-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

HENRY FORD MACOMB, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

September 20, 2016 

v No. 327572 

Wayne Circuit Court 

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, LC No. 14-009971-NF 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this action for benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant 

Farmers Insurance Exchange appeals the trial court’s decision to deny its motion for summary 

disposition. Defendant contends that, as utilized in MCL 500.3145(1), which governs time 

limitations with respect to actions for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits, “1 

year” for purposes of filing an action should be calculated differently than “1 year” for purposes 

of limiting the recovery of benefits. Because the method of calculating “1 year” should be the 

same, whether viewed prospectively or retrospectively, and particularly when the “1 year” 

deadlines at issue are set forth in the very same statute and subsection, we affirm. 

 

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiff, Henry Ford Macomb, treated a driver after he was involved in an automobile 

accident that occurred on August 2, 2013. Both the driver and the vehicle he was driving were 

uninsured. Plaintiff treated the driver from August 2, 2013, to August 5, 2013, accruing more 

than $44,000 in medical fees. Given that there was no ascertainable no-fault insurer, plaintiff 

submitted its claim for benefits to the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). Before the 

MACP assigned the claim to a no-fault insurer, plaintiff filed the instant suit against the MACP 

on August 4, 2014; of significance in this case, August 2, 2014 fell on a Saturday. When the 

MACP later assigned the claim to defendant, plaintiff amended the complaint to name defendant 

as the responsible party for the no-fault benefits. Defendant does not dispute the fact that 

plaintiff’s claim was timely filed within one year, in accordance with the limitation set forth in 

MCL 500.3145(1). 

 Defendant paid $1,477.16 for the medical services rendered on August 4, 2013 and 

August 5, 2013, but argued that the claims preceding August 4, 2013 should be summarily 
-2- 

disposed of because they violated the one-year-back provision found in MCL 500.3145(1). In 

other words, defendant argued that plaintiff was not permitted to recover benefits for August 2, 

2013 and August 3, 2013 because it had filed the complaint more than one year after those 

service dates. 

 Plaintiff argued that MCR 1.108(1)1 governed the computation of time for the one-yearback rule, and because August 2, 2014, was a Saturday, the one-year-back rule extended to the 

next business day, which was Monday, August 4, 2014. Accordingly, plaintiff urged the trial 

court to find that plaintiff had timely filed the complaint to collect all of the no-fault benefits. 

Defendant countered by arguing that, because the one-year-back rule was a limitation on 

damages and not a statute of limitation, MCR 1.108(1) could not operate to toll the rule. Upon 

hearing the arguments of both parties, the trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied defendant’s 

motion. Subsequently, defendant stipulated to a consent judgment while expressly reserving its 

right to appeal the decision of the trial court regarding defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court wrongly denied defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition because the one-year-back rule cannot be extended by MCR 1.108(1). We 

disagree. 

We review “decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo to determine if the 

moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Alcona Co v Wolverine 

Environmental Prod, Inc, 233 Mich App 238, 245; 590 NW2d 586 (1998). “This case presents 

issues regarding statutory interpretation of the Michigan no-fault insurance act. Statutory 

interpretation is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.” Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 

466 Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002). We also review de novo the proper interpretation 

and application of a court rule. Haliw v Sterling Hts, 471 Mich 700, 704; 691 NW2d 753 (2005). 

MCL 500.3145(1) provides in relevant part: 

 An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable 

under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 

year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury 

as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or 

unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance 

benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, 

the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent 

allowable expense, work loss or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the 

claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 

year before the date on which the action was commenced. 

 

1

 As will be addressed below, MCR 1.108 addresses the computation of time. 
-3- 

The first part of this statute contains a statute of limitations requiring that claims for nofault benefits be filed within one year of the accident that caused the injuries. As an exception to 

that rule, a case may be filed after one year where “written notice of injury . . . has been given to 

the insurer within 1 year after the accident or [] the insurer has previously made a payment of 

personal protection insurance benefits for the injury.” Id. See also Jesperson v Auto Club Ins 

Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 38-39; 878 NW2D 799 (2016). Even where the statute of limitation is 

extended to longer than one year, the second portion of the statute limits the benefits that are 

payable, stating, “the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more 

than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.” This limitation on damages is 

known as the “one-year-back rule.” Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 208; 815 

NW2d 412 (2012). 

 The one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), is a “damages-limiting provision” that 

“forecloses a claimant from recovering ‘benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 

year before the date on which the action was commenced.’ ” Id. at 214. “[A]lthough a no-fault 

action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than one year after the accident and more than 

one year after a particular loss has been incurred,” MCL 500.3145(1) “nevertheless limits 

recovery in that action to those losses incurred within the one year preceding the filing of the 

action.” Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 539 (2005). 

 MCL 500.3145(1) requires a court to compute time but does not provide directions on 

how that time is to be computed. MCR 1.108 “applies to computing a period prescribed by 

statute . . . .” People v Sinclair, 247 Mich App 685, 689; 638 NW2d 120 (2001). See also 

People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 256 n 4; 716 NW2d 208 (2006) (stating that MCR 1.108 

“unambiguously governs the computation of a period prescribed in a statute”); Dunlap v 

Sheffield, 442 Mich 195, 199; 500 NW2d 739 (1993) (stating that Michigan’s Supreme Court 

“promulgated MCR 1.108 to clarify and avoid any disputes regarding what is the last day” of any 

given time period). Further, “courts are required to apply [MCR 1.108] where applicable.” 

Sinclair, 247 Mich App at 689. 

 MCR 1.108 provides in relevant part: 

 In computing a period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by 

court order, or by statute, the following rules apply: 

 (1) The day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period 

of time begins to run is not included. The last day of the period is included, 

unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the court is closed 

pursuant to court order; in that event the period runs until the end of the next day 

that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the court is closed 

pursuant to court order. 

 By the plain language of MCR 1.108(1), the last day of a given period of time counts as a 

day, unless that last day falls on a “Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the court is 

closed pursuant to court order[.]” In such instances, the time period “runs until the end of the 

next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the court is closed 
-4- 

pursuant to court order.” MCR 1.108(1). In the present case, one year from August 2, 2013, is 

August 2, 2014. However, it is undisputed that August 2, 2014, was a Saturday. Therefore, 

pursuant to MCR 1.108(1), the calculation of that year extended to August 4, 2014, the Monday 

following, and the day on which plaintiff filed the instant claim. Accordingly, the trial court 

properly determined that the one-year-back rule did not bar plaintiff from recovering no-fault 

benefits from August 2, 2013. MCR 1.108(1); MCL 500.3145(1). 

 Defendant argues that a different result is required by our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006), overruled by Regents of 

Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289, 292-293; 791 NW2d 897 (2010), reinstated by 

Joseph, 491 Mich at 203-204. In Cameron, the parents of a minor brought a delayed suit for nofault benefits once the minor reached the age of majority. Cameron, 476 Mich at 59, 61. The 

plaintiffs filed the claim in 2002, which was within one year of the most recent loss, but sought 

benefits that accrued between 1996 and 1999, clearly more than one year back from the 

commencement date of the action. Id. at 61-62. The plaintiffs asserted that the minority/insanity

tolling provision at MCL 600.5851(1) tolled the one-year-back rule. Id. Under MCL 

600.5851(1), a person has “1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to 

make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.” Id., quoting MCL 

600.5851(1). 

 Our Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument, reasoning that, “[b]y its 

unambiguous terms, MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity 

may ‘make the entry or bring the action.’ It does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an 

action has been brought.” Id. In other words, the Supreme Court concluded that, because the 

one-year-back rule was not a statute of limitations, and MCL 600.5851(1) specifically stated that 

it tolled statutes of limitation, “the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does 

not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1).” Id. 

 Defendant urges us to follow Cameron and conclude that MCR 1.108 cannot toll the oneyear-back rule because the latter is not a statute of limitations. We decline to do so because the 

trial court was not using MCR 1.108 to “toll” the one-year-back rule, as characterized by 

defendant. It was using MCR 1.108 to calculate what constitutes “1 year” for purposes of MCL 

500.3145(1). Cameron is distinguishable from the instant case in that it did not even address 

how to calculate “1 year.” Moreover, MCR 1.108 does not specifically state that it applies only 

to statutes of limitation. Relative to the instant matter, it states that it should be consulted to 

compute “a period of time prescribed or allowed . . . by statute[,]” and the Supreme Court has 

indicated that MCR 1.108(1) should be consulted where a given statute does not provide 

directions for the computation of a given time period. See Williams, 475 Mich at 256 n 4. MCL 

500.3145(1) is just such a statute. 

 Our colleague in dissent argues that the “1 year” limitation set forth in MCL 500.3145(1) 

applicable to filing an action must be calculated differently than the “1 year” limitation set forth 

in MCL 500.3145(1) regarding the recovery of benefits because the former is a “forwardlooking” calculation and the latter is a “one-year-back” provision, and thus, a backward-looking 

calculation. We fail to see how this alters one’s calculation of the exact same time period. MCR 

1.108 does not indicate that the method of computing time differs depending on whether you are 

counting backwards or forwards. Instead, it states that the last day of the designated time period 
-5- 

is included in the computation of time unless it falls on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day 

on which the court is closed pursuant to court order, wherein the period runs until the end of the 

next day in which the court is open. See MRC 1.108(1). In this case, the last day of the “1 year” 

designated time period was August 2, 2014, which fell on a Saturday, and thus, the period ran 

until the end of the next day in which the court was open, being August 4, 2014. 

 Our colleague also contends that the statute of limitations is generally regarded as 

procedural, and the one-year-back rule is substantive in nature, and thus, applying MCR 1.108(1) 

to the one-year-back rule would violate the separation of powers doctrine. But we are not 

dealing with a substantive question. We are dealing with the procedural question of how to 

calculate the designated time period as set forth in a statute that fails to provide a method for its 

calculation. Our colleague argues that by not concluding that “1 year” means August 2, 2013 to 

August 2, 2014 we are “modif[ying] the plain language of the substantive law.” But instead, he 

is simply offering his interpretation as to how one should calculate the meaning of “1 year.” One 

year could certainly be calculated by jumping forward to the same date on the annual calendar. 

But it could also be calculated by counting 365 days, including or not including the day of the act 

or event in question, etc. We submit that the very purpose of MCR 1.108 is to create a uniform, 

procedural method of computing time when a statute fails to provide such method. 

 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in applying MCR 

1.108(1) to calculate when the one-year time period set forth in MCL 500.3145(1) actually 

ended. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s summary 

disposition motion on the ground that the one-year-back rule does not bar plaintiff’s claimed PIP 

benefits. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh