[Cite as Ohio Vendors Representative Commt. v. Opportunities for Ohioans with Disabilities, 2022-Ohio-1252.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Ohio Vendors Representative Committee, :

Appellant-Appellant, : No. 21AP-352

(C.P.C. No. 21CV-2184)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Opportunities for Ohioans with :

Disabilities/Bureau of Services

for the Visually Impaired, :

Appellee-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 14, 2022

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Eythan Gregory, 

for appellant.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Crystal R. 

Richie, for appellee. Argued: Crystal R. Richie.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Ohio Vendors Representative Committee ("OVRC"), appeals from 

a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss 

filed by Opportunities for Ohioans with Disabilities ("OOD")/Bureau of Services for the 

Visually Impaired ("BSVI"), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over OVRC's R.C. 119.12 

administrative appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 1936, the United States Congress enacted the Randolph-Sheppard 

Vending Stand Act ("RSA") to "provid[e] blind persons with remunerative employment, 

enlarg[e] the economic opportunities of the blind, and stimulat[e] the blind to greater 

efforts in striving to make themselves self-supporting." 20 U.S.C. 107(a). To this end, 
No. 21AP-352 2

Congress authorized blind persons to "operate vending facilities on any Federal property." 

Id. Congress also authorized the Department of Education Secretary to "prescribe 

regulations" to carry out and enforce the RSA and required the Secretary to "[d]esignate [in 

each State] * * * the State agency" that meets the Secretary's requirements and that will 

issue licenses to blind persons operating those vending facilities. 20 U.S.C. 107(b); 20 

U.S.C. 107a(a)(5); 20 U.S.C. 107b.

{¶ 3} Ohio enacted "parallel legislation (Ohio's 'mini-RSA') to expand the RSA's 

priority for blind merchants to state properties." Ohio v. United States Dept. of Edn., 986 

F.3d 618, 621 (6th Cir.2021), citing R.C. 3304.28 through 3304.35. BSVI is the designated 

Ohio agency responsible for implementing the RSA and Ohio's mini-RSA, and OOD "is the 

agency responsible for overseeing BSVI." Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-01(E).

1

 OVRC is an 

elected committee of blind vendors that represents all blind licensees in the Ohio program. 

See 20 U.S.C. 107b-1; Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-12. This committee "shall actively 

participate with BSVI in major administrative decisions and policy and program 

development with respect to [the Business Enterprise 'BE' program]," through which BSVI 

administers the RSA and Ohio mini-RSA. Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-12(G); See R.C. 

3304.34; Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-01(J).

{¶ 4} In June 2020, and pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14, OVRC filed a 

grievance with BSVI asserting BSVI made multiple major administrative decisions without 

OVRC's active participation, in violation of Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-12. An informal 

hearing was held to resolve OVRC's grievance. Because OVRC was dissatisfied with the 

outcome of the informal hearing, it requested a formal hearing. In January 2021, a BSVI 

hearing officer held a hearing regarding the matter. The next month, the hearing officer 

issued a report and recommendation recommending that OVRC's grievance be affirmed in 

part and denied in part. On March 23, 2021, BSVI issued an adjudication order denying 

OVRC's grievance. The adjudication order states that a complaint challenging the decision 

could be filed pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 107d-1, but it makes no reference to R.C. 119.12. 

1 Effective February 18, 2022, and during the pendency of this appeal, the administrative rules pertinent to 

this matter were amended. However, for ease of discussion, all references to these rules are to the former 

and applicable versions.
No. 21AP-352 3

{¶ 5} In April 2021, OVRC filed a notice of appeal in the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, citing R.C. 119.12 as the authority for the administrative appeal. BSVI 

moved for dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1), arguing the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over the matter. In June 2021, the trial court granted BSVI's motion 

and consequently dismissed OVRC's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

{¶ 6} OVRC timely appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 7} OVRC assigns the following errors for our review:

[1.] The trial court erred when it determined Ohio Revised Code 

Chapter 119 did not apply to Opportunities for Ohioans with 

Disabilities & Bureau of Services for the Visually Impaired. 

[2.] The trial court erred when it determined the Ohio Vendors 

Representative Committee acted as a blind licensee and not in 

its official capacity as an Ohio committee.

III. Discussion

{¶ 8} In its first assignment of error, OVRC argues the trial court erred in 

determining that R.C. Chapter 119 did not apply to BSVI. OVRC's second assignment of 

error contends the trial court erred in determining that OVRC acted as a blind licensee, and 

not in its official capacity as an Ohio committee. Based on the judgment from which OVRC 

appeals, we construe these assignments of error as generally challenging the trial court's 

dismissal of its administrative appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. These 

assignments of error lack merit.

{¶ 9} Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and decide a particular 

class of cases. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19. 

Because it is a question of law, our review of this issue is de novo. Great Lakes Courier 

Serv., LLC v. State Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-2, 2016-Ohio-3143, 

¶ 6. In the administrative appeals context, "[c]ourts of common pleas only have 'such 

powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided 

by law.' " Clifton Care Ctr. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-709, 

2013-Ohio-2742, ¶ 9, quoting Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4. See also Midwest 

Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177 
No. 21AP-352 4

(2001) ("The right to appeal an administrative decision is neither inherent nor inalienable; 

to the contrary, it must be conferred by statute."). Thus, jurisdiction over an administrative 

appeal is improper "unless granted by R.C. 119.12 or other specific statutory authority." Abt 

v. Ohio Expositions Comm., 110 Ohio App.3d 696, 699 (10th Dist.1996). "To determine 

whether R.C. 119.12 or other statutory authority does or does not grant the common pleas 

court jurisdiction over this appeal, we must look to the language of the statutes involved to 

determine legislative intent." Ikemefuna Nkanginieme v. Ohio Dept. of Medicaid, 10th 

Dist. No. 14AP-596, 2015-Ohio-656, ¶ 16.

{¶ 10} OVRC relies on R.C. 119.12(B) as the authority for its appeal. R.C. 119.12(B) 

states in pertinent part that "[a]ny party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued 

pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin 

county." OVRC contends R.C. 119.12(B) authorized it to file an administrative appeal 

because BSVI's adjudication order "adversely affected" its rights as a "party." But OVRC 

does not address whether this order was an "agency" order for the purpose of R.C. 119.12(B). 

We find that it was not.

{¶ 11} For the purpose of R.C. 119.12(B), "agency" is defined in pertinent part as 

"any official, board, or commission having authority to promulgate rules or make 

adjudications in the civil service commission, the division of liquor control, the department 

of taxation, the industrial commission, the bureau of workers' compensation, the functions 

of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or 

commission of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 

119.13 of the Revised Code and the licensing functions of any administrative or executive 

officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state 

having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling 

licenses." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 119.01(A)(1). In this matter, BSVI was not an "agency" 

under this definition because BSVI is not specifically identified as an "agency," and because 

its function of issuing an adjudication order concerning OVRC's grievance was not either a 

licensing function or "specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised 

Code." The rule governing such an order, Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14, does not indicate

that OVRC may appeal the order pursuant to R.C. 119.12.
No. 21AP-352 5

{¶ 12} Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14(A) provides that "OVRC, by a majority vote, 

may grieve in writing within sixty-five calendar days any action or inaction it determines 

violates the requirement," outlined in Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-12(G), that "OVRC shall 

actively participate with BSVI in major administrative decisions and policy and program 

development with respect to BE." "Active Participation" occurs when BSVI and OVRC 

"meaningfully collaborate on major administrative decisions and policy and program 

development decisions affecting overall administration of Ohio's vending facility program." 

Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-01(B). Once a grievance is filed pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 

3304:1-21-14(A), the "grievant shall be provided with an informal meeting." Ohio 

Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14(A)(1). If the grievant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the 

informal hearing, or the grievance remains unresolved for 120 days, the grievant may 

request an adjudication hearing pursuant to R.C. 119.01 to 119.09. Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-

21-14(A)(2) and (3); Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14(B). But once BSVI issues an 

adjudication order concerning an OVRC active participation grievance, Ohio Adm.Code

3304:1-21-14 does not provide for any further appeal, pursuant to R.C. 119.12 or otherwise. 

See generally Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14.

{¶ 13} Despite no reference to R.C. 119.12 in Ohio Adm.Code 3304:1-21-14, OVRC

argues its administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 was appropriate based on 

administrative appeal opportunities given to other BSVI grievants. In particular, OVRC 

contends BSVI permitted a blind licensee, Kevin Wilford, to file an R.C. 119.12 appeal from 

a June 2020 BSVI adjudication order addressing his grievance. That order indicated an 

appeal could be taken in accordance with R.C. 119.12, or a complaint could be filed pursuant 

to 20 U.S.C. 107d-1. OVRC also relies on Bruso v. Opportunities for Ohioans with 

Disabilities, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-130, 2015-Ohio-3439, which involved a blind licensee, 

Douglas Bruso, appealing pursuant to R.C. 119.12 from an adverse ruling as to his 

administrative grievance filed with BSVI. Id. at ¶ 1. In Bruso, this court ruled on the merits 

of the appeal, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded with instructions for the 

trial court to direct BSVI to sustain the licensee's grievance. Id. at ¶ 13. OVRC reasons that 

because Wilford and Bruso were provided the opportunity to appeal a BSVI grievance 

adjudication order pursuant to R.C. 119.12, it also should have had that opportunity. We 

are unpersuaded.
No. 21AP-352 6

{¶ 14} The issue of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

administrative appeal was not raised in Bruso, and therefore that case is not controlling as 

to the jurisdictional issue currently before us. Further, BSVI's statements in prior 

adjudication orders did not confer jurisdiction on the trial court in this matter relating to 

OVRC's appeal. Subject-matter jurisdiction is prescribed by law. Thus, a party cannot

confer it on a court; nor can it arise based on estoppel. Thompson & Ward Leasing Co., 

Inc. v. Ohio State Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-41, 2008-Ohio-3101, ¶ 12; 

Roth v. Glueck, 1st Dist. No. C-110780, 2012-Ohio-4407, ¶ 32. Consequently, OVRC's 

reliance on the Bruso and Wilford matters is misplaced.

{¶ 15} OVRC also argues that it was proper for it to file an administrative appeal 

pursuant to R.C. 119.12 because it could not challenge BSVI's adjudication order under 20 

U.S.C. 107d-1(a), which authorizes "[a]ny blind licensee * * * dissatisfied with any action 

arising from the operation or administration of the vending facility program * * * [to] 

submit to a State licensing agency a request for a full evidentiary hearing." If the licensee 

remains dissatisfied with the agency's decision as to that grievance, "he may file a complaint 

with the Secretary [of Education] who shall convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute 

pursuant to section 107d-2 * * * and the decision of such panel shall be final and binding 

on the parties except as otherwise provided in this chapter." 20 U.S.C. 107d-1(a). OVRC

asserts that a challenge of BSVI's adjudication order pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 107d-1 would 

violate state sovereignty because it would permit the federal government to interpret and 

apply Ohio law, and that OVRC could not request a hearing or file a complaint pursuant to 

that federal statute because it is not a "blind licensee." Thus, according to OVRC, its 

challenge to the BSVI's adjudication order should be resolved by the trial court pursuant to 

R.C. 119.12. OVRC's reasoning is fundamentally flawed, however, because it assumes 

OVRC is entitled to appeal BSVI's adjudication order. In Ohio, the right to appeal an 

administrative order is neither inherent nor inalienable. Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co. Inc.,

supra. Thus, even assuming OVRC could not request a hearing or file a complaint under 

20 U.S.C. 107d-1, this circumstance did not entitle OVRC to an appeal pursuant to R.C. 

119.12.
No. 21AP-352 7

{¶ 16} In sum, R.C. 119.12 did not confer on OVRC the ability to administratively 

appeal BSVI's adjudication order concerning OVRC's grievance. Therefore, the trial court 

did not err in dismissing OVRC's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 17} Accordingly, we overrule OVRC's first and second assignments of error.

IV. Disposition

{¶ 18} Having overruled OVRC's first and second assignments of error, we affirm 

the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

DORRIAN and MENTEL, JJ., concur.