This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-1562

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Ernest Alvin Ranzy, 

Appellant.

Filed August 15, 2016

Affirmed

Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-15-2879

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, 

Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JESSON, Judge

Appellant Ernest Ranzy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

terroristic-threats convictions. Ranzy argues that there is no evidence that he 
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communicated a threat to commit a future crime of violence. Ranzy also raises several 

issues in a pro se supplemental brief. Because the evidence is sufficient to support 

Ranzy’s convictions and we find no merit in the issues raised in his pro se brief, we 

affirm. 

FACTS

On January 25, 2015, appellant Ernest Ranzy and his wife T.R. had an argument in 

their pick-up truck. During the argument, Ranzy hit T.R. in the eye.1 When T.R. got out 

of the truck and refused to get back in, Ranzy drove away. T.R. flagged down a Metro 

Transit mobility vehicle for a ride. Ranzy started following the Metro Transit vehicle, 

and the driver called the police. Police drove T.R. to a shelter where she spent the night. 

On the morning of January 26, T.R. went to work at the Medica building in 

Minnetonka. Ranzy called multiple times that morning, telling her to come home and 

saying that they could work things out. He also said that he was not going to live without 

her. Their last conversation was around noon. T.R. told Ranzy that the relationship was 

over. T.R. thought Ranzy seemed very angry during the call.

T.R. asked her co-worker T.B. to give her a ride back to the shelter after work. 

T.B. agreed, and they left work together that afternoon. As they walked through the 

Medica parking lot toward T.B.’s car, T.R. noticed Ranzy in the pick-up truck. Ranzy 

was in the driver’s seat and was yelling out the window at T.R. to come with him. He 

was also saying that he was going to leave and not come back. When T.R. noticed 

 

1 T.R. testified that she was not sure if Ranzy punched her in the eye or if he threw a 

cellphone at her eye. 
3

Ranzy, she and T.B. were almost to T.B.’s car. They hurried through the parking lot and 

got into the car. 

Ranzy’s truck was behind T.B.’s car so she could not reverse out of the parking 

spot. There was no car in the spot in front of her, however, so she pulled forward and to 

the right. T.B. then took another right toward one of the parking lot’s exits. Ranzy drove 

the pick-up truck down the aisle of parking spots and blocked T.B. from completing her 

right turn and heading to the exit. A bystander heard the pick-up truck’s “wheels 

screeching” as Ranzy sped through the parking lot to block T.B.’s exit. T.B.’s car was 

now wedged between the pick-up and a median, preventing her from going forward or in 

reverse. T.B. and T.R. were both very scared. T.R. was saying they had to go because 

Ranzy would kill them. T.B. was holding her hands up to try and show Ranzy she 

wanted no part of this conflict.

Ranzy got partially out of the pick-up. Ranzy continued to yell at T.R. to come 

with him. As Ranzy got out, the pick-up pulled forward slightly. T.B. believed that she 

could now get around the pick-up and started to drive forward. When T.B. pulled 

forward, Ranzy quickly got back in the pick-up truck, reversed, and then drove forward at 

a relatively high rate of speed into T.B.’s car. The bystander again described hearing 

“wheels screeching” as Ranzy drove towards and rammed into T.B.’s car. When the 

vehicles collided, T.B.’s car spun so that it was now facing the opposite direction. 

After ramming T.B.’s car, Ranzy reversed a second time. T.B. thought that Ranzy 

was going to ram into her car again. She was also worried that if she got out of the car, 

Ranzy might run her over. But then Ranzy pulled the pick-up alongside the car to talk to 
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T.R. Although the driver-side door was jammed from the collision, T.B. was able to kick 

it open. She got out of the car and ran back into the Medica building. 

Ranzy got out of the pick-up and began banging on the passenger-side window

and yelling at T.R. about reconciling. T.R. believed that Ranzy was trying to break the 

window. She climbed over the driver’s seat, exited, and also ran back into the Medica 

building. Ranzy then got back into the pick-up truck and drove away. 

Initially, Ranzy was charged with two counts of second-degree assault. On the 

first day of trial, the state amended the complaint to add two counts of terroristic threats, 

one count for each victim. After the state presented its case, Ranzy moved for a 

judgment of acquittal on all charges. Ranzy’s attorney argued that Ranzy did not threaten 

to commit a crime of violence and therefore could not be convicted of terroristic threats. 

The district court denied the motion. 

The jury found Ranzy guilty of both terroristic-threats counts. The jury acquitted 

Ranzy of the two second-degree assault counts. The district court sentenced Ranzy to 32 

months in prison on one terroristic-threats count and 36 months in prison on the other. 

The district court ordered the sentences served concurrently. This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

I. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Ranzy 

threatened T.R. and T.B. with a future crime of violence and that he 

communicated the threat with the purpose of terrorizing the victims or in 

reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.

Ranzy first claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his terroristic-threats 

convictions. He argues that the state failed to prove that he threatened to commit a future 
5

crime of violence. Ranzy maintains that the act of driving a pick-up at another vehicle 

may be an assault but cannot be construed as a threat to commit a future assault. 

In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct a painstaking analysis 

of the record to determine if the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to reach the 

verdict that it did. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the 

state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 

223 (Minn. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 509 (2015). The verdict will not be disturbed if 

the jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was 

guilty of the charged offense[s].” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100. 

Any person who threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit a crime of violence 

with the purpose of terrorizing another or in reckless disregard of terrorizing another, is 

guilty of making a terroristic threat. Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2014). A threat is 

defined as the communication of an intent to harm another or his property through an 

unlawful act. State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 399, 237 N.W.2d 609, 613 (1975). The 

communication, when viewed in context, must have a “reasonable tendency to create 

apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

The threat need not be verbal or written. State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 

1996). Physical acts may communicate a threat. Id. 

The threat, however, must be to commit a crime of violence in the future. Id. The 

statute is designed to deter and punish both the future act threatened and the threat itself. 
6

Id. But there is no specific amount of time that must pass before a threat of immediate 

violence turns into a threat to commit future violence. State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 

136 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013). 

The jury was instructed that to find Ranzy guilty of both terroristic-threats counts 

they had to determine that he threatened T.R. and T.B. with second-degree assault. 

Second-degree assault requires the use of a dangerous weapon to commit an act “with 

intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death” or “intentional[ly] 

inflicting” or “attempt[ing] to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, 

subd. 10, .222, subd. 1 (2014). 

The state does not argue that Ranzy verbally threatened T.R. or T.B. Instead, 

when his actions are considered in context, the state argues that Ranzy’s driving conduct 

conveyed a threat to use the pick-up to commit the crime of assault with a dangerous 

weapon. We agree. 

The evidence shows that Ranzy assaulted T.R. on January 25. Then, on January 

26, Ranzy called T.R. and told her that he would not live without her. He was angry 

because T.R. wanted to end the relationship. When T.R. and T.B. left work at the end of 

the day, Ranzy was waiting in the parking lot and began yelling at T.R. to come with him 

and to reconcile their relationship. When T.B. drove toward the exit, Ranzy raced 

through the parking lot and used his pick-up to physically prevent T.R. and T.B. from 

leaving. 

When Ranzy’s pick-up pulled forward slightly, T.B. thought she could drive 

around it and to the exit. As soon as she began pulling forward, Ranzy got back into his 
7

truck and reversed. Ranzy appeared willing to do anything to prevent T.R. and T.B. from 

leaving. Given this context, a reasonable jury could find that, when Ranzy re-entered his 

pick-up and reversed, he communicated a threat to ram T.B.’s car if T.B. did not stop 

driving forward. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to believe that Ranzy 

would follow through with this threat.

While the length of time between Ranzy reversing and Ranzy ramming T.B.’s car 

was very short, there is no specific amount of time that must pass before a threat of 

immediate violence turns into a threat of future violence. Smith, 825 N.W.2d at 136. In 

Smith, the defendant waved a knife in front of the victim and demanded money. Id. at 

135. We held that, although this took place during an ongoing confrontation, the act of 

waving the knife in front of the victim communicated a threat to stab the victim in the 

future if the money was not delivered. Id. at 135-36. Smith’s terroristic-threats 

conviction therefore punished and deterred both the threat to stab the victim and the act 

threatened. Id. at 136. 

Similarly, when T.B. began to drive her car forward, Ranzy reversed. This 

communicated a threat that if T.B. did not stop her car, Ranzy would commit the future 

crime of second-degree assault by ramming T.B.’s car. Ranzy’s terroristic-threats 

convictions therefore punish and deter the threat Ranzy communicated by reversing, as 

well as the threatened act of ramming T.B.’s car. 

The state also argues that Ranzy threatened to commit a future second-degree 

assault when, after ramming T.B.’s car, he reversed again. We agree. T.B. testified that 

she was concerned that Ranzy was going to ram her car a second time. She also testified 
8

that she considered getting out of the car but was initially worried that Ranzy would run 

her over if she exited. A reasonable jury could find that Ranzy’s act of reversing, after 

running into T.B.’s car, communicated a threat to hit T.B.’s car a second time. Given the 

context, the jury could also find that it was reasonable to believe Ranzy would carry out 

this threat. 

Furthermore, Ranzy banging on the passenger window with his hands could also 

be viewed by the jury as a threat to commit second-degree assault. T.R. testified that 

Ranzy was banging so hard on the window she believed he was trying to break it. Given 

what had previously occurred, Ranzy pounding on the window with that amount of force 

could be viewed as a threat to assault T.R. should Ranzy successfully break the window. 

A threat to use hands as a dangerous weapon may be the basis of a terroristicthreats conviction, where the threatened crime of violence is second-degree assault. State 

v. Jorgenson, 758 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Minn. App. 2008). The defendant, however, must 

threaten to use his hands in a way that is calculated to or likely to produce great bodily 

harm or death. Id. By banging hard on the window after just ramming into T.B.’s car, 

Ranzy may have threatened to use his hands to commit an assault calculated to produce 

great bodily harm or death. 

In addition to proving a threat to commit a future crime of violence, the state also 

had to prove that Ranzy communicated the threat with the purpose of terrorizing T.R. and 

T.B. or acted “in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.713, subd. 1. Under the terroristic-threats statute, “purpose means aim, objective, 

or intention,” and “terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” 
9

Smith, 825 N.W.2d at 136 (quotation omitted). Intent is a state of mind that must 

generally be proven by using circumstantial evidence. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 

179 (Minn. 1997). A victim’s reaction to a threat is circumstantial evidence of intent. 

Schweppe, 306 Minn. at 401, 237 N.W.2d at 614.

We apply heightened scrutiny to convictions that are based on circumstantial 

evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). In circumstantial 

evidence cases, the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent 

with any other rational hypothesis. State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011). 

The first step in analyzing whether the evidence is sufficient is to identify the 

circumstances proved. Id. The second step, is to “examine independently the 

reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, 

including inferences consistent with rational hypotheses other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 

788 N.W.2d at 473-74 (quotation omitted). 

The circumstances proved, as outlined above, show that T.R. and T.B. were 

terrified by Ranzy coming to their workplace, physically blocking them from leaving the 

parking lot, running into T.B.’s vehicle, reversing, and then banging on the vehicle’s 

passenger-side window. We conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent 

with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.2 

 

2 Ranzy also argues that we must remand and order the district court to hold a restitution 

hearing. At Ranzy’s sentencing, the district court ordered restitution and Ranzy objected. 

The district court then agreed with a statement by the prosecutor that because written 

notice of the restitution amount had not yet been given, Ranzy should wait and request a 

hearing after the written restitution order had been filed. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, 

subd. 3(b) (2014) (“An offender may challenge restitution, but must do so by requesting a 
10

II. The issues raised in Ranzy’s pro se supplemental brief are without merit.

In his pro se supplemental brief, Ranzy claims that his trial attorney was 

ineffective, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that there was error in the 

jury instructions. We briefly address each claim below. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ranzy must demonstrate 

“(1) that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke 

v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). An attorney provides reasonable 

assistance when the attorney exercises the customary skills and diligence that a 

reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State, 

621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001). The defendant must overcome the “strong 

presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable 

assistance.” Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007). Matters of trial strategy 

 

hearing within 30 days of receiving written notification of the amount of restitution 

requested, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later.”). The prosecutor and the 

district court both indicated that they would consider any subsequent request for a 

restitution hearing timely. Ranzy conceded at oral argument that he has not requested a 

restitution hearing since the written restitution order was filed. Appellate courts typically 

do not consider matters that were not argued to and considered by the district court. Roby 

v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Because Ranzy has not requested a 

restitution hearing since sentencing, the district court has not considered the issue, and 

there is nothing for us to review. We do not address the matter. 
11

are left to the discretion of trial counsel and are not second-guessed on appeal. Leake v. 

State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007).

Ranzy first claims that his attorney was unprepared on the original trial date, and, 

as a result, the state had additional time to amend the complaint to add the terroristicthreats charges. On the date trial was scheduled to begin, Ranzy insisted that his public 

defender was not prepared and demanded a new attorney. The attorney, however,

indicated that he was prepared to proceed with trial. The district court explained to 

Ranzy that he would not be granted a different public defender, but Ranzy persisted in his 

demands. Ultimately the district court continued the matter to allow Ranzy additional 

time to consult with his attorney. The trial was therefore continued at Ranzy’s request. 

Furthermore, even if the continuance was granted because the attorney needed additional 

time to prepare for trial, it is unclear how successfully obtaining a continuance to further 

prepare a defense could amount to a failure to provide reasonable assistance. Moreover, 

Ranzy has failed to show prejudice. Although the new charges were added on the 

continued trial date, Ranzy provides no evidence that the additional charges would not 

have been filed had the trial commenced as originally scheduled. 

Second, Ranzy argues that his attorney failed to file “standard motions in 

preparation for trial.” But Ranzy does not identify the motions that he believes his 

attorney should have filed or state how he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to file 

these motions. 

Ranzy further argues that his attorney failed to communicate with him about trial 

strategy. Trial strategy, however, is left to the discretion of trial counsel and is generally 
12

not reviewed by this court. Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 536. Ranzy also does not indicate how 

this failure to communicate prejudiced him. He fails to state anything that would have 

been done differently had his attorney been in better communication. 

Ranzy also maintains that his attorney failed to provide him with discovery, jury 

instructions, or clothes for trial. These claims are all plainly contradicted by the record. 

Lastly, Ranzy claims that his attorney failed to object to the addition of the new 

terroristic-threats charges. It is unclear if this refers to a failure to object to the state 

amending the complaint, a failure to challenge probable cause, or both. Regardless, 

Ranzy cannot prevail because his attorney’s performance was not deficient, and, even if it 

had been deficient, Ranzy suffered no prejudice. Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2, 

prior to the jury being sworn, the prosecuting attorney may freely amend the complaint 

by motion. State v. Bluhm, 460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990). The state moved to amend 

the complaint before the jury was sworn. Accordingly, there was likely no basis to 

challenge the district court’s decision to grant the amendment. There was also no basis 

for a probable-cause challenge. This is clear from the district court’s denial of Ranzy’s 

motion for a judgment of acquittal and our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence 

to support Ranzy’s convictions on these charges. See, e.g., Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 

719, 731 (Minn. 2010) (noting that burden of overturning grand jury indictment is 

heavier after a fair trial and a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).

Ranzy’s attorney competently argued pre-trial and jury-instruction issues, 

thoroughly cross-examined witnesses, competently presented Ranzy’s testimony, and 

presented a thorough closing argument. The attorney’s representation led to an acquittal 
13

on the more serious second-degree assault charges. Ranzy has not shown that his 

attorney’s assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was 

prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged errors. See Nissalke, 861 N.W.2d at 94. 

B. Speedy Trial

Ranzy next argues that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial by 

allowing the state to amend the complaint to add the two terroristic-threats charges. He 

claims that the amendment violated his right to a speedy trial because it was made one 

day after his 60-day speedy-trial date. 

Ranzy’s trial began on May 5, 2015. Ranzy made a speedy trial demand on 

March 5, 2015. Ranzy’s trial therefore began on the 61st day after his speedy-trial 

demand. A delay of more than 60 days from the date of the speedy-trial demand raises a 

presumption that a violation has occurred. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 

2015); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09 (stating that “the trial must start within 60 days” 

of a speedy-trial demand “unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date”). 

However, “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the 

defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 

97, 109 (Minn. 2005). The delay was the result of Ranzy’s actions and can in no way be 

attributed to the state. Ranzy’s trial was originally scheduled for April 27, 2015, well 

within the 60 days. Although the state appeared to have been ready for trial and Ranzy’s 

attorney said he was also ready for trial, Ranzy insisted that his attorney was not prepared

and demanded a new attorney. Ranzy’s actions forced the district court to continue the 
14

matter. The state’s subsequent motion to amend the complaint caused no further delay. 

Ranzy’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. 

C. Jury Instructions

Finally, Ranzy raises a general challenge to the jury instructions. He does not 

point to any specific instruction, but alleges generally that the instructions confused the 

jury and were not in line with the law. A claim of error in a brief based only on assertion 

and not supported by argument or authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error is clear on 

inspection. State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006), aff’d, 728 

N.W.2d 2443 (Minn. 2007). We observe no obvious prejudicial error in the jury 

instructions.3 

Affirmed.

 

3 Ranzy’s pro se brief also raises what he labels a “[v]iolation of due process.” This 

section, however, only addresses a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim that appears 

identical to that argued in Ranzy’s principal brief.