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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

CHARLES LITTON MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No.: 3:11cv1/MCR/EMT

SUSAN STOKES CASTOR,

Defendant.

________________________________________/

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a “Notice of

Appeal/Petition for Writ of Mandamus/Petition for Writ of Certiorari” (Doc. 1). Presently before

the court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) and his amended complaint

(Doc. 4). For the limited purpose of dismissal of this action, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will

be granted.

In Plaintiff’s amended complaint, he names Susan Stokes Castor and Judge T. Michael Jones

as Defendants (Doc. 4 at 1–2).1

 Plaintiff alleges that on April 16, 2009, Defendant Castor caused

him to be wrongfully arrested for domestic violence (id. at 3). He states Ms. Castor also initiated

a civil proceeding, Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 2009 DR 001151, to obtain a domestic

violence injunction against him based upon the same allegations underlying his arrest (id. at 3–4). 

Plaintiff states that on December 23, 2009, he was acquitted of the criminal domestic violence

charge (id.). He contends this equates to his being “not guilty” of the allegations underlying the civil

proceeding; however, Judge Jones refused to dismiss the civil injunction (id.). Plaintiff alleges he

has had “dealings” with Judge Jones in the past, including the filing of two complaints against Judge

1

 The page references used in this Report reflect the page numbers as enumerated in the court’s electronic

docketing system rather than those the parties may have assigned.
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Jones with the Florida Commission on Ethics and the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission

(id.). Based upon these prior “dealings,” Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse Judge Jones from the civil

domestic violence case, which Judge Jones denied (id.). Plaintiff contends the motion to recuse

should have been granted, and the domestic violence injunction should have been dismissed (id. at

4–5). He states he sought review in the Florida First District Court of Appeal and the Florida

Supreme Court but was unsuccessful (see Doc. 1 at 1). He states “unconstitutionalities” and

“improprieties” occurred in the state court proceedings (id.). Plaintiff additionally states he has filed

a second motion to dismiss the injunction in the state circuit court, which remains pending (see id.

at 2, Attachment Three). As relief, Plaintiff seeks reversal or dismissal of the domestic violence

injunction and removal of Judge Jones from the case (id.). 

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss the case if satisfied

that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e) “where it lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104

L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when the legal theories are

“indisputably meritless,” id., 490 U.S. at 327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are

“clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340

(1992). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The

allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). However,

such acceptance should not be given blindly; only well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true

and only reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Oladeinde v. City of

Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 502

(5th Cir. 1980);2 see also Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(“reasonable inferences” drawn); Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th

2

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted

as precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981.

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Cir. 1974) (“unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true”). A plaintiff must allege more

than mere “labels and conclusions”; the complaint must include “[f]actual allegations . . . [sufficient]

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Indeed,

“any conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact or legal conclusions masquerading as

facts do not prevent dismissal.” Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1305

(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (citing Associated Builders, Inc., 505 F.2d at 99). 

The complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp., supra (retiring the often-criticized “no set of facts” language

previously used to describe the motion to dismiss standard and determining that because plaintiffs

had “not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be

dismissed” for failure to state a claim). Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that

dismissal of this action is warranted.

To the extent Plaintiff asks this court to review the substance of the final judgment of

injunction for protection against domestic violence or Judge Jones’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion

for recusal, he is not entitled to relief. It is well established that federal district courts exercise only

original jurisdiction; they lack appellate jurisdiction to review state court decisions reached in

administrative and judicial proceedings. See District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311–12, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923). The Rooker and Feldman decisions

have become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal

district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases

arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was

unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in [the Supreme Court on certiorari].” 

Berman v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 794 F.2d 1529, 1530 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Feldman, 460

U.S. at 486). The Eleventh Circuit has identified the following four criteria that must be met for the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar a district court’s jurisdiction:

(1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court; (2) the prior state

court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; (3) the party seeking

relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to raise its federal claims in the

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state court proceedings; and (4) the issue before the federal court was either

adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably intertwined with the state court's

judgment.

Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal

citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “inextricably intertwined” as meaning that the

federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.

Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations and quotations omitted). 

However, even if a claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment, the doctrine

does not apply if the plaintiff had no “reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state

proceedings.” Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wood v. Orange

County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983)). “[A] party’s ability to raise a claim on appeal

constitute[s] a reasonable opportunity to raise the claim.” Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Md., Inc.

v. Weiner, 868 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989).

Proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was very recently clarified by the United

States Supreme Court. The Court stated:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from

which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22, 161

L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005) (holding that the doctrine did not apply because the federal suit was filed

before the state court judgments were rendered).

In the instant case, the complaint falls squarely within Exxon’s definition of the kind of cases

to which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. Plaintiff is a state court loser complaining of injuries

caused by the final judgment for protection against domestic violence and is inviting this court to

review and reject that judgment. The attached docket sheet for the Escambia County Clerk of Court,

Case No. 2009 DR 001151, shows that a final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic

violence was rendered on April 29, 2009 (see attached Docket, Escambia County Florida Clerk of

the Circuit Court, Castor v. Morris, Case No. 2009 DR 001151). Plaintiff states he has sought relief

from the final judgment in the Florida First District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court

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but was unsuccessful (see Doc. 1 at 1, Attachment Four). See Morris v. Castor, et al., No. 1D10-

4212, 48 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 29, 2010); Morris v. Castor, No. SC10-2301, 50 So. 3d 603

(Fla. Dec. 3, 2010). Plaintiff commenced the instant federal action on January 3, 2011, after the

state court proceeding was concluded. He apparently believes that federal court is his next avenue

for appellate review. Plaintiff’s claims concerning the constitutionality of the domestic violence

proceeding could have and should have been raised in the state circuit court proceeding, and Plaintiff

does not allege any reason for his failure to raise his claims therein or, if he did raise them, his

failure to raise them on appeal to a higher court. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim is “inextricably

intertwined” with the state court’s judgment because Plaintiff, by challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to support the domestic violence injunction and Judge Jones’s impartiality during the

proceedings, is essentially attempting to reverse the state court’s order granting the injunction and

denying the motion for recusal. Indeed, Plaintiff’s claims in the instant case would succeed only to

the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff

seeks review the substance of the final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic

violence or Judge Jones’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal, his claims are barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Mickens v. Tenth Judicial Circuit, 181 Fed. Appx. 865, 872–74 (11th

Cir. 2006). 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks this court’ intervention in the pending state court proceeding

on his second motion to dismiss the final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic (see

Doc. 1, Attachment Three), his claim must be dismissed on Younger abstention grounds. In

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), the Court “reaffirmed the

‘basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving

party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.’”

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499, 94 S. Ct. 669, 677–78, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974) (quoting

Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44). The Younger abstention doctrine derives from “the vital consideration

of comity between the state and national governments,” Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676 (11th

Cir. 1992) (“Luckey V”), which Younger itself described as a “sensitivity to the legitimate interests

of both State and National Governments.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.

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Since Younger, the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have applied and expanded upon

that abstention doctrine. In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499, the Supreme Court, in an

alternative holding, held that the district court had properly declined to provide equitable relief to

plaintiffs who sought an injunction against various state officials, including state judges. The

plaintiffs had alleged that the state judges had unconstitutionally: (1) set bond in criminal cases

without regard to the facts of a case; (2) set sentences higher and imposed harsher conditions on

black persons than white persons; and (3) required black persons, when charged with violations of

city ordinances that carry fines and possible jail sentences if the fines cannot be paid, to pay for a

trial by jury. Id. at 492. The plaintiffs requested that the federal district court enjoin those practices,

and the district court declined to do so.

In holding that the district court had properly declined to enjoin those practices, the Supreme

Court stated that “‘the principles of equity, comity, and federalism . . . must restrain a federal court

when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.’” Id. at 499 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.

225, 243, 92 S. Ct. 2151, 2162, 32 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1972)); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25,

32, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1080, 122 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1993) (stating that “principles of federalism and

comity” must underlie the discretion of courts of equity). The Supreme Court emphasized that:

An injunction of the type contemplated by respondents . . . would disrupt the normal

course of proceedings in the state courts via resort to the federal suit for

determination of the claim ab initio, just as would the request for injunctive relief

from an ongoing state prosecution against the federal plaintiff which was found to

be unwarranted in Younger.

O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 501. The Court held that “the ‘periodic reporting’ system [that] . . . might be

warranted would constitute a form of monitoring of the operation of state court functions that is

antipathetic to established principles of comity.” Id. at 501 (footnote omitted). 

Relying on both Younger and O’Shea, the Eleventh Circuit held in Pompey v. Broward

County, that abstention was proper in a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of contempt

hearings in child support enforcement proceedings on Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 

95 F.3d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs were five fathers who already had been, and

who alleged that they were also likely in the future to be, ordered incarcerated by the Broward

County Circuit Court for failure to pay child support. Id. at 1544. They brought a § 1983 suit

against the Broward County Support Enforcement Division, Broward County, its administrator, the

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director of the Support Division, and the family division judges of the Broward County Circuit

Court. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ practices during “Daddy Roundups” were

unconstitutional because: (1) the court failed to inform them of their right to court-appointed

counsel, and to appoint such counsel for indigent fathers, and (2) the court failed to provide them

with due process at their civil contempt hearings by relying on faulty and insufficient evidence with

regard to the amount in arrears, spending insufficient amounts of time on each case, and failing to

keep records of each hearing. Id. at 1544–55. The plaintiffs sought various forms of injunctive

relief and damages. Id. After noting several problems that would arise “if the federal district court

were to arrogate to itself the role of overseer of Broward County’s child support enforcement

proceedings,” id. at 1549–50 (internal quotation omitted), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial

of the plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief against the defendant judges on abstention grounds, and

held that the plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief against the Support Division were also due to be

dismissed on Younger abstention grounds. Id. at 1551–52 and n.14. 

In the instant case, Plaintiff concedes that his second motion to dismiss is pending in the state

circuit court (see Doc. 1 at 2), and the attached docket sheet reflects that. Based upon the reasoning

of Pompey, the undersigned concludes that to the extent Plaintiff asks this court to intervene in that

proceeding and dismiss the domestic violence injunction, his claim should be dismissed under the

Younger doctrine. See, e.g., Adams v. Florida, 185 Fed. Appx. 816, 817 (11th Cir. 2006)

(unpublished) (affirming the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint seeking to enjoin a civil

contempt finding in child support enforcement case under the Younger doctrine).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) is GRANTED for the limited

purpose of dismissal of this action. 

And it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. That this action be DISMISSED with prejudice on Rooker-Feldman and Younger

abstention grounds.

2. That all pending motions be DENIED as moot. 

3. That final judgment be entered accordingly and the clerk be directed to close the file.

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DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of February 2011.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy hereof. Any different deadline that may appear

on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not control. A copy of

any objections shall be served upon any other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope

of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d

698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Case No.: 3:11cv1/MCR/EMT