SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0170-19T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TYRONE WILLIAMS and

ABDUR MUHAMMAD,

1

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

Argued January 8, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Haas and Enright. 

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior 

Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, 

Indictment No. 18-02-0020.

Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Sarah D. Brigham, of counsel and on 

the brief).

1

 This defendant also is referenced in the record as Abdurnd Muhammad and 

Abdur Muhammed.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 24, 2020
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Joseph D. Rotella argued the cause for respondent 

Tyrone Williams.

Michael B. Campagna argued the cause for respondent 

Abdur Muhammad (Michael B. Campagna, attorney, 

joins in the brief of respondent Tyrone Williams).

PER CURIAM

On February 18, 2018, a grand jury indicted defendants Tyrone Williams 

and Abdur Muhammad for second-degree conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(1), or to possess with 

intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (count 

one); third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count two); 

first-degree possession with intent to distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), 

2C:35-5(b)(1), and 2C:35-5(c) (count four); and third-degree possession with 

intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (count 

five). Additionally, the grand jury indicted Williams for second-degree 

distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(2) (count three).

By leave granted, the State appeals from an interlocutory order granting 

defendants' motion to suppress evidence seized from a vehicle driven by 

Williams. Based on this record and mindful of prevailing legal standards, we 

affirm.
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We recite only the pertinent facts, which are gleaned from the testimony 

of the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing, Detective Christopher 

Durning.

On July 8, 2016, Detective Durning and Detective Joseph Palach of the 

New Jersey State Police were detailed to a Targeted Integrated Deployment 

Effort in Newark, to suppress violent crime and narcotics distribution. While 

on duty and driving in an unmarked vehicle, the officers observed a Dodge

station wagon that was illegally parked about five feet from a stop sign, in 

violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-138(h). The Dodge's engine was running, its front 

windows were open, but its headlights were off. Williams was in the driver's 

seat and Muhammad was in the front passenger's seat. Both defendants were 

using their cell phones.

Detective Durning drove up alongside the Dodge and when he was within 

a few feet of it, he saw Williams pass Muhammad an opaque black bag that 

appeared "bricked off" at the bottom. The detectives shone their flashlight into 

the interior of the vehicle and Detective Durning saw Muhammad immediately 

drop the bag.

The police officers exited their unmarked car and Detective Durning 

walked up to the driver's side of the Dodge; Detective Palach approached the 
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passenger side, where Muhammad was seated. Detective Durning saw the bag 

Muhammad dropped to the floorboard of the Dodge and wondered what was in 

it. The detective could not see the bag's contents, and believed Muhammad was 

"trying to hide [the bag]." Muhammad blocked the detective's view of the bag 

with his left leg.

After Detective Durning approached Williams, he told Detective Palach

he detected the odor of alcohol emanating from the passenger compartment of 

the Dodge. Detective Durning was concerned Williams might be guilty of 

driving while under the influence of alcohol or that the occupants of the Dodge 

had an open container of alcohol inside the running car,2 but he did not find 

evidence of either infraction or recall asking Williams any questions. Detective 

Durning testified he did not fear for his safety when he walked toward the 

defendants.

Once Detective Durning told his partner he detected the odor of alcohol 

coming from inside the Dodge, Detective Palach ordered Muhammad out of the 

vehicle. Contemporaneously, Detective Durning ordered Williams out of the 

car. When Muhammad exited the Dodge, Detective Durning saw green 

2

 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-51b, "[a]ll occupants of a motor vehicle located on 

a public highway, or the right-of-way of a public highway, shall be prohibited 

from possessing any open or unsealed alcoholic beverage container."
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cellophane sticking out of the open black bag on the floorboard. The contents 

of the bag looked to him like bricks of heroin. Detective Palach retrieved the 

bag and discovered it contained 105 bricks of heroin.

Defendants were arrested at the scene. Following their arrest, the police 

officers conducted a warrantless search of the Dodge's passenger compartment. 

They recovered 360 additional bricks of heroin during this search.

At the suppression hearing, Detective Durning testified it was not his 

intention to look in the black bag when he initially exited his vehicle. However, 

he also testified that his "focus" during the incident "was to see what . . . that 

bag was." The detective admitted in his testimony that the contents of the bag 

"could have been something completely . . . not illegal at all," and "could have 

been boxes of cereal." He also affirmed he did not see defendants engage in any 

illegal activity before Detective Palach found the heroin.

Although the motion judge granted defendants' motion to suppress all 

evidence seized from the Dodge, she found Detective Durning to be a credible 

witness. She further found he was not interested in the contents of the black bag 

when he initially approached the Dodge and only became interested in the 

contents of the bag after Muhammad exited the vehicle. Additionally, she found 

the detectives initiated a lawful investigatory stop of the defendants based on a 
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suspected motor vehicle infraction under N.J.S.A. 39:4-138(h). The judge was 

satisfied the detectives were lawfully in the viewing area when they saw the 

contents of the black bag. However, she determined that in the absence of a 

heightened sense of caution, the officers exceeded the scope of their 

investigatory stop by ordering Muhammad out of the vehicle. As the judge 

noted:

[h]ad [d]efendant Muhammad never been given 

instructions to exit the car, the [d]etectives would never 

have seen the contents of the bag. As a result, the 

seizure of [d]efendant Muhammad that yielded the 

seizure of the evidence itself the [c]ourt deems is the 

result of the unconstitutional activities of the police and 

[the evidence] is hereby suppressed as the fruit of the 

poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 

471 (1963).

On appeal, the State raises the following arguments:

POINT I

THE DETECTIVES PROPERLY SEIZED THE 

BRICKS OF HEROIN UNDER THE PLAIN-VIEW 

DOCTRINE AND THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION.

A. The stop was lawful because the detectives not only had 

reasonable suspicion that the station wagon was in 

violation of the motor-vehicle code, they had 

reasonable suspicion that defendants were engaged in 

other illegal activity.

B. The passenger was lawfully ordered out of the vehicle 

because not only did the detectives have heightened 
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caution based on defendants' suspicious movements in 

the vehicle, they had reasonable suspicion that the 

passenger was engaged in culpable conduct.

C. The detectives lawfully seized the 105 bricks of heroin 

in the black bag under the plain-view doctrine.

D. The detectives also lawfully seized the additional 360 

bricks of heroin in the blue bag under the automobile 

exception.

We are not persuaded by these arguments and affirm, substantially for the 

reasons set forth in the motion judge's oral decision of July 1, 2019 and her 

written opinion dated August 7, 2019. We add only a few brief remarks.

Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is limited. 

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "[A]n appellate court reviewing a 

motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision so long as those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (citing State v. Locurto, 

157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). The "trial court's findings should be disturbed only 

if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention 

and correction.'" Id. at 244 (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). 

However, we utilize a de novo standard when reviewing a trial judge's legal 

conclusions. State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 426 (2017).
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We perceive no basis to disturb the motion judge's finding that the 

detectives' initial investigatory stop was justified by their reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that a traffic offense was being committed. Accordingly, 

we turn to the propriety of Muhammad being ordered out of the stopped vehicle. 

Our Supreme Court has held a police officer "may order a passenger out of a 

vehicle if the officer can 'point to specific and articulable facts that would 

warrant heightened caution to justify ordering the occupants to step out of a 

vehicle detained for a traffic violation.'" State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 106 

(2017) (quoting State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 618 (1994)).

[T]he officer need point only to some fact or facts in 

the totality of the circumstances that would create in a 

police officer a heightened awareness of danger that 

would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in 

securing the scene in a more effective manner by 

ordering the passenger to alight from the car.

[Smith, 134 N.J. at 618.]

The Bacome Court confirmed that even if an officer has authority to 

remove a driver from a vehicle, that authority does not automatically extend to 

removal of a passenger "because the passenger has not engaged in the culpable 

conduct that resulted in the vehicle's stop." 228 N.J. at 105 (quoting Smith, 134 

N.J. at 615).
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Here, the record is devoid of any explanation as to why Detective Palach 

ordered Muhammad out of the vehicle. Likewise, there is nothing in the record

to demonstrate circumstances that created a heightened awareness of danger that 

warranted defendants' removal from the Dodge. Although the motion judge's 

factual findings did not include Detective Durning's "focus" on the black bag 

before its contents were revealed, we are satisfied such an omission is 

inconsequential. Moreover, we are persuaded the motion judge's finding that 

the detectives improperly ordered defendants out of their vehicle is fully 

supported by the facts in the record. Therefore, her legal conclusions are 

unassailable.

The State's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.