1

Filed 10/13/22 P. v. Bunn CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLIFFORD LAMONT BUNN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165857

 (Kern County

 Super. Ct. No. MF013335A)

This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant 

Clifford Bunn of seven felony rape and other sexual assault crimes against 

Angelle C., his stepdaughter, a child under age 11.

1 Defendant received a 

total sentence of 145 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant contends 

the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence relating to the 

alleged infidelity of Ruby B., his former wife and Angelle’s mother, and 

Angelle’s alleged behavioral issues at school. Defendant also contends the 

trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences on all 

seven counts, rather than concurrent sentences. We reject these contentions 

and affirm.

1 This matter was transferred by California Supreme Court order on 

August 9, 2022, from the Fifth Appellate District to the First Appellate 

District.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2020, an amended information was filed charging 

defendant with four counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 

under age 11 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1, 3, 5, and 7),2 and three 

counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child under age 11 

(§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 2, 4, and 6).

Trial began January 13, 2020, and revealed the following.

I. The Prosecution’s Case.

Defendant and Ruby were married and had lived together since 2017. 

Ruby had a daughter from a previous relationship, Angelle, born in 2009, 

who had lived with the couple since 2018. Defendant and Ruby’s marriage 

was marred by tension. Ruby became suspicious of defendant after once 

finding an opened condom and, another time, finding what appeared to be a 

second cell phone. Defendant denied being unfaithful or having another 

phone.

A. Discovery of Defendant’s Sexual Abuse.

On March 4, 2019, Ruby left for the morning, leaving Angelle, age 10, 

with defendant, age 49 or 50. However, Ruby returned home unexpectedly,

after discovering she left behind some needed items. Ruby was surprised to 

find her bedroom door locked. Ruby pounded on the door, hearing shuffling 

inside the bedroom. Finally, defendant, naked, unlocked the door before 

running back across the bedroom, throwing something in the trash can, and 

jumping into bed. Ruby went to the trash can and found a blue ring with a 

condom wrapped around it.

2 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal 

Code.
3

Ruby then went to the bathroom door, which was closed. After opening

the door, Ruby saw her daughter, Angelle, sitting on the toilet. As Ruby

approached, Angelle quickly flushed but not before Ruby saw blood in the 

water. Extremely upset, Ruby grabbed a knife from the kitchen and cut 

defendant’s arm. She then called 911.

B. The Investigation and Angelle’s Statements.

Officer Brian Hansen, trained in responding to sexual assaults, 

responded to Ruby’s 911 call. When Officer Hansen first arrived, Ruby told 

him that she caught her husband “ ‘having sex’ ” with her daughter and gave 

him the condom and blue ring that she found in the trash. The condom, 

which had a red substance on it, was booked into evidence. Defendant was 

arrested and received medical treatment for the cut on his arm before being 

booked into jail.

Angelle was taken to a hospital for a sexual assault exam. Angelle told 

the examining nurse that her “dad” had been “having sex” with her for about 

a year. She further stated that he would kiss her all over and that she would

orally copulate him. Angelle also said that she had some bleeding that day 

but that she did not always bleed during intercourse. Consistent with her 

statements, the nurse found abrasions, lesions and tenderness consistent 

with penile penetration and sexual assault. The nurse took several swabs 

and collected Angelle’s underwear for testing.

Officer Hansen interviewed Angelle later that day. Angelle told him 

that defendant, wearing a condom, was having sex with her that morning 

when Ruby came home and started banging on their bedroom door. Angelle

explained she and defendant had been engaging in sexual intercourse several 

times a week since March 2018, about 100 times in total, and that she orally 

copulated him each time. Mostly, this occurred in defendant and Ruby’s bed. 
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Once, they had sexual intercourse while her sister and Ruby were also in bed. 

The family had been watching a movie together in the bed, and Ruby and 

Angelle’s sister fell asleep. Angelle did not tell anyone about defendant’s 

abuse because she loved him and did not want him to get in trouble. Angelle

also told Officer Hansen that Ruby and defendant had been arguing that 

morning before Ruby discovered them together. When Ruby confronted her, 

Angelle first denied having sex with defendant, prompting Ruby to 

repeatedly hit her.

A few days later, Angelle was interviewed at a child assessment center. 

Again, Angelle described having sexual intercourse with defendant regularly 

since March 2018. Angelle further stated that defendant went to jail for 

“having sex” with her after Ruby caught them. On that particular morning, 

she was getting ready for school when defendant went to get a condom and to 

check to make sure Ruby had left. When Ruby unexpectedly knocked on the 

bedroom door, defendant told Angelle to go to the bathroom.

Angelle further stated that the day before they were caught, defendant 

told Angelle to “suck on [his penis]” (which she did) while they were in his 

truck driving home. They had sex in defendant’s truck many times and 

sometimes had to stop when Ruby called defendant on his cell phone. 

Generally, defendant would tell Angelle to “ ‘[g]et ready,’ ” which meant he 

wanted to have sexual intercourse. Once, they had sexual intercourse in 

defendant and Ruby’s bed while her sister and Ruby were also in the bed,

sleeping. Angelle also specifically remembered having sexual intercourse 

with him in February 2019, two days before her birthday.

Angelle described defendant as her friend and said she did not want 

him to go to jail. Defendant told her not to tell anyone about their sexual 

relationship. Angelle also had sexual intercourse twice with “Phillip” in 
5

Las Vegas when she lived with her biological father before moving in with 

defendant and Ruby. Angelle was able to mark on a drawing where a 

female’s vagina and a male’s penis are located.

Angelle’s trial testimony was generally consistent with her previous 

statements, although she initially denied remembering anything about the 

day that defendant’s crimes came to light, or knowing what “ ‘sex’ ” is. 

Angelle testified that she and defendant had sexual intercourse regularly for 

about a year, from March 2018 to his arrest in March 2019. Usually, they 

had sexual intercourse in defendant’s bed or his truck, including the day 

before Ruby discovered them together. Defendant forced Angelle to orally 

copulate him every time they had sexual intercourse. They also had sexual 

intercourse once while Ruby and Angelle’s sister were also in bed. Angelle

did not report defendant’s abuse because she did not want defendant to get 

into trouble. Before Angelle moved in with defendant and Ruby, “Uncle Phil” 

had sexual intercourse with her at her biological father’s house in Las Vegas.

C. DNA Evidence.

The swabs from Angelle’s sexual assault evidence kit and the condom 

from the trash can were tested. A mouth (buccal) swab from defendant was 

also tested, sealed and booked into evidence. The red substance on the 

condom tested positive for blood.

The buccal swabs from defendant and Angelle were used as known 

reference samples for the DNA testing of the condom and Angelle’s sexual 

assault kit. Angelle could not be excluded as a potential contributor for the 

red substance on the condom, whereas defendant could be excluded. As to 

the swabs from the sexual assault kit, neither defendant nor Angelle could be 

excluded as potential contributors.
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II. Defense Case.

Several friends and relatives testified that the crimes alleged against 

defendant were inconsistent with his character.

Defendant’s mother, Barbara B., lived with Angelle, Ruby, and 

defendant. Defendant had been around children his whole adult life, and 

Barbara never saw defendant behave inappropriately with Angelle or any 

other child. If she had, Barbara would have reported it. Barbara did not 

believe the charged allegations were consistent with her son’s character. 

After defendant’s arrest, she allowed Ruby and Angelle to continue living at 

the home because they had nowhere else to go.

Defendant’s sister also lived with defendant, Ruby, Angelle and 

Barbara, for about a year and a half, and never saw defendant act 

inappropriately or suspiciously. She did not believe defendant would have 

committed the charged offenses.

Marva B. had known defendant since 2016. She had seen defendant

around children in the past and never saw him behave inappropriately. In 

her opinion, the charged allegations were inconsistent with defendant’s 

character. Marva further testified that defendant and Ruby frequently 

argued. She had seen defendant attempt to ignore Ruby’s phone calls. 

However, Ruby would keep calling him until he answered.

Deshawnia P. had known defendant for about 20 years. Deshawnia

had seen defendant interact with children before, including her own, and

never saw him act inappropriately. Deshawnia also testified that the 

charged allegations were not consistent with defendant’s character.

Anthony R., a close friend of defendant since 2012, had also seen 

defendant interact with children before, including his own. Anthony was 
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certain defendant would not commit the charged acts, and he questioned 

whether the DNA evidence was accurate.

III. The Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal.

On February 4, 2020, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The 

trial court sentenced him to a total term of 145 years to life, consisting of 

consecutive 25 years to life sentences on the sexual intercourse or sodomy 

counts and consecutive 15 years to life sentences on the oral copulation or

sexual penetration counts.

On June 12, 2020, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Defendant raises three primary grounds for reversal: The trial court 

prejudicially erred by excluding evidence relating to (1) Ruby’s alleged 

infidelity and (2) Angelle’s alleged behavioral issues at school and (3) abused 

its discretion by imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. We 

address each one in turn.

I. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings stand.

A. Evidence of Ruby’s Infidelity.

Defendant contends his state and federal constitutional rights to due 

process, confronting adverse witnesses and presenting a defense were

violated when the trial court barred him from cross-examining Ruby about

posting on social media regarding her new boyfriend and changing her profile

status to “new relationship” just after his arrest, and from questioning 

defense witness Anthony about Ruby’s social media activity and witnessing

her having sex with another man in November 2017 while still married to 

defendant. Defendant claims this evidence was admissible to prove Ruby’s

bias and motive to lie and to coach Angelle to lie about his sexual abuse. 

Moreover, he claims this evidence was vital to his defense given that Ruby
8

reported his crimes and turned over key DNA evidence (the condom and blue 

ring) to the police. (See Evid. Code, § 785 [“The credibility of a witness may 

be attacked or supported by any party”]; People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 

393, 433–434 [a party may ask questions of a witness on cross-examination 

for the purpose of attacking the witness’s credibility as long as the questioner 

has a good faith basis for asking the question].) The following legal 

framework applies.

“All relevant evidence is admissible, but only relevant evidence is 

admissible. (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 351.)” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 

1063, 1095 (McCurdy).) Under Evidence Code section 352, the court has 

broad discretion to determine relevant evidence should nonetheless be 

excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by its 

prejudicial effect. (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922; Evid. Code, 

§ 352.) “ ‘Prejudice,’ as used in Evidence Code section 352, is not synonymous

with ‘damaging.’ [Citation.] Rather, it refers to evidence that uniquely tends 

to evoke an emotional bias against [a victim, witness or party], and has little 

to do with the legal issues raised in the trial.” (McCurdy, at p. 1095.)

On appeal, a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 547; 

People v. Avitia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 185, 193.) “The trial court’s ruling 

will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing it exercised its discretion in 

an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Avitia, supra, at p. 193; see People v. Dyer

(1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 73.)

Here, the trial court excluded this proffered evidence under Evidence 

Code section 352 on the grounds that it was confusing, irrelevant and, as to 

the alleged 2017 infidelity, too remote in time to be probative. We find 
9

nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd about these rulings. (People 

v. Avitia, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.)

First, there was no evidence Ruby was romantically involved with the 

man identified on her social media page at the time defendant’s crimes were 

committed, which renders defendant’s proposed line of questioning

speculative, irrelevant and confusing to the jury. Moreover, while defendant 

contends this information was vital to his theory that Ruby made up his

crimes to get back at him, the trial court permitted him to present testimony 

from friends and family depicting Ruby as jealous and their marriage as 

troubled. Ruby herself testified that she had recently found an opened 

condom and what appeared to be a photograph of defendant with a second 

cell phone. As such, this theory was before the jury notwithstanding the 

court’s evidentiary ruling.

Further, as to Ruby’s alleged infidelity in 2017, we agree with the trial 

court that admission of this evidence, given its remoteness in time, would be 

significantly more prejudicial and confusing than probative of Ruby’s bias or 

motive to lie. Angelle consistently testified defendant’s sexual abuse did not 

begin until March 2018. Further, Ruby did not discover and report his abuse 

until March 2019, two years after the alleged infidelity. As such, the 

evidence would do little more than “evoke an emotional bias” against Ruby

despite having “little to do with the legal issues raised in the trial.” 

(McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

We also reject defendant’s argument that exclusion of this evidence 

implicated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. 

“ ‘Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right 

to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor 

[citations], “ . . . the proffered evidence must have more than ‘slight-
10

relevancy’ to the issues presented.” ’ ” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

816, 865.) Thus, while defendant may be correct Ruby’s bias was of vital 

importance to his case, “this does not mean the trial court constitutionally 

was compelled to permit [him] to introduce all possibly relevant evidence on 

these subjects despite its marginal relevance, the possible effect upon the 

jury’s ability to remain focused on the issues before it (rather than becoming 

sidetracked on collateral questions), and the potentially significant amount of 

time entailed in admitting the evidence in a manner fair to both sides. (See 

People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82 [citations] [‘a state court’s 

application of ordinary rules of evidence—including the rule stated in 

Evidence Code section 352—generally does not infringe upon’ the 

constitutional right to offer a defense]; [citations].)” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 

53 Cal.4th 622, 665–666.) As mentioned, the trial court admitted testimony 

from defendant’s friends and family regarding Ruby’s jealousy and the 

troubled state of their marriage. Evidence was also presented that Ruby was 

so enraged that she repeatedly hit Angelle after the child initially denied 

having sex with defendant and that she then stabbed defendant before 

calling 911. All of this evidence was helpful to defendant’s theory that Ruby

was motivated to lie and to coach Angelle to lie about his abuse. Under these 

circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit 

further evidence of Ruby’s 2017 infidelity notwithstanding its slight

relevance.

Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument this evidence should 

have been admitted, given its minimal relevance, it is not reasonably likely 

admitting it would have led to a different verdict. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 

Cal.4th 585, 611–612 [exclusion of evidence, even if erroneous, is harmless if 

it does not appear reasonably probable the verdict was affected].) The 
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evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Angelle consistently 

described his crimes to multiple people, from the time the police were first 

summoned until the trial was complete. Moreover, both medical and DNA 

evidence supported her descriptions. Under these circumstances, the court’s 

rulings provide no grounds for reversal.

B. Evidence of Angelle’s Behavioral Issues.

We apply this same reasoning to reject defendant’s contention that the 

trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence relating to Angelle’s

behavioral issues at school. Specifically, defense counsel requested to 

question Angelle or Ruby about information counsel received about Angelle’s

having been in trouble at school for “issues of misconduct, fighting with other 

people, and potentially not being completely honest.” The trial court denied 

this request on grounds of irrelevance, improper character evidence and lack 

of foundation. As before, defendant claims the court’s ruling was prejudicial

error because the excluded evidence was vital to his defense in that it tended 

to impeach his accuser Angelle’s credibility. We disagree.

Putting aside the fact that the record contains no offer of proof as to 

any specific incident of Angelle’s alleged behavioral issues, which itself is 

grounds for rejecting defendant’s challenge (People v. Foss (2007) 155 

Cal.App.4th 113, 127), we, as did the trial court, question the excluded

evidence’s relevance. “The law no longer recognizes a distrust of the 

testimony of someone based on having been a victim of unwanted sexual 

advances.” (People v. Foss, supra, at p. 130.) The trial court could have 

reasonably determined Angelle’s behavior at school was too tangential and 

unrelated to the charged crimes to warrant questioning.

Defendant responds that said evidence would have added to the 

reasons to be skeptical of Angelle’s truthfulness given that she made some 
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inconsistent statements regarding the number of times the abuse occurred, 

initially testified she did not remember the March 4, 2019 incident and 

denied knowing what sex is. Perhaps. But the issue for purposes of Evidence 

Code section 352 is whether the prejudicial value of the evidence 

substantially outweighs its probativeness. Here, the trial court reasonably 

found this weak evidence was likely to evoke an emotional bias against

Angelle despite being minimally probative on the issues at hand, such as

whether she credibly reported defendant’s crimes after Ruby found defendant 

naked with an opened condom in a just-unlocked bedroom with Angelle

hiding in the bathroom. Under these circumstances, defendant failed his 

burden to prove the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. (McCurdy, 

supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1095; see Santillon v. Roman Catholic Bishop of 

Fresno (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 708, 727.)

Finally, given the appropriateness of the trial court’s refusal to allow

questioning on the issue of Angelle’s school behavior, there was no violation 

of defendant’s federal constitutional rights. As stated ante, generally, a 

court’s application of ordinary rules of evidence does not impermissibly 

infringe on a defendant’s fundamental right to present a defense. (People v. 

Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 665–666.)

C. No Cumulative Error.

Relatedly, defendant contends the cumulative effect of the claimed 

errors in excluding his proffered evidence was prejudicial, warranting 

reversal. Under the “cumulative error” doctrine, we reverse a judgment if 

there is a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that the jury would have reached a 

result more favorable to defendant absent a combination of errors. (E.g., 

People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646; In re Avena (1996) 12 

Cal.4th 694, 771, 772, fn. 32.) Here, however, as discussed ante, the court’s 
13

exclusion of his proffered evidence was not error, much less prejudicial error. 

And, in any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that defendant’s 

trial was less than perfect, there is no basis for concluding he did not receive 

due process and a fair trial. (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 

[“The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether defendant received due 

process and a fair trial’ ”].)

II. No Sentencing Error.

Lastly, defendant contends the court abused its discretion by imposing 

consecutive life sentences on all seven counts rather than concurrent life 

sentences. He is wrong.

When a defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses, including 

offenses punishable by indeterminate life sentences,

3 the sentencing court 

generally has discretion to impose the sentences consecutively or 

concurrently. (§ 669; People v. Woodworth (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1479 

[“ ‘Absent an express statutory provision to the contrary, section 669 provides 

that a trial court shall impose either concurrent or consecutive terms for 

multiple convictions’ ”].)

On appeal, we review a trial court’s discretionary sentencing decision 

for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 

Cal.App.4th 822, 831.) As such, we will not reverse absent a clear showing of

abuse. (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20.) A judgment is presumed 

correct on appeal, and it is the appellant’s burden to prove the trial court 

committed error. (People v. Booth (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 450, 452 (Booth).)

3 A person found guilty under section 288.7, subdivision (a) “shall be 

punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life.” 

(§ 288.7, subd. (a).) A person found guilty under section 288.7, subdivision (b)

“shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years 

to life.” (§ 288.7, subd. (b).)
14

Here, the trial court’s sentencing decision was consistent with the 

recommendation in the probation report calling for consecutive sentences 

rather than concurrent sentences on three grounds: (1) the crimes and their 

objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (2) the crimes were 

committed at different times or separate places; and (3) the crimes involved 

separate acts of violence or threats of violence. The prosecution also sought 

consecutive sentences for counts 1–7 in its sentencing brief, arguing: “It is 

the People’s position that the Court does not have discretion in sentencing 

due to the nature of the acts, the multiple different acts and the sentencing 

scheme for each charge.” Defendant, in his sentencing brief, argued for 25 

years to life on count 1 with the remaining counts stayed or, alternatively, for 

concurrent sentences.

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor again argued for consecutive 

sentences, insisting that because defendant committed numerous separate 

offenses, “the Court does not have the authority to run all the counts 

concurrent.” Defendant, in turn, requested clemency and objected to 

imposition of consecutive sentences. Following argument by counsel, the trial 

court observed that Angelle’s trial testimony was “easily the worst testimony 

I’ve had to sit and listen to and to observe the effect on a young person at 

such a young age based on what happened.” The court then confirmed it read 

and considered everything presented by the parties before indicating it would 

follow probation’s recommendation. Accordingly, the court imposed

consecutive sentences on all seven counts.

On appeal, defendant speculates the trial court was unaware of its 

discretion to impose concurrent terms, reasoning the court must have 

adopted the prosecution’s mistaken position that consecutive sentences were 

mandatory. Defendant’s mere speculation does not meet his burden to 
15

affirmatively demonstrate error on appeal. (See Booth, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 452 [rejecting the contention that the court erroneously believed it had 

no discretion to run § 288.7 sentences concurrently].) Moreover, it runs 

counter to the well-established appellate rule that “[a]bsent evidence to the 

contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing 

law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.)

We also note that, contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court had no 

obligation to “[make] clear [on the record] that it understood it had discretion 

to impose concurrent sentences.” Under our statutory law, “a trial court is 

not required to state its reasons for ordering one indeterminate term to run 

consecutively to another indeterminate term. Section 1170, subdivision (c), 

which requires the trial court to ‘state the reasons for its sentence choice on 

the record at the time of sentencing,’ applies only to sentences imposed 

pursuant to section 1170, i.e., determinate sentences.” (People v. Arviso

(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1058; see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.403, 

4.406(b)(5).)

Finally, defendant’s case People v. Billingsley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 

1076 is inapposite. Billingsley involved the retroactive application of an 

ameliorative change in the law that granted trial courts new discretion to 

strike firearm enhancements. At issue was whether, when the appellate 

court applied the new law retroactively, the record made it clear the trial 

court “would not have stricken the firearm enhancement . . . even if it had 

that discretion . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1080–1081.) It was under that very different 

circumstance that the appellate court held: “ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to 

sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the 

sentencing court.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1081.)
16

Here, there is no dispute on appeal the law at the time of sentencing 

afforded the trial court discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 

sentences. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we presume in the absence of 

contrary evidence that the trial court’s sentencing order was a valid exercise 

of discretion.4

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Simons, J.

_________________________

Wiseman, J.*

A165857/People v. Clifford Lamont Bunn

4 Given this holding, we need not address defendant’s ancillary claim 

that he received ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s failure to object 

to the sentencing order. In any event, he appears mistaken. The record 

reflects that defense counsel raised an objection to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences at the hearing. 

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.