1 It is the policy of this court not to reveal the nam es of children who are victims of sex crimes.



### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs O ctober 29, 2002
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD DAVID WALLACE, JR.

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Campbell County No. 10620 E. Shayne Sexton, Judge

No. E2002-00695-CCA-R3-CD December 13, 2002

The defendant, Ronald David Wallace, Jr., was convicted of four co unts of aggravated sexual ba tt er y. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504 (a)(4) (p roviding that “[a]g grava

ted sexual

battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defe ndant . . . [where] [t]he victim is less than thirteen (13) years of

age”). The trial court orde red concurrent sentences of e ight yea rs. In this appeal of right, the defe ndant arg ues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirme d.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Trial Court Affirmed

G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., delivered the opinion of the cou rt, in which J OE G. R ILEY and R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined.

Julie A. Rice, Knoxville, Tennessee (on appeal), and Charles Herman, Assistant Public Defe nder (at trial), for the appellant, Ronald David Wallace, Jr.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ra l & Repor

ter; Br aden H. B oucek, A ssistant A ttorney Genera l; Michael O. Ripley, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee.
OPINION

In the fall of 1999, the defendant, who was married to Mary Ann Wallace, the older sister of the victim, shared a residence with the victim, A.A., 1 and his family. The first two c ounts of the indictmentw ere the

result of an incident that took place when the defendant wa s babysitting the eight- ye ar-old

victim while his mother and sister went shopping. Onthat occasion, the defendant rubbedthe victim’s penis as the two sat in a living room chair. The defendant also re moved his own pants and forced the victim to touch his penis. Afterw ard, the defenda nt instruc ted the vi ctim

to say nothing about the occurrence. Counts three and four were the result of an incident whic h occurred-2-

on the next day. The defe ndant repeated his actions while he and the victim were in t he family bathroom. On the following day , the victim reported both incidents to his sister.

At trial, the twenty-four

-year -old defendant testified that he had been marrie d to the victim’s sister for appr oximately four yea rs. He state d that in Se

ptember of 1999, h

e and his wife and t

heir one-y ear-ol d daught

er moved into the re sidence

occupie d by

the victim

and his parents. While the defendan tacknowledged that he baby sat the victim on two consecutive evenings shortly after moving in, he den

ied any sexual con

tact. He claimed t hat he and the vict

implayed video games and watched television both day s. He insisted that he f ed the victim

and sent him to bed each evening and that no sexual contact took place. When confron ted by his wife and the victim’s mother, the defendant denied the victim’s allegations. He testified that sometime later, he was again asked to babysit the victim, but refused.

On appeal, of course, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate viewof the evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn

therefrom. Stat e v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 19 78 ). Th e c re di bi li ty o f t he wi tn es se s, th e w ei gh t t o b e g iv en th ei r t es ti mo ny, and th e reconciliation of confl

icts in the proof ar e matter s entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact. Byrg e v. State , 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). When the sufficiency of the evidence i s challenged, the relevant

question i s whethe

r, afte r revie wing the

evidenc e in the lig

ht most fav orable to the state, any r

ational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a
reasona ble doubt. Te

nn. R. App. P. 13(e); S ta te v. Willia ms , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, a s well
as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact. Liak

as v. State , 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 85 6, 859 (19 56). Be cause a verdict o f guilt against a defendant re moves the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bear s the burden o f showing

that the e vidence was leg ally

insuffic ient to sust

aina guilty ve

rdict. Statev. Evans , 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).

The statute defining the offense of ag gravated s exual batt ery provide s in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Aggravated sexual battery is unlawf ul sexual c ontact wi

th a victim by the defendant or the defendant by

a victim acc omp anied by any of the following circumst ances: * * * (4) The victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 -13-504( a)(4). “‘Sexual contact’ includes the intentional touching of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the

immediate

area of the victim ’s, the de

fendant ’s, or an

y ot her per son’s intimate parts, if tha t int entio nal to uchin g can be r easo nably construed a s being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-501(6).-3-

In our view, the evidence presented a c lassic jury question. The victim, who is less than th i rteen ye ars of a

ge, tes tified tha

t in appro ximately

Septembe

r of 1999, the defe

ndant, wh

ile performing babysitting re sponsibilities, touched his penis and that, afterward, he was then forced

to touch the defe

ndant’s p enis. Ac cording to the vic tim, this same thing occurred the next day

. The defendant denied engag

ing in any activities that could have resulted in incidental contact with the victim’s penis. The jury ac credited the testimony of the victim and rejected that offered by the defenda nt. That was its pre rogative. A rational trier of fact could also have found be yond a
reasona ble doubt that the defendant’s conduct could “be rea sonably constru ed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratifica tion.” The ver

dict reso lved the c onflicts in the testimony in favor of the state. See State v. Sum merall , 926 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Accordingly , the judgments of the trial court must be affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE