In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-1511

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LORI BRADSHAW,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 10 CR 600-1—Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2011—DECIDED FEBRUARY 22, 2012

Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. While serving as an office

manager and executive assistant for a succession of

Chicago-area employers, Lori Bradshaw embezzled more

than $240,000 by making personal purchases on company credit cards, falsifying reimbursement claims for

business expenses, and depositing corporate checks in

her personal bank account. She pleaded guilty to one

count of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reserving the
2 No. 11-1511

right to challenge at sentencing the government’s recommendation of a two-level increase for abuse of a position of trust, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The district court accepted the government’s recommendation and applied

§ 3B1.3, which resulted in an advisory guidelines range

of 27 to 33 months. The court imposed a sentence of

27 months. Bradshaw appealed, reiterating her challenge

to the abuse-of-trust enhancement. We affirm.

I. Background

Bradshaw defrauded three Chicago-area employers

identified in the indictment and plea agreement as “Company A, Company B, and Company C.” From 2004 to

2007, she worked as an executive assistant and office

manager at Company A, a nonprofit organization. Her

duties included supervising executive assistants, providing administrative support to several staff members,

and coordinating purchases from vendors. Company A

also tasked Bradshaw with opening its new office in

downtown Chicago; Bradshaw was later given an award

commending her performance on this assignment.

Company A entrusted Bradshaw with a corporate credit

card for business expenses; notably, Bradshaw was not

required to submit invoices to the company supporting

her purchases. Bradshaw used the corporate credit card

to pay for personal items such as clothes, electronics,

and gifts. When the company began investigating

Bradshaw’s transactions, she submitted fake invoices

to conceal her theft. Bradshaw charged over $56,000 in

personal expenses to her Company A corporate credit

card. 
No. 11-1511 3

From 2007 to 2010, Bradshaw worked as an executive

assistant to a vice-president at Company B, a financialservices company. This company also issued Bradshaw

a corporate credit card for business purchases, and

again Bradshaw used the credit card to buy personal

items. Company B required Bradshaw to submit

invoices supporting her purchases, so to conceal her

theft, Bradshaw again manufactured fake invoices. She

also submitted phony reimbursement claims for business

expenses unconnected to the corporate credit card. In

addition, Company B entrusted Bradshaw with access to

her boss’s email account; using this access, she fraudulently approved her own invoices. Bradshaw’s personal

purchases at this company totaled over $170,000.

Company B eventually discovered Bradshaw’s misconduct, fired her, and reported the matter to federal law

enforcement. Meanwhile, however, Bradshaw obtained

a part-time job as an executive assistant at Company C,

a manufacturing company. Bradshaw continued her

fraudulent activity at this company by stealing corporate

checks and using them to deposit money into her

personal bank account. By the time her pattern of embezzlement was uncovered, Bradshaw had stolen over

$16,000 from Company C.

Bradshaw was indicted on several fraud counts and

eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud

pursuant to a plea agreement. Her presentence report

(“PSR”) recommended that she receive a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for abusing
4 No. 11-1511

Because the PSR and Bradshaw’s plea agreement detailed her 1

conduct at all three companies, the enhancement would apply

if she abused a position of trust at any one of them. See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).

positions of trust at Company A and Company B. In 1

her plea agreement, Bradshaw reserved the right

to contest the § 3B1.3 enhancement. At sentencing she

argued that § 3B1.3 applies to fiduciaries, whereas

she was merely “a secretary with a fancy title.”

The district court disagreed and applied § 3B1.3. In the

court’s view, Bradshaw’s job titles were unimportant;

the enhancement was warranted because of the nature

of her relationships with superiors and their level of

trust in her. Specifically, the court found that: (1) Company A entrusted Bradshaw with opening its Chicago

office and gave her a corporate credit card with little

oversight, allowing her to perpetrate and conceal her

fraud; and (2) Company B granted Bradshaw access

to a vice-president’s email account, which enabled

Bradshaw to approve her own fraudulent invoices. The

court then imposed a sentence of 27 months, the bottom

of the advisory guidelines range.

II. Discussion

The sentencing guidelines call for a two-level increase

in offense level “[i]f the defendant abused a position of

public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly

facilitated the commission or concealment of the of-
No. 11-1511 5

fense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. “We review the district court’s

interpretation of § 3B1.3 de novo and its factual findings

for clear error.” United States v. Thomas, 510 F.3d 714, 725

(7th Cir. 2007). The enhancement applies if Bradshaw:

(1) occupied a position of public or private trust; and

(2) abused the position of trust to significantly facilitate

or conceal the commission of the crime. Id.

Only the first element is at issue here. Bradshaw argues

that she did not occupy positions of trust because

her jobs were not “characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference).”

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. Bradshaw compares herself to

“an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk,” positions that

generally lack the characteristics of discretionary judgment required for application of § 3B1.3. See id. Instead,

she describes herself as merely “an administrative

assistant without significant authority.”

We recently clarified, however, that the “common

thread” in our decisions upholding application of § 3B1.3

is “the victim’s special trust and reliance,” noting that “a

defendant’s authority over the victim’s valuables and the

degree of discretion given to the defendant by the victim are

simply indicia of” that trust. United States v. Fuchs, 635

F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). Here, the

district court concluded that specific features of the

relationship between Bradshaw and her employers warranted the enhancement. Specifically, Company A gave

Bradshaw the multi-faceted responsibility of opening

its Chicago office and subsequently commended her
6 No. 11-1511

performance. Moreover, Bradshaw was entrusted with

a corporate credit card for business expenses with

very little oversight, which facilitated her fraudulent

purchases. Company B also gave Bradshaw a corporate

credit card, as well as unfettered access to a vice-president’s email account, which she used to approve her

own false invoices. Considering Bradshaw’s job titles

alone, this case would fall outside the outer boundaries

of § 3B1.3. But the district court’s findings about the

particular characteristics of her job responsibilities

support the conclusion that Bradshaw’s employers

“placed more than the ordinary degree of reliance on

[her] integrity and honesty.” Id.

Bradshaw’s argument resembles the one we rejected in

United States v. Cruz, 317 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003). In Cruz

we upheld application of § 3B1.3 to an office manager

convicted of bank fraud for forging and cashing false

checks in the name of her employer and for misusing

her employer’s credit card. In so holding, we emphasized that “[e]mployees may hold a position of trust

even when they do not occupy upper-level or even supervisory positions.” Id. at 767; see also United States v.

Tiojanco, 286 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 2002) (hotel

clerk occupied position of trust because he had primary

responsibility of issuing refunds to customers with

limited oversight); United States v. Hernandez, 231 F.3d

1087, 1090-91 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (staff accountant occupied position of trust because he had considerable

access to employer’s tax returns and was trusted by

supervisors). Like the employee in Cruz, Bradshaw “held

a position of limited authority” that she used to “earn[]
No. 11-1511 7

the trust of her supervisor[s] . . . so that [they] did not

question” the propriety of her purchases. Cruz, 317 F.3d

at 767.

We return to our standard of review, which requires

that we uphold the district court’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous. Bradshaw’s case is

close to the outer boundaries of the abuse-of-trust enhancement under § 3B1.3. On this record, it would not

have been erroneous not to apply the abuse-of-trust

enhancement. In a case as close as this one, these are

matters for the district court’s judgment, which in any

event is not bound by the advisory sentencing guidelines. The district court did not clearly err by applying the

abuse-of-trust enhancement. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

2-22-12