J-S14036-17

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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LEON L. IVERSON,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 671 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 29, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001012-2012,

CP-38-CR-0001016-2012, CP-38-CR-0001018-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2017

Leon L. Iverson (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order entered on 

March 27, 2016, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We remand for proceedings 

consistent with this memorandum.

In April of 2012, Appellant was charged at three separate docket 

numbers with two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, one count of possession with intent to deliver a non-controlled 

substance, and two counts of criminal use of a communication facility. 

Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the aforementioned crimes, 

and on January 24, 2013, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of four to 

ten years of incarceration. 
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On March 19, 2014, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Iverson, 100 A.3d 313 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance 

of appeal with our Supreme Court. 

On March 25, 2015, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition, 

which is the subject of this appeal. Attorney Ian M. Ehrgood was appointed 

to represent Appellant, and soon thereafter, an amended petition was filed. 

On March 21, 2016, a hearing was held, after which the trial court issued an 

order denying Appellant’s petition. Counsel filed timely a notice of appeal on 

Appellant’s behalf. On May 18, 2016, Appellant’s counsel complied with the 

PCRA court’s order to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Simultaneously, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a 

no-merit letter, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d. 927 (Pa. 

1988) (en banc) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988). The PCRA court granted counsel’s petition.

Before considering the merits of Appellant’s issues, we address 

whether Appellant is properly proceeding pro se. As indicated supra, the 

trial court ordered counsel’s withdrawal while the case was pending in this 

Court. 

However, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701, “[e]xcept as otherwise 

prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken ... the trial court or other 
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government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.” See 

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 829 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding the 

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain issues concerning bail when the 

Commonwealth’s appeal, taken from this Court’s grant of a new trial for 

Appellant, was pending before our Supreme Court). Thus, once the notice of 

appeal was filed, the PCRA court was without authority to rule upon 

counsel’s motion.1 If Attorney Ehrgood wished to withdraw as counsel, his 

motion and Turner/Finley letter should have been presented to this Court 

for review. 

Because the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain PCRA counsel’s 

motion, the court’s May 18, 2016 order, permitting Attorney Ehrgood to 

withdraw is a legal nullity. Thus, we decline to address the merits of the 

 

1 We are cognizant of a Commonwealth Court opinion which, upon reviewing 

Pa.R.A.P. 1701, reached the opposite result. See Commonwealth v. 

Reading Grp. Two Properties, Inc., 922 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2007). We are not bound by this decision, and in any event we do not find it 

persuasive in the context of the instant case. In Reading, the trial court’s 

motion-in-limine order was pending on appeal before our Supreme Court 

when counsel requested to withdraw. The trial court denied this motion, 

citing lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court determined 

that the trial court was able to exercise jurisdiction over counsel’s motion, as 

it was ancillary to the issue pending on appeal. Unlike this case, in which 

the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition and Appellant’s subsequent 

appeal concluded the case in the court below, the case in Reading was still 

ongoing. Similarly, in Bishop, supra, the case was over in the trial court 

when that court attempted to deal with the bail issue, and this Court held 

that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction. We find this distinction 

significant in our determination that the PCRA court erred in ruling upon 

Attorney Ehrgood’s motion. 
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issues now raised on appeal due to counsel’s deemed continued 

representation of Appellant, who is now actually proceeding pro se. We 

direct the prothonotary to furnish a copy of this memorandum to Attorney 

Ehrgood and enter a new briefing schedule, in accordance with which 

Appellant’s counsel may file either an advocate’s brief or a petition to 

withdraw and Turner/Finley no-merit letter with this Court addressing the 

issues Appellant wishes to raise on appeal.

Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained.