This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper ve rsion filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 MARK DANEMANN, 2 Petitioner-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 34,378 4 JOANNE MYRUP, 5 Respondent-Appellee. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 7 Sarah C. Backus, District Judge 8 Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP 9 Julie A. Wittenberger 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellant 12 Dorene A. Kuffer 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellee 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 GARCIA, Judge. 17
{1} Petitioner Mark Danemann (Husband) appeals from the district court’s order 182 granting Respondent Joanne Myrup’s (Wife) mo tion to set aside the parties’ marital 1 settlement agreement (MSA). [RP 191] Based on our review of the docketing 2 statement and record proper, we entere d a notice of proposed summary disposition, 3 proposing to dismiss for lack of a final order. Husband has filed a memorandum in 4 opposition to our notice and a motion to amend the docketing statement. We are 5 unpersuaded by Husband’s arguments with re spect to finality and therefore deny his 6 motion to amend and dismiss this appeal. 7
{2} Our notice proposed to hold that becausean order vacating a final judgment is 8 not a final order for purposes of appeal, Hall v. Hall , 1993-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 2, 7-8, 115 9 N.M. 384, 851 P.2d 506, the district court’s order setting aside the parties’ MSA in 10 its entirety [RP 191-94] was not properly befo re this Court. Wedo not reiterate our 11 analysis here; instead, we focus on Husband’s arguments in his memorandum in 12 opposition and motion to amend. 13
{3} Husband contends that the district court did not set aside a final order of the 14 district court, i.e. , the stipulated final judgment and decree [RP 54-55]; rather, it set 15 aside the parties’ MSA. [MIO 2-4] Hence, Husband argue s, the final decree “remains 16 in place and no other final judgment or order in this case has beenvacated” and “[t]he 17 order setting aside the parties’ [MSA] from whic h this appeal is taken is final and ripe 18 for review.” [MIO 4] This argument is unpersuasive. 193 {4} Our case law provides that once a settlement agreement between divorcing 1 spouses has been “adopted and incorporatedin [a] final divorce decree, the underlying 2 agreement is deemed to havemerged with the decree[.]” Gordon v. Gordon , 2011- 3 NMCA-044, ¶ 13, 149 N.M. 783, 255 P.3d 361. Inthis case, the parties’ stipulated 4 final judgment and decree states that “[t]he[m]arital [s]ettlement [a]greement and the 5 [p]arenting [p]lan filed in this matter are in corporated as if fully set forth herein[.]” 6 [RP 55] Accordingly, once the district court did this, the MSA in this case “was no 7 longer simply a contractual agreement between Husband and Wife. It became a 8 judgment of the district court.” Id. ¶ 14. “As such, the MSA became enforceable in the 9 same manner, and subject to the same limitations, as any other judgment of the district 10 court.” Id. Pursuant to this authority, Husband’ s attempt to separate the MSA from the 11 final decree in this case is unavailing. 12
{5} With respect to Husband’s argumen t that “Rule 1-060(B) NMRA is not 13 applicable to the order being appealed[,]” [MIO 7] we are unaware of any authority 14 that excludes marital settlement agreemen ts and resulting decrees from the reach of 15 Rule 1-060(B), and Husband has not cited any such authority. See Curry v. Great Nw. 16 Ins. Co. , 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to 17 support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”). In fact, our case law 18 recognizes that Rule 1-060(B) may be us ed to set aside final divorce decrees in 194 appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Mendoza , 1985-NMCA-088, ¶ 20, 1 103 N.M. 327, 706 P.2d 869 (“After the expiration of the time within which to appeal 2 a decree awarding a divorce, allocating re sponsibility for community debts, and 3 declaring the interests of the parties inthe property acquired during marriage, the 4 court in the original proceeding loses ju risdiction to modify the decree except under 5 the provisions of Rule 60(b)[.]”); Gordon , 2011-NMCA-044, ¶ 17 (citing Mendoza 6 for the proposition that Rule 1-060(B) could be used to modify an MSA merged into 7 a final decree). 8
{6} Lastly, we deny Husband’s motion to amend the docketing statement to include 9 the issue of whether the district court e rred in setting aside the MSA pursuant to Rule 10 1-060(B) because the rule permits only relief from a final order and not from an 11 independent contract between two parties. [MIO 3 ] This argument ignores what we 12 pointed out above: once an MSA has been in corporated into a decree, it is no longer 13 just a contract, but a judgment of the court. The argument also ignores case law, cited 14 above, providing that Rule 1-060(B) may be used to set aside an MSA incorporated 15 into a final decree under appropriate circum stances. In considering the foregoing, we 16 conclude that Husband has not presented a viable issue in his motion to amend, and 17 we therefore deny his motion. See State v. Munoz , 1990-NMCA-109, ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 18 118, 802 P.2d 23 (stating that if counsel had properly briefed th e issue, we “would 195 deny defendant’s motion to amend because wefind the issue he seeks to raise to be 1 so without merit as not to be viable”). 2
{7} Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in our notice of proposed disposition and 3 in this opinion, we dismiss for lack of a final order. 4
{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________ ______________ 6 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 7

WE CONCUR: 8

_______________________________ 9 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 10

_______________________________ 11 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 12