United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7085 September Term, 2023

 FILED ON: MAY 17, 2024 

MONICA HOCKADAY,

APPELLANT

v. 

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cv-03265) 

Before: HENDERSON, KATSAS, and CHILDS, Circuit Judges. 

JUDGMENT

This appeal was considered on the briefs and the district-court record. The Court has fully 

considered the issues and determined that a published opinion is unwarranted. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is 

ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

I 

Monica Hockaday worked for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority as a

police officer in the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) from 2002 until she retired in 2022. 

She was repeatedly promoted and eventually became a lieutenant. 

Hockaday claims to have been subjected to a hostile environment because of her race, sex, 

and protected activity. Answering contention interrogatories, she asserted that eight alleged acts 

constituted the hostile environment: 

First, in 2008, supervisor George Burns allowed unnamed male employees to make sexist 

remarks. The employees said that the MTPD did not “need any more women sergeants,” and one 

of them joked that, if Hockaday had not returned from sick leave, he would have given her a “lap 
2

dance.” D.A. 197. The summary-judgment record contains no further evidence about these 

alleged comments or Burns’s alleged acquiescence in them.

Second, in 2009, supervisor Robert Kirkpatrick gave Hockaday a “poor” evaluation. D.A. 

196. The record contains neither the evaluation nor any further evidence about it.

Third, in 2010, future-Chief Ronald Pavlik told supervisor Brad Hanna to give Hockaday 

a “hard time” and make her life “difficult,” though Hanna refused. D.A. 195. The record contains 

no further evidence of these alleged comments or any adverse actions ensuing from them.

Fourth, in 2013, Hockaday was reprimanded for unprofessional conduct at work. The 

record contains an MTPD report detailing what happened: A subordinate claimed that Hockaday 

herself had created a hostile environment, and supervisor Erhart Olson, investigating this claim, 

concluded that Hockaday’s “loss of composure by yelling, flailing of arms, and slamming of books 

and other objects [was] not acceptable behavior by an MTPD lieutenant.” D.A. 110.

Fifth, in January 2018, Pavlik suspended Hockaday for 24 hours for unprofessional conduct

after a Montgomery County police officer stopped her car. The record contains a report by senior 

WMATA employee-relations officer Luis McSween, who reviewed a video of the traffic stop and 

concluded that the suspension had been “fairly carried out.” D.A. 116.

Sixth, in August 2018, Hockaday was reprimanded after supervisor Peter Sepulveda 

concluded that she had accessed another agency’s computer system without proper training. The 

record contains no other evidence of this incident, though it does contain MTPD reports of other 

reprimands that Hockaday received in 2018 or 2019 for failing to ensure that subordinates kept 

adequate records, for losing her police credentials, and for crashing her vehicle into a parked car.

Seventh, Hockaday complains that a colleague, Lieutenant Jeffrey Miller, was not 

disciplined for his conduct in responding to a kidnapping in 2019. The record contains no other 

evidence of this incident.

Eighth, in May 2020, Hockaday again was suspended for 24 hours, this time for 

mishandling evidence during an investigation. The suspension was based on a report prepared by 

Lieutenant Beau Perrizo. Hockaday complained to WMATA’s employee-relations department. 

Sharon Andrews, a senior official there, conducted a “comprehensive review” of Hockaday’s 

concerns and found that they “could not be corroborated.” D.A. 162.

To further challenge this suspension, Hockaday filed a formal EEO complaint with 

WMATA. In this case, she complains about four later actions that she says contributed to the 

hostile environment and were undertaken in retaliation for her filing the complaint:

Ninth, in June 2020, WMATA denied Hockaday permission to take on 15 to 18 hours per 

week of outside employment. The denial rested on an assessment of Hockaday’s work 

performance by supervisor Stephen Boehm, who noted a pattern of Hockaday scheduling sick 

leave to align with her vacation days as well as a recent suspension imposed by WMATA’s Office 

of Professional Responsibilities and Inspections.
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Tenth, in August 2020, Hockaday received a “Solid Performer” performance evaluation

for the 2019–20 rating period. D.A. 170–73.

Eleventh, Hockaday complains about a September 2020 meeting to discuss her 2021 

performance objectives. Hockaday claimed to feel “uncomfortable and bullied” when Boehm, a 

higher-level supervisor, showed up in addition to her immediate supervisor. D.A. 185–86. After 

Hockaday refused to go forward with the meeting, Boehm suspended her. One day later, the 

suspension was revoked, and Hockaday lost no pay from it.

Twelfth, Hockaday was placed on paid administrative leave pending resolution of an 

investigation. About two weeks later, she returned to her duties.

The district court granted summary judgment to WMATA. On the hostile-environment 

claim, the court noted that Hockaday’s summary-judgment opposition cited only the complaint 

and no record evidence. The court then reasoned that Hockaday’s “total failure to support her 

allegations with record evidence (or any real argument)” doomed her claim. D.A. 406.

Alternatively, the district court reviewed the summary-judgment evidence and held that 

there were no genuine disputes of material fact. The court described Hockaday’s claim as “a 

disconnected list of grievances spanning nearly 15 years.” D.A. 406. It then concluded that these 

various allegations, involving “at least five supervisors and various unnamed colleagues,” as well 

as “types of slights” that “run the gamut” of workplace interactions, were not “adequately linked” 

into a “coherent hostile environment claim.” Id. at 410 (cleaned up). Instead, the court explained, 

Hockaday had identified at most an “array of unrelated discriminatory or retaliatory acts.” Id.

(cleaned up). Furthermore, the court held that the various alleged incidents, considered 

individually or together, were neither severe nor pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work 

environment. See id. at 406–10. Finally, the court observed that there were “legitimate reasons” 

for most of the alleged actions. Id. at 408 (cleaned up).

On the retaliation claim, the district court concluded that none of the disputed actions was

materially adverse to Hockaday. The court reasoned that denying Hockaday the opportunity to 

take a second job was not actionable. Moreover, there was no evidence that the 2020 performance 

evaluation caused Hockaday to lose pay or benefits. Nor did her placement on paid administrative 

leave pending an investigation. Nor did her 2020 suspension, which was “rescinded the next day” 

and for which she “lost no pay.” D.A. 413.

II

A

On the hostile-environment claim, the district court gave four considerations supporting

summary judgment: Hockaday cited no record evidence in opposing the motion for summary 

judgment, the disputed actions were insufficiently linked, the actions were insufficiently severe or 

pervasive, and there was little or no evidence of bias. The first two considerations provide ample 

basis for affirmance.
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The district court permissibly granted summary judgment because Hockaday, in opposing 

summary judgment, cited no record material besides allegations in her complaint. D.A. 405–06. 

WMATA’s motion explained how Hockaday had “failed to come forward with sufficient evidence 

to support a reasonable jury to find in her favor on one or more essential elements of her claim.” 

Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 93 (D.C Cir. 2015). At that point, Hockaday had the 

burden to “present affirmative evidence” in the record. Durant v. District of Columbia, 875 F.3d 

685, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)); 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). For purposes of this rule, it is “well established” that a plaintiff 

“cannot rely on the allegations of her own complaint,” but rather “must substantiate them with 

evidence.” Grimes, 794 F.3d at 94. Moreover, a district court “need consider only the cited 

materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). And if a party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact,” 

the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Id. 56(e)(2). Hockaday 

says nothing about these points, which are adequate to support the summary judgment.

In any event, the district court also correctly held that the constituent elements of the 

alleged hostile environment were not “adequately connected to each other.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 

662 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The “acts giving rise to a hostile work environment claim 

must ... [be] ‘part of the same unlawful employment practice.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger 

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002)). This determination turns on whether the acts 

“involved the same type of employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and were

perpetrated by the same managers.” Menoken v. Dhillon, 975 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned 

up); see also Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 168–69 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As the district court 

explained, the acts alleged here “run the gamut” of employment practices, including sexist remarks

by coworkers, reprimands, one-day suspensions, paid administrative leave, denial of outside 

employment, and more. D.A. 410. The incidents happened about once a year for nearly a decade 

and a half. And they involved many different supervisors and colleagues. The district court thus 

correctly held that the disputed incidents were at worst an “array of unrelated discriminatory or 

retaliatory acts,” which might have been actionable individually but not as a hostile environment. 

Id. (quoting Baird, 662 F.3d at 1252).

B

The district court also properly granted summary judgment to WMATA on Hockaday’s 

retaliation claim. Such a claim must rest on acts that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable 

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. 

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (cleaned up). “Typically, a materially adverse action ... involves a 

significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 

with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.” 

Bridgeforth v. Jewell, 721 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). The district court 

explained why none of the four allegedly retaliatory actions met this standard.

On appeal, Hockaday focuses entirely on the 2020 evaluation meeting and resulting 

suspension. To the extent she felt uncomfortable from having to confront two supervisors at once, 

D.A. 185–86, that was one of the “petty slights or minor annoyances” that cannot support a 

retaliation claim. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Moreover, the resulting suspension was 
5 

rescinded after one day, and Hockaday lost no pay or other benefits as a result. Hockaday objects 

that the suspension, even though rescinded, made her ineligible for promotions for one year. She 

cites General Order 241, a policy directive governing MTPD promotions and implemented in 

2011. D.A. 344. Hockaday did not raise this argument before the district court, so it is forfeited. 

Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In any event, the policy does not speak

directly to rescinded suspensions, D.A. 348, and it was discontinued in 2014 or 2015, see id. at

356–57, 363. Hockaday offers no evidence suggesting that her 2020 suspension, rescinded after 

one day, made her ineligible for promotions under a policy that itself was rescinded some five or 

six years earlier.

III

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment. The Clerk is directed to withhold 

issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or 

rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1). 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk