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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

CARRIE J. RHODES,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 4:11cv153-RH/CAS

SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, 

LEON COUNTY,

Defendant.

 /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case was initiated on April 13, 2011, by the filing of a complaint alleging

employment discrimination on the basis of race. Doc. 1. Counsel for Plaintiff was

permitted to withdraw, docs. 22, 23, and Plaintiff has been proceeding pro se in this

case. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, doc. 19, in November 2011, and

despite the fact that Plaintiff was granted several extensions of time in which to file a

response in opposition to the motion, docs. 20-21, 26-28, 30-32, no opposition has been

filed. The evidence is, accordingly, unrebutted.

Allegations of the complaint

Plaintiff is a black female who worked for the Leon County Supervisor of

Elections Office (hereinafter "Elections Office") from September 2007 until January 4,

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2008, as an OPS (other personnel services) employee. Doc. 1, at 2-3. After she was

fired, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(hereinafter "FCHR") on February 1, 2008, alleging that her termination was due to

racial discrimination. Id., at 3. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought employment with Capital

Regional Medical Center (hereinafter "CRMC"), but was not hired because the Elections

Office advised that it would not rehire Plaintiff due to "legal reasons" and "CRMC has a

policy of not hiring candidates who are not eligible for rehire with a former employer." 

Id., at 4-6.1 The complaint alleges claims for discrimination and retaliation. Id., at 6-7.

Plaintiff attached to the complaint a copy of an Employment Charge of

Discrimination filed with FCHR against both CRMC and the Elections Office. Doc. 1-2. 

Plaintiff alleged retaliation in a complaint filed on October 28, 2009, after CRMC refused

to hire her based on the statements made by the Elections Office. Id. The FCHR

issued a determination on May 3, 2010, "that reasonable cause exists to believe that an

unlawful employment practice occurred." Doc. 1-3. On March 23, 2011, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") issued a Notice of Right to

Sue letter. Doc. 1-5.

Standard of Review

On a motion for summary judgment, the Defendant initially has the burden to

demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex

Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L. Ed. 2d

265 (1986). If accomplished, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come forward with

1

 Plaintiff alleged that the "legal reason" was the discrimination complaint Plaintiff

filed with the FCHR. Id., at 5. 

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evidentiary material demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. An

issue of fact is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the case. Hickson Corp. v.

Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff must show more than the existence of a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the

material facts, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., LTD. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475

U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), and a "scintilla" of

evidence is insufficient. The Court must decide "whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law." Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1260, quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202

(1986). All reasonable inferences must be resolved in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 1999), if

there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007), cited in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677

(2009). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial

Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in Ricci v. DeStefano,

129 S.Ct. at 2677. 

"Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by

her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Owen v.

Wille, 117 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1126 (1998), quoting

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)). The

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nonmoving party need not produce evidence in a form that would be admissible as Rule

56(e) permits opposition to a summary judgment motion by any of the kinds of

evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c). Owen v. Wille, 117 F.3d at 1236; Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.

Local Rule 56.1(A) provides that a motion for summary judgment "shall be

accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." N.D. Fla. Loc.

R. 56.1(A). The Local Rule also provides that the statement "shall reference the

appropriate deposition, affidavit, interrogatory, admission, or other source of the relied

upon material fact, by page, paragraph, number, or other detail sufficient to permit the

court to readily locate and check the source." Id. The Local Rule provides that the

party opposing the motion shall serve a similar statement of the material facts "as to

which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried," using the same

format. Id. Facts set forth in Defendant's statement will be deemed admitted if

supported by the record evidence. In this case, those facts are admitted because

Plaintiff did not file her own statement. 

The relevant Rule 56(e) evidence

Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant in November 2007 as a temporary OPS

employee. Doc. 19, Ex. B (doc. 19-2, at 2). In the remarks section of the Personnel

Action Form, it indicates Plaintiff was hired to assist with the "2008 Election cycle." Id.

On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff was involved in a verbal altercation with several coworkers. Doc. 19, Ex. F. This argument was so load and disruptive, that the building

manager complained to the Supervisor of Elections about the noise. Id. Plaintiff

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refused to discuss the matter with her supervisor, and both Plaintiff and another coworker were sent home for the day. Id. 

Plaintiff initially left the Office peacefully, but she returned shortly thereafter,

collected her personal belongings and threw her security badge on her desk. Doc. 19,

Ex. F. Later that day, Plaintiff called her supervisor on the telephone and advised that

she was resigning her position. Id. Plaintiff then called her supervisor on the following

day and requested a letter setting forth the reasons Plaintiff was terminated. Id. The

Elections Office refused to issue the letter requested by Plaintiff, but did issue a letter

terminating Plaintiff's employment, effective January 4, 2008. Id. Simultaneously, the

Elections Office completed a Personnel Action Form on January 4, 2008, and noted that

Plaintiff was "not eligible for rehire." Doc. 19, Ex. B (doc. 19-2, at 1). 

Plaintiff filed a complaint with FCHR the following month, on February 1, 2008,

claiming racial discrimination.2

 Doc. 19, Ex. C (19-3, at 6). Plaintiff alleged that she had

an argument with two other employees, both of whom were white. Id. Plaintiff and the

white female employee were sent home for the day, and that evening, Plaintiff said her

supervisor told her she had heard about the incident. Plaintiff was dismissed and told

her "services were no longer needed." Id. Plaintiff complained that she was the only

employee terminated after the incident. Id. On July 30, 2008, FCHR issued a Notice of

Determination: No Cause. Id., at 5. The Commissioner "determined that no reasonable

cause exists to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred." Id., at 4. The

complaint was dismissed on September 5, 2008. Id., at 3. The EEOC "adopted the

2

 Plaintiff actually filed two separate FCHR complaints. The first complaint alleged

only racial discrimination by the Elections Office. The second complaint was filed

against both CRMC and the Elections Office, and alleged retaliation. Doc. 1-2. 

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finding of the state or local fair employment practices agency that investigated"

Plaintiff's charge. Id., at 1. 

Subsequently, Plaintiff applied for a position at CRMC in October 2009, and was

advised that although she had passed the criminal background check, a problem had

been discovered. Doc. 19, Ex D (Plaintiff's affidavit). Plaintiff was asked why the

Elections Office listed her as a "no rehire" and Plaintiff said she did not know because

her position had been OPS. Id. A follow-up phone call to the Elections Office advised

that Plaintiff was a "no rehire" because of a "legal issue," but the Office would not

elaborate on the reasons. Id., at 2. When this information was communicated to

Plaintiff, she explained "that the legal issue was a discrimination complaint that" Plaintiff

had filed with FCHR. Id. Plaintiff then requested to speak to Mr. Caracciolo, the hiring

person for CRMC, who told Plaintiff that the dates she listed for her employment with

the Elections Office on her employment application did not match up with the dates

listed on Plaintiff's resume. Id. Additionally, Mr. Caracciolo told Plaintiff that she "would

need to request that the Supervisor of Elections put the legal issue on letterhead." Id. 

Plaintiff called the Elections Office and spoke with Cynthia Kelley, requesting that

she call CMRC to clarify her employment dates. Id. Plaintiff also requested an

"explanation of the legal issue" be put on Office letterhead. Id. Both requests were

denied, although Ms. Kelley advised that CMRC could call her for Plaintiff's employment

dates. Id. When Plaintiff attempted to meet again with Mr. Caracciolo, Plaintiff said that

he "was not interested and in fact he became unprofessional and aggressive as

[Plaintiff] simply tried to discuss the issues at hand." Id. Mr. Caracciolo told Plaintiff she

"would not be hired because of the 'legal issue.' " Id. 

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Defendant has also submitted the affidavit of Cynthia Kelley who states that she

never received a call from "anyone at Capital Regional Medical Center regarding"

Plaintiff. Doc. 19, Ex. E (doc. 19-5, at 1). However, on October 19, 2009, Ms. Kelley

received a call from General Information Services regarding a reference for Plaintiff. Id.

Ms. Kelley advised of her dates of employment, and was then asked if Plaintiff was

eligible for rehire. Id. Ms. Kelley "advised the caller she was not eligible for rehire but

that [she] could not discuss [that] issue." Id. When the caller attempted to press the

matter, Ms. Kelley "simply responded that [she] could not discuss it because it was a

legal matter." Id. Ms. Kelley advises that at no time did she ever tell the caller that

Plaintiff had filed a claim of discrimination. Id., at 2. 

Janet Olin, Plaintiff's supervisor at the Elections Office, also filed an affidavit

explaining the basis for Plaintiff's termination. Doc. 19, Ex. F (doc. 19-6). Ms. Olin

states that Plaintiff's employment was terminated not because of her skin color, but

because of Plaintiff's actions. Id. 

On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff was working with a team of four other employees. 

Id. Mr. Rosario was one of the other four employees, and "had been given the

responsibility of supervising and coordinating the work of" Plaintiff and the other

employees. Id. However, on January 3rd, Ms. Conley had assigned Plaintiff "the task

of pulling absentee ballots and had given Mr. Rosario a different assignment." Id.

Plaintiff began "loudly challenging and berating Nelson Rosario asking why he was not

pulling absentee ballots." Id. Mr. Rosario explained he was given other tasks, but

Plaintiff "continued to harass Mr. Rosario asking him why he thought he was too good to

pull absentee ballots." Id. 1-2. Plaintiff continued to yell at Mr. Rosario when another

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staff member, Sherry Bell, "came to his aid, which unfortunately, became a heated

argument." Id., at 2.

Ms. Bell then reported the incident to Ms. Conley and during that discussion, the

property manager came to Ms. Conley's Office to report complaints from other tenants

in the building about the yelling from Plaintiff's work area. Id. Ms. Conley went with 

Ms. Bell to the work area and tried to "calmly discuss the situation and rebuild a

harmonious work environment within a very small staff of five people." Id. Ms. Bell was

willing to discuss the situation, but Plaintiff was not. Id. Both employees were "still

upset" and so, "in the interest of fairness, Ms. Conley sent both of them home for the

remainder of the day." Id. Ms. Bell collected her purse and left the area quietly, as did

Plaintiff initially, but within a few minutes, Plaintiff returned and "collected all her

personal items." Id. As Plaintiff exited the area, she "threw her security badge at her

work station, an act seen as a demonstration of her anger, and her resigning her

position." Id. 

Ms. Conley met with Ms. Olin later that afternoon to discuss the situation. Doc.

19, Ex. F (doc. 19-6, at 2). Ms. Olin inquired as to the work attitudes of both Plaintiff

and Ms. Bell, and Ms. Conley explained that Ms. Bell was a "team player, willing to

shorten her lunch to meet the daily fluctuating workload while [Plaintiff] was never willing

to shorten hers . . . ." Id. Ms. Conley reported that Plaintiff had even been late

returning from lunch one "day when the work load was especially heavy with the initial

absentee ballot mail out." Id. Following that meeting, Ms. Olin attempted to speak with

Plaintiff and left a voice message for Plaintiff to call her, which she did within two hours. 

Id. Ms. Olin described Plaintiff's voice as having a "challenge in her voice" and she then

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gave Plaintiff the option of voluntarily resigning or being terminated. Id. Plaintiff said

she would resign. Id. 

The next day, Ms. Bell returned to work and "apologized for her behavior." Id.

"She also expressed regret and wanted to move forward." Id. Ms. Conley and Ms. Olin

discussed the matter and decided that Ms. Bell could continue her employment with the

Elections Office. Id., at 3. 

Plaintiff, who stated on January 3rd that she would resign, later called Ms. Olin

and requested "a letter setting out the reasons [Ms. Olin] terminated her." Id. Ms. Olin

sent a letter to Plaintiff dated January 4, 2008, which stated: "This letter serves to

confirm that all employees of the Leon County Supervisor of Elections serve at the will

of the Supervisor of Elections." Doc. 19, Ex. B (doc. 19-2, at 3). The letter concluded,

"Your employment as an 'Other Personnel Services' employee is no longer required." 

Id. 

Ms. Olin explained in her affidavit that her decision to accept Plaintiff's

"resignation and to end her employment with our office was based solely upon

[Plaintiff's] actions and demeanor." Doc. 19, Ex. F (doc. 19-6, at 3). The Elections

Office "requires individuals who can work in stressful situations and be a team player." 

Id. Plaintiff did not exhibit those qualities. Id. Ms. Bell's employment was continued

because she "had no prior absences or infractions during her employment with our

office, she apologized for her actions, and she promised not to allow herself to become

embroiled in an argument again." Id. 

Analysis

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a. Racial discrimination3

Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace based on, among other things, a

person's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Analysis of a Title VII disparate treatment

claim supported by circumstantial evidence4

 requires use of the Supreme Court's

burden-shifting framework as described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Wilson v. B/E

Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff bears the initial burden

of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. After that

burden is met, the burden shirts to the employer-defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for its employment decision. Id. Thereafter, the burden shifts back

to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the non-discriminatory reason is a pretext. Id. 

To make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show (1)

she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the job; (3) she was

subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly situated

3

 Although the complaint contains only Count I, it alleges both unlawful

discrimination and retaliation. Doc. 1, at 6. Thus, there are two claims and each will be

addressed separately. Defendant failed to separately address the discrimination

allegation. Doc. 19. 

4

 "Direct evidence is 'evidence, that, if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact

without inference or presumption.'" Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d

1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997), quoted in Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086. "'[O]nly the most

blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the

basis of' some impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of discrimination." 

Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086, citing to Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir.

2002)(other citations omitted). If an alleged statement "suggests, but does not prove, a

discriminatory motive, then it is circumstantial evidence." Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086,

citing Burrell, 125 F.3d at 1393.

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employees outside her class more favorably. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087; Holifield v.

Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, and it may be assumed that she was

qualified to do the job. No argument has been made to the contrary. It is also evident

that when Plaintiff was given the choice of being terminated or voluntarily resigning from

the Elections Office, she was subjected to an adverse employment action. The only

issue is whether the Defendant treated similarly situated employees5 outside her class

more favorably. 

The evidence reveals that when the disagreement occurred between Plaintiff and

Ms. Bell, both employees were sent home for the day. Initially, both employees were

treated the same. Thereafter, Plaintiff's conduct escalated when she returned to the

office, threw down her security badge, and took her belongings with her as she left. 

Plaintiff demonstrated both a desire to quit and issues with anger. Plaintiff's conduct

went well beyond that of the other employee. Moreover, Plaintiff refused to discuss the

issue with her supervisor at the workplace and was unable to seek resolution at the

time. Ms. Bell demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and restore peace in the office.

During a telephone conversation with her supervisor later in the day, Plaintiff's attitude

was challenging. To the contrary, Ms. Bell showed remorse for the incident and

5

 "When comparing similarly situated individuals to raise an inference of

discriminatory motivation, the individuals must be similarly situated in all relevant

respects besides race . . . ." Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1273

(11th Cir. 2004), citing Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311

(11th Cir. 1998). It is unclear whether a temporary OPS employee is similarly situated

to an employee with full-time employment status. Nevertheless, this argument need not

be addressed in light of Plaintiff's failure to come forward with evidence to support her

claim.

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apologized. Based on this evidence, the Defendant's decision to terminate only

Plaintiff's employment may reasonably be concluded as due to Plaintiff's behavior and

attitude and not based on race. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence

showing that this reason is a pretext for discrimination. Therefore, summary judgment

should be granted in Defendant's favor on Plaintiff's discrimination claim.

b. Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: (1) that she

engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action

of a type that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in statutorily

protected activity, and (3) there was some causal relation between the two events.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405,

2414-15, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (announcing "materially adverse" element for Title VII

claims); Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); Meeks

v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994). To meet the causal

requirement, the plaintiff "merely has to prove that the protected activity and the

negative employment action are not completely unrelated." E.E.O.C. v. Reichhold

Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1993). At the outset, a plaintiff must

establish "that the employer was actually aware of the protected expression at the time

the employer took adverse employment action against the plaintiff." Holifield v. Reno, 

115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997), citing Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d

1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1524 (11th

Cir. 1991). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must proffer

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Reichhold

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Chem., 988 F.2d at 1571-72. If the employer offers legitimate reasons for the

employment action, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the employer's proffered

explanation is a pretext for retaliation. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1566, citing Meeks, 15 F.3d

at 1021; Goldsmith, 996 F.2d at 1163.

Here, it is clear that Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected expression as she

filed a charge of racial discrimination with FCHR against the Defendant within a month

after her employment ended. That constitutes statutorily protected expression.

The second element requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that she suffered a

"materially adverse" employment action from the standpoint of a reasonable employee,

such that it would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a discrimination

charge. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67-70, 126 S.Ct. at 2415-16. "[T]rivial harms" and

"petty slights" do not constitute adverse employment actions. Id. Defendant argues

that Plaintiff did not suffer a "materially adverse" employment action in being listed as

ineligible for rehire and in not disclosing more information as to the reason for the

ineligibility. It is true that in a telephone conversation, Ms. Kelley stated that she could

not "discuss it because it was a legal matter." An employer's desire not to discuss a

pending legal issue is understandable and rational. Indeed, had the employer disclosed

information about the case or its position in the matter, there would be additional claims

being raised in this case. The disclosure of information advising that the legal issue

was Plaintiff's filing a discrimination charge was due to Plaintiff's conduct, not the

Defendant. The failure to discuss the basis for a decision to not rehire a former

employee is not a materially adverse employment action.

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Nevertheless, an "adverse employment action may be an ultimate employment

decision, such as 'termination, failure to hire, or demotion.' " Crawford v. Carroll, 529

F.3d 961, 970-71 (11th Cir. 2008). There is a reasonable basis to assume that an

employer's decision to make a former employee ineligible for future rehire is an adverse

employment action. Such a decision is more than trivial and, if based on the fact that an

employee engaged in statutorily protected activity such as filing a discrimination claim,

would constitute a materially adverse action. If employees believed that an employer

would refuse to rehire them in the future, it is reasonable to concluded that a reasonable

worker would be dissuaded from making a charge of discrimination. See Burlington,

548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. For present purposes, it will be assumed that

Plaintiff suffered a materially adverse employment action due to the Defendant's action

in listing Plaintiff as ineligible for rehire.6

 

While giving Plaintiff the benefit of that assumption, her claim must fail on the

third element. Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to show a causal

relationship between her being listed as ineligible for rehire and having filed a charge of

discrimination. Defendant points out that the decision to not re-hire Plaintiff was

"determined on January 4, 2008, the date Plaintiff was terminated." Doc. 19, at 8. The

personnel action form was completed on January 4, 2008. Doc. 19, Ex. B (doc. 19-2, at

1). That date was prior to Plaintiff's filing her charge of discrimination. Plaintiff did not

file the charge of racial discrimination with FCHR until February 1, 2008. Doc. 19, Ex.

C. Because the ineligibility decision was made before the discrimination charge, there

6

 To the degree Plaintiff could have argued that she suffered an adverse action in

not being hired by CRMC, that employment decision was made by an employer not a

party to this case.

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is no causal connection. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of the

Defendant on the retaliation claim as well.

RECOMMENDATION

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant's

motion for summary judgment, doc. 19, be GRANTED and judgment entered in favor of

the Defendant on all claims.

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on June 5, 2012.

 S/ Charles A. Stampelos 

CHARLES A. STAMPELOS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of this report and

recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within 14 days

after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to file specific objections limits the

scope of review of proposed factual findings and recommendations.

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