NO. 12-23-00278-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

KORWIN JERARD JONES, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

APPELLEE

§

§ 

§ 

APPEAL FROM THE 7TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Korwin Jerard Jones, appeals his conviction for continuous trafficking of 

persons. In two issues, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to dismiss the venire 

panel and failure to hold a hearing on his motion for new trial. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On January 5, 2023, Appellant was indicted for the offense of continuous trafficking of 

persons, alleged to have occurred on or about March 1, 2019 through March 15, 2022. The 

indictment alleged that over a period of greater than thirty days, Appellant “did knowingly 

traffic, by any means, [S.D.], a child younger than 18 years of age, and by any means caused 

[S.D] to engage in or become the victim of conduct prohibited by” various sections of the Texas 

Penal Code, including: (1) Section 43.02 – Prostitution; (2) Section 43.021 – Solicitation of 

Prostitution; (3) Section 43.03 – Promotion of Prostitution; (4) Section 43.031 – Online 

Promotion of Prostitution; (5) Section 43.05 – Compelling Prostitution; (6) Section 43.25 – 

Sexual Performance by a Child; (7) Section 21.11 – Indecency with a Child; and (8) Section 

22.022 – Sexual Assault of a Child. The indictment further alleged that Appellant “did 

knowingly receive a benefit from participating in a venture that involved the trafficking of 
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[S.D.], a child younger than 18 years of age, and the said victim caused [S.D.] to engage in and 

become the victim of conduct prohibited by” each of the same sections of the Penal Code. 

Finally, the indictment alleged that Appellant “did engage in sexual conduct with [S.D.], a child 

under 18 years of age, knowing [S.D.] had been trafficked and was engaged in, or was the victim 

of, conduct prohibited by Texas Penal Code Section 43.02 – Prostitution.”

During jury selection, counsel for the State stated, “This is the continuous sexual 

trafficking of children. Okay? So when we get into that—before I jump in, does anybody—”

Defense counsel objected, and the parties approached the bench, where the following 

conversation occurred:

DEFENSE: The allegation in the indictment is trafficking of a person continuous. It is not 

continuous trafficking of children.

STATE: It’s a person under 18. It’s a child.

COURT: All right. I didn’t see “child” listed in here. Indecency with a child. So some aspects. 

But he is correct on the -- how you phrase it. 

STATE: Okay.

COURT: I sustain the objection.

...

DEFENSE: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to admonish the panel of what your ruling was on 

that to correct them.

COURT: All right.

...

DEFENSE: Further, I would move to dismiss this panel because of what counsel has just done. I 

don’t believe that we can cure. But I would ask for the instruction to the panel.

COURT: Well, now, I’m going to – I sustained your objection.

DEFENSE: Yes, sir.

COURT: I told him to state it more correctly than he did.

DEFENSE: Yes, sir.

COURT: And I’m happy to instruct them to disregard the statement, ignore the statement. I’m not 

going to dismiss this panel.

DEFENSE: Understood.

COURT: And truth be known, there’s several of these paragraphs that talk about the victim being 

a child. ... So it’s kind of really close as to whether I need to tell them anything. But if 

you’re asking, I will do it.

COURT: (addressing the venire) All right. I’ve sustained the defense’s objection. You’ll 

disregard the last statement by -- made by counsel, and he’ll restate it again.

STATE: (addressing the venire) It’s an umbrella offense. It’s continuous trafficking of a person, 

and that offense has certain different predicate offenses underneath it. So there’s 

trafficking, and the manner and means by which someone traffics another person is listed 
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out. ... One of the things we have to prove is that the victim in this case is a child under 

the age of 18 to satisfy those manner and means.

At the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the jury found Appellant “guilty” 

of the charged offense and imposed a sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. Appellant 

subsequently filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal 

followed. 

MOTION TO DISMISS VENIRE

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court should have dismissed the venire 

panel pursuant to his request, due to the State’s misstatement of the charged offense. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Appellate courts review a defendant’s request to strike or dismiss the jury panel under the 

same standard as a motion for mistrial. See Dupuy v. State, 631 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (denial of motion for mistrial based on improper comment 

by venireperson during voir dire is “functional equivalent of a refusal to quash the jury panel”); 

Castro v. State, No. 14-08-01156-CR, 2010 WL 3418273, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Aug. 31, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (motion to strike the 

venire panel is equivalent to a motion for a mistrial); Alvarez v. State, 804 S.W.2d 617, 619 

(Tex. App.—El Paso 1991), aff’d, 864 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). As the equivalent of a 

motion for mistrial, we review the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s request to dismiss the venire 

panel for an abuse of discretion, and uphold that ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. Castro, 2010 WL 3418273, at *4 (citing Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Mistrial is the appropriate remedy when error is so prejudicial that 

expenditure of further time and expense would be futile. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). It is a remedy required only in extreme circumstances when prejudice is 

incurable and less drastic alternatives have been explored. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

In analyzing whether the prejudicial event is so harmful that the trial court should have 

granted a mistrial, we consider (1) the severity of the misconduct (that is, the magnitude of any 

prejudicial effect of the remark at issue), (2) the curative measures taken (the efficacy of any 

cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the prejudicial 

event. Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) 
4 

(citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). Ordinarily, a prompt 

instruction by the trial court to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question, 

answer, or argument. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We 

generally presume that a jury followed the judge’s instruction to disregard absent evidence that it 

did not. See Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Michaelwicz v. 

State, 186 S.W.3d 601, 620 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Gardner v. State, 730 

S.W.2d 675, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). 

Analysis 

The allegedly prejudicial event in this case is the prosecutor’s incorrect reference to the 

offense with which Appellant was charged as “continuous trafficking of children” rather than 

“continuous trafficking of persons.” Assuming arguendo that this statement constituted 

misconduct,1 we cannot conclude that the extent of prejudice was so great here as to render

ineffectual a firm and timely curative instruction. The alleged misconduct was not extreme in 

nature—the prosecutor’s misstatement was singular and appears inadvertent rather than 

calculated. See Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We further note 

that the magnitude of any prejudicial effect was likely diminished given the rest of the record. 

See Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). As the trial court noted, the 

indictment correctly named the charged offense, but also alleged multiple predicate offenses 

which claimed as an element that the victim, S.D., was “a child younger than 18 years of age.” 

Similarly, the jury charge correctly identified the charged offense as “continuous trafficking of 

persons.” 

Further, upon Appellant’s objection and request for a curative instruction, the trial court 

expediently informed the venire panel to disregard the incorrect reference. Thereafter, the 

prosecutor rephrased his statement to (1) use the correct name for the charged offense and (2) 

clarify that the reference to “children” was instead related to the predicate offenses the State 

intended to prove. The law generally presumes that instructions to disregard and other 

cautionary instructions will be duly obeyed by the jury, and the record in this case contains no 

evidence to the contrary. See Reed v. State, 421 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. 

1 We are mindful that “[g]enerally, a prosecutor’s statements during voir dire will not constitute error 

unless they are contrary to the trial court’s charge.” McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 622, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston 

2015, pet. ref’d). However, the State does not dispute that the prosecutor’s statement was not wholly accurate as to 

the title of the charged offense.
5 

ref’d) (judge’s misstatement that defendant was charged with “continuous sexual abuse of a 

child” rather than “aggravated sexual assault of a child” cured by instruction to disregard). 

Accordingly, we must presume that the potential jurors understood that Appellant was charged 

with continuous trafficking of persons, rather than continuous trafficking of children. See id.

The third factor—the certainty of conviction absent the event at issue— also weighs in 

favor of the trial court’s ruling. Multiple law enforcement personnel testified regarding the 

process of investigating Appellant’s involvement with sex trafficking in general and his 

trafficking of S.D. in particular. The jury heard testimony from several other women for whom 

Appellant served as a “pimp” during the time he was alleged to have trafficked S.D., including 

their observations of S.D.’s behavior. S.D. also testified extensively about her association with 

Appellant and his role in facilitating her participation in prostitution, including maintaining 

contact with clients, negotiating rates, and creating and posting advertisements, as well as his 

receipt of the money she obtained from clients. Notably, S.D. testified that she was eventually 

arrested for offenses related to prostitution and turned eighteen years old while in jail; thus, she 

was certain that she was a minor for the entire duration of her association with Appellant. We 

conclude that the State presented substantial evidence of Appellant’s guilt and it is highly likely 

the jury would have reached the same verdict even absent the prosecutor’s misstatement. See

Newby v. State, 252 S.W.3d 431, 439 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). 

In summary, from this record, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor’s brief 

misstatement was so egregious or inflammatory that it was not cured by the trial court’s 

instruction to disregard. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of 

Appellant’s motion to dismiss the venire panel. See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 292 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010); Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567. Consequently, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. 

HEARING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

In his second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 

overruling his motion for new trial by operation of law without conducting a hearing. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse of 

discretion and reverse only when the trial judge’s decision lies outside the zone of reasonable 
6 

disagreement. Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

The purpose of a hearing on a motion for new trial is to decide whether the cause should 

be retried and to prepare a record for presenting issues on appeal in the event the motion is 

denied. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The opportunity to 

prepare a record for appellate review makes a hearing on a motion for new trial a critical stage, 

but such a hearing is not an absolute right. Id. To be entitled to a hearing, the motion for new 

trial must raise matters which are not determinable from the record and establish the existence of 

reasonable grounds showing that the defendant could be entitled to relief. Id. at 338-39. A 

motion for new trial which raises matters not determinable from the record must also be 

supported by an affidavit specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim. Hobbs, 298 

S.W.3d at 200. 

Analysis 

In Appellant’s motion for new trial, he briefly asserts, “The evidence introduced in this 

case was insufficient to sustain the conviction.” Appellant’s motion contains no request for a 

hearing and was not accompanied by an affidavit from either Appellant or any other person. 

As an initial matter, we note that it appears Appellant failed to preserve this complaint for 

appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). A complaint regarding the lack of a hearing is 

preserved by a timely filed and presented motion for new trial that requests a hearing. See Rozell 

v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230–31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (reviewing court does not reach 

question of whether trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold hearing on motion for new 

trial if no request for hearing was presented). Although the record reflects that Appellant timely 

filed his motion for new trial, it does not reflect that he requested a hearing on the motion.

Instead, he asked the trial court to sustain his motion and order a new trial, and the motion was

subsequently overruled by operation of law. Because Appellant did not request or otherwise 

indicate that he wanted a hearing, the trial court could not have abused its discretion in failing to 

hold one. Schneider v. State, 623 S.W.3d 38, 45 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d); Gallegos 

v. State, 76 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d). 

Even assuming arguendo that Appellant requested a hearing in some manner not apparent 

from the record, the lack of verification or a supporting affidavit is dispositive to any 
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determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.

2

 “As a prerequisite to obtaining a 

hearing on a motion for new trial, the motion must be supported by an affidavit, either of the 

accused or someone else specifically showing the truth of the grounds of attack.” Crowell v. 

State, 642 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Smith, 

286 S.W.3d at 339). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it denies a hearing on a timely 

motion for new trial that is not supported by affidavits.” Medina v. State, No. 05-19-01116-CR, 

2021 WL 247965, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (citing Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 455 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. 

ref’d)).

For these reasons, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered August 15, 2024. 

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

2 A motion for new trial need not be verified or supported by affidavit if the allegations therein can be 

determined from the trial record. See Bitterman v. State, 195 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d). 

However, Texas law does not require a hearing on a motion for new trial if the motion does not raise matters 

undeterminable from the record. Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Therefore, if we 

assume that Appellant’s motion required no verification or affidavit in support, then he was not entitled to a hearing 

on the motion, and the trial court did not err in denying same. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009).
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT 

AUGUST 15, 2024 

NO. 12-23-00278-CR

KORWIN JERARD JONES, 

Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

Appeal from the 7th District Court 

of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-0010-23) 

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, 

and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment. 

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the 

court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for 

observance. 

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.