NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANCISCO NEPAMUCENO OLIVO,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20

- 70903 Agency No. A087

- 765

- 034

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 13, 2021 * * San Francisco, California Before: McKEOWN, FORREST, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge BUMATAY
Francisco Nepamuceno Olivo , a native and citizen of Mexico , petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“ BIA ”) dismissal of his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for cancellation of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 12 29b(b)(1). Because we lack jurisdiction over Nepamuceno Olivo ’s petition, we dismiss it. Nepamuceno Olivo argues that the IJ and BIA erred in determining that he did not establish that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives because they failed to properly apply the legal standard to the undisputed facts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)

. But as we have held, “ w e lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s subjective, discretionary determination that [a petitioner] did not demonstrate ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).” Martinez

- Rosas v. Gonzales , 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2 005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law[,] . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . .
1229b , [the cancellation of removal provisio n].”). Nonetheless, Nepamuceno Olivo argue s that the Supreme Court’ s recent
decision in Guerrero

-

Lasprilla v. Barr , 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020) , establishes that his challenge fall s within the exception to th is jurisdictional bar set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2)(D), which provides that the limitation on judicial review in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “shall [not] be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Specifically, Nepamuceno
Olivo argue s tha t Guerrero

- Lasprilla ’s conclusion that the phrase “questions of3

law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) includes “the application of a legal standard to undisputed
or established facts , ” 140 S. Ct. at 1067 , provides for judicial review of whether the BIA correctly applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard to the facts of his case. Not so. Long before the Court concluded in Guerrero

- Lasprilla that the phrase “questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) includes “the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts , ” id. , we concluded the same

. S ee Ramadan v. Gonzales , 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the principle announced by the Supreme Court in Guerrero

- Lasprilla has long
coexisted with our jurisprudenc e under § 1252, including our holding that the hardship determination is a subjective, discretionary determination that we lack jurisdiction to review. Thus, though we concluded nearly 15 years ago that we possess jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to rev iew questions involving the application of statutes or regulations to undisputed facts , neither Ramadan ’s holding , nor by extension the Court’s holding in Guerrero

- Lasprilla , “infringe [s] upon the rule that discretionary determinations are beyond our revie w .” De Mercado v. Mukasey , 566 F.3d 810, 815 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). Nepamuceno Olivo also argues that the BIA lacked jurisdiction because the defective Notice to Appear ( “ NTA ” ) that he received was not cured by the satisfactory notices that he subsequently received. His argument is foreclosed by4

our precedent. In Fermin v. Barr , we held that any “lack of time, date, and place in the NTA sent to [petitioner] did not deprive the immigration court of jur isdiction over her case” because the proper remedy for such an error is simply providing “the complete notice at a later time.” 958 F.3d 887 , 895 (9th Cir. 2020)

. 1 Because
this argument is foreclosed by our precedent, and because we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s determin ation that Nepamuceno Olivo failed to establish that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives , we dismiss his petition for review.
PETITION DISMISSED
.

1 This conclusion is not affected by Niz

- Chavez v. Garland , 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), which “ concerns the requirements for a notice to ap pear to trigger the stop

time rule for cancellation of removal; [but] has no bearing on jurisdiction.” United States v. Sanchez , No. 20

- 30084,
___ Fed. App’x

___ (9th Cir. July 14, 2021).Nepamuceno Olivo v. Garland , No. 20

- 70903 BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:

As a matter of text, structure, and history, the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship ” determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (1)(D) appears to be a mixed question of law and fact. See Trejo v. Garland , 3 F.4th 760, 766

– 74 (5th Cir. 2021); Singh v. Rosen , 984 F.3d 1142, 1150

– 54 (6th Cir. 2021)

. Under recent Supreme Court precedent, we retain jurisdiction over such questions. See Guerrero

Lasprilla v. Barr , 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020).
I still concur with the court’s decision to dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction, however, because binding precedent dictates that we treat the hardship determination as a discretionary question. See Romero

- Torres v. Ashcroft , 327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003). W e are accordingly precluded from reviewing petitioner’s
claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). 

# FILED

AUG 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS