IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

RAYMOND LAPEER BELL,

Appellant.

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No. 38671-6-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SIDDOWAY, J.P.T. — Raymond Bell appeals his conviction for first degree assault 

with a deadly weapon, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging a 

violation of his right to a fair and impartial jury, evidentiary error, and an abuse of 

discretion in denying his request for an exceptional mitigated sentence. The evidence 

was sufficient, his standard range sentence is not appealable, and he fails to identify any 

error or abuse of discretion. For those reasons, and because he raises no meritorious 

issues in a statement of additional grounds, we affirm his judgment and sentence other 

than to grant his request for relief from the victim penalty assessment based on a 

recently-effective change in the law.

 



Judge Laurel H. Siddoway was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time 

argument was held on this matter. She is now serving as a judge pro tempore of the court 

pursuant to RCW 2.06.150.

FILED

AUGUST 24, 2023

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals Division III
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On an evening in March 2019, a woman who identified herself as “Shanna” called 

911 to report that she had just been assaulted. The call was transferred by the 911 

operator to a Spokane police dispatcher. Shanna had just begun speaking to the 

dispatcher when she abruptly told the dispatcher that her attacker had come back into the 

apartment. She ceased responding to questions. All the dispatcher could hear were 

muffled voices. Spokane police responded to the address provided to the 911 operator

and found Shanna Delcambre in an upstairs apartment with a deep head wound and her 

right hand almost completely severed. She told police that Raymond Bell had repeatedly 

attacked her with a machete. 

Mr. Bell was located in a first-floor hallway of the apartment building and was 

taken into custody. The State charged him with first degree assault with a deadly 

weapon, later amending the information to add a charge of attempted first degree murder. 

The case proceeded to trial in October 2021. Among Mr. Bell’s pretrial motions 

in limine were several related to the then-ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 

pandemic. He moved for two additional alternate jurors, the explanation being, “There 

should be additional alternates on the jury due to the risk of COVID-19 Delta infection.” 

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 18. He requested “additional time to investigate juror biases and 

strike jurors for cause,” including “for those who indicate they will be distracted by the 

surrounding issues with the COVID[-]19 pandemic.” Id. at 19 (boldface omitted). He
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

3

submitted that “[j]urors who concede that their ability to focus on the testimony is 

impaired by the pandemic must be stricken for cause.” Id. at 22. 

He objected to witnesses wearing masks while testifying as violating his right of 

confrontation. Finally, he objected to jurors wearing N95 or other face masks during voir 

dire, asking that they wear face shields instead. 

It was the practice of the superior court at the time for witnesses not to wear face 

masks when testifying. For jurors and prospective jurors, the practice was for them to 

wear face masks. When the parties’ motions in limine were heard, Mr. Bell’s request that 

the jurors not wear face masks was his only COVID-related request that was not 

accommodated or resolved with defense agreement. The court explained:

The record should reflect that—so sad I had to update this because it 

was the fourth wa[ve], now it’s the fifth wa[ve], our community is currently 

in what’s been characterized as the fifth [wave] of a global pandemic 

caused by the deadly Corona virus, which has killed—and back then it was 

over a half million, but I know that we are at 700-and-something-thousand 

U.S. citizens and infected millions more. Spokane County Health 

Department figures reflect, and this was yesterday’s numbers, so I’m sure 

that, or I would not be surprised if it did clear 67,000 cases because as of 

yesterday evening, it was 66,988 cases with 4,219 overall hospitalizations. 

Less than half of Spokane County is vaccinated.

While the defendant has a right to a timely jury trial, I also have to 

weigh the safety of the citizens that the court is compelling to attend jury 

service. CDC[1]face shield provided sufficient protection while advising 

N95 mask with social distancing provides the best protection against 

transmission, particularly important with the even more contagious Delta 

 

1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

4

variant. And in addition to that, Governor Inslee has instituted an indoor 

mask mandate.

For those reasons, I am going to deny defense number 9. I can’t tell 

you how much I wish we weren’t in this position still, but, unfortunately, 

we are.

1 Rep. of Proc. (1 RP) at 26-27 (emphasis added).

2

 

In jury selection the next week, the court began by talking to prospective jurors 

about the pandemic-related safety protocols in place. Face masks were provided, and 

jurors were told by the court that “[f]ace coverings are required for protection in the 

courtroom.” 1 RP at 59-60. The court added, “I will not have my face covering on while 

I’m talking during voir dire, and counsel will be allowed to remove their face covering 

while speaking.” Id. at 60. When the time came for jurors to answer questions, the court 

said, “[W]e’ll start with Juror No. 1. If you could lower your face covering while you’re 

speaking. It will help with the court reporting.” Id. at 67. During the questioning, 

prospective jurors were periodically reminded or requested to lower their face coverings 

when speaking. See, e.g., 1 RP at 78, 81, 97, 109.

After the jury was selected, three days of testimony ensued. There had been three 

witnesses to the assault: the victim, Shanna Delcambre; the defendant, Mr. Bell; and 

 

2 Our record on appeal includes three separately paginated reports of proceedings. 

We refer to the volume that includes the hearing on the parties’ motions in limine and the 

first day of trial (reported by Rebecca J. Weeks) as “1 RP.” We refer to the volume that 

includes the remainder of trial, the sentencing hearing, and a couple of early pretrial 

hearings (reported by Terri Rosadovelazquez) as “2 RP.” We refer to the volume that 

includes other hearings discussed in addressing Mr. Bell’s statement of additional 

grounds (reported by Korina C. Cox) as “3 RP.”
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

5

Dorothea George, Mr. Bell’s longtime girlfriend and his roommate at the time of the 

assault. Ms. George and Ms. Delcambre were called as witnesses in the State’s case. 

Dorothea George testimony

Of the witnesses to the assault, Ms. George testified first. She testified that on the 

day of the assault, Mr. Bell had been awake and upset for days, following a suspension 

from work. For four days, he had been drinking and smoking crack cocaine. She 

testified she had finally gotten Mr. Bell to sleep when, late in the afternoon, she heard an 

altercation in a parking area below their upstairs apartment. She looked out a window 

and saw Ms. Delcambre, who she recognized; she, Ms. Delcambre, and Mr. Bell had 

been friends, decades earlier, in high school. Ms. George shook Mr. Bell awake and 

together they went downstairs to calm down whatever was going on between Ms. 

Delcambre and a man with whom she was arguing. After things settled, Ms. George and 

Mr. Bell walked across the street to purchase beer and malt liquor and invited Ms. 

Delcambre to join them upstairs. The three began drinking and smoking weed in the 

apartment. Ms. George estimated that Ms. Delcambre was with them in the apartment for 

about three hours.

Ms. George testified that an argument started when Ms. Delcambre mentioned a 

girl they had gone to school with and Mr. Bell commented that the girl had been “pretty 

back in the day,” which Ms. Delcambre felt disrespected Ms. George. 2 RP at 38. When 

Ms. Delcambre asked Mr. Bell how he would feel if Ms. George talked wistfully about 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

6

her old boyfriend’s “stuff,” 2 RP at 38, Mr. Bell told her to be quiet, which made Ms. 

Delcambre angrier. According to Ms. George, the argument between Mr. Bell and Ms. 

Delcambre escalated and became a physical fight. Mr. Bell told Ms. Delcambre, “Get the 

‘F’ out of my house,” but Ms. Delcambre did not leave. 2 RP at 40. Ms. George then 

yelled for them both to leave, but only Mr. Bell walked out. Ms. Delcambre began to call 

the police, while Ms. George pleaded with her not to.

Ms. George assumed Mr. Bell heard Ms. Delcambre calling the police, because he 

came back into the apartment and followed Ms. Delcambre into the bedroom. Ms. 

George testified that she stayed in the living room until she heard Ms. Delcambre 

screaming her name. When she entered the bedroom, she thought the two were fighting 

like before, but she soon saw that Mr. Bell was “just chopping and chopping” at Ms. 

Delcambre with a machete. 2 RP at 43. Ms. George jumped in front of Mr. Bell, yelling

at him to stop. She testified that his eyes were blank and he appeared not to hear her; 

according to Ms. George, “[H]e didn’t know what the hell he was doing.” 2 RP at 79.

When she grabbed him and called him “Daddy,” he “stop[ped], froze, and looked around, 

and he was like, What the . . . .” 2 RP at 80. Ms. George testified Mr. Bell then left the 

apartment and never returned. Ms. George saw Ms. Delcambre was holding her wrist so 

she wrapped her hand in a shirt while calling 911.3

 

3 No recording of this 911 call was offered as evidence, but a dispatcher testified 

that the caller stated her friend needed help and then hung up. 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

7

According to Ms. George, Mr. Bell “wasn’t even mentally there” during the 

assault, and did not know what was going on. 2 RP at 42. She believed Mr. Bell was 

“blacked out” that night. 2 RP at 55. She had seen Mr. Bell black out before and said he 

would go entirely blank and be nonresponsive until he was shaken.

Shanna Delcambre testimony

Ms. Delcambre testified that she had been at the apartment building on the 

afternoon and early evening of the assault with her cousin, who was helping to change 

tires on the car of one of Ms. Delcambre’s friends. It took “at least a couple hours.” 

2 RP at 116. The altercation that caused Ms. George to look out the window happened 

when Ms. Delcambre’s friend’s boyfriend started flirting with Ms. Delcambre, and she 

“told him off.” 2 RP at 113. According to Ms. Delcambre, Ms. George came to a 

window and yelled down, “Oh girl, I thought that was you; I heard your voice.” 2 RP at 

115. The two talked briefly from that distance and then Ms. George came down to the 

parking lot. They shared a beer and chatted. Shortly after, Mr. Bell also came down and 

briefly joined them before leaving to buy beer. 

When the tires were finally changed, it was about dusk and Ms. Delcambre needed 

to use a bathroom. She accepted Ms. George’s invitation to use the bathroom in her and 

Mr. Bell’s apartment and stayed to visit with them when she was done. Ms. George 

offered Ms. Delcambre another beer and the three sat and talked, telling jokes and 

laughing. According to Ms. Delcambre, Mr. Bell and Ms. George continued to drink 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

8

heavily even though, by her account, they were already “pretty drunk.” 2 RP at 121. Ms. 

Delcambre believed she only had two beers total that night. 

About an hour and a half into the visit, there was a sudden shift in the mood, 

according to Ms. Delcambre. She recalled them all laughing at something Ms. George 

said and then Mr. Bell stood up and “shook me really hard,” demanding to know what 

Ms. Delcambre was laughing at. 2 RP at 123. Ms. Delcambre was irritated and said 

something like, “Hey, don’t shake me like that. You know, keep your hands off me; I’m 

not Dorothea.” 2 RP at 181. Ms. Delcambre acknowledged at trial that she has a strong 

personality and does not back down easily. 

Ms. George told Ms. Delcambre, “Don’t pay him no mind, you know, don’t 

leave,” so Ms. Delcambre decided to ignore Mr. Bell. 2 RP at 125. She shifted her 

attention back to Ms. George while Mr. Bell got up and went to the bedroom. When he 

returned, he was carrying a machete in a sheath. Initially, she assumed he was just going 

to show it to them. However, she became worried when he took it out of the sheath, 

started playing with it, and was laughing.

Ms. Delcambre struggled to remember her 911 call, testifying she believed she 

called 911 while running into the bedroom. The recorded 911 call was admitted into 

evidence and played for the jury. On it, Ms. Delcambre sounds calm and reports that she 

was just assaulted and Mr. Bell had a machete. She seems to say that Mr. Bell was 

“jumping on” Ms. George as well. Ex. P-12, at 59 sec. to 1 min., 4 sec.; see also 2 RP at 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

9

194 (“I’m calling because I think my friend is in danger.”). The recording ends as the 

call is being transferred to dispatch and Ms. Delcambre says she was just “socked” in the 

head multiple times. Ex. P-12, at 2 min., 2 sec. to 2 min., 6 sec.

Ms. Delcambre did remember that after the call she ran to the bedroom and tried to 

shut the door but was followed by Mr. Bell who kicked the door in. She described the 

attack that followed:

I went into the bedroom. He came in. I was trying to close the door. He 

kicked in the door. So when he came in, there was nowhere else to go, so I 

went towards the closet. I went into the closet. I was in the corner of the 

closet, and that’s—I just kept saying, Okay, Raymond, the police are on 

their way. You should just leave. Raymond, the police are on their way. 

And he started chopping at me. And when he hit my hand, I just was so 

puzzled that he had did it. He was still laughing. So I just was, like, 

Raymond, you really—like, you really did—like, my hand’s on the 

ground—or seemed like it was on the ground to me. I’m, like, it was gone 

from my wrist.

So I just kept trying to talk him down and tell him that the police 

were leaving—I mean, were coming, whatever. 

And so he had attacked me. And I don’t know if the door closed, 

like, because I was in the closet, so I don’t know if it kind of closed or if it 

kind of came off of the track, but I kept trying to crawl in further and like, 

leave my—oh, God, I was so scared to have any limbs out. I just didn’t 

want him to cut another one off.

So I was just trying to get in the closet as tight as I could. And it just 

seemed like he got tired and the door kind of got in his way, and he just 

walked away. And I just thought, Oh, God, it’s over, like, God, they should 

be here soon, like—and then the next thing I know, he was coming back.

2 RP at 132-33. She said Mr. Bell “looked like the Joker” and “act[ed] like he was 

jousting and laughing” as he jabbed her. 2 RP at 183, 174. Following the blow to her 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

10

wrist, Ms. Delcambre said it “just kept squirting like a faucet.” 2 RP at 143. She had 

never seen so much blood. 

Ms. Delcambre estimated it was only minutes after he left that Mr. Bell came back 

and started attacking her again. He chopped her in the head, cutting through her skull and 

slicing off some of her hair. During the second attack, Ms. Delcambre “felt then that he 

was trying to kill me,” so she pretended he had, after the first blow. 2 RP at 142. When 

Mr. Bell struck her again, she kept her eyes closed and acted like she did not feel 

anything even though she did. Mr. Bell finally left when Ms. George came into the 

bedroom and told him to stop. 

Other State witnesses

The State’s other witnesses were the Spokane Police Department dispatcher, three

Spokane police officers who responded to the 911 call, the assigned detective, an 

emergency physician from Sacred Heart Hospital in Spokane, and a hand surgeon from 

Harborview Medical Center.

The first police officer to respond to the 911 call found Ms. Delcambre in the 

Bell/George apartment, lying inside the back-bedroom closet blood soaked, and holding a 

towel to her hand. He immediately applied a tourniquet, which her doctors testified

saved Ms. Delcambre from dying from loss of blood.

Medical witnesses testified that Ms. Delcambre’s injuries were extensive and lifethreatening. Her right hand was nearly entirely cut off at the wrist and required multiple 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

11

surgeries to reattach. She had a laceration on her left thumb and a laceration to her scalp

that was two and a half to three inches deep. Both required staples to repair. She 

suffered a traumatic brain injury and continued to have memory issues. 

Responding officers found Mr. Bell in the first-floor hallway of the building. 

Officers testified that he appeared intoxicated, but also described him as not incapacitated 

in any respect. Corporal Brandon Lynch observed Mr. Bell’s communications with 

others, and testified that Mr. Bell was responsive, cooperative, and not confused. Officer 

Benjamin Yinger observed Mr. Bell comply with directions to show his hands and get on 

the ground. He, too, testified that Mr. Bell did not appear confused. When Officer 

Yinger interviewed Ms. George, she told him Mr. Bell had been on a four-day bender,

but did not tell Officer Yinger about any blackout.

Detective Paul Lebsock testified that if Mr. Bell had needed medical clearance or 

treatment for intoxication, it would have been documented, and there is no indication that 

anything of that sort occurred. The topic of intoxication came up in the detective’s direct 

examination. The prosecutor was questioning him about defenses he considers when 

engaged in an investigation, and the following testimony is identified as an issue on 

appeal:

Q. So in general, what types of defenses do you think of as part of your 

investigation?

A. Sure. Well, everybody has the right to defend themselves and 

another person from being attacked or unlawful injury, unlawful 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

12

assault. So you consider physical size. You do consider gender 

differences. You consider available weapons. You consider who 

might be the primary physical aggressor and then an appropriate 

level of defense to the point of self-defense without crossing the line 

into counteractive assault.

. . . Let’s say you have two individuals and one individual 

comes up and kind of shoulder bumps a kid in a hallway of the high 

school. . . . And the kid that gets shoulder bumped pulls a gun and 

shoots the guy. That’s an example of overstepping one’s boundary 

of self-defense.

Q. Pursuant to law enforcement evaluation?

A. Yes. The way we would interpret the law. We don’t write the law, 

but we try to interpret the law and work within the law with what the 

legislative branch has put forward.

Q. But these are the types of things you look—you consider when 

you’re going into any type of an incident such as one like this?

A. Sure. You evaluate levels of force that’s appropriate in defense of 

one’s self or another.

Q. And then what about intoxication, does that ever play into your 

analysis?

A. So our role is to look at the law the way the law is written, and, 

really, intoxication is not—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. This is law that the 

judge is going to be instructing on, not testimony of this witness.

THE COURT: Right. If we could shift to a different . . .

[PROSECUTOR]: Will do.

2 RP at 292-94. Defense counsel did not move to strike the aborted testimony or request 

any curative instruction.
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

13

Raymond Bell testimony

Mr. Bell was the only witness called in the defense case. He testified that he could 

not remember what happened on the night he assaulted Ms. Delcambre because he was 

drunk and had been binge drinking for a few days. He testified that he had also been 

smoking crack cocaine for about a day. 

He recalled seeing Ms. Delcambre outside in the parking lot, and knew she came 

up to his apartment with her dog. He remembered going to the store to buy beer. He 

remembered sitting on the couch with Ms. George while Ms. Delcambre sat on a chair. 

He remembered watching television, smoking a cigarette, talking, and drinking a beer. 

He said the last thing he remembered before blacking out was the three of them just 

talking. 

He testified he did not recall being snapped out of the blackout by Ms. George. 

He claimed his next memory after just talking was someone putting handcuffs on him,

and sleeping in the jail for four days. He had no injuries from the incident. He testified 

he had not wanted to hurt or kill Ms. Delcambre and did not intentionally assault her. 

Verdict, sentence and appeal

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge, but found 

Mr. Bell guilty of first degree assault with a deadly weapon.

At sentencing, Mr. Bell’s offender score of 8 resulted in a standard range of 209-

277 months. With the 24-month deadly weapon enhancement, his total standard range 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

14

was 233-301 months. The State recommended a high end sentence of 301 months, while 

Mr. Bell requested consideration of an exceptional sentence below the standard range. 

He offered five possible mitigating factors, the first being his age—55—which he 

argued meant he had, or soon would, age out of criminal behavior. He argued that a 

lengthy sentence would waste State resources by burdening it with medical expenses and 

others costs, and fail to give Mr. Bell “the chance of an opportunity to improve himself.” 

2 RP at 436. He submitted that the fact that he came from a low socioeconomic class, 

was a person of color, and had a criminal history spanning the majority of his life, should 

call into question “how the system and failures in our criminal justice system had affected 

his offender score.” 2 RP at 437. He argued that the trial evidence revealed Ms. 

Delcambre to be “an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.” 

2 RP at 437-38. Finally, he expressed remorse and testified that the assault was “not 

something he ever intended to do.” 2 RP at 439.

The trial court denied the request for an exceptional sentence and sentenced Mr. 

Bell to 250 months for the first degree assault conviction and 24 months for the deadly 

weapon enhancement, for a total period of confinement of 274 months. Mr. Bell appeals. 

He recently filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental assignment of error, and 

we have granted him leave to assign error supplementally to the trial court’s imposition 

of the $500 victim penalty assessment provided by former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) (2018).
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

15

ANALYSIS

Mr. Bell makes four assignments of error. He challenges the denial of his motion 

to require face shields rather than face masks for jurors, Detective Lebsock’s interrupted 

answer to the question about intoxication, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s 

refusal to impose an exceptional sentence.

I. USE BY PROSPECTIVE JURORS OF FACE MASKS DURING VOIR DIRE DID NOT VIOLATE 

MR. BELL’S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY

Mr. Bell’s first assignment of error is that the trial court violated his constitutional 

right to a fair trial before an impartial jury by denying his objection to prospective jurors 

wearing N95 or other masks during voir dire.4

Both the United States and Washington State Constitutions provide a right to trial 

by an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST.

art. I, § 22. Seating a biased juror violates the right. State v. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 

2d 843, 851, 456 P.3d 869 (citing State v. Irby, 187 Wn. App. 183, 193, 347 P.3d 1103 

(2015)). A juror demonstrates actual bias when he exhibits “a state of mind . . . in 

reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged 

person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of 

the party challenging.” RCW 4.44.170(2). Voir dire, the part of jury selection wherein 

 

4 He characterizes his motion as having objected to jurors wearing masks 

throughout the entirety of the criminal case, but his motion in limine spoke only of voir 

dire and relied on reasoning that applied only to voir dire. See CP at 24-26. Any 

objection to jurors wearing face masks during trial is unpreserved. RAP 2.5(a).
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

16

the parties ask questions and engage in discussion with potential jurors to draw out 

potential bias, is central to securing the right to an impartial jury. State v. Bell, ___ Wn. 

App. 2d ___, 529 P.3d 448, 454 (2023) (citing State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 152, 217 

P.3d 321 (2009)). The ability to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals 

who compose it, is a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and 

qualifications of potential jurors. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 167 

L. Ed. 2d 1014 (2007).

A second purpose of voir dire is to “gain[ ] knowledge to enable an intelligent 

exercise of peremptory challenges.” State v. Lupastean, 200 Wn.2d 26, 35, 513 P.3d 781 

(2022) (quoting CrRLJ 6.4(b)). Unlike constitutionally-required challenges for cause, 

however, peremptory challenges are “merely one rule-based component of the trial 

process, which must be limited by courts and may be eliminated altogether.” Id. at 43.

Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to see that voir dire is effective in 

obtaining an impartial jury and that this result is obtained with reasonable expedition. 

State v. Brady, 116 Wn. App. 143, 146-47, 64 P.3d 1258 (2003) (citing State v. 

Frederiksen, 40 Wn. App. 749, 753, 700 P.2d 369 (1985)). The court’s discretion is 

limited only by the need to assure a fair trial by an impartial jury. Brady, 116 Wn. App. 

at 147 (citing Frederiksen, 40 Wn. App. at 752). We review a trial court’s ruling on the 

conduct of voir dire for an abuse of discretion. Id.
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

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Mr. Bell provides no legal authority from any jurisdiction holding that requiring 

face masks for public safety during voir dire violates a criminal defendant’s right to an 

impartial jury. The issue has been addressed, as pointed out by the State’s response brief, 

and the universal response has been that a defendant is able to assess a juror’s credibility 

and demeanor while the juror is wearing a face mask. See Br. of Resp’t at 36-40 

(collecting cases).

Following the parties’ briefing on appeal, Division One of our court addressed an 

identical challenge by a different defendant named Bell, who also moved his trial court to 

employ face shields rather than face masks for the voir dire process. Bell, 529 P.3d at 

454. Like the State’s briefing in this case, Division One observed that courts that have 

seen challenges to their jurisdiction’s pandemic-induced jury selection procedures “have 

uniformly rejected these challenges.” Id. at 456. Bell points out that a common theme in 

courts’ treatment of such challenges, with which the Bell court agreed, is that “parties’ 

inability to see a juror’s mouth and nose deprives them of access to only a small part of 

their demeanor.” Id. at 457 (citing cases). Another common theme with which Division 

One agreed is the “countervailing need to provide for safety of all participants in the 

midst of a pandemic.” Id. at 457-58 (citing cases).

As recounted in Bell, Washington courts adopted a variety of strategies to ensure 

that trials could go forward safely during the pandemic. In an order issued in June 2020, 

the Washington State Supreme Court required courts to “conduct all [jury trial] 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

18

proceedings consistent with the most protective applicable public health guidance in their 

jurisdiction.” Ord. re: Modification of Jury Trial Proc., In re Statewide Response by 

Washington State Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, No. 25700-B-631, 

at 3 (Wash. June 18, 2020). As pointed out in Bell, the Supreme Court’s order

contemplated face masking and explicitly permitted the use of remote technology in jury 

selection, a dramatic change to the usual voir dire procedure, to reduce the risk of 

coronavirus exposure. Bell, 529 P.3d at 455.

The reasoning of Bell is sound, and we follow it. Evaluated in light of its 

reasoning, Raymond Bell’s is a particularly weak challenge. Since prospective jurors 

were instructed before voir dire questioning began to lower their masks when speaking, 

defense counsel was prevented from seeing only the lower faces of venire members who 

were not speaking, but listening. The constitutional concern is with “for cause” 

challenges, and it is hard to imagine that a venire member’s frowning, grimacing, 

smiling, or laughing that was revealed only by their lower face, while listening to others,

would support a challenge for actual bias. 

It is also the case that safety concerns were very real at the time and place of 

Raymond Bell’s trial. This was demonstrated by defense counsel’s own request for 

additional alternate jurors and the ability to excuse for cause a juror whose ability to 

focus on the evidence would be impaired by pandemic-related concerns. As pointed out 

in the record made by the trial court, Spokane County had a low vaccination rate and was
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

19

experiencing high numbers of Delta variant cases and hospitalizations. Like the trial 

court in Division One’s Bell decision, the trial court in this case did not abuse its 

discretion by requiring jurors to wear face masks during jury selection.

II. NO TRIAL COURT ERROR IS IDENTIFIED BY MR. BELL’S SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

Mr. Bell’s second assignment of error is that “[e]videntiary and constitutional 

error . . . occurred” when the jury heard a statement from Detective Lebsock that Mr. Bell

characterizes as “intoxication does not matter to Mr. Bell’s guilt.” Appellant’s Opening 

Br. at 1. What occurred was that after the detective answered questions about how he 

evaluates the possibility that a suspect has a valid defense against a charge (and 

specifically, a defense of self-defense), the prosecutor’s next question and the beginning 

of an answer drew an objection:

Q. And then what about intoxication, does that ever play into your 

analysis?

A. So our role is to look at the law the way the law is written, and, 

really, intoxication is not—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. This is law that the 

judge is going to be instructing on, not testimony of this witness.

THE COURT: Right. If we could shift to a different . . .

[PROSECUTOR]: Will do.

2 RP at 293. As can be seen, the question was never fully answered, and the defense 

objection was sustained. There was no motion by defense counsel to strike the partial 

answer. The State makes these points in its response brief.
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

20

In reply, Mr. Bell baldly asserts that no one “was under any illusion that Officer 

Lebsock’s opinion was one that mocked the idea that intoxication was pertinent to 

wrongdoing,” that the partial statement was “improper opinion testimony on guilt,” and 

that it was “manifest constitutional error.” Reply Br. at 9-11. None of these contentions 

is adequately explained. We reject all of them. 

Given his decades of law enforcement work, Detective Lebsock could have been 

familiar with how the jury would be instructed, and he might have been about to say

something like, “intoxication is not something that automatically relieves a person of 

criminal responsibility, but it can be relevant to whether he acted with intent.”5 Of 

course, if the detective was about to testify to whether intoxication was a defense, or how, 

then anything he had to say would be objectionable. The objection was properly 

sustained. 

Defense counsel could have asked the court to strike the partial answer and 

instruct jurors that they would receive their instruction on the law from the court.6 The 

 

5 The jury was later instructed by the trial court’s instruction 23, “No act 

committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal because

⎯by reason of that condition. However, evidence of intoxication may be considered in 

determining whether the defendant acted with premeditated intent and/or intent.” 2 RP at 

368.

6 Before its deliberations, the jury was instructed, “It is also your duty to accept 

the law from my instructions regardless of what you personally believe the law is or what 

you think it should be. You must apply the law from my instructions to the facts that you 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

21

court was not required to do either, because the defense did not ask it to. E.g., State v. 

Severns, 19 Wn.2d 18, 20, 141 P.2d 142 (1943) (appellant did not see fit to move to strike 

at trial, and could not complain on appeal); accord State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 728, 

582 P.2d 558 (1978) (citing State v. Jones, 70 Wn.2d 591, 424 P.2d 665 (1967)). No 

error by the trial court is shown.

III. THE EVIDENCE OF FIRST DEGREE ASSAULT WAS SUFFICIENT 

Mr. Bell’s third assignment of error is that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the jury’s verdict that he was guilty of first degree assault, and specifically insufficient on

the element of intent. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State to 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 

(1980). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all 

reasonable inferences that a trier of fact can draw from the evidence. State v. Salinas, 

119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence 

are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We 

defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and 

 

decide have been proved and in this way decide the case,” 2 RP at 356, and later, “The 

law is contained in my instructions to you. You must disregard any remark, statement, or 

argument that is not supported by the evidence or the law in my instructions.” Id. at 358. 

Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 

578, 586, 355 P.3d 253 (2015).
No. 38671-6-III

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22

the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 

(1990), abrogated in part on other grounds, State v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d 282, 505 

P.3d 529 (2022).

To convict Mr. Bell of first degree assault, the State was required to present 

evidence that with the intent to inflict great bodily harm, he assaulted Ms. Delcambre 

with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). “Great bodily harm” means “bodily 

injury which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent 

disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function 

of any bodily part or organ.” RCW 9A.04.110(4)(c). Evidence of intent to inflict great 

bodily harm “‘is to be gathered from all of the circumstances of the case, including not 

only the manner and act of inflicting the wound, but also the nature of the prior 

relationship and any previous threats.’” State v. Ferreira, 69 Wn. App. 465, 468-69, 850 

P.2d 541 (1993) (quoting State v. Woo Won Choi, 55 Wn. App. 895, 906, 781 P.2d 505 

(1989)). “Specific intent cannot be presumed, but it can be inferred as a logical 

probability from all the facts and circumstances.” State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 

883 P.2d 320 (1994).

Mr. Bell points to the evidence that he had experienced blackouts in the past and 

that he had been up for four days, drinking and smoking crack cocaine, to argue that the 

jury could not have found he was “capable of desiring and purposefully trying to achieve 

the outcome of great bodily harm.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30. A further reason he 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

23

argues the jury could not find that he acted with the specific intent to harm Ms. 

Delcambre was because “[t]here was no showing of prior threats or altercations, or 

enmity between the two.” Id. at 31. This was a plausible defense theory, and it was 

reasonable for Mr. Bell to argue that he lacked the required specific intent based on the 

evidence he identifies. But the State presented countervailing evidence and argument.

Mr. Bell’s testimony and that of Ms. George that he was in a blackout state and 

did not know what he was doing could have been viewed by the jury as biased and selfserving. The jury could view police officers who dealt with Mr. Bell immediately after 

the assault as more reliable witnesses to his condition. While the officers agreed that Mr. 

Bell appeared intoxicated, they described him as not requiring medical intervention for 

his intoxication and as fully able to cooperate with instructions, perform physical tasks, 

and communicate with the officers. Officer Yinger was one of the first two officers to 

arrive at the apartment building in response to the 911 calls, encountering Mr. Bell in the 

first-floor hallway on entering the building. Asked by the prosecutor whether Mr. Bell 

appeared “vacant,” or “blank,” as described by Ms. George, Officer Yinger answered, no

to both questions. 2 RP at 200. 

The jurors were presented with evidence that decades earlier, while in high school, 

Mr. Bell had been friends with Ms. Delcambre, and before the night of the assault 

nothing had happened to alter their relationship. More compelling to jurors, however,

could have been that on that March evening, Mr. Bell had been dressed down by Ms. 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

24

Delcambre, had responded by telling her to be quiet, had told her to “[g]et the ‘F’ out of 

my house,” 2 RP at 40, and, after fighting with her physically without his machete, 

retrieved the machete, returned, and unsheathed it. Those facts, the severity of the 

injuries inflicted, Ms. Delcambre’s testimony, and even Ms. George’s description of Mr. 

Bell “chopping and chopping” at Ms. Delcambre, 2 RP at 43, was ample evidence from 

which to find the required specific intent.

IV. MR. BELL’S STANDARD RANGE SENTENCE IS NOT APPEALABLE

Mr. Bell’s final assignment of error is that the court erroneously deemed the facts 

he identified as supporting an exceptional sentence not to be compelling. He 

acknowledges that by statute, a sentence within the standard range shall not be appealed. 

But he argues that we should treat his case as presenting an exception that exists for

“categorical refusals” to impose such a sentence. He asks us to “deem” the court’s 

findings that Mr. Bell’s case for mitigation was not compelling as “a categorical 

statement that the factors could not support a sentence below the standard range.” 

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 36. 

The fixing of legal punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function, and 

includes the power of the legislature to provide a minimum and maximum term within 

which a trial court can exercise discretion. State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 180, 713 

P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986) (citing State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 169, 103 P. 27 

(1909)). The power of the legislature in this respect “‘is plenary and subject only to 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

25

constitutional provisions against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.’” Id. 

(quoting State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360 (1937)).

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, provides that 

“[t]he court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if 

it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling 

reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added). It 

provides that “[t]he court may impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range 

if it finds that mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” RCW 9.94A.535(1) (emphasis added). It provides a nonexclusive list of 

mitigation circumstances, one being that “[t]o a significant degree, the victim was an 

initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.” RCW 

9.94A.535(1)(a).

RCW 9.94A.585(1) provides that “[a] sentence within the standard range . . . for 

an offense shall not be appealed.” As a matter of constitutional avoidance (given the

constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases)

7

, the Supreme Court held in Ammons that 

the provision “only preclud[es] appellate review of challenges to the amount of time 

imposed when the time is within the standard range,” and “[w]hen the sentence given is 

within th[at] . . . range, then as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion.” 

 

7 Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides, in part, “In 

criminal prosecutions the accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases.”
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

26

Ammons, 105 Wn.2d at 182-83; accord State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 126, 456 

P.3d 806 (2020). A trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses categorically to 

impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range under any circumstances or 

consider it for a class of offenders—both are, effectively a failure to exercise discretion.

Id. Another example of an impermissible basis for denying such a sentence occurs where 

the court operates under the mistaken belief that it lacks discretion. State v. McFarland, 

189 Wn.2d 47, 56-57, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017). In cases in which an impermissible basis 

for refusing to impose such a sentence is found, it is because the appellant is able to point 

to evidence in the record that there was or could have been a categorical refusal or a 

misapprehension by the court of its discretion.

Mr. Bell does not point to any evidence that the trial court categorically refused to 

consider the theories of mitigation he advanced, or that it misapprehended its discretion. 

The court’s decision denying an exceptional sentence reveals that it was complying with 

RCW 9.94A.535’s requirement that to impose a sentence outside the standard range, it 

must “find[ ], considering the purpose of [the SRA], that there are substantial and 

compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” The court explained:

That body camera was some of the most horrific images I’ve ever seen. I 

appreciated the fact that you demonstrated remorse. And I actually believe 

it was genuine, as opposed to playing up to the jury, because it is so 

disturbing to watch.

. . . .
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

27

. . . As it relates to the request for a downward, the aging out of 

criminal behavior, unfortunately, the past speaks for what you’ve done. 

And most folks age out before they’re 55. They’re not doing this when 

they’re in their mid 50s. So that’s not a particularly compelling argument 

for me.

With release motivating—potential for an early release motivating 

you for an opportunity to improve yourself, as I went through the prior 

convictions, they sort of graduated in severity instead of taking the 

advantage of being out and not committing further crimes. And probably 

a good example of that is why I respectfully disagree with you on the 

washing out of the juveniles, because you couldn’t go five consecutive 

years without being convicted of another crime. And that’s problematic.

It’s also problematic that you were on probation at the time, because 

the whole point of probation is serving your sentence outside the prison 

walls, so to speak, even though it’s a misdemeanor, to help people so that 

they can stop—they can fix whatever’s going on that’s making them make 

bad choices.

So I don’t think that any of the mitigating circumstances support a 

substantial or a compelling reason to justify an exceptional downward.

. . . .

And I agree that the criminal—excuse me, the court system, I 

believe Ms. Delcambre said it, it’s not just, especially for people of color. 

And you do have to kind of wonder what it would be like if that weren’t the 

case. So that’s factoring into my mind too.

I’m also taking into account—because I’m sure—I believe you when 

you say you didn’t intend to do that. I don’t think you intended to try to kill 

her or cut off her hand. So I think that, when you’re sober, you probably 

are a really good guy who has a lot of potential. And I hope that you take 

advantage of that.

Unfortunately, I get to see people at their worst. But I am taking 

into account that there is some potential for you, especially—in my box that 

I have to work with, it’s a very lengthy sentence. And I’m well aware of 

that. In taking into consideration your age, starting at—what I do is I look 

at the midpoint, which is 242 months, and then sort of say, Okay, are there 

things that go either way, up or down. One of the things that doesn’t go 

down for me is that there was evidence at trial that the ruckus, for lack of a 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

28

better word, in the living room had ceased and that it was the coming back 

that did it. Sort of like whatever beef you had with Ms. Delcambre 

stopped, and then it was a light switch, and I believe “going ballistic” was 

the testimony.

And I know Ms. George has been supportive of you, and I 

understand that, but I remember her testimony in particular when she talked 

about how you kept chopping. And certainly, the crime scene was 

consistent with that. So that sort of puts it out.

And like I said, that was one of the most horrific body-worn cameras 

that I had seen. Frankly, I was surprised—I had no idea that Ms. 

Delcambre’s hand was able to be reconnected after looking at the pictures. 

So when she came in to testify, I was, frankly, kind of surprised that she 

had a hand there. So this was a horrific, horrific situation. So that moves it 

up from the midrange.

So I am imposing 250 months with the 24 months of—based on the 

deadly weapon enhancement.

And I know that you folks—there’s never enough time that’s going 

to make you whole or make you unsee what you saw, but I am taking into 

account your age. It’s a significant sentence for a significant crime.

2 RP at 470-74. 

Mr. Bell’s argument that the court’s finding that his reasons were not compelling 

is a “categorical refusal” would make the denial of an exceptional sentence appealable in 

every case. His arguments on appeal are foreclosed by RCW 9.94A.585(1).

V. SUPPLEMENTALLY ASSIGNED ERROR TO VICTIM PENALTY ASSESSMENT

Following the effective date of Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1169, which was 

passed by the Washington Legislature in its 2023 regular session, Mr. Bell requested 

leave to file a supplemental assignment of error to the sentencing court’s imposition of 

the $500 victim penalty assessment provided by former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a). The bill 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

29

adds a new subsection (4) to the statute, which provides, “The court shall not impose the 

penalty assessment under this section if the court finds that the defendant, at the time of 

sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).” LAWS OF 2023, 

ch. 449, § 1. The record reflects that the sentencing court found Mr. Bell to be indigent. 

He is entitled to the benefit of the change, which became effective while his case was 

pending on appeal. State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 749, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). We 

granted Mr. Bell leave to assign error to the assessment, and we will remand to the trial 

court with directions to make the ministerial correction striking the assessment.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

In a pro se statement of “additional grounds” (SAG), Mr. Bell raises four. 

SAG 1: Inferior Degree Instruction 

Mr. Bell’s jury was instructed on the inferior degree offense of second degree 

assault.8 Citing State v. Coryell, 197 Wn.2d 397, 483 P.3d 98 (2020), and State v. Foster, 

91 Wn.2d 466, 589 P.2d 789 (1979), Mr. Bell argues that “[w]hen a crime has been 

proven against a person and there exist[s] a reasonable doubt as to which of the 2 or 

more degrees he or she is guilty, he or she shall be convicted only of the lowest degree.” 

SAG at 2. Those cases discuss when a defendant is entitled to an inferior degree 

 

8 The court’s instructions defined second degree assault, identified its elements, 

and told jurors, “The defendant is charged in Count II with first-degree assault. If, after 

full and careful deliberation on this charge, you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant is guilty, then you will consider whether the defendant is guilty 

of the lesser crime of second-degree assault.” 2 RP at 368 (Jury Instruction 24).
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

30

instruction and the notice required to subject a defendant to conviction of an inferior 

degree offense. See Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at 400 (“This case concerns the test to be 

applied when determining whether to instruct the jury on a lesser included or lesser 

degree offense.”); Foster, 91 Wn.2d at 471-73 (holding defendant had sufficient notice, 

in light of the charging documents and jury instructions). 

Since Mr. Bell’s jury was instructed on second degree assault, his SAG argument 

appears to be, in substance, an argument that substantial evidence does not support the 

verdict that he was guilty of first degree assault. That argument was adequately 

presented by Mr. Bell’s counsel, and we have rejected it. See RAP 10.10(a) (SAGs are to 

be addressed to matters not adequately addressed by counsel’s brief).

SAG 2: Violation of CrR 4.7 

Mr. Bell argues that CrR 4.7 was violated because he did not receive any 

paperwork on his case until 30 days after the third omnibus hearing. “CrR 4.7 is a 

reciprocal discovery rule that separately lists the prosecutor’s and defendant’s obligations 

when engaging in discovery.” State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 826, 845 P.2d 1017 

(1993). Under CrR 4.7, prosecutors have “a duty to disclose and to preserve evidence 

that is material and favorable to the defendant.” Id. “If the State fails to disclose such 

evidence or comply with a discovery order, a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair 

trial may be violated; as a remedy, a trial court can grant a continuance, dismiss the 

action, or enter another appropriate order.” State v. Barry, 184 Wn. App. 790, 796, 339 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

31

P.3d 200 (2014). To support a motion to dismiss based on a discovery violation, a 

defendant must show not only that the State failed to act with due diligence and withheld 

material facts, but also that the discovery violation “‘essentially compelled the defendant 

to choose between two distinct rights’: the right to a speedy trial and the right to 

adequately prepared counsel.” Id. at 797 (quoting State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 583, 

23 P.3d 1046 (2001)).

While Mr. Bell is not required to reference the record in an SAG, he must “inform 

the court of the nature and occurrence of alleged errors.” RAP 10.10(c). He does not; 

nevertheless, we identified two points in the record where Mr. Bell complained to the 

court about delayed discovery. In December 2019, he complained about not receiving 

discovery from his attorney, who he was asking the court to replace:

THE DEFENDANT: . . . Well, I haven’t received no discovery, 

no—none of my paperwork’s—since I been here nine months, I haven’t 

received no police reports, no discovery, no kind of papers from them, even 

to come at me with any kind of offer. And I just feel that I need a new 

attorney to represent me.

[THE STATE]: And, Your Honor, for clarification, I did sign off on 

an agreed order for—to provide redacted police reports to Mr. Bell. That 

was at Mr. Zeller’s request. Mr. Poston, I think, had initially asked for that, 

but then he left the public defender’s office and the case had to be 

reassigned. So that should be provided to Mr. Bell with the proper order 

that says that he can’t, you know, take back to his cell and whatnot. And 

we have made an offer to Mr. Zeller. Mr. Poston and I didn’t even get that 

far as far as negotiation.
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

32

2 RP at 8-9. Five months later, and well more than a year before his October 2021 trial, 

Mr. Bell presented another motion to replace his counsel and repeated similar discovery 

grievances: 

THE DEFENDANT: I’m here today to exercise my constitutional 

rights to address the Court regarding this injustice inflicted upon me during 

these judicial proceedings. Time after time I have been stonewalled in my 

attempts to be involved in my case. I have been denied proper access to the 

last evidence against me and adequate counsel to represent me.

. . . .

On November—on November 22nd my attorney tried to persuade 

me to take a plea offer because the prosecutor gave me a two-week 

deadline. My last omnibus hearing was on 10/25/2019, trial readiness call 

on November 4th, 2019. I have not received a police report, affidavit of 

facts, bill of particular, or discovery. I got a speedy note on December 4th 

of 2019 saying I would be getting ready active police report. That’s a 

violation of my Criminal Rule 4.7 discovery and a violation of my 

constitutional rights to a fair trial. Conflict of interest, effective 

assistance—ineffective assistance by counsel, refusal to help me correct my 

offender score history because I pointed out in my juvenile records, 1984, I 

have been walking through it, he won’t correct it. And I’m—I’ve been 

asking him to fix it. . . .

. . . .

MR. ZELLER: . . . We got Mr. Bell’s police reports that he 

requested, I believe, in December of 2019. There’s a protective order on 

them, but they should be at the jail for him to access if he needs those.

3 RP at 4-6, 9. 

Nevertheless, we find no evidence that Mr. Bell ever filed a motion seeking a 

remedy for an alleged violation of CrR 4.7, and he fails to identify resulting prejudice. 

Any issue is unpreserved. RAP 2.5(a).
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

33

SAG 3: Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Mr. Bell next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by trying to force 

a plea deal in October 2019 and that its amendment of the information in February 2020 

to add the attempted first degree murder charge was “improper,” as “[o]vercharging.” 

SAG at 4-6. 

The history and nature of plea negotiations is not reflected in the record. If Mr. 

Bell has evidence to support a tenable claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 

making the plea offer, his remedy is to seek relief by a personal restraint petition. See 

State v. Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 27-28, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991). 

As for the amendment to the information, under CrR 2.1(d), “[t]he court may 

permit any information or bill of particulars to be amended at any time before verdict or 

finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” It is not evident if Mr. 

Bell ever argued that his substantial rights were prejudiced when the amendment was

made. As for overcharging, we note that at least some of the jurors were prepared to find 

Mr. Bell guilty of the attempted murder charge.

We decline review because the nature and occurrence of the alleged errors are not 

clearly identified. RAP 10.10(c). 

SAG 4: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Finally, Mr. Bell claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on four 

occasions: (1) when counsel refused to argue wash-out for his juvenile convictions and 
No. 38671-6-III

State v. Bell 

34

tried to persuade him to enter a plea agreement, (2) when counsel failed to provide 

discovery in a timely manner, (3) when counsel “refuse[d] to work with me” at a trial 

readiness hearing, and, (4) when counsel told him to “be quiet and let the prosecutor 

amend an improper amendment.” SAG at 4, 7-8. The claim of ineffective assistance is 

based on factual allegations outside the record. If Mr. Bell has evidence to support his 

allegations, and can demonstrate the required prejudice, he may seek relief by a personal 

restraint petition. See Norman, 61 Wn. App. at 27-28. 

Mr. Bell’s judgment and sentence are affirmed, with the exception of the 

assessment of the $500 victim penalty assessment. We remand to the trial court with 

directions to make the ministerial correction striking the assessment.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040.

Siddoway, J.P.T.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J. Pennell, J.