UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6866

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

THOMAS MATHERLY,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior 

District Judge. (5:06-hc-02205-BR-JG)

Submitted: March 7, 2013 Decided: March 14, 2013

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Research and

Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Seth M. Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Thomas Matherly appeals the district court’s order 

committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam 

Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 

(2006). We have reviewed the record, and we affirm.

Matherly first asserts two constitutional challenges 

to his commitment, claiming that the civil commitment statute, 

18 U.S.C. § 4248, levies an unconstitutional criminal 

punishment, and that § 4248 violates equal protection principles 

by limiting its application only to prisoners. As Matherly 

concedes, however, both of these arguments are foreclosed by 

this Court’s decision in United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 189 (2012).

The remaining portion of Matherly’s appeal consists of 

his argument that the district court committed clear error in 

certifying him as a sexually dangerous person. In this respect, 

the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear 

error, while its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. United 

States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012). Where the 

district court’s factual findings are based on its evaluation of 

conflicting expert testimony, we are “especially reluctant” to 

set aside its determinations. Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
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Given Matherly’s concession that he previously engaged 

in child molestation and suffers from a serious mental disorder, 

the Government was required to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence only that Matherly “would have serious difficulty in 

refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if 

released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006); see Hall, 664 F.3d at 

463. The “serious difficulty” prong of the certification 

proceeding refers to the degree of an individual’s “volitional 

impairment;” that is, his “ability to refrain from acting upon 

his deviant sexual interests.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 463.

Matherly initially argues that, given that he had 

never committed a hands-on offense, the district court’s sexual 

dangerousness conclusion was based only upon Matherly’s deviant 

sexual fantasies and thoughts, and not because of any of his 

past conduct. Proceeding on this assumption, Matherly argues 

that the district court’s analysis effectively eviscerated the 

requirement that the Government prove not only his mental 

illness (i.e., his pedophilic desires) but also that he would 

have serious difficulty restraining himself from acting upon 

such urges.

But Matherly misconstrues the district court’s 

reasoning. The district court plainly rested its decision on 

Matherly’s active conduct in furtherance of his desires, 

observing that he “took measures to feed his compulsions and 
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fantasies about kidnapping and raping a young child” by 

travelling to the mall and to a nearby elementary school and 

“actively thinking about how he could lure [young children] 

away.” Because the court specifically found that Matherly had 

“taken active steps toward actually molesting a child” and that 

“Matherly’s own past conduct” demonstrated his significant 

inability to control his deviant sexual desires, Matherly is 

mistaken in arguing that the district court’s analysis equated 

the mere possession of strong, deviant fantasies with sexual 

dangerousness.

Matherly next asserts that the district court erred in 

“ignoring or otherwise failing to account for [a] substantial 

body of contradictory evidence” that did not support its 

decision that he is sexually dangerous. United States v. 

Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). We have thoroughly 

examined the record in light of Matherly’s contentions, and we 

disagree. “[E]valuating the credibility of experts and the 

value of their opinions is . . . a function best committed to 

the district courts,” and we see no reason to second-guess the 

district court’s decision to credit the testimony of the 

Government’s experts instead of that of Matherly’s experts. 

Hall, 664 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because “the district court’s account of the evidence is 

plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” we 
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agree with the Government that the district court’s conclusions 

do not amount to clear error. Id.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED