Filed 3/7/24 P. v. Duenas CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JULIO DUENAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B330378

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA088051)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed. 

Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Because this appeal is determined by well-settled legal 

principles, we decide the matter by memorandum disposition. 

(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) 

In 2011, a jury convicted defendant and appellant 

Julio Duenas of one count of first degree murder, three counts of 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, and one 

count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and found true 

numerous enhancement allegations. Defendant admitted to 

suffering prior convictions subjecting him to sentencing under the 

“Three Strikes” law. The trial court sentenced him to 275 years 

to life plus 46 years. On appeal we identified errors with two of 

the enhancements. On remand the trial court resentenced 

defendant to 275 years to life plus 40 years. 

In May 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing 

under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95.2 The resentencing 

court appointed counsel for defendant and received a response to 

the petition from the prosecutor. The court then held a hearing 

at which defendant’s counsel submitted on defendant’s petition 

and the prosecutor submitted on the response. The court denied 

the petition, finding defendant was “the sole shooter,” and “[t]he 

jury was not instructed on any theory of liability which would 

otherwise make Mr. Duenas eligible for relief.”

Defendant appealed, and appointed counsel filed a brief 

identifying no arguable issues. We invited defendant to file a 

supplemental brief, which he did.

1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2 The Legislature has since renumbered former 

section 1170.95 as section 1172.6, without substantive change. 

(People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174 (Lee).)
3

Because this is an appeal from a denial of postconviction 

relief under former section 1170.95, we are not required to 

conduct an independent review of the record, as we might be in a 

direct appeal from a criminal conviction. (People v. Delgadillo

(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222; see People v. Wende (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 436.) When a defendant files a supplemental brief, 

however, we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments 

presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” 

(Delgadillo, at p. 232.)

In his supplemental brief, defendant argues he did not 

commit the murder of which he was convicted and was not “the 

actual shooter.” He further argues his sentence was excessive in 

light of recent legislative enactments. He argues that because his 

resentencing petition was “facially sufficient,” he was entitled to 

discovery and review of the entire record. He also contends he 

was unable to take the stand at his trial because he had been 

accused by someone of snitching, and testifying would put 

defendant’s and defendant’s family’s lives in danger. 

These arguments do not compel reversal. “Senate Bill 

No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437)

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of the 

Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences 

liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and [to] 

limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’ [Citation.]” 

(Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.) The bill also added 

former section 1170.95, now numbered section 1172.6, “which 

creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be 

convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” 

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) Relief is potentially 

available for “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder 
4

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other 

theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on 

that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or 

manslaughter.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

We have reviewed the jury instructions from defendant’s 

trial. The trial court did not instruct the jury on felony murder, 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other 

theory of aiding and abetting or imputed malice. The 

resentencing court therefore correctly found defendant ineligible 

for relief, and defendant was not entitled to further discovery or 

evaluation of the record. Defendant’s arguments that the jury 

wrongly found he was the actual shooter, that his sentence is 

excessive, and that he was unable to testify at his trial are 

beyond the scope of a proceeding under section 1172.6 or former 

section 1170.95, which looks solely to whether the petitioner was 

convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a 

theory invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.