IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

F.A., by and through his Next Friend, 

Freddie Sims., et al., 

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO. 4:11cv198/RS-WCS

MIKE HANSEN, in his official 

capacity as Acting Director for the

Agency for Persons with Disabilities,

et al., 

Defendants.

__________________________________

ORDER

Before me are the Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 29) 

and Plaintiffs‟ Response in opposition (Doc. 30). 

Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, which 

accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569, 127 S. Ct. 

1955, 1974 (2007). Granting a motion to dismiss is appropriate if it is clear that no relief 

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the 

allegations of the complaint. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 

2229, 2232 (1984). In making this determination, the court must accept all factual 

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allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2182 (2003).

Background

Plaintiffs are individuals involuntarily committed to the care and custody of the 

State of Florida, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD”). They are in the Mentally 

Retarded Defendant Program (“MRDP”) pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 916 et seq. (Doc. 16, 

¶ 1). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants fail to provide adequate treatment or training in 

violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at ¶ 88. 

Analysis

Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), is 

the touchstone for cases such as these. Youngberg and its progeny firmly established that 

mentally retarded individuals in state custody have, under the Fourteenth Amendment,

liberty interests in “reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement 

conditions, and such training as may be required by these interests.” Id. at 324. 

However, these liberty interests are not absolute.

“There are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 

restrain the movement of residents -- for example, to protect 

them as well as others from violence. Similar restraints may 

also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution 

cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence if it is 

to permit them to have any freedom of movement. The 

question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has been 

infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or 

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lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due process.” Id. 

at 320. 

The question presented in Youngberg is identical to the one presented here: 

whether the extent or nature of the restraint and the lack of safety or training at 

Defendants‟ program violate Plaintiffs‟ due process. The answer to this question is 

determined by balancing Plaintiffs‟ liberty interests against the relevant state interests.

Courts play a limited role in weighing these interests. Judges are not better 

qualified than professionals in making decisions regarding the restraint and training of the 

in-custody mentally retarded. See id at 323. For this reason, “courts must show 

deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 1” Id. at 322. Likewise, 

Defendants must comply with the advice of professionals. They “may not restrain 

residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to 

assure such safety or to provide needed training.” Id. at 324. In addition, Defendants 

have a duty to provide “such training as an appropriate professional would consider 

reasonable to ensure [Plaintiffs‟] safety and to facilitate [Plaintiffs‟] ability to function 

free from bodily restraints.” Id. 

The decisions of professions are “presumptively valid.” Id. at 322-23. “Liability 

may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial 

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate 

 

1 A „professional‟ decisionmaker is “a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the 

particular decision at issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in 

medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and 

training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care -- including decisions that must be made 

without delay -- necessarily will be made in many instances by employees without formal training but who are 

subject to the supervision of qualified persons. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323, n.30. 

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that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 

330. The Court‟s role is limited to only “„make certain that professional judgment in fact 

was exercised,‟ not to second-guess the outcome of that judgment.” Johnson v. Florida, 

348 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Youngberg at 321). 

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have come up short by not sufficiently 

alleging what the professional standard is and by not pleading non-conclusory facts 

which establish that Defendants substantially departed from that standard. (Doc. 29, p. 4, 

14-21). Plaintiffs allege that part of the professional standard is an “individualized 

functional assessment which includes how [a plaintiff‟s] mental health diagnoses may 

impact his behavior.” (See Doc.16, ¶ 38). Similarly they contend that the professional 

standard requires individualized behavior plans and individualized treatment programs. 

Id. at ¶79 & 81. Plaintiffs cite no binding authority, either in medical literature or case 

law for their position. Rather, in their response the motion, Plaintiffs cite a string of outof-jurisdiction cases which stand for the general proposition that individuals in the 

custody of a state‟s program for mentally retarded persons must receive some form of 

individualized treatment or training. (Doc. 30, p. 12, citing Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 

1166 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D.N.C. 1988); Lelsz 

v. Kavanagh, 673 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Tex. 1987)). 

While not binding on this court, those out -of-circuit decisions are sufficient to 

make Plaintiffs‟ claim regarding the baseline standard of care plausible. Defendants

contend that MRDP establishes individualized behavior contracts, individualized training 

procedures, and individualized interventions for each resident. (Doc. 29, p. 6). If true, 

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this blunts much of Plaintiffs‟ argument regarding a substantial departure from the 

standard of care. However, at this stage, Plaintiffs‟ claims are plausible. A different 

outcome may result when the record contains evidence about the professional judgments 

made by Defendants. 

The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is DENIED. 

ORDERED on September 29, 2011.

/S/ Richard Smoak 

RICHARD SMOAK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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