SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

46 

KA 11-02407 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHAWN B. WITKOP, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

ROBERT M. PUSATERI, CONFLICT DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (EDWARD P. PERLMAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

MICHAEL J. VIOLANTE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (LAURA T. BITTNER OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of

the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, from an order of

the Niagara County Court (Sara S. Sperrazza, J.), dated July 25, 2011. 

The order denied defendant’s amended motion pursuant to CPL 440.10. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order summarily denying,

inter alia, his amended pro se motion pursuant to CPL 440.10

(hereafter, motion) to vacate the judgment convicting him upon his

guilty plea of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [2])

and manslaughter in the second degree (§ 125.15 [1]). We reject

defendant’s contention that County Court abused its discretion in

denying the motion without a hearing based on his allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserted in his

supporting affidavit that defense counsel’s investigation of the

charges against him was inadequate inasmuch as defense counsel failed

to discover statements by three alleged witnesses who “all stated that

[defendant] was on the premises to work,” and who “saw defendant at

work” on the victim’s home. Even assuming, arguendo, that those

alleged witnesses could establish that defendant did not enter the

victim’s home unlawfully, we conclude that such entry would not negate

the trespass element of burglary inasmuch as the indictment charged

only that defendant “remained unlawfully” in the home (see Penal Law §

140.30; see generally People v Jackson, 48 AD3d 891, 892, lv denied 10

NY3d 841). Defendant further asserted in his supporting affidavit

that defense counsel “intimidated” him into pleading guilty during two

off-the-record discussions at the plea proceeding. Defendant’s

unsupported, self-serving assertions, however, are contradicted by the

transcript of the plea proceeding, at which defendant indicated that

he agreed to plead guilty of his own free will and that no one had
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KA 11-02407 

coerced him to enter the plea (see CPL 440.30 [4] [d] [i]; People v

Sayles, 17 AD3d 924, 924-925, lv denied 5 NY3d 794). We note,

moreover, that defense counsel’s alleged off-the-record discussions

with defendant occurred after defendant’s above-described statements

during the plea colloquy, and thus there is no reasonable possibility

that any such intimidation affected defendant’s decision to plead

guilty (see CPL 440.30 [4] [d] [ii]). The record likewise does not

support defendant’s assertion that defense counsel was unprepared at

sentencing. We conclude, therefore, that the court properly denied

defendant’s motion without a hearing because, “given the nature of the

claimed ineffective assistance, the motion could be determined on the

trial record and defendant’s submissions on the motion” (People v

Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799; see People v Jamison, 71 AD3d 1435,

1437, lv denied 14 NY3d 888).

Defendant failed to address in his brief on appeal the remaining

grounds advanced in support of his motion, and we thus deem any

contentions with respect thereto abandoned (see generally People v

Dombrowski, 87 AD3d 1267, 1267-1268).

Entered: February 14, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court