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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

SAM J. PEARSON, IV ,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:11cv82/RV/EMT

MARCI GOODMAN

 Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court on Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Doc. 1), and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). For the limited purpose of

dismissal of this action, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, names one Defendant in this action: Judge Marci

Goodman, Escambia County Circuit Court judge. According to the allegations of the complaint,

Plaintiff was arrested on May 25, 2010 (Doc. 1 at 3). Following his arrest Plaintiff was taken before

Judge Goodman; Plaintiff also appeared before Judge Goodman in the same criminal case on

November 17, 2010 (id.). Plaintiff alleges that at his first appearance he demanded that Judge

Goodman dismiss the charges against him [which charges are not identified in the complaint] for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction but that she refused to do so; instead, she directed court security

to remove Plaintiff from the courtroom and he was placed in a cell with no bathroom (id.). At

Plaintiff’s second court appearance, Judge Goodman entered a plea of not guilty on Plaintiff’s behalf

without his consent (id.). Alleging that Judge Goodman’s actions denied him due process, Plaintiff

seeks as relief an injunction “compelling the court to prove jurisdiction and a stay of the

proceeding,” as well as monetary damages of an unspecified amount (id. at 4).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss the case if satisfied

that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
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granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e) “where it lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104

L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when the legal theories are

“indisputably meritless,” id., 490 U.S. at 327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are

“clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340

(1992). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The

allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). However,

such acceptance should not be given blindly; only well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true

and only reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Oladeinde v. City of

Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 502

(5th Cir. 1980);1 see also Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(“reasonable inferences” drawn); Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th

Cir. 1974) (“unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true”). A plaintiff must allege more

than mere “labels and conclusions”; the complaint must include “[f]actual allegations . . . [sufficient]

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Indeed,

“any conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact or legal conclusions masquerading as

facts do not prevent dismissal.” Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1305

(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (citing Associated Builders, Inc., 505 F.2d at 99). 

The complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp., supra (retiring the often-criticized “no set of facts” language

previously used to describe the motion to dismiss standard and determining that because plaintiffs

had “not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be

1

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted

as precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981.

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dismissed” for failure to state a claim). Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that

dismissal of this action is warranted.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot recover damages from Judge Goodman. Judges acting

in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from damages suits. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not

just from ultimate assessment of damages.”) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27, 105

S. Ct. 2806, L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985)); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S. Ct. 183, 186, 66 L. Ed.

2d 185 (1980); see also Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925–26 (11th Cir. 1991). Immunity may

be overcome only (1) where the judge has not acted within her judicial capacity or (2) where the

judge’s actions, though judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978); Mireles, 502

U.S. at 11; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988). 

Whether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relates “to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,

whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e.,

whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Stump,

435 U.S. at 362); see also Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996). The relevant

inquiry is the “nature” and “function” of the act, not the “act itself.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 (citing

Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). In other words, the court must look to the particular act’s relation to a

general function normally performed by a judge. 

A judge is not deprived of absolute immunity from liability for damages because an action

she took was in error, was illegal, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. Stump,

435 U.S. at 355–57; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (judicial immunity is not overcome by

allegations of bad faith or malice). Rather, a judge is subject to liability only when she acted in clear

absence of all jurisdiction, and knew or must have known that she was acting in such a manner. 

Simmons, 86 F.3d at 1084–85 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57). An act is done in “clear absence

of all jurisdiction,” for judicial immunity purposes, if the matter upon which the judge acted is

clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he presides. Dykes v.

Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Furthermore, for the

purposes of immunity, a judge’s jurisdiction is construed broadly. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357. Thus,

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where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity

purposes. Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1981) (judicial immunity extends to all judicial

acts provided they do not fall clearly outside the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction). The proper

inquiry for determining judicial immunity is not whether the judge actually had jurisdiction, or even

whether the judge exceeded her jurisdictional authority, but whether the challenged actions were

obviously taken outside the scope of the judge’s power. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 (quotation omitted). 

In the instant case, the complained-of conduct—Judge Goodman’s refusal to dismiss the state

criminal charges against Plaintiff and her entering a not guilty plea on his behalf—are quintessential

judicial functions. Furthermore, as Plaintiff was the defendant in the case over which Judge

Goodman presided, Plaintiff was dealing with Judge Goodman in her judicial capacity. Moreover,

although Plaintiff apparently would like to contend otherwise, the facts as alleged do not suggest that

Judge Goodman acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction to hear the state court criminal case. 

Therefore, judicial immunity shields Judge Goodman from a suit for damages.

Additionally, the principles announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27

L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), dictate that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for injunctive or declaratory relief (i.e.,

for dismissal or stay of any pending charges) be dismissed. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,

348–50, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 2291–92, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1975). In Younger, the Supreme Court held

that concerns of equity, comity, and federalism require that federal courts abstain from interfering

with state court criminal proceedings absent “extraordinary circumstances.” Younger abstention is

required when: (1) a state proceeding is pending; (2) the state proceeding involves important state

interests; and (3) the state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues.

Middlesex Co. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73

L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982). Plaintiff does not assert, nor do the allegations of the complaint suggest, that

the Younger requirements are not satisfied in this case, including with respect to Plaintiff’s being

afforded an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues in the pending state proceedings. 

Accordingly, this court should abstain from interfering in Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal proceedings

in state court by providing injunctive or declaratory relief. 

Plaintiff’s claims should also be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct.

2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), which applies both to actions for monetary damages and for

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injunctive relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005). A

civil rights action under § 1983 that necessarily calls into question the validity of a conviction,

sentence, or confinement cannot be brought until the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence had been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Id. at 487. This has been

referred to as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1004–06

(11th Cir. 1998). The Heck bar is appropriately applied when outstanding criminal charges remain

pending. See Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Entress, 133

F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998). In other words, where charges are outstanding against a plaintiff and

his constitutional claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction, the action

is barred under Heck. See Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997). In the

instant case, Plaintiff’s due process challenges in effect are challenges to his pending state charges. 

Plaintiff cannot establish the favorable termination requirement because it is evident that his

criminal charges have not yet been resolved. Accordingly, his claims are not presently cognizable

under § 1983. 

 “Ordinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity to amend before the district court

dismisses the complaint.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005). “A

district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where there has been undue delay, bad

faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed;

(2) where allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where

amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case,

amendment would be futile. Therefore, dismissal is appropriate for the failure to state a claim for

relief and for seeking monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.

And it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

That this cause be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). 

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At Pensacola, Florida, this 28th day of February 2011.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

ELIZABETH TIMOTHY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy thereof. Any different deadline that may appear

on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not control. A copy of

objections shall be served upon all other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope of

appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d

698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Case No: 3:11cv82/RV/EMT