J-A10011-18  

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37  

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA  

   Appellee  

  v.  

DAVID H. VENABLE, SR.        

   Appellant 

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: : 

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  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF            PENNSYLVANIA 

No. 2192 EDA 2017  

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 2, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County 

Criminal Division at No(s):  CP-48-CR-0003394-2016  

BEFORE:  GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2018 

 Appellant, David H. Venable, Sr., appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

bench trial conviction for one count each of driving under the influence of 

alcohol or a controlled substance (“DUI”) (general impairment and high rate 

of alcohol) and careless driving.1  We affirm.   

 In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case.  Therefore, we have no reason to 

restate them.  We add only that the court convicted Appellant on May 12, 

2017, of all charges and sentenced him on June 2, 2017, to three (3) days to 

six (6) months’ incarceration plus fines.  Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal on June 26, 2017.  The court ordered Appellant on June 29, 2017, to 

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (c); 3714(a).   

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file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b), and Appellant timely complied on July 19, 2017.   

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF A BLOOD DRAW WHERE 

APPELLANT WAS READ THE DL-26B WARNINGS WHICH DO NOT ADDRESS ENHANCED CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND 

UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE[S] APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVE 

HIS CONSENT TO THE BLOOD DRAW?  

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 

ARRESTING OFFICER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO PERFORM A VALID TRAFFIC 

STOP?  

(Appellant’s Brief at 5).   

Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

is as follows:  

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.  Because 

the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole.  Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by 

[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.  Where...the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are 

not binding on [the] appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts.  Thus, the conclusions of law of the [trial court are] subject to plenary review.   

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 Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 618 Pa. 684, 57 A.3d 68 (2012).   

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Michael J. 

Koury, Jr., we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief.  The trial court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented.  (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 25, 2017, at 7-17) (finding: 

(1) at DUI processing center, Officer Molnar read Appellant DL-26B form that 

contained no reference to enhanced criminal penalties for failure to consent 

to blood draw; Appellant testified he believed he had no choice but to consent 

and recalled being told he would be subject to higher penalties if he did not 

consent; Appellant admitted his knowledge of DUI law stemmed from his prior 

DUI in 2004 and conversations with acquaintance; court considered 

Appellant’s testimony incredible and concluded these events unlikely 

influenced decision to consent; further, Appellant wavered in his testimony at 

suppression hearing regarding his specific knowledge of potential penalties; 

although Appellant was unclear as to specific penalties associated with refusal 

to consent, Appellant did not clarify his understanding with DUI processing 

officer prior to blood draw; Appellant’s argument, that citizens are presumed 

to know law and by extension Appellant is presumed to know Pennsylvania 

statute imposes enhanced criminal penalties on motorists who refuse to 

consent to blood draw, fails; if court presumes Appellant knows law, court 

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must presume Appellant knew that Birchfield2 decision called into question 

Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute and provision authorizing enhanced 

criminal penalties for motorists who refuse to consent to blood draw; under 

totality of circumstances, Appellant voluntarily consented to blood draw; 

review of video recording from Northampton County DUI Processing Center 

revealed no police excesses or threats; Officer Molnar calmly read Appellant 

DL-26B warning; at conclusion of warning, Officer Molnar asked Appellant to 

consent to blood draw, and Appellant consented; Appellant actively 

participated in and testified at suppression hearing in English and was capable 

of understanding DL-26B warning as it was read to him; (2) Officer Fischer 

testified he observed Appellant exceed speed limit and fail to signal right-hand 

turn; Officer Fischer could “barely keep up” with Appellant; Officer Fischer had 

probable cause to conduct traffic stop).3  Accordingly, we affirm based on the 

trial court’s opinion.   

Judgment of sentence affirmed.   

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2 Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 

560 (2016).    3 See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, ___ A.3d ___, 2018 PA Super 133 (filed May 21, 2018) (holding defendant’s knowledge of law from previous 

arrest was irrelevant; threat of civil penalties and evidentiary consequences in DL-26 revised warning is permissible; form that did not threaten criminal 

sanctions for refusal to consent to blood draw accurately reflected post-Birchfield law; police had no duty to provide defendant with update on law 

or criminal procedure prior to requesting blood-draw).   

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/20/18