Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A05-1711-CR-2702 | August 27, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Devin Bays,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

28A05-1711-CR-2702

Appeal from the Greene Superior

Court

The Honorable Dena A. Martin, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

28D01-1706-F6-113

Friedlander, Senior Judge.

[1] Devin Bays appeals his convictions of resisting law enforcement and theft. We 

affirm.
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[2] In May of 2017, Nathan Kimmel allowed Devin Bays to store his motorcycle in 

Kimmel’s basement because it was raining. Bays put his motorcycle next to 

Kimmel’s yellow Suzuki RNZ450 motorcycle in the basement, and the two 

agreed that Bays would return later to retrieve his motorcycle. Approximately 

three days later, Kimmel sent a text message to Bays indicating that Bays 

needed to retrieve his motorcycle, that Kimmel would be at work, and that the 

basement would be unlocked. When Kimmel returned from work, Bays’s 

motorcycle was gone; Kimmel’s motorcycle had been knocked over; and “there 

[were] tools everywhere, gas everywhere.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 207. When Kimmel 

contacted Bays, Bays denied that he had removed his motorcycle from the 

basement and told Kimmel, “you owe me a bike.” Id. at 208. On May 26, 

2017, Kimmel discovered that his motorcycle was missing from the basement. 

[3] On June 2, 2017, Greene County Sheriff’s Deputy Harvey Holt received a call 

to assist in locating a stolen motorcycle, with Bays suspected as the thief. 

While parked at an intersection near Bays’s residence, Deputy Holt, who knew 

Bays and what he looked like, became aware of a motorcycle approaching. The 

motorcycle was similar to the stolen one that Deputy Holt was attempting to 

locate, and he immediately identified the rider, who was wearing a helmet 

without a visor that showed his entire face, as Bays. Deputy Holt activated his 

lights, Bays quickly accelerated away, and Deputy Holt gave chase for 

approximately three minutes before abandoning his pursuit. Later that day, 

working with information obtained from Bays’s cousin Shylar Vincent, Deputy 

Anthony Pope located a yellow motorcycle near where Deputy Holt had lost 
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sight of Bays. The motorcycle was in a ditch near the end of a road and 

appeared to be hidden. A check of the motorcycle’s vehicle identification 

number confirmed that it was Kimmel’s missing motorcycle. 

[4] On June 12, 2017, the State charged Bays with Level 6 felony resisting law 

enforcement, Level 6 felony theft, and Class C misdemeanor reckless driving. 

Bays proceeded to jury trial on September 9, 2017. During voir dire, the State 

engaged the venire in a line of questioning concerning memory and ability to 

recall details and commented that one of the deputies testifying at trial would 

not be able to remember what Bays was wearing but would be able to 

remember his face. The prosecutor commented that the deputy was “not going 

to lie” about this lack of memory. Id. at 37. Later, the prosecutor questioned 

the venire about their thoughts regarding the crime of receiving stolen property. 

Following voir dire but before opening statements, the trial court granted a 

motion in limine that prohibited Deputy Holt from testifying that he was 

familiar with Bays as a result of prior criminal contacts. While the State was 

examining and impeaching Sasha Vincent regarding her bias in favor of Bays, 

the prosecutor asked her whether she wanted to see Bays get in trouble. Sasha 

did not answer the question but did say that Bays had been in trouble many 

times. 

[5] The jury found Bays guilty of resisting law enforcement and theft as charged but

not guilty of reckless driving. On October 18, 2017, the trial court sentenced 

Bays to two years of incarceration for resisting law enforcement and two years 

for theft, to be served consecutively. 
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1. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[6] Bays contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by 

improperly questioning the venire during voir dire and by violating the motion 

in limine regarding prior bad acts by Bays. When reviewing a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts must determine whether the 

prosecutor engaged in misconduct and, if so, whether the misconduct placed 

the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been 

subjected. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2006). “The gravity of peril is 

measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s 

decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.” Ryan v. State, 9 

N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014) (citing Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835). To preserve a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must object and request an 

admonition of the jury at the time the alleged misconduct occurs. Neville v. 

State, 976 N.E.2d 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Failure to at least 

object and request an admonition results in waiver. Jerden v. State, 37 N.E.3d 

494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

[7] Bays acknowledges that he did not object to any of the alleged misconduct of 

which he now complains but attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by 

claiming that fundamental error occurred. A failure to object may avoid default 

if the misconduct at issue constitutes fundamental error, meaning it must 

“‘make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and 

elementary principles of due process [and] present an undeniable and 

substantial potential for harm.’” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 
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2002) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). A finding of 

fundamental error is essentially a conclusion that the trial court erred by failing 

to sua sponte correct an error. Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946 (Ind. 2014). To 

succeed on an appellate claim of prosecutorial misconduct presented in the 

absence of a contemporaneous trial objection, the defendant must establish not 

only the grounds for prosecutorial misconduct but also the additional grounds 

for fundamental error. Booher, 773 N.E.2d 814; see also Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 

80, 99 (Ind. 2011) (noting it is “highly unlikely” to prevail on a claim of 

fundamental error relating to prosecutorial misconduct). 

A. Vouching

[8] Bays asserts that fundamental error occurred due to repeated vouching for 

witnesses by the prosecutor. It is inappropriate for a prosecutor to make an 

argument which takes the form of personally vouching for a witness. Lainhart v. 

State, 916 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “A prosecutor may comment on 

the credibility of the witnesses only if the assertions are based on reasons which 

arise from the evidence.” Id. at 938.

[9] Bays argues that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for Deputy Holt by 

saying the following to the venire during voir dire:

Now, do you think you could tell me what the people are 

wearing that are sitting long that back wall if you look back there 

and glance back up here? Do you think you could tell me 2 

hours later what the people were wearing that are sitting along 

that back wall? Could you tell me what your significant others 

were wearing this morning when they left the house? You see 
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what I’m getting at. Right? We pay attention to faces but you 

don’t always notice the other details. Right? The officer is not 

going to lie to you. He is going to sit up there and say I don’t 

remember what the kid was wearing. Right? If he was going to 

make something up, he could very well make something up and 

say he was wearing a cutoff and specific clothing. He is not 

going to remember what color helmet Mr. Bays was wearing I 

don’t think. Does that make you guys think he is lying though 

just because doesn’t remember those other details we talked 

about? What do you think Number 63?

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 36-37. During closing argument, the prosecutor also told the 

jury Deputy Holt “has no reason to lie.” Id. at 239. 

[10] Neither of these occurrences amount to impermissible vouching. The 

prosecutor’s voir dire comments and questions, coming as they did during a 

discussion concerning what sort of details a person is likely to recall and what 

sort a person is likely to forget, were not the expression of an opinion on 

Deputy Holt’s general credibility. In other words, the prosecutor was not 

opining that Deputy Holt would never lie about anything, only acknowledging

that he expected Deputy Holt would not be able to recall certain details about 

his sighting of Bays on the yellow motorcycle. The prosecutor’s comments did 

not amount to error, much less fundamental error. 

[11] As for the prosecutor’s comment that Deputy Holt had no reason to lie about 

seeing Bays on the motorcycle, this is clearly nothing more than a reference to 

earlier argument grounded in the evidence:

You heard from Harvey Holt. Twenty years as both the Greene 

County Sheriff’s Deputy and it’s an MP he said some other word 
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for it. He was an Air Force Police Officer. You really think he is 

going to throw that career away to lie about someone running 

from him on a dirt bike in the middle of Greene County in the 

middle of nowhere? Does that really make sense? Did he any 

reason to come in here and lie to you about whether or not he 

saw Devin Bays? If he was going to lie, don’t you think he 

would have had oh well he had this type of a helmet on and these 

type of clothes on and I remember it all as clear as day. No, he 

saw his face, he didn’t remember a whole lot else and then he 

chased him for a while. It wasn’t a perfect story. If it was a 

made up story you know when our kids lie to us and people like 

that its usually a little too perfect. You know what I mean?

Id. at 233-34. The prosecutor was not vouching for Deputy Holt but, rather, 

arguing that the evidence supported an inference that his testimony was 

truthful. Again, Bays has failed to show error, much less fundamental error. 

B. Voir Dire

[12] Bays also claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by saying the 

following during voir dire: 

How about being in possession of stolen property, do you think 

that should be a crime, Number 328? [...] Alright, we don’t want 

somebody to be guilty of like you go buy a gun or something 

from someone and it ends up being stolen, that is a different 

story. Right? [...] But it[’]s different if you happen to know the 

guy who stole it and you’re in possession of it, that should be a 

crime. Right?

Id. at 55-56. Bays argues that the above questions suggest that the jury could 

convict Bays if it found that he simply possessed the motorcycle knowing that it 

was stolen. As it happens, in order to convict Bays of theft in this case, the jury 

was required to find Bays’s knowing or intentional exertion of unauthorized 
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control over the motorcycle with intent to deprive the owner of the vehicle’s 

value or use. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5(b) (2014). To the extent that these two 

concepts might be incompatible, the jury was instructed correctly on the 

elements of theft as charged in this case, and Bays points to no indication that it 

did not follow that instruction. See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 

1237 (Ind. 1991) (“[W]hen the jury is properly instructed, it may be presumed 

on appeal that they followed such instruction.”). 

C. Examination of Sasha Vincent

[13] Finally, Bays contends that the State violated a motion in limine barring 

testimony from Deputy Holt regarding Bays’s prior contacts with law 

enforcement. Deputy Holt did not, in fact, offer any such testimony, nor were

any questions asked that were likely to elicit such testimony from Deputy Holt. 

During the prosecutor’s examination of Sasha Vincent, however, who denied 

seeing Bays on a yellow motorcycle on the day in question despite 

acknowledging that she had earlier told police that she had, the following 

exchange occurred:

Q [...] I have a couple of more questions. As we talked 

about earlier, you’re related and friends with [Bays] through 

marriage. Is that right?

A Yeah.

Q You don’t want to see him get in trouble do you?

A I mean he has been in trouble I don’t know how many 

times.

Q You don’t want to see him get in trouble do you is my 

question?
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A I don’t care. I have my own stuff to worry about.

Q You’re not trying to protect him.

A No.

Q Thank you.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 198. Whatever prejudicial effect Sasha’s testimony about Bays’s 

previous troubles may have had, it was not elicited by anything the prosecutor 

did. Quite simply, the testimony was flatly unresponsive to the prosecutor’s 

specific question, prompting the prosecutor to repeat it. There is nothing in the 

record to suggest that the prosecutor should or could have known that Sasha 

would testify the way she did. Bays has failed to establish any prosecutorial 

misconduct at all, much less any amounting to fundamental error. 

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[14] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence 

nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 1995). 

We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that viewpoint 

there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

conclude that Bays was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the 

conviction. See Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720 (Ind. 1993). “[I]t is precisely 

within the domain of the trier of fact to sift through conflicting accounts of 

events. Not only must the fact-finder determine whom to believe, but also what 

portions of conflicting testimony to believe.” In re J.L.T., 712 N.E.2d 7, 11 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 
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[15] Bays’s challenge to his theft and resisting law enforcement convictions is 

limited to his claim that the State produced insufficient evidence that he was the 

person Deputy Holt saw riding the yellow motorcycle. It is well-settled that 

“[a] single eyewitness’ testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Emerson 

v. State, 724 N.E.2d 605, 609-10 (Ind. 2000). Deputy Holt testified that he knew 

Bays previously and what he looked like and immediately identified the rider of 

the motorcycle as Bays. This is sufficient to prove identity. Bays notes that no

physical evidence connects him to the motorcycle and points to several alleged 

reasons to doubt the veracity of Deputy Holt’s identification. Bays’s arguments 

amount to nothing more than invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we 

will not do. See Jordan, 656 N.E.2d at 817. 

[16] Judgment affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.