The Honor able De nny Chin, United St ates District Judge f or the Southern District of * New Y ork, sitting by

desig nation. 08-6228-c r USA v. Sappleton U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER Ru lings by summary orderdo no t ha ve p reced ential ef f ect. Citatio n to a summary orde r filed on or after Janu ary 1, 2007 , is permitted and is g overn ed by Federal R ule o f A ppe llate P roced ure 32. 1 a nd this c ourt’s Loc al R ule 3 2.1 .1. Whe n c iting a su mmary ord er in a docu ment filed w i t h t hi s c ou r t, a partymust cite eith er th e Federa l A ppe ndix or an electron ic data base (w ith th e n otation “su mmary orde r”). A partycitinga summary orde r must serve a co py of it on anypa rt y no t rep resen ted by co u n se l. At a stated Te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan United States Courthouse, at 500 Pea rl Street, in the City

of Ne w York, on the 11 day

of F ebrua

ry , two thousand ten. th P r e s e n t : G U ID O C A LA B R E S I,

ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, Circuit Judges , DENNYCHI

N, District Judge. *

____________________________________________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , - v - No. 08-6228-c r OWEN SAPP L ETON, De fe nd an t- Ap pe lla nt.

____________________________________________________________ F or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt: D A RR ELL B. F I EL DS , Fe dera l Defe nders of New York, Ne w York, N .Y. For Appellee : A MI E E LY , Assistant United States Attorney (Katherine Polk Fa illa, Assistant United St ates Attorney , on the brief

), for Preet B hara

ra, United States Attorney

for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, N ew Yor

k, N.Y.2

Appea l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York (Preska , J. ). ON CONSIDERATION WHE REOF, IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, ADJUD GED, AN D D EC RE ED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
. Def endant- appellant Ow en Sappleton appe als from a Dec ember

17, 2008 judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (Pre ska, J. ), sentenc ing Sappleton principally

to 57 months’ imprisonm ent, followinghis entry of a guilty

plea, f or illeg al
ree ntry into the United States after havingbeen de ported followinga convic tion of an ag g ravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and ( b)(2) . We assume the par ties’ familiarity

with the underlying f

acts a nd proce dural history

of this case
. Th e so le iss ue ra ise d in

thi s a pp e a l is wh e the r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e of 57 months ’ imp ri so nme nt w a s unr e a so na ble . We re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e fo r r e a so na ble ne ss, “which is akin to review unde r an a buse-of -discre tion standard.” United States v. Re yes , 557 F.3d 84, 87 ( 2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Our r eview is both proc edura l and substantive. See Un ite d S tates v . Ca v e ra , 550 F.3d 180, 189 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). With respec t to procedur e,
we e xami ne wh e the r “ the se nte nc e re su lte d f ro m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on sid e re d ju dg me nt a s to what wa s nece ssary

to addre ss the various, ofte n conflicting , purposes of se ntencing .” Id. at 189- 90. Wit h respe ct to substantive rea sonablene ss, we “take into acc ount the totality of the circ umstances, g iving due defe renc e to the sente ncingjudge ’s exercise of discretion, and be aring in mind the inst itutional advantag e of district c ourts.” Id. “Our role is no more tha

n to ‘patrol the boundar ies of re asonable ness,’” Un ite d S tates v . S te war t , 06-5015-c r (L ), 2009 U.S. App. L E XIS 2 8 5 9 5 , at* 1 1 3 (2 d C i r. De c. 2 3 , 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Cav e ra , 550 F.3d at 191), and we g e ne ra lly “ wi ll n ot s ub sti tut e our o wn jud g me nt f

or the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s on

the qu e sti on

of wh at is3

sufficie nt to meet the § 3553(a ) consider ations in any particula r ca se. We will instead set aside a district court’s substantive de termination only in exceptional case s where the trial cour t’s decision ‘c annot be loca

ted within the rang e of pe rmissible decisions.’” Cav e ra , 550 F.3d at 189 (qu o t i n g United States v. Rigas , 4 90 F .3 d 2 08 , 2 38 (2 d Ci r. 20 07 )) (c itatio n a nd e mph a sis omitted). Her e, Sappleton does not a rgue — nor do w e find — that the district c ourt’s sentenc e wa s pr oc e dura lly

unre a so na

ble . Ins te a d, Sa

pp le ton argue s o nly

tha t th e se nte nc e wa s su

bs tanti ve ly
unre a so na

ble g ive n h is tro ub le d c hil dh oo d, his re latio ns hip wi th h is f ianc e e and

he r c hil dr e n, his purportedly

minimal criminal recor d over the past 20 y ear s, the alleg ed unlikelihood of
rec idivism , and alleg ed disparities be tween the illega l ree ntry Guidelines ra

ng e and the rang es for other, purpor

tedly more ser ious crimes. We disag ree , and conc lude that the district cour t did not abuse its discre tion in im posing a sentenc e of 57 months’ imprisonment, a sente nce be low the Guidelines ra

ng e set for

th in Sappleton’s PS R, and at the bottom of the ra ng e set for

th in the g ov e rnme nt’ s Pimentel

letter. Specifica lly , the re cord makes cle ar that the district court ca ref ully took into account Sappleton’s per sonal circ umstances whe n fashioningits sentence, a nd balanc ed those c oncer ns ag ainst other fa ctors, includingthe seriousne ss of Sappleton’s cr iminal hist ory , the nee d for deter renc e, and the need to pr otect the public. It was not unrea sonable for the district court to do
so. United States v. J

ones , 4 60 F .3 d 1 91 , 1 95 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ) ( no tin gtha t th e se nte nc ingc ourt

is not prec luded from c onsideringits “own sense of what is a fa ir and just sentenc e under all of the circ umstances” ). Althoug h Sappleton notes that his most recent c rimes — other tha n the instant of fe ns e — w e re mis de me ano r m ari jua na of fe ns e s, the dis tr ic t c ourt

too k th at c on c e rn

int o
acc ount when it g rante d Sappleton a downwa rd depa rture a s to his C riminal History Categ ory .4

Mo re ov e r, a lth ou g h Sa

pp le ton argue s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e fa ile d to
a de qu ate ly

re fl e c t hi s a g e and

c or re sp on din g ly

low ri sk of re c idi vis m, S a

pp le ton did no t r a ise thi s argument below, and w e thus revie w this objection for plain e rror . See United States v. Carter , 489 F.3d 528, 537 ( 2d Cir. 2007). Given that Sappleton c ommitt ed four narc otics offe nses af

ter ill e g a lly re e nte ri ngthe c ountr

y , w iththe mos t r e c e nt o ff e ns e oc c ur

ri ngle ss t ha n o ne month be fo re his arr a ig nme nt i n th is a c tio n, we c ann ot c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt c omm itt e d p la in
err or whe n it declined to re duce Sapple ton’s sentenc e base d on an alleg ed unlikelihood of
re c idi vis m. L ike wi se , a lth ou g h Sa pp le ton argue s th at hi s se nte nc e sh ou ld h ave be e n lo we r i n light o f a lle g e d d isp ari tie s b e tw e e n th e ill e g a l r e e ntr y Gu ide lin e s r ang e and

the ra ng e s f or c e rt a in other c rimes, in the circ umstances of this case we see no e rror in the district court’s sente nce. In short, g iven Sappleton’s cr iminal hist ory , the nee d for de terre nce, the need to pr otect the pu bli c fr om f

ur the r c ri me s, and

the oth e r f

a c tor s e nume ra

te d in se c tio n 3 55 3( a ), thi s c a se does not prese nt one of the “ exceptional case s” whe re the district court’s de cision “ca nnot be located w ithin the rang e of pe rmissible decisions.” Rigas , 490 F.3d at 238. We have c onsidered Sapple ton’s rema ining a rguments and find them to be without merit. A c c o r d i n g l y, f

o r th e f o r e g o i n gr e a s o n s , th e j u d g m e n to f th e d i s tr i c tc o urti s h e r e b y AF F IRM ED
. FOR THE COURT: CATHERI

NE O' HAGANWOL FE, CL ERK