1

 Automatically substituted for Michael B. Mukasey as the respondent in this

case by F.R.A.P. 43(c)(2). 

2

 The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3829

___________

Muhammad Afzal Nadeem, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of

v. * an Order of the Board 

* of Immigration Appeals.

Eric H. Holder, Jr.,1

 Attorney General *

of the United States, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: December 17, 2009

Filed: March 30, 2010

___________ 

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BENTON, Circuit Judge, and VIKEN,2

 District Judge.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Muhammad Afzal Nadeem appeals the final decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
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Convention Against Torture. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, this court

affirms. 

I.

Nadeem, a Pakistani citizen, entered the United States in 2000 on a valid visa,

but stayed beyond the time authorized. In 2003, he requested asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on his fear of

political persecution in Pakistan. 

At a hearing before the immigration judge, Nadeem testified that his political

involvement led to death threats and demands that he cease campaign-related

activities. He claimed that his political rivals ransacked his store and severely beat

him following a 1997 election. Nadeem also said that police later abducted him from

his home at midnight, and bound, hanged, and tortured him in an unknown location.

He further alleged that his political rivals repeatedly opened fire outside his home and

threatened his family.

 

Nadeem offered the testimony of a friend, documentary evidence (detailing a

severe psychiatric disorder), records of medical treatment, arrests, and two letters from

Pakistani attorneys. Nadeem’s other evidence of torture included articles and reports

about his arrest and the political climate in Pakistan. 

The Department of Homeland Security submitted evidence that it could not

authenticate several of Nadeem’s documents. A State Department investigative report

questioned the accuracy of Nadeem’s statements about the time of his arrest and later

medical treatment. 

Citing inconsistencies in Nadeem’s asylum application, declarations, and

written records, the immigration judge concluded that he was not credible and denied
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relief. The judge doubted the veracity of Nadeem’s arrest records and medical report,

noting that the arrest documents appeared to be fabricated and the medical report did

not clearly show that Nadeem was the subject of it. The medical report also made no

mention of injuries that Nadeem would likely sustain if tortured by the police. The

State Department investigation concluded that the arrest information offered by

Nadeem was contradicted by a report on file in Pakistan. The Pakistani arrest warrant

was signed by a judge never posted to the issuing court. Further, the judge found that

Nadeem’s testimony conflicted with his asylum application and witness testimony.

Nadeem failed to mention that he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and

stated a time of abduction by the police that contradicted the time alleged by his

supporting witness and claimed in his asylum application. The judge also doubted the

veracity of the letters from the Pakistani attorneys because they contained identical

language, common errors, and the same allegations about the danger Nadeem faced

in Pakistan. 

The immigration judge declined to accept Nadeem’s rebuttal reasons for the

inconsistencies. Nadeem claimed he made no mention of his Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder because he was not diagnosed with the disorder until after entering the

United States. He contended that the difference in the time of his abduction was

immaterial, also asserting that it reflected a cultural difference in the description of

“midnight.” His witness disagreed with his assertion, and the court rejected all of his

rebuttal arguments.

The immigration judge also found Nadeem statutorily ineligible for asylum

because he did not file his asylum application within one year after entering the

United States. The BIA dismissed his appeal. 
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II.

Nadeem argues that he presented sufficient evidence to warrant political

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. He

also maintains that the BIA abused its discretion and violated his due process rights

by affirming the immigration judge’s credibility determination. 

A.

Nadeem asks this court to review the denial of his asylum application. He

concedes that he failed to timely file. See Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 855 (8th

Cir. 2001) (holding that this court generally may not review the Attorney General’s

determination that an asylum application is untimely in light of the one-year bar in 8

U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)). However, he asserts that this court may review the denial of

asylum if it disagrees with the immigration judge’s credibility finding. 

This court retains jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims, but may not

review factual disputes. See Purwantono v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.

2007). Because his adverse credibility challenge raises a fact question, this court lacks

jurisdiction to review Nadeem’s asylum claim. See Fofanah v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d

1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006) (interpreting credibility as a finding of fact); see also

Manani v. Filip, 552 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir. 2009) (declining to review a fact-based

challenge to a finding of untimeliness). 

B.

Nadeem challenges the denial of relief on the withholding of removal and

Convention Against Torture claims. Where, as here, the BIA adopts an immigration

judge’s decision and adds its own reasoning, this court reviews both decisions.

Kipkemboi v. Holder, 587 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2009). This court reviews legal
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determinations de novo, and factual findings for substantial evidence. See Mouawad

v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 412 (8th Cir. 2007) (withholding of removal); Surya v.

Gonzales, 454 F.3d 874, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2006) (Convention Against Torture). To

reverse under the substantial evidence standard, the evidence must be so compelling

that no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find for Nadeem. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992); Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 2007)

(holding that credibility determinations are conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary). 

Nadeem alleges that the BIA erred in affirming the finding of adverse

credibility. Adverse credibility determinations must be supported by specific, cogent

reasons for disbelief. Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 2005). Under

this standard, an immigration judge must provide reasons that are specific enough for

a reviewing court to understand the rationale behind the decision and convincing

enough that a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to reach a contrary

result. See Damkam v. Holder, 592 F.3d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 2010); Singh, 495 F.3d

at 557-58. Specific, cogent reasons include an applicant’s submission of fraudulent

documents or contradictions between official records and the evidence submitted. See

Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2008); Averianova v. Mukasey, 509

F.3d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the immigration judge provided specific, cogent reasons for disbelief.

Nadeem submitted articles, an information report, an arrest warrant, and a medical

record. The articles about an arrest in Pakistan lacked credibility because he failed to

obtain certified translations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33. The State Department

investigation found that Pakistani records contradicted the information report and

arrest warrant offered by Nadeem. The physician authoring the medical report

declared that the examinee was in Pakistan at a time Nadeem was in the United States.
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Nadeem presented two letters from attorneys in Pakistan, but they had similar

language, grammar, and spelling errors. See Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d

517, 519 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that an immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding

may be based on nearly identical language in separate written affidavits, which an

applicant contends are written by two different people on his or her behalf); Eta-Ndu,

411 F.3d at 985 (questioning the authenticity of letters typed on the same machine,

despite having allegedly been typed by separate officials, with offices located 40 miles

apart). Nadeem also incorrectly testified about the time of day he was kidnapped

while in Pakistan, and whether he had been treated for Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder. Although Nadeem tried to explain these discrepancies, the immigration

judge properly relied on the numerous documentary and testimonial inconsistencies

to reach an adverse credibility determination. See Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 857 (even

where an applicant’s explanations are plausible, an agency is not required to accept

the explanations if an alternative conclusion is also reasonable).

The adverse credibility finding is fatal to Nadeem’s claim for withholding of

removal. See Aden v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 2005). To qualify for

withholding of removal, an applicant must show a clear probability of persecution.

Aung Si Thu v. Holder, --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 772131, at *4 (8thCir. Mar. 9, 2010).

An applicant may show this by establishing past persecution or the likelihood of

future threats to his or her life or freedom based on race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).

Here, the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding, supported by specific and

cogent reasons for disbelief, details the discredited information, undermines

allegations of past persecution, and provides a proper basis for denying Nadeem’s

claim for withholding of removal. 

Nadeem also seeks protection under the Convention Against Torture. To

qualify for protection, an applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that

he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R.
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§ 1208.16(c)(2). Although an adverse credibility determination is not necessarily

determinative of the Convention Against Torture claim, an immigration judge may

consider an applicant’s discounted credibility when determining whether he or she

will be subject to torture. Ntangsi v. Holder, 554 F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 2009).

Here, the immigration judge could discount the incredible evidence. The only

additional evidence submitted by Nadeem featured media and government reports

about the political climate in Pakistan. Evidence of general conditions is insufficient

to establish that one is more likely than not to suffer torture. Esaka v. Ashcroft, 397

F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 2005). 

On appeal, Nadeem objects that he will be tortured if removed, because State

Department officials investigated his documentary evidence in Pakistan. The record,

however, does not indicate that State Department investigators disclosed any

information about Nadeem to Pakistani officials. An investigation of an asylum

applicant without divulgence of personal information to officials in the home country

does not establish that the applicant will be subject to torture. Cf. Anim v. Mukasey,

535 F.3d 243, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2008) (granting an applicant the opportunity to seek

relief based on a fear of persecution after State Department officials disclosed

information to officials in the country of removal that inferred that she sought asylum

in the United States). Because Nadeem failed to provide sufficient evidence that he

would be subject to torture in Pakistan, he does not qualify for protection under the

Convention Against Torture. 

Nadeem further asserts that the disclosure of information to Pakistani officials

violated his due process rights. Nadeem did not raise this argument about the process

he received before the immigration judge to the BIA. This court will not consider this

due process claim. See Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319, 323 (8th Cir. 2005)

(declining to review due process challenges to the immigration judge’s decision not

raised on appeal to the BIA). 
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C.

Nadeem claims that the BIA abused its discretion and violated his due process

rights by affirming the immigration judge’s order. He merely asserts the prior

challenges to the adverse credibility determination, and alleges no procedural error by

the BIA. As discussed, substantial evidence supports the denial of relief to Nadeem.

Because nothing in the record compels a contrary result, the BIA did not abuse its

discretion or commit constitutional error by denying relief. 

III.

The petition for review is denied. 

______________________________