In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CARLOS BELTRAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 388 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 22, 2013 — DECIDED MAY 15, 2014

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Carlos Beltran of

both possessing and conspiring to possess, with the intent to

distribute, 500 grams or more of cocaine and one kilogram or

more of heroin. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. The district

court ordered him to serve a term of 168 months in prison.

Beltran appeals, contending that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress the evidence—including large
2 No. 12-2990

quantities of cocaine and heroin, and various items associated

with narcotics trafficking—seized from his residence on the

day of his arrest. We affirm.

I.

Our summary of the facts is based largely on the district

court’s findings below. We have, in a few instances, supplemented those findings with additional relevant details disclosed by the testimony presented at the suppression hearing.

Beltran owed a two-flat residence in Berwyn, Illinois. At

approximately 2:30 p.m. on May 13, 2008, seven members of a

federal Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)task force,

comprised of both federal agents and local police officers,

arrived at Beltran’s residence to interview him. There was no

response when they rang the doorbells for the first- and

second-floor apartments and knocked at the front door, but

five minutes later, task force officer Sam Ayyad spotted

someone in a second-floor window and asked him to come

down to the front entry. Beltran’s co-defendant, Jesus Ivan

Vazquez-Ramirez complied with Ayyad’s request and came

down to the front porch of the building.

Vazquez-Ramirez, who was conversing in Spanish with

someone on his cell phone when he emerged from the building, informed the task force members that he did not speak

English very well but that he had the owner of the building on

the phone; he then handed the phone to DEA special agent

Donald Wood. Beltran identified himself to Wood, and Wood

explained that he and the other officers were at his residence

and wished to speak with him. Beltran indicated that he was at

work and that it would take him at least an hour to get home.
No. 12-2990 3

In response to Wood’s inquiries, Beltran denied that there was

any illegal contraband in the residence, agreed to let the

officers conduct a search of the premises, but asked that they

wait for his arrival before doing so. Beltran also advised the

officers that he lived in the first floor of the building and that

Vazquez-Ramirez lived in the second-floor apartment. Wood

asked Beltran to inquire of Vazquez-Ramirez whether he

would consent to a search of the upstairs apartment and

handed the phone back to Vazquez-Ramirez. After a short

conversation in Spanish between the two men, Wood re-took

the phone and learned from Beltran that Vazquez-Ramirez

would also agree to a search but that he too requested that the

officers postpone their search until Beltran arrived. Wood

agreed, endedthe call, andreturned Vazquez-Ramirez’s phone

to him. Vazquez-Ramirez remained on the front porch with

several of the officers while they awaited Beltran’s arrival.

During the wait, Vazquez-Ramirez placed or received a

number of calls (speaking in Spanish). He was sweating and

appeared nervous to the officers. 

About 15 minutes after Wood finished the call with Beltran,

one of the officers, looking from the edge of the front porch

toward the back yard, saw someone that he believed to be

Beltran walk into the back yard from the alley, talking on his

cell phone. (The officers had seen a picture of Beltran.) When

that information was conveyed to the other officers, officer

Mark Porlier moved toward the rear of the residence to a point

where he could see over the back fence. Porlier could see that

the back door to the building was closed and that there was no

one in the back yard. He remained there. Meanwhile, agents

Wood and Ayyad heard footsteps coming from the second
4 No. 12-2990

floor apartment and/or the stairway connecting the first and

second floors; they also heard the door to the upstairs apartment being slammed shut. Vazquez-Ramirez, of course, was

still in front of the building with the agents, and he had

previously advised Wood that no one else was present in the

building. Over the next 20 or so minutes, Vazquez-Ramirez

remained on the front porch with the agents.

During this period, officer Mike Bedalow, who had posted

himself in the alley behind the building immediately after

Beltran’s arrival, noticed a set of trash cans in the alley, just

outside of the fence surrounding the back yard; the cans had

the street number of Beltran’s building stenciled on them.

Bedalow decided to look inside the cans. He discovered

packaging materials which, based on his training and experience, looked like they had been used to wrap one or more

kilogram-sized “bricks” of narcotics. The materials were

comprised of multiple layers of green plastic wrapping

(variously describedby the witnesses as resembling cellophane

or Saran wrap), packing tape, and dryer sheets (used to mask ®

the odor of narcotics from police and drug-sniffing dogs). The

discarded materials retained the brick shape of their previous

contents.

Approximately 20 to 25minutes after Porlier posted himself

at the back of the residence, he saw Beltran emerge through the

back door of the building with one of his hands inside of his

shirt. Although Porlier called out to Beltran, directing him to

place both of his hands where he could see them, Beltran did

not immediately comply. Porlier walked over to Beltran and

friskedhim. Porlier felt something in Beltran’s front pocket and

asked him if it was cash; Beltran told him it that it was, and
No. 12-2990 5

Porlier was able to look into the pocket and confirm that it was

a substantial roll of money. According to Porlier, Beltran was

“sweating, seemed very nervous, and was shaking.” R. 270 at

121.

When Wood was advised that Beltran had just emerged

from the residence, he handcuffed Vazquez-Ramirez, left him

on the front porch with Ayyad, and walked to the rear of the

residence to speak with Beltran. He found Beltran to be visibly

nervous and soaked in sweat, as if he had just been engaged in

vigorous physical activity. Officer James Healy, who had

accompanied Wood to the back yard, described Beltran as “all

sweaty and he seemed out of breath and excited.” R. 259 at 41. 

Agent Wood asked Beltran what he was doing, and Beltran

said that he had just arrived from work and was coming to talk

to the agents. Wood believed that this was a lie, and that

Beltran in fact had arrived some 20-plus minutes earlier.

Beltran denied having just been inside of the building and

insisted that he had just arrived in his car. When Wood asked

Beltran to show him where he had parked his vehicle, Beltran

led him to the alley and identified his car, parked halfway

down the block. Wood noticed that there were several open

parking spots much closer to Beltran’s residence. Wood asked

Beltran for the second time whether there was any contraband

inside of the residence; once again, Beltran answered in the

negative.

Also for the second time, Wood solicited Beltran’s permission to search the residence and, initially, Beltran (again) gave

it, adding that he did not have the authority to consent to a

search of the second-floor apartment that Vazquez-Ramirez
6 No. 12-2990

was renting from him. But, at that point, the conversation took

a turn. Beltran asked Wood whether he had a search warrant.

Wood replied that he did not. Beltran then withdrew his

consent for a search and indicated he would prefer that the

agents obtain a warrant. Wood told him that was fine.

Wood began to secure the premises in order to maintain the

status quo while a warrant was sought. The first step he took

toward that end was to handcuff Beltran. He asked Beltran

whether there was anyone else inside the residence. When

Beltran replied that there was not, Wood asked him whether it

would be alright if he looked inside to make sure. Beltran

agreed. Wood and other officers then performed a protective

sweep of the premises and confirmed that no one else was

present. 

At the conclusion of the sweep, Wood returned to the front

of the residence and, with the help of a Spanish-speaking agent

whom Wood contacted by telephone, solicited VazquezRamirez’s permission to search the second-floor apartment;

Vazquez-Ramirez orally agreed to the search and thereafter

signed a Spanish-language consent form. Wood and Healy

then conducted a 10 to 15-minute search of the apartment.

Inside of an otherwise empty bedroom in the apartment, they

found two storage bins. One of the bins contained a money

counter, packaging material similar to that which Bedalow had

found in the garbage cans in the alley, and other items the

officers believed were used in narcotics trafficking; the other

bin contained over $1 million in cash. Elsewhere in the apartment, the officers discovered a loaded pistol.
No. 12-2990 7

Wood and Healy returned to the back yard, told Beltran

what they had found in Vazquez-Ramirez’s apartment, and

advised him that he (Beltran) was going to be taken with the

officers back to the DEA office where they would prepare an

application for a search warrant. While Wood was walking

Beltran to a vehicle, Beltran announced that he wished to

cooperate and that he would agree to a search of his residence.

The agents presented Beltran with a written consent form,

which he signed after reading it.

The search of Beltran’s first-floor residence and basement

produced, among other items, a shotgun, scales, a heat sealer,

two bottles of drug-cutting agents, more packaging material

which was consistent in color and texture with the material

found both in the upstairs apartment and in the trash cans left

in the alley, and a number of clear plastic bags that were

covered in some type of residue and appeared damp. A drugsniffing dog later alerted to those baggies.

When agents looked inside of a washer and dryer located

on the second floor landing outside of Vazquez-Ramirez’s

apartment, they found another large stash of money inside of

the washing machine and, inside of the dryer, a Louis Vuitton

bag containing approximately three kilograms of cocaine. A

more thorough search of the bins in the apartment bedroom

unearthed nine kilograms of heroin.

Beltran sat in the front room of his residence chatting with

Porlier while the search was underway. Approximately 40

minutes after Beltran signed the consent-to-search form, he

was read his Miranda rights, and Wood asked him whether he

would agree to an interview. Beltran declined, indicating that
8 No. 12-2990

he had already cooperated by giving his consent to search his

residence.

A grand jury subsequently indicted both Beltran and

Vazquez-Ramirez of conspiring to possess and possessing 500

or more grams of cocaine and a kilogram or more of heroin

with the intent to distribute them, in violation of sections

841(a)(1) and 846. They were also charged with possessing

firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking activity. See 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). They both filed motions asking the court to

suppress the large quantities of cocaine, heroin, and cash,

among other evidence, discovered in the search of the two-flat.

Beltran contended that his consent to search the portion of the

building outside of the second-floor apartment was the

product of coercion rather than free will, as Wood had handcuffed him when he insisted on a search warrant, which

Beltran views as an arrest designed to pressure him into giving

his consent. 

The district court denied Beltran’s motion to suppress (as

well as his co-defendant’s motion, which we need not discuss)

after conducting a lengthy evidentiary hearing that featured

testimony from Beltran, Vazquez-Ramirez (who had filed his

own motion to suppress), and seven of the officers who played

some role in the events of May 13, 2008. See United States v.

Beltran, No. 08 CR 388, 2010 WL 379873 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010).

At the outset, the court noted that Beltran’s account of events

diverged materially from those of the officers; and after

pointing out multiple aspects of Beltran’s testimony that were

shown to be false, the court credited the officers’ version of

events over his. Id., at *5. From there, the court proceeded to
No. 12-2990 9

analyze the officers’ interaction with Beltran upon his arrival

at the residence.

The court agreed that Porlier had initiated an investigatory

stop of Beltran when Beltran exited the back door of the

residence and Porlier approached him and patted him down.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 27, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868,

1880, 1883, 1884–85 (1968). Based on the facts known to Porlier,

the court held that reasonable suspicion supported both the

stop and the frisk, as (1) Beltran, knowing that the officers were

waiting to speak with him, had chosen to enterthe building for

some period of time rather than meet with the officers immediately upon his arrival; (2) the packaging materials discovered

in the trash cans in the alley were suggestive of narcotics

activity; and (3) drug trafficking is often associated with the

use of firearms. Thus, Porlier could reasonably suspect that

Beltran was engaged in narcotics trafficking and that he might

be armed. 2010 WL 379873, at *10. Wood’s decision to place

handcuffs on Beltran was likewise appropriate, the court

reasoned, given that Wood not only knew what Porlier knew

but also had heard someone moving around the upstairs

apartment. Id., at *11. The court added that within a short time

after Wood was placed in handcuffs, the reasonable suspicion

that supported the investigatory detention of Beltran ripened

into probable cause to arrest him, with the discovery of the one

million dollars in cash, the loaded pistol, and the packaging

materials in Vazquez-Ramirez’s apartment. Id.

The court also found that Beltran’s consent to search the

remainder of the building was the product of his free will

rather than coercion by Wood and the other officers. Because

the court had deemed Beltran’s detention to be lawful, his
10 No. 12-2990

consent was valid so long as the government proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that Beltran gave that consent

freely and voluntarily. Id. The court emphasized preliminarily

that Beltran had admitted, during his testimony, that he

understood what a search warrant was, that the officers

needed a warrant to search his residence absent his consent,

and that he had the right to withhold his consent. These

admissions themselves “strongly suggest[ed]” to the courtthat

Beltran’s consent was voluntary. Id. Nonetheless, the court

went on to consider Beltran’s specific contentions to the

contrary in light of the multiple factors we have identified as

bearing on the knowing and voluntary nature of his consent.

Id. (citing United States v. Sandoval-Vasquez, 435 F.3d 739, 744

(7th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d

696, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

The court found it most significant that the officers had

consistently adhered to Beltran’s requests over the course of

the encounter: At Beltran’s behest, they waited for his arrival

at the premises rather than proceeding immediately with a

search after he told Wood over the phone that he would agree

to a search; Wood respected Beltran’s later withdrawal of his

consent to search; and finally, it was Beltran who ultimately

volunteered his consent once he learned what the officers had

discovered in the upstairs apartment. Id.

Although Beltran argued that his consent was the product

of what he characterized as “ever-present coercion” by Wood

and the other officers—because they had “parked themselves”

on his doorstep while awaiting his return, placed him in

handcuffs when he arrived, and repeatedly solicited his

consent to search, see id., at *12—the court rejected this notion.
No. 12-2990 11

The fact that Beltran was in handcuffs did not “mechanically

vitiate” his consent: Although Beltran had not yet been advised

of his rights, he admitted that he understood his right to refuse;

the fact that he had given, and then withdrawn his consent,

and that the officers complied with his withdrawal, indicated

that he had some control over their actions; and although he

ultimately gave his consent to search the building, he did not

agree to be interviewed. Id. And although his consent to search

was solicited more than once, the court noted that Beltran had

immediately agreed to a search during Wood’s first conversation with him over the phone, which indicated to the court that

there was nothing magical about the fact that Beltran was

asked more than once for his permission to search the residence. Id., at *13. 

Finally, the court rejected Beltran’s contention that Wood’s

declaration that he would get a search warrant was a “threat”

aimed at pressuring Beltran to yield. Beltran had withdrawn

his consent to search at that point, Wood had a reasonable

factual basis to believe he had probable cause for a search

warrant, and he signaled his intent to obtain a warrant in

response to Beltran’s expressed wish that the officers follow

that very course. In short, the court was not persuaded that

Wood’s declaration was a mere pretext aimed at coercing

Beltran to (again) give his consent. Id.

After the court denied Beltran’s motion to suppress, he

proceeded to trial. (Vazquez-Ramirez pleaded guilty.) The jury

convicted Beltran on the two narcotics charges, although it

acquitted Beltran on the firearm charge. The sole issue that

Beltran pursues on appeal is whether the district court properly denied his motion to suppress.
12 No. 12-2990

II.

Beltran’s appeal hinges on two key contentions: first, that

he was effectively arrested before the officers had probable

cause to believe he was involved in anything criminal, and

second, that his consent to search his residence was the

product of both the wrongful arrest and the additional efforts

of Wood and the other officers to (allegedly) coerce him into

consenting.

The first contention hinges on the notion that what began

as a proper Terry stop morphed into a wrongful arrest once

Wood placed him in handcuffs. Beltran does not dispute that

there was reasonable suspicion for Porlier to commence an

investigatory detention, nor does he quarrel with Porlier’s

decision to pat him down. But once Porlier had frisked him

and discovered him to be unarmed, Beltran argues, there was

no reason to believe that he needed to be physically restrained

while the officers pursued their investigation. See, e.g., United

States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 972–73 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding

decision to place defendant in handcuffs did not transform

investigatory detention into arrest, where officers had reason

to believe defendant was armed and dangerous, and that

concerns for officer safety therefore justified use of restraints;

“we are unwilling to hold that under Terry, the placing of a

suspect in handcuffs without probable cause is always unlawful”) (emphasis in original); but see also United States v. Howard,

729 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Handcuffs in a Terry stop

and frisk are not and should not be the norm.”).

Beltran is correct that physically restraining someone, as by

putting him in handcuffs and/or confining him in the back of
No. 12-2990 13

a police car, normally is indicative of an arrest. See Glenna, 878

F.2d at 972; see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676

(2nd Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). Thegovernment counters that

this is not invariably so, invoking Glenna and its progeny to

argue that the use of handcuffs in this case was both justified

and consistent with the purposes of a Terry stop, and thus did

not transform the stop into an arrest. It reasons that in view of

the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Beltran was involved in

drug trafficking, which often involves firearms, it was appropriate for the officers to restrain Beltran for officer safety while

they pursued their investigation, even after the patdown

revealed that he was unarmed. Handcuffing Beltran was

particularly appropriate, the government maintains, giventhat

the officers had reason to believe that he was not only lying

about when he had arrived home from work and whether he

had been inside the building, but likely was attempting to

destroy evidence. 

We need not decide whether the use of handcuffs was

consistent with an ongoing Terry stop under the rationale of

Glenna and its progeny. For even if we assume that placing

Beltran in handcuffs transformed the investigatory stop into

arrest, we believe, contrary to Beltran’s premise, that Wood

had probable cause to arrest Beltran at that point in time.

Making a materially false statement to a federal agent is a

crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). When Wood confronted 1

Beltran after Beltran emerged from the building and asked him

This possibility was at least minimally raised during the suppression

1

hearing and in the briefing below and on appeal. See R. 97 at 8; R. 259 at

238–29; Gov’t Brief at 20 n.3.
14 No. 12-2990

what he was doing, Wood had reason to believe that Beltran

told him at least two lies: (1) that he had just arrived on the

premises, and (2) that he had not been inside the two-flat. Both

statements were demonstrably false in light of what Wood and

his colleagues knew. Beltran had been seen sneaking into the

back yard from the alley some 20 to 25 minutes earlier, and

Wood had heard him “rummaging around” upstairs, to use the

district court’s phrase. 2010 WL 379873, at *2. See United States

v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827–28 (7th Cir. 2007) (defendant’s statement to agent that he knew nothing about automobile that agent “had just seen him park and exit moments

earlier” supplied probable cause to arrest defendant for

making false statement in violation of § 1001). Beltran’s false

statements were material in the sense that they constituted an

effort to cover up his evident attempt to conceal or destroy

evidence, itself a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1)

(construed in United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 603–05 (7th

Cir. 2011)), and § 1519; see also United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d

790, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When statements are aimed at

misdirecting agents and their investigation, even if they miss

spectacularly or stand absolutely no chance of succeeding, they

satisfy the materiality requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.”). In

short, the facts confronting Wood warranted a reasonable

person in believing that Beltran had just committed a crime.

See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2013)

(defining probable cause to arrest). It does not matter whether

Wood had section 1001 in mind when he placed Beltran in

handcuffs; what matters is that given the facts known to him

at that time, he reasonably could have believed that Beltran

had made a false statement to him in violation of that statute.
No. 12-2990 15

See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593–94

(2004); see also, e.g., Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th

Cir. 2013); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir.

2007).

As the district court noted, not long after Beltran was

handcuffed, the officers developed probable cause to believe

that Beltran was implicated in additional crimes. Once the

officers searched the upstairs apartment with the consent of

Vazquez-Ramirez, they discovered more of the packaging

material, a loaded firearm, and over a million dollars in cash.

Those additional discoveries, coupled with Beltran’s evasive

behavior and the other facts known to the officers, warranted

a reasonable belief that Beltran was engaged in narcotics

trafficking. Notably, the search that yielded these discoveries 2

took place within a short time after Beltran was placed in

handcuffs. The record reflects that less than 20 minutes

separated the written consent to search that Vazquez-Ramirez

signed from the written consent that Beltran signed after he

was informed of what the officers had discovered in VazquezRamirez’s apartment. (By that time, Wood had informed

Beltran that he was going to be detained and taken with the

officers back to the DEA office.)

 Beltran has contended that there was no evidence linking the narcotics2

related materials to him: no one saw him placing the packaging materials

in the alley trash cans for example, and the million-plus dollars in cash, the

pistol, and the other items that were discovered in his tenant’s apartment

rather than his own. But particularly in light of Beltran’s surreptitious entry

into the building and his activity upstairs before he emerged and was

detained, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to believe that he had a

culpable connection to those materials.
16 No. 12-2990

The remaining question is whether Beltran’s consent to

search the remainder of the building was voluntarily given. As

the district court recognized, the government bore the burden

of proof on this point. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973) (collecting cases); see also, e.g.,

United States v. Hicks, 650 F.3d 1058, 1064 (7th Cir. 2011).

Factors bearing on this question include (1) Beltran's age,

intelligence, and education; (2) whether he was advised of his

constitutional rights; (3) how long he was detained before he

gave his consent; (4) whether his consent was immediate, or

was prompted by repeated requests by the authorities;

(5) whether any physical coercion was used; and (6) whether

he was in police custody when he gave his consent. E.g., United

States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 776 (7th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069, 1075–76 (7th Cir. 2001).

The court’s finding that Beltran’s consent was freely given is a

factual determination that we review for clear error. E.g.,

United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2008). 

There was no obvious mistake in the court’s well supported

and thoroughly explained finding that Beltran’s consent was

freely given. Certain of the relevant factors weigh negatively in

the calculus: Beltran was not only in custody but in handcuffs

at the moment he gave his consent, and he had not yet been

advised of his constitutional rights. Beltran naturally focuses

on the arrest and the restraints, arguing that Wood placed him

in handcuffs with the aim of extracting his consent and that

there was no intervening event, act of will, or significant

passage of time sufficient to attenuate his consent from his

arrest. Yet, as the district court rightly emphasized, Beltran not

only demonstrated a willingness to consent during his first
No. 12-2990 17

(telephonic) contact with Wood, but more to the point, he saw

first hand that Wood and the other officers would accede to his

wishes with respect to a search of his residence: They waited

for him to arrive at the residence as he requested, and when

Beltran withdrew his consent to search after twice having

given it, expressing a wish that the officers obtain a warrant,

Wood told him that was fine and that they would obtain a

warrant. (There is no indication that Wood’s statement about

obtaining a warrant was pretextual.) And as the court pointed

out, even after Beltran changed his mind and allowed the

search to proceed, he declined to be interviewed, citing his

consent to the search as sufficient cooperation—thereby

demonstrating a willingness and ability to exercise his constitutional prerogatives as he chose. Beltran admitted at the

hearing that he understood what a search warrant was, that in

the absence of his consent the officers would have to obtain a

warrant, and that he had the right to refuse his consent; and

from the sequence of events during his encounter with the task

force officers, one could reasonably conclude, as the district

court did, that Beltran was able to make an informed, deliberate, and voluntary choice whether to waive his constitutional

rights. “[W]e have held that an arrested, handcuffed suspect is

capable of giving voluntary consent to the search of his home,”

United States v. Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing

United States v. Bernitt, 392 F.3d 873, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2004)),

and the record lends sufficient support to the district court’s

finding that when Beltran orally consented to the search, and

confirmed that consent in writing, he did so knowingly and

voluntarily. It is a fair inference that once the search of

Vazquez-Ramirez’s apartment had exposed the over one
18 No. 12-2990

million dollars in cash and other incriminating items, Beltran

rightly surmised that a search warrant for the remainder of the

premises was inevitable, and he made a calculated decision to

cooperate by allowing the search of his residence to proceed.

III.

The district court correctly concluded that Beltran was not

wrongfully arrested whentheofficers placed him in handcuffs;

the officers had probable cause to believe that Beltran had

made materially false statements to a federal officer in violation of § 1001. The court also committed no clear error in

finding that Beltran’s subequent consent to search his residence

was knowingly and voluntarily given. Finding no error in the

denial of Beltran’s motion to suppress, we AFFIRM the

judgment.