IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 1, 2016

TADD TIMOTHY BROWN v. DAWN VERONICA BROWN

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County

No. 39251 Deanna B. Johnson, Chancellor

No. M2015-01318-COA-R3-CV – Filed August 26, 2016

This appeal arises from a finding of criminal contempt in a child support matter. Dawn 

Veronica Brown (“Mother”) filed a petition for contempt against her ex-husband Tadd 

Timothy Brown (“Father”) in the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial 

Court”). In her petition, Mother alleged numerous violations by Father of the parenting 

plan and marital dissolution agreement, including that Father had failed to pay child 

support toward their minor child (“the Child”). After a trial, the Trial Court found Father 

guilty on twelve counts of criminal contempt. Father appeals. We find and hold that the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain Father‟s convictions for failure to pay child support. 

However, we reverse the count found against Father for his refusal to turn the Child over 

to maternal relatives rather than Mother over one specific summer week, and modify his 

sentence accordingly. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed, in Part, and, Reversed, in Part

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL

MCBRAYER and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Judy A. Oxford, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tadd Timothy Brown.

Angela R. Hoover, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Dawn Veronica Brown.
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OPINION

Background

Mother and Father were divorced in March 2011. The parties‟ final decree 

of divorce incorporated a parenting plan that, among other things, required Father to pay 

child support to Mother for the Child, born 2002, in the amount of $357.00 per month. In 

addition to the $357.00 per month child support, the parenting plan and final child 

support order provided that Mother was to be permitted to retain the Child‟s Social 

Security Benefits of $633.00 per month related to Father‟s Social Security disability, and 

that these Social Security funds were to be used solely for the benefit of the Child. Father 

was disabled as a result of a work-related injury from 1988. Mother was named primary 

residential parent of the Child. Mother paid $350.00 per month to Father in transitional 

alimony. In March 2012, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to adjust his 

child support obligation. This petition never was acted upon.

In November 2013, Mother filed a petition for contempt against Father. 

Mother alleged numerous violations of the parenting plan. Relevant to the issues on 

appeal, Mother alleged that Father willfully failed to pay his child support and that he had 

failed to give Mother her visiting time in the summer of 2013. This matter was not tried 

until February 2015.

Father testified that he believed, despite what the parenting plan said, that 

the $357.00 he owed in child support per month actually should be subsumed into the 

$633.00 that went to the Child from his Social Security disability benefits. Father stated 

that he paid the $357.00 at first because he believed Mother needed it. Father remarried 

and adopted his current wife‟s two children, which caused the Social Security allocation 

to be reduced by two-thirds to the Child to $222.00 per month. According to Father, it 

was his understanding that so long as the total amount he paid Mother for child support, 

including the Social Security payment, equaled $357.00, he was adhering to his 

obligations. With respect to the summer of 2013 incident, Father testified that he 

originally had no issue with the Child going with her maternal relatives for the week the 

Child was scheduled to be with Mother. Because Father became concerned that the 

maternal relatives would not return the Child to him for his final two weeks of visitation, 

he refused to allow the visit.

Mother testified that Father had failed to pay the full $357.00 from 

November 2011 through April 2013. Mother stated that Father‟s refusing to pay the full 

amount coincided with Mother‟s ceasing to pay him alimony because of Father‟s 

remarriage. Mother also testified that Father had a practice of working side jobs which 
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significantly augmented his reported income. However, Father denied this categorically, 

and there was no additional evidence presented that he worked side jobs.

In March 2015, the Trial Court entered an order finding Father guilty of

criminal contempt. The Trial Court found that Father had failed to pay the full required 

amount of child support for eleven different months for a total of eleven counts. The 

Trial Court also found Father guilty on one count of criminal contempt for refusing to 

turn the Child over to maternal relatives in the summer of 2013. The Trial Court 

sentenced Father to 120 days in jail to be served consecutively, all but five days 

suspended. The Trial Court stated, in part: 

At the Hearing on the Contempt Petition, Father claimed he stopped 

paying the Child Support because he believed the Social Security disability 

benefits Mother was receiving on behalf of the child should take the place 

of the Child Support. Father claimed he was given this advice by his

attorney. The Court does note that on March 14, 2012, Father filed a 

Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan arguing that the Child Support 

Worksheet is incorrect because it improperly accounts for the Social 

Security disability benefits. However, that Petition was never heard. Thus, 

Father was still under an obligation to pay $357.00 per month as agreed to 

in the Parenting Plan and Marital Dissolution Agreement and as Ordered in 

the Final Divorce Decree.

Moreover, the Court finds that Father‟s claim that he was instructed 

by his lawyer to make only partial payments is not credible. Father failed to 

subpoena his lawyer to testify regarding such claims. Therefore, Father‟s 

story could not be challenged. Also, Mother‟s attorney has represented her 

throughout the entirety of this case. She informed the Court that the 

Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan Father had filed was dismissed by 

Father‟s previous attorney. In addition, the timing of Father‟s sudden 

ceasing of Child Support payments defeats his credibility. He had been 

paying $357.00 per month for nearly a year. Then, when Mother stopped 

paying Alimony (which was $350.00 per month), Father almost 

immediately stopped paying Child Support and a month later he filed a 

Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan. Finally, Father‟s general demeanor 

while testifying leads the Court to find that Father is not credible on this 

issue.

On March 22, 2013, Father emailed Mother and advised her that 

their daughter‟s portion of the Social Security Disability benefits would be 

decreased to $222.00 per month. This reduction occurred because Father 
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adopted his new wife‟s two children. At the Hearing, Father admitted that 

he knew that adopting two additional children would decrease the amount 

of Social Security benefits [the Child] would receive. Father gave no 

viable explanation for his decision to adopt two additional children despite 

it reducing [the Child‟s] benefits other than to say “it was the right thing to 

do.” In that same email, Father informed Mother that, because of this 

benefits decrease to [the Child], he would begin paying $135.00 per month, 

which would be the difference between $357.00 and $222.00. So, in April 

of 2013, Father began making partial payments of $135.00 per month in 

Child Support.

Ultimately, based on the parties‟ testimony, the Court finds that 

Father willfully did not pay any child support for the months of November 

of 2012, December of 2012, January of 2013, February of 2013, and March 

of 2013. In addition, the Court finds that Father willfully paid only $135.00 

per month for the months of April through September of 2013. Therefore, 

Father willfully failed to pay the full amount of Child Support Ordered, 

$357.00 per month, on eleven (11) different occasions. The Court finds 

that Father had the ability to pay all of this Child Support as he was 

continuing to receive his Social Security benefits from the Federal 

Government.

***

In the instant case, Father‟s excuse that his lawyer told him he did 

not have to pay $357.00 per month is not a defense to ignoring the Court‟s 

Order to pay it. First of all, the Court does not find Father‟s testimony that 

his lawyer told him not to pay $357.00 per month in Child Support to be 

credible. Father‟s demeanor and testimony at trial was not credible. In 

addition, the circumstances under which Father failed to pay the Child 

Support leads the Court to disbelieve Father‟s “my lawyer told me to”

defense. Father paid $357.00 per month for nearly a year. During this 

entire time, Mother was receiving the $633.00 per month for Social 

Security benefits for [the Child]. Then, in November of 2011, Mother 

stopped paying Alimony to Father because he re-married. Father almost 

immediately stopped paying Child Support. Then, in March of 2012, 

Father filed a Petition to Modify Child Support. However, that Petition was 

never heard by the Court. According to Mother‟s attorney, that Petition 

was withdrawn in open Court. As Father failed to bring his former lawyer 

to Court to testify about the matter or to submit an Affidavit about it, the 

Court has before it only the statements of Mother‟s attorney.
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It is also noteworthy that, during the Mediation, Mother raised 

allegations that Father was making money “on the side” in addition to the 

Social Security Disability benefits he received from the federal 

Government. During the bargaining process and the give-and-take of the 

Mediation, Mother compromised those allegations of Father earning money 

“on the side” and agreed to a lesser income for Father in exchange for 

receiving $357.00 per month in Child Support and the $633.00 per month 

for the child‟s social security disability benefits.

As discussed above, on March 22, 2013, Father emailed Mother and 

advised her that their daughter‟s portion of the Social Security Disability

benefits would be decreased to $222.00 per month. This reduction 

occurred because Father adopted his new wife‟s two children. At the 

Hearing, Father admitted that he knew that adopting two additional children 

would decrease the amount of social security benefits [the Child] would 

receive. Father gave no viable explanation for his decision to adopt two 

additional children despite it reducing [the Child‟s] benefits other than to 

say “it was the right thing to do.” In that same email, Father informed 

Mother that, because of this benefits decrease to [the Child], he would 

begin paying $135.00 per month, which would be the difference between 

$357.00 and $222.00. So, in April of 2013, Father began making partial 

payments of $135.00 per month in Child Support.

Ultimately, based on the parties‟ testimony, the Court finds that 

Father did not pay any child support for the months of November of 2012, 

December of 2012, January of 2013, February of 2013, and March of 2013. 

In addition, the Court finds that Father paid only $135.00 per month for the 

months of April through September of 2013. Therefore, Father failed to 

pay the full amount of Child Support Ordered, $357.00 per month, on

eleven (11) different occasions. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds 

that Father had the ability to pay the full amount of Child Support on all of 

those eleven (11) different occasions at the time the support was due. In 

addition, the Court finds that Father‟s failure to pay the full amount of 

Child Support on those eleven (11) different occasions was willful.

***

During the litigation, Father moved to Maine. The Parenting Plan 

requires that Father provide transportation to and from Maine at the 

beginning and end of his summer parenting time. At the time of the 
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divorce, [the Child] was eight (8) years old. Initially, Mother allowed [the 

Child] to travel on the airplane by herself. However, [the Child] was afraid 

of flying by herself. Accordingly, in approximately November of 2012, 

Mother decided not to require [the Child] to fly by herself and, instead, told 

Father that he would need to fly to Nashville to get her.

The Parenting Plan provides that, for the summer of 2012, Father 

would have parenting time in Maine for three non-consecutive weeks and 

Mother would have parenting time for one week in Maine at the end of the 

first or second week of Father‟s parenting time. Then, beginning in the 

summer of 2013, Father is to have parenting time for four non-consecutive 

weeks in the summer in two-week blocks, with Mother having one week of 

parenting time in Maine at the end of Father‟s first two-week block. 

According to Father‟s own testimony, the intention of this arrangement was 

so that [the Child] could visit with her aunt (Mother‟s sister) and the rest of

Mother‟s family, who also live in Maine, during that period of time.

In the summer of 2012, [the Child] did spend that one week time 

period with Mother‟s sister. However, in 2013, Father refused to allow [the 

Child] to leave his house with Mother‟s sister. Instead, Father kept [the 

Child] with him during that time, which was actually Mother‟s week, and 

then kept [the Child] another two weeks, for a total of five weeks that 

summer. Father claimed his reason for not allowing [the Child] to go with 

her aunt was that he believed the aunt would not return [the Child] to him. 

Mother testified Father‟s action in this regard was in retaliation for Mother 

refusing the previous November to allow [the Child] to fly alone. The 

Court finds Mother to be credible on this issue. Based on this evidence 

presented at trial, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, 

the Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Father willfully violated 

this portion of the Final Decree.

Father filed a motion to alter or amend judgment. The Trial Court denied Father‟s 

motion with respect to child support, visitation, and excessiveness of sentence.1 Father 

filed an appeal to this Court.

 

1

In its order on Father‟s motion to alter or amend, the Trial Court makes reference to a 130 day total 

sentence for Father. We believe this to be an error because in the Trial Court‟s earlier order it found 

Father guilty on twelve counts of criminal contempt for a total sentence of 120 days, all but five 

suspended. Both parties also state in their briefs that the sentence is 120 days rather than 130.
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Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Father raises the following three issues 

on appeal: 1) whether the Trial Court erred in finding Father guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt of criminal contempt for non-payment of child support; 2) whether the Trial Court 

erred in finding Father guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal contempt for 

refusing to turn the Child over to maternal relatives for one week of visitation during the 

summer; and, 3) whether Father‟s sentence is excessive. Mother attempts to request in 

the next to last sentence of her brief her attorney‟s fees incurred on appeal.

In Moody v. Hutchison we explained:

The first issue we will address is Defendant‟s claim that Plaintiff 

failed to prove he was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. As this Court recently observed in Barber v. Chapman, No. M2003-

00378-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 

2004), no appl. perm appeal filed:

In a criminal contempt case, the guilt of the accused 

must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Black v. 

Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394 at 398 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Robinson 

v. Air Draulics Engineering Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 377 S.W.2d 

908, 912 (Tenn. 1964)). However, on appeal, individuals 

convicted of criminal contempt lose their presumption of 

innocence and must overcome the presumption of guilt. 

“Appellate courts do not review the evidence in a light 

favorable to the accused and will reverse criminal contempt 

convictions only when the evidence is insufficient to support 

the trier-of-fact‟s finding of contempt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1993) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e)). Furthermore, 

appellate courts review a trial court‟s decision of whether to 

impose contempt sanctions using the more relaxed abuse of 

discretion standard of review. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 

573, 583 (Tenn. 1993).

Barber, 2004 WL 343799, at *2, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111, at *8. 

Accord, Freeman v. Freeman, 147 S.W.3d 234, 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003),

appl. perm. appeal denied March 22, 2004 (“Appellate Courts review a 

trial court‟s decision to impose contempt sanctions using the more relaxed 
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„abuse of discretion‟ standard of review.... The court of appeals has 

„appellate jurisdiction over civil or criminal contempt arising out of a civil 

matter.‟ See T.C.A. § 16-4-108(b)...”). 

Moody v. Hutchison, 159 S.W.3d 15, 25-26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). 

To sustain a finding of criminal contempt for failure to pay child support, 

the petitioner must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent had the ability to pay 

support when it was due and that his or her failure to pay the required support was 

willful. Cottingham v. Cottingham, 193 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tenn. 2006). 

Our Supreme Court has given guidance with regard to discretionary 

decisions stating:

The abuse of discretion standard of review envisions a less rigorous 

review of the lower court‟s decision and a decreased likelihood that the 

decision will be reversed on appeal. Beard v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 

288 S.W.3d 838, 860 (Tenn. 2009); State ex rel. Jones v. Looper, 86 

S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). It reflects an awareness that the 

decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable 

alternatives. Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 708 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1999). Thus, it does not permit reviewing courts to second-guess the 

court below, White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1999), or to substitute their discretion for the lower court‟s, Henry v. 

Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003); Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 

S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998). The abuse of discretion standard of review 

does not, however, immunize a lower court‟s decision from any meaningful 

appellate scrutiny. Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 211 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Discretionary decisions must take the applicable law and the relevant 

facts into account. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. 

Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008); Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 

652, 661 (Tenn. 1996). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays 

beyond the applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider 

the factors customarily used to guide the particular discretionary decision. 

State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007). A court abuses its 

discretion when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision 

by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or 

unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence. State v. Ostein, 293 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Tenn. 
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2009); Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 

S.W.3d at 358; Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 

Nashville, 154 S.W.3d at 42.

To avoid result-oriented decisions or seemingly irreconcilable 

precedents, reviewing courts should review a lower court‟s discretionary 

decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is 

properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the lower court 

properly identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles 

applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the lower court‟s decision was 

within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Flautt & Mann v. 

Council of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 872-73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) 

(quoting BIF, a Div. of Gen. Signal Controls, Inc. v. Service Constr. Co., 

No. 87-136-II, 1988 WL 72409, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1988) (No 

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed)). When called upon to review a 

lower court‟s discretionary decision, the reviewing court should review the 

underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence 

standard contained in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) and should review the lower 

court‟s legal determinations de novo without any presumption of 

correctness. Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2004); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d at 212.

Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524-25 (Tenn. 2010). 

The first issue we address is whether the Trial Court erred in finding Father 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal contempt for non-payment of child support. 

Father has two main arguments on this issue: (1) that Mother failed to prove Father‟s 

ability to pay; and (2) that Father had a pending petition to correct the amount of child 

support he was required to pay pursuant to the parenting plan.

With respect to Father‟s ability to pay, the evidence in the record is that 

Father receives approximately $1,100.00 per month in Social Security disability. 

Father‟s medications cost around $400.00 per month. Mother testified that, during the 

time child support was due, Father worked side jobs that swelled his income to over

$3,000.00 per month. Father denied that he did any work on the side. The Trial Court 

specifically found Father to be not credible. Mother never makes it clear exactly how she 

knows what side jobs Father works. However, whether Father worked side jobs or not, 

the issue remains whether Father had the ability to pay and whether he willfully refused 

to pay. Even were we to discount Mother‟s testimony that Father worked on the side, it 

remains undisputed that Father drew Social Security disability income. Father correctly 
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notes that it is insufficient in a case of criminal contempt merely to show non-payment of 

child support. There must be a showing of willfulness. 

In our view, the evidence shows, as found by the Trial Court, that Father 

stopped making child support payments not because of an inability to pay, but rather 

because he was unhappy with his child support obligation as required in the original 

parenting plan. Father, in his brief, asserts that “[w]hen Father was no longer receiving 

alimony from Mother, he did not have the funds with which to pay child support above 

and beyond what the SSA was paying Mother for support of the child.” This contradicts 

Father‟s stated rationale at other points in this case. As found by the Trial Court, “[a]t the 

Hearing on the Contempt Petition, Father claimed he stopped paying the Child Support 

because he believed the Social Security disability benefits Mother was receiving on 

behalf of the child should take the place of the Child Support.” The Trial Court found 

further that “Father had the ability to pay all of this Child Support as he was continuing to 

receive his Social Security benefits from the Federal Government.” The evidence does 

not preponderate against this finding. Father made the $357.00 per month child support 

payments until late 2011. Father clearly was aware of his obligation as established in the 

parenting plan. Father continued to receive his Social Security disability payments 

thereafter. Mother did stop making alimony payments upon Father‟s remarriage as 

allowed under the marital dissolution agreement, but the terms of the parenting plan were 

still in effect. If Father wished to challenge the amount of his child support, he should 

have done so through the courts rather than simply deciding to stop paying the full 

amount on his own.

Father then points to a petition he filed to alter his child support obligation. 

The record does reflect that Father filed a petition regarding his child support in March 

2012. However, the record does not reveal the disposition, if any, of this petition.2 We 

do not agree with Father‟s argument that his petition, apparently at least abandoned as 

best we can tell by the record, means that Father can unilaterally disregard his court 

ordered child support obligation. We affirm the Trial Court in its finding that Father, 

despite having the ability to pay, willfully failed to pay the required amount of $357.00 

per month in child support on eleven distinct occasions.

The next issue we address is whether the Trial Court erred in finding Father 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal contempt for refusing to turn the Child over 

to maternal relatives for Mother‟s one week of visitation in the summer of 2013. The 

Court found Father guilty on one count for his refusal to turn the Child over to a maternal 

aunt and uncle for one week during the summer of 2013. The parties‟ parenting plan 

 

2 Mother‟s counsel represented that Father dismissed the petition in court. However, we have no 

evidence in the record one way or the other.
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required that Mother have one week of visitation at that particular time. Father argues 

that Mother could not delegate her parenting time to her relatives and that he therefore 

was justified in refusing to turn the Child over to the maternal relatives. Father points out 

that in 2014, a different judge, Judge Martin, issued an order in this case stating in part 

that: “Mother may not delegate the middle week of the summer parenting schedule to 

someone else. The Court expects Mother to be with the child for the entire week of 

Father‟s summer parenting time.” While Judge Martin‟s order came one year after the 

controversy at issue but before the contempt hearing, we find it unjust to find Father‟s 

conduct willful and to penalize Father for refusing to turn the Child over to Mother‟s 

relatives rather than Mother when a different judge acting in this case ruled expressly that 

under the parenting plan Mother was not entitled to delegate her week to anyone else. 

We reverse the Trial Court‟s finding of criminal contempt against Father on this count.

The final issue of Father‟s we address is whether Father‟s sentence is 

excessive. In Simpkins v. Simpkins, 374 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) this Court 

modified a sentence we deemed to be excessive. We stated as follows:

Although the record clearly established Husband‟s guilt of all 

fourteen counts of criminal contempt, that fact alone does not justify the 

imposition of the maximum sentence of ten days for each conviction or that 

all of the sentences run consecutively to each other for an effective period 

of confinement of 140 days. To the contrary, there is a presumption in favor 

of concurrent sentencing as distinguished from consecutive sentencing. See 

State v. Taylor, 739 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that 

consecutive sentences should not routinely be imposed in criminal cases 

and the aggregate maximum of consecutive terms must be reasonably 

related to the severity of the offenses involved). Further, the record 

suggests the trial court did not consider the statutory criteria when 

determining whether Husband‟s multiple sentences should be served 

concurrently or consecutively. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(a) (“If a 

defendant is convicted of more than one (1) criminal offense, the court shall 

order sentences to run consecutively or concurrently as provided by the 

criteria in this section.”). Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-115(b) 

provides that the court may order sentences to run consecutively if the court 

finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) The defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted 

the defendant‟s life to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood;

(2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is 

extensive;
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(3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so declared by 

a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an investigation prior 

to sentencing that the defendant‟s criminal conduct has been characterized 

by a pattern of repetitive or compulsive behavior with heedless indifference 

to consequences;

(4) The defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or 

no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in 

which the risk to human life is high;

(5) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses 

involving sexual abuse of a minor with consideration of the aggravating 

circumstances arising from the relationship between the defendant and 

victim or victims, the time span of defendant‟s undetected sexual activity, 

the nature and scope of the sexual acts and the extent of the residual, 

physical and mental damage to the victim or victims;

(6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on 

probation; or

(7) The defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt.

The only statutory factor that applies to Husband is that he is 

sentenced for criminal contempt. While this may justify consecutive 

sentencing, at least in part, this factor alone does not justify the imposition 

of the absolute maximum sentence of 140 days. As we noted above, 

“[a]lthough statutory criteria may support the imposition of consecutive 

sentences, the overall length of the sentence must be „justly deserved in 

relation to the seriousness of the offense [s],‟ and „no greater than that 

deserved‟ under the circumstances.” Sneed, 302 S.W.3d at 828 (internal 

citations omitted).

***

We do not condone any of Husband‟s conduct and agree with the 

trial court that incarceration is appropriate based upon the facts of this case; 

however, his contemptuous acts do not justify the imposition of the 

maximum sentence of ten days for each and every count, or consecutive 

sentencing for all fourteen counts. Having considered the facts of this case, 

we find the imposition of an effective sentence of 140 days is excessive, 
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especially because only one of the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 

40-35-115(b) applies.

Simpkins, 374 S.W.3d at 424-25.

The evidence in the record on appeal reflects that Father willfully refused to 

pay in full his child support as required despite having the ability to pay. While Father 

objected to the amount of his child support in connection with his Social Security 

disability income to the Child, there nevertheless was a lawful order requiring Father to 

pay. Unlike Simpkins, here the Trial Court specifically considered the statutory criteria 

under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-115(a) and 40-35-115(b). Father‟s belief that he should 

be given credit for the Social Security disability payment to the Child did not permit him 

to unilaterally stop paying the full amount of child support absent a judicial order. The 

importance of a parent paying his or her court ordered child support timely cannot be 

overstated. This policy is supported by the General Assembly‟s including in Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-115(b) the specific provision allowing a court to order sentences to run 

consecutively if the court finds that “the defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt.” 

Given all this, including considering the totality of all the circumstances of this case, we 

find no reversible error by the Trial Court and, therefore, Father‟s sentence of 10 days for 

each of the eleven counts to be served consecutively is not excessive. 

Having reversed one of twelve counts found against Father, we affirm 

Father‟s conviction and sentence of 110 days in jail with all but five days suspended. 

The Trial Court‟s decision that Father‟s sentences are to be served consecutively also is 

affirmed.

As a final matter, we decline to award Mother her attorney‟s fees incurred 

on appeal. While Mother asks for her attorney‟s fees in the next to last sentence of her 

brief, Mother never set that out as a separate issue in her statement of issues as required. 

Additionally, Mother makes no argument as to why she is entitled to her attorney fees in 

this case.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, reversed, in part, 

and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs 

on appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Tadd Timothy Brown, and his surety, if 

any.

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE