Page 1 of 6

Cases No. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ and 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASES NO. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ

 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

JAMEY ALEXANDER MURPHY,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER DENYING THE § 2255 MOTION

The defendant Jamey Alexander Murphy pleaded guilty to cocaine and 

firearm offenses. He was sentenced. He appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit 

affirmed. Mr. Murphy now has moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

The motion is before the court on the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, ECF No. 73, and the objections, ECF No. 77. I have reviewed 

de novo the issues raised by the objections. This order accepts the report and

recommendation and denies the § 2255 motion.

Mr. Murphy contends that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by 

advising Mr. Murphy to plead guilty without fully advising him about a possibly 

well-founded motion to suppress critical evidence. To prevail on an ineffectiveCase 4:11-cr-00032-RH-GRJ Document 78 Filed 08/08/16 Page 1 of 6
Page 2 of 6

Cases No. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ and 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

assistance claim, a defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

The basis for a motion to suppress, in Mr. Murphy’s view, was the 

installation of a GPS tracking device on Mr. Murphy’s car. Mr. Murphy says 

agents installed the device without a warrant while the car was parked in a 

driveway on the private property where Mr. Murphy lived. The device yielded 

information that agents used to obtain a search warrant for a storage unit and later 

for another storage unit. The agents found drugs, guns, and money in the storage 

units and leveraged this evidence to obtain incriminating statements from Mr. 

Murphy.

The agents had developed significant information about Mr. Murphy’s 

activities before placing the GPS device on the car. At least insofar as shown by 

this record, the information was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that Mr. 

Murphy was engaged in drug trafficking and that placing a GPS device on the car 

would lead to information confirming his involvement. Mr. Murphy has not 

alleged facts suggesting that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion. 

The law of the circuit and in this district at the time of the guilty plea was 

not completely settled but strongly suggested that reasonable suspicion was 

sufficient to support placement of a GPS device on a car, and that a search warrant 

thus was unnecessary, even if the car was parked in a driveway on private 

Case 4:11-cr-00032-RH-GRJ Document 78 Filed 08/08/16 Page 2 of 6
Page 3 of 6

Cases No. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ and 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

property. See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 

banc) (reversing the suppression of evidence obtained through the warrantless 

installation of a beeper on a car that was in a restaurant parking lot but announcing 

the court’s holding in broader terms: “We . . . hold that reasonable suspicion is 

adequate to support warrantless beeper installation.”); United States v. Burton, 698 

F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1308 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (denying a motion to suppress evidence 

obtained from a GPS tracking device that was placed on the defendant’s vehicle 

while it was parked in the driveway of the defendant’s residence). Michael was 

binding precedent. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 

(11th Cir.1981). And Burton, while not binding, was a recent decision of a district 

court in the same district squarely on point.

To be sure, the Supreme Court held later that installing a GPS tracking 

constitutes a search, suggesting that a device can be installed only with probable 

cause, and perhaps also only with a warrant. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 

945 (2012). But an attorney’s failure to anticipate a change in the law, without 

more, does not constitute ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Funchess v. Wainwright, 

772 F.2d 683, 691 (11th Cir. 1985). And as the report and recommendation notes, 

Mr. Murphy was, by his own account, aware of this issue and the state of the law. 

He chose to plead guilty anyway. 

Case 4:11-cr-00032-RH-GRJ Document 78 Filed 08/08/16 Page 3 of 6
Page 4 of 6

Cases No. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ and 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

More importantly, an officer who takes action that reasonably appears to be 

authorized by the law of the circuit and is plainly authorized by a recent decision of 

the pertinent district court acts in good faith, precluding suppression of evidence 

obtained as a result. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) 

(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized as a result of 

an officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent); United 

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not

apply to evidence seized as a result of an officer’s good-faith reliance on an invalid 

warrant); see also Heien v. N.C., 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (rejecting a Fourth 

Amendment claim arising from an officer’s reasonable mistake of law).

So a motion to suppress would have failed in the district court, based on the 

law of the circuit at the relevant time and a recent decision of the district court. 

After losing such a motion in the district court, Mr. Murphy could have pleaded 

guilty while reserving the right to appeal, if the government consented. By the 

time of any appellate decision, Mr. Murphy would have had the benefit of a change 

in the law—the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. But he still would ultimately 

have lost the suppression issue, because the agents acted in good faith. And had 

Mr. Murphy gone to trial despite having lost a motion to suppress, he would have 

had no chance of success, because the evidence seized from the storage units, 

together with Mr. Murphy’s incriminating statements, would have ensured his 

Case 4:11-cr-00032-RH-GRJ Document 78 Filed 08/08/16 Page 4 of 6
Page 5 of 6

Cases No. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ and 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

conviction. Indeed, at that point, there is no reason to believe Mr. Murphy would 

have analyzed the decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial any differently 

than he in fact analyzed the decision when he pleaded guilty. Mr. Murphy has not 

suggested he would have gone to trial in the face of the unsuppressed evidence, or 

that his attorney’s advice on the merits of going to trial, based on that evidence, 

was erroneous.

In short, Mr. Murphy has not shown deficient performance because his claim 

turns on his attorney’s failure to anticipate a change in the law. And he has not 

shown prejudice, because the agents acted in good faith, and there is no reason to 

believe this case would have come out differently, no matter the advice given by 

the attorney. The § 2255 motion thus must be denied. 

A defendant may appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion only if the district 

court or court of appeals issues a certificate of appealability. Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 

(2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983); see also Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13 (2000) (setting out the standards applicable to a 

§ 2254 petition on the merits). As the Court said in Slack:

To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a 

Case 4:11-cr-00032-RH-GRJ Document 78 Filed 08/08/16 Page 5 of 6
Page 6 of 6

Cases No. 4:11cr32-RH/GRJ and 4:13cv236-RH/GRJ

demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes showing that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the 

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 

issues presented were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” 

529 U.S. at 483-84 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4). 

Reasonable jurists could disagree on whether this motion was properly 

denied without an evidentiary hearing. This order thus grants a certificate of 

appealability. 

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The clerk must enter a judgment stating, “The defendant Jamey Alexander 

Murphy’s motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied.”

2. A certificate of appealability is granted on this issue: whether the claim 

that the defendant’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to fully 

advise the defendant about a potential motion to suppress was properly denied 

without an evidentiary hearing.

3. Leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is granted.

SO ORDERED on August 8, 2016.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge

Case 4:11-cr-00032-RH-GRJ Document 78 Filed 08/08/16 Page 6 of 6