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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

RICHARD C. GOINS,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:10cv551/LAC/EMT

WALTER A. McNEIL, et al., 

Defendants.

____________________________________/

ORDER

This cause is before the court on Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Doc. 1). Leave to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

Upon review of the complaint, it is evident that the facts as presented fail to support a viable

claim for relief under § 1983 as to one or more of the named Defendants. The court will therefore

allow Plaintiff an opportunity to clarify his allegations in an amended complaint. Also, in light of

the substantive deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc.

16) and Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 17) will be denied.

Plaintiff is currently housed incarcerated at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution (“SRCI”) 

(Doc. 1 at 2). He was incarcerated at the Orange County Jail (“Jail”) and SRCI at the time of the

events giving rise to the complaint (id. at 6–7). Plaintiff names ten Defendants in this action: 

Walter A. McNeil, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”); Micheal Tidwell,

Chief Administrator at the Jail; M. Mitchell, a member of the medical staff at the Jail; R. Tifft,

Warden at SRCI; J. Haas, Assistant Warden at SRCI; R. Burch, Classification Supervisor at SRCI;

W.D. Rummel, Medical Director/Chief Health Officer at SRCI; I. Nieves, an Advanced Registered

Nurse Practitioner (“ARNP”) at SRCI; the Chief of Security at SRCI; and L.D. Brock, Property

Room Sergeant at SRCI (id. at 1–4). 
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Plaintiff alleges that on July 20, 2010, while he was being transported from FDOC custody

to the Orange County Jail, he broke his left foot (Doc. 1 at 11). Upon his arrival at the Jail, he

informed “the security and medical staff” of his injury (id.). Approximately 7–10 days later, he

received three x-rays (id.). Defendant Mitchell, who Plaintiff states is either a Registered Nurse or

an ARNP, reviewed the x-rays and advised Plaintiff that his foot was not broken, but he had a severe

bunion under his left foot behind his left big toe (id. at 11–12). Plaintiff states that when Ms.

Mitchell showed him the x-rays, he could clearly see that the bone behind his big toe on his left foot

was broken (id. at 11). Defendant Mitchell prescribed an ankle brace and a pain reliever (id. at 12). 

Plaintiff filed a formal grievance with Defendant Tidwell, the Jail Administrator, on August 18,

2010, complaining that he did not receive proper medical treatment for his foot and was charged

$30.00 for medical services and prescriptions (see Doc. 1, Ex. A), but he did not receive a response

(Doc. 1 at 12). 

On August 30, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to the FDOC’s Reception and Medical Center

(Doc. 1 at 12). Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Smith (not a named Defendant), who ordered x-rays

and issued a medical pass for no prolonged standing or walking, and no heavy lifting (id.).

On September 21, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to SRCI (Doc. 1 at 13). A senior nurse

conducted a “medical orientation” with incoming inmates (id.). Plaintiff advised her that his left

foot was broken, and she made a notation in his medical records (id.). The senior nurse informed

all of the incoming inmates that their existing medical passes would not be honored, and their

medical needs would be re-evaluated by a doctor within ten days (id.).

Seven days later, on September 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed an informal grievance complaining

that he had not received appropriate medical treatment for his foot and was suffering stiffness and

“hot and cold sensations” in his foot (Doc. 1 at 13, Ex. B-1). On October 4, 2010, Plaintiff was seen

by Defendant Nieves, an ARNP (Doc. 1 at 12). Plaintiff informed her that his foot was broken (id.). 

Nieves issued Plaintiff a medical pass for a bottom bunk and instructed Plaintiff to sign up for sick

call if he wished to consult with a doctor (id.). On October 5, 2010, the Health Services

Administrator, D.W. Griffiths, denied Plaintiff’s informal grievance and advised him to address his

medical issue at sick call (at which he would be assessed a $5.00 co-pay) (Doc. 1 at 14, Ex. B-1). 

Plaintiff appealed the response to the Warden’s Office (id.). Defendant Dr. Rummel, the Chief

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Health Officer, and Defendant Haas, the Assistant Warden, denied the grievance on the ground that

FDOC policy provided that each inmate who initiates a non-emergency visit to a health care

provider would be assessed a co-payment (id.). Plaintiff appealed the denial to Secretary McNeil’s

office on October 25, 2010, but as of the date of filing the instant complaint (December 28, 2010),

he had not received a response (Doc. 1 at 14). Plaintiff states the alleged broken bone has healed

improperly, causing him to walk “somewhat irregular at times” and restricting certain forms of

exercise (id. at 16). He also states he suffers constant pain and discomfort (id.).

In an unrelated claim, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered acts of retaliation since he filed the

informal grievance on September 28, 2010 (Doc. 1 at 13). He states his telephone access to a Ms.

Hugger was restricted in December of 2010, even though it had been approved in November (id. at

13, 19). He additionally states his outgoing and incoming mail was censored, tampered with, and

destroyed (id.). Also, on December 14 and 15, an officer threatened him for writing grievances

against staff (id. at 14). Plaintiff additionally states Defendant Brock confiscated and destroyed his

UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) materials valued at over $8,000.00 (id. at 13–14, 19). Plaintiff

states the Chief of Security and Defendants Burch and Tifft denied his grievances concerning the

destruction of his UCC materials (id. at 19). 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Tidwell, Mitchell, McNeil, Tifft, Haas, Griffiths (Plaintiff

apparently intended to name him as a Defendant (see Doc. 16)), Rummel, and Nieves deprived him

of adequate medical treatment for his foot, in violation of the Eighth Amendment (id. at 15). He

additionally contends the FDOC policy of canceling inmates’ medical passes from other institutions

and assessing a co-payment for non-emergency sick call visits constitutes deliberate indifference

(id.). Plaintiff claims that Defendants Tifft, Haas, Griffith, Brock, and the Chief of Security

retaliated against him for filing grievances by restricting his telephone access to Ms. Hugger,

interfering with his mail, and destroying his UCC materials without compensating him (id. at

18–19).

As relief, Plaintiff seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages (Doc. 1 at 22). He

also seeks injunctive relief (id.).

Initially, Plaintiff has failed to state a basis for liability as to Defendants Tidwell, McNeil,

Tifft, Haas, Burch, Rummel, and the Chief of Security. Supervisory officials are not liable under

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section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior

or vicarious liability. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Supervisory liability may occur, however, either when the supervisor

personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection

between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. (citation

omitted). This connection may be established “when a history of widespread abuse puts the

responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so,

or when a supervisor’s custom or policy ‘result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights’

or when facts support ‘an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully

or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.’” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir.

1999).

Isolated incidents are generally insufficient to establish a supervisor’s liability; indeed, the

deprivations must be “‘obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration . . . .’” Gray ex rel.

Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d

1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, filing a grievance with a supervisory person does not

alone make the supervisor liable for the allegedly violative conduct brought to light by the

grievance, even if the grievance is denied. Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1106; Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F.

Supp. 335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff’d, 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Bellamy v.

Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Knowledge imputed to the supervisor “must be so

pervasive that the refusal to prevent harm rises to the level of a custom or policy of depriving

inmates of their constitutional rights.” Tittle v. Jefferson County Com’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1542 (11th

Cir. 1994). The failure to act or implement policy must be in the face of repeated violations or other

indicators signifying a strong likelihood that the situation will recur. See Harris v. City of Marion,

79 F.3d 56, 58–59 (7th Cir. 1996). Supervisors are generally entitled to rely on their subordinates

to respond appropriately to situations absent clear or widespread evidence to the contrary. “The

standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a

subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

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In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Tidwell, McNeil, Tifft, Haas, Burch,

Rummel, and the Chief of Security denied his grievances. As discussed supra, this fact alone does

not provide a basis for liability. Therefore, Plaintiff should drop these Defendants unless additional

facts exist and are alleged to support claims against them.

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to Defendant Mitchell (either an ARNP

or an RN) and ARNP Nieves regarding their alleged deprivation of adequate medical treatment. It

is well settled that the government has a constitutional duty to provide minimally adequate medical

care to prisoners. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). Medical treatment

violates the Eighth Amendment “only when it is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’” Id. at 1505 (citing Rogers

v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). Incidents of mere negligence or malpractice do

not rise to the level of constitutional violations. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97

S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)).

Stating an Eighth Amendment claim of denial of adequate medical care requires satisfying

both an objective and subjective component. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.

2000). First, there must be conduct by prison officials which, objectively speaking, is “sufficiently

serious” to constitute a deprivation “‘denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” 

Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991) (internal

quotation omitted)). Second, the prison officials must possess a subjective intent to use the medical

deprivation as a means of punishment. Id. (citations omitted). 

Both the objective and subjective components encompass two subsidiary requirements. 

Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258. As to the objective prong, an objectively serious deprivation requires

showing an objectively “serious medical need.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. A serious medical need

is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Hill v. DeKalb

Regional Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds

by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002); see Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994) (serious medical need is one that, if

left unattended, “pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.”). In addition, an objectively serious

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deprivation requires showing the response made by the defendant to that need was so deficient as

to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1257; see also Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537,

1543–44 (11th Cir. 1995).

To show the required subjective intent to punish, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendant acted with an attitude of “deliberate indifference.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “Deliberate

indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard

of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,

1245–46 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) and

Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (stating that defendant must have subjective awareness of an “objectively

serious need” and that his response must constitute “an objectively insufficient response to that

need”)). 

A complete denial of readily available treatment for a serious medical condition constitutes

deliberate indifference. Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir. 1994). However,

where the inmate has received medical treatment, and the dispute is over the adequacy of that

treatment, courts should be reluctant to question the accuracy or appropriateness of the medical

judgments that were made. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1507 (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030,

1035 (11th Cir. 1989)). To do otherwise would be “to constitutionalize claims that sound in tort

law.” Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted).

A delay in providing medical treatment can constitute deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429

U.S. at 104–05. However, “[a]n inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a

constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the

detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Townsend v. Jefferson County, 582

F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2009). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff’s disagreement with Ms. Mitchell, who Plaintiff admits is a 

medical professional, as to her diagnosis of his foot condition does not constitute deliberate

indifference. Plaintiff admits Ms. Mitchell examined his x-rays, diagnosed the problem (albeit

incorrectly, according to Plaintiff), and provided treatment in the form of medical passes and pain

medication. Furthermore, even if Ms. Mitchell misdiagnosed Plaintiff’s condition, the facts do not

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suggest her allegedly erroneous diagnosis was deliberate. As to Defendant Nieves, her issuing

Plaintiff a medical pass for a bottom bunk and instructing him to sign up for sick call (for which he

would be assessed a $5.00 co-payment) was a reasonable response to Plaintiff’s complaint and,

therefore, does not suggest deliberate indifference. 

Additionally, the FDOC policy of initially cancelling medical passes issued by medical

providers outside the institution and requiring new inmates to have their medical needs re-evaluated

by medical staff at their new institution does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Also, Plaintiff has

failed to allege facts showing that the policy of assessing a $5.00 co-payment for non-emergency

medical visits results in deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. Plaintiff does not

suggest he was denied access to medical care unless he actually paid the co-pay, as opposed to the

co-pay simply being assessed against his inmate account.

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to Defendant Brock regarding the

confiscation and destruction of his UCC materials. It is well established that negligent or intentional

deprivations of property resulting from random, unauthorized acts of government officials do not

become due process violations when there exist adequate remedies under state law for Plaintiff to

seek redress for the deprivation. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed.

2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420

(1984), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed.

2d 662 (1986) (overruling Parratt to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state

official may “deprive” an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment);

Rodriguez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986). 

In the instant case, the DOC provides an inmate grievance procedure for contesting

mishandled inmate property. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that he utilized this procedure by filing

grievances with the institution and with the Secretary of the DOC regarding the alleged loss of his

property (UCC materials). Furthermore, Florida Statutes section 768.28 (1993) provides a tort

remedy for the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s property; thus, he cannot maintain a section 1983

action based on the alleged deprivation. Under no set of facts can Plaintiff establish that these

avenues for relief are constitutionally insufficient. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is

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without an adequate post-deprivation remedy for Defendant Brock’s alleged unconstitutional taking

of his UCC materials. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state an actionable claim. 

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of retaliation as to any Defendant. It is well

established that the First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating against prisoners for

exercising the right of free speech. See Crawford-El v Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10, 592–93, 118

S. Ct. 1584, 140 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1998); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted); Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); see

also Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964,

968 (11th Cir. 1986). “First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for a

redress of grievances are violated when a prisoner is punished for filing a grievance concerning the

conditions of his imprisonment.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006). To

prevail on a claim of retaliation, the inmate must establish these elements: (1) his speech was

constitutionally protected; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected

speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected speech. 

See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d

1247, 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005)); Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1274–75 (N.D.

Fla. 2010). A prisoner’s filing of a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment is

protected speech under the First Amendment. See Douglas, 535 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Boxer X, 437

F.3d at 1112). As to the second element, the Eleventh Circuit employs a purely objective standard: 

 “A plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter

a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett, 423 F.3d at

1253. In adopting this objective standard, the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected a subjective

“actual chill” standard, that is, a plaintiff suffers adverse action only if the retaliatory conduct

actually chilled the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 1250–54. The third element,

whether there was a causal connection between the retaliatory acts and the adverse effect on the

speech, “asks whether the defendants were subjectively motivated to discipline because [the

prisoner] complained of the conditions of his confinement.” Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278

(11th Cir. 2008).

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The Supreme Court decisions of Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.

274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977) and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88

S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968) guide analysis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. See

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260, 126 S. Ct. 1695, 64 L. Ed. 2d 441 (2006) (citing Mt. Healthy,

429 U.S. at 287; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566–67); Cummings, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1274; Pate v. Peel,

256 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1339 (N.D. Fla. 2003). Although the framework was established in the

employment context, it is beneficial to maintain uniformity in these types of cases. Cummings, 695

F. Supp. 2d at 1274–75. The employment four-step analysis is reduced to a three-step analytical

framework, but continues to provide a workable standard to guide all retaliation cases. Id. at 1275. 

Initially, the plaintiff must plead and provide sufficient evidence of the retaliatory motive and the

adverse action. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259–60. “[U]pon a prima facie showing of retaliatory

harm, the burden shifts to the defendant official to demonstrate that even without the impetus to

retaliate he would have taken the action complained of . . . .” Id. at 260 (citing Mt. Healthy, 429

U.S. at 287). In the context of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, however, the plaintiff

has the ultimate burden of proof; therefore, the defendant need only point to evidence as to the

legitimate reason, and the plaintiff must produce “affirmative evidence from which a jury could find

that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of proving the pertinent motive.” Crawford-El, 523

U.S. at 600 (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256–57). “The relevant showing . . . must be

more than the prisoner’s ‘personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation.’” Johnson v. Rodriguez,

110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995)). 

Appropriate deference should be afforded to prison officials “in the evaluation of proffered

legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802,

807 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299 (1995)). And, because

regulatory actions taken by prison officials are presumed to be reasonable, the inmate must produce

“specific, nonconclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive causing cognizable

injury.” Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598 (citation omitted); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916–17

(11th Cir. 1995); see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995) (because claims of

retaliation may be easily fabricated, they should be reviewed with skepticism). To defeat a summary

judgment motion, a plaintiff need not adduce clear and convincing evidence of improper motive, but

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he must produce evidence from which a jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence, that

retaliation was the but-for cause of the challenged action. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 590–95,

600. “If there is a finding that retaliation was not the but-for cause of the action complained of, the

claim fails for lack of causal connection between unconstitutional motive and resulting harm, despite

proof of some retaliatory animus in the official’s mind.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260 (citing Mt.

Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593. Indeed, “action colored by some

degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been taken

anyway.” Hartman, supra (citing Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593; Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285–86). 

However, “when nonretaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse

consequences, . . . retaliation is subject to recovery as the but-for cause of official action offending

the Constitution.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256 (citing Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593; Mt. Healthy, 429

U.S. at 283–84). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to produce specific, nonconclusory factual allegations

showing that the actions of Defendants were motivated by retaliation. Therefore, he has failed to

state a First Amendment claim of retaliation.

In amending his complaint, Plaintiff should carefully review the foregoing to determine

whether he can state a claim for relief against Defendants. If Plaintiff determines he does not wish

to proceed with this case, he should file a notice of voluntary dismissal. If Plaintiff determines he

wishes to proceed with this action, he must file an amended complaint clarifying his allegations. 

Plaintiff shall completely fill out a new civil rights complaint form, marking it “Amended

Complaint.” Plaintiff must limit his allegations to claims related to the same basic incident or issue

and name as Defendants only those persons who are responsible for the alleged constitutional

violations. Plaintiff must place their names in the style of the case on the first page of the civil rights

complaint form, and include their addresses and employment positions in the “Defendants” section

of the form. In the statement of facts, Plaintiff should clearly describe how each named Defendant

is involved in each alleged constitutional violation, alleging the claims as to each Defendant in

separately numbered paragraphs and including specific dates of the alleged illegal acts (Plaintiff is

advised that he must properly complete Sections V, VI, and VII of the complaint form instead of

referring the court to an attachment, as he did in his initial complaint (see Doc. 1 at 10)). In the

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section titled “Statement of Claims,” Plaintiff must state what rights or statutes he contends have

been violated, and he must provide reference to the facts supporting the claimed violations. Finally,

in the “Relief Requested” section, Plaintiff shall identify the form of relief he seeks from this court. 

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must contain all of his allegations because once an

amended complaint is filed, all earlier complaints and filings are disregarded. Local Rule 15.1,

Northern District of Florida.

Plaintiff should file the amended complaint with an original signature and keep an identical

copy for himself. He should not file a memorandum of law or otherwise provide citations to statutes

and cases, and he should not file a witness list or submit exhibits as evidentiary support for his

complaint. The court will notify Plaintiff when memoranda and exhibits are necessary, such as prior

to trial or in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiff should not

submit service copies of his complaint unless and until the court directs him to do so. Finally,

Plaintiff is advised that discovery is premature at this stage of the case, and Plaintiff should not

conduct any discovery without leave of court.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The clerk of court is directed to forward to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form for

use in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case number should be written on the form. 

2. Plaintiff shall have THIRTY (30) DAYS in which to file an amended civil rights

complaint, which shall be typed or clearly written, submitted on court form, and marked “Amended

Complaint.” Alternatively, Plaintiff shall file a notice of voluntary dismissal within that time.

3. Failure to submit an amended complaint as instructed will result in a recommendation

of dismissal of this action.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 16) is DENIED. Plaintiff shall

include all Defendants, factual allegations, claims, and requests for relief in his Amended Complaint.

5. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 17) is DENIED

without prejudice, in light of the substantive deficiencies of his claims identified in this order.

DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of March 2011.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case No: 3:10cv551/LAC/EMT