NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JACLYN R., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.P., N.R., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0218 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD24068 

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Michael Valenzuela 

Counsel for Appellee 

John L. Popilek, Scottsdale 

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. 
JACLYN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2

G O U L D, Judge: 

¶1 Jaclyn R. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her minor children J. P. and N. R. (the 

“Children”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In June 2013, DCS received a report that Mother tested 

positive for methamphetamines during her prenatal visits for N.R. in April 

and May. Later that month, when Mother gave birth to N.R., both Mother 

and N.R. tested positive for methamphetamines. DCS did not remove the 

Children from Mother’s home, but instead implemented a safety plan in 

which Mother would participate in the Substance Exposed Newborn Safe 

Environment (SENSE) program, substance abuse treatment through 

TERROS, and urinalysis testing through TASC. Mother, however, failed to 

enroll in the SENSE program and tested positive for amphetamines twice, 

once at the end of June and once at the end of July. 

¶3 As a result, on July 24, 2013, DCS took custody of the 

Children. DCS filed a petition alleging the Children were dependent as to 

Mother on the grounds of neglect and substance abuse. Mother did not 

contest the petition’s allegations, and the juvenile court found the Children 

dependent and approved a case plan of family reunification. Mother was 

offered parent aide services, a psychological evaluation, substance abuse 

testing through TASC, and substance abuse assessment and treatment 

through TERROS. 

¶4 In March 2014, the juvenile court approved changing 

Mother’s case plan to severance and adoption. DCS moved to sever her 

parental rights on the grounds of mental illness, substance abuse, and 

fifteen months’ time in care. 

¶5 On March 30 and April 23, 2015, the juvenile court held a 

severance hearing. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to the 

Children on the grounds of substance abuse, mental illness, and fifteen 

months’ time in care. The court also terminated Mother’s rights to N.R. on 

the grounds of six months’ time in care. Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Mother argues that the State did not establish grounds for 

termination by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. 
JACLYN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶7 As the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, the juvenile 

court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, 

judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus 

M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002), quoting In 

re Pima Cty. Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 (App. 1987). 

“[W]e will accept the juvenile court's findings of fact unless no reasonable 

evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order 

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. 

¶8 To terminate the parent-child relationship, the court's 

findings must be based on clear and convincing evidence. Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8–537(B) (2007); Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4. If 

any one of the grounds for termination is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence, “we need not address claims pertaining to the other 

grounds.” Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3; see Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 27 (2000). 

I. Statutory Grounds for Severance 

In addition to other grounds, Mother’s rights were terminated 

on the grounds of fifteen months’ time in care. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). 

Termination based on fifteen months’ time in care requires that the State 

prove: (1) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen 

months, (2) the State has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate 

reunification services, (3) the parent is unable to remedy the circumstances 

of the placement, and (4) there is a substantial likelihood that the parent 

will be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in 

the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). 

¶9 On appeal, Mother does not dispute the fact the Children 

were in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months or that DCS made 

diligent efforts to provide reunification services. Rather, Mother 

challenges the juvenile court’s determination that she did not remedy her 

substance abuse problem, and that her drug abuse rendered her unable to 

effectively parent the Children. 

¶10 “[I]n considering the impact of drug addiction, we must 

consider the treatment history of the parent” to determine whether “the 

parent has been unable to rise above the addiction and experience sustained 

sobriety in a noncustodial setting, and establish the essential support 

system to maintain sobriety....” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 

Ariz. 373, 378, ¶ 25 (App. 2010), citing In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa 

App. 1998).
JACLYN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶11 Here, the record shows that Mother failed to complete 

substance abuse treatment as required by her reunification plan. Mother 

was referred to substance-abuse treatment on five separate occasions; on 

the first four occasions, she failed to follow through with the referrals. 

Following the fifth referral in October 2014, Mother did attend substance 

abuse treatment, but was unable to complete the program due to her 

hospitalizations for depression.1 

¶12 In addition, Mother’s parent aide closed out her services in 

July 2014, due to Mother’s inconsistent attendance at supervised visits and 

parenting-skills sessions. In her report, the aide stated that Mother had 

failed to understand the effect her substance abuse had on the Children. 

¶13 Mother also failed to show that she was able to maintain an 

extended period of sobriety. Prior to August 2014, Mother missed the 

majority of her drug tests. During this time she repeatedly tested positive 

for methamphetamines. In August 2014, she gave birth to another child, 

E.R.; four days later she tested positive for methamphetamines. 

¶14 After the birth of E.R., Mother’s compliance with drug testing 

improved. Based on her efforts, the juvenile court reset the severance trial 

to give Mother more time to participate in services. However, Mother 

continued to miss drug tests during the period from August 2014 through 

January 2015. Additionally, Mother did not provide any drug tests after 

January 21, 2015. 

¶15 Mother contends that DCS and the trial court simply dealt 

with her labels as having a substance abuse and mental health problem and 

that looking at the narrative, she was dealing with her depression by 

seeking treatment and DCS did not consider her latest medical records. 

While we recognize Mother made some efforts in dealing with her 

problems, our role is to determine if there is reasonable evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s decision. We cannot reweigh the evidence to reach a 

different conclusion. Moreover, if Mother had continued to be sober, she 

could have introduced those records. 

¶16 Accordingly, the record supports the juvenile court’s decision 

to terminate Mother’s rights based on fifteen months’ time in care. 

 

1 Mother provided evidence that she was enrolled in a new substance 

abuse program at the time of the severance hearing. 
JACLYN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5

II. Best Interests 

¶17 Mother also contends the State provided insufficient evidence 

to show that severance was in the best interest of the children. The record 

does not, however, support her claim. 

¶18 “To prove that the termination of parental rights would be in 

a child's best interests, [DCS] must present credible evidence demonstrating 

‘how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the 

continuation of the relationship.’“ Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 

217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 8 (App. 2008) citing Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004). Evidence showing a child is 

adoptable is sufficient to satisfy a finding that the child would benefit from 

the termination of parental rights. Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. 

Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). In addition, the 

juvenile court may also consider whether the child's existing placement is 

meeting his needs. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec, 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 

5 (App. 1998) citing Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 

179 Ariz. 102, 107 (1994). 

¶19 Here, the juvenile court found that the Children would 

benefit from a severance because Mother, due to her substance abuse, had 

not provided a safe and stable home. In addition, the juvenile court 

determined the Children’s current placement was meeting their needs, and 

was willing to adopt the Children. Accordingly, the record supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that termination is in the Children’s best interst. 

CONCLUSION 

¶20 For the reasons above, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children.