### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT May 7 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Richard Mills, United States District J udg e for the Central District of * I llinois , sitti ngby

desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1319 9

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 03-00007 -CR- 4 UN IT ED ST AT ES OF AME RICA Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,

ve rs us ANTHONYSIMM ONS a. k. a. Mi ch ae l A rthur

G re en , a. k. a. A nto nio Whit e, a . k. a. A nto nio G re en , Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ (M ay 7 , 200 4) Before TJO FL AT and HI LL , C ircuit Judg es, and MILL S , D istrict Judg e. *18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c )( 1) (A ) p ro vid e s: 1 [A] ny person who, dur ing a

nd in relation to any

crime of violence or

drug traff ickingcrime . . . f

or which the person may

be prose cuted in a c ourt of the United States, uses or c arr ies a fir ear m, or who, in furthe ranc e of a ny such cr ime, po sse sse s a

fi re arm , s ha ll, in a dd iti on to t he punis hme nt p ro vid e d f or su c h c ri me of violence or drugtraff

ickingcrime . . . be sentenc ed to a ter m of imprisonment of not less than 5 year s . . . . 2 TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: I. O n O ct obe r 25, 200 2, A nth ony S im m ons w as arr es te d f

or vio la tin g pr oba tio n. A t the ti m e, he w as c ar ry ing aloa de d 9m

m se m iauto m at ic handgun and over two dozen sm all bags of cocaine. Sim m ons pl ed guiltyto carr

y ing a firear

m in r el at ionto a dr

ug tra ff ic kin g of fe nse in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( i) 1 in e xc hange f

or havin g se ve ra l othe r ch ar ge s a ga ins t hi m dr oppe d. T his statut e carr ie s am an da tor

y m ini m um se nte nc e of

f ive y ears ( 60 m onths) . S ee a lso U . S. S. G . § 2K2. 4( a) (2 ) (2 001) ( “ [I ] f the de fe ndant . . . w as c onvi ct ed of vio la tin g . . . S ec tio n 92 4( c) . . . of ti tle 18, U nit ed

S ta te s C ode , the gui de lin e se nt en ce i s t he m in im

um ter m of i m pr is on m en t re qu ire d b y

st atut e.”). T he dis tr ic t c ourt c hose to m ak e anupw ar d de part ur e be y ond thi s 60 m onth period and sentenced Sim m ons to 160 m onth s in prison . The c ourt explained th at Sim m ons “ has at least two prior f elon convi ctions for a crim e of violence or a3

controlled su bstance offense that w ouldhave resulted in a car eer offender de sig na tio n. ” T he c ourt no te d th at , ha d th e de fe ndant b ee n e lig ibl e to b e se nte nc ed a s ac ar ee r of

fe nde r, “ his gui de lin e range of im pr iso nm ent w oul d have be en262 to 327 m onths. ” Co nse que ntl y , “ [b ] as ed upo n [ the ] de fe ndant’ s pr ior co nv ic ti on s, t wo o f whi ch wou ldha ve res ul te d i n acare er o ffen de r de si gn at io n,” the j udge conclud ed that an upward departure of an additional 100 m onth s was warra nt ed . O n a ppe al , S im

m ons m ak es thr ee arg um en ts. F ir st, he c la im s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in co nsi de ri ng the 200 2 G uid el ine s, r athe r than ba sin g hi s sentence entirely

on the 200 1 Guidelines. Se cond, he contends that th e district co urt sh oul d no t have m ad e anupw ar d de part ur e. F ina lly , he arg ue s th at e ve n if an upward departure w as warranted, the extent of this particular upward departure was cle arl y

un reas on ab le . W e reject th es e cl ai m s an d a ffi rm hi s s en te nc e. II. W e begin by

determ ining whether

the sentencing court sh ouldhave applied the 200 1 G uid el ine s, w hic h w er e in e ff ec t at the ti m e Si m

m ons co m

m itt ed his of fen se , or t he 20 02 Gui de li ne s, wh ic h wer e in effe cton th e d at e o f hi s s en te nc in g. Federa l law requires j udges presum ptivelyto apply

the sentencing Guidelines as the y e xis t at the ti m e of

se nte nc ing . 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) ( “ T he c ourt, in4

de te rm ini ng the part ic ular se nte nc e to b e im pose d, sha ll co nsi de r . . . the kin ds o f se nte nc e an d th e se nte nc ing r an ge . . . se t f orth i n th e gui de lin es . . . that . . . are in ef fe ct on the da te the de fe ndant i s se nte nc ed . . . . ”) . T he Co nst itu tio n’ s E x P ost Facto Clause, however, prevents the Governm ent from im posin g additio nal pe na lti es f

or c ri m es that have a lr ea dy be enc om

m itt ed . S ee U . S. Co nst . art . I . § 9, cl . 3 (“No . . . ex p os t fa ct o Law s ha ll be pa ss ed .”); Cal de r v. B ul l, 3 U.S. (3 Dal l.) 386, 390 ( 1798 ) (h old ing that “ [e ] ve ry lawthat c hange s th e puni shm en t, and inf lic ts a gr eate r puni shm en t, than th e lawanne xe d to the c ri m e, w he n c om m itt ed ” is an “ ex po st fact o l aw[], with in th e wor ds an d t he in te nt of t he pro hi bi ti on ”). Consequent ly , a lthou gh courts m ust presum

ptivelyapply

the Guidelines as they ex ist a t the ti m e of

se nte nc ing , the y

m ay not do s o w he re tho se G uid el ine s w oul d lead to im posit ion of a harsher penalty than that to which the defendant was subj ec t at the ti m e of

the of fe nse . I n su chc as es , the G uid el ine s a ppl ic ab le a t the tim e of the of fe nse m ust be appl ie d. U nit ed

S ta te s v. S im on, 168 F . 3d 1 271, 127 2 n. 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( “ W e ap ply the ve rs ionof

the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s and co m m en tary in ef fe ct on the da te of

se nte nc ing , unl es s am or e le nie nt p uni shm en t would result und er the Guidelin es version in effect on the date the off ense wa s co m m itt ed . ” (c itatio n om itt ed )) ; se e al so U . S. S. G . § 1B 1. 11( b) (1 ) (2 001) ( “ If the co urt de te rm ine s th at

use of the G uid el ine s M anua l i n e ff ec t [ w he n] the de fe ndant5

is sentenced would vio late the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitu tion, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that th e o ffen se of c on vi ct io n was co m m it te d.” ). Inthi s c as e, both part ie s a gr ee that the 200 1 G uid el ine s w oul d r es ult in a m or e le nie nt s en te nc e fo r Si m m ons than th e 2002 G uid el ine s. C onse que ntl y , the 2001 Guidelines are applicable. B ecause the pre sentence investigatio n report wa s ba se d on , and the j udge appl ie d, the 200 1 G uid el ine s, no e rr or w as c om m itt ed in th is reg ard . III. H av ing ide nti fi ed

the c or re ct e dit ionof

the G uid el ine s to appl y , w e now tur n to w he the r anupw ar d de part ur e w as w ar

rante d inthi s c as e. Whe n a de fe ndant c la im s th at

an up w ar d de part

ur e “ is n ot a

uth or iz ed und er [ the Se nte nc ing Re fo rm

A ct of 198 4] ; or is not j ust if ie d by the f ac ts o f the c as e, ” 18 U . S. C. § 37 42( e) (3 )( B) (i i) -( iii ), w e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac tua l f ind ing s f or cl ear er ro r, id. § 37 42( e) (4 ), and i ts l eg al c onc lus ion s de nov o, U nit ed S ta te s v. W ill iam s, 340 F . 3d 1 231, 123 4 n. 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( “ Be ca use the statut e is s ile nt as to the standard

of r ev ie wf or ‘ pur e’ que sti ons of

law , w e re vie wthe m

und er our custom ary

de novo st andard.” ). W e begin in Section A by exam ining general6

pr inc ipl es appl ic ab le to upw ar d de part ur es ; S ec tio n B appl ie s th es e pr inc ipl es to th e in st an t ca se . A. T o de te rm ine the pr opr ie ty of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s up w ar d de part ur e, it is ne ce ssary to ide nti fy

the ty pe of de part ur e it w as and e xa m ine the r es tr ic tio ns o ur pr ec ed en ts p la ce on s uc h de part ur es . D ep ar

tur es are c la ssi fi ed

a s gu ide d or ungu ided. Aguided d eparture is one based on a fa ctor about an offense or a de fe ndant tha t the G uid el ine s e xpr es sly dis cu ss. U nit ed

S ta te s v. S m ith , 289 F . 3d 696, 710 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( “ G uid ed de part ur es are tho se de part

ur es spe ci fi ca lly providedfor in the G uidelin es.” ). T here are f our way s in which the Guidelines m igh t di sc uss apart ic ular fa ct or . F ir st, the f ac tor m igh t be one that a

gui de lin e, or a pol ic y state m en t or

appl ic at ionnot e in the G uid el ine s, e nc our ag es c ourts t o co nsi de r that ha s no t a lr ea dy be entake n in to a cc ount

by the spe ci fi c gui de lin e unde r w hic h th e de fe ndant i s be ing se nte nc ed . E nc our ag ed f ac tor s m ay

a lw ay s be us edas t he ba si s fo r up wardde pa rtu res un de r su ch cir cu m st an ces . See, e.g ., U nit ed S ta te s v. K im

ba ll, 291 F . 3d 7 26, 734 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. L ew is, 115 F . 3d 1 531 (1 1thCi r. 199 7) . F or e xa m ple , U . S. S. G . § 5K2. 3 ( 2001 ) encourages courts to m ake upwar d departures if the victim s of a cr im e suffer unus ua lly se ri ous psy ch olo gic al inj ur ie s. T he gui de lin e es ta bli shi ng the of

fe nseBe cause this enhance ment is mandatory , it is refer red to a s an “upw ard a djustment” or 2 “upwa rd enha nceme nt” and is not consider ed an upw ard de parture . 7 le ve ls foreav es dr op pi ng an d o th er i nv as io n- of -p riv acy offen se s, U.S.S.G. § 2 H3.1 (2 001) , doe s no t pr ovi de f or e nhanc em en ts b as ed

on s uc h c onsi de ratio ns o r otherwise take this fac tor into account. Consequentl y , if the victim

of such an of fe nse suf fe rs unu sua lly

se ve re psy ch olo gic al inj ur y , adis tr ic t c ourt i s f

ull y jus ti fie d i n i m

po si ng an up wardde pa rtu re. Second, the Guidelin es m ay expressly

encourage courts to base upwar d de part ur es on a part ic ular fa ct or , but

that f ac tor m ay a lr ea dy have be entake n in to ac co unt by the gui de lin e unde r w hic h th e de fe ndant i s be ing se nte nc ed . F or exam ple, U .S .S .G . § 2A 2.2 (2001) sets base the offense level f or aggravated as sault a t 15 , and d ir ec ts c ourts t o a dd an a ddi tio na l 5 of fe nse le ve ls i f a fi re ar

m is discharged during the crim e. Sec tion 5 K2. 6 encourages courts to grant an upward 2 de pa rtu re wh ere t he de fen da nt us es a weap on in th e co m m is si on of a cri m e. Although this section m akes the use of a f irear m an encouraged basis for an up wardde pa rtu re, i t i s a f act orth atth e u nd erl y in g a gg rav at edass au ltgu id el in e, § 2A2.2, alrea dy

takes into cons ideration. Sim ilarly , anoth er guideline encourages co ur ts to de pa rt u pwa rd s i f “ si gn ifi can t p hysic al in jury resu lt ed ” fro m

a cri m e. U. S. S. G. § 5K2.2 ( 2001 ). Bec ause the crim e of aggravate d assault is its elf based8

on the inflictio n of serious phy sical injury , this encouraged fac tor is already taken into account b y

the underly ing gu ideline. Adistrict court m ay grant an upwar d de part ur e in c as es suc h a s th es e, ba se d onan e nc our ag ed f ac tor that i s a lr ea dy co nte m plate d by the G uid el ine s un de r w hic h th e de fe ndant i s be ing se nte nc ed , onl y w he re the f

ac tor is “ pr es en t t o an e xc ep tio na l de gr ee ” not c ont em plate d by th e Gui de li ne s. Lewi s, 1 15 F.3dat 1 53 8. Third, a fa ctor m ight b e a discouraged basis for departure. For e xam ple, U . S. S. G . § 5H 1. 4 ( 2001 ) state s, “ Ph y sic al c ondi tio n or appe ar an ce , inc lud ing phy sique , is not

or din ar ily

r el ev an t i n de te rm ini ng whe the r” ade part ur e m ay be w ar rante d. A s w ithe nc our ag ed f ac tor s th at

have a lr ea dy

be entake n in to a cc ount by an underly ing gu ideline, a discouraged fac tor m ay be used as the basis for an upw ar d de part

ur e onl y if “ it is p re se nt t o an e xc ep tio na l de gr ee . ” L ew is, 115 F . 3d at 1538; see also U nited States v. K im , N o. 03-11016 , 2004 U. S. App. LE XI S 5858 , at *9 n.5 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2004) (“ The diff erence betwee n discou raged fa ct or s and e nc our ag ed

f ac tor s a lr ea dy

take n in to a cc ount

by the appl ic ab le gu id el in e is pu rel y

semanti c, no t l eg al .”). Fi na lly , the re are som e fa ct or s th at dis tr ic t c ourts are sim

ply pr ohi bit ed

f ro m usi ng a s th e ba sis f

or an up w ar d de part

ur e. F or e xa m ple , U . S. S. G . § 5K2. 19 (2 001) state s, “ Po st- se nte nc ing r eh ab ili ta tiv e ef fo rt s, e ve n if

e xc ep tio na l,Our c ir c uit ’s dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n “ guid e d” and “ un guid e d” de pa

rt ur e s is no t e nti re ly 3 consistent with that established by the Guidelines c ommentary . Acc ordingto the commentar y , a guided depa

rture is one in which the Guidelines e x pressly rec ommends the amount by which the court should depa

rt. An unguided depa

rture, in c ontrast, is one in which the Guidelines either rec ommend a par

ticular fa ctor a s a possible basis for de parture without specifying the amount by which the c ourt should depar t, or are silent as to whether a fa ctor should be use d as a ba sis for depar ture. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(4)( b). The only rea l disti nction betwee n our circ uit’s use of these ter ms and the Guidelines’ use of these terms is that where the Guidelines spec ify a fa ctor a s beingan appr opriate ba sis for depa rture w ithout recommendinga par ticular amount by

which the court should depa

rt, we w ould desig nate it as be ing a “guided” de parture (bec ause the basis for depar ture is spec ified in the Guidelines) while the Guidelines w ould term it an “unguided” depar ture (be cause the Guidelines do not provide a rec ommendation as to the extent of the proposed de parture ). It is unclear that this variation in terminology actua lly has any leg al ef fec t. Ne ve rt he le ss, un de r o ur

pr ior pa ne l r ule , w e are bo un d to a

bid e by the de fi nit ion s o f t

he se te rm s cultivated in our pre cede nts. See Gar rett v. Univ. of Ala . at B irmingha m Bd. of T rs., 344 F.3d 9 undertaken by

a defe ndant . . . are not an approp riate basis for a downwar d de part ur e w he n r es en te nc ing the de fe ndant f or that of fe nse . ” D ep ar

tur es ba se d on suc h f ac tor s are auto m at ic al ly

inv al id. U nit ed

S ta te s v. H of

fe r, 129 F . 3d 1 196, 1201 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( “ If the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s r el ie d up on a f or bid de n f ac tor , it ne ces sa ril y

ha s ab us edit s d is cret io n.” ). Whil e the G uid el ine s a ddr es s se ve ra l of the m ost c om m on c hara ct er ist ic s of offenses and defendants, there is an alm ost endless variety of other circ um stances or c onsi de ratio ns tha t m igh t w ar rant u pw ar d de part

ur es . S ee U . S. S. G . c h. 1, pt. A (4)(b) ( 2001 ) (“ [I] t is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelin es that en co m pa sse s th e va st r an ge of

hum anc ondu ct

pot en tia lly

r el ev an t t o ase nte nc ing de ci sio n. ”) . Ade part

ur e ba se d onaf

ac tor not e xpr es sly

dis cu sse d by

the Guidelines is called an “ ungu ided departure.” Acourt m ay m ake an unguid ed 312 88 , 1 29 2 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 3) (“ With out a c le arl y c ontr ary op ini on of the Sup re me Court

or of thi s court sitting e n banc, w e ca nnot overrule a dec ision of a prior pa nel of this court . . . .” ) (empha sis in original). 10 de part ur e w he ne ve r it “ fi nds that the re e xis ts an a ggr av at ing or m iti ga tin g ci rc um stanc e of

akin d, or

to a de gr ee , not

a de quate ly

take n in to c onsi de ratio n by the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ionin fo rm

ulatin g th e gui de lin es that sh oul d r es ult in a se nt en ce d iff

eren t fr om

th atde sc rib ed .” 18 U.S.C. § 3 55 3( b) (1 ); s ee al so U.S.S.G. § 5K2. 0 ( 2001 ) (“ Ci rc um stanc es that m ay w ar rant d ep ar

tur e fr om the gui de lin e range pur suant t o th is p ro vis ionc an not , by the ir ve ry na tur e, be c om

pr eh en siv el y lis te d and ana ly ze d ina dvanc e. T he de ci sio n a s to w he the r an d to w ha t e xte nt de pa rtu re i s warran te d re st s wi th th e se nt en ci ng co ur t o n acas e-s pe ci fic ba si s.”) . Be ca use , a s di sc uss ed

late r, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de part ur e m ay be j ust if ie d a s a gu id edde pa rtu re, we n eedno t fu rth er d is cu ss un gu id edde pa rtu res he re. B. In the instant case, the district court im posed an up ward departure based sol el y on the de fe ndant’ s e xte nsi ve c ri m ina l hi sto ry , statin g, “ Ba se d up on defendant’ s prior convictio ns, two of which w ouldhave resulted in a car eer offender designation, the Court concludes an upward departure is w arranted.” W e begin by

determ ining whether

this was a guided or an ungui ded departure. U .S .S .G . § 4A 1.3 expressly perm its dist rict courts to m ake upwar dSee Stinson v. United St ates, 508 U.S. 36, 46, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919, 123 L . Ed. 2d 598 4 (1993) ( “[Guidelines] commentary is binding on the fe dera l courts eve n though it is not review ed by Congr ess . . . .”) . 11 de part ur es if the G uid el ine s se nte nc ing r an ge “ doe s no t a de quate ly r ef le ct the se ri ousn es s of

the de fe ndant’ s pa st c ri m ina l c ondu ct or the li ke lih ood that the de fen da nt wil l co m

m itot he r cri m es .” Howev er, ap pl ic at io n n ot e 3 to U.S.S.G. § 2 K2.4 st at es th atth e Gui de li ne s i n c hapt ers 3 an d 4 (in cl ud in g U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3) do no t apply

to sentences under § 2K2.4, the guid eline under which Sim m ons was sentenced. Consequently , § 4A 1.3 cannot be understoo d as 4 authorizing or encouraging the court in thi s case to use Sim m ons’s cr im inal hi st ory as t he ba si s fo r an up wardde pa rtu re. A n a ppl ic at ionnot e to § 2K2. 4 st at es , A sentence above the m inim um term required by

18 U. S. C. § 9 24 (c) . . . is an up wardde pa rtu re fro m th e g ui de li ne sen te nc e. A de part ur e m ay be w ar rante d, f or e xa m ple , to re fl ec t the se ri ousn es s of the de fe ndant’ s c ri m ina l hi sto ry , part ic ularl y in a ca se in w hic h th e defendant is convicted o f an 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) . . . offense and has at least two prior f

elony conviction s for a c rim e of violence or a co ntr oll ed

sub stanc e of

fe nse that w oul d have r es ult ed in ap pli catio n of § 4B 1. 1 ( Care er

O ff en de r) if that gu ide lin e ap pli ed

to the se of fe nse s. U.S.S.G. § 2 K2.4 co m

m en t. (n .1) ( 20 01 ). A s no te d a

bove , the c ourt c hose to m ak e anupw ar d de part ur e be ca use it co nc lud ed

that, but f or the r es tr ic tio n onappl y ing the c ar ee r of fe nde r gui de lin e12

(U . S. S. G . § 4B 1. 1) , the de fe ndant w oul d have be ensub j ec t t o adr am at ic al ly long er sentence. W e need not reviewwhether the court wa s correc t in its belief that S im m ons te ch nic al ly

qua lif ie d a s ac ar ee r of

fe nde r be ca

use the pla in t ex t of the appl ic at ionnot e quot ed above e nc our ag es an up w ar d de part ur e w he ne ve r one is n ec es sary

“ to r ef le ct the se ri ousn es s of

the de fe ndant’ s c ri m ina l hi sto ry . ” Whil e a de part ur e ba se d onc ri m ina l hi sto ry is “part ic ularl y ” ap pr opr ia te if the de fe ndant would have qualified as a car eer offender under § 4B1.1, the departures re co m m en de d by

the appl ic at ionnot e ar e not li m ite d to suc h de fe ndants . I nst ea d, the note encourages courts to grant up ward departures based on serious crim inal histo ry , whether or not that crim inal histo ry is sufficient to trigger care er-of fender se nt en ci ng un de r § 4 B1 .1. The r ecord can f

airly be rea d as indicating the district court’ s belief that Sim m ons’s cr im inal histo ry

wa s sufficiently

serious as to war

rant an upwar d departure. Moreover, nothi ng in U.S .S .G . § 2K2.4 takes an offe nder’ s crim inal his tor y int o a cc ount ; i nde ed , the G uid el ine s se nte nc e unde r thi s pr ovi sio n is not even based on an offender’ s crim inal histo ry category . Consequent ly , the district court m ade an upwar d departure based on encouraged ground s that had not been ta ke n i nt o a cco un t b y

th e g ui de li ne un de r whi ch th e d efen da nt ha d b een sen te nc ed .13

Thi s i s an un qu es ti on ab ly val idtype o f up wardde pa rtu re, s ee s up ra Se ct io n II I.A, an d t he di st ric t co ur t d idno t ab us e it s d is cret io n b y gra nt in g i t.

IV. W e m us t n ow as se ss whet he r th e ex te nt of t hi s d ep artur e was un reas on ab le .

“ The am ount by

which a district court departs from the Sentencing Guidelines need only be rea sonable.” K im

ball, 291 F.3d at 734. W hen assessing whether

a district court “ depart[ed] to an unreasonable degree fr om the applicable guidelin es range , ” 18 U . S. C. § 37 42( e) (3 )C ) (2 001) , w e re vie wthe c ourt’ s f ac tua l f ind ing s fo r cl ear er

ro r an d th ei r le ga l c onc lus ion s de nov o. I n r ev ie w ing m ixe d qu es tio ns of fac t and law, invol ving the application of the Guidelines to th e fa cts of the case, w e giv e “ due de fe re nc e to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

the gui de lin es to the fact s.” Id . § 3 74 2( e). A s w e expla ine d inW ill iam s, thi s “ due de fe re nc e” standard m eans tha t [w ] he re ade te rm inatio n turn s pr im ar ily on the e va luatio n of

f ac ts (such as a w itness’s c redibility , intonation, and dem eanor) that ar e m or e acc es si bl e to th e d is tri ctco ur t t ha n t o t he co ur t o f ap pe al s, we w ill de fe r to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

the lawto tho se f

ac ts an d a ppl y “ cl ear er ro r” r ev ie w . S im ilarl y , ac as e inv olv ing application o f a f

airly we ll-understoo d legal standard to a com plex fa ct ua l sc en ar io w ill be c onsi de re d “pr im ar ily f ac tua l, ” an d be rev ie wedforcle ar erro r.14

340 F. 3d at 12 39. I n c as es w he re the se spe ci al c onsi de ratio ns d o no t a ppl y , the district court decision is not “ due” any defer ence, and we apply a de novo stand ard of r ev ie w . D e novo r ev ie wis part ic ularl y appr opr ia te w he re “ m ost or a ll of the re le vant f ac ts are c ont ai ne d inthe c ount s inthe ind ic tm en t f or w hic h th e de fe ndant h as b ee n co n v i ct ed o r p l ed g u i l t y,” o r a n y o t h ers i tu at i o n wh er e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s de te rm inatio n is “ be st c hara ct er iz ed a s . . . ale ga l i nte rp re ta tio n” r athe r than “ the ap pl ic at io n o f a cl ear- cu t s ta nd ardto a co m pl ex set of f

act s.” Id . at 1 23 9, 1 24 1. The district court incre ased Sim m ons’s sentence f

rom 60 to 16 0 m onth s. I t found th is to be a reasonable figure bec ause it held that, had the car eer offender guid eline been applicable to Sim m ons, he would have been subjec t to a sentence of a t l ea st 2 60 m onths. T he f ac t r em ai ns, how ev er , that the Guid el ine s e xpr es sly pr ohi bit ed

the c ar ee r of

fe nde r statut e fr om

be ing appl ie d to S im

m ons. T he se nte nc e to whic h an of

fe nde r w oul d have be ensub j ec t un de r a pa te ntl y ina ppl ic ab le gui de lin e is o f no r el ev an ce to de te rm ini ng the se nte nc e w hic h sh oul d be im pose d. Mo re ove r, the G uid el ine s im pli ci tly pr ohi bit dis tr ic t c ourts f

ro m considering subsequ ent Guidelines am endm ents that result in su bstantiv e changes to the law. See U. S. S. G. § 1B1.11(b)(2) ( 2001 ) (“ [I] f a c ourt applies an earlier ed iti on o f the G uid el ine s M anua l, the c ourt sh al l c onsi de r subs eque nt am endm ents, to the extent that such am endm ents are c larify ing rather than15

subs tantive changes.”). By apply ing an incorrect legal standard in determ ining an ap pr op ria te sen te nc e, th e d is tri ctco ur t n eces sa ril y ab us edit s d is cret io n. N ev er the le ss, w e ha ve the auth or ity to af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt, e ve n if it is on a gr ound oth er than th at upo n w hic h it

ba se d it s de ci sio n. S ee G as tonv. Be lli ngr ath G ar de ns & H om e, I nc . , 167 F . 3d 1 361, 136 3 n. 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) (“ [W ] e m ay

aff irm the district court’ s judgm ent on any ground th at finds supp ort in the r ec or d. ” (quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed )) . S im m ons ha s an e xte nsi ve cr im ina l hi sto ry , inc lud ing j uve nil e de lin que nc y a dj udi catio ns and a dul t convictio ns for loitering, theft, evading po lice, rec kless drivin g, re ceiving sto len pr ope rty ( fo ur ti m es ), arm ed

r obbe ry , a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult , pos se ssi on o f a w ea

pon dur ing ac ri m e, pos se ssi on o f a w ea pon w ith out

ape rm it, c ont em

pt o f co urt, poss es sio n of

ac ontro lle d su

bst an ce , pos se ssi on o f a co ntr oll ed sub stanc e w ith intent to distribu te, obstructin g officer s (twic e), possess ion of a sawe d-off shot gun, pos se ssi on o f a fi re ar m by ac onvi ct ed

f el on, and c ri m ina l tre spa ss. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d r ea sona bly have c onc lud ed

that, ba se d onthi s hi sto ry , he ne ed ed to be inc ap ac itate d f

or an e xte nde d pe ri od o f tim e, f or atot al of 160 m onths. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. T ay lor , 88 F . 3d 9 38, 948 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( “ T he sentence im

posed bythe district court was w ell under the statutory m axim um . In v i ew o f a l l th e c i rc u m s t an ce s , we co n cl u d e t h at th e a m o u n to f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s16

up wardad

jus tm en t was reas on ab le an d n ot an ab us e o f di sc ret io n.” ). Co nse que ntl y , the upw ar d de part ur e w as r ea sona

ble , and S im

m ons’ s se nte nc e is AFFIRM ED.