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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 11, 2017 

v No. 329388 

Wayne Circuit Court 

RICARDO CORTEZ STANFORD, LC No. 15-000121-01-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and GLEICHER and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 After his first trial ended in a deadlock, a jury convicted defendant of assault with intent 

to murder and two weapons charges arising from the shooting of Jaguar Stephens. Defendant 

contends that his counsel allowed the prosecution to violate his right to confront the witnesses 

against him and that the court should have declared a mistrial based on unresponsive and 

prejudicial testimony from the lead detective. Neither of these challenges bears merit. However, 

the court calculated defendant’s time served based on an incorrect arrest date. We affirm 

defendant’s convictions but remand for the ministerial correction of his judgment of sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On the afternoon of May 13, 2014, Jaguar Stephens went to a Detroit Dairy Queen with 

his brother Richard. Richard noticed a young man wearing a skull cap pulled down over his 

forehead and large sunglasses. The man and his friend followed Richard and Jaguar to the back 

of the line and circled around them. When the skull-cap-clad man was within arm’s reach of 

Richard, he pulled out a gun and shot Jaguar twice in the chest. Richard fled and the man 

allegedly fired three shots at him. Richard is a licensed concealed weapon carrier and removed 

his weapon when he reached a safe distance. The shooter ran away when he saw Richard’s gun 

and Richard gave chase, but was unable to apprehend him. 

 Police required Richard to remain at the scene while an ambulance took Jaguar to the 

hospital. Fearing for his brother’s life and anxious to join him at the hospital, Richard admitted 

that he gave a less than accurate description of the shooter. The following day, Richard told 

Detroit police Detective Loren Lozon that the shooter was a “black male, dark skin, around five 

foot ten tall, 170 pounds, skull cap, Cartier glasses, medium build” and clean shaven. Jaguar 

never saw his shooter as he was looking at his phone at the time. 
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 Richard’s description of the shooter was too general to lead Detective Lozon to a suspect. 

However, two days after the shooting, Lozon received two anonymous tips from the Crime 

Stoppers hotline naming defendant as the shooter. Detective Lozon placed a photo of defendant 

into a photographic array. Richard selected defendant as the shooter within “seconds.” 

 Ultimately, defendant denied even being at the scene. He presented the testimony of an 

acquaintance who had been at the Dairy Queen at the time of the shooting. This witness claimed 

she did not see defendant that day. The jury rejected this defense and convicted defendant as 

charged. 

II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 

 Defendant contends that his trial counsel should have objected when Detective Lozon 

testified regarding the Crime Stoppers tips and that the admission of this evidence was 

erroneous. Defendant filed a motion to remand to the trial court for a Ginther1

 hearing, which 

this Court denied. People v Stanford, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 6, 

2016 (Docket No. 329388). Therefore, our review of counsel’s performance is limited to 

mistakes apparent on the existing record. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 

714 (2009). 

 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so 

prejudiced the defendant that he was denied the right to a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 

298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must overcome the presumption that the 

challenged action was sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 

NW2d 315 (1991). To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). But “[t]his Court will not 

substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess 

counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 

601 NW2d 887 (1999). 

 “A defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” 

People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing US Const, Am VI; 

Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Pursuant to the confrontation clauses of the federal and state 

constitutions, out-of-court testimonial statements are inadmissible unless the declarant is 

“unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 

Chambers, 277 Mich App at 10. “A statement by a confidential informant to the authorities 

generally constitutes a testimonial statement.” Id. But even out-of-court testimonial statements 

may be admitted “for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 10-

11. One such purpose is “to show why police officers acted as they did. . . .” Id. at 11. 

 

1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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 In Chambers, this Court rejected the defendant’s claim that information about an 

informant’s tip to an FBI agent violated the defendant’s right of confrontation. In that case, “the 

lead detective testified that he received a phone call from an FBI agent who told him that one of 

the agent’s informants recognized the man in the still photographs [of the offense] as defendant.” 

Id. at 10. This Court explained: 

 In the present case, the challenged testimony did not violate defendant’s 

right of confrontation. The testimony was not offered to establish the truth of the 

informant’s tip. Rather, it was offered to establish and explain why the detective 

organized a surveillance of defendant’s home and how defendant came to be 

arrested. Because the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of out-of-court 

testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 

asserted, the testimony did not violate defendant’s right of confrontation. [Id. at 

11.] 

 Similarly in People v Putnam, 309 Mich App 240, 245-246; 870 NW2d 593 (2015), the 

defendant raised a confrontation challenge to a police officer’s testimony about a Crime Stoppers 

tip. The officer “testified that he received a tip through Crime Stoppers that the individual who 

shot the victim was named ‘Mike’ and that he ‘lived on Central.’ ” Id. at 246. The officer 

investigated “and discovered that defendant fit the description of the tip.” Id. at 247. Just as in 

this case, the officer then used the defendant’s photograph in a lineup which was shown to 

witnesses of the offense. Id. This Court held: 

In this context, it is clear that the tipster’s statement was not elicited from [the 

officer] to prove the truth of the informant’s statement, i.e., that “Mike” 

committed the murder; rather, it was used to explain why [the officer] put a 

photograph of defendant in the photographic array. Because the Confrontation 

Clause does not prevent the use of out-of-court testimonial statements to show 

why a police officer acted as he did, the admission of this testimony did not 

violate defendant’s right of confrontation and he has not shown plain error. [Id. at 

247 (citation omitted).] 

 This case is identical to Putnam. Before receiving the Crime Stoppers tips, Detective 

Lozon had only a general physical description provided by a witness. Detective Lozon explained 

why he chose to include defendant’s photo in the photographic array—because he received two 

Crime Stoppers tips naming defendant as the potential shooter. Just as in Putnam, and similar to 

Chambers, Detective Lozon’s testimony regarding the Crime Stoppers tips “show[ed] why [he] 

acted as he did,” and not to prove the truth of the statements. The admission of this evidence 

was not erroneous and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. 

People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 

III. MISTRIAL BASED ON UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY 

 Defendant further contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial 

after Detective Lozon referred to defendant’s arrest photograph and claimed that “burner 

phones,” such as defendant’s, are often used in crimes. These references were highly prejudicial, 

defendant insists, based on the weakness of the evidence in this case. “We review a trial court’s 
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decision to deny a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” People v Dennis, 464 Mich 

567, 572; 628 NW2d 502 (2001). “A court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome that 

is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich 

App 634, 670; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). 

 We first note that any error caused by Detective Lozon’s testimony that burner phones 

are often uncovered in criminal cases was remedied by defense counsel’s questioning of the 

witness. On cross-examination, Detective Lozon admitted that many people use burner or track 

phones and that defendant’s possession of such a phone was not actually incriminating. 

 Detective Lozon did improperly refer to defendant’s arrest photo. Defendant called 

Detective Lozon as a defense witness so he could directly examine him. Defense counsel grilled 

the detective regarding why he chose the individuals placed in the photographic lineup with 

defendant. Counsel noted that the other five men were older than defendant. When the detective 

indicated that the photo he had of defendant showed his hair and included facial hair, counsel 

retorted that hair should not have been an important factor in the photos as Richard did not see 

the shooter’s hair. Finally, Detective Lozon stated, “Yes, ma’am. They have to match the 

defendant’s last arrest record picture, and that’s what I had.” (Emphasis added.) 

 Defendant objected and the jury was excused. Defendant then moved for a mistrial, 

noting that Detective Lozon had been warned at both the current and last trial not to venture into 

the topic of defendant’s arrest 10 days after the current offense for carrying a concealed weapon. 

During argument, defendant focused on the allegedly intentional nature of the state actor’s 

improper comment. The prosecutor focused on the effect the statement had on the jury. 

Ultimately, the court ruled that a curative instruction was sufficient to remedy any prejudice. 

Accordingly, the court instructed the jury: 

THE COURT. All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to give you an 

instruction right now. You are to disregard and ignore the reference made by 

Detective Lozon in his answer to a question which mentioned defendant’s arrest 

photo. It cannot be used in any way by you in deciding this case. 

Can each of you follow and apply this instruction in acting as jurors in this 

case? 

MEMBERS OF THE JURY. Answered affirmatively. 

 “A trial court should grant a mistrial only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the 

rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” People v Bauder, 269 Mich 

App 174, 195; 712 NW2d 506 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] mistrial 

should be granted only where the error complained of is so egregious that the prejudicial effect 

can be removed in no other way.” People v Lumsden, 168 Mich App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645 

(1988). “The power to declare a mistrial should ‘be used with the greatest caution, only under 

urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.’ ” People v Barker, 161 Mich App 

296, 305; 409 NW2d 813 (1987), quoting 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d 

ed), § 698, p 426. 
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 “[A]n unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not cause for granting a 

mistrial.” People v Gonzales, 193 Mich App 263, 266-267; 483 NW2d 458 (1992) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). A mistrial is usually only justified if “the prosecutor knew in 

advance that the witness would give the unresponsive testimony or the prosecutor conspired with 

or encouraged the witness to give that testimony.” People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 

455 NW2d 358 (1990). As noted in Barker, 161 Mich App at 306, quoting 2 Gillespie, § 600, pp 

203-204: 

“A witness cannot bring error into a case by volunteering inadmissible testimony 

which is immediately stricken out. It may be true that such remarks work a 

certain amount of mischief with the jury, but a conviction is to be tested on appeal 

by the rulings of the judge. A witness cannot put error into a case by an 

unauthorized remark, neither called out by a question nor sanctioned by the jury; 

and if what he or she says or does improperly is likely to do much mischief, it is 

presumed that the judge will apply the proper corrective measures in his or her 

instructions if requested to do so. Unresponsive testimony by a prosecution 

witness, although error, is not necessarily grounds for reversal. . . .” 

When the offending witness is a police officer, however, our scrutiny must be more stringent. 

When an unresponsive remark is made by a police officer, this Court will 

scrutinize that statement to make sure the officer has not ventured into forbidden 

areas which may prejudice the defense. People v Page, 41 Mich App 99; 199 

NW2d 669 (1972). Police witnesses have a special obligation not to venture into 

such forbidden areas. People v McCarver (On Remand), 87 Mich App 12, 15; 

273 NW2d 570 (1978)[.] [People v Holly, 129 Mich App 405, 415-416; 341 

NW2d 823 (1983).] 

 In Page, 41 Mich App at 100-101, the police witness volunteered that he “observed [the 

defendant] in front of a dope den.” The defendant immediately objected and requested a 

mistrial. Id. The trial court denied the motion. This Court reversed. This Court acknowledged, 

“When a witness for any reason gives an irresponsive answer and which is not competent 

evidence, and the answer is suppressed at once, the case must be a very peculiar and very strong 

one which would justify a reversal for such fault or mistake of the witness.” Id. at 101, quoting 

People v Tutha, 276 Mich 387, 393; 267 NW 867 (1936). However, this Court held: 

 We are of the opinion that in this case, despite the fact that the court 

cautioned the jury to disregard the statement when the court was charging the 

jury, the statement was sufficiently prejudicial to compel the grant of a mistrial. 

The statement was made by a police officer, one who would normally command 

the respect of the jury. The statement was not made in response to a question, in 

fact the officer made the uncalled-for statement while court and counsel were 

discussing the defendant’s objection to a line of questioning designed to bring out 

that information. The statement, by its nature, was extremely inflammatory; it 

associated the defendant, in the minds of the jury, with either or both traffic and 

use of narcotics. And, of course, that information bears no relevance whatever to 

the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged. And, finally, while the 
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evidence adduced at defendant’s trial is certainly sufficient to support the jury’s 

conclusions, there is something less than a strong case against the defendant, and 

the gratuitous remark interjected into the record might well have irreparably 

damaged defendant’s opportunity to receive a fair trial. [Page, 41 Mich App at 

101-102.] 

 And in People v Jackson, 313 Mich App 409, 427-428; 884 NW2d 297 (2015), this Court 

warned of the dangers of witnesses who do not follow directions. The Jackson Court found that 

a new trial was not warranted where the prosecutor twice instructed the witness “not to discuss 

the content of the [threatening text] message” and yet the witness did so anyway. In Jackson, the 

testimony was not elicited by anyone and the prosecution made clear through additional 

questioning that no one was charged in relation to the alleged threats. Id. 

 The trial court in this case acted within its discretion in determining that a mistrial was 

unnecessary. Even though this case involved a police officer whom the court had warned not to 

mention the CCW case, the isolated reference to an unspecified arrest photo was not so egregious 

that its prejudicial effect could not be remedied. And the prosecutor played no role in creating 

the error. Furthermore, the trial court provided a curative instruction to the jury, advising them 

not to use the comment for any reason. Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given. 

People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 717; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). 

 Moreover, the identification evidence was not so weak that the improper comment 

rendered the entire proceeding unfair. Richard Stephens did provide conflicting descriptions of 

the shooter at the scene and at the hospital the following day. But Richard explained his 

inconsistency and insisted that the description given at the hospital was accurate. Richard 

admitted that the shooter’s forehead was covered by his skull cap and much of his face was 

screened by his sunglasses. However, he described that the glasses were only lightly tinted and 

he could discern the shooter’s features. And although Richard claimed to have poor vision at 

close range during the first trial, he explained at the second trial that his vision deficit merely 

required a few seconds to focus when reading and imposed no impediment in identifying large 

features, such as the shooter’s visage, when he was within arm’s reach. Accordingly, we discern 

no ground for relief. 

IV. JAIL CREDIT 

 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court relied on the wrong arrest date when 

calculating his time served. The prosecution agrees that defendant was arrested on November 

14, 2014, not November 16, and therefore is entitled to 294 days credit. To remedy this error, 

we remand to the trial court for the ministerial correction of the judgment of sentence. 
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 We affirm, but remand for the correction of the judgment of sentence. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra