This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Before 

GASTON, HOUTZ, and PENNIX

Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Troy R. TRIBBLE

Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

No. 202100073

_________________________

Decided: 14 June 2022

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: 

Kevin S. Woodard

Sentence adjudged 16 December 2020 by a special court-martial convened at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, consisting of a military judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: confinement for six months and a bad-conduct discharge.

For Appellant:

Lieutenant Commander R. Andrew Austria, JAGC, USN

For Appellee: 

Lieutenant John L. Flynn IV, JAGC, USN

Major Kerry E. Friedewald, USMC
United States v. Tribble, NMCCA No. 202100073

Opinion of the Court

2

_________________________

This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but 

may be cited as persuasive authority under 

NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

_________________________

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of false official statement, 

aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct in violation of Articles 107, 128, 

and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ].

1

Appellant asserts in his sole assignment of error [AOE] that the Government failed to comply with the plea agreement when it reduced Appellant to 

paygrade E-1, when no statute or regulation authorized automatic reduction 

in rank and the terms of the plea agreement disallowed the military judge from 

imposing reduction in rank. We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts of Appellant’s crimes are not required to resolve his 

AOE, other than that they occurred in 2020. Appellant’s plea agreement states 

in pertinent part that “[n]o reduction in rank will be adjudged.”2 At Appellant’s 

trial in December 2020, the military judge sentenced Appellant to six months’

confinement and a bad-conduct discharge for the offenses to which Appellant 

pleaded and was found guilty, noting that “[t]he Court . . . was not authorized 

to adjudge a reduction [in rank] . . . and the Court did not adjudge [reduction 

in rank].”

3 The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence in February 2021. The military judge then entered the judgment into the record in 

March 2021, and the sentence, except for the punitive discharge, was executed.

The following month, as reflected in his Leave and Earnings Statement of 

April 2021 that was submitted by his appellate counsel, Appellant received pay 

at the paygrade of E-1.

 

1 10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 928, 934.

2 Appellate Ex. XI at 7.

3 R. at 157.
United States v. Tribble, NMCCA No. 202100073

Opinion of the Court

3

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the interpretation of plea agreements.4 “Appellant bears 

the burden of establishing that a term or condition of the agreement was material to his decision to plead guilty, [and] that the Government failed to comply 

with that term or condition . . . .”5

Central to the issue presented is that an automatic reduction in rank was 

not allowed by law at the time of Appellant’s guilty plea, sentencing, and posttrial processing. For offenses committed prior to 1 January 2019—cases not 

governed by the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 2016—Article 

58a, UCMJ, provided that if certain sentencing parameters were met, an automatic reduction to E-1 would occur on the date the convening authority approved the qualifying sentence.6 However, prior to Appellant’s offenses and 

court-martial, the language of Article 58a was amended to include the caveat:

“if such a reduction is authorized by regulation prescribed by the President.”7

As of the writing of this opinion, the President has not delegated authority to 

the service Secretaries to establish conditions for such automatic reductions. 

The binding guidance for convictions “for an offense committed on or after 1 

January 2019 and before the President has delegated authority to the Secretary to establish conditions for automatic reductions” is that “[a]utomatic reduction in pay grade is not authorized.”8 Appellant’s convictions arise from offenses that occurred in 2020. Therefore, any automatic reduction of Appellant’s 

rank to paygrade E-1 was not authorized.

However, the fact that automatic reduction to E-1 was not authorized by 

law for Appellant’s convictions and sentence is a separate issue from whether 

any remedial action by this Court is required. Article 66, UCMJ, limits this

Court to “act only with respect to the findings and sentence as entered into the 

record” and to “affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such 

part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and 

 

4 United States v. Lundy, 63 M.J. 299, 301 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

5 Id. at 302.

6 See Article 58a, UCMJ (2016) (stating that a sentence including a dishonorable 

or bad-conduct discharge, confinement, or hard labor without confinement will result 

in automatic reduction in rank to paygrade E-1 on the date of approval by the convening authority).

7 Article 58a, UCMJ (2018).

8 Dep’t of the Navy, Judge Advocate General Instr. 5800.7G, Manual of the Judge 

Advocate General para. 0154.e.(2) (Feb. 14, 2022).
United States v. Tribble, NMCCA No. 202100073

Opinion of the Court

4

. . . should be approved.”9 Our superior court has interpreted this language to 

require a determination of whether the adjudged and approved sentence is 

both correct in law (e.g., “does not exceed the maximum penalty authorized 

under the applicable punitive article”) and should be approved (e.g., “in light 

of the underlying facts adduced at trial, to include all the extenuating and mitigating circumstances”).10 The court has further found that these determinations include the power to grant sentence relief based on post-trial confinement 

conditions.11 However, the case precedent does not support that Article 66 empowers this Court to resolve pay disputes resulting from an apparent administrative error by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service [DFAS].

12

Nor need we take such remedial action to resolve Appellant’s AOE. Here, 

insofar as the United States Government acted without authority by paying 

Appellant at paygrade E-1, it was not due to a violation of the plea agreement. 

The plea agreement’s term that “[n]o reduction in rank will be adjudged” was 

complied with when the military judge did not adjudge a sentence that included a reduction in rank and the convening authority took no action to approve one.

13 Since Appellant has not shown that the Government failed to comply with that term of the plea agreement, we find his AOE to be without merit. 

We therefore conclude it is beyond the purview of this Court of limited jurisdiction to take remedial action to resolve what amounts to an administrative 

pay dispute.

14

 

9 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ.

10 United States v. Guinn, 81 M.J. 195, 199 (C.A.A.F. 2021).

11 Id. at 200.

12 See United States v. Guardado, 79 M.J. 301, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (“[W]e do not 

have jurisdiction to adjudicate military pay disputes.”).

13 Cf. United States v. Singleton, No. 20200279, 2021 CCA LEXIS 327, *5 (A. Ct. 

Crim. App. June 29, 2021) (unpublished) (correcting the convening authority action 

and entry judgment, which erroneously and without authorization stated that the appellant was automatically reduced to E-1, and ordering restoration of the rights, privileges, and property of which the appellant had been deprived by same). 

14 To the extent the deprivation of pay to which Appellant is entitled can be considered punishment in excess of the sentence in the Entry of Judgment, we do not 

believe he is entitled under the circumstances to any modification of that sentence. 

However, that does not mean Appellant is without recourse to resolve the issue, particularly where the Government has conceded Appellant is entitled to the withheld pay 

and is working to correct the administrative error. Assuming DFAS has not yet cor-
United States v. Tribble, NMCCA No. 202100073

Opinion of the Court

5

III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we 

have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and 

that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred.15

The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

KYLE D. MEEDER

Clerk of Court

 

rected the issue, Appellant has other avenues for obtaining the relief he seeks, including petitioning DFAS, the United States Court of Federal Claims, or a United States 

District Court. See United States v. Allen, 33 M.J. 209, 215-16 (C.M.A. 1991).

15 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.