on Nove mber 16, 2004. In light of this timeline, it would be

reason a ble fo r t he tr ia l c ourt

to v ie w Pe re z’s a me ndme nt a s c a lc ulate d to surp ri se Em br e e . A s a result, we hold that the trial court acted withi n its discretion in striking the a mended c auses of

action for g ross neg lige nce a

nd neg lige nce pe r se f

iled in a case that ha d been on f ile for more than three y e ar s , mo r e th ann in e mo n th s a f te r th e a me n d me n t d e a d li n e an d a r o u n d tw o mo n th s b e f

o r e tr ia l. We

overr ule Pere z’s second issue. Expe r t- Wit ne ss T e st im ony

I n Perez’s third issue, he c ontends that the trial cour t erre d in stri k i n g h i s expert witness on premises saf

ety and OSHA reg ulations due to unt imely desig nation. Perez asser ts that his refe renc e to the witness’s de position t estimony in discover y response s constitutes sufficie nt desig nation.

A trial cour

t’s exclusion of an ex pert witness that has not been pr operly desig nated must be review ed under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard. Me nti s v . B ar na rd , 870 S.W .2d 14, 16 (T e x. 19 94 ). I f t

he tr ial cou rt e rr e d in

e xclu din g the wi tne ss, the e rr or is r e ve rs ibl e if

it i s b oth controlling on a mater ial issue and not cumulative. Id.11 The tr ia l c o u rt e xc lu d e d e xp e rt w it n e s s Jim Se a ly ’ s te s ti mo n y o n th e g r o u nds that Pe re z fa ile d to pr op e rl y

de sig nate Se a ly . Se a ly

ha d o ri g ina lly

be e n d e sig nate d a s an e xpe rt wi tne ss by Al lia nc e Ar c hit e c ts, a fo rm e r pa rt y in thi s c a se that wa s g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n A ug us t 9, 2002. I n Perez’s F ebrua ry 24, 2003, response to reque sts for disclosure, he noted that “ Plaintiffs have not r etained a

ny testify ing e x perts as of

the fil ing of

this Disclosure Statement. . . . Plaintiffs will also us e J i m W

. S ealy and Micha el Parris a s non-re tained adve rse e x perts who will testify throug h deposition.” Perez did not describe the subject matter on whi ch Sealy

would testify , but instead stated, “ See deposition testimony previ o u s ly

g iven.” On O ctober

4, 2003, Perez filed an amende d response to reque sts for disclosure, w hich included Sealy ’s addre ss a nd listed the subject matter of Sea ly ’s testimony as “[m] edica l or OSHA standar ds.” A plaintiff’s e x pert will be c onsidered “ timely ” desig nated if the reque sted inf o r m a t i o n i s p r o v i d e d e i t h e r n i n e t y d ay s b e f o r e t h e e n d o f t h e d i s c o v e r y p e r i o d o r a s o the rw ise order ed by

the cour t. Cunningham v. Columbia/St. David’s Healthcar e S ys., L.P. , 185 S.W .3d 7, 11 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 05 , n o pe t.) . In th is c a se , th e c ourt ’s sc he du lin g or de r r e qu ir e d p art ie s to desig nate e x perts by

submitt ing the expert’s name, a ddress, topic of testimony , and re ports by Septe mb e r 3 0 , 2 0 0 3

. E xp e rt r e p o rts r e late d to an e xp e rt w it n e s s w h o is n o t r e ta in e d b y the respondingparty ar e not di scover able. Te x . R. Civ. P . 194.2(f) (4). As of September 30, 2003, Pe re z’s dis c ov e ry

re sp on se s w e re inc omp le te to t he exte nt t he y fa ile d to inc lud e Se a ly ’s a dd re ss. Fa ilure to include a

witness’s addr ess in discovery response s may

b e considered g rounds for exclusion of the witness’s testimony

. See B oothe v. Hausle r , 766 S.W .2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989).

I t was within the trial cour t’s discretion to deny Perez the opportuni ty to call an expert12

witness that was not prope rly design at ed by

the re levant dea dline. See Crawford v. Hope , 898 S.W .2d 937, 944 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied)

. As a result, we c onclude that the trial court did not abuse its discr etion by excluding Sealy ’s testimony on the basis that Sealy was not proper ly desig nated, beca

use Perez’s discovery response s reg arding Sealy wer e incomplete as of the deadline se t in the scheduling order

.

Ex clusion of an untimely

desig nated e x pert’s te stimony is mandatory if the plaintiff does not establish g ood cause for the late desig nation or a la ck of unf ai r s u rprise or

prejudice

. Tex. R. C iv. P. 193.6; see Cunningham , 185 S.W .3d at 12; Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bailey , 92 S.W .3d 577, 580-81 (Te x . App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Perez did not prese nt e vidence of g ood

cause for f

ailing to timely

desig nate Sealy as an expert witness. Howeve r, Perez argues that Embree

wa s n ot u nf a ir ly surp ri se d o r p re

jud ic e d b e c a

us e Se a ly ’s de po sit ion

te sti mony

wa s re fer

re d to in Pe r e z ’ s d i s c o v e r

y r e s p o n s e s . P e r e z t a k e s t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y , g i v e n b y Se a ly in h is capa city as a r etained e x pert for

Alliance Architec ts, was sufficient to put Embree on notice of the subject matter of

Sealy ’s opinions. W e nee d not addre ss Perez’s cont en t i o n b ec ause e ven if the exclusion of the testimony was in er ror, it was ha

rmless err or. “[F]or the improper ex clusion of evidenc e to be r ever sible, the err oneously excluded evidenc e must have be en contr olling on a material issue.” El lio tt , 2 1 S. W.3 d at 92 1; se e als o Te x. R. A pp . P. 44 .1 (p ro vid ingthat to re ve rs e tr ial co ur t’ s ju dg me nt, e rr or

mus t ha ve “ pr ob a bly

c a us e d th e re nd iti on of an imp ro pe r jud g me nt” or “ pr ob a bly pr e ve nte d th e a

pp e lla nt f ro m pr op e rl y prese nting the c ase to the c ourt of appea ls”). The trial court’s judgme nt tur ned on the materia l issue of wh e the r E mbr e e ow e d a du ty to s top wo rk

ba se d o n a

n a wa re ne ss o f r ou tine sa fe ty

vio la tio ns .13

The trial c ourt found, and w e have aff irmed, that Pere z fa iled to e stablish that Embree e x erc ised a sufficie nt level of c ontrol over Kent Elliott ’s work to c reate such a duty

. Perez asser ts that Sea ly

was reta ined as ane xp e rt w it

n e s s to te s ti f

y o nth e is s u e o f

O SH A r e g u lati o n s , s p e c if ic a ll y th a t O SHA regulations applied to the construc tion sit e whe re the injury took place, w hich is not in dispute and in any case is irreleva

nt to the issue of whethe r Embre e exerc ised control. B eca use the e x cluded evidenc e wa s not controlling on a materia l issue, we hold that the trial c ourt’s exclusion of Sealy ’s testimony was, at most, harmless error . We overrule Perez’s third issue.

Motion for New Trial

I n Perez’s four

th issue, he contends that the trial court e rre d in denying his motion for ne w trial without a hea ring . Perez argues that a tria l c ourt has no powe r to ref use a he aringon a motion for new

trial. The re solution of a motion for new tria l is left up t o t h e t rial cour t’s discretion. Strac k be in v . P re witt , 6 71 S.W. 2d 37 , 3 8 ( Te x. 19 84 ). Th e tr ia l court ’s de nia l of suc h a motio n is not to be disturbed on appe al unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Id

. Texas law does not re quire a trial court to hold a hear ing be fore denying a motion for

n e w tr ia l if th e mo ti o n d o e s n o t p r e s e n t a c o mp la in t o n w h ic h e v id e n c e mu s t b e hea rd. See Ce c il v . S mi th , 804 S.W .2d 509, 512 n.5 (Tex. 1991). “Cer tainly it would not be error

for the c ourt to refuse to h o l d a hear ing on a motion for a new

trial except wher e it would be nec essar y to hear evidenc e upon a matter such as jury misconduct.” Un iv e rsi ty

of T e x . v . M orris , 352 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tex. 1962). Perez’s motion for new tria l does not prese nt any issues on which evide nce must be14

hear d, but me rely rea sserts the leg al arguments urg ed at tria l. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying Per ez’s motion for new tria l without a hear ing. Per ez’s fourth issue is overr uled.

CO NC LU SION Be cause we hold that Embre e did not e x erc ise sufficie nt c ontrol to ow e a duty to stop work a s a matter of

law, that striking Perez’s expert witness was ha rmless err or, and that the district court did not abuse its discre tion by striking Perez’s amende d pleading or denying Per ez’s motion for ne w trial, we aff

irm the district court’s dire cted ve rdict .

________________________________________ Diane H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: June 27, 2007