****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************SYLVESTERTRAYLORv. TERRYGERRATANAETAL. (AC 35242)
Gruendel, Lavine and Sheldon, Js. Argued December 5, 2013—officially released March 11, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Robaina, J. [motion to cite additional party];

Schuman, J. [judgment].) Sylvester Traylor, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees (defendant Terry Gerratana et al.).
Cristin E. Sheehan, with whom, on the brief, was Gina Hall, for the appellee (defendant Connecticut Medical Insurance Company).Opinion PER CURIAM. In this case, the plaintiff, Sylvester Traylor, commenced the present action against eighteen defendants, on divers legal theories, to obtain money damages, injunctive relief and a declaratory judgmentthat General Statutes § 52-190a1 isunconstitutional insofar as it requires indigent plaintiffs seeking tobringmedicalmalpracticeactionsagainsttheirhealth
careprovidersto obtain opinionletterssupportingtheir claims from similar health care providers before commencingsuit. The defendantsareseventeenstate defendants, including twelve state legislators,2 one Superior Courtjudge, oneappellateclerk,3theNewLondonSuperior Court,4 the ‘‘Connecticut Court of Appeals,’’5 and the State of Connecticut (state defendants), and one private defendant, the Connecticut Medical Insurance Company (insurance company).
In proceedings before the trial court, the state defendants and the insurance company filed and prosecuted separate motions to dismiss all ofthe plaintiff’s claims against them. The trial court granted both motions to dismissintheirentiretyandrenderedjudgmentdismissingthe action. Thisappealfollowed. Theplaintiffclaims that the trial court erroneously dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, except those against this court and the NewLondon Superior Court, whichthe plaintiffhas not pursued on appeal.6 For the following reasons, we concludethateachofthetrialcourt’schallengedrulings
were proper and that the judgment must be affirmed.
I
CLAIMS AGAINST LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS AND

THE STATE
The plaintiff seeks money damages, injunctive relief andadeclaratoryjudgmentthat § 52-190aisunconstitutional, arguing that the legislative defendants acted unethically, in violation of state and federal law, when voting on proposed amendments to § 52-190a. Specifically, the plaintiffclaims that the legislative defendants attempted to ‘‘derail,’’ for their own personal gain and enrichment, House Bill No. 6487, 2011 Sess., aproposed amendment to § 52-190athat would have expanded the types of health care providers who could provide the opinion letter required under that statute, eliminated the requirement that the letter provide a detailed basis for the formation of the opinion, and permitted the dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint only if the plaintiff failed to file the opinion letter with the complaint and also failed to correct that defect within sixty days when ordered by the court to do so. The plaintiff does not allege precisely how the legislative defendants attempted to ‘‘derail’’ the bill, however, he claims that when several of the legislative defendants either objected to or raised questions about the bill, theywere ‘‘promoting anunconstitutionallaw’’ inviola-tion ofthe conflicts ofinterest rule under General Statutes § 1-85 because each of the legislative defendants has a relative or business that benefits from § 52-190a.
In response, the legislative defendants argue that: (1) sovereign immunity and absolute legislative immunity bar the plaintiff’s state law claims against them in their official capacities; and (2) qualified immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction bar the plaintiff’s federal law claims against them in their individual capacities. For the following reasons, we agree with the legislative defendants.
A

The Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
We turn firstto the plaintiff’s claims againstthe legislative defendants in their official capacities for alleged violations ofstate law. The legislative defendants argue that sovereign immunity and absolute legislative immunity bar the plaintiff’s claims against them. We agree. ‘‘Sovereign immunityrelates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). ‘‘The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law.

. . . [T]he practical andlogicalbasisofthedoctrine [ofsovereignimmunity] is today recognized to rest

. . . on the hazard that the subjection ofthe state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property.

. . . Not only have we recognized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state.

. . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few andnarrowly construedunder our jurisprudence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Markleyv. Dept. ofPublic Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
Our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to sovereign immunity: ‘‘(1) whenthe legislature, either expressly or by force ofa necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity

. . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief
on the basis ofa substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights

. . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory
or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation ofwrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose inexcess ofthe officer’s statutoryauthority.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ColumbiaAirServices, Inc. v. Dept. ofTransportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
The plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive reliefagainstthe legislative defendants, and againstthe state, are barred by sovereign immunity because they do not satisfy any ofthese exceptions. The only exceptions to sovereign immunity that would apply to claims alleging constitutionalviolations and conduct in excess of statutory authority are the second and third, which require that the plaintiff’s claim be ‘‘ ‘substantial.’ ’’ Id. ‘‘For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests.

. . . For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess oftheir statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations.

. . . In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to supportthe applicability ofthese exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss

. . . is proper.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350.
The plaintiff’s amended complaint makes only conclusory allegations that § 52-190a violated his constitutional rights to equal access to court, separation of powers, equal protection, due process, and to trial by jury. None of the claims raised by the plaintiff allege
a ‘‘substantial’’ claim that ‘‘clearly demonstrate[s] an incursion upon [his] constitutionally protected interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 354.
The legislative defendants argue, and we agree, that the plaintiff’s claims against them also are barred by absolute legislative immunity, provided by the speech
ordebateclause ofthe Connecticutconstitution,7which bars all relief against legislators who are carrying out legislative functions. ‘‘[O]nce it is determined that [m]embers [ofthelegislature] areactingwithinthelegitimate legislative sphere the

. . . [speech or debate c]lause is an absolute bar to interference.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office ofGovernor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 563, 858 A.2d 709 (2004). The plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the state legislative defendants ‘‘attempted to derail House Bill HB-6487,’’ either by voting against it orspeaking about it onthe Senate floor. Participating in such legislative debate andvoting onproposed legislationundoubtedlyconstitutes ‘‘ ‘actingwithinthe legitimate legislative sphere.’ ’’ Id. Thus, the plaintiff’s state law claims against the legislative defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity and absolute legislative immunity.
BThe Plaintiff’s Federal Law Claims
The plaintiff also seeks money damages against the legislative defendants in their individual capacities for alleged violations of federal law. The legislative defendants argue that in addition to absolute legislative immunity, qualifiedimmunityandlackofpersonaljurisdictionbartheplaintiff’s claimsagainstthem. We agree. ‘‘Qualifiedimmunityshieldsfederalandstateofficials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Ashcroftv. al-Kidd, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011). ‘‘[I]fit was objectively reasonable forhim atthe time of the challenged action to believe his acts were lawful’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 2010); then qualified immunity applies. Qualified immunity bars the plaintiff’s claims because he failedto establishthatthe legislative defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right or that their actions were not objectively reasonable.
Theplaintiffalsofailedtoserveprocessonthelegislative defendants in their individual capacities at their usual places of abode, as required under General Statutes § 52-57 (a). Rather, the plaintiffserved the legislative defendants only in their official capacities at the office ofthe attorney general. In the absence ofproper service, the trial courtlackedpersonaljurisdiction over the legislative defendants in their individual capacities. See Edelman v. Page, 123 Conn. App. 233, 243–44, 1 A.3d 1188, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908, 10 A.3d 525 (2010). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s federal law claims against the legislative defendants in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction.
II
CLAIMS AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS
Theplaintiffmakes severalclaims againstthejudicial defendants in both their official and individual capacities, under state and federal law, arising out of the court’s failure to declare § 52-190a unconstitutional. Thejudicial defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claims
are barred by absolute judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and lack of personaljurisdiction. We agree. Absolute judicial immunity bars the plaintiff’s state law claims against the judicial defendants in their official capacities. ‘‘It is a long-standing doctrine that a judge may not be civilly sued forjudicial acts he undertakes in his capacity as ajudge.’’ Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 630, 749 A.2d 630 (2000). The improper actions alleged by the plaintiffagainst Judge Parker of issuing incorrect legal rulings and orders in the plaintiff’s malpractice and mandamus actions, applying unconstitutional laws, intimidating the plaintiff during hearings, engaging in ex parte communications, and requiring the plaintiff to obtain legal counsel for the claims of his wife’s estate, undeniably
were actions taken in Judge Parker’s official judicial capacity. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims against him are barred by absolute judicial immunity.
We arrive at the same conclusion with regard to the plaintiff’s claim against appellate clerk Gannuscio, alleging that he wilfully refused to grant the plaintiff’s motion for extension of time. ‘‘Clerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of tasks that are an integral part ofthejudicial process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chance v. Superior Court, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:04CV155 (MR) (D. Conn. December 13, 2004). Because the determination ofwhetherto grant ordenytheplaintiff’s motion for extension oftime falls within thejudicial function ofa clerk under Practice Book § 66-1, the plaintiff’s claimagainstGannuscioisbarredbyabsolute judicial immunity.
For the reasons set forth in part I B of this opinion, qualifiedimmunityandlack ofpersonaljurisdictionbar the plaintiff’s claims for money damages against the judicial defendants in their individual capacities. The plaintiffhas failed to allege facts sufficient to conclude that the judicial defendants’ conduct was outside the scope of their employment as judicial branch employees, or that such conduct rose to the level of being wanton, reckless or malicious. He also has failed to establish that the judicial defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right or that their actions were not objectively reasonable. Further, the plaintiff failed to serve process on the judicial defendants in their individual capacities attheirusual places ofabode, and thus, the court lacked personaljurisdiction over them. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims againstthejudicial defendants in both their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of state and federal law are barred by absolute judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and lack of personal jurisdiction.
III
CLAIMS AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY
The plaintiff also appeals from the trial court’sjudgment granting the motion to dismiss filed by the insurance company. The insurance companyargues thatthis court should decline review of the court’s judgment dismissing the counts against it, which sought, inter alia, awritofmandamus, becausetheplaintiffhasfailed to adequately brief this issue on appeal. ‘‘An appellant who fails to briefa claim abandons it.’’ Statev. Zarick, 227 Conn. 207, 221, 630A.2d 565 (1993).‘‘Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis oftheirclaims, we donotreviewsuchclaims.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knapp v. Knapp, 270 Conn. 815, 823 n.8, 856A.2d 358 (2004); seeDeLuciav. Burns, 11 Conn. App. 439, 444 n.7, 527 A.2d 1234 (bare assertions, without citations to legal authority evade meaningful appellate review), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 803, 531 A.2d 935 (1987). The plaintiff’s initial briefis silent
as to why the court’s dismissal of the counts against the insurance company was improper, and we decline to review any arguments advanced for the first time in his reply brief. See Mangiafico v. State Board of Education, 138 Conn. App. 677, 680–81 n.4, 53 A.3d 1066 (2012). Because the plaintiff has not adequately briefed his claim that dismissal of the counts against the insurance company was improper, we decline to review it.
The judgment is affirmed.

1 General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part as follows: ‘‘The complaint

. . . shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action

. . . that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant

. . . . To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant

. . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider

. . . that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion.

. . . The claimant

. . . shall retain the original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate.

. . .’’

2 SenatorTerry Gerratana, Senator Robert Kane, SenatorTony Guglielmo, Senator Len Fasano, Senator Toni Boucher, Senator Jason Welch, Senator Toni Harp, Senator Kevin Witkos, Senator Michael McLachlan, Senator Anthony Musto, Senator Len Suzio, and Representative Prasad Srinivasan (legislative defendants).

3 The Honorable Thomas F. Parker and appellate clerk Alan Gannuscio (judicial defendants).

4 There are no specific allegations made by the plaintiff against the New London Superior Court and neither the plaintiff nor counsel for the state defendants have addressed in their briefs any claims asserted specifically against that court.
5 The plaintiffstated in his oral argument onthis appealthat he previously has withdrawn this court as a party to the underlying action. Additionally, neither the plaintiffnor counsel for the state defendants have addressed in their briefs any claims asserted specifically against this court.
6 See footnotes 4 and 5 of this opinion.

7 The constitution of Connecticut, article third, § 15, provides: ‘‘The senators and representatives shall, in all cases of civil process, be privileged from arrest, during any session of the general assembly, and for four days before the commencement and afterthe termination ofany session thereof. And for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.’’