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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

ALBENO SCELETZ CARMICHAEL, 

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:11cv79/RV/EMT

KENNETH L. WILLIAMS,

Defendant.

________________________________/

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court on Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Doc. 1), and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). For the limited purpose of

dismissal of this action, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff names one Defendant in this action, Judge Kenneth L. Williams, a judge in the

Escambia County Circuit Court who presided over a domestic violence injunction proceeding

initiated by Jackie L. Carmichael, Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 2009 DR 000652 (Doc.

1 at 3). Plaintiff alleges Judge Williams signed an ex parte temporary injunction for protection

against domestic violence which granted custody of Plaintiff’s minor child to Ms. Carmichael,

prohibited Plaintiff from seeing or communicating with his minor child or going to the child’s

school, and deprived Plaintiff of his automobile (id.). Plaintiff states he was served with a copy of

the temporary order and notified that the matter was set for a final hearing on March 18, 2009 (id.). 

Plaintiff acknowledges, in another complaint he filed against Judge Williams in this court on the

same day he filed the complaint in this case, that Judge Williams entered a final judgment of

injunction for protection against domestic violence at the conclusion of the hearing on March 18,

2009. See Carmichael v. Williams, Case No. 3:11cv88/LAC/MD, Doc. 1 at 3 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 17,

2011). Plaintiff claims that Judge Williams violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
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process and equal protection (Doc. 1 at 4). As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against

Judge Williams in the amount of $10,000.00 and an order voiding the domestic violence injunction

(id.).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss the case if satisfied

that the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e) “where it lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104

L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when the legal theories are

“indisputably meritless,” id., 490 U.S. at 327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are

“clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340

(1992). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The

allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). However,

such acceptance should not be given blindly; only well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true

and only reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Oladeinde v. City of

Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 502

(5th Cir. 1980);1 see also Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(“reasonable inferences” drawn); Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th

Cir. 1974) (“unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true”). A plaintiff must allege more

than mere “labels and conclusions”; the complaint must include “[f]actual allegations . . . [sufficient]

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Indeed,

“any conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact or legal conclusions masquerading as

facts do not prevent dismissal.” Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1305

1

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted

as precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981.

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(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (citing Associated Builders, Inc., 505 F.2d at 99). 

The complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp., supra (retiring the often-criticized “no set of facts” language

previously used to describe the motion to dismiss standard and determining that because plaintiffs

had “not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be

dismissed” for failure to state a claim). Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that

dismissal of this action is warranted.

Initially, Plaintiff cannot recover against Judge Williams. Judges acting in their judicial

capacity are absolutely immune from damages suits. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct.

286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from

ultimate assessment of damages.”) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27, 105 S. Ct.

2806, L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985)); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S. Ct. 183, 186, 66 L. Ed. 2d

185 (1980); see also Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925–26 (11th Cir. 1991). Immunity may be

overcome only (1) where the judge has not acted within his judicial capacity or (2) where the judge’s

actions, though judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978); Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11;

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988). 

Whether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relates “to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,

whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e.,

whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Stump,

435 U.S. at 362); see also Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996). The relevant

inquiry is the “nature” and “function” of the act, not the “act itself.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 (citing

Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). In other words, the court must look to the particular act’s relation to a

general function normally performed by a judge. 

A judge is not deprived of absolute immunity from liability for damages because an action

he took was in error, was illegal, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. Stump,

435 U.S. at 355–57; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (judicial immunity is not overcome by

allegations of bad faith or malice). Rather, a judge is subject to liability only when he acted in clear

absence of all jurisdiction, and knew or must have known that he was acting in such a manner. 

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Simmons, 86 F.3d at 1084–85 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57). An act is done in “clear absence

of all jurisdiction,” for judicial immunity purposes, if the matter upon which the judge acted is

clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he presides. Dykes v.

Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Furthermore, for the

purposes of immunity, a judge’s jurisdiction is construed broadly. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357. Thus,

where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity

purposes. Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1981) (judicial immunity extends to all judicial

acts provided they do not fall clearly outside the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction). The proper

inquiry for determining judicial immunity is not whether the judge actually had jurisdiction, or even

whether the judge exceeded his jurisdictional authority, but whether the challenged actions were

obviously taken outside the scope of the judge’s power. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 (quotation omitted). 

Turning to the instant case, the conduct of which Plaintiff complains, specifically, Judge

Williams’s granting the injunction, is a quintessential judicial function. Furthermore, as Plaintiff

was a party in the domestic violence case over which Judge Williams presided, Plaintiff was dealing

with Judge Williams in his judicial capacity. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts

suggest, that Judge Williams acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction to hear the domestic

violence matter. Therefore, judicial immunity shields Judge Williams from suit.

To the extent Plaintiff asks this court to review the substance of Judge Williams’s order, he

also is not entitled to relief. It is well established that federal district courts exercise only original

jurisdiction; they lack appellate jurisdiction to review state court decisions reached in administrative

and judicial proceedings. See District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476,

103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311–12, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

415–16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923). The Rooker and Feldman decisions have become

known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts

do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of

judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. 

Review of those decisions may be had only in [the Supreme Court on certiorari].” Berman v. Fla.

Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 794 F.2d 1529, 1530 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486). The

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Eleventh Circuit has identified the following four criteria that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to bar a district court’s jurisdiction:

(1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court; (2) the prior state

court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; (3) the party seeking

relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to raise its federal claims in the

state court proceedings; and (4) the issue before the federal court was either

adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably intertwined with the state court's

judgment.

Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal

citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “inextricably intertwined” as meaning that the

federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.

Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations and quotations omitted). 

However, even if a claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment, the doctrine

does not apply if the plaintiff had no “reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state

proceedings.” Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wood v. Orange

County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983)). “[A] party’s ability to raise a claim on appeal

constitute[s] a reasonable opportunity to raise the claim.” Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Md., Inc.

v. Weiner, 868 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989).

Proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was very recently clarified by the United

States Supreme Court. The Court stated:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from

which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22, 161

L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005) (holding that the doctrine did not apply because the federal suit was filed

before the state court judgments were rendered).

In the instant case, the complaint falls squarely within Exxon’s definition of the kind of cases

to which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. Plaintiff is a state court loser complaining of injuries

caused by the final judgment for protection against domestic violence and is inviting this court to

review and reject that judgment. Plaintiff commenced the instant federal action on February 17,

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2011, nearly two years after the final judgment was rendered in the state proceeding. Plaintiff’s

claims concerning the constitutionality of the domestic violence proceeding could have and should

have been raised in the state circuit court proceeding, and Plaintiff does not allege any reason for

his failure to raise his claims therein or, if he did raise them, his failure to raise them on appeal to

a higher court. Finally, Plaintiff’s claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment

because Plaintiff is attempting to “void” the state court’s order granting the injunction. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Mickens v. Tenth Judicial Circuit,

181 Fed. Appx. 865, 872–74 (11th Cir. 2006). 

 “Ordinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity to amend before the district court

dismisses the complaint.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005). “A

district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where there has been undue delay, bad

faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed;

(2) where allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where

amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case,

amendment would be futile, and therefore dismissal is appropriate.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.

And it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

That this cause be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

(iii), and because this court lacks jurisdiction to review orders entered in the state court proceedings.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 24th day of February 2011.

/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy 

ELIZABETH TIMOTHY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served a copy thereof. Any different deadline that may appear

on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not control. A copy of

objections shall be served upon all other parties. Failure to object may limit the scope of

appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d

698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Case No: 3:11cv79/RV/EMT