STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES 

NATIONALLY CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS 

404/733-6070 

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

convenes the 

WORKING GROUP MEETING 

ADVISORY BOARD ON 

 

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 

NEVADA TEST SITE

 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 

Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 

Worker Health held in Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 

21, 2008. 
2

C O N T E N T S

May 21, 2008 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 6 

DR. CHRISTINE BRANCHE, DFO 

INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR 12 

MR. ROBERT PRESLEY 

NTS SITE PROFILE ISSUES: 

TUNNEL REENTRY 13 

ISSUE 11: ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION EXPOSURES 150 

FUTURE ACTIONS 240 

LETTERS SUBMITTED INTO THE RECORD 243 

COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 293 
3

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 

material is reproduced as read or spoken. 

In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 

an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 

sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 

or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 

word(s) when reading written material. 

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 

of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 

reported. 

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 

the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 

available. 

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 

"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 

 -- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 

without reference available. 

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 

failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 
4

 P A R T I C I P A N T S 

(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL

BRANCHE, Christine, Ph.D. 

Principal Associate Director 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Washington, DC 

MEMBERSHIP

1 CLAWSON, Bradley 

2 Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 

3 Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 

MUNN, Wanda I. 

Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 

Richland, Washington 

PRESLEY, Robert W. 

Special Projects Engineer 

BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 

Clinton, Tennessee 

ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 

Professor Emeritus 

University of Florida 

Elysian, Minnesota 

SCHOFIELD, Phillip 

Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 

Los Alamos, New Mexico 
5

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS

ADAMS, NANCY, NIOSH 

ANSPAUGH, LYNN, SC&A 

BRIGGS, NICOLE, SC&A 

CHEW, MEL, ORAU 

ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 

HOFF, JENNIFER, ORAU 

HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 

KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 

MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 

MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 

OH, KATHERINE, SEN. REID 

RICH, BRYCE, ORAU 

ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY, SC&A 

ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH 

ROLLINS, GENE, ORAU 
6

P R O C E E D I N G S

1 (9:00 a.m.) 

2 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS

3 DR. BRANCHE: Good morning. I’m Dr. 

4 Christine Branche, the Designated Federal 

5 Official for the Advisory Board on Radiation 

6 and Worker Health. And today we are now 

7 starting the working group on the Nevada Test 

8 site, the site profile with Mr. Robert Presley 

9 as the Chair. 

10 Would the Board members who are in the 

11 room please announce your names? 

12 MR. PRESLEY: Robert Presley, Chair. 

13 MR. CLAWSON: Brad Clawson. 

14 DR. ROESSLER: Gen Roessler. 

15 MR. SCHOFIELD: Phil Schofield. 

16 MS. MUNN: Wanda Munn. 

17 DR. BRANCHE: Are there any Board members 

18 who are participating by phone? 

19 (no response) 

20 DR. BRANCHE: Is there anyone on the phone 

21 who could please let me know that they can 

22 hear me? 

23 MS. OH: Christine, this is Kate in Senator 
7

1 Reid’s office. 

2 DR. BRANCHE: Great. Thank you very much. 

3 I’ll announce you specifically in just a 

4 moment, but thanks for letting me know that 

5 you can hear me. 

6 We do not have a quorum on the Board 

7 so we may proceed. Will the NIOSH staff who 

8 are in the room please announce your names and 

9 please say if you have a conflict with the 

10 Nevada Test Site. 

11 MR. ELLIOTT: Larry Elliott, NIOSH/OCAS. I 

12 have no conflict on NTS. 

13 MR. ROLFES: Mark Rolfes, NIOSH, no 

14 conflicts. 

15 MR. CHEW: Mel Chew of the O-R-A-U team, no 

16 conflicts. 

17 MR. RICH: Bryce Rich with the O-R-A-U team. 

18 I do have a conflict. 

19 MR. ROLLINS: Gene Rollins with the O-R-A-U 

20 team, no conflict. 

21 MS. HOFF: Jennifer Hoff with the O-R-A-U 

22 team, no conflicts. 

23 DR. BRANCHE: Are there any NIOSH staff 

24 participating by phone? Would you please 

25 state your name and say if you have a 
8

1 conflict? 

2 MS. ADAMS: Nancy Adams, no conflict. 

3 DR. BRANCHE: Are there any ORAU staff who 

4 are participating by phone? If you could 

5 please state your name and say if you have a 

6 conflict. 

7 (no response) 

8 DR. BRANCHE: SC&A staff who are in the room 

9 please announce your names and say if you have 

10 a conflict. 

11 DR. MAURO: John Mauro, SC&A, no conflict. 

12 DR. BRANCHE: SC&A staff participating by 

13 phone would you please announce your names and 

14 say if you have a conflict? 

15 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Arjun 

16 Makhijani, no conflict. 

17 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Lynn Anspaugh, 

18 conflict. 

19 MS. BRIGGS (by Telephone): Nicole Briggs, 

20 no conflict. 

21 MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS (by Telephone): Kathy 

22 Robertson-DeMers, no conflict. 

23 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Anspaugh, you said that 

24 you do have a conflict? 

25 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Yes. 
9

1 DR. BRANCHE: Thank you. I just want to 

2 make sure that I heard that correctly. 

3 Are there any SC&A staff who I didn’t, 

4 who I interrupted as they were saying their 

5 names? 

6 (no response) 

7 DR. BRANCHE: Other federal agency staff in 

8 the room, please state your names. 

9 MS. HOWELL: Emily Howell, HHS. 

10 DR. BRANCHE: Other federal agency staff 

11 participating by phone, would you please 

12 announce your names? 

13 MR. KOTSCH (by Telephone): Jeff Kotsch, 

14 Department of Labor. 

15 DR. BRANCHE: Petitioners or other 

16 representatives who are participating by 

17 phone, would you please feel free to state 

18 your names? 

19 (no response) 

20 DR. BRANCHE: Workers or their 

21 representatives who would like to announce 

22 their names? 

23 (no response) 

24 DR. BRANCHE: Members of Congress or their 

25 representatives who would like to mention 
10

1 their names. 

2 MS. OH: Katherine Oh in Senator Harry 

3 Reid’s office. 

4 DR. BRANCHE: Katherine, for the record 

5 would you please state your name? We need the 

6 court reporter to be able to register that 

7 properly. 

8 MS. OH: Sure, Katherine, K-A-T-H-E-R-I-N-E, 

9 Oh, O-H. 

10 DR. BRANCHE: Thank you very much. 

11 Are there other members of Congress or 

12 their representatives on the line? 

13 (no response) 

14 DR. BRANCHE: Are there any others who are 

15 participating by phone who would like to 

16 mention their names? 

17 (no response) 

18 DR. BRANCHE: Before I turn it over to Mr. 

19 Presley, I just have a couple of 

20 announcements. We will hear from Ms. Oh, 

21 Katherine Oh, who is a staffer in Senator 

22 Harry Reid’s office. And she’s going to read 

23 a letter from the Senator into the record. 

24 And based on the discussion I have with Mr. 

25 Presley, she will do that at ten o’clock a.m. 
11

1 eastern time. 

2 As well each of the Nevada Test Site 

3 work group members and I and several others of 

4 us received a fairly lengthy letter from 

5 [Identifying Information Redacted] who is with 

6 [Identifying Information Redacted]. I would 

7 just like to say for the record, Mr. Presley 

8 and I discussed this, and the entire contents 

9 of the 24-page document will be entered into 

10 the record. We’ve given the information to 

11 the court reporter, and the entire document 

12 will be typed into the record. So we’ve now 

13 said that publicly. 

14 (Whereupon, the four letters were delivered 

15 to the court reporter and are attached to this 

16 transcript beginning on page 241.) 

17 DR. BRANCHE: For everyone participating by 

18 phone, I ask, and unfortunately, I’ll probably 

19 have to remind you, but I do ask that you mute 

20 your phones. You would need to use star six 

21 if you do not have a mute button. It’s 

22 important that you mute your phones because 

23 everyone participating by phone has the 

24 quality of their reception for the call is 

25 affected by everyone else’s participation. So 
12

1 I do ask for your indulgence. Again, if you 

2 do not have a mute button, then please dial 

3 star six. And when you are ready to speak, 

4 then please use that same star six. Thank you 

5 very much. 

6 Mr. Presley, it’s all yours. 

7 INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR

8 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Christine. 

9 Today we have two things that we’d 

10 like to wrap up on the site profile for the 

11 NTS site profile. We want first to discuss 

12 items having to do with tunnel reentry, and 

13 then we want to get into issue eleven and wrap 

14 that up today. If we have any more time this 

15 afternoon, we plan on starting to work on the 

16 NTS SEC petition. 

17 But the main thing is trying to wrap 

18 up the site profile for NTS. And at this time 

19 I’d like to call on Mark Rolfes, our 

20 representative from CDC, or OCAS. I’ll let 

21 Mark start his presentation. 

22 MR. ROLFES: Well, thank you, Bob, and thank 

23 you everyone for coming today. As Bob said we 

24 had a couple of issues that we would like to 

25 discuss to hopefully allow us to close out 
13

1 this portion of the discussion relevant to the 

2 site profile for the Nevada Test Site. The 

3 two issues that we wanted to discuss are 

4 related to air monitoring data following an 

5 initial reentry. For example, for individuals 

6 who might have reentered into the tunnels 

7 without respiratory protection following the 

8 initial reentry that was done with scuba 

9 equipment, S-C-B-A. 

10 Also, we wanted to discuss the 

11 environmental radiation exposures at the 

12 Nevada Test Site. And to do that I’m going to 

13 ask members of our Oak Ridge Associated 

14 Universities Team to take us through those two 

15 issues. I believe the first issue we’d like 

16 to discuss is the tunnel reentry or post17 tunnel reentry time period. And to do that 

18 I’d like to ask Mel Chew to give some of the 

19 information that he’s prepared. 

20 TUNNEL REENTRY

21 MR. CHEW: Thank you very much, Mark. 

22 I think Mark had sent members of the 

23 working group quite a few attachments here, 

24 and so I’m going to be talking from those 

25 attachments. You can follow along with the 
14

1 talking points. 

2 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

3 Arjun. Is there any way this material can be 

4 e-mailed to me? 

5 MR. ROLFES: I don’t have the ability to 

6 send an e-mail right now. 

7 MS. BRIGGS (by Telephone): Arjun, this is 

8 Nicole. I can e-mail that to you right now. 

9 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Okay, great, 

10 thank you. 

11 MR. CHEW: Can everyone hear? The mikes are 

12 a little different than the ones we have used 

13 in the past. They’re actually hand mikes, 

14 too, so we can pick up. Can everyone on the 

15 phone hear my voice there? Arjun, are you 

16 going to respond? Can you hear me? 

17 (no response) 

18 DR. BRANCHE: Would someone please indicate 

19 that they can hear Mr. Chew? 

20 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): This is Billy 

21 Smith. I can hear you. 

22 MR. CHEW: Thanks, Billy. I appreciate that 

23 very much. 

24 Let me start this morning with a 

25 little bit of digression here. I’d like just 
15

1 to read something from an obituary, actually, 

2 and I’ll show why it was kind of key to this 

3 discussion here. The gentleman I’m talking 

4 about is a Cliff Penwell. He was 83, and he 

passed away last Thursday, May 15th 5 . He was a 

6 World War II veteran, a member of the Marine 

7 Corps. 

8 But in 1957, he began to work at the 

9 Nevada Test Site starting as a Radiation 

10 Safety Monitor. He was present at over 650 

11 atomic tests in a 30-year career, and later 

12 became the Radiological Field Operations 

13 Superintendent. He is survived by his wife, 

14 [Identifying Information Redacted], his 

15 daughters and four grandchildren and as well 

16 as two great-grandchildren. 

17 The reason why I’m going first this 

18 morning is that Billy Smith and Bill Frangas* 

19 who happen to be on the call who is with 

20 Tunnel Supervision, is going to be attending 

21 the memorial service that’s going to be held 

22 at 11:20 Nevada time today. 

23 I do have a personal relationship with 

24 Cliff. When I first went to the Nevada Test 

25 Site in the late 1961, he was the Radiological 
16

1 person who took me in tow with him to show me 

2 the ropes at the Nevada Test Site. So I’m 

3 very much indebted to Cliff. Our sincere 

4 condolences to his family, and I would like to 

5 acknowledge his significant contribution to 

6 his country, to his service in World War II 

7 and to the service and the safety of the 

8 (unintelligible) Program. Thank you very 

9 much. Cliff, may you rest in peace. 

10 I’d like to start today, I think you 

11 can follow along with the notes. The point 

12 was made in the site profile that there were 

13 workers who participated in the tunnel 

14 following the nuclear tests and recovery 

15 operations under radiological conditions 

16 including bioassays and from which dose 

17 reconstructions can be performed. However, 

18 the remaining concern there was a group of 

19 workers who were not on routine bioassay and 

20 who were assigned to preparatory projects in 

21 contaminated tunnels after from previous 

22 tests. 

23 So the question was raised to 

24 demonstrate or to document those workers who 

25 were not exposed to a significant and 
17

1 unmonitored internal sources of intake and 

2 there was sufficient data to allow a bounding 

3 of internal doses from the work in the 

4 contaminated tunnels from previous tests. So 

5 I’m going to show a few things. I put some 

6 things on the wall. There’s also you people 

7 who got the e-mails did receive copies of it. 

8 I’m going to try to walk you through a 

9 tunnel. I also brought some pictures of what 

10 tunnels look like for reentry. So let me just 

11 talk about what was the approach and how do we 

12 basically look at this problem and how to 

13 address this problem here. The approach is 

14 very important. 

15 MR. ROLFES: Just to call everyone’s 

16 attention. We’re working from the talking 

17 points related to air concentrations following 

18 tunnel tests. 

19 MS. MUNN: What day was this? 

20 MR. CHEW: That was sent Saturday. 

21 MR. ROLFES: It would have been Monday. 

22 DR. BRANCHE: It’s a large document that he 

23 sent, Mark sent, on Monday. 

24 MR. PRESLEY: Twelve attachments. 

25 MR. CHEW: And it says talking points 
18

1 related to the tunnel. 

2 MR. PRESLEY: Wanda, if you can’t find it, 

3 if you want -- 

4 MS. MUNN: I think I’ll be all right. 

5 MR. CHEW: Does anyone need a hard copy 

6 around the table? Jennifer has some hard 

7 copies. 

8 DR. BRANCHE: Dr. Makhijani, did you receive 

9 those documents that Mr. Rolfes sent? 

10 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): I’m just 

11 downloading my e-mail to see if they’ve come 

12 in. 

13 DR. BRANCHE: All right, we’ll wait to hear 

14 from you if you haven’t received it. 

15 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): I have not 

16 yet. 

17 MR. CHEW: The approach to look at this 

18 problem was there’s a considerable amount of 

19 information at the Records Center at the 

20 Nevada Test Site. And I’d like to thank the 

21 Records Center for providing for us here. 

22 Tunnel shot histories and locations were 

23 reviewed in recorded documents from Defense 

24 nuclear agencies, the DOE. At the time there 

25 was AEC Nevada, and a variety of Health and 
19

1 Safety reports, survey reports, data logs. 

2 And during the time period at the 

3 beginning of the resumption of underground 

4 testing, which was about the 1961 timeframe -- 

5 I’m going to talk about 1961 -- and to the 

6 mid-1970s. This was the period of the 

7 development of containment technology. I 

8 think that’s the important point here. 

9 Containment, things in the tunnels, were very 

10 exciting. It was going to be underground 

11 because of some of the test ban requirements 

12 here, the underground. And so learning how to 

13 contain shots underground was a very important 

14 part of that technology. And so there are 

15 greater containment issues here. 

16 A selection of monitoring data from 

17 representative tunnel shots were chosen that 

18 will cover the time period in question and 

19 demonstrate the preparatory work. And what I 

20 mean by preparatory work is that people spent 

21 most of their time in the tunnel getting, 

22 preparing the tunnels for an event or a 

23 detonation. These were including putting 

24 experiments in, putting in the emplacement 

25 where the devices or the test units are being 
20

1 conducted here. 

2 And following the testing and recovery 

3 operation with a special emphasis to compare 

4 activity in the tunnels following completion 

5 of recovery efforts here. Both a time and 

6 location matrix of the tests of interest I 

7 have included here, and I can bring you to 

8 that just to talk about the different events 

9 that happened in the tunnel. 

10 The process for record extraction can 

11 be briefly explained by reference to the 

12 excerpts from the index. And I think I sent a 

13 copy of the index. It was quite large here, 

14 but I just show the index here. This is only 

15 one of the indexes for the series called 

16 Operation Thorax. It’s a very large file. 

17 But it tells you what the people had to do to 

18 go in to find the data. 

19 If you actually go into the index, you 

20 can see all the different documents, the 

21 forms, the reports, the data that correspond 

22 to a specific tunnel, a specific event, and 

23 that’s how you need to do to gather, to 

24 extract the data. There are thousands of 

25 pages of these indexes organized by DOE under 
21

1 subject category. 

2 The database is extensive and the 

3 result took some considerable time to 

4 research. And I’d like to certainly 

5 acknowledge Bryce Rich, who’s sitting next to 

6 me on my right, and Billy Smith, who spent 

7 considerable time at the Records Center to 

8 gather this data for this presentation. Thank 

9 you very much, Bryce and Billy. 

10 I don’t think I need to go down each 

11 one of the indexes, but you can see it. You 

12 have a copy in your e-mail. It’s quite a few 

13 pages here. But you can just see that, for 

14 example, you can go right to a particular 

15 location, and it says this is the V-Tunnel air 

16 data. It tells you what reel it is, and what 

17 frame it is. This is all in microfiche. No, 

18 it’s not microfiche, Bryce it’s in -- 

19 MR. RICH: It’s on reel, not that ^. 

20 MR. CHEW: Okay, and when you see it, you 

21 download it onto a big computer screen, and 

22 then -- 

23 MR. PRESLEY: It’s on microfilm. 

24 MR. CHEW: Microfilm. Okay, very good. 

25 DR. BRANCHE: One note, Dr. Makhijani, I 
22

1 noticed on the e-mail from Mr. Rolfes that you 

2 were not included so I just now e-mailed you 

3 all the documents. 

4 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): I’m going to 

5 get them twice now. I just received them from 

6 Nicole. Thank you though. 

7 MR. CHEW: The purpose of this presentation 

8 is to provide a summary of the information and 

9 the data analysis resulting from this 

10 particular study and some of the background 

11 operational facts that addresses the basic 

12 issues available from site knowledge and also 

13 being confirmed by the records. And then I’d 

14 just kind of read a little bit about the 

15 background that we think is relevant to help 

16 evaluate the data. 

17 But I’m going to stand up for a second 

18 here and go to the board and bring you some 

19 realism I hope of what the tunnels kind of 

20 look like here. And many people said, Mel, 

21 you were there in 1961. That kind of puts you 

22 at 840 years old, very close to it. 

23 I’m holding up some pictures here of 

24 some people going back in and how they were 

25 dressed out, and this is some of the initial 
23

1 reentries here. You can see a person holding 

2 a PAC-3G alpha instrument here in some of the 

3 reentries here. This is going back into, this 

4 is the initial reentry. This is not the group 

5 that we’re actually talking about because all 

6 of these people during initial reentries were 

7 bioassayed, surveyed and were well protected. 

8 The group that we’re focusing in on is 

9 the people that went in after these particular 

10 recovery operations took place when the tunnel 

11 was deemed to be radiologically safe so they 

12 can go back into digging new drifts, put in 

13 new experiments and fix up the tunnels in 

14 preparatory for the next event. I’m just 

15 going to show you a couple more of these 

16 pictures here, and I’ll pass these around. 

17 I’d like to show this particular one. 

18 Mr. Penwell, who passed away, was this 

19 gentleman here, he was the tunnel’s 

20 radiological supervisor. And this is some 

21 wires that they communicate with the people as 

22 they were going into the tunnel. And this is 

23 a radiation monitor looking in. There’s the 

24 many, many holes that are dipped into the 

25 drifts and the tunnels here for emplacement of 
24

1 the charges and experiments and things like 

2 this. This is how the people monitor what 

3 potentially is leaking out of it. 

4 Another picture here of the people 

5 coming back out of the tunnels and how they’re 

6 radiologically monitored and surveyed. And 

7 this gentleman, I had to figure out what he 

8 was carrying, and this is, he was carrying a 

9 miner’s lamp and the battery pack that’s 

10 dangling down there. Just to give you some 

11 realism about going into the tunnel. 

12 DR. ROESSLER: Now I remember we saw the 

13 outside of the tunnels, but I’m trying to 

14 visualize how deep they are. 

15 MR. CHEW: Well, I’m going to go there. 

16 Thank you, Gen, that was a very good one. 

17 You can go and follow along with me. 

18 There’s a drawing that I’m going to show. 

19 It’s called the U-12-B Complex. And I’m going 

20 to take advantage of being on the board here, 

21 and it’s actually on one of the attachments 

22 here. You may have to find it. There was a 

23 series of little drawings. This is probably 

24 the key one, the U-12-B Complex. I’m going to 

25 take you through this particular tunnel and 
25

1 walk you through, and I’m going to give you 

2 some distances. 

3 Thank you very much, Gen. 

4 This is a portal where the people 

5 actually entered the tunnel. This is a road 

6 that drives up to the tunnel. They assemble 

7 usually further down and get suited up 

8 properly with the proper respiratory 

9 protection and badging, dosimetry and et 

10 cetera. And then this is after an event. 

11 I’m going to just walk you through a 

12 tunnel first, all right? And the first one 

13 I’d like to draw attention, this is called B 

14 Tunnel in 1957, 9/19/57. It was the first 

15 tunnel shot here called Rainier. This was 

16 prior to the period we’re focusing on. This 

17 is 1957. 

18 Right after that in 1958 Tamalpais was 

19 shot, and that was right in this particular 

20 portion, the drift on the right-hand side. 

21 And that was done in ten-eight. To give you 

22 the dimensions generated from it, you can see 

23 some numbers along the side of the tunnel 

24 where people reentered. The first number is 

25 304. That means it’s 304 feet from the 
26

1 portal. 

2 And as you go in further here, this is 

3 the 980-foot level. And then the Rainier is 

4 roughly at the 1,400 where the drift goes into 

5 the Rainier tunnel it’s 1,438 feet into the 

6 tunnel. This is in feet. Now Tamalpais and 

7 the next one was expended in 10/29/1958. And 

8 this was Evans right in here, down this 

9 particular drift. So the first series fired 

10 to the moratorium that occurred in 1958 was 

11 Rainier, Tamalpais and Evans, which were also 

12 the names of some of the mountains in 

13 California. 

14 Now there’s also the other shots that 

15 I’m going to be focusing in on the discussion 

16 is the Cheena* event, which is down this 

17 particular drift. When we follow this it’s 

18 the 1,900-foot level. This is the 2,300-foot 

19 level, 2,344, and the working point is right 

20 here about 1,000 feet in, almost 960 feet in 

21 from this particular entry point was the 

22 Cheena. And that was executed in 10/1961. 

23 And then this particular one was 

24 Feather, going around the corner here at the 

25 3,500-foot level. And that was in 12/22/1961. 
27

1 And this is the last one here is Yuba. It was 

2 done here in that particular tunnel, and that 

3 was 1963. You see there’s a period of 

4 timeframe between ’62 and ’63 and we’re taking 

5 a lot of air samples right at that time 

6 because after those particular two events the 

7 releases of fission products and debris came 

8 down the tunnel and they radiologically 

9 cleaned it up. They took a considerable 

10 amount of air samples in for people to go back 

11 into to put the experiments in Yuba in 1963. 

12 This is Feather, Cheena and Yuba are names of 

13 rivers in California. And I think the last 

14 working group someone had asked me how did 

15 they get these names for these events. Well, 

16 these are Livermore shots, and being Livermore 

17 and being California, the test director has an 

18 option to name whatever he wants. And so 

19 they’re names of mountains and rivers of 

20 California. 

21 DR. ROESSLER: Now every time they went to 

22 one of those farther points, they always have 

23 to come in at that one entry point? 

24 MR. CHEW: Yes, they did. Yes, they did. 

25 That was the entry point. 
28

1 I think I just want to give you a feel 

2 for it. We’re talking about from the entry 

3 point all the way to the working point. 

4 That’s another term that we used in the test 

5 program called the working point, and that’s 

6 where the device or the gadget that we call it 

7 is assembled and put together for the 

8 execution itself. 

9 Then there’s a lot of considerable 

10 amount of activity prior to the event. 

11 There’s sandbagging and grouting was put in to 

12 ensure that things did not leave the tunnel 

13 itself. However, there are experiments here. 

14 One of the most important part of the 

15 experiments is called reaction history. 

16 Reaction history is what happened through the 

17 event. What were the yields here? 

18 The best way to look at the yields, 

19 what gathers from the fission products here 

20 and tracers that were put in, and give a 

21 diagnostic tool. And those particular way to 

22 do it was actually insert a small tube right 

23 from the working point and into a vacuum 

24 chamber and then they go back out to recover 

25 those particular samples whether they’re gas 
29

1 samples or particulate samples, take them back 

2 to the laboratories for analysis similar to 

3 core sampling, but that’s how they did that. 

4 Later on they also did core sampling, 

5 too, when they came in from the top of the 

6 mesa and drilled down. So those are many 

7 opportunities to release activity into a 

8 tunnel. I hope I’m giving you some feeling 

9 for what that tunnel looks like here. 

10 My personal experience, I was part of 

11 the reentry team, part of the Livermore 

12 technical group to come back in to look at 

13 developing diagnostic sampling, was involved 

14 with the tracers and things like this we put 

15 in there. And I made some of the initial 

16 reentries into Feather, and I learned a lot. 

And that’s in December 22nd 17 , 1961. 

18 MR. PRESLEY: Mel, I’m sorry. Do you want 

19 to say how big in diameter the central shafts 

20 were versus -- that way you’ll give them some 

21 idea of how big these things were. 

22 MR. CHEW: The tunnels were approximately 

23 about, look a little less than the width of 

24 this particular room and about equally to 

25 high, and maybe a little higher, were 
30

1 ventilation ducts. The side drifts became 

2 smaller and smaller depending on how big the 

3 experiments were and how big the recovery 

4 operations would be. But then the actual 

5 location where the working point is, is a room 

6 about the size of, a little bit larger than 

7 the restroom, say the bathroom. 

8 We would bring in the parts that were 

9 actually assembled the device in place and 

10 putting all the arming and equipment and 

11 things like this. There was obviously quite a 

12 bit of extensive amount of technical work that 

13 has to do to making sure the experiments are 

14 going to be conducted properly to look at the 

15 signals they were looking for. 

16 DR. MAURO: The air supply and the exhaust. 

17 MR. CHEW: Yes, I’m going to talk about 

18 that. Thank you, John. 

19 There are some, in the main drifts 

20 there are three places of ventilation systems 

21 here. And then the air is sucked in from the, 

22 pulled back from the working point and 

23 exhausted right at the portal like in a stack. 

24 So you can almost think of the tunnel as like 

25 a small glovebox or a big glovebox; however 
31

1 you want to think about it. 

2 And so as they go back in further and 

3 further, additional ventilation ducts are in, 

4 attaching onto the main ventilation ducts that 

5 are pre-installed. I’d like to also point out 

6 for John, radiological monitoring for both air 

7 sampling and looking at the radiation gamma 

8 detectors are placed along the RAMs units, 

9 Remote Area Monitoring unit here. 

10 But the ventilation is a very key 

11 point because that’s when the initial reentry 

12 goes back in, the tunnel superintendent is 

13 responsible, the tunnel safety, is 

14 responsible, number one, to making sure carbon 

15 dioxide, carbon monoxide, explosive mixtures, 

16 breathable air and the ventilation duct is 

17 properly, because that’s how the exhaust 

18 issues. 

19 DR. MAURO: So there is some kind of stack 

20 at the entrance. 

21 MR. CHEW: Yes, right here. 

22 DR. MAURO: And there’s a fan blowing out. 

23 MR. CHEW: Yes, it’s blowing straight up. 

24 DR. MAURO: Straight up. And ducts feeding 

25 into that fan. And now the exhaust fan itself 
32

1 is there at the exit point. 

2 MR. CHEW: Yes, the fans are up, sitting -- 

3 and actually, if you look at the portal -- I 

4 think some of you people went up and looked at 

5 the portal -- 

6 MR. PRESLEY: They’ve seen -- 

7 MR. CHEW: You see that the exhaust ductwork 

8 and the blowers are right up on top of the 

9 portal. 

10 DR. MAURO: And that’s monitored? 

11 MR. CHEW: Yes, they are with the HEPA 

12 filters and the monitor had charcoal filters. 

13 DR. MAURO: Pre- and post-HEPA? 

14 MR. CHEW: Pre- and post-HEPA, yes, sir. 

15 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Mel, this is 

16 Billy Smith. 

17 MR. CHEW: Hi, Billy. 

18 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Bill Frangas just 

19 walked in. He may be able to shed some light 

20 on how that ventilation system works. 

21 MR. CHEW: Did he hear John’s question by 

22 any chance, Billy? 

23 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Yes, he did. 

24 MR. CHEW: Bill, would you have anything -- 

25 let me introduce you to the working group, 
33

1 Bill Frangas. He was the mining 

2 superintendent. Bill has been at the test 

3 site, Bill maybe can tell a little bit about 

4 your own history there when you started at the 

5 test site. But I appreciate Bill coming and 

6 having to be on this call. He’s also a very 

7 close friend of Cliff Penwell and will be 

8 attending his services. 

9 Bill? 

10 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): What is it that 

11 you don’t understand about the ventilation 

12 system? 

13 MR. CHEW: John, do you want -- 

14 DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I just 

15 asked a question. I wanted to know where the 

16 exhaust point was and where the fans were 

17 discharging the air to the atmosphere that was 

18 drawing down the negative pressure inside to 

19 keep the air moving. And whether or not at 

20 that location there were air samples being 

21 collected prior to the HEPA filter and perhaps 

22 charcoal filter because I know iodine, of 

23 course, is of concern. 

24 And whether or not there was another -

25 - and I’m mainly concerned with prior to 
34

1 because there would be a good integrator of 

2 what the airborne activity is leaving the 

3 drift. And of course, after the HEPA and/or 

4 charcoal filter what would actually be 

5 discharged to the atmosphere. So that was the 

6 reason for my question. 

7 The way I look at it that’s a very 

8 convenient place to gather data that would 

9 provide you with insight into the integrated, 

10 in other words, you’re at a point now where 

11 all the air collected from the entire place is 

12 discharged. So it’s a good starting point to 

13 get a sense of the magnitude of the airborne 

14 activity particulate. I assume it was a 

15 filter -- 

16 MR. CHEW: It was a filter probably in the 

17 sampler. 

18 DR. MAURO: The sample, perhaps silicon gel 

19 for tritium, perhaps charcoal for iodine. I’m 

20 not quite sure if it’s segregated into those 

21 compartments which they, of course, did more 

22 recently, because that would be a very nice 

23 distribution capturing the three main 

24 elements: particles, tritium and iodine. 

25 MR. CHEW: John, I think I want to make 
35

1 sure. We’re focusing today about what happens 

2 when the people went back in and the 

3 atmosphere and not necessarily the effluent 

4 monitor for later. That could be another 

5 discussion. 

6 DR. MAURO: No, I am interested in the 

7 effluent, but I’m also interested if it’s 

8 upstream from the HEPA and charcoal filters, 

9 what you’ve really got is a really nice sample 

10 of what is moving through the air and on its 

11 way out. So that would be a good spot to get 

12 an idea of what we’re dealing with. 

13 MR. CHEW: When they first turn the 

14 ventilation on, people are usually not in the 

15 tunnels unless they were focusing on exposure. 

16 They don’t represent when people are there. 

17 DR. MAURO: Okay. 

18 MR. CHEW: Bill, did you want to clarify 

19 anything I said here? Do you have any points? 

20 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): In large 

21 commercial tunnel-driving operations, 

22 traditionally they blew the air in. They’ve 

23 got it on positive. And then the air is 

24 sucked in from the outside, and it blows into 

25 the heading. Now, in our operations we went 
36

1 into to reverse. In other words we tried to 

2 put the bad air in the pipe and exhaust it 

3 out. You still following me? 

4 DR. MAURO: Yes. 

5 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): Initially, the 

6 tunnels were short. The ventilation was 

7 sometimes marginal, and it took awhile to get 

8 enough equipment and enough air and so on. 

9 Now, in terms of the HEPA filters and whatnot, 

10 I never did, I just don’t recall when they 

11 were start being used. 

12 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): John, this is 

13 Billy. One of the things that, you know, 

14 listening at your question, one of the things 

15 that I think you need to understand is that 

16 the air that was in the tunnel that people 

17 were working in was actually being sucked out 

18 of the tunnel from the end of the vent line 

19 inside the tunnel and pulled out of the tunnel 

20 and passed through HEPA filter systems. 

21 So your questions about sampling at 

22 that point to give you an indication of what 

23 the air is, is probably, would give you a very 

24 high value because all of the HEPA filters and 

25 the charcoal filters would have been, 
37

1 concentrate the materials that are being 

2 pulled down the vent lines. People are 

3 actually breathing air, fresh air, that’s 

4 being sucked in from the tunnel portal as the 

5 air is being pulled out from the rear end of 

6 the tunnel. 

7 Is that clear, John? 

8 DR. MAURO: Yeah, so what you’re saying is 

9 that the concentration of radionuclides in the 

10 air in the tunnel is going to vary as a 

11 function of how, where you are in the tunnel. 

12 The only reason I brought it up is that I saw 

13 that as if that’s your last point before 

14 discharge upstream of the filtration, and 

15 you’re grabbing air samples, what you’ve just 

16 done is say, okay, here’s the number of curies 

17 per second or millicuries or whatever -- 

18 MR. RICH: This is Bryce Rich. They did 

19 take ventilation samples, ventilation 

20 discharge samples, and did effluent 

21 evaluation, you know, discharge to the 

22 environment by the scrubbers as you indicate. 

23 DR. MAURO: I understand that, but, please, 

24 I’m trying to build a little picture in my 

25 mind, and if there were -- typically, you take 
38

1 your samples downstream of the filter because 

2 you’re concerned about what you discharge into 

3 the atmosphere. I mean, that’s standard. But 

4 I don’t know if they always take samples 

5 upstream, especially since you’d like to get a 

6 handle on what is, in fact, in the air prior 

7 to it hitting the HEPA filter because that’s 

8 the air that’s in the tunnel. 

9 MR. RICH: They did have samples on both 

10 sides. 

11 DR. MAURO: Okay, that’s all I was asking. 

12 MR. CHEW: And, John, I think we’ll make 

13 sure that we’re focusing on today, you know, 

14 the discussion is this is the initial 

15 reentries we’re talking about. And then we’re 

16 trying to concentrate on what the air 

17 concentration would be after the initial 

18 recovery. But I wanted just to walk you 

19 through a timeframe here. That’s good, John, 

20 good question. 

21 MR. CLAWSON: While we’re talking about this 

22 -- this is Brad. When they take and after 

23 they set the shot off, do they start the 

24 ventilation up after that or do they make an 

25 initial manned entry into there to be able to 
39

1 review what they’ve got back there before they 

2 turn that on? 

3 MR. RICH: They install in the tunnel remote 

4 monitors to determine, you know, both the gas 

5 mixtures and radiological gases and rams. 

6 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): Well, I think 

7 in order to make sense on this discussion, 

8 we’ve got to get ourselves a time. In 1958 

9 people like myself that came out of, I came 

10 out of the copper mines and that was the, in 

11 the copper mines we just believed in putting 

12 the air on suction and putting the, suck the 

13 good air in and put the bad air in a pipe. 

14 In 1958 the laboratory is underground 

15 for the first time. You know, Rainier was 

16 shot in 1957, in September of ’57, and then 

17 the big effort to get off of Tamalpais and 

18 Evans that took place because of the 

19 Eisenhower moratoriums coming up on Halloween 

on October 31st 20 of ’57, so in terms of the 

21 coordination of the laboratory and the 

22 contractor and the air movements and whatnot 

23 was pretty primitive. 

24 As time went on and the tunnels became 

25 bigger and the equipment and ventilation and 
40

1 whatnot became adequate, there were 

2 significant changes made. So in, I think in 

3 the fall of 1958 the coordination between 

4 laboratory and the so-called users, 

5 experimenters and the contractors, we were all 

6 getting acquainted with one another. 

7 And I would judge that much of the 

8 efforts that took place there were 

9 misunderstood by both parties. It took awhile 

10 for us to ^ what the laboratory wanted, and 

11 the laboratory had a certain amount of 

12 arrogance as to getting their experiments 

13 done. I’m just giving you kind of a 

14 historical point. 

15 Now after the reentry was made in 

16 Tamalpais, and the explosion took place, one 

17 day after that the entire systems was no 

18 longer free-wheeling. And at that time 

19 procedures and everything was tightened down, 

20 and the entire system then became a totally, 

21 completely controlled effort. So you still 

22 are following me. 

23 MR. CHEW: Thank you, Bill. 

24 MR. CLAWSON: My question was I’m trying to 

25 picture in my mind, we’re getting ready to be 
41

1 able to do a shot and so forth like that. We 

2 go back there. I presume we’d shut down the 

3 ventilation system. We’d get everything all 

4 set up for that. Then we’d do the blast. And 

5 the initial reentry, it seems like to me that 

6 before they’d turn the ventilation or anything 

7 on, they’d make the initial reentry to see 

8 what they’ve got. Or would they turn that on 

9 before or -- because, you know, you could 

10 damage an awful lot of stuff. 

11 MR. CHEW: Well, one of the things is that 

12 there could be an explosive mixture in there. 

13 If you turn that -- I think that’s where 

14 you’re going with that. 

15 MR. CLAWSON: Right. 

16 MR. CHEW: And if you turn the ventilation 

17 on, you’re going to go boom possibly. 

18 MR. CLAWSON: Right. 

19 MR. CHEW: Bill, I don’t remember. Can you 

20 maybe recall, the question is that right after 

21 the event and the initial reentry team to go 

22 in to survey the condition of the tunnel, were 

23 the ventilation systems turned on prior to 

24 them going in or shortly thereafter when they 

25 assessed that there will not be any damage 
42

1 that may occur if the ventilation was turned 

2 on. I think that’s the question. 

3 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I’m just trying to 

4 picture how they’d -- 

5 MR. CHEW: Do you recall that? 

6 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): In 1958 terms, 

7 all of the above. 

8 MR. CHEW: How about in the ‘60s here? 

9 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): By the ‘60s the 

10 system was pretty well sophisticated. 

11 MR. CHEW: And is it safe to say the 

12 ventilation systems were turned on immediately 

13 after the event so to ventilate the initial 

14 reentry team can go in safely? 

15 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): Yes. As a case 

16 in point, Tamalpais was shot -- I don’t 

17 remember, October 9, 10, something like that 

18 in ’58. 

19 MR. CHEW: Yes, October. 

20 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): There were some 

21 monitoring devices outside the portal. And if 

22 I recall right, there were some notions that 

23 the airborne contaminants were up in the 

24 10,000 R range. And so for people like myself 

25 who’d been on the Test Site at that time about 
43

1 three months and just getting acquainted with 

2 this business of, you know, that indicated to 

3 me that that tunnel was through. It was out 

4 of the picture. And we still had another shot 

5 called Evans to follow that. 

6 After the event was executed, and I 

7 heard those numbers, I went home because I’d 

8 been on that job 24/7 for weeks on end. There 

9 were some times that I didn’t get, I was in 

10 that tunnel almost 24 hours, and the only time 

11 I got some sleep is when I slept on my desk 

12 out at the portal. They was hell bent to get 

13 these shots off before that moratorium kicked 

14 in. Well, we execute the shot. We wind up 

15 with those airborne contaminants up in that 

16 high range, so I go home. 

17 The afternoon, the following afternoon 

18 the day after the shot, I get a call and says 

19 hustle on back, we want to make a reentry. So 

20 I hustled on back. At that time the levels 

21 were down in the 400 MR range which was 

22 permissible for reentry. Prior to my coming 

23 there, there are some people, and there was no 

24 one totally in charge of the entire operation. 

25 If I recall correctly, some of the 
44

1 Livermore people went into the tunnel a few 

2 feet. They took some measurements. Some of 

3 my guys were being rounded up. And the point 

4 I’m making there was not a formal process for 

5 reentry. A lot of anxiety, you know, like, 

6 well, we’ve got to get in there and see what’s 

7 happening. And then, of course, on that 

8 afternoon is where that infamous hydrogen 

9 explosion took place. 

10 Following that experiment both the 

11 laboratories and the contractor sat down and 

12 put together and said there will never again 

13 be a reentry that is not totally identified, 

14 totally controlled under the command of one 

15 person. There’s an old saying in my business 

16 that when there’s more than one guy in charge, 

17 in reality, nobody’s in charge. And so those 

18 were the learning curves, those were the 

19 points we put on the curve. And from then on, 

20 you know, following Tamalpais, from then on 

21 there never was again a reentry that wasn’t 

22 under total control. 

23 Now in terms of when did you turn the 

24 ventilation on and off and et cetera, 

25 conditions and readings from monitors inside 
45

1 and outside and judgments were made on actual 

2 conditions. But they were under the purview 

3 and under the control of knowledgeable people 

4 at all times after that first situation. 

5 MR. CHEW: Thank you, Bill. 

6 MR. ROLFES: This is Mark Rolfes from NIOSH, 

and I do have a procedure from November 9th 7 , 

8 1961. It’s titled “The Lawrence Radiation 

9 Laboratory General Reentry Procedure for 

10 Underground Nuclear Events” and does describe 

11 a little bit about the summary of reentry 

12 operations. And I just wanted to point out 

13 that some of the initial steps, it indicates 

14 remote reading radiation monitors including 

15 one at the ventilation stack, TV coverage of 

16 the tunnel portal and shaft collar, survey 

17 with geophones, with direct reading recorders, 

18 tunnel condition indicators and communications 

19 with photo and sample aircraft in the area. 

20 It goes on to say that ventilation 

21 into the tunnel or shaft complex will be 

22 started at the earliest possible time. Tunnel 

23 reentry will not be made until the vent lines 

24 are monitored for gas and it is determined by 

25 the test group director that it is safe to 
46

1 start actual tunnel or shaft reentry. I 

2 believe I provided this previous and put it on 

3 the O drive for people’s review. I can also 

4 send it again if everyone would like, but it 

5 does have additional details regarding the 

6 actual procedures for the reentry. 

7 MR. CHEW: But I think that’s pretty general 

8 to answer your question. I mean, they looked 

9 at the conditions here before they took a risk 

10 of turning the ventilation on. I think that’s 

11 important. 

12 MR. CLAWSON: Well, and also a lot of times 

13 I’m sure that when these blasts went off, you 

14 did lose some of your instrumentation. So 

15 that’s what I was trying to figure out was, is 

16 how because I read what you were saying there, 

17 and I was wondering how they got that 

18 information. 

19 MR. CHEW: I think I lost one of mine, and 

20 somebody said, well, you go get mine. 

21 MR. CLAWSON: I looked at some of your 

22 photos, and it looked like they were 

23 restringing instrumentation wires. 

24 MR. CHEW: That’s communication wire. 

25 Bryce, do you want to make a comment 
47

1 on that? 

2 MR. RICH: You need to understand that as 

3 Bill has indicated, after the first learning 

4 curve, it was always under the, these events 

5 were always under the command of a test group 

6 director, and the equipment laboratory 

7 appointed a test group director who was 

8 responsible for reentry and the safety of 

9 people associated, using the Site’s 

10 contractor, REECO, the tunnel people, the 

11 people that really had expertise. And he 

12 reported directly to the DOE test manager. 

13 And so there was that chain of command. After 

14 the recovery, which could have gone on for 

15 months, then it was passed back to the tunnel 

16 superintendent for control. 

17 DR. ROESSLER: Bryce, can you give us a date 

18 -- or maybe Bill can -- at what point did this 

19 control and all the changes take place? 

20 MR. RICH: It depended upon the event. 

21 MR. CHEW: Oh, you mean when they 

22 transferred from the test director to the 

23 tunnel entry -- 

24 DR. ROESSLER: At what point did things 

25 become under much better control and -- 
48

1 MR. RICH: Oh, you mean in the history. 

2 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): There’s a 

3 simple answer for that. The day after 

4 Tamalpais. 

5 DR. ROESSLER: And give me the date on that. 

6 MR. CHEW: That’s 10/8/1958. But then we 

7 went to the moratorium, and then things got, 

8 when resumption of the testing was under this 

9 procedure, it was dated November 1961. ^ was 

10 December of ’61. 

11 DR. ROESSLER: I think it’s important to 

12 have dates associated with the information 

13 that we’re receiving. 

14 MR. CHEW: I’d like to, there’s a picture, 

15 you saw the people there wearing a pack. And 

16 that’s called a McKay Pack. I think in this 

17 room I think Bryce and I are the two ones who 

18 were certified to wear a McKay Pack. We had 

19 to go through a considerable amount of 

20 training. This is a re-breather that allows 

21 you to go in to breathe for two hours, 

22 different than the scuba gear for 20, 30 

23 minutes. 

24 And what they did is they took your 

25 carbon dioxide that you breathe out and 
49

1 basically pass it through some calcium 

2 hydroxide. And it takes out the CO2 and then 

3 gives us about another ten or 15 percent of 

4 oxygen. So we carry this bottle. When the 

5 carbon dioxide actually got into the calcium 

6 hydroxide, it got hot, but I always remember 

7 seeing Bryce for the first time because he was 

8 getting certified for his McKay, and he was 

9 playing baseball. They set them up to play 

10 baseball wearing a McKay Pack. 

11 MR. RICH: And the sweat was right up to 

12 there on my mask. 

13 MR. CHEW: This is all mine safety equipment 

14 you all know. Our certification only lasted 

15 for a year, so we had to get re-certified. 

16 MR. CLAWSON: Are you still certified? 

17 MR. CHEW: No, I think there’s an age limit. 

18 I think you have to be young. 

19 Let me continue here because I want to 

20 focus in on what the data shows. If you can 

21 follow with me here, we’re going to talk about 

22 the air activity where it was migrated and 

23 controlled at the tunnels through pre24 installed ventilation as we talked about. 

25 Generally, a minimum of 2/10,000 CFM positive 
50

1 pressure blowers were used in the base flow 

2 driving ventilation. 

3 Post-shot venting of gases, 

4 radioactive, toxic and explosive, probably the 

5 latter two were more important as you can now 

6 imagine here, through charcoal filters and 

7 HEPA filters were performed at these shots as 

8 needed, generally, just prior to reentry or in 

9 unusual seepage problems that developed here. 

10 The remote radiation, toxic, explosive gas 

11 monitoring devices in the test strip in 

12 several locations by which conditions in the 

13 tunnel can be determined remotely following 

14 the tests and prior to personnel reentry 

15 activity. 

16 Initial reentry teams consist of 

17 Health and Safety personnel to address the 

18 radiological and toxic conditions here, Mine 

19 Safety personnel to address tunnel integrity 

20 and safety in addition to other experimental 

21 technical personnel as needed here. We were 

22 very anxious to get back and get our 

23 experiments obviously, but they held us back. 

24 The protection of workers during 

25 reentry into the test chamber and other known 
51

1 suspected high-level condition including full 

2 protective gear, respiratory protection as 

3 I’ve shown you with air re-breathing equipment 

4 here for high-level workers. These protective 

5 measurements were applied preventively, and 

6 protection measures were used in situations 

7 where you’re going to anticipate potential 

8 significant levels of air activity as 

9 evidenced from the known surface 

10 contamination. 

11 But if you went back in a monitor, I 

12 mean, your instruments told you a lot. And 

13 the people were very, very experienced. They 

14 could put it on the ground ^ taking air 

15 samples you can tell a lot. If you take an 

16 air sample and put an instrument right away, 

17 and then based on some of the counts, you can 

18 get a kind of a gross feeling where you are. 

19 You also know by just, you walk into a highly 

20 contaminated, you got contaminated. I mean, 

21 your survey showed that. 

22 And so there was a lot of indicators 

23 other than just the air sampling. And that’s 

24 a kind of important note. When do you 

25 actually end up relaxing those conditions here 
52

1 and when the air samplings are representative. 

2 The group that we’re talking about was the 

3 group who went in without bioassay. 

4 DR. MAURO: It sounds as if though one of 

5 the action levels was your millirem per hour 

6 reading as being a primary indicator of it’s 

7 time to leave -- 

8 MR. CHEW: Sure. 

9 DR. MAURO: -- as opposed to, let’s say, 

10 some gross alpha character or air sample. 

11 That would be your first trigger. 

12 MR. CHEW: They did both. As a matter of 

13 fact, the picture I showed you with the person 

14 kneeling down, that’s a Pack 3G, and it looks 

15 for alphas. It’s a depth-proportional 

16 detector. 

17 MR. RICH: Brad raised the question about 

18 the remote monitors that were fed through the 

19 gas stevedore and the overburden they called 

20 it. And they monitored several of those 

21 remote monitors, both for ^ and for radiation 

22 levels, and the results on the remote monitor. 

23 They lost one or two ^ so they didn’t lose 

24 those monitors so they knew ahead of time the 

25 conditions in those tunnels. And then the 
53

1 ventilator -- 

2 DR. BRANCHE: Excuse me. There’s a 

3 participant by phone, you will need to mute 

4 your phone. I’m sure it’s disturbing the 

5 other people online. Thank you. 

6 MR. RICH: -- and then they could watch the 

7 decrease and how effective the ventilation was 

8 before. An entry team went to the gas-sealed 

9 door and opened up doors and then this was a 

10 manned reentry to look at the condition of the 

11 tunnel as well as the radiological conditions 

12 after they went into the tunnel. But as Bill 

13 said, they had an experiment situation where 

14 an explosive mixture went off in the tunnel so 

15 they were extraordinarily careful after that. 

16 MR. CHEW: Thanks, Bryce. 

17 I think you can follow along with me 

18 in the written text. I’m going to scroll down 

19 about two or three bullets because some of 

20 those particular points that are on those were 

21 discussed already. And I’m going to go down 

22 to the area where it says a suspect or known 

23 highly contaminated areas were reentered when 

24 the first task was to check and be sure that 

25 the vent lines were intact and functioning and 
54

1 install new vent lines at the head of the work 

2 and newly-opened test chambers contaminated ^. 

3 Example, sometimes you ^ activity 

4 where some of the experiments getting to that 

5 particular entry point -- but remember, this 

6 is kind of convoluted, the particular drifts 

7 in here -- that they were so highly 

8 contaminated that you’d have to make a side 

9 trip. So they had to kind of bring in people 

10 to dig a new drift to access one of the other 

11 drifts that you put the experiments in. You 

12 couldn’t possibly go in because of the 

13 contamination directly into the one that you 

14 had put your experiment in. So we kind of 

15 relied on that ourselves. 

16 MR. CLAWSON: This is Brad. Would they take 

17 and seal off that tunnel? 

18 MR. CHEW: Yes, they did. They sealed it 

19 off. 

20 MR. CLAWSON: After the tunnel and come 

21 around from another direction. 

22 MR. CHEW: There was a lot of that. 

23 MR. RICH: That’s why the recoveries took 

24 weeks and months sometimes. 

25 MR. ROLLINS: And, Mel, that picture that 
55

1 you showed us with all the holes in the wall, 

2 was that a clean drift trying to recover 

3 experiments from a sealed tunnel? Was that 

4 the activity that was going on there? 

5 MR. CHEW: Where the person was? That’s 

6 additional holes that they had pre-drilled 

7 there, and I think the monitor was just really 

8 checking the condition of that one. I don’t 

9 know specifically what the shot there was, 

10 Gene, but they were just looking for, I wanted 

11 to show the picture that they look in every 

12 one of the holes because that’s where the 

13 seepage will occur. 

14 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Mel, this is 

15 Billy. That picture that you’re talking about 

16 where the guy, all those holes are drilled 

17 into the face, they’re getting ready to shoot 

18 some rounds. They’re actually doing mining 

19 there. Those holes are drilled, and then they 

20 pack those with explosive charges and they 

21 move out and blow that up, and then they come 

22 and muck that stuff out of there and put it on 

23 train cars and get it out and continue on 

24 forward. 

25 So what he’s surveying is to make sure 
56

1 that during that, you know, going in and then 

2 cross-cutting, they aren’t going into any 

3 contamination that they don’t know about. So 

4 he’s monitoring the face or the cuttings that 

5 came out of those holes before they put 

6 charges in them. 

7 MR. CHEW: These are emplacement holes for 

8 charges. I think that’s what you were asking. 

9 MR. CLAWSON: They’re tunneling on and 

10 making sure they haven’t drilled ^, and also 

11 shows on the front of this. 

12 MR. CHEW: The document and detail project 

13 event reports contaminated tunnels were 

14 immediately sprayed or washed down with water 

15 to settle the dust and create a wet surface 

16 and to obviously lessen resuspension. Water 

17 glass or a heavy oil spray was applied to a 

18 more permanent fixture of measurable 

19 contaminants. 

20 I think, Bill, I forgot to ask you. I 

21 don’t remember the water glass. What was the 

22 constituent of water glass? Do you recall 

23 that? I think I’m catching you off guard 

24 here. What was water glass made out of? 

25 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): That’s been a 
57

1 long time ago. 

2 MR. CHEW: Obviously when they would spray 

3 this down it kind of held things in. I just 

4 did not recall what the material, that was 

5 what you folks did to help us in the tunnels 

6 here. Okay, let me move on. 

7 Heavy oil -- 

8 MR. PRESLEY: Mel, excuse me just a minute. 

9 MR. FRANGAS (by Telephone): Just to get a 

10 perspective here. Once an event was executed, 

11 all the major effort was to make the initial 

12 reentry, turn on the ventilation, determine 

13 where the contaminants are, if any, what 

14 protection has to be taken place. And that 

15 generally took a day or two. 

16 And then once all of that was 

17 established, when the inspection team went in 

18 wearing the McKays, which were a four-hour 

19 breathing apparatus, determined -- you know, 

20 there were a lot of other things besides 

21 contaminants. Had to make sure that there 

22 wasn’t any loose rock in the back. The back 

23 is called the ceiling of the tunnel. And 

24 after all of that had been taken care of, then 

25 the complexion of the reentry changed to 
58

1 letting the so-called users get back to their 

2 experiments. 

3 And a lot of those experiments were 

4 time sensitive and so you had to get them as 

5 soon as you could. So the point I’m making 

6 here is that although reentries generally have 

7 a lot of similarities, no two of them were 

8 ever totally alike. And those penetrations 

9 back into the tunnel had to be judged by the 

10 actual conditions as we knew them. 

11 Now, as time went on we got pretty 

12 well sophisticated. We wound up with monitors 

13 inside the tunnel that were connected to the 

14 CP, the control point, and decisions could be 

15 made from the control point 30 miles away as 

16 to whether or not to turn on a particular fan 

17 or all the fans or whatever. And so this was 

18 the way that the system operated there. At 

19 the portal, portal control was maintained 110 

20 percent. 

21 MR. CHEW: Bill, thank you very much here. 

22 We’re going to have to interrupt our 

23 discussion here for a few minutes. I’m going 

24 to turn it back over to Christine because have 

25 a speaker from Senator Reid’s office. 
59

1 DR. BRANCHE: Yes, Mr. Presley and the work 

2 group. 

3 Ms. Oh, are you on the line? 

4 MS. OH: Yes, I am. 

5 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, great. Ms. Katherine Oh 

6 is the Legislative Assistant to Senator Harry 

7 Reid. And she has a letter that’s been 

8 addressed to the Board and to this work group. 

9 Ms. Oh, I’m also going to submit your 

10 letter so that it can be entered in its 

11 entirety into the record. But please go ahead 

12 and read your letter. 

13 MS. OH: Thank you for this opportunity. 

14 Dear Dr. Ziemer, Dr. Branche, and 

15 Members of the Advisory Board: I write to 

16 express my strong support for Petition SEC17 00084 to include Nevada Test Site workers 

18 employed from January 1, 1963 to September 

30th 19 , 1992 in the special exposure cohort. For 

20 the reasons explained in the petition, as well 

21 as concerns described elsewhere, I urge you to 

22 recommend giving these men and women the 

23 expedited and streamlined eligibility that is 

24 available only through SEC membership under 

25 the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 
60

1 Compensation Program Act. 

2 As a member of Congress who was 

3 involved in the passage of this law, I know 

4 firsthand that we intended for this landmark 

5 law to ensure timely, uniform and adequate 

6 compensation for our nation’s Cold War 

7 veterans who sickened on the job. While a 

8 limited number of Nevada’s claimants have 

9 received benefits under the Act, I am deeply 

10 troubled by the failure of the program to 

11 fulfill this promise for so many other 

12 deserving NTS workers. They are among the 

13 individuals covered by the petition pending 

14 before the Advisory Board’s Work Group on the 

15 Nevada Test Site. 

16 Unfortunately, these individuals now 

17 face an unreasonable and excessive burden of 

18 proof arising from the problems unique to NTS. 

19 Due to the numerous flaws in the data and 

20 methodologies used by the Department of Labor 

21 and the National Institute for Occupational 

22 Safety and Health, I continue to hear from my 

23 constituents that the eligibility hurdles and 

24 bureaucratic red tape are extremely difficult, 

25 if not impossible, to overcome. The dose 
61

1 reconstructions estimated by NIOSH are 

2 especially problematic for NTS workers as the 

3 petition explains. Although NIOSH’s 

4 evaluation of the petition is largely 

5 dismissive, I appreciate that members of the 

6 Advisory Board and its contractor Sanford, 

7 Cohen and Associates continue to pursue these 

8 serious and legitimate concerns. 

9 Among the issues that deserve your 

10 continued scrutiny are NIOSH’s unwarranted 

11 conclusions and flawed assumptions about the 

12 integrity of the external dose record, 

13 internal dose monitoring coverage, Iodine-131 

14 data, hot particles exposure, air15 concentration data, neutron doses, and 

16 resuspension of airborne materials. As 

17 numerous NTS workers have testified, it is 

18 important to keep in mind that radiation 

19 monitoring protocols often did not match up to 

20 reality. The adequacy, validity, and 

21 reliability of key parts of NIOSH’s Technical 

22 Basis Documents for NTS also remain in doubt. 

23 Not only are the NTS site profile documents 

24 still unfinished, future editions are not 

25 expected to address key shortcomings, 
62

1 including unplanned releases of radioactive 

2 materials and exposures associated with 

3 classified programs. Serious flaws in the 

4 methods themselves, not just the data used in 

5 the calculations, should give you pause as 

6 well. 

7 The Energy Employees Occupational 

8 Illness Compensation Program Act created the 

9 Special Exposure Cohort in anticipation of 

10 such weaknesses in the standard eligibility 

11 process. When the necessary information is 

12 inaccurate, incomplete or simply nonexistent, 

13 the SEC option ensures that gravely ill 

14 workers and their loved ones can still be 

15 given some measure of recognition for their 

16 sacrifices. In the case of the NTS petition 

17 pending before the Advisory Board, over 400 

18 filed claims could potentially qualify for the 

19 SEC designation. Given these high stakes, I 

20 respectfully ask you to give Nevada Test Site 

21 workers’ petition every consideration and 

22 recommend approval to the U.S. Secretary of 

23 Health and Human Services. Sincerely, Harry 

24 Reid. 

25 MR. PRESLEY: Katherine, thank you very 
63

1 much. 

2 MS. OH: Thank you. 

3 MR. CHEW: Do you want to take a break? 

4 MR. PRESLEY: That’s what I was going to 

5 say. While we’re stopped, I want to take 

6 about a ten-minute break. Be back in here 

7 please at 15 after ten. Is that all right? 

8 DR. BRANCHE: And we’ll mute the phones. 

9 (Whereupon, the working group took a break 

10 until 10:15 a.m.) 

11 DR. BRANCHE: I think we’re just about on 

12 time so can someone who’s participating by 

13 phone let me know that you can hear me? 

14 (no response) 

15 DR. BRANCHE: I know you’re probably on mute 

16 because I’ve asked you so nicely so many 

17 times, but could someone let me know that 

18 they’re participating by phone? 

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER (by Telephone): We’re 

20 here. 

21 DR. BRANCHE: Thanks so much. I appreciate 

22 it. 

23 Mr. Presley. 

24 MR. PRESLEY: Mel. 

25 MR. CHEW: Thank you very much. 
64

1 While we wait for everybody to gather 

2 back into the room, I just want to go back to 

3 the wall that showed, I described the B 

4 Tunnel. And the reason for that later on is 

5 that many of the information that I’m going to 

6 ^ on radiation activity post-shot is going to 

7 be from the B Tunnel because of the five 

8 previous shots it’s probably the 

9 representative tunnel area, John. 

10 The one Pile Driver, and the Pile 

11 Driver was a very interesting experiment and 

12 that was executed on 6/2/66 and was from U13 15A, another tunnel complex here. You can 

14 turn around and look at this one. This one 

15 was a shaft that went down from the top of the 

16 surface of the mesa down to almost about 1,400 

17 feet. So here is the shaft that they built. 

18 And the shaft was roughly, I remember it’s 

19 about five or six feet in diameter. It’s not 

20 much more than that. 

21 Then they had a skid and you can put 

22 about three people, or maybe four if you jam 

23 or squeeze everybody in on top of each other, 

24 and the skid brought us down. So we all went 

25 down in the tunnel and then going back into 
65

1 this particular, then they went down to the 

2 1,400 foot level and dug a drift. 

3 And the drift came all the way out 

4 from this particular point, and here’s what 

5 the drift looked like. Here’s coming down the 

6 excess draft, and this drift is now, we’re 

7 down at 1,500 ^, not just per portal. So 

8 there’s a couple of other little safety issues 

9 that they had to face, too. 

10 Brad, I think you can imagine making 

11 sure that people were down there. 

12 And then this experiment was called 

13 Pile Driver. These were structures that were 

14 actually built into the drifts for the 

15 experiment. And the experiment at that time 

16 was to determine how the survivability of some 

17 of our missile silos were. And that was the 

18 experiment. And so they were looking at the 

19 effects, the blast effects, from this 

20 particular shot. How it affected actual 

21 structures. We built structures there to 

22 assimilate some of our containment for our 

23 missile silos and obviously some of the 

24 information that was used at NORAD for the 

25 protection of the, that particular tunnel. I 
66

1 just want to show you the different way of 

2 actually executing the shot here. So here was 

3 the shot down here. The working point where 

4 we looked at the effects of what happened to 

5 those particular structures. Then we went 

6 back down and looked at them. 

7 MR. CLAWSON: Now that is tied into the B 

8 Tunnel ventilation system though, isn’t it? 

9 MR. CHEW: There’s another picture that 

10 shows the ventilation. This is the Gumdrop 

11 Tunnel. 

12 MR. RICH: However, a different part of the 

13 site. 

14 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, so Pile Driver was 

15 standing all by itself. 

16 MR. CHEW: Yes. 

17 MR. CLAWSON: It had its own ventilation 

18 system. 

19 MR. CHEW: Yes, it was 15A. It was a 

20 different, but I just wanted to show you a 

21 different kind of configuration where people 

22 had to go down the shaft and then go back into 

23 the drift that’s mined already 1,400 foot 

24 down. 

25 DR. MAURO: Where’s the supply air? I mean, 
67

1 I know the air’s coming out. Where’s the air 

2 coming in? 

3 MR. CHEW: They bring in ventilation ducts 

4 along the side. 

5 DR. MAURO: So there are other holes? 

6 MR. CHEW: Yeah, there are other holes here, 

7 ductwork. 

8 DR. MAURO: And they’re somehow sealed 

9 during the test and then they’re unsealed -- 

10 MR. CHEW: Yeah, with grout and things like 

11 this. And they blow air in and blow it back 

12 out this way. 

13 DR. MAURO: Is the negative pressure inside? 

14 MR. CHEW: Yes. 

15 DR. MAURO: I imagine. That makes sense. 

16 MR. RICH: Many of these shots had other 

17 vents. 

18 MR. ROLLINS: Did the muck come out of the 

19 shaft? 

20 MR. CHEW: Out of these shafts? When they 

21 went back in for ^. 

22 MR. ROLLINS: Just when they built all of 

23 these structures, I mean, how did they get the 

24 muck out? 

25 MR. CLAWSON: They have to blow out the 
68

1 shaft. 

2 MR. ROLLINS: Okay, up the shaft. 

3 MR. CHEW: This main access draft. 

4 MR. ROLLINS: They had a system that would 

5 take it up. 

6 MR. CHEW: I remember the ventilation duct 

7 because I remember there was an issue about 

8 some of the gases that part of the laboratory 

9 experiment, I guess however you want to say 

10 that, that we had to be concerned just in case 

11 it got loose inside the tunnels and people 

12 were there. I did some analysis making sure 

13 what we can do to have to make sure that 

14 people can evacuate properly. And so that 

15 also limited the amount of people under the 

16 ground when we were doing that. 

17 Okay? Let me go on. I do want to, 

18 since I have these up on the wall, and this is 

19 Gumdrop, which is 16A. This is the Gumdrop 

20 Tunnel, and this is the portal. And I brought 

21 this picture along because it showed where the 

22 RAM stations were marked off here. RAM 

23 stations here, explosimeter and the pumping 

24 station, and this is the working point for the 

25 Gumdrop event. 
69

1 And so this will show you a different 

2 tunnel diagram. So it’s not just a simple B 

3 Tunnel one. But this is the one that we 

4 mainly used quite often here. Now I’m going 

5 to concentrate on this discussion because 

6 there were five other events prior to it. The 

7 pictures and timeframe now, again, this is the 

8 timeframe line. 

9 We have shots that happened in ’58, 

10 and then we had a moratorium. And then we 

11 have two shots, Feather and Cheena that 

12 happened in 1961. Now there was a very 

13 important event, the experiment done called 

14 Yuba. And it was at this end here. The shots 

15 went along here. So this is a clean drift in 

16 here where the people have to pass by to go 

17 back into the tunnel. That’s the group of 

18 people we’re talking about. This is after -- 

19 this happened quite often. They went back and 

20 started -- these happened in ’61. Yuba didn’t 

21 happen until late ’62. So there was a time 

22 period, about quite a few months, that they 

23 were preparing the tunnel for the Yuba event. 

24 MR. RICH: The better part of a year. 

25 MR. CHEW: Yes, a better part of the year. 
70

1 Thanks, Bryce. 

2 And so, John, I think it was important 

3 that after these particular events and after 

4 the initial reentries under full protective 

5 gear, that now the miners went back in the 

6 tunnel. So you’re going to say to people that 

7 I went back into the tunnel, and there’s no 

8 question. I went back in the tunnel to help 

9 prepare the Yuba event. Well, fortunately, 

10 air compare samples were continually taken 

11 afterwards. 

12 And so I think this leads me to -- and 

13 I’m not going to go on any more of the little 

14 points that talks about the process because I 

15 think you can read along. I’d like to draw 

16 the attention immediately to the few graphs 

17 that I’m going to show here. 

18 John, I think the first one, we can 

19 talk about that. This is the air activity 

20 graph. You can go to your attachment here. 

21 MR. PRESLEY: Six N. 

22 MR. CHEW: Six N, thank you. 

23 The air activity graph. Be sure 

24 everybody stays with me because I think this 

25 is the meat of the discussion here. 
71

1 MR. ROLFES: Attachment 6LN Air Activity 

2 Graphs, PC Reference-dot-W. 

3 MR. RICH: Lognormal distributions. 

4 MR. CHEW: Well, as I said, Bryce and Billy 

5 went and collected the particular samples and 

6 you can read along. There are seven airborne 

7 and reactivity concentration datasets were 

8 developed and listed in Table 2. And we’re 

9 going to go there. And each of the datasets 

10 apparently were fit in lognormal distribution 

11 and did some analysis to show that it is 

12 lognormal, and this was put onto a 

13 spreadsheet. And then I thought we can give 

14 you the data, but I think the best way to show 

15 it is graphically. 

16 And I think the very first one you can 

17 see is going to be called NTS-12B-Airborne 

18 Alpha Activity Post-Shot Tunnel. Is everybody 

19 with me? 

20 (affirmative response) 

21 MR. CHEW: Well, we took the liberty of also 

22 putting a comparison to the DAC, and that’s 

23 using ICRP-30 as a comparison for the DAC. 

24 And if you look at alpha, and as you all know, 

25 the people who’ve been in the tunnels, even if 
72

1 you go into a regular tunnel, you’re going to 

2 take air samples, you’re going to get radon ^. 

3 And so some of these activities is going to be 

4 biased high because if they read, for 

5 instance, ^ on an alpha probe or ^ meter, and 

6 you see it’s below the DAC level and you took 

7 it immediately, you don’t need to really have 

8 to wait four or five days because ^ long life. 

9 But even then they still did that. 

10 But that gives you an immediate 

11 indication that the people who work in 

12 operational output contamination understand 

13 that. And this represents at least 500 

14 samples. Now the shot that we’re talking 

about happened in December 22nd 15 , 1961. This is 

16 many months afterwards which would be 

17 representing when people would be going in 

18 without all of the radiological radax* 

19 conditions because now the concentration, air 

20 concentration, they had in the tunnel has 

21 reached to this particular point. 

22 DR. MAURO: Well, when you say you have a 

23 DAC, I guess you’re assuming certain isotopes? 

24 MR. CHEW: Yes, this is assuming -- you read 

25 the text, John -- it’s assuming Pu-239. 
73

1 DR. MAURO: So you made your worst possible 

2 -- 

3 MR. CHEW: Make the worst possible case. 

4 Probably uranium is going to be there, too -- 

5 DR. MAURO: And you’re saying the short6 lived radon daughters, since you didn’t wait 

7 for decay -- 

8 MR. CHEW: Some did and some didn’t. We 

9 just had to make sure because -- 

10 MR. RICH: Most of them are decayed. They 

11 did, the laboratory did a long-lived analysis 

12 -- 

13 DR. MAURO: Okay, so it’s safe. 

14 MR. RICH: -- they did a midday count, a day 

15 count, and up to five-day counts. 

16 DR. MAURO: And the ones we’re looking at, 

17 these have been decayed, allowed to decay so -

18 - 

19 MR. RICH: Most have, however there were 

20 some that were I just opted to leave the first 

21 count in, so these are biased high. 

22 DR. MAURO: I think I understand now. 

23 MR. CHEW: From an operational standpoint we 

24 always had to play, when you work in plutonium 

25 facilities in a situation, you have a few 
74

1 tricks in your back pocket. You look at the 

2 alpha-beta ratio very quickly. You took a 

3 general air sample and looked at the alpha4 beta ratio, and then you go back in and you 

5 take an immediate air sample. Rather than 

6 waiting for the decay time, you go ahead and 

7 count it right away. Then you kind of know 

8 that you really have something or not. 

9 DR. MAURO: Given the time that passed, 

10 certainly what you’re saying is we’re really 

11 looking at the relatively long-lived 

12 radionuclides that are alpha emitters. And I 

13 gather from this that you’re not too concerned 

14 about tritium, certainly not concerned -- 

15 MR. CHEW: We have data here. 

16 DR. MAURO: Oh, you do. 

17 MR. CHEW: You’re ahead of me, John. 

18 DR. MAURO: So right now what we’re saying 

19 is, listen, we’ve got a pretty good handle on 

20 their possible exposures to Plutonium-239 that 

21 may have been airborne -- 

22 MR. CHEW: ^ here where we ^ out these 

23 tubes. We’re getting ready for Yuba. We’re 

24 taking these kind of air concentrations here 

25 for the people going back in. They went back 
75

1 in without respiratory, and also most likely 

2 represent the people who were not on a routine 

3 bioassay. I think that’s real key. 

4 Well, since you’re moving ahead, I 

5 think you can look at this one and make good 

6 sense out of that one here. You can go to the 

7 next slide which shows the beta activity. And 

8 if you look at it, the DAC levels were, look 

9 at it, and I think you can read what the 

10 activity we’re looking at. We’re looking at 

11 some of the ruthenium wells three, well six. 

12 Those are the shorter ones. There’s 

13 zirconium, Niobium-95, Strontium-90 and -- 

14 DR. MAURO: So you’re not assuming this is 

15 all Strontium-90. 

16 MR. CHEW: Right, we’re not. And we do 

17 chemical analysis to show only a small 

18 percentage of Strontium-90. But as you know, 

19 because you know DAC levels, and you and I 

20 have discussed this at many different 

21 locations here, John, the Strontium-90 DAC is 

22 right about in here. It’s going to be in the 

23 order of three times ten to the minus eight ^. 

24 And this is the DAC level concentration. 

25 And you can see, and what I expected 
76

1 because we’re talking about quite a few months 

2 afterwards, that the airborne beta activity 

3 representing longer-lived ^ fission products 

4 here would be at least two or three orders of 

5 magnitude below the DAC level. 

6 MR. RICH: All the DACs for strontium and 

7 zirconium and niobium and iodine are all in 

8 the queue of ^ minus ten range, or it’s a 

9 magnitude higher than the, along with alpha 

10 concern. And for that reason there were some 

11 of the beta samples they didn’t count twice. 

12 They just simply get a single count. So these 

13 samples are also biased levels. 

14 MR. ROLLINS: Gene Rollins. When we worked 

15 on, when I worked on the Savannah River TBD, 

16 environment TBD, what we learned was that 

17 ambient measurements of beta activities did 

18 not track with stack releases. What that told 

19 us was that there were a lot of constituents 

20 in that air that are not the result of the 

21 activities that are going on inside that 

22 tunnel. And if we assume that’s all 

23 strontium, that’s going to be extremely 

24 conservative in my way of thinking. But you 

25 say that we have radiochemical analysis that 
77

1 will allow us to make some judgment about how 

2 much there actually was of Strontium-90. 

3 MR. CHEW: Yes. 

4 MR. ROLLINS: Something we would probably 

5 need to look at and take advantage of. 

6 MR. CHEW: And those samples of 

7 radiochemistry was not only done by the 

8 Reynolds Electric legal folks, but also those 

9 samples were sent back to the respective labs 

10 like Livermore and Los Alamos because we were 

11 very interested technically in the data here. 

12 MR. ROLLINS: And it would be interesting to 

13 find out exactly what the constituents that 

14 were contributing to that activity actually 

15 were. 

16 MR. CHEW: And I think a very important 

17 point to show here is that, I think the key 

18 point is that even if they went after, a 

19 significant time after the shot when it’s kind 

20 of, relatively supposed to be clean and people 

21 ^, they continued to take air samples at that 

22 ^. And we have the data. 

23 MR. RICH: One other thing, in any tunnel 

24 environment obviously you’re going to get, as 

25 Mel’s indicated, radon and thoron daughters. 
78

1 Barometric pressure makes a huge difference by 

2 an order of magnitude or more. And so as a 

3 consequence this is data over a year’s period 

4 of time and those fluctuations you see are 

5 probably fundamentally and primarily 

6 barometric pressure associated, natural radon 

7 daughters. 

8 DR. MAURO: But not in this case. This is 

9 you’re not looking for radon progeny. I mean, 

10 I heard you did some radiochemistry, and you 

11 understand the mix, more or less, of what 

12 they’re dealing with here. 

13 MR. RICH: They did some additional analyses 

14 on these samples to determine if there was 

15 anything else present. That was way, way down 

16 below ^. These levels are gross beta. And by 

17 the way, the filters that they took normally 

18 are charcoal filters with a free filter. And 

19 so they did beta and alpha on the free filter 

20 and gross gamma on the charcoal filter so you 

21 see ^. 

22 MR. CHEW: Let me just go on. The next one 

23 -- you can just follow this. The next line is 

24 the tritium concentration like you asked, 

25 John. And we use obviously the most 
79

1 conservative tritium without being HTO and 

2 that’s probably true ^. So we’re probably an 

3 order of magnitude or thereabout below the DAC 

4 level. You’ve got to remember the DAC levels 

5 also represent the people in continuous 

6 exposure, and you know they didn’t go into the 

7 tunnels continuously, so you know that. 

8 DR. MAURO: My reaction is that what you’re 

9 saying here is when testing resumed in the 

10 early ‘60s, and you were getting ready to go 

11 back into these tunnels, measurements made to 

12 determine if there was some residue of 

13 airborne particulates, and certainly I’m sure, 

14 external exposure that was of such a level 

15 that we had to be concerned. 

16 So I think that, at least in this 

17 case, what you -- I mean, I read that pretty 

18 quickly. Is that clearly they had a good 

19 handle for the reentry following, years 

20 following the initial set of tests and get an 

21 understanding of what are we about to walk 

22 into. I guess when we started this I had in 

23 my head the story went more toward, okay, why 

24 do we have to do the test. There was, people 

25 went in shortly thereafter to retrieve. 
80

1 I guess I was a little bit more 

2 concerned about that part of the process. But 

3 I could see here, I didn’t even, quite 

4 frankly, I didn’t even think in terms of three 

5 year old drifts and making sure that there’s 

6 nothing there of concern. And I think there’s 

7 a good point -- 

8 MR. CHEW: Well, I think the question comes, 

9 these were the unmonitored folks. And so as a 

10 person who was a regular tunnel worker, I went 

11 back into installed new ventilation ducts. I 

12 was unmonitored, and we don’t have any record 

13 or bioassay and here are some ways that we can 

14 now assign some exposure. 

15 Let me go an, I’m going to go on to 

16 the next -- 

17 DR. MAURO: Before we leave this. Now 

18 you’ve done your, basically what was done 

19 here, the folks did their homework before they 

20 let people go back in to get ready for some 

21 new shots. During them, those activities 

22 where they were unprotected, was there ongoing 

23 -- now you’re in there disturbing. You’re 

24 drilling, I assume, you’re setting up. You’re 

25 building; you’re doing things. And now you’re 
81

1 going to create more dust. Are these samples 

2 taken while those activities were going on? 

3 MR. CHEW: The answer is definitely yes, 

4 exactly right. That’s exactly right on. It 

5 is going to do –- obviously concerns as they 

6 dig new drifts and experiment doing 

7 disturbances ^ activities. 

8 We’re going to just for comparison go 

9 to the next set of slides which is Dormis*. 

10 And Dormis, I want to focus in on these 

11 concentrations were taken shortly after the 

12 event here. And these concentrations 

13 represent different -- it’s the next slide 

14 down. And it’s U-12G Dormis here. And the 

15 reason for bringing this up here -- and 

16 thanks, Bryce -- is that we want to show you 

17 what kinds of activities were there during, 

18 immediately during recovery entry. And these 

19 people were not only protected but were also 

20 bioassayed. This represents a group that were 

21 bioassayed. Now we’ve already talked about 

22 the group that were not bioassayed, so -- 

23 MR. RICH: Let me just add one thing, Mel. 

24 During recovery all of these operations are 

25 under the directions of the Weapons Laboratory 
82

1 Testing Director. And after the recoveries 

2 were done, after the experimental drifts had 

3 been entered and all of the known high 

4 radiological jobs were done, the tunnel was 

5 sealed off and repaired and turned back over 

6 to the tunnel superintendent for future use 

7 and preparation. And so an evaluation was 

8 done before it was turned back over to them. 

9 DR. MAURO: And this data -- 

10 MR. RICH: And this gives you an idea of 

11 activities during recovery, during recovery. 

12 DR. MAURO: But this was after the radiation 

13 safety folks cleared it so to speak? 

14 MR. RICH: No, no -- 

15 DR. MAURO: This is while the -- 

16 MR. RICH: This is the initial -- 

17 DR. MAURO: This is the initial -- 

18 MULTIPLE SPEAKERS: (Indiscernable) 

19 MR. RICH: There’s a delay you hadn’t 

20 noticed here. There is a delay. 

21 MR. CHEW: Let me read you a little bit 

22 about Dormis. And, John, the point of 

23 bringing this one out is this is about the 

24 worst you’ve got. I think that’s the whole 

25 point, and I think that’s why we want to show 
83

1 that particular data, recognizing we’re 

2 focusing on the unmonitored worker, which I 

3 thought I showed you at an earlier time. 

4 DR. ROESSLER: On this data then the people 

5 were bioassayed. You have these measurements, 

6 so supposedly you could make some comparison 

7 between the bioassay and the conditions in the 

8 tunnel. 

9 MR. CHEW: Sure. We did that. 

10 DR. ROESSLER: If you were to take it to the 

11 next step. 

12 MR. CHEW: Yeah, you can. 

13 MR. RICH: Quantitatively, they didn’t get 

14 much activity detection in bioassay -- 

15 DR. ROESSLER: So you can bound something 

16 then. 

17 MR. RICH: -- except for episodic. There 

18 were events, incidents that occurred during 

19 recovery that surprised people. And then they 

20 knew about it. 

21 MR. CHEW: They were wearing this. They 

22 were taking the air concentrations, but they 

23 were wearing this. So to answer your question 

24 is a very good one. When we take the bioassay 

25 it will basically tell what the protection 
84

1 factor would be. 

2 MR. RICH: And a lot of them were covered 

3 with full-face respirators. 

4 MR. CHEW: And full-face respirators. 

5 Dormis, I’m just going to read about 

6 Dormis here. You can actually, I’ll just give 

7 you a little background. This event was 

detonated on August the 31st 8 , 1967 at 0900 

9 hours at Tunnel U-12G, Drift 7. A previous 

10 event, Red Hot, was conducted in the same 

11 tunnel complex. Stemming and containment 

12 failed on this particular resulting in damage 

13 to and to contamination of experiments here. 

14 The uncontrolled effluent was released 

15 into the atmosphere and minor levels of 

16 radioactive effluents was detected offsite. 

17 This came directly from the DNA report. The 

18 initial surveys through the portal occurred on 

19 September 1 with a maximum exposure of about 

20 an R per hour was measured. After this survey 

21 no further attempts to enter U-12G until 

September 5th 22 . They let some of the short23 lived fission products decay. 

24 Upon reentering the team encountered 

25 water on the tunnel floor inside the gas-
85

1 sealed door, and the exposure rates were as 

2 high as ten R per hour and made toxic and 

3 explosive gas mixtures and exited the tunnel 

4 after ten minutes inside the gas-sealed door. 

5 Water was pumped from inside the, 

6 water was pumped from inside the gas-sealed 

7 door within weeks following the initial 

8 reentry. Entry beyond the overburden plug 

began on October the 5th 9 . The tunnel was so 

10 damaged and wet inside that the overburden 

11 plug and the temperature exceeded 130 degrees 

12 F. It was decided to abort the reentry 

13 mission. 

14 All reentry and recovery operations 

15 became concentrated on mining through the U12-

16 G zero four drift into the 07 drift. Recovery 

17 was made through via this particular route. 

18 Some of the contact exposure, quick-exposed 

19 readings was like as much as 25 R per hour. 

20 The highest accumulated personal exposure 

21 during the 4,250 individual logged reentries 

into Dormis from August 31st to January 31st 22 , 

23 was 1,625 millirem. During this recovery 

24 operation more than 500 operational air 

25 samples were collected and processed, and this 
86

1 is what the data represents if you’re looking 

2 at Dormis. 

3 MR. RICH: But there’s an extended delay 

4 before they begin recovery so this gives you a 

5 feeling for that -- 

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Reentry ^ 

7 MR. CHEW: The Dormis was 8/31/57. The 

8 first kinds of activity we saw was in the mid9 October, about a month, about six weeks after. 

10 And I read this report to tell you what they 

11 really did here. 

12 DR. MAURO: Is that typical, a two-month 

13 delay before you entered? 

14 MR. CHEW: No, no. 

15 DR. MAURO: I didn’t think so. 

16 MR. CHEW: So some we never got back into. 

17 So you can look at the Dormis and 

18 alpha activity. I think we’re trying to say 

19 that this is the worst it could have got 

20 during the ^ and what personnel were there. 

21 You can see the DAC levels as compared to 

22 plutonium, you know, an order of magnitude or 

23 so thereabouts here, John, if you look at the 

24 data. 

25 MR. RICH: This reflects access into areas 
87

1 where there was actual bomb debris, refractory 

2 elements there. And so even with ventilation 

3 you had ambient levels and long-lived activity 

4 above DAC levels. So as a consequence, they 

5 were ^. 

6 DR. MAURO: In August the test went off. 

7 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 

8 DR. MAURO: Then some time after that test 

9 there may have been some ventilation started 

10 or there may not. 

11 MR. RICH: They did. 

12 DR. MAURO: They did. They started up some 

13 ventilation. And simultaneously, they were 

14 pulling air samples remotely. 

15 MR. RICH: And the initial reentry to the 

16 gas-sealed door and tunnel conditions of what 

17 they wanted to ^ and then they started the 

18 bypass operation. 

19 DR. MAURO: But they continued to monitor 

20 the airborne activity remotely with some kind 

21 of air sampling device? 

22 MR. RICH: Yes, anytime they went in they 

23 monitored ahead of the teams. 

24 DR. MAURO: So these dots, microcurie per 

25 centimeter cubed, these are the results of an 
88

1 air particulate sample -- 

2 MR. CHEW: Yes, sir. 

3 DR. MAURO: -- that was somehow collected 

4 from the location. How did you get it? 

5 MR. RICH: These represent activities 

6 measured in the tunnels by individual members. 

7 DR. MAURO: Oh, so people went in -- 

8 MR. RICH: Yes. 

9 DR. MAURO: -- in full gear, went in, pulled 

10 samples, and this was some brief sample, a few 

11 minutes -- 

12 MR. CHEW: They take ten cubic meters of air 

13 and things like this. 

14 DR. MAURO: Bring it back out -- 

15 MR. CHEW: As a gram sample. 

16 DR. MAURO: -- and then this case would be a 

17 gross alpha -- 

18 MR. CHEW: Yes. 

19 MR. RICH: It’s gross alpha, but these are 

20 also decayed. These are the ones where they 

21 determine long-lived activity. 

22 DR. MAURO: Got it. 

23 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

24 Arjun. I have a question about this. How do 

25 you relate the timing and location of these 
89

1 air samples with where the workers were 

2 working and what they were doing? 

3 MR. CHEW: We sample where they are working, 

4 Arjun. Remember during these -- 

5 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Were these 

6 fixed-head samplers or -- 

7 MR. CHEW: Pardon me? I’m sorry. 

8 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): They were 

9 area samplers, right? They were not lapel 

10 samplers. 

11 MR. RICH: No, they were -- 

12 MR. CHEW: They were graph samples that they 

13 were taking in that like Stay Flex air 

14 samplers. And the monitors went in with the 

15 workers that do the initial entry, and that’s 

16 what they were sampling, right where they were 

17 working. 

18 MR. RICH: They were high volume. 

19 MR. CHEW: High volume air samplers. They 

20 were pulling about a CFM 35 meters. 

21 MR. RICH: Five to 15. 

22 MR. CHEW: No, no, they were measuring about 

23 35 CFM a cubic meter. I remember. 

24 No, they were not lapel samplers, if 

25 that’s what you’re -- but remember, Arjun, 
90

1 these people are completely suited up. 

2 MR. ROLFES: And they were participating in 

3 the bioassay program as well. 

4 MR. CHEW: We just want to give you a little 

5 perspective of how, what the worst case would 

6 look like here. We can also see the beta 

7 activity in the next slide over. As you can 

8 well imagine the event was 8/31, and these 

9 samples probably represent some of the decay. 

10 And that’s why they’re way below DAC levels 

11 here as a concentration. We would expect that 

12 though, John, from the early fission products. 

13 And here’s some of the gamma 

14 concentration here which is the island. 

15 MR. RICH: The next one down is the island 

16 where you’re still close enough in that you 

17 see the volatiles and the islands. 

18 DR. MAURO: So this is a couple of months 

19 later and you’re picking up -- 

20 MR. CHEW: Six weeks. 

21 DR. MAURO: Six weeks later. 

22 MR. RICH: As you would expect. 

23 DR. MAURO: So the iodine levels shortly 

24 after were off the charts. 

25 MR. CHEW: So I think what I’d like to come 
91

1 back to what the point and the purpose was of 

2 this particular discussion was to, the 

3 question came up was what about the 

4 unmonitored workers that went back into the 

5 tunnels to help prepare the tunnels for new 

6 events here. 

7 And I want to focus back on some of 

8 the early -- well, I won’t show that again, 

9 but the samples from U12-B, which we feel are 

10 representative. And then I’m going to say 

11 just to conclude my technical presentation, 

12 I’m going to ask Gene, who is the document 

13 owner, to maybe draw some conclusions from, 

14 and I’d like to propose this to the working 

15 group. 

16 Gene. 

17 MR. ROLLINS: This data collection effort 

18 that we can thank Bryce and Billy and the 

19 presentation, we can thank Mel for that. He’s 

20 done a great job doing this. But what these 

21 data show us actually is that we now have 

22 enough information on the quality of the air 

23 in which these people typically worked. 

24 Again, we’re focusing on the people that were 

25 in the tunnel routinely that were not 
92

1 bioassayed. 

2 I think the data does show that there 

3 was some exposure there that was above what 

4 they would have gotten had they not been in 

5 that tunnel. And so the program, well, that 

6 would require us to make some effort to 

7 capture what that potential would be. 

8 But the data that we have gathered, 

9 and the quantity of the data that we gathered 

10 together, we can now assign a claimant 

11 favorable, reasonably claimant favorable, 

12 intake for these individuals. And with the 

13 amount of data that we have, we can develop 

14 the statistical analysis that will allow us to 

15 provide reasonable assurance that we’re not 

16 going to underestimate that dose to those 

17 unmonitored individuals. 

18 DR. MAURO: How does that play back on Table 

19 7.1 in the evaluation report where you make 

20 reference to these 100 workers that were 

21 polled based on ^. There’s a table in the 

22 evaluation report dealing with there were 100 

23 workers that had relatively high external 

24 exposures, and then you looked at the bioassay 

25 data. 
93

1 And that bioassay data, and some 

2 subset of that 100 did have bioassay data. 

3 And in theory it was our understanding that 

4 that represented a convenient dataset upon 

5 which to build a coworker model. How does 

6 that relate back to this? 

7 MR. ROLLINS: We haven’t had a chance to 

8 look at that yet. 

9 MR. CHEW: Well, I think we supplied that. 

10 That came from NOCTS, I think the top 100 of 

11 data. We chose the bioassay results because 

12 those people, especially a good number of them 

13 with the radiological monitors, that that 

14 particular data is to show the people who 

15 needed to be monitored. And they showed 

16 higher exposures here. This is a group that 

17 showed the people that they went back into the 

18 tunnels that’s why they were not monitored. 

19 And if they demonstrated later on that 

20 they went back and they didn’t, then they 

21 needed to be monitored because of some reentry 

22 that we can pull up in the log, not during an 

23 initial reentry, we could use this particular 

24 dataset. The top 100 probably consists of 

25 those people who actually went back in during 
94

1 the initial reentry. 

2 MR. ROLFES: This was also put together to 

3 demonstrate. Because NTS controlled doses to 

4 personnel, they controlled external doses. 

5 And there was research that was done that 

6 showed that if external doses were controlled, 

7 internal doses would not be an issue with 

8 regulatory requirements. 

9 And what we had done for the table in 

10 the evaluation report, we had identified some 

11 of the highest external exposed individuals to 

12 determine what kind of bioassay or what kind 

13 of internal exposures they were potentially 

14 subjected to. And this information is 

15 slightly different than what we’re referring 

16 to in the current presentation. 

17 In the current presentation we’re more 

18 focused on the people that didn’t participate 

19 in the bioassay program to determine what 

20 levels of radioactivity they were exposed to 

21 following the initial reentry. 

22 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

23 Arjun. I have a question. I mean, this is 

24 recently collected data. How have the dose 

25 reconstructions been done without this data so 
95

1 far? 

2 MR. ROLFES: For internal dose we have been 

3 using efficiency methods such as the Technical 

4 Information Bulletin-0002 or some various 

5 other methods that likely overestimate 

6 internal doses. We also always commit to make 

7 sure that whenever we find additional data, we 

8 want to make sure that if the data exceeds 

9 what we have previously assigned in a dose 

10 reconstruction, that we’re committed to going 

11 back and making sure that any new information 

12 wouldn’t affect a previous compensation 

13 decision or dose reconstruction. 

14 DR. MAURO: Was -0002 being used both to 

15 grant and deny? OTIB-0002. 

16 MR. ROLFES: No, it was typically for an 

17 overestimate-type case. 

18 MR. ROLLINS: And OTIB-0018 also was used in 

19 a number of cases that have already been -- 

20 DR. MAURO: That’s the MPC. Eighteen is the 

21 one where you base things on MPCs and then the 

22 adjustments were -0033? 

23 MR. ROLLINS: Right. 

24 DR. MAURO: So now what you’re saying is 

25 that was almost like a default approach until 
96

1 you had better data, and now you’re saying, 

2 well, we have the 100 cases which are a 

3 platform to build on. And you’ve got these 

4 data to supplement that. I’m just trying to 

5 think of there are 1,500 cases, as I 

6 understand, that are of implied, of concern 

7 here of those post-’62, I believe so. 

8 Out of those 1,500, which is your 

9 universe of people of concern that you’d like 

10 to be able to reconstruct internal dose, 100 

11 of them were selected based on some criteria 

12 related to external exposure that was based on 

13 the judgment that there was a relationship, 

14 that if you pick the high external, you 

15 probably picked up at least some of the high 

16 internal. 

17 MR. CHEW: We looked at the occupation, too. 

18 DR. MAURO: And the occupation, yeah, 

19 because one of the things that we’ve been 

20 planning -- we haven’t talked about this -- is 

21 that we see that there is a need for 

22 stratification. That is, there are a lot of 

23 different categories of workers that may or 

24 may not have had their own metrics, that is, 

25 tunnel workers, welders, carpenters. In other 
97

1 words categories of workers that really don’t 

2 come out of, are not represented by one 

3 distribution, but have their own distribution. 

4 And the question that we’ve been 

5 asking ourselves is, is it possible that there 

6 may be some subset of workers of the 1,500 

7 where their distribution -- let’s say, I have 

8 some subset of 300 workers that had a 

9 particular job category. All worked on a 

10 particular tunnel or test series. Has a 

11 distribution for the data that you do have 

12 that is markedly different than the 

13 distribution of the bio that you get from your 

14 100? 

15 I’m picturing how I look at things. 

16 It was pretty simple. Okay, you’ve got a 

17 single distribution of 100 workers subset that 

18 you can build some kind of coworker model 

19 around. I know you haven’t done that yet, but 

20 in theory you have the data to do that. 

21 Then I ask myself the question, okay, 

22 but if we were to go in and take those 1,500 

23 and start to sample based on some 

24 stratification, based on job description, 

25 perhaps test series, perhaps year -- I’m not 
98

1 sure yet -- and pull 20. The statistician 

2 says once you get your strata, let’s say 

3 you’ve got six or seven categories that you’re 

4 ^. The statistician says it’d be nice if we 

5 had 20 and has something to do with normal 

6 distributions and 20 would be sufficient to 

7 give you a robust geometric mean standard 

8 deviation. 

9 One of the things that we’re concerned 

10 about is if we were to do that, or if you were 

to do that, would, in fact, the upper 95th 11 

12 percentile of these other population groups, 

13 these other strata of samples, would they be 

bounded by the upper 95th 14 percentile of the 

15 100? And I guess, I’ve been thinking about 

16 this last night. This is really my thinking 

17 about this last night saying how would I try 

18 to convince myself. 

19 It’s really a weight of evidence kind 

20 of argument saying, listen, is there anything 

21 else that I would think that would be 

22 reasonable to do to convince me that the group 

23 of 100 that you picked does, in fact, do the 

24 trick. And I guess I’m communicating to you, 

25 and this, you know, everyone at the table it 
99

1 would be nice if we found out that we did some 

2 other sampling, and based on some other 

3 sampling criteria, and this would be a 

4 judgment call what those strata -- I call them 

5 strata -- would be. 

6 Whether or not the statistics that 

7 characterize the tritium intake -- I’ll just 

8 use tritium as an example -- and we start to 

9 have an understanding of what the distribution 

10 is for that group for the intake of tritium 

11 per year let’s say. How does that stack up 

against the upper 95th 12 percentile of the 

13 tritium intake for your group of 100? 

14 And then if a story emerges that 

consistently your upper 95th 15 percentile for 

16 your group of 100, the tritium intake, bounds 

or is close to or comparable to the upper 95th 17 

18 percentile for these other strata, now you’re 

19 building a lot of weight. That is because 

20 you’re coming at the problem from different 

21 directions. 

22 See, right now it’s almost as if there 

23 are some assumptions. You grab this 100 based 

24 on external dose. Not too much consideration 

25 -- maybe you did; maybe you didn’t -- to what 
100

1 tests they were involved in, what their job 

2 responsibilities were. 

3 The way I look at it, and I might be 

4 oversimplifying this, we’re going to grab 100 

5 of the highest external exposure, and I think 

6 that’s going to do it for us, and it might. 

7 But our concern, everyone on the phone and the 

8 other SC&A people, is that how else do you 

9 come at this thing, the dataset, in a way that 

10 starts to provide a high level of assurance 

11 that, yeah, we’ve got this thing in a box. 

12 So I wanted to communicate that to 

13 everyone around the table to let you know how 

14 SC&A’s thinking about this and what might need 

15 to be done. And, Arjun, I may not -- 

16 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

17 Arjun. 

18 DR. MAURO: Sure, go ahead. 

19 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): I have 

20 another question going back to Mark Rolfes’ 

21 earlier comment. One of our points in our 

22 site profile review was that TIB-0002, first 

23 of all, applies to non-tunnel workers after 

24 1971. I thought we have resolved that NIOSH 

25 was going to -- 
101

1 MR. ROLFES: Yes, Arjun -- 

2 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): -- wait a 

3 minute. We reviewed some earlier dose 

4 reconstructions in which TIB-0002 was 

5 improperly used at NTS. And I thought we’d 

6 settled this issue, but now I hear that TIB7 0002 is still in use. And we also understood 

8 that maybe TIB-0018 and TIB-0033 were not 

9 going to be used for NTS, but maybe that 

10 understanding is not correct. So I’m a little 

11 confused about how you’re doing dose 

12 reconstructions. 

13 MR. ROLFES: I’ll clarify that for you, 

14 Arjun. John Mauro had asked how we were 

15 completing dose reconstructions, and I took 

16 that to mean historically for Nevada Test 

17 Site. We had been using TIB-0002, but based 

18 on your review of the site profile, SC&A’s 

19 review of the site profile, we did indicate 

20 that we would not be using TIB-0002 any more 

21 so we decided to use TIB-0018 in lieu of TIB22 0002. 

23 There was nothing that I was aware of 

24 that would indicate that doses could have been 

25 higher at the Nevada Test Site than what we 
102

1 would be assigning in TIB-0002. It was simply 

2 a requirement to document why TIB-0002, we 

3 needed to provide justification for why TIB4 0002 might have been used in a dose 

5 reconstruction. 

6 It wasn’t an issue that doses could 

7 have been higher than TIB-0002. It was more 

8 of a requirement for us to provide the 

9 justification within an individual’s dose 

10 reconstruction as to why it was being used 

11 prior to 1971. 

12 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is not 

13 correct. I mean, the observation that we made 

14 in our review was use of TIB-0002 by the rules 

15 of TIB-0002 was prohibited, not allowed, 

16 before 1971, and not for tunnel workers at 

17 all. And so since we’re talking about tunnel 

18 workers, it would appear the use of TIB-0002 

19 was improper. Now, I’m not talking about 

20 whether justification was provided or not. 

21 And so I don’t know what is being done about 

22 those cases and what alternative methods have 

23 been used before this current data has been 

24 collected. 

25 MR. ROLFES: Well, as I indicated, we did 
103

1 say that TIB-0002 would not be used, and we 

2 would use TIB-0018 instead. 

3 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Well, what 

4 happened to all those old cases? 

5 MR. ROLFES: What’s that? 

6 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): What happened 

7 to all those old cases? 

8 MR. ROLFES: Well, TIB-0018 actually results 

9 in lower calculated internal doses than does 

10 TIB-0002. 

11 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Well, we also 

12 -- in my conversation with Kathy Behling we 

13 understood that you said at some point that 

14 TIB-0018 and TIB-0033 are not going to be used 

15 for Nevada Test Site, but maybe that 

16 understanding is incorrect. These are general 

17 procedures not oriented to the uniqueness of 

18 Nevada Test Site. But I haven’t been doing 

19 individual dose reconstruction audits, so I’m 

20 not familiar with all your worksheets and so 

21 on. But I’m quite confused about the state of 

22 dose reconstruction in the specific case of 

23 NTS and the application of these procedures 

24 without NTS-specific justification especially 

25 in light of the data that you’ve just come up 
104

1 with. 

2 MR. ROLFES: TIB-0002 calculated internal 

3 doses would likely exceed the information that 

4 we presented today. 

5 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): TIB-0002 is 

6 irrelevant. 

7 MR. ROLFES: Or TIB-0018, excuse me. 

8 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): We cannot 

9 allow it to be used. I mean, that’s the 

10 point. 

11 MR. ROLFES: Right. TIB-0002 we are no 

12 longer using. We are instead using TIB-0018, 

13 and there’s nothing that prevents us from 

14 using TIB-0018 for dose reconstructions at 

15 NTS, correct, because they are based on the 

16 maximum permissible concentrations or some 

17 fraction thereof which we have indicated in 

18 our presentation today that the air sampling 

19 indicates that much lower internal doses were 

20 observed than what we would be assigning from 

21 TIB-0018. 

22 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Have you done 

23 a comparison? 

24 MR. ROLFES: I believe that we just 

25 indicated this information in this 
105

1 presentation. 

2 DR. MAURO: Let me help out a little. We 

3 reviewed TIB-0018 and -0033, and for those not 

4 familiar with it, what it really boils down to 

5 is the concept that says, listen, starting in 

6 the ‘60s and moving on, the concept of MPCs 

7 and controlling access to areas that had 

8 elevated airborne activity, if there’s a 

9 comprehensive health physics program in place, 

10 you had control over access and egress from 

11 areas that have elevated levels of airborne 

12 radioactivity. 

13 Given that that’s the case, that is, 

14 you can trust that, yes, there was this degree 

15 of control, then one could argue that people 

16 aren’t going to be allowed to go into areas 

17 for extended periods of time where the 

18 concentrations of airborne are above the MPCs. 

19 And so therefore, what TIB-0018 does is say, 

20 okay, under worst case conditions, if we do 

21 know that a facility has a comprehensive 

22 health physics oversight controls, we can say 

23 with a degree of confidence no one’s going to 

24 go, unless there’s an accident, of course, no 

25 one’s going to go into an area where airborne 
106

1 concentrations are above the MPCs without 

2 proper respiratory protection and access and 

3 egress controls so that we always have that 

4 degree of control. 

5 MR. ROLLINS: And bioassay. 

6 DR. MAURO: And of your bioassay program. 

7 And superimposed on that, and everyone agreed 

8 that that was a good way to place a plausible 

9 upper bound given the set of conditions just 

10 described. You’ve got a well controlled 

11 oversight radiation protection program. And 

12 when we looked at that, we were looking at it 

13 more from the point of view of an engineer 

14 facility, a Hanford or a Savannah River or 

15 another facility where it was designed, built 

16 and under some kind of direct control with 

17 institutionalized, well-established designs 

18 and health physics controls. 

19 That in itself -- and then the next 

20 fear that came in and said, well, that 

21 represents, well, it’s a bounding situation. 

22 In effect what TIB-0018 does says we’re going 

23 to assume that you’re at the MPC for the worst 

24 possible radionuclide, usually Strontium-90. 

25 There’s a complicated workbook, but it really 
107

1 is off the charts. And I would agree. 

2 If you’ve got a well established 

3 radiation protection program, and you assume 

4 that there’s no transient or accident that’s 

5 going to result in some large problem where 

6 people could be exposed. You have direct 

7 control over access. I think it’s reasonable 

8 to say -- well, it’s unlikely that you’re 

9 going to be exposed to levels above an MPC. 

10 Then along comes OTIB-0033 which says, 

11 you know, that may be a little bit too 

12 conservative. Let’s tweak it. As a function 

13 of the number of parameters you could apply an 

14 adjustment factor and be at 0.5 an MPC 

15 annually, a chronic exposure of 0.5, maybe a 

16 0.1. So this construct came out that I see as 

17 -- and this is really a judgment that the 

18 Board and the work group has to make -- is 

19 that that construct almost becomes an approach 

20 that says, well, under other circumstances are 

21 we ever going to have airborne problems that 

22 we can’t reconstruct. We could always do 

23 that. 

24 In other words we could always say, 

25 well, we know for sure it’s not above the MPC, 
108

1 and we also know that as you move on in time 

2 for different facilities, we could even say we 

3 know for sure it’s not above 0.5 an MPC claim 

4 or 0.1 MPC. Now, that approach sort of 

5 bypasses the whole concern about having 

6 realistic airborne samples representative of 

7 the breathing zone and associated bioassay 

8 samples for the purpose of dose 

9 reconstruction. 

10 And I guess our concern was that is 

11 that strategy for doing dose reconstruction 

12 reasonable consistent with the letter and 

13 intent of the rule. And second, a big problem 

14 that Hans Behling brought up is that in 

15 general those samples were general air 

16 samples. And we have a ton of evidence that 

17 depending on the circumstances, the difference 

18 between general air samples and breathing zone 

19 samples, very often the breathing zone samples 

20 are a factor of ten higher easily on many 

21 occasions, not all occasions. 

22 So I guess what I’m saying is that 

23 that platform, especially as applied to an NTS 

24 situation, seems to be pretty far removed from 

25 the original intent of -0018 and -0033. And 
109

1 applying it to this setting, I guess we have a 

2 bit of concern about that applying it to this 

3 setting. But now to a degree now you have 

4 resolved some of that concern because you’re 

5 saying, well, we don’t really think we’re 

6 going to do it that way any more. 

7 What we have now is this group of 100 

8 where we have real bioassay data, and somehow 

9 that bioassay data can be used to build a new 

10 platform. And you made some comparisons 

11 apparently between that platform and the old 

12 18/33 approach and convinced yourself that -

13 0018 and -0033 were off the charts as compared 

14 to your bioassay data. So this is a story 

15 that I believe is unfolding. 

16 So what I’m hearing is, I think 

17 rightly so, moving away from what I consider 

18 to be a fundamentally questionable concept. 

19 And I’m speaking just for myself as a health 

20 physicist. The 18/33 approach as a default 

21 fix for all problems when you don’t have good 

22 air sampling or bioassay data for a particular 

23 facility. I’m sort of glad that that’s sort 

24 of, we’re moving away from that and moving 

25 into something that’s more site specific and 
110

1 data specific, let’s say in this case, NTS. 

2 So I told you that long story because 

3 I think that it’s a rich problem. I think 

4 there’s just some fundamental problems with 

5 the whole idea of using 18/33. What I’m 

6 hearing though is you -- I don’t know whether 

7 you would agree or not agree with that, and 

8 that’s fine. But I’m hearing is it’s really 

9 no longer relevant. What really is relevant 

10 now is you’re leaving that behind and moving 

11 on to a new platform upon which to build your 

12 coworker models. Is that true? 

13 MR. ROLFES: Well, it depends on the 

14 specific case as well. For example, if you 

15 have an individual that never entered a 

16 radioactively controlled area, I would 

17 certainly say that TIB-0018, the application 

18 of TIB-0018 and -0033 would be a bounding 

19 scenario. However, for an individual that was 

20 participating in reentries, no, we would look 

21 at bioassay data. That would -- so it depends 

22 upon the specifics of the case. 

23 DR. MAURO: Now, I foresee what you’ve just 

24 described as being reasonable for a bounding 

25 off-the-charts approach. If a person who 
111

1 never entered a radiation controlled area, why 

2 would you ever believe he was chronically 

3 exposed to an MPC. That brings us to 

4 sufficient accuracy. 

5 I’m throwing this right on the table 

6 because for the purpose of denial for a 

7 person, you have a person who’s doing a dose 

8 reconstruction. You don’t have any bioassay 

9 data. You have evidence that he nearly never 

10 entered a controlled area. We’re going to 

11 assign to him the MPC of Strontium-90 as if he 

12 was breathing that all the time and do the 

13 dose calculation. 

14 The probability of causation comes 

15 back at 30 percent ^. But can you use that 

16 same argument to say that meets the test of 

17 sufficient accuracy for an SEC? And I think 

18 now we’re entering into a new arena, and 

19 obviously it doesn’t. I mean, as a health 

20 physicist you just invented a number that 

21 clearly was impossible to be that high for 

22 this person. 

23 MR. RICH: Profoundly. 

24 DR. MAURO: Well, this is now where the 

25 judgment comes in of the working group and the 
112

1 Board. At what point does the conservatism 

2 inherent in your bounding analysis become so 

3 off the charts that it does not meet the test 

4 of sufficient accuracy? Because I think 

5 within the context of Part 82, where you are 

6 doing it for the purpose of denial, you’re on 

7 great solid ground. 

8 But when you’re using that same 

9 approach and argument as the basis for judging 

10 that you do meet the criteria of sufficient 

11 accuracy for Part 83, I think you’ve got a 

12 problem. Now that’s sort of like an 

13 overarching concern within which we’re talking 

14 about Nevada Test Site now. So within that 

15 concept that I just sort of laid out, now 

16 we’re going to come at, all right, we’re going 

17 to -- and I know we primarily started this as 

18 a site profile issue. 

19 And that’s fine, but I think it’s 

20 important to keep in mind that we blended the 

21 site profile with SEC on this particular 

22 project, and that’s going to be part of this 

23 issue. And so this new platform that you’re 

24 building, whether it’s robust enough in terms 

25 of that group of 100 to be, what I would say, 
113

1 claimant favorable and scientifically valid 

2 for all workers that were not bioassayed, and 

3 whether or not -- that’s question number one. 

4 And secondly, whether that new 

5 platform meets the criteria for sufficient 

6 accuracy is something that I think we all have 

7 to think about. And I know that’s what we’ve 

8 been thinking about. 

9 MR. ROLFES: In those best estimate-type 

10 cases what we would do is go back and look at 

11 the, for example, whether there was an 

12 episodic release. We would go back and look 

13 at those air samples that were taken for that 

14 specific episodic release. Rather than apply 

15 2,000 hours per year of exposure to that 

16 particular air concentration, we could refine 

17 that as the actual time that the individual 

18 was involved in that. 

19 We can certainly make things more 

20 sufficiently accurate, if you will. I guess 

21 we can certainly make our dose estimate more 

22 precise. However, when we do that it 

23 typically results in a lower internal dose, 

24 and it takes a lot more time. Also, the 

25 number of cases that we need to complete a 
114

1 best estimate-type dose reconstruction for are 

2 very few. 

3 DR. ROESSLER: John, what you’re bringing 

4 up, if I understand you right, is that it’s a 

5 really broader issue, and it applies to all -- 

6 DR. MAURO: But, yeah, and the funny thing 

7 about it is when you engage Nevada Test Site 

8 and the issues that we’re talking about today, 

9 it’s within this broader context. So it’s 

10 almost after you’ve got to go there, and then 

11 you’ve got to come back, and say, okay, does 

12 this platform that’s being built, the 100 

13 cases, and the dataset, the bioassay data that 

14 is contained within it which is being used -- 

15 -- and I don’t know how you plan to 

16 use that dataset because I don’t think you’ve 

17 actually developed your coworker model yet. 

18 Your basic argument says, listen, we’ve got a 

19 lot of good bioassay data from these 100 

20 workers that had high external exposure. And 

21 from that we have confidence that intakes 

22 these people experienced represent the upper 

23 end that anyone might experience -- 

24 MR. ROLFES: You’re getting into a couple of 

25 separate issues, and I want to try to make 
115

1 sure we stay on course to address the site 

2 profile issues, and then we’ll transition into 

3 SEC issues. I think that it’s important that 

4 we can resolve this portion before we continue 

5 on with the SEC portion. 

6 DR. MAURO: Well, then I’ll leave you with 

7 this. The fundamental question is if the new 

8 platform of the 100 cases in Table 7.1, you’ve 

9 got to sort of turn it upside down and look at 

10 it from different directions to make sure that 

11 that distribution is, in fact, claimant 

12 favorable for all different groups of workers 

13 that might have worked under different 

14 circumstances, settings and time periods. And 

that if you decide to pick the upper 95th 15 

16 percentile ^ emerges from that dataset that, 

17 in fact, there’s a high level of confidence 

18 that that’s going to be ^. Other work groups 

19 ^. 

20 DR. BRANCHE: There’s someone participating 

21 by phone who will need to mute their line. 

22 Thank you. 

23 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

24 Arjun. I have one more question. Can you all 

25 hear me? 
116

1 DR. BRANCHE: Well, we think we can. Keep 

2 talking, Arjun. 

3 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): ^. 

4 DR. BRANCHE: Arjun, I think actually it’s 

5 your phone that might be the problem. We’re 

6 getting an awful lot of static. 

7 (no response) 

8 DR. BRANCHE: Arjun? 

9 (no response) 

10 DR. BRANCHE: Is there someone else who 

11 isn’t muted? 

12 (no response) 

13 DR. BRANCHE: If everyone on the phone could 

14 please check to make certain that you’re muted 

15 unless you’re Dr. Makhijani. Thank you. 

16 Dr. Makhijani, are you still there? 

17 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Yeah, I’m 

18 here. Just one more question about this. If 

19 TIB-0018 and TIB-0033 do not include 

20 radioiodine, that has to be separately added. 

21 So how is that being dealt with? 

22 MR. ROLFES: I can’t answer that off the top 

23 of my head right now. Maybe Gene Rollins 

24 might be able to. 

25 MR. ROLLINS: The issue came up earlier, the 
117

1 item that’s been closed, was how had we 

2 accounted for iodine intakes from containment 

3 breaches events. And we included a model 

4 calculation in the Chapter Five of the TBD 

5 that showed what the dose to the thyroid would 

6 be if the individual had been exposed to the 

7 highest concentrations of iodine that were 

8 measured as a result of that event and the 

9 doses were trivial. 

10 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): We haven’t 

11 seen a revised version of Volume Five yet, at 

12 least I haven’t. 

13 MR. ROLFES: That’s correct. NIOSH does 

14 have all of the information. And the very 

15 last page of the NTS site profile matrix that 

16 I sent out, the entire matrix was essentially 

17 unchanged except for the final page, which 

18 shows that NIOSH has received from ORAU four 

19 separate sections of the Nevada Test Site site 

20 profile. 

21 These contain the revisions resulting 

22 from our discussions with the working group. 

23 These are all currently at OCAS for approval 

24 and final signature to be put up on the 

25 internet once any SEC issues have been fully 
118

1 discussed as well. So the information is 

2 documented and as part of the SEC discussions 

3 additional information may come up which would 

4 require additional information to be added to 

5 the site profile. 

6 So the information is, in fact, 

7 documented within the site profile at this 

8 time. However, it has not been put up on the 

9 internet and finalized and put on the 

10 internet. 

11 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Thank you. 

12 MR. CHEW: Gene, do you want to, any closing 

13 comments where you can close this discussion? 

14 This is focusing on the unmonitored worker in 

15 the tunnel. 

16 MR. ROLLINS: John, in your response to your 

17 idea of building a platform, yes, we’re going 

18 to use the 100 highest; we’re going to use 

19 this data that was captured from actual air 

20 sampling information in the tunnels themselves 

21 to build a method that will allow, using 

22 statistical analysis, to give us the required 

23 accuracy to develop a method to assign best 

24 estimate intakes for tunnel workers. That 

25 work is ongoing, and when we complete it, of 
119

1 course, and OCAS approves it, then you will 

2 have a chance to review it. That’s our path 

3 forward. 

4 MR. PRESLEY: As I understand it that won’t 

5 change the site profile one bit. 

6 MR. ELLIOTT: It will. 

7 MR. ROLLINS: It could. 

8 MR. PRESLEY: It could. 

9 MR. ROLLINS: Correct. 

10 MR. PRESLEY: There’s a possibility. 

11 MR. ROLFES: However, it would likely be for 

12 a very low number of claimants. 

13 MR. ROLLINS: That’s correct. But it would 

14 be a factor. 

15 MR. ELLIOTT: Right. 

16 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): This is Lyn 

17 Anspaugh. I’d like to ask a couple of 

18 questions about the Tunnel B data. And I 

19 think, Mel Chew, you said that the data were 

20 taken because you were getting ready for Shot 

21 Yuba? 

22 MR. CHEW: That’s correct, Lyn. 

23 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): My question is 

Yuba was shot on June 5th 24 , 1963, and it appears 

25 like Figure 1, the data basically ended in 
120

1 December of ’62. So is that because you 

2 didn’t seek out that data or were there no 

3 data for that time period? 

4 MR. ROLFES: It’s figure B and we have air 

sampling data between June 3rd 5 of 1962 through, 

6 the majority of it is through really the end 

7 of the year, 1962. And I think Lyn’s question 

8 was why did the air monitoring data stop at 

9 the end of 1962. 

10 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Good. 

11 MR. CHEW: That’s because you didn’t go back 

12 and pull those sets. Is that right, Bryce? 

13 Because I want to make sure. 

14 MR. RICH: The data start in June of ’62 and 

15 go through, we’ve got data into February of 

16 ’63, yeah, ’63. 

17 MR. ROLFES: The majority of the data is 

18 really for a six months’ period in 1962. And 

19 I would suspect that it’s very unlikely for 

20 the air concentrations to rapidly increase 

21 once air sampling stopped, that that might be 

22 where you’re -- 

23 MR. RICH: This is the dataset associated 

24 with the preparation of the Yuba Tunnel. And 

25 that represents the time period when that data 
121

1 was available and collected. 

2 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Hey, Bryce, this 

3 is Billy Smith. 

4 MR. CHEW: Lyn, Lyn, I think Bryce has -- 

5 -- I don’t want to put words in your 

6 mouth. 

7 -- this is what Bryce collected. It 

8 does not necessarily mean, and we know that 

9 there is data beyond the point that it shows 

10 on the graph here that brings us up to the 

11 Yuba event here. So we just did not collect 

12 it because we thought we thought we had enough 

13 representative information to show you what 

14 was in the tunnel. 

15 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay, well, my 

16 other question goes to the Shot Yuba itself, 

17 and there was one person who had a thyroid 

18 dose that was measured and calculated to be 

19 593 rem. 

20 MR. RICH: That’s correct. There was a, 

21 during reentry, and that’s listed in the 

22 summary on the Yuba, but that’s post-Yuba -- 

23 MR. CHEW: That’s post-Yuba event -- 

24 MR. RICH: Yuba. 

25 MR. CHEW: Remember, Lyn, this is an attempt 
122

1 to show you what the unmonitored worker in 

2 preparation for, that’s the questions on the 

3 table, not what was the people doing after the 

4 shot here. And you’re absolutely correct. 

5 There was a thyroid exposure for the Yuba 

6 event, but that was executed on 6/5/63. 

7 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, my other 

8 comment about Yuba was it appears that many of 

9 these air monitoring procedures failed during 

10 this particular event. The air sample wasn’t 

11 taken when it was supposed to have been. 

12 MR. RICH: There was a mistake made that, 

13 and an incident report developed, and dose 

14 reconstruction done because there were thyroid 

15 exposures. What happened was they were 

16 grouting the -- on the Yuba event they 

17 developed a bypass drift and were in the 

18 process of driving a cross-drift from the 

19 bypass into the end of the experimental 

20 tunnel. The shuttle face they had sampled 

21 before, but the shuttle face did not resample. 

22 That was a mistake. And as a consequence, as 

23 the tunnel workers were leaving after a couple 

24 hours of exposure, they were able to read the 

25 thyroid uptake directly with a meter. 
123

1 MR. CHEW: Let’s stay focused. This 

2 discussion is primarily to talk about the 

3 person that we do not have bioassay, who is 

4 the unmonitored worker. 

5 MR. ROLFES: The people that were involved -

6 - excuse me, Mel, just for a second. 

7 The people that were involved in the 

8 Yuba event, that was an usual occurrence not 

9 typical of normal operations. That was an 

10 extremely separate issue from what we’re 

11 discussing. The individuals, to address the 

12 Yuba incident, the individuals that 

13 participated in the drill back, those 

14 individuals did participate in the bioassay 

15 program and were given thyroid counts 

16 following their exposures that occurred. What 

17 we are trying to focus on are the individuals 

18 that did not have bioassay. 

19 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): I understand 

20 that. I just wanted to point out that not 

21 everything went perfectly. And I think we all 

22 realize that. 

23 MR. CHEW: We know that. That’s correct. 

24 MR. RICH: Most of the internal exposures 

25 were the result of episodic occurrences. 
124

1 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

2 Arjun. So when we look at those 100 cases in 

3 Table 7-1 for tunnel workers and so on post4 shot entry, we should expect to find iodine 

5 monitoring? 

6 (no response) 

7 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Isn’t that 

8 the implication of what you just said, Mark? 

9 MR. ROLFES: Some of the individuals that 

10 are contained within Table 7-1 were, in fact, 

11 shifters and miners and, yes, I would 

12 certainly believe that there would be 

13 radioiodine bioassay results within that top 

14 100 in Table 7-1. 

15 MR. CHEW: For the people specifically 

16 designated as miners and ^. Remember, quite a 

17 few of those events happened at the flats 

18 there, and they were not inside tunnels which 

19 created the additional problems of containment 

20 in tritium, as you know. 

21 But, yes, the answer to your question 

22 is yes, Arjun. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: We’re at a point where I feel 

24 we probably ought to stop, get some lunch, 

25 because the people from Nevada are coming on 
125

1 board here shortly. 

2 MR. CHEW: It’s 8:22 right now. 

3 MR. PRESLEY: So, Mel, are we at a point, or 

4 Mark, where in our presentations we can stop 

5 and pick up what we need to, wrap this 

6 portion. Let’s get on with Comment 11 when we 

7 come back. 

8 MR. ROLFES: I think we’ve said everything 

9 that can be said for this particular issue 

10 regarding to basically reconstructing 

11 unmonitored internal exposures. Well, I 

12 wouldn’t say unmonitored, but basically 

13 bounding internal exposures or coming up with 

14 a method to assign internal exposures to 

15 unmonitored, meaning not participants in the 

16 bioassay program tunnel workers. I think that 

17 we’ve said everything that we can. And I 

18 believe that the outstanding issue that we 

19 would be discussing is pertaining to issue 

20 number 11 of the site profile matrix. And 

21 that is the external environmental exposures. 

22 MR. PRESLEY: When we come back do you want 

23 to say a few words about the security people? 

24 You all did study that and have some slides on 

25 that. Did you want to, that’s one of the 
126

1 things that has come up in the past is were 

2 these people monitored or unmonitored, where 

3 they worked, such like this. Do you want to 

4 say some words about the guard doses? 

5 MR. ROLFES: I think when we get back if 

6 you’re ready to take a break, I think we can 

7 continue on with that or if you’re ready to do 

8 it now, we certainly can. 

9 MR. PRESLEY: Let’s take a break. Give 

10 these people time to eat, and then we’ll come 

11 right back in to where they will be on board 

12 hopefully. Can we eat in an hour, or do we 

13 need an hour and a half? 

14 DR. ROESSLER: We can’t really go anywhere I 

15 don’t think. 

16 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): What time are 

17 we reconvening? Sorry, I missed that. 

18 DR. BRANCHE: We’re establishing that right 

19 now, Dr. Makhijani. 

20 MR. PRESLEY: It’s up to you all. Do you 

21 all want to meet at 12:30 or do we want... 

22 MR. SCHOFIELD: I think one hour’s plenty. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: All right, so everybody be 

24 back here at 12:30. 

25 DR. BRANCHE: So 12:30 eastern daylight 
127

1 time. 

2 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Thank you 

3 very much, Dr. Branche. 

4 (Whereupon, the work group meeting took a 

5 lunch break between 11:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m.) 

6 DR. BRANCHE: We are rejoining the Nevada 

7 Test Site site profile work group. Mr. 

8 Presley is Chair. Would someone who’s on the 

9 line please indicate that they can hear me? 

10 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

11 Arjun. I can. 

12 DR. BRANCHE: Thank you. 

13 I remind everyone if you could please 

14 mute your phones. If you do not have a mute 

15 button, then please dial star six to mute your 

16 phones. It’s important so that everyone 

17 participating by phone can hear and maintain 

18 the quality of the sound that you mute your 

19 phones unless you’re speaking. If you use the 

20 star six to mute your phones, then you can use 

21 that same star six to unmute your phones when 

22 you’re ready to speak. Thank you so much. 

23 Mr. Presley. 

24 MR. PRESLEY: What we’re going to do is 

25 we’re going to digress just a minute. John 
128

1 Mauro has asked for a few minutes to explain 

2 SC&A’s position of what we were discussing 

3 this morning. Once we get that done then I’m 

4 going to turn it over to Gene Rollins. And 

5 Gene is going to start working on Comment 11. 

6 John. 

7 DR. MAURO: Well, the only point I wanted to 

8 make is that this morning we got into the 

9 drifts in reconstructing internal exposures to 

10 workers who were in an occupational setting 

11 under an environment with potential for 

12 inhalation exposure can occur. And the bottom 

13 line is that we do have concerns about how the 

14 set of 100 cases somehow is going to be used 

15 along with the new data that we’ve seen and to 

16 reconstruct the doses to all workers who might 

17 have been exposed in the tunnels and under 

18 what I would call occupational access19 controlled conditions who may not have been 

20 bioassayed but perhaps should have been 

21 bioassayed. 

22 And it’s not clear that the group of 

23 100 and the subset of that which has bioassay 

24 data is, in fact, a good foundation upon which 

25 to build a coworker model for its ^. This is 
129

1 completely different than ambient exposures 

2 that Gene and I were talking about over lunch. 

3 That’s a subject that I believe that is one of 

4 the open items on the site profile. 

5 So, in effect, we really dove into an 

6 internal exposure issue, certainly relevant to 

7 the site profile, and very much relevant to 

8 the SEC petition. But apparently, we never 

9 really got to what I believe Robert Presley 

10 was hoping we’d address which is ambient 

11 exposures. Our understanding is that there is 

12 a chapter in the site profile, Chapter Four, 

13 that is currently being rewritten. 

14 We have seen a white paper that was 

15 prepared by Gene that describes the 

16 fundamental approach or strategy for 

17 reconstructing doses to people who are 

18 outdoors, not under occupational exposure 

19 conditions, but they’re outdoors doing 

20 whatever jobs they’re doing and not people 

21 that were sort of like enter the tunnels or 

22 enter a controlled area where the access and 

23 egress controls are in place. But more toward 

24 people who worked on the site in general and 

25 you want to assign ambient exposures to them 
130

1 because there are airborne dust loadings that 

2 are out there from resuspension and 

3 dispersion. 

4 And, I guess, Gene has a strategy that 

5 he’s writing up right now for Chapter Four, 

6 and we have our list of issues, but I 

7 understand there has been some developments in 

8 that white paper that go beyond what was in 

9 the original white paper. So I guess with 

10 that as by way of introduction we’re prepared 

11 to discuss the concerns we have with the 

12 original white paper and perhaps we can have a 

13 dialogue regarding each of the issues that we 

14 originally had with the original white paper 

15 and perhaps the degree to which those issues 

16 are being dealt with and will be dealt with in 

17 your new Chapter Four. 

18 MR. ROLLINS: And the reason that we would 

19 want to do that at this time is because I 

20 think we’re in agreement that tunnel workers 

21 were in a controlled environment. Those that 

22 were unmonitored are going to be dealt with 

23 with coworker models to be developed. But 

24 ambient to those workers, internal ambient to 

25 those workers would not be necessary over and 
131

1 above what we give surface workers because 

2 they’re basically breathing the same air that 

3 the people on the surface are breathing 

4 because it’s being pulled in. 

5 And so I think that was where we kind 

6 of got disjointed a little bit, and so we’ll 

7 be in agreement right now is that we’re going 

8 to modify Chapter Four. And basically, we’re 

9 going to develop those ambient intakes for 

10 surface workers and apply them both to surface 

11 workers and tunnel workers. And that’s going 

12 to end the issues that we have related to 

13 internal ambient. 

14 Is that correct? 

15 DR. MAURO: Yeah, my understanding is that 

16 it’s important to make a distinction between 

17 workers who enter areas that are under direct 

18 access control where there’s a significant 

19 concern regarding potential airborne exposure 

20 and also to external exposure. And all the 

21 other workers that are onsite that are not 

22 gaining access to these controlled areas but 

23 are working for various purposes at the site 

24 outdoors and exposed to residual ambient 

25 exposures that are due to the fact that there 
132

1 was residual activity on the soil throughout 

2 the site. 

3 That soil is being resuspended, 

4 dispersed and the lots and lots of people out 

5 here could be inhaling it. And the potential 

6 for that exposure is much smaller, of course, 

7 than the potential of people who entered 

8 tunnels or who entered an access-controlled 

9 area where there is deliberate controls in 

10 place concerned about airborne activity. 

11 So it’s important to separate the two 

12 because the models and approach and 

13 assumptions being made in Chapter Four dealing 

14 with ambient exposure is a lot different than 

15 how we would come at the problem of exposures 

16 to people who were entering tunnels, for 

17 example. It’s a different problem. So 

18 unfortunately, I think that there’s a little 

19 bit of combining of the two that was not 

20 intended. 

21 DR. ROESSLER: So we’re done with the tunnel 

22 workers then. 

23 DR. MAURO: No, I’m saying we’re done with 

24 the tunnel workers -- 

25 MR. ROLLINS: For ambient. 
133

1 DR. MAURO: -- the ambient aspect. 

2 MR. ROLLINS: Not occupational but ambient. 

3 DR. MAURO: Well, to the extent your new 

4 ambient section addresses the various issues 

5 that we were concerned about. And I guess 

6 maybe to the extent to which we can go over 

7 our issues. Maybe -- I don’t know how best to 

8 start, but perhaps Lyn Anspaugh could itemize 

9 some of the original concerns we had in the 

10 original white paper and the degree to which 

11 those issues, your position regarding those 

12 issues at this time. 

13 MR. ROLLINS: Okay. 

14 DR. MAURO: Lyn, are you on the line? 

15 (no response) 

16 DR. BRANCHE: There’s someone on the line 

17 who needs to mute their phone. Apparently, 

18 you’re in a public place. Star six will be 

19 very helpful. 

20 Excuse me. This is Dr. Christine 

21 Branche. There’s someone on the line who’s in 

22 a public place, and we’re having difficulty 

23 hearing because you are in a public place and 

24 have not muted your phone. If you could 

25 please do so, we would appreciate it. 
134

1 Go ahead, John. 

2 DR. MAURO: Lyn, is Lyn Anspaugh on the 

3 line? 

4 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): I am on the 

5 line. Like everyone else right now I’m having 

6 trouble hearing. 

7 DR. MAURO: Would you want to take a run at 

8 trying to itemize some of the specific 

9 concerns that you had with the original white 

10 paper? It goes back quite some time so that 

11 everyone can benefit from at least SC&A’s 

12 concerns. And then that will give Gene a 

13 chance to talk about those issues. 

14 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay, well, 

15 we’ve been through several versions of how 

16 Gene has proposed to calculate the ambient 

17 environmental exposures. And I think the most 

18 recent one was more or less going back to an 

19 earlier proposal to use the air samplers that 

20 were operated on the Nevada Test Site. 

21 A previous version had suggested using 

22 mass loading which frankly we sort of liked 

23 better than the present one. If that’s still 

24 where you are, Gene, could you just make a 

25 comment or two about which of those approaches 
135

1 you’re planning on using? 

2 MR. ROLLINS: Lyn, the latest version we’re 

3 going to go with the air sampling data. We 

4 looked at mass loading, and my opinion was it 

5 was far too conservative. 

6 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay, well -- 

7 MR. ROLFES: I think SC&A also shared the 

8 same opinion. 

9 MR. ROLLINS: And since we have the 

10 empirical data, we decided it best to use 

11 empirical data as opposed to modeling. 

12 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay, and your 

13 empirical data that you intend to use begins 

14 in 1971. Is that still correct? 

15 MR. ROLLINS: That’s correct. 

16 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay. I have 

17 two major points I’d like to make about that 

18 and then two minor points. The first major 

19 point gets back to the question, do air 

20 samplers represent the material that people 

21 were really breathing. And that gets back to 

22 an issue of why were the air samplers located 

23 where they were. 

24 And as I have gone back and looked and 

25 asked questions of Martha DeMarre and other 
136

1 people, my impression is that these air 

2 samplers were not placed in order to look at 

3 exposure to people, they were placed more in 

4 the interest of knowing what kind of effluents 

5 might be moving off the test site and what 

6 some of the general activities were that might 

7 be influencing concentrations. And in 

8 general, there is not an attempt to place 

9 these samplers, as I understand it, where they 

10 would be representative of exposure to people. 

11 And let me just give one example, 

12 probably an extreme example, but nevertheless 

13 it’s a real case. And that is there was 

14 frequently times when it was necessary to move 

15 a drill rig from one location to another. And 

16 they did not disassemble the drill rig, but 

17 what they did was they jacked it up, put 

18 coasters under it, and then attached seven or 

19 eight large bulldozers to it and drug this 

20 thing across the desert. So this is one 

21 example where there would have been enormous 

22 air concentrations that would not be 

23 considered, as near as I can tell, were never 

24 reflected in these ambient air monitors. 

25 But my second major concern is that 
137

1 there’s great difficulty in knowing how to 

2 take a measurement made in 1971 and back 

3 extrapolate it to 1963. And there are two 

4 problems with that is, one is, of course, we 

5 have radioactive decay taking place. And on 

6 the other hand we also have some fresh inputs 

7 that occurred between 1963 and 1971 which 

8 would have added a lot of short-term or short9 lived radionuclide activities. 

10 Again, an extreme example would be the 

11 Schooner event which was a large cratering 

12 event. We had other cratering events like 

13 Buggy and some others. So I think there’s a 

14 great deal of difficulty in terms of trying to 

15 take air concentration data from 1971 and back 

16 extrapolate it. 

17 The other, a couple of minor points 

18 was that there are earlier data that were 

19 taken, and I believe they started in 1965, but 

20 they’re not nicely tabulated in environmental 

21 reports. But Martha told me that these data 

22 were available on microfiche, and she had, in 

23 fact, printed these data out and given them to 

24 NIOSH. And so I think if you’re going to use 

25 this approach, you really need to go back and 
138

1 look at the earlier data as well which would 

2 get you back at least to 1965. 

3 And then the last minor point is I 

4 think we have some fundamental disagreement on 

5 how you were proposing to make some 

6 corrections regarding fractionation. And I 

7 don’t think that, I don’t know if you’ve done 

8 something since we last talked on that issue 

9 or not, but that was unresolved the last time 

10 we discussed it. 

11 So that’s basically where we are. We 

12 have two major concerns and two minor ones. 

13 MR. ROLLINS: I tried to jot these down as 

14 best I could, Lyn, so let me try to address 

15 them from the hip if you will. I think your 

16 comment was that the air sampling results as 

17 presented in the annual environmental reports, 

18 which is what I have produced and used in the 

19 Technical Basis Document, may have been not 

20 from where people were working. 

21 If that’s true, then it would be in 

22 direct conflict with the words that were used 

23 when those data were presented in those 

24 reports, and I have those very words in the 

25 Technical Basis Document but I’m having a hard 
139

1 time pulling it up. But it was to the effect 

2 was that the vast majority of these samples 

3 were taken in areas where individuals were 

4 currently working. And it was to assess 

5 potential intakes from their activities. 

6 MR. ROLFES: There were air samplers set up 

7 around the site, around the perimeter of the 

8 site, and there were also air samplers that 

9 were set up, for example, on a drill rig when 

10 actual work was being done. So there were 

11 both types of air samples being taken. 

12 DR. MAURO: I’m sorry, Lyn. Could you start 

13 again? We ran into a little problem here. 

14 Could you start again, please? 

15 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Any air 

16 sampler that was on a drill rig is not part of 

17 this dataset that’s listed in the 

18 environmental reports as I understand it. And 

19 I also have a basic disagreement with why the 

20 sampler locations were picked. But I don’t 

21 think that there was any sampler that could 

22 represent what people were exposed to when 

23 they were dragging their drill rig across the 

24 desert with several large bulldozers, for 

25 example. 
140

1 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Lyn, this is 

2 Billy. As you well know, they never drug 

3 drill rigs across the desert pavement. They 

4 used the roads that were there, and they took 

5 them down the roads. And when they took them 

6 across the desert pavement, they were taking 

7 them directly from the road to the site where 

8 they were going to be using them to drill. So 

9 it was not as if they were taking drill rigs 

10 and dragging them across the desert pavement 

11 creating fugitive dust that may have been 

12 resuspended. 

13 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, that’s 

14 not what other people have told us, Billy. In 

15 fact, -- 

16 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Well, Lyn, I was 

17 there. I was there. 

18 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): There were 

19 people that I talked to who were driving the 

20 bulldozers, too, and they give me a remarkably 

21 different story. But the other point, Billy, 

22 even if they were on a dirt road, there’d 

23 still be an enormous amount of resuspension. 

24 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): How much material 

25 was on that dirt road? Had it been used 
141

1 frequently or not? Lyn, we shot shots using 

2 drill rigs in places where the activity was 

3 not on the ground. We didn’t drill it back in 

4 the contaminated areas. 

5 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, I think 

6 that’s, if you want to talk about a highly 

7 contaminated area that may be true because you 

8 would have scraped it off. But I think all 

9 the areas are contaminated to a certain 

10 extent, and we’re not talking about 

11 occupational exposures; we’re talking about 

12 ambient environmental. And I think that the 

13 contamination that it takes to create a 

14 ambient environmental exposure is certainly 

15 within the realm of where these drill rigs 

16 were. 

17 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Well, these areas 

18 were certainly not posted. 

19 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Yeah, okay. 

20 MR. ROLFES: From our site profile -- this 

21 is Mark Rolfes. This is information that’s 

22 been drafted in the environmental Technical 

23 Basis Document for the Nevada Test Site. It 

24 does indicate that equipment at fixed 

25 locations continually sampled the ambient air 
142

1 to monitor radioactive materials. 

2 The locations were chosen to provide 

3 representative samples from the populated 

4 areas on the site as well as to monitor 

5 resuspension of low-fired plutonium that was 

6 spread by safety experiments before 1960 in 

7 Areas 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10. Access worker 

8 population, geographical coverage, presence of 

9 radioactivity and availability of electric 

10 power were considerations in the site 

11 selection for air samplers. And this is 

12 pulled from a reference Black and Townsend 

13 1997. 

14 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay, well, 

15 there are several things about that statement 

16 that you just read. Number one is that they 

17 want to be where electric power is, and these 

18 stations are also permanent so that that means 

19 they weren’t going to be out there on drill 

20 rigs on a permanent basis. And they weren’t 

21 going to be monitoring specific activities 

22 that could have been the ones raising the 

23 dust. 

24 MR. ROLLINS: Electrical was a 

25 consideration, Lyn, not a requirement. 
143

1 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Pardon? I’m 

2 sorry. I didn’t hear -- 

3 MR. ROLLINS: Electrical, the availability 

4 of electricity was a consideration not a 

5 requirement. Every Health Physics Department 

6 has methods to pull remote samples using 

7 gasoline powered samplers and generators. 

8 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): The question 

9 is did they? 

10 DR. BRANCHE: Excuse me. This is Dr. 

11 Branche again. Again, I ask that those of you 

12 who are participating by phone mute your lines 

13 if you’re not speaking. And I’m concerned 

14 that there’s someone on the line who is in a 

15 public place or in a car, and you’re not 

16 muting your phone. 

17 And unfortunately, your participation 

18 is actually making it difficult for everyone 

19 on the phone to hear the conversation. I 

20 would encourage you if you cannot mute your 

21 phone to then perhaps join us at another time. 

22 Thank you, or I’ll have to have the operator 

23 cut you off. Thank you. 

24 I’m sorry, those of you who are on the 

25 phone, Mr. Anspaugh and Dr. Makhijani, please 
144

1 continue. 

2 (no response) 

3 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. 

4 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): I’m sorry. 

5 I’m still having a very hard time hearing. 

6 MR. PRESLEY: Lyn, we’ve heard you all’s 

7 concerns, and Gene has written down the 

8 concerns. 

9 Do you have any more -- 

10 MR. ROLLINS: A couple more we want to talk 

11 about if we can get off the air sampling idea. 

12 I think Dr. Anspaugh said taking ’71 data and 

13 back calculating to ’63 has problems 

14 associated with it, and I don’t disagree with 

15 that. But the example that he used was 

16 breaching containment events. And my 

17 understanding when the containment breaches 

18 occurred -- and Billy Smith’s on the line. 

19 Maybe he can elaborate on this a little bit. 

20 But the footprints from the fallout from those 

21 containment breaches were very well 

22 characterized. And people were not allowed to 

23 work inside those footprints. 

24 Billy, could you add something to 

25 that? 
145

1 (no response) 

2 MR. ROLLINS: Have we lost Billy? 

3 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Let me just 

4 make another comment. That was not my only 

5 concern. 

6 MR. ROLLINS: I’m going to talk to the 

7 others if you just give me a second. 

8 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Okay. 

9 MR. ROLLINS: You also made a comment that 

10 there was earlier air sampling data available. 

11 Now, that may be true, but the earlier air 

12 sampling data that I was able to obtain, that 

13 that was provided by Martha, related more to 

14 tracking the fallout plumes rather than trying 

15 to measure ambient air concentrations. And it 

16 would certainly not be appropriate to use that 

17 type of data to develop ambient intakes. 

18 And the last point that you made was 

19 the refractories and how we go about putting 

20 those back in where Harry Hicks took them out. 

21 I think the paper that you currently have, I 

22 think it puts -- I’m not sure which iteration 

23 you have, but, of course, the first iteration 

24 that you reviewed did not have the 

25 refractories put back in for the near field 
146

1 environment. 

2 Then there’s an iteration where I just 

3 put them back in so they would be neutral, and 

4 then when I got to thinking about it, I 

5 thought, well, really if you’re going to 

6 deplete them in the far field, then you need 

7 to enrich them in the near field. So the last 

8 iteration, which I do not believe you have a 

9 copy of, actually has the refractories 

10 enriched by a factor of four in the near field 

11 environment. I don’t think you have a copy of 

12 that work yet. 

13 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, you’re 

14 absolutely right. I do not have a copy of 

15 your draft after four or any version that 

16 attempts to compensate for the refractories. 

17 Some of the earlier data, by the way, 

18 do include measurements made at Mercury, so 

19 that I’m not familiar with that data because 

20 Martha was very reluctant to print it out for 

21 me. If somebody could dump it off the O drive 

22 for me and send it to me, I’d certainly like 

23 to see it. 

24 MR. ROLLINS: I would too. Lyn, I guess 

25 we’ll have to get with Martha and find out 
147

1 what she’s talking about. Because like I said 

2 the only -- in fact, the 1971 annual 

3 environmental report, they were pretty clear 

4 about what the purpose of that report was. 

5 And they kind of implied that it was something 

6 they hadn’t done before because the reason 

7 they were putting out the annual environmental 

8 report, and the reason they were making these 

9 measurements as opposed to just tracking the 

10 plumes and tracking the fallout was that they 

11 were trying to develop a baseline for the 

12 site. 

13 And they realized they hadn’t 

14 developed a baseline. They were out there 

15 doing all this testing and they were seeing 

16 what the effects of the tests were, but they 

17 had not developed a baseline. These days you 

18 go into a nuclear facility, for example, we’re 

19 going to build a nuclear power plant. The 

20 first thing we do is characterize the 

21 unaffected environment. And they realized in 

22 ’71 -- they might have realized it sooner than 

23 that but they actually published their 

24 realization in ’71. 

25 It says we need to start doing this so 
148

1 we can determine what the long-term effects 

2 are going to be on the surrounding 

3 environment. So I’m not saying there’s not 

4 ambient data out there prior to 1971. I’m 

5 just saying that the air sampling data that I 

6 have seen prior to 1971 were basically 

7 attempts to characterize the fallout plumes. 

8 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, I don’t 

9 think that’s true. And I read -- you know, 

10 there is an annual environmental report that’s 

11 published in 1965. I believe it may have been 

12 the first one. 

13 MR. ROLLINS: Actually, it goes back to 

14 1963, but if you go into those reports, you’re 

15 not going to find air sampling data like you 

16 find in 1971. It’s just not there. 

17 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, what 

18 you’re going to find are plots of the data. 

19 You’re not going find digital tabulations, but 

20 the data are available from Martha not from 

21 me. And she says she gave all that stuff to 

22 you guys. 

23 MR. ROLLINS: We have those reports. 

24 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): I’m not 

25 talking about the reports. I’m talking about 
149

1 the digital data. 

2 MR. ROLFES: Please also keep in mind for 

3 this discussion that we’re having, the 

4 internal doses resulting from environmental 

5 ambient exposures are very, very unlikely to 

6 affect the compensation decisions. We’re 

7 talking about maybe a millirem, two millirem 

8 in some cases. It could be higher for certain 

9 organs, but these doses from environmental 

10 intakes at Nevada Test Site were very, very 

11 low and are very unlikely to affect the 

12 outcome of a compensation decision. 

13 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, I agree 

14 that’s probably true according to the way 

15 you’ve done it. I don’t agree it’s true for 

16 the exposures that some people might have 

17 received while they were dragging drill rigs 

18 across the site, for example. 

19 MR. PRESLEY: Gene, do you have anything 

20 else? 

21 MR. ROLLINS: No. 

22 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): My other 

23 point, Mark, is that I don’t think it’s 

24 appropriate to just dismiss some pathway out 

25 of hand because you think it doesn’t matter. 
150

1 MR. PRESLEY: It’s not that it doesn’t 

2 matter. And I think we actually have enough 

3 data to say that they have sampled the areas 

4 that the plumes from anything that might have 

5 been dragged across the desert. If people 

6 were working in an area, and they received 

7 some fallout, there would be data or air 

8 monitors in that area where those people 

9 worked. 

10 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Well, that’s a 

11 very generous presumption. I’m not at all 

12 convinced that’s true. 

13 MR. PRESLEY: Does anybody have anything 

14 else on this? 

15 (no response) 

16 MR. PRESLEY: We can -- I hate to say it, 

17 but this could be discussed for the next 150 

18 years. So at this time I would like to call a 

19 halt to this, and let’s pick up with Comment 

20 11. 

21 ISSUE 11: ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION EXPOSURES

22 MR. ROLLINS: Are you turning that over to 

23 me, Mr. Presley? 

24 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, I am. 

25 MR. ROLLINS: I want to be sure that we’re 
151

1 all on the same page here, and so what I would 

2 like to do if it’s okay with John, could I get 

3 John to restate the problem so that I can make 

4 sure that we’re addressing the problem that’s 

5 of his concern. 

6 DR. MAURO: This is the problem that was 

7 just raised by -- 

8 MR. ROLLINS: No, no, we’re on to a 

9 geometric correction factors for ambient 

10 external. 

11 DR. MAURO: Oh, the external -- 

12 MR. ROLLINS: Issue 11. 

13 MR. PRESLEY: Issue 11. 

14 DR. MAURO: Okay, now I’m hearing you. 

15 This is a problem that we’ve 

16 encountered many times before, and it’s 

17 certainly a tractable problem we’ve evaluated. 

18 In effect, a person is standing on the ground 

19 that is a source of contamination, a photon 

20 emitter, on the ground relatively localized. 

21 What happens is the radiation’s coming 

22 up and striking the badge. It’s coming up at 

23 an angle. And not only that, it’s being 

24 detected on a film badge that might be sitting 

25 on the lapel. If you’re concerned about 
152

1 exposures to the bottom half, the lower part 

2 of the body, that exposure is going to, that 

3 you see on your film badge, is going to 

4 underestimate the exposure to the lower part 

5 of the body so there’s an adjustment that’s 

6 needed there. 

7 In addition, very often film badges, 

8 the way they’re calibrated is the radiation is 

9 striking it perpendicular. If it’s coming up 

10 like this, what happens is it’s passing 

11 through effectively a thicker layer of cadmium 

12 or whatever the shield attenuation is. And 

13 what happens is you result in a readout on the 

14 film badge which might be underestimating the 

15 dose to the lower organs for those two 

16 reasons. We’ve evaluated that on a number of 

17 occasions, and depending on the energy of the 

18 photon, the angle, the adjustment factors on 

19 the order of two to maybe six or seven are 

20 needed. 

21 So the way I see it this is very much 

22 a tractable problem. I think that it’s been 

23 addressed in other venues on at least two or 

24 three other occasions. There’s been general 

25 agreement on the fundamental approach on how 
153

1 to deal with that. So I see this as -- now, 

2 I’m not quite sure of how you folks are 

3 planning to deal with that. 

4 Are any provisions being made in your 

5 -- now, if you’re dealing with an effectively 

6 infinite plane, then there is no problem any 

7 longer. For all intents and purposes the 

8 radiation that’s being experienced by the 

9 badge now is the dose from the material that’s 

10 pretty far away to right up close. 

11 So the significance of the adjustment 

12 factor diminishes when you’re dealing with a 

13 surface that has widespread contamination 

14 because you’re getting, radiation’s coming in 

15 from all angles and so it’s not as much of an 

16 issue. It’s of greatest concern when material 

17 is close by like at your feet. 

18 Then you might -- and we talked about 

19 that, I believe, on Mallinckrodt for 

20 exposures, how to adjust for that so the 

21 numbers have been done. And so what I’m 

22 getting at is that I’m not sure the degree to 

23 which that particular issue has been engaged 

24 as applied to the Nevada Test Site. 

25 MR. ROLLINS: The last time we discussed 
154

1 this, I think it was back in February, we 

2 ended up realizing that we needed to make a 

3 distinction between occupational versus 

4 environmental exposures. And after some 

5 discussion you agreed that after looking at 

6 the values for elevated ambience that are 

7 currently in the TBD, which are typically 

8 around 100 millirem per year, that it’s not 

9 likely that the badge could have even picked 

10 up an exposure like that. I mean it would not 

11 have detected something that small. 

12 DR. MAURO: That’s correct. 

13 MR. ROLLINS: And so you looked at the data 

14 from ’71 forward and said, well, we don’t have 

15 an ambient geometry problem out there. But 

16 then you said, well, what about prior to 1971 

17 and what are we going to do about that. 

18 Because I think the hypothesis is as we get 

19 closer to the period of atmospheric testing 

20 that there could have been significant ambient 

21 out there that even though the badges picked 

22 it up -- and we’ve decided now that’s not an 

23 issue because everybody’s getting ambient 

24 because it’s included on their badge -- but 

25 now was the ambience high enough that a 
155

1 geometry factor might needed to have been 

2 applied during those early years. 

3 Well, we thought about how we might 

4 want to go back and try to determine whether 

5 there was significant elevated ambient in the 

6 years beginning in 1963 up to 1970, through 

7 1970. And we got -– by the way on the talking 

8 points now for Security force exposures as an 

9 indicator of background and possible changes. 

10 We could not find evidence -- even 

11 though some of the documents talked about 

12 using pressurized ionization chambers to 

13 measure ambient radiation, we could not find 

14 the results of those measurements. And I’m 

15 sure they’re there somewhere, but they were 

16 not readily available to us. 

17 What we decided to do was to go look 

18 at a cohort group of individuals that were all 

19 badged, that were not considered typical 

20 radiation workers, and that they would be 

21 assigned to an RWP to go in and handle 

22 radioactive material, but were required to be 

23 in all areas of the site. And the logical 

24 group there was the Security force. 

25 So we got the data from 300 Security, 
156

1 that’s the entire force, and we looked at 

2 their data from 1963 to 1970. The idea being 

3 here that we know most of their badges are 

4 going to be zeros, which means by the time you 

5 pull the control out, you’ve got nothing left. 

6 Now if we hypothesize that there was 

7 measurable, elevated ambient in those early 

8 years, then it seems to me you would expect 

9 the number of zero reads to decrease in that 

10 cohort group. 

11 When you look at the data we see that 

12 the lowest number of this 300 people, the 

13 lowest number of zero reads, 12. I mean, the 

14 highest number of zero reads -- let me get 

15 this right. The highest number of zero reads 

16 was in 1963. In fact, of that 300-member 

17 cohort group, there were only 12 positive 

18 radiation doses assigned to those people. In 

19 1964 there were 27 positives out of 323. In 

20 1965 there were 45, ’66 there were 70, ’67 

21 there were 60, ’68 there were 95, ’69, 14, 

22 fourteen positives. That means there 315 

23 zeros. 

24 I submit to you that if there had been 

25 measurable elevated ambient that we would have 
157

1 seen more zeros in 1963 than we would have in 

2 these other years. 

3 And, I don’t know. Did you have a 

4 chance to see that, John? 

5 (no response) 

6 MR. RICH: (Inaudible) 

7 MR. ROLLINS: Security guards. They 

8 patrolled all the roads, provided security for 

9 nuclear weapons. 

10 MR. PRESLEY: There was at least one at 

11 every drill site, at least one all over the 

12 site. 

13 DR. MAURO: So the number of individuals 

14 with positive doses from 1960, out of the 

15 total monitored individuals which was on the 

16 order of 300, what in effect you’re saying is, 

17 well, we have data back to 1963 though 1970 

18 consistently on the order of about 300 

19 individuals that were monitored. 

20 A number of individuals with positive 

21 doses detectable above background was, the 

22 highest number was in ’67, 60. And the lowest 

23 number was interestingly in 1963, which was 

24 12. So what we get from this is that whatever 

25 the ambient radiation exposure levels were 
158

1 that this population of workers experienced 

2 from ’63 to ’70 really didn’t change very 

3 much. 

4 MR. ROLLINS: No. 

5 DR. MAURO: If anything there might have 

6 been some slight increase in the potential for 

7 exposure in 1967. That’s when you had your 

8 highest in 1966, but that’s a little higher. 

9 Now as it goes toward this issue -- I’m trying 

10 to connect the dots but I’m having, but I 

11 can’t get my head around right now. Somehow 

12 you feel that that really puts to bed this 

13 geometry correction factor problem. 

14 MR. ROLLINS: Because you would have to have 

15 -- okay, we’ve got to connect the dots. 

16 DR. MAURO: Yeah, help me out here. 

17 MR. ROLLINS: In order for this to be 

18 important, there would have to be enough 

19 ambient out there that people were being 

20 unknowingly exposed to. And this would be the 

21 group that would be unknowingly exposed to it, 

22 not the radiation workers. That’s why we 

23 chose these people. 

24 DR. MAURO: From an ambient perspective. 

25 MR. ROLLINS: From an ambient perspective. 
159

1 DR. MAURO: I’m going to go out on a limb, 

2 and I always get myself in trouble when I do. 

3 I do think this is a tempest in a teapot. 

4 There’s no issue here. 

5 MR. ROLLINS: Thank you. 

6 MR. PRESLEY: So we can say that Comment 11 

7 has been closed. Everybody agrees? All 

8 right, Gene, I appreciate that. 

9 At this time I would like the whole 

10 working group to discuss what we want to do as 

11 far as whether we want to recommend or not 

12 recommend the site profile. And if you have 

13 some other discussion on this issue that came 

14 up about the resuspension of particles when 

15 the drilling rigs would be drug across the 

16 desert floor, we will take that up at that 

17 time. 

18 My inclination is on that that, yes, 

19 there could have been some dust. I’ve been 

20 out there. I’ve seen those drilling rigs. 

21 Yes, there were small -- where they turned off 

22 of their -- if I remember -- 

23 Mel, you all correct me. 

24 -- there was a road right down the 

25 middle of the test site, and that’s what we 
160

1 drug those drilling rigs on. And then to go 

2 from the road where they actually put the, set 

3 the drilling rig up, then if there was not a 

4 road there, yeah, they would have cut a road 

5 with a bulldozer, and they would have drug 

6 those things up to the site. That’s what I 

7 remember. 

8 And that’s where I remember seeing 

9 some plumage. But I also know from my 

10 experience on the Test Site that every area 

11 that was being worked, whether it be putting a 

12 weapon on hold, back scanning a smaller 

13 drilling rig, or whatever it was, that there 

14 were air monitors and people from Industrial 

15 Hygiene onsite when I was there. 

16 Now, Bryce, you and Mel were out there 

17 more than I was, but that is what I remember. 

18 Because we were checked when we would, we 

19 would wear our street clothes to work. We 

20 were checked by somebody from Health Physics 

21 that afternoon when we walked off that site 

22 and either got in a truck to come back to work 

23 or else went somewhere else. That’s what I 

24 remember, and if I’m not right on that or if 

25 there was something in the earlier days, you 
161

1 ought to correct me. 

2 MR. CHEW: Sure. 

3 MR. PRESLEY: Has anybody on the working 

4 group got anything else that we need to 

5 discuss before we discuss what we’re going to 

6 do with the site profile? 

7 MS. MUNN: My only question would be whether 

8 or not there is any source of documentation 

9 for the concerns that were just raised. I 

10 can’t imagine that there’s documentation that 

11 we haven’t pursued in some way. Is anyone 

12 aware of any existing documents that someone 

13 has not located, gone through, reviewed and 

14 reported on? 

15 (no response) 

16 MS. MUNN: There’s always the implication 

17 that there’s some sort of data that’s been 

18 overlooked, and I just would like us all to 

19 agree that any data that exists with respect 

20 to NTS has been very thoroughly vetted by both 

21 the agency and by the contractor. 

22 MR. PRESLEY: Realizing that we’re not going 

23 to come up with 100 percent of the data. 

24 MS. MUNN: No, I understand that. The 

25 question is not whether we looked at 100 
162

1 percent of it. The question is, are we 

2 relatively sure that there’s no other existing 

3 data. There’s always implications being 

4 placed before us that there’s something out 

5 there we haven’t seen. 

6 And I just am asking verification from 

7 the people sitting around this table to the 

8 best of our knowledge we are aware of as much 

9 existing data as possible within human 

10 capability to review. We’ve pretty much done 

11 that, have we not? 

12 MR. PRESLEY: John, you sent your people out 

13 there. You’re on your own site. 

14 DR. MAURO: What I’m hearing is that when it 

15 comes to the ambient dose reconstruction 

16 issue, the protocol that’s being developed and 

17 has been developed, Chapter Four, using the 

18 1971 data, there are a number of concerns 

19 related to extrapolating back. Concerns that 

20 have a degree of legitimacy because going back 

21 in time from ’71 to ’63, you know, you get a 

22 little nervous when you do things like that. 

23 But I also heard that it sounds like 

24 there may be data in ’65. Now, I’m not quite 

25 sure whether the data that was referred to by 
163

1 Martha to Lyn is the same data that Gene, that 

2 you had made reference to regarding plume 

3 tracking. Certainly, I agree with you. If 

4 the data in ’65 that we’re referring to is 

5 plume tracking data where you deliberately 

6 went in and sampled ventings or whatever else 

7 may have become airborne, and you’re tracking 

8 a plume, that is not ambient. 

9 MR. ROLLINS: I have -- 

10 DR. MAURO: Now, if we have, if that data 

11 somehow, ’65 data is out there, somehow could 

12 be used to validate the back calculation that 

13 is based on ’71 data, even if it’s limited, it 

14 would be very useful to say it looks like 

15 Gene’s model would predict in 1965 using ’71 

16 data going backwards in time using the 

17 protocol being developed, we’d get these kinds 

18 of, these levels of activity. Granted they’re 

19 probably small. 

20 And if it turns out there actually is 

21 some 1965 data out there, it would be a way 

22 to, in terms of due diligence, say, okay, if 

23 there are data out there -- and I’m not quite 

24 sure there is or there isn’t -- it sure would 

25 be a good idea to turn over that rock and put 
164

1 this thing to bed because we’ve looked at the 

2 data. We’ve confirmed that it’s the plume 

3 tracking data and really isn’t relevant to the 

4 particular ambient model, and that’s the end 

5 of it. 

6 Well, if it turns out it is, and we 

7 look at it, I think that we could be 

8 criticized for that for not taking one look at 

9 that particular source. So my recommendation 

10 would be let’s, if there is such a dataset, 

11 and it’s readily available and can be 

12 accessed, and we can use it to some benefit to 

13 validate the models that Gene has developed 

14 that would put to bed a lot of the questions 

15 that we’ve been talking about today. 

16 MS. MUNN: My question then would be and if 

17 your premise is validated, and there is 

18 something that perhaps due diligence would 

19 expect us to take a look at, can that be done 

20 in an expedient manner and resolved with a 

21 technical communication between the parties 

22 rather than another meeting of the work group. 

23 Because if you’re talking about this kind of 

24 plume data, obviously, this is episodic and 

25 would certainly, one would think the data 
165

1 that’s just been presented with respect to the 

2 guards would be adequate to cover anything 

3 other than a very clear, unexpected episode 

4 that would undoubtedly be of record somewhere. 

5 MR. CHEW: John, I’m just thinking aloud 

6 here. The plume data that we have especially 

7 Lyn is familiar, there was a couple of events 

8 that were concerns in 1965. They were 

9 cratering events. It was very important that 

10 plume data was to demonstrate the levels of 

11 activity that had gone beyond the site 

12 boundaries -- 

13 DR. MAURO: So it’s not useful for this. 

14 MR. CHEW: -- and also to the limits of the 

15 continental United States because there was a 

16 test ban of not contaminating another country, 

17 Canada. So I am familiar with that kind of 

18 plume data. And so the question I’m having 

19 difficulty is that where do you cut off the 

20 plume data to make it -- 

21 DR. MAURO: No, no, I’d be the first to -- 

22 MR. CHEW: -- where do you -- 

23 DR. MAURO: If that’s what it is, it’s not 

24 going to help us. 

25 MR. CHEW: Yeah, those particular data was 
166

1 very, very important to assure that we are not 

2 violating any test ban conditions here, test 

3 ban plume data. 

4 MS. MUNN: It still appears to me that it 

5 would be adequately covered by the guard data 

6 that we just looked at. 

7 DR. MAURO: Well, keep in mind the guard 

8 data is the external exposure. And what we’re 

9 concerned about is that there’s going to be, 

10 that is, there’s a protocol that’s been 

11 developed, back calculate airborne dust 

12 loading of a variety of radionuclides with a 

13 function of five from ’63 to ’71. And granted 

14 that -- I agree completely. That contribution 

15 to exposure is probably negligible or small 

16 certainly compared to the other exposures, 

17 what I would call the occupational exposure in 

18 controlled areas. 

19 But there’s a whole Chapter Four 

20 dealing with this. A protocol has been 

21 developed based on extrapolating ’71. And I 

22 would argue that I don’t know whether I would 

23 use the external records for security guards 

24 as a good way to get a handle on this and put 

25 that issue to bed. I’d sooner say to try to 
167

1 come to grips with some of the issues that 

2 were raised by Lyn. 

3 It seems to me the only real action 

4 item here, if there’s any, is if, in fact, you 

5 say it’s correct, it’s over. I mean, there’s 

6 really not much more we can do. We squeeze as 

7 much out of the data that we can. But if it 

8 turns out that some of those measurements were 

9 made -- and I guess Martha apparently knows 

10 about this. Apparently, you do, too. If 

11 you’re correct, it doesn’t bias anything 

12 because that’s not ambient. 

13 MR. CHEW: Yes, that’s not representative. 

14 You’re right. 

15 DR. MAURO: So I guess that’s as far as I 

16 can carry it. I don’t know what else to say. 

17 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): Let me make a 

18 -- 

19 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Hey, John. John, 

20 this is Billy Smith. You’re absolutely right. 

21 The data that Gene has talked about is direct 

22 to gamma exposure. But there were two sets of 

23 people that were on the routine bioassay 

24 program that was sampled every quarter and 

25 whole body counted annually whether or not 
168

1 they needed it or not. 

2 Those were the RAD Safe monitors and 

3 those were the WSI Guards. So therefore, the 

4 WSI Guards, the doses that they had, is 

5 representative of both internal and external 

6 exposures because they were part of the 

7 routine bioassay program. 

8 DR. MAURO: Well, that’s excellent. I mean, 

9 I hadn’t heard that. What you’re saying is we 

10 actually have some bioassay data from workers 

11 that were there not under control, under the 

12 access controls but are working in the ambient 

13 environment where there’s bioassay data, 300 

14 people. I don’t know how many of them were 

15 actually bioassayed. Well, now we’re talking. 

16 I mean, I’d much rather look at that than look 

17 at air sampling data. I mean, -- 

18 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): John, one of the 

19 things that is true is that there is no 

20 indication that WSI Guards got any positive 

21 doses from internal exposures. So therefore, 

22 I mean, only a few episodic occasions. But in 

23 those cases where they did, then that would be 

24 in their personnel dosimetry records. 

25 Otherwise, we’re having to go through 
169

1 tons and tons and tons of paper to try and 

2 find the laboratory data that would tie a 

3 result back to a person. And that is very, 

4 very difficult to do. And with Martha’s 

5 constraints of personnel and funding, she just 

6 can’t support us in doing that right now. But 

7 I do know that all of the guards were on a 

8 regular bioassay program. 

9 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

10 Arjun. A question about that. We’ve looked 

11 at some of these internal monitoring records, 

12 and in regard to plutonium, when you say the 

13 WSI Guards were routinely bioassayed or a part 

14 of the bioassay program, were they monitored 

15 for plutonium? Because we have found other 

16 than the Health Physics RAD Safe workers, 

17 plutonium data are somewhat more scarce. 

18 MR. SMITH (by Telephone): Well, Arjun, one 

19 of the sayings about the bioassay program, you 

20 typically on a quarterly basis took large sets 

21 of urine samples. There was about three or 

22 four 16 ounce bottles of urine that were 

23 actually processed and counted for gamma 

24 activity, beta activity, and then run through 

25 chemistry where plutonium was actually 
170

1 analyzed and alpha counted. It was done by 

2 alpha spectrometry. 

3 In addition, those same people were 

4 analyzed on an annual basis with either whole 

5 body and/or lung counts. So there was no 

6 picking and choosing as to what analysis you 

7 were going to do on routine bioassay samples. 

8 You did a gamma spec analysis, a gross beta 

9 count and a plutonium analysis, which was done 

10 by alpha spectroscopy. And also lung counting 

11 and whole body counting, done with 

12 spectroscopy methods. 

13 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Thanks, 

14 Billy. 

15 DR. ANSPAUGH (by Telephone): This is Lyn 

16 Anspaugh again. Let me make two suggestions 

17 for your consideration. One is Gene Rollins 

18 and I perhaps could take a quick look to look 

19 at a couple of issues. One is it should be 

20 easy to plot where the air sampler locations 

21 were relative to where we know people were 

22 working. That’s one issue. 

23 The other one is the air 

24 concentrations measured in 1965 I’m quite sure 

25 were not plume tracking data. They were at 
171

1 six locations although they were smaller in 

2 number than they were in ’71. But I think we 

3 should be able to quickly look at that, and 

4 like John Mauro’s suggestion of validate the 

5 model, so to speak, would be an excellent 

6 thing that shouldn’t take much effort to do. 

7 MR. CHEW: Lyn’s question is that the air 

8 sample data is representative of where people 

9 were working; is that the bottom line? 

10 DR. MAURO: We checked that. We checked 

11 that. In other words right now, remember, the 

12 two issues. One is the air sampling locations 

13 from 1971, the degree to which one could say 

14 that those locations are pretty good for the 

15 purpose of predicting what ambient exposures 

16 might have been onsite from 1963 to ’71. 

17 Now in terms of ^, that would be a 

18 location issue. And I think just looking at 

19 where those samples were collected, probably 

20 tell us a lot, and you may already have a map 

21 showing, there they are. And then a judgment 

22 could be made, yeah, it looks like it’s a lot 

23 more than just peripheral, that there’s a very 

24 real possibility that some of the samples that 

25 were collected in 1965 might have been ambient 
172

1 measurements and not necessarily plume 

2 tracking. 

3 MR. ROLLINS: May I make a comment on that? 

4 May I make a comment right now? I just wanted 

5 to look that up in ’65. I just pulled it up 

6 but I lost my connection, so it’s gone now. 

7 And Dr. Anspaugh is right. There are some 

8 plots back there, but those plots are gross 

9 beta activity, which doesn’t help me much. 

10 And then they did not detect alpha. 

11 DR. MAURO: But think about it like this. 

12 Okay, you’re going to come up from your model 

13 with some gross beta activity as a function of 

14 time. I mean, in theory you can do that, say, 

15 what would your model predict -- 

16 MR. ROLLINS: We do have gross beta 

17 activity. 

18 DR. MAURO: Right, and what would you 

19 estimate would be earlier of the gross beta, 

20 you know, picocuries per cubic meter at 

21 various locations at various times. 

22 MR. ROLLINS: Well, let me ask you this. If 

23 we look at the gross beta in 1971 forward and 

24 compare it to the little bit of gross beta 

25 activity that we have in 1965, ’66, ’67, ’68, 
173

1 and we don’t see statistical differences, 

2 would that make the problem go away? 

3 DR. MAURO: I think that’s the weight of 

4 evidence. In other words the way I look at 

5 what we’re doing now is, you come up with a 

6 line of attack on a problem, and you come at 

7 it in this direction. And when you’re done, 

8 say, that’s pretty reasonable. But is there 

9 any way we could come at it from another 

10 direction which will confirm that that is, in 

11 fact, reasonable? Time and again we run into 

12 this. What I’m hearing is you’ve come up with 

13 a line of attack. Certainly, it sounds 

14 reasonable, but there are certain weaknesses 

15 to it that it sounds to me that one way to 

16 perhaps reinforce that your approach is, in 

17 fact, robust would be to take advantage of, 

18 well, two things that Lyn just suggested. 

19 Let’s go and check where those locations are 

20 and see, yeah, it looks like that they were 

21 sprinkled very deliberately to evaluate 

22 airborne dust loadings onsite where the 

23 workers worked. That may happen pretty easy I 

24 think. And the other is, okay, the gross beta 

25 activity. Now if it turns out the gross beta 
174

1 measurements that were made come in at a level 

2 that is not incompatible with what Gene’s 

3 models predict, now we’ve got a weight of 

4 evidence. We’re building a body of evidence 

5 that is compelling. And we could all sit 

6 around and say, listen, we did everything we 

7 can to really turn this rock and look at this 

8 thing. And I think in the end of the process 

9 the weight of evidence is such that, yeah, I 

10 think we’ve got a good handle on it, and 

11 Gene’s models work. 

12 MR. CHEW: You’re actually proposing two 

13 things, John, if I hear you correctly. One, 

14 to look at the sample locations to see if they 

15 represent where people were working. And 

16 actually, secondly, look at the data to see if 

17 it fits the model. 

18 DR. MAURO: Or at least rings true. You 

19 know, I know they’re not going to nail each 

20 other, but they’ve got to ring true. Time and 

21 again we run into this. Every time an 

22 approach is taken in a site profile, and we 

23 see that theoretically there may be certain 

24 places where there’s some weaknesses, what 

25 SC&A always does, is there another way to come 
175

1 at this that would help us substantiate that 

2 approach is robust. 

3 And that’s all I’m saying. And I 

4 think that what we heard from Lyn is that he 

5 identified two things we can do to help 

6 reinforce and determine the degree to which 

7 we’ll hang our hat on Gene’s model. It may be 

8 inconclusive. 

9 I mean, one of the problems we always 

10 have when we do this is we build this whole 

11 idea in our head that, listen, if we do this, 

12 this and this, when we’re done we’re going to 

13 have some real answers. And if this is 

14 inconclusive, it’s inconclusive, but we did do 

15 everything what I consider to be reasonable to 

16 try to come to grips with this thing. 

17 MR. CHEW: I’d like to get into the status 

18 of the probably few events in 1965 timeframe 

19 where we were doing some crater experiments 

20 here that those particular samples would show 

21 an elevated level, and it’s not plume data, 

22 but it’s really ambient. So we have to 

23 understand that. But we do know when those 

24 events occurred. And so there is some, we can 

25 visualize. I just want to let you know. 
176

1 DR. MAURO: I agree. If we’re concerned 

2 with ambient, I don’t want to be fooled by 

3 looking at data which is not ambient. 

4 MR. CHEW: That’s exactly right. 

5 DR. MAURO: And we have to be very careful 

6 of that. 

7 MR. CHEW: That’s right. 

8 DR. MAURO: I agree with that. 

9 MR. ROLLINS: Just a point that Wanda wanted 

10 me to make, and I wanted everybody to 

11 understand. In each of the annual reports, 

12 even starting back as early as 1965, there is 

13 a map very similar to the one that is 

14 currently in the TBD that shows the precise 

15 locations of each of the air sampling 

16 stations, or precise as they can be on a page 

17 that big representing 300 miles. But there’s 

18 a similar map in every ^ that shows where the 

19 stations were. And they moved them around, 

20 and they changed the number from year to year 

21 for various reasons. 

22 MR. CHEW: They moved around where people 

23 were working. 

24 MR. ROLLINS: Why would they want to sample 

25 air where nobody’s working? 
177

1 MS. MUNN: Yeah, there isn’t any point. 

2 MR. CLAWSON: Well, wait a minute. Let me 

3 pull up a little other map for you. It’s 

4 called downwinders. But you know what’s real 

5 interesting? Nevada Test Site shows zero 

6 airborne, but everything around it, most of 

7 that stuff -- and this is what I have the 

8 problem with -- most of that stuff was 

9 implemented in there because they were trying 

10 to figure out what was blowing offsite. 

11 MR. ROLFES: True. Keep in mind that during 

12 atmospheric time period when you have an 

13 above-ground detonation, that’s really the 

14 focus of the offsite exposures. Because the 

15 super heated gas is traveling offsite, there 

16 isn’t really going to be much fallout onsite. 

17 It’s going to travel because of the heat of ^ 

18 expanding, rising gases. 

19 MR. CLAWSON: Right, but as the years went 

20 by and so forth like that, and as they started 

21 doing below-ground testing, as we’ve all 

22 understood, they were still monitoring with 

23 airplanes and so forth like that taking air 

24 sample data to make sure that we didn’t have 

25 anything going offsite again. And this is 
178

1 what a lot of that air sampling data was. 

2 Because when it did go off it shook the living 

3 heck out of a lot of stuff for a long way. 

4 MR. CHEW: There were some cratering 

5 experiments, Plow Share. 

6 MR. CLAWSON: Plow Share was a good example. 

7 Baneberry was ^ and from there. 

8 MR. ROLFES: With those exceptions though 

9 there are bioassay results for the individuals 

10 that were involved directly with those. 

11 DR. MAURO: I think that’s a great ^. I 

12 didn’t know that we had a set of bioassay data 

13 for people that only were exposed under 

14 ambient conditions. And that goes back to 

15 before 1971. That is another nice way to say, 

16 okay, let’s, do we have any detectable 

17 activity. And let’s say you come back zero, 

18 zero. What does that mean? They’re all less 

19 than this. Is that compatible with the model? 

20 In other words in effect would your model 

21 predict, you would expect to see any, and we 

22 didn’t see any. 

23 I mean, see, to me we’re building a 

24 weight of evidence that in the end says, 

25 listen, everything that this data speaks to us 
179

1 says that it rings true or it doesn’t. All of 

2 a sudden you have a bunch of bioassay data, 

3 and you’re seeing positive hits on the numbers 

4 of these workers that are incompatible with 

5 the model, you have to ask yourself why is 

6 that occurring. 

7 Now, there may be a good reason for 

8 it. They may have been exposed to some 

9 transient situation that was associated with 

10 an event or it’s not really ambient. But as I 

11 said, you like to turn over those, go as far 

12 as you can reasonably go. How far that is, 

13 you know, that’s a judgment call. 

14 But it sounds to me that if you’ve got 

15 some ’65 data, you got some bioassay data that 

16 somehow could be useful to let us know how 

17 robust or reliable Gene’s extrapolation model 

18 is, it wouldn’t hurt to take a look at it. 

19 MR. CHEW: There’s some logistics concern 

20 because I think, John, that we’ve talked about 

21 this before because we picked the top 100 

22 because they were available in NOCTS. But 

23 other data was because the logistics was 

24 funding for NOCTS to support that in ^. 

25 DR. MAURO: I thought the top 100 had 
180

1 nothing to do with the ambient. I thought the 

2 top 100 was designed to capture exposures to 

3 people who were exposed in a serious way. So 

4 I have those two in my head. 

5 MR. PRESLEY: Anybody else have any more 

6 questions? 

7 MS. MUNN: My only question is that we 

8 resolve the question adequately. Is there 

9 another exchange that needs to go on with 

10 respect to the placement of the sampling 

11 equipment and ^ the questions that were being 

12 raised by telephone as we just discussed. 

13 DR. MAURO: Well, Wanda, since you’re 

14 looking at me, I would say that if it’s not an 

15 inordinate burden that would be, you know, 

16 that’s going to tie us up for six months or 

17 something that can be done -- it looks like we 

18 just about did it on the first item. 

19 Now, when you look at it from the 

20 point of view, okay, here’s where the air 

21 samples were collected. You go back to ’71 

22 and see where the air samples are, see where 

23 workers were working, and here’s where workers 

24 were working in 1963 to ‘61. Here’s where the 

25 1971 air samples were. Here’s the way the 
181

1 wind was blowing. It seems like that you’ve 

2 got the samples in the place where if there 

3 was elevated ambient levels, these samples 

4 would have picked them up, and they would be 

5 applicable to workers who were working on the 

6 site as a way to predict ambient exposures. 

7 Now I think that should be done. I don’t 

8 think it’s very difficult to do. 

9 This other question regarding either 

10 the bioassay data from the workers or the air 

11 sampling in ’65 data -- I said the bioassay, 

12 I’m talking about not the 100 but the security 

13 guard data. Now, it seems to me that if 

14 someone would ask me, well, I’d like to look 

15 at that and convince myself that those data 

16 are compatible with Gene’s model, and they 

17 ring true, I think that’s worth doing. I 

18 don’t know how large an effort that is. So 

19 when you were looking at me that’s why I, 

20 that’s what I would do. 

21 MS. MUNN: And that’s what I’m trying to 

22 determine. Is the possibility of fairly 

23 straightforward, brief white paper addressing 

24 those specific points adequate do you believe? 

25 DR. MAURO: In my mind, absolutely. 
182

1 MS. MUNN: And is such a paper feasible? 

2 MR. ROLFES: This information may already be 

3 partially contained within the method that’s 

4 described by Gene in the current draft ambient 

5 Technical Basis Document. 

6 MS. MUNN: It sounds to me as though the 

7 data is out there. It’s a question of pulling 

8 those data together in one spot so that they 

9 can be viewed from the perspective that the 

10 contractor’s asking for. 

11 MR. ROLLINS: I think what we need, we need 

12 some kind of structure here; otherwise I end 

13 up answering the wrong question. 

14 MR. PRESLEY: Number one, Larry, if you did, 

15 and we ask the contractor -- or not the 

16 contractor, ask your contractor -- to go back 

17 and take a look, to come up with a white paper 

18 on these two items. 

19 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I’m sitting here 

20 wondering whether or not it would be most 

21 efficient if we finalized the revision of the 

22 chapters of our site profile, or at least this 

23 one on environmental ambient and issued it. 

24 If we’re that confident we understand the 

25 issues that have been raised, and we feel that 
183

1 we have reacted appropriately and responded 

2 appropriately to those issues, and we’re 

3 confident that this chapter will address them, 

4 perhaps maybe the best way, instead of a white 

5 paper, let’s issue this revised technical 

6 basis document that would be used. 

7 And then if that’s what the working 

8 group wants to evaluate, I think that’s what 

9 should be evaluated. I don’t know. And I 

10 really am at risk here of getting my head 

11 chopped off by staff because I’m not sure if 

12 staff is ready to pull the trigger and issue 

13 this. 

14 In order for us to issue it, we would 

15 want to make sure that we have had all of the 

16 peer and technical review comments addressed 

17 including what we think may have been new 

18 today in the discussion we heard. And so I 

19 can’t commit that, but I would say that should 

20 be easier for us than reproducing a white 

21 paper, which would just simply be maybe cut 

22 and paste or -- I don’t know. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: Larry, if you cannot do that, 

24 then can we ask them to produce -- I’m almost 

25 certain that y’all have got the majority of 
184

1 this data. We know where, there’s all kinds 

2 of data at the test site about where the 

3 samples were, when they were taken. Y’all 

4 probably have it. If we cannot come up with a 

5 technical basis document, then come up with 

6 some type of a paper that discusses that, yes, 

7 number one, we had 14 million samples or 

8 however many it was, and where the locations 

9 of the samples were, and here are the 

10 locations where the workers were working, and 

11 take into effect the location of where the 

12 workers worked changed almost monthly. Is 

13 that not right? Because we put one down a 

14 hole; we shot it. We moved on to the next 

15 one. So that’s going to change tremendously 

16 especially with the workers that worked down 

17 Yucca and ^. 

18 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, can I ask another 

19 question? 

20 MR. PRESLEY: Go ahead. 

21 MR. ELLIOTT: It’s not clear, have we 

22 provided access to all of the data that we 

23 have used to make the revisions to the site 

24 profile? Does SC&A have access to that? Have 

25 we called their attention to it or not? 
185

1 MR. ROLFES: Everything that we have 

2 previously discussed has been put onto the O 

3 drive. I do have a number of RAD Safe reports 

4 and things that have been put for specific 

5 projects, et cetera, onto the O drive for 

6 SC&A’s review. 

7 Off the top of my head I don’t recall 

8 if there’s ambient monitoring data that have 

9 been put up there as well, but it may have 

10 been discussed. I can probably take a look. 

11 I may have some of it with me here. 

12 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I just wanted your 

13 general sense. We either have shared all or 

14 we may not have shared all. We should share 

15 all of that. 

16 MR. ROLFES: What’s been discussed should 

17 have been put up onto the O drive. So if we 

18 had it and referenced it during one of these 

19 discussions of the working group, it was made 

20 available for review. 

21 MR. ELLIOTT: Let me commit to this. I’ll 

22 check with staff and our fine support contract 

23 folks and see if we’re ready to pull the 

24 trigger on this chapter. I think there’s four 

25 chapters that have been revised. 
186

1 We’ve been holding the issuance of 

2 those up until we get to a threshold of 

3 understanding where we think we’ve got all of 

4 the issues captured in these revisions. 

5 Because once we issue these, we recognize that 

6 there will be increases in certain types of 

7 dose to certain individuals, not everybody, 

8 not in all instances. 

9 Where there is, we’ll have to have a 

10 program evaluation review, go back and revisit 

11 claims previously done. But we don’t want to 

12 start new dose reconstructions under a 

13 document, a series of documents, that have 

14 just been revised and yet have to do another 

15 PER on those in six months, eight months, a 

16 year’s time. So that’s why we’ve been holding 

17 out on issuing this. 

18 And I think it puts Gene at a 

19 disadvantage I think because he’s got to talk 

20 about a draft that he can’t talk about or 

21 share in great length and detail. So is that, 

22 will that -- I will commit to get back to you, 

23 the Chair, and the full working group and John 

24 with how soon we think we can issue this. And 

25 if we can’t issue it in an expeditious way, 
187

1 then we’ll give you something that explains 

2 what we have talked about doing here. Is that 

3 fair? 

4 MR. PRESLEY: Wanda? 

5 MS. MUNN: That seems a reasonable approach 

6 to me. My hope would be that we could have 

7 identified in a relatively short time whether 

8 or not we’re going to be able to release the 

9 new documents and then what needs to happen 

10 once those documents are on the street whether 

11 we can get a fairly expeditious response 

12 regarding their sufficiency to address the two 

13 issues. 

14 NTS SEC PETITION

15 MR. PRESLEY: Let me ask you something. Can 

16 we as a working group discuss at this point 

17 whether we think that the site profile can be 

18 taken to the Board, that we think it’s 

19 complete and ready to use or if we think it’s 

20 not complete and ready to use. There’s a 

21 caveat on that that at some point in time 

before we meet on the 24th 22 , or if we have to 

23 have a meeting sometime the afternoon of the 

23rd 24 to go ahead and ratify this thing, and 

25 say, yeah, this is what NIOSH has come up with 
188

1 and SC&A has looked at this and agrees. And 

2 then we at that point go on down the road. 

3 What I would like to do today is see 

4 if we are ready. We’ve heard a tremendous 

5 amount of data and stuff on this. If we’re 

6 ready to say, yes, we think that the site 

7 profile is good and it’s workable, and that we 

8 will, the working group, will say, yes, to the 

9 site profile. And then we will recommend to 

10 the Board, full Board, that the site profile 

11 be used. 

12 Or, no, we don’t think it is, and 

13 we’ll go back and discuss and whatever your 

14 issues are that you have, we’ll go back and 

15 get either SC&A or HHS to come in and help us 

16 rectify the problem that we have here. But I 

17 think that we really ought to talk about this 

18 today, what we plan on doing going down the 

19 road. 

20 I’d rather do it face to face than us 

21 have some kind of a conference call where we 

22 can’t hear or we all can’t get there. We’re 

23 really lucky today. We are all five here. We 

24 have some experts here with us that can 

25 discuss any of the problems that you might 
189

1 have. 

2 DR. ROESSLER: Bob, I like your idea of the 

23rd 3 in the afternoon. We’d all be there I 

4 assume or could be there. But it would depend 

5 on the schedule that’s being developed for the 

6 Mallinckrodt. 

7 MR. CLAWSON: Well, I know Josie and myself 

8 are coming in a day early so we could still 

9 keep the morning. 

10 DR. BRANCHE: A lot of other people have 

11 since responded so we’re going for, I’ve 

12 arranged for 1:30. But it’s only supposed to 

13 be like an hour. So if you wanted to -- 

14 Isn’t that right, Nancy? 

15 MS. ADAMS: Well, it’s an hour at the site. 

16 It’ll probably be half an hour, 45 minutes 

17 each way coming and going. 

18 DR. BRANCHE: If you wanted to have a 4:30, 

19 depending upon how long you think the meeting 

20 would require. 

21 MR. PRESLEY: Or any people coming in the 

morning of the 23rd or the night of the 22nd 22 . 

I plan on being up there the night of the 22nd 23 . 

24 DR. ROESSLER: I haven’t made arrangements 

25 yet. I can -- 
190

 MR. CLAWSON: I’m going to be there the 22nd 1 . 

2 MR. PRESLEY: Then why don’t we at this time 

3 we say, that gives SC&A and HHS ample time, I 

4 believe, that gives them a month to look at 

5 this and see where we stand. And that gives 

6 us the last little bit to look at what we’ve 

7 got and say yes or no. 

8 But I want to say yes or no today. I 

9 want to get a straw vote that says we have no 

10 problems except this issue, these two issues. 

11 Or, yes, we’ve got some issues, and then we 

12 can’t vote on it and go on down the road. 

13 MR. CLAWSON: Well, Bob -- and this is just 

14 my personal opinion -- I really hate putting 

15 out a product at the end that I can’t say 

16 totally, 100 percent yes or no, this is what 

17 it is. And if you’re to be looking from the 

18 outside in, yeah, we all agree this site 

19 profile is good except for this chunk over 

20 here. That’s one of my primary concerns that 

21 I have. Is just the perception that we’re 

22 leaving something undone. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: Well, Brad. We’re trying to 

24 get everybody’s, you know, it’s kind of a 

25 straw man vote I guess is why I’m asking. Do 
191

1 we want to do this or do we not want to do it? 

2 Larry, you have a question. 

3 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, do you say in your 

4 proposal that you’re either okay with the site 

5 profile being used or not being used? I take 

6 that to mean the revised site profile that is 

7 revisions that are based upon all of the 

8 discussion that you’ve had as a working group. 

9 MR. PRESLEY: That’s correct. 

10 MR. ELLIOTT: And so how can you say that 

11 unless you see it? And so I pulled Mel and 

12 Mark aside for a sidebar here to verify in my 

13 mind where they thought we were at on these 

14 four chapters. And they say they think we’ve 

15 covered the bases, and we’re ready to issue 

16 this. 

17 And I’m going to say let’s go ahead 

18 and issue them so that if you want to task 

19 SC&A with evaluating a piece of it, they’ll 

20 have that piece to look at. And they have the 

21 data available on the shared drive to confirm 

22 what we say. Is that okay? So that means we 

23 can make that happen within the next couple of 

24 days, right? 

25 MR. PRESLEY: How about it, working group? 
192

1 DR. ROESSLER: Well, then I -- 

2 MR. ROLFES: It would be Jim’s signature 

3 that would, so I can’t speak -- 

4 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I can make sure Jim will 

5 sign it. 

6 DR. ROESSLER: Then I think we need the 

7 equal response from SC&A that they would have 

8 the opportunity to look at it. And if we’re 

proposing this meeting on the 23rd 9 as the time 

10 we would make this decision, I think we need 

11 to know if John can be there or somebody -- 

12 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, John would tie into this 

13 also. 

14 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I’m trying to get it to 

15 him as quick as I can. 

16 DR. MAURO: As far as the issues we’ve been 

17 talking about, namely, this ambient exposure, 

18 as far as I’m concerned this is very 

19 tractable, very doable, and we’d certainly 

20 regroup at the time it’s convenient for anyone 

21 and go over those two analyses and readily 

22 come to a conclusion regarding Gene’s 

23 extrapolation model. I’m not concerned about 

24 that. 

25 Okay, Arjun, go ahead. 
193

1 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): You know, 

2 John, the ambient is in your bailiwick and 

3 Lyn, and so I don’t have a worry about that. 

4 I just think I heard Larry say that all four 

5 would be published, and I’m not clear what we 

6 would be tasked to do. And I understand there 

7 are quite a few internal dose issues that 

8 we’ve raised that would be reflected 

9 presumably in the new site profile. And I 

10 think the internal dose issues are rather 

11 complex. And if that’s what the working group 

12 is asking us to look at, I think you have to 

13 first see the site profile revision to give an 

14 estimate of how long it might take to do it. 

15 Because ambient dose we’ve looked at a lot and 

16 debated them a lot. But the internal dose 

17 revision has been a long time in coming, and I 

18 imagine it will have a complex series of ^. 

19 DR. MAURO: I’ll take that a little step 

20 further, and I was mentioning this to Wanda, I 

21 know that we’re trying to separate site 

22 profile from SEC. And I understand if at all 

23 desirable that would be great. And I think 

24 that there are two looming issues that we’ve 

25 been talking about as SEC issues. But I have 
194

1 a hard time seeing them as not also site 

2 profile issues. 

3 MR. PRESLEY: That’s correct. 

4 DR. MAURO: And so I guess all I could say 

5 to this is that certainly regarding ambient, 

6 we’re going to take care of that. That’s a 

7 done deal. I know we’re going to get home on 

8 that. I’m much, much more concerned about the 

9 issue we started talking about earlier today 

10 which has to do with being able to reconstruct 

11 internal doses using the 100 cases as a 

12 platform and the new data we’ve seen. This is 

13 fundamental for the site profile and, of 

14 course, the SEC. So I’m having trouble 

15 separating SEC issues from site profile 

16 issues. 

17 The same thing goes with external. 

18 Looming is the issue of badges left behind. 

19 We all are right now, SC&A’s right now in the 

20 middle of putting together a plan, and we’re 

21 ready to implement as soon as it’s approved by 

22 the work group to look into records to 

23 evaluate, look at the weight of evidence of 

24 this concern about badges left behind and the 

25 degree to which if that practice did indeed 
195

1 take place, that it could undermine the 

2 ability to construct a coworker model. 

3 Now both of those issues, to boil it 

4 all down, to me are looming large, fundamental 

5 to the SEC. I have a hard time separating 

6 them from the site profile. Because some 

7 place in the site profile you’re going to talk 

8 about how we’re going to reconstruct doses, 

9 internal doses. Well, what you’re telling me 

10 is the way you’re going to do it is not the 

11 old way but some new way. And we haven’t even 

12 scratched the surface of that. 

13 The same thing goes with the badges 

14 left behind. What happens if we find out that 

15 the badges left behind was very pervasive, and 

16 it does affect the upper end of the tail of 

17 the distribution of the external exposures 

such that the upper 95th 18 percentile that you 

19 pluck off from the distribution of external 

20 exposures has been compromised for the reasons 

21 we all understand? Or maybe it wasn’t. But 

22 we haven’t engaged that yet. We haven’t 

23 gathered that data yet. We haven’t looked at 

24 it. 

25 Mel, you certainly did a great job the 
196

1 last time you sat down and looked up the mine 

2 cases, and that really kicked off this 

3 process. The process now needs to be 

4 completed. You were the first to admit that, 

5 listen, we took a look at it, and we think 

6 it’s a tractable problem because the records 

7 are out there. And remember we talked about 

8 you would look at the film badge and the PICC 

9 and survey meter readings and the radiation 

10 work from that. 

11 Well, we got a handle on trying to, 

12 compiling a weight of evidence argument the 

13 degree to which this badges left behind was 

14 not only pervasive but possibly could 

15 undermine the reliability of the distribution 

16 we built. In my mind those go to the heart of 

17 the site profile as well as, of course, the 

18 SEC. 

19 MR. PRESLEY: I kind of disagree. The site 

20 profile is a document on the site itself. It 

21 says that Building A was here, and they did 

22 check in here, and we have data here. Now, 

23 when you get into the SEC petition, that is 

24 when we’re going to cuss and discuss whether 

25 or not everybody wore their badge, and if they 
197

1 didn’t wear their badge, and we find out that 

2 they didn’t, then, yes, that’s more of a issue 

3 that has to do with an SEC petition or an SEC 

4 evaluation going on. I see right now that the 

5 site profile is pretty well, we’ve kicked that 

6 around. 

7 Now, everybody tell me on the working 

8 group if I’m not, you know, if I’m wrong here, 

9 we’ll go back and start all over again. But 

10 whether they didn’t wear their badges or 

11 whether they did wear their badges, that’s 

12 more of a special exposure cohort problem than 

13 it is a site profile problem, to me. 

14 DR. ROESSLER: I think your question brings 

15 up this whole broader picture, and John was 

16 starting to get into it earlier, is just what 

17 do we mean when we approve a site profile. I 

18 mean, how does that apply then to a possible 

19 SEC evaluation, and how are they tied 

20 together. And I think this applies to every -

21 - 

22 MR. ELLIOTT: You’ve seen it in Bethlehem 

23 Steel. You all approved the Bethlehem Steel 

24 exposure model that we’ve used. Yet we 

25 qualified a petition based on the necessary 
198

1 criteria for evaluation, and we are still 

2 awaiting the Board’s decision on Bethlehem 

3 Steel as a class, but yet we have an approved 

4 exposure model. 

5 DR. BRANCHE: Do you have another example 

6 that is -- 

7 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, do you want me to go 

8 down a list? 

9 DR. BRANCHE: No, just one. 

10 MR. ELLIOTT: I think Bethlehem Steel is the 

11 prime one. But there are certainly others 

12 where you have a petition underway, and you 

13 have either an approved exposure, a dose 

14 reconstruction approach or you have a set of 

15 review comments about that approach that have 

16 not yet been resolved. But I don’t see any 

17 difference here. 

18 DR. BRANCHE: So approving a site profile 

19 does not mean that there’s an automatic 

20 approval or anything else about an SEC 

21 petition. It’s just one step among many. 

22 MR. ELLIOTT: I think it’s best to have an 

23 approved site profile in play to do dose 

24 reconstructions although we don’t have to have 

25 a site profile at all to do dose 
199

1 reconstructions. I think that whenever we 

2 have an SEC petition that meets the basis 

3 required in the rule, we owe the petitioner an 

4 answer to those bases that are spoken about. 

5 And my hope has always been that at 

6 some point we’ll find ourselves at a state 

7 where we have these reviewed documents, if you 

8 will, on the shelf that have no issues with 

9 them. And we can say they’re still living 

10 documents, but, gee, we don’t know what will 

11 change now because we don’t know what’s left 

12 to be done with them. We’re not there yet. 

13 So when we have a petition, we need to answer 

14 the basis for the petition. 

15 MR. PRESLEY: To me a site profile is very 

16 much a living document. 

17 MR. ELLIOTT: Would somebody tell me what 

18 the SEC-related issues are with NTS versus, 

19 you know, aside from the site profile issues? 

20 Because that’s of concern to us because that’s 

21 another reason why we’ve held up on issuing 

22 the site profile revision. Because it’s going 

23 to result in two PERs at least if we have 

24 major SEC issues that are not attended to in 

25 the site profile review. 
200

1 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Larry, could 

2 I respond just on behalf of where our team is, 

3 being the task manager for the SEC. We did 

4 send in mid-March a document to the working 

5 group which was our preliminary take on what 

6 the SEC issues were with NTS based on, you 

7 know, the site profile revisions that we had 

8 not seen yet so we have not reviewed what 

9 changes might happen based on the evaluation 

10 report and some new things that were there and 

11 the related discussions. 

12 Like Table 7-1 is a major example 

13 because it really defines a very large part of 

14 the internal dose problem. NIOSH took a 

15 certain approach that cumulative external 

16 doses are indicative of high exposure 

17 potential for internal dose. We’ve got 

18 cumulative data for external dose. We’ve got 

19 the internal dose data. We can make a 

20 coworker model. And we’re in the process of 

21 reviewing that. 

22 As Mr. Presley and the work group 

23 know, we’ve initiated a look at a very 

24 significant fraction of those hundred cases. 

25 And so from the point of view of internal dose 
201

1 we couldn’t sign off on a site profile that 

2 said we’re going to use a coworker model in 

3 the way the ER says without completing that 

4 work. And so that’s -- but at the same time, 

5 I mean, if NIOSH wants to use its existing, I 

6 mean, there’s nothing for SC&A to say if NIOSH 

7 is using the revised site profile to do dose 

8 reconstruction. 

9 Maybe I’m not clear on what your 

10 internal process is there. At least from my 

11 point of view looking over SEC issues, we’re 

12 in the middle of looking at those things, and 

13 it looks like a little bit of a difficult 

14 thing to come to a conclusion very soon. 

15 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun, this is Bob. You all 

sent out a revised draft on May the 6th 16 . 

17 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Mr. Presley, 

18 that was not a revised draft. It was 

essentially the same. The one on May the 6th 19 

20 was PA cleared so that it could be given to 

21 Mr. Reid’s office before we briefed them. 

22 Because that was going to follow that in the 

23 briefing and it had not been PA cleared. 

24 There were a couple of typos or something that 

25 were corrected, but it’s the same, and maybe 
202

1 there was a redaction or two, but it’s the 

2 same document as you had in mid-March. 

3 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Arjun. 

4 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): You’re 

5 welcome. 

6 MS. MUNN: This question of what constitutes 

7 a site profile is one that I think bothers a 

8 great many people. It would really help if we 

9 could clarify in our minds here exactly what a 

10 site profile is. I do believe that Bob has a 

11 strong point. 

12 It can be argued that a site profile 

13 should be a full description of what 

14 constituted the site, what structures and 

15 activities occurred on the site, and when 

16 those occurred. If we expect a site profile 

17 to address the issues that we encounter when 

18 we get into dose reconstruction or special 

19 exposure cohort issues, then it would be very 

20 difficult to ever resolve what a site profile 

21 is. 

22 Clearly, how work is performed and the 

23 monitoring data that is of record on a site is 

24 a reasonable part of a site profile, and one 

25 would expect to see it there. But how those 
203

1 data are used in dose reconstruction cannot be 

2 resolved prior to the acceptance of a site 

3 profile else we would never have a document 

4 unless we are looking at a site profile where 

5 there are no claimants. 

6 If we’re going to identify what a site 

7 profile for NTS is, then we have to segregate 

8 in our minds what the functions of other 

9 people outside this work group are. If I 

10 understand the work group’s charter correctly, 

11 it is for us to approve a site profile for the 

12 Nevada Test Site. 

13 If it is more than what I’ve just 

14 described, we need to say so right here and 

15 reconcile ourselves to the fact that we’re 

16 likely never going to have a completed site 

17 profile. 

18 MR. CLAWSON: Isn’t that why we call that a 

19 living document? I guess -- and I understand 

20 your frustration because I have the same 

21 frustration. As far as the TBD, it bothers me 

22 to hear a claimant say, well, they denied me 

23 this because according to the TBD this wasn’t 

24 there. What are we using the TBD for but for 

25 dose reconstruction? They’re calling out that 
204

1 these people were in these areas. They were 

2 doing these things. And this is what we use 

3 this for is dose reconstruction. 

4 So in my mind’s eye we’ve got to make 

5 sure that this TBD is as clear and direct as 

6 possible for all these things. Because this 

7 is what the -- and this is just my opinion -- 

8 this is what the dose reconstructors are using 

9 to be able to do this with. And this is why I 

10 guess I put so much emphasis on that it’s got 

11 to be done. 

12 We’ve got to cover every, uncover 

13 every rock and make sure that this technical 

14 database is correct for them. Because if 

15 we’re just saying what a site profile is, 

16 that’s all well and fine because basically 

17 these TBDs are like flying over any site at 

18 40,000 feet. It’s not getting into the nitty19 gritty. But they’re still using this to be 

20 able to reconstruct dose. 

21 MR. ROLFES: But the most important piece of 

22 data that we would use for a specific dose 

23 reconstruction would be that individual’s 

24 information within in their bioassay and/or 

25 dosimetry records. That information would be 
205

1 the number one most valuable piece of 

2 information over and above the site profile. 

3 As part of the dose reconstruction 

4 process we would use that dosimetry 

5 information and also evaluate the completeness 

6 of that data. If there was a determination 

7 made that that data was not complete, then we 

8 would consult the site profile to give us 

9 additional guidance on how to essentially fill 

10 in any gaps and make sure that we do it in a 

11 claimant favorable manner. 

12 MR. CLAWSON: And, Mark, I understand that, 

13 and I just last week had an individual come up 

14 to me that worked in this building for 25 

15 years. And he says, Brad, what do they say 

16 that I can’t be exposed to this because this 

17 building doesn’t exist? This was a chemical 

18 storage facility. So I had him take a picture 

19 and send back to you guys that this is a part 

20 of the building. 

21 Because -- and I understand what 

22 you’re saying. I really do. I understand 

23 that it’s actually the people’s dose records 

24 and so forth like that. But in a lot of 

25 cases, and we hear it time and time again, 
206

1 that they’re using the site profile for this. 

2 And this is why I put so much, such a personal 

3 emphasis on that I want to make sure that when 

4 we do approve these site profiles that it does 

5 have the correct information and so forth. 

6 And as [Identifying Information 

7 Redacted] has pointed out, we’ve got a lot of 

8 little flaws. And you know what? Nine times 

9 out of ten maybe they really won’t affect it 

10 because the boom tower was moved or calling 

11 out a different area or so forth like that. 

12 But we’ve got to make sure that this is the 

13 right product. And I know. It’s frustrating 

14 to me, too. I want to make sure that we get 

15 there though, and that’s my only concern. 

16 DR. ROESSLER: Brad, if we -- and I think 

17 you’re going in the right direction, but I’m 

18 thinking the next step. If we look at the 

19 site profile and we, as a working group, say 

20 it’s adequate, and one of the criteria is that 

21 it’s adequate for doing dose reconstruction, 

22 then haven’t we taken a big step toward the 

23 determination on the SEC? 

24 MR. CLAWSON: Well, you know -- 

25 DR. ROESSLER: Where does one stop and the 
207

1 other begin? 

2 MR. CLAWSON: -- you know, that’s been an 

3 interesting one to me, too. Where do they 

4 begin and so forth like that? And I do. I 

5 agree with you on that point there. The thing 

6 that’s interesting to me and that I really 

7 hate to see, but it’s going to go on forever 

8 as long as we do this, is that we approve the 

9 site profile and then we start going down in 

10 it, and as everybody has said, the TBD is a 

11 living document. All of a sudden we’re having 

12 to change things because all of a sudden some 

13 new information came in that we didn’t see, 

14 which is a glorious thing, but it also makes 

15 it look like why wasn’t this done in the first 

16 place. And I’m looking at it somewhat from a 

17 kind of a claimant. 

18 MR. ELLIOTT: Because we couldn’t do all 315 

19 sites in a year. 

20 MR. CLAWSON: And I realize that, Larry. 

21 And I’m not saying anything like that. We’ve 

22 got a large -- 

23 MR. ELLIOTT: I know you didn’t. But I 

24 would remind -- and I’m not trying to lecture 

25 here -- but remind the Board members that an 
208

1 SEC really has a two-part test that is couched 

2 in the rule, in the language, and dose 

3 reconstruction is covered under another rule, 

4 of course, but we talk about in dose 

5 reconstruction the different approaches that 

6 we use. 

7 And if, as we proceed in refining our 

8 abilities to reconstruct dose, and a variety 

9 of doses, we run across situations where we 

10 recognize in our site profile or a technical 

11 basis document that we need to bolster that 

12 section. We need to build it up. We need to 

13 beef it up. It doesn’t have enough detail 

14 reminding you all that site profiles, 

15 technical basis documents really are intended 

16 for an audience of health physicists to give a 

17 consistent approach in interpreting what 

18 happened at the site. 

19 And we don’t claim that we have all 

20 there is that should be interpreted in those 

21 documents. That’s why we call them living 

22 documents. And we want to get there some day 

23 but, you know, when we identify or when a 

24 claimant or a petitioner identifies, here’s a 

25 dose that you haven’t covered in your site 
209

1 profile that you can’t reconstruct, that’s 

2 where the SEC rule comes to bear. Can we? 

3 We have to evaluate it. We have to 

4 look at it. You have to review it. Can we 

5 reconstruct dose with sufficient accuracy? 

6 The rule for special exposure cohort petitions 

7 says that is defined as an ability to compound 

8 the dose or more precisely estimate the dose. 

9 Those are the words in the rule. 

10 And I think -- again, not trying to 

11 lecture or preach here, but I think we have to 

12 all go back and touch that stone once in 

13 awhile and say can we bound the dose or more 

14 precisely estimate the dose? If not, that 

15 truly is an SEC criteria that’s met, to add a 

16 class. 

17 MS. MUNN: And the capability of doing that 

18 is based in documentary evidence well outside 

19 of the site profile. The site profile is the 

20 platform, is the platform from which the dose 

21 reconstructor begins their understanding of 

22 what transpired at that place during those 

23 years. It’s just a platform. The information 

24 that’s necessary for dose reconstruction is 

25 over and above this platform. We need to 
210

1 establish a platform. 

2 DR. BRANCHE: But as Mark said, the site 

3 profile is one piece, and perhaps not the most 

4 central piece of information that’s used. 

5 I’ve been listening intently. I want to make 

6 certain that we all are not letting -- I don’t 

7 know how to say this because everyone’s 

8 brought up some very sensitive information -- 

9 but I think we owe the claimants moving 

10 forward. 

11 And I’m concerned that part of what I 

12 heard, Mr. Presley, is that we’re waiting for 

13 perfect, and a living document is always going 

14 to have, you’re always going to be able to add 

15 some information to improve what you know. 

16 And as you move into your responsibilities now 

17 to review the information for the SEC, and you 

18 find that something from the site profile or 

19 any other piece of evidence at your disposal 

20 is wanting, it’ll raise questions. 

21 If you had been given this task only 

22 as an SEC, you would have been reviewing 

23 information, and the site profile may not have 

24 been perfect then either. I’m not trying to 

25 rush you. I think you all have raised some 
211

1 very important issues, but the claimants are 

2 moving forward. They filed an SEC. You guys 

3 have been meeting according to the information 

4 that Mr. Presley put together since 2006. 

5 I just want to make certain that 

6 we’re, I’m concerned that I’m hearing -- I 

7 don’t mean to be repetitive -- but I’m 

8 concerned that I’m hearing waiting for 

9 something perfect, and I don’t think that if 

10 you use the word living document, that is ever 

11 going to be final. At least not, I don’t 

12 think there’s a criterion for it to be final. 

13 If we have site profiles that have 

14 always been improved upon, is that my 

15 understanding? More information, new evidence 

16 has always been added to every site profile. 

17 A site profile’s just one piece of information 

18 that all layers of this organism use to move 

19 forward in their work. 

20 DR. ROESSLER: I think the bottom line 

21 really is the issues we have left that we’re 

22 going to look at before we get together again, 

23 are they site profile issues or are they 

24 really SEC issues? And I’m tending now 

25 through this discussion to think they’re SEC 
212

1 issues. 

2 MR. PRESLEY: A lot of them are. 

3 DR. ROESSLER: And if that’s the case, then 

4 it seems like we could actually say -- 

5 MR. PRESLEY: If you go through SC&A’s 

6 working draft, I mean, look at what they have 

7 commented on, -- 

8 John, this is yours. 

9 -- you will see that a lot of what we 

10 have talked about pertains to SEC petitions. 

11 A lot of this we’ve gone over. It’s been 

12 kicked around. We’re going to have to kick 

13 this dog two or three more times. But there 

14 are things that are in this that are SEC 

15 issues. It’s not going to make one bit of 

16 difference to the site profile. It’s going to 

17 make a difference to the issue whether we 

18 accept it or we reject it. 

19 DR. BRANCHE: Well, and again, I go back 

20 actually to what I believe are your draft 

21 words. Unfortunately, I was not around when 

22 the work group was formed to first deal with 

23 the site profile, so I don’t have at my 

24 disposal what your charge was. But if Mr. 

25 Presley’s captured it accurately, your charge 
213

1 was to document accuracy and authenticity. I 

2 don’t know if that’s always taken as approve 

3 or disapprove. And so given that the site 

4 profile can change is it accurate with the 

5 best of the information that you have now. It 

6 might be your central question. 

7 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): this is 

8 Arjun. Could I ask a clarifying question? 

9 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun, speak up. 

10 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Can you hear 

11 me? 

12 DR. BRANCHE: Dr. Makhijani, you’ll need to 

13 speak up, please. 

14 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Can you hear 

15 me? 

16 DR. BRANCHE: Now. 

17 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): As I recall 

18 the Board appointed the same working group to 

19 look over the SEC issues and also authorized 

20 SC&A to start the process of SEC review which 

21 is why we’ve done a number of things and 

22 initiated a number so we’re proceeding in 

23 parallel. And I just wanted to make sure, you 

24 know, a number of these issues are being 

25 covered under our SEC review. 
214

1 And I just wanted to make that 

2 explicit in this context, that we are 

3 proceeding in parallel to examine a number of 

4 these issues. All of you know what those 

5 issues are. You have the document of March 

17th 6 . And I just wanted to be clear about that 

7 in case any Board member has a comment about 

8 it for us for our guidance. 

9 MR. PRESLEY: You’re 100 percent correct, 

10 Arjun. 

11 DR. MAURO: I have a bold statement I’d like 

12 to make. I believe that throughout the 

13 process we’ve been through for the last four 

14 years or so there are site profile issues that 

15 are not SEC issues. In other words what that 

16 means is that, yeah, there’s a technical issue 

17 here on how you’re going to solve this 

18 problem. We know it can be solved. It’s just 

19 a matter of judgment of how conservative you 

20 want to be given that you have the data. 

21 So there are always -- so the way I 

22 see it is you have site profile issues that 

23 some of which are also SEC issues but every 

24 SEC issue is a site profile issue. And that’s 

25 what I mean by a bold statement. You, in 
215

1 other words, it’s a -- and that’s what I see. 

2 I’d be more than happy to define that more, 

3 but that’s how I see it. 

4 MS. MUNN: Every SEC issue has some 

5 component in it that is a site profile issue, 

6 but it is not the basis for the SEC in most 

7 cases. I can probably dream up some fictional 

8 or potential cases where that might be true, 

9 but by and large SEC issues are dose 

10 reconstruction issues, not a question of where 

11 it was. 

12 Now Brad had a very good example, an 

13 addition that needs to be made to a site 

14 profile. He gave us that. And that’s a good 

15 thing. That’s exactly the kind of issue that 

16 anyone that I know who’s written a site 

17 profile would want to be made aware of. 

18 There’s a building there that somehow has 

19 missed, been missed, in our process. 

20 With the site profile, as I repeated, 

21 I’m repeating myself, was a platform from 

22 which both the SEC dose reconstruction and 

23 other issues have been built upon, not the 

24 reason for an SEC, not the part and parcel of 

25 it. So, yes, I agree partly with what John 
216

1 said, but there is still the assertion that I 

2 believe to be accurate. 

3 MR. CLAWSON: You know, Wanda, this is Brad. 

4 I agree. I think that part of the problems we 

5 get into is we start out with a site profile, 

6 and before we get the site profile, all of a 

7 sudden somebody throws an SEC on us. And it’s 

8 very difficult for me to really divide from 

9 where this is an SEC issue or is this really a 

10 site profile issue. And I don’t know if 

11 anybody else has that problem. Maybe I’m over 

12 too cautious or whatever. But I really do. I 

13 have a hard time figuring out because each 

14 little piece of that SEC that now we’re 

15 looking at is also part of a site profile 

16 problem, too. And so that’s why I have a 

17 problem, and maybe it’s just my problem, but I 

18 really have a hard time distinguishing kind of 

19 where -- 

20 MR. ROLLINS: No, you’re not alone. 

21 MR. CLAWSON: I know, I’m -- and that’s 

22 where I’m at on this. 

23 MS. MUNN: It’s difficult. And that’s why 

24 the citizens of the United States are treating 

25 us so well. It’s a hard decision. 
217

1 MR. PRESLEY: You know, it’s a hard thing to 

2 do, but at some point you have to draw that 

3 line between an SEC petition and that site 

4 profile. Say, we’re going to stop the site 

5 profile work here. We’re going to say yes or 

6 no. If we say no, then we’re not going to 

7 stop the site profile. We’re going to go on. 

8 If we say yes, then we’re going to 

9 start working on this SEC petition. And if 

10 something comes out of that SEC petition that 

11 needs to go back and let’s take a look at that 

12 site profile or it needs to be reworked in the 

13 site profile, it can be done. We’ll go 

14 forward. And all we’ve got to do is say item 

15 A, page 22, whatever it is, we had to rework 

16 this. Everybody looks at it. Now, this is my 

17 perception. And then we say that looks good 

18 or we agree with that, and the site profile 

19 revision goes on. 

20 MR. CLAWSON: But sometimes when we take and 

21 change a site profile, we also create another 

22 problem for NIOSH and that’s that they have to 

23 go back and reevaluate all the previous cases 

24 that they have just may have gone through. 

25 MR. PRESLEY: They’re going to have to do 
218

1 that anyway if we find something on the SEC. 

2 MR. ELLIOTT: But that’s a good thing 

3 because if there’s any change in compensation, 

4 that’s what we’re all here striving to do. 

5 MR. ROLFES: It’s our commitment to go back 

6 and revisit any cases that have been 

7 previously denied. 

8 DR. BRANCHE: So you’re saying, Larry, let’s 

9 not, again, let’s not wait to get it all right 

10 with the concern that it would force going 

11 back. 

12 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I have no idea -- here’s 

13 my problem. If you want to talk about my 

14 problem, my problem is managing what he just 

15 mentioned, the consequences of this body’s 

16 action. If this body says to us today that 

17 they want to take up and vote on the site 

18 profile and knock those issues down, and 

19 whatever issues are not knocked down, then you 

20 guys will have to comment to the Board about 

21 what they are and have to let the Board decide 

22 what they’re going to do with them. 

23 But if you say that, I’m happy because 

24 then we can move forward with our site profile 

25 and dose reconstructions under that site 
219

1 profile and one PER for that, Program 

2 Evaluation Review, to evaluate what the 

3 changes might have done for others who have 

4 already had their dose reconstructions. I’m 

5 happy with that approach. 

6 If you say, no, we’re going to hold 

7 off, and we’re going to work this site profile 

8 set of issues along with the SEC issues until 

9 we get it all resolved, then I’m going to tell 

10 you right here and now that’s not a happy spot 

11 for me to be in because I’d have to tell 

12 claimants that we’re not applying certain 

13 changes that we would apply. They’ll have to 

14 wait. That’s one message I have to deliver 

15 that’s not very happy, not very satisfying for 

16 me to give but factual for me to give. 

17 The other thing is, okay, yeah, we 

18 might only have to issue one PER on SEC issues 

19 and all of that, but it’s going to be on more 

20 claims. So it’s a trade off. I think you’re 

21 better off if you deal with the site profile 

22 issues and let us put that to bed, and then we 

23 take that -- many of those, I believe, will go 

24 away in Arjun’s list for the SEC, and what is 

25 left is what you have to discuss and resolve 
220

1 for the petition. I just think it’s a better 

2 approach. 

3 DR. ROESSLER: It seems like it’s more 

4 favorable to the claimants to just go ahead 

5 and do the -- 

6 MR. ELLIOTT: We know we’re going to make 

7 changes. We’ve agreed to making changes. 

8 DR. ROESSLER: And there’s nothing negative 

9 really. 

10 DR. BRANCHE: I think you should probably 

11 raise that because I was about to potentially 

12 take the risk with Larry of sounding a little 

13 crass. I’m a little less grateful what work 

14 it causes for NIOSH. I’m much more concerned 

15 about what it means for the claimants and the 

16 petitioners. So if you could put it more in 

17 that context than what it means for NIOSH, I 

18 think it then has the ring of a valuable 

19 question. 

20 MR. ELLIOTT: To clear the site profile 

21 issues and for us to implement a revised site 

22 profile in accordance with what you discussed 

23 puts the claimants in the best advantage 

24 possible for getting a dose reconstruction, 

25 especially those individuals who require the 
221

1 best estimate dose reconstruction we can 

2 provide a clear advantage. Otherwise, they’re 

3 disadvantaged but get what we can provide 

4 them. We may hold their claim. 

5 If they’re a best estimate, we may 

6 pend their claim until all of this is done. 

7 While we’re working on others, you know, our 

8 efficiency approaches would allow us to treat 

9 other claims under our existing site profile 

10 to get an answer, but then those would have to 

11 be reexamined. And so those people are going 

12 to get -- here’s frustration for the claimant. 

13 They’re going to get a message that 

14 says we’re going to reexamine your dose 

15 reconstruction because the site profile has 

16 changed and then they’re going to have their 

17 hopes very high that they’re going to get 

18 compensated out of that. And quite frankly, 

19 we don’t know what the rate of compensation 

20 will be under these changes. For certain 

21 cancers it may be and other cancers it may not 

22 be feasible to get compensated. 

23 So in the framework of the claimants 

24 perception, I think we’re serving them best if 

25 we get the site profile. You’re this close. 
222

1 We issue the site profile to you all. You can 

2 see how we’ve revised it. You can react to 

3 that, and hopefully, you can come to closure 

4 on that. 

5 And also, at the same time, it will 

6 knock down several -- I can’t give you a 

7 number, of course -- of the issues that are 

8 relevant to the SEC petition leaving you with 

9 just what whatever remains to be discussed. 

10 And the petitioner gets a better, I think a 

11 better evaluation that way because you’re not 

12 constantly, I hope, treading ground that’s 

13 already been walked through many times in a 

14 site profile. 

15 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): This is 

16 Arjun. Might I suggest something? If NIOSH 

17 publishes the new revised site profile that, 

18 at least so far as the SEC is concerned, we 

19 can go back and take a look at the list of 

20 issues we submitted and revise those issues 

21 and give you a work plan. 

22 I mean, there are some things in that 

23 list that are based purely on the evaluation 

24 report and are not dependent on things that 

25 are related to the site profile revision 
223

1 because they carried over awaiting the site 

2 profile republication. 

3 So I think at least from the SEC point 

4 of view it may simplify matters, reduce the 

5 work potentially that we would do, and reduce 

6 the number of issues, and also maybe allow us 

7 to put some issues to bed and say this is not 

8 an SEC issue so it can be then dealt with 

9 purely in a site profile framework. It might 

10 disentangle things a little bit in my opinion. 

11 MR. ELLIOTT: I’ve already given orders to 

12 issue the revisions to the site profile. So I 

13 don’t think, but yes, I’ve already given 

14 those. 

15 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): What I was 

16 simply saying is that on publication if in the 

17 SEC work we could -- I’m just clarifying that. 

18 I’d like to take on that review just from the 

19 point of view of revising the work plan to the 

20 extent that it needs to be revised based on 

21 the republication. That’s all I wanted to 

22 say. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun? 

24 (no response) 

25 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun? 
224

1 (no response) 

2 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun. 

3 (no response) 

4 DR. BRANCHE: Dr. Makhijani? 

5 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Yes, yes, 

6 sorry. I was unmuting. 

7 MR. PRESLEY: What you’re saying is you 

8 would like to revise the work plan that came 

9 out in March in the revision in May? 

10 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Well, it may 

11 or may not need revision, but there are some 

12 parts of that work plan that I think are 

13 dependent on the site profile revision. There 

14 are other parts that are not dependent. So 

15 those parts will not need to be revised, but 

16 some parts may need to be revised. We just 

17 have to look at the revision of the site 

18 profile, and then I can make a judgment for 

19 you and send you a memorandum. 

20 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

21 We’ve gone through this today. Does 

22 anybody have any stirring issues that this 

23 site profile cannot be accepted? 

24 MS. MUNN: My only concern is our ability to 

25 take a look at the revision that’s coming out 
225

1 for Section Four and working on the assumption 

2 that that revision will be available for 

3 adequate review and technical discussion prior 

4 to our working group meeting. And it does not 

5 appear that either of the issues is 

6 intractable. And it would seem logical for us 

7 to make every effort and expectation to be 

8 able to approve this site profile as a 

9 recommendation to the Board in our upcoming 

10 Board meeting assuming that that is a decision 

11 following -- 

12 MR. PRESLEY: And there’s no showstoppers in 

13 any way stopping us going ahead. 

14 MS. MUNN: Correct. 

15 MR. PRESLEY: And so we’ve got that to go 

16 through. Arjun’s going to take a look at it 

17 and get back with us before then. If there 

18 are showstoppers, we stop right there and 

19 start all over again. If there are no 

20 showstoppers, in my estimation then I have no 

21 problems with accepting this thing as is and 

22 moving on to the SEC petition. 

23 DR. ROESSLER: And are you suggesting that 

24 we should accept it today or -- 

 MR. PRESLEY: No, no. No, no, the 23rd 25 . 
226

1 DR. ROESSLER: -- because I think that we -- 

2 MR. PRESLEY: I want to meet, if everybody 

3 can, I would like to meet the morning of the 

23rd 4 at nine o’clock at the hotel in St. Louis. 

5 Christine, do we have time to set that 

6 meeting? 

7 DR. BRANCHE: Yes, you do. Wait a minute, 

8 excuse me. There is time for it based on some 

9 of the information that I received from 

10 various people with my question about whether 

11 or not they wanted to go to Mallinckrodt. It 

12 was not clear that everyone from NIOSH, and I 

13 have no idea about the SC&A staff, were 

14 necessarily going to arrive the evening before 

15 they were going to come -- 

16 MR. PRESLEY: We’re going to find that out 

17 right now. 

18 DR. BRANCHE: So you can have it either the 

morning of or the afternoon of the 23rd 19 . 

20 MR. PRESLEY: I would rather have it in the 

21 morning if we possibly can, and I’ll tell you 

22 why. Everybody’s going to be fresh. If we go 

23 out and go through the Mallinckrodt thing, 

24 they may be hot and sweaty, and everybody may 

25 be tired by then. I would like to have it at 
227

1 nine o’clock in the morning where everybody’s 

2 fresh; we’ve got at least four hours to 

3 discuss this thing, and then if something, 

4 that don’t work, then we’ve got that night to 

5 come back together again. 

6 DR. BRANCHE: Unless somebody else wants a 

7 work group -- 

8 DR. ROESSLER: That’s motivation. 

9 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun. 

10 (no response) 

11 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun. 

12 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Yes, Mr. 

13 Presley. 

14 MR. PRESLEY: Can you make it on the morning 

of the 23rd 15 ? 

16 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): Yes, I 

17 believe I can do that. 

18 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. 

19 How’s SC&A’s -- I mean, not SC&A, 

20 NIOSH? 

21 MR. ROLFES: As far as I’m aware I’ll 

22 certainly be able to make myself available for 

23 the meetings. 

24 MR. CLAWSON: Larry just said you would. 

25 MS. MUNN: Bright and early Monday morning. 
228

DR. BRANCHE: Monday, June 23rd 1 . 

2 DR. MAURO: We will be wherever you want us 

3 to be. 

4 DR. BRANCHE: And I already know the court 

5 reporter will be there. 

6 MR. CLAWSON: Bob, may I offer a suggestion, 

7 too. If this is the case, and as we go 

8 through this, you need to give yourself some 

9 time to be able to present this to the rest of 

10 the Board members. 

11 MR. PRESLEY: We have to do that. 

12 MR. CLAWSON: I realize that but not five or 

13 ten minutes because there’s going to be -- 

14 MR. PRESLEY: I’ll tell you what I’m going 

15 to do. I plan on writing some type of a draft 

16 presentation that says we accept or we don’t 

17 accept. If we don’t accept, it will deal with 

18 that. If we accept then we go through. But I 

19 plan on writing the draft and trying to get it 

20 to you all before we ever go to St Louis. 

21 MR. CLAWSON: And I realize that. I just, I 

22 know that lots of the other Board members have 

23 asked numerous ones of us, because it’s on any 

24 site profile and so forth like that, you know, 

25 questions of how are you guys addressing this 
229

1 or so forth. And so these things come up. I 

2 just want to make sure you have adequate time 

3 to do it. 

4 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 

5 DR. BRANCHE: And let me ask this because I 

6 think Brad raised it. He anticipated, 

7 certainly, my question. As you know there is 

8 a work group update, that there is a provision 

9 available. And Ms. Munn did this at that 

10 Tampa meeting where a specific time was set 

11 aside for her with Kathy Behling to go over 

12 specific issues in an isolated timeframe to 

13 deal only with Procedures. 

14 Now is the time to tell me if you 

15 would like to have a special set-aside time to 

16 present to the Board. Do you want to use 

17 PowerPoint, that kind of thing, do all of 

18 that. I mean, I think this is a good 

19 recommendation. You can do it in 30 minutes. 

20 You can do it in 45 minutes. You can tell me 

21 how much time. But now is the time to tell me 

22 as I’m preparing the agenda. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: I don’t have PowerPoint. I’ll 

24 have to make my notes up and give them to Gen, 

25 and Gen can -- if she doesn’t mind doing that. 
230

1 DR. ROESSLER: We could change it that day 

2 if we wanted to. 

3 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 

4 DR. BRANCHE: So you want, that’s fine. We 

5 can make provision for PowerPoint. Now the 

6 question is do you want 30 minutes, 45 minutes 

7 or an hour? 

8 MR. PRESLEY: Why don’t we shoot for 45 

9 minutes? 

10 Now, somebody said that they were not 

11 going to be there on some certain days. Is 

12 that a figment of my imagination or did 

13 somebody say -- 

14 MR. CLAWSON: I leave the very last day. 

15 I’ve got to leave by 12:30. 

16 DR. BRANCHE: Oh, we wouldn’t have this on 

17 the last day. 

18 MR. PRESLEY: That’s what it was. I’m 

19 sorry. So we need to make sure that Brad is 

20 there. 

21 Now, the other thing was, Mark, if 

22 you’re going to be there Monday, is there any 

23 way, do you have anything to do, anything 

24 coming up Tuesday? 

25 MR. ROLFES: I’d have to check my calendar 
231

1 back at work but off the top of my head I 

2 don’t have anything that I’m aware of. 

3 MR. PRESLEY: What I’m trying to say is, you 

4 know, other than hold Mark and other people, 

5 if we could have this thing, we’re having our 

6 meeting on Monday, and then go into this 

7 Tuesday, then that would give Mark a chance to 

8 go home Wednesday. 

9 MR. ROLFES: Don’t worry about me. 

10 DR. BRANCHE: I have to work with many 

11 issues. 

12 MR. PRESLEY: That’s an issue that’s Larry’s 

13 group. 

14 DR. BRANCHE: Yeah, I can understand that, 

15 but there are a number of pushy people to get 

16 their stuff on the agenda when they want it. 

17 So I’m just going to -- but you know I love 

18 you, Bob, so -- actually, I love his wife, 

19 too, so that could help. But let me just make 

sure I’m understanding, Monday the 23rd 20 you 

21 want to begin at 9:00 a.m., but how much time 

22 do you think they’ll need? I’m looking for us 

23 to leave around 12:30 or 1:00. 

24 MR. PRESLEY: That’s what I was going to 

25 say. Why don’t we go from 9:30 ‘til 11:00? 
232

1 DR. BRANCHE: Nine to 11:30 or 9:30 to 

2 11:00? 

3 MR. PRESLEY: Nine to 11:30. 

4 DR. BRANCHE: Yeah, that way people can grab 

5 some lunch. 

6 MR. PRESLEY: And that will give us an hour 

7 and a half to grab lunch and get ready to go 

8 on the tour. 

9 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, that’ll be good. 

10 MR. PRESLEY: And as I understand it the 

11 tour is going to be a facility tour also. Is 

12 that correct? 

13 DR. BRANCHE: It should take one hour to do 

14 everything that we’ve been told is available 

15 to us. 

16 MS. ADAMS: There’s not a facility per se. 

17 DR. BRANCHE: There’s a museum center thing, 

18 but it’s not a site tour like -- 

19 MR. PRESLEY: Right, right, I understand 

20 that. But somebody’s going to explain what -- 

21 DR. BRANCHE: I’m trying to get all the 

22 particulars on that even today. 

23 MR. PRESLEY: It’s 20 minutes until 3:00. 

24 We have some people that have to catch planes. 

25 We have SC&A’s working draft and Arjun has 
233

1 just stated that he would like to go through 

2 what OCAS sends us and then come up with more 

3 comments. What I’m thinking about is let’s 

4 not start into these SEC petition comments 

5 now, but wait until SC&A has had time to 

6 comment this and that the working group has 

7 had comment time to look at the information 

8 that we’re going to get, and we will start on 

9 the SEC fresh down the road. 

10 MR. CLAWSON: Well, that brings up a 

11 question. As we go from the site profile to 

12 the SEC, are we going to keep the same report 

13 group people? 

14 MR. PRESLEY: Well, my understanding, yes. 

15 DR. BRANCHE: We made that decision at the 

16 Board meeting when this work group was 

17 created. It was agreed at that time, yes. 

18 MR. CLAWSON: I just want to make sure. 

19 MR. PRESLEY: Everybody’s got too much up 

20 here to stop and start all over again. 

21 DR. BRANCHE: Do you have any concerns or 

22 objections you need to -- 

23 MR. CLAWSON: No, no, I just want to make -- 

24 MR. PRESLEY: No, let’s don’t do that. 

25 Let’s keep the same people. 
234

1 Does anybody have anything for the 

2 good of the work group? 

3 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): I’d just like 

4 to clarify -- this is Arjun. I just want some 

5 clarification. As I said earlier everybody, 

6 the working group members do understand that 

7 we are proceeding, since my understanding and 

8 John’s was we were authorized to look at the 

9 SEC. We’ve prepared the work plan, and we’re 

10 proceeding on some of the items, not all of 

11 them. 

12 But we are, for instance, putting a 

13 lot of work on understanding Table 7-1, 

14 compiling the data, seeing what internal 

15 data’s available and things like that. So I 

16 just want to make sure that everybody 

17 understands that and is okay with it because 

18 otherwise things will get very dragged out. 

19 And, of course, it’s the pleasure of the 

20 working group, but that’s what we’re currently 

21 doing. 

22 MR. PRESLEY: As I understand it, you all 

23 were given permission to do that when we 

24 decided to, after the working group. 

25 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): And if anyone 
235

1 has comments on that work plan in the interim, 

2 therefore, you know, potentially ^ that they 

3 might have. 

4 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Arjun. 

5 Anybody else have anything? 

6 (no response) 

7 MR. PRESLEY: Mel, we appreciate you all’s 

8 help very much. 

9 MR. CHEW: You’re very welcome. 

10 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, all you do. 

11 DR. BRANCHE: We didn’t deal with this in 

12 the meeting today, but your write up of your 

13 work group that Dr. Ziemer requested, I 

14 believe that what has been requested, this is 

15 going to go on the website. So I would 

16 actually suggest something more along the 

17 lines of a paragraph to a half a page 

18 description of what the charge is and not so 

19 much what your history of working together is. 

20 MR. CLAWSON: It’s hard to believe Dr. 

21 Ziemer asked for three or four lines. 

22 MS. MUNN: My instructions were three 

23 sentences. 

24 MR. PRESLEY: We’ll say what Wanda said, 

25 three lines, no more. 
236

1 DR. BRANCHE: Are you finished, Mr. Presley? 

2 MR. PRESLEY: Has anybody else got anything 

3 else? 

4 (no response) 

5 MR. PRESLEY: One thing I’d like to say is 

6 when we come together remember that this is a 

7 living document. When we come together on the 

23rd 8 if the issues, make sure that they pertain 

9 to what we are doing. I don’t want to come in 

on the morning of the 23rd 10 and there’ll be 15 

11 or 20 more issues and we just have to stop and 

12 beat the bushes on. 

13 Yes, sir, Gene. 

14 MR. ROLLINS: In regard to what you just 

15 said, if there are issues, and I can’t imagine 

16 there wouldn’t be some minor points of 

17 discussion, will we have an opportunity to see 

18 those prior to, I mean, the sooner that we 

19 could see them the more expedient our 

20 discussion would be. 

21 MR. CLAWSON: Well, one of the issues is, 

22 falls under the Department of Labor that we 

23 kept hearing with Tonopah and other areas. 

24 Those I’d really like to be able to see 

25 something in writing that they explain, well, 
237

1 that one’s been taken care of. We’ve talked 

2 about, you and I, but there’s nothing been 

3 official. 

4 DR. ROESSLER: What was that, Brad? 

5 MR. CLAWSON: One of the issues that came 

6 out of this was in the earlier years at Nevada 

7 Test Site, they used to take part of the 

8 workforce and go to Tonopah, but also they 

9 took some out to Area 51. As Area 51 doesn’t 

10 exist, become more nonexistent, that stopped. 

11 But in the earlier years they were using 

12 Nevada Test Site people to be able to help 

13 perform a lot of the work and so forth out 

14 there, same as Tonopah Test Site. And I sent 

15 a letter to Jeff Kotsch on that. And he said 

16 that he was going to look into that and would 

17 get back with us. And I just wanted to make 

18 sure that -- 

19 MR. ELLIOTT: There is a letter also from 

20 Senator Reid’s office to the Department of 

21 Energy, the Department of Labor and to us at 

22 NIOSH about this issue. And essentially, 

23 we’re waiting to see DOL’s letter about the 

24 facility coverage at Nevada Test Site. It’s 

25 DOL’s responsibility to -- 
238

1 MR. PRESLEY: I understand that DOL has been 

2 told to add the Tonopah facility, but that 

3 Area 51 does not exist. 

4 MR. CLAWSON: Right, and I just want to make 

5 sure, you know, this is, to me this is a site 

6 profile issue. 

7 MR. PRESLEY: It is, but let me explain 

8 something. 

9 MR. CLAWSON: But it’s also kind of -- 

10 MR. PRESLEY: Area 51 did not start off. It 

11 was all the Tonopah Test Range there in the 

12 early days. Area 51 really did not take off 

13 and get its name until they started doing 

14 classified -- 

15 MR. CLAWSON: The stuff we’re not doing. 

16 MR. PRESLEY: -- the stuff that they’re not 

17 doing up there. And then it came into being 

18 an Area 51. In the early days, you know, to 

19 me if somebody went to Tonopah and worked, 

20 they could have been anywhere on the Tonopah 

21 Test Range working. 

22 And, Larry, if I’m not right there, 

23 let me know. 

24 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I would just say that 

25 what’s pertinent here is to the site profile, 
239

1 Brad, what’s pertinent here for this working 

2 group and its discussions about the site 

3 profile is that our site profile has to pass 

4 the covered facility designations. And that’s 

5 what we get done. That’s what we’re all 

6 working toward a better version of. We cannot 

7 step out of that and say, well, what are we 

8 going to do about Area 51. What are we doing 

9 about Tonopah? We can’t touch those until 

10 they become a legal covered facility 

11 designation. 

12 MS. HOWELL: It’s a determination that can 

13 only be made by the Department of Labor. 

14 MR. CLAWSON: And through this process this 

15 is how we have to get the Department of Labor 

16 to make the determination. If not, we all 

17 understand being with these different entities 

18 is that problem. And it’s hard for you guys 

19 to be able to implement something and then 

20 down the road, well, they might recognize 

21 that. And I’ve seen some of the e-mails back 

22 and forth. But that’s just kind of some of 

23 the stuff I wanted to make sure that, because 

24 we’ve heard it so many times, I want the 

25 petitioners to be able to understand that it 
240

1 has been addressed by this group. 

2 MR. PRESLEY: Very much so. 

3 FUTURE ACTIONS

4 MR. ELLIOTT: What actions are owed here? 

5 Did we commit anything from the discussion 

6 earlier today that -- 

7 Gene, did you have any action items 

8 that you committed to? I wasn’t clear. You 

9 were going to do –- 

10 MR. ROLLINS: Before they knew that they 

11 were going to get a copy of the documents, we 

12 were going to look at a few things. 

13 But I think it’s my concern for having 

14 a structured back and forth dialogue would be 

15 let them look at the documents which you have 

16 now released. And then the concerns that they 

17 have, if they can get those to me, if I can be 

in a position to discuss those on the 23rd 18 . 

19 MR. PRESLEY: Well, that, too, or discuss 

them prior to the 23rd 20 and try to iron out 

21 those issues so that when we get, you know, we 

22 need to know what the issues were. I would 

23 like for somebody to be able to say this is 

24 what the issue is. We’ve ironed the issue 

out. I don’t want to get there on the 23rd 25 and 
241

1 find out that we’re going to have to -- 

2 MR. ROLLINS: We need a dialogue prior to 

the 23rd 3 , and your response to the documents. 

4 If they can get that back to us, then we can 

5 start the dialogue. 

6 MR. ELLIOTT: The actions owed here is NIOSH 

7 to deliver the revised technical basis 

8 documents and chapters that we have right now. 

9 And then as soon as SC&A can identify any 

10 issues that they still have with them, let us 

11 know so that we can be prepared. And if not, 

12 have already talked through some of them and 

13 be able to express where we’re at on those at 

14 your meeting. 

15 MR. PRESLEY: That’s correct. 

16 MR. ELLIOTT: And then I understood that 

17 Arjun was going to take also the revised 

18 chapters and rub them against his SEC profile 

19 list and knock down what he could of, you 

20 know, expand upon what he needed to. 

21 DR. MAKHIJANI (by Telephone): I hope that I 

can do that before the 23rd 22 , but it depends on 

23 how many revisions there are, and what I have 

24 to do. 

25 MR. PRESLEY: I have great faith in you, 
242

1 Arjun. 

2 MR. ELLIOTT: I think that’s all that we -- 

3 MR. SCHOFIELD: Remember, you’ve got 24 

4 hours a day to work. 

5 MR. PRESLEY: Anybody else have anything? 

6 (no response) 

7 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you all for coming. 

8 We’ll see you, we’ll see some of you up here 

9 on the tenth. 

10 DR. BRANCHE: Thank you very much. We’re 

11 adjourned. 

12 (Whereupon, the work group meeting was 

13 adjourned at 3:00 p.m.) 

14 
243

1 LETTERS SUBMITTED INTO THE RECORD

2 April 19, 2008, John Vance, Department 

3 of Labor, EEOICPA, Washington, D.C. 

4 Dear John, 

5 In response to your e-mail request of 

6 April 18, 2008, related to my issues with the 

7 TBD and the site profile of Nevada Test Site 

8 the following is the list of problems that 

9 presently exist. 

10 1) There is no site expert. 

11 Information that was used to write the current 

12 site profile was acquired from Mr. William J. 

13 Brady, former head of RAD Safe NTS, from his 

14 death bed. There were numerous other sources 

15 that could have been used to obtain more 

16 accurate and better information. However, 

17 NIOSH chose to ignore those sources even 

18 though I actively attempted to gather that 

19 information for them. And even now it is only 

20 through efforts by myself and Dr. Lyn Anspaugh 

21 that this information is now being corrected 

22 at personal expense to myself, which NIOSH was 

23 paid handsomely to do. 

24 2) Site profile fails to fully 

25 articulate the many and varied types of 
244

1 experiments that were conducted at Nevada Test 

2 Site besides nuclear weapons testing there 

3 were many many other types of research that 

4 was conducted there, such as those tests at 

5 the Nuclear Rocket Development Site, EMAD and 

6 RMAD which was used for the purpose of 

7 developing nuclear rockets, nuclear jets and 

8 assorted types of nuclear reactor tests. Also 

9 the weapons testing which involved underground 

10 tunnel testing, underground shaft testing, and 

11 down hole testing, stemmed and unstemmed which 

12 pose all different problems. There were also 

13 numerous above ground testing which also 

14 created many re-suspension problems of above 

15 ground contaminents (sic) which have not been 

16 accurately addressed. 

17 3) Site profile states there were no 

18 bomb assembly activities or machining of bomb 

19 components and parts. However, I have proven 

20 there were numerous sites and places including 

21 on-site bomb assembly and numerous locations 

22 where machining did take place throughout the 

23 testing period. 

24 3a) The site profile states there were 

25 RADX yards at various locations where RADX 
245

1 procedures were done to the building and 

2 equipment that were used for the testing. 

3 However, I have produced scientists who used 

4 those building and equipment who have 

5 testified that no such procedures took place 

6 or no such locations other than CP-6 and the 

7 Mercury disposal yard were ever used in any 

8 RADX purposes. 

9 4) Site profile states that all 

10 contaminated areas at the Nevada Test Site 

11 were fenced and posted. However, I have 

12 produced documentation from the DOE from as 

13 late as 1996 that clearly states that no such 

14 posting or fencing had been done anywhere on 

15 the Test Site four full years after the 

16 testing period. 

17 5) Job classifications being used on 

18 dose reconstructions are clearly dated post 

19 1992, which was obviously not correct, as when 

20 Bechtel took over for REECO many of the job 

21 classifications had been changed and locations 

22 of support areas had been changed and last of 

23 all no weapons testing was done after 1992 as 

24 well, so any reference to post 1992 job 

25 classifications are totally inaccurate. 
246

1 6) Site profile states that REECO 

2 initiated a very aggressive and active BIO 

3 ASSAY program and a medical full body count. 

4 However, I have proven that BIOASSAY was 

5 volunteer and only offered to those personnel 

6 who were least likely to be exposed, and full 

7 body count which was also volunteer was only 

8 done to very few people who left employment at 

9 the Test Site. 

10 7) Site profile states that only those 

11 people with Q- clearance worked in areas where 

12 exposure was possible, however, I have proven 

13 this also to be untrue, as I have produced a 

14 REECO handbook which clearly states that red 

15 and orange badges did work in all of the areas 

16 along side Q- clearance badges as long as they 

17 were escorted by a Q- cleared person. 

18 8) Site profile does not fully address 

19 areas of work and their importance in the 

20 scope of man power that worked in these areas 

21 examples: area 2 and area 3 shop areas, have 

22 been minimized by describing them as two small 

23 areas where a few butler buildings were 

24 located, when in fact areas 2 and 3 each 

25 encompassed over 80 acres a piece and had over 
247

1 80 buildings each and was the daily work 

2 location of over 700 people. Well 3 drilling 

3 yard has not even been mentioned at all and 

4 well 3 drilling yard encompassed over 60 acres 

5 and was the work location of over 250 people. 

6 9) Many areas such as the Tweezers, 

7 Atlas and Super Kukla facilities are mentioned 

8 by name in the site profile. However they are 

9 not given any consideration in the tables 

10 documents which the dose re-constructors use 

11 to reconstruct dose. 

12 10) The old site profile tells dose 

13 re-constructors to ignore any neutron 

14 radiation after 1962 because after open air 

15 testing there were no sources of neutron 

16 radiation, however, there were many sources of 

17 neutron radiation after 1962, such as the BREN 

18 tower and the HENRE Experiments after it was 

19 relocated to area 25 and the BREN tower 

20 experiments located in area 4 which was in 

21 very close proximity to the Orange road which 

22 was the original road to area 12 and beyond, 

23 and was used daily by workers traveling back 

24 and forth. 

25 11) Original site profile states that 
248

1 the soils on NTS were hard and rocky and 

2 nothing grew there, however, the entire Yucca 

3 flat is a very soft aluvia (sic) formation 

4 that is soft enough to leave foot prints when 

5 walked upon and hundreds of millions of sage 

6 brush plants grow and are torn out of the 

7 ground by high winds every day of the year, 

8 which also contributes to the re-suspension. 

9 12) Site profile does not address the 

10 amount of construction activity that took 

11 place on contaminated open air testing ground 

12 such as the Yucca flats testing pads which 

13 were all 30 acres a piece and usually 30 shots 

14 per year not to mention the miles of access 

15 roads and construction roads that were used in 

16 the building of the pads it also does not 

17 address the 1000 ton main drilling rig that 

18 was 15 stories tall and dragged through the 

19 desert by 6 bull dozers from one test hole to 

20 the other test hole on a weekly basis which 

21 required a 100 foot wide access roads to be 

22 graded out in front of it for passage which 

23 also contributed to the re-suspension. 

24 13) Site profile describes post shot 

25 in a very sterile and controlled manner where 
249

1 state of the art radiation detection and the 

2 extensive use of signs and in their 

3 description of post shot recovery as a 

4 singular one time only operation, when in fact 

5 re-entry was actually done in numerous phases 

as many as seven times. Example: 1st 6 re-entry 

7 was done for assessment of damage and 

monitoring 2nd 8 re-entry was done for quick 

recovery of critical data 3rd 9 re-entry was done 

10 to stabilize building and leveling and total 

recovery of data, 4th 11 re-entry was done to 

12 begin removing test buildings and trailers. 

5th re-entry was done to set up post shot, 6th 13 

14 re-entry was done to remove post shot, there 

15 were no fencing other that the post shot drill 

16 area and there were no state of the art 

17 radiation detection until the post shot 

18 operation was set up which usually took place 

19 4-5 weeks after the original re-entry had been 

20 done. 

21 14) Site profile states that all the 

22 radiation detection was done with state of the 

23 art detection equipment however if you refer 

24 to the YUBA incident you will find out that 

25 the state of the art detection equipment was 
250

1 actually broken and did not work and data had 

2 to be brought into Las Vegas and be processed 

3 through the EPA testing equipment to determine 

4 what levels of radiation had taken place at 

5 the NTS. 

6 15) Site profile states that 

7 information on film badge exposures was 

8 unquestionable and accurate to a certainty. 

9 However, former area 3 Manager, Glenn Claytons 

10 [Identifying Information Redacted] upon 

11 acquiring his records found very clearly in 

12 writing on DOE and REECO documents that film 

13 badge information had been extensively 

14 modified to keep from laying people off from 

15 over-exposures. This was not an isolated 

16 event but had been a common on-going practice 

17 with many employees as attested to by the 

18 information she was given by the DOE. 

19 16) Site Profile does not address the 

20 numerous toxins and chemical exposures 

21 employees were subject to as in example of my 

22 case that was uncovered by the DOL where it 

23 was discovered after 7 long years that I had 

24 been telling the truth of my exposures to 

25 Lithium Hydride, Mercuric Chloride, Arsenic, 
251

1 Cyanide, Beryllium, Benzene and Asbestos based 

2 products. Even though it was admitted by the 

3 DOE that they had buried in the land fill all 

4 of the MDSD sheets and information related to 

5 the toxins and chemicals the site profile 

6 fails to address these exposures which people 

7 would have encountered in the work place. 

8 17) Site profile fails to articulate 

9 the size and scope in acreage or square miles 

10 the size of the NTS, or the amount of testing 

11 that took place there. Examples: site 

12 profile does not mention area 2, area 3, area 

13 12 and area 6 however they fail to fully 

14 explain how these four areas also encompassed 

15 the rest of the site which would have included 

16 area 5, 4, 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 20, 17, 15, 25, 

17 and 27 in all the areas not listed. Which are 

18 areas that nuclear testing also took place. 

19 18) Information used by does re20 constructors from the site profile also uses 

21 employee time cards, which do have an area of 

22 the card that denotes location of work. 

23 However, NTS has always used the positive cash 

24 flow system which ear marks funds to each 

25 individual test and using these time cards as 
252

1 a source of location of employees work would 

2 be sufficient provided the work was done to 

3 perfection, but this was not the case. 

4 Example: If a drill rig in the course of 

5 drilling the main hole was to encounter what 

6 is termed a dog-leg or a bend in the hole this 

7 would require the drill rig to remain over the 

8 hole for an additional 2-3 weeks reaming out 

9 the hole so that the 160 foot rack could get 

10 by the dog-leg, if a drill was to remain on a 

11 hole 3-4 weeks past the allocated time period 

12 it would exhaust the funds for that test and 

13 the test would continue to go on, however it 

14 would be necessary to take money allocated 

15 from other tests and use it to conduct work on 

16 that site which would show an employee working 

17 at the site of the money rather than the site 

18 of where he was actually working. So in 

19 closing it is better said that a time card 

20 does not denote where an employee worked but 

21 rather the source of the money. Even in the 

22 tunnels there were many cases where tunnel 

23 shots went broke and funds were borrowed from 

24 the Yucca flats tests to finish the project. 

25 19) Site profile on one page states 
253

1 that tunnel environment was very dry so 

2 therefore no consideration should be taken for 

3 Trittiated water however four pages later when 

4 addressing the possibility of suspended 

5 radionuclides, the tunnels are described as 

6 very wet and water being used very liberally. 

7 These two statements are very conflicting in 

8 themselves and make no sense whatsoever. 

9 20) Site profile describes the tunnels 

10 as mining operations and the employees there 

11 as all miners. (Facts) of what the tunnel 

12 environments really were the tunnels were only 

13 a mining operation when being constructed and 

14 when the test drifts were being mined out. 

15 The underground tunnels other than the test 

16 drifts were in fact underground laboratories, 

17 the main tunnel which was approximately 30 

18 feet in diameter and the alcoves which could 

19 be 60 feet in diameter were used over and over 

20 again. The tests drifts which were run off of 

21 the main drift were used only once but the 

22 main tunnels and the main alcoves were used 

23 over and over again as many as 20 times. Site 

24 profile fails to articulate what the tunnels 

25 really were or what was type of people who 
254

1 worked there which were in fact more than just 

2 miners, in fact there were Pipe Fitters, Sheet 

3 Metal Workers, Lineman, Electricians, 

4 Carpenters, Laborers, Operating Engineers, Set 

5 Up Men, Scientists, RAD safe personnel, 

6 Hygienists, Mechanics and many other personnel 

7 which would better be referred to as 

8 underground workers and not necessarily just 

9 miners which in fact were a minority of those 

10 personnel who worked underground. 

11 21) Site profile does not address the 

12 practice of re-use of equipment and material 

13 which was re-used over and over as long as 

14 they would last until broken. And in some 

15 cases this equipment and material became 

16 contaminated with radiation or toxins, but 

17 were still used. 

18 22) Site profile does not address the 

19 environmental dangers one might have been 

20 exposed to such as the raw diesel exhaust put 

21 off by diesel motors used underground prior to 

22 1988 that were not equipped with catalytic 

23 converters which would have abundantly 

24 contaminated the air with Benzenes and Carbon 

25 Monoxides as well as the extensive use of PCB 
255

1 for electrical transformers. Which some times 

2 exploded and the use of PCB in hydraulic 

3 systems where they were used. As well as the 

4 extensive use of Arsenic treated woods and 

5 Mercuric Chloride treated canvases and the 

6 wide use of Asbestos products and other 

7 substances such as Vistanex and unlabeled 

8 Beryllium alloyed metals and light bulbs. 

9 23) Site profile does not address the 

10 time periods that people spent on-site. 

11 Examples: a tunnels test where people were 

12 often required to work double and triple 

13 shifts and this extra time was not taken into 

14 consideration for exposure times. 

15 24) Site profile does not fully 

16 address the various noble gases that employees 

17 may have come into contact with nor the 

18 possibilities where noble gases might have 

19 been present. Such as Krypton, and Xeons 

20 which would have been near the floor of the 

21 tunnels because they are heavier than air and 

22 would not have been purged because the gas 

23 seal plugs has to be removed before the air 

24 supply lines that supplied the air used to 

25 purge the tunnels could be reconnected as the 
256

1 air supply lines were disconnected by any 

2 where the gas seal plugs were located. 

3 25) Site profile clearly states that 

4 no employees from Culinary or Clerical types 

5 could have encountered exposure, (Facts) 

6 Clerical types from Holmes and Narver and 

7 REECO and DNA and DOE and from assorted test 

8 labs often sent clerical types into the 

9 testing areas to deliver documents or forms 

10 and the NTS collective bargain agreement 

11 clearly stated that in the event any employee 

12 who was required to work in excess of 5 hours 

13 without a break would be served a hot lunch in 

14 place delivered and served by culinary 

15 personnel. 

16 26) Site profile fails to address 

17 employees who worked in area 51 (the site that 

18 does not exist) however area 51 does exist and 

19 was part of the NTS until 1999 when the land 

20 realignment agreement changed the boundaries 

21 of the NTS which excluded area 51 All of the 

22 personnel working in area 51 were hired by 

23 REECO and were processed through Mercury and 

24 they wore DOE badges for two to three months 

25 before their area 51 clearance was granted. 
257

1 They came and went to area 51 through the 

2 Mercury gate just like every one else, their 

3 paychecks were REECO paychecks funded by DOE 

4 appropriations funds and all the equipment 

5 used in area 51 was DOE REECO equipment and 

6 the general contractor for area 51 was REECO, 

7 and the General Managers name was [Identifying 

8 Information Redacted] who was a REECO general 

9 Manager who worked under [Identifying 

10 Information Redacted] and [Identifying 

11 Information Redacted] just like all the other 

12 area managers did. So therefore area 51 was 

13 very much a part of NTS and funded and 

14 operated by the DOE and REECO just like the 

15 rest of the NTS and therefore should be 

16 included in the EEOICPA. 

17 27) Site profile lists ten tests that 

18 were known to vent but for some unexplained 

19 reasons are not allowed. I know for a fact 

20 that some of these tests are listed as 

21 incidents under investigation and I can 

22 understand in a court of law that no 

23 conclusion can be brought from an incident 

24 under investigation, however we are not trying 

25 to resolve an incident closure but we are 
258

1 concerned about contamination and 

2 contamination was caused by these ten tests 

3 not listed. The site profile cannot be 

4 accurately built as long as these ten tests 

5 are not allowed. It is understandable that 

6 the results responsibilities cannot be 

7 determined at this time of who is at fault but 

8 we feel that any contamination of 

9 radioactivity should be allowed on the site 

10 profile in order for it to be totally 

11 accurate. So we would request that the 

12 exposures from these ten tests be included in 

13 the site profile. 

14 28) Site profile has in various 

15 locations had drawings taken from billboards 

16 on the NTS that were not drawn to scale, 

17 however NIOSH has introduced to these drawings 

18 the scale to be used by dose re-constructors 

19 which are severely flawed because the drawings 

20 were not drawn to scale in the first place. 

21 29) Site profile does not explain or 

22 understand the mechanics of the tunnel air 

23 supply, the air supply in the tunnels was 

24 unique in the fact that it is used no where 

25 else in the world other than the NTS. The 
259

1 original air supply blowers on top of the Mesa 

2 were originally designed for a mile deep 

3 tunnel, however over the course of the years 

4 the tunnels expanded into many miles and the 

5 air supply was never up graded and as the 

6 tunnels became larger the air supply became 

7 less adequate and it would be a stretch to say 

8 that three air changes a day took place. The 

9 system used on these tunnels was the supply 

10 source pumped air to the back side of the 

11 drift forcing the air to migrate back out 

12 through the portal which as I said was done no 

13 where else other than the NTS. 

14 30) Site profile does not take into 

15 consideration any possibilities of radiation 

16 exposure by way of air conditioning systems on 

17 the NTS, noble refrigeration gases are known 

18 gases that can become contaminated and could 

19 create exposure problems such as those 

20 discovered in the dismantling of Super Kukla. 

21 In conclusion, I have attempted on 

22 numerous occasions from the beginning of 

23 EEOICPA program to bring this information to 

24 the attention of DOL and NIOSH during my 

25 interviews and numerous conversations by 
260

1 telephone and in person to various personnel 

2 from the numerous entities involved in EEOICPA 

3 to no avail because no one really seems to 

4 want to resolve these errors and flaws in the 

5 Site Profile. Only recently has the 

6 Presidential Advisory Board assigned a site 

7 expert Dr. Lyn Anspaugh who I am presently 

8 working with to resolve these numerous 

9 problems contained in the Site Profile. 

10 All of the above can be confirmed by 

11 contacting Dr. Lyn Anspaugh at (801) 558-9489 

12 or (702) 616-0914. 

13 I have made two appearances before the 

14 Presidential Advisory Board here in Las Vegas 

15 and one appearance before the NTS working 

16 board and attempted to resolve the issues I 

17 have mentioned, I have also sent letters and 

18 e-mails to Mr. Larry Elliott and have had 

19 articles in the Las Vegas Review Journal and 

20 have informed Nevada Senator Harry Reid. 

21 However, I have not been able to have these 

22 changes made in the Site Profile and TBD, even 

23 though all of the above has been proven and 

24 verified as fact. 

25 All of the present applicants for 
261

1 compensation under EEOICPA for dose 

2 reconstruction are being done based on the 

3 flawed information that presently is the Site 

4 Profile and TBD documents and unless these 

5 changes are not corrected these dose 

6 reconstructions will most assuredly have to be 

7 done many more times. 

8 When Congress passed the EEOICPA Bill 

9 there was a spirit of good intent and fairness 

10 however, NIOSH has from the beginning been 

11 very mean spirited and possibly even criminal 

12 in their approach to doing dose reconstruction 

13 as attested to by the Shelby Hallmark E-mails 

14 between his office and the OMB where active 

15 discussions were carried out on how to stifle 

16 the process and delay payments as attested to 

17 by the hearings held by former Congressman 

18 Hostettler immigration and border security 

19 hearings where Shelby Hallmark explained away 

20 the discussions as brain storming rather than 

21 a real attempt at stopping payments to well 

22 deserving claimants. 

23 John, I sincerely hope that you and 

24 Pete Turcic really want to get to the bottom 

25 of the problems that are presently delaying 
262

1 the process of an accurate dose reconstruction 

2 of former Nevada Test Site applicants for 

3 compensation under EEOICPA and I thank you and 

4 Pete for the opportunity to bring these 

5 problems of the Site Profile to your attention 

6 and hopefully resolve this on going problem. 

7 Sincerely, [Identifying Information 

8 Redacted] Representing claimants of Nevada 

9 Test Site. 

10 (Whereupon, the second of four letters was 

11 entered into the record:) 

12 April 27, 2008, John Vance, Department 

13 of Labor, EEOICPA, Washington, DC. 

14 Dear John, Here are some more issues 

15 with the site profile of the Nevada Test Site. 

16 31) 4 issues. 

17 (a) Employee risk levels are not 

18 addressed -- EXAMPLE -- First responders like 

19 Fire fighters, paramedics and Guards, 

20 industrial hygienists, and Rad-safe safety 

21 inspectors all had open badges and were 

22 cleared to access any and all areas. Areas of 

23 worker access is not addressed. 

24 (b) There is a difference of risk 

25 level difference between people who worked in 
263

1 Mercury opposed to those who worked in the 

2 forward operations areas. 

3 (c) There is even a risk level 

4 difference between support personnel like 

5 culinary and clerical who worked in Mercury 

6 and those who worked in area 12 facility doing 

7 the same jobs. 

8 (d) There is a different risk level of 

9 clericals who worked in area 2 and area 3 

10 between REECO and H&N and Lab personnel. 

11 (e) There is even a difference between 

12 the crafts such as sheet metal and other 

13 crafts, because in the case of sheet metal. 

14 They had one shop to cover the entire site 

15 where as other crafts had dedicated shops for 

16 each area. 

17 In short all test site employees need 

18 to have an assigned risk level based on areas 

19 of access and areas of work and possibilities 

20 of exposure based on location and travel that 

21 was required to arrive at their location of 

22 work. 

23 32) Waste disposal and storage has not 

24 been fully addressed. There were numerous 

25 burial pits and waste storage areas that pose 
264

1 environmental and health hazards that have not 

2 been fully identified by location or what risk 

3 they pose to workers. 

4 33) 4 issues 

5 The use of coworkers records to do 

6 DOSE where no records of worker exist is 

7 flawed as 

8 (a) the coworkers name and job 

9 classification has been redacted from the 

10 individuals DOSE report. QUESTION--What 

11 defines a coworker? 

12 (b) any one who comes through Mercury 

13 gate regardless of job classification? 

14 (c) Some one who might have worked in 

15 the area regardless of job classification? 

16 (d) Another worker from the same 

17 craft? 

18 (e) The work partner of the worker? 

19 All of these scenarios are flawed. 

20 REASON-- None of these scenarios are 

21 acceptable unless the physical location of 

22 work is identified as each area such as 2 and 

23 3 and 12 had ongoing test areas other than 

24 just 2 and 3 and 12, some times as many as 5 

25 and 6 different test at different locations at 
265

1 any given time In many areas other than area 2 

2 or 3 or one tunnel. Posing different Risk 

3 levels. So how can NIOSH use coworkers 

4 records when it would require a perfect 

5 scenario of a full time partner from the same 

6 craft working in exact areas at the exact same 

7 time doing the exact same thing? Without such 

8 perfect scenario, any coworker information is 

9 strictly speculation. 

10 34) True re-suspension risks. SC&A 

11 site review identifies many areas of the site 

12 to have higher levels of contamination than 

13 other areas. EXAMPLES--Area 2 and 3 shop 

14 areas show high levels of Cesium pools from 

15 open air testing. The site profile does not 

16 fully address the risk level of employees who 

17 worked in this highly radioactive area opposed 

18 to those who might have worked in cleaner 

19 areas such as Mercury camp. 

20 35) 4 issues 

21 Site description does not assign risk 

22 levels to employees of the Nevada Test Site. 

23 EXAMPLES (a) Employees who worked in 

24 the Operations and NRDS areas were most 

25 assuredly at more risk than those who worked 
266

1 in camp Mercury. 

2 (b) Those culinary and Clerical and 

3 support personnel who worked carrying out the 

4 actual test. 

5 (d) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SECTION--

6 Labbs (sic) such as LLL, LANAL, SANDIA, GE, 

7 WESTINGHOUSE, JAYCORE, DNA, DOE, EG&G and PAN 

8 AM. All of the above mentioned sectors should 

9 have dedicated risk levels, however even this 

10 might be difficult as some workers from the 

11 identified sectors often cross over to other 

12 sectors in the course of their duties. 

13 37) 5 issues--Environmental risks are 

14 not fully identified 

15 EXAMPLES (a) The test site had many 

16 wells which were used for what ever water 

17 needs that were necessary from potable 

18 drinking waters to water needed for 

19 construction needs. 

20 (b) Evaporator ponds were on site used 

21 to evaporate away trittiated contaminated 

22 waters, mostly from draining the tunnels 

23 (c) Rain fall, snow and wind erosions 

24 have not been fully addressed as well as 

25 possible contributors to contamination. 
267

1 (d) Problems of contamination that 

2 exist on dry lake beds which become unstable 

3 during the dry season have not been addressed 

4 in re suspension activities. Dry lake bed in 

5 area 5 was site of some above ground test. 

6 (e) Animal studies from cattle such as 

7 cows and horses and wild life are not 

8 addressed, or reports included in site profile 

9 on animal Biological Studies that were done on 

10 site. 

11 (f) Radiation hazards from grass fires 

12 such as polonium which is known to happen when 

13 plants of alkaloid species burns. All Nevada 

14 Test Site plants are of the alkaloid species, 

15 and when burned during grass fires they emit 

16 polonium contaminations. As well as very 

17 active re-suspensions of Plutonium and other 

18 radioactive Alpha and Beta solid particulates 

19 which could have been a hazard to those who 

20 were charged to bring them under control. Such 

21 as firemen. 

22 38) Many types of operations have not 

23 been addressed or the risk they posed--

24 EXAMPLES 

25 (a) Pulling the pig--where LANAL used 
268

1 a special device to pull the rack cables out 

2 of the test hole after the shoot, these cables 

3 were highly radioactive and required the 

4 services of people to cut them into lengths 

5 and box them up to ship to lab, the time one 

6 was allowed to work in this area was 2 

7 minutes. 

8 (b) Replacing truck beds that were 

9 used to transport radioactive drilling bits. 

10 39) 2 issues 

11 Waste storage burial or management 

12 sites not fully addressed or identified. 

13 EXAMPLES-- 

14 (a) Old craters used as storage sites 

15 for contaminated materials. 

16 (b) Storage yards for set up materials 

17 like cable storage and stairs landings and 

18 security screens, mud boxes, drilling bits for 

19 drilling both new drill sites and post shoot 

20 equipment set up. 

21 40) Reuse of equipment and materials 

22 such as shock mounting alpha stations test 

23 trailers generators, Portable AC units, water 

24 tankers and rack assembly towers. NIOSH has 

25 disputed this risk based on information 
269

1 provided by Martha DeMarre, who provided 

2 information that such equipment and materials 

3 were processed through nonexistent RADAX 

4 yards. 

5 LANAL setup scientist Ron Sharp and 

6 REECO supervision who actually did the work 

7 and are testifying from first hand experience 

8 rather than archived library second hand 

9 information, have all testified that the ALPHA 

10 station and materials and test set up 

11 equipment was simply moved from one test area 

12 to the other without being processed through 

13 the RADAX yards claimed to exist by Martha 

14 DeMarre from the DOE library of records. 

15 As required by EPA and DOE any RADAX 

16 yard requires a concrete slab with drains to a 

17 holding tank to collect and dispose of 

18 contaminated particulates and granules. Area 

19 6 does have such a facility, but was never 

20 used for Yucca Flats down hole test trailers 

21 and ALPHA stations. One main reason being is 

22 that the door height to the facility was 12 

23 feet. And the bay was barely 16 feet wide. 

24 ALPHA stations were 20 feet high and 20 feet 

25 wide which would have been impossible to pass 
270

1 through such a bay. And there were no slabs 

2 or holding tanks in area 3 where RADAX could 

3 have been done in the area of area 3. Test 

4 set up buildings and equipment were simply 

5 moved from one site to the other. Shock 

6 mounting electromagnets pulse shields tie down 

7 ropes were moved back to the Carpenter shop. 

8 Stairs landings security screens and cable 

9 boxes were sent to the storage yard. Assembly 

10 towers were sent to the tower storage yard. 

11 ALPHA stations and test trailers were sent to 

12 their storage areas when not in use--which was 

13 rare--and none of them were ever RADAXED in 

14 any of these storage areas as their (sic) was 

15 no way to collect the contaminates. No RADAX 

16 was done on the test pads either---If it had 

17 been done it would have been an EPA violation. 

18 As post shoot would have had to walk through 

19 the contamination to perform their work. 

20 41) 4 issues 

21 Site history and different types of 

22 Nuclear bomb and reactor tests not fully 

23 identified--EXAMPLES 

24 (a) Atomic Bomb, Hydrogen Bomb, or 

25 Neutron Bomb. 
271

1 (b) Down Hole steamed, Down hole un2 steamed. 

3 (c) Pipe shot, Rack shoots, Shaft 

4 shoots or tunnel shoots from outside of 

5 mountain or from alcove inside of mountain. 

6 (d) Atomic Jet reactor test, atomic 

7 rocket reactor test of bare and shielded 

8 reactor test, all of these types of reactors 

9 posed different challenges and created very 

10 different types of exposure risk. 

11 42) 3 issues 

12 Some tests like Tweezers, Super Kukla 

13 and HENRE test are mentioned by name only, But 

14 are not listed in the tables as to their risk 

15 value or what type of radiation they put off. 

16 It was explained to me that the site 

17 profile and TBD was the base of information to 

18 do the DOSE reconstruction. 

19 It stands to reason that the DOSE Re20 constructors would use the tables within the 

21 documents to arrive at the total DOSE of an 

22 applicant. 

23 The mere mention of a site by name 

24 only without supporting information does not 

25 provided (sic) the person doing DOSE any 
272

1 tangible information to do DOSE reconstruction 

2 without supporting information within the 

3 tables that list such exposure information and 

4 value of Risk involved. 

5 43) 3 issues 

6 Tunnel and shaft descriptions are 

7 flawed, and very incomplete. 

8 EXAMPLES-- (a) Shafts were sometimes 

9 in granite formations as opposed to volcanic 

10 formations such as the tunnels in area 12. 

11 (b) some tunnels like “T” tunnel were 

12 very wet as opposed to “P” tunnel which might 

13 be described as very dry. Or “N” tunnel which 

14 had both wet and dry areas, depending what 

15 part of the tunnel you were in, and what time 

16 of the year you were there. 

17 There is no one size fits all 

18 description when addressing the environs and 

19 water problems or re-suspension of radio20 nuclides when doing DOSE Reconstruction for 

21 underground workers. 

22 (c) The assay reports of the minerals 

23 of the shafts and tunnels are also missing 

24 such as volcanic of limestone or sandstone. 

25 COMMENT--Each of the listed minerals 
273

1 and earth substances react differently to 

2 radioactivity and each pose different types of 

3 problems such as volcanic ash containing 

4 levels of Beryllium and Asbestos which both 

5 pose additional problems along with 

6 radioactivity. 

7 44) 3 issues 

8 Radioactive hazard sites in Mercury 

9 have not been fully addressed such as: 

10 (a) Replacement repair and disposal 

11 yard--Some times referred to as the REPO 

12 Depot--where equipment was refurbished sold or 

13 destroyed. This location would have been 

14 where dust particulates and granules would 

15 have been washed off the materials and 

16 equipment and where RADAX would have been 

17 carried out. 

18 (b) The samples Building where core 

19 samples were brought and studied in Glove 

20 boxes and stored for records. 

21 (c) There were also machine shops run 

22 by various labs in Mercury where Bomb and 

23 reactor repair and parts replacement were done 

24 and other machining of Nuclear Research and 

25 development metals was done. 
274

1 45) The risk of Alpha and Beta has 

2 been severely minimized by explaining a thin 

3 piece of paper was sufficient to protect one 

4 from exposures from alpha and beta radiation. 

5 The statement that one could protect 

6 themselves from Alpha and Beta radiation with 

7 some thing as simple as a piece of paper 

8 grossly underscores the real risk of alpha and 

9 Beta radiation particles. True that the paper 

10 would be possibly sufficient shielding to one 

11 skin, but hardly addresses the risk of an oral 

12 intake of those same particles. If one was to 

13 breath into their lungs or ingest through the 

14 mouth to ones stomach of Alpha or Beta 

15 particles. 

16 There was a very high risk of 

17 ingesting such radio-nuclides at the Nevada 

18 Test Site from re-suspended particles from 

19 wind and air lines and while eating ones lunch 

20 or even drinking the water from the water 

21 cans. The dangers of Alpha and Beta or 

22 trittiated water have not been fully addressed 

23 in the site profile. 

24 (14 principals (sic) which explain 46 

25 issues this letter) 
275

1 Thank you signed [Identifying 

2 Information Redacted]. 

3 (Whereupon, the third of four letters was 

4 entered into the record:) 

5 May 6, 2008, John Vance, Department of 

6 Labor, EEOICPA, Washington, DC. 

7 Dear John, This is the last of the 

8 principle (sic) issues and will be following 

9 up in the future after Sanford and Cohens 

10 final report providing you with the technical 

11 issues. 

12 46) Maps--Site profile and TBD does 

13 not have adequate maps to show the 

14 contaminated areas of site. SC&A has such 

15 maps contained in the 153 page overview they 

16 did, there are many very contaminated areas on 

17 the site where one could get much higher 

18 background readings. In order for the site 

19 profile to be accurate the maps should be part 

20 of the DOSE reconstructions process, 

21 especially where the base camps are located in 

22 such contaminated areas. 

23 47) 4 issues--People Living on site, 

24 Site profile does not explain how many people 

25 lived on the site full time, their (sic) were 
276

1 full time residences at (a) Mercury camp. (b) 

2 Area 12 camp (c) Tonopah Rocket test range and 

3 (d) Area 51. Addressing this would be a more 

4 accurate reading especially for those who 

5 resided at Area 12 where air born (sic) radio6 nuclides would have been greater than Camp 

7 Mercury or radio-nuclides that would have been 

8 greater at Area 51 than Camp Mercury or radio9 nuclides that would have been greater at Camp 

10 Mercury than the TTRTR site. 

11 48) Weather conditions on the Nevada 

12 Test Site. Site profile does not have an 

13 accurate report of the rain fall snow fall 

14 tempteratures (sic) or wind conditions of the 

15 sit by site or by areas with in the site, this 

16 would address the problems that are caused by 

17 erosion from wind and rain and melting snow 

18 which could disturb contamination left behind 

19 by open air testing. 

20 49) Schematic and Drawings. Site 

21 profile has some schematic drawings, but these 

22 drawings are lacking in scale and accuracy, 

23 unless drawings are to scale and accurate, 

24 they should not be used by DOSE re25 constructors. 
277

1 50) 3 issues--List of Rad safe staff, 

2 (a) Site profile and TBD does not have a 

3 roster of rad safe personnel or (b) their 

4 classifications such as fully qualified rad 

5 safe person or trainee rad safe personnel. Or 

6 (c) the amount of man power by numbers or a 

7 list of their duties and responsibilities on a 

8 day by day basis. This is necessary to prove 

9 REECO had the man power to do all they said 

10 they did on a day to day basis. 

11 Nevada test site is almost as big as 

12 Rhode Island in size and would require a 

13 substantial force of man power to accomplish 

14 the daily operations of Rad safe that REECO 

15 claims they did, especially when 8 to 10 tests 

16 were going on simultaneously, not to mention 

17 the daily back ground reports that were 

18 required of the over all site conditions. 

19 51) Open air Testing debris like 

20 towers and bunkers--Site profile does not 

21 address the amount of open air testing debris 

22 like towers and tower foundations, these areas 

23 are contaminated and people worked on clean up 

24 of these locations. This type of work did 

25 pose a risk and had time limits as to how long 
278

1 you could work in area. 

2 52) 3--issues--Tunnel drawings and 

3 schematics, Site profile and TBD does not have 

4 tunnel schematics, these are important as they 

5 explain just exactly what tunnels are and give 

6 an idea as to the threats of exposures like 

7 (a) trittated water and (b) Nobel (sic) gases 

8 during reentry, visual schematics are much 

9 better than written explanations as it will 

10 show how many (c) radiation gas seal plugs 

11 were used and where they were located in the 

12 tunnels. These drawings should also show the 

13 air supply migration routes from supply exit 

14 to the portal which would better explain the 

15 Purging capabilities of the air supply system. 

16 53) 2 issues--Site Profile does not 

17 have a foot print drawing of down hole 

18 testing, this is important because it will 

19 show (a) the amount of ground that was 

20 disturbed during grading and what part was 

21 fenced during the post shot and (b) what part 

22 was fenced in general. It would also most 

23 important show the acreage and size of test 

24 pads. The generalized description of a couple 

25 graded off areas is totally false and very 
279

1 misleading that exist in the site profile. 

2 54) 2 issues--Site profile does not 

3 have any chronology on down hole tests and (b) 

4 It also has no chronology on shaft and tunnel 

5 tests as well. All three chronologies would 

6 address the time span and identify risk time 

7 points as well as to risk locations of 

8 exposure possibilities. Site profile is 

9 totally lacking in its description of what 

10 actually took place and exactly how it was 

11 accomplished. 

12 55) 4 issues--Site profile (a) has no 

13 schematics on the tunnel and shaft air supply 

14 system. This is important because it will 

15 explain how the tunnels and shafts were purged 

16 and when the main air lines were disconnected 

17 and reconnected, and what the main air supply 

18 equipment capabilities were related to air 

19 changes. 

20 Site profile explains how the tunnels 

21 and shafts were purged by stating that they 

22 were purged by the air supply system, (b) But 

23 do not give details about the capabilities of 

24 the sir (sic) supply system or what its cubic 

25 per minute were nor the amount of cubic 
280

1 displacement the tunnels actually had. 

2 (c) Site profile is severely lacking 

3 in details about tunnels environments as well 

4 as space they occupied. (d) Or exactly how 

5 water was removed that came through the roof 

6 and side walls and floors of tunnels. 

7 56) Site profile does not have any 

8 drawings showing the foot print of a post shot 

9 and what parts were fenced and what parts were 

10 not fenced or where RADAX entry and exit 

11 change station were located or how they worked 

12 related to the mud box area and the change 

13 shacks and tool cribs and sleeping quarters 

14 and lunch room which was always on post shoot 

15 because post shoot was a 24/7 operation from 

16 start to completion. Post shoot operations 

17 were 24/7 and people worked sleep and ate from 

18 start to finish regardless of date, day, week 

19 or month, otherwise holidays included. 

20 57) Site profile does not address the 

21 Evaporator ponds where trittiated water was 

22 sent to be evaporated off into the air and 

23 prevented from getting into the water table or 

24 how many and what acreage they encompassed. 

25 58) 2 issues--Site profile does not 
281

1 have any drawings on gas seal plugs, these are 

2 important because they will show (a) if any 

3 noble gases could have been trapped behind 

4 them and (b) just when they were purged from 

5 the tunnels. They will also show the height 

6 of the craw tubs related to the floor 

7 elevation of the tunnel which would be an 

8 obstacle for heavier than air Nobel (sic) 

9 gases to be purged from behind the gas seal 

10 plugs and fully explain just when Nobel (sic) 

11 gases might have been able to move. 

12 59) 4--issues--Test site Fires--(a) 

13 Site profile lacks any reference to radiation 

14 hazards from assorted fires such as Machine 

15 shop and building fires (b) Records library at 

16 DOE indicate that records about building fire 

17 incidents are missing and all grass and forest 

18 fires only address the environmental aspects 

19 and (c) no reports of radiation monitoring 

20 were ever filed where grass and forest fires 

21 took place, even in areas known to be highly 

22 contaminated. 

23 (d) Firemen who responded to these 

24 fires would have been exposed in both grass 

25 forest and Building fires, especially machine 
282

1 shops and samples storage areas. (e) some 

2 firemen bio assay records are non-existent and 

3 some full body scans are missing even though 

4 their records claim they had full body scans 

5 and Bio Assays. 

6 60) Site Profile and TBD documents do 

7 not have an information about drinking water 

8 supplies or reports on the wells and lagoons 

9 and ice houses that used local well water from 

10 the site wells. 

11 61) Site profile does not address the 

12 open air site clean up of open air testing or 

13 why it was even attempted, although an attempt 

14 was made to clean up grounds soils--sand clay 

15 and loose rock--where open air testing took 

16 place, there is no report as to the findings 

17 of such an effort. Special equipment was 

18 developed to accomplish this task. 

19 62) Special radiation clean up 

20 equipment. Site profile does not explain for 

21 what purpose the test site had remote control 

22 scoop equipped tractors at CP 6 or why they 

23 were necessary to have at all. Such equipment 

24 did exist it was remote control metal track 

25 like a bull dozer and had a television mounted 
283

1 in the drivers window and was driven and 

2 controlled by remote control from a safe 

3 location. They were all painted white in 

4 color. 

5 63) Crafts equipment and materials not 

6 under control of Radax procedures. Site 

7 profile does not address the equipment and 

8 materials provided by crafts. 

9 EXAMPLES--Shock mounting material like 

10 Hexhale an aluminum alloy material that was 

11 originally designed as air craft fuel tank 

12 baffles was used as a shock absorber, 1-1/4 

13 nylon inch rope used to tie down buildings and 

14 equipment, Visqueen covered 3⁄4 inch plywood 

15 that was laid on the ground under shock 

16 mounting as a shield against electro magnetic 

17 pulse put off by bomb when it went off. All 

18 of this material was brought to and removed by 

19 the Carpenters, and it was refurbished and 

20 stored in the Carpenter shops and was never 

21 radsafed or even checked. As it was the first 

22 thing to be removed from the test pad after 

23 the test. 

24 Other things that were brought on 

25 station and removed by crafts were portable AC 
284

1 units used for the Alpha stations and test 

2 trailers, portable generators, air 

3 compressors, water tank--old gas tractor 

4 trailer--Porta-potties and step down station 

5 trailers used as step down stations and 440 

6 switch gear electrical transmission lines used 

7 on step down trailers as well as what ever 

8 Coaxial and fiber optics that could be reused. 

9 All of the items listed were brought 

10 to the test pad by the crafts and removed and 

11 stored by the crafts such as operating 

12 engineers sheet metal and pipe fitters 

13 specialty services and Carpenters shops. Many 

14 of these items had been contaminated and were 

15 removed and stored at designated shops with 

16 out been checked for contamination or cleaned. 

17 64) Site profile and TBD documents 

18 uses the metric units to describe lengths, 

19 heights and distances. The Nevada Test Site 

20 prior to 1992 never used the metric unit for 

21 the following reasons, all units of 

22 measurements used prior to 1992 were the 

23 standard 12 inch unit foot and 16 unit inch, 

24 all survey and elevations and distances were 

25 surveyed in using the 10 units of a foot with 
285

1 10 units of the 1/10 of a foot known as 

2 engineer scale--Example a foot and a half 

3 using standard English measure of a foot and a 

4 half were written down as 1 and 1⁄2 foot or one 

5 foot six inches (1 ft 6 in), engineer scale 

6 would write the same distance down as 1.5==one 

7 and a half foot or 1.50 one foot six inches = 

8 or 1.500.==one foot and 5/100’s of a foot. 

9 However, when you write down a meter and a 

10 half it is also written down as 1.5 (one and a 

11 half meter) 1.50 (one meter and 50 centemeters 

12 (sic)) or 1.500. (one meter and 500 milli 

13 meters (sic)) because these units of measure 

14 (engineer scale and metric) are all written 

15 down exactly the same, this causes a lot of 

16 very big mistakes, especially when you 

17 consider one and a half foot in engineer scale 

18 = 18 inches and one and a half meters == 56 

19 inches, over triple the distance. 

20 The rounded numbers used in the metric 

21 and engineer scale can also cause confusion 

22 when referring to distances of exposures as 

23 well and should not be used in the site 

24 profile and TBD documents. NIOSH has used 

25 this confusion to distort the mental picture 
286

1 of the site in the following manner--EXAMPLE--

2 NIOSH describes the burn out cavity of a 

3 nuclear device as being 80 meters radius 

4 severely minimizes the mental picture of 500 

5 feet in diameter which is eccentrically the 

6 same as 80 meters radius, 80 meters conjures 

7 up a far less metal (sic) picture than 500 

8 feet in diameter which is equal to the height 

9 of a 50 story building, and many if not most 

10 of the distances written down in reports in 

11 engineer scale if misinterpreted as metric 

12 would increase distances by nearly 300% of 

13 what they actually were. If DOSE 

14 reconstructions were to translate the numerals 

15 in reports as metric instead of Engineer scale 

16 which it always is--(Survey maps prove this). 

17 Other distortion might happen in describing a 

18 distance from a contaminated area--EXAMPLE--It 

19 might say the distance from the contaminated 

20 site was 4.5 kilo meters (sic) (which would 

21 maximize the mental picture) when it should 

22 say 2 and 1/2 miles (minimized numbers) which 

23 would paint a better and much more accurate 

24 mental picture. 

25 NIOSH has used the metric units to 
287

1 maximize the mental picture where needed and 

2 minimize where it is also needed, and also 

3 used the one foot measure unit where it is 

4 useful. METRIC SCALE WAS NEVER USED PRIOR TO 

5 1992 ANY WHERE I EVER WORKED, AND MY WORK 

6 REQUIRED WORKING WITH MEASUREMENTS 100% OF MY 

7 WORK DAY. 

8 My work also required me to read the 

9 blue prints and survey maps and I never seen 

10 so much as one that was ever done in the 

11 Metric scale during all my time on the Nevada 

12 Test Site. All reports written were all 

13 engineer scale which is written exactly like 

14 metric so the accuracy of distances could be 

15 grossly misread in almost all cases if metric 

16 units were used instead of foot inches and 

17 engineer survey scale. Distance is very 

18 important in DOSE Reconstruction, So 

19 interjecting unit of measure like metric only 

20 adds more distortion to already existing 

21 deliberate distortion of the facts done by 

22 NIOSH. 

23 18 principals (sic) and 33 issues for 

24 a grand total to date 105 issues that need to 

25 be addressed on the Nevada Test site Profile 
288

1 and TBD documents. This does not include the 

2 problems related to the technical problems 

3 that exist with the site profile and TBD 

4 documents. 

5 [Identifying Information Redacted] 

6 (Whereupon, the fourth of four letters was 

7 entered into the record:) 

8 Presidential Advisory Board NIOSH, May 

9 12, 2008, Dear Nevada Test Site Work Group, 

10 Recently John Vance assistant to Peter Turcic, 

11 Director of DOL’s EEOICPA office called me and 

12 ask (sic) me why I have not made known to 

13 NIOSH, The flaws contained in the site profile 

14 and TBD documents. I explained to Mr. John 

15 Vance that I have for the past 3 years made 

16 numerous efforts to correct the mistakes as 

17 SC&A and myself have uncovered them. Also by 

18 addressing the board during open meetings, 

19 through emails and letters and faxes. I 

20 explained to Mr. John Vance that Mr. Larry 

21 Elliott from NIOSH has ignored my issues and 

22 explained them away as simple historical 

23 inaccuracies by NIOSH, Editorial mistakes, or 

24 insignificant and did not apply to DOSE 

25 Reconstruction. 
289

1 However, Whatever one chooses to label 

2 these inaccuracies they are none the less 

3 (sic) flaws, as to what value they have 

4 related to DOSE reconstructions should best be 

5 determined by more qualified personnel than 

6 NIOSH office staff who are neither Site 

7 literate, Qualified Hygienist or Nuclear 

8 Health Physicists. EXAMPLES--such as my 

9 encounter with a Mr. David Chatou an 

10 unqualified and uncleared NIOSH office manager 

11 who did one of my interviews. 

12 NIOSH has had 5 long years with 

13 unlimited manpower and unlimited funds to 

14 correct these flaws and has done little of 

15 nothing to correct these obvious flaws which 

16 comprise 64 Principle subjects which contain 

17 108 separate issues, and this does not include 

18 the technical flaws contained in the site 

19 profile and TBD documents which could be of 

20 equal number of technical flaws if you include 

21 past and further overview reports of SC&A. 

22 In the past I have made these issues 

23 known to the board and NIOSH by sending in the 

24 information as I have uncovered it, and this 

25 file now has a complete list of all the 
290

1 Principle subject issues and I would like the 

2 Board to make sure the PAB working board of 

3 the Nevada test site addresses these issues in 

4 the very next meeting. 

5 As you are aware the site profile and 

6 TBD document is supposed to be a living 

7 document subject to change as inaccuracies are 

8 uncovered, I have seen nowhere in the rules 

9 where inaccuracies have to be DOSE related 

10 only or a criteria of what determines what 

11 information is significant or insignificant 

12 related to DOSE reconstruction. Surely a US 

13 107 page Government document written with 

14 unlimited funds and manpower could be written 

15 correctly in 5 long years with total accuracy 

16 regardless of what classifications of subjects 

17 and issues they address. 

18 I would believe that NIOSH with 5 LONG 

19 YEARS unlimited manpower, millions of dollars 

20 in funding could do at least as good as I have 

21 in correcting a simple 107 page document. 

22 My efforts are limited to a 2 years a 

23 couple volunteers, myself and my social 

24 security check which compared to NIOSH’s 

25 budget could not even qualify as pocket 
291

1 change. In fact my finding would not even 

2 cover one second of NIOSH’s expenses, let 

3 alone the expense of ORAU, NIOSH, OCAS, CDC, 

4 or DOL and the Presidential Advisory Board 

5 which all Operate on DOL--EEOICPA 

6 Appropriations. Surely all the entities 

7 involved could at least match my 

8 accomplishments if not surpass it In clearing 

9 up the mistakes contained in the Nevada test 

10 site Profile and TBD documents, I am sure OMB 

11 and Congress would agree if they knew about 

12 such efforts and flaws. 

13 Regardless of what label NIOSH chooses 

14 to label my issues the fact still remains the 

15 site profile and TBD documents are flawed 

16 Garbage. And when it’s garbage in, It is 

17 garbage out. 

18 DOSE Reconstructions can not be done 

19 using the existing site profile and TBD 

20 documents, and as long as these inaccuracies 

21 are not corrected I will continue challenging 

22 the results of any final decisions of claims 

23 that DOL sends out to claimants based on the 

24 inaccuracies of the site profile and TBD 

25 documents. 
292

1 We would like to have this letter and 

2 the 21 pages read into the record of the 

3 Nevada Test Site working board meeting. 

4 Thank you signed [Identifying 

5 Information Redacted] 

6 CC: Phillip Schofield, Bradley 

7 Clawson, Paul Ziemer, James Lockey, James 

8 Melius, Robert Presley, John Poston, Christine 

9 Branche, Lew Wade, Wanda Munn, Genevieve 

10 Roessler, Josie Beach, Michael Gibson, Mark 

11 Griffin (sic) 

12 CC: Pete Turcic Director of EEOICPA 

13 DOL 

14 CC: Nevada Test Site working Board 

15 CC: Dr. (sic) Larry Elliott, CHP, 

16 NIOSH 

17 

18 (Whereupon, all four letters are officially 

19 entered into the record.) 

20 

21 

22 
293

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 

STATE OF GEORGIA 

COUNTY OF FULTON 

 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 

Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 

above and foregoing on the day of May 21, 2008; 

and it is a true and accurate transcript of the 

testimony captioned herein. 

 I further certify that I am neither kin 

nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 

have any interest in the cause named herein. 

 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 

10th day of Feb., 2009. 

___________________________________ 

STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR, CVR-CM, PNSC 

CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 

CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102