Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Bartholomew, 2015 IL App (4th) 130575

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

THOMAS M. BARTHOLOMEW, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-13-0575

Filed July 7, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 12-CF-1022; 

the Hon. John C. Costigan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed; cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and John M. McCarthy, all 

of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Jason Chambers, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, 

David J. Robinson, and James C. Majors, all of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Pope and Justice Holder White concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 In April 2013, a jury convicted defendant, Thomas M. Bartholomew, of two counts of 

aggravated battery, both Class 2 felonies (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4), (h) (West Supp. 2011)) 

and one count of battery, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)). In 

June 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison. 

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court failed to substantially comply with Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) prior to allowing him to proceed pro se. We 

reverse and remand for a new trial. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 On September 28, 2012, the State charged defendant by information with two counts of 

aggravated battery, both Class 2 felonies (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4), (h) (West Supp. 2011)). 

The State alleged that on September 27, 2012, defendant knowingly (1) caused great bodily 

harm to a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official duties when he punched him in 

the mouth (count I); and (2) made contact of an insulting or provoking nature to the same peace 

officer when he punched him in the chest (count II). On April 8, 2013, the State charged 

defendant by information with battery, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1), (b) 

(West 2010)), based on the September 27, 2012, incident. The State alleged defendant 

knowingly and without legal justification caused bodily harm to the victim when he punched 

him in the face with his fist. 

¶ 5 On April 8, 2013, defendant’s jury trial commenced with defendant represented by an 

assistant public defender. The State presented its evidence–the details of which are not 

important to this appeal–and rested its case. Defendant, outside the presence of the jury, then 

requested to proceed pro se for the remainder of the trial. In considering defendant’s oral 

motion to proceed pro se, the trial court informed defendant that it first had to determine 

whether he had “the requisite capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of [his] right 

of counsel, not whether [he] can conduct [his] defense or not.” The court then asked defendant 

a series of questions regarding his age, education level, mental health, and his prior 

involvement with legal proceedings. Next, the court informed defendant that he would be held 

to the same standard as an attorney–who has substantial experience and training in trial 

procedure–in presenting evidence, and that by representing himself, he may fail to make 

appropriate objections, and therefore, allow into evidence that which may not otherwise be 

admissible. The court further admonished defendant he could not later claim ineffective 

assistance of counsel from that point forward in the trial. Defendant stated he understood the 

court’s admonishments and that his decision to proceed pro se would result in the discharge of 

his assistant public defender. Thereafter, the court found that defendant understood the 

admonishments, discharged the assistant public defender, and allowed him to proceed pro se. 

¶ 6 After defendant presented evidence–the details of which are not important to this 

appeal–the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial 

court sentenced defendant–who, due to his prior record was subject to mandatory Class X 

sentencing–to 13 years in prison on count I. Counts II and III were merged into count I. 

¶ 7 This appeal followed. 
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¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court failed to substantially comply with Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) prior to allowing him to proceed pro se. The 

State concedes the court did not substantially comply with Rule 401(a) and that defendant’s 

conviction and sentence should be reversed. We agree.

¶ 10 Rule 401(a) provides as follows:

“Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of 

counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by 

addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining 

that he understands the following:

 (1) the nature of the charge; 

 (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when 

applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior 

convictions or consecutive sentences; and 

 (3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed 

for him by the court.” Id. 

In People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84, 862 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2006), our supreme court 

stated, “[t]he purpose of this rule is ‘to ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and 

intelligently made.’ ” (quoting People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 241, 673 N.E.2d 318, 335 

(1996)). Thus, Rule 401(a) admonishments “must be provided when the court learns the 

defendant has chosen to waive counsel so the defendant can consider the ramifications of his 

decision.” People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d 269, 275, 728 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (2000). Prior 

admonishments, if any, are not sufficient. Id. “Accordingly, substantial compliance with Rule 

401(a) is required for an effective waiver of counsel.” Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d at 84, 862 N.E.2d 

at 936. 

¶ 11 In this case, the trial court did not address any of the three elements required by Rule 401(a) 

prior to allowing defendant to proceed pro se during the defense portion of his trial. 

Accordingly, defendant’s waiver of counsel was ineffective and his conviction and sentence 

must be reversed. See id. at 85, 862 N.E.2d at 936 (a conviction following an ineffective 

waiver of counsel cannot stand). 

¶ 12 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13 For the reasons stated, we reverse the defendant’s conviction and sentence and remand for 

a new trial. 

¶ 14 Reversed; cause remanded.