STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

State of West Virginia, 

Plaintiff Below, Respondent FILED 

September 1, 2017 

vs) No. 16-0341 (Kanawha County 15-F-186) RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA Leonard Thomas, 

Defendant Below, Plaintiff 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Leonard Thomas, by counsel Edward L. Bullman, appeals his February 3, 

2016, conviction for the offense of murder in the first degree. Respondent State of West Virginia, 

by counsel David A. Stackpole, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner 

argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his assertion that he acted in 

self-defense. Further, petitioner argues that the State failed to proffer evidence of malice and 

premeditation sufficient to sustain his conviction. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain petitioner’s conviction 

for murder in the first degree. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit 

court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

On November 18, 2014, petitioner was an overnight guest at an apartment in Rand, West 

Virginia. In addition to petitioner, several others were also staying in the apartment, including 

Gerald Maxwell. Petitioner contends that some of those staying in the apartment were using 

illicit drugs; that Mr. Maxwell was selling illicit drugs; and that several females staying in the 

apartment were trading sex for illicit drugs. 

Petitioner does not dispute that on the morning of November 18, 2014, he shot the 

decedent in the head at close range. However, petitioner’s description of the facts surrounding 

the shooting and the description provided by other witnesses are drastically different. Petitioner 

contends that on the evening prior to the shooting, he and the decedent argued over whose turn it 

was to engage in sex with a certain female. Petitioner testified that he and the decedent argued, 

and when the decedent made a move to pull a gun, such action prompted petitioner to shoot the 

decedent in self-defense.1 The State argues that petitioner shot the decedent as he laid, unarmed, 

1 Petitioner testified that on the night of the shooting, he engaged in sex acts with a 

female in the bathroom of the apartment. While petitioner was in the bathroom, the decedent 

(continued . . .) 

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upon a couch with his eyes closed. An eyewitness to the shooting, a woman sitting on a nearby 

couch, testified that at the time of the shooting, the decedent was unarmed and laying down with 

his eyes closed. Aside from petitioner, none of the other trial witnesses recalled the decedent 

having possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting or the evening prior. 

In support of his claims of self-defense, petitioner argued that the decedent constantly 

belittled him and had previously made threats of physical harm against him.2 However, the 

testimony of other trial witnesses describes petitioner as someone eager to commit murder. At 

trial, a witness present in the apartment testified that petitioner had been agitated the night prior 

to the shooting and had told her that it did not bother him to take a life. This witness described 

petitioner as being aggravated and testified that petitioner stated that the decedent was “treating 

him like he was a punk” and that the decedent was “going to force him to do something he didn’t 

want to do.” Similarly, another witness testified that on the morning prior to the shooting, 

petitioner was sitting at a table in the apartment “popping shells in and out of a gun.” When 

questioned about what he was doing, petitioner responded, “I’m going to kill me a mother f***er 

this morning.” 

Another witness testified that in the days leading up to the shooting, petitioner was 

“acting more withdrawn and more hateful” and was being “snappy.” The witness described an 

incident that occurred the same night of the shooting wherein she had to step in and break up an 

altercation between petitioner and one of her male friends. Further, the witness testified that on 

the evening of the shooting, she observed petitioner counting on his fingers. When she asked 

petitioner what he was doing, petitioner responded, “I need to know how many bullets I need 

because I’m going to kill every one of you mother f***ers before the night’s up.” 

In May of 2015, petitioner was indicted by the Kanawha County Grand Jury and charged 

with the decedent’s murder. Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of the offense of 

murder in the first degree. Further, the jury found that no mercy in sentencing should be afforded 

to petitioner. On March 9, 2016, the circuit court entered an order formally sentencing petitioner 

to life in prison. It is from his February 3, 2016, jury conviction that petitioner now appeals. 

On appeal, petitioner alleges three assignments of error. While independently argued, in 

each of these assignments of error petitioner contends that the State failed to present sufficient 

interrupted and demanded his turn with the female. Petitioner initially refused the decedent entry 

to the bathroom but ultimately relented and left the bathroom. Thereafter, petitioner returned to 

the bathroom and knocked on the door. The decedent told petitioner to leave. Sometime later, the 

decedent exited the bathroom and petitioner asked the decedent for drugs so that he could again 

engage in sex acts with the female. The decedent refused. Petitioner contends that after this 

exchange, the decedent pulled out a gun and aimed it at him. Petitioner alleges that in response 

he shot the decedent. 

2 Petitioner contends that in the days prior to the shooting, the decedent and his two 

brothers threatened petitioner. Further, petitioner testified that in the days before the shooting, 

the decedent forced petitioner to pick up excrement from the yard. 

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evidence to sustain his conviction. First, petitioner alleges that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence to rebut his testimony that he acted in self-defense. Second, petitioner alleges 

that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of malice and premeditation to sustain his 

conviction of murder in the first degree. Third, petitioner contends that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence to support a charge of murder in the second degree against him. 

We have long held that 

1.	 The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted 

at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to 

convince a reasonable person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

3.	 A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the 

evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the 

jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need not be 

inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long as the jury can 

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury 

and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only 

when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from 

which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that 

our prior cases are inconsistent, they are expressly overruled. 

Syl. Pts. 1 and 3, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). 

In addressing claims of self-defense, we have found that “[o]nce there is sufficient 

evidence to create a reasonable doubt that the killing resulted from the defendant acting in selfdefense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in 

self-defense.” Syl., State v. Clark, 171 W. Va. 74, 297 S.E.2d 849 (1982). Here, petitioner argues 

that he presented sufficient evidence that he was acting in self-defense at the time of the 

shooting. Such evidence included the fact that the decedent had a history of violence; the 

decedent was substantially bigger in physical size than petitioner; and the decedent consistently 

disparaged petitioner. 

Petitioner discounts the testimony of the witnesses present in the apartment at the time of 

the shooting and notes that these witnesses were more connected to the decedent than petitioner, 

who they viewed as an outsider. While none of the witnesses corroborated petitioner’s testimony 

that the decedent was in possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting, he argues that it 

“strains credibility” to believe that with the drug activity in the apartment that there were no 

drugs, money, or paraphernalia discovered by the police officers called to the scene. Petitioner 

speculates that the scene must have been cleared by the witnesses. 

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Conversely, respondent argues that petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence offered against him at trial is simply a request to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses. 

Respondent contends that even if petitioner’s self-serving testimony was sufficient to create 

reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense, the State offered sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner did not act in self-defense. Based upon 

our review of the record herein, we agree with respondent. 

We have previously held that that “[i]t is peculiarly within the province of the jury to 

weigh the evidence upon the question of self-defense, and the verdict of a jury adverse to that 

defense will not be set aside unless it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.” Syl. Pt. 7, 

State v. White, 231 W. Va. 270, 744 S.E.2d 668 (2013) (citations omitted). As the trier of fact, 

the jury was the “sole judge as to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” 

Syl. Pt. 8, in part, id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, viewing all of the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution and crediting all inferences and credibility assessments 

that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution, we conclude that the State’s evidence 

was sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction for murder in the first degree. 

In his second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence of malice and premeditation to sustain his conviction of murder in the first 

degree. We have previously held that 

[a]lthough premeditation and deliberation are not measured by any particular 

period of time, there must be some period between the formation of the intent to 

kill and the actual killing, which indicates the killing, is by prior calculation and 

design. This means there must be an opportunity for some reflection on the 

intention to kill after it is formed. 

Syl. Pt. 5, Guthrie. 

In State v. Hatfield, 169 W. Va. 191, 198, 286 S.E.2d 402, 407 (1982), we noted that in 

regard to first degree murder, the term “malice” is often used as a substitute for “specific intent 

to kill” or “an intentional killing.” We have further noted that a defendant “faces an ‘uphill 

climb’ when he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and that we will reverse ‘only if no 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” State v. Scott, 206 W. Va. 158, 167, 522 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1999) (citing State v. LaRock, 

196 W.Va. 294, 303, 470 S.E.2d 613, 622 (1996)). 

Here, petitioner contends that the shooting took place following an evening of drug use 

and during the heat of an argument in which the decedent disparaged petitioner. Petitioner asserts 

these actions caused him to react “suddenly and without premeditation.” Petitioner argues that 

had the shooting been premeditated he would not have shot the decedent face-to-face in front of 

an eyewitness. Petitioner contends that, at most, the evidence on the record establishes that his 

decision to shoot the decedent was formed in the heat of an argument over sex and money. 

Based on our review of the record before us, we disagree. The record is replete with 

testimony regarding the petitioner’s actions and attitude at the time of and shortly before to the 

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shooting to sustain the jury’s determination that he acted in a premeditated and deliberate way 

when shooting the decedent. In the days prior to the shooting, petitioner and the decedent were 

arguing. A witness described petitioner as agitated and irritated over the way he perceived that he 

was being treated by the decedent. Moreover, petitioner made statements to multiple witnesses 

on the night of the shooting that he intended to kill someone. Accordingly, we find that the jury 

reasonably could have determined that petitioner shot the decedent with malice, premeditation, 

and deliberation and find there is sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction. 

In his third assignment of error, petitioner argues that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to support a verdict of murder in the first or second degree as a matter of law.3 

Petitioner contends that there was sufficient evidence to require remand of the case with entry of 

an order finding petitioner guilty of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. We decline 

petitioner’s invitation to remand. Our determinations set forth above with respect to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction for murder in the first degree are 

dispositive of this issue. Accordingly, we find no merit to petitioner’s argument. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm petitioner’s February 3, 2016, conviction. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: September 1, 2017 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

DISSENTING: 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

3 It is without dispute that petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree, not 

murder in the second degree. 

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