THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2024 WY 80

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2024

July 24, 2024

DUSTIN M. SANCHEZ,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-23-0222

Appeal from the District Court of Park County

The Honorable Bill Simpson, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A.

Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Robin S. Cooper, Senior Assistant Appellate 

Counsel.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen 

R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donovan Burton, Assistant Attorney 

General.

Before FOX, C.J., and BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, FENN, and JAROSH, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
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FENN, Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Dustin M. Sanchez of one count of second-degree sexual abuse of 

a minor. He appeals, claiming the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and 

the prosecutor committed misconduct when he misstated the law in his closing and rebuttal 

arguments. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Sanchez raises two issues, which we rephrase as follows:

I. Did the State present sufficient evidence for the jury to 

find Mr. Sanchez guilty of sexual abuse of a minor in the 

second degree?

II. Did the district court commit plain error by permitting 

prosecutorial misconduct during closing and rebuttal 

arguments?

FACTS

[¶3] In early fall 2021, JM disclosed to the counselor at Cody High School that her 

biological father, Mr. Sanchez, had touched her inappropriately. The counselor reported 

JM’s disclosure to law enforcement, who then interviewed JM. JM told the investigating 

officer an incident occurred during one of her visits with Mr. Sanchez in June 2021. While 

they were watching a movie together, Mr. Sanchez put his arm around JM’s shoulder, 

reached across her chest, and placed his hand on her left breast, underneath her shirt and 

bra. Although she tried to move away, Mr. Sanchez kept her drawn close to him. The 

incident ended when JM excused herself to go to the bathroom and texted her grandmother 

to come pick her up.

[¶4] The State charged Mr. Sanchez with one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the 

second degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-315(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2021).

Following a three-day jury trial, Mr. Sanchez was convicted of this charge. The district 

court sentenced him to eight-to-ten years in prison. This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶5] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well established:

we do not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of 
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witnesses, but examine the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the State. We examine and accept as true the evidence of 

the prosecution together with all logical and reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely the 

evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith. In other words, 

we simply determine whether any rational trier of fact could 

have found that the essential elements of a charged crime were 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented.

Gonsalves v. State, 2024 WY 49, ¶ 8, 547 P.3d 340, 342 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Morris v. 

State, 2023 WY 4, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d 293, 298 (Wyo. 2023)). Mr. Sanchez’s argument also 

requires us to interpret statutory language, which we do de novo. Butler v. State, 2015 WY 

119, ¶ 6, 358 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2015) (citing Qwest Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 

Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 495, 497 (Wyo. 2007)).

[¶6] Mr. Sanchez was convicted under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-315(a)(iv), which states 

in relevant part:

(a) Except under circumstance[s] constituting sexual abuse 

of a minor in the first degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314, an 

actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the 

second degree if:

(iv) Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor 

engages in sexual contact with a victim who is less than 

sixteen (16) years of age and the actor occupies a position 

of authority in relation to the victim.

For the purposes of this appeal, Mr. Sanchez challenges the “position of authority” element. 

“Position of authority” is statutorily defined as: “that position occupied by a parent, 

guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, custodian, health care provider 

or any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence 

over a person[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2021). Although not 

defined in this statutory scheme, the dictionary definition of “parent” is:

The lawful father or mother of someone. • In ordinary usage, 

the term denotes more than responsibility for conception and 

birth. The term commonly includes (1) either the natural father 

or the natural mother of a child, (2) either the adoptive father 

or the adoptive mother of a child, (3) a child’s putative blood 

parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity, and (4) an 

individual or agency whose status as guardian has been 

established by judicial decree. In law, parental status based on 
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any criterion may be terminated by judicial decree. In other 

words, a person ceases to be a legal parent if that person’s 

status as a parent has been terminated in a legal proceeding.

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The uncontested evidence at trial established Mr. 

Sanchez is JM’s biological father. Because Mr. Sanchez is JM’s biological father, he 

qualifies as a “parent,” and therefore occupies a position of authority in relation to JM 

under the statute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(iv).

[¶7] Mr. Sanchez contends that despite establishing he is JM’s father, the State had the 

additional burden of proving he was able to “exercise significant influence over” JM to 

show he occupied a position of authority. He asserts the State could not do so. Despite 

being her biological father, he had no involvement in JM’s life until she was nine years 

old, he was not her primary caregiver, he played no role in making medical decisions for 

her, and he had no authority to impose discipline. He asserts the evidence showed he had 

no influence over JM despite being her biological parent. Mr. Sanchez’s argument is 

misplaced.

[¶8] When interpreting the phrase “position of authority,” we have repeatedly 

distinguished the statute’s enumerated categories from its catchall category. Butler, 2015 

WY 119, ¶ 10, 358 P.3d at 1262–63 (citing Rogers v. State, 2015 WY 48, ¶ 15, 346 P.3d 

934, 938 (Wyo. 2015); Solis v. State, 2013 WY 152, ¶¶ 27–32, 315 P.3d 622, 629–30 (Wyo.

2013); Baldes v. State, 2012 WY 67, ¶ 9, 276 P.3d 386, 388 (Wyo. 2012); Scadden v. State, 

732 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Wyo. 1987)). “The enumerated categories encompass parents, 

guardians, relatives, household members, teachers, employers, and custodians.” Butler, 

¶ 10, 358 P.3d at 1263 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–301(a)(iv)). The catchall category 

covers “any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant 

influence over a person.” Id. (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–301(a)(iv)). When a defendant 

falls into one of the enumerated categories, “the State need not prove that he was able to 

exercise significant influence over the victim.” Id. The State only has to prove that 

additional element if the defendant “qualifies under the catchall category.” Id. Those 

persons who fall within the statute’s enumerated categories are in a position of significant 

influence “based on implicit social norms.” Id. (citing Faubion v. State, 2010 WY 79, ¶ 17, 

233 P.3d 926, 930 (Wyo. 2010)). They “acquire[] that status by virtue of society and its 

system of laws granting to [them] the right of control over another.” Faubion, ¶ 17, 233 

P.3d at 930 (quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Wyo. 1987)). Although Mr. 

Sanchez and JM did not have a traditional father/daughter relationship, absent the fact that 

Mr. Sanchez was JM’s biological father, none of the events for which he was charged and 

convicted would have occurred. See id. (quoting Scadden, 732 P.2d at 1043). Mr. Sanchez 

was tried and convicted based on his position as JM’s “parent,” one of the enumerated 

categories. The State was not required to demonstrate he was able to exercise significant 

influence over JM.
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[¶9] The State established Mr. Sanchez occupied a position of authority in relation to 

JM, which is all that was required under the statute. A rational jury could have determined 

the State proved this essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. There was 

sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Sanchez’s conviction.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[¶10] During the trial, the defense elicited testimony to establish Mr. Sanchez was unable 

to exercise significant influence over JM. This evidence included: JM did not reside with 

Mr. Sanchez, she had spent little one-on-one time with him, her grandmother had been her 

guardian and caretaker since 2012, and Mr. Sanchez had little authority over JM. Based 

on the defense’s introduction of this evidence, the State was concerned the jury might find 

Mr. Sanchez did not occupy a “position of authority” and decline to convict him of sexual 

abuse of a minor in the second degree under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-615(a)(iv), even 

though he met the definition of a parent. During the jury instruction conference, the State 

asked the district court to consider instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of 

sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316 (LexisNexis 

2021). After researching the issue, the district court concluded it was unnecessary to give 

a lesser included offense instruction. Citing to Butler v. State, 2015 WY 119, 358 P.3d 

1259 (Wyo. 2015), the district court found Mr. Sanchez occupied a position of authority 

because the uncontroverted evidence established he was JM’s “parent or relative.” 

Therefore, he fell into one of the statute’s enumerated categories, and it was unnecessary 

for the State to prove Mr. Sanchez “exercised significant influence” over JM. The State 

agreed with the district court’s interpretation of the law. Defense counsel expressed her 

view that Butler was based on “a very outdated version of the realities of society,” but 

conceded Butler was the governing law and she would “abide by the [c]ourt’s decision.”

[¶11] The State made the following statement during its closing argument:

The position of authority, there’s a definition in the jury 

instructions that he’s a parent or a relative. And there is no 

contention he was in a position of authority. 

The defense did not object to this statement. Yet, in her closing statement, defense counsel 

suggested the position of authority element was contested:

You will also have to decide if [Mr. Sanchez] was in a position 

of authority. I am not going to belabor that point. The law is 

it [sic] in your packet. The law is pretty clear on what a 

position of authority is, but you will have to decide if the State 

has met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Mr. Sanchez] was in a position of authority.
5

In response to this statement, in its rebuttal argument the State said:

You don’t have to decide whether he was in a position of 

authority, because the - - it’s been decided by the fact that he 

is a parent and a relative. So check that box.

The defense did not object to this statement. Mr. Sanchez now claims the State committed 

prosecutorial misconduct by misstating the law in these statements made during its closing 

and rebuttal arguments.

[¶12] Prosecutorial misconduct is “a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act (or failure to act), 

especially involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or 

assess an unjustified punishment.” Soares v. State, 2024 WY 39, ¶ 30, 545 P.3d 871, 878–

79 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Freer v. State, 2023 WY 80, ¶ 24, 533 P.3d 897, 904[–05] (Wyo. 

2023)). Prosecutorial misconduct “claims are intended ‘to address gross prosecutorial 

improprieties that have deprived a criminal defendant of his or her right to a fair trial.’” Id.

(quoting Freer, ¶ 25, 533 P.3d at [905]). Mr. Sanchez did not raise a prosecutorial 

misconduct objection below, so we review for plain error. Id. at ¶ 29, 545 P.3d at 878 

(quoting Freer, ¶ 24, 533 P.3d at 904). To establish plain error, “an appellant must prove: 

‘1) the record clearly reflects the incident urged as error; 2) a violation of a clear and 

unequivocal rule of law; and 3) that he was materially prejudiced’ by the alleged error.” Id.

at ¶ 18, 545 P.3d at 877 (quoting Gutierrez v. State, 2020 WY 150, ¶ 5, 477 P.3d 528, 530–

31 (Wyo. 2020)). Failure to establish any of the three elements precludes a finding of plain 

error. Id. (quoting Lott v. State, 2022 WY 143, ¶ 10, 519 P.3d 646, 649 (Wyo. 2022)).

[¶13] The first step of the plain error test is met here because the alleged error appears in 

the record. Id. at ¶ 19, 545 P.3d at 877 (citing Gutierrez, ¶ 8, 477 P.3d at 531). The second 

step of the plain error analysis requires us to determine whether the prosecutor’s statements 

violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, 

way. Mendoza v. State, 2021 WY 127, ¶ 13, 498 P.3d 82, 85 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Ridinger 

v. State, 2021 WY 4, ¶ [34], 478 P.3d 1160, 1168 (Wyo. 2021)). Our law is clear that 

prosecutors may not misstate the law. Mendoza, ¶ 13, 498 P.3d at 85 (citing Hill v. State, 

2016 WY 27, ¶ 61, 371 P.3d 553, 569 (Wyo. 2016)) (“Even unintentional misstatements 

of the law are misconduct by a prosecutor.”)

[¶14] The prosecutor in this case did not misstate the law. As discussed above, the State 

presented uncontroverted evidence showing Mr. Sanchez was JM’s parent, and as such, he 

fell into one of the statute’s enumerated categories of persons in a position of authority. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(iv). Nothing else was required to prove this statutory 

element. Butler, 2015 WY 119, ¶¶ 10–11, 358 P.3d at 1263. The prosecutor accurately 

recited the law that applied to the position of authority element, and he did not commit 

misconduct by telling the jurors they could “check that box.” Because Mr. Sanchez failed 

to establish the prosecutor violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law, he also failed to 
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establish the district court committed plain error.

CONCLUSION

[¶15] The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Sanchez of sexual abuse of a 

minor in the second degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-315(a)(iv). The 

prosecutor correctly recited the law and did not commit misconduct during his closing and 

rebuttal arguments. Affirmed.