IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

KIMBERLY ANNETTE KLINE-PARRIS,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO. 1:10-cv-111-MP-GRJ

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

 /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff appeals to this Court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for a period of disability and

disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 1.) The Commissioner has answered (Doc. 10),

and both parties have filed briefs outlining their respective positions. (Docs. 16 and 22.) 

For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is due to be reversed

and remanded pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits under

Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) on July 7, 2006 alleging a disability onset

date of June 10, 2005. (R. 114, 116, 174-76.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially

and upon reconsideration. (R. 114.) Plaintiff then filed a timely request for an

administrative hearing on March 12, 2007. (R. 114.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at

Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 1 of 30
an administrative hearing that was held by video-conference on September 12, 2008. 

(R. 120.) On November 20, 2008 the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a written

decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled and thus was not entitled to a period

of disability insurance benefits. (R. 114-20.) Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of

the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council on November 24, 2008 and the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on July 1, 2010. (R. 1-2, 108-09.) Plaintiff

then filed her Complaint in this case on June 16, 2010. (Doc. 1.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, i.e., the evidence must do more 1

than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the

conclusion.2

Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the

district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as

finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against

the Commissioner's decision. The district court must view the evidence as a whole,

3

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).

1

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11 Cir. 1995) (citing W alden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835,

2 th

838 (11 Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842

th

(1971)); accord, Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11 Cir. 1991).

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Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11 Cir. 1991).

3 th

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 2 of 30
taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision.4

However, the district court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review if

the decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the district court with

sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law.5

The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be

expected to result in death, or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months. The impairment must be severe, making 6

Plaintiff unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial gainful activity which

exists in the national economy.

7

The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. First, if a 8

claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. Second, if a 9

claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairments which

significantly limit his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, then he does

Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord, Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11 Cir. 1992) (holding

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that the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine reasonableness of factual findings); Parker v.

Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177 (11 Cir. 1986) (finding that the court also must consider evidence detracting from

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evidence on which the Commissioner relied).

Keeton v. Dep’t Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11 Cir. 1994).

5 th

42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (2005) (All further references to 20 C.F.R.

6

will be to the 2005 version unless otherwise specified.).

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511.

7

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant has the burden of proving the existence of a

8

disability as defined by the Social Security Act. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11 Cir. 1991).

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

9

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not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. Third, if a claimant's impairments

10

meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, he is

disabled. Fourth, if a claimant's impairments do not prevent him from doing past 11

relevant work, he is not disabled. Fifth, if a claimant's impairments (considering his 12

residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and past work) prevent him from

doing other work that exists in the national economy, then he is disabled.13

The burden of proof regarding the plaintiff’s inability to perform past relevant

work initially lies with the plaintiff. The burden then temporarily shifts to the 14

Commissioner to demonstrate that “other work” which the claimant can perform

currently exists in the national economy. The Commissioner may satisfy this burden

15

by pointing to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”) for a conclusive

determination that a claimant is disabled or not disabled. 

16

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

10

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

11

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

12

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

13

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1002 (11 Cir. 1987); see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.

14 th

3d 1274, 1278 (11 Cir. 2001).

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Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2. In Doughty the court explained this burden shifting as follows:

15

In practice, the burden temporarily shifts at step five to the Commissioner. The

Commissioner must produce evidence that there is other work available in significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant has the capacity to perform. In order

to be considered disabled, the claimant must then prove that he is unable to perform the

jobs that the Commissioner lists. The temporary shifting of the burden to the Commissioner

was initiated by the courts, and is not specifically provided for in the statutes or

regulations.) (Internal citations omitted).

Walker, 826 F.2d at 1002 (“[T]he grids may come into play once the burden has shifted to the

16

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work.”).

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However, the ALJ should not exclusively rely on the Grids when “the claimant

has a non-exertional impairment which significantly limits his or her basic work skills or

when the claimant cannot perform a full range of employment at the appropriate level of

exertion.” In a situation where both exertional and non-exertional impairments are 17

found, the ALJ is obligated to make specific findings as to whether they preclude a wide

range of employment.18

The ALJ may use the Grids as a framework to evaluate vocational factors so

long as he introduces independent evidence of the existence of jobs in the national

economy that the claimant can perform. Such independent evidence may be 19

introduced by a Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) testimony, but this is not the exclusive

means of introducing such evidence. Only after the Commissioner meets this burden

20

does the burden shift back to the claimant to show that he or she is not capable of

performing the “other work” as set forth by the Commissioner.

III. SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

A. Personal Background

Plaintiff was born in November 1963. (R. 29.) Plaintiff graduated from high

school. (R. 190.) Her past work experience was primarily as a collections manager. 

(Id.)

Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 ( 11 Cir. 1996). See Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229

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(11 Cir. 1999); W alker, 826 F.2d at 1003 (“The grids may be used only when each variable on the

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appropriate grid accurately describes the claimant’s situation.”).

W alker, 826 F.2d at 1003.

18

W olfe, 86 F.3d at 1077-78.

19

See id.

20

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B. Evidence Considered By the ALJ

The evidence considered by the ALJ consisted primarily of Plaintiff’s medical

records from 2001 and thereafter as well as the reports prepared by several examining

and non-examining physicians.

Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Larry Chidgey, a hand specialist, from July 2001

through October 2001 for bilateral upper extremity pain. (R. 446-50.) Her right hand

and wrist were tender upon examination and a splint was constructed for her right wrist. 

(R. 446-49.) An MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine in July 2001 showed early disc

degeneration at L5-S1. (R. 312.) In October 2001, Plaintiff was treated at the Florida

Arthritis & Allergy Institute for pain in her ankles, feet, shoulders, hands and lower back. 

(R. 303.) The progress note from that visit reflects a conclusion of possible early

rheumatoid arthritis as well as “questionable” fibromyalgia. (Id.) An MRI of Plaintiff’s

cervical spine on December 4, 2001 reflected normal findings. (R. 360.)

In April 2002, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Roland Staud at the Shands

Rheumatology Clinic. (R. 457-59, 494-96.) She was diagnosed with chronic pain

syndrome and sleep disturbance consistent with fibromyalgia. (R. 458, 495.) Plaintiff

received treatment from Dr. James Atchison at the Shands SpineCare Center in May

2002. (R. 305-07.) On examination, Plaintiff was fidgety and suffered from midline and

bilateral paraspinal tenderness in the cervical, thoracic, lumbar and sacral spine. (R.

306.) She was diagnosed with myalgia and myositis. (Id.)

On May 30, 2002, Dr. Manuel Diaz, M.D. completed an attending physician’s

long-term disability statement for Plaintiff. (R. 27-29.) He noted Plaintiff suffered from

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chronic pain syndrome and fibromyalgia. (R. 27.) She could stand for less than 30 to

60 minutes, walk less than two blocks, and lift/carry less than ten pounds. (R. 29.) She

was unable to reach/work overhead or push or pull. (Id.) Dr. Diaz opined Plaintiff was

unable to work due to her impairment as of May 30, 2002 for an indefinite time. (Id.) On

September 6, 2002 Plaintiff returned to see Dr. Atchison. (R. 497-99.) Dr. Atchison

noted Plaintiff had tenderness in the cervical and thoracic spine and reduced range of

motion in both her cervical and thoracic spine due to diffuse pain. (R. 498.)

On February 3, 2003, Dr. Lori Waxenberg, Ph.D., a consultative psychologist,

completed a psychiatric attending physician’s statement of disability for Plaintiff. (R.

308-09.) Dr. Waxenberg assigned Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning

(“GAF”) score of 40. (R. 308.) Plaintiff’s mental status examination revealed her mood

was anxious/depressed and her judgment and concentration were moderately impaired. 

(R. 309.) Dr. Waxenberg noted Plaintiff suffered from poor coping skills, somatic focus,

attention and concentration difficulties, and had difficulty adapting to the demands of

the work environment. (Id.) She opined Plaintiff would require the ability to alternate

between sitting and standing, have frequent breaks, be in a low stress environment and

concluded Plaintiff was unable to return to work due to significant emotional distress.

(Id.) 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Staud, the rheumatologist, on February 27, 2003.

Examination reflected she had “diffuse myofascial tender points including the 18

recognized fibromyalgia tender points.” (R. 461-62.) An MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine

in March 2003 reflected minor degenerative disk disease at L5-S1, with a broad based

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disk bulge and a small annular tear. (R. 465.) On March 24, 2003 she was seen by Dr.

Atchison, who noted the MRI findings but also stated “we could not account for the

amount of pain that Ms. Kline-Parris is in” and “[w]e believe that with the amount of pain

Ms. Kline-Parris is in, it is more related to her myalgia and myositis versus the minimal

findings noted on her MRI.” (R. 463-64.)

On a July 25, 2003 visit to Dr. Atchison, Plaintiff reported having fallen on July

18, 2003 and the doctor noted Plaintiff appeared uncomfortable and in pain. (R. 503.) 

She showed tenderness in the cervical, thoracic, lumbar and sacral spine and Plaintiff’s

range of motion in each of those areas was reduced. (Id.) On July 29, 2003, Dr.

Atchison completed an attending physician’s long-term disability statement for Plaintiff. 

(R. 561-62.) He diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic pain syndrome and fibromyalgia and

stated she had permanent limitations per her hand surgeon, Dr. Chidgey, who had

placed her in the light duty range. (Id.)

Examination on April 26, 2004 by Dr. Staud revealed tenderness in Plaintiff’s

midline suprapubic area, tightness in her cervical spine and tenderness in twelve out of

the eighteen recognized fibromyalgia trigger points. (R. 466-67.) During a visit to Dr.

Atchison on September 22, 2004, Plaintiff reported worsening neck, upper and lower

back pains and increased numbness in her extremities, left more than right. (R. 378,

472.) Plaintiff experienced pain everywhere with very light palpation. (R. 379, 473.) 

The progress notes reflected her doctors “cannot account for the amount of pain she is

having nor all the various places where she is having the pain from her findings.” (R.

380, 474.)

X-rays of Plaintiff’s left shoulder performed on June 13, 2005 reflected normal

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findings, while anteroposterior X-rays of her pelvis did not reveal any significant

abnormalities. (R. 349.) On June 23, 2005, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of the left

shoulder. (R. 31, 347-48, 399.) The MRI showed “tendinosis/tendinitis of the

supraspinatus and to a lesser degree of the infraspinatus tendons with some mild,

bursal sided partial thickness tearing of the supraspinatus tendon but no full thickness

tears identified.” (Id.) There were also “changes that can be seen in the setting of

shoulder impingement syndrome with subacromial/subdeltoid bursitis” but no labral

tears. (Id.) On September 16, 2005 Plaintiff reported to her internal medicine

specialist, Dr. Umna Ashfaq, persistent shoulder pain and continued low back, hip and

leg pain. She was diagnosed with a rotator cuff tear. (R. 381-82.)

On October 6, 2005, Dr. Michael Moser, an orthopedist, examined Plaintiff. (R.

352-53, 383-84, 474-76.) Plaintiff had a positive speed’s test and empty can test and

was “essentially ... tender to palpation everywhere throughout her anterior, superior and

posterior aspects of her shoulder as well as along her trapezius.” (Id.) Dr. Moser noted

it was “very difficult to get a pinpoint examination on her because she hurts with almost

every maneuver and is tender everywhere” and he concluded Plaintiff “is basically

suffering from exacerbation of her fibromyalgia.” (R. 353, 384, 476.) 

From May 22, 2006 through July 18, 2006, Plaintiff underwent a vocational

evaluation at Santa Fe Community College’s Work Exploration Center. (R. 361-71.) 

Plaintiff was advised to reapply for Social Security benefits, as competitive employment

did not appear feasible or realistic due to Plaintiff’s pain level and the unpredictability of

her symptoms. (R. 367-68.)

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On September 28, 2006, Plaintiff was examined by consulting physician Dr.

Robert Greenberg, M.D. (R. 410-14.) Examination revealed decreased range of motion

and pain of the cervical and lumbar spine and both hips. (R. 413.) Dr. Greenberg did

note Plaintiff “was not putting forth full effort with regard to strength testing and ROM

testing.” (Id.) Plaintiff also had decreased right arm grip strength, decreased strength

in both legs of 4/5, positive straight leg raising pain bilaterally at 45 degrees and

difficulty stooping. (R. 413-14.) She was diagnosed with probable osteoarthritis of the

cervical and lumbar spine, hips, and shoulders. (R. 414.) MRI scans of Plaintiff’s

lumbar spine performed on September 28, 2006 in conjunction with Dr. Greenberg’s

examination reflected mild scoliosis. (R. 410.) 

Plaintiff underwent a consultative psychological examination on October 4, 2006

by Dr. Jeffrey Gedney, Psy.D. (R. 415-18.) Examination revealed Plaintiff’s mood was

dysphoric and her affect was generally agitated and hyperaroused. (R. 417.) Plaintiff

frequently cried during her examination, expressing frustration with her predicament. 

(Id.) Dr. Gedney noted “[w]hile there was no evidence of attentional or memory deficits

during the evaluation, it is likely that she experiences these deficits within her day-today routine, as is typical with individuals experiencing chronic pain and stress.” (Id.) 

She was diagnosed with pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a

medical condition, a chronic adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed

mood, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowels. (R. 417-18.) Dr. Gedney assigned her a GAF

of 60. (R. 418.) He concluded Plaintiff’s prognosis for return to work was poor due to

the chronic nature of her condition and Plaintiff’s family-related stressors. (Id.) 

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Dr. Angeles Alvarez-Mullin, M.D. completed a Mental Residual Functional

Capacity assessment and a Psychiatric Review Technique of Plaintiff, both of which

were dated October 17, 2006. (R. 427-44.) With respect to Plaintiff’s mental RFC, Dr.

Alvarez-Mullin concluded Plaintiff was moderately limited in (i) the ability to understand

and remember detailed instructions, (ii) the ability to carry out detailed instructions, (iii)

the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, (iv) the ability to

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically

based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number

and length of rest periods, (v) the ability to interact appropriately with the general public,

and (vi) the ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (R. 427-

28.) With respect to Plaintiff’s functional capacity, Dr. Alvarez-Mullin concluded Plaintiff

was capable of (i) carrying out simple tasks in a low demand work situation, (ii) carrying

out a work routine independently, (iii) learning new skills, (iv) adjusting to changes in the

work routine, (v) capable of making decisions in her own behalf, and (vi) relating

adequately to others, although she may have difficulty working with the public. (R.

429.) On the Psychiatric Review Technique, Dr. Alvarez-Mullin noted Plaintiff had a

chronic adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and a depressed mood and a pain

disorder associated with both psychological factors and a general medical condition. 

(R. 434, 436, 437, 443.)

Plaintiff was again examined by Dr. Moser in November 30, 2006 for left

shoulder pain. Upon examination she was tender to palpation over her entire left

shoulder. (R. 483, 517.) Dr. Moser diagnosed left shoulder rotator cuff strain and

impingement. (Id.) 

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Dr. Val Bee, Psy.D. completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity

assessment and a Psychiatric Review Technique of Plaintiff, both dated February 13,

2007. (R. 518-35.) With respect to Plaintiff’s mental RFC, Dr. Bee concluded Plaintiff

was moderately limited in (i) the ability to understand and remember detailed

instructions, (ii) the ability to carry out detailed instructions, (iii) the ability to maintain

attention and concentration for extended periods, (iv) the ability to complete a normal

workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and

to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods, and (v) the ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. 

(R. 532-33.) With respect to Plaintiff’s functional capacity, Dr. Bee concluded Plaintiff

was mentally capable of well structured task activity and at least superficially

appropriate social interaction, but cognitive sequela from Plaintiff’s pain and depression

may disrupt detailed learning and cause occasional lapses in concentration and

efficiency. (R. 534.) On the Psychiatric Review Technique, she noted Plaintiff had an

adjustment disorder with emotional features and a depressed mood and a pain

disorder. (R. 521, 524.)

Dr. Donald Morford, M.D. completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment dated February 21, 2007. (R. 536-43.) Dr. Morford concluded Plaintiff

could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds,

stand and/or walk for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit for a total of about 6 hours

in an 8-hour workday, and push and/or pull unlimited amounts. (R. 537.) With respect

to these physical capacities, he noted a “20/10 listing with occasional to frequent left

upper extremity overhead use and avoidance of extremes seems feasible with

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continued treatment.” (Id.) With respect to Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations, he noted

Plaintiff was limited to occasional to frequent overhead use of the left upper extremity

and her right upper extremity was without any limitations whatsoever. (R. 539.) 

Dr. Aymen Kenawy, M.D., a rheumatologist, examined Plaintiff on July 30, 2007. 

(R. 566-68.) On examination Plaintiff exhibited tenderness to palpation in her upper

and lower extremities, decreased range of motion in all extremities secondary to pain,

and motor strength of 4/5 in all extremities. (R. 567.) On a visit to Dr. Ashfaq on

August 3, 2007 Plaintiff appeared to be uncomfortable and moving around constantly. 

(R. 569.) The progress note reflected that Plaintiff’s left thumb and index finger were

tender to physical examination, but no abnormalities were noted. (R. 569.) 

On December 14, 2007, Plaintiff was again treated by her hand surgeon, Dr.

Chidgey, for continuing “problems on her left thumb and index finger for triggering; as

well as her right lateral epicondylitis.” (R. 572.) Plaintiff was given an injection in her

right trigger thumb and was instructed to return as needed for further trigger finger

injections. (Id.) Dr. Chidgey also completed a Physical Capacity Evaluation of Plaintiff

that same day. (R. 641.) He opined Plaintiff could only lift and carry five pounds

occasionally to one pound frequently. (Id.) He opined Plaintiff could never perform fine

manipulation and she could only rarely perform gross manipulation or reaching. (Id.)

He checked boxes corresponding to both “Never” and “Rarely” when asked how often

Plaintiff could perform pushing/pulling movements with arm and/or leg controls. (Id.) 

As the medical basis for his opinion, he wrote “trigger thumb and finger.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s chiropractor, Anthony Howe, also prepared an opinion regarding 

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her functioning on December 17, 2007. (R. 573-76.) Dr. Howe opined Plaintiff was

only able to lift and carry ten pounds occasionally and five pounds frequently. (R. 576.) 

She could only sit, stand or walk for four hours during an eight hour day. (Id.) She

could rarely climb, bend, stoop, or reach but could frequently perform gross and fine

manipulation. (Id.) Dr. Howe’s diagnosis was lumbar spondylosis, lumbar radiculitis,

left shoulder impingement syndrome and fibromyalgia. (Id.) 

On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff self-reported a flare-up of her fibromyalgia and pain

in both shoulders and left hip to Dr. Moser. (R. 579.) On examination Plaintiff

experienced diffuse pain with palpation around her shoulder girdle and trapezius and

left greater trochanter. (Id.) Plaintiff was again examined on February 11, 2008 by Dr.

Staud, her rheumatologist. (R. 600-02.) His examination reflected multiple tender

points, mainly in Plaintiff’s trapezius area and lower back, and two trigger points in her

trapezius area. (R. 601.) She was given trigger point injections in the two trigger points

in her trapezius area. (R. 602.) On October 14, 2009 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Chidgey

complaining of pain around the thumb CMC joint on her right hand. (R. 700.) 

Examination reflected that Plaintiff had some degenerative changes, mild subluxation, a

positive grind test and some crepitance. (Id.) Plaintiff was given a thumb splint. (Id.)

C. Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified at her administrative hearing. She testified she has constant

pain in her neck, back, shoulders and feet, stating that her “whole body hurts at

different times, different levels.” (R. 124.) Plaintiff testified the pain in her back and

neck gives her the most trouble of all of her medical problems. (R. 125-26.) 

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Plaintiff testified she has serious problems with her hands. She is unable to

engage in the repetitive use of her hands because she has a bone spur in one hand. 

(R. 133.) She also has trigger thumb and trigger finger in her left hand. (Id.) Her hand

problems limit her ability to grab, lift and hold objects. (Id.) Plaintiff stated she also

cannot walk for very long because she has plantar fasciitis, numbness and tingling in

her feet. (R. 127.) Plaintiff testified she could lift five pounds or less. (R. 129.) She

can only stand for 10-15 minutes, can only walk for 15 minutes and can only sit for 15

minutes. (R. 129-30.) 

As for her activities of daily living, Plaintiff lays in bed and watches television,

performs physical therapy exercises, applies ice and heat to her joints, and occasionally

prepares light meals. (R. 127.) She lays down for 2-3 hours every day, but

occasionally has to lay down for the entire day if she has a migraine headache. (R.

130.) She also has memory and concentration problems, which her doctors have

determined are stress-induced. (R. 131.) 

Plaintiff testified she has not worked since June 2005. (R. 129.) Plaintiff’s last

job was with a health insurer. (R. 128.) Her duties included copying files and mailing

contracts to doctors’ offices. (Id.) She was on light duty for the entire year before she

ceased working. (Id.) During the year that she was on light duty, Plaintiff made

numerous mistakes, such as mailing the wrong contracts or making too few or too many

copies, and consequently was asked to leave the job and apply for disability benefits. 

(R. 128, 131.) Prior to that, she worked in collections. (R. 128.) In that position, she

was responsible for answering phones, typing and calling customers. (Id.)

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D. Findings of the ALJ

In his decision the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had the severe impairments of

fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, hypertension and depression. (R. 116.) He

determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or equaled the Listings. (Id.) The ALJ further concluded Plaintiff had the RFC to

perform “light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) except she was limited to

occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling” and “she

retained the mental residual functional capacity to understand, remember, and carry out

semi-skilled tasks.” (R. 116-17.) The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was capable of

performing her past relevant work as a bill collector. (R. 120.) He further noted this

position did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by

Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id.) Consequently, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a

disability from June 10, 2005, the alleged disability onset date, through December 31,

2007, Plaintiff’s date last insured. (Id.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends there were at least three errors in the ALJ’s written decision. 

First, she argues the Commissioner erred in failing to make any findings regarding the

mental requirements of her past relevant work as a bill collector even though the ALJ

concluded Plaintiff exhibited moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and

pace. Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinions of several

non-examining state agency physicians. Third, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to

conclude Plaintiff suffered from any upper extremity limitations, despite the opinion of

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 16 of 30
Plaintiff’s treating hand surgeon to the contrary. The Court will address each issue in

turn below.

A. The ALJ Erred in Not Making Any Findings Regarding The Mental

Requirements of Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to make any findings regarding the

mental requirements of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a bill collector even though the

ALJ concluded Plaintiff exhibited moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and

pace. The Court agrees.

With regard to Plaintiff’s mental limitations the ALJ stated “Although she did not

exhibit any attention or memory deficits during her evaluation with Dr. Gedney, I give

her the benefit of the doubt and find she has moderate restriction in maintaining

concentration, persistence, and pace, due to somatic concern and pain, but not to such

an extent to prevent her from carrying out detailed tasks.” (R. 120.) Without any

discussion of the mental demands of her past relevant work the ALJ concluded Plaintiff

was capable of performing past relevant work as a bill collector both as Plaintiff had

actually performed that position as well as how that position is generally performed in

the national economy. (Id.) 

Before considering whether the ALJ erred in failing to make findings concerning

the mental demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work, the Court must consider a

threshold issue raised by Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly included bill

collector as past relevant work because she actually worked as a supervisor in the

collections area. 

Plaintiff testified she previously had worked in collections and her job duties in

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that capacity included answering phones, typing and calling customers. (R. 128.) On

her application for disability benefits, Plaintiff stated she worked as a collections

manager for different companies from 1991 until 2002. (R. 190.) In describing her

duties in this position, she noted she performed office work, utilized the telephone, dealt

with customer relations, typed, performed work on a computer, did bookkeeping and

dealt with the mail. (R. 190.) On a work background report Plaintiff completed, she

stated her work between at least 1998 and 2002 had involved, among other things,

telephone work, collections, mailing collection letters, data entry, and taking customer

payments. (R. 248.)

The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) provides the following definition for

the position of a bill collector:

 Locates customers to collect installments or overdue accounts,

damage claims, or nonpayable checks: Visits or phones customer and

attempts to persuade customer to pay amount due or arranges for

payment at later date. Questions neighbors and postal workers at post

office to determine new address of customers. May have service

discontinued or merchandise repossessed. Keeps record of collections

and status of accounts. May deliver bills. May sell insurance or other

service. May be designated according to type of collection as Claims

Collector (clerical); Insurance Collector (insurance); Utility-Bill Collector

(clerical). GOE: 07.03.01 STRENGTH: L GED: R3 M3 L3 SVP: 4 DLU:

81.21

While Plaintiff is technically correct that her past work in the collections field does not

exactly match the definition of bill collector provided in the DOT the inclusion of bill

collector by the ALJ does not constitute fundamental error sufficient to effect the

outcome of the case. According to her own testimony, and according to the disability

DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, § 241.367-010 (rev. 4th ed. 1991).

21

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 18 of 30
application and work background Plaintiff filled-out, Plaintiff performed many of the

duties of the bill collector job in her previous work in collections. The duties that Plaintiff

described were thus close enough to the duties of a bill collector, described in the DOT,

that the ALJ’s inclusion of the position of bill collector in Plaintiff’s past relevant work

was not error.

The ALJ erred, however, in failing to make any findings or even discuss the

mental demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a bill collector, particularly in view of

the fact that the ALJ concluded Plaintiff exhibited moderate limitations in concentration,

persistence and pace.

The regulations pertaining to Step Four of the sequential analysis direct the ALJ

to compare the claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s

past relevant work. In doing so, the ALJ must consider whether the claimant’s RFC 22

would prevent the claimant from performing the mental and physical requirements of

that past relevant work. Under the Commissioner’s own rulings “the ALJ has a duty to 23

fully investigate and make explicit findings as to the physical and mental demands of a

claimant's past relevant work and to compare that with what the claimant herself is

capable of doing before he determines that she is able to perform her past relevant

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

22

Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11 Cir. 1987)(“W here there is no evidence of the

23 th

physical requirements and demands of the claimant's past work and no detailed description of the

required duties was solicited or proffered, the Secretary cannot properly determine whether the claimant

has the residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work.”); Neims v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 1164,

1165 (11 Cir. 1986).

th

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work.”24

In this case, the ALJ failed to include in his written decision any discussion or

make any findings whatsoever with respect to the mental requirements or physical

requirements of the position of bill collector. And as explained below, the failure to

discuss the physical requirements of the job of bill collector created further error in view

of the fact that there was evidence of a restriction in Plaintiff’s upper extremity which

could impact her ability to reach and the ability to engage in tasks involving gross and

fine manipulation. (R. 128, 190, 248.) 

 Because the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work both

as she performed it and as the work is generally performed in the national economy,

the Plaintiff would be not disabled if she could perform either. The problem is that the

ALJ failed to discuss the specific demands of Plaintiff’s job as she performed it and

made no mention of the demands of the job as generally performed in the national

economy.

Turning first to the mental demands of the job as generally performed in the

national economy, the DOT’s definition of bill collector has a Level Reasoning

Development level of 3, meaning that to perform that position an individual must

“[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral,

or diagrammatic form” and “[d]eal with problems involving several concrete variables in

Nimick v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 887 F.2d 864, 866 (8 Cir. 1989); SSR

24 th

82-61, 1982 W L 31387; SSR 82-62, 1982 W L 31386 (“The decision as to whether the claimant retains the

functional capacity to perform past work which has current relevance has far-reaching implications and

must be developed and explained fully in the disability decision. Since this is an important and, in some

instances, a controlling issue, every effort must be made to secure evidence that resolves the issue as

clearly and explicitly as circumstances permit.”).

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or from standardized situations.” The ALJ determined that Plaintiff possessed the 25

RFC to “understand, remember, and carry-out semi skilled tasks.” (R. 117.) However,

the ALJ failed to mention or even discuss the mental requirements of a bill collector as

generally performed in the national economy. Moreover, the ALJ’s conclusion that

Plaintiff could perform semi-skilled work does not address the issue of whether mental

limitations would effect the ability to perform a given job. Simply because a claimant

can perform semi-skilled work does not mean the claimant can [a]pply commonsense

understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form”

and “[d]eal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from standardized

situations.” Nor does a determination that a claimant can perform semi-skilled work

mean the claimant would not have problems maintaining concentration, persistence,

and pace. 

Similarly, with respect to the mental requirements of the job of bill collector as

Plaintiff actually performed it, the record is devoid of any discussion or findings

concerning the mental tasks involved in performing that job. The Plaintiff’s testimony at

the hearing did not include any mention of what were the mental aspects of her

previous work in collections. The Court is left to guess whether maintaining

concentration and pace for extended periods of time were requirements of the Plaintiff’s

past work and, if so, how important these abilities were to actually performing Plaintiff’s

past job of bill collector, as she performed it. And as discussed above, the ALJ’s finding

that Plaintiff could perform semi-skilled work does not address whether problems

DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 21, App. C, § III.

25

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maintaining concentration, persistence and pace would have any impact upon the

ability to perform semi-skilled work. As such, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff can

“understand, remember, and carry-out semi skilled tasks” says nothing about whether

Plaintiff could perform the mental requirements of the bill collector position as Plaintiff

actually performed it.

Accordingly, because the ALJ failed to discuss or analyze the mental

requirements of the job of bill collector, either as Plaintiff actually performed it or as it is

generally performed in the national economy, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff can

perform her past relevant work is flawed and requires remand to the Commissioner so

that the ALJ can address the mental demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work and then

determine whether she is able to perform the demands of the job taking into account

her mental limitations.

B. The ALJ Erred In His Treatment of The Medical Opinions of the Nonexamining State Agency Physicians and the Medical Opinion

Expressed By Plaintiff’s Hand Specialist, Dr. Larry Chidgey

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred with respect to his treatment of the opinions

of three non-examining state agency physicians, Drs. Donald Morford, Angeles AlvarezMullin and Val Bee, and the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating hand specialist, Dr. Larry

Chidgey. 

Regarding the non-examining physicians, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by: (i)

ignoring the opinion of Dr. Donald Morford, a non-examining state agency physician,

who restricted Plaintiff’s use of her upper left extremity, (ii) failing to discuss the opinion

of Dr. Alvarez-Mullin, another non-examining state agency physician, who opined

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 22 of 30
Plaintiff could only carry out simple tasks in a low demand work situation, and (iii) failing

to credit the opinion of Dr. Val Bee, another non-examining state agency psychologist,

who opined Plaintiff’s pain and depression may disrupt her ability to learn and perform

detailed tasks. Plaintiff also alleges the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s

treating hand specialist, Dr. Larry Chidgey, who opined that Plaintiff could never

perform fine manipulation and only rarely perform gross manipulation or reaching.

With regard to the opinions of treating physicians it is well-established that

substantial or considerable weight must be given to the opinion, diagnosis and medical

evidence of a treating physician unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. If a 26

treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments is

well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,

and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ must

give it controlling weight. 

27

With regard to other medical opinions “the ALJ [is] required to state with

particularity the weight he gave the different medical opinions and the reasons

therefor.” While there is no requirement for the ALJ to discuss every medical record in 28

the administrative record, he is “required to state with particularity the weight he gave

Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F. 3d 1155, 1159 (11 Cir. 2004) (citing

26 th

Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.1997))(“W e have found ‘good cause’ to exist where the

doctor’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, or where the evidence supported a contrary finding.

W e have also found good cause where the doctors’ opinions were conclusory or inconsistent with their

medical records.”). See also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-584 (11 Cir. 1991); Sabo v.

th

Commissioner of Social Security, 955 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (M.D. Fla.1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

27

Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11 Cir. 1987.)

28 th

23

Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 23 of 30
the different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Additionally, because an 29

ALJ is not permitted to substitute his judgment for that of the medical experts, the ALJ

30

cannot reject portions of a medical opinion without providing an explanation for such a

decision. Where an ALJ fails to sufficiently explain how he reached his decision, the

31

Court may not speculate. 

32

In this case the ALJ failed to follow these principles with respect to his evaluation

and treatment of the opinions of Drs. Morford, Bee, Alvarez-Mullin and Chidgey. The

Court will address each medical opinion in turn

1. Dr. Morford’s Opinion

Despite endorsing the opinion expressed by non-examining state agency

physician, Dr. Donald Morford, with respect to Plaintiff’s physical RFC, the ALJ

inexplicably ignored Dr. Morford’s opinion that Plaintiff had a left upper extremity

restriction. Dr. Morford completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment dated February 21, 2007 and concluded that Plaintiff had a “20/10 listing

with occasional to frequent left upper extremity overhead use and avoidance of

extremes seems feasible with continued treatment.” (R. 537.) 

In his decision the ALJ found: “I afford significant weight to a State agency

Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11 Cir. 1990)(noting “the ALJ should state the weight

29 th

he accords to each item of impairment evidence and the reasons for his decision to accept or reject that

evidence”).

Graham v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1113, 1115 (11th Cir. 1986); Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727,

30

731 (11th Cir. 1982).

Morrison v. Barnhart, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2003).

31

Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984).

32

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medical consultant’s opinion [Dr. Morford] indicating that the claimant retains the

exertional residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of light work (Exhibit

23F). The State agency medical consultant’s opinion is well supported by the medical

evidence and the claimant’s own description of her daily activities as stated in her

written reports and as reported to a consulting psychologist on October 4, 2006.” (R.

119.) Despite the fact the ALJ wholly endorsed and gave great weight to the opinion of

Dr. Morford – including finding his opinion was consistent with the medical evidence –

the ALJ completely ignored Dr. Morford’s opinion that Plaintiff was restricted to

occasional or frequent overhead use of her upper left extremity. The ALJ never

discussed this limitation and did not include a reaching limitation in Plaintiff’s RFC. This

was error.

Because the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Morford’s opinion but failed to discuss

or consider Dr. Morford’s opinion that Plaintiff’s use of the upper left extremity was

restricted, the ALJ erred by failing to articulate a reason for not adopting that portion of

Dr. Morford’s opinion. This error was compounded by the fact that the ALJ failed to

discuss the physical requirements of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a bill collector.

Because the ALJ failed to address the physical demands of that job the Court cannot

determine whether Plaintiff’s job as a bill collector involved overhead reaching and,

thus, would be impacted by Dr. Morford’s restrictions regarding the left upper extremity.

Accordingly, because the ALJ’s decision is silent as to his reasons for not

including Dr. Morford’s restrictions on Plaintiff’s use of her upper left extremity, the case

is due to be remanded to the Commissioner so that an ALJ can address the weight to

be given to the portion of Dr. Morford’s opinion that Plaintiff’s manipulation with her left

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 25 of 30
upper extremity is restricted.

2. Dr. Bee’s Opinion

The ALJ also erred by improperly affording little weight to the opinion of nonexamining state agency psychologist, Dr. Val Bee, Psy.D., who opined that Plaintiff’s

pain and depression would disrupt her ability to learn and perform complex tasks. 

Dr. Bee completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity assessment dated

February 13, 2007. (R. 518-35.) She concluded Plaintiff was mentally capable of well

structured task activity and at least superficially appropriate social interaction, but that

cognitive sequela from Plaintiff’s pain and depression may disrupt detailed learning and

cause occasional lapses in concentration and efficiency. (R. 534.)

With respect to Dr. Bee’s opinion the ALJ found: “I also afford little weight to the

State agency medical consultant’s opinion indicating that the claimant is restricted to

unskilled work (Exhibit 22F)” because “[t]he objective medical evidence and the

claimant’s written statements of record do not support a finding that the claimant has

attention, concentration or memory deficits that prevent her from understanding,

remembering, and carrying out detailed tasks compatible with semi-skilled work.” (R.

119.) In support of this conclusion, the ALJ noted Dr. Jeffrey Gedney did not observe

any attention or memory deficits during his psychological evaluation of the Plaintiff. (Id.) 

The ALJ also cited Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in support of his rejection of Dr.

Bee’s opinion. 

The ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Bee’s opinion was not supported by

substantial evidence and is actually at odds with the evidence cited by the ALJ in

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support of his decision to give little weight to Dr. Bee’s opinion. While the ALJ

appropriately recognized that Dr. Jeffrey Gedney had not observed any attention or

memory deficits during his evaluation of Plaintiff, the ALJ ignored Dr. Gedney’s

conclusion that Plaintiff’s prognosis for returning to work was poor due in part to her

“escalating cycle of medical exacerbation and maladjustment.” (R. 417-18.) As such, 

Dr. Gedney’s conclusion was more consistent with Dr. Bee’s view than it was with the

ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform semi-skilled work. 

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living also do not support the ALJ’s decision to give

little weight to Dr. Bee’s opinion. Plaintiff reported she sometimes lays in bed and

watches television but also testified to stress-induced concentration and memory

problems she described as “fibro fog.” (R. 127, 131.) She also noted she had been

terminated from her last job because she was making all sorts of mistakes, including

making the incorrect number of copies and mailing the wrong contracts to doctor’s

offices. (R. 128.) 

 Accordingly, while standing alone, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Bee’s opinion is

not grounds for reversal and remand, the Court, nonetheless, determines that the ALJ’s

rejection of Dr. Bee’s opinion was not supported by substantial evidence and therefore

because the case is due to be remanded the ALJ on remand should give further

consideration to Dr. Val Bee’s opinion.

3. Dr. Alvarez-Mullin’s Opinion

The ALJ also improperly failed to address the opinion expressed by nonexamining state agency physician, Dr. Angeles Alvarez-Mullin, M.D., in which Dr.

Alvarez-Mullin opined that Plaintiff was restricted to carrying out simple tasks in a low

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 27 of 30
demand work situation. 

Dr. Alvarez-Mullin completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity assessment

dated October 17, 2006. (R. 427-44.) She concluded Plaintiff was capable of: (i)

carrying out simple tasks in a low demand work situation, (ii) carrying out a work routine

independently, (iii) learning new skills, (iv) adjusting to changes in the work routine, (v)

making decisions in her own behalf, and (vi) relating adequately to others, although she

may have difficulty working with the public. (R. 429.)

The ALJ completely ignored Dr. Alvarez-Mullin’s opinion and failed to discuss her

opinion even in a summary fashion in his written decision. The ALJ should have at

least addressed Dr. Alvarez-Mullin’s opinion and provided a reason for considering or

not considering her opinion. The failure to do so requires remand to the Commissioner

so that the ALJ properly can consider and determine the appropriate weight to be

accorded to the opinion expressed by Dr. Alvarez-Mullin.

4. Dr. Larry Chidgey’s Treating Physician Opinion

Lastly, the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating

hand specialist, Dr. Larry Chidgey, who found that Plaintiff could never perform fine

manipulation and only rarely can perform gross manipulation or reaching.

In a Physical Capacity Evaluation Dr. Chidgey opined that Plaintiff could never

perform fine manipulation and she could only rarely perform gross manipulation or

reaching. (Id.) (R. 641.) As the medical basis for his opinion, Dr. Chidgey wrote

“trigger thumb and finger.” (Id.) Dr. Chidgey’s opinion was based on a long history of

treating Plaintiff, as he had treated Plaintiff for pain in her upper extremities since as

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early as July 2001 and was still doing treating Plaintiff as late as October 2009. (R.

446-50, 700.)

With respect to Dr. Chidgey’s opinion the ALJ stated: “On December 14, 2007,

treating physician, Larry Chidgey, M.D., estimated the claimant’s lifting/carrying capacity

at less than the sedentary exertional level and he indicated little or no ability to push,

pull, reach overhead, and use her hands for manipulation. He attributed these

limitations to trigger thumb and trigger finger. These limitations are not supported by

the objective medical evidence.” (R. 118.) That is the extent of the ALJ’s discussion of

his reasons for rejecting Dr. Chidgey’s opinion. Because Dr. Chidgey is a treating

physician the ALJ was required to articulate specific reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for rejecting his opinion. The ALJ completely failed to do so.

Moreover, contrary to the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Chidgey’s opinion is not

supported by the objective medical evidence, a review of the evidence of record reflects

that Dr. Chidgey’s opinion that Plaintiff was restricted in the upper extremity was

actually consistent with the other objective medical evidence in the record. 

For example, Dr. Morford concluded that Plaintiff was restricted in the use of her

upper left extremity to occasional to frequent overhead use. (R. 539.) Moreover,

diagnostic studies of record support Dr. Chidgey’s opinion. A June 23, 2005 MRI of the

Plaintiff’s left shoulder showed tendinitis, shoulder impingement syndrome and tears in

the muscles of her left shoulder. (R. 31, 347-48, 399.) Plaintiff was also diagnosed

with a rotator cuff tear by Dr. Ashfaq in 2005 and a left shoulder rotator cuff strain and

impingement by Dr. Moser in 2006. (R. 381-82, 483, 517.)

Thus, contrary to the ALJ’s conclusional statement that the objective medical

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Case 1:10-cv-00111-GRJ Document 23 Filed 08/18/11 Page 29 of 30
evidence does not support Dr. Chidgey’s opinion, the objective medical evidence of

record, including findings by other doctors and the results of diagnostic testing, support

Dr. Chidgey’s treating physician opinion that Plaintiff had upper left extremity limitations.

Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ erred by failing properly to articulate reasons,

supported by substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting Dr. Chidgey’s opinion. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the decision of

the Commissioner should be REVERSED AND REMANDED to the Commissioner

under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings with instructions to

the ALJ to analyze the medical evidence and medical opinions as described above –

and as required by applicable law, regulations and rulings – and to properly analyze the

mental and physical demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a bill collector and

then determine whether Plaintiff can perform the mental and physical demands of that

job in light of the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC.

IN CHAMBERS in Gainesville, Florida, on August 18, 2011.

s/ Gary R. Jones

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), a party may file specific, written objections to

the proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with a

copy of this report and recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s

objections within 14 days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to file specific

objections limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and

recommendations.

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