FOURTH DIVISION FILED: Feb

ruary 28,2007

No. 1-05- 3213

DAR RELL E. SHO OP, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f Co o k C o un t y, I llino is Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, ) ) v. ) No. 03 M1 154118 ) DAIML ERCHRYSL

ER CO RPOR

ATIO N, )

) Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) ) Honorabl e Van

ess a A . Hopki

ns , (Dem psey Dodge, D ef

endan t.) ) Jud ge P re siding

JU STI CEMU

RP HY de l i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Plai nti f f , Da rre l l E. Sh oop, f i l ed sui t ag ai ns t de f en da nt D ai m l erC hr y sl er C orporati

on f or breach of expres s and i

mpl ie d warranties

under the Magn

uson-Moss Warran

ty–Fede ral Trade Co mmiss io n Ac t ( Ma gn us o n- Mo ss Ac t ) ( 15 U. S. C. §§ 23 08 , 23 10 ( d) ( 20 00 ) ) wh en his v eh icle req ui red nu merou s r ep ai

rs . W he n p l ai nti f f rec ei ve d m ore th an the f ai r m ark et val uef or hi s c ar on trade-i n, de f endan t fi l ed a m otion f or sum mary j udgm en t, argui ng th at pl ai nti f f di d not suf

f er a present i nj ury. The tri al

court granted defen

dant’s m ot ion. Bec ause we f

in d that a genui

ne i ssue of mate ri al f ac t ex i ste d a s to p l ai

nti f f ’s da mag esat the ti

me of ac ce pta nc e, w e re

ve rs e the d ec i si

on of th e tr i al cou rt.1-05-3213

-2- I. BACKG

ROUND On Apr il 4, 20 02, plaint iff pur chas ed a 200 2 Do dge Dak ot a t ru ck fo r $ 28, 000 , e xcluding ba nk a nd f i na nc e ch arges . As part of the purch

ase , def endan t, whi ch man uf acture d the

Dakota, is sued a 3-y

ear or 36,000- mi

le standard lim

ited warranty . Plai

ntif f al le ged that he al so entered in to a servi ce contract with the dealer, Dempse y D odge, at the tim

e of the sal

e. Demps ey

Dodge
wa s d ismisse d fr o m t he c as e a ft er it se t t led wit h pla int iff. Pl ai nti f f be gan ex peri enci ng probl ems wi th the truck s oon af

ter he took posses sion. De f ec ts i n th e en gi n e, su sp ensi

on , s tee ri n g, t ra n sm i ss i on , a n d oth er com pon en ts c au se d p l ai

n ti f f to take the truck t o a Chry sl er deal ershi p 12 tim es wi thin 18 months

for repai rs. The Dakota was sub j ect to repai

r at l eas t fi

ve tim es f or the s am

e def ect, an d tha t def ect rem ai ne d un corrected
. Plai nti f f , con ten di ng tha t de f en da nt wasunab l e to c ure

the de f ec ts a f ter a rea son ab l e n um be r of at t empt s, a llegedly revo ked his acce pt ance of t he t ru ck in wr iting, but defend ant re fused t he
re voc at ion. Plaint iff

t hen filed a co mplaint ag ainst defend ant alleging br eac h of w rit t en and i m pli ed wa rran tie s pur sua

nt to the M agn

uson-Moss

Ac t (15 U.S.C . §§230 8, 2310 (d) (200 0)). Plaint iff alleged t hat as a re sult of t he pe rsist ent defec t s, he t ra ded in his Dako t a and purchased a n

ew veh ic le on May 6, 2005. He had driv

en the truck for three y

ears and l ogged
mor e t han 39 ,0 00 miles. Plaint iff re ceived $16 ,5 00 fo r t he t ra de- in value o f the t ru ck. The NADA guide book pro vi

ded that a comparabl

e veh ic le in “av erage” condi

tion would h

ave an average trade-in

val ue of $14,425 and an

average retai l v

al ue of $17,225. Defen

dant fi le d a motion f or summ ary j udgme

nt all egi ng that pla

in tif f di d not suff er a present i

nj ury or dam

ages beca use he so ld t he t ru ck fo r a pr ice in exce ss o f its fair mar ket value a t t he t ime of t he t ra de- in.1-05-3213

-3-

In re spon se, p l ai

nti f f sub m i tted af f i dav i ts of two wi

tnes ses . Bas ed on

a vi sua l i ns pecti on, a
ro ad t est , a nd r eviews of t he Da ko t a’s s er vice hist or y and t echnica l service bullet ins relat ed t o t he Da kota , Th omasW al ters opi ne d that the tru

ck ’s va l uewa s d i m i ni sh ed by 35 %at the ti

me of purchase. W

al ters used the val

uation gui

de of the Ke ll

y B lue Book and hi s professi

onal experience i

n esti ma ting the Da

kot a’s di mi ni shed v al ue. Wal ters belie ved that the Dakota had
man ufacturing def

ects at the time of sal

e. Based o n a revi ew of the repair reco rds, plain tiff ’s second wi tness, Joseph Pen

nacch io, opin ed that the val

ue of the truck at t he tim

e of purchas e was $22,30 0. Th e tr i al cou rt gra n ted de f en da n t’s moti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t. N o h ea ri n g tr anscri

pts are in cl uded i n the record, and the court did not issue a m em orandum opi

nion. This

appeal followed. II. AN AL YSIS A. Dam ages Summ ary j udgme

nt is appropriate when the

ple adi ngs, deposi

tions, and other evi

dence
re v ea l th at th er e is n o gen ui n e iss ue of mate rial f act an d th at th e m ov i n g p ar ty i s e n ti tl ed to jud gme nt as a ma t t er o f law
. 73 5 I LC S 5 /2
- 10 05 ( We st 20 04 )
. Su mmar y jud gme nt is a dr as t ic
mea ns o f r es o lving lit iga t io n a nd sho uld o nly be allo we d w he n t he r igh t o f t he mo ving pa r t y is cl ear a nd f ree f rom d oubt. Bier

v. Lea nna Lakes ide P

rope rty A ss’n , 305 Ill . App. 3d 45, 50 (1999) . Our r evi ew of a grant o f sum mary judgm ent is de novo
. Woods v. Pence , 303 Ill . App. 3d 573 , 576 (1 999). Th e M ag n us on -M oss

A ct p rov i de s a con su mer wi th a p ri v ate ca us e of ac ti on ag ai n st a1-05-3213

-4-

manufact ur er or re t ailer t hat fails to co mply with t he Act or t he t er ms of a w rit t en wa rr ant y or any i m pl i ed wa rra nty ari si ng the ref rom . 15 U.S .C. §23 10( d)( 1) ( 200 0). W he n th e A ct d oesnot conf l i ct wi th state l aw govern

i ng th e sa l e of cons um er produc ts, state l aw ap pli es. Bartow

v. Ford Motor Co. , 342 Ill . App. 3d 480, 484 (2003), citin g Sorce v. Naperville Jee

p Eagle, Inc. , 309 Ill. App. 3d 313, 323 ( 1999). Section 2-71 4(2) o f the Uni form Comm

ercial Code (U CC) provides that t he m

easure of dam

ages f or breach of warran

ty whe n the b uye r has acce pted goo ds and g iven not ice is t he differe nce a t t he t ime and plac e o f acce pt ance bet wee n t he value of t he goods accepted and the val ue they would ha ve if they had b een as warranted, unl ess speci al circumstances show pro xi mate damages of a di

ff erent amount. 810 ILCS 5/2 -714(2 ) (West 200 4); Razor v. Hyundai Motor America , 222 Il l . 2d 75, 1 06 (20 06). In a ddi tion , dam ages are a n e sse ntial elem en t of a b reach of warra nty clai m . Kim v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., Inc. , 353 Ill . App. 3d 444, 460 (2004). The dim in is hed val ue of a product i s a c omp en sab l e i

nj ury i n a bre ach of w arran

ty c l ai m . Dew an v. Ford Motor Co. , 363 Ill . App. 3d 365, 369 (2005). While it i s not necessary

that damages f

or breach of warran

ty be cal cul ated wi th math em ati ca l pr ec i si on , b as i c c on

tra ct th eor y re qui re s th at dam ag es b e p roved

wi th
reas onab l e certai

nty . Burrus v. Itek Corp. , 46 Il l . A pp. 3d 3 50, 357(19 77) . Da mag esba se d on conj ecture

or spec ul ati on are

precl uded
. Bockman Printing & Services, Inc. v. Baldwin-Gre gg, Inc. , 21 3 Il

l . A pp. 3d 5 16, 527(19 91) . Pl ai nti f f cl ai m s th at the di f f ere nc e b etw een th

e val ueof t he au t omo bile as war ra nt ed a nd it s value in its de fect ive co ndit ion o n t he da t e o f the sale must be determi ned i n hi ndsi ght. See Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet, Inc. , 241 S.C. 508, 129 S. E.2d 323 (1963) . Furth

erm ore, acc ordi

ng to pl ai nti f f , unc ertai nty as to the am ount of dam ages wh en there1-05-3213

-5-

i s n o doubt as

to the f act of dam age w i l l not prec l ude re cove

ry . Story Parchment C

o. v. Paterson Parchment Pape

r Co. , 282 U .S. 555, 7 5 L. Ed . 544, 51 S. Ct. 248 ( 1931)
. Plai ntif f argues that he establ

is hed dam ages under s ection 2-714(2) becaus e two witnesses attest ed that the val

ue of hi s car was di

mi ni shed at the tim

e i t was purchased. Def

endan t responds t ha t pla int iff faile d t o es t ab lish “ pr es en t da mag es ” b ec au se he t r ad ed in t he Da ko t a fo rt he fair
market v al ue. This i ssue app ears

si m pl e b eca use i n re spon se to def

endan t’s m otion f or sum mary judgm ent, plai ntif f provi ded evi dence of hi s dam ages at the tim

e of acceptance , t he po int in t ime wh en dam ages are m eas ured f or brea ch of w arran

ty u nde r the U CC. 810 ILCS 5/2 -714(2 ) (West 200 4); Razor , 222 Ill . 2d at 106. Ho weve r, we w ill discu ss t he issue mor e ext ensively becau se t he general requirem ent that a plai

ntif f h ave actual , present dama

ges and the rul

e i n section 2-714(2) that da mages are m eas ured on the date of

acc eptan ce c onv erge i

n th i s ca se. Defend ant re lies on Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc. , 332 Ill . App. 3d 969 (2 002 ), for its c ont ent ion t hat plaint iff co uld no t est ablish “pre sent damag es” when he
re ceived fair mark et value w hen he t ra ded in the D ako t a. In Valenti , the plai ntif f rev oked
acc ept ance aft er she e xper ienced numer ou s pr oblems w ith a ne w ca r t hat she p ur chas ed. The de f en da n t den i ed h er re v oca ti on , a n d s h e f i l ed a c om pl ai n t al l eg i n g b re ach of ex pr es s w ar ra n ty
and the i m pli ed wa rran ty of merch an tabi l i ty u nde r the M agn

uson-Moss

Ac t. More tha

n two y ears after she revoked acceptance, the plai ntif f s old the al

le gedl y de fecti ve car f or its fai r market val

ue,
as a sal es m an ager a t the de al ersh

i p where the pl

ai nti f f rece i ve d the trade-i n credi t attested. To establ is h dam ages, the Valenti

pl ai nti f f rel i ed s ole l y on the al l egati ons of her com pl ai nt. The court1-05-3213

-6-

he ld t ha t t he pla int iff “c an no t mee t t his b ur de n w he r e t he un dis pu t ed fac t s s ho w t ha t pla int iff so ld the car at its f

ai r market val

ue, despi te the all eged def ect of whi ch sh e now compl

ai ns.” Valenti , 332 Ill . App. 3d at 973. Valenti is dist inguishable fr om t he fact s in the insta nt cas e. To est ablish damag es, t he Valenti pl ai nti f f onl y rel i ed on th e al l eg ati ons of he r com pl ai nt, wh i ch , com bi ne d w i th th e re st of t he r ec o r d, es t ab lishe d t ha t t he “p laint iff pu r ch as ed a n ew ca rfo ran ag r ee d- up o n p r ice , dr o ve it 17,290 mi le s and traded i

t in m ore t han 2 1/2 ye ars l ater for fai

r market val

ue.” Valenti , 33 2 I ll. App. 3d a t 973 . H er e, plaint iff co unt er ed d efenda nt ’s mot ion fo r su mmary judgment wit h t he af f i da vi ts of two w i tne ss es , wh

o averred asto the red uc ed va l ueof the Da kota at the ti me of acceptance. In addi

tion, the Valenti

plaint iff did no t ar gue t hat t he vehicle w as d efect ive at t he t ime o f ac ce pt an ce , wh ile p laint iff’s wit ne ss es he r e a t t es t ed t ha t t he Da ko t a w as no t su bst an t ially free of d efect s at t he t ime plaintiff to ok po sses sion. Defend ant also cite s a nu mber o f case s inte rp re t ing t he da mages re quir ed u nder t he Consum er Fraud and Dec eptive

Busi ness Practices A

ct (Consumer Fraud Act) (81 5 ILCS 505/1 0a(a) (We st 2004 )) in support o f i

ts argumen

t. See Avery v

. State Far

m Mutual Autom obile Insurance Co. , 21 6 Ill. 2d 100 (20 05) ; Hayman v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc. , 315 Ill . App. 3d 107 5, 1 078 (20 00) ; Verb v. Motorola, Inc. , 28 4 Ill. App. 3d 4 60 ( 199 6); White v. DaimlerChrys ler Corp. , 368 Ill . App. 3d 278 (2006). These cases, wh il e rele van t t o t he gen

eral is sue of presen

t damages, do not deal wi th section 2-714, a statute t hat specifi cally provides that dam ages are m

easured on the date of acceptance. In Avery , fo rex amp le, o ur su pr eme co ur t he ld that t he pl

ai ntif f f ai le d to show “actual dam age” under se ction 10a(a) of the Cons ume r Fraud Act1-05-3213

-7-

when he sold the truck in ques

tion f or t he sam

e val ue that he would h

ave recei ved if onl y origin al equi pm en t ma nuf acturer parts h

ad b een use d i n the repa i r. Avery , 21 6 I ll. 2 d a t 19 6. Simila r ly, in Hayman , t he co ur t fou nd t he plaint iff ’s Co nsumer Fra ud Ac t cas e wa s moo t when t he de fendant sent him a refund befo re t he ca se w as filed, and in White , 3 68 Ill. App . 3 d a t 28 7, t he p laint iff f ai l ed to al l eg e p rox i mate da mag es un der the C on su

mer Fr aud A ct. Altho ugh t he issue in Bartow , 3 42 I ll. App. 3d 4 80, was whet her t he plaint iff had s t anding to pu rs ue a c l ai m un der the M ag

n us on -M oss

A ct af ter se l l i n g th e v eh i cl e i n qu es ti on , i

ts discu ssio n of d amage s is also per sua sive. I n Bartow , th e p l ai nti f f , wh o ha d broug ht a ca se f or dam ages pursuan

t t o t he Magn

uson-Moss Act, traded in h er vehi cl e bef ore she f il ed her compl ai nt. The defe

ndan t moved to dism

is s the case on the b asi s that the plai ntif f n o longer had stan di ng to bri ng h er ca se u nde r the M agn

uson-Moss

Ac t. Bartow

held t hat t he UC C and t he
com m on l aw of sa l esde mons

trate tha t the res al e b y the bu yer d oesnot prec l

ude rec ove ry f or bre ach of w arran

ty. Bartow , 342 Ill . App. 3d at 490. We noted, citin g 67A A m. Jur. 2d Sales §1242(2000 ), tha

t the ap pl i ca ti on of the ordi na ry rul e of da mag esf or b rea ch of wa rra nty wa s n ot ch anged or m

odi f i ed b y the f act tha t the pur ch ase r ha d res old the a rtic l e at a pr

ofi t. Bartow , 342 Ill . App. 3d at 491. Th e p l ai n l an gua geof se cti on 2 -71 4(2 ) provi

de s th at “ [t]h e m ea su re of da mag esf or bre ach o f war ra nt y is the d iff er ence at t he t ime and plac e o f acce pt ance bet wee n t he value of t he goods accepted and the val ue they would ha ve if they had b een as warranted.” 810 ILCS 5/2- 714(2) (West 2004). Furthermore, Anderson on the Un if orm Comm

ercia l C ode pro vi

des as fol l ows:1-05-3213

-8- “The bu yer’s d amage s for bre ach o f war ra nt y are no t lessene d bec aus e t he buy er has resold the goods at an en han ced pric e. Had the goods been as warran ted, t hey might have been r eso ld at a st ill higher pr ice. It is, t her efo re , immate rial t hat t he goods were act ual ly

wort h the price for whi

ch they were resold. Wh

ether the price
r ec eiv ed o n a r es ale is e vid en ce o f t he va lue o f t he go o ds at t he t ime o f t he br ea ch is
ano t her que st ion. Cer t ainly such evidenc e is no t co nclusive. ” R. Ander so n, An ders on on th

e Un i f orm C omm

erci al Code § 2 -714:5 9, at 424(3d ed . 1997)
. The re for e, we find t hat wher e plaint iff pr od uce d evide nce o f the Dak ot a’s d imi nished va lue at t he time of s ale, a genui

ne i ssue of material

fact exi sted as t o his dam ages. W hi l e the re medi esprov

i de d by the UC C a re to b e “ l i

be ral l y ad m i ni stered wi th th e g oal of pla ci ng the aggrieved party

in as good a circum

stance as i

f the other party h

ad ful ly performe d” ( Toyomenka (America), Inc. v. Combined Metals Corp. , 139 Ill . App. 3d 654, 660 (1985)), an award should not put a pl ai ntif f i n a b etter positi on than he would h ave b een i n if the contract had be en f ull y perf orme d. Firs t National

Bank of Elgin v. Dus old, 180 Il l . Ap p. 3d 71 4, 719 ( 1989)
.

“ W he n th e b uy er s ue s th e s el l er f or wa rra nty da mag es , th e g en

era l rul e s pe cif i ed by the [UC C] f or the me asurem

ent of the dam

ages m ust be m odif ie d by deductin g the profi

ts made on resa

le .” R. An ders on, A nde rson on the Uni f orm C omm

erci al Code § 2 -714:2 23, at 48 8 (3d e d. 1997 ). Th ere f ore, pl ai nti f f wi l l not rea p a wi nd f al l asa re sul t of our c onc l

us i on th at a ge nu i ne i ss ueof mate rial fact exist ed a s t o his d amage s eve n t hou gh he r ece ived fair mar ket value a t t ra de- in. Defend ant claims, ho weve r, t hat plaint iff ’s o pinion t est imony reg ar ding t he value of t he Da kota at the ti me of ac ce pta nc e i s b as ed

on s pe cu l ati on a nd gue ss be ca us e the w i

tne ss esdi d n ot1-05-3213

-9-

sp ea k to pres en

t da mag es . W e f

i rs t note tha t de f en da nt d i d n ot move to stri kethe af f i da vi ts of plaint iff ’s wit nesse s. D efenda nt , r elying on Verb , Anzalone v. Kragness , 356 Ill . App. 3d 365 (2005), and Jankoski v. Preis er Animal Hospital, Ltd. , 157 Ill . App. 3d 818 (1987), contends that plaint iff picke d “a d imi

nut ion in value figu re ou t of t hin air.” In Verb , the plai ntif fs fai le d to ple ad damag es be cau se t he co mplaint w as ba sed on t he po ssibili t y that cellular t elepho nes may be defec t ive beca use of t heir u npr ove n safet y. He re , ho weve r, plaint iff has no t alleged t hat t he Dakota may

have been

defec tive. Rathe

r, he has a

ll eged that the Dakot a was def ective and that he had to take i

t in f or repai rs 12 tim es i n 18 months . Furth

erm ore, Anzalone and Jankoski are inap po sit e, as t hey invo lve s ent iment al o r e mo t io nal d ama ge s r es ult ing t he w ro ngfu l de at h o f a fam il y pet in stead o f the di

mi ni shed val ue of a vehi

cle under section 2-714 of the UCC. In addi ti on, be ca us e the val

ueof the Da kota at the ti me of ac ce pta nc e i s i m porta nt to a dam ages an al y si s un der s ection 2-7 14(2), s o, too , are expe rt opin i ons a ttesti ng to tha t val ue. Eve n lay witnes ses a re per mitt ed t o t est ify as t o t he value of p ro per t y if t hey have su ffi

cient know l edge

of the proper

ty a nd i ts va l ue. Razor , 22 2 Ill. 2d at 109 ; Burrus , 46 Ill . App. 3d at 358 (t her e is no re quir ement t hat a wit ness w ith exp er ience a nd kno wledg e as t o t he value of p rint ing pr esse s be q ualified as a n expe rt ). Fur t her mor e, in Mattuck v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 36 6 I ll. App. 3d 1026, 1034 ( 2006) , we d ecli ned to distur b the jury’s damage award when the plaintif f’s
ex pert te sti f i ed th at h e r el i ed on th e K el l y Bl ue Boo k a n d op i n ed th at th e v eh i cl e’ s def ec ts reduc ed th e v ehi cl e’s

va l ue b y 40 %. Here , ba sed

on a v i sua l i ns pecti on, a road test, an d rev i ewsof the Dak

ota’s s ervi ce h

i story and te chni cal service bul

letins related t o t he Dako ta, Thomas Walters o pined that the t ruck ’s1-05-3213

-10-

value w as d imi

nished by 35 % a t t he t ime of pu rc hase . Wa lter s us ed t he valua t ion g uide o f the Ke l l y Bl ue Book a

nd h i s prof ess i onal ex peri ence i n e sti mati ng th e Dak ota’s d i m i nished val ue. Walters believ

ed t hat t he Dako ta had these manufactu ring defects at the t im e of sale. Plaintif

f’s second wi tness, Joseph Pen

nacch io, opin ed based on a

review of the repai

r records t hat the val

ue
o f t he t ruc k a t t he t ime o f pu r ch as e w as $2 2, 30 0. Bo t h o f t he se wit ne ss es we r e e xp er ien ce d in the in spection or apprai sal

of veh ic le s. Accordin

gly , the testimony

of plai ntif f’ s opin ion wi tnesses
cre ate d a ge nu i ne i ss ueof mate rial f ac t tha t the va l ueof the Da kota wa s d i m i ni sh ed at the ti me of the sale. In su mmary, we find tha t beca use damag es u nder sec t ion 2 -7 14 a re t he differe nce a t t he tim e of acc eptan ce b etween the Dak

ota as ac cepted

and aswarra

nted , a genui

ne i ssue of m

aterial fact exi sted as t o plain

tiff ’s damages. Because we f in d the exi stence of a gen

uin e i ssue of m

aterial fact, we nee d not address plai ntif f’ s al ternative “

cover” dam

ages under s ection 2-712. B. Br each

of Im pl i ed W ar ra n ty of Me rc h an tab i l i ty Defendant ar gues t hat even if we fi nd a genuine issue of material f act as to plain

tiff ’s da mag es , he ca nno t r ec o ve run de rt he implie d w ar r an t y o f mer ch an t ab ilit y bec au se t he sa le o f his Da ko t a w as ev id en ce o f it s me r ch an t ab ilit y. Un de r s ec ti on 2 -31 4(c )(2 ) of the UC C, a prod uc t brea ch

esthe i m pl i ed wa rra nty of merchan tabil ity i f i t is not fit for the or din

ary purposes for which such goods are used. 810 ILCS 5/2 -31 4(2 )(c ) (W

es t 200 4). “ [W ]i

th reg ard to au tomobi l es , ‘ [f ]i tne ss f or th e ord i na ry pur pos e of driv in g im pli es that the vehi

cl e should be i

n a saf e condi tion and s ubstanti al ly

free f rom def ects.’ ” Check v. Clifford Chrysler-Plymouth of Buff alo Grove, Inc. , 342 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 15 0, 159 ( 2003) ,1-05-3213

-11-

quot in g Overland Bo nd &

Investment Corp . v. Howard , 9 Ill . App. 3d 348, 354 (1972). Breach
o f an implie d w ar r an t y o f mer ch an t ab ilit y may a lso o cc ur wh er e t he wa r r an t o rha s u nsu cc es sfu lly attem pted to repai

r or repl ace def ecti ve parts. Check

, 342 Ill . App. 3d at 150. Whether an i m pli ed wa rran ty h as b een bre ach ed i s a q ues tion of f act. Check

, 342 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 150. Defend ant , r elying on Alvarez v. A merican Isuzu M otors , 321 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 69 6 (200 1),
co nt en ds t ha t t he Da ko t a w as fit fo rt he o r din ar y pu r po se o f dr iving be ca us e p laint iff dr o ve it daily for mo re t han t hre e year s aft er pur chas e and t ra ded it in for its fair mark et value. In Alvarez , t he co ur t held t hat a “ ‘

prima facie

case that a product was defectiv e and that the def

ect exi sted when i t l ef t the man uf ac ture r’ s c ontr ol i s m ad e b y proof tha t i n th e a bs en ceof ab nor mal us e or
re aso nable sec ond ar y caus es t he pr od uct failed “to per for m in the manner re aso nably to be expected i

n l igh t o f i ts nature and i

ntended f unction.” [Ci

tations.]’ ” Alvarez , 321 Ill . App. 3d at 703, quot in

g Tw eedy v. Wright For

d Sales, Inc. , 64 Ill . 2d 570, 574 (1976). The court found that the only defec t o f an y c onsequence , a jerki

ng transm is si on, was reme die d, and the plai ntif f f ai le d to excl ude the bui l dup of

mois ture or other m

aterial s as a rea sona bl e ca use of the prob l em . Alvarez , 3 21 I ll. App. 3d a t 706 . H er e, how ever , p laintiff’s co mplaint sp ecifically el imi nat ed a ny ab norm al use s an d se cond ary caus es a s the

source of the def

ects i n the v ehi cle. In Mattuck , th e c ourt r ej ec ted the de f en da nt’ s a rgu men t tha t the i m pl i ed wa rra nty of
me rchantab il ity was not breache d when

the pla in tif f drove the v

ehi cl e for al most 100,000 mi

le s be caus e the

testi m ony estab l i shed th at the p l ai

nti f f had the vehi cle se rvi ced n o le ss th an si x ti mes. In a ddit ion, in Check

, th e c ourt h

el d that the j ury

cou l d have c onc l

ude d that a

de f ec ti ve pa i nt j ob
on a new c ar re nder ed it unmer chant able as a new c ar , a nd in Pearson v. DaimlerC hrysler Cor

p. ,1-05-3213

-12-

34 9 I ll. A pp . 3d 68 8, 69 9 ( 20 04 ) , a q ue st io n o f fac t ex ist ed as t o wh et he rt he pla int iff’s ca rwa s in a saf e condi tion and s ubstanti al ly

free of defec ts when an

expert testifi

ed that poo r gas m

il eage was consistent with a num ber of defects. The amende d co mplaint allege d t hat plaint iff bega n expe riencing pr oblems w ith t he Da kota ’s en gi ne , su sp en si

on a nd ste eri ng , tra ns m i ss i on, an d other c om

ponen ts of the truck s oon after he took po ssessi

on. Plai ntif f was required to take t he truck to a Chry sl er deal ershi

p 12 tim es wi thi n 18 months

f or repai rs, an d he al l eged that de f endan t was u na bl e to cure the def

ects af ter a
rea son ab l e n um be r of atte m pts . W he n W al ters tes t drov e the D akota, h

e e xp eri en ce d a l opi ng or jerk ing sensa t ion whe n he br ake d at ver y low sp eed s. F ur t her mor e, at highway sp eed s, a st eer ing wheel shi mm y w ith addi tional vi bration was

al so present when

he b raked. He als o not ic ed an intermittent singl

e po p noise from the fro nt susp ension when he turned lef t into plain

tiff ’s driv eway . Therefore, a genui ne i ssue of m

aterial fact ex is ted as to whether def

endan t breached t he imp lied wa r r an t y o f me r ch an t ab ilit y. Furt hermore, a lack of privity between plain tiff and defendant d oes no t p reclude plaintif f’s cl ai m. A lthough the UC C extends a buy er’s potential

cause of action f

or breach of the i

mpl ie d warranty of

me rchantab il ity only to an i mm edi ate sell er, the privi

ty requi remen t has been “re l ax ed” w

hen (1 ) a m

an uf acturer ha s ex

tended a w

ri tten wa rran ty w i th a p roduct; and (2) a
cons um er brough t an acti on ag ai

ns t the m an uf acturer under th e Ma

gnu son- Moss

Ac t. Mydlach v. DaimlerChrys ler Corp. , 364 Ill . App. 3d 135, 153 (2005). See Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc. , 119 Ill. 2d 2 88, 292 (19 88) ; Szajna v. General Motors Cor p. , 115 Il l . 2d 294 , 311 (1 986). Defe ndan t do es not dispute that a written warranty was provi ded to plai

ntif f wh en h e purchased1-05-3213

-13-

the vehicle, and hi

s action agains

t defendant has been b

rou ght pursuant to the Magnuson-Mo ss Act. Therefore, def

endan t was in vertical priv ity with pl ai ntif f f or purpo ses of pl

ai ntif f’ s i mpl ie d
warra nty of m erch an tabi l i ty c l ai m . Rothe , 11 9 Ill. 2d at 292 ; Szajna , 115 Ill . 2d at 311
. III. CONCLUSION Because a gen

uin e i ssue of m

aterial fact ex is ted as to pla

in tif f’ s dam ages whe n he recei ved f ai r m ark et val ueat tra de -i n b ut had ev i de nc e of the Da kota ’s red uc ed va l ueat the ti

me of acceptance, the trial

court ’s grant of sum

ma ry j udgme nt is reversed
. REVERSED. CA MPB ELL , J., an

d NEVIL LE, J., c oncu

r.