NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD EVERETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

M. BLACK, ISU Officer, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-16619 

D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01285-AWI-MJS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Ronald Everett appeals pro se from the district 

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process 

violations in connection with disciplinary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 20 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-16619 

(9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s 

Office for Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal 

pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). We may affirm on any 

ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 

F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

To the extent that success on Everett’s due process claims stemming from 

his 2008 disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

disciplinary conviction that resulted in the loss of good-time credits, Everett’s 

claims are barred by Heck, because Everett failed to allege facts demonstrating that

his disciplinary sentence has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 

(barring § 1983 claims which, if successful, “would necessarily imply the 

invalidity” of an inmate’s conviction or sentence, unless inmate demonstrates that

the conviction or sentence has been invalidated); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 

U.S. 641, 645-48 (1997) (challenge to loss of good-time credits not cognizable 

under § 1983). We treat the dismissal of these claims as a dismissal without 

prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995)

(Heck dismissals are without prejudice).

To the extent that success on Everett’s due process claims would not 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, dismissal was proper 

because Everett failed to allege facts sufficient to show a due process violation
3 17-16619 

arising from his placement in administrative segregation. See Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (liberty interest arises only when restraint “imposes 

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life”); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(describing due process notice requirements for inmate placement in administrative 

segregation), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. 

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See 

United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not 

presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”). 

AFFIRMED.