PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14

- 1387

___________ G.L.; MR. G.L. and MRS. E.L., in their own right

v.

LIGONIER VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY, Appellant

_____________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2

- 13

- cv

- 0 0034) District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak

_____________________ Argued: December 16, 2014

Before: Mc KEE, Chief Judge , GREENAWAY, JR., and

K RAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 22, 2015 )

_____________2 J ohn K. G reiner, Esq. C harles W. Jelley, Esq. [ Argued ] M argaret A. Tremba, Esq. K risten C. Weidus, Esq. Tremba, Jelley & Kinney 302 West Otterman Street Greensburg, PA 15601 Counsel for Appellees

C hristina Lane, Esq. [Argued] Sanchez Legal Group 2403 Sidney Street

, Suite 242 Pittsburgh, PA 15203 Counsel for Appellant

M ark L. Gross, Esq. H olly A. Thomas, Esq. United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section P.O. Box 14403 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Amicus Curiae

J ennerifer N. Rosen Valverde, Esq. [ Argued ] Rutgers University School of Law Special Education Clinic 123 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102 Counsel for Amici Appell ees 1

1 We thank the seven organizations led by the Education and Health La w Clinic at R utgers University3 ___________

OPINION

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) broadly authorizes the courts to provide appropriate relief, including compensatory education, to children who have been deprived by their state o r local educational
agenc ies of a free appropriate public education. When Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004, it enacted 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3) (C)

, a statute of limitations that requires parent s to file a due process complaint no more than two years a fter the parent s “knew or should have known” about the alleged deprivation , that is, within two years of the reasonable discovery of that violation

. 2 The legislation simultaneously amended 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) , which previews the various procedural s afeguards available to parents, inc luding the opportunity to file that due process complaint. T he new language added to this prefatory subsection , however, described the due process complaint as alleging an injury that occurred not more than two years bef ore the reasonable discovery date

.

School of Law

- Newark for their helpful perspective and excellent briefing and argument in this case.

2 The parties here, like some district courts in our Circuit, referred to the reasonable discovery date as the “KOSHK date. ” See, e.g.

, Jana K. ex rel. Tim K. v. Annville

Cleona Sch. Dist. , 39 F. Supp. 3d 584, 596 (M.D. Pa. 2014).4 In an appeal stemming from a due process complaint filed by the parents of G.L., a student with special needs, we consider, in a matter of first impression among the Courts of Appeals, how these two provisions should be interpreted together and what effect they have on the courts’ authority to remedy IDEA violations, in particular, through the award of compensatory education

. We address today which, of a variety of interpretations, is correct: D oes § 1415(b)(6)(B) limi t compensatory education to injuries occurring two years before the filing of the complaint , even if earlier injuries are claimed within two years of their reasonable discovery , as urged by Appellant Ligonier Valley School District Authority? Does it limi t compensatory education to injuries that occurred from two years before their reasonable discovery through the filing of the complaint

, up to two years after th at discovery

, i.e., the “2 +2 ” approach taken by the District Court and urged by G.L. ? D oes it impose only a pleading requirement

, without affecting the availability of a remedy for timely and well

- pleaded claims , as argued by A mici Appellees and G.L. in the alternative? Or is it simply a restatement , albeit ill

- phrased, of the same two

- year statut e of limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3) (C) , as asserted by the United States Department of Education (“DOE”) ? Recognizing the uncertainty in this area, the District Court certified the question for interlocutory appeal.

We now con clude, after careful c onsideration of the parties’ plain language arguments, the statu tory context and structure, the DOE’s interpretive guidance, and the legislative history

, that § 1415(b)(6)(B) is simply a n inartful attempt to mirror § 1415(f)(3) (C) ’s two

- year statute of lim itations . That is, both sections reflect the same two

- year filing deadline for a due process complaint after the reasonable discovery of an5 injury

, and § 1415(b)(6)(B) neither imposes a pleading requirement nor in any respect alter s the courts’ broad powe r under the IDEA to provide a complete remedy for the violation of a child’s right to a free appropriate public education

.

I. Facts and Procedural History

A. G.L.’s Schooling

After spending the previous year at a parochial school, G.L. entered high school in the Ligonier Valley School District ( the “District” ) in the fall of 2008. 3 At a school open house shortly after he started, G.L.’s teacher told his father that G.L. seemed distracted in class and lacked organizational skills. G.L.’s father then orally reque sted that the District evaluate G.L. for any special education needs. The request

was to no avail: No evaluation was conducted and, instead, in the wake of a tragic car accident in which G.L. lost his older sister, the District, purportedly on the basis of information in her obituary, opened an investigation into whether G.L. even lived within D istrict boundaries. That investigation confirmed G.L.’s residence and thus the District’s obligation under the IDEA to provide him with a free appropriate public e ducation (“FAPE”)

. In the meantime, however, G.L. continued to struggle academically. For a time, he was able to keep those struggle s

3 We review the allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to G.L., the non

- moving par ty. See D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. , 765 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2014).6 partially hidden from his parents by intercepting and altering his report card

. At the conclusion of the 2008

- 09 schoo l year, however, District officials informed G.L.’s parents that he would need to repeat the ninth grade. It was at this point that his parents learned that he was being bullied at school on the basis of his sexual orientation , with students regularly cal ling him a “ faggot ” and a “homo,” and that as a result he was having trouble eating, sleeping, and concentrating on his studies.

Faced with the District’s contention that G.L. should repeat the ninth grade, G.L.’s parents complained to the school princip al about the bullying and again requested that G.L . be evaluated for special education needs. The conversation became heated, and the principal told G.L.’s father to speak with the parents of the bullying students himself . The principal also informed G.L .’s parents that a request for special education evaluation needed to be in writing. G.L. ’s father then immediately hand wrote and submitted a request, which G.L.’s mother followed up with an email to the principal. Apparently not caring for the tone of

t hat email, the principal made an angry phone call to each of G.L.’s parents. The same day, the principal requested that the District again investigate the residency of G.L. and his family.

The District then began another investigation, representing to t he family that the new investigation was based on an anonymous phone call to the D istrict. Meanwhile , the principal also conducted his own ad

- hoc investigation, using school computers to search for voting records of G.L.’s parents. Over the next month , i t appears little was done to assist G.L. with the challenges he faced either academically or socially. The District did, however,7 demand that the family provide a number of additional documents to prove residency. Eventually

, the District agreed to forma lly evaluate G.L. for the remedial support to which he might be entitled pursuant to the IDEA, and i n August 2009, after the family hired an attorney

, yet again confirmed that G.L. lived within D istrict boundaries

.
Thus, when G.L. returned to school in the fall, the District finally evaluated him for his special education needs for the 2009

- 10 school year and instituted a plan to prevent him from being bullied. That evaluation revealed that G.L. did indeed have learning disabilities in math, reading

, an d writing

. In November 2009, the District offered to G.L.’s parents an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) , which G.L.’s parents found inadequate and sought to supplement with supports tied to each of G.L.’s special needs

. D espite multiple meetings between the parents and District officials during the months of December and January , they were unable to agree on the educational goals that would satisfy a FAPE for G.L

. While the parties were attempting to negotiate a satisfactory IEP over the fall a nd winter

, the District also attempted to implement a plan to prevent G.L. from being bullied. However, by January 2010, the bullying no t only had continued, but had grown to include the participation of the school’s football coach, who allegedly made a d isparaging remark to another student about that student’s relationship with G.L. , and did so in front of some of the very students who were bullying G.L

. When he learned of this public remark by the coach, G.L. became distraught and refused to

return to s chool. Instead, his parents picked up and returned his school work, which he completed at home. As this went

on, G.L.’s IEP team continued to meet

, and his parents were8 in regular contact with District officials to attempt to address the bullying situati on.

In March 2010, G.L. was evaluated by an intermediate unit psychologist, who conditionally diagnosed him with two additional disabilities, including post

- traumatic stress disorder caused by the ongoing bullying. On March 8, 2010, frustrated with the bullying that had been allowed to escalate and apparently had caused additional disabilities in their child, upset by his academic struggles, and dissatisfied with the IEP offered by the District , G.L.’s parents withdrew him from the school and enrolled hi m in a cyber charter school. The District has conceded that March 9 , 2010 reflects the date G.L.’s parents “knew or should have known” about the deprivation of a free appropriate public education to G.L.

, that is, the reasonable discovery date for purpose s of this

case. 4

On January 9, 2012, within two years of the reasonable discovery d ate
, and thus within the statute of limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C)

, G.L.’s parents filed their due process complaint, alleging that the District denied him a FAPE and requesting compensatory education for September 2008 through March 2010

— that is, the entire period that G.L. was allegedly denied a FAPE by the District before he withdrew from school

.

4 The District has not disputed at any point during these protracted proceedings, including on appeal, that March 9, 2010 was the reasonable discovery date . H aving not raised

suc h an argument to date, the District has waived it in any

event. See Del. Strong Families v. Att’y Gen. of Del. , 793 F.3d 304, 310 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015)

.9 B. Procedural History

As required by the IDEA, G.L.’s parents initi ally requested their due process hearing by filing a complaint with the Penns ylvania Department of Education , which in turn assigned it to a Hearing O fficer

. The Hearing O fficer acknowledged that the language of § 1415 seemed to describe two different tim e periods relevant to the IDEA’s statute of limitations: 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), which provides that a due process complaint must be filed no more than two years after the reasonable discovery date, and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), which describes the due process complaint as alleging an injury that occurred not more than two years before the reasonable discovery date. However, the Heari ng Officer adopted the District’ s position that the subs ections, first, were actually the “same

, ” and , second, barred r elief for violations that occurred more than two years before the complaint was filed. Put differently, the Hearing Officer adopted an effective two year remedy cap, compensating only injuries that actually occurred within two years of the filing date , re gardless of whether the parents filed within two years of reasonably discovering older injuries.

Applying this interpretation to G.L.’s complaint , the Hearing Officer held that

— even assuming that the District deprived G.L. of a FAPE f rom September 2008 u ntil March 9 , 2010, that the parents reasonably did not know about the injury before March 9 , 2010, and that the January 9, 2012 complaint was timely filed within two years of that March 9

, 2010 discovery

— G.L.’s remedy was limited to injuries that occurred in the three months between January 2010 and March 2010 because that was the only period G.L. attended the District school within the two

- year window before the filing of the complaint. Because the Hearing Officer10 proceeded to hold that G.L. was not inju red during this period, i.e., that the District had provided a FAPE to G.L. during the 2009

- 2010 school year

, the Hearing Officer denied any award of compensatory education , even for those three months. 5

The District Court, reviewing t his decision, disag reed. In denying the District’s motion to partially dismiss the complaint on the basis of the alleged remedy cap, the District Court construed § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B), in combination, to mean that G.L.’s relief may extend from two

years before the reasonable discovery date through the date the complaint was filed, which could be up to two years after the reasonable discovery date, for a maximum period of relief of four years. G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth. , No. 13

- 34, 2013 WL 6858963 , at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013). The District Court thus adopted what has become known as the “2+2” construction of these statutory sections, id. at * 4

- 6

, applying the same construction embraced by three other district court s in this Circuit

, s ee M. v. P enn Manor Sch. Dist.

, No. 12

- 3646, 2015 WL 221086, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015); Jana K.

, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 596

- 600 ; I.H. ex rel D. S. v.

5 Given his interpretation of the statute of limitations provision, the Hearing Officer did not have occa sion to address the parents’ contention that G.L. was denied a free appropriate public education throughout the 2008

- 2009 school year. He did, however, hold that the District had discriminated against and had retaliated against G.L. in violation of Sectio n 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.11 Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist. , 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 773

- 74 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Because the 2+2 construction would render G.L.’s injuries from September 2008 to January 2010 redressable upon finding a violation, the District Court remanded for the Hearing Officer to address whether the District provided G.L. a FAPE during the relevant period. 2013 WL 6858963

, at *6

. Howeve r, recognizing the uncertainty in this area and correctly identifying this issue as one that was “important, controlling, and recurring,” id. , t he District Court stayed its remand order and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal, which we then grante d. 6

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The D istrict C ourt had juris diction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The District Court’s construction of § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 14 15(b)(6)(B) presents a legal question over which we apply plenary review. See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. , 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 2009).

6 Because the District Court remanded on this basis, it did not address the Hearing Officer’ s finding that

, notwithstanding the disturbing manner in which the District treated G.L. and his family, the Dist rict did not deprive G.L. a FAPE during the 2009

- 2010 school year.12 III. The Individuals With Disabilities Act

A. Statutory Overview

The IDEA is intended to ensu re that every child with special needs is afforded a “ free appropriate public education designed to meet [those] unique needs,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), through the statute’s “comp rehensive . . . remedial scheme, ” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch. , 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). The law ensures that right “by mandating that public educational institutions identify and effectively educate those children, or pay for their education elsewhere if they require specialized services that the public ins titution cannot provide.” P.P. , 585 F.3d at 735.

Once a child is identified as having special needs, “[a] school district provides a FAPE by designing and implementing an individualized instructional program set forth in an [IEP] , which ‘must be reasona bly calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential.’” Id . at 729

- 30 (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. , 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004)). To the extent a school district fails to provide a student with a FAPE , a parent may file a due process complaint on behalf of his or her child, with a subsequent hearing held before an administrative hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. § § 1415 (b)(6), (f)(1 ) (A) ; D.E.

, 765 F.3d at 274. A party dissatisfied with the result of that hearing may then file an action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); D.E. , 765 F.3d at 274.

Under the IDEA, a “district court is authorized to grant ‘such relief as the court determines is appro priate,’ including attorneys’ fees, reimbursement for a private educational13 placement, and compensatory education.” A.W. , 486 F .3d at 802 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)). Compensatory education “aim[s] to place disabled children in the same posi tion they would have occupied but for the school district’s violations of IDEA

, ” by providing the educational services children should have received in the first instance. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This “judiciall y

- created remedy . . . has received the imprimatur of this Court,” D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ. , 694 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012), and reflects the “broad discretion,” Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of Mental Health/Mental Retardation v. Pennsylvania , 379 F.3d 61, 67 (3d Cir. 2004), that Congress has granted to the courts “to remedy the deprivation of the right to a free appropriate education,” Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P. , 62 F.3d 520, 536 (3d Cir. 1995).

B. The 2004 Reenactment and Its

Aftermath

Prior to 2004, the IDEA did not include a statute of limitations. See Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist. , 618 F.3d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 2010). Congress found this problematic because parents could knowingly wait for many years to file complaints, resulting in sc hool districts that were “ often surprised by claims . . . involving issues that occurred in an elementary school program when the child may currently be a high school student.” H.R. Rep, 108

- 77, at 115 (2003)

. Waiting many years to bring actions on behal f of a child, Congress reasoned, jeopardized that child’s education and created distrust between school administrators and parents. Id

.14 In the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress sought to remedy this problem by adding a statute of limitation s to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) , which is entitled “Impartial due process h earing” and sets forth the procedures for the life cycle of such hearings, from the initial receipt of the due process complaint that constitutes the request for the hearing, 20 U.S.C. § 1415( f)(1), through the findings of the hearing officer, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E). The new subsection, § 1415(f)(3)(C), was en titled “Timeline for requesting hea ring” and states:

A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). Accordingly, under the IDEA parent s must fi le their due process complaint within two years of the date they “knew or should have known” of the violation

, unless the state has its own statute of limitations

, in which case the state’s statute controls. Id. ; D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. , 696 F.3d 233, 244 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2012)

. T he reauthorization also added two equitable tolling exceptions to th is statute of limitations, which apply regardless of whether the state has enact ed its own statute of limitations : specific misrepresentations by the school district and the withholding15 of statutorily man dated disclosures. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D). 7

S ection 1415 overall is a lengthy and detailed section

, the “ entire purpose ” of wh ich “is to provide parents

‘ procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education. ’ ” D.M. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ.

,

--- F.3d

---- , No. 14

- 4044, 2015 WL 5255088, at *5 (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a ) ). 8 The section
opens with § 1415(a) , entitled “Establishment of procedures,” which requires state and local educational agencies to

“ establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this section to ensure that children with disabilities and their
pa rents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education” by these agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). It proceeds in § 1415( b )

, entitled “Types of procedures,” to list out and briefly summarize “[t]he pr ocedures required by this section

, ” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b), (b) (2)

- (8), in roughly the same o rder these procedures are then more fully described in the subsections that follow , 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)

- (f)

. A mong the procedures listed in § 1415(b), even before th e 2004 reenactment, was

“ an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child

, ” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)

7 These exceptions are not at issue in this case.

8 We describe in some detail here the structure of this section because, as will become apparent, it provides important context for our int erpretation of the two subsections at issue.16 (1999) (amended 2004)

, corresponding to the fuller explanation of the due process hearing procedures set forth in § 1415(f) (1999) (amended 2004)

.

A ccordingly, a long with the addition of the statute of limitations to § 1415(f) (3)(C) , the 200 4 reenactment also amended § 1415(b)(6) to read:

(b) Types of procedures

The procedures required by this section shall include the following:

. . .

(6) An opportunity for any party to present a complaint

—

(A) with respect to any matter relating to the ide ntification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and

(B) which sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public ag ency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint , or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint17 under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the exc eptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph

.
20 U.S.C § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). With this amendment, the complaint procedure described at § 1415(b)(6) (B) came to mirror the stat ute of limitations at § 1415(f)(3)(C) in almost all respects: they both describe a

two

- yea r time limit that hinges on the reasonable discovery date ; they both provide that any state statute of limitations will override this timeline ; and they both incorpor ate the two exceptions to the statute of limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(D)

. 9 Unlike § 1415(f)(3)(C), however,

9 While § 1415(b)(6)(B) describes “present[ing] a complaint,” and § 1415(f)(3)(C) describes “request[ing] an impartial due process hearing,” both sections address the filing of the same due process complaint bec ause there is no dispute that presenting a complaint is merely the vehicle by which a due process hearing is requested. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (noting that a hearing is held “[w]henever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6)”); see

a lso United States Department of Education, Questions and Answers on IDEA Part B Dispute Resolution Procedures, OSEP Memo 13

- 08, 34 (2013) ( explaining that “[t] he IDEA Amendments of 2004 made significant changes to IDEA’s due process procedures, and parties no longer have the right to request a due process hearing directly ” but instead “first must file a due process complaint” ).18 § 1415(b)(6)(B) ’s two

- year limitations period r u n s backward instead of forward from the reasonable discovery date.

The differences in th e language of these provisions and the fact that they appear to move in opposite directions from the reasonable discovery date

, has given rise to confusion in the wake of the 2004 reenactment, with district courts within this Circuit interpreting them in a range of ways. Some have construed them to limit redress to the two years preceding a complaint. See, e.g.

, D.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ.

, No. 12

- 5592, 2014 WL 1293534, *21

- 22 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014). Some have interpreted them to impose a filin g deadline but not to limit the remedy for timely

- filed c laims

. See, e .g. , Cent. Sch. Dist. v. K.C. ex rel. S.C. , No. 11

- 6869, 2013 WL 3367484, at *12 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2013) (collecting cases) (“We also agree with the conclusion reached by several co urts within this district, that the IDEA’s statute of limitations does not apply to limit the permissible period of compensatory educational awards.”). And at least four , including the District Court here, have adopted the 2+2 analysis. See , e.g. , G.L.

, 2013 WL 6858963, at *3

- 6

.

The District contends there can be no confusion because we have already addressed and resolved the question of how these provisions interact with each other and how they apply to claims dating back a number of years in Steven I.

, 618 F.3d 411 , and D.K. , 696 F.3d 233. That resolution, according to the District, is that w e “ definitively stated that claims are barred where they are alleged to occur two years prior to the date of filing .” Appellant’s Br. 8 (citing Steven I.

, 618 F.3 d at 417, and D.K. , 696 F.3d at 254). This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of our prior cas es. Those cases held that § 1415(f)(3)(C) bars claims that are not filed within two years after the parents “knew or should have19 known” about the i njury

— a proposition that is now well

established and is not disputed by either party to this case. However, neither Steven I. nor D.K. say s anything about claims that are filed within two years of that “knew or should have known” date but happen to relate to an injury that took place more than two years before the complaint was filed.

In Steven I.

, we considered a case brought by parents who had knowingly sat on a claim for years, see Mark v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist ., No. 08

- 571, 2009 WL 415767, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Steven I ., 618 F.3d at 41 7 , and held that § 1415(f)(3)(C) ’ s two

- yea r statute of limitations applies retroactively to claims that predated the 2004 amendments and “bars any causes of action that accrued prior to” two years before the filing of the due process complaint , even if the violation continue s into the

two

- year window before the complaint was filed. 618 F.3d at 417 (emphasis added). Likewise, i n D.K.

, where we held that the statutory tolling provisio ns of § 1415(f)(3)(D) precluded application of common law tolling doctrines and were therefore the exclusive exceptions to the IDEA’s two

- y ear statute of limitations , we reaffirmed our rejection of the “continuing violation” doctrine and held that the clai ms in that case, which we observed had been discovered years earlier

, were , as the parents conceded, “limited to the two

year time period” before the filing of the complaint under § 1415(f)(3)(C). D.K , 696 F.3d at 248, 254 . Indeed, contrary to the Distri ct’s reading, we expressly stated in D.K. that parents must request a due process hearing, not within two
year s of the occurrence of the injury , but “within two years of ‘the date the parent . . . knew or should have known about the alleged action that for ms the basis of the complaint. ’” I d. at20 244 (alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) ).

Although w e o bserved in passing in D.K. that th is two

year statute of limitations in § 1415(f)(3)( C) was “the same”

two

- year period that parents had to file an administrative complaint under § 1415( b ) (6)(B), i d. , w e did not there and have not since had occasion to reconcile the differences between the language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C)

or to consider how these provision s affect the rem edy available for claims spanning multiple years that were filed within two years of the date the parents first “knew or should have known” about the basis for those claims

. No r has any other Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between § 1415(f)(3)(C ) and § 1415(b)(6)(B). We resolve these issues today

.

IV. Analysis

The starting point of all statutory construction is the text of the statute, but where that text is ambiguous, “we

‘ must do our best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of statutory constr uction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. ’ ” King v. Burwell

, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A. , 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)). Thus, we consider below ( 1) the plain language arguments of the part ies and amici ; (2) the broader context of the statute ; (3) the position of the DOE ; and (4) t he legislative history of the 2004 amendments, and

w e conclude that applying the plain language of the text would force us to give § 1415(b)(6)(B) a meaning that “turns out to be untenable in light of the statute as a whole

. ’” King

, 135 S. Ct. at 2495 (internal quotations marks and alteration21 omitted) . Instead, our analysis confirms that , as we pr esaged in D.K. , § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) do indeed reflect “the same” statute of limitations

, 696 F.3d at 244, which imposes a deadline on the filing of claims once they are reasonably discovered but does not limit the redress available for time ly

- filed claims.

A. The Plain Language o f § 1415(b)(6)(B) Is Ambiguous

In interpreting § 1415(b)(6)(B), w e confront a statutory provision that by its plain terms does not impose a ny obligation on parents, but rather identifies the “opportunity

. . . to prese nt a complaint” among a list of procedural safeguards in the prefatory subsection of § 1415 , which are then explicated in the subsections that follow. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). Meanwhile, t he amendment to § 1415(f)(3)(C) by its plain terms describes the “[t]imeline for requesting [a] hearing” and mandates that “[a] parent . . . shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years” of the reasonable discovery date. The amendment to § 1415(b)(6)(B) appears to conform the description of the compla int that previously appeared in § 1415(b)(6), i.e., the mechanism to “request an impartial due process hearing,” to § 1415(f)(3 )(C) in every respect

— including t he exceptions

— but one: the time frame of before, rather than after, the reasonable discovery date

. Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C). No explanation is given for this singular difference. T he clearest way to demonstrate the ambiguity it has created in the statute

, however, is through the diametrically opposed interpretations proposed by the parties th emselves.22 i. The School District’s Proposed Remedy Cap

We begin with the District, which contends , first, that § 1415(b)(6)(B) describes the same two

- year statute of limitations as § 1415(f)(3)(C) and , second, that this statute of limitations limit s the sco pe of a child’s remedy to those injuries that actually occurred in the two year s before the filing of a complaint , no matter when the parent reasonably discovered the injury

. The obvious problem with the District’s first contention is that , as the Distric t Court noted in rejecting it

, the language and plain meaning of the subsections are, in fact, quite different : Section 1415(f)(3)(C) provides that parents who have been unable to secure relief for alleged violations through informal channels and are

reso rting to requesting a due process hearing must do so

“ within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint

. ” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). Section 1415(b)(6)(B), on the othe r hand, describes that very same complaint that parents shall have the opportunity to present as

“ set[ting] forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleg ed action that forms the basis of the complaint. ” Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B).

The District does not attempt to reconcile the language of these provision s ; it simply asks us ipse dixit to declare them identical and further asks that we read this single statute of limitations to permit relief only for those injuries that occurred no more than two years before the filing of the complaint

. The problem is that this is not what the statute says and the District’s logic proves an unworkable syllo gism: Section 1415(b)(6 )(B) makes reference to (a) injuries that23 occurred no more than two years before (b) the reasonable discovery date ; § 1415(f)(3)(C) provides that (b) th is reasonable discovery date must be no more than two years before (c) the filing of the complaint ; but neither subsection references (a) injuries that occurred no more than two years before (c) the filing of the complaint.

The District’ s reading not only lacks textual support but affirmatively contravenes the language and purpose of Congress in using a re asonable discovery date

. When fashioning a statute of limitations, a legislature may choose as the date from which the limitations period begins to run either the date the injury actually occurred

, an approach known as the “occurrence rule ,” or the date t he aggrieved party knew or should have known of the injury, that is, the “discovery rule. ” See Knopick v. Connelly , 639 F.3d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing these rules in the context of Pennsylvania tort law) ; see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sed ran & Berman

, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that t he discovery rule provides that the date the statute of limitations begins to run “ is not the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date on which the plaintiff d iscovers that he or she has been injured ” ). U nder the discovery rule, a plaintiff’s time to bring suit is not in any way shortened by his or her reasonable ignorance : “the statutory limitations period begins to run and the plaintiff is afforded the full l imitations period, starting from the point of [discovery] , in which to file his or her claim.” Oshiver , 38 F.3d at 1386. 10

10 We have acknowledged there are different views as to whether the discovery rule is properly characterized as delaying the date of claim accrual or as tolling the limitations24 The discover y rule controls here. Generally , “absen[t]

. . . a contrary directive from Congress, we apply the federal discovery rule ” as a default. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA , 539 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, of course, Congress left nothing to doubt, unambiguously providing in the IDEA that the date from which any limitations period begins to run is the date the parents “knew or should have known” of the basis for the claim

. See 20 U.S.C. § § 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C). The District thus does not argue that the occurrence rule applies, nor could it, because to do so would be contrary t o the IDEA’s explicit , twice

- repeated discovery rule

. Instead, it attempts an end run around the rule by proposing a two

- year cap on redress from the date of the complaint

, with the same effect : the requirement that a claim be filed within two years of th e date the violation actually occurred ( not the date it was reasonably discovered) for that claim to be cognizable

. Take a practical example. Assume a school district unreasonably fails to identify a child’s disability from the beginning of first grade t hrough the end of third grade

. Assume also that at the end of third grade, the parents first reasonably discover the injury, and the school district immediately begins providing the student with the

period for a claim that accrued upon occurrence of the injury, and recently have held that the federal discovery rule is properly viewed as the latter. See William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey , 646 F.3d 138, 150 (3 d Cir. 2011). This distinction is immateria l to our resolution here, for “[t] he distinction between the two concepts . . . makes no difference for purposes of deciding whether a claim survives a statute

- of

limitations defense.” Id. at 148.25 educational supports he or she needs going forward but d eclines to provide that child with compensatory education to make up for the three years the child was deprived a FAPE. Under the theory espoused by the District, even if the parents filed a due process complaint the very same day they reasonably discover ed the injury, the child’s compensatory education for the three years of this violation would be capped at two year s (the second and third grade years that occurred within the two years before the filing of the complaint). Moreover, those two year s of com pensatory education would di minish daily for each day after the reasonable discovery date that the parents or their counsel conducted due diligence, explored settlement options, or prepared the complaint before filing. Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests such an absurd result. Cf. Reiter v. Cooper , 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993) (“While it is theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of action that accrues at one time for the pur pose of calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the statute.”). 11

11 Perhaps for this reason, at oral argument, the District took another tack, stating that if a parent’s complaint was filed “very close in time” to the reasonable discovery date

— that is, if a parent only waited a week or two to file a complaint, versus the two years he or she is entitled under the

statute

— a child would not lose any remedy at all. Oral Arg. at 13:25, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral

argument

- recordings. This supposed two

- week grace period, like the District’s position generally, finds no s upport in the statutory text.26 Putting aside the oddity of a statute of limitations functioning in this manner and its inc onsistency with the broad remedial purposes of the IDEA (discussed more fully below)

, the text is clear that Congress e schewed the occurrence rule in favor of the discovery rule by hinging both § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b) (6)(B) on the date the parents “k new or should have known” of the injury

. See, e.g.

, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds , 559 U.S. 633, 651 (2010) (holding that when a “statute says that the plaintiff’s claim accrues only after the ‘discovery’ of . . . facts,” a lim itations period does not “begin be

fore ‘discovery’ can take place”); Beauty Time, Inc. v. VU Skin Sys., Inc. , 118 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 1997) (“It is well

- established that Pennsylvania law recognizes an exception to the statute of limitations which delays the running of the statute until the plaintiff knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the injury and its cause.” (internal quotation marks omitted) )

. T hus, the limitations period of § 1415(f)(3)(C) “begins to run once the plaintiff did discover or a r easonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the violation

— whichever comes first

. ” Merck & Co. , 559 U.S. at 653 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 12

12 The discovery rule, of course, has a practical and

“ fundamental difference” with general equitable tolling doctrines, Oshiver , 38 F.3d at 1390, the concept we considered with regards to the IDEA in D.K. , 696 F.3d at 245

- 47 . Specifically, “[t]he purpose of the discovery rule is to determine . . . when the statute of limitations [effectively] begins to run.” Oshiver , 38 F.3d at 1390. Our general equitable tolling doctrine, on the other hand, “steps in to toll, or stop, the running of the statute of limitations in light of27 Accordingly, § 1415 ( b )(6)(B) , which runs backward from the

re asonable discovery date (not the filing date)

, appears on its face to mean something different and, whatever that is, it is not, as the District would have it , that claims not known or reasonably known expire of their own accord if the injury occurred more than two years before the filing date

.

ii. G.L.’s 2+2 and Pleading Requirement Theories

In a diametrically different but no less problematic reading

, G.L. argues that the text of § 1415(b)(6)(B ) supports
two interpretations , each of which entitles him to r elief

. First, he argue s that the District Court’s 2 +2 approach was correct

— that § 1415(b)(6)(B) provides a two

- year window before the reasonable discovery date within which he may claim IDEA violations occurred , thu s effectively serving as a four

- year rem edy cap

. Second, he argues, along with Amici Appellees

, 13 that th is subsection is merely the description of a

established equitable considerations,” despite a plaintiff’s discovery of his or her injury. Id.

13 G.L. focused his argument almost exclusively on the 2+2 rule, candidly explaining at oral argument that, because he only alleged two years of violations, the Court’s adoption of that rule would give him complete relief. He did, however, also support the broader position urged by Amici Appellees

, i.e., that properly construed, neither § 1415(f)(3)(C) nor § 14 15(b)(6)(B) imposed a cap on remedies. Even if G.L. had not espoused this interpretation of the statute, we are bound, “ on the basis of our independent judgment, [to] exercis[e] a plenary review of the purely legal question[] presented” to us by the parti es, pursuant to “our duty to28 prima facie cause of action, with no limit on remedy at all. That is, § 1415(b)(6)(B) requires that a due process complaint allege an injury unde r the IDEA that occurred within two
years of a parent ’s reasonable discovery, but imposes no limitation on the remedy if these elements are pleaded and the complaint is timely filed

.

Both of these interpretations, however, would render the text illogical

. For like § 1415(f)(3)(C), § 1415(b)(6)(B) provides in the very same sentence that if a “S tate has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint,” the complaint shall instead be filed “in such time as the State law allows,” rather than the time described in § 1415(b)(6)(B)

, and further provides that if the state does enact its own statute of limitations, the federal exceptions still apply to the state’s

statute of limitations

. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B)

. Yet, i t would be non sensical for Con gress to specify that a federal statute’s remedy cap or the elements of a prima facie case be replaced by a state’s statute of limitations , and i t would be equally illogical to have two bases for equitable tolling

— a doctrine used to determine whether a sta tute of limitations has expired

— apply to a provision that is not a statute of limitations in the first place. We decline to interpret the

interpret statutory provisions” and accord them the meaning that Congress intended. Vornado, Inc. v. Trs. of the Retail Store Emps.’ Union Local 1262 , 829 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Loretangeli v. Critelli , 853 F.2 d 186, 189 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988) (“This court may consider a pure question of law even if not raised below . . . where the issue’s resolution is of public importance.”).29 statute in this bizarre fashion

. See, e.g.

, Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc. , 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994) (r ejecting statutory interpretation that would render a statute “illogical” and contrary to congressional intent).

In sum , the supposedly straightforward textual arguments of the parties more resemble the twists an d bends of a contortion artist, presenting us with the option , on the one hand, of ignoring swaths of the statutory text or , on the other, accepting a reading t hat is absurd on its face. The parties’ positions are illustrative , however, of the difficulty of applying a plain language reading to th is text. We conclude

, as we observed in addressing the pre

- 2004 version of the IDEA

, “the language of section 1415(b)(6) is at best ambiguous.” Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey , 417 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 2005). 14 We therefore must resort to othe r tools of statutory construction

.

B. Statutory Interpretation of § 1415(b)(6)(B)

The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he meaning

— or ambiguity

— of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” F.D.A. v.

14 In Lawrence , we addressed whether a school district had standing to bring a private r ight of action under § 1415(b)(6) and concluded the provision was intended to provide a private right of action only to disabled children and their parents. 417 F.3d at 371

- 72. While the question was wholly unrelated and we were addressing a pre

- amendmen t version of the IDEA, our observation about the opacity of § 1415(b)(6) pertains even more so to the amended version.30 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). That is, “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme

. . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effec t that is compatible with the rest of the law. ” United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); accord Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.

, 484 U.S. 49, 59

- 60 (1987) (analyzing statu tory language in a way that is in accord with the “language and structure” of the section of law at issue). Such is the case here, where examining § 1415(b)(6) (B) in the context of § 1415 and the IDEA as a whole points unequivocally in one direction: that § 1415(b)(6) (B) indeed restates § 1415 ( f ) (3)(C) ’s two

- year statute of limitation s and that this limitation s period functions in a traditional way, t hat is, as a filing deadline that runs from the date of reasonable discovery and not as a cap on a child’s remedy for timely

- filed claims that happen to date back more than two years before the complaint is filed

.

i. The Structure, Language, and Context of the Act

We begin with the overarching structure of § 1415. See Gwaltney , 484 U.S. at 59

- 60; Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC

, 793 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2015) (examining the “ structure and

. . . parallels ” of a statute to determine the meaning of its terms ). As previously noted, after opening with a preamble that reiterates that a state must “establis h and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)

, the section next proceeds to list and briefly describe the “[t] ypes of procedures” mandated by the IDEA, id

. § 1415 (b). That listing , in § 1415(b), serve s31 in effect as a table of contents for the expanded descriptions of these same procedures that then appear in roughly the same order in § 1415(c)

- ( f

). Thus, for example, § 1415(b)(3) requires writ ten prior notice of change s to a child’s education al program, the deta ils of which are described in § 1415(c)(1); § 1415(b)(4) ensures notice is ava ilable in a parent’s nat ive language, as described in § 1415(d)(2); § 1415(b)(5) provides “[a]n opportunity for media tion,” as described in § 1415(e); and, as relevant here, § 1415(b)( 6 ) provides an “ [ a ] n opportunity for any party to present a complaint,” which is more fully described in § 1415(f). Id. § 1415(b)

- (f). This structure makes clear that § 1415(b) was intend ed to preview and convey the same essential meaning

as § 1415(f)

.

Given that § 1415(b) , in context, appears to be nothing more than a summary list ing of the procedural safeguards more fully described in later sub sections, we cannot conceive that Congress intended to bury with in § 1415(b)(6) a sea change in the IDEA . That, however, would be the effect of cutting off at twenty four months in virtually all cases the courts’ power to award compensatory education

, and “le[aving] parents without an adequate rem edy when a sch ool district unreasonably fail[s] to identify a child with disabilities

. ” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A. , 557 U.S. 230, 245 (2009) (noting “Congress’ acknowledgment of the paramount importance of properly identifying each child eligible for services”)

. This proposition appears particularly fanciful considering that Congress failed to even hint at such an intention either in § 1415(f), the full version of the due process hearing procedure of which § 1415(b)(6) is merely a précis , or in § 141 5(i), which was reenacted in 2004 without any alteration to the “broad discretion” it grants federal courts32 to remedy violations of the IDEA

, Forest Grove , 557 U.S. at 238

. As the Supreme Court “ha[s] repeatedly said[,] . . . Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions

— it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation

, L.P. , 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1612 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass ’ ns , 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) )

. Moreover, it is “[a] standard principle of statutory construction . . . that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energ y Servs., Inc ., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007). Here, the words and phrases describing the IDEA’s statute of limitations and its exceptions indicate that § 1415(b) was intended to have the same meaning as the other references to a limitations period in § 1415

, and, like them, to function as a filing deadline and not a remedy cap

. Specifically , i n three separate subsections of § 1415, the statute provides a federal time limit, but

— using identical language

— provides as an alternative: “or, if the State has an expl icit time limitation . . . , in su ch time as the State law allows. ” 20 U.S.C. § § 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C), (i)(2) (B)

. Given that state limitations periods generally function as filing deadlines on claims that are known or should have been known , not remedy caps on claims not yet reasonably knowable , t he only way those words can be read sensibly is if they provide an alternative to a federal filing deadline, i.e., a traditional statute of limitations

.

“ T extual cross

- reference confirms this conclusion

, ” Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) , for § 1 415(b) (6)(B) not only mirrors § 1415 (f)(3)(C) ’s state statute of limitations provision but also its two equitabl e33 tolling exceptions, and does so simply by cross

- referenc ing the “ the exceptions to the timeline d escribed in [§ 1415(f)(3)(D) ]

, ” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C). This shorthand reference to these important tolling provisions

, which are then set forth in full in § 1415(f), fortifies our conclusion that § 1415(b) (6) was merely intended as an abstract of § 1415(f), that it reflects the same limitations period as § 1415(f) (3)(C) , and that this limitations period, pursuant to the “cooperative federalism” inherent in the IDEA

, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast , 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney , 183 F.3d 816, 830 ( 8th Cir. 1999) ) , defers to state limitations periods when appropriate and otherwise functions as a tra ditional statute of limitations

— not a remedy cap

.
Indeed, w hile it would make no sense for a state filing deadli ne to displace a federal remedy cap or elements of a prima facie case, it makes perfect sense that Congress

, according due weight to principles of federalism

, would allow

a state filing deadline to displace a federal one. Likewise, it would be odd indeed for § 1415(b) (6)(B) , if it actually describe d a remedy cap or a prima facie case , to apply equitable tolling provisions from § 1415(f) (3)(D) , but quite logical if § 1415(b) (6)(B) merely restates the statute of limitations to which those equitable exception s app ly

. That is, when we “look to the [section’s] surrounding words a nd provisions and their context,” Tavarez v. Klingensmith , 372 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2004) , and apply “the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole,” King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.

, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991), it is clear that § 1415(b) (6)(B)

,34 though poorly penned, was intended merely as a synopsis of § 1415(f)(3)(D) ’s statute of limitations. 15

ii. Forest Grove and the Canon against Sub Silentio Repeal

Even if the structure, language

, and context of the IDEA left room for doubt, we would be loath to interpret § 1415(b) (6)(B) as constricting the remedies available under the IDEA in view of the statute’s broad r emedial purpose, see A.W. , 486 F.3d at 803

, codified , among other places, in § 1415 (i)(2)(C)(iii)

. That sub section provides that a court “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and, in a long line of cases, the Supreme Court and this Circuit have held that it shou ld be interpreted expansively to provide a comprehensive remedy for children deprived of a FAPE

. See

, e.g. , Forest Grove

, 557 U.S. at 237

- 38 (“In determining the

15 Given the structure of this statute, which includes at the outset a digest of the multiple procedural safeguards that are each expound ed upon in later subsections, we also discern no tension between our interpretation of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and the canon against superfluity. Moreover, that canon “assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect ‘ to every clause and word of a statu te. ’ ” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship , 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2248 (2011) (quoting Duncan v. Walker , 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) . We can identify no competing interpretation that could give logical meaning to all the words of § 1415(b)(6)(B), and thus conclud e this is a quintessential case where “rigorous application of the canon does not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair construction of the statute.” King , 135 S. Ct. at 2492.35 scope of the relief authorized, . . . the ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discr etion on the court and . . . absent any indication to the contrary, what relief is appropriate must be determined in light of the Act’ s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE

. . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted) ) ; Bucks Cnty. D ep’t of Mental Health , 379 F.3d at 67 (“We . . . have broadly interpreted the term ‘appropriate’” and “discerned nothing in the text or history suggesting that relief under IDEA is limited in any way . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and a lterations omitted) ) ; see also D.E. , 765 F.3d at 273 (examining the IDEA’s purpose and rejecting a statutory interpretation which “would ‘create an enormous loophole’ in a school district’ s obligations under the IDEA, while ‘substantially weaken[ing] the I DEA ’s protections’ for students” (alteration in original) ( quoting D.F. , 694 F.3d at 497) )

.
Given the broad remedial scheme of the IDEA, neither in the period before the 2004 amendments

— w hen we borrowed a state’s most analogous statutory cause of action t o determine how long after an adverse decision by a hearing officer a parent could wait before filing an IDEA complaint in state or federal court 16

— nor in the period since , have we imp osed a cap on the remedy a child could seek for timely

filed claims . Ins tead, we have consistently repeated that a

16 See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E. , 172 F.3d 238, 25 0

- 5 1 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 767 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing that “ [ p ] rior to the [2004] amendment of the IDEA

. . . , the time for bringing suit . . . after receiving an adverse administrative determination had b een two years”).36 child’s right to compensatory education “accrue[s] from the point that the school district knows or should know” of the injury to the child, and the child “is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem.” M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch.
Dist. , 81 F.3d 389, 396

- 97 (3d Cir. 1996); see also D.F. , 694 F.3d at 499 (repeating standard); Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. , 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis , 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (same). T hat standard is grounded in our understanding, then and now, that “a child’s entitlement to speci al education should not depend upon the vigilance of the parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend the problem) nor be abridged because the district’s behavior did not rise to the level of slothfulness or bad faith.” M.C. , 81 F.3d a t 397.

Again s t the backdrop of these cases and the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has given to a court’s remedial power under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)

, it bears particular significance that Congress reenacted that subsection without change as part of t he 2004 reenactment. Thus, interpreting the IDEA’s statute of limitations as a remedy cap would also disregard the well

- settled canon of statutory interpretation that “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a s tatute and to adopt that interpretation when it re

- enacts a statute without change

. ” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) ; see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. , 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2015)

. On this po int , we find clear guidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove

, which examined the 199737 amendments to the IDEA. Those amendments added, among other thing s, § 1412(a)(10)(C), which provided that if the parents of a special

- needs child “who pre viously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency” enrolled their child in private school without the consent or referral of that public agency, a school district could still be ordered to provide tuition reimbu rsement if a fact

- finder determined that the school district failed to provide a student with a FAPE in t he first instance. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). In an attempt to limit liability, a school district argued that because the IDEA “only discusses

r eimbursement for children who have previously received special

- education services through the public school, [the] IDEA only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance.” 557 U.S. at 241.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It observed that the 1997 amendme nts preserved the IDEA’s comprehensive remedial goal of providing every child with a FAPE and did not alter 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)

. See id . at 243 n.10 (stating that the holdings in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Mass achusetts , 471 U.S. 359 (1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter

, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), “rested . . . on the breadth of the authority conferred by § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), the interest in providing relief consistent with the Act’s purpose, and the injustice that a contrary reading would produce

— considerations that were not altered by the 1997 Amendments” ( internal citations omitted) ). The Court thus rejected the notion that Congress repealed sub silentio those previous Supreme Court holdings de scribing the “ broad discretion” afforded by § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)

. Id. at 2 43. Any other reading, the Court reasoned, would be contrary to the IDEA’s broad remedial38 purpose and a “child’s right to a free appropriate education . . . would be less than comp lete.” Id . at 244

- 45 (alteration in original) (quoting Burlington , 471 U.S. at 370)

.

So too here, for the 2004 reauthorization reaffirmed the IDEA ’s first purpose as “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . designed to meet their unique needs ,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), and once more left unchanged § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)

, which grants courts the broad discretion to fashion remedies t hat accomplish that objective

. Congress’s purpose in that mandate is clear: In order to effectuate the law’s broad remedial goals

, a court finding a deprivation of a free appropriate public education should

return a child to the educational path he or she would have traveled had the educational agency provi ded that child with an appropriate education in the first place

. See D.F. , 694 F.3d at 498

- 99; Reid , 401 F.3d at 518 ; see also Ridgewood

, 172 F.3d at 251 (remanding to district court to consider eight years of claims for compensatory education); Lester H. by Octavia P. v. Gilhool , 916 F.2d 865, 873

- 74 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of thirty months of compensatory education).

C onsistent with that purpose and the traditional way in which a discovery

- based statute of limitations functions,

courts since the passage of the 2004 reenactment have routinely affirmed awards of compensatory education that remedy d eprivations of greater than two years , or at minimum, remanded for an administrative agency to consider those claims . See Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phil a. , 612 F.3d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming award of three years of compensatory education); M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd

. , 553 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the broad discretion afforded under the IDEA allowed a39 distric t court to consider reimbursement for three years of a child’s allegedly inappropriate placement); Draper v. Atl. Indep. Sch . Sys.

, 518 F.3d 1275 , 1286

- 90 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a school district’s argument that a child’s long

undiscovered injury was time barred and upholding an award of approximately five years of compensatory education); Reid , 401 F.3d at 526 (remanding to consider claims over a four and half year period of time); K.H. v N.Y. C. Dep’t of Educ. , No. 12

- 1680, 2014 WL 3866430, at *20 (E. D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014) (finding that “ the IDEA’s clear statutory language mandates” that a remedy is not limited by the statute of limitations when a claim is timely filed); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S. , 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1123 (N.D. Ala. 201 3) (holding that a right to redress for a complaint filed in October 2011 would be limited to the most recent two years “ unless

. . . the statute did not begin to run on the claim because the parent did not know/should not have known about that action unti l a time within two years of the due process request”). But see Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, Marshall v. H.M.J. , No. 14

- 2114, 2015 WL 4744505, at *11 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2015) (“No party may recover for a violation occurring outside the two

- year statute of l imitations.”)

.
Of course, the IDEA’s statute of limitations does still practically curtail remedy

, for i t “specif[ies] when a [ complaint] is timely filed” and thus “has the consequence of limiting liability because filing a timely [complaint] is a prerequi site to having an actionable claim.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan

, 536 U.S. 101, 120 (2002). I n context, however, that means simply that once a violation is reasonably discovered by the parent , any claim for that violation , however far back it da tes, must be filed within two40 years of the “knew or should have known” date . If it is not, all but the most recent two years before the filing of the complaint will be time

- barred ; but if it is timely filed , then, upon a finding of liability, the entire p eriod of the violation should be remedied

. In other words, § 1415(f) (3)(C)

, like its synopsis in § 1415(b) (6)(B)

, reflects a traditional statute of limitations

.

iii. The Department of Education’s Regulation and Interpretation

The DOE , the federal agency charg ed with promulgating regulations for the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1406, agrees that § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) state the

same limitations period

.

In its regulations following the 2004 reenactment, the DOE simply reproduced both subsections verbati m. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), and 1415(f)(3)(C), with 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), and 300.511(e). I n its Analysis of Comments and Changes to those regulations, however, the DOE reported that commenters were confused and sought guidance , “ because the statute of limitations is mentioned twice and implies that the time line for filing a complaint and filing a request for a du e process hearing are different.” Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities & Preschool Grants for C hildren with Disabilities

, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 20 06). I t responded that “[t]he statute of limitations in section [ 1415(b)(6)(B)] of the Act is the same as the statute of limitations in section [ 1415(f)(3)(C)] of the Act. ” Id

.

In this appeal, at our request, the DOE also submitted an amicus letter brief in which it reiterated its position that t he41 subsections are, in fact, referencing a single statute of limitations. 17

We afford the DOE’s interpretation of its regulation and its posi tion before us here “‘respect’ . . . to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade,’” Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) ; see id. at 25 6

- 5 7 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of regu lations that merely parrot the statute are accorded Skidmore deference, rather than the higher deference generally accorded to interpretive guidance under Auer v. Robbins , 519 U.S. 452 (1997) )

. Here, w e find the DOE’s position persuasive because it accord s with the language, structure and purpose of the statute, and it is yet one more voice in a har monious chorus that § 1415(b)(6)(B) was intended to reiterate § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two

- year st atute of limitations.

17 The IDEA also tasks the DOE with promulgating a model notice of procedural safeguards. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(e). In that model notice, it again repeated the language of § 1415(b)(6), but cautioned states that if they “established a specific timeframe for requesting a hearing under the IDEA that is different than two years (either shorter or longer), revise the above statement to reflect that timeframe.” United States Department of Education, Part B Procedural Safeguards Notice, 17 (2009), h ttp://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/modelform

safeguards.doc. Again, such a caution to revise the limitations notice shorter or longer based on a state’s statute of limitations only makes sense if § 1415(b)(6)(B) is, in fact, a statute of limitation s.42 T o the extent there remains any doubt about th is conclusion, it is put to rest by the legislative history, to which

we next turn.

iv. The Legislative History of the 2004 IDEA Amendments

“Supreme Court cases declaring that clear language cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history are legion.” Firs t Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co. , 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). That said, legislative history can play a confirmatory role in resolving ambiguity when statutory language and structure support a given interpretation

. See, e.g.

, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline , 540 U.S. 581, 586

- 91 (2004) ; Catwell v. Att’y Gen. , 623 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2010). This is such a case.

A legislature designing a statute of limitations confronts certain choices

. As we have discussed, i t can set the date from which the limitations period begins to run by using the occurrence rule or the discovery rule

. See supra a t 2 3

- 2 6

. It also can set the expiration date either by counting forward from that occurrence or discovery date to the filing of a complaint or by counting backward from the date a complaint is filed to the occurrence or discovery date

. When the House of Representatives proposed the amendment that was eventually incorporated into § 1415(b)(6), it chose to use the occurrence ru le and to count backward , providing that parents would have :

(6) an opportunity to present complaints

–43 (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and

(B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed;

H.R. Rep. 108

- 77, at 254 (2003)

. The House committee’s report unambiguously described this language as a one

- year

s tatu te of limitations. Id. at 115

- 16 ( “ Statute of limitations [ : ] The Act currently has no statute of limitations and leaves local educational agencies open to litigation for the entire length of time a child is in school, whether or not the child has been ide ntif

ied as a child with a disability. . . . The bill includes a statute of limitations of one year from the date of the violation . . . .). And as written, it would have unambiguously functioned like one, barring claims based on injuries that occurred mor e than twelve months before the complaint was filed.

The Senate, meanwhile, chose to use the discovery rule and to count forward, providing in what became § 1415(f)(3)(C):

Timeline for requesting hearing.

– A parent or public agency shall request an impart ial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a44 hearing under th is part, in such time as the State law allows.

S. Rep. 108

- 185, at 222 (2003)

. U nlike the House ’s proposal

, the Senate’s also added the provision giving primacy to a state’s limitations period

, along with the two statutory tolling exceptions.

Those t wo bills

—

both statutes of limitations but pointing in different directions and using different starting dates for the limitations period

— then went to conference where the conference committee sought to reconcile them. Th at committee reaffirmed that each b ody’s amendment functioned as a traditional statute of limitations on the filing of a complaint :

The House bill and Senate amendment have similar language regarding the opportunity to present complaints, but the House bill, not the Senate amendment, inclu des language establishing a 1 year statute of limitations on the right to present complaints. Senate has a 2 year timeline for filing complaints at note 221.

H.R. Rep. 108

- 779, at 213 n.193 (2004) (Conf. Rep.)

, reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2480, 2527 ; se e also id. at 218 n.221 , 2532 ( “T he Senate amendment establishes a 2

- year statute of limitations unless State law already has a statute of limitations. The House bill includes a 1

- year statute of limitations (see note 193).”).

Apparently c oncluding that the additi on of a statute of limitations sh ould involve both a new provision within § 1415 (f) (3)(C) and an amendment to its prefatory sub section45 at § 1415(b)(6) , the conference committee opted not to choose one body’s addition over the other but to retain both. It did so by conforming each and every of the material terms of the House’s version to the Senate’s , i.e., b y changing the House’s limitations perio d from one year to two, changing the occurrence rule to the discovery rule, adding that a state ’s

st atute of limitations could override the IDEA’s , and adding the two equitable tolling provisions specified by the Senate

. The conference committee then incorporated the Senate’s version at § 1415(f) and the House’s version in the summary listing at § 1415( b). W hen it did so

, however, it omitted to change the backward

- looking framework of the House’s version to the forward

- lo oking framework of the Senate’s.
T hus was created the problem we grapple with today

.

Section 1415(b)(6) , in other words, started in t he House as a functioning, one

- year statute of limitations for the filing of complaints:

(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public educati on to such child; and

(B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed [.]

H.R. Rep. 108

- 77, at 254 (emphasis added).

It ended, however, as something different altogether:

(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational46 placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and

(B) which set forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than two years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added).

The Congressional Research Service described the amendments this way:

The 20 04 reauthorization includes statutes of limitations in various sections. As previously discussed [ Section 1415 (b) ] provides for a
two

- year statute of limitations regarding the filing of a complaint . There is also a two

- year statute of limitations regarding requests for a hearing. The two years is from the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action.

Richard N. Appling an d Nancy Lee Jones, Cong. Research Serv. , RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Ana lysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108

- 446, CRS

- 27 (2005) (emphasis added)

. While this post

- enactment47 observation on its own carries little weight, n othing in the IDEA’s legislative history points to a contrary interpretation

. In fact, quite the opposite. F ar from Congress intending that the two limitations period s diverge or limit a

c ourt’s remedial power under § 1415 (i ) , the legislative his tory reflects that the drafters intended the amendments to add a single statute of limitations and to leave untouched the IDEA’s broad remedies

. For example, in its explanation of the addition of the statute of limitations, the Senate report stated:

This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under IDEA that children may receive compensatory education ser vices, as affirmed in School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts , 471 U.S. 359 (1985) and Florence County School District Four v. Carter , 510 U.S. 7 (1993) and otherwise limited under section [1412(a)(10)(C)]

. . . . In essence, where the issue giving rise to the claim is more than two years old and not ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or services at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory education services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services and the conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due p rocess or the private placement

. . . . S. Rep. 108

- 185, 40 (emphasis added).48 After conference, but before final passage, Senator Hark in, a co

- sponsor of the amendments, addressed the addition of a statute of limitations this way:

In this reauthorization, we also include a 2

- year statute of limitations on claims. However, it should be noted that this limitation is not designed to have a ny impact on the ability of a child to receive compensatory damages for the entire period in which he or she has been deprived of services. The statute of limitations goes only to the filing of the complaint, not the crafting of remedy. This is important b ecause it is only fair that if a school district repeatedly failed to provide services to a child, they should be required to provide compensatory services to rectify this problem and help the child achieve despite the scho ol’ s failings.

Therefore, compens atory education must cover the entire period and must belatedly provide all education and related services previously denied and needed to make the child whole.

150 Cong. Rec. S11851 ( daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (emphasis added ); see also Robert R. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist. , No. 05

- 1282, 2005 WL 3003033, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (examining the IDEA’s legislative history and concluding that “the limitations period placed on claims for compensatory education by the [2004] amendment to the IDEA was not meant to limit the period which the hearing officer could consider when a due process49 hearing was timely brought”) ; Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement Second

Class Remedial Scheme for Low

- Income Children with Disabilities in the Third Circuit , 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 599, 643

- 646 (2013)

. The legislative history is thus crystal clear that Congress intended to impose a single statute of limitations, but otherwise no t to limit a court’s pow er to remedy the deprivation of a free appropriate education.

V. Conclusion

As a general rule, “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. , 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). However, in the “rare cases [in whi ch] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,” the plain meaning need not control. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. , 458 U.S. 564, 571 (19 82 ) ). In those exceptional instances where

“ it is uncontested that legislative intent is at odds with the literal terms of the statute, . . . [ our ] primary role is to effectuate the intent of Congress even if a word in the statute instructs otherwise.” M

organ v. Gay , 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2006); accord Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe , 770 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2014).

Here, the language, context , and structur e of § 1415 lead inexorably to one conclusion: § 1415(b)(6)(B ) was intended to reflect the sam e statute of limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C) . To the extent that some of its language appears to conflict with that conclusion, the legislative history confirms what is apparent from our analysis of the statute itself. That is, the inconsistent language reflects nothing more than a drafting error in the reconciliation process, turning a50 passage that was at each stage of the legislative process thought to be a statute of limitations into s omething that both

contravenes c ongressional intent and re nders the statute illogical. Thus, the IDEA “needs common sense revision

, ” Morgan , 466 F.3d at 279, reflectin g c ongressional intent that a due process complaint must be presented “within 2 years” of a parent’s reasonable discovery date, not that remedies be limited to injuries that occurred “not more than 2 years before” that date.

The upshot of all this is two

- fold. On the one hand, although a child’s right to special education under the IDEA does not turn on parental vigilance, M.C. , 81 F.3d at 397,
pa rental vigilance is vital to the preservation and enforcement of that right . A s we made clear i n D

. K

. , claims that are known or reasonably sh ould be known to parents must be brought withi n two years of that “knew or should have known” date , and parents ma y not, without satisfying one of the two statutory exceptions

, knowingly sit on their rights or attempt to sweep both timely and expired claims in to a single “continuing violation” claim brought years later

. 696 F.3d at 248

. Parents are often in a positi on to be forceful advocates for their children and through their vigilance and
perseverance to help fulfill the IDEA’s promise of a free appropriate public education. That “cooperative process . . . between parents and schools” that results from a parent’ s action , after all, is at the very “core of the statute” itself. Schaffer , 546 U.S. at 53. Thus the sooner parents start that process and secure appropriate intervention and remedial supports after they discover or reasonably should have discovered the need for it , the better for the well

- being of the child, the goals of the school district , and the relationship between the family and school administrators

.51 On the other hand, where parents neither kn e w nor reasonably should have know n of the special n eeds of their child or of the educational system’s failure to respo nd appropriately to those needs

, the other partner in this endeavor

— the school district itself

— still has its independent duty to identify those needs within a reasonable time period and to work with the parents and the IEP team to expeditiously design and implement an appropriate program of remedial support

. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) ; see also Forest Grove , 557 U.S. at 245; P.P. , 585 F.3d at 738. This is a profound responsibility, with the po wer to change the trajectory of a child’s life . Thus, the corollary to D.K. is that when a school district has failed in that responsibility and parents have taken appropriate and timely action under the IDEA

, then that child is entitled to be made whole with nothing less than a “complete” remedy. Forest Grove , 557 U.S. at 244. Compensatory education is crucial to achieve that goal, and the courts, in the exercise of their broad discretion, may award it to whatever extent necessary to make up for the chi ld’s lost progress and to restore the child to the educational path he or she w ould have travel ed but for the deprivation. See D.F. , 694 F.3d at 498

- 99. In this way, the courts too have an essential function in fulfilling Congress’s mandate in the IDEA a nd enabling each child with special needs to reach his or her full potential.

For these reasons, w e hold today that

, absent one of the two statutory exceptions found in § 1415(f)(3)(D)

, parents have two years from the date they knew or should have known of the violation to request a due process hearing through the filing of an administrative complaint a nd that, assuming parents timely file that complaint and liability is
proven , Congress did not abrog ate our longstanding precedent52 that “ a disabled child i s entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem.” D.F. , 694 F.3d at 499 (quoting M.C. , 81 F.3d at 397).

* * *

G.L.’s claim was filed within two years of the date his parents knew or reasonably should have known of his injury

, and thus his right to compensatory education upon proof of a violation was not curtailed by the IDEA’s statute of limitations . Accordingly, w e will affi rm the District Court’s decision that his claims for remedy prior to March 2010 were not time

- barred and will remand to the District Court for
pr oceedings consistent with this O pinion.