Nos. 2--07--0539 & 2--07--0632 cons. F iled: 12-10-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE VIL LAGE OF MONTGO MERY, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 06--MR--533 ) AURORA TOWNSHIP and ) FRED BURGESS, in his Official Capacity as ) Aurora Township Highway Commissioner, )

) Defend ants-App ellants ) Honorab le ) Michael

J. Colwell, (The City of Auror

a, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE HUTCHINSON deliver ed the opi nion of the

court: Inthis consolidated appeal, defendants, Aurora Township (the Township) and Fre d Burg ess, inhis offic ial capaci

ty a s Aurora Township highway commissioner (the Commissioner), appeal from the trial court 's orde r denying t he Tow nshi p's motion to dismiss and g ranting summary judgmen t in favor of plaintiff, the Village of Montgomery (Montgomery

), and defendant, the City of Aurora (Aurora). In granting

summary judgme

nt, the trial court

found that the Township owned the Ashland Avenue Bridg e (the br

idge) s panning the Fox Rive

r in southernKane County, and f urther found that the Commissione

r had the obligat ion to maintain the bridge. On appeal, the Township contends that the trial court

erred i n deny ing its mot

ion to dismis s, becau se it was n ot a prope r party to this action. Ad di ti on al ly, the Commissioner contends that the t rial court erred in granting Montgomery

andNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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Auror a's joint mot ion for summary judg ment and in denying

his cross-motion for summary judgmen t. We affi

rm. OnDecember 11 , 2 006, M ontgo mery comm enced t he ins tant p roceed ing by fil ing a complaint for declaratory

judgment . As am ended, the complaint named the Township, the Commissioner, and

Aurora as defendants and reque sted the trial cou rt to dete rmine and adjudic ate the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the parties as they related to the bridge. The complaint alleged that the bridge was locat

ed in unincorporated

Kane County, betwe en the corporate limits of Montgomery

and Aurora, and

was wholly within the Township's bounda ries. The complaint alleged that the Township constructed the bridge in 1967 and 1968 and continued to maintai n the br idge between 1968 and 2005. The complaint alleged that, in 2005, the Commissioner sent a letter to the Illinois Department

of Transpo rtation (IDOT), indicating that the bridge was not within the Township's jurisdiction. The complaint alleged that, since that time, the Township

had ref used to maintain and clear snow from the bridge, c reatinganunsafe condition for motorists. Montgomery requested the trial court to declare that it did not own t he bridg e and tha

t it had no o

bligation to maintain the bridge. OnJanuary 11, 2007, the Township moved to dismiss the com plai nt pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Cod

e of Civil Procedure (the Procedure Code) (7 35 IL

CS 5/2--61 9(a)(9 ) (West 2006)). The Township asserted tha t Montg omery

's compl aint ag ainst it wa s barre d becau se townships have no statutory a uthority over roads a

nd bridges. See Burnidge Brothers Al mor a Height s, Inc. v. Wiese , 142 Ill. App. 3d 486, 492 (1986). OnMarch 2, 2007, Montgomery and Aurora

jointly moved

for summa

ry judgmen t. In t heir motion, they

argued that, prior to the construction of the br idge, A urora ha d disconne cted fr

om itsNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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southerncorporate boundaries the land on which th e b ri dg e w as to be bu il t. Ad di ti on al ly, prior to construction, Montgome

ry annexed la

nd immedia

tely south of the planned bridge. Montgomery and Aurora argue d that at no tim e after the construction of the bridge had they anne

xed the land upon whichthe bridge was construct ed. They argue d that the

Township had constr

ucted the bridge in 1967 and 1968 and had

maintained the bridge since that time until 2005. Montgomery and Aurora argued that, in 1997, the Township had also repaired and completely refurbished the bridge. Montgomery

and Aurora also a

rgued that, in 2005, the To wnshi p sto pped m ainta inin g the br idge and has since insisted that either Mon tgomery or Auror a owns the

bridge and is re sponsible

for its maintenance and operation. They requested the trial court

to enter summary judg

ment in their favor and declare that the Township owned the bridge and was responsible for its repair and maintenance
. In support of their joint motion for summary judgme

nt, Montgomery a

nd Aurora attached: ( 1) a pho tocopy

of Mo ntgo mery

Ordi nanc e No. 138 ( eff. Marc h 3, 19 58), annexi ng to th e municipa lity

parcels of land immediately to the south of the present location of the bridge; (2) a photo copy

of Aurora Ordinance No. 3317 (ef f. May 15, 1961), disconne cting from the souther n boundary of the mun

icipality certain parcels of

land on which the bridge is presently located; (3) the affida vit of Aurora city

clerk Chery

l M. Vonhoff, indicating that her "searc h of t he City records revealed no ordinance or records where in the City of Aurora re a nnexed territory that was disconnected

from the City by Ordi nance N o. 331 7"; (4) the aff idavi t of Au rora's former director of public property, Rosario DeLeon, indicating that the bridge was not

within Aur

ora's c orporat

e limits; (5) photo copies o f intergovernmental agr eements between Aurora and the Township date d November 20, 2001, and October 28, 2004, indi catin g that A urora w ould plow a nd sal t the b ridge
even though it fell withi nthe Township's jur

isdiction; (6) the a

ffidavit of Montg omery

public worksNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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director Michael Pubentz, averring that the bridge wa s not within the Montgomery corpora te limits and that, prior to 2006, the Township had maintained the bridge with the assistance of Aurora. Montgomery

and Aurora also attached the affida vit of Edwar d Wi lmes, who was Aurora Township highwa y c ommissione

r betwee n 1993 and

2001. I n his affidavit, Wilmes averred that the bridge wa s constructed

by the Aurora

Township road district in 1967 and 1968. Wilmes averred that, during his time as high way commi ssio ner, h is res ponsi bili ties i nclud ed mai ntain ing th e brid ge and removing snow and i ce from the bridg e. Wilmes a

verred that, dur ing eac h ye ar of his

term, he entered into anagreement with Aurora, wher eby Auror a agreed to clear snow from the bridge on the Towns hip's behalf. Wil mes aver red that Aurora had "disconnecte d the territory upon whic h the [b] ridge was ultim at el y built so that the [b]ridge could be built by the Township (as, afte r disconnection, the terr

ito ry was unincorporated)." Wilmes averred that, a fter construction of the bridge a nd until the

end of his

term as hi ghway

commissioner, the A

urora To wnship ro ad dist

ric t continued to own and

maintain t

he bridg e, and the

re was no attempt by a

ny m unicipal ity

to annex the bridge. Wilmes averred that neither Aurora nor Montg omery owned the bridge or had any obligation

to mai ntain it. W ilme s averr ed tha t the A urora T ownsh ip roa d dis trict rebui lt th e brid ge in1997 at a cost of approximately $1.2 million. Following the reconstruction of the bridge in 1997, plaques were affixed to the bridge indicating the Township's ownership of the bridge. The parties later de posed Wilme s, at whic

h time he affirmed

the state ments con

tained in his affid avit. Also attached to the motion for summary judgment was a jurisdictional boundar y line agreement

executed by Auror

a and Montgomery

on March 9, 1990. Paragraph 9 of the agreement provided as follow s:Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

-5- "In the event Au

rora en ters into a n agre ement wit

h Aurora Township w

ith respe ct to major repairs, reconstruction or replace ment of the Ashl and Avenu e Bridge, Montgomery shallreimburse Aurora for 25% of the total costs for suc h major repa ir s, reconstruction or replac ement. In the

event Mon

tgomer y is requested

to financially par

ticipate in such major repair s, reconst

ruction or repla

cement, Montgome

ry shallbe notified of such proposed work and has the right to participate in the decision as to the necessity , nature and

extent of such work. In a

ny e vent, all ordinar y r epairs a nd mainte

nance to said brid ge sha ll n ot be th e responsibility of Montgomery ." OnMarch 6, 2007, the Commissioner filed an answer to Montgomery' s complaint, denying all material allegations. The Commissioner also filed fou r aff irmat ive de fenses to Mo ntgom ery's suit. The Commiss i oner' s first affirmative defense allege d that Aurora Ordinance No. 3317, disconnectingthe land on which th e bridg e was bui lt, was voi d becau se "the Illinois Municipal Code precludes disconne ction from a municipality by

a municipal entity." The

Commissioner alleged that the land disconnected by

the ordinance was owned by a municipal entity known as the " Fox River Valley Pleasure Driveway

and Park District." The Com mi ssioner also alleged that Montgomery Ordinance No. 130 (eff. October 7, 1957), which also purported to disconnect land owned by the Fox River Valley Pleasure

Driveway

and Park District

and on which the bridge was built, was similarly void. The Commissioner's second affirmative defense alleged that the Townshi p's rep air of the bridge in 1997 was contingent upon Aurora and Montgomer y taking jurisdiction over

the bridge af

ter the completion of the repairs. In support of this allegation, the Commissioner attache d a FebruaryNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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14, 1996, letter that former highway commissioner Wilmes wrote to Montgomery' s administrator, which pr ovided, in releva nt part: "Thank you for taking

time to discuss the Ashland Avenue bridge rehabilitation proje ct thi s morn ing. * * * Fundingof the project solely by [the Township] is contingent upon [the Township] being relieve d from ownership, maintena nce, legal and fi

nancial obligat ions, past , presen

t, and future, relative

to [the brid

ge], inte rsection s, park accesses and any appurte

nances there unto as have existed, exist, or may exist in the future. Further, it must be resolved by the three e ntities tha t ownersh ip shall be convey ed to [Aurora], and the Aurora/Montgomery boundary ag

reement shall govern all future maintenance. Should an y fu rt he r c la ri fi ca ti on or ad di ti on al di sc us si on be re qu ir ed , p le as e n ot if y m e at once. Again, I

thank you for making

this project and transfer possible." The Commi ssioner alleged that Aurora and Montg omery neve r objected to the terms of thi s correspondence and that they have waived any

right to disclaim ownership of or responsibility for the bridge. The Commissioner's third affirma tive def ense allege d that I

DOT "ha s examined

ownersh ip of the [bridg e] and has

made a de

terminat ion that th e [bridge] lies within the corporate limits of Montgomery ." In support of this allegation, t he Commissio ner attached a July 30, 2004, le tter written by I

DOT engineer Chu

ck I ngerso ll, which provided, in relev ant part :Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

-7- "This is in response to y

our requ est for v erifica

tion as towhether

Aurora Township is responsi

b le for the As hland Ave

nue Bri dge *** over the

Fox River in

Aurora , Illi

nois (Kane County). You had brought to our

attention th at [t he br id ge ] h ad be en an ne xe d b y a
mu ni ci pa li ty, ye

t our st ructu re infor mation da

tabase s till indica

ted that [th e bridg e was] Aurora Township's responsibility. Pursuant to statute 605 IL CS 5/6--203 of the Illinois Road andBr idge L aws, a township ca nnot have

jurisdict ion over s treets in

municipa

litie s . Whenever

a municipality annexes a hig hway and/or struc

ture that was under tow

nship
re sp on si bi li ty, th is hi gh way or structure automatically be comes the responsibility of the
an ne xi ng mu ni ci pa li ty. Our record s indicate

that [the br

idge is] w

ithin the c ity l imits o f a munic ip al it y. Therefore, Aurora Township has no re sponsibility regar ding [the bridge]." The Commissioner also provided a 2005 IDOT internal memora ndum that stated

that "Montgomery
owns a small se ction of A shland wh ich inclu des [the br

idge]" and that " every

thing poi nts to Montgomery owning [t he bridge]." Re lyi ng on Aurora's and Montgomery 's pleadings, the Commissioner's fourth affir mative defense alleged that Aurora had jurisdiction over the r oadway on one

side of the bridge and that Montgomery

had jurisdictionover the roadway on the other side. The Commissioner alleged that the Township had no jurisdiction over any roa d leading to or from

the bridg e and tha

t, under I llinois law, "the dut

y to maintain a bridge rests with the gover nment re sponsible

for maint aining a public roadway for which the bridge is a part."Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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On March 9, 2007, the Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Th e Commissionerargued t hat Au rora's 1961 ordinance and Montgomery's 1957 ordinance purporting to disconnect the land on which the bridge was built were void because "a municipal e ntity cannot disconnect

from a municipality under the Illinois Municipal Code." The Commissioner argued that the en ti ty s ee ki ng di sc on ne ct io n u nd er th es e o rd in an ce s w as th e F ox Ri ve r V al le y Pleasure Dri veway and Park Distr

ict, which, as a

municipal entity, could not avail itself of the disconne ction procedure. The Commissioner further argued that, because A uror a and Mont go mery had a dmitted that they have jurisdiction over the land onthe opposite sides of the bridge, they must also have jurisdiction over the bridge itself as a matter of law. The Commissioner argued that Aur ora and Montgome

ry could notdivest themselves of responsibility for maintaining a bridge that was an integ

ral par t of the pu blic roadway sys tem within t

heir munic ipal juris dictions. The Co mm issioner also argued that no township r

oad connected with the bri dge an d that the neares t township

road under the jurisdiction of th e C om mi ss io ne r w as mo re th an on e m il e a wa y. OnMay 1, 2007, following a hearing, t

he trial court entered an order (1) de nying the Towns hip's mo ti on to di sm is s; (2 ) d en yi ng the Comm issi oner's c ross-moti on for sum mary judgmen t; and (3) gr anting A urora a nd Montg omery

's j oint motion f

or sum mary judgm ent. T he tri al cou rt's order further provided that "the Court declares that the ownership and control of the Ashland Avenue Bridge rests with the Aurora Township, and the obligation to maintain the bridge r es ts with the Aurora Township Highway

Comm issi oner. " Follo wing t he den ial of the Co mmis sion er's motion to reconsider, both the Township and the Commissioner filed timely noticesof appeal. This court has consolidated the appeals for purposes of decision.Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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Ini ti al ly, we addr

ess appe al No. 2- -07--06 32, in whic h the Town ship contends that the trial court erred i n deny ing its mot

ion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Procedure Code. The Township argues that it is not a proper party to this action beca

use it has no statutory power or authorit y over roads and bridges. See Western Sa nd & Gra vel Co. v. T own of Cor

nwall , 2 Ill. 2d 560, 566 (1954 ); Wiese , 142 I ll. App. 3d at 492. The Township asserts that, under section 6--201.8 of the Illinois Highwa

y C ode (the Highway

Code) (605 IL CS 5/6--201.8 (West 2006)), only the townshiphighway

commissioner has charge of roads a nd has the duty to repa

ir and maintain t

hem. Anaction may

be dismissed pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Procedure Code when it is barred by an affirmative matter that defeats the cla im or avoids its legal effect. 7 35 IL CS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2006 ); Turner v. Fletcher , 302 Ill. Ap p. 3d 1 051, 1 055 ( 1999) . We review de novo the trial court 's ruling on a section 2--619 motion
. Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital , 227 Ill. 2d 343, 352 (2008). We conclude that the T ownship is a proper p arty

to this action and that the trial court did not
err in deny ing its motion to dismiss. Although a township highway commissioner has sole statutory authority to repai r and impr

ove "the roads of his district" (605 I

LCS 5/6 --201.8 (

West 2 00 6)), the t own ship is nonethe less the owner of the road s within the

township' s road sy

stem ( Hennings v. Centrevi lle Township , 56 Ill. 2d 151, 154-55 (1974)) and must approve the budget prese nted by the highway commissioner to operate the township's roads and bridge s and must audit the highway commi ssio ner's accounts (60 ILCS 1/80--15, 80--60 (West 20 06)). As s uch, the Township was properl y named as a defendant to the instant action, which sought a declaration

of the " rights, obligat ions, and liabi lities of the parties as they pe rtain to the [b]ridge." Moreover, we note a numbe r of similar cases in which townships were named as defe ndants. See City of Mattoon v .Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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Paradise Township , 131 Ill. App. 3d 327 (1985); Andrews v. City of Spring field , 56 Ill. App. 2d 201 (1965). Here, the trial court's final order did not impose upon the Township any oblig ationthat was contrary to its statutory authority
. As noted ab ove, although the trial court declared that the Township owned the bridge, it nonetheless ruled tha t the Co mmissioner was responsible for maintaining the b ridg e. We therefore affirm the trial court' s order denying the Township's section 2--619 motion to dismiss. Inappeal No. 2--07--0539, theCommissioner contends that the trial court erred in granting Aurora and Montg omery

's joint motion for su

mmary judgmen t and in de

nyi ng his cross-motion for summary judgment. The Commissione r argu es that the trial cou rt imprope

rly focused on what e ntity "owned" the bridge, whe

n the appropriate inquiry

should have been what entity had "jurisdiction"
over the bridge. The Commissioner argues that he did not have jurisdiction over the bridge because it was part of the municipal street sy stem of Aurora and Mo nt go me ry, whose municipal boundaries extended to either side of th e bridg e. The Com miss ioner relies upon IDOT' s July 30, 2004, letter indicating that t he bri dge was within the bound

aries of a municip ality

and was n

ot the re sponsibilit

y of the Township. The Commissioner additionally asserts that Aurora's and Montgomery 's 1957 and 1961 ordinances disconnecting the land under the bridge from those municipalities were void and of no eff ect. The Township j oins in man

y of the Commissi oner' s arguments. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleading s, aff idav its, depositions, and admissions on file show that no genuine issue of mat erial fac t exists and t hat the mo ving pa

rty is
en titledto judgment as a matter of law. 735 I LCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2006). The purpose o f summary judgment is not to try a question of fa ct but, rather, to determine whether a g enuine issue of material fact exists. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. , 211 Ill. 2d 32 , 42-43 (20 04) . InNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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determining whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists, a court must constru e the pleading s, depositions, admiss ions, and aff idavits str ictly againstthe movant and liberally in fa vor of the opponent. Adams , 211 I ll. 2d at 43. Summary judgment is inappropr iate where the material facts are disputed or where, the material fa cts being undisputed, reasonable persons might dra w different inferences from

the undisp

uted facts. Adams , 211 I ll. 2d at 43 . Summary judgmen t is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and should be allowed only when the ri ght of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Adams , 211 Ill. 2d at 43. Th is court r eviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Adams , 211 Ill. 2d at 43. At the outset, we agree that the rele vant question in the instant case is not what enti ty owns the bridg e, but wha

t entity has resp onsibility

for maint aining t he bridg e. Stree

ts and roadway s are held by public entities in trust for the benef it of the public ( Hawthorne Bank of Wheaton v. Vill age of Gl en El lyn , 154 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (1987)), andgovernmental entities have a corre sponding duty to maintai

n the stre ets and roadway s within their jurisdiction ( Fountain Head Drainage District
v. City of C hampa ign , 160 Ill. App. 3 d 341, 346 ( 1987)). Bystatute and at common law, "the duty to maintain a bridge rests upon the government r esponsible for maintaining the public roadway of whichthe bridg e is a part, be it a county or a road d istr ict ** * and r egardle ss of w hethe r the b ridge
was built by that local gove rnment or by anothe

r governmental entity ." Cou nty of Bure au v. Thompson , 139 Ill. 2d 323, 340 (1990). Therefor e, the relevan

t inquiry on

appeal is what governmentalentity

is respon sible for

maintaini ng the p ublic roadwa

y of which the

bridge is a part. Thompson , 139 Ill. 2d at 340-41. Section2--103 of the Highway Code defines the township and district road system to include "all rural roads to which this Code applies *** and which are not a par t of the State hig

hway sys tem,Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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county highwa y sy stem or mun

icipal str eet system." 6 05 IL

CS 5/2--103 (West 2006). The Highway Code defines a rural road as "[a]ny highway or road outside the corporate limits of any municipality ." 605 IL CS 5/2--218 (West 2006). Meanwhile, section 2--104 of the Highway Code defi nes th e munic ipa l street sy

stem as inc luding " existing st reets a nd streets herea

fter est ablished in municipalities which are not a part of the State highway

system or county

highway system, togethe

r with roads outside th eir cor

porate l imits over which they have jurisdiction pursuant to this Code or any other statu te." 6 05 IL CS 5/2--10 4 (West 2006). The parties do not dispute that the roadway comprising the br idge is a part of neithe r the stat e highw ay

sys tem nor the

county highwa y sy stem. Hence, under the definitions provide d by the Hig hway Code, if the bridg e is not a part of a municipal street sys tem, then

it is a par t of the tow

nship and d

istrict ro ad sy stem and is

the responsibility of

the Commissione

r to mainta

in. 605 I LCS 5/2 --103 (We st 2006); Andrews , 56 Ill. App. 2d at 209-10. Based upon our review of the record, the uncontrove rted evidence establishes that the bridge is not a part of a municipal street sy stem, and we conclude th at the trial court properly granted summary judgme

nt on behalf of Montgomery and Aurora. As detailed

above, the record contains copies of municipal ordinances, enacted prior to the bridge's construction, by which Montgomery and Aurora disconnected

the property unde

r the bridge from their corporate boundaries. The record also contains

affida vits from Aurora's former direc tor of public propert y a nd Montg omery

's public works direct or averringth at th e b ri dg e i s n ot wi th in th e c or po ra te li mi ts of ei th er mu ni ci pa li ty. Based upon such

evidenc e, the ro adway

of which the bridg e is a

part is not within Montgomery' s or Auror a's governmental jurisdiction, and those municipalities have no correspond ing statutory or common-lawduty

to maintain the bridge. See 605 I LCS 5/2 --104 (We st 2006); Thompson , 139 I ll. 2d at 340-41.Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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Ad di ti on al ly, the materials accompany ing the cross-motions for summary judgmen t plainly indicate that neither Montgomery nor Aurora h as ever taken responsibility for maintaining the bridge. The Township's former highway commissioner, Edward Wilmes, averred that the Township constructed

the bridge in 1967 and 196 8 and maintained the bridge for near ly 40 y ears. Wilmes averred that Aurora

and Montgomery

originally disconne cted the land under the bridge so that the Towns hip could construct the bridge. The Township also rebuilt the bridg e in 1997 at a cost of approxima

tely $1.2 million . The re cord con tains evid ence de monstrati ng that p la q ues have been affixed to the br idge sh owing t he Tow nshi p's par tici patio n in t he bri dge's rec onst ructi on. Al thou gh the record contains intergovernmental a greemen ts reflecting that, during

certain ye ars, Aurora agree d to plow and

salt the bridge on behalf of the Township, neither Aurora nor Montgomery ever executed
a formal a greement to take over maintenance responsibility for the bridge. L acking such an agreement

or evidence that the bridge was other wise within the boundaries of a municipality, the trial court properly de

termined that the Commissioner was responsible for maintaining the bridge. See 605 IL CS 5/2--103 (West 2006). Inreaching this conclusion, we reject the Commissioner' s argument that Montgomery 's and Auror a's ordin ances d iscon necti ng the p ropert y on which the br idge was built were void and of no effec t. The Township asserts that the municipalities had no authority under I llinois law to disconnect pr o perty owned by a municipa

l entity, here the F ox River Valley Pleasure Drive way and Par

k District. In su

pport of h

is position, the Commissi o ner rel ies upon a line of case s holding

that a
mu nicipalit

y lac ks a ut hor it y to d is con nec t i ts own pro per ty, u nde r se cti on 7 --3 --4 of t he Il linoi s Municipal Code (65 I

LCS 5/7--3- -4 (West

2006)). See Citizens for Conservation v. Village of Lake Barrington , 241 Ill. App. 3d 471, 475-76 (1 993); People ex r el. Town of Aurora v. City of Aurora ,Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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2 22 Ill. A

pp. 3d 950, 954-55 (1 991). However, the Commission er may not use the

insta n t proceeding

as a means to collaterally

attack the validity of municipal or dinances disconnecting the land under the bridge. Questions of whether parcels have been lega

lly disconnected or a

nnexed can be tr ie d o nl y by quo warr anto proceedings and cannot be ra ised collaterally. See People ex r el. Quisenberry

v. Ellis , 253 I ll. 369, 37 4-75 (191 2); East Side Fire Protection District v. City of Bellevi lle , 221 Ill. App. 3d 654, 655-56 (1 991); North Maine Fire P rotect ion Di stri ct v. V illa ge of Niles , 53 Ill. App. 3d 389, 394-95 (1977). The Commissioner never soug ht review of the municipal ordinances by filing a quo warr anto action, and he is precluded from rai si ng the is sue colla terally almost 50 years la

ter. Instead, we pr

esume the validity of the ordina nces an d conclude that they disconnected

the prope

rty on which t

he bridg e was bui lt from the municipal boundaries. See Quisenberry , 253 Ill. at 374-75. The Commiss ioner al

ternativ ely

argue s that, even ass

uming the

validity of the or dinance s, the lega l description containe d within Mon tgomer y O rdinanc e No. 130 " failed to disconne ct prope

rty adjacent to the bridge." The Commissioner asserts that Montgomery , therefore, has jurisdiction over propert y adjace nt to the bridge. However, the Commissioner fails to cite any authority supporting his concl usio n that Mont gomery's ju ri sd ic ti on ov er pr op er ty adjacent to the bridge

has rele vance to the determ inati on of j urisd icti on ove r the b ridge itself. As noted above, the relevant inquiry unde r section2--104 of

the Highwa

y Co de is whether the

bridge is within municipal boundaries. Hence, the relevant question is whether the land on which t he bri dge sits

is within mun

icipal bo undarie s, notwhether

the la nd adjac ent to the brid

ge is wit hin those b oundarie s. 605 I LCS 5/2 --104 (We st 2006). Therefore, that Montgomery retained jurisdiction over property adjacent to the bridge does not alter our determination that the bridge falls within the Township's jurisdiction.Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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The Commissioner further argues that, even if the bridge is outside t

he corpo rateboundaries of Aurora and Montgomery, the bridge is nonetheless a part of a municipal street system. I n making this argument, the Commissioner notes that section 2--104 of the Highway

Code provides that the municipal street s ystem i ncludes e xisting str eets in the municipa lity "toge ther with roads outside [its ] corpora te limits over which [it has] jurisdiction pursuant to this Code or any other sta

tu te." (Emphasi s added.)605 I LCS 5/2 --104 (We st 2006). The plain

language of this section provides that roads outside a

municipa

lity 's corp orate lim

its are a part of it s street syst

em only where th e municipa lity has jurisdiction over

the roads under another provision of the Highway Code or other statute. Southern Illinoisan v. I llinois De p artment o f Public He alth , 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006) (noting that statu

tes must be

applied a ccordin g to thei r plain language). Telling ly, the Commissioner cites no other provision o f the Hig hway Code or ot

her statu te that would

place the bridge under the jurisdiction of either Aurora or Montgomery
. Lacking any statutory gr

ant of jur isdi ction , the b ridge f alls outside Aurora's and Montgomery 's corporate limits and is not a part of a municipal stre e t system under section 2--104 of the Highway Code. The lack of a statutory g

rant of jurisdiction extending Montgomery 's or Aurora's jurisdiction b eyond its corporate boundaries distinguishes this case from the authorities re lied u pon by th e Commissioner. See City of Mattoon v. Paradise Township , 131 Ill. App. 3d 327 (1985 ); Andrews
v. City of Springf ield , 56 Ill. App. 2d

201 (1965). In both of these ca ses, municipalities were found to have maintenance respon si bilities as to roadways outside their c orporate boundaries. The
ro ad wa ys at issue provided a ccess to lots adjoining a man-made lake constructe d by the municipalities outside th eir corporate limits as part of a municipal syste m of water works and water
su pp ly. Mattoon , 131 Ill. App. 3d at 329; Andrews , 56 Ill. App. 2d at 205-08. The lake and waterNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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sys tems were constructed by the municipalities under an expr es s g ra nt of le gi sl at iv e a ut ho ri ty. Mattoon , 131 Ill. App. 3d at 329; Andrews , 56 Ill. App. 2d at 208. Under these cir cumstances, the reviewing courts he ld that th e roads accessing these prope rties were part of the municipal street sys tems under

section 2--104 of the Highway Code because the municipalities had jurisdiction over the roads by "other statu te." Mattoon , 131 I ll. App. 3d at 332-33 ; Andrews , 56 Ill. App. 2d at 210. Unlike in Mattoon and Andrews , neither Aurora nor Montgomery

has statutory jurisdiction
over the bridge. To t

he contrary, the e

vidence reflects that these municipalities have no leg al relation ship to the brid

ge that would exten

d their jur isdiction t o include the bridg e as par

t of their municipal street systems. The e vidence demonstrates that the bridge was built by the Township on land out side Aurora's and Montgomery 's corporate limits. Aurora and Montgomer y have ne ver annexed the land under the bridge, and it is evidentthat the Township has maintained and repaired the bridge since its initial construction. Add it io na ll y, we reject the Commissioner's argument that g enuine issues of material fa c t precluded the entry of summary judg

ment. The Commissioner asserts that evidence appearing in the record suggested the possibility that Aurora and Montgomery had entered into intergovern me ntal agree ments to assume

responsi bility to maintai n and repair the bridge. Specifica lly, the Commissioner

relies upon the 1990 intergovernmental boundary line agreement between Aur ora an d Mo nt go me ry, whichcontained a provision relating to the municipalities' potential responsibilities inthe event of the repair, reconstruction, or r eplacement of the bridge. The Commissioner further relies upon Wilmes 's 199 6 letter to Montgomery's administrator, stating that funding of the 1997 bridge recons truct ion wa s cont ingent upon t he tran sfer of bridge owners hip t o Auro ra and A urora's and Montg omery

's assum ption of r epair a nd mainte nance r esponsibi lities.Nos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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Contrary to the Commissione

r's ass ertions, however, these documents do not establish that Montgomery

or Auror a did, in f act, ag ree to assume responsibility for the bridge. As noted above, the provision

of the 199 0 interg overnme ntal bound

ary lin e agree ment between Aurora and Montgomery

relating to maintenance of the bridg e bec a me effective only "[i]n the event Aurora enters into an agreement with Aurora Township with respe ct to major repairs, r e construction or replacement

of the Ashland Avenue Bridge." The record contains no evidence reflecting that Aurora ever entered into an agre ement with the Township regarding the bridg e. Although Wilmes's 1996 letter reflected that the Township and the municipalities had entered into discussions regarding the transfer or maintenance of the bridge, no ag reement on the matter was ever executed. Indeed, during his deposition, Wilmes spe cifical ly te stified that his 1996 letter me rely reflecte d a proposal discussed by the Township and the munici palities and that no formal agreement re garding the transfer or maintenance of the bridge was ever re ached. Wilmes testified that, despite the failure to reach an agreement

with the municipalities, the Tow nship deci ded to repair the bridge due to the pre sent availabi lit y

of federal, state, and township funds to pay for the project. Based on such uncontroverted

evidence from t he Tow nshi p's former highway supervisor, we find no issue of fact
as to Mo ntgom ery's or Aurora's execution of an agreement to assume responsibility for the bridge. We also reject the Commissioner's assertions that the July 30, 2004, letter written by IDOT engineer Chuck

Ingersoll and I

DOT's subsequent internal memorandum precluded the tr ial co urt's entry of summar

y ju dgment. As noted a

bove, I ngerso ll stated i

n his le tter th at IDOT's structure informationdata

base indicated that the bridge was the Township's re sponsibilit y. H owever , Ing ersoll stated that, because the Township "had brought to our attention

that [the bridge] had been annexed by a municipality," he

determined that the Township did not have responsibility for the bridg e. SuchNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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correspondencefai ls to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to jurisdiction over the br idge, because it provides no factual basis from which we might conclude that the bridge was a part of a municipal street system. See Kosten v. St. Anne' s Hospit al , 132 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1079 (1985) (noting that conclusory stateme nts lacking factual basis are insufficient to create an issue of

fact so
as to defeat a motion for summary judgment). Ing ersoll

stated that his determination was predicated uponinformation provided by the Tow nship indicating that the land under the bridge had be en annexed by

a m un ic ip al it y. However, the record contains no evidenc e of such an annexation, and the Township has failed to produce the information that it provided to I DOT and upon which IDOT based its conclusion. Si mi la rl y, the 2005 IDOT intern al memorandum indicating that Montgomery owned the bridge lacks any ve

rifiable basis. Although the memorandum states that Montgomery "owned a smallsection of

Ashland which includes [the bridge]," it provides no explana tion of the basis for this determination. Accord

ingly, IDO T's determination regarding jurisdiction is unsupported and conclusory

and pr ovid es no b asis t o sugges t that the br idge is within the corporate limits of either Montgomery

or Auror a. In view of the uncontroverted evidence prese nted by Aurora

and Montgomery

that the bridge is not within their corporate boundaries, the I DOT exhibits offered by the Commissioner failed to raise a genuine issue of material fa ct as to jurisdiction over

the bridge. See Kosten , 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. Inclosing , both

the Township and the Commissioner assert that the bridge cannot be under their jurisdiction because Aurora and Montgomery have annexed the property on e ither side of the bridge, leaving

the bridg e surrou

nded by the two mun

icipalitie s and iso lated from a ny Township road by many miles. While

we agr ee that the bridg e may

be heavily u sed by

the resid ents of Aurora andNos. 2-- 07--0539& 2--07 --0632 c ons.

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Montgomery

for travel between

the two m unici palit ies, s uch a ci rcums tance, as wel l as th e brid ge's isolation from Township roads, does not render the bridge a part of a municipal street system unde r the plain language of section 2-- 104 of the Highway Code. As already

discus sed, the municipal street sys tem consis ts of the existing str eets within the

corpora te limits an

d other st reets over which
a municip ality has jurisdiction by statute. 605 I LCS 5/2--104 (West 2006). Here, the rec ord definitiv ely

establishes that the

bridge is not contained within the corporate limits of Montgomery
or Aurora an d t ha t n ei th er mu ni ci pa li ty o th er wi se ha s s ta tu to ry j ur is di ct io n. Ac co rd in gl y, the trial court properly c oncluded that the b ridge w as not a part of a municipal street sy stem and that the obligation

to ma in ta in th e b ri dg e r es te d w it h t he Co mm is si on er . A cc or di ng ly, we affirm t he trial
cour t's orde r granting Aurora a nd Montgomery's motion for summary judg ment and denying

the Commissione

r's cr oss-motion

for summa

ry judgmen t. Fo r t he fo re go in g r ea so ns , w e a ff ir m t he ju dg me nt of

th e c ir cu it co ur t o f K an e C ou nt y. Affirmed. BURKE and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.