DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOHN POWERS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-2934

[April 14, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Mariya Weekes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-7743-CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

Appellant John Powers appeals his fifteen-year sentence for Driving 

Under the Influence (“DUI”) Manslaughter—Unlawful Blood Alcohol Level 

(“UBAL”), arising out of a resentencing hearing. Principally, Appellant 

asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in imposing a fifteen-year sentence 

without a probationary component and (2) Appellant’s judgment contains 

an error with respect to listing two subsections of section 316.193, Florida 

Statutes, as his offense statute numbers.1 

We find merit in both of these arguments, and thus reverse and remand 

for a de novo resentencing, with instructions to the trial court to correct 

the error in Appellant’s judgment and to fashion a sentence that complies 

with the pertinent statutes, as discussed below.

Background

1 The third issue raised in the appeal was not properly preserved for appellate 

review.
2

Appellant was charged by Information with one Count of DUI 

Manslaughter under sections 316.193(1)(a) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a., 

Florida Statutes (“Count 1”), and one count of DUI Manslaughter—UBAL 

under sections 316.193(1)(b) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a., Florida Statutes 

(“Count 2”). Appellant pled guilty on both counts, however the trial court 

dismissed Count 1 due to double jeopardy implications. 

Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty on Count 2, 

sentencing him to eleven years in prison, followed by two years of 

community control, and then two years of probation. Despite the 

Information charging Appellant under sections 316.193(1)(b) and 

316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a. for Count 2, Appellant’s written judgment listed his 

offense statute numbers as those charged under Count 1—sections 

316.193(1)(a) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a.

Appellant subsequently appealed his judgment and sentence, raising 

six issues on appeal. Powers v. State, 260 So. 3d 318, 319–320 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2018). Relevant for purposes of the instant appeal, Appellant argued 

that the trial court erred in considering a scoresheet containing improper 

prior record points and that the trial court made “a scrivener’s error in the 

written judgment regarding the offense statute number.” Id. Based on the 

trial court’s consideration of a scoresheet with improper prior record 

points, this court reversed and remanded for a de novo resentencing. Id.

at 322. 

As to the “scrivener’s error in the written judgment regarding the 

offense statute number,” the State conceded error. Id. at 320. However, 

rather than going into detail on the issue, our opinion merely expressed 

our “trust [that] the trial court w[ould] not commit the same error[] upon 

resentencing.” Id. at 322. Accordingly, the opinion did not address the 

“offense statute number” issue to the extent that Appellant now argues 

that inclusion of section 316.193(1) on his written judgment is improper, 

or his alternative argument that, if the inclusion of section 316.193(1) is 

proper, there should be a reference to section 316.193(1)(b) and not 

316.193(1)(a).

Subsequently, Appellant appeared before a different trial court judge

for a de novo resentencing hearing, wherein the State presented an 

updated scoresheet that removed all prior record points. Following the 

presentation of testimony from the victim’s family as to the impact of 

Appellant’s actions, defense counsel requested that the trial court 

sentence Appellant to seven years in prison, followed by either three or 

four years of probation, “along with whatever DUI mandatory minimums 

there are pursuant to the statute.” The State, in turn, requested that the 
3

trial court sentence Appellant to thirteen years in prison, followed by two 

years of probation, with a four-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen years in prison with a 

four-year mandatory minimum sentence. Despite the requests of both 

parties, the trial court did not impose probation as the predecessor judge

had done during Appellant’s initial sentencing. Moreover, the trial court 

did not enter a corrected written judgment.

Appellant timely appealed his fifteen-year sentence. While this appeal 

was pending, Appellant filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Errors, 

asserting once more that the written judgment contained a “scrivener’s 

error” and that his written judgment should only have listed section 

316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a. Appellant also filed an Amended Second Motion to 

Correct Sentencing Errors, asserting that his sentence lacked a 

probationary component. Both motions were deemed denied through the 

passage of time. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B). Thus, Appellant now 

seeks our review of both his sentence and the denial of his rule 3.800(b)(2) 

motions.

Analysis

“The standard of review for a motion to correct a sentencing error is de 

novo.” Terry v. State, 263 So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing 

Willard v. State, 22 So. 3d 864, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). We also review 

issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 

106 (Fla. 2008).

A. Probationary Component

Section 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a., Florida Statutes (2011), provides that a 

person who violates subsection (1), operates a vehicle, and causes the 

death of another by operation of such, commits “[a] felony of the second 

degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.” 

Section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2011), further provides that the 

maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is “a term of imprisonment 

of 15 years.”2 However, when a defendant is convicted under section 

316.193, “[t]he court shall place all offenders convicted of violating [that 

statute] on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a 

substance abuse course . . . .” § 316.193(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). 

Moreover, “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced to a term in prison followed by 

2 The statute has been subsequently amended and the applicable provision is 

currently § 775.082(3)(d). See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2020).
4

probation, the combined times must not exceed the statutory maximum.” 

Jackson v. State, 276 So. 3d 972, 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting 

Gonzales v. State, 816 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)).

 

When construing a statute, if “the plain language . . . is unambiguous 

and conveys a clear meaning, the statute must be given its obvious 

meaning.” McNeil v. State, 215 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 2017). If the statute is 

clear, “courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for 

legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain 

intent.” State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004).

Here, looking first at section 316.193(5)’s plain language, in fashioning 

a sentence for a person convicted under section 316.193 (as here), the 

court shall place this person on “monthly reporting probation” and shall

require this person to complete a substance abuse course. § 316.193(5), 

Fla. Stat. (2011). However, the State argues an apparent conflict exists 

between section 316.193(5)’s two requirements, on the one hand, and the 

general sentencing statute—section 775.082—referenced within section 

316.193(3), which provides for a maximum sentence of fifteen years’ 

imprisonment. The State asserts that because section 775.082 allows a 

defendant to be sentenced up to fifteen years for a felony of the second 

degree, and because the Legislature has signaled its intent to give a trial 

court the authority to sentence a defendant “up to and including the 

statutory maximum for any offense[,]” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2011), 

statutory construction is warranted.

Even looking beyond the plain language and applying statutory 

construction principles, the law disfavors the State’s argument. Statutory 

provisions must “be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and where 

possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and 

construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” 

Larimore, 2 So. 3d at 106 (internal alterations and quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 

2007)). Further, “a specific statute covering a particular subject area 

always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in 

more general terms.” McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994).

Here, it is undisputed that Appellant’s maximum sentence for DUI 

Manslaughter—UBAL was fifteen years pursuant to section 775.082(3)(c), 

Florida Statutes (2011). The trial court could easily have construed 

sections 316.193(5) and 775.082(3)(d) in harmony by simply sentencing 

Appellant to a prison term less than the statutory maximum of fifteen 

years and by providing for a probationary component, with the 

combination of time in prison and time on probation not exceeding fifteen 
5

years. Indeed, the predecessor judge imposed such a sentence at 

Appellant’s initial sentencing, and both Appellant and the State requested 

this at the resentencing hearing. Notably, this would have satisfied the 

additional rule of statutory construction that specific statutes control over 

general statutes. McKendry, 641 So. 2d at 46. This approach would also 

have complied with the requirement that a sentence split between prison 

and probation not exceed the statutory maximum. See Jackson, 276 So. 

3d at 973.

This court’s existing precedent is instructive. We have previously 

considered the interplay between section 316.193(3)’s reference to the 

general sentencing statute and section 316.193(5)’s probationary 

requirements. In McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), 

the defendant argued that “under section 316.193(3)(c)1., a conviction for 

DUI causing damage to property is punishable solely as provided in section 

775.082 and section 775.083[.]” Id. at 501. Despite section 775.082 

merely outlining a first-degree misdemeanor’s statutory maximum 

sentence, the McGhee court still held that section 316.193(5)’s mandatory 

probation and substance abuse course requirements were applicable to a 

conviction under section 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)1. Id. at 504 (“Subsection (5) 

requires probation and DUI school on any violation of section 316.193.”). 

Thus, we necessarily rejected the argument that section 316.193(3)’s 

sentencing parameters are solely provided by section 775.082.

Accordingly, we remand once again for de novo resentencing. The total 

sentence may not exceed fifteen years, and shall include a probationary 

period that, at a minimum, is of sufficient length to permit Appellant to 

complete a substance abuse course pursuant to section 316.193(5). 

We are cognizant that section 316.193(5)’s mandatory requirements

could be interpreted as preventing a trial court from ever sentencing a 

defendant to section 775.082’s maximum fifteen-year prison term, 

because those requirements necessitate the defendant being placed on 

probation for a sufficient length of time to complete a substance abuse 

course at the end of the defendant’s prison term. Because this issue is 

likely to recur, we certify the following question of great public importance 

to the Florida Supreme Court:

DOES SECTION 316.193(5)’S REQUIREMENTS OF 

“MONTHLY REPORTING PROBATION” AND COMPLETION OF 

A SUBSTANCE ABUSE COURSE VITIATE A TRIAL COURT’S 

DISCRETION TO IMPOSE THE MAXIMUM FIFTEEN-YEAR 

PRISON SENTENCE PROVIDED IN SECTION 775.082,

FLORIDA STATUTES?
6

B. Written Judgment

“DUI causing injury is not [a] mere enhancement of penalty for DUI, 

but a discrete crime.” McGhee, 847 So. 2d at 501 n.2 (citing Pulaski v. 

State, 540 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)). Indeed, a DUI conviction under 

section 316.193(1) is a lesser-included offense of DUI causing damage, 

serious bodily injury, or death. See Bribiesca-Tafolla v. State, 93 So. 3d 

364, 366–67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Collins v. State, 578 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 

4th DCA 1991), receded from on other grounds by Jackson v. State, 634 

So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“DUI is a lesser included offense of DUI 

manslaughter.”); § 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011) (including a 

violation of subsection (1) as an element of subsection (3)). A defendant 

may not “be convicted for violating both (1) and (3) [of section 316.193] as 

part of a single offense.” McGhee, 847 So. 2d at 501 n.2; see also Claps v. 

State, 971 So. 2d 131, 132–33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“mak[ing] explicit” that 

“a defendant may be charged and tried for both an offense and a 

necessarily lesser-included offense even though the defendant cannot 

ultimately be adjudicated and sentenced for both offenses due to the 

protections afforded by the prohibition against double jeopardy”).

In McGhee, we considered the differences between a conviction under 

section 316.193(1), and a conviction under section 316.193(3). In that 

case, the defendant—who was sentenced under sections

316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)1. and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.—challenged the following 

special conditions of probation: that he “pay a $250 fine, attend Level 1 

DUI school, perform fifty hours of community service, and have his car 

immobilized for ten days.” See id. at 499–500. 

In examining the special conditions’ propriety, we considered section 

316.193’s plain language. Id. at 501. We stated that section 316.193(5)’s 

requirement for probation and DUI school on any conviction under section

316.193, compared to section 316.193(6)’s requirement for additional 

probation requirements for a conviction under subsection (1), was a 

“variation in wording” that was “a distinction with a difference.” Id. 

McGhee therefore held that section 316.193(6)’s special conditions of 

probation—fifty hours of community service and immobilization of the 

defendant’s vehicle—were inapplicable to the defendant’s conviction under 

section 316.193(3). Id. at 504. Moreover, this court also held that section 

316.193(2)’s $250 fee was inapplicable, as section 316.193(2) also applied 

only to a conviction under 316.193(1). Id. at 502–04. However, because 

the defendant was convicted under section 316.193(3), we held that 

placing him on probation and imposing DUI school attendance was 
7

appropriate under section 316.193(5), which applied to any conviction 

under section 316.193. Id. at 501, 504. Thus, McGhee acknowledged that

a conviction under section 316.193(3) contains different penalties than a 

conviction under section 316.193(1).

In the instant case, Appellant was convicted under subsection (3) and 

not under subsection (1). Because McGhee made clear that an individual 

may not be convicted under both section 316.193(3) and section 

316.193(1), and because DUI manslaughter is a separate and distinct 

offense from regular DUI, we hold it was error not to grant Appellant’s 

3.800(b)(2) motions.3 We therefore instruct the trial court to remove the 

citation to section 316.193(1) on Appellant’s written judgment. See Hetrick 

v. State, 539 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (remanding for “correction of 

the offense statute number contained on the judgment to show the actual

crime for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced”).

Conclusion

The trial court erred in failing to sentence Appellant to probation under 

316.193(5), and in failing to correct Appellant’s written judgment. The 

trial court therefore further erred in not granting Appellant’s rule 

3.800(b)(2) motions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a de novo 

resentencing and instruct the trial court to enter an amended written 

judgment consistent with this opinion. “Importantly, however, the trial 

court is not required to recall witnesses or take additional testimony; it 

may take judicial notice of the record from the previous sentencing 

hearing.” Fain v. State, 308 So. 3d 190, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). We note 

that providing Appellant an opportunity to be present at the ensuing de 

novo resentencing is mandatory. See Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 339 

(Fla. 2014).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion; question of great public importance certified.

GERBER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

3 The State concedes error as to the citation of section 316.193(1)(a) instead of 

section 316.193(1)(b). However, the State argues citation to both 316.193(1)(b) 

and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a. is appropriate.