NO. 83-41 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

KATHLEEN RACHEL WILKINSON, 

Defendant and Appellant, 

vs . 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

Appeal from- District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula 

Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presidin*. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Nick A. Roterinq argued, Special Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Xontana 

Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana 

Karen S. Townsend, Deputy County Attorney, arqued. Missoula, 

Montana 

Submitted- June 2 , 198 3 

Decided- August 1, 1983 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The Department of Institutions of the State of Montana 

appeals from an order by the District Court of the Fourth 

Judicial District, Missoula County, declaring the Department 

financially responsible for costs incurred as a result of the 

birth of defendant's baby. 

On September 10, 1982, defendant entered a guilty plea to the 

charge of negligent homicide. The District Court sentenced 

defendant to ten years with two years suspended, to be served at 

a women's correctional facility chosen by the Department of 

Institutions. 

Because defendant was soon to give birth and because testimony at the sentencing hearing indicated that she had a strong 

medical relationship with her physician, the District Court 

allowed her to remain at the Missoula County jail until after the 

birth of her child. She was remanded to the custody of the 

Missoula County sheriff and subsequently gave birth to her child 

at the Missoula Community Hospital. On October 28, 1982, she was 

taken to the Women's Correctional Center at Warm Springs, 

Montana. 

The Department of Institutions refused to pay the medical 

expenses of the birth. Missoula County moved for an order from 

the District Court declaring that the Department pay the medical 

expenses. After a show-cause hearing, the District Court made 

the following findings, conclusions, and decree: 

"FINDINGS OF FACT 

"1. The Defendant, Kathleen Rachel Wilkinson, 

was found guilty by a plea of guilty to the 

offense of Negligent Homicide, a felony, and 

sentenced on the 10th day of September, 1982 

to a term of ten (10) years at Montana State 

Prison with two of those years suspended. 

"2. The Defendant, on September 10, 1982, was 

ordered to serve her time at the women's prison facility at Warm Springs State Hospital. 

"3. The Defendant was ordered retained in the 

Missoula County Jail until after the birth of 

her child so that her obstetrician could continue to care for her. 
"4. The Defendant was ordered to remain in 

Missoula County and not be transferred to Warm 

Springs State Hospital until her doctor determined that it would not be detrimental to her 

interests or the interests of her child to be 

transferred. 

"5. The Defendant was taken to Missoula 

Community Hospital for the birth of her child 

on October 23, 1982. 

"6. Expenses for medical and security costs 

in the amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred 

Eighty-two and 47/100th Dollars ($3,482.47) 

were incurred as a result of the birth of the 

Defendant's son. 

"7. The Defendant was transferred to the 

women's prison facility on the 28th day of 

October, 1982 after her physician stated she 

could be transferred. 

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

"1. The Defendant became a state prisoner on 

the 10th day of September, 1982 upon passing 

of sentence. 

"2. The Defendant's stay in the Missoula 

County Jail and or the Missoula Community 

Hospital from September 10, 1982 until October 

28, 1982, was a temporary stay for a state 

prison inmate. 

"3. The Montana Department of Institutions is 

financially responsible for the medical and 

security costs incurred as a result of the 

birth of the Defendant's child. 

"ORDER 

"The Montana Department of Institutions is 

hereby ordered to assume the financial responsibility for all medical and security costs 

incurred as a result of the birth of the son 

of Kathleen Rachel Wil kinson. 

"The Department is further ordered to remit to 

Missoula Community Hospital the sum of Two 

Thousand Eighty-f ive and 87/100ths Dollars 

($2,085.87); to Dr. Thomas A. Baumgartner the 

sum of Four Hundred and Sixty Dollars 

($460.00); and to Missoula County (Guards) the 

sum of Nine Hundred Fifty-four dollars 

($954.00). 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the Department of 

Institutions is responsible for the medical and security costs 

incurred as a result of the birth of the defendant's baby, 

despite the fact that she was not delivered to the Women's 

Correctional Center at Warm Springs prior to the birth. 

The law of Montana is clear that " [olnce a valid sentence is 
imposed, the court lacks jurisdiction to vacate or modify it 

unless specifically authorized by statute. State v. Porter 

(1964), 143 Mont. 528, 540, 391 P.2d 704." State v. Downing 

(1979), 181 Mont. 242, 593 P.2d 43, 44. Here the court, in its 

judgment, committed the defendant to the Montana Department of 

Institutions. From this it is clear that the defendant was the 

responsibility of the State as there is no way for the judge to 

change his decision, after the filing of the judgment. 

This point is illustrated most vividly by a line of 

Washington cases where it has been stated that: 

"This court said in January v. Porter, 75 

Wash.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876 (1969), that upon 

the entry of a final -- judgment and sentence of 

imprisonment, legal --- authority over the accused 

passes 

of Institutions 

bx operation of 

(now the-tmxt 

law to the 

of 

Department 

Social - - - -- 

and Health Services) ---- and the Board oT - Prison 

Terms and Paroles, and that those agencies of 

the executive branch bear full responsibility 

for executing the judgment and sentence or 

granting parole. " (Emphasis added ) Kanekoa 

v. Washington State Department of Social and 

Health Services (1981), 95 Wash.2d 445, 626 

P.2d 6, 7 (see also In Re Bush (1980), 26 

Wash.App. 486, 616 P.2d 666, In Re the Welfare 

of Lowe (1978), .2d 824, 576 P.2d 65.) 

Similarly, because of circumstances in this particular case, the Department of Institutions must bear the medical 

costs for the birth of defendant's child. 

It must be noted that our holding here applies solely to the 

particular expenses in question. We are neither setting nor 

suggesting a general method for determining financial responsibility of state prisoners. That is a legislative d atter. 

For the reasons stated above, the ourt's judgment 

is affirmed. 

We concur: / 

%-RJ t .Qw (&&J 

Y 

Chief Justice 
Justices 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: 

I dissent. I would hold that Missoula County is 

responsible for the expenditures. The unfortunate result 

here is that the Department of Instituti,ons, without even 

having been notified of the District Court decision in time 

to object, has been saddled with paying the costs of 

hospitalization and cost of providing guards at the hospital. 

The result not only is unfair it is papered over with 

citations and quotations of authority that have no 

application to the questions presented to the District Court 

and to this Court. 

At the sentencing hearing it was the defense attorney 

and the deputy county attorney who requested the District 

Court to take the action it did. The District Court did so 

without ever conferring with anyone from the Department of 

Institutions. Had the Department of Institutions been 

notified of the contemplated action rather than the completed 

action, it is possible that it could have made other and 

satisfactory arrangements for care of the mother and the baby 

through the time of delivery. 

The authority cited by the ma:jority has no application 

to the facts presented here. Here the District Court 

committed the defendant to the Department of Institutions. 

This should have meant that the defendant was in the custody 

and control of the Department and that the Department could 

have made appropriate arrangements itself for the proper care 

of the mother and expected child. The question here is not 

whether custody passed by operation of law to the Department 

of Institutions upon the passing of sentence of imprisonment. 

The question is whether the District Court had the authority 

to grant custody and control of defendant to the Department 
on the one hand, but on the other to take it away by never 

notifing the Department that it had made arrangments for the 

custody of the defendant up to the time that the baby was 

delivered. By the action it took, the District Court 

deprived the Department of any meaningful opportunity to 

object to the Court's decision. 

In later ruling that the Department must bear the 

hospitalization and guard expenses the District Court simply 

sanctified the time-honored rule that if possible make the 

State pay rather than the local unit of government, a 

governmental application of the deep pocket theory. This 

Court has of course, ratified that action by approving the 

ruling that the State rather than the county must pay. 

Here the District Court made a mistake and I have no 

doubt it had the authority to correct its own mistake by a 

ruling that truly passed the custody and control of defendant 

to the Department of Institutions. Had the Department been 

timely notified of the decision it could have objected and 

the District Court could have amended its decision to truly 

turn custody and control of defendant over to the Department 

of Institutions. I doubt that the Department would have been 

so callous as not to take care of the real needs of the 

expectant mother, but it was never given the opportunity to 

act. The county, not the State, should pay.