THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

convenes the 

TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING 

ADVISORY BOARD ON 

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 

DAY THREE 

EXCERPT CONCERNING IAAP SEC PETITION 

The verbatim transcript of the Meeting of the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health held 

at the Adam’s Mark, St. Louis, Missouri, on February 

9, 2005. 
 

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C O N T E N T S 

February 9, 2005 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report –

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAP): 

NIOSH Presentation of Report 13 

MR. LARRY ELLIOTT, NIOSH 

Petitioners Presentation of Comments on Report

and Public Comment 32 

Board Discussion 100 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 147 
3 

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND 

The following transcript contains quoted material. 

Such material is reproduced as read or spoken. 

In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 

an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 

sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 

or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 

word(s) when reading written material. 

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 

of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 

reported. 

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 

the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 

available. 

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 

"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 

-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 

without reference available. 

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 

failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

In the following transcript (off microphone) 

refers to microphone malfunction or speaker's neglect 

to depress "on" button. 
 

 

4 

P A R T I C I P A N T S 

(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 

BOARD MEMBERS 

CHAIR 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus 

School of Health Sciences 

Purdue University

Lafayette, Indiana 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D.

Senior Science Advisor 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Washington, DC 

MEMBERSHIP 

ANDERSON, Henry A., M.D.

Chief Medical Officer 

Occupational and Environmental Health

Wisconsin Division of Public Health 

Madison, Wisconsin

(via telephone) 

DeHART, Roy Lynch, M.D., M.P.H.

Director 

The Vanderbilt Center for Occupational and Environmental

Medicine 

Professor of Medicine 

Nashville, Tennessee 

ESPINOSA, Richard Lee

Sheet Metal Workers Union Local #49 

Johnson Controls 

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Espanola, New Mexico 
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GIBSON, Michael H.

President 

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union

Local 5-4200 

Miamisburg, Ohio 

GRIFFON, Mark A.

President 

Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc.

Salem, New Hampshire 

MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D.

Director 

New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund

Albany, New York 

MUNN, Wanda I.

Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired)

Richland, Washington 

OWENS, Charles Leon

President 

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union

Local 5-550 

Paducah, Kentucky 

PRESLEY, Robert W.

Special Projects Engineer

BWXT Y12 National Security Complex

Clinton, Tennessee 

ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus 

University of Florida

Elysian, Minnesota 
 

 

6 

AGENDA SPEAKERS 

(in order of appearance) 

Mr. Larry Elliott, NIOSH 

STAFF/VENDORS 

CORI HOMER, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH

STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS 

ADAMS, NANCY AND LARRY

AHIRA, KEN

ALEXANDER, OLIVE M.

ALEXANDER, TERRY

ALLEN, GEORGE

AMANN, DEBORAH

ANBLE, JOHN, KTVI

ANDERSON, KATHLEEN, IAAP

ANDERSON, ROBERT, IAAP

ARMSTRONG, CHRISTINE

ARRO, MICHAEL R.

BAFARO, MARILYN, NIOSH

BASCHERT, BETTY J.

BEATTY, EVERETT RAY, SR., FERNALD ATOMIC COUNCIL

BEHLING, HANS, SC&A

BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A

BELL, R. THOMAS, SC&A

BERRY, CHARLENE

BEST, CHARLINE

BEST, PAM SCOGGINS

BEST, RAYMOND

BIEST, JOAN

BLANKENSHIP, CINDY

BOGNAN, JOHN

BOYD, JAMES

BOYD, THOMAS S.

BLOSSER, FRED, NIOSH

BRALASKI, RITA

BRAND, ANSTICE, CDC

BROCK, DENISE, UNWW

BROUK, CAROLE

BROWN, THOMAS, BSCAG

BRUENING, MARK

BRYANT, DOROTHY

BULGER, HAROLD

CALLAWAY MOOCH, FERNALD ATOMIC COUNCIL

CHISHOLM, MILLIE

COFFELT, EVELYN

CONRAD, JAMES

COTTER, GARY 
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COTTER, WILLIAM D.

COVALESKY, SHIRLEY

COWPER, HARRIS

CRONK, JAMIE

CURTISS, JOANN & RICK

DANIEL, GWEN

DAVIS, RICKY, KTVI

DEEP, HEIDI, NIOSH

DEICHMAN, MATT, WBII-TV

DILLARD, HOMER & HALENE

DOLAN, JACQUELINE E.

DOLAN, WILLIAM E.

DORNFELD, DEBBIE, JIM TALENT

DOWNS, DEB

DREY, KAY

DUDLEY, MARTIN

DURSO, JEAN

DURSO, JUDITH

EATON, CLARISSA, UNWW

ECHEMENDIA, AIDA

EHLMANN, PAT, UNWW

ELLISON, CHRIS, NIOSH

ESPY, RICHARD

FAGAS, JANE

FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A

FRANKLIN, MICHAEL

FRAZIER, VIRGINIA

FRISCHMAN, BILL

FULKERSON, ROBERT

FUORTES, LAURENCE, UNIV. IOWA

GARNER, DON

GARNER, DOROTHY

GENERI, MARY

GILLARD, LORRAINE A.

GRAHAM, MAYOR, CITY OF O’FALLON

GRAHAM, PAULA, IAAP

GREEN, JAMES

GREUBLATT, B., UPI

HABBIG, JOHN K.

HAEREN, BERNELL

HALLMARK, SHELBY, LABOR

HARDEN, SHIRLEY

HARGIS, JOHN 
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HARRIS, WALTER

HARRISON, KATHY

HART, ALISON, SENATOR HARKIN

HASKELL, VICTOR, SR.

HAWKINS, BRENDA

HEADRICK, WILLIAM

HEISTER, MELANIE, NCRP

HENNITS, DOROTHY

HERBERT, NICHOLE, NIOSH

HERTZ, DOROTHY

HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH

HOLLAND, MARTIN

HOLTMEYER-MAUNE, JERRINE

HODGES, CARRIE

HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS

HORGAN, TOM, SEN. BOND

HUNTER, FREDA

IVERSEN, SI, IAAP

JOHNSON, MARY L.

JOHNSON, PAT

KARDY, SHARON

KATZ, TED, NIOSH

KELLER, LILLIAN A.

KELLY, PATRICK, SC&A

KENOYER, JUDSON, ORAU

KIEDING, SYLVIA, PACE

KIMPAN, KATE, DOE

KLOTZ, STEVE, KTRS

KOENEMAN, BARB, UNWW

KOENEMAN, RAYETTA

KOENEMAN, TANYA, UNWW

KORDING, GLENN

KORDING, SHARON

KOTSCH, JEFFREY L., DOL

KRAICHELY, MARY, UNWW

LACKEY, MELBA

LAMBKIN, DON, UNWW

LAVERY, KEVIN M., KWMU

LEA, JEFF, KMOV

LEAHMANN, SHIRLEY

LITTLE, JAMES

LYNCH, CINDY

LYNCH, HELEN 
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MACK, HUY, POST DISPATCH

MAURO, JOHN, SC&A

MCINTYRE, JOAN

MCKEEL, DAN, MD, WASHINGTON UNIV.

MCKEEL, VIRGINIA, VILLAGE IMAGE NEWS

MCLUCAS, DARRYL

MCNUTT, ROBERT

MESSALA, DAVE & JAN

MIKLOVIC, DAN

MILLER, RELADA L., NIOSH

MILLER, RICHARD, GAP

MITAS, JIM, CONGRESSMAN AKIN

MONTGOMERY, KENNETH L.

MOUSER, TERRI, UNITED NUCLEAR

MUCHO, JOHN J., SR., DOW CHEMICAL

MURPHY, DAN P.

MUSCKE, EDWARD C.

NAES, NORVILLE

NESVET, JEFF, DOL

NETON, JIM, NIOSH

NOVAK, JUSTINE

NUGENT, MARY, US GAO

O’HARE, FRANK W.

OJEDA, THERESA, KMOV

PATTON, JACK

PEDERSEN, ELAINE

PHEGLEY, RAYMOND, AIRPORT

PICKER, RANDY

PINKERTON, VIOLA R.

PIPER, WILLIAM

PORTER, DIANE, NIOSH

PRESLEY, LOUISE S.

PRIEST, CHRISTINE

RACH, CHARLES L.

RAMSPOTT, CHRISTINE

RAMSPOTT, JOHN

REMPE, VIRGIL J.

RENNER, WILLIAM, AIRPORT

RETKONSKI, RICHARD

REUSS, ANN

RINDALL, TINA, UNITED NUCLEAR

RINGEN, KNUT, CPWR/BCTD

ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY, SC&A 
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ROESSLER, CHARLES E.

ROSENTHAL, JAMES

ROTHROCK, AMY

RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH

RYAN, FRAN

SACKS-LONG, DONNA J.

SCHEIG, VIRGINIA & DIANE

SCHESLER, ELAINE

SCHISLER, LARRY

SCHNEIDER, CLARENCE

SCHNEIDER, MARILYN, UNWW

SCHRUMM, RUTH

SCOGGINS, FRANCES

SCOTT, SYLVIA

SHAUSHEN, JUDY

SHENOWSKI, JOE

SIMMONS, HOMER, DOW CHEMICAL

SMITH, BILLIE J.

SMITH, KIMBERLY

SOMRATY, ANDREW

SOVAR, RICH AND EVELYN

SPICKETT, DAVID

SPICKETT, EVELYN

STEGER, RON

STEGER, RONI

STEINKAMP, JUDIE

STEMPFLEY, DAN, NIOSH

STRAPES, FLO

STROUSSNER, DONALD A.

STUCKENSCHNEIDER, DOLORES

STUDT, ARLENE

SUERMANN, ZELDA

SULLIVAN, MICHELLE, WBII-TV

SWABODA, JAY, ST. LOUIS LABOR TRIBUNE

TASCHLOR, JOHN

TAULBEE, TIM, NIOSH

TAYLOR, JOHN, AIRPORT

TEAGUE, CARLOTTA, NCRP

TENFORDE, THOMAS S., NCRP

THORNHILL, CHARLENE

THORNHILL, GEORGE

TOOHEY, R.E., ORAU

TURCIC, PETE, DOL 
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UNDERWOOD, LEWIS, NIOSH

VACEK, PENNY, SENATOR GRASSLEY

VERHOFF, GWENDOLYN

WALKER, ED AND JOYCE, BSCAG

WATSON, DAVID P., JR.

WHITE, WALTER, JR.

WIESEHAUS, JOHN J.

WILDHABER, CHRIS

WINDISCH, ANTHONY

WOLFF, TOM

WOODS, JANET

WURTH, LARRY

YERINGTON, LASCA, IAAP

ZIEMER, MARILYN

ZINE, GEORGE 
 

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P R O C E E D I N G S 

(1:05 p.m.) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we will begin our afternoon 

session with a presentation by NIOSH of the 

petition evaluation report for the Iowa 

Ordnance Plant SEC, so if everyone will come to 

attention we'll have Mr. Elliott begin his 

presentation. Thank you. 

NIOSH PRESENTATION OF REPORT 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer, and 

welcome back from lunch, members of the Board, 

ladies and gentlemen of the Board, and 

appreciate the attendance of the audience and 

understand that you're very much interested in 

seeing the petition that has been presented -- 

petitions on Iowa that have been presented to 

us fully processed, and this is part of the -- 

part of the process in coming to a decision on 

those. 

Yesterday I spoke to the Board about 

Mallinckrodt, and the outline of the 

presentation for today is very similar. I'll 

cover the petition process and where this 
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particular set of petitions are at at this 

point in time in the process. 

I mentioned yesterday the Advisory Board's role 

and responsibility. I won't belabor that today 

with you all. We walked it through yesterday, 

but if you have questions or if the audience 

has questions about that role and 

responsibility, we certainly can go into it 

after my presentation. 

I will touch on a series of slides about the 

evaluation process that a petition goes through 

and particularly what was evaluated for these 

petitions for Iowa. And I will conclude with a 

proposed class definition and our summary 

findings that you see in the report for Iowa. 

If you're a member of the audience and you have 

not received a copy of the NIOSH evaluation 

report for the Iowa petitions, you may find 

those on the back table. You might avail 

yourselves of a copy. 

Petitioning process for handling Special 

Exposure Cohort petitions that are submitted to 

NIOSH starts with a petitioner submitting a 

petition on behalf of a class of workers. This 

whole process is governed by the statute, the 
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Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act, and by -- further 

regulated by the rule, the regulation that 

NIOSH put in place last year, in June, on how 

to handle and process petitions of this -- this 

type. 

The Iowa petition -- the original Iowa petition 

that we received was -- was submitted to us on 

June 15th in 2004. It was delivered directly 

to me at a meeting in Burlington by Sharon 

Shumaker* and the petitioners named on that 

petition are with us today either by phone or 

physically present here and they will be 

speaking shortly. 

 The initial class definition is shown on this 

slide and it involves all of these particular 

job titles. I hope we didn't miss one, but in 

the report itself -- if we did miss one on the 

slide -- it's fully -- all the job titles are 

fully listed in the petition itself. And the 

time frame for this petition, according to this 

proposed class definition, is from 1974 -- or 

1947 to 1974, excuse me, for the buildings and 

the areas that you see listed here. 

Now the next step in the petitioning process is 
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to qualify the petitioner. What this means is 

-- qualify the petition. What this means is 

that we are required to work with the 

petitioner to make sure that the petition 

submitted contains all the necessary 

information for it to be qualified, so we work 

hand-in-hand with the petitioners to assure 

that status. The first Iowa petition was 

qualified on October 20th, 2004. 

I should mention at this point that we had 

several petitions -- three, I believe -- that 

were merged together and are being handled in 

this one evaluation report, so you're going to 

hear from various petitioners, but they're all 

covered for the site of Iowa Army Ordnance -- 

Army Ammunition Plant are covered under this 

one evaluation report. 

We then not-- once a petition has been 

qualified, we notify the petitioners by letter 

that it has been qualified. We also notify 

them by phone, in many cases, and a notice is 

placed in the Federal Register to notify the 

public at large. We also then place this 

information on our web site so that everybody 

hopefully is informed. And the Iowa 
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qualification notice was published, as you see, 

on October 25th, 2004. 

The next step in this process, after 

qualification, is that NIOSH must evaluate the 

petition and the supporting materials to the 

petition, and a variety of other information, 

to essentially determine and provide a set of 

findings for the Board's consideration. And 

here we have, in that regard, the petition 

evaluation report was sent just last week. 

 And I apologize again for the lack of time, 

perhaps, that the petitioners have had to 

develop their response and rebuttal to this. 

We're working as diligently and as hard as we 

can to prepare these and do so in a -- not only 

a timely manner, but with a quality approach. 

And hopefully that's what was achieved, but I 

understand that it does present limitations to 

the petitioners. 

 The evaluation process, as I mentioned earlier 

-- the whole -- whole petitioning process is 

governed by the statute and by our rule. And 

in the statute there is this dual test, if you 

will, that must be addressed in the evaluation 

of a petition. One test is whether or not it 
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is feasible for NIOSH to estimate the level of 

radiation doses for individual members of the 

class with sufficient accuracy. And under that 

-- this particular regulation in the sections 

that you see cited here, NIOSH is -- has to 

determine whether it has access to sufficient 

information in order to estimate either the 

maximum radiation dose that could have been 

incurred under plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class, or whether it can estimate 

the radiation doses of members of the class 

more precisely than just using a maximum 

radiation dose estimate. 

If we find in our findings that it's not 

feasible for us to conduct dose reconstruction 

for a given class, we are then required to 

evaluate this second part of the -- second test 

here, and that is the determination of 

endangerment to health. And so we look at both 

of those as we proceed in evaluating petitions. 

For endangerment to health, our rule specifies 

that we must look at whether or not the 

information available to us indicates that 

there was any incident data that might have 

resulted in very high, acute exposures. And we 
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are looking for incident data that would 

essentially result in -- or be similar to a 

criticality event. 

Absent that, then we are to use a 250-day 

requirement -- 250 days is a work year -- and 

that is based upon chronic exposure to 

radiation in the workplace. 

It's also to be noted here that, given that 

there are multiple classes already -- four 

classes already in the Special Exposure Cohort; 

Mallinckrodt for the years 1942 to 1948, the 

Board has decided this morning that they will 

recommend to the Director of NIOSH and the 

Secretary that that class for Mallinckrodt be 

added, so the point I want to make here is that 

people who have time in these various classes 

can aggregate the days. If they have only 90 

days in one class and let's say 200 days in 

another class, those days can be aggregated to 

achieve this 250-day criteria for inclusion as 

a member in the class in the Special Exposure 

Cohort. 

 In the evaluation process we are required under 

our regulation to examine all available data in 

the information obtained through the site 
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profile development that -- that occurred or 

any Technical Basis Document that we have 

created as a tool for use in dose 

reconstruction. We look at all the dose 

reconstructions that may have been conducted to 

date for a given population or class at a site. 

We examine all interviews that have been done 

on claims for that site. We review classified 

information on sources, source terms and 

processes at the facility that are not 

available to the public. 

We have -- for this given petition and others, 

we have determined the completeness of the data 

research, and you can find in our rule under 

82.15 how we go about doing that. I refer you 

to that section in our rule on how we evaluate 

the sufficiency of data and what types of 

hierarchical data we look for in determining 

adequate information for sufficient dose 

reconstruction. This health physics data is 

listed in order of preference in our rule under 

82.14 and in 82.15 it tells you how we go about 

evaluating the sufficiency of that information. 

We also are required to evaluate issues of data 

availability and adequacy. And here we're 
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talking about whether or not there is data -- 

full data available or are there gaps in the 

data, and I'll speak a little bit more about 

the gaps and the adequacy of data for the Iowa 

Ordnance Plant in a moment. 

We -- in this particular case and others I'm 

sure we'll face an issue of trying to determine 

whether it's feasible for us to do our job in 

dose reconstruction without relying on 

classified information, and so that's another 

step that we have to take in the evaluation 

process. 

And finally, as I mentioned earlier, we have to 

evaluate whether health was endangered if we 

can -- if we decide we cannot reconstruct doses 

with sufficient accuracy. 

Now I'm going to move into a summary of our -- 

the evaluation that we did for the petitions on 

Iowa. Our evaluation report that you have 

before you addresses three classes of employees 

at Iowa according to these specific time frames 

-- June 1947 through May of 1948, May of 1948 

to March of 1949; and March, 1949 through 1974. 

We, in our review of information, find that 

there are distinguishing characteristics 
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associated with these three classes and these 

time frames. 

 These distinguishing characteristics, which 

I'll get into in a moment, are really a result 

of our reviewing all available data and 

resources, and this slide lists those things 

that we took careful consideration of in our 

evaluation -- our existing site profiles. And 

you notice that this is plural, and you 

probably also realize that there's only one 

site profile out available to the public. The 

revised site profile for Iowa is at DOE right 

now going through authorized classifica-- 

derivative classification review, and I'm given 

assurances that it is going to be turned back 

over to us so that we can make it publicly 

available very shortly. Hopefully we'll see 

that by the end of this week or first of next 

week. 

We look at our Technical Information Bulletins. 

Again, we look at our dose reconstruction 

efforts. We look at all of our internal 

databases for information and data that's 

pertinent to the petition. We examine DOE 

records. We examine NIOSH documents that have 
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been collected. We examine scientific reports 

that are made available to us by the 

petitioner, as well as those that we have in 

our hands. Again, we look at the information 

from interviews, as well as information 

provided by the petitioners themselves. 

In our report we speak to the data availability 

from June 1947 to May 1948. Our review of the 

documentation clearly indicates that no 

radiation exposure data is available or needed 

for this time period because no radioactive 

materials or radiological processes at Line 1 

of the Army Ammunition Plant occurred during 

this time frame. 

 Data availability from May 1948 to March 1949, 

NIOSH has determined that the potential exists 

for radiological exposure here and it's 

existing primarily in a class of workers who 

performed radiography, testing metal parts and 

components using X-rays. We have not prepared 

an evaluation report on this class at this 

point in time and we're going to move as 

expeditiously as possible to do so. 

 Our data availability for the class that's 

configured around the time frame of March 1949 
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to 1974 finds that prior to 1955 documents 

suggest that there were no nuclear capabilities 

at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant. Our -- we 

feel that because these documents are not 

definitive and that in fact some may have been 

destroyed. We are assuming that there might 

have been handling of nuclear capsules or the 

pits as early as March of 1949, so we're basing 

that on a petition-friendly assumption. 

This next set of slides gets into the data that 

we have available and data gaps that we have 

identified as part of our findings. For 

external dosimetry data you can see here that 

we portrayed from 1955 to 1961 there is 

radiation data available on -- on average of -- 

for 22 workers. And that ramps up and 

increases from the -- in the -- during the time 

period of '62 to 1967, going to 44 workers. 

And then beyond '68 it increases dramatically 

and we show an average -- on average about 226 

workers would show with external dosimetry. 

There are gaps in the data, of course. No 

personal radiation monitoring data prior to 

1955 is so noted. 

 Extremity exposure records exist from 1969 to 
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1974, and we have no wrist extremity dosimeters 

prior to 1969. The Iowa Ordnance Plant badge 

measurements from 1962 to 1975 exist and are 

available to us. There is, however, no area 

monitoring conducted prior to '62. We do have 

pocket ionization or pic measurements from June 

18, 1965 to November 1974, with no results of 

pics before 1965. 

 For neutron dosimetry there is monitoring data 

that began in 1962 and it increased to -- with 

increased worker monitoring. Approximately 25 

percent of the badges were processed on NTA 

film, a type -- special type of film, and half 

of those badges were area badges that were 

placed in a vault in the inspection area where 

neutron doses were expected to be the highest. 

We do not have neutron monitoring data prior to 

1962. 

There is accurate coworker data available from 

dosimetry measurements of Pantex workers from 

1993 to 2003. Our rule and the statute speaks 

that -- to the point that we can use coworker 

data for comparable exposure settings and 

process operations. 

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AEC reports summarizing the results of biweekly tritium bioassay monitoring for selected 

workers. These would have been workers that 

would have been deemed to have been potentially 

exposed to tritium at the highest exposure 

potential for tritium. There are no individual 

bioassay sample results for any of the 

radiological materials, however. The 

individual tritium bioassay monitoring results 

from workers from Pantex are available and can 

be used. 

Then we go to air sampling data. There is air 

sampling data for monitoring air in the Gravel 

Gerties from 1971 to 1974. Depleted uranium 

air sampling data is only available from 1971 

to '74, and we do not have data on that prior 

to 1971. 

There's also air sampling data for depleted 

uranium from adjacent area to the FS-12 area 

from 1965 to '73. 

And again we have tritium air sample data. 

This is air sample, not personal sample data or 

bioassay data. It's air sample data available 

from effluent monitoring reports for the period 

of '62 to '72. And as you can see, we don't 
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have air sampling -- similar air sampling data 

on the outer bounds of that time frame. 

 Additional Iowa air plant -- Ammunition Plant 

data for tritium comes to us from Pantex, as 

well, that can be used from 1959 to 1964. And 

radon levels were not quantified until nuclear 

materials were removed after 1989, so that 

presents us with some interesting work if we're 

to reconstruct those radon doses, but we think 

it can be done. 

Feasibility of dose reconstructions. Now we 

get into the report findings. For the time 

period of June 1947 to May of 1948 NIOSH has 

determined that there is no feasibility 

determination needed because there was -- the 

documentation indicates there was no 

radiological exposures that would have been 

covered by this compensation act during that 

time frame. 

For the feasibility of dose reconstructions for 

the second class, that being the radiographers 

from March -- or May 1949 -- '48 to March of 

1949, we are working on a separate evaluation 

report and we'll have that as soon as we 

possibly can. 
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Feasibility of dose reconstructions for the 

third class, that class being March -- workers 

who were there from March 1949 to 1974, NIOSH 

feels that it has access to sufficient 

information, both source term, process 

information, photon and neutron dose 

calculations that we feel we can use to 

estimate either the maximum radiation dose that 

was incurred by any member of the class, or to 

estimate those doses more precisely. The sum 

of the information available from our site 

profile and our revised site profile will 

enable us to do sufficient dose 

reconstructions. 

To go on about the feasibility, though, for 

this time period, there are some technical 

bases such as source term, process information, 

photon and neutron calculations that are 

sufficiently accurate for dose reconstructions 

for this class. However, they depend upon 

classified information, and this include-- this 

classified information that we are not able to 

talk about in public, I can mention, includes 

source term type data and process information. 

This is held in classified -- as a classified 
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set of documents because of national security. 

This limitation on the transparency of NIOSH's 

dose reconstructions is at question and we feel 

it may undermine the credibility of such dose 

reconstruction for the Iowa Army Ammunition 

Plant claimants. 

So while it's scientifically and technically 

feasible, we think, to estimate the doses with 

sufficient accuracy, we're raising the question 

with the Board and seek the Board's advice on 

how to handle this issue of transparency. 

Specifically, NIOSH is asking the Board's 

advice on whether we should conduct dose 

reconstructions under limited transparency 

conditions due to national security concerns. 

The Board's advice concerning this issue will 

be considered for this petition and for others 

that arise in the future. 

Now for the second part of the two-pronged test 

where we have to address the health 

endangerment, again for the 1949 to 1974 time 

period where weapons operations included the 

assembly and the disassembly, the surveillance 

and the maintenance and modification and 

dismantlement of nuclear weapons -- this is 
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placing and removing the pits or the nuclear 

capsules -- and for the operations that 

involved depleted uranium, enriched uranium, 

plutonium, tritium, polonium and radium, as 

well as the radiographers' experience used for 

industrial radiography, we find that there was 

a potential and a definitive health 

endangerment here. In that we do not see or 

find any information or documentation that 

leads us to understand or believe that discrete 

incidents were -- occurred which would give us 

a indication that the health endangerment 

should be based upon those, the workers in this 

class have accumulated what we consider to be 

doses through chronic exposure to external 

sources of radiation. 

 Our proposed class definition. This evaluation 

defines a single class of employees for which 

NIOSH has established that it may not be 

feasible to estimate radiation doses with 

sufficient accuracy for compensation purposes 

due to this transparency concern we have about 

use of national security information. Our 

definition as such is all employees working at 

the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant Line 1, which 
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includes Yard C, Yard G, Yard L, the Firing 

Site Area, Burning Field B, and storage sites 

for pits, weapons, including Buildings 73 and 

77, from March 1949 to 1974. 

In summary, our report specifies that we find 

that for the class of June 1947 through May of 

1948 workers at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant 

were not exposed to radioactive materials and 

so it's not applicable for us to consider that 

particular class under this program. There was 

no health endangerment to that class. 

For the class of workers that were there from 

May of 1948 through March of 1949, these are 

the radiographers that were exposed to X-ray, 

that needs to be -- the feasibility of our 

ability to reconstruct doses for those 

individuals needs to be determined as of this 

point in time, and we're working on that 

report, again. 

For the final class of employees who were there 

from March of 1949 to 1974, we're not making a 

statement at this time regarding the 

feasibility, other than to say we think it is 

technically feasible for us to do dose 

reconstructions. However, we're concerned 
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about the issue of transparency here and we're 

looking for the Board's advice on how to handle 

this difficult issue. We do think, however, 

that this class -- class's health was 

endangered. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Larry. Before we hear 

from the petitioners, the Chair would like to 

recognize some of the Congressional delegation 

participants who are here, and some of whom you 

will hear from shortly. Sue Zimmerman*, who is 

with Representative Leach's office. Sue, just 

let us see where you are. 

 MS. ZIMMERMAN: (Indicating) 

 DR. ZIEMER: There's Sue, thank you. Penny 

Vacek* with Senator Grassley*'s office -- 

there's Penny. We have Allison Hart and Jenny 

Wing from Senator Harkin's office. 

 The Chair would also note that Tom Horgan from 

Senator Bond's office here in Missouri and 

Debbie Dornfeld* from Senator Talent's office, 

and they participated earlier in the meeting. 

I believe they're both still here and, again, 

we would welcome them, as well. 

PETITIONERS PRESENTATION OF COMMENTS ON REPORT 

AND PUBLIC COMMENT 
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 For the petitioners now we'll hear first from 

Robert A. Anderson, who's one of the 

petitioners. Robert, would you like to lead 

off here? 

(Pause) 

Robert, you can use the front podium, if you 

wish, or... Being distributed now is a 

document which comes from Dr. Fuortes, who will 

-- I believe will be speaking to us -- or at 

least one of his colleagues will -- after -- 

after Robert speaks. 

MR. ANDERSON: All right. Are we on? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, please proceed. 

MR. ANDERSON: Members of the Advisory Board, I 

wish to express my thanks to the Director of 

NIOSH, John Howard, and the Director and staff 

of the Office of Compensation Analysis and 

Support for this report. This report will, if 

coupled with the Board's recommendation, lead 

to help for fellow members of the Cold War team 

who have already suffered so much. 

That Cold War team has sacrificed health and 

even their lives to provide this great nation 

with safety and security for the Cold War years 

for all Americans. At this time, and in memory 
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of those team members who have passed on, could 

I ask all here today for a moment of prayer for 

silence. Using these words I remember from a 

long ago, each in your own words and in your 

own way, let us bow our heads and pray, giving 

thanks to the heroic memories of the men and 

women of the Cold War team who have passed and 

the sacrifices of their families. 

(Pause) 

Amen. 

My story begins in the 1980's. I saw in the 

newspaper, the Burlington Hawkeye, that one of 

my fellow shift lieutenants had contacted -- 

contracted non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and fought a 

great battle and died. Then I was diagnosed 

with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and received 

chemotherapy treatment at the University of 

Iowa. From other friends I heard of two other 

exempt employees from the safety department of 

Line 1, who had been in the same areas as I 

had, had also contracted non-Hodgkin's 

lymphoma. One of them had died. 

 The coincidence of four people having the same 

disease within a short time seemed very 

suspicious, as our common ground was that we 
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all worked at the plant at the same time. As a 

shift commander and holder of AEC Q, DOD secret 

and crypto clearances at that time, I remember 

meeting armed AEC couriers who protected the 

incoming shipments of radioactive materials at 

the exterior gates. I was the first person to 

open and climb aboard the locked leaded cargo 

container. I was charged with comparing the 

serial numbers of each item with the manifest 

and signing receipt of the cargo. To do so I 

climbed over and around the shielded containers 

to get close and read each number in my 

uniform, which I then wore home. 

At home I was able to pick up and hold my two 

little daughters before going to bed. Life was 

good. 

If you look at my scorecard today, I had nonHodgkin's lymphoma with a volleyball-sized mass 

in my abdomen in 1988. I had a football-sized 

non-cancerous thyroid removed in June, 2004. 

My oldest daughter had a large cancerous 

thyroid removed in December, 2004. My youngest 

daughter had a molar pregnancy a few years ago 

that her doctors compared to a Hiroshima-type 

incident, and doctors are watching her thyroid 
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now. 

In the fall semester of 1997 while taking an 

evening class at the Southeastern Community 

College, my instructor for the "Man and the 

Environment" course gave a class assignment to 

write a letter to a government official in 

response to an environmental issue, either in 

support of that issue or against it. I decided 

that I would use that assignment to ask Senator 

Harkin a question that had bothered me since I 

was diagnosed in 1988: Did I get non-Hodgkin's 

lymphoma from working at the Burlington Atomic 

Energy Commission Plant. 

Since then I have heard from so many people who 

had worked there, or from their surviving 

spouses, with that same coincidence of cancer. 

And that was repeated all too often. In most 

cases the disease announced itself years after 

working at the plant. Sadly, at that time we 

could not even tell our doctors about the risks 

we faced. Some of that has been corrected now, 

and we can tell our doctors of our experiences. 

Many have received proper medical treatment 

based on knowledge of those hazards, thanks to 

the work of the Burlington Atomic Energy 
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Commission Plant Former Worker Program. Out of 

the thousands of people who worked at the 

Burlington Atomic Energy Commission Plant, too 

many have radiological diseases. Other groups 

have reported diseases from other dangerous 

elements used in making explosives and nuclear 

weapons. That issue remains to be addressed as 

part of Subtitle E. 

I welcome the OCAS report evaluating the 

petition and this meeting today. I am proud to 

have been part of that first effort to create a 

new Special Exposure Cohort, and very pleased 

that NIOSH believes that a second -- excuse me, 

a Special Exposure Cohort may be warranted. 

However, I respectfully disagree with the 

conclusion of the report that states dose can 

be reconstructed. 

As all of you know, the dose reconstruction 

process has been time-consuming and burdensome 

for those of us still alive and made ill. For 

the many families who have lost loved ones, 

often it has been only the hope of help that 

has carried the survivors' spirits on. 

In part NIOSH has based their finding that a 

Special Exposure Cohort may be warranted on the 
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fact that it will not be possible to perform 

dose reconstruction without using classified 

data. My fellow petitioners and I agree that 

relying almost exclusively on classified 

documents to develop assumptions and then 

perform dose reconstruction presents serious 

problems. The Special Exposure Cohort presents 

a more sound policy alternative. Just as one 

example, how could a person challenge the 

denial of their claim if they have no access to 

the data? So I welcome the Board's wisdom on 

this subject and hope that they agree that the 

lack of transparency is proper grounds for the 

recommendation of a Special Energy Cohort -- 

Exposure Cohort, excuse me. 

Further I'd like to point out that I also 

believe that the Burlington Plant meets the 

criteria for creation of a Special Exposure 

Cohort because it is not feasible to estimate 

with sufficient accuracy the radiation dose we 

received. Without knowing that -- what 

information remains classified, this is an 

argument that's difficult to make. However, 

I'd like to take a moment to review what we do 

know. 
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Almost every key assumption in the SEC 

evaluation report is deemed classified. That 

includes the following: The history of weapons 

assembly/disassembly activities; the low-energy 

photon doses from a pit; neutron exposure from 

pits; source term data of the contents from 

pits; correction factor used to account for 

low-energy photon badge measurement error; and 

the ability to use coworker data in a 

scientifically credible manner. 

As the OCAS report points out, there is no 

internal dosimetry data available for workers 

at the Burlington site at all. None at all for 

the tens -- excuse me, for the thousands of 

workers from any of the 27 years the weapons 

work was done there. 

Records for external monitoring are not much 

better. Monitoring was only performed on a 

tiny fraction of the work force. Between 1947 

and 1955, no records, including dosimetry 

records or badges or records, have been located 

to indicate that any monitoring of the internal 

doses of radiation that workers were exposed to 

occurred. 

Between 1955 and 1962 records indicate that 
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only eight to 23 workers in a work force of 

1,000 were monitored for external radiation 

doses, and that included X-ray technicians. 

Neutron monitoring did not begin until 1962. 

Only 25-cent -- 25 percent of the badges had 

film included to measure neutron. This means 

that only 11 workers were monitored for neutron 

exposure, on average, from the years 1962 to 

1967. 

Between 1970 and 1975, the high point of 

screening of IAAP, only 25 percent of the work 

force was screened for exposure to external 

radiation. 

 The NIOSH Special Exposure Cohort evaluation 

relies upon coworker data from Pantex workers 

from 1993 to 2003 in order to establish a basis 

of reconstructing dose. As a worker who was 

there and who knows, the weapons and the work 

at Pantex were not exactly the same. Much of 

the data NIOSH proposes using is from different 

time periods for different processes, and for 

periods when different safety precautions and 

standards were in effect. 

For example, Pantex data uses lead aprons for 

the 1992 to 2003 numbers. Burlington did not 
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use lead aprons at any time. I remind you that 

the Pantex plant was designed and built from 

the ground up as a nuclear facility. They took 

lessons learned from the IAAP. Line 1 at the 

IAAP was adapted from its original design of 

making artillery shells and adapted to become a 

nuclear facility. If it is necessary to use 

data with so many differences, then it's not 

feasible to estimate the dose. That's all we 

have to work with. 

 Please note that NIOSH was dead wrong in its 

first IAAP site profile about the IAAP 

assembling weapons with beryllium shells 

surrounding the pits. NIOSH initially assumed 

that the pits were surrounded with depleted 

uranium. I am pleased to see that NIOSH has 

done more homework and realized that the 

workers' recollections were correct. There 

were beryllium shells on the pits used in 

certain weapons. 

I am disappointed, however, by the disregard or 

dismissal of Mr. Polson's recollection on the 

fact that the beryllium shells came off and had 

to be glued back on; therefore workers handled 

bare plutonium pits. This is all the more 
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troubling, given that Mr. Polson has served as 

a highly credible source of information on 

weapons design. By actively disregarding this 

fact, NIOSH inappropriately reaches the 

conclusion that they can reconstruct internal 

dose. 

But of course plutonium uptakes did occur, and 

there is no way to measure it because there was 

no internal monitoring at the IAAP for 

plutonium or anything else. The SEC evaluation 

limits potential uptakes are from depleted 

uranium and tritium only. There was no testing 

done for the others. I believe the SEC 

evaluation misses the mark here and needs to be 

modified in order to account for plutonium 

uptakes, and that NIOSH cannot estimate this 

dose. 

In addition to NIOSH regulation and procedures, 

I'd like to draw attention of the Board to 

language contained in the 2005 Omnibus 

Appropriations Act. It says it was Congress' 

intent in passing the Energy Employees 

Compensation Act of 2000 to provide for timely, 

uniform and adequate compensation for employees 

made ill from exposure to radiation. The 
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committee encourages the Department to 

recognize that in situations were records 

documenting internal or external radiation 

doses received by workers at the specific 

facility are of poor quality or do not exist, 

that workers should promptly be placed in a 

Special Exposure Cohort. 

My fellow workers and I respectfully believe 

that there is not enough data in existence to 

make accurate dose estimations. For example, I 

and all my physical security people, numbering 

over 220 strong in those years average, were 

not issued film badges from the years '68 to 

'73, even when spending eight hours a day 

around and with weapons and/or materials. You 

cannot have data where none was taken. 

We also believe that far too much time has 

passed with little action. This facility 

closed 30 years ago this year. Many are sick. 

Many died. And the rest of us are not young 

and we have already been waiting for a very 

long time. 

I applaud NIOSH for finding that a Special 

Energy (sic) Cohort may be warranted for all of 

the Burlington workers. And I hope as the 
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Board debates the important issues before them 

today that they can keep in mind the human 

faces of myself and my fellow workers. I hope 

that you can keep in mind that many of us are 

no longer here, the sacrifices they made and 

how long we have already waited. 

In closing I wish to offer my thanks to the 

active participation of Senators Harkin and 

Grassley of Iowa, Congressman Leach of Iowa, 

and the continued interest of Senators Obama, 

Durbin and Bond, as they, too, have 

constituents who worked at the IAAP. A special 

thanks to my wife Kathleen for her continuing 

support over the years. 

I strongly urge the Board to act today to 

recommend the inclusion of all eligible IAAP 

workers in a Special Energy Cohort -- Special 

Exposure Cohort. 

Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate the Board now 

hearing from Dr. Laurence Fuortes, whose years 

of work and dedication has brought the focus 

and meaning to the Cold War team at Iowa. Dr. 

Fuortes is a medical doctor and professor at 

the University of Iowa. He is responsible for 

the Burlington Atomic Energy Commission Plant 
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Former Worker -- Former Nuclear Worker Program. 

Dr. Fuortes has been working with the Cold War 

team for several years now, learning about the 

processes, risks and health outcomes 

experienced by the workers. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Well, thank you, and we'd be 

pleased to hear from Dr. Fuortes at this time. 

Thank you. 

 DR. FUORTES: Thank you very much. I want to 

thank the Board and the Iowa delegation and the 

people who showed up in attendance. Everybody 

who is here, I think we are here for the same 

reasons, really -- interest in justice, truth 

and justice. It sounds kind of funny, but that 

is why we're here. And I'd like to acknowledge 

those people who couldn't come because of time, 

distance, health reasons, from Burlington. We 

have about 20 people. I'm surprised how many 

came, but some people couldn't make it for a 

variety of reasons, including vital status, and 

I think we need to -- to consider that, as Bob 

brought up. 

I am really grateful for this process and the 

opportunity to address the Board, but I would 

like to say a couple of words -- not just about 
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the science and the policy decision you guys 

are looking at -- the Board is looking at. 

You're looking at a policy decision regarding -

- you've already set a precedent, I guess, 

yesterday and then considering another one now. 

The issues that were raised in the NIOSH 

evaluation of the SEC petition addressed a 

couple of things. They said if we can't do 

this transparently, we'd like the Board to 

address that as a policy issue. Just given 

that issue, I'd like you to consider the 

Constitutionality issue of due process if 

people are not allowed, as Bob was saying, to 

confront the data that denies them what they 

believe is justice. So I think that's a 

Constitutional issue that needs to be 

considered. 

There are other aspects of the process I think 

we need to acknowledge, and this give-and-take 

of information, statements of fact, it really 

seems litigious to me, and I think it seems 

litigious to the claimants and to the -- to the 

public. Unfortunately, there is sometimes some 

degree of controversy, even in the field of 

science. And that's not an issue of bad 
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science, as you bring up. I don't think we're 

saying anybody here is doing bad science, and 

nobody has a monopoly on good intentions. I 

think we all have good intentions, scientific 

integrity. We all have our consciences that we 

have to answer to, and none of us here are 

trying to misconstrue things. 

To tell you honestly, when I came to work with 

the workers in Burlington -- I have studied 

nuclear physics. That was -- biophysics was my 

area of study in DeKalb*, Illinois. My 

assumption was this is a low-exposed 

population. I had the opportunity to speak 

with hundreds -- literally hundreds of workers 

in the process of the medical screenings, and 

some of the histories changed my views. 

On the one hand, I learned a lot more about the 

process and it raised a considerable number of 

questions. We are stuck with questions as to 

the ionizing radiation risk of some of these 

classified issues of geometry, masses of given 

fissile materials, the constituents of those 

materials, the constituents' thickness of 

cladding and the efficiency of shielding. 

Those are classified things that we won't be 
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able to answer. But it leaves us with some 

doubt in our mind. And in a worker-friendly 

process, that doubt I think behooves us to make 

judgments in the workers' favor. So that's one 

thing that this -- this issue of doubt. 

I really commend NIOSH for coming forward and 

saying we cannot do this with transparency, and 

so we urge the Board to consider should we be 

approving the Special Exposure Cohort on the 

basis of inability to do this with 

transparency. That's -- that's wonderful. 

In terms of those of you with the scientific 

bent of wanting to not establish policy without 

some reasonable doubt or reasonable concern 

regarding the risk to this population, I need 

you to consider some things. As I approached 

this population, we all approach the facts, the 

world around us, with some preconceived 

notions. If we didn't do that, we would get 

out of bed on the wrong side, literally, try to 

work on the ceiling, try -- you know, we have 

to have some preconceived notions when it comes 

to science and the world around us. 

We are adjacent to the world's biggest optical 

illusion. Are you all aware of that, the St. 
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Louis arch? It's a magnificent story. I mean 

this is -- this is something -- you stare at it 

and you say these are -- this is a catenary 

arc, these are two perfect parabolas, mirror 

images. This thing is obviously taller than it 

is wide. But in fact it's an optical illusion 

because the base gets so much wider. It's 192 

meters wide, it's 192 meters tall. 

So just to let you think that if you come to a 

situation with some preconceived notions, you 

may argue everything that you subsequently 

learn on the basis of this preconceived notion. 

Now this is not to cast ad hominem attacks 

against NIOSH and the scientists, but I do see 

this litiginous (sic) process. I say this, I 

go back and get some more information and I'll 

-- I'll argue your point. 

When the target moves, that also is not truly 

claimant-friendly, but back to the science and 

the pursuit of knowledge. We received the site 

profile, reviewed it amongst our board members 

and with technical staff from the plant, and 

they said this just ain't true; where did this 

come from? Go back to NIOSH and they said 

well, we spoke to one person, and that one 
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person told us this. We said well, but we've 

got these other people who were there longer 

and actually worked hands-on with the material; 

they say different things. Some of those 

different things, points of fact that we have 

received from one party that are not addressed 

in NIOSH's site profile or the response that 

ORAU did to the site profile, have to do with 

issues of internal dose or radiation exposure. 

In the early eras when people were handling the 

Mark VI weapons, they were handling huge, huge 

weapons. Now people with excellent technical 

descriptions of this who are very, very wary of 

breaking security issues, of -- of broaching 

some classified information, they will say to 

us we worked inside this thing not quite the 

size of a VW. There was a horizontal axis port 

in there the size of my arm. There was a 

metallic sphere inside there of what we can 

only refer to as hot metal. We would take a 

port inside that hollow sphere and turn it onequarter of a turn to access the center of that 

hollow sphere and stick our hands inside the 

hollow sphere and wipe out the metal on the 

inside, and this had to be done before these 
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weapons were shipped out. We had to do this 

last point of cleaning out whatever might have 

developed just from exposure to the air of this 

hot metal. And then we would replace that 

porthole with a quarter turn, and then high 

explosive would be placed over this. 

Sounds to me like a credible history. It's not 

addressed in the documents. Maybe it's a 

classified statement and I just said something 

you'll have to shoot me for; I'm sorry. But it 

is of interest. It really has some 

implications in terms of our concerns regarding 

unshielded ionizing radiation exposure and 

potentially internal dose. 

Then we have the plant scientist, the senior 

plant scientist who was referred to, Jack 

Polson, giving us a very credible history, 

stating that it was not standard procedure, but 

we did have to scrape off -- the glue off the 

beryllium cladding. This -- this was done. 

And in fact, he said, come to think of it, when 

we were in shut-down operations, this wasn't 

all that rare. Said in 1970 to 1974 this was 

not an uncommon procedure. 

The statements made by ORAU and NIOSH in 
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response to these observations all seem to 

belie this preconceived notion -- we believe 

this is a low-dose situation and we will 

interpret the world around us -- I don't mean 

to be insulting, but it's just how it appears -

- we're going to respond to this given this 

preconceived notion. So no mention is made of 

the technical -- technical staff's description 

of unshielded fissile material exposure. 

I think that's critical. I think that's very 

important. It may have to do, as I said, with 

class-- classification issues, but if that's 

the case, then certainly we have worker 

histories that are very, very suggestive. 

Another issue as regards the histories of this 

workplace, the data that is available and its 

credibility I think is quite important. Do we 

believe that these data are credible for a 

variety of reasons. Bob brought up the sample 

size, 22 workers out of 1,000. If you're 

weighing towards X-ray technicians, that may be 

problematic. That may not be a very big 

sample. 

In addition to that, if we have workers who 

tell us, credibly, we did not wear our badges 
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all the time in the bays; and some saying you 

know, I worked doing disassembly time -- day in 

and day out and I never wore a badge; and the 

senior scientist saying these are the most 

hazardous operations, disassembly, where the 

situations where -- where SOPs might not have 

even been relevant, so this was -- this was a 

high-risk situation if -- if every worker -- 

except for one. If all the workers except for 

one who did disassembly routinely tell me I 

never wore a badge, that really does bring up 

some concerns for me. 

The one worker who said I did disassembly and I 

wore a badge also says to me actually, you know 

something, I was -- I was one of the people 

assigned a badge. I wore it day in and day out 

and that means that six months out of the year 

when I was nowhere near or three days a week 

when I was nowhere near the pits, I was wearing 

it as well. And I think that that's -- that's 

interest-- interesting. There is some doubt 

regarding the reliability of these measures 

based on sample size, based on the targeting 

people, based on the people who are not 

measured. 
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Now if we say but we have comparable data from 

another facility, then I think there's another 

issue that's very important. Bob brought up 

the different SOPs and different technical 

processes and industrial processes at Pantex. 

We're talking a different era, different 

classes of weapons. From 1993 to 2003 data 

from Pantex used to -- to come up with worst 

dose scenarios for Pantex (sic) strikes me as 

quite a leap, in particular if we're using data 

of badges worn beneath lead aprons from Pantex. 

That's -- that's very odd. 

When I asked health physicists from NIOSH could 

you explain inconsistencies within the 22 

sampled early on, the 44 sampled next and the 

next 200 sampled, why would we have an increase 

in doses across that time period, the answer 

was well, because there was more production. 

The senior scientist responded no, there was 

not an increased production from 1968, that's 

not true at all. Our production rate was flat. 

Well, I have to say from my standpoint, well, 

it looks like there is some lack of reliability 

or inconsistency within what little data is 

available. Then if we go to needing to 
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extrapolate to other situations where we don't 

believe -- I certainly don't believe -- those 

exposures are applicable, and then we have no 

data for the situations that are highest risk, 

I think we do have to consider there are worker 

histories to suggest there were very high risk 

situations in this facility. And I think that 

NIOSH has changed its language in the last 

slide in terms of not -- no longer referring to 

this as a low-dose situation but potential for 

substantial dose. 

I'm very glad to see that, but I'm trying to -- 

to let you guys see my point of view as a 

scientist is there is enough doubt here that 

coming up with exposure assessment to 

categorize this group would be quite difficult. 

And using the maximal doses argument that -- 

that the HPs use I think is a very rash one to 

say we can -- we'll just assume the worst. But 

if you assume the worst based on data that is 

badge data from -- from beneath a lead apron or 

source term data that is clad, then I think 

you're not looking at the relevant data. 

And I would like to, if possible, change the 

forum here. I don't know if it's possible to 
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do this as question and answer, but I -- I hope 

Bill Field is -- is above me someplace and if 

you guys have any questions for us, I'd really 

appreciate hearing them. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, and we'll 

certainly feel free to call on you at that 

point, if necessary. 

Let me ask, was William Field -- did you tell 

me was not able to be here today from the 

petitioners group, William Field, is -- 

 DR. FUORTES: We thought we heard him ringing 

in possibly. If he's not here, we did deliver 

a document, too, which was some of his 

responses to --

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. 

 DR. FUORTES: -- to his concerns. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are there other members of the 

petitioning team itself that -- I have a list 

of others from the facility that do wish to 

address the assembly, but we want to give 

priority to the petitioners themselves. 

Mr. Anderson, were there additional members of 

the petitioning group? 

MR. ANDERSON: Could I have the members of the 

Congre-- Congress at this point? 
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 DR. ZIEMER: We'd be pleased to do so. We'll 

move to that next, certainly. 

MR. ANDERSON: The other two members, I don't 

know. 

 DR. ZIEMER: We have Allison Hart from Senator 

Harkin's office. Allison, do you wish to 

address the assembly? Either -- either mike, 

wherever you're comfortable is fine. 

 MS. WING: (Off microphone) Good afternoon. 

Can you hear me? 

 DR. ZIEMER: There is a lavaliere mike there, 

Allison, if you could use that it would be 

helpful for our recorder. 

 MS. WING: Can you hear me now? I'm actually 

Jenny Wing. I'm with Senator Harkin's staff in 

Washington, D.C. and I have letter on behalf of 

Senator Harkin that I would like to read today. 

(Reading) Dear Members of the Board, I 

appreciate this opportunity to share with you a 

few words today, and I am sorry I cannot be 

there in person. 

 This meeting, the first to consider creating a 

Special Exposure Cohort, has been a long time 

in coming. It has taken five years to get from 

the passage of the Energy Employees 
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Occupational Illness Compensation Act to this 

day. During that time we have made a lot of 

progress in uncovering and understanding the 

work that occurred in the Iowa Army Ammunition 

Plant, as well as the heroic contribution made 

by the workers, but not one worker with cancer 

has received any compensation to this date. 

 The IAAP workers are unsung heroes. They went 

to work every day unknowingly handling 

hazardous and radioactive materials without 

proper safety gear. For years they could not 

even talk about the material to which they had 

been exposed because the information was 

classified. As many workers became ill and 

were diagnosed with cancer, they couldn't even 

tell their doctors why they were sick. 

I have heard their stories over the years, 

stories of pain, suffering and turmoil. The 

Iowa facility has been closed since 1975. Many 

of these workers are dying. Many family have 

lost members far too early, and many family 

members have spent years caring for worker 

suffering from ravaging disease. 

Before making a decision I hope the Board takes 

the time to really hear from the workers who 
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have made the long trip here to this meeting 

today, and I hope the Board will keep in mind 

that this decision is about real people who are 

still dealing with very real sacrifices they 

made for the safety and security of our 

country. 

I welcome the NIOSH evaluation report finding 

that a Special Exposure Cohort may be warranted 

for the IAAP workers. NIOSH has based its 

findings on the ground that dose reconstruction 

performed with classified materials may lack 

necessary transparency. I firmly agree that 

dose reconstruction must be a transparent 

process. In order for the dose reconstruction 

process to be fair, workers must have access to 

these documents. If these documents truly 

cannot be released for reasons of national 

security, then the Board must authorize a 

cohort. 

Furthermore, I strongly urge the Board to look 

beyond the rationale of classified documents as 

justification for the cohort. In fact, it is 

not feasible to perform dose reconstruction for 

former IAAP worker with sufficient accuracy for 

the same reasons that are true of the 
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Mallinckrodt facility the Board examined 

yesterday. 

 The IAAP facility has been closed since 1975. 

The few records and documents that have been 

found are of questionable accuracy. There are 

no records at all documenting internal dose, 

and records for only a tiny fraction of the 

work force documenting external dose. Worker 

interviews have called into question NIOSH's 

basic assumptions about the type of materials 

and the level of exposure. Dose reconstruction 

is impossible without using records from a 

different facility during a different time 

period and with different safety precautions in 

place. 

 The decision before the Board today is not 

about cost implications for other facilities. 

It is about meeting our obligation to the 

workers of the IAAP who were guaranteed 

compensation if they became ill due to their 

work in these plants with the passage of 

EEOICPA. When we in Congress passed that bill 

we gave NIOSH and the Board the authority to 

create a Special Exposure Cohort because we 

envisioned precisely the type of scenario 
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workers from Iowa face. 

The situation is that there is so little 

clarity about exactly what workers were exposed 

to and when, and so few records remaining in 

existence, that it is literally impossible to 

perform accurate dose reconstructions. I 

strongly urge the Board to carry through on 

their obligation to these workers by voting 

today to recommend inclusion of all Iowa Army 

Ammunition Plant workers into a Special 

Exposure Cohort. 

 Sincerely, Tom Harkin. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Allison (sic). Also 

Penny Vacek with Senator Grassley's office. 

Penny, do you wish to address the assembly, as 

well? 

MS. VACEK: (Off microphone) I do. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

MS. VACEK: (Off microphone) Good afternoon. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Check to see that it's on. 

MS. VACEK: How's that? I have a letter from 

Senator Grassley. 

(Reading) I write to share my strong support 

for the Special Exposure Cohort petition filed 

on behalf of the workers of the -- at the Iowa 
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Army Ammunition Plant during 1947 to 1974. 

understand that the NIOSH SEC petition 

evaluation report finds that the records and/or 

information necessary to publicly evaluate part 

of the IAAP SEC petition are not and will not 

be available on a transparent and timely basis. 

According to the evaluation report, NIOSH 

claims that it is technically feasible to 

estimate doses with a sufficient accuracy, but 

such estimates could not be substantiated in a 

transparent, publicly-available process. I 

agree that this limitation on transparency of 

dose reconstructions would seriously undermine 

the credibility among the claimants at the 

IAAP. Maintaining a policy of transparency in 

the dose reconstruction process is vital to the 

credibility of the determination made by NIOSH. 

However, the petitioners have also demonstrated 

and continue to demonstrate that workers 

handled and were exposed to radioactive 

materials with little or no protective gear and 

radiation monitoring. I find it hard to 

believe that any accurate or credible dose 

reconstructions could be completed for workers 

at the IAAP with very little or no radiation 
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monitoring, particularly given the reliance on 

data from a separate facility. 

Even more alarming is the fact that NIOSH, in 

refuting the petitioners' assertions concerning 

the feasibility of dose reconstructions, is 

relying on data contained in a revised site 

profile that is unavailable to claimants and 

petitioners and likely to remain securityclassified indefinitely. 

Based on the compelling information provided by 

the petitioners and the finding by NIOSH, I 

strongly encourage the Advisory Board to 

swiftly recommend to Health and Human Services 

Secretary that the class of workers at the Iowa 

Army Ammunition Plant be added to the Special 

Exposure Cohort. Thank you for your 

consideration. 

 Sincerely, Senator Chuck Grassley. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Penny. Sue Zimmerman, 

you weren't on the speaking list, but I did 

want to give you the opportunity if you did 

wish to enter a statement in the record. 

 MS. ZIMMERMAN: (Off microphone) 

(Unintelligible) 

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other individuals associated with the Iowa 

facility that have asked for the opportunity to 

address the assembly. Sy Iverson*? 

 MR. IVERSON: (Off microphone) (Unintelligible) 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry? 

 DR. WADE: Declines. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, thank you, Sy. Okay. Paula 

Graham? Paula I believe also had some material 

she wished to distribute to the Board. And 

Paula, let us assist you with that as a handout 

here. 

 MS. GRAHAM: My name is Paula Graham. If I'm 

too far away from this, tell me, will you? I -

-

 DR. ZIEMER: You're fine. 

 MS. GRAHAM: I'm not used to speaking through a 

microphone. My name is Paula Graham and I live 

in Fort Madison, Iowa, and I'm here to speak 

about -- for some people who could not be here 

today because I'm here to speak about my own 

family. 

There's a Donald Larson in Tennessee and a 

Ronald Larson in West Virginia, and I was 

contact with them by telephone this last week 

and they FAXed up some material to use as 
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talking points concerning their mother and 

their experience. And each one of you have one 

of those in your folder, and he says -- and 

this was notarized, also. 

He says (reading) To It (sic) May Concern: 

This statement is to confirm that my brother 

and I offer considerable effort -- after 

considerable effort, have not been able to 

locate or obtain any records with respect to 

monitoring radiation and other deadly toxins at 

the IOP in Burlington, Iowa -- that is 

Middletown, Iowa, he has -- between the 1940's 

and 1950's when our mother, Edith Marie Larson, 

worked there as a custodial matron. Local and 

state politicians, along with newspaper 

investigators, have deplored sloppy recordkeeping and they, too, have been unsuccessful 

in assisting us with our efforts to find the 

records. 

If I'm short of breath it's because I am. I, 

too, worked at the ammunition plant and have 

troubles. 

 (Reading) Without records, and the fact that 

Mom passed away in January 1996, it seems to us 

that fair and scientific dose reconstruction is 
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simply not possible. Yet Mom fought a ten-year 

battle with cancer that was -- that we are 

convinced was due to the radiation and toxic 

exposure while she was an employee at the IOP. 

In the interest of justice, we urge you your 

careful consideration of our claim. 

And they sent along copies of two letters they 

FAXed that they had sent to a Ms. Kari Waller, 

the examiner at the U.S. Department of Labor, 

Office of Workers Compensation Program in 

Seattle, Washington. Now this first one says 

(reading) Dear Ms. Waller: My brother and I 

would like the DOL to go forward with our 

claim, and I am writing this letter in attempt 

to show why our claim should be placed under 

Special Exposure Cohort provision of the 

EEOICPA Act. We believe this placement is 

warranted due to ambiguities and lost or 

missing employment data pertinent to the 

operation of the IAAP in Middletown, Iowa. 

would like to cite a few examples. 

 First, in previous correspondence to you it was 

pointed out that Day and Zimmerman, the plant 

contractors at the AEC prior to 1951, are 

unable to provide information about my mother's 

I 
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work sites at the plant. Also, I state in my 

affidavit to the DOL that the University of 

Iowa medical researchers, while able to obtain 

my mother's two badge numbers, were unable to 

shed any light as to her work sites at the 

plant due to lost or missing records. 

Second, her employment history at the plant 

remains problematic. Social Security 

information shows that my mother made 

contributions to the program in 1944, '45 and 

'46 when the plant was under the operation of 

Day and Zimmerman. Apparently no contributions 

were made from 1947 to 1951. Yet in your 

letter of December 19th, 2003 you wrote "The 

Department of Energy was able to provide us 

with the termination date for Edith Larson, and 

that day was the 15th of June, 1951." The 

central question here, of course, is how does 

one explain the five-year gap regarding Social 

Security contributions and the DOE's 

termination date of my mother's employment. 

Third, is the DOE in fact correct when it 

asserts that my mother's termination date was 

June 15th, 1951. Was she not still a DOE 

employee while the plant was under 
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administration of Silas Mason. Social Security 

records indicate that Silas Mason reported 

contributions made by our mother for 1951, '52 

and '53, and information -- my brother and I 

remain convinced that our mother worked on Line 

1 at the plant where those -- these deadly 

weapons were assembled. 

Fifth, our mother's case is being included in 

the University of Iowa study of former AEC 

employees, yet the DOL has not acknowledged 

this fact, as far as we know. 

So they're -- they're wanting this -- well, 

workers there at the IAAP to be included in a 

Special Exposure Cohort. 

There is another letter, which I'm not going to 

read, that's from one -- the other brother, and 

-- but I just wanted to bring out one important 

point in it. He said -- and it's in the next 

to last paragraph on the last page. (Reading) 

Mr. Howard Nicholson told me by phone that my 

mother was a DOE employee and that their 

records indicate that she developed mestastic 

(sic) breast cancer. 

So she is in the health study, evidently, and 

so he FAXed this up -- I didn't FAX it to Dr. 
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Fuortes because I do not have a FAX machine, 

and that's why Dr. Fuortes's name is on it, and 

then he e-mailed it to me. 

Okay, let's see who this is -- Edward Webb, Sr. 

He's a gentleman who lives near Burlington, 

Iowa and he's pretty ill. He's on oxygen and 

he has cancer, and he worked on Line 1. And 

these statements are interviews that I had with 

him over the telephone, and he told me he would 

type up something and mail it to me. And we're 

not even 20 miles apart, yet he sent it by 

certified mail. The lady at the Post Office 

said she'll get it tomorrow anyway, but he 

spent $3.85 to get it to me. 

All right, to whom it may concern -- this is 

February 3rd, 2005 -- (reading) This statement 

shall be construed as a record of my employment 

time span at the Burlington Atomic Energy 

Commission Plant located inside the perimeter 

fence of the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant located 

in Middletown, Iowa. I started on June 19th, 

1950 and worked there in various buildings 

until April 11th, 1995 -- 1975. I started in 

building 1-13 building on a Mark 6. We were 

told this was the same weapon dropped on 
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Hiroshima. I worked at this building until the 

last half of 1952. During this time no blood 

tests were made, either finger prick or 

otherwise. No urine samples were taken. 

 This building was closed and we were all moved 

to Line 1 proper to fill in as needed. I 

worked in every occupational area at one time 

or another. I instructed women to operate 

machinery in the 1-40 building for one year. 

moved in and out of various operations -- prep, 

machining, tear-down and assembly -- for every 

unit group assembled at that plant. 

Well, I talked to him the next day, also, and 

I've written down -- it's the handwritten ones 

-- a summary of the notes that he gave me, and 

he -- so this was given by Edward Webb of 

Burlington, Iowa. (Reading) They used swipes 

to swipe the inside of the pit. Then they ran 

their bare hands around the inside of the pit 

to see if there was any residue or foreign 

materials left to see -- make sure it was clean 

inside. 

Then a plug was inserted. It was given an 

eighth of a turn to the right to lock into 

place. Three types of explosives were put in. 

I 
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It sat up horizontally, and the opening was in 

the front. There were no shields to protect 

the workers. 

Workers were not given any blood tests, no 

urine tests. In building 1-11 they had geiger 

counters setting on plexiglass surface 

containers, and on this they had bottles 

setting there, also, with tubes that ran from 

the bottles and were fastened to the units -- 

the sides of the units they were working on. 

The geiger counters would not work. They 

needed to be calibrated. The only way to 

calibrate them was to use some of the material 

they were working with to calibrate the geiger 

counters. The Mark 6 was open, not sealed. 

He worked in another place where he machined, 

and that was beryllium. He was machining 

beryllium, he told me. It was one of a kind, 

the machine was, and he said it was seven feet 

time and was built specially for this process. 

He said that they called that hot metals that 

he was machining, the beryllium. He said he 

was in there by himself and they had a 

beryllium blow door that was four inches thick 

and four-and-a-half feet wide. You were always 
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brushing against the door when going in and 

out, so he was exposed to beryllium. 

All right, I have another one from a lady 

called Anita Loving, and this is dated January 

31st, 2005 and it says -- it's addressed to you 

people, the Radiation Health Advisory Board 

members, and she says (reading) Dear Board 

Members, I am writing to you about the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program and the urgent need to grant the 

Special Exposure Cohort status for these former 

Iowa Ammunition employees. Since my father and 

I are unable to attend this meeting, I have put 

my thoughts down on paper to be read for me at 

the meeting. 

 My father, Wendell D. Pirtle, worked on Line 1, 

the atomic energy line, from sometime in the 

'50's until the line closed in the mid-1970's. 

He was an inspector general, went all over the 

line and inspected all weapons in all phases of 

their assembly. I believe there were about 13 

people with this position, and to the best of 

my knowledge, all but just a couple of this 

group have died from cancers. 

My father has had colon cancer and lives with a 
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colostomy and suffers from lung problems, which 

limit his activities of daily living. His lung 

doctors say that they cannot definitely say it 

was radiation which caused his breathing 

problems, but that they would never say it 

wasn't the cause. He has also had thyroid 

problems. His thyroid grew very rapidly during 

and after his employment at IAAP. He had it 

removed in 1995. The surgeon said it wasn't 

the largest he had ever removed, but was 

definitely up among the largest he had ever 

seen. 

My father devoted his working career to serving 

his country, both as a bomber pilot during 

World War II and then for so many years at the 

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant. He deserves to be 

compensated for the sacrificing of his health. 

He tells me had he known the dangers of his 

work, he would never have taken the job. He is 

a loyal American, and I feel our country is 

letting him down. 

Proper documentation does not exist to 

accurately reflect the radiation doses these 

people received. My dad has stated several 

times that their maintenance was lax in 
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comparison to other plants he traveled to for 

his work. 

Millions of dollars are being paid to people to 

figure all of this out, and none of it is going 

to the people who did the work, and deserve and 

need the compensation. It would be far more 

economically feasible to pay these people who 

are deserving and needy than to spend so much 

time trying to decide how to reconstruct the 

dosage, something I feel is probably impossible 

to accurately accomplish. These people are 

dying and need to receive their compensation 

while they're living to help pay for health 

care and daily living needs. 

Dad has had to move into an assisted living 

facility. His income is currently about $2,800 

per month, and he pays $2,709 per month for his 

care. His medication bills are somewhere 

between $50 and $100 per month for just his ten 

percent copayment. He does have good health 

insurance. This leaves him nothing for 

clothing and extras, which now I have to 

purchase for him. 

 My mother, Mary Frances Pirtle, also worked on 

Line 1 of the Army Ammunition Plant for a 
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period of almost seven years. She quit almost 

exactly two months before I was born. She 

processed the paperwork, probably radiationcontaminated paperwork, that accompanied all 

the weapons during all phases of assembly 

process. She died of breast cancer almost ten 

years ago. Although it was discovered 

relatively early, it was already in her bone 

and she fought it for almost two years before 

she died. I know that records were not kept 

well because we had a very difficult time 

establishing the fact that she had worked 

there. I've been told that prior to 1959 there 

are few records that exist. 

I, as a baby -- now understand, her mother 

worked there during her pregnancy, up to two 

months before she was born. 

(Reading) I, as a baby, was treated for thyroid 

problems. I've had thyroid surgery to remove 

part of my thyroid to check for the possibility 

of cancer. I suspect that my exposure to 

radiation before birth is the reason for my 

thyroid problems since birth -- since birth, 

but due to the fact that I cannot locate 

medical records from 45 years ago, I will never 
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be able to prove this. I know my mother would 

never have exposed me to the danger had she 

known it existed. I realize this has nothing 

to do with the Special Exposure Cohort issue, 

but is just to show the effects of the work 

have other consequences to the loved ones, as 

well. 

These people at the IAAP never knew the dangers 

they faced and deserve to be compensated while 

they are still alive, and in a timely fashion. 

My father traveled to other facilities doing 

inspection during his employment at the Iowa 

Ammunition Plant and he's stated many times 

that the precautions taken at other locations 

were far superior to those taken at the IAAP. 

My father is 82, and I do not know how long -- 

how much time he has left. Every day is a 

struggle for these people. I desperately ask 

you to grant Special Exposure Cohort to speed 

up this process before it is too late for him, 

and many like him, to see any fulfillment of 

the compensation that has been promised to him. 

Respectfully, Anita A. Pirtle Loving, daughter 

of Wendell D. and Mary Frances Pirtle. 

Now I just have one more, as soon as I get my 
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breath. I have one more letter, and this 

concerns my own family. My mother, my father, 

my sister who was 15 months older than me, and 

I myself worked at the ammunition plant at 

Burlington. I worked on the conventional 

lines, and my sister and I were hired the same 

day in 1951, and she -- she was 19 and I was 

18. The only difference was she transferred to 

the nuclear line, and we were both securitycleared people to the nuclear line. 

Well, I stayed behind, decided to, and she went 

on. And I can tell you one thing, because we 

were security-cleared, no one ever told us of 

the dangers we were going to. They just wanted 

people to go to that line. They needed workers 

desperately, and it -- just like Mrs. Loving 

said her father said, if he'd known of the 

dangers, if he'd been told, he'd have never 

taken the job. 

Okay. This is a letter that I wrote for my new 

nephews, Jim and Jon Anders. Now their mother 

worked first on the conventional lines and then 

transferred to the nuclear line and -- well, 

they made a claim with the Department of Labor. 

And of course they were turned down because she 
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died in 1956 and all the medical records had 

been destroyed. We did, however, get her 

medical records from Silas Mason, and that we 

do have, and the death certificate, of course. 

All right. So I wrote this for them because 

they said is there anybody can write a letter 

for you; how about your dad? They said our dad 

died just as we got out of high school. But 

they said our aunt could -- could write a 

letter, so I wrote it for them. It says to -- 

now this is for Jim and Jon Anders. 

(Reading) To Whom It May Concern: My name is 

Paula A. Graham. I am a sister of Lona I. 

Anders. I am writing to tell you about her 

work history at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant 

located in Middletown, Iowa. I'm also writing 

to tell you about her illness and death. 

Lona and I were hired on April 4th, 1951 by 

Silas Mason Company to work at the IAAP. Lona 

was 19 years old and I was 18. We were 

assigned to work on the detonator line, 6. We 

worked with fulminated mercury and possibly 

lead aside. I definitely remember the 

fulminated mercury. 

Very early in May of 1951 another worker 
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dropped a tray of detonators on the cement 

floor. The detonators exploded and injured 

Lona's legs. I remember this incident very 

well because I was there when it occurred. 

Lona was transported to the IAAP hospital. She 

was treated for her wounds numerous times 

during the month of May 1951. About a month 

after being released by the plant doctor, the 

wounds in her leg opened up and started 

draining, running. She returned to the plant 

hospital for further treatment, and her medical 

records show that they X-rayed again and found 

more shrapnel in her legs that they hadn't 

gotten out previously. 

Let's see, at this point -- oh, she was also 

treated at the plant hospital for another 

injury in May of 1951. A safety glass fell out 

of a metal frame. The glass fell onto her hand 

and injured it. Now these safety glasses were 

just about like this with a metal frame around 

them and so they really weren't much protection 

to the worker -- 'cause I worked there, I know 

-- but it did drop out and injure her. 

Okay. At this point I want to explain that the 

workers' skin constantly came into contact with 
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explosives we worked with, especially if you 

weighed and measured the powder for each 

detonator. As you sifted more powder into the 

container on the scale to get the required 

amount, powder wafted into the air the worker 

breathed. If you blew your nose, you got 

explosives on your face. You get the picture. 

I know I got terrible sinus headaches while 

weighing powder. My entire face was in pain, 

and I felt like I had a toothache in every one 

of my teeth. 

In April 1952 Lona transferred to Line 1, the 

nuclear energy line. While working on the 

nuclear line she gave birth to her first son, 

James Anders, November 25th, 1954. James was 

anemic and given special liquid vitamins, so 

she worked there during her pregnancy. His 

legs were deformed. The doctor wanted to break 

his legs and try to straighten them up. 

I cannot tell you the exact month Lona quit 

working at the IAAP, but I think it might have 

been toward the middle of 1955. I do remember 

that for a few months before she resigned, she 

was ill, not feeling well. I talked to her one 

day about how she felt about -- how ill she 
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looked, because I knew what she was working 

with. She said to me something happened; I was 

exposed to something. That was all she said. 

She was not supposed to talk about her work. 

Her health never improved from that point on. 

Her skin had an orangish-yellow color to it. 

Many of the workers who worked at the IAAP with 

certain explosives and chemicals turned that 

color -- their hair, their eyes, their skin, 

all over, they turned orange-yellow. 

Lona gave birth to her second son, Jon Anders, 

on April 3rd, 1956. He was so pale and anemic 

he was also given special liquid vitamins. 

Lona hardly had the strength to take care of 

her two boys. I would go to her house and feed 

Jon his bottle and help her all I could. I 

also had two small children. 

Lona's health continued to deteriorate from 

that time on. She couldn't eat. She would get 

sick. She looked awful. The doctor finally 

sent her to the hospital around the first of 

August, 1956. I do not know what diagnostic 

tests were performed, if any, or what the 

results were. Remember, I'm talking about 

1956, and they did not have all the 
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sophisticated tests we have today. My sister 

Lasca reminded me that several of her brothers 

and sisters gave blood for transfusions for 

Lona. 

 I had two babies, and she had two babies to 

care for. I was very busy helping to take care 

of them all. I did get to the hospital three 

to four times to see her that month. After 

being hospitalized for two to three weeks, it 

seemed as if she was improving. Suddenly she 

took a turn for the worse. The hospital called 

her husband at work to come down because she 

was critical. After a few days she seemed to 

improve. 

 On the morning of August 28th, 1956 I went to 

the hospital to see her. While I was in her 

room a tall oxygen tank was brought in and set 

up by her bed. The doctor came in at the same 

time. I asked what the tank was for. Oh, he 

said, this is just in case she gets a headache. 

That was all he would tell me. 

 There were ten children in my family and they 

all came home to see Lona. That resulted in a 

lot of us at the hospital. My mother was 

practically hysterical because she thought my 
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sister was going to die. The hospital 

personnel told us that only one of us could 

come back that evening to see her. I was the 

chosen one to go back to the hospital. 

My husband and I went back to the hospital that 

evening. We visited with her and her husband, 

who was staying day and night with her. Lona 

was setting on the table -- on the side of the 

bed. She was very quiet, but I thought she was 

better. 

About 9:00 a.m. the next morning I got a call 

from the hospital. They said I had better come 

quickly, Lona was much worse. I lived 35 miles 

from the hospital and I had to get the babies 

to my husband's niece to take care of them, 

therefore it took me an hour and a half to get 

to the hospital. 

 When I arrived at the hospital Lona's husband 

told me that she had a peaceful night. He said 

that when she awoke, she looked at him and said 

you have just one minute to do something. He 

pulled the cord to summon a nurse and ran to 

the door to see if he -- there was a nurse in 

the hall. He ran back to Lona's bed. He said 

it was probably just one minute, and she went 
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into convulsions. 

When I went into my sister's room she was still 

in a convulsion. They were giving her oxygen. 

The doctor put a shot of some kind of medicine 

through her chest into her heart trying to save 

her. She died within seconds. She never came 

out of the convulsion that started when she 

woke up that morning. 

The doctor told us that Lona had gone into a 

uremic convulsion and died of kidney failure. 

She died on August 29th, 1956 after being in 

the hospital about a month. Besides her 

husband, she left behind two babies, four 

months old Jon and 20 months old James. The 

babies were not -- their health was not good, 

either. 

I doubt the doctors and the hospital personnel 

were aware that she worked on the nuclear line 

of the IAAP because she was sworn to secrecy. 

My sister's death was devastating to my family. 

I told them I thought that the work that Lona 

had done at the ammunition plant had caused her 

death, and I still believe that. 

Her two sons did not know Lona had worked at 

the IAAP in Middletown, Iowa, or that she 
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worked on the nuclear energy line. It was when 

I called them in September of 1999 that they 

found out. They were both speechless for a 

while. They could not believe it. James 

finally asked me why their dad had not told 

them. I replied that he probably did not know 

that she worked on the nuclear line because 

those workers were sworn to secrecy. 

It has been painful to write about the injuries 

my sister sustained at the IAAP. It is 

particularly painful to write about the way she 

died. I assure you that even after all these 

years, those scenes are still clear and vivid 

in my mind. I hope that this letter stating 

the facts as I remember them will result in 

justice for her two sons, who had to grow up 

without their mother. 

If I can be of further assistance to your 

office, feel free to call me. 

Now I want to point out a couple of things. 

These were two women that worked there during 

their pregnancies. The one baby had the 

thyroid problem and my sister's boys were born 

with health problems, particularly the first 

one with the deformed legs and very anemic. I 
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know these are human interest stories. They 

are tragedies, human tragedies, and -- but 

these stories have an implication for a Special 

Exposure Cohort petition to be approved by the 

Board. 

We have had multiple credible histories of 

exposure to high explosives and solvents, 

people turning yellow, explosions, solvent 

intoxication. If for the best intentions of 

the plant such things happened, this is clearly 

evidence for deficient health and safety 

protocols and procedures. And I -- you know, I 

strongly urge you to approve a Special Exposure 

Cohort after looking at all of this. 

And one thing the others have stressed, 

transparency. That's very important, 

transparency is, and I realize that some of 

these documents -- or many of them -- are 

classified. And I agree with the others, if 

you're going to be turned down, you ought to 

have access to that information so that you can 

appeal. 

And I want to thank you for all the work you're 

doing, and I want to thank NIOSH and our -- 

Senator Harkin and Senator Grassley and all the 
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other senators that worked very hard for this 

group of people. So I urge you to approve the 

Special Exposure Cohort. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much -- 

 MS. GRAHAM: And thank you for listening to me. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- Paula, for sharing not only 

your own stories, but those of others that you 

knew, as well. 

I neglected to give Penny (sic) Wing an 

opportunity from Senator Harkin's office. 

Penny, did you also wish to address the 

assembly? Is Penny still here? 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Off microphone) 

(Unintelligible) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Now I have -- it looks like 

Lasea Yerrington? 

 MS. GRAHAM: Lasca Yerrington. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, okay. Would you like to 

speak next? Thank you. 

I do want to point out we need to complete the 

various addresses from the Iowa folks by about 

3:00 o'clock, so -- we will have a public 

session later, as well, but please proceed. 

 MS. YERRINGTON: Good afternoon. It's nice to 

be here today to talk to y'all, and I want to 
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thank you all for taking the time to listen to 

us and to come. I am Lasca Yerrington, and I 

am representing my father, Isaac McCracken*; my 

mother, Opal McCracken; and my sister, Lona 

Anders. That was my sister that just spoke. 

And also my husband, Willard Courtney, who all 

worked at the IAAP. 

Dad had many problems, COPD, pancreas, liver, 

gall bladder, stomach and was suspected of 

having colon cancer, was scheduled for a 

colonoscopy the very next day and he died 

before they could give it to him. My mother 

had lymphoma. My sister Lona, as Paula said, 

died at 25 and left two babies, four months and 

21 months. 

My husband Willard Courtney worked at the Iowa 

Ordnance Plant, and it wasn't until the EEOICPA 

Act came into being in 2000 that I found out he 

worked on the nuclear Line 1. When hired they 

were instructed not to speak of their work and 

what they did because there was a communist in 

the Burlington area. The workers would not 

know who it was. They could be fined and would 

be sent to prison if they did. Hence, he never 

told me what he did at the plant. He wasn't 
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allowed to. 

Not long after starting at the plant he started 

having rashes and sores on his face and arms. 

He had lumps on his body removed numerous 

times. He had numerous skin cancers and 

precancerous spots taken off. He had to have 

his nose reconstructed because of cancer 

surgery. 

 Not only these conditions, but he developed 

tremors with Parkinson-like disease. 

Neurological problems, colon cancer, 

bletheritis and many more. He also had a 

kidney removed with a large tumor. Heart 

problems, also. 

When he left the plant he was so ill he went 

the disability Social Security. The last four 

years he spent in a nursing home because his 

neurological problems were increasingly severe 

where I could not take care of him. 

With all his problems, when he passed away his 

death certificate said respiratory failure. 

I want to thank you all for taking time from 

your families and traveling long distances to 

work on our behalf. 

My sister Paula and I were talking one day to a 
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man that worked at the plant. He said they had 

times of getting together and having a meal, 

and he said the previous week or so, five of 

the people died. That's what's happening all 

the time. They're ill. They're dying. 

They're waiting for help, and some people don't 

have the money to take care of their -- their 

physical needs, their illnesses and all. And I 

feel that we need to do something and I 

strongly urge you to pass a Special Exposure 

Cohort for these people. 

 Thanks again for all that you've done, and we 

want to thank Senator Harkin and Senator 

Grassley, Mr. Anderson, all of them that have 

worked so hard in trying to get this through, 

and especially Dr. Fuortes. He's a man that 

really gets up and goes. Thank you all. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. I understand 

that we have on the telephone connection Mrs. 

Shirley Wiley. Mrs. Wiley, are you on the 

phone? 

MS. WILEY: (By telephone) Yes, I am. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Did -- did you or -- and I believe 

Mrs. Wiley's sisters perhaps are with her. Did 

any of you wish to address the group? If you 
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do, we want to give you that opportunity. 

You'll need to speak perhaps pretty loudly into 

the phone. 

MS. WILEY: My name's Shirley Wiley. What the 

speakers before me said pretty much says it 

all, but I'd like to put a little bit -- just a 

little bit of my own. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, speak very loudly 'cause 

we're having a little difficulty hearing you. 

MS. WILEY: Okay. The dose reconstruction that 

they did on my dad they did with no proof of 

how much radiation he got. He was a pipe 

fitter and worked everywhere on Line 1 

(unintelligible) and no (unintelligible) badge. 

They gave (unintelligible) people that did 

Dad's dose reconstruction are guessing about 

(unintelligible). They don't know what they're 

doing. These are people. They're not numbers. 

The IAAP threw the people in harm's way and 

didn't care about the people, just the work 

they did. I hope you decide (unintelligible) 

the SEC petition. It won't help my dad. He's 

been dead since 1973. But it will help the 

living. Please hurry. Need that help now. My 

dad's name was Herbert Spector*. Everybody 
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calls me Spec. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Shirley. Shirley, did 

you wish to continue? 

MS. WILEY: Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Shirley. And 

Sharon Corde*? Is Sharon here? Are there any 

other individuals from the Iowa group? I have 

several folks, some of whom I believe are from 

the Mallinckrodt group, but any other of the 

Iowa folks? We wanted to hear from the Iowa 

folks at -- if there are any others. Yes, 

please identify yourself. 

 MR. SHELTON: My name is James Shelton, and I 

worked at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant and 

also the AEC plant. They was called Division A 

and Division B. And I have worked 39-and-ahalf years at this place, and the biggest part 

of it was working for AEC. I've worked in all 

phases of atomic energy plant and from pouring 

the powder to the shipping of the -- the 

missiles out. And I've worked in all the 

areas. I've also tore down, what they -- that 

they refer to as teardown. 

And at no time was there ever a badge of any 

type to indicate for radiation for us. And --
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and I never was monitored for radiation. And I 

spent a lot of years on Line 1, then I went to 

security, and in security we were -- we toured 

these areas for eight hours at a time, and no 

badges, no nothing. 

And there was many times when I was on 

production the monitors would go off and we had 

to leave the areas. Safety would say well, it 

was a malfunction, and nobody was tested that I 

know of. And -- and as a security guard I was 

in these areas. As a security supervisor I was 

in these areas. And also I was a courier, I 

bought and sold, what they considered bringing 

in and sending out of material from AEC 

couriers. 

And when I was detected with cancer, I felt my 

world was coming to an end, and it was kidney 

cancer. And for the -- we've been very 

fortunate. They got it at a early stage. They 

had to remove one rib, took ten percent of my 

left kidney and they say they had got it all. 

Well, we're praying to God and everybody else 

that it will not pop up someplace else. And I 

do hope and I pray and I plead with you to 

approve the petition. Thank you. 
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 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. We have -- was there 

another lady -- yes, please approach the mike. 

 MS. KENLON*: My name is Bonnie Kenlon and my 

dad worked at the IAAP. He doesn't fit this 

time frame, and I'm kind of curious as to why. 

He worked in the melting pot and he was in the 

blow-up of December 12th, 1941, and I can 

remember going to see him -- he was in the 

hospital two different times. When I went to 

see him he was as black as my coat, and there 

was four of us children. We were without a dad 

for a good six months or more. We had to live 

with our grandparents, and he died of cancer in 

'81. 

I have been denied a claim on him. My mother 

was denied a claim on him. And I guess I'm 

asking why there is this time frame. Is it 

because of something they used or what? 

He was a fun-loving father. He was never the 

same afterwards. He had a lot of depression. 

He had webbed arms because of the burns. He 

was burnt from his waist up and a lot of 

physical disabilities in that way as -- as to 

what he could do as -- as work. He was never 

able to go back to the plant because of his 
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injuries, and he suffered maybe I think eight 

years with the cancer. 

Another think I wanted to touch on was my 

sister-in-law worked there in '67 and 8, maybe 

9, and I remember my brother tak-- bringing her 

home and her skin was as yellow -- yellow as it 

could be. Her hair was white and brittle, and 

she passed away last -- within the last year, 

and hers started out I think with lung cancer, 

but you could see the cancer on her. It came 

out, big hard lumps. You couldn't touch her or 

anything. And I believe my brother is in the 

process of trying to get some benefits from 

that. 

And then on my last note, my son-in-law worked 

at the plant in the early '80's, and they wore 

the hazmat badges or whatever, and there was a 

group of young guys just out of high school and 

they would go in and unload and load boxcars 

and different things. They worked in the 

yards. And their badges would turn and they 

were told to turn them over, to go in and do 

your job. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, thank you. Yes, ma'am. We 

ha-- this will be the last one before our 
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break. 

 MS. DOWNING: Good afternoon. I'm Marilyn 

Downing. I'm from Fort Madison, Iowa and I'm 

here representing my grandmother who is 

deceased, who was a Line 1 worker at the IAAP. 

She worked from 1947 to 1971 on Line 1 and she 

died in October 27th, 1982 of colon cancer. 

But in researching her records for this claim, 

I had looked at her medical records and there 

were so many records it was -- I had to cut it 

down to submit the claim, but she had lung, 

heart and cancer problems. 

When I had attended the first open public 

meeting at the Burlington Memorial Auditorium I 

had stood up and asked how far did this claim 

extend to her survivors, and it was there that 

some of her coworkers approached me and 

actually told me what she did. And all through 

the years we never knew because we would ask 

her and we were told emphatically, I cannot 

discuss it. And so it was at this time, at 

this meeting, that I was able to discover what 

my grandmother actually did on Line 1, and I 

was told that she actually loaded plutonium 

pucks* into the bombs, and then she would -- 
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that these bombs weighed about 50 pounds and 

that she would have to manually pick them up, 

hold them up against her abdomen and then 

transport them over to the racks to stack them 

up, and that she did this eight hours every 

day. 

And to me it seems kind of funny, the 

relationship of her cancer was in her abdominal 

area that she finally was -- died from. 

The reason none of her children are here, she 

had five children, and they all died in their 

fifties of cancer, and there's 14 grandchildren 

left. We are the next of kin, the survivors. 

I just wanted to come here today and represent 

my grandmother's voice since she did work so 

long at this plant. And I want to thank all of 

you that are here and being very patient with 

all of us, for listening to our stories and to 

consider our stories in helping you determine 

your advice to the NIOSH department. And we 

thank you very much. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We're going 

to now have a brief recess, and then the Board 

will return and begin the deliberations on the 

Iowa petition. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Paul, just -- just one question 

before we break. I'm concerned that we still 

have a quorum for the rest of our 

deliberations. Are people leaving soon or... 

 DR. ZIEMER: I think Mr. Espinosa and Dr. 

Roessler both have planes. I do have their 

cell phone numbers if we do need to reach them 

for a vote -- and others, too -- so we -- make 

the break as quick as we can, about ten 

minutes, and we'll begin deliberations 

immediately. 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:00 p.m. 

to 3:10 p.m.) 

 DR. ZIEMER: We'll begin momentarily, if you'll 

take your seats again, please. The Chair's 

going to ask to allow one more of the Iowa 

contingency to speak, Laurie Kuntz. Laurie, we 

recognize you if you'll come to the microphone, 

and Laurie wishes to briefly address the 

assembly, as well. Is Laurie here in the 

assembly? Okay. 

(Pause) 

I think we've lost Laurie, at least 

temporarily. Robert Anderson, our original 

petitioner, has also asked for just a minute or 
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so for a recap, and I'm going to allow that. 

If Laurie returns we will give her the mike and 

then we will begin our deliberations. So 

Robert? 

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. I appreciate the 

help of the Board. You heard a few of the 

stories from workers' loved ones. Over and 

over again we heard of radiological diseases 

and death. We have on one hand a technical 

report of what should have happened to assure 

that we were safe. And then on the other hand 

we seem to have contrary information that it 

didn't take place. There was -- there is a 

contrary view. So I ask the Board to keep in 

mind the accuracy of the data, and secondly, 

the accessibility to the data should an appeal 

be necessary because of our Constitutional 

right to due process. And I hope that we will 

hear a positive finding from the Board today. 

Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Robert. Did -- and now 

we'll hear from Laurie Kuntz. Laurie? 

 MS. KUNTZ*: Thanks for this opportunity. I 

live in Mediapolis, Iowa. My name's Laurie 

Kuntz and I'm here to -- on behalf of my -- my 
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husband. Mike is deceased. He passed away in 

1986, and my sons keep informed on the 

legislative issues, the -- anything that's in 

the paper, and they both asked me if I would 

come and -- and listen today, and so I took off 

work and I can't stay too long, so... 

 I'm just thankful for your support, and Mike 

worked -- I met him in 1974, and he was working 

as a guard at the IAAP. And we married and 

three years later a tumor came up on his neck 

and for three years he was -- he battled nonHodgkin's lymphoma. And we went through chemo 

and radiation and his sons were nine and six 

when he passed away. And they don't remember 

their dad other than being sick, and it would 

just be nice to have some closure and answer. 

And for all the others that are suffering, I 

know what they're going through and it's hard. 

So thank you for your time. I appreciate that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Laurie. 

BOARD DISCUSSION 

Now as we begin our deliberations, we do have 

some input from the Department of Labor, and I 

believe Pete Turcic is prepared to address the 

Board. Pete? 
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 MR. TURCIC: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. The 

Department of Labor would just like to make a 

few brief points. Again, we're not urging any 

specific outcome of the advice, you know, from 

the Board on the Iowa petition, but we do urge 

the Board to clearly express, you know, any 

rationale that is behind any advice that -- 

that is given. 

And just a few points that -- we believe that, 

you know, since it was clear when Congress 

included the dose reconstruction process in the 

law that classified information would 

undoubtedly be involved in some of the dose 

reconstructions, we believe that it would be 

very useful if your advice, you know, would 

include guidance on what degree of transparency 

is needed, and a few questions that, you know, 

if the -- if the Board could include in their 

advice we believe would be useful. 

One, should the existence of any classified 

information disqualify dose reconstruction at a 

particular site; and two, if not, then how 

central to a given set of dose reconstructions 

does classified data have to be in order to 

result in a lack of feasibility to do those 
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dose reconstructions. 

Three, does the Board think that alternative 

means of assuring claimants that NIOSH's use of 

classified data was appropriate would be 

sufficient to overcome transparency concerns. 

And finally, I would just like to reiterate, 

you know, a point that Shelby made relative to 

some of the Mallinckrodt petition, and that is 

that -- the need for the Board to also weigh 

the degree of transparency needed along with 

the likelihood that -- of the loss of 

eligibility of benefits for, you know, any 

claimants that have a non-SEC cancer then, 

which again runs about 40 percent of the 

claims. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Thank you. As the 

Board begins deliberations, and it's clear that 

one of the central issues is going to focus 

around this issue of transparency and the 

classification of documents as well as perhaps 

the quality of data, let me remind the Board of 

a requirement in the rule, and that is it -- 

the rule on -- this is from 82 -- get the exact 

citation here. This is 42 Part 82. This is 

the dose reconstruction rule that we go by, and 
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it's Section 82.3, says that Health and Human 

Services will also make available to 

researchers and the general public information 

on the assumptions, methodology and data used 

in estimating radiation doses, as required by 

the Act. So there -- there inherently in the 

rule is a sort of three-part test, assumptions, 

methodology and data. And it certainly appears 

to the Chair that we have to be able to assure 

that that test is met, and whatever impact 

classification has on that seems to me to be 

pertinent. 

Now let me open the floor and Rich, you have a 

comment that --

MR. ESPINOSA: Yeah. On page 7 of Larry 

Elliott's presentation he refers to accurate 

coworker data is available from dosimetry 

measurements of Pantex workers from 1993 to 

2003. Now my opinion on definition of a 

coworker is somebody that I work next to, 

somebody that works in the same job title, 

somebody that works at the same facility and at 

the same time. I find this disturbing that 

this would even be considered to be used. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I wonder -- do any of the NIOSH 
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staff -- is that -- is that a question or a 

statement? 

MR. ESPINOSA: It's a question --

 DR. ZIEMER: It's a question, thank you, for 

NIOSH. Larry or Jim -- Jim Neton perhaps can 

respond. 

DR. NETON: Richard, could you please repeat 

the time frame that you're discussing? I 

didn't catch that. 

MR. ESPINOSA: On page 7 of Larry Elliott's 

presentation it states accurate coworker data 

is available from dosimetry measurements of 

Pantex workers from 1993 to 2003. Now this --

DR. NETON: Okay, I just wanted --

MR. ESPINOSA: -- (unintelligible). 

DR. NETON: -- the clarify -- I wanted to make 

sure I understood you. Yeah, Tim Taulbee is 

more familiar with that and he's going to 

address the question. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Tim can address that, Tim 

Taulbee. 

 MR. TAULBEE: Thank you. This is Tim Taulbee. 

What we were doing with the -- trying to use 

the Pantex data is, in order to use the Iowa 

neutron dose measurements, there needs to be a 
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correction factor 'cause a certain fraction of 

the neutrons would not have been measured. To 

develop that value requires classified 

information to come up with what fraction would 

be -- would not have been detectable. Once we 

did that and we compared what the neutron to 

photon ratio was, it was less than what Pantex 

workers -- the ratio from the Pantex workers 

was. 

Another factor that affects the Pantex workers 

that result in a higher neutron to photon ratio 

is the fact, as it was pointed out earlier, 

that they wore lead aprons, which means their 

photon doses would have been lower, thus 

increasing this neutron to photon ratio. So 

our use of this particular estimate is a 

maximization. We believe the neutron doses 

were lower than this for -- but instead of 

trying to explain all of this, we put this -- 

we put it in there that we would use the Pantex 

data because it is more -- in our opinion, more 

-- well, it's more claimant favorable, as well 

as easier to explain. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Rich, did you have a 

follow-up on that? 
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MR. ESPINOSA: Yeah, I -- it just kind of 

leaves in mind what -- you know, to the 

accuracy of the data as -- you know, from -- 

from IAAP to -- to Pantex. And I guess I just 

don't understand it. Maybe I don't have the 

background for it, but -- 

 MR. TAULBEE: Well, it --

MR. ESPINOSA: -- with the time frames and 

everything else, I just don't see how it could 

be done. 

 MR. TAULBEE: What we're do-- we do have data 

from 1962 forward at Iowa on these neutron 

exposures to where -- that we could use instead 

of using the Pantex data. As I described 

earlier, it would require some calculations 

that we can't really disclose or be fully 

transparent about. Those calculations would 

result in a dose that is lower, and so as a 

result, to be claimant favorable, we use the 

Pantex data and -- and that was our 

justification for it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Let's see, who's 

next? Yes, Leon and -- okay, Jim and then 

Leon. Go ahead, Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: Oh, okay. It's a question for DOL 
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and for -- for NIOSH. When -- in Pete's 

comments recently he mentioned that Congress 

was aware that some of this information was -- 

that would be used in dose reconstruction would 

be -- was classified. But it also seems to me 

that the way the law was written and the way 

that regulations was -- you did set up a very 

transparent process and a process that was 

dependent on the transparency and availability 

of the data. People have appeals procedures 

and so forth that -- that seem to require that 

all this information be -- be available. And I 

guess my question is was -- was this type of 

situation not addressed in the law adequately, 

or was it a question of something that might be 

in the law but was just not addressed 

adequately in the regulation or -- or just not 

really thought of at all? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Or not anticipated --

 DR. MELIUS: Anticipated, yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Or -- and Pete, you may not even 

really know the answer to that, but -- 

 MR. TURCIC: Right, but the reason and the 

point we were trying to make was that we were 

asking that in any advice the Board gives that 
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-- you know, that the rationale explain how 

much transparency is necessary before -- you 

know, before you have -- it's infeasible to do 

dose reconstructions. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, but I believe you also 

mentioned something about potential for 

alternative procedures or something. That's 

what I was trying to get at --

 MR. TURCIC: That was a --

 DR. MELIUS: -- deal with -- deal with that 

particular situation. It seems to me that if 

the law allowed it or if -- whatever, that 

could have been done in the drafting and, you 

know, promulgation of the regulations, and for 

whatever reason this situation wasn't 

anticipated, I'm trying to understand was that 

because the law didn't really provide a way of 

doing that or was it that in drafting the 

regulations you didn't fore-- foresee this 

possibility? 

 MR. TURCIC: That -- I mean that's a question 

that --

 DR. MELIUS: I'm not sure we're -- we're in a 

position to answer that. I mean we can answer 

your -- I think we can address your first 
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question. I think there's -- it's a sort of a 

slippery slope issue, but I think that -- 

 MR. TURCIC: I think the point that we were 

trying to get is in your rationale -- I mean if 

-- if it's -- on one end of the spectrum you 

could say that if there's any classified data 

involved at all, then it's not feasible to do 

dose reconstructions. 

 MS. MUNN: That's not true. 

 MR. TURCIC: Or, you know, could parts of it, 

or how -- or are there ways to get around that, 

that was the question. 

 DR. ZIEMER: It's sort of where on the spectrum 

do you draw that line. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'd like to interpose here and 

just interrupt the other questions and -- I 

know that NIOSH itself has I think reflected 

some uncertainty as to where that -- perhaps 

that line should be, but can -- can -- Larry, 

are you or your staff able to tell us whether 

or not assumptions, methodology and data will 

be -- would be public -- available from this 

particular site? I think that's the -- an 

issue, and I don't know if you even know the 
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answer yet because you're still looking at the 

data, but --

 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, Tim is our Q-cleared person 

that was assigned to follow up on this and 

there are assumptions, there are data and there 

are perhaps methodology based upon the 

assumptions and the data that we would not be 

able to speak about at this time. 

We have the site profile that Tim has revised 

based upon his review of classified 

information. That is -- that revised site 

profile is going through a review by an 

authorized derivative classifier at DOE 

headquarters. We hope that it will be 

available to the Board and to the public very 

soon, as I said. And in that we hope that they 

will be able to reveal as much as possible. 

We're not sure yet at this juncture what will 

be withheld, so we're working through that. 

If I might, I would speak to Dr. Melius's 

question a moment ago about our rulemaking 

effort, and in discussions in the early throes 

of that rulemaking we had conversed with 

Department of Labor and Justice about 

classified information and how it would be 
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dealt with. The statute is silent on this. 

One could interpret the language of the statute 

to assume that classified information, because 

of the nature of DOE's operations, is going to 

have to be dealt with in dose reconstruction in 

Special Exposure Cohort petitions. We weren't 

-- it wasn't clear to us at NIOSH how that 

would be dealt with. We were seeking advice 

and consultation from -- from whether -- DOL as 

to whether they could adjudicate claims that 

were classified, let's say. The dose 

reconstruction held some information that was 

classified and how would that find its way an 

adjudication process, and I don't think -- 

right now I can't speak to that. I don't know 

if DOL can speak to that or not. But we would 

offer that, as an Advisory Board with cleared 

members on your body and with your -- the 

contractor support that the Board and NIOSH has 

who are working toward getting their Q 

clearances, that might be an avenue and a 

mechanism to evaluate the classified 

information that NIOSH would have seen and -- 

and determine whether or not we have used that 

information appropriately. 
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I know that's not going to be perhaps 

satisfactory to all claimants and all 

petitioners, but it is one step toward trying 

to validate the effort that we have undertaken. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Let me go to Leon and Roy 

and then back to Jim. 

MR. OWENS: Dr. Ziemer, I have a question for 

Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson, the time periods 

from June 1947 through May of 1948 and then 

from May of 1948 through March of 1949, are you 

aware of any radiological processes that did 

occur on Line 1 during those two time frames, 

from a worker standpoint? 

MR. ANDERSON: It's my understanding at that 

time that the radiological component of the 

weapon was inserted in flight and thus we would 

not -- would not have seen anything at the 

ordnance plant unless it was being disassembled 

or from a previous time. 

MR. OWENS: So as far as any workers actually 

being involved in a process on a line then, as 

far as you know and from the workers' 

standpoint, that didn't occur? 

MR. ANDERSON: That's -- that is my 

understanding. 
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MR. OWENS: Okay, sir. Thank you. 

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Roy? 

 DR. DEHART: It would appear to me that a 

little transparency is perhaps a lot opaque, 

and it's a slippery slope. I don't know how we 

handle a certain degree of transparency or 

failure to have full transparency. Failure to 

provide access to data necessary for dose 

reconstruction because of a national security 

concern I think forces a real consideration for 

a defined class. And of course, as is obvious 

with that, we establish a precedent in 

considering future petitions. Consequently, it 

is not a decision solely affecting this 

petition, but it will affect all the rest if we 

should decide to approve it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Jim? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Several points. First of 

all, I just find it very difficult for us to do 

two things. One is to somehow try to reach a 

decision that's based on a hypothetical 

revision of a site profile document that may or 

may not reveal further information or give us 

more insight into this classified information. 
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I just don't know how to deal with it in this -

- in this process, and I think we need to focus 

on what information we have available to us -- 

to us now. 

Secondly, I also find it very difficult for us 

to develop the regulations or the system or 

whatever you want to call it for -- for dealing 

with this for the whole program. Again, our 

context is a single petition for a Special 

Exposure Cohort and I don't think we're in 

position or would want to try to think of all 

the alternative procedures to deal with all the 

situations where classified information may be 

involved. I think it's really up to the 

agencies and -- particularly since we advise 

NIOSH -- NIOSH to come back to us with -- with 

those procedures that, if they decide that's 

the route that -- that should be taken and -- 

I'm not saying we're adverse to that, but just 

that I don't think we can formulate it here. 

I do think that in this situation, based on 

NIOSH's evaluation, based on the site profile 

and -- and based on the information presented 

by the petitioners, which I certainly was very 

impressed with their efforts and the thought 
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they put into their petition, there certainly 

is -- we're faced with a situation where the 

adequacy of the available information for doing 

individual dose reconstructions is -- is sparse 

and is -- is questionable. 

NIOSH has reviewed that and asserted that they 

think they can, using only -- the only way that 

they can do individual dose reconstructions is 

based on this classified information that -- 

that is not available to us nor to the -- as a 

total Board, nor to the public. 

I think we also have a finding of health 

endangerment here, so it meets that criteria 

for -- for a Special Exposure Cohort, so I just 

think we're in a position that, based on the 

information available to us now, that we should 

recommend that the Special Exposure Cohort 

petition be accepted and -- and really concur 

with the -- NIOSH's recommendation for the 

class. 

MR. ESPINOSA: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are you making that as a motion? 

 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 

MR. ESPINOSA: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: It's been moved and seconded then 
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that the -- that the Board so designate or 

recommend designating this group as a Special 

Exposure Cohort. 

I would also -- let me point out and we'll hear 

the other two comments here in a moment -- 

point out that although some members of this 

Board might in fact obtain or have Q clearance, 

that in fact this still would preclude the full 

Board from having the knowledge of -- of the 

various parameters that go into the 

determination, so the transparency issue I 

believe goes beyond just the public. I think 

it becomes an issue even within the Board in 

terms of having full Board knowledge of the 

information to be used in the decision process. 

And not to mention our own contractor would 

have the same issue. There would be very 

limited numbers of persons that would be privy 

to the material used. 

Mark. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, Jim summarized several of 

my points. I speak in -- in support of the 

motion, and I think that we -- we need to 

support this motion or support this petition on 

two avenues, and it's on its technical merits 
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as well as on this classification issue 'cause 

I think Table -- if I look at Table 5.1 within 

the -- within the petition, it -- it really is 

striking that there is skimpy data, I would 

say. And it -- you know, it's not inconsistent 

with the date we saw for '42 to '45 or '42 to 

'48, I forget the years, for Mallinckrodt in 

that there's very little external, it says no 

internal data, some air sampling. So I -- I 

think there -- there are a lot of technical 

merits for which this petition should be 

supported. The -- and as Jim said that -- that 

-- I think, given the skimpy data, they -- they 

went to a source term information and therein 

lies the problem where they got into the 

classification issues. The -- I -- I -- I also 

think that, as far as setting a precedence, I 

don't know that it's going to -- my experience 

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pretty unique facility in that regard, that 

most -- most of the classified operations and 

classified data I've had to deal with, I do 

have a Q clearance and have gone after health 

and safety type information, radiation records, 

oftentimes they're difficult to get, as we've 
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heard earlier in this meeting, but oftentimes 

they're mixed in with process data. And if you 

don't need the process specifics, the 

geometries, things like that, they're usually 

available. And for several facilities that I'm 

aware of that have classification issues, they 

were probably doing more monitoring. This is a 

very early time frame where monitoring was 

sparse, so you have this kind of dual issue 

here, so I'm not sure that it's going to sort 

of have this effect of creating a massive 

amount of -- of exactly the same type of 

petitions. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Mr. Presley. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Do we want to exclude the June 

1947 to May 1948 time frame from the SEC since 

there are, and it has been stated -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: It was the Chair's understanding 

that we're only dealing with the third part of 

the table. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: The group that's been established 

that there was no radiological material, I 

believe that was confirmed by -- by the 

petitioner. The second period, we actually do 
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not have an evaluation from NIOSH on which to 

act. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And therefore it is only that 

third period, I believe, that we're focusing 

on. It's the March '49 through 1974 period. 

Is that correct? Yes. Larry, do you need to 

amplify that at all? 

 MR. ELLIOTT: I think, as outlined yesterday in 

the Board's responsibilities, and you could go 

look at the rule on this, but I think you do 

need to address that early time period, as we 

set it out, and either make a recommendation 

that you concur or that you want more work done 

on it --

 DR. ZIEMER: I understand. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: -- or whatever. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Since it was in the original 

petition? 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, the original petition 

included that time frame, so -- and this is how 

we broke it out and our understanding of the 

documentation that supports that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: We can act on that separately 

then, yes. 
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 MR. ELLIOTT: Correct. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Did that answer your 

question, Bob, or did you have a follow-up 

then? 

 MR. GRIFFON: The specific motion is related to 

the '49 to --

 DR. MELIUS: To '74, correct. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Right. No, that's what I wanted 

to make sure --

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 

 MR. PRESLEY: -- that was what we were talking 

about. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Further discussion on the motion? 

Yes, Jim. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I just want to, as a 

comment, address Pete Turcic's question. It --

again, I think we're focused very narrowly on 

this particular petition at this particular 

point in time based on the information 

available to us, and I can say personally I'm 

not averse to procedures being set up where 

there is classified information that in-- 

involving individual dose reconstruction and 

alternative procedures for dealing with that, 

but I think we need to evaluate those on -- on 
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their face and for the situations involved. 

certainly don't think that simply the presence 

of classified information about any, you know, 

body on the site or whatever is, you know, 

grounds for a Special Exposure Cohort for the 

entire site. I think we have to look at really 

how critical is that information to either a 

particular dose reconstruction or how critical 

it is to a Special Exposure Cohort, and -- and 

we could evaluate it accordingly. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Robert -- no? Okay. Roy. 

 DR. DEHART: Just a clarification of my point. 

The issue was one of not being able to 

accomplish a dose reconstruction without the 

use currently of classified information, and 

that's the point that I'm making, that we would 

be setting a precedent for, I think. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda Munn, and then Leon. 

 MS. MUNN: There's I'm sure not a member of 

this Board who does not bear enormous sympathy 

and empathy for the petitioners who come before 

us and for the illnesses and the heartaches 

that they have suffered. It would be very 

easy, as a human being, to say these folks are 

due something because they have contributed so 
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much to the welfare of our nation and have 

suffered so much. We do not know whether as a 

result of that or as a result of the normal 

process of living. Our issue here with respect 

to whether we can or cannot provide more light 

on what harm might have come is the basis of 

our existence here. This is probably the most 

difficult issue that we've had to deal with. 

And to assume that it will not carry over into 

other aspects of what we do is probably not 

justifiable. This will most assuredly 

establish how the agencies and how the public 

views what we do, what is possible and what is 

not possible. 

We've been told -- I have no reason to doubt -- 

that it is possible for dose reconstructions to 

be done, but that it is not possible to do so 

so that every single aspect of it is crystal 

clear to every party involved. So the issue --

the base issue here is are we going to accept 

that we will not do good calculations that can 

be done as long as there is any aspect of that 

which cannot be fully understood by everyone. 

That's really the problem. This is not a 

litigious process, has never been, is not 
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intended to be, and certainly not our charter 

to be involved in such a process. If we can do 

these dose reconstructions, it seems logical 

that we should attempt to do them. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm not sure whether your question 

was rhetorical, but I'm going to make a partial 

answer anyway. 

 MS. MUNN: Good. 

 DR. ZIEMER: It occurs to me that it may not 

just be a matter of being understood by people. 

I don't understand it all, the dose 

reconstructions -- and I'm chairing this 

committee -- and that's terrible. But it's the 

issue of whether the information, I think, is 

publicly available for those who wish to view 

it and examine it, which I -- I believe is a 

somewhat separate question from public 

understanding. Public understanding versus 

more of the transparency, that's -- that's how 

I'm viewing it, at least, than -- so that would 

be my answer to that question. 

Yes, we -- I understand that the contractor 

feels they can do the calculations, and I 

believe that. But whether or not they can make 

the information known, both to the claimant, to 
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the public and even to this Board, seems to me 

to be the issue. Jim and then Leon. 

 DR. MELIUS: That's exactly the point. The 

information can't be even made available to the 

Board to support or refute whether they can or 

cannot do it with sufficient accuracy. And 

again, I think if we focus on the situation we 

had -- now what information's available to us, 

not what hypothetically could be done -- we 

then make a recommendation through NIOSH to the 

Secretary about this -- this petition and then 

it's up to the Secretary and NIOSH to decide 

how to handle this. It may be something that 

Congress has to address. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Well, ultimately Congress gets 

into the picture because they are the ones that 

will make the final determination. These --

all these recommendations go back to Congress. 

 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 MS. MUNN: It's they who created this. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Leon? 

MR. OWENS: Dr. Ziemer, I speak in favor of the 

motion. I think that, as Dr. Wade reminded the 

Board yesterday prior to our first deliberation 

for SEC status for Mallinckrodt, this 
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particular petition meets the criteria. Even 

though we do not have a answer on the 

feasibility question, I think we've hammered 

that in the ground regarding confidentiality 

and the classified data. 

I will say that this Board is using, in my 

opinion, the correct judgment. It's very easy 

to get caught up in the emotion. Those of us 

who work on the particular sites and have 

talked to the claimants and have talked to the 

families, we're well aware of the emotional 

attachment that the workers have to this 

legislation. And I think that if this Board 

carried that same emotion into this particular 

case, then some of the time periods the Board 

would seek to include those periods as SEC 

designation, rather than what we're doing right 

now in taking a look at the actual time periods 

based on the recommendations from NIOSH that 

should be included. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? Do 

you wish to speak for or against the motion? 

 MR. PRESLEY: I speak for the motion. As 

somebody that's worked in this field since 

1969, my first job was in weapons teardowns, 
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some of the last things I'm doing today is 

working with records. So I know what problems 

that you get involved with when you tear a 

weapon down and I also know what problems we're 

having today in trying to get records and also 

make some of the records available to where 

they can be used. And for these two reasons, I 

would like to speak in favor of the motion. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Richard? 

MR. ESPINOSA: Yes, I also speak in favor of 

the motions for the same reasons that Dr. 

Melius and Mr. Owens mentioned. I'd also like 

to call for the vote. 

 DR. ZIEMER: The vote's been called for. I'll 

take that as an informal call for the vote so 

that we don't vote to end debate and get into 

that issue. Is the Board ready to vote on the 

motion? 

The motion is to recommend the Special Exposure 

Cohort status for the 1949 to 1974, and it's -- 

more specifically it's March '49 through '74 

group at the Iowa Ordnance Plant. If you vote 

in favor of the motion, I believe we are also 

going to need a similar -- what shall I call it 

-- a justification statement along the lines of 
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what we had before, and we will need to have a 

workgroup or some help in wording the exact 

details of that again. But let's go ahead and 

act on the motion and then we can proceed from 

there, and then we will try to address the 

other two portions of the time frame. 

Are you ready then to vote? All in favor, aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: And the Chair votes aye. Noes? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Any absten-- one no? 

 MS. MUNN: No. 

 DR. ZIEMER: No, I'm sorry. Any abstentions? 

 MS. MUNN: I'd like to abstain, please. 

 DR. ZIEMER: One abstention. So we have one, 

two, three, four, five, six, seven affirmative 

votes. I don't know if Dr. Anderson came on 

the line, but we are not going to end up with a 

tie vote or -- so -- and we do have a quorum, 

so that vote will stand and it is so ordered. 

Now the chair would entertain a motion to deal 

with the June '47 through May '48 time period. 

 MR. PRESLEY: I make a motion we deny the June 

'48 through May -- I mean June '47 through May 

'48. 
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THE COURT REPORTER: Bob, can you use the mike? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Motion again, to -- 

 MR. PRESLEY: I make a motion that we deny June 

'47 through May 8 (sic) petition. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And seconded? 

 DR. DEHART: Second. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Discussion on this? We have 

confirmed that there was no radiological 

material present during that period. That, in 

itself, would seem to be a sufficient reason 

for excluding this period. Does anyone else 

wish to make any comments or observations or 

speak to the motion? 

If not, I'll call for a vote. All in favor, 

say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Any opposed, no? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Any abstentions? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: The motion carries. Now for the 

period May '48 through March '49 -- and I'm 

going to ask NIOSH to help me out here. It 

appears to the Chair that we don't actually 

have an evaluation for that period. Do we not 
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require an evaluation in order to act on that? 

 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, you do, and as I said 

earlier, we're preparing that. We're working 

toward that end. As soon as we can, we'll 

provide you a --

 DR. ZIEMER: So that a proper motion might be, 

for example, in the absence of an evaluation by 

NIOSH, the -- the Board wishes to delay action 

on that time period. That would be a possible 

motion if someone --

MR. OWENS: So moved. 

MR. ESPINOSA: So moved. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, and seconded. Is there 

any discussion on that motion? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Confusion. 

THE COURT REPORTER: Who made the motion and 

who seconded? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Motion made by Leon and seconded 

by Richard -- and by Roy. Is there further 

discussion on the motion? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, sir. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Presley. 

 MR. PRESLEY: I'd like to speak for the motion, 
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that we do hold our comments until we get more 

determination, the reason being I have a report 

here from the Nuclear Weapons Research 

Development Testing and Production of the 

Nuclear Navy and Propulsion Facilities dated 

1999, and it states that Mark IV had work done 

in Burlington, Iowa sometime in 1949, does not 

have a month date, and that -- March of 1949 

falls into that, so there could be a record 

somewhere that shows there was work done on 

nuclear weapons at Burlington sometime in 1949. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And I believe that's what NIOSH in 

fact is trying to establish, right. Richard, 

please. 

MR. ESPINOSA: I forgot what I was going to 

say. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. It's getting that time of 

day. You just feel the urge to say something, 

but don't quite know what. 

Is there further discussion on this motion? 

MR. ESPINOSA: Oh, I know what I was going to 

say. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, now Richard. 

MR. ESPINOSA: As far as the time frame on -- 

on when recommendation will be out by NIOSH, 
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are we going to be able to receive that -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, use the mike. I believe 

Richard's just asking sort of what the sort of 

expected time frame. I don't think there's a -

- we're not asking that it be done by the next 

meeting, but you're simply inquiring as to when 

it will come aboard, is that it? 

MR. ESPINOSA: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Larry, do we have some idea on the 

status of this particular piece? 

 MR. ELLIOTT: I'd love to give you a time 

frame, but I'm not going to today. We, as you 

know, just finished this report up, and the 

Mallinckrodt report, last week. And in that -- 

the throes of that effort, identified this 

particular situation and, quite frankly, we 

have folks that are thinking about it and 

getting started to do that, but I'm not going 

to commit today to get a report to you in a 

certain time frame. We'll do the best we can 

as soon as we can. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Does that answer your 

question, Richard? 

MR. ESPINOSA: Yeah, along with the same -- the 

same line of thought, the same question as -- 
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as far as SCA -- SC&A's involvement on that, as 

well, too. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Is the Board ready now to 

vote on this particular issue? 

MR. ESPINOSA: I believe we've got -- 

UNIDENTIFIED: I'd like to speak as a subject 

matter expert. Previously -- my name --

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry, sir, you'll have to 

wait till the public comment period for -- 

UNIDENTIFIED: Well, it's regards to subject of 

data that NOSHA (sic) presented at the last 

minute, and I've been trying to get this to -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are you talking -- I'm sorry. Are 

you talking about this particular time period, 

'48 to '49? 

UNIDENTIFIED: The report -- the report that 

they just presented here, February 9th, 2004 

(sic). I'm a -- besides being a worker at 

Mallinckrodt, I'm a certified computing 

professional. I got a start -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Are you speaking to the issue 

that's before the Board right now? 

UNIDENTIFIED: I'm -- I'm speaking as a subject 

matter expert regards this information. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry, you'll need to -- 
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unless you're speaking for information on the 

motion before us that is critical to the 

Board's decision, I'll have to ask you to wait 

till the public comment period. Thank you. 

Board members, are you ready to vote? Okay, 

this motion then would be to -- I've forgotten 

the motion, actually. It -- it's to -- I 

believe it's actually to delay action on the -- 

that time period until we have a full analysis 

of it by NIOSH is, in essence, what the motion 

is. 

All in favor, say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: All opposed, no? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: And any abstentions? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Then that motion also carries. 

 DR. WADE: Might I address the Board now as the 

Designated Federal Official -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. 

 DR. WADE: -- as to the task in front of you, 

now that you've completed your business. And 

again I refer you back to 83.15, this is from 

the SEC rule itself -- 83.15(e), upon the 
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completion of NIOSH evaluations and the 

deliberation of the Board concerning a 

petition, the Board will develop and transmit 

to the Secretary a report containing its 

recommendations. The Board report will include 

the following: one, the identification and 

inclusion of the relevant petitioner petitions; 

two, the definition of the class of employees 

covered by the recommendation; three, a 

recommendation as to whether or not the 

Secretary should designate the class as an 

addition to the Cohort; and four, the relevant 

criteria under 83.13(c) and the findings and 

information upon which the recommendation is 

based, including NIOSH evaluation reports, 

information provided by the petitioners, any 

information considered by the Board, and the 

deliberations of the Board. So I think that's 

the task in front of you. 

I would also like to remind you, reading from 

83.16, how the Secretary will decide upon the 

outcome of a petition and the Director of NIOSH 

will propose and transmit to all affected 

petitioners a decision to add or deny adding 

classes or employees to the cohort, including 
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an iteration of the relevant criteria as 

specified under 83.13(c), and a summary of the 

information and findings upon which the 

proposed decision is based. This proposed 

decision will take into consideration the 

evaluation of NIOSH and the report and 

recommendations of the Board, and may take into 

consideration information presented or 

submitted to the Board and the deliberations of 

the Board. 

I only read you that to emphasize the fact that 

this report that you submit really needs to 

include your findings and deliberations to be 

complete. Also, the report that you submit 

will trigger time frames, so you need to be -- 

you need to think about your report being 

complete and when you will submit that report. 

And I wanted to say that after you conducted 

your business, not to influence your business. 

Now that you've decided, this is what's in 

front of you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right. On the Mallinckrodt action 

we have already drafted the summary of that 

action, and of course the -- the content of the 

deliberations would accompany that, so that 
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part I believe has been taken care of. It 

simply has to be put in final form as the 

letter that's transmitted. 

But we actually need something similar for this 

action, I believe, which would be essentially a 

one-pager. 

 DR. MELIUS: Give me five minutes, I've got it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I was going to -- you're 

anticipating me here. In a moment I'm going to 

suggest that we have another break, at which 

time we will craft the wording of such a 

document. Then we can act on it yet today. We 

have some time before the public comment 

period. We can act upon it today and therefore 

complete our business before we leave. Mark, 

you have a -- if you have a better suggestion, 

I hope. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Let's give it a try, I guess. 

just -- I think this wording could be fairly 

critical, so I'm not sure I want to rush to -- 

but Jim says he's already got it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I'm --

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm willing to work on it. 

 DR. ZIEMER: You might -- we might want to give 

an opportunity, if -- certainly if any of the 

I 
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Board members are uncomfortable with the 

wording -- my concern is, once we leave here 

then we're -- we have to delay. We cannot take 

action unless we're in open session, which 

means either the next subcommittee meeting or 

the next Board meeting, so -- 

It would still have to be a public conference 

call, and difficult to do wordsmithing and so 

on. 

 DR. MELIUS: But I do believe that we can 

authorize the Chair to do a final wordsmith or 

 DR. ZIEMER: As long as we have the concepts 

down, yeah, if you're just talking about fine 

editing and so on. 

The petitioner's at the mike. Are you asking 

for --

MR. ANDERSON: A final comment, if you would, 

please. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

MR. ANDERSON: First off I want to thank the 

Board for their consideration and their 

understanding and judgment. I really thank you 

from the bottom of my heart. 

Please affirm our desire to those higher up 
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which you will report to, and we want to keep 

it focused on the access -- the validity of the 

data, the accuracy of the data and the 

feasibility of -- of the data being 

reconstructed. It's not there. And also the 

confidentiality issue is of importance to us. 

Again, I thank you for your time and your 

effort. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Let's then 

take a recess while we have -- and those who 

wish to assist Jim in some wording here, and 

then we'll reconvene in perhaps about 15 

minutes and can complete our action prior to 

the public comment period. 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 4:05 p.m. 

to 4:25 p.m.) 

 DR. ZIEMER: I will confirm that we still have 

a quorum of the Board -- yes, we do still have 

a quorum. 

 The Chair will recognize Jim Melius for the 

purpose of presenting a -- a document -- 

basically this will be a motion, I believe, 

from an ad hoc workgroup that worked during the 

break to provide us with some wording for the 

decision that we have already affirmed, so the 
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Chair recognizes Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. And this --

 DR. ZIEMER: Hold on just a moment. 

(Pause) 

 DR. ZIEMER: The question of a quorum has been 

raised. I would tell the group that Roy 

DeHart, I believe, had the opportunity to see 

the material that's being presented and has in 

fact left, as it were, a proxy vote on it, if -

- if that is agreeable. That would be our 

seventh vote. 

I guess the Chair is the Parliamentarian. I'm 

going to rule that we have a quorum based on 

that. 

 DR. WADE: But no other business. 

 DR. ZIEMER: We will do no other business 

beside that. He has in fact seen the document 

that was prepared and has weighed in on it. 

 DR. MELIUS: He actually helped to write it, 

correct. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Here's -- here's the document. 

 DR. MELIUS: Okay. The Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health has evaluated SEC 

petition under the statutory requirements 

established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 
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the appropriate regulations. The Board 

respectfully recommends a Special Cohort 

designation be accorded to all Department of 

Energy contractors or subcontractor employees 

who worked at the Iowa Ordnance Plant facility 

during the time period March 1949 to 1974. 

It's followed by a series of bulleted points. 

 Number one, all employees identified in the 

petition worked in one of the earliest 

environments where nuclear materials were 

handled. 

Point number two, there is limited monitoring 

data available at this facility during the time 

period in question. This limited data causes a 

number of difficulties for performing 

individual dose reconstructions. A number of 

serious questions have been raised at -- at our 

meeting about the accuracy and completeness of 

the available data. 

Next point, NIOSH reports the data critical to 

performing individual dose reconstructions is 

classified and not available to the Board or to 

the public at this time. 

Another point, following extensive effort 

seeking, retrieving and reviewing all available 
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information, NIOSH has concluded that it is 

likely that radiation doses at the Iowa 

Ordnance Plant during the time period in 

question could have endangered the health of 

members of this class. The Board concurs. 

Given these difficult circumstances and the 

importance of transparency to this program, the 

Board recommends that this SEC petition be 

granted. 

 DR. ZIEMER: That is the motion, and let me ask 

for a second and do any of the members wish to 

discuss that motion? Actually the motion is 

not the action, but the wording for what we 

have -- will carry forward to describe the 

action already taken. We're not -- we're not 

voting on the Special Exposure Cohort but only 

the wording of the document to go forward. 

Is there any discussion, or you're ready to 

vote? I understand Roy DeHart has -- who 

helped frame this has voted in favor. 

 All who favor this, say aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Any opposed? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: So ordered. And that will be 
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provided to the Chair to put in final form so 

that we can transmit it. 

I don't believe that dealt with the other two 

pieces of our action. 

 DR. MELIUS: No, it did not. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I think I -- I believe I'm going 

to have to add that. Is that -- would not -- 

that not be correct? We will need to add a 

statement about the early group saying that it 

was agreed that there were -- there was no 

radiological material and that that is the 

basis of our decision. And also I will have to 

identify that for the middle group, until NIOSH 

completes its evaluation, the Board is 

deferring action. So with the agreement of the 

mover and the seconder, we will add those two 

points, and if you'll just pen them in, Jim, 

we'll consider that part of the motion. 

Did we vote? No. All in favor, aye? 

 (Affirmative responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: Opposed? 

 (No responses) 

 DR. ZIEMER: So ordered. We did vote, but we 

re-voted with that -- parliamentary procedure 

gets messy this time of day. 
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It is 4:30. We have scheduled a public comment 

period for 5:00 o'clock and I'm going to 

suggest it be moved up. Is there a comment 

prior to this? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, just -- I know no further 

business, but I -- I just wanted to remind the 

Chair maybe that if we can -- if you -- someone 

can take action on drafting a subcommittee 

agenda --

 DR. ZIEMER: Agenda. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- to include those four items I 

mentioned before, that -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right. In fact, Mark, why don't 

you help the Chair and we'll just do that. We 

don't have to take action on the agenda. We 

can draft agendas and distribute them in 

advance of the meeting, so any item that you 

think needs to be on there, let's -- we'll 

develop that, if that's agreeable with the 

others. 

 DR. WADE: And then just a point of 

clarification. I think you have -- you have 

passed your motion and you have drafted your 

language. I think it would be appropriate for 

the Chair to work with myself and staff in 
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terms of putting that package together. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Right, the Chair will certainly do 

that and we'll work together to get it in the 

form that's necessary to transmit. 

 Wanda Munn? 

 MS. MUNN: One final comment before we begin 

public discussion. It's -- it seems that we 

may have not responded to the requests that 

were made of us today from the agencies. It 

remains a rather large concern for many, I'm 

sure, how we will in the future address this 

issue of transparency with respect to 

classified material. I don't believe we've 

given any guidance in the decision we've made 

today. 

I would urge that we consider, as individual 

Board members, the possibility of addressing 

this in a very quickly-upcoming Board session 

as to whether or not we are going to make it a 

practice to address this issue individually as 

each site comes to us; whether we are going to 

provide the agencies with a blanket statement 

that is a policy, if classified material is an 

issue, then the SEC petition will move forward; 

or whether we will try to find some other 
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method for addressing it in the future. I 

think it's incumbent upon us to address that. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, a very good point, and 

it may be that that should be an item for our 

upcoming agenda to weigh those matters in terms 

of trying to develop some sort of policy. It 

certainly would be appropriate. 

 DR. WADE: And I agree. I think your record on 

the discussions will show that you tried to 

concentrate on the issue at hand, and I think 

the record will speak for itself on that. I 

think there are larger issues that it would be 

appropriate for the Board to consider, but that 

is the Board's choice. 

 DR. ZIEMER: And Jim? 

 DR. MELIUS: I would just -- again, reiterate 

what Lew said, I think we did -- pretty clear 

that we were specifying to these particular 

circumstances for this particular 

recommendation. But I would also add I would 

hope that the agencies involved would also give 

some more thought to this issue and so I think 

it really is more than -- as much up to them, 

more than the Board, to address this issue and 

for us then to provide advice on that. But I 
146 

1 would certainly agree with Wanda that we should 

2 discuss it at further length at -- preferably 

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at our next meeting. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I do believe that there is in a 

5 sense built into the decision one kind of 

6 message, and that is that the Board and the 

7 agencies would need to find a way to provide 

8 the -- the required transparency in these kind 

9 of cases, however one does that, and that may 

10 not be doable or perhaps there is a way of 

11 doing it, but I think that in a sense is part 

12 of what's built into the decision itself. 

(Whereupon, the Board review and determination 

on the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant petition for 

addition as a Special Exposure Cohort portion 

of the session was concluded.) 
147 

C E R T I F I C A T E OF COURT REPORTER
 

STATE OF GEORGIA
 

COUNTY OF FULTON
 

I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court
 

Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the
 

above and foregoing on the 9 th day of February,

2005; and it is a true and accurate transcript
 

of the testimony captioned herein.
 

I further certify that I am neither kin
 

nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor
 

have any interest in the cause named herein.
 

WITNESS my hand and official seal this the
 

22nd day of February, 2005.
 

CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPQITER 

CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-21102