## In the Court of Appeals Second A ppellate District of Texas at F ort Wort h

__________________________ _ No. 02

- 21

- 00129

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 231

- 657232

- 19

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinio n by Justice Walker 

### M ARCEL 

### H OWARD 

### , Appellant

V


### . C ASSANDRA 

### L EE 

### H ORNE 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINIO N Appellant Marcel How ard appe a ls the t rial cou r t ’ s divorce de cree. W e affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
Howard and Appellee Cassandra Lee Ho rne both appeared with cou nsel at the April 6, 2021 bench t rial. After hearing the evi d ence, the trial court made its oral rulings

. Sti ll re presented by counsel, Howard filed a notice of appeal on May 4, 2021

. A nd on May 5, 2021, counsel filed a timely motion for new trial on H o ward ’ s beha lf

. T he reafter , on June 21, 2021 , however , Howa r d ’ s counsel filed a motion to
withdraw

. The motion indicated that Howard no longer wished to retain counsel and wished, instead, to represent himself. O n June 22, 20 21, the trial court signed an order permitt

ing counsel to wi thdraw.
O n Ju ly 1 3, 2021 , t he trial cou rt had a hearing for entry of the final decree of
divorce

. O n that date, t he trial court signed the final judgment

. Although Howard ’ s Ma y 4, 2021 notice of appeal was premature , it nevertheless perfected his appeal. Se e Tex. R. App. P. 27.1 ( a).
Thr ee days later, on July 16, 2021 , Ho war d filed a pro se motion for new trial , which the trial court set for a h earing on August 30, 2021. Our reco rd contains no order ruling on H oward ’ s pro se motion for new trial

. S ee Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
How a rd filed a pro se appellant ’ s brief on Nove mber 24 , 2021. Due to numerous defects, we requested by clerk ’ s letter that H oward file an amen ded br ief by3

De cember 9, 202 1

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38 .9

. Howar d filed an amended brief on December 9, 2021 , but hi s amended brief still contain ed num erous deficiencies. Horne filed her appellee ’ s brief , and How ard filed a reply brief that also contain ed
numerous deficienci es . II. DISCUSSION
Howard pres e nts legal authorities, but he presents them in the abstract. H is legal a uthorities are not tied to any of his complaints

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). And althoug h Howard artic ulates complaints in his pro se bri ef, he does not address whether he p reserved those complaints in the trial court , see T ex. R. App. P. 33. 1, or support th em with legal arguments and a uthoritie s , see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i)

. Finally,
Howard do es not provide any record references. See Tex . R. App. P. 38.1(g).
We are to const ru e the briefing rules liberally. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. Although s ubstanti al compliance with the briefing rules suff ices , it is not our duty to
fas hion legal arguments on a party ’ s behal f

. Harris C

nty

. v. Ram i

rez , 581 S.W.3d 423 , 429 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton (14 t h Dist. ) 2019 , no pet. )

. Additionally, Howard ’ s noncompliance wi th the rules is substantial. Under these circumstances, the rules authorize u s to strike H o ward ’ s brief, to pr ohibit him from filing anothe r, a nd to proceed as if he had faile d to file a brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9(a) ; Smith v. DC Civil Constr., LLC , 521 S .W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (per curiam)

. We de cline t o take that route. On the other hand, a sking
Howard to fi l e a second amended brief af ter we ha ve already a sked him to file an4

amended brief seems pointless. See Tex. R. App. P. 3 8.9( b ). As best we can, we will
add re ss his complaint s within the parameters o f his deficient brief.
A. H IDING A SSETS Howard comp l ains that H orne tried to hide a ssets
. The record shows that the
trial court was aware

— based on Horne ’s testimony

— that she had been less t han
candid

. For example, Horne admitted lending money to “ a lady ” but maintained that the lady had repaid the loan, s o t h e mo ney was back in the community. Horne also admitted removing $18,000 from h er bank account to retain the funds as a down
paym ent on a home that she wanted to purchase

. She explained, “ I withdrew it
because I di dn ’ t want him to have it because I s a ved up three years for that money. ”
B ut she a lso maintained th at s he had returned the $18,000 to her bank account

. She lamented, “ [H] e ’ s making it seem like I ’ m spending this money. That ’ s money all
saved

. That 18,000, if he adds all that up, that ’ s a l l mon ey saved [.] ” H orne further
admitted traveling to t he Dominican Republic and spending about $4,000 on cos metic
surg ery or

— as Howard described it

— “ a mommy ma keover , ” which raised concerns
about de pletion of the marital estate.
To the extent that H o r ne wa s less th an candid, the record shows th at How ard is correct, but the record also shows that the trial court was awar e of the prob lem. I n a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of t he witnesses. See
Smith v. Smith , No. 0 2

- 20

- 0 0370

- CV, 2022 WL 1682427, at *14 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 26, 2022, no pet. ) (mem. op.). Consequently, to the extent that Howa rd5

argues that the trial court erred by believing anything that H orne said, Howard ’ s argument fails because the trial cour t , as the factfinder , had the ultimate call on what
to believe. See id.
We overrule this complaint. T o the extent that this comp lain t impacts the property division, we address that compl aint separately

.

B
. R ETROA CTI VE C HILD S UPPORT Howard complain s ab o ut re troactive child support. We note that t he attorney general intervened and sought retroactive child s upport. We also note that a court can order retroactive child support. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 154.009

. Howard contends , however, that th e trial c ourt did not order h im to pay retroactive child support and th at the attorney general backdated his child support to achie ve the same ends. The clerk ’ s record shows the trial court ’ s tempo rary order s d id not order retro active child suppo rt but reserved t h e iss ue for later

. W he ther the attorney general backdated the child support order to collect retroac tive child supp ort is another matter. At trial, Horne requested retroact ive child support

— nine months at $ 6 54 per

mo nth for a total of $5,886

— but Howard objec ted that t he attorn ey general ’ s office
had already been taking retroactive child support out of his pay che ck

. The t rial court
stated , “ All right. I f it hadn ’ t already been o rdered, then I ’ m ordering

-- I ’ ll go ahead
and order that

-- $5,886 in re tr o ch ild suppo rt. ” During the trial, however, whether
H oward had alr eady been paying re troactive child support remained unresolved

.6

T he divorce decree , which the trial court signed several m ont hs after the trial,
does not order retroac tive chil d support. G iven that the trial court expressly ordered
retroactive chi ld support at the trial, this omission is curious. Although unc lear, one
way to ex plain its absence is that by the time the trial court signed the decree, H oward
had alrea dy paid off the retroac ti ve ch ild support, so ordering retroactive ch ild
suppo rt had become moot

. The motion for new trial filed by Howard ’ s counsel did

not mention retroactive child support. Howard ’ s pro se motion for new trial si milarly
d id not mention retroactive child supp or t. C onsequently, to the extent that Howard ’ s complaint is not moot , the record is not sufficiently developed to re solve it

. See Pelloat
v. Bolenbaucher

, No. 09

- 17

- 00415

- CV, 2018 WL 2339644, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont May 24, 2018, pet . denied) ( mem. op. )

. A ss uming that H o ward has shown error , he
has not shown ha rm. See Tex. R . App. P. 44.1(a). We overrule this complai nt.

C
. I NCREASE IN A

MOUNT OF C HILD S UPPORT
Next , Howard complains th at the trial court arbitrarily raised his month l y c hild
sup port pay me nt fr om $654 to $ 741. The record shows that the $ 654 amount was based on H oward ’ s assertion that he worked forty hours per week , but at trial How ard
testified that he frequently worked over time and was paid for it ; the $741 amount was based on Howard ’ s te stimo ny that he was freque n tly paid overti me, which increas ed
his ann ua l salary. Th erefore, Howard ’ s child support payment was not raised7

arbitrarily but was raise d t o reflect H oward ’ s actual income, whi ch he had previously underrep orted.
We overrule H ow ard ’ s comp laint that his chil d support was raise d arbitrar ily.
See Smith , 2022 WL 1682427, at * 2 (stating that courts review child support awar ds
under an abuse of dis cretion s tandard).
D
. P ROPERTY D IVISION
H oward ’ s other complaints fall into the broad c atego ry of dissati sfaction with
the overall p rope rty division

. Although H oward complain s about particulars, he
makes no effort to show how the overall di vision was mani festly un just.
T he trial court is to divide a marital estate in a manner that it de em s “ju st and right, having due regard for the rights of e ach party.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 ; Touponse v. Toupo nse , No. 02

- 20

- 00285

- CV, 2021 WL 2753504, at *3 (Tex. App

. — Fort
Wo rth July 1, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). We review the trial court ’ s prope rt y div ision
for an abuse of discretion

. See Murff v. Mu rff , 615 S.W.2d 696, 698

– 99 (Tex. 1981) ; Touponse , 2021 WL 2753504, at *3

. We presume that the trial court exercised it s discret ion properly

. See Murff

, 615 S.W.2d at 698

– 99 ; Touponse , 2021 WL 2753 50 4, at
*3

. I f the division is manifestly unfair , a trial c ourt abuses its dis cretion

. See Mann v.
Mann , 607 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980) ; Touponse , 2021 WL 2753504, at *3.
H o ward ’ s pro se brief does not show that the property divi sion is manifestly unj us t and , thus, does not show that the trial court abu sed its di scretion. We will not
make Ho ward ’ s arguments for hi m. See Harris C nty

. , 581 S.W.3d at 42 9.8

We overrule this complaint.

III. CONCLUSION
We hold that Howard has not shown reversible er ror an d, accor d ingly, affir m the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ B rian Walker
B rian Wal ker Justice Delivered: August 25, 2022