[Cite as State v. Wyatt, 2021-Ohio-3146.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WARREN COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Appellee, 

 - vs - 

CHARLES R. WYATT, 

 Appellant. 

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CASE NO. CA2020-11-076 

O P I N I O N 

9/13/2021 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. 19CR035909 

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Kirsten A. Brandt, 520 Justice 

Drive, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for appellee 

Johnna M. Shia, P.O. Box 145, Springboro, Ohio 45066, for appellant 

 HENDRICKSON, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Charles R. Wyatt, appeals from a decision of the Warren County 

Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons stated below, we 

affirm the decision of the trial court. 

{¶ 2} On October 21, 2019, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

possession of drugs (methamphetamine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(b), a 
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felony of the third degree, one count of counterfeiting in violation of R.C. 2913.30(B)(3) and 

(C), a felony of the fourth degree, one count of possessing drug abuse instruments in 

violation of R.C. 2925.12(A) and (C), a misdemeanor of the second degree, and one count 

of the illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1) and 

(F)(1), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The charges arose following a pat down of 

appellant's person, during which appellant was found to be in possession of 

methamphetamine and a counterfeit $50 bill. 

{¶ 3} Appellant pled not guilty to the charges and moved to suppress evidence and 

statements obtained following the detention and search of his person, arguing there was no 

reasonable articulable suspicion justifying law enforcement's search or seizure of his 

person. He further argued that law enforcement exceeded the scope of a permissive search 

for weapons by searching for drugs and manipulating objects in his pockets. 

{¶ 4} A hearing on appellant's motion to suppress was held on February 4, 2020. 

At this time, the state presented testimony from two officers assigned to the Warren County 

Drug Task Force (WCDTF). Sergeant Lacy testified his works for the Warren County 

Sheriff's Office and has been assigned to the WCDTF since 2014. Around 2:45 p.m. on 

August 16, 2019, he and other members of the WCDTF were in the parking lot of the 

Franklin Municipal Court in order to serve an arrest warrant on Kayla Nipper. Nipper was 

being arrested on a charge of mailing narcotics to jail. Sergeant Lacy and another officer, 

Officer Aspacher, were dressed in street clothes rather than in a uniform, but both men wore 

vests identifying themselves as "Sheriff" or "Police." Other officers on scene to assist with 

the arrest, including Trooper Roddy, an officer with the Ohio State Highway Patrol, were in 

uniform. 

{¶ 5} Nipper drove into the court's parking lot and parked next to Sergeant Lacy's 

unmarked vehicle. Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat of Nipper's car. Nipper 
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exited her vehicle and started walking towards the courthouse. At this time, Sergeant Lacy 

and other officers approached Nipper and took her into custody without incident. 

{¶ 6} Appellant remained in Nipper's car during Nipper's arrest. Sergeant Lacy 

testified that after Nipper was arrested, he looked at appellant, who was approximately 50 

feet away, and observed that appellant appeared surprised and had a "shocked, stunned 

expression" on his face. Sergeant Lacy also observed that appellant's hands were down 

by his waist, manipulating something in his crotch area, as if in "an attempt to conceal 

something." Sergeant Lacy approached the vehicle while repeatedly telling appellant to put 

his hands up. Sergeant Lacy explained appellant's failure to immediately raise his hands 

as directed was concerning because "when we approach anyone in a drug investigation, 

we're concerned with weapons and concealment of evidence." The sergeant further 

testified that as a result of the thousands of drug investigations he had been involved in, he 

"always" has concerns with suspects or their associates having weapons on their person, 

explaining that "[w]ith drugs * * * comes weapons especially, when we're dealing with meth." 

{¶ 7} With the help of Trooper Roddy, Sergeant Lacy removed appellant from the 

vehicle and handcuffed him. Trooper Roddy did a "quick" weapons pat down of appellant's 

person. However, because Trooper Roddy was a female officer patting down a male 

subject, her pat down did not extend to appellant's crotch area, where Sergeant Lacy had 

observed appellant moving his hands.1 Trooper Roddy did not discover any weapons on 

1. Sergeant Lacy testified as follows when asked about the thoroughness of Trooper Roddy's pat down of 

appellant's person: 

[Prosecutor]: [D]o you recall how much of a pat down [Trooper Roddy] did? 

Was it a quick one, was it a long in depth one? 

[Sergeant. Lacy]: I believe she probably just did a quick pat down for a 

weapons check. Trooper Roddy is a female. Mr. Wyatt's a male. 

[Prosecutor]: Why is that significant then? 
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appellant. 

{¶ 8} Subsequent to Trooper Roddy's pat down of appellant, Officer Aspacher 

approached appellant and read him his Miranda rights. Appellant stated he had a Viagra 

pill on him. Sergeant Lacy could not recall whether appellant indicated he had a prescription 

for the medicine. He also could not recall whether Officer Aspacher retrieved the pill from 

appellant's person. He did, however, recall that Officer Aspacher, a male officer, conducted 

a pat down of appellant, during which crystal methamphetamine and a counterfeit $50 bill 

were located in appellant's pants pocket. 

{¶ 9} Officer Aspacher was the second officer to testify at the suppression hearing. 

He testified that he has over 11 years of police experience and is currently employed by the 

city of Monroe Police Department He was assigned to the WCDTF in May or June 2019. 

He explained that he handles drug possession charges on a weekly basis and has been 

trained to identify street drugs, including methamphetamine. Based on his training and 

experience, he is aware that "[d]rugs and guns go hand and hand." In his drug 

[Sergeant. Lacy]: If at all possible, we like males to search males, females to 

search females. 

[Prosecutor]: Okay. So, if that's the case and you were saying that the 

defendant was moving towards his crotch, would Trooper Roddy have been 

authorized or should she have been patting down the defendant in his crotch 

region? 

* * * 

[Sergeant. Lacy]: There are situations where a female would pat down a 

male, in very extreme situations. If she's the only one there and she has to 

make sure that there's not a weapon there, absolutely. But, if there's males 

standing right there, there would be absolutely no reason for a female to pat 

a male down while there are male officers there. 

[Prosecutor]: Okay, in that area? 

[Sergeant. Lacy]: Right. 

[Prosecutor]: Meaning in the crotch? 

[Sergeant. Lacy]: Right. 
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investigations, he frequently encounters weapons, including individuals armed with knives 

"pretty much every single time." 

{¶ 10} Officer Aspacher testified that on August 16, 2019, he was dressed in plain 

clothes and parked in the Franklin Municipal Court parking lot awaiting Nipper's arrival. He 

was stationed on the opposite side of the lot from where Nipper parked. By the time Officer 

Aspacher approached Nipper's car, Nipper had already been taken into custody and 

appellant had been removed from Nipper's vehicle and handcuffed. Although he believed 

Trooper Roddy had conducted a "real quick pat down" of appellant, he did not think she had 

done an "in depth" pat down due to appellant being the opposite sex. Because he was 

concerned about appellant being able to reach for a weapon, he decided to conduct a pat 

down. However, before patting down appellant, he read appellant his Miranda rights and 

asked appellant if he had anything illegal on his person. Appellant responded he had some 

Viagra in his pocket but did not indicate whether he had a prescription for the drug. Officer 

Aspacher located the Viagra in appellant's front right jeans pocket before conducting a pat 

down of appellant's person. 

{¶ 11} During the pat down, Officer Aspacher observed a bulge in the right front 

pocket of appellant's jeans. Officer Aspacher ran his flat hand across the bulge without 

squeezing, moving, rolling, or pushing on it and heard "plastic crinkling," which in his training 

and experience was consistent with drug storage. It was immediately apparent to Officer 

Aspacher what he was feeling was methamphetamine, "just based on the size of it and what 

we were there for." Officer Aspacher retrieved the substance from appellant's pocket and 

observed a hard, semi-clear crystal substance consistent with methamphetamine in a clear 

plastic sandwich baggie. He also recovered a counterfeit $50 bill from appellant's pocket. 

Thereafter, appellant "made some statements" to him and a canine sniff of Nipper's vehicle 

was conducted. 
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{¶ 12} After hearing from Sergeant Lacy and Officer Aspacher, the trial court took 

the matter under advisement. On March 4, 2020, the trial court issued a decision denying 

appellant's motion to suppress. The court found that the stop, or detention, of appellant 

was permissible as "there was reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant was engaged 

in, or about to engage in, criminal activity." Moreover, the court found that Officer Aspacher 

had not exceeded the scope of a permissive pat down and that the "plain feel doctrine" 

permitted the seizure of contraband discovered during the pat down for weapons. 

{¶ 13} Following the denial of his motion to suppress, appellant entered a no contest 

plea to all the charges against him. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate 

prison term of 30 months. 

{¶ 14} Appellant timely appealed from his conviction, raising the following as his sole 

assignment of error: 

{¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WYATT'S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS. 

{¶ 16} Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress as 

the state failed to demonstrate that the officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity to initially detain him, to continue his detention, or to arrest him. He further 

contends that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that he was armed and 

dangerous in order to conduct a pat down for weapons and that the second pat down 

exceeded the scope of what was authorized by the Fourth Amendment as the search was 

not for weapons. 

{¶ 17} "Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed 

question of law and fact." State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, ¶ 14, citing 

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court, as the trier of 

fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence to resolve factual questions and evaluate 
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witness credibility. State v. Vaughn, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2014-Ohio-05-012, 2015-

Ohio-828, ¶ 8. Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, 

this court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence. Turner at ¶ 14. "An appellate court * * * independently 

reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts and determines, without 

deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the 

appropriate legal standard." State v. Cochran, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2006-10-023, 2007-

Ohio-3353, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 18} Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. State v. Jimenez, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-09-103, 2012-Ohio-3318, ¶ 9; 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). Any searches or seizures 

that occur "outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are 

per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specially 

established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz at 357. An investigative stop, or a Terry

stop, by a police officer is a common exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). Under Terry, a police 

officer may detain an individual without probable cause when the officer has reasonable 

suspicion based on specific, articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 21. "An 

investigatory stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

if the police have reasonable suspicion that 'the person stopped is, or is about to be, 

engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 35, 

quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981). 

{¶ 19} Reasonable articulable suspicion is "something more than an undeveloped 

suspicion or hunch" but is less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. State 
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v. Hinkston, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-03-012, 2020-Ohio-6903, ¶ 18. "Reasonable 

articulable suspicion exists when there are specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together, with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." State 

v. Hill, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-05-044, 2015-Ohio-4655, ¶ 10, citing State v. Bobo, 

37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 (1988). Reasonable and articulable suspicion is determined by 

evaluating the totality of the circumstances "through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent 

police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold." State v. Popp, 12th 

Dist. Butler No. CA2010-05-128, 2011-Ohio-791, ¶ 13. "This process allows officers to draw 

on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions 

about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained 

person.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), quoting Cortez, 

449 U.S. at 418. 

{¶ 20} After an officer makes a lawful Terry stop, the officer may conduct a limited 

protective search, or a pat down, for weapons if the officer has "reason to believe that he is 

dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable 

cause to arrest the individual for a crime." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Popp at ¶ 12. "The officer 

need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably 

prudent main in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that 

of others was in danger." Terry at 27. "The rationale behind the protective search is to 

allow the officer to take reasonable precautions for his own safety in order to pursue his 

investigation without fear of violence." State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 89 (1991), citing 

Terry at 24, 30. 

{¶ 21} Based on the totality of the circumstances presented in the present case, we 

find that law enforcement had reasonable and articulable suspicion to effectuate a Terry

stop on appellant in order to investigate the possibility of criminal activity and that the 
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officers acted lawfully in conducting a protective pat down of appellant for weapons. 

Appellant is correct that one's mere proximity to or association with others independently 

suspected of criminal activity does not alone provide a sufficient basis to search that person. 

See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338 (1979); State v. Davis, 140 Ohio 

App.3d 659, 664 (9th Dist.2000). However, Sergeant Lacy's testimony established that 

appellant's association with Nipper was not the sole basis for appellant's detention and 

subsequent pat down. Rather, Sergeant Lacy had reason to believe that Wyatt was 

engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity when he was detained following 

Nipper's arrest. 

{¶ 22} At the time law enforcement encountered appellant, they were arresting 

appellant's associate, Nipper, on drug-related crimes. Appellant appeared shocked and 

stunned that the arrest occurred. After appellant witnessed Nipper's arrest, appellant began 

to manipulate something in his crotch area, as if trying to conceal something. Sergeant 

Lacy observed the movements appellant made around his waist and the sergeant directed 

appellant to put up his hands. Appellant did so only after Sergeant Lacy made repeated 

demands. 

{¶ 23} Sergeant Lacy explained that based on appellant's movements around his 

waist, the sergeant was concerned with "weapons and concealment of evidence." 

Following thousands of drug investigations over a more than 20-year career in law 

enforcement, Sergeant Lacy was well aware that weapons are commonly found among 

narcotic suspects and their associates. 

{¶ 24} This court has previously recognized that "the need for a protective pat-down 

becomes more urgent where drugs are involved." Jimenez, 2012-Ohio-3318 at ¶ 15. See 

also State v. Bales, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24897, 2012-Ohio-4968, ¶ 23. "The very 

nexus between drugs and guns can create a reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer." 
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State v. Thompson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050400, 2006-Ohio-4285, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 25} Accordingly, based on Sergeant Lacy's experience and training and his 

observations of appellant's behavior, we find that Sergeant Lacy had sufficient reasonable 

suspicion to detain appellant in order to conduct an investigative stop under Terry. Sergeant 

Lacy and his fellow officers acted lawfully in removing appellant from Nipper's vehicle, 

placing appellant in handcuffs, and subjecting him to a pat down. 

{¶ 26} Appellant contends that even if the first pat down of his person, conducted by 

Trooper Roddy, was lawful, the second search conducted by Officer Aspacher violated his 

constitutional rights as there was no reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the scope 

of the initial seizure and search. He contends that following Trooper Roddy's search, Officer 

Aspacher had no reason to believe he was armed and dangerous. 

{¶ 27} This court has previously recognized that "the rationale for a protective Terry

search 'becomes attenuated with successive searches.'" State v. Bean, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2015-07-136, 2016-Ohio-876, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Hackett, 171 Ohio App.3d 235, 

2007-Ohio-1868, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.). "[T]he basis for a Terry search is diminished each 

additional time an officer searches a subject." State v. Dunlap, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 

12 CO 31, 2013-Ohio-5637, ¶ 33. "When the use of multiple protective searches exceeds 

the rationale behind a Terry-type investigation, it becomes unreasonable." Hackett at ¶ 17. 

Accord Bean at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 28} "A second-pat down search has been found to be justified when the officer 

who conducted the second pat-down search did not observe the first pat down or was 

concerned with the adequacy of the first pat down." State v. Garrett, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 27630, 2018-Ohio-4530, ¶ 56. See, e.g., Bean at ¶ 17; State v. Willette, 4th Dist. 

Washington No. 11CA32, 2013-Ohio-223, ¶ 22; State v. Davis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

22572, 2008-Ohio-2885, ¶ 16. 
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{¶ 29} In State v. Davis, 2008-Ohio-2885, a female was frisked for weapons by a 

male officer before being placed in the officer's patrol car. During this search, no weapons 

were discovered. Id. at ¶ 7. The defendant was not under arrest at this time, although the 

officer was investigating pills he had observed in the defendant's open purse when the 

defendant was taking out her license. Id. Once a second officer arrived on scene, the 

defendant was moved into the second officer's patrol car. Id. at ¶ 9-10. However, before 

being placed in the second officer's car, the officer, a female, conducted a second pat down 

of the defendant. Id. at ¶ 10. During the search, the female officer felt hard plastic in the 

defendant's groin area, which ended up being a bottle holding crack cocaine, empty gel 

caps of heroin, and Viagra. Id. At this time, the defendant was arrested and subjected to 

another search by the female officer, during which time a baggie of powdered cocaine was 

found underneath the defendant's bra. Id. at ¶ 10. The defendant filed a motion to 

suppress, which the trial court granted, finding that the second officer "did not have a 

reasonable belief that [the] [d]efendant was armed when she conducted the [second] patdown." Id. at ¶ 12. The Second District reversed, finding that the female officer had a 

reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed to justify conducting a second pat 

down. Id. at ¶ 15. The court noted that 

[a]lthough [the defendant] had already been frisked for weapons

by [the male officer] prior to being placed in his cruiser, a male 

officer might be more restrained when patting down a female. 

Despite the fact that [the defendant] was wearing very tight 

clothing consisting of very short shorts and a short, skimpy top, 

it was possible for her to conceal a small weapon in her groin 

and breast areas – areas which a male officer may be reluctant 

to pat down. In short, we find that [the female officer's] patdown 

of [the defendant] prior to placing her in her cruiser was lawful. 

Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 30} The present case is similar to Davis in that the first pat down of appellant was 

conducted by an officer of the opposite sex, Trooper Roddy. Both Sergeant Lacy and 
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Officer Aspacher testified that Trooper Roddy's search of appellant's person was "quick" 

and did not extend to appellant's crotch area. As Sergeant Lacy explained, there was 

"absolutely no reason" for Trooper Roddy, a female officer, "to pat a male down [in the 

crotch area] while there are male officers there." Officer Aspacher, in turn, testified that he 

had concerns about appellant being able to reach for a weapon and therefore conducted a 

second pat down of appellant for officer safety. Under these circumstances, we find that 

the second pat down of appellant was reasonable and did not violate appellant's 

constitutional rights. 

{¶ 31} We further find, contrary to appellant's assertions, that appellant was not 

under arrest when he was handcuffed and subjected to the pat downs. As we have 

previously recognized, "[a]n individual may * * * be temporarily restrained either for his own 

safety or that of the officer." Popp, 2011-Ohio-791 at ¶ 20. Placing an individual in 

handcuffs before conducting a pat down does not automatically convert the investigation 

into an arrest. Fairfield v. Adams, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA95-09-153, 1996 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 1563, *4-5 (Apr. 22, 1996); State v. Dunson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20961, 2006-

Ohio-775, ¶ 17. The fact that Officer Aspacher read appellant his Miranda rights and asked 

appellant if he had anything illegal on his person before conducting the second pat down 

also did not convert the Terry investigation into an arrest requiring probable cause. 

{¶ 32} Finally, we find that Officer Aspacher's pat down did not exceed the scope of 

a protective search and that the contraband found in appellant's pants pocket was subject 

to seizure under the plain-feel doctrine. "Under Terry and its progeny, the police may search 

only for weapons when conducting a pat down of the suspect." State v. Evans, 67 Ohio 

St.3d 405, 414 (1993). "'The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of 

crime, but to allow the officer to pursue [the officer's] investigation without fear of violence * 

* *.'" Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993), quoting Adams v. 
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Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972). "[O]nce the officer determines from his 

sense of touch that an object is not a weapon, the pat-down frisk must stop." Evans at 414. 

{¶ 33} However, "[u]nder the plain feel doctrine, if, during a pat down, the officer feels 

an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent as contraband, 

the officer may seize the object." State v. Fisk, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2020-11-016, 2021-

Ohio- 2989, ¶ 31, citing Dickerson at 375-376. The "immediately apparent" requirement is 

satisfied if the officer has probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity based 

on the totality of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Grant, 12th Dist. Preble No. 

CA2014-12-014, 2015-Ohio-2464, ¶ 17. The officer may not manipulate the object to 

determine its incriminating nature. Id.; Bean, 2016-Ohio-876 at ¶ 18. 

{¶ 34} Immediately prior to the second pat down of appellant's person, Officer 

Aspacher recovered Viagra that appellant advised was in his front right jean pocket. The 

recovery of the Viagra from this pocket, however, did not foreclose the possibility that 

appellant may have been armed with a weapon. Officer Aspacher observed a bulge in 

appellant's right front jean pocket, near the crotch area that Trooper Roddy had not patted 

down. To ensure his safety, Officer Aspacher ran his flat hand across the bulge. At that 

time, he heard plastic crinkling. Based on his training and experience with how drugs were 

packaged, it was immediately apparent to Officer Aspacher that he was feeling 

methamphetamine, "just based on the size of it and what we were there for." Officer 

Aspacher denied that he manipulated the object, stating "All I did was touch it. I didn't 

squeeze it, move it around, roll it, push on it." Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer 

Aspacher had the right, pursuant to the plain-feel doctrine, to seize the contraband items 

he felt in appellant's pocket. 

{¶ 35} Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we find that the trial court did not 

err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. Law enforcement's investigative Terry stop 
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and pat down of appellant did not violate appellant's constitutional rights. Appellant's sole 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 36} Judgment affirmed. 

 PIPER, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.