NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

AMIR REZA AZIN, Petitioner/Appellee,

and 

KRISTINA J. MILAZZO, Respondent/Appellee,

v.

LAURA DRESSELHUYS, et al., Intervenors/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0672 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2015-091728

The Honorable Lisa S. Wahlin, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Padish Law Group PLLC, Scottsdale 

By James E. Padish 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Hildebrand Law P.C., Tempe 

By Kip M. Micuda 

Counsel for Intervenors/Appellants

FILED 7-11-2023
AZIN/MILAZZO V. DRESSELHUYS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Lauren and Edward Dresselhuys (“Maternal Grandparents”) 

appeal the superior court’s order permitting Amir Reza Azin (“Father”) to 

travel with his daughter (“the child”) to Iran. Because Maternal 

Grandparents have not shown that the court abused its discretion, we 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Kristina Milazzo (“Mother”) are the parents of the 

child, who was born in 2015. Shortly after the child’s birth, Father filed a 

petition to establish his paternity, legal decision-making authority, 

parenting time, and child support. At that time, the child was living with 

Maternal Grandparents through an arrangement with the Department of 

Child Safety.

¶3 Maternal Grandparents intervened in Father’s family law

case and requested in loco parentis sole legal decision-making authority,

with supervised parenting time for both parents. They also asked the 

superior court to “bar [Father] from obtaining any travel Visa, passport [or]

other such document for [the child] without a specific court order and bar 

him from taking her more than fifty (50) miles from [Maternal 

Grandparents’] home . . . without a court order.”

¶4 A year later, the parties signed an agreement addressing legal 

decision-making and parenting time (the “Agreement”), which was later 

adopted by the superior court. Under the Agreement, Father and Maternal 

Grandparents would share joint legal decision-making authority for one 

year, but thereafter Father has sole legal decision-making authority. The 

Agreement also grants the parties shared parenting time with the following 

restriction: “[I]f Father wishes to take [the child] outside the United States, 

he must either obtain [Maternal Grandparents’] specific written agreement 

or a court order.” The Agreement also states that “[t]he parties agree these 
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Decision of the Court

3

terms are in the child’s best interests until circumstances manifest and are 

proven otherwise.”

¶5 Father’s ability to travel outside the U.S. continues to be a 

point of contention between the parties. In 2021, they attended mediation 

but were unable to resolve the issue. Father then filed a petition to modify

the Agreement, which he later amended for procedural reasons. In his 

petition, he requested a court order permitting him to travel to Iran with 

the child so she could meet her paternal grandparents. Alternatively, he 

asked the court to permit them to travel to the United Arab Emirates so the

child could meet her paternal grandparents there. 

¶6 Maternal Grandparents opposed the petition, expressing

safety concerns regarding travel to the Middle East and their fear that 

Father might not return from the visit. They also alleged that if Father were 

to abscond with the child, or if third parties were to abduct her, there would 

be no civil recourse for them to obtain her safe return because Iran is not a 

member of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 

Child Abduction. 

¶7 In August 2022, the superior court held a trial on Father’s 

petition. The court heard from Father, Maternal Grandmother, and 

Maternal Grandparents’ expert witness Abed Awad. Following the trial, 

the court granted Father’s request to travel to Iran with his child, subject to 

a secured cash bond of $100,000. This order was a final judgment under 

Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 78(c). Maternal Grandparents filed 

an expedited motion to reconsider and an expedited motion to stay the 

order. Following full briefing, the court denied both motions. 

¶8 Maternal Grandparents timely appealed the superior court’s 

order permitting Father to travel with the child to Iran. They also requested 

that we stay the court’s order under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 7(c), which we denied. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Maternal Grandparents argue the superior court abused its 

discretion by “compelling the child’s travel to Iran” because it is “contrary 

to the child’s best interests.” 

¶10 We review an order addressing legal decision-making for an 

abuse of discretion. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019). A 

court abuses its discretion when it “commits an error of law in reaching a 
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4

discretionary decision or when the record does not support” its decision. 

Id. We do not reweigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the court’s 

credibility assessments on appeal. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284,

¶ 20 (App. 2019). And we will affirm the court’s ruling for any reason 

supported by the record. Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4 (App. 2008). 

¶11 As a threshold issue, we recognize that although Father 

framed his request to the superior court as a parenting time issue under 

A.R.S. § 25-411(J) (modification of legal decision-making or parenting time), 

the issue presented to the court is governed by A.R.S. § 25-410(A) (judicial 

supervision). Section 25-410(A) provides that except as otherwise agreed 

to by the parties, a parent designated as the sole legal decision-maker “may 

determine the child’s upbringing” unless the court limits that authority by

finding that “the child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s 

emotional development would be significantly impaired” without the 

limitation.

¶12 The Agreement’s legal decision-making provision states that 

“[a]fter twelve (12) months, Father shall have sole legal decision-making, 

except if Father wishes to take [child] outside the Unites [sic] States, he must 

either obtain [Maternal Grandparents] specific written agreement or a court 

order.” At most, this provision limits Father’s ability to exercise his legal 

decision-making authority in the sense that if Maternal Grandparents do 

not approve of him taking the child out of the country, he must obtain a 

court order. But even then, the provision would only affect his ability to 

parent the child as he deems appropriate if Grandparents can meet the 

heightened standard under § 25-410(A) to justify judicial interference. 

¶13 And though Father petitioned to “modify” the parties’

parenting plan he did not request any material changes to the Agreement. 

Instead, he essentially requested enforcement of the Agreement, which 

meant he needed to seek a court order allowing his child to travel to Iran. 

The superior court’s order addressed the parties’ arguments relating to 

parenting time and § 25-411(J), but the court specifically rejected “the 

argument that Father seeks to modify the Agreement.” Furthermore, the

relief granted flows logically from the terms of the Agreement, which 

specifically contemplated issuance of a court order addressing whether 

Father had permission to travel with the child to Iran to visit the paternal 

grandparents. 

¶14 Maternal Grandparents argue the superior court erred by 

relying on In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 244 Ariz. 111 (2018), because 

the court applied the wrong legal standard when it found that “Father is a 
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5

fit parent, who will act in the child’s best interests.” This “fit parent” 

presumption, they contend, only applies in cases concerning third-party 

custody rights, and not in cases involving parenting time and legal 

decision-making authority. 

¶15 Contrary to Maternal Grandparents’ assertion, the supreme 

court’s holding in Friedman that “a parent is presumed to be ‘fit’ until he or 

she has been adjudicated unfit” is not restricted to third-party custody 

cases. Id. at 119, ¶ 33. For instance, in Paul E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388 

(2019), the supreme court held that under § 25-410(A) “the court may limit 

the sole legal decision-maker’s authority only if ‘the child’s physical health 

would be endangered or the child’s emotional development would be 

significantly impaired,’ circumstances that presumably would occur 

infrequently with a fit parent making decisions.” Paul E., 246 Ariz. at 

393–94, ¶ 20. This standard is “patently more onerous than the ‘best 

interest’ test.” Id. at 394, ¶ 21 (quoting Section 408 of the Uniform Marriage 

and Divorce Act). 

¶16 Here, the superior court found that it was in the child’s best 

interests to visit Iran with Father and meet paternal grandparents and other 

extended family. And while the court reached this conclusion in the 

framework of parenting time, the court’s findings are still relevant to the 

§ 25-410(A) legal decision-making analysis. Furthermore, a finding that 

travel would be in the child’s best interests necessarily means that Maternal 

Grandparents have not met the higher burden of showing that travel would 

endanger the child’s physical health or impair her emotional development. 

See id. Because we may affirm for any reason supported by the record, the 

court did not abuse its discretion. See Pettit, 218 Ariz. at 531, ¶ 4. And 

because this dispute is governed by § 25-410(A), rather than 

§ 25-411(J), we need not address whether the court misapplied Lehn v. 

Al-Thanayyan, which addressed a parent’s right to exercise parenting time in 

a foreign country. 246 Ariz. at 284–86, ¶¶ 20–28.

¶17 Maternal Grandparents contend the superior court ignored a 

dozen particular facts and arguments they presented at trial. Many of these 

challenges ask us to credit Maternal Grandparents’ own testimony or the 

testimony of their expert witness over Father’s testimony, but we will not 

reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id. at 284, ¶ 20. 

¶18 Also, in its order the court made detailed findings supported 

by the record regarding Father’s ties to the United States, Maternal 

Grandmother’s concerns about travel to Iran, and Abed Awad’s expert 

testimony on Iran. Based on these findings, the court determined that
AZIN/MILAZZO V. DRESSELHUYS

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Father has strong ties to the U.S. that indicate he will return to the U.S. 

following his visit to Iran. It also found that Father’s desire for the child to 

meet her paternal grandparents is a reasonable and valid reason to travel;

and that it is in the child’s best interests. Because these findings are

supported by the record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 

discretion. See Smith v. Smith, 253 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 9 (App. 2022).

¶19 Finally, Maternal Grandparents argue in their reply brief that 

the court erred because it did not make specific findings on the record 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403(B). They contend the statutes governing legal 

decision-making and parenting time generally require that a court make 

written findings regarding the child’s best interests. Maternal 

Grandparents have waived this argument by not raising it in their opening 

brief. See Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 11 (App. 2022) (appellate 

courts will generally decline to consider arguments made for the first time 

in a reply brief).

¶20 Even so, express findings are not required when a court 

imposes limitations on a parent’s exercise of sole legal decision-making

under A.R.S. § 25-410(A). See, e.g., Hart v. Hart, 220 Ariz. 183, 187, ¶¶ 16–17 

(App. 2009) (recognizing that A.R.S. §§ 25-410(B) and 25-411(D), now 

subsection (J), contain “no requirement, as there is in A.R.S. § 25-403(B), that 

findings be reduced to writing or stated on the record.”). Although under

§ 25-410(A) the court must “find” certain facts before granting the requested

relief, there is no requirement that the court’s findings be reduced to writing 

or stated on the record. See Hart, 220 Ariz. at 187, ¶ 16. Under these 

circumstances, we find no error.

¶21 Both parties request their attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal 

under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), which authorizes a discretionary fee award based 

on disparity of financial resources and reasonableness of positions taken in 

the litigation. In our discretion, we decline to award attorneys’ fees to either 

party. As the successful party on appeal Father is awarded taxable costs 

subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.