Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2911 | May 12, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Sean P. Hilgendorf 

South Bend, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Megan M. Smith 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cynthia Miller,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

May 12, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2911

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court 

The Honorable Julie P. Verheye, 

Magistrate 

Trial Court Cause No.

71D04-1903-CM-884 

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2911 | May 12, 2020 Page 2 of 6

[1] Cynthia Miller appeals and claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain her 

conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a 

class A misdemeanor. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 1, 2019, Indiana State Trooper Kyle Glaze heard the South Bend 

Police Department advise of a hit-and-run and responded to the scene. When 

he arrived, he noticed other units at the scene in a cul-de-sac and another officer 

speaking with Miller. Trooper Glaze observed from a distance of twenty to 

thirty feet that Miller was visibly swaying. He approached Miller and asked her

“questions as to if she had been driving, the crash, and drinking.” Transcript 

Volume II at 5. Miller stated that she had been driving the vehicle and had 

accidentally struck the other vehicle. Trooper Glaze asked about her drinking, 

and she admitted to drinking two beers. He noticed her speech was slurred and 

at times it was difficult to understand her. Trooper Glaze asked Miller which 

vehicle she had been driving, and she pointed to a vehicle behind her in a 

driveway. He did not see damage to her vehicle. He noticed minor damage to 

a Honda Pilot and spoke with the victims. Trooper Glaze then attempted to 

administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus test several times. However, Miller 

“seemed either belligerent or incoherent to be able to successfully follow 

directions in order to complete the test.” Id. at 8. He observed her eyes were 

bloodshot and glossy. According to Trooper Glaze, prior to transporting her to 

the jail and “while observing her clothing, it appeared that her groin area was 

saturated wet.” Id. at 10. Another officer transported Miller to the jail. At the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2911 | May 12, 2020 Page 3 of 6

jail, Trooper Glaze administered the walk-and-turn test, and Miller exhibited 

seven indicators of intoxication which was considered failure. 

[3] The State charged Miller with: Count I, operating a vehicle while intoxicated 

endangering a person as class A misdemeanor; Count II, operating a vehicle 

while intoxicated as a class C misdemeanor; and Count III, leaving the scene of 

an accident as a class B misdemeanor. At a bench trial, the State presented the 

testimony of Trooper Glaze. On cross-examination, when asked if he knew 

how much time elapsed between the neighbors reporting an accident and for the 

police to respond, Trooper Glaze responded he believed the approximation 

given by the victims was five to ten minutes. Miller’s defense counsel moved 

for a directed verdict and argued there was “no proof that she was driving, 

except for what an officer had heard and provided to the Court.” Id. at 17. The 

court found the State did not meet its burden with respect to Count III and 

granted Miller’s motion for a directed verdict as to that count. The court found 

her guilty on Counts I and II, stated Miller admitted to drinking a couple of 

beers, had been driving, and hit a car, and said “[c]ertainly, that’s conduct that 

could have endangered a person.” Id. at 24. The court entered judgment of 

conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a 

class A misdemeanor under Count I, sentenced Miller to sixty days with fiftyfive days suspended, and placed her on probation for one year. 

Discussion 

[4] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we 

must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2911 | May 12, 2020 Page 4 of 6

the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess 

witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting 

evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction 

unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome 

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. at 147. The evidence is sufficient 

if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. 

[5] Miller argues that, even if she was intoxicated at the time Trooper Glaze 

observed her, the conclusion that she had been driving while intoxicated was 

based solely on speculation and not inference. She argues Trooper Glaze did 

not see her operate a vehicle. She argues there was no evidence to link any 

intoxication to the time of any operation of a motor vehicle. 

[6] Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 provides “a person who operates a vehicle while 

intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor” and the offense “is a Class A 

misdemeanor if the person operates a vehicle in a manner that endangers a 

person.” “Intoxicated” means “under the influence of: (1) alcohol . . . so that 

there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal 

control of a person’s faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86. To operate a vehicle is 

to drive it or be in actual control of it upon a highway. Jellison v. State, 656 

N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 

prove that the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Id. 

Intoxication may be established through evidence of consumption of significant 

amounts of alcohol, impaired attention and reflexes, watery or bloodshot eyes, 
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an odor of alcohol on the breath, unsteady balance, failed field sobriety tests,

and slurred speech. Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),

opinion adopted, 929 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 2010). The element of endangerment can 

be established by evidence showing the defendant’s condition or operating 

manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or 

the defendant. Id. Endangerment does not require that a person other than the 

defendant be in the path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the same area to obtain 

a conviction. Id. 

[7] The record reveals that Trooper Glaze testified that Miller admitted she had 

consumed two beers and that he observed that she was visibly swaying, her 

speech was slurred, her eyes were bloodshot and glossy, and she failed the walkand-turn test. Further, when he asked her about the crash and if she had been

driving and drinking, Miller stated that she had been driving and had 

accidentally struck the other vehicle. Trooper Glaze testified that he asked 

Miller which vehicle she had been driving, and she pointed to a vehicle in the

driveway behind her. He also testified that he spoke with the victims and 

noticed minor damage to a Honda Pilot. Based upon the record, we cannot say 

the inferences made by the trier of fact were unreasonable. We conclude that 

evidence of probative value exists from which the court as the trier of fact could 

have found Miller guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated endangering a person as a class A misdemeanor. 

[8] Affirmed. 
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[9] Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.