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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

JEAN M MEADOWS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:11-cv-00045-MP -GRJ

CITY OF INGLIS, TIMOTHY LETSON, BRANDON ROBERTS,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 5, motion to dismiss by City of Inglis and

Brandon Roberts. Plaintiff, Jean Meadows, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1983, against defendants, Timothy Letson, Brandon Roberts, and City of Inglis. Meadows

alleges that Letson used excessive force in restraining her and that Roberts and City of Inglis

were negligent in supervising and training subordinate officers. For the following reasons the

motion is denied. 

 Meadows was caring for a minor during the fourth of July celebrations. Just before

midnight, she stopped at a bar, went in, and left the minor in the car for approximately ten

minutes. Officer Letson and Sergeant Roberts saw the unattended minor in the car and arrested

Meadows for child neglect. The State Attorney’s Office, however, declined to prosecute. 

During the arrest, Meadows informed the officers that she recently had shoulder surgery and

asked them not to handcuff her behind the back. Doc 1 at 8. Despite Meadows’s request,

Officer Letson, in view of Sergeant Roberts, handcuffed her behind the back. Meadows alleges

that Letson used such “excessive, improper and unprovoked force that he so twisted [her] arms
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as to cause a scaphoid fracture and severe pain and suffering.” Doc 1 at 9. As a result,

Meadows has a fractured wrist, damage to her shoulder, and a permanent medical impairment. 

Doc 1 at 9.

Meadows filed a complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, against defendants for

excessive force, battery, and negligent supervision and training. Doc 1 at 6. Defendants, City of

Inglis and Brandon Roberts, petitioned for removal of the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C.

§1331, federal question jurisdiction. Doc 1 at 2. Once in federal court, defendants, City of

Inglis and Brandon Roberts, filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Meadows responded to the motion to dismiss.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must

demonstrate “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Zaveri, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 (S. D. Fla.

2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme

Court interpreted this standard to mean that a plaintiff’s complaint does not need detailed factual

allegations but must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 

Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held that the factual allegations must be enough to “raise

the right of relief above the speculative level.” Id.

The defendants argue two grounds in support of their motion to dismiss. First,

defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s three-count Complaint fails to specify which of the three

named defendants are being sued in each of the three counts.” Doc 5 at 2. While defendants

initially move to dismiss the complaint “due to its failure to specify which causes of action

pertain to which defendants,” subsequently they ask the Court to direct plaintiff to replead her

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causes of action. Defendants also rely on Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, which supports

a motion for a more definite statement when a complaint fails to specify which defendant is

being sued for which count. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127112 (M.D. Pa., 2010). Thus, the Court

construes this as a motion for a more definitive statement. The Court agrees that plaintiff’s

causes of action could be clearer as to which defendants are being sued. Accordingly, the

plaintiff is directed to replead her causes of action to clearly specify which counts apply to which

defendants.

Second, defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Doc 5 at 3. Specifically, defendants argue that “Count I alleges a claim

for ‘excessive force’ and makes reference to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, however,

Count I does not indicate the basis for her entitlement.” Doc 5 at 3. The Court disagrees. 

Paragraph ten of the complaint, which is incorporated into Count I, specifically invokes 42

U.S.C. 1983 as a basis for relief. Doc 1 at 7. As such, Count I of the complaint adequately states

the legal basis for Meadows’s claim.

Defendants also argue that Meadows failed to state a claim for negligent supervision and

training. Specifically, defendants argue that Meadows’s Count III allegations do not comport

with Florida’s definition of negligent supervision. Defendant’s rely on a 5th DCA case, which

states that “[t]he plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that once an employer received

actual and constructive notice of problems with an employee’s fitness, it was unreasonable for

the employer not to investigate or take corrective action.” Department of Environmental

Protection v. Hardy, 907 So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). However, in paragraph twentysix of the complaint, which is incorporated into Count III, Meadows alleges that Roberts and

City of Inglis had actual notice of problems with Letson’s fitness, when Letson used “excessive,

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improper, and unprovoked force . . . in full view of Sgt. Roberts . . . .” Doc 1 at 9. Meadows

further alleges, in paragraph thirty-seven of the complaint, that Roberts, the acting Chief of

Police, failed “to intervene to stop or to adequately investigate or report the mistreatment of the

Plaintiff . . . .” Doc 1 at 10-11. Thus, Count III of the complaint provides sufficient facts to

support Meadows’s claim of negligent supervision.

Furthermore, defendants argue that “Count III purports to allege ‘Negligent Supervision

and Training,’ however, there are no allegations regarding training whatsoever.” Doc 5 at 3. 

Defendants are correct that the complaint contains no factual allegations regarding training. The

only mention of training in the complaint is paragraph four, which states that Sergeant Roberts,

as the acting Chief of Police of the City of Inglis, was responsible for “ensuring that those under

his command, including Officer Letson, received appropriate training . . . .” Doc. 1 at 6. This is

insufficient to support Meadows’s claim of negligent training. Meadows must allege some set of

facts that could prove defendants breached their alleged duty to properly train Officer Letson.

In their reluctance to dismiss a pleading, courts often grant a motion to dismiss but grant

the pleader leave to amend his pleading to correct the defects. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). It

appears that if the plaintiff amends her complaint to include allegations regarding negligent

training, or eliminate that claim entirely, the defects of the complaint will be remedied. Thus,

the motion to dismiss the complaint is granted with leave to the plaintiff to amend the complaint

within twenty (20) days after entry of the order hereon. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The motion for a more definitive statement is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff is directed to replead her causes of action to clearly specify which counts

apply to which defendants.

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3. The motion to dismiss the complaint, Doc. 5, is GRANTED with leave to the

plaintiff to amend the complaint within twenty (20) days after entry of the order

hereon.

4. Defendants’ time to answer is extended to twenty (20) days after the filing of the

amended complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2011

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case No: 1:11-cv-00045-MP -GRJ