[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-11491

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-00141-SLB

GERALD N. LINDLEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BIRMINGHAM, CITY OF, ALABAMA,

a municipal corporation, et al.,

 Defendants,

FREDIA L. TAYLOR, 

Nurse; in her professional and official capacity as an employee 

of the City of Birmingham and as a Nurse at the Birmingham City Jail, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(June 13, 2016)

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 1 of 14 
2

Before MARTIN, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Fredia Taylor appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for summary 

judgment on Gerald Lindley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deliberate indifference claim and 

state-law negligence claim. Lindley’s claims arise out of his nine-day detention at 

the Birmingham City Jail, where he alleges he was deprived of medical care for an 

infection in his leg. In denying Taylor’s motion, the district court ruled that: (1) 

the claims in Lindley’s amended complaint related back to his original complaint; 

(2) Taylor was not entitled to qualified immunity on Lindley’s § 1983 claim; and 

(3) Taylor was not entitled to state-law immunity on Lindley’s negligence claim. 

We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because it concerns whether 

Taylor is entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Moniz v. City of Fort 

Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998). After careful review, we 

affirm. 

I.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs when an amended complaint 

“relates back” to original filings for statute of limitations purposes. We review a 

district court’s application of Rule 15(c) for abuse of discretion. Powers v. Graff, 

148 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998). An amended complaint that adds a party or 

changes the name of a party “relates back” when: (1) the amendment “arose out of 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 2 of 14 
3

the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the 

original pleading”; and (2) within the 120-day period for service provided by Rule

4(m), the new party “received such notice of the action that it will not be 

prejudiced in defending on the merits” and “knew or should have known that the 

action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 

party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), (C)(i)–(ii); see also Krupski v. Costa 

Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (2010). Constructive 

notice satisfies Rule 15(c)’s requirements and can be imputed to a new defendant 

through her attorney if that attorney also represents the parties originally sued. 

Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407–408 (5th Cir. 1980),1 abrogated on other 

grounds by Schiavone v. Fortune, AKA Time, Inc., 477 U.S. 21, 106 S. Ct. 2379 

(1986). 

There is no question that Lindley’s amended claims arose out of the same 

conduct set out in the original complaint. Taylor asserts, however, that she did not 

have adequate notice “that [she] would have been named a defendant but for an 

error.” Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548, 130 S. Ct. at 2493. But Lindley’s original 

complaint named “Nurse Frida” as a defendant in addition to the Birmingham City 

Jail and a number of Taylor’s coworkers there. The city attorney investigated the 

 1 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on this Court. See

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 3 of 14 
4

incident and filed pleadings on behalf of other defendants named in the original 

complaint. Once Lindley corrected Taylor’s name to “Nurse Fredia L. Taylor” in 

his amended complaint, the city attorney undertook her representation as well. On 

this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imputing notice of the 

action to Taylor. See Kirk, 629 F.2d at 408. Because Taylor should have known 

that she was not named in the original complaint due to an error, Lindley’s 

amended complaint “relates back” and his claims against Taylor are not timebarred. 

II.

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards that governed the district 

court.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). In reviewing a denial of summary judgment, we are required to 

“view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor 

of the non-movant.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(quotation omitted). 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 4 of 14 
5

A.

Qualified immunity “protects public officials to some extent from lawsuits 

against them in their individual capacities.” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 

1329 (11th Cir. 2007). To claim qualified immunity, a defendant must first 

demonstrate that she was engaged in a discretionary duty. Mercado v. City of 

Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005). After that, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because 

she violated a clearly established constitutional right. Holloman ex rel. Holloman 

v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). Because it is undisputed that 

Taylor was engaged in a discretionary duty as a nurse at the jail, we consider 

whether Lindley has overcome Taylor’s claim of qualified immunity. 

1.

We first consider whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to 

Lindley, establish that Taylor violated a constitutional right. Deliberate 

indifference to a pre-trial detainee’s serious medical needs is a violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., 116 

F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997).2 To establish deliberate indifference, 

Lindley must prove: (1) an “objectively serious medical need”; and (2) that Taylor 

 2 The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause governs deliberate 

indifference claims by convicted prisoners. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326. Because the minimum 

standards of medical care are the same under the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendment, we 

apply caselaw developed under both to Lindley’s claim. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. 

Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005).

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 5 of 14 
6

“acted with deliberate indifference to that need.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 

1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). 

A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quotation omitted). In either 

case, “the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk 

of serious harm.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Lindley was arrested and booked into the City of Birmingham Jail on 

January 24, 2008. According to Lindley’s affidavit, he began requesting treatment 

on January 28 for a sore on his leg that was “highly inflamed” and “swollen.” The 

condition of his leg worsened, and “it became too painful to raise [his] pants leg 

over [his] knee.” He “would eat little if any food due to [his] fever and nausea.” 

Lindley was scheduled to be transported to the Shelby County Jail on February 2, 

2008, but the Shelby County deputies at first refused to move him and told 

Birmingham Jail personnel that he needed immediate medical attention. By the 

time he arrived at the Shelby County Jail that same day, Lindley “was unable to 

walk under [his] own power.” The nurse who examined him upon arrival noted 

that Lindley had an abscess with a “blackened center” and recommended 

immediate medical attention. After processing, Lindley was transported directly to 

the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a staph infection. He underwent two 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 6 of 14 
7

surgeries, leaving him with an open wound “from the top of [his] thigh to mid calf”

that took approximately ten months to heal. 

Taylor claims that Lindley did not meet his burden of establishing a serious 

medical need because he “never deposed any doctors, nurses or other medical 

personnel regarding [his] alleged [staph infection].” However, Lindley’s hospital 

records describe a “staph infection in his [] lower extremity” that required the 

removal of “[l]arge amounts of necrotic fascia.” Even if Lindley’s specific 

diagnosis were not clear from his medical records, his affidavits establish that he

had a rapidly worsening infection whose severity should have been obvious to 

trained nurses. In fact, the nurse who examined him at the Shelby County Jail 

recommended immediate medical attention. In light of the foregoing, we agree 

with the district court that Lindley has demonstrated a serious medical need. 

Lindley must also show that Taylor was deliberately indifferent to this

serious medical need. To satisfy this element, Lindley must prove that: (1) Taylor 

had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) she disregarded that risk; 

(3) by conduct that was more than gross negligence. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326–

27. Whether a defendant had subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm is a 

question of fact, which can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (1994). In a case concerning a 

delay in treatment, we decide whether the defendant’s conduct was more than 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 7 of 14 
8

gross negligence based on: “(1) the seriousness of the medical need; (2) whether 

the delay worsened the medical condition; and (3) the reason for the delay.” 

Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327.

Lindley “specifically recall[ed] reporting [his] medical need to Nurses 

Fredia Taylor and Allinda Brown” and filling out medical request forms four times 

a day between January 28 and February 2. During the week of January 28, he also 

showed his knee, which was “clearly swollen, red and very warm to the touch,” to 

Taylor and Brown. After it became too painful for Lindley to raise his pants over 

his knee, he again “specifically remember[ed]” showing his infection to Taylor and 

other jail staff. During the relevant time period, a “staff [sic] infection” is 

mentioned three times in the ledger maintained by the jail. The entire time, 

Lindley alleges that he was given only Tylenol to manage the pain. 

These allegations support the inference that Taylor had “subjective 

knowledge of a risk of serious harm” and “disregard[ed] [] that risk.” Goebert, 510 

F.3d at 1327. Lindley’s affidavit indicates that he showed his leg to Taylor in 

serious enough condition that she should have provided prompt medical attention. 

The fact that deputies and a nurse from Shelby County recognized the severity of 

Lindley’s infection the same day he left the Birmingham Jail bolsters this 

inference. Regarding whether Taylor’s conduct amounted to more than gross 

negligence, Lindley’s hospital records indicate that he arrived with an “extensive 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 8 of 14 
9

infection of the right lower extremity, which was not responding to antibiotics.” A 

reasonable jury could conclude that Taylor’s decision to offer no treatment besides 

Tylenol for six days allowed the infection to worsen to the point that antibiotics 

were no longer effective, leading to the extensive loss of tissue and skin. See

Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327 (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that a 

delay in treatment caused the loss of the plaintiff’s child). Taken in the light most 

favorable to Lindley, the facts alleged establish that Taylor was deliberately 

indifferent to his medical needs. 

2.

Because Lindley has properly identified a violation of his constitutional right 

to adequate medical care for purposes of surviving Taylor’s motion for summary 

judgment, we next consider whether that right was clearly established at the time 

of the violation. This Court must determine whether a “reasonable official” would 

understand that what she was doing violated the right in question. Coffin v. 

Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quotation omitted). In 

this Circuit, a right can be clearly established in three ways. Terrell v. Smith, 668 

F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). First, cases from the United States Supreme 

Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state where the relevant 

events took place (here, the Alabama Supreme Court) may clearly establish the 

right. Id. at 1256. “A judicial precedent with materially identical facts is not 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 9 of 14 
10

essential for the law to be clearly established, but the preexisting law must make it 

obvious that the defendant’s acts violated the plaintiff’s rights in the specific set of 

circumstances at issue.” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam). Second, a legal principle announced in caselaw may establish the 

right “with obvious clarity to the point that every objectively reasonable 

government official facing the circumstances would know that the official’s 

conduct did violate federal law.” Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 279 (11th Cir. 

2013) (quotation omitted). Third, an official’s conduct may be “so bad that case 

law is not needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). Cases successfully invoking the second and third rationales are rare. 

Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1015. 

Taylor does not argue that existing caselaw failed to give her “fair warning 

that [her] alleged treatment of [Lindley] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2516 (2002). Instead, she says that she should 

not be deprived of liability because Lindley “did not prove that he had MSRA or a 

staph infection.” However, the district court identified specific Circuit precedent 

that gave Taylor the requisite notice that Lindley’s condition was serious enough to 

require treatment. In Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2007), this 

Court held that dog bites on the arrestee’s upper thigh created a serious medical 

need. Id. at 1203. The plaintiff was “crying in pain, and [] his ability to walk was 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 10 of 14 
11

impaired” because of the bites. Id. Here, Lindley had an obvious sore on his leg 

that was red, swollen, and later developed a blackened center. His condition 

worsened until it was too painful for him to undress himself and “even impossible 

for [him] to get out of bed.” By February 2, he could not walk or even “sit 

upright.” These symptoms were sufficiently similar to those described in Andujar

to establish that Lindley needed treatment. 

Another case from our Circuit, Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 

1989), establishes that Taylor’s treatment of Lindley was “so cursory as to amount 

to . . . deliberate indifference.” Id. at 789. In Mandel, the plaintiff suffered a hip 

injury which worsened to the point “that he could barely stand.” Id. at 785. The 

plaintiff repeatedly requested treatment over the course of two months, but was 

misdiagnosed with muscle inflammation and only given aspirin or a muscle 

relaxant. Id. at 785–86. By the time he was released, he needed a complete hip 

replacement. Id. at 787. In this case, Lindley likewise complained of pain so 

severe that it prevented him from standing. And yet the only treatment he was 

provided before leaving the Birmingham Jail was Tylenol. After Mandel, a 

reasonable nurse would know that this was constitutionally inadequate care. 

Indeed, legal principles announced by this Circuit have also established this

right such that “every objectively reasonable government official facing the 

circumstances would know that the official’s conduct did violate federal law.” 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 11 of 14 
12

Gilmore, 738 F.3d at 279. This Court has stated that “an official acts with 

deliberate indifference when he intentionally delays providing an inmate with 

access to medical treatment, knowing that the inmate has . . . an urgent medical 

condition that would be exacerbated by delay.” Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1425. This 

general statement sufficiently establishes that not treating Lindley even after he 

became feverish and could no longer get out of bed for meals was deliberate 

indifference. Because a reasonable nurse would have known that refusing Lindley 

treatment in his condition was a constitutional violation, we affirm the district 

court’s ruling that Taylor is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to 

Lindley’s § 1983 claim. 

III.

We also affirm the district court’s denial of state-law immunity with respect 

to Lindley’s negligence claim. Taylor argues that she is entitled to state-agent 

immunity under Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), and discretionaryfunction immunity under Alabama Code § 6-5-338. Neither argument has merit. 

A.

In Cranman, a plurality of the Alabama Supreme Court clarified the scope of 

Alabama’s state-agent immunity doctrine. Under Alabama law, a state agent is 

immune from civil liability if she is engaged in: 

(1)formulating plans, policies, or designs; or

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 12 of 14 
13

(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department 

or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such 

as:

(a) making administrative adjudications;

(b) allocating resources;

(c) negotiating contracts;

(d)hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or

(3)discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, 

or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the 

manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the 

duties in that manner; or

(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the 

State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’

arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or

(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, 

rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing 

persons of unsound mind, or educating students.

Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. After Cranman, the Alabama Supreme Court 

established a burden-shifting framework to analyze claims of state-agent 

immunity. First, the defendant must demonstrate that “the plaintiff’s claims arise 

from the defendant’s performance of a discretionary function.” Hollis v. City of 

Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 306 (Ala. 2006) (quotation omitted). The burden then 

shifts to the plaintiff to “establish that the defendant acted in bad faith or with 

malice or willfulness.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Taylor fails at the first step. She claims that her conduct falls under 

Cranman’s third category: “discharging duties imposed on a department or agency 

by statute, rule, or regulation.” Id. However, she has not identified any “statute, 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 13 of 14 
14

rule, or regulation prescrib[ing] the manner for performing [her] duties.” Id. As 

such, she is not entitled to state-agent immunity. 

B.

Taylor also claims discretionary-function immunity under Alabama Code 

§ 6-5-338. The statute provides, in relevant part, “[e]very peace officer . . . who is 

employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution or statutes of this state . . . 

shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in 

performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her 

law enforcement duties.” Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a). According to the statute, a 

peace officer is one “empowered . . . to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into 

custody persons who violate [the law].” Id.; see also Walker v. City of Huntsville, 

62 So. 3d 474, 501 (Ala. 2010). Taylor has presented no evidence that she is 

empowered to perform the duties of a peace officer. Therefore, she cannot claim 

discretionary-function immunity under Alabama Code § 6-5-338. 

IV.

We hold that Lindley’s claims are not time-barred because his amended 

complaint “relates back” to his original complaint. Because we also conclude that 

Taylor is not entitled to qualified immunity or state-agent immunity, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of summary judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

Case: 15-11491 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Page: 14 of 14