FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MAR 20, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1697 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N os. 05-6150 4-CV -W PD 04-601 22 CR-W PD RICHAR D THOMPSON, Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Res po nd en t-Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 20, 200 7) Be fo re T JO FL A T , BA RKE T T a nd KRA V IT CH , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. BARKE TT , C ircuit Judg e: Upon sua spon te r ec onsi de ratio n of thi s a ppe al , w e va cate our

pr ior opi nio n and subs titute the following o pinio n in its p lace.Th omp so n a nd Sto ne we re a lso c ha

rg e d w ithon e c ount o f p os se ssi on wi th i nte nt t o 1 di st ri bu te 5 00 grams or m ore o f coc ain e, i n v io lat io n o f 21 U.S .C . § § 8 41 (a)(1 ) and84 1(b )(1 )(B) and 18 U. S.C. § 2 . Purs ua

nt t o p le a a g re e me nts , th e g ov e rnme nt d ism iss e d th is c ount.

2 Ri ch ar d T hom

psonappe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of his Mo tio n to Va cate brought pursu ant to 28 U.S .C. § 2255 . W e re verse. I. Ba ck gr ound Thom pson and two co-def

endants, W ay

ne Annakie and E lworth Stone, pled gui lty to one c ount

of c onsp ir ac y

to poss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te 500 gr am s or m or e of c oc ai ne , in vio la tio n of

21 U . S. C. §§ 8 41( a) (1 ), 841 (b )( 1) (B ) an d 84 6, in co nne ct ionw ithadr

ug- sm uggl ing sc he m e inv olv ing c re wm em be rs on C el eb ri ty Cr uis e L ine s. A ll thr ee de fe ndants w er e se nte nc ed on the sam e day . A t the 1 sentencing h earing, the district court granted the co-defendants’ m otion s for a m ino r ro le r ed

uc tio n and s en te nc ed

the m to 46 m onths i m

pr iso nm en t. C ouns el f

or T hom pson , w ho h ad

not pr ev iou sly

r eque ste d ar ed

uc tio n, the n m ad e an ore te nus m otion for the sam e m inor role reduction on Thom pson ’ s behalf, which the court de ni ed . The co ur t t he n s en te nc edTho m ps on to 57 m on th s i m

pr is on m en t. T hom psondid not appe al . T hom pson , pr oc ee din g pro se , sub se que ntl y f ile d ati m el y

Mo tio n to V ac at e pur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 22 55, a sse rt ing f our c la im s of ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e ofTh omp so n’ s in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la ims we re that ( 1) c ouns e l on ly me t w ith 2 him on c e pr ior

to h is e nte ri ngthe ple a

a g re e me nt; (2 ) c ouns e l st ipu late d to a highe r d ru gqu anti ty than could prope rly

have be en attributed to Thompson; (3) c ounsel failed to f ile a motion for downwar d role a djustment prior to sentencing , there by resultingin Thompson’s highe r sentenc e vis-à-vis his similarly

situated co-de fenda

nts; and (4) c ounsel failed to f ile a notice of

appea l d es p i t e T h o mp s o n ’s d i re ct i o nt o d o s o i m m ed i at el y af t er s en t en ci n g. Th is o pin ion

is n ot r e fe rr ingto atto rn e y Da vid Os c ar M ark

us , who wa s n ot i nv olv e d in 3 the ca se. Whether counse l was ineff ective is a mix ed question of law

and fa ct that we r eview de 4 n o v o . U n it e d

St ate s v . B e n d e r , 2 9 0 F . 3 d 1 2 7 9 , 1 2 8 4 ( 1 1 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( c it ati o no mi tt e d ) . We revie w the district cour

t’s conclusions of lawde novo, and its finding s of fa ct for c lear err or. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F .3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000). 3 co unse l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt f ound thr ee of the c la im s to be c onc lus ive ly r ef ute d by 2 t h e r ec o rd , b u th el dan ev i d en t i ary h ea ri n g o n t h e f o u rt h : t h at Th o m

p s o n ’s at to rn ey , Davi d S co tt Markus (“ Co un se l” ), ha d fa il edto fil e an ap pe al as d ire ct ed . 3 Af ter the evidentiary

hearing, the c ourt conclud ed that Thom pson wa s not entit led to r el ie f on the r em ai nin g c la im , f ind ing Co unse l’ s te sti m ony that T hom

psondid not ask for an appeal “ m ore cr edible” (or, elsew here, “ sligh tly m ore cr edible”) than T hom

pson ’ s te sti m ony

to the c ontrary . T he c ourt de nie d th e m oti on i n it s en tir ety , but

gr an te d T hom

psonaCe rt if

ic at e of Appe al ab ili ty

pur suant t o 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 3( c) o n t ha t cl ai m . II . D isc uss ion 4 Inor de r to p re va il on h is c la im that c ouns el w as c onst itu tio na lly ine ff ec tiv e for fa iling to file an appeal, Thom pson m ust sh ow that counsel’ s perform ance w as4

de fi ci en t and tha t this de fi ci en cy pr ej udi ce d hi m . S ee S tr ic kland v . W as hin gto n, 466 U . S. 668 , 687 ( 1984 ); se e al so R oe v. F lor es -O rt eg a, 528 U . S. 470 , 476 -7 7 (2 000) ( hol din g th at

S tr ic kland t es t a

ppl ie s to c la im

that l awy er

w as ine ff

ec tiv e fo r fai li ng fil e a n ot ic e o f ap pe al ). In Flores-O rtega, the Suprem e Court “ reaf firm ed the we ll-settled rule that ana tto rn ey

w ho f ai ls t o f ile a n a ppe al on b eh al f of

ac lie nt who s pe ci fi ca lly re que sts it

a ct s inapr of

es sio na lly unr ea sona

ble m an ne r pe r se . ” G om ez -D ia z v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 792 (11t h Cir. 2005 ) (c iting Flores-O rtega, 528 U.S . at 477 ). Mo re ove r, c ouns el ge ne ra lly ha s aduty

to co nsul t w iththe de fe ndant ab out a n a ppe al . S ee F lor es -O rt eg a, 528 U . S. a t 48 1 ( ex pe ct ing that c ourts “ w ill fi nd, in the va st m aj or ity

of c as es , that c ouns el ha d aduty to co nsul t w iththe de fe ndant a

bout a n a ppe al . ”) . T he S upr em e Co urt ha s de fi ne d th e te rm “ co nsul t” spe ci fi ca lly

to m ean “ advis ing the de fe ndant a bout the a dvanta ge s and dis advanta ge s of

takin g an a

ppe al , a nd m ak ing ar ea sona ble e ff ort t o di sc ove r the de fe ndant’ s w ish es , ” id. a t 47 8, to as sur e that any w ai ve r of

the r igh t t o a

ppe al is kn o w i n g a n dv o l u n t a ry. Inthi s c as e, a ft er

he ar ing the c onf

lic tin g te sti m ony

of T hom psona nd h is pr ior a tto rn ey , the dis tr ic t c ourt c re dit ed Co unse l’ s te sti m ony

that T hom

psondid not in struct him

to file a notice of a

ppeal. T here is no basis for us to conclud e thatThompson testified that he met with his attorney only once be tween his initial 5 appea ranc e and ple a. Counsel testified that he me t with Thompson once or twice betwee n the arr a ig nme nt a

nd ple a , a nd on c e a ft e r r e c e ivi ngthe pr e -s e nte nc e inv e sti g atio n r e po rt .

5 the c ourt’ s f

ac tua l f ind ing on this m atte r w as c le ar ly e rr one ous. S ee Carr

v. Schofield, 364 F. 3d 12 46, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2004). H ow ev er , w he re ade fe ndant h as not spe ci fi ca lly

ins tr uc te d hi s a tto rn ey

to fi le a n a ppe al , w e m

ust sti ll de te rm ine “ w he the r co unse l i n f ac t c onsu lte d w iththe defendant about an appeal.” F lores-O rtega, 528 U.S . at 478. As noted above, ad equa te c onsu ltatio n r equir es inf orm ing ac lie nt a

bout his r igh t t o a

ppe al , advis ing the c lie nt a

bout the a dvanta ge s and d isa dvanta ge s of takin g an a

ppe al , and m ak ing ar ea sona

ble e ff ort t o de te rm ine w he the r the c lie nt w ish es to pur sue an appeal, regardless of the m erits of such an appeal. Fra zer v. South Carolina, 43 0 F .3d69 6, 7 11 (4t h C ir. 2 00 5) . Inthi s c as e, a lth oughT hom psona nd h is atto rn ey

dis ag re ed

about the num ber of tim es they

m et througho ut the course of the repre sentation, it was undi sput ed

that C ouns el did

not dis cu ss T hom

pson ’ s a ppe llate r igh ts p ri or

to sentencing. Indeed, he only advised Thom

pson of his appellate rights at 5 se nte nc ing after

the j udge no tified Thom pson of his right to app eal. Counsel te sti fi ed that r igh t a ft er

se nte nc e w as im

pose d, T hom

psonw as “ unha

ppy ” w ithhis se nte nc e, a s c om

pare d to that of

his c o- de fe ndants , a nd “ as ke d [ him ] about w hyThompson testified that he and his attorney rema ined in the cour

troom for a

bout three 6 minutes after

sentenc e wa s imposed. Counsel testified that this ex chang e lasted “ no more than five minutes, proba

bly less.” 6 the Judg e told him

he had a right to appeal if he had pled guilty .” Counsel re ite rate d th at

T hom psonha d ar igh t t o a

ppe al , onl y

a ddi ng tha t he did

not thi nk anappe al w oul d be suc ce ssf ul o r w orthwhil e. T hom

psonthe n sa id “ fi ne . ” T his ex ch an ge , w hic h la ste d no m or e than f ive m inu te s, c onsi ste d si m ply of not if y ing 6 Th o m p s o n o f t h e r i g h tt o ap p ea l (a s t h e ju d g e h ad al re ad y d o n e) an dCo u n s el ’s opi nio n th at

suc h an a ppe al w oul d no t be suc ce ssf ul. C ouns el did

not e xpl ai n th e ap pe ll at e p ro ces s o r th e ad va nt ag es an d d is ad va nt ag es of t ak in g a n app eal . Co unse l f urthe r adm itt ed

that he did

not te ll T hom

psonthat an a

ppe al w oul d no t expose Thom

pson to a higher sentence, nor that he was obligated to file an appeal if that is what T hom

pson wanted, re gardless of his recom m endation. When asked whether Thom

pson appeared to understand what an appeal w as, C ouns el re spon de d “ I don’ t kn ow. . . I m ean I c an ’ t ge t i nto his he ad . ” Co unse l di d no t co m m uni cate f urthe r w ithT hom

psondur ing the te n- day

pe ri od w ith in whic h he co ul d h av e ap pe al ed . A lth oughthe dis tr ic t c ourt f ound a spe ct s of

thi s te sti m ony

“ tr oubl ing , ” its onlycom m ent about th e adequacy of Counsel’ s perform ance w as that

“ [c] onsu lting with [T hom pson ] for less than five m inutes abou t his right to appealWhil e no t di sp os iti ve , th e sh or t du ratio n o f t he e xch ang e is a

re le va nt f a c tor wh ic h, in 7 this case, we ighs a g ainst finding a dequate consultation as a matter of law. See Flore s-Orte g a, 528 U.S. at 489 (Souter, J., concurringin part and dissentingin part) ( “I f the c rime is minor, the iss ue s si mpl e , a

nd the de fe nd ant s op his tic ate d, a 5- min ute c onve rs atio n w ithhis lawye r m ay we ll suffice ; if the cha

rg e is serious, the potential c laims subtle, and a def endant une ducate d, hours of counselingmay

be in orde r.”) . 7 doe s no t e qua te to a fa ilure to co nsul t. ” T he que sti on o f w ha t c onst itu te s a de qua te co nsul ta tio n, how ev er , is not one of dur at ion , but

of c ont en t. 7 T he c ont en t of

the e xc hange in thi s c as e did not c onst itu te a de qua te co nsul ta tio n. S im

ply a sse rt ing the vie wthat an a ppe al w oul d no t be suc ce ssf ul does not constitu te “ consult ation” in any m eaningful sense. N o inform ation was pr ovi de d to T hom

psonf ro m w hic h he c oul d have int el lig en tly a nd know ing ly ei the r as se rt ed or

w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o an a

ppe al . T his r ec or d is c le ar that no reasonable eff

ort wa s m ade to discover Thom pson ’ s inform ed wishes re garding an ap pe al . U nde r the se c ir cu m stanc es , a ny w ai ve r by

T hom psonof his r igh t t o ap pe al was n ot kn owi ng an d v ol un ta ry . H av ing de te rm ine d th at

Co unse l di d no t a de qua te ly c onsu lt w ithT hom

pson , w e tur n to w he the r, if

c ouns el ha d an a ff

irm at ive duty

to co nsul t, his f

ai lur e to d o so p re j udi ce d th e de fe ndant. F lor es -O rt eg a, 528 U . S. a t 48 0, 484 . C ouns el ha s a co nst itu tio na l du ty

to co nsul t w ithade fe ndant a bout a n a ppe al w he n: ( 1) a ny ratio na l de fe ndant w oul d w an t t o a ppe al ; or ( 2) the de fe ndant r ea sona bly de m onstrate d an in te re st i n a ppe al ing . G om ez -D ia z, 433 F . 3d a t 79 2 ( ci tin gThat the sente ncingjudge notified Thompson that he had a rig ht to appeal doe s not 8 a bs olv e c ouns e l f

ro m th e duty

to c on su lt w ithhis c lie nt a bo ut t he su bs tanc e of

the ri g ht t o a

pp e a l. 8 Fl or es -O rt eg a, 528 U . S. a t 48 0) . I n or de r to e sta bli sh tha t he w as pr ej udi ce d by co unse l’ s f

ai lur e to f ile a n a ppe al , T hom

psonm ust sho wthat “ the re is a re as ona ble probabilit y

that, but for counsel’ s deficient failure to consu lt with him about an ap pe al , he w oul d have ti m el y appe al ed . ” F lor es -O rt eg a, 528 U . S. a t 48 4. B ec au se a direct a ppeal of a fe deral conviction is a m atter of r ight, see Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S . 327, 329-330 (1969 ), we determ ine whether a defe ndant has shown th at

the re is a re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity that he w oul d have appe al ed w ith out re gard to the put at ive m er its of

suc h an a ppe al . F lor es -O rt eg a, 528 U . S. a t 48 5- 86; G om ez -D ia z, 433 F . 3d a t 79 3. H e r e , a c c o r d i n g t o C o u n s e l ’s o w n t e s t i mo n y, T h o mp s o n wa s “ u n h ap p y” w ithhis se nte nc e as c om

pare d to that of

his c o- de fe ndants , a nd a ske d a bout the ri ght to ap pe al a t se nte nc ing . U nde r the se c ir cu m stanc es , Co unse l ha d ac le ar duty to c onsu lt w ithT hom

pson . T hom

psonde m onstrate d an in te re st i n an a ppe al by 8 asking h is attorney

about that right . In addition , it c annot be said th at no rational defendant would have wanted to appeal the diffe rential sentence im posed un der the facts of this case. Fi na lly , w e re ad ily

f ind that T hom

psonm et his bur de n of

sho w ing the9

requisite prej udice. T hom pson wa s dissatis fied w ith what he perc eived to be a disparate sentence com

pared to his sim ilarly -situated co-defendants. H ad Counsel ad equa te ly

c onsu lte d w ithhim

about a n a ppe al , the re is a re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity that T hom

psonw oul d have e xe rc ise d hi s r igh t t o a ppe al . I nde ed , the re is no b as is on thi s record to conclude otherwise. REVERSED.