F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M O N O C O U

N T Y , County Counsel, Plaintiff-Appellee
,

M I N E R A L C O U N T Y ,Intervenor-PlaintiffAppellant
,

W A L K E R L A K E W O R K I N G G R O U P , Defendant-Appellant
,

and

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff
,

W A L K E R R I V E R P A I U T E T R I B E , I ntervenor-Plaintiff

,

v.

W A L K E R R I V E R I R

R I G A T I O N D I S T R I C T ; N E V

A D A D E P A R T M E N T O F W I L D L I F E ; F E N I L I F A M I L Y T R U S T , c/o Peter F enili and Veronica F enili, Trustees; S I X N No. 15-16342

D.C. No. 3:73-cv-00128-RCJ

W GC

ORDER CERTI F YI

NG A QUESTI ON TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADAM O N O C T Y

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R A N C H , I N C

. , c/o Richard and Cy nthia Nuti; M I C H A E L N U T I ; N A N C Y N U T I ; R A L P H E. N U T I ; M A R Y E

. N U T I ; L A W

R E N C E M. N U T I ; L E S L I E N U T I ; M I C A F A R M S , L L C, c/o Mike F aretto; J O H

N A N D L U R A W E A V E R F A M I L

Y T R U S T , c/o L u ra W eaver, Trustee; S M I T H V A L L E Y G A R

A G E , I N C ., c/o Dan Smith and Shawna Smith; D O

N A L D G I O R

G I ; L O R I E M C M A H O N ; M E R

L E M C M A H O N ; C E

N T E N N I A L L I V E S T O C K ; L Y O N C O U N T Y ; A N N E T T ’ S M O N O V I L L

A G E ; F .I .M. C O R

P O R A T I O N ; R.N. F U L S T O N E C O M P A

N Y ; J A M E S T. F O U S E K

I S , Trustee; C H R

I S H. G A N S B E R G , J R .; F A

Y E E. G A N S B E R G ; T O D D G A N S B E R G ; H U N E W I L L L A N D & L I V E S T O C K C O ., I

N C .; D A V I D S C E I R

I N E ; P A M E L

A H A A S ; V I R G I N I A L A K

E M U T U A L W A T E R C O M P A

N Y , Defendants-Appellees.M O N O C T Y

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F iled May

22, 2018

B e fore: A. W allace Tashima, Ray mond C. F isher and J ay S. B y bee, Circuit J udg es.

SUMMARY *

Water Rights

I n an appeal raising issues pertaining to Nevada state water law, the p anel certified to the Supreme Court of Nevada the following question:

Does the publ i c t rust doctrine apply to rig hts already ad

judicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and, i f s o, to what ex tent?

I n l i gh t of its decision to c ertify the issue, the panel withdrew submission of this appeal for decision, a n d stay ed all further proceeding s in this case pending final action by the Supreme Court of Nevada, save f or any petition for rehearing
reg arding this order or a concur re n t ly filed memorandum disposition.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M O N O C T Y

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ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 5 o f t h e Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, we respectfully certify to the Supreme Court o f Nevada the question of la w s et f orth in Section I I I of this order. The a

nswer to the certified q

uestion may determine an issue pending before this court and its resolut i o n will have sig nificant implications for Nevada state water law. There is

no clearl y c o n trolling p recedent in the decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court.

W e hold Mineral County ’s p ublic tr u s t claim for the reallocation of the waters of W a lker River an d t h e Taking s Clause c laim in abey ance pending the result of certification.

I. Background

The circumstances here are virtually i d entical to those that led to the Nevada Supreme Court’s d ecision in M ineral County v. N

e v a d a Department of Conservation & Natural Resources
, 20 P.3d 800, 802–05 (N e v

. 2001), in which Mineral County and the W alke r L a k e Working Group (the “W o r k ing Group”) broug ht essentially the same suit as this

one. I n Mineral County
, the Nevada Supr e me Court ultimately declin e d to ex ercise jurisdiction in lig ht of the f ederal d istrict court’s continuing and ex clusive jurisdiction

over th e W al k e r River B asin litig ation. See id. at 8 07. W e reproduce the relevant backg round here in brief.

A. The Walker River Basin and Walker Lake’s Decline

The Walker River B asin covers about 4000 square miles, running northeast from its orig ins in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in California before turning south and ultimat elyM O N O C T Y

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flowing into W alker L a ke in Nevada. The first quarter of the basin lies in California, and California accounts for a majority of the precipitation a

n d surfac e w at e r flow into the basin. The vast majority of the water is consumed across the border in Nevada.

W a lker L ake is about 13 miles long
, five miles wide a nd 90 feet deep – a larg e lake by most any measure. B ut its siz e and volume have shrunk sig nificantly since they were first measured in 1882. B y 1996, W a l k e r L a ke had retained just 50 percent of its 1882 surface area and 28 percent of its 1882 volume. Today ’s W a lker L ake also suffers from hig h concentrations of total dissolved solids (“TDS”) – meaning it has a hig h s a l t c o n tent, low ox y g en content and a hig h temperature.

These conditions have d rastically deg raded the lake’s

e n v ironmental and e conomic well-being

. The hig h TDS concentrations have proven so inhospitable to fish species that, a ccording to Mineral County
, much of the lake’s fishing industry “has been eliminated f or the time being .” Walker L ake’s decline also threatens its status as an important shelter for migr a t o r y birds, and it has “drive[ n] away the many Nevadans and other Americans who used W alker L ake for recreational e njoy

ment and ec o n omically productive activities.” Althoug h the parties dispute the cause of Walker L ake’s t roubles, it seems clear that upstream appropriations play at least some part, tog ether with declining precipitation levels and natural lake recession over time.

B. Litigation Over Water Rights in the Basin

I n an effort to prote c t a n d r ehabilitate W alker L ake, Mineral County intervened in the long -running litig ation overM O N O C T Y

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water rig hts in the W alker River B a sin. That litig a tion b eg an in 1902, when one cat t le and land company sued another in the United States District Cour t fo r t he District o f Nevada

over appropriations from the W alker River. A f t er considerable back and forth in state and federal cour t

– including a Supreme Court decision holding that the Nevada federal court had prior, ex clusive jurisdiction over the action,

see Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v

. Miller & Lux
, 218 U.S. 258, 262 (1910) – the case ended in 1919.

F ive y ears later, the United States broug ht a new action in Nevada federal court, seeking to establish the water rig h ts o f the W alker L ake Paiute Tribe. After 12 more y ears of litig ation – bring ing us to 1936 – that proceeding resulted in the W alker River Decree. T he Walker River Decree adjudicated the water rig hts of hundreds of claiman t s under the doctrine of prior a

ppropriation. 1 The Decree also created the Walker River Commission and the United States B oard o f W a ter Commissioners. The federal distr i c t court in Nevada has maintained jurisdiction over the Decree and its administration ever since.

I n 1987, the Paiute Tribe intervened in the W alker River litig ation to establish procedures for reallocating water rig hts

u n d e r the Decree. Since that proceeding ’s conclusion in 1988, the N evada Stat e Eng ineer reviews all applications to chang e allocations under the Decree in Nevada, subject to

1 Un d er th e do ctrin e o f p rio r ap pro p riatio n , “ [t]h e f irst ap p ro priato r

o f th e w ater o f a stream p assin g th ro u g h th e p u b lic lan d s

. . . h as th e rig h t to in sist t h at t h e w ater sh al l b e s u b

j e c t t o h is u se an d en

j o y m en t to th e

ex ten t o f h is o rig in al ap p ro priatio n , a n d t h at its q u ality sh all n o t b e im p aired so as to d ef

eat th e p u rp ose o f its ap p ro p riatio n .” Lo b d ell v. S imp so n , 2 Nev

. 2 7 4
, 2 77

– 78 (1 8 6 6 ) (q u o tin g Bu tte Ca n a l & Ditch Co

. v. Va u g h n , 1 1 Cal. 1 4 3 , 1 5 3

– 54 (1 8 5 8 )).M O N O C T Y

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r e v i e w by the Nevada federal district court. I t appears t h at Nevada’s prior appropriation law, which has l a r g ely been codified, g overns the Eng ineer’ s d e cisions and the district court’s r eview. See, e.g. , Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.370; see also Greg W alch, W

ater Law: Treading W

a ter Law — A Nevada W ater R i g h t s Primer
, 6 Nev. L aw. 1 8, 18 (Nov. 1 998) (discussing the h i s tory of prior appropriation and its codification in Nevada). Nex t, in 1 991, the Paiute T r ibe a nd the United States soug h t recog nition of the T ribe’s rig ht to a certain a dditional amount of w a t e r from the W alker River, under a p r inciple that Native American tribes have superior
water r i g h t s based on their r elationship to the federal
g overnment. That case is p endin g b e fo r e this panel. See United S tates v. W alker River I

rrigation Dist.
, No. 15-16478.

C. Mineral County’s Intervention

I n 1994, Mineral County moved to int e r v e n e in the Decree litig a tion. The district court g ranted t h e m o tion in 2013. The a mended complaint in interve ntion alleg es that “[ a] ctivities and businesses attributabl e t o the presence a nd

us e of Walker L ake represent[ ] approx imately 50% of the
economy of Mineral County .” The complaint asks the Decree court, “pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction under

. . . the

. . . Decree, [ to] reopen and modify the final Decree to recog niz e the rig hts o f Mineral County . . . and the public to have minimum level s [of water] to maintain the viability o f W a lker L ake.” Mineral County se e k s recog nition “that a minimum o f 127,000 acre/feet [ o f water] per y ear to WalkerM O N O C T Y

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L ake is

. . . r equired under the doctrine of maintenance of the public trust.” 2

The W orking Group – a lready a party to this litig ation a s

a rig ht-holder under the Decree

– supports Mineral County ’s position. B ecause of the posture of this case, the W orking Group is c onsidered a defendant a s to Mineral County ’s intervention. B ut the W orking Group “alway s has supported efforts to transfer water rig hts for u se in W alker L ake

. . . a nd has supported the enforcement of the public trust doctrine for this same purpose.”

I n 2 015, the district court dismissed the amended complaint in intervention. F irst, the distr i c t court h eld Mineral County lacked standing to a s s e r t its public trust claim. I t concluded Miner a l County ’s claim “was based purely o n a p arens patriae theory ” of standing

– i

. e

. , t hat Mineral County did not a ssert any of its own interes t s , only those of its citiz ens – and that a county lacks the ability to sue as parens patriae.

Notwithstanding its conclusion o n standing
, the district
court also addressed the merits of Mineral County ’s public
trust claim. I t concluded the public trust doctrine may factor into future allocations o f water, but that using the doctrine to reallocate rig hts a lready adjudicated under the Decree would constit ute a taking and require just compensation. I nvoking

2 Un d er th e p u

b lic t r u st d o ctrin e, states h old n av ig ab le w aterw ay s

w ith in th eir b ord e r s in tru st f o r th e g o o d o f th e p u

b lic. S ee La wren ce v. Cla rk Co u n ty , 2 5 4 P .3 d 6 0 6
, 6 0 7 (Nev

. 2 0 1 1 ); see a lso Min era l Co u n ty , 2 0 P .3 d at 8 0 7 (Ro se, J., co n cu rrin g ) (“ In its m o st f

u n dam en tal term s , th e p u b lic tru st d o ctrin e p ro v id es th at

. . . all o f a state’ s n av i g ab le w aterw ay s

are h eld in tru st b y th e state f o r th e b en ef

it o f th e p eo p l e an d th at a state

o f f icial’ s co n tro l o f

th o se w aters is f

orev er su bj ect to th at tru st.”).M O N O C T Y

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the political question doctrine, the court concluded it lacked authority to order Nevada to effec t u a te such a taking

. The district court also held, without a naly sis, that W alker L ake is
not part of the W alker River B asin under the Decree, a nd
t h e refore that the Decree prohibits allocating any wa t e r specifically

to the lake.

Mineral County timely appealed. W e have concluded the district cour t e r r ed in dismissing the amended c omplaint in intervention for lack of standin g

. 3 T he remaining issue

– wh e t h e r the W alker River Decree can b e amended to allow for c ertain minimum flows of wa t er to reach W alker L ake

– depends on whether the public trust doctrine applies to rig hts previously adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and permits alteration of prior allocations. 4 This is an important question of Nevada water law we believe should be decided by

the Nevada Supreme Court.

II. Discussion

The Nevada Supreme Court ex pressly rec o gn iz e d the public trust doctrine under Nevada law in Lawrence v. Clark County
, 2 5 4 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011). Lawrence involved an attempt by the Nevada leg islature to transfer state-owned land
to Clark County

. See id. at 608. B ecause the land may have been a navig able water

way when N evada joined the United

3 In a co n cu rren tly f

i led m em o ran d u m d isp o sitio n , w e h o ld Min eral Co u n ty h as stan din g to assert its p u b l ic t ru st claim

. Fu

rth erm ore, w e h av e

co n cu rren t ly d ecid ed t

h at W alk er L ak e is w ith in th e W alk er Riv er B asin

. S ee Un ited S ta tes v. U.S . Bd . o

f W a ter Co m m’rs , No . 1 5

- 1 6 3 1 6

.

4 W e h o ld th e su

b seq u en t tak in g s claim in ab ey an ce p en d in g th e

resu lt o f certif i catio n

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States, the Nevada State L and Reg istr a r refused to transfer title, ci t i n g the public trust’s p rohibition on alienating land h e l d in trust for the public. S ee id. The Nevada Supr e m e Court remanded a fter setting out a three-part test for assessing whether the public trust doctr i ne permits alienation of state land. See id. at 616–17. 5

Lawrence
, althoug h formally recog niz ing the doctrine for the first time, traced public trust p r i n c i p l es in Nevada law back to the state’s founding
, c o n cluding the doctrine was “based on a pol i c y reflected in the Nevada Constitution, Nevada statutes, and the inherent limitations on the state’s

s overeig n power.” Id. at 6 13. The court a lso noted it h ad applied public trust principles i n s everal of its earlier decisions. One of those decisions, Mineral County v. Nevada Department of Conservation & Natural Resources
, appears to be particularly

relevant here.

Mineral County involved the very case now un d e r

c o n s i d eration, filed by Mineral County and the W o rking Group directly in the Nevada Supr e m e Court while the county ’s motio n t o i ntervene in this case was p ending

. Althoug h the Nevada S upreme Court dismissed the action based o n the federal court’s prior ex clusive jurisdiction, two aspects o f Mineral County a re r elevant here. F irst, the Nevada Supreme Court effectively i n v i ted the federal court to c ertify the public trust question at issue here. See M ineral County
, 20 P.3d at 807 n.35 (“[ Mineral County and the W o rking Group] arg ue that if their motion to intervene in the

5 T h is t e s t a p p e ars t o b e o f lim ited relev an ce h ere b ecau se i t ad d resses alien atio n o f tru st lan ds. T h e issu es h ere in v olv e th e sco p e of th e p u b l ic tru st d o ctrin e an d its relatio n sh ip to th e d o ctrin e o f p rio r ap p ro p riatio n

an d Nev ad a’ s statu t o ry

w ater law

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federal court is eventually g ranted, they w ill seek to have this
court decide the scope of the p ublic trust doctrine pursuant to the federal abstentio n doctrine. I f the federal court reviews this question, it can certify a quest i o n r e garding the public
trust doctrine p ursuant to NRAP 5; therefore, the issue need
not necessarily be addressed via the ex traordinary remedy o f a writ.”).

Second, in Mineral County
, J ustice Rose (joined b y J ustice Shearing ) wrote a concurrence addressing in broad strokes the public trust doctrine’s application i n this c ase. J ustice Rose opined:

Althoug h the orig inal objectives of the public trust were to protect the public’s rig hts in navig ation, commerce, and fishing
, the trust has e volved to encompass additional public values – including r ecreational and ecolog ical

uses. Additional l y , a lthoug h the orig inal
scope of the public trust r eached only navi ga b le water, the trust has evolved to encompass non-navig able tributaries that feed navig able bodies of w ater. This ex tension of the doctrine is natural and necessary where, a s here, the navig a

b le water’s ex istence i s wholly dependent on tributaries that appear to be over-appropriated.

. . . [ T] h e ex istence of the public trust doctrine in Nevada appears to be bey ond debate.

. . . This court has it s e l f r e cog niz ed that

. . . public ownership of water is the most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law. Additionally
, we have noted that thoseM O N O C T Y

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holding vested water rig hts d o not own or acquire title to water, but merely enjoy a rig ht
to the beneficial u se of the water. This rig ht, however, is forever subject to the public trust, which at all times forms the o uter boundaries of permissible g overnment action with respect to public trust resources. I n this manner, then,
t h e p u b l i c t r u s t d o c t r i n e o p e r a t e s simultaneously with the sy stem o f p r ior appropriation.

. . . .

I f the current l a w g overning the water eng ineer does not c lea r ly direct the eng ineer
to continuously c onsider in the course of his work the public’s interest in N evada’s natural
water resources, then the law is deficient. I t is then appropriate, i f n ot our constitutional duty
, to ex pressly reaffirm the eng ineer’s continuing responsibility as a public trustee to allocate and supervise water rig hts so that the appropriations do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands a nd waters remaining

.

Id. at 807–09 (footn o t es a n d internal quotation marks omitted). No Nevada Supreme Court decision has formally adopted J ustice Rose’s concurrence, but Lawrence d iscussed it as persuasive authority in the d evelopment of N e vada’s public trust law. See 254 P.3d at 610–11.

I n lig ht of Lawrence
, all p a rties ag ree the public trust doctrine ex ists in Nevada. They disag ree, however, o ver theM O N O C T Y

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doctrine’s scope and w hether it permits reallocation o f rig hts settled under the separate doctrine of prior approp riation b y the W alker River Decree. No controlling Nevada p recedent reconciles these doctrines, a n d the p arties advance conflicting proposals.

Mineral County
, f

or ex ample, contends the public trust doctrine require s the State Eng ineer to reconsider previous allocations and, in doing so, to reserve a specified minimum flow for W alker L ake reg ardless of any other rig hts o r considerations. Althoug h Mineral County points to a number of g eneral principles sug g esting the public trust doctrine applies to W alker L ake in some fo r m , i t has not presented

a u t hority for a version o f the doctrine that holds absolu t e

s u p re m a cy o v e r t h e c o m p e t i n g d o c t ri n e o f p r i o r appropriation.

The L y on County

appellees sit at the opposite end of the spectrum. They contend, essentially
, that once w a ter rig hts have been adjudicated and settled by d ecree, they are vested and no long er within the purview of the p ublic trust doctrine. L y on County is correct that Nevada considers water rig hts settled by decree “vested.” See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.090 et seq. (entitled “Adjudication o f Vested W ater Rig h ts”). Nevada law refers to water rig hts settled by decree as “ final” and “conclu s i ve,” id. § 533.210, a nd the Nevada State Eng inee r

– c harg ed with administering Nevada’s statutory water law – may neither “carry out his o r h e r d u t i es

. . . in a

manner that conflicts with any

. . . decree or order issued b y

a state or federal court,” id. § 533.0245, nor autho riz e any chang e in water use that “is inconsistent with any applicable federal or state decree,” id. § 533.3703. There is, moreover, sig nificant authority stressing the importance of f inality in the adjudication of water rig h ts. See, e .g. , Arizona v. California
,M O N O C T Y

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460 U.S. 6 05, 6 20 (1983) (“Certainty of rig hts is p a rticularly important w ith respect to water rig hts in the W estern United States.

. . . T he doctrine of prior appropriation

. . . is i t self larg e ly a product of the compelling n ee d for certainty in the holding and use of water rig h ts.”).

L y on County ’s position nonetheless appears to suffer from t h e same shortcoming as that o f Mineral County

. I t does not ex plain why the public trust doctrine must completely y ield to the doctrine o f p rior appropriation (or,

more pr ecisely
, to the decrees resulting from adjudications under the prior appropriation doctrine and Nevada’s statutory water law). T he principles of finality o n which L y on County rests are encapsulated in Nevada’s statutes and endorsed b y the Supreme Court, but it i s n o t clear they would c ompel Nevada to conclude that ri gh t s already adjudicated a re

ex e mpt from the public trust.

There is sig nificant authority sug g esti n g rig h ts already adjudicated may not be alway s and forever ex empt from the public trust. F or ex ample, the Nevada Suprem e C o u rt has held:

the most fundamental tenet of Nevada wat e r law [ is that] “the w ater of all sources of water suppl y within the b oundaries of the state whether above or beneath the surfac e of the
g round, belongs to the public .” I ndeed, even those holding certificated, vested, or p erfected
water r ig hts do not own o r acquire t i t l e to water.

Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v

. N e v ada
, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) ( alteration omitted) (quoting Nev. Rev. Stat.M O N O C T Y

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§ 533.025). B ased on this statement, J u stice Rose concluded in Mineral C ounty that even “those holding vested water rig hts” hold “ [ t] his r i ght

. . . forever subject to the public trust.” 2 0 P.3d at 808. Quoting J ustice Rose, Lawrence said the same thing in its ex positi o n o f the p ublic trust doctrine (albeit without holding that vested water rig hts are subject to the public trust). See 25 4 P

. 3 d at 611; see also M ineral County.
, 20 P.3d at 808–09 (Rose, J

. , c oncurring ) ( opining that “the public trust doctrine opera t e s s imultaneously with the sy stem o f prior a

p propriation” and urg ing the Nevada Su p r e m e Court “to ex pressly reaffirm the [ Nevada State] [ E] ng ineer’s c ontinuing responsibility as a public trustee to

a l l o cate and supervise water r ig hts [ pursuant to the public
trust doctrine] ”). Thus, Nevada mig ht not altog ether e x empt vested, adjudicated rig

hts from the public trust doctrine.

Under J ustice Rose’s view, that w a t e r r ig h ts have been settled by adjudication a nd decree may be rel e v ant to b alancing the public trust doctrine ag a inst c ompeting principles of Nevada water law. B ut it do e s n o t necessarily

mean the public trust – itself a fundamental principle of law – cannot disturb them.

F aced w ith a similar question in Nationa l A u d ubon S o c i et y v. Superior Court
, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1 983), the California Supreme Court outlined the comp e t i ng values underly ing the public trust doc t rine and doctrine of prior appropriation and, rather than deeming one doctrine supreme, balanced them:

This case bring s tog ether for the first time
t w o s y s t e m s o f l e g a l t h o u g h t : t h e appropriative water rig hts sy stem which since the day s o f the g old rush has dominatedM O N O C T Y

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Calif

o r n i a water law, and the public trust doctrine which, after e volving as a shield for the protection o f tidelands, no w ex tends its protective sco p e to navig able lakes. Ever since we first recog niz ed that the public trust protects environmental an d recreational values, the two sy stems o f leg al thoug ht have b e e n on a collision c o u rse. They meet in a unique and dramatic setting which hig hlig hts the clash of va l u e s

. Mono L ake is a scenic

a n d e c o l o g i c a l t r e a s u r e o f n a t i o n a l

s i g n i f i c a n c e , i m p e r i l e d b y c o n t i n u e d diversions of water; y et, t h e need of L os Ang eles f or water is a p p arent, its reliance on rig hts g ranted by the board evident, the cost o f curtailing diversions substantial.

. . . The pros p e rity and habitability o f much of this state requ i r es the diversion o f
g reat quantities of wa t e r from its streams for
purposes unconnected to any navig ation,
commerce, fishin g, recreation, or ecolog ical

use relating to the source stream. The st a te must have the power t o grant nonvested

us ufructuary r ig hts to appropriate water even if diversions harm public trust uses. Approval of such diversion w ithout considering public
trust values, however, may resul t i n needless destruction of those values.

Id. at 712 (citations omitted). This a pproach appears similar
to the one J ustice Rose de s c r ibed – albeit in only g eneral
terms – in his Mineral County concurrence. An approach along thes e l i n e s would p ermit, but not require, reallocationM O N O C T Y

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of water rig hts that were previously settled. See Minera l C ounty. , 2 0 P.3d at 8 08–09 (Rose, J
., concurring ) (the t w o sy stems operate simultaneously
, and the State Eng ineer must at least “consider” the p u b l ic trust in making allocation decisions). 6

W e conclude that w hether, and to what ex tent, the public
trust doctrine applies to appropriative r ig hts settled u nder the W a lker River Decree is a n open q u estion. B ecause this question has sig nificant implications for Nevada’s w ater laws

an d b e c a use we cannot b e certain how the Nevada Supreme Court would resolve this matter, certification on this question of law is appropriate.

III. Question Certif

ied to the Nevada Suprem e Court

The question of law we certify is:

Does the public trust d o c trine apply to rig hts already adju dicated and settled under the

6 L y on Co u n ty an d th e Nev ad a Dep artm en t o f W ild lif e (NDOW ) also

su g g est Nev ad a law alread y in co rp o r a t e s t h e p u b lic tru st d o ctrin e b y req u irin g th at ap p ro priated w ater b e pu t to a “ b en ef icial u se.” T h e Nev ad a Su p rem e Co u rt h as n o t y e t c o nsid ered th is q u estio n

. A s in Na t i o na l Au d u b o n , “ n o resp o n sib le b o d y h as ev er” ex p ressly co n sid ered th e p u b l ic
tru s t in m ak in g allo catio n d ecisio n s

. Na t’l Au d u b o n , 6 5 8 P .2 d at 7 2 8 ; see

a lso M i n era l Co u n ty , 2 0 P .3 d at 8 0 8 (Ro se, J
., co n cu rrin g ) (“ If th e cu rren t law g ov ern in g th e w ater en g in eer d o es n o t clearly d irect th e en g in eer to

co n tin u o u sly co n sid er . .

. th e p u

b lic’ s in t erest in Nev ad a’ s n atu ral w ater

reso u rces, th en th e law is d ef icien t.”).M O N O C T Y

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d o c t r ine of prior appropriation a nd, if so, t o what ex tent? 7

IV. Conclusion

Mineral County ’s appeal presents an open and important question u nder Nevada law t h at may be determinative of an issue ess e ntial to the resolution of the claims r aised in the present case. W e therefore r es p e ctfully request that the Supreme Court o f Nevada accept a nd dec i d e t h e question certified. “W e recog niz e that t h e [ N evada Supreme] Court may , in its discretion, reword the certified question.” Progressive Gulf

Ins. Co. v. Faehnrich
, 627 F .3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). W e f

urther ag ree to abide by the decision o f the Nevada Supreme C o u r t as specified in Rule 5 o f the Nevada Rules of Appellate Proc edure, which states “[ t] he written opinion of the Supreme Court stat i n g the law
g overning the questions certified

. . . s hall be res judicata a s to the parties.” Nev. R. App. P. 5(g )

.

I n lig ht of our decision to certify the issue set forth above, the submission of this appeal for decision is withdrawn, and all further proceeding s in this case before our court are stay ed pending final action by the Supreme Court of Nevada, save for any petition for rehearing re g arding this order or the concurrently filed memorandum disposition. The Clerk is directed to administratively close this d ocket, pending f urther

or d e r

. The Clerk of this court shall f orward a copy of this

7 If th e Nev ad a Su

p rem e Co u rt d eterm in es th e p u b lic tru st d o ctrin e ap p lies an d allo w s f

o r reallo catio n

o f rig h t s settled u n d er th e d octrin e of
p rio r ap pro p riatio n , it m ay w i sh t o an sw er a f u rth er q u estio n : d o es th e ab ro g atio n o f su ch ad

j u d icated o r v ested rig h ts co n stitu t e a “ tak i n g ” u n der th e Nev ad a Co n stitu

tio n req u irin g p ay

m en t o f j u st co m pen satio n ?M O N O C T Y

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order, under o fficial seal, to the Su p r e m e Court of Nevada, along with copies o f all briefs an d ex c erpts of record that have b een filed w ith this court. The parties shall n otify the Clerk of this court wit h i n 14 day s of a ny decision by the N e vada Supreme Court to accept o r decline certification. I f the Nevada Supreme Court accepts certification, the parties shall then notify the Clerk of this court within 14 day s of the issuance of the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion.

Supplem ental Material

Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Nevada Rule s o f Appellate Procedure, w e include here the desig nation of the parties w ho would be t h e appellants and r espondents in the Nevada Supreme Court, as well as the names and addresses o f counsel.

Appellants :
Mineral County , Nevada and W a lker L a ke W o rking Group

Sean A. Rowe Mineral County

District Attorney P.O. B ox 1210 Hawthorne, NV 89415

Simeon M. Herskovits Advocates for Community & Environment P.O. B ox 1075 El Prado, NM 87529-1075

A t t o r ney s for Mineral County
, Nevada and W alker L a k e W o rking GroupM O N O C T Y

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Respondents :

L y on County
, Nevada et al. (C e ntennial L ivestock, B ridg eport Ranchers and the Schroeder Group)

Stephen B

. Ry e, District Attorney L y on County 31 S. Main Street Yering ton, NV 89447 Attorney for L y on County

J erry M. Sny der 429 W e st Plumb Reno, NV 89509 Attorney for L y on County

Roderick E. W alston Steven G. Martin B est B est & Krieg er L L P 2201 N. Main Street, Suite 390 W a lnut Creek, CA 94596 Attorney s for Centennial L ivestock

Therese A. Ure Schroeder L a

w Offices, P.C. 440 Marsh Avenue Reno, NV 89509 Attorney for the Schroeder Group

W a lker River I

rrig ation District

Gordon H. DePaoli Dale E. F e rg uson W o odburn and W edg eM O N O C T Y

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6100 Neil Road, Suite 500 Reno, NV 89511 Attorney s for W a lker River I rrig ation District

Nevada Department of W ildlife

Adam Paul L ax alt, Attorney General B ry an L . Stockton, Senior Deputy Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City , NV 89701-4717 Attorney s for Nevada Department of W ildlife

County of Mono, California

Stacey Simon, Acting County Counsel Stephen M. Kerins, Deputy County Counsel Office of the County Counsel County of Mono P.O. B ox 2415 Mammoth L akes, CA 93546 Attorney s for County

of Mono, California

Q U E S T I O N C E R T I F I E D ; P R O C E E D I N G S STAYED.

_____________________________

J a y S. B y bee United States Circuit J udg e, Presiding