Joslyn Manufacturing and Sup

Ft. Wayne, IN

Special Exposure Cohort

Evaluation Report Addendum

James W. Neton, Ph.D., CHP

Associate Director for Science

Division of Compensation Analysis and Support

Kansas City, MO

January 28, 2014
About Joslyn

 Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) from Ma

to 1952

 Machining and rolling of uranium rods, limi

thorium machining before 1948

 Primary commercial uranium rolling facility 

AEC before Simonds Saw and Steel

 Manhattan Engineer District (MED) ‐ hot ro

quenching, straightening, cooling, grinding, 

burning, and abrasive cutting of natural ura

billets into metal rods
Production

 Pre‐1948work uraniumproductionforHanfor

 Developproceduresforrollinguraniummetal

nuclearreactors

 Rollingoperationsfortestinguraniummetalro

ChalkRiverreactor,Canada

 UraniummetalforBritishgovernment
Three rolling mills

18 inch12 inch

9 inch
Petition review

 Received March 15, 2012 Qualified May 10, 2012 Petitioner proposed class

 All employees who worked in any area of the J

Manufacturing and Supply Company in Fort W

Indiana, from 1944 through 1952

 Class Evaluated

 All employees who worked in any area of the J

Manufacturing and Supply Company in Fort W

Indiana, from March 1, 1943 through Decembe

1952
Board action review

 December 2012

 AWE employees for March 1944 ‐ Decembe NIOSH proposes dose reconstruction (DR) f

January 1948 using TBD‐6000 methods

 Board tasks SC&A with report on 1948 ‐ 195

 December 2013

 SC&A submits report with 11 issues

 January 16, 2014

 Addendum, issues matrix with work gro
NIOSH action review

 Numerousinterviews Additionaldata capture

 Reviewed records andbasisfor TBD‐6000 

appropriateuseofsurrogate data

 Recommendedclass amendedtoinclude

January 1, 1948 ‐July 31, 1948 due toinab

reconstructinternaldose forreasonstobe

discussed
Exposure sources

 Inhalationandingestionofnaturaluraniumoxide

uraniummetalrodsproductionandshaping

 Hand‐operatedshop,rodsweremanuallyreinsert

themilltherequirednumberoftimesandthendr

thenextprocess

 Threeco‐locatedrollingmills(18inch,12inch,and

usedfor variousoperationssimultaneously

 Uraniumrolling

 Rollershadwater‐cooledbearings

 Producedsteamandhighlevelsof contaminati
Exposure sources

 Additional machining and preparation steps 

uranium metal prepared on site and other fa

 Centerless grinding, cutting, heat treating 

quenching, and threading

 Billets stored onsite for long periods of time Uranium waste collected and burned outsid

• Worker interviews noted burning of wast

 Documents reviewed describe off‐site explo

an improperly treated drum of uranium met
Exposure sources

 For alloperations,Joslynwasresponsible fo

packaging,handling,andloading

 MED/AEC keptstrictrecords ofmetals and

to regainasmuchofthematerial aspossibl

 Joslynresponsiblefor cleanupandaccountingf

materials

 Documentsdescribe a required medical

surveillanceprogram forJoslynworkersincx‐rays andbloodwork
Exposure sources

 Two recorded thorium‐related processing p

prior to 1948

 June 21, 1946: Straightening and centerless gri

six thorium rods

 January 21, 1947: Centerless grinding of five ex

thorium rods

• NIOSH has developed an external dosimetr

for these operations based on a TBD‐6000 a
Uranium quantities proces
External Monitoring Program

Data Availability

 No evidence of routine monitoring pro Extremely few measurements are avai

source term basis needed

 1949 Health and Safety Laboratory (HA

survey reported contamination levels a

dose rates in several areas
Internal Dose Monitoring

Programs and Data Availabi

 No routine air monitoring or bioassay progra

 Limited air samples taken on three different

occasions (December 1943, May 1944, Octo

1951)

 Very limited in scope

 Mostly General Area (GA) samples

 Early data taken using equipment (electrostatic precipitat

would not be comparable to HASL equipment

 Substantial study performed January 8, 1952

 HASL conducted a time weighted average study of various

production operations at Joslyn
Class addition rationale

 Previously recognized TBD‐6000 approach needed v

for specific practices and methods used at Joslyn fa

performed under MED supervision

 Extensive data collected in 1952 was shown to be bounded by a 

approach: How far back can NIOSH justify these measurements 

the conditions and practices at the site?

 Found that practices and standards evolved rapidly 

1943‐1948

 For Joslyn, the same oversight continued through the high

production rolling period (until the end of July 1948)

 Operations after July of 1948 guided by AEC (including con

presence of AEC officials)

 Tie to AEC (and HASL) provides consistency with monitori

procedures, representativeness of sampling
Class addition rationale

 Three closely co‐located rolling mills (see ea

diagram)

 The pre‐August 1948 practices include documen

rolling of multiple rods simultaneously on the sa

adjacent mills

 The 1952 study was done one station at a time

 In early 1948 this practice was needed to handle 

nearly 600,000 lbs of uranium rods that were pr

in 42 operating days (January to July 31, 1948)

 NIOSH believes data collected in 1952 are direct

comparable to this high production phase that rdifferent operational practices
Class addition rationale

 Most of the rolling days (and the only days with sub

rolling efforts) in 1949 and 1950 were in support of 

at the Chalk River reactor Canada (alpha phase urandimensional stability)

 Required careful temperature control

 Represented smaller efforts (approximately 30 tons in bot

1950)

 These two efforts represent were specifically done using 

inch rolling mills

 The 18 inch rolling mill was shown in the 1952 study to ha

substantially lower air concentration levels that the 9 inch 

 Previous electrostatic precipitation air sampling also show

inch mill produced much higher air concentrations than th

mills
Class addition rationale

 SuitableDRmethoddoesnotexistsbefore1948fo

workerswhowerenotmonitoredandpotentiallytouraniumandthorium

 Lackofadequatebiologicalmonitoringdata,

 Insufficientairmonitoringinformation Differencesinoperational characteristicsfromoth

working (noappropriatesurrogatedataexists)
Class addition rationale

 Why everyone?

 Based on reports by the AEC and facility layout, 

process areas were broadly distributed and contpreventing movement in these areas was not en

 Why stop in July 1948?

 NIOSH proposes that the surrogate data from TB

coupled with the known operational data and soterm information provides support that a realist

can be determined
Employees not included in the 

 NIOSH will use internal monitoring data t

become available for an individual claim

 Perform DRs for March 1, 1943 ‐ July 31, 1

 External 1943 ‐ 1952

 Medical x‐ray 1943 – 1952

 Internal August 1 – December 31, 1948
External Dose Post 1943‐5

 Standard approach to medical X‐ray dose using OTI

 External dose rate factors for rolling days and conta

surfaces will be applied

 Billets were stored onsite for an extended amount o

 For the purposes of the example dose reconstructio

external dose determined

• Rolling day: 10 hour exposure to a long billet at 1 foot per 

(7.03 mR/day)

• Billet storage: 10 hour exposure to a long billet at 1 meter 

rolling day (1.08 mR/day)
Post July 1948 Internal Do

 NIOSH proposes to use the data from TBD‐6000 and 

rolling days to determine internal and external dosebeginning with August 1, 1948

 Dose reconstruction approach summarized in a whi

(currently in classification review)

 TBD‐6000 tabulated data converted from per calend

per rolling day exposures for ingestion and inhalatio(assuming 250 work days per year)

 In addition to rolling operator, NIOSH will include u

machining as a method using TBD‐6000 to assess th

considerable amount of machining operations cond

during the Joslyn operational period
Health Endangerment

 The evidence reviewed in this evaluation indic

that some workers in the class may haveaccumulated chronic radiation exposures thro

intakes of radionuclides and direct exposure tradioactive materials.

 Consequently, NIOSH is specifying that health 

have been endangered for those workers covethis evaluation who were employed for a num

work days aggregating at least 250 work days 

the parameters established for this class or incombination with work days within the param

established for one or more other classes of

employees in the SEC.
Summary

Feasibility Findings for Joslyn Petition SEC-200 

March 1, 1943 – December 31, 1952 

Source of Exposure Reconstruction Feasible Reconstructio

Feasibl

Internal 

- Uranium 8/1/1948 -

12/31/1952 

3/1/1943

7/31/194

-Thorium N/A 3/1/1943

12/31/194

External 

- Gamma/Photon All years 

- Beta All years - Neutron N/A - Occ. Medical X-ray All years 
Proposed Class

“All Atomic Weapons Employees who work

any buildings/area owned by the Joslyn

Manufacturing and Supply Co. in Fort Way

Indiana, from March 1, 1943 through July 3

1948, for

a number of work days aggregati

least 250 work days, occurring either solel

under this employment or in combination work days within the parameters establish

one or more other classes of employees inin the Special Exposure Cohort.”