COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

GARY JEROME PALMER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2213-95-1 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 DECEMBER 17, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Alfred W. Whitehurst, Judge 

 Jennifer T. Stanton (Stowe & Stanton, P.C., 

on brief) for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Gary Jerome Palmer (appellant) appeals from his bench trial 

convictions by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial 

court) for second offense possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248, possession of a 

firearm while in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 

in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4, and possession of a firearm 

after having been convicted of a felony in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-308.2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when 

it refused to suppress the cocaine and firearm evidence, in 

admitting the certificate of analysis of the cocaine into 

evidence, and in finding that the chain of custody of the drugs 

was not broken. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

 In an appeal from an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below and grant all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 

58, 354 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1987); Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 

1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). 

The finding of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is 

not supported by the evidence and plainly wrong, Commonwealth v. 

Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991), and 

the burden is upon appellant to show that the trial court's 

ruling constituted reversible error. Fore, 220 Va. at 1010, 265 

S.E.2d at 731. Our review of the record includes evidence 

adduced at both the trial and the suppression hearing. DePriest 

v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 583, 359 S.E.2d 540, 542-43 

(1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988). 

 Appellant first contends that the evidence fails to show 

that the arresting officer, Detective Richard A. Scarola 

(Scarola), articulated reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry

stop. We disagree. Terry declared that the Fourth Amendment 

does not proscribe all seizures, only those that are 

unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); see also

Hogan v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 355, 367-68, 423 S.E.2d 841, 

849-50 (1992), and cases there cited. 

 There is no litmus test for reasonable suspicion. Harmon v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 440, 444-45, 425 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1992). 
- 3 - 

 Each instance of police conduct must be judged for 

reasonableness in light of the particular circumstances. 

Castenada v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 574, 580, 376 S.E.2d 82, 85 

(1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 

The analysis proceeds with various objective 

observations, information from police reports 

if such are available, and consideration of 

the modes or patterns of operation of certain 

kinds of law breakers. From these data, a 

trained officer draws inferences and makes 

deductions--inferences and deductions that 

might well elude an untrained person. 

 The process does not deal with hard 

certainties, but with probabilities. Long 

before the law of probabilities was 

articulated as such, practical people 

formulated certain common sense conclusions 

about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 

are permitted to do the same--and so are law 

enforcement officers. 

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). In 

determining what cause is sufficient for a police officer to stop 

a person, "cognizance must be taken of the 'totality of the 

circumstances--the whole picture.'" Williams, 4 Va. App. at 65, 

354 S.E.2d at 85. The totality of the circumstances includes the 

consideration that a trained law enforcement officer may be able 

to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would 

not be perceived by an untrained person. United States v. 

Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982). The officer's 

perception need not rise to the level of probable cause; rather, 

the officer must only possess a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that criminal activity may be afoot. United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
- 4 - 

The Fourth Amendment does not require a 

policeman who lacks the precise level of 

information necessary for probable cause to 

arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and 

allow a crime to occur or a criminal to 

escape. On the contrary, Terry recognized 

that it may be the essence of good police 

work to adopt an intermediate response. A 

brief stop of a suspicious individual, in 

order to determine his identity or to 

maintain the status quo momentarily while 

obtaining more information, may be most 

reasonable in light of the facts known to the 

officer at the time. 

Williams, 4 Va. App. at 65, 354 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting Adams v. 

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). 

 In the case before us, eight members of the Norfolk Police 

Vice-Narcotics Unit were armed with information that illegal 

narcotics distributions were reputed to be taking place in a 

particular block of an area managed by the Norfolk Redevelopment 

and Housing Authority. The officers were patrolling the area at 

2:00 p.m. on February 20, 1995, in two unmarked cars. Detective 

Richard Scarola, a seventeen-year veteran of the Norfolk Police 

Department who had been assigned to vice-narcotics1 for the last 

nine years, was among the eight officers. 

 Scarola exited from one of the unmarked police vehicles and 

entered the reputed block where a playground facility was 

located. As Scarola approached the playground, he observed seven 

or eight men in the area. They did not appear to be playing on 

the playground. Scarola observed appellant whose back was 

 

 1During that period, Scarola had made "a few hundred" 

arrests for narcotics violations. 
- 5 - 

partially turned toward him. Appellant appeared to be talking to 

another man directly in front of him. Appellant had his right 

hand out, palm up, and made a motion as if he were placing 

something in the other man's hand. 

 Scarola was approximately twenty-five feet away when he 

heard someone yell "Five-0," a street term used to indicate that 

police are in the area. Appellant turned in the direction of 

Scarola and then turned the opposite way and ran from Scarola's 

view. 

 Considering Scarola's knowledge of the totality of the 

circumstances, his training and experience as a narcotics 

investigator, and appellant's flight, Scarola articulated 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have been afoot. 

 This reasonable suspicion justified further investigation. 

 Appellant also argues that Scarola did not have probable 

cause to arrest him. We disagree. 

 Scarola pursued appellant behind a brick shed. At this 

point Scarola was the only officer in the immediate area. 

Appellant was out of sight for fifteen to thirty seconds. When 

Scarola caught up with appellant, he observed appellant 

withdrawing his hand from a trash can and simultaneously heard 

the "thud" of something heavy hitting the trash can. Appellant 

then turned and faced Scarola. Scarola asked appellant "to let 

me see your hands." Instead of responding as requested, 

appellant placed his hands out of sight underneath his sweatshirt 
- 6 - 

near the waist of his pants. Scarola, "worried for [his] safety 

and any other investigator's safety," "reached and grabbed" for 

appellant's hands so that he could see them. As Scarola 

contacted appellant's arm, both men fell to the ground. After a 

short wrestle, and as one of the other officers came up to 

assist, Scarola "stood [appellant] back up, placed him on a wall 

and arrested him." Scarola then walked over to the trash can, 

seven or eight feet away, opened it and found a loaded gun and 

beeper inside. Thereafter, for his protection and incident to 

the arrest, Scarola searched appellant and found bags of cocaine. 

 We hold that there was no violation of appellant's Fourth 

Amendment rights and that Scarola had probable cause to arrest 

appellant. In Williams, 4 Va. App. at 67, 354 S.E.2d at 87, this 

Court clearly established that suspicion of narcotics possession 

and distribution gives rise to an inference of dangerousness. To 

hold otherwise would be an invitation to violence in what is 

always a potentially explosive situation. Id. The record before 

us establishes that Scarola had reasonable suspicion that drug 

activity was afoot. When someone yelled out "Five-0" in a 

reputed narcotics transaction area where appellant was observed 

passing something to another person, thereby alerting him to 

police presence in the area, appellant fled. Appellant's 

"flight" in the face of lawful authority, with the other evidence 

in the record, supplied reasonable suspicion, invited pursuit by 

the officer, and colored conduct that may have appeared innocent 
- 7 - 

to the untrained observer. See Quigley v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. 

App. 28, 33, 414 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1992) (quoting United States v. 

Lane, 909 F.2d 895, 899 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 

1093 (1991)); Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 302-03, 456 

S.E.2d 534, 535-36 (1995). When Scarola commanded appellant to 

show his hands, he refused and concealed them from view. 

Appellant placed his hands under his sweatshirt at the waistline 

of his pants where he would likely have concealed a weapon if he 

were carrying one. 

 Probable cause to justify an arrest means, 

. . . facts and circumstances within the 

officer's knowledge that are sufficient to 

warrant a prudent person, or one of 

reasonable caution, in believing, in the 

circumstances shown, that the suspect has 

committed, is committing, or is about to 

commit an offense. The evidence needed to 

establish probable cause is more than a mere 

suspicion, rumor, or strong reason to suspect 

but less than evidence sufficient to convict. 

United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1993) 

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 313 (1994). At 

this point in time, Scarola had sufficient facts and 

circumstances to warrant his belief that appellant had committed, 

was committing, or was about to commit an offense. 

 "The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Blain v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988) 

(citation omitted). Appellant argues that the certificate of 
- 8 - 

analysis should not have been admitted into evidence because it 

did not comport with Scarola's testimony that he recovered twenty 

individually-wrapped bags of cocaine from appellant. However, a 

comparison of the request for laboratory examination form and the 

certificate of analysis shows the two documents both contain the 

names of appellant and the investigating officer, and the case 

number assigned by the lab. This information coincides to 

connect the drug analyzed and referenced in the certificate to 

the substance recovered by Scarola. See Crews v. Commonwealth, 

18 Va. App. 115, 120, 442 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1994). Any 

discrepancy in Scarola's testimony about the number of baggies of 

cocaine he submitted addressed the weight to be given the 

evidence, not its admissibility. "Where there is mere 

speculation that contamination or tampering could have occurred, 

it is not an abuse of discretion to admit the evidence and let 

what doubt there may be go to the weight to be given the 

evidence." Reedy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 386, 391, 388 

S.E.2d 650, 652 (1990); see also Gosling v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. 

App. 158, 166, 415 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1992). Therefore, the trial 

judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the certificate. 

 Scarola testified that he took custody of the drugs from 

appellant and took them to his office. He sealed the drugs in 

the plastic bag that the drugs were in at trial, labeled the bag, 

and placed it into his evidence locker. He later took the drugs 

to the police department's property and accounting division where 
- 9 - 

another number was assigned to the evidence. Scarola then took 

the drugs to the forensic laboratory and gave the evidence to the 

state representative who logged the information in a book and 

gave Scarola a receipt. Scarola testified that the drugs were in 

substantially the same condition from the time he received them 

from appellant until he took the drugs to the laboratory. 

 Thus, the Commonwealth showed with reasonable certainty that 

the evidence had not been altered, substituted, or contaminated 

prior to analysis. Scarola explained that he thought there were 

twenty bags of cocaine rather than two, as stated on the 

certificate of analysis, but that he was testifying from memory. 

 Further, appellant did not "offer any evidence of mishandling or 

tampering to rebut the Commonwealth's proof of chain of custody." 

See Brown v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 552, 557, 466 S.E.2d 116, 

118 (1996). Again, any argument that a break in the chain of 

custody occurred was based on mere speculation, and the record 

does not suggest any taint or contamination of the evidence. 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the drugs into evidence. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.