PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 1 2

- 4137

_____________

M.R. ; J.R., PARENTS OF MINOR CHILD E.R

.

v.

RIDLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT

,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States Dis trict Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court No. 2

- 11

- c v

- 0 2235 ) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

Argued October 1 7 , 20132 Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 20, 2014 )

John F r ancis X. Reilly , Esquire (Argued)
230 N orth Monroe Street Media, PA 19063

- 2908

Counsel for Appellant

Alan L . Yatvin , Esquire (Argued) Popper & Yatvin
Suite 503
230 South Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellee s

O P I N I O N

LIPEZ

, Circuit Judge :

Th e ―stay

- put‖ provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (―IDEA‖) s tates that a disabled child shall remain in his or her current educational setting

*Honorabl e Kermit V. Lipez, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting by designation.3 during the pendency of proceedings to resolve a d is pute over the child‘s placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). This case

r equires us to decide two issues of first impression in this Circuit concerning the obligation of school districts to pay for private school education during th at interim p eriod : (1)
whether parents are eligible for reimbursement for private
school costs if they do not file a claim seeking payment until after a court has ruled in favor of t he school district , and (2)
whether the right to i nterim funding , if applicable, ext ends through the time of a judicial appe al

.

T he d istrict c ourt answered both questions in t he
affirmative. It thus held that defendant Ridley School District (―Ridley‖ ) must reimburse the plaintiff parents for the cost of roughly three years of their daughter‘s private school tuition notwithstanding judicial findings disagreeing with the hearin g officer

– rendered before the parents sought payment

– that Ridley had complied with the IDEA by offer ing the child a free, appropriate education in its own schools

.

For the reasons that follow

, we affirm the d istrict

c ourt‘s judgment.

I.

This court has previously described in detail the
d ispute between Ridley and the plaintiff s

– M.R. and J.R.

– over the educational placement of plaintiffs‘ daughter, E.R. See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R. , 680 F.3d 260 , 264

- 67 (3d Cir. 2012) (― Ridley I

‖)

. We briefly re view here the fact ual and procedural background pertinent to the legal issues now
before us.4 E.R. attended kindergarten and first grade at Grace Park Elementary School in the Ridley School District during
the 2006

- 2007 and 2007

- 2008 school years , receivi ng special services to address her learning disabilities and health

- related problems . During the summer after first grade, plaintiffs concluded that the public school was not meet ing their daughter‘s needs

, and they enrolled her at a private school,
Bench mark, that specializes in educating students with learning disabilities. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education claiming, inter alia, that Ridley had violated the IDEA and the
Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide E.R. with a suitable
Individualized Education P rogram (―IEP‖), thereby denying
her the ―free appropriate public education‖ (―FAPE‖) required by those laws

. 1 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a ) (1)(A) ; 29

1 The IDEA requires sc hool districts to develop IEPs for
children with disabilities to specify how they will be provide d
with a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (detailing the framework for evaluating a child and creating an IEP). The statute
describes a FAPE as ―special education and related services‖
that

—

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational

agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool,

e lementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and5 U.S.C. § 794. 2 Among other remedies, plaintiffs sough t reimbursement for the cost of sending E.R. to Benchmark for second grade

. 3

On April 21, 2009, a n administrative hearing officer found that Ridley had committed no violations during E.R.‘s kindergarten year, but that E.R. was denied a FAPE for part
of f irst grade and all of second grade. The hearing officer

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

2 Section 794, more familiarly known as Sect ion 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, prohibits discrimination in public schools

– among other federally funded programs

– on the basis of disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(B); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a). We explained in Ridley I that ―§ 504‘s  ̳nega tive prohibition‘ is similar to the IDEA‘s  ̳affirmative duty‘‖ and also requires schools that receive federal financial assistance to provide qualified students with a FAPE. See 680 F.3d at 280 (quoting W.B. v. Matula , 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995),
abr ogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.
Schs. , 486 F.3d 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007)).

3 In moving E.R. to private school without the school district‘s acquiescence, the parents were initially responsible
for her tuition and other costs. At issue in this case is the extent, if any, of the school district‘s reimbursement obligation.6 awarded compensatory education for the 2007

- 2008 school year (when E.R. attended first grade at the public school) and
ordered Ridley to reimburse the p laintiffs for the tuition and transportation co sts associated with E.R.‘s enrollment at
Benchmark in 2008

- 2009

. 4 Nearly two years later, in February 2011, a federal district court reversed the hearing
officer‘s placement assessment

, finding that Ridley ‘s proposed IEP w as adequate and, hence, that the s chool d istrict
had offered E.R. a FAPE in the local public school. This

c ourt affirmed the d istrict c ourt‘s ruling on May 17, 2012. See Ridley I , 680 F.3d at 2 83

.

Meanwhile, i n March 2011, after filing their appeal
from the d istrict c ourt‘s judgment, p laintiffs sent a letter to the school district requesting payment for E.R. ‘s Benchmark

costs from the date of the hearing officer‘s decision forward

– at that point, from April 2009 through s pring 2011

– pu rsuant to the IDEA‘s stay

- put provision

. See infr a Section II (describing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) and related authority)

. When

t he s chool d istrict declined to pay

, plaintiffs responded with
this action claiming that the IDEA required Ridley to finance
E.R.‘s private placement until all appeals had concluded in the previous litigation over the adequacy of her IEP.

Ridle y denied responsibility for the Benchmark

expenses on both procedural and substantive grounds. The

s chool d istrict asserted that the demand for interim tuition
was barred at the threshold b ecause it was untimely . This
argument rel ied on three theories: res judicata , the

4 E.R. remained at Benchmark for third, fourth and fifth grades as the case progressed through the courts, and her parents paid her tuition.7 compulsory counterclaim requirement of Fed eral Rule of Civil Procedure 13, and the statute of limitations. Ridley also
contended that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because

, by the time of their second IDEA lawsuit , the district court
had already held that Ridley had properly designated the local public school as E.R.‘s appropriate placement. The s chool
d istrict argued

, in effect

, that its validated placement
determ ination had become the baseline for determining the
parents ‘ entitle ment to a remedy and, accordingly, the IDEA did not provide for recover y of the private school costs.

On cross

- motions for judgment on the pleadings , the
d istrict c ourt ruled in favor of plaintiffs

. T he c ourt rejected each of Ridley‘s timeliness contentions and concluded that the IDEA‘s stay

- put provision entitled the parents to
reimbursement for the costs they incurred to send E.R. to
Benchmark for the entire period they had requested

. The

costs at issue

– $57,658.38 , as stipulated by the parties

– covered the approximately three years from the hearing officer‘s decision in April 2009 through proceedings in the court of appeals ( which had by then concluded with this
court‘s 2012 decis ion affirming the d istrict c ourt‘s judgment)

.

This appeal followed. Ridley again challenges both
the timeliness of plaintiffs‘ reimbursement claim and the legal
basis for the award. Our review of the district court‘s judgment on the pleadings is de n ovo. See Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp. , 609 F.3 d 239, 259 n.25 (3d Cir. 2010).8 II.

The premise of the IDEA is that parents and school s working together to design an IEP is the ideal way to reach
the statute‘s goal of a FAPE for every child

. See R i dley I

, 680 F.3d at 269; s ee also Schaffer v. Weast , 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). Congress anticipated, however, that ―the collaborative process‖ may at times break down

. Ridley I

, 680 F.3d at 269. Hence, the Act allows either party to respond to a stalemate in the discussions by requesting an impartial due process hearing before a state or local
administrative officer

. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) ; Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368

- 69 (1985) (― Burlington”) ; Ridley I , 680 F.3d at 269 . A variety of disputes may arise concerning placement. For example, the parents may argue for removing the child from public school because the y believe the services are inadequate . Or the school district might argue for the same result, over the parents‘ objection, because it considers the child too disruptive to be in a regular school setting. Alternatively, either party could be advocating for public

school placement

– with the school district insisting that an expensive specialized private sc hool is unnecessary or the parents insisting that participation in a regular classroom is essential for their child‘s development. See generally Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323

- 26 (1988) (discussing school system‘s limited authority to exclude disabled st udents); Burlington , 471 U.S. at 373 (stating that one purpose of the
stay

- put provision ―was to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular classroom over the parents‘ objection pending completion of the review proceedings‖);
id. at 3 69

- 70 ( discussing whether parents are entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition); Drinker v. Colonial9 Sch. Dist. , 78 F.3d 859, 861

- 63 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing parents‘ objection to school district‘s plan to move child from a placement outside the district to a local public school).

The parties have the right to s eek state or federal court review of the administrative decision , 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), and

– under the provision at issue in this case

– the child has the right to remain in hi s or her ―then

- current educational placement ‖ during the pendency of the dispute resolution proce edings

, id. § 1415(j). Section 1415(j) states, in pertinent part:

[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the Sta te or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child
shall remain in the then

- current educational placement of the child

. . . . 5

Th is provision, known as the IDEA‘s ― stay

- put rule, ‖ serves ―in essence, as an automatic preliminary inj unction

, ‖ Drinker

, 78 F.3d at 864 , reflecting Congress‘s conclusion that a child
with a disabilit y is best served by maintaining her educational status quo until the disagreement over her IEP is resolved

, Pardini v. Allegheny Interm

. Unit , 420 F.3d 181, 1 90 (3d Cir. 2005) ; Drinker , 78 F.3d at 864

. ―  ̳ Once a court ascertains the student‘s current educational placement, the movants are

5 The stay

- put provision wa s previously codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3). Its language did not change when it was
moved.10 entitled to an order [maintaining that placement] without satisfaction of the usual prerequisites to injunctive relief. ‘ ‖

D rinker , 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of
Educ. , No. 93

- 5123, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 439, 440 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 1993)) ; see also Pardini

, 420 F.3d at 188 (―Congress has already balanced the competing harms as well as the competing equities‖) ; Zvi D. v. Ambach , 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982) (― T he statute substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court‘s discretionary consideration of the
factors . . . .‖ )

.

The stay

- put rule thus requir es that the child‘s placement under the IDEA at the time a dis agreement arises between the parents and the school district

– what the statute
terms the ―then

- current educational placement‖

– be protected while the dispute is pending

. To determine that pla cement, this court has looked to the IEP ―actually functioning when the  ̳stay put‘ is invoked.‖ Drinker , 78 F.3d at 867 (citing Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. , 918 F.2d 618, 625

- 26 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. , 96
F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996) (― Raelee S. ‖)

. Th e operative placement could be either a public school or a private school
that the local district was f inanc ing to satisfy the requirement that every child be given a free

, appropriate education. See,

e.g., Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter , 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993) ( ―Congress intended that IDEA‘s promise of a  ̳free appropriate public education ‘ for disabled children would normally be met by an IEP‘s provision for education in the regular public schools or in pri vate schools chosen jointly by school officials and parents.‖); Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 8 6 (noting that providing a FAPE may involve ―  ̳ placement in11 private schools at public expense ‘ ‖ (quoting Burlington , 471
U.S. at 369 ) )

. 6

The stay

- put provision‘s prote ctive purpose means that ―it is often invoked by a child‘s parents in order to maintain a placement where the parents disagree with a change proposed by the school district.‖ See Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 83. During

― the pendency‖ of the dis pute process

, the child is entitled to
remain in her IEP

- specified educational setting

. 7 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Where the parents seek a change in placement , however, and unilaterally move their child from

an IEP

- specified program to their desired alternative setting

, the stay

- put rule does not immediately come into play

. Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 83. In such circumstances, the parents will be responsible for the costs of th e child‘s new placement

– at least initially.

The new placement can become the educational setti ng protected by the stay

- put rule if the parents and ―the State or
local educational agency‖ agree to the change

. S ee 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) . Also, importantly, a decision favorable to the parents during the administrative review process ―must be

6 If the dispute concerns a child who is applying for initial admission to a public school, the child ―shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school program‖ until the dispute resolution proceedings have
concluded. See 20 U.S.C. § 1514(j); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(b).

7 We have referred to this educational setting as the child‘s ―pendent placement‖

– a term of art drawn from t he language of § 1415(j). See Raelee S.

, 96 F.3d at 80 n.1.12 treated as an agreement between the State and the parents,‖ 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (d) ; see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (noting that an administrative decision in favor of the parents and private school placement ―would seem to constitute agreement by the S tate to the change of placement‖); Raelee
S. , 96 F.3d at 83 (citing Burlington )

. 8 Accordingly, a n administrative ruling validat ing the parents‘ decision to move
their child from an IEP

- specified public school to a private
school will, in essence, make the child‘s enrollment at the private school her ―then

- current educational placement‖ for purposes of the stay

- put rule. Having been endorsed by the State, the move to private school is no longer the parents‘ unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ―stay put ‖ at the private school for the duration of the dispute resolution proceedings. See Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 83

- 84.

Although § 1415(j) does not specify which party pays
when a child‘s pendent placement becomes a private school
based on an administrative de cision

, the school district‘s obligation to do so is well established by case law. See
Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 8 4 , 86

. Hence, the school district is

8 In Raelee S

. , this court declined to decide whether a decision in favor of the parents by a hearing officer

– as opposed to an administrative appellate panel

– ―would constitute agreement by t he state for purposes of pendent placement and tuition reimbursement.‖ See 96 F.3d at 85 n.8. The subsequently enacted Department of Education regulation addressing pendent placement explicitly includes a hearing officer‘s decision within the scope of th e pendent

placement protection, and we now do likewise. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(d).13 obliged to fund a private placement if it was either the educational setting prescribed by the current IEP or is subsequently designated by a hearing officer or administrative appeal official as the appropriate setting to meet a child‘s
needs. In this case, the stay

- put provision became effective in April 2009, when the hearing officer determined that Ridley
h ad denied E.R. a FAPE and concluded that Benchmark was her appropriate educational setting. E.R. could thus ―stay put‖ at Benchmark at the school district‘s expense while the court proceedings were pending . Because E.R. was entitled
to reimbursement for her costs at Benchmark beginning in April 2009, the parents could have requested that Ridley reimburse any tuition they already had paid for the remaining portion of the 2008

- 2009 school year and also could have
asked the school district to reimburse the B enchmark costs in the following years (or pay those amounts as they became due).

At issue in this case is whether th e school district‘s financial responsibility dissolves if the parents do not request
reimbursement for their out

- of

- pocket private school costs until after an administrative decision in their favor has been
reversed by a court upon further review . Ridley emphasizes
that the remedial subsection of the IDEA provision that
authoriz es ―[a]ny party aggrieved‖ by the administrative ruling to file a civil action allows a court to grant only ― such relief as the court determines is appropriate

. ‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (A), (i)(2) (C) (iii). 9 The s chool d istrict maintains

9 A civil action may be brought with ―respect to the [administrative] complaint,‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), and complaints may be filed ―with respect to any matter re lating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of14 that it was inappropriate in this case to award reimbursement for private schooli ng that the district court had found unnecessary by the time the request for payment was made. Ridley argues that the court ruling returned E.R.‘s placement

t o Grace Park Elementary School with respect to the s chool
d istrict‘s funding obligation, eliminat ing the justification for

any interim reimbursement. Ridley further asserts that, even
if we conclude that interim reimbursement is required under
the IDEA

, any obligation for interim funding does not include the period of the appeal to the Third Circuit.

Before confronting th ose merits argument s , we address Ridley‘s procedural claims.

III.

Ridley asserts that E.R.‘s parents should have demanded
tuition reimbursement for their daughter‘s pendent placement as part of the relief they requested throu gh counterclaims in
the earlier action , which was filed by the school district to challenge the hearing officer‘s ruling. Ridley offers a trio of rationales to support its contention that plaintiffs‘ request for reimbursement should be denied as untimely. We find none of them persuasive

.

A. Res judicata

Ridley argues that plaintiffs , having failed to assert their claim for reimbursement in the earlier IDEA lawsuit
between the same p arties

, may not do so in this subsequent

the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,‖ id. § 1415 (b)(2)(B)(6)(A).15 action under the principles of res judicata, or claim preclusion

. To rely on t he affirmative defense of res judicata

, a party must establish three elements: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior proceeding that involved (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) the same ― c au se of action. ‖ See, e.g., Duhaney v. Att’y Gen. , 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010); Sheridan , 609 F.3d at 260 (explaining that ―the central purpose of the [res judicata] doctrine [is] to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a single suit‖ (third alteration in original) (inter nal quotation
mark omitted )). The first two elements are not disputed. In examining the similarity of the claims (the third element)

, we focus on ―whether the acts complained of [are] the same, whether the material facts alleged in each suit [are] the same and whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such allegations [are] the same.‖ United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc. , 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984).

We agree with the d istrict c ourt that the reimbursement claim in this case differs materially from the issues addressed
in Ridley I. Although both cases concern the rights of E.R. and her parents under the IDEA

, the similarity ends there. Ridley I focused on the subst ance of an appropriate education for E.R., while the current case i s a payment dispute over E.R.‘s stay

- put expenses. The former was fact

- intensive, requiring the courts to review testimony and documentary
evidence about E.R.‘s needs and the s chool d istri ct‘s plans for meeting them, while the latter is centered on the legal question of financial responsibility and the undisputed fact that a hearing officer ruled in plaintiffs‘ favor. 10 That the

10 The second action theoretically also involves fact

- finding
on the cost of E.R.‘s pendent placement at Benchmark, but16 cases are related does not erase the se significant differences
between the causes of action at issue. Indeed

, this court previously has recognized, albeit in the different context of
collateral

- order review , that ―resolution of [pendent

placement and tuition

- reimbursement rights] is completely separate from the mer its issues which focus on the adequacy of the proposed IEP .‖ Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 81 n.4 ( allowing appeal of pendent

- placement ruling as a collateral order subject to review under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949) ) ; see also A.D . v. Haw

. Dep’t of
Educ. , 727 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a stay

put order ―resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the child‘s ultimate placement‖)

.

We therefore conclude that the res judicata doctrine
does not bar this action.

B. The Compulsory Counterclaim Rule

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) requires a party to assert as a counterclaim any cause of action that is available against the opposing party that ―arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party‘s claim.‖ The failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim bars a later independent action on that claim. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc. , 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel , 1 42 F.3d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1998); 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &

the parties have stipulated to the amount at issue. Moreover, evidence proving tuition and transportations costs is plainly
distinct from the evidence needed for the merits issues in Ridley I

.17 Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1417, at 147 (3d ed. 2010).

The inquiry to determine if a claim is compulsory under Rule 13(a) is ―whether the counterclaim  ̳bears a logical relationship to an opposing party‘s claim.‘‖ Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc. , 292 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp.

, 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978) ). This court has

state d that a logical relationship exists ―where separate trials
on each of th e [] respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the courts.‖ Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co. , 2 86 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961) ; see also Transamerica, 292 F.3d at
389

- 90

. T he compulsory counterclaim inquiry thus requires essentially the same comparison between claims as the res judiciata analysis. S ee Transamerica , 292 F.3d at 391 (noting
―the close connection betwee n Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of claim preclusion‖)

.

As discussed above, despite a relationship between the two lawsuits, there is no meaningful overlap between the facts and law underlying the different claims at issue. Cf. Ross v. Bd. of Educ. , 486 F. 3d 279, 283

- 84 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that current claims under Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were compulsory counterclaims in a prior suit where both lawsuits ―deal with [the school district‘s] placement
decis ions, the services it offered [the plaintiff], and its response to her disability‖). P laintiffs were therefore not compelled to advance their pendent

- placement reimbursement demand by means of a counterclaim.18 Moreover, as the d istrict c ourt observed, R ule 13(a) ―effectively operates as a waiver,‖ M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist.

, No. 11

- 2235, 2012 WL 3279230, at *7 (Aug. 13, 2012) ( Ridley II ), and this court previously ha s expressed doubt that ―parents can lose their stay put protection except by
affirmative a greement to give it up,‖ Drinker , 78 F.3d at 868. E.R.‘s parents did not explicitly agree to forgo their child‘s
stay

- put rights. Hence, as in Drinker

, ―even assuming that in a proper case the stay put provision can be waived, we find nothing in the reco rd here that leads us to believe this is such
a case.‖ Id.

Accordingly, Rule 13(a) does not foreclose this independent action seeking reimbursement for E.R.‘s interim placement expenses. We emphasize, however, that our conclusion that neither res judic ata nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) bar s the instant action does not mean that claims for stay

- put reimbursement should not be brought in
the same civil action with s ubstantive IDEA claims , such as those addressing the child‘s placement or the pr ovision of a
FAPE. We hold only that, in the context of this case, plaintiffs were permitted to bring them separately.

C. Statute of Limitations

Ridley argues that plaintiffs‘ claim is barred by the
IDEA provision requir ing ― [ a ] ny party aggrieved‖ by a hearing officer‘s decision to file suit within ninety days of
that decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2 ) (A), (B). As the
d istrict c ourt concluded, th at statutory limitations period does not by its terms apply to plaintiffs‘ stay

- put reimbursement
claim

. Although the parents did seek reversal of the hearing19 officer‘s decision on certain issues

, 11 they had prevailed on
the is sue of E.R.‘s placement at Benchmark for second grade

. That favorable decision included an award of E.R.‘s tuition and transportation costs for 2008

- 2009 and, under the stay

- put provision, made Benchmark E.R.‘s pe ndent placement going
forward with the right to interim tuition reimbursement

. 12

H ence, the parents were not aggrieved by the hearing
officer‘s decision on the issue raised in this case. Ridley points to no other applicable limitations period , and we therefore reject its statute

- of

- limitations defense to plaintiffs‘
claim.

11 Their pleading in response to Ridley‘s Petition for Review alleged, inter alia, that the hearing officer had erred in finding that Ridley did not deny E.R. a FAPE for the 2006

- 2007 school year and in finding that she was not improperly denied extended programming for the summer of 2007.

12 After the courts reversed the hearing officer‘s ruling that
E.R.‘s IEP for the 2007

- 2008 and 2008

- 2009 school years was inadequate, plaintiffs were no longer entitled to reimbursement for the costs of E.R.‘s second grade year at
Benchm ark (2008

- 2009) based on the school district‘s failure to provide her a FAPE. At issue in this case is whether the
stay

- put provision gives them a separate basis to recoup a portion of their costs for that year (from the date of the hearing officer‘s deci sion in April 2009 through the end of the school year), as well as the costs for E.R.‘s enrollment at Benchmark through the date of this court‘s decision in May 2012 (i.e., for the entire 2009

- 2010 and 2010

- 2011 school years and for most of the 2011

- 2012 s chool year ).20 IV.

Ridley‘s challenge on the merits also focuses on issues of timing. Its primary argument is that E.R .‘s parents are not
entitled to any reimbursement under § 1415(j) because they
f ile d their claim for payment too late , i.e., after the administrative ruling in their favor was reversed by the
district court

. The school district further argues that, even i f the parents may recover some of the private school costs, the covered period ended with the district court‘s entry of judgment rather than at the time of the appeals court‘s
decision. Both contentions require us to consider aspects of the stay

- put right that this court has not previously addressed

.

Ridley‘s assertion that plaintiffs‘ right to
reimbursement expire d when the district court overturned the hearing officer‘s decision necessarily d epends on two assumption s about how the stay

- put scheme work s. First, the
school district maintains that the reimbursement right does not ripen until a claim seeking payment is presented to the

court . Second, Ridley contends that once the district court ruled that Ridley had offered E.R. a FAPE in its public
scho ols, Benchmark was no longer E.R.‘s pendent placement

. In Ridley‘s view, the parents fail ed to seek payment while the private school was designated as E.R.‘s pendent placement and, hence, their potential right to reimbursement never ripened into an entitl ement.

We consider below Ridley‘s two assumptions: (1) that the right to reimbursement ripens only when parents file a claim with the court seeking payment , and (2) that E.R.‘s
relevant educational placement had returned to the public
school by t he time her parents filed their claim. We then21 address Ridley‘s argument that the stay

- put financing obligation lasts only until judgment at the district court.

A. When Does the Right to Reimbursement Accrue?

Ridley argues that the IDEA does not automatically provide for reimbursement for the cost of private schooling during the stay

- put period and that parents must make an affirmative request to the court for that remedy

. As support,

t he s chool d istrict cites the IDEA‘s remedial provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (C)(iii), which states that a court ―shall grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.‖ Ridley
infers from th at statut ory language that parents have no entitlement to stay

- put reimbursement until a court rul es that
it is ―appropriate

. ‖

We re ject this interpretation as inconsistent with the
IDEA ‘s stay

- put guarantee and this court‘s prior case law. The stay

- put provision

– titled ―Maintenance of current
education al placement‖

– directs that ―the child shall remain
in the then

- current educatio nal placement‖ throughout the pendency of any proceedings conducted to resolve a dispute

over the provision of a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis added). Ridley does not dispute that the hearing officer‘s
decision in this case had the effect of switch ing E.R.‘s pendent placement from the public school recommended by
her IEP to the private Benchmark S chool. As noted above,

see supra Section II, w e have expressly held that financing goes hand

- in

- hand with pendent private

- school placement:

It is undispu ted that once there is a state agreement with respect to pendent placement, a fortiori, financial responsibility on the part of22 the local school district follows. Thus, from the point of the [state administrative] decision forward . . . [the student‘s] pe ndent placement, by agreement of the state, is the private school and [the school district] is obligated to pay for that placement.

Raelee S. , 9 6 F.3d at 84; see also B d. o f Educ. v. Schutz , 290 F.3d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that ― once the parents ‘ challenge [to a proposed IEP] succeeds . . . , consent to the private placement is implied by law, and the requirements of § 1415(j) become the responsi bility of the school district‖).

We have thus recognized that the stay

- put provision itself impliedl y, and necessarily, deems reimbursement for the costs of pendent placement in a private school an ―appropriate‖ remedy. See Raelee S. , 96 F.3d at 87 (―Without interim financial support, a parent‘s  ̳choice‘ to have his child
remain in what the state has de termined to be an appropriate private school placement amounts to no choice at all.‖).
There is no separate requirement of a c ourt finding of appropriateness ; rather, the obligation arises automatically
from a determination that the private school is the protected
status quo during the period in which the dispute resolution process is ongoing. Indeed, Ridley admitted as much before
the d istrict c ourt in this case when it acknowledg ed that the court would have been ―obliged‖ to order reimbursement if the p arents had sought the fund s through a timely
counterclaim

. Ridley II , 2012 WL 3279230, at *8 n.8. We think it pointless to insist on a formal demand for interim tuition reimbursement when there is no viable response to that
demand.23 Hence, p laintiffs se cured the right to reimbursement
when the hearing officer ruled i n their favor in April 2009.
We must now consider w hether that right survived the subsequent district court ruling in favor of the school district.

B

. T he Current Educational Placement

Ridley contends that any reimbursement entitlement the parents may have had under § 1415(j) dissolved in February 2011, when the district court reversed the hearing
officer‘s decision. The school district argues that the court ruling ―rendered the hearing officer‘s decision inoperative‖
and reinstat ed the public school as E.R.‘s stay

- put placement, making the parents ineligible for private

- school reimbursement at the time they request ed payment from the
school district in March 2011 . At that point, accord ing to
Ridle y‘s theory, the parents‘ unilateral decision to send E.R. to Benchmark no longer had the state imprimatur that made reimbursement appropriate. Ridley‘s position thus depends
on whether the d istrict c ourt‘s ruling in fact recal ibrated the
stay

- put assessment.

This court observed in Drinker that ―  ̳ the dispositive factor in deciding a child‘s ― current educational placement ‖ should be the Individualized Education Program . . . actually functioning when the ― stay put ‖ is invoked. ‘ ‖ 78 F.3d at 867 (quoting Woods , 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440). According to Ridley, plaintiffs did not invoke the stay

- put until after the d istrict c ourt determined that the s chool
d istrict‘s IEP was appropriate and, hence, the original IEP, ―placing the student in the school district, is the one now  ̳actually functioning.‘‖24 Ridley‘s argument lacks support in the law. The operative placement is not determined by the date the parents
seek reimbursement for stay

- put expenses , but by the date the disp ute between the parents and the school district ―  ̳ first
arises ‘ ‖ and proceedings conducted pursuant to the IDEA begin

. Id. (quoting Thomas, 918 F.2d at 625). At the latest, the pertinent proceedings in this case began with the parents‘ filing of their du e process complaint in December 2008, at which point E.R.‘s current placement was the public school.
See A.D. , 727 F.3d at 915 (―[A] stay

- put placement is effective from the date a student requests an administrative due process hearing.‖); D.F. v. Colling swood Borough Bd. of
Educ. , 694 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2012 ) (―By filing the [due process] petition, A.C. triggered the IDEA‘s  ̳stay

- put‘ requirement.‖). As described above, however, E.R.‘s operative placement switched by law to the private
Benchmark Scho ol when the administrative hearing officer agreed with the parents that Ridley had not offered the child a FAPE in the public school.

Nothing in the statute or this circuit‘s law provides a basis for changing E.R.‘s stay

- put placement back to the public school during the pendency of the dispute process, notwithstanding the s chool d istrict‘s success ful appeal of the administrative decision. To the contrary, § 1415(j) states that
the child shall remain in the current educational placement
―until all [IDEA ] proceedings have been completed‖ (emphasis added). We cannot conclude that Congress
intended a placement based on an agreement with ―the State or local educational agency‖ to be less secure than one based
on an IEP. Id. Indeed, any other conclusion wo uld be at odds
with our expressly stated understanding that the stay

- put provision is designed to ensure educational stability for25 children with disabilities until the dispute over their placement is resolved, ― ‛ regardless of whether their case is

meritorious or not

. ‘ ‖ Drinker , 78 F.3d at 86 4 ( quoting
Woods , 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440) (emphasis added) ; see also A.D. , 727 F.3d at 914 (stating that ―a student who requests an administrative due pr ocess hearing is entitled to remain in his educational placement regardless of the strength of his case or the likelihood he will be harmed by a change in placement‖); Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch.

Dist. , 559 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) (―[T]he sta y put provision acts as a powerful protective measure to prevent disruption of the child‘s education throughout the dispute process.‖); Mackey v. Bd. of Educ.

, 386 F.3d 158, 160

- 61 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting the Drinker language above )

.

Thus, under the sta tute and this court‘s precedent

, E.R.‘s pendent placement under § 1415(j) remained the Benchmark School through at least the conclusion of the proceedings in the district court, and the s chool d istrict‘s correlative obligation to pay for her schooling ther e also remained intact. The only remaining question is whether Ridley‘s financial responsibility extended through final judgment in the app eals court.

C. The Duration of the School District’s Reimbursement Obligation

Ridley asserts that its responsibi lity to finance E.R.‘s pendent placement at Benchmark terminated, at the latest,
when the d istrict c ourt ruled in favor of the s chool d istrict on plaintiffs‘ IDEA claim. This court previously has held that § 1415(j) requires a school district to pay for a private school
that is a pendent placement t hrough the date of a district26 court‘s final order in an IDEA case

. See Drinker , 78 F .3d at
867 . The court has not, however, addressed whether the stay

put provision also applies through the pendency of an IDEA dispute in the Court of Appeals

. T he only two circuits to have decided the issue in published opinions are split. Compare Joshua A

. , 559 F.3d at 1038

- 40 (holding that stay

put obligation extends through appeals decision), with Andersen v. Dist. of Colum bia , 877 F.2d 1018 , 1023

- 24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ( (holding that Congress did not intend stay

- put financing to cover federal appellate review)

. See also Kari H. v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist. , 125 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1997) (table), 1997 WL 468326, at *6 (Nos. 9 6

- 5066, 5178) (Aug. 12, 1997) (following Andersen ); N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. v. K.W.

, 123 P.3d 469 , 483 (Wash. App. Ct. 2005) ( holding that stay

put period extends ―throughout the entire process, including any appeals ‖ ).

Having now considered the question, w e agree with
the Ninth Circuit

– and the d istrict c ourt in this case

– that the statutory language and the ―protective purposes‖ of the stay

put provision lead to the conclusion that Congress intended
stay

- put placement to remain in effect through the fina l resolution of the dispute

. Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *11. The statute‘s text is broadly written to encompass ―the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this
section

. ‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1 415(j) (emphasis added). N arrowing the provision ‘s sco pe to exclude the appellate process strikes

us as an unnatu ral reading of such expansive language. T he

― proceedings ‖ specifically covered by § 1415 include civil
actions in ―a district court of the United States

. ‖ Id. § 1415 (i)(2)(A)

. T he d istrict c ourt reasonably construed that
reference to include all phases of the federal proceedings that begin with a district court filing : ― Although Congress did not27 explicitly articulate that an appeal is a  ̳ proceeding ‘ under § 1415, it seems intuitive that an appeal is part of a  ̳ civil action
. . . in a district court of the United States. ‘

. . . In drafting § 1415(j), Congress surely understood that district court review would necessarily include an appeal to a circuit court. ‖ Ridley II

, 2012 WL 3279230, at * 1 1 ; s e e also Joshua A. , 559 F.3d at 1038 (―By giving Joshua the right to appeal the ALJ‘s decision to the district court, § 1415 also made it possible for Joshua to appeal the dispute to this circuit court.‖).

Even if we had doubt s about the clarity of the l anguag e itself, we would nonetheless adopt the same construction
because that ―reading . . .  ̳best accords with the overall purposes of the statute.‘‖ Nugent v. Ashcroft , 367 F.3d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Moskal v. United States , 498 U.S. 103, 116

- 17 (1990)), overruled on other grounds by Al

- Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , 734 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) ) ; see also Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc. , 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that, in addition to language and c ontext, we ―consider the  ̳overall object and policy of the statute, and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense‘‖ (quoting Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. , 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) ) ) . We
have stated consistently that the stay

- put provision is designed to preserve the status quo ―  ̳ until the dispute with regard to [the child‘s] placement is ultimately resolved

. ‘ ‖
Drinker , 78 F. 3d at 864 (quoting Woods, 20 Indiv.
Disabiliti es Educ. L. Rep. at 440 ) ; see also, e.g., Pardini , 420 F.3d at 190; J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ. , 287 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2002)

. We cannot sensibly find that a FAPE dispute is ― ultimately resolved ‖ before pr oceedings have run
their course through a final, unappealed decision by an28 administrative body or an appellate judicial decision

. See
Joshua A. , 559 F.3d at 1040 (―It is unlikely that Congress intended the protective measure to end suddenly and arbitrarily before the dispute is fully resolved.‖)

.

Moreover, the rationale that underlies a school district‘s obligation to finance a child‘s pendent placement
remains compelling through the appellate process

. If we
conclude d that s tay

- put protection terminates while an appeal
is pending

, the parents of a child with disabilities would be
faced with the untenable choice of removing their child from a setting the appeals court might find appropriate or risking the burden of private school costs they cannot afford for the period of the appeal

. Se e, e.g., J oshua A. , 559 F.3d at 1040 ; Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 86

- 87

. In addition,

cutting off stay

- put protection
after district court review has potential negative consequences
in other factual scenarios besides private school placement

. For instance, the stay

- put provision could have been invoked during the pendency of an appeal to maintain a child‘s special services
within the school district or to maintain a child‘s placement in a
mainstream rather than a self

contained classroom.

Ridley II

, 2012 WL 3279230, at *12 n.10. The broad reading
of § 1415(j) thus aligns with the statute‘s important mission29 to guarantee educational stability for all children with
disabilities until there is a final ruling on placement.

T h e wisdom of th is reading of § 1415(j) is re inforced by the Department of Education ‘s implementing regulation, which states explicitly that the child must remain in his or her current educational placement ―during the pendency of ― any

.

. . judicial proceeding regarding a due process complaint.‖
34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (emphasis added)

. T he unbounded
reference to ―any‖ judicial proceeding plainly extend s the mandate through the conclusion of the appellate process , and the agency‘s view of the statute‘s reach thus mirrors our own

. If we h ad consider ed § 1415(j) ambiguous on the issue of duration, we would have been obliged to give deference to
this permissible construction by the agency. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837,
84 3 (1984); Castillo v. Att’y Gen.

, 729 F.3d 296, 302 (3d C ir. 2013)

. Every appropriate interpretive path thus leads us to
the same conclusion.

The D.C. Circuit in Andersen adopted the contrary interpretation based on a view of the IDEA‘s purpose that we believe is unjustifiably limited

. Th e Andersen court f ocused
on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Honig v. Doe

, where the
issue was whether school districts may be ex cused from the
stay

- put requirement wh en a child‘s continuing pre sence in the classroom poses a danger to himself or others

. See Honig

, 484 U.S. at 323 ; Andersen , 877 F.2d at 1023

- 24

. In rejecting such an exception, 13 the Supreme Court observed that ―one of

13 The IDEA does allow certain temporary exceptions to the pendent

- placement provision, including for students carrying a weapon to school, using or selling drugs at school,30 the purposes of § 1415 [ (j)] . . . was  ̳to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular public school
cl assroom over the parents‘ objection pending completion of the review proceedings,‘‖ Honig , 484 U.S. at 327 (quoting Burlington , 471 U.S. at 373). The Court emphasized the incompatibility of the asserted unilateral a uthority to exclude
students perceived a s dangerous with the IDEA‘s goals, see id. at 323, 327, and pointed out that school officials faced with a safety issue could, among other steps, seek court
intervention under the IDEA if ―parents of a truly dangerous child adamantly refuse to permit any c hange in placement

, ‖

i d. at 326.

The D.C. Circuit appeared to treat Honig as establishing a single goal for the stay

- put provision , i.e., ―t o protect children from unilateral displacement by school
authorities

. ‖ 877 F.2d at 1024 . T he court thus reason ed that
the automatic stay

- put injunction is no longer justified once a district court has decided in favor of a proposal by schoo l
officials to transfer a student: ―Once a district court has rendered its decision approving a change in placement, that
chan ge is no longer the consequence of a unilateral decision by school authorities; the issuance of an automatic injunction perpetuating the prior placement would not serve the section‘s purpose.‖ 877 F.2d at 1024. Based on this

or inflicting serious bodily injury on others. See 20 U.S.C. §
1 415(k)(1)(G); see also Honig , 484 U.S. at 325 & n.8 (citing a Department of Education position that a ten

- day suspension ―does not amount to a  ̳change in placement‘ prohibited by § 1415[(j)]‖).31 assumption about the role of § 1415(j), t he Andersen court held that, after a court has endorsed the school district‘s educational plan for a disabled child

, the child‘s parents may prevent a change in placement consistent with the court ruling only by satisfying the standard require ments for injunctive
relief. Id.

In our view, there is a flaw in the D.C. Circuit‘s reasoning . T he Supreme Court has not declare d protection from unilateral action by school officials to be the only

pu rpose of the stay

- put provision . R ather , the C ourt identified it in Honig as ― one of [ the section‘s ] purposes.‖ 484 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added); see also id. (describing ―the unilateral exclusion of disabled children by schools‖ as

― one of the evils Congress sought to remedy‖ (emphasis in first phra se omitted) (emphasis in second phrase added) ); Burlington , 471 U.S. at 373 (―We think at least one purpose
of § 1415 [ (j)] was to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular public school classroom over the parents‘ objection pending co mpletion of the review proceedings.‖ (emphasis added)). As we have just explained,

t he pen dent

- placement requirement also reflects a concern
about the continuity of a child‘s placement generally

. S ee A.D., 727 F.3d at 916 (―[T]he purpose of the stay

- pu t provision . . . is to protect students from changes to their educational programs when there is a dispute over the lawfulness of the changes.‖); K.W. , 123 P.3d at 482 (―[T]he
hold ing in Andersen does not follow the general policy behind IDEA, which is t o keep from disturbing the child throughout the statutory process designed to resolve disputes between the school district and the child‘s parents or guardians over where the child can receive the appropriate educational opportunities.‖). The D.C. Circuit ‘s limited32 perspective in Andersen undermines its conclusion that the
stay

- put protection, which triggers the school district‘s reimbursement obligation, do es not extend through the period of an appeal. 14

V

.

We are not insensitive to the financial burden o ur decision will impose on school districts, see Raelee S , 96 F.3d at 87, or the seeming incongruity of the ultimately prevailing party having to pay for a now

- rejected placement

. Despite

two judicial determinations that Ridley did not deny E.R. a FAPE, t he s chool d istrict will be assessed the cost of her private school education for a substantial period of time

. 15 I t is impossible , however, to pr otect a child‘s educational status

quo w ithout sometimes taxing school districts for private
education costs th at ultimately will be deemed u nnecessary b y a court

. We see this not as ―an absurd result,‖ Ridley II

, 2012 WL 3279230, at *13, but as an unavoidable

consequence of the balance Congress struck to ensure stability for a vulnerable group of children.

Affi rmed.

14 The plaintiffs in this case did not seek Supreme Court

r eview of the appeals court ruling in Ridley I , and we therefore do not address whether stay

- put protection encompasses such proceedings.

15 As noted above, the reimbursement period runs from the date of the administrative hearing officer‘s decision in A pril
2009

– i.e., shortly before the end of the 2008

- 2009 school

year

– through the date of the appellate decision in May 2012.