IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs December 2, 2008

JEROME BOND v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 03-06593 Chris Craft, Judge

No. W2008-00319-CCA-R3-PC - Filed March 9, 2009

The petitioner, Jerome Bond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for

post-conviction relief. Following his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially

aggravated robbery, the petitioner was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and

twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to call an alibi witness at trial. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief

is affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J.C.MCLIN and CAMILLE

R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Patrick E. Stegall, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jerome Bond.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Assistant Attorney General;

William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Colin Campbell, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual Background

The relevant underlying facts of the case, as established on direct appeal, are as follows:

At approximately 8:30 a.m. on March 19, 2003, the victim, Dennis Bell, left

his residence with the intention of driving to his grandmother’s house to visit friends.

Later, Patrol Officers Jeremy Wells and Sean Sanders of the Memphis Police

Department responded to an “armed-party call” at the LaPaloma Apartments. The

caller reported that there were three armed men at the scene. When they arrived, the

officers saw the [petitioner] and Jerry Mason flee from the parking lot. The officers
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ultimately found the two men hiding underneath a vehicle and took them into

custody. At that point, the officers turned their attention to a parked car occupied by

the victim and John Davis Streeter. Streeter, who was on the ground near the

passenger side of the vehicle, had been shot in the shoulder. The victim, who was

found slumped in the open window of the driver’s side of the car, had suffered a fatal

gunshot wound to the left side of his face. After calling for assistance, Officer Wells

found a .22 caliber long rifle where he had first seen the [petitioner]. Officer Sanders

found a .380 caliber pistol and a bag of cocaine where the men were hiding just

before their arrest. Other officers found a bag of cocaine in the victim’s car and a

.380 caliber shell casing at the scene. At trial, Streeter testified that the victim, who

had been a friend since childhood, picked him up at approximately 10 p.m. on the

night of the shooting and then drove into the LaPaloma parking lot. He recalled that

the [petitioner] approached their vehicle and informed the victim that someone was

looking for him. Streeter testified that he then heard two gunshots. Shortly

thereafter, he saw a police car, which was traveling towards their vehicle, make a uturn. He stated that the victim, who had blood “shooting out” of his head, drove in

the direction of the police car before the vehicle was brought to a halt. Streeter

insisted that he was not intoxicated at the time of the offense and that he had never

known the victim to deal in drugs. 

. . . . 

Jerry Mason, who had been charged with aggravated robbery and facilitation

of a felony as a result of this incident, testified for the state. He claimed that he

purchased marijuana from the [petitioner] on a regular basis and on the night of the

offense agreed to “watch [his] back” while he made an illegal drug purchase.

According to Mason, a third individual, who he knew only as “Peewee,” drove the

two men to the LaPaloma Apartments. He testified that the [petitioner], who

possessed a small, black automatic pistol, provided him with a rifle. Mason stated

that he hid behind a building as the [petitioner] approached the vehicle driven by the

victim. He contended that after about twenty seconds, he heard a gunshot and,

thinking that the [petitioner] had been shot, responded by firing a shot at the victim’s

vehicle. Mason testified that it was only when he saw the [petitioner] running in his

direction that he realized the [petitioner] had shot the victim. He claimed that he

dropped his rifle and fled but was quickly apprehended by the police. 

Detective Marcus Berryman of the Memphis Police Department Crime

Response Unit, questioned the [petitioner]. At trial, he presented a written statement

from the [petitioner] wherein the [petitioner] acknowledged his plans to rob the

victim. In the statement, the [petitioner] admitted shooting both the victim and

Streeter but insisted that it was accidental. According to the statement, Mason had

provided the [petitioner] with a loaded pistol and the third individual involved in the
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incident went by the name “ToJo”. The [petitioner] confirmed that he had taken

seventy-five dollars from the victim, all of which was recovered by the police. 

. . . . 

Steve Scott, a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation,

examined the .380 caliber pistol and the .22 caliber rifle that were found at the scene.

He stated that the pistol, which was in operating condition, included a safety feature

and determined that a “trigger-pull test” did not indicate any likelihood of a misfire.

Agent Scott confirmed that the .380 caliber shell casing found at the scene was fired

from the pistol. 

State v. Jerome Bond, No. W2004-02557-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 8,

2005). Following a jury trial, the petitioner was found guilty of first degree felony murder and

especially aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive terms of life

imprisonment and twenty-five years for the respective convictions. The convictions and sentences

were later affirmed by a panel of this court on direct appeal. Id. 

The petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction, asserting that he was denied

his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of

counsel, an amended petition was filed. An evidentiary hearing was held at which the petitioner and

the two attorneys who had represented him at trial testified. The petitioner’s lead trial counsel was

the first to testify and stated that he had been appointed to represent the petitioner in this case

following the preliminary hearing stage. Trial counsel stated that he filed discovery motions in the

case and received open file discovery from the State. He further testified that he had a private

investigator appointed in the case and that the investigator interviewed the surviving victim and

available witnesses. Trial counsel also stated that he filed a motion to suppress the petitioner’s

statement to police, as well as the photograph of the petitioner holding the bloodstained money, but

the motion was denied. Because the petitioner confessed to being the shooter and was arrested at

the scene of the crime, counsel proceeded to trial on a theory that the crime was not first degree

murder, claiming there was no intent to rob but rather it was a drug deal gone wrong. Trial counsel

stated he had no recollection of the petitioner ever informing him of the possibility of Angela

Hankins’ testifying that it was Mason who had supplied the weapons rather than the petitioner.

However, trial counsel testified that, in light of the facts of the case, particularly the petitioner’s

acknowledgment that he was the shooter, in his opinion, who supplied the weapons would not have

affected the outcome of the case. 

Next, the petitioner testified and stated that after he reviewed discovery in the case, he

informed trial counsel that Angela Hankins, his live-in girlfriend, could testify that Mason had

supplied the guns rather than the petitioner. According to the petitioner, trial counsel informed him

that he did not see that the statement would affect the outcome of the case and made no attempts to

contact her. The petitioner acknowledged that Hankins was the only possible witness he had in

support of his defense. 
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Finally, a second attorney who also assisted in the petitioner’s defense was called to testify

at the hearing by the State. According to this attorney, both he and trial counsel, after reviewing the

facts of the case and the discovery materials with the petitioner, came up with the best possible

defense. According to him, they had a good working relationship with the petitioner. He also

testified that he did not recall the petitioner ever mentioning Angela Hankins to either himself or trial

counsel. He testified that if her testimony was that Mason has supplied the weapons, while it might

have been used to impeach Mason, it did not go to the ultimate issue of guilt in the case. 

After hearing the proof presented, the post-conviction court, by written order, denied the

petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief. This timely appeal follows.

Analysis

On appeal, the petitioner has raised the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. To

succeed on a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of

establishing the allegations set forth in his petition by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-

30-110(f) (2006). The petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936

(Tenn. 1975). Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984),

the petitioner must establish (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice resulting from the

deficiency. The petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of hindsight, may not second-guess a

reasonably based trial strategy, and cannot criticize a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision made

during the course of the proceedings. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994). This deference to the tactical decisions of trial counsel is dependent upon a showing that the

decisions were made after adequate preparation. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1992).

 It is unnecessary for a court to address deficiency and prejudice in any particular order, or

even to address both if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on either. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. In order to establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104

S. Ct. at 2068).

The issues of deficient performance by counsel and possible prejudice to the defense are

mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 461. “[A] trial court’s findings of fact underlying a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, accompanied

with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is

otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Henley

v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997)). However, conclusions of law are reviewed under a

purely de novo standard with no presumption that the post-conviction court’s findings are correct.

Id.
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Though multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel were alleged in the petition,

on appeal, the petitioner contends only that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because

of trial counsel’s failure to call an alibi witness, specifically Angela Hankins. According to the

petitioner, Hankins “would have served as a crucial alibi witness at trial” and would have testified

that the co-defendant Mason brought the guns to the home she shared with the petitioner on the night

of the shooting. The petitioner contends that this would have shown that it was the co-defendant,

not the petitioner, who was primarily responsible and would have limited the petitioner’s culpability,

resulting in a different outcome. 

In denying relief with regard to this issue, the post-conviction court found as follows:

The petitioner testified that his live-in girlfriend saw the co-defendant, Jerry

Mason, deliver the guns to him that were to be used in the robbery. He stated that her

testimony would have contradicted Mason’s testimony at trial that the petition[er]

was the one who provided the guns, and may have resulted in a lesser sentence. This

allegation fails for three reasons.

First[], Ms. Hankins was not produced at the hearing on this petition. To

establish prejudice, a petitioner must (1) produce the witness at his post-conviction

hearing; (2) show that through reasonable investigation, trial counsel could have

located the witness; and (3) elicit both favorable and material testimony from the

witness. State v. Black, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Assuming

arguendo that the attorneys would have located her (the petitioner testified that he

mentioned her name in conversation to his attorneys only once – her name was not

mentioned in any pre-trial discovery or in his statement to the police), there was no

offer of proof by her at the hearing as to what her testimony would have been, or

whether or not it would have been material.

Secondly, the defense in this case was that the petitioner’s gun went off by

accident, that there was no intent to rob, but only to buy drugs, and that Mason was

there only to “back up” the petitioner as he bought drugs from the victim. This,

essentially, was what Mason testified to as a State witness at trial. The State’s theory

at trial was that the petitioner committed the robbery to get money to buy drugs. If

the jury had believed this aspect of Mason’s testimony, that the petitioner did not

intend to rob, they might not have found the petitioner guilty of murder during

perpetration of a robbery or of especially aggravated robbery. If Angel Hankins had

been called as a witness and her testimony about the origin of the guns had been

believed by the jury, this may have eroded Mason’s credibility about helpful

testimony of an alleged “drug deal gone bad.”

Thirdly, the fact of whether or not Mason or the petitioner brought the guns

to the petitioner’s house prior to the murder is immaterial. Both guns were

introduced as exhibits at the trial, and the gun found underthe car with the petitioner,
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which he admitted firing, was shown through ballistic evidence to be the one

matching spent shell casings found at the scene. This allegation fails for lack of

proof as to deficient performance or prejudice to the [petitioner].

Review of the record reveals nothing to preponderate against these findings made by the

court. As noted by the post-conviction court, the petitioner’s claim must fail because of his own

failure to produce Ms. Hankins at the post-conviction hearing. Because of this failure, nothing in

the record, except the petitioner’s own testimony, establishes what, if anything, Ms. Hankins would

have testified to. In these cases, it is the petitioner’s burden to produce the witness at the hearing,

without which prejudice cannot be established. Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. Moreover, despite the

fact that the petitioner argues otherwise, Ms. Hankins was not an alibi witness, even assuming that

she testified as the petitioner stated she would. Her testimony would have in no way provided the

petitioner with an alibi for the time of the crime, especially in light of the fact that he admitted to

committing the shootings and was arrested at the crime scene with the victim’s money in his pocket.

As testified to at the hearing, Ms. Hankins, assuming arguendo that she testified as the petitioner

claimed she would, would have at most been an impeachment witness. Both of the petitioner’s

attorneys specifically testified that her testimony would not have been helpful to the defense. Her

testimony, as found by the post-conviction court, was not material to the issue of guilt and could, in

fact, have hampered the asserted defense. As such, the petitioner has failed to establish that he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction

relief is affirmed. 

___________________________________ 

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE