[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Ball, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-785.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-785

CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. BALL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Ball, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-785.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 

including engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice 

law—Indefinite suspension. 

(No. 2015-0286—Submitted September 1, 2015—Decided March 3, 2016.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2014-001. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Stephen John Ball of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 00087242, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2011. 

{¶ 2} In December 2013, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a 

complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, alleging 
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that Ball violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct arising out of his 

September 6, 2013 convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”) 

and disorderly conduct as well as subsequent false statements of material fact to 

relator’s investigator.1

 After a probable-cause panel certified that complaint to the 

board, relator amended the complaint to add allegations that Ball overdrew his 

client trust account and engaged in the practice of law while his license was 

inactive. 

{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and 

aggravating and mitigating factors but did not agree to a recommended sanction. 

Following a hearing, where a panel of the board heard testimony from Ball and one 

character witness and received 13 exhibits, the panel issued a report adopting the 

parties’ stipulations with one exception—it declined to find that Ball’s alcohol 

addiction qualified as a mitigating factor. On those findings, the panel 

recommended that Ball be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. The 

board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation. 

{¶ 4} Ball submitted six objections to the board’s report, challenging the 

board’s failure to accord any mitigating effect to his diagnosed alcohol dependency 

and disputing the board’s recommended sanction. For the reasons that follow, we 

overrule Ball’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and 

indefinitely suspend Ball from the practice of law. 

Misconduct 

OVI, Disorderly Conduct, and False Statements to Relator’s Investigator 

{¶ 5} One night in December 2012, Ball attended a basketball game where 

he consumed a beer and a Christmas party where he consumed seven or eight beers. 

Although he was admittedly too inebriated to drive, he started to drive home. A 

Hamilton County sheriff’s deputy observed his vehicle and attempted to execute a 

 

1

 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 

renamed the Board of Professional Conduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
January Term, 2016 

3

traffic stop, but Ball continued driving to his subdivision with the deputy in pursuit. 

Ball came to a stop at the end of a cul-de-sac near the driveway to his home, exited 

his vehicle, and began to run as the deputy yelled for him to stop. After Ball 

eventually complied with the order and allowed the deputy to catch up with him, 

the deputy physically restrained and arrested him. 

{¶ 6} Ball was charged with OVI, obstructing official business, driving 

under suspension, and a felony count of receiving stolen property for using a stolen 

license plate on his vehicle. Ball eventually pleaded guilty to OVI and disorderly 

conduct and advised relator of his plea. He was sentenced to probation, ordered to 

participate in a residential-treatment program, and granted driving privileges only 

with the use of an ignition-interlock device. 

{¶ 7} In September 2013, relator’s investigator questioned Ball about the 

stolen license plate on his vehicle. Ball stated that he had purchased the car from 

his father in 2011 and insisted that his father’s license plate remained on the vehicle, 

but he could not adequately explain why the license-plate number did not match his 

father’s registration documents. He eventually admitted that he knew the license 

plate was stolen when he obtained it from a friend. He also admitted that this was 

the second stolen license plate that he had obtained and used with the intent to 

prevent law-enforcement officers from discovering that he was driving while his 

driver’s license was under suspension. 

{¶ 8} The parties stipulated and the board found that Ball violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that 

reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(d) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice) by knowingly driving a vehicle with stolen license plates, 

concealing from law enforcement the fact that he did not have a valid driver’s 

license, driving while intoxicated, and running from a law enforcement officer. In 

addition, the parties stipulated and the board found that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 
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8.1(a) (prohibiting knowingly making a false statement of material fact in 

connection with a disciplinary matter) for claiming ignorance about the stolen 

plates when he knew they were stolen. 

{¶ 9} Although the complaint charged Ball with a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 

8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 

lawyer’s fitness to practice law) with respect to this conduct, neither the parties nor 

the board addressed that allegation. However, having considered Ball’s efforts to 

flee a lawful traffic stop and conceal the fact that he was driving while his license 

was under suspension as well as his lie about receiving and using stolen license 

plates, we conclude that his conduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant that 

additional finding here. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 

2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 20 (“Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) * * * is a catchall 

provision that [applies to] situations in which a lawyer’s conduct in violation of 

other more specific rules is so egregious that it reflects on his fitness to practice 

law”). 

Client Trust Account Overdrafts 

{¶ 10} In addition to his OVI-related misconduct, Ball stipulated that he 

agreed to receive settlement payments on behalf of Paul Duncan after another 

attorney obtained a settlement on Duncan’s behalf. Ball processed those payments 

through his client trust account and charged no fees or expenses for the service. 

After the obligor fell behind on his payments, he made a partial payment toward 

his arrearage and assured Ball that he would send a second payment to bring his 

obligation current. Based on that assurance, Ball issued a check to Duncan for the 

full amount with knowledge that the account did not contain sufficient funds. After 

the obligor failed to send Ball a second payment, Ball issued a check for the amount 

he had actually received on the client’s behalf and obtained a temporary stoppayment order for the other check. But because he failed to go to the bank to 
January Term, 2016 

5

finalize the stop-payment order as instructed, the bank processed the check, causing 

his client trust account to become overdrawn. 

{¶ 11} Consistent with the parties’ stipulations, the board found that Ball 

caused his client trust account to be overdrawn twice more in connection with his 

effort to establish a nonprofit organization with an accountant. Ball issued two 

checks on two different closed bank accounts and deposited them into his client 

trust account, causing that account to become overdrawn when the bank assessed 

fees for the bad checks. He explained that he took over his own accounting when 

his paralegal took another job and was unaware of which bank accounts remained 

open and which had been closed. 

{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found that Ball violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by demonstrating an inability to effectively manage his own 

financial accounts and by writing a check from his client trust account when he 

knew that there were insufficient funds in the account. 

Practicing Law While Registered Inactive 

{¶ 13} Ball’s Ohio attorney registration was inactive from January 31, 

2014, to March 7, 2014, but his voicemail and website remained active, albeit with 

all of his advertising removed. On February 13, 2014, he spoke with an insurance 

adjuster on behalf of one of his clients and discussed a pending case without 

informing the adjuster that he was no longer an active attorney. And on March 1, 

2014, he wrote to the client to terminate his representation and return the client’s 

file, but his letter also discussed his opinions about the client’s case and the 

feasibility of certain actions going forward. Ball did not change his letterhead to 

reflect his inactive status and failed to inform any of his clients that his license was 

inactive when he told them that he would be “on hiatus” for a month. 

{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in 

violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction). 
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Recommended Sanction

{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated and the sanctions 

imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 

2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final determination, we also 

weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B).2

 Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 

875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 16} As mitigating factors, the board adopted the parties’ stipulations that 

Ball does not have a prior disciplinary record, self-reported his OVI, and submitted 

evidence of his good character and reputation. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), 

(d), and (e). 

{¶ 17} The parties also stipulated that Ball was struggling with an addiction 

to alcohol at the time of his December 2012 OVI offense but noted that there had 

been no determination by a substance-abuse counselor that such dependency 

contributed to his misconduct in 2014. Consistent with the parties’ stipulations, the 

board found that Ball was an admitted alcoholic and that he had withdrawn his 

application to take the July 2008 bar exam after the Board of Commissioners on 

Character and Fitness exercised its authority to conduct an additional, sua sponte 

investigation into his character and fitness. 

{¶ 18} As the parties had stipulated, the board also found that Ball has had 

multiple encounters with law enforcement as a result of his alcohol use, including 

an August 2000 charge for underage consumption, a December 2003 charge of 

public intoxication that was later dismissed, and an April 2007 open-container 

violation. He also has a history of OVI offenses dating back to 2002 when he was 

twice charged with OVI, the second offense occurring while his driver’s license 

 

2

 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 

Proc.Reg. 10(B) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
January Term, 2016 

7

was under suspension. And he was arrested and charged in May 2007 with OVI 

and possession of drug paraphernalia and an unloaded firearm after leaving a 

Cincinnati Reds game. After pleading guilty to the OVI and a misdemeanor 

weapons charge, he was ordered to serve ten days in a residential-treatment 

program followed by an intensive outpatient program and probation. 

{¶ 19} Ball participated in the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 

(“OLAP”) following his 2007 arrest, but approximately nine months after his arrest 

he began drinking again and failed to complete his contract. On June 27, 2013, he 

entered into a second OLAP contract—a five-year recovery contract—after his 

2012 OVI, but he has failed to comply with its terms. His last contact with OLAP 

was on December 2, 2013. 

{¶ 20} Despite having acknowledged Ball’s extensive history with alcohol 

addiction, the board declined to accord it any mitigating effect, stating that “neither 

party submitted evidence that alcohol dependency contributed to any misconduct.” 

The board did, however, find that his multiple offenses, his false statements during 

the disciplinary process, and his failure to comply with the terms of his OLAP 

recovery contract were aggravating factors. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d) and 

(f). 

{¶ 21} Ball urged the board to recommend an 18- to 24-month suspension 

with six months stayed on conditions. Relator, on the other hand, argued that Ball 

should be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. The board recommends 

that we indefinitely suspend Ball from the practice of law, that he be required to 

successfully complete an OLAP-approved substance-abuse-treatment program, and 

that upon reinstatement to the practice of law, he be required to complete six hours 

of continuing legal education related to law-office management and accounting. 

 
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Ball’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation 

{¶ 22} Ball objects to the board’s decision to reject his alcohol dependency 

as a mitigating factor and also argues that its recommended sanction is not 

supported by the record or our precedent. 

{¶ 23} Ball argues that contrary to the board’s finding, he presented 

evidence sufficient to establish his alcohol dependency as a mitigating factor but 

that the board erroneously found that (1) neither party submitted any evidence that 

his alcohol dependency contributed to any of his misconduct, (2) expert testimony 

was required to establish a causal connection between his alcohol dependency and 

his misconduct, and (3) the mitigating factor was not relevant because he admitted 

that it did not apply to all of his misconduct. He also suggests that the board 

disregarded his evidence of alcohol dependency because the information did not 

come from an OLAP professional. 

{¶ 24} BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g) provided that a chemical dependency 

may be considered in mitigation if (i) a qualified health-care professional or 

alcohol/substance-abuse counselor has diagnosed the condition, (ii) there is a 

determination that the condition contributed to cause the misconduct, (iii) there is 

certification that the respondent has successfully completed an approved treatment 

program, and (iv) a qualified health-care professional or alcohol/substance-abuse 

counselor has issued a prognosis that the attorney will be able to return to the 

competent, ethical, and professional practice of law under certain specified 

conditions. 

{¶ 25} We acknowledge that Ball presented some evidence relevant to each 

of the factors enumerated in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). There is compelling 

evidence that he has been diagnosed with alcohol dependency and that he has 

successfully completed an approved treatment program. BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g)(i) and (iii). 
January Term, 2016 

9

{¶ 26} While respondents in these proceedings often submit the testimony 

of their treating professionals (either live or by affidavit) to establish that a chemical 

dependency or mental disability contributed to their misconduct, the rule does not 

expressly require such evidence, nor have we rigidly required it, see, e.g., Columbus 

Bar Assn. v. Allerding, 123 Ohio St.3d 382, 2009-Ohio-5589, 916 N.E.2d 808, ¶ 17 

(finding sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the respondent’s 

diagnosed alcohol dependency and his misconduct, which consisted mainly of 

neglect and failure to competently represent several clients, based on the 

“respondent’s testimony that he was intoxicated daily during the events at issue”). 

{¶ 27} Here, however, Ball has only submitted his own self-serving 

testimony that his alcohol dependency is causally related not only to his OVI 

offense but also to his use of stolen license plates. While the causal relationship 

between his alcohol dependency and his OVI offense is readily apparent, the 

relationship between his alcohol dependency and his decision to receive stolen 

license plates and use them on his vehicle for an extended period of time is not as 

clear—particularly in light of his testimony that he was binge drinking on weekends 

but remained able to practice law because he never drank during the week. Thus, 

the board could reasonably have determined that Ball presented insufficient 

evidence to establish a causal connection with respect to that conduct. 

{¶ 28} But even if the board had found that Ball’s testimony was sufficient 

to establish that his alcohol dependency is causally related to both his OVI and his 

use of stolen license plates, we find that he has not submitted sufficient evidence to 

establish that he will be able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional 

practice of law under specified conditions as required by BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g)(iv). Ball did submit documents that address his prognosis and his 

ongoing treatment for alcohol dependency, but those documents do not adequately 

address the conditions under which he may resume the practice of law. The first 

document is an unsigned copy of a June 19, 2013 letter from Kelly Rogan, M.S., 
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10 

L.S.W., L.I.C.D.C., in which she stated that Ball had entered the continuing-care 

phase of his treatment program on April 15, 2013, and that he had agreed to attend 

that program for one year—which would have expired more than three months 

before Ball’s July 21, 2014 disciplinary hearing. But in her July 8, 2014 follow-up 

letter, Rogan states that she would consider using Ball as a group facilitator “when 

he completes [treatment] because of the commitment he has shown to his program 

and his helpfulness to others along the way,” but she offered no explanation about 

the nature of his ongoing treatment. 

{¶ 29} A July 18, 2014 affidavit executed by Steve Lawson, the Licensed 

Independent Chemical Dependency Counselor who diagnosed Ball’s alcohol 

dependency in 2013, is perhaps the most important document that Ball has 

submitted regarding his prognosis and the conditions under which he will be able 

to return to the practice of law. It states, “Mr. Ball’s alcoholism will not preclude 

him from returning to competent, ethical professional practice if he continues to 

treat his alcoholism.” (Emphasis added.) Yet, with the exception of Ball’s own 

testimony that at the time of his disciplinary hearing he was attending one small 

group session and at least two Alcoholics Anonymous meetings each week, the 

record is devoid of any evidence setting forth the requirements of that treatment. 

{¶ 30} Moreover, if we were to find that Ball had established his alcohol 

dependency as a mitigating factor, it would only serve to mitigate a small portion 

of his misconduct. And that misconduct and mitigating evidence would still be 

overshadowed by Ball’s subsequent misconduct—lying to relator’s investigator 

about his use of stolen license plates, writing bad checks, overdrawing his client 

trust account, and practicing law while his license was inactive—all of which 

occurred while he was sober and in recovery. 

{¶ 31} Although participation in the OLAP program is not expressly 

required for an attorney to establish a chemical dependency or mental disability as 

a qualifying mitigating factor, Ball’s abandonment of his five-year OLAP recovery 
January Term, 2016 

11 

contract just six months after he voluntarily entered into it weighs heavily as an 

aggravating factor. 

{¶ 32} The board relied on two cases to support its recommendation that 

Ball be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law: Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 

Zimmer, 135 Ohio St.3d 462, 2013-Ohio-1962, 989 N.E.2d 51; and Columbus Bar 

Assn. v. Larkin, 128 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011-Ohio-762, 944 N.E.2d 669. 

{¶ 33} Zimmer’s misconduct arose from three separate incidents involving 

his unlawful operation of a motor vehicle—including fleeing the scene of an 

accident, driving without a license, and OVI. Zimmer at ¶ 5-10. He also failed to 

abide by multiple court orders, including a subpoena to appear for deposition in the 

resulting disciplinary matter, and two bench warrants were issued for his arrest. Id.

at ¶ 7-11. Although Zimmer presented evidence of “sporadic” contact with OLAP, 

there was no evidence of a formal diagnosis or that Zimmer was participating in an 

approved treatment program. Id. at ¶ 15. Recognizing that Zimmer likely suffered 

from untreated alcohol or substance abuse that interfered with his personal conduct 

but did not interfere with his work, we indefinitely suspended him from the practice 

of law and conditioned his reinstatement on the submission of proof of compliance 

with an established substance-abuse program and a prognosis of his capability to 

return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Id. at ¶ 16-18. 

{¶ 34} In Larkin, after the respondent was seriously injured in an 

automobile accident, police officers discovered a used crack-cocaine pipe and used 

heroin syringes in her automobile. Larkin at ¶ 5. She was indicted for possession 

of cocaine and heroin and entered a diversion program, but when she did not 

comply with the terms of that program, her criminal case was returned to the active 

docket. Id. Larkin testified that the treatment she had received for her longstanding 

problem with drugs and alcohol had been unsuccessful, and although relator urged 

her to contact OLAP during the pendency of her disciplinary matter, she never did. 

Id. at ¶ 6. We indefinitely suspended Larkin for her misconduct and conditioned 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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her reinstatement on her successful completion of a substance-abuse-treatment 

program. Id. at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 35} Ball contends that the indefinite suspension recommended by the 

board is not supported by the record or our precedent and argues that his conduct is 

most comparable to cases in which we imposed sanctions ranging from six months 

fully stayed to two years partially or fully stayed on conditions. We do not find the 

cases he has cited to be instructive in this matter because none of them addresses 

the practice of law while an attorney’s license is inactive, nor do they present the 

lengthy history of alcohol dependency, treatment, and relapse present in this case. 

{¶ 36} In light of Ball’s multiple instances of misconduct, his significant 

history of alcohol dependency, and our concerns as to the paucity of the evidence 

regarding the treatment he requires going forward, we agree that an indefinite 

suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case. Therefore, we overrule Ball’s 

objections, and we adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and its 

recommended sanction. 

{¶ 37} Accordingly, Stephen John Ball is indefinitely suspended from the 

practice of law in Ohio. In addition to complying with the requirements for 

reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(25), he shall be required to successfully 

complete an OLAP-approved substance-abuse-treatment program and comply with 

the terms of his June 27, 2013 OLAP contract. And upon reinstatement, he shall 

be required to complete six hours of continuing legal education related to law-office 

management and accounting as part of his professionally required continuing-legaleducation requirements pursuant to Gov.Bar R. X(3). Costs are taxed to Ball. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 

concur. 

PFEIFER and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent and would impose a suspension of two 

years with six months stayed on conditions. 
January Term, 2016 

13 

_________________ 

Paul M. Laufman, Sarah Tankersley, and Edwin W. Patterson III, General 

Counsel, for relator. 

Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, L.P.A., George D. Jonson, and Brian M. 

Spiess, for respondent. 

_________________