[Cite as In re H.P., 2021-Ohio-4446.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LUCAS COUNTY 

In re H.P. Court of Appeals No. L-21-1090 

 

 Trial Court No. JC 16255015 

 

 

 

 DECISION AND JUDGMENT

 Decided: December 17, 2021 

* * * * * 

 Christopher S. Clark, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} H.P., the father and appellant herein, appeals a May 10, 2021 judgment by 

the Lucas County Court of Common Please, Juvenile Division that denied his request for 

parenting time. As set forth below, we affirm. 
2. 

II. Background 

{¶ 2} This case originated with the filing of a complaint in dependency and 

neglect by Lucas County Children’s Services on April 25, 2016. After months of caseplanning with both parents, the juvenile court awarded legal custody of H.P., Junior 

(d.o.b. 07/27/2010 and hereinafter referred to as “H.P. Jr.”) to his maternal aunt and 

uncle, H.F. and A.F. The court ordered parenting time for mother “by agreement of the 

parties.” With regard to father’s parenting time, the order provided as follows: 

Father has [mental health] issues that interfere with his parenting of 

child. He says he attends Zepf, but has failed to sign releases to prove he is 

receiving treatment. He has not had visitation with child for over a year. * 

* * Due to father’s current [mental health] status, no parenting time order 

will issue at this time. Should father in the future wish to establish 

parenting time, he will need to file a proper motion with this court that 

includes documentation from his [mental health] therapist that his [mental 

health] issues are addressed and have been stabilized for at least 6 months.” 

(Nov. 13, 2017 J.E.). 

{¶ 3} At issue in this appeal is father’s November 9, 2020, “Motion to Modify 

Parental Rights and Responsibilities,” filed pro se. In response to the motion, a 

magistrate ordered father to undergo a urine screen and a home study, to be completed by 

LCCS. 
3. 

{¶ 4} A home study could not be conducted because, according to LCCS, father 

failed the urine screen (alcohol and diluted creatinine) and because father continued to 

refuse treatment, despite “a history of significant and severe mental health diagnosis.” 

{¶ 5} Following an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, father’s motion was 

denied. Father filed objections and requested that the trial court order his son, H.P. Jr., be 

seen by father’s psychiatrist. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied 

father’s objections on May 10, 2021. 

{¶ 6} Through counsel, father appealed and assigns a single assignment of 

error for our review. No other parties entered an appearance in this matter or filed 

a brief. 

The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to 

modify parental rights and responsibilities as the court’s decision is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence, as visitation is in the best interest of 

the child. 

III. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 7} As an initial matter, we note that father’s motion appears to have been 

incorrectly styled, in that father was not seeking to change a shared parenting plan or to 

change the designation of the sole residential parent and legal custodian. Rather, father 

sought to modify the trial court’s previous order that denied him parenting time. Indeed, 

father testified at hearing that he “just want[ed] visitation so [he] can spend time with 
4. 

[his] son.” Accordingly, we interpret father’s request as a motion to modify parenting 

time. Accord In re X.L., 5th Dist. Licking No. 13CA6, 2013-Ohio-2421, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 8} When considering a motion for parental visitation, following an adjudication 

of dependency under R.C. 2151.353, the juvenile court is required to focus “solely” on 

the best interest of the child. In re N.F., 9th Dist. Summit No. No. 29508, 2020-Ohio2701, ¶ 20; see also In re J.S., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-162, 2012-Ohio-4461. In In 

re J.S., the court rejected the legal custodian’s argument that a parent seeking visitation 

must demonstrate that a “change of circumstances” had occurred. Id. at ¶ 32; accord In 

re X.L. at ¶ 12-13 (Trial court commits reversible error by requiring a parent to show a 

change in circumstances). 

{¶ 9} The best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051 (“Parenting time rights”) 

apply in these cases. In re N.F. at ¶ 23.1 The statute provides, in part, 

(A) If a divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment 

proceeding involves a child and if the court has not issued a shared 

parenting decree, the court * * * shall make a just and reasonable order or 

decree permitting each parent who is not the residential parent to have 

parenting time with the child at the time and under the conditions that the 

court directs, unless the court determines that it would not be in the best 

1

 In his brief, father cites R.C. 3109.04(B)(1), which also contains a “best interest of the 

child” standard. But, R.C. 3109.04 applies to the issue of legal custody following an 

adjudication of abuse, neglect or dependency,” not parenting time. In re N.F. at ¶ 22 

citing In re A.M., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29388, 2019-Ohio-5221, ¶ 12. 
5. 

interest of the child to permit that parent to have parenting time with the 

child and includes in the journal its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

{¶ 10} Although R.C. 3109.051 does not refer to parenting time in proceedings 

involving an abused, neglected, or dependent child, “there is no statute that does.” In re 

N.F. at ¶ 23. Moreover, R.C. 3109.051 is “the only statute pertaining to parenting time 

and has been applied in similar situations to the one before us on appeal.” Id. Thus, 

pursuant to R.C. 3109.051(D), the juvenile court was required to consider the following 

best interest factors: 

(1) The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with the 

child’s parents, siblings, and other persons related by consanguinity or 

affinity, and with the person who requested companionship or visitation if 

that person is not a parent, sibling, or relative of the child;

(2) The geographical location of the residence of each parent and the 

distance between those residences, and if the person is not a parent, the 

geographical location of that person’s residence and the distance between 

that person's residence and the child’s residence; 

(3) The child’s and parent’ available time, including, but not limited 

to, each parent’s employment schedule, the child’s school schedule, and the 

child’s and the parent’ holiday and vacation schedule; 

(4) The age of the child; 
6. 

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; 

(6) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers, pursuant to 

division (C) of this section, regarding the wishes and concerns of the child 

as to parenting time by the parent who is not the residential parent or 

companionship or visitation by the grandparent, relative, or other person 

who requested companionship or visitation, as to a specific parenting time 

or visitation schedule, or as to other parenting time or visitation matters, the 

wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court; 

(7) The health and safety of the child; 

(8) The amount of time that will be available for the child to spend 

with siblings; 

(9) The mental and physical health of all parties; 

(10) Each parent’s willingness to reschedule missed parenting time 

and to facilitate the other parent’s parenting time rights, and with respect to 

a person who requested companionship or visitation, the willingness of that 

person to reschedule missed visitation; 

(11) In relation to parenting time, whether either parent previously 

has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving 

any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; 

whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an 
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abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the 

perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of the 

adjudication; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has 

acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected 

child; 

(12) In relation to requested companionship or visitation by a person 

other than a parent, whether the person previously has been convicted of or 

pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a 

child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether the person, in a 

case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected 

child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive 

or neglectful act that is the basis of the adjudication; whether either parent 

previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 

2919.25 of the Revised Code involving a victim who at the time of the 

commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is 

the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent previously has 

been convicted of an offense involving a victim who at the time of the 

commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is 

the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the 

victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to 
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believe that the person has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an 

abused child or a neglected child; 

(13) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a 

shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other 

parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court; 

(14) Whether either parent has established a residence or is planning to 

establish a residence outside this state; 

(15) In relation to requested companionship or visitation by a person other 

than a parent, the wishes and concerns of the child’s parents, as expressed by them 

to the court; 

(16) Any other factor in the best interest of the child. 

{¶ 11} We now turn to the juvenile court’s judgment that overruled father’s 

objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision to deny his request for parenting time. 

Pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d), if timely objections to a magistrate’s decision are filed,

the juvenile court “shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to 

ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately 

applied the law.” We review a trial court’s decision with respect to visitation under an 

abuse of discretion standard. In re J.S. at ¶ 19. This standard requires that the trial 

court’s reasoning not be disturbed unless it was “unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable,” because the trial judge is best equipped to determine and weigh the 
9. 

credibility of the proffered testimony. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 

450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶ 12} In its decision, the juvenile court found, 

After reviewing the record, the Court finds Father’s objection 

unpersuasive. Indeed, the Magistrate clearly ordered [in 2017] that Father 

provide documentation that his mental health issues have been stabilized 

for at least six months. Although the court commends Father for providing 

evidence that he was recently seen by a psychiatrist, the doctor also noted 

that it was only the first time evaluating Father. Accordingly, Father must 

continue to be evaluated by his psychiatrist for, at least, another six months 

before the Court will allow parenting time between Father and the minor 

child. As for psychiatric evaluations for the minor child, custodians [H.F. 

and A.F.] may choose to allow the minor child to be seen by Father’s 

psychiatrist; however, the Court makes no such order to do so at this time. 

Based on the foregoing, Father’s objection is denied. 

{¶ 13} On appeal, father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

his request for parenting time. He claims that H.P. Jr.’s best interests would be served by 

“allowing [H.P. Jr.] the opportunity to develop a relationship with his natural father and 

allow [father] the opportunity to have a relationship with his natural son.” Father points 
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to his “stable income” and the fact that he owns his own home just “four blocks from 

[H.P. Jr.]” as factors supporting visitation. 

{¶ 14} In applying the best interest factors, the trial court clearly afforded the most 

weight to R.C. 3109.051(D)(9), regarding father’s mental health. Given father’s longstanding history of unaddressed mental health issues, we see no abuse of discretion by the 

trial court in placing more weight on that factor than the others. Indeed, a trial court has 

discretion in determining which best interest factors are relevant, and “each factor may 

not necessarily carry the same weight or have the same relevance, depending upon the 

facts before the trial court.” (Quotations and internal citations omitted.) Haldy v. 

Hoeffel, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-19-08, 2020-Ohio-975, ¶ 32. The record also supports the 

court’s consideration of R.C. 3109.051(D)(1), regarding father and son’s “prior 

interaction and interrelationship.” According to LCCS, H.P. Jr. was “fearful of [father] 

and has not had visitation [with him] in several years.” 

{¶ 15} The record supports that the trial court considered R.C. 3109.051(D) 

through its independent review of the magistrate’s decision. That is, in deciding whether 

to grant father’s motion to modify parenting time, the trial court considered whether the 

request was appropriate and in H.P. Jr.’s best interest by weighing the relevant statutory 

factors under R.C. 3109.051(D). After our review of the record, we cannot say that the 

trial court’s balancing of those factors or its application of the weight assigned to each 

factor was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. 
11. 

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 16} For the reasons expressed above, we find that the juvenile court’s decision 

to deny father’s motion was not an abuse of discretion, and therefore we find that father’s 

assignment of error is without merit. The May 10, 2021 judgment of the Lucas County 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs of 

this appeal are assessed to father. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ 

 JUDGE 

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

____________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.