**[J-94-2020] IN** **THE SUPREME** **COURT OF** **PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN** **DISTRICT BAER,** **C.J., SAYLOR,** **TODD, DONOHUE,** **DOUGHERTY, WECHT,** **MUNDY, JJ.** **IN RE:** **B.W. .** **No. 14** **WAP 2020** **APPEAL OF:** **BLAIR COUNTY** **DEPARTMENT OF** **HUMAN SERVICES** **Appeal from** **the Order** **of the** **Superior Court** **entered November** **1, 2019** **at No.** **289 WDA** **2019, reversing** **the Order** **of the** **Court of** **Common Pleas** **of Blair** **County entered** **February 13,** **2019 at** **No. 2018** **GN 2882,** **and remanding.** **ARGUED: October** **22, 2020** **OPINION JUSTICE** **MUNDY DECIDED:** **MAY 18,** **2021 In** **this appeal** **by allowance,** **we consider** **whether the** **Superior Court** **erred in** **ordering the** **expungement and** **destruction of** **the medical** **records of** **the Section** **302 involuntary** **emergency examination** **and treatment** **of Appellee,** **B.W., on** **the basis** **that the** **Section 302** **petition was** **insufficient to** **prove B.W.** **was a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others.** **We conclude** **the Superior** **Court erred** **as the** **physicians' records** **contained sufficient** **facts to** **prove B.W.** **made a** **threat to** **harm another** **person and** **acted in** **furtherance of** **that threat** **by developing** **a plan** **to harm** **that person,** **which the** **physicians found** **credible. Accordingly,** **we reverse** **the Superior** **Court's order.** **I. PENNSYLVANIA'S** **MENTAL HEALTH** **PROCEDURES ACT** **AND EXPUNGEMENT** **OF INVOLUNTARY** **COMMITMENT RECORDS** **The legislature** **enacted Pennsylvania's** **Mental Health** **Procedures Act** **(MHPA), 50** **P.S. §§** **7101-7503, to** **establish procedures** **"to assure** **the availability** **of adequate** **treatment to** **persons who** **are mentally** **ill." 50** **P.S. §** **7102. The** **MHPA's provisions** **"shall be** **interpreted in** **conformity with** **the principles** **of due** **process to** **make voluntary** **and involuntary** **treatment available** **where the** **need is** **great and** **its absence** **could result** **in serious** **harm to** **the mentally** **ill person** **or to** **others." Id.** **One treatment** **option the** **MHPA governs** **is involuntary** **emergency examination** **and treatment,** **commonly referred** **to as** **a "302** **commitment." See** **50 P.S.** **§ 7302.** **Section 302** **of the** **MHPA provides** **that an** **involuntary emergency** **examination of** **a person** **may occur** **upon a** **physician's certification.** **50 P.S.** **§ 7302(b).** **If the** **examining physician** **determines "that** **the person** **is severely** **mentally disabled** **and in** **need of** **emergency treatment,** **treatment shall** **be begun** **immediately" and** **may continue** **for up** **to 120** **hours. 50** **P.S. §** **7302(b), (d);** **see also** **50 P.S.** **§ 7301(a)** **(providing a** **person who** **is "severely** **mentally disabled** **and in** **need of** **treatment" may** **be subject** **to "involuntary** **emergency examination** **and treatment").** **Section 301** **further provides** **that a** **person is** **"severely mentally** **disabled" when** **mental illness** **causes the** **person's "capacity** **to exercise** **self-control, judgment** **and discretion** **in the** **conduct of** **his affairs** **and social** **relations or** **to care** **for his** **own personal** **needs is** **so lessened** **that he** **poses a** **clear and** **present danger** **of harm** **to others** **or to** **himself[.]" 50** **P.S. §** **7301(a). Section** **301(b)(1) lists** **the following** **criteria for** **showing a** **person is** **a clear** **and present** **danger of** **harm to** **others: (b)** **Determination of** **Clear and** **Present Danger.** **--(1) Clear** **and present** **danger to** **others shall** **be shown** **by establishing** **that within** **the past** **30 days** **the person** **has inflicted** **or attempted** **to inflict** **serious bodily** **harm on** **another and** **that there** **is a** **reasonable probability** **that such** **conduct will** **be repeated.** **If, however,** **the person** **has been** **found incompetent** **to be** **tried or** **has been** **acquitted by** **reason of** **lack of** **criminal responsibility** **on charges** **arising from** **conduct involving** **infliction of** **or attempt** **to inflict** **substantial bodily** **harm on** **another, such** **30-day limitation** **shall not** **apply so** **long as** **an application** **for examination** **and treatment** **is filed** **within 30** **days after** **the date** **of such** **determination or** **verdict. In** **such case,** **a clear** **and present** **danger to** **others may** **be [J-94-2020]** **- 2** **shown by** **establishing that** **the conduct** **charged in** **the criminal** **proceeding did** **occur, and** **that there** **is a** **reasonable probability** **that such** **conduct will** **be repeated.** **For the** **purpose of** **this section,** **a clear** **and present** **danger of** **harm to** **others may** **be demonstrated** **by proof** **that the** **person has** **made threats** **of harm** **and has** **committed acts** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm.** **50 P.S.** **§ 7301(b)(1).** **Section 301(b)(2)** **contains the** **criteria for** **determining that** **a person** **is a** **danger to** **himself or** **herself. (2)** **Clear and** **present danger** **to himself** **shall be** **shown by** **establishing that** **within the** **past 30** **days: (i)** **the person** **has acted** **in such** **manner as** **to evidence** **that he** **would be** **unable, without** **care, supervision** **and the** **continued assistance** **of others,** **to satisfy** **his need** **for nourishment,** **personal or** **medical care,** **shelter, or** **self-protection and** **safety, and** **that there** **is a** **reasonable probability** **that death,** **serious bodily** **injury or** **serious physical** **debilitation would** **ensue within** **30 days** **unless adequate** **treatment were** **afforded under** **this act;** **or (ii)** **the person** **has attempted** **suicide and** **that there** **is the** **reasonable probability** **of suicide** **unless adequate** **treatment is** **afforded under** **this act.** **For the** **purposes of** **this subsection,** **a clear** **and present** **danger may** **be demonstrated** **by the** **proof that** **the person** **has made** **threats to** **commit suicide** **and has** **committed acts** **which are** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit suicide;** **or (iii)** **the person** **has substantially** **mutilated himself** **or attempted** **to mutilate** **himself substantially** **and that** **there is** **the reasonable** **probability of** **mutilation unless** **adequate treatment** **is afforded** **under this** **act. For** **the purposes** **of this** **subsection, a** **clear and** **present danger** **shall be** **established by** **proof that** **the person** **has made** **threats to** **commit mutilation** **and has** **committed acts** **which are** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit mutilation.** **[J-94-2020] -** **3 The** **Pennsylvania Uniform** **Firearms Act** **of 1995** **(UFA), 18** **Pa.C.S. §§** **6101-6128, makes** **it unlawful** **for a** **person who** **has been** **involuntarily committed** **under Section** **302 to** **"possess, use,** **control, sell,** **transfer or** **manufacture" a** **firearm or** **to obtain** **a license** **to conduct** **any of** **those activities.** **18 Pa.C.S.** **§ 6105(a)(1),** **(c)(4). However,** **the UFA** **provides two** **ways for** **the subject** **of a** **302 commitment** **to obtain** **relief from** **the Section** **6105(a)(1) firearm** **restrictions. The** **one at** **issue in** **this case** **is a** **court-ordered expungement** **of the** **302 commitment** **record under** **Section 6111.1(g)(2),** **which provides:** **(g) Review** **by court.—** **(2) A** **person who** **is involuntarily** **committed pursuant** **to section** **302 of** **the Mental** **Health Procedures** **Act may** **petition the** **court to** **review the** **sufficiency of** **the evidence** **upon which** **the commitment** **was based.** **If the** **court determines** **that the** **evidence upon** **which the** **involuntary commitment** **was based** **was insufficient,** **the court** **shall order** **that the** **record of** **the commitment** **submitted to** **the Pennsylvania** **State Police** **be expunged.** **A petition** **filed under** **this subsection** **shall toll** **the 60-day** **period set** **forth under** **section 6105(a)(2).** **18 Pa.C.S.** **§ 6111.1(g)(2).** **This Court** **clarified the** **appropriate review** **of a** **Section 6111.1(g)(2)** **petition to** **expunge a** **302 commitment** **record based** **on the** **sufficiency of** **the evidence** **to support** **the 302** **commitment in** **In re** **Vencil, 152** **A.3d 235** **(Pa. 2017):** **50 P.S.** **§ 7301(b)(2).** **The second** **means for** **the subject** **of a** **302 commitment** **to obtain** **relief from** **the Section** **6105(a)(1) firearms** **restrictions is** **to petition** **the trial** **court to** **grant relief** **based on** **a finding** **that "the** **applicant may** **possess a** **firearm without** **risk to** **the applicant** **or any** **other person."** **18 Pa.C.S.** **§ 6105(f)(1).** **[J-94-2020] -** **4 under** **section 6111.1(g)(2),** **a challenge** **to the** **sufficiency of** **the evidence** **to support** **a 302** **commitment presents** **a pure** **question of** **law, and** **the court's** **sole concern** **is whether,** **based on** **the findings** **recorded by** **the physician** **and the** **information he** **or she** **relied upon** **in arriving** **at those** **findings, the** **precise, legislatively-defined** **prerequisites for** **a 302** **commitment have** **been satisfied** **and are** **supported by** **a preponderance** **of the** **evidence. We** **emphasize that** **the trial** **court's review** **is limited** **to the** **findings recorded** **by the** **physician and** **the information** **he or** **she relied** **upon in** **arriving at** **those findings,** **and requires** **deference to** **the physician,** **as the** **original factfinder,** **as the** **physician examined** **and evaluated** **the individual** **in the** **first instance,** **was able** **to observe** **his or** **her demeanor,** **and has** **particularized training,** **knowledge and** **experience regarding** **whether a** **302 commitment** **is medically** **necessary. Vencil,** **152 A.3d** **at 246** **(rejecting de** **novo review** **subject to** **clear and** **convincing burden** **of proof** **for Section** **6111.1(g)(2) petitions).** **II. FACTUAL** **AND PROCEDURAL** **HISTORY With** **this legal** **framework in** **mind, we** **set forth** **the facts** **of this** **case. On** **September 6,** **2018, B.W.** **went to** **Altoona Family** **Physicians, his** **primary care** **provider's office.** **The office** **visit notes** **show that** **on September** **6, 2018,** **Dr. Joseph** **Sumereau was** **the provider** **who treated** **B.W., while** **Dr. Amanda** **Cattol was** **B.W.'s primary** **care physician.** **Office Visit** **Notes, 9/6/18.** **The physician's** **progress notes** **of the** **office visit,** **signed by** **Dr. Terry** **Ruhl, indicate** **the reason** **for B.W.'s** **visit was** **"anxiety" and** **the primary** **diagnosis was** **"agitation." Id.** **Dr. Ruhl** **elaborated: Discussed** **with Dr.** **Sumereau and** **Jimmy. Anxiety** **and anger** **feelings. Making** **credible threats** **of violence** **against a** **co-worker but** **is here** **for help.** **Girlfriend has** **concerns for** **his safety.** **Crisis here** **now -** **expect they** **will recommend** **inpatient treatment,** **involuntary if** **necessary. UPMC** **police here** **for safety,** **but he** **has made** **no threats** **against staff.** **Id. (note** **entered 9/10/18** **regarding 9/6/18** **visit). [J-94-2020]** **- 5** **Indeed, on** **September 6,** **2018, Dr.** **Sumereau submitted** **a Section** **302 application** **for involuntary** **emergency examination** **and treatment** **for B.W.** **Appl. for** **Involuntary Emergency** **Examination &** **Treatment, 9/6/18,** **at 1.** **Dr. Sumereau** **completed Part** **I of** **the application** **as "the** **person who** **believes the** **patient is** **in need** **of treatment."** **/d. Dr.** **Sumereau selected** **the pre-printed** **option on** **the form** **indicating he** **believed B.W.** **was "severely** **mentally disabled"** **because he** **posed a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others.** **Id. at** **2 (marking** **the box** **on the** **form largely** **reciting the** **Section 301(b)(1)** **criteria). Dr.** **Sumereau completed** **the narrative** **portion of** **the 302** **application with** **a description** **of the** **details that** **supported his** **belief, as** **follows: I,** **Dr. Sumereau,** **was present** **while the** **patient stated** **that he** **would strangle** **another person** **to death.** **He then** **gave the** **name of** **the intended** **victim. Patient** **stated that** **he was** **not sure** **when or** **where he** **would perform** **this act,** **but he** **would do** **it the** **next time** **he saw** **the person.** **Id. at** **3. As** **a result,** **Dr. Sumereau** **certified that** **B.W. was** **in need** **of involuntary** **examination and** **treatment, and** **he requested** **that UPMC** **Altoona Hospital** **examine B.W.** **to determine** **his need** **for treatment.** **Id. B.W.** **was transported** **to UPMC** **Altoona, where** **the examining** **physician, Dr.** **Mercedes Boggs,** **noted the** **findings of** **her examination** **of [B.W.]** **were that** **"[B.W.] is** **homicidal toward** **his coworker** **and admits** **to stating** **that he** **would strangle** **him. [B.W.]** **very angry** **and agitated,** **danger to** **others. Not** **receptive to** **voluntary admission."** **Id. at** **7. She** **noted the** **treatment needed** **was "[f]urther** **evaluation and** **assessment, therapy** **and medication."** **Id. She** **certified B.W.** **was "severely** **mentally disabled** **and in** **need of** **treatment" and** **recommended his** **admission to** **a facility** **for up** **to 120** **hours of** **treatment. Id.** **Accordingly, B.W.** **was involuntarily** **committed at** **the Altoona** **Hospital Mental** **Health Unit,** **and he** **was released** **after 72** **hours. Pet.** **to Expunge,** **10/2/18, at** **¶¶ 2,** **10. [J-94-2020]** **- 6** **On October** **2, 2018,** **B.W. filed** **a petition** **to expunge** **mental health** **record. In** **the petition,** **B.W. averred** **"there was** **no basis** **to the** **involuntary commitment** **as he** **was not** **homicidal and** **did not** **express any** **homicidal ideations."** **Id. at** **¶ 11.** **He claimed** **he had** **no intent** **to carry** **out his** **threat and** **characterized his** **statements to** **Dr. Sumereau** **as "blowing** **off steam."** **Id. at** **¶ 8.** **He asserted** **the record** **of his** **involuntary commitment** **impaired his** **employment opportunities** **and his** **ability to** **carry a** **firearm. Id.** **at ¶** **13. Accordingly,** **he requested** **relief in** **the form** **of a** **trial court** **order directing** **the Altoona** **Hospital and** **the Pennsylvania** **State Police** **(PSP) to** **expunge the** **records of** **his September** **6, 2018** **involuntary commitment.** **Id. at** **¶ A.** **Even though** **the petition** **did not** **expressly cite** **Section 6111.1(g)(2),** **it is** **clear from** **the request** **for relief** **that B.W.** **requested a** **Section 6111.1(g)(2)** **review of** **his 302** **commitment. On** **January 4,** **2019, the** **trial court** **held a** **hearing on** **the petition** **to expunge.** **At the** **hearing, the** **PSP introduced** **the 302** **commitment record** **into evidence,** **and B.W.** **introduced the** **Altoona Family** **Physicians' office** **visit notes.** **N.T., 1/4/19,** **at 2,** **23. Additionally,** **the trial** **court heard** **the testimony** **of B.W.** **and his** **girlfriend despite** **the objection** **of the** **Blair County** **Department of** **Social Services** **(DSS) that** **the testimony** **was not** **relevant to** **the sufficiency** **of the** **evidence according** **to Vencil.** **Id. at** **2-3. Neither** **DSS nor** **the PSP** **presented any** **testimony. Id.** **at 26.** **At the** **conclusion of** **the hearing,** **the trial** **court took** **the matter** **under advisement** **pending the** **transcript of** **the hearing** **and the** **parties' memoranda** **of law.** **Id. On** **February 13,** **2019, the** **trial court** **issued an** **order denying** **B.W.'s petition** **to expunge.** **Trial Ct.** **Order, 2/13/19.** **In its** **accompanying opinion,** **the court** **identified the** **issue as** **whether B.W.** **committed an** **act in** **furtherance of** **his threat** **to strangle** **his As** **this testimony** **is irrelevant** **to a** **Section 6111.1(g)(2)** **review under** **Vencil, we** **do not** **consider it.** **See Vencil,** **152 A.3d** **at 238-39** **n.3, 244.** **[J-94-2020] -** **7 coworker.** **Trial Ct.** **Op., 2/13/19,** **at 16.** **The court** **found it** **was undisputed** **that B.W.** **made threats** **to harm** **his coworker.** **Id. at** **15. The** **trial court** **stated the** **"act in** **furtherance" inquiry** **was a** **fact-specific determination** **made on** **a case-by-case** **basis. Id.** **at 6.** **Addressing whether** **B.W. acted** **in furtherance** **of his** **threat, the** **court initially** **noted that** **B.W. did** **not communicate** **by any** **means his** **threat to** **his coworker** **or a** **third party;** **he did** **not engage** **in a** **physical altercation** **with his** **coworker; and** **he did** **not search** **the internet** **for ways** **to strangle** **or injure** **another person.** **Id. at** **15. Nonetheless,** **the trial** **court concluded** **that Dr.** **Sumereau's description** **of B.W.'s** **statement that** **he would** **strangle his** **coworker "the** **next time** **he saw** **this person"** **was sufficient** **to support** **the conclusion** **that B.W.** **was a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others.** **Id. It** **explained that** **under Vencil,** **"[w]e must** **give deference** **to the** **physician, as** **the original** **factfinder, as** **the physician** **examined and** **evaluated [B.W.],** **and was** **able to** **observe his** **demeanor." Id.** **Applying Vencil,** **the court** **found "that** **the evidence** **known by** **the physician** **at the** **time, as** **contained in** **the contemporaneously-created** **record, supports** **the conclusion** **that [B.W.]** **presented a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others,** **requiring a** **302 commitment."** **Id. Accordingly,** **the trial** **court denied** **B.W.'s petition** **to expunge.** **B.W. appealed** **to the** **Superior Court.** **In a** **2-1 unpublished** **non-precedential memorandum** **decision, the** **Superior Court** **reversed the** **trial court** **order denying** **B.W.'s petition** **to expunge.** **In re** **B.W., No.** **289 WDA** **2019, 2019** **WL 5682614,** **at*****6 (Pa.** **Super. Nov.** **1, 2019).** **The Superior** **Court concluded** **that the** **involuntary commitment** **petition did** **not contain** **sufficient facts** **to prove** **B.W. took** **an "act** **in furtherance"** **of his** **threat to** **kill his** **coworker. Id.** **at*****5. The** **court viewed** **B.W.'s statement** **that he** **intended to** **strangle his** **coworker the** **next time** **he saw** **him as** **a bare** **threat without** **an accompanying** **act in** **furtherance. Id.** **at*****6. [J-94-2020]** **- 8** **In support** **of its** **decision, the** **Superior Court** **analogized this** **case to** **its unpublished** **decision in** **Interest of** **K.M., No.** **1677 MDA** **2018, 2019** **WL 3243142** **(Pa. Super.** **July 17,** **2019). Id.** **at*****5-6. In** **K.M., the** **involuntary commitment** **petition stated** **that K.M.** **told medical** **staff that** **he would** **not live** **long enough** **for his** **medical bill** **to matter,** **that he** **would end** **his life** **when his** **medical debt** **was too** **much, and** **that "he** **could take** **a 350** **mag [sic]** **to his** **head and** **pull the** **trigger &** **kill people** **with no** **care." K.M.,** **2019 WL** **3243142, at** ***1. The** **K.M. Court** **held these** **statements were** **insufficient to** **support the** **involuntary commitment** **because "besides** **examples of** **threatening thoughts** **and statements,** **the record** **contains no** **evidence of** **any act** **undertaken by** **[K.M.] in** **furtherance of** **his threat** **to harm** **himself or** **others." Id.** **at*****5. Therefore,** **the court** **concluded the** **records of** **K.M.'s involuntary** **commitment had** **to be** **expunged and** **destroyed. Id.** **In this** **case, the** **Superior Court** **rejected DHS** **and PSP's** **argument that** **K.M. was** **distinguishable because** **B.W. identified** **his intended** **victim and** **stated how** **he would** **carry out** **the threat.** **In re** **B. W,** **2019 WL** **5682614, at** ***6. The** **court explained** **that "the** **threat itself,** **without more,** **does not** **constitute an** **act in** **furtherance of** **the threat."** **Id. Accordingly,** **the Superior** **Court reversed** **the trial** **court and** **ordered that** **the records** **of B.W.'s** **involuntary commitment** **must be** **expunged and** **destroyed. Id.** **Judge Lazarus** **filed a** **dissenting memorandum** **in which** **she opined** **that proof** **of an** **act in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to commit** **harm was** **not necessary** **for a** **Section 302** **involuntary commitment,** **and even** **if it** **was necessary,** **applying the** **Vencil standard** **to the** **physicians' statements** **showed the** **evidence was** **sufficient to** **support B.W.'s** **involuntary commitment.** **Id. (Lazarus,** **J., dissenting).** **Judge Lazarus** **explained that** **Section The** **Superior Court** **noted that** **its unpublished,** **non-precedential decisions** **filed after** **May 1,** **2019 may** **be relied** **on for** **their persuasive** **value. In** **re B.** **W., 2019** **WL 5682614,** **at*****6 n.2** **(citing Pa.R.A.P.** **126(b)). [J-94-2020]** **- 9** **301(b)(1) does** **not necessarily** **require proof** **of an** **act in** **furtherance because** **it states** **that a** **threat and** **an act** **in furtherance** **may, not** **must, demonstrate** **a clear** **and present** **danger of** **harm to** **others. Id.** **at*****9 (relying** **on Commonwealth** **v. Helms,** **506 A.2d** **1384, 1388** **(Pa. Super.** **1986)). Further,** **Judge Lazarus** **found the** **evidence was** **sufficient to** **prove B.W.** **committed an** **act in** **furtherance of** **his threat** **to his** **coworker because** **in his** **statements "he** **identified a** **co-worker as** **his target** **and had** **chosen strangulation** **as the** **means by** **which he** **intended to** **kill that** **target[, and]** **physicians found** **B.W.'s threats** **credible." Id.** **at*****10. Applying** **Vencil, Judge** **Lazarus concluded** **that the** **evidence known** **by the** **physicians at** **the time** **of the** **involuntary commitment** **was sufficient** **to support** **their conclusions** **that an** **involuntary commitment** **was medically** **necessary. Id.** **III. ISSUE** **AND STANDARD** **OF REVIEW** **This Court** **granted DSS's** **petition for** **allowance of** **appeal to** **consider the** **following issue:** **Whether the** **development of** **a plan** **satisfies the** **requirement for** **an act** **in furtherance** **of a** **threat to** **kill a** **co-worker for** **purposes of** **an involuntary** **commitment under** **§ 302** **of the** **Mental Health** **Procedures Act?** **In re** **B. W.,** **235 A.3d** **272 (Pa.** **2020) (per** **curiam). Generally,** **this issue** **presents a** **question of** **law, over** **which our** **standard of** **review is** **de novo** **and our** **scope of** **review is** **plenary. Vencil,** **152 A.3d** **at 241.** **Additionally, given** **that we** **are reviewing** **a Section** **6111.1(g)(2) expungement** **ruling, we** **are limited** **to considering** **the evidence** **the physician** **knew at** **the time** **of the** **302 commitment.** **Id. at** **242. Further,** **as this** **issue presents** **a question** **of statutory** **interpretation, we** **note that** **in construing** **a statute,** **we must** **give effect** **to the** **legislature's intent** **and give** **effect to** **all of** **the statute's** **provisions. 1** **Pa.C.S. §** **1921(a). The** **plain language** **of the** **statute is** **the PSP** **filed a** **notice of** **joinder to** **DSS's petition** **for allowance** **of appeal,** **and following** **the grant** **of the** **petition, our** **prothonotary deemed** **both DSS** **and PSP** **as the** **appellants. [J-94-2020]** **- 10** **best indication** **of the** **legislature's intent.** **Crown Castle** **NG E.** **LLC v.** **Pa. Pub.** **Util. Comm'n,** **234 A.3d** **665, 674** **(Pa. 2020).** **To discern** **the plain** **meaning of** **a statute,** **we consider** **the operative** **statutory language** **in context** **and give** **words and** **phrases their** **common and** **approved usage.** **Id. Courts** **must give** **effect to** **a clear** **and unambiguous** **statute and** **cannot disregard** **the statute's** **plain meaning** **to implement** **its objectives.** **/d. "Only** **if the** **statute is** **ambiguous, and** **not explicit,** **do we** **resort to** **other means** **of discerning** **legislative intent."** **Matter of** **Private Sale** **of Prop.** **by Millcreek** **Twp. Sch.** **Dist., 185** **A.3d 282,** **291 (Pa.** **2018). IV.** **ACTS IN** **FURTHERANCE OF** **THE THREAT** **TO COMMIT** **HARM TO** **OTHERS A.** **PARTIES' ARGUMENTS** **The PSP** **argues that** **the plain** **language of** **Section 301(b)(1)** **does not** **require the** **showing of** **an "act** **in furtherance"** **for all** **involuntary commitments** **based on** **a clear** **and present** **danger to** **others. PSP's** **Brief at** **13. Echoing** **Judge Lazarus's** **dissent, the** **PSP stresses** **that the** **operative sentence** **of Section** **301(b)(1) states** **that "a** **clear and** **present danger** **of harm** **to others** **may be** **demonstrated by** **proof that** **the person** **has made** **threats of** **harm and** **has committed** **acts in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to commit** **harm." Id.** **(quoting 50** **P.S. §** **7301(b)(1) (emphasis** **added)). The** **Superior Court** **erred in** **holding that** **acts in** **furtherance are** **required in** **all cases,** **according to** **the PSP,** **because such** **an interpretation** **renders the** **legislature's use** **of the** **word "may"** **mere surplusage.** **Id. at** **14 (citing** **1 Pa.C.S.** **§ 1921(b);** **Helms, 506** **A.2d at** **1388 (observing** **the "threats** **and acts"** **formula may,** **not must,** **be used** **to demonstrate** **a clear** **and present** **danger)). Instead,** **the PSP** **contends that** **B.W.'s plan** **to strangle** **his coworker** **established a** **"clear and** **present danger"** **to another** **person, as** **three examining** **physicians found.** **Id. at** **15. DSS** **does not** **pursue this** **argument in** **its brief.** **[J-94-2020] -** **11 Moreover,** **DSS and** **the PSP** **contend we** **should reverse** **the Superior** **Court's decision** **because B.W.'s** **development and** **completion of** **a detailed** **plan to** **strangle his** **coworker to** **death the** **next time** **he saw** **him constitutes** **an "act** **in furtherance"** **under Section** **301. DSS's** **Brief at** **6; PSP's** **Brief at** **5. DSS** **points to** **court cases** **construing the** **"act in** **furtherance" requirement** **of the** **Section 301** **criteria for** **showing a** **person is** **a clear** **and present** **danger to** **others, 50** **P. S.** **§ 301(b)(1),** **or a** **clear and** **present danger** **to himself** **or herself,** **50 P.S.** **§ 301(b)(2)(i)-(ii),** **as consisting** **of both** **tangible and** **intangible actions.** **DSS's Brief** **at 8-9.** **DSS argues** **that the** **Superior Court's** **holding that** **B.W.'s complete** **plan to** **harm another** **did not** **constitute an** **act in** **furtherance is** **inconsistent with** **this precedent** **and the** **plain language** **of Section** **301, which** **DSS interprets** **as requiring** **only that** **"the subject** **of an** **involuntary commitment** **will have** **done something** **to advance** **the threat** **of harm** **to himself** **or others."** **Id. at** **10. The** **PSP contends** **that B.W.'s** **"specific and** **detailed plan** **itself was** **a sufficient** **act in** **furtherance to** **justify the** **commitment, particularly** **when the** **[Superior Court]** **was required** **to give** **deference to** **the committing** **physician pursuant** **to this** **Court's decision** **in [Vend[)."** **PSP's Brief** **at 7.** **Emphasizing the** **deference courts** **must give** **to the** **examining physicians** **under Vencil,** **the PSP** **stresses that** **the three** **physicians in** **this case** **deemed B.W.'s** **homicidal threats** **credible and** **warranting involuntary** **examination and** **treatment. Id.** **at 11.** **DSS maintains** **the plain** **language of** **Section 301** **does not** **require the** **act in** **furtherance to** **be overt** **or tangible** **for two** **reasons. DSS's** **Brief at** **11-13. First,** **DSS notes** **that unlike** **the Pennsylvania** **Crimes Code's** **requirement for** **proof of** **an "overt** **act in** **pursuance" of** **a conspiracy,** **18 Pa.C.S.** **§ 903(e),** **Section 301(b)(1)** **requires "acts** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat." Id.** **at 12.** **The lack** **of an** **adjective modifying** **"acts in** **furtherance" in** **Section 301,** **according to** **DSS, suggests** **the legislature** **knowingly avoided** **the requirement** **of an** **overt act.** **Id. (citing** **Bowers v.** **Pa. Labor** **Relations Bd.,** **[J-94-2020] -** **12 167** **A.2d 480,** **487 (Pa.** **1961) (stating** **similar language** **in different** **statutes requires** **the same** **construction)). Second,** **DSS posits** **that requiring** **an overt** **act would** **conflict with** **the stated** **intent of** **the MHPA** **to protect** **the safety** **of the** **patient and** **others. Id.** **at 12-13.** **DSS compares** **this case** **to In** **re Woodside,** **699 A.2d** **1293 (Pa.** **Super. 1997),** **in which** **the court** **concluded that** **a person** **committed an** **act in** **furtherance of** **a threat** **when he** **purchased a** **rifle scope** **after stating** **he "might** **as well** **get a** **rifle and** **scope and** **get rid** **of my** **problem. The** **problem being** **my soon** **to be** **ex-wife." Woodside,** **699 A.2d** **at 1294.** **DSS contends** **the only** **difference between** **this case** **and Woodside** **is that** **the plan** **in Woodside** **involved a** **weapon while** **the plan** **in this** **case involved** **the use** **of B.W.'s** **hands, which** **DSS maintains** **is "a** **distinction without** **a difference** **that would** **produce an** **absurd result** **if allowed."** **DSS's Brief** **at 13.** **Further, DSS** **analogizes this** **case to** **In re** **R.F., 914** **A.2d 907** **(Pa. Super.** **2006), which** **found that** **the patient's** **internet research** **of painless** **ways to** **commit suicide** **was an** **act in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to harm** **himself. R.F.,** **914 A.2d** **at 915.** **DSS emphasizes** **that "B.W.** **made a** **threat and** **had a** **plan that** **only needed** **the appearance** **of the** **intended victim** **for completion."** **DSS's Brief** **at 14;** **see also** **PSP's Brief** **at 9** **(analogizing this** **case to** **R.F. and** **arguing the** **totality of** **the circumstances** **coupled with** **deference to** **the physicians'** **findings "coalesce** **into sufficient** **evidence"). Similarly,** **the PSP** **argues the** **interpretation that** **a specific** **plan constitutes** **an act** **in furtherance** **is necessary** **to avoid** **the absurd** **result that** **a physician** **cannot involuntarily** **commit a** **person who** **has articulated** **a clear** **and detailed** **plan until** **the person** **takes a** **step to** **carry out** **the plan.** **PSP's Brief** **at 12** **(citing 1** **Pa.C.S. §** **1922(1) (stating** **"the General** **Assembly does** **not intend** **a result** **that is** **absurd, impossible** **of execution** **or unreasonable.** 

### ").**The PSP** **states this** **result is** **inconsistent with** **the legislative** **intent of** **the MHPA,** **which is** **to help** **those in** **crisis and** **protect the** **public. Id.** **at 13.** **The PSP** **also [J-94-2020]** **- 13** **notes that** **its interpretation** **of Section** **301 does** **not render** **mere threats** **sufficient to** **support an** **involuntary commitment,** **but it** **"gives a** **physician, who** **in their** **expert medical** **opinion believes** **that a** **threat that** **is accompanied** **with specific** **details and** **planning is** **credible, the** **ability to** **meaningfully act."** **Id. at** **12-13 n.3.** **Accordingly, DSS** **and the** **PSP maintain** **we should** **reverse the** **Superior Court's** **decision. DSS's** **Brief at** **14; PSP's** **Brief at** **16. In** **contrast, B.W.** **argues we** **should affirm** **the Superior** **Court. B.W.** **agrees with** **DSS and** **the PSP** **that the** **"development of** **a plan** **could satisfy** **the act** **in furtherance** **of a** **threat to** **kill a** **co-worker for** **purposes of** **an involuntary** **commitment under** **§302 of** **the [MHPA],"** **but B.W.** **argues the** **evidence did** **not show** **that B.W.** **had developed** **a plan** **to harm** **his coworker.** **B.W.'s Brief** **at 5.** **To support** **his position** **that he** **did not** **have a** **plan, B.W.** **relies exclusively** **on facts** **developed at** **the January** **4, 2019** **trial court** **hearing and** **characterizes his** **statements to** **the physicians** **as "blowing** **off steam"** **and "just** **words." Id.** **at 6.** **Like the** **Superior Court** **majority, B.W.** **relies principally** **on K.M.** **in support** **of his** **position that** **"[m]aking a** **threat to** **the doctor** **concerning another** **and indicating** **that he** **would carry** **out said** **threat next** **time he** **saw the** **co-worker is** **not a** **specific plan,** **nor an** **explicit plan** **of how** **he would** **harm the** **co-worker." Id.** **at 8.** **Ultimately, B.W.** **"agrees if** **there were** **an exact** **plan, then** **that could** **be considered** **an act** **in furtherance[,]"** **but there** **was no** **such plan** **in this** **case. Id.** **at 10.** **Accordingly, B.W.** **maintains we** **should affirm** **the Superior** **Court's decision** **that the** **record of** **his involuntary** **commitment should** **be expunged.** **Id. at** **10-11. B.** **ANALYSIS We** **first address** **the threshold** **issue the** **PSP raises** **of whether** **Section 301(b)(1)** **requires proof** **of an** **act in** **furtherance. Based** **on the** **plain language** **of Section** **301(b)(1), we** **conclude that** **when an** **involuntary commitment** **is based** **on the** **"threat and** **act" [J-94-2020]** **- 14** **formulation, both** **a threat** **and an** **act in** **furtherance must** **be proven.** **Section 301(a)** **provides that** **a person** **may be** **involuntarily examined** **and committed** **if the** **person is** **severely mentally** **disabled, meaning** **the person** **is "a** **clear and** **present danger** **of harm** **to others** **or to** **himself." 50** **P.S. §** **7301(a). Section** **301(b)(1) lists** **the criteria** **for determining** **a person** **is a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others** **as follows:** **(b) Determination** **of Clear** **and Present** **Danger. --(1)** **Clear and** **present danger** **to others** **shall be** **shown by** **establishing that** **within the** **past 30** **days the** **person has** **inflicted or** **attempted to** **inflict serious** **bodily harm** **on another** **and that** **there is** **a reasonable** **probability that** **such conduct** **will be** **repeated. If,** **however, the** **person has** **been found** **incompetent to** **be tried** **or has** **been acquitted** **by reason** **of lack** **of criminal** **responsibility on** **charges arising** **from conduct** **involving infliction** **of or** **attempt to** **inflict substantial** **bodily harm** **on another,** **such 30-day** **limitation shall** **not apply** **so long** **as an** **application for** **examination and** **treatment is** **filed within** **30 days** **after the** **date of** **such determination** **or verdict.** **In such** **case, a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others** **may be** **shown by** **establishing that** **the conduct** **charged in** **the criminal** **proceeding did** **occur, and** **that there** **is a** **reasonable probability** **that such** **conduct will** **be repeated.** **For the** **purpose of** **this section,** **a clear** **and present** **danger of** **harm to** **others may** **be demonstrated** **by proof** **that the** **person has** **made threats** **of harm** **and has** **committed acts** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm.** **50 P.S.** **§ 7301(b)(1).** **From a** **plain reading** **of Section** **301(b)(1), there** **are three** **alternative formulations** **of a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others:** **(1) the** **person has** **inflicted, or** **attempted to** **inflict, serious** **bodily harm** **on another** **in the** **past 30** **days and** **there is** **a reasonable** **probability the** **person will** **repeat that** **conduct; (2)** **the person** **has been** **found incompetent** **to stand** **trial or** **acquitted due** **to lack** **of criminal** **responsibility of** **charges of** **inflicting, or** **attempting to** **inflict, serious** **bodily harm** **on another,** **and the** **petition establishes** **the charged** **conduct occurred** **and a** **probability it** **will be** **repeated; or** **(3) "the** **person has** **made threats** **of harm** **and has** **committed acts** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm."** **Id. [J-94-2020]** **- 15** **Relying on** **Helms, the** **PSP, like** **Judge Lazarus's** **dissenting memorandum,** **contend that** **an act** **in furtherance** **is not** **required because** **the last** **sentence of** **Section 301(b)(1)** **uses the** **word "may"** **instead of** **"shall" or** **"must." PSP's** **Brief at** **14 (quoting** **In re** **B.W., 2019** **WL 5682614,** **at*****9 (Lazarus,** **J., dissenting)).** **This reliance** **on Helms,** **however, is** **misplaced because** **Helms recognized** **Section 301(b)(1)** **sets forth** **alternative ways** **to show** **a person** **is a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others.** **In Helms,** **Helms killed** **his next-door** **neighbor, but** **was acquitted** **at his** **criminal trial** **based on** **the finding** **of a** **lack of** **criminal responsibility** **under MHPA** **Section 404,** **50 P.S.** **§ 7404.** **Helms, 506** **A.2d at** **1386. However,** **the trial** **court also** **found Helms** **was severely** **mentally disabled** **and committed** **him involuntarily** **to a** **state hospital** **under MHPA** **Sections 304(g)(2)** **and 305.** **Id. Helms** **was involuntarily** **recommitted four** **times, and** **he challenged** **the sufficiency** **of his** **fourth recommitment** **on the** **grounds that** **the petition** **did not** **show he** **was a** **"clear and** **present danger"** **to others.** **Id. at** **1386-87. The** **Superior Court** **concluded that** **the Section** **301(b)(1) formulation** **of "clear** **and present** **danger" to** **others contained** **alternative methods** **to make** **such a** **showing. Id.** **at 1388.** **Specifically, the** **court explained** **that the** **last sentence** **of Section** **301(b)(1), containing** **the "'threats** **and acts'** **formula may,** **not must,** **be used** **to demonstrate** **dangerousness." Id.** **(emphasis in** **original). The** **court based** **its statement** **that "threats** **and acts"** **are not** **always required** **on the** **preceding portion** **of Section** **301(b)(1), which** **"contains an** **alternative method** **for showing** **clear and** **present danger** **which applies** **specifically to** **insanity acquittees** **who are** **the subjects** **of petitions** **for involuntary** **commitment[,]" namely** **that "(1)** **the conduct** **that led** **to the** **criminal proceedings** **occurred; and** **(2) that** **there is** **a reasonable** **probability that** **it will** **occur again."** **Id. Significantly,** **the court** **did not** **offer a** **further interpretation** **of the** **"threats and** **acts" requirement** **or opine** **that acts** **in furtherance** **were not** **required under** **that requirement.** **Instead, the** **court held** **that the** **record showed** **a reasonable** **[J-94-2020] -** **16 probability** **that Helms** **would act** **violently again** **without treatment,** **which met** **the Section** **301(b)(1) "insanity** **acquittees" formulation** **of clear** **and present** **danger to** **others. Id.** **at 1390.** **Thus, Helms** **is consistent** **with our** **interpretation that** **Section 301(b)(1)** **contains three** **alternative ways** **to show** **a person** **is a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others.** **Further, we** **conclude that** **when the** **involuntary commitment** **is based** **upon the** **third means** **to show** **a clear** **and present** **danger in** **Section 301(b)(1),** **i.e., the** **"threats and** **acts" formulation,** **both a** **threat and** **an act** **in furtherance** **must be** **proven. This** **is clear** **from the** **plain language** **of the** **pertinent portion** **of Section** **301(b)(1), which** **states "[f]or** **the purpose** **of this** **section, a** **clear and** **present danger** **of harm** **to others** **may be** **demonstrated by** **proof that** **the person** **has made** **threats of** **harm and** **has committed** **acts in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to commit** **harm." 50** **P.S. §** **7301(b)(1). First,** **reading Section** **301(b)(1) as** **a whole,** **we disagree** **with the** **significance the** **PSP attaches** **to its** **use of** **the word** **"may" because** **such a** **reading ignores** **the context** **of Section** **301(b)(1). The** **first sentence** **of Section** **301(b)(1) provides** **that a** **"clear and** **present danger** **to others** **shall be** **shown" by** **proving serious** **bodily harm** **and a** **reasonable probability** **of recurrence.** **Id. (emphasis** **added). Its** **third sentence** **then provides** **that "a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others** **may be** **shown" for** **those who** **are incompetent** **to stand** **trial or** **those who** **have been** **acquitted for** **a lack** **of responsibility.** **Id. (emphasis** **added). Lastly,** **its fourth** **sentence provides** **that "a** **clear and** **present danger** **of harm** **to others** **may be** **demonstrated by** **proof' of** **threats of** **harm and** **acts in** **furtherance. Id.** **(emphasis added).** **Viewing Section** **301(b)(1) as** **a whole,** **it is** **clear the** **legislature used** **the word** **"may" to** **express alternative** **possibilities for** **showing a** **clear and** **present danger** **if the** **serious bodily** **harm formulation** **cannot be** **met. See** **Vencil, 152** **A.3d at** **244 ("[i]n** **determining legislative** **intent, '[s]ections** **of a** **statute must** **be read** **together and** **in conjunction** **with each** **other, and** **construed with** **reference to** **the entire** **[J-94-2020] -** **17 statute."')** **(quoting Bd.** **of Revision** **of Taxes,** **City of** **Phila. v.** **City of** **Phila., 4** **A.3d 610,** **622 (Pa.** **2010)). Our** **interpretation is** **consistent with** **the Helms** **Court's conclusion** **that Section** **301(b)(1) contains** **alternative means** **to show** **that a** **person is** **a clear** **and present** **danger to** **others. See** **Helms, 506** **A.2d at** **1388. Second,** **Section 301(b)(1)** **is clear** **that the** **proof required** **to meet** **the "threats** **and acts"** **formulation is** **"proof that** **the person** **has made** **threats of** **harm and** **has committed** **acts in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to commit** **harm." 50** **P.S. §** **7301(b)(1) (emphasis** **added). The** **use of** **the conjunction** **"and" to** **connect threats** **and acts** **in furtherance** **makes it** **clear that** **both are** **required elements** **of proof.** **The PSP's** **disjunctive reading** **that a** **clear and** **present danger** **can be** **shown by** **threats alone** **is inconsistent** **with the** **statutory language.** **Additionally, the** **phrasing "has** **committed acts** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm"** **is clearly** **referring back** **to the** **previous phrase** **"the person** **has made** **threats of** **harm," showing** **that the** **two phrases** **are connected** **and dependent,** **not independent** **requirements. Id.** **Finally, the** **PSP's reading** **of this** **sentence as** **requiring a** **showing of** **only a** **threat of** **harm would** **render meaningless** **and superfluous** **the acts** **in furtherance** **language, which** **is contrary** **to the** **basic tenants** **of statutory** **construction. See** **1 Pa.C.S.** **§ 1921(a)** **(requiring courts** **to aim** **to give** **effect to** **all of** **a statute's** **provisions); Commonwealth** **v. Ostrosky,** **909 A.2d** **1224, 1232** **(Pa. 2006)** **(noting the** **legislature is** **"presumed not** **to intend** **any statutory** **language to** **exist as** **mere surplusage").** **Accordingly, we** **conclude that** **when an** **involuntary commitment** **is based** **on Section** **301(b)(1)'s threats** **and acts** **formulation, both** **a threat** **of harm** **to others** **and an** **act in** **furtherance of** **that threat** **must be** **proven.' To** **be clear,** **we do** **not hold** **that under** **Section 301(b)(1)** **an act** **in furtherance** **of a** **threat to** **harm another** **person must** **be shown** **for all** **involuntary commitments.** **Accord Helms,** **506 A.2d** **at 1388.** **[J-94-2020] -** **18 Having** **concluded that** **proof of** **an act** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm** **was necessary,** **we now** **turn to** **the issue** **of whether** **B.W.'s communication** **of his** **plan to** **strangle his** **coworker the** **next time** **he saw** **him was** **sufficient to** **prove B.W.** **committed an** **act in** **furtherance. We** **conclude that** **the articulation** **of a** **specific plan** **to harm** **an identified** **target that** **is deemed** **credible by** **medical professionals** **is sufficient** **to prove** **an act** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm.** **As noted** **above, Section** **301 contains** **criteria for** **when a** **person is** **a clear** **and present** **danger to** **oneself or** **another. Section** **301(b)(2)(ii) contains** **a parallel** **requirement for** **an involuntary** **commitment based** **on a** **threat to** **commit suicide** **and acts** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat. 50** **P.S. §** **7301(b)(2)(ii). The** **Superior Court** **has held** **that a** **person who** **has developed** **a complete** **plan, or** **taken steps** **to develop** **a plan,** **to commit** **suicide "has** **committed acts** **which are** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit suicide[.]"** **See id.** **In Appeal** **of H.D.,** **698 A.2d** **90 (Pa.** **Super. 1997),** **the court** **concluded H.D.'s** **plan to** **jump off** **a bridge** **was sufficient** **to support** **her 302** **commitment and** **rejected H.D.'s** **characterization of** **her statement** **as a** **mere suicidal** **"idea" that** **did not** **establish intent.** **H.D., 698** **A.2d at** **94 n.4.** **The court** **explained "[a]fter** **a thorough** **review of** **the record,** **we refuse** **to second-guess** **the conclusion** **of the** **emergency medical** **and mental** **health professionals** **that H.D.** **presented a** **clear and** **present danger** **of harm** **to herself."** **Id. Moreover,** **the Superior** **Court has** **held that** **engaging in** **the planning** **process constitutes** **an act** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit suicide.** **See In** **re R.F.,** **914 A.2d** **907, 915-16** **(Pa. Super.** **2006); Commonwealth** **v. Smerconish,** **112 A.3d** **1260, 1264** **(Pa. Super.** **2015). In** **R.F., the** **Superior Court** **affirmed the** **trial court's** **order denying** **R.F.'s petition** **to expunge** **because there** **was sufficient** **evidence to** **support the** **initial 302** **commitment. R.F.,** **914 A.2d** **at 908.** **The court** **rejected R.F.'s** **argument that** **he had** **not taken** **an "affirmative** **action" to** **commit suicide** **and concluded** **R.F. was** **a clear** **and [J-94-2020]** **- 19** **present danger** **to himself** **because he** **had "used** **the internet** **to access** **ways to** **commit suicide,** **and he** **phoned a** **suicide hotline** **to gather** **further information** **on the** **subject, which** **we find** **coalesce to** **constitute proof** **in furtherance** **of [R.F.'s]** **suicidal ideation."** **Id. at** **914. Similarly,** **in Smerconish,** **the Superior** **Court affirmed** **the trial** **court's order** **denying Smerconish's** **petition to** **expunge because** **there was** **sufficient evidence** **of his** **suicide threat** **and an** **act in** **furtherance. Smerconish,** **112 A.3d** **at 1264.** **Smerconish sent** **his sister** **12 instant** **messages threatening** **suicide and** **stating he** **was searching** **for painless** **ways to** **kill himself,** **which the** **Superior Court** **found showed** **he was** **severely mentally** **disabled and** **in need** **of treatment.** **Id. at** **1263-64. Additionally,** **the court** **held that** **"[h]is online** **research seeking** **painless methods** **of committing** **suicide constituted** **an act** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat to** **commit harm."** **Id. at** **1264. From** **these cases,** **it is** **clear that** **engaging in** **the planning** **process by** **conducting research** **or expressing** **a detailed** **plan constitute** **acts in** **furtherance of** **a threat** **under the** **MHPA. We** **see no** **reason to** **construe the** **"acts in** **furtherance" requirement** **of Section** **301(b)(1) differently** **from that** **requirement in** **Section 301(b)(2)(ii).** **See Ratzlaf** **V. U.S.,** **510 U.S.** **135, 143** **(1994) ("[a]** **term appearing** **in several** **places in** **a statutory** **text is** **generally read** **the same** **way each** **time it** **appears.**

### ").**Even B.W.** **concedes that** **the development** **of an** **exact plan** **to harm** **another person** **is sufficient** **to show** **an act** **in furtherance** **of a** **threat for** **a 302** **commitment. B.W.'s** **Brief at** **5, 10.** **B.W. articulated** **to his** **physician a** **developed, specific** **plan to** **kill his** **coworker, whom** **he identified,** **by strangling** **him the** **next time** **he saw** **him. This** **plan was** **fully-formed as** **it detailed** **the named** **target of** **the threat,** **the method** **of carrying** **out the** **threat of** **harm, and** **the imminence** **of the** **threat. Concluding** **that B.W.'s** **plan to** **strangle his** **coworker is** **an act** **in furtherance** **is consistent** **with H.D.,** **in which** **the court** **held a** **plan to** **jump off** **a bridge** **was an** **act in** **furtherance. See** **H.D., 698** **A.2d at** **94 n.4.** **Further, our** **conclusion that** **a [J-94-2020]** **- 20** **fully-developed plan** **to harm** **another is** **supported by** **R.F. and** **Smerconish, both** **of which** **held that** **conducting research** **to develop** **a final** **plan of** **how to** **commit harm** **was an** **act in** **furtherance under** **the MHPA.** **See In** **re R.F.,** **914 A.2d** **907, 915-16** **(Pa. Super.** **2006); Commonwealth** **v. Smerconish,** **112 A.3d** **1260, 1264** **(Pa. Super.** **2015). Significantly,** **the three** **physicians who** **treated B.W.** **found his** **threats credible** **and determined** **he was** **in need** **of immediate** **treatment. Pursuant** **to Vencil,** **we accord** **deference to** **the physicians,** **"as the** **physician examined** **and evaluated** **the individual** **in the** **first instance,** **was able** **to observe** **his or** **her demeanor,** **and has** **particularized training,** **knowledge and** **experience regarding** **whether a** **302 commitment** **is medically** **necessary." Vencil,** **152 A.3d** **at 246;** **see also** **H.D., 698** **A.2d at** **94 n.4** **(refusing to** **question the** **medical professionals'** **conclusions). The** **Superior Court's** **holding that** **B.W.'s actions** **constituted a** **mere threat** **without an** **act in** **furtherance was** **inconsistent with** **this precedent** **that the** **acts of** **planning and** **communicating a** **developed plan** **to medical** **professionals is** **an act** **in furtherance.** **Moreover, the** **Superior Court** **seemingly read** **into Section** **301 the** **requirement that** **an act** **in furtherance** **under the** **MHPA must** **be overt** **or tangible.** **However, the** **plain language** **of Section** **301 does** **not contain** **such a** **requirement. Compare** **50 P.S.** **§ 7301(b)(1)** **(stating a** **person is** **a clear** **and present** **danger to** **others if** **"the person** **has made** **threats of** **harm and** **has committed** **acts in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to commit** **harm), 50** **P.S. §** **7301(b)(2)(ii) (providing** **a person** **is a** **clear and** **present danger** **to oneself** **if "the** **person has** **made threats** **to commit** **suicide and** **has committed** **acts which** **are in** **furtherance of** **the threat** **to commit** **suicide), 50** **P.S. §** **7301(b)(2)(iii) (stating** **the same** **requirements for** **proving self-mutilation),** **with 18** **Pa.C.S. §** **903(e) (requiring** **proof of** **an "overt** **act in** **pursuance" for** **a criminal** **conspiracy). Because** **the plain** **language of** **the MHPA** **does not** **require an** **overt act** **in furtherance** **of the** **threat, we** **decline to** **read [J-94-2020]** **- 21** **such a** **requirement into** **the statute.** **See Sivick** **v. State** **Ethics Comm'n,** **238 A.3d** **1250, 1264** **(Pa. 2020)** **(explaining that** **a court** **cannot add** **language to** **a statute** **in its** **interpretation of** **the plain** **language). V.** **CONCLUSION For** **these reasons,** **we conclude** **that the** **record contains** **sufficient evidence** **to show** **that B.W.** **was a** **clear and** **present danger** **to others** **at the** **time of** **the 302** **commitment as** **the physicians'** **found he** **made a** **threat to** **harm another** **and committed** **acts in** **furtherance of** **that threat.** **Accordingly, we** **reverse the** **Superior Court's** **order that** **the medical** **records of** **B.W.'s 302** **commitment be** **expunged and** **destroyed. Order** **reversed. Jurisdiction** **relinquished. Chief** **Justice Baer** **and Justices** **Donohue, Dougherty** **and Wecht** **join the** **opinion. Justice** **Todd files** **a concurring** **and dissenting** **opinion in** **which Justice** **Saylor joins.** **[J-94 -2020]** **- 22**