* The Honor able Ann A ldrich, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of O hio, sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0674n.06 F iled: Septem ber 6, 2006 No. 05-6434 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT JUDITH ANN LOGA N, P laintif f-App ellant, On App eal from the United States D istrictCourt v. for th e Eas te r n Di st r ic t o f K e nt uc ky MARA THON PETROLEUM COMP ANY, LLC, Defendan t-Appellee.
Be for e : KEITH and BA TC HELD ER , Ci rc uit Judg e s; ALDRICH , District J udg e. * ALDRICH, J. Th is is a di sa bil ity dis c ri min a tio n c a se , in

wh ic h Pl a int if

f- Ap pe lla nt Jud ith Ann L og an ( “ L og a

n” ) s e e ks re lie f f

ro m th e e ntr

y of summary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f D e fe nd antAp pe lle e Maratho n Pe tr ole um C omp any , L .L .C. (f orm e rl y “ Ma ra tho n A sh land

Pe tr ole um; ” here inafter

“MAP”). B eca

use the district cour

t did not err in its determination that no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t remaine d on L og an’s c laims, or in its deter mination that MAP is entitl ed to judg ment
as a matter of law , its decision is AFF I RMED. I. Bac kgr ound- 2 -

L og an beg an her employ

ment with MA P a s a tanker truck driver, in Ma y of 2001. Her

duties
a s a dr ive r inc lud e d the pic ku p of g a so lin e and oth e r pe tr ole um p ro du c ts f ro m th e MA P f

a c ili ty in Catlettsburg , Kentucky , for de livery around the are a. I n Oc tob e r of 20 01 , L og an b e g an e xpe ri e nc inghe a lth pr ob le ms, inc lud ingdizzi ne ss whil e at work. Asubsequent MRIreve aled the pr esenc e of brain lesions, and L og an then underwe nt two br a in b iop sie s. F oll ow ing a sp ina l punc tur e in 200 2, L og an wa s d ia g no se d w ithMu lti ple Sc le ro sis (“MS”)
. I n Fe bruar

y of 2002, L og an attempted to r eturn to work f or MAP, but could not pass the ph y sic a l. A t th a t ti me , L og an’ s su pe rv iso r, B ob Od om ( “ Od om” ), su g g e ste d th a t sh e mig ht r e a pp ly for e mploy

ment with South S hore O il and Gas, he r pre vious employ er. She did so, and w as re hired. I t appe ars that L og an re mains employ ed by South S hore, tra

nsporting pe troleum to and fr om Kentucky fac iliti es, including MAP’s Catlettsburg de pot. Wh e nd e p o s e d , L o g ante s ti f ie d th a t O d o m h a d

a ls o to ld h e r , “ Ju dy , Ic an ’ t h a v e s o me o ne with MS driving for Marathon.” Appellant’s Br ief at 4; J .A.66. S he also testified that Odom made ref ere nce to his sister-in-la

w, who had r etired f

rom her te achingposition after MS rend er ed her unable to wa lk. Id . M AP d oe s n ot d ir e c tly dis pute the ve ra c ity

of the se a lle g a tio ns . Marathon o ff

i ci all y terminated L og an’s e mploy ment in April of 2002. Soon after her termination, Odom approa ched L og an about the possibility of re h i ri n g her in a

maintenanc e or custodial position. L og an wa s interested in this offe r, but no such pos i tions became available
. L og an does not dispute the e vidence provided by MAP demonstrating that no postings we re ma de for suc h positions during the re levant time per iod.Thi s m od el in g m ak es it a pp ro pr ia te to c it e A D A c as e la w , in cl ud in g f ed er al r egul at io ns , in 1 interpretingKCR

A. See, e. g., How ard Baer , In c. v. Scha ve , 1 27 S
. W. 3d 5 89 , 5 92 ( Ky
. 2 00 3) ( fo otno te and citations om itted)
. - 3 - L og an filed he r Ve rified Complaint in Boyd County (Ke ntucky ) Circuit Court on April 15, 2004. I n it, she char g es t h at MAP wrong fully terminated he r, but cites no spec ific statute or regulation prohibiting MAP’s conduc t. On May 7, 2004, MAP removed the c ase to fe dera l court for the Easter n District of Kentucky , claiming that MAP is a Delaw are corpor ation with i t s p ri n ci p al place of business in Ohio, and citing diversity jurisdiction. Although L o g an' s complaint cited no statutory basis for he r cla ims, the feder al cour t interpre ted L og an’s c laims as arising under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act ( KCRA), KRS § 344.030, et s eq . Modeled a fter the fede ral Ame rica ns with Disabiliti es Ac t (ADA) , 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq. , K CRAmake s it

ill e g a l f or any e mpl oy e r t o d isc ri min a te on the ba sis of dis a

bil ity . B e c a

us e 1 L og an’ s c omp la int

inc lud e d no a lle g a tio n that sh e wa s d isa ble d, the c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t sh e c ou ld only proce ed under

the sec tions of the KCRA prohibiting discrimination ag ainst employ ees “re g arde d as having. . . an impairment.” See KRS § 344.010(4)(c) ; 344.040(1). On August 5, 2005, the di strict court g rante d MAP’s motion for summary judgme nt, finding that n o g e nu in e is s u e s o f

mate r ia l f

a c t r e ma in e d

c o n c e r n in g L o g an ’ s K CR

A c la im
. T h is appea l followed. II. Discussion L og an c ha lle ng es th e di st ri c t c ourt ’s de c isi on in v e ry va gue te rm s, a sse rt ingthat it wa s in
e rr or , a nd tha t th e ca se sh ou ld h ave be e n a llo we d to pr oc e e d to a jur y tr ia l. T he pa

ne l r e vie ws a dis tr ic t cou

rt ’s de c isi on to g ra

nt s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. Sperle v. MI De pt. of Corr e. , 297 F.3d- 4 -

4 8 3 , 4 9 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 00 2) ; see also Jac kson v. Leighton , 168 F.3d 903, 909 ( 6th Cir. 1999), (citing EE OC v . U niv e rsi ty of D e tro it , 904 F.2d 331, 334 ( 6th Cir. 1990)). To defe at a motion for summary judgme nt, a par

ty must “set forth spec ific fa cts showing that there is a g enuine issue f or t ri al
. ” Fed. R. Civ. P . 56(e) . The Court must view the fa cts and infere nces draw n there from in the light most fa vorable to L og an. See Ma tsu sh ita Elec. I ndus. Co., Ltd . v. Z eni th Radi o Co rp ., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see als o Jack son , 168 F.3d at 909 (citing Huffman v. United States , 82 F.3d 703, 705 ( 6th Cir
. 1 9 9 6 ))
. The c entra l issue is “whether the evidenc e pre sents a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so onesided that one party must pre vail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t summa

ry jud g men t wa s a

pp ro pr iate be c a

us e L og an f

a ile d to prove a n essential ele ment of her case , namely

that she wa s perc eived a s disabled by MAP. Such a fa ilure would be f

atal to L og an’s c ase, since the pla in lang

ua g e of Rul e 56 (c ) mand a te s the e ntr y of summa

ry jud g me nt . . . a g a ins t a par ty who fa ils to m ake a

showing suffic i en t t o es tablish the exi stence of an element e ssential to that party ' s case , and on which that party will be ar the burden of proof at trial. I n such a situation, t here can be “no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fa ct,” since a complete failure of proof conce rning an esse ntial element of the no nmo vin g pa

rt y ' s c a se ne c e ssa

ri ly re nd e rs a ll o the r f

a c ts i mmate ri a l. Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). More spe ci fi ca l l y , the district court found that L og an could not satisfy the statute’s require ment that she demonstrate that her e mploy er pe rce ived her as unable to perfor

m the functions of a job be cause of a me dical condition when, in f act, [she was] perf

ectly abl e t o m eet the job’s duties.” Ross v. Campbell Soup Co. , 237 F.3d 701, 706 ( 6th Cir. 2001).- 5 -

Under [t he ADA], individuals who are “reg arde d as” having a dis ability are disabled within the meaningof the AD A. See[42 U .S .C.] § 1 21 02 (2 )( C) . Su bs e c tio n ( C) provides that having a disability includes “be ing r eg arde d as having ,” § 12102(2) (C), “a phy sical or menta l impairment that substantially limit s one or more of the major li f e a c t i v i t i e s o f s u c h i n d i v i d u a l , ” § 1 2 1 0 2 ( 2 ) ( A )
. T h e r e ar e t w o a p p ar e n t w a y s in wh i c h i n d i v i d

u a l s m ay f a l l w i t h i nt h i s s t a tu t o r

y d e f i n i t i o n : ( 1 ) a

c o v e r e d e n t ity mis take nly

be lie ve s th a t a pe rs on ha s a phy sic a l im pa ir me nt t hat su bs tanti a lly

lim its one or more major life a ctivities, or (2) a cover ed entity mistakenly believes that an a c tua l, n on lim iti ngimp a ir me nt s ub sta

nti a lly lim its on e or mor e ma

jor lif e a c tiv iti e s. I n both case s, it is nec essar y that a cover ed entity enter tain misperce ptions about the individual - - it must believe e ither that one ha s a substantially limit ing impair

ment that on e do e s n ot h ave or

that on e ha s a subs tanti a lly lim iti ngimp a ir me nt whe n, in fa ct , t h e i mp ai rm en ti s n o ts o l i m i t i n g. Sutton v. Unit ed Air L ines, I nc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). Under either f ormulation, L og an’s inability to poin t t o MAP’s misperce ptions concer ning he r a bil ity to p e rf or m “ ma jor lif e a c tiv iti e s” is f

a ta l to the su c c e ss o f h e r c la im. Vi e wi ng a ll f a c ts i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f

av o rab l e t o L o gan , i ti s re as o n ab l e t o i n t er p re tOd o m ’s co m m en t s as i n d i ca t i n g a mistaken belief that she could not ade quately perf orm the t asks associated wit h driving a Mar athon petroleum truc k. I t is not, however, ne cessa rily tru e t hat Odom believe d her una ble to drive a

ny truck. I t was Odom, af

ter a ll, who sugg ested that L og an re apply for he r pre vious driving position – a job which she subsequently obtained – and Odom’s fac ility which continues to provide L og an wi th a c c e ss t o it s p e tr ole um s up pli e s. I n an y c a s e , p r o o f

th a t M A P r e g ar d e d

L o g ana s to o im

p a ir e d to p r o p e r ly

dr iv e an y

tr uck would not be enoug h. Under t h e ap p l i cable fede ral re g ulations, the phrase “Major L ife Ac tiviti es
m ea n s functions such as c aringfor one self, per formingmanual tasks, wa lking, se eing , hear i n g, speaking , breathing, lea

rning , and wo r

k in g . ” 2 9 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). L og an mig ht conce ivably pursue
a the or y that sh e wa s pe rc e ive d a s una ble to p e rf or m th e “ ma jor lif e a c tiv ity of wo rk ing ,” if

sh e c ou ld sh owthat MA P vi e we d h e r a s una ble “ to p e rf

or m e ith e r a c la ss of

job s o r a br oa d r ang e of

job s in- 6 -

various cla sses as compared to the averag e person having compar able tra ining, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (i). Unfortunately for L og an, “[ t] he inabili ty to perfor m a sing le, par

ticular job does not constitute a substantial limit ation in the major life a ct i v i ty of working .” Id . MAP’s actions demonstrate that it reg arde d L og an as a ble t o : (a) perf

orm work suc h as custodial and
ma int e na nc e job s; a

nd (b ) d ri ve a truc k f

or he r p re vio us e mpl oy e r. Vi e we d in the lig ht m os t favor able to L og an, Odom’s r emar ks only demonstrate that he saw he r as una ble to drive a

truck for MAP, clear ly

a “sing le, par

ticular job.” The c ourts have r outinely applied these very

regulations to bar “r eg arde d as” claims by simil arly situated employ ees. See, e .g., Sutton , 527 U.S. at 491 (“When the major l ife a ctivity under consideration is t hat of wor king, the [st atute] require s, at a minimum , that plaintiffs alleg e they are
un a ble to wo rk in a

br oa d c la ss o f j ob s. ” ); Baer , 127 S.W .3d at 594 (“ The e vidence showed only that the c omp any pe rc e ive d Sc have a s no t qu a lif ie d to wo rk a s a tr

uc k d ri ve r f or B a e r. ); Murphy v . United Parcel Se rvice

, Inc. , 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999) ( “[T] he undisputed re cord e vidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, reg arde d as unable to perfor m only a par ticular job.”) L og an relies e x tensively

on this Ci rcuit’s holding in Ro ss , which is distinguishable f rom the instant case. I

n Ro ss , the plaintiff suffe red repe ated back injuries, which re ndere d his employ er more likely to view him as “sig nificantly limit ed in his ability

to lift or in his a b i l i t y t o wo rk i n a broa d class of jobs, not simply his j o b at C am p b ell Soup[ .]” 237 F.3d at 709. Unlike MAP, Ross’s employ er a lso concoc ted a pr etextual ex cuse f or his f iring
. I nstead, the f

acts of L og an’s c ase be ar
a more substantial simi larity to those of Baer

and Murphy , in which summary judgme nt in the
e mpl oy e r’ s f

avo r w a s u

ph e ld o n a

pp e a l.- 7 -

Be cause L o g a

n ' s V e rified Complaint cites no law wha tsoever, a nd rec ites fac ts and asser

tions which could only

be construe d as stating a “r eg arde d as” c laim, L og an was rele g ated to a position in which she ne eded to show that MAP perc eived her as unable to per form “ma jor life ac tiviti es.” Clearly , the evidenc e ava ilable to her did n o t s u pport the existence of suc h a per ception, and the district court did not err

in refusingto rewr ite L og an’s c omplaint for her
.

III. Conclusi on F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e d e c i s i o no f t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rti s A F F IR M E D i ni t s e n t i r e t y.