No. 13509 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

197 6 

The State of Montana on the 

Relation of CHARLES F. ANGEL, 

Relator, 

VS. 

ROBERT L. WOODAHL, 

Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

Counsel of Record: 

For Relator: 

Charles F. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl appeared, Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Robert A. Poore argued, Butte, Montana 

James H. Morrow argued and Edmund P. Sedivy argued, 

Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted: October 8, 1976 

( i - .,,i i ',I) f \: .." . , 8, "i , ! -3 

Filed: 

erk 
PER CURIAM: 

This is an original proceeding against the Attorney 

General of Montana for contempt of court by reason of his 

alleged violation of an order of this Court prohibiting " * * * 

all public out-of-court statements that may conceivably influence 

public opinion for or against any person or issue * * *" in 

pending criminal prosecutions involving workmen's compensation 

matters. 

The background of the present proceeding indicates that 

for some time prior to June 11, 1976, many charges and countercharges by the attorney general's special prosecutors on the 

one hand and various defense attorneys on the other relating to 

pending criminal prosecutions involving workmen's compensation 

matters were being widely disseminated throughout Montana by 

means of out-of-court statements to the detriment of fair and 

just legal proceedings therein and that such actions were rapidly 

approaching a crisis. 

On June 11, 1976, the attorney general called a press 

conference in which he charged three named district judges in 

pending cases with voluntary actions resulting in "substantial 

delays" in bringing the defendants to trial and that the workmen's 

compensation investigation and prosecution "is one of the sad 

chapters in Montana history and, if not turned around, is going 

to be a sad chapter in the history of the judiciary" because of 

dilatory actions by lawyers for the defendants and the lack of 

firmness by many of the judges. At this press conference one 

of the attorney general's special prosecutors announced that he 

was resigning because of "substantial delays" resulting in his 

prosecuting only one case in 10 months and charging there was 

almost "an incestuous relationship" between a small number of 

judges and some lawyers. 

At said press conference the attorney general called upon 
this Court "to take hold of the matter" by calling in the judges, 

defense lawyers and prosecutors and making it clear to them 

"that they should get on with the business of the day which is 

to get these cases to trial." 

That in response to the attorney general's complaints 

and request and in view of the rapidly deteriorating relationship 

between the attorney general and his prosecutors on one side, 

defendants and defense counsel on another side, with a number of 

trial judges in the middle, this Court called a conference of 

prosecutors, defense counsel, and presiding judges by its order 

of June 14, 1976, and provided, among other things: 

"That in order to prevent further injury to the 

rights of the public, the state, the defendants 

and the judiciary pending the conference herein 

provided, all counsel, their staffs, clerks, 

stenographers and attaches are ordered and directed to refrain directly or indirectly from public 

comment in any way relating to the litigation 

heretofore described." 

and 

"Any violation of this order shall subject the 

offender to proceedings for contempt of court." 

The conference was held in the courtroom of this Court on June 

21, 1976. The attorney general and members of his staff were 

present and participated. At said conference, among other things, 

this Court, through the Chief Justice, explicitly stated: 

"Finally, the objectives that we are prepared to 

insist upon can be stated in the following charge 

to each of you. First, accord this litigation its 

rightful paramount priority. Second, bring these 

cases to trial with all deliberate speed. Third, 

cease and desist from all public out-of-court 

statements that may conceivably influence public 

opinion for or against any person or issue relating to this pending litigation. Fourth, each of 

you will be held responsible for your own conduct 

in accomplishing these objectives. * * *" 

On August 12, 1976, at a meeting of the Kiwanis Club in 

Sidney, Montana, the attorney general, a candidate for governor, 

spoke for approximately 10 minutes at which time he made no 
remarks concerning the workmen's compensation criminal prosecutions. That thereafter certain questions from the audience 

were directed to him regarding the workmen's compensation 

litigation. That the attorney general asked if there were any 

members of the press present and then proceeded to publicly 

blame three other district judges from those named at his press 

conference of June 11 for some of the prosecution's difficulties; 

that all three judges were appointed by former Governor Forrest 

Anderson; implied that these judges were looking out for the 

interests of the former democratic governor and his friends; 

and went on to tell how he was trying to get the cases tried 

quickly but the three judges and the lawyers representing the 

defendants had been filing numerous unwarranted motions and 

dragging their feet to stall the trials past election time. The 

attorney general indicated that he realized he was making the 

type of comments that are frowned upon by the Supreme Court and 

mentioned this Court's order against public comment on the cases. 

After this matter came to the attention of this Court, 

we issued an order and citation to the attorney general to appear 

and show cause why contempt proceedings should not be instituted 

against him. The attorney general appeared, admitted the substance of events and statements giving rise to our order and 

citation, but denied that they were intended to or did constitute 

contempt. Following hearing, this Court by order of September 7, 

1976, directed that contempt proceedings be instituted against 

the attorney general and designated attorney Charles F. Angel to 

institute such proceedings. 

On September 28, 1976, contempt proceedings were instituted by the filing of an affidavit for contempt by Mr. Angel. 

The attorney general responded on October 7, by filing a motion 

to quash and dismiss the proceeding and an answer to the affidavit 
for contempt. Briefs were filed, testimony was taken, exhibits 

were offered in evidence, oral argument was had and the matter 

was submitted for decision on October 14, 1976. 

The attorney general attacks the contempt proceeding 

on these principal grounds: (1) That there was no court order 

in effect at the time he made his statements at the Sidney 

Kiwanis meeting; (2) if a court order did exist, it was unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and ambiguous; (3) that the 

court order he is accused of violating is in itself a violation 

of the free speech, due process, equal protection and separation 

of powers provisions of the federal and state constitutions. 

To reach the merits of this case, we make the following 

preliminary rulings heretofore taken under advisement: (1) Relator's exhibit A (the newspaper article of June 11, 1976, in the 

Independent Record) is admitted in evidence; (2) respondent's 

exhibits B through F (newspaper articles) are admitted in evidence; 

(3) all motions to quash or dismiss this proceeding are denied. 

We make the following findings of ultimate fact: 

(1) This Court's orders of June 14 and June 21 and the 

conference of June 21 were made and held on the basis of complaints 

and at the special instance and public request of the attorney 

general. 

(2) That at no time has the attorney general applied to 

this Court for relief from the orders of June 14 and June 21 on 

any grounds. 

(3) That the attorney general willfully, knowingly and 

deliberately violated the order of this Court of June 21 directing him, among others to "cease and desist from all public out-ofcourt statements that may conceivably influence public opinion 

for or against any person or issue relating to this pending litigation" by reason of his statements and remarks at the Kiwanis 
meeting of August 12 in Sidney, Montana. 

(4) That the circumstances existing on June 14 and June 

21 presented a clear and present danger to the proper functioning of the judicial processes of this state and the rights of its 

citizens, the defendants, and the investigation and prosecution 

of criminal cases involving workmen's compensation matters, and 

that remedial action was necessary and required of this Court. 

(5) That the orders of this Court of June 14 and June 21 

were made in response thereto. 

We conclude as a matter of law: 

(1) That the orders of this Court on June 14 and June 

21 were within its jurisdiction and authority pursuant to Art. 

VII, Section 2 of the 1972 Montana Constitution and were in all 

respects valid and legal; 

(2) That the due process, equal protection, separation 

of powers and freedom of speech provisions of the state and federal constitutions were not violated by the order of this Court 

of June 14 and June 21, 1976, under the unique and compelling 

circumstances of this case. 

(3) That the remedy for any alleged prejudice to the 

attorney general's political campaign lies in applying to this 

Court for relief from its order of June 21, which remedy has 

never been sought. 

(4) That the attorney general is guilty of contempt of 

court pursuant to section 93-9801(5), R.C.M. 1947, by reason of 

his willful, knowing and deliberate violation of this Court's 

order of June 21 commanding him, among others, to cease and 

desist from all public out-of-court statements that may conceivably influence public opinion for or against any person or issue 

involved in pending criminal prosecutions involving workmen's 

compensation matters. 
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, we enter judgment as follows: 

(1) The attorney general is hereby adjudged guilty of 

contempt of court. 

(2) That a fine of $250 is assessed as a penalty. 

(3) That the attorney general may purge himself of contempt of court by agreeing in open court within 10 days of the 

date hereof that in the future he will abide by the order of 

this Court of June 21 until the same is altered, amended or 

revoked by proper legal proceedings and acco~ding fo law. 

,*/ Chief Justice 

Mr. Justice Wesley Castles is absent at the time of the 

preparation of this Opinion and has taken no part therein. 

He will have the opportunity to express his views later.