NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEVEN THOMAS WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0089

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201400410

The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Jr., Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Michael F. Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Chief Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Steven Thomas Williams appeals his conviction and sentence 

imposed after a jury found him guilty of one count of possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Williams argues the superior court erred when it allowed 

the State to introduce statements from Kellie Davis, a co-defendant who did 

not testify in their joint trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Officers executed a search warrant on a home in Bullhead 

City.1 On their arrival, they detained Davis near the home's entrance and 

found Williams in the master bedroom. Searching the master bedroom and 

bathroom, officers found a digital scale, two glass pipes with 

methamphetamine residue, Williams's wallet and identification, and mail 

addressed to both Williams and Davis at the home.

¶3 Davis and Williams each were charged with possession of 

drug paraphernalia. Four officers testified, including one who questioned 

Davis about the items found in the home. The officer testified Davis 

admitted she and Williams lived in the home and shared the master 

bedroom. He testified that when Davis learned what officers had found in 

the home, she stated that whatever the officers had found belonged to her, 

that she would "take the blame" for anything found, and that she did not 

want Williams to go to jail. Williams did not object to the officer's

testimony.

¶4 The jury found Williams guilty of one count of possession of 

drug paraphernalia and the court sentenced him to 1.75 years'

imprisonment. This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised 

 

1 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 

most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. State v. Vandever, 211 Ariz. 

206, 207, n.2 (App. 2005).
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

3

Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2017), 13-4031 (2017), and -4033(A)(1) 

(2017).

2

DISCUSSION

¶5 Williams argues that the hearsay statements by Davis that the 

officer recounted directly implicated him, in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to confrontation. We review arguments raised for the 

first time on appeal for fundamental error. State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 

457, ¶ 144 (2016). To prevail under this standard of review, a defendant 

must establish both that fundamental error occurred and that the error 

caused him prejudice. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 20 (2005).

¶6 Fundamental error is error that "goes to the foundation of [a 

defendant's] case, takes away a right that is essential to his defense, and is 

of such magnitude that he could not have received a fair trial." Id. at 568, ¶ 

24. The showing required to establish prejudice "differs from case to case." 

Id. at ¶ 26. A defendant "must show that a reasonable jury, applying the 

appropriate standard of proof, could have reached a different result." Id. at 

569, ¶ 27.

¶7 A defendant may be deprived of his Sixth Amendment right 

to confrontation when a non-testifying co-defendant's confession

incriminating the defendant is admitted at their joint trial. Bruton v. United 

States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (confession inadmissible despite limiting jury 

instruction). But this rule only applies when the co-defendant's confession 

explicitly implicates the defendant. State v. Blackman, 201 Ariz. 527, 538, ¶¶

42, 48 (App. 2002); see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987) 

(Bruton does not extend "to confession that was not incriminating on its 

face" but which "became so only when linked with evidence introduced 

later at trial.").

¶8 In Blackman, for example, a co-defendant had said that "about 

30" men were present at an event at which the State alleged several boys, 

including the defendant, forced a victim to engage in sex. Blackman, 201 

Ariz. at 532, ¶ 4. The co-defendant denied having sex with the victim, but 

conceded, in the hearsay statement recounted at trial, that things "got out 

of control[;] it got out of hand." 201 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 35. The court held the 

co-defendant's statement did not violate the defendant's confrontation 

clause rights because it did not directly refer to him and was not "facially 

 

2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

4

incriminating." 201 Ariz. at 540, ¶ 52 (quoting State v. Herrera, 174 Ariz. 387, 

395 (1993)). The court explained that in order for the statement to 

incriminate the defendant, the jury would have to make "at least two 

inferential steps," removing the case "from the 'narrow exception' created 

by the ruling in Bruton." Id. at ¶ 53.

¶9 Here, Davis's statements did not facially or expressly 

implicate Williams. Her statements, in fact, expressly implicated herself, 

and exculpated Williams. That is why in closing argument, Williams's 

counsel cited those statements in arguing the jury should find Davis guilty, 

but not Williams. In order for the hearsay statements to incriminate 

Williams, the jury would have to make at least two inferential steps: (1) that 

Davis was not telling the truth when she told the officer that all of the illegal 

items in the house belonged only to her; and (2) that Davis was taking the 

"blame" for Williams, instead of for a third person. As with the codefendant's statements in Blackman, these necessary inferences remove this 

case from a Bruton analysis. The superior court did not err, therefore, in 

admitting the hearsay statements.

3

CONCLUSION

¶10 For the foregoing reasons, Williams's conviction and sentence

is affirmed.

 

3 Williams did not ask the superior court to give a limiting instruction 

with respect to the hearsay statements, and does not argue on appeal that 

even if the statements did not directly implicate him, the omission of such 

an instruction was fundamental error.