Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30485

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

THERON DEMOINE BOSLEY,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:03-CR-60031-1

Before KING, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Theron Demoine Bosley, federal prisoner # 12064-035, appeals the denial

of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We

review the decision whether to grant or deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion for an abuse

of discretion. United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009).

Bosley argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying a

reduction based on the minor offenses in his prison disciplinary record and

without considering his later positive accomplishments. Post-sentencing conduct

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 18, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 08-30485

2

of the defendant that occurs after imposition of the original sentence may be

considered by the district court in determining whether a reduction should be

granted. See § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B)(iii)). Even in light of Bosley’s later

accomplishments, Bosley’s disciplinary record suggests an inability or

unwillingness to comply with prison rules and regulations. Therefore, Bosley

has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by denying relief on

this basis.

Bosley argues that the district court erred by denying his motion without

giving him an opportunity to be heard. A defendant need not be present when

a “proceeding involves the correction or reduction of sentence under Rule 35 or

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(4). He also argues that the district

court failed to indicate that it considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and

§ 1B1.10. Although a district court is required to consider these factors, it is not

required to provide reasons for its denial of a § 3582 motion or to explain its

consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. See Evans, 587 F.3d at 674. The record

reflects that the district court considered Bosley’s subsequent pleadings and

implicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Whitebird, 55

F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995).

Bosley also argues that the district court erred by considering his criminal

history and his possession of a firearm, both of which he asserts were already

considered in the calculation of his original sentence. Bosley has not shown that

the district court abused its discretion as § 3553(a)(1) requires the district court

to consider “the nature and circumstances of offense and the history and

characteristics of defendant.”

Finally, citing United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 2007), Bosley

argues that the district court erred by considering his unadjudicated arrests.

The district court mentioned the arrests in passing, but it twice stated that

Bosley’s prison disciplinary record alone was sufficient to justify the denial of

relief and it also considered several other clearly permissible factors. As there

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3

is no indication that the mere mention of Bosley’s unadjudicated prior arrests

had any bearing on the district court’s decision to deny relief, Bosley has not

shown that the district court abused its discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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