Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

 PENSACOLA DIVISION

EMMANUEL LEE JONES,

 Plaintiff,

vs. Case No.: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT

WENDALL HALL, et al.,

 Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause filed pursuant to Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 is presently before the

court on Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint (Doc. 1). Leave to proceed in forma pauperis was granted,

and no initial partial filing fee was assessed (Doc. 4). 

Since Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court is required to dismiss the case at

any time if it determines that the “action or appeal” is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous under section

1915(e) “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). “[T]he statute accords judges not only

the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual

power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.” Id., 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338

(1989). Dismissals on this ground may be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably

meritless,” or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are “clearly baseless.” Id. at 327, 109
Page 2 of 8

S. Ct. at 1833; Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340

(1992); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (internal quotations

omitted). 

Because the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of FED.R.CIV. P. 12(b)(6),

dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The allegations of

the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008); Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s

Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d

1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff must allege more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and his complaint must include factual

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 1973 n.14, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (declining to apply a

heightened pleading standard, and abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78, S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (“a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99.)) A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure

to state a claim “when its allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery

on the claim.” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cottone v. Jenne,

326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003)). Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint

as amended would still be properly dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for

the defendant. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Hall v. United Ins.

Co. Of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)). Upon review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the court

concludes that Plaintiff has not presented an actionable claim and that sua sponte dismissal is

therefore warranted. Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff is currently an inmate at the Santa Rosa County Jail (“SRCJ”). He alleges that on

June 7, 2010, at the SRCJ, he was forced to protect himself from an assault by another inmate due

to the negligence of Officer Christopher Wallace, Officer Robert Tolbert, and the Control Room

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT
Page 3 of 8

Operator, who is not identified by name1 (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff claims that the officers broke

institutional rules by placing “deadly weapons” (i.e., mops, a long-handled scrub brush, and a large

push-broom) out at the jail “in a criminal atmosphere without supervision” (id.). Plaintiff asserts

that he was involved in a heated argument with inmate Henry Davis for ten to fifteen minutes while

the Control Room Officer and Officer Wallace slept and Officer Tolbert wandered around the

hallway “doing nothing” (id.). Inmate Davis tried to grab a nearby broom during the argument, but

Plaintiff succeeded in grabbing it first (id.). Inmate Davis then secured a long-handled scrub brush

with which he attempted to hit Plaintiff (id.). Plaintiff fended off the attack and after diffusing the

“threat of imminent danger,” retreated to his cell while the authorities were summoned (id. at 5–6). 

Plaintiff claims that it was only because the officers were asleep or wandering around—and hence

neglecting their duties—that he was forced to protect himself from Inmate Davis’ attack (id. at 6). 

He further asserts that jail officials fabricated incident reports and failed to get statements from the

Control Room Officer and Officer Tolbert, instead obtaining a statement from a Sgt. Robert White

who was not present at the time and “did not see anything” (id.). Plaintiff complains that the officers

in question are still employed at the jail, despite the fact that they failed to protect him and put in

him a “life or death situation” where he was forced to defend himself (id.). Plaintiff admits that he

has been charged with aggravated assault and aggravated battery as a result of the incident, although

he contends that these charges are “bogus” (id.).

In his statement of claims, Plaintiff asserts that his right to protect himself under Florida law

has been violated, and that he has been falsely imprisoned, denied protection from the SRCJ, and

neglected by its employees (id. at 7). As relief, he asks that the County of Santa Rosa drop the

“bogus charges,” and he seeks between $500,000.00 and $1.5 million for his pain and suffering

based on the illegal imprisonment and having to “miss out” on the birth of his first daughter (id.). 

He specifically states that he is seeking relief “for all of the mental and emotional stress” he has

been through (id.). 

On the first page of the complaint form Plaintiff identifies Santa Rosa County Sheriff

 1 Plaintiff appears to assert that his inability to discover the Control Room Officer’s name is due to a vast cover-up

at the jail (Doc. 1 at 5).

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT
Page 4 of 8

Wendall Hall and the Santa Rosa County Jail as Defendants, although only Wendall Hall is

identified as a Defendant on page two of the form. To the extent Plaintiff does seek to sue the Santa

Rosa County Jail, this entity is not a proper Defendant. The capacity to be sued in federal court is

governed by the law of the state in which the district court is located. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d

1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 17(b)). In Florida, there is no such legal entity as

the “Santa Rosa County Jail.” Under Florida law, there are constitutionally created political

subdivisions called counties and separately created constitutional officers, including a sheriff. Fla.

Const. art. VIII, §§ 1 (a) and (d). However, no provision is made constitutionally or statutorily for

a county jail facility as a separate legal entity, as an agency of the county, or as a corporate entity;

nor is a county jail given authority to be sued in such a name. See Eddy v. City of Miami, 715 F.

Supp. 1553, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (indicating that department which is integral part of local

government’s policing function is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983); Shelby v. City of

Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (same); Heckman v. Hall, 2007 WL 2175919 at

*3 (N.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that county jail is not an actionable legal entity because it does not

enjoy a separate legal existence independent of the county or the sheriff’s office), adopted, 2007 WL

2428487 (N.D. Fla. 2007); Avant v. Rice, 1992 WL 359633 at *6 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (same); Mayes

v. Elrod, 470 F.Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (same). For claims against a county jail, the

appropriate defendant is the Sheriff in his official capacity. See Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp.

886, 888 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (referring to the sheriff as “the Chief Jailer” of the county jail); Avant v.

Rice, supra. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a viable claim against the Santa Rosa

County Jail. 

Plaintiff’s claim against Wendall Hall also fails. Because Sheriff Hall is not mentioned by

name at all in Plaintiff’s statement of facts, presumably Plaintiff seeks to hold Sheriff Hall liable as

the head official at the SRCJ, and hence the “supervisor” of the individuals mentioned in the body

of his complaint. However, it is well established that respondeat superior, without more, does not

provide a basis for recovery under section 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct.

445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981); Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007);

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1352; Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 1995). “Supervisory

liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT
Page 5 of 8

unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising

official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360; see also Marsh v.

Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001); Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d

988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, one

cannot be held liable for the actions or omissions of others, but can only be held responsible if he

participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Marsh, supra; Harris v. Ostrout,

65 F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 1995). The necessary causal connection can be established “when a

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the

alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno,

325 F.3d at 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Braddy v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & and Employment

Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998))); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); 

Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985). No such causal connection

appears here. 

Plaintiff’s claim is based both on the fact of the accessibility of the “weapons” and the lack

of supervision. To the extent that he alleges that these two factors together were a violation of jail

policy, Sheriff Hall may not be held liable. This is because a supervisor ordinarily cannot be held

liable under a respondeat superior theory for the acts and omissions of individuals acting in

contravention to policy. Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission,10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir.

1994). A causal connection and hence liability may be established when a supervisor’s “custom

or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights” or when facts support an

inference that the supervisor “directed [his] subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Goebert v. Lee County,

510 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. Again,

Plaintiff’s allegations suggest no basis for respondent superior liability. The bottom line is that

“[t]he standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a

subordinate is extremely rigorous,” Cottone, supra, (quoting Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234), and

Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard.

Even if Plaintiff could state a claim against either of the two named Defendants or any other

individual, his claim for monetary damages for the mental anguish he claims to have suffered as a

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT
Page 6 of 8

result of the alleged misconduct is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)

provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or

other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” This is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional limitation. Douglas

v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to

state a claim “when its allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on

the claim.” Yates, 535 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1357). As the Eleventh Circuit

has explained: “[Section] 1997e(e) applies only to lawsuits involving (1) Federal civil actions (2)

brought by a prisoner (3) for mental or emotional injury (4) suffered while in custody.” Napier v.

Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit has determined that “the phrase

‘Federal civil action’ means all federal claims, including constitutional claims.” Napier, 314 F.3d

at 532. This § 1983 action brought by Plaintiff is a “Federal civil action” under this definition. 

Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed his complaint while imprisoned. Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges only “pain and suffering” and “mental and emotional stress,” so as to satisfy the third

predicate for the application of § 1997e(e). Finally, the harm complained of occurred while plaintiff

was in custody, so as to satisfy the fourth predicate.

Based on the foregoing, the incarcerated Plaintiff’s damages claim is subject to dismissal

without prejudice unless he alleges physical injury.2 Further, he must allege more than a de minimis

physical injury. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We therefore join the

Fifth Circuit in fusing the physical injury analysis under section 1997e(e) with the framework set

out by the Supreme Court in Hudson [v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156

(1992)] for analyzing claims brought under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual

 2 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003), does not apply here. Id., at

1162 (holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar suits by prisoners who have not alleged a physical injury if they seek nominal

damages); see also Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that nominal damages are recoverable,

but that compensatory and punitive damages are precluded under PLRA). Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be liberally

construed as requesting nominal damages, because he specifically requests only compensatory and punitive damages. 

See, e.g., Sears v. Rabion, No. 03-13558, 97 Fed. Appx. 906 (Table) (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2004) (affirming district court’s

sua sponte dismissal of complaint under § 1997e(e), noting that plaintiff’s complaint could not be liberally construed

as requesting nominal damages, because he specifically requested compensatory and punitive damages). See also Geiger

v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (physical injury requirement does not apply to claims for declaratory or

injunctive relief). 

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT
Page 7 of 8

punishment, and hold that in order to satisfy section 1997e(e) the physical injury must be more than

de minimis, but need not be significant.”), reh’g granted, opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.

1999), opinion reinstated in pertinent part on reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532

U.S. 1065, 121 S. Ct. 2214, 150 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2001); Osterback v. Ingram, 2000 WL 297840, 13

Fla. L. Weekly D 133 (N.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 169 (11th Cir. 2001) (Table) (holding that

a prisoner plaintiff may not recover compensatory or punitive damages for mental or emotional

injury without establishing that he suffered more than de minimis physical injury), cert. denied, 122

S. Ct. 2362, 153 L. Ed. 2d 183 (2002). In the instant complaint, Plaintiff neither claims nor alleges

facts to remotely suggest a physical injury arising from the conduct of the Defendants or any other

individual. Consequently, he is presently prohibited by § 1997e(e) from bringing his damages

claims. 

Finally, insofar as Plaintiff seeks an order affecting the ongoing state criminal proceedings

in his case, the complaint must be dismissed, because Plaintiff’s claim lacks even an arguable basis

in law. Federal Courts cannot intervene in ongoing criminal proceedings except in the most

extraordinary circumstances and upon a clear showing of both great and immediate harm. Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971); see also, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.

332, 349, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1975); Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 677–78 (11th

Cir. 1992); Christman v. Crist, 315 Fed. Appx. 231 (11th Cir. 2009).3 Plaintiff’s request that the

court order that the charges arising from the incident described in the complaint be dropped is

beyond this court’s jurisdiction. 

As Plaintiff cannot successfully bring his action as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at this

time, the court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact and that

it fails to state a claim, and it should be dismissed. Dismissal should be without prejudice as 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e) would not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing a claim for mental and emotional

stress upon his relief, if appropriate and otherwise legally permissible, upon his release. 

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

 3 The undersigned cites this case only as persuasive authority to show the continued application of Younger in this

circuit and recognizes that the opinion is not considered binding precedent. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2. 

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT
Page 8 of 8

That this cause be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

At Pensacola, Florida, this 30th day of March, 2011.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy thereof. Any different deadline that may appear on

the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not control. A copy of

objections shall be served upon all other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope of appellate

review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th

Cir. 1988).

Case No: 3:11cv106/LAC/EMT