### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Marc h 9, 200 4 S es sio n
WI LLI AM ALE XA ND ER COC KE STU AR T v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2001-C- 1658 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 01387-CCA -R3-P C - F iled May 4, 2004

The pe titioner, Wi lliam Alex ander Cocke Stuart, pled g uilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to t he ft of pr op e rt y ov e r $ 10 ,0 00 and

re c e ive d a

fi ve -ye ar s e nte nc e to b e se rv e d in sp lit c on fi ne me nt. Subsequently , he filed a petiti on for post-c onviction relief, a lleg ing that he re ceive d the ineff ective assistance of couns el and that his g uilty plea wa s not knowing or voluntary . The post-c onviction
cour t , wi t h out holding an e videntiary hear ing, dismissed the pe tition and the petitioner appe aled. Upon re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e re verse t h e j u d gm ent of the post-c onviction
c ourt and re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t i s R e ve r se d and Re m ande d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J ERRY L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Th e od or a A. Pa pp a s, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Willi am A le xan de r C oc ke Stu art

.
Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma

rk ham, A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , Distri ct Attorney Gene ral; and Paul De Wit t, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The fa cts in the i nstant case are sparse . On Fe bruar y 5, 2002, the petitioner pled guilty to a char g e of the ft and re ceive d a sente nce of split confinement. L ater , on Fe bruar y 4, 20 0 3 , the petitioner timely

filed a post-c onviction petition, asking the c ourt for r elief. The petitioner alleg ed:-2- [1.] [The petitioner] did not effe ct a knowingand intellige nt plea barg ain ag ree ment beca

use of multiple mat e r ia l m is r e p r e s e nta ti o ns by his de fe ns e c ouns e ls.
[2.] Be tween Septe mber 2001 a nd Fe bruar y 2 002, [t he petitioner] repe atedly

was de nied ef

fec t i v e l eg al assistance from Of fice Of Me tr op oli tan Pu

bli c De fe nd e r e mpl oy e e s. Also in his petiti on, the petitioner alleg ed, in ne arly illegible handwr iting, that he was “assur ed prior to his acce ptance of the plea ag ree ment by

his attorney

that he would be elig ible to apply for judicial diversion under

TCA 40-35-313 a fter [his] probation.” A dditionally , the petition noted that the petitioner, thoug h actingpro se, wa s assisted by counsel in the fil ing of the post-convic tion petition. The State did not file a r esponse to the pe tition.

There afte r, on Mar ch 14, 2003, the post-c onviction court, without conductingan evide ntiary hear ing, e ntere d an “opinion” dismissing the petition. The court state d:

The petitioner made no mention of his intention to apply for judicial diversion under

TCA 40-35-313 on the judgme nt, ple a petition form or otherw ise. . . . The pe titioner signe d th ese doc uments in open court, ther eby , ag ree ing to their terms and e ff

ectinga convic tion on his be ha lf . F ur the rm or e , o ne is no t e nti tle d to jud ic ia l div e rs ion a s a matte r o f r ig ht.

. . . N e ve r w a s th e pe tit ion e r g ua ra nte e d the ri g ht t o enjoy the bene fits of judicial diversion. Petitioner’s acce ptance of the plea a g ree ment, which was quite favor able, substantially undermined his c omp la int

of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Finally , the post-conviction court dismiss ed the petition, finding that the petitioner “ failed to prove that c ouns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll b e low the re qu isi te sta

nd ard de mand e d o f d e fe ns e a tto rney s in criminal ca ses.” The petitioner appe als this decision.

II. Ana lys is

The P ost-Conviction Procedur e Act of 1995 provides that a post-conviction petition must be filed with the cle rk of the c ourt in which the c onviction occur red. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30- 104(a) (2003). “The petition must contain a c lear and spec ific statement of all g rounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the fa ctual basis of those grounds.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106 ( d ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. A b ar e a ll e g a ti o nth a t a c o n s ti tuti o n a l r igh t h a s b e e nv io late d an d mere c on c lus ion s o f l aw w ill no t be su ff ic ie nt t o w arr ant f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s. I d. Mo reov er, fa ilure to state a f actua l basis for the g rounds alleg ed will result in immediate dismissal of t h e petition. I d. In th e e v e n t o f a d i s m i s s a l , th e tr i a l c o urts h a l l f i l e ano r d e r

d i s m i s s i n g th e p e t i t i o nw i th i nth i rty d ays of the filingof the pe tition. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-106(a ). The orde r of dismissal shall set-3-

fo rt h th e c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l aw. Se e Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -1 06 (f ). We w ill re vie w the po stconviction cour

t’s deter minations de novo. See B urnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tenn. 2002).

A. Timeliness of Dismissal

Initially , the petitioner c omplains that the post-conviction court filed its “opinion” denying his petition m ore than thirty day s afte r the filing of the petition, in contrave ntion of Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40-30-106( a). T h e S tate conc edes that the post-conviction cour t did not take action on this case until thi rty -eig ht day s after the petition was filed, but it arg ues that the pe titioner has not alleg ed that he suf fer ed any prejudice by

the delay . We ag ree with the State.

In State v. J ones, 729 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986), this court deter mined that the def endant wa s not entitled to relief beca use the trial c ourt failed to c onduct a se ntencinghear ing wi thi ngthi rt

y da y s a s r e qu ir e d b y

statut e

. Spe c if

ic a lly , we e xpla ine d that “it is the g e ne ra l rul e in Tenne ssee that statutory

provisions which relate to the mode or time of doingan ac t to which the statute applies ar e not to be mandatory , but dir ector y only .” I d. Moreove r, “w ithout a showing by the [pe tit ion e r] o f r e su lti ngpr e jud ic e , a ny e rr or mus t be ha

rm le ss. ” I d. Th is c ourt

ha s p re vio us ly applied this ra

tionale in the context of a post-conviction court’s untimely filing of a dismissal order. See Ge org e Thurma

n Hay nie, J r. v. State, No. M2001-01522- CCA-R3-PC, 2002 WL 464822, at *7 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. a t N a sh vil le , M ar. 26 , 2 00 2) ; L or ing C. War ne r v. State , No . 0 3C0 1- 96 10 -C R00407, 1998 WL22072, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J an. 23, 1998); Russell Strader, Jr. v. State, No. 03C01-9611-CC-00433, 1998 WL 6932, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J an. 8, 1998).

In the instant case , there is no question that the post-conviction court exceede d the thirty -day g uideline for pr eliminary consi d er at i o n

. Howeve r, the pe titioner does not specific ally alleg e any re su lti ngpr e

jud ic e fr om t

he un tim e ly dis mis sa l. Ac c or din g ly , b e c a us e the pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to
a lle g e pr e jud ic e , w e c on c lud e tha

t th e pe tit ion e r i s e nti tle d to no re lie f on thi s issu e

. Ne xt, w e wi ll
a dd re ss t he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the pe tit ion

on the me ri ts.

B. D ismiss al without Evidentiary Hea ring

In Bur nett v. State, 92 S.W .3d 403, 406 (Tenn. 2002) , ou r s u p re m e court expl ained the proces s which a post-c onviction court should use to deter mine whether

a post-convic tion petition should be dismiss ed without a hear ing. First, the post-conviction court should c onsider the petition to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he pe tit ion

a sse rt s a c olo ra

ble c la im. I d. A c olo ra

ble c la im i s “ ‘a

c la im that, if taken as true, in the light most fa vorable to the petitioner, would entitle petitioner to re lief under the Post-Conviction P roce dure A ct.’” I d.; (quoting Te nn. Sup. Ct . R 28 § 2(H)). I f the fa cts alleg ed, taken as true, do not state a c olorable c laim, the petition should be dismi ssed. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( f); see also Waite v. State, 948 S.W .2d 283, 284 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 1997). When deter mining if a

colora ble claim has be en pre sented, pro se petitions should be held to less stringe nt standards tha

n formal plea dings dr afte d by lawy ers. See Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993). “I f the availability of re lief ca

nnot be conc lusively

deter mined from a pro se petition a nd theT he reco rd ref l ect s t hat t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt e n te re d a n o rder o n A ugust 27 , 20 0 3 , rel i evi ng t he 1 pet i t i oner ’ s co un s el , N i chol as D

. H ar e, f r om r epre s ent i ng t he pet i t i oner

. T he cour t appo i nt ed T heodora A. P appas as t he p et i t i o ner’ s “at t o rney of reco rd.” A d d i t i o nal l y , i n an af f i d avi t s ub m i t t ed t o t hi s co urt , P ap p as s t at ed t hat H are
re p re se n te d the p e tit io n e r a t his g u ilt y p le a , b u t he left p riv a te p r a c ti c e a n d P a p p a s w a s a p p o inte d a s the p e tit io n e r’s
couns el

. O n O ct ob er 2 0, 2 00 3, P appas r ece i ved not i ce t hat an appel l at e r ecor d had been f i l ed i n t he pet i t i oner ’ s ca s e. T h a t sa m e d a y, she c o n ta c te d the A p p e llate C o u rt C le rk ’s O ff ic e a n d lea rn e d tha t t h e p e tit io n e r h a d fi le d a p ro se p o stc o n v ic tio n p e tit io n a n d tha t she ha d b e e n a p p o inte d a s h is c o u n se l.
-4- acc ompanying rec ords, an appellant must be given the aid of counsel.” Billy J oe Henderson v. State, No. E2001-00438- CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 1464544, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, Nov. 19, 2001). In the instant case , we c annot deter mine when c ounsel was appointed to assist the petitioner. 1 Notably , the re cord a lso does not refle ct t hat an amende d petition was ever requested or filed. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-106(d) and (e ).

In its opini on dismiss ing the petition, the post-conviction court stated t hat the petitioner

“ fa ile d to pr ov e that c ouns e l’ s re pr e se ntatio n fe ll be low the re qu isi te sta

nd ard de mand e d o f d e fe ns e a tto rn e y s in

c ri min a l c a se s. ” Ho we ve r, the pe tit ion e r w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to “ pr ov e ” any c la im i n h is petition; ins tead, the pe titioner neede d only to alleg e a co l o ra b l e cla im. See Shazel v. St ate, 966 S.W .2d 414, 415-16 (Te nn. 1998) (“There obviously is an important distinction between the rig ht to seek re l ief in a post-c onviction proce edingand the r ight to haverelief in a post-conviction proce eding .”). Or d i narily , the petitioner would be require d to prove his claims by clea r and convincingevidenc e at a

n evidentiar

y hear ing. H oweve r, a he aringdid not take plac e in the instant
case . Moreove r, we note that the post -c o nviction court’s opinion containe d fac tual finding s, not
mere ly conclusions of law . Such fac tual finding s should not have bee n made in the a bsence of an evidentiar y hear ing. See Charlton v. State, 987 S.W .2d 862, 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that “[t] he pre liminary

stag e is not the appropr iate for um for adjudica

tion of the fac ts of the ca se”)

. The post-c onviction court appe ars to have dismiss ed the petition after dete rmining that the petitio n er wo u l d b e unable to preva il following a n evidentiar

y hear ing. See Roosevelt Malone v. State, No. E2002-00782- CCA-R3-PC, 2003 W L 21145488, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, May 16, 2003). The ultimate suc cess or failure of a pe titioner’s clai m s i s n o t a proper basis for dismiss ing a

post-conviction petit ion without conducting an evide ntiary hear ing. I d.; see a lso Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40 -3 0- 10 6( b) -( d)

. Th e pe tit ion e r a lle g e d that his c ouns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e and that hi s g uil ty ple a wa s n ot kno wi ng ly or vo luntari ly e nte re d, bo th of wh ic h ar e c olo ra ble g ro un ds fo r p os tconvicti o n re l ief. More over, the petitioner fa ctually supported his claims by

alleg ing that he was

“ a ssu re d p ri or to h is a c c eptan c e of

the ple a a g re e me nt b y

his a tto rn e y

that he wo uld

be e lig ibl e to
app l y f o r j u d i c i a l d i v e r s i o n un d e r T C A 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 1 3 a f t e r [h i s ] p r o b a t i o n

. ” A c c o r d i n g l y , the po stconviction cour

t should not have dismi ssed t he petiti on at this stage . See Waite, 948 S.W.2d at 285; Amin Shabazz v. State, No. M2002-01302-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 354511, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, F eb. 14, 2003).

III. Conclusi on-5-

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e re verse the judg ment of the post-c onviction court and r emand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s in

a c c or da nc e wi th t he 19 95 Pos t- Convic tio n Pr oc e dure Ac t.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE