This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Hanford Work Group, has 

been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

Centers for Disease Control

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

Hanford Work Group

Tuesday, April 14, 2020

The meeting convened via teleconference at 10:00 

a.m. Eastern Time, Brad Clawson, Chair, presiding.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

2 

Present: 

Bradley Clawson, Chair

Phillip Schofield, Member

Paul Ziemer, Member

Also Present: 

Ted Katz, Designated Federal Official

Nancy Adams, NIOSH Contractor

Terrie Barrie, ANWAG

Ron Buchanan, SC&A

Bob Burns, ORAU Team

Grady Calhoun, DCAS

Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A

Mark Lewis, ATL

Pat McCloskey, ORAU Team

Jenny Naylor, HHS

Chuck Nelson, DCAS

Lavon Rutherford, DCAS

Tim Taulbee, DCAS
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. 

3 

Contents

Centers for Disease Control National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health Hanford Work Group 

Tuesday, April 14, 2020 1

Welcome and Introductions 4

Review of SEC Exposure Issues 16

Issue 3: TH-232 internal exposure from 

Jan 1, 1960 Onward 16

Issue 4: HEU - Uranium Intake 

Estimation 27

Issue 7: U-233 Intakes 37

Issue 9: Np-237 Intakes 43

Issue 10: Tritium Intake Estimation 

from 1949 Onwards 49

Issue 20: Skin Contamination 52

Issue 22: Radiological Incidents 56

Issue 27: Building 324 Leaks 58

Review of Data Adequacy and Completeness

60

Petitioner Comments 70

Path Forward 71

Adjourn 73
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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4

Proceedings

(10:01 a.m.)

Welcome and Introductions

Mr. Katz: So, welcome, everyone. This is the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. 

This is the Hanford Work Group. It’s been quite a 

while since we met.

Let me just cover some preliminaries. We have --

the Work Group is dealing with the SEC still. And it 

is going to pull together our information from 

bringing the Work Group up to date and everyone 

up to date with what’s been put to bed and what is 

ready to be addressed.

The presentations for today should be posted on the 

NIOSH website under the schedule of meetings with 

today’s date, so people could follow on with the 

presentation there, if they would like to. And there’s 

both a presentation from the program, from DCAS, 

and a presentation from the Board’s technical 

support contractor, SC&A, both for today’s meeting.

There is also a report from the program that’s the 

background for these presentations today that also 

should be posted there.

So, roll call. This is a Work Group on a specific site, 

so conflict of interest is always an issue there. The 

Work Group Members by definition don’t have

conflicts of interests or they wouldn’t be Members of 

the Work Group. So, and our Work Group Members 

are all present. That’s Brad Clawson who’s on the 

line. He’s Chair of the Work Group. And Paul Ziemer 

and Phil Schofield, both Members.

Let’s go on with roll call for NIOSH ORAU team and, 

please, speak to the conflicts of interests.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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5

(Roll call.)

Mr. Katz: All right, that takes care of it. So, and 

with that, Brad, it’s your meeting.

Brad? You might be on mute.

Chair Clawson: Hello?

Mr. Katz: There you are.

Chair Clawson: There I am. What do we got? I’m 

sorry.

Mr. Katz: That’s all right.

Chair Clawson: I’m trying to work, at, I’m trying to 

work at the same time here, so.

Okay. One of the things, I’d like to welcome 

everybody here and to the meeting. Like you said, 

this has been a long time since we got in there. So, 

I’m going to talk with Joe and Chuck.

Chuck has just put out all of these different papers 

and stuff. So I was wondering, Joe, if we wanted 

Chuck to first go over what he’s done, or do you 

want to respond to some of these?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. I think Chuck’s done a pretty 

good job just laying out the background. And when 

we get into the specific issues on the agenda, you 

know, certainly I would expect them to present the 

NIOSH position, then we can respond. I think that 

would be the best thing once we get into the issues.

Chair Clawson: Okay. So, do we want to proceed 

that way?

Mr. Nelson: That sounds good to me too, Joe.

Chair Clawson: You’ve got it, then.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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6

Mr. Nelson: Okay. All right. My name’s Chuck 

Nelson. I’m the SEC team lead for Hanford.

And, Bomber, has anybody pulled up my 

presentation? I might be over here. The only reason 

I’m getting the audio so let me try to share it to see 

if that works. Apologize.

Mr. Rutherford: You shared it earlier. It should be, 

should be okay.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Let me know if it pops up there.

Mr. Rutherford: It’s coming up now.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Can you see it yet?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes. Yep, we’ve got it.

Mr. Nelson: Sorry about that. Anyways, I’m the SEC 

team lead for Hanford. I’ll go ahead and go through 

some of the background information since it’s been 

a while, and for everybody else’s benefit on the 

phone.

Just talk about, a little bit about the SEC evaluation 

history. We had SEC Petition 57 Part 1. That 

covered October 1st, ‘43 to August 31st, 1946.

Then we had SEC Petition 57 Part 2, covered 

September 1, ‘46 through December 31, 1968 for 

select areas.

Then there was another Petition, SEC 152, and it 

subsumed both those two previous Classes from 

SEC Part 57 Part 1 and 2 for those time periods 

through ‘68, as well as through June 30th, 1976.

There is also another Petition, 155, and that Class 

was not added. There was no evidence of 

falsification of radiological records during that time 

period.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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7

And then we had SEC Petition 201, which covered a 

period from January -- make that July 1, 1972 

through December 31st, 1983. And that was for all 

areas.

SEC 201 determined that dose reconstruction was 

feasible from 1984 onward, which was the same 

conclusion drawn from SEC 57-2.

Mr. Rutherford: Chuck, can you move your slide?

Mr. Nelson: Oh. Thank you, Bomber.

Okay, sorry about that. Forgive my coordination 

here.

Okay. So, in March of 2015 there was an 83.14 

status, and the Class was issued. And it was for 

SEC-226 that was for contractors and 

subcontractors who worked at Hanford during the 

period of January 1, ‘84 through December 31st, 

1990. There were some exclusions from this class, 

specifically Battelle Memorial Institute from January 

1, ‘84 through December 31st, 1990; Rockwell from 

January 1, 1984 through June 28th, 1987; Boeing 

Computer Services from January 1, ‘84 through 

June 28th, 1987; United Nuclear from January 1, 

1984 through June 28, 1987; and Westinghouse 

from January 1, 1984 through December 31st, 

1990; and Hanford Environmental Health 

Foundation from January 1, 1984 through December 

31st, 1990.

So, basically there was a Class issued for the 

contractors and subcontractors, but the prime 

contractors were excluded.

Okay. There was a consolidation that took place in 

mid-1987, around the June 28th time frame. And 

the prime contractors’ responsibilities that were 

executed by Rockwell, Boeing Computer Services, 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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8

United Nuclear, were all brought together under a 

single contract which was executed, which was 

executed by Westinghouse Hanford Company.

United Nuclear was operating as contractor for the 

N Reactors and some other 100 Area facilities. 

Rockwell managed the operations in the two other 

areas, which was PUREX and the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant.

Okay. I also wanted to just go over some of the 

Hanford Work Group efforts in the recent past just 

to bring us all up to speed, on the same page.

In November 2017, NIOSH and SC&A provided the 

Hanford Work Group consensus recommendations of 

the scope and status of outstanding Hanford issues. 

And what happened from that is we captured all 

unresolved SEC-related and dose reconstruction 

issues.

In October 26 of 2018, the Hanford Work Group met 

again to consider these joint recommendations. And 

during the Work Group meeting each issue and 

recommendation was discussed individually, 

followed by input from the Work Group regarding 

whether they concurred with the joint 

recommendations from SC&A and NIOSH or 

whether they requested changes or any other 

actions they may have had. During that meeting 

some of the issues were closed.

In November of 2018, NIOSH placed all the issues 

into a Board Review System and then we updated it 

with the proper status whether it was an in-progress 

item, closed, or in abeyance. And since that period 

of time NIOSH has been going through all our 

holdings and interviews. And we documented the 

summary of all our findings into a White Paper, 

which is the subject of this meeting.
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9

The title of the White Paper is Assessment of 

Hanford SEC Issues. And it was issued on January 

7th, 2020.

Okay. So, we have this White Paper. And its 

purpose was attach and present all the extensive 

site research activities accomplished since the 

approval of SEC 201.

The White Paper’s purpose, again, was to provide 

status of the assessment of the dose reconstruction 

feasibility for the several Special Exposure Cohortrelated issues and that reflect the current state of 

knowledge based on extensive site research actions 

to accomplished since the approval of SEC 201.

And, again, the White Paper only addresses 

potential SEC issues not dependent on 

implementation of revised co-exposure methods.

Okay. At this point what we’re going to do is go into 

the Hanford Rad Protection Program and just give 

some background information prior to getting into 

the issues.

So, at this point I’d like to turn it over to Bob Burns. 

He was our principal investigator on the ORAU side. 

And I’d like for him to give a little overview of that 

subject there.

Mr. Burns: Okay. Thank you, Chuck.

I’m going to rely on you to advance the slides 

because I don’t have them up on the Skype 

presentation. I’m going from hard copy here.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. I’m ready for that.

Mr. Burns: So, assuming we’re on slide 7, that’s 

where I’ll pick it up.

Mr. Nelson: Okay.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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10

Mr. Burns: All right. And as Chuck described, 

Hanford, we’re talking about the time period 1984 

through 1990. And bear in mind that we’re 

specifically, as far as the issues we’re going to be 

talking about subsequently, we’re just talking those 

with respect to the site, the prime contractors, you 

know, the contractors that were responsible for the 

various operating areas of Hanford.

And keep in mind that Hanford throughout its 

history it seems like, you know, the site level was 

always going back and forth between when it was 

operated by one single overarching contractor 

versus, you know, a number of individual 

contractors that were responsible for individual 

operating areas.

So, this period we’re talking about, ‘84 through ‘90, 

at the beginning of that period, ‘84 through mid-‘87, 

we had a mixture of site prime contractors and 

then, as Chuck said, mid-1987 was this 

consolidation where all the site operations came 

under one, one overall contract that was 

administered by Westinghouse.

But regardless, that was history, so the Radiation 

Protection Program at Hanford has always operated 

almost like the airlines, a hub-and-spoke type 

model is how I think of it. So, you have the 

centralized program that was maintained as a 

services function by PNL, by Pacific Northwest Lab. 

And it provided those health physics, and 

monitoring, and internal dosimetry sources and so 

forth across the site.

So, regardless of whether it was site contractor or 

multiple site contractors, you always had this, you 

know, centralized radiation protection element that, 

again, was managed by PNL.

So, each prime contractor was responsible for its 
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11

own rad protection plans and so forth. But, you 

know, they didn’t do it in a vacuum. There was 

guidance and so forth that was provided by PNNL.

And specifically, as far as the issues we’re 

addressing in this White Paper, most of those 

pertained to questions of internal monitoring. So, 

the discussion here, likewise, is going to focus on 

internal monitoring.

So, one of the key documents that PNL maintained 

for the site was the Hanford Internal Dosimetry 

Program Manual. And that’s where they spelled out, 

you know, contractor responsibilities for identifying 

when bioassays were needed and things of that 

nature. It specified a lot of things. It was a big, 

comprehensive document.

But, I guess the bottom line here is the overarching 

basis for the Radiation Protection Program at 

Hanford during this time was the first line of 

defense was workplace monitoring. That was the 

primary means for identifying things in the field that 

were representative of internal exposure potential.

And then backstopping that was the routine 

bioassay program which was secondary to the 

Workplace Monitoring Program. And one of the 

purposes of, you know, the routine bioassay 

program, of course, was to confirm the 

effectiveness of the Workplace Monitoring Program.

So, if you have things showing up in your routine 

bioassay then, you know, that tells you there are 

going to be gaps in your workplace monitoring. So, 

the bottom line there, you know, that approach 

reflects a basis that, you know, internal exposures 

were infrequent, and typically would only occur as a 

result of, as I said there, a failure of a protective 

system. You know, generalizing, internal exposures 

would only happen as a result of radiological 
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12

incidents.

With the exception of the Plutonium Finishing Plant -

- and really we don’t have any issues associated 

with that at this point -- there were no chronic 

sources of intake at Hanford during this period. So 

that’s something to bear in mind as we proceed 

here.

So, with respect to the Workplace Monitoring 

Program, PNL’s guidance to the contractors was 

Internal Dosimetry should be contacted whenever 

an intake of radioactivity is suspected or when the 

dosimetric significance of an observation or event is 

in doubt. That’s a quote from the Internal Dosimetry 

Manual.

And that includes, you know, even describing some 

of them in the White Paper. They are, you know, 

included several examples of those types of 

circumstances where they would want the 

contractors to now, hey, you guys might want to 

take a look at this.

About 1987 the Internal Dosimetry Program began 

publishing its formal annual summary reports. And 

within those they included summary statistics of 

radiological incidents that had occurred across the 

site during the prior year, whatever the year, 

whatever the subject year was. So, when we 

reviewed those, you know, we made several 

observations, one being PNL’s guidance for incident 

reporting was indeed adopted site-wide, so all 

incidents being reported across the various 

operating areas, across the various contractors.

Another take-away was that the workplace 

monitoring was quite capable of identifying 

radiological occurrences at a level below those of 

internal dose significance. And along with that, 

incidents of internal dose significance were rare.
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13

Basically, an event, you know, a radiological 

incident that had potential for internal dose was a 

big deal. You know, and this wasn’t your everyday, 

you know, personnel contamination type of incident. 

So, as I said, the take-away there was, you know, 

occurrences of internal dose significance were, you 

know, significant events and would have been 

recognized in the workplace.

The Workplace Monitoring Program was more than 

capable of identifying such incidents when they 

occurred.

So, and then the back end -- oh, sorry, Chuck, were 

up to Slide 9. Forgive me. I’m just looking at my 

hard copy.

Mr. Nelson: I got you covered.

Mr. Burns: Sorry about that. Battling away here.

So, in addition to the Workplace Monitoring Program 

then, on the back end of that was the Routine 

Bioassay Program. So, and in particular the routine 

monitoring was provided for both in vivo and in 

vitro bioassay. But a key element of the routine 

program was the in vivo program. In other words, 

the whole body count and the chest counting 

program. Those were key elements of the routine 

monitoring.

So, whole body counts were performed as an 

element of workers’ annual physical in the 

occupational medicine, occupational medical 

requirement. And they also performed whole body 

counts for new hires, for folks that terminated, or at 

the beginning or end of special progress -- projects 

when they needed, you know, where they wanted a 

baseline.

So, you know, I included this quote here from one 
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14

of the whole body counting summary reports for a 

given year just to have the purpose of the Routine 

Monitoring Program.

Document the absence of radioactivity in most 

radiation workers -- you know, that’s the 

backstopping of the Workplace Monitoring Program -

- and determine the amount, distribution, and so 

forth for the few employees who become internally 

contaminated.

And then in addition to the whole body counting 

program there was also a routine chest counting 

program for individuals that worked with materials 

that had, that were, you know, lower energy 

gamma emitters that wouldn’t -- where the chest 

counting would have better sensitivity for it.

But, you know, the individuals that received routine 

chest counts also received routine whole body 

counts. So, the chest counts were in addition to the 

whole body counts.

And keep in mind an important point regarding the 

chest counts, all chest counts recorded, at a 

minimum recorded three readings of interest for 

three isotopes: americium-241 as a proxy for 

plutonium; thorium-234 as a proxy for uranium; 

and also uranium-235, of course, as an indicator for 

HEU. So, all chest counts covered plutonium and 

both natural, depleted, and enriched uranium.

So, moving on to slide 10, you know, regarding, 

okay, we had the Routine Monitoring Program, 

where does it -- you know, where are results 

generated by that program? Where is that 

information? Now revising it on the REX database, 

the Radiation Exposure Database, which contains 

both the in vitro monitoring data and the data from, 

you know, urinalyses and so forth, and in vivo data, 

the data from chest counting and whole body 
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15

counting and such.

And we, the project has available a version, you 

know, a fully identified version of the REX database 

that was provided to us. It’s a snapshot of, I want 

to say 2014, I think it was October of 2014. But 

suffice it to say it more than covers the ‘84 to ‘90 

period we’re talking about here.

So, you know, one of the elements of these 

evaluations, of course, was to review what we see 

in the REX database for this evaluation period. And 

in doing so, it showed, you know, we see 

participation in the Routine Whole Body Counting 

Program across all the prime contractors. But also, 

and this was interesting to me, we see participation, 

you know, yeah, you see the routine chest counting 

program but I was kind of surprised as to how 

broad that was as well. You know, I wasn’t a bit 

expecting participation in the chest counting 

program from folks from Boeing Computer Sciences, 

for instance.

So, not only did all the contractors participate in the 

whole body counting program but there was, you 

know, -- well, not sure it was all, but, you know, by 

and large there was a lot more participation in the 

routine chest counting program than I would have 

expected.

So, short of that being, so the routine in vivo 

program, you know, it did its job. It did, you know, 

as far as the prime contractors go, those folks were 

indeed monitored.

So, in summary, Slide 11 now Chuck. You know, the 

take-away to summary review of the 

Internal Dosimetry Program, the rad program at 

Hanford during this time were the prime contractors 

did report incidents of internal dose significance to 
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16

PNL and, you know, in concert with that the minor 

incidents that were not of internal dose significance.

And the Routine Bioassay Program, again, served as 

a backstop to the Workplace Monitoring Program.

As far as the bioassay methods they had available, 

they had appropriate bioassay methods for all 

radionuclides of concern.

Another observation was the routine in vivo 

monitoring program was sensitive to the presence 

of, you know, unexpected radioisotopes. Like I said, 

they always reported plutonium and uranium, and 

different enrichments of uranium. But you do see 

counts or results where they saw other isotopes. 

And they were on the lookout for those.

As I said, there was participation across the Board 

by the prime contractors. And we did not see any 

indication of any chronic sources of intake or any, 

you know, previously unknown sources of chronic 

intake. They would have shown up in this routine 

bioassay result. So that was kind of just a 

confirmation that the underlying basis that intakes 

were only the results of incidents, that was indeed 

valid.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Well, are you done, Bob?

Mr. Burns: That was Slide 11. Yes.

Review of SEC Exposure Issues

Issue 3: TH-232 internal exposure from Jan 1, 1960 

Onward

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Thanks very much. Okay. So, 

that takes us to the individual SEC issues addressed 

in the White Paper. I think what I heard Joe say is 

that I’d give an overview of each issue then turn it 

over to SC&A. I think they have something to say 
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17

about each issue.

So, I can start with the first issue which is thorium232. And the issue relates to potential thorium 

exposure during remediation of certain areas. That 

would be like legacy contamination, potential use of 

thorium in nuclear fuels fabrication and related 

operations in the 300 Area, and potential thorium 

uses in other areas at Hanford during that time.

You know, during these reviews of these 

radionuclides of concern, as Bob likes to call them, 

the team mined through a large volume of NMC&A 

data. And there were many, many site records 

captured and several interviews performed. And the 

conclusion was the likelihood of intake for thorium232 at Hanford appear very small. A prior internal 

dosimetry program expert -- we can’t say 

specifically who it is for Privacy Act reasons, but at 

least we’ll call it an expert -- does not recall any 

incidents or exposures, concerns involving thorium 

during this evaluation period.

And, again, like Bob was mentioning earlier, if an 

intake potential existed, any dosimetrically 

significant intakes would have resulted from 

incidents that have been recognized in the field. And 

we just didn’t see any chronic intake for thorium232.

So, our NIOSH conclusion is the site research and 

interviews to investigate the potential for 

unmonitored intakes of thorium-232 by the Hanford 

prime contractor employees during ‘84 through 

1990 have not identified any information contrary to 

determinations made in SEC 201 or SEC 57-2 that 

dose reconstruction is feasible.

I don’t know if you want to get into any more detail 

on this issue. I know SC&A in their presentation had 

a position on thorium.
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18

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. Let me just jump in then.

Before getting into what we’ve been calling the Big 

4 in terms of the nuclides, the ROCs as Bob calls it, 

just to back up a little bit for the Work Group’s 

benefit. You know, what we’re looking at is the prior 

SEC up through the end of ‘83 was concluded on the 

basis of just inadequate in vitro/in vivo bioassay. 

And the fact is NIOSH lacked sufficient workplace 

monitoring source term data for HEU, U-233, 

neptunium, thorium, those four.

And again, when we’re looking at 1984 to ‘90, the 

subsequent period, the conclusion -- this is in the 

White Paper but, you know, it’s been stated before -

- that NIOSH believes that the maturation of the 

Hanford work practices and programs, as well as the 

nature of the work performed after ‘83 was such 

that, you know, again, one could estimate potential 

intakes or rule out potential intakes, because 

whether source term data were available or one 

could make a conclusion that there were no chronic 

sources of intake as monitored.

So, much of what we’re trying to weigh is really 

weight of evidence from a programmatic standpoint. 

I think that’s how we termed it in the past. And to 

look at the program, to look at to what extent one 

can confirm or not confirm whether or not there 

may have been sources of chronic intakes.

And so a lot of what certainly NIOSH has done is, 

over the last couple of years, has done the 

confirmatory survey of methods, of documentation 

at Hanford to settle some of these uncertainties on 

source terms.

So, anyway, going to thorium -- and Chuck cited 

the three lines of inquiry that we had, and I think 

both NIOSH and SC&A agreed to put this in the BRS 

-- the first one was the remediation of certain 
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19

Hanford areas, this is 200 and 300 Areas.

And I guess, in short, NIOSH noted that significant 

clean-up work did not begin at Hanford until after 

1990 and was performed by prime contractors, 

other than those considered, you know, in the White 

Paper. And any thorium -- and this was the chief 

conclusion -- any thorium present in the soil or 

residual matter would likely have been commingled 

with other radiological materials, notably uranium. 

So, you would not have had thorium by itself. And 

that was the conclusion that is cited in the White 

Paper.

And, finally, I think they concluded that if any such 

work performed during --

Mr. Katz: Joe. Sorry.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah.

Mr. Katz: Sorry, can you stop a sec?

Someone on the line doesn’t have their phone 

muted and you’re having a little sidebar which is 

kind of what everyone else is hearing. So, everyone

but Joe should have their phone muted. And if you 

don’t have a mute button, then *6 -- I should have 

said that before the call -- and then press *6 to 

come off mute. Thanks.

Sorry, Joe. I’m sorry to interrupt.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Am I coming through clear? I 

guess I am.

Okay. Finally, any such work that was performed 

during 1984 to 1990, it would have been limited in 

scope and likely would have been performed by 

individuals already covered by the 83.14 that 

created in the 0226 petition.
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20

So, that was one -- that was basically a summary of 

the conclusions that are in the White Paper on the 

remediation question. This is one of the three.

I think our response basically is that we agree that 

potential exposure to legacy thorium-232 

contamination would have been unlikely and, in any 

case, would have been likely detected in this 

particular time frame. And certainly the program 

can advance, and I think we agree to that.

And so, the monitoring would have certainly have 

identified any thorium-232 legacy contamination.

Mr. Katz: Okay, again sorry, Joe. Sorry, Joe.

Folks, there’s now a woman speaking and you’re not 

on mute. So please, if you want to be on this call 

from the public, please mute your phone. If you 

don’t have mute, press *6, or get off the line 

completely. But you’re interfering with the Work 

Group call.

Okay. Sorry, Joe.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Let me continue. As construction 

trade workers are largely encompassed by the prior 

SEC 226 Class, I think NIOSH concluded, and we 

agree, that in terms of D&D clean-up workers, many 

of these, if not all of them, would have been 

covered under the subcontractor, the CTW Classes 

that were within the last SEC. This was the other 

primes in the ‘84 to ‘90.

So, there wasn’t -- and maybe Chuck can correct 

me -- there wasn’t any definitive black and white 

that there wasn’t any pure thorium in a residual 

contamination in the clean-up work.

On the other hand, in terms of the monitoring 

available, in terms of the programmatic history of 

that program where there wasn’t really any clear 
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21

evidence that they did any substantial clean-up until 

after 1990, you know, certainly the weight of 

evidence seems to suggest that there would not be 

a chronic source of thorium intakes from legacy 

contamination or clean-up contamination.

And that was a concern we had because, again, 

certainly disturbing soils around some of these 

operations and facilities in D&D and clean-up would 

have presented a potential source in that time 

frame if in fact that occurred. And based on the 

review, it doesn’t appear that any operation of that 

sort did occur.

So, we’re okay with the way the conclusion was 

reached on that particular aspect.

So, if the Work Group or NIOSH has anything to 

add, I know that this is going to get a bit long, so 

just jump in.

I’m sorry, somebody was going to say something?

Mr. Nelson: Joe, I was going to say, you kind of 

asked a question about, you know, materials 

present and pure forms and all that. You know, we 

looked through the materials accountability data 

and reviewed it. And actually Bob went through it 

and looked for material movement and transfer. 

And there just seemed very little movement or 

transfer of material, and it just didn’t indicate any 

chronic sources, you know, due to that, so.

And, yeah, I agree with what you’re saying about 

the soil. That’s essentially what our point was for 

legacy contamination. So, that’s my point.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, I think the weight of evidence 

would suggest that there wasn’t any issue with 

chronic sources. I think that was probably one of 

our major concerns because it wouldn’t have shown 
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22

up likely on the NMC&A just because it was a legacy 

contamination that would have been in the soils.

But again, I think the fact that there’s no record of 

clean-up after 1990, and the fact that the 

monitoring would have been subset, it would have 

been part of the surveillance, I think is persuasive.

A lot of this, again, is weight of evidence just 

because it is programmatic. I mean, I think that 

was one recognition we had going into this in terms 

of Bob had called it confirmatory surveys that 

NIOSH did of the documentation. I mean, it’s going 

to come down to what do the records indicate. And I 

think in this case it would indicate that there wasn’t 

a chronic source.

So, on this part I think we’re okay.

Member Ziemer: Joe, this is Paul Ziemer. You don’t 

specifically say it, but it sounds like SC&A is 

recommending that Issue 3 be closed. Is that 

correct?

Mr. Fitzgerald: No. There’s actually three 

operational facets to this. This is one of the three. 

So, we haven’t gotten to the overall, you know, --

Member Ziemer: Okay. You’re not ready for that 

yet. Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I’m just trying to break this up. 

There was three lines of inquiry we had an issue 

with on thorium. And NIOSH actually walked each 

one of those down.

This was the first one. This was the remediation of 

200 and 300 Area in terms of any legacy 

contamination that might have contained thorium.

So in any case, the second question that we had 

raised originally and that NIOSH agreed and 
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23

included in the BRS for review was the potential use 

of thorium in nuclear fuel fabrication. This was the 

300 Area.

And this is where I think, Chuck, you guys 

emphasized that you had gone through quite a bit 

of the NMC&A data. This is the accountability data 

where DOE and the contractor were obliged to 

track, for national security reasons, where key 

special nuclear and strategic material was being 

used and transferred on site. And in this case 

thorium-232 was one of the nuclides that were 

being tracked.

And in any case, this review of the documentation 

saw indications that there was occasional work that 

involved small amounts of thorium that moved 

around within PNL facilities. And PNL had 

operational control of the 300 Area in this time 

period. But the conclusion was that these would 

have been small amounts of thorium where the 

intake, if there was any potential intake, would have 

been confined to incidents rather than any kind of 

ongoing chronic exposure.

And I guess from our standpoint, our original 

concern -- I’m just going to go back to where this 

came from -- was that we had looked at a database 

at Hanford called SWITS. And that stands for Solid 

Waste Information and Tracking System database, 

which was the database that looked at the 

movement of waste materials in terms of nuclides. 

And from that we established the presence of what 

appeared to be residual thorium contamination in 

process drains, piping, and sewers in the 300 Area.

And this is from years and years of processing in 

the 300 Building, you know, 324, 326, the rest of 

them.

And in any case, that was the source of our concern 
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24

to look at the 300 Area and to look at these 

operations to see if, upstream -- you know, this is 

indications that you have some small residual 

thorium contamination in these sewers and the 

drains. The question was upstream, could you find 

any evidence of the chronic source of such thorium 

in those buildings?

And we pointed to 340 Building, 340 Building, 325, 

and 308 in particular. But, I think at the same time 

-- this is going back a few years -- we also noted 

that the thorium exposure potential from whatever 

contamination was upstream was unclear. I mean, 

just the fact that we saw some small amounts in the 

drainage did not suggest that there was in fact any 

exposure potential wherever it was being used.

And based on the NIOSH review and the NMC&A 

survey, and also the operational evaluations that 

were done on these 300 Area buildings, we don’t 

see an exposure potential that would have been 

anything other than maybe incidental, meaning that

the there was some evidence that you had 

occasional leaks, you had occasional 

contaminations, but these were all picked up and 

reported.

So, we don’t see any evidence that there was a socalled chronic source of thorium exposure potential 

for workers in the 300 Area. So, I think there was 

agreement on that as well.

I guess anyone from the Work Group have any 

questions on that particular review?

Okay. The final, the third aspect of this was I think 

what Chuck called other areas, that we’re calling 

operational sources in terms of the site. And 

NIOSH’s review of the PNL, Pacific Northwest 

inventories for ‘84 to ‘90 and whatever transfers 

they did on site as well as between sites -- you 
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25

know, again we can use the accountability system 

and you can look at the manifests, and I think 

NIOSH did a pretty comprehensive job.

And what we were concerned about was where did 

it go on site? Because lot of it was actually in vaults. 

It was being stored. It wasn’t necessarily being 

used. So, even if you had NMC&A values, it didn’t 

really tell you whether or not there was a potential 

for exposure because if it’s just sitting in a vault, 

there wouldn’t be any exposure.

So, the idea here is more that’s an exercise of 

establishing where it was, where did it go, was it 

actually being operationally used in a way that 

would have led to a potential intake. And I think the 

conclusion that NIOSH reached was there was no 

uncontained thorium sources identified. And that’s 

pretty important. There were sources, but they were 

all contained.

And, again, I think we agree with that based on the 

review that was done. We were looking for some 

confirmation on it, and I think this is the 

confirmation that was required. So, I think that 

resolves that question of where it was on site and 

whether or not it was in an uncontained 

circumstance that would have led to potential 

intake.

So, going back to your original question, Paul, yeah, 

I think on the three lines of inquiry that were, you 

know, our key ones from a few years ago, I think 

NIOSH has done the programmatic review that we 

thought was necessary to confirm that there were 

no chronic sources of thorium. This is a key because 

thorium, of course, was a key part of or key basis 

for the SEC up through ‘83. So, this confirmation is 

pretty critical as far as going forward to ‘84 to ‘90.

So, at least tentatively -- we haven’t written this up 
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26

-- but based on what we have seen in the White 

Paper, I think SC&A is satisfied with the 

confirmatory review that NIOSH did.

Any questions on that, on that element?

Member Ziemer: Joe, this is Paul again. I’d kind of 

gotten ahead of myself or ahead of you, I guess, on 

this. I was actually looking at Issue 3 on your slides

as well. And I guess I was looking at your bottom 

line there, it wasn’t clear to me whether you were 

recommending closure or just agreeing with NIOSH 

per se, but, yeah.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, yeah, like the Work Group, 

that’s certainly the Work Group’s prerogative. I’ll 

say, though, I think we’re certainly in agreement 

with what NIOSH did in terms of confirmation, and 

we have no issues.

Member Ziemer: My question for Brad, do you want 

to deal with each of these issues as they go, or do 

you want to wait till the end?

Chair Clawson: I kind of wanted to wait for an end. 

There’s still a little bit that I’ve got questions on. I’d 

rather just go through this and see if my questions 

get answered a little bit further down.

Member Ziemer: Sure.

Chair Clawson: If that’s all right with you, Paul?

Member Ziemer: Sure. It’s your, it’s your meeting. 

I’m just asking.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I guess the other thing, too, is we’re 

developing a report that would basically be a 

response. And obviously, in the context of the times 

that may or may not get to you very fast. So, that 

might be a consideration as far as doing things in 

real time versus waiting for details.
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27

Member Ziemer: We may want to wait for the final 

report then anyway. I just was asking how you 

wanted to proceed actually.

Mr. Katz: And this is Ted. I mean, as far as, I mean, 

if you’ve concluded something for discussion, 

there’s no problem with the Work Group. We just 

had a Work Group meeting yesterday, and there’s 

no problem with closing findings where everyone’s 

in agreement that there’s nothing left to do. It’s 

kind of silly to leave it open for another Work Group 

meeting to close the findings.

But certainly, you know, waiting for the end of the 

meeting and going through them then, that’s fine, if 

you want to do that.

Chair Clawson: Well, yeah, I kind of would. I’d like 

to run through everything.

Member Ziemer: That’s fine.

Chair Clawson: Then go ahead and close it down. I’d 

appreciate that. Thanks.

Mr. Katz: That’s fine. Yeah, no trouble with that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I guess, Chuck, you can -- if that 

completes that one, maybe we can move on to HEU.

Issue 4: HEU - Uranium Intake Estimation

Mr. Nelson: Okay. All right.

Okay. So, Issue 4 is highly-enriched uranium intake 

estimation. It pertains to whether workers who had 

potentially received intakes of highly enriched 

uranium during the post-‘83 period were monitored 

by alpha spectrometry for urinalysis or by other 

appropriate means.

Okay. The issue is contingent upon identification of 
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28

a potential source of HEU intakes by Hanford 

workers from 1984 through 1990.

Okay. Reviews of the NMC&A records at Hanford 

identified what appeared to be potential sources of 

HEU within the 200 and 300 Areas. Regarding the 

200 Area, our site research activity concluded, since 

those earlier NMC&A reviews included numerous 

interviews with Hanford staff, where we determined 

there was no significant operations within the 200 --

within the 200 Area.

The vaults at the Plutonium Finishing Plant were 

used to store HEU materials on behalf of others but 

there was no processing of HEU at the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant or the PUREX Plant.

Regarding the 300 Area, site research activities 

included potential use of HEU in nuclear fuels 

research and development activities in 308. 308 

was the plutonium fuels pilot plant.

The research looked into oxides, metals, and mixed 

oxide fuels for use in fast reactors in the late ‘80s. 

So, that would be for the fast flux test facility. And 

this involved intermittent fuel pin fabrications and 

fuel pellets produced at Argonne National Lab and at 

Los Alamos.

NMC&A indicated the presence of HEU powders in 

Building 308, but no records were found indicating 

the use of material.

Okay. We did some interviews in 2017 to look into 

this further. And, again, we spoke to a rad 

monitoring expert as we have to call them for 

Westinghouse 300 Area. And the person stated that 

nuclear materials in 308 included both plutonium 

and uranium, and that there were various types of 

air monitoring used in the facility.
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29

And the 308 Building was solely a Westinghouse 

facility that was not shared with PNL. And he said 

monitoring practices were very stringent, and 

workers received routine whole body and chest 

counts, as well as in vitro bioassays and nasal 

smears as needed.

Procedures were in place for responding to 

incidents.

Now, when we get to regarding incidents, it’s also 

further discussed in Issue 22, which we’ll talk about 

later. Okay.

Chair Clawson: Hey, Chuck.

Mr. Nelson: Yes?

Chair Clawson: Chuck, this is Brad. I’ve got a 

question.

Now, you were talking to the radcon individuals 

over the monitoring part of this and so forth. Did 

you talk to any of the fuels people that were 

controlling these products or were you just talking 

to radcon?

Mr. Nelson: Well, if you look at the end of the White 

Paper, we cite every interview that we did. I know 

some of that was, like, there was a PDF version. It 

went through Privacy Act to take their name out of 

there. But --

Chair Clawson: Okay.

Mr. Nelson: -- if you look at those, you’ll see we did 

interview some of those.

Chair Clawson: Okay. I just --

Mr. Nelson: Go ahead, Brad. Okay.

Chair Clawson: Well, my thing is is I’m just, I’m 
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30

trying -- you guys, you guys are using one source to 

be able to track some of this plutonium, enriched 

uranium, and so forth, but there’s a thing in the 

DOE world that you track your own material. But 

when you are storing somebody else’s material, you 

don’t, you don’t track it except on your criticality 

charts.

I’m just wondering how you’re getting through with 

that because it’s not uncommon for them to hold 

other people’s material but they have no traceability 

because they do not own it; it is somebody else’s. 

So, it only shows up on their crit scenarios. And 

once it’s gone, the paperwork is gone too.

So, I’m just wondering if you were taking a look at 

that as you’ve gone through here because I’ve been 

told, just put it this way, that our HEU is a little off, 

and some other ones are off because of this practice 

that went on. So I’m just trying to figure out how 

you were going to be able to address some of these, 

because I know all you’re using is this database. 

And this is their stuff. But you’re not, somehow 

we’re not accounting for the other people’s material. 

And we shared material between each other quite 

often.

Mr. Nelson: I would have to -- when you’re having 

highly enriched uranium at a facility, I wouldn’t 

think that stuff was moved in and around without 

having documentation.

Chair Clawson: Well, I can tell you the way from 

experience, that I had HEU didn’t belong to us. It 

was not for use. The only thing it shows up on is our 

crit. It does not -- when it leaves here, all the 

paperwork with it goes. It doesn’t even go into our 

filing system because we do not own it and other 

people and other sources.

And that’s one of the issues that we’ve had with 
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31

using some of these programs. But I just want you 

to keep that in the back of your mind because that 

is going to become a bigger issue. And so I just 

wanted --

Mr. Nelson: Okay. So I --

Chair Clawson: What?

Mr. Nelson: Sorry about that. I didn’t mean to 

interrupt you. I thought you were done.

Chair Clawson: No, you can go ahead.

Mr. Nelson: One thing I’d like to say is what we’re 

looking at is uranium intakes. So, if we’re --

Chair Clawson: Right.

Mr. Nelson: -- if they’re storing material on behalf of 

others I’m sure it’s pretty well contained, not being 

manipulated or used, so I wouldn’t expect that 

there would be a whole lot of -- I wouldn’t expect 

any use.

Chair Clawson: I wouldn’t ever make that, I 

wouldn’t ever make that comment because there’s 

special little places around all of these sites where 

other work has gone on for others. And I’m just, I’m 

thinking of one of them that is out, you know, in our 

area.

But I’ll let you continue with this and we’ll bring this 

up a little bit later. But I just want you to be 

thinking about that.

Mr. Nelson: Okay.

Chair Clawson: But go ahead, continue on.

Mr. Nelson: -- that’s stored --

Member Ziemer: This is Paul. Can I, can I insert a 
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32

comment here as well?

You’re not using source term data to determine 

internal dose in any event, as I understand it. So, 

even if you had no source term information about 

material stored for others, you would still have the 

in vivo data, or in vivo and in vitro data on the 

workers who were in that location. That’s what 

you’re basing your internal doses on; isn’t that 

correct?

Mr. Nelson: Right. And then the lack of seeing any 

report what’s done with the material.

Chair Clawson: But that’s --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: I thought that was suggesting that 

you might not have all the source term information. 

But even if you didn’t, you’re not using source term 

information to determine internal dose. You’re using 

the actual in vivo/in vitro information.

Mr. Nelson: Correct. If we’re going to assign dose, 

that’s what we’d be using.

Chair Clawson: But, Chuck, also on that, if you did 

not have any information on that, you are using 

that you could not find a source term for it; is that

not correct?

Mr. Burns: Brad, this is Bob. If I may, keep in mind 

we didn’t base these determinations solely on a 

material control and accountability data. That was 

just one resource. We have, you know, lots and lots 

and lots of documents or memoranda and so forth, 

that describe operations in these facilities. So we, 

you know, we see them, during fuel pin fabrication 

and so forth, using pellets that came from Argonne, 

pellets that came from LANL and, you know, things 

of that nature.
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33

So I, you know, NMC&A is certainly not our only 

resource here.

Chair Clawson: Okay. But, and I understand that, 

and I appreciate that. I just, well, I read through 

some of these that were, that you were also using 

that you couldn’t find any material and so -- for use, 

so that wouldn’t have been an issue there. And 

that’s kind of what bothers me a little bit now.

But you know what, keep on going, Chuck. And we’ll 

address some of these issues down the road and go 

from there.

Mr. Nelson: Okay.

Chair Clawson: Thank you.

Mr. Nelson: All right, thank you.

All right. So, we were talking about interviews. We 

did some additional interviews in July of 2013 that 

included several workers from 308. These are 

people that worked in the ‘70s and the ‘80s, so our 

time period being ‘84 to ‘90. The individuals say the 

operations were performed in gloveboxes, and 

contamination surveys and air monitoring testing 

were performed daily.

Okay. Now, reactor fuel pin, reactor fuel pin 

assembly in 308 Building was the only operation 

involving enriched uranium that was identified. And 

this was an intermittent batch process activity for 

research and development. But we saw no routine 

use of HEU identified.

Operations were performed in gloveboxes and it was 

described as a well-controlled environment including 

daily surveys and various types of air monitoring, 

which I mentioned previously.

Internal exposures from HEU would have only 
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34

resulted from radiological incidents that would upset 

conditions. It seems unlikely that an incident would 

have gone unrecognized, especially given that 308 

was considered an alpha facility, so they had very 

stringent monitoring.

Procedures were in place for responding to 

incidents, including individual or in vivo counting as 

needed.

So, with regard to workers in 308 Building, they 

received routine bioassays, including whole body 

counts and chest counting.

U-235 was one of the isotopes routinely reported in 

chest counts, as Bob mentioned earlier. Transuranic 

material in 308 required a rigorous internal 

monitoring and workplace surveillance program. 

Appropriate bioassay measures, meaning both in 

vivo and in vitro, were available in the event there 

was an incident involving HEU. And unknown 

intakes would have been detected by routine chest 

counting.

NIOSH’s conclusion is site research and interviews 

to investigate the potential for monitoring intake for 

highly-enriched uranium by Hanford prime 

contractors for the period 1984 through 1990 have 

not identified any information contrary to the 

determination made in SEC-201 that dose 

reconstruction is feasible for those workers during 

that time.

That’s what I have regarding HEU. And I’ll turn it 

over to SC&A.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, thanks, Chuck.

This one actually has quite a bit of history. Back in 

2011 we wrote up our initial review or survey on 

HEU. And looking at NMC&A records and looking at 
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35

what records, you know, documentation we could 

find at the site, you know, we established 

particularly HEU, highly-enriched uranium, figured 

in several operations, particularly with respect to 

pins that were used in the FFTF experimental work.

And in this case you have sort of the old thing of 

you have the front end of that where the pins were 

fabricated, the powders were pressed and the pins 

were made. And then you, once they were in the 

reactor obviously you had the shield source, 

certainly not really internal intake issues.

And then on the back end you have issues of where 

those pins would be processed, resolved. And then 

you have some questions about scrap if there were 

in fact scrap.

So, we kind of looked at all that. And certainly the 

line of inquiry which was adopted at NIOSH 

reflected that in our, in the BRS of a couple years 

ago, was to in fact look at that particular issue and 

to characterize it from the standpoint of any 

potential intakes.

And we sent the Work Group an update in January 

of 2019. I think this kind of summarizes it pretty 

good. It is clear that an HEU inventory continued to 

exist at Hanford in the SEC time period of 1984 to 

‘90, and that some exposure potential may have 

existed in the handling or packaging of scrap or 

other material for shipping or storage.

However, as noted by SC&A, it was likely confined 

to the HEDL Facility, the PFP if it was scrap 

inventory, and to much smaller extent in other 

facilities such as the 222-S Laboratory.

So what we’re saying is that even though there’s 

evidence that this material, the source was there, it 

appeared that it was in a form that would have 
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36

precluded chronic intakes of HEU.

So the question really came down to, in this 

particular case it wasn’t a question of source term --

certainly the sources were there -- the question was 

whether or not it was handled in such a way and in 

such a form that there would have been a potential 

for intake.

And as Chuck was saying, certainly they expanded 

the interviews that we initially conducted with 

former workers and staff at the 308 Building and 

other facilities. And I think what was established 

was, you know, the workers received routine whole 

body and chest counts, in vitro bioassay and nasal 

smears, but they had a mature surveillance 

program for workers at those facilities, which is not 

too surprising. These were probably some of the 

more hazardous processing facilities at Hanford.

And I think Chuck already mentioned some of the 

feedback from the interviews.

And the conclusion that NIOSH reached was -- and I 

went ahead and wrote this down -- it’s unknown 

how frequently operations involving enriched 

uranium took place at 308 Building. However, it 

appears that only internal exposure potential from 

HEU would have been associated with radiological 

incidents.

So it wasn’t, the way we read this it wasn’t possible 

to confirm necessarily how frequent those 

operations took place in the late ‘80s. However, the 

monitoring program that was in place was stringent 

enough that something like HEU would have 

certainly been picked up in the whole body counting 

and the bioassay analysis, the overall bioassay 

analysis you’re talking about.

So, again, we think the weight of evidence is that, 
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37

you know, that there wasn’t a chronic source of HEU 

intake. Although one has to qualify that by, you 

know, NIOSH’s conclusion that, you know, there 

just wasn’t any confirmation on how frequent those 

powder pressing operations and other operations in 

308 were taking place.

We don’t think that disqualifies the conclusion, but 

we just want to make sure it’s clear that this is a 

case where the likelihood of any exposure potential 

at a chronic level doesn’t appear to exist, and that 

the monitoring system in place was stringent 

enough that it would have identified any incidental 

intakes that did take place.

So, from our standpoint we think this would be 

confirmatory that there was no chronic sources of 

HEU intake that were evident in this time period at 

Hanford.

Does the Work Group have any questions on that?

Chair Clawson: No. This is Brad.

Member Ziemer: No. This is Ziemer. I have none.

Member Schofield: I don’t have any.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. I guess we can go to 233, 

Chuck.

Issue 7: U-233 Intakes

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, okay. Yeah.

That’s Issue 7, Uranium-233.

This issue pertains to potential sources of U-233 

intakes during 1984 through 1990 and the 

adequacy of Hanford’s internal monitoring practice 

for Uranium-233 in the event such sources existed. 

So, for us the issue was really contingent upon 
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38

identification of a potential source of U-233 intakes 

by Hanford workers during this time period. And 

with respect to the intake potential, site research 

interviews, we found no indication of any sources 

for uses of U-233 from 1984 through 1990.

And we did make a recommendation to the Work 

Group that the issue be closed due to lack of 

identified source terms.

We do believe that availability of alpha spectroscopy 

bioassay data would help estimate, estimation of U233 exposures if they did exist.

And I do see the SC&A had some issues perhaps 

with that, so I’ll let them get into it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. I mean, just quickly.

Our review back two or three years ago confirmed 

inventory of 233 being held in four organizations at 

Hanford in FY ‘74 into the middle of the ‘70s. And 

the key thing for us was the presence of U-233 

apparently in scrap solutions and PFP, and possible 

continued experimental work in the 300 area. And 

that was the source of our question about potential 

exposure.

But we at the same time agree that there’s no 

evidence of any chronic potential exposure to 

Hanford employees from 233 based on looking at 

the incident data, looking at the bioassays, and also 

operational information.

So, our question really on that one was a scope 

issue, you know, since that was the starting point 

for our inquiry on this even though we agree there 

doesn’t appear to be any evidence of an intake 

source, whether that, whether the scrap solutions 

and the so-called experimental work in 300 Area 

was specifically addressed as part of, you know, 
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39

your NIOSH survey work, the research, onsite 

research.

So, it’s not so much a question of the bottom line as 

much as the scope of the review since this is 

something that was certainly of interest to us 

originally. So that’s the question that we sort of 

posed back to NIOSH, and it’s sort of a clarification 

question on scope.

Mr. Nelson: Bob, do you want to expand on that at 

all?

Mr. Burns: I’ll just say, yeah, Joe, I completely 

understand what you’re saying. And as you put it, it 

just seems to be a question back to NIOSH looking 

for some expansion and confirmation that those 

items that you identified were indeed in the scope of 

our review, sir.

Mr. Nelson: We can certainly dig deeper in those 

areas and see if we can uncover anything.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, that was all that we had 

picked up back in 2011, sort of those source terms, 

without any indication of potential exposure. But 

nonetheless, it just seems like it would be helpful to 

know, you know, if there was any, any records or 

any way to confirm, you know, that, that people 

handling scrap or people that were involved in 

whatever 300 Area experiments with 233 would not 

have had a source of exposure.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. I’ll leave it up, I’ll push it over to 

Bomber or Tim. But we can certainly dig in that area 

deeper and look at that topic. So, like we dug in 

there enough. I know we didn’t come across it. 

However, if we didn’t drive the nail in that then we 

can certainly dig deeper on it because it sounds like 

perhaps we need to.
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40

Dr. Taulbee: This is Tim. I have a kind of follow-up 

question for SC&A on this. I mean, I guess and Bob.

With regards to U-233, and first to Bob, we looked 

at material accountability and controls associated 

with that, didn’t we?

Mr. Burns: Yes.

Dr. Taulbee: Okay. And so I guess my question then 

to SC&A is what more do you want us to look at 

from that standpoint? U-233 would be a trackable 

material along that line, including the scrap coming 

from various areas. So, what more are you looking 

for here?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I think -- given that I think at 

this stage we’re talking more or less confirmatory 

reviews, just looking at the source term and then 

tying that to potential intake.

So, my question’s just a very basic one. Since this 

was an originating question for this particular issue 

from our review back about, probably seven or eight 

years ago, I guess my question is whether it’s the 

NMC&A review or any other review, and can NIOSH 

really confirm, you know, whether or not there was 

a source term connected to these particular 

activities? And then, you know, conclude whether 

that’s an issue of intake or not.

And that’s what you’ve done elsewhere. I’m just 

asking whether or not this was specifically 

addressed or not.

Mr. Calhoun: It appears to me that it was. Correct

me if I’m wrong here, Bob, but if you look through 

the materials accountability and controls at the 

various areas and we don’t see any indications of 

sources or the usage from ‘84 to 1990.

Mr. Nelson: Yeah. I think that’s correct. To Joe’s 
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41

point, I think we just need to re-craft our response 

to, as he said, just to adjust the scope so that it 

specifically addresses those issues that it raised 

previously.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. I think you can go back and 

look at the citations or references behind that 

particular finding. I can give you the original. I think 

it’s 2011. So, you know, tying that to your most 

recent review should be enough to, you know, close 

that out.

Or, if it turns out it doesn’t quite encompass it, then 

to maybe do additional work on it.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. All right. I think, Bob, you can go 

ahead and --

Mr. Fitzgerald: And, Bob, if you can’t find that 2011 

--

(Telephonic interference.)

Chair Clawson: That sounded cool.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: I was going to say, Bob, if you can’t 

put your finger on that particular citation from that 

time frame, I’ll be glad to send it to you. But you 

know, I think it was 2011 that was the original item.

Mr. Burns: Okay. I’ll check. I think I have it, but if 

not then we’ll let you know.

Mr. Fitzgerald: All right.

Mr. Nelson: This is Chuck. I’m certain we have it. 

We’ll dig that up and make sure we’ve covered that 

particular issue.

Mr. Fitzgerald: I have that down as review of 

Special Exposure Cohort issues for Hanford ‘72 to 
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42

‘90, September 2011. It’s on the DCAS website, 

apparently.

Chair Clawson: All right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. I guess, I don’t know if the 

Work Group has any questions on the U-233?

Chair Clawson: No, not at this time, Joe.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Member Ziemer: I think that will take care of it. It’s 

probably a matter of tying in more specifically to 

that particular, what was it, Building 300?

Mr. Fitzgerald: It was a 300 Area question on 

experimental work.

Member Ziemer: This area, right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: The scrap was, where the scrap was 

-- the scrap was in a different location. I think it 

was PFP actually.

Member Ziemer: Right.

Member Schofield: How about any chem analysis, 

was it done in the same building?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Chem analysis in what sense?

Member Schofield: Like when they sent samples in 

for, you know, the -- like that whether they were 

looking into a microscope or doing a chem analysis 

on it to see whether there was any contaminants in 

it or anything. Was all that done in the same 

building?

Mr. Fitzgerald: I think that would have been 

probably the 300 Area. And that would have been 

probably related to some of the process and 

experimental work. So on U-233 that was one of 
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43

our questions is whether or not one could establish 

that there was a source term in the 300 Area in 

terms of experimental work and whether that was a 

source of chronic intake or not.

So, that’s part of the question I think we’re raising 

along with the scrap metal issue, just to sort of nail 

that down.

Member Schofield: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Now, U-233 was a, obviously, a very 

critical strategic nuclide or material. So, it was 

tracked very carefully.

And I agree, the NMC&A, you know, review or 

system is one that was pretty precise. So, you 

know, that would be a starting point certainly as far 

as where it was. And then the follow-on question is 

why does it matter? Was there a possible intake?

If it was sitting in a vault in PFP as scrap metal, 

then there’s no issue, the potential for intake would 

have been negligible. So that’s kind of what we just 

want to cross the T on.

Member Schofield: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Neptunium, Chuck.

Issue 9: Np-237 Intakes

Mr. Nelson: Okay. All right. Issue Number 9 was 

Neptunium-237 intakes. And we did some site 

research actually to investigate potential exposures 

associated with the multi-isotope production, that’s 

the MIP, performed at Fast Flux Test Facility, the 

potential exposures associated with nuclear waste 

characterization research, and potential exposures 

at the PUREX plant associated with side-pocketing 

of impure neptunium solutions and from legacy 

material in Q Cell.
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44

And, you know, the White Paper goes into quite a 

bit of detail on each of those. And our conclusion 

basically was it’s unlikely such activities would have 

resulted in unknown intakes of purified Neptunium237.

And now, with respect to chronic intake potential, 

we didn’t see any significant sources of purified 

neptunium during this time period. And what little 

intake potential existed during that time appears to 

have been limited to infrequent activities involving 

small quantities within the 300 Area. And any 

intakes would have been the results of radiological 

incidents.

An incident involving a potential intake of 

Neptunium-237 apparently occurred in July 1989, 

but it was a confirmation to us that appropriate 

bioassay measures were available and used, if 

needed.

NIOSH’s conclusion is that site research and 

interviews completed to investigate the potential for 

unmonitored intakes of the purified Neptunium-237 

by Hanford prime contractor employees during 1984 

through 1990 have not identified any information 

contrary to those determinations made in SEC-201 

that dose reconstruction is feasible for those 

workers during that time.

I’ll turn it over to SC&A to give their analysis of 

what they saw. 

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. And certainly, again, this goes 

back quite a while. But we had looked at three 

operations that we thought based on the NMC&A 

information, as well as other information, that 

neptunium figured in. And certainly this was the 

MIP, so-called MIP multi-isotope production test that 

was performed in FFTF.
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45

There was exposures that may have been 

associated -- and again, may have been associated 

-- with nuclear waste characterization research. This 

was in the 300 Area.

And then finally, potential exposures that were clear 

that may have occurred at the PUREX plant because 

again, Neptunium-237 was present in the facility in 

what we would call impure neptunium solutions, so 

it wasn’t the pure neptunium solutions, in legacy 

materials in Q Cell.

So, and certainly with PUREX it did go through a 

number of operational phases where it was 

supposed to restart. It didn’t restart. It didn’t 

actually stay in -- online and then was finally shut 

down in the early ‘70s. So, there’s certainly a 

history that had some impact on what happened 

with respect to the stored neptunium.

Going back a few years ago we, frankly, came to a 

conclusion, and we actually expressed this in a 

couple of documentation reports that we sent to, 

you know, to NIOSH and the Work Group, that we 

were satisfied based on what we could see on the 

MIP test testing and some of the 300 Area 

processing that we did not see any chronic potential 

exposure from neptunium in those operations. 

However, we couldn’t get to that same point for 

PUREX.

Certainly we knew the impure neptunium was in 

those cells and we knew workers were going in 

performing maintenance and other support work, 

but it wasn’t clear at that time whether or not there 

was a potential for intake for those workers for 

those particular operations.

So, that was a lot of the confirmatory work was to -

- and this was on NIOSH’s part -- to go back and 

research that, and also contribute any other 
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46

additional information for the source terms for the 

other two potential sources of exposure for 

neptunium, meaning the MIP as well as the 300 

Area.

You can see from the slides that, you know, we’re 

comfortable. We’re in agreement with what was 

done on the PUREX review. It was detailed and 

certainly brought some new information as well as 

some interviews as far as some lead people involved 

at PUREX.

The only clarification question that we have on the 

review on neptunium, there was some additional 

discussion that talked to neptunium in waste 

streams at several Hanford facilities. This is PFP, the

324 Building, I think there were two.

And on this, NIOSH observed -- and this is quote 

from the report, the White Paper -- “Neptunium-237 

appears to have been associated with liquid waste 

or other similar materials present in the 325 

Building in support of its various radiochemical 

research missions. However, the NMC&A data show 

only accountable materials, not fission products or 

other radioactive materials in general that might 

also be present.”

And I think the bottom line was that even though 

neptunium shows up as far as the identified nuclides 

in the waste stream, that the NMC&A data wouldn’t 

tell you if it were in fact commingled with other 

materials like plutonium and other maybe fission 

products. And therefore it would have been, as far 

as exposure potential, it would have been also an 

exposure that would have involved these other 

nuclides and therefore would have been certainly 

identified and would not have been pure in any 

case.

The only, the only issue we have with that is that, 
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47

you know, I think NIOSH’s conclusion on the 

presence of neptunium in the waste stream came 

out of the nuclear material accountability database. 

And Bob, you can correct me if I get this wrong. Our 

original concern about neptunium being present in 

the waste stream came from the SWIFT waste 

management database.

So, you know, it certainly would have reflected, you 

know, other materials that would have been 

present. So, I don’t know if that’s going to make a 

difference or not. But as far as clarification, we 

didn’t rely on the NMC&A so much for that particular 

issue, it was mostly the SWIFT waste management 

database that indicated neptunium was present in 

the waste stream from the 300 Area.

So, I don’t know, do you have a reaction to that?

Mr. Nelson: Yeah, I do. I would say it’s two sides of 

the same coin. In the same sense that the NMC&A 

data is only going to show the neptunium and not 

the other fission products that would be present in 

those waste streams, but granted they’re working 

with tank waste, it’s all nuclear fuel, that’s why the 

neptunium’s showing up.

But the same thing in SWIFT. SWIFT tells you, you 

know, if you query SWIFT for neptunium it tells you 

waste streams that included neptunium. That 

doesn’t mean, in the same sense, that doesn’t mean 

they were pure sources. I think you’re seeing the 

same waste streams.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, that’s what I was wondering. 

Because I think the conclusion I got from what 

you’re putting in the report was that it only reports 

the strategic metal, and therefore it’s likely that 

there would have been other materials. And I think 

that, you know, I think that assumption is probably 

a good one.
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48

But my question is was that, was SWIFT also a basis 

for that conclusion or -- I think that would be 

clearer on what, you know, whether the other 

materials are commingled or not.

Mr. Nelson: I would say the principal basis would be 

just going to operations of the 224 Building and 

what they worked with, which again was tank 

waste. Looking at, you know, vitrification methods 

and so forth. So they had megarad levels of, you 

know, basically high-level liquid waste from PUREX.

So neptunium was certainly a constituent of those, 

but by no means were there any pure sources.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. I’m just curious why, you 

know, it seemed like there was an assumption that 

was tied into the NMC&A assessment where I think, 

I think your explanation here is probably a clearer 

one. Because one doesn’t have to, you know, just 

simply rely on NMC&A. There’s other information 

that would confirm that in fact it was a mingled, 

commingled waste stream.

Mr. Nelson: Sure. I was trying to, I think I was just 

trying to address the questions that had come up as 

to, you know, why it does show up in the NMC&A 

data. So I was just trying to clarify.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. I think that clarifies. I’m just 

saying that the way it was worded it wasn’t clear 

why the assumptions had to be made because I 

think there’s other information, including SWIFT and 

the operational stuff that you just mentioned, that 

kind of confirms that it was a mixed waste stream. 

And you know, the fact that neptunium was 

present, it would have been, it would have been 

detected just because there’s all this other material 

involved as well.

Mr. Nelson: Right.
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49

Mr. Fitzgerald: Anyway, I think that helps.

That’s all we have. Does the Work Group have any 

questions on this one?

Member Ziemer: This is Ziemer. So what’s the 

follow-up on this? Do you need some more 

clarification in the, in the OCAS summary?

Mr. Fitzgerald: I think specifically, no. I think the 

one question we had really linked into PUREX more 

than anything else. And I think the confirmatory 

review they’ve done is a pretty comprehensive one.

The clarification I was just indicating was in reading 

the report, since a lot of our, you know, a lot of our 

line of inquiry came from SWIFT in terms of 

neptunium, and to what extent that played into, you 

know, some of these conclusions and findings.

Member Ziemer: Right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: It sounds like Bob -- a lot of NMC&A 

and sort of an operational perspective which I think 

helps. I think maybe, you know, doing that makes 

that much clearer to me.

Member Ziemer: Thanks.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So, I think we’re good with that 

clarification.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Any other questions from the 

Work Group?

Chair Clawson: I don’t have any at this time.

Member Schofield: I’m good.

Issue 10: Tritium Intake Estimation from 1949 

Onwards

Mr. Nelson: Thank you. Okay. I’ll move on to the 
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50

next issue if I can get the slide to -- hold on.

There it goes. Sorry about that.

Issue 10 is tritium intake estimation. This issue 

came about -- the issue pertains to tritium dose 

assignment in the event that sources of special 

tritium compounds are identified that present a 

potential for worker intakes during the period of 

1984 to 1990.

And like I said, it came about and was prompted by 

a statement that was in our Hanford site profile, and 

it said that metal tritides were potentially present as 

part of the tritium target production program --

tritium target program that began in 1988. And that 

was something, a line that was in our internal 

occupational internal dose TBD.

And we believe that to be referring to the postirradiation examination of test assemblies for light 

water reactor-based tritium production performed 

by PNL in the 300 Area.

The NIOSH team did -- going to the slide with those 

again. I don’t know why it’s dragging here. There it 

goes.

Okay. The NIOSH team conducted research but we 

still have not identified any sources of metal tritide 

exposure at Hanford from 1984 through 1990. 

However, it is worth noting that NIOSH has 

developed methods for assigning dose from intakes 

of special tritium compounds. We have a procedure, 

ORAU OTIB-66. And it’s a procedure for calculations 

of dose and internal intakes of special tritium 

compounds.

So, based on the fact that we haven’t found 

anything, but if we were to find something we have 

a procedure in place, we found that we had no dose 
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51

reconstruction infeasibility related to the intakes of 

special tritium compounds.

I’ll turn it over to SC&A.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. Our concern here was just a 

basic one: whether or not there were in fact any 

evidence of special tritium compounds, you know, 

tritides that were present. We saw the operations 

involving tritium and the circumstances of the work 

that was being done, and that was the question, 

you know, were there in fact tritides in that time 

frame?

I think NIOSH has confirmed that there was in fact 

no tritides.

So that was our, that was basically our question. So 

we’re good with this.

Mr. Nelson: Any questions from the Work Group?

Chair Clawson: No. This is Brad.

Member Schofield: I’ve got just one question.

Was this a small subset of people or are we talking 

about a fairly large group of people for this or a 

very small group?

Mr. Burns: Well, we found no indication of special 

tritium compounds. So, we went through our 

research and didn’t identify any, so we’re not aware 

that they even exist during this time period.

Member Schofield: Okay. Thanks.

Mr. Nelson: So, the point being, if we were to find 

them then we could reconstruct the dose because 

we have a procedure in place on how to do that.

Member Schofield: So there weren’t any claimants 

in the file or anything that they said that they did 
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52

work with these or they had potential exposure to 

any special compounds?

Mr. Nelson: Is that Phil Schofield?

Member Schofield: Yes.

Mr. Nelson: Hi, Phil. I’m not aware of any specific 

claimants making that statement. I know Bob 

doesn’t generally work with dose reconstructions I 

don’t think too much. But I’m not aware of any. 

Member Schofield: Okay.

Issue 20: Skin Contamination

Mr. Nelson: Okay. I’ll get the slides advanced again. 

I don’t know why I’m having issues.

Okay. Issue 20 is skin contamination at the N 

Reactor. What we have in our BRS is this issue 

pertains to adequacy of monitoring data for skin 

contamination that resulted from radiological 

incidents involving primary cooling water at the 

Hanford N Reactor.

The N Reactor was shut down in 1987 as part of the 

-- due in part to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 

1986. And what we found is that there was formal 

monitoring and recording of skin contamination 

events in the reactor. And they were in place well 

before 1984.

And they used skin contamination forms to 

document any contamination an individual may 

have on their skin.

And we also saw that personnel used portal 

monitors, and they were in place as of 1984.

And on the skin contamination forms, if you look at 

them -- we’ve reviewed many of them -- you’ll find 
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53

that it will list maximum contamination levels and it 

will show, like, the location of the contamination on 

the person’s body. And it will also show an 

estimated time that the contamination was on that 

person’s body. And also on the form there’s usually 

a checkbox that will say if the person was sent for 

whole-body counting.

And during that review we went and looked at 

several hundred skin contamination forms that we 

had in our Site Research Database. And in addition 

to that, we went through all our Hanford claims for 

the period of 1984 to 1990.

We looked at all those just to see, you know, what 

kind of skin contaminations were we seeing and 

were they documented properly. And based on the 

review we drew the conclusion that no internal or 

external dose reconstruction infeasibility related to 

insufficient monitoring for skin contamination events 

at N Reactor were identified.

We know that the site had portal monitors. They 

had a formal system in place for identifying and 

documenting skin contamination, as well as to 

prescribe any follow-up actions as deemed 

appropriate. And this was in place throughout the 

entire period of 1984 through 1990.

So, basically, we saw they had a good system in 

place for documenting skin contaminations and that 

it existed for quite a while. So, we were satisfied 

with what we found.

I’ll turn it over to you, Joe, if you have any specific 

comments.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Just in terms of background. This 

came from recognition that, you know, N Reactor 

being a graphite reactor, it was sort of a 

characteristic of that reactor where in refueling 
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54

outages workers tended to get, I guess, get 

splashed with some of the in-process cooling water.

And so the question became to what extent were 

they monitored for what would have been skin 

contamination from what looked like it was a fairly 

frequent occurrence, at least anecdotally from 

talking to people that were associated with the 

operation.

So, that was the question that was left, was to what 

extent was there monitoring and what is the 

evidence that that monitoring was routine and, you 

know, complete.

So, that’s what we were looking for. And I think, 

again, this was only the first part of the 1980s 

because it was shut down right after Chernobyl. But 

based on the forms and the documentation that 

NIOSH was able to identify it looked like there was a 

-- and this was not too surprising because of the, 

again, it seemed like it was a reoccurring situation 

with the workers being splashed with what may 

have been slightly contaminated water.

They had a contamination form, a skin 

contamination form. And it was used pretty 

comprehensively. And certainly it would have been 

the basis for identifying what, or knowing what the 

exposure would have been to those workers from 

skin contamination.

So, I think there’s a basis for knowing that exposure 

potential and doing dose reconstruction from it. So, 

so we’re fine with what review was done on that 

one.

Chair Clawson: So, Chuck, what kind of portal 

monitors were these? Where were they located at 

on the site? I don’t see that they can be fairly close 

to where this was at or they wouldn’t be any good.
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55

Mr. Nelson: Well, I would expect portal monitors 

would be on the exit of the areas. And generally 

they, like you said, they can’t locate them in real 

hot areas. So, typically they’d have to put them in a 

low background area. I don’t know specifically -- I 

was going to say I don’t know if Bob specifically 

looked at that in detail or not with regard to the 

exact location of the portal monitors.

Mr. Burns: Yeah, the short answer would be no. I 

can’t tell you specifically, no.

Chair Clawson: Well, and I was just looking, just 

going through some of the records when we were 

up there I thought for some reason the portal 

monitors were almost outside the building, but also 

I thought it was a little bit later. But that’s neither 

here nor there. I’m just -- it seemed like there was 

a lot of, a lot of skin contaminations in this one 

area, so. Okay, thanks.

Member Schofield: I have a question on the skin 

contaminations. The levels that we reported was 

that before or after they were treated or trying to 

remove any skin contamination? Was the level 

reported what initially they found or after they 

deconned them as much as they could, was that the 

level that’s reported on this document?

Mr. Nelson: Yeah, the levels reported on the skin 

contamination form are those that were detected on 

initial finding. So, they might alarm a portal monitor 

and the technician would take them to the side, do 

detailed monitoring, take the skin contamination 

form, log it on that form. And know that if they did 

any decontamination efforts afterwards there would 

be details to that respect and what level they got 

them down to.

Member Schofield: Okay.
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56

Issue 22: Radiological Incidents

Mr. Nelson: Anybody else on this issue? Okay. I will 

move on to Issue 22.

Issue 22 pertains to whether sufficient bioassays 

were taken to account for potential worker 

exposures from minor radiological incidents during 

1984 through 1990.

Previously SC&A was looking at, you know, the 

major incidents. And they felt those were 

documented properly and sufficient bioassays were 

taken. So they were more, in this particular issue, 

they were looking at the minor radiological 

incidents.

So, looking at Hanford guidance to site contractors, 

it refers employees for internal dosimetry 

evaluation, would send them for internal dose 

evaluation when an incident or workplace indication 

suggests a potential for radiological intake.

We reviewed numerous site references and 

conducted interviews, and also looked at numerous 

examples of contractor radiological incident reports 

which we had in our Site Research Database.

And our conclusion was that they recognized and 

documented radiological incidents in the field and 

performed further investigation of potential 

exposures, notifying PNL when required.

And that based on this review it left us with the 

conclusion that no dose reconstruction infeasibility 

was associated with insufficient attention to internal 

doses from radiological incidents.

That’s what we had on that. I don’t know if SC&A 

wants to weigh in.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, we went through all the 
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57

incident reports. I think this was just a question, as 

you pointed out, that, you know, we had done a 

pretty good review of the major ones but that was 

sort of the other question that we had is how 

comprehensive did that go in terms of sort of the 

day to day type of incident reporting.

And I think your survey was pretty comprehensive.

The only question we have, you, at one part of the 

report you cite the PNL incident file as 

representative of the kind of reporting we’re talking 

about, but you also cite something called the 

Hanford radiological incident file, which sounds like 

the gold standard. That sounds like the truly 

comprehensive file. But it apparently was never 

actually located. Is that right?

Mr. Nelson: Yes. I think you’re right. We have the 

PNL incident file. And then they may be one and the 

same that what we have now is the remnants of the 

original file now that the two, you know, now that 

Hanford and PNL are operated kind of separately 

where, you know, previously they didn’t.

But the short answer to your question is yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. It was just a little confusing 

because it sounded like the Hanford radiological 

incident file was the, you know, was the 

comprehensive one and then the actual information 

that you were citing in the White Paper was from 

the PNL file. But you’re saying they may have been 

the same.

Mr. Nelson: Right. I don’t know for certain. But, you 

know, or maybe one is a subset of the other. You 

know, the PNL file is what we tangibly had, whereas 

the other one, the Hanford, Hanford incident file we 

know about that because it’s referred to in, you 

know, procedures and the program documents. But 
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58

I don’t know that we actually, you know, explicitly 

had something of that title.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Well, again, the citations from 

the PNL file seem pretty comprehensive. But that 

was just a question from the way it was described.

Otherwise I don’t think we have any issue. I think 

this sort of answers that question, lingering 

question we had from a few years ago.

Any questions from the Work Group?

Chair Clawson: This is Brad. No.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. I guess, Chuck, on the 324 

leaks.

Issue 27: Building 324 Leaks

Mr. Nelson: Yes. Okay. Issue 27 was Building 324 

leaks. There were leaks of high level waste in B Cell 

in Building 324, including a major spill in 1986. 

Decontamination of B Cell began in the late 1980s.

There were earlier leaks under A and C Cells and 

the soil under B Cell was found to be contaminated 

in 2010.

So, in the BRS we have it reading “adequacy and 

completeness of monitoring data have been 

evaluated and determined to be sufficient for dose 

reconstruction. Documentation of those findings is 

pending.”

So basically, I think the missing link was to put all 

this in one document and discuss Building 324 

leaks, hit the highlights of the major incidents that 

occurred there in see if there was proper 

monitoring.

So, the NIOSH team evaluation of -- excuse me. 
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59

The NIOSH evaluation of pertinent radiological 

incidents that occurred within the 324 Building did 

not identify any personnel monitoring deficiencies or 

indications of unmonitored internal dose.

We found no infeasibility associated with cell 

leakage at 324 Building for any of the Hanford 

prime contractors from 1984 through 1990.

And if you go and read the White Paper, we go into 

detail of three of the events, incidents that occurred 

in there.

So, I’ll turn it over to Joe to see if you want to 

discuss any of those in detail or if you’re satisfied 

with the review.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. The reason we left this a bit 

open is that when this call was scheduled a couple, 

two, three weeks ago we hadn’t really completed 

our review of the incidents and the underlying data 

from those incidents. We’re pretty much done.

I’ll let Ron certainly speak to some of the data 

review. But, you know, I certainly looked at the 

incidents and the supporting information and, you 

know, I’m -- we’re pretty satisfied at least from the 

standpoint of the question of the leaks and the fact 

that there was adequate, you know, monitoring that 

was done at the time.

Ron, did you want to say something to your review 

of the data itself?

Dr. Buchanan: Yes. This is Ron Buchanan. Yes, we 

looked at these incidents and tracked back. It’s 

been going on for a while, way back to 2013. And I 

followed the paper trail and then NIOSH’s response. 

And I did look up those references and reviewed the 

incidents. And also went to the REX database, which 

is a fairly large database, and sifted out the 
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60

information from that period of time and did verify 

the whole body counts that were done. And that 

appeared adequate.

And so, at this time we have no outstanding issues. 

I think we’ll probably summarize this in our report 

at the end of the month. At this time I have no red 

flags on it.

Review of Data Adequacy and Completeness

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. I might add that I think this is 

described as due diligence type follow-up. I mean, 

this was picked up in the course of our review that 

there had been some leakage, some question of 

contamination at the facility and in that time frame, 

‘89-‘90.

So the question just arose as to whether or not you 

could find the incident reports and then find 

whether in fact there was monitoring that was done 

for any of the workers that might have been 

involved in these particular incidents.

So, this is really kind of an -- almost a proof of 

principle whether in fact there was a rad control 

program surveillance that was deficient and that 

you could find the documentation that we’re talking 

about.

And I think, again, based on this review, yeah, the 

incident reports are there, the accounts are there. 

And as Ron mentioned, we can certainly identify 

where it’s available, where bioassay data is 

available as well.

So, we haven’t really written this up but I think 

that’s where we came out.

Does the Work Group have any questions on that?

Chair Clawson: Yeah. I’m just looking at this first 
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61

statement up here. I’m trying to understand the 

timeline here. You’re saying that there was, 

including a major leak in ‘86, decontamination of 

the cell started in ‘80. So this leak happened after 

they start decontamination of the cell?

You see where I’m at?

Mr. Nelson: I think that was just calling out a 

specific incident in 324. And that’s just, that’s a 

separate statement that -- I believe it is. I’ll have to 

ask Bob about that.

Chair Clawson: Well, if you just read it, the timeline 

kind of just becomes interesting to me, we reported 

one in ‘86 but they started decontaminating it in 

‘80. And then there were earlier leaks that found 

contamination in ‘10. So, I’m just trying to figure 

your timeline here. It doesn’t --

Mr. Burns: Doesn’t that say, Chuck, doesn’t that say 

decontamination began in the late ‘80s?

Mr. Nelson: Yeah, it says late ‘80s.

Mr. Burns: After ‘86.

Mr. Nelson: Late ‘80s. I can’t tell you, I don’t recall 

the specific date but that was, you know, they 

started -- you know, they began clean-up at 324, 

you know, going into the major clean-up activities 

that began in the post-1990 time frame.

Chair Clawson: Okay. That’s making a little more 

sense to me. Okay, thank you.

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Anything else from the Work 

Group?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay, I think that pretty much 

addresses the specific items that were on the White 

Paper.
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62

We also, as a matter of course, wanted to look at 

the -- in terms of the incidents and whatnot, the 

data adequacy and completeness. This is something 

we normally do.

It’s not a, it’s not a broad general thing that we’ve 

done, but looking at the bioassay data that was 

presented in the White Paper for the nuclides 

concern as well as some of the incident data, we 

wanted to be able to speak to that as well.

And Ron can address that. I just have a couple 

clarifying questions and maybe Chuck or Bob can 

answer this.

You know, you spent a great deal of time in the last 

couple two, three years doing the companion piece 

to the 226 83.14 SEC, which is -- were the other 

unnamed primes, also with the bioassay monitoring 

program complete.

Does the data in this White Paper represent the 

results of that review?

Mr. Nelson: I hate to answer with a question. But if 

you’re asking if the data in the White -- the data in 

the White Paper, the bioassay data reflects just the 

prime contractors, you know, represented totals for 

the given type of analysis for a given type of year, 

that does not include Kaiser or J.A. Jones or those 

folks.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, I was going to say that --

Mr. Nelson: If that’s what you’re asking.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- is there a separate exercise -- I 

know you’ve been doing sort of, again I call it a 

companion piece, but the flip side of the 226 SEC 

was the other prime contractors.

Mr. Nelson: Well, it wasn’t prime, it was anyone that 
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63

wasn’t a prime.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, anybody that wasn’t named in 

the 226 SEC. I guess that’s the easier way to put it.

Mr. Nelson: Right. That was the purpose of this 

effort.

So, the information I presented in the White Paper 

is just Rockwell, United, you know, Westinghouse 

before and after consolidation, Boeing Computer.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So this is everybody that was not 

named in the 226.

Mr. Nelson: That’s right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay.

Mr. Nelson: Including Boeing and including PNL.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right. Because I think certainly the 

first year or so of your review onsite was to settle 

that question as to whether the same conditions 

that led to the SEC for the other contractors under 

226, whether those conditions existed for the 

balance of the site.

So you’re saying this, what’s presented here would 

be the balance of the site?

Mr. Nelson: That’s correct.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. I just wanted to be clear on 

that.

The other thing, I guess in terms of the data, 

certainly, as you pointed out before, for this overall 

question of adequacy and completeness awaits the 

coworker model based on a new implementation 

guide? Is that still forthcoming?

Mr. Burns: Yes, it is. I think Dr. Taulbee could 
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64

probably speak to that because we spoke about it 

the other day. I think it’s going to be presented in 

the upcoming NIOSH Board meeting.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So, we can talk completeness and 

adequacy but it comes with an asterisk. You know, 

we still have to look to that coworker model before 

we have a complete picture.

Dr. Taulbee: Let me clarify that for just a second. 

What we’re going to be talking about at the 

upcoming Board meeting will be a schedule for us to 

complete all of the co-exposure models in 

accordance with the implementation guide. We’re 

currently working on that. We do not have that yet 

in place or know when the Hanford one would be 

scheduled to be updated.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. So, just for the Work Group’s 

advantage, so the context of our looking at 

adequacy and completeness, it’s pretty much the 

data presented and looking at that data but not 

certainly speaking to, you know, the co-exposure 

coworker aspect of it, which as Tim points out is still 

down the road.

Okay. With that, Ron, did you want to say 

something about what we’ve done so far?

Dr. Buchanan: Yes, this is Ron again. Yes. We went 

to, and now this is limited to, like Joe says, to the 

data that’s in the White Paper. And just as a check 

on the information in there I went through, mainly 

using the REX database, which is a very large 

database. It’s kind of hard to manipulate on these 

little laptops.

But I did go through and verify each of the -- all the 

data in the tables and in the radionuclides of 

concern, and looked at those and seen that they 

were present and that they were correct as 
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65

represented in the White Paper.

And at this point, and also I looked at some of the 

Site Research Database documents and the claim 

documents and did not find any discrepancy to 

speak of. And so at this point we will probably 

include that write-up in our report. And have no 

issues at this time on that item.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And again, we’re planning on 

documenting all of this in a relatively brief report, 

but one that obviously awaits the opening of 

governmental buildings since we can’t get this 

through DOE.

So, you know, that’s in progress. And actually it’s 

probably about half written already.

Member Ziemer: This is Ziemer. Let me raise a 

question then.

Is it important that we get the completion of the 

adequacy and completeness issue prior to closing 

any of these items that were before us today?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Let me answer this way, I think the 

other issues don’t rely upon this particular part of it. 

As Ron was pointing out, we have looked at it and 

did not see any red flags. So we can report that to 

the Work Group.

I think the question of adequacy and completeness, 

you know, sort of requires the completion of the 

coworker model to finally answer that part of it.

So, everything else I think is certainly open to the 

Work Group for, you know, discussion or closure. I 

don’t think it relies on this data issue. We didn’t see 

any red flags.

Member Ziemer: Right. Well, that was my 

impression but I wanted to make sure that was your 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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66

understanding as well. Because, and Brad I think 

it’s your call on this, but I think there’s a few of 

these, like the tritium one in my mind could be 

closed today. But I’d like to hear from the other 

Work Group Members.

Chair Clawson: I understand what you’re saying, 

Paul. I guess I’d just like SC&A to be able to finish 

up their report and for us to be able to digest that. 

And then we could go through and close each one.

That’s just my opinion. But it’s up to you guys, too.

Member Ziemer: Well, I am certainly willing to do 

that. I just was trying to think if there’s any way we 

could trim it down that wouldn’t depend on the final 

report.

Chair Clawson: Yes.

Member Ziemer: But I’m fine with it either way.

Mr. Katz: If I could speak up, Brad. You know, I 

just, I hate to where you’re already gone through it 

and you’re all on here, and I just -- you know, 

maybe it’s my recent health experiences that are 

impressing me here, but I hate to, when there’s 

work that’s already been done and it’s ready I hate 

to put it off. Because you never promise what’s 

going to be -- who’s going to be okay tomorrow. 

And you’ve done it all now.

And so I would love for you to close the findings 

that you seem to be ready to close now. You won’t 

be closing the SEC as, you know, we just discussed, 

but it will be putting, you know, off the table the 

matters that can be put off the table.

And keep in mind, you know, all of what you do 

here is just a recommendation by the Work Group 

to the Board anyway. So it’s not, you know, it’s not 

ending anything until the Board has a chance to 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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and certified by the Chair of the Hanford Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should 

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67

consider it and review everything.

So really, I really hate for, when work’s been done 

for it to sit on the shelf sort of unclosed, again, in 

part, and this is just sort of influenced by my recent 

health experience, but then we all know, we’ve had 

a lot of these with the Board given our longevity 

with the Board, of things happening --

Chair Clawson: Well, I have no problem with doing 

that. I just so many times in my personal opinion 

we have basically forced SC&A into these last little 

parts. But I have no problem going through it today 

if we want to. And we can close the ones that we 

can and go from there. That would not be a bit of a 

problem.

And then we’ll just wait for, we’ll just wait for 

SC&A’s final report and go from there.

I didn’t want to make it -- I guess I didn’t want to 

think that we were forcing SC&A into these reports, 

but we can go back and go through them and close 

them out if you’d like. Do you have any issue with 

that?

Mr. Katz: I’d appreciate that.

Chair Clawson: Well, anything for you, Ted.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Katz: I’ll take that, Brad. I’ll take that.

Chair Clawson: Okay.

Member Ziemer: It would be helpful to me to -- if 

SC&A as the Board’s contractor would be in a 

position to tell us which one they’re comfortable in 

stating today that they would actually recommend 

that the Work Group close.
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68

Chair Clawson: Okay. I agree with that fully, Paul.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Okay. Well, you know, I think the 

ones that don’t have an attendant clarification 

question hanging would be the ones that would be 

obviously ones we would be comfortable with 

closing.

Member Ziemer: Yes. That’s exactly what I’m 

saying. And if you’d be willing, Joe, to identify those 

again for us just in order, I think it would make it 

easier for us.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah. I’d say the thorium we’re 

comfortable with.

The --

Chair Clawson: So, Issue 3.

Mr. Nelson: Yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald: That’s Issue --

Mr. Nelson: 3 is thorium.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Issue 3, yes.

Issue, I believe Issue 4 didn’t have anything 

hanging as well. So HEU we’d be comfortable with.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: 233 I think there was a question that 

at least Bob was going, Bob and Chuck were going 

to follow up on, which is the scrap solutions and the 

experimental work, to see if there’s any way to put 

that to bed.

Member Schofield: Yes, that’s correct.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So, which leaves Issue 7 open or in 

abeyance.
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69

Issue -- Issue 9 we would be comfortable closing, 

as would we on Issue 10, tritium.

The same for Issue 20 on skin contamination. Same 

for Issue 22 on radiological incidents.

And we’re not, we’re not quite crossing the T on 27 

yet, so --

Member Ziemer: Right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- we probably wouldn’t recommend 

that. And, of course, we already talked about the 

data completeness issue.

So, but all those, the other ones I think would be 

okay.

Chair Clawson: Okay.

Member Ziemer: Brad, if you’re comfortable with a 

single motion I would move that we close Issues 3, 

4, 7, 9, 10, 20, and 22. If you’re not comfortable 

with a group we can do them one at a time. 

Chair Clawson: No, I have no problem with that.

I thought that there was a question on 7, but 

maybe I wasn’t writing it down either myself right. 

233 --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, I think the question on 7 was 

just the collection --

Member Ziemer: 7 is, no, 7, I shouldn’t have said 7. 

You’re right. 7 should really be open.

So it would be 3, 4, 9, 10, 20, and 22.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Right.

Chair Clawson: That’s what I’ve got. I have, I have 

no problem. I guess I’ll ask the other Work Group. I 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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70

move to -- or Paul’s already moved that we close 

these. And I agree with him.

Do you have anything Phil?

Member Schofield: No. I agree with that.

Chair Clawson: Okay.

Mr. Katz: Okay, thank you.

Chair Clawson: Does that make you feel better, 

Ted?

Mr. Katz: It does. It makes me smile from ear to 

ear. Ear to ear. Thank you.

Member Schofield: I think Ted’s starting to feel 

older.

Mr. Katz: I’m always feeling older, Phil. But I really 

can’t talk in this company. I have some people who 

are far more senior than me.

Chair Clawson: Yeah, Phil, I’m not going to mention 

any names, but you know them.

(Laughter.)

Chair Clawson: Okay. Is there any, is there 

anything else? Because I am an essential person 

and I have to be back to work. So is there anything 

else that we need to do?

Petitioner Comments

Mr. Katz: I just want to mention, I just want to 

mention, so we have -- we don’t have any 

petitioners on. I’ll just confirm that, because they 

have an opportunity to comment. But if they are on 

now, certainly you do have that opportunity. Yes, I 

didn’t think so.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

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71

So, and then last thing, just to note for you all that 

obviously you officially had a meeting in -- hello? 

We have a lot of background sound. Can you still 

hear me?

Mr. Fitzgerald: I can hear you.

Path Forward

Mr. Katz: Hello? Okay. So, we had to cancel the 

April meeting. We are now at our August meeting. 

That August meeting we are planning to have at the 

end of August, the 26th and the 27th I believe. And 

we’re planning to have that in your neck of the 

woods, Brad, Idaho Falls.

And given that you’ve done so much here on 

Hanford, I think even though we’re not going to be 

there, it seems to me a good time to get an update, 

it’s been a long time, on Hanford. So, while that was 

on the agenda because we were going to be there in 

Richland area, I don’t see any reason, unless you 

disagree, to give such an update just the same in 

Idaho Falls. But let me know if you think differently 

about that.

And this is something certainly you guys can discuss 

at the June teleconference when you’re discussing 

the agenda for August.

But any thoughts, immediate thoughts you have 

about that issue, by all means speak up on that, 

Brad or Paul or Phil.

Chair Clawson: I think it would be a good thing to 

make, do an update with it. It’s been quite a while. 

Be able to bring up everybody to speed where we’re 

at on Hanford.

Mr. Katz: Yeah.

Member Ziemer: I agree. I agree. And Ted, on the 
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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72

June teleconference will you still be aboard or --

Mr. Katz: I will not. I will be missing in action. 

Before I lose the thought on this matter, though, 

just let me just say, Joe, if you wouldn’t mind 

preparing a presentation for that, for the August 

meeting?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yeah, sure.

Mr. Katz: That would be great because that would 

be sort of traditional for you to summarize the 

review as it stands for the Work Group.

And of course, Brad, you know, whether a piece is 

presenting, introducing, et cetera, you know, that’s 

of course your prerogative always. But Joe, if you 

could just prepare the technical part of that 

presentation that would be great.

Chair Clawson: Great.

Mr. Katz: So, Paul, yeah, so I didn’t, I wasn’t trying 

to escape that, just I wanted to get that off my 

mind because I would forget it.

But no, the beginning of June, I’ll be out from the 

beginning of June forward.

Member Ziemer: Yeah. So you’re going to wash 

your hands of Hanford by end of this meeting.

Mr. Katz: That’s a terrible way to put it, Paul.

(Laughter.)

Chair Clawson: He’s just being honest.

Mr. Katz: That’s not how I feel at all.

Member Ziemer: No. I just want to make sure you 

don’t have a party scheduled for right after this 

phone call.
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been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable 

information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed 

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73

Mr. Katz: It’s actually, you know, I’m sort of 

surprised at how sad I’m feeling about retirement, 

so.

Mr. Katz: Well we are, too, Ted. We will certainly 

miss you.

Ms. Adams: It won’t last long.

Member Schofield: We’re not going to have you to 

beat up on anymore.

Mr. Katz: No. I’ve been beat up all my life, so it’s 

kind of a part -- I’m going to miss that, too. So, but 

I’ll be in touch with all of you certainly before I go in 

a more extensive fashion than this little hello here.

Member Ziemer: Right. A small group of us. Okay.

Adjourn

Mr. Katz: So, anyway, I want to thank you all for a 

great meeting and for all the hard work everybody, 

the staff did preparing for this, and for the Work 

Group in getting ready to address the issues that 

the staff prepared. Thank you.

And, you know, have a good rest of the week and 

stay safe and healthy. And we are adjourned.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 12:17 p.m.)