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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW J. WISOTZKEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 245 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0007095-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 07, 2020

Appellant, Matthew Wisotzkey, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of seven and one-half to fifteen years of incarceration imposed after a jury 

convicted him of one count of persons not to possess firearms and two counts 

of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance.

1

 Specifically, 

Appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel, and 

he challenges the trial court’s January 19, 2016 order permitting counsel to 

withdraw and denying Appellant’s motion for appointment of co-counsel. After 

careful review, we affirm. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
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The underlying facts of the criminal charges against Appellant are not 

relevant to the disposition of this appeal. Accordingly, we simply note that 

the criminal charges were filed after searches of Appellant’s residence and a 

leased garage uncovered illegal narcotics and firearms. The procedural history

as recounted by the trial court however, is germane to the outcome of this 

case: 

[Appellant] was formally arraigned on December 2, 2014, 

and represented by privately-retained counsel, Shane Kope, Esq. 

On March 10, 2015, [Appellant] filed a counseled Omnibus Pretrial Motion challenging the constitutionality of the search of his

home and seizure of his firearms. A hearing was scheduled to 

convene on April 20, 2015, but was later moved to April 30, 2015. 

On April 30, 2015, Attorney Kope withdrew the Omnibus Pre-trial 

Motion and this matter was placed on the July 2015 trial docket.

On July 1, 2015, Attorney Kope filed a Motion for 

Continuance indicating [Appellant] discharged him from service. 

On July 9, 2015, this [c]ourt granted [Appellant] in forma pauperis

status and on July 10, 2015, during a status hearing, granted 

Attorney Kope’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Additionally, this 

[c]ourt continued [t]rial to September 8, 2015, and informed 

[Appellant] that he must retain counsel immediately as no further

continuances would be granted.

On September 3, 2015, [Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion 

for a Pre-trial Conference and on September 11, 2015, 

[Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion for Bail Reduction and Petition

for In Forma Pauperis status. On September 15, 2015, Joshua 

Neiderhiser, Esq., a York County assistant public defender, 

entered his appearance on [Appellant’s] behalf and on September 

30, 2015, this [c]ourt granted [Appellant] in forma pauperis

status. 

On October 14, 2015, this [c]ourt issued an Order 

scheduling a hearing on [Appellant’s] bail reduction motion for 

November 25, 2015. On November 25, 2015, at the conclusion 

of the hearing on [Appellant’s] bail reduction matter, this [c]ourt 

denied [Appellant’s] request. On December 4, 2015, Attorney 
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Neiderhiser filed a Petition for Nominal Bail which this [c]ourt

denied.

On December 31, 2015, at the behest of [Appellant] who 

had filed a “Motion for Waiver of Counsel,” Attorney Neiderhiser 

filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel citing [Appellant’s] desire 

to act in the capacity of co-counsel and file meritless motions. On

January 19, 2016, this [c]ourt convened a hearing on counsel’s

motion and subsequently issued an Order granting counsel’s

Motion to Withdraw but denying [Appellant’s] request for

appointment of co-counsel.

On January 20, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion for 

Discovery and on January 28, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a 

Petition for Transcription of Hearing Notes of January 19, 2016. 

On February 2, 2016, this [c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] request for 

a transcription of hearing notes. On February 18, 2016, 

[Appellant], pro se, filed a 50-page Omnibus Pre-trial Motion 

essentially renewing previously-filed and disposed pro se motions.

On April 4, 2016, and April 25, 2016, this [c]ourt issued 

Orders denying [Appellant’s] Omnibus Pre-trial Motion. On May 

9, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a motion renewing his request 

for internal police documents. On May 16, 2016, [Appellant], pro 

se, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of [Appellant’s] Motion in 

Limine and Motion for the Production of Witnesses. On May 27, 

2016, this [c]ourt continued [Appellant’s] trial to the July 2016 

trial term. On June 29, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion 

in Limine to bar the concealment of the identity of any confidential 

informant.

Following a jury trial July 19, 2016, through July 21, 2016, 

the jury unanimously convicted [Appellant] of all counts. On 

September 23, 2016, [Appellant] prematurely filed a PostSentence Motion. The [t]rial [c]ourt ordered a Pre-Sentence 

Investigation and deferred sentencing to September 27, 2016, at 

which time this [c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] as follows: five (5) 

to ten (10) years of imprisonment in a State Correctional 

Institution for Count 1; two and one half (2 1/2) to five (5) years 

of imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution for Count 2, to 

run consecutively to Count 1; and two (2) to four (4) years of 

imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution [for Count 3], to 

run concurrently with Count 2. [Appellant’s] aggregated term of 

confinement is seven and one half (7 1/2) to fifteen (15) years.
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On September 27, 2016, this [c]ourt appointed Jonelle 

Harter Eshbach, Esquire, to represent [Appellant] during appellate 

proceedings. [Appellant], pro se, filed an Amended Post-Sentence 

Motion on October 13, 2016. On April 3, 2017, [Appellant’s] PostSentence Motion was denied by operation of law. [Appellant] did 

not take [a] direct appeal.

On May 8, 2018, [Appellant], pro se, filed his first petition 

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. On June 4, 2018, this [c]ourt 

appointed Charles J. Hobbs, Esquire to represent [Appellant] in 

his PCRA litigation. On December 3, 2018, Attorney Hobbs filed a 

motion requesting an extension of time within which to amend 

[Appellant’s] PCRA motion which this [c]ourt granted on 

December 12, 2018.

On January 4, 2019, Attorney Hobbs filed an amended PCRA 

petition seeking reinstatement of [Appellant’s] direct appeal 

rights. On January 14, 2019, this [c]ourt granted Appellant’s

requested relief. On February 12, 2019, Appellant, by and 

through Attorney Hobbs, timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the 

Superior Court.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/19, at 3–6. 

Appellant raises the following issue for review:

Whether Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 

his right to counsel and invoked his constitutional right to selfrepresentation where the trial court never conducted an on-therecord colloquy in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 121?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted). 

Although stated as a single question, we understand Appellant’s claim 

to have two components. First, did the trial court err when it granted Attorney 

Neiderhiser’s motion to withdraw? We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition 

to withdraw under an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. 

Magee, 177 A.3d 315, 322 (Pa. Super. 2017). Second, did the court’s failure 
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to conduct a colloquy in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1212 deprive Appellant

of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. We interpret this 

____________________________________________

2 Rule 121 instructs:

(1) The defendant may waive the right to be represented by 

counsel.

(2) To ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to 

counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing 

authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from 

the defendant:

(a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the 

right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have 

free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent;

(b) that the defendant understands the nature of the 

charges against the defendant and the elements of each of 

those charges;

(c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of 

sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;

(d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives 

the right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all 

the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be 

familiar with these rules;

(e) that the defendant understands that there are possible 

defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of, 

and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be 

lost permanently; and

(f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to 

defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely 

asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur 

and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised 

by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently.

Pa.R.Crim. P. 121(1)(2).
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latter contention as a challenge to the trial court’s determination that 

Appellant forfeited, rather than waived, his right to counsel. Whether 

Appellant forfeited his right to counsel is a question of law over which our 

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Fill, 202 A.3d 133, 139 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Pa. 2009)).

Initially, we are compelled to address whether Appellant waived review of 

his claim that Attorney Neiderhiser was improperly permitted to withdraw as 

counsel. On or about December 30, 2015, Attorney Neiderhiser received a 

packet of motions that Appellant directed him to file. Motion to Withdraw, 

12/31/15, at ¶ 6. Included in the packet was a Motion for Waiver of Counsel

wherein Appellant averred that he and Attorney Neiderhiser “have approached 

an unbridgeable impasse in communications,” and that Attorney Neiderhiser 

“refuses to assist [Appellant] any further in defensive strategies.” Motion For 

Waiver of Counsel Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121(A)-(D), 1/4/16, 

at ¶¶ C, D. Appellant thus requested that Attorney Neiderhiser withdraw as 

counsel and that a pro bono attorney be assigned as “co[-]counsel.” Appellant 

further stated the he “fully understands his rights under the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Criminal Procedure: Rule 121 (A)-(D) inclusive.” Id. at ¶ G. When Attorney 

Neiderhiser received a copy of Appellant’s motion, he filed a motion to withdraw

averring that he and Appellant “have irreconcilable differences [that] has made 
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communication and representation nearly impossible.” Motion to Withdraw, 

12/31/15, at ¶ 9.

On January 19, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the two motions. 

The testimony reveals that Appellant did not object to the trial court’s 

decisions to grant Attorney Neiderhiser’s motion to withdraw and to deny 

Appellant’s request for appointment of co-counsel:

THE COURT: I feel like we have been in this position before. Am

I wrong, [Appellant]?

ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: I had to relieve Mr. Kope.

THE COURT: That’s what I thought. Are you planning to proceed

without a lawyer, because we are running out of options?

[APPELLANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I asked one to be pro bono, as 

co-counsel, so we don’t have this problem again.

ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: We have a conflict of interest, Your

Honor. He won’t allow me to submit any motions.

THE COURT: Well, when you have a lawyer, sir, you are not

allowed to submit any motions. Those are pretty simple Rules of

Procedure. When I have a motion the rules are filed by a lawyer 

because last time I checked you didn’t graduate from law school, 

is that correct?

[APPELLANT]: Correct.

THE COURT: You have to let your lawyer do his job.

[APPELLANT]: He refuses [to] submit any motions for me.

THE COURT: Attorney Neiderhiser?

ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: That’s correct, Your Honor. 

[Appellant] has requested numerous motions. The most 

important to him the suppression motion regarding the search

warrants in this case. Your Honor, I did review those facts. I

believe they are without merit and so ethically I am not able to

file them if I would have filed them anyway because they served

no purpose, Your Honor. I wouldn’t have filed them anyway.
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THE COURT: So, I am assuming based on your motion you wish 

to withdraw?

ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: Yes, Your Honor.

* * *

THE COURT: [Appellant], I don’t have your motion to have cocounsel in front of me, but according to what is alleged by

Attorney Neiderhiser in his motion to withdraw, I don’t think you

understand. You don’t get co-counsel. When you are not a 

lawyer, you are either going to represent yourself or let a lawyer

represent you. You have chosen not to let a lawyer represent

you now on two cases.

[APPELANT]: That’s fine, Your Honor, if that’s--

THE COURT: I have to say, I believe we had this same issue with

Attorney Kope. So, even if I took the time and the County’s 

money to get you another lawyer, I suspect he’s going to have 

the same response to you that he’s not going to file your motion 

to suppress. 

* * *

In the case of Commonwealth versus [Appellant], docketed 

at 7095 of 2014. This matter was on the trial list this morning. 

In addition, there are a number of motions outstanding, including

a motion to dismiss counsel and a motion for counsel to withdraw. 

We grant Attorney Neiderhiser’s motion to withdraw as counsel

in this case, as clearly the parties are not able to work together

to move this case forward . . . . 

[Appellant’s] motion for appointment of co-counsel is 

denied.

N.T. (Motion Hearing), 1/19/16, at 2–6.

After the January 19, 2016 hearing, Appellant filed a number of pro se

motions and represented himself during trial. Appellant does not reference 

any occasion in those proceedings wherein he objected to his pro se status or 

the trial court’s refusal to appoint co-counsel.
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“Where the parties fail to preserve an issue for appeal, the Superior 

Court may not address that issue sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Colavita, 

993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253, 

1257 (Pa. 2009)). However, this prohibition is not absolute. Commonwealth 

v. Markun, 185 A.3d 1026, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2018). Specifically, this Court 

has held that “‘as a general rule, failure to raise an issue in a criminal 

proceeding does not constitute a waiver where the defendant is not 

represented by counsel in the proceeding. This rule does not apply where the 

defendant knowingly and intelligently waived representation by counsel.’” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 158 A.3d 117, 121 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Monica, 597 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 1991)). Applying these 

principles to the instant matter, wherein it is acknowledged that a formal 

waiver colloquy was not conducted, we will address Appellant’s withdrawal of 

counsel issue.

Initially, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order 

granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. Notably, counsel’s request to 

withdraw was precipitated by Appellant’s earlier motion for waiver of counsel. 

Both Appellant and appointed counsel agreed that their working relationship 

had deteriorated to the point of unmanageable impasse. Additionally, after 

the trial court explained that Appellant was not entitled to co-counsel, 

Appellant indicated his desire to represent himself. Under these

circumstances, the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to withdraw was 
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supported by the record and grounded in the law, and there is no reason to 

conclude that the court’s ruling was based on bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, 

manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of the law. See

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (trial 

court abuses its discretion when in “reaching a conclusion the law is overridden 

or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,” as shown by the record 

evidence.).

We turn to whether the trial court correctly concluded that Appellant 

forfeited his right to counsel. Appellant contends chiefly that he did not 

voluntarily waive his right to counsel because the trial court did not conduct a 

waiver of counsel colloquy in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 121. 

The trial court conceded that it did not conduct a Rule 121 colloquy, but 

reasoned that the waiver colloquy was unwarranted because Appellant had

forfeited his right to counsel. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 378 

(Pa. Super. 2010 (colloquy requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P 121 do not apply to 

situations where forfeiture is found). The trial court relied upon the following 

reasoning in reaching its forfeiture conclusion: 

A defendant forfeits the right to counsel when he engages in 

extremely serious misconduct or extremely dilatory conduct. 

Kelly, supra. For example:

[I]n Lucarelli, [supra], the defendant failed to retain 

counsel despite having more than eight months to 

prepare for trial and the financial means to hire a 

lawyer. He had privately retained counsel on several 
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occasions, but the trial court allowed counsel to 

withdraw when the attorney-client relationship 

deteriorated. Five weeks before trial, the trial court 

gave the defendant access to funds to retain counsel,

but he failed to do so by the start of trial and had no

explanation for not having done so. The Supreme Court

concluded that the defendant had engaged in 

“extremely dilatory conduct” such as to amount to a 

forfeiture of his right to counsel. 

Commonwealth v. Fill, 202 A.3d 133, 139 (Pa. Super. 2019). 

Similarly, in Kelly, supra, the Superior Court found the defendant 

engaged in serious misconduct as, “the defendant was

uncooperative with all three lawyers appointed to represent him . 

. . because they refused to argue his view of the law.” Id.

Further, the Superior Court found the trial court’s actions

reasonable when it refused to appoint further counsel after the 

defendant requested another continuance and appointment of a 

fourth attorney. Id.

[Appellant] is similar to the defendants in Lucarelli and

Kelly as he too engaged in extremely serious misconduct and/or 

dilatory conduct. First, while represented by Attorney 

Neiderhiser, [Appellant] continued to file pro se motions. (See,

Motion for Continuance and Pre-trial Discovery, filed 11/16/15; 

see also, Motion to Compel, filed 11/30/15). [Appellant] also filed 

of public record correspondence he addressed to Attorney 

Neiderhiser. (See, Correspondences to Attorney Neiderhiser, 

filed 11/4/15 and 11/5/15).

Second [Appellant] addressed correspondence to the Clerk’s 

office which was filed of record wherein he indicated that he 

wished to move forward with his Bail Motion and that he would be 

“conjoining the assistance” of Attorney Neiderhiser. (See, 

Correspondences to Clerk of Court, filed 10/14/15). [Appellant]

has been unequivocal in his desire to act in the capacity of lead 

counsel in his matters. (N.T. Hearing, 1/19/16, p. 2.).

Third, while Attorney Neiderhiser filed the Motion to 

Withdraw as Counsel on 12/31/15; it was [Appellant] who initiated 

this chain of events by filing a “Motion for Waiver of Counsel.” 

(See, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, filed 12/31/15). By his 

actions, [Appellant] essentially asked the court to permit Attorney 

Neiderhiser to withdraw and appoint a different attorney to act as 

co-counsel to [Appellant] while [Appellant] would continue to 
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represent himself pro se. After granting Attorney Neiderhiser’s 

Motion to Withdraw, the trial court indicated its belief that 

appointing new counsel would be futile as [Appellant] would likely 

lodge the same complaints as he had done in the past—an 

assertion to which [Appellant] did not refute. (N.T. Hearing, 

1/19/16, p. 5). Moreover, [Appellant] stated that he was “fine”

with representing himself during trial proceedings. (Id., p. 4.).

On January 19, 2016, when this [c]ourt granted Attorney 

Neiderhiser’s Motion to Withdraw, [Appellant] continued to renew 

previously filed motions and failed to secure private counsel in the 

six months preceding trial. On two separate occasions, 

[Appellant’s] relationship with his legal counsel deteriorated 

ultimately because counsel declined to file what they assessed to 

be meritless motions. [Appellant] is not permitted to engage in

extremely serious misconduct and/or dilatory conduct only to later 

claim an absence of waiver.

The extensive record reflects that [Appellant] actively 

chooses when he wants to exercise his right to counsel and when 

he chooses to forfeit that right. During Appellant’s sentencing 

hearing, the following exchange took place:

Court: Sir, again I would offer you the opportunity to 

make application for counsel to assist you with your 

appeal. That’s up to you whether you wish that 

opportunity.

[Appellant]: For my appeal, I will, yes, Your Honor.

(N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 9/27/16, p. 7). In this instance, 

[Appellant] accepted the [c]ourt’s offer to appoint counsel to 

represent him on appeal. While the court appointed Attorney

Eshbach on September 27, 2016, to represent [Appellant] in his 

post-sentence litigation, [Appellant] continued to move pro se. 

(See, Amended Post-Sentence Motion, filed pro se 10/13/16).

Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt believes that 

[Appellant’s] actions preceding his trial amount to intentional 

forfeiture and/or forfeiture of his right to counsel. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/19, at 7–10 (emphasis in original). 
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Appellant’s only retort to this reasoning is that the trial court never 

advised Appellant that “he was engaging in ‘extremely serious misconduct’ or 

‘dilatory conduct,’ by filing motions with the court and proceeding pro se.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant also complains that the trial court did not 

caution him “about his conduct during any of the hearings before it, or in any 

of its written orders denying him relief.” Id. 

We agree with the trial court that Appellant forfeited his right to counsel 

through his pattern of refusal to accept his attorneys’ stewardship, beginning 

with his relationship with his privately-retained counsel, Shane Kope, Esq. On 

December 5, 2014, Attorney Kope entered his appearance on Appellant’s 

behalf. On June 30, 2015, Appellant filed a self-styled “Ineffective Assistance 

of Counsel” document requesting that Attorney Kope be removed as counsel 

because, inter alia, he refused to “raise exigent points pertinent to the case” 

and “submit an omnibus motion.” Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 6/30/15, 

at ¶ 4(a)(b). On July 1, 2015, Attorney Kope filed a Motion for Continuance of 

Appellant’s trial scheduled to begin on July 5, 2015, citing Appellant’s 

notification that he was discharging Attorney Kope. Motion for Continuance, 

7/1/15, at ¶ 3. A few days later, on July 10, 2015, Attorney Kope filed a motion 

to withdraw, averring that his conflict with Appellant over the validity of the 

search warrant issued in this matter resulted in a “breakdown of 

communications such that the [attorney/client] relationship has become 

acrimonious.” Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/10/15, at ¶11. That same 
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day, the trial court held a hearing on both motions. In its order granting the 

motions, the trial court stated: “We have made it clear to [Appellant] that he 

needs to seek counsel immediately if he intends to do that as we will not grant 

him a further continuance for that purpose.” Order, 7/10/15, at 1–2. 

Despite this admonition from the trial court, Appellant did apply to the 

York County Public Defender’s Office until September 2015 when Attorney 

Neiderhiser entered his appearance on Appellant’s behalf. Appellant continued 

to file pro se motions after Attorney Neiderhiser’s appointment. The 

relationship between Appellant and appointed counsel was fraught with conflict 

over the merits of motions that Appellant requested to be filed, culminating in 

Appellant’s motion for waiver of counsel and Attorney Neiderhiser’s motion to 

withdraw. At the hearing on these motions, the trial court explained that 

Appellant was not entitled to co-counsel and advised him that his remaining 

options were representation by a lawyer or self-representation. Appellant 

confirmed that he would proceed pro se, and he represented himself through 

the trial. As a result of Appellant’s insistence on usurping his attorneys’ legal 

guidance and his copious pro se filings, trial did not commence until July 19, 

2016, one year after the trial court informed Appellant that no further 

continuances would be granted.

As detailed above, Appellant’s refusal to cooperate with either his 

privately retained and/or his appointed counsel, his expectation that his 

counsel should execute the unmeritorious legal strategies he proposed, his 
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numerous pro se filings, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 

to pursue his flawed legal arguments, and his stated desire to proceed pro se

amounted to conduct sufficiently obstructive to mandate a conclusion of 

forfeiture.

We further reject Appellant’s contention that the trial court was required 

to advise him that his conduct could result in forfeiture of this right. No such 

notice is necessary in forfeiture cases. See Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1179 

(“‘Forfeiture can result regardless of whether the defendant has been warned 

about engaging in misconduct and regardless of whether the defendant has 

been advised of the risks of proceeding pro se.’”) (quoting United States v. 

Goldberg, 67 F3d. 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995)). Where, as here, “a 

defendant’s course of conduct demonstrates his or her intention not to seek 

representation . . . , a determination that the defendant be required to proceed 

pro se is mandated because that defendant has forfeited the right to counsel.” 

Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1179. Appellant’s uncooperative behavior 

demonstrated his clear intention not to follow counsel’s advice, and no further 

hearing was necessary to develop this aspect of Appellant’s misconduct.

3

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3

 We also note that Appellant’s waiver of counsel motion declared that he 

understood his rights under Rule 121. Motion For Waiver of Counsel, 1/4/16, 

at ¶ G. While we do not view this averment as a substitute for a Rule 121 

colloquy, it is further indication that Appellant viewed himself as a pro se

litigant. 
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Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it permitted Attorney Neiderhiser to withdraw. Further, 

the trial court’s finding that Appellant forfeited his right to counsel did not 

constitute a violation of Appellant’s constitutional right. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/07/2020