Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

ISHMAEL CASH ROLLE, III,

 Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK

SIMMON, et al., 

 Defendants.

____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court upon plaintiff’s complaint(doc. 1), filed pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants, Sergeant Simmon, Officer M. Salon, and Detective

Fortenberry, have filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 27). Plaintiff has filed

a response in opposition (doc. 30). After a careful review of the record and the

arguments presented, the court concludes that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment should be GRANTED.

THE COMPLAINT AND ALLEGATIONS 

The complaint alleges that on August 10, 2010, following an incident in which

plaintiff was struck by a car while riding his bike on Garden and L streets in

Pensacola, the defendants arrested plaintiff and took him into custody. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

As it happened, plaintiff was a suspect in several robberies that had occurred in the
Page 2 of 15

surrounding area. The defendants drove plaintiff to the Pensacola Police Department

1

headquarters where he was then interrogated by defendant Fortenberry. (Doc. 1, p.

5). Plaintiff claims that as a result of being hit by a car, he suffered “from a head

injury to the left side of [his] head, [his] left ear was scared [sic] and bleeding, [his]

right big toe wasfractured, [he] suffered fromscraps [sic] and bruses[sic] to [his] left

thigh, right leg, right hip, [his] left palm was punchered [sic] and bleeding, and [his]

lower back was hurting real bad . . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff contends that despite

these injuries, the defendants “failed” to get him any “medical treatment at that time,

or any time. . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Instead, defendants kept plaintiff in the interrogation

room “until they got what they wanted from [plaintiff].” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Following

the completion of plaintiff’s interrogation at the police station, defendants escorted

plaintiff to his home. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). Defendant Fortenberry and an unnamed

detective subsequently–after acquiring plaintiff’s consent–searched plaintiff’s

residence. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Upon completion of the search, defendant Fortenberry took

plaintiff to the hospital to have his injuries treated. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff argues

defendants should have first taken him to the hospital for treatment prior to

interrogating him or searching his residence. (Doc. 1, p. 6). 

Plaintiff gave a more detailed description of the events at issue in his

deposition (doc. 28-1) and interrogatories (doc. 28-2). Initially, plaintiff was being

chased by his neighbor Willie Young (“Willie”). (Doc. 28-1, p. 13). Plaintiff was

fleeing from Willie on a bike. (Doc. 28-1, p. 13). Plaintiff was also attempting to

evade the police who were searching for an unknown (at that time) assailant

Plaintiff was later convicted of those robberies, including the robbery for which the instant 1

arrest occurred.

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 3 of 15

following a robbery. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 27-29). Plaintiff approached L and Garden

streets and looked behind him in an effort to discern where Willie waslocated. (Doc.

28-1, p. 13). At that time, a car hit plaintiff and knocked him off his bike onto the

ground. (Doc. 28-1, p. 13). Plaintiff hit his head on the ground. (Doc. 28-1, p. 13). 

The driver of the car proceeded to check on the plaintiff and see how he was doing.

(Doc. 28-1, p. 14). Plaintiff, after a few moments, “jumped up” and looked around. 

(Doc. 28-1, p. 14). Plaintiff saw Willie, and in response, grabbed his bike and tried

to flee. (Doc. 28-1, p. 14). At that point, plaintiff realized his foot was injured, but

he was able to limp away. (Doc. 28-1, p. 22). Plaintiff left his bike on the side of the

road, climbed over a fence, and walked to a parking garage located behind a building

on Pace street. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 14, 25). 

About five to ten minutes after reaching the parking garage, plaintiff was

“standing up” and heard defendant Simmon “say[] something about get down, get

down, get down, get down.” (Doc. 28-1, p. 14). Defendant Simmon then tackled the

defendant and handcuffed him on the ground. (Doc. 28-1, p. 14). Defendant Salon

arrived at the scene, searched the plaintiff and put him into the back of the police car. 

(Doc. 28-1, p. 15). Plaintiff was then taken to the police station for interrogation. At

that point, plaintiff was bleeding from his ear and “had a puncture” in his right hand. 

(Doc. 28-1, p. 15). Plaintiff first realized he was bleeding from his ear in the police

car on the way to the police station. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 30-31). Plaintiff claims he had

blood on his white t-shirt and had to wipe up his own blood in the interrogation room. 

(Doc. 28-1, pp. 15, 31). In the interrogation room, however, plaintiff did not

complain about his injuries; instead, he discussed the burglary accusations against

him. (Doc. 28-1, p. 33). Defendant Fortenberry entered into the room and asked

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 4 of 15

plaintiff if he would like a glass of water. (Doc. 28-1, p. 14). Later, defendant

Fortenberry asked plaintiff what happened to him and plaintiff responded, “I got hit

by a car.” (Doc. 28-1, p. 15). Fortenberry then stated (according to plaintiff), “[y]ou

didn’t get hit by no car, there wasn’t no car there.” (Doc. 28-1, p. 16). Plaintiff

admits he did not respond and “just left it like that.” (Doc. 28-1, p. 16). 

After his arrest, plaintiff did not say anything about his injuries or requiring

medical care to the officers driving him to the police station. (Doc. 28-1, p. 32). 

Plaintiff further admits that after being taken into custody, the only visible sign he

was injured was the blood dripping from his ear. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 35-36). Plaintiff

indicated that his ear had stopped bleeding by the time he was in the interrogation

room. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 34). Once in the interrogation room, plaintiff did not ask

anybody to take himto the hospital or complain about his injuries. (Doc. 28-1, p. 33). 

Later, when the officers took plaintiff to his residence and searched his home,

plaintiff again did not indicate he was injured or required medical care. (Doc. 28-1,

pp. 37-38). Plaintiff posits that it was about four and a half hours at most from the

time of his arrest until he was taken to the hospital. (Doc. 28-1, p. 38). Plaintiff does

not allege that the defendants’ delay in taking him to the hospital made his injuries

worse; instead, plaintiff argues only that the defendants should have followed “the

standard operations procedure of officials of the law.” (Doc. 28-1, p. 42). Finally,

plaintiff does not remember any doctor, nurse, or other hospital staff, at any point in

time, indicating to him that his injuries were worsened by the defendants’ alleged

delay in taking him to the hospital. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 41-42, 47). 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges defendants: 1) failed to properly follow the

Florida rules of criminal procedure, 2) failed to bring plaintiff to the hospital after he

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 5 of 15

was struck by a car and instead interrogated him for two and half hours, 3) deprived

plaintiff of his “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution or laws

of the United States,” and 4) have not allowed plaintiff to go back to the hospital for

a follow-up appointment despite plaintiffs continued head and back problems. (Doc.

1, p. 7). Plaintiff seeks “monetary relief” based on his pain and suffering, legal fees,

hospital debts, and “monetary relief on the maximum amount thats [sic] allowed and

awarded to this particular case.” (Doc. 1, p. 7). 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants, pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56, moved for

summary judgment (doc. 27) against the plaintiff. Defendants assert that plaintiff’s

pleadings, deposition, medical records, and discovery responses establish that there

are no genuine issues of material fact. The motion for summary judgment proceeds

under the theory that plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs is

unsupported by the evidence ofrecord and that the defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. (Doc. 27, p. 5). Accordingly, defendants conclude, they are entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 27, p. 1).

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff responds that the defendants were all aware that plaintiff had been

struck by a car. Specifically, plaintiff points to defendant Salon’s probable cause

arrest report (doc. 30-1, pp. 8-9), defendant Salon’s deposition (doc. 30-1, pp. 5-7),

and defendant Simmon’s deposition (doc. 30-1, pp. 1-4), to support his contention

that defendants were aware he had been struck by a car prior to his arrest. 

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 6 of 15

ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant

must show that the plaintiff has offered no evidence to support an essential element

of his case, or present affirmative evidence that plaintiff will be unable to prove one

or more essential elements of the case at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry ofsummary

judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.”). If the movant successfully negates an essential

element of the plaintiff’s case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with

evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See id. 

“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will

not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]” See id. at 248. A dispute is

“genuine” if “the evidence issuch that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” See id. “When the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 7 of 15

To that end, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party

will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Young v. City of Palm

Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004). Likewise, “‘unsupported speculation

. . . does not meet a party’s burden of producing some defense to a summary judgment

motion’” and “does not create a genuine issue of fact.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc.,

419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d

928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1995)). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment must

either point to evidence in the record or present additional evidence sufficient to

withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary

deficiency. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 333 n.3 (“Once the moving party has

attacked whatever record evidence–if any–the nonmoving party purportsto rely upon,

the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving party, who must either (1)

rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers, (2) produce additional

evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e),

or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided

in Rule 56(f).”); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (providing that the standard for granting

summary judgment “mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the

governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict”).

Deliberate Indifference

“To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) there

was an act or omission that deprived him of a constitutional right, privilege, or

immunity and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color

of state law.” Evans v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 448 F. App’x 971, 973 (11th Cir. 2011)

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 8 of 15

(citing Hale v. Tallapossa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff

asserts claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, which arise under

the Eighth Amendment. A challenge to the failure to provide medical care requires

a two-prong showing: “an objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is

‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities’ and a subjective showing that the official had a ‘sufficiently culpable

state of mind.’” See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Where, as here, the claim

is for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the plaintiff must also show

causation. See Milton v. Turner, 445 F. App’x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2011) (“To state

a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a serious medical need;

(2) deliberate indifference to that need by the defendants; and (3) causation between

the defendants’ indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.”). 

The objective component of a claim alleging inadequate medical care is

difficult to meet. “First, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘an objectively serious medical

need, one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Evans,

448 F. App’x at 974 (quoting Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted)). “A serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Farrow

v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted)). “Second, the

plaintiff must show that the response ‘was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (quotation

omitted)). “The level of care exercised by the official must be worse than mere

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 9 of 15

‘accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical

malpractice actionable under state law.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258)

(quotations omitted)).

As described generally above, the subjective component of a claim alleging

inadequate medical care requires that “the official had a ‘sufficiently culpable state

of mind.’” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (internal

citations and quotations omitted)). More specifically, “the relevant state of mind for

purposes of liability is deliberate indifference.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

294, 303 (1991)). “This has three components: ‘(1) subjective knowledge of a risk

of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere

negligence.’” Evans, 448 F. App’x at 974 (quoting Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245

(quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the official must have

been actually aware of the risk of harm: “the official must both be aware of facts

fromwhich the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk ofserious harmexists,

and he must also draw the inference.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

First, plaintiff failsto sufficiently allege the existence of the essential elements

of a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff did not disclose his injuries with the officers driving

him to the police station (doc. 28-1, p. 32), did not request to be taken to the hospital

or complain about his injuries when he was being interrogated (doc. 28-1, p. 33), and

following interrogation, while his house was being searched, did not indicate he was

injured or needed to go to the hospital. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 37-38). Plaintiff’s outward

physical injuries were not sufficient to alert the defendants to his professed yet

undisclosed need to go to the hospital. Plaintiff posits that after being taken into

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 10 of 15

custody, the only visible sign that he wasinjured wasthe blood dripping from his ear.

Plaintiff, however, had stopped bleeding by the time he wasin the interrogation room. 

(Doc. 28-1, pp. 34-36). Plaintiff argues that defendants were aware he had been hit

by a car prior to being arrested. While defendants were aware that plaintiff had been

struck by a car, defendants were also aware plaintiff had, following the collision, fled

2

the scene of the accident, climbed over a fence, and continued to evade law

enforcement. Such actions are not indicative of someone in need of immediate

medical attention. Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, these defendants had

no indication that plaintiff had suffered any sort of significant injury, much less one

that required immediate medical attention. 

Plaintiff has not shown that the defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk

of serious harm or that, if they did, they chose to disregard that risk and, in doing so,

engaged in conduct that was beyond mere negligence. See Evans, 448 F. App’x at

974. Indeed, given plaintiff’s description of the injury and the resulting symptoms,

all of which, outwardly, had ceased by the time he was taken into the interrogation

room, defendants could not have had the requisite awareness of the severity of

plaintiff’s injury. Even assuming that defendants should have further inquired into

plaintiff’s injuries, such error is one of negligence and not of deliberate indifference. 

See Mann v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, 946 F. Supp. 962, 968-69 (M.D.

Fla. 1996) (“Negligent conduct does not constitute the type of abuse of government

power that is cognizable under § 1983. Something more akin to deliberate

indifference is required. Deliberate indifference implies knowledge, and knowledge

While defendants Salon and Simmons were aware plaintiff had been struck by a car prior 2

to being arrested, the record does not evidence that defendant Fortenberry had such knowledge.

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 11 of 15

constitutes conduct above that of mere negligence.”) (citations omitted). Thus,

plaintiff has not satisfied the subjective component of a claim alleging inadequate

medical care. See Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304. 

Moreover, plaintiff has failed to make any showing that the supposed delay in

treatment caused additional symptoms or deterioration of his condition. See Milton,

445 F. App’x at 162 (“‘[A]serious medical need is determined by whether a delay in

treating the need worsensthe condition.’” (quoting Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d

1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009))). Plaintiff readily admits that the defendants’ delay in

taking him to the hospital did not make his injuries worse. (Doc. 28-1, p. 42). 3

Further, plaintiff does not remember any doctor, nurse, or other hospital staff, at any

point in time, who indicated his injuries were worsened by the defendants’ delay in

taking him to the hospital for treatment. (Doc. 28-1, pp. 41-42, 47). Plaintiff does

not assert facts that would support an inference that the injury to his head and back,

fractured toe, and bleeding ear (which had stopped bleeding by the time he had

reached the interrogation room), were “so obvious that even a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See id. (articulating the alternative

standard—applied where the plaintiff does not allege that a delay in treating

worsened the condition—for determining whether a medical need is “serious”).

Nothing in plaintiff’s pleadings demonstrates he informed the defendants of such

injuries or gave the defendants any indication he wasinjured to such a serious degree

Such an admission demonstrates that plaintiff’s claim lacks a sufficient causal nexus 3

between the claimed indifference of defendants and his injury. See Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x

508 (11th Cir. 2010); Milton, 445 F. App’x at 162 (requiring plaintiff claiming deliberate

indifference to allege “causation between the defendants’ indifference and the plaintiff’s injury”

(quoting Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010)). 

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 12 of 15

and required medical attention. Similarly, only speculation would support a

conclusion that law enforcement officials somehow should have divined any such

serious injury, in light of all the facts known to them. See Fernandez v. Metro Dade

Police Dept., 397 F. App’x 507, 512-13 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that plaintiff’s

bloody nose and mouth, both of which eventually stopped, coupled with plaintiff’s

facial bruising, pain, disorientation, and blood clogs in his nose, were not an

“objectivelyserious medical need”). Plaintiff’s medicalrecords fromBaptistHospital

evidenced only a hand laceration and toe fracture, neither of which were brought to

the attention of law enforcement officials while the defendant was in custody. 

Consequently, plaintiff has not satisfied the objective component of a claim alleging

inadequate medical care. See Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258. As a matter of law, then, the

defendants were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. 

Qualified Immunity

In addition to showing that they were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

medical needs, defendants also argue they are immune from suit and entitled to

summary judgment because of qualified immunity. Although this case may be

decided solely on the foregoing analysis, the undersigned will also review the

qualified immunity claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity is a guarantee of fair

warning. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 1999). Qualified

immunityshields government officialsfromindividual capacity suits against themfor

acts that do not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable

person would be aware given the circumstances and information possessed by the

official at the time of the conduct. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153

L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295, 143 L.

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 13 of 15

Ed. 2d 399 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73

L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that individuals can reasonably

anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability. To that end, liability attaches

only if the contours of the right allegedly violated are sufficiently clear that a

reasonable person would understand that what he is doing violates that right. 

McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1260 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270, 117

S. Ct. 1219, 137 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1997)). A public official seeking qualified immunity

“must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority

when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194

(11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Once the defendant establishes

that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff

to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Id. 

Courts apply a two-pronged test when evaluating a claim of qualified

immunity: (1) whether, on the facts alleged, a constitutional right was violated; and

(2) whether the right was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121

S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). The court may exercise its discretion

in deciding which of the two prongs should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129

S. Ct. 808, 818, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). The court may find qualified immunity if

the plaintiff fails to carry his burden on either of the two prongs. See, e.g., Pearson,

129 S. Ct. at 822-23 (evaluating only Saucier’s second prong and holding that law

enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness

of their conduct was not clearly established). When a defendant moves for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity, the court “resolve[s] all issues of materialfact

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 14 of 15

in favor of the plaintiff, and then determine[s] the legal question of whether the

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts.” Bashir

v. Rockdale Cnty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the defendants have demonstrated that they were acting within their

discretionary authority; thus, under the prevailing authorities, plaintiff bears the

burden of showing that qualified immunity is not appropriate. As discussed

previously, and dispositive of this issue as well, plaintiff has not shown that the

defendants violated his constitutional rights by not immediately taking him to the

hospital. See supra pp. 8-12. The defendants, therefore, are entitled to qualified

immunity. 

Having determined that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court recommends that

summary judgment be granted in favor of all defendants asto the totality of plaintiff’s

claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2), 56(e) (“When a motion for summary judgment

is made and supported as provided in thisrule, an adverse party may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.”); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (“Rule 56(e) . . . requiresthe

nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”). 

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK
Page 15 of 15

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 27) be GRANTED.

2. Consistent with this order, that the clerk be directed to enter summary final

judgment in favor of all defendants.

3. That the clerk be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida this 17th day of September, 2013.

/s/Charles J. Kahn, Jr. 

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of any objections shall be served upon the magistrate judge and all

other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual

findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.

1988).

Case No: 3:11cv21/MCR/CJK