### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 13, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KEWA N JA CKS ON
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 02-07016 J.C. M cLin, Ju dge

No. W2003-01917-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jun e 25, 2004

The a ppellant, Kew an J ackson, was found g uilty by a jury in the Shelby

CountyCriminal Court of criminally

neg lige nt homicide and re ckless ag g ravated assault. The appellan t received a total eff ective se ntence o f t h re e y ears in the Shelby CountyWorkhouse. On appe al, the appe llant challeng es the sufficiency of t he evidence supporting his convictions and the ref usal of the tria l court to r e mov e a jur or
. Up on ou r re vie w o f the re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of the trial c ourt.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined. Kevin E. Childress, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Kew an Jackson.
Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Patience Br anham a nd Vane ssa King , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
The a ppellant was indicte d by the S helby County Gra nd J ury for the voluntary manslaug hter of Eric B ur ks a ndfo r the a g g ra va te d a ssa ult of Corinthia

us Da nie ls. I n th e lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the State, the proof

adduce d at trial re veale d that a party was he ld on J uly

7, 2001, at the Af

ter Da rk Clu b o n A us tin Pe a y

Hi g hw a y in M e mph is. To pr e ve nt a ny on e fr om b ri ng ing dr ug s o r w e apo ns int o t h e c l u b , s e c u r i t y

p e r s o n n e l s e ar c h e d a t t e n d e e s p r i o r t o a d m i t t a n c e
. B u rk s w a s t h e d i s k j o c k e y ( D J) fo r the pa rt y . T he re fo re , h e arrive d a t th e c lub e arl y
. Da nie ls an d Ke vin De nto n, frie nd s o f B ur ks , arrive d a t th e c lub sh ortly a ft e r B ur ks

. L a te r i n th e e ve nin g , th e app e lla nt, a no the r f ri e ndof B ur ks ,-2-

arrived at the club. Bur

ks told se curity

to let the appellant into the party without pay ing a dmission.
Da nie ls spe nt mos t of the e ve nin g on the da nc e fl oo r, da nc ing by him se lf . De nto n s a t a t a ta ble ne ar the DJ bo oth . T he app e lla nt e nte re d the DJ bo othwi th B ur ks . D a nie ls s ho ute d a t B ur ks , reque sting that he chang e song s. Howeve r, beca use B urks was w earing a

headse t and the music wa s lou d, he wa s u na

ble to h e ar D a nie ls’ re qu e st. Da nie ls the n w a lke d to wa rdthe DJ bo oth to p e rs on a lly make his re quest. The appellant wa s standing on the steps of the DJ booth. W hen Da niels rea ched the booth, the appe llant walked of f the steps a nd shoved or bumped D aniels with his rig ht arm.
Af t ert h e c o n t ac t , t h e a p p el l an tre ac h ed i n t o t h e w ai s tb an d o f h i s p an t s an d wi t h d re w a Hi gh Point AC P .45 caliber pistol. When Daniels attempted to g rab the pistol, t he appe llant beg an firing multipl e shots. Daniels wa s struck seve ral times. Security personne l approa ched t he men a nd attempted to stop the alterc ation. Both Daniels and the appe llant fled outside. Danie ls sought cove r in an attempt to avoid furthe r shots. The appe llant fired a g ain outside the club. By the conc lusion of the incident, Danie ls had suffe red a total of five g unshot w ounds: one wound in his a

rm, one in his leg , one in his back, and two in his stomach. Daniels wa s hospitaliz ed for thre e day s as the re sult of his wounds. Additionally , Bur ks was killed by

a g unshot wound inside the club.
Se vera l a tte nd e e s a t th e pa rt y , n a me ly

Da nie ls, De nto n, Od e rria l Mo or e , a ndCha rl ie P at t erson, stated that the appe llant was the only person at the club in possession of a g un. Consist ently , the attende es maintained that the a ppellant “bumped” Daniels, then dr ew his we apon. Additionally , the attende es uniformly identified the a

ppellant as the shooter

. Police at the sce ne discove red a Hig h Point A C P

. 4 5 caliber pistol, spent rounds and
cartridg es, and live r ounds. One of the bullets a nd one of the c artridg es we re ide ntified as being fired f r o mt h e H i g h P o i n tp i s t o l

. M o r e o v e r , t h e M e d i c a l E x a m i n e r r e t r i e v e d a b u l l e t f

r o m B u rk s ’ b o d y, wh ic h b ull e t ha d b e e n f

ir e d f ro m th e Hi g h Po int

pis tol

. Contrastingly , at trial the a ppellant asse rt ed that he ca me to the party at B urks’ invitation. Da nie ls w a s “acti ng errat ic” on the da nc e fl oo r, sw ing ing his arm s a ndda nc ing wi ldl y . D a nie ls looked towar d the DJ boot h and beg an cur sing. Daniels approac hed the booth, uttered a rac ial slur toward the appellant, a nd moved his hand towar d his waistban d as i f t o rea ch for a we apon. The ap p el l an t wi t h d re w hi s Hi gh P o i n t AC P

. 4 5 ca l i b er p i s t o l t o i n t i m i d at e Da n i el s i n t o r e t r e a t i n g. Daniels g rabbe d the pistol and the appe llant’s hair. At that point, the appe llant shot Daniels.
The two m en s t ru g g led over the g un. Daniels ha d both hands on the appe llant’s g un. He turned the g un and s h o t the appe llant in the arm. Eventua lly , security intervene d. Daniels ra n outside while the ap p el l ant s tay ed in the club. The appellant e x plained to sec urity that he had a permit to car

ry the pi stol. After the i ncident, the appellant went to his g irlfriend’ s house. He w as later taken by

ambulance to the hospital where he wa s arr ested.-3-

Ba sed upon the for eg oing evidenc e, the jury convicted the appellant of the lesse r-include d offe nses of c rimin al l y n egl ige nt homicide and re ckless ag g ravated assault. At the se ntencing hearing, the trial court f

ound the appe llant to be a standa rd R an ge Ioffe nder. The court imposed sentenc es of two y ear s for the c ri m i n ally neg lige nt homicide conviction and thre e y ear s for the
rec kless ag g ravated assault convic tion. The trial court further order ed the se ntences to be serve d
c on c ur re ntl y . O n a

pp e a l, the app e lla nt c hal leng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su pp ortin g his convictions and the tria l court’s re fusal “to excuse a juror who was familiar with a member of the victim’s family .”
II. Ana lys is
A. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e On appe al, a jury

convict i o n re m o ves the pre sumption of the appellant’s innoce nce a nd repla ces it with one of g uilt, so that the appellant car ries the burden of

demonstrating to this court
w h y th e e v id e n c e w il l n o t s u p p o r t th e ju r y ’ s f in d in g s
. Se e St a te v
. T u g g le , 6 3 9 S. W. 2 d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The a

ppellant must establish that no “rea sonable trier of fa ct” could have f

ound the essential ele ments of the off ense bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2789 (1979); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e).
Acc ording ly , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable infere nces which may be draw n there from. See State v. Williams, 657 S .W.2d 405, 410 (Te n n
. 1 9 8 3 ). I n other wor ds, questions conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, a s well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e, ar e resolved by

the t rier of

fac t, and not the appe llate courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

. I n ord e r to pr ov e that the app e lla nt co mmi tte d the c ri min a lly ne g lig e nt h omi c ide of

B ur ks , the St a te w a s r e q u ir e d to p r o v e th a t th e ap p e ll a n t e n g a g e d in c r im in a ll y n e g li g e n t c o n duct which resulted in B urks’ de ath. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212( a) ( 1997). Tenne ssee Code A nnotated
se c tio n 3 9- 11 -3 02 (d ) ( 19 97 ) p ro vid e s:

“Criminal neg lige nce” ref ers to a p erson who a cts with criminal neg lige nce w ith respec t to the circumstanc es surrounding that person’ s conduct or the result of that conduct when t he person oug ht to be awa

re of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circ umstances e x ist or the result will occur

. The risk must be of such
a na tur e a nd deg re e that th e fa ilu re to p e rc e ive it c on sti tut e s a g ro ss de viatio n fr om the sta nd ardof c are that a n o rd ina

ry pe rs on wo uld exercise u n d er all the circumstanc es as view ed fr om the acc used person’ s standpoint.-4-

“I n other wor ds, the acc used must know, or should know , that his or her conduct, or the re sult of that conduct, will imperil the life of another g iven the cir cumstance s that exi st when the c onduct takes place .” State v. Ada ms, 916 S.W .2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. I n the instant case , in the light most favor able to the State, the fac ts a dduced at trial re veal that the appe llant brandished a loaded .45 c aliber pistol in a nig htclub filled with other people. The appellant f

ired re peate dly

into the small space, a nd one of the bul lets struck Burks, killing him. The S tate’s witnesse s testified that the appe llant was the only person in the c lub that night with a g un. Moreove r, the State’s w itnesses also stated that the a ppellant was the only

p er s o n i n t h e club sh oo tin g a

g un . We c on c lud e that th e app e lla nt kne w or sh ou ld h a ve kn ow n th a t hi s a c tio ns wo uld “imperil the life of

another g iven t he circumstance s that exis t[ ed] when the c onduct [took] place .” Adams, 916 S.W.2d at 474. According ly , this evidence i s sufficie nt to support the appellant’s conviction for criminally neg lige nt homicide. See S tate v. Onea l Sanford, No. E 1999-02089-CCAR3-CD, 2001 WL

681312, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J une 18, 2001).
I n order to prove that the a

ppellant committed the re ckless ag g ravated assault of Daniels, the State was re quired to pr ove that the appellant rec klessly cause d bodily injury to Daniels while using or display ing a

deadly wea pon. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-1 0 1 (a )( 1 ) and 39-13-102(a )(2) (1 99 7) . T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -3 02 (c ) p ro vid e s:

“ Re c kle ss” re fers to a

pe rs on wh o a c ts r e c kle ssl y wi th r e sp e c t to circ umstances surr o u n d ing the conduct or the re sult of the conduct when the person is a war e of but c onsciously disreg ards a substantial
a ndun jus tif ia ble ri sk that th e c ir c ums ta nc e s e xist o r the res ul t w ill
occur . The risk must be of suc h a nature and deg ree that its disreg ard constitutes a g ross deviation fr om the standard of car e that an ordinary person would exercise unde r all the c ircumstance s as viewe d fr om the a c c us e d p e rs on ’s sta nd po int

. I n the light most favor abl e t o the State, the proof at trial demonstra ted that the appe llant pointed his loaded pistol at Daniels, then he fired thewea pon at Danie ls. I n fac t, the appellant
conce ded that he shot Da niels. Daniels testified that he rec eived f ive g unshot wounds and still bears
scar s from t he wounds. Ag ain, t he appellant was the only person in the club that night with a g un. We c on c lud e that th is e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in the app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n f or re c kle ss a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. S e e S t a t e v
. M i c h a e l L e w i s , N o
. W 2 0 0 1

- 0 3 1 2 1

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 2 0 0 3 WL 1697689, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Ma r. 26, 2003).
The a ppellant’s main complaint re g arding the suffic iency of the e vidence i s t he jury ’s reje ction of h i s claim of self- defe nse. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-11-611(a ) (1997) pr ov ide s: A per son is just ified in threatening o r u s ing f orce ag ainst another pers o n when a nd to the deg ree the per son rea sonably believes the-5- forc e is immediately

nece ssary

to protect a g ainst the other’ s u s e or a tte mpt e d u se of

un la wf ul f or c e . T he pe rs on mus t ha ve a re a so na ble be lie f tha t th e re is an imm ine nt d a ng e r o f d e a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily injur y
. T h e d ang er c reating the be lief of imminent death or serious bodily injury must be rea l, or honestly

believed to be rea l at the time, and must be founde d upon rea sonable g rounds.
Self-def ense is esse ntially

a question of f

act to be de termined by the j ury
. See State v. Clifton, 880 S.W .2d 737, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App

. 1 9 9 4 ); State v. I vy , 868 S.W .2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). As such, “ in the conte x t o f j udicial re view of the jury verdic t, in order to pre vail, the [ap pe lla nt] m us t sh ow that th e e vid e nc e re la tiv e to ju st if ica tio n, su c h a s se lf

-d e fe ns e , r a ise s, a s a matter of la w, a r easona

ble doubt as to his conduct being criminal.” Clifton, 880 S.W .2d at 743. The only proof at trial supporting the appellant’ s claim of self- defe nse wa s his self-ser ving testimony . The State’s w itnesses uniformly testified that the appellant “bumped” Daniels, then dr ew h i s g u n
. A s t ru g g l e f

o r c o n t r o l o f t h e g u n b e g a n , r e s u l t i n g i n t h e s h o o t i n g o f D a n i e l s a n d B u rk s
. It is within t he jury ’s pre rog ative to ac cept or reje ct a claim of self-de fense

. See State v. Goode , 956 S.W .2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . We conclude that the jury was we ll within i ts purview to rejec t the appellant’ s claim of self- defe nse. B. Juror Disqualification As his final issue, the appe llant arg ues t hat t he trial court erre d in ref using to ex cuse a

juror who was f

amiliar wit h a member

of the victim’s fa mily . Gene rally , “[o] nce a jury is impaneled, jurors may

be discha rg ed fr om further

service prior to deliber ations only if found by

the trial court to be ‘una

ble or disqualified to pe rform their duties.’” State v. Cleve lan d , 9 59 S.W .2d 548, 551 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(e)(2) ). The de cision whether to discharg e a jur or and imp a ne l a n a lte rn a te jur or re sts wi thi n th e so un d d isc re tio n o f the tr ia l cou rt

. I d. As su c h, we wi ll not disturb the trial court’s de cision absent an a buse of that discr etion. At trial, Bur

ks’ mother testified c oncerning B urks’ non-violent nature

. At the conc lusion of he r t e sti mon y , a

jur or inf or me d the tr ia l c ou rt

that he re c og nize d B ur

ks ’ m oth e r a s th e mothe r o f h is sister-in-law ’s ex-boy friend. In other wor ds, the juror told the court t hat he kne w B urks’ brothe r. The juror stated t hat he was not close friends with the victim’s family ; he simplyknew them. The juror maintained that he did n o t re al i z e h e knew the fa milyuntil he saw B urks’ mother. H e explained that Burks a nd his mother had a dif fer ent surname than B urks’ brothe r.
The a ppellant objecte d to the juror’s continuing se rvice on the jury . Upon questioning by the trial court, the juror stated, “I don’t think it would have a bearing on my decision.” A dditionally , the jur or re pe a te dly a sse rt e d tha t he co uld be fa ir a ndimp art ia l, a ndhe ma int a ine d th a t he wo uldba se his decision upon the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l. The trial court, in its discretion, determined that the juror could be fair a nd impartial and re fused to re move t h e j u ro r. See State v. B ates, 804 S.W.2d-6-

86 8, 87 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in r e fu sin g to remove the cha lleng ed juror.
III. Conclusi on Finding no err or, we aff

irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE