DA 11
- 0148 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 20 11 MT 285
IN THE MATTER OF L.L.A., Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty
- First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DI 11
- 05 Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender; Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana For Appellee : Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General; Joshua Van Swearingen, Legal Intern; Helena, Montana William Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney; Angela Wetzsteon, Deputy County Attorney; Hamilton, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 28, 2011 Decided: November 15, 2011 Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk November 15 20112

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Respondent and Appellant L.L.A. appeals the Order of the Twenty
- First Judicial District Court , inv

oluntarily committing her to the Montana State Hospital (MSH). We find the following issue dispositive: ¶2 **Whether the District Court erred**  **by failing to provide a detailed statement of the**  **facts upon which it found L.L.A.**  **to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring**  **commitment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR** **AL BACKGROUND** ¶3 On February 14, 2011, the Stateof Montana petition ed, pursuant to § 53
-21
- 121, MCA, for L.L.A.’s involuntary commitment to MSH. The State’s petition recounted information from report s submitted by certified mental health professionals Carleen Grussling and Fred Huskey, describing s ev eral instances of

L .L.A
. ’s bizarre behavior. The see vents included L.L.A. swinging a frying pan at her father’s groin because she believed he was “raping

her through the air wav es,”burning

kitchen chairs and starting clothes on fire in the bathtub due to “bio
- terrorism, ”throwing wine on her parents and the walls of their home t o “baptize” them, and claiming her mother and father were “imposters” o r “ev

iltwins” of her parents. B oth Grussling and Huskey were of the opinion that L.L.A. suffered from the mental disorder of Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, and rec ommended she be committed to MSH
. ¶4 On February 17, 2011, the District Court held a hearing on the petition. L.L .A.’s father testified and relat ed the ev ents stated in the petition along with other information raising concern about her mental health
. Huskey, who had reviewedL .L.A.’s clinical3

history and examined her before the hearing, t estified that h er responses during the
ev aluation suggested paranoid delusions and offered implausible explanations for her behavior. F or example, L.L.A. believed a former classmate and his fa mily lived underneath her family’s home. L.L.A. gathered a “survival packet” of supplies for them, including lit candles, and threw it underneath the house. Huskey d iagnosed L.L.A. with a Psychotic Disorder NOS (Not Otherwise S pecified) , noting the need to rule out Schizophrenia and Bipolar D isorder because“there may be indicatio ns of the possibility, but we need more information and more observation[.]” L.L.A. told Huskey and testified at the hearing that she did not believe she was mentally ill. ¶5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Courtorally made brief findings and pronounced L.L.A. would be committed to MSH for a period not to exceed 90 days. The State then indicated it would prepare a commitment order and have it ready for the court in “[l]ess than ten minutes. ” TheDistrict Court’swritten order contained seven findings of fact: 1. Respondent has been advised of Respondent’s rights and appropriate

notices have been given as required by law. 2. Respondent suffers from mental disorders as defined by § 53
- 21
- 102(9), M.C.A., specifically diagnosed as Psychotic D isorder NOS. 3. Respondent is in need of commitment as defined by § 53
- 21
- 126, M.C.A. in that Respondent’s mental disorder has resulted in recent acts or omissions which ma ke her unable to protect her life and safety. Further, Respondent’s mental disorder is treatable with a reasonable prospect of success, and will, if untreated, predictably result in further deterioration of Respondent’s mental condition which will create an imminent threat to Respondent and/or others.4

4. The Respondent is either unab le to or unwilling to consent to treatment so Respondent requires commitment at the Montana State Hospital for up to ninety (90) days unless sooner released as determined appropriate by the staff at the State Hospital. 5. Of the treatment alternatives av a ilable and investigated by the Professional Person, commitment to the Montana State Hospital offers the least
- restrictive environment for the needs of the Respondent, and other possible alternatives, including out -patient treatment, are not suitable , b asedupon the Respondent’s refusal and/or inability to accept treatment. 6. The Professional Person has recommended involuntary medication of the Respondent if necessary to protect the Respondent and to facilitate effective treatment. 7. If discharged from the Montana State Hospital prior to the expiration of the commitment period, Respondent would benefit from community treatment and aftercare, including case management services, to assist with monitoring Respondent’s mental health condition and medication, facilitating treatment, and finding housing and employment. ¶6 On appeal, L.L.A. claims the District Court erred in making insufficient findings of fact supporting her commitment. She argues the requirements of § 53
- 21
- 12 7 (8)(a) , MCA, were not followed and, a s a result, the order committing her to MSH must be vacated. **STANDARD OF REVIEW** ¶7 Whether a d istrict c ourt’s findings of f act meet the statutory requirementsi s a question of law which we review for correctness. In reM ental Health of

E.P.B. , 2007 MT 22 4, ¶ 5, 339 Mont. 107, 168 P.3d 662.5 **DISCUSSION** ¶8 **Whether the District Court erred**  **by failing to provide a detailed statement of**  **the facts upon which it found**  **L.L.A. to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring**  **commitment.** ¶9 The procedural requirements for an involuntary commitment are prescrib ed in §§ 53
- 21
- 126and 1 27, MCA. This Court consistently hasemphasized the need for strict compliance with statutory requirements in involuntary commitment proceedings. In re Mental Health of L.K.

-S. , 2011 MT 21, ¶ 15, 359 Mont. 191, 247 P.3d 1100; In re A.K. , 2006 MT 166, ¶ 14, 332 Mont. 511, 139 P.3d 849; In re C.R.C. , 2004 MT 389, ¶ 16, 325 Mont. 133, 104 P .3d 1065 ; In re Mental Health of S.J. , 231 Mont. 353, 355, 753 P.2d 319, 320 (1988)
. We have stress edthe laws “are of critical importance because of the ‘calamitous effect of a commitment,’ including loss of liberty and damage to a person’s reputation.” In reM

ental Health of

T .J.D. , 2002 MT 24, ¶ 20, 308 Mont. 222, 226 , 41 P.3d 323 ( citing In re Mental Health of R.M. , 270 Mont 40, 44, 889 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1995)); In reShennum , 210 Mont. 442, 450
- 51, 684 P.2d 1073, 1078 (1984). ¶10 On a petition for involuntary commitment, the court must first determine whether the respondent is suffering from a mental di sorder. If the court so finds, it then considers whether commitment is necessary based on the following factors: (a) whether the respondent, because of a mental disorder, is substantially unable to provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, cloth ing, shelter, health, or safety; (b) whether the respondent has recently, because of a mental disorder and through an act or an omission, caused self
- injury or injury to others; (c) whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent threat of in jury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s acts or omissions; and6

(d) whether the respondent’s mental disorder, as demonstrated by the respondent’s recent acts or omissions, will, if untreated, predictably result in deterioration of re spondent’s mental condition to the point at which the respondent will become a danger to self or to others or will be unable to provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health or safety. Section 53
- 21
- 126(1), MCA. Once the court conc ludes commitment is required, § 53
- 21
- 127(8)(a), MCA, mandates the court’s order contain “a detailed statement of the facts upon which the court found the respondent to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring commitment.” L.L.A. asserts the District Court’s findings were insufficient bec ause they merely recitedthe language of § 53
- 21
- 126, MCA , and did not address any facts specific to L.L.A. The State responds with three separate arguments: 1) the findings
were adequate, 2) L.L.A. isp recluded from challenging the findings on appeal because she did not give the District C ourt an opportunity to correct them, and 3) even if the findings were insufficient , the error was harmless. ¶11 We have held “conclusory statements of statutory criteri a” do not “constitute strict compliance with the statutory mandate of § 53
- 21
- 127(8)(a), MCA.” E.P.B. , ¶ 13
. Here, the District Court’s order contains no indication of the facts upon which it found that, because of her mental disorder, L.L.A. i s substant ially unable to p ro tect her life and safety or that imminent threat of injury to hers elf or otherswill result if she is left untreated
. Citing In re Mental Health of O.R.B. , 2008 MT 301 , 345 Mont. 516, 191 P.3d 482 , and In re Mental Health ofL.R. , 2010 MT76, 356 Mont. 20, 231 P.3d 594 , the State assert sthe court’s factual findings were sufficient because they are similar to those we have upheld in previous cases. Both of those cases are distinguishable.7

¶12 In O.R.B. , the trial court entered nineteen find ings of fact in its commitment order and each was supported by evidence presented from the commitment hearing. ¶ 20. The court’s oral findings also includedf our pages of

transcript in which it“meticulously
rev iewed the testimony received in support of each finding of fact.” O.R.B. , ¶ 21. There, the D istrictC ourt illustrated events and facts specific to the respondent which demonstrated shesuffered from a mental disorder and required commitment. O.R.B. , ¶ 21. For instance ,t

he court discussed O.R.B .’s mental status evaluation, her diagnosis, fa ilure to f

ollow through with necessary medical treatment, fa ilure to maintain a proper diet, and her at
- risk living conditions. O.R.B. , ¶ 21. In L.R. , the District C ourt also made several findings unique to L.R. , including that she was paranoid, had grandiose thoughts, showed extreme religious ideation, and was suspiciou s of those trying to help her. L.R. , ¶ 21. ¶13 The court ’s order here enumerated seven “F indings of F act , ”d erived almost exclusively from thelang uag e of § 53
- 21
- 126, MCA. The only information specifically reflec ting L.L.A. ’s circumstanceswas her diagnosis (P sychotic Disorder [Not Otherwise S p ecified]) , but the order contains no findings reflecting the basis for that determination. I n contra st to L.R. , there were no findings concerning L.L.A.’s particular behavior and thought processes w

hich supported the conclusionsmade by the court
. Althoughthe findings in L.R. were minimally sufficientf or the statutory requirements of § 53
- 21
- 127, MCA, they at least included some findings specific to L.R.’s actual behavior demonstrating why she required commitment
. L.R. , ¶ 21. The findings in this case lack any such references.8

¶14 For example, the State contends the following findings are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements: “ Respondent’s mental disorder has resulted in recent acts or omissions which ma keh er unable to protect her life and safety,” and that lack of treatment would “predictably result in further deterioration of [her] mentalc ondition which will create an imminent threat to her and/or others
. ” These statements do no t describef

acts particular to L.L.A., h owever, but conclusions. W hile the court did find that L.L.A. was “unable or unwilling to consent to treatment,” the order contains no information about L.L.A.’s behavior demonstrating she was unable to protect herself or the basis for its determination that her unwillingness to obtain treatment would result in imminentdang

er to herself or others
. We hav e held such a “conc lusory restatement of the statutory criteria” is insufficient to comply with the requirement for a detailed statement of facts. In re G.M. , 2007 MT 100, ¶ 22, 337 Mont. 116, 157 P.3d 687. ¶15 In E.P.B. , we noted it appeared the deputy county attorney had prep ared the commitment order for the court before the hearing had even commenced. ¶ 1 2. We expressed concern for em ploying this method in involuntary commitments , noting the numerous rights implicated by the proceedings. E.P.B. , ¶ 12. We stated , “ [ i ] n a d if ferent case, adoption of a pet itioner’s proposed findings and conclusions might be appropriate in light of the evidence presented, but district courts must

—at thev ery least

—ensure that such ‘prepared’ orders comply with statutory mandates.” E.P.B. , ¶ 1 2. Here, based on the record, it likewise appears theState hastily prepared proposed findings of fact, which the District Court adopted without assuring compliance with the statute.9

¶16 The Statenonethelessc ontends L.L.A. is precluded from challenging theD istrict Court’s findings because she did not provide the court with notice and an opportunity to correct its error. I

n support of this assertion, the State cites In re D.D. , 277 Mont. 164, 920 P.2d 973 (1996). There , the District Court ’s commitment ord er “found that D.D. had received the benefit of all applicable statutory and constitutional rights and was seriously mentally ill and in need of further evaluation and treatment.” D.D. , 277 Mont. at 167, 920 P.2d at 975. In support of its order, the cour t attached the written report of a doctor who had ev

aluated D.D. and testified during the hearing. D.D. , 277 Mont. at 167, 920 P.2d at 975. On appeal, D.D. argued the District Court’s order was inadequate under M. R. Civ. P. 52(a)( 1995) , w hich required the c ourt to “find the facts spec i ally and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” We affirmed the commitment order, in part because D.D. did not give the District C ourt an opportunity to correct itserror. D.D. , 277 Mont. at 169, 920 P.2d at 9 76
. ¶17 The 1995 version of the commitment statute at issue in D.D. did not contain language identical to that now present
. It provided: “The court shall enter into the record
a detailed statement of the facts upon which it found the respondent to be seriou sly mentally ill and, if the court authorized involuntary medication, of the facts upon which it found involuntary medication to be necessary. ” Section53
- 21
- 127(2)(c), MCA (1995). As noted above, the current statute requires the court’s findings of f actt o include a detailed statement of the facts upon which the court determined the respondent requires commitment
. Section53
-21
- 127(8)(a), MCA (2009 )
. Our decision inD. D. wasnot based
on the statutory requirements that are controlling in this case. S incethat case was10

decided , we have applied the language of the current statutea nd we have never faulted a respondent for failing to ensure a district court’s findings were sufficient to order commitment. G.M. , ¶ 22; E.P.B. , ¶¶ 12
- 13; L.R. , ¶¶ 19
-23. Moreover, we have held that M. R. Civ. P. 52(b) does not require a party to seek amendment as a precondition to appealthe insufficiency of a court’s findings
. In re Marriage of Metcalf , 183 Mont. 266, 269
-70, 598 P.2d 1140, 1142 (1979). ¶18 Therefore, D.D. is n ot apposite t o the extent itrelied on the respondent ’sfailure to raise the deficiencies in the findings of fa ct at the district court lev el pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 52(a) , and it does not provide ground to assert waiver of the requirement for a detailedstatement of factsin § 53
- 21
- 127(8)(a), MCA
. ¶19 Finally, the State argues that , even if def iciencies in the District Court’s findings of fact rendered the order inadequate , itwas harmless error because the record contained sufficient evidence to support the commitment . In In re R.J.W. , 226 Mont. 419, 424, 736 P.2d 110, 113 (1987), we did apply harmless error review to the district court’s factual findings but warned court s to comply with the statutory requirements in the future: Given the detail in the record as a whole, we find that this was harmless to appellant under the facts here. Future findings of f act should more carefully detail the factual basis on which a finding of serious mental illness is premised. In D.D. , weaffirmed the district court b oth because the respondent did not seek specific findings of fact at the trial court level and the deficiencies in the commitment order constituted harmless error ; however, we again em phasized “we do not recommend the11

shortcut method used by the District C ourt in this case [
. ] ”277 Mont. at 169, 920 P.2d at 976. ¶20 Since our decision sin both those cases, we have firmly enforcedthe statutory requirements for involuntary commitmentproceedings. L.K.

-S. , ¶ ¶ 21
- 26; In re D.L.T. , 2003 MT 46, ¶

¶ 8 , 18 , 314 Mont. 297, 67 P.3d 189 ( overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Costco Wholesale , 2007 MT 43, ¶¶ 17, 21, 336 Mont. 105, 152 P.3d 727); C.R.C. , ¶ 16 ; A.K. , ¶¶ 11, 14; G.M. , ¶¶ 19
-22, E.P. B. , ¶ 13. In G.M. , we specifically emphasized our language in R.J.W. instr ucting district courts to provide more carefully detailed statements of fact. A s a result, we declined to apply harmless error to the deficient factual findings in that case. G.M. , ¶ 21. While we have found errors harmless in involuntary commitment proc eedings af ter D.D. and R.J.W. , those errors did not amount to violation of the specific statutory mandates for ordering an involuntary commitment
. See e.g. O.R.B. , ¶ 30 (District Court failed to ensure professional person’s recommendation was included in his written report); In re A.S.B. , 2008 MT 82, ¶ 36, 342 Mont. 169, 180 P.3d 625 (District Court erred by incorporating hearsay from a report into its order). ¶21 Our adherence to the statutory scheme for involuntary commitment is not a matter of elev ating fo rm ov

er substance. Findings of fact serve an important purpose . They “inform the court of appeals of the basis of the judgment. ” In re Marriage of Bart sch , 2007 MT 136 , ¶

3 3 , 337 Mont. 386, 162 P.3d 72. They are of particular necessity in commitment ca ses because the order of commitmentapprise sthe receiving staff at MSH, treatment pro fessional s , and even law enforcement who may be involved in transporting12

the patient, o f the particular condition and behaviors that prompted hospitalization or gave riseto the need for commitment. The statute’s express requirement for a detailed statement furthers that purpose and we therefore decline to apply harmless error. ¶22 Since we are reversing the commitment order on this ground, we need not address L.L.A. ’s additional arguments on appeal. **CONCLUSION** ¶23 We hold the District Court erred in failing to provide a detailed statement of facts supporting its commitment order as required by § 53
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- 127(8)(a) , MCA . Accordingly, the order involuntarily committing L.L.A. is rev ersed.

/S/ BETH BAKER
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ BRIAN MORRIS /S/ JIM RICE