SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0821-21

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JAHMELL W. CROCKAM, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Submitted March 13, 2024 – Decided April 3, 2024 

Before Judges Currier and Firko. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 11-03-0471.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Howard Woodley Bailey, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0821-21

 Defendant Jahmell W. Crockam appeals from an October 22, 2021 Law 

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel without an evidentiary hearing. We 

affirm. 

I.

 This matter comes before us a second time. Defendant appealed from the 

denial of his first PCR petition. We affirmed in part and remanded in part 

because defendant's previous PCR counsel only addressed two of the eight 

claims asserted in defendant's pro se petition. We concluded PCR counsel did 

not meet the necessary requirements in his representation of defendant, and 

reversed the PCR court's denial of relief on the six claims that first PCR counsel 

did not list or incorporate in his brief, and which were not addressed by the PCR 

court. State v. Crockam, No. A-0617-18 (App. Div. Apr. 14, 2020). 

To resolve the issues raised in this PCR appeal, we need not discuss the 

trial evidence, which is detailed in our unpublished opinions addressing PCR 

and on direct appeal affirming defendant's convictions and sentence for the firstdegree murder of Officer Christopher Matlosz while performing his duties as a 

law enforcement officer, second-degree possession of a weapon, a handgun, for 

an unlawful purpose, and second-degree possession of a handgun. Defendant 
3 A-0821-21

was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without parole, 

subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. State v. Crockam, No. 

A-4400-12 (App. Div. Feb. 3, 2016). 

 On February 2, 2017, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In his certification in support of PCR, 

defendant alleged he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because 

trial counsel did not: (1) challenge the warrant; (2) seek a cross-racial 

identification charge; (3) investigate to determine if certain witnesses received 

favorable "deals" for their testimony; (4) file a motion to dismiss the indictment; 

(5) produce his grandmother, father, and mother for the Wade1 hearing; (6) file 

a motion to suppress all witnesses who identified him and made statements 

against him; (7) send an investigator to look into the photo that was sent out 

prior to his arrest; and (8) object when a Muslim witness was sworn by placing 

his hand on a Bible. Crockam, No. A-0617-18 (slip op. at 16-17).

 As noted in our PCR opinion, defendant's first PCR counsel only 

addressed two of the eight claims in the supplemental brief: defense counsel (1) 

was deficient because counsel did not call defendant's grandmother and failed 

to obtain her cell phone records; and (2) failed to call defendant's grandmother 

1

 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
4 A-0821-21

to show that five witnesses who testified against him were identified as a result 

of an illegal search of her cell phone. Id. at 17. First PCR counsel did not 

incorporate defendant's other six contentions in his brief, and the first PCR court 

did not address them. Ibid. 

On remand, we ordered the PCR court to assign new PCR counsel for 

defendant, allow PCR counsel to submit supplemental certifications and another 

brief, and permit the State to respond. Id. at 18. We also ordered the PCR court 

to conduct oral argument on the petition and determine if defendant presented a 

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ibid. 

 Following our remand, on September 24, 2021, Judge Steven F. Nemeth 

conducted oral argument and reserved decision. Upon considering the parties' 

briefs and arguments, the judge entered an order accompanied by a 

comprehensive twenty-five-page written decision denying defendant's PCR 

petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel without an evidentiary 

hearing. 

 As a threshold matter, with respect to PCR counsel's obligations under 

Rule 3:22-6(d),2 Judge Nemeth found that second PCR counsel listed and 

2

 Rule 3:22-6(d) provides: 
5 A-0821-21

incorporated defendant's pro se claims in her brief, and thus, met the 

requirements set forth in State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254 (2006). In accordance 

with our mandate, the judge then considered each of defendant's pro se claims 

not previously adjudicated by the first PCR court. 

With regard to defendant's first claim—that trial counsel failed to 

challenge the search warrant—Judge Nemeth found that defendant had 

previously raised this PCR claim and was thus procedurally barred under Rule 

3:22-5.3 The claim was premised on the lack of a warrant and consent to obtain 

information from defendant's grandmother's cell phone; and because the search 

Substitution: Withdrawal of Assigned Counsel. The

court shall not substitute new assigned counsel at the 

request of defendant while assigned counsel is serving, 

except upon a showing of good cause and notice to the 

Office of the Public Defender. Assigned counsel may 

not seek to withdraw on the ground of lack of merit of 

the petition. Counsel should advance all of the 

legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that 

the record will support. If defendant insists upon the 

assertion of any grounds for relief that counsel deems 

to be without merit, counsel shall list such claims in the 

petition or amended petition or incorporate them by

reference. Pro se briefs can also be submitted. 

3

 Rule 3:22-5 states: "A prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for 

relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the conviction 

or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this [R]ule or prior to 

the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings." 
6 A-0821-21

was unlawful, defendant contended the statements of the individuals allegedly 

identified from her cell phone warranted suppression. 

However, as Judge Nemeth pointed out, the first PCR court had already 

determined that defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his 

claim that trial counsel was deficient for not challenging the search and seizure 

of the cell phone, because no affidavits were submitted to support the claim that 

these individuals were identified through the search of the cell phone. 

Judge Nemeth noted that defendant only supplied an unsworn statement 

from his grandmother alleging that she did not provide the police with 

permission to search her cell phone and that her unsworn statement did not 

mention whether the police obtained witness information as a result of the 

search. Based upon this proffer, the first PCR judge had concluded that 

defendant's claim amounted to a mere bald assertion, which did not entitle him 

to an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed on direct appeal. Crockam, No. A-0617-

18, slip op. at 13-15. 

As for defendant's second claim—that trial counsel failed to seek a crossracial identification jury charge—Judge Nemeth found that the charge was given 

and this claim lacked merit. Thus, Judge Nemeth ruled that "[t]he trial record 

clearly shows that a cross-racial identification charge was provided to the jury," 
7 A-0821-21

and therefore, "trial counsel could not have been ineffective even if he did not 

request one." 

With regard to defendant's third claim—that trial counsel failed to 

investigate whether certain witnesses4 received favorable "deals" for their 

testimony—Judge Nemeth found this was "a mere bald assertion" because no 

certifications or affidavits detailing what an investigation would have revealed 

were submitted with the petition. Judge Nemeth noted plea agreements are a 

matter of public record in this State, and the fact that defendant failed to provide 

any record of the purported deals made by the State with these witnesses "speaks 

volumes." 

Judge Nemeth found this deficiency in defendant's proofs amounted to a 

"clear and convincing indication that no such 'deals' could have been used to 

impeach any witnesses." In addition, the judge highlighted there were other 

witnesses at trial who testified defendant had admitted to them that he murdered 

Officer Matlosz. Thus, Judge Nemeth concluded that defendant failed to 

provide any explanation how such "deals," if they were made, refuted the 

testimony of these other witnesses. 

4

 Presumably, these witnesses are Darius Johnson, Ronnie Crippen, Tonya 

Cook, and Corey Rua as identified in defendant's initial pro se PCR petition. 
8 A-0821-21

As to defendant's fourth claim—that trial counsel failed to file a motion 

to dismiss the indictment—Judge Nemeth found this claim was previously raised

in the first PCR petition. Specifically, defendant asserted that the information 

used by the State before the grand jury was discovered as a result of the 

purported unlawful search of the cell phone, which amounted to the same 

argument raised in defendant's first PCR claim. Because the first PCR judge 

had already determined that defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence to 

support this contention—that trial counsel was deficient by not challenging the 

search and seizure of the cell phone—Judge Nemeth determined that defendant's 

fourth claim was procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5.

As for defendant's fifth claim—that his trial counsel failed to produce his 

grandmother, father, and mother for the Wade hearing—Judge Nemeth found 

this was another bald assertion because defendant "fail[ed] to allege any 

specificity with respect to how trial counsel was ineffective in this context." In 

particular, the judge noted that defendant did not submit any affidavits or 

certifications indicating what testimony these individuals would have given at 

the Wade hearing. 

As to defendant's sixth claim—that trial counsel failed to file a motion to 

suppress the testimony of witnesses who identified him—Judge Nemeth found 
9 A-0821-21

this claim was previously raised before the first PCR court and was thus

procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5. According to Judge Nemeth, the first 

PCR court had already determined that defendant failed to provide sufficient 

evidence in support of his claim that trial counsel was purportedly deficient in 

not challenging the search and seizure of the grandmother's cell phone and this 

claim was procedurally barred. 

As for defendant's seventh claim—that his trial counsel failed to 

investigate the photo of him that was disseminated prior to his arrest—again, 

Judge Nemeth found this was merely a bald assertion because defendant failed 

to provide an affidavit or certification in support of his claim and advanced no 

argument regarding what an investigation would have revealed. 

Finally, with regard to defendant's eighth claim—that counsel failed to 

object when a witness, who was purportedly Muslim, was sworn in by placing 

his hand on a Bible—Judge Nemeth found that defendant neither presented

proofs nor made any argument in support of this claim. The judge also found 

defendant failed to establish that such a purported "error" would have materially 

affected the outcome of the trial. This appeal followed. 

 Before us, defendant raises the following sole point with subparts for our 

consideration: 
10 A-0821-21

THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT 

AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE 

RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL. 

A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY 

HEARINGS, AND PETITIONS FOR [PCR]. 

B. DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS TRIAL 

ATTORNEY FAILED TO REQUEST A MORE 

SPECIFIC JURY CHARGE ON CROSS-RACIAL 

IDENTIFICATION. 

II. 

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing 

this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus. 

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a 

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he 

is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. To sustain this burden, the petitioner 

must allege and articulate specific facts, "which, if believed, would provide the 

court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). 
11 A-0821-21

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 

demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the 

Strickland two-pronged analysis in New Jersey). "That is, the defendant must 

establish, first, that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness' and, second, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.'" State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

When assessing Strickland's first prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's 

performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 669. "Merely because a 

trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey, 

161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption 

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 

circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound 

trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
12 A-0821-21

Under Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show "the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. That is, "counsel's errors were 

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. Ultimately, "[a]n error by 

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the 

judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 

691.

Further, "[a]ny factual assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of 

relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and 

based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an 

evidentiary hearing." R. 3:22-10(c); see State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). 

Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an 

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with 

an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. The mere raising 

of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing. 

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Rather, "[i]f the court perceives that holding 

an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant 
13 A-0821-21

is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State 

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted). 

The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the 

defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court 

determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved 

by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary 

hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. 

Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 

(2013)). 

"Where, as here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing, 

we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464 

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 

540-41 (2013). However, "we review under the abuse of discretion standard the 

PCR court's determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. 

Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Marshall, 148 N.J. 

at 157-58). 

Rule 3:22-5 provides "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground 

for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the 

conviction or in any [PCR] proceeding, . . . or in any appeal taken from such 
14 A-0821-21

proceedings." "[A] prior adjudication on the merits ordinarily constitutes a 

procedural bar to the reassertion of the same ground as a basis for postconviction review." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 476 (citing R. 3:22-5 ). "[A] defendant 

may not use a petition for [PCR] as an opportunity to relitigate a claim already 

decided on the merits." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 (1997) (citation 

omitted). 

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that 

defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness of trial 

counsel under the Strickland/Fritz test warranting an evidentiary hearing. 

Defendant's arguments raised on appeal were more than adequately addressed 

by the PCR judge and do not warrant additional discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

The claims were either procedurally barred or without substantive merit. We 

affirm substantially for the reasons articulated by Judge Nemeth in his

thoughtful and thorough written opinion. We add the following comments. 

Defendant alleges trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a 

cross-racial identification charge that conformed with State v. Henderson, 208 

N.J. 208, 267 (2011). "A cross-racial identification occurs when an eyewitness 

is asked to identify a person of another race." Id. (quoting State v. Cromedy, 

158 N.J. 112, 120 (1999)). "[T]he purpose of a cross-racial instruction is to alert 
15 A-0821-21

the jury through a cautionary instruction that it should pay close attention to a 

possible influence of race." Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 133; id. at 120-23 

(recognizing that a witness may have more difficulty making a cross-racial 

identification). A cross-racial identification charge is appropriate "whenever 

cross-racial identification is an issue at trial." Henderson, 208 N.J. at 299.

The former Model Jury Charge for cross-racial identification provided: 

The fact that an identifying witness is not of the same 

race as the perpetrator and/or defendant, and whether 

that fact might have an impact on the accuracy of the 

witness' original perception and/or the accuracy 

subsequent identification. You should consider that 

ordinary human experience of people have greater 

difficulty in accurately identifying members of a 

different race. 

[(Emphasis added).] 

In contrast, the new Model Jury Charge on cross-racial identification changed 

"ordinary human experience" to "research has shown."

Here, the trial court appropriately gave the cross-racial identification 

charge that was then used in the Model Jury Charge. The Henderson Court 

clearly explained that its decision changing the Model Jury Charge on crossracial identification would apply to "future cases only" and the ruling would take 

effect "thirty days from the date [the Court] approves new [M]odel [J]ury 

[C]harges on eyewitness identification." Henderson, 208 N.J. at 302. 
16 A-0821-21

At the time of defendant's trial, our Court had not yet approved the new 

charge, and when the Court did so—six months after defendant's trial—the new 

charge was to be applied prospectively.5 Moreover, the revised cross-racial 

identification charge is not "drastically different" from the former charge as 

defendant contends. Indeed, the only real difference between the two charges is 

the former Cromedy charge refers to "ordinary human experience," and the 

revised Henderson charge notes "research has shown" to describe the "greater 

difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race." And, there was 

corroborating evidence here based on defendant's own statements to a number 

of individuals that he had shot and killed an officer, coupled with being 

identified by multiple witnesses. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective, and 

defendant has not shown prejudice under either Strickland/Fritz prong. 

Affirmed. 

 

5

 Henderson was decided on August 24, 2011. Defendant's trial concluded on 

March 22, 2012. The new Model Jury Charge became effective on September 

4, 2012.