1 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

 

In re B.S. and S.C. 

No. 18-0423 (Wood County 17-JA-185 and 17-JA-186)

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Mother A.S., by counsel Jeffrey O. Dye II, appeals the Circuit Court of Wood 

County’s April 5, 2018, order terminating her parental rights to B.S. and S.C.1 The West Virginia 

Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Mindy M. Parsley, filed a 

response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), Robin S. 

Bonovitch, filed a response on behalf of the children in support of the circuit court’s order. On 

appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in finding no reasonable likelihood that she 

could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future and terminating 

her parental rights instead of utilizing a less-restrictive dispositional alternative. 

 This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

On July 14, 2017, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that petitioner 

went to the hospital for pregnancy-related issues, but left against medical advice. The DHHR 

further alleged that petitioner subsequently returned to the hospital suffering from seizures and 

underwent an emergency caesarian section. B.S. tested positive for methamphetamine, 

amphetamines, and THC at birth and suffered from withdrawal symptoms. Petitioner’s boyfriend 

disclosed to the DHHR that petitioner actively used methamphetamine during her pregnancy 

with B.S. The DHHR alleged that at the time the petition was filed, petitioner and the child were 

still hospitalized and that, due to her continued substance abuse, petitioner was unable to provide 

appropriate care and supervision for B.S. and the older child, S.C. On January 24, 2018, the 

circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing during which petitioner stipulated to the allegations of 

abuse and neglect and was adjudicated as an abusing parent. Following the hearing, petitioner 

moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. 

                                                             1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W.Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 

W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

FILED 

November 19, 2018 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2 

On April 2, 2018, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing. Counsel for petitioner 

again requested a post-adjudicatory improvement period and explained that petitioner was 

incarcerated, but that she was attempting to enter into a plea agreement and intended to 

participate in an in-patient substance abuse treatment program. Counsel for S.C.’s father, along 

with the DHHR and guardian, objected to granting petitioner a post-adjudicatory improvement 

period. The circuit court noted that petitioner failed to attend hearings in the matter scheduled in 

July, August, September, October, and November of 2017. It also noted that petitioner was 

incarcerated in West Virginia or Ohio for at least part, if not for the entirety of, the abuse and 

neglect proceedings.2 Counsel for S.C.’s father informed the circuit court that petitioner had not 

seen S.C. since July 20, 2016, when the child was six months old. The circuit court denied 

petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Based upon the evidence 

presented, the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially 

correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future due to her substance abuse and 

failure to provide the children with appropriate care and supervision. The circuit court also found 

that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare and was 

the least-restrictive dispositional alternative. Ultimately, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s 

parental rights in its April 5, 2018, dispositional order.3 It is from this order that petitioner 

appeals. 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review: 

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Upon our review, this Court 

finds no error in the proceedings below. 

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Other than a speeding charge mentioned by counsel for petitioner, the record is devoid 

of any further information regarding the crimes for which petitioner was charged. 

3

According to the parties, S.C.’s father is a nonabusing parent and retains custody of that 

child. B.S.’s father’s parental rights were terminated and the permanency plan for that child is 

adoption in his current foster placement.
3 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred when it found that there was no 

reasonable likelihood that she could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in 

the near future. In support, petitioner asserts that as part of the plea agreement in her unrelated 

criminal case, she “intended to participate in a long-term residential drug treatment program” in 

order to help correct her parental deficiencies. We find this argument to be meritless. West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(3) clearly indicates that a situation where there is no reasonable 

likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected includes one in 

which 

[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] not responded to or followed through with a 

reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the 

abuse or neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or insubstantial 

diminution of conditions which threatened the health, welfare or life of the child. . 

. . 

Here, petitioner abused substances during her pregnancy with B.S. and had no further 

contact with the child after his birth. Petitioner last saw S.C. in July of 2016 when the child was 

only six months old. Petitioner also failed to participate in the instant proceedings and missed 

numerous scheduled hearings. Although petitioner argues that she intended to participate in an 

in-patient substance abuse treatment program and that her participation in said program would 

correct the deficiencies in her parenting, this argument is purely speculative. There is no 

evidence to suggest that she would successfully complete any such program or even be permitted 

to undergo such treatment under the terms of her plea agreement. Based on this evidence, the 

circuit court correctly found that there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could 

substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future. Further, West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6) provides that circuit courts are to terminate parental rights upon 

findings that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination is necessary for the children’s 

welfare. Due to petitioner’s substance abuse issues, failure to attend multiple hearings, and 

incarceration, it is clear that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 

Therefore, we find no error in the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. 

Further, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights 

rather than utilizing a less-restrictive dispositional alternative. In support, petitioner argues that 

she should have been granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period to address the issues of 

abuse and neglect. Again, petitioner asserts that “part of the anticipated plea was that the 

[p]etitioner would likely be receiving long-term residential treatment.” As discussed above, this 

assertion is speculative and not persuasive. West Virginia Code § 49-4-610 provides that a parent 

may be granted an improvement period if “[t]he [parent] demonstrates, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the [parent] is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.” Additionally, 

we have stated that “West Virginia law allows the circuit court discretion in deciding whether to 

grant a parent an improvement period.” In re M.M., 236 W.Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 

(2015). Petitioner failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that she would be likely to 

participate in an improvement period and, therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying her 

the same. Moreover, we have held that 
4 

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W. Va. Code 

[§] 49-6-5 [now West Virginia Code § 49-4-604] . . . may be employed without 

the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no 

reasonable likelihood under W. Va. Code [§] 49-6-5(b) [now West Virginia Code 

§ 49-4-604(c)] . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially 

corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). 

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W.Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). For these reasons, the 

termination of petitioner’s parental rights was appropriate. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

April 5, 2018, dispositional order is hereby affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: November 19, 2018 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Evan H. Jenkins 

Justice Paul T. Farrell sitting by temporary assignment