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Centers for Disease Control

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health

Hanford Work Group

Friday, October 26, 2018

The Work Group Convened via Teleconference, at 

2:00 P.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Bradley P. Clawson, 

Chair, Presiding. 
2 

Members Present: 

Bradley P. Clawson, Chair

Phillip Schofield, Member

Paul L. Ziemer, Ph.d., Member

Also Present: 

Ted Katz, Designated Federal Official

Nancy Adams, NIOSH Contractor

Terrie Barrie

Bob Barton, SC&A

Bob Burns, ORAU Team

Joe Fitzgerald, SC&A

Michael Kubiak, ORAU Team

Jenny Naylor, HHS

Charles Nelson, DCAS

Jim Neton, DCAS

Lavon Rutherford, DCAS

Karen Stevenson
3 

Contents

Centers for Disease Control National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health Hanford Work Group 

Friday, October 26, 2018 1

Roll Call/Introductions 5

Work Group Discussion 6

Matrix Issue 3 11

Matrix Issue 4 14

Matrix Issue 6 19

Matrix Issue 7 21

Matrix Issue 8 21

Matrix Issue 9 22

Matrix Issue 10 24

Matrix Issue 11 26

Matrix Issue 12 27

Matrix Issue 13 27

Matrix Issue 14 29

Matrix Issue 16 29

Matrix Issue 18 30

Matrix Issue 19 31

Matrix Issue 20 32

Matrix Issue 21 35

Matrix Issue 22 38

Matrix Issue 23 39

Matrix Issue 25 40
4 

Matrix Issue 26 41

Matrix Issue 27 42

Adjournment 49
5

Proceedings

(2:00 p.m.)

Roll Call/Introductions

Mr. Katz: Good morning, everyone, first of all. This 

is the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health, the Hanford Work Group teleconference 

today. The Hanford Work Group hasn't met in a long 

time and this meeting is a lot about catching up and 

planning forward. There aren't a lot of materials for 

this meeting; there is a sort of matrix of issues, and 

that is posted on the NIOSH website for everyone on 

this line; on the NIOSH website this program's 

portion under the Board section, schedule of 

meetings, so you can go to today's date and then 

schedule of meetings and find the document that 

folks will be talking about today. And the agenda 

issue is just that document, so there's really nothing 

to the agenda but that really.

So, let's run through -- since we are speaking about 

a specific site, please speak to conflict of interest 

when you go, and let's just start with the NIOSH 

ORAU team.

(Roll call.)

Mr. Katz: All right, then. So we have all our Work 

Group Members, and all set. Let me just remind 

everyone on the phone, lots of people who don't 

normally join these calls, to mute your phone so that 

your phone doesn't cause any audio problems. If you 

don't have a mute button on your phone, press *6, 

that'll mute your phone. And then to take your phone 

off of mute you just press *6 again. Also, I'll just 

note, please don't put this call on hold at any point. 

Hang up and dial back in. If you put it on hold we'll 

have hold music interrupting the call for everyone 

else until you get back on, so please don't put it on 

hold.

And with that, Brad, it's your meeting. 
6

Chair Clawson: First of all, I'd like to welcome 

everybody out here. It's been a while since we've 

met as Hanford Work Group, especially with the 

passing of Dr. Melius. So we're all kind of trying to 

catch up and that's the importance of this meeting.

I guess from the start, Joe, I guess I'm going to turn 

it over to you or to NIOSH to tell us where we're at 

on these outstanding issues. 

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I think it was a joint effort and 

I would defer to Chuck since he took the lead in 

organizing it. But this was request from Jim Melius 

when he was chair to more or less reconcile both the 

SEC and Site Profile issues. It had been a long time 

since the Work Group had met, and given the 

ongoing activities in terms of the SEC '84 to '90 there 

was a need to more or less 

re-baseline everything and to, in his view, to apprise 

the Work Group pretty much on where things stood, 

what issues remain, and to look to the Work Group 

for some direction given the situation or 

circumstance that we're in. And so that was the 

impetus to do this last year and I thought it went 

pretty well. But I'll go ahead and let Chuck go 

through it. I mean, we basically worked together in 

terms of the issues that we had, and where there was 

a difference we tried to resolve those differences to 

make sure that the status was clean, and I think we 

accomplished that.

So, I'll let Chuck go ahead and kind of walk us 

through this since this is literally his drafting. 

Work Group Discussion

Mr. Nelson: Okay, this is Chuck Nelson. What we 

did is we took all the issues that we thought were 

outstanding issues, and what we had to do is we had 

to mine through a lot of the SC&A reports and to see 

were these issues for the current period -- which 

what we're looking at is the 1984 to 1990 period --

these were all the prime contractors. So there's 

outstanding issues there and what we did is we went 
7

through all the SC&A reports and we tried to do a 

conglomeration of all issues, and then we worked 

directly with SC&A and said, hey, you agreed that 

these issues are still valid. You laid them all out with 

the matrix that was identified in 2011, and a lot of 

these issues went away with the issuance of previous 

SECs since 2011. So what you're going to see here 

is just some background information that talks about 

the various matrices for which these issues came 

from. Then from there we went matrix issue by

matrix issue, starting with Issue No. 3.

Brad, do you see any need for any background as far 

as SECs that have been issued to date or anything, 

or do you want to just stick --

Chair Clawson: No, I actually -- because of what has 

gone on, because actually what you already said, 

some of these issues were taken care of with previous 

SECs, so if we could just run through the SECs that 

we have and their end dates and where they're at, 

I'd just like to bring everybody up to speed on that if 

you would, Chuck.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, this is Joe. One thing I'd add is 

as part of this process we did reach back, for 

example, and discuss all these issues, these former 

issues, the ones that were handed off to me, anyway, 

from Arjun Makhijani just to make sure there was 

continuity. There was a real concern that we didn't 

lose anything in the process, that in fact, he reviewed 

the matrix as he left it to ensure that that was 

addressed going forward. So this was a pretty 

systematic process reaching back prior to 2013, 

anyway, so covering the last ten years.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, so Brad -- this is Chuck Nelson --

I'm going to go ahead and cover just the evaluations 

to date from Hanford -- the initial petition was 

received back in March 2006. The initial ER was for 

SEC 57-1 and it covered the time period, October 1, 

1943 through August 31st, 1946. Then March 26th, 

2008 was SEC 57-2 and that picked up really the 

remainder of the period, so September 1, 1946 to 
8

December 1, 1990. 

Now, during that timeframe when that ER was issued, 

a Class was given from September 1, 1946 through 

December 31st, 1961 for the 300 area; then January 

1, 1949 through December 31st, 1968 in the 200 

area; then after that there was in 2009, there was 

another SEC 00152 where a Class was granted for all 

employees and that basically include all the dates 

from the beginning of October 1, 1943 all the way 

through June 30th, 1972. So when that SEC 152 was 

issued it superseded the two previous Classes, so 

now we have a period '43 all the way through '72, 

those specific dates. 

Then in 2012 there was SEC 201, it was a 83.14 and 

NIOSH determined that there was some additional 

dose reconstruction infeasibilities. So then at that 

point the SEC time period was extended through 

December 31st, 1983 and those specific issues were 

worked with highly enriched uranium, uranium 233, 

thorium and neptunium. So, that kind of left us right 

where we were back in 2015. 

So now we're carried all the way through 1983 from 

beginning of time and then in 2015, specifically June 

2015, SEC 226 was issued; this was, again, another 

83.14, and that's the most recent one, and that's 

where it basically covered construction and 

tradeworkers for the period of '84 through 1990 and 

said that they were having trouble placing 

construction tradeworkers in specific areas, they 

were all over the place and it wasn't a good 

mechanism for seeing exactly where those guys 

were. So in order to get those cases going, they 

implemented that class, which then left the 

remainder of SEC 57 which we're now wanting to 

evaluate and are evaluating over the period of 1984 

through 1990, and that's for all the prime 

contractors. That's kind of the history of the SECs at 

Hanford to date.

So, Sam Glover had Hanford until 2016 when I took 

over for him when he had moved on to higher 
9

pastures. 

Chair Clawson: Okay. So for the construction trades 

just let me clarify on the SEC; they have a SEC from 

what time period, the 90s?

Mr. Nelson: Yes, all the way to 1990, which is the 

entirety of SEC 57; SEC 57 was capped off until 1990.

Chair Clawson: Okay. And the prime contractors are 

up to '83 or --

Mr. Nelson: Yes, everybody on-site including DOE is 

up to '83.

Chair Clawson: Okay, just wanted to make sure.

Mr. Nelson: So the focus has been on these issues 

that we're about to go through are '84 through '90 

for prime contractors. So just to go over those, that's 

going to be Battelle Memorial Institute, Rockwell 

Hanford, Boeing Computer Services, United Nuclear 

Industries, Westinghouse Hanford, and Hanford 

Environmental Health Foundation.

Chair Clawson: Okay.

Mr. Nelson: So if that's enough background, I think 

is everybody ready to go through these issues?

Chair Clawson: I am. I just -- to be honest, with all 

these different SECs, my issue was is I was really 

getting a little bit confused every once in a while on 

the dates and stuff. So it's sufficient for me. 

Anybody else on the Work Group need any more 

clarification? 

Member Ziemer: No, that's good. I think we can 

move ahead. Member Schofield: I think so.

Chair Clawson: Okay, so go ahead. 

Mr. Nelson: Okay, and Joe, feel free to project on 

these as we go. I'm pretty much going to read what 

we laid out and what we agreed upon, and I think the 

consensus or the idea of this meeting was to go 
10

through these issues -- previously the matrix issue 

read one way, but as we are looking at the '84 to '90 

timeframe, then we felt a need to reword some of 

these so we could focus on the issue at hand and say, 

okay, here's what we're really evaluating in this time 

period for the prime contractors. 

So what you'll see in these issues is you'll have a title, 

and we may or may not propose a change for that 

title, and then you'll have a description of the issue, 

and in many cases we do ask that we change the 

proposed description of the issue to more tailor 

where we are with this timeframe and the prime 

contractors. And from that after that we have a 

discussion that kind of explains why we recommend 

a change of perhaps the proposed description.

Member Ziemer: I was going to ask a question at 

this point -- this is Ziemer -- the document that was 

referred to on the agenda, the document entitled, 

"Suggested Updates to the Outstanding Dose 

Reconstruction and Special Exposure Cohort issues 

for consideration by the Work Group on Hanford" --

is that document the document that you are 

addressing, or are you --

Mr. Nelson: Yes, sir. What we're going to go 

through.

Member Ziemer: Okay. So the second part of my 

question is -- because I was trying to retrieve that 

document -- do we have that or was that distributed?

Mr. Katz: Yes, Paul. It was sent to all of you and it's 

also posted on the NIOSH website for this meeting.

Member Ziemer: Okay, I'll pull the NIOSH website 

up. I somehow couldn't find it. Okay.

Mr. Katz: Go ahead, Brad.

Chair Clawson: I just pulled it off there because I 

had it on my computer and it just went kind of goofy, 

so I just went to the meeting agenda and just pulled 

that off, it just brings it up.
11

Member Ziemer: I'll do that, okay.

Mr. Nelson: Does anybody else need time to pull that 

up?

Chair Clawson: I think -- Paul can get to it pretty 

good.

Member Ziemer: Go ahead, I can get to it. Feel free.

Matrix Issue 3

Mr. Nelson: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. Okay, so Issue 

No. 3 which is a SEC issue; the title of the issue was, 

"Thorium-232 Internal Exposures from January 1, 

1960 and Onward." Do you think it could be worth 

reading the previous description or the proposed 

description or should we just focus on where we think 

we are?

Chair Clawson: Let's focus where we're at.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, so things that need further 

clarification as we go through them, please ask and 

we'll elaborate. Okay, so when we got this issue the 

reason -- and the real reason for this, Dr. Melius, his 

plan was to get all these into the Board Review 

System and that's an electronic system where we can 

go in there and put these issues in there and 

frequently update them and keep everybody up to 

speed of where the issues are and it's an interactive 

process through the different groups, and it's a better 

mechanism to track these.

So, Brad, I'm not sure how comfortable you are with 

the Board Review System. Some people aren't and 

they choose to use a hard copy matrix, so I'm not 

sure if you're familiar with the use of that with some 

of your other Work Groups or not?

Chair Clawson: Yes, I am. I'm very familiar with it; 

it's just on your computer and the system works good 

that's one of the keys to it. We've had trouble with 

them.

Mr. Katz: This is Ted. So what we'd normally do with 
12

this is all Work Groups should be using the Board 

Review System at this point. And then because not 

all Board Members always have access to the BRS --

I mean, Board Members that have access normally 

and have issues with their computers and so they 

don't necessarily have access at any given time. 

Whenever we update the BRS, Chuck, we also make 

a PDF and send that to the Work Group; that way 

everyone has it; that way when we have a Work 

Group meeting we can post those PDFs if we can't do 

anything with the BRS for the public. Is that okay, 

Chuck?

Mr. Nelson: Yes, I understood it to be that way as 

well.

Mr. Katz: Okay, good.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, this first issue, Matrix Issue No. 

3, again, it's Thorium-232 internal exposure, and 

that means that it's a SEC issue related to potential 

foreign exposures during the remediation of certain 

areas and the potential use of foreign and nuclear 

fuel fabrication and related operations within the 300 

area during '84 to 1990, and any possible thorium 

use in any other areas of Hanford during that time. 

And basically we expanded the scope. Previously the 

scope was just to look at remediation areas, and what 

we found -- so we have been working in the last few 

years and we'd been performing interviews looking at 

MC&A records, as well as we have thousands upon 

thousands of documents that in our site research 

database, and we've done a lot of data capture in 

2016 and '17. So in mining through all that we 

asked, and I think Joe would agree based on our 

interviews which he participated in, that we felt we 

should expand the discussion of that to include the 

300 area because you'd think that we may need to 

dig the 300 area, specifically nuclear fuels 

fabrication, a little deeper to see -- you find while 

looking in some of these records that there may have 

been some thorium, but the question is, is there 

potential internal exposure from that thorium, or is it 

just something that's stored somewhere? 
13

So what it requires that you do further investigation 

by many different means and you're just trying to 

determine if that internal exposure exists. So, what 

we'd like to do on each of these issues is to get some 

buy-in from the Work Group, they might agree with 

our proposed description as we go through the 

issues, and with the goal finally being we have a good 

working Board Review System issue matrix.

I know I came full circle there, but --

Chair Clawson: Now, that --

Mr. Nelson: Go ahead, Brad.

Chair Clawson: That's no problem. I was trying to 

remember why we brought the 300 area into it and 

that was because of the fuel fabrication process, 

correct?

Mr. Nelson: Yes.

Chair Clawson: Okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: And Brad, this is Joe. For the 

workers' benefit, what you're going to hear is going 

to be quite similar when we talk about not only 

thorium but U-233, the HEU and neptunium, these 

were all, as you heard Chuck describe, the basis for 

the preceding SEC Class. So what we're doing here 

is frankly taking this forward into this new time 

interval, '84 to '90 and establishing whether those 

source terms in fact exist and the operations are in a 

time period and where those source terms and 

potential exposure sources may have been present. 

So a lot of the research that Chuck and we have been 

doing is looking through the documentation and 

doing interviews just to establish from an operational 

standpoint where the source terms might be and 

whether the exposure potential existed. So you're 

going to hear, I think, something similar on this one 

and the other three key exposure sources just 

because we want to establish to what extent they 

were of significance in this particular SEC interval, 
14

and then chase that down and establish whether or 

not the conditions that led to the SEC in the preceding 

class would possibly exist in this time interval, '84 to 

'90. So, I think this is a case on thorium and probably 

the same for the other three, so.

Chair Clawson: My question was a little bit because 

the way we're not just looking at the 300 area 

correctly, it's other areas, because exposure during 

remediation of certain areas, and then it calls out 300 

area. So this is not just limited to the 300 area, 

correct?

Mr. Nelson: That's correct. That's kind of where our 

primary focus is right now, though.

Chair Clawson: Yes, the way it just kind of read I 

just wanted to make sure because I knew of some 

other areas and some other issues of that time period 

that I was thinking about. Well, that sounds good to 

me. What about any of the other Board Members?

Member Ziemer: No issue here. 

Member Schofield: No issue.

Chair Clawson: Okay, sounds good. Go ahead, 

Chuck.

Matrix Issue 4

Mr. Nelson: Okay, the next issue was, as you alluded 

to, is highly enriched uranium, and the title is "HEU, 

Uranium Intake Estimation." So, again, we're looking 

at internal exposures from highly enriched uranium 

and whether, in fact, it's an individual's exposed to 

HEU, if proper -- or at least some dosimetry was 

performed on the individual where we can bound the 

dose, specifically alpha spectroscopy is something 

that's nice to have. So for this particular issue, the 

way we'd like to propose a description of the issue, if 

you read it, this is a SEC issue pertaining to whether 

workers who are partially -- excuse me, who 

potentially receive intakes of HEU during the post '83 

period were monitored by alpha spectroscopy, 
15

urinalysis, or by other appropriate means. 

This is contingent upon the identification of a 

potential source of HEU intakes by half our workers 

through the '84 through the 1990 period. Now, we 

added some additional discretion to that to say why 

we changed exactly how that reads. And SC&A and 

NIOSH agreed to the proposed update on the wording 

of this issue to reflect that. Thus far, a source term 

representing particular intakes of HEU have not been 

identified at Hanford for '84 through '90, it's really 

contingent upon if you do find a source term. So, 

while we're seeing the source terms there for 

thorium, at this point in time we're not necessarily 

finding anything specifically for HEU, but we also 

haven't excluded that.

Chair Clawson: So, in your terminology of HEU what 

are you looking at? Are you looking at an enrichment 

amount of, what? Anything over what?

Mr. Nelson: Actually, Bob, you want to bounce in on 

that because I know we have established a -- I don't 

want to miss what it is, so I'm not 100 percent sure 

of that -- I know it's highly enriched, but --

Mr. Burns: Highly enriched, right. I wouldn't say --

there's not -- we've never defined a specific threshold 

-- this is Bob Burns, by the way -- but at Hanford, for 

instance, we're looking at the material control and 

accountability data; they have a threshold that they 

use for additional reporting purposes, for inventory 

purposes that's 30 percent enrichment. So that's a 

level of convenience for our purposes because it 

allows us to differentiate the two inventories. So I 

think that's how we would look at it. I guess, it starts 

getting above 20 percent is where we're going to --

that's what we're looking for. That's not to say I 

consider 20 percent highly enriched; in my mind 

highly enriched is getting upwards to 90 percent or 

so. But back to your question, there's not a specific 

threshold, but we're not ignoring material that's 

lower than say into the 90's, if that's helpful.

Chair Clawson: Yes, I just -- well kind of enriched 
16

uranium to me was way up there in the 90s and I 

know at Hanford we dealt with a lot of it, it was a lot 

less than that. But it was going into -- it was in the 

process. Now, going into the reactors, the single 

pass-throughs and stuff, we're looking at two to 

three, and then going on up from there. I was just 

trying to understand your terminology on the HEU 

because that's what I wanted to hear is what are we 

classifying as HEU there. That's okay with me.

Mr. Burns: Okay, I could characterize it as HEU, not 

LEU, not low enriched uranium. So we're not looking 

-- or as you said, there's massive quantities of say, 

in-reactor fuel that's like 1 percent enriched; yes, it's 

enriched but it's not highly enriched. 

Chair Clawson: Right, I'm just thinking of looking at 

some of the reactor fuel that went through there that 

we were trying to get to and they were not low 

enriched, but they were higher -- and I'm just trying 

to clarify that because a lot of that fuel was going 

through those reactors, was not low, but to me it was 

enriched.

Mr. Burns: Okay.

Member Ziemer: Well, let me ask sort of a practical 

question now; so if we take, for example, the 

proposed description, what is to be done with that? 

Is that going to appear in the main document again 

to make it --

Mr. Nelson: Yes, that'll be in the Board Review 

System and that's how the issue will read. Like I 

said, we're not eliminating them, we're looking for 

them, but thus far through all of our site research, 

our interviews, our record reviews. We haven't found 

or identified the source of HEUs that had internal 

exposures. There are a few items that ORAU has 

mentioned that we need to look at a little closer, but 

at this point we don't have any good, documented 

evidence, but we have not eliminated that.

Member Ziemer: Okay, but the implication there is 

that additional attention will be given to this; is that 
17

right?

Mr. Nelson: That is correct.

Member Ziemer: It still leaves it open -- what's the 

terminology, in process, in something.

Mr. Nelson: In progress, whatsoever.

Mr. Katz: Yes, we usually call that "in progress."

Member Ziemer: Yes, so this will remain in progress 

and this just basically is saying where we think we 

are in terms of the issue has arisen before and how 

we're going to address it; is that the direction it goes?

Mr. Nelson: Yes, I mean, we have all these issues 

that go back for so many years and we've had all 

these SEC issues that we're at a point where we need 

to be a little better organized on how we let issues 

remain in the current status for this period of time. 

So the focus of this meeting is to lay those out and 

get them quick that we have something clean to work 

with and agreed upon by the Work Groups that they 

understand our direction and they agree with our 

direction.

Member Ziemer: Yes. 

Chair Clawson: Paul? This is Brad. Also, too, in 

cleaning some of this up we'd have to change the 

wording a little bit of what it previously was in the 

matrix. So this is also quite why we're kind of going 

through this so that we're all on the same page as we 

change the wording of it and so forth so that we all 

understand where we're at.

Member Ziemer: Yes, let me steer that; I'm sort of 

looking for specificity on when things are going to 

actually happen.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Let me add to that, Paul; I think, one, 

the wording has been shifted somewhat to reflect the 

fact that from a monitoring feasibility issue I think 

we're seeing this as almost a source term validation, 

is there in fact a HEU exposure potential or not, 
18

because so far we have not found it. We are close, 

to answer your question. I think before we got 

diverted somewhat because of the CTW SEC process, 

that took certainly some time, as well as validating 

whether the primaries had the same issue. That's 

taken the last several years. But before that we had 

a year to year and a half pretty intense review of 

HEU, thorium, and looking for those source terms, 

and at that time we did not find any source terms for 

'84 to '90 that were exposure potential. Therefore, 

we were getting ready or prepared to advise the 

Work Group that we did not see a SEC issue revolving 

around high enriched uranium or some of these other 

sources. 

We're not quite done yet; thorium, as you heard, we 

still need to look at some of the 300 area issues. For 

HEU, I'm not sure there's a whole lot more we can do 

on that one, so we're kind of finishing up what we 

had pretty much -- we were 80-90 percent through a 

few years ago, and at some point soon we ought to 

be able to advise the Work Group on these issues.

Member Ziemer: Okay, gotcha. That's helpful. 

Mr. Nelson: Dr. Ziemer, you're going to find that 

some of these we're laying down pretty good and 

we're actually ready to close them out for various 

reasons, some are just old issues that we carried 

through from the original matrix, so continuity that 

we're not leaving the issues out. 

Member Ziemer: Right. 

Member Schofield: This is Phil, I got one question; I 

assume you're going to be reissuing this matrix with 

updates; any idea on when this is going to happen?

Mr. Nelson: Well, I think we can do it here pretty 

quickly once we all have an agreement that, if the 

Work Group accepts our proposed description that 

SC&A and we have agreed upon, then we can issue 

it almost immediately.

Member Schofield: Okay, thanks.
19

Chair Clawson: That's actually what we're going 

through right now, Phil. So as soon as we get 

through this, the Work Group gives them the 

approval of we accept what they've given us and 

that'll be sent out. 

Mr. Nelson: So truly the real point of this was just to 

get to that point where the agreement, not 

necessarily dive into the issues at depth, but get to 

the agreement that the Work Group agrees with 

these are the issues. If you guys want to talk about 

it, I suppose you can; this could maybe turn into a 

long meeting. 

Chair Clawson: I really don't think so, not at this 

time. I spent a little time just on the wording of this; 

the only one that I wanted to ask is because of the 

HEU, I just wanted to know if there's determination, 

but as far as sitting down and really discussing this, 

I think that'll have to be for another day.

Mr. Nelson: All right, are we ready to move on to 

Matrix Issue No. 6?

Chair Clawson: Yes.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Matrix Issue 6

Mr. Nelson: Matrix Issue No. 6, we have a new title 

for it because we basically wanted to make sure that 

we wanted to separate it from the previous issue of 

ATU; it's just an estimation of intakes have depleted 

through low enriched uranium for unmonitored 

workers. And our proposed description is the data is 

available and the issue pertains to the question if 

uranium dose assignments for unmonitored workers, 

are they able to explain it. 

And basically what it comes down to being is a 

coworker issue, so we'd like to revise the title and the 

proposed description of that issue and we believe this 

issue is going to be one of those that where we go 

and evaluate coworkers to include this subject into 
20

our coworker evaluation.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, I think the key one here is that 

we do have data; it's not a question of scanty data or 

no data at all. We do have data. So this is a nonSEC Site Profile issue, and just for continuity's sake 

we're including it.

Chair Clawson: I understand.

Member Ziemer: Hang on just a second. I should 

have asked this before but the proposed titles are 

intended just to be more clear than the original title. 

Those will show up, that will be a new name for the 

same issue is what you're saying, right?

Mr. Nelson: Yes, Dr. Ziemer. That's exactly correct.

Member Ziemer: Yes, okay.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, I think that the station is 

important too because in this case -- 

Member Ziemer: Yes, it makes it more clear.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, in this case it's a Site Profile 

issue and it's really a matter of how that data will be 

used, other than whether there's sufficient data at 

all. So certainly making sure it's clear that this is 

different than the HEU issue.

Member Ziemer: Yes, gotcha.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, so are we ready to move to Matrix 

Issue No. 7?

Member Ziemer: Yes. Just a matter of procedure; 

do we need to formally agree or are you taking it by 

consent that there's no objection that we prove 

these?

Mr. Katz: I think, Paul, we did just take it by consent, 

it's quicker and easier.

Member Ziemer: I'm good with that; just want to 

make sure.
21

Member Schofield: Yes, that seems reasonable.

Matrix Issue 7

Mr. Nelson: Okay, thank you. Matrix Issue No. 7, 

this is an SEC issue, the title is "U-233 Intakes." And 

again, this is an SEC issue pertaining to potential U233 intakes during '84 to '90 and the adequacy of the 

Hanford internal monitoring practice for U-233 in the 

event that such a source existed. Just like the HEU, 

it's contingent upon identification of a potential 

source of U-233 by Hanford workers during '84 to '90. 

At this point we have not yet identified any U-233 

exposures during that time, which is one of the 

reasons that we wanted to update the proposed 

reading as I just read. 

So basically contingent upon whether we identify 

source of U-233. So we've done interviews, we've 

gone through our site research database, we've dug 

through multiple things like MC&A records and you 

have to identify U-233 source. But again, we're not 

closing the issue out just like HEU but we'd like to 

update it. 

Chair Clawson: I understand; that looks good.

Matrix Issue 8

Mr. Nelson: Okay, we're on Matrix Issue No. 8 and 

this is a recycled uranium intake estimation. And 

data from '72 exists for estimating claimant favorable 

trace contamination ratios; NIOSH should use these 

data instead of the late 80's data. So this was 

something that was discussed in a previous time 

period and there's a need to review DRs to confirm 

that this approach is being used. 

SC&A and NIOSH concur that this issue can be 

resolved by an agreement to use trace contaminant 

ratios for '70 through '72 rather than the 1980's time 

period. And we recommended this to the Work Group 

this issue be closed for SEC purposes. We go onto 

say that NIOSH has verified the implementation of 

this agreement by performing dose reconstruction 
22

reviews or the issuance of dose reconstruction work 

instructions to verify or assure that previously agreed 

upon trace contamination ratios are being issued. 

SC&A and NIOSH therefore propose to this Work 

Group that this issue be placed in abeyance pending 

of proof of implementation. 

Chair Clawson: Okay, I understand what you're

saying there, that I don't think you really want to 

have any discussion on that today, do you?

Mr. Nelson: No.

Chair Clawson: Okay, I just -- we're in your same 

place, in abeyance, I understand that. I'm good with 

that. We'll take that issue up when we meet.

Mr. Rutherford: Yes, Brad. This is Bob. I'd like to 

add that a lot of these issues we know that were old 

issues that are issues that are associated with a Site 

Profile. So once the SEC is closed out and we move 

into a Site Profile portion of it, we'll rewrite the Site 

Profile to include all the updates and everything that 

has been discussed, and then obviously we'll go back 

to SC&A to verify that all these issues have been 

addressed.

Chair Clawson: I understand that, thank you. 

Matrix Issue 9

Mr. Nelson: Okay, next Matrix issue is No. 9. I know 

Joe is pretty familiar with that, so at some point he 

may not want to run with this, but I will read what 

we got on this and we'd like the title to be is, 

"Neptunium 237 Intakes" and here's our discussion 

that we have right now; "SC&A and NIOSH are in 

agreement that discussions over neptunium-237 

intake that Fast Flux Test Facility had been 

addressed." The work that has been done to address 

this issue for the PUREX Plant was at a point where it 

could be brought to closure. NIOSH and SC&A in the 

report recommend to the Work Group that the scope 

of this issue be defined as a need to document the 
23

findings regarding the potential for neptunium-237, 

FFTF, PNL and PUREX during '84 through '90 with the 

expectation that a recommendation for closure of this 

SEC issue would follow. 

There was quite a bit of interviews that were done in 

July 2013, SC&A wrote up many of these interview 

results in 2014; there's quite a bit of discussion about 

neptunium and the lack of source term with regard 

to internal exposure potential during this time period.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, just for the worker's benefit, like 

HEU and U-233, I think the NIOSH team and SC&A 

essentially walked down some very complex 

operations from beginning to the end of those 

operations just to establish where these particular 

nuclides were handled and what the exposure 

potential may have been to workers. So that 

involved quite a bit; I mean, you had to look at 

operational documents, reports, incident reports. 

You also had to characterize actual source term 

applications and doses, and also interviewing 

workers to understand first-hand how they may have 

handled certain operations and whether or not the 

exposures may have existed. And for PUREX in 

particular I think that's been quite a challenge going 

back in time and I think there's a few more stones 

that have to be turned over, but we're very close. I 

think really PUREX is it. The FFTF and PNL I think we 

pretty well addressed. So I think there's a few more 

operational issues at PUREX and we should be able 

with NIOSH to come forward to the Work Group with, 

I think, some conclusions on this. 

Chair Clawson: Sounds good to me. Yes, I've been 

involved in the PUREX issues and it'll be interesting 

to see how that turns out.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, I think we're ready to move on. 

Our Matrix Issue No. 10 --

Member Ziemer: Let me just ask one question; are 

the findings complete or is there some more work to 

be done there? 
24

Mr. Fitzgerald: I think there's more work that I 

believe NIOSH is finishing up with PUREX, and again, 

some of these resources were diverted on the issues 

that led to the last SEC Class. So we're now, I think, 

wrapping things up with PUREX. I'll let NIOSH 

respond to that one, though. I think we're relatively 

close given the amount of work we did a couple of 

years ago.

Member Ziemer: So I'm asking whether we're 

recommending closing or we're going to abeyance or 

whether we're not quite there yet?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, we're not quite there yet on 

PUREX. I think I could report even though this hasn't 

been in writing that we're pretty satisfied with FFTF 

and PNL not presenting any issues along the lines of 

an SEC. PUREX, I think there's a few more lines of 

inquiry that have to be finished before we can reach 

the same conclusion.

Member Ziemer: Gotcha.

Mr. Nelson: Yes, my understanding was that we 

pretty much closed all those, but it's true that all this 

needs to be documented. So that's really where 

we're left is documenting what was done, the 

interviews that we've conducted and the results of 

those -- I mean, a lot of those are already in some of 

the SC&A reports, but they probably all need to be 

pooled together.

Member Ziemer: It remains in progress then?

Mr. Nelson: That is correct.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Matrix Issue 10

Mr. Nelson: Okay, the next one is, Tritium intake 

estimation from 1949 onward. And we'd like to keep 

that same title. And just for an explanation; the 

proposed description is the issue pertains to the 

question of tritium dose assignment in the event of 
25

sources of special tritium compounds representing 

the potential for worker intakes are identified at 

Hanford during the '84 to '90 period. 

The issue stems from a statement in the Hanford 

internal dosimetry TBD regarding a metal, zirconia, 

and this was specifically in tritides, that it could 

perhaps be associated with work under the Tritium 

Target Program in 1988. In the event a source term 

for the potential intakes of special tritium compound 

by Hanford during '84 through '90 is identified; what 

you would do is do an evaluation of any procedure 

that we have with tritium bioassay and OTIB-66 

that's titled final calculation of dose intakes of special 

tritium compounds. And you would evaluate whether 

we could apply the tritium bioassay with that special 

tritium compound and see if we can bound dose. 

So, what we'd like to do is the status of this SEC issue 

would be therefore conditional depending on the 

availability of sufficient tritium bioassay in the event 

of a source of special tritium compound intakes is 

discovered. And so the discussion on that is SC&A 

and NIOSH propose to the Work Group that the SEC 

status be considered conditional depending on if a 

potential source term of intakes of a special tritium 

compound is identified. And if so, then they would 

look at the bioassay data.

So at this point we don't have necessarily any special 

tritium compounds identified to date; but if we do, 

similar to HEU, then we would need further 

evaluation.

Mr. Katz: Chuck, this is Ted. In the BRS the status 

is in progress, there's no conditional or whatever. 

There's no terminology like that, but it's in progress. 

That would be clear from your narrative. 

Mr. Nelson: Okay, status in progress?

Mr. Katz: Yes, in progress. You're either in progress, 

you're either open which means they haven't been 

addressed yet, or they're in progress, meaning 

they're being worked on, or they're in abeyance 
26

meaning there's conceptual agreement but you want 

to see implementation before close.

Member Ziemer: This is true for every item that's in 

progress; there's all kinds of details that you have to 

go to the narrative to understand what it is that's 

being done. The narrative makes it clear what's 

intended here.

Mr. Katz: Right.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Katz: Sure.

Matrix Issue 11

Mr. Nelson: All right, Matrix Issue No. 11 is 

promethium-147. We had some discussion on that. 

SC&A and NIOSH are in agreement this issue is not 

applicable for the period '84 onward and we 

recommend to the Work Group that this be closed. 

So this was an issue that was back in the '70s, an 

historical issue that kind of carried through from 

previous SC&A reports, so it is of our opinion that this 

issue can be closed and is not applicable to this time 

period.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So Brad, this would be a 

recommendation for closure since it's a lingering 

issue from the past matrix which has been overtaken 

and we don't see any source terms actually past '75. 

So, I mean, that was something that was in the past 

matrix; so it's sort of a loose end, this was a bit of 

housekeeping that we just need to recommend 

closure to the Work Group. 

Member Ziemer: All right, I agree on closure on this 

one. I think on closure we need to agree.

Chair Clawson: Yes, we do on that one. I didn't think 

we were going to get into that a little bit, but I 

understand what you're saying; I just want to read a 

little bit more.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, this was something in the 2011 
27

matrix where we included a reference that beyond 

'75 we did not establish any operational handling and 

recommended that this should be conveyed to the 

Work Group for closure. And going back and 

updating the matrix we identified that issue and said, 

okay, this needs to be taken care of now.

Chair Clawson: I understand; I remember going 

through that. I'm good; how about other Board 

Members?

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Member Schofield: I'm in agreement.

Chair Clawson: We'll close Matrix 11, promethium147.

Matrix Issue 12

Mr. Nelson: All right, Matrix Issue No. 12, this is a 

non-SEC issue, so this is a dose reconstruction issue. 

The title is Strontium-90, Cesium-137, and Mixed 

Fission Product Intake Estimation. There are 

extensive data available; the issue is listed as closed. 

In reviewing DRs a check needs to be made if workers 

exposed during incidents have adequate bioassay 

data, and data adequacy for coworker models need 

to be established. So the discussion of this is SC&A 

and NIOSH recommend to the Work Group that this 

be kept in abeyance until the verification of this is 

completed so we can ensure that it's been 

implemented. So this is a dose reconstruction nonSEC issue that we'd like to place in abeyance.

Chair Clawson: I understand; I'm good with that.

Matrix Issue 13

Mr. Nelson: Okay, Matrix Issue 13; the title is Tank 

Farm Alpha Contamination. This is another issue, 

NIOSH and SC&A are in agreement that this issue is 

subsumed under other matrix items, specifically 3, 7, 

9 and 12, and we recommend to the Work Group that 

it be deleted. This is another housekeeping issue 
28

where the issue was brought up, but these other 

issues, the other matrix issues pretty much cover 

alpha contamination throughout the site.

Chair Clawson: So, this has been covered under 3, 

7, 9, and 12 is what you said?

Mr. Nelson: Right. So if you go to 3, 3 is thorium, 

so that's an alpha emitter, 7 is U-233, and then 9 is 

neptunium-237, and 12 is -- well, they're mixed 

fission products so not necessarily alpha emissions, 

but it's radionuclides that they've been exposed in 

the tank farm.

Chair Clawson: I'm good with deleting this one.

Member Ziemer: Yes, okay.

Chair Clawson: But we are also keeping in touch with 

what's happening in today's world in those tanks, 

correct, as far as what the emissions are coming off 

them now?

Mr. Rutherford: Well, Brad, this SEC goes up to 

1990. If we're looking at dose reconstruction --

through the building beyond that, that's really not a 

part of this SEC evaluation.

Chair Clawson: Okay, I understand, Lavon. I just 

think what I've been reading about what's been going

on there now. So what would actually have to 

happen is another SEC would have to be filed up into 

this timeframe then, correct?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes, that, or during our Site Profile 

review and during it if ultimately there was new 

information that came in from Hanford during -- that 

we identified -- NIOSH identified infeasibility, we 

would pursue it through an 8314. So it either has to 

go through one of those, either somebody outside 

petitioning for it or us self-identifying.

Chair Clawson: Okay, I understand. I'm just 

thinking of today's world. I forgot about the SEC --

so, okay, thank you.
29

Matrix Issue 14

Mr. Nelson: Okay, moving on to the Matrix Issue No. 

14, this is a SEC issue, and a lot of these you're going 

to see they're all coworker issues, and it's titled 

Plutonium Intake Estimation. The description is 

coworker models need to be evaluated from a SEC 

standpoint. Basically we have to look at the adequacy 

of the REX database for coworker models and how it 

applies from 1984 onward for most workers. So what 

we're saying is we agree we need to look at coworker 

models, and we'd like to keep that issue open, and 

what we'll be doing is evaluating coworker methods 

against the new implementation guide and --

coworker methods are being evaluated at Savannah 

River, so that's -- the implementation guide itself 

isn't completed yet, that's kind of a test, so at this 

point we're not doing coworker evaluation, but we 

want to leave that open with -- eventually that will 

be done for Hanford.

Chair Clawson: I understand.

Matrix Issue 16

Mr. Nelson: Okay, the next issue is curium-244, and 

what we are discussing on this is SC&A and NIOSH in 

agreement this issue is not applicable for the period 

1984 and onward, and therefore recommend to the 

Work Group that it be closed. So this is an issue 

similar to the promethium-147 whereas it's an old 

issue, and we haven't found that issue in the current 

timeframe, and our recommendation is that the issue 

be deleted. So with the previous identified matrices 

but not applicable to this time period.

Member Ziemer: So that's a closure 

recommendation, then?

Mr. Nelson: Yes. This was documented back in April 

2013. SC&A recommended that it be closed.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, this was based on the on-site 

data capture which included interviews as well as 

document reviews, and the idea was to establish 
30

whether there was an exposure potential of curium 

after '83, and we could not establish any.

Chair Clawson: I'm good with that.

Member Ziemer: Yes, I agree. Let's close it.

Matrix Issue 18

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Matrix Issue No. 18, this was a 

Site Profile, and you'll see this a lot of times when 

you're looking at SECs, this becomes a -- so this is 

germane to all sites. The description is the external 

exposure geometry to use of appropriate correction 

factors for different types of jobs. So this is an SEC 

-- or this is a Site Profile, not a SEC issue -- and this 

is a -- issue. So we'd like its status to be as such. I 

don't know, does that typically, Lavon, fall off the 

matrix or does it remain as a Site Profile? 

Mr. Rutherford: You know, I don't recall. Jim might 

remember -- Dr. Neton might remember, but I know 

it could go in abeyance until the issue is resolved. 

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Dr. Neton: Which one were you talking about, 

Bomber? 

Mr. Rutherford: We're talking about the issue of --

Mr. Nelson: It's the external exposure geometry and 

the correction factors necessary for the different 

types of jobs. It comes up with most Site Profiles, 

and it's a global complex-wide issue, so --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Dr. Neton: Yes, this is a Site Profile issue for sure; 

it's just what kind of corrections applied.

Mr. Rutherford: Right, so ultimately what would 

happen is once we -- the Site Profile after completion 

and resolving the issues, then we can verify it 

through that.
31

Mr. Nelson: Now, I know at one time they had 

specific Work Groups as one of their agenda items. 

Maybe that's never been --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Dr. Neton: Yes, this is all caught up in that ICRP 116 

work that we're doing, organ-specific doses based on 

geometries.

Chair Clawson: So this is still going to stay open; it's 

going to be in abeyance. It is a Site Profile issue, 

though, just like at all the other sites, but it's just 

going to be in abeyance until we get into the Site 

Profile. It could actually just move into that. We 

don't want to lose it either, though.

Matrix Issue 19

Mr. Nelson: Okay. Yes, I wasn't sure exactly on the 

housekeeping of that and how that -- so we'll put that 

in abeyance as a Site Profile issue.

Okay, moving on to Matrix Issue No. 19, this is 

another non-SEC issue, and it's lack of adequate 

monitoring, and this is a petitioner issue pertaining 

to the use of coworker models in the Hanford Site 

Profile loads and whether they're adequate. Again, 

the coworker methods will be reviewed against -- the 

NIOSH Implementation Guide for coworkers once it 

becomes finalized. Like I said, there's going to be a 

few of those where we have to do coworker 

evaluation, that is up and coming, so that is an open 

item, but it's a non-SEC issue.

Member Ziemer: Wouldn't this particular one be 

ordinarily combined with a more general one about 

the adequate monitoring? I mean, this was a specific 

case, was it, or petition? Didn't we have it before in 

the matrix?

Chair Clawson: Well, I think it kind of falls under the 

data adequacy, but --

Member Ziemer: I was looking -- trying to look back. 
32

There was not specific external exposure issue or --

Mr. Barton: We think that we can bound external 

data, so it's relative to internal exposures. So you 

need to be looking at coworker methods for that 

particular issue.

Member Ziemer: Well, it sort of gets resolved if a 

different coworker issue comes up, I guess, but we 

can leave it --

Mr. Nelson: I see what you're saying, Dr. Ziemer. 

You're saying that it's basically covered under 

previous issues that you've discussed as coworker 

dose, so it would kind of get rolled --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Katz: Yes, this is Ted.

Member Ziemer: It is really then with a different one, 

that's what --

Mr. Katz: I mean, you have more narrow ones like 

Issue 6 was, particular to low enrichment, but it's 

also coworker issues.

Member Ziemer: I guess it's okay to just leave it as 

it is. It might get solved in some way with something 

else, but we've had that before also, so I think it's all 

right.

Mr. Nelson: Yes, a lot of these are historical issues 

that have been out there and we're carrying them 

forward, and we just don't want to lose them, so the 

wording sometimes is a fairly --

Member Ziemer: Right, yes.

Chair Clawson: Sounds good to me.

Member Ziemer: That's fine.

Matrix Issue 20

Mr. Nelson: Okay, so moving on to Matrix Issue No. 

20, this is an SEC issue, and it pertains to the 
33

adequacy of monitoring data for skin contamination 

that resulted from radiological incidents involving 

primary cooling water at the N reactors. The site 

data indicates considerable potential for skin 

contamination during maintenance work at N reactor. 

And we'd like to leave it as written right now, and it 

will be an SEC issue.

Chair Clawson: I just wanted one clarifying question 

on this because you call out in this exposures in some 

maintenance work. You're not just limiting that to 

the maintenance personnel, are you? Because I'm 

looking at the operations and the refueling process 

and everything else like that. This is to everybody, 

correct?

Mr. Nelson: I think it was specifically came out from 

a site expert interview, and they specifically 

mentioned maintenance work, but I don't know that 

we would necessarily exclude others from it.

Chair Clawson: Well, right. When somebody refers 

to as maintenance work, in my eyes that's taking in 

all people, but this one says the N reactor and stuff 

like that, it's kind of interesting because of the 

operations personnel, dealing with the cooling water 

loads and the refueling process. I just wanted to 

share because I've read this before, especially the 

statement of maintenance, and I just want to make 

sure it was everybody. It's more of a clarifying 

question for me.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, I would add that perhaps, Chuck, 

we ought to expand that wording a little bit, because 

I agree with Brad in this case. This actually, this 

issue came from a refueling problem which was the 

splashing of workers with primary cooling water 

when they removed the core elements, the tubes, 

and they were getting quite a bit of skin 

contamination just because of that water. And they 

were awash in water if you can imagine from that 

process. It was a quarterly process, so -- and they 

were wearing masks, so essentially it's a question of 

what the skin contamination may have been and to 
34

what extent that was being monitored or not. So 

maybe we can use something broader than 

maintenance and just include refueling, 

maintenance, and other activities. Maybe that'll be 

the phrase to throw in there.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Nelson: -- we just remove the word 

maintenance? 

Mr. Fitzgerald: I think we can just say refueling, 

maintenance, and other activities supporting N 

reactor operations. I think that would be broad 

enough. The other comment I would throw in just 

for background is that, as I understand it, Jay Jones 

was the primary support for these activities. So of 

course the CTWs have a SEC for the time period. So 

to some extent we may also have to establish who 

these support personnel actually were at N reactor, 

and they may already be covered, but I'll just throw 

that in as background.

Mr. Nelson: Okay, so you're suggesting --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: I would just say refueling, 

maintenance and other support activities at N 

reactor. That would be broad enough to respond to 

Brad's question. It actually just was a refueling 

issue, not a maintenance issue.

Chair Clawson: I think we agree with that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Again, I think what's interesting is 

who these workers might have been, and again, I 

think a lot of them are Jay Jones personnel. One 

issue we're going to have to walk through is exactly 

who constituted the support staff for N reactor, who 

may have been subject to this kind of exposure 

because it may be --

Chair Clawson: I just remember operations being 

involved in it, and my reason why this -- because 
35

that's where this came from was an operations 

personnel mentioning that that -- it wasn't Jay Jones, 

it was actually them that was doing the refueling. So 

I just want to make sure we are not leaving anybody 

out in any way, and I did not want to just tie this to 

construction or so forth because Hanford is a little bit 

different in that aspect. So --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, it'd have to be inclusive, rather 

than exclusive.

Chair Clawson: Right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: So we need to be very inclusive in 

terms of the personnel as well as the operational 

activities. 

Chair Clawson: Because this issue actually came up 

from one of the operations personnel in the N reactor, 

so that's all I wanted to make sure on that. We'll run 

it all down if they did have masks and everything else 

like that, so I just wanted to make sure it doesn't 

exclude anybody.

Member Ziemer: Yes. Well, I think Jones -- will 

cover it sufficiently.

Chair Clawson: I think so, too. Thanks, Paul.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, we'll make that change.

Matrix Issue 21

Mr. Nelson: Okay, Matrix Issue 21, this is titled 

Missing Records. So the discussion is SEC-specific 

analysis for Hanford is needed to verify that the 

approaches specified are bounding doses, or more 

accurate than bounding doses, for all members of the 

proposed class. Review of box labels of destroyed 

records indicate vast majority are not relevant or preJuly 1, 1972. Some boxes do not have clear dates 

for contents, some boxes may have relevant data. 

It's unclear if duplicates exist. And the discussion 

with this is that SC&A and NIOSH agreed that there's 

no clear indication of destroyed records and that such 
36

evaluations are a standard part of SEC evaluation as 

required in the NIOSH dose reconstruction 

implementation guide and our implementing 

procedures. And we are recommending that the 

issue be deleted.

I mean, in the SC&A reports, SC&A went on to 

mention that they didn't find any specific missing 

records, and Joe might be able to expand on that, but 

-- October 2013 SC&A report mentions there were 

several interviews and data captures investigating 

the issue, and it was an extensive evaluation, but Joe 

may better remember that.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Given that comment, we did, as we 

do at all sites, look for any evidence, any 

documentation, any corroboration about destroyed 

records, and to date we have not found any. So it 

would be a Work Group judgement as to whether you 

want to keep an open item or basically delete this as 

-- because, again, it's generic as Chuck was saying. 

We do this at all the sites. We follow every 

suggestion or comment or indication of destroyed or 

compromised records. So even if there is no item, 

we would certainly look for any evidence of that. So 

it's really a judgement as to whether or not it's 

necessary to maintain a separate item on this or not.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Chair Clawson: Right. Joe, part of this came from 

the interview process and when we interviewed 

somebody and they had mentioned to from a certain 

time period something happened about destroyed 

records, so forth. So this came into that, we have 

run that to ground, we have not found anything. But 

this is just kind of a housekeeping issue. Plus, 

because of some of the things that we have found. 

You're right, in any of our reviews we go into this, 

but we wanted to be able to address this person's 

concerns and make sure they knew that we had 

evaluated that. So I have no problem if we want to 

get rid of it or not, but it's part of your process, 

anyway.
37

(Simultaneous speaking.) 

Mr. Fitzgerald: If we get a prominent question or 

issue that would arise along these lines, it would very 

well could be something that we would add a line 

item. Again, it's just something that, again, we have 

not found anything. 

Chair Clawson: I know that in three of the meetings 

that we've had at Hanford, this question has come 

up. So it does not matter to me if we keep it in there 

or not, but from the sense of -- from my sense of 

being able to address and show that it was a line 

item, I would just kind of -- I don't know what you 

want to do, close it or whatever, but that we had 

addressed that issue and that we had found nothing 

with it.

Mr. Fitzgerald: We will continue asking the question 

and being open to the question. This won't affect 

that --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Fitzgerald: -- or any others, so it's really a Work 

Group discretion.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: Yes, I'd suggest closing it. You 

have shown that you have used your normal 

procedures for confirming that the records haven't 

been destroyed or missing, and you can't go much 

beyond what you're ordinarily doing. But in any 

event, I don't think we should use deletion of it -- the 

things would still be in the record that it's been an 

issue that was asked for --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Nelson: -- SEC 155 about falsification of records, 

and that was not added because of evaluation that 

was -- if that's directly related or just --

Mr. Rutherford: I do agree with Dr. Ziemer that it 

should -- saying deleted is the wrong word. It should 
38

be closed, and that way the record is always 

maintained.

Chair Clawson: I agree with that. Thanks, Lavon or 

Bomber, or whatever you want to go by today.

Mr. Rutherford: I like Bomber better, but I figured 

we're in a formal setting --

Chair Clawson: Well, that's why I called you Lavon 

and then when Steve called you Bomber, I said okay 

I can do it.

Member Ziemer: In view of today's news, we better 

use Lavon.

Chair Clawson: I'm good with that. I'd just like to 

close it. Are the other Work Group Members good 

with this?

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Member Schofield: Yes.

Chair Clawson: Okay, we'll go on.

Matrix Issue 22

Mr. Nelson: Okay, Matrix Issue No. 22, this is -- the 

new title we're proposing is radiological incidents. 

It's an SEC issue pertaining to the question if 

sufficient bioassays were taken for potential internal 

exposures from minor radiological incidents. There 

was some discussion before about these large 

incidents with SC&A and the Work Group. They were 

-- the smaller radiological incidents, were they 

adequately followed up. In this case the prime 

contractors, did they do a good job in the incidents 

performed -- such that sufficient bioassays were 

performed. So basically the only change we'd like on 

that is just before it said missing incident records, 

and we'd just like to call it radiological incidents and 

have a new proposed description, basically tying that 

back to -- bioassays even for those minor incidents.

Chair Clawson: I understand. I'm good with that.
39

Matrix Issue 23

Mr. Nelson: Okay, so moving on to Matrix Issue No. 

23 is the REX database adequacy and 

representativeness for coworker models. Our new 

proposed description is that coworker models are 

based on the REX database. The representativeness 

of that REX database for estimating coworker doses 

needs to be examined in the SEC context. This is 

another one of those issues where it's going to have 

to be coworker evaluation once the NIOSH 

Implementation Guide is completed. So at this point 

we'd just like to propose a change in the description 

to be more so what needs to be done which is 

evaluate the coworker methods.

Chair Clawson: All right, I agree. That's good.

Member Ziemer: This is Ziemer. I'm okay on that. 

That remains -- that's not in abeyance though at this 

point, is it?

Mr. Nelson: Right, we're waiting on the 

implementation guide to be completed. You're going 

to see that same answer, then we can start doing 

coworker for Hanford site.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: So does that put it in abeyance 

then?

Mr. Katz: That should put it as an open issue because 

it hasn't been engaged.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Mr. Nelson: Where should we put that status, like 

next to the proposed description, or should we put it 

at the end as an open issue?

Mr. Katz: In the BRS there should be an option to --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Katz: -- it's a separate column, so that would 
40

actually be open. And I just -- for clarification this -

- you represented these coworker issues as Site 

Profile issues, so is that what this is represented as 

in what you got there?

Mr. Nelson: This is SEC. So if you look in the 

proposed description, to be examined in the SEC 

context.

Mr. Katz: Okay, because previously on some of these 

coworker matters you said they were Site Profile 

matters, some of the other issues on coworker you 

called that --

Mr. Nelson: I'm just looking at the wording. That's 

the only reason I said that. Bomber might be able to 

clarify --

Mr. Rutherford: Ultimately, I think once the 

Implementation Guide is approved -- this is a Site 

Profile issue -- it would become an SEC issue if 

coworker -- if we determined it was not feasible to 

develop a coworker model. 

Mr. Katz: Right. I'm just saying we should be 

consistent if we're going to call them Site Profile at 

this point until they're addressed, then we should call 

them all Site Profile for the coworker issues. 

Mr. Rutherford: I agree --

Mr. Nelson: We will clarify that.

Mr. Katz: Okay, thank you.

Matrix Issue 25

Mr. Nelson: Okay, similar issue, Matrix Issue 25, 

this is for miscellaneous radionuclides, chromium-51, 

ruthenium-106, cerium-144, and cobalt-60. This 

issue involves a review of methods presented in the 

Hanford Site Profile for assigning internal dose from 

fission and activation product nuclides, and including 

the use of coworker methods. So this is the same 

issue whereas this is a -- even if -- it's a Site Profile 

issue and the need for a coworker review.
41

Any discussion on that? 

Chair Clawson: Yes, I understand what you're 

saying. I'm just wanting to make sure that I 

understand what the wording is there.

Mr. Nelson: Okay.

Chair Clawson: We're addressing this --

Member Ziemer: It's pretty much the same as the 

previous one. Clarify for me, though, do we consider 

the Hanford work still in progress as opposed -- it's 

not completed, it's not in abeyance?

Mr. Nelson: Correct.

Member Ziemer: So that is still in progress, so this 

has got to be in progress? 

Mr. Katz: Yeah, well, it's open if we haven't done 

anything yet at all. Then it's open.

Member Ziemer: Or open, yes.

Mr. Katz: Yeah, it's open.

Chair Clawson: Yes, it looks like this one would be 

open, so.

Member Ziemer: Okay. 

Matrix Issue 26

Mr. Nelson: Okay, Matrix Issue No. 26, this is a nonSEC issue titled data completeness. And SC&A and 

NIOSH agreed that concerns raised in this issue are 

an integral part of the SEC evaluation process via the 

SEC Implementation Guide and associated 

procedures, NIOSH and -- therefore recommends to 

the working group that this issue be -- well we have 

deleted it, the wording should be closed on this 

particular one. So this is a discussion about how 

complete individual those records are, that's done as 

a matter of routine performance for any dose 

reconstruction.
42

Member Ziemer: Right.

Chair Clawson: Right, this is kind of a lingering issue 

that we got into part of the way through. I have no 

problem with this.

Mr. Nelson: Again, that's a historical issue that's 

carried through that's done with every site in DR.

Chair Clawson: Right.

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Member Ziemer: Okay to close?

Chair Clawson: Yes, I think we should just close it. 

I don't want to delete it. I'd just like to close it.

Member Schofield: Yes, let's -- I'd say let's go ahead 

and close it. It's kind of a general thing at all sites.

Member Ziemer: Yes.

Matrix Issue 27

Mr. Nelson: Okay. This next one is Building 324 

leaks. And Joe can just jump in here eventually -- I 

know he's pretty familiar with this, but the previous 

description -- we're going to keep that same 

description so I'll just read through it. There were 

leaks of high-level waste in B-Cell, Building 324, 

including a major spill, reportedly in 1986. 

Decontamination of B-Cell began in the late 1980s. 

SC&A conducted interviews and HP coverage was 

reportedly good. Mixed fission product monitoring 

data exists for the mid-1980s when the major B-Cell 

spill occurred. Some specific radionuclides may not 

have data. There were earlier leaks under A and CCells. The soil under B-Cell was found to be 

contaminated in 2010. NIOSH should verify whether 

the workers involved, including those dealing with A 

and C-Cell leaks, were monitored and whether the 

data exists that can be used with claimant-favorable 

assumptions to estimate the incident-related doses.

And the discussion is SC&A and NIOSH agree that the 
43

SEC issue has been thoroughly investigated and is 

now at a stage where it needs to be fully documented 

to close out. So there's a need to provide some 

documentation to close this issue out. There's been 

quite a bit of investigation. 

Mr. Rutherford: Yes, this was a due diligence issue 

that we had to pursue. It was an incident that was 

reported that had pretty important implications for 

exposure, but the question was, was the monitoring 

that was done adequate enough to provide a basis 

for a dose reconstruction. And I think that we have 

certainly looked at the documentation and 

interviewed -- at the facility, so we feel pretty solid 

about it; we just have to, again, document it and then 

make a recommendation to the Work Group.

Chair Clawson: I understand. We'll just leave this 

open and when we get the paperwork we'll --

Member Ziemer: Is the agreement simply that the 

data is complete?

Mr. Rutherford: It's a data completeness issue 

whether given the incident monitoring that was done 

--

Member Ziemer: Right, so there's an agreement 

between both NIOSH and SC&A that there's adequate 

data to do the dose reconstruction?

Mr. Rutherford: Yes.

Chair Clawson: That's true, but we have not officially 

seen the paperwork and the --

Member Ziemer: No, no --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Nelson: You haven't seen the write-up.

Member Ziemer: Yes, I understand that, but there 

should be adequate data.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, the issue is whether there was 
44

adequate bioassay data done or performed at the 

time that you would have the basis for dosage. 

Member Ziemer: Right. We're recommending to 

close it then, right?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Once we submit the review to the 

Work Group, that would be a possible and a likely 

recommendation, but we haven't prepared that yet.

Chair Clawson: So right now we're just going to 

accept it and keep it --

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, it's open and would remain open 

until you see the documents.

Member Ziemer: Open, I think.

Mr. Katz: Not to be a nag, but that would be in 

progress because you've already accepted --

Mr. Nelson: Okay, in progress.

Mr. Katz: You just need the documentation, yes.

Mr. Nelson: What we agreed is that we would take 

these recommendations and agree with changes as 

noted during the discussion. I think one thing that 

has been brought up a few times here is that we 

should look at the status of them and all be in 

agreement with them.

Mr. Katz: Yes.

Mr. Nelson: Closed versus open. That's one thing 

I've learned here is that there's a specific way of 

doing that, and we could be a little bit clearer on that 

with our matrix. If we put it in the BRS, it'll force us 

to do that. Like you mentioned, there's a thing in 

there in that program where it'll force us to do that.

Member Ziemer: Right.

Mr. Katz: And, Chuck, I'd be happy to look through 

it all once you put it in the BRS, just let me know.

Mr. Nelson: I appreciate that, Ted.
45

Mr. Katz: Sure.

Mr. Nelson: Definitely would be open to that.

Chair Clawson: Okay, so basically what this will come 

down to is once this gets all put together and the 

status of it all, the Work Group will accept this. I 

think we've already accepted this, but to review the 

status and so forth, we'll be good with it and go from 

there.

Is there anything else that needs to come forward to 

the Work Group today?

Mr. Fitzgerald: Well, just the thought that of course 

the premise of updating all of this and getting it 

current and providing the latest assessment of where 

things stand would be to receive any direction the 

Work Group might want to provide. Certainly we're 

going to focus on finishing up the key source term 

reviews, the uranium, high enriched uranium U-233, 

thorium, and neptunium, so that we can present that 

to the Work Group for closure, as well as this last one 

we just talked about. 

I think NIOSH is finishing up its assessment of the 

primary contractors in terms of the question of 

bioassay program support, the same issue that was 

dealt with the CTWs. So that's kind of what the 

outlook is I would say for the immediate future as far 

as our priority in terms of staff work. If there's any 

need to add priorities or to shift priorities, I guess 

that's what we would look to the Work Group for. So 

whatever would give you enough information beyond 

this matrix that would allow you to do that, that 

would certainly help us as well. That was another 

premise for getting this up to date. 

Chair Clawson: Right.

Mr. Fitzgerald: As it stands that's what we're going 

to be focusing on is wrapping up the reviews that we 

had gotten pretty far along a couple years ago but 

didn't quite finish and got diverted on some of these 

other important SEC issues, but ones that precluded 
46

finishing up on these original ones. But we certainly 

intend to finish up on these in the near term. 

Chair Clawson: Well, right. We've got several open 

items in this matrix that, I guess, the last time I 

talked to Chuck, they were still collecting data. My 

question to Chuck now is how is your data capture 

going?

Mr. Nelson: We have actually received pretty much 

all the requests that we've had in place. We had 

some PNL records that we've been waiting since 2014 

and '17 on, and we've just received those. We have 

not gone through those yet. And there's a few 

outstanding items, one in particular the very first 

one, the thorium one, I think is going to have a need 

to do some more site investigation on that one. So 

right now we have some keywords that we'd like to 

submit to our DOE point of contact to see if we can 

get any additional information. We saw that there's 

thorium in some areas, but we need to do a little 

more research to see if anybody was actually -- if 

there was internal exposure potential. Then if we 

were to identify that, then we would say how are you 

monitored and were you adequately monitored. So 

that's one issue what we're working on, getting 

keywords for that so we can go to the site. And the 

other thing we're doing is there's various ways to find 

out where these radionuclides were, NMC&A records, 

and one that we were trying to follow through was 

SWITS, the Solid Waste Information Tracking 

System. We had the point of contacts there. We 

were working through them, and they had -- there 

was like a change in management there. 

The last discussion we had with them is they didn't 

feel like it would be very useful, and so what we'd like 

to do is make a site visit there, talk to the new point 

of contacts and have a face to face discussion with 

them, just to make sure if there's any potential, good 

information we could mine from that particular 

database. So a couple things that we planned is we 

see the need for a site visit to meet with those 

individuals, depending on what they come back from 
47

our keywords, maybe some box reviews specifically 

for that. And will there be any more NMC&A record 

reviews. We're not sure of that, we got -- Bob has 

gone through quite a bit of NMC&A records. And so 

that's kind of the near-term plan that we're actually 

working right now. 

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, and --

Chair Clawson: Go ahead, Joe.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Yes, and Brad, this is obviously data 

driven. If you're looking at whether or not source 

terms existed in various places on site, getting this 

substantiating data is the basis for doing that. So we 

need to get the additional data for thorium, we need 

to, I guess, finish up on PUREX, and we're looking to 

the data captures that NIOSH has organized. Again, 

that will feed the completion of our analysis as well. 

So that data capture is the pacing item on our being 

able to finish up our report to the Board on these four 

-- I would call them four critical source terms that 

come from the preceding SEC class, which is thorium, 

U-233, HEU, and Np, neptunium. If we can get any 

of the remaining data capture information for them 

and finish that up, we can present our report and 

reach closure on those that I think are the key items 

that remain for the primary contractors. And there 

are other issues, but those are I think the primary 

ones we would like to wrap up.

Chair Clawson: Right, we'd like that. What are we 

looking at a timeframe, Chuck?

Mr. Nelson: Well --

Chair Clawson: Has your ability to be able to get this 

helped out in all that -- we've got some -- out there 

to Hanford for you, he's -- he got a new contract put 

in place and stuff, so I'm just wondering --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Mr. Nelson: -- we'll refine the keywords -- that we 

have right now, we'll take the input from any 
48

clarification that we've gotten through this -- today, 

and we'll finalize that and get it over to Gayle Splett 

from DOE, and then see how fast she can turn it 

around. Like I said, I think they're going pretty good. 

I think they're pretty well-staffed. I know there were 

some contract issues a few months ago, and it 

sounds like they're getting all those straightened out, 

and even classification review with Dave Briggs, he's, 

I think, back onboard, so I think --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

Chair Clawson: Yes, I talked with DOE about this 

issue, and so they started keeping me in the loop on 

that, so. What did you say the timeframe was?

Mr. Nelson: I know you're trying to nail me down, 

but --

Mr. Rutherford: Why can't we provide a better time 

table to the Work Group once we have an idea from 

Hanford on how quickly they can get the keywords 

searched and give us an estimate on when they can 

support any site visit that we have. Then we can give 

you a better idea because I think right now we're 

going to be guessing.

Mr. Nelson: Right, because there's coordination 

that's got to take place with the site. It costs a lot of 

money and resources. And also the Board Members, 

and, Brad, you may want to come along and others. 

Then you got schedules. So I think what we need to 

do is finish our keywords, get it over to them, see 

how quickly they can turn it around and let them 

come up with the number of boxes, how long it takes 

to pull those boxes, then you got to kind of work out 

schedules -- the review. 

Chair Clawson: Okay. Well, I guess what I would 

say to you is I'd like to -- I've been trying to pull a 

lot of strings with DOE to be able to push this because 

Hanford has been drug out there for a long time. I 

just want to stay in touch on this so that, believe or 

not, people are trying to hold my feet to the fire of 

when are we going to complete this. There's been a 
49

lot of unseen issues come up and switches in the care 

and everything like this, and I understand this. But 

when you do get this data, if you'd let us know so we 

can kind of be tentatively be looking at a time to be 

able to get the Work Group together to be able to 

take care of these issues and bring them to rest. So 

just keep me in the loop, I guess, is what I'd say, but 

let me know what they say on the data and the site 

visit.

Mr. Nelson: I'll copy you on emails then.

Chair Clawson: Right. Okay, anything else that 

needs to come before the Work Group?

Member Ziemer: Are we going to have a report to 

the main Board at the next meeting, the status of this 

meeting?

Chair Clawson: Yes, basically what we're going to be 

able to bring up is that we've cleaned up the matrix 

and are proceeding forward with the top four hitters 

on this and that we've got a Site Profile -- or a site 

visit in progress and another data capture coming.

Member Ziemer: Okay.

Chair Clawson: I'll just report status -- get there.

Member Ziemer: Sounds good.

Chair Clawson: Okay. Well, if nothing more there, 

Ted, do you have anything?

Mr. Katz: No, I think that's good, and I think this was 

a very useful meeting. So I think that you can 

adjourn it now.

Adjournment

Chair Clawson: Okay, I would like to tell everybody 

thanks. I know, Chuck, I've been trying to hold you, 

your feet to the fire a little bit, too, Joe, and 

everybody else like that, but I appreciate all the work 

that you've done, and we'll see everybody in 

December.
50

Mr. Katz: Thanks a lot.

Chair Clawson: With that, this meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the 

record at 3:41 p.m.)