J-S45012-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KAREEM GREEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 698 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0000101-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KAREEM GREEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 699 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0000103-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2023

Appellant, Kareem Green, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on December 2, 2021, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion on February 14, 2022. We affirm.

The trial court thoroughly summarized the underlying facts of this case:

[The Commonwealth charged Appellant with committing 

escape, aggravated and simple assault against T.J., and 
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aggravated and simple assault against J.U.1 During the 

ensuing jury trial, the Commonwealth demonstrated that 

Appellant] repeatedly stabbed [T.J.], who was the mother of 

his children, as she walked on Seventh Street in the City of 

Allentown. He initially punched her in the face, and then 

stabbed her. He also stabbed [J.U.].

[Appellant], at the time of the attack, had failed to return to 

the Lehigh County Community Corrections Center 

(hereinafter work release), where he was serving simple 

assault sentences for previously attacking [T.J. Appellant]

was permitted to go to the hospital because he was 

complaining of chest pains, but instead[] tracked[] down 

[T.J.] and stabbed her. He was not apprehended until almost 

six (6) months after his escape.

. . .

[Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine,

where it sought permission to introduce the following 

evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts at trial: 1) evidence 

that, on August 5, 2018, Appellant pleaded guilty to two 

counts of simple assault against T.J. and 2) evidence that, in 

January 2020, Appellant violated a no-contact order and his 

work release by entering T.J.’s apartment through a 

third-floor window and “confront[ing] her as to whether she 

was dating anyone.” Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 

8/3/21, at 1-3. Appellant did not file a written response to 

the Commonwealth’s motion. Further, although the trial 

court held a hearing on the motion, Appellant did not include

a transcript of the hearing in the certified record. On 

September 15, 2021, the trial court granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine. Trial Court Order, 

9/15/21, at 1.]

[During trial, the Commonwealth introduced the following 

evidence.] 

On January 26, 2020, after midnight, [T.J.] and [J.U.] were

returning to [T.J.’s] apartment after visiting a nearby 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5121(a), 2702(a)(1), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
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7-Eleven when [A]ppellant ran towards them. [A]ppellant 

and [J.U.] squared off. [A]ppellant stabbed [J.U.], who then 

ran away, and [A]ppellant turned his attention to [T.J.].

He punched [T.J.], called her a "dumb bitch," and then 

stabbed her in her stomach and collar. Doctor Rovinder 

Sandhu, a general trauma surgeon and surgical critical care

doctor, treated [T.J.]. She had two stab wounds in her right 

arm, and one stab wound to the right side of her belly. [T.J.] 

was considered Code Omega, which meant upon her arrival

at the hospital, she went directly to the operating room. The 

right side of [T.J.’s] colon was removed, "basically the part 

that includes the appendix to the right side. You basically 

remove about a foot of the right colon." He described the 

penetration of the knife as "quite deep." Without being 

treated quickly, her injuries were life threatening.

[T.J.] remained at the hospital for "less than three weeks," 

and upon release, suffered some complications from the 

stabbing. Photographs of her injuries were introduced into 

evidence.

The identification of [A]ppellant as the person who stabbed 

[T.J.] was confirmed by her testimony. Additionally, 

surveillance videos were introduced into evidence which 

confirmed the attack. [T.J.’s] testimony was also 

corroborated with still images from the video, which she 

explained showed [A]ppellant stabbing her.

At the time of the incident, by happenstance, Evelyn Mota 

was seated in her car waiting to pick up her kids when the 

stabbing unfolded in front of her. [She testified that she] 

"could see everything." [As she testified, s]he observed a 

person running towards two people and "surprised them. He 

just came out of nowhere and started stabbing the guy, and 

the guy ran away. He ran away and left the girl there. She 

was saying no, trying to get in front of him to stop with the 

other guy. And that's when he ran away, and he started 

stabbing her." Ms. Mota then called 9-1-1.

Officer Christopher Matthews, in the aftermath of the 

stabbings, responded to St. Luke's hospital to follow[] up on 

a report of a walk-in stabbing victim. [J.U.], who did not 

testify at trial, was observed by Officer Matthews with a 
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laceration across his right eye. By stipulation, [J.U.’s]

medical records were introduced and disclosed that he also

sustained a "fracture of his medial orbital wall, right side, 

closed fracture," which required surgery.

On the day after the stabbing, Detective Cherie Lebert 

secured an arrest warrant for [A]ppellant. It was not served 

that day because [A]ppellant fled to Florida. He was not

arrested until July 16, 2020, a little less than six [] months 

after the stabbing. Detective Lebert received information 

that [A]ppellant had returned to the local area, and after 

Detective Lebert and another detective set up surveillance, 

[A]ppellant was taken into custody as he exited a family 

member's residence.

[A]ppellant testified and conceded he failed to return to the 

work release quarters, but instead went to his brother's 

residence and drove off with his Chevrolet Impala. He then 

drove to the location where [T.J.] lived[] and saw her walking 

on the street. He also saw [J.U.], and the two of them began 

"clutching." He claimed to have seen [J.U.] reaching toward 

his waist[] and observed a "handle." The two, in [A]ppellant's

words, then began "tussling." [A]ppellant claimed that [J.U.]

cut him, and in return, [A]ppellant claimed that he "bit" [J.U.]

in the face. Appellant's version of events was that he then 

pulled out a knife from his pocket and "just started swinging," 

striking [J.U.]. He then felt somebody coming up from his 

left side, and again started swinging the knife. He never 

admitted that he stabbed [T.J.], but admitted that he saw her 

lying on the ground. He did not render aid, did not call 9-1-1, 

nor did he do anything to assist [T.J.]. Instead, he went to 

Florida — because he knew he "ran from work release . . .

and stabbed two people." The stabbing of [T.J.], from 

[A]ppellant's perspective, was an accident, and the stabbing 

of [J.U.] was self-defense. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/22, at 3-6 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The jury found Appellant guilty of all charged crimes and, on December 

2, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 

13 1⁄2 to 27 years in prison for his convictions. Following the denial of 
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Appellant’s post-trial motion, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Appellant raises one claim on appeal:

Did the trial court err in permitting the testimony regarding 

[Appellant’s] history of domestic abuse or convictions for 

domestic [violence] based on the likely prejudicial effect 

occurring in the prosecution of [Appellant] for a new assault 

on [T.J.]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Here, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine, where it sought to 

introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts against T.J. As noted above, 

Appellant did not file a written response to the Commonwealth’s motion in 

limine and, on appeal, Appellant did not include a transcript of the hearing on 

the Commonwealth’s motion. Thus, we have no way of determining whether,

or upon what grounds, Appellant objected to the admission of the contested 

evidence. Appellant’s claim on appeal is, therefore, waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal”); Commonwealth v. Minerd, 753 A.2d 225, 229 

(Pa. 2000) (“an appellate court may reverse a trial court's ruling regarding 

the admissibility of evidence only upon a showing that the trial court abused 

its discretion . . . [and] our scope of review is limited to an examination of the 

stated reason”); Commonwealth v. Gillen, 798 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (holding that it is an appellant’s responsibility to order all transcripts 

necessary for review and that a failure to do so constitutes waiver of the 

issue).
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In the alternative, we conclude that, even if Appellant had not waived 

the claim on appeal, Appellant’s claim fails on the merits.

“We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001, 1007 (Pa. 2021). As our Supreme 

Court has explained:

the term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the 

purpose of giving effect to the will of the trial judge. An 

appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion based on 

a mere error of judgment, but rather where the trial court 

has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the 

law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or 

ill-will.

Id. at 1007-1008 (citations, corrections, and some quotation marks omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), pertaining to prior bad acts 

evidence, provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, 

or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in 

order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for 

another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this 

evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the 

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

(3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case the 

prosecutor must provide reasonable written notice in 

advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair 
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opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses 

pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific 

nature, permitted use, and reasoning for the use of any 

such evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial.

Pa.R.E. 404(b).

This Court has explained:

Evidence of a defendant's distinct crimes are not generally

admissible against a defendant solely to show his bad 

character or his propensity for committing criminal acts, as 

proof of the commission of one offense is not generally proof 

of the commission of another. However, this general 

proscription against admission of a defendant's distinct bad 

acts is subject to numerous exceptions if the evidence is 

relevant for some legitimate evidentiary reason and not 

merely to prejudice the defendant by showing him to be a 

person of bad character.

Exceptions that have been recognized as legitimate bases for 

admitting evidence of a defendant's distinct crimes include, 

but are not limited to:

(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or 

accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or design such that 

proof of one crime naturally tends to prove the others; 

(5) to establish the identity of the accused where there is 

such a logical connection between the crimes that proof 

of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the 

person who committed the other; (6) to impeach the 

credibility of a defendant who testifies in his trial; (7) 

situations where defendant's prior criminal history had 

been used by him to threaten or intimidate the victim; (8) 

situations where the distinct crimes were part of a chain 

or sequence of events which formed the history of the 

case and were part of its natural development 

(sometimes called “res gestae” exception).

Additional exceptions are recognized when the probative 

value of the evidence outweighs the potential prejudice to the 

trier of fact.
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Commonwealth v. Yocolano, 169 A.3d 47, 54-55 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some 

citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it admitted 

evidence of his prior bad acts toward T.J., as the evidence was “highly 

prejudicial and contradicted the defense presented that the harm to her was 

done accidentally rather than intentionally.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. This 

claim fails. To be sure, Appellant’s entire claim on appeal is that the evidence 

of his prior bad acts toward T.J. was too prejudicial, as the evidence undercut 

his defense “that the harm to her was done accidentally rather than 

intentionally.” Id. However, as Rule 404(b)(2) makes clear, a permissible 

use of prior bad act evidence is to prove “absence of mistake, or lack of 

accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Therefore, evidence that Appellant committed 

simple assault against T.J. and then violated a no-contact order and his work 

release by entering T.J.’s apartment through a third-floor window and 

“confront[ing] her as to whether she was dating anyone” was indeed 

admissible to prove that, on January 26, 2020, Appellant did not “accidentally” 

stab T.J. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Appellant’s claim on appeal thus 

immediately fails.

Further, we note that the case at bar is similar to Commonwealth v. 

Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483 (Pa. 2009). In Sherwood, the defendant was 

charged with first-degree murder for the beating death of his four-year-old 

stepdaughter. Id. at 486. The Commonwealth offered into evidence prior 

instances in which the defendant beat the victim. Id. at 497. Our Supreme 
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Court held that such evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b). Id.

at 497. Specifically, our Supreme Court held that prior bad acts evidence is 

admissible when the bad acts were critical to understanding the history of 

events related to the crime. Id. Applying that rule, our Supreme Court held 

that the prior beatings were critical to understanding that the killing of the 

victim was not an accident or mistake and that the defendant possessed the 

requisite mens rea for first-degree murder. See id.

The same is true in the case at bar. Appellant assaulted T.J. in 2018

and then, shortly before he committed the crime at issue, Appellant violated 

a no-contact order and his work release by sneaking into T.J.’s apartment and 

“confront[ing] her as to whether she was dating anyone.” As explained above, 

this evidence is admissible to prove that Appellant did not “accidentally” stab 

T.J. on January 26, 2020. Moreover, the evidence is admissible to explain the 

history of events related to this crime and Appellant’s jealous motive for

attacking T.J. and J.U. on the date in question. Appellant’s claim on appeal 

thus fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2023