### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 28, 200 6 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RU SSEL L L. TIPT ON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for F ranklin County

No. 15084 J. Curtis Sm ith, Jud ge

No. M2006- 00260-CCA -R9-C O - F iled Augu st 9, 2007

The a ppellant, Russell L . Tipton, was charg ed with rec kless operation of a motor vessel and f ailure to observe the motor vessel li g ht law. The appellant applied for pretria l diversion and has twice be en de nied. I n the ins tant a pp e a l, t he a pp e lla nt c ha lle ng e s th e pr os e c uto r’ s se c on d d e nia l of his

a pp lic a tio n f

or pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion

. Up on our r e vie w o f t he re c or d a

nd the pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e re ve rs e the judg ment of the trial c ourt upholding the prosec utor’s denial of diversion a nd rema nd to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 9 Int e r loc ut or y A ppe al; Judg m e ntof t he Ci r c uitCo ur t i s R e ve r se d; Ca se Re m ande d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., joined. D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., filed a se parate conc urringopinion.

Robert T. Carte r, Tullahoma, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Russell L . Tipton.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Atto r

n e y G e n e r a l and

Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T ur

ne r, As sis tant A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Mik e Ta ylor , D istri c t Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l; and Ste ve n M. B lou nt, As sis tant Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

A Fr anklin County

Gra nd J ury indicted the appellant for one count of rec kless or neg lige nt op e ratio n o f a mo to rbo at or vess e l, a Cla ss Amis de me ano r, and on e c ount o f f

a ili ngto e xhibi t proper lights on a boat or vessel, a C lass C misdemeanor. On May 23, 2002, the appe llant applied for pr etrial diver sion, which application was denied. The appellant f iled in the trial court a

petition for a writ of ce rtiorar i, and the petition was denied on September 23, 2003. Thr oug h an interloc utory appea l to this court, the a ppellant cha lleng ed the de nial of pre trial diversion.

Th e re c or d o f t

his c a se re fl e c ts that on J uly 4, 20 02 , th e a

pp e lla nt a nd his wi fe we re on

the ir po nto on bo a t on Ti m’ s F or d L ake . T he y ha d s top pe d th e bo a t on

th e so ut h si de of

a c ha nn e l toFore ns i c t es t i ng i ndi cat es t hat t he s ki b oat o pera t or’ s b l oo d al cohol l eve l was

. 08 per cen t an d t hat he t es t ed 1

p o sitive fo r te tra h yd ro c a n n a b ino id . T h e e igh te e n -yea r-o ld vic tim ’s b lo o d a lc o h o l l e v e l wa s .1 2 p e rc e n t.
-2- watch f irewor ks. At approximately 9:00 p.m., a ski boat containingsever al y oung men struck the back of the pontoon boat. One of the passeng ers of the ski boat, J ames Er ic J ones, wa s thrown from 1 the ski boat, and he ultimately drowne d. The State claimed that the a ppellant’s pontoon boat wa s operating without proper lights and char g ed the appellant with rec kless operation of a motor vessel and fa ilure to observe the motor vessel lig ht law.

Th is c ourt ’s op ini on

re mand ingthe or ig ina l de nia l of pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion

e xpla ins : On May 23, 2003, the [appellant] subm itted a n application for pretria l diversion. I n a letter d enying the [appellant’s] application, the District Attorney

Gene ral noted the seriousness of the offe n se, the need f or deterre nce, a

nd the [appellant’s] failure to ac cept
re sp on sib ili ty or feel re mor se fo r h is a c tio ns . In s up po rt of his po sit ion , th e Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l ind ic a te d th a t th e [ap pe lla nt] fa i l e d t o an s w e r

“ qu e s t i o n# 3 2 , ” w h i c ha s k e d f o r t h e [a p p e l l ant’ s]

re c itatio n o f th e ev e nts in q ue sti on . H ow e ve r, the [ap pe lla nt] contends that he did not ref use to r espond, but r ather attache d a copy of his statement to authorities followingthe incident. The letter de nyingdiv e rs ion a lso no te d sev e ra l f a c tor s w hic h w e re fa

vo ra ble to the [appellant], such as his lack of a crimin al re co rd, his social history , his amenability

to corre ction, and his “attitude and be havior since a rre st and attitude of law enfor ceme nt.” Howeve r, the District Attorney Gene ral ult imately

summarily

conclude d that the “other fa ct o rs consider ed her ein outweig h[ed] ” these fac tors and denie d diversion.
Followingthe District Attorney Gene ral’s de n i al of pre trial diversion, the [appellant] filed a petition for wr it of cer tiorari. In an order denying the petition, the trial cou rt found t hat the District Attorney Gene ral c onsidered a

nd weig hed all re levant fa ctors as se t
out in c a se law a

nd that su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e e xiste d in the re c or d to support the dec ision. According ly , the trial cour t found that there was no abuse of

discretion on the pa

rt of the District Attorne y

Gene ral a nd de nie d th e wr it o f c e rt ior ari

.
State v. Russell L . Tipton, No. M 2 003-03030-CCA-R9-CO, 2005 WL1240174, at **1-2 (T enn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 24, 2005).

On a pp e a l, t his c ourt c on c lud e d th a t th e Di st

r i c t A ttor ne y Ge ne ra l “ ba se d th e de nia l pr ima ri ly

on a g e ne ra l ne e d f

or de te rr e nc e and

th e ser io usne ss o f t

he a lle g e d o ff

e ns e , w hil e fa ili ngto-3-

emphasize the [ appellant’ s] amena bility to corr ection.” I d. at *3. Fur ther, thi s court noted that the denial “le tter fa il[ ed] to state why the forme r ar e of ‘ such over whelming signific ance ’ as to be g iven controlling weig ht.” I d. Thus, we concluded that “the denial is contrar y to the applicable prec edent and, ther efor e, re mand[ed] t he matter to the District Attorney Gene ral for f urther c onsideration of these fa ctors, the e vidence supporting t h ei r application, and the appr opriate w eig ht to be g iven them.” I d.
Upon re mand, the prose cutor onc e ag ain denied the application. In the deni al letter, the prosec utor stated that he c onsidered

(1) the c ircumstance s of th e o ff ense; (2) the [appellant’s] criminal

re c or d; ( 3) the [ap pe lla

nt’ s] so c ia l hi sto ry ; (4) the [ap pe lla nt’ s] phy sical and me ntal condition; (5) the dete rre nt effe ct of punishment up on oth e r c ri min a l a c tiv ity ; (6 ) the [ap pe lla nt’ s] ame na

bil ity to
corr ection; (7) the likelihood that pretrial div ersion will “ser ve the ends of justice” and the best interests of the defe ndant and the public;

and (8 ) th e [ap pe lla

nt’ s] “ a tti tud e , b e havio r s inc e arr e st, ho me environment, e m o t i o nal stability , and attitude of la w enf orce ment.”
Reg ardingthe circ umstances of the offense, the pr osecutor ma intained that “[a]lthough the [appellant] was indicted for misdemea nor cha rg es (A a nd B misdemea

nors), his ac tions and the results of his ac tions (the death of a y o u n g person) makes this a ver y serious ca se. The circ umstances of

the offe nse ce rtainly

weig h ag ainst diversion.” The prosec utor noted that the appellant lac ked a c riminal rec ord but opine d that “nea rly ever y applicant f

or pre -trial diver sion has no criminal re cord, a s a re cord usua lly prec ludes an individual from be ing e ligible to fi le an application for

divers i o n

. ” T he prose cutor found that the appellant’ s lack of a criminal re cord weig hed in favor of diver sion.

Th e pr os e c uto r c on sid e re d th e a pp e lla nt’ s so c ia l hi sto ry

and no te d th a t th e a

pp e lla nt

is a re tir e d la

w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic er wi th 25 y e ars se rv ic e . H is application conta ined numerou s ref ere nces, inc luding letter s from politicians and lawy ers. We noted t he [ appellant] has been marr ied three times and has ver

y few fi n an ci al debts. We also noted he ha s been involved in two police org anizations and the Americ an L eg ion. Ex c e p t f o r t h e [a p p e l l an t ’ s ] i s s u e s w i t h m u l t i p l e s p o u s e s , i two uld appea r that this fac tor weig hs in favor of the [appellant].

Howeve r, the prose cutor e x presse d displeasure that the appellant, a re tired law e nforc ement off icer who spent his car eer enfor cing the l aws, “violated Tenne ssee’ s laws, with disastrous results. One might expect more from a 25 year veter an of la

w enf orce ment.”Q u e stio n 1 1 o n the a p p lica tio n a sk s fo r th e a p p lica n t t o c h e c k a b o x to ind ic a te the lev e l o f his o r h e r IQ , i f 2

su c h is kn o w n

. -4- Th e pr os e c uto r n ote d that the a pp e lla nt’ s phy sic a l and

me nta l c on dit ion

a pp e ar t o w e ig h in favor of pre trial diversion. Reg ardle ss, t h e p rosecutor noted that the a ppellant fa iled to answer question 11 on the application reg ardingintelligenc e leve l. The prose cutor al s o ref ere nced the 2 petitioner’s re sponse of no to the question of whether he had ever had a psy cholog ical eva luation,

rema rking that the petitioner’s history as an office r indicates that “he was subjec ted to psy cholog ical testing in orde r to be a

cer tified offic er.”
The prose cutor nex t stated t hat deterrenc e was a “serious issue” we ighingag ainst diversion. The prose cutor a sserted that “[i] n the past sever al y ear s there have been numerous boating cra shes

and se ve ra l de a ths and inj ur ie s. Th e re e xists a str on g pu bli c po lic y re g ard ing wate r sa fe ty , e sp e c ia lly in Fra nklin County .” The prosecutor stated that the appellant’s “ac tions direc tly resulted in a boating collision and the d eath of a y oung man. Althoug h the [appellant] was not indicted for be ing criminally

responsible for

the y oung man’s death, criminal violations that can (a nd do) lea d to such conseque nces must be de terre d.” The ref ore, “[g]ranting him pre-tria l diversion would not serve a s
a de te rr e nt t o th is ty

pe of be havio r, e ith e r t o th e [ap pe lla nt], or oth e rs who mi ght be incl ine d to commit such acts.”
The prose cutor a cknowledg ed that t h e appellant’s “lack of a cr iminal recor d and socia l background see m to support the pos ition that he would likely be amenable to corr ection.” H oweve r, the prosec utor opined that the a ppellant “ha s shown no remorse or re sponsibili ty for his ac tions.” The prosec utor believe d that the appe llant was eva sive in providing de tails about the incident, and, thus, this factor weig hed ag ainst diversion. The prosec utor’s belief stemmed almost entirely from the appe llant’s failure to admit his guilt.

Th e pr os e c uto r m a int a ine d th a t th e a pp e lla nt “ avo idi ngre sp on sib ili ty fo r h is c on du c t” wo uld not serve the ends of justice or the best intere sts of the victim, the victim’s family , or the public. The pr os e c uto r o pin e d th a t be c a us e the a pp e lla nt is a ve te ra n la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r, “ [t]he re is a

c on c e rn that th e pu

bli c may pe rc e ive that the [ap pe lla nt] h a s avo ide d p ro se c uti on and re sp on sib ili ty for his cr iminal conduct bec ause of his positi on and his political c onnections.” This fa ctor we ighe d ag ainst diversion

. Finally , the prosec utor found that the a ppellant’s “‘ attitude and beha vior since

arr est, home environment, stability , and attit ude of law enforce ment’” weig hed in favor of diversion. Spe c if ic a lly , th e State ob se rv e d that the a pp e lla nt ha d no t be e n c ha

rg e d wi th any of

fe ns e s si nc e his instant arre st, and he a

ppear ed to have a stable home environment.
The prose cutor we ighe d the fa ctors and “unequivoca lly conclude [d] that this is not an appropr iate ca se for

diversion.” The prosec utor conclude d that pretria l dive rsion “will not serve the ends of justice a

nd will not serve the be st i n t er es t s o f the de cea sed, the de cea sed’s fa mily , or the publi c. ” Fo l l o wi n g the denial, the a ppellant ag ain filed in the trial c ourt a pe tition for a writ of

cer tiorari, which w as summarily denied. The appellant then a ppeale d to this court, challeng ing the denial of pr etrial diver sion.-5- II. Ana lys is

Th e pr e tr ia l di ve rsio n prog ra m pe rm its a

pr os e c uto r t o s us pe nd

pr os e c uti on

a g a ins t a qu a lif ie d de fe nd ant fo r up to tw o y e ars

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 15 -1 05 (a )( 1) (A ) ( 20 03 ); State v. B e ll, 69 S.W .3d 171, 176 (Tenn. 2002) . A def endant is elig ible for pr etrial diver sion when he or she
(1) ha s not previously

been grante d diversion; (2) h as no prior misdemeanor conviction for which conf inement was se rved; (3) has no prior fe lony conviction within a five- y ear period a fter c ompleting the sentenc e or pr obationary period for the conviction; and (4) is not

c harged wi th a c la ss Afe lony , a

c la ss B fe lony , c e rt a in c la ss C felonies, a

sexual o ffe nse, drivingunder the influence , or vehic ular assault.

Be ll, 69 S.W .3d at 176; see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15- 105(a) (1)( B) (i)(a )-( c) ( 2003).
Statutory elig ibilit y for pretrial diversion does not entitle a defe ndant to diversion. State v. Curry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999) . A prosec utor, in his or her di s cr et i o n , m u st make the deter mination whether to g rant diver sion. I d. I n deter mining whe ther to g rant a defe ndant pre trial diversion, the prose cutor “ should focus on the de fenda nt’s amena

bility to corre cti o n

. ” Bell, 69 S.W .3d at 176. Thus, “[a]ny fac tors which tend to acc urate ly ref lect whe ther a

particula r def endant will or will not become a r epeat offende r should be considered.” State v. Hammer sley , 650 S.W .2d 35 2, 35 5 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) . O ur su pr e me c ourt

ha s e xpla ine d th a t
[a] mong the fac tors to be considered in addition t o the circ umstances of the off ense a re the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord, social history , the phy sical and me ntal condition of the def endant whe re a

ppropriate , and the likelihood that pre trial diversion wil l serve the ends of justi ce and the be st interest of both the public and the defe ndant.

I d.

I f a pr osecu t o r d enies pretrial diversion, the de nial must be written and must elucidate the fac tors considere d as well as the weig ht a ttributed to e ach f

actor . Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 157. In the event pr etrial diver sion is denied, a def endant may

appea l by

filing in the tria l court a petition f or a writ of c e rti o r ar i. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 1 5

- 1 0 5 ( b ) ( 3 ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. T h e tr ia l c o u rt mu s t c o n s ider the eviden c e c o n s id e r e d b y th e p r o s e c u to r an d ma y o v e rtu r n th e d e c is io n o n ly if th e p r o s e c u to r has abused his or he r discre tion. Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 177. On appe al, this court “must deter mine whether the trial cour

t’s decision i s supported by a prepondera nce of the evidence.” Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 158.

Rece ntly , our supreme court cautioned t hat “a district attorney g ener al is bound to consider

and we ig h a ll relev ant

fac tors in determining whether to gr ant pre trial diver s i o n. The obvious-6-

c or oll ary to thi s re qu ir e me nt is that the dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l mu st av oid

relying upon irrelevant fa c tor s in de nying div e rs ion .” State v. Mc Ki m, 21 5 S.W. 3d 78 1, 78 7 (T e nn

. 20 07 ). F a ili ngin t his task constitutes a

n abuse of discretion. I d. at 788. Moreove r, an a buse of discr etion exis ts “wher e the prosec utor fai l s t o consider a ll the releva nt fac tors or re ache s a dec ision not supported by

su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e .” State v. Th omp so n, 18 9 S.W. 3d 26 0, 26 6 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). Our c a se law has ma de it patently clea r that in deter

mining whe ther a

defe ndant is suitab l e for pr etrial div e rs ion, a pro sec uto r’ s d uty is t o f oc us on that de fe nd ant’ s ame na

bil ity to c or re c tio n a nd to consider a ll releva

nt fac tors, including those favor able to the de fenda nt. Be ll, 69 S.W .3d at 178.

I n our first opinion on this matter, we noted that the prosec utor based the denial of pr etrial diversion on a “g ener al need for deterre nce and t he seriousness of t he allege d offe nse whil e fa iling to emphasize the [appellant’s] ame nability to c orre ction.” Tipton, No. M2003-03030-CCA-R9-CO, 2005 WL 1240174, at *3. We r emande d the matter for “fur ther considerati o n o f t h e pertinent fac tors, a discussion of those fa ctors and the evidenc e supportingth ei r application, and an

e xp la n a ti o no f th e w e igh t a c c o r d e d

to e a c h

. ” I d

. a t * 4

. Up o nr e ma n d , th e p r o s e c u to r

s tate d th a t “ [i ]t seems appa

rent to us that [in t he orig inal denial] we prope rl y l isted the evidenc e conside red, w e discussed which f

actor s were considere d, and the we i gh t accorde d eac h fac tor. . . . The C.C.A. obviously disag ree d. We will now attempt to articulate a response that more a dequate ly complies with the C.C.A.’s de cision.” Ultimately , the prosec utor ig nored the dictates of our orig inal opinion and ag ain denied pr etrial diver sion, finding that the “ circ umstances/fa cts of this case , the deter renc e issue, the [appellant’s] non-a menability to c orre ction, and the f act that justice w ould not be serve d by diversion all combine to g ive controllingweig ht [ ag ainst diversion] in t his case.”

I nitially , we note that in the denial letter the prosec utor stated that the char g ed offe nses wer e
a Cla ss Amis de me ano r a nd a Cla ss B mis de me ano r. How ever , th e of fe ns e s are a

Cla ss A misdemeanor a

nd a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-9-219( a) (2006). Moreover, in the instant case, the prosec utor orig inal l y found the a

ppellant amena

ble to corr ection. I nexpli cably , upon rema

nd the prosec utor, based upon the same fa cts as bef ore, f ound that the

a pp e lla nt w a s not

amena ble to corr ection. As support for this position, the prosecutor a g ain noted that the appel l an t did not answer que stion 32 on the application which a sked for the appe llant’s

ve rs ion of e ve nts

. Th e pr os e c uto r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e a pp e lla nt i nc lud e d w ithhis a

pp lic a tio n h is state me nt t o p oli c e re g ard inge ve nts , w hic h state me nt wa s mad e imm e diate ly fo llo wi ngthe inc ide nt. Howeve r, the prose cutor labe led the appe llant’s behavior in attachingthe statement “ evasi v e,” indic at i n g t h at he was not amena ble to corr ection. Reg ardle ss, the prosec utor admitted that the appellant’ s lack of a criminal rec ord and his soc ial background, despite his three marria g es, “se em to support” that he would be amena ble to corr ection.
Although the prosec utor claimed that the sec ond denial would attempt to comply with our decision followingthe orig inal denial of pr etrial diver sion, he ag ain fa iled to follow the l aw as to the applicability

of pre trial diversion. For example, we fail to see that the a ppellant was “ evasive ” about providing details reg ardingthe incident. Shortly afte r the acc ident, the appellant g ave a statement to police. The a

ppellant included a

copy of t hat s tatement with his application for dive rsion. I n the state me nt, the a

pp e lla nt s a id t ha t he be lie ve d th a t th e lig hts on his bo a t w e re in o pe ra

tio n at th e tim e-7-

of the a ccide nt. T he prose cutor opined that the evidenc e in the ca se did not support that assertion. Th is c ourt

ha s r e pe a te dly

he ld that a pr os e c uto r may no t e sse nti a lly re qu ir e a de fe nd ant t o a dmi t hi s or her g uilt to obtain pretria l diversion. Thompson, 189 S.W .3d at 268. Despite our case law to the contra ry , the tenor of the prose cutor’s de nial in the instant case is c lear : absent an unqua lified mea culpa f rom the appe llant, the prosec utor will not fi n d t h e appellant suit able f or pre trial diversion. To requir e a c omplete admission of g uilt before grantingpretria l d i v ersion is improper a nd

c on sti tut e s an a

bu se of dis c re tio n. I d. We c on c lud e that su bsta nt ia l e vid e nc e do e s n ot e xist to support denying pr etrial diver sion on this basis.

Mo re ov e r, in c on sid e ri ngthe a pp e lla nt’ s ame na

bil ity to c or

re c tio n, the pr os e c uto r f

avo ra bly acknow ledg ed the sixt y -y ear -old ap p el l an t’s lack of a cr iminal hist ory

but affor ded it minimal weig ht, rea soning that almost all pretria l diversion applicants have no cr iminal recor d. This court ha s p re vio us ly

state d th a t

a def endant’ s criminal history – espec ially a l a ck the reof – is an important signifie r of whe ther the de fenda nt is li kely

to offend a g ain. That is, a defenda

nt’s criminal hi story is a critical fac tor to consider in evaluatinghis or her a

menability

to corre ction: the primary focus require d in evaluatinga re quest for pr etrial diver sion.

Th omp so n, 18 9 S.W. 3d a t 26 7 (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. A “ re fu sa l to g ive any fa vo ra ble we ight to th is fa c tor is a re fu sa l to a c c or d a

ny sig nif ic anc e to a fa c tor re pe a te dly str e sse d b y Te nn e sse e ’s a

pp e llate
c ourt s a s c ru c ia l to the c omp re he ns ive ana ly sis re qu ir e d of dis tr ic t atto rn e y s in ass e ssi nga re qu e st fo r p re tr ia l di ve rs ion .” I d. Th us , th e pr os e c uto r a bu se d h is d isc re tio n b y

re fu sin g to p ro pe rl y consider this fa ctor. I d. We c onclude that this fa ctor weig hs heavily in f avor of the g rant of pr etrial div e rs ion , s pe c if

ic a lly be c a us e it i nd ic a te s f

avo ra bly tow ards th e a

pp e lla nt’ s ame na

bil ity to
corr ection.

I n denying dive rsion, the prosec utor noted seve ral times that the appellant was a for mer law enfor ceme nt office r; there fore , the appe llant’s violation of t h e l aw was a disappointment. The pr os e c uto r a lso no te d his c on c e rn that if the a pp e lla nt we re g ra

nte d pr e tr ia l div e rsi on , t he pub lic

wo uld be lie ve tha

t th e a pp ell ant’ s st a tus a s f

or me r l aw e nf

or c e me nt a llo we d h im t o avo id prosec ution. The prosec utor weig hed this fac tor heavily ag ainst the g rant of dive rsion. This court has pre viously

cautioned that acts that ar e commi t t ed o ff- duty and do not re late to an of fende r’s public employ

ment should not impose a highe r standard of conduc t justi fying a denial of dive rsion. State v. L ane, 56 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); s ee al s o McKim, 215 S.W .3d at 787. There fore , the prosec utor impermissibly relied upon this irre levant fa ctor in deny ing dive rsion.

Finall y , th e p r o s e c u to r

n o te d th a t t h e f a c ts an d c ir c u ms ta

n c e s o f th e c a s e an d

d e te rre nce weig hed ag ainst the g rant of pr etrial diver sion. I n making that deter mination, the prosecutor

relied heavily on the fact that a death occur red. “[W ]hi le t he circumstance s of t he case and the need for deter renc e may be considere d as two of many fac tors, they cannot be g iven controlling we ig ht u nle ss they are ‘of suc h overwhelming sig nificanc e t h at they [necessar ily ] out weig h all other fa ctors.’”-8-

State v. Washington, 8 6 6 S.W .2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting State v. Markham, 755 S.W .2d 85 0, 85 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 )) . Abs e nt s uc h e xce pti on a l c ir c ums tanc e s, the pr os e c uto r m us t consider the defe ndant’s ame nability to corre ction and the likelihood that the def endant will not commit further c rimes. I d.
Although the prosec utor ac knowledg ed that the of fense s for whic h th e a

ppellant was indicte d

wer e misdemea

nors, he never

theless stated that the f

act that a death oc curr ed made the ca se a “ very serious” one . Howeve r, “[t] he fa cts and c ircumstance s of nea rly all crimin al o ff

en s es are by definition se r io us”; thus, all fac tors must be examined to identify those suitable for pr etrial diver sion. Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 158. All fac tors must be considere d becaus e whe n “the f acts a nd circ umstances a

re g iven conc lusive weig ht a g ainst a defe ndant’s potential for corr ection, rar e is the defe ndant who would qualify for pr etrial diver sion.” I d. at 159.
The prose cutor opined that “cr iminal violations that can ( and do) le ad t o [ d ea th] must be de te rr e d. ” I n oth e r wo rd s, the pr os e c uto r i mpl ie d th a t pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion is n ot a pp ro pr iate in a

ny c a se in which a death occurr ed. Respec tfully , our leg islature has de emed diff ere ntly . Our lawis clear

that diversion may

not be denied simply beca use an offe nder is char g ed with a particular ty pe of of fense

. Thompson, 189 S.W .3d at 268. We are cog nizant of the trag ic eve nts und er l y i n g the ca se at ba r; ho we ve r, “ [t]o d e ny the a pp e lla nt div e rs ion be c a

us e his c ri me inv olv e d d e a th w ou ld b e ins e rt int o
o u r p r e t r i a l d i v e r s i o n

s t a tu t e a p r e r e qu i s i t e w h i c ht h e l e g i s l a tu r e c h o s e t o o m i t

. ” S t a t e v

. J a c k i e L. Bla nkenship, No. 02C01-9210-CC-00236, 1993 WL379193, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Sept. 29, 1993). As our supre me cour t rec ently stated:

Con tr ary to e sta bli sh e d p re c e de nt, the [p r o s e c ut o r ] i n th is c a se focuse d not on the [appellant’s] amenability to corre ction but rather

on his ow n o pin ion

of wh a t sh ou ld a

nd sh ou ld no t be a

div e rt ibl e offe nse. I n so doing, the [prosecutor] c onsidered a fac tor not releva

nt to h is d e te r

mi n a ti o no f

w h e th e r to g r an t p r e tr ia l d iv e r s io nto the defe nd an t i nth is matt e r

. T h e p r o s e c u to r ’ s c o n s id e r a ti o no f , and emphasis upon, an irr eleva nt fac tor s o t ainted his dec ision-making proce ss as to constitute an abuse of discre tion.
McKim, 215 S.W .3d at 788. Thus, sub s t an t i al evidenc e did not exis t to support denying pr etrial diversion on this basis.

We n ote tha

t wh e n the a

pp e lla nt f ile d a pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f c e rt ior ari , th e tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld have inf ormed the pr osecutor that he had a bused his disc retion bec ause the denial of pr etrial diversion was obviously based upon irrele vant fa ctors. I d. at 788-89. Or dinarily , the prope r re medy would be to re mand to the prosec utor for f urther c onsideration. Bell, 69 S.W .3d at 180. However, following this court’s remand, the prosec utor and the trial court a g ain fa iled to corre ctly focus the inquiry upon the appe llant’s suitabilit y for pretria l dive rsion. Upon re mand, the prose cutor found that cer tain fac tors weig hed in favor of diver sion. Howeve r, the prose cutor a g ain ruled, based upon irrele vant consider ations and fa ctors, that the evidence weig hed aga inst diversion. Addit ionally , the-9-

prosec utor staunchly

ref used to focus on the appe llant’s lack of a cr iminal hist ory

and his positive social hi story , which indi cate the appellant’s amena bility for corre ction, as we ighty fac tors favor ing diversion. B eca

use there is no substantial evidence to support the decision of the pr osecutor, w e ar e
c omp e lle d to re ve rs e the pr os e c uto r’ s d e nia l of pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion

and re mand to t he tr ia l c ourt

wi th an instruction that pre trial diversion is to be g rante d.

III. Conclusi on

Ba sed upon the fore g oing, we reve rse the prosec utor’s denial and rema nd to the trial court for the e ntry

of an or der g rantingpretria l diversion.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE