COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

MARCHIA L. BRACKETT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0466-98-1 PER CURIAM 

 AUGUST 25, 1998 

CHESAPEAKE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 

 TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 

 AND TRIGON ADMINISTRATORS 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Karen M. Rye, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Bradford C. Jacob; Taylor & Walker, on 

brief), for appellees. 

 Marchia L. Brackett contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in denying her request to penalize her employer, 

Chesapeake Public Schools, Transportation Department, pursuant to 

Code § 65.2-524. Brackett argues that the commission erred in 

allowing employer a credit for voluntary payments made to 

Brackett pursuant to employer's sick leave policy against 

temporary total disability benefits owed to Brackett for the same 

period of time under the commission's July 24, 1996 award. Upon 

reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 The facts are not in dispute. Brackett sustained a 

compensable injury while working for employer as a school bus 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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driver. Brackett filed an application seeking an award of 

medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the commission entered an award 

in favor of Brackett, granting her temporary total disability 

benefits from March 21, 1994 until March 27, 1994 and from March 

9, 1995 until March 12, 1995. After deducting the statutory 

seven-day waiting period under Code § 65.2-509, Brackett was 

entitled to four days of benefits, totalling $64.43. Neither 

party appealed the July 24, 1996 decision. 

 Alleging employer's failure to timely pay benefits, Brackett 

filed a motion requesting that the commission assess a penalty 

against employer pursuant to Code § 65.2-524. Brackett also 

filed a motion for employer to show cause why it had not complied 

with the commission's award. 

 The commission held a hearing on Brackett's motion for the 

penalty. At that hearing, the parties stipulated that employer 

paid Brackett her full wages for work absences from March 21, 

1994 through March 27, 1994 under the terms of its sick leave 

policy. The parties agreed that employer did not charge Brackett 

with sick leave for those days. The parties also agreed that 

employer paid Brackett her full wages for work absences from 

March 9, 1995 through March 12, 1995 and that, although she was 

initially charged with sick leave for those days, employer 

reinstated Brackett's sick leave in August 1996 after the 

commission's award was final. 
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 In denying Brackett's motion for a penalty, the commission 

found as follows: 

 In this case, [Brackett] argues that the 

employer waived its right to credit itself 

with [Brackett's] reinstated sick leave and 

is barred from raising the issue now because 

it did not raise it at the compensation 

hearing or appeal the compensation award. 

However, as Dyson [v. Commonwealth of 

Virginia Department of Transportation, 67 

O.I.C. 237 (1988),] makes apparent, this is 

not required by § 65.2-520. The Act also 

does not require that the employer seek the 

Commission's prior approval before crediting 

itself. Such a requirement would discourage 

and delay the voluntary payment of benefits 

through salary continuation to employees. 

(Footnote omitted.). 

 Citing Collins v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Comm., 21 Va. 

App. 673, 679-80, 467 S.E.2d 279, 282 (1996), the commission 

ruled that it has "the power and authority not only to make and 

enforce its awards, but to protect itself and its awards from 

fraud, imposition and mistake." The commission further ruled as 

follows: 

 [E]mployer maintains that it did not know at 

the July 23, 1996 hearing that [Brackett] 

received her full wages during the disability 

period. Paying the indemnity benefits 

awarded by the Commission would result in 

[Brackett] being paid twice. We disagree 

with [Brackett's] argument that the 

Commission lacks the authority to prevent 

such unjust enrichment. 

 Under facts similar to this case, the commission held in 

1988 that "payment of wages to the employee based upon sick or 

annual leave may be credited to the employer under the provisions 
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of § 65.1-72 [now Code § 65.2-520] when leave is reinstated." 

Dyson, 67 O.I.C. at 239. 

 The construction afforded a statute by the 

public officials charged with its 

administration and enforcement is entitled to 

be given great weight by a court. The 

legislature is presumed to be cognizant of 

such construction. When it has long 

continued without change, the legislature is 

presumed to have acquiesced therein. 

Watford v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 13 Va. App. 501, 505, 

413 S.E.2d 69, 71-72 (1992). 

 Contrary to Brackett's assertions, the plain language of 

Code § 65.2-520 does not require that an employer seek approval 

from the commission before taking a credit for voluntary payments 

made to a claimant. Moreover, as the commission correctly found, 

Brackett would have been unjustly enriched with a double recovery 

if employer was denied its right to take the credit. Under the 

circumstances of this case, "'[i]mposition' . . . empower[ed] the 

commission . . . to render [a decision] based on justice shown by 

the total circumstances even though no fraud, mistake or 

concealment [was] shown." Avon Prods., Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 

1, 7, 415 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992). 

 In light of the weight to be given to the commission's 

construction of Code § 65.2-520 and the application of the 

doctrine of imposition to this case, we hold that the commission 

did not err in denying Brackett's motion for a penalty and in 

allowing employer a credit. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 
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 Affirmed.