916 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 3 / Friday, January 4, 2008 / Notices 

22See supra note 13. 

23 17 CFR 240.10A–3. 

24 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

25 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

26 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

designed to promote fair disclosure of 

information that may be necessary to 

appropriately price the Shares. Under 

Rule 5.2(j)(3)(v), the Exchange is 

required to obtain a representation from 

iShares, Inc. that the NAV per Share 

will be calculated daily and made 

available to all market participants at 

the same time. In addition, the 

Exchange represents that the Web site 

disclosure of the information regarding 

the Shares and the portfolio 

composition of the Fund will be made 

available to all market participants at 

the same time. The Exchange further 

represents that MSCI has procedures in 

place that comply with the requirements 

of Commentary .01(b)(1) to NYSE Arca 

Equities Rule 5.2(j)(3), which relates to 

restricted access of information 

concerning changes and adjustments to 

the Index. 

The Commission further believes that 

the trading rules and procedures to 

which the Shares would be subject 

pursuant to this proposal are consistent 

with the Act. The Shares would trade as 

equity securities and be subject to NYSE 

Arca’s rules governing the trading of 

equity securities. The Commission also 

believes that the Exchange’s trading halt 

rules under NYSE Arca Equities Rule 

5.5(g)(2)(b) are reasonably designed to 

prevent trading in the Shares when 

transparency is impaired. 

In support of this proposal, the 

Exchange has made the following 

representations: 

1. The Exchange would utilize its 

existing surveillance procedures 

applicable to ICUs to monitor trading of 

the Shares. The Exchange represents 

that such surveillance procedures are 

adequate to properly monitor the 

trading of the Shares. The Exchange 

may obtain trading information via the 

ISG from other exchanges that are 

members or affiliate members of ISG.22

2. Prior to the commencement of 

trading, the Exchange will inform its 

ETP Holders in the Bulletin of the 

special characteristics and risks 

(including the risks involved in trading 

the Shares during the Opening and Late 

Trading Sessions when an updated 

IOPV will not be calculated or publicly 

available) associated with trading the 

Shares. The Bulletin will discuss the 

procedures for purchases and 

redemptions of Shares, the Exchange’s 

suitability requirements, information 

regarding the IOPV, and prospectus 

delivery requirements. 

3. The Exchange represents that 

iShares, Inc. is required to comply with 

Rule 10A–3 under the Act 23 for the 

initial and continued listing of the 

Shares. 

This approval order is based on the 

Exchange’s representations. 

The Commission finds good cause, 

pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the 

Act,24 for approving the proposed rule 

change prior to the 30th day after the 

date of publication of notice in the 

Federal Register. The Commission notes 

that the Shares are currently listed on 

NYSE and trading on the Exchange 

pursuant to UTP. This proposal would 

move the listing from NYSE to NYSE 

Arca. Given that the Shares comply with 

all of NYSE Arca’s initial generic listing 

standards for ICUs (except for narrowly 

missing two requirements of 

Commentary .01(a)(B)(3) to NYSE Arca 

Equities Rule 5.2(j)(3)) the listing and 

trading of the Shares by NYSE Arca 

does not appear to present any novel or 

significant regulatory issues. Therefore, 

the Commission finds that there is good 

cause to approve the proposed rule 

change, as modified by Amendment No. 

1 thereto, on an accelerated basis. 

V. Conclusion 

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to 

Section 19(b)(2) under the Act,25 that 

the proposed rule change (SR–

NYSEArca–2007–127), as modified by 

Amendment No. 1 thereto, be, and it 

hereby is, approved on an accelerated 

basis. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.26

Nancy M. Morris, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E7–25581 Filed 1–3–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket Number PHMSA–2007–28119; 

Notice No. 07–9] 

Proposed Recommended Practices for 

Bulk Loading and Unloading of 

Hazardous Materials in Transportation 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA). 

ACTION: Notice; request for comments. 

SUMMARY: This notice solicits 

information and comments on proposed 

recommended practices for loading and 

unloading operations involving bulk 

packagings used to transport hazardous 

materials. In this notice, we summarize 

incident data related to bulk loading 

and unloading operations; discuss 

recommendations issued by the 

National Transportation Safety Board 

and the Chemical and Safety Hazard 

Investigation Board; provide an 

overview of current Federal regulations 

applicable to bulk loading and 

unloading operations; summarize the 

results of a public workshop we hosted 

earlier this year; and set forth proposed 

recommended practices for bulk loading 

and unloading operations. Based on 

information and comments received, we 

plan to consider strategies for enhancing 

the safety of bulk loading and unloading 

operations, including whether 

additional regulatory requirements may 

be necessary. In addition, we are 

soliciting comments on whether there 

are existing gaps and/or overlaps in 

regulations promulgated by PHMSA, 

OSHA, EPA and the USCG that 

adversely affect the safety of these 

operations, and how any identified gaps 

and/or overlaps in Federal regulations 

should be addressed. 

DATES: Submit comments by February 8, 

2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

identified by the docket number 

(PHMSA–2007–28119) by any of the 

following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. 

• Fax: 1–202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Operations, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, West 

Building, Ground Floor, Room W12–

140, Routing Symbol M–30, 1200 New 

Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 

20590. 

• Hand Delivery: To Docket 

Operations, Room W12–140 on the 

ground floor of the West Building, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

Holidays. 

Instructions: All submissions must 

include the agency name and docket 

number for this notice at the beginning 

of the comment. Note that all comments 

received will be posted without change 

to the docket management system, 

including any personal information 

provided. 

Docket: For access to the dockets to 

read background documents or 

comments received, go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, or DOT’s Docket 

Operations Office (see ADDRESSES). 

PRIVACY ACT: Anyone is able to search 

the electronic form of any written 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 3 / Friday, January 4, 2008 / Notices 917 

communications and comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

document (or signing the document, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477), or you may visit http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rick 

Boyle, Office of Hazardous Materials 

Technology, (202) 366–4545 or Kurt 

Eichenlaub, Office of Hazardous 

Materials Standards, (202) 366–8553, 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

I. Background 

A recent PHMSA review of hazardous 

materials transportation incidents 

occurring over the past decade indicates 

that roughly one-quarter to one-half of 

all serious hazardous materials 

incidents may be associated with 

loading and unloading operations 

involving bulk packagings such as cargo 

tank motor vehicles (CTMV) and rail 

tank cars. In addition, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and 

the Chemical and Safety Hazard 

Investigation Board (CSB) have 

investigated a number of accidents 

associated with these loading and 

unloading operations. PHMSA’s data 

review and the NTSB and CSB 

investigations suggest that there may be 

opportunities to enhance the safety of 

such operations. 

A. PHMSA Analysis of Bulk Loading 

and Unloading Incidents 

On February 8, 2007, PHMSA issued, 

‘‘A Summary Evaluation of Risk 

Associated with Bulk Loading/ 

Unloading of Hazmat,’’ a summary 

report of a risk assessment conducted to 

identify risks associated with bulk 

loading and unloading operations for 

highway and rail transportation. The 

report provides both a qualitative and 

quantitative analysis of incident reports 

involving loading and unloading of bulk 

packagings submitted to PHMSA in 

accordance with the reporting criteria 

specified in § 171.16 of the Hazardous 

Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR 

Parts 171–180). The report focuses on 

highway and rail transportation 

incidents because 89% of total incidents 

and 97% of all serious incidents occur 

during transportation operations in 

these two modes. Serious incidents in 

highway and rail transportation include 

any unintentional release that results in 

death, major injury, closure of a major 

transportation artery, release of 

radioactive material from a Type B 

package, suspected release of certain 

infectious substances, or release of a 

bulk quantity of hazardous material. 

The data used for the report are from the 

Hazardous Materials Information 

System (HMIS), as of January 7, 2007. 

The results of the data analysis showed 

that: 

• During the 2004–2006 period, 27% 

of all serious incidents occurred during 

bulk loading and unloading operations. 

• During the 2004–2006 period, 

hazardous materials shipments 

transported by highway and rail in bulk 

packagings were involved in 

approximately 9 out of 10 high 

consequence events. 

• The number of incidents occurring 

during the loading and unloading of 

bulk packagings has remained relatively 

unchanged over the last 10 years. 

• Many of the identified causes of 

both en route and storage incidents can 

be attributed to loading and unloading 

operations (i.e., overfilled, 

overpressurized, loose closure, 

component or device, etc.). 

PHMSA’s summary report and 

analysis of bulk loading and unloading 

incident data is available for review in 

this docket. 

B. NTSB Accident Investigations 

NTSB has investigated several serious 

accidents related to bulk loading and 

unloading operations: 

• On July 14, 2001, in Riverview, 

Michigan, during unloading from a rail 

tank car, a pipe attached to a fitting on 

the unloading line fractured and 

separated, causing the release of methyl 

mercaptan. The methyl mercaptan 

ignited, engulfing the tank car in flames. 

Fire damage to cargo transfer hoses on 

an adjacent tank car resulted in the 

release of chlorine. Three plant 

employees were killed in the accident, 

and about 2,000 people in the 

surrounding neighborhood were 

evacuated from their homes. The 

fractured piping used for the unloading 

operation exhibited significant 

corrosion damage. As a result of this 

investigation, NTSB issued the 

following recommendations to DOT: 

Æ I–02–1: Develop, with the 

assistance of the Environmental 

Protection Agency and Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration, 

safety requirements that apply to the 

loading and unloading of railroad tank 

cars, highway cargo tanks, and other 

bulk containers that address the 

inspection and maintenance of cargo 

transfer equipment, emergency 

shutdown measures, and personal 

protection requirements. 

Æ I–02–2: Implement, after the 

adoption of safety requirements 

developed in response to Safety 

Recommendation I–02–01, an oversight 

program to ensure compliance with 

these requirements. 

• On September 13, 2002, in Freeport, 

Texas, a tank car containing about 6,500 

gallons of hazardous waste ruptured at 

a transfer station. The car had been 

steam-heated to permit the transfer of 

the waste to a CTMV for subsequent 

disposal. As a result of the accident, 28 

people received minor injuries, and 

residents living within one mile of the 

accident site had to shelter in place for 

51⁄2 hours. The tank car, highway cargo 

tank, and transfer station were 

destroyed. The force of the explosion 

propelled a 300-pound tank car dome 

housing about 1⁄3 mile away from the 

tank car. Two storage tanks near the 

transfer station were damaged; they 

released about 660 gallons of the 

hazardous material oleum (fuming 

sulfuric acid and sulfur trioxide). As a 

result of its investigation, NTSB issued 

the following recommendation to 

PHMSA: 

Æ R–04–10: In cooperation with the 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration and the Environmental 

Protection Agency, develop regulations 

that require safe operating procedures to 

be established before hazardous 

materials are heated in a railroad tank 

car for unloading; at a minimum, the 

procedures should include the 

monitoring of internal tank pressure and 

cargo temperature. 

NTSB has also issued previous 

recommendations I–88–1 and I–88–2 to 

the Department of Transportation, and 

R–02–16 to the Federal Railroad 

Administration related to loading and 

unloading safety requirements: 

Æ I–88–1: Establish safety 

requirements for the movement and 

temporary storage of hazardous 

materials at intermodal transportation 

facilities. 

Æ I–88–2: Strengthen minimum safety 

requirements for loading and unloading 

of hazardous materials to provide 

adequate, uniform safety in all modes of 

transportation. 

Æ R–02–16: Issue a hazardous 

materials bulletin to warn companies 

involved in tank car loading and 

unloading operations that tank car 

excess flow valves cannot be relied 

upon to stop leaks that occur during 

these operations. 

C. CSB Accident Investigations 

CSB has investigated two incidents in 

which chlorine was released during rail 

tank car unloading operations: 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
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• On August 14, 2002, in Festus, 

Missouri, approximately 24 tons of 

chlorine was released during a threehour period following the rupture of an 

unloading hose. The magnitude of the 

incident was exacerbated because the 

emergency shut down system failed to 

operate properly. Consequently, 48,000 

pounds of chlorine was released, 

resulting in the evacuation or shelter-inplace of hundreds of residents. Three 

residents were admitted to the hospital. 

• On August 11, 2005, in Baton 

Rouge, Louisiana, a chlorine transfer 

hose ruptured. However, the emergency 

shut down system operated properly, 

and the release ended in under a 

minute. The successful activation of the 

emergency shut-down system prevented 

a major release and off-site impact. 

As a result of its investigations, CSB 

issued DOT the following 

recommendation: 

Æ 2006–06–I–LA–RI: Expand the 

scope of DOT regulatory coverage to 

include chlorine rail car unloading 

operations. Ensure the regulations 

specifically require remotely operated 

emergency isolation devices that will 

quickly isolate a leak in any of the 

flexible hoses (or piping components) 

used to unload a chlorine rail car. The 

shutdown system must be capable of 

stopping a chlorine release from both 

the rail car and the facility chlorine 

receiving equipment. Require the 

emergency isolation system be 

periodically maintained and 

operationally tested to ensure it will 

function in the event of an unloading 

system chlorine leak. 

D. OSHA/EPA/USCG Requirements 

Both the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) and the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

regulate operations involving the 

handling of hazardous materials at fixed 

facilities. For example, OSHA’s Process 

Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 

CFR 1910.119) contains requirements 

for processes that use, store, 

manufacture, handle, or transport 

particular chemicals on-site. Bulk 

loading and unloading operations 

involving PSM-covered chemicals are 

subject to the requirements of the PSM 

standard. The OSHA standards also 

include requirements for the handling 

and storage of specific hazardous 

materials, such as compressed gases, 

flammable and combustible liquids, 

explosives and blasting agents, liquefied 

petroleum gases, and anhydrous 

ammonia. Similarly, EPA regulations 

establish a general duty for facility 

owners or operators to identify hazards 

associated with the accidental releases 

of extremely hazardous substances, 

design and maintain a safe facility as 

needed to prevent such releases, and 

minimize the consequences of releases. 

In addition, stationary sources with 

more than a threshold quantity of a 

regulated substance in a process are 

subject to EPA’s accident prevention 

regulations, including the requirement 

to develop risk management plans (40 

CFR Part 68). 

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

maintains regulations that apply to 

hazardous materials directly loaded or 

unloaded to or from a hold or tank on 

a vessel without the use of containers or 

break-bulk packaging (46 CFR Parts 

148–154). In addition, the USCG 

regulations establish requirements for 

the transfer of hazardous material to or 

from a portable tank while on a vessel; 

and, requirements for waterfront 

facilities engaged in the handling, 

storage, loading, discharging or 

transportation of packaged hazardous 

materials and solid bulk cargo (33 CFR 

Part 126). 

II. PHMSA Regulations 

1. Requirements Applicable to Loading 

and Unloading Operations 

The HMR include requirements for 

loading and unloading railroad tank 

cars, CTMVs, and other bulk containers. 

Part 174 of the HMR, which applies to 

the transportation of hazardous 

materials by rail, establishes general 

loading and unloading requirements for 

hazardous materials and specific 

loading and handling requirements for 

shipments of Class 1 (Explosive), Class 

2 (Non-flammable, Flammable, and 

Poison gases), Class 3 (Flammable 

liquid), Division 6.1 (Poison), and Class 

7 (Radioactive) materials. Part 177 of the 

HMR, which applies to the 

transportation of hazardous materials by 

motor carrier, establishes general 

hazardous materials loading and 

unloading requirements and specific 

loading and unloading requirements 

applicable to Class 1 (Explosive), Class 

2 (Non-flammable, Flammable, and 

Poison gases), Class 3 (Flammable 

liquid), Class 4 (Flammable solid, 

Spontaneously combustible, and 

Dangerous when wet), Class 5 (Oxidizer 

and Organic peroxide), Division 6.1 

(Poison), Class 7 (Radioactive), and 

Class 8 (Corrosive) materials. The HMR 

also include additional loading 

requirements applicable to rail tank 

cars, portable tanks, cargo tanks, and 

intermodal bulk containers in §§ 171.31, 

173.32, 173.33, and 173.35. 

2. Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles and 

Loading/Unloading Equipment 

The HMR include requirements for 

the inspection and maintenance of cargo 

transfer equipment, such as piping and 

transfer hoses, that is part of bulk 

packaging or carried on a vehicle used 

to transport a bulk packaging. The HMR 

require each operator of a CTMV to 

conduct periodic tests and inspections 

of the CTMV and its attachments and 

appurtenances, including piping and 

transfer hoses used for loading and 

unloading the CTMV. Each operator 

must conduct external visual 

inspections, internal visual inspections, 

leakage tests, and pressure tests in 

accordance with the schedule 

established in § 180.407(c). Section 

180.407 also sets forth the specific 

procedures to be followed for each 

inspection or test. In addition, for 

CTMVs used to transport liquefied 

compressed gases, each operator must 

visually inspect each CTMV’s cargo 

transfer equipment, including piping 

and hoses installed or carried on the 

CTMV, at least once each month (see 

§ 180.416). These periodic inspections 

and tests help to ensure that each CTMV 

and its cargo transfer equipment are free 

of leaks or other defects that could 

adversely affect the safe operation of the 

CTMV, including the safety of loading 

and unloading operations. 

3. Cargo Tank Motor Vehicle Emergency 

Shutdown Requirements 

The HMR require DOT specification 

CTMVs to be equipped with emergency 

discharge control systems. For example, 

an MC 330 or 331 CTMV used to 

transport liquefied compressed gases 

must be equipped with an emergency 

discharge control system activated 

automatically or by remote control in 

the event of an unloading emergency. In 

addition, each CTMV operator must 

carry on the vehicle written emergency 

discharge control procedures for all 

delivery operations. An MC 338 CTMV 

tank must be equipped with a remotely 

controlled self-closing shutoff valve 

with both a mechanical and thermal 

means of automatic closure. On DOT 

406, 407, and 412 CTMVs, each loading/ 

unloading outlet must be fitted with a 

self-closing system capable of closing 

the outlet(s) in an emergency within 30 

seconds of actuation. On DOT 406, 407, 

and 412 CTMVs used to transport 

flammable, pyrophoric, oxidizing, or 

poisonous materials, the remote means 

of closure must be capable of thermal 

activation. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
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4. Training Requirements 

Each person who performs a function 

regulated under the HMR must be 

trained (see Subpart H of Part 172). This 

training must include general 

awareness, function-specific, safety, and 

security training. Thus, each person 

who performs a loading or unloading 

function regulated under the HMR must 

be trained concerning all aspects of that 

function, including emergency 

shutdown procedures. In addition, each 

person who performs a loading or 

unloading function regulated under the 

HMR must be trained concerning 

specific hazards associated with the 

materials handled and personal 

protection measures. 

III. Consensus Standards 

We are aware of a variety of existing 

national consensus standards that 

address bulk loading and unloading 

operations. For example, the Chlorine 

Institute has developed loading and 

unloading procedures for chlorine (e.g., 

Pamphlet 57, ‘‘Emergency Shut-off 

Systems for Bulk Transfers of Chlorine; 

Pamphlet 66, ‘‘Recommended Practices 

for Handling Chlorine Tank Cars; 

Pamphlet 91, ‘‘Checklist for Chlorine 

Packaging Plants, Chlorine Distributors 

and Tank Car Users of Chlorine’’). The 

Association of American Railroads 

(AAR) has developed Pamphlet 34, 

‘‘Recommended Methods for the Safe 

Loading and Unloading of Tank Cars.’’

The American Chemistry Council has 

developed the Responsible Care 

management system, which establishes 

an integrated, structured approach to 

drive results in seven key areas: 

community awareness and emergency 

response; security; distribution; 

employee health and safety; pollution 

prevention; process safety; and product 

stewardship. PHMSA reviewed some of 

these industry standards to ascertain if 

existing standards provide the necessary 

amplification of the basic loading and 

unloading practices proposed in this 

notice. 

The industry standards address a 

number of topics related to the loading 

and unloading of hazardous materials 

and are different based upon the type of 

hazardous material, the physical form of 

the material, the mode of transportation, 

and the type of packaging used to 

transport the material. While the 

standards exhibit differences in specific 

detail, there are a number of common 

general safety topic areas, such as, risk 

evaluation, development of operational 

procedures, maintenance and testing of 

equipment, training, and emergency 

response. 

The available industry standards 

clearly demonstrate industry’s focus on 

safety issues associated with loading 

and unloading operations. Virtually all 

standards specifically require the use of 

personal protective equipment, often 

specifying in detail the equipment that 

should be used. In addition, most 

standards include considerable detail 

concerning activities that appear to be 

associated with the greatest personal 

risk (e.g., assuring evacuation of all 

hazardous material residues from tanks 

before required interior inspections). 

The wide variety of industry standards 

applicable to loading and unloading 

operations provide useful information 

on industry standard practices, which 

we considered in the development of 

the recommended practices proposed in 

this notice. 

PHMSA recognizes that it reviewed 

only a sampling of guidelines and 

standards that are available to the bulk 

hazardous materials shipping industry. 

The documents are representative of 

what is available to industry and were 

submitted by those industry personnel 

who believe additional guidance would 

be useful. 

IV. Public Workshop 

On June 14, 2007, PHMSA hosted a 

public workshop to bring stakeholders 

together for conceptual discussions on 

the risks associated with loading and 

unloading bulk hazardous materials and 

the range of actions that could be taken 

by the government and industry to 

address those risks. In the May 11, 2007 

public notice advertising this workshop 

(72 FR 26864), we invited interested 

persons to submit comments related to 

the issues discussed at the workshop. 

Representatives from industry, federal 

agencies, state and local government, 

standards organizations, the emergency 

response community, employee groups, 

environmental and public interest 

organizations, and the public 

participated in the meeting. 

The workshop consisted of a series of 

panel presentations on specific topics 

followed by discussions of the issues 

presented. Issues covered at the 

workshop included: (1) Incident data 

analysis and evaluation; (2) NTSB and 

CSB accident reports; (3) loading and 

unloading procedures and 

recommended practices; (4) whether 

there are gaps in the safety and 

regulatory programs; (5) training; and (6) 

emergency response. 

Many workshop participants voiced 

strong support for the development of 

loading and unloading procedures, 

suggesting that development and 

adoption of such ‘‘recommended 

practices’’ or consensus standards could 

significantly improve the safety of 

loading and unloading operations. A 

working group of shippers, carriers, and 

industrial package organizations 

(Interested Parties Working Group) 

developed, and presented for 

consideration, a draft operating 

procedures document for the loading, 

unloading, and incidental storage of 

hazardous materials in bulk packagings 

having a capacity of greater than 3,000 

liters. 

The draft operating procedures 

document specifies information and 

processes that the Interested Parties 

Working Group recommends offerors, 

consignees, or transloading facility 

operators address in their operating 

procedures. Some key elements include 

recommendations applicable to pretransfer operations (e.g., securement of 

the transport unit, and inspection of the 

transfer equipment and attachments), 

transfer operations (e.g., monitoring the 

temperature of the lading and the 

pressure of the containment vessel), 

post-transfer operations (e.g., evacuation 

of the transfer system and 

depressurization of the containment 

vessel), storage (e.g., monitoring for 

leaks and releases), and emergency 

procedures (e.g., use of emergency shutdown systems). The Interested Parties 

Working Group recommends that 

operators and facilities engaged in 

loading, unloading and incidental 

storage activities develop and 

implement written operating procedures 

inclusive of the elements outlined in the 

draft operating procedures document, 

which are based on a safety and security 

analysis of the functions performed at 

the particular loading, unloading, or 

storage location or facility. The 

complete draft operating procedures 

document presented by the working 

group is available for review in this 

docket. This docket also includes a 

transcript of the public workshop, 

presentations made by panel 

participants, comments presented at the 

workshop or during the comment 

period, and a petition for rulemaking 

submitted by the Dangerous Goods 

Advisory Council on November 19, 

2007 requesting the adoption of 

operational procedures in the HMR 

applicable to loading, unloading and 

incidental storage of hazardous 

materials in bulk packagings. 

Prior to publication, a copy of this 

notice was provided for review to 

OSHA, EPA, NTSB, CSB, the 

International Association of Fire Chiefs, 

the National Association of State Fire 

Marshals, DGAC, and the Chlorine 

Institute. Comments we received from 

these agencies and organizations are 

posted on the Docket. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
920 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 3 / Friday, January 4, 2008 / Notices 

V. Proposed Recommended Practices 

for Bulk Loading and Unloading 

Operations 

As a result of the collaborative effort 

between PHMSA and our stakeholders, 

we are proposing a set of recommended 

practices that would apply to loading 

and unloading operations involving 

hazardous materials in many different 

types of packagings and a number of 

different operational and modal 

contexts. These proposed recommended 

practices build on the submission from 

the Interested Parties Working Group, 

the NTSB and CSB recommendations 

related to loading and unloading of bulk 

packagings, and our analysis of bulk 

loading and unloading incidents. Note 

that these proposed recommended 

practices would supplement current 

HMR requirements applicable to loading 

and unloading operations. For example, 

the recommendations applicable to 

training would not replace the current 

requirements for general awareness, 

function specific, safety, and security 

training established in Subpart H of Part 

172, but would be considered as 

additions to current training 

requirements and programs. 

Proposed Recommended Practices for 

Loading and Unloading Bulk Quantities 

of Hazardous Materials 

1. Loading/Unloading Safety Analysis 

A shipper, carrier, or facility operator 

should conduct a thorough, orderly, 

systematic analysis to identify, evaluate 

and control the hazards associated with 

specific loading and unloading 

operations. The analysis should be 

appropriate to the complexity of the 

process and the materials involved in 

the operation. For example, the analysis 

should consider the hazards of the 

material to be loaded or unloaded, 

including any temperature or pressure 

controls necessary to ensure safe 

handling of the material, and conditions 

that could affect the safety of the 

process, such as access control, lighting, 

ignition sources, and physical 

obstructions. The analysis should also 

assess current procedures utilized to 

ensure the safety of loading and 

unloading operations and identify any 

areas where those procedures could be 

improved. 

2. Loading/Unloading Operational 

Procedures 

Based on the safety analysis, the 

shipper, carrier, or facility operator 

should develop a step-by-step guide to 

loading and unloading that is clear, 

concise, and appropriate to the level of 

training and knowledge of its 

employees. The written guide should 

address pre-loading/pre-unloading 

procedures, loading/unloading 

procedures, and post-loading/postunloading procedures. 

(a) Pre-loading/Pre-unloading 

procedures should include: 

(1) Inspection of the transport unit 

and transfer area. For example, shippers 

should ensure that a DOT specification 

packaging is marked to indicate that it 

has been designed, manufactured and 

maintained (including periodic 

inspection and testing) in accordance 

with specification requirements. 

(2) Securing the transport unit against 

movement. 

(3) Grounding and bonding of the 

transport unit, as warranted. 

(4) Inspection of transfer equipment 

and connections, including hoses and 

valves, to ensure that they are free of 

defects, leaks, or other problems that 

could result in an unsafe condition. 

(5) Identification and verification of 

piping path, equipment lineups and 

operational sequencing and procedures 

for connecting piping, hoses, or other 

transfer connections. 

(6) Identification and verification that 

the materials that are being loaded or 

unloaded are being transferred into the 

appropriate packagings, temporary 

storage facilities, or production 

containment vessels and that the 

compatibility of the material to be 

transferred is appropriate, authorized 

and consistent with applicable 

procedures. 

(b) Loading/Unloading procedures 

should include: 

(1) Measures for initiating and 

controlling the lading flow. For 

example, if the material is to be heated 

prior to its transfer, the facility operator 

should analyze a sample of the material 

to ascertain the heat input to be applied, 

if warranted. The maximum heat input 

to be applied and the rate at which the 

heat input will be applied must not 

result in pressurization to a level that 

exceeds the packaging’s test pressure. 

(2) Measures for monitoring the 

temperature of the lading and pressure 

of the containment vessel (e.g., cargo 

tank or rail tank car) and receiving 

vessel (e.g., storage tank). For example, 

for loading or unloading operations 

involving heating of the material to be 

transferred, during the heating process, 

the facility operator should monitor the 

heat input applied to the containment 

vessel and the pressure inside the 

containment vessel to ensure that the 

heating process does not result in overpressurization or an uncontrolled 

exothermic reaction. 

(3) Measures for monitoring filling 

limits and ensuring that the quantity to 

be transferred is appropriate for the 

receiving vessel. 

(4) Measures for terminating lading 

flow. For example, personnel 

responsible for monitoring a loading or 

unloading process should be familiar 

with shut-off equipment and 

procedures, and should be trained to 

take necessary actions to stop the lading 

flow as efficiently as possible. 

(c) Post-loading/Post-unloading 

procedures should include: 

(1) Measures for evacuation of the 

transfer system and depressurization of 

the containment vessel, as warranted. 

(2) Measures for disconnecting the 

transfer system. 

(3) Inspection and securement of 

transport unit fittings and closures. 

(d) Review and Revision of 

Procedures: 

The operating procedures should be 

reviewed as often as necessary to ensure 

that they reflect current operating 

practices, materials, technology, 

personnel responsibilities, and 

equipment. To guard against outdated or 

inaccurate operating procedures, the 

hazmat employer should consider 

revalidating the operating procedures 

annually. 

3. Emergency Management 

Appropriate emergency procedures 

should be identified and implemented, 

including identification of emergency 

response equipment and individuals 

authorized in its use; incident response 

procedures and clearly identified 

personnel responsibilities; personnel 

protection guidance and use of 

emergency shut-down systems; and, 

emergency communication and spill 

reporting. Emergency instrumentation 

and equipment appropriate to the 

loading or unloading operation should 

be identified, available, and in working 

order. Emergency procedures should be 

clear, concise, and available to workers. 

Emergency training, including the need 

for drills, should also be provided. 

Loading and unloading facilities may 

want to consider: 

(a) Instrumentation to monitor for 

leaks and releases. 

(b) Equipment to isolate leaks and 

releases and to take other appropriate 

emergency shutdown measures, 

remotely if necessary. 

(c) Training in the use of emergency 

response equipment. 

(d) Procedures for incident response. 

(e) Procedures for use of emergency 

shut-down systems and the assignment 

of shut down responsibility to qualified 

operators to ensure that emergency 

shutdown is executed in a safe and 

timely manner. 

(f) Procedures for emergency 

communication and spill reporting. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 3 / Friday, January 4, 2008 / Notices 921 

(g) Procedures of safe startup after an 

emergency shut down. 

(h) Procedures and schedules for 

conducting drills and exercises 

necessary to demonstrate the efficacy of 

the plan, and to ensure a timely and 

efficient emergency response. 

(i) Emergency procedures should be 

reviewed and updated as often as 

necessary to ensure that they reflect 

current operating practices, materials, 

technology, personnel responsibilities, 

and emergency response information. 

4. Maintenance and Testing of 

Equipment 

Loading and unloading equipment 

and systems need to be properly 

maintained and tested. Shippers and 

carriers should develop and implement 

a periodic maintenance schedule to 

prevent deterioration of equipment and 

conduct periodic operational tests to 

ensure that the equipment functions as 

intended. Equipment and system repairs 

should be completed promptly. 

5. Training 

Personnel involved in loading and 

unloading and emergency response 

operations need to know and 

understand their specific 

responsibilities during loading and 

unloading operations, including 

attendance or monitoring 

responsibilities. Consider training in the 

following areas: 

(a) Overview of the loading/unloading 

process and, specifically, the portions of 

the process for which the employee is 

responsible; 

(b) Safety systems and their functions; 

(c) Emergency operations and 

procedures, including shutdown 

procedures; 

(d) Additional safe work practices. 

(e) Recurrent training as necessary to 

address changes to the procedures or 

personnel responsibilities. 

VI. Request for Comments 

Based on our analysis of incident 

data, the NTSB and CSB 

recommendations, and information and 

recommendations presented at the June 

14 public workshop, we are considering 

strategies for enhancing the safety of 

bulk loading and unloading operations, 

including whether additional regulatory 

requirements may be necessary. To 

assist us in developing such strategies, 

we invite interested persons to submit 

comments on the issues and questions 

listed below: 

1. PHMSA Proposed Recommended 

Practices 

As summarized above, the HMR 

include a number of requirements 

applicable to loading and unloading 

operations. We invite commenters to 

address whether the proposed 

recommended practices adequately 

address the safety concerns discussed in 

this notice and to suggest how the 

proposed recommended practices 

should be revised and strengthened. We 

are particularly interested in comments 

concerning whether our proposed 

recommended practices are consistent 

with Federal regulations and guidance 

or industry consensus standards 

applicable to bulk loading and 

unloading operations. We also welcome 

comments concerning the potential 

costs that may be incurred to implement 

our proposed recommended practices. 

Based on comments received, we will 

revise the recommended practices and 

may issue them as a guidance document 

for hazardous materials shippers and 

carriers that conduct bulk loading and 

unloading operations. 

In addition, we are considering 

whether additional regulatory 

requirements, similar to the measures in 

our proposed recommended practices, 

are necessary. We invite comments to 

address whether the recommended 

practices proposed in this notice should 

be incorporated into the HMR and, if so, 

how that could best be accomplished. 

Should the recommended practices 

apply to all bulk loading and unloading 

operations, or should the scope of the 

recommended practices be dependant 

upon the volume and/or type of bulk 

packaging being loaded or unloaded? 

Should the recommended practices 

apply to the shipper, carrier, and 

loading/unloading facility; or, should 

the recommended practices apply only 

to the facilities at which loading/ 

unloading operations take place? What 

costs, if any, would be imposed on the 

regulated community if we choose to 

adopt regulations similar to these 

proposed recommended practices in the 

HMR? 

2. PHMSA Regulations 

As described above, the HMR 

currently include a number of 

requirements applicable to bulk loading 

and unloading operations. In addition, 

the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA), the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

and the U.S. Coast Guard regulate 

operations involving the handling of 

certain hazardous materials at fixed 

facilities. We invite commenters to 

address whether the existing loading 

and unloading requirements in the HMR 

adequately address the risks associated 

with bulk loading and unloading 

operations. Are there gaps or overlaps in 

the standards and regulations 

promulgated by PHMSA, OSHA, EPA 

and the USCG that adversely affect the 

safety of these operations? If so, how 

should these gaps or overlaps be 

addressed? 

3. National Consensus Standards 

We invite commenters to compare 

national consensus standards with 

which they are familiar to current 

Federal standards and regulations 

applicable to bulk loading and 

unloading operations and to the 

recommended practices proposed in 

this notice. Commenters should indicate 

whether and to what extent the national 

consensus standards are consistent with 

current Federal standards and 

regulations and the proposed 

recommended practices. Should we 

consider incorporating consensus 

standards applicable to bulk loading 

and unloading operations into the 

HMR? If so, how could this be 

accomplished, and which standards are 

appropriate? 

4. Accident and Incident Information 

As indicated above, PHMSA 

conducted an analysis of bulk loading 

and unloading accidents submitted to 

the agency in accordance with the 

reporting criteria specified in § 171.16 of 

the HMR. This analysis did not consider 

accidents that may have occurred 

outside of transportation, as that term is 

defined for purposes of the HMR. We 

plan to work with the Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) and the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) to fill that data 

gap by including incident data on bulk 

loading and unloading accidents that 

may have occurred outside of 

transportation, and therefore, were not 

reported to PHMSA in accordance with 

§ 171.16. We invite commenters to 

submit any information on safety 

problems or incidents that may not have 

been reported, but that could help us to 

refine our assessment of the safety risks 

associated with loading and unloading 

operations and develop appropriate 

strategies for addressing those risks. We 

also ask commenters to suggest other 

data sources that could support this 

effort. 

Issued in Washington, DC on December 27, 

2007. 

Theodore L. Willke, 

Associate Administrator for Hazardous 

Materials Safety. 

[FR Doc. 07–6300 Filed 1–3–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 


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