# FILED
November 25, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) NO. 02C01-9705-CC-00183 Appellee, ) ) HARDEMAN COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. JO N KE RRY BLACKWOOD, RANDY JOY, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (Delivery of Cocai ne)

FOR THE APPELLANT : JEANNIE KA

ESS (At Trial) Assistant District P ublic Defender P. O. Box 700 Somerville, TN 38068 C. MICHAEL RO BBINS (On Appeal) 3074 East Street Memphis, TN 38128 FOR THE APPEL LEE : JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Repor ter KENNETH W. RUCKER Assistant Attorney Gener al Cordell Hull Bldg. , 2nd Floor 425 5th Avenue, North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 ELIZABETH T. RICE District Attorney General JERRY W. NORWOOD Assistant

District Attorney

General 302 Market Street Somerville, TN 38068

OPINION FI LED:

AFFIRMED

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE2 O P I N I O N
The defendant, Randy Joy, w as convicted by a Har

deman County jury of deliveringcocaine over 0.5 grams, a Class B felony. Defendant was sente nced as
a Range I, Sta n dard Offender, to a term of eleven (11) years in the Tennessee Departmentof Correction and fined in the amount of $5,000. Defendant presents the foll owing issue s for our r eview: (1) whether a proper foundation was laid for the testimony of the drug an aly st concerning the wei ght of the cocaine; (2) whe ther

the trial court should have admitted evidence relating t o t he informant’s girlfriend hand ling cocaine; and (3) whether

defendant’s prior drug conviction was properly admitted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS
Although sufficiency of the evidence i s not an issue in this appeal, a br ief recitation of the facts is appropriate. The l ocal Drug Task Force empl oyed a confidential informant as a part of an undercove r drug operati o n. The informant arranged a narcotics transaction with the defendant. The narcotics agent gave the informant $100 to be used in the purchas e of cocaine and wired the informant. The confidential informant met the defendant at a pr earranged location. The defendant requested the money, and the c onfidential informant gave him $80. Defendant departed in his vehicle and returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Defendant then handed the confidential informant a plastic bag conta ining five (5) rocks of crack cocaine. The narcotics agent followed the informant ba ck to his mobile home and obtained possession of the narcotics and the recorder

.3 TESTIMONY CONCERNING WEIGHT OF COCAINE

The state prese nted eviden ce from a fo rensic scientist speci alizing in drug identification. When the witness testified that “I w eighed it . . . I determined that the substance weighed .6 grams,” defense counsel objected. The basis of the objection
was a failure to lay a proper founda tion regarding the accuracy of the measuring instrument. The objection was overruled. Defense counsel did not cross-examine the witness. Defense counsel has not cited n o r have we discov ered any case requir

ing that a forensic scientist testi fy as to the calibration and a ccur acy of a weighing instrument

prior to being allow

ed to testify as

to the weight of a partic ular substance. Tenn. R. Evid. 705 provides that experts may express opinions and give re ason s without the prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless requir e d by the court. The rule further provides that the expert may

be requi red to disclose the underlying facts or data upon cross-ex amination. Defense counsel chose not to cross-examine the witness concerning the w eighing instrument. Defendant primarily relie s upon State v. Sensing , 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992), which established certain minimal requirements relating

to the admissibility of the results

of a breath testing devic e. Sensing is distinguishable. Police officers
are not recognized as ex perts on blood a lcohol co ncentration or the manner in which certain instruments perform t hi s measur ement. The forensic scientist w ho determined the weight of this controlled su bstance was recognized as an expert witness. As such, her testimony is controlled by the law relating to expert witnesses. Certainly, defense counsel was free t o cross -examine the witness concerning the accuracy of the weighing inst rument. However, w e find no reason to extend S ensing to foren sic sci entists who tes

tify co ncernin g the w

eight o f a particular substance. This issue is without merit.4 BIAS OF THE INFORMANT

The defense called as a witn ess an officer who had wor ked with the informant. The defense endeavored to introduce a videotape of a transaction i n an unrelated case. Defendant contends that the tape shows the informant’s g irlfriend handling cocaine during a transaction. Defense counsel contends this is r elevant to show the bias of the i nf ormant toward the state in order to prevent the prosecution of his girlfriend for handling the cocaine. The trial court disallow ed the testimo ny. Certainl y, evidence of bias of a witness is relev

ant and admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 616; State v. Willia ms , 929 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn. C rim. App. 1996). However, no party may examine a witness upon i rrelevant matters. Tenn. R . Evid. 402. The prop riety, scope, manner and control of the ex amination of witnesses is
a matter within the disc retion of the trial court, s ubject t o appellate review on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Caughron , 855 S.W.2d 526, 540 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied

510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 475, 126 L.E d. 2d 426 (1993). We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in this i nstance. There was
no showing that the drugs allegedly handled by the girlfriend were not prope rly handed over to aut horities . Defend ant simp ly c onte nded she did not have the authority to handle the drugs, and her handling of the dr ugs would be a criminal offense. We fail to see how this test imony would have show n bias on the part of the informant. At most, the failure to admit such evidence was harmless error. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). This issue is without merit.

PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Prior to defendant’s testimony, the trial court ruled that the defendant could not be impeached by

a prior conviction for the sale of cocaine. During defendant’s direct examination, he was asked whether he deliv ered the cocaine to

the informant.5

He remarked, “I don’t do drugs; I don’t sell drugs.” Defendan t fu rther stated on three other occasions that he did not sell drugs. The prosecuting attorney secured permission of the trial court at a bench c onference to ask about the prior conv iction in light of this testimony. The trial cour t found that the defendant “made a blanket statement that he doesn’t sell drug s” and opened the door for admission of the prior drug co nvic tion. Upon cross-exami nation, the prosecuting attor ney asked the defendant about the prior drug conv iction. We conclude that

the defendant’s testimony opened the door to the state’s cross-examinationabout the previous drug con v iction. See State v. Bray , 669 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 1983) . In fact, the defendant stated on four separate occasions that he did not sell drugs. This clearly left the impli cation that he had never been involv ed in the sale of drugs. The state had a right t o challenge the implication left with the jury. The trial court did not abuse its dis cretion in allowing the introd uction of this evidence. This issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court i s affirmed.

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE6

CONCUR:

GARY R. WA

DE, JUDGE

DAVID G. HA

YES, JUDGE