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16-P-245 Appeals Court

COMMONWEALTH vs. WALTON VALENTIN.

No. 16-P-245.

Essex. February 28, 2017. - May 12, 2017.

Present: Vuono, Carhart, & Kinder, JJ.

1

Assault by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Assault and Battery.

Stalking. Protective Order. Abuse Prevention. Evidence, 

Hearsay, Unavailable witness. Witness, Unavailability, 

Self-incrimination, Immunity. Constitutional Law, 

Confrontation of witnesses, Self-incrimination. Practice, 

Criminal, Hearsay, Confrontation of witnesses, Required 

finding, Instructions to jury, Reasonable doubt, Question 

by jury. Reasonable Doubt.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on January 2, 2014. 

The cases were tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J.

Robert L. Sheketoff for the defendant.

David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.

 

1 Justice Carhart participated in the deliberation on this 

case prior to his retirement.
2

KINDER, J. Following a jury trial in Superior Court, the 

defendant, Walton Valentin, was convicted of multiple crimes of 

violence against his former girl friend, whom we shall call 

Jane.

2 The jury found him guilty of entering a building with 

intent to commit a felony, G. L. c. 266, § 17; assault by means 

of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15B; aggravated assault 

and battery in violation of a restraining order, G. L. c. 265, 

§ 15A(c)(iii)3; assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A; 

stalking in violation of a restraining order, G. L. c. 265, 

§ 43(b); and violations of a restraining order (twelve counts), 

G. L. c. 209A, § 7.4 On appeal, the defendant claims (1) the 

judge erred in admitting the victim's hearsay statements 

pursuant to the doctrine of forfeiture of the right of 

confrontation by wrongdoing; (2) the evidence was insufficient 

on the charges of stalking, aggravated assault and battery, and 

entering a building with intent to commit a felony; (3) the 

judge's instruction on reasonable doubt was error; and (4) the 

 

2 A pseudonym.

3 The indictment cites G. L. c. 265, § 13(b)(iii), but the 

language of the indictment charges a violation of G. L. c. 265, 

§ 15A(c)(iii). No claim is raised regarding this variance.

4 The defendant was acquitted of charges of assault by means 

of a dangerous weapon and kidnapping alleged to have occurred on 

November 9, 2013.
3

judge abused his discretion in responding to a question from the 

jury. We affirm. 

Background. 1. The break-in and assaults. We summarize 

the evidence the jury could have found, viewing it in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 

378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). On June 24, 2013, Jane obtained 

a restraining order prohibiting the defendant from contacting or 

abusing her. The order was in effect through January 7, 2014. 

In October 2013, Jane began staying at the home of her coworker and friend, Susan5, in Lawrence. On October 28, 2013, 

Jane and Susan attended a party in Boston. Following the party, 

in the early morning hours of October 29, they went to the Chau 

Chow City restaurant in Boston. At approximately 4:00 A.M, the 

defendant appeared at the restaurant uninvited and confronted 

Jane. 

After leaving Chau Chow City at approximately 6:00 A.M., 

Jane and Susan went to a Boston police department (BPD) station 

to report the contact with the defendant. Jane told the police 

that the defendant slapped her three times at the restaurant.6 

She further reported that the defendant had "keyed" her car, a 

statement corroborated, in part, by the officer's observations 

 

5 A pseudonym.

6 This evidence was admitted through the testimony of a 

Boston police officer, over objection, pursuant to the doctrine 

of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
4

of marks on the exterior of the vehicle. While they were at the 

BPD, the defendant called Susan twice looking for Jane. 

Jane and Susan then drove to the Lawrence police department 

(LPD) where Jane again reported what had occurred at Chau Chow 

City. She explained that the defendant followed them from 

Boston to Lawrence. She further reported the telephone calls

they had received from the defendant. The calls from the

defendant continued while they were at the LPD. 

Jane and Susan left the LPD at approximately 7:30 A.M., 

returned to Susan's apartment, and went to sleep in the same 

bedroom. At approximately 9:00 A.M. they were awakened by the 

defendant emerging from the bedroom closet. A struggle ensued. 

Susan escaped and screamed to the apartment manager that there 

was someone in the apartment. Susan pointed to the defendant as 

he ran through the parking lot.7 Meanwhile, Jane called 911 and 

reported "I was here sleeping with a girlfriend, at my 

girlfriend's house, with my girlfriend, and he came into the 

 

7 Surveillance video played for the jury shows the defendant 

entering the building at 4:46 A.M. Susan is seen descending the 

stairs at 9:13 A.M., speaking with the property manager and 

pointing out something in the parking lot. Another camera 

showed the defendant leaving by way of a rear stairwell at 9:10 

A.M.
5

house, we don't know how, with a knife, and attacked both of 

us."8 

Police responded within minutes. They observed that the 

door to the apartment was damaged and the interior of the 

apartment was in disarray. Broken lamps and pieces of furniture 

were strewn about, chairs were overturned, and a glass table-top 

was shattered. There was swelling on the arms and necks of both 

women. Susan appeared disheveled. She was shaking and crying.

She told officers that the defendant appeared at the foot of the 

bed armed with a knife and that she and Jane had screamed as the

defendant made slashing and stabbing motions toward them. Susan

also reported that the defendant smashed her head against the 

wall. Susan handed the officers a large knife she retrieved 

from a closet near the entry to the apartment, which she claimed 

the defendant had used.

Crying hysterically, Jane told the officers that she 

awakened to see the defendant standing at the foot of the bed 

with a knife. After Jane calmed down, she explained that the 

defendant had swung the knife in her direction.9,10 She, too, 

 

8 The 911 call was admitted under the excited utterance 

exception to the rule against hearsay. A redacted tape 

recording of the call was played for the jury. Because the 

recorded 911 call was in Spanish, a written English translation 

was provided to the jury as the tape was played.

9 Jane's initial statements were admitted as excited 

utterances. The statements regarding the defendant swinging the 
6

reported that the defendant grabbed her and slammed her head 

against the wall. She said the defendant fled the apartment 

when Susan began screaming for help. Police efforts to locate 

the defendant that day were unsuccessful.

2. The alleged abduction. On November 9, 2013, police 

responded to the Parkview Inn in Salem, New Hampshire. They 

found Jane in one of the rooms. She was crying and had 

lacerations on her head. She reported that the defendant 

abducted her at gunpoint as she entered her vehicle in Lawrence. 

They drove to the Parkview Inn where the defendant directed Jane

to pay for a room while he waited in the vehicle. She told the 

officers that the defendant struck her multiple times with the 

firearm while they were in the room. Eventually she escaped,

and the defendant fled in her vehicle. The next day the vehicle

was found parked on the side of the road in Andover, 

Massachusetts. Five days later, the defendant was arrested in 

the Bronx, New York.

11 

Discussion. 1. Forfeiture by wrongdoing. Under the 

doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing,

 

knife at her and slamming her against the wall were admitted 

pursuant to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

10 Neither Jane nor Susan suffered any knife wounds.

11 The defendant was acquitted of the kidnapping and assault 

by means of a dangerous weapon charges, but convicted of 

violating the restraining order on November 9, 2013.
7

"a defendant forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right 

to object to the admission of an unavailable witness's outof-court statements on both confrontation and hearsay 

grounds on findings that (1) the witness is unavailable; 

(2) the defendant was involved in, or responsible for, 

procuring the unavailability of the witness; and (3) the 

defendant acted with the intent to procure the witness's 

unavailability."

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 540 (2005). See Mass. 

G. Evid. § 804(b)(6) (2017). "A defendant's involvement in 

procuring a witness's unavailability need not consist of a 

criminal act, and may include a defendant's collusion with a 

witness to ensure that the witness will not be heard at trial."

Edwards, supra.

Pursuant to this doctrine, the Commonwealth sought a 

ruling, in limine, to admit Jane's hearsay statements as 

substantive evidence at trial. The Commonwealth asserted that 

the defendant, while incarcerated awaiting trial, had numerous 

telephone conversations with Jane in violation of the 

restraining order in which he "pressured and threatened [Jane]

about her participation in the case and urged and counseled 

[her] about obtaining an attorney so she would not have to 

testify." After a pretrial evidentiary hearing, which included 

a review of the tape-recorded telephone calls,

12 the judge made 

comprehensive findings of fact. The judge concluded that (1) 

 

12 The telephone calls were recorded as a matter of jail 

policy.
8

Jane had a valid privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution not to incriminate herself and was 

therefore unavailable as a witness; (2) the defendant, in 

numerous telephone conversations with Jane, suggested to her the 

idea of not testifying by threats, persuasion, and pressure; and 

(3) he did so with the intent to procure her unavailability. 

Based on these findings, the judge allowed the motion in limine 

as to Jane's statements that he found reliable. 

On appeal, the defendant argues it was error to admit 

Jane's hearsay statements. According to the defendant, 

collusion to assert a valid Fifth Amendment privilege does not 

meet the Edwards test if, as in this case, the defendant wanted 

the witness to testify and the Commonwealth could have immunized 

her.

13 We are not persuaded. The defendant cites no authority 

in support of this argument, and we have found none.

Grants of immunity are discretionary at the request of the 

Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 578 

(2008) ("Subject to the approval of the court, it is the purview 

of the prosecutor to seek a grant of immunity . . ."). The 

question is not whether Jane had a right to refuse to testify, 

but whether the defendant intentionally procured her 

 

13 By the time of trial, the defendant, through counsel, had 

changed his position regarding Jane's testimony, apparently 

assuming that her testimony would now be helpful.
9

unavailability as a witness. See Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 

Mass. 858, 864-865 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1230 (2011)

(forfeiture by wrongdoing properly applied where defendant 

married witness with intent to have her exercise spousal 

privilege). Here, the evidence established that the defendant 

had multiple conversations with Jane regarding her testimony, 

all in violation of the restraining order. He repeatedly 

suggested that she tell her lawyer about the Fifth Amendment, so 

that she would not have to testify. The judge found that "he 

did so by way of threats, persuasion, and pressure." These 

findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Edwards, supra at 542-543 (application of forfeiture by 

wrongdoing doctrine is a preliminary question of fact subject to 

proof by a preponderance of the evidence). Accordingly, the 

doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was properly applied.

Due process requires that hearsay statements admitted under 

the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing be reliable. Szerlong, 

supra at 866. Based on the pretrial testimony of the Lawrence 

police officers regarding the 911 call from Jane, her physical 

and emotional state upon their arrival, and the condition of the 

apartment, the judge found that Jane's hearsay statements 

regarding the break-in and assaults on October 29 were 
10

sufficiently reliable.14 This independent corroborating evidence 

adequately supported the judge's finding.

15

As an alternative argument, the defendant contends that 

this is the exceptional case in which the judge should have, sua 

sponte, granted "equitable immunity" to Jane, so that the jury 

could hear her testimony. According to the defendant, the judge 

must have known that Jane would make "significant retractions" 

if she testified at trial16 and proceeding to trial without those 

retractions would put the defendant at an unfair disadvantage. 

Put another way, the defendant suggests that without Jane's 

testimony "the [trial] process was short circuited and [his] 

constitutional rights were violated." We disagree.

The Supreme Judicial Court has explained:

 

14 The judge did not admit all of Jane's hearsay statements. 

For example, Jane reported that the defendant told her he would 

send armed men to her mother's home. The judge found that 

statement was not sufficiently reliable.

15 In light of the defendant's acquittal on the kidnapping 

and assault charges on November 9, 2013, we need not address the 

reliability of Jane's statements regarding those allegations.

16 The judge conducted an in camera hearing with Rodriguez 

and her counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 

496 (1996), to determine whether the invocation of her Fifth 

Amendment privilege was valid. Neither defense counsel nor the 

prosecutor was present. The transcript of that hearing was 

sealed, but made available for our review. At argument, counsel 

acknowledged that the transcript of the hearing was included in 

the public record on appeal. Neither party sought an order of 

impoundment.
11

"While a prospective defense witness's assertion of [her] 

right under the Fifth Amendment . . . could affect a 

defendant's ability to present his defense most 

effectively, the compulsory process provisions of the 

Federal and State Constitutions do not mandate a judicial 

grant of immunity to such a witness as a matter of course. 

See Commonwealth v. Curtis, 388 Mass. 637, 646 (1983), 

S.C., 417 Mass. 619 (1994). Although we have left open the 

possibility that 'unique circumstances' could require a 

judge to grant a limited form of immunity to a defense 

witness, see id., we have not been presented yet with such 

a scenario."

Commonwealth v. Brewer, 472 Mass. 307, 312 (2015), quoting from 

Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 438-439 (2014). A unique 

circumstance might arise "where there exists prosecutorial

misconduct arising from the government's deliberate intent to 

distort the fact-finding process." Brewer, supra, quoting from 

Vacher, supra (quotations omitted). Here, the defendant has not 

argued, much less shown, that the Commonwealth's decision not to 

immunize Jane was improperly motivated. Indeed, in light of the 

defendant's efforts to corrupt the trial process by dissuading

Jane from testifying against him, there was good reason for the 

Commonwealth to be skeptical of her testimony.

Further, it is not clear that Jane's testimony would have

been material to the defense. The transcript of the hearing 

held pursuant to Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496 (1996),

shows Jane made a single false statement regarding the events of 
12

October 29.

17 Jane stated that she falsely reported that the 

defendant had broken the door. She did not retract her 

statement that the defendant suddenly appeared at her bedside 

and assaulted her at knifepoint. To be sure, had Jane

testified, the false statement would have undermined her

credibility, but judicial immunity is not available when the 

proffered testimony relates only to the credibility of the 

government's witnesses. Brewer, supra at 314. Therefore, on 

the record before us, the judge properly declined to grant 

"equitable immunity" to Jane.

2. Sufficiency of evidence: stalking in violation of an 

abuse prevention order. "To establish the aggravated form of 

stalking at issue in this case, § 43 (b) (stalking in violation 

of court order), the Commonwealth must prove both a pattern of 

conduct constituting stalking under § 43 (a) and that the 

conduct violated (in this case) a 209A order that was in 

effect." Edge v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 74, 76 (2011). 

General Laws c. 265, § 43(a), as appearing in St. 2010, c. 92, 

§ 9, provides that "[w]hoever (1) willfully and maliciously

engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a 

period of time directed at a specific person which seriously 

 

17 There was a second false statement regarding the alleged 

kidnapping. Because the defendant was acquitted of that charge, 

we consider it only as it may have impacted Jane's credibility 

regarding the October 29 incident.
13

alarms or annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person 

to suffer substantial emotional distress, and (2) makes a threat 

with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death or 

bodily injury is guilty of the crime of stalking . . . ." "A 

pattern or a series in the context of this statute . . . 

involve[s] more than two incidents." Commonwealth v. 

Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 478 (1994). Here, the judge 

instructed the jury that to meet its burden of proof on the 

stalking charge, the Commonwealth had to prove the defendant 

committed three acts on October 29, 2013: (1) slapping Jane at 

the Chao Chow City restaurant; (2) calling her at the BPD

station; and (3) confronting her at Susan's apartment. 

The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

a "series of acts over a period of time" because each of the 

alleged acts, even if proved, occurred on the same day. We are 

not aware of any authority that supports the defendant's 

contention that, in this context, "over a period of time" means 

over a period of time greater than one day. The statute does 

not define "over a period of time," and our cases have not 

further interpreted these words. Consequently, we "give them 

their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are 

consistent with the statutory purpose." Commonwealth v. Zone 

Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). "We derive the words' 

usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the 
14

statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts 

and dictionary definitions." Ibid. The word "over" is defined 

as "from one point to another across an intervening space." 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1605 (2002). 

"Period" means "any extent of time." Id. at 1680. "Time" is 

defined as a "measurable duration." Id. at 2394. Thus, the 

phrase "over a period of time" simply denotes the passage of 

time. We see no reason to require a particular interval of time 

between acts. As long as the acts are separate, distinct, and 

separated by some interval, they occur "over a period of time" 

within the meaning of the statute.

Here, there was evidence that the defendant arrived at Chao 

Chow City, confronted Jane and slapped her at approximately 4:00

A.M.; he called her repeatedly when she was at the BPD around 

6:00 A.M., and he emerged from the bedroom closet wielding a 

knife around 9:00 A.M. Examining this evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, see Latimore, 378 Mass. at 

677, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt (1) 

that the defendant engaged in three separate acts over a period 

of time which alarmed and annoyed Jane, and would have caused a 

reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and 

(2) that the defendant threatened Jane with the intent to place

her in imminent fear of death or bodily injury.
15

The defendant was charged with an aggravated form of 

stalking because the acts were alleged to have been committed in 

violation of an abuse prevention order issued under G. L. 

c. 209A, §§ 3 and 4. A violation of an abuse prevention order 

consists of (1) the existence of the order at the time in 

question, (2) the defendant's violation of the order, and (3)

the defendant's knowledge of the order. Commonwealth v. Silva, 

431 Mass. 401, 403 (2000).

The defendant claims that the evidence of his knowledge of 

the order was insufficient where the order indicates it was 

served before it was issued. The order shows that it was issued

on June 27, 2013, at 3:40 P.M. However, it also indicates in 

two different places that it was served in hand by a court 

officer on June 24, 2013, at 3:50 P.M., three days earlier, at 

the Lawrence District Court. Of course, a restraining order 

cannot be served before it exists. However, given the times on 

the order for issuance and service (a ten-minute interval), and 

the two separate handwritten entries on the order indicating 

service by a court officer on June 24, the jury could have 

reasonably inferred that the date of issuance on the order was a 

typographical error, and that the order had been issued and 

served on the defendant at the Lawrence District Court on June 

24, 2013.
16

Further, there was ample evidence that the defendant knew 

that he was not permitted to contact Jane. The jury heard that 

she had obtained two prior restraining orders against the 

defendant, the most recent of which expired only one month 

before the June, 2013, order was issued. The jury also heard 

evidence that the defendant engineered a ruse, so that he could 

see Jane in violation of the order while he was incarcerated. 

From this evidence, the jury could have found that the defendant 

knew he was prohibited from contacting Jane. For all of these 

reasons, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the jury's guilty finding on the charge of stalking in violation 

of a restraining order.18,19

3. Reasonable doubt instruction. Since January of 2015, 

the preferred jury instruction on reasonable doubt in 

Massachusetts includes the following language:

 

18 The defendant advances the same argument regarding the 

dates on the restraining order to challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence on his conviction of aggravated assault and 

battery. We reject the argument for the reasons set forth 

above.

19 The indictment for breaking and entering with intent to 

commit a felony was placed on file with the defendant's consent. 

We do not consider appeals from convictions placed on file 

absent exceptional circumstances, "such as where the legal error 

affects all the charges." Commonwealth v. Prashaw, 57 Mass. 

App. Ct. 19, 27 (2003). The defendant's argument that his 

motion for required finding should have been allowed because the 

indictment did not allege that the entry occurred in the 

nighttime, does not affect all the charges. Accordingly, we do 

not address this claimed error.
17

"A charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt if, after you 

have compared and considered all of the evidence, you have 

in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, 

that the charge is true. When we refer to moral certainty, 

we mean the highest degree of certainty possible in matters 

relating to human affairs -- based solely on the evidence 

that has been put before you in this case."

Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477 (2015). Here, 

without the benefit of the Supreme Judicial Court's guidance in 

Russell, the judge used different language, instructing the jury 

that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you 

firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. In other words, you 

have an abiding conviction that the charge is true." The 

defendant argues that the judge's failure to include the words 

"moral certainty" in his instruction was constitutional error. 

We disagree.

The judge's reasonable doubt instruction was derived from

Federal Judicial Center Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 21

(1998), the same instruction considered by the Supreme Judicial 

Court in Russell.

20 There, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded 

 

20 In relevant part, instruction 21 provides: 

"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you 

firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very 

few things in this world that we know with absolute 

certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require 

proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on 

your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly 

convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime 

charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, 

you think there is a real possibility that he is not 
18

that "the instruction met the minimum requirements of due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment and art. 12." Russell, 

supra at 474. However, because of concern about potential 

misinterpretation of the term "moral certainty,"

21 the Supreme 

Judicial Court exercised its supervisory power and provided a 

uniform instruction on reasonable doubt which further defined 

that term. The instruction is to be used by all Massachusetts 

trial judges from that point forward. Id. at 477. Because 

Russell was decided after the trial in this case, the judge did 

not have the benefit of that uniform instruction.

We view the charge in its entirety to determine its 

adequacy. Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 231-232 

(1980). The jury were instructed that the defendant was 

presumed innocent and that the Commonwealth bore the burden of 

proof. They were also instructed that "it is not enough for the 

Commonwealth to establish a probability, even a strong 

probability, that the defendant is more likely to be guilty than 

not guilty." Instead, the jury were instructed that they must 

be "firmly convinced and have an abiding conviction that the 

 

guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find 

him not guilty."

21 The "moral certainty" language comes from Commonwealth v. 

Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 313 (1850). The Webster charge was the 

preferred instruction on reasonable doubt for 150 years before 

Russell.
19

defendant is guilty of the crime charged." These instructions, 

taken as a whole, adequately "impressed upon the factfinder the 

need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt 

of the accused." Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 Mass. 341, 344 

(1995). We discern no error.

4. The jury question. In connection with the stalking 

charge, the jury asked "is it sufficient that he showed up at 

Chao Chow or necessary we are convinced of slapping." The 

defendant claims that the judge's answer to that question, set 

forth in the margin,

22 permitted conviction on a theory not 

supported by the evidence. Again, we disagree.

 

22 The judge responded to the jury as follows:

"My answer to you is that it's not sufficient if the 

Commonwealth simply shows that he showed up at the Chao 

Chow restaurant. But the Commonwealth does not necessarily 

have to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that there 

was an incident of slapping or three slaps at the Chao Chow 

restaurant. Let me explain. The Commonwealth does have to 

prove to you that there was some incident at the Chao Chow 

restaurant that would cause a reasonable person to suffer 

substantial emotional distress; and that this act at the 

Chao Chow restaurant did indeed cause [Jane] to become 

seriously alarmed or annoyed; and that the defendant took 

these actions at the Chao Chow restaurant willfully and 

maliciously . . . .

"What the Commonwealth would have to prove is even if 

the Commonwealth couldn't prove an actual slapping, that 

the defendant showed up uninvited at the Chao Chow 

restaurant; that his presence was not consented to by the 

people at the Chao Chow restaurant; that he shows up 

intentionally knowing the people are there; that he doesn't 

show up just accidentally and, oh, jeez, there's [Jane]; 

instead, he intentionally knows that she's there at the 
20

"The proper response to a jury question must remain within 

the discretion of the trial judge, who has observed the evidence 

and the jury firsthand and can tailor supplemental instructions 

accordingly." Commonwealth v. Bell, 455 Mass. 408, 420 (2009), 

quoting from Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 7-8 (2007). 

There was evidence that after attempting to reach Jane by 

telephone, the defendant appeared at the restaurant uninvited 

and angrily confronted her in violation of the restraining 

order. From this evidence, the jury could have found, even 

without the alleged slapping, that the defendant acted willfully 

and maliciously in a way that alarmed and annoyed Jane, causing 

her substantial emotional distress. Accordingly, we discern no 

abuse of discretion in the judge's answer and supplemental 

instruction.

Judgments affirmed.

 

time; that he knows that he is not supposed to have any 

contact with or be within a hundred yards of [Jane]; and 

that he does some action there at the Chao Chow restaurant 

willingly and maliciously that causes her to become 

seriously alarmed or annoyed and would cause a reasonable 

person to suffer substantial emotional distress."