COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, McClanahan and Senior Judge Willis 

TIFFANY JACKSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2757-06-1 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 15, 2007 

CITY OF PORTSMOUTH DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

James A. Cales, Jr., Judge 

 (Darell Sayer; Ferrell, Sayer & Nicolo, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (G. Timothy Oksman, City Attorney; Sheila C. Riddick, Assistant 

City Attorney; Barrett Richardson, Guardian ad litem for the minor 

child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem

submitting on brief. 

 On October 12, 2006, the trial court entered an order terminating the residual parental rights 

of Tiffany Jackson, appellant, to her daughter, H.J., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), 

16.1-283(C)(1), and 16.1-283(C)(2). On appeal, appellant contends the evidence did not prove 

termination was in H.J.’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

FACTS

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant to 

it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of 

Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 

 H.J. was born on July 4, 2003. The identity of H.J.’s father is unknown. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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 In August of 2004, appellant left H.J. at the home of a friend with the friend’s children. The 

friend had not granted appellant permission to leave H.J. at the home. When appellant failed to 

return for H.J. for several days, the friend contacted the Portsmouth Department of Social Services 

(DSS), which took H.J. into custody and placed her in foster care. 

 Following H.J.’s foster care placement, DSS attempted to help appellant regarding issues of 

substance abuse, inadequate housing, and inadequate supervision of her children. DSS referred 

appellant to several resource agencies and made appointments to help her achieve the goals required 

for reunification with H.J. DSS repeatedly sent letters to appellant advising of the services that had 

been initiated on appellant’s behalf and reminding her of various scheduled appointments. Other 

than completing a psychological evaluation, however, appellant achieved none of the required goals. 

 While H.J. was in foster care, appellant did not provide the child with toys, letters, money, 

or items that could be used in her care. Eventually, DSS lost contact with appellant, and she failed 

to appear for scheduled visits with H.J. after December 30, 2004. DSS was unable to locate any 

relative of appellant who was able to take custody of H.J. 

 Appellant did not appear at the termination hearing in circuit court on October 12, 2006, and 

her attorney was unaware of her whereabouts. DSS presented evidence that H.J. had bonded with 

her foster parents and was thriving in their care. 

DISCUSSION

 On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination 

of her parental rights. 

 When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we 

presume the circuit court “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, 

considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination 

based on the child’s best interests.” Fields v. Dinwiddie County 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) 

(quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 

796 (1990)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence 

heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly 
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wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. (quoting Logan, 13 

Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). In its 

capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains “broad 

discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster 

a child’s best interests.” Farley, 9 Va. App. at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 

795. 

Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Social Services, 46 Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 

(2005). Moreover, 

In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a 

court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age 

and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age 

and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship 

existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child 

or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in 

the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and 

such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests 

of the child or children. 

Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). 

 At the time of the termination hearing, three-year-old H.J. had been in foster care for 

more than two years. During that period, appellant had made no provisions for her child. In fact, 

appellant had no contact with H.J. after December 2004. Other than completing a psychological 

evaluation, appellant made no progress toward the goals required for her to be reunited with H.J. 

The evidence proved appellant completely failed to avail herself of the assistance and resources 

provided by DSS. Appellant did not maintain contact with DSS or with the attorney representing 

her in the termination action. At the time of the termination hearing, H.J. was thriving in her 

foster parents’ care. 

We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and 

irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 

407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Department of Public Welfare of the City of 

Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). However, “[i]t is clearly not in the best 

interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent 
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will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). 

Clear and convincing evidence proved that termination of appellant’s parental rights was 

in H.J.’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

 Affirmed.