#25553-a-SLZ 

2010 S.D. 86

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HUTTERVILLE HUTTERIAN 

BRETHREN, INC., a South Dakota 

non-profit Corporation, Plaintiffs, 

 and 

JOHNNY WIPF, ALVIN HOFER, 

and JAKE HOFER, SR., Individually, 

as voting members and as directors 

and/or officers of Hutterville 

Hutterian Brethren, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

v. 

JOHN G. WALDNER, GEORGE 

WALDNER, SR., TOM WALDNER 

and KENNITH WALDNER, as voting 

members of Hutterville Hutterian 

Brethren, Inc., Defendants and Appellees. 

 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT 

OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HONORABLE JACK R. VON WALD 

Judge 

* * * * 

JAMES E. MCMAHON 

ROCHELLE R. CUNDY of 

Murphy, Goldammer & Prendergast, LLP 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellants. 

JODY ODEGAARD SMITH 

DON E. PETERSEN of 

Morgan Theeler LLP 

Mitchell, South Dakota Attorneys for appellees. 

* * * * 

 ARGUED ON OCTOBER 5, 2010 

 OPINION FILED 11/17/10
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#25553 

ZINTER, Justice 

[¶1.] In this case we must determine whether a dispute regarding 

governance of a religious corporation involves issues over which courts have subject 

matter jurisdiction. We conclude that underlying religious controversies over 

church leadership and the validity of member excommunications so pervade the 

governance issue that it is beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts. 

Background and Procedural History 

[¶2.] Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. (Hutterville) is a nonprofit 

religious corporation organized under the laws of South Dakota. As set forth in its 

articles of incorporation, the purpose of the corporation is to promote the Hutterian 

religious faith and the Hutterian Church. 

[¶3.] Hutterian Church members live an agrarian, communal life based on 

the Bible’s New Testament. Hutterville operates a farming enterprise, which is also 

communal. All real and personal property is owned by the Hutterville Colony, and 

all individual labor and services are for the sole benefit of the Colony and the 

Hutterian Church. For a more detailed description and history of the Hutterite 

colonies and their religion, see Decker ex rel. Decker v. Tschetter Hutterian Brethren, 

Inc., 1999 S.D. 62, ¶¶ 3-5, 594 N.W.2d 357, 359. 

[¶4.] In 1992 there was a schism within the Canadian-United States 

Hutterian Church. Ninety-five of the 173 ministers of the local colonies repudiated 

Rev. Jacob Kleinsasser’s leadership as Senior Elder. Senior Elder is a powerful 

position because the Senior Elder acts as the final arbiter of issues affecting 
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members of the Hutterian Church and the colonies. Those colonies that repudiated 

Rev. Kleinsasser’s leadership opted to follow Rev. Joseph Wipf. 

[¶5.] Although all parties claimed membership in the Hutterian Church, the 

leadership followed and the resultant church affiliation at Hutterville Colony are 

disputed issues in this case. The parties claimed church membership in one of three 

ways. Appellees claimed membership through Hutterville Colony’s affiliation with 

the Hutterian Brethren Church Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference Inc., which 

followed Rev. Kleinsasser. Appellants claimed membership through Hutterville 

Colony’s affiliation with the Hutterian Brethren Church, Schmiedeleut Conference 

Inc., which followed Rev. Wipf. But at times, both parties merely referred to 

membership in “the Hutterian Church.” For ease of reference we use the latter, 

most general description of the Church at Hutterville Colony except when necessary 

to address a party’s specific contention. 

[¶6.] Following the 1992 schism, most of the colonies adopted a new 

constitution and reaffirmed their faith in the Hutterian Church as led by Rev. Wipf. 

But Appellee George Waldner, Sr., the minister of the Hutterville Colony, remained 

loyal to the leadership of Rev. Kleinsasser. Therefore, Hutterville Colony was one of 

five South Dakota colonies that remained loyal to Rev. Kleinsasser and did not 

reaffirm its faith under Rev. Wipf. Nevertheless, individuals following Rev. Wipf 

were permitted to live in Hutterville Colony. This litigation arose out of the two 

factions’ subsequent attempts to obtain control of the corporate governance of 

Hutterville. 
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[¶7.] The governance dispute had two phases. The first occurred through 

the time the circuit court made a preliminary determination of Hutterville’s officers 

and directors. The second occurred following the court’s ruling and a purported 

excommunication of the court-determined officers and directors. The first phase 

started in 2008, when Hutterville was controlled by Appellee officers and directors 

who followed Rev. Kleinsasser. Appellee George Waldner, Sr., Appellee John G. 

Waldner, and Appellant Johnny Wipf were directors and officers. George Waldner, 

Sr. was president, John G. Waldner was secretary-treasurer, and Johnny Wipf was 

vice president. 

[¶8.] In 2008 and 2009, Appellant Johnny Wipf and other members of 

Hutterville began attempts to replace the Appellee officers and directors. 

Appellants wanted to obtain control of Hutterville in order to repudiate Rev. 

Kleinsasser and follow Rev. Joseph Wipf. In August 2008, in an attempt to prevent 

this attempted change of governance, Appellee George Waldner, Sr. called a special 

meeting of Hutterville. The members at this meeting removed Appellant Johnny 

Wipf (as a director and vice president) and Appellee John G. Waldner (as a 

director). Appellee Tom Waldner was elected secretary-treasurer and vice president 

(replacing Johnny Wipf), and Appellee Kennith Waldner was elected as a director. 

[¶9.] Additional meetings and elections, however, resulted in further 

officer/director replacements giving Appellants control. Nevertheless, Appellees 

refused to recognize the new officers and directors. Appellees also refused to 

relinquish control of the business and property of Hutterville’s farming enterprise. 

As a result, in August 2009, Appellants commenced this action seeking a 
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declaration that the individually-named Appellants – Johnny Wipf, Jake Hofer, Sr., 

and Alvin Hofer – were the properly elected directors of Hutterville. Appellants 

also applied for a temporary restraining order to prevent Appellees – George 

Waldner, Sr., Tom Waldner, and John G. Waldner – from acting as directors. 

Appellees responded by applying for a temporary restraining order seeking to 

restrain Appellants from acting as directors of Hutterville.

[¶10.] After hearing, the circuit court denied Appellees relief and granted 

Appellants’ application for a temporary restraining order (also treated as a 

preliminary injunction by stipulation of the parties). In reaching its decision, the 

circuit court analyzed Hutterville’s articles of incorporation and bylaws regarding 

meeting requirements. Based on those provisions, the court concluded that the 

then-existing officers of Hutterville were: Appellant Johnny Wipf – president and 

secretary-treasurer; and, Appellant Jake Hofer, Sr. – vice president. Hutterville’s 

directors were determined to be Appellants Johnny Wipf, Jake Hofer, Sr., and Alvin 

Hofer, along with Appellee Kennith Waldner. The court ordered that Appellees 

George Waldner, Sr., John G. Waldner, and Tom Waldner were precluded from 

acting as officers or directors of Hutterville unless they were properly elected.

[¶11.] The second phase of the governance dispute developed after the circuit 

court’s decision. Although the individual Appellants had obtained control of 

Hutterville, George Waldner, Sr. remained the minister of the Church. And, on 

August 18, 2009, Appellee George Waldner, Sr. and two other Church elders issued 

a Church resolution purportedly excommunicating the Appellants. Entitled, 

“Resolution of Action Taken By Hutterian Church Group I,” the resolution provided: 
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The undersigned, being duly authorized by Hutterian Church 

Group I to act on its behalf, hereby declare that Johnny Wipf, 

Alvin Hofer and Jake Hofer Sr., residents of Hutterville 

Hutterian Colony, are hereby excommunicated/removed as 

Members of the Hutterian Church, effective as of August 19, 

2009. As a result of such excommunication, the said Johnny 

Wipf, Alvin Hofer and Jake Hofer Sr. shall no longer be 

considered Members of Hutterian Church Group I, nor shall they 

be entitled to attend services or participate in Church activities. 

(Emphasis added.) Three other voting members in the Johnny Wipf/Rev. Joseph 

Wipf faction were excommunicated in a similar manner. 

[¶12.] On October 18, 2009, following the excommunications, a special 

meeting of Hutterville was held. The corporate minutes identify the fifteen voting1

members who were present and the five voting members who were absent. The 

minutes do not mention the presence or absence of the six people who were 

“excommunicated.” The stated purpose of the meeting was to fill director and 

officer “vacancies” previously held by Appellants. The minutes indicate that the 

vacancies existed because Appellants had been excommunicated and “one who is not 

a member of the Hutterian Brethren Church Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference 

Inc.” cannot be a member of Hutterville. The minutes reflect that, by unanimous 

vote, Appellee George Waldner, Sr. was elected director and president, and Appellee 

Tom Waldner was elected director, vice president, and secretary-treasurer. 

1. Article XIV of the articles of incorporation and Article I Section I of the 

bylaws provide that “[t[here shall be two classes of members. Voting 

members shall be all male, married members and all others shall be nonvoting members[.]” The record reflects that certain other non-married males 

may be voted into a voting membership. 
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[¶13.] In response to the October 18 election, Appellants moved to amend 

their temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to reflect that they 

had not vacated their positions as officers and directors. To support this request, 

Appellants disputed their excommunications. They submitted affidavits of Mike 

Tschetter and Johnny Wipf. Tschetter’s affidavit alleged that Appellants Johnny 

Wipf, Jake Hofer, Sr., and Alvin Hofer remained “members of the Hutterian 

Brethren Church.” Johnny Wipf’s affidavit similarly alleged that he, Jake Hofer, 

Sr., and Alvin Hofer remained “members of the Hutterite Church.” 

[¶14.] Appellee George Waldner, Sr. submitted an affidavit disputing Mike 

Tschetter’s and Johnny Wipf’s affidavits. Waldner, Sr. asserted that the Appellants 

“had been excommunicated/removed as members of the Hutterian Brethren Church 

Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference, Inc.” He also asserted that “one who is not a 

member of Hutterian Brethren Church Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference, Inc. is 

not a member of [Hutterville].” 

[¶15.] The circuit court heard argument regarding these new events and 

scheduled an evidentiary hearing. But before the hearing, Appellees moved to 

dismiss Appellants’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of 

their motion, Appellees submitted another George Waldner, Sr. affidavit. In this 

affidavit, Waldner, Sr. specifically alleged that “Hutterville members belong to the 

Hutterian Brethren Church Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference, Inc.” He alleged 

that Rev. Kleinsasser was the senior elder or president of that conference. And, he

alleged that the Appellants were excommunicated “for failing to recognize and abide 

by the rules of the Hutterian Brethren Church and for failing to agree to abide by 
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the rules, regulations, directives, and authority of the presiding elder or elders of 

the Hutterian Church.” At his deposition, George Waldner, Sr. explained that the 

Appellants belonged to a different Church than the Church at Hutterville Colony. 

Waldner maintained that the Church at Hutterville Colony was the Hutterian 

Brethren Church Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference, Inc., and the Appellants 

belonged to a different Church: 

A: Johnny Wipf and this group left our church. They joined the 

different church. . . . This is church group one. . . . They joined 

a different church, a reformed church. . . . They announced that 

they joined another church. They don’t live in this church where 

I am as the minister. 

 Q: But they belong to the Hutterian Brethren Church? 

A: I don’t know if it’s Hutterian Brethren. It’s a different 

church. It’s a reformed church. 

 Q: It’s a Hutterian Brethren Church. 

 A: It’s a different church. 

 Q: Is it called the Hutterian Brethren Church? 

 A: It’s a church group. They do not belong to our church. 

 Q: So you don’t know what the name of their church is? 

A: I don’t know. It’s a reformed – yeah, it’s a reformed church. 

It’s a Hutterite Reformed Church.2

[¶16.] Appellants responded by submitting another Tschetter affidavit 

claiming church membership through a different conference. Tschetter alleged that 

on November 10, 2009, the elders “of the Schmiedeleut [C]onference . . . reaffirmed 

that Johnny Wipf and his group were accepted and were members of the Hutterite 

2. George Waldner, Sr.’s testimony was subject to vigorous cross-examination. 

The cross-examination reflected that no Hutterville corporate documents 

specifically referred to the “Group I” conference. Nevertheless, Waldner, Sr. 

held to his position. As is discussed, infra ¶ 31, the corporate bylaws do 

require membership adherence to the presiding bishop of the Hutterian 

Church to which Hutterville members belong through Hutterville’s “local 

church.” 
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Brethren Church.” Tschetter further disputed Appellee Waldner’s assertion that 

one who was not a member of the Hutterian Brethren Church Group I, SchmiedenLeut Conference, Inc. was not a member of Hutterville. Tschetter finally impliedly 

challenged the excommunications. Tschetter alleged that Appellees were not 

members of the Schmiedeleut Conference, the “true Church,” and that the Jacob 

Kleinsasser faction was not part of the Schmiedeleut Conference: 

[T]he Jacob Kleinsasser faction [which the Appellees follow] is 

not a member of the Schmiedeleut Conference of the Hutterian 

Brethren Church as indicated by George Waldner in his 

Affidavit. In fact, in Canada they have been refused the ability 

to use the name “Schmiedeleut” Conference. That name lies 

with the “true Church” which is part of the Schmiedeleut 

Conference[.]” 

(Emphasis added.) 

[¶17.] After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed Appellants’ complaint 

under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court 

concluded that the matter had become a religious dispute that deprived the court of 

jurisdiction under the First Amendment. Appellants appeal contending that this 

case only presents secular issues of civil corporate governance. 

Decision 

[¶18.] The issue is whether court resolution of the governance issue would 

impermissibly entangle secular courts in religious disputes involving church 

doctrine. A SDCL 15-6-12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction is a recognized method of raising this First Amendment issue. Decker, 

1999 S.D. 62, ¶ 14, 594 N.W.2d at 362. We review jurisdictional issues de novo. 
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City of Sioux Falls v. Missouri Basin Mun. Power Agency, 2004 S.D. 14, ¶ 9, 675 

N.W.2d 739, 742. 

[¶19.] Appellants first argue that the circuit court would not have to consider 

the religious disputes regarding the controlling elders, “true church” affiliation, and 

the validity of the excommunications. Appellants point out that these issues were 

not raised in the complaint, answer, or counterclaim. Those pleadings only raised 

issues regarding compliance with corporate articles and bylaws governing the 

removal of members, directors and officers, and the requirements for meetings. 

Appellants argue that the circuit court could restrict its review to those nonreligious issues raised in the pleadings. 

[¶20.] But we are presented with a factual Rule 12(b)(1) subject matter 

jurisdiction question. Therefore, courts consider matters outside the pleadings. 

Decker, 1999 S.D. 62, ¶ 14, 594 N.W.2d at 362 (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 

F.2d. 724 (8th Cir. 1990)). As Osborn explained: 

A court deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) must distinguish 

between a “facial attack” and a “factual attack.” In the first 

instance, the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings, 

and the non-moving party receives the same protections as it 

would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6). . 

. . In a factual attack, the court considers matters outside the 

pleadings, and the non-moving party does not have the benefit 

of 12(b)(6) safeguards. 

918 F.2d at 729 n.6 (citations omitted). In factual attacks, the court must also 

weigh the evidence and resolve disputed issues of fact affecting the merits of the 

jurisdictional dispute. 

Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s 

jurisdiction-its very power to hear the case-there is substantial 

authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and 
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satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In 

short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s 

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not 

preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of 

jurisdictional claims. 

Id. at 730. Thus, evidentiary hearings, affidavits, documents, and live testimony 

may all be considered to resolve the subject matter jurisdiction dispute. Id.

[¶21.] Because Appellees raised a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack, we may not 

simply ignore the factual allegations regarding true church leadership, church 

affiliation, and the validity of the excommunications. Instead, we must determine 

whether the corporate governance issues can be resolved without resolving those 

disputes involving religious doctrine. 

[¶22.] “The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art VI, § 

3 of the South Dakota Constitution preclude civil courts from entertaining religious 

disputes over doctrine, leaving adjudication of those issues to ecclesiastical 

tribunals of the appropriate church.” Decker, 1999 S.D. 62, ¶ 16, 594 N.W.2d at 

362. The fact that a portion of the dispute involves secular claims does not override 

this constitutional protection. Id. “Even when possession or ownership of church 

property is disputed in a civil court, ‘there is substantial danger that the State will 

become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of 

groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.’” Id. (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox 

Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380, 

49 L.Ed.2d 151, 162 (1976)). Therefore, a civil court may only adjudicate a church 

controversy if it can do so “without resolving underlying controversies over religious 

doctrine.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 96 S.Ct. at 2381. 
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[¶23.] Control of Hutterville is governed by its articles and bylaws. 

Appellants argue that the relevant corporate documents regarding membership, 

meeting requirements, and removal of members, directors and officers do not 

incorporate religious doctrine and no tenet or rule of the Hutterian Church is 

implicated. Therefore, Appellants argue that control of Hutterville is a secular 

issue that the circuit court could adjudicate under “neutral principles of law.” See 

Decker, 1999 S.D. 62, ¶ 18, 594 N.W.2d at 364 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 

604, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979)). “The neutral-principles approach 

calls for a completely secular examination . . . into church documents . . . , state 

statutes and other relevant evidence to determine [the dispute].” Id. “The key to 

the neutral-principles approach is that such determination is to be made 

‘exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of [ ] law familiar to lawyers and 

judges.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. at 3025). 

[¶24.] In Decker, this Court concluded that it could not apply the neutralprinciples approach in considering a number of civil causes of action arising out of 

the same Rev. Kleinsasser/ Wipf control struggle in another Hutterite colony. In 

that case, Tschetter Hutterian Brethren, Inc. was split between members following 

Rev. Joseph Wipf and those following Rev. Kleinsasser. The majority of the colony 

(those who followed Rev. Wipf) voted to expel members who followed Rev. 

Kleinsasser. The Rev. Kleinsasser followers refused to leave and filed suit in an 

attempt to retain control of the colony. Their suit involved a number of causes of 

action, but all alleged acts had their origin in the Rev. Kleinsasser/Wipf controversy 

and “arose from their excommunication from the church and attempted expulsion 
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from the colony.” Id. ¶ 20, 594 N.W.2d at 364. Although those plaintiffs requested 

a determination of “whether these acts were done with malice thus purporting to 

negate any claim of religious privilege,” id., the circuit court concluded that the suit 

was essentially a religious dispute. We affirmed, citing Jones, 443 U.S. at 609 n. 7, 

99 S.Ct. at 3028, for the proposition that the neutral principles of law doctrine “runs 

afoul of the First Amendment . . . when church doctrine and policy ‘pervade’ the 

documents governing the church[.]” Id. ¶ 18, 594 N.W.2d at 364. In concluding that 

the Rev. Kleinsasser/Wipf religious dispute pervaded all causes of action, we 

explained: 

[T]here is no separation of religious life from a secular life in a 

Hutterite colony because there is no separate secular life. The 

colony is run and its members, whether the followers of Rev. 

Kleinsasser or Rev. Wipf, all conduct their lives on religious 

absolutes based on the Bible and the Ten Commandments[.] 

Id. ¶ 23, 594 N.W.2d at 365. 

[¶25.] Appellants, however, point out that in this case both parties filed 

pleadings invoking the court’s jurisdiction to determine Hutterville’s corporate 

governance under its articles and bylaws. Although both factions sought court 

intervention, it initially appeared this dispute could be determined under neutral 

principles. In fact, in its first decision, the circuit court resolved the director/officer 

dispute by a neutral-principles review of Hutterville’s articles of incorporation and 

bylaws regarding quorums and the calling of special meetings. 

[¶26.] But after the circuit court’s initial decision, the nature of this dispute 

changed. The individual Appellants were purportedly excommunicated and another 

election was held based upon “vacancies” created by the excommunications. The 
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minutes reflect that at the subsequent election, the Appellees were elected officers 

and directors of Hutterville by a majority of the voting members (even if the six 

“excommunicated” members were still considered voting members). And 

significantly, even though Appellants argue that the governance issue may be 

resolved by neutral principles governing corporate law, Appellants themselves 

advanced religious arguments to sustain their claims to director and officer 

positions. They submitted affidavits contesting the validity of their 

excommunications. They argued that George Waldner, Sr. and the other two 

excommunicating elders were not the elders of the true Hutterian Church. They 

specifically asserted that the Rev. Kleinsasser faction, whose senior elders 

purportedly excommunicated Appellants, did not follow the “true Church,” and that 

Appellants remained members of the “true Church.” Consequently, this case is like 

Decker. It requires resolution of a dispute over “[one group’s] excommunication from 

the church[.]” Id. ¶ 20, 594 N.W.2d at 364. The neutral-principles approach does 

not apply in such cases as it “has never been extended to religious controversies in 

the areas of church government, order and discipline, nor should it be.” Hutchison 

v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986). 

[¶27.] Appellants, however, argue that the circuit court could avoid the 

excommunication and related true elder/church issues if the court only determined 

the validity of calling and conducting the October 18 special meeting wherein 

Appellees were elected. Appellants contend that the circuit court could restrict its 

review to determining whether sufficient officers and directors called, and whether 

sufficient members were present to conduct, the meeting. Appellants point out that 
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under Article XIV of the articles of incorporation (regarding membership of 

Hutterville), membership is granted to all persons residing at the colony who are 

dependent upon its treasury for support. Appellants also point out that neither this 

Article nor any other corporate provision mentions removal of members, officers, or 

directors by excommunication. Because the purportedly excommunicated members 

continued to reside in, and were supported by, the Colony, Appellants contend they 

retained their positions in Hutterville notwithstanding the alleged 

excommunications. This contention, however, overlooks other articles and bylaws 

tying Hutterville membership, directorships, and officerships with membership in 

the Hutterian Church. 

[¶28.] Hutterville’s articles of incorporation and bylaws reflect that 

governance of the corporation is inseparable from membership in the Hutterian 

Church and compliance with its religious principles. First, religious language 

pervades Hutterville’s requirements for membership,3 the position necessary to 

constitute quorums and elect directors who elect the officers that call meetings of 

 

3. The bylaws contain the following religious provisions regarding membership: 

 “All members of this Corporation shall recognize and abide by 

the rules of the Hutterian [C]hurch, . . . and each and all of the 

members agree to abide by the rules, regulations, directives, and 

authority of the presiding bishop or bishops of the Hutterian 

Church to which all members of this corporation, through its 

local church, belong.” 

 All members must “follow the teachings and tenets of the 

Hutterian Brethren Church.” 

 All members “shall recognize and abide by the rules of the 

Hutterian Brethren Church . . . and each and all of the members 

agree to abide by the rules, regulations, directives and authority 

of the presiding bishop or bishops of the Hutterian Church[.]”
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the corporation. Specifically, Article XI of the articles of incorporation provides: 

“This corporation is a church and a religious corporation and its members shall be 

associated with the Hutterian Church[.]” Indeed, Appellants concede that 

Hutterville’s articles and bylaws “refer to its members as being church members.” 

Appellant’s Br. 21. Second, regarding the board of directors, Article II section 1 of 

the bylaws provides that “a director [on the board of directors] need not be a 

member of the corporation, but must be a member of the Hutterian Church.” 

Finally, regarding officers, the articles and bylaws are silent. At oral argument, 

however, all parties agreed that a person cannot be an officer of Hutterville unless 

that person is also a member of the Church. 

[¶29.] Thus, Church membership is a prerequisite for all three positions. A 

person cannot be a member, director, or officer of Hutterville unless that person is a 

member of the Hutterian Church. For that reason, to determine Appellants’ 

corporate governance issue involving quorums of the voting members and the 

validity of calls of meetings, the circuit court would have to determine the status of 

the Appellants’ membership in the Church. To determine that membership issue, 

the circuit court would have to determine the validity of the Appellants’ purported 

excommunications. And that necessarily leads to the religious questions of what is 

the “true” Hutterian Church at Hutterville Colony and who are its “true” elders? 

[¶30.] Although these are obvious religious questions, Appellants argue these 

questions may also be avoided because irrespective of conference affiliation, they 

remain members of the broad “Hutterian Church.” Although Appellants 

acknowledge Appellees’ position that Appellants were excommunicated from the 
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Group I, Schmieden-Leut Conference, Appellants point out that the articles and 

bylaws are silent regarding membership in groups or conferences of the Hutterian 

Church. Appellants further point out that in many religions, a person is considered 

a member of a church irrespective of the person’s association with a particular 

conference, division, synod, assembly or subdivision. 

[¶31.] But determining the local church affiliation at Hutterville Colony is 

necessary to determine the corporate governance issue under Hutterville’s articles 

and bylaws. A determination of local affiliation is necessary because the articles 

and bylaws tie Hutterville membership to the local Church. Article XI of the 

articles provides that “[a]ll rights of membership, ground for their expulsion and 

managerial rules over the members of the corporation . . . shall be prescribed by the 

[b]y-laws, none of which shall be contrary to the tenets, rules or faith of the 

Hutterian Church.” One such bylaw, Article IX, section 3, ties members’ adherence 

to the authority of the presiding bishop or bishops of the Hutterian Church to which 

all members of the corporation belong through the local church. That bylaw 

provides: 

All members of this Corporation shall recognize and abide by the 

rules of the Hutterian Brethren [C]hurch, . . . and each and all of 

the members agree to abide by the rules, regulations, directives, 

and authority of the presiding bishop or bishops of the Hutterian 

Church to which all members of this corporation, through its 

local church, belong.

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the circuit court could not look simply to Appellants’ 

status as members of the “Hutterian Church.” To determine voting membership in 

Hutterville, the circuit court would have to determine the “true” Church and elders 

at Hutterville Colony in order to determine validity of the excommunications. This 
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would ensnare the circuit court in determining whether Rev. Kleinsasser or Rev. 

Wipf was the “presiding” leader of the Hutterian Church at Hutterville Colony and 

whether Appellants failed to abide by that leader’s authority. But as the Supreme 

Court noted in Milivojevich, civil courts have no subject matter jurisdiction when it 

comes to such matters of “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical 

government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of 

morals required of them.” 426 U.S. at 714, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. 

[¶32.] Appellants’ reliance on Second International Baha‘i Council v. Chase, 

326 Mont. 41, 106 P.3d 1168 (2005) and Viravonga v. Samakitham, 372 Ark. 562, 

279 S.W.3d 44 (2008) is misplaced. The controversy in Chase followed a schism 

within the Second International Baha‘i Council resulting in different parties 

claiming the right to control church property through membership on a governing 

board. Chase claimed that opposing board members had “automatically” been 

removed from membership for “covenant-breaking.” But both parties relied on the 

same resolution that “by its own terms constitute[d] an authoritative ruling on the 

precise point” at issue. Chase, 326 Mont. at 48, 106 P.3d at 1174. Under that single 

controlling resolution, automatic removal was not authorized: “a finding by the 

Board . . . [was] a necessary precondition for involuntary removal.” Id. Therefore, 

the court did not need to determine the religious question whether covenant 

breaking had occurred. It only determined the “ordinary factual inquir[y]” whether 

the Board had acted (made a finding) to remove members under the controlling 

resolution. Id. That purely secular task is far different than determining 

Appellants’ dispute, which would involve determining the leaders, members, and 
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affiliation of the Hutterian Church at Hutterville Colony. 

[¶33.] Similarly, in Viravonga the court “did not delve into matters that were 

essentially religious in nature, but rather applied neutral principles of law 

concerning election procedures” in a board of directors election. 372 Ark. at 571, 

279 S.W.3d at 50-51. To the extent there was a religious dispute regarding voter 

eligibility, the trial court utilized provisional ballots. Those ballots demonstrated 

that if the trial court had erred in considering a religious issue of voter eligibility, 

there was no prejudice. Therefore, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not reach the 

First Amendment question on that issue. Finally, the remaining issues regarding 

membership and power to remove members were not controlled by religious 

doctrine. They were controlled solely by a historical issue of fact regarding an 

affiliation that had taken place before the current controversy. Therefore, unlike 

the case we consider today, the membership and removal issues in Viravonga could 

be decided by simple neutral principles. Id. at 574, 279 S.W.3d at 53. 

Conclusion 

[¶34.] Voting memberships, directorships and officerships of Hutterville are 

inseparable from religious principles and contemplate local Church membership. 

Accord Decker, 1999 S.D. 62, ¶ 6, 594 N.W.2d. at 359. After the excommunications 

and the October 2009 election, a resolution of the governance question became 

dependent upon resolution of a dispute regarding membership in and expulsion 

from the “true” Hutterian Church by the “true” church elders of the local church at 

Hutterville Colony. Such matters of membership are shielded from judicial scrutiny 

under the First Amendment. See Alexander v. Shiloh Baptist Church, 62 Ohio 
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Misc.2nd 79, 84-85, 592 N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1991). See also Burgess v. 

Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.D.C. 1990) (providing, “the 

question of determining who is and who is not a member of [this Baptist] Church is 

a matter of ecclesiastical cognizance”); Grunwald v. Bornfreund, 696 F. Supp. 838, 

840-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (providing, “[t]he mere expulsion from a religious society, 

with the exclusion from the religious community, is not a harm from which courts 

can grant a remedy”); Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444, 448 (D.Va. 1981) 

(concluding that in a hierarchical church, “this court is compelled by the First 

Amendment to avoid adjudicating the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ expulsion was 

in accordance with procedure prescribed by the [church]”). Because religious issues 

arising from the Rev. Kleinsasser/Wipf controversy pervade the corporate 

governance issue, corporate governance cannot be decided without “extensive 

inquiry into religious doctrine and beliefs” of the Hutterian faith. See Decker, 1999 

S.D. 62, ¶ 22, 594 N.W.2d. at 365 (quoting Wollman v. Poinsett Hutterian Brethren, 

Inc., 844 F. Supp. 539, 543 (D.S.D. 1994)). Therefore, South Dakota courts have “no 

constitutional basis to interfere[.]” See id. ¶ 24, 594 N.W.2d. at 365. “[A]djudication 

. . . by the courts of this state is precluded by the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and art VI, § 3 of the South Dakota Constitution.” See id.

[¶35.] Affirmed. 

[¶36.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, MEIERHENRY, 

and SEVERSON, Justices, concur.