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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

RAY CHRIS MOBLEY,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:11cv270/MCR/CJK

SANTA ROSA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE

MAIL PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the Court upon plaintiff’s civil rights complaint filed under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. 

Upon review of the complaint, the Court concludes that this case should be dismissed

because plaintiff is barred from recovering the relief he seeks. 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was an inmate of the Putnam County Jail in Eatonton, Georgia at the

time he initiated this action on May 25, 2011. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has since been

released. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff’s complaint names one defendant: “Santa Rosa County

Sheriff’s Office Mail Personel [sic] & Administration.” Plaintiff alleges that upon

being booked into the Santa Rosa County Jail on June 1, 2007, plaintiff’s legal books

were confiscated. Plaintiff alleges that he was using these books to “learn my rights,

rules of procedure, state statute laws, etc.” in connection with filing “several” civil

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rights complaints to address an alleged conspiracy among county law enforcement

agencies that existed since March of 2003. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff claims that the

confiscation of the books, and Jail personnel’s denial of plaintiff’s access to the books

from June of 2007 through January of 2008, denied plaintiff access to the courts in

violation of the Constitution. (Id., pp. 6-7). As relief, plaintiff seeks “general

damages and punitive damages for this violation of my rights, and for mental anguish

and/or distress.” (Id., p. 7). 

DISCUSSION

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss the

case if satisfied that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must read

plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92

S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are

governed by the same standard as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell

v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). In determining whether the

complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court accepts all

factual allegations in the complaint as true and evaluates all reasonable inferences

derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v.

Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). The complaint may be dismissed

if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 1974, 167 L. Ed.

2d 929 (2007) (retiring the negatively-glossed “no set of facts” language previously

used to describe the motion to dismiss standard and determining that because plaintiffs

had “not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their

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complaint must be dismissed” for failure to state a claim). A complaint is also subject

to dismissal for failure to state a claim when its allegations, on their face, show that

an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268

F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.

Ct. 910, 920-21, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007) (reiterating that principle).

Taking the allegations of the complaint as true and construing them in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, they show that plaintiff’s claims are barred by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(e). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, “No Federal civil

action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Eleventh Circuit has

concluded that “the phrase ‘Federal civil action’ means all federal claims, including

constitutional claims.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002). This

action, brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is a “Federal civil action” under

this definition. It is evident from the face of the pleadings that plaintiff was a prisoner

at the time he filed this action, and that the harm complained of occurred while

plaintiff was in custody. Plaintiff’s damages claims, which cannot be liberally

construed as requesting nominal damages, are based on the emotional distress plaintiff

suffered as a result of the defendants’ alleged conduct, and/or the fact of the alleged

constitutional violations themselves (divorced from any mental or emotional injury

they caused). The complaint identifies no physical injury arising from defendants’

conduct, much less injury that is more than de minimis. See Harris v. Garner, 190

F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Harris I”) (concluding that in order to satisfy §

1997e(e) “the physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be

significant.”), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.

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1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Harris II”). 

Thus, plaintiff is prohibited under the PLRA from bringing his damages claims. 

Harris I, 190 F.3d at 1287-88 (affirming district court’s dismissal of claims for

compensatory and punitive damages as barred by § 1997e(e)), reinstated on reh'g,

Harris II, 216 F.3d at 972; see also Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2011)

(holding that “the overall tenor of Harris and its progeny, when taken together,

unmistakably supports” the conclusion that § 1997e(e) applies to constitutional claims

and precludes the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in the absence of

the requisite physical injury). 

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

2. That the Clerk be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida this 17th day of February, 2012.

/s/ Charles J. Kahn, Jr.

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court's internal use only, and does not control. 

A copy of any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to object may

limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United

States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

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