UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

CREDITORS INSURANCE PURCHASING GROUP, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JOHN D. DOAK, Commissioner of Insurance, Defendant-Appellee. No. 13-6189 (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-01046-F) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
Creditors’ Insurance Purchasing Gr oup (CIPG) appeals from the district court’s order dismissing unde r Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) its action against John D. Doak, Oklahoma Commissi oner of Insurance. The sole issue presented on appeal is whethe r CIPG stated a plausible cl aim for declaratory relief that collateral protection insurance (CPI) is liability insurance under the definition set

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 14, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - out in the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906. We agree with the district court that CIPG did not stat e a plausible claim, and we therefore affirm th e dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND CIPG is a risk purchasing group (RPG) under the LRRA. 1 The members of CIPG consist of “Buy Here, Pay Here” used car dealers/creditors , who purchase CPI to cover similar exposures. CPI protect s the used car dealer s/creditors from loss when their collateral—the car so ld—is damaged or destroyed. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A ., 107 F.3d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that bank’s CPI program included umbrella policy cove ring bank’s interest in collateral and coverage is similar to comprehensive a nd collision coverage, be cause coverage is limited to smaller of damage to collateral or balance due on loan). CIPG purchased CPI for this exposure for its member s from a risk retention group (RRG). 2 CIPG and Mr. Doak informally disput ed whether CPI is liability insurance under the LRRA. They failed to resolve the issue, and CIPG brought suit. In its second amended complaint, CIPG sought a declaratory judgment th at CPI is liability

1 The LRRA defines a purchasing group as a group of members with similar businesses in terms of the liability to which they are expos ed and who purchase liability insurance for the group “to cover thei r similar or related liability exposure.” 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(5)(A)-(C).
2 The LRRA defines RRG as “any corporation or other limited liability association . . . whose primary activity consis ts of assuming and spreading all, or any portion, of the liability exposure of its gr oup members.” 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4)(A).- 3 - insurance under the LRRA. Mr. Doak moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that CIPG did not plead facts showing that CPI covers legal risk for damages to others under the LRRA. The di strict court granted the motion, finding that CPI is not liability insurance under th e LRRA because CIPG failed to allege facts showing that CPI protect s the used car deal ers/creditors from “legal liability for damages” to others as the LRRA re quires, 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(2).
II. ANALYSIS We review de novo a district court’ s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting “as true all well-pleaded fact ual allegations in the compla int and view[ing] them in the light most favorable to [the non-movant].” SEC v. Shields , 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). “T o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffi cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is pl ausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also , “[w]e review the district court’s interpretation of a fede ral statute de novo.” United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah , 472 F.3d 702, 710 (10th Ci r. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether the district court co rrectly determined th at CIPG failed to state a plausible claim that CPI meets the definition of lia bility insurance under the LRRA, we first look to the statutory language. See Ctr. for Legal Advocacy v.
Hammons , 323 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10t h Cir. 2003) (“When inte rpreting the language of- 4 - a statute, the starting point is always the language of th e statute itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “If the langua ge is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute controls.” Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). The LRRA defines “liability” in rele vant part as “legal liability for damages . . . because of injuri es to other persons, damage to their property, or other damage or loss to such other persons re sulting from or arising out of . . . any business . . . , trade, product, services . . . , premises, or ope rations.” 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(2)(A)(i). Under the Act, “liab ility” expressly “does not include personal risk liability and an employer’s liability with resp ect to its employees other than legal liability under the Federal Em ployers’ Liability Act.” Id . § 3901(a)(2)(B). Like the district court, we conclude that this statut ory language clearly requires that the insured be liable for damages to another person due to damage to that person’s property. CIPG has no liability to another for damages. Instead, CPI is a first-party liability policy, where the dealers/creditors make claims with their own insurance company for damages to the buye r/debtor’s property, which serves as collateral for the dealers/cred itors. CPI only insures the dealers/credito rs for their losses. CIPG agrees that CPI “was designed to pr otect a creditor, in this case, a used car dealer/creditor, from any loss it might suffer when the property of another, in this case a car buyer, was damaged or destroyed either by the buye r or some third party.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10. Bu t it contends that the LRRA does not require liability to- 5 - another; rather, it only requi res that the liability arise out of the damage to the property of another, without a third-part y requirement. In other words, CIPG believes that “payment under a CPI policy is triggered by damage to the property of the buyer, ie [sic] ‘another’ under the LRRA .” Aplt. Br. at 17. CIPG, however, misreads the statutory requirement for “l egal liability for damages . . . because of . . . damage to [another person’s] pr operty.” 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(2)(A)(i). CPI protects the dealers/credit ors from their own losses. At no time does CPI require them to pay damages to anyone. And the fact that CPI is not expressly listed as an exclusion under the LRRA does not change the clear requirement under the LRRA of liability for damages. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that CIPG has not asserted sufficient facts to stat e a plausible claim that CPI fits within the definition of liability insurance set forth in the LRRA . We therefore affirm the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
III. CONCLUSION The judgment of the dist rict court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge