[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11647

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KASI JAMEELAH CRAWFORD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

d.b.a. Atlanta Evergreen Marriott Conference Resort,

Defendant,

MARRIOTT HOTEL SERVICES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02687-CAP

____________________

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kasi Jameelah Crawford appeals the summary judgment 

granted to defendants Marriott International, Inc. and Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. (collectively, “Marriott”) and the denial of her motion to disqualify or recuse the district court judge. The district 

court granted Marriott’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no legal basis for the duty asserted in Crawford’s 

complaint—the purported duty to warn patrons of the latent dangers of seafood consumption. The court denied Crawford’s motion for recusal or disqualification on the ground that it was both 

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procedurally and substantively deficient. After careful review, we 

affirm.1 

I 

Kasi Crawford suffered an allergic reaction after eating a 

meal prepared by Marriott at the Revealed Life Church’s 2018 Annual Banquet, held at the Atlanta Evergreen Resort & Conference 

Center. Marriott representatives communicated extensively with 

the pastor organizing the event—Pastor Angelique Carter—about 

the entrée selections for the banquet, including the fact that one 

option would be a blue-crab-stuffed chicken. Carter asked the hotel about a chicken option with no seafood in case anyone had an 

allergy, and the hotel agreed to make one available. But no one 

from the Church ever told the hotel to expect someone with food 

allergies and the Church placed no orders for a seafood-free 

chicken dish: The signed banquet event order forms reflected orders for thirty blue-crab-stuffed chicken breasts and twenty honeyglazed salmon entrees, with dietary restrictions marked “N/A.” 

Doc. 283 at 7. When a hotel employee asked Carter on the day of 

1 We review a “summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards 

used by the district court.” Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Auth., 941 F.3d 

1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review a district court’s 

denial of a motion to recuse or a motion to disqualify for abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 1999); Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876, 878 (11th Cir. 1988). 

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the banquet whether any attendees had “changes to this menu because of restrictions,” Carter responded no. Doc 283 at 8. 

Crawford never informed the Church or the hotel about her 

shellfish allergy. She alleges that she never saw the menu options 

that the Church posted; instead, Pastor Carter told her only that 

the options were “salmon, chicken or veggie.” Doc. 283 at 6. 

Crawford told Carter that she wanted the chicken. 

On the day of the banquet, Crawford sat at a seat marked by 

a place card stating her name and “chicken.” Pastor Carter had 

prepared these place cards in accordance with the event order form 

she received from Marriott, which instructed the Church to provide place cards to identify which entrée each attendee should be 

served. Crawford didn’t communicate with the server who delivered her blue-crab-stuffed chicken. She ate a few bites before becoming ill. 

Crawford’s complaint alleged one count of negligence 

against Marriott, stating that Marriott “owed a duty to all patrons 

to provide an adequate warning of the latent dangers arising from 

the consumption of seafood products.” Complaint at 6. She also 

asserted that Marriott knew or should have known the chicken dish 

contained seafood, which would be life-threatening to people with 

seafood allergies; that the presence of the crabmeat wasn’t obvious 

to Crawford; and that the “food label” didn’t disclose the presence 

of crab. Id. 

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About 16 months after filing her complaint, Crawford 

moved for the district court judge to recuse or disqualify himself 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. The primary rationales Crawford offered were that (1) one of the judge’s former 

law clerks was a current employee of the law firm representing 

Marriott; (2) Crawford is an African American female “who has experienced systemic biases in this judicial system;” and (3) the judge 

“executed disparate treatment” toward Crawford by sanctioning 

her counsel and issuing other adverse rulings against her. Doc. 248 

at 4–5. The district court denied this motion for what it characterized as three independent reasons: (1) Crawford’s counsel, not 

Crawford, submitted the affidavit supporting recusal, violating a 

clear requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 144; (2) the affidavit of recusal 

wasn’t timely because it was filed after more than 16 months of 

litigation; and (3) the affidavit didn’t provide a legally sufficient basis for recusal. 

On appeal, Crawford challenges both the summary judgment and the denial of her motion for disqualification or recusal. 

II 

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

for Marriott because Crawford failed “to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential” to her case: She

failed to show that Marriott breached any duty that it owed her, so 

“no genuine issue as to any material fact” remained. Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–323 (1986). 

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To state a claim for negligence under Georgia law, a plaintiff 

must show “the existence of a legal duty; breach of that duty; a 

causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury; and damages.” Handberry v. Manning Forestry Servs., 

LLC, 836 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). “A legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is either a duty imposed by 

a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by 

a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of [Georgia’s] appellate courts.” Sheaffer v. Marriott Int’l, 

Inc., 826 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

Crawford’s original theory of liability in her complaint was 

based on an alleged duty to warn all patrons of the latent dangers 

of seafood consumption. But she has failed to identify any Georgia 

statute or caselaw that might possibly stand for the proposition that 

a food-serving establishment has such a duty—particularly where, 

as here, the patrons preselected entrees to be served and told the 

establishment that no one had any dietary restrictions.

In response to Marriott’s motion for summary judgment, 

Crawford identified alternative legal duties that she alleges Marriott breached—duties, based on two Georgia Department of Public Health Rules, to honestly present food offered for human consumption and to properly label foods. These are the duties that 

Crawford asserts on appeal. The district court characterized Crawford’s citation of the Georgia Rules as an impermissibly late “secUSCA11 Case: 21-11647 Date Filed: 11/01/2021 Page: 6 of 14
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ond attempt to amend her complaint and shift her theory of negligence to something on which Marriott did not have the opportunity to conduct discovery, which the court previously rejected.” 

Doc. 283 at 17. So, the district court dismissed Crawford’s case because “the [Georgia] DPH Rules do not provide a basis for the legal 

duty asserted in Crawford’s failure to warn claim.” Id. 

We don’t need to decide whether Crawford’s invocation of 

the DPH Rules is really a departure from the theory of liability she 

alleged in her complaint.2 Instead, we may affirm the district 

court’s summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. See Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 793 F.3d 1246, 1249 

(11th Cir. 2015). And summary judgment for Marriott should be 

affirmed even if we consider the Georgia DPH Rules that Crawford 

cites as a basis for the duty that she alleges Marriott breached.3 

2 This question is debatable: Crawford’s complaint’s first count is simply titled 

“Negligence,” and while it does explicitly refer to a duty to warn about the 

dangers of seafood consumption, it also states that the “presence of the crabmeat . . . was not obvious to the Plaintiff, and the food label did not disclose 

that she was being served ‘crabmeat stuffed chicken.’” Complaint at 6. 

3 The district court noted that Crawford provided the court only with a copy 

of the Georgia Rules that was revised “more than two years after the incident 

in question” and that she supported her assertion that the rules applied to the 

Marriott by reference to the deposition of the Evergreen’s Director of Operations, who didn’t start work until two days after the incident. Doc. 283 at 16.

So, it was “not clear to the court that these regulations were in place during 

the Banquet or whether and to what extent they were binding on Marriott.” 

Id. For purposes of argument, we will assume that these regulations were

binding on Marriott in substantially the same form at the time of the incident. 

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Crawford first points to Georgia DPH Rule 511-6-1-

.04(7)(b)(1), which states: “Honestly Presented. Food shall be offered for human consumption in a way that does not mislead or 

misinform the consumer.” On appeal, Crawford argues that Marriott violated this provision by “disguising blue crab stuffed chicken 

as a regular chicken breast entrée.” Brief of Appellant at 25. 

This argument fails based on the undisputed facts in the record. Marriott’s agents communicated to the Church’s representative, Pastor Carter, repeatedly and in writing that the entrée being 

offered was a blue-crab-stuffed chicken breast and asked several 

times whether any guests had dietary restrictions. Marriott also 

offered a different seafood-free chicken entrée for anyone with a 

seafood allergy. Pastor Carter nevertheless executed the banquet 

event orders on behalf of her church for “thirty blue crab stuffed 

chicken breasts.” Doc. 283 at 7. There is no plausible argument 

that Marriott “disguis[ed]” its dish or misled or misinformed consumers when it provided the exact entrée that the Church ordered 

for its members.4 Therefore, Crawford has failed to establish that 

Marriott breached any duty that it may have had under this Rule. 

4 On appeal, Crawford doesn’t argue that the place cards stating “chicken” violated Rule 511-6-1-.04(7)(b)(1). Even if this argument were preserved, it 

would fail: The Church prepared the cards, not Marriott, and it’s doubtful 

whether a card that just says “chicken” is misleading when (1) the entrée is a 

chicken dish; (2) the card doesn’t purport to be anything like an exhaustive list 

of ingredients; and (3) the fact that this entrée was blue-crab-stuffed chicken 

was posted at the Church more than three months before the banquet.

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Crawford also cites Georgia DPH Rule 511-6-1-

.04(7)(c)(4)(i), which states: “Bulk, unpackaged foods such as bakery products and unpackaged foods that are portioned to consumer 

specification need not be labeled if: A health, nutrient content, or 

other claim is not made . . . .” Crawford’s argument seems to be 

that because the place card said “chicken,” it made a “health, nutrient content, or other claim” and, therefore, that the dish needed to 

be labeled. So, according to Crawford, Marriott violated the Rule 

by “negligently failing to verify that the mandatory Place Card with 

Appellant’s entrée selection was properly labeled.” Brief of Appellant at 25. 

This argument also fails. The Georgia food-labeling rules

simply don’t apply to Marriott serving dinner at a banquet. First, 

this section of the Rules is titled “Food Labels” and begins “Food 

packaged in a food service establishment, shall be labeled as specified in law.” Ga. DPH Rule 511-6-1-.04(7)(c)(1) (emphasis added). 

The dinners that Marriott served at the Church’s banquet were not 

packaged food. 

Second, the full provision that Crawford cites states that 

“bulk, unpackaged foods such as bakery products and unpackaged 

foods that are portioned to consumer specification” don’t have to 

be labeled if a “health, nutrient content, or other claim is not 

made;” “[t]here are no state or local laws requiring labeling;” and 

the food “is manufactured or prepared on the premises of the food 

service establishment . . . .” Id. § 511-6-1-.04(7)(c)(4). Even if this 

provision encompasses dinners prepared and served by a hotel at a 

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banquet, a place card with just the word “chicken” doesn’t make a 

health, nutrient content, or similar claim; it simply identifies which 

preselected entrée each guest should receive. And Crawford cites 

no other law that might require food labeling here. 

Third, the Georgia Rules require food labels to contain a lot 

of information, including the “common name of the food,” a “list 

of ingredients and sub-ingredients in descending order of predominance by weight, including a declaration of artificial color or flavors and chemical preservatives,” an “accurate declaration of the 

net quantity of contents,” the “name and place of business of the 

manufacturer, packer, or distributor,” and the “name of the food 

source for each major food allergen contained in the food.” Id. 

§ 511-6-1-.04(7)(c)(2). If the labeling rules applied here, Marriott 

would have been required to produce detailed food labels like 

those we might find on a box of cereal or can of beans for each dish 

it served at the banquet and hand them out to each guest alongside 

her plated entrée. Crawford makes no such contention, but her 

argument that Marriott negligently violated the labeling rules is 

baseless unless these rules applied to Marriott’s activities in the first 

place. We will not interpret the Georgia DPH Rules to require restaurants and hotels to provide detailed food labels for every dish 

they serve. Because the labeling rules don’t apply to Marriot’s conduct, Crawford can’t rely on them to establish the legal-duty element of her negligence claim. 

So, even if we consider the Georgia DPH Rules that Crawford raised for the first time in a response to Marriott’s motion for 

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summary judgment, she still has failed to establish any breach of 

duty given the undisputed facts in the record. Therefore, there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and Marriott was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–323. Accordingly, the district court did 

not err in granting Marriott summary judgment. 

III 

Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Crawford’s motion for disqualification or recusal. Crawford’s motion failed to comply with the procedural requirements 

of 28 U.S.C. § 144, which states that a “party” to the proceeding 

may file a “timely” affidavit that the judge had a personal bias or 

prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 144. We have long held that disqualification 

affidavits must be filed by a party to the litigation, not by the party’s 

counsel. See Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cnty., 517 

F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1975) (“‘[P]arty’ as used in s 144 does not 

include counsel as such.”). Here, Marsha Mignott, Crawford’s 

counsel, signed and filed the affidavit of recusal. See Doc. 248-1. 

Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found 

that the motion was untimely: It was filed after more than 16

months of litigation, and the primary grounds it raised—the judge’s 

former law clerk’s employment with the firm representing Marriott and the plaintiff being an African American female—long predated the filing of the motion. Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying Crawford’s motion under § 144.

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Crawford’s motion also cited 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states 

that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The test is “whether 

an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts 

underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” United 

States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003). On appeal, 

Crawford renews three arguments for why the district court judge 

should have been disqualified: (1) Crawford is an “African American female a double minority who has experienced systemic biases 

in this judicial system”; (2) the district court judge “is in favor of” 

Marriott’s success because of his relationship with a former law 

clerk who is employed by Marriott’s law firm; and (3) the judge 

erred in issuing orders adverse to Crawford throughout the litigation. Brief of Appellant at 27–29. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding all 

these reasons legally insufficient to require disqualification. First, 

general allegations that the justice system is systemically biased 

against African American women do not raise significant doubt 

about an individual judge’s impartiality, particularly where, as 

here, there are no specific allegations of racial or gender prejudice. 

Second, the fact that the judge’s former law clerk works at the firm 

representing Marriott does not compel disqualification. A judge’s 

impartiality is cast into significant doubt only where “his former 

law clerk is actively involved as counsel for a party in a case in 

which the law clerk participated during his clerkship.” Fredonia 

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Broad. Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1978). In 

fact, a law clerk may even practice before the judge for whom he 

clerked. Id. Here, the former clerk has not appeared on behalf of 

Marriott in any capacity. Third, the district court’s rulings against 

Crawford throughout the litigation do not raise doubt as to the 

judge’s impartiality. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United 

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Nor do judicial remarks during 

litigation that are “critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, 

counsel, the parties, or their cases.” Id. Here, the rulings about 

which Crawford complains—for instance, denying her motion for 

sanctions and denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint—are adverse rulings of the sort that are common in litigation 

and do not cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality.

* * *

The district court did not err in granting Marriott summary 

judgment because Crawford failed to “make a showing sufficient 

to establish” that Marriott breached any duty that it owed her—

an “element essential” to her negligence claim. Celotex Corp., 

477 U.S. at 322. There remains “no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” so Marriott was entitled to summary judgment. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court also did not err in denying Crawford’s 

motion for recusal or disqualification because the motion was 

procedurally deficient under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and, in any event, 

was legally insufficient to raise significant doubt as to the judge’s 

impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455.

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AFFIRMED. 

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