J-A10031-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MARY DELANEY, 

BARBARA DELANEY AND 

HELEN DELANEY 

Appellants

v.

ALFONZO SAWYER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2339 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 8, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): 190606044

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 2, 2024

Mary Delaney appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Alfonzo 

Sawyer, in this civil action filed in the Philadelphia County Court of Common 

Pleas on December 8, 2023.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

On July 5, 2017, Delaney was in a two-car motor vehicle accident in 

which her car was rear-ended by Sawyer. On October 18, 2019, Delaney filed 

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1 While the notice of appeal purports to be an appeal by all defendants in the 

underlying matter, including Mary Delaney, Barbara Delaney, and Helen 

Delaney, only Mary Delaney is referenced in the statement of matters 

complained of on appeal and in the appellate brief. Accordingly, any matters 

as to Barbara and Helen are considered waived. For ease of disposition, this 

memorandum will focus solely on Mary Delaney (hereinafter “Delaney”), even 

where Barbara and Helen may have originally been involved. 
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a complaint against Sawyer for claims of personal injury sounding in 

negligence. 

Following an arbitration hearing in September 2022, the panel found in 

favor of Delaney and against Sawyer, awarding Delaney $25,000. Delaney 

appealed from the arbitrator’s award, requesting a jury trial. 

A jury trial was held between August 16 – 18, 2023, during which 

Delaney testified, along with medical experts from each side. Sawyer did not 

testify. At the close of evidence, Delaney made an oral motion for a directed 

verdict on Question Number 1 on the verdict sheet – “Do you find the 

defendant Alphonso Sawyer was negligent?”. N.T., Jury Trial, 8/18/23, at 6. 

Specifically, Delaney requested the court either to direct the jury to answer 

yes to Question Number 1, or to remove the question and inform the jury that 

negligence was established by the evidence presented. The court denied the 

motion, noting that no stipulation had been made regarding negligence. See 

id. at 7.

The jurors were instructed that if their answer was “no” as to Question 

Number 1, they should stop and return to the courtroom without answering 

any further questions. See Verdict Sheet, at 1. Following deliberations, the 

jury returned a verdict in favor of Sawyer, finding Sawyer was not negligent.

See N.T., Jury Trial, 8/18/23, at 75. Delaney raised no objection to the verdict

at that time. 
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Delaney timely filed a “Motion for Post-Trial Relief Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 

227.1; Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; Motion to Vacate the 

Verdict”, asserting Sawyer was negligent and the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. The only relief Delaney sought was a new trial limited 

to damages. After consideration, the trial court denied post-trial relief. This 

timely appeal followed.

2

Delaney purports to raise five issues on appeal as follows, which we 

slightly rephrase for ease of reading:

1. Was the portion of the verdict of the jury finding that Sawyer 

was not negligent against the clear weight of the evidence?

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Delaney’s motion for a 

directed verdict, which motion requested the court to find as a 

matter of law that Sawyer was negligent, or to instruct the jury 

that Sawyer was negligent, or to remove the question of 

negligence from the verdict form. 

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Delaney’s motion for 

post-trial relief requesting a new trial on the issue of damages 

because the verdict of the jury in finding no negligence on the part 

of Sawyer, was against the clear weight of the evidence presented 

at trial as Sawyer’s medical expert conceded that Delaney suffered 

compensable personal injury damages? 

4. Did the trial court err in denying Delaney’s motion for post-trial 

relief because her uncontradicted injuries were significant and of 

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2 Delaney purported to appeal from the order denying post-trial relief. 

However, “the proper, procedural course to pursue in perfecting an appeal

from [a] jury verdict is to reduce the verdict to judgment and take an appeal

therefrom and not from an order denying post-trial motions.” Crosby v.

Department of Transportation, 548 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. Super. 1988).

Pursuant to our rule to show cause order, final judgment was subsequently 

entered by praecipe on December 8, 2023. We have changed the caption 

accordingly.
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the type that naturally and normally cause pain and suffering and 

did in fact cause Delaney to suffer such non-economic damages,

and, accordingly, when the jury was not free to disregard them?

5. Did the trial court err in denying Delaney’s motion for post-trial 

relief because the court had no reasonable basis to believe that 

either (1) the jury did not believe the plaintiff suffered any pain 

and suffering, or (2) that a preexisting condition or injury was the 

sole cause of the alleged pain and suffering?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3. 

As a preliminary matter, we note that Delaney’s brief violates our rules 

of appellate procedure. While Delaney’s brief contains an argument section, it 

is not divided “into as many parts as there are questions to be argued.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Instead, the argument portion of her brief is only one main 

section: “A. Appellant, Mary Delaney, Should be Granted A New Trial on the 

Issue of her Damages.” While her statement of questions involved alleges trial 

court error, her argument section generally challenges the jury’s verdict. 

To the degree that the issues raised in her statement of questions are 

addressed in her one main argument on appeal, we find them waived or 

without merit. Delaney categorizes her claims as going to the weight of the 

evidence. 

A weight challenge is sui generis. Such a claim is not premised 

upon trial court error or some discrete and correctable event at 

trial, but instead ripens only after, and because of, the jury’s 

ultimate verdict in the case. The challenge does not dispute the 

power of the jury to render the verdict it rendered, nor does it 

even allege any facial error in the verdict of the jury (be it, in the 

eyes of the challenger, a flaw, an inconsistency or a total 

injustice). Assuming that the case properly was ripe for jury

consideration--i.e., neither of the parties was entitled to a directed

verdict because a properly joined issue of material fact remained 
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for resolution—the jury is fully empowered to rule in favor of either 

or any party. The basis for a weight claim derives from the fact 

that the trial court, like the jury, had an opportunity to hear the 

evidence and observe the demeanor of the witnesses; the hope 

and expectation animating a weight challenge is that the trial 

court will conclude that the verdict was so contrary to what it 

heard and observed that it will deem the jury’s verdict such a 

miscarriage of justice as to trigger the courts time-honored and 

inherent power to take corrective action.

Criswell v. King, 834 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. 2003). 

Here, while Delaney states she is challenging the weight of the evidence, 

her argument is not that the jury improperly weighed competing evidence. 

Rather, her argument is that the jury was not permitted as a matter of law to 

find Sawyer was not negligent because the evidence only supported a finding 

of negligence. This type of argument is directed at the trial judge, i.e., the 

trial judge’s decision to deny the request for a directed verdict on the issue of 

negligence.

However, after a review of the record, it is clear Delaney has 

misconstrued the evidence presented, and accordingly we find her claims are 

belied by the record. Generally, Delaney challenges the jury’s finding that 

Sawyer was not negligent. The law of negligence is well-settled in 

Pennsylvania:

Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably 

prudent person would exercise in the same or similar 

circumstances. The mere occurrence of an accident does not 

establish negligent conduct. Rather, the plaintiff has the burden 

of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

defendant engaged in conduct that deviated from the general 

standard of care expected under the circumstances, and that this 

deviation proximately caused actual harm.
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Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1998) (citations omitted).

Delaney focuses her argument on the theory that a jury award should 

be set aside as inadequate “where it clearly appears from the uncontradicted 

evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation to the 

loss suffered by the plaintiff.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9 (citation omitted). 

Here, after hearing all of the evidence presented, the jury rendered a 

verdict of no negligence by Sawyer. Accordingly, the verdict in this case did 

not contain an “amount” and did not consider any “loss suffered by the 

plaintiff.” Delaney’s entire argument pertains to her injuries and pain and 

suffering, which are only relevant in terms of damages. However, since the 

jury did not find Sawyer to be negligent, they never reached the issue of 

damages. 

Similarly, Delaney only cites to case law regarding compensable injury 

and pain. See id. at 9-10. The cases Delaney cites to in support of her claims 

are cases in which negligence or liability was conceded, and the only issue 

was the amount of damages awarded. 

However, other than baldly claiming Sawyer “admitted to causing” the 

accident, or relying on “undisputed liability,” Delaney does not cite to any trial 

evidence which supports a finding that Sawyer was negligent. Despite her bold 

assertion to the contrary, Sawyer only admitted that he rear-ended Delaney’s 

vehicle. Importantly, he made no statements regarding causation or 

negligence. Notably, Delaney did not call Sawyer as of cross examination to 
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ask any such questions. Accordingly, with no concession, stipulation or 

testimony by Sawyer, liability and causation were very much disputed at the 

trial. 

Since the beginning of trial, Delaney has relied, to her detriment, on her 

assertion that negligence was somehow conceded or admitted. This is simply 

not the case. The trial court advised Delaney about the lack of a stipulation as 

to negligence in denying her motion for a directed verdict. The court made it 

clear that it specifically asked at the beginning of trial if there were any 

stipulations, and that nobody said anything about negligence. Accordingly, it 

was Delaney’s burden to prove negligence. See Martin, 711 A.2d at 461.

The trial court accurately summarized the relevant evidence presented

as follows: 

A. On July 5, 2017, [Delaney] and [Sawyer], were both travelling 

a Pennsylvania interstate highway in congested, post-holiday 

traffic. 

B. [Delaney], on May 23, 2017 was in a three-car motor vehicle 

accident and claimed substantially the same injuries as the 

immediate accident. Following the May 23, 2017 accident, []

Delaney was transported by ambulance to the hospital from the 

scene of the accident and was still receiving treatment at the time 

of the accident that is the subject of this case. Her car was also 

reported to be left undrivable and had to be towed from the 

location of the accident. 

C. In photographs of damage to the [Delaney]’s car, there was 

only physical evidence of the May 23, 2017 accident. There was 

no evidence of physical damage to [Delaney]’s car that resulted 

from the July 5, 2017 accident. 

D. The testimony of the witnesses for [Delaney] was at times 

contradictory and incredible. [Delaney]’s car was hit from the rear, 
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but Helen Delaney, a passenger in the car, reports being flung 

forward. Furthermore, Helen Delaney did not correct or contest 

the assertion, on questioning, that the conditions on the highway 

were bumper-to-bumper, yet, a bit incredibly to this [c]ourt, she 

reported looking back, from her position in the rear middle 

passenger seat, and seeing a car approaching behind their car, 

getting in and out of traffic, and speeding prior to hitting their 

vehicle. 

E. In the report of [Delaney]’s own expert, in his recitation of 

[Delaney]’s medical records, Dr. Robert F. Sing reported that: 

In the records it was noted that Dr. Tosh was already 

treating [Delaney] for injuries sustained in the 5/23/2017[]

MVA for essentially the following diagnosis: Cervical 

sprain/strain (whiplash type) with intersegmental 

dysfunction and muscle spasm, and lumbosacral 

sprain/strain with intersegmental dysfunction and muscle 

spasm with Myofascial Pain Syndrome, also suffering from 

neck pain, more so on the left, with shooting pain along the 

left paraspinal regions to the length of the spine and left 

pain the prior evening. On 6/27/17, [Delaney] reported 

right leg in addition to the left lumbar pain and left T2 

spinous process pain. She reported on that visit continuing 

costochondral rib pain on the left 10th rib. With overall 

improvement noted on 6/30/2017, lower neck pain radiating 

into the left posterior shoulder was persistent. She 

continued with intermittent right leg pain/stiffness. 

She returned to Dr. Tosh on 7/1//2017 with left shoulder 

and left upper back pain. On 7/14/2017, [Delaney] 

continued with left upper back and left shoulder pain in 

addition to persistent right upper back and right shoulder 

pain. Complaints of continued left neck, upper back, and 

shoulder pain, in addition to a new complaint of left lower 

back pain radiating into the left proximal thigh was noted on 

7/21/2017. At the last chiropractic treatment session on 

7/26/2017, it was documented that [Delaney] stated her 

symptoms had substantially improved overall although she 

continued to report soreness during manipulative efforts 

over the thoracic and lumbar spines. 

Sing, R. “Expert Opinion.” 02/15/2023. 
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F. [Sawyer] presented the expert opinion of Dr. Dennis McHugh. 

He testified regarding [] Delaney’s subjective complaints, those 

being, “what the individual indicates that their symptoms are,” 

versus his objective observations, those complaints being, what 

he can verify through his training, experience, and observations 

through physical examination. Dr. McHugh stated that, in his 

professional opinion, [] Delaney’s subjective complaints were 

“disproportionate compared to objective findings, which were 

negligible.” He further states that he, “didn’t find anything 

objective that would substantiate what she was complaining 

about.” 

G. Dr. McHugh explained one such example where, in his opinion, 

[] Delaney’s subjective complaints did not match his objective 

observations: 

To give you an idea, when I went through the range of 

motion of her cervical spine, she had no motion and when I 

say no motion, I mean zero. She wouldn’t flex her neck. She 

wouldn’t extend her neck. She wouldn’t side bend her neck. 

She wouldn’t rotate her neck. Yet, there were other aspects 

of the examination during distraction maneuvers when she 

was changing position or during the history or when I was 

examining the shoulder or the back where she was moving 

her neck freely, clearly indicating to me that she was not 

setting forth a true physical representation of what she 

could and couldn’t do. 

Delaney Dep. At 17-18 (05/31/2023). 

H. [Sawyer] acknowledged rear-ending [Delaney]’s car. However, 

at no time did he stipulate to or concede negligence. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/23, at 5-8. Based on the testimony cited above, 

the credibility of the witnesses, and weighing the conflicting testimony, the 

trial court found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Delaney 

failed to meet her burden of proving negligence. See id. at 8.

As Delaney spends a majority of her argument on matters that were not 

reached by the jury, she fails to develop an argument regarding whether or 
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not she met her burden of proving negligence. As such, we find her claim 

waived on this basis alone. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 

1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding issue waived where appellant failed to 

properly develop claim and set forth applicable case law).

We note, in any event, we would be unable to give Delaney the relief 

she seeks - a new trial limited to damages. We have long-recognized that

[t]rial courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a new trial ... 

[and,] absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, 

appellate courts must not interfere with the trial court’s authority 

to grant or deny a new trial. In addition, [t]he trial court’s decision 

whether to limit a new trial to a particular issue or grant a new 

trial as to all issues will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion.

Banohashim v. R.S. Enters., LLC, 77 A.3d 14, 22–23 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Where, as here, Delaney seeks a new trial as to damages only, other 

principles also govern our review. Our Supreme Court has held, 

new trials may be limited to specific issues only when this 

procedure will be fair to both parties. Where the question of 

negligence or contributory negligence is not free from doubt, it is 

an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to grant a new trial on 

the issue of damages alone. Specifically: a trial court may grant a 

new trial limited to the issue of damages only where (1) the 

question of liability is not intertwined with the question of 

damages, and (2) the issue of liability is either (a) not contested 

or (b) has been fairly determined so that no substantial complaint 

can be made with respect thereto.

Id. at 23 (citations and quotation marks omitted). As stated, Delaney simply 

did not meet her burden to prove negligence. Contrary to her assertion, the 

issue of liability remained disputed. As such, since “the question of negligence 
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or contributory negligence is not free from doubt,” she cannot be granted a 

new trial limited to damages. Id.

Judgment affirmed.

Date: 7/2/2024